Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01400/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01400-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Stay of Execution)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERT JURADO, 

Petitioner,

v. 

RON DAVIS, Warden of San Quentin 

State Prison, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 08cv1400 JLS (JMA) 

DEATH PENALTY CASE 

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING PETITIONER’S 

REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY 

DEVELOPMENT, DISCOVERY 

AND/OR EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

AND 

(2) DENYING HABEAS RELIEF ON 

CLAIMS 2-4, 7-13, 15-32, 35-42, 44, 

AND 46-48 IN THE SECOND 

AMENDED PETITION 

Presently before the Court are the remaining claims in the Second Amended Petition 

[“SAP”], namely Claims 2-4, 7-13, 15-32, 35-42, 44, and 46-48; Claims 1, 5-6, 14, 33-34, 

43 and 45 were previously adjudicated in the Group One Order. (See ECF No. 171.) 

Petitioner has filed a Group Two Merits Brief [“Pet. Br.”], providing additional briefing on 

Claims 2-4, 7-8, 10-12, 19, 29-30, 38 and 47-48 in the SAP and requesting evidentiary 

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development and/or an evidentiary hearing. (ECF No. 182.) Respondent filed a Response 

[“Resp.”] to Petitioner’s Group Two Merits Brief, and Petitioner has filed a Reply 

[“Reply”]. (ECF Nos. 187, 194.) The Court held oral arguments on May 22, 2018. 

Subsequent to oral arguments and pursuant to the Court’s request, Petitioner filed a 

Supplemental Brief on June 5, 2018, outlining the claims on which Petitioner requests a 

COA. (ECF No. 205.) On June 19, 2018, Respondent filed a Response to Petitioner’s 

Supplemental Brief. (ECF No. 206.) 

 For the following reasons, based on the arguments presented in the pleadings, 

including relevant portions of the SAP, Answer [“Ans.”], and Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Support of the Answer [“Ans. Mem.”], as well as at oral argument and in 

the supplemental briefs, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s request for evidentiary 

development, discovery, and/or an evidentiary hearing on Claims 2-4, 7-8, 10-12, 19, 29-

30, 38, and 47-48 and DENIES habeas relief on Claims 2-4, 7-13, 15-32, 35-42, 44, and 

46-48 in the SAP. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 By an Amended Information filed on October 11, 1991, Petitioner Robert Jurado 

and co-defendants Denise Shigemura and Anna Humiston were charged with first-degree 

murder and conspiracy to commit murder in the death of Teresa Holloway. (CT 49-51.) 

Petitioner was tried separately from his co-defendants. 

Petitioner was convicted on May 23, 1994, of one count of first-degree murder 

pursuant to California Penal Code § 187 and one count of conspiracy to commit murder 

pursuant to California Penal Code §§ 182 and 187. (CT 1656-58.) The jury found that 

Petitioner used a deadly and dangerous weapon to commit the murder. (CT 1658.) The 

jury also found true the special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed 

while lying in wait under California Penal Code § 190.2(a)(15). (CT 1659.) On June 14, 

1994, the jury returned a sentence of death. (CT 1676.) On October 7, 1994, the trial court 

denied Petitioner’s motions for a new trial, to set aside the special circumstance finding, 

and for modification of the verdicts, and sentenced him to death. (CT 1682-83.) 

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 On automatic appeal (hereinafter “direct appeal”) of this conviction and judgment to 

the California Supreme Court, Petitioner filed an opening brief on July 9, 2003, raising 

twenty-six (26) claims for relief. (Lodgment No. 72.) Petitioner also filed a reply brief on 

February 15, 2005. (Lodgment No. 74.) The California Supreme Court affirmed 

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence in a decision issued on April 6, 2006. People v. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th 72 (2006). On October 10, 2006, the Supreme Court of the United 

States denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. Jurado v. California, 549 U.S. 956 (2006). 

On August 11, 2005, while his direct appeal was pending, Petitioner filed a habeas petition 

with the California Supreme Court, raising thirty-two (32) claims for relief. (Lodgment 

No. 76.) Petitioner also filed a reply brief on July 9, 2007. (Lodgment No. 78.) The 

petition was denied on July 23, 2008, without an evidentiary hearing. (Lodgment No. 79.) 

 On July 31, 2008, Petitioner filed motions for the appointment of counsel and for a 

stay of execution with this Court. (ECF No. 1.) On August 6, 2008, the Court granted 

Petitioner’s motions and referred the matter to the Selection Board for the suggestion of 

one or more attorneys to represent Petitioner on federal habeas review, and appointed 

counsel on June 23, 2009. (ECF Nos. 2, 23.) On July 18, 2009, Petitioner filed a Protective 

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 42.) After hearing and adjudicating 

Petitioner’s request for equitable tolling, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition and 

accompanying exhibits on February 22, 2010. (ECF Nos. 73, 74.) On March 9, 2010, the 

parties submitted a joint statement regarding exhausted claims and a joint stipulation to 

stay the federal proceedings and hold the case in abeyance pending the exhaustion of those 

claims. (ECF No. 78.) On March 10, 2010, the Court granted a stay of the federal 

proceedings. (ECF No. 79.) 

 On January 16, 2013, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s state 

exhaustion petition. (Lodgment No. 91.) On February 14, 2013, Petitioner filed the Second 

Amended Petition, the operative pleading in this action, and accompanying exhibits. (ECF 

Nos. 94-95.) On August 14, 2013, Respondent filed an Answer and accompanying 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities. (ECF Nos. 104, 104-1.) 

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 On November 19, 2015, after briefing and oral argument, the Court issued an Order 

denying Respondent’s request to dismiss Claims 1.J, 1.K, 1.T through 1.AA, 5-6, 14, 33-

34, 43 and 45 on the basis of state procedural bars, denying Petitioner’s motion for 

investigation, discovery and an evidentiary hearing on procedural default, denying 

Petitioner’s motion for evidentiary development and/or an evidentiary hearing on Claims 

1.A through 1.K, 1.M through 1.W, 1.Y through 1.AA, 5 and 6, denying Petitioner’s 

request for stay and abeyance, and denying habeas relief on the Group One Claims, Claims 

1, 5-6, 14, 33-34, 43 and 45. (ECF No. 171.) 

Pursuant to the Court’s request, the parties submitted a joint statement with respect 

to setting a briefing schedule for the claims remaining in the SAP. (ECF No. 172.) Based 

on the parties’ respective proposals and the claims remaining in the SAP, the Court ordered 

one additional round of briefing, limited to Claims 2-4, 7-8, 10-12, 19, 29-32, 38 and 47-

48. (ECF No. 173.) As noted above, on June 12, 2016, Petitioner filed the Group Two 

Merits Brief, addressing Claims 2-4, 7-8, 10-12, 19, 29-30 and 47-48,1

 along with an 

attached exhibit. (ECF Nos. 182, 182-1.) On December 1, 2016, Respondent filed a 

response, and on March 9, 2017, Petitioner filed a Reply with attached exhibits. (ECF Nos. 

187, 194.) On June 5, 2018, Petitioner filed a Supplemental Brief, and on June 19, 2018, 

Respondent filed a Response to Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief. (ECF Nos. 205, 206.) 

II. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

 The Court refers the parties to the statement of evidence issued by the California 

Supreme Court in Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 82-93. The California Supreme Court’s factual 

findings are presumptively reasonable and entitled to deference in these proceedings. See 

Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981). 

/// 

                                               

1

 In the Group Two Merits Brief, Petitioner notes that he did not submit additional 

briefing on Claims 31-32, “as those claims are fully briefed in the Second Amended 

Petition.” (Pet. Br. at 16 n.1.) 

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In order to provide a context for the Court’s discussion of the claims addressed in 

the instant order, restated below is the California Supreme Court’s summary of evidence 

presented during the guilt and penalty phases. 

On May 17, 1991, a stranded motorist saw the body of Teresa (Terry) 

Holloway in a culvert beneath Highway 163 in San Diego County. She had 

been strangled and beaten to death two days earlier. As the prosecution’s 

evidence at trial established, defendant killed Holloway, with the help of 

Denise Shigemura and Anna Humiston, to prevent her from disclosing their 

plan to kill a drug dealer named Doug Mynatt.FN2

FN2. Shigemura pled guilty to first degree murder and was 

sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison. Humiston, who was 

17 years old at the time of the killing, was tried as an adult,

convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit 

murder, and sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison. (See

People v. Humiston (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 460, 465, 24 

Cal.Rptr.2d 515.) 

A. Prosecution’s Guilt Phase Case-in-Chief

In October 1989, Brian Johnsen met Teresa Holloway; a month later, 

they began living together and continued living together until late April 1991. 

Throughout this time, Holloway was using methamphetamine on a regular 

basis. In December 1989, Holloway met Doug Mynatt at a bar and introduced 

him to Johnsen. 

In July or August of 1990, Brian Johnsen met defendant and bought 

crystal methamphetamine from him at Mark Schmidt’s house. Defendant was 

sharing an apartment with Denise Shigemura, but his girlfriend was Anna 

Humiston, a high school student who lived with her parents. Johnsen and 

Teresa Holloway socialized and shared drugs with defendant, Shigemura, and 

Humiston. Johnsen later introduced defendant to Mynatt. 

In October 1990, Denise Shigemura was arrested and remained in 

federal custody until April 1991, when she was released to a halfway house. 

During her time in custody, Shigemura exchanged letters and telephone calls 

with Teresa Holloway. When Shigemura obtained overnight passes from the 

halfway house, she stayed at the house where Teresa Holloway lived with 

Brian Johnsen. 

/// 

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In February 1991, Teresa Holloway argued with defendant, and their 

relationship became strained. Holloway’s relationships with Anna Humiston 

also became strained, and on one occasion they had a quarrel that almost 

turned violent. Around the same time, Doug Mynatt moved on a temporary 

basis into the house that Brian Johnsen and Holloway shared. Johnsen had 

been buying methamphetamine from Mynatt. 

In late March 1991, defendant gave Doug Mynatt a .38-caliber handgun 

in exchange for drugs. When Mynatt learned that defendant had stolen the 

gun, he insisted that defendant take it back and instead pay money for the 

drugs. A few weeks later, Mynatt and Johnsen took defendant from his 

apartment to Johnsen’s house. Mynatt made him stay there overnight until 

defendant agreed to pay Mynatt and to sell methamphetamine for him. Mynatt 

threatened to kill defendant if he did not agree. 

On April 11, 1991, Brian Johnsen was arrested during a drug raid and 

spent five days in custody. He was arrested because drugs were found under 

a couch at his house. Some of the drugs belonged to defendant, but defendant 

did not admit they were his. Johnsen felt that defendant owed him something 

because of this incident, and defendant agreed to compensate Johnsen with 

marijuana. 

In late April 1991, Brian Johnsen made Teresa Holloway move out of 

the house they had shared because of her continuing drug use, and he offered 

to let Doug Mynatt remain in the house on a more permanent basis as his 

roommate. Holloway approached Thomas Carnahan, who agreed to let her 

live in his apartment temporarily. He did not give her a key, and he insisted 

that she either be in the apartment by 11:00 p.m. or telephone him before that 

time to let him know when she would be arriving. 

On May 6, 1991, Brian Johnsen began serving a 14-day jail sentence 

for driving with a suspended license. Doug Mynatt continued to live in 

Johnsen’s house. Defendant still owed Mynatt money. 

On May 13, 1991, during a telephone conversation, Denise Shigemura 

told Brian Johnsen (who was still in custody) that Doug Mynatt had stolen her 

purse, which contained $80, a key to the business where she was then working, 

and the combination to the business’s safe. According to Shigemura, Mynatt 

admitted taking the purse and said he did it because he suspected Shigemura 

of stealing $450 from him. Shigemura seemed very upset about the incident 

and was worried about what Mynatt might do with the business key and the 

safe combination. During this conversation, defendant phoned Shigemura, 

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and a three-way conversation ensued between defendant, Shigemura, and 

Johnsen, during which they discussed possibly killing Mynatt. They were 

worried about potential retaliation, however, because Mynatt had claimed to 

have a friend who was affiliated with the Hell’s Angels. They agreed to 

discuss the matter further the next day. They decided not to tell Teresa 

Holloway about the plan to kill Mynatt because of concern that she would 

reveal it to the police. 

On the same day, Monday May 13th, defendant telephoned David 

Colson, with whom he had used methamphetamine, and he asked to borrow a 

shotgun. Defendant said he “needed to do somebody up,” which Colson 

understood to mean that defendant intended to kill someone. Colson told 

defendant that he did not own a shotgun, although his brother did, and he gave 

defendant his brother’s telephone number. Defendant called Colson’s brother 

and asked to borrow his shotgun, saying he “had a job to do,” but the brother 

refused to lend the shotgun to defendant. 

Around the same time, Denise Shigemura asked Steven Baldwin if he 

could get her a “gat” (a slang term for a gun). Shigemura explained that she 

had a problem she needed to take care of. Baldwin told her he could not help 

her with her problem. 

On Tuesday, May 14th, Brian Johnsen telephoned his house from the 

county jail and spoke to Denise Shigemura. They decided to contact defendant 

so the three of them could discuss what to do about Doug Mynatt. Johnsen 

telephoned Anna Humiston’s house and spoke briefly to defendant about the 

plan to kill Mynatt. Defendant said he was still deciding whether to go through 

with it. 

Later on the same day, Tuesday May 14th, Holloway was at the 

apartment complex where defendant lived. Larissa Slusher and Ted Meier 

managed the complex, and they occupied an apartment next to defendant’s. 

Slusher had known Teresa Holloway as a casual acquaintance for seven or 

eight months. Holloway asked Meier if she could spend the night in their 

apartment, because it was after 11:00 p.m., and she had been locked out of the 

apartment where she had been staying. Meier agreed. The next morning, 

Holloway left the apartment around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m., taking with her a dress 

that Slusher had loaned her. Before she left, Holloway said she would return 

later that day, May 15th, but she never did. 

On Wednesday evening, May 15th, Brian Johnsen telephoned Mark 

Schmidt and asked him to bring defendant and Denise Shigemura to 

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Schmidt’s house so he could talk to them. Schmidt ran about two and a half 

blocks to defendant’s apartment, where he found Teresa Holloway and 

Shigemura with defendant. Anna Humiston arrived in a blue Geo Metro while 

Schmidt was speaking to defendant. Defendant agreed to take Johnsen’s call, 

and he came to Schmidt’s apartment in Humiston’s car with Humiston, 

Shigemura, and Holloway. 

At 8:17 p.m. that evening, Brian Johnsen telephoned Schmidt’s 

apartment. Schmidt answered and passed the phone to Shigemura, who said 

she was still unsure about the plan to kill Mynatt. Defendant then got on the 

phone and told Johnsen that he could not wait and that it (meaning the killing 

of Mynatt) would probably happen before Johnsen was released from jail. 

Johnsen said that was fine with him. Teresa Holloway then got on the phone 

and asked whether there was a plan to kill Mynatt. Johnsen told her not to get 

involved. 

While Teresa Holloway was speaking on the telephone to Brian 

Johnsen, defendant had a “forceful talk” with Anna Humiston; he seemed 

angry about something; she seemed both angry and scared. Defendant then 

asked Schmidt for a chain that defendant could use to tie up Johnsen’s 

motorcycle so Doug Mynatt could not steal it. Schmidt offered defendant an 

18-inch length of plastic weed-eater cord. Defendant wrapped the cord around 

his own neck, with one end in each fist clenched at shoulder height. He said: 

“It will do.” Denise Shigemura needed to return to her halfway house by 9:00 

p.m. At defendant’s request, Schmidt told Holloway to get off the phone 

because he needed to leave the apartment. They all left Schmidt’s apartment 

around 8:45 p.m. 

At 9:31 p.m., defendant telephoned Christie Medlin at her apartment. 

He told her that he was stranded and needed a ride, and that he was calling 

from a 7-Eleven store. Medlin asked David Silva, her boyfriend, to pick up 

defendant and his friends. Silva found defendant with Denise Shigemura and 

Anna Humiston at the 7-Eleven store at Spruce and Fifth Streets. He drove 

them to Medlin’s apartment; when they arrived, Humiston was holding her 

stomach and appeared to be ill; she told Medlin she had an upset stomach. 

Defendant seemed bothered by something, and Shigemura seemed agitated. 

Noticing what appeared to be blood on defendant’s socks, Medlin asked him 

what had happened. Defendant said he “got into a fight.” Humiston used 

Medlin’s telephone to call her father to tell him that the blue Geo Metro had 

broken down. Silva drove Humiston home. Medlin then drove defendant and 

Shigemura to defendant’s apartment. 

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On Thursday morning, May 16th, around 9:30, a tow truck driver met 

defendant, Anna Humiston, and Denise Shigemura on Highway 163 near the 

Quince Street Bridge, where the blue Geo Metro was parked. The driver towed 

the car to the apartment complex where defendant lived. He observed nothing 

unusual about their demeanor. Humiston signed the towing receipt. 

On the afternoon of the same day, Thursday May 16th, defendant and 

Denise Shigemura went to David Silva’s apartment, and the three shared pizza 

and beer. Shigemura asked defendant and Silva to “bruise her up” so she could 

say she had been beaten and would have an excuse for not returning to her 

halfway house the previous night. Defendant and Silva then hit Shigemura 

with their fists. When defendant and Shigemura later went to Mark Schmidt’s 

apartment, Shigemura removed her shirt to show Schmidt the bruises on her 

chest and arms. She told Schmidt that she had been “jumped” the previous 

night. 

During the same day, defendant and Denise Shigemura went to Steven 

Baldwin’s house with Mark Schmidt. They sat in the living room, with 

Baldwin and Schmidt on one couch, defendant and Shigemura on another. 

Shigemura said to Baldwin: “I no longer need what it was I asked you for. We 

took care of the problem and we dumped the body at Balboa Park.” Defendant 

said nothing; his face had what Baldwin described as an “empty look.” 

On Friday morning, May 17th, Joseph Hedley experienced engine 

trouble as he was driving a van on Highway 163 through Balboa Park. He 

parked the van beside the freeway and began walking to a telephone call box 

about 100 yards away. As he neared the call box, he noticed a human foot 

protruding from a culvert that ran beneath the freeway. Approaching closer, 

he saw a woman’s body inside the culvert, where it was not visible to persons 

traveling on the freeway. He called to her but received no response. Using the 

call box, Hedley reported what he had seen. Police officers arrived 15 minutes 

later and found that the body was Teresa Holloway’s. 

During the autopsy of Teresa Holloway’s body, Mark A. Super, a 

deputy medical examiner employed by the San Diego County Medical 

Examiner’s Office, saw many injuries on the face, torso, and extremities. 

Contusions and abrasions were on the chest and on both legs and both arms, 

with the right hand being particularly bruised and swollen. Some of the 

abrasions showed clusters of short parallel linear marks suggesting they were 

made by an object with threads. There were many bruises and abrasions on 

the neck, including some marks that could have been made by ligature or 

manual strangulation. The hyoid bone was fractured and there were 

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hemorrhages in the eyeballs; both of these findings were consistent with 

strangulation. There was a bite mark in the center of the back. The most 

extensive injuries were to the face and head. The jaw and all the facial bones 

were fractured and some had caved in. There were many deep lacerations on 

the scalp, and the skull was fractured. In Super’s expert opinion, a scissor jack 

had “all the characteristics that one would expect” in the weapon that inflicted 

the injuries he observed. The cause of death was “blunt force head injuries 

and strangulation.” 

On Friday evening, May 17th, James R. Manis, a sergeant with the San 

Diego Police, found defendant with Anna Humiston outside defendant’s 

apartment complex. He told defendant he was investigating the death of 

Teresa Holloway. Defendant said that he knew Holloway, that he had last seen 

her about three days before at a party at the house of a man named Mark, that 

she was a drug user who owed money to drug dealers, and that he did not trust 

her because she had stolen from him. Defendant led Sergeant Manis to 

Holloway’s car, which was parked about three or four blocks from 

defendant’s apartment. 

On Saturday morning, May 18th, defendant and Anna Humiston 

arrived at David Silva’s apartment in a new car that Humiston’s parents had 

just given her. They then drove to defendant’s apartment, where Sergeant 

Manis arrested them. Later that day, Sergeant Manis found a scissor jack in a 

tree midway between the place where Teresa Holloway’s body was found and 

the 7-Eleven store at the corner of Spruce and Fifth Streets where David Silva 

had found defendant, Shigemura, and Humiston on the night of the murder. 

The jack was covered with red stains and had hair attached to it. Denise 

Shigemura was arrested on the same day. 

After his arrest, defendant made telephone calls from the jail to Brian 

Johnsen, Christie Medlin, and David Silva. When Johnsen asked defendant 

why he had killed Teresa Holloway, defendant said it had to be done. To 

Medlin, defendant sang “On, on, that bitch is gone.” According to Medlin’s 

trial testimony, defendant said “something like he doesn’t really care if he has 

to spend the rest of his life paying for this, the bitch is gone.” When Silva 

asked defendant about Holloway’s death, defendant told him that Holloway 

was killed in a car, that he had been sitting in the back seat with Humiston 

while Shigemura was driving and Holloway was sitting in the front passenger 

seat, and that an argument “got out of hand.” 

Around May 19th, Larissa Slusher saw the dress she had loaned Teresa 

Holloway in a dumpster about 100 feet from defendant’s apartment. With the 

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dress were Holloway’s purse, her wallet, her identification papers, 

photographs of her daughter, a sandal that matched one found at the murder 

scene, and a pair of shoes belonging to defendant. 

Gary Mark Dorsett, an evidence technician for the San Diego Police 

Department Crime Lab, examined the blue Geo Metro. He collected samples 

of red stains from the front passenger seat cover and seatbelt harness and from 

the rear floorboard carpet on the passenger side. There was no jack in the car. 

Norman Donald Sperber, a forensic dentist, compared the bite mark on 

Holloway’s back with dental impressions from defendant, Denise Shigemura, 

and Anna Humiston. In Sperber’s opinion, defendant’s teeth were “highly 

consistent” with the bite mark, but neither Shigemura nor Humiston could 

have made it. 

At trial, as part of the prosecution’s case, the parties stipulated to the 

results of blood analysis. The blood on the scissor jack and on the rear 

floorboard of the blue Geo Metro was consistent with Teresa Holloway’s 

blood, but inconsistent with the blood of defendant, Denise Shigemura, and 

Anna Humiston. Blood on the sandal and purse found in the dumpster, and on 

the front passenger seat cover of the blue Geo Metro, was consistent with the 

blood of all four of these individuals. 

The parties also stipulated to the results of hair comparison analysis. 

Ten of the hairs found in Teresa Holloway’s hand were consistent with the 

hair of Anna Humiston but not with the hair of defendant, Denise Shigemura, 

or Teresa Holloway. Four of the hairs were consistent with the hair of both 

Humiston and Holloway, but not with the hair of defendant or Shigemura, and 

three of the hairs were inconsistent with Humiston’s hair and were not 

compared to the hair of defendant, Shigemura, or Holloway. 

B. Defense Case at the Guilt Phase

After defendant’s arrest, Brian Johnsen went to the house of Josephine 

Jurado, defendant’s mother, and knocked on the door of her house one night 

around 9:30. Without opening the door, she asked Johnsen who he was and 

what he wanted. Johnsen said he wanted a helmet he had lent to defendant. 

She told him she did not have the helmet and did not know where it was, but 

Johnsen would not leave. She was frightened because she knew that Teresa 

Holloway had been Johnsen’s girlfriend and that defendant had been charged 

with her murder. Johnsen eventually left after defendant’s mother telephoned 

the police. 

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On May 19, 1991, during a 10-minute interview, San Diego Police

Officer David Swiskowski asked Mark Schmidt to describe what happened at 

Schmidt’s apartment on the evening of May 15, 1991, before Teresa 

Holloway’s murder, but Schmidt’s replies were vague and evasive. Schmidt 

said that defendant, Holloway, Anna Humiston, and Denise Shigemura came 

to his apartment that evening around 8 o’clock, and that he received a phone 

call from Brian Johnsen. Schmidt told Swiskowski that he gave the phone to 

defendant, and that defendant and Holloway were alone in his bedroom with 

the phone for about 10 minutes. Schmidt did not say anything to Swiskowski 

about having to leave the apartment, or making up a story about having to 

leave the apartment, or that defendant put a cord around his neck. 

On the same day, May 19th, during an interview that lasted 10 to 15 

minutes, David Silva told Officer Swiskowski that defendant had called him 

from jail after being arrested for Teresa Holloway’s murder. Silva told 

Swiskowski that during that conversation defendant did not talk about the 

murder except to say that he had been charged with it. Silva did not tell 

Swiskowski that defendant said Holloway was killed because she was a 

snitch, nor did Silva say that defendant had described where persons were 

seated in Humiston’s car before or during the murder. 

On September 10, 1991, Tony Bento, an investigator for the San Diego 

District Attorney, interviewed David Silva for around 25 minutes. During the 

interview, Silva said he had talked to defendant on several occasions after 

defendant’s arrest, and that defendant had always denied killing Teresa 

Holloway and never said that she had been killed because she had overheard 

a conversation, or that she was killed because an argument got out of hand. At 

the end of the interview, however, Silva mentioned a conversation with 

defendant before Holloway’s death during which defendant had said that 

Holloway had overheard something and she “was going to snitch him off 

about something.” 

On September 16, 1991, Tony Bento interviewed Brian Johnsen for at 

least an hour, during which Johnsen said that after defendant’s arrest, 

defendant called and told him to stay away from defendant’s family or “the 

same thing would happen to them.” Bento understood “them” as a reference 

to Johnsen and his friends. In this interview, Johnsen never said that defendant 

told him that Terry Holloway was killed because it had to be done. Johnsen 

also told Bento that he had discussed with Jeffrey Latimer the plan to kill 

Doug Mynatt. 

/// 

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Jeffrey Latimer was a childhood friend of Brian Johnsen and through 

him met defendant and Doug Mynatt. Latimer testified that he never discussed 

with Johnsen a plan to kill Mynatt, and that to his knowledge Johnsen had 

“never really been honest” and “was always the crook and the thief.” 

In 1991, Richard Whalley, a forensic scientist and toxicologist, 

arranged to have a private laboratory retest the urine sample taken from 

defendant after his arrest. The urine was found to contain methamphetamine 

at a very low level (130 nanograms) that would not have caused any effect but 

which suggested that defendant had probably used methamphetamine during 

the previous two to four days. 

In January 1992, Marion Louise Pasas, a licensed private investigator 

whom Anna Humiston’s attorney had retained, interviewed Christie Medlin 

at her apartment. Medlin told Pasas that after Teresa Holloway’s murder 

defendant had called Medlin from jail on one occasion, but during that 

conversation defendant did not talk about the murder. Medlin did not tell 

Pasas that defendant said he was glad Holloway was dead or that he said he 

did not care whether he spent the rest of his life in jail or in prison. 

C. Prosecution’s Penalty Phase Case in Aggravation

Before August 1988, while defendant was living with his mother and 

his sister in an apartment in San Marcos, he once became highly agitated and 

upset, pushed his mother slightly against a bed, and spit in her face. Another 

incident occurred later while defendant was living with his mother and sister 

in a house in San Diego. On this occasion, defendant came home very upset 

after having broken up with his girlfriend, threatened to obtain weapons and 

shoot up the house, threatened to kill his mother, and advanced toward her 

with a raised hand as if to strike her. Defendant’s friends restrained him and 

took him outside. When defendant’s sister tried to telephone the police, 

defendant grabbed the phone from her hand. After this incident, in December 

1989, defendant’s mother applied for a restraining order to have him removed 

from her house. 

In October 1990, defendant was convicted of felony possession of 

marijuana for sale. 

In May 1991, during the autopsy of Teresa Holloway’s body, she was 

found to have been pregnant. The fetus, which was around 17 weeks old, was 

too young and too small to have survived outside the womb, but it showed no 

evidence of traumatic injury or other condition that would have precluded its 

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survival to full term and birth had Holloway not died. Some weeks before her 

death, Holloway had told defendant that she was pregnant, but defendant did 

not believe her. Holloway said she was planning to get a pregnancy test and 

that when she got the test result she would show it to defendant to prove she 

was pregnant. 

On July 21, 1991, Steven Baldwin was booked into the county jail for 

a probation violation. As a deputy was escorting him to a holding tank, 

defendant, who was inside the tank, saw him and said to another inmate: “I 

know that dude. He’s the reason I’m in here. He told the cops I killed that 

bitch.” After the deputy had placed Baldwin in the tank, an inmate named 

Richard Janssen, whom Baldwin did not know, approached him and struck 

him. Baldwin was then hit several times, from different directions, on the back 

of the head and the side of the face. Defendant did not strike him, but when 

the beating stopped, defendant came out of a side cell and told Baldwin: “You 

can’t be in this cell. You got to roll up out of this cell.” Baldwin lost 

consciousness, and the next thing he remembered was being outside the tank 

on a gurney. As a result of the beating, Baldwin suffered injuries to the left 

side of his face, including bruising and swelling both above and below the 

eye, a laceration below the eye, and a nondisplaced fracture of the malar bone. 

On September 5, 1993, a fight broke out among inmates in module 5-B 

of the county jail in San Diego. Deputies arriving at the module observed 15 

to 20 Hispanic inmates on one side of the module faced off against eight to 10 

Black inmates on the other side of the module. The inmates were yelling and 

throwing things back and forth, and some inmates had bloodstained towels 

wrapped on their arms. Defendant was in the group of Hispanic inmates and 

was one of at least four inmates holding metal bars, 12 to 18 inches in length 

and one-quarter inch in diameter, that had been removed from inmate bunks. 

The inmates were slamming these bars against bunks and making stabbing 

motions with them toward Black inmates, although defendant was not seen to 

strike anyone. After the inmates were removed, the deputies found many items 

that could be used as weapons scattered throughout the module, including 13 

metal bars, seven wooden mop handle pieces, two razors, one razor blade 

attached to a comb, three wooden window grate pieces, and two socks 

containing soap bars. 

Teresa Holloway’s murder deeply affected her parents, James and Joan 

Cucinotta, and her daughter, who at the time of Teresa Holloway’s death was 

four years old and lived with her father. After the daughter learned of her 

mother’s death, she became sad and withdrawn and cried a lot. She often said: 

“I want my Mommy, I want my Mommy.” 

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A police detective came to the home of James and Joan Cucinotta to 

tell them of Teresa Holloway’s death. At first Joan could not accept it; she 

was very upset and angry, and she tried to hit the detective. When he said they 

had identified Teresa Holloway’s body through fingerprints, Joan fell apart 

and became hysterical. Some friends and family came over to be with her. 

That night and for days afterwards, she was unable to eat or sleep. She just 

cried and smoked cigarettes. She was unable to deal with making the funeral 

arrangements or telephoning relatives, so James Cucinotta did those things. 

James Cucinotta, Terry Holloway’s father, was also seriously affected 

by her murder. At the time of her death, he worked in law enforcement as an 

investigator, but within two weeks after learning of the murder, he lost his job 

because he was no longer able to function. He began drinking heavily until 

eventually he went into a treatment center. He and his wife Joan both received 

treatment from psychiatrists for their grief. The murder also deeply affected 

their two other children, Teresa Holloway’s brother and sister, and family 

holidays became very painful. At the time of his testimony, more than four 

years after Teresa Holloway’s death, James Cucinotta and his wife continued 

to visit Teresa’s grave every week. Joan Cucinotta sometimes took Teresa’s 

daughter to the grave. 

D. Defense Penalty Phase Case in Mitigation

Calvin Bruce was one of the inmates in module 5-B of the county jail 

in San Diego on September 5, 1993. He was talking on the phone to his wife 

when he saw two inmates, one Black and the other Hispanic, have a 

confrontation that became physical and resulted in a face-off between groups 

of Black and Hispanic inmates during which inmates in both groups wielded 

and threw metal pipes. According to Bruce, defendant was not one of the 

original combatants, he did not have any weapon in his hand during the 

incident, and he tried unsuccessfully to persuade other inmates to stop the 

fighting. 

Defendant’s parents-Robert Jurado, Sr., and Josephine Jurado-married 

in 1968. Defendant was born in June 1970, and his sister Oralia in November 

1973. At that time, the family lived in Los Banos. Once, when he was around 

four years old, defendant saw his father hit his mother. Defendant ran up to 

his mother and hugged her. 

In 1973, defendant’s parents separated, and defendant began to 

experience “tremendous headaches that would make him cry a lot.” He also 

developed a fear of sleeping in the dark, and he became more rebellious with 

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his mother. After the separation, defendant’s father saw his children no more 

than once or twice a year. 

In 1977, defendant’s parents finalized their divorce. In 1984, 

defendant’s mother moved to San Diego. His father never went there to visit, 

and he telephoned very seldom. Around 1985, defendant’s father remarried. 

In 1986, defendant’s grades began to fail and he began to use drugs. In 1987 

or 1988, defendant’s mother placed him in a drug treatment program. When 

he learned that defendant was using illegal drugs, defendant’s father cut all 

ties with defendant. Around this time, a psychiatrist told defendant’s mother 

that defendant was suicidal and needed to be hospitalized right away. When 

defendant’s mother telephoned his father to get some insurance papers to 

cover defendant’s hospitalization, defendant’s father said something to the 

effect that it might be better if defendant did commit suicide. 

Defendant’s father testified that he had seen defendant once since his 

arrest and could now form a relationship with him because defendant was no 

longer using drugs. 

Before moving to San Diego with his mother in 1984, defendant had 

close relationships with his aunt, Patricia Camacho, and his two 

grandmothers, Josefina Martinez and Paz Jurado. They each testified that they 

love defendant very much and intended to visit him in prison. Defendant’s 

mother and his sister Oralia both testified that they love defendant very much, 

that they had visited defendant weekly since his arrest, and that they intended 

to continue visiting him in prison. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 82-93. 

III. PROCEDURAL BARS 

A. Teague v. Lane

 “Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of 

criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before 

the new rules are announced.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality 

opinion); see also Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 227 (1992) (“Subject to two exceptions, 

a case decided after a petitioner’s conviction and sentence became final may not be the 

predicate for federal habeas corpus relief unless the decision was dictated by precedent 

existing when the judgment in question became final.”) A new rule “breaks new ground 

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or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” or one whose “result 

was not dictated by precedent existing at the time defendant’s conviction became final.” 

Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. The two exceptions to Teague are if the new rule: (1) “places 

‘certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe,’” or (2) “requires the observance of ‘those procedures that 

. . . are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Id. at 307, quoting Mackey v. United 

States, 401 U.S. 667, 692, 693 (1971). “That a new procedural rule is ‘fundamental’ in 

some abstract sense is not enough; the rule must be one ‘without which the likelihood of 

an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 

(2004), quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313. “[I]f the State does argue that the defendant seeks 

the benefit of a new rule of constitutional law, the court must apply Teague v. Lane before 

considering the merits of the claim.” Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994). 

 For the reasons discussed below in section III.A.3., and previously discussed in the 

Court’s Group One Order, while Respondent offers a general Teague assertion with respect 

to the bulk of the claims in the SAP, that does not properly raise the issue before this Court. 

(See e.g. ECF No. 171 at 18-19.) However, upon review of the Answer, the accompanying 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and the Response to Petitioner’s Group Two 

Merits Brief, Respondent offers specific arguments that Claims 3, 19, 47 and 48 are 

Teague-barred. (See Ans. Mem. at 180-81; Resp. at 50-51, 59, 61.) 

1. Claim 3 

 In Claim 3, Petitioner asserts that “[t]he prosecution’s use of mutually exclusive and 

inconsistent theories violated Petitioner’s right to fundamental fairness under the Due 

Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and “resulted in a fundamentally unreliable 

determination of Petitioner’s guilt.” (SAP at 284.) Respondent argues that “there is no 

clearly established precedent from the United States Supreme Court to support a conclusion 

that due process prohibits a prosecutor from arguing inconsistent theories.” (Ans. Mem. at 

181.) Respondent references Justice Thomas’ concurrence from Bradshaw v. Stumph, 545 

U.S. 175 (2005), which states: “This Court has never hinted, much less held, that the Due 

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Process Clause prevents a State from prosecuting defendants based on inconsistent 

theories.” Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 190. 

 Petitioner cites to both California state law and Ninth Circuit cases to support his 

argument, but he fails to point to any such support in clearly established federal law. Thus, 

it appears that this rule falls under Teague, in that it would “break[] new ground or impose[] 

a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government,” and it does not seem to satisfy 

either exception. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 307. As an alternate ground for the 

disposition, the Court finds that Claim 3 fails on the merits for the reasons discussed below.

2. Claims 19, 47 and 48 

In Claim 19, Petitioner contends that the cumulative effect of the guilt phase errors 

requires reversal of his convictions. (SAP at 468.) Meanwhile, in Claim 47, Petitioner 

argues that the cumulative effect of the errors raised on direct appeal require reversal of his 

death sentence, and in Claim 48, asserts that the combination of errors in his capital 

proceedings deprived him of his constitutional rights. (Id. at 676-80.) In the Answer, 

Respondent addresses Claims 19, 47 and 48 on the merits but has not raised any specific 

Teague argument with respect to these three claims. (See Ans. Mem. at 320-21, 425-27.) 

In the Response to Petitioner’s Group Two Merits Brief, Respondent offers a specific 

Teague argument with respect to all three claims which had not been previously presented. 

With respect to Claim 19, Respondent now argues that there is a lack of any United 

States Supreme Court precedent with respect to a claim of cumulative error. (Resp. at 50-

51.) Respondent acknowledges that the Ninth Circuit has recognized this type of claim, 

for instance in Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2007), but argues that this does not 

suffice as clearly established federal law. (Id. at 51) (“[T]here is no clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent for the cumulative error claim asserted by Jurado.”) Respondent 

asserts that: “Likewise, Jurado’s assertion of a due process right through cumulative error 

would constitute a new rule of criminal procedure barred under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 

288, 310 (1989).” (Id.) With respect to Claims 47 and 48, Respondent, employing identical 

language in each section, refers the Court to the argument presented in connection with 

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Claim 19. (See id. at 59, 61) (“As previously discussed in Argument IX [which addresses 

Claim 19], Jurado is not entitled to relief because there is no clearly established United 

States Supreme Court law as to cumulative error. [¶] In any event, even if cumulative 

error were cognizable in federal habeas proceedings, Jurado would not be entitled to 

relief.”) 

The Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected arguments that a claim of cumulative error 

is not clearly established or that it is Teague-barred. See Parle, 505 F.3d at 928, n.8 (“The 

State’s argument that Parle’s cumulative error claim is not cognizable on habeas review 

because it asks the court to recognize a new constitutional rule, see Teague v. Lane, 489 

U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), lacks merit. As noted above, Chambers 

[v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)] and its progeny clearly established the cumulative 

error doctrine decades ago.”) In view of clear Ninth Circuit authority specifically refuting 

Respondent’s contention, the Court is compelled to conclude that Petitioner’s claims of 

cumulative error are not barred from habeas review under Teague. 

3. Remainder of Claims in SAP

 With respect to the remaining claims in the SAP, Respondent generally asserts that: 

“To the extent any of Petitioner’s claims rely upon a new rule of constitutional law, 

including so-called ‘actual innocence,’ the non-retroactivity doctrine forecloses federal 

habeas corpus relief because, at the time his conviction and sentence were final, existing 

precedent did not ‘compel’ the result he now seeks.” (Ans. Mem. at 64.) The Ninth Circuit 

has previously declined to conduct a Teague analysis when the state mentions it “only in 

passing.” Arredondo v. Ortiz, 365 F.3d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Normally we decline to 

address an issue that is simply mentioned but not argued . . . and we see no reason to depart 

from that practice in a habeas appeal.”) (internal citation omitted). Respondent does not 

offer a specific Teague argument with respect to the remaining claims sufficient to raise 

the issue. See id. at 782 (“No true Teague argument having been made by the state in this 

case, we decline to conduct a Teague analysis on our own.”), citing Caspari, 510 U.S. at 

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389. Thus, in accord with the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, the Court will not engage in 

a Teague analysis with respect to the remainder of the claims in the SAP. 

B. State Procedural Bars

 In the Answer, Respondent contends that Claims 1 (subparts J, K, and T through 

AA), 5-6, 14, 33-34, 43 and 45 are procedurally barred. (Ans. at 2.) Each of these claims 

were denied in the Group One Order. (See ECF No. 171.) Respondent notes that the 

California Supreme Court also denied a number of Petitioner’s claims on procedural 

grounds when they were raised again in the second state petition, after previously denying 

those same claims on the merits either on direct appeal or when raised in the prior habeas 

petition, namely Claims 2-4, 7-13, 15-19, 24, 28-32, 35-42, 44, and 46-48.2

 (See Ans. 

                                               

2

 The Court’s review of the procedural bars imposed by the state court has revealed 

several errors in Respondent’s recitation, the first two of which are of some consequence. 

Respondent claims the California Supreme Court imposed several procedural bars on 

Claims 38 and 44, specifically asserting that the state court denied both claims as untimely, 

successive and as previously raised and rejected on appeal. (See Ans. Mem. at 404 n. 91, 

416 n. 99.) Yet, an examination of the state record reveals that the California Supreme 

Court specifically declined to impose procedural bars on either of these two claims in 

adjudicating the second state petition. The California Supreme Court denied all claims in 

that petition as untimely, “except claims 20 to 23, 25 to 27, 38 and 44,” and did not list 

Claim 38 or 44 among those barred either as successive or because they had been 

previously raised. (See Lodgment No. 91) (emphasis added.) Accordingly, Respondent’s 

contention that Claims 38 and 44 were subject to procedural bars is without record support. 

As for the remaining errors, Respondent asserts that Claims 2-4, 24 and 42 were 

barred as successive, but an examination of the California Supreme Court’s decision does 

not support that contention. (Compare Ans. Mem. at 175, n. 36, 180, n. 39, 187 n. 42, 325 

n. 69, 413 n. 97 with Lodgment No. 91.) Respondent asserts that the state court barred 

Claim 28 as previously raised on appeal, but an examination of the state court adjudication 

reflects Claim 28 was also barred as untimely. (Compare Ans. Mem. at 329, n. 71 with 

Lodgment No. 91.) Respondent asserts that Claims 7-9 were barred as untimely and 

successive, while the state court adjudication reflects Claims 7-9 were also barred as 

repetitive of claims rejected on appeal. (Compare Ans. Mem. 193, n. 43, 201 n. 45, 205 n. 

46 with Lodgment No. 91.) Respondent asserts that Claim 48 was barred as untimely, 

successive and because it was previously raised on appeal, but a review of the state court 

adjudication reflects that Claim 48 was only barred as untimely by the California Supreme 

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Mem. at 175 n. 36, 180 n. 39, 187 n. 42, 193 n. 43, 201 n. 45, 205 n. 46, 227 n. 47, 243-44 

n. 50, 262-63 n. 53, 269 n. 56, 290 n. 60, 298 n. 63, 301 n. 65, 310 n. 66, 321 n. 68, 325 n. 

69, 329 n. 71, 330 n. 72, 338 n. 76, 342 n. 78, 351 n. 80, 379 n. 85, 385 n. 86, 395-96 n. 

90, 404 n. 91, 405-06 n. 92, 408 n. 94, 410 n. 96, 413 n. 97, 416 n. 99, 422 n. 101, 425 n. 

102, 426 n. 104.) 

 Respondent states that: “Once state remedies are exhausted, subsequent imposition 

of a procedural bar by the state court in a subsequent state court proceeding does not bar 

federal merits review of the claim. When a claim is presented and denied on the merits 

(whether on direct appeal or in a prior post-conviction review proceeding) the claim is not 

barred in federal court. See, Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, n.3, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 115 

L. Ed. 2d 706 (1991).” (Id. at 58 n. 14.) 

With respect to Claim 2, Respondent states that “subsequent imposition of 

procedural bars by the state court does not bar federal habeas merits review where, as here, 

the same claim was denied on the merits in previous state proceedings,” and that “the State 

does not rely on the procedural bars applied to this claim as to the instant Petition except 

to the extent that Jurado alleged any facts for the first time in his second state petition.”3

 

(Id. at 175, n. 36, citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, n.3.) Respondent repeats the 

substance of this assertion in the subsequent footnotes addressing the remainder of the 

claims noted above. (See id. at 180 n. 39, 187 n. 42, 193 n. 43, 201 n. 45, 205 n. 46, 227 

n. 47, 243-44 n. 50, 262-63 n. 53, 269 n. 56, 290 n. 60, 298 n. 63, 301 n. 63, 310 n. 66, 321 

n. 68, 325 n. 69, 329 n. 71, 330 n. 72, 338 n. 76, 342 n. 78, 351 n. 80, 379 n. 85, 395-96 n. 

                                               

Court. (Compare Ans. Mem. at 426, n. 104 with Lodgment No. 91.) These remaining 

errors are of minimal consequence to this Court’s review because, as discussed in this 

section, Respondent has indicated the State will decline to assert the imposition of 

procedural bars as to these claims. 

3 In response to the Court’s inquiry on this point at oral arguments, Respondent 

indicated that the State had not identified any new facts that were not previously presented.

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90, 404 n. 91, 405-06 n. 92, 408 n. 94, 410 n. 96, 413 n. 97, 416 n. 99, 422 n. 101, 425 n. 

102, 426 n. 104.) 

In light of Ylst and Respondent’s assurance that the State will generally decline to 

assert the imposition of a procedural bar on the claims listed above, the Court will not 

address the procedural bars noted above in this section. To the extent Respondent asserts 

that certain facts may have been alleged for the first time in the second habeas petition and 

a procedural bar may therefore apply, the Court will address any such argument along with 

the merits discussion of that claim. 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Standard of Merits Review under AEDPA

 The provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act [“AEDPA”] 

apply to federal habeas petitions filed after its effective date of April 24, 1996. See Lindh 

v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 207 (2003). 

Because Petitioner filed his federal petition in this Court after that date, AEDPA applies to 

this case. 

 Pursuant to AEDPA, a state prisoner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on a claim 

that the state court adjudicated on the merits, unless that ruling: “(1) resulted in a decision 

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “(2) resulted in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97-

98 (2011), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). 

 A decision is “contrary to” clearly established law if “the state court arrives at a 

conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the 

state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A decision 

involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if “the state court 

identifies the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle 

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to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.; Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 

2004). 

“Section 2254(d)(1)’s ‘clearly established’ phrase ‘refers to the holdings, as opposed 

to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions at the time of the relevant state-court 

decision.’” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003), quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 

412. The Supreme Court has stated that “circuit precedent does not constitute ‘clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,’ 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). It 

therefore cannot form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA.” Parker v. Matthews, 567 

U.S. 37, 48-49 (2012).4 However, “circuit court precedent may be persuasive in 

determining what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law 

unreasonably.” Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011), quoting Maxwell v. 

Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Rodgers, 569 U.S. at 64 (While a 

reviewing court may “look to circuit precedent to ascertain whether it has already held that 

the particular point in issue is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent, . . . it may 

not canvass circuit decisions to determine whether a particular rule of law is so widely 

accepted among Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to [the Supreme] Court, be 

accepted as correct.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

 Pursuant to section 2254(d)(2), “[t]he question under AEDPA is not whether a 

federal court believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether that 

determination was unreasonable– a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 

550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007), citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. “State-court factual findings, 

                                               

4 In the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer, 

Respondent contended that “it is ‘err[or]’ to even ‘consult[]’ lower court decisions.” (Ans. 

Mem. at 68, see also Group One Merits Resp. [ECF No. 145] at 17), quoting Parker, 567 

U.S. at 48. For the reasons noted in the Group One Order, the Court rejected this contention 

and noted that the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that circuit law continues to play a 

role in habeas corpus review. (See ECF No. 171 at 20 n. 2, citing Marshall v. Rodgers, 

569 U.S. 58, 64 (2013) (per curiam).)

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moreover, are presumed correct; the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption 

by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338-39 (2006), quoting 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

 “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas 

relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s 

decision.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101, quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 

(2004). “If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be. As amended 

by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation 

of claims already rejected in state proceedings. . . . It preserves authority to issue the writ 

in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s 

decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court’s precedents.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. 

 Of the claims adjudicated in this Order, the claims which were not denied with a 

reasoned state court opinion include Claims 2-4, 21-25, 27-28, 44, 46 and 48, which were 

denied on the merits by the California Supreme Court in a July 23, 2008, Order stating in 

relevant part: “The petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on August 11, 2005, is denied. 

All claims are denied on the merits, except for Claim XXVII, which is denied as premature, 

without prejudice to renewal after an execution date is set.” (Lodgment No. 79.) 

Meanwhile, Claims 21-23, 25-27 and 485

 were denied on the merits by the California 

                                               

5 While both Petitioner and Respondent note that Claim 48 was raised in the first 

state petition (see SAP at 678, Ans. Mem. at 426), the California Supreme Court 

characterized Claim 48 as one of the “only new claims” when it was raised in the second 

state petition. (See Lodgment No. 91.) It appears that both Petitioner and Respondent 

acknowledge that Claim 48 as raised in the second state petition incorporated all of the 

claims raised in the second state petition, including several newly raised claims. (See 

Lodgment No. 89 at 118; Lodgment No. 90 at 85.) In any event, the state supreme court’s 

characterization of Claim 48 as “new” does not impact the standard of review under 

AEDPA because the California Supreme Court clearly denied both iterations of Claim 48 

on the merits, and as discussed above in section III.B., Respondent is not asserting the 

untimeliness procedural bar the state court imposed on Claim 48 in its adjudication of the 

second state petition.

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Supreme Court in a January 16, 2013, Order which stated in relevant part: “The petition 

for writ of habeas corpus filed on March 18, 2010, is denied. [¶] Claims 1.J, 1.K, 1.T to 

1.AA, 5, 6, 26, 33, 34 and 48, which Petitioner concedes are the only new claims, and 

Claims 21 to 23, 25, and 27, which are not subject to procedural bars, are each denied on 

the merits for failure to state a prima facie case for relief.” (Lodgment No. 91.) 

 With respect to the claims which were denied on the merits without a statement of 

reasoning, the Court will conduct an independent review of the record with respect to each 

of these claims in order “to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application 

of Supreme Court Law.” Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002); see also 

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (in the absence of a reasoned decision 

by the state court, “[o]nly by [an independent review of the record] may we determine 

whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable.”) “Under § 2254(d), a 

habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported, or as here, could have 

supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded 

jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in 

a prior decision of this Court.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102; see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 

U.S. 170, 187 (2011) (“Section 2254(d) applies even where there has been a summary 

denial.”), citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 101-03. 

V. DISCUSSION 

A. Applicability of AEDPA and Request for Evidentiary Development 

As an initial matter, the Court rejects Petitioner’s contention that § 2254(d) does not 

apply. In the Group Two Merits Brief, Petitioner asserts that “the California Supreme 

Court was unreasonable in denying each of Jurado’s claims, and § 2254 does not bar relief.” 

(Pet. Br. at 16.) With respect to several claims contained in Group Two, Petitioner argues 

that “‘there was no reasonable basis’ for the state court to summarily deny the 

constitutional claims presented in the state habeas petitions, and thus § 2254(d) does not 

apply to bar merits review of those claims (i.e., Claims 2-4 and 48).” (Id. at 19.) Petitioner 

asserts that he established a prima facie case for each claim, warranting additional 

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evidentiary development, and contends that “[t]he state court decisions summarily denying 

the claims satisfies § 2254(d) because they (1) are contrary to federal law that requires state 

courts to hold a hearing to resolve federal claims; (2) imposed an unconstitutionally higher 

burden on Mr. Jurado than the elements of federal constitutional law governing each of his 

claims as established by Supreme Court precedent; and/or (3) constitute an ‘objectively 

unreasonable’ application of federal constitutional law because the state court failed to 

initiate adversarial proceedings to reliably resolve the claims.” (Id. at 27.) Petitioner also 

contends that he has satisfied section 2254(d)(2) because the California Supreme Court 

“necessarily” made factual determinations in denying Petitioner’s claims without an 

evidentiary hearing, which constituted an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Id. at 

27-28.) 

As the Court previously held with respect to Petitioner’s similar argument 

concerning the Group One Claims (see ECF No. 171 at 24-26), “the Ninth Circuit has 

explicitly rejected the contention that evidentiary development is a prerequisite to 

deference under section 2254(d).” (Id. at 24, citing Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 

965-66 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We decline to hold that AEDPA’s reference to ‘adjudicated on 

the merits’ authorizes us to review the form or the sufficiency of the proceedings conducted 

by the state court. Thus, we will not read into ‘adjudicated on the merits’ a requirement 

that the state have conducted an evidentiary hearing, or indeed, any particular kind of 

hearing.”).) 

Moreover, “[s]ection 2254(d) applies even where there has been a summary denial.” 

See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 187, citing Richter, 562 U.S. 101-03; see also Lambert, 393 

F.3d at 969 (“[W]e hold that a state has ‘adjudicated’ a petitioner’s constitutional claim ‘on 

the merits’ for purposes of § 2254(d) when it has decided the petitioner’s right to post 

conviction relief on the basis of the substance of the constitutional claim advanced, rather 

than denying the claim on the basis of a procedural or other rule precluding state court 

review of the merits.”) In this case, the claims newly raised in the second state habeas 

petition were denied on the merits “for failure to state a prima facie case for relief.” (See 

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Lodgment No. 91.) Meanwhile, the claims raised in the first state habeas petition were 

denied in relevant part as follows: “All claims are denied on the merits, except for Claim 

XXVII,6

 which is denied as premature, without prejudice to renewal after an execution date 

is set.” (Lodgment No. 79.) Because these claims were adjudicated on the merits, section 

2254(d) applies. See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 187-88, citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 101-03. 

The Court’s previous discussion with respect to the Group One Claims (see ECF No. 

171 at 24), remains relevant to Petitioner’s contention that the California Supreme Court 

likely made credibility determinations adverse to Petitioner in summarily denying his 

Group Two Claims7

 on state habeas review. (See Pet. Br. at 27-29.) Again, as discussed 

previously, both of Petitioner’s 2008 and 2013 state habeas denials were on the merits 

without an accompanying statement of reasoning, and there is no substantive evidence in 

the record to support Petitioner’s implication that the state court based its denials on 

credibility determinations. 

As with the prior set of claims, in the course of reviewing the claims at issue in the 

instant Order, the Court also examined whether the California Supreme Court’s summary 

rejection of the claims involved an objectively unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law or was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Petitioner also advances a general request for evidentiary development, but does not 

specifically articulate which claims warrant further development nor what type of evidence 

he intends to gather. Instead, Petitioner asserts that: “§ 2254(d) does not bar relief, and 

thus this Court should review the claims de novo and grant habeas relief. To the extent this 

                                               

6 Claim XXVII in the state petition is Claim 20 in the instant federal Petition, in 

which Petitioner alleges that California’s lethal injection protocol constitutes cruel and 

unusual punishment. (SAP at 470.) As discussed below, (see infra), the parties agree that 

this claim remains unripe for review.

7 As noted in the prior section, this contention appears to include Group Two Claims 

denied without a statement of reasoning in the first or second state habeas petitions, namely 

Claims 2-4, 21-28, 44, 46 and 48. (See Lodgment Nos. 79, 91.)

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Court believes that Mr. Jurado has not successfully demonstrated relief under de novo

review, he requests a meaningful opportunity for evidentiary development, including 

funding and discovery, and an evidentiary hearing, pursuant to the rules governing § 2254 

cases.” (Pet. Br. at 139; see also Reply at 76.) 

“If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas 

petitioner must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that 

state court.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 185. Section 2254(d)(2), meanwhile, explicitly directs 

that a habeas court’s review is of the “evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). “Although state prisoners may sometimes submit new evidence 

in federal court, AEDPA’s statutory scheme is designed to strongly discourage them from 

doing so.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 186. 

 “Section 2254(e)(2) imposes a limitation on the discretion of federal habeas courts 

to take new evidence in an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 185. Under that section: “If the 

applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the 

court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing” unless the petitioner’s claim meets several 

exceptions. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). The statute also directs that the claim must either rely 

on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 

Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable” or “a factual predicate that could not have 

been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence” and the prisoner must 

also show that “the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and 

convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have 

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” Id. The Supreme Court has stated 

that: “Section 2254(e)(2) continues to have force where § 2254(d)(1) does not bar habeas 

relief,” such as, “when deciding claims that were not adjudicated on the merits in state 

court.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 185-86. 

 “Because the deferential standards prescribed by § 2254 control whether to grant 

habeas relief, a federal court must take into account those standards in deciding whether an 

evidentiary hearing is appropriate.” Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 474. “It follows that if the 

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record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes relief, a district 

court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id.; see also Sully v. Ayers, 725 F.3d 

1057, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n evidentiary hearing is pointless once the district court 

has determined that § 2254(d) precludes habeas relief.”) As discussed below, because 

Petitioner’s claims do not warrant habeas relief under section 2254, an evidentiary hearing 

or other evidentiary development is unnecessary. See id. 

B. Claims Alleging Destruction of Evidence and Prosecutorial Misconduct

1. Claim 2

 Petitioner alleges a denial of due process “as material and exculpatory evidence has 

been destroyed by the San Diego Police Department,” namely, blood and urine samples 

that were taken upon Petitioner’s May 18, 1991 arrest, and which were later destroyed in 

1996 pursuant to police department policy at the time. (SAP at 280-82.) 

 Petitioner raised this claim as Claim VII in the first state habeas petition, and the 

California Supreme Court denied that claim on the merits without a statement of reasoning. 

(Lodgment No. 79.) While Petitioner also later raised this claim in the second state habeas 

petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see Lodgment No. 91), for the reasons 

discussed above in section III.B., the Court will address the claim on the merits. 

“[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 

violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 

83, 87 (1963). “[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had 

the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 

 “Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that 

duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the 

suspect’s defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, evidence must both 

possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be 

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of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other 

reasonably available means.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984) 

(footnote and internal citation omitted). In Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), 

the Supreme Court held that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of 

the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of 

due process of law.” Id. at 58. 

 Petitioner asserts, citing Trombetta and Brady, that “[t]he blood and urine samples 

would have played a significant role in Petitioner’s defense as they possessed an 

exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and were of such 

a nature that Petitioner is now unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonable 

available means.” (SAP at 282.) He contends that “[t]esting would have demonstrated 

Petitioner was under the influence of LSD at the time of the offense,” which would have 

undermined the prosecution’s theory of first-degree murder, the lying in wait special 

circumstance, and would have provided evidence in mitigation. (Id.) 

 However, the record clearly shows that the blood and urine evidence already had 

played a role in Petitioner’s trial proceedings, and in particular, his defense. As both parties 

acknowledge, the blood and urine samples taken on May 18, 19918

 were tested not once, 

but twice; both times were prior to Petitioner’s 1994 trial proceedings, albeit not in either 

instance for the presence of LSD. (See id. at 280; see also Ans. Mem. at 175-76.) The San 

Diego Police Department laboratory had Petitioner’s urine sample tested for a number of 

substances, including amphetamines, benzodiazepines, antidepressants, sedatives, 

barbiturates, opiates, PCP, cocaine and THC/cannabinoids, and the blood sample was 

tested for amphetamines, several opiates, PCP and cocaine. (Ex. 1 to SAP, ECF No. 95-1 

at 1-2.) The blood sample tested negative for every substance, while THC/cannabinoid 

was identified in the urine sample. (Id.) The defense, meanwhile, retained its own 

                                               

8 The murder of Teresa Holloway occurred on the evening of May 15, 1991, three 

days prior to Petitioner’s arrest. (See CT 129.)

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toxicologist and found that methamphetamine was present in Petitioner’s urine, but “it was 

lower than 500 ng/ml.” (Ex. 2 to SAP, ECF No. 95-1 at 3.) After conducting re-testing on 

Petitioner’s urine sample, the defense’s retained expert reported that “methamphetamine 

was detected at a concentration of 130 ng/ml,” which according to the expert was 

“consistent with Jurado using methamphetamine in the last three days.” (Id.) 

As discussed previously in the Group One Order (see ECF No. 171 at 56-57), both 

the prosecution and defense at trial presented expert testimony concerning the drugs in 

Petitioner’s samples. Criminalist Jennifer Wheeler, who testified for the prosecution, 

stated that the presence of 34 nanograms per milliliter of marijuana in Petitioner’s urine 

sample “doesn’t say much” due to the fact that “marijuana is kind of a difficult drug 

because the drug tends to get struck [sic] in the fat in the body and is released slowly,” and 

that the drug could show up in tests well after a person stopped using it. (RT 2545.) 

Wheeler noted that because the marijuana was found in Petitioner’s urine rather than his 

blood, the results only reflected “what was at one time in your bloodstream; whereas, your 

bloodstream, that is actually showing what’s going on in your system at that moment.” 

(RT 2547.) Forensic scientist and toxicologist Richard Whalley testified for the defense 

that after resubmitting the tests on Petitioner’s urine sample using a lower threshold than 

in prior testing, Petitioner’s sample showed a positive result of 130 nanograms, which 

indicated that “[t]he person has been exposed or used methampetamine” but at “a low 

level.” (RT 2616-17.) Whalley stated that unlike with alcohol, it was not possible to go 

backwards and determine Petitioner’s methamphetamine level in days prior, but that “[t]he 

person has used in the last several days, probably in the last two to four days, or the person 

has used a very small amount, you know, a couple of hours ago, which typically isn’t the 

situation.” (RT 2618.) Whalley explained that because Petitioner’s blood sample had 

tested negative for methamphetamine, the latter situation was unlikely. (RT 2621.) 

 Petitioner’s argument that the samples “would have” played a role in his defense and 

“possessed an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed” is 

unpersuasive on this record. The blood and urine evidence had already played a role in 

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Petitioner’s defense and had been evaluated and tested by both the prosecution and defense 

experts for its evidentiary, including any exculpatory, value. Moreover, the evidence was 

not destroyed until 1996, well after its use at Petitioner’s 1994 trial proceedings. 

Petitioner’s assertion that the blood and urine evidence would have not only shown the 

presence of LSD, but would have somehow shown him to be under the influence of LSD 

at the time of the crime, is entirely speculative. The assertion is particularly untenable in 

light of the trial testimony from the defense’s expert witness acknowledging that it was not 

possible, using the samples in question, to extrapolate the levels of methamphetamine in 

Petitioner’s system at the time of the crime or to pinpoint when that drug was taken. (See 

RT 2618.) As discussed in the Group One Order concerning Petitioner’s claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate and present evidence of 

Petitioner’s purported LSD use and intoxication at the time of the crime: 

[T]here is no evidence that, had counsel tested his blood and urine for 

LSD, it could have shown that he was actually intoxicated at the time of the 

murder. Based on academic sources, Petitioner claims that “LSD can be 

detected in urine up to four days after it is ingested.” (Merits Br. at 52 (citation 

omitted).) In this case, Petitioner’s blood and urine samples were taken three 

days after the crime. Similar tests were conducted to determine the presence 

of other drugs in Petitioner’s system, and even positive results showing the 

presence of marijuana and methamphetamine did not conclusively support a 

claim of intoxication on the day of the murder. Petitioner fails to explain how 

testing his samples for LSD would have compellingly shown he was under 

the influence at the time of the crime, when drug testing failed to do so for the 

other substances. 

(ECF No. 171 at 61.) Petitioner fails to offer any persuasive argument or factual support 

for the proposition that testing for LSD would have provided specific proof of that drug’s 

use on the day of the murder when testing for other drugs, such as marijuana or 

methamphetamine, could not. 

 Because the blood and urine evidence had already been subjected to multiple rounds 

of scientific testing and analysis, and because Petitioner offers only the speculative 

assertion that additional testing would have shown him to be under the influence of LSD 

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at the time of the murder (which the original rounds of testing could not show for other 

substances), it is clear that Petitioner fails to state a reason the police should have been 

aware of any remaining evidentiary value, much less exculpatory value, of this evidence. 

See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57 (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 

as interpreted by Brady, makes the good or bad faith of the State irrelevant when the State 

fails to disclose to the defendant material exculpatory evidence. But we think the Due 

Process Clause requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the State to 

preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have been 

subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.”) 

 “[U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure 

to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” 

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. Because this evidence had twice been subjected to testing for 

a myriad of chemical substances by both the prosecution and defense and both sets of 

results had been discussed at trial, Petitioner fails to convincingly show that the samples 

were anything more than “potentially useful” after the conclusion of the trial proceedings. 

As to whether the destruction was done in “bad faith,” a 2005 San Diego Police Department 

report indicates the samples were destroyed pursuant to a May 1996 forensic science 

departmental policy which stated that “[e]vidence samples (blood and urine) will be kept 

for three (3) years.” (Ex. 4, ECF No. 95-1 at 16-17.) The same report indicates that “this 

policy changed in 1997 and all blood and urine are retained related to homicide and sex 

crimes cases.” (Id. at 16.) 

 Petitioner argues that “[a] policy mandating destruction of biological evidence in 

murder and especially capital murder cases, as late as 1994 demonstrates bad faith in [sic] 

its face.” (SAP at 282-83.) Clearly established law does not support this position, as courts 

have rejected claims of constitutional violations in instances where police actions were 

done “in good faith and in accord with their normal practice.” See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 

488, quoting Killian v. United States, 386 U.S. 231, 242 (1961) (internal quotations 

omitted). Petitioner asserts that the samples were destroyed “based on an earlier purported 

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departmental policy” which was later changed to preserve samples in cases such as 

Petitioner’s (see SAP at 282), but there is no evidence that the policy in question was 

“purported” nor that the destruction in this case was anything but routine. Simply put, 

Petitioner fails to show any bad faith or a violation constitutional guarantees, as he offers 

no evidence supporting a conclusion that the blood and urine samples were destroyed in 

any “calculated effort to circumvent the disclosure requirements” under Brady. See 

Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488. Again, it is clear from the state record that the samples were 

made available to the defense for testing and evaluation prior to Petitioner’s trial 

proceedings (and the defense could have tested them for LSD at that time), the results were 

introduced into evidence at trial, the samples were retained for several years after they were 

taken, and that they were destroyed according to procedures in place at the time, well after 

the conclusion of the trial proceedings. 

 Because Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the police had reason to believe the 

evidence in this case had any apparent remaining exculpatory value at the time of 

destruction, and because the evidence was destroyed, pursuant to existing policy, years 

after it had been subject to testing by both the defense and prosecution and played a part at 

trial, the Court cannot conclude that the destruction was done in bad faith or amounted to 

a violation of Petitioner’s constitutional rights. The California Supreme Court’s rejection 

of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

law, nor has Petitioner shown that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-89; 

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-58. Habeas relief is not warranted on Claim 2. Petitioner has 

not demonstrated entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. See Sully, 725 F.3d at 1075 (“[A]n 

evidentiary hearing is pointless once the district court has determined that § 2254(d) 

precludes habeas relief.”) 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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2. Claim 3

 Petitioner asserts that “[t]he prosecution’s use of mutually exclusive and inconsistent 

theories violated Petitioner’s right to fundamental fairness under the Due Process clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment” and “resulted in a fundamentally unreliable determination of 

Petitioner’s guilt.” (SAP at 284.) Specifically, Petitioner contends that “[i]n order to 

convict and secure the death penalty for Petitioner, the state relied on a theory of facts that 

was factually irreconcilable with theories the state had earlier used to secure the conviction 

of Anna Humiston and the death penalty for Brian Johnsen. This misconduct lacked a good 

faith justification and entitles Petitioner to relief.” (Id. at 285.) 

 Petitioner raised this claim as Claim XIX in the first state habeas petition, and the 

California Supreme Court denied that claim on the merits without a statement of reasoning. 

(Lodgment No. 79.) While Petitioner also later raised this claim in the second state habeas 

petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see Lodgment No. 91), for the reasons 

discussed above in section III.B., the Court will address the claim on the merits. Also, as 

discussed above in section III.A.1., while it appears this claim is barred under Teague, the 

Court addresses this claim on the merits as an alternate ground for the disposition. 

 Relying on clearly established law prohibiting a prosecutor from knowingly 

presenting false evidence, the Ninth Circuit has reasoned that “[i]t follows that a 

prosecutor’s pursuit of fundamentally inconsistent theories in separate trials against 

separate defendants charged with the same murder can violate due process if the prosecutor 

knowingly uses false evidence or acts in bad faith.” Nguyen v. Lindsey, 232 F.3d 1236, 

1240 (9th Cir. 2000). While Petitioner cites circuit authority and California state decisional 

law in support of this claim, it appears, as noted above in the Court’s discussion of Teague,

Respondent is correct in his observation that the Supreme Court “has never hinted, much 

less held, that the Due Process Clause prevents a state from prosecuting defendants based 

on inconsistent theories.” Stumpf, 545 U.S. at 190 (Thomas, J., concurring). In the absence 

of any Supreme Court authority supporting Petitioner’s claim of constitutional error, the 

state supreme court’s rejection of this claim cannot be contrary to, or an unreasonable 

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application of, clearly established federal law. See Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 

126 (2008) (“Because our cases give no clear answer to the question presented, let alone 

one in [Petitioner’s] favor, ‘it cannot be said that the state court unreasonabl(y) appli(ed) 

clearly established law.’”), quoting Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (additional 

internal quotation omitted). 

 Even to the extent Petitioner could overcome AEDPA’s restriction to clearly 

established Supreme Court case law, he fails to demonstrate that his claim is meritorious. 

With respect to Brian Johnsen,9

 Petitioner contends that “[d]uring the penalty phase of the 

state’s case against Brian Johnsen, the prosecution presented and argued aggravating 

evidence that Johnsen was a liar who was directly involved in Terry Holloway’s murder in 

letters to Eric Holland and Assistant District Attorney Pettine,” while “[s]everal weeks 

later, at Petitioner’s trial, the prosecution entirely changed its position,” and “not only 

presented Johnsen as a credible witness, it advanced the theory that Johnsen was in no way 

involved in Holloway’s death.” (SAP at 287-88.) 

 Yet, as Respondent aptly and accurately points out, the two cases were not tried by 

the same prosecutor. (See Ans. Mem. at 186.) Johnsen was tried, convicted of capital 

murder, and sentenced to death in Stanislaus County for crimes committed in that 

jurisdiction. See Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 116 fn. 9; see also State v. Johnsen, California 

Supreme Court Case No. S040704, http://www.courts.ca.gov/supremecourt.htm. 

Petitioner, meanwhile, was tried, convicted, and sentenced in San Diego County. Petitioner 

fails to offer any authority supporting a proposition that two different prosecutorial 

agencies are required to advance the same theory in entirely separate prosecutions. As an 

                                               

9 Petitioner’s arguments in Claim 3 overlap in parts with Claim 4, in which Petitioner 

asserts the state committed misconduct by presenting the false testimony of Brian Johnsen 

at Petitioner’s trial. (Compare SAP at 284-90 with SAP at 290-98.) In the adjudication of 

Claim 3, the Court limits its analysis to the claim of error arising from the prosecution’s 

alleged use of inconsistent facts and theories at separate judicial proceedings, and addresses 

the state’s alleged use of false evidence in Claim 4, below.

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additional matter, Johnsen was not prosecuted for the Holloway murder. The Holloway 

murder was introduced into evidence at Johnsen’s Stanislaus County penalty phase 

proceedings; Johnsen was actually prosecuted for a separate murder and other crimes 

committed in Modesto, California in early 1992. (See SAP at 288; see also Ex. 5 to SAP, 

ECF No. 95-1 at 17-31.) The Court remains unpersuaded that Petitioner’s due process 

rights were in any way implicated when a prosecutor in a wholly unrelated capital trial 

advocated for a death sentence in that case by arguing that Johnsen actually had more 

knowledge of, or involvement in, Holloway’s murder.10 

 With respect to Mark Schmidt, Petitioner points out that at Humiston’s trial, the 

prosecutor urged the jury to reject Schmidt’s trial testimony and rely on his earlier 

statements to police, but later turned around and relied on Schmidt’s testimony at 

Petitioner’s trial, particularly his testimony about Petitioner’s request for a cord or cable 

on the evening of Holloway’s murder, an incident Schmidt did not tell the police about in 

his earlier statements. Specifically, Petitioner contends: “It was factually inconsistent to 

argue that (1) Schmidt was a liar and the only testimony of his that was credible is what he 

told to police investigators in the days immediately following Holloway’s death, and (2) 

one of the statements that Schmidt did not tell police investigators in the days immediately 

following Holloway’s death is not only credible, but the most crucial evidence that the 

prosecution has of the Petitioner’s premeditation.” (SAP at 287.) 

 Respondent maintains that “[t]he prosecutor did not argue irreconcilable and 

inconsistent theories, because the prosecutor did not argue, in Humiston’s and Jurado’s 

separate trials, that Humiston and Jurado both committed a criminal act that only one of 

                                               

10 In any event, as discussed in greater detail below with respect to Claim 4, the 

prosecutor in Petitioner’s case attempted to introduce Johnsen’s letters to Eric Holland, 

which appear to indicate Johnsen had more intimate knowledge of and involvement in the 

Holloway murder, but defense counsel prevented the admission of that evidence by 

successfully arguing that the letters should be excluded from Petitioner’s trial. (See CT 

907-09; RT 1883-84.) 

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them could have committed. The prosecutor’s consistent theory in both trials was that 

Jurado, Humiston and Shigemura all plotted and participated in the murder of Holloway.” 

(Ans. Mem. at 185.) The record supports Respondent’s position. At Humiston’s trial, the 

prosecutor argued that Schmidt was biased in favor of Humiston and minimized her 

involvement in the Holloway murder to help her defense. (See CT 659-61.) Indeed, at that 

trial, Schmidt testified that it was “Robert [Jurado] and Denise [Shigemura],” not 

Humiston, who urged the victim to leave with them that evening, and denied his earlier 

police statements that Humiston was angered when Petitioner and the victim were alone in 

a bedroom together. (Ex. 25 to SAP, ECF No. 95-2 at 273-77.) On later examination, 

Schmidt admitted he was friends with Humiston and did not like to see her in trouble. (Id. 

at 278.) While the prosecutor clearly challenged Schmidt’s testimony at Humiston’s trial 

as conflicting with his earlier statements about Humiston, Schmidt’s statements and 

testimony about Petitioner’s involvement do not present a similar conflict. Most pertinent 

to the ultimate disposition of this claim, the record shows that the prosecutor advanced the 

same theory at both trials, that Petitioner, Humiston and Shigemura were all involved in 

planning and carrying out the murder of Teresa Holloway. 

 In sum, Petitioner fails to show that the differing arguments made by two separate 

prosecutorial agencies in two unrelated cases about the extent of Brian Johnsen’s 

involvement in the Holloway murder, only one of which was actually a prosecution for that 

murder, amounted to a violation Petitioner’s constitutional rights. Neither does Petitioner 

demonstrate that the prosecutor’s decision to challenge Schmidt’s testimony at Humiston’s 

trial but rely upon it at Petitioner’s trial resulted in a constitutional violation, particularly 

given that the record reflects the theory advanced at both trials was that all three defendants 

were actively involved in Holloway’s murder. Petitioner has not demonstrated that the 

California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was either contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or that it was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. Even if he could make that showing, the claim 

still fails for the reasons discussed above. Thus, Petitioner does not merit habeas relief or 

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an evidentiary hearing on Claim 3. See Sully, 725 F.3d at 1075; see also Totten v. Merkle, 

137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[A]n evidentiary hearing is not required on issues 

that can be resolved by reference to the state record.”). 

3. Claim 4

 Petitioner asserts that the “state knowingly presented Brian Johnsen’s perjured 

testimony, which was material to Petitioner’s conviction. The prosecution presented a 

videotaped recording of Brian Johnsen’s conditional examination at Petitioner’s trial even 

though it knew or should have known that crucial portions of Johnsen’s testimony were 

perjured and false.” (SAP at 291.) Specifically, Petitioner argues that “[d]uring his 

conditional examination, Johnsen committed perjury and testified falsely with regards to 

his role in Holloway’s death, the content of his May 15, 1991 conversations during his 

phone call to Schmidt’s apartment, and the nature of his relationship with Holloway.” (Id.) 

 Petitioner also asserts that “[t]he State knowingly presented the perjured testimony 

of Mark Schmidt” and “relied on Schmidt’s testimony even though it knew or should have 

known this testimony to be perjured and false.” (Id. at 295.) Specifically, Petitioner asserts 

that despite the fact that the prosecutor challenged the veracity of Schmidt’s testimony at 

Humiston’s earlier trial, “at Petitioner’s trial it called Schmidt to testify to some of the 

exact same trumped up stories that the state had rejected at Humiston’s proceeding.” (Id. 

at 296.) 

 Petitioner raised this claim as Claim XX in the first state habeas petition, and the 

California Supreme Court denied that claim on the merits without a statement of reasoning. 

(Lodgment No. 79.) While Petitioner also later raised this claim in the second state habeas 

petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see Lodgment No. 91), for the reasons 

discussed above in section III.B., the Court will address the claim on the merits. 

 “[A] conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by 

representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Napue v. Illinois, 

360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959), citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) and Pyle v. 

Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). “The principle that a State may not knowingly use false 

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evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, . . . does not cease to 

apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness,” and 

“[t]he same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it 

to go uncorrected when it appears.” Napue, 360 U.S. at 269. “[T]he Court has consistently 

held that a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally 

unfair, and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony 

could have affected the judgment of the jury.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 

(1976) (internal footnotes and citations omitted). “A Napue claim requires the petitioner 

to show that ‘(1) the testimony (or evidence) was actually false, (2) the prosecution knew 

or should have known that the testimony was actually false, and (3) that the false testimony 

was material.’” Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 F.3d 884, 903 (9th Cir. 2013), quoting United 

States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 Petitioner’s primary contention is that Johnsen testified falsely about his knowledge 

of and involvement in Holloway’s murder. In his conditional examination testimony, 

which was introduced at Petitioner’s trial, Johnsen denied knowledge of any plans to kill 

Holloway, while in later letters to the prosecutor and another inmate written prior to 

Petitioner’s trial, Johnsen indicated that he had a discussion with Petitioner about killing 

Holloway which he failed to disclose at the conditional examination. (SAP at 291-92.) 

Petitioner asserts that “[t]he very existence of these letters showed that Johnsen was a liar, 

a co-conspirator, or both,” and that “[w]hether they were true or not, the letters 

demonstrated that Johnsen was a liar and that his testimony was fundamentally unreliable.” 

(Id. at 292.) However, whether Johnsen was a reliable witness is not the question- the 

claim raised here is that the prosecution knowingly presented false testimony at Petitioner’s 

trial. While Petitioner now asserts that the letters demonstrate Johnsen lied at the 

conditional examination (and thus at trial), the defense was successful in excluding those 

very same letters from the trial proceedings, in part by arguing that it was the letters, rather 

than the conditional exam testimony, that were inherently untrustworthy and unreliable. 

(See e.g. CT 907-09.) 

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 At the hearing on the defense motion to preclude introduction of the Johnsen letters 

and statements to Holland, defense counsel argued that the statements were not reliable, 

and pointed out with respect to Johnsen’s reason for mentioning his conversation with 

Petitioner about Holloway, “all we can really do is speculate, because without asking him 

about it and without subjecting him to cross-examination it’s very difficult to get at the 

truth of that statement.” (RT 1883.) Defense counsel speculated that Johnsen made the 

statements to Holland as “collateral” in order to get Holland to kill witnesses for him, and 

Johnsen’s motives rendered those statements “particularly dubious.” (RT 1883-84.) 

 At that same hearing, the prosecution acknowledged that with respect to the 

conditional examination testimony: “I think everyone had at least a suspicion Brian 

Johnsen knew more and was involved more than he was letting on. I believe that was based 

on the totality of the circumstances,” and surmised that “I think there was a feeling and 

from the totality of the evidence that this really is true, that he probably did participate in 

this conversation with the defendant.” (RT 1885.) The prosecutor argued that the evidence 

should be admitted, stating that “in this particular instance we’re simply offering the letter 

itself as being trustworthy. And again I think our main point is that these things are not 

inherently unreliable.” (RT 1887.) The trial court reasoned that there was “a real problem 

under [Cal. Ev. Code section] 1230 establishing the basic trustworthiness of the 

declaration.” (RT 1889.) The trial court characterized the statements as “basically one 

crook trying to out macho another crook. One crook trying to out con another crook,” 

which “doesn’t pass muster.” (Id.) The trial court granted the defense motion to preclude 

the prosecution from introducing the letters and statements into evidence. (RT 1890.) 

 Based on a review of the record, it is evident that while the prosecution 

acknowledged their own suspicions that Johnsen knew more than he testified to at the 

conditional examination, that does not amount to a deliberate presentation of evidence 

known to be false. As it stood, the prosecutor presented Johnsen’s conditional examination 

testimony, which was inconsistent with other statements that the prosecution 

unsuccessfully sought to introduce into evidence. The prosecution’s attempts to ameliorate 

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any possibility that Johnsen was not being truthful by impeaching their own witness were 

thwarted by the defense’s successful efforts to keep the letters out of evidence. The defense 

had evidence of Johnsen’s inconsistent statements, which they not only declined to use but 

vociferously and successfully argued against admitting into evidence. The present record 

reflects only that Johnsen’s trial testimony denying prior knowledge of plans to kill Terry 

Holloway was inconsistent with later statements, which does not establish that Johnsen’s 

testimony about this matter was actually false, that the prosecution knew the testimony to 

be false, or that the prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony. 

 With respect to the other two alleged instances of Johnsen’s false testimony, the 

record again fails to support Petitioner’s contention that the prosecution presented or failed 

to correct testimony they knew or should have known to be false. First, Petitioner points 

out that Johnsen testified that the May 15, 1991 phone call to Mark Schmidt’s apartment 

was only about 7-9 minutes long, which “supported Johnsen’s testimony that little was 

discussed” during the call. (SAP at 293, citing CT 1065-66.) Petitioner argues that the 

prosecutor possessed phone records that the call was actually 27 minutes long and therefore 

should have known Johnsen’s testimony was false in this respect, yet persisted in 

presenting his testimony and “misrepresented information that was material to the jury’s 

assessment of Johnsen’s credibility and the truthfulness of his entire testimony.” (Id. at 

293-94, citing Exs. 27, 28 to SAP.) 

 It is apparent from a review of the record that the prosecution made efforts to 

introduce the corrected information about the phone call through the testimony of Mark 

Schmidt, reference to the phone records themselves, and in arguments to the jury. During 

Schmidt’s trial testimony, the prosecutor referenced Schmidt’s phone bill, which had been 

introduced as an exhibit at trial and asked about the “27-minute phone call,” which Schmidt 

confirmed was a collect call from Brian Johnsen and that, after Schmidt answered the 

phone: “He [Johnsen] wanted to talk to Robert, and I handed the phone to Robert.” (RT 

2284.) In closing arguments, the prosecutor noted that the jurors would have the phone 

records in the room during their deliberations, again specifically referred to the 27 minute 

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phone call, and stated that the advantage of phone records over witness recollection is that 

the record “gives you precise information, not subject to human error in making time 

estimates” about what took place that evening. (RT 2824-25.) 

 The Court also remains unpersuaded that the prosecution presented false testimony 

because they knew or should have known Johnsen lied about the nature of his relationship 

with the victim. Petitioner contends that despite evidence of violent incidents that occurred 

between Holloway and Schmidt, “Johnsen testified that he was a concerned and loving 

boyfriend to Holloway,” and the prosecution therefore knew that Johnsen painted a false 

picture of the relationship but failed to correct such testimony. (Pet. Br. at 51; see also 

SAP at 294, citing CT 954, 980-81, 1022-24, 1119.) A review of the record, in particular 

the citations offered by Petitioner, does not support this contention. Johnsen testified that 

he and Holloway were boyfriend-girlfriend, that at one point he asked her to leave the 

apartment they shared when she came home on drugs, that he spoke to her on the phone 

the evening of the murder and wanted to continue that discussion despite the other 

individuals urging her to leave Schmidt’s apartment with them, and that after her murder, 

he told Mynatt about the earlier plot because “[h]aving Terry no longer in my life made me 

realize the value of life.” (CT 954, 980-81, 1022-24, 1119.) The Court remains 

unpersuaded that these incidents portray Johnsen as “concerned and loving.” In any event, 

Johnsen also testified that as a result of one argument between him and Holloway, she went 

to a bar and came home with Doug Mynatt, who thereafter sold drugs to both of them on 

occasion. (CT 975.) After examining the actual substance of his testimony, the Court is 

not persuaded that Johnsen testified falsely in this respect. For the reasons discussed above, 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the prosecution knowingly presented false testimony 

from Brian Johnsen.11

                                               

11 Because Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the prosecution knowingly presented 

false testimony from Johnsen, it is unnecessary to undertake a detailed examination of the 

materiality prong or prejudice. However, as discussed in the Group One Order (see ECF 

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 With respect to Mark Schmidt, Petitioner contends that despite contesting the 

veracity of Schmidt’s testimony at Humiston’s trial, the prosecutor relied on that very same 

testimony at Petitioner’s trial. In particular, Petitioner notes that at Humiston’s trial, 

Schmidt testified that Humiston did not tell Holloway to leave Schmidt’s apartment that 

evening, stated that Humiston was not upset when Holloway and Petitioner were alone in 

a bedroom in Schmidt’s apartment, denied overhearing a statement about not trusting Doug 

Mynatt, and testified that Petitioner asked for a cord and wrapped it around his neck prior 

to leaving the apartment with the victim; he repeated these same statements at Petitioner’s 

trial. (SAP at 295-96.) First, as discussed above with respect to Claim 3, the record clearly 

shows that the prosecutor challenged Schmidt’s testimony at Humiston’s trial by arguing 

that Schmidt was biased in favor of Humiston and minimized her involvement in the 

Holloway murder to help her defense. (See CT 659-61.) There is nothing in the record to 

reflect Schmidt had a similar inclination to help Petitioner. 

 A review of the trial record in Petitioner’s case demonstrates Schmidt’s testimony at 

Petitioner’s trial was, unlike his testimony at Humiston’s trial, largely consistent with his 

earlier police statements. For instance, at Petitioner’s trial, Schmidt admitted he told police 

that Humiston was upset the victim and Petitioner were alone in a bedroom together. (See 

RT 2337-38, 2347-49, 2349-52.) Schmidt also testified that he recalled telling a police 

detective about overhearing a statement about not trusting Doug Mynatt. (RT 2723-27.) 

                                               

No. 171 at 70-71) with respect to trial counsel’s decision to stipulate to Johnsen’s 

unavailability, which avoided the possibility Johnsen would be cross-examined on the 

letters, “the letters between Johnsen and Holland presented significant drawbacks for the 

defense.” (Id. at 70.) While the letters could have impeached Johnsen’s credibility, they 

also revealed details concerning Petitioner’s primary role in planning and carrying out 

Holloway’s murder, which defense counsel indicated would be “devastating on issues of 

premeditation and lying-in-wait.” (CT 911-12; see also RT 1889-90.) As such, even were 

Petitioner able to demonstrate that the prosecution knowingly presented false testimony, in 

light of the content of the letters, it is dubious at best that Petitioner would be able to show 

both materiality and prejudice. 

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Moreover, at both Humiston’s and Petitioner’s trials, Schmidt testified that prior to leaving 

his apartment that evening, Petitioner asked him for a cord, wrapped it around his neck and 

stated it “will do.” While Petitioner is correct that the statement about the cord was not in 

Schmidt’s original police statement, that fact alone does not demonstrate it was fabricated. 

Detective Swisikowski noted that Schmidt was “vague” and “evasive” in his initial 

interview with police; Swisikowski testified that Schmidt mentioned the Johnsen phone 

call, but did not mention either the statement about the cord nor Schmidt’s own lie to get 

Holloway to leave the apartment. (RT 2637-40, 2642-44.) Schmidt, meanwhile, testified 

at Petitioner’s trial that when he was initially interviewed by the police, he did not realize 

the full meaning of the statement about the cord. (RT 2347-49.) Petitioner fails to 

demonstrate that the prosecution knowingly presented false testimony in this matter, as he 

fails to show either that Schmidt testified falsely about Petitioner’s involvement in the 

murder, much less that the prosecutor knew Schmidt’s testimony was false but presented 

it anyway. At any rate, the inconsistencies Petitioner cites between Schmidt’s police 

statements and trial testimony were addressed at Petitioner’s trial proceedings during both 

Schmidt’s testimony and in closing arguments by both the defense and prosecution. (See 

e.g. RT 2890-92, 2921, 2927-28.) 

 Petitioner fails to show that the inconsistencies highlighted here demonstrate that 

either Johnsen’s or Schmidt’s trial testimony was actually false, or that the prosecutor knew 

the testimony to be false, yet presented it anyways. Again, several portions of testimony 

Petitioner points to as false were addressed during trial, either during the witnesses’ 

examination or during arguments to the jury, and the record clearly reflects the prosecutor’s 

efforts to present accurate testimony to the jury. In any event, because Petitioner fails to 

persuasively demonstrate that the prosecutor presented or failed to correct testimony they 

“knew or should have known” to be “actually false,” this claim is without merit. Gentry, 

705 F.3d at 903, quoting Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d at 889. The Court cannot conclude that the 

California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was either contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or that it was based on an 

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unreasonable determination of the facts. Neither habeas relief nor an evidentiary hearing 

is warranted on Claim 4. Sully, 725 F.3d at 1075; Totten, 137 F.3d at 1176. 

C. Claims Alleging Errors During Pretrial Proceedings or Jury Selection

1. Claim 7

 Petitioner argues that his guilty plea after the dismissal of the lying in wait special 

circumstance raised a double jeopardy bar to his subsequent prosecution for capital murder 

once the special circumstance was reinstated by the state appellate court. (SAP at 303.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court held that the California Court of 

Appeal’s decision denying this claim was the law of the case and rejected Petitioner’s 

contention that either exception to the law of the case doctrine was present, as follows: 

The District Attorney of San Diego County filed an amended 

information charging defendant with murder (§ 187) and conspiracy to 

commit murder (§§ 182, 187), and alleging a lying-in-wait special 

circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) making defendant eligible for the death 

penalty. Defendant filed a motion under section 995 to set aside the conspiracy 

count and the lying-in-wait special circumstance allegation on the ground that 

they were not adequately supported by the evidence presented at the 

preliminary hearing. The prosecution filed written opposition to the motion, 

and the trial court, after a hearing, denied the motion to dismiss as to the 

conspiracy count, but the court granted the motion as to the special 

circumstance allegation. 

Immediately after the court made its ruling dismissing the special 

circumstance allegation, defendant announced his intention to plead guilty to 

the remaining charges. The prosecutor stated that his office might seek 

appellate review of the ruling setting aside the special circumstance by 

petitioning the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, and that for this reason 

he would not sign the change of plea form if defendant pled guilty to the 

remaining charges. Defendant then withdrew his previous not-guilty pleas and 

pled guilty to the remaining charges. 

To challenge the ruling setting aside the special circumstance 

allegation, the prosecution petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of 

mandate. (See People v. Superior Court (Jurado) (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1217, 

6 Cal.Rptr.2d 242.) The Court of Appeal stayed defendant’s sentencing 

hearing, which had been scheduled for December 23, 1991. In his opposition 

to the writ petition, defendant argued that because he had already pled guilty 

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to the remaining charges, any further prosecution of the special circumstance 

allegation would violate the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state 

Constitutions (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15), and for this 

reason the special circumstance allegation could not be reinstated even if the 

trial court had erred in dismissing it. (See People v. Superior Court (Jurado), 

supra, at p. 1229, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 242.) 

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court had erred in dismissing the 

special circumstance allegation under section 995 (People v. Superior Court 

(Jurado), supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 1229, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 242) and also that 

there was no double jeopardy bar to reinstatement and prosecution of the 

special circumstance allegation (id. at pp. 1235-1236, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 242). In 

granting the petition for writ of mandate, the Court of Appeal directed the trial 

court to enter a new order denying defendant’s section 995 motion in its 

entirety, thereby reinstating the special circumstance allegation. (People v. 

Superior Court (Jurado), supra, at p. 1236, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 242.) This court 

denied defendant’s petition for review. (Ibid.) Defendant then withdrew his 

guilty pleas, pled not guilty to the charges, and denied the special 

circumstance allegation. 

Defendant here raises the same double jeopardy issue he raised 

unsuccessfully in opposing the prosecutor’s pretrial writ petition in the Court 

of Appeal. The Attorney General argues that defendant’s claim is barred by 

the law of the case doctrine. 

Under the doctrine of the law of the case, a principle or rule that a 

reviewing court states in an opinion and that is necessary to the reviewing 

court’s decision must be applied throughout all later proceedings in the same 

case, both in the trial court and on a later appeal. (People v. Turner (2004) 34 

Cal.4th 406, 417, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 182, 99 P.3d 505; People v. Barragan (2004) 

32 Cal.4th 236, 246, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 83 P.3d 480; People v. Stanley (1995) 

10 Cal.4th 764, 786, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) We apply the doctrine 

even in death penalty cases, and even when the previous decision was 

rendered by a Court of Appeal, but we do not apply it when an intervening 

decision has altered or clarified the controlling rules of law, or when the rule 

stated in the prior decision was a “‘manifest misapplication’ of the law 

resulting in ‘substantial injustice.’” (People v. Stanley, supra, at p. 787, 42 

Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481; accord, People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 

197, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496.) 

Defendant argues that both of the recognized exceptions to the doctrine 

of the law of the case-intervening change in the law and manifest 

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misapplication of existing legal principles resulting in substantial injusticeare present here. To evaluate his arguments, we begin by reviewing the Court 

of Appeal’s decision. 

The Court of Appeal framed the issue this way: “Jurado’s response to 

the People’s petition presents the question of whether the prejeopardy 

dismissal of the special circumstance allegation pursuant to Jurado’s motion 

under section 995 and his immediate guilty plea without the concurrence of 

the prosecutor and before the prosecutor could seek pretrial review of that 

dismissal would result in a ‘second prosecution’ for the same offense after 

‘acquittal’ or ‘conviction.’” (People v. Superior Court (Jurado), supra, 4 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1229-1230, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 242.) The court concluded, first, 

that dismissal of the special circumstance allegation under section 995 was a 

prejeopardy rather than a postjeopardy determination. (People v. Superior 

Court (Jurado), supra, at pp. 1230-1231, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 242.) The court 

concluded, second, that the lying-in-wait special circumstance was not “an 

added element which would create a greater offense out of the charged 

murder,” but instead was a “penalty enhancement.” (Id. at p. 1231, 6 

Cal.Rptr.2d 242.) Third, the court concluded, after distinguishing certain 

decisions that defendant cited, that this case “most closely resembles” Ohio v. 

Johnson (1984) 467 U.S. 493, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (Johnson). 

(People v. Superior Court (Jurado), supra, at p. 1233, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 242.) 

In Johnson, a defendant charged with four offenses arising from the 

same incident pled guilty to two of the offenses-involuntary manslaughter and 

grand theft-after which, on the defendant’s motion, the trial court dismissed 

the other two charges-murder and aggravated robbery-“on the ground that 

because of his guilty pleas, further prosecution on the more serious offenses 

was barred by the double jeopardy prohibitions of the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments.” (Johnson, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 494, 104 S.Ct. 2536.) The 

United States Supreme Court concluded, to the contrary, that “prosecuting 

[the defendant] on the two more serious charges would not constitute the type 

of ‘multiple prosecution’ prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause.” (Ibid.) 

The high court explained that the federal Constitution’s double

jeopardy clause protects against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense 

after acquittal or conviction and (2) multiple punishment for the same offense. 

(Johnson, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 498, 104 S.Ct. 2536.) The bar against a 

subsequent prosecution after acquittal or conviction “ensures that the State 

does not make repeated attempts to convict an individual, thereby exposing 

him to continued embarrassment, anxiety, and expense, while increasing the 

risk of an erroneous conviction or an impermissibly enhanced sentence,” 

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while the bar against multiple punishment for a single offense “is designed to 

ensure that the sentencing discretion of courts is confined to the limits 

established by the legislature.” (Id. at pp. 498-499, 104 S.Ct. 2536.) The court 

concluded that the issue of multiple punishment was not yet presented because 

the defendant had never been tried for, convicted of, or sentenced for the more 

serious offenses of murder and aggravated robbery. (Id. at pp. 499-500, 104 

S.Ct. 2536.) “While the Double Jeopardy Clause may protect a defendant 

against cumulative punishments for convictions on the same offense, the 

Clause does not prohibit the State from prosecuting respondent for such 

multiple offenses in a single prosecution.” (Id. at p. 500, 104 S.Ct. 2536.) 

The court also rejected the argument that further prosecution of the 

murder and aggravated robbery charges would violate the double jeopardy 

prohibition against successive prosecutions: “No interest of respondent 

protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated by continuing 

prosecution on the remaining charges brought in the indictment. Here 

respondent offered only to resolve part of the charges against him, while the 

State objected to disposing of any of the counts against respondent without a 

trial.... There simply has been none of the governmental overreaching that 

double jeopardy is supposed to prevent. On the other hand, ending prosecution 

now would deny the State its right to one full and fair opportunity to convict 

those who have violated its laws.” (Johnson, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 501-502, 

104 S.Ct. 2536.) 

Here, the Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s attempts to distinguish 

Johnson, supra, 467 U.S. 493, 104 S.Ct. 2536. Defendant argued that the 

prosecutor here did not sufficiently object to defendant’s guilty pleas. As the 

Court of Appeal pointed out, however, the prosecutor advised the trial court 

that his office might seek appellate review of the dismissal of the special 

circumstance allegation, and the trial court advised defendant of the 

possibility that the special circumstance would be reinstated. (People v. 

Superior Court (Jurado), supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1234-1235, 6 

Cal.Rptr.2d 242.) The Court of Appeal concluded: “Jurado was never in 

jeopardy for the special circumstance, nor was he ever convicted or acquitted 

of that charge. Since the special circumstance is not in a lesser- or greateroffense relationship to the murder, there is no reason to allow Jurado’s tactical 

maneuver to deny the People the right to a trial on the merits of that 

allegation.” (Id. at pp. 1235-1236, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 242.) 

Defendant argues, first, that the United States Supreme Court’s

decision in Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 

556, constitutes an intervening change in the law establishing that a special 

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circumstance making a defendant eligible for the death penalty is the 

functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense of capital murder. We 

need not decide whether defendant is correct that a special circumstance is, 

for double jeopardy purposes, the functional equivalent of an element of a 

greater offense. Even if that is true, and the Court of Appeal erred in stating 

otherwise, it does not assist defendant because it is not a basis for 

distinguishing Johnson, supra, 467 U.S. 493, 104 S.Ct. 2536. There, the high 

court accepted the Ohio Supreme Court’s determination that the defendant 

could not be convicted of both murder and involuntary manslaughter for the 

same killing, but it nonetheless concluded that a guilty plea to involuntary 

manslaughter did not bar prosecution for murder under the facts of that case. 

(Johnson, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 496-497 & fn. 6, 104 S.Ct. 2536.) So also 

here, for purposes of double jeopardy analysis under the facts shown, it makes 

no difference whether a special circumstance is or is not an element, or the 

functional equivalent of an element, of a greater offense. 

Defendant’s second argument is that Johnson, supra, 467 U.S. 493, 104 

S.Ct. 2536, is distinguishable, and that the Court of Appeal’s reliance on that 

decision was a manifest misapplication of the law, because unlike the 

defendant in Johnson, he pled guilty to all charges then pending against him 

and the prosecutor openly and actively participated in the taking of these 

pleas. We are unpersuaded that these slight differences are significant. The 

prosecution charged defendant with murder with a special circumstance 

allegation, it timely sought review of the trial court’s erroneous dismissal of 

the allegation, and it did not acquiesce in defendant’s guilty plea to the murder 

charge. The prosecutor’s participation in the taking of the guilty plea, 

primarily in the form of insisting that an adequate factual basis be 

demonstrated, was not an “effort to prosecute the charges seriatim” (Johnson, 

supra, 467 U.S. at p. 500, fn. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2536) and did not pose the risks that 

the successive prosecution aspect of the double jeopardy bar was intended to 

guard against-“repeated attempts to convict an individual, thereby exposing 

him to continued embarrassment, anxiety, and expense, while increasing the 

risk of an erroneous conviction or an impermissibly enhanced sentence” (id.

at pp. 498-499, 104 S.Ct. 2536). As in Johnson, there was “none of the 

governmental overreaching that double jeopardy is supposed to prevent,” and 

imposing a double jeopardy bar “would deny the State its right to one full and 

fair opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws.” (Id. at pp. 501-

502, 104 S.Ct. 2536.) 

Because defendant has not shown that the Court of Appeal’s decision 

rejecting his double jeopardy claim was a manifest misapplication of the law, 

that it resulted in substantial injustice, or that there has been an intervening 

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change in the controlling law, the Court of Appeal’s decision is the law of the 

case on that issue. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 93-97 (alteration in original). This claim was later re-raised in the 

second state habeas petition and denied on procedural grounds, but for the reasons 

discussed above in section III.B., the Court will address this claim on the merits. 

As an initial matter, Petitioner asserts that “[t]he California Court of Appeal’s 

opinion is the ‘last reasoned opinion’ in this matter for purposes of the AEDPA. (Pet. Br. 

at 54; Reply at 37, citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991).) In Ylst, the 

Supreme Court stated that: “Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a 

federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim 

rest upon the same ground.” 501 U.S. at 803 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court 

reasoned that: “The essence of unexplained orders is that they say nothing. We think that 

a presumption which gives them no effect- which simply ‘looks through’ them to the last 

reasoned decision- most nearly reflects the role they are ordinarily intended to play.” Id. 

at 804 (emphasis in original). Respondent appears to concur with Petitioner’s contention, 

and similarly relies on Ylst, stating that: “The ‘look through’ doctrine does not readily 

apply here because the California Supreme Court’s decision on this issue was not 

unexplained. However, the lower court’s decision is still the last reasoned judgment based 

on the California Supreme Court holding that the lower court’s decision was the law of the 

case.” (Resp. at 41 n. 14.) 

By the plain language of Ylst, the Supreme Court indicated that the “look through” 

doctrine applies when one court rejects a claim in an “unexplained order” that another court 

addressed in a reasoned decision. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-04. Here, the California 

Supreme Court clearly issued a reasoned and lengthy decision, as detailed above. Neither 

Petitioner nor Respondent12 provide a persuasive reason for this Court to eschew the state

                                               

12 In response to inquiry on this matter at oral arguments, Respondent indicated that 

that the Court could look to both decisions, noting that the two decisions were in agreement 

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supreme court’s decision in favor of reviewing only the California Court of Appeal’s 

decision, much less compelling authority supporting that course of action. It is also unclear 

how the Court could “look through” the California Supreme Court’s reasoned decision 

denying Petitioner’s claim on direct appeal. The Ylst Court indicated that such an approach 

was appropriate when facing an “unexplained” order, which is clearly not the situation 

presented here. 

Although not the sole focus of the Court’s review, it is evident that the California 

appellate court decision remains highly pertinent to this Court’s consideration of this 

matter, as the California Supreme Court not only explicitly referenced that decision to 

determine whether an exception to the law of the case doctrine applied, but also clearly 

incorporated the state appellate court’s reasoning in its own analysis of the claim. See e.g. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 96 (“Defendant argued that the prosecutor here did not sufficiently 

object to defendant’s guilty pleas. As the Court of Appeal pointed out, however, the 

prosecutor advised the trial court that his office might seek appellate review of the 

dismissal of the special circumstance allegation, and the trial court advised defendant of 

the possibility that the special circumstance would be reinstated.”) “Although ‘AEDPA 

generally requires federal courts to review one state decision,’ if the last reasoned decision 

adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a previous state court decision, we 

may consider both decisions to ‘fully ascertain the reasoning of the last decision.’” 

Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), quoting Barker v. 

Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Hedlund v. Ryan, 854 F.3d 557, 

565 (9th Cir. 2017) (same). Thus, the Court will consider the reasoning of both decisions 

in evaluating the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim under AEDPA. 

                                               

and the California Supreme Court decision relied on the reasoning of the appellate court. 

Petitioner disagreed and asserted that because the decision of the Court of Appeal was the 

last and only reasoned decision on the merits, the state appellate court decision was the 

appropriate focus of the Court’s review.

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The Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment states that “nor shall any 

person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. 

Const. Am. V. “It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. 

It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it 

protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 

395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 

(1989); see also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). 

 Petitioner contends that his claim of double jeopardy is meritorious and that the state 

court rejection of his claim involved both an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law as well as an unreasonable determination of the facts. (SAP at 303; Pet. Br. at 

54-55, 58; Reply at 40.) Petitioner argues that “the state appellate court was incorrect in 

ruling that the special circumstance was not an element of capital murder” and erred in its 

application of Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984), to his case. (Reply at 40; Pet. Br. at 

59-60, 65-66; SAP at 305.) Petitioner also asserts that the appellate court made 

unreasonable factual findings in: (1) holding the special circumstance was not a lesser 

included offense or added element of the charged murder, (2) finding Petitioner’s decision 

to plead guilty was an attempt to “cut off” the prosecutor’s ability to get the lying in wait 

special circumstance reinstated, and (3) failing to recognize the prosecutor’s “active” 

participation in the plea proceedings. (Pet. Br. at 66-70; Reply at 40.) 

Petitioner first asserts that the state appellate court erred in ruling that the special 

circumstance was not a lesser included offense or added element of first-degree murder, 

and that this holding was both an unreasonable application of law as well as an 

unreasonable factual determination. Upon review, the California Supreme Court explicitly 

found that the appellate court’s holding on this matter was not determinative of the 

outcome, stating: “We need not decide whether defendant is correct that a special 

circumstance is, for double jeopardy purposes, the functional equivalent of an element of 

a greater offense. Even if that is true, and the Court of Appeal erred in stating otherwise, it 

does not assist defendant because it is not a basis for distinguishing Johnson, supra, 467 

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U.S. 493, 104 S.Ct. 2536.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 96. The state court reasoned that “for 

purposes of double jeopardy analysis under the facts shown, it make[s] no difference 

whether a special circumstance is or is not an element, or the functional equivalent of an 

element, of a greater offense.” Id. at 97. Thus, because the California Supreme Court’s 

adjudication of this issue did not rest on the state appellate court’s finding concerning the 

special circumstance, Petitioner fails to show that the asserted error by the state appellate 

court implicates either section 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2). 

Because the California Supreme Court did not rest its decision on whether the special 

circumstance was an element of a greater offense, Petitioner’s reliance on Sattazahn v. 

Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003), is misplaced. Petitioner notes that the Sattazahn Court 

stated that “for purposes of the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee, the underlying 

offense of ‘murder’ is a distinct, lesser included offense of ‘murder plus one or more 

aggravating circumstances’,” and that the same understanding extended for purposes of a 

double jeopardy analysis. (Pet. Br. at 59-60, quoting Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 111.) 

Petitioner asserts that “Sattazahn demonstrates that the appellate court’s double jeopardy 

analysis is erroneous.” (Id. at 60.) Yet again, the California Supreme Court clearly 

resolved Petitioner’s double jeopardy claim on other grounds, finding that even if the 

appellate court erred in this respect, it was not a basis for distinguishing Johnson.13 Again, 

the Court is reviewing the reasonableness of the California Supreme Court’s decision that 

regardless of the appellate court’s finding on the special circumstance, Johnson was not 

                                               

13 Moreover, while Sattazahn was a majority decision in Parts I-II and IV-V, 

Petitioner’s citation above is to Part III, which was not joined by a majority. See Sattazahn, 

537 U.S. at 103. As the parties acknowledged at oral arguments, that portion of Sattazahn 

is not controlling. Thus, it is of limited utility in reviewing the state court resolution of this 

issue. See Smith v. Hedgpeth, 706 F.3d 1099, 1104-06 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Justice Scalia’s 

statements in Part III are part of a plurality opinion and are not a binding declaration of the 

Court.”); see also Andrade, 538 U.S. at 71 (“Section 2254(d)(1)’s ‘clearly established’ 

phrase ‘refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions 

at the time of the relevant state-court decision.’”), quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 

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distinguishable from Petitioner’s case and the appellate court’s application of Johnson was 

appropriate and constituted the law of the case. 

Petitioner contends that Johnson is distinguishable and asserts that the California 

Court of Appeal erred in its application of Johnson to his case, offering a variation on the 

same argument rejected both by that court as well as by the California Supreme Court. 

Petitioner argues that “unlike the defendant in Johnson, Petitioner pleaded guilty to all of 

the charges pending against him at the time of his plea,” and that “the prosecutor in Johnson

affirmatively objected to entry of the respondent’s guilty plea to the lesser charges,” but in 

Petitioner’s case, “while the prosecutor did not sign the change of plea form and said there 

was a ‘possibility’ his office would consider filing a writ petition challenging the court’s 

ruling striking the special circumstance allegation (PRT 290), the record clearly 

demonstrates the prosecutor’s open and active participation in the taking of Petitioner’s 

plea.” (SAP at 309-10) (footnote omitted.) The California Supreme Court addressed this 

matter, namely Petitioner’s argument that “unlike the defendant in Johnson, he pled guilty 

to all charges then pending against him and the prosecutor openly and actively participated 

in the taking of these pleas.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 97. The California Supreme Court 

recognized that the two situations differed but nonetheless held that: “We are unpersuaded 

that these slight differences are significant.” Id. The state court reasonably noted that the 

prosecution was “timely” in seeking review of the trial court’s dismissal of the special 

circumstance, “did not acquiesce” in Petitioner’s plea, and noted that the prosecutor’s 

participation in the plea proceedings, rather than attempting to prosecute the pending 

charges, was “primarily in the form of insisting that a factual basis be demonstrated.” Id. 

While Petitioner continues to insist that Johnson is distinguishable from his situation, 

he fails to persuasively explain how the California Supreme Court’s rejection of that 

argument was unreasonable. Because this claim is presented on federal habeas review, the 

question before the Court is not simply the applicability of Johnson, but is instead the 

reasonableness of the California Supreme Court’s determination that Johnson is not 

distinguishable and that the state appellate court’s decision was the law of the case. 

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The California Supreme Court found that the prosecutor’s actions at the plea 

proceedings “did not pose the risks that the successive prosecution aspect of the double 

jeopardy bar was intended to guard against-‘repeated attempts to convict an individual, 

thereby exposing him to continued embarrassment, anxiety, and expense, while increasing 

the risk of an erroneous conviction or an impermissibly enhanced sentence.’” Jurado, 38 

Cal. 4th at 97, quoting Johnson, 467 U.S. at 498-99. The state court also reasoned that: 

“As in Johnson, there was ‘none of the governmental overreaching that double jeopardy is 

supposed to prevent,’ and imposing a double jeopardy bar ‘would deny the State its right 

to one full and fair opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws.’” Id., citing 

Johnson, 467 U.S. at 501-02. 

 The Court similarly finds that the situation in Johnson bears favorable comparison 

to the instant case and does not implicate double jeopardy concerns- i.e., prosecution after 

acquittal, multiple prosecutions for the same offense, or multiple punishments.14 In both 

cases, the trial court dismissed the charges at issue prior to their prosecution, as opposed to 

disposition by acquittal or other verdict after prosecution. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 109 

(“[T]he touchstone for double-jeopardy protection in capital-sentencing proceedings is 

whether there has been an ‘acquittal.’”) Moreover, in both cases, the actions were 

prompted by the defense. In Johnson, the defendant offered to plead guilty to the lesser 

charges and moved to dismiss the greater charges, which the trial court granted. In 

                                               

14 At oral arguments, Petitioner argued that Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), 

supported their argument as in order to prove the special circumstance, the prosecutor 

would have to prove conduct for which Petitioner had already pled guilty. In Grady, the 

Supreme Court held that “the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if, to 

establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government 

will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been 

prosecuted.” Grady, 495 U.S. at 510, overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 

(1993). However, as Respondent accurately noted at oral arguments, the Supreme Court 

overruled the “same conduct” test established in Grady. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704. 

Accordingly, Grady does not assist Petitioner in this regard. 

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Petitioner’s case, the defense moved to dismiss the special circumstance, which when 

granted by the trial court was promptly followed by the defendant’s guilty plea to the 

remaining charges. As discussed in greater detail below, in neither case did the prosecutor 

assent to the guilty plea and in both situations, the prosecution sought review of the trial 

court’s decision. Nor was Petitioner subject to multiple punishments, as sentencing was 

stayed due to the prosecution’s appeal of the special circumstance dismissal and Petitioner 

later withdrew his guilty plea when it was reinstated. Instead, as in Johnson, “[t]he trial 

court’s dismissal of these more serious charges did more than simply prevent the 

imposition of cumulative punishments; it halted completely the proceedings that ultimately 

would have led to a verdict of guilt or innocence on these more serious charges.” Johnson, 

467 U.S. at 499-500. Petitioner has not demonstrated that the state supreme court erred in 

its application of Johnson, much less that the decision was an unreasonable application of 

clearly established law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 413 (“[A]n unreasonable application of 

federal law is different from an incorrect or erroneous application of federal law.”) 

In addition to arguing that the state appellate court erred in applying Johnson, 

Petitioner also asserts that the appellate court made unreasonable factual findings in (1) 

holding the special circumstance was not a lesser included offense or added element of the 

charged murder, (2) finding Petitioner’s decision to plead guilty was an attempt to “cut off” 

the prosecutor’s ability to get the lying in wait special circumstance reinstated, and (3) 

failing to recognize the prosecutor’s “active” participation in the plea proceedings. (Pet. 

Br. at 66-70; Reply at 40.) As noted above, given that the California Supreme Court’s 

rejection of this claim did not rest on the whether the special circumstance was or was not 

a lesser included offense or added element, the reasonableness of the appellate court’s 

factual finding on this matter is not pertinent to this Court’s analysis under AEDPA. With 

respect to the remaining assertions, Petitioner specifically argues that: “Jeopardy attached 

by virtue of Jurado’s plea to all remaining charges combined with the state’s action in (1) 

failing to unequivocally state an objection thereto and (2) actively participating in the plea 

to first-degree murder.” (Reply at 40.) 

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 Petitioner contends that rather than immediately appealing the trial court’s ruling, 

requesting a continuance, or voicing a clear objection to the plea, the prosecutor only 

“stated an intent to possibly seek review of the superior court’s ruling, and then actively 

participated in the plea hearing.” (Pet. Br. at 68.) Petitioner details the prosecutor’s 

participation in the plea proceedings, including that he asked to see change of plea form, 

offered input and concerns, requested a factual basis for the plea, and questioned Petitioner 

during the plea proceedings concerning the factual basis. (Id. at 68-70.) 

Petitioner fails to explain how, given the timing of events and Petitioner’s right to 

enter a plea regardless of the prosecutor’s agreement or lack thereof, the prosecutor’s 

decision to voice his disagreement, refuse to sign the plea form, and raise the possibility of 

appeal was somehow tantamount to acquiescence in those proceedings sufficient to raise a 

double jeopardy bar. A review of the trial record reflects that the court’s decision to dismiss 

the special circumstance was immediately followed by Petitioner stating an intention to 

plead guilty to first degree murder. (See PRT 287) (trial court’s decision granting motion 

to dismiss the special circumstance); (PRT 288) (defense states Petitioner’s intention to 

plead guilty to first degree murder). After this sequence of events, the prosecutor promptly 

indicated that “just for the record, I’ve advised counsel that the People would not be signing 

the change of plea form. I know he can plead to the face at any time, but consulting with 

Mr. Fisher [another member of the prosecution], there’s a possibility that the People may 

take a writ on the ruling by the Court, so I just wanted counsel to be aware that the plea 

could conceivably be set aside at a later time depending on how that procedure goes.” (PRT 

290.) Even Petitioner acknowledges that the prosecutor’s agreement was not needed for 

the plea, stating that: “As the appellate court noted, Petitioner was entitled to plead guilty 

to the ‘face’ of the remaining pleading, and there was no requirement that the prosecution 

consent to that plea.” (SAP at 310, n. 20, citing Jurado, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 1234.) 

/// 

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The record also reflects that while the prosecutor participated in the plea 

proceedings, he clearly did not concur in the plea and indicated several times a possible 

intent to appeal. The prosecutor remained present for the plea proceedings, but described 

himself as simply “interested” and again indicated he would not sign the plea form; the 

trial court similarly described him as an “interested party.” (PRT 296.) The record also 

reflects that the exchanges during the first portion of the proceeding took place almost 

entirely between Petitioner and the trial court, including Petitioner’s admission to the 

crimes, the consequences of the plea, his satisfaction with defense counsel’s advice, and 

his rights, including his right to a jury trial, to confront witnesses against him, to remain 

silent, to testify, present evidence and witnesses, and the maximum possible penalty. (PRT 

298-312.) It was only after the trial court and defense counsel were discussing completion 

of the change of plea form, and defense counsel submitted the preliminary hearing 

transcript to provide a factual basis for the plea, that the prosecutor stated: “We would ask 

the court to get a factual basis from Mr. Jurado. We would not be inclined to stipulate to 

a factual basis.” (PRT 312-13.) The trial court agreed that it would require Petitioner to 

state a factual basis, but then first inquired of the prosecution whether they agreed that 

Petitioner could withdraw his plea in the event they pursued a writ and the court of appeal 

reversed the dismissal of the special circumstance, and whether statements he made could 

or could not be used against him. (PRT 314-16.) In response to the trial court’s inquiry, 

the prosecution responded that “any statement he makes here cannot be used against him 

later if the plea is withdrawn.” (PRT 316.) The trial court then inquired as to the factual 

basis for the plea and Petitioner responded- the prosecutor interjected during this portion 

of the proceedings to ask Petitioner to “elaborate” on his conversations with co-defendant 

Shigemura, asked a few questions on that point, asked for comment on the overt acts 

alleged, and specifically inquired as to whether Petitioner’s statement that “it was me” who 

killed the victim was a sufficient factual basis for the conspiracy charge, to which Petitioner 

stated that he and Shigemura conspired, but that he killed the victim. (PRT 317-26.) The 

trial court then resumed his direct exchange with Petitioner, asking for his plea to each 

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charge, and accepting the plea. (PRT 327-33.) Finally, within a few weeks of the plea 

proceedings and prior to sentencing, the prosecution petitioned the state appellate court for 

review and that court stayed sentencing and ordered additional filings on the matter. (See 

PRT 337; CT 141-42.) 

On this record, it was not unreasonable for the state court to intimate that the timing 

of Petitioner’s guilty plea was an attempt to head off a potential appeal. See Jurado, 38 

Cal. 4th at 95. Almost immediately after the trial court’s dismissal of the lying in wait 

special circumstance, which was the sole special circumstance alleged, the defense stated 

that Petitioner wished to plead guilty to the remaining charges, and entered the plea even 

in the wake of the prosecutor’s indication that the ruling might be challenged. While it is 

quite possible that Petitioner’s actions were not aimed at curtailing a potential appeal, it 

was not unreasonable for the state court to surmise otherwise in light of the record. 

California law provides for an appeal by the prosecution under the circumstances presented 

here. See Cal. Penal Code § 1238 (stating in relevant part that: “(a) An appeal may be 

taken by the people from any of the following: (1) An order setting aside all or any portion 

of the indictment, information, or complaint. (2) An order sustaining a demurrer to all or 

any portion of the indictment, accusation, or information. . . .”) Also, as noted above and 

contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the California Supreme Court acknowledged Petitioner’s 

attempt to distinguish Johnson in part on the grounds that “the prosecutor openly and 

actively participated in the taking of these pleas.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 97. However, the 

state court found that “[t]he prosecutor’s participation in the taking of the guilty plea, 

primarily in the form of insisting that an adequate factual basis be demonstrated, was not 

an ‘effort to prosecute the charges seriatim’” and did not fall under the double jeopardy 

prohibition against successive prosecution. Id. In view of the record, this finding was not 

unreasonable. It is evident from this Court’s review of the trial proceedings that the vast 

majority of the exchanges during the plea colloquy took place between Petitioner and the 

trial court, the prosecutor’s participation was limited, either taking place in response to the 

trial court’s inquiry, or clearly directed at ensuring adherence to the law and procedure, 

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including noting that a factual basis was required for the plea and inquiring as to the factual 

basis on certain counts.15 The California Supreme Court reasonably concluded that these 

actions did not amount to an effort to prosecute the charges so as to violate double jeopardy, 

and that decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

 For the reasons discussed throughout this claim, the state court correctly and 

reasonably found that Petitioner’s situation was akin to, and governed by, the Supreme 

                                               

15 Petitioner has also attached as Exhibit A to his merits brief transcripts from codefendant Humiston’s trial proceedings. (See ECF No. 182-1.) He notes that during 

Humiston’s trial, the parties stipulated that Petitioner had pled guilty and contends that 

“[t]he state’s use of Mr. Jurado’s plea of guilty-during the pendency of the appellate court 

writ proceedings and by the same prosecutor-supports the double jeopardy claim because 

it shows that the state was using the plea of guilty to its own advantage. Indeed, in this 

instance, the state was using Mr. Jurado’s plea as a sword.” (Pet. Br. at 64) (emphasis in 

original.) Respondent, in turn, argues first that the exhibit cannot be considered unless it 

was in the state court record at the time the state court adjudicated this claim, and second 

that the record does not reflect why the parties entered into that stipulation and therefore 

does not support a contention that the prosecutor was using the stipulation to his advantage. 

(Resp. at 43.) 

 The Court need not decide whether or how the stipulation materially impacts 

Petitioner’s argument, as it is clear that in Pinholster, the Supreme Court held that “review 

under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated 

the claim on the merits.” Id., 563 U.S. at 181. Review under section 2254(d)(2) is 

explicitly limited to “the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(2). Because Petitioner fails to show that this exhibit was part of the state record 

at the time this claim was decided, this Court cannot consider Exhibit A in deciding whether 

the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. Petitioner acknowledges this limitation, as he indicates in the 

reply brief that “based solely on the evidence that was before the state court, that the state 

court’s adjudication of the claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts,” 

and that “[o]n de novo review of the claim, this Court can thus consider the prosecutor’s 

use of Jurado’s plea of guilty to first degree murder.” (Reply at 39.) 

For the reasons outlined in the discussion of this claim, because Petitioner fails to 

satisfy section 2254(d) on the record which was before the state court, the Court will not 

consider Exhibit A in adjudicating this claim. 

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Court’s decision in Johnson. Given the timing of the dismissal of the special circumstance, 

immediately followed by a guilty plea to the remaining counts over the prosecutor’s 

objection and with awareness of a potential appeal of that dismissal, the state court 

reasonably concluded that: “As in Johnson, there was ‘none of the governmental 

overreaching that double jeopardy is supposed to prevent,’ and imposing a double jeopardy 

bar ‘would deny the State its right to one full and fair opportunity to convict those who 

have violated its laws.’” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 97, citing Johnson, 467 U.S. at 501-02. 

This Court finds similarly, and concludes that as in Johnson, “[n]otwithstanding the trial 

court’s acceptance of [Petitioner’s] guilty pleas, [Petitioner] should not be entitled to use 

the Double Jeopardy Clause as a sword to prevent the State from completing its prosecution 

on the remaining charges.” Johnson, 467 U.S. at 502. The Court cannot conclude that the 

California Supreme Court’s adjudication was either contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law, or that it was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. Habeas relief is not available on Claim 7. 

At oral arguments, Petitioner specified that he requests both evidentiary 

development and an evidentiary hearing on Claim 7. Specifically, Petitioner indicated that 

he requests discovery of District Attorney files relating to this matter and depositions of 

the trial prosecutors concerning why the District Attorney did not file an immediate writ, 

move for continuance, object to the plea or request that the plea be conditioned on the 

outcome of any writ proceedings, as well as whether or how the prosecution used the plea 

in any other manner, such as in other proceedings. However, because Petitioner fails to 

satisfy section 2254(d) on the basis of the state record, an evidentiary hearing is not 

available on Claim 7. Sully, 725 F.3d at 1075; Totten, 137 F.3d at 1176. Nor does this 

claim merit discovery. See Kemp v. Ryan, 638 F.3d 1245, 1260 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“[B]ecause the district court was not authorized to hold an evidentiary hearing on Kemp’s 

deliberate elicitation claim, obtaining discovery on that claim would have been futile.”) 

/// 

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2. Claim 8

 Petitioner asserts that he “exercised his statutory rights to challenge the sufficiency 

of the evidence supporting the charged lying-in-wait special circumstance allegation, and 

to plead guilty after that special circumstance was dismissed, only to have the prosecution 

respond by seeking the death penalty when the special circumstance was reinstated.” (SAP 

at 315.) He argues that the prosecution’s decision was in response to his exercise of rights, 

and “[b]ecause the prosecution failed to offer sufficient justification to dispel this 

appearance of vindictiveness, Petitioner’s death sentence must be reversed.” (Id.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

On July 6, 1992, after the Court of Appeal’s decision reinstating the 

special circumstance allegation became final, the prosecutor announced that 

his office had decided to seek the death penalty against defendant. On August 

20, 1992, defendant filed a motion to bar the prosecutor from seeking the 

death penalty on the ground that the decision to do so was vindictive. On 

September 4, 1992, the prosecutor filed written opposition to the motion, and 

on September 11, 1992, defendant withdrew his guilty pleas and entered pleas 

of not guilty. Also on September 11, 1992, the trial court denied the motion 

alleging vindictive prosecution. Defendant now claims the trial court erred in 

so ruling. 

“Absent proof of invidious or vindictive prosecution, as a general 

matter a defendant who has been duly convicted of a capital crime under a 

constitutional death penalty statute may not be heard to complain on appeal 

of the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion in charging him with special 

circumstances and seeking the death penalty.” (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 

Cal.4th 415, 477, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) But the due process 

clauses of the federal and state Constitutions (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th 

Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15) forbid the prosecution from taking 

certain actions against a criminal defendant, such as increasing the charges, in 

retaliation for the defendant’s exercise of constitutional rights. (United States 

v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 372, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74; In re 

Bower (1985) 38 Cal.3d 865, 880, fn. 7, 215 Cal.Rptr. 267, 700 P.2d 1269.) 

It is not a constitutional violation, however, for a prosecutor to offer benefits, 

in the form of reduced charges, in exchange for a defendant’s guilty pleas, or 

to threaten to increase the charges if the defendant does not plead guilty. 

(Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978) 434 U.S. 357, 365, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 

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604; see People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 309, fn. 4, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 

836, 27 P.3d 726.) In the pretrial setting, there is no presumption of 

vindictiveness when the prosecution increases the charges or, as here, the 

potential penalty. (United States v. Goodwin, supra, at pp. 381-382, 102 S.Ct. 

2485; People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 515, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 

49 P.3d 1032.) Rather, the defendant must “prove objectively that the 

prosecutor’s charging decision was motivated by a desire to punish him for 

doing something the law plainly allowed him to do.” (United States v. 

Goodwin, supra, at p. 384, 102 S.Ct. 2485, fn. omitted; People v. Michaels, 

supra, at p. 515, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032.) 

The only evidence defendant submitted to the trial court to prove his 

claim of vindictive prosecution was a declaration by his trial attorney 

recounting certain events leading up to the prosecutor’s announcement of the 

decision to seek the death penalty. On August 16, 1991, when defendant was 

arraigned on an information charging him with the murder of Teresa 

Holloway and alleging the special circumstance of lying in wait, the 

prosecutor, Deputy District Attorney Mark Pettine, announced that his office 

was not seeking the death penalty. On October 11, 1991, an amended 

information was filed adding the charge of conspiracy to commit murder. On 

November 15 through 19, 1991, Brian Johnsen testified at a conditional 

examination, describing how he and defendant had discussed a plan to kill 

Doug Mynatt and how defendant later admitted killing Teresa Holloway 

because “it had to be done.” Two days later, on November 21, the trial court 

dismissed the special circumstance allegation and defendant pled guilty to the 

remaining charges. 

The prosecution then challenged the dismissal of the special 

circumstance allegation by petitioning the Court of Appeal for a writ of 

mandate. In late March or early April of 1992, after the Court of Appeal had 

granted the petition, but before its decision had become final, Deputy District 

Attorney Pettine told defendant’s trial attorney that if defendant withdrew his 

guilty pleas, Pettine would talk to the District Attorney about whether to seek 

the death penalty, but if defendant did not withdraw the guilty pleas it was 

likely that the death penalty would not be sought.FN3 A few weeks later, 

however, Pettine advised defense counsel that he intended to discuss the death 

penalty with the district attorney whether or not defendant withdrew his guilty 

pleas, but he implied that the death penalty might not be sought if defendant 

admitted the special circumstance allegation. On July 6, 1992, at a hearing in 

superior court to discuss the status of the case, after defense counsel 

announced that this court had denied defendant’s petition for review of the 

Court of Appeal’s decision reinstating the special circumstance allegation, 

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Deputy District Attorney Pettine stated that he had again met with the district 

attorney, who had decided to seek the death penalty against defendant, and 

that he had immediately advised defense counsel of that decision. 

FN3. On April 27, 1992, the trial court held a hearing to discuss 

the status of the case. Defense counsel announced that defendant 

intended to petition this court for review of the Court of Appeal’s 

decision reinstating the special circumstance allegation, and that 

regardless of the outcome of that effort defendant did not intend 

to withdraw his guilty pleas. Deputy District Attorney Pettine 

announced that he had discussed with the district attorney 

whether to seek the death penalty, and the district attorney said 

that no decision would be made until defendant decided whether 

he would withdraw his guilty pleas. Pettine said he would discuss 

the matter with the district attorney again in light of defendant’s 

decision not to withdraw his guilty plea, but he explained that

“all options are still open.” 

Like the trial court, we see in this sequence of events no evidence that 

the prosecution’s decision to seek the death penalty against defendant was 

motivated by a desire to punish defendant for making the motion to dismiss 

the special circumstance allegation under section 995, for pleading guilty and 

attempting to assert a double jeopardy bar, for opposing the prosecution’s writ 

petition in the Court of Appeal, or for petitioning this court to review the Court 

of Appeal’s decision. Although the discussions between Deputy District 

Attorney Pettine and defense counsel suggest that the decision to seek the 

death penalty may have been influenced to some extent by defendant’s 

decision to deny the special circumstance allegation, this was not an 

impermissible consideration. (Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra, 434 U.S. at p. 

365, 98 S.Ct. 663; People v. Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 309, fn. 4, 109 

Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726.) 

Defendant argues, in substance, that the prosecution’s decision to seek 

the death penalty against defendant must have been motivated by a desire to 

punish him for challenging the validity of the special circumstance allegation 

through his section 995 motion because nothing else of significance occurred 

between August 16, 1991, when the prosecutor said his office was not seeking 

the death penalty, and July 6, 1992, when the prosecutor said it was. We 

disagree. In September 1991, Brian Johnsen told prosecution investigators of 

defendant’s involvement in a plan to kill Doug Mynatt; in November 1991, 

the prosecutor conditionally examined Brian Johnsen and assessed the 

credibility of his testimony; and, in early 1992, at Anna Humiston’s trial for 

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the murder of Teresa Holloway, the prosecution had an opportunity to assess 

the strength of its case. These events could well have caused the prosecution 

to reassess its decision about the appropriate penalty in this case. 

Defendant argues that Brian Johnsen’s information could not have been 

significant because the prosecution did not decide to seek the death penalty 

until many months after receiving that information. We disagree. Because of 

its concerns for the safety of Brian Johnsen and Doug Mynatt, the prosecution 

decided to conditionally examine Johnsen immediately after disclosing the 

information obtained from him. Two days after that conditional examination 

ended, the trial court dismissed the special circumstance allegation. It was 

only months later that the special circumstance was reinstated, and the 

prosecution then immediately reassessed its decision and announced its 

intention to seek the death penalty. Thus, the actual window of time for the 

prosecution to act on Brian Johnsen’s information was not many months, as 

defendant asserts, but only a few days. No inference of improper motive arises 

from the prosecution’s failure to act during this brief period. Moreover, the 

decision to seek the death penalty ultimately did not rest on Johnsen’s 

information alone, but also on the prosecution’s opportunity to preview its 

case at the Humiston trial, including the testimony of Denise Shigemura. 

Because defendant did not present evidence of a vindictive motive for 

the prosecution’s decision to seek the death penalty, the trial court did not err 

in denying defendant’s motion to bar the prosecution from seeking that 

penalty. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 97-100. This claim was later re-raised in the second state habeas 

petition and denied on procedural grounds, but for the reasons discussed above in section 

III.B., the Court will address this claim on the merits. 

“In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the 

accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, 

and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his 

discretion.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). Yet, “[t]o punish a person 

because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the 

most basic sort, and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective 

is to penalize a person’s reliance on his legal rights is ‘patently unconstitutional.’” 

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Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (internal citation omitted), quoting Chaffin v. 

Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32-33 (1973). 

 A presumption of vindictiveness has been applied in certain situations, such as where 

a prosecutor sought greater punishment on retrial after a reversed conviction. See e.g. 

Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724-25; Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974). With respect to 

pretrial proceedings, the Supreme Court has declined to adopt this presumption. See 

Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 365-66; United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382 (1982) 

(“A prosecutor should remain free before trial to exercise the broad discretion entrusted to 

him to determine the extent of the societal interest in prosecution. An initial decision 

should not freeze future conduct. As we made clear in Bordenkircher, the initial charges 

filed by a prosecutor may not reflect the extent to which an individual is legitimately 

subject to prosecution.”) (footnotes omitted). Even so, “a defendant in an appropriate case 

might prove objectively that the prosecutor’s charging decision was motivated by a desire 

to punish him for doing something that the law plainly allowed him to do.” Id., 457 U.S. 

at 384. “‘To establish a prima facie case of prosecutorial vindictiveness, a defendant must 

show either direct evidence of actual vindictiveness or facts that warrant an appearance of 

such.’” United States v. Montoya, 45 F.3d 1286, 1299 (9th Cir. 1995), quoting United 

States v. Sinigaglio, 942 F.2d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 Petitioner contends that the prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty in his 

case was vindictive and came in response to his motion to dismiss the special circumstance 

and his decision to plead guilty once it was dismissed. (SAP at 315.) Petitioner asserts 

that prior to trial, the defense made a prima facie case of vindictiveness which the 

prosecutor failed to rebut but the trial court still rejected, and argues that because he 

established this showing, the California Supreme Court’s decision rejecting his claim was 

an unreasonable application of clearly established law under Bordenkircher and Goodwin. 

(Pet. Br. at 76-77.) Petitioner additionally argues that the California Supreme Court’s 

decision was also based on an unreasonable determination of facts, in that the state court 

found that the prosecutor had only a few days to make a penalty decision with respect to 

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Johnsen’s information, when the prosecutor in fact had that information for several months 

prior to the decision to seek the death penalty, as well as the state court’s finding that the 

prosecutor’s decision was based not only on Johnsen’s information but also on information 

presented at Humiston’s trial. (Id. at 77-78.) 

 With respect to this first argument, a review of the record does not support 

Petitioner’s contention that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of his vindictive 

prosecution motion was based on an unreasonable application of clearly established law. 

As Petitioner appears to concede, there is no “direct evidence of actual vindictiveness” in 

this case. See Montoya, 45 F.3d at 1299, quoting Sinigaglio, 942 F.2d at 584. Despite 

Petitioner’s assertion otherwise, the Court also remains unpersuaded that Petitioner has 

established “facts that warrant an appearance of such.” Id. The Court’s review of the 

record does not support a conclusion that the defense made a showing of vindictiveness 

which went unrefuted. 

 The showing of vindictiveness that Petitioner relies upon is primarily the chronology 

of events surrounding the challenge to the special circumstance, plea proceedings, and 

eventual reinstatement of the special circumstance, as detailed in the defense’s pretrial 

motion and accompanying declaration by defense counsel. (See CT 183-201.) However, 

this chronology, as the trial court reasonably found, does not sustain an appearance of 

prosecutorial vindictiveness. The record reflects that the prosecution decided to seek the 

death penalty against Petitioner after the reinstatement of the special circumstance in June 

1992. While Petitioner is correct that the prosecution had the statement of Brian Johnsen, 

one of the primary witnesses against Petitioner, in September 1991, the record also reflects 

that Johnsen was not conditionally examined until November 1991. (PRT 381-82.) Only 

a few days after that proceeding, the trial court granted a defense motion to dismiss the sole 

special circumstance, removing the death penalty as an option unless and until that special 

circumstance was reinstated. (Id.) In the period between dismissal and reinstatement, the 

record also reflects that co-defendant Humiston was tried and convicted. (PRT 382-84.) 

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The trial court heard argument on this exact series of events and rejected the 

defense’s argument, reasoning that: “I think there’s no showing of actual or apparent 

vindictiveness on the part of the prosecuting agency in this case.” (PRT 384.) The 

California Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s assessment of the issue, stating: 

“Like the trial court, we see in this sequence of events no evidence that the prosecution’s 

decision to seek the death penalty against defendant was motivated by a desire to punish 

defendant for making the motion to dismiss the special circumstance allegation under 

section 995, for pleading guilty and attempting to assert a double jeopardy bar, for opposing 

the prosecution’s writ petition in the Court of Appeal, or for petitioning this court to review 

the Court of Appeal’s decision.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 99. Clearly established law supports 

the reasonableness of this conclusion. See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 382 n. 15 (rejecting 

presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness where “the only evidence respondent is able 

to marshal in support of his allegation of vindictiveness is that the additional charge was 

brought at a point in time after his exercise of a protected legal right.”); see also United 

States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1982) (“When increased charges 

are filed in the routine course of prosecutorial review or as a result of continuing 

investigation, there is no realistic likelihood of prosecutorial abuse, and therefore no 

appearance of vindictive prosecution arises merely because the prosecutor’s action was 

taken after a defense right was exercised.”) (internal citation omitted.) 

In the written motion to dismiss for vindictive prosecution, the defense also argued 

that the prosecutor “strongly inferred” that the prosecution would not seek the death penalty 

if Petitioner admitted the special circumstance, but stated that if he proceeded to trial, the 

prosecutor would “discuss the penalty to be sought with [the District Attorney].” (CT 188.) 

However, during arguments on the motion, defense counsel conceded that during the 

prosecution’s appeal of the trial court’s ruling, he and the prosecutor “had some contact 

about what would happen in the event that the court of appeals overruled [the trial] court,” 

but that “there were no plea negotiations in terms of, well, if you abandon your appeal then 

we’ll agree to do something, not seek the death penalty or whatever.” (PRT 371.) In any 

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event, the California Supreme Court acknowledged and rejected this argument, reasoning 

in part that: “Although the discussions between Deputy District Attorney Pettine and 

defense counsel suggest that the decision to seek the death penalty may have been 

influenced to some extent by defendant’s decision to deny the special circumstance 

allegation, this was not an impermissible consideration.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 99. The 

state court reasoned that: “Because defendant did not present evidence of a vindictive 

motive for the prosecution’s decision to seek the death penalty, the trial court did not err in 

denying defendant’s motion to bar the prosecution from seeking that penalty.” Id. at 100. 

The California Supreme Court’s reasoning in this regard is consistent with clearly 

established authority. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (“[I]n the ‘give-and-take’ of 

plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused 

is free to accept or reject the prosecution’s offer.”); see also Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 382-83 

(“This Court in Bordenkircher made clear that the mere fact that a defendant refuses to 

plead guilty and forces the government to prove its case is insufficient to warrant a 

presumption that subsequent changes in the charging decision are unjustified.”) 

With respect to the second contention, Petitioner also fails to demonstrate that the 

California Supreme Court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. Petitioner contests the reasonableness of two factual findings, first, the California 

Supreme Court’s reasoning that the prosecution had a matter of days instead of months to 

make a penalty decision based on Johnsen’s information, and second, the state court’s 

determination that the prosecutor’s decision was in part based on the Humiston trial. (SAP 

at 324-28; Pet. Br. at 77-78.) However, as discussed below, both contested matters find 

support in the state court record. 

Petitioner asserts that that the state court holding that the prosecution had a few days 

to act on Brian Johnsen’s information resulted from an unreasonable factual determination, 

arguing that “the prosecution had two months (not merely a few days) to act on Johnsen’s 

information because the prosecution interviewed Johnsen on September 16, 1991, two 

months before his conditional examination, and during the interview Johnsen claimed that 

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Holloway was killed to prevent her from disclosing a purported plan to kill Mynatt. (CT 

1:41-45; PRT 7:369-373.)” (Pet. Br. at 78.) In holding the trial court did not err in rejecting 

the defense motion to bar the prosecutor from seeking the death penalty due to vindictive 

prosecution, the California Supreme Court stated that “the actual window of time for the 

prosecution to act on Brian Johnsen’s information was not many months, as defendant 

asserts, but only a few days. No inference of improper motive arises from the prosecution’s 

failure to act during this brief period.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 100. 

A review of the decision on direct appeal reflects that the California Supreme Court 

explicitly acknowledged the timeline of the events in this case, including when the 

prosecution’s interview with Johnsen and the later conditional examination took place, 

reciting that “[i]n September 1991, Brian Johnsen told prosecution investigators of 

defendant’s involvement in a plan to kill Doug Mynatt,” and that “in November 1991, the 

prosecutor conditionally examined Brian Johnsen and assessed the credibility of his 

testimony.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 99-100. The California Supreme Court did not disregard 

or overlook the fact that the prosecution obtained Johnsen’s information several months 

before the conditional examination, but clearly placed importance on the latter date in 

evaluating whether the prosecution’s decision to seek the death penalty was vindictive, 

emphasizing that the conditional examination provided the prosecution with an opportunity 

to evaluate Johnsen as a witness and could have played a role in determining which penalty 

to seek. See id. at 100 (“These events [the September 1991 interview with Johnsen, 

November 1991 conditional examination, and early 1992 Humiston trial] could well have 

caused the prosecution to reassess its decision about the appropriate penalty in this case.”) 

This Court’s own review of the record supports the reasonableness of the state 

court’s factual finding. In the motion hearing before the trial court, the defense argued that 

“the case against Mr. Jurado since September of ’91 really hasn’t changed at all. Mr. 

Johnsen was interviewed at that time. They knew about him,” and asserted that the 

conditional examination was not to evaluate him, but to preserve his testimony, arguing: 

“They knew about what he had to say long before he ultimately testified in this court. They 

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were in a position to make a determination before that.” (PRT 381.) The prosecution 

agreed that they knew of Johnsen’s information in September 1991, adding: “But 

determining whether or not his testimony would support a decision to seek the death 

penalty as opposed to going forward with a special circumstance only and life without 

possibility of parole, is an evaluation that I think takes time. And it is an evaluation that is 

an ongoing evaluation.” (PRT 379.) The prosecution also stated: “I think that if the day 

that Brian Johnsen had walked into our office and sat down with [the DA investigator] and 

myself and gave this information to us, if five minutes after that conversation I called 

[defense counsel] and said, now this is a death penalty case, he would have said, take your 

time and evaluate this information, let’s make sure this is a credible witness,” and noted 

that: “The office of the District Attorney of San Diego County has never moved quickly in 

making these kind of decisions. Historically we’ve evaluated the information that we 

receive.” (PRT 382.) The trial court indicated: “I think the office would be justifiably 

subject to criticism if you had made such a quick decision as you alluded to, yes.” (Id.) 

Petitioner also argues in the SAP that after receiving Johnsen’s information, “the 

prosecution waited seven months – and after Petitioner exercised his statutory rights to 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the special circumstance allegation, 

and to plead guilty in the face of the prosecutor’s refusal to sign the plea form – before 

deciding they would reconsider their decision not to seek the death penalty, and almost 10 

months before they actually announced that they were seeking to put Petitioner to death.” 

(SAP at 325) (record citations omitted.) Even were the Court to calculate the time elapsed 

between the initial information from Johnsen and the decision to seek the death penalty, 

Petitioner’s assertion that the prosecution “waited” for seven or ten months to make a 

decision on seeking the death penalty is without record support. The record reflects that 

while the prosecution had Johnsen’s information in September 1991, the sole special 

circumstance charged in this case was dismissed in November 1991. The California Court 

of Appeal reinstated the special circumstance on March 24, 1992 and denied further review 

in June 1992; meanwhile, at a status conference in April 1992 shortly after the 

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reinstatement of the special circumstance, the prosecutor indicated that the district 

attorney’s office might re-evaluate whether to seek the death penalty. See Jurado, 4 

Cal.App.4th at 1236; (see also CT 225-26.) Because the lying in wait special circumstance 

was the sole special circumstance charged, Petitioner fails to explain how the prosecution 

could have decided to seek the death penalty between mid-November 1991 and late March 

1992, when its dismissal was under challenge and no special circumstance was pending in 

Petitioner’s case. Under California law, a criminal defendant charged with murder in the 

first degree must also be charged with at least one special circumstance in order to be 

eligible for the death penalty. See Cal. Penal Code § 190.2. 

In any event, after reviewing the record in concert with the state court’s findings, it 

is evident that the state court both acknowledged the proper timeline of events as well as 

articulated a rational and supportable reason for relying upon the date of the conditional 

examination instead of the date of Johnsen’s interview in its analysis of the prosecutorial 

vindictiveness claim. As such, the Court remains unpersuaded that the California Supreme 

Court’s finding resulted from an unreasonable factual determination. 

Petitioner also challenges the reasonableness of the state court’s reference to Anna 

Humiston’s trial, which took place in early 1992, as a potential factor in the prosecution’s 

decision to seek the death penalty against Petitioner. In upholding the trial court’s decision 

to reject the defense claim of vindictive prosecution, the California Supreme Court 

reasoned in relevant part that “the decision to seek the death penalty ultimately did not rest 

on Johnsen’s information alone, but also on the prosecution’s opportunity to preview its 

case at the Humiston trial, including the testimony of Denise Shigemura.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 

4th at 100. Petitioner asserts that the state court determination was unreasonable, arguing 

that “the prosecution did not file an affidavit in opposition to the defense motion to dismiss 

for vindictive prosecution, and thus the prosecution did not present any admissible 

evidence that the decision to pursue the death penalty was based on the Humiston trial.” 

(Pet. Br. at 78.) 

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A review of the pre-trial proceedings reflects that the prosecution cited the Humiston 

trial in both the written opposition filed in response to the defense’s vindictive prosecution 

motion as well as offered it in argument at the motion hearing. (CT 237; PRT 382-83.) In 

opposing the defense motion to dismiss for vindictive prosecution, the prosecution noted 

that they originally sought a penalty of life without parole against Petitioner. (CT 235.) In 

addition to citing Johnsen’s testimony at the November 1991 conditional examination, 

which included evidence that the murder of Holloway took place in the course of a plan to 

kill another individual, and the proceedings to appeal the dismissal of the special 

circumstance, the prosecution noted that: “Also during the pendency of the appeal, 

codefendant Humiston’s trial occurred. Brian Johnson [sic] testified consistent with his 

prior testimony. Humiston was convicted of murder. This trial demonstrated to Mr. Pettine 

[the prosecutor] the strength of his case and how Brian Johnson’s [sic] testimony would be 

received by a jury.” (CT 237.) 

The prosecution again cited both the Humiston trial and Johnsen’s information in 

arguing this motion before the trial court, in relevant part as follows: “And in addition to 

the information, the thing that obviously concerns the office of the district attorney, that 

we didn’t know originally, is this plan to kill Doug Mynatt. That makes this case far more 

serious than it was originally thought to be. But in addition to that information we’ve also 

the benefit of hearing the testimony at trial. And information came out in the course of that 

trial relating to the testimony of Denise Shigemura that showed the brutality of this case. 

That was not information that was even available in September of 1991.” (PRT 382-83.) 

The prosecution stated: “Additionally, there was the testimony the Court may recall of a 

witness named Mark Schmidt, who provided the murder weapon to Mr. Jurado. None of 

that information was available at the time Mr. Johnsen first came forward in September 

1991. As you recall, the testimony at the trial was after the weapon was provided to Mr. 

Jurado, he holds the weapon up to his throat, indicating what he plans to do. To me that 

was one of the most chilling pieces of evidence in the Humiston trial. That is evidence that 

we will present against Mr. Jurado.” (PRT 383.) The prosecutor asserted that “the Schmidt 

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testimony, the Shigemura testimony and the whole evolution of the plot to kill Doug 

Mynatt has certainly projected this case in a different light.” (PRT 383-84.) 

This information was part of the state record, and as such, the California Supreme 

Court was entitled to consider it in rendering its decision on this claim. Petitioner fails to 

demonstrate that the lack of an affidavit is significant. This information was offered by a 

representative of the prosecution in proceedings before the trial court and is part of the state 

record. Petitioner provides no grounds for the Court to question, much less doubt, the 

veracity and reliability of the prosecution’s assertion in open court that the testimony 

presented at Humiston’s trial played a part in the prosecution’s decision to seek the death 

penalty in Petitioner’s case. Nor does Petitioner cite to any authority supporting his 

assertion that the lack of an affidavit from the prosecution on this matter somehow 

circumscribes the California Supreme Court’s ability to consider it on review or renders 

such consideration unreasonable, despite the fact that the prosecution presented an 

argument, both in writing and at the motion hearing before the trial court, that the Humiston 

trial played a role in their decision to seek the death penalty. Petitioner fails to show that 

California Supreme Court’s citation to the Humiston trial, given it was clearly part of the 

record before the state court, constituted an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

The record before this Court supports a conclusion that the prosecution’s decision to 

seek the death penalty was based on evidentiary concerns, including obtaining and testing 

the validity of a witness who would testify that Holloway was killed to prevent her from 

revealing the plot to kill Doug Mynatt, as well as other evidence presented at the trial of 

Petitioner’s co-defendant Anna Humiston, and not on any desire to punish Petitioner for 

challenging the application of the special circumstance to his case. 

/// 

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/// 

/// 

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Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this 

claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363-66; Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380-82, 384. Petitioner also 

fails to demonstrate that the state court decision was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief or an 

evidentiary hearing on Claim 8. Sully, 725 F.3d at 10175; Totten, 137 F.3d at 1176. 

3. Claim 9

 Petitioner contends that the trial court’s failure to conduct individual, sequestered 

voir dire with respect to the death penalty qualification process violated his federal 

constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, an impartial jury, effective assistance 

of counsel and a reliable penalty determination. (SAP at 329.)

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

In Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 

616 P.2d 1301, this court decided that in capital prosecutions the deathqualification portion of each prospective juror’s voir dire should be 

sequestered, meaning that it should be conducted out of the presence of other 

prospective jurors. This court did not hold that sequestered voir dire was 

constitutionally required; instead, we mandated this practice as a rule of 

procedure. (See People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 286-287, 25 

Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 628, 25 

Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635.) In 1990, however, the voters abrogated this 

aspect of Hovey by enacting Proposition 115, which added section 223 to the 

Code of Civil Procedure. That statute provides, in part, that “where 

practicable” the trial court must conduct voir dire “in the presence of the other 

jurors in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases.” (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 223.) 

The jury selection process in this case began with hardship screening, 

after which the remaining prospective jurors filled out a lengthy juror 

questionnaire. To comply with the statutory mandate that voir dire occur in 

the presence of other jurors “where practicable” (Code Civ. Proc., § 223), the 

trial court decided to conduct voir dire, including questioning about the death 

penalty, with small groups of 10 prospective jurors. Before the voir dire of the 

first small group, the defense requested individual voir dire of five prospective 

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jurors who, in the view of defense counsel, had “expressed very strong 

attitudes toward the death penalty” in their questionnaire responses. The trial 

court denied the request but stated that it would reconsider the matter based 

on the individual jurors’ answers during voir dire. Thereafter, however, the 

court agreed to separateFN4 or sequestered voir dire of prospective jurors 

whose questionnaire responses indicated strong opposition to the death 

penalty, and the court said that it would do the same if questionnaire responses 

indicated a bias in favor of the death penalty. The court followed this 

procedure during the remainder of the voir dire, providing sequestered deathqualification voir dire for any juror who had expressed particularly strong 

views about the death penalty, either for or against, in filling out the 

questionnaire, and inviting counsel to assist in identifying the prospective 

jurors for whom sequestered voir dire would be appropriate. After nearly 100 

prospective jurors had been questioned on voir dire in this manner, and 

challenges for cause had been made and ruled upon, the jury selection process 

was completed by the exercise of peremptory challenges. The defense 

expressed satisfaction with the jurors selected, and they were sworn to try the 

case. 

FN4. In some instances, jurors who expressed strong death 

penalty views on the questionnaire responses were questioned 

with others who had expressed similar views but out of the 

presence of jurors who had not expressed such views. 

Defendant contends that the trial court’s failure to conduct sequestered 

death-qualification voir dire-that is, to question each prospective juror on 

subjects relating to the death penalty out of the presence of other prospective 

jurors-violated his rights under the federal Constitution to due process, equal 

protection, jury trial, effective assistance of counsel, and a reliable penalty 

verdict, and his right under California law to individual juror voir dire when 

group voir dire is not practical. 

Insofar as defendant contends that the federal Constitution requires 

sequestered death-qualification voir dire of every prospective juror in a capital 

case, the claim has been frequently rejected by this court and is without merit. 

(People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 536-537, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 

182; People v. Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 286-287, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 

106 P.3d 990; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1180, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 

5 P.3d 130.) 

Insofar as defendant contends that the trial court violated his rights 

under the federal Constitution and under California law by failing to exercise 

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its discretion to consider whether group voir dire was “practicable,” the record 

in this case does not support his claim. Rather, the trial court clearly 

understood it had discretion to order individual voir dire, and it did so for 

those jurors whose questionnaire responses suggested strong and possibly 

disqualifying views regarding imposition of the death penalty. The trial court 

did not abuse its discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 223, nor 

did it violate defendant’s constitutional rights. (People v. Box, supra, 23 

Cal.4th at pp. 1180-1181, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 100-02. This claim was later re-raised in the second state habeas 

petition and denied on procedural grounds, but for the reasons discussed above in section 

III.B., the Court will address this claim on the merits. 

 Petitioner first challenges the constitutionality of California’s voir dire procedures, 

arguing that “[g]iven the substantial risks created by exposure to the death qualification 

process, any restriction on individual and sequestered voir dire on death-qualifying issues 

- including that imposed by Code of Civil Procedure section 223, which allows death 

qualification in the presence of other prospective jurors and abrogates the California 

Supreme Court’s mandate that such voir dire be done individually and in sequestration . . . 

- cannot withstand constitutional principles of jury impartiality.” (SAP at 330-31.) 

 Petitioner fails to cite clearly established federal law holding that individual, 

sequestered voir dire is constitutionally required in a capital trial proceeding. The Supreme 

Court has generally stated that “[v]oir dire ‘is conducted under the supervision of the court, 

and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion.’” Morgan v. Illinois, 504 

U.S. 719, 729 (1992), quoting Ristaine v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594 (1976); see also Mu’Min 

v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 427 (1991) (“[O]ur own cases have stressed the wide discretion 

granted to the trial court in conducting voir dire in the area of pretrial publicity and in other 

areas of inquiry that might tend to show juror bias.”) “The Constitution, after all, does not 

dictate a catechism for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury.” 

Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729. 

The California code provision at issue holds that “[v]oir dire of any prospective 

jurors shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors in all criminal 

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cases, including death penalty cases.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 223. As the California 

Supreme Court noted in its rejection of this claim on direct appeal, state courts have 

repeatedly rejected challenges to the constitutionality of this provision. See Jurado, 38 Cal. 

4th at 101. Given the lack of clearly established federal law supporting his contention, the 

Court cannot conclude that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was 

unreasonable. 

 Petitioner’s related contentions, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

requests for individual sequestered voir dire and that the trial court’s application of law 

concerning voir dire requires reversal of his sentence, fail to find support in either the state 

record or in clearly established federal law. The Supreme Court has held that “part of a 

defendant’s right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors.” 

Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729. Petitioner has not shown that the voir dire in his case was 

somehow inadequate, as a review of the record reflects the trial court’s considered 

approach in conducting voir dire was aimed at identifying individuals who held such strong 

views that rendered them unqualified to serve. Each prospective juror completed a lengthy 

written questionnaire which included numerous questions about their background, their 

views of and experience with the criminal justice system, and their views on capital 

punishment in particular. (See e.g. CT 5495-29.) The trial court conducted in-court 

questioning in small groups of ten individuals. (See e.g. RT 1005.) The groups of 

prospective jurors were apprised that they could ask to address certain topics or matters in 

private when needed. (See e.g. RT 1011, 1193, 1296-97.)

Neither does the record support a conclusion that the court’s comments about the 

negative impact individual voir dire would have on the schedule reflect an improper 

exercise of discretion. While the record reflects the trial court noted individual voir dire 

would consume more time, this comment was in the context of what the law required. The 

trial court reasoned that state law no longer required individual questioning of all 

prospective jurors and that to separately question “anybody who seems to express a fairly 

strong support of the death penalty” would result in “going to be basically back to 

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individual Hovey voir dire, which is not required under the present law.” (RT 1000.) The 

trial court elected to conduct voir dire with small groups of prospective jurors, as “sort of 

a compromise I guess” but stated that “I intend to be and I will try to be sensitive to the 

questioning of each prospective juror, particularly on the - - on the death penalty issue.” 

(RT 1005.) The trial court also apprised counsel that if it appeared a juror was unwilling 

to open up, “I’ll try to be sensitive to that and shut that down and suggest that maybe we 

ought to talk to that person privately and individually.” (RT 1005-06.) The trial court 

further reassured the parties that: “I’m not ruling out entirely separate and individual voir 

dire, I just think for most people who are - - appear to be in the middle, and in the middle, 

by that I mean, not sufficiently out on one extreme or another, either always or never, but 

sort of in that broad middle range where they may . . . Most of these people I think are kind 

of in that midrange. And so I think I’ll just be sensitive.” (RT 1006.) The court also stated 

that: “[I]f I sense we’ve got somebody we’re not going to get anything out of them at all 

unless we talk to them separately, I’ll be sensitive to that.” (Id.) Additional comments by 

the trial court also undermine any argument that the rejection of individual voir dire was 

primarily motivated by the schedule, as the court informed counsel that: “I’m sensitive to 

the concerns you’ve raised, and - - and I say, if I think with respect to a particular individual 

juror that really is going to be necessary to talk to that person separately, why, we’ll do so. 

Take whatever time is necessary.” (RT 1007.) 

 Petitioner also contends that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his 

constitutional rights “by the unequal manner in which it conducted individual death 

qualification voir dire,” in that the trial court, on several occasions, conducted individual 

voir dire on jurors who had views against the death penalty, but did not individually voir 

dire those who were for the death penalty. (SAP at 336-37.) The record also belies this 

argument, as it reflects that defense counsel pointed out that the trial court had individually 

questioned several prospective jurors who expressed strong feelings against the death 

penalty, to which the trial court responded: “Well, I’d do the same thing if I thought 

somebody was way over on the other end, too. What I’m looking for is people I think are 

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on one extreme or the other.” (RT 1659-60.) When defense counsel requested that some 

individuals with views on the other end of the spectrum be questioned individually, the 

trial court replied: “Point that out to me, and I would question them in the same way.”16 

(RT 1660.) Defense counsel promptly identified prospective juror D.D., who had indicated 

views strongly favoring the death penalty and was scheduled for voir dire that same 

afternoon; the trial court conducted individual voir dire of D.D. on the death penalty matter. 

(RT 1660, 1668-1674.) Later during the voir dire process, another prospective juror who 

was already going to be individually questioned on a personal matter was at that same time 

asked about their strong feelings for the death penalty. (RT 1729-37.) 

 Nor is the Court persuaded that the small group voir dire caused prospective jurors’ 

views to be influenced by the responses of others in the group. Instead, a review of the 

voir dire transcripts reflect that a number of prospective jurors voiced agreement or 

disagreement with the responses or views of other prospective jurors, pointing to others’ 

responses in attempting to clarify and define their own positions. Indeed, Petitioner points 

to one example of such supposed influence, when the exchange in question was actually a 

question posed by defense counsel. (See SAP at 335, citing RT 1604-05.) There, in an 

attempt to define one prospective juror’s feelings concerning the death penalty, defense 

counsel noted that: “The - - the two jurors that I’ve questioned already this morning have 

indicated that they - - if I’m interpreting them correctly, would lean toward the death 

penalty, given a choice between the death penalty and life without possibility of parole. 

                                               

16 In response to the trial court’s remarks, Petitioner argues that: “That is, however, 

precisely what counsel did - to no avail,” and cites to a number of prospective jurors who 

expressed strong views in favor of the death penalty and were not questioned individually. 

(SAP at 337-39.) The trial court’s remarks took place on May 5, 1994. (RT 1660.) 

Petitioner points to several jurors who were questioned in the days prior to the trial court’s 

statement. (Compare RT 1660 with SAP at 336-39, citing RT 1045, 1077-80, 1114-15, 

1135, 1197, 1238, 1300-04.) Given the timing, these citations fail to support an argument 

that after the trial court’s suggestion that counsel point out jurors to individually question, 

defense counsel made such requests “to no avail.”

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How would you fit yourself in on the spectrum?” (RT 1604.) That prospective juror 

responded that it would depend on the circumstances, and noted that “perhaps maybe mass 

murder” would be a case where the death penalty should always be imposed, and answered 

“no” to whether the killing of children should always warrant the death penalty. (RT 1605.) 

Another juror in the group, when asked, agreed with that juror’s view concerning mass 

murder, while yet another said “I don’t know” about always imposing the death penalty for 

the killing of children, and another stated “murder of a police officer” as a case that would 

warrant the death penalty. (Id.) Thus, even when specifically asked about comparing their 

views to those of others, the record reflects that the prospective jurors’ responses were 

varied and reflected their individual views rather than simply repeating the responses of 

others in the group. Based on a review of the record, the Court is not persuaded that the 

small group voir dire was deficient in the manner alleged. 

 In sum, given the lack of Supreme Court authority supporting Petitioner’s contention 

that the lack of individual voir dire violates the Constitution, and based on a review of the 

voir dire proceedings which fails to support his argument that the trial court abused its 

discretion in the manner it conducted voir dire in his case, Petitioner has not demonstrated 

that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was either contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or that it was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. Habeas relief is not warranted on Claim 9. 

4. Claim 10

 Petitioner asserts that the “prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude from 

the jury two African-Americans, both women, and eight of twelve women in general.” 

(SAP at 341-42.) Petitioner asserts that “the prosecutor’s excuses for excluding these 

prospective jurors found little or no support in the record” and contends that “the trial court 

failed in its duty to seriously evaluate the credibility of the prosecutor’s excuses and make 

a reasoned determination of whether purposeful discrimination existed.” (Id. at 342.) 

/// 

/// 

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 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

During jury selection, after the prosecution used its ninth peremptory 

challenge to excuse B.J., a Black woman, the defense made an objection under 

People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748. 

The trial court stated that it would hear argument on the objection at the next 

recess. The prosecution then used its eleventh peremptory challenge against 

N.M., another Black woman. After the prosecutor had exercised 12 

peremptory challenges and the defense had exercised 13 peremptory 

challenges, both sides expressed satisfaction with the jury as constituted, and 

the jurors were sworn to try the case. Alternate jurors were then selected and 

sworn. 

During the next recess, the defense presented argument on the Wheeler 

objection. Defense counsel stated that the objection was under Batson v. 

Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (Batson) as well 

as Wheeler and that “[t]he racial group we are talking about in this instance is 

African American, specifically African American women.” The court asked 

whether the challenge was “based on the race of the two jurors who were 

excused.” Defense counsel replied that it was based on “race and gender,” that 

the prosecutor had excused two of the three African-American women who 

were on the jury panel, and that defense counsel believed this was sufficient 

to raise an inference of impermissible discrimination. 

In response, the prosecutor argued that the defense was improperly 

“interrelating classes” and that the presence of seven women on the jury 

showed there had been no discrimination against women. The prosecutor also 

noted that of the four African-Americans on the initial panel, he had 

challenged two, the defense had challenged one, and one was seated on the 

jury. Defense counsel responded that, as to gender, the prosecution had used 

eight of 12 peremptory challenges against women. The trial court stated that 

“out of an abundance of caution” it was giving the prosecution “the 

opportunity to offer whatever nongender-based or nonracially based rationale 

you care to offer for the challenges.” 

The prosecutor said he challenged N.M. because she “indicated that she 

thought there was some problems with the district attorney’s office handling 

high-profile cases” and because she “indicated that she had a brother that had 

been arrested and prosecuted for drugs.” The prosecutor said he challenged 

B.J. because her “son was prosecuted by our office, and she was an alibi 

witness in that case” and because “she’s probably one of the most hostile 

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jurors that I’ve ever questioned.” The prosecutor added: “I think that she feels 

very, very upset with the prosecution of her son.” Defense counsel declined 

the trial court’s invitation to comment on these reasons, stating: “We would 

submit for the court’s ruling on it.” The trial court then ruled on this aspect of 

the challenge, stating: “I think the People-their explanation I think convinces 

me that the challenges to [B.J.] and [N.M.] were not racially motivated or 

based upon their race.” 

The trial court then “out of an abundance of caution” asked the

prosecutor to provide reasons for its peremptory challenges against the other 

six women. The prosecutor asked for time to review his notes and papers, and 

the court agreed to take up the matter later. The prosecutor noted that the 

defense had used most of its peremptory challenges against men, possibly as 

many as 11 out of 13 challenges. The court replied, in substance, that it did 

not think that was relevant in ruling on the defense challenge: “I’m not sure 

two wrongs make a right....” 

The next day, the prosecutor provided reasons for the remaining six 

peremptory challenges to women. The prosecutor said he challenged L.J. 

“because she indicated on five different places on the questionnaire that she 

was against the death penalty.” He challenged J.O. because she “indicated on 

her questionnaire that she felt she was a wishy-washy person,” that she “had 

difficult[y] making up her mind,” that “pressure from other jurors might start 

her to doubt herself,” and that “she thinks she is a bad judge of character.” He 

challenged N.J. because she stated on her questionnaire that “the burden of 

deciding a person’s life was really just too great a decision for her to make.” 

He challenged F.C. because she stated on her questionnaire that she would 

“find it difficult” to vote for death and the prosecutor thought she had “a clear 

leaning against the death penalty.” He challenged L.H. because “a fair reading 

of her questionnaire is that she hasn’t made up her mind” about the death 

penalty, and because “a fair reading of her statements in court was that she 

really is much opposed to the death penalty.” He challenged B.B. because she 

wrote on her questionnaire that “she had religious and philosophical views so 

that she would always vote against the death penalty” and because he thought 

she might have difficulty understanding spoken English. Finally, he 

challenged M.B. because she was 73 years old and appeared to be “basically 

overwhelmed” and because she had apologized for believing in the death 

penalty. 

After hearing defense counsel’s argument in response, the trial court 

overruled the defense objection, stating: “I’m satisfied that the district 

attorney has made an explanation for each of these challenges which 

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persuades me that they were not solely or sufficiently based on gender that 

they should be held to have violated [defendant’s] constitutional rights.” 

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in overruling the Batson/ 

Wheeler objection because the prosecutor’s reasons for the peremptory 

challenges “found little or no support in the record” and because the trial court 

“failed in its duty to seriously evaluate the credibility of the prosecutor’s 

excuses and make a reasoned determination of whether purposeful

discrimination existed.” Defendant contends that this error violated his rights 

under the federal Constitution to a fair trial, to due process of law, and to equal 

protection of the law, and his rights under the state Constitution to trial by a 

jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. 

The use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors because 

of their race or gender violates both the federal and the California 

Constitutions. (J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994) 511 U.S. 127, 129, 114 

S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89; Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 409, 111 

S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411; Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712; 

People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 969, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 

P.3d 874.) The United States Supreme Court has set out a three-step process 

to be followed when a party claims that an opponent has improperly 

discriminated in the exercise of peremptory challenges. First, the complaining 

party must make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination. Second, 

the party exercising the challenge must state nondiscriminatory reasons for 

the challenge. Third, the trial court must decide whether the complaining party 

has proved purposeful discrimination. (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 

162, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2416, 162 L.Ed.2d 129; Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 

765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834; People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 

345, 384, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) 

By asking the prosecutor to explain the peremptory challenges, the trial 

court here implicitly found that defendant had made a prima facie showing of 

impermissible discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. 

(People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 723, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 

332.) Once the trial court ruled on the credibility of the prosecutor’s stated 

reasons, the issue of whether the defense had made a prima showing became 

moot. (Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 

L.Ed.2d 395; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 135, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 

913 P.2d 980.) 

When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate 

each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great 

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deference to its ruling, reviewing it under the substantial evidence standard. 

(People v. McDermott, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 971, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 

P.3d 874; People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 725, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 

50 P.3d 332.) 

We consider each of the eight challenged jurors, taking them in the 

order in which the prosecutor provided reasons for the peremptory challenges. 

The prosecutor’s stated reasons for challenging N.M. were that she 

“indicated that she thought there was some problems with the district 

attorney’s office handling high-profile cases” and because she “indicated that 

she had a brother that had been arrested and prosecuted for drugs.” These 

reasons are neutral as to race and gender, they are not inherently implausible, 

and substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding on the credibility of 

this explanation. In response to a question on the juror questionnaire asking 

whether she had “any specific feeling for or against ... prosecutors (district 

attorneys),” she marked “yes” and explained: “There seems to be many 

problems with high-profile cases.” In response to another question, she 

indicated that a close relative or friend had been arrested, charged, and tried 

for a crime, and she explained: “Brother arrested for possession of drugs.” 

Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s reasons for challenging N.M. 

are not credible because other jurors whom the prosecutor did not challenge, 

and who were ultimately seated on the jury, also had relatives who had been 

arrested for drug-related offenses. Even if we assume we must conduct a 

comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal (see Miller-El v. Dretke 

(2005) 545 U.S. 231, fn. 2, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2326, fn. 2, 162 L.Ed.2d 196; 

People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 270, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 

451; People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 188-189, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 

118 P.3d 496), defendant does not identify any seated juror who gave 

responses similar to N.M.’s on both of the topics mentioned by the prosecutor. 

Although some of the seated jurors had relatives who had been arrested for 

drug-related offenses, none of these jurors also expressed any feelings against 

prosecutors. 

The prosecutor said he challenged B.J. because her “son was prosecuted 

by our office, and she was an alibi witness in that case” and because “she’s 

probably one of the most hostile jurors that I’ve ever questioned.” The 

prosecutor added: “I think that she feels very, very upset with the prosecution 

of her son.” These reasons are neutral as to race and gender, they are not 

inherently implausible, and substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 

finding on the credibility of this explanation. On voir dire, B.J. said that she 

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had been an alibi witness in her son’s trial in San Diego County, that the case 

was dismissed after two trials resulted in hung juries, and that her experiences 

with the police in that case “were not very favorable,” although she denied 

having negative feelings toward the prosecutor or the criminal justice system. 

When the prosecutor stated that B.J. was “probably one of the most hostile 

jurors” he had ever questioned, the trial court said, “I recall having that same 

impression when we were talking to her.” Defense counsel did not dispute this 

characterization of B.J.’s demeanor on voir dire, instead merely submitting 

the matter. 

The prosecutor’s stated reason for challenging L.J. was that “she 

indicated on five different places on the questionnaire that she was against the 

death penalty.” The record supports this statement, which provides a credible 

and gender-neutral ground for challenge. Skepticism about the death penalty 

is a permissible basis for a prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge. 

(People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 441, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 

790; People v. McDermott, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 970-971, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 

654, 51 P.3d 874.) 

The prosecutor’s stated reasons for challenging J.O. were that she 

“indicated on her questionnaire that she felt she was a wishy-washy person,” 

that she “had difficult[y] making up her mind,” that “pressure from other 

jurors might start her to doubt herself,” and that “she thinks she is a bad judge 

of character.” The record supports these reasons, which provide credible and 

gender-neutral grounds for challenge. A prosecutor could reasonably be 

concerned about a juror who said she was a bad judge of character because 

she would “believe any hard luck story.” 

The prosecutor’s stated reason for challenging N.J. was her 

questionnaire response that “the burden of deciding a person’s life was really 

just too great a decision for her to make.” This is an accurate description of 

one of N.J.’s questionnaire responses, in which she marked the “no” response 

to a question asking whether she would like to serve as a juror on this case, 

adding this explanation: “The burden of decision for a person’s life-either the 

death sentence or life imprisonment.” This response provides a legitimate and 

credible reason for the challenge. 

The prosecutor said he challenged F.C. because she stated on her 

questionnaire that she would “find it difficult” to vote for death and the 

prosecutor thought she had “a clear leaning against the death penalty.” In 

response to a question asking for her “feelings about the death penalty,” F.C. 

wrote on her questionnaire, “In a few cases it may be necessary, but in general 

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I would find it difficult to give this recommendation.” These reservations 

about the death penalty provided a permissible basis for a prosecutor’s 

exercise of a peremptory challenge. (People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 

441, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790; People v. McDermott, supra, 28 

Cal.4th at pp. 970-971, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874.) 

The prosecutor said he challenged L.H. because “a fair reading of her 

questionnaire is that she hasn’t made up her mind” about the death penalty, 

and because “a fair reading of her statements in court was that she really is 

much opposed to the death penalty.” In response to the question asking for her 

“feelings about the death penalty,” L.H. wrote this response: “Well, it seems 

that killing a person by the death penalty for killing someone else is confusing. 

What will sentencing someone to die do for our society? I’m not sure of this 

‘eye for an eye’ sentence.” In response to a question asking what purpose or 

purposes the death penalty serves, she wrote: “I’m not sure it does serve a 

valid purpose. Unfortunately, it seems to be disproportionately given to nonwhites. Also, there’s no going back once it’s done-what if new evidence 

comes to light?” Her responses on voir dire also revealed skepticism about the 

death penalty. These reservations about the death penalty provided a 

legitimate, credible, gender-neutral basis for a prosecutor’s exercise of a 

peremptory challenge. 

He challenged B.B. because she wrote on her questionnaire that “she 

had religious and philosophical views so that she would always vote against 

the death penalty” and because he thought she might have difficulty 

understanding spoken English. The record supports these reasons. The 

questionnaire asked the prospective jurors whether they had “any moral, 

religious, or philosophical opposition to the death penalty so strong that [they] 

would be unable to impose the death penalty regardless of the facts.” In 

response to this question, B.B. put a check mark next to “yes,” with this 

explanation: “Thou shalt not kill, one of the 10 commandments of God.” She 

also indicated that she had been born in the Philippines, thereby suggesting 

that English might not be her first language. These are permissible, neutral, 

and credible reasons for the peremptory challenge of B.B. 

Finally, the prosecutor said he challenged M.B. because she was 73 

years old and appeared to be “basically overwhelmed” and because she had 

apologized for believing in the death penalty. The record supports these 

reasons, which are credible and gender neutral. The questionnaire asked the 

prospective jurors to state their “feeling about the death penalty.” M.B. wrote 

in response: “I am sorry to say but I am for the death penalty.” She also 

indicated on the questionnaire that she would not like to serve as a juror on 

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this case. On voir dire, when the prosecutor asked her about this response, she 

said: “I have served on juries before and I also been on election boards, I think 

somebody else should do it. You know, my years living.” 

We are unpersuaded by defendant’s argument that the trial court erred 

in deferring argument on defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motion until the next 

recess, which occurred after the jury selection process had been completed 

and a jury had been sworn to try the case. Defense counsel did not object to 

this procedure at the time, and in fact indicated that the defense was satisfied 

with the jury that was sworn to try the case. Moreover, the swearing of the 

jury would not have made it impossible for the trial court to grant effective 

relief in the event the court granted the Batson/ Wheeler motion. Although 

jeopardy attached with the swearing of the jury, a Batson/ Wheeler motion 

may be deemed a motion for mistrial and thus a waiver of any double jeopardy 

defense. (See People v. Batts (2003) 30 Cal.4th 660, 679, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67, 

68 P.3d 357 [a defendant’s request for a mistrial waives any double jeopardy 

claim]; see also People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 115, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 

186, 72 P.3d 1166 [wheeler motions often termed motions for mistrial].) 

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s rulings 

rejecting defendant’s Batson/Wheeler challenges on the basis of race and 

gender. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 102-08 (alterations in original). This claim was later re-raised in the 

second state habeas petition and denied on procedural grounds, but for the reasons 

discussed above in section III.B., the Court will address this claim on the merits. 

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court held that “the State’s 

privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges, is subject to the 

commands of the Equal Protection Clause,” and that “the Equal Protection Clause forbids 

the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race.” Id. at 89. The 

Supreme Court later also held similarly with respect to challenges based on the gender of 

a prospective juror, concluding that: “[T]he Equal Protection Clause prohibits 

discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender, or on the assumption that an 

individual will be biased in a particular case for no reason other than the fact that the person 

happens to be a woman or happens to be a man.” J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 

127, 146 (1994); see also id. at 129 (“We hold that gender, like race, is an unconstitutional 

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proxy for juror competence and impartiality.”) The Batson Court outlined a three-step 

procedure to evaluate such claims, restated in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), 

as follows: 

First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that 

the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory 

purpose.” 476 U.S., at 93-94, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (citing Washington v. Davis, 

426 U.S. 229, 239-242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)). Second, once 

the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the “burden shifts to the State 

to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible raceneutral justifications for the strikes. 476 U.S., at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712; see also 

Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 

(1972). Third, “[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must 

then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial 

discrimination.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 

L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam). 

Id. at 168 (footnote omitted) (alteration in original). 

The trial court did not specifically conclude that the defense had demonstrated a 

prima facie case with respect to either the race or gender challenge to the venire, but stated 

that: “Well, I think out of an abundance of caution, not to unnecessarily put the case at risk, 

I should at least afford the people the opportunity to offer whatever nongender-based or 

nonracially-based rationale you care to offer for the challenges to - - in the case of racial 

challenge on racial basis to Ms. [B.J.]17 and Ms. [N.M.].” (RT 1967.) With particular 

reference to the gender-based challenge, the trial court stated: “I don’t feel real comfortable 

right now in saying, ‘No, they haven’t made a prima facie showing, so let’s move on.’ I 

think they may have, so I’ll give you an opportunity to rebut the prima facie showing. . .” 

(RT 1970.) As the California Supreme Court noted on direct appeal, and the parties here 

acknowledge, because in this case the trial court elicited and evaluated the prosecutor’s 

reasons for the peremptory challenges, this first Batson step is “moot.” (See Ans. Mem. at 

                                               

17 The Court will refer to each member of the jury venire by their first and last initials 

only, following the practice of the California Supreme Court on direct appeal in this case.

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237, SAP at 347); see also Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 104, citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 

U.S. 352, 359 (1991) (plurality opinion) (“Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral 

explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate 

question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had 

made a prima face case showing becomes moot.”) As such, this Court’s analysis will focus 

on the California Supreme Court’s analysis of the third Batson step.

 As previously argued on direct appeal, Petitioner contends that the record fails to 

support the prosecutor’s stated reasons for the peremptory challenges. Specific to this 

Court’s habeas review, Petitioner asserts that on direct appeal he “raised a meritorious 

claim that the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude Black and female 

jurors violated his federal constitutional rights, and that the state court’s conclusion that 

there was no discrimination was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” (Pet. Br. at 82-83.) The 

Supreme Court recently outlined in detail the differing burdens with respect to Batson 

claims at the trial court level, during state court review, and on federal habeas corpus, as 

follows: 

The opponent of the strike bears the burden of persuasion regarding 

racial motivation. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 

L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam), and a trial court finding regarding the 

credibility of an attorney’s explanation of the ground for a peremptory 

challenge is “entitled to ‘great deference,’” Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 

598, 131 S.Ct. 1305, 179 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011) (per curiam) (quoting Batson, 

476 U.S., at 98, n.21, 106 S.Ct. 1712.) On direct appeal, those findings may 

be reversed only if the trial judge is shown to have committed clear error. Rice 

v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006). Under 

AEDPA, even more must be shown. A federal habeas court must accept a 

state-court finding unless it was based on “an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

§ 2254(d)(2). “State-court factual findings, moreover, are presumed correct; 

the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by ‘clear and 

convincing evidence.’” Collins, supra, at 338-339, 126 S.Ct. 969 (quoting 

§ 2254(e)(1)). 

Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct 2187, 2199-2200 (2015). 

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 Petitioner acknowledges that “[t]he standard is doubly deferential; unless the state 

appellate court was objectively unreasonable in concluding that a trial court’s credibility 

determination was supported by substantial evidence, the federal reviewing court cannot 

disturb it.” (Pet. Br. at 83, citing Rice, 546 U.S. at 338-42 (“Reasonable minds reviewing 

the record might disagree about the prosecutor’s credibility, but on habeas review that does 

not suffice to supersede the trial court’s credibility determination.”) and Hernandez, 500 

U.S. at 365 (“As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of 

mind based on demeanor and credibility lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).) Pursuant to § 2254(d)(2), this Court must 

accept the California Supreme Court’s conclusions unless they were based on an 

unreasonable determination of facts and must presume the state court’s factual findings are 

correct unless Petitioner rebuts that presumption. In this case, as detailed below, because 

the California Supreme Court’s findings are amply supported by the state record, Petitioner 

fails to rebut the presumption that the state court’s findings are correct and does not 

demonstrate that the state court’s conclusions were based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts. 

 During voir dire proceedings, the defense raised a Batson challenge with respect to 

the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges against nine18 prospective jurors, 

asserting that those challenges were impermissibly based on race and/or gender. This 

includes prospective jurors N.M. and B.J., both Black females, who Petitioner claims were 

impermissibly excused on the basis of race and gender, and prospective jurors L.J., J.O., 

N.J., F.C., L.H., B.B., and M.B., each of whom Petitioner contends were impermissibly 

excluded based on their gender. 

                                               

18 In the opinion on direct appeal, the California Supreme Court incorrectly states 

that it would discuss the “eight challenged jurors” but in reviewing the opinion, the state 

court discusses the same nine jurors discussed in the instant Order. See Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th 

at 105-07.

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The prosecutor cited several statements N.M. made in her juror questionnaire, 

specifically that “she indicated that she thought there was some problems with the district 

attorney’s office handling high-profile cases,” and that “she had a brother that had been 

arrested and prosecuted for drugs,” as reasons for her excusal. (RT 1967.) In the briefing, 

Petitioner asserts that the record reflects the prosecutor admitted that he had yet not read 

her questionnaire at the time he issued the challenge and points out that the prosecutor 

failed to specifically question N.M. about either cited matter, arguing this both supports a 

conclusion that the reasons cited were not genuine and a pretext for discrimination, as well 

as proves that the state court’s rejection of this claim was based on an unreasonable factual 

determination. (Pet. Br. at 85; Reply at 44.) 

 As an initial matter, the Court does not agree with Petitioner’s contention that the 

prosecutor admitted he failed to read N.M.’s questionnaire prior to issuing the peremptory 

challenge, nor that it supports a conclusion that the prosecutor’s stated reasons for the 

challenge were pretextual. During the Batson discussion, the prosecutor at one point stated: 

“I hadn’t looked at her [N.M’s] questionnaire when I issued the challenge this morning.” 

(RT 1966.) Based on this statement, Petitioner alleges that: “It was only after Ms. M[] was 

challenged and the defense objected that the prosecutor reviewed her questionnaire.” (SAP 

at 351, citing RT 1966.) After reviewing the trial transcript, it is evident that Petitioner 

takes this statement out of context, as the remark was clearly made concerning the 

prosecutor’s indication that he did not realize the juror in question was Black and appeared 

limited to that subject. When the defense listed the prospective jurors included in the 

Batson challenge, the prosecutor explained that while he realized several other prospective 

jurors and one seated juror were Black, that “I didn’t realize Ms. [M] was until counsel 

pointed that out,” made the statement above; after pulling the questionnaire, he agreed it 

indicated she was Black. (RT 1966.) To this, the trial court responded that “from physical 

appearance, outward appearance, she’s not as obviously African American or Black 

American as the others were,” but stated that “I think it’s - - I think she is in - - a member 

of that group, and I’m satisfied that that’s the case. And I think that at this point in the 

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process, that either was known or should have been known based on what she told us in 

writing and our talking with her during the selection process.” (RT 1966-67.) The Court 

is not persuaded that the cited comment, when reviewed in light of the surrounding record 

rather than devoid of context, supports a conclusion that the prosecutor failed to conduct 

any review of N.M.’s written questionnaire prior to issuing the peremptory challenge. The 

record reflects the prosecutor made the cited comment in response to the defense’s 

inclusion of N.M. in the Batson challenge as an explanation for his lack of realization that 

the prospective juror in question was Black. The Court is not persuaded it was a general 

statement intimating that he never, at any point, reviewed her questionnaire prior to issuing 

his peremptory challenge. 

 A review of the surrounding record further supports a conclusion that the 

prosecutor’s statement was limited in its scope and was not, as Petitioner contends, an 

admission that the prosecutor failed to review the prospective juror’s questionnaire prior 

to issuing the peremptory challenge. During a later portion of the Batson hearing, the 

prosecutor explained his procedure for reviewing the prospective jurors’ questionnaires, 

stating that: “What we did by way of processing all these questionnaires is Mr. Bento [the 

prosecution’s investigator] and I reviewed them and then met” in order to make their 

decisions on each potential juror. (RT 1968.) Indeed, as Petitioner acknowledged during 

oral arguments, a review of the voir dire record reflects that the prosecutor asked N.M. 

questions based on her responses in the questionnaire. (See e.g. RT 1539) (“Q: If on one 

end of the spectrum you have those folks that support the death penalty and the other end 

of the spectrum those folks that were opposed to the death penalty, you indicate in the 

questionnaire that you favored it or you thought it was appropriate in some cases I 

believe?”) (emphasis added). 

Based on the Court’s review of the record, including the context surrounding the 

cited comment and the prosecutor’s explanation of his procedure for evaluating the 

prospective jurors, specifically including the statement that his procedure included a review 

and discussion of the answers provided in the questionnaires as well as the prosecutor’s 

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direct questioning of N.M. based on her responses in the questionnaire, the Court is not 

persuaded that the above statement supports Petitioner’s assertion that the cited reasons for 

the peremptory challenge were pretextual. 

 The Court also remains unpersuaded that the prosecutor’s failure to specifically 

question N.M. about her brother’s arrest and the district attorney’s office’s handling of 

high-profile cases compel a conclusion that those reasons were not the genuine reasons for 

the peremptory challenge, nor that it serves to demonstrate that the state court’s rejection 

of the claim involved an unreasonable determination of the facts. Petitioner is correct that 

the Supreme Court has indeed indicated that a prosecutor failing to question a prospective 

juror on a particular subject is a factor that may be considered in evaluating the genuineness 

of prosecutor’s cited reason for the strike. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 246 

(2005) (“[T]he State’s failure to engage in any meaningful voir dire examination on a 

subject the State alleges it is concerned about is evidence suggesting that the explanation 

is a sham and a pretext for discrimination.”), quoting Ex parte Travis, 776 So.2d 874, 881 

(Ala. 2000). Yet, Supreme Court has also generally instructed that: “Credibility can be 

measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how 

improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in 

accepted trial strategy.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003). 

Here, the California Supreme Court recited and assessed the prosecutor’s stated 

reasons, concluding that: “These reasons are neutral as to race and gender, they are not 

inherently implausible, and substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding on the 

credibility of this explanation.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 105. The Court agrees with this 

assessment. While a prosecutor’s failure to question a prospective juror on a certain subject 

may “suggest” the existence of pretext, the Supreme Court has not held that such failure 

conclusively demonstrates that any such given reasons must be pretextual. See Miller-El, 

545 U.S. at 246. Even if the circumstances surrounding the strike of N.M. raised a concern, 

the California Supreme Court’s opinion reflects a keen awareness of Miller-El v. Dretke, 

as the state court cited to and applied that very decision in Petitioner’s case when 

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conducting a comparative analysis between N.M. and other seated jurors. See Jurado, 38 

Cal. 4th at 105. Thus, any potential for concern is dispelled by the state court’s thorough 

treatment of the issue and specific application of clearly established law to Petitioner’s 

claim. Even had the state court not specifically discussed the very case Petitioner relies 

upon, AEDPA’s “highly deferential standard requires us to presume that ‘state courts know 

and follow the law.’” Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F.3d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 2003), quoting 

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). In this instance, the Court is not persuaded 

by Petitioner’s assertion, based on a review of the trial record, the required deference, and 

the state court’s diligent assessment of the matter. 

After conducting the comparative juror analysis, the state supreme court reasoned 

that: “Even if we assume we must conduct a comparative juror analysis for the first time 

on appeal, defendant does not identify any seated juror who gave responses similar to 

N.M.’s on both of the topics mentioned by the prosecutor. Although some of the seated 

jurors had relatives who had been arrested for drug-related offenses, none of these jurors 

also expressed any feelings against prosecutors.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 105 (internal 

citations omitted). Now on federal habeas review, Petitioner points out several seated 

jurors with relatives arrested for drug related offenses. (See SAP at 351 n.24.) However, 

as noted above, while several jurors were similar to N.M. on that matter, the California 

Supreme Court found that no seated juror was similar to N.M. on both of the cited subjects. 

Petitioner does not provide grounds to dispute the reasonableness of this finding. 

Thus, given that the California Supreme Court was clearly aware of and applied 

Miller-El to Petitioner’s claim, even if this Court were persuaded that the state court was 

somehow incorrect in its application of this clearly established law or in its factual 

determination, such error on its own would be insufficient to warrant relief unless the state 

court’s decision was unreasonable under sections 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2). In light of the 

deference with which this Court must review the state court’s decision, on this record the 

Court cannot reach that conclusion. For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has not 

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shown that the California Supreme Court’s conclusion that the record supported the trial 

court’s decision concerning N.M. was unreasonable. 

 With respect to prospective juror B.J., Petitioner challenges the reasonableness of 

state court’s finding that the juror was “hostile” and harbored feelings against the 

prosecution. During the Batson hearing, the prosecutor stated that “Ms. [J.]’s son was 

prosecuted by our office, and she was an alibi witness in that case. And I should also 

indicate that she’s probably one of the most hostile jurors that I’ve ever questioned. I mean, 

she was so hostile that even defense counsel commented on it after we went into recess,” 

to which the trial court responded, “I recall having that same impression when we were 

talking to her.” (RT 1967.) Petitioner contends that the record does not support a 

conclusion that B.J. was hostile to the prosecution, pointing out that: “No description of 

B.J.’s conduct and demeanor appears in the record, and neither counsel nor the court made 

a record of any sensed hostilities after her voir dire.” (Pet. Br. at 87.) During individual 

questioning of B.J. conducted prior to, and separately from, the later group voir dire, B.J. 

indicated that while “[t]he experience with the police were not very favorable,” that she 

“didn’t have much interaction” with the prosecutor’s office and that “I assume the man was 

doing his job, and I don’t have any feelings toward it at this point.” (RT 1495.) Petitioner 

notes that the juror “explicitly stated that that she had no negative feelings about the 

criminal justice system as a result of her son’s case and that her experience would not affect 

her ability as a juror.” (Pet. Br. at 87, citing RT 1496-97.) 

While this is correct, a review of the entirety of this cited exchange reveals that the 

prosecutor continued to question B.J. on whether she could be fair, stating that: “I sense 

that there’s something else that - - maybe I’m just misreading what you’re saying. Is there 

anything else in your background or past that would affect you in judging a case such as 

this? No?” to which she replied, “No.” (RT 1496-97.) After B.J. left the courtroom, the 

trial court asked if either side wanted to discuss the prospective juror, and the prosecutor 

stated that: “I don’t know if the defense is intending to challenge her. I know the line of 

questioning indicated they had a concern. We have a concern on other issues. We’d be 

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willing to stipulate to avoid additional questioning, if she were to come in with the group.” 

(RT 1498.) The defense declined. (Id.) 

During the Batson hearing, the prosecutor cited the earlier exchanges with B.J. in 

explaining his peremptory challenge, stating that: “In fact, I even think if we looked at the 

transcript, I asked her to expound on if there was a problem, and I never got a sufficient 

response.” (RT 1967.) The prosecutor again voiced a belief that B.J. “feels very, very 

upset with the prosecution of her son” and “harbors ill feelings towards prosecutors and I 

think that was apparent in her conduct and demeanor in court.” (RT 1967-68.) When the 

trial court asked if the defense had any comment, counsel declined and stated that they 

would submit it for the trial court’s ruling. (RT 1968.) The trial court accepted the reasons, 

concluding that: “I think the People - - their explanation I think convinces me that the 

challenges to Ms. [J] and Ms. [M] were not racially motivated or based upon their race.” 

(Id.) 

 Again, in addition to presuming the state court’s findings correct unless that 

presumption is rebutted, a reviewing court must also defer to the trial judge’s findings. See 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)); see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (“As with the state of mind 

of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility 

lies ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’”), quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 

412, 428 (1985), citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984); see also Miller-El, 

537 U.S. at 339 (“Deference is necessary because a reviewing court, which analyzes only 

the transcripts of voir dire, is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make credibility 

determinations.”) 

The Court’s review of the record supports a conclusion that B.J. harbored negative 

feelings towards the prosecution. While the prosecutor may not have explicitly called out 

the juror directly on this matter, it is apparent from the exchange between the prosecutor 

and B.J. that the prosecutor inquired repeatedly about his concerns that “something” in her 

background would prevent her from being a fair juror in the case. The record also reflects 

that immediately after B.J. was excused from the courtroom, the prosecutor informed the 

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trial court that he had concerns and was willing to stipulate to her excusal. Moreover, 

during the Batson hearing, the trial court agreed with the prosecutor’s characterization of 

B.J. as hostile. Therefore, regardless of the lack of an explicit verbal articulation of 

hostility from B.J., the record supports the California Supreme Court’s factual findings. 

Given the record support for both the trial court’s decision and the state court’s 

rejection of this claim, the Court is not persuaded that the California Supreme Court’s 

acceptance of the citation to B.J.’s hostility and apparent adverse feelings towards the 

prosecution as appropriately neutral reasons for the peremptory challenge was 

unreasonable. 

 With respect to prospective juror L.J., the prosecutor stated that “she indicated on 

five different places on the questionnaire that she was against the death penalty. And that 

was one of our challenges for cause. And I believe she only survived that challenge for 

cause because of Mr. Warren’s [defense counsel] hypothetical situations wherein she said 

she could fathom some extreme case of mass murder where it might be possible that she 

could do it. But basically she’s very much opposed to the death penalty and indicated that 

five different places on her questionnaire.” (RT 2004.) The California Supreme Court 

found the record supported the prosecutor’s statement about L.J.’s feelings against the 

death penalty and reasoned that “[s]kepticism about the death penalty is a permissible basis 

for a prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 106. 

Petitioner asserts that “[c]ontrary to the state court’s suggestion that L.J. could not 

return a death verdict under the appropriate circumstances, L.J. explicitly stated an ability 

to impose a death verdict in an appropriate case.” (Pet. Br. at 89, citing RT 2004.) 

Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor did not question L.J. about this subject, undermining 

it as a valid basis for the challenge. (Id., citing RT 1615-17, Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 246.) 

But a review of the record reflects that the prosecutor did question L.J. about her 

views on the death penalty, and in fact, specifically inquired about the answers written in 

her questionnaire on that subject. (RT 1622-24.) The prosecutor noted that L.J. indicated 

she had “a conscientious objection” to the death penalty, to which L.J. responded “I wasn’t 

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quite sure what it meant by conscientious objection. But it would just be difficult to make 

the decision for death. I guess I would probably lean towards life imprisonment without 

chance of parole. It would just be a difficult situation, difficult decision.” (RT 1622-23.) 

L.J. stated that she “wouldn’t always vote for that,” but acknowledged “it’s a leaning that 

I have.” (RT 1623.) When asked if there was a situation where she might find the death 

penalty appropriate, she replied: “Well, like those other people were saying perhaps mass 

murder or something of that nature, that was, you know, horrendous enough that that would 

seem like it was appropriate.” (Id.) After further questions, L.J. again stated that: “It would 

be difficult. It would be difficult to decide for the death penalty,” and when asked if her 

views were the same as when she completed the questionnaire, L.J. stated: “I think so. I’ve 

just had time to really, you know, focus on what my views really are.” (RT 1624.) In light 

of this record, it is evident that the prosecutor inquired extensively about L.J.’s views about 

capital punishment and ability to vote for the death penalty. 

 As for Petitioner’s argument that the California Supreme Court erred in its 

“suggestion” that L.J. could not impose the death penalty, the Court finds no such 

suggestion in the state court’s decision. The California Supreme Court simply recited the 

prosecutor’s statement that L.J. indicated in several places on her questionnaire that she 

was against the death penalty and reasoned that “skepticism” about capital punishment was 

a legitimate basis for a peremptory challenge. Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 106. The Court finds 

no error in this regard. This claim does not concern a cause challenge pursuant to 

Witt/Witherspoon, but instead concerns the evaluation as to whether the prosecutor’s 

peremptory challenge violated Batson. As the California Supreme Court reasonably found, 

a prospective juror’s “skepticism” concerning capital punishment is a reasonable, genderneutral ground for a peremptory challenge, and the record supported a finding that L.J. 

articulated skepticism, at a minimum, about capital punishment. Petitioner presents 

nothing to undermine the reasonableness of the state court’s factual determination. 

 With respect to prospective juror J.O., the prosecutor noted that J.O. stated that she 

was a “wishy-washy person,” and “had difficulty making up her mind,” that her 

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questionnaire reflected “the emotional impact of this testimony - - of the case could sway 

her,” and that “pressure from other jurors might start her to doubt herself,” and that “she 

thinks she’s a bad judge of character” and “can believe any hard-luck story.” (RT 2004.) 

Similar to the contentions raised concerning L.J., Petitioner asserts that the reasons given 

are not credible “because the prosecutor failed to ask J.O. any questions about these 

subjects before challenging her.” (Pet. Br. at 88.) Petitioner also contends that several of 

the reasons given by the prosecutor misstated J.O.’s answers or are contradicted by the 

record. For instance, Petitioner challenges the prosecutor’s statement that J.O. could be 

swayed by the emotional aspects of the testimony or the case, asserting that “[t]his 

misstates J.O.’s statement, which was that she might be swayed by emotional testimony 

from Holloway’s family about the impact of her death.” (Id.) Petitioner also argues that 

the prosecutor’s statement that J.O. indicated she might doubt herself due to pressure from 

other jurors lacks record support, because J.O. also indicated that she would not change her 

vote due to such pressure and that “since I don’t like to be bullied I wouldn’t back down 

unless someone could calmly explain the other view point and it made sense.” (Id. at 88-

89, quoting CT 5480, 5492.) 

 A review of the record, however, reveals that J.O. was questioned extensively on 

these matters during voir dire by defense counsel, and she articulated that she might be 

swayed or overwhelmed by prospective testimony from the victim’s family. When counsel 

asked: “Do you feel you might be overwhelmed emotionally by that, making it difficult for 

you to assume your role as a juror?,” J.O. replied, “Yes, I feel that really is a distinct 

possibility.” (RT 1124-25.) Counsel asked “how much of a possibility is it,” to which she 

replied “I feel that I will - - I will be swayed.” (RT 1125.) When counsel further inquired 

about the potential impact of family testimony and whether it could impact her ability to 

be fair, J.O. replied: “Well, yeah, I - - that sounds horrible. I don’t know. I - -I can’t give 

you - - I’d like to think that yes, we could hopefully kind of maintain, but I just - - I don’t 

know what these people are going to be like, what they could possibly say.” (RT 1126.) 

It is clear this area was extensively probed, and that the prosecutor followed up on the 

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defense’s inquiry by asking about J.O.’s statement that she thought the situation was 

“overwhelming.” (RT 1160.) The prosecutor asked how J.O. felt about sitting in judgment 

on a capital case, and she stated “It’s an incredible responsibility,” but indicated that she 

could vote for death “if the evidence and facts warrant it.” (RT 1160-61.) Consistent with 

the state court’s findings, J.O. indicated a concern, both verbally and in writing, that she 

could be overwhelmed or swayed by emotional testimony from the victim’s family 

members, and contrary to Petitioner’s contention, defense counsel engaged in extensive 

questioning on this subject which was followed up by questions from the prosecutor on the 

overwhelming nature of the case. As such, based on a review of the record, the Court is 

not persuaded that the California Supreme Court’s assessment, that the prosecutor’s 

peremptory challenge against J.O. was supported by reasons in the record both credible 

and neutral to gender, was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

 The prosecutor stated that prospective juror N.J. “does not want to be on this jury 

because she thought the burden of deciding a person’s life was really just too great a 

decision for her to make,” as she indicated in her questionnaire. (RT 2004.) The California 

Supreme Court concluded that the prosecutor accurately referenced N.J.’s questionnaire, 

specifically her response that she would not like to serve as a juror and citation to the 

“burden” of a life or death decision. Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 106. The state court found that 

“[t]his response provides a legitimate and credible reason for the challenge.” Id. 

After reviewing the Petitioner’s merits brief and reply, it does not appear Petitioner 

has articulated a specific challenge to the reasonableness of the state supreme court’s 

findings or conclusions concerning N.J. In the SAP, Petitioner generally argues that “[t]he 

record also provides reasons to suspect the good faith of the prosecutor’s explanations for 

the other female prospective jurors he challenged,” and asserts that “most people would 

feel the same” as N.J. about the burden of deciding between life in prison and the death 

penalty. (SAP at 365-66.) Petitioner points out that N.J. was “strongly for the death 

penalty” and was able to vote for it. (Id. at 366, citing RT 1198, 1250.) 

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Notwithstanding Petitioner’s contention that many people feel making a life and 

death decision would constitute a significant burden, that alone does not dispel or negate it 

as a legitimate race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge. When the prosecutor 

questioned N.J. during voir dire on this subject, her responses on this matter were consistent 

with her questionnaire responses, as she stated that: “I’ve wrestled with this. It’s just - - 

it’s a difficult question, it’s a difficult dilemma, because I very strongly believe in the death 

penalty. May not be necessarily in this case. But again I guess I don’t want to do the dirty 

work, I don’t want to bear the responsibility.” (RT 1249-50.) Petitioner fails to 

persuasively explain why there should be suspicion about the validity of the prosecutor’s 

stated reasons concerning N.J., particularly given that it appears reasonable for a prosecutor 

to choose to strike a juror who repeatedly articulated a clear desire not to serve and an 

aversion to making a penalty determination both verbally and in writing. After reviewing 

the record, the Court finds sufficient support for the California Supreme Court’s factual 

findings and conclusions with regard to N.J. 

 During the Batson hearing, the prosecutor stated that F.C. would be a good juror on 

a non-capital case “but indicated on the questionnaire that she’d find it difficult to give this 

recommendation, although she indicated there are some cases where she might.” (RT 

2004-05.) Petitioner points out that “[a]lthough candidly stating she would find it difficult 

to return a death verdict, she had no conscientious, moral, religious, or philosophical 

opposition to the death penalty, and explicitly stated that she would not automatically vote 

for life without parole,” and indicated that she could impose death in an appropriate case. 

(Pet. Br. at 90, citing CT 3409-11, RT 1058-60.) Based on this record, Petitioner asserts 

that the California Supreme Court’s finding that F.C. had “reservations” about the death 

penalty was an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Id.) 

 F.C. indicated during voir dire that “[i]t would have to be something very extreme 

for me to want to have somebody put to death,” and mentioned “severe” cases such as those 

involving torture. (RT 1058-59.) This answer appears consistent with the responses 

provided in her questionnaire, in which F.C. wrote about her feelings concerning the death 

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penalty, stating that: “In a few cases it may be necessary, but in general I would find it 

difficult to give this recommendation.” (CT 3409.) To a question asking what purpose, if 

any, the death penalty served, F.C. wrote: “Little. A danger to society is removed forever 

– but I doubt that this will stop others from doing a similar crime.” (CT 3410.) Given 

these responses, the record supports the factual finding that F.C. expressed “reservations” 

about the death penalty, as the state court concluded. While Petitioner correctly notes that 

F.C. could potentially vote for the death penalty and was not an automatic vote against it, 

that fact does not preclude a conclusion that the juror also harbored reservations about 

capital punishment. There is clear support in the record for a finding that F.C. found the 

penalty determination difficult and expressed concerns about her ability to impose capital 

punishment. In any event, whether F.C. could potentially impose the death penalty in any 

case is irrelevant to the outcome of this claim, as F.C. was not the subject of a successful 

challenge for cause based on her views. Instead, the prosecutor struck F.C. via peremptory 

challenge, and the prosecutor’s references to F.C.’s hesitation about imposing the death 

penalty are both supported by the record and are gender neutral. Based on this review of 

the record, including F.C.’s written responses in the questionnaire as well as her verbal 

statements during voir dire questioning, the California Supreme Court acted reasonably in 

finding that “[t]hese reservations about the death penalty provided a permissible basis for 

a prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 106. 

 At the Batson hearing, the prosecutor stated that he struck prospective juror L.H. 

because while she gave issues a lot of thought, she “wrote in the margins that she was 

unsure, hadn’t made up her mind. And then when she was questioned by Mr. Warren 

[defense counsel] here in court and by myself, she indicated over and over again she could 

not do it. And she only survived a challenge for cause because Mr. Warren presented a 

hypothetical concerning some mass murder where she thought possibly under some 

circumstance she might.” (RT 2005.) Similar to prospective juror F.C., the California 

Supreme Court concluded that L.H.’s written and verbal responses indicated a “skepticism” 

about the death penalty and that such “reservations” constituted appropriate gender-neutral 

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grounds for a challenge. See Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 107. Petitioner contends that “[t]he 

state court’s conclusion that L.H. could never return a death verdict is belied by the record, 

which indicates that she could in fact consider the death penalty” and argues that L.H. 

survived a cause challenge because she could consider death as a potential penalty, 

rendering the state court’s conclusion premised on an unreasonable factual determination. 

(Pet. Br. at 93, citing RT 1410-12, 2005.) 

 Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the California Supreme Court did not articulate or 

conclude that L.H. “could never return a death verdict,” but instead found that L.H. held 

“reservations” about the death penalty. Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 107. A review of the trial 

record affirms the reasonableness of the state court’s factual findings. Even defense 

counsel acknowledged that L.H. was not impartial on the issue of capital punishment. 

During the Batson hearing, defense counsel stated that: “[w]hat Mr. Pettine [the prosecutor] 

said about Miss [H.] is quite justified. She was - - and he did take a challenges [sic] on 

her. And I’m not going to sit here and argue that Miss [H.] was completely open-minded 

about death versus LWOP. But I would just submit to the Court that there are several 

people sitting on the panel right now, and again who were on the overall panel, who were 

kept on the panel, not excused for cause, who had very, very strong leanings for the death 

penalty.” (RT 2010.) 

Yet, as with F.C., the question is not whether L.H. was completely open-minded as 

to the death penalty, because she was not stricken from the jury for cause, but through the 

use of a peremptory challenge. L.H.’s leanings against the death penalty are supported by 

the record and provide a gender neutral basis for the peremptory challenge. As such, 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. 

 The prosecutor stated that in reviewing B.B.’s questionnaire, it was initially unclear 

where she stood but later “she indicated she had religious and philosophical views so that 

she would always vote against the death penalty and cited one of the Ten Commandments 

as a basis for that.” (RT 2005.) The prosecutor added that B.B. was born in the Philippines 

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and that he had a concern about a language problem given some of her responses, 

explaining: “And that was an additional concern I had in having a juror that may not 

understand English completely hearing the case of this magnitude.” (RT 2006.) The 

California Supreme Court cited these two stated reasons and concluded that: “These are 

permissible, neutral, and credible reasons for the peremptory challenge of B.B.” Jurado, 

38 Cal. 4th at 107. 

Petitioner asserts that “[t]he state court’s conclusion that a language problem 

provided a basis for the challenge is belied by the record,” noting that “[a]lthough stating 

on voir dire that there were a few questions in the questionnaire that she did not understand, 

there is nothing in the record indicating this was due to a language problem.” (Pet. Br. at 

91.) The state court simply indicated that the “record supports” the stated reasons for the 

challenge of B.B. After reviewing the record, this finding appears reasonable. B.B. 

acknowledged during voir dire that she did not understand some of the questions posed in 

the questionnaire, stating that: “There are a few questions that I put a question mark because 

I don’t - - I don’t want to answer it if I’m not really certain or sure about it.” (RT 1615.) 

A review of the questionnaire reflects that several question were marked only with a “?” in 

the space provided for an answer, including questions asking “How would you judge the 

testimony of a victim’s family about the impact of a death of a family member?” and 

“Please state your personal belief regarding each of these statements. a) The defendant is 

innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. b) If the prosecution goes to the 

trouble to bring someone to trial, the person is probably guilty of the charges.” (CT 3341.) 

A review of B.B’s questionnaire reflects that she failed to provide any response to several 

questions and answered other questions with “I don’t know.” (See e.g. CT 3336-38.) At 

the end of the questionnaire, B.B. added a signed postscript which read: “Some of the 

questions I hadn’t answered are hard for me to understand so I leave [sic] it blank or ?-” 

(CT 3345.) 

 Petitioner points to the fact that B.B. lived in San Diego for fifteen years at the time 

of the trial, and that she had attended college and previously worked as a bank teller and 

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customer service clerk, but this does not preclude the state court from concluding there was 

record support for the prosecutor’s stated reason of potential language difficulties. That 

Petitioner now offers facts that could support an opposite conclusion does not mean the 

California Supreme Court’s factual finding concerning language difficulties was 

unsupported, much less that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Given the portions of voir dire and from the questionnaire referenced above, there is ample 

record support for the state court’s conclusion. 

 The findings about B.B.’s views on capital punishment are also reasonable and 

supported by the record. As the prosecutor and the state supreme court each indicated, a 

review of B.B.’s questionnaire reflects that she answered yes to a question asking: “Do you 

have any moral, religious, or philosophical opposition to the death penalty so strong that 

you would be unable to impose the death penalty regardless of the facts?” and that she 

added in writing that: “Thou shalt not kill, one of the 10 commandments of god.” (CT 

3337.) A review of the record reflects that the trial court appeared to agree with the 

prosecutor’s statements concerning B.B.’s views on the death penalty. When the 

prosecutor articulated his initial reasons for the challenge, the trial court responded that 

“looking at my own notes, as I read her questionnaire I had sort of figured she was a neverthe-death-penalty person, although some of her answers did seem to be a little ambiguous 

or uncertain in that regard.” (RT 2005-06.) At the Batson hearing, defense counsel argued 

that they interpreted B.B.’s reference to “Thou Shalt Not Kill” in the questionnaire as 

meaning a person should not kill, and not as a reference to death penalty, and noted that 

B.B. at another point in the questionnaire stated that the death penalty was appropriate in 

murder cases. (RT 2011.) To this, the trial court replied: “Well, I think there is an 

ambiguity or there is some uncertainty there about the meaning of her answers, yes. Those 

are - - the interpretations that both sides have put on her answers I think are reasonable. 

But I guess that sort of underscores the point that her answers reasonably gave some cause 

for concern, I think.” (Id.) This conclusion is reasonable and well-supported by the record. 

While Petitioner now contends that any confusion about B.B.’s views about capital 

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punishment were cleared up during voir dire and that she could indeed impose the death 

penalty, as stated before, the question before this Court is not whether B.B.’s death penalty 

views would have sufficed to sustain a challenge for cause, but whether they provide 

reasonable, neutral grounds for the prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge. The 

stated concerns about both B.B.’s language abilities and her views on capital punishment 

provide a reasonable and gender neutral basis for the peremptory challenge. As such, 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. 

 In articulating the reasons for excluding the final contested prospective juror, the 

prosecutor stated that M.B. “was basically overwhelmed by this. And when she was asked 

on the questionnaire whether or not she believed in the death penalty, she was apologetic. 

She said she believed it in and apologized for believing in it. And I looked at that response 

and also her age, being 73 years old, and I thought this was just not the appropriate case 

for her.” (RT 2006.) The California Supreme Court’s opinion recited the prosecutor’s 

stated reasons and concluded that: “The record supports these reasons, which are credible 

and gender neutral.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 107. 

Petitioner presently asserts that “[c]ontrary to the state court’s suggestion that M.B.’s 

age was a factor in the prosecutor’s decision to challenge her, the prosecutor never 

questioned her about how her age might affect her ability to impartially decide the case, 

thereby revealing the pre-textual nature of this reason.” (Pet. Br. at 94, citing Miller-El, 

545 U.S. at 246.) Petitioner also argues that M.B. could have been a fair juror and 

considered capital punishment, asserting that “[i]n light of the record, the prosecutor’s 

vague explanation for the challenge- i.e., ‘I thought this was just not the appropriate case 

for her’ (RT 23:2006)-was so lacking in content as to amount to virtually no explanation, 

and thus failed to constitute the required ‘clear and reasonably specific explanation of his 

legitimate reasons for exercising th(is) challenge().’ Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, n. 20, internal 

quotations and citations omitted.” (Pet. Br. at 94.) 

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While the prosecutor may not have specifically questioned M.B. on her age, a review 

of the record reflects that M.B. herself appeared to refer to it during questioning by defense 

counsel, as she reiterated the statement from her questionnaire that she did not want to 

serve, explaining that: “I have done - - I have served on juries before and I also been on 

election boards, I think somebody else should do it. You know, my years living.” (RT 

1026-27.) M.B. also indicated she had “a little bit” of a problem with her knees, but stated 

she did not think it would affect her ability as a juror. (RT 1027.) As noted above, while 

a prosecutor’s failure to question a prospective juror on a certain subject may “suggest” the 

existence of pretext, the Supreme Court did not state that such failure conclusively 

demonstrates that any such reasons must be pretextual. See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 246. 

Additionally, as previously noted, the California Supreme Court was clearly aware of 

Miller-El v. Dretke, which it applied to this claim. See Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 105. 

The record also reflects that the prosecutor questioned M.B. about her ability to keep 

an open mind as to punishment and that he specifically inquired about her questionnaire 

response that she was “sorry to say” she was in favor of the death penalty. (RT 1056, 1070-

72.) Despite the lack of specific questions on M.B.’s age, the prosecutor questioned her 

on another of his cited reasons for the peremptory challenge, her apology for believing in 

the death penalty, further undermining a suggestion of pretext. 

 Finally, the Court disagrees with Petitioner’s characterization of the stated reasons 

for the peremptory challenge. As noted just above, Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor’s 

statement that “‘I thought this was just not the appropriate case for her’ (RT 23:2006)-was 

so lacking in content as to amount to virtually no explanation.” (Pet. Br. at 94.) Petitioner 

takes this statement out of context, as it was coupled with the prosecutor’s citation to 

M.B.’s age and death penalty views, as follows: 

And then the final juror was [M.B.]. She was a juror that was 73 years old, 

and it was my view that she was basically overwhelmed by this. And when 

she was asked on the questionnaire whether or not she believed in the death 

penalty, she was apologetic. She said she believed in it and apologized for 

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believing in it. And I looked at that response and also her age, being 73 years 

old, and I thought this was just not the appropriate case for her. 

(RT 2006.) Viewing the challenged statement in the context in which it was made, it is 

clear that the “appropriate case” remark was made in view of her age and death penalty 

views together, and it was not articulated as a stand-alone reason for the peremptory 

challenge. 

Upon reviewing the record, M.B. indicated both verbally and in writing that she did 

not want to serve as a juror on the case, and that she verbally cited her “years living” as a 

reason. (RT 1026-27, CT 3123.) She noted in the written questionnaire that she had 

problems with her knees that could impair her ability to serve, although she stated during 

voir dire questioning that her knees would not impact her potential service. (CT 3094, RT 

1027.) To the prosecutor’s questions about her ability to set aside personal feelings and 

follow the rules or laws, M.B. indicated she had concerns, but also stated that she thought 

she “could play by the rules.” (RT 1056.) The record also reveals that in response to the 

prosecutor’s statements at the Batson hearing, the defense simply pointed out that several 

other prospective jurors were over age 70 and that despite saying she was “sorry” for 

favoring the death penalty and her inability to articulate a reason why, she favored it but 

could keep an open mind. (RT 2009-10.) Notably, the defense did not appear to offer any 

response to the prosecutor’s statement that M.B. appeared overwhelmed nor a response to 

M.B.’s indication she did not want to serve as a juror on the case. Therefore, based on a 

review of the record, the Court finds that the stated grounds about M.B.’s age and views 

provide a reasonable and gender neutral basis for the peremptory challenge against her and 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. 

Finally, Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s “conduct” and handling of the Batson 

motion itself was “suspect.” (SAP at 348.) Petitioner notes that while trial counsel was 

timely in raising a Batson objection during the selection of the trial jury panel, the trial 

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court told counsel it would hear the motion during the next recess and continued jury 

selection. (Id., citing RT 1945-47.) Petitioner states that after the objection: 

The court then oversaw the selection and swearing of the twelve principle [sic] 

jurors (RT 1949; CT 1635), conducted selection of three alternate jurors and 

had the clerk swear these alternates (RT 1949-1952; CT 1635), excused the 

remaining jury panel (RT 1952-53; CT 1635), and gave preliminary remarks 

and admonitions to the jury. (RT 1953-1960; CT 1635-1636). This done, the 

court finally took a recess to hear Petitioner’s Batson-Wheeler objection. (RT 

1961.) 

(Id.) Petitioner contends that “[a]bsent rare circumstances where it would reward a party’s 

improper use of peremptory challenges, the remedy for a Batson-Wheeler violation is for 

the trial court to declare a mistrial, dismiss the jurors thus far selected and the remaining 

venire, and begin jury selection again from a new venire,” but that in this case the trial 

court did not conduct the Batson hearing until after the jurors were sworn and jeopardy had 

attached. (Id. at 349, citations omitted.) He argues that “[t]he trial court’s conduct in 

hearing Petitioner’s objection ensured that the effect of granting that objection would be 

an acquittal barring retrial,” and that: “This circumstance suggests that, from the start, the 

court had no intention of making a sincere determination of whether purposeful 

discrimination existed, and no intention of granting the objection if warranted. The ensuing 

hearing has the appearance of being nothing more than a pretense with court [sic] having 

already made up its mind.” (Id. at 350.) 

 Here, Petitioner’s two arguments appear intertwined. He first argues that the trial 

court erred in delaying the Batson hearing until after the jury was sworn and jeopardy 

attached, noting that had the trial court granted relief on the defense’s Batson motion, 

double jeopardy would have barred a retrial. (Id. at 349.) Relatedly, Petitioner asserts that 

the trial court’s decision to hold the Batson hearing after the jury was sworn demonstrates 

that the trial court had no intention to sincerely consider the Batson motion nor to grant 

relief if warranted, as a grant of relief at that point would have barred retrial. (Id. at 348-

50.) 

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 The California Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s claim of error in this regard, 

reasoning as follows: 

We are unpersuaded by defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in 

deferring argument on defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motion until the next 

recess, which occurred after the jury selection process had been completed 

and a jury had been sworn to try the case. Defense counsel did not object to 

this procedure at the time, and in fact indicated that the defense was satisfied 

with the jury that was sworn to try the case. Moreover, the swearing of the 

jury would not have made it impossible for the trial court to grant effective 

relief in the event the court granted the Batson/ Wheeler motion. Although 

jeopardy attached with the swearing of the jury, a Batson/ Wheeler motion 

may be deemed a motion for mistrial and thus a waiver of any double jeopardy 

defense. (See People v. Batts (2003) 30 Cal.4th 660, 679, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67, 

68 P.3d 357 [a defendant’s request for a mistrial waives any double jeopardy 

claim]; see also People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 115, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 

186, 72 P.3d 1166 [wheeler motions often termed motions for mistrial].) 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 107-08. 

 Petitioner fails to cite Supreme Court authority in support of his position, instead 

relying on a Ninth Circuit case and several state cases to buttress his argument. (See SAP 

at 368.) Petitioner cites to United States v. Sammaripa, 55 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 1995), to 

assert that the trial court’s handling of the Batson motion after the jury was sworn did not 

create a “manifest necessity” that would allow retrial had the motion been successful. 

However, that case is clearly distinguishable from the instant situation. In Sammaripa, 

unlike here, the prosecution moved for mistrial after the jury was sworn, due to alleged 

Batson error on the part of defense counsel, and a mistrial was declared over the objections 

of defense counsel. Id., 55 F.3d at 434. The Ninth Circuit specifically reasoned that 

“defense counsel’s alleged Batson error, which by its very nature should be apparent before

jeopardy attaches, cannot create a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial.” Id. at 435. 

In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit explicitly articulated a distinction between Batson 

motions made by the defense and those raised by the government, which the Court finds 

pertinent to the instant claim. The Ninth Circuit noted that in an earlier decision, it found 

a Batson objection raised by defense counsel after the jury was sworn to be timely and 

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valid. Id. at 435 n.1, citing United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 

1987). In Sammaripa, the Ninth Circuit explained that: “The significant difference 

between the two cases is that in Thompson, the defendant moved for a mistrial, and thus 

waived his right to be free from double jeopardy. In contrast, in the instant case, the 

government made the delayed objection. Here, the government moved for the mistrial over 

Sammaripa’s objection. Sammaripa did not waive his right to be free from double jeopardy 

because he objected to the mistrial.” Id. Thus, Petitioner’s reliance on Sammaripa is not 

well-taken, as had the trial court ruled in favor of Petitioner’s Batson motion, any mistrial 

would not have been over the objection of the defense, but instead would have been at the 

defendant’s behest. 

 The Supreme Court has held that double jeopardy may be invoked after a defendant’s 

successful mistrial motion under limited conditions, indicating that: “Only where the 

governmental conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a 

mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having 

succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion.” Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 

(1982); see also id. at 679 (“We do not by this opinion lay down a flat rule that where a 

defendant in a criminal trial successfully moves for a mistrial, he may not thereafter invoke 

the bar of double jeopardy against a second trial. But we do hold that the circumstances 

under which such a defendant may invoke the bar of double jeopardy in an second effort 

to try him are limited to those cases in which the conduct giving rise to the successful 

motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial.”) 

Petitioner has offered nothing to show that the prosecution “provoked” the Batson motion 

through the use of his peremptory challenges, and in any event, the motion was 

unsuccessful. The prosecution, when asked, provided thorough and persuasive gender and 

race neutral reasons for the challenges which the trial court found reasonable and supported 

by the record. 

 Petitioner’s contention that the trial court’s timing in handling the Batson motion 

suggested its lack of sincerity is similarly unpersuasive and is belied by the record. Even 

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as the trial court stated that it would require the prosecution to provide reasons for the 

peremptory challenges for the purposes of preserving the record, the record reflects the 

court repeatedly indicated that it was unsure that Petitioner had demonstrated a prima facie 

case of discrimination. (See RT 2012- “I realize some case authority that - - by inviting 

the prosecution to make this record, I may be held by implication to have found that the 

defense had made a prima facie showing, and I’m not entirely satisfied myself that they 

have.”) The trial court also correctly recognized that the defense motion was “for a 

discharge of this jury and a summoning of a new panel of prospective jurors,” and defense 

counsel agreed that was the aim of the request. (Id.) 

 The record fails to support a suggestion that the Batson hearing was conducted under 

false pretense or that the denial of Petitioner’s motion was a foregone conclusion. As 

recounted above, the record reflects the trial court conducted a considered and thorough 

evaluation of the contested challenges. With respect to the two challenges contested on the 

basis of race, the trial court implicitly found a prima facie case, required the prosecutor to 

detail the reasons for the challenges, evaluated those reasons in view of the questionnaires 

and voir dire, and articulated its decision on the record. The trial court also provided for a 

detailed record concerning the challenges to several female jurors despite its own stated 

uncertainty over whether a prima facie case had actually been shown as to gender. Again, 

the trial court inquired as to the prosecutor’s reasons for the challenges, and evaluated those 

reasons and issued a ruling on the record. Given the thorough and thoughtful way in which 

the trial court handled the Batson hearing, the Court is not persuaded that the timing of the 

hearing itself somehow compels a conclusion that the outcome was decided prior to the 

hearing or that court was somehow disingenuous in its handling of the Batson motion. 

 Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the 

California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of Batson, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Habeas relief is not warranted on Claim 10. At oral arguments, Petitioner requested 

discovery and an evidentiary hearing on this claim with respect to the challenge of 

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prospective juror N.M., including discovery of the prosecution files and notes concerning 

voir dire and depositions of the trial prosecutors. As Petitioner fails to satisfy section 

2254(d) on the basis of the state record, an evidentiary hearing is not available on this 

claim. Sully, 725 F.3d at 1075; Totten, 137 F.3d at 1176. The request for discovery on 

Claim 10 is denied. Kemp, 638 F.3d at 1260. 

D. Claims Alleging Error During Guilt Phase

1. Claim 11

 Petitioner alleges that “[t]he State was permitted to present Brian Johnsen’s 

conditional examination testimony to the jury despite unequivocal state law prohibiting the 

use of such evidence in capital cases,” and because without such evidence the State would 

neither have sought the death penalty against Petitioner nor could the jury have found 

Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of either conspiracy or special circumstance 

murder, the admission of that evidence violated Petitioner’s federal constitutional rights. 

(SAP at 368-69.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Defendant contends that the trial court erred under state law in 

overruling his objection to admission at trial of the conditional examination 

testimony of Brian Johnsen, and that this error violated defendant’s 

constitutional rights to due process, to counsel, to confrontation, and to fair 

and reliable determinations of guilt and penalty under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 

1. Factual background 

On November 1, 1991, the trial court granted the prosecutor’s request 

under section 1054.7 for an in camera hearing out of the presence of defendant 

and his attorney to consider postponement or limitation of discovery. At the 

hearing, the prosecutor told the court that in September 1991, during an 

interview with a prosecution investigator, Brian Johnsen had said that 

defendant had killed Holloway to prevent her from revealing a plan to kill a 

man named Doug Mynatt, who was believed to have ties to the Hell’s Angels 

and whose whereabouts was unknown. The prosecutor expressed concern that 

disclosure of this information to the defense through the discovery process 

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could endanger Mynatt’s life or cause Mynatt to become a threat to the lives 

of Johnsen and Anna Humiston, who was not then in custody. The prosecutor 

also stated his intention to secure Johnsen’s testimony by conditional 

examination. The trial court granted the prosecutor a one-week extension of 

the deadline for disclosure of the information obtained during the September 

interview of Johnsen. 

At a hearing on November 8, 1991, the prosecutor gave the defense an 

investigator’s report of the September interview of Brian Johnsen, and the 

prosecutor submitted a written motion for a conditional examination of 

Johnsen on the ground that his life was in jeopardy (§ 1336, subd. (b)). 

Defendant’s attorney asked for more time to study the report and the motion, 

but the trial court granted the motion for conditional examination. The court 

observed, however, that under section 1341, if the magistrate was convinced, 

on the date set for the conditional examination, that Johnsen’s life was not in 

jeopardy, then the conditional examination would not take place. 

The conditional examination of Brian Johnsen, which was recorded on 

videotape, began on November 15, continued on November 18, and concluded 

on November 19, 1991. Thereafter, on July 6, 1992, the prosecutor announced 

that he was seeking the death penalty against defendant, in part because of the 

evidence disclosed at the conditional examination. On September 10, 1993, 

the defense filed a motion to exclude the conditional examination at trial, 

primarily on the ground that conditional examinations are not permitted in 

capital cases. After receiving opposition to the motion from the prosecution, 

and holding a hearing, the trial court denied the motion on October 29, 1993. 

Defendant petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate barring 

use of the conditional examination at trial. The Court of Appeal denied the 

petition in an unpublished opinion on December 2, 1993. This court granted 

defendant’s petition for review of the Court of Appeal’s decision and 

transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal to reconsider in light of 

People v. Municipal Court (Ahnemann) (1974) 12 Cal.3d 658, 117 Cal.Rptr. 

20, 527 P.2d 372 (stating that mandate is unavailable to resolve an issue as to 

the admissibility of evidence). After reconsideration, the Court of Appeal 

again denied the mandate petition, this time citing Ahnemann. 

On March 22, 1994, defendant filed a motion asking the trial court to 

reconsider his motion to exclude the conditional examination on the ground 

that the controlling law had been clarified by the Court of Appeal’s decision 

in Dalton v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1506, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 248 

(holding that in a capital case the prosecution could not conditionally examine 

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a witness whose life was in jeopardy). The trial court agreed to reconsider its 

ruling, but after reconsideration it again denied the motion to exclude the 

conditional examination. 

Defendant sought appellate review of this ruling by again petitioning 

the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal summarily 

denied the petition, and this court denied defendant’s petition for review. 

At trial, the parties stipulated to Brian Johnsen’s unavailability as a 

witness. Over defendant’s continuing objection, the videotape of the 

conditional examination was played for the jury. In his conditional 

examination testimony, Johnsen described how he and Teresa Holloway had 

become acquainted with defendant, Denise Shigemura, Anna Humiston, and 

Doug Mynatt, and how their relationships had developed. His testimony 

provided the only evidence of the telephone conversations in which the plan 

to kill Mynatt was discussed and concern was expressed that Holloway not be 

told about the plan for fear she would disclose it. His testimony also described 

a telephone conversation after Holloway’s murder in which Johnsen asked 

defendant why he had killed Holloway and defendant had replied that it had 

to be done. 

2. Conditional examinations in capital cases 

Defendant contends that conditional examinations are not permitted in 

capital cases. He relies on section 1335, subdivision (a), which provides: 

“When a defendant has been charged with a public offense triable in any court, 

he or she in all cases, and the people in cases other than those for which the 

punishment may be death, may, if the defendant has been fully informed of 

his or her right to counsel as provided by law, have witnesses examined 

conditionally in his or her or their behalf, as prescribed in this chapter.” (Italics 

added.) Defendant argues that this provision bars the prosecution from 

conditionally examining any of its witnesses in a capital case. In ruling the 

conditional examination admissible, however, the trial court relied on 

subdivision (b) of the same section, which at the time of defendant’s trial 

provided: “When a defendant has been charged with a serious felony, the 

people may, if the defendant has been fully informed of his or her right to 

counsel as provided by law, have a witness examined conditionally as 

prescribed in this chapter if the people have evidence that the life of the 

witness is in jeopardy.” (§ 1335, former subd. (b), as amended by Stats.1985, 

ch. 783, § 2, p. 2525.)FN5

FN5. The Legislature has since amended this subdivision to also

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allow a defendant to take a conditional examination of a witness 

whose life is in danger. (Stats.2005, ch. 305, § 1.) It now reads: 

“When a defendant has been charged with a serious felony, the 

people or the defendant may, if the defendant has been fully 

informed of his or her right to counsel as provided by law, have 

witnesses examined conditionally as prescribed in this chapter, if 

there is evidence that the life of the witness is in jeopardy.”

(§ 1335, subd. (b).) 

On first reading, subdivision (a) and former subdivision (b) of section 

1335 appear inconsistent. Subdivision (a) appears to generally prohibit the 

prosecution from conditionally examining witnesses in cases “for which the 

punishment may be death,” whereas former subdivision (b) appears to allow 

the prosecution to conditionally examine a witness whose life is in jeopardy 

in any case in which the defendant is charged with a serious felony. 

To resolve this apparent inconsistency, we view the provisions in their 

statutory context as part of an overall statutory scheme for conditional 

examinations in criminal cases, seeking to harmonize the provisions in light 

of the apparent legislative purpose. (Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 

Cal.4th 894, 901, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 30, 69 P.3d 951; People v. Acosta (2002) 

29 Cal.4th 105, 112, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 435, 52 P.3d 624; People v. Murphy 

(2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129.)

The statutory scheme for conditional examinations includes section 

1336. At the time of defendant’s trial, subdivision (a) of that section provided: 

“When a material witness for the defendant, or for the people, is about to leave 

the state, or is so sick or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds for 

apprehension that he or she will be unable to attend the trial, the defendant or 

the people may apply for an order that the witness be examined conditionally.” 

(Stats.1985, ch. 783, § 3, p. 2525.) Subdivision (b) of section 1336 provided: 

“When the people have evidence that the life of a prosecution witness is in 

jeopardy, the people may apply for an order that the witness be examined 

conditionally.” (Stats.1985, ch. 783, § 3, p. 2525.)FN6

FN6. Since defendant’s trial, the Legislature has amended 

section 1336 to include witnesses 65 years of age or older and 

dependent adults, and to authorize the defendant, as well as the 

prosecution, to take a conditional examination under subdivision 

(b). (Stats.2005, ch. 305, § 2.) Those subdivisions now read: “(a) 

When a material witness for the defendant, or for the people, is 

about to leave the state, or is so sick or infirm as to afford 

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reasonable grounds for apprehension that he or she will be unable 

to attend the trial, or is a person 65 years of age or older, or a 

dependent adult, the defendant or the people may apply for an 

order that the witness be examined conditionally. [¶] (b) When 

there is evidence that the life of a witness is in jeopardy, the 

defendant or the people may apply for an order that the witness

be examined conditionally.” (§ 1336, subds.(a)-(b).) 

Reading sections 1335 and 1336 together, it appears that the Legislature 

may have intended to prohibit the prosecution in a capital case from taking a 

conditional examination of a witness for any of the reasons stated in 

subdivision (a) of section 1336-illness, dependency, age, or impending 

departure from the state-but to permit the prosecution in a capital case to 

conditionally examine a witness whose life is in jeopardy. This reading would 

resolve the apparent inconsistency between subdivision (a) and former 

subdivision (b) of section 1335 and harmonize those provisions with section 

1336. 

Arguing against this construction, defendant relies on Dalton v. 

Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 1506, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 248. The Court 

of Appeal there expressed the view that allowing the prosecution to 

conditionally examine a witnesses in a death penalty case only when the 

witness’s life was in jeopardy “would create a distinction in the use of 

preserved testimony which seemingly would have no justification” in that “the 

testimony of a witness who is to die before the death penalty trial because of 

natural causes could not be preserved, while that same witness’s testimony 

could be preserved if the threat of nonattendance at trial were based upon 

possible kidnap or murder.” (Dalton, supra, at p. 1512, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 248.) 

We do not view this distinction as irrational, however. When a prosecution 

witness may die before trial from natural causes, the prosecution risks the loss 

of important evidence. This same interest is at stake when the witness’s life is 

in jeopardy from criminal violence, but there is in addition the strong public 

interest in deterring criminal conduct in the form of an actual or attempted 

murder of the witness. Recognizing the presence of this additional interest, 

the Legislature could reasonably decide to authorize prosecutorial conditional 

examinations in capital cases when the witness’s life is in jeopardy from 

criminal violence, to remove the incentive a capitally charged defendant or 

his or her allies might otherwise have to murder prosecution witnesses to 

prevent them from testifying. 

This construction is also consistent with the history of conditional 

examinations in criminal cases in California. As enacted in 1879, the 

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California Constitution granted the Legislature power to authorize 

prosecutorial conditional examinations “in criminal cases, other than cases of 

homicide.” (Cal. Const., former art. 1, § 13, repealed Nov. 5, 1974.) In 1905, 

the Legislature exercised this constitutionally granted authority by providing, 

in section 1335, for conditional examinations of prosecution witnesses in 

cases “other than homicide.” (Stats.1905, ch. 540, § 1, p. 702.) In 1951, 

section 1335 was amended to permit conditional examinations of prosecution 

witnesses in cases other than “those for which the punishment may be death.” 

(Stats.1951, ch. 96, § 1, p. 354.) In 1974, the state Constitution was amended 

to remove the prohibition on conditional examinations in capital cases. The 

relevant provision now reads: “The Legislature may provide for the deposition 

of a witness in the presence of the defendant and the defendant’s counsel.” 

(Cal. Const., art. 1, § 15, cl.4.) In 1985, the Legislature amended section 1335 

to permit the prosecution to take a conditional examination when the 

defendant has been charged with a serious felony and there is evidence the 

witness’s life is in jeopardy. (Stats.1985, ch. 783, § 2, p. 2525.) We infer that, 

after the 1974 constitutional amendment removed the blanket prohibition on 

conditional examinations by the prosecution in capital cases, the Legislature 

used its new authority in 1985 to authorize the prosecution to take conditional 

examinations in capital cases in the limited situation where the witness’s life 

is threatened. 

The 1985 amendment of sections 1335 and 1336 was included in 

Assembly Bill No.2059 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.), which also added section 

1350 to the Evidence Code. That provision establishes an exception to the 

hearsay rule for a statement by an unavailable declarant when, among other 

things, “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the declarant’s 

unavailability was knowingly caused by, aided by, or solicited by the party 

against whom the statement is offered for the purpose of preventing the arrest 

or prosecution of the party and is the result of the death by homicide or the 

kidnapping of the declarant.” (Evid.Code, § 1350, subd. (a)(1).) Like the “life 

in jeopardy” provision for conditional examinations (§ 1335, subd. (b)), the 

hearsay exception of Evidence Code section 1350 applies in criminal 

proceedings in which a serious felony is charged (id., subd. (a)), and “serious 

felony” is defined to include felonies listed in subdivision (c) of section 

1192.7. (Compare Evid.Code, § 1350, subd. (d), with Pen.Code, § 1335, subd. 

(c).) Those listed felonies include “any felony punishable by death ....” 

(§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(7).) Because they were packaged together, it is reasonable 

to infer that the adoption of the hearsay exception in Evidence Code section 

1350 and the amendment of the conditional examination provisions of Penal 

Code sections 1335 and 1336 address a common problem and result from a 

common Legislative concern-criminal violence against prospective 

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prosecution witnesses to prevent their testimony. The risk that this will occur 

likely increases in proportion to the potential punishment for the charged 

offense, and thus it is greatest in capital cases. Absent language expressly 

barring application of these provisions to capital cases, therefore, it is 

reasonable to infer that the Legislature intended to permit the prosecution to 

conditionally examine witnesses in capital cases when there is evidence that 

their lives are in serious danger. 

We conclude, therefore, that under subdivision (b) of section 1335, 

conditional examination of a prosecution witness is permitted in a capital case 

when the witness’s life is in jeopardy.FN7

FN7. Dalton v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 1506, 24 

Cal.Rptr.2d 248, is disapproved. 

3. Required showing for conditional examination 

Defendant argues, next, that the prosecution should not have been 

allowed to conditionally examine Brian Johnsen because there was no 

evidence that his life was in jeopardy. 

Section 1335, subdivision (b), permits the prosecution to conditionally 

examine a witness “if there is evidence that the life of the witness is in 

jeopardy.” (Italics added.) Section 1336, subdivision (b), similarly requires 

the prosecution to produce evidence to support a claim that a witness’s life is 

jeopardy. Section 1337 provides that an application for conditional 

examination “shall be made upon affidavit stating” among other things “that 

the life of the witness is in jeopardy.” Section 1338 requires that the 

application be made on “three days’ notice to the opposite party,” and section 

1339 provides that “[i]f the court or judge is satisfied that the examination of 

the witness is necessary, an order must be made that the witness be examined 

conditionally, at a specified time and place, and before a magistrate designated 

therein.” 

Here, the prosecution’s application to conditionally examine Brian 

Johnsen was supported by evidence in the form of a declaration of Deputy 

District Attorney Pettine stating, in relevant part: “I am informed that witness 

Brian Johnsen was directly involved with defendants Shigemura and Jurado 

in a plot to kill Doug Mynatt. According to Mr. Johnsen, the defendants, 

acting on their own and without the knowledge of Mr. Johnsen, killed victim 

Teresa Holloway so that she would not disclose the plan to murder Mr. 

Mynatt. Mr. Mynatt’s current whereabouts is unknown. Mr. Johnsen, who was 

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in custody on the date of the Holloway murder, is currently out of custody. [¶] 

Declarant believes that once this information becomes known, witness Brian 

Johnsen’s life will be jeopardized by Mr. Mynatt, the defendants, and/or their 

associates.” 

The trial court granted the application without allowing the defense the 

three days’ notice specified in section 1338, but the court said that under 

section 1341 the conditional examination would not take place if, on the day 

set for the conditional examination, the defense was able to show to the 

magistrate’s satisfaction that Johnsen’s life was not in danger.

FN8 The 

conditional examination began a week later. Before it began, defendant 

offered no evidence that Johnsen’s life was not in danger. 

FN8. In full, at the time of defendant’s trial, section 1341 read: 

“If, at the time and place so designated, it is shown to the 

satisfaction of the magistrate that the witness is not about to leave 

the state, or is not sick or infirm, or that the life of the witness is 

not in jeopardy, or that the application was made to avoid the 

examination of the witness on the trial, the examination cannot

take place.” (Stats.1985, ch. 783, § 5, p. 2525.) Since defendant’s 

trial, section 1341 has been amended to include witnesses 65 

years of age or older and dependent adults. (Stats.2005, ch. 305, 

§ 4.) 

The prosecution satisfied the requirements of sections 1335, 1336, and 

1337 by submitting a declaration stating that Johnsen’s life was in danger from 

Doug Mynatt, defendant and his codefendants, and their associates. In 

granting the prosecutor’s application for a conditional examination, the trial 

court did not abuse the broad discretion with which the statutory scheme 

vested it. In particular, it was not necessary, under the circumstances of this 

case, for the prosecution to present evidence that anyone had expressly 

threatened Johnsen or conspired to harm him. Because of the evidence that 

defendant, Shigemura, and Humiston had killed Holloway to prevent her from 

exposing a plot to kill Mynatt, the trial court-who both granted the application 

for conditional examination and served as magistrate in the taking of the 

examination-could justifiably conclude that defendant and the persons with 

whom he associated would be likely to use deadly force against anyone 

perceived as a threat, and that the substance of Johnsen’s proposed testimony 

made him an actual or potential threat to defendant and his codefendants, and 

also to Mynatt. 

/// 

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Although defendant did not receive the three days’ notice to which 

section 1338 entitled him, he was not prejudiced by the shortened notice 

because seven days elapsed before the conditional examination began during 

which, under section 1341, defendant could have presented evidence to 

contradict the prosecutor’s declaration that Brian Johnsen’s life was in danger. 

We conclude that defendant has failed to show that any prejudicial error 

occurred in the taking of Brian Johnsen’s conditional examination. 

4. Admission of conditional examination at trial 

The prosecutor argued below, and the Attorney General argues in this 

court, that even if the prosecution is prohibited from taking conditional 

examinations in capital cases, that prohibition did not apply here because the 

prosecutor had not yet decided to seek the death penalty, and indeed had 

announced the death penalty would not be sought, when the trial court granted 

the prosecution’s application for a conditional examination and when Brian 

Johnsen was conditionally examined. In response to this argument, defendant 

argues that even if it was proper to conditionally examine Johnsen because 

the prosecutor was not then seeking the death penalty, it was error to admit 

Johnsen’s conditional examination in evidence at defendant’s capital trial. 

Because we have concluded that the prosecution in a capital case may 

conditionally examine a witness whose life is in jeopardy, we need not address 

this issue. 

Defendant also argues that admission of Brian Johnsen’s conditional 

examination in evidence at trial denied him his rights under the federal 

Constitution to due process, confrontation of adverse witnesses, and reliable 

guilt and penalty determinations in a capital case. But Johnsen testified under 

oath at the conditional examination, and defendant had a full and fair 

opportunity to cross-examine him at that time. For purposes of due process, 

confrontation, and reliability, the situation is no different than if Johnsen or 

any other witness had testified at the preliminary hearing or at an earlier trial 

and then, because he had become unavailable, his prior testimony was 

admitted at trial. When a defendant has had an adequate opportunity for crossexamination and the witness is unavailable at trial, use of prior testimony does 

not violate the defendant’s rights under the federal Constitution. (People v. 

Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 343, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 114 P.3d 758; see 

Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 55-57, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 

L.Ed.2d 177.) 

Defendant asserts that he did not have an adequate opportunity to crossexamine Brian Johnsen at the conditional examination because his attorneys 

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later acquired additional information that would have been useful in crossexamining Johnsen. In particular, he calls our attention to the statements that 

Johnsen later made, after he had been charged with capital murder,FN9

admitting that he was aware of and agreed with defendant’s plan to kill 

Holloway. Again, however, the situation is no different than if Johnsen had 

testified at defendant’s preliminary hearing or at a prior trial of defendant on 

the same charges. Absent wrongful failure to timely disclose by the 

prosecution, a defendant’s subsequent discovery of material that might have 

proved useful in cross-examination is not grounds for excluding otherwise 

admissible prior testimony at trial. (See People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 

795, 851, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2 [admission of prior testimony does 

not violate the right of confrontation “regardless whether subsequent 

circumstances bring into question the accuracy or the completeness of the 

earlier testimony.”].) 

FN9. Brian D. Johnsen was sentenced to death on June 9, 1994, 

for crimes committed in Stanislaus County. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 108-16 (alterations in original). While Petitioner also later raised this 

claim in the second state habeas petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see 

Lodgment No. 91), for the reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will address 

the claim on the merits. 

Petitioner alleges several errors in the admission of Johnsen’s conditional 

examination at trial. He asserts that “the state court’s erroneous application of state law 

rendered Mr. Jurado’s trial fundamentally unfair, and thus denied Jurado due process under 

the federal Constitution,” and contends that “Mr. Jurado had a state-created liberty interest 

under California law not to have a conditional examination conducted unless the life of the 

witness is in jeopardy, and thus a violation of that state-created liberty interest and 

subsequent introduction into evidence of the conditional examination testimony violated 

Jurado’s right to due process.” (Pet. Br. at 96) (emphasis in original.) Specifically, 

Petitioner alleges that “[t]here was no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s ruling 

that Johnsen’s life was in jeopardy, and thus the ruling permitting his conditional 

examination violated state law.” (Id. at 100.) Finally, he asserts that the admission of the 

conditional examination testimony was prejudicial and violated his rights to a reliable guilt 

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and sentencing hearing, confrontation, right to present a complete defense, and a 

fundamentally fair trial. (Id. at 96-97.) 

 Respondent maintains that the state court’s rejection of the claim was neither 

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor was it 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Resp. at 47.) Respondent also argues 

that Petitioner’s assertion that the California Supreme Court made an unreasonable factual 

determination in concluding the conditional exam was authorized under California law “is 

not a federal question cognizable in federal habeas.” (Id.) 

 In the reply brief, Petitioner addresses Respondent’s assertion concerning his second 

argument, stating that “petitioner does not seek review of the California Supreme Court’s 

interpretation of California Penal Code sections 1335 and 1336 (i.e., state law), nor its 

holding ‘that under subdivision (b) of section 1335, conditional examination of a 

prosecution witness is permitted in a capital case when the witness’s life is in jeopardy. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 113,’” but that “[i]nstead, petitioner claims that the California 

Supreme Court made an unreasonable factual determination when concluding that the 

requisite showing for a conditional examination had been made-i.e., that Johnsen’s life was 

in jeopardy,” and that this contention “is entirely consistent with federal habeas review.” 

(Reply at 46) (emphasis in original.) 

 While Petitioner clearly indicates in the Reply brief that he only alleges the state 

court’s decision involved an unreasonable factual determination under section 2254(d)(2), 

a plain reading of the SAP and the Group Two merits brief clearly reflects that Petitioner 

also claims that state law error resulted in a denial of federal due process, which falls under 

section 2254(d)(1). (See Pet. Br. at 96-97); (see also SAP at 368-69) (“The State was 

permitted to present Brian Johnsen’s conditional examination testimony to the jury despite 

unequivocal state law prohibiting the use of such evidence in capital cases.”) As such, the 

Court will examine both arguments. 

Federal habeas relief is not available based on alleged errors of state law unless that 

error violated a petitioner’s federal constitutional rights. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 

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62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine statecourt determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court 

is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 

the United States.”); see also Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 

1991) (“The issue for us, always, is whether the state proceedings satisfied due process; 

the presence or absence of a state law violation is largely beside the point.”); OrtizSandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 1996) (“While a petitioner for federal 

habeas relief may not challenge the application of state evidentiary rules, he is entitled to 

relief if the evidentiary decision created an absence of fundamental fairness that ‘fatally 

infected the trial.’”), quoting Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 

1986). 

 Here, the California Supreme Court analyzed the relevant sections of California law 

concerning conditional examinations, as well as discussed and considered the California 

Constitution, in holding that: “We conclude, therefore, that under subdivision (b) of section 

1335, conditional examination of a prosecution witness is permitted in a capital case when 

the witness’s life is in jeopardy.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 113. Respondent correctly notes 

that this Court, reviewing a claim of state law error such as this one, is bound by the 

California Supreme Court’s interpretation of California law. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 

U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (“We have repeatedly held that a state court’s interpretation of state 

law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal 

court sitting in habeas corpus.”) Although there is no error in the state court’s finding that 

a conditional examination is permitted, Petitioner also alleges there is error in the 

application of that rule in his case. 

However, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the state court’s decision was factually 

erroneous, much less that it involved an unreasonable factual determination. Section 

2254(d)(2) provides an avenue for federal habeas relief in the event that the state court’s 

decision was based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(2). “Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear 

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and convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision adjudicated on the 

merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual 

grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the statecourt proceeding, § 2254(d)(2).” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Taylor v. Maddox, 

366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n concluding that a state-court finding is 

unsupported by substantial evidence in the state-court record, it is not enough that we 

would reverse in similar circumstances if this were an appeal from a district court decision. 

Rather, we must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of 

appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the 

record.”), abrogated on other grounds by Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 999-1000 (9th 

Cir. 2014). 

As the California Supreme Court noted, at the time of Petitioner’s trial, section 

1335(b) provided for a conditional exam “if the people have evidence that the life of the 

witness is in jeopardy.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 110. Petitioner contends that the California 

Supreme Court made an unreasonable factual determination when it concluded that the 

prosecutor properly demonstrated that a conditional examination was warranted. Petitioner 

asserts that “[t]here was no credible evidence that Johnsen’s life was in jeopardy,” and 

alleges that “the state presented only speculation and conjecture, and absolutely no 

evidence, that Johnsen’s life was in jeopardy.” (Pet. Br. at 99.) Petitioner contends that: 

“There was no known threat to Johnsen’s life. The declaration of DDA Pettine did not 

explain-with competent evidence or otherwise- how Johnsen’s life would be jeopardized 

when it was Johnsen who threatened Mynatt’s life, not Mynatt who threatened Johnsen’s 

life.” (Id. at 102.) 

 The California Supreme Court found the prosecutor’s proffer was sufficient and the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in authorizing the conditional examination, reasoning 

as follows: 

In particular, it was not necessary, under the circumstances of this case, 

for the prosecution to present evidence that anyone had expressly threatened 

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Johnsen or conspired to harm him. Because of the evidence that defendant, 

Shigemura, and Humiston had killed Holloway to prevent her from exposing 

a plot to kill Mynatt, the trial court-who both granted the application for 

conditional examination and served as magistrate in the taking of the 

examination-could justifiably conclude that defendant and the persons with 

whom he associated would be likely to use deadly force against anyone 

perceived as a threat, and that the substance of Johnsen’s proposed testimony 

made him an actual or potential threat to defendant and his codefendants, and 

also to Mynatt. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 114. 

This evidence supported a conclusion that Johnsen’s life was in jeopardy due to his 

proposed testimony. Johnsen indicated that Holloway had been killed to prevent her from 

revealing the plan to kill Doug Mynatt. As such, Johnsen, by testifying, put himself in a 

position similar to Holloway in the view of Petitioner and his co-defendants. Additionally, 

given that Johnsen participated in the plot against Mynatt, Johnsen could have expected 

retaliation from Mynatt or his associates. In advance of the conditional examination, the 

prosecutor submitted a declaration stating that “Mr. JOHNSEN, who was in custody on the 

date of the Holloway murder, is currently out of custody,” that “Mr. Mynatt’s current 

whereabouts is unknown,” and that “[d]eclarant believes that once this information 

becomes known, witness BRIAN JOHNSEN’s life will be jeopardized by Mr. Mynatt, the 

defendants, and/or their associates.” (CT 69.) In light of the prosecutor’s declaration, the 

Court cannot conclude that the state court’s finding is unsupported by the record or that the 

decision involved an unreasonable determination of the facts. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 

340; see also Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000 (“[W]e must be convinced that an appellate panel, 

applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the 

finding is supported by the record.”) 

Nor does Petitioner demonstrate that the admission of Johnsen’s testimony rendered 

his trial unfair or his guilt determination unreliable. Petitioner argues that Johnsen’s 

testimony was critical to both the guilt verdict and the death judgment, asserting that 

“Johnsen was the only witness to testify regarding a plan to kill Mynatt, the underpinning 

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for the prosecution’s theory of conspiracy, murder and the special circumstance of lying in 

wait to kill Holloway,” and that “[i]n fact, without Johnsen’s testimony, the state would 

not have sought the death penalty against Mr. Jurado.” (Pet. Br. at 101.) The Court 

previously examined the importance of Johnsen’s testimony in this respect in adjudicating 

Claim 1.I in the Group One Order (in which Petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel in stipulating to Johnsen’s unavailability as a witness) and finds the prior analysis 

applicable to the instant claim. As outlined in the Group One Order: 

While Johnsen was an important witness, the other evidence of 

premeditation, planning and lying in wait was strong. In the days prior to the 

May 1991 murder, Petitioner approached David and Jeff Colson on separate 

occasions and unsuccessfully tried to borrow Jeff’s shotgun, telling David that 

he “needed to do somebody up” and informing Jeff that he “had a job to do.” 

While at Schmidt’s apartment on the evening of Holloway’s murder, while 

Holloway was on the phone with Johnsen, Petitioner asked Schmidt for a 

chain to tie up Johnsen’s bikes. When Schmidt provided Petitioner with wire, 

Petitioner placed it around his neck, clenched his fists and said “that will do.” 

The medical examiner stated that marks on the victim’s neck could have been 

from manual or ligature strangulation. 

Schmidt also testified that Petitioner had several extended interactions 

with both Shigemura and Humiston that evening. Petitioner also directed 

Schmidt to lie to Holloway about needing to leave the apartment to get her off 

the phone with Johnsen, after which Holloway left in the company of 

Humiston, Shigemura and Petitioner. Petitioner later told David Silva that 

Holloway sat in the front seat of Humiston’s car that evening, while the 

medical examiner found it possible that many of the injuries to the victim’s 

head and neck could have come from behind, and noted that the bite mark was 

found on the victim’s back. When Shigemura later told Baldwin that she no 

longer needed what she had asked for, she stated in Petitioner’s presence that: 

“We took care of our problem and dumped the body off at Balboa Park” while 

Petitioner remained silent. 

(ECF No. 171 at 73.) Johnsen was admittedly an important witness. Yet, the record reflects 

that apart from Johnsen’s testimony, the other evidence on the charged crimes and special 

circumstance was substantial. As such, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the admission 

of Johnsen’s conditional examination testimony rendered his trial fundamentally unfair or 

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his guilt determination unreliable so as to merit habeas relief. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 

F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Although the Court has been clear that a writ should be 

issued when constitutional errors have rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, see 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 375, it has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or 

overly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant 

issuance of the writ.”); see also Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(“Admission of evidence violates due process ‘[o]nly if there are no permissible inferences 

the jury may draw’ from it.”) (alteration in original), quoting Jammal, 926 F.2d 920. 

With respect to his contention that admission of the conditional examination 

rendered his penalty determination unreliable, Petitioner generally asserts that “[a]t the 

penalty phase, the admission of non-statutory aggravating evidence violates a defendant’s 

Eighth Amendment rights to a reliable sentencing determination.” (Pet. Br. 96-97.) In the 

SAP, Petitioner asserts that he “was sentenced to die on the basis of Johnsen’s conditional 

examination testimony,” and that testimony “was the foundation upon which the State built 

its case for capital murder.” (SAP at 394.) Given the significant evidence in aggravation 

wholly independent of Johnsen’s testimony, including but not limited to the brutality of the 

murder itself and Petitioner’s prior criminal activity, the Court finds no merit to this 

contention. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983) (“What is important at the 

selection stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the 

individual and the circumstances of the crime.”) 

Finally, Petitioner argues that the use of Johnsen’s conditional examination 

testimony at trial violated Petitioner’s constitutional right to confront and cross-examine 

witnesses against him and his right to present a complete defense. (SAP at 390.) The Sixth 

Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right “to be 

confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. Am. VI. “The central concern of 

the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal 

defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding 

before the trier of fact.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990). “Testimonial 

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statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is 

unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” 

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). 

In recounting the trial proceedings concerning Johnsen’s examination, the California 

Supreme Court specifically noted that: “At trial, the parties stipulated to Johnsen’s 

unavailability as a witness.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 109. The state court rejected Petitioner’s 

argument of constitutional error in this regard, finding that “Johnsen testified under oath at 

the conditional examination, and defendant had a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine 

him at that time,” and reasoning that “[w]hen a defendant has had an adequate opportunity 

for cross-examination and the witness is unavailable at trial, use of prior testimony does 

not violate the defendant’s rights under the federal Constitution.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 

115, citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55-57. 

This Court’s own review of the record confirms the accuracy of the California 

Supreme Court’s factual findings, as the parties stipulated to Johnsen’s unavailability as a 

witness, and the trial court accepted the stipulation and stated: “And for my purposes, then, 

or for all purposes here in this trial, we’ll consider that the court has found pursuant to that 

stipulation that within the meaning of any applicable law as it relates to Mr. Johnsen that 

he is unavailable within the meaning of that law.” (RT 1654.) At the conditional 

examination itself, Petitioner’s counsel cross-examined Johnsen; Johnsen was also crossexamined by counsel for co-defendant Shigemura. (See PRT 148-216, 226-31.) 

In the SAP, Petitioner nonetheless asserts that “Johnsen’s conditional examination 

testimony did not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception and thus, did not possess 

the inherent reliability that renders established hearsay exceptions particularly worthy of 

belief under the Confrontation Clause.” (SAP at 390.) A review of this argument reveals 

that Petitioner premises this argument on pre-Crawford case law, including Ohio v. 

Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), which Petitioner relies upon to assert that “an unavailable 

witness’ out-of-court statements satisfy the demands of the Confrontation Clause only if 

they ‘bear() adequate indicia of reliability,’ and that “[r]eliability is inferred were the 

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evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception; otherwise, the evidence is 

admissible only upon ‘a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’” (SAP 

at 390, quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.) In Crawford, the Supreme Court specifically 

abrogated Roberts on this point, holding that: “Where testimonial statements are at issue, 

the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the 

Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69; see also id. 

at 61 (“Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to 

leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less 

to amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’ Certainly none of the authorities discussed above 

acknowledges any general reliability exception to the common-law rule. Admitting 

statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of 

confrontation. To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, 

but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence 

be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible 

of cross-examination.”) 

Indeed, as noted above, the California Supreme Court correctly recognized and 

applied Crawford, which was issued in 2004, in adjudicating this claim on direct appeal in 

2006. See Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 115, citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55-57. Because 

Crawford was issued before Petitioner’s conviction was final and therefore governs the 

Court’s consideration of this claim under AEDPA,19 Petitioner fails to state a claim of 

constitutional error in this regard, as it is clear both that Johnsen was unavailable as a 

                                               

19 In the Group Two Merits Brief with respect to Claim 12, Petitioner appears to 

acknowledge that Crawford sets forth the clearly established law with respect to the 

analysis of Confrontation Clause claims, stating: “Because Mr. Jurado’s direct appeal was 

still pending when Crawford was announced, Crawford and its progeny provide the 

controlling law in this case. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007).” (Pet. Br. at 

105.)

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witness and that the defense had an opportunity to cross-examine Johnsen during the 

conditional examination. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. 

Even were Petitioner somehow able to demonstrate that the California Supreme 

Court’s rejection of the confrontation claim was unreasonable, habeas relief is unavailable 

because Petitioner fails to show that the admission of Johnsen’s conditional examination 

had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” See 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); United States v. Nielsen, 371 F.3d 574, 

581 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless error 

analysis, because ‘the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect 

one.’”), quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680-81 (1986). 

As discussed previously and in greater detail elsewhere in this Order, apart from 

Johnsen’s testimony, there was significant other evidence of planning and premeditation, 

including Petitioner’s unsuccessful attempts to obtain a gun in the days prior to the murder, 

his successful attempt to obtain a chain on the night of the murder, and the evidence of 

subterfuge in getting the victim to accompany him, Shigemura and Humiston on the night 

of the murder. In light of the other evidence against Petitioner, the Court is not persuaded 

that the admission of Johnsen’s conditional examination testimony had a “substantial and 

injurious effect or influence” in determining the jury’s guilt or penalty phase verdicts. See 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

Nor does Petitioner demonstrate that the admission of Johnsen’s testimony violated 

his right to present a complete defense “by denying him the opportunity to effectively 

cross-examine Johnsen.” (SAP at 395.) “Whether rooted directly in the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation 

clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a 

meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 

690 (1986), quoting Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485. Again, defense counsel cross-examined 

Johnsen at the conditional examination. When later offered the opportunity to impeach 

Johnsen’s conditional examination testimony with the statements and letters to Holland, 

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the defense declined and in fact successfully sought to have those materials excluded from 

evidence. (See CT 907-09; RT 1883-84.) As such, the trial court did not prevent Petitioner 

from impeaching Johnsen’s testimony, except by the defense’s own request to exclude that 

evidence, and he fails to demonstrate that his ability to present a defense was impeded by 

the method of impeachment made available to him. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 

15, 20 (1985) (“Generally speaking, the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity

for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, 

and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”); see also Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 

505, 509 (2013) (collecting cases and observing that “[o]nly rarely have we held that the 

right to present a complete defense was violated by the exclusion of defense evidence under 

a state rule of evidence.”) (emphasis added). 

 Petitioner has not demonstrated that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this 

claim was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 

law, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Because Petitioner 

has not satisfied the provisions of § 2254(d), he is not entitled to habeas relief or evidentiary 

development on Claim 11. Sully, 725 F.3d at 1075; Totten, 137 F.3d at 1176. 

2. Claim 12

 Petitioner contends that Shigemura’s statements to Steven Baldwin, which were 

introduced at Petitioner’s trial, were erroneously allowed into evidence as exceptions to the 

hearsay rule, and the admission of that evidence violated Petitioner’s federal constitutional 

rights to a fair trial, due process, confrontation and a reliable guilt and penalty 

determination. (SAP at 411.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in overruling defense 

hearsay objections to the testimony of Steven Baldwin relating out-of-court 

statements by Denise Shigemura. Baldwin testified that on the day after 

Holloway’s murder, defendant and Shigemura came to his house with Mark 

Schmidt. As the four of them sat together in the living room, Shigemura said 

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to Baldwin: “I no longer need what it was I asked you for. We took care of 

the problem and we dumped the body at Balboa Park.” Baldwin testified that 

he thought Shigemura was referring to a conversation a few days earlier 

during which she had asked him if he could get her a “gat” because she had a 

problem she needed to take care of. The trial court admitted this evidence 

under the adoptive admissions exception to the hearsay rule. 

“Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made 

inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is one of which the party, 

with knowledge of the content thereof, has by words or other conduct 

manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth.” (Evid.Code, § 1221.) When 

a defendant remains silent after a statement alleging the defendant’s 

participation in a crime, under circumstances that fairly afford the defendant 

an opportunity to hear, understand, and reply, the statement is admissible as 

an adoptive admission, unless the circumstances support an inference that the 

defendant was relying on the right of silence guaranteed by the Fifth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. (People v. Riel (2000) 22 

Cal.4th 1153, 1189, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969; People v. Mayfield

(1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 741, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) 

Denise Shigemura’s out-of-court statement-“We took care of the 

problem and we dumped the body at Balboa Park”-was admissible as an 

adoptive admission by defendant. He must have heard and understood the 

statement because he was sitting on the same couch with Shigemura, the 

circumstances called for a denial or protest if the statement was inaccurate, 

nothing prevented him from making a response, and nothing supports an 

inference that he was relying on a constitutional right of silence. In this 

situation, the jury could properly view defendant’s silence as adopting 

Shigemura’s statement. 

Defendant claims that admission of this evidence violated his right of 

confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution. He did 

not, however, make a specific objection on constitutional grounds at trial. 

Assuming without deciding that the issue is preserved for appellate review 

(see People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 

891 P.2d 93; see also People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 

644, 122 P.3d 765), the claim is without merit. The right of confrontation is 

not violated when the jury hears evidence, from a witness subject to crossexamination, relating a defendant’s own out-of-court statements and adoptive 

admissions. (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 711, fn. 25, 27 

Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289; People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 842-

843, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) 

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As defendant points out, he was not present a few days before when 

Shigemura asked Baldwin for a “gat” and said she needed it to take care of a 

problem, so this earlier statement was not admissible as an adoptive 

admission. The request for the gun, by itself, was not hearsay, however, 

because an out-of-court statement is hearsay only when it is “offered to prove 

the truth of the matter stated.” (Evid.Code, § 1200.) Because a request, by 

itself, does not assert the truth of any fact, it cannot be offered to prove the 

truth of the matter stated. (See People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 741, 

60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485 [pleas for help “were not hearsay because they 

were not admitted for the truth of the matter stated”]; People v. Bolden (1996) 

44 Cal.App.4th 707, 714-715, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 [request that defendant “not 

come around the house anymore” was not hearsay because it was not offered 

for the truth of matter stated]; People v. Reyes (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 53, 67, 

132 Cal.Rptr. 848 [“words of direction or authorization do not constitute 

hearsay since they are not offered to prove the truth of any matter asserted by 

such words”].) Thus, Shigemura’s request for a gun was not hearsay. 

Shigemura’s earlier out-of-court statement to Baldwin was hearsay 

insofar as it asserted that Shigemura had a problem that she needed to take 

care of. The Attorney General argues that it was admissible under the 

coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule (Evid.Code, § 1223) because it 

was made to further a conspiracy between defendant, Shigemura, and Brian 

Johnsen to kill Doug Mynatt. There was no substantial evidence at trial, 

however, that these three individuals reached any agreement to kill Doug 

Mynatt until the evening of May 15, 1991, shortly before Holloway’s murder, 

whereas Shigemura’s statement to Baldwin occurred a day or two earlier. 

Accordingly, this statement was not admissible under the coconspirator 

exception to the hearsay rule, and the trial court erred in not excluding it. 

Even if we assume this error violated defendant’s right of confrontation 

under the federal Constitution, reversal is not required because defendant 

suffered no prejudice. Shigemura repeated the substance of the earlier hearsay 

statement (that she had a problem she needed to take care of) in defendant’s 

presence (“We took care of the problem and we dumped the body at Balboa 

Park”) and defendant by his conduct adopted that statement as his own. We 

conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 116-18 (alterations in original). While Petitioner also later raised 

this claim in the second state habeas petition and the state court imposed procedural bars 

(see Lodgment No. 91), for the reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will 

address the claim on the merits. 

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As discussed above, to establish a federal due process violation arising from a claim 

of state law error, such as the error asserted here through the admission of Shigemura’s 

statements, that evidence must have “so fatally infected the proceedings as to render them 

fundamentally unfair.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919; see also McGuire, 502 U.S. at 68-73. To 

warrant habeas relief, the Court must also conclude that the error had a “substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

 With respect to Shigemura’s statement after the crime, which the trial court ruled 

was admissible as an adoptive admission, Petitioner acknowledges that “pure state law 

claims (even if incorrectly decided) are not reviewable on federal habeas,” but nonetheless 

contends that “the state court’s erroneous application of state law rendered Mr. Jurado’s 

trial fundamentally unfair, and thus denied Jurado due process under the federal 

Constitution, which is an issue reviewable on federal habeas.” (Reply at 47-48.) With 

respect to Shigemura’s statement several days before the crime, which the trial court 

admitted under a co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, Petitioner contends that this 

too presents a federal claim because the California Supreme Court analyzed the contention 

by assuming that the error in admitting that statement rose to the level of a Confrontation 

Clause violation and conducted harmless error review under the federal standard. (Id. at 

48, citing Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 118.) 

The California Supreme Court held that “[w]hen a defendant remains silent after a 

statement alleging the defendant’s participation in a crime, under circumstances that fairly 

afford the defendant an opportunity to hear, understand, and reply, the statement is 

admissible as an adoptive admission, unless the circumstances support an inference that 

the defendant was relying on the right of silence guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 116. Again, this Court is bound by 

the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of California law. See Richey, 546 U.S. at 

76 (“We have repeatedly held that a state court’s interpretation of state law, including one 

announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in 

habeas corpus.”) While there is no error in the state court’s holding that an adoptive 

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admission constitutes a hearsay exception and can be admissible, Petitioner contends that 

the state court erred in applying the rule to his case. 

The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that Shigemura’s 

post-crime statement “was admissible as an adoptive admission by defendant.” Jurado, 38 

Cal. 4th at 116-17. In finding Shigemura’s statement that “We took care of the problem 

and dumped the body at Balboa Park” to be admissible, the California Supreme Court 

reasoned that Petitioner “must have heard and understood the statement because he was 

sitting on the same couch with Shigemura, the circumstances called for a denial or protest 

if the statement was inaccurate, nothing prevented him from making a response, and 

nothing supports an inference that he was relying on a constitutional right of silence.” Id. 

at 117. To support his contention that Shigemura’s post-crime statement was not 

admissible as his own adoptive admission, Petitioner suggests that the “we” in “We took 

care of the problem and dumped the body at Balboa Park,” could have actually referred to 

Shigemura and Schmidt, rather than Shigemura and Petitioner, and as such, Petitioner 

would not have had a reason to respond to Shigemura’s statement. (SAP at 414-15, Pet. 

Br. at 106-08.) To the extent Petitioner argues that this supports a conclusion that the 

California Supreme Court’s decision involved an unreasonable determination of the facts, 

a review of the record supports the reasonableness of the state court’s decision. While the 

record reflects that Schmidt accompanied Petitioner and Shigemura to Baldwin’s home, 

Baldwin testified that Schmidt was “excited and nervous-acting” and stated: “You have to 

hear this, what they have to say, you have to hear this. Can we come in?” (RT 2451) 

(emphasis added.) Baldwin noted that during the conversation he was seated on one couch 

next to Schmidt, while Shigemura and Petitioner were seated on the other. (Id.) Petitioner 

also asserts that he “barely knew, and never confided in, Baldwin, and most likely knew 

him only as a methamphetamine user and a convicted felon,” and “[t]here is no reason why 

Mr. Jurado would have responded to Shigemura’s statement in Baldwin’s presence.” (Pet. 

Br. at 107-08.) A review of the trial transcript reflects that Baldwin knew and was 

acquainted with Petitioner and knew Shigemura through Mark Schmidt. (RT 2446.) 

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Baldwin stated that he knew Petitioner “maybe two months” prior to that conversation, had 

“met him on a few occasions,” and agreed he did not know Petitioner or Shigemura very 

well. (RT 2455-56.) The record also reflects that Baldwin used methamphetamine on 

occasion during the time he was acquainted with Petitioner and Shigemura, and that he had 

been previously convicted of a felony. (RT 2456.) However, Petitioner fails to indicate 

and the record does not reflect whether Petitioner was aware of Baldwin’s drug use and 

prior convictions during their acquaintance or if he subsequently learned that information. 

In any event, even assuming Petitioner’s acquaintance with Baldwin was marginal, 

Shigemura’s post-crime statement that they took care of a problem and dumped the body, 

made while sitting right next to Petitioner, clearly invited a denial, rebuttal or clarification 

if untrue or inaccurate, regardless of the quality of the audience. 

Given the deference with which this Court must treat the state court’s factual 

findings, and in light of the record support for the state court’s findings in this instance, the 

Court is not persuaded that the California Supreme Court’s decision was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. See Rice, 546 U.S. at 338-39 (“State-court factual 

findings, moreover, are presumed correct; the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the 

presumption by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’”), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

Petitioner also fails to show that the admission of Shigemura’s statements violated 

his rights to due process, a fair trial, or to a reliable guilt determination. He argues that 

Shigemura’s statements allowed corroboration of the conspiracy, which in turn provided a 

motive for the murder, as well as provided evidence of planning and premeditation with 

respect to the murder. However, the record reflects sufficient evidence apart from 

Shigemura’s statements on these crimes, including but not limited to Schmidt’s testimony 

about Petitioner’s request for a chain, Petitioner’s conversations with Shigemura and 

Humiston, Petitioner’s request for Schmidt to lie to Holloway to get her to leave with the 

group, Petitioner’s subsequent statements to David Silva and others about the crime, his 

subsequent behavior, and the physical evidence. Moreover, as noted above, even if the 

Court were to find federal error, the Supreme Court “has not yet made a clear ruling that 

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admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation 

sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ.” Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. 

The Court also remains unpersuaded that the admission of Shigemura’s statements 

violated his right to a reliable sentencing determination. Petitioner simply asserts that “[a]t 

the penalty phase, the admission of non-statutory aggravating evidence- here the admission 

of Shigemura’s out-of-court statements- violated Mr. Jurado’s Eighth Amendment right to 

a reliable sentencing determination.” (Pet. Br. at 110.) Petitioner alleges that “[t]he 

statements-suggesting a premeditated intent to kill arrived at a few days prior to the killingwas significant evidence in aggravation.” (Reply at 50.) However, as previously noted, in 

light of the substantial evidence in aggravation wholly independent of those statements, 

including but not limited to the brutality of the murder itself and Petitioner’s prior criminal 

activity, this contention fails. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 879 (“What is important at the selection 

stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and 

the circumstances of the crime.”) 

 In the briefing, Petitioner separately asserts that the admission of Shigemura’s 

statements violated his constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause. (See e.g. Pet. 

Brief at 104-05, 110.) With respect to Shigemura’s post-crime statement made in 

Petitioner’s presence, the California Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s Confrontation 

Clause argument, reasoning that: “The right of confrontation is not violated when the jury 

hears evidence, from a witness subject to cross-examination, relating a defendant’s own 

out-of-court statements and adoptive admissions.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 117. With respect 

to Shigemura’s pre-crime statement, the California Supreme Court reasoned that: 

Even if we assume this error violated defendant’s right of confrontation 

under the federal Constitution, reversal is not required because defendant 

suffered no prejudice. Shigemura repeated the substance of the earlier hearsay 

statement (that she had a problem she needed to take care of) in defendant’s 

presence (“We took care of the problem and we dumped the body at Balboa 

Park”) and defendant by his conduct adopted that statement as his own. We 

conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Id. at 118. 

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As an initial matter, the Court is not persuaded that either statement actually falls 

under the purview of the Confrontation Clause, as the Supreme Court emphasized that 

“only testimonial statements are excluded by the Confrontation Clause.” Giles v. 

California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008) (emphasis in original). Given the circumstances 

surrounding Shigemura’s statements, both of which were utterances made during private 

conversation between acquaintances, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that either statement 

raises Confrontation Clause concerns.20 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“An accuser who 

makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person 

who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”); see also Ohio v. Clark, 576 

U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 2180 (2015) (“[A] statement cannot fall within the Confrontation 

Clause unless its primary purpose was testimonial. ‘Where no such primary purpose exists, 

the admissibility of a statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not 

the Confrontation Clause.’”), quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 359 (2011). 

First, the California Supreme Court reasonably concluded that Shigemura’s postcrime statement did not violate the Confrontation Clause given Petitioner’s adoption of that 

statement as his own, again, holding that: “The right of confrontation is not violated when 

the jury hears evidence, from a witness subject to cross-examination, relating a defendant’s 

own out-of-court statements and adoptive admissions.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 117. 

Petitioner fails to cite to any clearly established law holding that the introduction of a 

defendant’s own adoptive admission implicates the Confrontation Clause. As Respondent 

correctly notes, several circuits have rejected such a proposition. (See Ans. Mem. at 267, 

citing United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579 (8th Cir. 2003); Newman v. River, 125 F.3d 

315 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405 (7th Cir. 1993).) Even so, 

Petitioner accurately notes that the Ninth Circuit held, prior to Crawford, although “there 

                                               

20 At oral arguments, the Court asked counsel to address the Confrontation Clause 

aspect of this claim, and Petitioner appeared to acknowledge that the claim was primarily 

a due process and Eighth Amendment claim rather than a Confrontation Clause claim. 

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is some justification for viewing adoptive admissions as automatically satisfying the 

Confrontation Clause,” that “adoptive admissions do not automatically satisfy the 

Confrontation Clause, at least where the third-party statements alleged to have been 

adopted have probative value independent of the fact that they may have been adopted by 

the defendant.” United States v. Monks, 774 F.2d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 1985). But in this 

case, because Shigemura’s statement that “we” had a problem that had been taken care of 

was only probative to the extent it was adopted by Petitioner due to his presence and silence 

became Petitioner’s own statement, it does not present Confrontation Clause concerns. See 

Allen, 10 F.3d at 413 (“An ‘adoptive admission’ is a statement that the defendant has 

adopted as his own. Thus, the defendant himself is, in effect, the declarant. The ‘witness’ 

against the defendant is the defendant himself, not the actual declarant; there is no violation 

of the defendant’s right to confront the declarant because the defendant only has the right 

to confront ‘the witnesses against him.’”), quoting U.S. Const. Amend. VI. Had Shigemura 

instead made the same post-crime statement outside of Petitioner’s presence and without 

specifically identifying who “we” was comprised of, it would not have independently 

implicated him in the crime. It is evident that the state court was persuaded that Petitioner’s 

presence next to Shigemura, and his silence in the face of her statement that they took care 

of their problem and dumped the body in Balboa Park, allowed the statement to be 

admissible as an adoptive admission. See Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 117. As discussed above, 

Petitioner fails to show that this conclusion was incorrect, much less unreasonable. 

Because Petitioner fails to offer any clearly established federal law supporting his 

contention that allowing his adoptive admission into evidence violated the Confrontation 

Clause, the Court declines to conclude that the state court’s rejection of that argument was 

objectively unreasonable. 

With respect to Shigemura’s earlier pre-crime statement, made outside Petitioner’s 

presence several days before the crime, the California Supreme Court also chose to analyze 

any potential prejudice in its admission, under the assumption that the Confrontation 

Clause applied to that erroneously admitted statement. Petitioner is not entitled to federal 

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habeas relief unless he can show that the state court’s determination that Petitioner was not 

prejudiced and that any error was harmless was itself objectively unreasonable. See Ayala, 

135 S.Ct. at 2199 (“When a Chapman decision is reviewed under AEDPA, ‘a federal court 

may not award habeas relief under § 2254 unless the harmlessness determination itself was 

unreasonable.’”), quoting Fry, 551 U.S. at 119. 

Petitioner first contends that the California Supreme Court’s harmless error 

determination was unreasonable because it was premised not only on the incorrect 

assumption that the earlier statement was repeated in the later statement, but also that the 

later statement was properly admitted into evidence. (Reply at 48-49.) Petitioner again 

asserts that admission of the later post-crime statement actually violated his due process 

rights, and was not itself harmless. (Id. at 49.) Yet, as discussed earlier, Petitioner fails to 

show that the admission of Shigemura’s post-crime statement made in the presence of, and 

adopted by, Petitioner, violated his federal constitutional rights. 

 Petitioner also asserts that the state court’s harmlessness determination was 

unreasonable because the California Supreme Court was incorrect in concluding that 

Shigemura’s later statement that they took care of the problem and dumped the body 

“repeated the substance” of Shigemura’s pre-crime statement that she had a problem she 

needed to take care of. (Pet. Br. at 109.) Petitioner notes that “Shigemura’s earlier hearsay 

statement was inadmissible, and thus the second statement was not merely a repeat of an 

admissible statement.” (Id.) Petitioner also argues that Shigemura’s earlier statement was 

one of “future intent” while the later statement was “recounting past events,” and that only 

the earlier statement “was highly probative of the specific intent elements of conspiracy, 

first-degree murder, and the special circumstance of lying-in-wait.” (Reply at 49.) 

The Court is not persuaded that the noted differences between the two statements 

render the state court’s decision unreasonable. The Court rejects Petitioner’s contention 

that the California Supreme Court was incorrect in finding that the later statement “repeated 

the substance” of the earlier statement. In both conversations, one of which took place 

prior to the murder and the other a few days after, Shigemura spoke to the same individual, 

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Baldwin, about a “problem” she had and referenced taking care of that problem. The 

California Supreme Court also recognized that the earlier pre-crime statement was admitted 

in error, and analyzed the claim accordingly. See Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 117-18. The Court 

is required under AEDPA to apply a presumption of correctness to the state court’s finding, 

which Petitioner has failed to rebut given the similarities between the two statements. See 

Rice, 546 U.S. at 338-39. Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the state court finding was 

unreasonable in light of the evidence in the state record. See Schriro, 550 U.S. at 473 (“The 

question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s 

determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable– a 

substantially higher threshold.”), citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. It is true that 

Shigemura’s earlier statement occurred prior to the murder and discussed an existing 

problem, while in the later statement she indicated that the problem had been taken care of. 

Yet, in addition to rejecting Petitioner’s argument that this distinguishes the substance of 

the two statements, the Court also disagrees with Petitioner’s contention that the earlier 

statement was alone probative of intent, given the clear similarities between the statements. 

Even were Petitioner somehow able to demonstrate that the California Supreme 

Court’s rejection of this claim was unreasonable, habeas relief is unavailable because any 

error from the admission of Shigemura’s statements was harmless. The record reflects 

ample evidence of intent and planning apart from Shigemura’s statements, including, but 

not limited to, Petitioner asking Schmidt for a cord on the evening of the murder, Petitioner 

conferring separately with Humiston and Shigemura, all three co-defendants urging 

Holloway to leave with them, and Petitioner asking Schmidt to lie to Holloway so she 

would leave with them. Meanwhile, as discussed in greater detail below in Claim 13, this 

coupled with the physical evidence clearly supported the jury’s true findings on the lying 

in wait special circumstance, as the victim suffered numerous strangulation-type injuries 

to her neck and blunt force injuries to her head and back consistent with an attack from 

behind, and Petitioner told David Silva that he was in the back seat and Holloway was in 

the front seat that evening. Additionally, Holloway’s body was found in a culvert several 

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miles from Schmidt’s apartment, close in proximity to where Humiston’s car was towed 

from the next morning, further supporting a conclusion that Holloway was not attacked 

immediately upon leaving Schmidt’s apartment, but was instead first taken to a more 

remote location. In light of this evidence, Petitioner fails to show that the admission of 

Shigemura’s statements had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 

the jury’s verdict.” See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637; Nielsen, 371 F.3d at 581 (“Confrontation 

Clause violations are subject to harmless error analysis, because ‘the Constitution entitles 

a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.’”), quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 

680-81. 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this 

claim was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 

law, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Because Petitioner 

fails to satisfy § 2254(d), he is not entitled to habeas relief or evidentiary development on 

Claim 12. Sully, 725 F.3d at 1075; Totten, 137 F.3d at 1176. 

3. Claim 13

 Petitioner argues that the evidence at trial “did not establish beyond a reasonable 

doubt that a conspiracy existed between Petitioner, Shigemura, and Humiston to kill Teresa 

Holloway. Nor did the evidence legally support the conclusion that Petitioner killed 

Holloway while acting with premeditation and deliberation, and while lying-in-wait,” and 

that the insufficiency of the evidence deprived him of his constitutional rights to due 

process, a fair trial, and a reliable guilt and penalty determination. (SAP at 424.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Defendant contends that the evidence presented at the guilt phase was 

insufficient to establish the premeditation element of first degree murder, the 

lying-in-wait special circumstance, and the conspiracy conviction, and he 

asserts that basing a conviction or special circumstance finding on insufficient 

evidence violates his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the federal Constitution to due process of law, a fair trial, and 

reliable verdicts in a capital case. 

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“To determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, 

an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, 

credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 

Cal.4th 1100, 1128, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450; accord, People v. Silva, 

supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 368, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) 

A murder that is premeditated and deliberate is murder of the first 

degree. (§ 189.) “In this context, ‘premeditated’ means ‘considered 

beforehand,’ and ‘deliberate’ means ‘formed or arrived at or determined upon 

as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against 

the proposed course of action.’” (People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 

767, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) “An intentional killing is premeditated 

and deliberate if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection 

rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.” (People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th 

at p. 543, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182.) A reviewing court normally 

considers three kinds of evidence to determine whether a finding of 

premeditation and deliberation is adequately supported-preexisting motive, 

planning activity, and manner of killing-but “[t]hese factors need not be 

present in any particular combination to find substantial evidence of 

premeditation and deliberation.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Combs, supra, 34 

Cal.4th at p. 850, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007; People v. Silva, supra, 

25 Cal.4th at p. 368, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) 

The evidence of preexisting motive was ample. During the days before 

Holloway’s murder, defendant had talked to Brian Johnsen and Denise 

Shigemura about whether they should kill Doug Mynatt, but they had decided 

not to tell Teresa Holloway about this because of concern that she would 

reveal it to the police. On the night of the murder, defendant told Johnsen that 

he had decided to proceed with the plan to kill Mynatt and that it could not 

wait until Johnsen was released from jail. Teresa Holloway then got on the 

phone and asked Johnsen whether there was a plan to kill Mynatt. From this 

evidence, a rational juror could infer that defendant had a motive to kill 

Holloway, to prevent her from revealing his planned killing of Mynatt. 

The evidence of planning activity was ample as well. Shortly before the 

murder, defendant asked Mark Schmidt for a chain. When Schmidt offered 

defendant an 18-inch length of plastic weed-eater cord, defendant wrapped 

the cord around his own neck, with one end in each fist clenched at shoulder 

height, and said: “It will do.” From these actions, a rational juror could infer 

that defendant had already decided to use the cord to strangle Holloway. 

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Defendant then asked Schmidt to tell Teresa Holloway to get off the phone 

because he (Schmidt) needed to leave the apartment. A rational juror could 

infer that defendant made this request so that Holloway would be forced to 

leave Schmidt’s apartment and then could be lured into Anna Humiston’s car, 

where the fatal attack would take place. In the car, defendant positioned 

himself directly behind Holloway. A rational juror could infer that defendant 

did so to facilitate his planned strangulation of Holloway. 

Because this evidence of preexisting motive and planning activity was 

by itself sufficient to support the first degree murder conviction on a theory 

of premeditation and deliberation, we need not review the evidence 

concerning the manner of killing. 

The lying-in-wait special circumstance requires proof of “an intentional 

murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a concealment of 

purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune 

time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an 

unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage.” (People v. Morales (1989) 

48 Cal.3d 527, 557, 257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244; accord, People v. Combs, 

supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 853, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007; People v. 

Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 516, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032.) 

There is sufficient evidence that defendant concealed from Holloway 

his purpose to kill her. As explained earlier, there is substantial evidence from 

which a rational juror could infer that defendant had already formed this 

purpose when he obtained a cord from Mark Schmidt that could be used to 

strangle Holloway. He did not reveal that purpose to Holloway immediately 

by attacking her, but instead lured her into Humiston’s car. 

There is sufficient evidence of a substantial period of watching and 

waiting for an opportune time to act. The place where Teresa Holloway’s body 

was found was two to three miles from Mark Schmidt’s apartment. A rational 

juror could infer that defendant did not attack Holloway immediately after 

luring her into Humiston’s car, but instead waited for a substantial period 

while the car was driven to a location where there was little risk that the attack 

would be observed by other motorists or by pedestrians. 

Finally, there is substantial evidence that once the car reached a suitable 

location, defendant immediately launched a surprise attack on an 

unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage. Defendant ensured a 

position of advantage by occupying the back seat of Humiston’s car, directly 

behind Teresa Holloway. From the blood evidence found in the car, the very 

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nature of the planned attack, and the lack of injury to defendant, Humiston, or 

Shigemura, a rational juror could infer that Holloway was taken by surprise, 

with little or no opportunity to escape or fight back. 

In concluding that the evidence is sufficient to support the lying-in-wait 

special circumstance, we are guided by this court’s decisions in People v. 

Combs, supra, 34 Cal.4th 821, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007, and People 

v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d 527, 257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244, which 

involved nearly identical facts. In Combs and Morales, as here, the defendant 

armed himself with a weapon suitable for use in strangulation, lured an 

unsuspecting victim into the front seat of an automobile, positioned himself 

directly behind the victim, waited until the car reached a suitable location, and 

then launched a surprise attack on the unsuspecting victim. (People v. Combs, 

supra, at p. 853, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007; People v. Morales, supra, 

at p. 554, 257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244.) In Morales, as here, the defendant 

bludgeoned the victim to death after an initial attempt at strangulation was 

unsuccessful. (People v. Morales, supra, at p. 554, 257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 

244.) 

We consider next defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the conspiracy conviction. 

“A conviction of conspiracy requires proof that the defendant and 

another person had the specific intent to agree or conspire to commit an 

offense, as well as the specific intent to commit the elements of that offense, 

together with proof of the commission of an overt act ‘by one or more of the 

parties to such agreement’ in furtherance of the conspiracy.” (People v. 

Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 416, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 975 P.2d 1071;

accord, People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1131, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 

25 P.3d 641.) “Disagreement as to who the coconspirators were or who did an 

overt act, or exactly what that act was, does not invalidate a conspiracy 

conviction, as long as a unanimous jury is convinced beyond a reasonable 

doubt that a conspirator did commit some overt act in furtherance of the 

conspiracy.” (People v. Russo, supra, at p. 1135, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 

641.) 

Here, defendant’s plan to attack and kill Teresa Holloway in Anna 

Humiston’s car required the cooperation of Humiston and Denise Shigemura. 

There is ample evidence that one or both of them did agree or conspire to 

commit the murder. Shigemura shared defendant’s motive to kill Holloway, 

because she also had been part of the plot to kill Doug Mynatt and, like 

defendant, would be put at risk if Holloway revealed that plot. Although there 

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is no direct evidence that defendant and Shigemura discussed in advance the 

killing of Holloway, there was evidence that they were alone together at Mark 

Schmidt’s residence shortly before the killing, during which a discussion and 

agreement could have taken place. Shigemura’s later conduct provided 

additional evidence that she agreed to the murder. She was driving 

Humiston’s car at the time of the fatal attack, she did not separate herself from 

defendant or report the killing afterward, and with defendant’s help she 

concocted a false story to explain why, on the night of Holloway’s murder, 

she failed to return to the halfway house where she was then required to live. 

As for Humiston, there was evidence that defendant engaged in an intense 

conversation with her at Schmidt’s residence, that she allowed Shigemura to 

drive her car, and that she did not report the murder afterward and continued 

to associate with defendant. From this evidence, a rational juror could 

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant and either Shigemura or 

Humiston (or both) had the specific intent to agree or conspire to murder 

Holloway, as well as the specific intent to commit the elements of murder. 

The overt act requirement was also satisfied. The prosecution alleged 

five overt acts in support of the conspiracy charge. Two alleged overt acts 

occurred before Holloway’s murder (defendant, Denise Shigemura, and Anna 

Humiston met with Teresa Holloway at Mark Schmidt’s residence and 

defendant, Shigemura, Humiston, and Holloway left Schmidt’s residence in 

Humiston’s car); two alleged acts occurred after the murder (defendant, 

Shigemura, and Humiston placed Holloway’s body in the culvert and walked 

to a nearby phone from which defendant called to request a ride); and one 

alleged act was the murder itself. The jury returned “not true” findings on the 

preoffense overt acts allegations, but it found each of the other overt act 

allegations to be true. 

Commission of the target offense in furtherance of the conspiracy 

satisfies the overt act requirement. (People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 

966, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388.) Because the jury found that defendant 

committed the murder itself in furtherance of the conspiracy, and because 

substantial evidence supports that finding, the overt act requirement is 

satisfied. Although defendant is correct that the overt act requirement may not 

be satisfied by conduct occurring after the target offense is complete (People 

v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 560, 134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75), 

defendant was not prejudiced by the jury’s consideration of the invalid 

postoffense overt act allegations, and the valid finding of a single overt act is 

sufficient to support the conspiracy verdict. (People v. Padilla, supra, at pp. 

965-966, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388.) 

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Defendant argues that the jury’s “not true” findings on the preoffense 

overt act allegations conclusively demonstrate the jury’s rejection of the 

prosecution’s theory that defendant had agreed with Shigemura or Humiston 

(or both) to kill Holloway before Holloway was lured into Humiston’s car, 

and that this inconsistency fatally undermines the conspiracy verdict. We 

disagree. An inconsistency between a “not true” finding on an overt act and a 

verdict or another finding is not a ground for overturning the inconsistent 

verdict or finding. (People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 862, 134 

Cal.Rptr.2d 602, 69 P.3d 446; see People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 

911, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 884 P.2d 81 [recognizing that an apparently 

inconsistent not true finding may be the result of mistake, compromise, or 

lenity].) 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 118-22 (alteration in original). While Petitioner also later raised this 

claim in the second state habeas petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see 

Lodgment No. 91), for the reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will address 

the claim on the merits. 

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which 

he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). To that end, in reviewing a claim 

that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction, “the relevant question is whether, 

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). In other words, “the 

applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence 

adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Id. at 324. “The Jackson standard ‘must be applied with explicit 

reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.’” 

Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004), quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 

n.16. Moreover, because this petition is governed by AEDPA, in order to merit habeas 

relief, Petitioner must also demonstrate that the state court’s adjudication of his claim 

involved an objectively unreasonable application of Jackson. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 

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F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005) (“After AEDPA, we apply the standards of Jackson with 

an additional layer of deference.”): see also Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012) 

(per curiam) (“We have made clear that Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas 

proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference.”) 

A. First-Degree Murder

 With respect to the first-degree murder conviction, Petitioner asserts that the 

evidence presented failed to establish either premeditation or deliberation. In accordance 

with California Penal Code section 189, which states in part that: “All murder which is 

perpetrated . . . by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, . . . is 

murder of the first degree,” Petitioner’s jury was instructed that: 

All murder which is perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and 

premeditated killing with express malice aforethought is murder of the first 

degree. 

The word “willful,” as used in this instruction, means intentional. 

The word “deliberate” means formed or arrived at or determined upon 

as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against 

the proposed course of action. The word “premeditated” means considered 

beforehand. 

If you find that the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear, 

deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result of 

deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon preexisting reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition 

precluding the idea of deliberation, it is murder of the first degree. 

(CT 1223.) 

 The California Supreme Court has “identified three categories of evidence which 

this court has found sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation: (1) 

facts showing planning activity; (2) facts suggesting motive; and (3) facts about the manner 

of killing which suggest a preconceived design.” People v. Lucero, 44 Cal. 3d 1006, 1018 

(1988), citing People v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d 15, 26-27 (1968). “When the record discloses 

evidence in all three categories, the verdict generally will be sustained. Otherwise, 

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convictions for first degree murder typically have been upheld where there is ‘either very 

strong evidence of planning, or some evidence of motive in conjunction with planning or 

a deliberate manner of killing.’” People v. Proctor, 4 Cal. 4th 499, 529 (1992), quoting 

People v. Raley, 2 Cal. 4th 870, 887 (1992) (internal quotations and citation omitted). In 

rejecting Petitioner’s claim of insufficiency, the California Supreme Court noted that 

“ample” evidence existed of both motive and planning activity. With respect to motive, 

the California Supreme Court cited Brian Johnsen’s testimony about discussions Petitioner 

had with Johnsen and Shigemura about killing Mynatt and their decision not to tell the 

victim for fear she would reveal the plan. 

 Petitioner argues that the evidence presented at trial failed to establish either 

premeditation or deliberation, and asserts that: “As discussed in Claim 11, ante, absent 

Brian Johnsen’s deposition testimony, the evidence merely indicated that Petitioner, 

Shigemura, Humiston and Holloway arrived at and left Schmidt’s home as friends, and that 

Holloway was subsequently killed in Humiston’s car, possibly with a piece of plastic cord 

Petitioner had obtained from Schmidt to tie up Johnsen’s motorcycle. There was no 

evidence presented as to what actually happened in the car, and the physical evidence was 

equivocal. Whether the killing was the result of calculated consideration or, as Silva 

testified Petitioner told him, an argument that got out of hand (RT 2397), was pure 

speculation.” (SAP at 431.) 

 As an initial matter, for the reasons discussed in Claim 11, supra, the Court rejected 

Petitioner’s claim of error arising from the admission of Brian Johnsen’s conditional 

examination at trial. As such, it is appropriate for the Court to include that testimony when 

evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence against Petitioner. Johnsen’s testimony provided 

substantial evidence of motive, as he testified about phone conversations he had with 

Shigemura and Petitioner concerning their plan to murder Doug Mynatt and their decision 

not to tell the victim out of concern that she would reveal those plans to the police. (CT 

1006-20.) Johnsen also testified that, on the evening of the murder, Petitioner stated his 

intention to go ahead with the Mynatt murder prior to Johnsen’s release from jail, and at 

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one point during the same phone call, Holloway got on the phone to speak with Johnsen 

and asked about the existence of a plan to murder Mynatt. (CT 1018-19.) 

 As this Court noted in rejecting Claim 1.I in the Group One Order, and again in the 

adjudication of Claim 11, there was substantial evidence of planning and premeditation 

apart from Johnsen’s testimony, as follows: 

While at Schmidt’s apartment on the evening of Holloway’s murder, while 

Holloway was on the phone with Johnsen, Petitioner asked Schmidt for a 

chain to tie up Johnsen’s bikes. When Schmidt provided Petitioner with wire, 

Petitioner placed it around his neck, clenched his fists and said “that will do.” 

The medical examiner stated that marks on the victim’s neck could have been 

from manual or ligature strangulation. [¶] Schmidt also testified that 

Petitioner had several extended interactions with both Shigemura and 

Humiston that evening. Petitioner also directed Schmidt to lie to Holloway 

about needing to leave the apartment to get her off the phone with Johnsen, 

after which Holloway left in the company of Humiston, Shigemura and 

Petitioner. Petitioner later told David Silva that Holloway sat in the front seat 

of Humiston’s car that evening, while the medical examiner found it possible 

that many of the injuries to the victim’s head and neck could have come from 

behind, and noted that the bite mark was found on the victim’s back. When 

Shigemura later told Baldwin that she no longer needed what she had asked 

for, she stated in Petitioner’s presence that: “We took care of our problem and 

dumped the body off at Balboa Park” while Petitioner remained silent. 

(ECF No. 171 at 73.) 

 The California Supreme Court stated that it “need not review the evidence 

concerning the manner of killing,” reasoning that “this evidence of preexisting motive and 

planning activity was by itself sufficient to support the first degree murder conviction on a 

theory of premeditation and deliberation.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 119. In addition to the 

California Supreme Court’s thorough recounting of the evidence of planning and motive, 

this Court’s review of the record finds similarly “ample” evidence that the manner in which 

the victim was killed indeed reflects a “preconceived design.” The evidence shows that 

the victim sustained numerous abrasions and lacerations to her face and head and a bite 

mark on her back, as well as marks on the sides of her neck and bruising on the muscles 

underneath, which the medical examiner testified was consistent with applying pressure to 

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the neck. (RT 2131-33, 2157-58.) The victim also suffered fractures to her voice box and 

hyoid bone, which, coupled with the neck marks and petechiae, provided evidence of 

strangulation, and the medical examiner testified that her death was caused by blunt force 

injuries and strangulation. (RT 2159-60.) The medical examiner stated that: “All the 

injuries appeared to be occurring at about the same time. Whether - - they all might be 

going on concurrently. Some blows may have occurred and then strangulation and then 

more blows. So there’s really no way to separate the injuries out temporally.” (RT 2161.) 

He agreed that the injuries could be consistent with attempted and unsuccessful 

strangulation followed by the infliction of blunt force injuries, as follows: 

Q: Now, the injuries that you saw, is it consistent with a person 

being strangled for a period of time and then, when the strangulation doesn’t 

work to kill the victim, that the victim is bludgeoned with a hard object such 

as a scissors jack? Is that consistent? 

A: That could result in injuries like we’re seeing. 

(RT 2161-62.) The appearance of injuries consistent with strangulation, coupled with the 

testimony that Petitioner had earlier that evening procured a cord from Mark Schmidt, 

wrapped it near his neck and stated it “would do,” evidence not only planning, but also 

support a conclusion that there was indeed a “preconceived design” to kill Holloway by 

strangulation, and that the tire jack was only used when that method of killing proved 

unsuccessful. It is clear that “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution,” including the evidence in the record that demonstrated motive and planning, 

all of which supports a conclusion that the murder was deliberate and premeditated, “any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

 As such, given this evidence, as well as the California Supreme Court’s explicit 

citation to, and application of, the elements of the crime at issue, and the deferential 

standard of review under AEDPA, it is evident that the state supreme court’s rejection of 

the contention that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation or deliberation was not 

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an objectively unreasonable application of Jackson, nor was it based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. See Chein, 373 F.3d at 983, quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 

n.16; Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274; Coleman, 566 U.S. at 651. 

B. Lying In Wait Special Circumstance 

 This argument bears significant similarities to the prior contention, in that Petitioner 

again asserts that “the State’s case was dependent on Johnsen’s testimony providing a 

motive for the killing, upon which the State asked the jurors to infer that Holloway was 

killed to prevent her from telling Mynatt of the plan to kill him. Even with Johnsen’s 

testimony, however, the inferences the State asked the jurors to draw from the evidence 

were far too speculative to establish that Petitioner calculated Holloway’s murder, then 

committed that murder while lying in wait.” (SAP at 432.) Petitioner alleges that 

“Johnsen’s conditional examination testimony failed to establish a motive for the killing 

because, as noted above, there was no evidence indicating anyone was afraid Holloway 

was going to tell Mynatt about the plan,” citing Johnsen’s later testimony that when he 

heard of Holloway’s death, he did not think it was connected to the plot to kill Mynatt. 

(Id., citing PRT 180.) He contends that “[t]he prosecutor’s theory was based solely on 

conjecture and speculation that Petitioner intended to silence Holloway at the point in time 

when they drove away from Schmidt’s home (see RT 2066-71, 2831-2838), rather than on 

the reasonable inferences that could actually be drawn from the evidence,” and that “even 

with Brian Johnsen’s deposition testimony, the evidence merely raised the possibility that 

the State’s theory of the case was correct. That possibility is not sufficient to support 

Petitioner’s capital murder conviction.” (SAP at 432-33.) 

 Petitioner primarily focuses on contesting the weight and importance that should be 

granted to Johnsen’s testimony, but largely fails to address the other evidence presented at 

trial. That evidence, as discussed below, amply supports the lying in wait convictions. 

Starting with the elements, the California Supreme Court correctly noted that: “[t]he lyingin-wait special circumstance requires proof of ‘an intentional murder, committed under 

circumstances which include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of 

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watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a 

surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage.’” Jurado, 38 Cal. 

4th at 119, quoting People v. Morales, 48 Cal. 3d 527, 557 (1989). Respondent, 

meanwhile, aptly points out that under California law, “the lying in wait special 

circumstance [‘]contains [the] more stringent requirements[’]” than does the lying in wait 

theory of first degree murder, and thus “if ‘the evidence supports the special circumstance, 

it necessarily supports the theory of first degree murder.’” (Ans. Mem. at 82 n. 15, quoting 

People v. Hillhouse, 27 Cal. 4th 469, 500 (2002).) 

 The Court’s review of the record reflects that a rational juror could have found 

sufficient proof that Petitioner concealed his intentions from Holloway, given the evidence 

that Petitioner asked Mark Schmidt for a chain, and obtained a cord instead, on the evening 

of the murder, then wrapped the cord around his neck and stated “that will do,” coupled 

with the fact that later that same evening Petitioner exhorted Schmidt to lie to Holloway to 

get her to leave the apartment with him, Humiston and Shigemura, which she did, stating 

she would be back later to finish her phone conversation with Johnsen. (RT 2291-96, 2320-

22, 2325-26.) 

 A review of the record also provides sufficient evidence that Petitioner engaged in a 

“substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act,” as the victim’s 

body was discovered in a ditch or culvert off of Highway 163, several miles from Schmidt’s 

apartment, and Humiston’s car, which broke down that evening, was towed the next 

morning from the Quince Street Bridge, located over that same highway. (See RT 2079-

83, 2086-89, 2244.) As the state court reasonably observed, the evidence supports a 

conclusion that the victim was not attacked until they reached this more secluded location. 

The evidence also shows that the victim’s death was caused by not just strangulation but 

also by blunt force injuries, and that a scissors jack, which had likely been stored in the 

rear side panel of Humiston’s vehicle and was not located in the vehicle when searched, 

was later found in the vicinity of the victim’s body covered in red stains and with hair 

attached to it. (See RT 2161-62, 2496, 2497-2501.) 

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 The record also contains substantial physical and testimonial evidence that the 

victim was subjected to a surprise attack from behind once the car reached its destination, 

as Petitioner himself acknowledged to David Silva that Holloway was in the front seat of 

the car and he was in the back seat behind her that evening. (RT 2396-99.) The seat belt 

on the front passenger side had red stains on it, as did the front passenger seat cover, the 

seat itself, and the rear floorboards. (RT 2489-95.) Humiston’s father, meanwhile, testified 

that the front passenger seat of the car was broken, as it “wouldn’t hold down at the front 

corners,” that “[t]he whole seat would flop back” and that “[i]t would lie clear back against 

the front edge of the back seat.” (RT 2475-77.) 

 Again, the medical examiner testified that the victim had marks on the sides of her 

neck and bruising on the muscles underneath, consistent with applying pressure to the neck. 

(RT 2131-33, 2157-58.) She also suffered fractures to her voice box and hyoid bone, 

which, coupled with the neck marks and petechiae the medical examiner noted, provided 

evidence of strangulation, and the examiner concluded that her death was caused by blunt 

force injuries and strangulation. (RT 2159-60.) Holloway had a bite mark on her back. 

(RT 2163.) While Petitioner also told Silva that it was an argument that got out of hand 

which led to Holloway’s death, when viewing all of the evidence, as directed by the United 

States Supreme Court, “in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” this Court concludes 

that given the substantial evidence that Petitioner first procured the cord, then lured 

Holloway from the apartment under false pretenses, that Holloway was attacked and found 

several miles from the apartment and that she was in the front seat of the car when attacked 

from behind, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

 Accordingly, given the California Supreme Court’s explicit discussion of the 

elements necessary to find true the lying in wait special circumstance and the evidence 

supporting those elements, as well as the deferential standard of review under AEDPA, the 

state supreme court’s rejection of this contention was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, Jackson, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination 

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of the facts. See Chein, 373 F.3d at 983, quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Juan H., 

408 F.3d at 1274; Coleman, 566 U.S. at 651. 

 C. Conspiracy

 “A conviction of conspiracy requires proof that the defendant and another person 

had the specific intent to agree or conspire to commit an offense, as well as the specific 

intent to commit the elements of that offense, together with proof of the commission of an 

overt act ‘by one or more of the parties to such agreement’ in furtherance of the 

conspiracy.” People v. Morante, 20 Cal. 4th 403, 416 (1999), quoting Cal. Penal Code 

§ 184 (entitled “Overt act; venue” and stating as follows: “No agreement amounts to a 

conspiracy, unless some act, beside such agreement, be done within this state to effect the 

object thereof, by one or more of the parties to such agreement and the trial of cases of 

conspiracy may be had in any county in which any such act be done.”) 

 Petitioner contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the crime 

of conspiracy because of the five overt acts alleged,21 the jury found “not true” the two 

overt acts alleged to have taken place prior to the murder, and only found true the overt act 

of the murder itself and two overt acts alleged to have taken place after the commission of 

the murder. He argues that (1) the jury’s rejection of the pre-offense overt acts demonstrate 

that the jury necessarily rejected the existence of an agreement to commit the murder, 

which was one of the elements required for conspiracy, and (2) that the overt acts found, 

                                               

21 The five overt acts, all alleged to have occurred “on or about May 15, 1991,” were 

as follows: (1) Petitioner, Shigemura, and Humiston met with Holloway at Schmidt’s 

apartment; (2) Petitioner, Shigemura, Humiston and Hollway left Schmidt’s apartment in 

Humiston’s vehicle; (3) After leaving Schmidt’s apartment, Holloway was murdered by 

Petitioner, Shigemura and Humiston in the vehicle; (4) Humiston’s vehicle broke down on 

the highway near the Quince Street exit, so Petitioner, Shigemura and Humiston left 

Holloway’s body in a nearby ditch; and (5) After dumping the body, Petitioner, Shigemura 

and Humiston walked to a nearby phone where Petitioner called Silva to pick up all three 

individuals and give them a ride home. (CT 1218.) 

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the murder itself and the two that took place after the murder, were insufficient to satisfy 

the overt act requirement, another required element of the crime. (SAP at 425-30.) 

 Petitioner argues that “[t]he State’s theory was that Petitioner, Shigemura and 

Humiston agreed to kill Holloway because they were afraid of Doug Mynatt and feared 

Holloway would tell Mynatt about the plan to kill him,” citing the prosecutor’s presentation 

of evidence that Holloway found out about the plan to kill Mynatt on the evening of her 

death, that Petitioner had separate private conversations with both Shigemura and 

Humiston at Schmidt’s apartment, and that Petitioner procured a cord from Schmidt prior 

to luring Holloway from Schmidt’s apartment under false pretenses, but “[c]onspicuously 

absent, however, is any evidence that Petitioner and Shigemura discussed Holloway and 

agreed to kill her while they were alone in Mark Schmidt’s bedroom,” and “[n]or was there 

any evidence that Petitioner and Humiston agreed to kill Holloway when they conversed 

after Petitioner came out of Schmidt’s bedroom.” (Id. at 426-27.) Petitioner also asserts 

“there was no indication in the evidence that anyone believed Holloway was going to tell 

Mynatt about the plan to kill him,” citing Johnsen’s testimony that they did not tell 

Holloway about the plan for fear she might tell the police. (Id. at 427.) He states that 

“[a]fter hearing this and the other evidence presented at trial, the jury expressly found that 

Petitioner, Shigemura, and Humiston did not meet with Holloway at Schmidt’s home, and 

then leave with her in Humiston’s vehicle, in order to further an agreed upon plan to kill 

Holloway,” and asserts that “[t]hese findings indicate that the jurors did not believe the 

evidence was sufficient to show that Petitioner, Shigemura and Humiston had an agreement 

to kill Holloway at the point in time when they left Schmidt’s residence in Humiston’s 

vehicle.” (Id.) Finally, Petitioner maintains that “[w]ithout sufficient evidence of a prior 

agreement, what is left to establish a conspiracy is the actual killing and subsequent 

events,” but that “the actual killing cannot establish a conspiracy,” nor can the conduct that 

took place after the crime. (Id. at 427-28.) 

 Petitioner’s first argument, that the jury’s not true findings on the first two overt acts 

demonstrates that the jury found insufficient evidence that there was an agreement to kill 

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Holloway when they left the apartment, is unpersuasive. The “not true” finding did not 

necessarily mean, as Petitioner asserts, that the jury found Petitioner, Humiston, Shigemura 

and Holloway did not actually meet at Schmidt’s apartment and later leave together that 

evening, but only that jury was not unanimously persuaded that the alleged acts constituted 

overt acts. See Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 124 (“Because undisputed evidence established that 

both of these acts occurred, the jury’s ‘not true’ finding can be explained only by inferring 

that the jury was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that these acts were done in 

furtherance of the conspiracy.”) 

 Nor do the jury’s not true findings on the two alleged overt acts occurring prior to 

the murder necessarily lead to a conclusion that the jurors rejected the existence of any

agreement. Petitioner posits that because there was a lack of evidence conclusively 

showing what the alleged conspirators discussed that evening, there is no evidence that 

Petitioner, Humiston and Shigemura specifically discussed killing Holloway and thus no 

evidence of an agreement. While there is no direct evidence that the conversations that 

took place between Petitioner and Shigemura, and Petitioner and Humiston, that evening 

involved plans for Holloway’s murder, such direct evidence is not required to prove the 

existence of a conspiracy. As the jury was instructed: “The formation and existence of a 

conspiracy may be inferred from all circumstances tending to show the common intent and 

may be proved in the same way as any other fact may be proved, either by direct testimony 

of the fact or by circumstantial evidence, or by both direct and circumstantial evidence. It 

is not necessary to show a meeting of the alleged conspirators or the making of an express 

or informal agreement.” (CT 1210- CALJIC 6.12) (emphasis added.) At any rate, the jury 

found Petitioner guilty of the crime of conspiracy, which given the elements outlined by 

the jury instructions, means that the jurors found sufficient evidence of an agreement. (See 

CT 1208- “A conspiracy is an agreement entered into. . .”) 

 Based on a review of the record, the evidence presented at trial also supports the 

existence of an agreement. On the evening of the murder, Petitioner had separate private 

conversations with Shigemura and Humiston, obtained a cord from Schmidt, made an 

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accompanying gesture and comment that the cord “would do,” and directed Schmidt to lie 

to Holloway so she would leave the apartment with him, Shigemura and Humiston. 

Moreover, the day after the murder, Shigemura and Petitioner went to Baldwin’s home, 

where in Petitioner’s presence, Shigemura told Baldwin she no longer needed the weapon 

she previously requested, as the “problem” had been taken care of and the body dumped in 

Balboa Park. Holloway’s body was found several days later in a ditch off the highway in 

that very area. See Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 86 (the driver who found the victim’s body 

described coming upon it after experiencing engine trouble when “driving a van on 

Highway 163 through Balboa Park” and leaving the van to walk to a nearby call box.) 

There was also evidence that, days before the murder, the conspirators in the Mynatt 

murder plan discussed their intention to keep that information from Holloway for fear she 

would expose the plot, and evidence that she revealed her knowledge of the plan to murder 

Mynatt on the same night she was murdered. 

 The facts surrounding the murder itself also reflected circumstantial evidence of an 

agreement. As the California Supreme Court observed, “defendant’s plan to attack and kill 

Teresa Holloway in Anna Humiston’s car required the cooperation of Humiston and Denise 

Shigemura.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 121. It was also reasonable for the state court to note 

that Shigemura, who was driving the car that evening and later enlisted others to help her 

create a fiction that she failed to make curfew at the halfway house due to a fight, had 

plotted with Petitioner and Johnsen to kill Doug Mynatt and similarly would want to silence 

Holloway. Humiston, meanwhile, was dating Petitioner, owned the car driven that evening 

and was present at the murder. Hair similar to Humiston’s was additionally found in the 

victim’s hands, supporting a conclusion that Humiston was, at a minimum, somehow 

physically involved in the violence that evening. As the California Supreme Court 

reasonably found: “From this evidence, a rational juror could conclude beyond a reasonable 

doubt that defendant and either Shigemura or Humiston (or both) had the specific intent to 

agree or conspire to murder Holloway, as well as the specific intent to commit the elements 

of murder.” Id. 

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 The basis for the jury’s verdict on the first two overt acts is not known, but the 

California Supreme Court specifically denied Petitioner’s claim that the not true findings 

“conclusively demonstrate the jury’s rejection of the prosecution’s theory” and that “this 

inconsistency fatally undermines the conspiracy verdict,” reasoning that “[a]n 

inconsistency between a ‘not true’ finding on an overt act and a verdict or another finding 

is not a ground for overturning the inconsistent verdict or finding. (People v. Hernandez 

(2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 862, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 602, 69 P.3d 446; see People v. Santamaria

(1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 911, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 884 P.2d 81 [recognizing that an apparently 

inconsistent not true finding may be the result of mistake, compromise, or lenity].)” 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 122 (alterations in original). Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the 

California Supreme Court’s conclusion was objectively unreasonable, particularly given 

the substantial evidence supporting the conspiracy conviction. 

 Petitioner’s second argument, that the three overt acts the jury found true cannot 

support the conspiracy conviction, is also untenable. The California Supreme Court 

correctly concluded that the two overt acts which occurred after the murder could not 

satisfy the overt act requirement. See Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 122, citing People v. Zamora, 

18 Cal. 3d 538, 560 (concluding that “acts committed by conspirators subsequent to the 

completion of the crime which is the primary object of the conspiracy cannot be deemed 

to be overt acts in furtherance of that conspiracy.”) However, the California Supreme 

Court correctly observed that “[c]ommission of the target offense in furtherance of the 

conspiracy satisfies the overt act requirement.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 121, citing People v. 

Padilla, 11 Cal. 4th 891, 966 (1995) (concluding that jury’s true finding on alleged overt 

act of “actual killing” of victim “clearly qualified as overt and was legally and factually 

sufficient.”), overruled on other grounds by People v. Hill, 17 Cal. 4th 800 (1998). In this 

case, the jury found true the overt act alleging that “[o]n or about May 15, 1991, after 

leaving the Schmidt residence, TERESA HOLLOWAY is murdered by ROBERT 

JURADO JR., DENISE RENEE SHIGEMURA, and ANNA JEANETTE HUMISTON 

while inside ANNA JEANETTE HUMISTON’S vehicle.” (CT 1254.) The jury was also 

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specifically instructed that: “The term ‘overt act’ means any step taken or act committed 

by one [or more] of the conspirators which goes beyond mere planning or agreement to 

commit a public offense and which step or act is done in furtherance of the accomplishment 

of the object of the conspiracy.” (CT 1208) (alteration in original.) In light of the evidence, 

instructions, and case law supporting the validity of the target offense as an overt act, the 

California Supreme Court did not act unreasonably in concluding that “[b]ecause the jury 

found that defendant committed the murder itself in furtherance of the conspiracy, and 

because substantial evidence supports that finding, the overt act requirement is satisfied.” 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 121-22. 

 Ultimately, Petitioner’s contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the 

conspiracy conviction fails because when the Court views the evidence presented at trial, 

as it must, “in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” it is clear that a “rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. As discussed thoroughly above, this includes evidence that in 

the days and hours prior to the murder, Petitioner, Shigemura and Humiston intentionally 

entered an agreement to kill Teresa Holloway, shown by the numerous discussions between 

them, the separate plot to kill Mynatt and decision not to tell Holloway, coupled with the 

information that Holloway learned of the Mynatt plot prior to her death. There was also 

substantial evidence of intent to commit the murder itself, evidenced by Petitioner 

obtaining a cord from Schmidt on the evening of the murder and his accompanying 

comments, the lies to get Holloway to accompany them when leaving Schmidt’s apartment, 

that the participants all left together, were present at the murder itself, and freely continued 

to associate with one another after the crime. There was also substantial evidence of an 

overt act, the murder itself. Given the record and the standard under which the Court must 

evaluate a claim of insufficiency, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the evidence presented 

at trial is such that “no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Id. at 324. 

/// 

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 Thus, as with Petitioner’s prior claims of insufficient evidence, in light of the 

California Supreme Court’s clear and detailed decision discussing the evidence in support 

of each of the elements of conspiracy and the deferential standard of review under AEDPA, 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the state supreme court’s rejection of this contention 

was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Jackson, or that it was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. See Chein, 373 F.3d at 983, quoting Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 324 n.16; Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274; Coleman, 566 U.S. at 651. Petitioner does not 

merit habeas relief on Claim 13. 

4. Claim 15

 Petitioner argues that the trial court failed to “clarify the jurors’ confusion on an 

essential element of conspiracy” and gave an “erroneous instruction which omitted another 

essential element of this crime,” in violation of Petitioner’s constitutional rights to due 

process, proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the charged offense, reliable 

fact-finding, and a fair and impartial jury trial. (SAP at 436.) In addition to asserting that 

“[t]aken alone, each of the above errors requires reversal of Petitioner’s conspiracy 

conviction under the Chapman standard,” Petitioner alleges that “[i]n conjunction, these 

errors require per se reversal of that conviction.” (Id. at 445.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Defendant contends that the trial court’s instructions to the jury 

defining the charged offense of conspiracy omitted part of the specific intent 

element of that crime and that, during jury deliberations, the trial court erred 

in failing to dispel the jurors’ confusion about the overt act element of 

conspiracy. He further contends that these errors denied him his rights under 

the federal Constitution to due process, to proof of each element beyond a 

reasonable doubt, to a fair and impartial jury trial, and to reliable factfinding 

in a capital case. 

The trial court instructed the jury with two modified versions-one 

spoken, one written-of CALJIC No. 6.10 defining the crime of conspiracy. As 

here relevant, the spoken version stated: “A conspiracy is an agreement 

entered into between two or more persons with the specific intent to commit a 

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crime, in this case alleged to be the crime of murder, the murder of Teresa 

Holloway, followed by an overt act committed by one or more of the parties 

for the purpose of accomplishing the object of the agreement.” (Italics added.) 

As here relevant, the written version stated: “A conspiracy is an agreement 

entered into between two or more persons with the specific intent to agree to 

commit the public offense of murder, followed by an overt act committed in 

this state by one or more of the parties for the purpose of accomplishing the 

object of the agreement.” (Italics added.) The written version was given to the 

jury for its use during deliberations. 

As this court has explained, the crime of conspiracy requires dual 

specific intents: a specific intent to agree to commit the target offense, and a 

specific intent to commit that offense. (People v. Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 

p. 1131, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641; People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 

593, 600, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994.) We have cautioned trial courts 

not to modify CALJIC No. 6.10 to eliminate either of these specific intents. 

(People v. Marks (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1345, 248 Cal.Rptr. 874, 756 P.2d 

260.) 

Here, neither of the modified versions of the standard instruction 

expressly mentioned both of the required specific intents. The written 

instruction mentioned only the specific intent to agree, while the spoken 

instruction mentioned only the specific intent to commit the target offense of 

murder. As defendant points out, when the jury has received an instruction in 

both spoken and written forms, and the two versions vary, we assume the jury 

was guided by the written version. (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 

542, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 

83, 138, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887; People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 

97, 111, fn. 2, 249 Cal.Rptr. 630, 757 P.2d 569.) 

Although the trial court erred in modifying CALJIC No. 6.10 to delete 

mention of the required specific intent to commit the target offense of murder, 

defendant suffered no prejudice. For a conspiracy to commit murder, intent to 

commit the target offense means an intent to kill. (People v. Swain, supra, 12 

Cal.4th at p. 607, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994.) As defendant concedes, 

the jury’s verdict that defendant was guilty of the first degree murder of Teresa 

Holloway necessarily included a finding that defendant himself had that 

intent. He argues, however, that the jury made no similar finding for either 

Denise Shigemura or Anna Humiston, the other alleged conspirators. But 

defendant does not identify any evidence in the record that could lead a 

rational juror to conclude that Shigemura and Humiston agreed to kill 

Holloway, with the specific intent to agree to do so, but without a specific 

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intent to actually kill her. Because we find in the record no evidence that could 

rationally lead to such a finding, we are satisfied that the instructional error 

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Neder v. United States (1999) 527 

U.S. 1, 9, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35; People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 

510, 564, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 115 P.3d 417.) 

During guilt phase deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge. 

It read: “Is the jury merely deciding whether the overt acts alleged actually 

occurred, or are we also determining whether or not the acts do indeed meet 

the requirements of being overt acts as defined in CALJIC 6.10[?]” The trial 

court sent the jury this written response: “As [CALJIC No.] 6.10 states, in 

order to find Mr. Jurado guilty of conspiracy, you must unanimously find to 

be true at least one of the alleged Overt Acts, as that term is defined in 6.10.” 

(Italics added.) 

Defendant maintains that this response did nothing to answer the jury’s 

question, and that there is an unacceptable risk that the jury merely determined 

whether the conduct charged as overt acts occurred, without also determining 

whether any of the acts was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. We 

disagree. The trial court’s response expressly directed the jury’s attention to 

the definition of an overt act in CALJIC No. 6.10, which stated that “‘overt 

act’ means any step taken or act committed by one or more of the conspirators 

... in furtherance of the accomplishment of the object of the conspiracy.” 

(Italics added.) That the jury so understood the court’s response is 

conclusively shown by the jury’s findings on the overt acts. The jury found 

“not true” the overt act allegations that defendant, Denise Shigemura, and 

Anna Humiston met with Teresa Holloway at Mark Schmidt’s residence and 

that they left Schmidt’s residence with Holloway in Humiston’s car. Because 

undisputed evidence established that both of these acts occurred, the jury’s 

“not true” finding can be explained only by inferring that the jury was not 

satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that these acts were done in furtherance 

of the conspiracy. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 122-24 (alterations in original). While Petitioner also later raised 

this claim in the second state habeas petition and the state court imposed procedural bars 

(see Lodgment No. 91), for the reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will 

address the claim on the merits. 

A court evaluating a claim of instructional error must determine “‘whether the ailing 

instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due 

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process.’” McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). 

“It is well established that the instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but 

must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” 

McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. Even if federal constitutional 

error occurred, habeas relief is only available if the error had a “substantial and injurious 

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

Petitioner first argues that the trial court erred in failing to clarify the jury’s 

confusion with respect to the overt act element of conspiracy. The trial court instructed the 

jury that in order to find Petitioner guilty of conspiracy, “there must be proof of the 

commission of at least one of the overt acts alleged in the information.” (RT 2787; see 

also CT 1208.) The trial court also instructed, pursuant to CALJIC 6.10, that: 

The term, quote “overt act,” close quote, means any step taken or acts 

committed by one or more of the conspirators which goes beyond mere 

planning or agreement to commit a crime and which step or act is done in 

furtherance of the accomplishment of the object of the conspiracy. 

To be an overt act, the step taken or the act committed need not in and 

of itself constitute the crime or even an attempt to commit the crime which is 

the ultimate object of the conspiracy, nor is it required that such step or act in 

and of itself be criminal or an unlawful act. 

(RT 2787; CT 1208.) During deliberations, the jury sent a question to the trial court, 

asking: “Is the jury merely deciding whether the overt acts alleged actually occurred, or 

are we also determining whether or not the acts do indeed meet the requirement of being 

overt acts as defined in CALJIC 6.10,” to which the trial court sent a written reply that 

stated: “As 6.10 states, in order to find Mr. Jurado guilty of conspiracy, you must 

unanimously find to be true at least one of the alleged overt acts, as that term is defined in 

6.10.” (CT 1164.) 

 Petitioner asserts that “the jury clearly was confused about whether they were 

determining solely if the alleged overt acts occurred, or if they were also determining 

whether the acts that they believed did occur were in fact ‘overt acts’ in furtherance of a 

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plan to kill Holloway,” contends that “[t]he jury’s verdict further reflects this confusion, 

and its findings regarding overt acts cannot be reconciled with a finding of conspiracy,” 

and that the findings “strongly suggest that the jurors understood CALJIC 6.10, and the 

trial court’s answer to their note, to mean their task was to decide only if the alleged acts 

occurred, and not whether these acts actually were in furtherance of an agreed upon plan 

to kill Holloway.” (SAP at 439-40.) 

 As the California Supreme Court similarly found, a plain reading of the jury 

instruction refutes this contention, as CALJIC 6.10 defined an overt act, instructing that it 

“means any step taken or acts committed by one [or more] of the conspirators which goes 

beyond mere planning or agreement to commit a public offense and which step or act is 

done in furtherance of the accomplishment of the object of the conspiracy.” (CT 1208) 

(emphasis added) (alteration in original.) The record further reflects that the jury reached 

a verdict shortly after receiving the trial court’s response to their inquiry. (CT 1654.) A 

jury is presumed to understand and follow the trial court’s instructions. See Weeks v. 

Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1989). 

 In this claim, Petitioner repeats the assertion previously raised and rejected in Claim 

13 that the jury’s not true findings on the first two overt acts means the jurors did not accept 

the prosecution’s theory that Petitioner, Shigemura and Humiston agreed to kill Holloway 

prior to the murder itself and argues that “a conclusion that the killing was the culmination 

of an agreement was, at best, speculative.” (SAP at 440.) As discussed above, the jury’s 

findings on the overt acts did not necessarily mean the jury rejected the existence of any

agreement, only that the jury was not unanimously persuaded that those two particular 

events constituted overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 

124 (“Because undisputed evidence established that both of these acts occurred, the jury’s 

‘not true’ finding can be explained only by inferring that the jury was not satisfied beyond 

a reasonable doubt that these acts were done in furtherance of the conspiracy.”) Again, the 

jury found Petitioner guilty of the crime of conspiracy, which given the specific elements 

outlined in the jury instructions, means that the jurors were persuaded there was evidence 

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of an agreement. (See CT 1208- “A conspiracy is an agreement entered into. . .”) Based 

on a review of the record, the Court finds no error in the trial court’s instruction on the 

overt act requirement or in the trial court’s response to the jury question, much less the 

existence of an error that would have “so infected” Petitioner’s trial as to result in a denial 

of due process. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72. 

 Petitioner next asserts that the trial court erred in omitting the “dual specific intent” 

requirement of conspiracy, and that the “erroneous instructions given to Petitioner’s jurors 

completely removed from their deliberative process that element of conspiracy requiring 

that Shigemura and Humiston not only intended to agree with Petitioner to murder 

Holloway, but also intended to commit that murder.” (SAP at 443-44.) The California 

Supreme Court acknowledged this error, noting that neither the spoken instructions, which 

mentioned the specific intent required to commit murder, nor the written instructions, 

which discussed the specific intent to agree, addressed both required intents. Jurado, 38 

Cal. 4th at 123. Citing California law, the California Supreme Court “assume[d] the jury 

was guided by the written version.” Id. Then, citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 

(1999),22 the state court found the instructional error harmless. Id. 

 Petitioner simply argues that “given the state of the record, the People cannot show 

the trial court’s failure to instruct on the omitted ‘dual specific intent’ element of 

conspiracy was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and this error requires reversal of the 

conspiracy verdict.” (SAP at 445.) However, because the California Supreme Court 

acknowledged the error and conducted an analysis of any prejudicial impact, this Court 

must evaluate that determination, rather than engage, as Petitioner appears to advocate, in 

a de novo review of the claim. See Ayala, 135 S.Ct. at 2199 (“When a Chapman decision 

is reviewed under AEDPA, ‘a federal court may not award habeas relief under § 2254 

                                               

22 Neder, in turn, cited both Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) and Brecht, 

among other cases, in distinguishing between errors amenable to harmless error analysis 

as opposed to those constituting structural error. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 8-20.

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unless the harmlessness determination itself was unreasonable.’”), quoting Fry, 551 U.S. 

at 119; see also Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18-19 (2003) (per curiam). 

 The California Supreme Court reasonably concluded that “the jury’s verdict that 

defendant was guilty of the first degree murder of Teresa Holloway necessarily included a 

finding that defendant himself had that intent.” Jurado, 38 Cal 4th at 123. Rejecting 

Petitioner’s contention that the jury failed to make similar findings of intent with respect 

to his co-conspirators, the state court reasoned that: “But defendant does not identify any 

evidence in the record that could lead a rational juror to conclude that Shigemura and 

Humiston agreed to kill Holloway, with the specific intent to agree to do so, but without a 

specific intent to actually kill her. Because we find in the record no evidence that could 

rationally lead to such a finding, we are satisfied that the instructional error was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 

 Even were the Court to engage in its own harmless error analysis, the record reflects 

substantial evidence supporting a conclusion that the co-conspirators had not only the 

specific intent to enter an agreement, but also the specific intent to kill Holloway. For 

instance, as discussed in greater detail throughout Claim 13, there was evidence that 

Shigemura, who was driving the car that evening, had planned Mynatt’s murder with 

Petitioner and Johnsen and shared the motive to prevent Holloway from informing others 

of those plans. Humiston, meanwhile, owned the car driven that evening, was at a 

minimum present at the murder, and hair similar to hers was found in the victim’s hands 

after her death, indicating potentially more extensive involvement in the crime. The day 

after the murder, rather than ending their association with Petitioner, both Shigemura and 

Humiston returned to the scene to have Humiston’s car towed. That same day, Shigemura 

enlisted Petitioner and another individual to beat her up in an attempt to create an alternate 

reason for missing curfew the prior evening. 

 Yet, this Court is not simply conducting its own harmless error analysis, but under 

AEDPA must first decide whether the California Supreme Court’s harmless error 

determination was unreasonable. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. at 2199. Given the evidence in the 

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record supporting the jury’s findings, and the lack of any demonstrable support for 

Petitioner’s position, the Court cannot conclude that the state court’s harmless error 

analysis was erroneous, much less objectively unreasonable. 

 Based on the lack of error arising from the trial court’s answer to the jury inquiry 

about the overt act element, the Court also rejects Petitioner’s contention that the 

“combined effect” of the two alleged instructional errors on the conspiracy charge warrant 

reversal of that conviction. Petitioner argues that this case is comparable to a California 

Supreme Court case in which the state court found a trial court’s failure to instruct on four 

of five elements of robbery was not amenable to harmless error analysis, but instead 

required reversal. (SAP at 446, citing People v. Cummings, 4 Cal. 4th 1233 (1993).) He 

argues that: “As described above, there are essentially three elements of the crime of 

conspiracy: (1) an agreement between two or more persons with the specific intent to agree 

to commit a crime, (2) with the further specific intent to commit the elements of that crime, 

(3) followed by an overt act in furtherance of accomplishing the object of the agreement,” 

and asserts that “[t]he trial court’s failure to clarify the jury’s confusion on the overt act 

requirement of conspiracy, and its failure to instruct on that portion of CALJIC 6.10 

requiring a further specific intent to commit the elements of the targeted crime, effectively 

removed two of these three elements from the jury’s consideration.” (Id. at 446) (citations 

omitted.) 

 Again, the Court found no error in the trial court’s response to the jury question on 

the overt act requirement, as the provided instructions clearly and accurately directed the 

jury to the written instruction, which provided that an overt act was a “step or act [] done 

in furtherance of the accomplishment of the object of the conspiracy.” (CT 1208.) Because 

Petitioner has only identified one error, which the California Supreme Court was not 

unreasonable in finding harmless,23 his claim of “combined error” with respect to the 

                                               

23 While Petitioner’s claim of “combined error” in the conspiracy jury instructions 

fails, Petitioner has also raised multiple claims of cumulative error, notably in Claim 19, 

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conspiracy instructions necessarily fails. For the reasons discussed above, habeas relief is 

unavailable on Claim 15. 

5. Claim 16

 Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it was required 

to unanimously acquit Petitioner of first degree murder before the trial court could accept 

a verdict as to second degree murder. (SAP at 447.) He argues that “[a]n instruction that 

the jury cannot convict on the lesser charge unless it first unanimously votes to acquit on 

the greater charge prevents a capital case jury from making use of lesser included offense 

instructions in the way contemplated by Beck [v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980)], and 

subjects jurors to the same pressure to ignore the reasonable doubt standard that they would 

face if no lesser included offense instruction were given at all.” (Id. at 449.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Defendant contends the trial court erred when it instructed the jury, in 

the language of CALJIC No. 8.75, that it would not accept a verdict that 

defendant was guilty of second degree murder unless the jury also 

unanimously returned a verdict that he was not guilty of first degree murder. 

Defendant maintains that this “acquittal first” instruction violated his federal 

constitutional rights to due process and to a fair and reliable jury consideration 

of lesser included offenses in a capital case. 

As defendant concedes, this court has repeatedly rejected the same 

contention. (E.g., People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 715, 134 

Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 68 P.3d 1190.) As we stated in Nakahara, “[w]e see no 

reason for reconsidering these decisions.” (Ibid.) 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 125 (alteration in original). While Petitioner also later raised this 

                                               

47 and 48. As such, the instructional error discussed in the instant claim will be necessarily 

included in the Court’s analysis of Petitioner’s claims of cumulative error. See Parle, 505 

F.3d at 927 (“The cumulative effect of multiple errors can violate due process even where 

no single error rises to the level of a constitutional violation or would independently 

warrant reversal.”), citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 290 n.3. 

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claim in the second state habeas petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see 

Lodgment No. 91), for the reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will address 

the claim on the merits. 

Again, to merit relief, Petitioner must show that “the ailing instruction by itself so 

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process,” after considering 

the challenged instruction “in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” 

McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. Even if such error occurred, 

habeas relief is only available if it had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

In this case, the trial court instructed the jurors pursuant to CALJIC 8.75, which 

provided the following direction for their consideration of the murder charges: 

If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 

guilty of the crime of first degree murder as charged in Count Two and you 

unanimously so find, you may convict him of any lesser crime provided you 

are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of such crime. 

You will be provided with guilty and not guilty verdict forms as to 

Count Two for the crime of murder in the first degree and lesser crimes 

thereto. Murder in the second degree is a lesser crime to that of murder in the 

first degree. 

Thus, you are to determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty 

of murder in the first degree or of any lesser crime thereto. In doing so, you 

have discretion to choose the order in which you evaluate each crime and 

consider the evidence pertaining to it. You may find it productive to consider 

and reach tentative conclusions on all charged and lesser crimes before 

reaching any final verdicts. You should consider the lesser offenses before 

reaching a verdict upon the greater. 

Before you return any final or formal verdicts, you must be guided by 

the following: 

1. If you unanimously find a defendant guilty of first degree murder, as 

to Count Two, your foreperson should sign and date the corresponding guilty 

verdict forms. All other verdict forms as to Count Two should be left 

unsigned. 

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2. If you are unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to the charge in 

Count Two of first degree murder, do not sign any verdict forms as to that 

count and report your disagreement to the court. 

3. The court cannot accept a verdict of guilty of second degree murder 

as to Count Two unless the jury also unanimously finds and returns a signed 

verdict of not guilty as to murder of the first degree in the same count. 

4. If you find a defendant not guilty of murder in the first degree as to 

Count Two but cannot reach a unanimous agreement as to murder of the 

second degree, your foreperson should sign and date the not guilty of murder 

in the first degree form, and should report your disagreement to the court. Do 

not sign any other verdict forms. 

5. If you unanimously find a defendant not guilty of first degree 

murder, but guilty of second degree murder, your foreperson should sign and 

date the corresponding verdict forms. 

(CT 1228-29.) 

 In Beck, the Supreme Court held that a capital jury must be instructed on a lesserincluded charge supported by the evidence, stating that “when the evidence unquestionably 

establishes that the defendant is guilty of a serious, violent offense- but leaves some doubt 

with respect to an element that would justify conviction of a capital offense- the failure to 

give the jury the ‘third option’ of convicting on a lesser included offense would seem 

inevitably to enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction.” Id., 447 U.S. at 637. 

 Here, the jury was clearly instructed on the lesser included option of second degree 

murder. Petitioner’s contention that the instruction at issue prevented or precluded the jury 

from properly considering the lesser included offense is not supported by the record. 

Petitioner argues that “[u]nder ‘unanimous acquittal’ instructions such as those given in 

this case, a jury that is deadlocked on the charged offense can render a verdict on a lesser 

crime only if they report their deadlock to the judge, and the judge then declares a mistrial 

as to the charged offense and directs the jury to deliberate on the lesser offense.” (SAP at 

449.) But Petitioner’s jury was not provided with any such “acquittal first” instructions, 

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and was instead specifically instructed that they could evaluate and discuss the two charges 

in the order they chose: 

You must determine whether Mr. Jurado is guilty of the crime of

murder in the first degree or a lesser crime, murder in the second degree. Now, 

in doing so, you have the discretion to choose the order in which you consider 

those two crimes and consider the evidence relating to each of those crimes. 

We have seen that the crimes share certain common elements, and the 

common elements are that murder in either degree is the unlawful killing of 

one human being by another with malice aforethought. For murder in the first 

degree, there has to be those additional elements or ingredients of either 

premeditation and deliberation or its equivalent, lying in wait. 

So those are the common elements and those are the distinctions. And 

I think you should talk about both crimes, the essential required elements of 

both crimes, where the distinctions lie, what is required additionally to find 

murder in the first degree as opposed to murder in the second degree. 

So I think it may well be productive to talk about murder in both 

degrees, understand the essential elements of each crime, what distinguishes 

one from the other, what additional ingredients are required for first degree as 

opposed to second degree. Consider all the evidence in that regard and - - it 

may be helpful, productive to reach some tentative conclusions at least as to 

first degree and second degree, see where you think the - - the - - there has 

been proof and where there hasn’t been proof in that regard. 

But when it comes time to reach any final or formal verdicts, you have 

to consider the two crimes in the greater-lesser relationship that I’ve talked 

about; that is, you must first in a final or formal way when it comes time to 

see if you can reach a final or formal verdict, you must first consider murder 

in the first degree and then murder in the second degree, because murder in 

the first degree is considered the greater, murder in the second degree the 

lesser. 

(RT 2797-98.) 

 For this reason, Petitioner’s reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States 

v. Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1984), and the Second Circuit’s decision in United 

States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340 (2nd Cir. 1978), is misplaced. In both of those cases, the 

jurors were instructed that they could not even consider lesser charges before reaching a 

verdict on the greater offense, and the respective circuit courts held that such instructions 

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violated due process. See Jackson, 926 F.2d at 1469-70; Tsanas, 572 F.2d at 344. 

Meanwhile, as the record clearly reflects, the trial court did not preclude Petitioner’s jury 

from considering the lesser crime of second degree murder, as the jurors were instructed 

that they could “choose the order” in which they considered the two crimes. The trial court 

even explicitly suggested that the jury “talk about murder in both degrees” and reach 

“tentative conclusions at least to first degree and second degree” before attempting to reach 

a final verdict. Accordingly, there is no support for a conclusion that the instruction at 

issue “so infected” Petitioner’s trial as to result in a due process violation. Even were 

Petitioner able to establish a constitutional violation, which he has not, he fails to show that 

any such error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 

verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

 Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this 

claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, 

or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Habeas relief is not 

warranted on Claim 16. 

6. Claim 17

 Petitioner contends that the trial court’s instructions on consciousness of guilt “were 

impermissibly argumentative, they permitted the jury to make irrational inferences from 

the evidence, and the trial court should have modified all of these instructions, as Petitioner 

requested, to clarify that consciousness of guilt evidence was not probative of Petitioner’s 

state of mind, and therefore could not be used in determining the degree of his guilt.” (SAP 

at 452.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Defendant contends that the trial court’s instructions to the jury on 

consciousness of guilt were impermissibly argumentative, permitted the jury 

to draw irrational inferences, were potentially misleading, and were 

unsupported by the evidence. 

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The trial court instructed the jury that it could infer consciousness of 

guilt from efforts to suppress evidence (CALJIC No. 2.06), from flight after a 

crime (CALJIC No. 2.52), and from the telling of a falsehood (CALJIC No. 

2.03). The trial court declined defense requests to modify the instructions to 

state that they were inapplicable to fix the degree of a crime.

We have repeatedly rejected contentions that these standard jury 

instructions on consciousness of guilt were impermissibly argumentative or 

permitted the jury to draw irrational inferences about a defendant’s mental 

state during the commission of the charged offenses. (E.g., People v. 

Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 100, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 507, 105 P.3d 1099; 

People v. Nakahara, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 713, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 68 P.3d 

1190; People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 375, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 

P.2d 1169.) We see no reason to reconsider these decisions. Because the 

instructions as given correctly stated the law and did not invite the jury to 

draw irrational inferences about defendant’s mental state, the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in declining the defense requests to modify them. 

Whenever the prosecution relies on evidence of flight as tending to 

show a defendant’s guilt, the trial court must instruct the jury substantially in 

this language: “The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a 

crime, or after he is accused of a crime that has been committed, is not 

sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, the jury 

may consider in deciding his guilt or innocence. The weight to which such 

circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.” (§ 1127c.) In 

this context, flight “requires neither the physical act of running nor the 

reaching of a faraway haven” but it does require “a purpose to avoid being 

observed or arrested.” (People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 869, 251 

Cal.Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423; accord, People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 

1005, 1055, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.) “Mere return to familiar 

environs from the scene of an alleged crime does not warrant an inference of 

consciousness of guilt [citations], but the circumstances of departure from the 

crime scene may sometimes do so.” (People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 

695, 268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887; accord, People v. Bradford, supra, at 

p. 1055, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.) 

Here, the circumstances of defendant’s departure from the scene of 

Teresa Holloway’s murder were sufficient to support an inference that his 

purpose was to avoid being observed or arrested, and thus an inference of 

consciousness of guilt for her death. Although there was a call box around 20 

yards from the culvert in which Holloway’s body had been placed, defendant 

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did not use the call box to summon aid after Anna Humiston’s car broke down. 

Instead, defendant, Humiston, and Denise Shigemura walked a half-mile to a 

7-Eleven Store, along the way hiding in a tree the scissors jack that had been 

used to kill Holloway, before calling a friend for assistance. Defendant’s 

failure to use the call box, and the secreting of the murder weapon, support an 

inference that in leaving the crime scene defendant acted with a purpose to 

avoid observation and arrest. The flight instruction was properly given. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 125-26 (alteration in original). Petitioner also later raised this claim 

in the second state habeas petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see 

Lodgment No. 91), but for the reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will 

address the claim on the merits. 

Again, the Court must decide if “the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire 

trial that the resulting conviction violates due process,” by considering the alleged error “in 

the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, 

quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. Habeas relief is only available if any such error had a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 

507 U.S. at 637. 

 Petitioner argues that three jury instructions, CALJIC 2.03, 2.06 and 2.52, were 

argumentative and improperly allowed the jury to draw irrational inferences regarding his 

degree of guilt. CALJIC 2.03 directed the jurors that: “If you find that before this trial (the) 

defendant made a willfully false or deliberately misleading statement concerning the 

crime(s) for which (he) is now being tried, you may consider such statement as a 

circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of guilt. However, such conduct is not 

sufficient by itself to prove guilt, and its weight and significance, if any, are matters for 

your determination.” (CT 1233.) CALJIC 2.06 instructed that: “If you find that a 

defendant attempted to suppress evidence against (himself) in any manner, such as (by 

concealing evidence), such attempt may or may not be considered by you as a circumstance 

tending to show a consciousness of guilt. However, such conduct is not sufficient by itself 

to prove guilt, and its weight and significance, if any, are matters for your consideration.” 

(CT 1234.) CALJIC 2.52 instructed that: “The flight of a person immediately after the 

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commission of a crime, is not sufficient in itself to establish (his) guilt, but is a fact which, 

if proved, may be considered by you in the light of all other proved facts in deciding the 

question of whether he is guilty or not guilty. Whether or not the evidence proves flight, 

and if so, whether that flight shows a consciousness of guilt, and the significance to be 

attached to such a circumstance, are matters solely for your determinat [sic].” (CT 1239.) 

 The California Supreme Court cited prior California decisional law while stating: 

“We have repeatedly rejected contentions that these standard jury instructions on 

consciousness of guilt were impermissibly argumentative or permitted the jury to draw 

irrational inferences about a defendant’s mental state during the commission of the charged 

offenses,” and concluded that “[b]ecause the instructions as given correctly stated the law 

and did not invite the jury to draw irrational inferences about defendant’s mental state, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining the defense requests to modify them.” 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 125-26. 

 This decision was not unreasonable. Reviewing the instructions as a whole, the 

Court remains unpersuaded that the jury misunderstood or misapplied these three 

challenged instructions in a way that “so infected” Petitioner’s trial as to result in a due 

process violation. The instructions were clear and stated the law correctly, instructed that 

Petitioner’s conduct, including falsehoods, concealment of evidence, or flight, if the jurors 

found it, were “not sufficient” on their own to prove guilt, and directed the jurors that it 

was their province to decide what weight or significance “if any” to give those matters. 

Additionally, as Respondent points out, the Ninth Circuit has previously rejected 

challenges to the constitutionality of CALJIC 2.03 and 2.52. See Karis v. Calderon, 283 

F.3d 1117, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting challenge to CALJIC 2.52 and noting that the 

instruction “clarified that flight alone is insufficient to establish guilt.”); Turner v. 

Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 820 (9th Cir. 1995) (“So long as the instruction does not state that 

inconsistent statements constitute evidence of guilt, but merely states that the jury may 

consider them as indicating a consciousness of guilt, the instruction would not violate 

constitutional rights. Because CALJIC 2.03 fits this requirement, we find no constitutional 

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error.”) (internal citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 

677, 685 (9th Cir. 1999). As all three challenged instructions “merely state[]” that the 

jurors may consider the statements presented or conduct alleged, if proved, as 

circumstances tending to show a consciousness of guilt, the Court is not persuaded that the 

trial court’s decision to give these instructions was erroneous, much less that their inclusion 

in the jury charge amounted to error of a constitutional dimension. 

 Even were Petitioner able to demonstrate that the trial court erred in providing the 

above instructions to the jury, Petitioner fails to show that the instructions had a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the outcome of his trial proceedings. 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Again, the jury was repeatedly instructed that none of the alleged 

conduct was sufficient on its own to establish guilt and was specifically charged with 

determining what, if any, “weight and significance” to give to this evidence in deciding 

whether it showed a consciousness of guilt on the part of Petitioner. Moreover, as 

discussed throughout this Order, the jury was presented with strong affirmative evidence 

of the premeditation and planning of Holloway’s murder, including, but not limited to, 

Petitioner obtaining a cord from Schmidt prior to leaving that apartment, wrapping it 

around his neck and stating “that will do,” and directing Schmidt to lie to the victim to get 

her to leave the apartment with him, Shigemura, and Humiston in Humiston’s car, where 

Holloway was murdered shortly thereafter. Petitioner himself later told an acquaintance 

that Holloway sat in the front seat of Humiston’s car that evening, while the medical 

examiner found it possible that many of the injuries to the victim’s head and neck could 

have come from behind, noted a bite mark on the victim’s back, and testified that marks on 

the neck could have come from manual or ligature strangulation. The jury also heard 

testimony that the day after the murder Shigemura told Baldwin that she no longer needed 

the weapon she had asked him for days earlier, and she stated in Petitioner’s presence and 

in the face of Petitioner’s silence, that: “We took care of our problem and dumped the body 

off at Balboa Park,” which is where Holloway’s body was found. In light of the strength 

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of this evidence, any potential error arising from the consciousness of guilt instructions 

would clearly be harmless. 

 Petitioner also separately contends that there was insufficient evidence of flight to 

warrant instructing the jury with CALJIC 2.52, arguing that: “Petitioner had no choice but 

to leave the crime scene as Humiston’s car had broken down on the side of the freeway and 

thus, Petitioner would have left the scene and made a phone call regardless of the crime.” 

(SAP at 460.) He asserts that in giving this instruction in the absence of factual support, 

the trial court acted contrary to admonitions from the California Supreme Court “‘not to 

confuse a mere departure from the scene of the crime with a deliberate flight from the area 

in which the suspect is normally to be found.[’]” (SAP at 461, quoting People v. Green, 

27 Cal. 3d 1, 37 (1980).) 

 But, as the California Supreme Court reasonably and accurately pointed out, the 

evidence at trial was clearly sufficient to show that Petitioner undertook actions calculated 

to minimize attention paid to him or to the area surrounding the crime scene, and was not 

“merely” departing from the area, in that: “Although there was a call box around 20 yards 

from the culvert in which Holloway’s body had been placed, defendant did not use the call 

box to summon aid after Anna Humiston’s car broke down. Instead, defendant, Humiston, 

and Denise Shigemura walked a half-mile to a 7-Eleven Store, along the way hiding in a 

tree the scissors jack that had been used to kill Holloway, before calling a friend for 

assistance. Defendant’s failure to use the call box, and the secreting of the murder weapon, 

support an inference that in leaving the crime scene defendant acted with a purpose to avoid 

observation and arrest.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 126. Petitioner misled his friends and 

minimized the severity of that evening’s events, as when friends inquired what had 

happened and observed the blood on his socks and shoes, Petitioner simply stated that he 

had gotten into a “fight.” The evidence shows that Petitioner waited until the next day, 

after disposing of the bloody items of clothing in a dumpster near his apartment, to call for 

a tow truck for Humiston’s car. This also supports a conclusion that the trial court did not, 

as Petitioner asserts, confuse a “mere departure” with flight, and that the flight instruction 

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was properly given in this case. Given the evidence supporting this instruction, Petitioner 

fails to show that the trial court’s decision “so infected” his trial as to deprive him of his 

constitutional rights to due process or a fair trial, much less that the state supreme court’s 

rejection of this claim was objectively unreasonable under AEDPA. Claim 17 is without 

merit, and accordingly, does not warrant habeas relief. 

7. Claim 18

 Petitioner argues that “[a] number of the jury instructions given during the guilt 

phase misled the jury regarding the reasonable doubt standard, and impermissibly lightened 

the prosecution’s burden of proof,” in violation of Petitioner’s rights to due process, a fair 

trial, unanimous jury verdict, and to reliable and individualized guilt and penalty 

determinations. (SAP at 463.) He contends that while California jury instruction 

[“CALJIC”] 2.90, which instructs the jury on the presumption of innocence, reasonable 

doubt, and burden of proof, “standing alone,” has been upheld as constitutional, “in 

combination with the other instructions and the prosecutor’s argument, it was reasonably 

likely to have led the jury to convict Petitioner on proof that did not meet the ‘beyond a 

reasonable doubt’ standard.” (Id. at 464.) Specifically, Petitioner asserts that elements of 

California jury instructions 1.00, 2.01, 2.02, 2.21.2, 2.22, 8.20, 8.83 and 8.83.1, likely 

“undermined” or “replaced” the reasonable doubt burden of proof standard and allowed 

the jury to convict him under a lesser standard. (Id. at 463-68.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Defendant contends that certain of the trial court’s instructions to the 

jury misled the jury regarding the reasonable doubt standard of proof and 

impermissibly lightened the prosecution’s burden of proof. He maintains that 

these instructions violated his federal constitutional rights to due process, a 

fair trial, a unanimous jury verdict, and reliable guilt and penalty 

determinations. 

We have previously rejected each of the claims that defendant makes, 

and we decline to reconsider these decisions. Contrary to defendant’s 

arguments, CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02, 8.83, and 8.83.1, which direct the jury to 

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accept reasonable inferences and to reject unreasonable ones, do not permit 

the jury to base a determination of guilt on something less than proof beyond 

a reasonable doubt. (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 351, 33 

Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545; see also People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 

822, 847, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820; People v. Nakahara, supra, 30 

Cal.4th at pp. 713-714, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 68 P.3d 1190.) CALJIC No. 

1.00, which directs the jury not to “infer or assume” that defendant “was more 

likely to be guilty than not guilty” merely because he had been arrested, 

charged, or brought to trial, does not undercut the burden of proof. (People v. 

Crew, supra, at pp. 847-848, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820; People v. 

Nakahara, supra, at p. 714, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 68 P.3d 1190.) CALJIC No. 

2.21.2, the standard instruction on willfully false testimony, does not lighten 

the prosecution’s burden of proof. (People v. Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 

p. 751, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302; People v. Nakahara, supra, at p. 714, 

134 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 68 P.3d 1190; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 

428-429, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) CALJIC No. 2.22, the standard 

instruction on weighing conflicting testimony, does not undermine the 

standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Cleveland, supra, 32 

Cal.4th at p. 751, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302; People v. Nakahara, supra, 

at p. 714, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 68 P.3d 1190; People v. Maury, supra, at p. 

429, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) Finally, CALJIC No. 8.20, defining 

premeditation and deliberation, does not suggest that a defendant must 

absolutely preclude the possibility of premeditation rather than merely raising 

a reasonable doubt. (People v. Nakahara, supra, at p. 715, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 

223, 68 P.3d 1190.) 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 126-27. Petitioner also later raised this claim in the second state 

habeas petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see Lodgment No. 91), but for 

the reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will address the claim on the merits. 

 Petitioner acknowledges that the jury was given CALJIC 2.90, which provided 

instruction on the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt and the burden of proof, and 

states in part that: “A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the 

contrary is proven, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily 

shown, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. The presumption places upon the People 

the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] In this case, the 

presumption places upon the People the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 

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Mr. Jurado is guilty of conspiracy to commit murder and/or guilty of first degree murder 

with the special circumstance of ‘lying in wait.’” (CT 1199.) 

 Yet, Petitioner contends that the other jury instructions listed above undermined or 

otherwise obviated the reasonable doubt standard. For one, Petitioner asserts that CALJIC 

2.01, 2.02, 8.83 and 8.83.1 “informed the jury, in essentially identical terms, that if one 

interpretation of the evidence, ‘appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation 

appears to be unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the 

unreasonable,” which “was contrary to the requirement that Petitioner may be convicted 

only if guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (SAP at 464.) He argues that “the 

instructions operated as an impermissible mandatory conclusive presumption of guilt upon 

a finding that an interpretation of the evidence that pointed to guilt ‘appears to be 

reasonable.’” (Id. at 465.) He asserts that CALJIC 1.00 also undermined the burden of 

proof, as while the jury was properly instructed that Petitioner’s arrest, charges, trial were 

not evidence of guilt, the mention of “innocent” in juxtaposition with guilt was 

problematic, contending that “the issue to be decided at a criminal trial is not one of guilt 

or ‘innocence,’” but rather whether the state could prove its case beyond a reasonable 

doubt, and that “[t]his error encouraged jurors to find Petitioner guilty because it had not 

been proven that he was ‘innocent.’” (Id. at 465-66.) With respect to CALJIC 2.21.2, 

which advised that jurors could reject testimony of a witness who was willfully false in 

part, he argues that the instruction “allowed the jury to assess prosecution witnesses by 

seeking only a probability of truth in their testimony.” (Id. at 466.) Petitioner asserts that 

CALJIC 2.22, which instructed jurors to weigh evidence not by counting witnesses but by 

evaluating “the convincing force of the evidence,” actually “replaced” the standard of proof 

and directed jurors “to determine which side has presented evidence that is comparatively 

more convincing than that presented by the other side.” (Id.) He further argues that the 

use of the word “precluding” in defining premeditation and deliberation in CALJIC 8.20, 

“could be interpreted as requiring the defendant to absolutely preclude the possibility of 

premeditation- as opposed to raising a reasonable doubt,” and that: “No reasonable juror 

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could have understood-in the face of so many instructions permitting conviction upon a 

lesser showing- that they were required to find Petitioner not guilty unless each element of 

the charged offenses was proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at 467-68.) 

As stated previously, this Court must decide “whether the ailing instruction by itself 

so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process,” after 

considering it “in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” McGuire, 

502 U.S. at 72, quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. Petitioner’s contentions parse the language 

contained within a number of the contested instructions to point out and highlight phrases 

or passages that could potentially on their own, or in combination with phrases or passages 

plucked from other instructions, be interpreted as lowering the burden of proof. This 

treatment of the jury instructions clearly contravenes Supreme Court authority, which 

directs a reviewing court to consider the “instructions as a whole,” and not in “‘artificial 

isolation.’” McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. The jury in 

Petitioner’s case was properly directed to consider the instructions as a whole, as follows: 

“Again I think you understand as I pointed out at the outset, that the instructions are to be 

considered as a whole as they relate one to the other to make up an entire body of applicable 

law. You’re not to single out any particular rule or instruction, place any greater or lesser 

emphasis thereon.” (RT 2764.) The written set of instructions included that same 

admonition, as follows: “Do not single out any particular sentence or any individual point 

or instruction and ignore the others. Consider the instructions as a whole and each in light 

of all the others.” (CT 1177.) That Petitioner has selected phrases or passages from these 

instructions that could, devoid of context, suggest a different burden of proof, fails to 

persuade the Court of the complained of error, given the Supreme Court’s clearly 

established authority directing that the instructions must be considered “as a whole.” 

 After reviewing the full complement of jury instructions, the Court is not persuaded 

that the challenged instructions “misled the jury regarding the reasonable doubt standard, 

and impermissibly lightened the prosecution’s burden of proof,” as Petitioner contends. 

(SAP at 463.) The record clearly reflects that the jurors were repeatedly instructed on the 

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burden of proof. For instance, Petitioner complains that the language in CALJIC 2.01 

concerning reasonable and unreasonable interpretations of the evidence were “contrary to” 

the reasonable doubt burden of proof, yet that very instruction also contained explicit 

references to the very reasonable doubt standard it supposedly undermined, as the 

instruction directed that “each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances 

necessary to establish the defendant’s guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

other words, before an inference essential to establish guilt may be found to have been 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance upon which such inference 

necessary rests must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (CT 1184.) The jury was also 

repeatedly instructed with the proper burden of proof and reasonable doubt standards 

during instructions on the degrees of murder, special circumstances, and other allegations. 

(See e.g. CT 1226- CALJIC 8.71 instructed that: “If you are convinced beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the crime of murder has been committed by a defendant, but you have a 

reasonable doubt whether such murder was of the first or of the second degree, you must 

give defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict fixing the murder as of the 

second degree.”; CT 1228- CALJIC 8.75 instructed in part that: “If you are not satisfied 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime of first degree murder 

as charged in Count Two and you unanimously so find, you may convict him of any lesser 

crime provided you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of such crime.”; 

CT 1240- CALJIC 17.16, instruction on the allegation of personal use of a 

dangerous/deadly weapon, stated in part that: “The People have the burden of proving the 

truth of this allegation. If you have a reasonable doubt that it is true, you must find it to be 

not true.”; CT 1241- CALJIC 8.80, the introductory special circumstances instruction, 

stated that: “The People have the burden of proving the truth of a special circumstance. If 

you have a reasonable doubt as to whether a special circumstance is true, you must find it 

to be not true.”; CT 1244- CALJIC 8.83, an instruction on the sufficiency of circumstantial 

evidence of a special circumstance, instructed in part that: “Further, each fact which is 

essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish the truth of a special 

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circumstance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] In other words, before an 

inference essential to establish a special circumstance may be found to have been proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance upon which such inference 

necessarily rests must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”) 

 Even were there any potential for confusion in the passages Petitioner highlights in 

the challenged instructions, the jury was repeatedly and properly instructed that the 

prosecution bore the burden of proof and that each of the elements of the charged crimes, 

special circumstances, and other allegations must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in 

order to establish guilt. Considering the jury instructions as a whole, as the Supreme Court 

has specifically directed, Petitioner fails to show that the instructions at issue here were 

erroneous, much less that they “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction 

violates due process.” McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. Nor has 

Petitioner shown that the asserted error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence 

in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

 Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this 

claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Habeas 

relief is unavailable on Claim 18. 

E. Claims Alleging Error During Penalty Phase Proceedings

1. Claim 29

 Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in excluding Petitioner’s videotaped 

confession as hearsay, arguing that “Petitioner’s non-assertive conduct, as seen in the 

videotape, was not hearsay. Moreover, even assuming it was hearsay, the videotape was 

still admissible in the penalty phase of this capital trial under the United States Supreme 

Court’s holdings in Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) and Chambers v. Mississippi, 

410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).” (SAP at 515.) Petitioner contends that this error prevented 

the jurors from hearing all available mitigation evidence and deprived him of rebuttal 

evidence to counter the State’s evidence in favor of the death penalty. (Id. at 516.) 

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 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding a videotape 

of his interrogation by police detectives on May 18, 1991, shortly after his 

arrest for the murder of Terry Holloway. He further contends that this error 

violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments 

to the federal Constitution. 

As part of its case in mitigation, the defense proposed to have the jury 

watch a videotape that was made, without defendant’s knowledge, while he 

was being interrogated by police detectives about the murder of Terry 

Holloway. During the interrogation, defendant at first denied any involvement 

in the murder, but eventually he admitted killing Holloway, and he insisted 

that he had done it entirely on his own and that neither Denise Shigemura nor 

Anna Humiston was present. He said he killed Holloway because he was in 

danger and his family was in danger. He expressed fear that Brian Johnsen 

had friends in prison who would kill him or his mother or other family 

members in retaliation for killing Holloway. He also expressed concern that 

he would be perceived in prison as a snitch and killed for that reason, or that 

he would have to spend his entire life in prison. During this part of the 

interrogation, defendant displayed considerable emotion, sobbing and at one 

point grasping an interrogating officer’s hand. The defense argued that the 

evidence of defendant’s emotional responses was admissible to show his 

remorse for the killing. 

The prosecution objected that the videotape was inadmissible under the 

hearsay rule (Evid. Code, § 1200), because defendant’s emotional displays 

were assertive conduct, and also under Evidence Code section 352, because 

the evidence’s probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of 

undue prejudice and jury confusion. After viewing the videotape, the trial 

court sustained the hearsay objection and excluded the evidence. The court 

agreed with the prosecution that defendant’s emotional displays were a form 

of hearsay and not within any exception to the hearsay rule. The court also 

rejected the defense argument that defendant’s constitutional right to present 

mitigating evidence in a capital case overrode the hearsay rule in this instance. 

The court noted there was no compelling need for the evidence, because 

defendant could testify to any remorse he might have felt, and that the 

evidence was not particularly trustworthy as evidence of remorse because on 

the videotape defendant never articulated any feelings of sorrow or regret for 

killing Teresa Holloway, or any sympathy for Holloway or her family, 

although he did indicate concern for his own safety and well-being, and also 

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concern for his mother and for Anna Humiston. Thus, in the court’s view, it 

was by no means clear that defendant’s emotional display was in any way 

caused by remorse, and it seemed more likely that it was caused entirely by 

concern for his own predicament. 

The defense raised the issue again after both sides had rested at the 

penalty phase and the prosecutor had given his closing argument to the jury. 

Defense counsel requested permission to reopen the evidence to play the 

videotape for the jury to rebut the prosecutor’s assertion, in argument to the 

jury, that defendant “lacked a conscience.” Defense counsel pointed out that 

during the videotaped interview defendant said, in response to a question 

asking whether he had received any injuries in his struggle with Teresa 

Holloway, “The only injury I got is from my, just from my conscience.” The 

trial court denied the request to reopen. 

The defense raised the issue a final time after the jury had returned the 

penalty verdict of death. In a motion for a new trial, the defense argued that 

the trial court had erred in excluding the videotape. To demonstrate prejudice, 

the defense submitted declarations by three trial jurors stating that evidence 

that defendant lacked remorse for killing Teresa Holloway was an important 

factor in aggravation, and that evidence that defendant had an emotional 

reaction to the murder and talked about his conscience would have 

counterbalanced that evidence. The trial court denied the motion for a new 

trial. 

Defendant is correct that, by themselves, defendant’s emotional 

displays were nonassertive conduct, and thus not within the hearsay rule. For 

purposes of the hearsay rule, conduct is assertive if the actor at the time 

intended the conduct to convey a particular meaning to another person. (Evid. 

Code, § 225 [defining statement to include “nonverbal conduct of a person 

intended by him as a substitute for oral or written verbal expression”].) For 

example, a nod of the head in response to a question calling for a yes-or-no 

answer, or a gesture pointing to a particular person when asked to identify a 

perpetrator, are examples of assertive conduct. Here, nothing in the videotape 

suggests that defendant’s emotional responses were voluntary or that he 

intended them to convey any particular meaning to the interrogating officers. 

But the defense sought to introduce more than just evidence of the 

emotional displays themselves. To explain the significance of the emotional 

displays, and particularly defendant’s statement that as a result of the murder 

he had received an “injury from [his] conscience,” the defense sought to 

introduce the statements defendant made during the videotaped interview. As 

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defendant must concede, those statements, including assertions and 

descriptions of his own feelings and other mental states, were hearsay. They 

were not admissible under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule 

(Evid. Code, § 1250) if they were made under circumstances indicating a lack 

of trustworthiness (id., § 1252). As the trial court correctly determined, the 

circumstance that defendant made his statements during a postarrest police 

interrogation, when he had a compelling motive to minimize his culpability 

for the murder and to play on the sympathies of his interrogators, indicated a 

lack of trustworthiness. In past decisions, we have upheld the exclusion of 

self-serving postcrime statements made under similar circumstances. (People 

v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 779-780, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297;

People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 820, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 

436; People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 642-643, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 

P.2d 849.) 

We have also rejected the argument that exclusion of this sort of 

hearsay evidence violates a capital defendant’s right to a fair trial and a 

reliable penalty determination under the federal Constitution. As we have 

explained, a capital defendant has no federal constitutional right to the 

admission of evidence lacking trustworthiness, particularly when the 

defendant seeks to put his own self-serving statements before the jury without 

subjecting himself to cross-examination. (People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th 

at pp. 838-840, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481; People v. Livaditis, supra, 

2 Cal.4th at p. 780, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297; People v. Edwards, supra, 

54 Cal.3d at pp. 820-821, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436; People v. Whitt, 

supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 644, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849.) 

In excluding the entire videotape of defendant’s postarrest 

interrogation, the trial court did not err under state law, nor did it violate 

defendant’s rights under the federal Constitution. The defense never offered 

to redact the videotape to show only the nonassertive conduct, and, even if it 

had done so, any error in excluding the admissible portions of the videotape 

was harmless. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 128-30 (alterations in original). Petitioner also later raised this claim 

in the second state habeas petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see 

Lodgment No. 91), but for the reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will 

address the claim on the merits. 

/// 

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Petitioner asserts that the California Supreme Court correctly found that his 

emotional responses during the interrogation were not within the scope of the hearsay rule, 

but erred in concluding the evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus properly 

excluded, because the statements and responses were made during an interrogation just 

after his arrest. (Pet. Br. at 119, citing Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 130.) Petitioner contends that 

“[t]he state court’s opinion fails to analyze the material fact that the police had secretly

recorded the interview, and thus since Mr. Jurado was in fact unaware that he was being 

videotaped the circumstance of the videotaped interrogation presents significant indicia of 

reliability.” (Id. at 119-20) (italics in original.) 

This first assertion, that the California Supreme Court “implicitly- and correctlyfound the videotaped interrogation was admissible” under an exception to the hearsay rule 

warrants clarification and correction. Petitioner, citing the direct appeal opinion, maintains 

that “[t]he California Supreme Court agreed with the defense that ‘defendant’s emotional 

displays were nonassertive conduct, and thus not within the hearsay rule. . . . . Here, (unlike 

conduct that is assertive in nature,) nothing in the videotape suggests that defendant’s 

emotional responses were voluntary or that he intended them to convey any particular 

meaning to the interrogating officers.[’] Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 129, italics added.” (Id. at 

118.) However, a review of the California Supreme Court’s opinion shows that Petitioner’s 

reference to, and quotation from, the state court’s opinion is incomplete. The state supreme 

court found that while, “by themselves, defendant’s emotional displays were nonassertive 

conduct, and thus not within the hearsay rule,” the defense was at the same time attempting 

to introduce the statements Petitioner made to provide context for and explain the 

significance of his emotional responses, and that “those statements, including assertions 

and descriptions of his own feelings and other mental states, were hearsay.” Jurado, 38 

Cal. 4th at 129 (emphasis in original.) 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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As the Court previously discussed in the Group One Order with respect to Claim 

1.R,24 while Petitioner contends that his behavior during the interrogation did not constitute 

hearsay and provided reliable evidence of remorse, both the trial court and the California 

Supreme Court rejected that argument, as follows: 

When the defense attempted to introduce the video into evidence, the trial 

court ruled that the tape constituted inadmissible hearsay and questioned the 

reliability of the statements, as follows: “So I think that for this evidence to 

have any relevance it really has to have a hearsay purpose, that is, to 

communicate his mental or emotional state, either through express words or 

conduct which is a substitute for words. () So I think there is the inherent 

danger and mischief in hearsay. I think the circumstances under which the 

statement was made raise serious, serious questions about the reliability of the 

trustworthiness of the statements.” (RT 3133.) The trial court acknowledged 

that the decision was “a close call,” yet reasoned that: “But I just think any 

way you cut it, it’s a - - its either hearsay or so close to hearsay that the hearsay 

analysis is relevant, really, and applicable.” (RT 3135.) The California 

Supreme Court agreed that the statements were hearsay. See Jurado, 38 Cal. 

4th at 129-30. 

(ECF No. 171 at 120.) In the Group One Order, the Court also noted the difficulty in 

attempting to introduce only the non-hearsay aspects of the interrogation: 

Had counsel redacted or muted the video in an attempt to show only the 

nonassertive conduct, the lack of context would have deprived the evidence 

of relevance. The trial court recognized this difficulty when it elaborated on 

the reasons for excluding the videotape, concluding that it was impossible to 

divorce the emotional displays from the surrounding circumstances: 

Again I think here, for this to really have any meaning or 

relevance in this case, the emotional response and display of 

emotion requires some explanation or interpretation for it to have 

relevance. It - - its relevance is not in my view just some general 

display of emotion or - - or - - or the crime here. (¶) I mean it’s 

                                               

24 In Claim 1.R, which the Court rejected in the Group One Order, Petitioner asserted 

that trial counsel should have sought to introduce Petitioner’s videotaped confession 

without sound, which would have addressed the hearsay issue and allowed the jury to view 

his emotional responses and remorse, and that the failure to do so constituted ineffective 

assistance of counsel. (ECF No. 171 at 119-23.)

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not a contention that he’s a - - completely emotionless, that he 

can never cry or never display emotion, it’s whether he has 

displayed any emotion concerning the crime here and the victim.

And particularly that’s - - I think on all theories advanced that’s 

the relevancy. Certainly that’s the relevancy if it’s intended to 

rebut the testimony of the prosecution witness, but I think also 

under the expanded “k” factor relevance and the sub “a” 

relevance it’s only relevant if it’s emotion concerning the crime 

and the victim and what he did here. And that demands crossexamination in my view, that demands being tested on the anvil 

of truth, cross-examination. 

(Id. at 121, quoting RT 3256-57.) As the Court previously noted in the Group One Order, 

(see id. at 122), Petitioner fails to persuasively explain how his non-verbal conduct during 

the interrogation, including any emotional responses, could be effectively separated from 

his statements in order to satisfy the hearsay exception while still offering relevant evidence 

of remorse. Moreover, as the California Supreme Court observed, the trial court was not 

persuaded that remorse was the impetus for Petitioner’s emotional behavior at the 

interrogation, as follows: 

The court noted there was no compelling need for the evidence, because 

defendant could testify to any remorse he might have felt, and that the 

evidence was not particularly trustworthy as evidence of remorse because on 

the videotape defendant never articulated any feelings of sorrow or regret for 

killing Teresa Holloway, or any sympathy for Holloway or her family, 

although he did indicate concern for his own safety and well-being, and also 

concern for his mother and for Anna Humiston. Thus, in the court’s view, it 

was by no means clear that defendant’s emotional display was in any way 

caused by remorse, and it seemed more likely that it was caused entirely by 

concern for his own predicament. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 128-29. This passage also undercuts Petitioner’s second argument, 

that the California Supreme Court’s decision involved an unreasonable factual 

determination concerning the reliability and trustworthiness of the videotape based on the 

circumstances surrounding the interrogation. As noted above, Petitioner also argues that 

“[t]he state court’s opinion fails to analyze the material fact that the police had secretly

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recorded the interview, and thus since Mr. Jurado was in fact unaware that he was being 

videotaped the circumstance of the videotaped interrogation presents significant indicia of 

reliability.” (Pet. Br. at 119-20.) He contends that “[t]he court’s factual finding- i.e., that 

the statement was untrustworthy because it was made during a postarrest police 

interrogation-also was erroneous in that it ignored the trial court’s own statements showing 

strong indicia of trustworthiness.” (Id. at 120.) 

The Supreme Court has held that in certain circumstances, the exclusion of hearsay 

evidence may rise to the level of a due process violation, such as when “[t]he excluded 

testimony was highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase of the trial . . . and 

substantial reasons existed to assume its reliability.” Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 

(1979), citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 (“[T]he hearsay rule may not be applied 

mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.”) Yet, the Ninth Circuit has since clarified 

that decisions such as Green and Chambers “do not stand for the proposition that a 

defendant must be allowed to put on any evidence he chooses.” LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 

F.3d 1253, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) 

(“[W]e have never questioned the power of the States to exclude evidence through the 

application of evidentiary rules that themselves serve the interests of fairness and 

reliability- even if the defendant would prefer to see the evidence admitted.”) 

Petitioner fails to show that the evidence in question satisfies Green, as the Court is 

not persuaded that the tape was both relevant to the jury’s penalty phase determination and 

reliable. Petitioner cites portions of the motion hearing in trial court in support of his 

argument that the trial court found the tape trustworthy. However, upon review, the 

citations in question are from the trial court’s questioning of the parties’ arguments, and 

are not the actual “findings” of the trial court. For instance, Petitioner cites to a portion of 

the record where the trial court generally stated that “[t]he presence of remorse is relevant” 

to assert that the trial court found the tape itself “clearly” relevant, when the record reflects 

the trial court immediately added that relevance alone was insufficient, as “you have to 

prove it by admissible evidence.” (Pet. Br. at 120, citing RT 3138.) The trial court’s 

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ultimate conclusion was that the tape constituted inadmissible hearsay, reasoning that: “I 

think for this evidence to have any relevance, it really has to have a hearsay purpose, that 

is, to communicate his mental or emotional state, either through express words or conduct 

which is a substitute for words,” and that: “I think the circumstances under which the 

statement was made raise serious, serious questions about the reliability of the 

trustworthiness of the statements.” (RT 3133.) The California Supreme Court similarly 

concluded that Petitioner’s statements were not reliable, reasoning that: “As the trial court 

correctly determined, the circumstance that defendant made his statements during a 

postarrest police interrogation, when he had a compelling motive to minimize his 

culpability for the murder and to play on the sympathies of his interrogators, indicated a 

lack of trustworthiness. In past decisions, we have upheld the exclusion of self-serving 

postcrime statements made under similar circumstances.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 130. 

Petitioner argues that the California Supreme Court’s decision was unreasonable 

because Petitioner did not minimize his involvement, but instead, as the trial court noted, 

admitted to strangling and bludgeoning the victim. (Reply at 56-58, citing RT 3117.) 

However, this admission about his physical actions does not preclude a conclusion that 

Petitioner at the same time sought to minimize his moral culpability during that interview. 

A review of the interrogation transcript reveals that Petitioner first denied and then 

admitted committing the murder, but he also rationalized his behavior and lied about the 

circumstances of the crime. Petitioner claimed at one point that “all I know is I’m in 

danger, my family’s in danger,” stating that he had been kidnapped earlier and the victim 

had something to do with it. (CT 1387-89.) When asked by the interrogating officer if 

“this is because you got threats to your family,” Petitioner replied that: “It’s the only reason 

man. I could never do this to nobody.” (CT 1393.) The evidence at trial showed that the 

murder was committed because the victim discovered Petitioner’s plan to kill another 

individual, Doug Mynatt, and was planned and carried out to prevent her from informing 

Mynatt of that plot rather than out of fear for his family’s safety or due to threats to him or 

his family. 

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Petitioner also argues that his lack of knowledge that the statement was recorded by 

the police increases its reliability, but offers no clearly established authority in support of 

this contention. He simply asserts that “[s]tatements made by individuals accused of 

committing crimes are routinely introduced into evidence in California trial courts- and in 

trial courts around the county- on the basis that the statements made during postarrest 

police interrogations are made under circumstances indicating trustworthiness,” and cites 

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) and Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 

182 (1982) (dis. opn. Brennan, J.), as well as several California Supreme Court cases. (Pet. 

Br. at 120.) However, while both Fulminante and Connelly constitute clearly established 

authority binding on this Court, a review of those decisions reveals that neither supports 

Petitioner’s argument or compels the result he urges. Instead, in both decisions, the 

Supreme Court expressed concern about the reliability of confessions, particularly given 

the potential import and power of such evidence, and emphasized that a reviewing court 

must take careful pains to examine the trustworthiness of such statements. Fulminante 

involved a question as to whether the admission of a coerced confession was harmless 

error, while Connelly involved a voluntariness question about a confession; in neither case 

did the Supreme Court state that that a police interrogation was inherently reliable, much 

less support Petitioner’s argument that an unknowingly recorded interrogation resulting in 

a confession is reliable simply because the suspect was unaware of the recording. See 

Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296 (“A confession is like no other evidence. . . . In the case of a 

coerced confession . . ., the risk that the confession is unreliable, coupled with the profound 

impact that the confession has upon the jury, requires a reviewing court to exercise extreme 

caution before determining that the admission of the confession at trial was harmless.”); 

Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 (“[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the 

finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) Both cases are also easily distinguished from Petitioner’s 

assertion that his post-arrest statement to police should have been considered reliable. 

While the Connelly decision, like Petitioner’s case, involved a confession to the police, the 

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Supreme Court acknowledged that the issue in that case was the voluntariness of that 

confession given the defendant’s mental state and coercive police actions, factors not 

asserted in Petitioner’s case. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165-67. Meanwhile, neither of the 

two confessions at issue in Fulminante was the result of post-arrest police interrogation. 

See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 283-84. 

Additionally, as Petitioner acknowledges, his citation of Connelly is to the dissenting 

opinion. (See Pet. Br. at 120.) Even in that dissent, Justice Brennan acknowledged that: 

“Our distrust for reliance on confessions is due, in part, to their decisive impact upon the 

adversarial process,” stated that “[b]ecause the admission of a confession so strongly tips 

the balance against the defendant in the adversarial process, we must be especially careful 

about a confession’s reliability,” and like the Fulminante Court, articulated the need for 

caution in admitting such evidence. Id. at 182-83. For the reasons discussed, the Court 

finds no support in either decision for Petitioner’s contention that a post-arrest police 

statement is inherently reliable, much less that it is somehow more reliable because 

Petitioner was unaware it was recorded. 

Regardless of whether the interrogation was recorded with or without Petitioner’s 

knowledge, the fact remains that it took place just after Petitioner’s arrest and that situation 

weighed against finding the statements reliable.25 This Court is limited to reviewing the 

                                               

25 At oral arguments, Petitioner cited Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), in which 

the Supreme Court noted that the “against penal interest” hearsay exception “is founded on 

the broad assumption ‘that a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his own 

interest at the time it is made.’” Lilly, 527 U.S. at 126-27, quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 

299. While the Supreme Court acknowledged in Lilly that “[s]tatements in the first 

category-voluntary admissions of the declarant-are routinely offered into evidence against 

the maker of the statement and carry a distinguished heritage confirming their admissibility 

when so used,” see id. at 127, any attempt by Petitioner to leverage this as support for an 

argument that expressions of remorse made in such a statement are similarly reliable is 

unpersuasive. Whether or not the prosecutor contemplated attempting to introduce 

Petitioner’s statement at the guilt phase, as Petitioner contended at oral arguments, the fact 

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reasonableness of the state court’s determination, not rendering a decision on the merits of 

the matter in the first instance. Thus, in light of the trial court’s explicit and reasonable 

finding that Petitioner’s police interrogation took place under circumstances that 

undermined the reliability of the statements he sought to admit, Petitioner fails to 

demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s decision to affirm the trial court’s 

conclusions on similar grounds was unreasonable. 

Petitioner also asserts that, contrary to the California Supreme Court’s conclusion, 

the tape was relevant to show his humanity, remorse and acceptance of responsibility. As 

the trial court and the California Supreme Court each found, the tape did not offer 

compelling evidence of remorse for his actions, as any concern or emotion Petitioner 

displayed appeared related to what would happen to him and his own loved ones, such as 

his family and Anna Humiston, rather than any regret or concern for the victim or her 

family. After viewing the tape, the trial court stated: “I did note that nowhere does he 

expressly articulate any emotion, if you will, or concern or remorse about the victim or her 

family.” (RT 3251.) The trial court recounted that Petitioner expressed concerns about 

being labeled a snitch, expressed fear and concern for his family and Humiston, and 

indicated that he did not want to go to jail, “[b]ut never, I say, did he articulate or express 

in words any mention of the victim herself or the victim’s family.” (RT 3251-52.) After 

reviewing the tape, the trial court reaffirmed its earlier ruling excluding the tape as hearsay 

and stated: “[U]nder Green versus Georgia there must be some compelling need for the 

evidence, reason for the evidence - - and some significant, substantial evidence of inherent 

trustworthiness or reliability. And I don’t think there’s either in this case.” (RT 3255.) 

The trial court stated that: 

Again I think here, for this to really have any meaning or relevance in this 

case, the emotional response and display of emotion requires some 

explanation or interpretation for it to have relevance. It - - its relevance is not 

                                               

remains that Petitioner fails to demonstrate the evidence at issue was reliable or trustworthy 

for the purpose of mitigation.

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in my view just some general display of emotion or - - or - - or some emotional 

response, it has to be related to the victim or - - or - - or the crime here. [¶] I 

mean it’s not a contention that he’s a - - completely emotionless, that he can 

never cry or never display emotion, it’s whether he has displayed any emotion 

concerning the crime here and the victim. And particularly that’s - - I think 

on all theories advanced that’s the relevancy. Certainly that’s the relevancy 

if it’s intended to rebut the testimony of the prosecution witness, but think also 

under the expanded “k” factor relevance and the sub “a” relevance it’s only 

relevant if it’s emotion concerning the crime and the victim and what he did 

here. And that demands cross-examination in my view, that demands being 

tested on the anvil of truth, cross-examination. 

(RT 3256-57.) The California Supreme Court affirmed this decision, similarly concluding 

that “a capital defendant has no federal constitutional right to the admission of evidence 

lacking trustworthiness, particularly when the defendant seeks to put his own self-serving 

statements before the jury without subjecting himself to cross-examination.” Jurado, 38 

Cal. 4th at 130. 

This Court’s own review of the interrogation transcript affirms the reasonableness 

of that decision. While at one point Petitioner mentions an injury to his “conscience” from 

the crime and expresses emotions by crying, at no point does Petitioner articulate any 

feelings of regret or remorse over his actions or their impact on the victim or her family. 

Indeed, almost immediately after mentioning an “injury” from his “conscience,” the officer 

leaves the room and Petitioner says to himself: “Lord help me get out early. I don’t want 

to waste my life in prison.” (CT 1398.) As such, the Court’s review of the record does not 

support Petitioner’s assertion that the California Supreme Court acted unreasonably in 

upholding the exclusion of the tape. 

Finally, Petitioner separately argues that the “[t]he due process violation amounts to 

clear error under Eddings [v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982)] and Skipper [v. South 

Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986)] because petitioner proffered the videotaped confession as 

relevant evidence in mitigation for a sentence of less than death.” (Reply at 62.) Petitioner 

argues the tape was relevant evidence in mitigation, as it showed that he took and accepted 

responsibility for the murder as well as demonstrated remorse. (Id. at 62-63.) 

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“‘[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . . not be 

precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character 

or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis 

for a sentence less than death.’” Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110, quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 

U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis in original). In Skipper, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 

those earlier decisions and added that “[e]qually clear is the corollary rule that the sentence 

may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering ‘any relevant mitigating 

evidence.’” Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4, quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114. 

The Court remains unpersuaded that the tape constituted relevant evidence in 

mitigation either with respect to Petitioner’s acceptance of responsibility or demonstration 

of remorse. Petitioner sought during his interrogation to characterize the murder as being 

committed out of fear or due to threats, when the available evidence shows Holloway was 

instead murdered to conceal Petitioner’s plan to commit another murder, and that while 

Petitioner may have demonstrated concern for his own future and well-being, and that of 

his family and of Humiston, as well as dismay about how his actions would affect him and 

his own loved ones, he did not articulate any such concern about Holloway or her family. 

As such, the Court finds an absence of error under Eddings or Skipper. 

Because Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s rejection 

of this claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, 

habeas relief is not available on Claim 29. At oral arguments, Petitioner requested 

discovery and an evidentiary hearing26 on this claim, including discovery of notes or 

                                               

26 At oral arguments, Petitioner also requested discovery and an evidentiary hearing 

on Claim 1.R, a related ineffective assistance of counsel claim previously denied in the 

Group One Order. (See ECF No. 171 at 119-23.) In that prior Order, the Court also denied 

Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing and discovery on a number of claims, 

including Claim 1.R (see id. at 123, 150-51), and Petitioner fails to provide grounds for 

reconsideration of those decisions. 

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documents concerning the use of the videotaped interrogation in other cases, such as 

Humiston’s or Shigemura’s. As Petitioner fails to satisfy section 2254(d) on the basis of 

the state record, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted on Claim 29. Sully, 725 F.3d at 

1075; Totten, 137 F.3d at 1176. Petitioner’s request for discovery is also denied. Kemp, 

638 F.3d at 1260. 

2. Claim 30

 Petitioner alleges that while the trial court excluded evidence of Teresa Holloway’s 

pregnancy and the death of her fetus at the guilt phase, the trial court erred in admitting 

that same evidence during the penalty phase, arguing that “[t]he evidence presented at 

Petitioner’s penalty phase trial established that Petitioner did not believe Teresa Holloway 

was pregnant at the time of her death” and that it was thus “irrelevant to the jurors’ reasoned 

moral response to Petitioner’s crime.” (SAP at 558.) Alternately, he argues that “even 

assuming that evidence of Holloway’s pregnancy was relevant to the jury’s individualized 

determination of whether Petitioner should die, this evidence was so inflammatory and 

created such a substantial danger of undue prejudice that any probative value the evidence 

may have had clearly was outweighed by its harmful effects.” (Id.) (emphasis in original.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Before defendant’s trial began, the trial court denied his motion to 

exclude from the penalty phase any evidence that Teresa Holloway was 

pregnant when defendant murdered her. Defendant contends that the ruling 

was error because the evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. He 

further contends that admission of the evidence violated his rights under the 

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 

The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the murder victim’s 

pregnancy at the penalty phase as a circumstance of the offense. The Eighth 

Amendment to the federal Constitution permits the prosecution, in a capital 

case, to present evidence about the murder victim and the specific harm that 

the defendant caused as relevant to the jury’s penalty decision. (Payne v. 

Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720; People 

v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 351, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545.) In 

California, the prosecution may introduce evidence of the specific harm 

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caused by a defendant’s crime at the penalty phase in aggravation as a 

circumstance of the crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)). (People v. Panah, supra, 35 

Cal.4th at p. 494, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790; People v. Fierro (1991) 

1 Cal.4th 173, 235, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302.) 

Defendant argues that evidence of the pregnancy was irrelevant 

because, although the prosecution presented evidence that Terry Holloway 

told him she was pregnant, there was also uncontradicted evidence that he did 

not believe it. This court has concluded, however, that facts concerning the 

victim that are admissible at the penalty phase of a capital trial as 

circumstances of the crime are not limited to those known to or reasonably 

foreseeable by the defendant at the time of the murder. (People v. Pollock

(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1183, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353; accord, People 

v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 732, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289.) 

We also reject defendant’s argument that the trial court abused its 

discretion by not excluding the pregnancy evidence as unduly prejudicial. We 

have explained the parameters of the trial court’s discretion in these situations 

in this way: “‘On the one hand, it should allow evidence and argument on 

emotional though relevant subjects that could provide legitimate reasons to 

sway the jury to show mercy or to impose the ultimate sanction. On the other 

hand, irrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury’s 

attention from its proper role or invites an irrational, purely subjective 

response should be curtailed.’” (People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 

836, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436, quoting People v. Haskett (1982) 30 

Cal.3d 841, 864, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776; accord, People v. Panah, 

supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 494-495, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790; see also 

People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 1180, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353 

[evidence admissible if it “is not so inflammatory as to elicit from the jury an 

irrational or emotional response untethered to the facts of the case”].) That in 

murdering Teresa Holloway defendant also terminated the life of a healthy 

17-week-old fetus she was carrying was part of the harm caused by 

defendant’s crime and thus was a legitimate, though emotional, consideration 

for the jury in making its penalty decision. We note also that defendant does 

not challenge the manner in which the evidence was presented, and we 

conclude it was not presented in an unnecessarily inflammatory way. 

Therefore, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion 

in admitting evidence of the victim’s pregnancy. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 130-31 (alteration in original). Petitioner also later raised this claim 

in the second state habeas petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see 

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Lodgment No. 91), but for the reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will 

address the claim on the merits. 

Again, a claim of state law error arising from the erroneous admission of evidence 

may merit federal habeas relief only if “the admission of the evidence so fatally infected 

the proceedings as to render them fundamentally unfair.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919; see 

also McGuire, 502 U.S. at 68-73. As discussed in greater detail with respect to Claim 31 

below, an allegation of error arising from the admission of victim impact evidence is 

amenable to this type of analysis. See Gretzler v. Stewart, 112 F.3d 992, 1009 (9th Cir. 

1997) (“Evidence about a victim’s characteristics and the impact of a murder on the 

victim’s family is relevant and admissible at a death penalty sentencing proceeding. 

Admission of such evidence will only be deemed unconstitutional if it is so unduly 

prejudicial that it renders the sentence fundamentally unfair.”), citing Payne v. Tennessee, 

501 U.S. 808, 825, 827 (1991).

Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of his 

claim was unreasonable under section 2254(d)(1) because the state court erred in limiting 

itself to deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the pregnancy 

evidence rather than explicitly examining whether the admission of that evidence violated 

due process. (Pet. Br. at 124-26.) Petitioner contends that unforeseeable characteristics of 

the victim are irrelevant to a penalty determination, and that “the state court failed to 

appropriately consider that unforeseeable victim characteristics are irrelevant to a 

defendant’s personal responsibility and moral guilt, and thus when considered as a factor 

at sentencing will lead to sentences out of proportion to the defendant’s blameworthiness.” 

(Id. at 126, citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).) 

This argument fails to find support in clearly established law. In Enmund, the 

Supreme Court held that: “For purposes of imposing the death penalty, . . .[a defendant’s] 

punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt.” Enmund, 458 

U.S. at 801. In 1987, the Supreme Court relied on Enmund to hold that the Eighth 

Amendment prohibited the consideration of a victim impact statement during capital 

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sentencing proceedings. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502, 507, 509 and n.10 

(1987), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. 808. However, as discussed in greater detail with 

respect to Claim 31, the Supreme Court has since reversed Booth and provided for the 

admission and consideration of victim impact evidence in capital sentencing. See Payne, 

501 U.S. at 825 (“We are now of the view that a State may properly conclude that for the 

jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s moral culpability and blameworthiness, it 

should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the 

defendant.”)

Moreover, as Respondent correctly points out, the victim’s pregnancy was not an 

“unforeseeable” characteristic. As outlined in greater detailed below, testimony showed 

that Holloway told Petitioner she was pregnant in a conversation a short time prior to her 

death and that the victim was in fact several months pregnant at the time of her death. 

While the trial record also reflects that Petitioner expressed his disbelief that Holloway was 

pregnant, regardless of that belief or lack thereof, it is clear that Petitioner was at the very 

least aware that she claimed to be pregnant. Thus, Holloway’s pregnancy could not have 

been an “unforeseeable” victim characteristic, and the Court is unpersuaded that 

Petitioner’s stated disbelief that Holloway was pregnant somehow “lessened the probative 

value of the evidence.” (Pet. Br. at 126.) 

The California Supreme Court’s analysis of this matter was not unreasonable, as the 

trial court correctly found that the pregnancy evidence was both relevant and admissible 

under Cal. Penal Code § 190.3(a), as part of the circumstances of the crime, regardless of 

whether Petitioner believed that she was pregnant or not. Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 130-31 

(“In California, the prosecution may introduce evidence of the specific harm caused by a 

defendant’s crime at the penalty phase in aggravation as a circumstance of the crime 

(§ 190.3, factor (a)). . . . This court has concluded, however, that facts concerning the victim 

that are admissible at the penalty phase of a capital trial as circumstances of the crime are 

not limited to those known to or reasonably foreseeable by the defendant at the time of the 

murder.”) This Court is bound by the state court’s interpretation of California law. See 

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Richey, 546 U.S. at 76 (“We have repeatedly held that a state court’s interpretation of state 

law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal 

court sitting in habeas corpus.”) In any event, the state court’s decision is also consistent 

with federal law concerning the admissibility of victim impact evidence. See Payne, 501 

U.S. at 808 (“Victim impact evidence is simply another form or method of informing the 

sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of 

a general type long considered by sentencing authorities.”) In light of this authority, 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s affirmance of the trial 

court’s decision to allow the pregnancy evidence as relevant to the penalty decision 

involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

Petitioner’s second argument27 is that the California Supreme Court’s decision was 

unreasonable because, even assuming the pregnancy evidence was relevant, the state court 

did not adjudicate the issue of prejudice correctly under either prong of section 2254(d). 

(Pet. Br. at 126-27; Reply at 67-68.) With respect to section 2254(d)(2), Petitioner asserts 

that: “The state court’s holding was an unreasonable factual determination because the state 

court did not correctly consider the prejudicial effect and influence on the jury of this 

testimony,” and relies on Ninth Circuit authority to argue that “[section] 2254(d)(2) [is] 

                                               

27 In the merits brief, Petitioner also briefly argues that the California Supreme Court 

did not address prejudice at all, asserting that “the California Supreme Court held the 

evidence of the pregnancy was admissible, and thus it did not adjudicate the issue of 

prejudice,” and that as a result, this Court must examine prejudice de novo. (Pet. Br. at 

127.) However, a plain reading of the California Supreme Court’s direct appeal opinion 

reflects that the state court addressed prejudice, finding: “We also reject defendant’s 

argument that the trial court abused its discretion by not excluding the pregnancy evidence 

as unduly prejudicial,” and that: “We note also that defendant does not challenge the 

manner in which the evidence was presented, and we conclude it was not presented in an 

unnecessarily inflammatory way.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 131 (emphasis in original). 

Because the record refutes Petitioner’s contention that the California Supreme Court failed 

to address prejudice, the Court is not persuaded that de novo review of that issue is 

warranted. 

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satisfied where state court factual findings ‘were not supported by substantial evidence in 

the state court record.’” (Pet. Br. at 127, quoting Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1146 

(9th Cir. 2012).) Additionally, Petitioner contends with respect to section 2254(d)(1) that 

“[i]n failing to engage in the correct due process analysis, identified above, the state court 

also failed to appropriately consider that the pregnancy would serve no other purpose other 

than to encourage jurors to decide in favor of death rather than life on the basis of their 

emotions rather than their reason.” (Id. at 126, citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 

(1976) (plurality opinion.).) 

As an initial matter pertinent to both of these arguments challenging the 

reasonableness of the California Supreme Court’s prejudice determination, this Court must 

reiterate that a state court’s alleged errors in undertaking a legal or factual analysis is 

distinct from a conclusion that the state court’s decision was unreasonable. Federal habeas 

relief is not available unless the state court’s application of federal law or determination of 

the facts is shown to have been unreasonable. See Schriro, 550 U.S. at 473 (“The question 

under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination was 

incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable– a substantially higher 

threshold.”), citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410; see also id. (“[A]n unreasonable application 

of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”) 

Regardless, in this case it is apparent that the California Supreme Court correctly 

and reasonably applied controlling law. The state court firmly rejected Petitioner’s 

argument that pregnancy evidence should have been excluded as “unduly prejudicial,” 

acknowledging that “irrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric” was not allowable, 

but reasoning in this case: “That in murdering Teresa Holloway defendant also terminated 

the life of a healthy 17-week-old fetus she was carrying was part of the harm caused by 

defendant’s crime and thus was a legitimate, though emotional, consideration for the jury 

in making its penalty decision.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 131. 

Petitioner argues that the state court’s conclusion was unreasonable “because 

evidence of the pregnancy would necessarily create a highly negative visceral reaction in 

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a reasonable juror, such that the evidence was unduly prejudicial in view of the 

circumstances that petitioner thought that Holloway was not pregnant.” (Reply at 67.) 

Again, the Court is not persuaded that Petitioner’s lack of belief concerning Holloway’s 

pregnancy diminishes the probative value of that evidence, nor that Petitioner’s belief or 

lack thereof about the victim’s pregnancy materially impacts the prejudice determination, 

much less amplifies any potential prejudice. The evidence showed both that the victim told 

Petitioner she was pregnant and that she was actually pregnant at the time of her murder, 

and the jury was also presented with evidence that Petitioner did not believe the victim was 

pregnant. The state court’s determination that the pregnancy evidence, regardless of 

Petitioner’s knowledge or belief in its truth, was admissible under state law is binding in 

this forum. See Richey, 546 U.S. at 76. The state court’s analysis of the issue was 

reasonable, acknowledging the emotional power of such evidence but ultimately deciding 

that the trial court correctly concluded the evidence was not overly prejudicial, and thus 

admissible. Petitioner’s assertion that the jury would have had a “visceral” and emotional 

reaction to this evidence which impacted their penalty determination is not supported by 

the record. As detailed below, the evidence was presented in a brief and unemotional 

manner and was not so “unduly prejudicial that it render[ed] the sentence fundamentally 

unfair.” Gretzler, 112 F.3d at 1009. 

Petitioner’s challenge to the reasonableness of the state court’s factual determination 

is similarly untenable. The California Supreme Court concluded that: “We note also that 

defendant does not challenge the manner in which the evidence was presented, and we 

conclude it was not presented in an unnecessarily inflammatory way.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th 

at 131. As recounted in the direct appeal opinion, the pregnancy was presented as part of 

the prosecution’s penalty phase case in aggravation as follows: “In May 1991, during the 

autopsy of Teresa Holloway’s body, she was found to have been pregnant. The fetus, which 

was around 17 weeks old, was too young and too small to have survived outside the womb, 

but it showed no evidence of traumatic injury or other condition that would have precluded 

its survival to full term and birth had Holloway not died. Some weeks before her death, 

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Holloway had told defendant that she was pregnant, but defendant did not believe her. 

Holloway said she was planning to get a pregnancy test and that when she got the test result 

she would show it to defendant to prove she was pregnant.” Id. at 90. 

 A review of the penalty phase transcript affirms that the California Supreme Court’s 

account of the evidence was accurate and reasonable. At the penalty phase, medical 

examiner Mark Super testified that: “Besides the injuries, the decedent was pregnant,” and 

that “[d]uring the autopsy, the uterus was - - the uterus contained a male fetus, 

approximately 15 or 16 weeks of age.” (RT 3290.) Super stated that the fetus itself was 

not injured, had not suffered trauma, and when asked for a conclusion, stated: “That the 

death of the fetus was due to the death of the mother.” (RT 3291.) Pediatric pathologist 

Henry Krous then testified, stating that he had been called to consult on the autopsy 

concerning the age of the fetus and as to whether the fetus would have survived to term 

had pregnancy continued. (RT 3293-96.) Krous opined that the fetus was at about 17 

weeks of gestation. (RT 3297.) Krous stated that he did not see any effects of drug use on 

the fetus and that he saw nothing that would prevent the fetus from surviving to term. (RT 

3301.) He acknowledged on cross-examination that the continued drug use of the mother 

could have resulted in injury to the fetus. (RT 3303.) 

Larissa Slusher stated that she knew Terry Holloway was pregnant prior to her death, 

as she took Holloway to get a pregnancy test, which came back positive. (RT 3305.) 

Slusher testified that a “short time” prior to her death, and prior to the pregnancy test, 

Slusher took part in a conversation with Holloway about her pregnancy, and testified that 

others, including Petitioner, also took part in the conversation. (RT 3305-06.) Slusher 

testified that Petitioner did not believe Holloway was pregnant, to which Holloway said 

she was getting a test and would show him the paper. (RT 3306.) Slusher acknowledged 

that she left during part of conversation and was not present for its entirety, and stated that 

Denise Shigemura and Mark Schmidt were also present during the conversation. (RT 

3307-08.) Slusher estimated that she took Holloway for a pregnancy test probably about a 

week after that conversation. (RT 3309.) Slusher also acknowledged that part of the 

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conversation included Holloway indicating she would get an abortion, as well as Petitioner 

voicing disbelief that Holloway was pregnant and indicating that she said it “for attention.” 

(RT 3310.) Slusher stated: “I honestly didn’t catch the whole thing, but the whole 

discussion and argument was the fact if she was even pregnant in the first place. So that’s 

the reason why I was supposed to take her to get the proof, so she could show him.” (Id.) 

Thus, upon review, Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive, given that “substantial 

evidence” in the state record supports the California Supreme Court’s factual findings 

concerning the presentation of the victim’s pregnancy. See Hibbler, 693 F.3d at 1146 (“[A] 

petitioner may challenge the substance of the state court’s findings and attempt to show 

that those findings were not supported by substantial evidence in the state court record.”) 

 A review of this record also supports the reasonableness of the California Supreme 

Court’s conclusion that the evidence introduced with respect to victim’s pregnancy was 

not inflammatory or overly prejudicial. The testimony was brief and largely clinical, as 

the medical examiner testified a primarily about the age and viability of fetus, and a 

pediatric pathologist affirmed its viability. Larissa Slusher briefly recounted a 

conversation, for which Petitioner was present, where Holloway mentioned her pregnancy, 

Petitioner expressed disbelief, and Holloway stated an intention to take a pregnancy test to 

prove it to Petitioner. In light of the evidence presented at trial, the state court reasonably 

concluded that the evidence as introduced was not prejudicial. 

Because Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s rejection 

of this claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, 

habeas relief is unavailable on Claim 30. Greztler, 112 F.3d at 1009, citing Payne, 501 

U.S. at 825, 827. Because Petitioner has not satisfied §2254, an evidentiary hearing is not 

warranted on this claim. Sully, 725 F.3d at 1075; Totten, 137 F.3d at 1176. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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3. Claim 31

 Petitioner asserts that the trial court’s decision to allow the admission of victim 

impact evidence during the penalty phase under California Penal Code section 190.3(a) 

“renders California’s sentencing statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad,” and that 

“retroactive application in Petitioner’s case of the change in law allowing this type of 

evidence violated established principles of ex post facto and due process, and undercut the 

reliability of Petitioner’s death sentence.” (SAP at 566.) Petitioner also contends that 

“[t]hree of the witnesses that the State presented in seeking Petitioner’s death gave detailed 

and extremely emotional testimony describing the grief suffered by Teresa Holloway’s 

relatives,” namely the victim’s former mother-in-law Carol Holloway Cheatem, and the 

victim’s parents James and Joan Cucinotta, and asserts that “this evidence was so 

voluminous and inflammatory that it rendered Petitioner’s penalty trial unfair and 

unreliable, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

federal Constitution.” (Id. at 565-66.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Defendant contends that admission of detailed and emotional testimony 

about the impact of Teresa Holloway’s murder on members of her family 

rendered his penalty trial unfair and unreliable, in violation of his rights under 

the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal 

Constitution. He further contends that section 190.3, factor (a), which permits 

introduction of victim impact evidence as a circumstance of the crime, is 

unconstitutionally vague, and that retroactive application of case law allowing 

use of this evidence violates federal constitutional principles of ex post facto 

and due process. 

We have rejected claims that section 190.3, factor (a), is 

unconstitutionally vague insofar as it permits introduction of victim impact 

evidence as a circumstance of the crime (People v. Wilson, supra, 36 Cal.4th 

at p. 358, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 114 P.3d 758; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 

Cal.4th 381, 445, fn. 12, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391), and that use of 

victim impact evidence in trials for capital crimes committed before the 

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 

U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, violates federal constitutional 

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principles of ex post facto and due process (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 

382, 394-395, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244). Defendant does not persuade 

us to reconsider these decisions. 

Nor are we persuaded that the trial court erred in failing to exclude 

victim impact testimony that defendant claims was overly emotional or 

irrelevant. Three witnesses testified to the impact of Teresa Holloway’s 

murder on members of her family. Carol Holloway, Teresa Holloway’s 

mother-in-law, testified primarily about the impact of the murder on Teresa’s 

young daughter, but also about its impact on herself. James and Joan 

Cucinotta, Teresa’s parents, testified mainly about the impact of the murders 

on themselves, but also about its impact on their other two children and on 

their grandchild. The testimony of these three witnesses was relatively brief, 

comprising just 25 pages in the reporter’s transcript. During their testimony, 

the defense made no objections to any questions put to the witnesses, nor did 

the defense move to strike any of the answers. During a break in proceedings 

immediately after the testimony of Carol Holloway, however, the defense 

moved for a mistrial or in the alternative to preclude any further victim impact 

testimony. Defense counsel pointed out that as the jury was leaving the 

courtroom for the break, four of the jurors were “very visibly crying.” The 

trial court denied the motions, although it agreed with defense counsel that at 

least two of the jurors had been in tears, and the trial court added that 

defendant had been “crying and sobbing” as well. Later, out of the jury’s 

presence, the trial court observed for the record that during the testimony of 

Teresa Holloway’s parents it had been watching the four jurors that defense 

counsel had previously identified as crying and that it did not notice “nearly 

as much emotional response on their part, frankly.” 

As examples of testimony that was irrelevant, defendant cites, among 

other things, Joan Cucinotta’s testimony that her mother died of cancer shortly 

after Teresa Holloway’s death and that her husband lost his job two weeks 

after Holloway’s death. By failing to make timely objections during the 

witnesses’ testimony, defendant forfeited the claim that any of the victim 

impact evidence was irrelevant. (People v. Wilson, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 357, 

30 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 114 P.3d 758.) In any event, we are satisfied that all of 

that testimony was relevant. For example, Joan Cucinotta explained that 

because she did not want to upset her mother during her final illness, she had 

pretended that Holloway was still alive, which was “very difficult.” And 

James Cucinotta explained that he lost his job “pretty much because of this 

[meaning Holloway’s death].” Thus, all of this testimony was relevant to 

explain the direct impact of the murder on Holloway’s family members. 

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Defendant provides examples of testimony he considers overly 

emotional. In the testimony of Teresa Holloway’s mother, Joan Cucinotta, 

defendant cites, among other things, her statements that “there is nothing 

worse to me than the death of a child,” that she lunged at and wanted to hit 

the detective who told her Holloway was dead, that she visits Holloway’s 

grave every week and at first she would “cry, sobbing, cry and cry, throw 

[her]self on the grave,” and that Holloway’s daughter, when she visits the 

grave, “says a prayer and kisses her [mother’s] picture.” In the testimony of 

Holloway’s father, James Cucinotta, defendant cites, among other things, his 

statements that he and his wife visit Holloway’s grave every week, that they 

“couldn’t take a look at her [Holloway] for the last time because of the 

condition that she was in ... [a]nd of course she’d laid out in the road for a 

couple days,” that while he was making the funeral arrangements for 

Holloway he “had to stuff everything” (meaning suppress his emotions) and 

“because of that stuffing, [he] started to do a lot of inappropriate things,” his 

“drinking got out of hand,” and he “had to finally go to a treatment center and 

get that taken care of,” that as a result of Holloway’s death his son, who was 

34 years old, was “not the same anymore” and was “in a recovery home here 

in San Diego,” and that during the first year after Holloway’s death he and his 

wife “didn’t even have a holiday in the house,” they “didn’t have a turkey for 

Thanksgiving ... didn’t have a Christmas tree for Christmas.” 

This testimony was not dissimilar from, or significantly more emotionladen than, other victim impact testimony that has been held admissible. For 

example, in Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, the 

defendant was convicted of murdering a 28-year-old woman and her twoyear-old daughter. At the trial, when asked how the woman’s three-year-old 

son had been affected by the murders of his mother and sister, the boy’s 

grandmother replied: “‘He cries for his mom. He doesn’t seem to understand 

why she doesn’t come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to 

me many times during the week and asks me, Grandmama, do you miss my 

Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I’m worried about my Lacie.’” (Id. at pp. 

814-815, 111 S.Ct. 2597.) In People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th 310, 33 

Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545, the murder victim’s mother “described how 

she learned of the murder, and of the emotional and financial costs involved 

in planning and attending the funeral.” (Id. at p. 328, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 

P.3d 545; see also id. at pp. 351-352, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545 

[holding this evidence properly admitted].) In People v. Panah, supra, 35 

Cal.4th 395, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790, the murder victim’s father 

testified that before the victim’s death, her 16-year-old brother “was the 

family athlete, and was a ‘4.0 student,’ but, following her death, his grades 

deteriorated, ‘he is drinking a lot and doing drugs,’ and would not talk about 

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his sister but ‘kept it all inside himself,’ and refused to go to counseling.” (Id.

at p. 495, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790.) We concluded that this testimony 

was “neither irrelevant nor prejudicial but, in context, depicted the ‘residual 

and lasting impact’ he ‘continued to experience’ as a result of [the victim’s] 

murder.” (Ibid.) In People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th 381, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 

544, 58 P.3d 391, a murder victim’s father “testified and related how close he 

was with the victim, how her eight-year-old son had said he wanted to die so 

he could be with his mother, how her six-year-old son had nightmares and 

would telephone wanting to know where his mother was, and how [the victim] 

had been in a drug rehabilitation program and had turned her life around.” (Id. 

at p. 440, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391; see also id. at p. 444, 127 

Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391 [holding the evidence was properly admitted].) 

As in these cases, we conclude that the victim impact evidence here “did not 

surpass constitutional limits.” (Id. at p. 444, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 

391.) 

The record does not support defendant’s suggestion that after hearing 

the victim impact testimony the jurors were so overwhelmed by emotion that 

they were unable to make a rational determination of penalty. Of particular 

significance, the jury deliberated on penalty for five days before reaching its 

verdict. The length of their deliberations rather strongly implies that, rather 

than rushing to judgment under the influence of unbridled passion, the jurors 

arrived at their death verdict only after a full and careful review of the relevant 

evidence and of the legitimate arguments for and against the death penalty. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 131-34 (alterations in original). Petitioner also later raised this claim 

in the second state habeas petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see 

Lodgment No. 91), but for the reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will 

address the claim on the merits. 

The Supreme Court has held that “if the State chooses to permit the admission of 

victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment 

erects no per se bar. A State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and 

about the impact of the murder on the victim’s family is relevant to the jury’s decision as 

to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 827; see also 

Gretzler, 112 F.3d at 1009 (“Evidence about a victim’s characteristics and the impact of a 

murder on the victim’s family is relevant and admissible at a death penalty sentencing 

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proceeding. Admission of such evidence will only be deemed unconstitutional if it is so 

unduly prejudicial that it renders the sentence fundamentally unfair.”), citing Payne, 501 

U.S. at 825, 827. 

 First, with respect to Petitioner’s assertion that the admission of victim impact 

evidence under Payne violated ex post facto and due process principles, the Court finds 

reasonable the California Supreme Court’s rejection of that argument. In general, “‘any 

statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when 

done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or 

which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the 

time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.’” Collins v. Youngblood, 

497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990), quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925); see also 

Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353 (1964) (“An ex post facto law has been 

defined by this Court as one that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and 

which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action, or that aggravates a 

crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.”) (internal quotations omitted). 

 However, in Gentry v. Sinclair, the Ninth Circuit rejected an ex post facto challenge 

to the application of Payne. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “[t]he admission of 

victim impact statements potentially implicates Calder’s [Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 290 

(1798)] fourth category: ‘Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives 

less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the 

offence, in order to convict the offender,’” but the circuit court clarified that “an ex post 

facto problem does not arise for a law that ‘does nothing more than admit evidence of a 

particular kind in a criminal case . . . which was not admissible under the rules of evidence 

as enforced by judicial decisions at the time the offense was committed.’” Gentry, 705 

F.3d at 908-09, quoting Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 387 (1898). 

 That is precisely the situation presented in the instant case. While Payne provides 

for the admission of victim impact testimony, it does not alter the burden of proof required 

for finding in favor a death sentence. Both before and after Payne, a California capital jury 

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was and still is required to determine whether the evidence presented in aggravation so 

outweighs the evidence in mitigation that they are persuaded death is the appropriate 

sentence in the individual case before them. See id. at 909-10 (“We agree with the Eighth 

and Tenth Circuits that the admission of a victim impact statement under Payne does not 

violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. . . While the admission of the victim impact statement 

may have adversely affected [the petitioner’s] presentation at the penalty phase, the State’s 

evidentiary burden remained the same.”) In view of this clear authority rejecting 

Petitioner’s precise contention, the Court is not persuaded that the California Supreme 

Court’s resolution of this issue was unreasonable. 

 Petitioner similarly fails to demonstrate that California Supreme Court was 

unreasonable in declining to conclude that the admission of victim impact evidence 

rendered section 190.3 overbroad and vague in violation of the federal Constitution. 

California law provides for the admission of victim-impact evidence as part of the 

“circumstances of the crime” outlined in section 190.3(a). See e.g. People v. Robinson, 37 

Cal. 4th 592, 650 (2005) (“[V]ictim-impact evidence may be introduced at penalty-phase 

proceedings under the federal Constitution . . . we also have found such evidence (and 

related ‘victim character’ evidence) admissible as a ‘circumstance of the crime’ under 

section 190.3, factor (a).”) (internal citation to Payne omitted) (collecting cases). 

Moreover, as Respondent correctly notes (see Ans. Mem. at 349), while not specifically 

addressing the admission of victim-impact evidence, the Supreme Court has previously 

rejected a vagueness challenge to section 190.3(a). See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 

967, 976 (1994) (“Petitioners’ challenge to factor (a) is at some odds with settled principles, 

for our capital jurisprudence has established that the sentencer should consider the 

circumstances of the crime in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. . . . [T]his 

California factor instructs the jury to consider a relevant subject matter and does so in 

understandable terms. The circumstances of the crime are a traditional subject for 

consideration by the sentencer, and an instruction to consider the circumstances is neither 

vague nor otherwise improper under our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”) Petitioner 

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fails to offer any clearly established law demonstrating that the introduction of victim 

impact evidence renders the California statute constitutionally infirm and has not shown 

that the state court’s rejection of this argument was unreasonable. 

 Finally, Petitioner contends that the victim impact evidence introduced in his case 

was inflammatory, prejudicial and violated his right to due process.28 In Payne, the 

Supreme Court indicated that “[i]n the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly 

prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, citing 

Darden, 477 U.S. at 179-83. As noted above, such error may warrant habeas relief only if 

“the admission of the evidence so fatally infected the proceedings as to render them 

fundamentally unfair.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919; see also McGuire, 502 U.S. at 68-73. 

 The California Supreme Court found that the victim impact evidence presented at 

Petitioner’s trial “was not dissimilar from, or significantly more emotion-laden than, other 

victim impact testimony that has been held admissible.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 133. The 

state court specifically compared the testimony presented in Petitioner’s case with that 

admitted in other cases and concluded that, like in those cases, the evidence presented 

during the penalty phase proceedings “did not surpass constitutional limits.” Id. at 134. 

The California Supreme Court also rejected Petitioner’s assertion that the evidence was so 

prejudicial that it prevented the jurors from properly fulfilling their role of rationally 

deciding the appropriate penalty, reasoning as follows: 

                                               

28 At one point in the SAP, Petitioner appears to argue that if the victim impact 

evidence had any impact on the jury’s decision, that impact was itself prejudicial. (See 

SAP at 584-85 - “There is more than a reasonable possibility that the victim impact 

evidence in this case contributed to the jury’s death verdict, and this evidence must 

therefore be deemed to have prejudiced Petitioner.”) As discussed above, this is not the 

appropriate standard for evaluating this claim. Instead, as outlined in Payne, relief may be 

warranted under due process principles only if the evidence in question is “so unduly 

prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (emphasis 

added).

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The record does not support defendant’s suggestion that after hearing 

the victim impact testimony the jurors were so overwhelmed by emotion that 

they were unable to make a rational determination of penalty. Of particular 

significance, the jury deliberated on penalty for five days before reaching its 

verdict. The length of their deliberations rather strongly implies that, rather 

than rushing to judgment under the influence of unbridled passion, the jurors 

arrived at their death verdict only after a full and careful review of the relevant 

evidence and of the legitimate arguments for and against the death penalty. 

Id. 

 Upon review, the state supreme court evaluated Petitioner’s claim under the clearly 

established law under Payne, discussed the evidence presented at Petitioner’s trial at length, 

specifically compared the testimony presented in his case to that presented in cases raising 

a similar claim, and carefully evaluated whether there was a likelihood that the evidence 

had a prejudicial impact. While Petitioner asserts in the SAP that the evidence was 

prejudicial because it was overly emotional and several jurors became visibly upset by the 

testimony, the California Supreme Court acknowledged and considered the emotional 

impact of the testimony. In its decision, the state supreme court specifically mentioned the 

trial court comments, noting that several jurors had a visible response to the testimony of 

the victim’s former mother-in-law, but at the same time recognizing that the trial court also 

later remarked that he did not see any repeat of that type of response to the victim impact 

testimony by the victim’s parents. Petitioner fails to demonstrate that this decision was 

unreasonable, particularly given the lengthy and well-reasoned discussion of the claim, 

which persuasively pointed to the length of time of jury deliberations as supporting a 

conclusion that the jury based its decision on an objective view of evidence, rather than 

subjectively making a penalty decision based on emotion. 

 In the SAP, Petitioner also asserts the trial prosecutor relied heavily on victim impact 

evidence and argued to the jury that this evidence, by itself, outweighed mitigation, “[t]hey 

[the jurors] heard that the victim impact evidence presented in this case was the only 

aggravating evidence they needed to look at because this evidence ‘substantially 

outweigh(ed) any and all factors in mitigation.’” (SAP at 584.) A review of the record 

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does not support this argument. Instead, the record reflects that the cited portion of the 

prosecutor’s closing argument was made during the prosecutor’s discussion of the whole 

of section 190.3, factor (a), which provided that the jury could consider the “circumstances 

of the crime.” In arguing the sentencing factors, the - prosecutor started with factor (a) and 

stated that the crime was “a hands-on execution” of an individual that was four feet ten 

inches tall, weighed 107 pounds and was four months pregnant. (RT 3583.) The prosecutor 

went on to state that: “But probably the most aggravating fact in this entire case, and I 

would submit to you that this fact substantially outweighs any and all factors in mitigation, 

and that’s the fact that Mr. Jurado killed Terry Holloway so that he could kill again. That’s 

one of the most aggravating factors about this murder. This was not an isolated random 

act of violence. This was a cold a calculated plan to snuff out the life of a human being so 

that he could kill again.” (RT 3583-84.) Only after asserting that killing the victim in order 

to kill again was “probably the most aggravating fact in this entire case” did the prosecutor 

then address the victim impact evidence, stating that in addition to the crime itself, this 

evidence could also be considered under factor (a), as the “circumstances of the crime 

includes different things. It includes victim-impact testimony, for example.” (RT 3584.) 

After briefly discussing the victim impact testimony, the prosecutor then summed up the 

argument on factor (a) by stating: “I’d submit to you that you can take a look at that one 

factor in aggravation, and that outweighs, substantially outweighs any and all factors in 

mitigation.” (RT 3585.) The prosecutor then moved on to discuss factor (b). (Id.) Thus, 

it is clear from a review of the record that the prosecutor was not asserting that the victim 

impact evidence on its own outweighed the evidence in mitigation, but instead, that all of 

the evidence under factor (a), the circumstances of the crime, primarily Petitioner’s 

planning and commission of a vicious and callous murder so that the existing murder plot 

was not revealed and he could kill again, when coupled with the victim impact evidence, 

together comprised significant evidence in aggravation. 

 Ultimately, Petitioner fails to show that the victim impact evidence was “so unduly 

prejudicial that it render[ed] the trial fundamentally unfair.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 825. 

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Again, apart from the victim impact evidence which was introduced as part of the 

circumstances of the crime, the murder was particularly brutal, as the pregnant victim was 

less than five feet tall, weighed just over 100 pounds, and was subjected to a surprise attack 

by several taller and larger individuals. She died from a combination of strangulation and 

numerous blunt force injuries to her head and body, including fractures to her jaw, eye 

sockets, nose, voice box and skull. In addition to the fact that she was murdered to prevent 

her from exposing a plot to murder another individual, there was significant other evidence 

in aggravation, including a prior conviction and prior criminal activity in which Petitioner 

was involved and armed during a jail altercation, was involved in a jailhouse assault, and 

an assault against his mother.29

 In sum, because Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the state court decision was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Payne, or that it was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts, habeas relief is not warranted on Claim 31. 

4. Claim 32

 Petitioner asserts that the jury’s consideration of the Baldwin jail assault during the 

penalty phase violated his federal Constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments because: (1) the prosecution’s lack of diligence in discovering 

and providing timely notice of the introduction of this evidence in aggravation led to the 

destruction of evidence necessary to counter the evidence in aggravation; (2) the jury’s 

consideration of the assault was irrelevant to any statutory aggravating factor because the 

                                               

29 For this same reason, any potential error arising from the testimony of Mr. 

Cuccinotta, the victim’s father, that he was “angry” at those involved in the trial 

proceedings, including the defendant, and his statement that “I can’t forgive. I can’t 

forget,” (RT 3388), was also harmless in light of the strong evidence in aggravation. See 

Bosse v. Oklahoma, 580 U.S. ____, 137 S.Ct. 1, 2 (2016) (per curiam) (courts “remain[] 

bound by Booth’s prohibition on characterizations and opinions from a victim’s family 

members about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence unless this Court 

reconsiders that ban.”)

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conduct at issue did not constitute a crime; and (3) the introduction of the evidence violated 

the state statute of limitations. (SAP at 585-608.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Defendant contends that the trial erred in overruling his objections to 

admission of evidence of his assault on Steven Baldwin, and that this error 

violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments 

to the federal Constitution. 

On April 14, 1994, the prosecution notified defendant that it intended 

to introduce in aggravation evidence of defendant’s assault on Steven 

Baldwin, which had occurred in July 1991, soon after defendant’s arrest. The 

defense moved to exclude evidence of the incident on the ground that the 

notice was untimely. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion without 

prejudice to its renewal if the trial reached the penalty phase. 

Defendant renewed the motion to exclude after the jury returned its 

guilt verdicts and made its special circumstance finding. In support of the 

motion, defendant informed the court that jail documents listing the inmates 

who were housed in the module where the assault occurred and the employees 

who worked in that module had been destroyed on or before July 1993, 

although a report relating to the incident had been preserved. The trial court 

denied the renewed motion to exclude, rejecting defendant’s argument that, in 

light of the document destruction, use of the incident in aggravation would 

violate his constitutional right to due process of law. Defendant contends the 

trial court erred in denying the motions to exclude. 

“Section 190.3, factor (b) provides for the admission, during the penalty 

phase of a capital trial, of evidence of any criminal activity by the defendant 

involving the use or attempted use of force or violence.” (People v. Kraft

(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1070, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) Section 190.3, 

factor (b), imposes no time limitation on the introduction of unadjudicated 

violent crimes; rather, it permits the jury to consider a capital defendant’s 

criminally violent conduct occurring at any time during the defendant’s life. 

(People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1174, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 

P.2d 384; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 233, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 

940 P.2d 710.) Thus, evidence of violent criminal activity is admissible even 

though prosecution of the crime would be time-barred (People v. Williams, 

supra, at p. 233, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710), the right to a speedy trial 

is not implicated (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1161, 36 

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Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1), and the defense of laches is not available 

(People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1087-1088, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 

46 P.3d 335). As we have explained, the remoteness in time of a prior incident 

“goes to its weight, not to its admissibility.” (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 

Cal.4th 81, 172, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357.) Defendant asks us to 

reconsider these decisions, but he does not persuade us to do so. 

Here, as defendant concedes, defendant’s assault on Steven Baldwin 

was not remote in time; indeed, it occurred after the charged capital offense, 

the murder of Teresa Holloway. Defendant nonetheless contends that the trial 

court should have excluded evidence of the incident because the prosecutor’s 

lack of diligence in discovering the incident and in providing notice of his 

intention to offer evidence of the incident in aggravation resulted in the 

destruction of relevant jail records, thereby compromising defendant’s ability 

to defend against the charge. 

The prosecutor told the trial court that he first learned of the incident in 

December 1993 during an interview of Steven Baldwin while preparing the 

case for trial. Although defendant argues that the prosecutor could have 

discovered the incident earlier, he cites no authority for the proposition that a 

prosecutor in a death penalty case has an obligation to promptly and diligently 

search for all available aggravating evidence, or that, if such a duty exists, 

exclusion of evidence is an appropriate and lawful sanction for its violation. 

Thus, defendant fails to persuade us that he suffered any legally cognizable 

harm as a result of the prosecution’s failure to discover the incident at an 

earlier time. 

The prosecution is required to notify a capital defendant of its intended 

penalty phase evidence “within a reasonable period of time as determined by 

the court, prior to trial.” (§ 190.3.) Notice provided before jury selection 

begins is generally considered timely, and the purpose of the notice provision 

is satisfied if the defendant has a reasonable chance to defend against the 

charge. (People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 562, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 

P.3d 182.) Here, the prosecutor gave notice to defendant of his intention to 

introduce evidence of the Baldwin assault 11 days before jury selection began. 

Defendant then received, or had already received, a report that described the 

incident and included the names of two inmates, in addition to Baldwin and 

defendant, who had been present in the module and were questioned about the 

incident. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 

defendant received timely and adequate notice. 

Defendant also argues that the incident was inadmissible because it did 

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not constitute a crime by defendant. Evidence of other criminal activity 

introduced in the penalty phase under section 190.3, factor (b), must 

demonstrate “the commission of an actual crime, specifically, the violation of 

a penal statute.” (People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72, 222 Cal.Rptr. 

127, 711 P.2d 423; see also People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1133, 113 

Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450; People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772, 215 

Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) The prosecution did not argue that defendant 

personally assaulted Baldwin, but instead that he aided and abetted an assault 

on Baldwin by loudly referring to Baldwin as a “snitch,” knowing that 

snitches are commonly the targets of assault in jail. “[A]n aider and abettor is 

a person who, ‘acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the 

perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or 

facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, 

encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.’” (People v. Prettyman

(1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 259, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013, quoting 

People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 

1318.) On the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably conclude that 

defendant, acting with the intent to have Baldwin assaulted, and with 

knowledge that other inmates would likely do so if told that Baldwin was a 

snitch, encouraged or instigated the assault by openly announcing to the other 

inmates that Baldwin was a snitch. Defendant’s remark to Baldwin after the 

assault (“You can’t be in this cell”) supports an inference that defendant 

orchestrated the assault to achieve his own purposes, intimidation of Baldwin 

and his removal from the module. Therefore, we reject defendant’s argument 

that the evidence was insufficient to show that defendant violated a penal 

statute. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 134-36 (alteration in original). Petitioner also later raised this claim 

in the second state habeas petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see 

Lodgment No. 91), but for the reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will 

address the claim on the merits. 

California Penal Code § 190.3(b) provides for the consideration of penalty phase 

evidence concerning: “[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant 

which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or implied threat to use force 

or violence.” That same statute also provides that “no evidence may be presented by the 

prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given 

to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to 

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trial.” Cal. Penal Code § 190.3. Yet, as the California Supreme Court accurately and 

reasonably observed, the defense was provided notice of this aggravating evidence 11 days 

prior to jury selection in this case, that “[n]otice provided before jury selection begins is 

generally considered timely, and the purpose of the notice provision is satisfied if the 

defendant has a reasonable chance to defend against the charge,” and the defense had also 

been previously provided with a report which included the names of several inmates 

present during the altercation, aside from Petitioner and Baldwin. Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 

136. The record further reflects that the report concerning the July 1991 Baldwin assault 

had been provided to the defense when the prosecutor learned about it in December 1993, 

and that while notice of the prosecution’s intent to introduce the incident as aggravation 

was provided prior to jury selection in mid-April 1994, the penalty phase jury proceedings 

did not actually commence until June 1994, nearly six weeks later. (See RT 3063, 3085; 

CT 1664.) 

 Similar to the argument advanced on direct appeal, while Petitioner “argues that the 

prosecutor could have discovered the incident earlier, he cites no authority for the

proposition that a prosecutor in a death penalty case has an obligation to promptly and 

diligently search for all available aggravating evidence, or that, if such a duty exists, 

exclusion of evidence is an appropriate and lawful sanction for its violation.” Jurado, 38 

Cal. 4th at 135-36; (compare Lodgment No. 72 at 300-07 with SAP at 594-601.) 

Petitioner’s attempt to draw parallels between this issue and Supreme Court cases such as 

Brady v. Maryland or Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991), are unpersuasive. Under 

Brady and subsequent case law, the prosecution is required to learn of, and provide the 

defense with, all available and material exculpatory evidence. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 

U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (“[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable 

evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the 

police.”) However, as Respondent aptly points out, the evidence at issue in this case, the 

report of the Baldwin assault, was not “exculpatory.” Nor was the San Diego Sheriff’s 

Department acting as an investigatory agency on the murder case, rather, they were 

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working in a correctional capacity, housing defendant in the county jail while he was 

awaiting trial. Petitioner’s citation to Lankford is similarly unavailing, as in that case the 

Supreme Court articulated a general rule that “adequate notice” was required to allow the 

adversarial system to function effectively, finding a violation of due process where 

“[p]etitioner’s lack of adequate notice that the judge was contemplating the imposition of 

the death sentence created an impermissible risk that the adversary process may have 

malfunctioned in this case.” Lankford, 500 U.S. at 127. This situation is again clearly 

distinguishable, as first, the defense in this case was clearly aware that the prosecution was 

pursuing a death sentence, and second, as discussed above, the defense was provided with 

a report about the assault six months prior to the penalty proceedings and was given notice 

of the prosecutor’s intent to use it in aggravation eleven days before the commencement of 

trial proceedings and approximately six weeks before the penalty phase actually began. 

Thus, based on a review of the record and the lack of clearly established authority 

supporting Petitioner’s argument, it is clear the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting this evidence and the California Supreme Court did not act unreasonably in 

rejecting Petitioner’s attempts to exclude the evidence due to a lack of notice. 

 Petitioner also alleges that the Baldwin assault was inadmissible as evidence in 

aggravation because the conduct at issue did not constitute a crime, which was required for 

admission under section 190.3(b). As the California Supreme Court correctly noted, 

“[e]vidence of other criminal activity introduced in the penalty phase under section 190.3, 

factor (b), must demonstrate ‘the commission of an actual crime, specifically, the violation 

of a penal statute.’” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 136, quoting People v. Phillips, 41 Cal. 3d 29, 

72 (1985). The California Supreme Court reasoned that the jury could have concluded that 

Petitioner had aided and abetted an assault on Baldwin, as follows: 

On the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably conclude that 

defendant, acting with the intent to have Baldwin assaulted, and with 

knowledge that other inmates would likely do so if told that Baldwin was a 

snitch, encouraged or instigated the assault by openly announcing to the other 

inmates that Baldwin was a snitch. Defendant’s remark to Baldwin after the 

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assault (“You can’t be in this cell”) supports an inference that defendant 

orchestrated the assault to achieve his own purposes, intimidation of Baldwin 

and his removal from the module. Therefore, we reject defendant’s argument 

that the evidence was insufficient to show that defendant violated a penal 

statute. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 136. 

 Petitioner maintains that “even if ‘snitches’ are disliked and sometimes subjected to 

physical or verbal abuse, Petitioner’s statement, made to another inmate standing next to 

him, did not constitute a statutory crime,” and asserts that there was a lack of evidence that 

the inmate or inmates who committed the assault were near Petitioner at the time of his 

comments or that they even heard his comments. (SAP at 602-03) (citations to reporter’s 

transcript omitted.) 

 At the penalty phase proceedings, Baldwin testified that: “I was booked in county 

jail for a violation of probation and was processed to be put in the same tank as the 

defendant. In walking by the tank, Jurado saw me and identified me by saying, ‘I know 

that dude. He’s the reason I’m in here. He told the cops I killed that bitch.’” (RT 3315.) 

Baldwin indicated that the comments were made in the presence of “several” other inmates. 

(Id.) After he was placed in the cell, Baldwin testified he went to look for Petitioner to talk 

to him, stating: “And I was walking down the hall and someone struck me from behind. 

And it turned into a multiple - - multiple fight, and I don’t really know exactly what 

happened. I was hit several times. And then it stopped for a moment.” (Id.) Baldwin 

testified that he did not know how many inmates attacked him, but that it may have been 

“two or three,” and that he was hit “mostly from behind.” (RT 3315-16.) When asked if 

he saw Petitioner again while the assault was taking place, Baldwin testified that: “At the 

moment that the fight stopped for a second, he stepped out of one of the side cells, and 

everything just came to a standstill for a moment, and he said, ‘You can’t be in this cell. 

You got to roll up out of this cell.’” (RT 3316.) Baldwin stated that shortly after that, he 

“was unconscious,” and that: “Next thing I knew, I was on a gurney being carried down 

the hallway.” (Id.) 

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 On cross-examination, Baldwin stated that: “I told the deputy that I had a problem 

with this inmate. And he said, ‘Well, you’ll just have to work it out,’ and he put me in the 

tank anyway.” (RT 3318.) Baldwin acknowledged that during a prior interview with 

deputies, and prior interviews with prosecutors and defense counsel, he did not mention 

Petitioner using the term “bitch.” (RT 3319-20.) Baldwin testified that Petitioner was not 

one of the inmates who hit him. (RT 3322.) Baldwin stated he did not know the inmate 

who hit him and that the only individual he knew in the group was Petitioner. (RT 3323.) 

Baldwin explained that the reason he wanted to talk to Petitioner upon entering the cell, 

after Petitioner had called him a snitch, was to explain to Petitioner that he had not initiated 

the conversations with police about the murder. (RT 3323-24.) 

 Prior to Baldwin’s testimony, a San Diego Sheriff’s detective from the fugitive and 

jail investigations unit testified that snitch was a “slang term for an informant,” that is, 

“someone who is normally either testifying against someone or providing us information 

about activity going on in the jails.” (RT 3312.) He noted that some snitches are placed 

into protective custody “to protect them from any physical harm, is usually the problem, 

but even verbal abuse. Any number of things. An inmate that’s labeled a snitch is normally 

not liked by most inmates in there.” (RT 3312-13.) The detective stated it was common 

knowledge that inmates do not like snitches. (RT 3313.) 

 This review of the record does not support Petitioner’s argument, as Baldwin plainly 

testified that they were in the presence of “several” other inmates when Petitioner identified 

Baldwin as having told police of Petitioner’s involvement in the murder, and that Baldwin 

was assaulted by one or more inmates almost immediately after being placed in the cell. 

The jury also heard testimony that snitches are not looked upon favorably by other inmates, 

and efforts are often made to protect those individuals from harm by other inmates, 

including placing those inmates in protective custody. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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 Based on this record, the Court agrees with the California Supreme Court’s 

conclusion that the evidence presented at trial could have led the jury to reasonably 

conclude that Petitioner’s conduct constituted a crime,30 that is, Petitioner made comments 

about Baldwin informing on him to the police in the presence of other inmates, intending 

to incite violence against Baldwin. The state supreme court’s rejection of this argument 

was not unreasonable. 

 With respect to Petitioner’s third and final argument, that the admission of this 

incident violated the state statute of limitations and denied Petitioner his rights to due 

process and to a speedy trial, clearly established authority again fails to support his 

position. Petitioner argues that “[t]he cases upon which the California Supreme Court 

relied in developing the proposition that ‘the penalty phase of trial (is not) the equivalent 

of a criminal prosecution for the purposes of due process and speedy trial analysis’ (People 

v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 822-823, citing People v. Jennings, 46 Cal.3d 963, 982 

(1988), People v. Balderas, 41 Cal.3d 144, 205, fn. 32 (1985)) have not involved situations 

where, as here, the prosecution’s failure to act with diligence in discovering and noticing 

alleged other criminal activity is directly responsible for the permanent loss of evidence 

necessary to the capital defendant’s defense to the alleged crime,” and asserts that 

“Petitioner’s situation clearly lends itself to the due process analysis applicable to a speedy 

trial claim.” (SAP at 604-05.) 

 Petitioner’s argument is premised on a patchwork of authority expressing general 

principles, such as that a capital jury’s consideration of prior criminal activity can have a 

                                               

30 Petitioner’s related argument, that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury 

on the elements of aiding and abetting liability and assault, was raised as Claim 33 in the 

SAP, and was considered and rejected by the Court in the Group One Order, on the grounds 

that neither clearly established federal law, nor California law, requires such instruction. 

(See ECF No. 171 at 35-37); see also People v. Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th 610, 668 (2001) 

(“Instruction to the jury on the elements of unadjudicated crimes are not required by logic 

or by the constitutional guarantees of due process, fundamental fairness, right to a fair trial, 

equal protection, or reliability of penalty.”)

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“‘dramatic’” or “‘decisive’” impact on the penalty determination and that “[s]tatutes of 

limitation are ‘designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against 

charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to 

minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past.’” (Id. at 

605-06, quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 903, Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 586 (1988), 

and United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 323 (1971).) 

 Yet, the Supreme Court has also held that: “Sentencing courts have not only taken 

into consideration a defendant’s prior convictions, but have also considered a defendant’s 

past criminal behavior, even if no conviction resulted from that behavior.” Nichols v. 

United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994). Petitioner fails to cite to any clearly established 

authority supporting his position that the prosecution should be precluded from introducing 

evidence of prior criminal activity that would not be subject to prosecution on its own. 

California’s capital statute expressly allows for the introduction and consideration of prior 

criminal activity in the penalty phase. See Cal. Penal Code § 190.3(b). As the California 

Supreme Court accurately pointed out in its rejection of this claim, “[s]ection 190.3, factor 

(b), imposes no time limitation on the introduction of unadjudicated violent crimes; rather, 

it permits the jury to consider a capital defendant’s criminally violent conduct occurring at 

any time during the defendant’s life.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 135. Moreover, the Supreme 

Court has upheld the constitutionality of California’s capital statute, including specifically 

rejecting a challenge to factor (b). See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 975-80. 

 The Supreme Court has also recently rejected the contention that the speedy trial 

right applies to sentencing proceedings, holding that “[t]he Sixth Amendment speedy trial 

right, however, does not extend beyond conviction, which terminates the presumption of 

innocence.” Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1609, 1618 (2016). In so 

deciding, the Supreme Court stated that: “We reserve the question whether the Speedy Trial 

Clause applies to bifurcated proceedings in which, at the sentencing stage, facts that could 

increase the prescribed sentencing range are determined (e.g., capital cases in which 

eligibility for the death penalty hinges on aggravating factor findings).” Id. at 1613 n. 2. 

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In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Betterman, specifically reserving this matter, it 

is apparent that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of Petitioner’s speedy trial 

argument could not have been contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. 

 In Betterman, the Supreme Court also noted that “[a]fter conviction, a defendant’s 

due process right to liberty, while diminished, is still present,” that “he retains an interest 

in a sentencing proceeding that is fundamentally fair,” but because the petitioner had not 

raised a due process argument, “we express no opinion on how he might fare under that 

more pliable standard.” Id. at 1617-18. Thus, with respect to the due process argument, 

even if Petitioner were able to demonstrate error of a constitutional dimension, Petitioner 

fails to show that the admission of this evidence rendered his penalty phase proceedings 

fundamentally unfair. As discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this order, there was 

significant and powerful evidence in aggravation, primarily concerning the brutality and 

reasons for the murder itself. The evidence showed that the victim was killed to prevent 

her from revealing another murder plot, was lured to an area by three acquaintances, 

attacked from behind and brutally beaten and strangled, and apart from that, evidence of 

other prior criminal activity aside from Petitioner’s involvement in this assault. In light of 

this evidence, Petitioner fails to show that any potential error arising from the admission 

of the Baldwin assault had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 

the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

 Accordingly, the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was neither 

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on Claim 32. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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5. Claim 35

 Petitioner asserts that “the trial court allowed the prosecutor to improperly argue lack 

of remorse as an aggravating circumstance supporting a death sentence, which in turn 

allowed the jurors to erroneously conclude that they could attach aggravating weight to this 

nonstatutory factor.” (SAP at 617.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Defendant claims the death judgment must be reversed because the 

prosecutor improperly urged the jury to consider defendant’s lack of remorse 

after the crime as an aggravating circumstance. 

During his argument to the jury at the conclusion of the penalty phase, 

the prosecutor began to read the testimony of Christie Medlin about 

statements defendant had made to her during telephone calls after the murder 

of Teresa Holloway. Defense counsel interrupted and asked to approach the 

bench, where he argued that defendant’s postoffense statements were 

“inappropriate evidence in aggravation to show lack of remorse,” and that the 

court should not permit the prosecutor to make an argument urging the jury to 

view defendant’s postoffense lack of remorse as aggravating. The court 

overruled the objection, noting that defendant’s postoffense statements could 

properly be used in aggravation insofar as they constituted circumstantial 

evidence of his state of mind during the crime. The prosecutor then quoted 

defendant’s postoffense statements that “the bitch is gone” and that he did not 

care if he had to spend the rest of his life paying for it. The prosecutor argued 

that this showed “the state of mind of [defendant] at or about the time this 

crime occurred as to his idea of punishment.” 

The prosecutor then discussed evidence showing that defendant knew 

that killing Teresa Holloway was wrong. The prosecutor mentioned that there 

were seven factors in aggravation and mitigation that the jury would be asked 

to consider, and that the jury was not merely to count the factors on each side 

but was to weight them to determine their “convincing force.” As factors in 

aggravation, the prosecutor mentioned and discussed the circumstances of the 

crime, including the victim impact testimony, the presence or absence of 

criminal activity involving force or violence, and the presence or absence of 

prior felony convictions. The prosecutor mentioned and discussed whether the 

offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of 

extreme mental or emotional disturbance; whether at the time of the offense 

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defendant had the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 

conform his conduct to the requirements of law, and whether that capacity 

was impaired by intoxication; defendant’s age at the time of the crime; and 

“the last factor,” which was “any other circumstances which extenuate the 

gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and 

any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the 

defendant offers as a basis for a sentence of less than death.”

In connection with this last factor, the prosecutor discussed the 

evidence that the defense had presented during its case in mitigation. During 

this discussion, the prosecutor made this argument, which defendant now 

challenges: “I listened as the defense witnesses testified yesterday for any 

evidence or testimony pertaining to the victim. And there was. There was. The 

defendant’s grandmother testified, bless her heart, that she not only prays for 

[defendant] but she prays for the victim and the victim’s family. What a nice 

thing. What a human thing. What a nice person from a nice family. [¶] When 

she testified to that I kind of thought back in the evidence that was presented 

in the guilt phase and the penalty phase, about the defendant and his view of 

the victim. After the murder of Terry Holloway, she had only been in the 

drainage ditch a matter of minutes, what was [defendant] doing at Christie 

Medlin’s house? He was playing darts. What was he doing the next day with 

Denise Shigemura while the victim still lay cold in the drainage ditch? He was 

having pizza and beer. [¶] And after he got arrested and he talked to Christie 

Medlin on the telephone, how did he feel about the victim at that time, right 

around the time of the crime? ‘On, on, the bitch is gone.’ [¶] And when he 

identified Steve Baldwin as a snitch in the county jail, what were his words? 

‘That’s the guy who told the cops I killed the bitch.’ [¶] What’s his 

grandmother doing during this time? She’s praying for the victim. [¶] Do you 

see what I mean? He’s not like them. He doesn’t share in their goodness, he 

doesn’t share in their compassion, he doesn’t share in their humanity. [¶] I 

think those statements that he made in the presence of Baldwin and in the 

presence or on the telephone to Christie Medlin tell you who the real Robert 

Jurado is. All right out there, very clear and open for you to understand and 

evaluate.” 

Although a prosecutor in a capital case may not argue that a defendant’s 

postcrime lack of remorse is an aggravating factor, a prosecutor may, as the 

prosecutor did here, argue that lack of remorse is relevant to the evaluation of 

mitigating factors. (People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1186, 13 

Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353; People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 187, 

99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150.) The prosecutor here never suggested that 

lack of remorse was an aggravating factor, and he did not refer to lack of 

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remorse during the portion of his argument devoted to the discussion of 

aggravating factors. Instead, the challenged argument occurred during the 

course of the prosecutor’s review of the defense case in mitigation and the 

potential mitigating factors. A reasonable juror likely would have understood 

the prosecutor’s argument to be that defendant’s failure to demonstrate any 

concern for the woman he had killed meant “that remorse was not available 

as a mitigating factor and also that defendant was not entitled to the jury’s 

sympathy.” (People v. Pollock, supra, at p. 1186, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 

353.) 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 140-41 (alterations in original). Petitioner also later raised this claim 

in the second state habeas petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see 

Lodgment No. 91), but for the reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will 

address the claim on the merits. 

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor’s argument urged the jurors to improperly 

consider his actions and comments in aggravation, because section 190.3(a) allows the jury 

to consider the circumstances of the crime in aggravation, but neither Petitioner’s postcrime behavior nor statements should be considered under that factor. (SAP at 617-18.) 

Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor’s argument was not, as the state court concluded, 

directed at negating any mitigating evidence of remorse. (Id. at 619.) 

 Petitioner relies on a California Supreme Court case, People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 

1179 (1990), which approved the admission of evidence of a defendant’s lack of remorse 

“at the immediate scene of the crime” but instructed that “postcrime evidence of 

remorselessness does not fit within any statutory sentencing factor, and thus should not be 

urged as aggravating.” (SAP at 617-18, quoting from Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d at 1232.) Yet, 

Gonzalez also states that “[i]t is proper for the prosecution to stress that remorse is not 

available as a sentencing factor,” and found no basis for relief where “[f]or the most part, 

the prosecutor’s argument focused on overt evidence of defendant’s defiance, not his mere 

failure to confess guilt or express remorse.” Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d at 1232. Moreover, as 

the Court has previously noted, state law error is not grounds for federal habeas relief. See 

McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68 (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine 

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state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal 

court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties 

of the United States.”) 

 As noted previously, this type of claim may merit relief only if “the admission of the 

evidence so fatally infected the proceedings as to render them fundamentally unfair.” 

Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919; see also McGuire, 502 U.S. at 68-73. In the Group One claims, 

Petitioner raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (Claim 1.T) for failing to 

present evidence of remorse and, relevant to the instant claim, for failing to object to the 

prosecutor’s comments and argument on Petitioner’s lack of remorse and lack of 

conscience. (See ECF No. 171 at 126-30.) In adjudicating that claim, the Court rejected 

Petitioner’s argument that the remarks at issue amounted to misconduct, as follows: 

An argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

prosecutor’s argument on lack of remorse is similarly without merit. 

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct in arguing that 

Petitioner had a lack of remorse and conscience because the prosecutor was 

aware that Petitioner had expressed remorse in the probation report and in the 

confession and was privy to Denise Shigemura’s statements about Petitioner’s 

remorse. As discussed earlier, the probation report and confession contained 

unreliable hearsay statements, and Denise Shigemura’s proposed testimony 

was ambiguous, as it was unclear whether Petitioner’s upset after the crime 

was attributable to remorse or to Petitioner’s fear of the consequences to 

himself and his own loved ones. Meanwhile, it is clear from a review of the 

record that the prosecutor’s argument was based on the evidence presented at 

trial, such as Petitioner’s statement to Christine Medlin that “the bitch is 

gone,” and to Steven Baldwin in prison that: “I killed the bitch,” and did not 

constitute misconduct. “Counsel are given latitude in the presentation of their 

closing arguments, and courts must allow the prosecution to strike hard blows 

based on the evidence presented and all reasonable inferences therefrom.” 

Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1253-54 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Menendez v. 

Terhune, 422F.3d 1012, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The prosecutor may argue 

reasonable inferences from the evidence presented . . . .”) 

(Id. at 128-29.) The prosecutor’s argument was reasonable, as it was based on the 

testimony and evidence introduced at trial, and was relevant to the evaluation of 

Petitioner’s case on an individualized basis, as the federal Constitution requires. See Zant, 

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462 U.S. at 879 (“What is important at the selection stage is an individualized

determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the 

crime.”) The prosecutor’s argument, that Petitioner’s crime and the circumstances 

surrounding it warranted the death penalty, were reasonably admitted, and did not “so 

fatally infect[]” his penalty phase proceedings as to result in a constitutional violation. 

 Even if Petitioner were somehow able to demonstrate that this argument amounted 

to constitutional error, Petitioner cannot establish that the comments had a “substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

Petitioner asserts that the jurors considered his alleged lack of remorse in aggravation, 

citing three juror declarations submitted during post-trial proceedings. (See SAP at 621, 

citing CT 1484-89.) But, as the Court previously discussed in greater detail in the Order 

on the Group One Claims, these type of post-verdict statements may not be considered by 

the Court. (See ECF No. 171 at 30-31.) Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 606(b) states: 

“During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict . . . a juror may not testify about any 

statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of 

anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning 

the verdict or indictment. The Court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a 

juror’s statement on these matters.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).31 

In the declarations, three of the jurors who sat on Petitioner’s case acknowledge 

discussing and considering Petitioner’s remorse, or lack thereof, during deliberations. (CT 

1484-89.) But again, “a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that 

occurred during the jury’s deliberations.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b); see also Raley v. Ylst, 470 

F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting claim of juror misconduct stemming from the 

                                               

31 The Federal Rules of Evidence notes three exceptions to this rule and allows juror 

testimony in a case where the jury was: presented with “extraneous prejudicial 

information,” subject to “an outside influence,” or where “a mistake was made in entering 

the verdict.” See Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). There is no allegation nor showing that any of the 

exceptions are applicable to the instant claim.

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jury’s discussion of matters they were instructed not to consider, reasoning that such 

evidence was not “extrinsic” to the evidence presented at trial, and holding that “[w]e may 

not inquire into a jury’s deliberations concerning the evidence at trial.”), citing Belmontes 

v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005), reversed on other grounds by Ayers v. 

Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7 (2006); see also Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 521, 

527 (2014) (“As enacted, Rule 606(b) prohibited the use of any evidence of juror 

deliberations, subject only to the express exceptions for extraneous information and outside 

influences.”) Accordingly, the Court is precluded from considering the juror declarations 

for this purpose. 

 Given Petitioner’s failure to demonstrate that the trial court erred in allowing the 

prosecutor’s argument, much less that the decision amounted to error of a constitutional 

dimension such that it impacted the fairness of the penalty phase proceedings, the Court is 

unable to conclude that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was contrary 

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor that it was based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Habeas relief is not warranted on Claim 35. 

6. Claim 36

 Petitioner argues that the jury improperly considered evidence that he possessed a 

weapon in jail as aggravation because: (1) the evidence presented failed to identify the 

weapon Petitioner allegedly possessed and the jury was therefore deprived of the 

opportunity to decide whether the conduct alleged constituted criminal activity; (2) the trial 

court erred in directing the jury to presume that possession of a weapon in jail involved an 

actual or implied use of force or violence or a threat of force or violence; and (3) the crime 

of possession of a deadly weapon in jail is an unconstitutionally overbroad aggravating 

circumstance. (SAP at 621-31.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

In regard to the prosecution’s evidence at the penalty phase that 

defendant illegally possessed a weapon in the county jail, defendant claims, 

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first, that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the weapon he 

possessed was a deadly weapon within the meaning of section 4574; second, 

that the trial court misinstructed the jury regarding the elements of a section 

4574 violation; and, third, that the trial court should not have permitted the 

jury at the penalty phase to consider the section 4574 violation as an 

aggravating circumstance because the offense does not necessarily involve an 

actual or implied threat of violence. 

Section 4574 makes it a felony for a county jail inmate to possess a 

“deadly weapon.” Within the meaning of this penal statute, an object is a 

deadly weapon if it has a reasonable potential of inflicting great bodily injury 

or death. (People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1178, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 

89 P.3d 353; see People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 383, 116 

Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) 

Arguing that here the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to 

establish that the weapon he possessed had a reasonable potential of inflicting 

great bodily injury or death, defendant asserts that the evidence did not show 

which of several weapons he possessed and that some of the weapons, such 

as soap bars in socks, were incapable of inflicting great bodily injury. We 

disagree with defendant’s characterization of the evidence. 

Mark Thiede testified, on direct examination, that on September 5, 

1993, he was working as a deputy sheriff at the county jail in San Diego when 

he saw groups of Black and Hispanic inmates facing off against each other in 

one of the tanks. Several Hispanic inmates had steel poles or posts that they 

were slamming against the steel bunks and using to make stabbing motions to 

keep the Black inmates in another part of the room. He later wrote a report 

identifying four inmates “who possessed weapons.” Defendant was one of the 

four. Asked to describe “with a little more particularity what type of weapons 

... these inmates were possessing,” Thiede replied: “The weapons that was 

used in the riot, they’re bars about between 12 and 18 inches long, quarter 

inch in diameter. There was also socks. They take a sock and they put two, 

one or two bars of soap in the socks to make it weighted. You can use that as 

a clubbing instrument. Thin pieces about a half inch wide, five or six inches 

long with tape on the end that you can sharpen down to a point. Those are I 

believe the weapons that were found.” (Italics added.) 

Defendant argues that from this testimony the jury could not determine 

which weapon, of the several that Deputy Thiede described, he had possessed 

during the riot, and thus the jury could not determine whether the weapon 

satisfied the section 4574 definition of a deadly weapon. The more likely 

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interpretation of this testimony, we think, is that defendant was one of four 

inmates that Thiede saw wielding the steel poles or posts and that the other 

weapons were merely found during a later search of the tank. Moreover, any 

confusion or uncertainty in this regard was dispelled by cross-examination. 

Defense counsel asked: “You never saw Mr. Jurado, or the person that you 

identified as Mr. Jurado, that is, the person in the tank that you said had the 

pipe, you never saw that individual strike anybody, did you?” (Italics added.) 

Thiede replied, “No, I didn’t.” Thus, the evidence before the jury sufficiently 

established that defendant possessed one of the steel objects 12 to 18 inches 

in length-variously described as poles, posts, bars, and pipes-that the inmates 

were slamming against bunks and using to make stabbing motions. As 

defendant does not dispute, an object of this sort is capable of inflicting great 

bodily injury or death, and thus it is a deadly weapon within the meaning of 

section 4574. 

We next consider defendant’s claim that the trial court misinstructed 

the jury regarding the elements of a section 4574 violation. Specifically, the 

trial court instructed the jury that in reaching the penalty verdict it could 

consider evidence that defendant had engaged in criminal activity that 

involved the express or implied use of force or violence or the threat of force 

or violence. The court then stated: “And indeed, evidence has been introduced 

during this phase of the trial for the purpose of showing and proving that 

[defendant] committed the following criminal activity: ... possession of a 

weapon in the county jail.” Defendant contends that this instruction was 

inaccurate or at least misleading because it referred merely to “a weapon” 

rather than “a deadly weapon.” 

As defendant recognizes, we considered a similar claim in People v. 

Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th 287, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432. There, the 

prosecution introduced evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial that the 

defendant while in a county jail had possessed “a four-inch, slightly bent but 

straightened, hard, sharp object with a loop at the end.” (Id. at p. 381, 116 

Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) The trial court instructed the jury that 

“‘evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant 

has committed the following criminal act: possession of a sharpened 

instrument while confined in the county jail....’” (Id. at p. 382, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 

401, 39 P.3d 432.) We concluded that the trial court had erred in instructing 

in these terms because possessing a sharpened instrument while confined in 

the county jail “was, at the time, and without more (that is, a showing that the 

object was a deadly weapon), not a crime.” (Id. at p. 383, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 

39 P.3d 432.) The trial court’s instruction “should have used the words ‘deadly 

weapon’ rather than ‘sharpened instrument,’” an error we characterized as 

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“minor.” (Id. at p. 384, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) 

We also concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was 

not prejudiced by the error. We observed that the object the defendant had 

possessed qualified as deadly weapon under section 4754. (People v. Hughes, 

supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 383, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) We reasoned: 

“To find prejudice, we would need to hypothesize two things, which tend to 

be self-canceling: (i) that the jury would consider the shank, although a 

sharpened instrument, not to be a deadly weapon, and (ii) that despite such a 

finding, the jury nonetheless considered the evidence to be so important that 

it affected the penalty determination. [¶] It is quite unlikely that the jury would 

find the object to be a sharpened instrument but not a deadly weapon. But if 

the jury made that improbable finding, thus minimizing the seriousness of the 

evidence, it is also quite unlikely that it would then consider the evidence to 

be so important as to control, or even have a significant impact upon, the 

penalty determination.” (Id. at p. 384, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432; see 

also People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1179, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 

P.3d 353.) 

Similarly here, we conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by the 

trial court’s description of the alleged criminal conduct as defendant’s 

possession of a “weapon” rather than a “deadly weapon.” It is quite unlikely 

that the jury would view the object that defendant possessed-a steel rod or bar 

12 to 18 inches in length-as a weapon but not a deadly weapon. It is also quite 

unlikely that if the jury made such an improbable finding, it would then 

nonetheless treat the incident as sufficiently aggravating to have affected the 

penalty verdict. The combination of these improbabilities persuades us 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the instructional error was harmless. 

Defendant also argues that the instruction was erroneous insofar as it 

required the jury to treat defendant’s possession of a deadly weapon in county 

jail as aggravating without making its own determination that the conduct 

involved actual or threatened force or violence. Defendant argues that the 

instruction precluded the jury from considering any possible innocent 

explanation for his weapon possession. We have previously rejected this 

argument (People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 235, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 

118 P.3d 496; People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 793, 22 

Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 101 P.3d 956), and defendant does not persuade us to 

reconsider these decisions. 

Finally, we reject defendant’s argument that the trial court should not 

have permitted the jury at the penalty phase to consider the section 4574 

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violation as an aggravating circumstance because the offense does not 

necessarily involve illegal violence. This court has consistently concluded, to 

the contrary, that a prisoner’s possession of a weapon is conduct that 

necessarily involves an actual or implied threat to use force or violence. (E.g., 

People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1057, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 

388; People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1186-1187, 270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 

791 P.2d 965; People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 962-963, 171 Cal.Rptr. 

679, 623 P.2d 240.) “The trier of fact is free to consider any ‘innocent 

explanation’ for defendant’s possession of the item, but such inferences do 

not render the evidence inadmissible per se.” (People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 

Cal.4th 569, 589, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142.) 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 137-40 (alterations in original). Petitioner also later raised this claim 

in the second state habeas petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see 

Lodgment No. 91), but for the reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will 

address the claim on the merits. 

Again, a claim of state law error may only merit habeas relief if the error “so fatally 

infected the proceedings as to render them fundamentally unfair.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 

919; see also McGuire, 502 U.S. at 68-73. The Court must also conclude that the asserted 

error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

 A California capital jury may consider penalty phase evidence that includes: “[t]he 

presence or absence of other criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or 

attempted use of force or violence or which involved the express or implied threat to use 

force or violence.” Cal. Penal Code § 190.3(b). Meanwhile, California Penal Code 

§ 4574(a) states in relevant part that “any person who, while lawfully confined in a jail or 

county road camp possesses therein any firearm, deadly weapon, explosive, tear gas or tear 

gas weapon, is guilty of a felony.” California decisional law provides that: “Within the 

meaning of this penal statute [section 4574], an object is a deadly weapon if it has a 

reasonable potential of inflicting great bodily injury or death.” People v. Pollock, 32 Cal. 

4th 1153, 1178 (2004). 

/// 

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 Petitioner first asserts the evidence presented at trial failed to specify or properly 

identify the type of weapon Petitioner possessed or whether that weapon satisfied section 

4574. Deputies Hernandez and Thiede testified about the jail altercation. Hernandez stated 

that upon being alerted to the disturbance, that: “So we went over, responded to that module 

and turned the corner of the catwalk where we heard yelling and screaming, and we came 

up to it. We just seen a bunch of inmates fighting, throwing things back and forth at each 

other. And I noticed some blood on a couple of inmates. We knew there was a good fight 

going on.” (RT 3327-28.) Hernandez estimated that there were about 30 to 40 inmates in 

the module, that some in the area were not involved, and that the dispute took place along 

racial lines, in that: “There was group of Black inmates on one side and a group of Hispanic 

inmates on the other side.” (RT 3328-29.) After separating the groups, Hernandez stated 

that they searched the module and found a variety of weapon, including metal bars, broken 

mop pieces, razors, grates from windows and wooden gates, socks with soap bars inside, 

and pens. (RT 3331-33.) Hernandez acknowledged that he could not pinpoint Petitioner’s 

location during the altercation. (RT 3334.) 

 Deputy Thiede, who also responded to the fight along with Hernandez, testified that 

after arriving he told Hernandez to close the gates between the groups of inmates. (RT 

3343-44.) Thiede stated that from his view of the altercation: “And there’s several inmates 

- - what I could see right in front of me there was several inmates, Hispanic inmates with 

steel - - steel poles, steal [sic] posts. And they were, geez, they were taking them and 

slamming them against steel bunks, they were also using it as a - - stabbing motions to keep 

all the other Black inmates in this other - - in the other part of the dorm, in the other room.” 

(RT 3344.) Thiede recounted that: “After the gate was shut and inmates scattered away, I 

made - - I made a note to myself, that I later wrote in my report, who these inmates were.” 

(Id.) Thiede explained that he tried to recall the identities of those four inmates because 

possession of a weapon was a crime and stated that: “I was able to identify four - - four 

inmates.” (RT 3344-45.) To the prosecutor’s question: “Was Mr. Jurado one of the 

inmates who possessed a weapon?” Thiede replied: “Yes, he was.” (RT 3345.) Thiede, 

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like Hernandez, described the weapons found in the search of the module, and similarly 

stated that they found weapons that included bars 12-18 inches in length, socks with soap 

in them, and clubbing instruments. (RT 3345-46.) 

 Petitioner contends that “while there was testimony that Petitioner possessed a 

weapon (RT 3345), neither deputy identified this particular weapon,” and asserts that 

“[a]bsent identification of the specific object Petitioner allegedly possessed, neither the 

jurors, nor the court, could be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner possessed 

a ‘deadly weapon’ as prohibited by section 4574.” (SAP at 626-27.) The California 

Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s assertion that Thiede’s testimony would not have 

allowed the jury to determine what type of weapon Petitioner possessed during the 

altercation, reasoning that: “The more likely interpretation of this testimony, we think, is 

that defendant was one of four inmates that Thiede saw wielding the steel poles or posts 

and that the other weapons were merely found during a later search of the tank. Moreover, 

any confusion or uncertainty in this regard was dispelled by cross-examination.” Jurado, 

38 Cal. 4th at 138. This Court agrees with the California Supreme Court that an 

examination of the trial record clearly shows that defense counsel’s questions reflected that 

he too, understood that Deputy Thiede testified Petitioner possessed a pipe, not one of the 

other weapons, during the altercation. On cross-examination, defense counsel specifically 

asked Thiede: “You never saw Mr. Jurado, or the person that you identified as Mr. Jurado,

that is, the person in the tank that you said had the pipe, you never saw that individual 

strike anybody, did you?” (RT 3349) (emphasis added.) With respect to the pipe, the state 

court found that “an object of this sort is capable of inflicting great bodily injury or death, 

and thus it is a deadly weapon within the meaning of section 4574.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 

138. Based on the testimony that described the metal pipes or bars as made of steel and 

about twelve to eighteen inches in length (see RT 3331-33, 3345-46), this conclusion was 

clearly reasonable. 

 Petitioner next alleges that the trial court’s instruction, which “essentially defined 

the alleged criminal activity as one that involved the express or implied use of force or 

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violence or the threat of force or violence,” also violated his rights, as “[o]nce the jury 

found the underlying fact that Petitioner possessed a weapon to be true, they were to 

presume that this conduct constituted an actual or threatened use of force or violence, and 

apply the aggravating fact against Petitioner.” (SAP at 628-29.) Petitioner argues that due 

to the trial court’s instructional error, the jury was precluded from considering an “innocent 

explanation” for his possession of a weapon in jail. (Id. at 629-30.) The facts of the case 

fail to support any such likelihood, as the evidence showed that Petitioner brandished a 

twelve to eighteen inch long pipe or bar during a prison altercation. Petitioner fails to 

explain, and the Court fails to discern, any possible “innocent explanation” for this weapon 

possession that does not involve the use of, or threat to use, force or violence. As such, 

even were the Court to assume, without deciding, that the trial court’s instruction was 

erroneous, Petitioner fails to show that the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict” in his case. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

 Finally, Petitioner notes that “[s]ection 4574 proscribes possession, not use, of a 

deadly weapon by a jail inmate” and points out that “[b]ecause of the potential or capability 

for causing great bodily injury or death determines an objects [sic] classification as a deadly 

weapon, virtually any item possessed in jail could be considered as a deadly weapon.” 

(SAP at 630) (internal citation omitted.) Petitioner asserts that “[s]uch possession standing 

alone, however, does not necessarily imply a threat of violence pursuant to section 190.3, 

factor (b),” and argues that “[e]vidence that a defendant possessed a ‘potentially’ deadly 

weapon in jail in violation of section 4574 therefore amounts to an overbroad and invalid 

aggravating factor.” (Id. at 630-31.) Petitioner supports his contention with only the 

general argument that this aggravating factor has such a broad reach that it fails to 

“meaningfully assist” the jury in its penalty determination and allows for “‘randomness’” 

or for the “‘jury to be influenced by a speculative or improper consideration.’” (SAP at 

630-31, quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 878 and People v. Bacigalupo, 6 Cal. 4th 457, 477 

(1993).) The Court sees no potential for the identified error in his case, as again, the 

evidence presented during his penalty phase proceedings showed that Petitioner possessed 

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and wielded a twelve to eighteen inch long pipe or bar, clearly a deadly weapon, during a 

prison altercation, clearly imputing the threat of force or violence.32 Petitioner fails to 

demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was contrary to, or 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or that it was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. Claim 36 does not merit habeas relief. 

7. Claim 37

 Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in admitting two incidents between 

Petitioner and his mother as evidence in aggravation, and contends that the admission of 

that evidence violated his rights to due process, a fair penalty trial and reliability in the 

sentencing determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

(SAP at 632.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Defendant argues that the trial court should have exercised its discretion 

to exclude, as inflammatory and lacking in probative value, the evidence that 

on one occasion he pushed and spit on his mother, and on another occasion he 

approached with raised arm as if to strike her and threatened to kill her and 

shoot up the house. He further argues that admission of this evidence violated 

his statutory and due process right that the penalty evidence admitted against 

him be limited to evidence relevant to a factor listed under section 190.3, and 

his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments 

to due process, a fair penalty trial, and reliability in the determination of 

capital punishment. 

We reject the argument that defendant’s conduct toward his mother was 

not admissible under section 190.3, factor (b), as criminal activity that 

involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied 

                                               

32 The California Supreme Court also rejected Petitioner’s contention that he was 

prejudiced by the trial court’s error in referring to Petitioner’s possession of a “weapon” 

rather than a “deadly weapon” during jury instructions on the elements of section 4574. 

See Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 138-39. While Petitioner does not specifically re-raise that 

contention in the SAP, the Court is in accord with the state supreme court’s conclusion that 

any error in this regard was harmless. See id. at 139.

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threat to use force or violence. Defendant does not argue that his conduct did 

not violate a penal statute, nor does he argue that it did not involve the use or 

attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force 

or violence. Instead, he argues that the evidence was “not the kind of evidence 

that justified sentencing [him] to execution,” because it is “unfortunately not 

that uncommon for a teenager or a nineteen-year-old to have such 

confrontations with his parents.” But the admissibility of section 190.3, factor 

(b), evidence does not depend on how common or uncommon the criminal 

conduct is, or whether viewed in isolation it would be sufficient to justify a 

death sentence. The evidence met all statutory requirements for admission 

under section 190.3, factor (b). 

We reject also defendant’s argument that the trial court should have 

exercised its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude the 

evidence on the ground that its probative value was substantially outweighed 

by the probability that its admission would create a substantial danger of 

undue prejudice. As we have explained, Evidence Code section 352 does not 

give the trial court discretion to exclude all evidence of a criminal incident 

that is admissible under section 190.3, factor (b). (People v. Cunningham

(2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1017, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519; People v. 

Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 586, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; 

People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 542-543, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 

P.2d 420.) 

Nor are we persuaded by defendant’s constitutional arguments, which 

are based on the unrealistic perspective of viewing this evidence in isolation 

from all the other evidence offered in aggravation and mitigation at the penalty 

phase, including the circumstances of the capital offense. In the context of the 

entire penalty determination process, we find nothing improper or unfair about 

allowing the jury to consider each occasion during defendant’s life when he 

violated a penal statute by conduct that involved the use or attempted use of 

force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 142-43 (alteration in original). Petitioner also later raised this claim 

in the second state habeas petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see 

Lodgment No. 91), but for the reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will 

address the claim on the merits. 

 California Penal Code § 190.3(b) provides for penalty phase consideration of “[t]he 

presence or absence of other criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or 

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attempted use of force or violence or which involved the express or implied threat to use 

force or violence.” Petitioner argues that the incidents between him and his mother do not 

fit the parameters of section 190.3(b), because “[t]here is a vast and insurmountable 

difference between violent criminal conduct that justifies putting a defendant to death, and 

a teenager’s only two instances (see RT 3354, 3356, 3362-63) of aggressive conduct 

towards his parent involving verbal threats, a ‘slight push’ and spitting.” (SAP at 634.) 

 Both the trial court and the California Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis 

of whether these incidents met the statutory requirements of section 190.3(b). The 

prosecutor sought to introduce evidence of several incidents between Petitioner and his 

mother, one which “involve[d] pushing of her person and spitting on her,” and the other 

“where Mr. Jurado advanced toward her with his hand in a raised position and got to within 

a couple feet from her before a couple of his friends jumped on him and subdued him and 

dragged him outside.” (RT 3019.) The prosecutor also mentioned Petitioner destroying 

items at his mother’s home, putting his hands through walls and grabbing a phone from his 

sister. (Id.) With respect to the pushing and spitting incident, the trial court inquired “Well, 

think [sic] that’s a classic battery, isn’t it, technically?” to which defense counsel conceded 

that “It’s technically a battery. I just - - there’s something which strikes me as almost 

surreal about using a technical battery to try to kill somebody,” and the trial court stated: 

“That may be a great argument to the jury.” (RT 3022.) The trial court found the second 

incident admissible under section 190.3(b), and to defense counsel’s point that it was 

unclear whether Petitioner actually was going to assault his mother, the trial court reasoned 

that “Well, again, I think that goes to the weight. That goes - - that’s an argument to be 

made to the jury, I think. I mean, I take your point and the jury may agree that there was 

no - - I mean assault is a general intent crime, but that he didn’t even really intend to 

actually strike her, actually commit a battery on her. But that again I think is - - I think 

there’s some substantial evidence from which the jurors could find that he did unless 

otherwise restrained, and so I think there are two incidents there that I think technically 

qualify.” (RT 3023.) After further argument about whether the second incident, or the 

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other incidents, qualified for admission under section 190.3(b), the trial court limited its 

ruling to only the first two incidents, stating: “I think there’s some substantial evidence of 

those two incidents sufficient to allow the people to present her testimony on those two 

incidents, but I think we’re going to - - I will be cautious, and I don’t like to make my own 

objection, but I assume there are going to be some defense objections, and I’ll be cautious 

and sensitive to limit her testimony to just those two incidents.” (RT 3029.) 

 The California Supreme Court conducted a similar analysis, and also concluded that 

the evidence met standards for admissibility under section 190.3(b), rejecting Petitioner’s 

argument that “common” incidents, such as disputes between a teenager and his mother, 

were somehow unfair to admit into evidence. The state court noted that “the admissibility 

of section 190.3, factor (b), evidence does not depend on how common or uncommon the 

criminal conduct is, or whether viewed in isolation it would be sufficient to justify a death 

sentence. The evidence met all statutory requirements for admission under section 190.3, 

factor (b).” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 142 (emphasis in original). The state court’s reasoning 

that the incidents in question met the standards necessary for admission is sound, as in both 

incidents there was “criminal activity” by Petitioner that involved “force or violence” or 

the “implied threat to use force or violence.” Cal. Penal Code § 190.3(b). 

 Petitioner argues generally that “Mrs. Jurado’s testimony about her two incidents 

with her son was not the kind of evidence that justified sentencing Petitioner to execution, 

and certainly was not the type of evidence that allowed the jurors to differentiate between 

those found guilty of murder who deserve death, and those who do not.” (SAP at 634.) 

Petitioner notes that during the sentencing proceedings, the trial court characterized 

evidence of the two incidents as having “trivialized the process a little bit” and “was 

stretching it a bit” and, while acknowledging that the jury may have decided differently, 

stated that he did not consider them persuasive in determining Petitioner’s sentence. (RT 

3733.) Yet, as the California Supreme Court correctly and reasonably noted, evidence 

introduced in the penalty phase is not to be viewed in isolation, as the jury was instructed 

to weigh and consider everything together in determining penalty. (See e.g. CT 1437-38 - 

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“The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere 

mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary 

assignment of weights to any of them. . . In weighing the various circumstances you 

determine under the evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the 

totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating 

circumstances.”) Petitioner’s assertion that these incidents, if considered on their own, do 

not justify a death sentence, is misplaced and unpersuasive. The issue is whether the trial 

court erred in admitting the incidents into evidence, and whether that admission, if in error, 

violated his federal constitutional rights. See e.g. Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (“A habeas petitioner who challenges a state court’s admission into evidence of 

prior acts of misconduct is not entitled to habeas relief unless the state court’s admission 

of this evidence violated the petitioner’s federal due process right to a fair trial under the 

Constitution.”); see also McGuire, 502 U.S. at 68-73. This Court is in accord with the 

reasoning of the California Supreme Court, which rejected Petitioner’s argument, stating: 

“Nor are we persuaded by defendant’s constitutional arguments, which are based on the 

unrealistic perspective of viewing this evidence in isolation from all the other evidence 

offered in aggravation and mitigation at the penalty phase, including the circumstances of 

the capital offense. In the context of the entire penalty determination process, we find 

nothing improper or unfair about allowing the jury to consider each occasion during 

defendant’s life when he violated a penal statute by conduct that involved the use or 

attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.” 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 142-43. 

In addition to Petitioner’s failure to demonstrate that this evidence was admitted in 

error, he fails to show that the admission of the evidence rendered his penalty proceedings 

“fundamentally unfair.” See Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919 (“[Petitioner] claims that he was 

denied his right to the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by the due process clause. We 

therefore consider whether the admission of the evidence so fatally infected the 

proceedings as to render them fundamentally unfair.”) As trial court noted, it did not 

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consider the evidence persuasive in determining the appropriate penalty. While the trial 

court acknowledged it was unknown what, if any, importance the jury placed on this 

evidence, it is clear that there was significant and weighty evidence in aggravation 

independent from these two incidents. As discussed in detail previously, the murder itself 

was particularly brutal, as the pregnant victim was less than five feet tall, weighed just over 

100 pounds, and was subjected to a surprise attack by several taller and larger individuals. 

She died from strangulation and a myriad of blunt force injuries to her head and body. The 

evidence showed she was murdered to prevent her from revealing a plot to murder another 

individual. Wholly aside and apart from Petitioner’s incidents with his mother, there was 

substantial evidence of other prior criminal activity, including his involvement in a 

jailhouse assault and being armed with a weapon during a jail altercation. Even were 

Petitioner able to establish a constitutional violation, which he has not, he fails to show any 

alleged error in admitting the evidence of these two incidents between him and his mother 

had an impact on the outcome of the penalty proceedings, much less a “substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

 Accordingly, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s 

rejection of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Habeas relief is not warranted on Claim 37. 

8. Claim 38

 Petitioner asserts that the lying-in-wait special circumstance, set forth in California 

Penal Code § 190.2(a)(15), “violates the Eighth Amendment by failing to narrow the class 

of persons eligible for the death penalty.” (SAP at 637.) Petitioner also contends that the 

special circumstance fails to properly differentiate between capital and non-capital cases. 

(Id., citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (“A capital sentencing scheme 

must, in short, provide a ‘“meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which (the 

penalty) is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”’”), quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. 

at 188, and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring).) 

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 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Defendant contends that the lying-in-wait special circumstance 

(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)), as interpreted by this court, violates the Eighth 

Amendment to the federal Constitution by failing to appropriately narrow the 

class of persons eligible for the death penalty. “We have repeatedly rejected 

this contention, and defendant fails to convince us the matter warrants our 

reconsideration.” (People v. Nakahara, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 721, 134 

Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 68 P.3d 1190; see also People v. Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 

p. 303, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 

Cal.4th 1083, 1148-1149, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572.) 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 127. 

Petitioner asserts that “[t]he lying-in-wait special circumstance applies to almost all 

premeditated killings,” and thus “fails to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants as 

required by the Eighth Amendment” and “creates a substantial and unconstitutional risk of 

arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty.” (Pet. Br. at 129, citing People v. 

Morales, 48 Cal.3d, 527, 575 (1989) (Mosk, J., dissenting), Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 

U.S. 356 (1988), Gregg, 428 U.S. at 205-06.) Petitioner notes that “[t]he overly broad 

structure of this special circumstance has come under increasing attack,” and relies on 

concurring and dissenting opinions from California Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit 

decisions. (See id. at 131-32, citing People v. Ceja, 4 Cal. 4th 1134, 1146 (1993) (Kennard, 

J., concurring); People v. Jones, 17 Cal. 4th 279, 321 (1998) (Mosk, J., dissenting); Morales 

v. Woodford, 388 F.3d 1159, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 2003) (McKeown, J., concurring and 

dissenting in part).) 

 Petitioner fails to provide any clearly established federal law supporting his 

contention that California’s lying in wait special circumstance violates constitutional 

guarantees. The Supreme Court cases Petitioner relies upon simply affirm general 

principles that a state’s capital sentencing system must provide guidance to a sentencer and 

a “way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty is imposed, from the many cases 

in which it is not.” Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363, quoting Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433; see also 

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Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206 (upholding capital sentencing system in which “jury’s discretion is 

channeled” through guidelines, sentencing factors, and appellate review, stating that “[l]eft 

unguided, juries imposed the death sentence in a way that could only be called freakish.”) 

Meanwhile, in Morales, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the argument that California’s 

lying in wait special circumstance fails to narrow those eligible for the death penalty: 

The lying-in-wait circumstance is not overly broad such that it

“appl[ies] to every defendant convicted of murder.” Such over breadth would 

render it inadequate under Tuilaepa. Evidently, California regards ambush as 

an especially immoral way of murdering someone. The lying-in-wait special 

circumstance codifies that moral sentiment. Our dissenting colleague is quite 

right that the California Supreme Court has interpreted it liberally, to embrace 

not just traditional ambush, but murder accomplished by surprising the victim. 

Where we differ is that the dissent thinks almost all first-degree murders 

satisfy the California lying-in-wait requirements as so interpreted, and we do 

not. The three elements of lying in wait, in California law, are “(1) a 

concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for 

an opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on 

an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage.” The combination of 

these elements embraces some first-degree murders, but not all. 

Morales, 388 F.3d at 1175 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted.) 

 Given the lack of Supreme Court authority compelling the result Petitioner 

advocates and Ninth Circuit authority rejecting this very argument, Petitioner fails to 

demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim was either contrary 

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or that it was based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See Van Patten, 552 U.S. at 126 (“Because 

our cases give no clear answer to the question presented, let alone one in [Petitioner’s] 

favor, ‘it cannot be said that the state court unreasonabl(y) appli(ed) clearly established 

law.’”), quoting Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77; Morales, 388 F.3d at 1175. Petitioner does not 

merit habeas relief or an evidentiary hearing on Claim 38. See Sully, 725 F.3d at 1075 

(“[A]n evidentiary hearing is pointless once the district court has determined that § 2254(d) 

precludes habeas relief.”); see also Totten, 137 F.3d at 1176. 

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 9. Claims 39 and 40

 In Claim 39, Petitioner argues that while the jury was instructed that the reasonable 

doubt standard applied to their evaluation of Petitioner’s prior convictions and prior 

criminal activity, “[t]he jury was not, however, instructed to apply the reasonable doubt 

standard to the other aggravating circumstances - the ‘circumstances of the crime’ and 

age,” and “[n]or were the jurors instructed that the reasonable doubt standard governed 

their ultimate determination of the appropriate penalty in this case, and that they could 

impose a sentence of death only if they were persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

aggravating circumstances were so substantial in comparison with the mitigating 

circumstances that the death penalty was justified.” (SAP at 644.) In Claim 40, Petitioner 

contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that they were required to 

unanimously agree on the aggravating circumstances, and instead instructed the jurors that 

they were not required to unanimously agree on the aggravating circumstances, violating 

Petitioner’s rights to due process, equal protection33 and a reliable determination of penalty 

under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (SAP at 649-50, citing RT 

3560, 3562.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected Claim 39 on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Defendant claims that his death sentence must be reversed because the 

trial court did not instruct the jurors to return a death verdict only if they were 

persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances were 

so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that the death 

penalty was justified. As defendant acknowledges, this court has held that 

“neither the federal nor the state Constitution requires the jury to agree 

unanimously as to aggravating factors, or to find beyond a reasonable doubt 

that aggravating factors exist, that they outweigh mitigating factors, or that 

                                               

33 In Claim 44, Petitioner asserts that the California sentencing scheme as a whole 

violates equal protection by denying capital prisoners procedural safeguards that are 

provided to non-capital prisoners. (See SAP at 662-66.) The Court will address 

Petitioner’s equal protection arguments raised in its adjudication of Claim 44.

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death is the appropriate sentence.” (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 

1223, 1255, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 784, 947 P.2d 1321.) Defendant urges us to 

reconsider this holding in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions 

in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 

435, Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, 

and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 

403. We have already done so, and we have concluded that these decisions do 

not require us to alter our previous conclusion on this point. (People v. 

Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 103-104, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622; 

People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 730-731, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 

P.3d 568.) 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 143. The California Supreme Court also rejected Claim 40 on the 

merits, reasoning as follows: 

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury 

that unanimity was required before a particular circumstance could be 

considered aggravating. As defendant acknowledges, this court has 

consistently rejected this argument (e.g., People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 

p. 236, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496; People v. Morrison, supra, 34 

Cal.4th at pp. 730-731, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568), and he fails to 

persuade us to reconsider these holdings. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 143. Petitioner also later raised these claims in the second state 

habeas petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see Lodgment No. 91), but for 

the reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will address both claims on the 

merits. 

In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Supreme Court held that 

“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490. “Ring altered the range of permissible methods for 

determining whether a defendant’s conduct is punishable by death, requiring that a jury 

rather than a judge find the essential facts bearing on punishment,” by holding that “‘a 

sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, [may not] find an aggravating circumstance 

necessary for imposition of the death penalty.’” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 

(2004), quoting Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (alteration in original). 

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 With respect to Claim 39, Petitioner asserts that California’s capital statute is similar 

to the Arizona statute at issue in Ring, as it only allows for imposition of the death penalty 

if the jury makes additional findings in the penalty phase, and thus “[u]nder the principles 

expressed in Ring and Apprendi, the additional factual findings required for a death 

sentence in California must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (SAP at 649.) 

Petitioner also cites Apprendi and Ring in support of Claim 40, arguing that “[b]ased on 

the rationales in Apprendi and Ring, jury unanimity as to each aggravating circumstance is 

required as well.” (Id. at 650.)

“A defendant in California is eligible for the death penalty when the jury finds him 

guilty of first-degree murder and finds one of the § 190.2 special circumstances true.” 

Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 975, citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 (1983); see also 

Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a) (“The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of murder in 

the first degree is death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility 

of parole if one or more of the following special circumstances has been found under 

Section 190.4 to be true: . . . (15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by means 

of lying in wait.”) At the end of the guilt phase proceedings in this case, Petitioner’s jury 

found him guilty of first-degree murder and found the charged lying in wait special 

circumstance to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. (See e.g. CT 1199 (jury instruction on 

reasonable doubt and burden of proof); CT 1220-29 (jury instructions on murder); CT 

1241-45 (jury instructions on special circumstance); CT 1256-57 (jury verdict on murder 

and special circumstance).) 

The Court remains unpersuaded that the California capital sentencing system is 

contrary to Apprendi, as after the guilt phase verdict in a capital case such as Petitioner’s, 

a death sentence is within the “prescribed statutory maximum.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.

Nor does Petitioner demonstrate that Ring assists his argument, as that case concerned an 

Arizona system in which a judge, not a jury, rendered the findings necessary to sentence 

an individual to death. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (“We overrule Walton [v. Arizona, 497 

U.S. 639 (1990] to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to 

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find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. Because 

Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an 

element of a greater offense,’ the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.”), 

quoting Apprendi, 503 U.S. at 494, n. 19 (internal citations omitted). Again, in California, 

the jury makes both the eligibility determination at the guilt phase as well as renders the 

penalty decision. 

 The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of California’s capital 

sentencing statute despite the absence of unanimity and reasonable doubt standards 

advocated by Petitioner. See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 979 (“Once the jury finds that the 

defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death 

penalty, . . . the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death 

is the appropriate punishment.”), quoting Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1008; see also Tuilaepa, 512 

U.S. at 979 (“A capital sentencer need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact 

in the capital sentencing decision.”) As such, Petitioner fails to show that the California 

Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was either contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law, or that it was based upon an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on Claims 39 or 40. 

10. Claim 41

 Petitioner asserts that “[t]he trial court instructed the jury on seven statutory factors 

to consider in deciding whether Petitioner should live or die, and directed the jurors to 

determine which of these circumstances they believed to be aggravating,” and argues that 

“there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ (Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991); Boyde v. 

California, 494 U.S. 370, 380) that the jurors understood the court’s charge as allowing 

them to attach aggravating labels to statutory factors that militated in favor of a lesser 

sentence.” (SAP at 653.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

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Contrary to defendant’s contention, “[t]he trial court was not 

constitutionally required to inform the jury that certain sentencing factors 

were relevant only in mitigation, and the statutory instruction to the jury to 

consider ‘whether or not’ certain mitigating factors were present did not 

impermissibly invite the jury to aggravate the sentence upon the basis of 

nonexistent or irrational aggravating factors.” (People v. Morrison, supra, 34 

Cal.4th at p. 730, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568; accord, People v. Gray, 

supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 237, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496.) 

Defendant argues, however, that certain instructions given in this case 

created an unacceptable risk that the jurors would treat as aggravating a 

circumstance that could only be mitigating. First, the trial court modified the 

standard jury instruction on penalty factors, CALJIC No. 8.85. After listing 

the seven factors that the parties had agreed were relevant to penalty 

determination in this case, the instruction stated: “The circumstances in the 

above list which you determine to be aggravating are the only ones which the 

law permits you to consider.” The instruction also stated, however, that “[t]he 

absence of a statutory mitigating circumstances does not constitute an 

aggravating circumstance.” 

Second, during penalty deliberations, the jury sent the trial court a note 

with this question: “Can we consider the conspiracy to kill Doug Mynatt a 

‘circumstance of the crime,’ as this term is used in CALJIC [No.] 8.85. (a)?” 

The trial court replied: “Yes, it can be considered as a ‘circumstance of the 

crime’ under CALJIC [No.] 8.85(a), as either a circumstance in aggravation 

or mitigation.” Defendant suggests that this reply would cause the jury to 

conclude that it could consider any of the statutory factors as either 

aggravating or mitigating. We disagree. On the same day, the jurors also sent 

the trial court a note asking whether section 190.3, factor (k), as described in 

CALJIC No. 8.85 (“Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of 

the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any 

sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the 

defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not 

related to the offense for which he is on trial”) could be either mitigating or 

aggravating. The trial court replied that this factor was “mitigating only.” 

Thus, no reasonable juror could have been misled into believing that any 

factor could be either aggravating or mitigating. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 143-44 (alterations in original). Petitioner also later raised this claim 

in the second state habeas petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see 

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Lodgment No. 91), but for the reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will 

address the claim on the merits. 

Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the trial court’s penalty phase 

instructions on aggravating and mitigating circumstances, first alleging that the trial court 

erred in failing to define which factors were aggravating and which could only be 

mitigating and second, alleging that given the absence of specific direction, it is likely that 

the jurors construed one or more of the factors that could only be mitigating as aggravating 

instead. This argument fails to find support in clearly established law. Indeed, the United 

States Supreme Court rejected a similar challenge to California’s capital sentencing statute 

as a whole: 

Petitioners also suggest that the § 190.3 sentencing factors are flawed 

because they do not instruct the sentencer how to weigh any of the facts it 

finds in deciding upon the ultimate sentence. In this regard, petitioners claim 

that a single list of factors is unconstitutional because it does not guide the 

jury in evaluating and weighing the evidence and allows the prosecution (as 

well as the defense) to make wide-ranging arguments about whether the 

defendant deserves the death penalty. This argument, too, is foreclosed by 

our cases. A capital sentencer need not be instructed how to weigh any 

particular fact in the capital sentencing decision. 

Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 978-79; see also Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1484 (9th Cir. 

1995) (“The death penalty statute’s failure to label aggravating and mitigating factors is 

constitutional.”), citing Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189, 1994 (9th Cir. 1982), reversed on 

other grounds by Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1984). 

 Petitioner also fails to demonstrate any likelihood that the jurors in his case 

misunderstood or misapplied the penalty phase instructions. Petitioner’s jury was 

instructed with seven of the eleven sentencing factors provided for in California Penal Code 

section 190.3. Factors (a), (b), (c), and (i) could be considered in aggravation, while factors 

(d), (h), and (k) could only be considered in mitigation. Citing academic studies and reports 

suggesting that juries have difficulty in accurately comprehending capital sentencing 

instructions and pointing to several questions Petitioner’s jury submitted to the trial court, 

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Petitioner contends that his penalty phase jury was likely confused and may have 

erroneously considered sentencing factors that could only be considered in mitigation as 

aggravating. (SAP at 654-56.) Petitioner also asserts that the trial court’s modification of 

CALJIC 8.85 allowed the jurors to consider mitigating factors as aggravating, as it directed 

the jurors that: “The circumstances in the above list which you determine to be aggravating 

circumstances are the only one which the law permits you to consider. You are not allowed 

to consider any other facts or circumstances as the basis for deciding that the death penalty 

would be an appropriate punishment in this case.” (CT 1431.) 

A review of the record does not support Petitioner’s claim that the jury may have 

construed mitigating factors as aggravating. During deliberations, Petitioner’s jury sent 

several questions to the judge inquiring about the proper application of the sentencing 

factors. The jury submitted a question to the trial court asking: “Can we consider the 

conspiracy to kill Doug Mynatt a ‘circumstance of the crime,’ as this term is used in 

CALJIC 8.85(a)?,” to which the trial court responded, “Yes, It can be considered as a 

‘circumstance of the crime’ under Caljic 8.85(a), as either a circumstance in aggravation 

or Mitigation.” (CT 1415.) Citing this question and response, Petitioner contends that 

“[t]here is no reason why the jurors would not have understood the court’s answer that this 

could be considered as a circumstance of the crime and could be ‘either a circumstance in 

aggravation or (m)itigation’ as allowing them to likewise attach aggravating labels to those 

statutory factors that are mitigating only, especially when those mitigating factors were 

defined as ‘whether or not’ they existed.” (SAP at 656.) But this assertion is not borne out 

by the record because the jurors also asked the trial court: “May we use Factor #g (other)34

                                               

34 Factor (k), which allows a jury to consider “[a]ny other circumstance which 

extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and 

any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant 

offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for 

which he is on trial. . . .” was labeled factor (g) in the instructions given in this case because 

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as either a mitigating or aggravating circumstance? (CALJIC 8.85(g).[)],” to which the trial 

court answered, “Factor g is mitigating only.” (CT 1414.) 

 While Petitioner asserts that the questions themselves reflect the jury’s confusion 

and that the trial court’s responses left open the possibility that the jury might have 

considered mitigating factors as aggravating, the Court finds no record support for this 

argument, particularly in light of the fact that the jurors were explicitly directed that section 

190.3(k) was “mitigating only” and were also instructed that “[t]he absence of a statutory 

mitigating circumstance does not constitute an aggravating circumstance.” (CT 1431.) A 

jury is presumed to understand and follow the trial court’s instructions. See Weeks, 528 

U.S. at 234; Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211. On this record, the state court was not 

unreasonable in concluding that “no reasonable juror could have been misled into believing 

that any factor could be either aggravating or mitigating.” Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 144. 

It is clear from the trial court’s specific responses to the jury questions that while 

certain factors could be considered in aggravation or mitigation, other sentencing factors 

could only be considered in mitigation. Based on a review of the record, including the 

juror questions, trial court’s responses, and the instructions to the jurors as a whole, the 

Court remains unpersuaded that a likelihood exists that the jurors considered mitigating 

factors in aggravation, much less that these instructions “so infected” the penalty phase 

proceedings that the resulting death sentence “violates due process.” McGuire, 502 U.S. 

at 72, quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. 

 Accordingly, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s 

rejection of this claim was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, or that it was based upon an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. Habeas relief is unavailable on Claim 41. 

/// 

                                               

the trial court renumbered the section 190.3 sentencing factors after deleting several 

inapplicable factors from the instructions. (RT 3677; CT 1430-31.)

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11. Claim 42

 Petitioner asserts that “California’s death penalty scheme fails to require that the jury 

make a written statement of findings and reasons for the death verdict,” which violates his 

rights to due process, equal protection,35 and meaningful appellate review of his sentence 

as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (SAP at 658.) 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Defendant claims that California’s death penalty law is unconstitutional 

because it does not require the jury to make a written statement of findings 

and reasons for its death verdict. This court has consistently rejected this claim 

(e.g., People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 236, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 

P.3d 496; People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 105, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 

117 P.3d 622; People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 730-731, 21 

Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568), and defendant does not persuade us to 

reconsider these decisions. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 144. Petitioner also later raised this claim in the second state habeas 

petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see Lodgment No. 91), but for the 

reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will address the claim on the merits. 

Petitioner fails to cite any clearly established law supporting his contention that 

written findings are constitutionally required in a capital penalty decision. The Ninth 

Circuit rejected a similar challenge to California’s 1977 death penalty statute, predecessor 

to the 1978 version under which Petitioner was sentenced, reasoning that the capital statute 

“need not require written jury findings in order to be constitutional.” Williams, 52 F.3d at 

1484-85, citing Harris, 692 F.2d at 1995-96, reversed on other grounds by Harris, 465 U.S. 

at 53-54. 

                                               

35 In Claim 44, Petitioner asserts that the California sentencing scheme as a whole 

violates equal protection by denying capital prisoners procedural safeguards that are 

provided to non-capital prisoners, including failing to require a statement of reasons on the 

record for a capital sentencing decision. (See SAP at 662-66.) As previously noted, the 

Court will address Petitioner’s equal protection arguments in its adjudication of Claim 44.

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 Given the lack of Supreme Court authority on this matter, Petitioner cannot show 

that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was either contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See Van Patten, 552 U.S. at 

126 (“Because our cases give no clear answer to the question presented, let alone one in 

[Petitioner’s] favor, ‘it cannot be said that the state court unreasonabl(y) appli(ed) clearly 

established law.’”), quoting Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77. Nor has Petitioner shown that the 

decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Habeas relief is not 

warranted on Claim 42. 

12. Claim 44

 Petitioner asserts that “California’s death penalty scheme provides significantly 

fewer procedural protections for persons facing a death sentence than are afforded persons 

charged with non-capital crimes. This differential treatment violates the constitutional 

guarantee of equal protection of the laws.” (SAP at 663.) Petitioner also alleges that 

appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. (Id. at 665.) 

 Petitioner raised this claim as Claim XXXV in the first state habeas petition, and the 

California Supreme Court denied that claim on the merits without a statement of reasoning. 

(Lodgment No. 79.) 

 Specifically, Petitioner points out that: (1) “[a]n enhancing allegation in a California 

non-capital case is a finding that must, by law, be unanimous,” and that “[n]o such 

unanimity is required before a juror can find that a particular fact is so aggravating and 

militates in favor of death;” (2) a judge in a non-capital case must state on the record 

reasons for selecting a lower or upper term and there is no such requirement in a capital 

case; (3) “[i]n a non-capital case, furthermore: ‘Circumstances in aggravation and 

mitigation shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence.’ Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 4.42(b). There is no standard of proof in the penalty phase of a capital case;” and (4) 

“[i]n non-capital cases, defendants are entitled to disparate-sentence review,” while 

“[t]hose sentenced to death are not.” (SAP at 664-65.) 

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“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State 

shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is 

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of 

Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985), quoting Plyler v. 

Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). Petitioner fails to cite clearly established federal law 

supporting his position. Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit has previously rejected the 

proposition that a capital and non-capital defendant are “similarly situated” and articulated 

that “[t]he relevant comparison for equal protection purposes is between two defendants, 

both of whom are sentenced to death.” Massie v. Hennessey, 875 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th 

Cir. 1989). In light of this authority, the Court remains unpersuaded that the cited 

differences between capital and non-capital cases violate equal protection guarantees. 

Moreover, because Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the claim is meritorious, appellate 

counsel cannot be faulted for failing to raise this claim on direct appeal. See Baumann v. 

United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The failure to raise a meritless legal 

argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”) 

 In sum, habeas relief is not warranted on Claim 44 because Petitioner fails to 

demonstrate that the state court decision is either contrary to, or involves an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law, or that the decision was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. 

13. Claim 46

 Petitioner contends that his “confinement is unlawful in that his convictions and 

sentence were illegally and unconstitutionally obtained in violation of his rights under the 

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because 

it was based on inaccurate, unreliable evidence, ambiguous instructions, misleading 

argument and is disproportionate to Petitioner’s culpability.” (SAP at 673.) 

 Petitioner raised this claim as Claim XXXIX in the first state habeas petition, and 

the California Supreme Court denied that claim on the merits without a statement of 

reasoning. (Lodgment No. 79.) Petitioner also later raised this claim in the second state 

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habeas petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see Lodgment No. 91), but for 

the reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will address the claim on the merits. 

 Petitioner asserts that: “The death sentence imposed on Petitioner is unconstitutional 

because it was not based on an individualized determination of his death-worthiness and 

was based on inaccurate, incomplete, and unreliable evidence. The jury’s determination 

that Petitioner was deserving of the death penalty was based on incomplete, inaccurate and 

unreliable evidence as the result of the failure of defense counsel to investigate, develop 

and present critical mitigating evidence or challenge the aggravating evidence, ambiguous 

instructions, and prosecutorial misconduct.” (SAP at 674.) Specifically, Petitioner asserts 

that the death sentence imposed in his case “was and is disproportionate to his moral 

culpability,” pointing out that he was 20 years old at the time of the crime and youth is an 

“extremely weighty mitigator,” that a defendant’s immaturity, particularly his “mental and 

emotional development,” is also a factor to consider in sentencing, that “reasonably 

competent counsel would have presented evidence that Petitioner’s impairments and 

disabilities, including the severe and chronic substance abuse he had suffered, severely 

affected Petitioner’s development” and “would have presented lay witness testimony and 

other evidence of Petitioner’s immaturity.” (Id. at 675-76.) 

 Upon reviewing the contentions that comprise this claim, it is clear that Petitioner 

has simply restated alleged constitutional violations which were raised in other claims and 

either rejected in the Group One Order or elsewhere in this Order. For instance, Petitioner 

argues that trial counsel failed to investigate and present sufficient evidence in mitigation 

concerning his age, immaturity, impairments and disabilities, and substance abuse. In 

Claim 1.Y, which was addressed and rejected in the Group One Order, Petitioner alleged 

in part that trial counsel “conceded that Petitioner’s age of 20 years might not be a 

mitigating factor in favor of a life sentence.” (See ECF. No. 171 at 135-38.) In Claim 1.Z, 

also addressed and rejected in the Group One Order, Petitioner alleged that “trial counsel 

failed to investigate, develop, and present to the jury, available evidence of Petitioner’s 

extreme immaturity, which placed his psychological and emotional age at a level well 

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below his chronological age and below the chronological age of a 16-year-old, and counsel 

unreasonably and prejudicially failed to argue to the jury that Petitioner’s psychological 

and emotional age compelled a verdict of life in prison.” (See id. at 138-44.) In Claims 

1.M, 1.N and 1.O, also addressed and rejected in the Group One Order, Petitioner alleged 

that trial counsel was ineffective in “failing to investigate and present evidence of exposure 

to toxins, chemicals, and pesticides and the resulting behavioral and physical consequences 

that arose from such exposure,” that trial counsel failed to “investigate, discover and 

present adequately available and substantially mitigating evidence,” and that counsel 

“failed to conduct a timely or adequate investigation of the potential penalty phase evidence 

and issues, did not develop or present a coherent penalty phase strategy, and were unable 

and failed to make informed and rational decisions regarding potentially meritorious 

defenses and tactics.” (See id. at 86-107.) In Claims 1.C, 1.D., 1.E, 1.F, 1.G, and 1.H, also 

addressed and rejected in the Group One Order, Petitioner alleged that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to present evidence at trial of Petitioner’s substance abuse and 

intoxication on the day of and at the time of the crimes, including alcohol, LSD, 

methamphetamine and marijuana, and his history of substance abuse, particularly his longstanding use of alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, LSD and methamphetamine. (See id. at 54-

68.) Finally, to the extent this claim can be construed as alleging cumulative error, 

Petitioner raised several separate cumulative error claims in the SAP, which are adjudicated 

elsewhere in this Order. (See Claims 19, 47, 48, infra.) 

Because the Court has rejected each of the contentions comprising this claim, either 

in the Group One Order or elsewhere in the instant Order, Petitioner fails to demonstrate 

that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of Claim 46 was either contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or that it was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. Habeas relief is not warranted. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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F. Systemic Claims; Atkins

1. Claim 20

 Petitioner asserts that his conviction and death sentence violate the federal 

Constitution “because California’s method of execution constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment and was adopted by means which violate fundamental principles of procedural 

and substantive due process.” (SAP at 470.) 

 Petitioner raised this claim as Claim XXVII in the first state habeas petition and the 

California Supreme Court denied that claim “as premature, without prejudice to renewal 

after an execution date is set.” (Lodgment No. 79.) He again raised the claim as Claim 20 

in the second state habeas petition, and the California Supreme Court again denied the 

claim, stating that “Claim 20 is denied as premature, without prejudice to renewal after an 

execution date is set. (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 485.)” (Lodgment No. 91.) 

 Both parties previously addressed this claim in briefs filed in connection with the 

Group One claims. In the Response to Opening Brief Related to Procedural Defenses, 

Respondent asserts that “Claim 20 in the current Petition should be dismissed because it is 

unripe at this time.” (ECF No. 146 at 17-18 n.9.) In the Reply to Response to Opening 

Brief Related to Procedural Defenses, Petitioner cites Respondent’s argument and states, 

“Petitioner agrees. Claim 20 should be dismissed without prejudice as premature.” (ECF 

No. 162 at 27.) 

 The Court agrees with the parties that Claim 20 is not ripe for review. See Payton 

v. Cullen, 658 F.3d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 2011) (“No new protocol was in place when the 

district court ruled” on a lethal injection challenge and “the claim was unripe, and it should 

have been dismissed.”) Other judges in this district have denied habeas challenges to 

California’s lethal injection procedures without prejudice as premature. See e.g. Roybal v. 

Davis, No. 99cv2152 JM (KSC), 148 F.Supp.3d 958, 1106-07 (S.D. Cal. December 2, 

2015); Michaels v. Chappell, No. 04cv0122 JAH (JLB), 2014 WL 7047544, at *118-19 

(S.D. Cal. December 18, 2014). The Court is in agreement with those decisions. 

Accordingly, Claim 20 is denied without prejudice as premature.

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2. Claim 21

 Petitioner contends that “[t]he California statutory scheme under which Petitioner 

was convicted and sentenced to death, as set forth in California Penal Code §§ 189 et. seq., 

violates the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution, in that the California statute fails to adequately narrow the class of persons 

eligible for the death penalty.” (SAP at 477.) 

 Petitioner raised this claim as Claim XXIX in the first state habeas petition, and the 

California Supreme Court denied that claim on the merits without a statement of reasoning. 

(Lodgment No. 79.) 

“Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter 

so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that 

discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly 

arbitrary and capricious action.” Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion). “To pass 

constitutional muster, a capital sentencing scheme must ‘genuinely narrow the class of 

persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more 

severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.’” Lowenfield 

v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988), quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 877. 

 Petitioner notes that “[i]n California during the 5-year period 1988-92 (a period 

including the year of the capital offense charged against Petitioner), approximately 9.6% 

of convicted first degree murderers were sentenced to death,” and while the special 

circumstances set forth in Cal. Penal Code section 190.2 narrows the class of murderers 

eligible for the death penalty, “[t]here are however, so many special circumstances, so 

broadly construed, that the special circumstances accomplish very little narrowing.” (SAP 

at 480-81.) Citing a declaration and study conducted by Professor Steven F. Shatz, 

Petitioner asserts that “[u]nder the death penalty scheme in effect in 1991, the year of the 

capital offense charged against Petitioner, 87% of first degree murderers were statutorily 

death eligible,” and argues that such a scheme does not genuinely narrow. (Id. at 481.) 

Petitioner also alleges that “since only 11.0% of those statutorily death-eligible are 

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sentenced to death, California’s death penalty scheme permits an even greater risk of 

arbitrariness than the schemes considered in Furman [sic], and, like those schemes, is 

unconstitutional.” (Id.) 

 Petitioner fails to cite any Supreme Court authority supporting his contention that 

the California capital statute violates the federal Constitution in this manner. Moreover, 

the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected this contention, as follows: 

With regard to this claim, we reject Karis’ argument that the scheme does not 

adequately narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. The 

California statute satisfies the narrowing requirement set forth in Zant v. 

Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). The special 

circumstances in California apply to a subclass of defendants convicted of 

murder and are not unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 972, 103 S.Ct. 2733. 

The selection requirement is also satisfied by an individualized determination 

on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the 

crime. See id. California has identified a subclass of defendants deserving of 

death and by doing so, it has “narrowed in a meaningful way the category of 

defendants upon whom capital punishment may be imposed.” Arave v. 

Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 476, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 123 L.Ed.2d 188 (1993). 

Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1141 n. 11 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Mayfield v. 

Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“A reasonable jurist could not 

debate, therefore, that the 1978 California statute, which narrowed the class of deatheligible defendants at both the guilt and penalty phases, was constitutional.”) 

 As such, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s rejection 

of this claim was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law. Nor has Petitioner shown that the decision was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. Habeas relief is not warranted on Claim 21. 

3. Claim 22

 Petitioner alleges that his “conviction, judgment and sentence of death violate the 

Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because 

defects in the state’s statutory scheme introduces arbitrary and capricious elements into the 

decision-making process.” (SAP at 482.) Specifically, Petitioner contends that “[u]nder 

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California law, by virtue of the failure of the state’s death penalty scheme to narrow the 

class of death eligible murders (see Claim 21, re: Professor Shatz, Ex. 22, supra), the 

prosecutor in a special circumstances case has the unbridled discretion to determine 

whether a penalty trial will be held to determine whether the death penalty should be 

imposed,” and that the exercise of this power deprived Petitioner of his constitutional 

rights. (Id.) 

 Petitioner raised this claim as Claim XXX in the first state habeas petition, and the 

California Supreme Court denied that claim on the merits without a statement of reasoning. 

(Lodgment No. 79.) 

 In support of his contention, Petitioner references several Supreme Court decisions, 

as follows: “Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1981) (“Capital punishment (must) 

be imposed ... with reasonable consistency, or not at all.”); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 

885 (1983) (seeking the death penalty on the basis of ‘factors that are constitutionally 

impermissible ... such as ... race” violates the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments); 

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (‘arbitrary and wanton’ jury 

discretion condemned); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (principled decisionmaking in charging, prosecuting, and deciding whether to submit a case to a penalty phase 

jury mandated by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.[)]” (SAP at 483.) He 

also argues that “[t]he statistical information developed by Professor Shatz, and described 

in Claim 21, supra, demonstrates that the charging and trial practices of the San Diego 

County District Attorney’s office have resulted in the arbitrary imposition of many death 

sentences, including Petitioner’s.” (SAP at 483.) 

 None of the cited Supreme Court cases holds that prosecutorial discretion in capital 

charging decisions violates constitutional guarantees. The Supreme Court has instead 

rejected this argument in several cases. See e.g. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199-200; Jurek v. 

Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 254 (1976). The 

California Supreme Court has, in turn, applied Gregg, Jurek, and Proffitt on numerous 

occasions to reject this same argument. See e.g. People v. Williams, 16 Cal. 4th 153, 278 

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(1997), quoting People v. Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d 478, 505 (1988) (“[P]rosecutorial discretion 

to select those eligible cases in which the death penalty would actually be sought does not 

in and of itself evidence an arbitrary and capricious capital punishment system or offend 

principles of equal protection, due process, or cruel and/or unusual punishment.”), citing 

Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274, Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 254, Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199-200. 

 In light of authority rejecting this contention, it is evident that the California 

Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was neither contrary to, nor involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Nor has Petitioner 

demonstrated that the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Habeas relief is unavailable on Claim 22. 

4. Claim 23

 Petitioner argues that the absence of proportionality review in the 1978 death penalty 

statute, under which he was sentenced, is unconstitutional, and specifically asserts that 

“[g]iven the tremendous reach of the special circumstances that make one eligible for death 

as set out in section 190.2- a significantly higher percentage of murderers than those 

eligible for death under the 1977 statute considered in Pulley v. Harris- and the absence of 

any other procedural safeguards to ensure a reliable and proportionate sentence, the 

California Supreme Court’s categorical refusal to engage in inter-case proportionality 

review now violates the Eighth Amendment.” (SAP at 488.) 

 Petitioner raised this claim as Claim XXXI in the first state habeas petition, and the 

California Supreme Court denied that claim on the merits without a statement of reasoning. 

(Lodgment No. 79.) 

 Petitioner argues that “[t]wenty-nine of the thirty-eight states that have reinstated 

capital punishment require comparative, or ‘inter-case,’ appellate sentence review,” and 

specifically points to Supreme Court decisions upholding the capital sentencing statutes in 

Georgia and Florida, respectively, in which the Supreme Court noted that those states had 

adopted proportionality review. (SAP at 487, quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 and Proffitt, 

428 U.S. at 259.) 

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 In Harris, however, the Supreme Court clearly rejected the contention that prior 

decisions of the Court, specifically referencing Proffitt and Gregg,36 mandated 

proportionality review in capital sentencing, reasoning that “[p]roportionality review was 

considered to be an additional safeguard against arbitrarily imposed death sentences, but 

we certainly did not hold that comparative review was constitutionally required.” Id., 465 

U.S. at 50. The Supreme Court upheld California’s 1977 death penalty statute, which did 

not provide for such review. See id. at 51 (“Assuming that there could be a capital 

sentencing system so lacking in other checks on arbitrariness that it would not pass 

constitutional muster without comparative proportionality review, the 1977 California 

statute is not of that sort.”) 

 The Ninth Circuit has since found “no merit” to a similar claim raised with respect 

to the 1978 statute under which Petitioner was sentenced, reasoning that “[petitioner’s] due 

process argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s holding in Pulley v. Harris, 465 

U.S. 43-46, 104 S.Ct 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984), that neither the Eighth Amendment nor 

due process requires comparative proportionality review in imposing the death penalty.” 

Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 1018 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 In light of the above authority, it is evident that the California Supreme Court’s 

adjudication of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law. Harris, 465 U.S. at 50-51; Allen, 395 F.3d at 1018. Nor 

has Petitioner demonstrated that the decision was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts. Habeas relief is not available on Claim 23. 

/// 

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36 Indeed, the Court specifically noted: “[t]hat Gregg and Proffitt did not establish a 

constitutional requirement of proportionality review is made clearer by Jurek v. Texas, 428 

U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976), decided the same day. In Jurek we upheld 

a death sentence even though neither the statute, as in Georgia, nor state case-law, as in 

Florida, provided for comparative proportionality review.” Harris, 465 U.S. at 48.

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5. Claim 24

 Petitioner contends that his death sentence and incarceration “were obtained in 

violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 

because the death penalty is imposed arbitrarily and capriciously depending on the county 

in which the case is prosecuted.” (SAP at 489.) 

 Petitioner raised this claim as Claim XXXII in the first state habeas petition, and the 

California Supreme Court denied it on the merits without a statement of reasoning. 

(Lodgment No. 79.) While Petitioner also later raised this claim in the second state habeas 

petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see Lodgment No. 91), for the reasons 

discussed above in section III.B., the Court will address the claim on the merits. 

As the noted earlier in the discussion of Claim 22, the United States Supreme Court 

has rejected this argument. See e.g. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 254; Gregg, 

428 U.S. at 199-200. Petitioner acknowledges the holdings in Jurek, Proffitt, and Gregg, 

but argues that “[n]onetheless, on December 12, 2000, the Supreme Court of the United 

States recognized that when fundamental rights are at stake, uniformity among the counties 

within a state, in the application of processes that deprive a person of a fundamental right, 

are essential. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 S.Ct. 525, 530-32 (2000). When a statewide 

scheme is in effect, there must be sufficient assurance ‘that the rudimentary requirements 

of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied.’ Id. at p. 532. This principle 

must apply to the right to life as well as the right to vote.” (SAP at 490.) 

 Petitioner’s reliance is misplaced. Bush v. Gore was a narrow holding that 

specifically dealt with legal challenges arising from a presidential election, in which the 

Supreme Court explicitly stated that “our consideration is limited to the present 

circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents 

many complexities.” 531 U.S. at 109 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s assertion that the case 

is applicable to capital charging and sentencing is undermined by the very language of the 

decision itself. 

/// 

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 Accordingly, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s 

rejection of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on Claim 24. 

6. Claims 25 and 26

 In Claim 25, Petitioner asserts that his “conviction and sentence of death violate the 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration), 

and the International Convention Against All Forms of Racial Discrimination,” as well as 

the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article VI of the United States 

Constitution. (SAP at 491-92.) In Claim 26, Petitioner contends that his “confinement is 

unlawful in that his conviction and sentence were illegally and unconstitutionally obtained 

in violation of his rights under Article II, clause 2, and Article VI, clause 2 of the United 

States Constitution, the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution, their state constitutional analogs, and international law, covenants, 

treaties and norms because Petitioner’s sentence of death was imposed without regard to 

international treaties and laws to which the United States is a signatory, and which obligate 

the United States to comply with human rights principles,” again referencing the 

agreements noted above, and additionally argues that he has been “denied his right under 

customary international law to appeal and habeas corpus review by an independent, 

impartial tribunal.” (Id. at 495-96.) 

 Petitioner raised Claim 25 as Claim XXXIII in the first state habeas petition, and the 

California Supreme Court denied that claim on the merits without a statement of reasoning. 

(Lodgment No. 79.) Petitioner raised both claims in second state habeas petition as Claims 

25 and 26, respectively, and the California Supreme Court denied the claims “on the merits 

for failure to state a prima facie case for relief.” (Lodgment No. 91.) 

 “[W]hile treaties may comprise international commitments . . . they are not domestic 

law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys 

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an intention that it be self-executing and is ratified on these terms.” Medellin v. Texas, 

552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) (internal quotation omitted); see also Cornejo v. County of San 

Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2007) (“For any treaty to be susceptible to judicial 

enforcement it must both confer individual rights and be self-executing.”) 

 Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the international agreements he relies upon are 

self-executing or otherwise enforceable on federal review. Available case law appears to 

preclude such a conclusion. See e.g. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004) 

(“[T]he [Universal] Declaration [of Human Rights] does not of its own force impose 

obligations as a matter of international law.”); Id. at 735 (“[A]lthough the [International] 

Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] does bind the United States as a matter of 

international law, the United States ratified the Covenant on the express understanding that 

it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal 

courts.”); Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he American 

Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man . . . is merely an aspirational document that, 

in itself, creates no directly enforceable rights.”) 

 Petitioner’s assertion that his conviction and sentence are in violation of the federal 

Constitution because they were “imposed without regard to international treaties and laws” 

and because he was denied his rights under “customary international law,” similarly lacks 

support, as Petitioner fails to cite to any Supreme Court authority that compels the result 

he seeks. The Ninth Circuit has disallowed individual attempts to invoke international law 

for such a purpose, reasoning that “customary international law is not a source of judicially 

enforceable private rights in the absence of a statute conferring jurisdiction over such 

claims.” Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2010). Petitioner fails to cite to 

any such statute. 

 Given the lack of clearly established law supporting a conclusion that California’s 

capital sentencing system violates international law or treaties that are enforceable on 

habeas corpus review, the Court is unable to conclude that the California Supreme Court’s 

rejection of these claims was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

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established federal law. Nor has Petitioner shown that the state court decision was based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Habeas relief is not warranted on Claims 

25 and 26. 

7. Claim 27

 Petitioner argues that his conviction and sentence violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments “because the extraordinary delay in the appellate process violates 

the state and federal constitutions,” and argues that “[s]uch delay also violates international 

covenants prohibiting cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.”37 (SAP at 501.) 

 Petitioner raised this claim as Claim XXXVII in the first state habeas petition, and 

the California Supreme Court denied that claim on the merits without a statement of 

reasoning. (Lodgment No. 79.) This claim was later re-raised in the second state habeas 

petition and was denied “on the merits for failure to state a prima facie case for relief.” 

(Lodgment No. 91.) 

 Petitioner relies on Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), to argue that delay in 

appointing appellate counsel and adjudicating his direct appeal “has severely prejudiced 

Petitioner’s ability to discover and present exculpatory evidence in his habeas corpus 

proceedings.” (SAP at 503.) This reliance is misplaced, however, as the Ninth Circuit 

clearly rejected the application of Barker to an appellate context, as follows: 

We cannot grant relief on this claim because no “clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” 

recognizes a due process right to a speedy appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Hayes relies on Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 

101 (1972), but that case established only the contours of the right to a speedy 

trial, not an appeal. . . . “[W]hen a Supreme Court decision does not ‘squarely 

address[] the issue in th[e] case’ or establish a legal principle that ‘clearly 

extend[s]’ to a new context,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) requires that we deny 

relief. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wright v. Van 

                                               

37 To the extent Petitioner again asserts violations of international law, those 

arguments are addressed in the Court’s adjudication of Claims 25 and 26, elsewhere in the 

instant Order.

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Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125, 128 S.Ct. 743, 169 L.Ed.2d 583 (2008)) (second, 

third, and fourth alteration in original). No Supreme Court decision “squarely 

addresses” the right to a speedy appeal, nor does the right to a speedy trial 

“clearly extend” to the appellate context. The interest in a prompt initial 

adjudication of a defendant’s rights, which underlies the right to a speedy trial, 

is plainly not the same as the interest in having a trial court conviction 

reviewed quickly on appeal. 

Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 523 (9th Cir. 2011) (alterations in original). 

 “The Supreme Court has never held that execution after a long tenure on death row 

is cruel and unusual punishment.” Allen, 435 F.3d at 958. The Supreme Court has instead 

declined to address this matter. See e.g. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (mem.) 

(Stevens, J., discussing denial of certiorari and observing that the claim has not been 

addressed, noting “the Court’s denial of certiorari does not constitute a ruling on the 

merits”); see also Valle v. Florida, 564 U.S. 1067 (2011) (mem.); Thompson v. McNeil, 

556 U.S. 1114 (2009) (mem.); Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985 (2007) (mem.). The Ninth 

Circuit has also rejected a similar claim pursuant to Teague. See Smith v. Mahoney, 611 

F.3d 978, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting a claim that a prisoner’s “four sentences in 

combination with his twenty-five years on death row satisfy any need for retribution and 

deterrence and that any penalty beyond such punishment violates the Eighth Amendment,” 

reasoning that “a state court considering [Petitioner’s] Eighth Amendment claim at the time 

his conviction became final would not have felt compelled by existing precedent to 

conclude that the rule sought was required by the Constitution.”) 

 Nonetheless, Petitioner argues that: “Over a century ago, the United States Supreme 

Court recognized that stating that ‘when a prisoner sentenced by a court to death is confined 

in the penitentiary awaiting the execution of the sentence, one of the most horrible feelings 

to which he can be subjected during that time is the uncertainty during the whole of it.’” 

(SAP at 504, quoting In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890).) Petitioner contends that: 

“In Medley, the period of uncertainty was just four weeks. As recognized by Justice 

Stevens, Medley’s description should apply with even greater force in a case such as this, 

involving a delay that has lasted over thirteen years.” (SAP at 504, citing Lackey, 514 U.S. 

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1045.) However, in view of the Supreme Court’s clear decision to refrain from addressing 

this issue, Petitioner fails to demonstrate an entitlement to habeas relief. Van Patten, 552 

U.S. at 126 (“Because our cases give no clear answer to the question presented, let alone 

one in [Petitioner’s] favor, ‘it cannot be said that the state court unreasonabl(y) appli(ed) 

clearly established law.’”), quoting Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77. 

 Because Petitioner fails to provide clearly established federal law which supports his 

claim, and fails to demonstrate that the state supreme court’s rejection of this claim on 

appeal was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 

law, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, habeas relief is not 

warranted on Claim 27. 

8. Claim 28

 Petitioner argues that “[t]he imposition of the death penalty on offenders so mentally 

impaired that they are unable to understand, modulate, and/or control their behavior 

offends a longstanding collective judgment of the American people as expressed in their 

laws and sentencing practices, is grossly disproportionate to such offenders’ moral 

culpability, serves no permissible penological goal, and carries an enhanced risk of error,” 

and asserts that because he suffers from such mental impairments, his conviction and 

sentence are in violation of the federal Constitution. (SAP at 510-11.) Petitioner cites 

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1998), 

in support of this claim. (Id. at 510.) 

 Petitioner raised this claim as Claim XXXVIII in the first state habeas petition, and 

the California Supreme Court denied that claim on the merits without a statement of 

reasoning. (Lodgment No. 79.) Petitioner later raised this claim in the second state habeas 

petition and the state court imposed a procedural bar (see Lodgment No. 91), but for the 

reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will address the claim on the merits. 

 Petitioner fails to offer any clearly established law in support of his argument and 

instead argues that “[v]irtually every major mental health association in the United States 

has published a policy statement advocating either an outright ban on executing all 

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mentally ill offenders, or a moratorium until a more comprehensive evaluation system can 

be implemented,” citing numerous organizations that have expressed a position to this 

effect. (SAP at 512.) Petitioner fails to persuasively explain how positions expressed by 

mental health or medical organizations establish a cognizable claim for federal habeas 

corpus relief on this matter. 

 Petitioner’s reliance on Atkins and Thompson is also unpersuasive, as both decisions 

are distinguishable from his situation. In Thompson, the Supreme Court held that “the 

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a person who was under 16 

years of age at the time of his or her offense.” Id., 487 U.S. at 838. Petitioner was born on 

June 11, 1970, and was twenty years old at the time of the May 15, 1991 murder of Teresa 

Holloway. (CT 129.) As such, Thompson is clearly inapplicable to this case. Petitioner’s 

reliance on Atkins is similarly untenable. In Atkins, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he 

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution forbid the execution of persons 

with intellectual disability.” Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014), 

citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. Yet, Petitioner fails to assert, much less offer any evidence 

to substantiate a contention that he is intellectually disabled. 

 To state a claim of intellectual disability in California38 post-conviction proceedings, 

a prisoner must submit a habeas petition which includes an expert declaration stating that 

the petitioner is intellectually disabled. See In re Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th 40, 47 (2005), 

quoting Cal. Penal Code § 1376. Specifically, “the expert’s declaration must set forth a 

                                               

38 California’s definition of intellectual disability appears consistent with the 

definition outlined by the Supreme Court in Atkins. Compare Cal. Penal Code § 1376(a) 

(“As used in this section, ‘intellectual disability’ means the condition of significantly 

subaverage intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior 

and manifested before 18 years of age.”) with Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1994 (“As the Court noted 

in Atkins, the medical community defines intellectual disability according to three criteria: 

significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, deficits in adaptive functioning (the 

inability to learn basic skills and adjust behavior to changing circumstances), and the onset 

of these deficits during the developmental period.”), citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n. 3. 

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factual basis for finding the petitioner has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning 

and deficiencies in adaptive behavior in the categories enumerated above. The evidence 

must also establish that the intellectual and behavioral deficits manifested prior to the age 

of 18.” Id. at 48. In the instant case, Petitioner does not appear to contend that he is 

intellectually disabled, nor was his state petition accompanied by the required declaration. 

As such, Petitioner has not shown that Atkins is applicable to his situation. 

 Petitioner instead argues that “[a]t the time of the crime, Petitioner suffered from 

myriad, serious mental impairments, which individually and in combination affected his 

abilities to make reasoned judgments, to rationally and effectively modulate his impulses 

and behaviors, to understand the consequences of his actions, to exercise volitional control 

of his behavior, and to meaningfully comprehend and follow the capital trial proceedings 

and assist in his own defense.” (SAP at 511.) He asserts that “volitionally incapacitated 

individuals” such as himself should be exempt from execution, as they are less culpable 

for their behavior, their prosecution results in a higher risk of unjustified executions due to 

their reduced ability to assist counsel, testify, or express remorse, and asserts a death 

sentence for such offenders would serve neither retribution nor deterrence. (Id. at 511-13.) 

He contends that “[t]he weight of national consensus dictates that Petitioner’s death 

sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, 

and must be vacated.” (Id. at 514.) But, the fact remains that Petitioner fails to offer any 

clearly established federal authority compelling that result. 

 In the absence of any clearly established law barring the execution of such 

“volitionally incapacitated” individuals that do not meet the definition of intellectually 

disabled, the Court is unable to conclude that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of 

these claims was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law. Nor has Petitioner shown that the state court decision was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. Habeas relief is not warranted on Claim 28. 

/// 

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G. Cumulative Error Claims 

 1. Claim 19 

Petitioner contends that his “guilt trial was tainted by numerous errors” outlined in 

other claims in the SAP and that “[i]n addition to considering these errors individually, the 

Court must consider their cumulative impact.” (SAP at 468.) 

As discussed above in section III.A.2., Ninth Circuit authority refutes Respondent’s 

assertion of a Teague bar. See Parle, 505 F.3d at 928, n.8. Thus, the Court must conclude 

that Petitioner’s claims of cumulative error are not barred from habeas review. 

On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Defendant argues that even if no single error requires reversal of the 

guilt verdicts, the cumulative effect of the errors at the guilt phase must be 

deemed sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal of the guilt verdicts. 

Defendant has demonstrated few errors, and we have found each error or 

possible error to be harmless when considered separately. Considering them 

together, we likewise conclude that their cumulative effect does not warrant 

reversal of the guilt verdicts. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 127. Petitioner later raised this claim in the second state habeas 

petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see Lodgment No. 91), but for the 

reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will address the claim on the merits. 

“The cumulative effect of multiple errors can violate due process even where no 

single error rises to the level of a constitutional violation or would independently warrant 

reversal.” Parle, 505 F.3d at 927, citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 290 n.3; see also Killian v. 

Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[E]ven if no single error were prejudicial, 

where there are several substantial errors, ‘their cumulative effect may nevertheless be so 

prejudicial as to require reversal.’”), quoting United States v. de Cruz, 82 F.3d 856, 868 

(9th Cir. 1996). 

Petitioner refers to the admission of Johnsen’s testimony and Shigemura’s 

statements and generally asserts that “the numerous errors in his case had a negative 

synergistic effect that resulted in ‘a criminal defense far less persuasive than it might 

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(otherwise) have been.’” (Pet. Br. at 113, quoting Parle, 505 F.3d at 927 (unattributed 

internal quotation marks omitted).) Petitioner specifically states that “[t]hese errors include 

the state’s use of Johnsen’s conditional examination and the state’s use of Shigemura’s outof-court statements to Baldwin.” (Reply at 52.) 

As discussed in Claim 11, the Court found no constitutional error in the admission 

of Brian Johnsen’s conditional examination testimony at trial. As recounted in Claim 12, 

while there was an acknowledged error in admitting Shigemura’s earlier, pre-crime 

statement to Baldwin, the error was harmless because the earlier statement was similar in 

substance to the later, post-crime statement which was made in Petitioner’s presence and 

properly admitted into evidence as an adoptive admission. As recognized by the state court 

and discussed in Claim 15, there was also an acknowledged error in the given conspiracy 

instruction with respect to the dual specific intent, but that error too, was harmless. After 

examining these asserted errors cumulatively, Petitioner fails to show that his constitutional 

rights were violated and the Court is not persuaded that this claim of cumulative error is 

meritorious. 

Thus, based on a review of the record, the Court cannot conclude that the California 

Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established law, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Habeas relief is unavailable on Claim 19 and an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. 

Sully, 725 F.3d at 1075; Totten, 137 F.3d at 1176. 

2. Claim 47 

 Petitioner contends that his “death judgment must be evaluated in light of cumulative 

effect of the multiple errors occurring at both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial,” 

specifying that this claim concerns the “cumulative effect of the errors raised on direct 

appeal,” and asserts that “even if the Court were to hold that not one of the errors discussed 

above was, by itself, prejudicial, the cumulative effect of these errors sufficiently 

undermines confidence in the integrity of the penalty proceedings in this case.” (SAP at 

677; see also Pet. Br. at 132-34.) 

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As discussed above in section III.A.2., in light of Ninth Circuit authority refuting 

Respondent’s assertion of a Teague bar, Petitioner’s claims of cumulative error are not 

barred from habeas review. See Parle, 505 F.3d at 928, n.8. 

On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, 

reasoning as follows: 

Defendant claims that the judgment must be reversed because of the 

cumulative effect of errors at both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. 

Defendant has demonstrated few errors at either phase of the trial, and we 

have found each error or possible error to be harmless when considered 

separately. Considering them together, we likewise conclude that their 

cumulative effect does not warrant reversal of the judgment. 

Jurado, 38 Cal. 4th at 144-45. Petitioner later raised this claim in the second state habeas 

petition and the state court imposed procedural bars (see Lodgment No. 91), but for the 

reasons discussed above in section III.B., the Court will address the claim on the merits. 

In addition to the errors identified and alleged in Claim 19 above (the acknowledged 

error concerning the jury instruction on conspiracy and the admission of Shigemura’s precrime statement to Baldwin, as well as the alleged error in admitting Johnsen’s conditional 

examination testimony into evidence at trial), Petitioner incorporates all allegations of error 

raised on direct appeal concerning both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. (See SAP 

at 677) (“Petitioner’s death judgment must be evaluated in light of the cumulative effect of 

the multiple errors occurring at both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial, as set forth in 

Claims 7 through 13, inclusive, 14 through 19, inclusive, 29, 30, 31, 32, and 35 through 

42, inclusive, herein, which were raised on direct appeal in state court.”) In particular, 

Petitioner asserts that “[t]he significant errors identified herein, including those set forth in 

the guilt-phase cumulative error claim (Claim 19), when combined with the penalty-phase 

errors-including exclusion of Mr. Jurado’s mitigating evidence of the videotaped 

interrogation (Claim 29) and the inclusion of the Holloway pregnancy evidence (Claim 

30)- cumulatively produced a trial setting that was fundamentally unfair, requiring reversal 

of the death judgment for a denial of due process.” (Pet. Br. at 133.) 

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 Respondent maintains that “the California Supreme Court found that Jurado has 

demonstrated few errors, and that each error or possible error was harmless when 

considered separately,” and argues that any cumulative effect does not warrant relief. 

(Resp. at 59.) Respondent also notes that “as to the penalty phase, the California Supreme 

Court only found err [sic] in the fact that the trial court mis-instructed the jury on the 

elements of a violation under Penal Code section 4574 regarding Jurado’s possession of a 

deadly weapon in jail, but found that error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” and 

that “because there was only one error, and there were not multiple errors to consider 

together, there can be no cumulative error.” (Id. at 60.) 

 In assessing this claim, the Court shall consider the errors discussed above with 

respect to Claim 19 together with any penalty phase errors raised on direct appeal. First, 

the errors alleged by Petitioner in Claims 29 and 30 are not amenable to inclusion in the 

cumulative error analysis because, as discussed above, Petitioner demonstrates no error in 

either the exclusion of Petitioner’s videotaped interrogation or the admission of evidence 

concerning the victim’s pregnancy. (See Claims 29, 30, supra.) As discussed in greater 

detail above, in light of the questions about the videotape’s reliability and whether it 

actually amounted to evidence of remorse, the trial court did not err in excluding the 

interrogation from evidence. Meanwhile, the fact that the victim was pregnant was not 

unforeseeable, was clearly relevant to the penalty determination and was admissible as 

victim impact evidence and as a circumstance of the crime; the trial court did not err in 

admitting the evidence. Thus, neither allegation warrants inclusion in the cumulative error 

determination. 

However, Respondent correctly notes that the California Supreme Court 

acknowledged and addressed one penalty phase error on direct appeal, concerning the trial 

court’s error in instructing the jury on Petitioner’s possession of a weapon, rather than a 

deadly weapon, in jail, which was addressed and rejected by this Court in the instant order. 

(See Claim 36, supra.) A jail deputy testified that Petitioner was one of several inmates in 

possession of a twelve to eighteen inch steel pipe or post during an altercation. But 

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regardless of the instructional error, the evidence showed that Petitioner was seen in 

possession of the weapon and that the weapon in question had a reasonable potential to 

cause death or great bodily injury sufficient to qualify as a deadly weapon. As such, 

Petitioner was not prejudiced by that error. Considering this penalty phase error along with 

the two guilt phase errors, the Court remains unpersuaded that Petitioner has shown a 

constitutional violation. The cumulative impact of these errors does not undermine 

confidence in the verdict or sentence. 

Petitioner fails to show the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established law, or that it was based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief or 

an evidentiary hearing on Claim 47. Sully, 725 F.3d at 1075; Totten, 137 F.3d at 1176. 

 3. Claim 48 

Petitioner alleges that “[t]he conviction and sentence of death were imposed in 

violation of Petitioner’s rights as guaranteed by Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments because the trial was so tainted by the ineffective assistance of his appointed 

counsel, errors by the trial court, and acts of misconduct by the prosecution that Petitioner’s 

right to fundamental fairness at his trial was violated,” and that “[e]ach of the errors 

asserted in this petition, individually and cumulatively, including, inter alia, of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, trial court error and misconduct, and prosecutorial misconduct, had 

a substantial and injurious effect and/or influence in determining the jury’s sentencing 

verdict and rendered the guilt and penalty phase of Petitioner’s trial unfair and the 

sentencing and trial process unreliable.” (SAP at 678-79.) Petitioner argues that “[t]he 

instant claim incorporates all direct appeal and state habeas claims, and thus includes the 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel addressed in the Opening Brief on the Merits 

(Group 1 Claims).” (Pet. Br. at 136) (italics in original.) 

As discussed above in section III.A.2., in light of Ninth Circuit authority refuting 

Respondent’s assertion of a Teague bar, Petitioner’s claims of cumulative error are not 

barred from habeas review. See Parle, 505 F.3d at 928, n.8. 

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Petitioner raised this claim as Claim XL in the first state habeas petition, and the 

California Supreme Court denied that claim on the merits without a statement of reasoning. 

(Lodgment No. 79.) Petitioner again raised this argument as Claim 48 in the second state 

habeas petition, and the California Supreme Court denied the claim “on the merits for 

failure to state a prima facie case for relief.” (Lodgment No. 91.) While the state court 

also barred this claim as untimely (see id.), for the reasons discussed above in section III.B., 

the Court will address the claim on the merits. 

 Petitioner reiterates many of the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel 

addressed in the Group One Order, including that counsel was prejudicially deficient in 

failing to investigate and present evidence of Petitioner’s drug use and intoxication at the 

time of the crimes and history of substance abuse despite promising such evidence to the 

jury, in conceding that Petitioner was guilty of second degree murder, and in failing to 

present evidence of Petitioner’s history of drug use or fear of Mynatt at the penalty phase. 

(Pet. Br. at 137-38, referencing Claims 1.B-1.H and 1.M-1.O and citing Claims 1.J, 1.T, 

1.Y and 1.Z.) Petitioner also reiterates a number of claims of misconduct addressed 

elsewhere in the instant Order, including the destruction of Petitioner’s blood and urine 

samples, inconsistencies in the prosecution’s presentation of evidence at Petitioner’s trial 

in comparison with the trials of Humiston and Johnsen, allegations that the prosecution 

presented the false testimony of Schmidt and Johnsen, and alleged prosecutorial 

vindictiveness in seeking the death penalty in Petitioner’s case. (Id. at 138, citing Claims 

2-4 and 8.) Petitioner also reiterates the errors alleged in Claims 19 and 47, including the 

trial court’s admission of Johnsen’s conditional examination testimony, the admission of 

Shigemura’s statements to Baldwin, the exclusion of the videotaped interrogation, and the 

admission of Holloway’s pregnancy into evidence at the penalty phase. (Id. at 138-39, 

citing Claims 11-12 and 29-30.) 

 As discussed throughout the Group One Order, Petitioner’s claims of ineffective 

assistance were largely speculative assertions premised on academic sources and were 

presented without evidentiary support, such as declarations, affidavits or other substantive 

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evidence. (See e.g. ECF No. 171 at 67, 101, 105-106, 137, 140-42.) For instance, 

Petitioner alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence of 

his mental difficulties due to exposure to pesticides and other chemicals, but supported that 

contention with reference to academic sources and anecdotal accounts concerning the 

potential for exposure to such substances- i.e., that he and his sibling played in fields that 

were later found to be contaminated and that his family members worked as field laborers. 

(See id. at 90-93, citing e.g. Exs. 7, 8, 10, 12, 15 to SAP.) However, Petitioner failed to 

present any testing results or declarations from experts supporting a contention that he was 

actually impacted by such exposure and instead merely relied on speculation to support the 

claim. (See id. at 100-01.) Petitioner’s claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

present evidence of his extreme immaturity and long term drug use suffered from similar 

evidentiary shortcomings. (See id. at 139-40, 142-43.) In any event, in the Group One 

Order, the Court also considered Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance in the 

cumulative, and found no prejudice. (See id. at 140-44.) 

With respect to the remaining claims Petitioner cites, the Court has considered these 

contentions elsewhere in the instant Order and rejected his allegations of error in each 

instance. (See Claims 2-4, 8.) For instance, the record shows that Petitioner’s blood and 

urine sample were not destroyed until well after his trial, that they had been already 

subjected to testing for multiple substances (although not LSD) by both the defense and 

prosecution and played a part in the trial; Petitioner offered only speculation that additional 

testing would have showed the presence of LSD, much less that the evidence would have 

assisted in his defense. (See Claim 2, supra.) The Court also rejected Petitioner’s claim 

that the prosecution offered inconsistent theories in trying Humiston and Johnsen, as 

Johnsen was not tried by the same prosecuting agency as Petitioner, and the prosecution’s 

presentation was similar in both Humiston and Petitioner’s trial. (See Claim 3, supra.) The 

Court similarly rejected Petitioner’s claim that the prosecution presented false testimony, 

as it was the defense that succeeded in excluding Johnsen’s letters that reflected 

inconsistent statements, and suspicion that Johnsen knew more than he said during his 

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conditional examination testimony was not the same as presenting false testimony; 

meanwhile, the Court found Schmidt testified consistently with his statements with respect 

to Petitioner’s involvement in the crime and the addition of details did not sustain a claim 

that his testimony was false. (See Claim 4, supra.) The Court also found no evidence that 

the prosecution’s decision to seek the death penalty was vindictive, as the record supported 

a conclusion that the decision was based on the evidence offered in Johnsen’s conditional 

examination and the presentation of evidence at Humiston’s trial rather than as any sort of 

punishment for Petitioner’s decision to plead guilty after the special circumstance was 

dismissed. (See Claim 8, supra.) 

 Even considering Petitioner’s allegations of error cumulatively, including the errors 

alleged in Claims 19 and 47 as well as those alleged in this claim, Petitioner fails to offer 

a persuasive showing that these errors resulted in a “fundamentally unfair” guilt or penalty 

phase trial proceeding in violation of his constitutional right to due process. See Parle, 505 

F.3d at 928 (“[T]he combined effect of multiple trial errors may give rise to a due process 

violation if it renders a trial fundamentally unfair, even where each error considered 

individually would not require reversal.”) 

Thus, based on a review of the record, the Court cannot conclude that the California 

Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established law, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief or an evidentiary hearing on Claim 48. Sully, 725 

F.3d at 1075; Totten, 137 F.3d at 1176. 

VI. CERTIFICATE OF APPELABILITY

 In a habeas case, a certificate of appealability [“COA”] may be granted “only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2). “A certificate of appealability should issue if ‘reasonable jurists could debate 

whether’ (1) the district court’s assessment of the claim was debatable or wrong; or (2) the 

issue presented is ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Shoemaker v. 

Taylor, 730 F.3d 778, 790 (9th Cir. 2013), quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

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(2000); see also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338 (“Indeed, a claim can be debatable even though 

every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been granted and the case has received 

full consideration, that petitioner will not prevail.”) Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit has 

repeatedly characterized the standard required for granting a COA as “relatively low” or 

“modest.” See e.g. Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002), Silva v. 

Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 832 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 

1022, 1024 (9th Cir. 2000). 

In the November 19, 2015 Order on the Group One Claims (Claims 1, 5-6, 14, 33-

34, 43 and 45 in the Second Amended Petition), the Court indicated that: “In the final order, 

the Court will GRANT a COA on Claim 1 (limited to subparts 1.J, 1.M-1.O, 1.U, 1.Y) and 

Claim 33.” (ECF No. 171 at 153.) At oral arguments on the instant matter, Petitioner 

indicated that he is requesting a COA on a number of claims and decisions by the Court, 

including several claims and motions adjudicated in the Group One Order as well as claims 

and motions presently at issue. Subsequent to oral arguments and pursuant to the Court’s 

request, Petitioner filed a Supplemental Brief outlining the claims and matters on which he 

requests a COA and Respondent filed a Response to that brief. (See ECF Nos. 205, 206.) 

In that brief, Petitioner requests a COA on the claims the Court previously identified in the 

Group One Order as suitable for a COA, and additionally lists Claims 7, 10, and 29 from 

the instant set of claims and Claims 1.R, 1.S., and 1.Y39 from the Group One claims. (ECF 

No. 205 at 4-5.) Petitioner also requests a COA on several Orders issued by the Court, 

including the Court’s Order denying Petitioner’s motion for investigation, discovery and 

an evidentiary hearing on procedural default and Order denying Petitioner’s motion for 

evidentiary development and an evidentiary hearing on Claims 1.A-1.K, 1.M-1.W, 1.Y1.AA, 5 and 6. (ECF No. 205 at 6.) Petitioner also states that “[i]f the Court denies 

                                               

39 In the Group One Order, the Court indicated it will grant a COA on Claim 1.Y (see 

ECF No. 171 at 153), and Petitioner appears to acknowledge this ruling in the supplemental 

brief. (See ECF No. 205 at 4.) As such, this request appears moot. 

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Petitioner’s request for evidentiary development of Claims 7, 10 and 29, as requested 

during oral argument on May 22, 2018, Petitioner requests a COA on the Order denying 

such relief.” (Id.) Respondent maintains that “[t]his Court should reject Jurado’s request 

for a COA because he has failed to demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find this 

Court’s denials of the claims and orders debatable and wrong.” (ECF No. 206 at 4.) 

With respect to Petitioner’s request for a COA on the Court’s orders denying the 

above motions, Petitioner cites Ayestas v. Davis, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 1080 (2018), in 

which the United States Supreme Court recently considered whether it had jurisdiction in 

a case where “petitioner appealed an order of the District Court that denied both his request 

for funding under 18 U.S.C. § 3599 and his underlying habeas claims,” and “[t]he Court of 

Appeals denied a COA as to the merits of his request for habeas relief but held that a COA 

was not required insofar as petitioner challenged the District Court’s denial of funding 

under § 3599.” Id. at 1088 n.1. The Supreme Court “assume[d] for the sake of argument 

that the Court of Appeals could not entertain petitioner’s § 3599 claim without the issuance 

of a COA.” Id. 

Upon review, the Court finds Claims 7, 11-12, 29-30 and 37 appropriate for a COA, 

but remains unpersuaded that Claims 1.R or 1.S are suitable for a COA. In light of Ayestas, 

and in an abundance of caution, the Court finds it appropriate to issue a COA on the Order 

denying Petitioner’s motion for investigation, discovery and an evidentiary hearing on 

procedural default as it relates to Claims 1.J, 1.M-1.O, 1.U, 1.Y and 33. The Court also 

finds it appropriate to issue a COA on the Order denying Petitioner’s motion for evidentiary 

development, discovery and/or an evidentiary hearing on Claims 1.J, 1.M-1.O, 1.U, 1.Y, 

7, 11-12, and 29-30. 

VII. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s motion for 

evidentiary development, discovery, and/or evidentiary hearing on Claims 2-4, 7-8, 10-12, 

19, 29-30, 38 and 47-48 and DENIES habeas relief on Claims 2-4, 7-13, 15-32, 35-42, 44, 

and 46-48 in the Second Amended Petition. In the final order, the Court will GRANT a 

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COA on Claims 7, 11-12, 29-30, and 37. The Court will also GRANT a COA on the Order 

denying Petitioner’s motion for investigation, discovery and an evidentiary hearing on 

procedural default as it relates to Claims 1.J, 1.M-1.O, 1.U, 1.Y and 33, and on the Order 

denying Petitioner’s motion for evidentiary development, discovery and/or an evidentiary 

hearing on Claims 1.J, 1.M-1.O, 1.U, 1.Y, 7, 11-12, and 29-30. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 17, 2018 

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