Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00482/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00482-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

George D. Lopez, Jr., 

Petitioner, 

v.

Ivan Bartos, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-07-482-PHX-DGC (CRP)

ORDER

Pending before the Court are a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner

George Lopez, Jr., a report and recommendation (“R&R”) issued by United States Magistrate

Judge Charles Pyle, and objections filed by Petitioner. Dkt. ##1, 15, 16. The R&R

recommends that this Court deny the petition as untimely and procedurally defaulted. The

Court will accept the R&R in part and deny the petition.

I. The R&R and Objections.

The R&R provides two independently sufficient grounds for dismissing Petitioner’s

habeas corpus petition: expiration of the statute of limitations and procedural default for

failure to exhaust state claims. Because the Court finds the R&R’s reasoning on the statute

of limitations correct, the Court need not address procedural default.

A. The R&R’s Conclusions Regarding the Statute of Limitations.

After a state prisoner’s conviction becomes final, he has one year to file a federal

habeas corpus petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). “The limitations period begins to run from

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the last of – (a) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; [or] (b) the date on which the

impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution

or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action[.]” Id. Although Petitioner contends that he was impeded from timely filing his

federal habeas petition, the R&R notes that he does not allege that he was unconstitutionally

impeded, nor does he present any substantial evidence that a State impediment prevented him

from filing his petition. See id. The critical question, then, is when the judgment became

final by conclusion of direct review or expiration of time for review, triggering the one-year

limitations period. 

Because a Rule 32 proceeding under Arizona law is a form of direct review, § 2244’s

“one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run until the conclusion of the Rule 32 ofright proceeding and review of that proceeding, or until the expiration of the time for seeking

such proceeding or review.” Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). For the

petition to be timely, the limitations period must not have ended before March 5, 2007, the

day the petition was filed.

Petitioner properly filed an of-right post-conviction relief petition after pleading guilty

to two counts of attempted child molestation. Dkt. # 15. On January 10, 2005, the trial court

dismissed the petition for failure to state a material issue of fact. Id.

 Petitioner had until January 25, 2005 to file a motion for rehearing in the trial court

or until February 9, 2005 to file a petition for review in the Court of Appeals. Dkt. #15;

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(a). Petitioner missed both deadlines. He placed the motion for

rehearing in the mail on January 26, 2005, one day late, and filed a petition for review on

April 27, 2005, 77 days late. Id. The trial court does not appear to have ruled on Petitioner’s

untimely motion for rehearing, which was actually incorrectly filed as a motion for

reconsideration. Dkt. #15. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review as

untimely. Id.

 Although the Court of Appeals denied the petition as untimely, it noted that the trial

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Because July 30, 2005 fell on a Saturday, Petitioner had until Monday, August 1,

2005 to file.

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court could grant permission to filed a delayed petition for review if it found that Petitioner

was not at fault for the late filing of the first petition. Petitioner filed a motion with the trial

court requesting permission to file a delayed petition for review, and the trial court granted

the motion on June 30, 2005. Id. The trial court did not specify a deadline for filing the

petition, but Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c) allows 30 days to file a petition for

review. Calculating from the date of the trial court’s order, Petitioner’s time to file the

delayed petition expired August 1, 2005.1

 The one-year limitations period under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244 therefore began to run on August 2, 2005, and Petitioner was required to file his

federal habeas petition by August 2, 2006 – more than seven months before it was actually

filed. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (calculating the one-year

statute of limitations using the anniversary method of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a)).

Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief on December 27, 2005.

Dkt. #15. On February 2, 2006, the trial court dismissed this petition as untimely. Dkt. #1

at 19. The Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s request for review on January 16, 2007.

Dkt. #15. Petitioner filed this federal habeas petition on March 5, 2007. Dkt, #1. 

Because Petitioner repeatedly failed to meet filing deadlines and specifically did not

file a formal petition for delayed review, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Petitioner

failed to show that he was entitled either to statutory or equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations. Id.

II. Discussion.

A. Petitioner’s Objections.

A party may file specific, written objections to an R&R within ten days after being

served with a copy of the R&R. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The

court must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which specific

objections are made. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); United States v. ReynaCase 2:07-cv-00482-DGC Document 17 Filed 03/27/08 Page 3 of 7
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Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). On February 14, 2008, Petitioner filed

objections relating to the statute of limitations issue, contending (1) that he filed his delayed

petition for review in a timely manner, (2) that he was entitled to statutory tolling because

of new evidence he submitted when he attempted to apply for state post-conviction relief, and

(3) that he was entitled to equitable tolling because any delay in submitting his applications

was caused by circumstances beyond his control. Dkt. #16. 

B. Petitioner failed to file a timely delayed petition for review.

Petitioner contends that he filed his delayed petition in a timely manner. Dkt. #16.

As the Magistrate Judge concluded, however, the evidence does not support this claim,

particularly given the lack of any delayed petition in the record. See Dkt.#15. 

Petitioner contends his delayed petition was actually filed on July 27, 2005, and bore

the title “Affidavit in Support of Previous Mailing of Motion for Reconsideration/Review.”

See Dkt.#16. Petitioner has provided the Court with only the first page of this document.

Dkt. #16 at 16. Even a review of the first page, however, shows that it is not a delayed

petition for review. The document states that it is an affidavit in support of a previous

mailing of a motion for consideration, and then refers to a motion for reconsideration filed

on January 26, 2005. Id Petitioner had also filed a motion for reconsideration in the Court

of Appeals on May 16, 2005. Dkt. #16 at 14. Both of these motions for reconsideration were

filed before the trial court granted Petitioner permission to file a delayed petition for review,

and neither, therefore, could have constituted the delayed petition for review. 

Moreover, a review of the record shows that the documents filed by Petitioner in state

court contained correct titles, including the “Petition for Review” he filed on

February 27, 2006 (Dkt. #12-4 at 27) and his “Motion for Permission to File Delayed Petition

for Review” (Dkt. #12-3 at 23). There is no reason to conclude that Petitioner would have

labeled his “Delayed Petition for Review” as an “Affidavit in Support of Previous Mailing

of Motion for Reconsideration/Review.” Even liberally construed, the document identified

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Petitioner argues that his filing of a delayed petition for review is confirmed by the

fact that the state thereafter attempted to file a response to a petition for review. As

Petitioner himself confirms, however, this attempted filing was rejected by the Court of

Appeals because Petitioner had not filed a delayed petition for review. Dkt. #16 at 20. 

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by Petition simply cannot be viewed as a delayed petition for review.2

C. Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling.

Petitioner asserts various state procedural rules and precedents suggesting different

grounds for post-conviction relief, such as newly discovered evidence. See Dkt. #16. But

regardless of what legal arguments Petitioner might have had, § 2244(d)(2) tolls the federal

statute of limitations only for the time during “which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review” is pending. Untimely applications in state court

are not “properly filed” under the statute. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005);

Allen v. Siebert, 128 S.Ct. 2, 4 (2007). Petitioner has not met the requirements of

§ 2244(d)(2) because he filed untimely petitions in state court.

Petitioner seems to contend that his second state petition for post-conviction relief,

filed on December 27, 2005, was timely because it asserted newly discovered evidence under

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(e). Dkt. #16 at 4. The state trial court found this

petition to be untimely. Dkt. #1 at 19. Moreover, even if the petition were somehow deemed

timely because it asserted newly discovered evidence, it was denied by the trial court on

February 2, 2006. Id. The 37 days it was pending are not a sufficient period of statutory

tolling to render Petitioner’s seven-month-late petition in this Court timely. 

Petitioner does not argue that the newly discovered evidence triggers the one-year

period of limitations for newly discovered evidence in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Even if

he did, this argument would be unavailing. Petitioner does not identify the date on which he

learned of the allegedly newly discovered evidence, much less the date on which he could

have learned it “through the exercise of due diligence” as required by the statute. Id. But he

certainly learned of it by December 27, 2005 – the date on which he filed his second state

petition for post-conviction relief – and one year from that date would still have expired

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before the habeas petition was filed in this Court.

D. Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling.

Equitable tolling applies when “extraordinary circumstances beyond the prisoner’s

control make it impossible to file a petition on time” and “the extraordinary circumstances

were the cause of [the prisoner’s] untimeliness.” Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th

Cir. 2003); see Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003); Calderon v. United

States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998). A prisoner must prove two elements: “that he has

been pursuing his rights diligently, and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418.

Petitioner has failed to establish either of these elements. First, Petitioner has not

pursued his rights diligently given his multiple untimely filings in state court. Petitioner

contends that his first motion for rehearing was timely filed because he gave it to the prison

mail system on January 26, 2005, but the filing deadline was January 25, 2005. The motion

for rehearing therefore was untimely. 

Petitioner also claims that he filed his delayed petition in a timely manner. As

previously stated, however, the evidence shows that Petitioner never filed a delayed petition

for review. Moreover, Petitioner missed filing deadlines for his first petition for review and

for his second request for post-conviction relief. Petitioner also filed his federal habeas

petition seven months late. Petitioner’s overall behavior does not display diligence. 

Petitioner also has not shown that an extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.

Petitioner asserts that the courts should have recognized his attempts at filing and made an

attempt to correct any mistakes, but this bare assertion does not show that an extraordinary

circumstance impeded Petitioner’s ability to file his federal habeas petition on time. 

III. Conclusion.

The Court accepts the R&R’s conclusion that the petition is untimely. Petitioner

failed to file his federal habeas corpus petition within the statutory one-year period, and

neither statutory nor equitable tolling applies. 

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IT IS ORDERED:

1. The R&R (Dkt. #15) is accepted in part as set forth in this order.

2. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. #1) is denied.

3. The clerk is directed to terminate this action.

DATED this 26th day of March, 2008.

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