Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00396/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00396-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRYL SCOTT TUNSTALL,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-0396 MCE JFM P

vs.

TOM L. CAREY, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is serving a sentence of twenty-six years

to life in prison following his 1983 conviction on charges of first degree murder, robbery, and use

of a weapon. By this action, petitioner claims that his constitutional rights have been violated by

the failure of the California Board of Prison Terms (BPT) to release him on parole and the failure

of officials with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to properly

calculate his good time behavior credits. Respondents have moved to dismiss this action as

barred by the one year statute of limitations codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244 and for failure to state a

cognizable claim for relief in this federal habeas corpus action.

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Section 2244(d)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(2) of the same title provides that “[t]he time during

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

The limitation period set forth in § 2244 “applies to all habeas petitions filed by

persons in ‘custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,’ . . . , even if the petition

challenges an administrative decision rather than a state court judgment.” Shelby v. Bartlett, 391

F.3d 1061, 1062 (9 Cir. 2004); see also Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077 (9 Cir. 2003) th th

(§ 2244(d) applies to state parole board decisions).

In the petition, petitioner alleges that in 1993 his minimum eligible parole date

(MEPD) was set at November 29, 1997. (Petition, filed February 27, 2006, at 5.) Petitioner does

not challenge a specific decision of the BPT denying him parole. (Id. at 6.) Instead, petitioner

claims that, under applicable provisions of California law, petitioner was entitled to release on

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 Intertwined with this claim are contentions that petitioner has been improperly

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classified as a life prisoner and also that it is error to require that he first receive a parole date

from the BPT before good time credits are applied against his sentence. (See Petition, at 2-3.)

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parole on his MEPD and that the BPT lacks authority to deny petitioner release on parole after

that date. Respondent contends this claim is time-barred.

In Redd, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the

provisions of § 2244(d)(1)(D) apply to habeas petitions challenging the decisions of

administrative bodies. See Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066 (citing Redd, 343 F.3d at 1081-83). “Under

subsection (D), the limitation period begins to run on ‘the date on which the factual predicate of

the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.’” Shelby, at 1066 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).) 

Petitioner’s MEPD, set on November 8, 1993, was November 29, 1997. That is

the date on which petitioner could and should have discovered the factual predicate for his claim

that his constitutional rights were violated by the failure to release him on parole on his MEPD. 

In his opposition, petitioner contends that he was unaware of the legal bases for his claim until he

was so advised by other inmates during “recently created ‘Lifer Meetings.’” (Opposition to

Motion to Dismiss, filed October 12, 2006, at 2.) Petitioner’s contention is unavailing, as

discovery of the factual basis for a claim is the operative criteria for statute of limitations

purposes.

Petitioner knew or should have known on or about November 30, 1997 that he

had not been released from prison on his MEPD. This action was not filed until February 2006,

almost eight and one half years later. Petitioner’s claims arising from the failure of state officials

to release him on parole on his MEPD is barred by the statute of limitations.

Petitioner also claims that the CDCR has not applied against his sentence all good

time credits to which he is entitled. Review of the petition shows that, notwithstanding the 1

references therein to the United States Constitution, petitioner’s claims concerning the

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application of good time credits to his sentence are grounded in state law. A writ of habeas

corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of some transgression of federal law

binding on the state courts. Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985), Gutierrez

v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is unavailable for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d at 1085; see also, Lincoln

v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th

Cir. 1986). Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed. 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondents’ July 18, 2006 motion to dismiss be granted; and

2. This action be dismissed. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 21, 2006.

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tuns0396.mtd

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