Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00501/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00501-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 1 The State also charged William (a.k.a. Billy) Watson, Rita Anthony, Keoni Watson, Andre

Hamilton, and Guy Wooten with committing additional crimes against Francesa A.

(Respondents’ Exh. A, item 2) Pursuant to cooperation plea agreements, Rita Anthony, Keoni

Watson, and Guy Wooten testified against Petitioner who was tried alone. (Respondents’ Exh.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ian Thomas Branham, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

John Gay, et al. 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-10-501-PHX-ROS (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

(Doc.1) Respondents have filed an Answer, doc., 12, to which Petitioner has replied, doc.

16. After considering the briefing, exhibits, and relevant law, it is recommended that the

Petition be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Charges, Trial and Sentencing

On June 23, 2003, the State of Arizona filed an indictment in the Arizona Superior

Court, Maricopa County, charging Petitioner with several crimes against the same victim,

Francesca A: (1) five counts of sexual assault (Counts IX, X, XIII, XIV, and XV); and one

count of kidnapping (Count XVI).1

 (Respondents’ Exh. A, item 2) At a pretrial conference,

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F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 82-84; Exh. H., Tr. 4/14/05 at 14-16, 29-30; Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 97-98) 

 2 The Honorable Brian K. Ishikawa presided over Petitioner’s pre-trial, trial, sentencing, and

post-conviction proceedings in the Arizona Superior Court. 

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the trial court2 renumbered Counts X, XIII, XIV, and XVI, as Counts I, II, III, IV, and V,

respectively. (Respondents’ Exh. B, item 108; Exh. D, Tr. 4/8/05 at 3-6) Counts I and IV

alleged that Petitioner had vaginal sexual intercourse with Francesca without her consent. 

(Respondents’ Exh. F at Tr. 4/12/05 at 10-11) Counts II and III charged Petitioner as an

accomplice to non-consensual vaginal sexual assaults against Francesca, committed by Guy

Wooten and Keoni Watson, respectively. (Id.) 

The charges were based on the following events. The victim, Francesca, traveled to

Tempe, Arizona in early June 2003 to visit a friend. (Respondents’ Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at

47-52) Francesca, her friend, and his roommates visited Mill Avenue twice. (Id. at 55) 

On Monday June 9, 2003, Francesca visited Mill Avenue alone. (Id. at 55-56) Francesca

recognized “Jake” and his friends from her prior visits to Mill Avenue, and joined them for

the afternoon. (Respondents’ Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/2005 at 56-58) While at a nearby park,

Francesca bought LSD from a couple who invited her and Jake to a party. (Respondents’

Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/2005 at 57-59, 116-118) After taking the LSD, Francesca, who was

disoriented, followed the couple and Jake to 1129 South Stratton Avenue, a reputed drug

house. (Id. at 61; Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 75, 79, 81, 85) 

Billy Watson resided at the house along with several others. (Respondents’ Exh. F, 

Tr. 4/12/05 at 75-76, 95-96) Billy slept in the northeast bedroom, which he secured with a

double dead-bolt to which only he had a key. (Id. at 95-96; Exh. O, Tr. 5/2/05 at 8-9, 32) 

Billy’s girlfriend, Rita Anthony, frequently visited the residence. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr.

4/12/05 at 72-78) Billy’s drug clientele included four men who shared an apartment in

Mesa - Guy Wooten (“Woo”), Damien King (“ATL”), Andre Hamilton (“Dre”), and

Petitioner (“T”, “T-Dog”, “T-Loc”, and “L.J.”). (Respondents’ Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 15-

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24, 81-82; Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 88-95, 109; Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 32; Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05 at

19, 56) 

Rita and Keoni saw Francesca and Jake shortly after they arrived at Billy’s house. 

(Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 84-85; Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 103) Rita observed

Francesca “hanging out” with Billy, holding a marijuana pipe. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr.

4/12/05 at 81, 84-85) Rita left the house at 11:00 p.m. (Id. at 86; Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at 62) 

Francesca later went into Billy’s bedroom, and was alone with Billy who locked the door. 

(Respondents’ Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at 62) Billy threatened Francesca with violence, and

forced her to perform oral sex on him. (Respondents’ Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at 63, 71)

At around 1:00 a.m., on June 10, 2003, Rita returned to Billy’s house, found his

bedroom door locked, and waited for him to join her in the living room. (Respondents’ Exh.

F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 96-97) Billy opened his bedroom door and called Rita into his room. 

(Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 97-98; Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at 63) When she entered

the bedroom, Rita heard Billy lock the door, and saw Francesca partially naked, quiet, and

unresponsive. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 98-99; Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at 63) 

Throughout the early morning hours, Billy forced Francesca to engage in sexual acts, beat

her, hit her with a golf club, cut her with a razor, gave her drugs, and Rita and Billy tied

Francesca up with an electrical cord. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 100-11; Exh. G,

Tr. 4/13/05 at 68) At some point, Francesca’s friend Jake left the house. (Id. at 63)

At approximately 6:00 a.m., Billy telephoned the residence of Petitioner, King,

Wooten, and Hamilton and invited them to his house to pick up some marijuana. 

(Respondents’ Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 34-35, 37) Wooten drove himself, Petitioner,

Hamilton, and King to Billy’s house. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 16, 163; Exh. G,

Tr. 4/13/05 at 37; Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 34-35) When the four men arrived, Billy let them

into his bedroom and Rita left the room. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 113-120, 159-

60; Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at 36-37, 44; Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 34-35; Exh. P., Tr. 5/3/05 at 98,

102-05) 

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When they entered the bedroom, Petitioner and the three men saw Francesca naked

on the bed with bruises and lash marks on her legs, and abrasions. (Respondents’ Exh. H,

Tr. 4/14/05 at 36-39, 50) Francesca perceived the men enter the room, but was unable to

observe their appearance before losing consciousness. (Respondents’ Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at

85) Billy told Petitioner and the others he had given Francesca five “hits” of LSD. 

(Respondents’ Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 138-40) Billy whipped Francesca with a belt and told

Petitioner, Wooten, Hamilton, and King that he “wanted [them] all to gang bang

[Francesca].” (Id. at 43) 

After obtaining condoms, the four men took turns having vaginal intercourse with

Francesca, and watched each other’s activities. (Respondents’ Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 46-48,

93-94; Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05 at 63) Rita, who was standing outside the room, heard Francesca

“moaning,” “slapping noises,” and other “gross” sounds. Rita concluded that the men were

raping Francesca. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 120; Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at 24, 36-

37) 

After Petitioner, Wooten, Hamilton, and King had non-consensual sex with

Francesca, Billy did the same and called his brother, Keoni, into the room to watch. 

(Respondents’ Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 108-09, 172) Meanwhile, Rita saw Petitioner,

Wooten, Hamilton, and King return to their car and leave. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr.

4/12/05 at 120, 163; Exh. H, 4/14/05 at 51) 

At around 8:00 a.m. that morning, Austin Del Castillo, who had arrived at the house a

few hours earlier, saw Francesca wander into the living room and heard her babble

incoherently, like she “was drugged.” (Respondents’ Exh. O, Tr. 5/2/05 at 15-18, 135) 

Austin noticed that Francesca’s face and body were covered with semen; she was nearly

naked, and had numerous fresh bruises, a black eye, bite marks on her neck, and lash marks

on her arms and legs. (Id. at 16-17) Billy then took Francesca, who still appeared

disoriented, to the bathroom and Austin helped her take a shower. (Respondents’ Exh. O,

Tr. 5/2/05 at 18-19) Billy and Rita found Francesca’s ATM card in her clothing and Billy

sent Rita to use the ATM card to withdraw money. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at

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126-27; Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 99-100) Austin tried to convince Francesca to leave, but she

would not go without her ATM card. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4.12.05 at 28; Exh. G, Tr.

4/13/05 at 86-87; Exh. O, Tr. 5/2/05 at 21) 

Throughout the day, Billy continued to beat Francesca, gave her more drugs, and

threatened another “gang bang.” (Respondents’ Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at 89) For the second

time that day, Billy called Petitioner’s apartment to summon Petitioner, Wooten, and

Hamilton to his house. (Respondents’ Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 54-56) Billy also sent Rita

and Keoni to pick up two female friends, Jamie Dix and Vanessa Gregg. (Respondents’

Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 128; Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 41-42, 103; Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 117-19) 

Petitioner, Wooten, and Hamilton arrived at Billy’s residence while Austin was playing a

videogame in the living room. (Respondents’ Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 56-58, 60; Exh. J, Tr.

4/20/05 at 49-51, 106-08; Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 120-21; Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05 at 66) While

Francesca was wandering around the house naked, Wooten noticed that she appeared to have

more injuries since the morning and she was acting “skittish” and saying things like “I don’t

know what I’m doing,” “Oh, my god.” (Respondents’ Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 55-56) 

When Keoni, Vanessa, and Jamie arrived, Billy left the house. (Respondents’ Exh. J,

Tr. 4/20/05 at 43, 104-07; Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 119) When Keoni, Vanessa, and Jamie

entered Billy’s bedroom, they saw Petitioner, Wooten, and Hamilton sitting around

Francesca who was sitting on a stool in the corner, appeared disoriented, wearing only thong

underwear, and with bruises on her face and whip marks on her legs. (Respondents’ Exh. J,

Tr. 4/20/05 at 43-44, 106-110; Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 119-21; Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 62, 69-

71). When Jamie and Vanessa asked Francesca if she wanted to leave, she again refused to

leave the house without her ATM card. (Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 43-44, 48, 62;

Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 61) 

 A short time later, Francesca, Vanessa, Jamie, and Petitioner left Billy’s bedroom

and went to the living room. (Respondents’ Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 60-61) Before leaving

the house with Jamie, Vanessa saw Petitioner walk down the hallway towards Billy’s

bedroom. A short while later, Francesca returned to Billy’s bedroom, where Petitioner,

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Wooten, and Hamilton were talking. (Respondents’ Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 61-63) Keoni

entered the bedroom and saw Wooten and Hamilton “kissing on” and “feeling up”

Francesca, who “seemed incoherent,” while she was standing next to the bed where

Petitioner was seated. (Respondents’ Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 63; Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 123-

24) Keoni then hit Francesca several times. Petitioner grabbed Francesca by the hair and

“elbowed her in the face,” causing her to go “limp” and fall back onto the bed where she

remained motionless for a minute. Keoni “thought she was dead.” (Respondents’ Exh. H,

Tr. 4/14/05 at 63, 64; Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 124-25, 128; Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 17) 

Francesca, aware that three or four men were in the room, overheard Petitioner,

Wooten, Hamilton, and Keoni talking about her. (Respondents’ Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at 91-

93) When Francesca began to move, Hamilton grabbed her hands and held them over her

head, Petitioner and Wooten held her legs open, and Keoni vaginally raped Francesca while

she fought and screamed. (Id. at 92-93; Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 70; Exh. K, Tr., 4/21/05 at

124-25, 129-30) Petitioner continued to hold one of Francesca’s legs and laughed while

Keoni sexually assaulted her. (Respondents’ Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 125)

In the meantime, Vanessa and Jamie knocked on the bedroom door because Vanessa

had left her purse inside. (Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 61, 113-114; Exh. L, Tr.

4/25/05 at 72) When someone cracked the door to hand Vanessa her purse, she was Keoni

pulling down Francesca’s shirt. (Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 114-115, 117–19;

Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 72) Vanessa and Jamie left the house, but did not call police. 

(Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 51, 119-20) 

A short time later, Austin knocked on Billy’s bedroom door, and Keoni let him in. 

(Respondents’ Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 67; Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 128-129) Keoni locked the

door, then put a pillow on Francesca’s face, and sat on her chest. (Respondents’ Exh. K, Tr.

4/21/05 at 126; Exh. O, Tr. 5/2/05 at 36-38) Wooten then had vaginal intercourse with

Francesca while Petitioner and Hamilton held her legs. (Respondents’ Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05

at 92-95; Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 67-69; Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 126-28; Exh. O, Tr. 5/2/05 at

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36-38, 119-120; Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05 at 16) Francesca was aware the men “were having sex

with” her, but did know which men were doing so. (Respondents’ Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at 93)

After Wooten finished sexually assaulting Francesca, Austin saw Petitioner approach

Francesca, who was then wandering around the bedroom, elbow her in the head, and knock

her onto the bed. (Respondents’ Exh. O, Tr. 5/2/05 at 39-40) Petitioner then started hitting

Francesca in the ribs and stomach, drug her into the bathroom, pushed her head down into

the bathtub, and raped her while she was “screaming” and “fighting.” While doing so,

Petitioner hit and strangled Francesca to control her. Wooten, Keoni, Austin, and Hamilton

watched from outside the bathroom. (Respondents’ Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at 98, 126, 133,

139-140; Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 72-74, 134-36, 147-48; Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 129-34; Exh.

L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 26, 38; Exh. O, Tr. 5/2/05 at 40-43, 51-52; Exh. P, Tr. 5/3/05 at 60-63, 108-

11; Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05 at 14-16, 63-66, 71) Petitioner left Francesca on the bathroom floor. 

(Respondents’ Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 74) 

Shortly thereafter, Billy returned home. (Id. at 77) When Petitioner, Hamilton, and

Wooten left the house Tuesday night, Keoni found Francesca lying on a bed and mumbling

“I just want to sleep.” (Respondents’ Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 138-39) 

When Rita returned to Billy’s house on the morning of June 11, 2003, she found

Francesca badly bruised. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 133-34; Exh. O, Tr. 5/2/05 at

45) At around 3:00 p.m., Rita and Billy left the house. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05

at 134-35) Austin dressed Francesca, carried her to his car, and they drove away from the

house. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 135-36; Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at 100-01; Exh. K,

Tr. 4/21/05 at 140; Exh. O, Tr. 5/2/05 at 45-46) 

When Billy and Rita returned home and Francesca was gone, they packed, loaded the

car, and fled. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 135-37; Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 140) Billy

plucked his eyebrows and shaved his hair, which he had worn in a ponytail. (Respondents’

Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 122-23; Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 24-25; Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 88) 

At around 8:15 p.m., Austin drove Francesca to the Tempe Police Department. 

(Respondents’ Exh. F, TR. 4/12/05 at 52, 54, 65; Exh. O, Tr. 5/2/05 at 46-47) Officer

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Berumdez found Francesca in Austin’s car “almost lifeless,” “limp,” and with multiple

contusions on her face and body. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 54-57) Officer

Bermudez photographed Francesca’s injuries, she was too weak to be interviewed. 

(Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 57-60, 62) 

Francesca was transported to Scottsdale Osborn Hospital and treated by emergency

physician, Dr. Vasquez at 8:48 p.m. He observed that she was badly beaten, and later

confirmed that her right eye had an orbital fracture. (Respondents’ Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at

151-57, 160) 

In the meantime, Detective Ball interviewed Austin at the Tempe police station. 

(Respondents’ Exh. P, Tr. 5/3/05 at 89-91; 106-09) At around 10:20 p.m., Forensic Nurse

Examiner Kreiner, began an examination which took nearly three hours because Francesca

had 33 distinct injuries to document. (Respondents’ Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 13-44) 

Subsequent test results revealed the presence of amphetamine, methamphetamine, several

depressants (Xanax, Methorphan, and Lorazepam), and the metabolites of marijuana and

cocaine. (Respondents’ Exh. I, Tr. 4/19/05 at 4-10; Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 24-25) 

On June 12 and 13, 2003, Sergeant Stadel interviewed Francesca at the hospital. 

(Respondents’ Exh. I, Tr. 4/19/05 at 92-95) Francesca described the person who had lashed

her legs as “[t]all,” “[kind of] dark-skinned, not a lot of hair on his body, long [dark, wavy]

hair, dark eyes, [and] tattoos on his body.” (Id. at 99-100) Although Francesca’s

description matched Billy’s appearance, she could not identify him from a photographic

lineup. (Id. at 101-02) Francesca described the other men as “black guys,” and later

elaborated that the man who sexually assaulted her in the bathroom was “pretty built” and

“strong” had “long hair [in] cornrows going back,” and was approximately 25 years old and

stood approximately 6’4” tall. (Id. at 114-116) Francesca never described the bathroom

attacker as having an arm cast. (Id. at 116) 

Police obtained a search warrant for Billy’s house. (Respondents’ Exh. I, Tr. 4/19/05

at 102-03; Exh. P, Tr. 5/3/05 at 95, 132) Police found a golf club, a discarded Lifestyles

condom wrapper, woman’s clothes, a pill packet containing a Lorezepam tablet, a bag of

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marijuana, an electrical cord, and loose ammunition. (Respondents’ Exh. I, Tr. 4/19/05 at

83-86, 103-08; Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 43-56, 119-23) The police did not find used

condoms, or biological fluids in the bedroom. (Respondents’ Exh. I, Tr. 4/19/05 at 105, 108,

121-122) None of the seized items contained the DNA of Francesca, Petitioner, Wooten,

Hamilton, King, or Keoni. (Id. at 57-58, 63; Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 113, 122-23, 133, 138-

39) 

On June 13, 2003, Detective Shumaker showed Austin five different photographic

lineups. (Respondents’ Exh. X, State’s photographic trial exhibits 71-75; Respondents’ Exh.

P, Tr. 5/3/05 at 140-47) Austin identified Wooten and Rita from two photographic lineups. 

(Id. at 140-41, 145-47) 

That same day, Detective Culp visited Francesca at the hospital to show her six

photo-lineups. (Id. at 26-32) Francesca, who appeared “muddled” and “injured,” did not

identify anyone from the lineups containing pictures of Smith, King and, Trumbull;

however, she identified Rita, Wooten, and Keoni in three different photo arrays. (Id. at 28-

32, 41-47)

On June 14, 2003, the police arrested Billy, Keoni, and Rita. (Respondents’ Exh. J,

Tr. 4/20/05 at 64-65; Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 142, Exh. P, Tr. 5/3/05 at 138, 147; Exh. F, Tr.

4/12/05 at 136-38; Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at 15) Inside Rita’s purse and Billy’s bags, police

found a small scale, glass pipe, marijuana, morphine, Lorezepam, methamphetamine, and

several anti-depressants. (Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 88-98; Exh. P, Tr. 5/3/05 at

10-24)

During her interview with police, Rita reported seeing “four black men” arrive at

Billy’s house on the morning of June 10, 2003. (Respondents’ Exh. P, Tr. 5/3/05 at 98) 

Rita positively identified King from a photo-lineup. (Id. at 99-102, 119) Rita indicated that

Wooten’s picture looked familiar, and later explained that fear of reprisal made her afraid to

positively identify Wooten. (Id. at 103-04; Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at 34-35) 

That same day, Detective Shumaker interviewed Keoni and showed him three photolineups containing pictures of Wooten, King, and Trumbull. (Respondents’ Exh. P, Tr.

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5/3/05 at 148-51) Keoni positively identified Wooten, but did not identify King or

Trumbull. (Id.) Keoni described the person he called “T” as being either a “light-skinned

African-American,” a Mexican, or a Spaniard. (Id. at 153) Keoni consistently told

Shumaker that “T” was the person who raped Francesca in the bathroom, and “Woo” had a

cast on his arm and raped Francesca in the bedroom. (Id. at 154) 

Also on June 14, 2003, Detective Johnson interviewed Jamie Dix about her

observations at Billy’s house on Tuesday night. (Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 41-42;

Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 60) Jamie reported that: (1) she and Vanessa arrived around 9:00

p.m. and left at 10:30 p.m.; (2) inside Billy’s bedroom, she saw Francesca with “four black

guys,” one of whom “wasn’t totally black,” but “real light skinned;”(3) these men were

sitting around Francesca, who was on the bed; (4) Francesca spoke in a “really tiny voice”

and was on “cloud nine”; and (5) Francesca wouldn’t leave without her ATM card. 

(Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 45-48; 57, 62, 66; Exh. L, TR. 4/25/05 at 60-62) 

Detective Johnson showed Jamie three photo-lineups containing pictures of Wooten, King,

and a person unrelated to the case. (Respondents’ Exh. L, Tr. 5/25/05 at 66-68) Jamie

indicated that Wooten might be “the guy.” (Id. at 67; Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 53-54)

Although Vanessa Gregg initially denied knowledge on the incident, (Respondents’

Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 115-116; Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 68), when Detective Johnson

interviewed her on June 26, 2003, she provided the following information: (1) when she

entered Billy’s bedroom on Tuesday night, she saw three men, whom she described as “two

darker skinned black males, one of which was smaller, and the other one was tall and skinny

and had a cast on his arm, and . . . there was a lighter-skinned black male [who] had like

breadties in his hair that went around the side”; (2) she talked to the lighter-skinned man in

the living room; (3) she was unable to retrieve her purse from Billy’s bedroom because the

door was locked; and (4) when someone cracked the door to return her purse, Vanessa saw

Keoni pulling Francesca’s shirt down. (Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 115-17, 127-28;

Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 68-71, 97-98; Exh. R, Tr. 5/9/05 at 72-75, 78, 80) 

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Detective Johnson showed Vanessa four photo-lineups containing pictures of

Wooten, Petitioner, King, and Hamilton. (Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 121-23; Exh.

L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 72-76; Exh. R, Tr. 5/9/05 at 79-80) Vanessa identified Petitioner as “the

guy that I was talking to,” and identified Hamilton as “the smaller of the two dark guys.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 122-23; Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 75-76, 95) Although

Vanessa did not identify Wooten, she reported seeing another dark-skinned man with a cast

inside Billy’s bedroom. (Respondents’ Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 96-97) 

On June 18, 2003, police arrested Wooten, who consented to an interview with

Detective Shumaker. (Respondents’ Exh. P, Tr. 5/3/05 at 158; Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05 at 2-3) 

Wooten initially stated that he, Petitioner, Hamilton, and King went to Billy’s house on

Tuesday morning, but contended that only Billy had raped Francesca. (Respondents’ Exh.

P, Tr. 5/3/05 at 158-59; Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05 at 3) Wooten acknowledged that Francesca

appeared drugged and that he saw belt marks on her legs. (Respondents’ Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05

at 4-5) Wooten stated that he saw Petitioner elbow or slap Francesca in the face, and that he

heard Francesca screaming when she was in the bathroom with Petitioner. (Id. at 3-4; Exh.

H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 147-48) 

Later that same day, police arrested King and Hamilton. (Respondents’ Exh. P, Tr.

5/3/05 at 158; Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05 at 2, 5-6) 

Based on information obtained from Wooten, Hamilton, and King’s post-arrest

interviews, the police identified and arrested Petitioner that night. (Respondents’ Exh. P,

Tr. 5/3/05 at 158-59; Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05 at 2-3) At approximately 11:00 p.m., Detective

Hayes presented Austin another photo-lineup which contained Petitioner’s picture. 

(Respondents’ Exh. P, Tr. 5/3/05, at 59-63; Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05 at 7-8) Austin pointed at

Petitioner’s picture and stated, “That’s ATL. That’s ATL or Woo. I seen (sic) him there. 

I’d seen (sic) him raping her.” (Respondents’ Exh. P, Tr. 5/3/05 at 62-63, 75, 82) Austin

told detectives that Petitioner was one of the three men who raped Francesca with Keoni at

Billy’s house. (Id. at 63, 76, 81-82) 

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Detective Shumaker subsequently presented Austin with individual photographs,

each depicting a single person. (Respondents’ Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05 at 11-16) Austin

identified Billy, Rita, Keoni, Hamilton, and Petitioner. Austin identified Petitioner as the

man who raped Francesca in the bathroom and held Francesca’s leg while another man

raped her in the bedroom. Austin identified Wooten as the man who raped Francesca in the

bedroom while the other two men held her legs. (Respondents’ Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05 at 11-16;

Exhibit X, State’s photographic trial exhibits 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 86, 88, 89) 

During a three-day preliminary hearing and subsequent trial, Austin consistently

identified Petitioner in court as the “light-skinned” and “fat” man with braided hair who had

raped Francesca inside the bathroom on Tuesday afternoon. Austin referred to Petitioner as

“ATL,” because they had never been formally introduced. (Respondents’ Exh. H, Tr.

4/14/05 at 135; Exh. O, Tr. 5/2/05 at 129-30, 133; Exh. P., Tr. 5/3/05 at 108-11; Exh. Q, Tr.

5/4/05 at 71, 75, 77, 81-83, 86-90) Austin also consistently identified Wooten in court as

the person he saw raping Francesca in the bedroom. (Respondents’ Exh. P, Tr. 5/3/05 at

109) Although Austin did not know Petitioner’s and Wooten’s correct names, he

consistently identified them by their conduct during his police interview and in-court

testimony. (Id. at 110-11; Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05 at 9-16) 

B. Verdicts and Sentences

At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Petitioner of all five counts, as charged. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A, Items 146-50; Exh. T, Tr. 5/11/05 at 3-11) The jury later found three

aggravating factors: (1) the offense involved accomplices; (2) the offense was especially

heinous, cruel, and depraved; and (3) Petitioner caused physical and emotional harm to the

victim. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Items 156-60; Exh. U, Tr. 5/12/05 at 68-79) Petitioner

subsequently admitted a historical prior felony conviction for armed robbery. (Respondents’

Exh. B, Item 166; Exh. V, Tr. 5/23/05 at 3-13) The trial court found no mitigating

circumstances. (Respondents’ Exh. W, Tr. 6/17/05 at 50) The trial court imposed four

consecutive, aggravated, 21-year prison terms for Petitioner’s sexual assault convictions

(Counts I-IV). (Respondents’ Exh. W, Tr. 6/17/05 at 50-51) The trial court imposed an

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aggravated prison term of 18.5 years for Petitioner’s kidnapping conviction (Count V), to

run concurrently with the sentence on Count I. (Respondents’ Exh. B, Item 167; Exh. W,

Tr. 6/17/05 at 51-52) 

C. Direct Appeal

On July 6, 2005, Petitioner filed a timely notice of direct appeal. (Respondents’ Exh.

A, Item 177) On June 5, 2006, Petitioner, through counsel Thomas Gorman, filed an

opening brief raising the following issues:

1. Petitioner “was deprived of his right to a fair trial and to present a defense

under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, U.S. Constitution, when the trial 

court refused to permit him to present probative evidence and argument relevant

to his misidentification defense regarding an uncharged assailant named Damian

King.” (Respondents’ Exh. Y, at 10-15)

2. “The trial court abused its discretion by permitting the State to repeatedly

elicit evidence and argument terming the incident a ‘gang bang’ and ‘gang

rape.’” (Id. at 15-17) 

3. Petitioner “was deprived of his rights to a fair trial, compulsory process and

to present exculpatory evidence under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, U.S.

Constitution, when the trial court refused to permit [Petitioner] to call Hamilton

to be viewed by the jury or to declare a mistrial or impose other appropriate

sanctions against the State for its misconduct which resulted in the loss of a

prospective witness and codefendant Andre Hamilton’s testimony at trial after

he invoked his privilege to remain silent.” (Id. at 18-24)

4. “The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to order that the Department

of Public Safety disclose Austin Del Castillo’s security guard clearance application

that would have provided relevant impeachment evidence and thereby violated

[Petitioner’s] rights under the Sixth Amendment, U.S. Constitution.” (Id. at 24-26) 

5. “The State failed to present substantial evidence that proved [Petitioner’s]

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as an accomplice to a sexual assault by 

codefendant Guy Wooten [Count II]. The trial court abused its discretion when

it denied [Petitioner’s] Motion for a Directed Verdict.” (Id. at 26-27) 

6. “The State failed to present substantial evidence that proved [Petitioner’s] 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of sexually assaulting the victim in the 

bathroom [Count IV]. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied 

[Petitioner’s] Motion for a Directed Verdict.” (Id. at 27-29) 

7. “The trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury on the lesser-included

offense of sexual abuse and thereby violated [Petitioner’s] rights under the 

Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, U.S. Constitution.” (Id. at 29-31) 

8. “The reasonable doubt instruction impermissibly lowered the State’s 

burden of proof and deprived [Petitioner] of his rights to a jury trial and due

process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.” (Id. at 31-33) 

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9. “The jury instructions defining the especially cruel, heinous, or depraved 

aggravating factor was inadequate, erroneous, and constitutionally vague

in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, U.S. Constitution.” 

(Id. at 33-36) 

10. “[Petitioner’s] consecutive sentences are in violation of his right to be

free from double punishment under the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution,

and A.R.S. § 13-116.” (Id. at 36-40)

On March 8, 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions

and sentences in an unpublished opinion. (Respondents’ Exh. Z) The Court of Appeals

found that Petitioner waived his federal constitutional arguments on his claims related to: (1)

the preclusion of the allegedly exculpatory evidence regarding Damien King; and (2) the

trial court’s allegedly vague jury instruction defining the aggravating circumstances of

“especially cruel, heinous, or depraved.” (Respondents’ Exh. Z at 8, 21) The Court of

Appeals also found that all of Petitioner’s claims lacked merit. (Id.) 

On April 20, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for review in the Arizona

Supreme Court, which summarily denied review on August 8, 2007. (Respondents’ Exhs.

AA, BB) Petitioner did not petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of

certiorari. 

D. Post-Conviction Review

On June 26, 2007, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the trial court

pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. (Respondents’ Exh. CC) On July 10, 2007, the court

assigned Petitioner counsel, Kerri Droban, for the Rule-32 proceedings. (Respondents’ Exh.

DD) 

On December 10, 2007, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for postconviction relief, raising the following claim:

Trial counsel was ineffective under the United States and Arizona

Constitutions for failure to raise evidentiary issues pretrial regarding the 

admission of William Watson’s and Rita Anthony’s criminal acts of sexual 

assault and kidnapping unrelated and outside of Petitioner’s presence that 

ultimately led to prejudicing the jury’s determination of a critical issue in the 

case - both guilt and the cruel, heinous, and depraved aggravator and sentencing. 

(Respondents’ Exh. EE at 4) 

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 The Honorable Brian Ishikawa presided over post-conviction proceedings. 

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Petitioner identified the following evidence to which he contends his defense counsel

should have objected:

In [Petitioner’s] case, the State introduced evidence primarily through 

[Francesca] (the victim) and Rita Anthony as to acts by Anthony and William

[Billy] Watson that occurred on or about June 9, 2003. They testified as to the 

initial acts by William during which he threatened the victim, ordered her to 

have sex with him and perform sexual acts on both him and Anthony, and 

prance around his room wearing various items of lingerie. R.T. 4/12/05, at 

99-113. They also testified that William severely whipped and beat the 

victim when she did not comply and when she continued to moan and cry

with pain. Id. Anthony further testified after whipping the victim continuously

with extension cords, William hog-tied her, including wrapping the cord

around the victim’s neck so tightly that she turned blue and almost died. Id. at 108-10. Photographs introduced throughout trial predominantly represented

injuries sustained by William’s and Anthony’s acts to her neck, legs,

buttocks, and back — particularly the most gruesome and heinous ones. 

R.T. 4/14/05, at 52-55. 

(Respondents’ Exh. EE at 5-6)

On March 17, 2008, the State filed its response, opposing Petitioner’s request for

post-conviction relief. (Respondents’ Exh. FF) On May 12, 2008, the trial court3

 denied

relief and dismissed the petition stating that:

The Court has received the defendant’s Petition for Post-Conviction 

Relief, and the State’s Response to Petitioner for Post-Conviction Relief. The 

Court has reviewed the defendant’s petition, the State’s response, the file and 

records, and disregarding defects of form, it determines that no material issue 

of fact or law exists which would be served by any further proceedings . . . .

* * * 

1. The defendant has failed to show any colorable claim entitling him to postconviction relief.

2. The defendant’s allegations that he had ineffective assistance of counsel is

not supported by the record. The conduct of William Watson and Rita Anthony

was intrinsic to the crimes committed by the defendant. Additionally, the Court 

gave a limiting instruction on Absence of Other Participant. The defendant’s 

trial counsel moved to preclude photographs of the victim prior to trial and

argued that Watson and Anthony caused the injuries, not the defendant. The 

Court denied trial counsel’s motion. The defendant’s argument relating to the

sentencing phase is also without merit. There was more than sufficient 

aggravating factors present to warrant an aggravated prison term irrespective

of the cruel, heinous and depraved factor. The defendant fails to show both 

that trial counsel’s performance was (1) not reasonable under all the circumstances

and (2) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unreasonable

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 4 Although Petitioner did not subdivide his grounds for relief, for ease of reference, the Court

adopts Respondents’ manner of identifying Petitioner’s claims. 

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conduct the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1994), and State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 916 P.2d

1035 (1996). 

The Defendant’s petition raises no material issue of fact or law which

would entitle him to relief under Rule 32 and no purpose would be served by

any further proceedings. Accordingly, dismissal is appropriate. 

(Respondents’ Exh. GG)

On May 28, 2008, Petitioner petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals to review the

denial of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 1-1 at 5) The appellate court summarily denied

review on August 14, 2009. (Respondents’ Exh. HH) 

On November 30, 2009, Petitioner submitted a pro se petition for review to the

Arizona Supreme court. (Respondents’ Exh. II) The clerk of the Arizona Court of Appeals

rejected and returned the pleading to Petitioner for non-compliance with several procedural

rules. (Respondents’ Exh. JJ) Petitioner never corrected the defects and did not petition the

Arizona Supreme Court for review of the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. 

E. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. (Doc. 1) Petitioner raises the following claims for relief:4

Ground I: Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment “right to be free from double 

punishment” was violated when the trial court abused its discretion in the

following way:

(A) The trial court disregarded the recommendations of defense 

counsel and the author of the pre-sentence report that the court impose

concurrent prison terms for his convictions on Counts I, II, III, and

IV, because “they all occurred during one continuous 

episode,” and because the sexual assaults underlying Counts II

and III were the “ultimate crime” for his kidnapping conviction 

in Count V. (Doc. 1 at 5) (“Ground I(A)”) 

(B) “The trial court ran counts I and IV consecutive to each other

without any discussion as to whether he legally had the discretion 

to do otherwise,” (Id.) (“Ground I(B)”) 

(C) “The trial court did have the discretion to impose concurrent

terms for Counts II and III, which were imposed due to other 

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people’s conduct.” (Id.) (“Ground I(C)”)

Ground II: Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

by the trial court’s following rulings:

(A) The court refused to permit Petitioner “to call Andre Hamilton

into court to be viewed by the jury.” (Doc. 1 at 6) (“Ground II(A)”)

(B) The court “refused to declare a mistrial or impose other appropriate

sanctions against the State (prosecutors) for their (mis)conduct which 

resulted in the loss of Hamilton’s exculpatory testimony at trial.” (Id.)

(“Ground II(B)”)

(C and D) The court refused to permit Petitioner “to present probative

evidence and argument relevant to [his] misidentification defense 

regarding an uncharged assailant named Damian King. (Id.) 

1. the trial court erred by ruling that Petitioner could not call

King to the stand to force him to invoke his Fifth Amendment

privilege in the jury’s presence; and 

2. the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion in limine

to preclude Petitioner from eliciting testimony that King had

not been charged with any crime in connection with the kidnapping

and sexual assaults of Francesca. (“Grounds II(C) and (D)”)

E. The trial court “erroneously refused to instruct the jury on 

[sexual assault’s] lesser-included offense of sexual abuse” on 

Count II because “it was inconclusive whether Wooten or [Petitioner]

ever penetrated the victim.” (Id.) (“Ground II(E)”)

Ground III: Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 

object to the admission of evidence of the abusive acts that Billy Watson

and Rita Anthony committed against the victim on June 9, 2003, outside 

Petitioner’s presence, which prejudiced the jury and led to Petitioner’s 

convictions and the finding of the aggravating circumstance of especially

cruel, heinous, or depraved. (Doc. 1 at 7) 

Ground IV: The trial court violated Petitioner’s right to a jury trial, due

process, and a fair trial, as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments, by giving the following jury instructions:

(A) A reasonable-doubt instruction that contained “firmly convinced”

language that lowered the State’s burden of proof to “clear and 

convincing evidence.” (Id. at 8) (“Ground IV(A)”)

(B) An instruction defining the “especially cruel, heinous, or depraved”

aggravating circumstance, which was “unconstitutionally vague.” (Id.)

(“Ground IV(B)”) 

Respondents have filed an Answer to the Petition, to which Petitioner has replied. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Petition should be denied. 

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II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

Respondents argue that Grounds II(C), II(D), and IV(B) are procedurally defaulted

and barred from federal habeas corpus review by virtue of the Arizona Court of Appeals’

denial of those claims on the basis of an adequate and independent state-law ground. (Doc.

12 at 34) Petitioner asserts that he properly exhausted his claims. (Doc. 16) The Court will

consider the procedural bar issue below. 

A. Applicable Law 

Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless

the petitioner has exhausted the state remedies available to him. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). 

When seeking habeas relief, petitioner bears the burden of showing that he has properly

exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981) (per

curiam). The exhaustion inquiry focuses on the availability of state remedies at the time the

petition for writ of habeas corpus is filed in federal court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838 (1999). The prisoner “shall not be deemed to have exhausted . . . if he has the right

under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(c). In other words, proper exhaustion requires the prisoner to “give the state

courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete

round of the State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. 845. “One

complete round” includes filing a “petition[] for discretionary review when that review is

part of the ordinary appellate review procedure in the State.” Id. 

To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to

rule upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest”

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989);

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (stating that “[t]o provide the State with the

necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must “fairly present” her claim in each appropriate

state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.”). In Arizona,

unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if

the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on

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direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. Crowell v. Knowles , 483 F.Supp.2d

925 (D.Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

In addition to presenting his claims to the proper court, a state prisoner must fairly

present his claims to that court to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. A claim is “fairly

presented” in state court only if a petitioner has described both the operative facts and the

federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Reese, 541 U.S. at 28. It is not enough that

all of the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state court or that a

“somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Reese, 541 U.S. at 28 (stating that a

reference to ineffective assistance of counsel does not alert the court to federal nature of the

claim). Rather, the habeas petitioner must cite in state court to the specific constitutional

guarantee upon which he bases his claim in federal court. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d

895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). Similarly, general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such

as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish fair

presentation of a federal constitutional claim. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th

Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne,

223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (insufficient for prisoner to have made “a general appeal

to a constitutional guarantee,” such as a naked reference to “due process,” or to a

“constitutional error” or a “fair trial”). Likewise, a mere reference to the “Constitution of

the United States” does not preserve a federal claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152,

162-63 (1996). Even if the basis of a federal claim is “self-evident” or if the claim would be

decided “on the same considerations” under state or federal law, the petitioner must make

the federal nature of the claim “explicit either by citing federal law or the decision of the

federal courts . . . .” Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668. A state prisoner does not fairly present a claim

to the state court if the court must read beyond the pleadings filed in that court to discover

the federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 27. 

In sum, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2)

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through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the

claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised

in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds such as

waiver or preclusion. See Beard v. Kindler, ___ U.S.___, 130 S.Ct. 612, 614-19 (2009); Ylst

v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Thus, a

petitioner may be barred from raising federal claims that he did not preserve in state court by

making a contemporaneous objection at trial, on direct appeal, or when seeking postconviction relief. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 842 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that failure to

raise contemporaneous objection to alleged violation of federal rights during state trial

constitutes a procedural default of that issue); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th

Cir. 1991) (finding claim procedurally defaulted where the Arizona Court of Appeals held

that habeas petitioner had waived claims by failing to raise them on direct appeal or in first

petition for post-conviction relief.) If the state court also addressed the merits of the

underlying federal claim, the “alternative” ruling does not vitiate the independent state

procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); Carringer v. Lewis, 971

F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (state supreme court found ineffective assistance of counsel

claims “barred under state law,” but also discussed and rejected the claims on the merits, en

banc court held that the “on-the-merits” discussion was an “alternative ruling” and the

claims were procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review). A higher court’s

subsequent summary denial of review affirms the lower court’s application of a procedural

bar. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. However, “in order to constitute adequate and

independent grounds sufficient to support a finding of procedural default, a state rule must

be clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time of Petitioner’s default.” Wells

v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court had held that “a

discretionary state procedural rule can serve as an adequate ground to bar federal habeas

review,” and that “a discretionary rule can be ‘firmly established’ and ‘regularly followed’ -

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even if the appropriate exercise of discretion may permit consideration of a federal claim in

some cases but not in others.” Kindler, 130 S.Ct. at 618. Likewise, occasionally excusing

non-compliance with a procedural rule does not render a state procedural bar inadequate. 

See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n. 6 (1989). 

Arizona courts have been consistent in their application of procedural default rules. 

See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (holding that Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32.2(a) is an adequate and independent procedural bar); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d

1000, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[p]reclusion of issues for failure to present them at

an earlier proceeding under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) ‘are independent

of federal law because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the

merits.’”) (footnote omitted) (quoting Smith, 536 U.S. at 860); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d

923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that Arizona courts have not “strictly or

regularly” followed Rule 32). 

The second procedural default scenario arises when a petitioner failed to present his

federal claims to the state court, but returning to state court would be “futile” because the

state courts’ procedural rules, such as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the

previously unraised claims. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v.

Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27, 916 P.2d

1035, 1048-53 (1996); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) & (b); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3) (postconviction review is precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review must

be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). A state post-conviction action is futile

where it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th

Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal

of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under Rule

32.2(a)). This type of procedural default is known as “technical” exhaustion because

although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, the petitioner no longer has an

available state remedy. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted

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his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no

remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”).

 In either case of procedural default, federal review of the claim is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v.

Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94, (2004); Hughes, 800 F.2d at 907-08. To establish “cause,” a

petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Id. The following objective factors may

constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2) a showing that the factual or legal

basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective assistance

of counsel. Id. Ordinarily, the ineffective assistance of counsel in collateral proceedings

does not constitute cause because “the right to counsel does not extend to state collateral

proceedings or federal habeas proceedings.” Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301,

1306 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Prejudice is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v.

Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a habeas petitioner

bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

dimension.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d

1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). Where petitioner fails to establish cause, the court need not

reach the prejudice prong. 

A federal court may also review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if 

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. To satisfy the “fundamental

miscarriage of justice” standard, petitioner must establish that it is more likely than not that

no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Id. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B). Even if a petitioner asserts a claim of

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actual innocence to excuse his procedural default of a federal claim, federal habeas relief

may not be granted absent a finding of an independent constitutional violation occurring in

the state criminal proceedings. Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393-94. 

B. Grounds II(C) and II(D)

In Ground II(C), Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his right to present a

defense when it denied Petitioner’s request to call Damien King to the witness stand at trial

so that Petitioner could force him to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination in the jury’s presence. In Ground II(D), Petitioner argues that the trial court

violated his right to present a defense when it ruled that Petitioner could not offer evidence

that the State had not charged King with any crime in connection with the kidnapping and

sexual assaults of Francesca. (Doc. 1 at 6) Respondents assert that Grounds II(C) and (D)

are procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus review. (Doc. 12 at 41) 

Petitioner argues that his claims are properly before this Court. (Doc. 16) 

Petitioner presented both claims challenging the trial court’s rulings regarding

Damien King to the Arizona court on direct appeal. The Arizona Court of Appeals

ultimately ruled that Petitioner had “waived the constitutional argument in [Grounds II(C)

and II(D) involving King] by failing to present it at trial.” (Respondents’ Exh. Z at 8) The

appellate court further explained that:

Because King was not a State witness, the prosecutor made a motion 

in limine to preclude evidence ‘not whether or not Damien King was there, 

but there should be no mention of the fact that he was neither charged nor 

arrested for these crimes.’ Noting that the prosecutor did not intend to ‘preclude 

any testimony as to the others as to what they observed Mr. King do or his 

identification,’ [Petitioner] objected on the basis that ‘it certainly goes to 

everybody’s credibility as to what happened to Mr. King.’ The court granted

the prosecutor’s motion to preclude the evidence.

During trial, defense counsel learned that King intended to assert his 

Fifth-Amendment right against self-incrimination at [Petitioner’s] trial. Counsel

then requested that the court allow him to call King to the stand for the sole

purpose of displaying a tattoo on the back of his neck that stated “ATL.” 

The trial court ruled that [Petitioner] could not call King to the stand. 

It said, however, that the prosecutor could recall Detective Shumaker to identify

King, and defense counsel could ask King to display his tattoo to the jury.

Because a defense was mistaken identity, [Petitioner] claims on appeal 

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that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the prosecutor’s motion 

because the evidence that King was not charged and arrested was relevant to 

his defense of third-party culpability. [Petitioner] argues from this proposition 

that his constitutional right to present his defense was compromised. 

[Petitioner] also insists that the trial court should have permitted him 

to call King to the stand. He maintains that the court’s limited ruling allowing 

the jury to see King’s tattoo did not cure the error created by precluding evidence

that King was not charged in the case. 

First, [Petitioner] waived the constitutional argument by failing to present 

it at trial. See State v. Baldenegro, 188 Ariz. 10, 14, 932 P.2d 275, 279 ([Ariz.

Ct] App. 1996). [FN 4: Even if [Petitioner’s] request to call King to testify

after King had exercised his Fifth-Amendment privilege preserved the issue

for review, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying this request.

See State v. Henry, 176 Ariz. 569, 580-81, 863 P.2d 872-73 ([Ariz.] 1993) (The

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request to 

call a witness when the witness would have claimed his Fifth Amendment 

privilege in front of the jury.).]

Second, the trial court did not err in precluding as irrelevant evidence 

that King was neither charged nor arrested. In State v. Gibson, 202 Ariz. 321, 

324, ¶ 19, 44 P.3d 1001, 1004 ([Ariz.] 2002), the Arizona Supreme Court held 

that the Arizona Rules of Evidence (“Rules”) 401, 402, and 403 ‘set forth the 

proper test for determining the admissibility of third-party culpability evidence.’ 

Applying those rules, the court held that ‘[t]he proper focus in determining 

relevancy is the effect the evidence has upon the defendant’s culpability. To be

relevant, the evidence need only tend to create a reasonable doubt as to the

defendant’s guilt.’ Id. at ¶ 16. 

The trial court did not preclude [Petitioner] from introducing testimony

that King may have been the person who committed the charged offenses,

and it did not prevent him from asserting a third-party culpability defense. 

However, evidence that King was neither charged nor arrested is not

relevant to the issue whether [Petitioner] was guilty of the offenses . . . We

find no error.

(Respondents’ Exh. Z at 7-9) 

As set forth above, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that Petitioner had waived his

constitutional arguments by not presenting them to the trial court. In other words, the

Arizona Court of Appeals found Petitioner’s constitutional arguments pertaining to King

were procedurally defaulted on state procedural grounds. See Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d

953, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding petitioner’s failure to make timely objections at trial

constituted grounds for finding federal claim procedurally barred from § 2254 review). 

Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion in his Reply, Arizona courts have consistently invoked the

waiver doctrine to preclude review of federal claims that defendant never presented to the

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trial court. See State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 13, 951 P.2d 869, 877 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc)

(citing State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 572, 858 P.2d 1152, 1175 (Ariz. 1993)). Here, the

Arizona Court of Appeals’ finding that Petitioner waived his constitutional arguments

regarding King results in a procedural bar, notwithstanding the appellate court’s observation

that, “[e]ven if [Petitioner’s] request to call King to testify after King had exercised his

Fifth-Amendment privilege preserved the issue for review, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying this request.” (Respondents’ Exh. Z at 8 n. 4) “The fact that the court

went on to discuss the lack of merit of some or all of the [procedurally-precluded claims]

does not eliminate the procedural bar.” Poland, 169 F.3d at 586 n. 8 (citing Harris v. Reed,

489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989)). 

To the extent that Petitioner challenges that Arizona Court of Appeals’ determination 

based on Arizona Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403, that “evidence that King was neither

charged nor arrested is not relevant to the issue whether [Petitioner] was guilty of the

offenses,” Respondents’ Exh. Z at 9, such a claim is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus

review because it is based on state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (stating

that “[i]t is not the province of a federal court to re-examine the state court determinations of

state law questions.”). 

Finally, even if Petitioner’s constitutional challenges to the trial court’s ruling

pertaining to King were properly before this Court, Petitioner has not shown that the State

courts’ determination that the evidence at issue was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible

was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as

determined by the Supreme Court. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 770 (2006) (stating

that “‘[w]hile the Constitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules

that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted

to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its

probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of

the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.’”) (quoting Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S.

319, 326 (2006)). 

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In view of the foregoing, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on Grounds

II(C) and II(D). 

C. Ground IV(B)

In Ground IV(B), Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his rights to due

process and a fair trial by giving a jury instruction which defined the “especially cruel,

heinous or depraved” aggravating circumstance in an unconstitutionally vague manner. 

(Doc. 1 at 8) Respondents argue that this claim is procedurally barred from federal habeas

corpus review because the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected this claim on the basis of an

adequate and independent state procedural rule. Petitioner presented this claim on direct

appeal. The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected it on the ground that Petitioner had “invited”

the error and, therefore, was precluded from challenging the jury instruction defining

“especially cruel, heinous, or depraved.” (Respondents’ Exh. Z at 21) The Court of

Appeals explained that:

[Petitioner] claims that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury

on the aggravating factors of ‘cruel,’ ‘heinous’ or ‘depraved.’ He insists that

the definitions were unconstitutionally vague. 

Both [Petitioner] and the prosecutor submitted proposed jury instructions, 

and the trial court gave the jury the instructions defining ‘cruel,’ ‘heinous,’

and ‘depraved’ that [Petitioner] requested. ‘[W]hen a party requests an 

erroneous instruction, any resulting error is invited and the party waives

his right to challenge the instruction on appeal.’ State v. Logan, 200 Ariz.

564, 565, 30 P.3d 631, 632 ([Ariz.] 2001). We therefore will not consider

[Petitioner’s] argument of alleged constitutional infirmity. 

(Respondents’ Exh. Z at 21) 

Arizona courts have consistently held that a defendant who invites error has waived a

subsequent challenge to it on appeal because a party “‘may not be heard [on appeal] to decry

a result fashioned by its own handiwork.’” State v. Moreno, 173 Ariz. 471, 473, 844 P.2d

638, 640 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1992) (quoting Sisson v. State, 16 Ariz. 170, 175, 141 P. 713, 714-15

(1914)). Specifically, Arizona courts have consistently applied the invited-error doctrine to

appellate challenges to jury instructions that a defendant proposed or helped draft. See State

v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 564, 566-67, 30 P.3d 631, 633-34 (Ariz. 2000) (citing cases). The

invited-error doctrine is an adequate and independent state procedural rule upon which the

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Arizona Court of Appeals relied to reject Petitioner’s challenge to the “heinous, cruel, and

depraved” jury instruction. Accordingly, Ground IV(B) is procedurally barred from federal

habeas corpus review. See Beard v. Kindler, ___ U.S.___, 130 S.Ct. 612, 614-19 (2009);

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 802-05. 

Moreover, Petitioner’s claim asserted in Ground IV(B) lacks merit. Petitioner was

not tried for a capital offense, thus the Eighth Amendment vagueness inquiry does not apply. 

See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991) (stating that [o]ur cases creating and

clarifying the ‘individualized capital sentencing doctrine’ have repeatedly suggested that

there is no comparable requirement outside the capital context, because of the qualitative

difference between death and all other penalties.”); Holman v. Page, 95 F.3d 481, 87 (7th

Cir. 1996) (stating that “it is now established . . . that the Eighth Amendment vagueness

inquiry does not apply in noncapital cases.”), overruled on other grounds by, Owens v. U.S.,

387 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2004). Additionally, Petitioner’s vagueness challenge to the

definitions of “especially cruel, heinous, or depraved,” fails to consider that “definition of an

aggravating factor of this nature is not susceptible of mathematical precision.” Mata, 185

Ariz. at 324, 916 P.2d at 1040; Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973) (“Words

inevitably contain germs of uncertainty . . . .”); Holman, 95 F.3d at 487 (“On some level,

virtually every verbal or written formulation is vague; there is always some circumstance

that puts interpretative pressure on a word and exposes the limits of its meaning. When it

comes to terms like ‘exceptionally brutal,’ ‘heinous,’ and ‘wanton cruelty,’ - all resounding

with strong moral condemnation - precise meaning is probably impossible. Thus, in the

application, terms like ‘wantonly cruelty’ will at some point be subject to a judgment call

and a charge of vagueness.”). 

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground IV(B).

D. Overcoming the Procedural Bar

As set forth above, Grounds II(C), II(D), and IV(B) are procedurally defaulted and

barred from federal habeas corpus review absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” or a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

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1. Cause and Prejudice

To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor

external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. 

Murray, 477 U.S. at 488-492. The following objective factors may constitute cause: (1)

interference by state officials, (2) a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was

not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.

Prejudice is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v.

Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). Where petitioner fails to establish cause for

his procedural default, the court need not consider whether petitioner has shown actual

prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S.

527, 533 (1986). 

In an effort to overcome the procedural bar, Petitioner baldly asserts that the

procedural rules upon which the Arizona Court of Appeals relied in rejecting his claims

were not adequate and independent, or regularly followed, Petitioner does not assert any

basis to overcome the procedural bar. (Doc. 16 at 3) As set forth above, the procedural

grounds upon which the Arizona Court of Appeals relied in rejecting Grounds II(C), II(D),

and IV(B), were both adequate and independent, and regularly followed. Petitioner does

not assert any other basis to overcome the procedural bar. Because Petitioner offers no

legitimate “cause” which precluded him from properly exhausting his state remedies as to

Grounds II(C), II(D), and IV(B), the Court declines to reach the issue of prejudice. Engle,

456 U.S. at 134 n. 43. 

2. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice 

Additionally, Petitioner has not shown that failure to consider Grounds II(C),

II (D), and IV(B) will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. A federal court may

review the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim if the petitioner demonstrates that

failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of

justice.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. A “fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a

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constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent. Id. 

This gateway “actual innocence” claim differs from a substantive actual innocence

claim. Smith v. Baldwin, 466 F.3d 805, 811-12 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court

described the gateway showing in Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315-16, as a less stringent standard

than a substantive claim of actual innocence. See also Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463,

476 (9th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that a “habeas petitioner asserting a freestanding innocence

claim must go beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt and must affirmatively prove that

he is innocent.”). If Petitioner passes through the Schlup gateway, the court is only

permitted to review his underlying constitutional claims. Smith, 466 F.3d at 807. The

fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies only to a “narrow class of cases” in

which a petitioner makes the extraordinary showing that an innocent person was probably

convicted due to a constitutional violation. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 231. To demonstrate a

fundamental miscarriage of justice, Petitioner must show that “a constitutional violation has

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Id. at 327. To establish the

requisite probability, Petitioner must prove with new reliable evidence that “it is more likely

than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id. New evidence presented in support of a fundamental miscarriage of justice may

include “exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical

physical evidence that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324, see also, House v. Bell, 547

U.S. 518 (2006) (stating that a fundamental miscarriage of justice contention must involve

evidence that the trial jury did not have before it). 

Petitioner has not established that, in light of newly discovered evidence, “it is more

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327.

III. Analysis

Respondents concede that Petitioner’s claims raised in the remaining Grounds for

relief are properly before the Court on habeas corpus review. Respondents, however, argue

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that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because he has not established that the

Arizona courts’ resolution of his claims was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts; or that the Arizona courts’ determination was either contrary to, or based an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). 

A. Standard of Review

This Court’s consideration of the merits of Petitioner’s claims is constrained by the

applicable standard of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended in 1996 by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The ADEPA “modified a

federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent

federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the

extent possible under the law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). The standard in §

2254(d) is “meant to be” “difficult to meet.” Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S., ___ , 131 S.Ct.

770, 786 (2011). Section “2254 stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court

relitigation of claims already rejected in state court proceedings.” Id. (citations omitted).

“Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against extreme

malfunction in the state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error

correction through appeal.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n. 5 (1979)).

Federal habeas relief may not be granted for claims subject to § 2254(d) unless it is

shown that the earlier state court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law then clearly

established in the holdings of the United States Supreme Court, § 2254(d)(1); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); or that it “involved an unreasonable application of” such

law, § 2254(d)(1); or that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” in

light of the record before the state court, § 2254(d)(2). Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 785; see also

Mancebo v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 2006). To determine whether a state court

ruling was “contrary to” or involved an “unreasonable application” of federal law, courts

look exclusively to the holdings of the Supreme Court which existed at the time of the state

court’s decision. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. ___ , ___, 130

S.Ct. 1855, 1866, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010)). The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that it

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cannot reverse a state court decision merely because that decision conflicts with Ninth

Circuit precedent on a federal constitutional issue. Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 957 (9th

Cir. 2004); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). Even if the state court

neither explains its ruling nor cites United States Supreme Court authority, the reviewing

federal court must nevertheless examine Supreme Court precedent to determine whether the

state court reasonably applied federal law. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784 (citing Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003)). The Supreme Court held in Early, and recently reaffirmed in Richter,

that citation to federal law is not required and that compliance with the habeas statute “does

not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts them.” Early, 537 U.S. at 8; Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784.

“Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s

burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state to deny

relief. This is so whether or not the state court reveals which of the elements in a multipart

claim it found insufficient, for § 2254(d) applies when a ‘claim’, not a component of one,

has been adjudicated.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784.

Under § 2254(d), a state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a

rule of law “that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it

confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme

Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.”

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted); Williams, 529 U.S. at 411. A

state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court identifies the

correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a particular case. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405; Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). An incorrect

application of federal law does not satisfy this standard. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.

652, 665-66 (2004) (stating that “[r]elief is available under § 2254(d)(1) only if the state

court's decision is objectively unreasonable.”). “A state court’s determination that a claim

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree on

the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. 786 (citing Yarborough,

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541 U.S. at 664). “‘[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires

considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in

reaching outcomes in case-by-case determination.’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing

Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664). 

The habeas court presumes that the state court’s factual determinations are correct

and petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (stating that “a determination of factual issues made by a

State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting

the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”); Williams v. Rhoades,

354 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Where a state court decision is deemed “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application

of” clearly established federal law, the reviewing court must next determine whether it

resulted in constitutional error. Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2002). 

On habeas review, the court assesses the prejudicial impact of most constitutional errors by

determining whether they “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v.

United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007) (Brecht

standard applies whether or not the state court recognized the error and reviewed it for

harmlessness). The Brecht harmless error analysis also applies to habeas review of a

sentencing error. The test is whether such error had a “substantial and injurious effect” on

the sentence. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-57 (1998) (holding that for habeas

relief to be granted based on constitutional error in capital penalty phase, error must have

had substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict in the penalty phase.); Hernandez v.

LaMarque, 2006 WL 2411441 (N.D.Cal., Aug. 18, 2006) (finding that even if the evidence

of three of petitioner’s prior convictions was insufficient, petitioner was not prejudiced by

the court’s consideration of those convictions because the trial court found four other prior

convictions which would have supported petitioner’s sentence.) However, some

constitutional errors do not require that the petitioner demonstrate prejudice. Musladin v.

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Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,

310 (1991); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984)). The Court will review

Petitioner’s claims under the applicable standard of review.

B. Grounds I(A), (B), and (C)

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his “right to be free from

double punishment under the United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.” (Doc. 1 at 5) 

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that “it [was] not constitutionally permissible to

impose consecutive sentences for [his sexual assault convictions in] Counts II and III,”

because he had committed these two offenses by engaging in “the same course of conduct,”

which was “to hold one of the victim’s legs” while his accomplices (Keoni and Wooten)

took turns sexually assaulted her. (Respondents’ Exh. Y at 39) Petitioner tried to

distinguish his case from Arizona opinions upholding consecutive sentences for multiple sex

acts committed against the same victim in quick succession, by arguing that the sexualassault convictions in Counts II and III “were for actions taken by his codefendants that

occurred during the same transaction which [he] committed during a single act of sexual

assault.” (Respondents’ Exh. Y at 39-40; distinguishing State v. Williams, 182 Ariz. 548,

898 P.2d 497 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1995); State v. Boldrey, 176 Ariz. 378, 861 P.2d 663 (Ariz.Ct.

App. 1993); State v. Arnoldi, 176 Ariz. 236, 860 P.2d 503 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1993)). 

On direct appeal, Petitioner also asserted a statute-based challenge to his sentences on

all four of his sexual assault convictions. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred by

ordering that his sentences for Counts I, II, III, and IV run consecutively because: (1) the

court mistakenly considered the controlling statute to be A.R.S. § 13-1406(C); and (2) the

court assumed that A.R.S. § 13-708 mandated consecutive sentences, notwithstanding the

Arizona Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Garza, 192 Ariz. 71, 74, 962 P.2d 898, 901

(1998), that this statute did not create a presumption of consecutive sentences when

“multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a person at the same time.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. Y at 36-37) Petitioner argued that the trial court could have imposed

concurrent sentences had it understood that the controlling sentencing statute was A.R.S. §

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13-116, which provides that “[a]n act or omission which is made punishable in different

ways by different sections of the laws may be punishment under both, but in no event may

sentences be other than concurrent.” (Respondents’ Exh. Y at 37-38) Petitioner asserted

that the trial court should have recognized that A.R.S. §§ 13-708, and 13-1406(C) did not

mandate consecutive prison sentences because both the pre-sentence report writer and

defense counsel had recommended the imposition of concurrent sentences for Counts I, II,

III, and V. (Respondents’ Exh. Y at 37-38) 

In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner supports his double jeopardy

claim with language from foregoing passages of his appellate brief which allege that the trial

court misconstrued or misapplied the applicable Arizona sentencing statutes. (Doc. 1 at 5)

Thus, although Petitioner labels Ground One as a Fifth Amendment double jeopardy claim,

he also raises several state-law arguments:

Ground I(A): the trial court erred in disregarding the recommendations of 

defense counsel and the pre-sentence report writer that Petitioner receive 

concurrent prison sentences for his convictions on Counts I, II, III, and IV, 

because “they all occurred during one continuous episode,” and because

the sexual assaults underlying Counts II and III were the “ultimate crime’

for his kidnapping conviction in Count V. 

Ground I(B): “The trial court ran counts I [and] IV consecutive to each other

without any discussion as to whether he legally had discretion to do 

otherwise.” 

Ground I(C): “The court did have the discretion to impose concurrent

terms for Counts II [and] III, which were imposed due to other people’s 

conduct.” 

(Doc. 1 at 5) 

As Respondents argue, Petitioner essentially challenges the trial court’s failure to

recognize that Arizona’s sentencing statutes permitted the imposition of concurrent

sentences for Petitioner’s sexual assault convictions. Petitioner’s claim is based on the

application of state law which is not subject to habeas corpus review by this Court. See

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (explaining that “it is not the province of a

federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”). A

state prisoner can obtain federal habeas corpus relief only if his conviction violates the

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Constitution or the laws and treaties of the United States. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,

119 (1982). Federal habeas corpus relief does is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Peltier v. Wright, 15

F.3d 860, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, this Court lacks authority to consider

Grounds I(A), (B), and (C) to the extent that Petitioner challenges the trial court’s

application of Arizona law. See Souch v. Schriro, 289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding

that habeas relief was not available when Arizona court imposed consecutive sentences

without complying with A.R.S. § 13-708); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1044 (9th

Cir. 1997) (rejecting claim that state court improperly double-counted an aggravating

circumstance on the ground that it was a state-law issue); Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37

F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that the “decision whether to impose sentences

concurrently or consecutively is a matter of state criminal procedure and is not within the

purview of federal habeas corpus.”); Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (9th Cir.

1989) (refusing to consider alleged errors in violation of state sentencing law). 

To the extent that Ground One also alleges a double jeopardy claim under the United

States Constitution, it also fails. (Doc. 1 at 5) The guarantee against double jeopardy

protects against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second

prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same

offense. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498 (1984); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S.

117, 129 (1980); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). Where “cumulative

sentences [are] imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than

prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature

intended.” Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983). See Albernaz v. United States,

450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981) (“Where consecutive sentences are imposed at a single criminal

trial, the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not

exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same

offense.”) (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977)). “Thus, determining the

permissibility of imposing multiple punishments for one course of conduct is a matter of

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discerning the legislature’s intent.” United States v. Patel, 370 F.3d 108, 114 (1st Cir. 2004)

(citing Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344). 

As previously stated, on direct review, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected

Petitioner’s challenge to the imposition of consecutive sentences on Counts II and III. 

(Respondents’ Exh. Z at 22-23) The appellate court’s conclusion was based on its

determination that the Arizona legislature intended that consecutive sentences be imposed

for the conduct at issue. (Id.) On habeas corpus review, this Court must defer to the

Arizona Court of Appeals’ determination regarding the state legislature’s intent. See

Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 615 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating that on habeas corpus

review, the court is bound by the state court’s determination regarding whether state

legislature intended to prescribe cumulative punishment.); Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368;

Brimmage v. Sumner, 793 F.2d 1014, 1015 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that, on habeas corpus

review, “[w]e must accept the state court’s interpretation of the legislative intent for the

imposition of multiple punishments, although we are not bound by that court’s ultimate

conclusion concerning whether such punishments violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”). 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that A.R.S. §

13-116 did not prohibit the imposition of consecutive sentences for Counts II and III. The

court stated:

Second, the facts showed that [Petitioner] held one of F.’s legs while 

Wooten attempted to sexually assault her. He also hit, slapped, and elbowed F.,

enabling Keoni to sexually assault her. Thus, [Petitioner] engaged in separate 

acts at different times to aid Wooten and Keoni in sexually assaulting F., and the 

imposition of consecutive sentences was proper. See State v. Williams, 182

Ariz. 548, 562-63, 898 P.2d 497, 511-12 ([Ariz.Ct.] App. 1995) (the imposition

of consecutive sentences was proper if the defendant committed different 

acts of sexual assault during a single episode exposing one victim to different

harms.).

(Respondents’ Exh. Z at 22-23) 

The record supports the Arizona Court of Appeals’ finding that Petitioner beat

Francesca before Keoni’s sexual assault, and that Petitioner therefore had engaged in

conduct in addition to restraining one of Francesca’s legs while Keoni and Wooten sexually

assaulted her. Before Keoni sexually assaulted Francesca, Petitioner grabbed her hair,

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forced her head toward his face, and then struck Francesca in the face with sufficient force

to cause her to fall and become motionless. (Respondents’ Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 122-24,

126-28) Thereafter, Petitioner and Wooten held Francesca legs while Keoni had nonconsensual intercourse with her. (Respondents’ Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 124-25, 129-30) 

The record indicates that there was an interval separating when Petitioner held one of

Francesca’s legs to permit Wooten, and short time later, Keoni to sexually assault Francesca. 

(Respondents’ Exh. O, Tr. 5/2/05 at 33-39) In between Wooten’s and Keoni’s assaults on

Francesca, Vanessa knocked on the door and someone inside handed her her purse. Vanessa

saw Keoni pulling Francesca’s shirt down. Austin knocked on the door after Vanessa

retrieved her purse, and Keoni opened the door and let Austin into the bedroom. When

Keoni opened the door, Austin saw Francesca on the bed, Petitioner leaning on the south

wall, Hamilton on the east side of the room, and Wooten on the west side of the room.

Austin then saw Wooten put on a condom and sexually assault Francesca while Petitioner

and Hamilton kept her legs open and Keoni covered her head with a pillow. Austin did not

see Keoni sexually assault Francesca in the bedroom. (Id.) 

The appellate court’s factual finding that Petitioner engaged in separate acts support

its conclusion that “the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences under

A.R.S. § 13-116.” (Respondents’ Exh. Z at 23) In reaching that conclusion, the appellate

court relied on Arizona law which permits consecutive sentences for multiple violations of

the same statute, A.R.S. § 13-1406, which prohibits non-consensual vaginal and anal

intercourse, as well as oral sexual conduct. Arizona courts have found that “[s]o long as the

multiple acts of . . . intercourse can be considered separate offenses, nothing prohibits

consecutive sentences for those convictions. To the contrary, A.R.S. section 13-708

presumes consecutive sentences are appropriate.” State v. Williams, 182 Ariz. 548, 562, 898

P.2d 497, 511 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1995), superseded by rule, on other grounds, as stated in, State

v. Terrazas, 187 Ariz. 387, 930 P.2d 464 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1996). The Court of Appeals also

relied on Arizona precedent which permits the imposition of consecutive sentences for each

of several sexual acts that a defendant has committed against the same victim during the

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same assault episode. (Respondents’ Exh. Z at 22-23) (citing Williams, 182 Ariz. at 562-64,

898 P.2d at 511-13) (upholding the imposition of consecutive sentences for multiple acts of

fellatio and intercourse occurring in rapid succession during the same episode) (citing

cases). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ determination that A.R.S. § 13-116 did not prohibit

the imposition of consecutive sentences for Petitioner’s convictions on Counts II and III

resolves Petitioner’s argument that the Arizona statutes did not permit consecutive

sentences. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368. Petitioner has not offered evidence or argument

sufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness afforded the state court’s

determination. 

Moreover, even if Petitioner were able to establish that he held Francesca’s leg

continuously while Keoni and Wooten sexually assaulted her, he cannot establish a double

jeopardy violation. First, Arizona’s accomplice liability statutes do not recognize the

distinction that Petitioner has drawn, rather, the statutes view Petitioner as if he had stood in

Keoni’s and Wooten’s place when they raped Francesca. See State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131,

140, 856 P.2d 792, 801 (Ariz. 1993) (“As the jury was instructed, ‘[t]he law makes no

distinction between the person who directly commits a crime and the person who is an

accomplice.’”) (citation omitted). Because Arizona’s accomplice-liability statutes treat

Petitioner as if he had personally raped Francesca two separate times in quick succession,

Arizona law permitted the trial court to impose consecutive sentences for Counts II and III,

because, “[e]ach act constituted intercourse as defined by A.R.S. § 13-1401 and each was

established with reference to the elements of the other.” State v. McCuin, 167 Ariz. 447,

449, 808 P.2d 332, 334 (Ariz.Ct. App. 1991), judgment affirmed in part, vacated on other

grounds part by, State v. McCuin, 171 Ariz. 171, 829 P.2d 1217 (Ariz. 1992). Second,

Arizona courts defined the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes, not by the act of

the defendant, but by the results of the charged act. State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585,

125 P.3d 1039, 1041 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2005). The sexual assaults underling Counts II and III

constituted separate and distinct acts. 

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 In short, Petitioner has not shown that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ rejection of his

Double Jeopardy claim is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it is

contrary to, or rests on an unreasonable application of, federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

C. Grounds II(A) and II(B)

In Ground II(A), Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by not permitting

Petitioner to call Andre Hamilton into court to be viewed by the jury. (Doc. 1 at 6) In

Ground II(B), Petitioner argues that the trial court improperly “refused to declare a mistrial

or impose other appropriate sanctions against the State (prosecutors) for their (mis)conduct

which resulted in the loss of Hamilton’s exculpatory testimony at trial.” (Doc. 1 at 6) As

discussed below, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s rejection of these claims was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. §

2254. 

a. Relevant Background

In exchange for reduced sentences, Hamilton pled guilty to two charges (kidnapping

and attempted sexual assault), pursuant to a plea agreement that required him to testify at

Petitioner’s trial. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Item 175; Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 37-38) Based on

Hamilton’s post-arrest and “free-talk” interviews, the State anticipated that Hamilton would

testify that: (1) he was present at Billy’s house when Francesca as sexually assaulted; (2)

Petitioner had accompanied him to Billy’s house on Tuesday morning; (3) Hamilton realized

from Francesca’s bruises that she had been beaten; (4) Petitioner told Hamilton he had sex

with Francesca that morning; (5) Hamilton saw Petitioner have oral sex with Francesca; and

(6) Hamilton saw Petitioner take Francesca to the bathroom and heard punching sounds

emanating from that room. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 37-38; Exh. N, Tr. 4/29/05

at 14-16, 21-22) 

On March 10, 2005, Petitioner’s defense counsel conducted a tape-recorded interview

of Hamilton. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Items 125, 175; Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 4-10; Exh. L, Tr.

4/25/05 at 4-6; Eh. M, Tr. 4/26/05 at 4) During the interview, Hamilton contradicted

statements that he had previously made to the State by alleging that the following events had

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occurred: (1) on Tuesday morning, Petitioner, Wooten, Hamilton, and King had consensual

sex with Francesca; (2) the men did not have group sex with Francesca, but waited their turn

outside the bedroom; (3) before Hamilton and Francesca had sex, Francesca voluntarily

removed her clothing; and (4) Hamilton did not actually see Petitioner enter the bedroom,

but later heard that Petitioner had sex with Francesca. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Item 175; Tr.

3/10/05 at 20-23, 30-34, 36-38, 42-44, 48) 

On April 18, 2005, Deputy County Attorney Baker interviewed Hamilton, in the

presence of his attorney, Germann Salazar, to prepare his trial testimony. (Respondents’

Exh. A, Items 125, 128; Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 3-10; Exh. M, Tr. 4/26/05 at 4-5). Baker was

surprised when Hamilton gave a version of the events that differed from his pre-trial freetalk. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Item 128 at 102; Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 6-8; Exh. M, Tr.

4/26/05 at 14-15, 19) Hamilton essentially repeated to Baker what he had told Petitioner’s

counsel during the March pretrial interview, however, he alleged that he had actually seen

Petitioner in the bedroom - which differed from his statement in March that he had only

heard that Petitioner had sex with Francesca. (Respondents’ Exh. M, Tr. 4/26/05 at 6-7;

Exh. N., Tr. 4/29/05 at 15) 

On April 19, 2005, the prosecution advised Petitioner that the State no longer

intended to call Hamilton and would be moving with withdraw from Hamilton’s plea

agreement. (Respondents’ Exh. M, Tr. 4/26/05 at 4-5) The next day, the prosecution

informed the trial court that it intended to withdraw from Hamilton’s plea agreement

because of his statements during Baker’s trial preparation session and stated that it’s

decision not to call Hamilton during trial was due to credibility concerns. (Respondents’

Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 3-4, 7-10)

On April 25, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion for any exculpatory evidence that

Hamilton had disclosed during Baker’s pre-trial interview. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Item 125;

Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 3) Petitioner reported that Hamilton’s claim of consensual sex with

Francesca on Tuesday morning was “not new news” because Hamilton had made this

assertion during his defense interview; Petitioner provided the court with a transcript of the

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March pretrial interview. (Respondents’ Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 4, 8-9) Petitioner stated that

Hamilton’s attorney, Salazar, was unwilling to be interviewed because of the State’s

threatened motion to withdraw from Hamilton’s plea agreement. (Id. at 5) The court

scheduled a hearing the next day to consider the issue of Hamilton’s testimony. (Id. at 8) 

On April 26, 2005, Petitioner’s defense counsel argued the State had untimely

disclosed the statements that Hamilton had made to Deputy County Attorney Baker, despite

the fact that defense counsel rejected Baker’s offer to recite Hamilton’s statements to

defense counsel in open court six days earlier. (Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 9-10;

Exh M, Tr. 4/26/05 at 3-6, 17) The State avowed that Hamilton’s statements to Baker were

substantially the same as those that Hamilton made to defense counsel on March 10, 2005,

with the exception of Hamilton’s assertion that he had actually seen Petitioner entering the

bedroom to have sex with Francesca. (Respondents’ Exh. M, Tr. 4/26/05 at 6-7) Salazar

refused to answer any questions regarding Hamilton’s statements to Baker because he

deemed that to be privileged as a result of the State’s threat to withdraw the plea agreement. 

(Id. at 8-10, 14-15) Although the State reported the Petitioner could call Hamilton as a

defense witness, the court suspended the trial, ordered the State to file a formal motion to

withdraw from Hamilton’s plea agreement, and scheduled a hearing for April 29, 2005. (Id.

at 13-25) 

On April 27, 2005, the prosecutor informed the trial court and defense counsel by email that the State had decided not to withdraw from Hamilton’s plea agreement, stated that

Petitioner could call Hamilton as a defense witness, stated that Salazar was willing to

disclose Hamilton’s statements to Baker, and stated that Salazar would also allow Petitioner

to re-interview Hamilton. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Item 168) The State also filed a formal

response to Petitioner’s discovery request, in which it affirmed that Hamilton’s statements to

Baker, with the exception referenced above, were identical to those that Hamilton made

during the defense interview conducted by Petitioner’s counsel on March 10, 2005. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A, Item 128)

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At the next scheduled hearing, Salazar and Baker reaffirmed their willingness to

participate in defense interviews about Hamilton’s mid-trial statements. (Respondents’ Exh.

N, Tr. 4/29/05 at 4-5) Additionally, both the State and Salazar advised Deputy Legal

Defender Cleary that he could call Hamilton on Petitioner’s behalf as trial. (Id. at 4-5, 8) 

Defense counsel expressed concern about the degree to which “the State used its powers that

it has with Mr. Hamilton because of this plea agreement, holding it over his head to get him

to say things he didn’t tell us before.” (Id. at 7) 

Defense counsel characterized Hamilton as “a witness that has been so damaged for

any purpose by the State’s [threat] to withdraw from the plea,” and opined that Hamilton has

“been so manipulated . . . by the State and their threats,” that the prosecution “ended up

destroying exculpatory evidence for [Petitioner].” (Respondents’ Exh. N, Tr. 4/29/05 at 7-8) 

Defense counsel also wondered aloud whether Hamilton planned to invoke his Fifth

Amendment privilege at trial. (Id. at 8-9) Arguing that he couldn’t “draw from [Hamilton]

the exculpatory information he had provided . . . at the [March 10, 2005] interview” because

of “prosecutorial misconduct,” defense counsel requested various sanctions, including

declaring a mistrial. (Id. at 11-13, 19-20)

In response, the State explained that it had decided not to withdraw from Hamilton’s

plea agreement for the purpose of permitting Petitioner to call Hamilton himself. 

(Respondents’ Exh. N. Tr. 4/29/05 at 13-14) The State told the court that: (1) both parties

could impeach Hamilton with his prior inconsistent statements, because Hamilton changed

his story several times; (2) some of Hamilton’s prior statements incriminated Petitioner,

including his allegation that Petitioner had oral sex with Francesca and raped her in the

bathroom; (3) the State “never said one word to Mr. Hamilton about his ability to plead” the

Fifth Amendment privilege, if he were called as a witness at Petitioner’s trial; (4) 

Hamilton’s plea agreement required him to testify truthfully regardless of which party called

him; and (5) the State could not revoke the plea agreement if Hamilton ultimately testified

for Petitioner. (Id. at 13-17, 21-22) 

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The trial court denied Petitioner’s requests for sanctions ruling that: (1) the State

immediately disclosed to defense counsel the exculpatory statements that Hamilton made to

Baker on April 19, 2005, and also offered to relate these statements to defense counsel in

open court the following day; (2) the State had fully complied with Petitioner’s motion for

disclosure of exculpatory evidence; and (3) Petitioner could interview Salazar and Hamilton

after the hearing, with the prosecutor and case agent present, “in case there’s as dispute as to

what has been said.” (Id. at 22-24) When defense counsel announced his intention to call

Hamilton to testify on Petitioner’s behalf, the court rescinded its ruling allowing the State’s

representatives to attend defense counsel’s interview of Hamilton. (Id. 24-28) 

Two days after Petitioner’s trial resumed, the trial court asked defense counsel Cleary

whether he needed a court order to secure Hamilton’s presence to testify in the defense’s

case. (Respondents’ Exh. P, Tr. 5/3/05 at 170) Cleary responded that he was “having

problems” with Hamilton, and did not request Hamilton’s appearance the next day. (Id. at

171) Cleary did have Hamilton transported to court on May 9, 2005. (Respondents’ Exh.

R, Tr. 5/9/05 at 3-7) Cleary informed the parties and Hamilton’s lawyer that he did not plan

to elicit any testimony from Hamilton, but instead intended to bring Hamilton into the

courtroom and to ask Detective Shumaker to make an in-court identification of Hamilton

before the jury. (Id. at 7-8) The State asked whether Hamilton intended to invoke his

privilege against self-incrimination during any prosecutorial cross-examination. (Id.) The

State also objected to producing Hamilton for an in-court viewing because Hamilton’s

appearance was not an issue. (Id. at 8, 12-13)

In response to the State’s objections and request to cross-examine Hamilton, defense

counsel told that court that he has spoken with Hamilton on April 29, 2005 and that he had

learned that Hamilton did not remember a lot and he didn’t want to testify. “He never

asserted the Fifth. He just said he didn’t want to testify.” (Id. at 11) Before resting his case

later that day, Petitioner never called Hamilton to the stand to determine whether he would

invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. (Id. at 12-15, 72) 

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On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court should have granted a mistrial or

otherwise sanctioned the State because the prosecution had deprived him of his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment right to compulsory process and to present exculpatory evidence, by

threatening to withdraw from the plea agreement, which Petitioner argued prompted

Hamilton to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent. Petitioner also

challenged the trial court’s order denying his request to have the jury view Hamilton. 

(Respondents’ Exh. Y, at 18-24)

The Arizona Court of Appeals found no prosecutorial misconduct and rejected

Petitioner’s claims. (Respondents’ Exh. Z at 11-15) The court found that:

[T]he prosecutor had the right to enter the plea agreement with Hamilton in 

an effort to obtain his truthful testimony . . . . Second, after the prosecutor

indicated that she would not seek to withdraw from the plea agreement but

would not call Hamilton as a witness, the prosecutor agreed to all of 

[Petitioner’s requests for disclosure. Finally, Hamilton did not intend to assert

his Fifth Amendment privilege at trial, so defense counsel could have called 

him to testify. However, because Hamilton’s pre-trial statements were 

inconsistent and he therefore may have lacked credibility as a witness, defense

counsel chose merely to have him identified by Detective Shumaker. There is

nothing in the record to suggest that, but considering whether to withdraw

from the plea agreement, the prosecutor “damaged’ the credibility of a witness

who was already inconsistent in his statements, uncooperative and reluctant to

testify. 

The record does not show that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct

regarding any agreement. The trial court did not err in refusing to grant a 

mistrial or to impose sanctions. 

(Respondents’ Exh. Z) The Court will consider Grounds II(A) and (B) in view of the

foregoing background. 

b. Ground II(A)

In Ground II(A), Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying Petitioner’s requests to “call Andre Hamilton into

court to be viewed by the jury.” (Doc. 1 at 6) As set forth below, Petitioner is not entitled

to habeas corpus relief on this claim. 

Both Hamilton and that State objected to Petitioner’s request to call Hamilton at trial

simply to be viewed by the jury. (Respondents’ Exh. K, Tr. 5/9/05 at 3-8) Hamilton

objected on relevance grounds and argued that Petitioner had not complied with

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Ariz.R.Crim.P. 35. The State argued that such an in-court presentation was cumulative and

irrelevant because the jury already had “photographs in evidence” and Hamilton did not

have any distinct features, such as a tattoo. (Id. at 4, 8) The trial court denied Petitioner’s

request finding that an in-court presentation would be irrelevant and cumulative, noting that

“with the other witnesses there was something unique with regard to the tattoo and

placement of a tattoo . . . There’s nothing unique about Mr. Hamilton.” (Respondents’ Exh.

R, Tr., 5/9/05 at 12-13) The Court of Appeals summarily denied relief on his claim. 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief on Ground II(A) which

essentially challenges the trial court’s determination that a show-up was irrelevant and

cumulative under Arizona evidentiary rules. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle, 502 U.S. at

67-68 (stating that “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to re-examine state court

determinations of state law questions.”). 

Moreover, the trial court’s finding that an in-court presentation of Hamilton was

irrelevant and cumulative did not violate Petitioner’s federal constitutional right to present

defense evidence. The Supreme Court has held that “trial judges retain wide latitude insofar

as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination

based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues,

the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”). The

presentation of Hamilton was not necessary to Petitioner’s misidentification defense

because: (1) Austin, who knew that Hamilton went by the names “Dre” or “Drew,” referred

to the man who raped Francesca in the bathroom on Tuesday by the names “ATL” or

“Woo;” and (2) Petitioner relied upon Austin’s nomenclature to argue that either Wooten

(“Woo”) or King (“ATL”) had committed the sexual assault in the bathroom. (Respondents’

Exh. O, Tr. 5/2/05 at 26-30, 51-52, 109, 129-33; Exh. P, Tr. 5/3/05 at 61-62, 75076, 106-09,

137; Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05 at 14-16, 75-76, 87-89; Exh. S, Tr. 5/10/05 at 61-62, 65-67, 75) 

Indeed, Petitioner never argued that the State’s witnesses had mistakenly attributed any of

Hamilton’s criminal conduct to Petitioner. 

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Moreover, Hamilton’s involvement in the charged offenses was not an issue at

Petitioner’s trial. Rita, Keoni, and Wooten gave testimony regarding Hamilton’s

participation in the sexual assaults on Francesca. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 113-

20, Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at 42; Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 24, 32, 52, 62-74, 91-92; Exh. K, Tr.

4/21/05 at 89, 108-09, 120-27, 137-38; Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 38; Exh. O, Tr. 5/2/05 at 26-

39, 53-54, 132-33). Additionally, Austin and Vanessa positively identified Hamilton from

photo arrays that police prepared and showed to them. (Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at

122-33; Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 75-76, 95. Exh. O, Tr. 5/2/05 at 50-51, 140-44) Finally, the

jury already had photographs of Hamilton admitted into evidence because the State’s trial

exhibits included the photo-lineups from which its witnesses has identified Hamilton, as

well as the single-image photograph of Hamilton that the police showed to Austin at a later

date, and which the prosecutor showed Rita and Wooten at trial to identify Hamilton. 

(Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 116-118, Exh. H. Tr. 4/14/05 at 24; Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05

at 76, 95; Exh. O, Tr. 5/2/05 at 27-28, 30, 142-44; Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05 at 11-16)

In summary, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s rejection of his claim

asserted in Ground II(A) was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law. 

c. Ground II(B)

In Ground II(B), Petitioner argues that the trial court improperly “refused to declare a

mistrial or impose other appropriate sanctions against the State (prosecutors) for their

(mis)conduct which resulted in the loss of Hamilton’s exculpatory testimony at trial.” (Doc.

1 at 6) Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal arguing that the State’s threat to

withdraw Hamilton’s plea agreement constituted prosecutorial misconduct which violated

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to present defense witnesses, based on Hamilton’s

alleged invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege and refusal to testify at trial. The Court

of Appeals denied relief on Ground II(B). (Respondents’ Exh. Z at 11-15) Petitioner has

not shown that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief on this claim. The Court will consider

the law governing prosecutorial misconduct and compulsory process because Ground II(B)

raises both issues. 

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On habeas corpus review, the standard of review for claims of prosecutorial

misconduct is “the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory

power.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974)). “[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in

cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is that fairness of the trial, not the culpability of

the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (stating that the “aim of due

process ‘is not punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an

unfair trial to the accused.’”) (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). The

relevant question is “whether the prosecutors’ [alleged misconduct] ‘so infected the trial

with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Darden, 477

U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643)). 

The Supreme Court has indicated that a petitioner alleging prosecutorial misconduct

is not entitled to relief unless he establishes: (1) that the prosecutor’s “actions amounted to

‘misconduct;” and (2) that “such misconduct resulted in actual prejudice to petitioner, such

that his trial was rendered ‘fundamentally unfair.’” Woods v. Adams, 631 F.Supp.2d 1261,

1279 (C.D.Cal. 2009) (citing Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 637-38). “Prosecutorial misconduct

which rises to the level of a due process violation may provide the grounds for granting a

habeas petition only if that misconduct is deemed prejudicial under the ‘harmless error’ test

articulated in Brecht v. Abrahamson.” Shaw v. Terhune, 380 F.3d 473, 478 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citing Fields v. Woodford, 309 F.3d 1095, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

The Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause gives a criminal defendant the

“right to offer the testimony of witnesses, to compel their testimony, if necessary,” as part of

a defendant’s broader “right to present a defense,” which is “a fundamental element of due

process of law.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). The right, however, is not

absolute and must accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal process. See

Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1991) (rejecting defendant’s Sixth Amendment

challenge to Michigan’s rape-shield statute’s notice-and-hearing prerequisite for admission

of victim’s prior consensual sexual activity because this procedural requirement “serves

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legitimate state interests in protecting against surprise, harassment, and undue delay.”);

Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415 (1988) (upholding preclusion of defense witnesses

disclosed after the prosecution had rested, despite arguments that preclusion violated the

accused’s right to compulsory process.). 

Supreme Court cases regarding the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause

have borrowed from cases involving the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. United

States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872 (1982). Thus, when a defendant alleges a

violation of his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, “the Court must consider

whether he has made [the same] showing of materiality” that the Supreme Court requires

defendants to establish in the context of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. United

States v. Bianchi, 594 F.Supp.2d 532, 544-45 (E.D.Pa. 2009). The Supreme Court has

defined “materiality” as “a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would

have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Thus, in

the context of a compulsory process claim, “more than the mere absence of testimony is

necessary to establish a violation of the right [to compulsory process].” Valenzuela-Bernal,

458 U.S. at 867 (citing Washington, 388 U.S. at 16). The petitioner “must at least make

some plausible showing of how [the unavailable] testimony would have been both material

and favorable to his defense.” Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867. 

2. Analysis of Ground II(B)

As stated above, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that the State’s conduct related

to Hamilton did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct resulting in a violation of

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, and that defense counsel’s

tactical decision was the reason that Hamilton, who had given inconsistent statements and

lacked credibility, never took the stand as a defense witness. (Respondents’ Exh. Z at 14) 

On habeas corpus review, this Court must grant a substantial measure of deference to the

state court’s decision denying relief on Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct

because the standard governing that issue is a “general rule.” Renico, 130 S.Ct. at 1864; 

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Slagle v. Bagley, 457 F.3d 501, 516 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 645)

(stating that the standard governing prosecutorial misconduct “is necessarily imprecise.”). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that the State did not engage in

prosecutorial misconduct by securing Hamilton’s testimony against Petitioner pursuant to a

plea agreement that reduced his potential sentence in exchange for truthful testimony. 

“‘The general rule is that an accomplice who has pled guilty may testify against nonpleading defendants without raising due process concerns.’” Morris v. Woodford, 273 F.3d

826, 836 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1537 (9th Cir.

1988) (stating that “a plea agreement may require an accomplice to testify fully and

truthfully without violating the Due Process Clause.”). 

Additionally, the prosecution did not engage in misconduct when it threatened to

withdraw from Hamilton’s plea agreement after discovering that he had deviated from his

earlier statements which raised concerns regarding Hamilton’s credibility as a witness. 

When an accomplice who has agreed to testify against the defendant breached the

truthfulness provision of his plea agreement, the prosecution may move to withdraw from

the agreement, reinstate the original charges, and bring the witness to trial. Hentz v. Hargett,

71 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (5th Cir. 1996). Arizona law did not require the court’s authorization

for the State to withdraw from its plea agreement with Hamilton based on his inconsistent

pre-trial statements, because the court had not yet accepted Hamilton’s guilty plea. 

(Respondents’ Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 142); State v. Superior Court, 160 Ariz. 71, 71-72, 770

P.2d 375, 375-76 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1988) (citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.4(b)). 

Regardless, the State ultimately did not withdraw from its plea agreement with

Hamilton, and announced in open court that the plea agreement did not prohibit Petitioner

from interviewing Hamilton and calling him as a witness. Additionally, the State disclosed

the statements Hamilton had made to Deputy County Attorney Baker during their pre-trial

preparation session on April 18, 2005. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Item 128; Exh. N, Tr. 4/29/05

at 4-5, 8, 13-17, 21-24) The Court of Appeals concluded that the State did not commit

prosecutorial misconduct. (Respondents’ Exh. Z at 12-14) Additionally, the prosecutor’s

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actions ensured that Petitioner could call Hamilton as a witness without concern that he

would tailor his testimony to keep his favorable plea agreement with the State. See United

States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1108-09 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding no

governmental interference with government witnesses because the plea agreement permitted

them to testify for the defendant, and the prosecutor cured the case agent’s improper

statements discouraging the witnesses from meeting with the defense investigator by telling

them that such a meeting was permissible.). 

The Court will next consider Petitioner’s assertion in Ground II(B) that the alleged

prosecutorial misconduct resulted in a violation his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory

process. Petitioner essentially argues that the prosecutor’s interference with their own

witness, Hamilton, violated Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. The

Arizona Court of Appeals rejected this claim. (Respondents’ Exh. Z at 12-15)

Petitioner has not established that the State court’s determination was contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Supreme Court cases concerning compulsory process, involve governmental interference

with defense witnesses. See Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972) (concluding “that the

judge’s threatening remarks, directed only at the single witness for the defense, effectively

drove that witness off the stand, and thus deprived the petitioner of due process of law under

the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Washington, 388 U.S. at 19 (invalidating a Texas statute

categorically prohibiting a defendant from calling his accomplices and co-defendants at

trial). The Ninth Circuit had noted that it is “an open question” whether Webb applies to

prosecution witnesses, such as Hamilton in this case. United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d

1185, 1191 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court has explained that if habeas corpus

relief depends on the resolution of an “open question in [Supreme Court] jurisprudence,’ §

2254(d)(1) precludes relief.” Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting

Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76) (stating that “[g]iven the lack of holdings from this Court

regarding the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators’ courtroom conduct of the kind

involved here, it cannot be said that the state court ‘unreasonably applied clearly established

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federal law.’”); see Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76-77 (noting the division among lower courts on

an issue never resolved by the Supreme Court as a basis for holding that the state court of

appeals’ rejection of a claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.). 

Regardless of the absence of clearly established federal law on the precise issue

before the Court, Petitioner’s compulsory process argument fails because, contrary to

Petitioner’s assertion, Hamilton never invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. (Respondents’ Exh. Z at 14) Petitioner bases his assertion that Hamilton

invoked the Fifth Amendment on defense counsel’s statement to the trial court that,

Hamilton “isn’t going to say anything, and the problem I think is because of what went on

last week and what he heard, but he’s an 18, 19, 20-year-old kid. You now, Mr. Salazar’s

had problems with him. Obviously, the State’s had problems with him. Now I’m having

problems with him.” (Respondents’ Exh. P, Tr. 5/3/05 at 170) The record supports the

appellate court’s determination that Hamilton never invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. 

 Petitioner’s counsel told the court that Hamilton never invoked his Fifth Amendment

privilege and answered questions during his private trial preparation interview on April 29,

2005. (Respondents’ Exh. R, Tr. 5/9/05 at 11). Neither Hamilton nor his attorney ever

informed the court that he intended to invoke the Fifth Amendment and refuse to answer

questions if Petitioner called him to testify. (Id. at 15; Exh. N, Tr. 4/29/05 at 4-8, 23-27) 

Additionally, the record reflects that Hamilton did not testify on Petitioner’s behalf,

not because of the prosecution’s conduct, but because defense counsel made a tactical

decision not to call him as a witness because he was uncooperative and had credibility

issues. Indeed, Hamilton and his attorney were present in the courtroom and Hamilton was

prepared to be called to the stand on the last day of the defense’s case. (Respondents’ Exh.

R, Tr. 5/9/05 at 2-8) The record supports the Arizona Court of Appeals’ finding that

Petitioner’s defense counsel, Mr. Cleary, decided not to call Hamilton as a defense witness

because of Hamilton’s inconsistent pretrial statements and his resulting lack of credibility. 

(Respondents’ Exh. Z at 14) After interviewing Hamilton, Cleary informed the court that

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he was experiencing the same difficulties with Hamilton that the prosecution and Salazar

had encountered with Hamilton. (Respondents’ Exh. P, Tr. 5/3/05 at 170) Moreover, even

if Cleary had called Hamilton as a witness, the State could have damaged Hamilton’s

credibility and offer additional evidence of Petitioner’s guilt by impeaching Hamilton with

his numerous prior inconsistent statements. (Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 4/2/05 at 9; Exh. N,

Tr. 4/29/05 at 14-16, 21-22; Exh. R, Tr. 5/9/05 at 8) 

In view of the foregoing, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on Ground

II(B)

D. Ground II(E)

In Ground II(E), Petitioner argues that the trial court “erroneously refused to instruct

the jury on [sexual assault’s] lesser-included offense of sexual abuse” on Count 2 because “it

was inconclusive whether Wooten or [Petitioner] ever penetrated the victim.” (Doc. 1 at 6) 

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the denial of this lesser-included offense jury

instruction violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Respondents’ Exh. Y at

29) The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected this argument, finding that the evidence did not 

support the requested instruction. (Respondents’ Exh. Z at 18-20) As discussed below,

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this claim.

First, under § 2254, habeas corpus relief is not available unless the state court

decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

“Where the Supreme Court has not addressed an issue in its holding, a state court

adjudication of the issue not addressed by the Supreme Court cannot be contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.” Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d

873, 881 (9th Cir. 2007). See also Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124-26 (2008). This

rule applies here because “the Supreme Court has never held that there is a constitutional

requirement that lesser-included offense instructions be given in non-capital cases.” Carney

v. Fabian, 487 F.3d 1094, 1097 (8th Cir. 2007). Although the Supreme Court has held that

the Constitution requires trial courts in capital cases to instruct the jury on all lesser-included

offenses which the evidence supports, the Supreme Court has not extended that holding to

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non-capital cases. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980); see Bobby v. Mitts, __ S.Ct.

___, 2011 WL 1631037 (May 2, 2011) (discussing Beck). The Supreme Court has

emphasized that the rule it announced in Beck only applies to capital murder cases. Id. 

After acknowledging that it has “never held that a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included

offense instruction as a matter of due process,” 447 U.S. at 637, the Court indicated that this 

precedent remained intact in non-capital cases stating that, “[w]e need not and do not decide

whether the Due Process Clause would require the giving of such instructions in a noncapital case.” Beck, 447 U.S. at 638 n. 14. Supreme Court decisions after Beck have

clarified that Beck was based on the Eighth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause, and

have left open the question of whether the Due Process Clause requires state trial courts to

give lesser-included offense instructions in non-capital cases. See Hopper v. Evans, 456

U.S. 605, 611 (1982) (stating that “[o]ur holding in Beck, like our other Eighth Amendment

decisions of the past decade, was concerned with insuring that sentencing discretion in

capital cases is channeled so that arbitrary and capricious results are avoided.”); Howell v.

Mississippi, 543 U.S. 440, 444-45 (2005). 

In view of the foregoing Supreme Court precedent, numerous circuit courts, including

the Ninth Circuit, have concluded that the Supreme Court has left open the question of

whether the Beck rule applies to non-capital cases. See Tiger v. Workman, 445 F.3d 1265,

1268 (10th Cir. 2006); Scott, 302 F.3d at 606; Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 928-929 (9th Cir.

2000); Jones v. Hoffman, 86 F.3d 46, 48 (2nd Cir. 1996); Tata v. Carver, 917 F.2d 670, 71

(1st Cir. 1990). Because the issue of whether the Beck rule applies in non-capital cases had

not been resolved by the United States Supreme Court when Petitioner’s case was decided

on direct review, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ denial of Ground II(E) was not contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of the then-existing, clearly established Supreme Court law. 

Van Patten, 552 U.S. at 24-26; Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77; Garcia-Espitia, 546 U.S. at 10. 

Moreover, lower federal courts have held that “the failure of a state trial court to

instruct on a lesser-included offense in a non-capital case does not present a federal

constitutional question.” Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing

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Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 819 (9th Cir. 1995)). These cases reason that the propriety

of a lesser-included offense instruction is a state-law question over which federal habeas

courts have no jurisdiction. See Bland v. Sirmons, 459 F.3d 999, 1016-17 (10th Cir. 2006);

Green v. Groose, 959 F.2d 708, 709 (8th Cir. 1992). The “majority of circuits considering

this difficult issue have held that the failure of a state court to instruct on a lesser included

offense in a non-capital case never raises a federal constitutional question.” Pitts v.

Lockhart, 911 F.2d 109, 112 (8th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit subscribes to the majority

view that federal habeas corpus relief is unavailable for this type of claim. James v. Reese,

546 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1976). 

In view of the foregoing, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground II(E). 

Accordingly, the Court declines that address Respondents’ alternative argument that, even if

the trial court was constitutionally required to give a lesser-included offense instruction on

sexual abuse, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because he cannot meet the

required showing of prejudice. (Doc. 12 at 117-123) 

E. Ground III

In Ground III, Petitioner argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

because he did not move to preclude the State from offering evidence of Billy’s and Rita’s

conduct towards Francesca which occurred outside of Petitioner’s presence and without his

knowledge. (Doc. 1 at 7) Petitioner argues that this “horrific” evidence caused the jury to

convict him on all counts and to find the aggravating circumstance that the offenses were

“especially cruel, heinous, or depraved.” (Doc. 1 at 7) Petitioner raised this claim on postconviction review. (Respondents’ Exh. EE) The post-conviction court rejected this

argument and concluded that Petitioner’s defense counsel provided effective assistance. 

(Respondents’ Exh. GG) As set forth below, Petitioner has not shown that this

determination was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law. 

The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail upon a claim of

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ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must show that: (1) counsel’s performance was

deficient; and that (2) counsel’s deficient performances prejudiced petitioner. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687-94. Under the first prong, to be deficient, counsel’s representation must

have fallen “below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U. S. at 688. 

There is a “strong presumption” that counsel’s representation is within the “wide range” of

reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S.

365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “A fair assessment of attorney

performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate

the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Bonin, 59 F.3d at 833 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.’”

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, __ U.S.___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485

(2010)). “The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence

under ‘prevailing professional norms’, not whether it deviated from best practices or most

common custom.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, a petitioner must also establish that

counsel’s deficient performance resulted in prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. To

establish prejudice, petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The “potential prejudicial effect of counsel's

deficient performance must be evaluated in light of” the strength of the prosecution’s case. 

Johnson v. Baldwin, 114 F.3d 835, 838 (9th Cir. 1997). 

 Establishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under

§2254(d) is difficult, because both standards are “highly deferential,” 466 U. S. at 689, and

because Strickland’s general standard has a substantial range of reasonable applications. 

The issue under §2254(d) is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable, but whether

there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard. 

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Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788. See also Yarbrough, 540 U.S. at 6 (“Judicial review of a defense

attorney’s summation is therefore highly deferential — and doubly deferential when it is

conducted through the lens of federal habeas.”). 

Here, Petitioner has not established that trial counsel rendered deficient performance

by failing to move to exclude evidence of Billy Watson’s and Rita Anthony’s conduct

during the first night when Petitioner was not present. The evidence to which Petitioner

refers includes Billy repeatedly forcing Francesca to perform fellatio, beating Francesca with

a golf club, forcing Francesca to take drugs, strangling her, whipping her legs and buttocks,

hog-tying her with electrical cords, forcing her to dance like a stripper, and forcing

Francesca to submit to Rita touching her breasts. (see, supra pg. 3-4)

After Billy and Rita engaged in the foregoing conduct, Billy left and locked

Francesca and Rita in the bedroom until the morning. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at

110-11) Rita testified that Francesca “laid there like a doll, just limp.” (Id.) When

Petitioner, Wooten, Hamilton, and King arrived at Billy’s house at 6:00 a.m., they found

Francesca naked on Billy’s bed, incoherent, and suffering from recent, visible injuries,

including abrasions on her neck, dark bruises, and lash marks on her legs. (Respondents’

Exh. H, Tr. 4/14/05 at 36-39, 50) Additionally, Billy told Petitioner and the others that he

had given Francesca LSD, Respondents’ Exh. F, TR. 4/14/05 at 138-40, and she appeared

disoriented and was mumbling incoherently saying “Bob Marley,” “7-Eleven,” and

“vortex.” (Id. at 39, 43, 50) Based upon this evidence, the State argued at trial and on postconviction review, that evidence of the injuries inflicted on Francesca by Billy and Rita,

including photographs of Francesca at the hospital, were admissible to prove that: (1)

Francesca was being held against her will; (2) Francesca neither consented, nor had the

capacity to consent, to sexual intercourse with Petitioner and his companions; (3) these

visible injuries established Petitioner’s knowledge that Francesca did not consent to sexual

intercourse and was being held against her will. (Respondents’ Exh. D, Tr. 4/8/05 at 44-47;

Exh. GG at 4-5)

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On post-conviction review, the trial court denied relief on this claim of ineffective

assistance, finding that “[t]he conduct of William Watson and Rita Anthony was intrinsic to

the crimes committed by [Petitioner.]” (Respondents’ Exh. GG at 1; Exh. HH at 1) In

Arizona, “[o]ther act evidence is ‘intrinsic’ when evidence of the other act and evidence of

the crime charged are ‘inextricably intertwined’ or both acts are part of a ‘single criminal

episode,’ or the other acts were ‘necessary preliminaries’ to the crime charged.” State v.

Dickens, 187 Ariz. 1, 18 n. 7, 926 P.2d 468, 485 (Ariz. 1996) (quoting United States v.

Coleman, 78 F.3d 154, 156 (5th Cir. 1996)). Intrinsic evidence of third-party conduct is

admissible when offered to prove an element of the charged offense. State v. Baldenegro,

188 Ariz. 10, 15-16, 932 P.2d 275, 280-81 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1996) (holding that evidence of

crimes committed by other gang members was admissible against defendant as “intrinsic”

evidence, which was “inextricably intertwined” with the charged offense of assisting and

participating in a criminal syndicate for the benefit of a street gang). 

Because the trial court determined that the challenged evidence was admissible,

Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to that evidence fails. 

When a habeas corpus petitioner argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to object to certain evidence as inadmissible under the state’s evidentiary rules, the

state court’s determination that the evidence at issue would have been properly admitted at

trial under state law, establishes that counsel’s failure to object was neither deficient

performance nor prejudicial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. See Stanley v. Schriro,

598 F.3d 612, 619-20 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding defense counsel was not ineffective for failing

to present expert testimony that was inadmissible under Arizona law); Hebner v. McGrath,

543 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on trial

counsel’s failure to object to rape victim’s testimony based on California’s Evidence Code,

where state appellate court ruled that the evidence would have been admitted under a

different California rule of evidence.). Because an objection to Billy’s and Rita’s testimony

regarding their conduct the first night Francesca was kept in Billy’s room would have lacked

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merit, defense counsel’s failure to object to the admission of that testimony was not

constitutionally deficient performance. Id. 

Moreover, although defense counsel did not file a motion in limine to preclude

evidence of Billy’s and Rita’s conduct that occurred outside of Petitioner’s presence, at least

once during trial, defense counsel objected to Rita’s testimony describing Billy’s conduct

that occurred before Petitioner arrived at the house. (Respondents’ Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at

108) The court overruled the objection. (Id.) Trial counsel also used other tactics to

minimize the impact of Rita’s and Billy’s testimony and other evidence of conduct by third

parties including: (1) moving to preclude photographs depicting Francesca’s injuries

(Respondents’ Exh. D, Tr. 4/8/05 at 44-47); (2) moving to preclude the State’s witnesses

from using the term “gang bang” and “gang rape” (Id. at 48; Exh. E, Tr. 4/9/05 at 3); and

(3) arguing that other persons, including Billy and Rita, caused at least some of Francesca’s

injuries. (Respondents’ Exh. S, Tr. 5/10/05 at 63-64; Exh. U, Tr. 5/12/05 at 57-58) The

admission of evidence regarding Billy’s and Rita’s conduct also allowed defense counsel to

blame Billy and Rita for some of Francesca’s injuries and to argue that the jury could not

identify beyond a reasonable doubt which injuries Petitioner had caused. (Respondents’

Exh. U, Tr. 5/12/05 at 57-58) 

Additionally, even if Petitioner could satisfy Strickland’s performance prong, he has

not established that he was prejudiced by the admission of evidence regarding Billy’s and

Rita’s conduct outside of Petitioner’s presence. Even without considering Billy’s and Rita’s

conduct that occurred when Petitioner was not present, there was sufficient evidence to

support the jury’s verdicts, such that Petitioner cannot establish a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of Petitioner’s trial would have been

different - in other words that the jury would have reached a different conclusion regarding

guilt or regarding the aggravating factor of “especially cruel, heinous, or depraved.” See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-94. The record contains the following evidence which supports

the jury’s guilty verdicts: (1) Petitioner and his companions watched Billy whip Francesca

legs, buttocks, and back with a belt; (2) Petitioner and his companions beat Francesca, as

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supported by Rita’s testimony that she heard “slapping noises” and “gross” sounds coming

from Billy’s bedroom; (3) Francesca’s visible injuries and disoriented behavior did not deter

Petitioner from beating and raping Francesca; (4) Petitioner “elbowed” Francesca in the face

with sufficient force to propel her backward onto the bed, and render her motionless for

enough time that others in the room thought she was dead; (5) Petitioner restrained

Francesca and “laugh[ed]” while Keoni had non-consensual intercourse with her; (6)

Petitioner restrained Francesca while Wooten sexually assaulted Francesca; (7) Petitioner

then attacked Francesca by “hitting her in the ribs and her stomach . . . and just pounding

her” in the presence of Wooten and the other accomplices; (8) Petitioner dragged Francesca

from Billy’s bedroom to the bathroom, pushed her head down into the bathtub, “inserted his

penis into [her] vagina,” “pounded” and “hit her so hard [that] she fell,” and strangled her to

stifle her screams while Wooten, Hamilton, and Keoni watched from the doorway; (9) after

violating Francesca in the bathroom, Petitioner left her slumped on the bathroom floor; (10)

the extent and number of Francesca’s injuries were so extreme that the forensic nurse

examiner and the emergency room doctor who examined her had independent recollection of

her almost two years later. (Respondents’ Exh. D, Tr.4/12/05 at 120; Exh. E, Tr. 4/13/05 at

24, 36, 91-93, 95, 98, 126, 133, 139-40; Exh. F, Tr. 4/14/05 at 42-44, 50-56, 63-64, 70, 72-

74, 134-36, 140, 147048, 151-60; Exh, K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 21, 27-44, 124-34; Exh. L, Tr.

4/25/05 at 17, 26, 38l Exh. I, Tr. 5/2/05 at 40-43, 51-52; Exh. P, Tr. 5/3/05 at 60-63, 108-11;

Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05 at 14-16, 63-65, 71) Additionally, Petitioner was very muscular, had

“broad shoulders,” and was described as weighing between 185 and 195 pounds, “a lot

bigger than the rest of the guys” who sexually assaulted and beat Francesca. (Respondents’

Exh. F, Tr. 4/12/05 at 113-14, 116, 160; Exh. G, Tr. 4/13/05 at 139-40, 144; Exh. H, Tr.

4/14/05 at 18-21; Exh. J, Tr. 4/20/05 at 50, 107, 111-13, 125, 127; Exh. K, Tr. 4/21/05 at 90-

96; Exh. L, Tr. 4/25/05 at 33-34, 69; Exh. O, Tr. 5/2/05 at 25-28; Exh. Q, Tr. 5/4/05 at 20,

47) In view of the foregoing evidence of Petitioner’s participation in sexually assaulting

and beating Francesca, Petitioner cannot establish that, but for counsel’s failure to object to

the admission of evidence regarding the conduct of Rita and Billy that occurred outside of

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Petitioner’s presence, there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the guilt phase

would have been different.

Petitioner also argues that counsel’s failure to object to evidence of Billy’s and Rita’s

conduct that occurred outside of his presence resulted in prejudice because it led to the

jury’s finding during the sentencing phase that Petitioner’s conduct was “especially cruel,

heinous, or depraved.” (Doc. 1 at 7) As an initial matter, the Supreme Court has not

specifically extended Strickland’s requirements to non-capital sentencing proceedings. The

Strickland Court “expressly declined to ‘consider the role of counsel in an ordinary

sentencing, which . . . may require a different approach to the definition of constitutionally

effective assistance.’” Cooper-Smith, 397 F.3d at 1244 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

686). “Moreover, since Strickland, the Supreme Court has not delineated a standard which

should apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims in noncapital sentencing cases.” See

Davis v. Grigas, 443 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Cooper-Smith, 397 F.3d at

1244). Therefore, there is no clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme

Court in the context of non-capital sentencing. See Cooper-Smith, 397 F.3d at 1244;

Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 983 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, the Arizona Court of Appeals’

resolution of this issue could not have been an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. Id.

Moreover, Petitioner was not prejudiced with regard to the aggravating factor at issue

because Judge Ishikawa, who presided over Petitioner’s trial, sentencing, and postconviction proceedings stated that he would have imposed the same sentence even without

consideration of the “especially cruel, heinous, or depraved,” aggravating circumstance. 

Judge Ishikawa stated that, “[t]here was more than sufficient aggravating factors present to

warrant an aggravated prison term irrespective of the cruel, heinous, and depraved factor.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. GG at 2) The record supports this finding because, at the sentencing

hearing, Judge Ishikawa found two additional aggravating factors - the presence of

accomplices and the emotional and physical pain to the victim- and did not find any

mitigating factors. (Respondents’ Exh. W, Tr. 6/17/05 at 50) 

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F. Ground IV(A)

In Ground IV(A), Petitioner argues that the “firmly convinced” language in the trial

court’s reasonable-doubt instruction, given pursuant to the Arizona Supreme Court’s

directive in State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 898 P.2d 970 (1995), violated the Fourteenth

Amendment by lowering the State’s burden of proof. (Doc. 1 at 8) The jury instruction at

issue provides that:

The state has the burden proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. In civil cases, it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely

true than not or that its truth is highly probable. In criminal cases, such as 

this, the state’s proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a

reasonable doubt. 

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced

of the defendant’s guilt. There are very few things in this world that we 

know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not 

require proof that overcomes every doubt.

If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that

the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find the defendant 

guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that the 

defendant is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find the

defendant not guilty. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A, Item 142, pp. 4-5; Exh. S, Tr. 5/10/05 at 7-8) (emphasis added) 

On direct review, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s challenge to the

reasonable-doubt instruction stating that:

[Petitioner] claims that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the

reasonable-doubt instruction set forth in State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 596,

898 P.2d 970, 974 (1995), because it impermissibly lowers the State’s 

burden of proof and violates his constitutional rights. The Arizona Supreme 

Court has continued to uphold the constitutionality of that instruction. State v.

Roseberry, 210 Ariz. 360, 369-70, 111 P.3d 4-2, 411-12, cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.

444 (2005). We find no error. 

(Respondents’ Exh. Z at 20-21) 

Petitioner has not shown that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ rejection of his challenge

to the reasonable-doubt instruction was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law. 

The reasonable-doubt instruction given in this case correctly states the law. Although

the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the reasonable-doubt instruction given in

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this case, in a concurring opinion in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 27 (1994), Justice

Ginsburg approved an identically-worded federal pattern criminal jury instruction on

reasonable doubt:

See Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions 17-18 (Instruction

21) (1987). We agree with Justice Ginsburg that this instruction ‘surpasses

others . . .in stating the reasonable doubt standard succinctly and comprehensibly.”

Victor, 511 U.S. [at 27], 114 S.Ct. at 1253 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). We

believe that its consistent use will assist jurors, be fair to both the state and 

defendants, and obviate the need for any future appeals on this issue. 

Portillo, 182 Ariz. at 596, 898 P.2d at 974. Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has upheld the

reasonable-doubt instruction using the phrases “real possibility” and “firmly convinced.” 

U.S. v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1257-59 (9th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Velasquez, 980 F.2d 1275,

1278 (9th Cir. 1992). In view of the foregoing, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground

IV(A).

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be

denied because Petitioner’s claims either lack merit or are procedurally barred. 

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, doc.

1, be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have (14) fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28

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U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties

have (14) fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to

file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. 

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to

file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a

waiver of a party=s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment

entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

DATED this 2nd day of May, 2011.

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