Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00078/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00078-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332in Diversity-Insurance Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 11cv78

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REJEANNE BERNIER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11-cv-78 JLS (RBB)

ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION

TO CONTINUE DEFENDANT’S

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

AND (2) VACATING HEARING

(ECF No. 47)

vs.

TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY

INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,

Defendant.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s ex parte motion to continue Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. (ECF No. 47.) Also before the Court is Defendant’s opposition (ECF No. 48)

and Plaintiff’s reply (ECF No. 49). The motion hearing on Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is currently set for March 29, 2012, at the same time as Plaintiff’s motion to remand the

case to state court (ECF No. 43) is set for hearing. 

As Plaintiff points out, a Rule 56(d) “continuance of a motion for summary judgment for

the purposes of conducting discovery should be granted almost as a matter of course unless the

non-moving party has not diligently pursued discovery of evidence.” Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R.

Co. v. The Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation, 323 F.3d 767, 773-74 (9th

Cir. 2003) (interpreting former Rule 56(f), which was carried forward without substantial change

into current Rule 56(d) in 2009). Plaintiff states that she has a pending motion before Magistrate

Case 3:11-cv-00078-JLS-RBB Document 50 Filed 03/12/12 Page 1 of 2
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 11cv78

Judge Ruben B. Brooks to extend the discovery cut-off, and for other forms of discovery-related

relief. (See ECF No. 37.) Plaintiff alleges “newly discovered evidence of January 26, 2012"

directly relates to Defendant’s statute of limitations defense. (Reply 2.) Defendant opposes

Plaintiff’s motion on the grounds that Plaintiff was not diligent in pursuing discovery, “waited

literally to the last minute to conduct all of her depositions,” and failed to bring this motion until

one month after the close of discovery. (Def.’s Opp’n 3.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has

not explained how the information she seeks would specifically relate to any opposition to

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Id. at 4.) 

The Court finds the liberal policy of Rule 56(d) towards allowing discovery-related

continuances for summary judgment motions dictates granting Plaintiff’s motion here, especially

given that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. See, e.g., Berkeley v. Home Ins. Co., 68 F.3d 1409, 1414

(D.C. Cir. 19995) (describing “the usual generous approach toward granting” Rule 56(d) motions). 

As the Supreme Court has noted, summary judgment should be entered “after adequate time for

discovery.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Here, Magistrate Judge Brooks

has not yet determined whether adequate time has been given for discovery. Thus, the motion

hearing on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is HEREBY VACATED until after

Magistrate Judge Brooks has ruled on the pending discovery motion. The Court will issue a

briefing schedule, setting a new hearing date, after Magistrate Judge Brooks’ ruling on that

motion. Further, the hearing set on Plaintiff’s motion to remand is HEREBY VACATED, and the

matter is taken under submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 12, 2012

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

Case 3:11-cv-00078-JLS-RBB Document 50 Filed 03/12/12 Page 2 of 2