Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-16928/USCOURTS-ca9-14-16928-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HABEAS CORPUS RESOURCE

CENTER; OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL

PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE DISTRICT

OF ARIZONA,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE; LORETTA E. LYNCH,

Attorney General,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 14-16928

D.C. No.

4:13-cv-04517-

CW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Claudia Wilken, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 10, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed March 23, 2016

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Barry G. Silverman,

and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bea

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 1 of 26
2 HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ

SUMMARY*

Standing/Ripeness

The panel vacated the district court’s decision on

summaryjudgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss

an action raising challenges to the Attorney General’s 2013

regulations implementing a procedure for certifying a state’s

capital-counsel mechanisms for the fast-tracking of capital

prisoners’ federal habeas cases.

The panel held that the plaintiffs, the Habeas Corpus

Resource Center and the Office of the Federal Public

Defender for the District of Arizona, two governmental

organizations that provide legal representation to capital

defendants and prisoners, did not have standing to bring this

action based on their theory of direct injury. Because the

plaintiffs have not suffered a legally cognizable injury as a

result of the promulgations of the final regulations, the panel

did not need to address further their contentions that they had

standing to challenge procedural errors in the notice-andcomment-rulemaking process and third-party standing on

behalf of their clients.

The panel declined the plaintiffs’ request for a limited

remand to allow their clients an opportunity to intervene. The

panel wrote that the Attorney General has not yet made any

certification decisions, and, thus, challenges to the procedures

and criteria set forth in the regulations are not ripe for review.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 2 of 26
HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ 3

COUNSEL

Samantha Lee Chaifetz (argued), Melissa N. Patterson, and

Michael Raab, United States Department of Justice, Civil

Division, Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellants.

Marc Shapiro (argued), Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP,

New York, New York; George E. Greer, Orrick, Herrington

& Sutcliffe LLP, Seattle, Washington; Shannon Christine

Leong, Catherine Y. Lui, and Darren S. Teshima, Orrick,

Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, San Francisco, California, for

Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Kent S. Scheidegger, Criminal Legal Foundation,

Sacramento, California, for Amici Curiae Marc Klaas and

Edward G. Hardesty.

OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge:

Title 28, chapter 154 of the United States Code (“Chapter

154”) permits the “fast-tracking” of federal habeas cases for

capital prisoners from states that offer competent counsel to

indigent capital prisoners during state postconviction

proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–2266. “Fast-tracking”

principally affects habeas corpus petitioners because it

contracts from one year to six months the period in which

petitioners may file a timely federal habeas petition. See id.

§ 2263(a). Before a state can avail itself of Chapter 154’s

“fast-tracking” provisions, it must request and receive

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 3 of 26
4 HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ

certification from the Attorney General1that it “has

established a mechanism for providing counsel in

postconviction proceedings” to indigent capital prisoners. Id.

§§ 2261(b)(1), 2265(a)(1)(A). In 2013, the Attorney General

finalized regulations to implement a certification procedure,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2265(b), and the plaintiffs then

brought this action, which raises numerous challenges to the

regulations, which challenges are based upon the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). On summary

judgment, the district court sustained most of the plaintiffs’

challenges, found the regulations arbitrary or capricious in

several respects, and enjoined the regulations from going into

effect. We vacate the district court’s decision and remand

with instructions to dismiss this case because the plaintiffs,

two governmental organizations that provide legal

representation to capital defendants and prisoners, did not

have standing to bring this action. Furthermore, we decline

the plaintiffs’ request for a limited remand to allow their

clients an opportunity to intervene; the Attorney General has

not yet made any certification decisions, and, thus, challenges

to the procedures and criteria set forth in the regulations are

not yet ripe for review.

1 The United States Department of Justice and the Attorney General are

named as defendants in this case. Because the Attorney General is vested

with the authority to promulgate the regulations at issue here, see

28 U.S.C. § 2265(b), we refer to the AttorneyGeneral when discussing the

defendants. Loretta E. Lynch was substituted for Eric H. Holder Jr. as

Attorney General on April 27, 2015.

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 4 of 26
HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ 5

I

A. Background on Chapter 154 and the Final Regulations

Although the federal Constitution requires that counsel be

appointed for indigent criminal defendants when a conviction

results in imprisonment, see Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S.

654, 661–62 (2002), this requirement does not extend, as a

federal constitutional matter, to postconviction collateral

attacks on a conviction or sentence in state or federal court,

see Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555–59 (1987).

Chapter 154, which was added by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), provides

procedural benefits to states that voluntarily appoint counsel

to represent indigent capital prisoners during state

postconviction proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–2266.2

For a state to “opt in” to Chapter 154, it must request and

receive certification from the Attorney General that it “has

established a mechanism for the appointment, compensation,

and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent

counsel in State postconviction proceedings brought by

indigent prisoners who have been sentenced to death.” Id.

§ 2265(a)(1)(A); see id. § 2261(b)(1). For the state to invoke

Chapter 154 in a particular capital prisoner’s federal habeas

case, it must have appointed counsel to represent the prisoner

during state postconviction proceedings pursuant to its

capital-counsel mechanism, unless the prisoner validly

2 Federal law provides for the appointment of counsel to indigent capital

prisoners during federal habeas proceedings. See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2).

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 5 of 26
6 HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ

waived counsel, retained his own counsel, or was found not

indigent. Id. § 2261(b)(2).3

If Chapter 154 applies to a federal habeas case, then,

among other things, (1) the capital prisoner can secure an

automatic stay from execution while his state postconviction

and federal habeas proceedings are ongoing, see id. § 2262;

(2) the statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas

petition is shortened from one year to six months from the

date of final judgment of the state courts on direct appeal,

compare id. § 2244(d) (general rule), with id. § 2263(a)

(Chapter 154 rule); and (3) the federal courts must give

priority status to the habeas case and resolve it within the

time periods specified by Chapter 154, see id. § 2266.

Chapter 154 requires the Attorney General to certify state

capital-counsel mechanisms that comply with the

requirements of Chapter 154, and such certification decisions

are subject to de novo review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the D.C. Circuit. Id. § 2265(a), (c). The Attorney General

must also promulgate regulations to implement such

certification procedure. Id. § 2265(b). After engaging in

3 Federal courts entertaining habeas corpus petitions were previously

required to determine whether a state’s capital-counsel mechanism

qualified the state to receive Chapter 154’s benefits. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2261(b) (Supp. III 1997); Spears v. Stewart, 283 F.3d 992, 1008–09 (9th

Cir. 2002) (amended opinion). In 2006, Congress amended Chapter 154

to shift responsibilityfor determining the adequacy ofstate capital-counsel

mechanisms from the federal courts to the Attorney General. See USA

PATRIOT Improvement & Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-

177, § 507, 120 Stat. 192, 250–51 (2006). Under all versions ofthe statute,

such federal habeas courts must still determine whether the state did

appoint counsel to represent the capital prisoner during state

postconviction proceedings, pursuant to the state’s capital-counsel

mechanism.

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 6 of 26
HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ 7

notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Attorney General

finalized such regulations in September 2013 (“Final

Regulations”). See 78 Fed. Reg. 58,160 (Sept. 23, 2013).4

The Final Regulations establish a procedure for certifying

whether a state’s mechanism is adequate for the appointment

of professionally competent counsel to represent indigent

capital prisoners during state postconviction proceedings. The

Final Regulations require a state to request certification; the

AttorneyGeneral must post the state’s request on the Internet,

solicit public comments, and review such comments during

the certification process. See 28 C.F.R. § 26.23. If the

Attorney General certifies that a state’s capital-counsel

mechanism conforms to the requirements of Chapter 154 and

the Final Regulations, she also must determine the date on

which the state established its mechanism. See 28 C.F.R.

§ 26.23(c)–(d); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2265(a)(1)(B). The

certification is effective as of the date the Attorney General

finds the state established its adequate mechanism; as this

date can be in the past, a certification decision may apply

retroactively. 28 U.S.C. § 2265(a)(2); 28 C.F.R. § 26.23(c).

The Final Regulations also set forth substantive criteria

that a state’s capital-counsel mechanism must meet to be

certified. Consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 2261(c)–(d), a state’s

mechanism must require a court of record to appoint counsel

4 The Attorney General first issued final regulations under Chapter 154

in 2008. See 73 Fed. Reg. 75,327 (Dec. 11, 2008). The district court

preliminarily enjoined the AttorneyGeneral fromputting those regulations

into effect, concluding that notice of certain aspects ofthe final regulations

had been inadequate. Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

No. C 08-2649 CW, 2009 WL 185423, at *7–*8, *10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20,

2009). The Attorney General subsequently withdrew those regulations.

See 75 Fed. Reg. 71,353 (Nov. 23, 2010).

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 7 of 26
8 HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ

to represent an indigent capital prisoner in state

postconviction proceedings unless the capital prisoner

competently rejected the offer of counsel or was not indeed

indigent. 28 C.F.R. § 26.22(a). If the court appoints counsel,

the attorney must not have represented the prisoner at trial,

unless the attorney and prisoner expressly agree otherwise.

See id. Under the Final Regulations, a state’s capital-counsel

mechanism must include competency and compensation

standards for counsel appointed pursuant to the mechanism.

The Final Regulations provide two competency benchmarks,

as well as a catchall provision for mechanisms that

“otherwise reasonably assure a level of proficiency

appropriate for State postconviction litigation in capital

cases.” Id. § 26.22(b)(2). Similarly, the Final Regulations

provide four compensation benchmarks, as well as a catchall

provision for mechanisms that are “otherwise reasonably

designed to ensure the availability for appointment of

counsel” satisfying the competency standards. Id.

§ 26.22(c)(2). A state’s mechanism must also authorize

payment of “the reasonable litigation expenses of appointed

counsel.” Id. § 26.22(d); accord 28 U.S.C. § 2265(a)(1)(A).

B. Procedural History

After the Attorney General issued the Final Regulations

in 2013, the Habeas Corpus Resource Center (“HCRC”) and

the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the District of

Arizona (“Arizona FPD”) (collectively, “Defender

Organizations”), commenced this action, in which they

sought to block the Final Regulations from taking effect.

Their complaint alleged four causes of action under the APA:

(1) the Attorney General had failed to give adequate notice

regarding certain aspects of the Final Regulations; (2) the

Attorney General had failed to respond to significant public

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 8 of 26
HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ 9

comments made about the Final Regulations during noticeand-comment rulemaking; (3) the certification process

prescribed by the Final Regulations is arbitrary or capricious

because it is exempt from the APA’s notice-and-commentrulemaking requirements and does not allow for meaningful

public participation; and (4) the substantive criteria set forth

in the Final Regulations are arbitrary or capricious because

they do not provide sufficient competency standards and fail

to establish the factual bases on which the Attorney General

will make certification decisions.5

The Defender Organizations are governmental

organizations that counsel capital defendants and prisoners

and represent capital prisoners in federal habeas proceedings.6

According to declarations submitted by the Defender

Organizations to the district court, vagueness in the Final

Regulations prevents the Defender Organizations from

making reasonable predictions as to whether and how the

Attorney General will certify state capital-counsel

mechanisms and, thus, whether Chapter 154 may apply to

their clients’ federal habeas cases. The Defender

Organizations declared that, as a result, they must make

5 The Defender Organizations voluntarily withdrew a fifth cause of

action, which alleged that the Attorney General’s “involvement in the

rulemaking and certification process violates the Due Process Clause of

the United States Constitution.”

6 The HCRC is an office within the judicial branch of the State of

California thatrepresents indigent capital prisoners in state postconviction,

federal habeas, and executive clemency proceedings. Similarly, the

Arizona FPD is a federal defender organization that represents capital

prisoners in federal habeas proceedings, provides legal assistance to

capital defendants and prisoners and their counsel, and trains attorneys

who represent capital prisoners in federal habeas proceedings.

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 9 of 26
10 HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ

immediate strategic and resourcing decisions, such as

“whether to commit limited attorney time and financial

resources,” whether to “curtail the development of claims to

include in a federal [habeas] petition,” and how to advise

appellate and postconviction counsel to preserve capital

defendants’ and prisoners’ rights for their eventual federal

habeas cases.

The district court agreed that “confusion” caused by the

Final Regulations required the Defender Organizations to

“make urgent decisions regarding their litigation, resources,

and strategy.” The district court held that this “confusion”

was a legally cognizable injury sufficient to give the

Defender Organizations standing to challenge the Final

Regulations; it also ruled that the Defender Organizations’

challenges to the Final Regulations were ripe for review. The

district court issued a temporary restraining order preventing

the Attorney General from applying the Final Regulations.

The Defender Organizations then filed a motion for a

preliminary injunction, which the district court granted. The

Attorney General appealed the district court’s order granting

a preliminary injunction; while the appeal was pending, the

parties cross-moved for summary judgment. On summary

judgment, the district court sustained most of the Defender

Organizations’ challenges to the Final Regulations and found

the Final Regulations arbitrary or capricious in several

respects. The district court thus ordered that the Attorney

General refrain from putting the Final Regulations into effect

and held that the Attorney General “must remedy the defects

identified in this order in any future efforts to implement the

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 10 of 26
HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ 11

procedure prescribed by chapter 154.” The Attorney General

appeals this decision.7

II

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of

federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const.

art. III, § 2. The case-or-controversyrequirement ensures that

“[f]ederal courts [do] not ‘decide questions that cannot affect

the rights of litigants in the case before them’ or give

‘opinion[s] advising what the law would be upon a

hypothetical state of facts.’” Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct.

1017, 1023 (2013) (third alteration in original) (quoting Lewis

v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). This

case involves two components of the Article III case-orcontroversy requirement: standing, which concerns who may

bring suit, and ripeness, which concerns when a litigant may

bring suit. As noted, the district court found that the Defender

Organizations had standing to bring this suit and that their

challenges to the Final Regulations were ripe for review. We

review the district court’s standing and ripeness

determinations de novo. See Colwell v. Dep’t of Health &

Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir. 2009).8

7 The district court’s final judgment superseded the preliminary

injunction. As a result, we previously granted the Attorney General’s

unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal of the district court’s order

granting the preliminary injunction as moot.

8 We note that the Supreme Court previously rejected, on jurisdictional

grounds, a challenge arising out of the prior version of Chapter 154.

Before the statute was amended in 2006, federal habeas courts—not the

Attorney General—determined whether a state’s capital-counsel

mechanismqualified the state to receive Chapter 154’s benefits. See supra

note 3. In Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 743 (1998), a class of

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 11 of 26
12 HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ

A. Standing

At the core of the Article III case-or-controversy

requirement is the doctrine of standing. Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “It requires federal courts

to satisfy themselves that the plaintiff has alleged such a

personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant

his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction,” so that “there is

a real need to exercise the power of judicial review in order

to protect the interests of the complaining party.” Summers v.

Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (emphasis in

original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

California capital prisoners brought suit under the Declaratory Judgment

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), seeking “declaratory and injunctive relief to

resolve uncertainty over whether Chapter 154 applied” to them. Ashmus,

523 U.S. at 743. The Supreme Court found that this was not a justiciable

Article III case or controversy. Id. at 749. The Court noted that the suit

would not finally determine class members’ entitlement to habeas relief;

the class sought to resolve only a subsidiary legal issue, to wit, whether

Chapter 154 would apply when class members eventually filed federal

habeas petitions. Id. at 746–48. “Any risk associated with resolving [that]

question in habeas, rather than a pre-emptive suit, is no different from

risks associated with choices commonly faced by litigants.” Id. at 748.

The Court found that there was no concrete Article III case or controversy

even though class members allegedly were forced “to make an

unacceptable choice: filing a pro se [habeas] petition within 180 days in

order to ensure compliance with Chapter 154, which may fail to raise

substantial claims, or waiting until counsel is appointed, which may miss

the 180-day filing deadline if Chapter 154 applies.” Id. at 744, 746–48 &

n.3. We recognize that there are clear parallels between Ashmus and this

case. However, the Court focused on whether Ashmus presented “a

concrete controversy susceptible to conclusive judicial determination,”

which is a jurisdictional prerequisite for cases arising under the

Declaratory Judgment Act; the Court did not discuss the standing and

ripeness issues that are present in this case. Id. at 748–49. As a result,

Ashmus does not control our analysis.

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 12 of 26
HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ 13

Case law has “established that the irreducible constitutional

minimum of standing contains three elements”:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an

“injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally

protected interest which is (a) concrete and

particularized; and (b) “actual or imminent,

not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second,

there must be a causal connection between the

injury and the conduct complained of—the

injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the

challenged action of the defendant, and

not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action

of some third party not before the court.”

Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to

merely “speculative,” that the injury will be

“redressed by a favorable decision.”

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (alterations in

original) (citations and footnote omitted). The Defender

Organizations “bear[] the burden of establishing these

elements.” Id. at 561. Because this is an appeal from an order

granting summary judgment, we accept as true the

declarations submitted by the Defender Organizations to the

district court. See id. We find, however, that these

declarations do not demonstrate that the Defender

Organizations have suffered a legally cognizable injury in

fact. As a result, the Defender Organizations did not have

standing to bring this suit.

1. Direct Injury

At the outset, we note that the Final Regulations prescribe

procedures and criteria to guide the Attorney General’s

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 13 of 26
14 HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ

certification of state capital-counsel mechanisms; the Final

Regulations thus directly affect only the Attorney General

and, to some degree, states seeking certification under

Chapter 154. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 26.22–.23. “[W]hen the

plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or

inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is

ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562 (quoting Allen v.

Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984)). The Defender

Organizations “can demonstrate standing only if application

of the regulations by the Government will affect them in the

manner described above.” Summers, 555 U.S. at 494

(emphasis in original).

In their brief, the Defender Organizations set forth a

connection between themselves and the Final Regulations

which, they argue, establishes that they have suffered a

legally cognizable injury due to the issuance of the Final

Regulations. We do not disagree with the Defender

Organizations on several points. To start, we do not dispute

that, if Chapter 154 applies to a capital prisoner’s federal

habeas case, the prisoner may be adversely affected,

particularly because Chapter 154 shortens the statute of

limitations for filing a federal habeas petition from one year

to six months.9See 28 U.S.C. § 2263(a). We also do not

doubt that Chapter 154’s shorter statute of limitations may

alter the Defender Organizations’ “strategic considerations in

the development and presentation of appellate and postconviction claims, the calculation of legal and financial

resources available to competently prepare and litigate cases,

9 We do not decide here whether this effect alone constitutes a legally

cognizable injury sufficient to confer standing on capital prisoners to

challenge the Final Regulations directly.

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 14 of 26
HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ 15

and the advice to counsel and clients who are subject [to] its

provisions.” (Alteration in original.) And we recognize that

the Final Regulations influence whether Chapter 154 will

apply to a capital prisoner’s federal habeas case, as they guide

the Attorney General’s certification process under Chapter

154. Further, a state must request and receive certification

from the Attorney General before it may seek to invoke

Chapter 154 in a capital prisoner’s federal habeas case. See

id. §§ 2261(a)(1)(A), 2265(b)(1).

The Defender Organizations base their claim of injury on

the role the Final Regulations play in the certification

process. According to the Defender Organizations, the Final

Regulations create “‘significant confusion’ insofar as [they]

provide[] (1) no basis for understanding what evidence or

measure of sufficiency the Attorney General will rely upon in

making . . . certification decisions, (2) no procedural

safeguards to those directly affected by certification or an

opportunity to meaningfully contribute to the certification

decision, and (3) no indication whether a certification

decision will be guided by the body of law interpreting

Chapter 154 prior to its amendment.” In light of this

“confusion,” the Defender Organizations assert that they and

their death-sentenced clients “are faced with two untenable

choices: either proceed as if Chapter 154 does not apply, and

thereby risk the forfeiture of potentially meritorious claims

against their convictions and death sentences if the time

limitations of Chapter 154 are later found to be applicable; or

attempt to comply with those stringent limitations, and

thereby forego full investigation and adequate factual and

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 15 of 26
16 HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ

legal development of their constitutional claims.”10 The

Defender Organizations assert that the Final Regulations have

injured them because they must “assume the worst and

‘immediately make litigation, resource, and advisory

decisions’ in the dark,” such as “whether to commit limited

attorney time and financial resources, and, in some instances,

curtail the development of claims to include in a federal

petition, in order to comply with a six month, rather than one

year, statute of limitations.”

This is a long-winded explanation of what we think is a

relativelysimple notion:TheDefenderOrganizations contend

that they had standing to challenge the Final Regulations

because the Final Regulations are vague, and the Defender

Organizations must advise and assist their death-sentenced

clients without knowing, in advance, whether the Attorney

General will certify state capital-counsel mechanisms and

whether Chapter 154 may therefore apply to their clients’

federal habeas cases. However, we fail to see how the

Defender Organizations have suffered a concrete,

particularized11injury sufficient to give them standing to

challenge the Final Regulations.TheDefenderOrganizations’

bare uncertainty regarding the validity of the Final

Regulations and the applicability of Chapter 154 to their

clients’federal habeas cases, absent “anyconcrete application

that threatens imminent harm to [their] interests,” cannot

10 This is very similar to the risk that the Supreme Court in Ashmus

found was insufficient to give rise to a concrete case or controversy under

the Declaratory Judgment Act. See supra note 8.

11

“Particularized” in this context “mean[s] that the injury must affect the

plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. at 560 n.1.

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 16 of 26
HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ 17

support standing. Summers, 555 U.S. at 494; see Lewis,

494 U.S. at 477–79; Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. Nuclear

Regulatory Comm’n, 457 F.3d 941, 951–55 (9th Cir. 2006).

Nor is it enough that vagueness in the Final Regulations

may cause the Defender Organizations to “assume the worst”

and change their litigation strategy to file their clients’ federal

habeas petitions within the six-month statute-of-limitations

period prescribed by Chapter 154 instead of the general oneyear statute-of-limitations period. Cf. Calderon v. Ashmus,

523 U.S. 740, 748 (1998) (“Any risk associated with

resolving the question [whether Chapter 154 applies] in

habeas, rather than a pre-emptive suit, is no different from

risks associated with choices commonly faced by litigants.”).

Assisting and counseling clients in the face of legal

uncertainty is the role of lawyers,12and, notably, the

Defender Organizations have not cited any authority

suggesting that lawyers suffer a legally cognizable injury in

fact when they take measures to protect their clients’ rights or

alter their litigation strategy amid legal uncertainty.

13 Taken

12 We recognize that the Defender Organizations are in a different

position from typical attorneys: They are governmental organizations that

have a mandate to represent indigent clients; they cannot recoup the cost

of their representation and must make independent resourcing decisions

in light oflegal uncertainty created by the Final Regulations. However, we

think that distinction is unimportant, and the Defender Organizations have

cited no authority that would support standing in light of that distinction.

13 The Defender Organizations emphasize that the district court ruled

that they had standing to challenge the Attorney General’s Chapter 154

regulations on three separate occasions: twice in this case and once in a

prior, related case. See also supra note 4. However, the decision we here

review provides little authoritative support for the rulings in that very

decision. Further, we cannot affirm the district court’s decision because

it made the same analytical mistake three times instead of just once. The

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 17 of 26
18 HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ

to its logical conclusion, this theory of injury would permit

attorneys to challenge any governmental action or regulation

when doing so would make the scope of their clients’ rights

clearer and their strategies to vindicate those rights more

easily selected. We think the Defender Organizations would

be hard-pressed to find authority supporting such an

expansion of standing. Cf. Summers, 555 U.S. at 494 (opining

that allowing the plaintiff to challenge a “regulation in the

abstract . . . would fly in the face of Article III’s injury-in-fact

requirement”).

Indeed, a recent Supreme Court case undercuts the

Defender Organizations’ claim of direct injury. In Clapper v.

Amnesty International USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142 (2013),

lawyers, journalists, and others sought to enjoin the

enforcement of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, a statute authorizing

governmental surveillance of communications with foreign

persons. The plaintiffs claimed that they had standing

because, among other reasons, they were injured by the need

to take measures to avoid surveillance when communicating

with their foreign contacts. Id. at 1150–51. The Supreme

Court rejected that argument, holding that the harm the

closest relevant cases the Defender Organizations cite are Paulsen v.

Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1005 (9th Cir. 2005), and Yesler Terrace

Community Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442, 445–47 (9thCir. 1994). But

in those cases, the plaintiffs challenged regulations that directly affected

their rights, not the rights of any client of theirs. See Paulsen, 413 F.3d at

1005 (“The effect of the regulation was to deny [the petitioners] sentence

reduction.”); Yesler Terrace, 37 F.3d at 445–47 (“As a consequence of

HUD’s decision, [the plaintiffs], personally, now are subject to the threat

of eviction for alleged criminal activity without recourse to an informal

grievance hearing.”). These cases may support the standing of capital

prisoners—the Defender Organizations’ clients—to challenge the Final

Regulations, but they do not support the standing of the Defender

Organizations themselves.

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 18 of 26
HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ 19

plaintiffs sought to avoid was not “certainly impending,” as

the plaintiffs could only “speculate and make assumptions

about whether their communications with their foreign

contacts [would] be acquired under § 1881a.” Id. at 1148. The

plaintiffs could not “manufacture standing merely by

inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of

hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending,”

even though the measures they took were “a reasonable

reaction to a risk of harm.” Id. at 1151.

So too here, it may be eminently reasonable for the

Defender Organizations to take measures to prevent or

mitigate the harm their clients may face due to the possible

future application of Chapter 154 to their federal habeas

cases. But, the Defender Organizations face no “certainly

impending” harm resulting from the issuance and application

of the Final Regulations; even if their clients face a “certainly

impending” harm from “confusion” caused by the Final

Regulations, the Defender Organizations have given us no

reason to believe that they can parlay such harm into an

injury of their own. We therefore hold that the Defender

Organizations did not have standing to bring this suit based

on their theory of direct injury, as propounded in their

declarations and accepted by the district court.14

14 We also question whether the Defender Organizations’ claimed injury

is fairly traceable to the Final Regulations or redressable by setting aside

the Final Regulations. However, because we find that the Defender

Organizations have not suffered a legally cognizable injury in fact, we

need not, and do not, analyze the remaining prongs of the standing

inquiry.

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 19 of 26
20 HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ

2. Third-Party Standing and Procedural Standing

In their brief, the Defender Organizations advance, for the

first time, two additional theories of standing. First, they

claim that, at a minimum, they had standing to challenge

procedural errors in the notice-and-comment-rulemaking

process that culminated in the issuance of the Final

Regulations, because they participated in that process.

Second, the Defender Organizations argue that they had thirdparty standing to challenge the Final Regulations on behalf of

their death-sentenced clients. However, even under these

theories, the Defender Organizations must identify a concrete

interest of their own that is harmed by the Final Regulations;

they cannot circumvent the injury-in-fact requirement of

standing. See, e.g., Summers, 555 U.S. at 496 (procedural

standing); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,

491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989) (third-party standing). Because

we find that the Defender Organizations have not suffered a

legally cognizable injury as a result of the promulgation of

the Final Regulations, we need not address these theories

further.

B. Ripeness

Because we find that the Defender Organizations lacked

standing to challenge the substance of the Final Regulations,

we decide next whether to grant the Defender Organizations’

request for a limited remand to afford their death-sentenced

clients an opportunity to intervene. We decline to follow this

course of action, because the challenges to the substance of

the Final Regulations that the Defender Organizations raise—

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 20 of 26
HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ 21

and, by extension, those that their clients would raise if they

intervened in this case—are not yet ripe for review.15

Ripeness doctrine seeks “to prevent the courts . . . from

entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over

administrative policies, and also to protect [administrative]

agencies from judicial interference until an administrative

decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete

way by the challenging parties.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,

387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967). In resolving ripeness questions,

courts examine the “fitness of the issues for judicial decision”

and the “hardship to the parties of withholding court

consideration.” Id. at 149.

Ripeness issues arise often when a litigant seeks “preenforcement review” of an agency’s regulations—that is, the

litigant challenges regulations anticipating that an

administrative agency will, in the near future, apply those

regulations in a manner that will harm the litigant’s interests.

See, e.g., id. Courts permit pre-enforcement review of

regulations understanding that regulations can immediately

affect “primary conduct”: Regulated parties may have to

choose between complying with the regulations immediately

or facing penalties. See, e.g., Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n,

15 We could also conceivably scrutinize the ability of capital prisoners

to challenge the Final Regulations in terms of standing, because, “[w]hen

addressing the sufficiency of a showing of injury-in-fact grounded in

potential future harms, Article III standing and ripeness issues often ‘boil

down to the same question.’” Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir.

2014) (amended opinion) (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 n.5 (2014)); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,

499 n.10 (1975). We think ripeness cases better describe the jurisdictional

constraints on capital prisoners who might seek preemptively to challenge

the Final Regulations.

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 21 of 26
22 HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ

497 U.S. 871, 891–92 (1990). The Final Regulations are of a

different sort, because they do not act upon capital prisoners

but guide the AttorneyGeneral’s certification of state capitalcounsel mechanisms. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 26.22–.23. A capital

prisoner’s federal habeas rights may be affected indirectly, if

the sentencing state requests certification and if the Attorney

General finds that the state’s capital-counsel mechanism

comports with Chapter 154 and the Final Regulations. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 2261(a), 2265(a)–(b); 28 C.F.R. §§ 26.22–.23.

To determine whether the challenges to the substance of

the Final Regulations are ripe, we must consider:

“(1) whether delayed review would cause hardship to the

plaintiffs; (2) whether judicial intervention would

inappropriately interfere with further administrative action;

and (3) whether the courts would benefit from further factual

development of the issues presented.” Ohio Forestry Ass’n,

Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998). We think this

case is analogous to Ohio Forestry and, as in that case,

consideration of these factors forecloses review here.

In Ohio Forestry, the Forest Service developed a plan,

mandated by statute, for managing the natural resources of

the Wayne National Forest. Id. at 728–29. The plan set

logging goals, selected areas of the forest suitable for logging,

and determined appropriate methods for timber harvesting.

Id. at 730. Promulgation of the plan made logging more likely

because a plan is a “logging precondition”—“in its absence

logging could not take place”—but the plan did not itself

authorize the cutting of any trees. Id. The Forest Service had

to take additional steps to permit logging, and its decisions

were subject to an administrative-appeals process and judicial

review. Id. The Sierra Club challenged the plan as wrongly

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 22 of 26
HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ 23

favoring logging; the Supreme Court ruled that the challenge

was not ripe for review. Id. at 732–37.

The Court noted first that the Forest Service’s plan did not

“command anyone to do anything or to refrain from doing

anything”; before the Forest Service could permit logging, it

had to “focus upon a particular site, propose a specific

harvesting method, prepare an environmental review, permit

the public an opportunity to be heard, and (if challenged)

justify the proposal in court.” Id. at 733–34. This gave the

Sierra Club “ample opportunity later to bring its legal

challenge at a time when harm is more imminent and more

certain, [which] challenge might also include a challenge to

the lawfulness of the present Plan.” Id. at 734. The same is

true here: The Final Regulations do not require anything of

capital prisoners—or indeed of their lawyers—and do not

immediately alter their federal habeas rights or procedures.

See 28 C.F.R. §§ 26.22–.23. Before a capital prisoner’s rights

may be affected, the sentencing state must request

certification by the Attorney General, the Attorney General

must (under the Final Regulations) allow for public comment

on the request, and the Attorney General must then certify

that the state’s capital-counsel mechanism is compliant with

Chapter 154. See 28 U.S.C. § 2265; 28 C.F.R. § 26.23. That

decision is (under Chapter 154) subject to de novo review in

the D.C. Circuit.1628 U.S.C. § 2265(c). Delayed judicial

review of the Final Regulations is unlikely to cause hardship

to capital prisoners, even if they might change their strategy

16 The D.C. Circuit’s de novo review of certification decisions is

different from—and less deferential than—typical judicial review of

agency action, which is governed by the arbitrary-or-capricious standard.

Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2265(c)(3) (Chapter 154), with 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A) (APA).

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 23 of 26
24 HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ

for pursuing postconviction relief in light of the promulgation

of the Final Regulations. Cf. Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t

of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807–12 (2003) (finding unripe a

challenge to regulations exempting concession contracts from

the provisions of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (“CDA”)

even though “applicability vel non of the CDA is one of the

factors a concessioner takes into account when preparing its

bid for . . . concession contracts” and rejecting the argument

that “mere uncertainty as to the validity of a legal rule

constitutes a hardship for purposes of the ripeness analysis”).

As to the second Ohio Forestry factor, the Supreme Court

noted that judicial interference “could hinder agency efforts

to refine its policies . . . through application of the Plan in

practice.” 523 U.S. at 735–36. Similarly here, the Attorney

General must interpret and apply the Final Regulations when

evaluating specific state capital-counsel mechanisms, and

judicial review of the Final Regulations has prevented the

AttorneyGeneral from doing so. The Defender Organizations

(and, hence, their clients) essentially complain that the Final

Regulations do not make clear precisely how the Attorney

General will conduct the certification process, how the

Attorney General will make certification decisions, and how

the Attorney General will apply the catchall provision for

competency of counsel. These issues will sort themselves out

as the Attorney General applies the Final Regulations, makes

certification decisions, and justifies those decisions in the

D.C. Circuit, if indeed challenged. Cf. Toilet Goods Ass’n,

Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164–65 (1967).

Considering the third Ohio Forestry factor, we think that,

in the absence of a concrete application of the Final

Regulations, the challenges to the substance of the Final

Regulations represent “‘abstract disagreements over

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 24 of 26
HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ 25

administrative policies,’ that the ripeness doctrine seeks to

avoid.” 523 U.S. at 736 (quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at

148). Any deficiencies in the certification process and the

criteria prescribed by the Final Regulations will become

clearer as the Attorney General makes certification decisions

and as those decisions undergo de novo review in the D.C.

Circuit. See id. at 737 (“All this is to say that further factual

development would ‘significantly advance our ability to deal

with the legal issues presented’ and would ‘aid us in their

resolution.’” (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt’l

Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 82 (1978)); cf. Pearson v.

Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“That is not to

say that the agency was necessarily required to define the

term in its initial general regulation—or indeed that it is

obliged to issue a comprehensive definition all at once. The

agency is entitled to proceed case by case . . . .”). We find the

challenges to the substance of the Final Regulations not ripe

for review at this time. We therefore decline to remand this

case to the district court to allow capital prisoners an

opportunity to intervene and interpose these challenges.17

17 The Defender Organizations renew their argument that the Attorney

General failed to give adequate notice that certification decisions will be

treated as orders, not rules, and will not be subject to the dictates of

notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA. Ordinarily, we would

agree that such a procedural claim is ripe for review. See Citizens for

Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 976–78 (9th Cir.

2003); Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 216 (D.C. Cir.

2007). We question whether the same ripeness conclusion holds here: The

Defender Organizations essentially complain that they did not receive

notice that the certification process prescribed by the Final Regulations

will not meet certain procedural requirements, but the Attorney General

has not yet endeavored to begin the certification process. The Attorney

General may very well afford the Defender Organizations all the

procedural protectionsthey seek. Cf. Colwell, 558 F.3d at 1124–28. In any

event, we need not decide this issue, because the Defender Organizations

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 25 of 26
26 HABEAS CORPUS RES. CTR. V. USDOJ

III

For these reasons, we vacate the decision of the district

court and remand with instructions to dismiss this case for

lack of jurisdiction. Each party will bear its own costs on

appeal.

VACATED and REMANDED with instructions.

did not have standing to bring that claim. See supra. The Defender

Organizations do not appear to request that we remand this case to the

district court to allow capital prisoners to intervene regarding the

inadequate-notice claim—perhaps because the district court found in favor

of the Attorney General on that claim—and we decline to do so.

 Case: 14-16928, 03/23/2016, ID: 9911837, DktEntry: 62-1, Page 26 of 26