Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02327/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02327-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIGUEL ROSALES,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 06 CV 2327 JM (AJB)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION AND DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

vs.

ROBERT HOREL, Warden,

Respondent.

BACKGROUND

On October 18, 2006, Petitioner filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner contends his criminal sentence violates his Sixth Amendment right

to a jury trial and the principles announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Blakely

v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Pending

before the court is the Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) of the Honorable Anthony J. Battaglia,

United States Magistrate Judge, which recommends that the petition be denied. Petitioner filed timely

objections. 

On January 20, 2004, Petitioner was convicted by a jury in San Diego Superior Court for

kidnaping in violation of Penal Code § 207, carjacking in violation of Penal Code § 215, and

unlawfully taking and driving a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code § 10851. The judge sentenced

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1 The crime of carjacking permits a sentence of three years (low term), five years (middle term), or nine

years (upper term). Cal. Penal Code § 215(b). 

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Petitioner to the upper term of 9 years1 for carjacking, doubled to 18 years based on a prior strike

conviction, an additional 5 years on the basis of a prior serious felony conviction, and an additional

1 year for a prior prison conviction. Petitioner was thus sentenced to 24 years total. The judge

selected the upper term on the basis of three aggravating factors: (1) Petitioner committed a kidnaping

in the course of the carjacking ; (2) Petitioner had violated his parole or probation in this past; and (3)

Petitioner’s overall criminal record. 

Petitioner now challenges his conviction on the ground that his upper term sentence violated

his Sixth Amendment rights. The California Court of Appeal had rejected this argument on direct

appeal, citing People v. Black, 35 Cal.4th 1238 (2005). The California Supreme Court denied review

without explanation. Lodgment 10. In Black, the California Supreme Court held that California’s

Determinate Sentencing Law (“DSL”), which requires a sentencing judge to select the middle term

unless the judge finds aggravating factors by a preponderance of the evidence which allow imposition

of the upper term, did not violate the Sixth Amendment and the rules announced in Apprendi, Blakely,

and Booker. Id. at 1254.

After Respondent filed its response to the present petition but before Petitioner filed his

traverse, the Supreme Court decided Cunningham v. California, 127 S.Ct. 856 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2007),

and vacated Black. Black v. California, 127 S.Ct. 1210 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2007). Cunningham held that

the DSL was inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment and Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker.

Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 871. In his traverse, Petitioner argued that because his Sixth Amendment

challenge was rejected by the California courts on the basis of Black, a decision now vacated, his

petition should be granted. The R&R concluded sua sponte that Cunningham does not apply

retroactively under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and because Cunningham, decided on

January 22, 2007, was decided after Petitioner’s conviction became final on March 9, 2006,

Cunningham provides no basis for relief in this case. The R&R therefore recommended that the

petition be denied. Petitioner filed timely objections on the retroactivity issue. 

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DISCUSSION

The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R are set forth in

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636. The district court “shall make

a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made. A judge of the

court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980); McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Business Machines, Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1981). The

magistrate’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, regardless of whether any party has filed

objections thereto. See Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). “If neither party

contests the magistrate’s proposed findings of fact, the court may assume their correctness and decide

the motion on the applicable law.” Orand v. United States, 602 F.2d 207, 208 (9th Cir. 1979). 

The court will now conduct a de novo review of that portion of the R&R to which Petitioner

objects. In his objections, Petitioner argues that Cunningham did not announce a new, non-retroactive

rule under Teague, but merely applied existing precedent to invalidate California’s sentencing scheme.

Therefore, according to Petitioner, this court has the power to apply Cunningham to this case. 

The court finds Petitioner’s objection to be without merit. The argument that the DSL was

already invalid under United States Supreme Court precedent at the time his conviction became final,

and that Cunningham merely announced the pre-existing invalidity of the DSL, is unpersuasive.

Black, the controlling California Supreme Court decision at the time Petitioner’s conviction became

final, also applied existing federal precedent (Apprendi, Blakely, Booker) to the DSL and concluded

that California’s DSL presented no Sixth Amendment concern. Black, 35 Cal.4th at 1255-64.

Petitioner’s arguments in the instant case were squarely addressed and rejected in Black. Therefore,

the California Court of Appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment challenge was not contrary

to, nor was it an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Petitioner also states in his objections that the issue of whether Cunningham is retroactive was

not raised by either party and therefore neither party has had opportunity to brief the question. The

court, however, has discretion to raise the Teague retroactivity question sua sponte. See Caspari v.

Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994); Webster v. Woodford, 369 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2004). Although

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2 One district court, in an unpublished decision, has also found that Cunningham is not retroactive. See

Dropalski v. Stewart, 2007 WL 963989 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 28, 2007). 

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the retroactivity of Cunningham has not yet been addressed in the Ninth Circuit, the R&R’s

retroactivity analysis sound.2

 The R&R reasoned that because “Cunningham relied heavily on the new

procedural rule announced in Blakely”, and because the Ninth Circuit has already decided that Blakely

is not retroactive, then Cunningham is also not retroactive. R&R at 5-6; Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d

1025, 1027 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that Blakely does not apply retroactively). The R&R further

reasoned that 

As in Blakely, the decision in Cunningham shifted decision-making authority

previously held by judges to juries, making it a procedural rule rather than a

substantive rule. Furthermore, a change in law that requires juries rather than

judges to make the factual findings on which a sentence is based does not

announce a watershed rule in criminal procedure. Schardt, 414 F.3d at 1036.

Thus, Cunningham does not fall under the watershed rule of criminal procedure

exception to nonretroactivity.

R&R at 6. Although “the fact that a court says that its decision is within the ‘logical compass’ of an

earlier decision, or indeed that it is ‘controlled’ by a prior decision, is not conclusive for purposes of

deciding whether the current decision is a ‘new rule’ under Teague”, Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S.

407, 415 (1990), it is likely the Ninth Circuit would find that Cunningham does not apply retroactively

given the trend in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s objections are OVERRULED. The court hereby

ADOPTS the findings and recommendations of the R&R in full. Accordingly, the petition is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 26, 2007

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Battaglia 

All Parties 

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