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Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3017

___________

Michael David Lenz, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Charlie Wade, Jr., Sgt. Cummins Unit, *

ADC (originally sued as Wade); *

Louis Seamster, CO-I, Cummins Unit, *

ADC (originally sued as Seamster); *

Kenneth Bell, Lt. Cummins Unit, *

ADC (originally sued as Bell); *

Arkansas Department of Correction; *

Larry Norris, *

*

Defendants, *

*

M.D. Reed, *

*

Appellant, *

*

Loren Burrer; Percy Sergeant, Mr., *

*

Defendants. *

___________

Submitted: June 11, 2007

Filed: June 20, 2007

___________

Before BYE, RILEY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

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On January 7, 1998, similar violence occurred in the Cummins Unit. After

inmates threw water or urine on a female officer, other officers doused the inmates

with pepper spray. The officers then took inmates Kiloe Page (Page) and George

Proby (Proby) to the captain’s room. In the captain’s room, Officer Wade, Officer

Bell, and other officers beat Page and Proby and used shock sticks in the inmates’

“behinds.”

The district court found Warden Reed learned of the January 7 violent incident

after the January 24 violent incident because “[Warden Reed] did not receive [Page’s

grievance] until February 2, 1998, which was after the Lenz incident.” The district

court’s factual finding is not clearly erroneous and is not challenged by Lenz. Thus,

the January 7 violent incident is not relevant to determining whether Warden Reed

exhibited deliberate indifference. See Blades v. Schuetzle, 302 F.3d 801, 804 (8th Cir.

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RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Following a two-day bench trial, the district court entered a judgment against

Charlie Wade, Jr. (Officer Wade), Kenneth Bell (Officer Bell), and M.D. Reed

(Warden Reed) for inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on Michael Lenz (Lenz).

Warden Reed appeals. We reverse the judgment against Warden Reed and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Lenz is an inmate within the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC). At

the time of the incident on January 24, 1998, Lenz and three other inmates were

housed in isolation in the Cummins Unit of the ADC, where Warden Reed was the

warden. As a result of an incident between an officer and one of the inmates, several

officers instructed the inmates to allow themselves to be handcuffed. Lenz refused to

be handcuffed. Officer Wade, Officer Bell, and the other officers doused Lenz and

other inmates with pepper spray. Lenz then put on the handcuffs. Pursuant to an

ADC policy, the officers took the other inmates affected by the pepper spray to the

showers, however, the officers took Lenz to the captain’s room, which is an enclosed

room without cameras. In the captain’s room, Officer Wade, Officer Bell, and other

officers beat Lenz, who was still handcuffed, and shocked him with a shock stick.1

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2002) (“[T]he matter of deliberate indifference must be determined with regard to the

relevant prison official’s knowledge at the time in question, not with ‘hindsight’s

perfect vision.’” (quoting Jackson v. Everett, 140 F.3d 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1998))).

2

Lenz attempted to file a grievance with the ADC regarding the January 24

violent incident, however, Officer Bell destroyed Lenz’s completed grievance form.

The district court concluded Lenz was prevented from exhausting Lenz’s available

administrative remedies. See generally Lyon v. Vande Krol, 305 F.3d 806, 808 (8th

Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“[I]nmates cannot be held to the exhaustion requirement of the

[Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66,

codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e,] when prison officials have prevented them

from exhausting their administrative remedies.”). Under the Prison Litigation Reform

Act, failure to exhaust the available administrative remedies is an affirmative defense,

not a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. See Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919-922

(2007). Because this issue has not been raised on appeal, we will not consider it

further. See United States v. Paz, 411 F.3d 906, 910 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating we

will not consider issues that have been abandoned). 

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As a result of the beating, Lenz suffered severe injuries, including a locked jaw and

a broken rib. Lenz did not receive immediate medical treatment for his injuries

despite an ADC policy that requires inmates who are shocked with shock sticks to

receive immediate medical attention. Warden Reed was not present during the

January 24 violent incident.2

 

Before January 24, 1998, Warden Reed had reviewed several complaints

regarding Officer Wade and Officer Bell. First, inmate Greg Rose (Rose) alleged

Officer Wade “jumped” him on February 26, 1996. Warden Reed investigated the

grievance, concluding the evidence did not support Rose’s allegations. Warden Reed

then referred the grievance to Internal Affairs, which concurred with Warden Reed’s

conclusion. Second, inmate Tommy Radford (Radford) accused Officer Wade of

beating him on May 22, 1996. After investigating the matter, Warden Reed concluded

the evidence supported the accusations and (1) suspended Officer Wade for one week

without pay; (2) counseled Officer Wade; (3) told Officer Wade “a reoccurance [sic]

of this type of behavior will not be tolerated,” meaning termination; and

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With respect to prisoners, the cruel and unusual punishment analysis under the

United States Constitution and the Arkansas Constitution is the same. Grayson v.

Ross, 454 F.3d 802, 811-12 (8th Cir. 2006). 

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(4) temporarily reassigned Officer Wade to building security for about three months.

Officer Wade’s beating of Radford was Officer Wade’s first instance of disciplinary

action since joining the ADC in 1989. Warden Reed believed Officer Wade’s

misconduct was a one-time event and did not constitute a pattern of misconduct.

Third, inmate Patrick Sherman (Sherman) alleged Officer Wade attacked him on

October 29, 1996. Warden Reed investigated the grievance, concluding Officer Wade

used pepper spray only after Sherman attempted to kick Officer Wade. Fourth, inmate

Marcus Copeland (Copeland) accused Officer Bell of punching him and pushing his

head against a wall. After an investigation, Warden Reed concluded Copeland’s

accusations were unfounded. Fifth, inmate Rickey Stewart (Stewart) alleged Officer

Bell and another officer shocked him after he refused to be handcuffed. After

investigating the grievance, Warden Reed concluded Stewart’s allegation could not

be corroborated. If an inmate’s grievance could not be corroborated, then Warden

Reed denied the grievance. 

Lenz filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil

Rights Act of 1993, Ark. Code §§ 16-123-101–16-123-109,3

 against Officer Wade,

Officer Bell, Director Larry Norris (Director Norris), Warden Reed, and others. A

magistrate judge held a bench trial and issued a report and recommendation, which the

district court adopted, concluding (1) Officer Wade and Officer Bell inflicted cruel

and unusual punishment on Lenz, (2) Director Norris’s actions did not exhibit

deliberate indifference, and (3) Warden Reed’s actions exhibited deliberate

indifference. The district court awarded Lenz $15,000 in compensatory damages,

$36,562.50 in attorney fees and $3,424.45 in costs assessed against Officer Wade,

Officer Bell, and Warden Reed, jointly and severally. The district court further

awarded punitive damages of $10,000, allocated $5,000 each to Officer Wade and

Officer Bell. 

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Warden Reed appeals, challenging the district court’s finding that Warden

Reed’s actions exhibited deliberate indifference and also the district court's calculation

of the compensatory damages award. Officer Wade and Officer Bell did not appeal

the judgment of the district court. 

II. DISCUSSION

After a bench trial, we review for clear error the district court’s findings of fact

and we review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions. Snider v. United States,

468 F.3d 500, 509 (8th Cir. 2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). 

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual

punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “‘[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison

and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth

Amendment.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Helling v.

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). Prison officials must provide humane conditions

of confinement, including protecting inmates from violence. See Jensen v. Clarke, 94

F.3d 1191, 1197 (8th Cir. 1996). Unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain,

including inflictions of pain without penological justification, “‘constitute[] cruel and

unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.’” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.

730, 737 (2002) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). “Being

violently assaulted in prison is simply not ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders

pay for their offense against society.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). 

 A prison official, such as Warden Reed, “may not be held liable under § 1983

for the constitutional violations of a subordinate on a respondeat superior theory.”

Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070, 1079 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). A

prison official, nonetheless, violates the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect an

inmate from a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate. See Blades v. Schuetzle,

302 F.3d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 2002). 

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A violation of the Eighth Amendment based on a failure to protect has two

parts. First, the conditions that result from the failure to protect the inmate must pose

a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmates. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “This

objective requirement ensures that the deprivation is sufficiently serious to amount to

a deprivation of constitutional dimension.” Jensen, 94 F.3d at 1197. Here, no dispute

exists that the abusive conditions that developed at the Cummins Unit posed a

substantial risk of serious harm to the inmates. 

Second, the subject prison official must have exhibited a sufficiently culpable

state of mind, that is, the prison official must have been deliberately indifferent to a

substantial risk of serious harm to the inmates. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “[A]

prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an

inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. “This subjective state of mind must

be present before a plaintiff can be successful because only the unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.” Blades, 302 F.3d at 803

(internal quotation marks omitted). This requisite state of mind is akin to

recklessness, which is “more blameworthy than negligence,” yet less blameworthy

than purposefully causing or knowingly bringing about a substantial risk of serious

harm to the inmates. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 839-40. 

An obvious risk of a harm justifies an inference a prison official subjectively

disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmates. See Hope, 536 U.S. at

738. Nevertheless, “[a] single incident, or a series of isolated incidents, usually

provides an insufficient basis upon which to assign supervisor liability.” Howard v.

Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 138 (8th Cir. 1989). “However, as the number of incidents

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grow[s], and a pattern begins to emerge, a finding of tacit authorization or reckless

disregard becomes more plausible.” Id.

The evidence shows Officer Wade used excessive force on only one

substantiated occasion, resulting in a one-week suspension without pay, counseling

by Warden Reed, a reprimand, and temporary reassignment. Inmates filed several

other uncorroborated grievances alleging the use of excessive force by Officer Wade

and Officer Bell. As of January 24, 1998, Warden Reed had actual knowledge of only

a single corroborated incident involving the use of excessive force by Officer Wade.

Warden Reed investigated the other grievances and each time concluded neither

Officer Wade nor Officer Bell had acted improperly. Based on Officer Wade’s use

of excessive force against Radford, combined with the other uncorroborated

accusations of excessive force, Warden Reed may have suspected Officer Wade (and

possibly Officer Bell) posed substantial risks of serious harm to the inmates.

However, neither unsupported conjecture nor negligence regarding a substantial risk

of serious harm to the inmates is sufficient to prove deliberate indifference. See

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Lenz never presented any direct or circumstantial evidence

showing Warden Reed actually knew Officer Wade and Officer Bell posed substantial

risks of serious harm to the inmates. Cf. Tucker v. Evans, 276 F.3d 999, 1003 (8th

Cir. 2002) (reversing the denial of qualified immunity to supervisors because, in part,

the evidence did not demonstrate the supervisors knew of and deliberately disregarded

“an excessive risk to inmate health and safety”). The record here does not establish

Warden Reed ever had the requisite knowledge or drew the necessary inferences to

support a claim of deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Davis v. Delo, 115 F.3d 1388 (8th Cir. 1997), relied upon by Lenz and the

district court, is not to the contrary. In Davis, we held the record supported the

conclusion a supervisor exhibited deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of

serious harm to the inmates when the supervisor (1) had received numerous letters and

other complaints accusing the officer of using excessive force, (2) had not investigated

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the accusations, and (3) ignored recommendations from other officials that the officer

be reassigned or discharged. Id. at 1392-93, 1396. Based on the evidence, the district

court found the supervisor “had knowledge that [the officer] had a propensity to use

excessive force.” Id. at 1396. In contrast here, Warden Reed investigated all five

accusations, substantiated only one, and did not ignore recommendations for

reassignment or discharge. Warden Reed actually counseled, suspended,

reprimanded, and reassigned Officer Wade for the one substantiated accusation. The

record does not sufficiently show Warden Reed knew by January 24, 1998, that

Officer Wade and Officer Bell had a propensity to use excessive force or posed

substantial risks of serious harm to the inmates. 

Additionally, Officer Wade and Officer Bell were not obvious risks to harm the

inmates. The evidence indicated Warden Reed believed Officer Wade’s use of

excessive force against Radford was a one-time event and not a pattern of misconduct.

A single substantiated incident involving excessive force in Officer Wade’s sevenyear career does not indicate the officer was an obvious risk to harm the inmates. Cf.

Riley v. Olk-Long, 282 F.3d 592, 595-96 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court’s

denial of the supervisor’s and warden’s motions for judgment as matters of law

because the officer “was the subject of numerous investigations concerning his

inappropriate behavior with inmates” and the supervisor and warden believed the

officer was a problem and may be sexually assaulting inmates). Moreover, the

uncorroborated grievances only indicated inmates complained about Officer Wade and

Officer Bell in the same fashion the inmates regularly complained about many other

officers. (Warden Reed responded to 24,352 grievances from 1996 to 1998, 82

involving physical abuse charges.)

The district court primarily was convinced Warden Reed exhibited deliberate

indifference because, after the one substantiated violent incident in May 1996, Warden

Reed did not provide Officer Wade with counseling, anger management, or some

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The district court reasoned “[h]ad [Warden] Reed [after the May 1996 violent

incident] provided some sort of remedial program for [Officer] Wade, such as

counseling or anger management, together with a supervised schedule for returning

back to work in the isolation area, the [c]ourt probably would reach a different

conclusion concerning liability.” 

5

“The Constitution charges federal judges with deciding cases and

controversies, not with running state prisons.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 364

(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring). 

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other remedial program before returning Officer Wade to the isolation unit.4

However, as the district court found, Warden Reed responded to the May 1996 violent

incident by suspending Officer Wade for one week without pay, and counseling,

reprimanding, and temporarily reassigning Officer Wade to another unit. The district

court’s criticism of Warden Reed’s disciplinary choices does not support a finding of

deliberate indifference by Warden Reed. Federal courts are in no position to so finely

tune a warden’s supervision and discipline of officers in a state prison, such as the

district court conducts here.5

 

Therefore, we reverse the district court’s finding of liability as to Warden Reed.

Having made this determination, we need not consider Warden Reed’s argument the

district court erred in calculating Lenz’s compensatory damages. Lenz’s pro se

motions are hereby denied. 

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the judgment against Warden Reed and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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