Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02608/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02608-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Edward Szabo, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 10-2608-PHX-GMS (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Pending before the court is a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Petitioner John Edward Szabo. Doc. 1. Also pending are

Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance of Petition, and a Motion for Expansion of the

Record. Doc. 3, 10. 

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pled guilty in Pinal County Superior Court

on May 4, 2004, to two counts of attempted sexual conduct with a minor, class three felonies

and dangerous crimes against children under Arizona law. Doc. 9, Exh. A at 11-13. On

November 22, 2004, following a jury trial on the issue of aggravating factors, Petitioner was

sentenced to two consecutive aggravated terms of 15 years in prison, for a total of 30 years.

Doc. 9, Exh. B at 21.

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1

 The petition was actually filed in the state trial court on December 20, 2004, but

under the prison mailbox rule the petition is deemed filed on the date it is delivered to prison

authorities for mailing. See Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).

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On December 3, 2004, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief under Rule

32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.1

 Doc. 9, Exh. C. On September 12, 2005,

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief in which he raised

eight claims for relief. Doc. 9, Exh. D. In a minute entry dated November 28, 2005, the trial

court denied relief on all claims except one. Doc. 9, Exh. E. The court granted relief on

Petitioner’s claim that he was not sentenced in accordance with the laws in place at the time

of the offenses. Id. As a result, a nunc pro tunc “Re-Sentencing” order was filed on

December 22, 2005, in which the court ordered that Petitioner would not be eligible for

release until he served at least half of the sentence imposed. Doc. 9, Exh. F. The previous

sentencing order required Petitioner to serve 85% of the sentence imposed. Id. Also in the

re-sentencing order, the court granted Petitioner 30 days to petition the Arizona Court of

Appeals for review of the post-conviction relief decision. Id. On January 9, 2006, Petitioner

filed a request that videotapes used against him at the aggravating factors trial be transcribed

and that the deadline for a petition for review be extended to 30 days from the filing date of

the transcript. Doc. 12, Exh. 1. On January 19, 2006, the trial court granted Petitioner’s

request, ordered the videotapes to be released to defense counsel to be transcribed, and

extended the deadline for a petition for review to “30 days from the filing of the transcript.”

Doc. 12, Exh. 2. Petitioner’s counsel filed a notice on April 21, 2006, in which he

acknowledged receipt of the videotapes. Doc. 12, Exh.3.

More than a year after the notice was filed, Petitioner learned that his attorney had left

the Pinal County Public Defender’s Office in March 2007, with no notice to Petitioner or the

court. Doc. 12, Exh. 4, 11. Petitioner’s subsequent requests to the Public Defender’s Office

regarding his representation and the status of the transcripts went unanswered until he finally

received a letter on January 22, 2008, in which the Pinal County Public Defender wrote that

representation on his case ceased when the petition for post-conviction relief was denied.

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Doc. 12, Exh. 6, Doc. 9, Exh. G (attachment). Petitioner then sought relief in the trial court.

The court issued an order on October 28, 2008, stating that Petitioner’s counsel and

Petitioner were dilatory in notifying the court about the failure to transcribe the videotapes

and in seeking an additional extension for the petition for review. Doc. 12, Exh. 7. The

court then appointed new counsel and authorized a new petition for post-conviction relief

seeking a delayed right to file a petition for review. Id. 

Petitioner, through new counsel, filed a Supplemental Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief on October 8, 2009. Doc. 9, Exh. G. Petitioner first alleged ineffective assistance of

counsel and requested permission to file a delayed petition for review regarding his previous

petition for post-conviction relief. Id. Additionally, Petitioner raised a claim that an

improper aggravating factor was allowed to go to the jury. Id. On December 9, 2009, the

trial court found that Petitioner presented no colorable claim to warrant relief on the prior

post conviction decision. Doc. 9, Exh. H. The court further found that the failure to file a

timely petition for review was not Petitioner’s fault and the court granted him the right to file

a delayed petition for review by February 1, 2010. Id. 

Through counsel, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on February 1, 2010. Doc. 9,

Exh. I. Petitioner raised four claims in the petition for review, all of which had been raised

in the original petition for post-conviction relief. Id. In a Memorandum Decision filed on

April 29, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied review. Doc. 9, Exh. J. In finding the

petition for review untimely, the Court of Appeals explained:

In his petition for review, Szabo does not address any issues ruled upon

in the trial court’s December 22, 2005, order. Rather, he asks this court to

review the court’s denial of relief on most of his claims in its November 28,

2005, order. But the trial court only granted Szabo leave to file a delayed

petition for review of the December 22, 2005, ruling, not the ruling of

November 28. Consequently, his petition for review of issues the court had

ruled upon on November 28, 2005, is untimely and we deny review. See Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 32.9(c) (petition for review shall be filed with appellate court no

more than thirty days after final decision of trial court on petition for postconviction relief).

Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. Doc. 1 at 5.

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On December 2, 2010, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

court. Doc. 1. Petitioner alleges four grounds for relief. Petitioner alleges in ground one

that the trial court violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by

allowing the prosecution to file an untimely notice of aggravating factors. In ground two,

Petitioner alleges that the trial court knowingly admitted false prior bad act and character

evidence during the aggravating factors trial, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments. In ground three, Petitioner alleges that the prosecution improperly commented

to the jury about Petitioner’s silence during the trial, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments. Lastly, in ground four, Petitioner alleges that his sentence was

enhanced based on factors not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of the Fifth,

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. On the same day he filed his habeas petition, Petitioner

also filed a Motion for a Stay and Abeyance. Doc. 3. District Judge Snow screened the

petition and directed Respondents to file an answer to the petition and response to the motion

for a stay. Doc. 5. On February 14, 2011, Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus and Response to Request for Stay and Abeyance. Doc. 9. On March 16,

2011, Petitioner filed a Reply to Respondents’ Answer to Motion for a Stay and Abeyance

and a Reply to Respondents’ Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Doc. 11, 12.

Also on March 16, 2011, Petitioner filed a Motion for the Expansion of the Record.

Doc. 10. No response to that motion has been filed. 

DISCUSSION

Respondents contend that the habeas petition should be dismissed because it was not

filed within the statute of limitations period. Petitioner argues in his reply that sufficient time

was tolled such that his petition was timely filed. The court finds that based on the

information presented, the habeas petition was filed after the limitations period expired. The

court will therefore recommend that it be denied on that basis. Because the court finds the

petition is barred by the statute of limitations, it need not address Respondents’ procedural

default defense.

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A. Legal Standards

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 

An "of-right" petition for post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, which is available to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of "direct

review" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d

710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the judgment of conviction becomes final upon the

conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding or upon the

expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review. See id.

Additionally, "[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward" the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also

Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A post-conviction petition is "clearly

pending after it is filed with a state court, but before that court grants or denies the petition."

Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). In Arizona, post-conviction review

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Because an “of-right” petition for post-conviction relief is a form of direct review

under AEDPA’s statute of limitations, the statutory tolling provision at § 2244(d)(2) is

inapplicable to Petitioner’s “of-right” petition. See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d at 717

(applying direct review rules rather than collateral review tolling rules to calculate limitations

period for an “of-right” petition for post-conviction relief).

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is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed even though the petition is not filed

until later. Isley v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004).

B. Application

Petitioner was sentenced under the plea agreement on November 22, 2004. Petitioner

filed a timely “of-right” petition for post-conviction relief on December 3, 2004.2

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November 28, 2005, the trial court denied all but one claim in the petition for post-conviction

relief. According to the Arizona Court of Appeals in their Memorandum Decision, Petitioner

then had 30 days from that date to seek review, which he did not do. Although Petitioner

eventually filed a petition for review on February 1, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals

found it to be untimely. Accordingly, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1)(A), Petitioner’s

conviction became final upon the expiration of the 30-day period to seek review, which was

December 29, 2005. The limitations period therefore began to run the following day on

December 30, 2005. It ran uninterrupted until it expired one year later on December 30,

2006. Petitioner did not file his habeas petition in this court until December 2, 2010, nearly

four years after the limitations period expired. The habeas petition is therefore untimely.

Petitioner argues in his reply that the Arizona Court of Appeals got it wrong. He

contends that the trial court’s order granting him leave to file the untimely petition for review

did not limit the issues he could raise and necessarily included permission to raise issues that

were denied in the November 28, 2005, ruling, contrary to the Court of Appeals’

interpretation of the order. 

Whether the Court of Appeals’ ruling was wrong is not for this court to decide.

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for errors of state law. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497

U.S. 764, 780 (1990). It is not the policy of the federal courts to re-examine state court

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determinations of state law questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).

Federal courts are without jurisdiction to review State court applications of state procedural

rules. Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1998). Applying an Arizona procedural

rule regarding the time to file a petition for review, the Court of Appeals concluded the

petition for review was untimely. This court is without authority to decide otherwise.

Moreover, if Petitioner believed the Court of Appeals’ decision was wrong, his

remedy was to seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. Any remaining confusion about

the trial court’s orders, and whether the Court of Appeals interpreted them correctly, could

have been resolved by the Arizona Supreme Court. Petitioner failed to seek review in that

court and thus is stuck with the Court of Appeals’ decision as the final say on the state law

timeliness issue.

C. Equitable Tolling

The statute of limitations under AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate

cases. Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). However, for equitable tolling to

apply, a petitioner must show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that

some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” and prevented him from filing a timely

petition. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S, 408, 418 (2005). As a general

rule, equitable tolling is not available in most cases and may be applied only when

"extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition

on time." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Petitioner claims in his reply that he is entitled to equitable tolling. Doc. 12 at 9-16.

He argues that several factors support the application of equitable tolling here, including the

trial court’s order extending the time to file a petition for review until the transcripts were

filed; the failures of his court-appointed counsel; the trial court’s acknowledgment that the

failure to file a timely petition for review was not his fault; and what Petitioner contends was

an erroneous decision by the Court of Appeals. While these factors may have contributed

to numerous misunderstandings and delays in the state court proceedings, none of them were

so extraordinary as to prevent Petitioner from filing a timely habeas petition. Instead of

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waiting for years to exhaust his state court remedies, Petitioner could have filed a timely

“protective” habeas petition in federal court and asked that the matter be stayed and held in

abeyance pending the exhaustion issue. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 416-17 (recommending that

a prisoner file a “protective” habeas petition to avoid the predicament of finding out years

too late that his habeas petition is time barred because of a state court procedural ruling).

Based on the circumstances presented, the court simply cannot say that extraordinary

circumstances stood in Petitioner’s way and prevented him from timely filing a habeas

petition in this court. The court therefore finds that equitable tolling is not applicable here.

D. Motion for Stay and Abeyance

In this motion, Petitioner asks that his claim in ground four be dismissed without

prejudice so he can return to the state court to exhaust his remedies there. He further requests

that his remaining claims be stayed and that his habeas petition be held in abeyance pending

exhaustion of his state court remedies. Because the court has determined that Petitioner’s

habeas petition is barred by the statute of limitations, further exhaustion of remedies in the

state court would be futile. The court will therefore recommend that the motion be denied.

E. Motion for Expansion of the Record

In this motion, Petitioner asks the court to order the production of a transcript of his

December 21, 2005, re-sentencing hearing in Pinal County Superior Court. Petitioner claims

that the Minute Entry of this hearing is an insufficient record and resulted in a

misinterpretation of what occurred at that hearing by the Arizona Court of Appeals. As the

court explained above, Petitioner’s remedy to challenge the Court of Appeals’ decision

regarding the timeliness of his petition for review was to seek further review in the Arizona

Supreme Court. This court must accept the Court of Appeals’ decision on this issue. As a

result, ordering the transcript to be produced would be futile. The court will therefore

recommend that the motion be denied.

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F. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Petitioner's habeas petition is barred by

the statute of limitations. The court will therefore recommend that the petition be dismissed

with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and

That Petitioner’s Motion for a Stay and Abeyance (Doc. 3) and Motion for the

Expansion of the Record (Doc. 10) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED: 

That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal

be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and

jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

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Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 31st day of August, 2011.

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