Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00058/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00058-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

KENNETH D. LESLIE, #156 048, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:12-CV-58-MHT

) [WO]

OFFICER LORENZO GREENE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Plaintiff Leslie, a state inmate presently incarcerated

at the Frank Lee Youth Center Deatsville, Alabama, challenges the constitutionality of

actions taken against him during his incarceration at the Easterling Correctional Facility

[“Easterling”]. He contends that on January 1, 2012, his constitutional rights were violated

when he was subjected both to an excessive use of force and a failure to be protected from

the use of force. Leslie further alleges a due process violation regarding a disciplinary

infraction issued against him following the January 1, 2012, incident. Named as defendants

are Correctional Officers Lorenzo Greene [“Greene”] and Dennis Durry [“Durry”]. Leslie

seeks injunctive relief, damages, legal costs, attorneys fees, and requests trial by jury. Doc.

Nos. 1, 14.

Defendants filed special reports and supporting evidentiary materials addressing

Leslie’s claims for relief. Pursuant to the orders entered in this case, the court deems it

appropriate to treat the special reports as motions for summary judgment. See Doc. Nos. 9,

Case 2:12-cv-00058-MHT-CSC Document 47 Filed 01/12/15 Page 1 of 21
28. This case is now pending on Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Upon

consideration ofsuch motions, the evidentiarymaterials filed in support thereof, and Leslie’s

responses in opposition to these motions, the court concludes that Defendants’ motions for

summary judgment are due to be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11 Cir. th

2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(a) (“The court

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). The party moving 1

for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings,

discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

[dispute] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant

may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact

Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding

1

summary-judgment motions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision, “[s]ubdivision (a)

carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), changing only one word --

genuine ‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of a summary-judgment

determination.” Id. “‘Shall’ is also restored to expressthe direction to grantsummary judgment.” Id. Thus, although

Rule 56 underwent stylistic changes, its substance remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing the prior versions

of the rule remain equally applicable to the current rule. 

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or by showing the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence to support some element

on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.

 Defendants have met their evidentiary burden. Thus, the burden shifts to Leslie to

establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material

to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex,

477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of

fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required [by citing to

materials in the record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court

may ... grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials -- including the facts

considered undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.”). A genuine dispute of

material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a

reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. 

Consequently, to survive Defendants’ properly supported motions for summary judgment,

Leslie is required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible

at trial supporting his claims for relief. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249

(1986); Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “If the evidence [on which the

nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary

judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250 (internal citations omitted). “A

mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there

must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).” 

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Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on

subjective beliefs likewise cannot create a genuine issue of material fact and, therefore, do

not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555,

1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (Leslie’s “conclusory assertions ..., in the absence of [admissible]

supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”); Harris v. Ostrout,

65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate where inmate

produces nothing beyond his own conclusory allegations challenging actions of the

defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11 Cir. 1984) (“mere verification of th

party’s own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment....”). 

Hence, when a Leslie fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the

Leslie will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor

of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”);

Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) (If on any

part of the prima facie case the Leslie presents insufficient evidence to require submission

of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. 

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami, th

Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the

substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of the

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Dept. of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Only factual

disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry

of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat

summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome

of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003).

To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for

the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (internal citations omitted). In

cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be

reduced to admissible form indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and

establishes the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law,

summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (Summary judgment is

appropriate where pleadings, evidentiarymaterials and affidavits before the court show there

is no genuine dispute as to a requisite material fact.); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental

Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (to establish a genuine dispute of

material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact

could return a verdict in his favor.).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a

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pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

dispute of material fact. See Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670

(11th Cir. 1990). Thus, Leslie’s pro se status alone does not mandate this court’s disregard

of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. In this case, Leslie fails to

demonstrate a requisite genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude summary

judgment. Matsushita, supra. 

II. DISCUSSION

On January 1, 2012, Greene pepper sprayd Leslie twice. Leslie maintains Greene’s

conduct amounted to excessive force because his actions, which comprised making

threatening statements, did not reach a “threat level per D.O.C. regulations” requiring

Greene’s use of pepper spray under the circumstances. Doc. No. 1. In an amendment to the

complaint, Leslie claims Durry failed to protect him from Greene’s use of force when this

officer watched Greene pepper spray him twice and failed to intervene. Doc. No. 14. 

Greene indicates that at approximately 2:15 a.m. he was escorting Leslie from Dorm

C2 to the lobby with his property. When Leslie began cursing Greene the guard ordered him

to stop. Leslie kept on, however, stating “You fucked my life up. I won’t make parole now.

I’m going to fuck you up.” Greene again directed Leslie to stop at which time Greene states

Leslie shoved a laundry cart into him and walked towards him stating “I’m going to fuck you

up!” Greene pulled out his Sabre Red pepper spray, yelled “Gas!” and sprayed a one second

burst at Leslie’s face. Leslie commented “Is that all you fucking got?” and continued to

advance towards the officer. Greene sprayed Leslie again in the face at which time he

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stopped his actions. Durry, a Dorm C1 rover, handcuffed Leslie. Doc. No. 7, Greene

Affidavit. 

Durry, while roving Dorm C1 heard a commotion at approximately 2:15 a.m. coming

from the C-Dorm lobby. He looked in the lobby and observed Leslie sitting at a table being

loud, disrespectful, and insubordinate to Greene. Durry then watched Leslie take off his coat

and lunge at Greene who yelled “Gas!” and sprayed Leslie in the face as the inmate lunged

at the officer. After being sprayed, Durry watched Leslie fall back onto the table and state

“That’s all you got?” Leslie got up from the table and walked towards Greene at which time

Durry saw Greene spray Leslie again. Durry states three other correctional officers entered

C-Dorm lobby at 2:20 a.m. Leslie then complied with Durry’s request to turn around to the

rear to be handcuffed. Doc. No. 26, Durry Affidavit. 

Leslie was taken to the health care unit for assessment and decontamination at 2:35

a.m. Medical personnel observed that Leslie had “bilateral red eyes.” The effects from the

pepper spray were visible on his face and neck area also red. Medical personnel released

Leslie to DOC custody at 2:55 a.m. Doc. No. 7, Exhs. 2, 3.

Defendants’ evidentiarymaterial includes the DOC incident report and a use of force

investigative report. The incident report reflects that Leslie’s conflict with Greene began

shortly before 2:00 a.m. when the guard observed Leslie off his assigned bed. Greene

reported the incident to Sergeant KerryWilliams who told Greene to escort Leslie to the shift

commander’s office. After questioning Leslie about his conduct in the dorm Sgt. Williams

reprimanded him and told him to pack his belongings because he was being moved to the

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restricted privileges dorm-Dorm C1. The remainder of the report depicts the incident in

similar fashion to Greene’s description of the events as stated in his affidavit but reflects that

besides stating “Is that all you fucking got,” after he was initially sprayed, Leslie also stated

“I’m going to fucking kill you.” Doc. No. 7, Exh. 3.

Captain Nathaniel Lawson prepared a use of force investigative report on January 6,

2012, after interviewing Leslie, Greene, and Durry. He made the following determinations: 

Captain Lawson[‘s] investigation revealed that Inmate Leslie was mad and

upset wit[h] Officer Greene about being placed in DormC1. Inmate Leslie was

threatening to cause bodily harm to Officer Green. Inmate Leslie walked

toward Officer Greene with his fists clenched. Officer Greene Yelled, “Gas”

and sprayed a one second burst of Sabre Red Chemical Agent to the facial area

of Inmate Leslie. Inmate Leslie continued to walk toward Officer Greene and

threaten[ed] to kill him. Officer Greene sprayed Inmate Leslie with a second

burst of Sabre Red Chemical Agent. Inmate Leslie was restrained by Officer

Durry, and no other force was used.

Doc. No. 7, Exh. 5 at 1. 

Captain Lawson recommended a finding that the use offorce was justified.To support

his recommendation Captain Lawson noted that Leslie pushed a laundry cart at Greene,

Greene feared Leslie would cause him bodily harm, and Leslie was sprayed a second time

because he continued to walk towards Greene in a threatening manner. Doc. No. 7, Exh. 5

at 2.

A. Injunctive Relief

Leslie requests declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants, see Doc. Nos. 1,

14, but he is no longer incarcerated at Easterling. The transfer or release of a prisoner

renders moot any claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. See County of Los Angeles v.

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Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); see also Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777, 780 (11th Cir.

1985) (past exposure to even illegal conduct does not in and of itself show a pending case

or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing present injury

or real and immediate threat of repeated injury). Therefore, his requests for equitable relief

are moot.

B. Excessive Force Claim

Claims of excessive force by prison officials against convicted inmates are governed

by the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Campbell

v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). The standard applied to an Eighth

Amendment excessive force claim contains both a subjective and objective component.

Hudson, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). The subjective component requires that prison “officials

act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 

Regarding the objective component, a Leslie must show that “the alleged wrongdoing was

objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. (internal quotations

omitted). Not every malevolent touch by a prison official amounts to a deprivation of

constitutional rights. Id. at 9. Summary applications of force are constitutionally

permissible when prison security and order, or the safety of other inmates or officers, have

been placed in jeopardy. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 312. 

In extending Whitley to all cases involving allegations of force, the Hudson Court

reasoned:

Manyofthe concerns underlying our holding in Whitley arise whenever guards

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use force to keep order. Whether the prison disturbance is a riot or a lesser

disruption, corrections officers must balance the need “to maintain or restore

discipline” through force against the risk of injury to inmates. Both situations

may require prison officials to act quickly and decisively. Likewise, both

implicate the principle that “‘[p]rison administrators . . . should be accorded

wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices

that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and

to maintain institutional security.’”

503 U.S. at 6 (citations omitted).With these concerns in mind, the Hudson Court set out

certain factors that should be considered in evaluating whether the use of force was wanton

and unnecessary. They include: 1) the extent of the injury suffered by the inmate; 2) the need

for the application of force; 3) the relationship between the need and the amount of force

used; 4) the threat reasonably perceived by the prison official; 5) any efforts made to temper

the severity of a forceful response. Id. at 7-8. “From consideration of such factors,

‘inferences may be drawn as to whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought

necessary, or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of

harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.’ Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106

S.Ct. 1078 (quoting Johnson Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2 Cir. 1973).” Skrtich v. nd

Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1300-1301 (11th Cir. 2002). The Hudson Court made it clear that

the extent of the injury suffered by the inmate is only one of the many factors which should

be considered, not a decisive one when it said, “[t]he absence of serious injury is therefore

relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.” 503 U.S. at 7. “An inmate

who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force

claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury” Wilkins v.

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Gaddy, 556 U.S. 34, 38 (2010).

There is no dispute among the parties that Leslie was in an agitated state about being 

moved to the restricted privileges dorm and was being very vocal about it in the C-Dorm

lobby. It is also undisputed that Greene ordered Leslie to stop his verbal agitation and

threatening remarks and that Leslie disobeyed the order by stating he would not shut up, and

that Greene could not make him shut up. Leslie then made additional comments that the

guard was “fucking [his] life up for nothing;” he was “waiting for work release,” and “you

[Greene] just want to fuck up my life over a mistake.” Doc. No. 18 at Exh. A. Greene agrees

that Leslie made these statements but asserts the inmate also said “I’m going to fuck you up.” 

Doc. No. 7, Exh. 1. Green again ordered Leslie to be quiet, but alleges Leslie again failed

to comply with this order and walked towards him and shove a laundry cart at him while

stating “I’m going to fuck you up!” Doc. No. 7, Exh. 1. Leslie contends it was Greene who

approached the table where he was sitting and moved the laundry cart containing Leslie’s

property off to the side at which time Leslie stated to him “I see how you are, I see thru [sic]

you. You let them violate and play poker, watch fuck-movies, and run around late, but you

want to fuck-up the White man for anything you can.” Doc. No. 18, Exh. A. Greene then

sprayed Leslie with a one second burst of pepper spray. Id.; Doc. No. 7, Exh. 1. 

While there is some disagreement among the parties whether Leslie was sitting at the

table or walking towards Greene when the guard initially sprayed him, Leslie concedes that

he had failed to comply with repeated directives from Greene he cease his defiant and

belligerent behavior and then continued this conduct by stating to Green“You just fucked up.

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I’ll sue your ass now, and fuck you up. Is that all you got?” Doc. No. 18, Exh. A; see also 2

Doc. No. 7, Exh. 1, 5; Doc. No. 26, Exh. B. Defendants maintain that Leslie was walking

towards Greene when he stated “Is that all you got?” Doc. No. 7, Exhs. 1, 5. Greene

responded by macing Leslie a second time. Doc. No. 18, Exh. A, Doc. No. 7, Exh. 5, Doc. 3

No. 26, Exh. B.

Leslie argues that Defendant Greene’s use of a chemical agent amounted to an

excessive force under the circumstances. He maintains his conduct during the incident in

question did not warrant the level of force used by Greene and also violated Department of

Corrections’ policy for use of pepper spray. Doc. No. 18. Leslie acknowledges expressing

his displeasure over being moved to the restricted privileges dorm but insists his behavior

did not warrant Greene’s decision to pepper spray him. Id.

Leslie submitted the affidavit of an inmate he alleges witnessed the incident between him and 2

Officer Greene. An affidavit is “[a] voluntary declaration of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant

before an officer authorized to administer oaths,” such as a notary public. Black's Law Dictionary 62 (8th

ed. 2004). In this instance, the undersigned finds the affidavit signed by innmate Charles Coldiron and

submitted by Leslie as Exhibit B in his opposition to Defendant Greene’s dispositive motion (see Doc. No.

18) is not a valid affidavit upon which the court may rely because the affidavit is neither sworn under

penalty of perjury nor does it contain the notary public's stamp or seal. See Doc. No. 18, Exh. B. Under 28

U.S.C. § 1746, a declaration that is signed “under penalty of perjury” is sufficient to constitute evidence for

purposes of a motion for summary judgment. Because the witness affidavit Leslie submitted was not signed

“under penalty of perjury,” it is not a sworn affidavit or a declaration which can be considered in the

determination of Defendants' dispositive motions. See Holloman v. Jacksonville Housing Auth., 2007 WL

245555 at *2 (per curiam) (“unsworn statements, even from pro se parties, should not be ‘consider[ed] in

determining the propriety of summary judgment’”) (quoting Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d 120, 123 (5th

Cir.1980) (per curiam)); see Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc) (the

Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1, 1981).

The information Leslie provided to Captain Lawson for his investigative report indicates that even 3

after Greene pepper sprayd him a second time he had still not ceased his threatening comments and manner

by stating to Greene he was going to kill him at which time Durry restrained him. Doc. No. 7, Exh. 5; see

also Doc. No. 7, Exh. 1. 

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As explained, Defendants have denied Leslie’s allegations regarding the use of force,

in this instance a chemical agent, and maintain Greene did not use force maliciously and

sadistically to cause Leslie harm. Doc. Nos. 7, 26. Rather, Greene maintains he pepper sprayd

Leslie because he felt sufficiently threatened by the inmate after he shoved a laundry cart at

the him and walked towards him in a hostile manner. Doc. No. 7. Thereafter, Leslie

manifested a further aggressive posture and intent by asking Greene “Is that all you got?”

prompting Greene’s decision to pepper spray Leslie again. Id.

In evaluating the challenged conduct of prison officials, a court must keep in mind the

paramount concerns of maintaining order and discipline in an often dangerous and unruly

environment. Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 322 (11 Cir. 1987). “[I]f force was applied in a

th

good faith effort to maintain discipline, courts should give great deference to acts taken by

prison officials in applying prophylactic or preventative measures intended ‘to reduce the

incidence of riots and other breaches of prison discipline.’” McBride v. Rivers, 170

Fed.Appx. 648, 656 (11th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (quoting Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d

1572, 1576 (11th Cir. 1991)); see Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 (1981) (in 4

considering whether the Eighth Amendment has been violated, courts must be mindful that

such inquiries “‘spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them

must reflect that fact rather than a court’s idea of how best to operate a detention facility.’”)

(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979)). While this deference “‘does not insulate

Pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rules 36-2, 36-3, unpublished opinions are not considered

4

binding precedent, but may be cited as persuasive authority.

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from review actions taken in bad faith or for no legitimate purpose, it requires that neither

judge nor jury freely substitute their judgment for that of officials who have made a

considered choice.’” Ort, 813 F.2d at 322 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322). Where the

only question concerns the reasonableness of the force used by a prison official, the

defendant will ordinarily be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Campbell, 169 F.3d

at 1374 (explaining that “force does not violate the Eighth Amendment merely because it is

unreasonable or unnecessary. . . ‘[T]he core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied

in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciouslyand sadisticallyto cause

harm.’ ”) (citations omitted); McBride, 170 Fed.Appx. at 657 (although correctional officers

could arguably have used less force after subduing inmate, inmate “failed to produce

evidence showing that these measures were taken ‘maliciously and sadistically for the very

purpose of causing harm.’”) (citations omitted).

The court finds the evidence insufficient to support a finding that Greene used force

“maliciously and sadistically to cause harm” rather than “in a good-faith effort to maintain

or restore discipline.” See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. In reaching this conclusion the court finds

that the need for the application of force was established by Leslie's repeated refusals to

comply with Greene’s orders and his threatening remarks coupled with a clearly agitated

state. Greene’s application of a chemical agent “in order to gain control of [the inmate] and

force him to comply with [his] orders” is not excessive force. Rather than comply with

Greene’s directives to cease his unruly conduct, Leslie refused and continued with his

“boisterous” language including cursing loudly and making verbal threats at Greene both

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before and after Greene initially pepper sprayd him. Doc. No. 18, Exh. A. “Prison guards

may use force when necessary to restore order and need not wait until disturbances reach

dangerous proportions before responding.” Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th

Cir.1990). Use of chemical agents by prison officers on disruptive prisoners is not per se

unconstitutional. Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008) ( overruled in part

on other grounds, Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010)) (“Pepper spray is an

accepted non-lethal means of controlling unruly inmates.”); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d

189, 196 (9th Cir. 1979) (“use of nondangerous quantities of [tear gas] in order to prevent

a perceived future danger does not violate ‘evolving standards of decency’ or constitute an

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”). “And prison guards do not have the luxury

or obligation to convince every inmate that their orders are reasonable and well-thought out.

Certainly they are not required to do so where an inmate repeatedly fails to follow those

orders.” Danley, 540 F.3d at 1307.

Second, the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force used,

weighs against a finding of a constitutional violation as “[a] short burst of pepper spray is not

disproportionate to the need to control an inmate who has failed to obey a jailer's orders.”

Danley, 540 F.3d at 1307; Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 2002 (“Courts

have consistently concluded that using pepper spray is reasonable ... where the Leslie was

... refusing police requests.”). Leslie does not dispute he failed to comply with Greene’s

directives before the first burst of pepper spray and thereafter continued not to follow the

guard’s orders prompting the officer’s second application of pepper spray. Sanchez,

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McCray, 349 Fed.Appx. 479, 483 (11th Cir.2009) (use of pepper spray against inmate who

refused to comply with officers’ orders was permissible use of force). 

Third, the evidence fails to demonstrate that Greene’s use of pepper spray had as its

objective an intent to punish rather than the legitimate government objective of restoring

order and control. While Leslie complains he lost visibilityand suffered breathing difficulties

from the chemical agent, Doc. No. 18, Exh. A, the body chart evaluation made shortly after

the incident reflects Leslie’s eyes, face, and neck were red from the pepper spray but

otherwise does not reflect he had any other effect or injury. See Danley, 540 F.3d at 1308

(quoting Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1348) (“Any injuries or discomfort [Leslie] suffered as a

necessary result of a dose of pepper spray were neither substantial nor long lasting”, as

pepper spray“‘is designed to disable a suspect without causing permanent physical injury.’”). 

Following decontamination, Leslie was released to DOC custody and processed into

administrative segregation pending disciplinary action. Doc. No. 7, Exhs. 2, 3. 

Regarding the fourth use of force factor, the court finds the extent of the threat

reasonably perceived by Greene on the basis of facts known to him would reasonably permit

the use of some force to compel Leslie’s compliance with the orders of a prison official. 

Leslie’s belief that his conduct and actions did not rise to a threat level sufficient to warrant

any use of force by Greene misses the mark. Leslie’s refusal to abide repeated orders along

with his agitated state and threatening manner, even if such conduct did not amount to an

immediate threat of physical harm to Greene, did not make the guard’s actions in spraying

Leslie unreasonable, especially where his paramount concerns involve the interests of

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preserving security, order, and safety not only of himself but also other prison personnel and

inmates. See Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1267 (7th Cir. 1984) (“When an inmate refuse[s]

to obey a proper order, he is attempting to assert his authority over a portion of the institution

and its officials. Such refusal and denial of authority places the staff and other inmates in

danger.”). Further, Greene’s actions in promptly reporting the incident to his supervisors so

Leslie could be treated for the effects ofthe pepper spray undermines Leslie’s contention that

the guard engaged in the conduct complained of solely to inflict punishment. 

Lastly, Greene’s use of pepper spray rather than making physical contact with Leslie

suggests a tempered response to the situation. The amount of force used by Greene was 

limited to no more than necessary to regain control of the situation. See Nasseri v. City of

Athens, 373 Fed.Appx. 15, 18 (11th Cir. 2010) (guards are “permitted to use some force in

controlling the situation and preventing it from escalating.”). 

The decision to pepper spray Leslie does not appear to the court to have been

excessive under the circumstances. As explained, the existence of “a mere dispute over the

reasonableness of a particular use of force or the existence of arguably superior alternatives”

is not enough to support a claim of excessive force in an institutional setting. Campbell, 169

F.3d at 1375 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322). Further, Leslie has failed to demonstrate more

than de minimis injury. He was decontaminated for the effects of pepper spray immediately

after the incident with Greene. There is no evidence he sustained other effects or injury

from the two short bursts of pepper spray. Leslie’s relatively de minimis injuries from the

effects of the pepper spray and all other facts and circumstances governing the January 1,

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2012, incident, establish that Greene’s administration of pepper spray to Leslie’s facial area

amounted to no more than a de minimis use of force. Cf. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37

(2010) (“Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that

ultimately counts.”). The court concludes that Defendant Greene is entitled to summary

judgment on Leslie’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim.

C. Failure To Protect

Leslie maintains Durry acted with deliberate indifference by failing to protect him

from Greene’s use of excessive physical force in the C-Dorm Lobby. Doc. No. 14. Durry

denies failing to protect Leslie from a use of force because Greene’s conduct did not amount

to a use of force against Leslie committed maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose

of causing him harm. Doc. No. 26. Rather, Durry contends Greene used that amount of force

necessary to bring Leslie under control and, Durry did not fail to protect Leslie from an

excessive use of force. Id. 

Here, the court has determined that Greene’s conduct in macing Leslie did not amount

to an excessive use of force. Accordingly, Leslie’s failure to intervene claim against Durry

entitles him to no relief as this officer “had no attendant obligation to intervene.” Crenshaw

v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1294 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that because officer who applied

force did not violate arrestee’s right to be free from excessive force, the non-intervening

officer had no attendant obligation to intervene). Defendant Durry is entitled to summary

judgment on Leslie’s failure to protect claim.

D. Due Process

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Because of the incident between Leslie and Greene on January 1, 2012, Leslie

received disciplinary infractions for violating Rule # 44- threats - and Rule # 56 - failure to

obey a direct order of a prison official. A disciplinary hearing on the charges was held on

January 5, 2012. The hearing officer found Leslie guilty of both rule violations. On January

10, 2012, Warden Sconyers approved the hearing officer’s determination regarding the

finding of guilt for Leslie’s violation of Rule #56. He disapproved the finding of guilt

regarding the charge against Leslie for violating Rule #44. Doc. No. 7, Exh. 6. 

Leslie alleges a violation of his right to due process during his disciplinary

proceedings because Greene’s testimony at the hearing differed from the written statement

he submitted on the disciplinary report which, he claims, ultimately led to the Warden’s

disapproval of the infraction issued against him for violating Rule #44. Doc. Nos. 1, 34. To

the extent Leslie argues Greene issued a false disciplinary infraction against him for making

threats, he is entitled to no relief. 

Prison inmates have no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or

wrongly accused of conduct which may cause the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.

Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir.1986);see also Collins v. King, 743 F.2d 248,

253 (5th Cir. 1984) (prisoner’s claim he was falsely “charged with things he did not do,”

standing alone, states no due process claim). The undisputed evidence before the court

reflects Leslie had the benefit of the minimum procedural due process protections set forth

in Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), regarding the infraction in question where he

was given the opportunity to rebut the charge against him. Doc. No. 7, Exh. 6. That Leslie

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endured disciplinary proceedings for an infraction where the initial finding of guilt was

ultimately disapproved does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See generally

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).

Leslie also alleges a general due process violation regarding Greene’s use of pepper

spray asserting that the officer violated ADOC policy based on the manner and

circumstances under which he deployed his chemical agent. See Doc. No. 1; Doc. No. 18 at

7. Leslie’s conclusoryallegation supports no constitutional claimfor relief as the mere failure

of an official to follow an agency regulation or state law, without more, does not amount to

a federal due process violation. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944); Murray v.

Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 911 F.2d 1167, 1168 (5th Cir.1990); Williams v. Nix, 1 F.3d

712, 717 (8th Cir.1993). Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543 n. 27 (1979) (noting that

correctional standards recommendations by various organizations and associations “may be

instructive in certain cases” but that “they simply do not establish the constitutional minima;

rather, they establish goals recommended by the organization in question.”). Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on Leslie’s due process claims. 

III. CONCLUSION

In light ofthe foregoing, it is the RECOMMENDATION ofthe Magistrate Judge that:

1. Leslie’s request for injunctive relief (Doc. No. 1) be DISMISSED as moot;

2. Defendants’ motions for summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 7, 26) be GRANTED;

3. Judgment be ENTERED in favor of Defendants and against Leslie.

It is further 

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ORDERED that on or before January 26, 2015, the parties may file an objection to

the Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which a party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or

general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised this

Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file a written objection to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en

banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit Court

of Appeals handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 12 day of January, 2015. th

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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