Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-05711/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-05711-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JW\HC.08\Lacerda05711_denyHC.wpd

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN LACERDA,

Petitioner,

 vs.

D K. SISTO, Warden, 

Respondent.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C 08-05711 JW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison in San

Quentin, California, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state convictions. The Court reviewed the petition and

ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted based

on petitioner’s cognizable claims. Respondent filed an answer and supplemental answer with

a supporting memorandum and exhibits. Petitioner filed a traverse and supplemental

traverse.

BACKGROUND

According to the petition, petitioner pleaded guilty to gross vehicular manslaughter,

driving under the influence of alcohol, and hit and run resulting in permanent serious injury

Case 5:08-cv-05711-JW Document 15 Filed 04/16/10 Page 1 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 People v. Lacerda, No. H030026, California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District

(July 23, 2008). (Resp’t Ex. E.)

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JW\HC.08\Lacerda05711_denyHC.wpd 2

or death in Santa Clara County Superior Court. Petitioner admitted the prior conviction

allegation as to the driving under the influence count. Petitioner’s plea agreement specified

that he would receive a sentence between eleven and fifteen years in state prison. On March

6, 2006, petitioner was sentenced to the upper term of ten years for the gross vehicular

manslaughter conviction plus five years for the enhancement attached to the hit and run

conviction. The trial court otherwise stayed the remaining punishments. The court further

imposed a $9000 restitution fine and a $9000 parole revocation fine that was to be suspended

after completion of parole. After a series of remands between the California Supreme Court

and the California Court of Appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on

July 23, 2008 and on October 3, 2008, the California Supreme Court denied review. 

Thereafter, petitioner filed the instant federal petition on December 22, 2008. 

The California Court of Appeal set forth the following summary of facts1

:

[Petitioner] met a woman in a bar and gave her a ride on his

motorcycle despite consuming several alcoholic beverages. He lost

control of the motorcycle and struck a fire hydrant. The woman was

thrown from the motorcycle into a tree. She later died. [Petitioner]

walked away from the scene.

[Petitioner] signed the advisement of rights form, which denoted

a sentence “11 yr. bottom 15 yr. top.” In reciting the terms of the

agreement at the change-of-plea hearing, the trial court stated that, “The

sentencing understanding is that he’ll receive no less than 11 years and

no more than 15 years in state prison.” It then asked [petitioner], “Is that

what you want to do?” [Petitioner] responded, “Yes, sir.” The following

colloquy then occurred.

“THE COURT: [Defense counsel], did you execute a plea form, or did

you help [petitioner] execute the form?

“[Defense counsel]: I read the form in its entirety except for the matters

which did not relate to his case and crossed out those boxes, prior to his

initialing and signing the form.

“THE COURT: I’ve been handed a waiver form. Are these your initials

and signature on the form?

“THE [PETITIONER]: Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: Did you go over the form carefully with your attorney

Case 5:08-cv-05711-JW Document 15 Filed 04/16/10 Page 2 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JW\HC.08\Lacerda05711_denyHC.wpd 3

... before you signed it?

“THE [PETITIONER]: Yes.

“THE COURT: Do you have any questions for me or for your attorney

concerning anything, anything concerning the case?

“THE [PETITIONER]: No, sir.”

Provision 30 of the form signed by [petitioner] states: “No one

has made any promises to me other than what were stated on the record

in order to induce me into entering my plea(s).” [Petitioner] placed his

initials next to provision 30.

Provision 42 of the form signed by [petitioner] states: “I

understand that there will be a mandatory restitution fund fine of not less

than $200 nor more than $10,000, and if I am being sentenced to State

prison that there will be an additional equal amount imposed but

stayed.” [Petitioner] placed his initials next to provision 42.

At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel asked the court to

impose a midterm sentence, which would calculate to the minimum

11-year term, rather than the upper term recommended by the

prosecution, which would calculate to the 15-year term. Defense

counsel did not, however, argue that the trial court did not have the

authority to impose an upper term sentence absent jury findings that one

or more aggravating factors existed. [Citations omitted.] In sentencing

[petitioner] to the upper term, the trial court also ordered the following,

which was consistent with the probation officer’s recommendation:

“There’s a $9,000 restitution fine using the statutory formula. I imposed

an additional $9,000 restitution fine suspended pursuant to [section]

1202.45 of the Penal Code pending successful completion of your

parole.”

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

Case 5:08-cv-05711-JW Document 15 Filed 04/16/10 Page 3 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JW\HC.08\Lacerda05711_denyHC.wpd 4

presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal habeas

court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal

habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at

409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th

Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes of determining

whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent,

only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings

need be “reasonably” applied. Id.

Even if the state court decision was either contrary to or an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law, within the meaning of AEDPA, habeas relief is still only

warranted if the constitutional error at issue had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 796 (2001)

(quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)).

Lastly, a federal habeas court may grant the writ it if concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

Case 5:08-cv-05711-JW Document 15 Filed 04/16/10 Page 4 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Under California’s Determinate Sentencing Law (“DSL”), a defendant can be sentenced to a

lower, middle, or upper term. “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The “‘statutory

maximum’ is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in

the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004). The

statutory maximum under the DSL is the middle term. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 293

(2007).

3

 The trial court also found that other bases for imposing an aggravated sentence were that

petitioner “engaged in violent conduct” and “knew he was impaired and chose to drive anyway.” (RT

142.) This Court need not decide whether judicial factfinding about these two aggravating factors

violated the Sixth Amendment because under California law, “only one aggravating factor is necessary

to authorize an upper term sentence.” Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 641 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, there

was no constitutional error in this case so long as the trial court’s findings about the petitioner’s

criminal history were permitted by the Sixth Amendment.

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JW\HC.08\Lacerda05711_denyHC.wpd 5

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue

made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence. Id. §2254(e)(1). 

B. Legal Claims and Analysis

Petitioner raises two claims for federal habeas relief: (1) his Sixth Amendment right to

a jury trial was violated when the trial court sentenced him to the upper term and (2) his due

process rights were violated when the trial court imposed a restitution fine which was not a

term of the plea bargain. 

1. Sixth Amendment Challenge

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial

by sentencing him to a high-end sentence2

 for his guilty plea convictions. Specifically,

petitioner claims that the trial court committed constitutional error by finding that petitioner

had suffered prior convictions that were numerous or of increasing severity.3

 According to

petitioner, the United States Supreme Court has held that defendants have a right for these

facts -- with the exception of a fact of a prior conviction -- to be found by a jury, not a trial

judge. And, petitioner contends that Butler supports his argument by conclusively stating,

“the [prior convictions] exception does not extend to qualitative evaluations of the nature or

seriousness of past crimes, because such determinations cannot be made solely by looking to

Case 5:08-cv-05711-JW Document 15 Filed 04/16/10 Page 5 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JW\HC.08\Lacerda05711_denyHC.wpd 6

the documents of conviction.” Butler, 528 F.3d at 644.

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s argument. Applying the

California Supreme Court’s ruling in People v. Black (“Black II”), 41 Cal. 4th 799 (Cal.

2007), it held that the trial court was permitted to sentence petitioner to a high-end sentence

based on the judge’s determination that this aggravating factor was present. Specifically, the

state appellate court found:

Black II also held that the [petitioner’s] criminal history was a second

aggravating circumstance meeting Sixth Amendment requirements. The [Black

II] court explained that this factor encompasses “not only the fact that a prior

conviction occurred, but also other related issues that may be determined by

examining the records of the prior convictions. [Citations.] [¶] The

determinations whether a defendant has suffered prior convictions, and whether

those convictions are ‘numerous or of increasing seriousness’ [citation] require

consideration of only the number, dates, and offenses of the prior convictions

alleged. The relative seriousness of these alleged convictions may be

determined simply by reference to the range of punishment provided by statute

for each offense.” (Black II, 41 Cal. 4th at 819-820, fn. omitted.) . . .

Here, the probation report states the following: “A review of the

[petitioner’s] criminal history revealed three prior misdemeanor convictions for

Unlawful Sexual Intercourse and Driving under the Influence of Alcohol.”

And, in entering his plea, [petitioner] admitted suffering the prior

driving-under-the-influence conviction. Because the fact of a prior conviction

is an exception to the requirement that aggravating circumstances must be

found true by a jury or admitted by the [petitioner], [petitioner’s] prior criminal

record was established consistent with Sixth Amendment principles. Also,

because [petitioner] admitted a prior conviction, that prior conviction was

established consistent with Sixth Amendment principles. The trial court was

therefore entitled to rely on [petitioner’s] recidivism as an aggravating factor so

as to impose the upper term. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal. 4th 622, 728 [a

single aggravating factor is sufficient to support imposition of the upper term].)

Its reference to other aggravating factors is irrelevant. (Black II, supra, 41 Cal.

4th at p. 813.)

(Resp. Ex. E at 6-8.)

In order to grant petitioner’s habeas petition, this Court would have to find that Black

II, on which the appellate court relied, was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. In Black II, the California

Supreme Court held that the trial judge’s imposition of an upper-term sentence was valid

because the judge found at least one aggravating circumstance in a fashion that satisfied the

Sixth Amendment. Black II, 41 Cal. 4th at 805-06. Noting that the defendant’s criminal

history included three misdemeanor convictions for second degree burglary and receiving

Case 5:08-cv-05711-JW Document 15 Filed 04/16/10 Page 6 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Under California Rules of Court, Rule 4.421(b)(2), the fact that a defendant has suffered

prior adult convictions that are “numerous or of increasing seriousness” is an aggravating factor at

sentencing.

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JW\HC.08\Lacerda05711_denyHC.wpd 7

stolen property, followed by felony convictions for grand theft and burglary four years later,

the trial judge determined that the defendant’s convictions were “numerous and of increasing

seriousness.”4

 Id. at 818. On appeal, the defendant argued that he was entitled to a jury trial

on whether his convictions were numerous and of increasing severity. Id. at 819. Relying on

the Supreme Court’s decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998),

Black II disagreed with the defendant. Almendarez-Torres noted that recidivism “is a

traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court’s increasing an offender’s

sentence” and held that the fact of a prior conviction need not be pleaded in an indictment or

proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 523 U.S. at 243-47. Apprendi upheld

Almendarez-Torres as a “narrow exception” to the general rule that any fact that increases

the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be found by a jury or

admitted by the defendant. 530 U.S. at 490. Black II interpreted the Almendarez-Torres

exception broadly, reasoning that “recidivism” includes “not only the fact that a prior

conviction occurred, but also other related issues that may be determined by examining the

records of the prior convictions.” 41 Cal. 4th at 819. According to Black II, a defendant is

therefore not entitled to a jury determination on whether his convictions are numerous or of

increasing seriousness. Id.

Petitioner argues that Black II is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court

precedent. Petitioner relies on the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Butler v. Curry, 528

F.3d 624 (9th Cir. 2008). In Butler, the trial court had found that two aggravating factors

warranted imposition of the upper-term sentence: that the victim was particularly vulnerable

and that the defendant was on probation at the time of the offense. Butler, 528 F.3d at 632.

Butler held that the Almendarez-Torres exception for prior convictions does not permit

sentencing courts to make “qualitative evaluations of the nature or seriousness of past crimes,

because such determinations cannot be made solely by looking to the documents of

Case 5:08-cv-05711-JW Document 15 Filed 04/16/10 Page 7 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JW\HC.08\Lacerda05711_denyHC.wpd 8

conviction.” Id. at 644. In Butler, the trial court’s finding that the defendant was on

probation at the time of the offense violated the defendant’s right to a jury trial as this fact

was “not reflected in the documents of a prior conviction nor, for that matter, may it be

conclusively inferred from those documents.” Id. at 646.

Butler does not demonstrate that Black II was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. For the purposes of AEDPA,

habeas review is based only on Supreme Court holdings. See Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742,

762 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1126 & n.8

(9th Cir. 2007)). Federal law is not clearly established by the Supreme Court of the United

States, even where a federal court of appeals has reached a clear standard on the issue, if the

issue remains an “open question in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.” Moses, 555 F.3d at

762 (citation omitted).

Black II held that the prior conviction exception is broad enough to allow a judge to

determine whether a defendant’s prior convictions are numerous or of increasing seriousness.

See Black II, 41 Cal. 4th at 819-20 (citation omitted) (“The relative seriousness of these

alleged convictions may be determined simply by reference to the range of punishment

provided by statute for each offense. This type of determination is quite different from the

resolution of the issues submitted to a jury, and is one more typically and appropriately

undertaken by a court.”). Further, other circuits and state courts have interpreted the prior

conviction exception more broadly to include facts related to recidivism. See, e.g., United

States v. Smith, 474 F.3d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 2007) (determination that criminal history was

“extensive and egregious” within Almendarez-Torres exception); United States v. Santiago,

268 F.3d 151, 157 (2d Cir. 2001) (existence of three prior felony convictions for offenses

committed on “separate occasions” within Almendarez-Torres exception); State v. Jones, 159

Wash. 2d 231 (Wash. 2006) (prior conviction exception encompasses a determination of the

defendant’s probation status).

Indeed, the Ninth Circuit recognized in Butler that its precedent on the scope of the

prior conviction differ from those of other circuits. See Butler, 528 F.3d at 648 n.15 (“Some

Case 5:08-cv-05711-JW Document 15 Filed 04/16/10 Page 8 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JW\HC.08\Lacerda05711_denyHC.wpd 9

of our sister circuits have . . . taken a broader view of the Almendarez-Torres exception,

permitting judicial factfinding as to facts that we have held do not come within the

Almendarez-Torres exception.”). Moreover, after Butler, the Ninth Circuit held in Kessee v.

Mendoza-Powers that because of this difference of opinion about what degree of judicial

factfinding is authorized by Almendarez-Torres, “Butler does not represent clearly

established federal law ‘as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 574

F.3d 675, 679 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Kessee therefore concluded

that although under Butler “a defendant’s probationary status does not fall within the ‘prior

conviction’ exception, a state court’s interpretation to the contrary does not contravene

AEDPA standards.” Id. It follows, therefore, that even if Black II conflicts with the Ninth

Circuit precedent articulated in Butler, this Court cannot conclude that Black II was contrary

to federal law for AEDPA purposes.

In sum, because the Supreme Court has not spoken on whether the prior conviction

exception allows a sentencing judge to determine that prior convictions are numerous or

increasingly serious and because the federal circuits have reached conflicting conclusions on

the scope of the exception, the California Court of Appeal’s decision that the judicial

factfinding in this case was constitutional is not “contrary to, or [ ] an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

2. Restitution fine

Petitioner claims that the imposition of a restitution fine violated his right to due

process because it was not a bargained-for term included in his plea agreement. In support of

his argument, petitioner relies on two California state cases: People v. Walker, 54 Cal. 3d

1013 (Cal. 1991) and People v. Crandell, 40 Cal. 4th 1301 (Cal. 2007).

On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claim as follows:

Relying on People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 1013, [petitioner]asserts that any restitution fine above the statutory minimum of $200 violated his plea

bargain because the terms of his plea bargain did not contain any reference to the

fines.

Case 5:08-cv-05711-JW Document 15 Filed 04/16/10 Page 9 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JW\HC.08\Lacerda05711_denyHC.wpd 10

In People v. Crandell (2007) 40 Cal. 4th 1301, the court held that the

imposition of a more-than-minimum restitution fine does not violate a plea

agreement, even if the amount of the fine was not mentioned as part of the plea

agreement, so long as the defendant acknowledged that there had been no

promises to him other than the agreed prison term and he was informed that a

restitution fine of between $200 and $10,000 would be imposed. (Id. at pp.

1309-1310.)

Here, at the change of plea hearing, the court and the parties orally

identified the agreed prison-term range. But other aspects of the plea were

reflected in the written waiver form and became part of the bargain as well. As

relevant here, [petitioner] acknowledged in the waiver form that (1) no one had

made promises to him other than reflected on the record (provision 30), and (2)

the trial court would impose restitution fines between $200 and $10,000

(provision 42). [Petitioner] entered his plea only after confirming his

understanding of that form. This incorporated into the plea the terms set forth in

the form. “[B]ecause the record demonstrates that the parties intended to leave

the amount of [petitioner’s] restitution fine to the discretion of the court,

defendant is not entitled to relief.” (Crandell, supra, 40 Cal. 4th at p. 1309.)

“These facts distinguish the case from Walker, where the court advised

the defendant only that the “maximum penalties provided by law” ‘for his

offense included “a fine of up to $10,000” ‘and obtained no assurance that the

parties intended their plea bargain to leave the amount of the restitution fine to

the court’s discretion.” (Crandell, supra, 40 Cal. 4th at pp. 1309-1310.)

(Resp. Ex. E at 8-9.)

“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the

prosecutor, so that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or consideration, such

promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). Plea

agreements are contractual in nature and subject to contract law standards of interpretation. 

In re Ellis, 356 F.3d 1198, 1209 (9th Cir. 2004). If the terms of the plea agreement have a

clear and unambiguous meaning, then the court does not look to extrinsic evidence. United

States v. Streich, 560 F.3d 926, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2009).

California law allows parties to negotiate concerning the amount of restitution. See

Crandell, 40 Cal. 4th at 1309; Walker, 54 Cal. 3d at 1027-28. Here, the record shows that the

parties agreed in the plea agreement that petitioner would have to pay a mandatory restitution

fine “of not less than $200 nor more than $10,000.” (CT 318.) Further, petitioner very

clearly signed his initials next to that statement. (Id.) Looking to the plain terms of the

written plea agreement, it is clear that the parties understood petitioner would pay a

restitution fine of something between $200 and $10,000. Petitioner’s contention to the

Case 5:08-cv-05711-JW Document 15 Filed 04/16/10 Page 10 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JW\HC.08\Lacerda05711_denyHC.wpd 11

contrary is belied by the record. See Crandell, 40 Cal. 4th at 1309-10 (no breach of plea

agreement where record showed the parties intended to leave the amount of restitution fine to

the discretion of the court; court “flatly informed” defendant that he would be ordered to pay

victim restitution); People v. Knox, 123 Cal. App. 4th 1453, 1461 (Cal. App. 2004) (fact that

precise amount of restitution fine was not specified prior to entry of plea showed defendant

recognized the amount of the fine would be left to the sentencing judge).

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently

been amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a

certificate of appealability (“COA”) in its ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254

Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). For the reasons set out in the

discussion above, petitioner has not shown “that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right [or] that jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural

ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, a COA is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a COA are

DENIED.

DATED: 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge 

April 16, 2010 

Case 5:08-cv-05711-JW Document 15 Filed 04/16/10 Page 11 of 13
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN LACERDA,

Petitioner,

 v.

D.K. SISTO, Warden,

Respondent. /

Case Number: CV08-05711 JW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on , I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office

delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Steven Lacerda F-18673

CSP - San Quentin

San Quentin, Ca 94974

Dated: 

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Elizabeth Garcia, Deputy Clerk

4/16/2010 4/16/2010 /s/

Case 5:08-cv-05711-JW Document 15 Filed 04/16/10 Page 12 of 13
Steven Lacerda F-18673

CSP - San Quentin

San Quentin, Ca 94974

CV08-05711 JW 

Case 5:08-cv-05711-JW Document 15 Filed 04/16/10 Page 13 of 13