Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01567/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01567-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON SAUNDERS, 

 

Plaintiff,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

1:06-cv-01567-AWI-GSA-PC

SCREENING ORDER

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF RULES 8(a)

AND 18(a), WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

(Doc. 51.)

ORDER FOR CLERK TO SEND PLAINTIFF A

CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT FORM

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE TO FILE THIRD

AMENDED COMPLAINT NOT EXCEEDING

TWENTY-FIVE PAGES

I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jason Saunders (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with

this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing

this action on October 13, 2006. (Doc. 1.) On December 7, 2006, Plaintiff filed the First Amended

Complaint. (Doc. 5.) On April 12, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint together

with a proposed Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 10.) On August 2, 2007, the Court denied the

motion to amend. (Doc. 11.)

On March 17, 2009, the Court denied Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis and

ordered Plaintiff to pay the filing fee in full within thirty days. (Doc. 16.) Plaintiff failed to pay the

filing fee, and on April 6, 2010, the case was dismissed and judgment was entered. (Docs. 28, 29.) 

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On January 3, 2012, Plaintiff appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit. (Doc. 40.) On February 14, 2013, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court improperly

denied Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis and erred in denying Plaintiff leave to file his

proposed amended complaint. (Doc. 46.) The district court's judgment was vacated, and the case

was remanded to the district court. Id. On February 15, 2013, the case was reopened at the district

court. (Doc. 47.) On March 11, 2013, the Ninth Circuit issued its formal mandate. (Doc. 48.)

On March 18, 2013, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and filed

Plaintiff's proposed Second Amended Complaint, which is now before the Court for screening.

(Docs. 50, 51.)

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

III. PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego,

California. The events at issue in the Second Amended Complaint occurred at Pleasant ValleyState

Prison in Coalinga, California, and the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility in Corcoran,

California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated at those facilities. Plaintiff names more than forty-nine

defendants for violation of his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, denial

of due process and equal protection, conspiracy, and related state claims. 

A. Rule 8(a)

Under federal notice pleading, a complaint is only required to contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

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Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

663 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “While a plaintiff’s

allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). To state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must set forth sufficient factual allegations

sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service,

572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this

plausibility standard. Id. 

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint consists of sixty-five pages of allegations and claims

set forth in one-hundred-seventy-six enumerated paragraphs. Thus, the Second Amended Complaint

fails to comport with Rule 8(a)'s instruction that the complaint is only required to contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Plaintiff’s lengthy

narrative does not succinctly allege facts against the named defendants. Plaintiff shall be granted

leave to file a Third Amended Complaint that complies with Rule 8(a). Twenty-five pages is more

than sufficient for Plaintiff to identify his claims and set forth specific facts in support of those

claims. Accordingly, the Third Amended Complaint may not exceed twenty-five pages in length,

and it will be stricken from the record if it violates this page limitation.

B. Rule 18(a) - Unrelated Claims

Plaintiff alleges multiple claims in the Second AmendedComplaint that are largelyunrelated.

Plaintiff may not proceed in one action on a myriad of unrelated claims against different staff

members. “The controlling principle appears in Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a): ‘A party asserting a claim to

relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as

independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has

against an opposing party.’ Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against

Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims

against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass [a

multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners paythe required

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filing fees-for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals

that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” George

v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 

If Plaintiff pursues unrelated claims in his Third Amended Complaint, the Court shall decide

for him which related claims shall be permitted to proceed.

III. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted). “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed bythe federal Constitution,

Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

In the paragraphs that follow, the Court will provide Plaintiff with the legal standards that

appear to apply to his claims. Plaintiff should carefully review the standards and amend only those

claims that he believes, in good faith, are cognizable. 

A. Excessive Force Claim - Eighth Amendment

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . .

. contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates

contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Id.

at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment excessive force

standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis injuries)). However, not “every

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth

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Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarilyexcludes from constitutional

recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort

‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal quotations marks and citations

omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whetherforce was applied

in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciouslyand sadisticallyto cause harm.”

Id. at 7. “In determining whetherthe use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also be proper

to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of

force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

“The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end

it.” Id.

B. Adverse Conditions of Confinement - Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from

inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim, and only those

deprivations denyingtheminimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficientlygrave to form

the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (citations and quotations

omitted). In order to state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must allege

facts sufficient to support a claim that prison officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of

serious harm to the plaintiff. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994);

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). The circumstances, nature, and duration of the

deprivations are critical in determining whether the conditions complained of are grave enough to

form the basis of a viable Eighth Amendment claim. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir.

2006). “[R]outine discomfort inherent in the prison setting” does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. Id. at 731. 

///

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C. Medical Claim - Eighth Amendment

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical [or dental] treatment,

an inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285 (1976)). The

two-part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “‘a serious medical need’

by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in furthersignificant injury

or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need was

deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059

(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted)). Deliberate indifference is shown by “a

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and harm caused

by the indifference.” Id. (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). Deliberate indifference may be

manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or

it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Id. Where a prisoner

is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to further harm in order

for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin at

1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060

(9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person

‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada,

290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). “A showing of medical malpractice or negligence is

insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1060. 

“[E]ven gross negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. (citing Wood v.

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990)).

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D. Conspiracy

In the context of conspiracy claims brought pursuant to section 1983, a complaint must

“allege [some] facts to support the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants.” Buckey v.

County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police

Department, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff must allege that defendants conspired or

acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Sykes v.

State of California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1974).

A conspiracy claim requires proof of “‘an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate

constitutional rights,’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting United Steel

Workers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted)),

and an actual deprivation of constitutional rights, Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Woodrum v. Woodward County, Oklahoma, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989)). “‘To

be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each

participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.’” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441

(quoting United Steel Workers, 865 F.2d at 1541).

E. Due Process Violations - Fourteenth Amendment

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners from being

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,

556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff

must first establish the existence of a protected interest. Liberty interests may arise from the Due

Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). With respect

to liberty interests arising from state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison

regulations is determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by prison regulations are limited to freedom from

restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. 

“Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply

of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. With respect

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to prison disciplinary proceedings, the minimum procedural requirements that must be met are: (1)

written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the time the prisoner receives written

notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may prepare his defense; (3) a written

statement by the fact finders of the evidence they rely on and reasons for taking disciplinary action;

(4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his defense, when permitting him to do so would not

be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; and (5) legal assistance to the

prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the issues presented are legally complex. Id. at 563-71. 

As long as the five minimum Wolff requirements are met, due process has been satisfied. Walker

v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994). “Some evidence” must support the decision of the

hearing officer. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). The standard is not particularly

stringent and the relevant inquiry is whether “there is any evidence in the record that could support

the conclusion reached . . . .” Id. at 455-56 (emphasis added). 

F. Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Rehabilitation Act ("RA") 

“Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the RA both prohibit discrimination on the basis of

disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). Title II of the ADA provides

that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from

participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,

or be subject to discrimination by such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 of the RA provides

that “no otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his

disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 29 U.S.C.

§ 794. Title II of the ADA and the RA apply to inmates within state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept.

of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 1955 (1998); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d

1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 453-56 (9th Cir. 1996).

“To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is a

qualified individual with a disability; (2) [he] was excluded from participation in or otherwise

discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3) such

exclusion or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052. “To

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establish a violation of § 504 of the RA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is handicapped within

the meaning of the RA; (2) [he] is otherwise qualified for the benefit or services sought; (3) [he] was

denied the benefit or services solely by reason of [his] handicap; and (4) the program providing the

benefit or services receives federal financial assistance.” Id. 

“‘Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination in programs of a public entityor discrimination

by any such entity.’” Roundtree v. Adams, No. 1:01-CV-06502 OWW LJO, 2005 WL 3284405, at

*8 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 1, 2005) (quoting Thomas v. Nakatani, 128 F.Supp.2d 684, 691 (D. Haw. 2000)). 

“The ADA defines ‘public entity’ in relevant part as ‘any State or local government’ or ‘any

department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local

government.’” Roundtree, 2005 WL 3284405, at *8 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)-(B)). Public

entity, “‘as it is defined within the statute, does not include individuals.’” Id. (quoting Alsbrook v.

City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n.8 (8thCir. 1999)). 

The treatment, or lack of treatment, concerningPlaintiff’s medical condition does not provide

a basis upon which to impose liability under the RA or the ADA. Burger v. Bloomberg, 418 F.3d

882, 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (medical treatment decisions not a basis for RA or ADA claims); Schiavo

ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2005) (RA not intended to apply to

medical treatment decisions); Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005)

(medical decisions not ordinarilywithin scope of ADA or RA); Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249

(7th Cir. 1996) (“The ADA does not create a remedy for medical malpractice.”). 

G. Retaliation

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because

of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his

First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional

goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted); accord

Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). 

An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison

grievance is sufficient to support claim under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th

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Cir. 2003). The mere threat of harm can be sufficiently adverse to support a retaliation claim. 

Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1270. The Court must “‘afford appropriate deference and flexibility’ to

prison officials in the evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to

be retaliatory.” Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at

482). The burden is on plaintiff to demonstrate “that there were no legitimate correctional purposes

motivating the actions he complains of.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808. 

H. Failure to Protect - Eighth Amendment

Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical abuse. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833; Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1982). To establish a

violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison officials were “deliberately indifferent

to a serious threat to the inmates’s safety.” Farmer, at 834. The question under the Eighth

Amendment is whether prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to

a sufficiently substantial ‘risk of serious damage to his future health ... .’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843

(citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). The Supreme Court has explained that

“deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence ... [but] something less than

acts or omissionsfor the very purpose of causing harm or with the knowledge that harm will result.” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. The Court defined this “deliberate indifference” standard as equal to

“recklessness,” in which “a person disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware.” Id. at 836-37.

The deliberate indifference standard involves both an objective and a subjective prong. First,

the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Id. at 834. Second,

subjectively, the prison official must “know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety.” Id. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995). To prove

knowledge of the risk, however, the prisoner may rely on circumstantial evidence; in fact, the very

obviousness of the risk may be sufficient to establish knowledge. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Wallis

v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995).

I. Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarlysituated be treated alike. 

City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985); Shakur

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v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). An equal protection claim may be established by

showing that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff based on his membership in

a protected class, Comm. ConcerningCmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 702-03

(9th Cir. 2009); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071,1082 (9th Cir. 2003), Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001), or that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated

differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Oregon

Department of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601-02, 128 S.Ct. 2146 (2008); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,

528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073 (2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th

Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008).

J. Denial of Access to Courts

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 346, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2177 (1996); Phillips v. Hust , 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The right of access to the courts is merely the right to bring to court a grievance the inmate wishes

to present, and is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Lewis,

518 U.S. at 354. To bring a claim, the plaintiff must have suffered an actual injury by being shut out

of court. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2185-87 (2002); Lewis at 351;

Phillips, 588 F.3d at 655.

K. First Amendment Violations

"[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his

[or her] status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." 

Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Clement v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 364 F.3d 1148, 1151

(9th Cir. 2004); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). A regulation that impinges

on First Amendment rights "is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 526 (2006). Courts

should accord prison officials great deference when analyzing the constitutional validity of prison

regulations. See Id. at 528-30; Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).

In determining whether a prison regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological

interest, the court should consider the following factors: (1) whether there is a valid, rational

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connection between the regulation and the interest used to justify the regulation; (2) whether

prisoners retain alternative means of exercising the right at issue; (3) the impact the requested

accommodation will have on inmates, prison staff, and prison resources generally; and (4) whether

the prisoner has identified easy alternatives to the regulation which could be implemented at a

minimal cost to legitimate penological interests. See Beard, 548 U.S. at 529; Overton, 539 U.S. at

132; Turner, 482 U.S. at 132, Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 975-76 (9th Cir. 2004).

L. Appeals Process

Defendants’ actions in responding to Plaintiff’s appeals, alone, cannot give rise to any claims

for relief under section 1983 for violation of due process. “[A prison] grievance procedure is a

procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow,

997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982));

see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of

appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641,

647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann

v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). “Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty

interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned bythe Fourteenth Amendment.” Azeez, 568

F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). Actions in reviewing a

prisoner’s administrative appeal, without more, are not actionable under section 1983. Buckley, 997

F.2d at 495. 

M. Verbal Harassment and Threats

Mere verbal harassment or abuse, including the use of racial epithets, does not violate the

Constitution and, thus, does not give rise to a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Oltarzewski

v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987). Threats do not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987).

N. Personal Property Violations

Prisoners have a protected interest in their personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728,

730 (9th Cir. 1974). However, while an authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable

under the Due Process Clause, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13, 104 S.Ct. 3194

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(1984) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36, 102 S.Ct. 1148 (1982));

Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985), “[a]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of

property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the

loss is available,” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. 

California Law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property deprivations.

See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 810-895; Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994). 

California’s Tort Claims Act requires that a tort claim against a public entity or its employees be

presented to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, formerly known

as the State Board of Control, no more than six months after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov’t

Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950-950.2 (West 2006). Presentation of a written claim, and

action on or rejection of the claim are conditions precedent to suit. State v. Superior Court of Kings

County (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1245, 90 P.3d 116, 124, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 543 (2004); Mangold

v. California Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). To state a tort claim against

a public employee, a plaintiff must allege compliance with the Tort Claims Act. State v. Superior

Court, 32 Cal.4th at 1245, 90 P.3d at 124, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d at 543; Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477; KarimPanahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1088). 

O. State Law Claims

Violation of state tort law, state regulations, rules and policies of the CDCR, or other state

law is not sufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, there

must be a deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693

(1976). Although the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff

must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint violates Rules 8(a) and 18(a)

and must be dismissed. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend

‘shall be freely given when justice so requires.’” The court will provide Plaintiff with time to file

an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified above. Plaintiff is granted leave to file a

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Third Amended Complaint within thirty days. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir.

1987).

The Third Amended Complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each

named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There is no

respondeat superior liability, and each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 676-77. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is

plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff must also

demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones, 297

F.3d at 934 (emphasis added). 

As discussed above, twenty-five pages is more than sufficient for Plaintiff to identify his

claims and set forth specific facts in support of those claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff ’s Third

Amended Complaint may not exceed twenty-five pages in length, and it will be stricken from the

record if it violates this page limitation. 

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not for

the purposes of adding new defendants for unrelated claims arising before October 13, 2006. In

addition, Plaintiff should take care to include only those claims that were administratively exhausted

before October 13, 2006. 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an

amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer serves any function in the case. 

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearlyand boldly

titled “Third Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed

under penalty of perjury. 

///

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, filed on March 18, 2013, is dismissed for

violation of Rules 8(a) and 18(a), with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in this order;

4. Plaintiff shall caption the amended complaint “Third Amended Complaint” and refer

to the case number 1:06-cv-01567-AWI-GSA-PC; 

5. The Third Amended Complaint may not exceed twenty-five pages in length, and it

will be stricken from the record if it violates this page limitation; and

6. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action may be dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 22, 2013 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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