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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

-

Filed February 2, 1996

No. 94-5104

LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR VIETNAMESE ASYLUM SEEKERS;

THUA VAN LE; EM VAN VO; THU HOA THI DANG;

TRUC HOA THI VO,

APPELLANTS 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, ET AL.,

APPELLEES 

On Petition for Rehearing

William R. Stein, Daniel Wolf, and Robert B. Jobe for appellants.

Robert M. Loeb and Michael Jay Singer, Attorneys, United States Department of Justice, for

appellees. With them on the petition were Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Eric H.

Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence and Sherri L. Evans, Assistant United States

Attorneys, and Catherine W. Brown, Attorney, Department of State.

Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SENTELLE and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: On this petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing in banc,

the United States Department of State arguesthat the case has been mooted by itstender of the relief

requested by the individual appellants. The District Court has ruled on remand in favor of the State

Department on the mootness issue, but the appellants contest this ruling. Because we hold that the

case is not moot as to two of the individual named appellants, we reverse the District Court's

mootness determination, deny rehearing, and remand the case for treatment consistent with both this

opinion and our prior opinion on the merits of the State Department's policies. See Legal Assistance

for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs (hereinafter

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"LAVAS"), 45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of disagreements over the procedures used for handling the tremendous

flow of immigrants out of Vietnam that has continued ever since the North Vietnamese took over

South Vietnam in 1975. From June 1979 through June 1988, Hong Kong (and other nations in the

region) granted presumptive refugee status to Vietnamese immigrants on the condition that the

United States and other western countries would help resettle them. But in 1988, following an

increase in the number of economic immigrants, Hong Kong changed its policies, determining that

it would detain all new arrivals and screen them for actual refugee status. The countries concerned

soon formed the Comprehensive Plan of Action, which provides that those screened out as

non-refugees should return to Vietnam, where they can then apply for immigrant visas.

In April 1993, the United States Consulate in Hong Kong stopped processing immigrant visa

applications on orders from the United States State Department. In February 1994, plaintiffs Legal

Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers (LAVAS), Thua Van Le, Em Van Vo, Thu Hoa Thi

Dang, and Truc Hoa Thi Vo filed suit against the State Department and various officials, claiming

individually and on behalf of the class ofscreened-out Vietnamese told to return to Vietnam that the

State Department's policy change violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§

1151-1156, the regulations promulgated thereunder, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the

United States Constitution. The four individual plaintiffs comprise two pairs, each consisting of one

Vietnamese refugee and that refugee's United States sponsor. The District Court granted summary

judgment for the State Department in April 1994. (For a more detailed summary of the factual

background up to this point, see our prior opinion in LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 470-71.)

On appeal by LAVAS, we held in February 1995 that the State Department's refusal to

process appellants' applications at the United States Consulate in Hong Kong violated the INA. See

id. at 470-74. Judge Randolph dissented on the merits, but also on the grounds that we should have

remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether the dispute had become moot because

the alien appellants might have already obtained relief at the time of the decision. See id. at 474-76

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(Randolph, J., dissenting). In March 1995, the State Department filed a petition for rehearing and

suggestion for rehearing in banc, claiming for the first time in the litigation that the case was mooted

as to Thua Van Le and Thu Hoa Thi Dang on July 21, 1994, when Dang was found eligible for an

immigration visa, and as to Em Van Vo and Truc Hoa Thi Vo on November 30, 1994, when Truc

Hoa Thi Vo was preliminarily determined to be ineligible for an immigrant visa. The appellants

concede that the individual claims of Thua Van Le and Thu Hoa Thi Dang have become moot, but

claim that these individuals and LAVAS may remain as class representatives. They do contest the

mootness of the Vos' individual claims.

In May 1995, because resolution of the mootness issue might require the evaluation of new

evidence, we remanded the case to the District Court for a determination. On September 11, 1995,

the District Court declared the case moot and issued a memorandum opinion, relying primarily on its

view that the only claim for relief wasthat Truc Hoa ThiVo's application be processed in Hong Kong

instead of in Vietnam:

The application of detained plaintiff Truc Hoa Thi Vo was... processed at the

United States Consulate in Hong Kong and was denied on November 30, 1994. Ms.

Vo has one year from the date of denial of her immigrant visa application to supply

the Consulate with additional documentation to support her application, or her

application will be canceled.

Plaintiffs contend that the current status of Ms. Vo's application is such that

her case cannot be moot, since the Consulate has not yet made a "final" determination

to grant or deny her immigrant visa application, but has made only an "initial"

determination to deny her application. Defendants argue that Ms. Vo has obtained

the reliefshe soughtnamely, that her immigrant visa application be processed by the

United States Consulate in Hong Kong, rather than after a forced repatriation to

Vietnam. The Court agrees with defendants. Ms. Vo has obtained the specific relief

she sought and has had her application processed by the United States Consulate in

Hong Kong. Plaintiffs are correct that the Consulate has not yet finally determined

whether Ms. Vo's immigrant visa application will be granted or denied, but the relief

Ms. Vo sought from this Courtthe processing of her application in Hong Kong

instead of Vietnamhas been achieved. (The Court has, of course, no power to

review a final determination of the Consulate as to the merits of Ms. Vo's immigrant

visa application.) Ms. Vo's claims, and those of her citizen-sponsor, Em Van Vo, are

therefore moot.

Mem. Op. at 3-4. We subsequently ordered additional briefing on the issue of mootness, which issue

we now consider as a prelude to ruling on the request for rehearing.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

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Mootness

We are guided in our decision in this case by our decision in City of New York v. Baker, 878

F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In Baker, the plaintiffs challenged the State Department'srefusal to grant

a visa to former Italian Senator Nino Pasti so that he could participate in a political demonstration

in the United States. The State Department refused to grant the visa on the grounds that it would

prejudice this country'sforeign policyinterests. On appeal, the State Department argued that the case

had become moot because it had decided that it would not deny any future visa application from

Senator Pasti or other aliens on the challenged basis. We rejected that argument, however, in light

of the fact that accepting it would mean that "the State Department would be free to reassert its

earlier position, which the government has not renounced." Id. at 511. Importantly, we noted that

"voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not in and of itself moot a case when the party

could renew it." Id. at 511-12.

A useful case from a sister circuit court is Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988).

In Allende, the State Department had initially refused to grant a visa to Hortensia de Allende. By the

time of the appeal, however, the State Department had granted her a visa, and therefore claimed that

the case was moot. The First Circuit rejected the mootness claim, stressing the continuing nature of

the basic controversy:

[T]he validityof[the challenged policy]in generalremains a live controversy.... [T]he

government has stated that future visa applications by Mrs. Allende "presumably

would be approved." The government has not, however, revised its interpretation of

[the relevant statute]. The mere voluntary cessation of its challenged activity does

not, in our opinion, moot the controversy.

Id. at 1115 n.7.

Both of these cases stand for the proposition that the government cannot escape the pitfalls

of litigation by simply giving in to a plaintiff's individual claim without renouncing the challenged

policy, at least where there is a reasonable chance of the dispute arising again between the

government and the same plaintiff. Better Government Ass'n v. Department of State, 780 F.2d 86

(D.C. Cir. 1986), and Payne Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 837 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

Appellants argue (with good reason) that theirs is just such a case. To begin with, appellants did not

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1A suggestion for rehearing in banc still pends before the full court. 

simply request a "one shot, all or nothing opportunity to have a consular officer interview Ms. Vo in

Hong Kong." At a minimum, they requested that Ms. Vo's application be completely and fully

processed in Hong Kong, not merely subjected to an initial determination. The record reveals that

the State Department has not yet fully afforded this relief to Ms. Vo. Her application has been

considered, but it remains open until November 16, 1996, according to an affidavit recently added

to the record. Because Ms. Vo is still "participat[ing] in the application process giving rise to this

action ... [it] is not moot." Singh v. Ilchert, 784 F. Supp. 759, 762 (N.D. Cal. 1992).

In any case, even if Ms. Vo's current application had expired by this time, she would

presumably be free to file another application. If she did, her dispute with the State Department

would remain essentially unchanged since, according to both parties, the State Department has

returned to its former policy of refusing to process applications of Ms. Vo's sort in Hong Kong after

December 1, 1994. The State Department, then, cannot show that it is "absolutely clear that the

allegedlywrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd.

v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 66 (1987) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). In fact, the allegedly wrongful behaviorthe refusal to process applications of this type

at the United States Consulate in Hong Kongis virtually certain to recur, and it will quite probably

recur in the case of Ms. Vo should her current application be turned down. Where there is a

reasonable probability that "the same complaining part[ies]" will "be subject[ ] to the same action

again," a finding of mootness is inappropriate. Mississippi River Transmission Corp. v. F.E.R.C.,

759 F.2d 945, 952 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)).

We accordingly hold that this case is not moot as to the individual claims of Mr. and Ms. Vo and

reverse the District Court's judgment of mootness. We deny the State Department's petition for

rehearing.1 Our prior judgment and opinion on the merits of the State Department's policy stands,

and we remand this case to the District Court for treatment consistent with both this and our prior

opinion.

Class Certification

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2Subject to the full court's resolution of the in banc suggestion. 

Onthis appeal, LAVAS and the individual appellants also challenge the District Court'sfailure

to grant their class certification motion under FED. R. CIV. P. 23. The District Court initially denied

this motion as moot in April 1994 after granting summary judgment for the State Department on the

individual claims which we subsequently reversed. On remand, the District Court again refused to

grant the certification, holding that "because the named plaintiffs' claims have now become moot, no

case or controversy exists on which to append a class of plaintiffs." Mem. Op. at 8 (Sept. 11, 1995).

Because we hold today that this case is not moot with respect to Mr. and Ms. Vo, the basis for the

District Court's holding on the class certification motion is no longer true, and we must necessarily

vacate the District Court's refusal to grant the class certification motion. However, we do not find

it necessary to reach the merits of the motion. We simply remand this issue for reconsideration in

light of our holding that the case is not moot as to Mr. and Ms. Vo.2

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree the case is not

moot. LAVAS sought an order directing U.S. officials to "conduct the final processing" of the

plaintiffs' visa applicationsinHong Kong. Whatever "final processing" means, it has not yet occurred

with respect to Truc Hoa Thi Vo. Her application was initially denied on November 30, 1994,

several months before we issued our decision in Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v.

Dep't of State, 45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995). However, the consulate general's letter to her indicated

that more processing in Hong Kong could occur, and an uncontested declaration filed with this court

states that her application will remain alive at least until November 16, 1996.

Nonetheless, I would grant the petition for rehearing for reasons I have already given.

LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 474-75 (dissenting opinion). LAVAS remains a barrier to full implementation of

the international plan to end the "boat people" crisis. Since the time of our decision, the refugee

problem has continued to fester. According to press reports, growing uncertainty over the position

of the United States has contributed to rioting in the refugee camps, which has in turn slowed the

process of repatriation. Philip Shenon, Riots by Vietnamese Erode Plan to Send Them Home, N.Y.

TIMES, June 9, 1995, at A3. Under the international plan, all of the Vietnamese now in the Hong

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Kong camp were to be back in Vietnam by the end of 1995. The Final Vietnam Refugees, WASH.

POST, Dec. 28, 1995, at A22. That deadline has now passed, and still no end is in sight. Still a Long

Battle Ahead to Clear Boatpeople Camps, Say Experts, Agence France Presse, Jan. 16, 1996,

available in LEXIS. In the meantime, further doubts have been raised about the majority's

interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In a related case, now pending in this court

(Lisa Le v. Department of State, No. 95-5425), the State Department contends that § 202(a)(1), 8

U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1), on which LAVAS rested, should not have been invoked because it governs only

the issuance of visas, a matter not involved in this case, which deals instead with where visa

applications must be processed. Venue determinations are, the State Department says, entrusted

entirely to the Secretary of State by § 222(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1202(a), and are not subject to § 202(a)(1).

Whatever the validity of this new argument, I remain convinced that none of the plaintiffsin this case

were discriminated against on the basis of their nationality in violation of § 202(a)(1), that the

majority decision is in error, and that the case should be reheard forthwith so that the United States

can promptly bring itself into compliance with the international agreement this country reached with

fifty other nations.

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