Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_08-cv-08064/USCOURTS-azd-3_08-cv-08064-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Randolph Wolfson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

J. William Brammer, Jr., et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-08-8064-PCT-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it plaintiff Randolph Wolfson’s motion for summary judgment

(doc. 69), defendant Chief Counsel of the State Bar of Arizona’s (“Bar Counsel”) response

(doc. 84), defendant Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct’s (the “Commission

Members”) response (doc. 86), and Wolfson’s reply (doc. 92). We also have before us the

Commission Members’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 71), Bar Counsel’s motion for

summary judgment (doc. 75), plaintiffs’ combined response to these motions (doc. 79), the

Commission Member’s reply (doc. 91), and Bar Counsel’s reply (doc. 89). Finally, we have

a motion for summary judgment by defendant Disciplinary Commission (doc. 73). Plaintiff

has since voluntarily dismissed all claims against the Arizona Disciplinary Commission (doc.

88). Therefore, the Disciplinary Commission’s motion for summary judgment is denied as

moot (doc. 73). 

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I

Arizona’s Constitution provides for the selection of some state court judges by

popular election. See Ariz. Constitution, Art. 6, § 12(A). In an attempt to address the

challenges inherent in a system of an elected judiciary, Arizona has adopted a Code of

Judicial Conduct (the “Code”) that allows judicial candidates to speak to voters about their

qualifications and viewpoints on issues, but prohibits them from, among other things,

personally soliciting funds for their own campaigns or actively campaigning for others. The

Code regulates the conduct of both judges and candidates for judicial office. The defendants

contend that the Code attempts to address the areas of greatest possible harm to the

appearance and reality of a fair and impartial judicial system. 

Defendant Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct has authority under Article 6.1

of the Arizona Constitution to investigate complaints involving Code violations, bring formal

charges against judges, impose informal sanctions, and make recommendations to the

Arizona Supreme Court for formal sanctions. Lawyers who are judicial candidates are also

required to comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct. See E.R. 8.2(b), Rule 42, Rules of

the Ariz. Sup. Ct. Violations of E.R. 8.2(b) are investigated and prosecuted by defendant Bar

Counsel. 

II

In 2006, plaintiff Randolph Wolfson was a candidate for the office of Kingman

Precinct Justice of the Peace in Mohave County, Arizona. Compl. ¶ 14. In 2008, Wolfson

was a candidate for the office of Judge of the Superior Court of Arizona in Mohave County.

Wolfson contends that during his 2006 and 2008 campaigns, he wanted to personally solicit

campaign contributions at live appearances and speaking engagements, by making phone

calls, and by signing his name to fund appeal letters, in order to support his own campaign.

Compl. ¶ 33. He refrained from soliciting, however, because he believed that he was

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1

After the complaint was filed in this case, the Arizona Supreme Court amended the

Code of Judicial Conduct. The current version of the challenged Rules now appears under

the Code’s Canon 4, and is essentially the same as the former version. We refer to the

current Code provisions only.

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prohibited by Rule 4.1(A)(6), Rule 81, Rules of the Ariz. Sup. Ct.,1

 which provides that a

judicial candidate may not “personally solicit or accept campaign contributions other than

through a campaign committee.” 

Wolfson also wanted to endorse other candidates for political office and support their

election campaigns, but he believed that he was prohibited from these political activities by

Rules 4.1(A)(2), (3), (4), and (5), which prohibit a judge or judicial candidate from making

speeches or soliciting funds on behalf of a political candidate or organization, or endorsing

or otherwise actively participating in any political campaign other than his or her own. 

Wolfson brought this action seeking a declaration that these provisions of the Arizona

Code of Judicial Conduct violate his rights under the First Amendment, and a permanent

injunction against their enforcement. By the time Wolfson’s motion for summary judgment

was fully briefed, Wolfson had lost the 2008 election. On January 15, 2009, because

Wolfson had affirmatively stated that he had no intention of participating in the next election,

we concluded that Wolfson’s claims were not capable of repetition and granted defendants’

motion to dismiss on grounds of mootness (doc. 47). 

Article III of the United States Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to “actual,

ongoing cases or controversies.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110

S. Ct. 1249, 1253 (1990). An exception to the actual case or controversy requirement permits

prospective relief where the action is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Federal

Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2662

(2007). “[T]he capable-of-repetition doctrine applies only in exceptional situations, and

generally only where the named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again

be subjected to the alleged illegality.” Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109, 103 S. Ct.

1660, 1669 (1983). Wolfson represented to the Ninth Circuit that while he had no intention

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of participating in the next election, he desired to participate in a “future judicial election.”

That court concluded that this was sufficient to satisfy the “capable of repetition”

jurisdictional test. Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th Cir. 2010). We now must

consider the merits of Wolfson’s First Amendment claims. 

III

Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct broadly provides that “A judge or Candidate

for Judicial Office Shall not Engage in Political or Campaign Activity That is Inconsistent

with the Independence, Integrity, or Impartiality of the Judiciary.” Wolfson challenges five

provisions under Canon 4: (1) the prohibition on personal solicitation of campaign

contributions by judicial candidates, Rule 4.1(A)(6) (the “solicitation clause”); (2) the

prohibition on publicly endorsing or opposing other candidates for public office, Rule

4.1(A)(3) (the “endorsement clause”); (3) the prohibition on making speeches, Rule

4.1(A)(2); (4) soliciting funds, Rule 4.1(A)(4); or (5) actively participating in another’s

campaign, Rule 4.1(A)(5) (collectively, the “political activities clauses”). While each of

these Rules applies equally to a sitting judge or a judicial candidate, Wolfson does not have

standing to challenge the Rules as applied to sitting judges. “Wolfson cannot assert the

constitutional rights of judges when he is not, and may never be, a member of that group.”

Wolfson, 616 F.3d at 1064. Therefore, our review is limited to the constitutionality of the

Rules as applied to judicial candidates who are not also sitting judges. 

The First Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered

during a campaign for political office.” Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent.

Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223, 109 S. Ct. 1013, 1020 (1989) (quotation omitted). Inherent

within this restriction is the protection of “political association as well as political

expression.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S. Ct. 612, 632 (1976). It is clear,

however, that “(n)either the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities

is absolute.” U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567, 93 S. Ct. 2880,

2891 (1973). Although “[l]aws that burden political speech are subject to strict scrutiny,”

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010), “[e]ven a significant

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interference with protected rights of political association may be sustained if the State

demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid

unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, 96 S. Ct. at

638 (citations omitted). A judge, of course, holds a judicial office, not a political office.

Problems arise when a state chooses to fill judicial offices through the political process.

A. Constitutional Scrutiny

In Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2542

(2002) (White I), the Supreme Court struck down a Minnesota canon of judicial conduct that

prohibited judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal and political

issues. Without discussion, presumably because the parties agreed, the Court applied the

strict scrutiny test to determine the constitutionality of the restriction. Id. at 774, 122 S. Ct.

at 2534; see also Carey v. Wolnitzik, 614 F.3d 189, 199 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying strict

scrutiny to solicitation clause); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002)

(same); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 775 (8th Cir. 2005) (White II)

(applying strict scrutiny to solicitation and political activities clauses). 

Nevertheless, the Commission Members suggest that an intermediate level of scrutiny

is appropriate to assess the Code’s restrictions on direct solicitation, political activities, and

endorsements. In Seifert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 983-88 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,

131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011), the court held that restrictions on endorsements and partisan speeches

should be measured by a “balancing test” that weighs the State’s interest in limiting speech

against a judge’s interest in speaking. Under the balancing test, narrow tailoring is not

required. “The fit between state interest and regulation need not be so exact.” Id. at 985.

Instead, the public employee’s right to speak as a citizen is weighed against the government’s

interests as an employer in ensuring an efficient and impartial judiciary. 

The balancing test applied in Seifert derives from the line of Supreme Court cases

upholding the limited power of governments to restrict their employees’ political speech in

order to promote the efficiency and integrity of government services. See, e.g., Pickering v.

Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731 (1968) (balancing

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interests of school district against teacher’s First Amendment rights); Letter Carriers, 413

U.S. 548, 93 S. Ct. 2880 (upholding Hatch Act restrictions on political activities of federal

employees); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 102 S. Ct. 1684 (1983) (balancing the

government’s interest in running an effective workplace against employees’ free speech

rights); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) (holding that the

government can restrict a public official’s speech if it is necessary to the effective delivery

of public services). In adopting the Pickering line of cases, which specifically targeted

political activity by government workers, Seifert’s holding arose from an incumbent judge’s

political speech. Seifert, 608 F.3d at 987. Two months later in Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d

704 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011), the Seventh Circuit appears to have

extended the application of the balancing test to restrictions on political speech of judicial

candidates. 

We agree with the Seventh Circuit. Candidates for judicial office run against sitting

judges. Fundamental fairness requires that they abide by the same rules. Candidates for

judicial office must behave like the judges they hope to become. While core speech, as in

White I, warrants the application of strict scrutiny, behavior short of true speech does not.

An intermediate level of scrutiny strikes an appropriate balance between the weaker First

Amendment rights at stake and the stronger State interests in regulating the way it chooses

its judges. 

The parties agree that preserving the appearance and reality of a non-corrupt, and

impartial judiciary is a compelling state interest. Litigants have a due process right to a trial

before a judge who has no personal or pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case or bias

for or against a party. We apply the Seifert/Bauer balancing test to weigh the State’s

compelling interests against the competing interests of a candidate for judicial office. 

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B. Solicitation Clause

Arizona’s Code of Judicial Conduct restricts candidates for judicial office from

personally soliciting contributions, either for their own campaign or the campaigns of others.

Rule 4.1(A)(6) prohibits a judicial candidate from “personally solicit[ing] or accept[ing]

campaign contributions other than through a campaign committee authorized by Rule 4.4.”

Campaigning for elected office necessarily involves the expenditure of funds, which

in turn requires fundraising. See White I, 536 U.S. at 780, 122 S. Ct. at 2542 (“Unless the

pool of judicial candidates is limited to those wealthy enough to independently fund their

campaigns . . . the cost of campaigning requires judicial candidates to engage in

fundraising.”) (O’Connor, J., concurring). In choosing to select judges by popular election,

Arizona has itself created the dilemma it now seeks to avoid—the state’s ability to provide

neutral judges free of partisan or pecuniary influence. See id. 536 U.S. at 788, 122 S. Ct. at

2528 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that “the very practice of electing judges

undermines [an] interest” in an actual and perceived impartial judiciary). If the State chooses

to elect its judges, it cannot deprive the candidates of an effective opportunity to present

themselves to the electorate. At the same time, the State’s decision to select its judges by

popular election does not eliminate the State’s compelling interest in preserving the real and

perceived integrity of an unbiased judiciary. 

The State argues that the solicitation clause is designed to serve its compelling interest

in preserving an impartial judiciary by preventing undue influence over judges by those who

give them money. Personal solicitations create the risk that judges’ decisions in cases will

be affected by campaign contributions. Restrictions on personal solicitations are meant to

preserve both the appearance and reality of judicial impartiality. Any candidate for judicial

office who would ask the lawyers who would appear before that person for money does not

know what it means to be a judge.

In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), the Court held that a

restriction on a judicial candidate’s ability to solicit funds for his own campaign is one of

many “safeguards against judicial campaign abuses that threaten to imperil public confidence

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in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected judges.” Id. at 2266-67 (internal

quotations omitted). The Court held that due process required the recusal of a West Virginia

Supreme Court justice in a case involving a mining company because the CEO of the

company had contributed in excess of three million dollars to the judge’s campaign. Id. at

2257. When a dispute involving the mining company came before the court, the judge

refused to recuse himself and ultimately joined the majority in ruling in favor of the mining

company. The Court held that by refusing to disqualify himself, the judge had

unconstitutionally deprived the parties of a fair hearing. The Court recognized that “there

is a serious risk of actual bias” when a judge presides over cases involving persons who had

a substantial role in the judge’s election campaign. Id. at 2263-64. 

We agree that Arizona has a compelling interest in regulating campaign solicitations

by a judicial candidate in order to ensure the actual and perceived independence, impartiality,

and fairness of its judiciary, free from political influence and pressure. Rule 4.1(A)(6)

prohibits any form of personal solicitation of campaign funds except through a campaign

committee. We recognize the risk of bias arising from in-person solicitations. Successful

judicial candidates may appear beholden to their campaign contributors, particularly if the

contributor is a lawyer or litigant appearing before the judge. Public confidence in the

independence and impartiality of the judiciary is eroded if judges or candidates are perceived

to be subject to political influence.

Like face-to-face solicitations, methods of indirect solicitations, such as mass mailings

signed by the candidate, or presentations to a large audience create the same risk of coercion

and bias. By requiring the use of a campaign committee the State has struck a reasonable

balance between the need of the candidate for funds and the need of the State for a judiciary

not beholden to the lawyers who practice in its courts and their clients who become parties

to litigation. 

We conclude that Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 4.1(A)(6), as applied to

judicial candidates who are not sitting judges strikes a constitutional balance between the

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candidates’ need for funds and the State’s interest in judges beholden to the law and not to

those who finance their campaigns. 

C. Political Activities Clauses

Wolfson also expressed a desire to participate in other candidate’s campaigns through

endorsements, speeches, and solicitations on their behalf while he is a candidate for judicial

office. He argues that the political activities clauses burden political expression because they

impair a candidate’s ability to advocate the election of other candidates, and to associate with

like-minded candidates. He wishes to identify with the political views of candidates for nonjudicial office with the hope it would rub off on his own campaign for judicial office.

Arizona’s Code of Judicial Conduct limits a judge or judicial candidate’s campaignrelated activity to that necessary to advance his own campaign, but restricts him from

participating in the campaigns of others. Specifically, the Code provides that a judge or

judicial candidate shall not (1) make speeches on behalf of a political organization or another

candidate for public office, (2) publicly endorse or oppose another candidate for public

office, (3) solicit funds for or pay an assessment to a political organization or candidate, or

(4) actively take part in any political campaign other than his or her own. Arizona Code of

Judicial Conduct, Rules 4.1(A)(2), (A)(3), (A)(4), and (A)(5). 

We conclude that the State has a compelling interest in restricting endorsements and

political activities in order to prevent judges from misusing the prestige of their office to

further political aspirations of parties or candidates. The State also has a compelling interest

in limiting a judge’s or judicial candidate’s participation in politics in order to avoid the

appearance and reality of a biased, partisan judiciary. Preventing actual bias preserves

litigants’ due process rights. Preventing perceived bias preserves public confidence in a

judiciary that is guided by the rule of law, not partisan politics. White I, 536 U.S. at 775, 122

S. Ct. at 2535. 

Endorsements, making speeches, and soliciting funds on behalf of other candidates

is not the same core political speech at issue in White I. White I authorized a candidate for

judicial office to speak freely in support of his own campaign by announcing his views on

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disputed legal and political subjects. Id. at 788, 122 S. Ct. at 2542. But publicly endorsing

or speaking on behalf of other candidates is not the same as expressing one’s own political

views or qualifications for office. Instead, endorsements, speeches, and solicitations are

made to advance other candidates’ political aspirations, or to garner votes by way of political

coattails. Judges and judicial candidates who publicly endorse, speak on behalf, or otherwise

actively participate in the campaign of another candidate undermine the appearance of

impartiality and impair the public’s confidence in the judiciary. 

While this case does not present the question whether the State may restrict a sitting

judge’s political activities, there is little doubt that a sitting judge’s partisan political

activities impairs the public’s perception of an impartial judiciary and thus the government’s

ability to promote the fair and efficient administration of justice. Therefore, we recognize

the continued validity of the various regulations in both state and federal codes of judicial

conduct that prohibit sitting judges from endorsing political candidates, participating in

political fundraising, making speeches on behalf of candidates, or serving in leadership roles

in political organizations. See White I, 536 U.S. at 796, 122 S. Ct. at 2546 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring) (noting that the Court did not consider “[w]hether the rationale of Pickering and

Connick could be extended to allow a general speech restriction on sitting judges–regardless

of whether they are campaigning–in order to promote the efficient administration of justice”).

The Pickering line of cases remains relevant to restrictions on the speech of sitting judges.

See Seifert, 608 F.3d at 983. 

We reject the suggestion that judicial candidates ought to enjoy greater freedom to

engage in partisan politics than sitting judges. An asymmetrical electoral process for judges

is unworkable. Fundamental fairness requires a level playing field among judicial

contenders. Candidates for judicial office must abide by the same rules imposed upon the

judges they hope to become.

Applying the Seifert/Bauer balancing test, we conclude that the State’s compelling

interest in protecting the due process rights of litigants and ensuring the real and perceived

impartiality of the judiciary outweighs the candidate’s interest in participating in the political

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campaigns of other candidates. Therefore, we conclude that the restrictions set forth in

Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct, Rules 4.1(A)(2), (A)(3), (A)(4), and A(5) are

constitutional. 

IV

IT IS ORDERED DENYING Wolfson’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 69).

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING the Commission Members’ motion for summary

judgment (doc. 71).

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING Bar Counsel’s motion for summary judgment (doc.

75).

IT IS ORDERED DENYING the Disciplinary Commission’s motion for summary

judgment as moot (doc. 73).

DATED this 29th day of September, 2011.

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