Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02064/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02064-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH JOHNSON, JR.,

Petitioner,

 v.

 MELVIN HUNTER, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-02064 SI

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Now before the Court is Joseph Johnson, Jr.'s petition for writ of habeas corpus concerning his

commitment to Atascadero State Hospital. Having carefully considered the papers submitted, and for

good cause appearing, the Court hereby DENIES the petition. 

BACKGROUND

Under the Sexually Violent Predator Act ("SVPA"), California Welfare & Institutions Code

§ 6600, et seq., the State of California can commit a person for a period of two years if he is found to

be a sexually violent predator (“SVP”). Before the state may commit a person under the SVPA,

however, the statute requires that the state fulfill a number of procedural requirements. First, the person

must be “evaluated by two practicing psychiatrists or psychologists,” both of whom must concur “that

the person has a diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence

without appropriate treatment and custody.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601(d). If both evaluators

concur, then the state may petition to have the person committed. Id. The person may be committed

only if a jury finds, “beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually violent predator.” Cal. Welf.

& Inst. Code § 6604.

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On May 24, 2000, a jury found that petitioner was an SVP. He was thereafter committed to

Atascadero State Hospital for a period of two years. In 2005, he filed the instant habeas petition,

arguing that his commitment was unconstitutional. 

1. Commitment Proceedings

Petitioner’s commitment was based upon a long criminal history of attempted and completed

sexual assaults. The California Court of Appeal summarized petitioner's criminal history as follows:

On October 2, 1971, defendant broke into the home of a 46-year-old woman at 4:00 a.m.,

climbed into bed with her while she was sleeping, put one hand over her mouth and the

other hand on her hands, and told her, "shut up, you won't get hurt." The woman woke

and started screaming. Defendant attempted to pull the woman's pants down, but she

was able to get out of bed and run out. Defendant then ran out of the house.

On October 26, 1971, a 19-year-old woman woke at 1:15 a.m. to find defendant at the

end of her bed. Defendant told the woman, "be quiet and you won't get hurt." He got

into bed with the woman and tried to climb on top of her. She began to fight and scream.

He placed his hand over her mouth and then moved his hand to her throat. When she

screamed again, he got off the bed and ran out.

On October 31, 1971, another woman was awakened by a noise at 4:35 a.m. She saw

defendant turn off her lamp and close her bedroom door. She sat up in bed but he pushed

her down and told her not to make any noise. She said that she was afraid and kept

trying to get defendant to let her get something. He let her get a towel. When he finally

let her out of her room, she ran out with the towel, screaming. 

In May 1972, after he had escaped from custody, defendant was charged with rape in

Denmark and spent nine months in custody there.

In November 1980, a woman heard defendant coming in through her front door in the

middle of the night. She was able to shut him out. She called the police when she heard

noise downstairs shortly thereafter. Downstairs, a 24-year-old woman was awakened

from sleep in her own bed at about 3:45 a.m. Defendant was on top of her. He put her

housecoat over her head and assaulted her. She attempted to resist but he kept hitting

her and trying to push his fingers into her eyes. In the process they rolled onto the floor,

at which time he turned her on her stomach and raped her from behind. The victim

suffered swelling, multiple areas of bruising, and lacerations on her lips. 

Also in November 1980, a 32-year-old woman woke at some unknown time with

defendant's hand over her face. She tried to scream, and was advised she wouldn't be

harmed if she didn't. She tried to resist and defendant struck her. He also stuck his

finger into her mouth, causing a deep gash under her tongue. He raped her, then left

through the front door. In addition to her other injuries, this victim suffered bruising on

her arm.

Resp. Ans., Exh. F, at 3-4.

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At petitioner’s commitment trial, two psychologists testified about their evaluation of petitioner:

Dr. Charlene Steen and Dr. Barrie Glen. The California Court of Appeal summarized their testimony

as follows:

Based on defendant's history, prior evaluations and diagnoses, and her psychological

testing and interviews of him, Dr. Steen diagnosed defendant as having paraphilia not

otherwise specified. Someone with paraphilia has recurrent urges, fantasies, or

behaviors that have to do with unconsented sex or humiliating a partner. . . . Dr. Steen

also diagnosed defendant with polysubstance dependence and an antisocial personality

disorder with some compulsive and avoidant features. . . .

In Dr. Steen's opinion, defendant currently has a diagnosed mental disorder that

predisposes him to the commission of criminal sexual acts. It is her opinion that

defendant is likely to sexually violently reoffend as a result of his mental disorders. A

person usually commits similar offenses to those he or she committed before if that

person has a pattern of offending, and defendant has been consistent in his pattern of

offending.

. . .

 Dr. Steen indicated that when someone is not treated for paraphilia, offenses can

become more serious or more frequent or both. With treatment, paraphilia can be

controlled or contained.

. . .

Dr. Barrie Glen, a psychologist who contracts with the state to perform SVP evaluations,

also evaluated defendant. . . . She diagnosed defendant with three disorders: paraphilia

not otherwise specified, polysubstance dependence in remission, and antisocial

personality disorder. In her opinion, defendant currently has diagnosed mental disorders

within the meaning of SVPA and is likely to engage in sexually violent criminal

behavior in the future as a result of his disorders.

. . .

In Dr. Glen’s opinion, defendant needs treatment. Over the long term without treatment,

the chances are that defendant will not be able to resist the urge to commit another rape.

Resp. Ans., Exh. F, at 4-5, 9-10.

Defendant also testified at his commitment trial. The California Court of Appeal described his

testimony as follows:

Defendant was called to testify for the People. He disagreed with Dr. Steen's diagnosis

that he suffers from an antisocial personality disorder. He lived a criminal lifestyle, but

it was a choice he made and he does not see it as a disorder. . . . He is sorry for the

sexual assaults; it was wrong and he knows that it will never happen again.

. . .

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Defendant testified that he did not recall being charged with breaking into a house and

attempting a rape on October 26, 1971. Nor did he recall another similar event on

October 31, 1971. He also indicated that he did not recall going through any court

proceedings relating to these incidents. He was arrested for the 1971 offenses and was

in custody when he escaped in November 1971 and went to Denmark using a false

passport. Prostitution is legal in Denmark and he engaged in pimping and prostitution

there with three women. He was arrested in May 1972 for rape and for entering the

country on a false passport. He spent eight or nine months in custody, but was only

found guilty of the passport offense. After being released he got his legitimate passport

and came back to the United States. He was only back a few weeks when he was

arrested in March 1973 for the earlier charges and the escape. 

Resp. Ans., Exh. F, at 7-11.

2. Procedural History

In 1982, petitioner was convicted of rape and sentenced to 33 years in prison. Resp. Ans., Exh.

F, at 9. In May 1999, shortly before he was set to be paroled, the State of California filed a petition to

commit petitioner as an SVP. Id. at 2. The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the case

as follows: 

On May 11, 1999, the People filed a petition to commit defendant as an SVP. The

petition alleged that defendant was in the custody of the Department of Corrections with

a scheduled release date of May 23, 1999. Attached to the petition was a declaration by

an assistant district attorney. The declaration alleged that defendant qualified for

commitment under the SVPA because he had been convicted of sexually violent offenses

against two or more victims and because a review of the evaluations of defendant by two

practicing mental health professionals indicated that defendant has a current mental

disorder such that he was likely to reoffend by committing another sexually violent

offense. Four mental health evaluations were attached to the petition.

Defendant filed a demurrer to the petition on June 21, 1999, alleging that the petition

failed to state facts necessary to establish jurisdiction because it failed to have attached

to it a required affidavit asserting that two concurrent mental health evaluators concluded

that defendant has a diagnosed mental disorder and he is likely to reoffend. The trial

court overruled the demurrer at a hearing that same day, and immediately began the

probable cause hearing.

Resp. Ans., Exh. F, at 2.

Petitioner's demurrer contested the validity of respondent's commitment petition, alleging that

the two mental health evaluators required by § 6601 had initially disagreed on categorizing him as an

SVP. In fact, petitioner had been evaluated by two pairs of mental health professionals. The first pair

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1

According to § 6601(e) of the SVPA, "the person shall be evaluated by two practicing

psychiatrists or psychologists . . . designated by the Director of Mental Health. If both evaluators concur

that the person has a diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she is likely to engage in acts of sexual

violence without appropriate treatment and custody, the Director of Mental Health shall forward a

request for a petition for commitment. . . ." If the two evaluators do not concur, "the Director of Mental

Health shall arrange for further examination of the person by two independent professionals. . . ." 

2

The record indicates the second pair of doctors interviewed petitioner on April 26, 1999, and

April 27, 1999. Dr. Schiff-Gennis informed the Department of Health that she changed her

classification of petitioner on April 27, 1999. The second pair of doctors issued their reports on

petitioner on May 1, 1999, and May 10, 1999. Resp. Ans., Exh. M, at RT 5-6.

5

of evaluators, Dr. Glen and Dr. Schiff-Gennis, did not initially concur that the petitioner was an SVP.

Pursuant to § 6601(e) of the SVPA, the Director of Mental Health then assigned another pair of

evaluators to the petitioner, Dr. Tucker and Dr. Steen.1

 The second pair also ultimately disagreed as to

whether petitioner was an SVP. Before they reached their conclusions, however, but after they began

interviewing petitioner, Dr. Schiff-Gennis from the first evaluation pair changed her opinion and

concluded that petitioner was in fact an SVP.2 Based on Dr. Schiff-Gennis' change of opinion, the

People filed their petition to commit petitioner according to the SVPA. Resp. Ans., Exh. A.

On May 24, 2000, a jury found petitioner to be an SVP, and the trial court committed him to

Atascadero State Hospital for a period of two years. Resp. Ans., Exh. F, at 11. Although the record is

not entirely clear, it appears that petitioner remains in state custody because he has been recommitted

pursuant to California Welfare & Institutions Code § 6605. 

Petitioner appealed his commitment, which was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal.

Resp. Ans., at 2. His petition for review by the California Supreme Court was summarily denied on

December 12, 2001. Id. On August 20, 2002, petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California

Supreme Court. Id. That petition was denied on December 11, 2002. Id. The parties concede

petitioner has exhausted his state judicial remedies with respect to the claims presented in the instant

petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c).

Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 19, 2005. On January

26, 2006, this Court issued an order denying respondent's motion to dismiss. California answered the

petition on March 24, 2006. Petitioner filed his traverse on May 23, 2006. Having considered these

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papers, the Court DENIES the habeas petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus on "behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition may not be

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;

or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

"Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives

at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than [the] Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). "Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case." Id. at 413.

DISCUSSION

The sole basis for petitioner’s habeas petition is his contention that his federal due process rights

were violated when the State of California failed to follow the commitment procedures set forth in the

SVPA. Specifically, petitioner contends that he was never properly evaluated by a team of medical

health professionals as required by § 6601(c).

Petitioner’s argument is based on Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980), in which the

Supreme Court found that a criminal defendant’s federal due process rights had been violated by the

state court’s failure to follow state procedural law. The defendant in Hicks was convicted in Oklahoma

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of distributing heroin and was sentenced to a mandatory term of 40-years in prison. Id. at 345. While

his appeal was pending, the statute under which the defendant was sentenced was found to be

unconstitutional. Id. Rather than setting aside the defendant’s sentence, the appellate court affirmed

his sentence, finding that he was not prejudiced because the 40-year term “was within the range of

punishment that could have been imposed in any event.” Id. The Supreme Court held that this was

error; Oklahoma state law gave criminal defendants a right to have their punishment fixed by a jury, and

that law gave the defendant a procedural right protected by the federal due process clause. Id. at 346

(“The defendant in such a case has a substantial and legitimate expectation that he will be deprived of

his liberty only to the extent determined by the jury in the exercise of its statutory discretion.”).

Petitioner argues that, as in Hicks, he had a federally protected liberty interest in the commitment

procedures outlined in the SVPA. See Campbell v. Blodgett, 997 F.2d 512, 522 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Hicks

recognized that state laws which guarantee a criminal defendant procedural rights at sentencing, even

if not themselves constitutionally required, may give rise to liberty interests protected against arbitrary

deprivation by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.”). He contends that the state violated

that interest when it failed to follow the SVPA’s procedural requirements. Respondent contends that

petitioner may not raise this basis for his habeas petition because it was procedurally defaulted. As to

the merits, respondent argues that the procedures followed by the trial court were fully consistent with

California law and the federal Constitution. The Court finds that petitioner’s claim was not procedurally

defaulted, but that it fails on the merits.

1. Procedural Default

A federal court may not review a habeas corpus petition if the state court's decision was based

on an independent and adequate state procedural bar. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991).

When a state prisoner defaults his federal claims in state court in accordance with an independent and

adequate state procedural rule, "federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can

demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,

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or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice."

Id. at 750. However, "[t]he mere existence of a basis for a state procedural bar does not deprive this

Court of jurisdiction; the state court must actually have relied on the procedural bar as an independent

basis for its disposition of the case." Caldwell v. Mississippi 472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985).

Respondent contends that petitioner's current claim is procedurally defaulted based on People

v. Pompa-Ortiz, 27 Cal.3d 519 (1980). Pompa-Ortiz involved a defendant who, after being convicted

of rape, moved to set aside his conviction on the ground that he had been denied a public preliminary

hearing. Id. at 522. The California Supreme Court agreed that the defendant had been denied a

substantial right, but found that the defendant had not properly raised the challenge to his preliminary

hearing. Id. Instead of waiting until after his conviction had become final, the court held, the defendant

should have challenged his preliminary hearing before trial:

[I]rregularities in the preliminary examination procedures which are not jurisdictional

in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the appropriate standard of prejudicial

error and shall require reversal only if defendant can show that he was deprived of a fair

trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of the error at the preliminary

examination. The right to relief without any showing of prejudice will be limited to

pretrial challenges of irregularities. At that time, by application for extraordinary writ,

the matter can be expeditiously returned to the magistrate for proceedings free of the

charged defects.

Id. at 529. Because the defendant in Pompa-Ortiz had waited until after trial to raise a challenge to his

preliminary hearing, the appellate court’s review was limited to whether the defendant had been

prejudiced. Id.

As in Pompa-Ortiz, petitioner in this case failed to raise before his trial a challenge to the pretrial

commitment procedures the state used. The California Court of Appeal recognized this, and reviewed

petitioner’s challenge to the pretrial commitment procedures only for prejudice. It found that there was

no prejudice because petitioner “was found to be an SVP, beyond a reasonable doubt, after a trial in

which two doctors testified, and in which he was able to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses and

call his own witnesses.” Resp. Exh. F at 22. Because the California appellate court’s review was so

limited, respondent argues that petitioner has procedurally defaulted on his argument.

Respondent’s argument misses the mark. Petitioner does not – and cannot – base his federal

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habeas petition on the argument that his conviction was illegal under state law. Rather, petitioner argues

that his federal due process rights were violated by the state’s failure to follow its own commitment

procedures. While the two arguments overlap to a large degree, petitioner’s due process argument is

a distinct question from his argument that his commitment was illegal under state law. Further,

petitioner’s appellate brief in state court reveals that he raised his due process argument, but that the

appellate court failed to address it. See Resp. Br., Exh. C at 7. Because the appellate court did not

address petitioner’s federal claim, it cannot be said to have relied on a procedural bar in denying his

appeal. Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner adequately raised his due process argument to avoid

a procedural bar.

2. Due Process

Petitioner contends that his federal due process rights were violated when the People filed a

petition for his commitment under the SVPA. He argues the that state did not follow SVPA procedure

when it filed a petition for commitment after allowing a doctor to change her diagnosis of him as an

SVP. Petitioner contends that once the initial team failed to concur, a new team was appointed and the

first team's opinion could no longer be used or changed.

 When a state fails to abide by its own statutory commands, it may implicate a constitutionally

protected liberty interest. Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he failure of

a state to abide by its own statutory commands may implicate a liberty interest protected by the

Fourteenth Amendment against arbitrary deprivation by a state."); Campbell v. Blodgett, 997 F.2d 512,

522 (9th Cir. 1992) (petitioner had "a liberty interest in having the Washington Supreme Court review

and make particular findings before affirming his death sentence"); Walker v. Deeds, 50 F.3d 670, 673

(9th Cir. 1995) ("Nevada's law requiring a court to review and make particularized findings that it is 'just

and proper' for a defendant to be adjudged a habitual offender also creates a constitutionally protected

liberty interest in a sentencing procedure."). Where, however, the state court’s action is based upon an

interpretation of the governing state statute, federal habeas review is generally unavailable. See Hubbart

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v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 779-80 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We may not second-guess the California appellate

court's construction of its own state law unless it appears that its interpretation is an obvious subterfuge

to evade consideration of a federal issue.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Campbell v.

Blodgett, 997 F.2d 512, 522 (9th Cir. 1992).

Here, petitioner has not shown that the state trial court failed to abide by California’s statutory

commands. Rather, the trial court considered petitioner’s contention that a team of psychiatrists had not

concurred that he was “likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and

custody,” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601, and found that the state had complied with the statute. See

Resp. Br., Exh. M. Because the trial court’s ruling was based upon an interpretation of state law, it

cannot provide the basis for a cognizable habeas claim. Accordingly, the habeas petition is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby DENIES the petition for

writ of habeas corpus.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 30, 2006 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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