Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02156/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02156-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Maisha Lamptey, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Corrections Corporation of America, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-02156-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 15), Plaintiffs’ Response (Doc. 18), Defendant’s Reply (Doc. 19), and 

Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Allegations (Doc. 22). Defendant seeks dismissal of Counts I, II, 

and IV. For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion will be denied. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

On a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), all 

allegations of material fact are assumed to be true and construed in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the 

absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica 

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To avoid dismissal, a complaint need 

contain only “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). But the principle that a court accepts as true 

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all the allegations in a complaint does not apply to legal conclusions or conclusory factual 

allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 

II. BACKGROUND 

The Court thus assumes the truth of the following allegations. Plaintiffs Maisha 

Lamptey and Belinda Rodriguez worked for Defendant Corrections Corporation of 

America (CCA) at its Eloy facility. Doc. 11 ¶ 7. Lamptey served as a correctional officer; 

Rodriguez served as a correctional counselor. Both were required to supervise inmates. 

Doc. 18 at 2. 

 Rodriguez alleges that CCA supervisors Lopez and Trejo sexually harassed her 

beginning November 2011. She reported the conduct in March 2012. Doc. 11 ¶¶ 8, 12. 

This conduct forms the basis of Plaintiffs’ Count III, sexual harassment against Rodriguez 

in violation of Title VII, which CCA does not seek to dismiss. 

 In early 2012, Plaintiffs allege CCA employees posted a magazine cutout of a 

gorilla in Trejo’s office, made racial jokes about the picture, and compared the picture to 

Lamptey, who identifies as African American. Rodriguez told Lamptey only that the 

picture was in the office, and Lamptey saw the picture herself. Id. ¶ 9. 

 Rodriguez subsequently apprised a unit manager of the picture and told Lamptey 

about the racial jokes and comparisons. At some point between April 9 and April 16, 2012, 

Lamptey also discussed the picture and comments with the unit manager. Doc. 18 at 3 & 

n.2. Rodriguez also reported the picture to human resources, and both Rodriguez and 

Lamptey participated in an internal investigation in mid-April, at which point CCA put 

Lopez and Trejo on administrative leave. Doc. 11 ¶ 10; Doc. 22 at 2. After a one-month 

investigation, CCA fired them. Doc. 11 ¶ 12; Doc. 22 at 2. This allegedly angered many 

of Plaintiffs’ coworkers who were friendly with Lopez and Trejo. Doc. 11 ¶ 12. 

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 During the month-long investigation, and for two months after CCA fired Lopez 

and Trejo, coworkers Susan Murray, Vanessa Romero, Angela Rodriguez, and Rebecca 

Rodriguez twice each week made racially charged comments in Lamptey’s presence, 

including “it smells like bananas” and “my face is so hairy today.” Doc. 11 ¶ 13; Doc. 22 

at 2. Despite Lamptey’s repeated reports to human resources, CCA neither disciplined her 

coworkers nor provided any relevant training. Doc. 22 at 2–3. Because of these 

comments, Lamptey attempted to avoid her coworkers and experienced humiliation and 

stress. Consequently, she called in sick three times in May and June. Doc. 11 ¶ 12; Doc. 

22 at 2. Similarly, in August 2012 Lamptey’s physician recommended she avoid work for 

nine days because she experienced stress and increased blood pressure there. Doc. 11 ¶ 13. 

This conduct forms the basis of Plaintiffs’ Counts I and II, racial discrimination against 

Lamptey in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 

 Finally, Plaintiffs allege CCA violated Title VII by retaliating against both of them 

for protesting the harassment. This forms the basis of Count IV. Rodriguez alleges that the 

terms of her employment changed. Before she complained, Rodriguez had obtained a 

favorable schedule to attend school and had only been “posted up” to cover absentee 

coworkers’ shifts once or twice each week. Doc. 22 at 3–4. After she complained, CCA 

scheduled her less favorably, which prevented her from attending school, posted her up 

four or five days each week, twice posted her up in unsafe and previously unassigned 

positions, and withdrew her ability to move certain prisoners to ensure safety. Doc. 22 at 

4–5; Doc. 11 ¶ 16. CCA investigated Rodriguez’s retaliation charges and found them 

unproven. Doc. 11 ¶ 16. In August 2012, Rodriguez sought medical and psychological 

attention “due to the sexual harassment and resulting hostile work environment.” Id. ¶ 17. 

In September 2012, CCA’s warden told Rodriguez, “People who retaliated will not be 

fired. I’m sure those things happened but how do you prove that?” Doc. 22 at 5. 

Rodriguez accepted long-term disability and left work in December 2013. Doc. 11 ¶ 19. 

Lamptey alleges that after complaining and then participating in CCA’s 

investigation, CCA stopped assigning her to lucrative overtime duties in May 2012—and 

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declined to provide her the required certification to obtain those duties—despite assigning 

them to similarly situated employees who did not complain and despite informing her 

before the investigation that she could become certified. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. Additionally, in 

May and June 2012 Lamptey’s supervisors began criticizing her work. Lamptey 

complained to human resources about perceived retaliation three times in May 2012. Doc. 

22 at 3. Finally, Lamptey asserts she received three disciplinary notices, two in December 

2012 and one in May 2013. The third resulted in a suspension, at which time CCA’s 

warden told her she just could not let go of the gorilla picture. CCA then reassigned 

Lamptey to another facility. Doc. 11 ¶ 18. 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Race discrimination against Lamptey 

Plaintiffs assert Lamptey was subject to a sufficiently hostile environment to 

constitute race discrimination. “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an 

unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual 

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 

of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., 

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quotation marks omitted). A hostile work environment may 

violate Title VII, id. at 21, and it is also actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Manatt v. 

Bank of America, N.A., 339 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). 

To establish an actionably hostile workplace, Lamptey must allege she was subject 

to unwelcome verbal or physical racial conduct and that “the conduct was sufficiently 

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive work 

environment.” Gregory v. Widnall, 153 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curium). An 

environment must be both subjectively and objectively hostile. Fuller v. City of Oakland, 

Cal., 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 

871–72 (9th Cir. 2011). 

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CCA argues the environment was not so objectively abusive that it constituted an 

actionably hostile work environment. Doc. 15 at 5–7; Doc. 19 at 4–5. Whether an 

“environment is hostile or abusive can be determined only by looking at all the 

circumstances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its 

severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; 

and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris, 

510 U.S. at 23; see also Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The totality of the circumstances must be assessed “from the perspective of a reasonable 

person belonging to the racial or ethnic group of the plaintiff.” McGinest v. GTE Serv. 

Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1115 (9th Cir. 2004); id. at 1116 (“Racially motivated comments or 

actions may appear innocent or only mildly offensive to one who is not a member of the 

targeted group, but in reality be intolerably abusive or threatening when understood from 

the perspective of a plaintiff who is a member of the targeted group.”). 

Construing the First Amended Complaint in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court cannot 

accept CCA’s conclusion that “[a] reasonable person in Lamptey’s position would not 

consider the environment hostile.” Doc. 15 at 6. Lamptey has alleged that CCA 

employees made racially charged comments in her presence for several months after a 

supervisor was fired in part for displaying a gorilla picture in his office. She included 

specific examples, which allude to racist tropes and which an African American quite 

reasonably could perceive as sufficiently abusive to render the environment hostile. See, 

e.g., Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir. 2001) (“To suggest that a 

human being’s physical appearance is essentially a caricature of a jungle beast goes far 

beyond the merely unflattering; it is degrading and humiliating in the extreme.”); Ray v. 

Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Repeated derogatory or humiliating 

statements . . . can constitute a hostile work environment.”). 

This remains so even though the coworkers’ did not direct their comments at 

Lamptey. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1117 (“[I]f racial hostility pervades a workplace, a 

plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII, even if such hostility was not directly 

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targeted at the plaintiff.”); id. at 1118 (“If racial animus motivates a harasser to make 

provocative comments in the presence of an individual in order to anger and harass him, 

such comments are highly relevant in evaluating the creation of a hostile work 

environment, regardless of the identity of the person to whom the comments were 

superficially directed.”). It is also not dispositive that Lamptey’s coworkers used language 

that, in other contexts, would not have carried the racist overtones she reasonably 

perceived. Id. at 1116–17 (“[T]he use of ‘code words’ can, under circumstances such as 

we encounter here, violate Title VII.”). 

Although Lamptey has offered only two examples of her coworkers’ statements, her 

allegations that these statements were made twice each week for several months distinguish 

this situation from the balance of cases to which CCA cites affirming defense judgments 

for largely isolated, sporadic, or undescribed incidents. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los 

Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment on hostile work 

environment claim where only two of the alleged incidents involved “racially related 

epithets”); Manatt, 339 F.3d at 796, 798–99 (affirming summary judgment on hostile work 

environment claim where defendants engaged in “simple teasing,” where two troubling and 

“regrettable incidents” occurred over two-and-a-half-year period, and where the “jokes” 

ceased after a responsive staff meeting); Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1111 

(9th Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment on hostile work environment claim where 

“offensive conduct was concentrated on one occasion”); Gregory, 153 F.3d at 1074–75 

(affirming summary judgment on hostile work environment claim involving a single 

drawing of a monkey, which accompanied a memo admonishing employees “not to ‘get 

the monkey off their back’ by passing their responsibilities to others”); Sanchez v. City of 

Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 1990) (summarily affirming a directed 

verdict to defendants on hostile work environment claim without describing or analyzing 

the offensive conduct). 

Lamptey alleges specific, twice-weekly racial harassment over a period of “several 

months,” which caused her to experience “humiliation,” to avoid coworkers, and to miss 

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work. This is sufficient to state a plausible claim for race discrimination under Title VII 

and § 1981 on a hostile work environment theory. 

To recover from CCA, Lamptey must ultimately demonstrate that her employer is 

liable for the actions of its employees. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1119 (“[A] court must first 

assess whether a hostile work environment existed, and then determine whether the 

response was adequate as a whole.”). Here, Plaintiffs allege that CCA failed to take 

corrective action despite Lamptey’s continued complaints to her human resources contact. 

This probably suffices to state a claim for employer liability. Nichols, 256 F.3d at 875 

(“Once an employer knows or should know of co-worker harassment, a remedial obligation 

kicks in. An employer is liable for the hostile work environment created by a co-worker 

unless the employer . . . takes adequate remedial measures in order to avoid liability.”) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). Because CCA does not challenge employer 

liability, however, and instead attacks Lamptey’s allegations of a hostile work 

environment, the Court does not reach the issue on this motion. 

B. Retaliation against Lamptey and Rodriguez 

Lamptey and Rodriguez both allege that CCA retaliated against them in violation of 

Title VII. To state a claim for retaliation, they must show (1) they engaged in protected 

activity, (2) they suffered adverse employment action, and (3) the protected activity and 

adverse action share a causal link. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240. 

 1. Protected activity 

CCA concedes for purposes of its motion that Rodriguez engaged in protected 

activity. It disputes that Lamptey did. The First Amended Complaint, response, and 

supplemental allegations, however, reflect that Lamptey engaged in protected activity 

beginning in early April when she discussed the gorilla picture and racist jokes with her 

unit manager, when CCA’s human resources department twice interviewed her as part of 

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its internal investigation, and when she complained to human resources about the continued 

conduct after CCA fired Lopez and Trejo. Doc. 11 ¶ 10; Doc. 18 at 3 n.2. 

CCA makes much of whether Lamptey asserts activity protected by the opposition 

clause of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision or by its participation clause. 

The Title VII antiretaliation provision has two clauses, making it “an 

unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of 

his employees . . . [1] because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 

employment practice by this subchapter, or [2] because he has made a 

charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 

proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). The 

one is known as the “opposition clause,” the other as the “participation 

clause.” 

Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 274 (2009). 

On CCA’s view, Lamptey has not alleged that the opposition clause protects her conduct, 

and she cannot allege that the participation clause protects it. 

Lamptey’s statements pursuant to an internal investigation—rather than an EEOC 

investigation—may be unprotected by the participation clause. See Vasconcelos v. Meese, 

907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1990). Lamptey’s conduct comes within the opposition clause, 

however, which the Supreme Court has interpreted broadly. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276–77 

(rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s restrictive definition of “opposing” and extending the 

opposition clause to an employee who did not instigate but nonetheless responded to an 

internal investigation); see also Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240 n.3 (“Making an informal complaint 

to a supervisor is also a protected activity.”). At this early stage, it is sufficient that 

Lamptey complained about the offensive conduct and was interviewed in response to her 

complaints; she need not have used the word “opposition” to bring her activity within Title 

VII’s antiretaliation provision. 

2. Adverse employment action 

Title VII protects employees “from retaliation that produces an injury or harm.” 

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006). The challenged action 

must be “materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a 

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reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 68 

(quotation marks omitted); see also Ray, 217 F.3d at 1237. “[O]nly non-trivial 

employment actions that would deter reasonable employees from complaining about Title 

VII violations will constitute actionable retaliation.” Brooks, 229 F.3d at 928 (citing Ray, 

217 F.3d at 1243). “Among those employment decisions that can constitute an adverse 

employment action are termination, dissemination of a negative employment reference, 

issuance of an undeserved negative performance review and refusal to consider for 

promotion.” Id. Similarly, the transfer of job duties, see Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 

1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987), lateral transfers, Ray, 217 F.3d at 1241, and the initiation of 

administrative inquiries may suffice. See Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 

2007). On the other hand, “declining to hold a job open for an employee and badmouthing 

an employee outside the job reference context do not constitute adverse employment 

actions.” Brooks, 229 F.3d at 928–29. Similarly, “mere ostracism by co-workers” is 

insufficient. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1241. 

Both Plaintiffs have adequately alleged materially adverse employment action. 

After Rodriguez complained, CCA posted her up more often and to dangerous and 

previously unassigned situations, reassigned her favorable schedule, and withdraw one of 

her job responsibilities. Rodriguez also alleges that CCA’s warden conceded that 

retaliation occurred but doubted she could prove it. This rises above badmouthing and 

ostracism. After Lamptey complained, she experienced increased criticism, and CCA 

declined to weapons-certify her, transferred away her hospital duty, issued disciplinary 

notices, and ultimately reassigned her to another facility. Although the informal criticism 

likely does not constitute materially adverse employment action, the rest does. Brooks, 229 

F.3d at 928; Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1376. 

3. Causal connection 

Finally, Plaintiffs must allege that CCA took the adverse employment action 

because they engaged in the protected activity and that “but for such activity” they would 

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not have been subject to the challenged decisions. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 

F.3d 1054, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2002). “At the prima facie stage of a retaliation case, the 

causal link element is construed broadly so that a plaintiff merely has to prove that the 

protected activity and the negative employment action are not completely unrelated.” 

Poland, 494 F.3d at 1180 n.2 (quotation marks omitted). “The causal link between a 

protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action can be inferred from timing alone when 

there is a close proximity between the two.” Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 

812 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). 

 Rodriguez suffered the adverse employment action beginning early May 2012, less 

than two months after she complained about the sexual harassment and racist comments 

and corresponding with CCA’s investigation of Lopez and Trejo. This is close enough to 

infer a causal link. Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1376 (finding causal link where just less than three 

months lapsed between protected activity and adverse employment action). 

 Lamptey also sufficiently alleges that she lost hospital duty in close proximity to 

complaining. At the end of 2011, CCA decided that employees assigned to hospital duty 

required weapons certification, which Lamptey did not possess. Still, Lamptey continued 

to receive hospital duty through the beginning of April 2012. CCA also informed her that 

she would receive the necessary weapons certification. After she complained, Lamptey no 

longer received hospital duty, and CCA did not certify her. She alleges, however, that two 

other CCA employees who did not complain and who were uncertified continued to 

receive hospital duty in April and May 2012. These allegations are subject to competing 

inferences—that CCA retaliated against Lamptey as she says, or that CCA was slow and 

uneven in implementing a preannounced policy requiring weapons certification and that it 

decided against certifying Lamptey for nondiscriminatory reasons despite earlier 

representations. That is enough at this stage. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 

2011) (“If there are two alternative explanations, one advanced by defendant and the other 

advanced by plaintiff, both of which are plausible, plaintiff’s complaint survives a motion 

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff’s complaint may be dismissed only when 

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defendant’s plausible alternative explanation is so convincing that plaintiff’s explanation is 

im plausible.”). 

Because Lamptey has sufficiently alleged a causal connection between her protected 

activities and losing hospital duty, the Court need not (and does not) determine whether she 

has also sufficiently alleged a causal connection between those activities and receipt of 

disciplinary notices and a subsequent transfer. It is worth noting for the parties’ benefit, 

however, that these latter employment actions did not follow in close proximity to her 

protected activity and that, aside from the warden’s May 2013 comment that Lamptey 

could not let go of the picture, there are no factual allegations suggesting that the protected 

activity was their but-for cause. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

First Amended Complaint (Doc. 15). 

 Dated this 12th day of June, 2014. 

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