Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-02297/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-02297-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RACHAEL CROWE,

Plaintiff,

vs.

B O A T R I G H T R A I L R O A D

COMPANIES, INC.,

Defendant.

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CASE NO. 2:13-CV-2297-SLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is presently pending before the court on defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 

(Doc. 9.) Plaintiff Rachael Crowe has sued her former employer, defendant Boatright 1

Railroad Companies, Inc., alleging that defendant terminated her in retaliation for her

opposition to an unlawful hostile work environment. Upon consideration of the record, the

submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant law, the court is of the

opinion that defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 9), is due to be granted.

I. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

Defendant has moved to dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claimupon

which relief can be granted. (Doc. 9 at 1-2.) The purpose of such a motion, authorized by

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is to test the facial sufficiency of the

plaintiff’s statement of a claim for relief. Brooks v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida,

Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997). Rule 12(b)(6) must be read together with Rule

Reference to a document number, [“Doc. ___”], refers to the number assigned to each 1

document as it is filed in the court’s record.

FILED

 2014 Aug-07 PM 02:53

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:13-cv-02297-SLB Document 15 Filed 08/07/14 Page 1 of 7
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which “requires that a pleading contain a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief in order

to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 

Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal citations

and quotation omitted). 

When addressing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court accepts the allegations in the

Complaint as true and construes those allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff. 

Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1359

(11th Cir. 2011)(quoting Am. Dental Ass’n, 605 F.3d at 1288). To survive a Motion to

Dismiss, “the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Am. Dental Ass’n, 605 F.3d at 1289 (quoting Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)))(internal quotations omitted). A claim

is “plausible” if the facts are sufficient “to allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). However, “courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation,” and the court does not assume that plaintiff can prove facts she has not

alleged. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 563 n.8. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

“[W]hile notice pleading may not require that the pleader allege a ‘specific fact’ to cover

every element or allege ‘with precision’ each element of a claim, it is still necessary that a

complaint ‘contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements

necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.’” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr.

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Case 2:13-cv-02297-SLB Document 15 Filed 08/07/14 Page 2 of 7
for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001)(quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litig.,

655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 8, 1981)).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

In her Complaint, plaintiff alleges the following facts:

8. Plaintiff Crowe became employed with Boatright in July 2011 as a

payroll specialist.

9. One of plaintiff’s direct supervisors at Boatright was Steve Bookout,

the company’s Chief Financial Officer.

10. Over the course of plaintiff’s employment she embarked upon a

physical fitness regimen, and lost a great deal of weight.

11. After plaintiff’s weight loss Bookout began commenting upon her

appearance and complimenting her on a frequent basis. Bookout made

numerous comments about how attractive he found the plaintiff.

12. After several weeks and/or months ofthese comments, plaintiff met

with Bookout in October 2012 and informed him that his unprofessional

comments made her uncomfortable, and asked him to stop. 

13. A few days after this meeting plaintiff was terminated from her

employment on or about October 17, 2012.

(Doc. 1 at 2-3 ¶¶ 8-13.)

Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on or about January 31,

2013. (Doc. 1 at 7.) In her Charge, plaintiff alleges that she was terminated “based upon

[her] gender (female) and in retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment.” (Id.)

After receiving a right-to-sue letter, plaintiff filed the instant action, which contains

a single claim of retaliatory discharge. (Id. at 3 ¶¶ 15-18.) She alleges that she “engaged in

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Case 2:13-cv-02297-SLB Document 15 Filed 08/07/14 Page 3 of 7
protected activity by complaining to her supervisor about his inappropriate sexual

comments,” and that she was terminated shortly thereafter. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.)

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant asks the court to dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim

for relief. (Doc. 9 at 1.) As grounds for its Motion to Dismiss, defendant states as follows:

1. The Complaint asserts one cause of action against Boatright, namely,

retaliation under Title VII. (Doc. 1, p. 3.)

2. Plaintiff alleges that her supervisor complimented her on her

appearance and told her he found her attractive. (Doc. 1, ¶ 11.)

3. Plaintiff alleges she asked her supervisor to stop making such

comments, and a few days thereafter, she was fired. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 12, 13.)

4. Plaintiff has not stated a prima facie case of retaliation under Title

VII because she has not alleged activity which could be deemed “protected

activity.”

5. As a matter of law, Plaintiff did not have an objectively reasonable

basis for believing that the conduct alleged in the Complaint amounted to

sexual harassment or any other conduct prohibited by Title VII. Little v.

United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997).

6. The Eleventh Circuit has held that comments of the type allegedly

made to Plaintiff do not constitute sexual harassment. Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of

Regents, 212 F.3d 571 (11th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).

(Id. at 1-2.)

In response, plaintiff argues that her statement to Bookout is protected activity – “Ms.

Crowe opposed a hostile working environment caused by her immediate supervisor.” (Doc.

12 at 3.) She contends that she has sufficiently alleged facts to support a finding that she

reasonably believed Bookout’s conduct violated Title VII. (See id. at 4-5.)

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Case 2:13-cv-02297-SLB Document 15 Filed 08/07/14 Page 4 of 7
In an unpublished opinion, the Eleventh Circuit has held:

Title VII protects individuals who have informally voiced complaints

to their superiors. Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 715

n.2 (11th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff must demonstrate that she had a subjective,

good-faith belief that her employer was engaged in unlawful employment

practices and that her belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and

record presented. Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d

956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997). The plaintiff’s subjective belief is measured against

the substantive law at the time of the offense. Lipphardt v. Durango

Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001). Although

the conduct opposed need not “actually be sexual harassment, . . . it must be

close enough to support an objectively reasonable belief that it is.” Clover v.

Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999).

Henderson v. Waffle House, Inc., 238 Fed. Appx. 499, 501-02 (11th Cir. 2007).2

Plaintiff alleges that for months before her termination “Bookout . . . comment[ed]

upon her appearance and compliment[ed] her on a frequent basis,” and he “made numerous

comments about how attractive he found [her].” (Doc. 1 ¶ 11, 12.) However, “[a] man can

compliment a woman’s looks . . . on one or several occasions, by telling her that she is

looking ‘very beautiful,’ or words to that effect, without fear of being found guilty of sexual

harassment for having done so.” Gupta, 212 F.3d at 584. Indeed, “[n]ot uncommonly such

words show a flirtatious purpose, but flirtation is not sexual harassment.” Id. (citation

omitted). Thus, the alleged “unlawful conduct” – Bookout’s comments and compliments –

cannot support a finding that plaintiff reasonably believed Bookout’s conduct violated Title

VII by creating a hostile work environment based on sex.

Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2 provides, in pertinent part, “An opinion shall be 2

unpublished unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it. Unpublished opinions are

not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir.

Rule 36-2 (emphasis added).

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Case 2:13-cv-02297-SLB Document 15 Filed 08/07/14 Page 5 of 7
Therefore, defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 9), will be granted and plaintiff’s

retaliation claim will be dismissed.

In her response, plaintiff asks the court for an opportunity to replead her claim. (Doc.

12 at 6.) The court will allow plaintiff to replead her Complaint to allege any causes of

action she may have under the facts of this case.3

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court is of the opinion that plaintiff’s Complaint fails

to state a retaliation claim for which relief may be granted. An Order granting defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint and giving her the opportunity to file an Amended

Complaint will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.

The Eleventh Circuit has held: 3

A district court’s discretion to dismiss a complaint without leave to amend “is

‘severely restrict[ed]’ by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), which directs that leave to

amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires.’” Thomas v. Town of

Davie, 847 F.2d 771, 773 (11th Cir. 1988)(citation omitted). Generally,

“[w]here a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff

must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district

court dismisses the action with prejudice.” Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112

(11th Cir. 1991). A district court need not, however, allow an amendment (1)

where there has been undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated

failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed; (2) where

allowing amendment would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party; or

(3) where amendment would be futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,

182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1962).

Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001).

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DONE this 7th day of August, 2014.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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