Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944-371/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

IN RE: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT)

ANTITRUST LITIGATION 

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MDL No. 1917 

Case No. C-07-5944-SC 

ORDER SETTING HEARING FOR 

OBJECTIONS TO APPOINTMENT 

OF SPECIAL MASTER 

This Order Relates To: 

ALL ACTIONS 

 The Court has received objections to the appointment of U.S. 

Magistrate Judge (Ret.) James Larson ("Judge Larson") as a Special 

Master to hear those motions before the Court as described at the 

Status Conference held on August 7, 2015. See ECF No. 4021; see 

also ECF No. 3986; Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1)(C). 

 The Court is not in the habit of releasing preliminary 

rulings. However, to ensure parties can address the concerns of 

the Court at a hearing the Court will order herein, the Court makes 

a rare exception and discloses that it leans toward a finding that 

the marital relationship of the proposed Special Master to Judge 

Illston is irrelevant. 

Judge Larson is an honest, reliable, and trustworthy 

individual whose many years of service to the Court give the Court 

great confidence in his ability to be fair and impartial when 

considering judicial opinions authored by his spouse. The Court is 

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

equally confident that he will use his own resources when making 

decisions, and will consider the need for an order that he not be 

permitted to discuss the substance of this case with his wife until 

after this case is done. 

 Insofar as parties cite 28 U.S.C. § 455, the Court is inclined 

to find that the precedent supports this appointment. Section 455, 

Subsection (a) states in relevant part that: "Any justice, judge, 

or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any 

proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned." The United States Supreme Court has clarified that 

the goal of this subsection is to "avoid even the appearance of 

partiality. If it would appear to a reasonable person that a judge 

has knowledge of facts that would give him an interest in the 

litigation then an appearance of partiality is created even though 

no actual partiality exists. . . ." Liljeberg v. Health Servs. 

Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988). The test, as 

reformulated by the Ninth Circuit, has been: 

"'whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all 

the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality 

might reasonably be questioned.'" Herrington v. 

County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1502 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(quoting United States v. Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 

(9th Cir. 1983)). "Section 455(a) asks whether a 

reasonable person perceives a significant risk that 

the judge will resolve the case on a basis other than 

the merits." In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 385 (7th Cir. 

1990). The "reasonable person" in this context means 

a "well-informed, thoughtful observer," as opposed to 

a "hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person." Id. 

at 386. 

In determining whether disqualification is 

warranted under § 455(a), we also apply the general 

rule that questions about a judge's impartiality must 

stem from "extrajudicial" factors, Liteky v. United 

States, 510 U.S. 540, 554[] (1994), that is, from 

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

sources other than the judicial proceeding at hand. 

Pau v. Yosemite Park and Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 885 

(9th Cir. 1991) (citing Toth v. Trans World Airlines,

862 F.2d 1381, 1388 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

We are also mindful "that section 455(a) claims 

are fact driven, and as a result, the analysis of a 

particular section 455(a) claim must be guided, not by 

comparison to similar situations addressed by prior 

jurisprudence, but rather by an independent 

examination of the unique facts and circumstances of 

the particular claim at issue." United States v. 

Bremers, 195 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 1999). 

Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 

1178 (9th Cir. 2005). Clemens also cited approvingly the list by 

the Tenth Circuit in Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 

1995). See Clemens, 428 F.3d at 1178-79. 

As applied, the Ninth Circuit has clarified that many 

instances do not rise to a level requiring recusal. See S.E.C. v. 

ING USA Annuity & Life Ins. Co., 360 F. App'x 826, 828 (9th Cir. 

2009) ("There is no authority for the proposition that judges must 

recuse themselves if they served as mediators in a related 

proceeding."); Clemens, 428 F.3d at 1179-80 (all the Federal Judges 

in a judicial district did not need to be recused after collective 

death threats); Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 911-12 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (where a former law clerk who finished working for a 

judge eight years ago threatened to use his influence to guarantee 

a favorable judgment, the judge did not have to recuse himself); 

Cordoza v. Pac. States Steel Corp., 320 F.3d 989, 998-1001 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (Judge Patel did not need to recuse herself when 

pursuing her administrative role as an enforcer of the behavior and 

standards for an already appointed special master). Simple 

"conclusions and opinions" are also insufficient allegations of 

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

prejudice. Keyter v. Locke, 182 F. App'x 684, 685-86 (9th Cir. 

2006). 

Here, two cases are particularly instructive. See In re 

Smith, 317 F.3d 918, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2002); Perry v. 

Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 909, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2011). In Smith, 

the Ninth Circuit established that: 

First, judicial rulings alone almost never constitute 

a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion . . . . 

Second, opinions formed by the judge on the basis of 

facts introduced or events occurring in the course of 

the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do 

not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion 

unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or 

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. 

Id. at 933 (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555) (emphasis in 

original). Rather, expression of opinions only require recusal 

where they "reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism 

as to make fair judgment impossible." Id. (quoting Liteky, 510 

U.S. at 555). Based on this understanding of Liteky, the Ninth 

Circuit in Smith found that an opinion from a prior proceeding can 

only be a basis for recusal where the opinions display "a deepseated favoritism or antagonism." Id. (internal citation omitted). 

Thus, the predisposition of the judge in Smith to approve a 

settlement with modification did not show any bias, and the fact 

that the inclination did not change through many hearings was 

insufficient "to indicate that it was impossible for [that judge] 

to change his mind." Id. Even adverse rulings did not rise to the 

level of the "deep-seated antagonism or favoritism [required] to 

render a fair judgment impossible." Id. Smith thus held that 

"[e]ven if Judge Jones clung to his opinion, a little stubbornness 

is not ordinarily grounds for disqualification." Id. at 934. 

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

 In Perry, the Ninth Circuit examined an instance where a Judge 

did not recuse himself in spite of very public statements and 

actions by his wife that were directly on point. See Perry, 630 

F.3d at 914-16. There, the judge reasoned that his "recusal under 

§ 455(a) would still be appropriate only if a reasonable person 

with knowledge of all the facts would reasonably believe that, by 

virtue of [his] marriage, [he] might approach and decide this case 

differently than [he] would have otherwise approached and decided 

it." Id. at 914 (citations omitted). Perry then catalogued how 

the judge's wife had no interest in the outcome of the case (beyond 

that of any American interested in that type of case), and how even 

though the judge's wife headed (part of) an organization (the ACLU) 

with an interest in that case, the ACLU had no filings before the 

court and thus had nothing to gain. Id. at 914-915. The court 

then expressly considered that even though the views of the judge's 

wife or those of the ACLU may come before the court, 

"[the judge's wife] is an independent person who need 

not obtain [her husband's] approval or agreement to 

advocate for whatever social causes she chooses. The 

views are hers, not [her husband's], and [the judge 

does] not in any way condition [his] opinions on the 

positions she takes regarding any issues." 

Id. at 916. Therefore, the panel reasoned that a reasonable person 

who truly knew all the facts would not believe the judge would be 

partial or biased due to his wife's views on social policy, 

"whether those views are publicly expressed and advocated for, or 

not, and whether advocated for by her in her private capacity or in 

her capacity as head of the ACLU/SC." Id. The court also cited 

that the judge in that case had been a jurist for 30 years, and any 

/// 

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

person familiar with his record would not reasonably believe that 

beliefs of his wife would bias him. See id. 

Here, the Court's sense is that certain parties are concerned 

that Judge Larson, after 14 years of federal service, will be 

swayed by the written opinions of his wife Judge Susan Illston, a 

Federal, Article III Judge of 20 years. These same parties seem 

concerned that Judge Larson will give greater weight or deference 

to decisions by Judge Illston. Yet Smith clearly teaches that 

former judicial decisions do not yield bias absent a deep-seated 

favoritism or antagonism which is clearly lacking in this case. 

And Perry stands for the proposition that a spouse's personal or 

professional opinions do not always yield bias to a federal judge 

such that recusal is required. The concerned parties offer merely 

"conclusions and opinions," and thus fail to offer a sufficient 

allegation of bias. Keyter, 182 F. App'x at 685-86. 

The Court recognizes the key difference from Perry that 

certain parties would no doubt cite -- that unlike the judge in 

Perry, Judge Larson would be forced to evaluate the judicial 

opinions decided by his wife. True, it may be awkward for parties 

to argue to Judge Larson that he should reach a finding contrary to 

that of his wife, or for Judge Larson to hear such arguments. But 

under Section 455 this justifies only permissible rather than 

mandatory recusal. Critically, Judge Illston has nothing to gain 

or lose from her husband's conclusions -- even if Judge Larson were 

to uniformly agree or uniformly disagree with Judge Illston, Judge 

Illston would be no better off, no worse off, and no more or less 

likely to be upheld or reversed on appeal. Armed with that simple 

knowledge, any reasonable person familiar with the circumstances -- 

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

to include Judge Larson's judicial record and that of his spouse -- 

would not hesitate to affirm that the decisions Judge Larson will 

reach will be fair, equitable, and will in no way grant any 

improper deference to the work product of his spouse. Therefore, 

the Court is inclined to overrule the pending objection. 

 To ensure adequate opportunity to be heard, the Court hereby 

ORDERS that there be a hearing at which interested parties may 

appear before the Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(b)(1). Parties 

are not required to attend if they do not wish to be heard further 

on this matter. The hearing will be Friday morning, September 11, 

2015, at 10:00 am, at the San Francisco Courthouse, 17th Floor, 

Courtroom 1. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 Dated: August 31, 2015 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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