Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01633/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01633-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

 CALIFORNIANS FOR ALTERNATIVES 

 TO TOXICS, WILDERNESS WATCH, 

 LAUREL AMES, and ANN 

 MCCAMPBELL,

NO. CIV. S-05-1633 FCD KJM

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

 JACK TROYER, in his official 

 capacity, USDA FOREST 

 SERVICE, and GARY SCHIFF, in 

 his official capacity,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on plaintiffs

Californians for Alternatives to Toxics, Wilderness Watch, Laurel

Ames, and Ann McCampbell’s (collectively, “plaintiffs”) motion

for attorney fees, costs, and other expenses, under the Equal

Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), they incurred with respect to a

civil action against defendants Jack Troyer, the USDA Forest 

Case 2:05-cv-01633-FCD-KJM Document 129 Filed 08/11/06 Page 1 of 25
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1 Because oral argument will not be of material 

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

2

Service and Gary Schiff (collectively, “defendants”). 

Specifically, plaintiffs seek an award of $99,420.00 in attorney

fees and $13,693.00 in costs, for a total award of $113,113.00. 

Defendants oppose plaintiffs’ motion on the ground that

defendants’ position was substantially justified and thus, in

accordance with the EAJA’s limitations on recovery, no fees

should be awarded. Alternatively, defendants argue that if any

fees, costs and other expenses are awarded to plaintiffs, the

court should significantly reduce the amount plaintiffs request,

awarding no more than $26,359.27 for attorneys fees and costs. 

For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs’ motion is

GRANTED in part, as the court finds plaintiffs entitled to an

award of fees and costs, and DENIED in part, with respect to the

amount plaintiffs seek to recover.1 In that regard, the court

awards plaintiffs $78,402.50 in attorney fees and $12,943.00 in

costs, for a total award of $91,345.50.

BACKGROUND

On April 30, 2004, defendant USDA Forest Service (the

“Service”) issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”)

under the National Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”),

indicating that it would not prepare an Environmental Impact

Statement (“EIS”) and approving the Silver King Creek Paiute

Cutthroat Trout Recovery Project (the “Project”). The Project

authorized the California Department of Fish and Game (“CDF&G”)

to apply the pesticide rotenone to certain areas of Silver King

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2 Hereinafter, all references to “Am. Mem. & Order” refer

to the court’s order on the motion for a PI, filed September 1,

2005. 

3

Creek and Tamarack Lake in the Carson-Iceberg Wilderness in

California. (Pls.’ Compl., filed August 15, 2005, ¶ 28.) 

Subsequently, on August 15, 2005, plaintiffs brought suit

against defendants, alleging the Service violated NEPA and the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by failing to prepare an EIS

and/or prepare an adequate Environmental Assessment (“EA”) for

the Project. (Pls.’ Compl. at ¶¶ 59-79.) On August 23, 2005,

the court issued a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and,

shortly thereafter, a preliminary injunction (“PI”) enjoining the

Project. (Am. Mem. & Order, filed September 1, 2005, at 3:5-7.)2

The court held that the balance of hardships both parties would

incur if the Project were implemented tipped in favor of

plaintiffs, and plaintiffs sufficiently raised “serious

questions” as to the merits of their NEPA claims. (Id.) 

Ultimately, the CDF&G cancelled the Project “indefinitely.” 

(Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, filed Nov. 4, 2005, Ex. A.) 

Additionally, the Service withdrew its Decision Notice

authorizing the CDF&G to apply rotenone. (Id. at Ex. C.)

On November 4, 2005, defendants filed a motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1), arguing that plaintiffs’ action had become legally moot

as there was “‘no reasonable expectation . . . that the alleged

violation’ would recur.’” (Dfs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 7:3-6,

quoting City of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979).) 

The court granted defendants’ motion, as defendants satisfied

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their burden of establishing the unlikelihood that the alleged

violation would recur, and defendants voluntarily ceased

implementation of the Project such that plaintiffs were no longer

harmed. (Mem. & Order, filed February 27, 2006, at 10:5-7,

11:27-28, 12:1-2.)

Plaintiffs now seek to recover attorney fees, costs and

other expenses under the EAJA for all four stages of litigation

in this action, the motion for a TRO, the motion for a PI, the

motion to dismiss, and this motion for fees.

STANDARD

Under the EAJA, a court “shall award” attorney fees, costs

and other expenses to a “prevailing party” in a civil action

“brought by or against the United States in any court having

jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the

position of the United States was substantially justified or that

special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2412(d)(1)(A). 

In the absence of a statutory definition, a plaintiff is a

“prevailing party” for purposes of the EAJA if he or she

“succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves

some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” See

United States v. Real Property Known as 22249 Dolorosa Street,

190 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). Specifically, where a plaintiff is

granted a preliminary injunction, he or she is a prevailing party

under the EAJA despite the “subsequent mooting” of his or her

case. See Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096-97

(9th Cir. 2002).

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5

However, a plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees, costs

and other expenses in a civil action against the United States,

despite satisfying the “prevailing party” test, if the

government, bearing the burden of proof, demonstrates that its

position “was substantially justified or that special

circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A);

see Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir. 1988).

ANALYSIS

I. Prevailing Parties

The court is required to treat a party succeeding on a claim

for a PI as a “prevailing party” for EAJA purposes where the PI

satisfied a primary purpose of the lawsuit. Watson, 300 F.3d at

1096. Here, plaintiffs sought to stop defendants from

implementing the Project until, minimally, defendants prepared an

EIS in compliance with NEPA. (Pls.’ Mot. for Att. Fees, filed

May 19, 2006, at 2:3-5; Pls.’ Compl. at 19:3-4.) The court

subsequently issued a TRO and a PI, enjoining defendants from

executing the Project. (Pls.’ Mot. for Att. Fees at 2:4-14). 

Indeed, as a result of the court’s decision to issue the PI, the

Project was permanently halted--the plaintiffs’ precise objective

in bringing suit against defendants. (Id. at 2:27-28, 3:1.) 

Consequently, plaintiffs are the prevailing party under the EAJA. 

Further, the court notes that defendants did not contest this

issue, and thus, apparently concede that plaintiffs are the

prevailing parties for purposes of the EAJA. (Dfs.’ Opp’n, filed

June 20, 2006.) 

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II. Substantial Justification of the Underlying Action and

Litigation Position

Even if a party prevails in a civil action against the

United States, as required by the EAJA for recovery, the

government may nonetheless escape liability for attorney fees,

costs and other expenses incurred by the prevailing party if its

position is “justified to a degree that could satisfy a

reasonable person” both in law and fact. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988); Bowen, 825 F.2d at 1330. The Ninth

Circuit has specifically rejected the argument that the EAJA’s

1985 legislative history implicated a more stringent standard of

justification than reasonableness. Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329,

332 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit applies the “totality of

circumstances” test, requiring that the court conduct a two-part

inquiry in determining whether the government’s position was

substantially justified. League of Women Voters v. FCC, 798 F.2d

1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 1986). The court must review both the

government’s litigation position and underlying government action

at issue for reasonableness. Id. 

Importantly, “that the government lost [on a claim] does not

raise a presumption that its position was not substantially

justified.” Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzmam, 817 F.2d

484, 498 (9th Cir. 1987)(citing In re Hill, 775 F.2d 1037, 1040

(9th Cir. 1985)). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has refused to

automatically deem the government unjustified simply because its

underlying action was unreasonable. United States v. Marholf,

277 F.3d 1156, 1164 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002).

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7

Plaintiffs first argue that defendants’ underlying action

was unreasonable, as defendant Service violated NEPA by preparing

an EA but failing to prepare an EIS. (Pls.’ Mot. at 4:19-28,

5:8-11.) NEPA permits an agency to prepare an EA 1) if an EIS is

not required or 2) to determine whether to prepare an EIS. 

Foundation for North American Wild Sheep v. U.S. Dep’t of

Agriculture, 681 F.2d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1982). However, an

agency must prepare an EIS where “substantial questions are

raised whether a project may have a significant effect upon the

human environment . . . .” Id. (quoting City & County of San

Francisco v. United States, 615 F.2d 498, 500 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

In that regard, the Ninth Circuit has held that an agency’s

preparation of only an EA and a programmatic environmental impact

statement (“PEIS”) are unreasonable agency actions, for EAJA

purposes, if neither analysis “provides the information

‘necessary reasonably to enable the decision-maker to consider

the environmental factors and to make a reasoned decision.’” 

Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman, 714 F.2d 901, 904 (9th

Cir. 1983) (quoting Westside Property Owners v. Schlesinger, 597

F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 1979)). In the first phase of

litigation in Kunzman, the plaintiffs brought suit against the

defendants, including the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, seeking

a PI to stop the defendants from authorizing or implementing a

program where a chemical insecticide would be sprayed in an

Oregon residential area. Kunzman, 714 F.2d at 901. The Ninth

Circuit, in reversing the district court’s ruling that the

defendants had not violated NEPA, noted that neither the EA or

PEIS addressed the program’s effects upon the residential

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population in the region, nor did they consider the “carcinogenic

effects” of the chemical’s by-product. Id. at 904-905. 

Consequently, the district court determined that the government’s

position was not substantially justified, as its pre-litigation

actions were “unreasonable,” under the EAJA, and it never

admitted to the PEIS and EA’s deficiency. Oregon Environmental

Council v. Kunzman, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24481 *4 (D. Ore.

1984). 

Similarly here, in granting a PI to plaintiffs, the court

noted that plaintiffs raised a “serious question as to whether

plaintiffs’ experts’ comments and objections on the EA . . . were

adequately addressed by the [Forest] Service” such that a

“controversy existed sufficient to trigger an EIS.” (Am. Mem. &

Order at 7:26-27, 8:1-6.) Additionally, the court found that

plaintiffs successfully raised a substantial question “since the

Project’s inception” as to whether there was “a high probability

that rare and endemic species live[d] in the Project area” that

might effect the human environment, to warrant an EIS. (Id. at

8:24-27, 9:5-21.) “Preparation of an EIS is mandated where

uncertainty may be resolved by further collection of data . . .

.” National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722,

732 (9th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the court finds that defendant

Service’s action, in failing to prepare an EIS where a

controversy might exist and where a project’s effects were highly

uncertain or involved unknown risks, was “unreasonable” for

purposes of the EAJA. (Id. at 7:2-16, 8:1-10, 8:24-27).

Additionally, defendants prepared the EA in an untimely

manner, further supporting a finding of unreasonableness under

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3 Defendants argue that the court’s comments during the

preliminary injunction proceedings, namely that the case was

difficult to decide, “plainly indicate” that the government’s

position was substantially justified. (Dfs.’ Opp’n at 6:10-23.) 

Additionally, defendants recount their arguments in opposition to

plaintiffs’ motions for a TRO and PI as evidence of substantial

justification. (Id. at 6:23-28, 7:1-5.) The court finds both

arguments unsatisfactory in light of the court’s final decisions

(continued...)

9

the EAJA. As “proper timing is one of NEPA’s central themes,” an

agency must prepare an assessment so that it “‘can serve

practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaking

process . . . .’” Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d

714, 718 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (1987)). In

Block, the defendant USDA Forest Service awarded reconstruction

contracts for a road before preparing EAs, and construction began

before the Forest Service prepared a biological assessment

(“BA”). Id. at 716-717. In fact, the defendants began

constructing one section of the road without completing an EA. 

Id. at 716.

Similarly, the court noted here that defendants chose “in

2002 not to conduct a full NEPA analysis” and, after “promising

to perform the requisite analysis,” waited two years before

completing the subject EA in compliance with NEPA. (Am. Mem. &

Order at n.8.) Further, defendants failed to answer Lahontan

Regional Board’s inquiries in a timely manner, instead requesting

the State Water Board to “review the Lahontan Board’s actions and

grant the permit” required to move forward with the Project. 

(Id.) As in Block, defendants here delayed in conducting an

appropriate NEPA analysis, rendering the government’s underlying

actions unreasonable for purposes of the EAJA.3

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3(...continued)

to grant a TRO and PI to plaintiffs. Having already analyzed and

rejected defendants’ arguments, the court does not now repeat

that analysis. 

4 Defendants also point to the court’s decision to grant

their motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint, after the case was

rendered moot, as reflecting the government’s reasonable

litigation position. (Dfs.’ Opp’n at 11:16-20.) However,

defendants’ success on the motion to dismiss does not preclude

the court from rejecting their substantial justification defenses

on the motions for a TRO and PI. Instead, the court acknowledges,

and takes into account, defendants’ success on the motion to

dismiss when calculating plaintiffs’ fee award.

10

Finally, the Ninth Circuit has held that “fees generally

should be awarded where the government’s underlying action was

unreasonable even if the government advanced a reasonable

litigation position.” United States v. Marolf, 277 F.3d 1156,

1159 (9th Cir. 2002); see also High Sierra Hikers Association v.

Blackwell, CIV. 00-01239 (9th Cir. [Appellate Comm’er Dec.] Mar.

16, 2006)(Ex. E to Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A., filed May 19, 2006, at

11). Therefore, even if the court found defendants’ litigation

positions, against the motions for a TRO and a PI, to be

marginally reasonable, the court does not find defendants’

overall position substantially justified for purposes of the EAJA

in light of defendant Service’s unreasonable underlying actions.4

III. Special Circumstances

The case involves no special circumstances that would make

an award of fees unjust. The merits of the case did not involve

a novel, important and doubtful, or close question. Cf. United

States v. Gavilan Joint Community College Dist., 849 F.2d 1246,

1249 (9th Cir. 1988). Neither does the case involve an issue

upon which “reasonable minds could differ . . . .” League of

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5 Where the court awards fees in excess of the statutory

rate based upon an existing “special factor,” the higher rates

(continued...)

11

Women Voters v. FCC, 798 F.2d at 1260. Further, defendants do

not contend that special circumstances preclude the court from

awarding attorney fees, costs, and other expenses under the EAJA. 

IV. Calculation of Attorney Fees

The EAJA requires a prevailing party to include “an itemized

statement for any attorney or expert witness representing or

appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended

and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed.” 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Plaintiffs amply satisfy their burden of

production. (See generally Frost, Olson Decls., filed May 19,

2006). They request the court to award their attorneys Julia

Olson (“Olson”) and Peter Frost (“Frost”) $99,245 in fees for

316.9 hours of work. (Pls.’ Reply, filed August 2, 2006, at

23:1-10). To determine reasonable attorney fees, the court must

multiply “the number of hours reasonably expended on the

litigation . . . by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Accordingly, the court 

first determines whether plaintiffs’ requested rates are

reasonable, and then ascertains the reasonable hours worked.

A. Rate

The EAJA limits the award of attorney fees to $125 per hour

unless the court identifies a cost of living increase or “a

special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified

attorneys for the proceedings involved” to justify a higher fee. 

28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(2)(A).5

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5(...continued)

subsume a cost of living increase. Therefore, as the court here

awards plaintiffs’ attorneys increased fees dependent upon the

specialized nature of this case, the court does not detail the

appropriate cost of living increase which would be applicable

otherwise.

12

Plaintiffs’ attorneys seek fee rates of $275, $300, and $325

for Olson’s work in 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively, and rates

of $325 and $350 for Frost’s work in 2005 and 2006, respectively,

arguing that plaintiffs’ attorneys satisfy the criteria required

for a “special factor” enhancement to the statutory rate under

the EAJA. (Pls.’ Mot. at 10:23-26.) Plaintiffs correctly cite

the Ninth Circuit’s three-part test to determine whether a

“special factor” exists such that the court may award fees

exceeding the statutory rate. Love v. Reilly, 924 F.2d 1492,

1495 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Prius v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 536 (9th

Cir. 1989)). The attorney must 1) must possess distinctive

knowledge and skills developed through a practice specialty which

are 2) needed in the litigation and 3) are not available

elsewhere at the statutory rate. Prius, 869 F.2d at 541-542.

Specifically, “environmental litigation is an identifiable

practice specialty that requires distinctive knowledge.” Love,

924 F.2d at 1496 (citation omitted). In Love, the plaintiff’s

attorney submitted an affidavit detailing his experience in court

and in administrative proceedings involving insecticides and

preliminary injunctions, such that the district court found he

had developed “distinctive knowledge” for purposes of EAJA

“special factor” fees. Id. Here, Olson has spent nine years and

Frost has spent fourteen years “litigating exclusively

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6 Judge Karlton awarded Olson her requested fee rate of

$175 per hour for her work in 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and April

2003. Id. at 9 n.5. Environmental attorneys Sharon Duggan and

David Williams were awarded a rate of $275 per hour for their

work on the case during the same years. Id. at 25:19-24. 

13

environmental cases . . . .” (Pls.’ Mot. at 8:6-8, 8:22-23;

Olson Decl. at ¶¶ 4,6; Frost Decl. at ¶¶ 1-3, 5.) In fact, this

court has held in a previous environmental case that Olson has

“specialized skills warranting an adjustment to her fees.” 

Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. Dombeck, CIV. S-00-605

(E.D. Cal. 2004) (Karlton, J.)(Ex. G to Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. at

11:5-9).6 Further, the Ninth Circuit has held that both Olson

and Frost possess “distinctive knowledge and skill” required to

understand the “complex interplay between several statutory

schemes” including NEPA. Blackwell, CIV. 00-01239, Ex. E to

Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. at 17. As in Blackwell, here plaintiffs’

attorneys’ distinctive skills in environmental litigation were

necessary to interpret NEPA and its relevant requirements, the

EIS and EA. 

Additionally, where plaintiffs submit declarations from

plaintiffs and attorneys demonstrating that their attorneys’

distinctive skills were unavailable elsewhere at the statutory

rate, and the government fails to provide evidence to the

contrary, plaintiffs satisfy the last element of the Love test. 

(Id. at 18). Here, plaintiffs submitted a declaration from

plaintiff Patricia Clary (“Clary”) stating that plaintiffs “were

unable to secure representation in this federal case from

qualified attorneys at the EAJA rate.” (Clary Decl., filed May

19, 2006, ¶ 3). Defendants argue that since Clary never

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specifies “the nature of the [attorney] search . . . or whether

she specifically looked in Sacramento, the relevant market,” her

declaration fails to show that attorneys with comparable skills

were unavailable at the statutory rate. (Dfs.’ Opp’n at 18:14-

24.) However, the court does not find authority, nor have

defendants cited any, requiring plaintiffs to make such a

specific showing. 

Moreover, plaintiffs submit a declaration from Sharon Duggan

(“Duggan”), an attorney specialized in environmental law and

aware of billing rates in the “legal market in Sacramento,” who

previously collaborated with both attorneys on environmental

cases. (Duggan Decl., filed May 19, 2006, ¶¶ 9-12). Duggan

states that she was previously awarded, in 1999, $235 an hour in

a County of Sacramento case and also in 1999, $275 an hour in

this district court for an environmental case, both awards in

excess of the EAJA’s statutory rate at the time. (Id. at ¶ 9).

Finally, plaintiffs note that the Ninth Circuit awarded both

Olson and Frost enhanced rates ranging from $250 to $300 and $275

to $325, respectively, for their work on Blackwell from 2002 to

2004. (Pls.’ Mot. at 10:26-28, 11:1-2). Significantly, as in

Blackwell, defendants do not introduce evidence that any attorney

would represent plaintiffs in this case at the statutory rate. 

Further, in challenging plaintiffs’ argument for enhanced fees,

defendants fail to alternatively offer a different enhanced fee

rate to be awarded to plaintiffs. Therefore, plaintiffs satisfy

a showing of a “special factor,” such that the court awards Olson

and Frost enhanced rates of $275, $300, and $325 an hour for

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7 The court declines to grant Frost enhanced rates of

$325 and $350, higher than those requested by Olson. While the

Ninth Circuit awarded Frost enhanced rates at $25 per hour more

than Olson in Blackwell, the court awarded fees based upon

evidence of the reasonable rates for attorneys in San Francisco. 

Here, however, the court must refer to the market rate of the

“forum district,” Sacramento. Mendenhall v. National Transp.

Safety Bd., 213 F.3d 464, 471 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs do

not provide evidence differentiating both attorneys’ experiences

to justify awarding Frost a higher enhanced fee than Olson based

upon Sacramento prevailing rates. Declarant Duggan only states

that both attorneys “practice in a highly specialized field of

environmental law, and they are among the most proficient

practioners.” (Duggan Decl. at ¶ 10). The court, therefore,

awards both Olson and Frost the same enhanced rates. 

8 Defendants do not object to plaintiffs’ recovery for

hours spent preparing this motion for attorney fees, costs and

other expenses. Accordingly, the court awards plaintiffs

attorney fees for Olson’s 23.5 (including 5 hours on plaintiffs’

reply) and Frost’s 4.7 hours spent on this motion. The

calculation of these hours is further detailed later. 

15

2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively.7 

B. Reasonable Hours

In awarding attorney fees (“fees”), the district court must

consider only those hours which are reasonably expended,

excluding any “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary”

hours. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Specifically, where a party

brings multiple claims, failing on one claim “distinct in all

respects from” the other successful claims, the court cannot

include the hours that party expended upon preparing and

litigating the failed claim when calculating fees. Id. at 440. 

However, time expended on this fee motion may be included in

calculating the prevailing party’s fee award. Commissioner, INS

v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 162 (1990). 

Aside from this motion for attorney fees,8 this case

involves three stages of litigation for which plaintiffs seek to

recover fees: plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO, plaintiffs’ motion

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9 Plaintiffs submitted itemized statements detailing the

number of hours they spent on this action. While they itemize

these hours by date, they do not categorize hours by each stage

of litigation. However, defendants did categorize the number of

hours plaintiffs’ attorneys spent on each phase of litigation,

based upon plaintiffs’ statements. Unless otherwise indicated,

the court finds that defendants categorized plaintiffs’ attorney

fee hours accurately. 

16

for a PI, and defendants’ motion to dismiss.9 Additionally,

plaintiffs seek to recover costs and other expenses. 

1. Motion for a TRO

Defendants first argue that the court should not award fees

for plaintiffs’ time spent on the motion for a TRO, as plaintiffs

unreasonably delayed bringing the motion more than a year after

the claim became ripe. (Dfs.’ Opp’n at 12:1-12.) Defendants are

correct that in ruling on plaintiffs’ motions for a TRO and PI,

the court noted that plaintiffs delayed in bringing their action. 

(Transc. of Motion for PI Hearing, filed October 19, 2005, at

4:20-24). However, ultimately the court granted plaintiffs’

motions. Plaintiffs explained in their motion for a TRO that

they “in good faith sought to avoid having to seek . . . [a

TRO].” (Pls.’ Mot. for a TRO; filed August 22, 2005, at 8:8-9.) 

Specifically, plaintiffs stated that they “proposed [to

defendants] that the parties agree to a briefing schedule that

would avoid the need for an ex parte TRO application,” but allow

the court time to decide upon the issue of preliminary relief

before CDF&G could continue with the Project. (Id. at 8:13-17.) 

Defendants rejected the proposal. (Id. at 8:18.)

The EAJA permits the court to award “reasonable” attorney

fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The court finds that, since

plaintiffs resorted to filing a motion for a TRO only after

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10 Defendants indicate that Olson spent 85.7 hours and

Frost spent 46.3 hours total on the TRO motion, all within 2005,

based upon plaintiffs’ itemized statements of time expended. 

(Dfs.’ Opp’n at Ex. A-1, A-2). 

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failing to reach an agreement with defendants regarding

preliminary relief, plaintiffs’ time spent on the TRO motion was

reasonable for purposes of the EAJA. As such, the court awards

plaintiffs fees for the time spent on the motion for a TRO.10 

2. Motion to dismiss

Defendants additionally oppose plaintiffs’ recovery of

attorney fees for time spent litigating defendants’ motion to

dismiss, as plaintiffs lost that motion. The court agrees with

defendants. Defendants’ motion to dismiss stemmed from

plaintiffs’ case becoming moot once the court granted plaintiffs’

PI request. In dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint, the court held

that defendants’ met their “heavy” burden in establishing that

their alleged violation was unlikely to recur and that subsequent

events in the case, specifically the cancellation of the Project,

eliminated any alleged harm to plaintiffs. (Mem. & Order, filed

February 27, 2006, at 10:5-7, 11:27-28, 12:1-2.) Plaintiffs

contend that, in light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Watson

v. County of Riverside to award fees to a plaintiff even for time

spent on claims that plaintiff lost, the court should award fees

for the time they spent on the motion to dismiss. (Pls.’ Reply

at 14:18-24). 

However, plaintiffs do not dispute that “the district court

has discretion in determining the amount of a fee award.” 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 438. Specifically, if the plaintiffs’

losing claims are related to their successful claims, “the court

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11 Defendants referred to plaintiffs’ itemized statements

to determine how many hours plaintiffs spent on the motion to

dismiss. (Dfs.’ Opp’n at Ex. B-1, B-2). According to

defendants’ calculations, in 2005 Olson spent 3 hours and Frost

spent 33 hours on the motion to dismiss, and in 2006, Olson spent

1.4 hours and Frost spent 6.4 hours on the same motion. However,

defendants incorrectly incorporated hours plaintiffs’ attorneys

spent before defendants filed the motion to dismiss in its

calculations. The court finds that in 2005, Olson actually spent

2.2 hours and Frost spent 23.6 hours on the motion to dismiss. 

Defendants’ calculations for hours spent in 2006 are correct. 

Accordingly, the court excludes only the hours plaintiffs spent

on the motion to dismiss, after it was filed, from its

calculations of attorney fees. 

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must then evaluate the significance of the result achieved and

calibrate the compensation accordingly.” Outdoor Sys., Inc. v.

City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 619 (9th Cir. 1993)(citing Hensley,

461 U.S. at 434-437). Related claims “will involve a common core

of facts or will be based on related legal theories.” Hensley,

461 U.S. at 435. Here, the motion to dismiss involved facts

distinct from those addressed in the other motions litigated in

this case. At the motion to dismiss stage, the court addressed

whether plaintiffs’ action became moot once defendant Service

withdrew the special permit granted to CDF&G to execute the

Project, after the court granted plaintiffs’ motion for a PI. 

(Memo. & Order, filed February 27, 2006, at 1:25-28, 2:1-5). In

contrast, the motions for a TRO and PI centered around

defendants’ failure to prepare an EIS before authorizing CDF&G to

proceed with the Project. Furthermore, plaintiffs do not contend

that they relied upon legal theories for the motion to dismiss

related to their successful motions. As such, the court declines

to award plaintiffs attorney fees for time expended on the motion

to dismiss.11

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3. Motion for a preliminary injunction and administrative

proceedings/state litigation 

While defendants do not contest plaintiffs’ request for a

fee award that includes time spent on the PI motion, defendants

do argue that the court should prohibit plaintiffs from receiving

compensation for their attorneys’ work on administrative

proceedings or state litigation regarding the Project. (Dfs.’

Opp’n at 13:22-25, 14:1-8.) The court is persuaded by

defendants’ argument. The EAJA permits recovery for fees

“incurred . . . in any civil action . . . in any court having

jurisdiction over that action . . . .” 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(1)(A). In light of section 504(a)(5), “the only part of

the EAJA that allows fees and expenses for administrative

proceedings conducted prior to the filing of a civil action,” the

Supreme Court held that a court may not award fees for

administrative proceedings under section 2412(d)(1)(A). 

Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 93-94 (1991). 

Where a prevailing party does not bring suit to recover fees

under section 504(a)(5), the court cannot award fees for

administrative proceedings unless “a civil suit has been brought,

the court orders the parties to resolve an issue in an

administrative proceeding, retains jurisdiction of the civil

action, and the resolution of the action depends upon the outcome

of the administrative proceedings upon jurisdiction of the civil

action . . . .” Dombeck, CIV. S-00-605, Ex. G to Pls.’ Mem. of

P. & A. at 22:5-23. Here, plaintiffs do not bring this motion

under section 504(a)(5), nor did the court previously order the

resolution of any administrative proceeding. 

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12 According to defendants’ review of plaintiffs’ itemized

statements, Olson spent 10.5 hours in 2004 and 30.6 hours in 2005

on administrative and state litigation work. (Dfs.’ Opp’n at Ex.

C). The court finds that Olson did spend 10.5 hours in 2004 but

that she actually only spent 16.8 hours in 2005 on administrative

work or state proceedings. Olson spent the remaining 13.8 hours,

which defendants argue were also spent on non-compensable work,

to develop this civil action. Furthermore, the 30.6 hours of

work include 0.3 hours, expended on February 26, 2005, that

defendants already included in the time spent on the motion to

dismiss for which plaintiffs cannot recover. Accordingly, in

fairness to plaintiffs, the court precludes plaintiffs from

recovering for 16.5 hours, not 30.6 hours, Olson spent in 2005. 

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Defendants note the number of hours plaintiffs spent on

administrative proceedings and state litigation in detail. They

contend that the hours spent on this work should be excluded from

a fee award. (Dfs.’ Opp’n at 13:22-25, 14:1-8). The court

agrees to exclude these hours to the extent they were spent

before plaintiffs’ commenced this action or were spent on work

related to state litigation. 

Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that their attorneys should be

compensated for time spent preparing this action prior to filing

their complaint, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Webb v.

Dyer County Bd. of Educ. (Pls.’ Reply at 17:14-15). However, in

Webb, the Supreme Court noted that the administrative proceeding

was easily distinguishable from the judicial proceeding, such

that the district court correctly precluded recovery for time

spent on administrative work before the action was filed. 471

U.S. 234, 242-243 (1985). Furthermore, where the court cannot

decipher from plaintiffs’ records whether Olson’s hours spent

during this action pertained to state or federal litigation, the

court declines to award attorney fees for the time expended.12

The court thereby reduces plaintiffs’ fee award accordingly. 

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13 Plaintiffs’ fee request includes this cost. (Pls.’

Mot. at 12:27-28, 13:1-6). However, the court was unable to

decipher how plaintiffs’ included this cost with respect to the

fee hours. Thus, for purposes of calculating the total award to

plaintiffs, the court assumes this cost is included in the

attorney fee portion of the award.

14 Plaintiffs requested $400 and $350 to compensate

attorneys Axline and Yeates, respectively. The court deducts

this cost from the total fee award. Furthermore, the court

excludes approximately 66% of the hours Olson spent working with

Axline and Yeates to prepare these declarations, 2.5 hours.

21

V. Costs and Other Expenses

In addition to fees, a prevailing party may recover costs

and other expenses pursuant to section 2412(a)(1) and

2412(d)(1)(A). Plaintiffs request $3,143.10 in costs, $10,550.00

in expert witness fees, $1,150.00 in fees for attorney

declarations in support of the rates plaintiffs request and hours

plaintiffs claim,13 and 3.8 hours of time spent on preparing

these declarations. Defendants oppose plaintiffs’ request for

$1,150.00 in compensation for the attorneys’ declarations and the

3.8 hours Olson spent on these declarations. (Dfs. Opp’n at

17:3-10). They argue that the court did “not need the testimony

of counsel’s associates . . . in order to determine the quality

of the representation in this case.” (Id.) The court agrees

regarding the declarations of attorneys Axline and Yeates.14

However, the court relied upon Duggan’s declaration in finding

that specialized attorneys were not available at the statutory

rate in Sacramento. Therefore, Duggan’s fee of $400 and Olson’s

1.3 hours of time working with Duggan to prepare her declaration

are included in the fee award. 

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VI. Conclusion

After reducing plaintiffs’ request for fees, costs and other

expenses as appropriate, the court grants attorney fees in the

amount of $78,402.50 and expenses in the amount of $12,943.00 to

plaintiffs, for a total award of $91,345.50.15

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 11, 2006

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr. 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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ATTACHMENT “A”

The amount is based on the costs and fees sufficiently

documented by plaintiffs’ counsel, and the reductions discussed

above. 

ATTORNEYS

OLSON

Year Rate per hr Hours Total Award

2004

2005

2006

$275

$300

$325 

0

125.5

21

$0.00

$37,650.00

$6,825.00

 OLSON TOTAL: $44,475.00

Year Hrs Originally

Requested

Reduced By Type of Work Total Hrs

Awarded

2004 10.5 10.5 Administrative

proceedings/

state

litigation

0 

2005 30.6

85.7

25.5

3

16.8

0

0

2.2

Administrative

proceedings/

state

litigation

 

TRO motion

PI motion

Motion to

dismiss

13.5

85.7

25.5

0.8

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2006 1.4

23.5

1.4

2.5

Motion to

dismiss

Fee motion

0

21 

FROST

Year Rate per hr Hours Total Award

2004

2005

2006

$275

$300

$325

0

108

4.7

$0

$32,400.00

$1,527.50

 FROST TOTAL: $33,927.50

Year Hrs Originally

Requested

Reduced By Type of Work Total Hrs

Awarded

2004 0 0 N/A 0

2005 46.3

52.3

33

0

0

23.6

TRO motion

PI motion

Motion to

dismiss

46.3

52.3

9.4

2006 6.4 

4.7

6.4

0

Motion to

dismiss

Fee motion

0

4.7

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COSTS AND OTHER EXPENSES

Purpose Cost Originally

Requested

Total Cost Awarded

Expert witnesses:

Nancy Erman

Don Erman

$6,350.00

$4,200.00

$6,350.00

$4,200.00

Filing fees,

transcripts, meals,

postage, supplies,

telephone, and

travel expenses

$3,143.00 $3,143.00

 Sub-Total: $13,693.00

Time spent on

attorney

declarations by

Axline, Yeates, and

Duggan in support of

fee motion

$1,150.00 already

included in fee

request

- $750.00 

(For Axline’s and

Yeates’

declarations)

 Total: $12,943.00

GRAND TOTAL EAJA AWARD: $91,345.50

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