Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02011/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02011-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Darnell Cain,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-13-2011-PHX-DGC (JFM)

Report & Recommendation on 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Safford, 

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on 

October 3, 2013 (Doc. 1). On January 30, 2014 Respondents filed their Response (Doc. 

11). Petitioner has not filed a reply.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarized the facts (viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict):

On June 4, 2009, Cain and two accomplices entered a

convenience store in Gilbert, filled three large plastic bags with 

cigarettes, liquor, and other merchandise, and left without paying. 

The clerk who witnessed the incident called the police and the store 

manager. The store manager arrived, closed the store, and

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performed a “scan audit" on merchandise that was thought to be 

missing. Based on the audit, the manager estimated the total loss at 

$10,940-$10,200 for cigarettes, $700 for other tobacco products, 

and $40 for liquor.

Four days later, on June 8th, Cain and the same two

accomplices returned to the same convenience store. The three

individuals again filled three large plastic bags with cigarettes, 

liquor, and other merchandise and left without paying. The same 

clerk was working and again called police and his store manager. 

The manager arrived soon thereafter, closed the store, and 

performed the same type of audit. The manager estimated the total 

loss from this theft at $11,500-$.10,000 for cigarettes, $900 for 

other tobacco products, $300 for liquor, and $300 for general 

merchandise. Both thefts were videotaped by surveillance cameras.

Shortly after the June 8th incident, a Gilbert police officer 

saw a vehicle matching the description of the one seen fleeing the 

store and initiated a traffic stop. Officers arrested Cain and his 

accomplices, obtained a search warrant, and seized three large 

plastic bags filled with merchandise.

(Exhibit C, Mem. Dec. 11/29/11 at 2-3.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. #, are referenced 

herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner and his accomplices were indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court 

on charges of burglary and theft for each of the two incidents. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) 

Petitioner proceeded to trial and was convicted on all counts. On March 22, 2010, the 

court found Petitioner to be a repeat offender and sentenced him to presumptive 10 year 

sentences on each of the burglary charges and 11.25 years on each of the theft charges, 

with the sentences on each incident running concurrently, but the sentences on the two 

incidents running consecutively. Thus, Petitioner received a combined sentence of 22.5 

years in prison. (Exhibit C, Mem. Dec. at 3-4; Exhibit B, Sentence.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a delayed notice of direct appeal. (Exhibit D, Opening Brief at 2.) 

Counsel filed a brief (Exhibit D) arguing that the state failed to determine the values of 

the thefts, and the trial court erroneously issued consecutive sentences. On November 29, 

2011, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the arguments and affirmed Petitioner’s 

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convictions and sentences. (Exhibit C, Mem. Dec.)

Petitioner did not seek further review. (Exhibit C, Mandate 1/17/12; Petition, 

Doc. 1 at 3.) 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner then proceeded to file a series of notices of post-conviction relief.

First PCR – On March 26, 2012, Petitioner instituted his first PCR proceeding 

when counsel filed a PCR Notice (Exhibit E) asserting claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. On April 3, 2012, the PCR court summarily dismissed the proceeding as 

untimely, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). (Exhibit F, M.E. 4/3/12.)

Second PCR – On August 31, 2012, Petitioner instituted his second PCR 

proceeding by filing a PCR Notice (Exhibit G), asserting he wished to present claims of 

ineffective assistance, newly discovered facts, change in the law, and actual innocence. 

On September 12, 2012, the PCR Court summarily dismissed the proceeding, finding 

that Petitioner failed to show with allegations of fact that his claims were of the type 

which could be raised in an untimely petition. (Exhibit H, M.E. 9/12/12.)

Third PCR – On October 9, 2012, Petitioner filed his third PCR Notice (Exhibit 

I), as well as a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit J) arguing newly discovered 

material facts, i.e. that he had been sentenced under statutes repealed at the time of his 

offense, and various changes in the law. On November 13, 2012, the PCR Court 

summarily dismissed the PCR petition as untimely and precluded because either waived 

or raised in prior proceedings. (Exhibit K, M.E. 11/13/12.)

Review – In his Petition, Petitioner alleges that he sought review of each of his 

three PCR proceedings in the Arizona Court of Appeals. However, he also explains that 

he did not do so because he “did not fully know [his] way around the legal system!” 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 5.) Respondents allege that Petitioner did not seek review in any of 

his PCR proceedings. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 4-5.) However, Respondents point to no 

records which support that contention. Petitioner, of course, has not replied.

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The resolution of this factual issue is reached via 28 U.S.C. § 2248, which 

provides that the “allegations...of an answer to an order to show cause in a habeas 

corpus proceeding, if not traversed, shall be accepted as true except to the extent that the 

judge finds from the evidence that they are not true.” Here, the undersigned finds no 

reason to reject the allegation of Respondents that Petitioner did not seek review. To the 

contrary, the timeline of Petitioner’s filings in his three PCR proceedings, and the selfcontradictory allegations of his Petition, suggest the correctness of Respondents’ 

allegations.

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October 3, 2013 (Doc. 11). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts the following three grounds for relief:

(1) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove one of the elements 

of theft at trial, and the court erroneously sentenced him to consecutive 

sentences;

(2) his defense counsel was ineffective; and 

(3) newly discovered material facts could change the outcome of the verdict 

and sentence.

Response - On January 30, 2014, Respondents filed their Limited Response 

(“Answer”) (Doc. 11). Respondents argue that the petition is barred under the habeas 

statute of limitations, and that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his state remedies on 

his claims.

Reply – The Court’s Service Order (Doc. 4) provided Petitioner 30 days from 

service of the answer to reply. Petitioner has not filed a reply, and the time to do so has 

now passed.

/ /

/ /

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III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 6, 

et seq.) 

1. One Year Limitations Period

As part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-year statute of limitations for all applications for 

writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and 

sentences rendered by state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one 

year limitations period are barred and must be dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on 

"the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Later 

commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly recognized 

constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Except as discussed hereinafter, Petitioner proffers no argument 

that any of these apply.

Conviction Final - Here, Petitioner’s direct appeal remained pending at least 

through November 29, 2011, when the Arizona Court of Appeals denied his appeal. 

(Exhibit C, Mem. Dec..) Thereafter, Petitioner had 30 days to seek further review by the 

Arizona Supreme Court. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). Petitioner did not do so. 

Accordingly, his conviction became final on December 29, 2011 by “expiration of the 

time for seeking such review.”

Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly 

recognized constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Except as discussed hereinafter, Petitioner proffers no 

argument that any of these apply.

New Constitutional Right - Petitioner did argue in the state courts that his 

claims were based on recent decisions in Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012) and 

State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 10 P.3d 1193 (App. 2000). (Exhibit I, PCR Pet. at 5.) 

Donald, of course, predates Petitioner’s conviction (having been decided in 

2000), and thus cannot be a newly recognized constitutional right.

Lafler held that a fair trial did not preclude a showing of prejudice from 

ineffective assistance leading the defendant’s rejection of a favorable plea offer. Here, 

however, Petitioner did not plead guilty. Accordingly, Lafler can have no application to 

his claims. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that Lafler did not decide a new 

rule of constitutional law, but “merely applied the Sixth Amendment right to effective 

assistance of counsel according to the test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and established in the pleabargaining context in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 

(1985).” Buenrostro v. U.S., 697 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9

th Cir. 2012).

Moreover, even assuming such cases established a new constitutional right, § 

2244(d)(1)(C) requires that such a new right be made “retroactively applicable to cases 

on collateral review.” Petitioner points to no decision making Lafler retroactively 

applicable. The undersigned knows of none.

Newly Discovered Factual Predicate - Petitioner also argued in his third PCR 

proceeding that he had newly discovered facts, in the form of his recent discovery of the 

purported repeal of the statutes under which he was sentenced. (Exhibit J, Petition at 2.) 

He raises the same argument in his Ground Three of the instant Petition. (Petition, Doc. 1 

at 8.) 

Although section 2244(d)(1)(D) does provide an alternative of “the date on which 

the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered 

through the exercise of due diligence,” and Petitioner alleges he had only recently 

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discovered those facts, Petitioner proffers nothing to show that he could not have 

discovered the repeal earlier had he exercised due diligence. For example, Petitioner 

does not suggest that the Arizona statutes were not available to him and his various 

counsel until the preparation of his third PCR petition, let alone until preparation of the 

instant petition

Conclusion re Commencement – Based on the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner’s one year limitations period commenced running on December 

30, 2011, and without any tolling expired on December 29, 2012, making his October 3, 

2013 Petition over ten months delinquent.1

3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This provision only applies to 

state proceedings, not to federal proceedings. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

For purposes of calculating tolling under § 2244(d), the federal prisoner “mailbox 

rule” applies. Under this rule, a prisoner’s state filings are deemed “filed” when they are 

delivered to prison officials for mailing. Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 

2000). Pre-requisites to application of the mailbox rule include: (1) that the petitioner is 

not represented by counsel; and (2) the filing is delivered to prison officials for 

forwarding to the courts within the applicable period. Delivery to prison officials for 

forwarding to an attorney or other intermediary does not qualify. Stillman v. LaMarque, 

319 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2003). Because it does not affect the outcome, the undersigned 

generaly presumes herein that Petitioner’s pro se filings were delivered to prison 

 

1

Petitioner’s habeas Petition alleges he delivered it to prison officials for mailing on 

August 30, 2013. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 11.) Petitioner has not replied to suggest that its 

filing on October 3, 2013 was the result of delay by prison officials, rather than 

reflecting a misrepresentation in his Petition Even if this Court were to find that the 

Petition should be deemed filed as of that date, the extra 34 days would not be sufficient 

to make Petitioner’s Petition timely.

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officials for mailing to the courts on the date of the last signature on the filing.

Petitioner’s limitations period commenced running on December 30, 2011. 

Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding was commenced on March 26, 2012 when counsel 

filed Petitioner’s first PCR notice (Exhibit E). That proceeding remained pending until 

April 3, 2012, when the PCR court dismissed the proceeding. (Exhibit F, M.E 4/3/12.) 

Thus, Petitioner’s habeas limitations period was arguably tolled for the intervening seven 

days. This would extend his limitations period through January 5, 2013.

Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding was commended no sooner than August 28, 

2012, the date of signature on his second PCR notice (Exhibit G at 4), and remained 

pending until September 12, 2012, when the PCR court dismissed it. (Exhibit H, M.E. 

9/12/12.) Thus, Petitioner’s habeas limitations period was arguably tolled for the 

intervening sixteen days. This would extend his limitations period through January 21, 

2013.

Petitioner’s third PCR proceeding was commended no sooner than September 27, 

2012, the date of signature on his second PCR notice2(Exhibit G at 4), and remained 

pending until November 13, 2012, when the PCR court dismissed it. (Exhibit K, M.E. 

11/13/12.) Thus, Petitioner’s habeas limitations period was arguably tolled for the 

intervening 48 days. This would extend his limitations period through March 11, 2013 

Even with all statutory tolling for all three PCR proceedings, Petitioner’s petition 

would be almost seven months delinquent.

Moreover, in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) the Court held that when 

a state post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, then it is not “properly filed” 

within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2) for purposes of statutory tolling. Here, the PCR 

court plainly held Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding to be untimely. (Exhibit F, M.E. 

4/3/12.) Similarly, the PCR court held Petitioner’s second and third PCR proceedings to 

be untimely because, having analyzed Petitioner’s intended claims, the court concluded 

 

2

The date of the verification on the Petition for Post Conviction Relief submitted with 

his third PCR notice was October 1, 2012 (Exhibit J at 10), suggesting he did not 

actually present the notice for mailing until at least that date.

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that Petitioner had failed to allege facts to bring his proceedings within the exceptions to 

the state’s timeliness rule. (Exhibit H, M.E. 9/12/12; Exhibit K, M.E. 11/13/12.) 

4. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9

th

Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations 

on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling 

is appropriate.”).

Petitioner does not proffer any grounds for equitable tolling, and the undersigned 

finds none.

5. Actual Innocence

To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the habeas statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude “a court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

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petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 

S.Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013). To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a 

petitioner “’must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’” Id. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). This exception, referred to as the “Schlup gateway,” applies 

“only when a petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was 

free of nonharmless constitutional error.’ ” Id. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

316). 

Petitioner makes no such claim of actual innocence in this proceeding.

Insufficient Evidence - Petitioner does argue in his Ground One that the State 

failed to present sufficient evidence to prove one of the elements of theft at trial. 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) Even if true that would not establish his actual innocence. 

“Finally, as the Schlup decision explains, the gateway actual-innocence standard is ‘by 

no means equivalent to the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 

61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979),’ which governs claims of insufficient evidence.” House v. Bell, 

547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). The Court in House explained that an insufficiency of the 

evidence claim is founded upon an evaluation of the evidence presented to the jury, 

while an actual innocence claim is founded upon “evidence the trial jury did not have 

before it.” Id. See U.S. v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2003) (lack of proof of FDIC 

insurance in a bank robbery case, without evidence that such insurance did not exist, was 

not sufficient to establish actual innocence where lack of such insurance not shown). 

Indeed, such a determination is based upon all the available evidence, including evidence 

which may have been “excluded or unavailable at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 328. 

Petitioner makes no suggestion that all the available evidence (whether or not presented 

at trial) would preclude a reasonable juror from finding him guilty.

Repealed Sentencing Statute - Also, Petitioner does argue in his Ground Three 

that he has “[n]ewly discovered material facts” in the form of the purported repeal of the 

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applicable sentencing statutes in 2009. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.) 

However, that would, at most, invalidate Petitioner’s sentences.

In Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333 (1992), the Court extended the actual 

innocence exception to the bar on second and successive habeas petitions to claims of 

capital sentencing error. Acknowledging that the concept of “actual innocence” did not 

translate neatly into the capital sentencing context, the Court limited the exception to 

cases in which the applicant could show “by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 

constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the 

death penalty under the applicable state law.” Id., at 336. 

In Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-394 (2004), the Court declined to address 

whether this also extended to actual innocence of a non-capital sentence, in that case a 

three-strikes sentence. The Dretke Court noted there was a divergence of opinion among 

the circuits on the issue. Id. at 392. The Ninth Circuit has not yet resolved the issue. 

See Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing actual innocence of noncapital sentencing in the context of deciding whether a challenge to a federal sentence 

can be raised in a § 2241 habeas petition rather than a § 2255 motion to vacate, and 

noting the limited circumstances in which courts have permitted such claims).

Even if this Court could conclude that the actual innocence exception should 

apply to non-capital sentencing, Petitioner fails to show that he was actually innocent of 

the sentence given him. 

In his Petition, Petitioner does not clarify the statutes he contends were repealed. 

In his PCR Petition in his third PCR proceeding, Petitioner argued that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

§§ 13-604 and 13-702.01 had been repealed on January 1, 2009, and were referenced in a 

proffered plea agreement and his Sentence. (Exhibit J at 3-4.)

Indeed, Petitioner’s written Sentence reflects that he was being sentenced 

pursuant to, inter alia “A.R.S. § 13-604” for purposes of finding prior felony 

convictions. (Exhibit B, Sentence at 4.) 

It is also true that an earlier version of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604, which 

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established various sentencing ranges for various classes of repeat offenders, was 

repealed effective January 1, 2009. See 2008 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch 301, § 15 (2008). 

However, that same legislation enacted a new section 13-604. Id. That new section 

regulated the classifications of Class 6 felonies as felonies or misdemeanors.

Here, the trial court’s reference to § 13-604 was limited to identifying three prior 

offenses as prior felony convictions, two of which were Class 6 felonies for possession 

of marijuana, which under the version applicable in 2009 may have been eligible for 

designation as Class 1 misdemeanors. (Exhibit B, Sentence at 4.) While the trial court 

also referenced a Class 4 felony for failure to register as a sex offender (id.), which may 

have been incongruent to the referenced to § 13-604, Petitioner proffers no reason to find 

that such a reference rendered the sentence invalid.

Moreover, in finding Petitioner eligible for enhanced sentencing as a result of his 

prior convictions, the trial court properly referenced Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703(c). 

(Exhibit B, Sentence at 2.) That provision, which took the place of the prior Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. § 13-604, governed enhanced sentencing for repeat offenders. It was enacted in the 

same legislation as the repeal of the prior § 13-604, and was in effect on January 1, 2009.

See 2008 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch 301, § 28 (2008). 

Neither the oral pronouncement nor the written Sentence reference the other 

repealed statute to which Petitioner points, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702.01. A proffered 

plea agreement did. (See Exhibit J, PCR Petition at attachments, Plea Agreement at 1.) 

An error in a proposed plea citing repealed statutes does not suggest that a sentence 

imposed by the court after trial was on the basis of such a statute. The plea agreement 

was never entered into, or adopted by the court. 

It is true that at the sentencing hearing, the trial court did initially reference Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 13-702.02(B)(4). (Exhibit P, R.T. 3/22/10 at 16.) That provision was 

repealed as part of the same 2008 legislation. See 2008 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch 301, § 25 

(2008). However, the trial court subsequently referenced the correct section, § 13-

703(C) (Exhibit P, R.T. 3/22/10 at 26), which is also reflected in the written Sentence.

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In effect then, Petitioner attempts to leverage a partially incongruent but 

superfluous statutory reference in the written sentence, and a self-contradicted reference 

on the record to the repealed version of the repeat offender sentencing statute, into a 

claim of actual innocence of the sentence. What Petitioner does not do, however, is 

show that he was ineligible for the sentence he actually received. For example, he does 

not suggest that he did not have the requisite number of historical prior felony 

convictions, or that the sentence imposed exceeded that applicable for the crimes of 

conviction with those priors. Petitioner simply nitpicks at a superfluous citation and a 

singular, spoken, and subsequently twice corrected mistaken citation. Thus, even 

assuming that Sawyer applies in the context of the statute of limitations, and that it 

applies in the context of a non-capital sentence, Petitioner has failed to show that he is 

actually innocent of the sentence which he received. 

6. Summary re Statute of Limitations

Taking into account the arguably available statutory tolling, Petitioner’s one year 

habeas limitations period commenced running on December 30, 2011, and expired no 

later than March 11, 2013, making his Petition almost seven months delinquent. 

Petitioner has shown no basis for additional statutory tolling, and no basis for equitable 

tolling or actual innocence to avoid the effects of his delay. Consequently, the Petition 

must be dismissed with prejudice.

B. EXHAUSTION & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents also contend that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his state 

remedies on his claims. Because the undersigned finds the Petition plainly barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations, this additional defense is not addressed.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

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that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the 

reasoning set forth herein, the undersigned finds that Ajurists of reason@ would not Afind it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.@ Accordingly, to 

the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a 

certificate of appealability should be denied.

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V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed October 3, 2013 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: March 28, 2014

13-2011r RR 14 03 26 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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