Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01412/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01412-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE ESTATE OF RUBEN NUNEZ 

by and through its successor-ininterest LYDIA NUNEZ, ALBERT 

NUNEZ, and LYDIA NUNEZ,

Plaintiff, 

v.

CORRECTIONAL PHYSICIANS 

MEDICAL GROUP, INC., et al.,

Defendants, Third-Party Plaintiffs,

v.

CORRECTIONAL PHYSICIANS 

MEDICAL GROUP, INC., et al.,

Third-Party Defendants. 

Case No.: 16cv1412-BEN-MDD

ORDER ON JOINT DISCOVERY 

MOTION PRESENTING 

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 

COMPEL PRODUCTION OF 

DOCUMENTS

[ECF No. 150]

Before the Court is the parties’ Joint Discovery Motion filed on August 

7, 2017. (ECF No. 150). The joint motion presents Plaintiffs’ motion to 

compel production of documents from Defendant Patton State Hospital

(“Patton”). (Id.). The dispute involves disclosure of documents created by 

Patton pertaining to meetings held following the death of Ruben Nunez.

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LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally allow for broad 

discovery, authorizing parties to obtain discovery of “any nonprivileged 

matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the 

needs of the case....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Information within the scope 

of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. 

District courts have broad discretion to determine relevancy for discovery 

purposes. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F. 3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Similarly, district courts have broad discretion to limit discovery where the 

discovery sought is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be 

obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or 

less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

A party may request the production of any document within the scope of 

Rule 26(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). “For each item or category, the response 

must either state that inspection and related activities will be permitted as 

requested or state an objection to the request, including the reasons.” Id. at 

34(b)(2)(B). If the responding party chooses to produce responsive 

information, rather than allow for inspection, the production must be 

completed no later than the time specified in the request or another 

reasonable time specified in the response. Id. An objection must state 

whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that 

objection. Id. at 34(b)(2)(C). An objection to part of a request must specify 

the part and permit inspection or production of the rest. Id.

DISCUSSION

Request for Production (“RFP”) No. 21

In this RFP, Plaintiffs request documents generated, produced, written, 

drafted, edited, compiled, or used by any Patton employee in preparation, 

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anticipation, or utilization “at the meeting” to review the circumstances of 

Nunez’s death. (ECF No. 150 at 3). While this RFP is vaguely worded, “the 

meeting” appears to be a January 2016 Morbidity/Mortality Interdisciplinary 

Review Committee (“MIRC”) meeting.

Defendant Patton has objected, stating that they are entitled to official 

information, deliberative process, and self-critical analysis privileges. On 

July 7, 2017, Defendants filed a privilege log and declaration. (ECF No. 150-

4, 150-5). The Privilege Log identifies these three documents as (1) Internal 

Interdiscipline/Service Review of Death Summary; (2) DSH External 

Mortality Review; and (3) E-mail to M. Gomes re: MIRC discussions. (ECF 

No. 150-4). 

According to Dr. Kayla Fisher, Medical Director for the Department of 

State Hospitals – Patton State Hospital, the primary predominant purpose of 

a MIRC meeting is to “explore ways to reduce morbidity or mortality, and/or 

improve patient outcomes.” (ECF No. 150-5 at ¶2). In her declaration, Dr. 

Fisher, explains why Defendants believe the three documents fall within the 

scope of the three claimed privileges.

1. Official Information Privilege

“Federal common law recognizes a qualified privilege for official 

information.” Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033 (9th 

Cir.1990) (citing Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 511 

F.2d 192, 198 (9th Cir.1975)). The discoverability of official documents 

should be determined under the “balancing approach that is moderately preweighted in favor of disclosure.” Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653,

661 (N.D. Cal. 1987). The party asserting the privilege must properly invoke 

the privilege by making a “substantial threshold showing.” Id. at 669. To

meet this showing, Defendants “must submit a declaration or affidavit from a

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responsible official with personal knowledge of the matters to be attested to 

in the affidavit.” Dowel v. Griffin, 275 F.R.D. 613, 616 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17,

2011) (quoting Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613). Specifically, 

“[i]n order to fulfill the threshold requirement, the party asserting the 

privilege must submit a declaration or affidavit from a responsible official 

with personal knowledge of the matters to be attested to in the affidavit. The 

affidavit must include: (1) an affirmation that the agency generated or 

collected the material in issue and has maintained its confidentiality; (2) a 

statement that the official has personally reviewed the material in question; 

(3) a specific identification of the governmental or privacy interests that 

would be threatened by disclosure of the material to plaintiff and/or his

lawyer; (4) a description of how disclosure subject to a carefully crafted 

protective order would create a substantial risk of harm to significant 

governmental or privacy interests, and (5) a projection of how much harm 

would be done to the threatened interests if disclosure were made.” Soto, 162 

F.R.D. at 613 (quoting Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 670). If the nondisclosing party 

does not meet this initial burden of establishing cause to apply the privilege, 

the court must order disclosure of the documents; if the party meets this 

initial burden, the court generally conducts an in camera review of the 

material and balance each party's interests. Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613; Kelly,

114 F.R.D. at 671.

Here, Patton has failed to meet the threshold burden because they have 

not satisfactorily declared requirements 3 through 5. The declaration did not 

identify the specific governmental or privacy interest that would be 

threatened by disclosure of these three documents. Further, Dr. Fisher’s

declaration has not described a risk to significant governmental or privacy 

interests that would not be overcome through a protective order. Rather, Dr. 

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Fisher’s opinion states that disclosure would “erode integrity and security of 

the protected documents” and “affect the morale” of those who took part in 

creating or using the documents in question. (ECF No. 150-5 at ¶7). That 

there might be lower morale among the unnamed MIRC participants if these 

documents were disclosed under a protective order does not rise to the level of 

harm to an unidentified significant governmental or privacy interest.

Since Patton has not met their burden, the Court is not required to 

conduct an in camera review and may require production of the requested 

documents. As such, Defendants’ objection on the basis of official information 

privilege is OVERRULED.

2. Deliberative Process Privilege

Patton argues that as a government agency, the deliberative process 

privilege allows for open and robust discussion among hospital staff and 

applies here to keep the documents used in preparation for and about the 

MIRC meeting unavailable for discovery. Plaintiff argues the deliberative 

process privilege does not apply because Patton failed to make the threshold

showing required to invoke the privilege.

The deliberative process privilege permits governmental agencies to 

withhold documents that “reflect[] advisory opinions, recommendations and 

deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions 

and policies are formulated.” Hongsermeier v. C.I.R., 621 F.3d 890, 904 (9th 

Cir. 2010) quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975). 

The purpose of the deliberative process privilege is to “promote frank and 

independent discussion among those responsible for making governmental 

decisions,” and ultimately to “protect the quality of agency decisions.” F.T.C. 

v. Warner Communications, Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1994). In 

order to be protected by the privilege, a document must be both 

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“predecisional” and “deliberative.” Id. A document is “predecisional” if it was 

“prepared in order to assist an agency decision maker in arriving at his 

decision.” Hongsermeier, 621 F.3d at 904. A document is “deliberative” if its 

disclosure would “expose an agency’s decision making process in such a way 

as to discourage candid discussion within the agency and thereby undermine 

the agency’s ability to perform its functions.” Id. “[W]henever the unveiling 

of factual materials would be tantamount to the ‘publication of the evaluation 

and analysis of the multitudinous facts’ conducted by the agency, the 

deliberative process applies.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 861 

F.2d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).

The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege. Warner 

Communications, 742 F.2d at 1161. A party may obtain materials protected 

by the privilege if the need for the information overrides the government’s 

interest in non-disclosure. Id. The following factors are considered in 

deciding whether to override the privilege: “1) the relevance of the evidence; 

2) the availability of other evidence; 3) the government’s role in the litigation; 

and 4) the extent to which disclosure would hinder frank and independent 

discussion regarding contemplated policies and decisions.” Id.

Here, through Dr. Fisher’s declaration, Patton has not indicated how 

the documents they are seeking to withhold directly contribute to the 

formulation of policy. The declaration makes no mention of formulating 

governmental decisions in the wake of the MIRC meeting. Further, Patton 

does not assert that MIRC meetings are geared toward policymaking at all or 

that they are attended by policymakers. Dr. Fisher simply states that a 

MIRC session’s predominant purpose is exploring ways to reduce morbidity 

and mortality and/or improving patient outcomes. (ECF No. 150-5 at ¶2). 

While a MIRC meeting may aim to guide future medical decisions, not every 

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decision results in a governmental policy and as such the Court finds that 

Patton has not shown how the MIRC meeting and these associated 

documents are deliberative. Patton cannot invoke the deliberative process 

privilege to shield discovery of these three documents.

As such, Patton’s assertion of deliberative process privilege is 

OVERRULED.

3. State and Federal Self-Critical Analysis Privileges

Lastly, Patton encourages the Court to endorse a federal self-critical 

analysis privilege or, in the alternative, apply California Evidence Code §

1157(a). (ECF No. 150 at 19, 23). The parties agree that there is no 

unequivocal federal case law that supports self-critical analysis privilege, 

however Patton argues that some courts have adopted a privilege and others 

have left the door open to the possibility of said privilege.

In arguing for and against a federal privilege, the parties both cite

Agster v. Maricopa Cty., 422 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2005). In Agster, parents of a 

prisoner who died in custody of county sheriff's department brought action 

against the county. Plaintiffs sought discovery of the mortality review and 

defendant declined asserting the peer review privilege. The Ninth Circuit 

declined to create peer review privilege for county correctional health 

services' ‘mortality review’ of circumstances surrounding the prisoner's death. 

Similarly, in Leon v. County of San Diego, 202 F.R.D. 631 (S.D. Cal.

2001), a § 1983 action against the county, sheriff's department, and sheriff, 

alleging deliberate indifference to detainee's medical condition, failure to 

train and supervise, and existence of policy, practice or custom creating 

constitutional violations, the court held (1) nursing peer review records from 

county detention facility were relevant to municipal liability and, therefore, 

were discoverable; (2) provision of California Evidence Code privileging 

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medical peer review records did not apply to protect records from discovery; 

and (3) self-critical analysis privilege under federal common law did not 

apply to protect records from discovery.

While Plaintiffs cite Agster in support of discovery, Patton argues that 

the decision left the door open to hospitals’ use of the critical self-analysis 

privilege, pointing to the decision’s differentiation between the defendant 

Correctional Health Services and an “ordinary hospital.” Agster, 422 F.3d at 

839. The assumption is that Patton considers itself to be an “ordinary 

hospital.” Patton’s population is, according to their website, over 90% 

individuals who are either incompetent to stand trial, mentally disordered 

offenders, individuals deemed not guilty by reason of insanity, or sexually 

violent predators. While Patton and the correctional medical provider in 

Agster may not be entirely the same, both have a correctional mission that 

must be taken into account when seeking to apply the self-critical analysis 

privilege. Thus, this privilege is not recognized by the Ninth Circuit in the 

context of the instant case.

Were the court to adopt the self-critical analysis privilege, Patton would 

need to establish that the documents met the following three criteria: “first, 

the information must result from a critical self-analysis undertaken by the 

party seeking protection; second, the public must have a strong interest in 

preserving the free flow of the type of information sought; finally, the 

information must be of the type whose flow would be curtailed if discovery 

were allowed.” Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 426 

(9th Cir. 1992). 

As a threshold matter here, Dr. Fisher’s declaration does not indicate 

that the MIRC is a self-critical analysis or a peer review process. As it is, the 

words “self-critical” or “peer-review” are not in the declaration at all. Nor has 

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Patton provided any law that would serve as a gap filler to establish that a 

MIRC session is inherently a self-critical or peer-review practice. As stated 

above, Dr. Fisher’s declaration simply states that a MIRC session’s 

discussions “explore ways to reduce morbidity or mortality, and/or improve 

patient outcomes.” (ECF No. 150-5 at ¶2). The declaration does not detail 

through what means this exploration occurs.

Further, Patton encourages the Court to look to California Evidence 

Code § 1157 for guidance. (ECF No. 150 at 23.) State privilege law applies to 

purely state law claims brought in federal court pursuant to diversity 

jurisdiction; however, state law claims that are pendent to federal question 

cases are governed by federal privilege law. Burrows v. Redbud Cmty. Hosp. 

Dist., 187 F.R.D. 606, 610 (N.D. Cal 1998). In the instant case the Court’s 

jurisdiction is grounded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on Plaintiff’s civil rights 

claims. Thus, federal privilege law applies.

As such, Patton’s assertion of the self-critical analysis privilege is 

OVERRULED.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Patton’s objection and assertion of the deliberative process 

privilege with regard to the three documents at issue is OVERRULED. The 

Court compels Patton to produce the three documents at issue to Plaintiff in 

response to Request for Production No. 21.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 11, 2017

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