Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01431/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01431-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REGINALD CHAVIS, SR.,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-08-1431 JAM EFB P 

vs.

JOHN W. HAVILAND,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner without counsel seeking a writ of habeas corpus. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254. He claims in his petition that the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR) imposes race-based polices that prevent him from participating in

rehabilitative programs. He further claims that these race-based policies have caused his

indeterminate life sentence to become unconstitutional, as his inability to “program,” prevents

him from being found eligible for parole. He also claims that, in light of Johnson v. California,

543 U.S. 499 (2005), his trial motion to substitute counsel should be reevaluated under the

standard of strict scrutiny.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that petitioner fails to state a claim

and that petitioner’s claims are barred by procedural default. As explained below, however, the

court finds that the petition is second or successive, and that this court lacks jurisdiction to

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1 Johnson held that strict scrutiny was the proper standard of review for a state prisoner’s

Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge to California’s policy of racially segregating

some prisoners in double cells for up to 60 days. 543 U.S. 499. The court expresses no opinion

as to the merits of petitioner’s claims.

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consider it.

I. Background

Petitioner is serving an indeterminate life sentence for attempted first degree murder. 

Dckt. No. 8 at 2. On December 30, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition, alleging that

CDCR violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by using race-based policies that

affect his ability to be found eligible for parole by depriving him of opportunities for

programming based on his race. Id. at 5.3-5.4. Petitioner also claims that his motion to

substitute trial counsel should be reconsidered in light of the standards set forth in Johnson v.

California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).1 Dckt. No. 8 at 5. As relief, petitioner asks the court to: 

1) make a finding that CDCR’s racial discrimination policies exist . . . ; 2) test,

under “strict scrutiny,” the consequences upon the operation of the life term

sentence; 3) modify [] petitioner’s sentence so as to remove the “life term”

ceiling, because the life term operates preferentially, with race being the deciding

factor; 4) make a finding that the race discrimination operations [and] policies,

pre-existed the sentencing court’s imposition of the life term imposed to

petitioner; and 5) make findings designating what constitutional protections are

entitled to an individual, suffering the interference of racial discrimination in

adult authority operations, which give consequences to the term “life” from the

sentencing court, though/until the prospective graduation, or end of the term.

Id. at 5.13-5.14. Thus, petitioner makes clear that he is not challenging any particular denial of

parole, but rather, claims that his indeterminate life sentence is unconstitutional and should be

modified. See id. at 5.9 (explaining that the petition concerns his sentence and should not be recharacterized as “administrative and/or [as a] parole hearing pleading”); see also id. at 5.10

(stating that the petition is not a “BPH appeals” petition and that “petitioner’s challenge is to test

the constitutionality of the consequences [that] the existence of pervasive race

discrimination/decision making, gives to the imposed term and to the procedural operation of the

term.”). 

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2

 A court may take judicial notice of court records. See MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman,

803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980).

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II. Discussion

Before addressing the merits of the pending motion, the court must first assure itself of its

subject matter jurisdiction. Absent petitioner’s compliance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(b)(3)(A), this court lacks jurisdiction to consider a successive claim. A petition is second

or successive if it makes “claims contesting the same custody imposed by the same judgment of

a state court” that the petitioner previously challenged, and on which the federal court issued a

decision on the merits. Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529

U.S. 473, 485-86 (2000). Before filing a second or successive petition in a district court, a

petitioner must obtain from the appellate court “an order authorizing the district court to consider

the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Without an order from the appellate court, the

district court is without jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition. See Burton, 549

U.S. 147.

In the present action, petitioner challenges his sentence of seven years to life, plus eight

years, as imposed by the Sacramento County Superior Court in 1991, following petitioner’s

conviction of attempted first degree murder. Dckt. No. 8 at 2. However, petitioner previously

challenged the same conviction in an earlier filed habeas petition. See Chavis v. Garcia, No.

Civ. S-00-2496 WBS GGH.2

 That petition was dismissed as untimely, and was therefore denied

on its merits. Id., Dckt. No. 8 (magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations, recommending

that respondent’s motion to dismiss petition as time-barred be granted); Dckt. No. 16 (district

judge’s order adopting findings and recommendations); Dckt. No. 23 (Judgment from Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals affirming district court’s judgment); see also McNabb v. Yates, 576

F.3d 1028, 1029 (9th Cir. 2009) ( “[D]ismissal of a habeas petition as untimely constitutes a

disposition on the merits and [] a further petition challenging the same conviction [is] ‘second or

successive’ for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).”); Murray v. Greiner, 394 F.3d 78, 81 (2d Cir.

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2005) (dismissal of habeas petition as time barred “constitutes an adjudication on the merits that

renders future petitions under § 2254 challenging the same conviction ‘second or successive’

petitions under § 2244(b).”).

Since petitioner challenges the same judgment now that he previously challenged and

which was adjudicated on the merits, the pending petition is second or successive. Petitioner

offers no evidence that the appellate court has authorized this court to consider a second or

successive petition. This action must therefore be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Burton,

549 U.S. 147; Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).

Consequently, respondent’s motion to dismiss must be denied without prejudice.

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

1. This action be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction;

2. Respondent’s October 26, 2009 motion to dismiss be denied without prejudice; and

3. The Clerk be directed to close the case. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). In

his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue in the

event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Federal Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant).

Dated: August 11, 2010.

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