Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00092/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00092-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Bradley J. Crane, a single man, 

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

vs.

Native American Air Ambulance, Inc., a

Nevada Corporation, 

Defendant/Counterclaimant.

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No. CV 06-0092-TUC-FRZ(HCE)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Upon review of pleadings, exhibits, and affidavits submitted and oral argument by

respective counsel on January 28, 2008, and for the following reasons, the Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court award Defendant/Counter-Claimant Native American Air

Ambulance, Inc. (hereinafter “Defendant”) attorney’s fees to be paid by attorney Douglas H.

Clark, Jr., attorney for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Bradley J. Crane, (hereinafter “Plaintiff”)

in the amount of $63,246.95.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Mandatory Award of Attorney’s Fees

On January 26, 2007 this Court by way of Report and Recommendation to the District

Court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding Attorney Clark’s harassing,

groundless, and bad faith filing of the instant class action. (Doc. No. 29) No objections to

this Court’s Report and Recommendation were filed by Attorney Clark. Thereafter, the

Case 4:06-cv-00092-FRZ-HCE Document 47 Filed 03/28/08 Page 1 of 5
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District Court accepted and adopted the Report and Recommendation analysis and Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Doc. Nos. 30, 32). 

This Court found that harassment, groundlessness, and bad faith had been established by

clear and convincing evidence under A.R.S. §-341.01(c) and by a preponderance of the

evidence under A.R.S. §12-349. An award of attorney’s fees under either section is

mandatory. Under both sections the attorney’s fees must be reasonable and the amount of

attorney’s fees is to be determined by the court.

B. Reasonableness of Billing Rate

A court, in determining a reasonable hourly rate, must consider the experience, skill, and

reputation of the attorney requesting fees. Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205,

1210 (9th Cir. 1986), amended 808 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 1987). This Court has considered the

attorney for Defendant’s experience, skill and reputation as submitted. (“Memorandum In

Support of Application For Attorneys’ [sic] Fees Under Local Rule Civil 54.2 and A.R.S.

§12-350"; “Declaration of David A. Selden In Support of Application For Attorneys’ [sic]

Fees Under Local Rule Civil 54.2 and A.R.S. §12-350") (Doc. No. 34 and 34-2).

Defendant’s billing rates are not unreasonable. Attorney Selden prior to September 1,

2006 billed at $325.00 an hour; from September 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006 billed at

$335.00 an hour; after January 1, 2007 billed at $350.00 an hour. During those respective

time periods paralegals and other attorneys for Defendant billed $145.00 to $350.00 an hour;

$150.00 to $240.00 an hour; and $160.00 to $290.00 an hour.

Attorney Clark per his retainer agreement with Plaintiff billed at $150.00 an hour for legal

assistant/paralegal services; billed at $200.00 to $350.00 an hour for partners; and billed at

$190.00 to $225.00 an hour for associates. (Plaintiff’s “Itemized Statement and Affidavit of

Attorneys [sic] Fees”, Exhibit 2.) (Doc. No. 23) Thus, Attorney Clark’s billing for legal

assistant/paralegal services and other attorneys generally fall within the range of billing by

Attorney Selden for the same services.

Unclear to this Court is: what exactly is Attorney Clark’s billing rate that would serve as

a basis for comparison? Per Attorney Clark’s retainer agreement of January 30, 2006

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Attorney Clark’s billing rate was $425.00 an hour. (Plaintiff’s “Itemized Statement and

Affidavit of Attorneys [sic] Fees”, Exhibit 2) Attorney Clark’s “standard rate” is $375.00

per hour on September 8, 2006. (Id.) On this same date his hourly rate is $250.00 per hour.

(Id., Exhibit 1.)) Attorney Selden’s billing rates fall reasonably within Attorney Clark’s

minimum to standard rates for billing.

C. Punitive in Nature

The underlying rationale for the mandatory award of attorney’s fees such as in the instant

case where harassment, groundlessness, and bad faith has been established is to compensate

the “victim”, herein Defendant, and punish the “offender”, herein Attorney Clark. White v.

Kaufmann, 652 P.2d 127(1982). The findings of fact and conclusions of law in the February

26, 2007 Report and Recommendation to the District Court are incorporated herein in their

entirety and serve to support this Court’s conclusion that Attorney Clark was less than

forthright with Defendant: requesting records to prepare for trial or to negotiate a settlement

with Farmers Insurance; requesting to negotiate a compromise with Defendant when the trial

court had already been noticed that a settlement had been reached; receiving a check for

Defendant’s services and neither informing Defendant of its existence nor interpleading with

the trial court the check in question. Instead, Attorney Clark filed suit that a check in his

possession effectively rendered moot, as did the check later issued by Plaintiff’s own medical

insurance company, Great West.

Attorney Clark averred that he was retained by Plaintiff because of his experience and

success in representing parties in class actions. (First Amended Complaint, ¶ 22(d))

Attorney Clark’s relative experience consisted of three class actions in his career, none

against air ambulance companies. Attorney Clark also averred that Plaintiff “was clearly not

trying to use the litigation system as a ‘source of income.’ All plaintiff was trying to do [in

filing the class action] was to resolve his personal injury claim and his dispute with Native

Air concerning what he considered to be an unjustified overcharge for services he never

requested.” (“Plaintiff’s Opposition To Defendant’s Motion For Attorneys’ [sic] Fees”, p.5)

(Doc. No. 27) This Court will accept this averment. In doing so, and disregarding for the

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moment the existence of the check issued by Farmers Insurance resolving Defendant’s lien,

this Court can only conclude that Attorney Clark sought to place Defendant in the position

of writing off a $12,825 debt owed it rather than risk a five million dollar judgement should

it lose at trial: Attorney Clark veritably attempting to drive a spike with a tack hammer.

Neither Plaintiff nor Attorney Clark are the architects of how Defendant should defend

and prepare for such a defense against the class action filed against it. Once the class action

was filed Defendant “ramped up” to meet the suit head on. Attorney Clark had to assume

the risk of paying attorney’s fees as evidenced by Defendant’s First Amended Answer and

First Amended Counter Claim requesting such relief. It is not enough to argue against the

awarding of attorney’s fees that the lack of motions and discovery reflect the absence of

preparation to carry out such. Attorney Clark set into motion, by the harassing, groundless

and bad faith class action filed against Defendant, Defendant’s willingness and preparation

to defend against such class action and attorney’s fees must be awarded.

II. RECOMMENDATION

Upon review of Defendant’s memoranda, exhibits, affidavits and oral argument it is the

finding and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge to the District Court that Defendant’s

request for $70,837.50 is unreasonable in that there is research, memoranda, and conferences

unrelated to the record; redundant and excessive hours regarding research, writing and rewriting of memoranda submitted to the Court; redundant and excessive hours in intra-office

conferences regarding “strategizing” positions to be taken in written and oral forms and the

memorializing of these strategized positions; redundant recycling of language in Defendant’s

various motions and memoranda in support of attorney’s fees.

Although there was a paucity of pleadings and discovery in the instant case, the issues that

a class action of the type filed by Attorney Clark would give rise to were of major and

paramount concern to Defendant to be defended robustly.

Attorney Clark’s unwillingness to “negotiate a compromise” of a mere $6,412.00 (50 %

of the $12,825.00 lien owed Defendant); and an unwillingness to apprise Defendant or the

trial court of a pre-existing check rendering the instant class action moot wrought a response

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from Defendant resulting in attorney’s fee far exceeding the underlying lien. Defendant by

third-party subpoena learned of the pre-existing check made payable in the underlying lien’s

full amount. Defendant, by re-application to Plaintiff’s medical health provider, Great West,

was paid the full amount of the underlying lien. To award Defendant attorney’s fees for

work apparent from court pleadings alone would make a nullity of the mandatory and

punitive rationale for A.R.S. §12-341.01(c). See Wean Water, Inc. v. Sta-Rite Indus., Inc.,

686 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Ariz. App. 1984). For the aforesaid reason it is the recommendation

of this Court that Defendant be awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $63,246.95.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within ten

days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may

respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with a copy thereof.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number:

CV 06-92-TUC-FRZ.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the District

Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 28th day of March, 2008.

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