Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01892/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01892-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM THORNTON,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 11cv01892 JLS(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [ECF

NOS. 8-9] AND ORDER DENYING

PETITIONER’S EX PARTE MOTION

FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

[ECF NO. 10] 

Petitioner William Thornton, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus on August 19, 2011 [ECF No. 1], and a First Amended Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus on September 16, 2011, with exhibits [ECF

No. 5].1 The Petitioner claims that his equal protection rights

were violated when he was denied California Penal Code section 4019

credits because, in part, he was a sex offender. (Am. Pet. 6, ECF

No. 5.)

1

 Because Thornton’s Petitions in this and the other

referenced case are not consecutively paginated, the Court will

cite to each using the page numbers assigned by the Court’s

electronic case filing system.

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On October 10, 2011, the Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 

First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF Nos. 8-9]. 

Respondent argues that the issue raised in Thornton’s First Amended

Petition is included in the petition for writ of habeas corpus

filed by Thornton in another case, Thornton v. Cate (Thornton I),

No. 11-cv-338 IEG (POR) (S.D. Cal. filed Feb. 17, 2011), ECF No.

42.2 Thornton filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss on October

24, 2011, conceding that the claims in this Petition are similar to

his claims in Thornton I. (Opp’n 1, ECF No. 11.) 

The Court finds Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss to be suitable

for decision without oral argument pursuant to civil local rule

7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the district court

should GRANT Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 William Cecil Thornton initially filed a petition for writ

of habeas corpus on February 17, 2011, challenging his conviction

in San Diego Superior Court case number SCE295036 and alleging a

claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Thornton I, No. 11-

cv-338 IEG (POR) (original petition), ECF No. 1. United States

District Judge Irma E. Gonzalez construed the petition as one filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and dismissed it without prejudice

for failure to allege exhaustion of remedies and failure to name a

proper respondent. Id. (order dismissing petition), ECF No. 3. On

March 18, 2011, Thornton filed a first amended petition for writ of

habeas corpus in that case, raising claims for ineffective

2

 The Court may take judicial notice of its files and records. 

See Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir.

2010).

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assistance of counsel and “racial remarks and bias.” Id. at 6, 8

(first amended petition), ECF No. 4. 

On June 17, 2011, Thornton filed a separate petition for writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in a different case

before this Court, seeking to challenge the same conviction in San

Diego Superior Court case number SCE295036 on the ground that he

was not granted credits under California Penal Code section 4019. 

Thornton v. Stainer (Thornton II), No. 11-cv-1368 BTM (RBB) (S.D.

Cal. filed June 17, 2011), ECF No. 1. United States District Judge

Barry Ted Moskowitz dismissed the petition without prejudice,

noting that Thornton’s habeas corpus action challenging this

conviction was pending in Thornton I, and that an answer had been

filed in that case. Id. (order dismissing petition), ECF No. 3. 

Judge Moskowitz observed that the claim regarding denial of credits

under section 4019 of the California Penal Code in Thornton II was

not duplicative of the claims brought in Thornton I but, rather,

was an additional ground challenging Thornton’s conviction in San

Diego Superior Court case number SCE295036. Id. In dismissing

that petition, the court instructed Thornton to seek leave to amend

his petition in Thornton I. Id. 

Petitioner then filed a motion to amend his petition in his

original case, Thornton I, seeking to add the claim for denial of

credits under section 4019 of the California Penal Code. Thornton

I, No. 11-cv-338 IEG (POR) (motion to amend), ECF No. 29. That

motion was filed nunc pro tunc to August 1, 2011. 

While the motion to amend in Thornton I was pending, Thornton

on August 19, 2011, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this case, challenging his

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conviction in San Diego Superior Court case number SCE295036 [ECF

No. 1]. In his Petition, Thornton alleges that he was denied

credits under California Penal Code section 4019. 

On September 27, 2011, Thornton filed another motion to amend

in Thornton I, and attached his proposed second amended petition in

that action. Thornton I, No. 11-cv-338 IEG (POR) (motion to

amend), ECF No. 40. The court granted Thornton leave and directed

the clerk to file the second amended petition for writ of habeas

corpus as the operative petition. Id. (order granting motion to

amend), ECF No. 41. Respondent filed an answer to the petition

[ECF No. 54], and petitioner filed a traverse [ECF No. 64]. 

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

Respondent argues that the issue raised in Thornton’s current

Petition is part of a second amended petition for writ of habeas

corpus in Thornton I, No. 11-cv-338 IEG (POR). (Mot. Dismiss 2,

ECF No. 9.) 

A. Legal Standard

It is well established that federal courts retain broad powers

to control their dockets and “prevent duplicative or unnecessary

litigation.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000); Link v.

Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). The power of a federal

court to prevent duplicative litigation is intended to foster

judicial economy and the “comprehensive disposition of litigation,”

Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183

(1952), and “to protect parties from ‘the vexation of concurrent

litigation over the same subject matter.’” Curtis v. Citibank,

N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Adam v. Jacobs, 950

F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1991)). “Plaintiffs generally have ‘no right

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to maintain two separate actions involving the same subject matter

at the same time in the same court and against the same

defendant.’” Adams v. Cal. Dep't of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684,

688 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70

(3d Cir. 1977)). “[I]n assessing whether the second action is

duplicative of the first, [a court] examine[s] whether the causes

of action and relief sought, as well as the parties or privies to

the action, are the same.” Id. at 689 (citations omitted). 

If a district court has “duplicative suits contemporaneously

pending on its docket,” the court has discretion to “dismiss [the]

later-filed complaint without prejudice, to consolidate the two

actions, or to stay or enjoin proceedings . . . .” Id. at 692. 

“Dismissal of the duplicative lawsuit, more so than the issuance of

a stay or the enjoinment of proceedings, promotes judicial economy

and the ‘comprehensive disposition of litigation.’” Id. (quoting

Kerotest, 342 U.S. at 183). By dismissing a duplicative suit with

prejudice, a district court acts “to protect the parties from

vexatious and expensive litigation and to serve the societal

interest in bringing an end to disputes.” Id. at 693. At the same

time, dismissal with prejudice might be an abuse of discretion

where the claims in a second suit are based on events occurring

subsequent to the filing of the complaint in the first action. Id.

B. Discussion

Here, Respondent moves to dismiss Thornton’s Amended Petition

as duplicative of the earlier-filed petition in Thornton I, No. 11-

cv-338 IEG (POR). (Mot. Dismiss 2, ECF No. 9.) Both petitions

were brought by Thornton pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge

his conviction in San Diego Superior Court case number SCE295036. 

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Thornton’s Petition in this case was filed on August 19, 2011, six

months after he initiated Thornton I, and almost three weeks after

the motion to amend in that action. The sole issue advanced in

this later-filed action is whether Thornton’s equal protection

rights were violated when he was denied California Penal Code

section 4019 credits. (Am. Pet. 6, ECF No. 5.) Specifically, as

ground one for relief in the Amended Petition, Thornton alleges

that he is “[n]ot being allowed California P.C. 4019 credits prior

to sentence to felony robbery and because of being a sex offender.

(is violation of Equal Protection).” (Id.) In the earlier-filed

Thornton I action, Petitioner stated that he was “[n]ot being

allowed or granted P.C. 4019 credits retroactively per amended 4019

credit laws.” Thornton I, No. 11-cv-338 IEG (POR) (second amended

petition 11), ECF No. 42. Even though the earlier-filed action

does not reference the Equal Protection Clause, the claims are

substantively the same, and the Respondent in his answer addresses

the purported violation of equal protection. Thornton I, No. 11-

cv-338 IEG (POR) (answer attach. #1, memorandum of points and

authorities in support of the answer to second amended petition

17), ECF No. 54. Indeed, Thornton himself does not distinguish

between these two claims and concedes that the issues involved in

the two cases are “similar.” (Opp’n 1, ECF No. 11.) 

Thornton sought leave to add the substantially identical claim

for denial of credits under section 4019 of the California Penal

Code in Thornton I, the earlier-filed case. Thornton I, No. 11-cv338 IEG (POR) (motion to amend), ECF No. 29. Additionally,

Thornton filed his Petition in this case while his motion to amend

in Thornton I was pending. Thornton brought this duplicative claim

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as he attempted to amend his petition in Thornton I to add the same

claim. Because Thornton was granted leave to amend his petition in

Thornton I to add the claim for denial of credits under section

4019 of the California Penal Code, this Petition is now

duplicative. Nonetheless, Thornton argues that the Court should

allow him to proceed with this duplicate claim in a separate case. 

(Opp’n 2, ECF No. 11.) Thornton does not offer any legal or

factual support to justify his request. 

Because the issue raised in this later-filed Petition is

substantively identical to the claim advanced by Thornton I,

allowing the Petitioner to proceed with this claim in a separate

case would not promote the interests of judicial economy or

comprehensive disposition of litigation. Adams, 487 F.3d at 692;

see Contreras v. Yates, No. 1:10-CV-02047 GSA HC, 2011 WL 109137,

at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011) (dismissing a second identical

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as

duplicative). Accordingly, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss should

be GRANTED. 

III. EX PARTE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

On October 11, 2011, Thornton filed an Ex Parte Motion for

Appointment of Counsel [ECF No. 10].3 In support of his request

for attorney representation, Petitioner asserts that the

appointment of counsel is warranted in this case, because he is

indigent. (Ex Parte Mot. 1, ECF No. 10.) 

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to

federal habeas corpus actions by state prisoners. McCleskey v.

3 The Court will cite to the Ex Parte Motion by using the

page numbers assigned by the electronic case filing system.

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Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991); Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191,

1196 (9th Cir. 1986); Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th

Cir. 1986). Nonetheless, financially eligible habeas petitioners

seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may obtain representation whenever “the court determines that the interests of justice

so require . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2010);

Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1990); Bashor

v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984); Hoggard v. Purkett,

29 F.3d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1994). The interests of justice require

appointment of counsel when the court conducts an evidentiary

hearing on the petition. Terrovona, 912 F.2d at 1177; Knaubert,

791 F.2d at 728; Abdullah v. Norris, 18 F.3d 571, 573 (8th Cir.

1994); Rule 8(c), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (West 2010). Otherwise,

the appointment of counsel is discretionary. See Terrovona, 912

F.2d at 1177; Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728; Abdullah, 18 F.3d at 573.

“Indigent state prisoners applying for habeas relief are not

entitled to appointed counsel unless the circumstances of a

particular case indicate that appointed counsel is necessary to

prevent due process violations.” Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196;

Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728-29. A due process violation may occur in

the absence of counsel if the issues involved are too complex for

the petitioner. In addition, the appointment of counsel may be

necessary if the petitioner has such limited education that he or

she is incapable of presenting his or her claims. Hawkins v.

Bennett, 423 F.2d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 1970). “To determine whether

appointment of counsel is required for habeas petitioners with

nonfrivolous claims, a district court should consider the legal

complexity of the case, the factual complexity of the case, the

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petitioner’s ability to investigate and present his claim, and any

other relevant factors.” Abdullah, 18 F.3d at 573 (citing Battle

v. Armontrout, 902 F.2d 701, 702 (8th Cir. 1990); Johnson v.

Williams, 788 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (8th Cir. 1986)).

Because these factors are useful in determining whether due

process requires court-appointed counsel, they are considered to

the extent possible based on the record before the Court. The

Court first notes that Petitioner has sufficiently represented

himself to date. He has prepared and filed the following documents

in this action: a Petition [ECF No. 1], an Amended Petition [ECF

No. 5], a Notice of Change of Address [ECF No. 6], an Opposition to

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 11], as well as this Motion

for Appointment of Counsel [ECF No. 10]. As mentioned above,

Thornton also has filed other habeas petitions in the district. 

Petitioner’s filings demonstrate an understanding of the law and

relevant facts. In sum, the Court’s docket reflects that Thornton

has adequately represented himself. Under such circumstances, a

district court does not abuse its discretion in denying a state

prisoner’s request for attorney representation; the appointment of

counsel is not required in the interests of justice. See LaMere v.

Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987). Furthermore, because

this Court has recommended that Thornton’s action be dismissed,

there is no need for legal assistance in this proceeding. The

Court therefore finds that at this stage of the proceedings, the

interests of justice do not require that Petitioner receive

attorney representation. 

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For the reasons stated above, Petitioner’s Motion for

Appointment of Counsel is DENIED without prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

the Amended Petition as duplicative should be GRANTED. 

Petitioner’s Ex Parte Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED

without prejudice. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before march 29, 2012. The document should be captioned

"Objections to Report and Recommendation." Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before April 13, 2012. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 2, 2012 __________________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Sammartino

All parties

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