Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_14-cv-00281/USCOURTS-almd-3_14-cv-00281-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

EASTERN DIVISION 

 

BOBBY E. KNOX, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:14cv281-WC 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Bobby E. Knox (“Plaintiff”) filed applications for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income benefits. His applications were denied at the initial 

administrative level. Plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision in 

which he found Plaintiff not disabled from the alleged onset date of January 20, 2011, 

through the date of the decision. Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council, which 

rejected his request for review of the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ’s decision consequently 

became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”).1

 

See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the 

 

1

 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 

103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to 

Social Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

Case 3:14-cv-00281-WC Document 16 Filed 03/19/15 Page 1 of 14
2 

court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties 

have consented to the conduct of all proceedings and entry of a final judgment by the 

undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. Pl.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 9); 

Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 8). Based on the court’s review of the record and the 

briefs of the parties, the court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to benefits when the person is 

unable to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).2

 To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2011). 

(1) Is the person presently unemployed? 

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe? 

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific 

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 [the Listing of 

Impairments]? 

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation? 

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy? 

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next 

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative 

 

2

 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques. 

Case 3:14-cv-00281-WC Document 16 Filed 03/19/15 Page 2 of 14
3 

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of 

“not disabled.” 

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).3

 The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step 4. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 

357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of 

qualifying disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step 1 through Step 

4. At Step 5, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show there are a 

significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. 

 To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s 

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). Id. at 1238-39. The RFC is what the claimant is 

still able to do despite the claimant’s impairments and is based on all relevant medical 

and other evidence. Id. It may contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. 

at 1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and 

work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the 

claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical 

Vocational Guidelines4

 (“grids”) or call a vocational expert (“VE”). Id. at 1239-40. 

 The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary 

or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job 

 

3

 McDaniel is a supplemental security income case (SSI). The same sequence applies to disability 

insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II are appropriately cited as authority in Title XVI cases. 

See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981). 

4

 See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2. 

Case 3:14-cv-00281-WC Document 16 Filed 03/19/15 Page 3 of 14
4 

experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available 

to an individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a 

statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. 

 The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court 

must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the 

decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”). A reviewing court may not look 

only to those parts of the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must 

view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the 

evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the 

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No 

similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal 

conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied 

in evaluating claims. 

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Case 3:14-cv-00281-WC Document 16 Filed 03/19/15 Page 4 of 14
5 

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 

 Plaintiff, who was forty-four years old at the time of the hearing before the ALJ, 

has at least a high school education. Tr. 16. Following the administrative hearing, and 

employing the five-step process, the ALJ found at Step One that Plaintiff “has not 

engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 20, 2011, the alleged onset date[.]” 

Id. At Step Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from the following severe 

impairments: “diabetes mellitus type II with diabetic neuropathy and borderline 

obesity[.]” Id. At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment 

or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the 

listed impairments[.]” Tr. 12. Next, the ALJ articulated Plaintiff’s RFC as follows: 

[Plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as 

defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). However, [Plaintiff] is 

never able to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and can only occasionally 

climb stairs. He is also able to occasionally perform crouching or stooping. 

He is able to perform frequent handling and fingering bilaterally. He is 

unable to work in environments with concentrated exposure to hazard[s]. 

Lastly, the work must be simple . . . , low stress (few changes in workplace 

and occasional simple decision-making) jobs only. 

Id. After consulting the VE, the ALJ concluded at Step Four that Plaintiff “is unable to 

perform any past relevant work[.]” Tr. 16. Finally, at Step 5, the ALJ found that, 

“[c]onsidering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional 

capacity,” and after consulting with the VE, “there are jobs that exist in significant 

numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” Id. The ALJ identified 

the following occupations as examples: “cafeteria attendant,” “sales attendant,” and 

Case 3:14-cv-00281-WC Document 16 Filed 03/19/15 Page 5 of 14
6 

“housekeeping cleaner.” Tr. 17. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “has not 

been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from January 20, 2011, 

through the date of th[e] decision[.]” Id. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

 Plaintiff presents the following issues for this court’s consideration in review of 

the ALJ’s decision: 

A. “Whether the [ALJ] committed error in determining [Plaintiff]’s physical 

residual functional capacity.” 

B. “Whether the [ALJ] failed to properly apply the pain standard.” 

Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 1. 

V. DISCUSSION

A. Whether the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff’s RFC based on the 

ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Patel’s opinion. 

 Plaintiff argues that “the ALJ did not properly apply the treating physician’s rule 

and, therefore, did not properly determine [Plaintiff]’s RFC, which was error.” Pl.’s Br. 

(Doc. 13) at 4. Plaintiff’s argument centers on the ALJ’s decision to discount the opinion 

of Dr. Piyush Patel, M.D., Plaintiff’s treating physician. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges, 

Without the countervailing opinion of another treating/examining physician 

in the record, and without a more substantial and detailed analysis of the 

medical evidence of record which the ALJ asserted was inconsistent with 

[Dr. Patel]’s opinion, there is not substantial evidence in the record to 

support the ALJ’s decision to reject [Dr. Patel]’s uncontroverted medical 

opinion. 

Case 3:14-cv-00281-WC Document 16 Filed 03/19/15 Page 6 of 14
7 

Id. at 3. Further, Plaintiff asserts that, because “no examining doctor has expressed a 

medical opinion as to the meaning of the above [Plaintiff]’s ability to do work related 

activities, except [for Dr. Patel],” the ALJ erred by “arbitrarily substitut[ing] his own 

opinion for the diagnosis of a medical professional” when the ALJ formed the RFC. Id.

at 4. 

In general, “[a]bsent ‘good cause,’ an ALJ is to give the medical opinions of 

treating physicians ‘substantial or considerable weight.’” Winschel v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 

1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)). “Good cause exists ‘when the (1) treating physician 

opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or 

(3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own 

medical records.” Id. (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 

2004)). If the ALJ disregards a treating physician’s opinion, or affords it less than 

“substantial or considerable weight,” the ALJ must “‘clearly articulate [the] reasons’ for 

doing so.” Id. (quoting Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41). 

 In pertinent part, Plaintiff points to Dr. Patel’s opinion that Plaintiff would need 

“‘the freedom to rest, recline, or lie down at his/her own discretion throughout a normal 8 

hour work day’ for ‘6 hrs.’”; that Plaintiff’s pain and fatigue make Plaintiff unable to 

work; that Plaintiff is not a malingerer; and that Plaintiff takes “‘medications that 

interfere with the ability to work.’” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 2 (quoting Tr. 280-81). 

Case 3:14-cv-00281-WC Document 16 Filed 03/19/15 Page 7 of 14
8 

 In addressing Dr. Patel’s opinion, the ALJ explained as follows: 

The undersigned has also considered the assessment completed in February 

2013 by Piyush Patel, M.D., the claimant’s treating physician. Dr. Patel 

says the claimant has been unable to work since January 2011 due to pain, 

fatigue, numbness, tingling, and blurred vision. Interestingly, as noted 

above, the claimant has denied numbness and tingling on many occasions. 

Dr. Patel also opined that the claimant is able to sit/stand/walk for a total of 

only two hours in an eight-hour day and that he would need to lie down the 

remaining six hours. He also opined that the claimant would not be able to 

use his hands for any repetitive action. This is despite the consultative 

examination showing normal gross and fine manipulation. Obviously, Dr. 

Patel’s opinion is rendered less persuasive by the objective findings of the 

consultative examination. Nevertheless, as a precaution, the undersigned 

has limited the claimant to light work with no more than frequent handling 

and fingering bilaterally. 

The undersigned further notes that the claimant’s testimony that he needs to 

lie in bed six hours daily is supported only by Dr. Patel’s questionnaire, 

which is not supported by any objective medical evidence of record, so is 

given no weight. 

Tr. 16 (internal citations omitted). Thus, the ALJ mentioned the relevant portions of Dr. 

Patel’s opinion and articulated three distinct bases for his rejection of it, including (1) Dr. 

Patel’s opinion is inconsistent with other evidence in the record, (2) Dr. Patel’s opinion is 

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s own statements, and (3) the opinion that Plaintiff needs to lie 

in bed six hours daily is supported only by Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and “is not 

supported by any objective medical evidence of record.” Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff has 

not shown that the ALJ lacked good cause in discounting the opinion of Dr. Patel. 

Plaintiff states that “[t]he ALJ admits that Dr. Patel is [Plaintiff]’s treating 

physician, but the ALJ fails to mention the fact that Dr. Patel is [Plaintiff]’s Board 

Case 3:14-cv-00281-WC Document 16 Filed 03/19/15 Page 8 of 14
9 

Certified Physician, who examined and treated [Plaintiff] for over a year.” Pl.’s Br. 

(Doc. 13) at 1. The court is not aware of, and Plaintiff has not pointed to, any legal 

authority establishing that the ALJ’s failure to mention such information is error. 

“[T]here is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence 

in [the] decision, so long as the ALJ’s decision . . . is not a broad rejection which is ‘not 

enough to enable [this court] to conclude that [the ALJ] considered [the] medical 

[opinion] as a whole.’” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting 

Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995)). Here, the ALJ’s failure to 

mention that Dr. Patel is a board certified physician who examined and treated Plaintiff 

for over a year does not make the decision such a broad rejection as to disable this court 

from concluding that the ALJ considered the medical opinion as a whole. 

Plaintiff also asserts that the “requisite ‘good cause’ for not according controlling 

weight to a treating physician’s opinion is not provided by the report of a non-examining 

physician . . . because the opinion of such a person is entitled to little weight if it 

contradicts the opinion of [Plaintiff]’s physician.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 4 (emphasis in 

original). Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that, because the “ALJ fail[ed] to state a 

reasonable basis for rejection of [Dr. Patel]’s opinion,” the opinion of Dr. Patel must “be 

accepted as true as a matter of law.” Id. Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred in 

disregarding Dr. Patel’s opinion based on the opinion of a non-examining physician fails 

because, as addressed above, the ALJ did not discredit Dr. Patel’s opinion solely because 

Case 3:14-cv-00281-WC Document 16 Filed 03/19/15 Page 9 of 14
10 

of an opinion given by a non-examining physician. Rather, the ALJ articulated good 

cause for discrediting Dr. Patel’s opinion, including inconsistencies between Dr. Patel’s 

opinion and Plaintiff’s own statements and a lack of objective support for other aspects of 

Dr. Patel’s opinion. Additionally, Plaintiff is misguided in arguing that the court is 

bound to accept as true as a matter of law the opinion of Dr. Patel. While Plaintiff is 

correct that a treating physician’s testimony must, as a matter of law, be accepted as true 

when “the [ALJ] has ignored or failed to properly refute” it, MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 

F.2d 1050, 1051 (11th Cir. 1986), here, as previously addressed, the ALJ did not so 

ignore or fail to refute Dr. Patel’s testimony. Rather, the ALJ articulated good cause for 

discrediting Dr. Patel’s testimony, and the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial 

evidence. 

Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that “no examining doctor has expressed a medical 

opinion as to the meaning of [Plaintiff]’s ability to do work related activities,” except for 

Dr. Patel, and because the ALJ discredited that opinion, the ALJ “did not properly 

determine [Plaintiff’s RFC], “which was error.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 4. To the extent 

Plaintiff is arguing that the ALJ must base the RFC on a medical opinion, the court 

disagrees. The regulations make clear that it is the ALJ, not a physician, who “is 

responsible for assessing” a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546. The ALJ did not 

err by doing so. 

Case 3:14-cv-00281-WC Document 16 Filed 03/19/15 Page 10 of 14
11 

 In sum, the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record, and 

Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ lacked good cause in discounting the opinion of Dr. 

Patel, nor that the ALJ erred in determining the RFC. 

B. Whether the ALJ properly applied the pain standard.

 Plaintiff’s second claim is that “the ALJ failed to properly apply the pain (and/or 

fatigue) standard.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 5. The United States Court of Appeals for the 

Eleventh Circuit has articulated a three-part “pain standard” to be utilized where a 

claimant attempts to establish disability through subjective testimony about pain. 

The pain standard requires: “(1) evidence of an underlying medical 

condition; and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence confirming the 

severity of the alleged pain; or (b) that the objectively determined medical 

condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain.” 

[Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002)]. If the ALJ 

determined that the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that 

could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms, then 

the ALJ evaluates the extent to which the intensity and persistence of those 

symptoms limit her ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). At this 

stage, the ALJ considers the claimant’s history, the medical signs and 

laboratory findings, the claimant’s statements, statements by treating and 

nontreating physicians, and other evidence of how the pain affects the 

claimant’s daily activities and ability to work. Id. § 404.1529(a). 

 A claimant’s testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies 

the pain standard is sufficient to support a finding of disability. Foote v. 

Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995). If the ALJ decides not to 

credit a claimant’s testimony about her symptoms, the ALJ “must articulate 

explicit and adequate reasons for doing so. Failure to articulate the reasons 

for discrediting subjective pain testimony requires . . . that the testimony be 

accepted as true.” Id. at 1561-62. 

McMahon v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 583 F. App’x 886, 893 (11th Cir. 2014). 

Case 3:14-cv-00281-WC Document 16 Filed 03/19/15 Page 11 of 14
12 

In the case at hand, after summarizing this standard, Plaintiff’s entire argument is 

as follows: 

 In this case, there is evidence of an underlying medical condition 

(satisfying part one) that could reasonably be expected to produce 

[Plaintiff]’s alleged pain (and/or fatigue) (satisfying part three). That 

underlying medical condition includes, but is not limited to “Insulin 

Dependent Diabetes Mellitus w/ severe Neuropathy (Brittle Diabetes)[,]” 

confirmed by clinical and objective findings of multiple examinations an 

lab studies. 

 There is no question that “Insulin Dependent Diabetes Mellitus w/ 

severe Neuropathy (Brittle Diabetes)” is a condition that can reasonably be 

expected to produce pain and/or fatigue, thereby satisfying part three . . . of 

the pain (and/or fatigue) standard. 

 Based upon the above, the Commissioner did not properly apply the 

pain (and/or fatigue) standard, which was error. 

Def.’s Br. (Doc. 14) at 5 (citations omitted). 

 Upon review of the ALJ’s decision, it is apparent that the ALJ did properly apply 

the pain standard. The ALJ recognized his obligation to apply and then accurately 

described the pain standard in his opinion. See Tr. 13. Having surveyed the objective 

medical evidence and Plaintiff’s own prior statements and testimony about his pain, the 

ALJ found as follows: 

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the 

claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s 

statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these 

symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the [RFC 

articulated by the ALJ]. 

Id. 

Case 3:14-cv-00281-WC Document 16 Filed 03/19/15 Page 12 of 14
13 

 There is no dispute that the ALJ indeed found that Plaintiff satisfied the pain 

standard because he determined that the “claimant’s medically determinable impairments 

could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms[.]” Tr. 13. But, contrary to 

Plaintiff’s apparent belief, this finding, alone, does not compel the conclusion that 

Plaintiff is disabled. Rather, as the Eleventh Circuit has made clear, once the ALJ 

determines that a claimant’s impairments might reasonably be expected to cause the sort 

of pain described by the claimant, the ALJ is required to “evaluate[] the extent to which 

the intensity and persistence of” the claimant’s alleged pain “limit her ability to work.” 

McMahon, 583 F. App’x at 893 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b)). To do this, the ALJ 

does not rely on just the Plaintiff’s statements. Rather, “the ALJ considers the claimant’s 

history, the medical signs and laboratory findings, the claimant’s statements, statements 

by treating and nontreating physicians, and other evidence of how the pain affects the 

claimant’s daily activities and ability to work.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)). The 

ALJ exhaustively performed this analysis.5

 Additionally, Plaintiff has not identified any 

 

5

 The ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of 

[his] symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision.” Tr. 13. The ALJ 

elaborated as follows: 

In analyzing the credibility of [Plaintiff]’s subjective complaints, the first factor 

considered involves his daily activities. Although [Plaintiff] has described daily activities 

which are fairly limited, two factors weigh against considering these allegations to be 

strong evidence in favor of finding [Plaintiff] disabled. First, allegedly limited daily 

activities cannot be objectively verified with any reasonable degree of certainty. 

Secondly, even if [Plaintiff]’s daily activities are truly as limited as alleged, it is difficult 

to attribute that degree of limitation to [Plaintiff]’s medical condition, as opposed to other 

reasons, in view of the relatively weak medical evidence and other factors discussed in 

this decision. Overall [Plaintiff]’s reported limited daily activities are considered to be 

outweighed by the other factors discussed in this decision. 

Case 3:14-cv-00281-WC Document 16 Filed 03/19/15 Page 13 of 14
14 

instance in which the ALJ improperly relied upon record evidence, nor has Plaintiff 

challenged the ALJ’s credibility findings, which are supported by substantial evidence in 

the record. As such, the ALJ did not fail to properly apply the pain standard and did not 

commit reversible error in rendering his credibility findings regarding Plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints of disabling pain. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

 The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, 

for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A 

separate judgment will issue. 

Done this 19th day of March, 2015. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

Tr. 13. The ALJ continued to highlight other inconsistencies that lead the ALJ to find Plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints to be “not entirely credible,” including that, although Plaintiff “continued to 

reported joint pain and stiffness” to his physician, (1) “he was noted to have only 70% compliance with 

prescribed medications and he was not measuring his blood sugar”; and (2) his “treatment notes reflect 

brief inspections of [Plaintiff’s] joints and extremities were unremarkable.” Tr. 14. Additionally, the 

ALJ noted that Plaintiff appeared with a cane at the hearing, but “the cane had not been prescribed, which 

calls into question the medical necessity of such device.” Tr. 15. 

Case 3:14-cv-00281-WC Document 16 Filed 03/19/15 Page 14 of 14