Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01211/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01211-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CITY OF CARLSBAD; CARLSBAD

PUBLIC FINANCING AUTHORITY ,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 08CV1211 JLS (WMc)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR PARTIAL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (2)

DECLARING PLAINTIFF AS THE

RIGHTFUL OWNER OF THE

TRADEMARKS AND LOGO AT

ISSUE (3) AUTHORIZING USPTO

TO DENY REGISTRATION OF

DEFENDANT’S APPLICATIONS

AND REGISTER PLAINTIFF’S

APPLICATIONS.

(Doc. No. 18.)

vs.

PRINCE REZA SHAH,

Defendant.

In the present action, the City of Carlsbad (“Plaintiff”) alleges various claims against Prince

Reza Shah (“Defendant”), including copyright infringement, cybersquatting, unfair competition in

violation of the Lanham Act; unfair competition in violation of California’s Business and Professional

Code §17200, and common law unfair competition. Plaintiff also seeks a declaratory judgment

regarding who holds trademark rights in various marks at issue in the case. In return, Defendant filed

a counterclaim in which he seeks a declaration that his trademark rights are superior to that of

Plaintiff’s, and an injunction against Plaintiff from further utilizing the marks. 

The only issue presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment,

which contends that the claim for relief for declaratory judgment regarding trademark rights contains

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1

 Serial Nos. 77/230889, 77/230864, 77/240017, 77/238790, 77/235270, 77/326199,

77/263971, 77/263925, and 77/263996.

2

 Serial Nos. 77/054111, 77/054126, 77/061706, 77/202046, 77/2037554, and 77/284659.

3

 Conrad “Skip” Hammann is the Director of Special Projects for the City of Carlsbad.

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no genuine issue of material fact and is ripe for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the

Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment. The Court further DECLARES

that Plaintiff is the rightful owner of the trademarks and logo at issue in the present case.

Additionally, the Court AUTHORIZES the United States Patent and Trademark Office to register

Plaintiff’s pending trademark applications1

 and to deny registration of Defendant’s application of the

marks and Marbrisa logo.2

In addition, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice. 

BACKGROUND

In 1998, the City of Carlsbad acquired land on which it planned to develop a golf course.

(Compl. ¶ 10.) Construction began in 2005. (Id.) Also that year, the City initiated a public

campaign soliciting names for the golf course, contacting marketing consultants and experts. 

(Compl. ¶ 11.) On June 6, 2006, the City held a meeting of the Carlsbad City Council which was

open to the public. (Compl. ¶ 12.) At this meeting, the City announced that it would publicly

announce the chosen name for the golf course on October 18, 2006 and, in the meantime, solicited

proposed names from the public (it received over 700 proposals). (Id.) On September 11, 2006,

the City, through an agent, registered the domain name “thecrossingsatcarlsbad.com.” (Hammann3

Decl. ¶ 3.) 

The City formally announced at an open City Council meeting on October 18, 2006, that

the selected name was “The Crossings at Carlsbad.” (Hammann Decl. ¶ 4.) This was reported in

the local newspaper, the North County Times, that same day (Hammann Decl. ¶ 4-5.) The name

was formally adopted by the City Council on November 21, 2006. (Hammann Decl. ¶ 6.) This

was followed by a press release and a newspaper article in the San Diego Union Tribune,

specifically identifying “The Crossings at Carlsbad” as the name of the golf course. (Hammann

Decl. at ¶¶ 7-8; NOL ISO MSJ, Ex. 1 & 32.) The City also used the acronym “TCAC” to

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4

 The timing of when the use of “TCAC” began is unclear.

5

 The City alleges that the development of the logo began in December 2006. (Hammann

Decl. ¶ 9.)

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identify the golf course and related goods. (Hammann Decl. at ¶ 8.)4 

Also on November 21, 2006 and the day after, Shah registered the domain names

“www.thecrossingatcarlsbad.com,” www.golfthecrossingatcarlsbad.mobi” and “www.tcac.mobi.” 

(NOL ISO Opp., Ex. B at 17 & Ex. E at 159.) Shah has no relationship with the City or the golf

course, nor has he been involved in any prior golf-related businesses of any kind. (Mot. ISO MSJ

at 2; Opp. to MSJ at 8.) In Shah’s deposition, he admits that he was at the public City Council

meeting when the name “The Crossings at Carlsbad” was discussed. (Shah Depo. at 12:15 -

13:20.)

Starting November 30, 2006, Shah filed a series of Intent to Use trademark applications in

the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). (Compl. ¶ 24; NOL ISO MSJ, Exs.

13 - 17.) The first five trademark applications related to the marks “The Crossings at Carlsbad,”

and “TCAC” (Id.) The applications were filed for use on clothing, golf balls, golf courses, golf

clubs, and golf tees. (Id.) The first five applications, which involved no logo, were filed as

follows:

(1) November 30, 3006 - “The Crossings at Carlsbad” - for clothing, namely men’s and

women’s golf caps and golf shirts

(2) November 30, 2006 - “TCAC” - for clothing, namely men’s and women’s golf caps and

golf shirts

(3) December 11, 2006 - “TCAC” - for golf balls

(4) June 7, 2007 - “The Crossings at Carlsbad” - for golf courses

(5) June 12, 2007 - “The Crossings at Carlsbad” - for golf balls, golf clubs, and golf tees

On or about February 5, 2007, the City Council was formally presented at a public meeting

with the wave-like logo that officially became the logo for the golf course on March 1, 2007.5

(Hammann Decl. at ¶ 9.) The logo was published at the official launching of the

www.thecrossingsatcarlsbad.com website in mid-March 2007. (Hammann Decl. at ¶ 10.) 

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On August 24, 2007, Plaintiff applied for trademarks related to the logo. (NOL ISO MSJ,

Exs. 25-27.) On September 20, 2007, Defendant filed an intent to use application for a Logo

almost exactly the same as Plaintiff’s. The only difference was that Defendant’s application

inserted the name “Mabrisa” instead of “Carlsbad.” (Compare NOL ISO MSJ, Ex. 18 with NOL

ISO MSJ, Exs. 25-27). Defendant admitted that the designed was influenced by Plaintiff’s logo. 

(Def. Depo. at 151-153.)

Beginning on July 16, 2007 and ending on August 24, 2007, Plaintiff filed a series of nine

intent to use applications for “The Crossings at Carlsbad,” “TCAC” and the logo. On March 31,

2008, the City obtained the copyright in the logo and exclusive rights and privileges to the

copyright. (Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. E.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when “there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 

Entry of summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party

moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing an absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Where the party moving for summary judgment does not bear

the burden of proof at trial, it may show that no genuine issue of material fact exists by

demonstrating that “there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Id.

at 325. 

Once the moving party meets the requirements of Rule 56, the burden shifts to the party

resisting the motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Without specific facts to

support the conclusion, a bald assertion of the “ultimate fact” is insufficient. See Schneider v.

TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1991). A material fact is one that is relevant to an

element of a claim or defense and the existence of which might affect the outcome of the suit. The

materiality of a fact is thus determined by the substantive law governing the claim or defense. 

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Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. 

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). When making this determination, the court must view all inferences

drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Credibility

determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts

are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] . . . ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

DISCUSSION

“District courts have broad authority to review trademark decisions by the U.S. Patent and

Trademark Office (PTO), both before and after registration of the mark.” Aktieselskabet v. Fame

Jeans, Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2008). “In addition, district courts may authorize the PTO to

register or to deny registration to a pending mark.” Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1)). 

Under the Lanham Act, “[a] person who has a bona fide intention, under circumstances

showing the good faith of such person, to use a trademark in commerce may request registration of

its trademark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1). “The term ‘use in commerce’ means the bona fide use of

a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve the right in a mark.” 15

U.S.C. § 1127. Therefore, lack of such intent is a ground on which a party may oppose the

registration. See Aktieselskabet, 525 F.3d at 12. Plaintiff in this case is doing just that – arguing

that Defendant offers no objective evidence of the bona fide intent to use the marks at the time the

application was filed, and therefore there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the

(in)validity of the application to register the marks. 

i. Relevant Case Law

In Aktieselskabet, the D.C. Circuit noted that “the [Trademark Trial and Appeals Board]

has held § 1(b) [of the Lanham Act] to require both actual intent to use a mark in commerce and

evidence, contemporary with the application, that objectively demonstrate that intent,” and

explicitly agreed with this interpretation. Aktieseskabet, 525 F.3d at 21 (citing Wet Seal, Inc. v.

FD Mgmt., Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1633 (T.T.A.B. 2007)). The D.C. Circuit went on to find

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that “Congress made clear that a ‘bona fide intent to use’ also involves an objective standard by

specifying there must be ‘circumstances showing . . . good faith.”6

 Id. at 21. 

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB” or “Board”) has further qualified what

evidence a nonmoving party must present in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment based

on lack of intent to use. In Commodore Electronics Ltd. v. CBM Kabushiki Kaisha, both parties

filed motions for summary judgment regarding the notice of opposition to the applicant’s

registration. 26 U.S.P.G.2d 1502 (T.T.A.B. 1993). The Board stated that the issue was “whether

the absence of any documents evidencing applicant’s claimed intention to use its mark may be

sufficient to constitute objective proof of a lack of a bona fide intention to use.” Id. at 1506. The

Board went on to note that the bona fide intent requirement focused on an “objective good-faith

test.” Id. The Board stated:

Although admittedly a close question, we hold that absent other facts which adequately

explain or outweigh the failure of an applicant to have any documents supportive of or

bearing upon its claimed intent to use its mark in commerce, the absence of any

documentary evidence on the part of an applicant regarding such intent is sufficient to

prove that the applicant lacks a bona fide intention to use its mark in commerce as

requirement by Section 1(b) [of the Lanham Act].” 

Id. at 1507. 

Ultimately, however, the Board did not grant the motion for summary judgment. Instead,

the Board found that “as a general rule, the factual question of intent is particularly unsuited to

disposition on summary judgment.” Id. at 1508 (quoting Copelands’ Enterprises Inc. v. CNV Inc.,

945 F.2d 1562 (Fed Cir. 1991)). Understandably, Defendant makes much of this, arguing that

Commodore actually goes against Plaintiff’s argument that summary judgment is warranted. 

(Opp. to MSJ at 6-7 (“Thus, at bottom Commodore is not a precedent that supports the City’s

contention that it is entitled to summary judgment; it is instead a precedent that supports Mr.

Shah’s position that summary judgment would be particularly inappropriate here.”).) Plaintiff,

however, counters this contention in two rather persuasive ways.

First, the procedural posture in Commodore was different than in the present case. In

Commodore, the applicant was seeking summary judgment and the opposer was seeking to amend

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7

 In addition to the two cases discussed above, Plaintiff cites to DC Comics and Marvel

Characters, Inc. v. Silver, TTAB Opposition No. 91/176,744 (TTAB Aug. 21, 2009) in its Reply. 

This case is not on Westlaw, but is attached as an exhibit to Plaintiff’s reply brief. It clearly states at

the top that it is not TTAB precedent. Thus, while it does affirm Commodore’s proposition above,

it can not legally be considered or cited in these proceedings. Regardless, the Court finds that Honda

Motors and L.C. Licensing are sufficient to support Plaintiff’s argument that Commodore is

distinguishable from the present case and remains applicable here.

8

 Moreover, the Board focused on the applicant’s answers to interrogatories and requests for

documents as evidence of the lack of documentary evidence. Honda Motor Co., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d at

1662-63. These interrogatories and answers are strikingly similar to those in this case used by

Plaintiff in support of its argument for lack of documentary evidence. 

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its notice of opposition to assert a lack of documentary evidence supporting the bona fide intent. 

Thus, the Board denied the applicant’s request for summary judgment and allowed the opposer to

amend its opposition. This amendment created a material issue of fact regarding the bona fide

intent. Additionally, the Board ordered a discovery period directed solely to this issue. In

contrast, in the present case, Plaintiff is seeking summary judgment and Defendant (the applicant)

has had ample opportunity to produce documentary evidence of his intent to use at the time he

filed his application. As discussed more below, Defendant has offered no such objective evidence,

but only a subjective statement of his intent. 

Second, the proposition that summary judgment is appropriate when the applicant fails to

produce any documentary evidence of bona fide intent to use the mark has been reaffirmed in 

more recent cases heard by the TTAB.7

 For example, in Honda Motor Co. v. Winkelmann, 90

U.S.P.Q.2d 1660 (T.T.A.B. 2009), the Board noted that, in general, questions of intent should not

be decided on summary judgment. But, it went out to state: “The Board has held, however, that

the absence of any documentary evidence regarding an applicant’s bona fide intention to use a

mark in commerce is sufficient to prove that an applicant lacks such intention as required by

Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, unless other facts are presented which adequately explain or

outweigh applicant’s failure to provide such documentary evidence.” Id. at 1662 (citing

Commodore, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1507). Thus, the Board focused “on the entirety of the

circumstances, as revealed by the evidence of record” and held that “viewing [the] evidence in the

light most favorable to applicant, . . . there is no evidence of applicant’s bona fide intent to use the

mark in the United States to identify the claimed goods.”8

 Id. at 1663-64. The Board, therefore,

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granted the opposer’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1664.

Similarly, in L.C. Licensing, Inc. v. Berman, the Board reiterated the above quoted

statement in Commodore. 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1883, 1891 (T.T.A.B. 2008). The Board then went on

to analyze the applicant’s answer to various interrogatories, all of which indicated that he had no

documents evidencing his alleged intent to use the marks for which he was seeking to register, just

as in the present case. The Board found that “[t]he mere assertion of an intent to use the mark

without corroboration of any sort, whether documentary or otherwise, is not likely to provide

credible evidence to establish a bona fide intention to use the mark.” Id. at 1892. Thus, the Board

sustained the opposer’s opposition to the registration for lack of bona fide intention to use the

mark in commerce. Id. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the statement in Commodore that summary judgment is

not appropriate for deciding issues of intent has been adequately clarified by the more recent cases

of Honda Motor and L.C. Licensing. Thus, the Court must then turn to whether summary

judgment is appropriate under the facts and evidence produced in this case.

ii. Defendant Has Not Produced Any Documentary Evidence of His Intent to Use

the Marks

Under the above-cited case law, Defendant must produce either 1) objective documentary

evidence of his intent to use the marks in commerce or 2) a valid explanation as to why no

evidence has been produced under a totality of the circumstances analysis. See Honda Motor Co.

v. Winkelmann, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 1660 (T.T.A.B. 2009) (“The Board has held, however, that the

absence of any documentary evidence regarding an applicant’s bona fide intention . . . is sufficient

. . . , unless other facts are presented which adequately explain or outweigh applicant’s failure to

provide such documentary evidence.” Id. at 1662 (citing Commodore, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1507)). 

After examining the record, the Court finds that Defendant has not met either burden.

First, in response to Interrogatories, Defendant acknowledged that he does not have any

evidence other than the trademark applications to support his intent to use the marks. When asked

to state all facts and produce any documents that relate to Defendant’s contention that he had a

bona fide intent to use the marks at the time of the application, Defendant responded that “[h]e

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9

 In his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Defendant contends that he took

other “preliminary steps to develop the business,” but the record is clear that most of these steps,

including the filing of the fictitious business name registration and corporation formation, were taken

after the application had been filed, not “preliminary” to it. (See Def. Depo. at 88-91.) Further, at oral

argument, Defendant argued that these actions, though taken after the applications were filed, should

still be evidence of his intent to use at the time of the application. This, however, is not the law. The

standard is whether there was objective evidence contemporaneous with the filing of the applications.

See Aktieseskabet, 525 F.3d at 21. Moreover, documentary evidence of these actions have only been

testified to in Defendant’s deposition, but the Court has seen no physical evidence supporting these

statements.

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knows of no external facts that would or could relate to that contention” and that the only

document related to that contention was the “applications to register the Marks in the USPTO.” 

(NOL ISO MSJ, Exs. 29 & 30, Interrogatories and Responses Nos. 11-12.) Further, in

Defendant’s deposition, he testified that the first step he took in relation to using the marks was

after the trademark application had been filed with the USPTO. (Def. Depo. at 107-08.) And,

Defendant submitted fictitious business name statements and created corporations utilizing the

name “The Crossings at Carlsbad” only after the applications had been filed. (Id. at 146.) In fact,

Defendant produced only seventeen pages of documents, testifying that these are the only

documents that relate to the law suit. (Id. at 41; Def. Depo. Exs. 6&7.) Defendant makes no

argument that these documents support his intent to use the marks at the time of the application.

Defendant counters the argument that no documentary evidence has been produced by

pointing to his own statement that such intent existed. In his deposition, Defendant alleges that he

had in fact taken preliminary or contemporaneous actions to develop a business using the marks. 

He testified that he decided on Carlsbad Village as the location of the store prior to the application,

consulted with a designer and silk-screener the same week as he filed the application, and then

began creating merchandise over the next few months.9

 (Def. Depo. at 85-89.) 

It is clear that Defendant’s statement alone is not sufficient to defeat the motion for

summary judgment because it is subjective evidence, not objective evidence. Aktieseskabet, 525

F.3d at 21 (agreeing with the TTAB’s holding that “§ 1(b) . . . require[s] both actual intent to use a

mark in commerce and evidence, contemporary with the application, that objectively demonstrate

that intent”; see also id. (“Congress made clear that a ‘bona fide intent to use’ also involves an

objective standard by specifying there must be ‘circumstances showing . . . good faith.”) 

Moreover, as Plaintiff points out, these activities which allegedly show Defendant’s intention to

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10 Specifically, when asked whether there were any current business activities using the marks,

Defendant responded: “Because since the – since the lawsuit, I am not selling [the merchandise]. I’m

not doing like this. But I have them. I have given it to my friends and stuff, but no money involved

or anything, because I waiting this thing to finish, because of this lawsuit here they created.” (Def.

Depo. at 101.) 

11 In support of his “business decision” argument, Defendant cites to Nautica Apparel, Inc.

v. Crain, 2001 WL 1182881 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 21, 2001). However, the TTAB stated that Nautica is

not to be cited as precedent of the TTAB and therefore of no help to the Court. Instead, the Court

follows the rationale in L.C. Licensing, which is precedent of the TTAB and therefore highly

persuasive to the Court. Moreover, even if the Court were to recognize the rationale in Nautica, the

decision does not explain the lack of objective evidence at the time of the application, which is the

applicable time frame. 

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use the marks, including the alleged designs and merchandise, should be accompanied by

documentary evidence, “such as bank statements, purchase orders, invoices, and written

communications. However, despite numerous interrogatories and requests for production of

documents, [Defendant] has failed to produce a single piece of documentary evidence regarding

these alleged activities.” (Reply to Opp. at 3.) 

Defendant also argues in his opposition to the motion for summary judgment that other

facts exist which explains the lack of documentary evidence. Namely, Defendant contends that he

“made a business decision not to proceed with commercial activities related to the mark until a

legal dispute over the mark was resolved.”10 (Opp. to MSJ at 8 (citing Def. Depo. at 100-101).) In

L.C. Licensing, however, the Board found that “[a]pplicant’s decision to forgo a business model

until after the opposition is decided does not explain his failure to have any documents whatsoever

at the time the application was filed that showed an intent to use the mark.” 86 U.S.P.Q.2d at

1892. Thus, the Board found that, because there was no documentary evidence of his intent to use

at the time of application, summary judgment for the opposer was appropriate. Id. Thus, this

argument fails.11 

At oral argument, Defendant argued that the Court must look at the objective evidence

produced at the time of each individual application, which ranged from November 2006 to June

2007. The Court agrees that this is the appropriate approach, but finds that doing so does not 

change the Court’s overall analysis. The bottom line is that Defendant has produced only

seventeen pages of documentary evidence, none of which support Defendant’s bona fide intent to

use any of the Marks. Again, Defendant argues that his statement regarding the actions he

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12 The record shows that after announcing and then formally adopting the name “the City of

Carlsbad” and using the acronym, “TCAC,” Plaintiff started ordering and distributing marketing

materials using the same. (Mem. ISO MSJ at 11-12.) Further, in January, Plaintiff provided the name

for publication on a San Diego golf map. (Id. at 12.) The next month, “the City marketed its golf

course through the Carlsbad Chamber of Commerce and San Diego Golf Expo under the name ‘The

Crossings at Carlsbad.’” (Id.) Also in February, the City ordered various merchandise which had the

marks and/or logo on them. (Id.) “On August 2, 2007, the golf course’s pro shop began selling

clothing, golf balls, and other items bearing the Marks and the Logo. The golf course opened for

business on August 11, 2007.” (Id.) Accordingly, it appears that the first actual use of the marks and

logo in commerce is around January or February 2007, when Plaintiff began marketing and setting

forth its business plan. 

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allegedly took shortly after he filed his November applications, such as finding a location and

meeting with a designer, is evidence that he did intend to use the marks in commerce. Thus,

Defendant argues, even if the November and December 2006 applications fail for lack of objective

evidence at the time of the applications, the June 2007 applications should not fail because such

objective evidence had been generated by this time. But, separating the applications by date does

not make a difference – the alleged activities and merchandise purchased by Defendants have not

been produced before this Court, nor has a receipt, bill, or any other objective evidence. 

Defendant saying such objective evidence exists is simply not enough to meet his burden to defeat

the motion for summary judgment.

Moreover, even if the Court were to find that such evidence existed at the time of the June

2007 applications, the common law priority of use doctrine would still place the rights with

Plaintiff. “It is axiomatic in trademark law that the standard test of ownership is priority of use.” 

Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC International, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). “When proving

ownership of a trademark, federal registration of the mark is prima facie evidence that the

registrant is the owner of the mark,” and therefore “the registrant is granted a presumption of

ownership.” Id. at 1219. “However, the non-registrant can rebut the presumption by showing that

the registrant had not established valid ownership rights in the mark at the time of registration - in

other words, if the non-registrant can show that he used the mark in commerce first, then the

registration will be invalidated.” Id. at 1220. The non-registrant’s burden is a preponderance of

the evidence. Id. at 1219. The record regarding Plaintiff’s implementation of its business plan

using the marks illustrates that Plaintiff established the requisite use in commerce around January

or February 2007.12 Thus, Defendant’s June 2007 applications are invalidated based on the

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priority of use doctrine even if we find the intent to use. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has not produced any objective evidence of his

bona fide intention to use the marks in commerce at the time of any of his applications to use the

marks. Thus, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment. 

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary

judgment, finding that Defendant has not established his bona fide intent to use the marks in

commerce at the time of his applications. Thus, the Court DECLARES Plaintiff the rightful

owner of the trademarks and logo at issue in the present case. The Court therefore

AUTHORIZES the United States Patent and Trademark office to DENY registration of

Defendant’s trademark applications, Serial Nos. 77/054111, 77/054126, 77/061706, 77/202046,

77/2037554, and 77/284659, and REGISTER Plaintiff’s trademark applications, Serial Nos.

77/230889, 77/230864, 77/240017, 77/238790, 77/235270, 77/326199, 77/263971, 77/263925, and

77/263996. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 20, 2009

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-01211-AJB-WMC Document 26 Filed 10/20/09 Page 12 of 12