Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00195/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00195-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNEST MERRILL and )

LILA MERRILL, )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. )

)

COUNTY OF MADERA, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F 05-0195 AWI SMS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

AND THE PARTIES’ REQUEST FOR

CLARIFICATION

(Document #149)

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises from Defendants’ citations and denial of several permits to Lila and

Ernest Merrill, husband and wife (“Plaintiffs”), and to Ernest Merrill as an individual

(“Plaintiff”), which allegedly interfered with Plaintiffs’ use of their property. The court has

jurisdiction over the civil rights claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

On March 2, 2007, the court ruled on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The

court’s ruling was as follows:

Accordingly, based on the above memorandum opinion, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part. Specifically, the court ORDERS that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ equal

protection claim (Count 3) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part;

a. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’

contention that Defendants treated them differently when

they cited Plaintiffs and required Plaintiffs to have a permit

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to grade a 300 foot driveway and Plaintiffs’ contentions

that Defendants treated them differently when Defendants

did not give them a 15 day period between notice and being

cited for grading the 300 foot driveway and cited Plaintiffs

for grading the 300 foot driveway is DENIED; 

b. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the other factual basis of

Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim is GRANTED;

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ procedural due process

claim (Count 2) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;

a. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims arising

from Defendants’ actions concerning the denial or delay in Plaintiff

obtaining grading permits, including Defendants’ refusal to meet with

Plaintiff to get the permit reinstated on the Schub property, is GRANTED;

b. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the other factual basis of

Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim is DENIED;

3. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Right

to Petition Clause claim (Count 1) is GRANTED;

4. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Contract Clause claim

(Count 4) is GRANTED.

On March 8, 2007, Plaintiff filed an application for reconsideration of the court’s ruling

on summary judgment. Specifically, Plaintiffs contends that the court did not consider the facts

submitted by Plaintiffs because the court had chided Plaintiffs for not submitting a document

entitled “Statement of Disputed Facts” as part of their opposition to the motion for summary

judgment. Rather, Plaintiffs had submitted their facts in a document entitled “Plaintiff’s

Response to Defendant’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts.” In their application,

Plaintiffs express concern that the court never received this document, and the court did not

consider Plaintiff’s evidence.

On March 8, 2007, the court also held an informal telephonic conference with the parties. 

During the hearing, the parties asked the court to clarify which of the alleged due process

violations were still in play for trial. In addition, the parties asked the court to clarify whether

the third and fourth theories of Plaintiff’s equal protection claim were still in play for trial and/or

whether these theories were limited to Defendants’ actions concerning the 300 foot driveway and

not the road.

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II. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

The court has discretion to reconsider and vacate a prior order. Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d

1185, 1198 (9 Cir.1994); United States v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 396 (9 Cir.1992). th th

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored, however, and are not the place for parties to make

new arguments not raised in their original briefs. Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood

Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9 Cir.1988). Nor is reconsideration to be used to ask the th

court to rethink what it has already thought. United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F.Supp.2d 1112,

1116 (D.Ariz.1998). Motions to reconsider are committed to the discretion of the trial court. 

Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d

456, 460 (9 Cir. 1983) (en banc). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly th

convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision. See, e.g., Kern-Tulare Water

Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part

on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9 Cir. 1987). When filing a motion for reconsideration, Local th

Rule 78-230(k) requires a party to show the “new or different facts or circumstances claimed to

exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist

for the motion.” 

In Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff’s take issue with Footnote 1, found in

the court’s order on summary judgment. Footnote 1 noted that the Undisputed Facts Section of

the court’s order on the motion for summary judgment were based on Defendants’ proposed

undisputed facts and Plaintiffs’ responses. Citing Local Rule 65-260(b), the court stated that

those undisputed facts proposed by Defendants would be deemed undisputed unless Plaintiffs

cited to evidence indicating a dispute. The court further noted that Plaintiff had not provided a

statement of disputed facts as allowed for by Local Rule 65-260(b), and stated that Plaintiffs’

discussion section was not the place to introduce facts for the first time. 

Despite Footnote 1, the court did consider the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs in their

responses to Defendants’ undisputed facts and found in Plaintiffs’ briefs. The purpose of

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 This theory is only proceeding on Defendants’ citation of the 300 foot driveway and not 1

the citation concerning the road. The undisputed facts show that Defendants had a legitimate

reason to cite Plaintiffs for grading the road without a permit and there is no evidence of pretext. 

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Footnote 1 was to inform the parties the proper way to respond to a statement of undisputed facts

and inform the parties that the court would not search through evidence, such as depositions and

declarations, to find facts that had not been cited by the parties. Because the court did consider

Plaintiffs’ response to Defendants’ undisputed facts, and the evidence specifically cited to by

Plaintiffs, the court considered the very evidence at issue in the motion for reconsideration. 

Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration will be denied.

III. REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION ON REMAINING CLAIMS

At the March 8, 2007, hearing the parties expressed some confusion over the court’s

order on summary judgment. It appears that the confusion is based on the fact that Plaintiffs’

equal protection claim has several factual basis that each support a separate, alleged violation of

the Equal Protection Clause. In addition, Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim has several

factual basis that each support a separate, alleged violation of the Procedural Due Process Clause. 

 While the court’s order attempted to list each factual basis and state whether this basis would

proceed to trial, the court will attempt to again explain what theories that are proceeding to trial.

Plaintiff’s equal protection claim will proceed on the following theories: 

 (1) Defendants citing Plaintiffs and requiring them to have a permit to grade a 300

foot driveway, despite their permit for the mobile home, but Mr. Gilbert was

allowed to grade his driveway under his house permit and did not need another

grading permit;

(2) Defendant Ruiz cited Plaintiffs two days after Plaintiffs were given notice of

improper grading of the 300 foot driveway though others were given 15 days to

remedy violations;

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(3) Plaintiffs were cited for grading the 300 foot drive without a permit when no one

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 This theory is only proceeding on Defendants’ citation of the 300 foot driveway and not 2

the citation concerning the road. The undisputed facts show that Defendants had a legitimate

reason to cite Plaintiffs’ for grading the road without a permit and there is no evidence of pretext. 

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else has ever been cited for grading. 

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In the complaint and opposition, Plaintiffs also listed several actions by Defendants that

Plaintiffs believe violated Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights. In their motion for summary

judgment, Defendants did not address or move for summary judgment on many of these theories. 

Accordingly, the alleged procedural due process violations that remain for trial are:

(1) Defendants’ denial of Plaintiffs’ permit to build a barn; 

(2) Defendants requiring Plaintiffs to obtain a grading permit to grade the road when

none was allegedly required under the County’s ordinances; 

(3) Citing Plaintiffs for grading without a permit without giving Plaintiffs 15 days to

remedy the situation; 

(4) Arresting Plaintiff for grading without a permit without giving Plaintiffs 15 days

to remedy the situation; 

(5) Not releasing Plaintiffs’ erosion bond; 

(6) Cancelling or revoking Plaintiffs’ renewal permit to grade Site 2 (the Schub

Property);

(7) Refusing Plaintiffs access to a government building so that Plaintiffs could apply

for a new permit to grade the Schub Property; 

(8) Denying Plaintiffs a permit to build a home. 

Based on this list of legal issues that remain for trial, the parties should be able to complete their

trial preparation.

IV. ORDER

Accordingly, the court ORDERS that:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED’

2. The parties request for clarification on the theories remaining for trial is

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GRANTED. This action will proceed on the theories listed in Part III of

this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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