Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00576/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00576-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH SIMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 

FRANCISCO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-00576-SI 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR SANCTIONS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 47, 59

On March 13, 2015, the Court heard argument on defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment. On March 16, 2015, the Court vacated the hearing set for March 20, 2015 on plaintiff’s 

motion for sanctions. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment, and DENIES plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. 

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

This is an employment discrimination case. Pro se plaintiff, Joseph Sims III, is an 

employee of the City and County of San Francisco (“the City”), working as a street sweeping 

truck driver for the Department of Public Works (“DPW”) since 2000. Complaint ¶ 2. He alleges 

that defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his race (black), age (currently 59 years 

old), and disability (an injury to his shoulder), and have also retaliated against him for 

complaining of their discriminatory acts. Id. ¶ 1. 

In July of 2008, plaintiff injured his shoulder while performing work-related duties. Id. ¶ 2.

Plaintiff’s shoulder was reinjured in October of 2008 when he was allegedly struck by a DPW 

vehicle (defendants contend that it was in fact plaintiff who hit the side of the vehicle with his 

hand as it passed him). Id. Plaintiff applied for and received workers compensation benefits. Id.

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Plaintiff returned to work in November of 2008, and was placed on modified duty as a security 

guard at the entrance to the facility until June of 2009 to accommodate his injury. Docket No. 47, 

Def. Mot. at 4. In July of 2009, plaintiff had surgery on his shoulder, and returned to work in 

November 2009 and assumed his regular truck driving duties. Id. at 5.

Plaintiff argues that his modified duty assignment “placed him in a position to be

ridiculed,” and that white employees with similar injuries were allowed to stay at home to 

recuperate or given desk jobs indoors. Complaint ¶ 22. He also notes feeling “ostracized” by his 

coworkers, who “snickered” and “laughed” whenever he entered a room. Id. He describes various 

instances in which coworkers momentarily blocked his truck from leaving the station, causing him 

to reroute his truck and delay his departure, and engaged in reckless driving in order intimidate 

him. Id. ¶¶ 22, 26. “These various incidents have frightened Plaintiff and have caused emotional 

strain and nervous breakdown to Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff also complains of being stalked by 

certain DPW employees.1Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff alleges that his supervisors have failed to adequately 

investigate his complaints, id. ¶¶ 22-23, and in fact parroted rumors that employees should “stay 

away from” and “watch out for plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 37. 

Plaintiff filed his complaint in California Superior Court on December 23, 2013. Plaintiff 

alleges causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”), California Fair Employment 

and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Americans 

With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Plaintiff 

names as defendants the City, Paul Renzi, Phil Galli, Joel Primes, John Sheehan, and Jack 

Sullivan. Complaint ¶¶ 9-14. On February 6, 2014, the City removed this case to federal court 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, and answered the complaint on that same day. Docket No. 1. The 

 

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Plaintiff has also made multiple reports to the City Police and the FBI alleging that agents 

of the City have been following him on the street in unmarked cars, at his church, and surveilling 

him while he is at his home. Docket No. 51, Exh. A; Sims Dep. I. at 108:4-25, 109:14-25, 161:4-

163:11.

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individual defendants answered in April of 2014. Docket Nos. 15-18. Defendants filed an 

amended notice of removal on May 23, 2014. Docket No. 30. On May 19, 2014, plaintiff 

voluntarily dismissed defendant Jack Sullivan from this action. Docket No. 29. 

II. Past Lawsuits and Administrative Actions

A. WCAB

On February 8, 2010, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Workers Compensation and 

Appeals Board (“WCAB”) alleging that the City intentionally discriminated and retaliated against 

him for receiving worker’s compensation benefits. Docket No. 51, Exh. A. On January 3, 2011, 

the parties reached a settlement. Id. at Exh. B. 

B. EEOC

On December 9, 2011, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) claiming he was discriminated against on the 

basis of his disability and worker’s compensation benefits. Id. at Exh. D. On February 8, 2012, the 

US Department of Justice (“DOJ”) responded by issuing plaintiff a right to sue letter, apprising 

him of his obligation to file suit within 90 days of his receipt of the letter if he chose to institute a 

civil action. Id. at Exh. G. On June 19, 2013, plaintiff filed a new charge of discrimination with 

the EEOC, alleging discrimination, harassment, and retaliation on the basis of age and race. Id. at 

Exh. K. On July 19, 2013, the DOJ issued plaintiff a right to sue letter in connection with his latest 

charge of discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA. Id. at Exh. L. 

C. DFEH

On December 10, 2011, plaintiff filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair 

Employment and Housing (“DFEH”), alleging discrimination, harassment, and retaliation on the 

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basis of race and age. Id. Exh. E. In the section of the form requesting a description of the reasons 

the plaintiff believed he was being discriminated against, he focused almost exclusively on 

perceived discrimination related to his receiving worker’s compensation benefits 2: “This has been 

ongoing since my return from surgery for a workers comp injury. I firmly believe this harassment 

and being ostracize [sic] by my coworkers are a direct result of management’s resentment for a 

favorable ruling against public works.” Id. On the same day, DFEH issued plaintiff a right to sue 

letter, noting that if he chose to file suit, he must do so within one year from the date of the letter. 

Id. On October 4, 2013, plaintiff filed an amended complaint of discrimination with DFEH to 

include more recent events which transpired between February to June of 2013; he received a right 

to sue letter on that same day. Id. at Exh. M. On October 5, 2013, plaintiff amended his complaint 

of discrimination for a second time, and received a new right to sue letter based on his second 

amended complaint of discrimination on that same day. Id. at Exh. N. 

D. State Court

On November 23, 2011 plaintiff filed a complaint in California Superior Court which 

mirrors most of the allegations in the case at bar. The complaint alleged causes of action for 

employment discrimination, harassment, retaliation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 

and negligence, all premised on plaintiff’s disabled status and collection of worker’s compensation 

benefits. Id. at Exh. C. On July 16, 2012, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint to include 

allegations that he was also discriminated against on the basis of his race. Id. Exh. H. On February 

11, 2013, the City moved for summary judgment. Id. at Exh. I. On April 30, 2013, plaintiff filed a 

voluntary dismissal of all his claims without prejudice. Id. at Exh. J.

 

2 As noted above, plaintiff reached a settlement with the City regarding worker’s 

compensation benefits, and is therefore precluded from raising this cause of action in this forum. 

Id. at Exh. B. 

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LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on 

file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party 

bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party, however, has no burden to 

disprove matters on which the non-moving party will have the burden of proof at trial. The 

moving party need only demonstrate to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support 

the non-moving party’s case. Id. at 325.

Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to 

“set out ‘specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting then Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e)). To carry this burden, the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving 

party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). In deciding a summary 

judgment motion, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255. “Credibility determinations, the 

weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 

functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. However, 

conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine 

issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 

730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). The evidence the parties present must be admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c)).

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DISCUSSION

I. Timeliness

Defendants argue that, except for his § 1981 claim, plaintiff’s state and federal 

discrimination claims are time barred. 

To state a retaliation or discrimination claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must file a Charge 

of Discrimination with the EEOC no more than 180 days after the alleged violation. See 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). If the plaintiff first files a claim with a state agency (such as the DFEH), 

then the charge must be filed within the earlier of 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment 

practice occurred, or thirty days after receiving notice that the state agency has terminated the 

proceedings. Such notice often comes in the form of a right to sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(e)(1). The timely exhaustion of this administrative remedy is a statutory prerequisite to filing a 

Title VII claim. See Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 707-08 (9th Cir. 2001). DFEH 

and EEOC have a “work sharing agreement” whereby each is designated as the other’s agent for 

purposes of receiving charges. E.E.O.C. v. Dinuba Med. Clinic, 222 F.3d 580, 585 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Therefore, “a charge initially filed with [DFEH] will be treated as constructively filed with the 

EEOC upon either the expiration of 60 days or the termination of [DFEH] proceedings, whichever 

occurs first.” Id. Under Title VII, ADA, and ADEA, a plaintiff has 90 days after receipt of the 

EEOC’s right to sue letter to file a complaint in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1);

Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 624 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2010).

FEHA also has its own exhaustion requirements, which impose a duty upon plaintiffs to 

file a written charge of discrimination with DFEH within one year of the alleged violation, and 

exhaust his administrative remedies. Cal. Govt. Code § 12960(d); Rodriguez v. Airborne Express,

265 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir.2001); see also Alberti v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco Sheriff's Dep't, 

32 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“An EEOC right-to-sue letter does not satisfy the 

jurisdictional requirement of exhaustion of remedies as to FEHA claims.”). Upon receiving a right 

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to sue letter from DFEH, a plaintiff has one year to file his FEHA claims in a judicial forum. Cal. 

Govt. Code § 12965(b). 

A. Federal Causes of Action

On February 8, 2012, plaintiff received a right to sue letter from the DOJ for his claims 

under the ADA. Docket No. 51, Exh. G. On July 19, 2013, plaintiff received a right to sue letter 

from the DOJ for claims under Title VII and the ADEA. Id. Exh. L. Both letters apprised plaintiff 

that he had a maximum of 90 days to file a civil action. Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit in 

December of 2013, well after the 90 day period had expired on both letters. Therefore, plaintiff’s 

claims under Title VII, ADA, and ADEA are time barred. See Stiefel 624 F.3d at 1245 (9th Cir. 

2010). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to these 

claims.

B. FEHA

Plaintiff received right to sue letters from DFEH on December 10th and 16th of 2011.

Docket No. 51, Exhs. E-F. These letters carried with them a one-year limitation to file a civil 

action based on the facts alleged in the complaint filed with DFEH. Plaintiff did not file this action 

until December of 2013; all claims associated with the December 2011 right to sue letters are 

therefore time barred.3

Plaintiff received right to sue letters from DFEH on October 4th and 5th of 2013 based on 

 

3

Plaintiff’s first state court case was filed within the one-year statutory period. However, 

as noted above, plaintiff dismissed this case without prejudice in April of 2013. When a plaintiff 

voluntarily dismisses a suit without prejudice, it “leaves the situation the same as if the suit had 

never been brought in the first place.” Humphreys v. United States, 272 F.2d 411, 412 (9th Cir. 

1959). Therefore, “the statute of limitations ... continued to run as if the suit had never been 

brought.” Lee v. AFT-Yakima, No. CV-09-3112-EFS, 2011 WL 2181808, at *5 (E.D. Wash. June 

3, 2011); see also Troche v. Daley, 217 Cal. App. 3d 403, 412, (Ct. App. 1990). 

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plaintiff’s claims of race and age discrimination. Docket No. 51, Exhs. M-N. He also filed a 

charge of discrimination with the EEOC on July 19, 2013, which under the “work sharing 

agreement,” can be deemed to have also been filed with DFEH. Id. Exh. K. Claims associated 

with these right to sue letters are timely. Therefore, plaintiff’s state law discrimination claims are 

limited to FEHA claims of race and age discrimination premised upon actions which occurred on 

or after July 19, 2012, the year preceding plaintiff’s July 19, 2013 charge of discrimination. See 

Cal. Govt. Code § 12960(d).

II. Section 1981 and FEHA

Plaintiff’s remaining discrimination claims include a claim for racial discrimination under 

§ 1981, and a claim for disparate treatment and retaliation based on race and age under FEHA.

To establish a discrimination claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he 

is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff 

on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination concerned at least one statutorily enumerated 

activity, such as the making or enforcement of contracts. See Ennix v. Stanten, No. C 07-02486 

WHA, 2007 WL 2462119, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2007). A plaintiff pursuing a § 1981 claim 

cannot rely upon disparate impact evidence to make his case; instead, he must allege that the 

defendants purposefully discriminated against him. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. 

Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389-91 (1982); Gay v. Waiters’ & Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, Local 

No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[S]ection 1981 is limited to claims of intentional 

discrimination.”). To successfully state a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must establish that the 

defendant’s intentional racial discrimination resulted in the impairment of, or prevented the 

creation of, a contractual relationship. See Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 

(2006). Importantly, “[s]ection 1981 plaintiffs must identify injuries flowing from a racially 

motivated breach of their own contractual relationship, not of someone else’s.” Id. at 480. 

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A plaintiff may establish intentional discrimination under § 1981 in two ways: he may 

allege facts that would support a finding of disparate treatment under Title VII, see Gay, 694 F.2d 

at 539, or he may allege facts that would support a finding of retaliation, see CBOCS W., Inc. v. 

Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 446 (2008).

The analysis of plaintiff's disparate treatment and retaliation claims under FEHA is the 

same as the analysis required for evaluation of his § 1981 claims. “California courts have relied 

upon federal interpretations of Title VII to interpret analogous provisions of [FEHA], which 

prohibits unlawful discrimination.” Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 

1996). 

A. Disparate Treatment

To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must allege facts 

demonstrating that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position he 

sought or held; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated 

individuals outside his protected class were treated differently. Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 

1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008).

As an initial matter, plaintiff has produced almost nothing in the way of admissible 

evidence. See Docket No. 61, Pl. Opp’n Exhs. 1-16. Furthermore, even if the Court were to credit 

his allegations as evidence, they fail to show that he suffered any adverse employment action, nor 

do they establish that any of the purported harms he suffered were due to his race or age. 

The Ninth Circuit defines adverse employment action “broadly,” Fonseca v. Sysco Food 

Servs. of Ariz. Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2004), as an act that “materially affect[s] the 

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges” of employment. Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 

1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008), citing Chuang v. Board of Regents, 225 F.3d 1115, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 

2000). To constitute an adverse employment action, the act “must result in a substantial adverse 

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change in the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment. A change that is merely 

contrary to the employee’s interests or not to the employee’s liking is insufficient.” Akers v. 

County of San Diego, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1455 (2002).

Plaintiff contends that his temporary reassignment to security guard duty at the entrance or 

exit of the facility, made in order to accommodate his shoulder injury, put him in a position to be 

“ridiculed” by his coworkers, who “snickered” and “laughed” at him. Pl. Opp’n at 13. Plaintiff 

contends that white employees with similar injuries were allowed to go home and recuperate, or 

given jobs that did not require them to be outdoors. Id. at 12-13. Plaintiff submits no evidence to 

support these allegations. Moreover, his deposition testimony -- and subsequent amendments by 

errata -- demonstrate that plaintiff could only identify one other black employee who was given 

this assignment, but had seen “a couple” of white employees working security guard duty. Pl. Dep. 

I. 37:9-25; Pl. Dep. I. Errata. Therefore plaintiff has failed to show that similarly situated 

individuals outside his protected class were treated differently. 

Plaintiff has also failed to show why receiving a workplace accommodation on account of 

his injury constitutes an adverse employment action. While it may not have been his first choice, 

plaintiff has not shown that this temporary reassignment resulted in reduced pay, reduced 

opportunity to be promoted, or anything else which could be construed to materially affect the 

“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges” of his employment. See Nidds v. Schindler 

Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 919, nt. 3 (9th Cir. 1996) (transfer to different work location 

without a diminution in pay deemed not to be an adverse employment action).

Plaintiff also describes numerous instances where his coworkers engaged in various tactics 

to block him from leaving the facility, such as blocking his truck with their truck so that he 

momentarily could not leave the yard. He also alleges one instance in which a coworker stood in 

his way so that he could not sign into work. Finally, plaintiff appears to believe that DPW 

employees, as well as employees from other City departments, intentionally park their vehicles on 

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his sweeping routes so as to frustrate his attempts to perform his duties. However, plaintiff has not 

alleged any consequences stemming from these incidents which could properly be construed as an 

adverse employment action. “Title VII, [the Supreme Court] [has] said, does not set forth ‘a 

general civility code for the American workplace.’”; Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 

548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 

S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998)). Plaintiff cannot rely on FEHA or § 1981 to remedy the 

“petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees 

experience.” Burlington 548 U.S. at 68.

Additionally, plaintiff has entirely failed to show that he was subjected to any of these 

experiences on account of his race or age. While plaintiff does allege a single instance in which he 

was called a racial epithet by a coworker, Pl. Dep. II. at 154:1-155:6, 171L2-15,4“a ‘single, 

isolated discriminatory comment’ [even] by [a] plaintiff's immediate supervisor [is] insufficient to 

trigger burden shift[ing] or to avoid summary judgment for defendant.” Merrick v. Farmers Ins. 

Grp., 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 

F.2d 309, 314–16 (6th Cir.1989)); see also Patterson v. Apple Computer, Inc., 256 F. App'x 165, 

168 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Stray comments are insufficient to establish discrimination.”). 5

 

4

 Plaintiff testified at his deposition that one time co-worker Frank Perez “called me the Nword as I was going to enter my vehicle.” Pl. Dep. II at 154:15-16. Plaintiff filed an Incident 

Report on August 20, 2014, the day of the incident, describing a generally unpleasant interaction 

with Perez and another co-worker and reporting that “as Perez walked away I believe he call me a 

'niger' under his breath.” Renzi Decl. Exh. B.

5

Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action entitled “negligent hiring, retention, and supervision,” is 

actually a claim of discrimination based on a hostile work environment theory, predicated on his 

manager’s refusal to adequately investigate his complaints or punish the coworkers he accused of 

discriminatory conduct. See Pl. Opp’n at 19 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 

(1986)). To establish a prima facie case for a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, the 

plaintiff must show “(1) she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct because of her race, (2) 

the conduct was unwelcome, and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 

conditions of her employment and create an abusive work environment.” Manatt v. Bank of 

America, NA, 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kang v. U. Lim Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 

817 (9th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The “working environment must both 

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Finally, plaintiff complains that he has not been trained to operate two types of trucks that 

offer premium pay. Plaintiff’s supervisor, Paul Renzi, notes that at “numerous mandatory 

meetings,” he offered training on these two types of trucks to anyone that was interested, and that 

plaintiff has never requested to be trained. Renzi Decl. ¶ 12. He also suspected that plaintiff has 

already received such training before Renzi began working at DPW. Id. Plaintiff’s testimony 

essentially echoes Renzi’s account. Plaintiff admits that his seniority is too low to bid on one of 

the trucks, and for the other, he acknowledges that he has not even asked to be trained. Pl. Dep. II 

47:17-25; 53:23-54:5. Plaintiff cannot complain of discrimination when his own testimony shows 

that he understands that the reasons he was not offered these opportunities were nondiscriminatory reasons – namely, lack of seniority and failure to express interest.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion as to plaintiff’s cause of action for 

disparate treatment under FEHA and § 1981.6

In their motion, defendants attempt to undermine plaintiff’s claims by highlighting

numerous times that (1) many of the employees who allegedly discriminated against plaintiff were 

also black, and (2) one of the operators of one of the trucks that offers premium pay is black. Def. 

Mot. at 7, 9, 10, 11, 16, 18. While plaintiff has not introduced sufficient evidence to create a 

 

subjectively and objectively be perceived as abusive.” Craig v. M&O Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 

1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995)) 

(internal quotation mark omitted). “Objective hostility is determined by examining the totality of 

the circumstances and whether a reasonable person with the same characteristics as the victim 

would perceive the workplace as hostile.” Id. The “conduct must be extreme to amount to a 

change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Id. (citations omitted). Title VII hostile 

work environment standards are also applicable to FEHA. Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television 

Products, 38 Cal. 4th 264, 278-79 (2006). To the extent plaintiff’s employment discrimination 

claims are based on a hostile work environment theory, they must fail for precisely the same 

reasons that his claim of disparate treatment is insufficiently proved.

6 At argument on March 13, 2015, plaintiff noted that defendant Primes stated on an 

interrogatory that he had not previously been a party to a lawsuit, when in fact he had been 

involved in five or six law suits. Counsel for defendants responded that he had not previously been 

made aware of this issue. While, if true, such a discrepancy may bear on Primes’ credibility, it 

would not raise a triable issue of fact, and therefore would not affect the ultimate outcome of this 

order.

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triable material issue for trial, the Court pauses to note that this line of argument is unpersuasive,

and fundamentally misapprehends the purpose of our anti-discrimination laws. 

“[T]he aim of Title VII is to protect individuals, not groups.” Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 

440, 458 (1982). Therefore, the fact that a single black employee operates a truck that garners 

premium pay, does not preclude plaintiff from making out a claim that he was denied the 

opportunity to be trained to drive that same truck on account of being a black American. “The 

principal focus of the statute is the protection of the individual employee, rather than the 

protection of the minority group as a whole.” Teal, 457 U.S. at 453-54. Therefore, “[a] racially 

balanced work force cannot immunize an employer from liability for specific acts of 

discrimination.” Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579. Cf. Latta v. Otter, No. 12-

17668, 2014 WL 4977682, at *19 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014) (“This focus in modern sex 

discrimination law on the preservation of the ability freely to make individual life choices 

regardless of one's sex confirms that sex discrimination operates at, and must be justified at, the 

level of individuals, not at the broad class level of all men and women.”). Similarly, the fact that 

some of plaintiff’s alleged harassers were also black does not weaken plaintiff’s right to advance 

his career unfettered by race-based discrimination. See Oncale 523 U.S. at 75 (“this Court has 

rejected any conclusive presumption that an employer will not discriminate against members of 

his own race.”); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977) (“it would be unwise to presume 

as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other 

members of their group.”).

B. Retaliation

To state a claim for retaliation under § 1981, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he engaged in 

protected activity opposing an unlawful employment practice; (2) he suffered an adverse 

employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the activity and the adverse 

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employment action. See Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2003); see 

also Manatt v. Bank of Am., N.A., 339 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying Title VII retaliation 

standard in § 1981 retaliation claim).

As noted above, the Ninth Circuit defines adverse employment action “broadly.” Fonseca 

374 F.3d at 847. This includes acts such as “lateral transfers, unfavorable job references, and 

changes in work schedules.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000). However, 

“the statute does not limit its reach only to acts of retaliation that take the form of cognizable 

employment actions such as discharge, transfer or demotion.” Id., citing Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc., 

935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, case law has put some limiting principles on this 

otherwise expansive concept. In the retaliation context, the employer’s act must be “reasonably 

likely to deter the [employee] from engaging in protected activity.” Ray 217 F.3d at 1242-43. 

Furthermore, badmouthing an employee, or refusing to hold a job open for an employee, is not 

considered an adverse employment action. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928-29 (9th 

Cir. 2000). Additionally, actions that might otherwise be considered adverse will not state a claim 

for retaliation under § 1981 if they are subject to modification, or otherwise lack finality. See 

Brooks 229 F.3d at 930 (“Because the evaluation could well have been changed on appeal, it was 

not sufficiently final to constitute an adverse employment action.”).

The third element, causation, may be inferred from the employer’s “pattern of antagonism

following the protected conduct,” Porter v. California Dep't of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 895 (9th Cir. 

2005), as well as from the temporal proximity of the protected employment activity and the 

occurrence of the adverse employment act. Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 

1987) (causation can be inferred from “employer's knowledge that the plaintiff engaged in 

protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly 

retaliatory employment decision.”). However, “[i]f a plaintiff relies solely on the proximity in time 

inference to support the causation prong, that proximity in time must be very close.” Williams v. 

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Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 316 F. App'x 563, 564 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Manatt v. Bank of Am., 

NA, 339 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that nine months between the complaint and 

adverse decision was too long to establish causation).

While not entirely clear from his opposition brief, plaintiff presumably wishes to show that 

he was retaliated against for filing formal complaints of age and race discrimination with the 

EEOC, the DFEH, and his supervisors. While these actions certainly constitute “protected 

activities,” for the reasons previously stated, none of the allegedly retaliatory acts which plaintiff 

describes rise to the level of an adverse employment action.

7

See Section II. A., supra; see also 

Ray 217 F.3d at 1243 (§ 1981 “does not cover every offensive utterance by co-workers, because 

offensive statements by co-workers do not reasonably deter employees from engaging in protected 

activity.”). Plaintiff has also failed to establish a causal nexus between the allegedly retaliatory 

acts and the protected activities that he engaged in.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to 

plaintiff’s cause of action for retaliation under FEHA and § 1981.

III. Motion for Sanctions

Plaintiff brings a motion for sanctions, alleging that defendants have failed to provide him 

with discoverable material, despite his many requests. Docket No. 59, Pl. Mot. at 4-5 

(“Defendants simply did not respond to several of plaintiff’s email [sic] and continued to take 

unreasonable positions when they finally met and conferred with Plaintiff.”). In particular, 

plaintiff requests security video footage, and certain audio recordings. 

However, upon reviewing the record, it appears that defendants did diligently correspond 

with plaintiff, including exchanging emails and meeting in person on December 12, 2014. Pl. 

Motion Exh. 1; Docket No. 63, Gschwind Decl. Defendants apprised plaintiff both in person and 

 

7 At argument on March 13, 2015, plaintiff explained that he had recently been put on 

indefinite administrative leave for actions he purportedly committed three or four years ago. There 

is no evidence concerning this issue before the Court, and the Court will therefore not consider it 

for purposes of ruling on this motion. 

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in writing that defendants did not, as a matter of policy, record audio communications over radio 

channels. Defendants also made clear that they were not in possession of the video plaintiff seeks 

either because there is no camera trained on the area plaintiff is interested in, or because video 

recordings are typically not stored for longer than 60 days. Gschwind Decl. ¶ 10.

At the December 19, 2014 case management conference (“CMC”), the Court told plaintiff 

that if he wished to resolve any discovery dispute, he should do so in accordance with the Court’s 

standing order (meet and confer sessions, followed by letter briefs re: discovery disputes). 

However, plaintiff made no attempt to contact defendants after the CMC, id. ¶ 7, nor did he file 

any motion or letter with the Court seeking to compel discovery as outlined in the standing order.

Plaintiff’s failure to follow the Court’s instructions renders his motion premature. Accordingly, 

the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 

and DENIES plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. This order resolves Docket Nos. 47 and 59.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 25, 2015

________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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