Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03248/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03248-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREENE,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

 ROBERT HALF INTERNATIONAL INC. et

al.,

Defendant. /

No. C05-03248 MJJ

ORDER GRANTING JUDICIAL NOTICE

AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR STRIKE

Pending before the Court is Defendants Robert Half International Inc., Robert Half Inc., and

Robert Half of California, Inc.’s (collectively RHI) Motion to Strike and/or Dismiss Portions of the

First Amended Complaint. (Doc. #21.) Plaintiff Lizette Greene has filed an Opposition (Doc. #27), and

Defendants have filed a Reply. (Doc. #28.) Defendants have also filed a Request for Judicial Notice

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. (Doc. #22.) 

I. BACKGROUND

On August 8, 2005, Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants alleging RHI failed to

compensate its non-exempt inside sales employees for hours worked in excess of 40 hours a week and

eight hours a day, in violation of both federal and state law. Specifically, Plaintiff brings a collective

action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

Plaintiff also brings two supplemental state-based claims: (1) a class action pursuant Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2) and alternatively, (b)(3), under California’s Unfair Competition Law

(“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.; and (2) a class action pursuant Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure 23(a), (b)(2) and alternatively, (b)(3), under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). On

December 1, 2005, Plaintiff amended the Complaint, due to cases currently pending in Los Angeles

Superior Court, to seek only civil penalties under PAGA. (Doc. #15.)

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants focus on two separate aspects of the First Amended

Complaint. First, Defendants contend that the state UCL claim is derivative of the federal FLSA claim,

and as a matter of law, is therefore preempted because: (1) of an irreconcilable conflict between the

procedural requirements of the UCL and FLSA; and (2) the UCL state claim stands as an obstacle to

FLSA’s purposes and objectives. Second, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s class allegations require

adjudication on the merits to determine class membership, and ask the Court to strike the class

definitions with leave to amend. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Request for Judicial Notice, DENIES

Defendants’ Motion to Strike or Dismiss Plaintiff’s UCL claim, and DENIES Defendants’ Motion to

Strike or Dismiss Plaintiff’s class allegations.

II. DISCUSSION

 A. Request for Judicial Notice Pursuant Federal Rules of Evidence 201

Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of two complaints filed against Defendants

in other jurisdictions. Plaintiff has not filed an Opposition to Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice.

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows a court to take judicial notice of a fact “not subject to

reasonable dispute in that it is . . . capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, judicially

noticed facts often consist of matters of public records, such as prior court proceedings. See, e.g., Emrich

v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 1988); Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 92 (2d

Cir. 2000) (taking judicial notice of a filed complaint as a public record); Del Puerto Water District v.

U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1232 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (taking judicial notice of

matters of public record including pleadings, orders, and other papers). 

Here, Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of the following two complaints pending

in other courts: (1) a class action filed in Los Angeles Superior Court on September, 10, 2004; (2) a class

action filed in United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on December 29, 2004.

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(Doc. #22 Ex. A & Ex. B.) Defendants contend these records are relevant to the present action because

the claims in the present case are the same as those asserted in the other actions, increasing the risk of

conflicting judgments, and waste judicial resources. Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the

requested documents.

 B. Motion to Strike and/or Dismiss Portions of the First Amended Complaint

1. Legal Standard - Motion to Dismiss 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. Navarro

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the focus of a 12(b)(6) motion is on the legal

sufficiency, rather than the substantive merits of a claim, the Court ordinarily limits its review to the face

of the complaint. See Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002).

Generally, dismissal is proper only when the plaintiff has failed to assert a cognizable legal theory or

failed to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta

Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1996); Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984).

Further, dismissal is appropriate only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of a claim. See Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1990). In

considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts the plaintiff’s material allegations in the complaint as

true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Shwarz v. United States, 234

F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). 

2. Legal Standard - Motion to Strike

Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may strike from the

pleadings any insufficient defense, or any matter that is redundant, immaterial, impertinent or

scandalous. However, motions to strike under Federal Rule 12(f) “are viewed with disfavor and are

infrequently granted.” Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221, 229 (8th Cir. 1977); see also 2 James

2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 12.37[1] (3d ed. 2000) ("Courts disfavor the

motion to strike, because it 'proposes a drastic remedy.' "). Furthermore, courts regard motions to strike

with disfavor because they are often used as delaying tactics, and because of the limited importance of

pleadings in federal practice. Stanbury Law Firm v. I.R.S., 221 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000);

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Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 922 F.Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 

3. Analysis of Defendants’ Challenges

a) Preemption

Defendants first move to strike or dismiss Plaintiff’s UCL representative allegations. Defendants

contend that under the doctrine of conflict preemption Plaintiff’s state UCL claim, based on a violation

of the federal FLSA, is preempted by federal law. Plaintiffs, however, argue that a violation of FLSA

can be predicate unlawful act or practice to support a UCL claim without preempting the UCL claim.

Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States “shall be the supreme

Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the Contrary

nothwithstanding.” In analyzing preemption, the Ninth Circuit considers three preemption categories

as defined by the Supreme Court: (1) express preemption – where Congress explicitly defines the extent

its enactments preempt state law; (2) field preemption – where Congress attempts to regulate an area

exclusively; and (3) conflict preemption – where compliance with both federal and state law is

impossible or where state law stands as an obstacle to the fulfillment of Congress’s purpose and

objectives. Williamson v. General Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth

Circuit has also recognized “Congressional intent to preempt state law must be clear and manifest.” Id.

at 1150 (citing Industrial Truck Ass’n, Inc. v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1997)).

Defendants in this case do not argue express or field preemption. In fact, the Ninth Circuit

previously decided that the FLSA’s saving clause evidences Congress’s intention not to preempt the

field. Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1151. The FLSA savings clause provides in part that nothing “shall

excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum

wage higher than the minimum wage established under this chapter or a maximum work week

established under this chapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 218(a). Rather, Defendants argue both types of conflict

preemption as defined by the Supreme Court: (1) where compliance with both federal and state law is

impossible, and (2) where state law stands as an obstacle to the fulfillment of Congress’s purpose and

objectives. The Court will therefore focus its attention of these arguments.

 i. Impossibility to comply with both state and federal requirements

First Defendants argue compliance with both federal FLSA and state UCL statutes is an

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Plaintiff contends the real issue pertaining to these conflicting procedural requirements remains manageability of

proceedings. 

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impossibility. Specifically, Defendants contend Congress has mandated that all collective actions under

FLSA must be opt-in procedures, while class actions under UCL, which are governed by California

Code of Civil Procedure § 382, modeled after Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allow

only for opt-out class actions. Thus, Defendants argue compliance with both the state and federal

procedures “is a physical impossibility,” and the federal statute thus preempts the state law. 

The FLSA and UCL have contrary, irreconcilable procedural

requirements for group actions. The FLSA mandates that such actions

be pursued on an opt-in basis, while the UCL requires that such

actions be pursued on an opt-out basis. The unavoidable result of this

conflict is that the state law must give way to the federal, meaning that

an employee may not vindicate rights created by the FLSA through a

UCL collective action. 

(Doc. #21 at 4:18-22.)

However, in her opposition, Plaintiff contends that not only can a UCL claim be based on a

violation of FLSA, but that opt-in procedures are not irreconcilable with state law opt-out procedures.1

In support, Plaintiff cites several district court cases representing that these two procedures may be

maintained in the same case. Defendants failed to cite a single case that holds FLSA conflicts with or

preempts state law on these grounds. In their motion, Defendants cite cases that stand for the general

proposition that FLSA representative claims must be opt-in and UCL claims must be opt-out, and how

these procedures are mutually exclusive. However, none of these cases hold that these two procedures

cannot be maintained in the same case. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not seek to certify a FLSA opt-out

class or a UCL opt-in class, rather Plaintiff seeks to represent a FLSA opt-in class according to FLSA

procedures and a state opt-out class in accordance to Federal Rule 23. 

For instance, in Kelley v. SBC, Inc., 5 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 16 (N.D. Cal. 1998) the

plaintiff brought overtime violation claims under both FLSA and California’s UCL. The defendant

opposed the action on the grounds that Federal Rule 23 certification of pendant state claims is

inappropriate in an action that also includes a claim under FLSA. The court found “the risk of creating

two separate classes on the State and federal causes of action neither requires nor justifies the dismissal

of Plaintiffs’ State law claim,” and held the opt-in provision of FLSA was not a bar to class certification

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of pendant state law claims under Rule 23. Id. at 39. The Kelley Court continued:

To hold otherwise would create two parallel proceedings in State and

federal court, concerning virtually identical issues. If for some reason the

Court’s holding leads to the creation of two dissimilar classes, or if the

maintenance of two classes frustrates efficient case management, the

Court can consider decertification at that time.

Id. at 39-40. 

Other district courts have reached the same conclusion as Kelley. See, e.g. Beltran-Benitez v. Sea

Safari, Ltd., 180 F.Supp.2d 772 (E.D.N.C. 2001)(FLSA opt-in class action provision did not warrant

court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims to which Rule 23 opt-out

provision applied); DeAsencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 8 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 190 (E.D. Pa.

2002)(rejecting employer’s arguments that Rule 23 opt-out procedures were inconsistent or

irreconcilable with FLSA’s section 216(b) opt-in procedures)(reversed on other grounds); see also Scott

v. Aetna Servs., 210 F.R.D. 261 (D. Conn. 2002)(court granted plaintiff’s motion to certify Federal Rule

23 class in same case as FLSA-based opt-in class); Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 201

F.R.D. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)(court may exercise supplement jurisdiction over opt-out state wage claim

in same case as FLSA opt-in collective action); O’Brien v. Encotech Construction Services, Inc., 203

F.R.D. 346 (N.D. Ill. 2001)(court maintained Rule 23 class action in same case as FLSA opt-in

collective action); Ladegaard v. Hard Rock Concrete Cutters, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17832, at

*27 (D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2000)(court held class action superior method of adjudicating state wage claims

although potential class members had to opt-in for FLSA claim). Furthermore, in Aguayo v. Oldenkamp

Trucking, 2005 WL 2436477, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005), the district court, in evaluating whether

FLSA preempted a UCL claim, found the “impossibility of compliance with both state and federal

standards does not apply,” and focused solely on the second type of conflict preemption. Id. at 10. 

The Court agrees with the district courts in these cases that federal FLSA claims based on opt-in

procedures are not irreconcilable with pendant state claims based on Federal Rule 23 opt-out procedures;

therefore, the two causes of action may be maintained in the same case. Additionally, the Court agrees

with the district courts’ reasoning that by allowing parallel proceedings in state and federal court on

actions involving the same case or controversy, great potential exists for confusion of the issues,

unnecessary costs, inefficiency and inconsistency of proceedings and results. 

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 ii. State law stands as an obstacle to the fulfillment of Congress’s purpose and

 objectives.

In their Reply Defendants also argue that the UCL claim is preempted because it stands as an

obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Section 216(b) of the FLSA. According to Defendants, by

allowing a UCL claim to be based on a violation of FLSA, the plaintiff circumvents the thoughtful and

balanced protection put in place by Congress. Specifically, Defendants contend: 

[T]he purported nationwide UCL class is not primarily an attempt to enforce

California’s wage and hour laws against California employers for the benefit

of California employees, which is what is contemplated by the savings clause

of the FLSA. Rather the UCL/FLSA class is an express attempt to undercut

the procedural requirements and intent of Section 216(b) by premising a

purported nationwide UCL action on the FLSA federal law. The UCL itself

contains no substantive wage and hour provisions.

(Doc. #28 at 1:18-24.)

In contrast, Plaintiff maintains a violation of FLSA can be a predicate unlawful act or practice

to support a UCL claim, without preempting the UCL claim. In particular, Plaintiff contends that

“nothing in the UCL prohibits a civil litigant from using the FLSA violation as the predicate unlawful

act merely because a claim brought directly under the FLSA would proceed according to an opt-in

procedure.” (Doc. #27 at 7:12-14.) Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that FLSA’s savings clause expressly

allows a plaintiff to seek enforcement of overtime requirements under state law as well as federal law.

Although the Ninth Circuit has not ruled directly on this point, other district courts have analyzed

the relationship between FLSA and FLSA-based UCL claims, and found the opt-in procedure as

prescribed by FLSA does not act as a barrier to UCL claims based on violations of FLSA, despite the

different procedural requirements. see Tomlinson v. Indymac Bank, 359 F. Supp. 2d 898 (C.D. Cal. Feb.

18, 2005); Barnett v. Wash. Mut. Bank, FA, 2004 WL 2011462, (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2004); Aguayo v.

Oldenkamp Trucking, 2005 WL 2436477 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005); Bahramipour v. Citigroup Global

Markets, Inc., 2006 WL 449132 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2006). Reviewing these decisions, the Court finds

the reasoning, with respect to whether state UCL claims stand as an obstacle to federal FLSA claims,

persuasive. 

As a starting point, the Court looks to California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), California

Business & Professional Code §§ 17200. This section allows plaintiffs to bring actions based on

business practices that are (1) unlawful, (2) unfair, or (3) fraudulent that result in unfair competition.

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People ex rel. Bill Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins. Co., 104 Cal. App. 4th 508, 515, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 463

(Cal. Ct. App. 2002). Under this statutory scheme, violations of any federal law, state law or local law

can serve as the underlying unlawful act. Id. Moreover, these “borrowed” violations become

independently actionable as unfair competitive practices under the UCL. Id. (quoting Farmers Ins.

Exch. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 377, 383, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 487, 826 P.2d 730 (1992)).

Nevertheless, Defendants argue that the wrong alleged in the UCL claim “consists solely of a

violation of federal law.” (Doc. #21 at 1:21.) Defendants claim that Congress amended FLSA through

the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 in response to a flood of suits often concerning uninvolved employees.

Id. at 4, 5. Defendants advance: 

Congress’ aim in adding the “opt-in” language to § 216(b) was to

“prevent large group actions, with their vast allegations of liability, from

being brought on behalf of employees who had no real involvement in,

or knowledge of, the lawsuit. Id. [Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare

Services, Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1248] Or put another way, “[t]he ‘consent

in writing requirement sought to eradicate the problem of totally

uninvolved employees gaining recovery as a result of some third party’s

action in filing suit.” Id. Thus, the Act “prohibit[s] what precisely is

advanced under Rule 23 – a representative plaintiff filing an action that

potentially may generate liability in favor of uninvolved class members.

Id.

(Doc. # 21 at 5:10-16.)

However, in Tomlinson where employees alleged overtime violations pursuant to both FLSA and

UCL, the district court held Congress did not create an absolute barrier to relief precluding the state law

claim based on opt-out procedures. See Tomlinson v. Indymac Bank, 359 F. Supp. 2d 898, 900 (C.D. Cal.

Feb. 18, 2005). In that case, although the court focused on whether plaintiffs used the FLSA-based UCL

claim to circumvent a statutory barrier to relief and not the issue of preemption, the court found

Congress’s concerns when amending FLSA “simply are not present in a UCL action, where plaintiffs

are limited to restitution.” Id. at 900. Moreover, the Tomlinson court concluded that the opt-in

requirement was merely a procedural hurdle, and a UCL claim “is not precluded simply because it is

procedurally barred by the underlying statute.” Id. In support, the Tomlinson court cited a California

Supreme Court case, Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 999 P. 2d 706 (Cal. 2000), that

allowed a UCL claim despite the fact that the statute of limitations had expired on the underlying statute

which supplied the predicate violation. Id. The Tomlinson court noted that the UCL makes violations

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of other laws independently actionable, and in essence creates a second cause of action not dependent

on the procedures of the underlying statute. Id. 

Moreover, Barnett is also instructive. see Barnett v. Washington Mutual Bank, FA, 2004 WL

2011462, (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2004). As in the last case, the defendants in Barnett argued that the

plaintiff’s overtime violations based on federal FLSA claims preempted the state UCL overtime

violations, to the extent the UCL claims were based on violations of FLSA. In particular, the defendants

noted that the claims under section 17200 allowed for a longer statute of limitations and called for optout procedures in direct contrast to FLSA’s opt-in procedures. Id. at *4. The Barnett court found

Congress’ adoption of FLSA’s statute of limitations and opt-in procedure did not preclude a California

UCL claim with a longer statute of limitations and opt-out procedure “in light of the savings clause and

the absence of a clear indication from Congress to the contrary.” Id. at *6. The Barnett court cited

Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d. 1144, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000), a Ninth Circuit decision,

wherein the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s finding that FLSA was the exclusive remedy for

claims duplicated by or equivalent of rights covered by FLSA. Id. at *6. Moreover, the Barnett Court

found that rather than protect employers who fail to pay overtime, the “Supreme Court and the Ninth

Circuit have consistently found that the central purpose of the FLSA is to enact minimum wage and

maximum hour provisions designed to protect employees,” Id. (citing Williamson at 1154.)

Similarly, in Aguayo v. Oldenkamp Trucking, 2005 WL 2436477 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005),

plaintiffs sought to certify two classes, one under FLSA, and another under California’s UCL, for

alleged overtime violations. Defendants argued the UCL claims, based on opt-out procedures, were

preempted by the Portal-to-Portal Act as a means of enforcement of FLSA violations. Id. at *8. The

Aguayo court found that conflict preemption did not apply because “FLSA was designed to give specific

minimum protections to individuals workers.” Id. at *10 (citing Williamson at 1150). The Aguayo court

reasoned that, if the protection of workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours

remained FLSA’s goals, more favorable remedies such as a longer statute of limitations and a potentially

easier class certification process should not poise a real threat to the accomplishment of that goal. Id.

at *10.

More recently on February 22, 2006, in Bahramipour v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 2006

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WL 449132 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2006), the Northern District analyzed the issue of preemption and found

a longer statute of limitations and opt-out procedure did not bar the plaintiff’s UCL claim based on a

violation of FLSA. Although the plaintiff in Bahramipour brought a state UCL claim based on a FLSA

violation, without an independent FLSA claim, the Court’s reasoning is nonetheless applicable. Similar

to the other district court decisions, the Bahramipour court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

Williamson, noting that the purpose of FLSA to protect employees “despite the [Portal-to-Portal Act]

amendments, . . . the central purpose of the FLSA is to enact minimum wage and maximum hour

provisions designed to protect employees.” Id. at 7 (citing Williamson, 208 F. 3d at 1052). 

These cases also are consistent with applicable Ninth Circuit authority that has examined the

scope of California’s overtime laws in reference to FLSA. In Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass’n v. Aubry,

918 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1990), the defendants argued that because Congress expressly excluded seamen

from FLSA’s overtime requirements, Congress intended seamen to be excluded from California’s

overtime requirements as well. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, and described states as possessing “broad

authority under their police powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect resident workers.”

Id. at 1415. The Ninth Circuit held “in light of the plain language of FLSA savings clause and in the

absence of a clear indication from Congress to the contrary, [the FLSA exemption] does not preclude

enforcement of California’s overtime provisions to protect California-resident seamen in this case.” Id.

at 1419.

Nevertheless, Defendants in their Supplemental Brief suggest that none of the cases referenced

above “squarely” address their argument and that “one of Congress’s primary goals in passing the

Portal-to-Portal Act was to outlaw FLSA opt-out class actions and to require personal involvement in

FLSA class actions.” (Doc. #32 at1:5, 6.) Defendants cite Rodriguez v. The Texan, Inc. 2001, U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 24652, *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2001), as supporting their argument. However, the Rodriguez court,

while questioning the policy behind FLSA’s opt-in procedure in light of similar state statutes with optout requirements, also expressed concern on the issue of supplemental jurisdiction. As this court noted

earlier, several district courts have found opt-in and opt-out causes of action, although mutually

exclusive procedures, may be maintained in one case. Furthermore, the Rodriguez Court admitted that

“this Court’s brief research has not uncovered any precedential discussion or ruling on the

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appropriateness or inappropriateness of federal class action treatment of such state law claims in this

circumstance,” and referenced Ladegaard v. Hard Rock Concrete Cutters, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

17832, at *27 (D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2000), that granted class certification for such claims. Id. at 1.

Ultimately, the Rodriguez Court did not find the pendant state claims brought under two separate Illinois

statutes were preempted, but merely put the plaintiffs, “on notice that they have an uphill burden in their

effort to convert Rodriguez’s individual claim into one of broader scope.” Id. at 2.

Defendants also cite two district court cases that dismissed common law claims deemed to be

preempted by FLSA: Tombrello v. USX Corp., 763 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ala. 1991); Nettles v. Techplan

Corp., 704 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.S.C. 1988). However, these cases do not squarely address Defendant’s

issue in this case. In Tombrello, the plaintiff brought a wage claim under FLSA and three pendant state

claims based on a collective bargaining agreement. Besides citing cases for the proposition that

collective bargaining agreements are preempted by federal labor law, the Tombrello court found FLSA

“the exclusive remedy for enforcing rights created under the FLSA.” Id. at 545. In support of this

proposition, the Tombrello court cited Nettles and a Northern District case, Lerwill v. Inflight Motion

Pictures, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 1972). As the district court in Barnett stated,

“Lerwill does not persuade the court that plaintiffs’ claim is preempted.” Barnett, 2004 WL 2011462

at *5. The Barnett court distinguished Lerwill because: (1) it was not a preemption case that engaged

in a preemption analysis and, (2) the issue was whether to incorporate FLSA provisions into a private

contract. Id. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has noted that Lerwill is “weak precedent” for asserting

equivalent state law claims are preempted by FLSA. Id. (citing: Williamson, 208 F.3d at 1153). Also,

as noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit in Williamson reversed a district court’s finding that FLSA was the

exclusive remedy for claims duplicated by or equivalent of rights covered by FLSA. Id. at *6. 

Here, Plaintiff seeks to bring a cause of action under a California statute that expressly allows

violations of federal law to act as the predicate unlawful act and remain independently actionable under

the statute. The Ninth Circuit, in addition, has recognized “Congressional intent to preempt state law

must be clear and manifest.” Williamson at 1150 (citing Industrial Truck Ass’n, Inc. v. Henry, 125 F.3d

1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1997)). The Court finds the reasoning in Tomlinson, Barnett, Aguayo, and

Bahramipour sound and consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Williamson analyzing

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preemption. The Court holds that California’s UCL is not preempted by FLSA.

b) Class allegations improperly require adjudication on the merits to determine

 class membership.

In their Motion, Defendants also request the Court strike Plaintiff’s class allegations with leave

to amend because Defendants argue Plaintiff’s proposed class improperly requires an adjudication on

the merits to determine class membership. Specifically, Defendants argue the Court cannot discern class

members based on Plaintiff’s FLSA, UCL, and PAGA class descriptions that include current and former

RHI “salaried non-exempt inside sales employees” who “have not been compensated at least at one and

one-half times the regular rate of pay for all work performed in excess of forty hours per week.”

Defendants claim this description lacks clarity as to what alleged class members did for a job, what their

duties were, or even their formal job titles. In support, Defendants cite Oshana v. Coca-Cola Bottling

Co., 225 F.R.D. 575 (N.D. Ill. 2005), for the proposition that class definitions must be definite enough

to ascertain class members.

In response, Plaintiff maintains that the class allegations sufficiently specify type of employee

(inside sales person), the way employees are paid, the geographic locations, and the time frame for the

class periods, especially given the fact that the case is in its initial stage. Plaintiff further contends the

class definitions are distinguishable from Oshana where the proposed class definition might be said to

encompass “millions of potential members without any identifiable basis for standing.” Id. at 580. In

addition, Plaintiff maintains that the Motion for Class Certification is the proper time to specify all

formal job titles and other particulars, to the extent Plaintiff needs to specify these details at all.

Moreover, Plaintiff argues, at the very least, an opportunity should be afforded “to conduct discovery

to determine the various formal job titles before narrowing their class definition in such a way that might

risk excluding certain inside sales employees. Furthermore, Plaintiff has alleged an across the board

policy and practice of misclassifying inside sales employees as exempt.” (Doc. #27 at 10:17-21.)

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the class allegations are sufficient at this stage of the

proceedings. Defendants failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s class definitions, at this point, are

unworthy of consideration and unduly prejudicial requiring adjudication on the merits to determine class

membership. 

/ / /

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice

(Doc. #22), DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Strike or Dismiss Plaintiff’s UCL claim, and DENIES

Defendants’ Motion to Strike or Dismiss Plaintiff’s class allegations (Doc. #21).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/28/2006 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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