Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05983/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05983-27/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMOND J. MANZANILLO,

Plaintiff,

v.

GREGORY D. LEWIS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 12-cv-05983-JST 

AMENDED ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT1

Re: ECF Nos. 204, 206

Plaintiff Raymond Manzanillo, an inmate at Pelican Bay Prison, was stabbed by another 

inmate when a guard left his cell door open. Manzanillo alleges that the guard knew that an attack 

was likely and that he left the door open in retaliation for Manzanillo having filed a prior lawsuit 

concerning the prison. 

Defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing that (1) Defendant Brown, the 

guard who left Manzanillo’s door open, was not deliberately indifferent to the risk to Manzanillo’s 

safety; (2) the training Brown received was adequate, and that even if it was not, the remaining 

defendants were unaware of any deficiencies in that training; and (3) in any event, all defendants 

are entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 204, 206. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the motions. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

A. Manzanillo’s Prior Lawsuit

During the events giving rise to this lawsuit, Manzanillo was incarcerated at Pelican Bay 

 

1

This order has been amended to correct a few typographical errors. No substantive changes have 

been made. 

2 As it must, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to Manzanillo. Tolan v. Cotton, 

134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014).

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State Prison within the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). 

Manzanillo was housed in the Security Housing Unit (SHU).3 Inmates housed in the SHU have 

severe disciplinary issues, convictions for assaults committed in prison, or are validated gang 

members and associates. ECF No. 212-1 (“Lewis Depo.”) at 6-8; ECF No. 212-2 (“McGuyer 

Depo.”) at 3-4; ECF No. 212-8 (“Brown Depo.”) at 12; Vasquez Decl. ¶ 15. 

On August 10, 2010, Brown filed a civil rights action for excessive force against prison 

officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 13 at 5; see also ECF No. 213 ¶ 10 (“Manzanillo 

Decl.”). That action was pending when the events underlying this case occurred. ECF No. 13 at 

5. In his complaint, Manzanillo alleges that Pelican Bay staff permitted him to be assaulted by 

another inmate in retaliation for filing this lawsuit. See, e.g., ECF No. 13 at 2 (stating that 

Defendants “collaborat[ed] in a staging of a gladiator fight that resulted in Plaintiff being attacked 

and stabbed by another prisoner to retaliate against me for exercising protected conduct”). The 

presence or absence of such a motive by the guards is not at issue in the present motion. 

B. The Events of August 8, 2011

The events underlying the present case took place on August 8, 2011. Some time before 

10:35 a.m. that day, Defendant Naeem Brown, acting as the Control Booth Officer in 

Manzanillo’s pod of cells, let inmate George Blakeley out into the exercise yard. ECF No. 212-8 

(“Brown Depo.”) at 12. Blakeley was a member of the “Northern Structure Prison Gang,” a 

“Norteño” affiliated gang, while Manzanillo was an associate of the “Mexican Mafia,” or 

“Sureños” affiliated gang. Manzanillo Decl. ¶ 13. “It is common prison knowledge . . . that rival 

gang inmates in PBSP must be kept separate due to the rioting that occurs in the general 

population between Northern Hispanics and Southern Hispanics.” Id. at ¶ 15. At approximately 

10:35 a.m., while Blakeley was still in the yard, Brown released Manzanillo from his cell so he 

could speak to a law library officer at the front door of the pod about documents related to his 

excessive force lawsuit. Brown Depo. at 12; Manzanillo Decl. ¶¶ 10-12. While Manzanillo was 

speaking to the law library officer, Brown allowed Correctional Sergeant B. Grenert, his superior,

 

3 Manzanillo is now an inmate at Kern Valley State Prison. Manzanillo Decl. ¶ 2.

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into the control booth and began speaking to him. Brown Depo. at 12. Inmate Blakeley, from the 

yard, was watching “off and on” what was going on inside the pod. Brown Depo. at 14; see also

ECF No. 204-1 at 6. While Brown and Grenert were still speaking, Manzanillo and the law library 

officer finished their conversation. Brown Depo. at 12. Brown saw that Manzanillo turned away 

from the pod door and made eye contact with him as he was returning to his cell, but admits that 

he did not maintain constant visual observation of Manzanillo until he was back in his cell with 

the door secured, a violation of his post orders. Brown Depo. at 15; Manzanillo Decl. ¶¶ 21-23. It 

is undisputed that Manzanillo’s “cell door was not electronically secured by control booth officer 

defendant Brown.” ECF No. 13 at 7. 

It seems that while Brown was still conversing with Sergeant Grenert, Blakeley asked to 

re-enter the pod to return to his cell.4 Brown Depo. at 13. Brown looked into the pod to make 

sure that no inmates were outside of their cells. Id. Brown claims that he then “looked up at the 

[sic] inmate Manzanillo,” but that because Manzanillo’s cell “was kind of ‒ it was on the upper 

tier and it’s in the corner,” Brown “guess[es] [he] just didn’t really notice that his door was open.” 

Id. When Brown moved to allow Blakeley inside, Manzanillo alleges that he heard the “unit floor 

officer L. Simonsen state to Brown . . . ‘No I don’t want you [to].’” Manzanillo Decl. ¶ 22. 

“A couple of seconds later Brown open[ed] the exercise door allowing [Blakeley] out of 

the yard.” ECF No. 13 at 7; Brown Depo. at 13. Given what happened next, a reasonable jury 

could conclude that Blakeley was aware, when he entered the pod, that Manzanillo’s door was not 

closed. Manzanillo Decl. ¶ 26. Also, since inmates in the exercise yard “can hear when [cell 

doors] open and close because it’s pretty loud,” they are aware when a cell opens and closes and if 

a cell door is open or closed. Brown Depo. at 14. Instead of returning to his own cell, Blakeley 

“threw something into his cell” and then immediately “ran up the stairs and entered [Manzanillo’s] 

cell to attack [him]” with a homemade 7-inch knife. Manzanillo Decl. ¶¶ 23-25. Brown agrees 

that when he let Blakeley in, he could immediately tell by his actions “something was wrong 

because he came and he ran straight in and he ran up the stairs.” Brown Depo. at 14. Brown then 

 

4

There are some slight differences in Brown’s various retellings of the events, discussed in further 

detail below. See infra at 12. 

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“looked up,” saw “that the cell door was open,” and saw “where [Blakeley] was going.” Id.

Once Blakeley ran inside, Manzanillo “never heard Brown yell out any command for 

Blakeley to stop his course of action and/or return to his cell,” and he never heard Blakeley’s cell 

door being opened as it normally would be upon an inmate’s return from the yard. Manzanillo 

Decl. ¶ 24. Brown did not attempt to lock Manzanillo’s door before Blakeley arrived there. Id. ¶ 

25. Instead, when he realized what was happening, he hit his alarm button and made a radio call 

for backup. Brown Depo. at 14. Manzanillo estimates that “cell doors which were only opened 

half way took less than [three] seconds or so to close,” and that it took Blakeley “almost [eight] 

seconds to trot up the stairs and enter” Manzanillo’s cell. Manzanillo Decl. ¶ 27.5 Once Blakeley 

entered Manzanillo’s cell, Brown closed the door to it, locking both inmates inside. Id. 

Manzanillo tried to defend himself for several minutes “before Pelican Bay officials finally 

entered the unit” and pepper sprayed both Manzanillo and the other prisoner to end the assault. Id. 

Afterwards, Manzanillo was escorted to be decontaminated from the pepper spray. He 

alleges that during the escort Defendants Wood and Hallock told him they “had no choice.” 

Manzanillo Decl. ¶ 30. Manzanillo was treated for stab wounds and lacerations, and the 

institution Investigative Services Unit took photographs of his injuries. ECF No. 13 at 8. Brown’s 

actions were administratively reviewed and he was disciplined. See ECF No. 208, Ex. D at 34; 

McGuyer Depo. at 20; Lewis Depo. at 25-26, 30, 38; Brown Depo. at 56. 

On November 26, 2012, Manzanillo filed this case. ECF No. 1. The First Amended 

 

5 Defendant Brown makes a variety of objections to Manzanillo’s declaration. ECF No. 224 at 2-

5. For the most part, the objections do not specifically identify the allegedly objectionable 

testimony. See, e.g., id. at 2 (stating that “plaintiff cites to hearsay on multiple occasions in his 

opposition to the motion” without providing a paragraph number). The Court can only overrule 

these objections. Defendant Brown does make a specific hearsay objection on page 3, lines 4-6, 

and a foundation objection at page 5, lines 2-4. Both of these objections are also overruled. 

 The remaining Defendants also make certain objections, ECF No. 225 at 11-12, which do cite to 

the particular portions of Manzanillo’s declaration to which Defendants object. All of those 

objections are overruled, except for the speculation objection to Paragraph 21 of Manzanillo’s 

declaration, which is sustained. The Court notes, however, that Defendant Brown acknowledged 

in his deposition that there was a light in the control booth that lit up when a cell door was open, 

so this fact is still in the record. Brown Depo. at 35-36. With regard to Defendants’ hearsay 

objections, the Court notes that all of the statements in question have been offered for the fact they 

were said, and not for the truth of the matter asserted. 

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Complaint was filed on April 26, 2013, alleging, under § 1983, violations of his First Amendment 

right to be free from retaliation for seeking redress of grievances,6his Eighth Amendment right to 

be free from torture and deliberate indifference to his safety, and his Fourteenth Amendment right 

to equal protection by Defendants Greg D. Lewis, Kurt McGuyer, Troy A. Wood, John Hallock, 

and Naeem Brown. ECF No. 13 at 2, 4. 

C. Jurisdiction

The Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show there is 

“no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2014). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the 

case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material 

fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party. See id. 

A court shall grant summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 

party will bear the burden of proof at trial[,] . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” 

 

6 While Manzanillo’s complaint alleges a First Amendment retaliation claim, all parties’ briefing 

regarding the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment is limited to Manzanillo’s Eighth 

Amendment deliberate indifference claim. See ECF No. 13 at 2. The Court likewise limits its 

analysis to that claim. Manzanillo’s claim of retaliation is relevant on this motion only to 

Defendants’ potential state of mind and motive concerning Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference 

claims. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(3). 

 On July 27, 2011, Manzanillo attended an annual review meeting and informed Defendant Lewis 

that he had filed an administrative grievance. ECF No. 13 at ¶ 4. After he “attempted to seek [a] 

preliminary injunction against Defendant Lewis in the pending lawsuit . . . [Manzanillo alleges] 

Pelican Bay officials retaliated against [Manzanillo] and tortured [him].” Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Manzanillo 

alleges that he was “harassed and threatened verbally, guards spit on his food, [he] was under 

constant surveillance . . . and [he] was tortured by Pelican Bay officials utilizing radio frequency.” 

Id. ¶¶ 3, 6, 7. Defendants do not engage with these allegations in their motions for summary 

judgment, and Manzanillo makes no claim directly based on them.

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See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party bears the initial 

burden of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact. Id. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings 

and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 

file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See id. at 324 

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 

For purposes of summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party; if the evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with 

evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the court must assume the truth of the evidence 

submitted by the nonmoving party. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 

1999). The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility 

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. 

Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The non-moving party, however, must “identify with reasonable particularity the evidence 

that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). Indeed, 

it is not the duty of the district court “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable 

fact.” Id. “A mere scintilla of evidence will not be sufficient to defeat a properly supported 

motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party must introduce some significant 

probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Summers v. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 

1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If the non-moving 

party fails to make this showing, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 323.

B. Eighth Amendment Safety Claims7

 

7

“[S]tate officials sued in their official capacities are not ‘persons’ within the meaning of 1983,” 

and damage claims against prison officials in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989); see also Doe v. 

Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, any claims for money 

damages brought by Manzanillo against the defendants in their official capacities are barred. 

Manzanillo’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against defendants in their official 

capacities, however, may proceed. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 

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It is well-established that prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect 

inmates from physical harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994). In particular, 

prison officials have an affirmative duty to protect inmates from violence at the hands of other 

inmates. See id. at 833. The failure of a prison official to protect inmates from attacks by others

from dangerous conditions at the prison only violates the Eighth Amendment, however, when two 

requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the 

official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s safety. See id. at 834. 

In determining whether a deprivation is sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective 

component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a court must consider the circumstances, nature, and 

duration of the deprivation. Id. With respect to the subjective component in prison conditions 

cases, a prison official cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for failing to guarantee 

the safety of a prisoner unless the standard for criminal recklessness is met, i.e., the official must 

know of and disregard an excessive risk to the inmate’s safety. See id. at 837 (holding deliberate 

indifference requires that “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health 

or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference”). 

Deliberate indifference lies “somewhere between the poles of negligence at one end and 

purpose or knowledge at the other.” Id. at 836. On the one hand, deliberate indifference describes 

a more blameworthy state of mind than negligence ‒ negligence, and even gross negligence, are 

not enough to trigger an Eighth Amendment violation. See id. at 835. On the other hand, a 

plaintiff is not required to show purposeful conduct to meet his burden of showing deliberate 

indifference. Id. at 836. 

1. Defendant Naeem Brown

Defendant Naeem Brown brings a separate summary judgment motion as to himself. ECF 

No. 204. Manzanillo brings only one cause of action against him, alleging Brown was 

deliberately indifferent to his safety by not securing Manzanillo’s cell door and by allowing 

 

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Blakeley to enter and attack him. ECF No. 13 at 9, 12. 

a. Brown’s Training and Knowledge of Safety Concerns

The first question relevant to Brown’s motion is whether he was aware of the risk to 

Manzanillo’s safety posed by an open cell door, which in turn depends, in part, on his training. 

As part of that training, Brown received basic instruction on the rules, regulations, policies, 

and procedures of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Brown 

Depo. at 4; ECF No. 208 Ex. E (“Hallock Depo.”) at 12-14. He was instructed on prison gangs 

and rivalries, the risk-classification levels that CDCR assigns to inmates, and inmate-housing 

settings, including the SHU. Brown Depo. at 5-9. After basic training, Brown received a 40-hour 

block training, which was supposed to include training in how to operate the SHU control booth. 

Lewis Depo. at 10; Brown Depo. at 16. Prior to Brown’s first shift in the SHU Unit D-8 control 

booth, Brown reviewed, understood, and signed Post Order 292349, which describes an officer’s 

responsibilities while working in the control booth. Lewis Depo. at 11-13; Brown Depo. at 25-29. 

Those responsibilities include making a visual check of the pod before opening any door to ensure 

there are no staff or inmates present, maintaining constant observation of an unescorted inmate 

when releasing that inmate from his cell to attend various in-house activities, and ensuring that no 

two doors are open at the same time. Brown Depo. at 33-35. Brown also confirmed that he 

understood that before returning an inmate from the yard, operational procedures required him to 

“visually inspect the pod and view the control panel to ensure all inmates are secured in their 

cells.” Brown Depo. at 39. 

Brown fully understood that failing to secure Manzanillo’s cell door before allowing 

Blakeley into the pod amounted to a violation of the prison’s policies and procedures, as well as 

his post orders. Brown Depo. 25-27, 29, 53. As certain Defendants acknowledge, “[i]t is 

undisputed that the training instructed officers to constantly observe an inmate until that inmate 

returns to his cell and the door is secured.” ECF No. 206 at 14. 

Brown’s on-the-job training, however, did not provide him with an opportunity to practice

operating the control booth control panel, and he did not observe inmate movement. He stated 

that “it just so happened when I went up there for my two hours . . . everyone was locked up. So I 

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didn’t get to see anything because . . . there was no movement.” Brown Depo. at 20. Several of 

the Defendants, as well as Manzanillo’s expert, Daniel Vasquez, have testified that on-the-job 

training is not effective unless the trainee officer observes inmate movement and actually works

the control panel to operate the doors in the SHU. See, e.g., Vasquez Decl. ¶¶ 18-19; McGuyer 

Depo. at 4-5. For example, Defendant McGuyer opined “[i]f you weren’t observing inmate 

movement, then there wasn’t a training going on. You were sitting in a control booth with 

somebody.” McGuyer Depo. at 4. Observation of inmate movement is “required.” Id. Defendant 

Wood concurred that if “Officer Brown was not shown any prisoner movement during his training 

block,” then “he would not be adequately trained.” ECF No. 209, Ex. A (“Wood Depo. III”) at 10. 

And Vasquez testified that “For an officer preparing to take the post of Control Booth Operator, 

training that does not require the officer to observe inmate movement and actually use the control 

panel to operate the doors is inadequate.” Vasquez Decl. ¶ 18.

Before beginning to work in the control booth, Brown understood that the SHU only 

housed “validated indeterminate gang members and associates.” ECF No. 218-1 at 17-18.8 And 

he already knew, from his training at the CDCR academy, that “all gangs were rivals.” Id. at 4-5. 

He also learned that rival gang members could attack each other if they interacted. Id. at 8. He 

also learned, once he got to Pelican Bay, that the inmates housed in the SHU were “some of the 

worst inmates at the institution and they needed to be segregated from everybody else.” Id. at 12. 

The inmates in the SHU are dangerous, and Brown was aware of that danger on August 8, 2011. 

Id. at 13. 

Moreover, all Defendants were aware that violating operating procedures in the control 

booth, such as opening cell doors inappropriately, accidentally, or in violation of the operational 

procedures, often leads to inmate injuries and violence. McGuyer Depo. at 8. SHU operational 

procedure 222 explains that “staff and inmates will not be in the same proximity with an 

unrestrained inmate.” McGuyer Depo. at 19. The operating rules intended to keep inmates

separated while unrestrained are clearly in place due to safety concerns. Id.

 

8

ECF No. 218-1 contains additional portions of Brown’s deposition. 

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b. Objective Component

A reasonable factfinder, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Manzanillo, could 

find that he was subjected to an objectively substantial risk of serious harm when his door 

remained unsecured while another inmate ‒ a member of a rival gang ‒ was allowed into the pod 

unescorted. 

First, Manzanillo has presented evidence that there are clear policies in place regarding 

inmate movement that are designed to avoid this precise risk. See ECF No. 208, Ex. D, (“Wood 

Depo. II”) at 21-23; see also infra at 8. Manzanillo points to a Post Order issued by the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) regarding the duties of a Control Booth 

Officer at PBSP. It states, in relevant part: “Under no circumstances should two or more inmates 

be allowed in the same area at the same time unless they are cellmates or unless both inmates are 

under the control of staff and are in mechanical restraints.” ECF No. 208-6, Ex. G-2, at 18. Post 

Order 292349 also states that “[w]hen releasing an unescorted inmate from his cell to attend 

various in-house activities (i.e. yard, shower or staff interviews at the pod door), you will maintain 

constant observation of the inmate until he is restrained by staff or secured into a cell.” ECF No. 

208-6, Ex. G-2, at 5. Defendant Brown signed and indicated that he had read and understood 

these orders before he began work in the control booth. Brown Depo. at 23. 

Moreover, Manzanillo has established that the SHU houses inmates who “pose a definite 

and serious threat to the safety of others or themselves.” Prison Op. Proc. 222, at 3. The Control 

Booth Officer supervises and manages the movement of inmates and other correctional officers 

within that portion of the SHU. Post Order 292349; Op. Proc. 222, at 13-21. The Control Booth 

Officer’s primary responsibility is to keep inmates separated from others in order to prevent 

violence. Vasquez Decl. ¶ 15. 

The evidence is undisputed that inmate-on-inmate violence occurs in the SHU, that 

inadvertent or intentional door openings may lead to such violence, and that the policies described 

above are in place to prevent violence. See Wood Depo. II at 21-23; see also infra at 8. 

Defendant Wood acknowledged in his deposition that, in the SHU, “due to the assaultive nature of 

the inmates housed there . . . the different gang rivalries and the politics within the different prison 

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gangs when you let two inmates out unrestrained generally there was going to be a fight.” Wood 

Depo. II at 21. Defendant Hallock corroborated that “it is the obligation of the inmates . . . if an 

officer” opens a door to “fight,” and “it happen[s] all the time.” Hallock Depo. at 4-5. Brown’s 

basic training, as described above, provided him with knowledge of prison gangs and rivalries and 

the violence that can occur. 

The Court finds that Manzanillo has established a triable issue of fact as to whether 

Brown’s failure to close Manzanillo’s door before allowing Blakely to enter the pod created “an 

objectively substantial risk of harm.” Brown v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2016). 

c. Subjective Component

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Manzanillo, the Court also concludes 

that genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether Brown knew of the substantial risk and 

disregarded it. 

“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of 

fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial 

evidence . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. “[A] factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew 

of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id.; see also Berg v. Kincheloe, 

794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the prison official need not “believe to a moral 

certainty that one inmate intends to attack another at a given place at a time certain before that 

officer is obligated to take steps to prevent such an assault.”). The “obviousness of a risk,” 

however, is not conclusive, and “a prison official may demonstrate that the obvious escaped him.” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843, n.8. “If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, 

then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson 

v. Cty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Defendant Brown states that he had no prior knowledge of the affiliations of Manzanillo or 

his attacker when the attack occurred, ECF No. 204-2 (“Brown Decl.”) ¶ 4; that he did not know 

that Manzanillo had instituted his prior lawsuit, id.; and that he failed to notice that Manzanillo’s 

door was open when he allowed Blakely back into the pod. ECF No. 204-1 at 6. Defendant 

Brown therefore argues that he was not aware of any specific risk to Manzanillo’s safety, and did 

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not disregard any such risk. Brown Decl. ¶¶ 6-7. 

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Manzanillo, however, a reasonable jury 

could conclude that Brown was deliberately indifferent to the risk of attack on Manzanillo. Brown

concedes that he did not follow his post orders when he failed to visually observe Manzanillo all 

the way into his cell. See Brown Depo. at 83 (“I chose [speaking to a supervisor] over” following 

procedures as they related to operating doors in the SHU). Moreover, although Brown disclaims 

knowing about Manzanillo’s prior lawsuit, or realizing that Manzanillo’s door was open, 

Manzanillo has raised triable issues of fact regarding Brown’s credibility. Although Brown claims 

not to know about Manzanillo’s lawsuit, he knew that Manzanillo was talking to the law library 

officer immediately before Blakely entered the pod. Brown Depo. at 39. A jury could find that 

Brown was aware of the inmates’ gang affiliations, which were “common knowledge” in the pod. 

See Manzanillo Decl. ¶ 14 (“Based on my observations, the gang affiliations of inmates were 

common knowledge in the Pod. . . . each inmate housed in my Pod was assigned an identification 

card that indicated each inmate’s race and/or gang affiliations.”). And several grounds would 

permit a jury to disbelieve Brown’s initial statement that he was not aware of Manzanillo’s open 

door when he let Blakely in: the contradiction between his initial statement that the open door was 

difficult to see and his later statement that he noticed the open door when he saw Blakely running 

into the pod; the undisputed evidence that a light inside the control booth showed when a door was 

open; Manzanillo’s testimony that more than enough time remained to close the door once 

Blakeley entered the pod, but Brown chose not to do so; that another officer allegedly called out to 

Brown not to open the door for Blakely in the first place; and that Brown has given different 

accounts of the events.

9

 See ECF No. 214-1 at 9; Brown Depo. at 162-63; Vasquez Decl. at 19-

23; Manzanillo Decl. ¶¶ 21-23. Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to Manzanillo, he 

has sufficiently established genuine questions of material fact which must be answered by a jury. 

 

9

In Brown’s incident report to CDCR, he stated that he went to the bathroom without realizing 

Manzanillo’s door remained unsecured; in his responses to interrogatories, he stated he was 

“attempting to also secure plaintiff Manzanillo’s cell door” while talking to Sergeant Grenert; and 

at his Skelly hearing and in a deposition he made no mention of a trip to the bathroom or any 

attempt to secure Manzanillo’s cell. ECF No. 215 at 8-9. 

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Notably, the Ninth Circuit has reversed a grant of summary judgment in similar 

circumstances. In Delgado v. Barnes, 465 Fed. Appx. 712 (9th Cir. 2012), the defendant argued to 

the district court that his release of the prisoners who attacked the plaintiff was “inadvertent.” 

Delgado v. Barnes, No. C 08-2556 PJH (PR), 2010 WL 3744367, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 20, 2010). 

The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s “actions were done on purpose.” Id. The district court 

held that “[p]laintiff’s statements [went] only to his beliefs, not what [the defendant] believed or 

what his intent was,” and therefore plaintiff could not “generate a genuine issue of material fact as 

to whether the release was inadvertent.” Id. (citing Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 

902 (9th Cir. 2001)). Since “the only fact that might generate a genuine issue as to [the 

defendant’s] intent, that he opened the inmates’ cell doors at the wrong time, [was] equally 

probative of intent or inadvertence,” the district court granted summary judgment. Id. The Ninth 

Circuit reversed, noting that even in a sparse “he said, she said” situation, summary judgment is 

“premature” where “a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk 

from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Delgado, 465 Fed. Appx. at 712 (quoting Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 842). 

Accordingly, Defendant Brown is not entitled to summary judgment on Manzanillo’s 

Eighth Amendment claim.

d. Qualified Immunity

Defendant Brown also argues that summary judgment is warranted because he is entitled to 

qualified immunity from Manzanillo’s Eighth Amendment claim. The defense of qualified 

immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their 

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 

person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A court considering 

a claim of qualified immunity must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of 

an actual constitutional right and whether such right was “clearly established.” Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Where there is no clearly established law that certain conduct 

constitutes a constitutional violation, a defendant cannot be on notice that such conduct is 

unlawful. Rodis v. Cty. of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 964, 970–71 (9th Cir.2009). The relevant, 

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dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be 

clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Saucier 

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). 

The Court has already determined that a jury could conclude that Defendant Brown’s 

actions violated the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the Court now considers whether the right at 

issue was “clearly established” at the time of the violation. In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff “bears 

the burden of proving that the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the 

official’s allegedly impermissible conduct.” Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 

1993). To qualify as a clearly established constitutional right, a plaintiff must show “that every 

reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle v. 

Howards, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In other 

words, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 

debate.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

By August 2011, it was clearly established in the Ninth Circuit that prison officials violate 

inmates’ constitutional rights when the officials are aware “that placing inmates of different races 

[or gangs] in [the same place] at the same time presents a serious risk of violent outbreaks,” yet 

allow them to be in the same place together anyway. Robinson v. Prunty, 249 F.3d 862, 867 (9th 

Cir. 2001). 

Brown also contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he acted reasonably. 

ECF No. 204 at 13-14. Whether a prison official’s actions were reasonable is a mixed question of 

law and fact: “It involves an objective test of whether a reasonable official could have believed 

that his conduct was lawful in light of what he knew and the action he took. If there are genuine 

issues of material fact in issue relating to the historical facts of what the official knew or what he 

did, it is clear that these are questions of fact for the jury to determine.” Williams, 2012 WL 

1094351, at *11 (quoting Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 70 F.3d 1095, 1099 

(9th Cir. 1995)). 

The Court also cannot grant qualified immunity on this ground. Here, as in Williams, 

“[w]hen the facts underlying Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference to safety . . . claim[] [is] viewed in 

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the light most favorable to him, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the reasonableness of 

Defendant letting [Manzanillo] and [Blakeley] out . . . at the same time . . . in light of 

[Defendant’s] knowledge that it was a violation of prison policy to do so and [Manzanillo] and 

[Blakelely] were members of different gangs.” Id. A jury could conclude that no reasonable 

officer knowing what Brown knew ‒ that the SHU housed dangerous inmates who were not to be 

in the same place at the same time, that prisoners of differing gangs were obligated to fight each 

other if they could, and that policies in place required constant visual monitoring while they 

moved about and securing of inmates once they arrived at their destination ‒ would have 

purposefully violated those policies by being aware of an open door, ignoring it to continue a 

conversation, and then allowing a rival gang member into the pod, creating a substantial risk of 

two inmates being together in the same place unrestrained. 

In short, Brown’s motion for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity is 

denied. 

2. Defendants Wood, McGuyer, Lewis, and Hallock

a. Failure To Train

Manzanillo also brings an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against 

Defendants Wood, McGuyer, Lewis, and Hallock for their “tacit approval” of and failure-to-train 

Defendant Brown. See ECF No. 13. Defendant Gregory Lewis was the warden of Pelican Bay 

State Prison during the relevant period and “was responsible for the complete operation of the 

institution,” including hiring and personnel matters. Lewis Depo. at 3. Defendant Kurt McGuyer

was the associate warden and had administrative responsibility for the daily operations within the 

SHU. McGuyer Depo. at 5. Defendant Troy Wood was the SHU Facility-D Captain for second 

watch during the relevant period, and managed and oversaw the daily operations of SHU FacilityD from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. Wood Depo. I at 4. One of Defendant Wood’s reported duties was 

to “[e]nsure that appropriate training is administered to staff on a continuous basis.” Wood Depo. 

II at 24. Defendant John Hallock was the SHU Facility-D Sergeant for second watch during the 

relevant period and supervised the daily operations of SHU Facility-D, maintaining supervision of 

all staff assigned to that facility from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. Hallock Depo. 11-16. It is 

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undisputed that Defendants Wood, McGuyer, Lewis, and Hallock all had responsibility for 

Defendant Brown’s training. 

The Ninth Circuit has “long permitted plaintiffs to hold supervisors individually liable in 

§ 1983 suits when culpable action, or inaction, is directly attributed to them.” Starr v. Baca, 652 

F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012). A supervisor may be liable 

under § 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a 

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation. Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 

Supervisory liability may attach if the requisite causal connection is established “‘by 

setting in motion a series of acts by others,’ [or] by ‘knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of 

acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others 

to inflict a constitutional injury.’” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207-08 (quoting Dubner v. City & Cty. of 

San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir. 2001)). Officials who are “ultimately in charge of the 

facility’s operations,” who know or reasonably should have known about dangerous conditions 

and acquiesce “‘in a deficient policy that was a moving force behind’ the harm caused to the 

plaintiff . . . may suffice to show that a supervisor ‘personally played a role in the alleged 

constitutional violations.’” Id. at 1208 (quoting Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1149 

(9th Cir.2005)).

To establish his failure-to-train claim, Manzanillo must show that:

in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees, the 

need for more or different training [was] obvious, and the 

inadequacy so likely to result in violations of constitutional rights, 

that the policy-makers . . . can reasonably be said to have been 

deliberately indifferent to the need.

Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390). 

Ordinarily, a single constitutional violation by an untrained employee is insufficient to 

demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train. Connick v. Thompson, 563 

U.S. 51, 62 (2011). Instead, a plaintiff must usually demonstrate “[a] pattern of similar 

constitutional violations by untrained employees.” Id. Defendants argue that a handful of 

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accidental door openings each year, followed by discipline and reprimands, cannot constitute a 

pattern. See ECF No. 206 at 17; Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. 

In a failure-to-train case, however, a plaintiff need not always prove that there have been 

repeated violations. Even in the absence of a prior pattern of constitutional violations, Canton

instructs that in some situations the need for training is “so obvious” and “so likely to result in the 

violation of constitutional rights,” that “the failure to provide proper training may fairly be said to 

represent a policy for which the city is responsible, and for which the city may be held liable if it 

actually causes injury.” Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. In the rare case, “a particular showing of 

obviousness can substitute for the pattern of violations ordinarily necessary to establish municipal 

culpability.” Wereb v. Maui Cty., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1032 (D. Hawaii 2011) (quoting 

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 64 (2010)). If a violation of a protected right is a “highly 

predictable consequence” of a decision not to train, it is possible to establish a “failure in a . . . 

training program . . . so obviously deficient that it could lead to liability for damages resulting 

from a single violation.” Id. A complete absence of training supports an inference of deliberate 

indifference. Connick, 563 U.S. at 67-68 (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 391).10 

As previously noted, many witnesses testified that Control Booth Officer on-the-job 

training is not effective unless the trainee officer observes inmate movement and actually works 

the control panel to operate the doors in the SHU. See, e.g., McGuyer Depo. at 4 (testifying that 

“[i]f you weren’t observing inmate movement, then there wasn’t a training going on. You were 

sitting in a control booth with somebody” and observation of inmate movement is “required”); 

Wood Depo. III at 10 (if “Officer Brown was not shown any prisoner movement during his 

training block,” then “he would not be adequately trained”). Moreover, because the purpose of 

control booth training is in large part to prevent violence against inmates and staff, a reasonable 

 

10 Connick analyzed a claim against a governmental official in his official capacity, yet it is clear 

that Connick is also applicable to claims against governmental supervisors in their individual 

capacity. See Flores v. Cty. of LA, 758 F.3d 1154, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2014) (“As to an official in 

his individual capacity, the same standard applies—[a plaintiff] must show that [the defendant 

supervisor] was deliberately indifferent to the need to train subordinates, and the lack of training 

actually caused the constitutional harm or deprivation of rights.”). 

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factfinder could conclude that the violation of an inmate’s protected rights would be a “highly 

predictable consequence” of the prison’s decision not to properly train Brown. 

In their testimony, several of the named Defendants seemed to assume that the on-the-job 

control booth training included observing inmate movement because that observation was such an 

important part of the job and because inmate movement happened frequently in the SHU, see e.g., 

Hallock Depo. at 6-8; McGuyer Depo. at 4; Wood Depo. III, at 10; ECF No. 209 (“Wood Decl.”)

¶ 7 (“[A]s SHU Facility-D Captain, it was my expectation and understanding that the two hours of 

on-the-job training (OJT) that control-booth officers received included . . . observing inmate 

movement.”). Yet Defendants point to no evidence in the record that there are any controls in 

place such as a check-list, guidelines, or training materials that either require or guarantee that new 

officers observe inmate movement as part of their training. See, e.g., Wood Depo. at 102 (Q: “Are 

experienced control booth operators instructed to show new control booth operators inmate 

movement before they take the post?” . . . A: “It’s been a while ago so I’m trying to 

remember.”).

11 While it is clear that Defendants certainly expected new officers to observe inmate 

movement during their two-hour training, Defendants point to no training requirements mandating 

that expectation be fulfilled. 

Defendants argue, however, that because Brown’s mistake was a single instance unrelated 

to their training program generally, they had no notice that Brown was improperly trained. ECF 

No. 225 at 6-7. The evidence does suggest that Defendants learned of Brown’s shortcomings only 

after the attack on Manzanillo, and “they didn’t know anything about any of the training that Mr. 

Brown received or didn’t receive.” Vasquez Depo. at 4. The problem Manzanillo identifies, 

however, is not that Brown failed to receive the training ordinarily provided to other Control 

Booth Officer trainees; but that Defendants’ failed to have any standardized instruction or 

universal curriculum for such trainees, making training failures like Brown’s virtually inevitable. 

On these facts, a factfinder could conclude that Defendants “knew of a substantial risk from the 

 

11 Defendants also fail to point to any evidence that new trainees are required to actually operate 

the control booth control panel during training, rather than just observing the experienced officer 

do it. 

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very fact that the risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Love v. Salinas, No. 2:11-cv00361-MCE-CKD, 2013 WL 4012748, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6 2013) (“[E]vidence of a single 

violation of an individual’s rights can trigger liability if the violation was a ‘highly predictable 

consequence’ of the failure to train.” (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 63-64)).12 

The Court will deny summary judgment as to Defendants Wood, McGuyer, Hallock, and 

Lewis. 

b. Qualified Immunity

Defendants Lewis, Hallock, Wood, and McGuyer also argue that they are entitled to 

qualified immunity. As analyzed above, Manzanillo has presented sufficient evidence to establish 

that Defendants’ wrongdoing violated his constitutional rights. The only remaining question for 

the Court, therefore, is whether Manzanillo’s constitutional right was clearly established. 

“The state of the law in [2011], when the alleged constitutional violation took place, would 

have given Defendants a fair warning that their failure to protect Plaintiff from a substantial risk of 

harm from a known dangerous condition was unconstitutional.” Love, 2013 WL 4012748, at *10 

(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). It was also 

established by that time that evidence of a single violation of an individual's rights can trigger 

liability if the violation was a “highly predictable consequence” of the failure to train. Connick, 

563 U.S. at 64.

Since Manzanillo has presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude 

that the manner of training created a significant risk to his safety and that Defendants knew of the 

risk but chose to disregard it, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to 

Manzanillo’s “failure to protect” claim on summary judgment. 

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are denied. 

 

12 Defendants concede that Brown did not observe inmate movement during his training, but argue 

that because Brown had worked for a week without incident, there is no cause to conclude the 

training was inadequate. ECF No. 225 at 6-7. Because there is no evidence that any event 

remotely similar to the one at issue here occurred during that week, it is impossible for the Court 

to find that a week’s on-the-job training was adequate as a matter of law. Defendants can present 

this theory to the jury. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 5, 2017

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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