Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00225/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00225-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM ATCHERLEY,

Plaintiff,

vs.

EDGAR CLARK, et al., 

Defendants.

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1:12cv00225 DLB PC

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO 

EITHER FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT OR 

NOTIFY COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO 

PROCEED ONLY ON COGNIZABLE 

CLAIMS

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff William Atcherley (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his complaint on 

February 17, 2012. Plaintiff names the following Defendants: Edgar Clark, M.D., Glenn Thiel., 

M.D., CEO Macias, R.N. Holt, R.N. Ceballo, R.N. Anderson, R.N. Barbolla, L.V.N. Arbadia, 

L.V.N. Ross, Correctional Officer J. Rios, Correctional Officer J. Torres, Pacific Orthopedic and 

Clement Alade, M.D. 

A. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

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legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or 

appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are 

not. Id.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or 

other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 

1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s allegations must link the 

actions or omissions of each named defendant to a violation of his rights; there is no respondeat 

superior liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, 

Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 

(9th Cir. 2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to 

state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 

F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

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B. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison. The events complained of 

occurred while he was housed at Corcoran State Prison (“CSP”)

On January 13, 2011, Defendant Alade performed arthroscopic surgery on Plaintiff’s left 

knee at Pacific Orthopedic.1 Defendant Alade ordered a wheelchair for Plaintiff for two weeks, 

and ordered that his dressing be kept clean and dry until his next appointment.

When Plaintiff arrived back at CSP, he was taken to the CSP emergency room and 

examined by Defendant Clark. Defendant Clark ordered a wheelchair for Plaintiff for two 

weeks. He also issued, and approved, a CDC 7410 chrono but failed to give Plaintiff a copy. A 

copy of the order and chrono were given to Defendant Barbolla, but Defendant Barbolla did not 

take any action on the order or chrono until after they had expired. Plaintiff was forced to walk 

everywhere, against doctor’s orders, when he was returned to his housing unit. 

On January 18, 2011, after Plaintiff was returned to his housing unit, he submitted a 

request to see the yard nurse or doctor. On January 20, 2011, Plaintiff saw Defendant Holt. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Holt refused to follow up on the wheelchair/walker problem and 

used a pair of non-sterile gloves. Defendant Holt touched various items and then, without 

washing her hands, began removing Plaintiff’s bandages. In the process, she accidentally pulled 

out one of the stiches and his wound began to bleed. Defendant Holt touched the torn stitch with 

her contaminated gloves, and without cleaning the wound, rewrapped the wound with the same 

dirty bandage. She secured the old bandage with a new bandage on the outside. 

On January 21 and 22, 2011, Plaintiff asked the second and third watch L.V.N.s to 

change his dirty bandage.2 They refused, stating that they had no doctor’s orders to do so. 

 

1

Plaintiff alleges that Pacific Orthopedic and Dr. Adale were consultants and/or contractors with CSP and/or 

CDCR.

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Plaintiff states that he does not know the name of these L.V.N.s because they were not required to wear their name 

tags.

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On January 23, 2011, Plaintiff awoke with yellow drainage running down his leg. He 

showed this to the second and third watch L.V.N.s, who told Plaintiff that it was normal. An 

L.V.N. gave Plaintiff clean bandage material to change his own bandage and told him to submit 

a form for medical services. Plaintiff contends that the L.V.N. refused to change the bandage 

and refused to send Plaintiff to the prison emergency room to be seen by the doctor on call. 

Also on January 23, 2011, Plaintiff wrote letters to Defendants Pacific Orthopedic, 

Defendant Alade, Defendant Clark and Defendant Macias about the lack of assistive devices and 

his developing infection. Plaintiff contends these Defendants were aware of his improper 

medical care and ignored his letters 

On January 24, 2011, the second and third watch L.V.N.s refused to change Plaintiff’s 

bandages without a doctor’s order, and refused to send Plaintiff to the prison hospital. These 

L.V.N.s also refused to give Plaintiff new bandage material. 

On January 25 and 26, 2011, Plaintiff saw Defendant Ceballo. He did not have his 

wheelchair and walker. Defendant Ceballo changed Plaintiff’s dirty bandage and said that the 

drainage was normal. Defendant Ceballo also said that she would check on the wheelchair. 

On January 26, 2011, Defendants Rios and Torres escorted Plaintiff back to his housing 

unit after medical appointments. Plaintiff fell down, hurt both knees and dirtied the just-changed 

bandage. Defendants Rios and Torres refused to take Plaintiff back to the clinic because they 

were too busy.

Plaintiff then asked the second and third watch L.V.N.s to change his bandage, and they 

refused. They told Plaintiff that it had already been changed and it was not their job to change it. 

The L.V.N.s would not give Plaintiff bandage material.

On the evening of January 26, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a new request for medical 

treatment. On January 27, 2011, Defendant Barbolla came to Plaintiff’s cell to examine 

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Plaintiff’s cell mate. Plaintiff asked her about the wheelchair and she said that he didn’t need 

one. Defendant Barbolla told Plaintiff that if he did need one, he could use the one in the unit. 

On January 28, 2011, Plaintiff was again escorted to the clinic without a wheelchair or 

walker because the unit wheelchair could not be located. Plaintiff saw Defendant Anderson, who 

changed Plaintiff’s bandage and told him that the drainage was not normal. She did not, 

however, order the L.V.N.s to change his bandages when needed and did not send him to see a 

doctor. 

From January 28, 2011, through February 1, 2011, Plaintiff requested assistance from 

every L.V.N. who came to his cell door and each refused to help change Plaintiff’s bandage 

without a doctor’s order. On January 30, 2011, Plaintiff’s leg was swollen from the knee down 

and the assigned L.V.N. listened to his complaints but left the building without providing 

assistance.

On January 31, 2011, Plaintiff saw Dr. Galt in the clinic. Dr. Galt removed the two 

remaining stitches, ordered the wheelchair extended, ordered that the bandage be changed daily 

and ordered antibiotics. The third watch L.V.N. then refused to change his bandage, stating that 

the nurse should do it so she could see how his leg was doing.

On February 2, 2011, Plaintiff was examined against by Defendant Holt. Defendant Holt 

had a doctor look at Plaintiff’s knee and he was taken to the prison hospital emergency room. 

Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Moon, who wanted to admit Plaintiff for IV treatment, but Plaintiff 

refused. 

On February 4, 2011, Plaintiff returned to the hospital and when Dr. Moon saw Plaintiff’s 

knee, he was taken to San Joaquin Hospital and admitted. After testing, Plaintiff was diagnosed 

with MSSA, septic/emesis arthritis and mild anemia.

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On February 11, 2011, Dr. Alade performed a second surgery to clean out the infection 

caused by “poor wound care.” Instead of three small holes in his knee, Plaintiff now had a ten 

inch scar down the middle of his knee. 

On February 19 and 20, 2011, Defendant Ross refused to change Plaintiff’s bandage 

following the second surgery. The daily bandage change was ordered by Dr. Kim on February 

17, 2011, when he was released from the prison hospital. Plaintiff alleges that an unknown 

L.V.N. also refused to change his bandages after the second surgery. 

From February 24, 2011, to August 5, 2011, Plaintiff underwent painful physical therapy 

as he awaited a recommended third procedure on his left knee. Defendant Thiel denied the 

procedure on an unknown date. 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Thiel and Macias were in charge of supervising 

medical staff, training medical staff, and creating policy. 

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff alleges (1) violation of the Eighth Amendment based 

on failure to protect by Defendants Pacific Orthopedic, Alade, Clark, Thiel, Macias, Holt, 

Ceballa, Anderson, Barbolla, Rios, Torres, Ross and Doe Defendants; (2) deliberate indifference 

to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Defendants Pacific 

Orthopedic, Alade, Clark, Thiel, Macias, Barbolla, Holt, Ceballa, Anderson, Rios, Torres, 

Arbadia, Ross and Doe Defendants; (3) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment against Defendants Pacific Orthopedic, Alade, Clark, Macias, Thiel, Holt, Ceballa, 

Anderson, Barbolla, Rios, Torres, Ross, Arbadia and Doe Defendants; and (4) negligence 

against Defendants Pacific Orthopedic, Alade, Clark, Thiel, Macias, Holt, Ceballa, Anderson, 

Barbolla, Arbadia, Ross, Rios, Torres and Doe Defendants.

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C. ANALYSIS

1. Failure to Protect

Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim is duplicative of his Eighth Amendment medical claim, 

and the Court will therefore analyze his allegations in this context.

2. Eighth Amendment- Medical Care

To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care in prison, a plaintiff 

must show deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 295 (1976)) (quotation 

marks omitted). The two-part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) a 

serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in 

further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and (2) the 

defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

Deliberate indifference is shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s 

pain or possible medical need, and harm caused by the indifference. Id. (citation and quotation 

marks omitted). Deliberate indifference may be manifested when prison officials deny, delay or 

intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison 

physicians provide medical care. Id. (citation and quotations omitted). Where a prisoner is 

alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to further harm in order 

for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Berry v. 

Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 

1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 

1997) (en banc).

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a. Defendants Clark, Thiel and Macias- Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff first alleges that Defendants Clark, Thiel and Macias instituted a policy of 

“restricting if not outright denying follow-up care/treatment recommended by outside medical 

consultants/contractors when such care is expensive.” Compl. 16. 

Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the 

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant 

holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed 

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 

941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must 

allege some facts indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged 

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or 

promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

While it is possible, then, to base liability on a policy, Plaintiff has failed to do so here. 

His statement that Defendants Clark, Thiel and Macias instituted a policy to deny medical 

treatment is unsupported, especially since the only facts he presents to the Court are ones dealing 

with his own medical treatment. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations fail to state a claim against 

Defendants Clark, Thiel and Macias based on an alleged policy.

Moreover, other than stating that Defendant Macias implemented a policy, he includes no 

other factual allegations linking Defendant Macias to any constitutional violation. He has 

therefore failed to state any claims against Defendant Macias. This applies to all claims against 

Defendant Macias and he will not be discussed further in this order

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b. Defendant Arabadia

Plaintiff alleges no facts related to Defendant Arabadia and he has therefore failed to state 

any claim against her. This applies to all allegations against Defendant Arabadia and she will 

not be discussed further in this order. 

c. Defendants Pacific Orthopedic, Alade, Clark and Thiel 

Plaintiff next contends that Defendants Pacific Orthopedic, Alade, Clark and Thiel 

violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to take steps to ensure that Plaintiff received 

necessary medical treatment. He bases this on his presumption that these Defendants were aware 

of the lack of care because he sent them a letter. 

Even assuming for screening purposes that Pacific Orthopedic is a “person” for purposes 

of section 1983, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that either Pacific Orthopedic or Defendant 

Alade knew of an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety. Plaintiff alleges that he wrote 

them a letter to inform them of the issues, but simply sending a letter does not support a 

presumption of knowledge. Pursuant to Iqbal, Plaintiff must affirmatively allege that Defendants 

received the letter and knew of its contents. He therefore fails to state a claim against Pacific 

Orthopedic or Defendant Alade.

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Clark and Thiel fail for the same reasons. 

Plaintiff’s letter to Defendants Clark and Thiel is not sufficient to presume that they were aware 

of Plaintiff’s complaints and knowingly denied or delayed medical care.

Insofar as Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Thiel violated the Eighth Amendment by 

failing to approve a medical procedure, his claims are too vague to state a claim. Plaintiff 

provides no facts or allegations to indicate that Defendant Thiel acted with deliberate 

indifference. 

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d. Allegations Relating to Wheelchair Orders

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Clark, Barbolla, Holt, Ceballa, Anderson, Rios and 

Torres refused to provide Plaintiff with his own wheelchair. He also contends that Defendants 

Rios and Torres refused to use discretion in escorting Plaintiff, who obviously lacked mobility, 

around the institution without a wheelchair or walker.

According to Plaintiff, Defendants Clark ordered a wheelchair, but instead of giving the 

order to Plaintiff, he gave it to Defendant Barbolla, who did not take appropriate action. As a 

result, Plaintiff was not given a wheelchair and was forced to walk everywhere. He asked 

Defendant Holt to follow-up on the wheelchair order, but Holt refused to do so. Plaintiff also

asked Defendant Ceballo, who told Plaintiff that she would follow-up. Defendant Barbolla 

eventually told Plaintiff that he did not need a wheelchair and that if he did, he could use the unit 

wheelchair. There are no factual allegations made against Defendant Anderson relating to the 

wheelchair issue. 

Based on a liberal reading of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court finds that he states a claim 

for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Defendants Holt and Barbolla in 

light of Dr. Clark’s order for a wheelchair. 

There are no factual allegations that Dr. Clark or Defendant Ceballo acted with the 

requisite knowledge, and he therefore fails to state a claim against them for deliberate 

indifference. Similarly, there are no allegations connecting Defendant Anderson to the 

wheelchair issue and Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against Defendant Anderson on this 

basis. 

As to Defendants Rios and Torres, who escorted Plaintiff back to his housing unit 

without his walker or wheelchair, Plaintiff fails to allege that they even knew that Plaintiff 

needed and/or wanted a wheelchair. His allegations therefore do not demonstrate that 

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Defendants Rios or Torres acted with the requisite knowledge and he fails to state an Eighth 

Amendment medical claim against them.3

e. Allegations Relating to Bandage Changing

Plaintiff contends that Defendants Clark, Holt, Ceballo, Anderson, Ross and Doe 

Defendants refused and/or failed to change his bandages, even though they knew the bandages 

needed to be changed. 

Plaintiff states that he does not know what orders Dr. Clark made regarding bandage 

changing, though he also alleges that Dr. Clark failed to “specifically order bandage changing.” 

Compl. 8. Defendant Holt re-used a dirty bandage to re-wrap his wound. Numerous Doe 

L.V.N.s refused to change Plaintiff’s bandages despite his requests to do so. Defendant Ceballo 

changed his bandage, but then failed to order the L.V.N.s to change the bandages daily, or as 

needed. Similarly, Defendant Anderson changed Plaintiff’s bandages, but failed to order the 

L.V.N.s to change the bandages as needed. Defendant Ross refused to change Plaintiff’s 

bandages after the second surgery, despite an order from Dr. Kim to do so.

Plaintiff has stated a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against 

Defendant Ross in light of Dr. Kim’s order. He also states a claim against the Doe L.V.N.s who 

repeatedly refused to change his bandages. 

However, as to Defendant Clark, Ceballo, Holt and Anderson, Plaintiff has not alleged 

that their actions were taken in conscious disregarded of an excessive risk to his health. While 

Defendants Clark, Anderson and Ceballo may have failed to order his bandages changed, there is 

no indication that they did so in conscious disregard of his health. Similarly, while Defendant 

Holt may have been negligent in caring for Plaintiff’s wound, there is no indication that he did so 

in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s health. “Medical malpractice does not become a 

constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 

 

3

Plaintiff also contends that Doe officers escorted him without his wheelchair, but he includes no factual allegations 

against them and therefore fails to state a claim. 

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106, 97 S.Ct. 285 (1977); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled 

on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

f. Failure to Send Plaintiff to the Prison Hospital

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Clark, Holt, Ceballo and Doe L.V.N.s refused and failed 

to order that Plaintiff be taken to the prison hospital after being informed either in person, or by 

letter, that he had increased pain and drainage from his wound.

Construed liberally, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a claim against the Doe L.V.N.s 

based on their delay and/or denial of further medical treatment.

However, as explained above, a letter written to Dr. Clark is not sufficient to support a 

presumption of knowledge. Regarding Defendant Holt, Plaintiff makes no allegations that 

Defendant Holt refused to send him to the prison hospital. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a 

claim against either Defendant Clark or Holt.

Defendant also fails to state a claim against Defendant Ceballo. According to his 

allegations, Defendant Ceballo provided care but did not send him to the prison hospital. There 

is no indication that she did not send Plaintiff to the prison hospital in conscious disregard of 

Plaintiff’s health. “A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical 

authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a [section] 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 

662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted); accord Snow v. McDaniel, 681 

F.3d 978, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2012); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2012).

3. Eighth Amendment- Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects 

prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of 

confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)) 

(quotation marks omitted). While conditions of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive 

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and harsh, they must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Morgan, 465 

F.3d at 1045 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, conditions 

which are devoid of legitimate penological purpose or contrary to evolving standards of decency 

that mark the progress of a maturing society violate the Eighth Amendment. Morgan, 465 F.3d 

at 1045 (quotation marks and citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002); 

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. 

Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, 

clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted), but not every injury that a prisoner sustains 

while in prison represents a constitutional violation, Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks 

omitted). To succeed on an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, a prisoner 

must show that (1) the defendant prison official’s conduct deprived him or her of the minimal 

civilized measure of life's necessities and (2) that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference 

to the prisoner's health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Extreme deprivations are required to 

make out a conditions of confinement claim, and only those deprivations denying the minimal 

civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth 

Amendment violation. Hudson, 503 U.S.at 9.

a. Defendants Pacific Orthopedic, Alade and Clark

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Pacific Orthopedic, Alade and Clark failed to follow-up 

on Plaintiff’s treatment after Plaintiff wrote them a letter, and that this led to inhumane 

conditions of confinement.

Plaintiff’s claim against these Defendants fails, again, because sending a letter cannot 

support a presumption of knowledge.

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b. Allegations Relating to Wheelchair Order

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Clark, Thiel, Barbolla, Holt, Ceballa, Anderson, Rios, 

Torres and Does failed to authorize a wheelchair for movement around the prison and/or failed to 

ensure that Plaintiff had the required paperwork for the wheelchair. He contends that this 

amounted to cruel and unusual punishment because he was forced to move around the institution 

without an assistive device, which caused him to sweat more and contributed to the development 

of a serious and painful staph infection. 

Based on a liberal reading of the complaint, Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment 

conditions of confinement claim against Defendants Holt and Barbolla in light of the wheelchair 

order and subsequent fall, followed by a second surgery. 

As to Defendants Clark, Ceballo, Rios and Torres, there are no factual allegations that 

they acted with the requisite knowledge, and he therefore fails to state a claim against them. 

Similarly, there are no allegations connecting Defendant Anderson, Thiel or Doe Defendants to 

the wheelchair issue and Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against them on this basis. 

c. Allegations Relating to Bandage Changing

Plaintiff contends that Defendants Alade, Clark, Holt, Ceballa, Anderson, Ross and Doe 

Defendants refused and/or failed to change his bandages. He contends that this led to the 

development of a serious and painful staph infection and second surgery.

Plaintiff has stated a claim for inhumane conditions of confinement against Defendant 

Ross in light of Dr. Kim’s order. He also states a claim against the Doe L.V.N.s who repeatedly 

refused to change his bandages. 

As to Dr. Alade, the Court notes that Plaintiff alleges that he ordered that the bandages be 

kept “clean and dry until appointment.” Compl. 7. This seems to be contrary to Plaintiff’s 

allegation and here therefore fails to state a claim against Dr. Alade.

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As to Defendants Clark, Ceballo, Holt, Anderson and Ross, Plaintiff has not alleged that 

they acted with deliberate indifference. He therefore fails to state a claim against them.

4. Negligence

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original 

jurisdiction, the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are 

so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same 

case or controversy under Article III,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). “[O]nce 

judicial power exists under § 1367(a), retention of supplemental jurisdiction over state law 

claims under 1367(c) is discretionary.” Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th 

Cir.1997).

“Under California law, ‘[t]he elements of negligence are: (1) defendant’s obligation to 

conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risks 

(duty); (2) failure to conform to that standard (breach of duty); (3) a reasonably close connection 

between the defendant’s conduct and resulting injuries (proximate cause); and (4) actual loss 

(damages).’” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 572 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting McGarry v. Sax, 

158 Cal.App.4th 983, 994, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 519 (2008) (internal quotations omitted)).

a. Allegations Relating to Wheelchair Order

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Pacific Orthopedic, Alade, Clark, Thiel, Holt, Ceballo, 

Anderson, Rios, Torres and Doe Defendants were negligent in failing to provide a walker and/or 

wheelchair, and/or failing to ensure that Plaintiff had the proper documentation for the use of a 

walker or wheelchair.

Construed liberally, Plaintiff states a negligence claim against Defendants Holt and 

Barbolla based on their duty arising from their positions as treating sources in the prison where 

the wheelchair would have been provided. 

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As to the remaining Defendants, however, there doesn’t appear to be, and Plaintiff does 

not allege, a duty to ensure that Plaintiff received his wheelchair. He therefore fails to state a 

claim against the remaining Defendants on this basis.

b. Allegations Relating to Bandage Changing

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Pacific Orthopedic, Alade, Clark, Holt, Ceballo, Ross, 

Anderson and Doe Defendants were negligent in failing to order daily bandage changes and/or 

refusing to change bandages.

Construed liberally, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a negligence claim against 

Defendants Clark, Anderson and Ceballo based on their failure to order daily bandage changes in 

light of their position as treating sources with control over such orders. The Court also finds that 

Plaintiff states a negligence claim against Defendant Ross and Doe L.V.N.s based on their 

refusal, as Plaintiff’s treating sources in the prison, to change his bandages. Finally, Plaintiff 

states a negligence claim against Defendant Holt for what Plaintiff alleges to be improper wound 

care.

As explained above, Dr. Alade did order bandage changes and Plaintiff therefore fails to 

state a claim against him and/or Pacific Orthopedic for negligence.

c. Failure to Send Plaintiff to Prison Hospital

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Holt, Ceballo, Anderson and Doe Defendants were 

negligent in failing to send him to the prison hospital to be seen for his infection.

Construed liberally, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a claim against Defendants

Ceballo, Anderson and Doe L.V.N.s based on their failure to send Plaintiff to the prison hospital.

Regarding Defendant Holt, Plaintiff makes no allegations that Defendant Holt refused to 

send him to the prison hospital and he therefore fails to state a claim against Holt on this basis.

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d. Dr. Thiel

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Thiel was negligent in failing to approve a procedure for 

Plaintiff’s knee. His allegations are too vague, however, to allow the Court to properly analyze 

whether this states a claim for negligence. Accordingly, as currently pled, Plaintiff fails to state 

a negligence claim against Dr. Thiel.

D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint states the following cognizable claims: (1) violation of the Eighth 

Amendment against Defendants Holt, Barbolla, Ross and Doe L.V.N.s for deliberate indifference 

to a serious medical need; (2) violation of the Eighth Amendment against Defendants Holt, 

Barbolla, Ross and Doe L.V.N.s based on conditions of confinement; and (3) negligence against 

Defendants Holt, Barbolla, Clark, Anderson, Ceballo, Ross and Doe L.V.N.s.

Plaintiff may either (1) proceed on his cognizable claims, identified above, or (2) file an 

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in this order. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). 

If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he may not change the nature of this suit by 

adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 

(7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). Further, Plaintiff is notified that his amended 

complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 

(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or 

superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

If Plaintiff is willing to proceed on his cognizable claims, he may notify the Court in 

writing. The Court will then dismiss Plaintiff’s other claims and Defendants, and provide 

Plaintiff with further instructions regarding service of a summons and the complaint.

4

 

4 Plaintiff is reminded that the United States Marshal cannot initiate service of process on unknown defendants. 

Therefore, the Court will send Plaintiff the appropriate service documents at such time as Plaintiff ascertains the 

identities of the Doe defendants.

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court 

in this order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended 

complaint and is willing to proceed only on the cognizable claims identified above. 

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure 

to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 15, 2013 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

3b142a

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