Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01645/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01645-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JORGE ANTHONY CARRASCO aka

TONY CARRASCO MOTORS; and

NANCY JEAN CARRASCO, an

individual,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 14cv1645-WQH-DHB

ORDER

vs.

STANLEY IVAN HORWITZ, an

individual; ANITA HORWITZ, an

individual; THE SPRING STAR

TRUST, a Trust; KENNETH G.

ADAMS REVOCABLE TRUST dtd

05/14/93; and ALAN G. HORWITZ,

individually and as trustee of the Star

Spring Trust and Kenneth G. Adams

Revocable Trust; and DOES 1 through

50,,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second

Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Alan G. Horwitz, Kenneth G. Adams

Revocable Trust, and the Star Spring Trust (ECF No. 8), the Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Stanley Horwitz and Anita

Horwitz (ECF No. 9), and the Motion to Remand filed by Plaintiffs Jorge and Nancy

Carrasco (ECF No. 10). 

I. Background 

On January 29, 2013, Plaintiffs Jorge Anthony Carrasco and Nancy Jean

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Carrasco commenced this action by filing a complaint in San Diego County Superior

Court. (ECF No. 1 at 2). On June 14, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a second amended

complaint, which is the operative pleading (hereinafter “Complaint”). Id. On July 11,

2014, Defendant Alan Horwitz removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)

on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1). Defendant Alan Horwitz

has obtained the consent of Defendants Stanley Ivan Horwitz and Anita Horwitz. (ECF

No. 1-3 at 2). 

On July 22, 2014, Defendants Alan Horwitz, the Kenneth G. Adams Revocable

Trust, and the Star Spring Trust filed the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second

Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 8). On July 25, 2014, Defendants Stanley Horwitz and

Anita Horwitz filed the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. 

(ECF No. 9). On July 26, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the Motion to Remand Action to State

Court. (ECF No. 10). On August 15, 2014, Defendants Stanley Horwitz and Anita

Horwitz filed an opposition to the motion to remand. (ECF No. 13). On August 19,

2014, Defendants Alan Horwitz, the Star Spring Trust, and Kenneth G. Adams

Revocable Trust filed an opposition to the motion to remand. (ECF No. 14). On

August 25, 2014, Plaintiffs filed oppositions to the motions to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 15-

16). On August 25, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a reply in support of the motion to remand. 

(ECF No. 17). On August 29, 2014, Defendants filed replies in support of their

respective motions to dismiss. (ECF No. 18-19). 

II. Motion to Remand (ECF No. 10)

Plaintiffs contend that the notice of removal does not comply with the procedural

requirements of the removal statute because Defendant Alan Horwitz failed to “attach

all process, pleadings and court orders” in a case that has “extensive procedural

history.” (ECF No. 10-1 at 4). Defendants contend that 28 U.S.C. section 1447 does

not require remand for procedural defects. Defendants rely on 28 U.S.C. section

1447(b) for the proposition that a court may cure a removing party’s failure to attach

the necessary state court documents. Defendants contend that any defect in failing to

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attach pleadings and process can be cured. Defendants Alan Horwitz, The Star Spring

Trust, and Kenneth G. Adams Revocable Trust have also submitted sixteen exhibits

from the state court proceedings in support of their opposition in an attempt to cure the

alleged defect in the notice of removal. 

28 U.S.C. section 1446(a) provides:

A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action from a State

court shall file in the district court of the United States for the district and

division within which such action is pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a

copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). The Court “may require the removing party to file with its clerk

copies of all records and proceedings in such State court or may cause the same to be

brought before it by writ of certiorari issued to such State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(b). 

“A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject

matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal

under section 1446(a).” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

The procedural requirements of removal are “formal and modal and [ ] not

jurisdictional.” Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1980).

District courts may not ignore the procedural requirements of the removal statute. See

Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1998), superseded by statute on other

grounds as stated in Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 681-82 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“We do not ... read Caterpillar to authorize district courts to ignore the

procedural requirements for removal: to the contrary, we agree with Caterpillar that

‘[t]he procedural requirements for removal remain enforceable by the federal trial court

judges to whom those requirements are directly addressed.’”) (citing Caterpillar, Inc.

v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 78 (1996)). For example, “the time limit [for removal] is

mandatory and a timely objection to a late petition will defeat removal....” Fristoe, 615

F.2d at 1213. “[A] party may waive the defect or be estopped from objecting to the

untimeliness by sitting on his rights.” Id. (emphasis added). 

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In this case, Defendants removed on July 11, 2014, and Plaintiffs filed the motion

to remand on July 26, 2014, which raises Defendants’ failure to attach all “process,

pleadings and orders” served upon them. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have timely

raised a procedural defect in the notice of removal, as required by 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). 

It “is undisputed that the Notice of Removal inadvertently failed to attach all

pleadings, process, and orders that had been served on the Star Spring Trust.” (ECF

No. 14 at 5). Defendants also failed to cure this defect within the thirty days of being

served with the SAC, as required by 28 U.S.C. section 1446(b)(1),(2)(B). Star Spring

Trust was served on June 14, 2014. (ECF No. 1 at 2). However, Defendants did not

attempt to cure Star Spring Trust’s failure to “attach all pleadings, process, and orders”

until it filed the opposition to the motion to remand on August 19, 2014, more than

thirty days later. (ECF No. 14). The Court finds that Defendants’ notice of removal is

procedurally defective, and Defendants have failed to cure the defect within the thirty

day statutory period of 28 U.S.C. section 1446(b).

Despite this procedural defect, Defendants request that the Court exercise its

discretion and deny Plaintiffs’ motion to remand. There is disagreement among district

courts as to whether a district court has discretion to waive this procedural requirement

or allow it to be cured beyond the thirty-day removal period, and then deny a timely

filed motion to remand that raises this procedural defect. Compare Kosen v. Ruffing,

No. 08cv0793, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 659, at *28-32 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2009) (holding

that “the failure of Defendants to attach all necessary documents to the Notice of

Removal does not necessitate remand” because “the failure to attach the process and

pleadings to the Notice of Removal.... are technical defects that do not deprive the Court

of jurisdiction”), Ackerberg v. Citicorp USA, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 934, 938 (N.D. Cal.

2012) (denying timely motion to remand on the ground that the defendants failed to

provide a copy of the required state court papers because it was “a technical defect that

does not strip this Court of jurisdiction” that the defendants cured), and Ngo v. Bank of

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Am., No. 10cv1007, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65124, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. June 30, 2010)

(to same effect) with Kisor v. Collins, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2004)

(remanding case to state court where the defendants failed to timely provide the

required state court papers in their notice of removal because denying remand would

make 28 U.S.C. section 1447(c) “nothing more than a vehicle by which an unhappy

plaintiff, who selected a presumptively competent state forum, can, at his option, warn

the removing defendant who has woefully failed to dot his procedural i’s and cross his

procedural t’s, to amend post hoc and post haste, so as to make everybody but the

plaintiff happy”), Andalusia Enters., Inc. v. Evanston Ins. Co., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1290,

1300 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 15, 2007) (granting motion to remand because “[t]he provisions

of § 1446(a) would be virtually meaningless if a removing defendant can cure its

procedural error at any time before an order of remand is entered”), and EmployersShopmens Local 516 Pension Trust v. Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co. of Am., No. 05-444,

2005 WL 1653629, at *3 (D. Or. July 6, 2005) (finding that the distinction drawn

between procedural and jurisdictional defects in the removal statute is to provide the

timing in which the non-removing party must object and holding that a failure to attach

the necessary state court papers to the notice of removal mandated remand). 

Strictly construing the removal statute, there is no provision granting a district

court discretion to waive procedural defects in the removal process that are timely and

properly objected to by the non-removing party. The Ninth Circuit has held that, with

respect to other procedural defects in removal, a district court must remand when a

timely motion to remand raises that procedural defect. See Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix

(U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1999), superseded by statute on other

grounds as stated in Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 681-82 (“[B]ecause the removal notice

was facially defective and the deficiencies uncured within the thirty-day statutory

period, removal was improper. [Defendants] plainly and simply failed to meet the

removal requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).”). Under both the removal statue and

Ninth Circuit case law, the only party able to waive procedural requirements of the

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removal statute is the non-removing party. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“A motion to

remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction

must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section

1446(a).”); see also Fristoe, 615 F.2d at 1213 (“[A] party may waive the defect or be

estopped from objecting to the untimeliness by sitting on his rights.” ) (emphasis

added). 

There is no authority under the removal statute or Ninth Circuit case law for the

proposition that the Court may cure a procedural defect in removal to prevent remand,

or the proposition that a party may cure a procedural defect after the thirty day removal

period has expired. Cf. Prize Frize, 167 F.3d at 1266 (finding that removal was

improper because the removing defendants could have cured procedural defects in

removal within the thirty-day statutory period). The procedural requirements of the

removal statute are no less mandatory simply because they do not affect a court’s

subject matter jurisdiction. Caterpillar, 61 U.S. at 78 (“The procedural requirements

for removal remain enforceable by the federal trial court judges to whom those

requirements are directly addressed.”). 

Even if the Court had discretion to waive Defendants’ compliance with the

removal statute, the Court would not exercise its discretion in retaining jurisdiction over

this case. Defendants filed the notice of removal on July 11, 2014. Plaintiffs filed the

motion to remand on July 26, 2014, which would have alerted Defendants to the

procedural defect in removal. From that date, Defendants had sixteen days to cure the

defects in their notice of removal before the statutory thirty day period ended. 

Defendants offer no reasons for why they were unable to do so. 

The Court concludes that this action should be remanded to San Diego County

Superior Court because Defendants have failed to comply with the procedural

requirements of the removal statute. 

III. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Remand is GRANTED. (ECF

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No. 10). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), this action is REMANDED to San Diego

County Superior Court, where it was originally filed and assigned case number 37-

2013-000324340CU-BC-CTL. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to

Dismiss filed by Defendants Alan G. Horwitz, Kenneth G. Adams Revocable Trust, and

the Star Spring Trust and the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Stanley Horwitz

and Anita Horwitz are DENIED as moot. (ECF Nos. 8-9). 

DATED: October 23, 2014

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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