Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00991/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00991-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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MDR

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v.

Juan Francisco Quinonez-Ruiz, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CV 12-991-PHX-DGC (DKD)

No. CR 09-1366-PHX-DGC

ORDER

On May 11, 2012, Movant Juan Francisco Quinonez-Ruiz, who is confined in the

Corrections Corporation of America’s Torrance County Detention Facility in Estancia, New

Mexico, filed a pro se “Motion for Time Reduction by an Inmate in Federal Custody, (28

U.S.C & 2255).” In a May 21, 2012 Order, the Court denied the Motion because it was not

filed on a court-approved form and gave Movant 30 days to file an amended § 2255 motion

on a court-approved form. On June 15, 2012, Movant filed an Amended Motion Under 28

U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody

(Doc. 4). The Court will summarily dismiss the Amended Motion.

I. Procedural History

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Movant pled guilty to Reentry of Removed Alien, in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), with sentencing enhancement pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(1). On February 1, 2010, the Court sentenced Movant to a 6-month term of

imprisonment, followed by 3 years on supervised release.

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Movant was released from prison on April 5, 2010. On June 16, 2010, the United

States Probation Office filed a Petition to Revoke Supervised Release. On June 28, 2010,

the Court revoked Movant’s probation and committed him to the custody of the Bureau of

Prisons for 9 months, followed by 27 months on supervised release. This commitment ran

consecutive to a 90-day sentence imposed in 10-PO-28983-TUC-DTF for illegal entry.

Movant was released from prison on April 8, 2011. On January 20, 2012, the United

States Probation Office filed a Petition to Revoke Supervised Release. On May 3, 2012, the

Court revoked Movant’s probation and committed him to the custody of the Bureau of

Prisons for 9 months. This commitment runs consecutive to a 15-month sentence imposed

in 12-CR-189-PHX-DGC for Reentry of Removed Alien.

Movant seeks a 50% reduction of his sentence, claiming that his family needs him,

he needs to provide for his family and is unable to do so while incarcerated, he would like

to be with his son who just received an eye surgery, and he will be a better person and will

not illegally return to the United States.

II. Summary Dismissal

A district court must summarily dismiss a § 2255 application “[i]f it plainly appears

from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving

party is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the

United States District Courts. When this standard is satisfied, neither a hearing nor a

response from the government is required. See Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 526

(9th Cir. 1985); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1982).

In this case, the record shows that summary dismissal under Rule 4(b) is warranted

because Movant has waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion.

III. Waiver

Movant has waived challenges to his sentence. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

has found that there are “strict standards for waiver of constitutional rights.” United States

v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005). It is impermissible to presume

waiver from a silent record, and the Court must indulge every reasonable presumption

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against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d

1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). In this action, Movant’s waiver was clear, express, and

unequivocal.

Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo,

398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a

§ 2255 action challenging the length of his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431,

433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992). The only

claims that cannot be waived are claims that the waiver itself was involuntary or that

ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See Washington v.

Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plea agreement that waives the

right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver); Pruitt,

32 F.3d at 433 (expressing doubt that a plea agreement could waive a claim that counsel

erroneously induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain); Abarca,

985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining to hold that a waiver forecloses a claim of ineffective

assistance or involuntariness of the waiver); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4

(declining to decide whether waiver of all statutory rights included claims implicating the

voluntariness of the waiver). 

“Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are

characterized as falling outside [the category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims

challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver] are waivable.” United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Williams v. United States, 396

F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth

Circuits in holding that “a valid sentence-appeal waiver, entered into voluntarily and

knowingly, pursuant to a plea agreement, precludes the defendant from attempting to attack,

in a collateral proceeding, the sentence through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

during sentencing.”).

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As part of a plea agreement both covering the January 20, 2012 Petition to Revoke

Supervised Release and 12-CR-189-PHX-DGC, Movant made the following waiver:

Providing the defendant’s sentence and disposition are

consistent with this agreement, the defendant waives . . . (2) any

right to file an appeal, any collateral attack, and any other

writ or motion that challenges the conviction, . . . the entry of

judgment against the defendant, or any aspect of the defendant’s

sentence or disposition, including the manner in which the

sentence or disposition is determined, including but not limited

to any . . . motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2255. The

defendant acknowledges that if the Court has sentenced the

defendant and imposed disposition according to the terms of this

agreement, this waiver shall result in the dismissal of any

appeal, collateral attack, or other motion the defendant

might file challenging the conviction, order of restitution or

forfeiture, or sentence or disposition in this case.

(Doc. 27 in 12-CR-189-PHX-DGC) (emphasis added). Movant indicated in his plea

agreement that he had discussed the terms with his attorney, agreed to the terms and

conditions, and entered into the plea voluntarily. (Doc. 27 in 12-CR-189-PHX-DGC).

Movant’s assertions in his Amended § 2255 Motion all pertain to sentencing and do

not pertain to the voluntariness of the waiver. Movant expressly waived issues regarding the

imposition of sentence and expressly waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion. The Court

accepted his plea as voluntarily made. Consequently, the Court finds that Movant waived

the sentencing issues raised in his Amended § 2255 Motion. Thus, the Court will summarily

dismiss the Amended § 2255 Motion. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The Clerk of Court must terminate Doc. 42 in CR 09-1366-PHX-DGC.

(2) The Amended Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct

Sentence (Doc. 4 in CV 12-991-PHX-DGC (DKD)) is denied and the civil action opened in

connection with this Motion (CV 12-991-PHX-DGC (DKD)) is dismissed with prejudice.

The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

(3) Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, in the event

Movant files an appeal, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability because

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reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s procedural ruling debatable. See Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

DATED this 16th day of July, 2012.

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