Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_98-cv-02111/USCOURTS-caed-2_98-cv-02111-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW R. LOPEZ,

Plaintiff,

vs.

D. PETERSON, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. CIV S-98-2111 (JKS)

O R D E R

INTRODUCTION

This case has languished on the Court’s docket for some time. 

To get it moving, there are a number of motions pending. Chief

among these motions is the State’s motion to dismiss this case. 

See Docket Nos. 210 (Mot.); 217 (Opp’n); 219 (Reply). Plaintiff

Andrew Lopez also moves to supplement his opposition, Docket No.

221; a motion the State opposes, Docket No. 224. Lopez moves again

for an appointment of counsel and for a writ of habeas corpus ad

testificandum for what are essentially discovery requests. Docket

Nos. 223 (Mot. for counsel); 222 (Hab. corp.). These motions are

addressed below.

DISCUSSION

The State’s motion to dismiss makes what are essentially two

arguments. First, the State argues that Lopez has failed to

exhaust his claims of deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 

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Second, the State argues that even if Lopez’s claims are exhausted,

they fail to meet the threshold standards of deliberate

indifference as established by United States Supreme Court and

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent.

As the Court’s numerous orders in this case have outlined,

Lopez raises two claims. The first is that prison officials failed

to provide him adequate footwear. The second is that prison

officials failed to provide him surgery for his deviated septum. 

The State argues that both of these claims are unexhausted and

provides various documents to prove its point. However, addressing

the merits of the exhaustion argument is unnecessary if Lopez’s

claims of alleged harm fail to meet the minimum requirements of

deliberate indifference jurisprudence. Toward this end, the State

moves for a judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Lopez’s

allegations fail to describe sufficient harm, or in the

alternative, link specific harms to the various Defendants.

I . Whether Lopez’s allegations meet deliberate indifference

requirements

To make a claim, Lopez must show that Defendants exhibited

“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). Such a showing is sufficient to

demonstrate the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain

proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v.

Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The Constitution “does not necessitate

comfortable prisons,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)

(quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)), nor is the

Eighth Amendment a mandate for “broad prison reform” or excessive

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federal judicial involvement, Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246

(9th Cir. 1982). However, the Eighth Amendment does not permit

inhumane conditions, and prison conditions are subject to scrutiny

under its provisions. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.

The United States Supreme Court has outlined a two-part test

to determine if prison officials have violated a prisoner’s rights

under the Eighth Amendment:

[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only

when two requirements are met. First, the deprivation

alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious[;] a

prison official’s act or omission must result in the

denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities. . . . The second requirement follows from

the principle that only the unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment. To

violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a

prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state

of mind.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citations and internal quotations

omitted); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299–300 (1991)

(discussing subjective requirement); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d

726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing two-part test); Osolinski v.

Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); Wallis v. Baldwin,

70 F.3d 1074, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); Allen v. Sakai, 48

F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (same).

With regard to the first requirement, “[t]he circumstances,

nature, and duration of a deprivation of [shelter, food, clothing,

sanitation, medical care, and personal safety] must be considered .

. . .” Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731. “The more basic the need, the

shorter the time it can be withheld.” Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1259. 

Deprivation of basic necessities for even brief periods can

constitute a violation whereas more moderate deprivations must be

more lengthy or ongoing. Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731–32. 

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As to the second requirement, the relevant state of mind is

“one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety . . .

.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To show deliberate indifference, the

inmate must prove that “the official knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both

be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.” Id. at 837. “Thus, Farmer[] requires an inmate to

show that the official knew of the risk and that the official

inferred that substantial harm might result from the risk.” 

Wallis, 70 F.3d at 1077. The “prison official need not have acted

‘believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough

that the official acted . . . despite his knowledge of a

substantial risk of serious harm.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 842) (omission in original). The question of the official’s

knowledge is a question of fact. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 826.

The State argues first that Lopez’s complaints regarding his

footwear are not objectively serious under prevailing deliberate

indifference standards. It argues that the two periods of which

Lopez complains, which the State summarizes as periods of nine

months and a subsequent period of forty-five days, is not

sufficient to describe a § 1983 violation when prison officials

only gave Lopez shoes that were two sizes too narrow—size E rather

than EEE width shoes. Docket No. 210 at 10–11. However, the only

case that the State points to that specifically references the

adequacy of footwear in the context of a prisoner § 1983 suit is an

unpublished decision from Judge Patel in the Northern District of

California, id. at 11, and, that case is not even on point. In

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that case, prisoners filed a class action, arguing that the slip-on

shoes mandated by Pelican Bay created cruel and unusual conditions

because the slip-ons provided insufficient support and did not

allow inmates to exercise “vigorously.” Munoz v. Marshall, 1994 WL

508633, *1 (N.D. Cal. 1994). While Judge Patel ultimately held

that such claims were not sufficiently serious, she specifically

noted that “[i]nmates who claim that the state-issued footwear

helps to exacerbate pre-existing orthopedic injuries may request to

see a physician who, if he or she deems it medically indicated, may

prescribe therapy or alternative footwear as needed.” Id. at *2.

The situation Judge Patel describes is precisely the situation

Lopez outlines in his amended complaint, at least as to the first

period of deprivation. The amended complaint alleges that Lopez

had received a doctor-ordered prescription for “special shoes.” 

Docket No. 10 at 3(f). It goes on to allege that Defendant Minnick

deliberately and intentionally refused to provide or order the

shoes, even after repeated requests. Id. The State admits that

the minimal result of this conflict was Lopez being without

medically prescribed shoes for a period of nine months. The

amended complaint alleges Lopez suffered permanent scarring and

extreme pain because the shoes were not provided. “A ‘serious’

medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition

could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050,

1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104) overruled

on other grounds by WMX Tech., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th

Cir. 1997). Lopez’s allegations meet this standard. 

Case 2:98-cv-02111-MCE-EFB Document 227 Filed 06/24/05 Page 5 of 16
 Lopez alleges the other related Defendants were liable due 1

to their involvement in denying his administrative appeal related

to the shoes. He does not allege that they were personally

involved in depriving him of the shoes. Because the allegations

establish the lack of a constitutional violation, the dismissal

will be with prejudice. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

ORDER 

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However, the Court agrees with the State with regard to its

second argument that even if sufficient harm is alleged, the

amended complaint does not state a claim against most of the named

Defendants. With regard to the first period, the amended complaint

only states a claim against Defendant Minnick. According to the

complaint, Minnick was responsible for ordering such shoes, Lopez

showed Minnick his prescription, Lopez complained about the serious

pain he was suffering without his shoes, and Minnick refused to

order the shoes without justification. Docket No. 10 at 3(f). As

to the rest of the Defendants allegedly involved in the nine-month

deprivation, the amended complaint is facially deficient in

alleging personal involvement in denying Lopez the shoes. The 1

Court will allow Lopez’s claims concerning the nine-month

deprivation to proceed against Minnick only.

As to the second alleged deprivation of forty-five days, Lopez

has not stated a claim against any Defendants. He alleges only

that he told several guards that he needed his shoes returned to

him after his return from an unrelated court appearance and that

the named Defendants did not provide his shoes in a “timely

manner.” Id. at 3(n). No where does Lopez state why these

Defendants were responsible for returning his shoes or what a

“timely manner” means. Not every prison official to whom a

prisoner complains becomes liable when apprised, by the prisoner or

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another individual, of a prisoner’s complaints. At most the

allegations describe negligence rather than deliberate

indifference, which is insufficient under prevailing Supreme Court

precedent. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.

The only other named Defendant related to the forty-five day

period is Defendant Selky. Lopez’s allegations relate to Selky’s

apparent position of authority in that he alleges Selky deprived

Lopez of his shoes for forty-five days as the commanding officer in

charge of providing property to Lopez’s section of the prison. 

Docket No. 10 at 3(n). Supervisory personnel are generally not

liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a

theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between

him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically

alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). “Liability

under [§] 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation

by the defendant.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989). 

Lopez’s complaint fails to allege that Selky personally, as

opposed to as a supervisor, deprived him of his shoes. Moreover,

any deprivation alleged by Lopez, at least as the deprivation

concerns Selky, is related to Selky’s alleged discrimination

against Lopez as a member of the “Hispanic C.D.C. based class

group.” Docket No. 10 at 3(n). Lopez does not allege that Selky

knew of his “extreme” pain and suffering and then personally failed

to act in the face of that knowledge when Selky had a duty to do

so. Indeed, Lopez does not allege how or why Selky was even aware

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 The Court has previously ruled that the complaint only 2

makes out claims of deliberate indifference to Lopez’s medical

needs. While clearly discrimination based on race could describe a

constitutional violation under § 1983, as outlined above, claims of

deliberate indifference to medical needs must describe a serious

deprivation and action, or inaction, in the face of that

deprivation that amounts to something more than negligence. Acting

out of alleged racial animus, in a generalized way, does not allege

specific indifference to a known medical need, of which the failure

to treat creates serious pain and suffering. Thus, without a

surviving claim of racial discrimination, Lopez’s allegations fail

to outline a violation by Selky that would be grounded in the

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment.

 Even were the Court to allow the alleged forty-five day 3

shoe deprivation claim to continue, it is clear that the claim was

unexhausted at the time Lopez filed suit since the conduct at issue

occurred after the filing date of this suit. Lopez filed this suit

on October 1, 1998. See Docket No. 1. The alleged forty-five day

deprivation began in December 1998. Docket No. 10 at 3(n).

ORDER 

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of Lopez’s doctor’s prescription for the shoes, that Selky even

knew the “package” he was allegedly withholding contained Lopez’s

medical footwear, or that Selky knew Lopez was suffering. Instead,

Lopez vaguely alleges in conclusory terms that Selky acted

intentionally and deliberately in denying Lopez his footwear

through Selky’s position as a commanding officer. The amended

complaint makes clear that any personal participation in

withholding packages in general was due to Selky’s alleged

discrimination toward Lopez’s prison classification rather than

Lopez’s suffering due to his not receiving his medically prescribed

shoes. Because Lopez’s factual allegations with regard to the 2

alleged forty-five day deprivation of his shoes give no indication

that they could be fairly cured by amendment, the dismissal will be

with prejudice as to the defendants allegedly involved. See 3

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27.

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 With regard to Lopez’s deviated septum allegations, the State

argues that this case presents the classic “difference in opinion”

paradigm common in § 1983 cases. In short, a prisoner’s

disagreement with a doctor’s course of treatment, without more, is

insufficient as a matter of law to preclude summary judgment. 

Mayfield v. Craven, 433 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir. 1970) (“[A]

difference of opinion between a prisoner patient and prison medical

authorities as to what treatment is proper and necessary does not

give rise to a claim under [§ 1983].”); Stiltner v. Rhay, 371 F.2d

420, 421 n.3 (9th Cir. 1967). Even a difference in medical

opinions is insufficient to describe a violation. Sanchez v. Vild,

891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). The State’s argument is that

Lopez’s complaint establishes a difference in medical opinions,

i.e., the opinions of the two doctors who recommended surgery for

Lopez’s deviated septum versus the opinions of the Medical

Authorization Review and Health Care Review committees, which

denied the surgery. Docket No. 210 at 12–13.

The Court disagrees. To substantiate the State’s argument,

the amended complaint would have to outline the reasons why the

committees denied the surgery. It does not. It simply states that

Lopez received a surgery recommendation from one doctor. Docket

No. 10 at 3(g). In accordance with prison policy, Lopez then went

to Reno, Nevada for a second opinion. The second doctor also

recommended surgery. The complaint then states that the two

committees denied the surgery “intentionally and deliberately” and

continued Lopez’s “suffering,”; suffering that included “severe

headaches, vision problems, loss of balance, loss of sleep, and

other difficulties.” Id. at 3(g)–3(h). While it is conceivable

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that the committees’ denials could have been based on reasoned

medical opinions—in which case the State’s argument would be well

taken—the amended complaint does not allege such facts. If the

denials were based on other factors such as cost, inconvenience,

time, personnel, or something unrelated to medical advice, then the

State’s argument would clearly be unpersuasive. Indeed, Exhibit D

to Lopez’s opposition indicates that Defendant Hooper informed Dr.

Cappola, the doctor to whom Lopez was referred for a second

opinion, that the reason that the surgery was denied was because

“CDC requires that there be bilateral blockage of the nose before

it is authorized.” Docket No. 217, Ex. D. There is nothing in the

record to indicate why this policy is reasonable or that it is

based on reasoned medical opinion. The Court will let this claim

stand against Defendants Hooper, Jennings, and Castro.

II. Whether Lopez’s claims are exhausted

To be clear, the Court is allowing this action to proceed

against the following Defendants: Minnick, Hooper, Jennings, and

Castro and no others. With this clarification, it is easier to

address whether Lopez has exhausted his claims as to these

Defendants. A motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust falls under

the unenumerated ambit of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). 

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Exhaustion

is an affirmative defense that must be raised and proved by the

defendants to a § 1983 suit. Id. The basic requirement under the

Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) is that all non-judicial

remedies, i.e., administrative remedies, must be exhausted before a

prisoner may file suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In

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 There appear to be two rejection letters from prison 4

officials. The first rejects the appeal for having “too many

issues.” The form goes on to explain that only one issue is

allowed per inmate appeal—Lopez had included several on his prison

appeal form—and that Lopez needed to receive informal responses

ORDER 

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making the exhaustion determination, courts “may look beyond the

pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1119–20. The proper remedy for failure to exhaust is dismissal of

the unexhausted claims without prejudice to their renewal once they

have been exhausted. Id. at 1120. 

With regard to Defendant Minnick, the State essentially admits

that Lopez’s claims against Minnick were exhausted. It states that

Lopez failed to exhaust remedies regarding the nine-month

deprivation of his shoes, except for an inmate appeal against

Minnick as the laundry supervisor that “arguably”exhausted Lopez’s

claim against Minnick. This claim will therefore stand against

Minnick.

With regard to the other Defendants and their role in Lopez’s

claims of deliberate indifference related to Lopez’s deviated

septum, the State argues that “none of [Lopez’s] inmate appeals

exhausted before [Lopez] filed this action concern[ing] this

issue.” Docket No. 210 at 7. The State points to Inmate Appeals

Nos. 97-01975, 97-02028, and 97-02912, all of which were appeals by

Lopez and none of which mention the deviated septum issue. See

Docket No. 211, Ex. A at MTD-006–009, 014–017, 018–021, 028-031. 

Indeed, the only inmate appeals that even mention Lopez’s deviated

septum are appeals that Lopez includes with his opposition. See

Docket No. 217, Ex. C. But as the State points out, each of these

appeals was rejected for failing to meet various procedural

requirements in filing inmate appeals. To support its argument 4

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before submitting his appeal to the appeals office. The second

letter rejects the appeal because it was submitted directly for a

third-level review rather than after the second-level review

process had been completed. 

ORDER 

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that such appeals fail to meet the exhaustion requirement, the

State points to two unpublished cases, Barkley v. Brown, 2002 WL

1677709 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2002) and Burns v. California

Department of Corrections, et al., 2001 WL 1658283 (N.D. Cal. Dec.

14, 2001), which hold respectively that a prisoner fails to exhaust

if he refuses to comply with prison appellate procedures and if he

bypasses the second-level review after receiving an appellate

screening form. See Docket No. 219 at 5. 

Lopez argues that the rejections are evidence of prison staff

“interfering” with his efforts to exhaust his claims with the

result being that exhaustion is not required. Docket No. 217 at 3. 

While, as Lopez notes, there is support for this contention, see

Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001), Lopez fails to

outline why he was unable to comply with what appear to be simple

procedural requirements. His original appeal was rejected because

he included numerous claims on his inmate appellate screening form

when, instead, prison regulations apparently required him to submit

each issue individually on separate forms. Lopez does not explain

why this requirement is unreasonably onerous nor why he was

unwilling to comply. Nor does the Court see why the requirement is

unreasonable. Instead of complying, Lopez attempted to jump review

levels and go directly to a third-level review. Again, he fails to

explain why he was unable or unwilling to go through normal

channels. In the least, the listed reasons for not accepting the

appeal do not make out a case of deliberate interference with

Lopez’s appeal by prison officials.

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 A further concern noted by the Ninth Circuit is not present 5

in the instant case. When looking beyond the pleadings and

deciding the exhaustion issue, courts must insure that the prisoner

has adequate notice of his opportunity to develop a record. See

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.14. In this case, the State’s motion put

Lopez on notice; a conclusion buttressed by Lopez’s inclusion of

numerous prior prison appeals with his brief in opposition to the

State’s motion, all of which fail to demonstrate exhaustion.

ORDER 

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Lopez is clearly aware of the procedures to file prison

appeals. His own appeal exhausting his claims against Defendant

Minnick show he is capable of compliance. Further, it is equally

clear that he has extensive experience in filing appeals as he has

filed more than fifty prison complaints between 1993 and 2003, at

least seven of which were filed before this action commenced in

federal court. See Docket No. 212, Ex. A. The Court will grant

the State’s motion to dismiss Lopez’s claims related to his

deviated septum for failure to exhaust.5

Finally, several issues need to be addressed. First, the

State argues that because Lopez did not exhaust his remedies

against all of the defendants he named in his amended complaint,

the action cannot continue as to any of the defendants, whether the

claims have been exhausted or not. Docket No. 210 at 7–8. It

cites Graves v. Norris, 218 F.3d 884, 885 (8th Cir. 2000), as well

as a number of unpublished decisions to support its contention that

because some of the claims are unexhausted, the entire suit must be

dismissed. Despite the State’s apparent allegations to the

contrary, suffice it to say that this so-called “total exhaustion”

rule is a disputed proposition of law that has not been

definitively ruled on by the Ninth Circuit. Compare Blackmon v.

Crawford, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1178–81 (D. Nev. 2004) (holding

that proper remedy is to allow prisoner to amend complaint to

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allege only exhausted claims) and Cooper v. Garcia, 55 F. Supp. 2d

1090, 1094–95 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (concluding that proper procedure

under PLRA is to dismiss without prejudice unexhausted claims and

address merits of exhausted claims) with Mubarak v. Cal. Dep’t of

Corr., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1060–61 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (noting that

district courts in the Ninth Circuit are split on this issue,

listing cases, and holding that total exhaustion rule is better

reading of PLRA’s requirements). The primary policy ground upon

which the disagreeing courts seem to differ is which procedure will

better promote judicial efficiency. In this case, it is clear that

efficiency has not been in great supply. The Court will therefore

not apply the total exhaustion rule. As explained above, Lopez has

stated a claim against Defendant Minnick. The Court will therefore

grant the State’s motion to dismiss in part and deny the motion in

part as applied to Minnick.

Second, the Court has significantly narrowed the issues in

this case to one claim against one defendant. This claim is not

overly complex, and Lopez has repeatedly demonstrated his ability

to oppose the State and address the Court. Accordingly, his motion

for counsel will be denied. Third, Lopez’s motion for a writ of

habeas corpus ad testificandum is an attempt to subpoena the prison

warden to bring various documents to what the Court assumes will be

deposition testimony. The request will be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

The State’s motion to dismiss at Docket No. 210 is GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART . All Defendants other than Defendants

Minnick, Hooper, Jennings, and Castro are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE . Defendants Hooper, Jennings, and Castro are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE . Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference

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related to his alleged forty-five day deprivation of his medically

prescribed shoes is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE . Plaintiff’s claim

of deliberate indifference related to his deviated septum is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE . To be clear, only Plaintiff’s claim

of deliberate indifference related to the alleged nine-month

deprivation of his medically prescribed shoes as alleged against

Defendant Minnick remains. Plaintiff’s motion to supplement his

opposition at Docket No. 221 is GRANTED . Plaintiff’s motion for

counsel at Docket No. 223 is DENIED . Plaintiff’s motion for a

writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum at Docket No. 222 is

DENIED .

And finally, the time for filing dispositive motions in this

case has run. Accordingly, the parties are directed to certify,

through individually filed briefs, that this case is ready to

proceed to trial. Should either party wish to file additional

dispositive motions, they should notify the Court in writing and

ask for leave to file briefing supporting the motion. Any such

requests are due on or before Friday, July 8, 2005 . In the event

the parties do not anticipate additional dispositive motions, they

should notify the Court that they are ready to proceed to trial, as

well as outline dates during the next six months that would be

amenable to trial, in briefing to be filed by the respective

parties on or before Friday, July 8, 2005 . Once both parties have

certified that the case is ready to proceed to trial and provided

appropriate dates, the Court will send out a trial setting order.

Dated at Anchorage, Alaska, this 24th day of June 2005.

 /s/ James K.

Singleton, Jr.

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR. 

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ORDER 

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United States District Judge 

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