Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-02842/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-02842-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CHRISTOPHER LINDSAY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

YOLANDA FRYSON, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CIV. S-10-2842 LKK/KJN 

ORDER 

Defendant Yolanda Fryson, while on paid leave as a social 

worker for Yuba County Child Protective Services (“CPS”), tried 

to extort money from plaintiff. Fryson falsely claimed that she 

had a CPS file showing that plaintiff had sexually molested a 17-

year-old girl. Plaintiff ultimately participated in a sting 

operation which resulted in Fryson’s arrest. 

Plaintiff has sued Fryson and Yuba County alleging 

violations of his federal Due Process rights, and asserting 

several state tort claims. For the reasons set forth below, Yuba 

County’s motion for summary judgment will be granted. 

//// 

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I. UNDISPUTED FACTS 

Defendant Yolanda Fryson was hired as a social worker for 

Yuba County CPS in March 2002. Plaintiff’s Matrix of Disputed 

Facts (“Facts”) (ECF No. 70-1) ¶ 1.1

 After conducting a criminal 

background check on Fryson, Yuba County issued her a badge. 

Facts ¶¶ 2-5. On August 15, 2005, Fryson reported that her badge 

was missing or stolen. Facts ¶ 6. Fryson reported the loss or 

theft to the Sheriff’s Department, and Yuba County issued her a 

replacement badge. Facts ¶¶ 7-9. 

On June 3, 2008, the Placer County Sheriff’s Department came 

to Fryson’s workplace and arrested her, apparently for writing 

bad checks. Facts ¶ 10. On June 5, 2008, the first day Fryson 

returned to her office after her arrest, Yuba County put Fryson 

on paid administrative leave. Facts ¶ 13. The County stripped 

Fryson of all her duties, and she relinquished her replacement 

County badge, keys, computers and communications devices. Facts 

¶ 14.2

 On June 10, 2008, the County began its administrative 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s “Matrix of Disputed Facts” is plaintiff’s response 

to Yuba County’s statement of “Undisputed Material Facts” (ECF 

No. 68-2). The facts cited here are those material facts 

asserted by defendant which plaintiff has not genuinely disputed. 

Plaintiff has not set forth any undisputed facts of his own. 

2

 Plaintiff attempts to put this fact into dispute by asserting: 

“This is false. The County’s given admission was that Fryson had 

TWO badges and only turned in one – with the County on notice of 

Fryson’s lawlessness [sic] misconduct. (Decl. of Tony Roach at 

para 4-5).” However plaintiff’s statement does not place this 

fact genuinely in dispute. Plaintiff’s cited declaration does 

not indicate that the county ever admitted that Fryson had two 

badges at the time. Roach’s Declaration says that the second 

badge was issued as a replacement badge for the first one, which 

had been reported lost or stolen. ECF No. 68-5 ¶¶ 4-5. He does 

not say that Fryson was in possession of two badges, nor does he 

state that the County knew or believed that Fryson had two 

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investigation of Fryson. Facts ¶ 15. 

On October 21, 2008, Fryson – while she was still on paid 

administrative leave – called plaintiff, and told him, falsely, 

that a report had come across her desk accusing him of molesting 

a 17-year-old girl. Facts ¶ 18.3 Fryson did not choose 

plaintiff completely out of the blue. She had some acquaintance 

with people plaintiff knew, including Wendy Leveron, his 

girlfriend, and Beverly Avery, a friend of Leveron’s. Lindsay 

Depo. at 14-17. After this phone call, plaintiff called Leveron 

and Avery and discussed Fryson’s allegations with them. Facts 

¶ 20; Lindsay Depo. at 35-38. At that time, Avery told plaintiff 

that Fryson worked for CPS. Facts ¶ 20. 

Later that day, plaintiff and Fryson talked again by phone. 

Facts ¶ 21. Fryson refused to disclose the (non-existent) 

reporting party, but indicated that she might be able to make the 

whole mess “go away.” Facts ¶ 21.4

 Even later that day, 

 

badges. However, it is a fair inference from later events that 

Fryson was in fact still in possession of the original badge, 

even though she had reported it lost or stolen. 

3

 Plaintiff attempts to put this fact into dispute by asserting: 

“This fact is disputed. Plaintiff contacted Yuba after being 

told by Fryson that there was a file – But Yuba did not tell 

Plaintiff that as contended. They only confirmed that Fryson was 

a CPS Officer. (Lindsay Depo. P. 76).” Plaintiff’s statement, 

once again, does not put this fact genuinely in dispute. Nothing 

on the cited deposition page (or anywhere else) disputes 

defendant’s asserted fact about this phone call. Indeed, the 

cited deposition page has nothing to do with Fryson’s phone call 

to plaintiff. The cited deposition page only establishes that 

plaintiff called CPS, asked to speak to Fryson, and was told 

“that she’s not here.” Lindsay Depo. at 76. 

4

 Plaintiff attempts to put this fact in dispute by asserting: 

“Disputed. The day after Fryson contacted Plaintiff, Plaintiff 

contacted Yuba. (Lindsay Depo. p. 76).” Plaintiff’s statement, 

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plaintiff and Fryson talked again by phone, and agreed to meet at 

a restaurant. Facts ¶ 22. On the same day Fryson, plaintiff, 

Avery and Leveron met at the restaurant. Facts ¶ 23. Fryson 

told plaintiff that she had taken the file and hidden it, that 

she knew plaintiff was innocent, that she didn’t want bad things 

to happen to a good person, and that she may have ways to make 

this thing “go away.” Facts ¶ 23. 

The next day, plaintiff and Fryson again spoke by telephone, 

and agreed to meet at a coffee shop. Facts ¶ 24. In the parking 

lot of the coffee shop, Fryson showed plaintiff a badge. Facts 

¶ 25. Although plaintiff already believed that Fryson worked for 

Yuba County or possibly Yuba County CPS in some type of law 

enforcement capacity, seeing the badge made him realize that this 

was real, and he was facing real trouble. Lindsay Depo. at 68. 

Fryson told plaintiff that she would probably turn the file over 

to her supervisor, and that plaintiff would certainly be 

arrested, either at home or at his workplace. Lindsay Depo. at 

68 & 72. 

Later, plaintiff contacted an attorney. Facts ¶ 30. Later 

still, plaintiff tried to reach Fryson at Yuba County CPS. Facts 

¶ 31. Fryson of course was not there, since she was still on 

paid administrative leave while the check kiting incident was 

being investigated. The CPS staff member who answered the 

 

yet again, does not put this fact genuinely in dispute. Nothing 

on the cited deposition page (or anywhere else) disputes 

defendant’s asserted facts regarding the phone call. Indeed, the 

cited deposition page has nothing to do with Fryson’s phone call 

to plaintiff. 

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telephone was, unsurprisingly, evasive about Fryson. Plaintiff 

was told that Fryson was not there, he could not leave a message, 

CPS could not answer his question about when Fryson would return, 

and CPS could not explain its answers. Lindsay Depo. at 76-77. 

Plaintiff then spoke with Fryson’s supervisor. Facts ¶¶ 16 

& 31. Plaintiff told the supervisor about his conversations with 

Fryson, and her allegation about having a file about him. Id. 

¶¶ 17 & 31. Within 24 hours, the supervisor called plaintiff 

back and told him that there was no file about him, nor any 

charges pending against him. Id. ¶¶ 16 & 31.5

Soon after, plaintiff and his lawyer met with Yuba County 

counsel, and advised the County of Fryson’s actions. Facts ¶ 32. 

After that meeting, plaintiff agreed to cooperate with the 

Sheriff’s department in their investigation of, and ultimately a 

sting operation against, Fryson. Facts ¶ 33-34. Fryson was 

arrested. Facts ¶ 35.6

 

5

 Plaintiff attempts to put this fact in dispute by asserting: 

“This fact is disputed. Plaintiff contacted Yuba after being 

told by Fryson that there was a file – But Yuba did not tell 

Plaintiff that as contended. They only confirmed that Fryson was 

a CPS Officer. (Lindsay Depo. P. 76).” Once again, nothing on 

the cited deposition page (or anywhere else) put’s defendant’s 

asserted fact genuinely in dispute. The cited deposition page 

only establishes that plaintiff called CPS, asked to speak to 

Fryson, and was told “that she’s not here.” Lindsay Depo. at 76. 

It is important to realize that plaintiff does not provide a 

sworn statement disputing this fact, which indeed would create an 

issue of fact. Instead, he only provides an unverified 

statement, which is insufficient. This observation applies to a 

number of unverified “disputes”, and will not be repeated each 

time. 

6

 It appears, according to a press release from the Placer County 

District Attorney, that Fryson was later tried and convicted of 

check fraud, forgery, attempted extortion and accepting a bribe. 

http://www.placer.ca.gov/departments/da/news/2010/december/newsit

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

A. Original Complaint. 

Plaintiff, originally proceeding pro se, sued Fryson and 

Yuba County. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff asserted that his federal Due 

Process rights were violated, citing the Fourteenth Amendment to 

the U.S. Constitution.7 Specifically, he alleged that 

defendants’ conduct deprived him of his rights to “liberty” and 

“familial association.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 35. Adopting the Magistrate 

Judge’s recommendation, this court dismissed this claim without 

prejudice. ECF No. 25 ¶ 2(a). 

Plaintiff also alleged a common law state claim directly 

against the County for negligent hiring, supervision and 

retention, negligent infliction of emotional distress and fraud. 

Because state common law claims may not be pled directly against 

the County without an authorizing statute, this court, adopting 

the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, dismissed these claims 

without prejudice so that plaintiff could identify the statute or 

statutes under which he was proceeding.8

 ECF No. 25 ¶¶ 2(c), (d) 

& (e). However, since plaintiff also asserted that the County 

 

em,-d-,fryson2

7

 Plaintiff also asserted “Due Process” claims, under the Fourth 

and Fifth Amendments, and an Equal Protection claim. This court 

adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and dismissed these 

claims with prejudice. ECF No. 25 ¶ 2(a) & (b). 

8

 “[T]he California Government Claims Act immunizes public 

entities such as the County from tort liability in all cases 

except those where liability is explicitly created by a 

particular statute. Cal. Gov’t Code § 815(a); see also Hoff v. 

Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., 19 Cal. 4th 925, 932 (1998).” 

Order of January 3, 2012, ECF No. 35 14 n.7. 

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was vicariously liable for the negligent infliction and the fraud 

claims, pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 815.2, this court allowed 

those claims to proceed, as pled.9 Id. ¶¶ 2(d) & (e).10

Finally, plaintiff alleged a violation of Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 52.1 against the County. Because the claim did not allege that 

Fryson threatened any violence against plaintiff, the court 

adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and dismissed the 

claim with prejudice. Id. ¶ 2(f). 

B. Second Amended Complaint.11

Still proceeding pro se, plaintiff filed a Second Amended 

Complaint. ECF No. 29. Declining to adopt the Magistrate 

Judge’s recommendation, this court denied the County’s motion to 

dismiss the re-pled Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim. This 

court found that the Complaint sufficiently alleged that the 

County had a policy of permitting employees on leave to retain 

their badges, and that the County failed to properly supervise 

employees on leave. ECF No. 39 at 3-4. 

Plaintiff re-alleged his common law state claim directly 

 

9

 “A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an 

act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the 

scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from 

this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that 

employee or his personal representative.” Cal. Gov’t Code 

§ 815.2(a). 

10 The Magistrate Judge recommended that the court reject the 

County’s assertion that Cal. Govt. Code § 818.8 rendered it 

immune from fraud claims. This court, by adopting the Magistrate 

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations, rejected the County’s 

assertion. 

11 Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint out of turn, and it 

has been disregarded. 

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against the County, for negligent hiring, supervision and 

retention, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and fraud. 

Ignoring the court’s order previously dismissing these claim 

without prejudice, plaintiff again failed to identify any 

statutory basis for these claims. Accordingly, this court 

dismissed the claims with prejudice. ECF No. 45 ¶ 3. However, 

since plaintiff identified a statutory basis for vicarious 

liability of the negligent infliction and fraud claims, namely 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(a), the court permitted those claims to 

proceed.12

C. Third Amended Complaint. 

Still pro se, plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint. 

ECF No. 40. This Complaint again alleges the Fourteenth 

Amendment Due Process violations which the court previously found 

to be sufficient to survive the earlier dismissal motions. 

Once again ignoring the prior order of this court, plaintiff 

re-pled his negligent hiring, supervision and retention, 

negligent infliction of emotional distress, and fraud claims 

directly against the County, without identify any statutory bases 

for them. These claims will be summarily dismissed. However, 

plaintiff properly re-pled his vicarious liability claims for 

negligent infliction of emotional distress and fraud, citing Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 815.2(a). 

//// 

 

12 Adopting plaintiff’s strategy of ignoring this court’s order, 

the County renewed its argument that it was immune from the fraud 

charge. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the assertion be 

summarily denied, and this court adopted that recommendation. 

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D. Motion for Summary Judgment. 

The County moves for summary judgment on the Section 1983 

Claim solely on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to show 

that Yuba County has any custom, policy or practice that led to 

plaintiff’s alleged harm, and that Fryson herself was not a 

policy-maker and exercised no policy-making authority of the 

County. 

The County moves for summary judgment on the common-law 

claims on the grounds that the statute permitting vicarious 

liability – the only way these claims can be asserted against the 

County – requires that the employee be acting within the scope of 

her employment. Yuba County asserts that the undisputed facts 

show that Fryson was not acting within the scope of her 

employment.13

III. STANDARDS 

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (it is the 

movant’s burden “to demonstrate that there is ‘no genuine issue 

as to any material fact’ and that the movant is ‘entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law’”); Walls v. Central Contra Costa 

Transit Authority, 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) 

(same). 

 

13 Continuing to adopt plaintiff’s strategy, the County renews its 

twice-rejected argument that it is immune from the fraud claim 

under Cal. Gov’t Code § 818.8. That argument is summarily 

rejected. 

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Consequently, “[s]ummary judgment must be denied” if the 

court “determines that a ‘genuine dispute as to [a] material 

fact’ precludes immediate entry of judgment as a matter of law.” 

Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 884, 891 (2011), 

quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo 

Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(en banc) (same), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1566 (2012). 

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the 

initial responsibility of informing the district court of the 

basis for its motion, and “citing to particular parts of the 

materials in the record,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), that show 

“that a fact cannot be ... disputed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); 

Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re 

Oracle Corp. Securities Litigation), 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 

2010) (“The moving party initially bears the burden of proving 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact”) (citing Celotex 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). 

A wrinkle arises when the non-moving party will bear the 

burden of proof at trial. In that case, “the moving party need 

only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the 

non-moving party’s case.” Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the 

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to establish the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986); 

Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (where the moving party meets its 

burden, “the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to 

designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine 

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issues for trial”). In doing so, the non-moving party may not 

rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but must tender evidence 

of specific facts in the form of affidavits and/or other 

admissible materials in support of its contention that the 

dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). 

“In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a 

genuine issue of fact,” the court draws “all reasonable 

inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving 

party.” Walls, 653 F.3d at 966. Because the court only 

considers inferences “supported by the evidence,” it is the nonmoving party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate as a 

basis for such inferences. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight 

Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party 

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 

doubt as to the material facts .... Where the record taken as a 

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87 (citations omitted). 

IV. ANALYSIS 

A. Claim One: Section 1983. 

Yuba County may be liable under Section 1983 if the County 

itself “‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or 

‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” 

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359-60 

(2011).14 Under § 1983, the County is responsible only for its 

 

14 Citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 

658, 692 (1978). 

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own “illegal acts,” and cannot be held vicariously liable for the 

actions of its employees. Id.15

Since plaintiff seeks to impose liability on the County 

under § 1983, he “must prove that ‘action pursuant to official 

municipal policy’” caused his injury. Id. Official municipal 

policy includes “the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the 

acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent 

and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Id.16

Plaintiff identifies three policies as the basis for his Monell 

claim against Yuba County, namely, that (1) Yuba County “hired a 

person with a known criminal record,” (2) allowed Fryson “to keep 

her badge while on administrative leave,” and (3) allowed Fryson 

to have “virtually no supervision while on administrative leave.” 

Plaintiff’s Response to Special Interrogatories No. 3, ECF 

No. 68-3; Facts ¶ 43.17

1. Hiring persons with a known criminal history. 

Reading his Interrogatory response in the light most 

favorable to him, plaintiff asserts that Yuba County has a policy 

of hiring persons with known criminal histories. At trial, he 

will have the burden of establishing this fact. 

 

15 Citing Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986), City of 

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), and Board of Comm'rs 

of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). 

16 Citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–168 

(1970). 

17 Plaintiff also alleges in the Complaint that Fryson was a 

policy-maker. Complaint ¶ 13. However, he does not offer any 

evidence to dispute the County’s evidentiary showing that Fryson 

was not a policy-maker. See Facts ¶¶ 44-45. The court concludes 

that it is undisputed that Fryson was not a policy-maker. 

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In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that “According to a 

memorandum filed by DA Stephanie McCumber, Fryson was disciplined 

in 2008 for preparing false time sheets and mileage as a Child 

Protective Service worker, arrested in 2003 for check fraud in 

Florida and convicted in 1990 of grand theft in Los Angeles 

County.” Complaint ¶ 27. In his opposition to Yuba County’s 

summary judgment motion, he points to his own deposition 

testimony, which is that the DA “had alerted me of that, that 

there was a prior conviction.” See Lindsay Depo. at 98. 

However, both of these statements are plainly hearsay under 

Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Both assertions rely upon the truthfulness 

of McCumber’s alleged statement – whether in the alleged 

memorandum, or directly to plaintiff – that Fryson already had a 

conviction before Yuba County hired her. Plaintiff has not shown 

that these alleged statements can be presented in admissible form 

at trial. There is no declaration from the DA who allegedly 

wrote the memorandum or made the statement and no deposition of 

that DA, plaintiff has not offered the memorandum itself, and 

plaintiff has not offered any Interrogatory Answer or Admission 

of this fact. 

Even if this memorandum exists and McCumber made the 

asserted statement, and even if plaintiff could somehow get this 

memorandum or statement into admissible form, and it could be 

considered for the truth of the matter asserted, plaintiff still 

has to show that it is a “policy” of Yuba County to hire people 

with criminal convictions (or at least, not to screen them 

properly, or something along those lines). Plaintiff has done 

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nothing to show that there is such a policy.18 He has offered no 

deposition testimony of any County employee, no employment 

manual, no memoranda, no declarations. In short, he has not 

offered any evidence to prove this fact, nor given any hint of 

how he could possibly prove the existence of such a policy at 

trial.19

2. Fryson keeps her badge while on leave. 

Plaintiff alleges, but points to no evidence at all, that 

the County had a policy of permitting its employees to keep their 

badges while on paid administrative leave. The only evidence 

plaintiff points to is the Declaration of Roach at ¶¶ 4-5. That 

testimony has nothing to do with the disposition of badges while 

an employee is on leave. Rather, that testimony is that Fryson 

was issued Badge No. 49, reported it lost or stolen, and 

thereupon was issued Badge No. 1 as a replacement badge. ECF 

No. 68-5 ¶¶ 4-5. 

There is no evidence anywhere that the County has a policy 

of permitting employees on paid administrative leave (or any 

other kind of leave), to keep their badges. 

 

18 At oral argument in this matter, plaintiff’s counsel argued 

that the County should have known better than to hire someone 

with convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude. However, 

she offered no admissible evidence, nor any indication that such 

evidence could be offered in admissible form, that the County 

hired Fryson with such prior convictions, or that it had a policy 

of hiring such persons. 

19 Meanwhile, the County has offered declarations which they say 

show that it has no such policy. In fact, the declarations only 

show that people convicted of “certain” offenses cannot be hired, 

without identifying those offenses, or if they include the one(s) 

allegedly applicable to Fryson. But it matters not, because this 

is plaintiff’s burden, not the County’s. 

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To the contrary, the County has offered its written policy 

on “Paid Administrative Leave,” which states that during the time 

the employee is on leave, she “shall immediately relinquish [her] 

County Department-issued identification badge.” ECF No. 68-3. 

Moreover, the County offers the Declaration of Erich Runge, which 

states that when Fryson was placed on paid administrative leaved, 

she did relinquish her Badge No. 1, the replacement badge. ECF 

No. 68-6 ¶¶ 5-6. As far as the evidence shows, this was the only 

badge the County knew Fryson had possession of, as she had 

reported the original (Badge No. 45) lost or stolen.

3. Supervision of Fryson. 

[A] constitutional violation may arise from 

training or supervision where the training or 

supervision is sufficiently inadequate as to 

constitute “deliberate indifference” to the 

righ[t]s of persons with whom the police come 

into contact. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 

U.S. 378 (1989). Canton dealt specifically 

with inadequate training. We see no 

principled reason to apply a different 

standard to inadequate supervision. 

Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989). 

“Deliberate indifference,” meanwhile, 

is a stringent standard of fault, requiring 

proof that a municipal actor disregarded a 

known or obvious consequence of his action. 

Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1360 (emphasis added).20

Plaintiff asserts that the County failed to supervise Fryson 

while she was on leave, because she was only required to call in 

once per day. Plaintiff does not make any connection between 

 

20 Citing Board of Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 

(1997). 

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this level of supervision and the harm she caused, nor does he 

hint at what supervision could have prevented Fryson from 

attempting extortion. Plaintiff does not show how a once-a-day 

call-in by Fryson was insufficient supervision. It is not 

“obvious” that requiring an employee on leave to call in once per 

day would lead to that employee’s attempting the crime of 

extortion. Nor is it obvious how a different policy – calling in 

twice per day, disconnecting Fryson’s home phone and cell phone, 

requiring her to sit in a supervisor’s office all day, for 

example – would prevent that employee from attempting the crime 

of extortion. 

Even the strictest supervision – requiring Fryson to sit in 

a supervisor’s office during the entire work day – leaves her 

free to do exactly what she did, namely, attempt to extort money 

from plaintiff during the hours when she was not at the office. 

4. Conclusion. 

Plaintiff has done nothing to oppose the County’s summary 

judgment motion. His objections to undisputed factual assertions 

by the County is to say “disputed,” and then to cite to testimony 

that does not even relate to the fact allegedly being disputed. 

Plaintiff has put forward no evidence to show that the County had 

a policy that led to the crime committed by Fryson, nor that its 

supervision was deliberately indifferent to the risk that its 

employee would commit this crime. 

B. Claims Two, Three and Six:21 State Vicarious Liability 

Claims for Negligent Supervision, Fraud, and Negligent 

 

21 Claim Four is asserted only against Fryson. There is no Claim 

Five in the Complaint. 

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Infliction of Emotional Distress. 

Vicarious liability is a primary basis for 

liability on the part of a public entity, and 

flows from the responsibility of such an 

entity for the acts of its employees under 

the principle of respondeat superior. As the 

Act provides, “[a] public entity is liable 

for injury proximately caused by an act or 

omission of an employee of the public entity 

within the scope of his employment if the act 

or omission would ... have given rise to a 

cause of action against that employee,” 

unless “the employee is immune from 

liability.” 

Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 4th 1112, 1128 (2002) 

(emphasis added and citation omitted), citing Cal. Govt. Code, 

§ 815.2(a) & (b). The statute provides: 

A public entity is liable for injury 

proximately caused by an act or omission of 

an employee of the public entity within the 

scope of his employment if the act or 

omission would, apart from this section, have 

given rise to a cause of action against that 

employee or his personal representative. 

Yuba County argues that Fryson’s conduct was not within the 

scope of her employment, and therefore the County cannot be 

liable for it. Plaintiff counters that whether her conduct was 

within the scope of her employment is a question of fact. 

Cal. Govt. Code § 815.2(a). At trial, it would be plaintiff’s 

burden to prove “that the employee’s tortious conduct was 

committed within the scope of employment.” Mary M. v. City of 

Los Angeles, 54 Cal.3d 202, 209 (1991); Perry v. County of 

Fresno, 215 Cal. App. 4th 94, 101 (5th Dist. 2013) (“The burden 

is on the plaintiff to prove that the employee's tortious conduct 

was committed within the scope of employment”). 

Ordinarily, the determination whether an 

employee has acted within the scope of 

employment presents a question of fact; it 

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becomes a question of law, however, when “the 

facts are undisputed and no conflicting 

inferences are possible.” 

Id., at 213. Here, the only fact that plaintiff has offered 

about the scope of Fryson’s employment is that she was a “social 

worker in the County of Yuba.” Complaint ¶ 4. Plaintiff has 

offered no job description, no declaration or deposition 

testimony, no discovery, no anything that explains what Fryson’s 

job duties were, nor anything from which the court can deduce the 

scope of her employment.22 For example, did her duties include 

confronting persons suspected of sexual assault on minors (or is 

that a function left to the police, or some other person within 

CPS)? In short, plaintiff has failed to show that he will be 

able to prove at trial that Fryson’s conduct was within the scope 

of her employment. 

In any event, what is undisputed is that at the time the 

extortion attempt occurred, plaintiff had no job duties other 

than to call in to the office every day, and to be ready to 

resume work. ECF No. 68-3 23 (memo re Paid Administrative 

Leave). Whatever her duties may have been before her arrest, 

while she was on administrative leave, she was “relieved from 

[her] duties” as a social worker. Id., 22. She was stripped of 

all authority as a social worker, and directed to return all 

 

22 Plaintiff argues in his brief, but offers no evidence, that 

“Fryson was employed to assess the safety of children involved in 

circumstances of child abuse and neglect and monitor services 

relating thereto.” ECF No. 70 at p. 4. He argues from this that 

faking a report about child abuse was therefore within the scope 

of her employment. Id. He has, however, presented no evidence 

of what her job duties are, and no one has offered any evidence 

of those duties. 

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property related to her job, including her badge. Id. She was 

banned from all County facilities other than those open to the 

general public. Id. 

This case is complicated further by the fact that Fryson’s 

actions were criminal. The California Supreme Court, in John R. 

v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 48 Cal.3d 438 (1989), “applied 

‘the historical and perhaps still prevailing point of view’ that 

an employer could not be held vicariously liable for the criminal 

act of an employee committed in furtherance of the employee's 

personal purpose.” Thorn v. City of Glendale, 28 Cal. App. 

4th 1379, 1384 (2nd Dist. 1994). Although the Supreme Court 

later decided Mary M., holding the City liable for a police 

officer’s rape of a citizen, it did not expressly overrule John 

R. Thus, Mary M. appears to say that the employer can be 

vicariously liable for the acts of its police officers while 

otherwise carrying out their duties. The California Supreme 

Court found vicarious liability because of many factors not 

present here, including the “extraordinary power and authority 

over its citizenry” that society bestows upon police. Most 

important, the police officer was abusing his actual authority 

over the plaintiff. The officer raped the plaintiff while 

otherwise carrying out his actual duties. 

Here, Fryson was not carrying out her duties. First, she 

had no duties, other than to call in to the office every day. 

Second, even if she had not been on leave, plaintiff has not 

shown that confronting alleged molesters is within the scope of 

her employment. 

Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that he can produce 

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any evidence at trial that Fryson was acting within the course 

and scope of her employment as a social worker when she tried to 

extort plaintiff. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, 

 1. The court summarily DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE 

plaintiff’s Second (negligent hiring), Third (fraud), and Sixth 

(negligent infliction of emotional distress) Claims, to the 

extent they are direct claims against the County; 

 2. The court GRANTS defendant County’s motion for 

summary judgment on all other claims, and the County is hereby 

DISMISSED from this case. 

Case Status 

Defendant Fryson, the sole remaining defendant, has answered 

the Third Amendment Complaint. See ECF No. 56 (Answer dated 

November 20, 2012). Pursuant to the Status (Pretrial Scheduling) 

Order (“PTO”), discovery and motion practice in this case is 

ended. ECF No. 50 (Order dated October 29, 2012). 

It appears from Fryson’s most recent filing that she is 

incarcerated in the California state prison system, and is not 

represented by counsel. See ECF No. 74 (Notice of Change of 

Address dated October 29, 2013). Accordingly, the court VACATES

the current Status Conference date of December 9, 2013. the 

parties shall instead submit Status Conference statements no 

later than December 20, 2013. In addition to the information 

normally required in such reports, the parties shall advise the 

court what special procedures, if any, will be needed in light of 

defendant’s incarceration. 

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All dates and requirements set forth in the PTO are hereby 

CONFIRMED. If the parties’ Final Pretrial Conference statements 

reflect that both parties are represented by counsel, the Final 

Pretrial Conference (currently scheduled for January 27, 2014 at 

2:30 p.m.), will take place with counsel in Chambers, otherwise, 

the Final Pretrial Conference will be vacated, and the Final 

Pretrial Order will be based upon the papers. 

The trial date of April 29, 2014 at 10:30 a.m. in Courtroom 

No. 4 is hereby CONFIRMED. However, neither surviving party 

having demanded a jury trial, and the time for doing so having 

passed, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b)(1), the matter will be tried to 

the court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: November 25, 2013. 

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