Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00644/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00644-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

State of Arizona, et al., 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

International Boundary and Water 

Commission, United States Section, et al., 

 Defendants and Third- Party Plaintiffs, 

v. 

City of Nogales, Arizona, 

 Third-Party Defendant. 

No. CV-12-00644-TUC-FRZ (DTF) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff State of Arizona’s Partial Motion for 

Summary Judgment: Liability for Counts 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, with accompanying 

statement of facts. (Docs. 45, 46.) Defendant International Boundary and Water 

Commission, United States Section (USIBWC), responded to the motion and statement 

of facts. (Docs. 56, 57.) Plaintiff replied and submitted a supplemental statement of facts, 

to which USIBWC replied, and Third-Party Defendant City of Nogales submitted an 

Objection to USIBWC’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts. (Docs. 60-64.) 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice in this Court, the matter was assigned to Magistrate 

Judge Ferraro for a report and recommendation. Magistrate Judge Ferraro heard oral 

argument on June 8, 2015, after which he took the matter under advisement. The 

Magistrate recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the record, 

Case 4:12-cv-00644-FRZ-DTF Document 68 Filed 06/18/15 Page 1 of 14
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

enter an order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 

judgment. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND LAW 

 The Clean Water Act 

 The Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., was passed in 1972 “to 

restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 

waters.” Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 52 

(1987) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)). To achieve this objective: 

[section] 301(a) of the [CWA] makes unlawful the discharge of any pollutant into navigable waters except as authorized by specified sections of 

the [CWA]. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 

One of these specified sections is § 402 which establishes the National 

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). 33 U.S.C. § 1342. 

Pursuant to § 402(a), the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) may issue permits authorizing the discharge of pollutants in accordance with specified conditions. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a). 

Id. Pursuant to § 402(b) of the CWA, each State may create its own permit program that 

conforms to federal guidelines, if it is approved by the EPA. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 52 

(citing 33 U.S.C. §1342(b)). The State of Arizona has established a federally approved 

state NPDES program (AZPDES permit program) which is administered by the Arizona 

Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ). Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 49-203(A)(2), 49-

255.01; Ariz. Admin. Code § R18-9-A901 et seq. 

 A permittee is legally bound to meet the specific effluent limitations, conditions, 

and other standards established by its NPDES permit. Hawaii’s Thousand Friends v. City 

and Cnty of Honolulu, 821 F. Supp. 1368, 1391 (D. Haw. 1993) (citing Sierra Club v. 

Union Oil Co. of Cal., 813 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 

485 U.S. 931 (1988), judgment reinstated, 853 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1988)). The CWA and 

Arizona impose strict liability for violations of NPDES permits. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 49-

261; 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(a)(2). ADEQ may issue an order requiring compliance if it 

determines a person is in violation of a discharge limitation or other permit condition. 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 49-261(A). The director may bring an enforcement action for a 

Case 4:12-cv-00644-FRZ-DTF Document 68 Filed 06/18/15 Page 2 of 14
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

compliance order or a violation of an NPDES permit. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 49-261(E), 49-

262. 

USIBWC’s AZDPES Permit 

 The Nogales International Wastewater Treatment Plant (NIWTP) is located in Rio 

Rico, Arizona and treats wastewater from Santa Cruz County, Arizona and Nogales, 

Sonora, Mexico. (Doc. 46, Ex. 5 at 1.) Wastewater from Nogales, Sonora travels from the 

border to the NIWTP through a pipeline known as the International Outfall Interceptor 

(IOI). (Doc. 23, ¶ 20; Doc. 24, ¶ 20.) In 2006, USIBWC and the City of Nogales applied 

for the AZPDES permit for the NIWTP that is at issue in this case. (Doc. 23, ¶ 24; Doc. 

24, ¶ 24.) The permit was issued effective December 24, 2007 (2007 Permit), and 

allowed the discharge of treated wastewater from the NIWTP into a tributary of the Santa 

Cruz River. (Doc. 46, Ex. 5.) On October 22, 2010, ADEQ issued a Compliance Order to 

USIBWC setting forth numerous violations of the 2007 Permit and ordering USIBWC to 

take specific actions in response. (Doc. 23, Ex. A.) Upon application, ADEQ issued a 

new permit to USIBWC and the City of Nogales for the NIWTP, effective March 31, 

2014 (2014 Permit). (Doc. 46, Ex. 6.) 

DISCUSSION 

 The Amended Complaint contains nine claims. (Doc. 23.) The Court has granted a 

motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Claims 1, 3, and 4. (Doc. 35.) Plaintiff now 

seeks summary judgment as to liability on the remaining allegations, Claims 2 and 5-9. 

 Summary Judgment Standard 

 In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 

motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Eisenberg v. Ins. 

Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987). Summary judgment is appropriate if 

the pleadings and supporting documents “show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Material facts are those 

Case 4:12-cv-00644-FRZ-DTF Document 68 Filed 06/18/15 Page 3 of 14
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

“that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 248. A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

Claim 2 

 Plaintiff alleges USIBWC failed to comply with the October 22, 2010 Compliance 

Order, Section III.B, which requires “[w]ithin sixty (60) calendar days after the effective 

date of this Order, USIBWC shall submit a written report to ADEQ identifying all 

sources of cadmium in the influent of the NIWTP.” (Doc. 23, Ex. A at 9.) In response to 

Claim 2, “USIBWC admits that it has not provided a written report or information 

identifying all of the sources of cadmium influent to NIWTP.” (Doc. 24, ¶ 51.) 

 USIBWC argues that the 2007 Permit does not require it to identify the sources of 

cadmium in Mexico, nor does it have the legal authority or practical ability to do so. 

First, the Court looks at the language of the permit. The Compliance Order recites 

violations regarding excessive cadmium in the effluent and the biosolids of the NIWTP. 

(Doc. 23, Ex. A at 2, 8.) Section III.I.2.c.ii of the permit provides that if a pollutant 

concentration in the plant’s biosolids exceeds the ceiling concentration, the permittees 

must “[i]dentify the source of the pollutants and take appropriate source control 

measures.” (Doc. 46, Ex. 5 at 22.) Thus, the permit does provide for the identification of 

sources as required by the Compliance Order. Next, the Court evaluates USIBWC’s 

contention that is practically and legally unable to comply with this requirement. 

USIBWC cites no legal authority for its “impossibility” defense. Because the CWA is a 

strict liability statute, a permittee’s lack of fault does not absolve it from liability. See 

Hawaii’s Thousand Friends, 821 F. Supp. at 1392. 

 USIBWC also argues this claim is moot. The Court agrees that there is no 

effective relief the Court can grant for this violation of the Compliance Order, although 

for reasons different than those asserted by USIBWC.1

 See Northwest Envir. Defense 

 

1

 The Court does not reach USIBWC’s argument of mootness premised on issuance of the 2014 Permit (which is addressed in the discussion of Claim 5). 

Case 4:12-cv-00644-FRZ-DTF Document 68 Filed 06/18/15 Page 4 of 14
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Center v. Gordon, 849 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988). This claim is premised on 

USIBWC’s failure to file a report in 2010 regarding sources of cadmium. A logical 

remedy would be money damages for not submitting the required report. However, the 

United States has not waived its sovereign immunity as to fines for past violations of the 

CWA; injunctive relief is the only available remedy. See U.S. Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 

503 U.S. 607, 613-29 (1992). Plaintiff does not identify any effective injunctive relief for 

failure to file a report due five years ago. Nor does Plaintiff allege that USIBWC has 

violated the cadmium levels since 2011, such that identifying cadmium sources would be 

meaningful at this time. Additionally, the permit requirement for USIBWC to identify the 

source of industrial pollutants in biosolids is not currently applicable in light of the 

USIBWC’s disposal of biosolids in a landfill. See discussion infra Claims 6 and 7. 

 USIBWC has been found liable for exceeding the cadmium limits in its discharge 

from 2008 through 2011, as alleged in Claim 1, and the determination of a remedy for 

those violations remains pending before the Court. There is, however, no behavior to 

enjoin with respect to Claim 2. 

Claim 5 

 Plaintiff alleges USIBWC failed to implement a pretreatment program in violation 

of the 2007 Permit, section V.A, and the Compliance Order, section III.C. Specifically, 

Plaintiff alleges that USIBWC was required under the 2007 Permit to take certain actions 

and failed to do so, including: “develop as necessary and implement mass influent 

objectives for pollutants” (section V.A.1.b.i); prepare and provide to ADEQ a report 

“comparing the Mexican and U.S. influent quality to the influent objectives . . . . The 

report shall characterize the frequency and magnitude of any exceedances of the influent 

objectives” (section V.A.1.d); and “undertake appropriate action under U.S. law and 

applicable international agreements to arrive at cooperative United States-Mexico 

agreements to facilitate actions in Mexico that will seek to eliminate exceedances of the 

influent objectives before the end of this permit’s five-year term” (section V.A.1.e.iii). 

(Doc. 23 at 12-13, citing Doc. 46, Ex. 5 at 32-35.) Plaintiff also alleges USIBWC failed 

Case 4:12-cv-00644-FRZ-DTF Document 68 Filed 06/18/15 Page 5 of 14
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

to fulfill the Compliance Order requirement to submit a written description of the actions 

it would undertake to complete international agreements to facilitate actions in Mexico 

seeking to eliminate the exceedances. (Doc. 23 at 12, citing Doc. 23, Ex. A at 9.)

 In its Answer, USIBWC did not deny Plaintiff’s allegations that USIBWC violated 

each of these four requirements. Rather, it stated, in entirety: 

USIBWC denies that it was required to comply with the pretreatment program requirements in the Compliance Order because the relevant 

sources are located in Mexico, and USIBWC has no authority to regulate Mexican sources. Arizona has been informed of USIBWC’s efforts to 

address the issue by working with Mexican authorities. 

(Doc. 23, ¶ 85; Doc. 24, ¶ 85.) 

 Turning first to permit sections V.A.1.b.i and V.A.1.d, and section III.C of the 

Compliance Order. Because USIBWC does not deny in its Answer that it violated the 

2007 Permit requirements regarding objectives and preparation of influent reports, the 

Court treats those facts as admitted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6); see Fontes v. Porter, 156 

F.2d 956, 957 (9th Cir. 1947). USIBWC admits that it did not submit the statement 

required by section III.C of the Compliance Order. Neither in its response on the motion 

for summary judgment (see Doc. 56) nor at oral argument did USIBWC dispute 

Plaintiff’s facts or arguments on these portions of Claim 5. 

 As to permit section V.A.1.e.iii, USIBWC does not deny in its Answer that it 

failed to take the required actions to eliminate exceedances as Plaintiff alleges in the 

Amended Complaint. (Doc. 23, ¶ 85; Doc. 24, ¶ 85.) Thus, the Court treats that fact as 

admitted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6); see Fontes, 156 F.2d at 957. In its motion for summary 

judgment, Plaintiff cites Rule 8 and argues that because USIBWC does not deny this 

allegation from the complaint it is admitted; therefore, there is no genuine issue of fact as 

to this part of Claim 5. (Doc. 45 at 9-10.) In its response to the motion for summary 

judgment, USIBWC does not dispute this point. (Doc. 56 at 7-12.) Rather, in implicit 

contradiction of its admission, it argues that it has complied with this portion of the 

permit by working “cooperatively with its Mexican counterparts to control the level of 

metals in the influent to the NIWTP.” (Doc. 56 at 8-9.) 

Case 4:12-cv-00644-FRZ-DTF Document 68 Filed 06/18/15 Page 6 of 14
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Although USIBWC’s lack of denial as to the facts underlying Claim 5 is explicitly 

raised by Plaintiff in the motion for summary judgment, counsel representing USIBWC 

does not respond to that argument or seek to amend the Answer. Instead, USIBWC 

presents several documents to support its argument that it complied with this section of 

the permit.2

 These documents do not create a genuine issue of fact in light of USIBWC’s 

admission that it violated section V.A.1.e.iii of the 2007 Permit. 

 In sum, USIBWC admits the four allegations of Claim 5 and the Court finds it 

violated the 2007 Permit, sections V.A.1.b.i, V.A.1.d, V.A.1.e.iii, and the Compliance 

Order, section III.C. 

 USIBWC argues that summary judgment should be denied because Claim 5 is 

moot. USIBWC relies upon the case of West Coast Seafood Processor Ass’n v. Natural 

Res. Def. Council, 643 F.3d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Outdoor Media Grp., Inc. 

v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2007)), for its holding that an action “is 

moot if there exists no ‘present controversy as to which effective relief can be granted.’” 

Here, the question is whether there is effective injunctive relief available because that is 

the only remedy at issue. U.S. Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. at 613-29. 

 USIBWC argues no injunctive relief is available on Claim 5 due to the issuance of 

the 2014 Permit. More specifically, USIBWC contends that an NPDES permit must 

include the provisions necessary to comply with the CWA, and compliance with the 

permit constitutes compliance with the CWA. Plaintiff does not dispute that full 

compliance with the 2014 Permit would constitute compliance with the CWA. However, 

Plaintiff cites numerous remedies the Court could impose, including: requiring USIBWC 

to control the industrial pollutants in the influent; directing USIBWC to install additional 

treatment at the NIWTP to ensure the effluent’s limits are met; and ordering USIBWC to 

 

2

 USIBWC cites the following evidentiary support: a sample invitation and agenda for a January 2015 meeting between the United States and Mexican sections of 

IBWC (to which ADEQ was invited); a November 2014 IBWC memorandum with a 3rd 

quarter pretreatment report including exceedances; quarterly pretreatment reports for 2008-11, including exceedances; and an ADEQ report acknowledging bi-national monitoring efforts to identify cadmium dischargers in Sonora. (Doc. 56, Exs. 12-16.) 

Case 4:12-cv-00644-FRZ-DTF Document 68 Filed 06/18/15 Page 7 of 14
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

stop accepting wastewater from Mexico unless it complies with the permit. USIBWC 

responds that if the remedies suggested by Plaintiff were necessary to comply with the 

CWA, they could have been included in the 2014 Permit. 

 There are several flaws in USIBWC’s mootness argument. First, USIBWC 

historically has not fully complied with its permit and Plaintiff cites evidence that 

USIBWC is not in full compliance with the 2014 Permit. (Doc. 62, ¶¶ 1-3 & Exs. A-C 

(reports of effluent exceedances of nickel for January, February, and April 2015).) 

USIBWC does not dispute that it reported exceedances of the effluent limit for nickel 

during those months. (Doc. 63, ¶¶ 1-3.) Thus, the fact that full compliance with a permit 

would satisfy the CWA is irrelevant because the requirements of the permit alone are not 

inducing USIBWC to comply. Second, although Plaintiff could have included additional 

requirements in the 2014 Permit, such as a compliance schedule, it did not do so. 

Therefore, additional remedies remain available to induce USIBWC to comply with the 

permit requirements. 

 Third, accepting USIBWC’s argument would moot all claims for injunctive relief 

based on violation of an NPDES Permit, if the permit was renewed during the course of 

the litigation. The remedy would always be subsumed in a subsequent permit, which is 

not the law. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Sw. Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985, 992 & n.2 

(9th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that defendant was operating under a new permit that was 

essentially the same and upholding injunctive relief). In the above-cited case, the Ninth 

Circuit explicitly rejects an argument that injunctive relief is limited to ordering 

compliance with existing requirements and determines an equitable remedy is limited 

only to the extent it must be “reasonably calculated to ‘remedy an established wrong.’” 

Id. at 1000 (quoting Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 

1994)). USIBWC asserts that this case is unique because the 2014 Permit, section V.A, 

contains detailed new steps that USIBWC must take to address exceedances of the permit 

limits. (Doc. 46, Ex. 6 at 39.) The new requirements in the 2014 Permit serve the same 

purpose as the sections of the 2007 Permit that Plaintiff relies upon in Claim 5 of the 

Case 4:12-cv-00644-FRZ-DTF Document 68 Filed 06/18/15 Page 8 of 14
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Amended Complaint. The new 2014 Permit provisions are procedural requirements 

designed to increase USIBWC’s compliance with the influent standards for industrial 

pollutants, which have been carried over from the 2007 to the 2014 Permit. (Compare

Doc. 46, Ex. 5 at 32 (2007 Permit, section V.A.1.b.i, setting limitations for 7 pollutants) 

with Doc. 46, Ex. 6 at 41 (2014 Permit, section V.B.1.a, setting limitations for the same 7 

pollutants and 5 additional ones).) Because the 2014 Permit objectives regarding 

industrial pollutants in the NIWTP’s influent remain substantially the same, USIBWC’s 

argument – that this case is excepted from the general rule that a new permit does not 

moot a case to enforce an NPDES permit – fails. Claim 5 is not moot. 

 Plaintiff has demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and is 

entitled to summary judgment on Claim 5. 

Claims 6 and 7 

 Claims 6 and 7 arise out of the 2007 Permit provisions regarding biosolids. The 

facts underlying these claims are essentially undisputed. 

 In Claim 6, Plaintiff alleges USIBWC failed to adequately sample and monitor 

biosolids to ensure they did not exceed pollutant ceiling concentrations, in violation of 

the 2007 Permit, section III. The 2007 Permit prohibits selling, giving away, depositing 

on the ground or land application of biosolids if the pollutant concentration for cadmium 

exceeds the ceiling concentration limits in the Permits. (Doc. 46, Ex. 5 at 21-22.) Based 

on sampling records, USIBWC generated biosolids exceeding the ceiling concentration 

on May 11, August 4, October 9, and December 7, 2009; and February 17, April 9, June 

3, and August 5, 2010. (Doc. 23, ¶ 95; Doc. 24, ¶ 95.) USIBWC reported that it had land 

applied biosolids off-site with cadmium levels exceeding the ceiling concentration of 85 

mg/kg. (Doc. 23, ¶ 96; Doc. 24, ¶ 96.) Therefore, Plaintiff has established that USIBWC 

violated the 2007 Permit by land application of biosolids that exceeded the ceiling 

concentration limit for cadmium, as alleged in Claim 6. 

 In Claim 7, Plaintiff alleges USIBWC failed to identify sources of cadmium in the 

biosolids and take appropriate source control measures, in violation of the 2007 Permit, 

Case 4:12-cv-00644-FRZ-DTF Document 68 Filed 06/18/15 Page 9 of 14
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

section III.I.2.c.ii. In its motion response and at the hearing, USIBWC does not dispute 

Plaintiff’s factual allegations with respect to Claim 7. Plaintiff cites two documents, 

written by USIBWC representatives, in which USIBWC states that it cannot identify the 

cadmium sources or take source control measures. (Doc. 46, Exs. 11 at 1, 12 at 1.) 

 USIBWC contends these claims are moot because it is not currently land applying 

biosolids and cannot do so under the current permit without approval. The violations 

alleged in Claims 6 and 7 arise out of permit requirements that apply only if USIBWC is 

land applying biosolids. There is no dispute that USIBWC ceased land application of 

biosolids in August 2010. (Doc. 56, Ex. 10.) Under the 2014 Permit, section III.A, all 

biosolids from the NIWTP must be disposed of in a landfill unless ADEQ and EPA 

approve an alternate plan. (Doc. 46, Ex. 6 at 21.) Thus, Plaintiff retains control over 

whether USIBWC can return to land applying the biosolids from the NIWTP. 

 A claim is moot if a court cannot grant any effective relief. Gordon, 849 F.2d at 

1245. Arizona seeks only injunctive relief and prospective fines designed to induce 

compliance with an injunction. See U.S. Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. at 614, 629. 

Because USIBWC is not land applying biosolids and cannot do so without permission 

from Plaintiff, it has no obligation to identify the pollutant sources and take control 

measures. Therefore, these claims are moot. This was confirmed at oral argument when 

Plaintiff’s counsel was unable to identify any injunctive relief the Court could grant in 

relation to the biosolids violations. Plaintiff’s request for summary judgment as to Claims 

6 and 7 should be denied. 

Claim 8 

 Plaintiff alleges that, as to the permit violations alleged in the Amended 

Complaint, USIBWC failed to comply with the written reporting requirements of the 

2007 Permit, sections II.C and III.k.1.b.3

 ADEQ does not have in its files any written 

 

3

 The Amended Complaint refers to USIBWC’s alleged failures to report, without specifying the relevant subsections of the 2007 Permit. (Doc. 23 at 15-16.) At 

oral argument, Plaintiff clarified that it was seeking summary judgment only as to the written (not oral) notification sections of the permit. 

Case 4:12-cv-00644-FRZ-DTF Document 68 Filed 06/18/15 Page 10 of 14
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

notifications from USIBWC of permit violations as alleged in the Amended Complaint. 

(Doc. 46, Ex. 13 at 5-6.) 

 Section II.C of the 2007 Permit provides that permittees shall report 

noncompliance with a permit condition that “may endanger the environment or human 

health.” (Doc. 46, Ex. 5 at 17-18.) It must be reported in writing within 5 days of the 

event. (Id.) Plaintiff’s motion fails to acknowledge that reporting is required only for 

events that endanger health or the environment. To the extent Plaintiff suggests that all 

permit noncompliance must be reported, that argument is not compelling. That would 

render superfluous the language that requires reporting only violations that “endanger the 

environment or human health.” Further, in the section covering biosolids, the permit 

acknowledges a distinction by creating different reporting requirements for those 

incidents of noncompliance that endanger health or the environment and “other” 

noncompliance. See 2007 Permit, section III.K.1 (Doc. 46, Ex. 5 at 25). At oral argument, 

Plaintiff asserted that industrial pollutants such as those at issue in this case necessarily 

impact public health and the environment, therefore, any amount over a limit is a threat. 

Again, this is not supported by the permit, which sets a maximum amount allowed of 

each pollutant. (Doc. 46, Ex. 5 at 4-5, 21, 32.) The allowed amounts are not zero (see id.), 

as they necessarily would be under Plaintiff’s argument. To establish a violation of the 

plain language of section II.C, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the permit violations 

alleged in the Amended Complaint endangered the environment or human health. 

 There is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether any of the 

noncompliance events were a danger to the environment or human health. Plaintiff cites 

general information indicating that industrial pollutants, including cadmium, cyanide, and 

ammonia nitrogen are regulated because they are a threat to human health and the 

environment. Plaintiff did not cite the particular violations or the level of exceedance and 

prove that each one was endangering. Therefore, there remains a factual question as to 

whether USIBWC was required to report, under section II.C, any of the permit violations 

alleged in the Amended Complaint. 

Case 4:12-cv-00644-FRZ-DTF Document 68 Filed 06/18/15 Page 11 of 14
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Section III.K.1.b of the 2007 Permit requires that any noncompliance with a 

biosolids provision should be reported to ADEQ in writing within 5 days of the permittee 

“becoming aware of the circumstances.” (Doc. 46, Ex. 5 at 25.) Plaintiff presents no 

evidence as to when USIBWC became aware of its violations of the biosolids section of 

the permit. USIBWC submitted an August 4, 2010 email, from USIBWC to two 

individuals at ADEQ, reporting that it had “just received word” that the cadmium levels 

in its biosolids were five times the limit.4

 (Doc. 56, Exs. 8, 9.) USIBWC asserts that this 

report was essentially contemporaneous with its knowledge because it previously had 

been relying upon erroneous lab reports. USIBWC’s cited evidence, without further 

explanation, does not establish those facts. (See Doc. 56 at 13, Exs. 8, 9, 27-29.) 

However, there remains a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff has not established that 

USIBWC knew of a biosolids violation for more than five days before providing notice. 

 Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on Count 8. 

Count 9

 Plaintiff alleges that USIBWC illegally discharged from the IOI in violation of 

A.R.S. § 49-255.01. Section 49-255.01(A) prohibits any discharge of pollutants without a 

permit. The IOI has deteriorated over time and has developed cracks and structural 

problems that allow discharge of sewage and other related wastewater. During storm 

events, storm water flowing through the Nogales Wash intermingles with untreated 

wastewater that escapes from the IOI and discharges into the wash. (Doc. 23, ¶ 111-12; 

Doc. 24, ¶ 111-12.) 

 The parties are in agreement that an owner or operator of a point source that 

discharges pollutants into a navigable water is liable. See Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold 

Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1145 (10th Cir. 2005). They disagree as to whether the 

USIBWC is an operator of the IOI, and the submitted documents do not provide a 

 

4

 Plaintiff contends this email was sent to the wrong person at ADEQ, but the 2007 Permit states only that ADEQ should be notified, not a specific person. See 2007 

Permit, section III.K.1.b (Doc. 46, Ex. 5 at 25). The requirement that the report be made to the ADEQ Biosolids Coordinator is a new provision in the 2014 Permit. (Compare id., with Doc. 46, Ex. 6 at 28.) 

Case 4:12-cv-00644-FRZ-DTF Document 68 Filed 06/18/15 Page 12 of 14
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

definitive answer. A 1968 contract between the City of Nogales and the United States 

provided that the City of Nogales would pay 22% of the costs to construct the current 

NIWTP and the IOI, and would have an “undivided interest in the improvements 

corresponding to the financial contribution to their construction costs.” (Doc. 56, Ex. 5, 

¶¶ 2, 6.) It also provided, however, that the city would assume operation and maintenance 

of the plant and IOI. (Id., ¶ 6.) As of 1996, USIBWC became the sole operator of the 

NIWTP, and the IOI is integral to the NIWTP serving its purpose of treating wastewater 

from Nogales, Sonora. (See Doc. 56-1, Ex. 3 at 1 (memorandum of agreement in which 

USIBWC agrees to operate and maintain the NIWTP, “a portion of which is constructed 

upon lands title to which vests in the City and a portion thereof consisting of a main trunk 

pipe line in Nogales, Sonora, Mexico”).) Additionally, USIBWC has repeatedly provided 

funding to repair the IOI. (Doc. 62, Ex. E.) In four documents, dated from 2000 to 2014, 

the City of Nogales affirmed that it owns and operates the IOI. (Doc. 56, Exs. 23-26.) 

The Court’s review of all the evidence presented reveals a genuine issue of fact regarding 

whether USIBWC is an owner or operator of the IOI, which precludes summary 

judgment on this claim. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court 

GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Claim 5, and DENY

Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Claims 2, 6, and 7 because they 

are moot, and Claims 8 and 9 because there is a genuine issue of material fact. (Doc. 45.) 

Case 4:12-cv-00644-FRZ-DTF Document 68 Filed 06/18/15 Page 13 of 14
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party=s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district 

court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

 Dated this 18th day of June, 2015. 

Case 4:12-cv-00644-FRZ-DTF Document 68 Filed 06/18/15 Page 14 of 14