Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02957/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02957-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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 Strong indicates that the reason for his unemployment is “disability,” though he does not

clarify whether the monthly payment he expects to receive is in the form of a Social Security payment

or from some other source. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOUGLAS STRONG,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11CV2957 JLS (WVG)

ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION

TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS AND (2) DISMISSING

COMPLAINT WITHOUT

PREJUDICE

(ECF No. 2)

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; and ERIC

HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

UNITED STATES, or OFFICE HOLDER,

Defendant.

Presently before the Court is Douglas Strong’s (“Strong”) motion to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”). (IFP, ECF No. 2) Strong, proceeding pro se, has submitted a civil action against the United

States and the Attorney General of the United States seeking declaratory judgment pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2201. (Compl., ECF No. 1)

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

A federal court may authorize the commencement of an action without the prepayment of

fees if the party submits an affidavit, including a statement of assets, showing that he is unable to

pay the required filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Strong attests that he is currently unemployed, but

that beginning in February 2012 he will receive $675.00 per month from an undisclosed source.1

(IFP 2, ECF No. 2) He claims that his current assets include $180.00 in a First National Trust

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checking account. Strong further states that his son is dependant on him for $150.00 per month in

support. Based on this information, the Court GRANTS Strong’s motion to proceed IFP.

INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

1. Legal Standard

Notwithstanding IFP status, the Court must subject each civil action commenced pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening and order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds

“frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also

Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua

sponte dismiss an IFP complaint that fails to state a claim).

Before its amendment by the PLRA, former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. However, as amended,

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to the IFP

provisions of § 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing the U.S. Marshal

to effect service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3). See id. at 1127; Calhoun, 254

F.3d at 845; McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that sua

sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur “before service of process is made on the

opposing parties”). 

2. Analysis

Strong’s complaint seeks this Court’s declaration that (1) the U.S. government is

“prohibited from declaring, announcing or waging a war on any state, portion of states or these

United States,” (2) that the U.S. government is “enjoined from any further use of the phrase war on

drugs,” and (3) that “Strong is not an enemy of the United States as that term is defined by the

United States Constitution,” (Compl. 16, ECF No. 1). Strong specifically seeks a declaration as to

his “Constitutional rights under the 5th and 9th Amendments.” (Id. at 1)

//

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A. War on Drugs

A complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neizke

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), superseded by statute on other grounds, Omnibus

Consolidated Recissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, as

recognized in Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126. As currently pleaded, Strong’s complaint fails to state a

cognizable claim for declaratory relief concerning the use of the phrase and the constitutionality of

the “War on Drugs.” It is difficult for this Court to discern the nature of Strong’s claims in his

sixteen-page complaint, which reads more like an opinion letter regarding the perceived drawbacks

of the War on Drugs. Among other things, Strong argues that the War on Drugs has “caused the

unnecessary death of over a million Americans, including Law Enforcement Officers[,] . . . [and

has] caused to be spread throughout the population the diseases of H.I.V./Aids and Hepatitis C.” 

(Id. at 4) Moreover, he suggests that the War on Drugs is unconstitutional given that “there never

was a declaration of war, the Defendants did not and do not have specific statutory authorization

and even if the drug problem is a National Emergency, there was no attack on the United States, it’s

(sic) possessions or armed forces.” (Id. at 6) Even viewing Strong’s pro se complaint liberally, his

allegations fail to present a cognizable legal theory or facts sufficient to support a cognizable legal

theory against the Defendants.

Moreover, the Court questions whether Strong has Article III standing to bring his claim

seeking a declaration that the War on Drugs is unconstitutional, as he has failed to assert any

personally suffered injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); City of

L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02, 111 (1983). A review of Strong’s allegations makes clear that

his war on the War on Drugs is merely an assertion that certain practices of the U.S. government

are unconstitutional, which is insufficient for Article III standing purposes. Though it is clear to

this Court that Strong has a strong interest in the perceived flaws of the War on Drugs, the Supreme

Court has made clear that “a mere interest in a problem, no matter how long standing the

interest . . . is not sufficient.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).

Thus, the Court DISMISSES Strong’s complaint as frivolous to the extent it seeks

declaratory relief regarding the use of the phrase and the constitutionality of the War on Drugs. 

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B. Label as Enemy of United States

Strong additionally seeks a declaration that he is not an enemy of the United States, (Compl.

16, ECF No. 1), because it is “illegal to label or designate citizens who use drugs as ‘enemies,’” (id.

at 13). In essence, Strong alleges that because he is an addict, the U.S. government has labeled him

as an enemy in the War on Drugs despite his “absolute right to not have a war waged against him.” 

(Id.) Moreover, he contends that his name and information were placed in the “Homeland Security

Data-Base” and that the U.S. government uses “unmanned drones for surveillance of United States

citizens” who have been labeled as threats to the United States. (Id. at 12)

To the extent Strong is claiming a Fifth Amendment due process violation because he was

“labeled an enemy of his own country” without any means to challenge this designation, the Court

finds the claim frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Strong’s complaint lacks even “an arguable

basis either in law or in fact,” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, and appears “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or

“delusional,” id. at 328. Even while construing a pro se complaint liberally, as the Court must, see

Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), the Court may not “supply

essential elements of claims that were not initially pled,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). As such, the Court can find no cognizable basis for

Strong’s instant claim.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion to proceed IFP

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). However, the Court DISMISSES Strong’s complaint as

frivolous, but will provide Strong with the opportunity to amend his complaint to correct the

deficiencies of the pleading identified by the Court. Strong’s complaint is therefore DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(i). Strong, if he wishes, shall file

an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies of pleading noted above within 45 days of the

date this Order is electronically docketed. IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 23, 2012

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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