Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02096/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02096-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eugene Boyd Johnson, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

The State of Arizona, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-10-2096-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before this Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner

Eugene Boyd Johnson. (Doc. 1). Magistrate Judge Steven P. Logan has issued a Report and

Recommendation (“R & R”) in which he recommended that the Court deny the petition with

prejudice; Petitioner has objected to the R & R. (Docs. 28, 29). Because objections have been

filed, the Court will review the petition de novo. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d

1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). For the following reasons, the Court accepts the report

and recommendation, and denies the petition.

BACKGROUND

On August 30, 2004, Petitioner was found guilty after a jury trial in Superior Court,

Maricopa County, of one count of robbery and two counts of armed robbery. (Doc. 17-1, Ex.

B). Petitioner was sentenced to 31.5 years in prison on December 2, 2004. (Doc. 17-1, Ex.

C). Petitioner appealed his conviction, and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the

conviction but added one day to his pre-sentence incarceration credit. (Doc. 17-1, Ex. A).

Case 2:10-cv-02096-GMS Document 30 Filed 06/25/12 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

The Arizona Supreme Court denied review of the appeal. (Doc. 17-2, Ex. F).

On June 15, 2007, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the Maricopa

County Superior Court. (Doc. 23, Ex. R). After his court-appointed attorney stated that she

was unable to find any cause for relief in the record, Petitioner filed a pro se petition on

January 28, 2008. (Doc. 18-1, Ex. H). The petition was denied on April 21, 2008, and the

Court of Appeals denied review of Petitioner’s appeal on October 2, 2009. (Doc. 18-4, Ex.

J; Doc. 19-1, Ex. M).

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court on September 29,

2010, and a Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on January 27, 2011.

(Docs. 1, 10). Petitioner alleges nine grounds for relief, as follows: 1) The state prosecutor

committed misconduct during jury selection, 2) Petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation

Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated at trial, 3) Petitioner’s right to compulsory

process was violated, 4) Petitioner’s due process rights were violated because he was

convicted even though the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction, 5) Petitioner

never received an evidentiary hearing in his previous petitions, 6) Petitioner’s trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance, 7) Petitioner’s direct appeal attorney provided ineffective

assistance, 8) Petitioner’s direct appeal attorney had a conflict of interest, and 9) Petitioner

was denied his due process rights by evidentiary rulings at trial. (Doc. 10). Respondent filed

a timely response, and Petitioner filed a 138-page reply. (Docs. 17, 26).

On March 27, 2012, Magistrate Judge Logan issued an R & R in which he

recommends that the Court find that Petitioner had failed to exhaust Grounds One, Three,

Four, and Eight, and that he was procedurally defaulted from returning to state court to

pursue them. Magistrate Judge Logan further recommends that the Court find that Ground

Five and Ground Nine are not cognizable on habeas review, and that it dismiss Grounds Two,

Six, and Seven on the merits.

Case 2:10-cv-02096-GMS Document 30 Filed 06/25/12 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006). The writ

may be granted by “the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit

judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). Review of Petitions for

Habeas Corpus is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2244 et seq. (2006).

A. Statute of Limitations under AEDPA

Under AEDPA, petitions for habeas corpus must be filed within one year of the start

of the limitations period. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410 (2005) (AEDPA

“establishes a 1-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas corpus petition”) (citing

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)). The limitation period begins to run when the state conviction

becomes final—either “upon ‘the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time

for seeking such review.’” White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)). The limitations period is subject to statutory tolling under the terms

of AEDPA or equitable tolling under extraordinary circumstances.

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

Habeas relief is not available to petitioners who do not properly exhaust their state

court procedural remedies prior to filing their federal petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). In

order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must give state courts the opportunity

to pass upon and correct alleged violations of the prisoner’s federal rights. Duncan v. Henry,

513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)); see Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (holding that “a state prisoner’s federal habeas

petition should be dismissed if the prisoner has not exhausted available state remedies as to

any of his federal claims”) (citations omitted); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th

Cir. 1999) (“A habeas petitioner must give the state courts the first opportunity to review any

claim of federal constitutional error before seeking federal habeas review of that claim.”)

Case 2:10-cv-02096-GMS Document 30 Filed 06/25/12 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Failure to exhaust state court remedies does not prevent a court from denying a petition

on the merits should it deem such denial proper. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); see Duncan v.

Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 183 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that the “AEDPA gives

a district court the alternative of simply denying a petition containing unexhausted but

nonmeritorious claims”).

- 4 -

(citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518–19 (1982)). Except in cases “carrying a life

sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for the

purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona State Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’”

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Swoopes v. Sublett,

196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999).1

1. Fair Presentation

To provide the state with the necessary opportunity to review the claim a petitioner

must fairly present the claim in each appropriate state court. A claim is not fairly presented

unless a petitioner “explicitly indicated” that “the claim was a federal one” in the state court

litigation. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended, 247 F.3d 904

(9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). A petitioner explicitly indicates that a claim is federal

by including “reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement

of the facts that entitle the petitioner to relief.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162–63

(1996). A petitioner does not fairly present a state court with a federal claim merely by

including “general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal

protection, and the right to a fair trial.” Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)

(citing Gray, 518 U.S. at 162–63).

2. Excuse from Exhaustion Requirement

In certain limited circumstances, habeas petitions may be considered by the federal

court, even if the petitioner did not exhaust the claims by fairly presenting them in state

court. Excuse from exhaustion is available when either “(i) there is an absence of available

State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to

protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). The Ninth Circuit has held

Case 2:10-cv-02096-GMS Document 30 Filed 06/25/12 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) may be satisfied when “the highest state court has recently

addressed the issue raised in the petition and resolved it adversely to the petitioner.” Sweet

v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 236 (9th Cir. 1981). It may also be satisfied when “there is no

opportunity to obtain redress in state court or if the corrective process is so clearly deficient

as to render futile any effort to obtain relief.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981).

C. Procedural Default

Habeas review is also not available to petitioners whose claims are procedurally

defaulted. A claim may be procedurally defaulted in one of two ways. First, a claim is

procedurally defaulted when it was raised in state court, but the state court denied relief

based upon “an independent and adequate state procedural rule.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 750 (1991). Second, claims that were not exhausted in state court are procedurally

defaulted if the district court determines that a return to state court would be futile because

procedural rules would eliminate “the likelihood that a state court will accord the habeas

petitioner a hearing on the merits of the claim.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268–70 (1989)

(O’Connor, J., concurring). A federal court may only hear a claim that has been procedurally

defaulted if a petitioner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result

of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

2. Miscarriage of Justice

Absent cause and prejudice for a procedural default, a petitioner must show that

failing to consider a habeas petition would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. To

meet this standard, a petitioner must show that “a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S 298, 327

(1995) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). A miscarriage of justice claim

is not a constitutional claim for relief, but merely “a gateway through which a habeas

petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the

merits.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993)).

D. Standard of Review

Case 2:10-cv-02096-GMS Document 30 Filed 06/25/12 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

A court reviewing a petition alleging that a state court violated a constitutional rule

can grant relief only if the state court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of”clearly established law. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000). Clearly

established federal law consists of “the governing principle or principles set forth by the

Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 71–72 (2003) (citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698 (2002)). Habeas is not granted

merely when a federal court disagrees with a state court’s constitutional interpretation: “the

most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different than an

incorrect application of federal law.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 410 (emphasis in original).

II. Analysis

In the R & R, Magistrate Judge Logan recommended that the Court find that four of

Petitioner’s grounds for relief were never properly exhausted and have been procedurally

defaulted, two were not cognizable on habeas review, and three should be dismissed on the

merits. (Doc. 28). The Court has reviewed the original petition, Respondents’ answer,

Petitioner’s reply, Magistrate Judge Logan’s R & R, and Petitioner’s objections. (Docs. 10,

17, 26, 28, 29). After reviewing the R & R de novo in light of Petitioner’s objections, the

Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Logan and adopts all of the findings of the R & R. The

discussion below addresses only those issues specifically argued in Petitioner’s objections.

A. Procedurally Defaulted Claims

The R & R recommends that the Court find that Grounds One, Three, Four, and Eight

were not fairly presented in state court, and that because Petitioner would be barred from

bringing them in state court now, they are procedurally defaulted. The claims are discussed

below.

1. Ground One

In Ground One, petitioner claimed that the state prosecutor engaged in misconduct

when he asked potential jurors whether they would be able to find Petitioner guilty of armed

robbery even if there was no evidence that Petitioner was actually armed. (Doc. 10 at 5).

Petitioner did not bring this issue as a direct claim in any state court proceeding; instead he

Case 2:10-cv-02096-GMS Document 30 Filed 06/25/12 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

claimed in his Rule 32 proceeding that his attorney was ineffective for not bringing it. (Doc.

18-1, Ex. H). In his objections, Petitioner argues the merits of the claim, but does not contest

the fact that he did not raise it on appeal. Instead, he again frames the claim within the

context of an ineffective assistance claim, writing that “[b]y not filing arguments on this issue

Appellate Counsel failed to defend the Petitioner’s Constitutional Rights and prejudiced any

further appeals on the issues.” (Doc. 29 at 3). As discussed below, the Court agrees with the

R & R that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is meritless and does not provide an

excuse for the procedural default on Ground One. Ground One is procedurally defaulted.

2. Ground Three

Petitioner claims that he was denied his right to compulsory process under the Sixth

Amendment when his attorney failed to call two alibi witnesses. As Magistrate Judge Logan

noted, Petitioner “is challenging the actions of his own counsel, not the actions of the state

court or the state prosecutor,” and the claim is therefore better analyzed as part of the

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Doc. 28 at 8). To the extent that Ground Three

alleges denial of compulsory process by a state actor, Magistrate Judge Logan noted that the

claim was not fairly presented to state court and has since been procedurally defaulted. (Doc.

28 at 9). Petitioner’s objections do not address the fair presentation of this claim, but instead

argue the merits. (Doc. 29 at 5). Ground Three is procedurally defaulted.

3. Ground Four

In Ground Four, Petitioner claims that there was never evidence of an actual weapon

being used, and that the conviction for armed robbery therefore violated his Due Process

rights. (Doc. 10 at 6). As Magistrate Judge Logan notes, Petitioner never raised this claim

in any state proceeding, but instead argued in his Rule 32 proceeding that his trial lawyer had

been ineffective for not raising it. (Doc. 28 at 9; Doc. 18-1 Ex. H). Petitioner’s objections to

Magistrate Judge Logan’s recommendation regarding Ground Four are addressed to his

request for an evidentiary hearing, and do not counter the argument that the claim was never

presented to state court and has been procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 29 at 5–6). Ground Four

is procedurally defaulted.

Case 2:10-cv-02096-GMS Document 30 Filed 06/25/12 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

4. Ground Eight

In Ground Eight, Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel, whom he claims was a

colleague of his trial counsel, failed to present claims that the trial counsel was ineffective

because of a conflict of interest based on their collegial relationship. (Doc. 10 at 9). As

Magistrate Judge Logan noted, Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel suffered from a

conflict of interest only in his original Rule 32 proceeding, and did not mention it in his

petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 19-1, Ex. L). In his objections,

Petitioner again argues the merits of the claim, but does not address the issue of fair

presentation or procedural default. (Doc. 19 at 20) (“Bottom line here is Appellate Counsel

acted in interest other than this Petitioner and his constitutional rights on direct appeal by

refusing to file ineffective assistance on Trial Lawyer and disavowal of this Petitioner’s

attempts to do so.”). Ground Eight is procedurally defaulted.

B. Non-Cognizable Claims

Magistrate Judge Logan recommends that Ground Five and Ground Nine both be

dismissed because they are not cognizable on habeas review. The claims will be addressed

in turn.

1. Ground Five

Petitioner’s Fifth Ground for relief is a request for an evidentiary hearing. Magistrate

Judge Logan addressed the request for an evidentiary hearing and recommended that it be

denied because the “petition fails to raise any colorable claim for relief.” (Doc. 28 at 19). In

his objections, Petitioner states that he “would like to point out that multiple violations

constitutional rights and the magnitude of them are facts for this Court to plainly see.” (Doc.

29 at 6). As noted above and below, after reviewing the R & R de novo, the Court agrees

with its conclusions, and consequentially agrees that there are no grounds for an evidentiary

hearing.

2. Ground Nine

In Ground Nine, Petitioner argues that relevant evidence was excluded at trial in

violation of Arizona state law, and that he was thereby denied his Due Process rights under

Case 2:10-cv-02096-GMS Document 30 Filed 06/25/12 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

federal law. (Doc. 10 at 10). Magistrate Judge Logan notes that Petitioner cited to the

Arizona Rules of Evidence, and noted that a petitioner may not “transform a state-law issue

into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d

1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). In his objections, Petitioner continues to argue that the evidence

regarding his physical appearance “clearly proves this Petitioner’s innocence.” (Doc. 29 at

20). Petitioner himself, however, describes the claim as comprising “repeated violations of

Rule 403 of Arizona Rules of Evidence.” (Doc. 29 at 20). The claim is not cognizable on

habeas review.

C. Claims Addressed on the Merits

Magistrate Judge Logan recommends dismissing Ground Two, Ground Six, and

Ground Seven under the AEDPA standard of review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Claim Two

Petitioner claims that his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth

Amendment were violated when a police officer was allowed to testify at trial about the

statements of a clerk at one of the stores that was robbed. (Doc. 10 at 6). As Magistrate

Logan noted, the Court of Appeals considered this claim and found that one of the statements

was admitted as an excited utterance, and other statements were elicited from the police

officer by Petitioner’s attorney. (Doc. 28 at 12–13). Applying Crawford v. Washington, 541

U.S. 36 (2004) and the invited error doctrine, the Court of Appeals found that there was no

violation. Magistrate Judge Logan found that the application of Crawford was not contrary

to clearly established federal law, and that the invited error doctrine was a procedural bar

precluding habeas review. (Doc. 28 at 15). In his reply, Petitioner alleges that the prosecutors

doctored the surveillance video and reiterates his Confrontation Clause argument, stating that

“[f]ace to face confrontation enhances the accuracy of fact finding by reducing the risk that

a witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent person.” (Doc. 29 at 4). Petitioner does not

address either the excited utterance doctrine or the invited error doctrine, and thereby does

not counter the grounds on which Magistrate Judge Logan recommended that Ground One

be dismissed. The Court adopts the R & R with respect to Ground Two.

Case 2:10-cv-02096-GMS Document 30 Filed 06/25/12 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

2. Ground Six

In Ground Six, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance

because he a) did not object when the prosecutor asked potential jurors whether they could

convict for armed robbery in the absence of a finding that Petitioner was in fact armed, b) did

not raise the Confrontation Clause argument, and c) did not call Petitioner’s alibi witnesses.

Magistrate Judge Logan discussed the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984), which requires that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot succeed

unless a petitioner shows that a counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that counsel’s errors prejudiced the

defendant. (Doc. 28 at 15).

Under Arizona law, a person may be convicted of armed robbery even if he is holding

only a simulated deadly weapon, and the Arizona Supreme Court has held that suggesting

a gun under a piece of clothing qualifies as a simulated deadly weapon. (Doc. 28 at 16). The

Court of Appeals thus found that the Confrontation Clause claim was meritless. Therefore,

failing to bring the Confrontation Clause claim at trial could not have constituted a deficient

performance that prejudiced Petitioner. (Id.). Further, the alibi witnesses were duplicative of

a witness that was called, and failing to call them “fell within the wide range of reasonable

assistance.” (Doc. 28 at 17).

In his objections to these determinations by Magistrate Judge Logan, Petitioner cites

to cases that affirm that prosecutorial misconduct can constitute a Due Process violation, but

does not address the fact that in his particular trial, the conduct of the prosecutor conformed

with well-established law. (Doc. 29 at 7). He states only that the Prosecutor used “improper

methods,” but offers no support for the statement other than stock citations to prosecutorial

misconduct cases. (Id.) (emphasis in original). Regarding his claim that his attorney was

ineffective because he did not make Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause argument, Petitioner

again cites only to general Confrontation Clause cases; he does not discuss the actual grounds

on which the claim was found not to be valid. (Doc. 29 at 10). Finally, he reiterates that the

alibi witnesses were available to testify, but does not address the finding that their testimony

Case 2:10-cv-02096-GMS Document 30 Filed 06/25/12 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

would be duplicative. (Doc. 29 at 10).

Petitioner’s objections do not address the grounds upon which the Magistrate Judge

recommended that Ground Six be dismissed. With regards to the prosecutorial misconduct

claim and the Confrontation Clause claim, the Court adopts the R & R completely. Regarding

the claim that the trial attorney was ineffective because he failed to call the alibi witnesses,

the Court adopts the R & R but adds one fact from the record not discussed by either party.

Petitioner’s trial attorney filed a motion in limine to prevent the state from introducing

recorded telephone calls between Petitioner and the witnesses he now states his attorney

should have called. (Doc. 19-1, Ex. S at 47–49). On these recorded conversations, Petitioner

was speaking to these witnesses “about dates that he was with her and both of them about

people who could testify that that’s where he was,” even though “[t]hose dates and those time

frames are inconsistent with what each of those witnesses said at a subsequent interview.”

(Id.). The Court held that so long as the government did not disclose that the tapes were made

from jail, they could be introduced for impeachment purposes. (Id. at 52). The Court’s ruling

further suggests why a competent lawyer would choose not to call Petitioner’s alibi

witnesses.

3. Ground Seven

Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective because she a) did not raise

the prosecutorial misconduct issue, b) did not raise the Confrontation Clause issue, c) did not

raise the Compulsory process issue, and d) did not argue that there was insufficient evidence

introduced at trial to convict him. (Doc. 10 at 8). Magistrate Judge Logan recommends that

the ground be dismissed because a) the prosecutorial misconduct argument was without

merit, b) the appellate counsel did raise the Confrontation Clause issue, c) the failure to call

alibi witnesses cannot be construed as a Compulsory process claim because the state did not

deny Petitioner’s right to call the witnesses, and thus there was no purpose in raising it on

appeal, and d) the appellate counsel did raise the issue with regards to one claim, and with

regards to the others the claim was meritless. (Doc. 28 at 18–19).

In his objections, Petitioner again states the reasons he believes the claims are valid,

Case 2:10-cv-02096-GMS Document 30 Filed 06/25/12 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

which were considered and rejected elsewhere in the R & R and in this Order. (Doc. 29 at

12–19). He again does not address settled Arizona law that one can be convicted of armed

robbery by suggesting that one is armed with a hand under a piece of clothing. See State v.

Bousley, 171 Ariz. 166, 167, 829 P.2d 1212, 1213 (1992). He does not address the grounds

upon which the Court of Appeals found there was no Confrontation Clause violation. He

does not address the fact that his appellate attorney cannot bring a claim for the denial of

compulsory process when his trial attorney elected not to call witnesses. He does not address

the fact that his appellate attorney in fact argued that the evidence was insufficient to merit

a conviction. Petitioner does not address the reasoning supporting the R & R’s conclusions

in his objections, and this Court adopts the reasoning of the R & R.

D. Cause for Procedural Default

In his objections, Petitioner notes correctly that ineffective assistance of counsel can

constitute cause for procedural default. (Doc. 29 at 21–22). Since this Court adopts the R &

R’s recommendation that there was no ineffective assistance here, Petitioner has shown no

cause for procedural default. Petitioner additionally notes that procedural default may be

excused when “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of a person

who is actually innocent.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 496. Petitioner states that some of the video

evidence that was not shown to the jury “could have revealed suspect had no tattoos on his

arms” when Petitioner in fact has tattoos on his arms. Nowhere in the record of this case is

there any suggestion that actual exculpatory evidence was withheld from Petitioner, and his

musings about what video evidence could have shown do not meet Murray’s high standard.

Petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claims will not be considered.

E. Certificate of Appealability

Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, in the event

Movant files an appeal, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability because

reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s procedural rulings debatable, and would not

“find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Case 2:10-cv-02096-GMS Document 30 Filed 06/25/12 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

CONCLUSION

Magistrate Judge Logan’s R & R properly concludes that four grounds are

procedurally defaulted, two grounds are not cognizable on habeas review, and three grounds

should be dismissed on the merits. Petitioner’s objections merely re-argue the merits of his

claim and generally do not address the reasoning on which the R & R is based. In those cases

where Petitioner does challenge that reasoning, the Court finds that the R & R is correct.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Petitioner’s Amended Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 10) is

denied.

2. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 28) is accepted.

3. Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, in the event

Petitioner files an appeal, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability because

reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s procedural ruling debatable. See Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

4. The Clerk of Court shall terminate this action.

DATED this 25th day of June, 2012.

Case 2:10-cv-02096-GMS Document 30 Filed 06/25/12 Page 13 of 13