Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02095/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02095-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Christopher Musselman, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 05-2095-PHX-NVW (JCG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus brought pursuant to

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this

matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin for Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 2).

Before the Court are the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. No. 1), and

Respondents’ Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. No. 13). The

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny the Petition as to Grounds 2 and 4.

The Magistrate Judge further recommends that Respondents be afforded 30 days in which to

supplement their Answer with respect to Grounds 1 and 3 of the Petition. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner began a sexual relationship with a 14-year-old boy in 1996; the relationship

lasted for two years and involved several acts of oral and anal sex, some of which Petitioner

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1

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court

shall be presumed to be correct." 

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videotaped.1 (Answer, Ex. A, pgs. 1-4.) Petitioner was represented at trial by private counsel.

(Answer, Ex. G, pg. 4.) On February 26, 1999, a jury convicted Petitioner of two counts of

sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen years of age. (Answer, Ex. A, pg. 4; Ex. E, App. H.)

Petitioner was sentenced to two consecutive 13-year prison terms without possibility of parole.

(Answer, Ex. A, pg. 4.) He was also convicted of three counts of sexual conduct with a minor

over the age of 15 and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, for which the trial court

suspended his sentence and placed him on lifetime probation. (Id.) 

On December 20, 1999, the Maricopa County Public Defender's Office represented

Petitioner in filing a direct appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Answer, Ex. B.)

Petitioner's direct appeal raised one claim: whether Petitioner's twenty-six year sentence without

possibility of parole violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishment. (Id., pg. 6.) The Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence.

(Answer, Ex. A, pgs. 4-8.) Petitioner petitioned for review of the Court of Appeal's decision;

the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied his petition. (Answer, Ex. C.) 

Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief on March 5, 2001. (Answer, Ex. D.)

On January 18, 2002, after several continuances, Petitioner filed a Rule 32 petition for review.

(Answer, Ex. E.) Petitioner presented eighteen claims for relief in his Rule 32 petition, twelve

of which were claims for ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.) The trial court, after reviewing

the Rule 32 petition and its exhibits, the 3-volume legal file, and after conducting an evidentiary

hearing, concluded that all but two of the claims presented in Petitioner's Rule 32 petition were

precluded and dismissed the claims. (Answer, Ex. F.) The trial court ruled that Petitioner had

presented two colorable claims for ineffective assistance of counsel. However, in its order

denying the Rule 32 petition, the trial court discussed only one ineffective assistance of counsel

claim: Petitioner's claim that his trial counsel failed to communicate a plea offer to him. The

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 Although Petitioner identified only one constitutional violation in his Petition – "Ground 1:

ineffective assistance of counsel" – the supporting facts section of that Ground provides factual

allegations in support of several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Petition, pg. 5.) The

supporting facts section also includes numerous allegations that are unrelated to any alleged

constitutional violation. For example, Petitioner alleges in Ground 1 that he was denied a continuance

by the trial court judge. (Petition, pg. 5.) Accordingly, the Court has construed the Petition as stating

four claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, but has not considered any factual allegations

unrelated to those claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (stating that the Court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court

only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States); see also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277 (1971) (holding that it is not sufficient to raise

only the facts supporting the claim; rather, "the constitutional claim ... inherent in those facts" must also

be raised).

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trial court then denied relief with respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

(Answer, Ex. F.) 

On April 4, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for review of the trial court's denial of the

Rule 32 petition. (Answer, Ex. G.) Petitioner's Court of Appeals petition for review asserted

three claims: (1) the trial court erred in failing to consider Petitioner's claim for ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel, (2) the trial court erred in failing to consider any of Petitioner's

ineffective assistance of counsel claims other than the claim arising from trial counsel's alleged

failure to inform Petitioner of a plea offer, and (3) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of

counsel because his trial counsel failed to communicate the plea offer to him. On July 14, 2004,

the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review. (Answer, Ex. H.) 

On July 15, 2005, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in federal court.

In his petition, Petitioner presents four claims for relief, each arising from Petitioner's Fifth,

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel:2

Ground 1: Petitioner's trial counsel failed to communicate a plea offer to him;

Ground 2: Petitioner's trial counsel spent a limited amount of time preparing for trial;

Ground 3: Petitioner's trial counsel admitted his guilt during opening statements; and

Ground 4: Petitioner's counsel of record was not present during the reading of the

verdict.

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DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness

Respondents argue that Petitioner's Petition was not filed within the 1-year limitation

period set forth by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Respondents contend that Petitioner's state court

proceedings became final at the conclusion of the state court's direct review of his conviction,

and that the statute of limitations was tolled only so long as Petitioner's Rule 32 petition

remained pending. According to Respondents, Petitioner's Rule 32 petition was no longer

pending after July 14, 2004, the date that the Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's

petition for review of the trial court's denial of Petitioner's Rule 32 petition. Respondents

contend that Petitioner's 1-year limitations period began to run on July 15, 2004, and expired

on July 14, 2005 – one day before Petitioner filed his Petition in federal court.

Even if the Court were to assume that Respondents' argument that Petitioner's 1-year

limitations period began to run on July 15, 2004 were correct, Petitioner's Petition would

nonetheless have been filed within the 1-year limitations period because Petitioner is a pro se

prisoner litigant. Under the "prison mailbox rule" of Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988), a

prisoner's federal habeas petition is deemed filed when he hands it over to prison authorities for

mailing to the district court. See Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001). In the

present case, Petitioner dated his Petition on July 13, 2005, and it was filed with the Court on

July 15, 2005. Thus, the latest possible date that Petitioner could have handed his Petition to

prison authorities for mailing is July 14, 2005. Accordingly, Petitioner's petition will be deemed

timely filed.

B. Exhaustion

Ordinarily, before a federal court will consider the merits of a habeas petition, the

petitioner must exhaust the remedies available to him in state court. 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A);

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). First enunciated in Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241

(1886), the exhaustion requirement is designed "not to create a procedural hurdle on the path

to federal habeas court, but to channel claims into an appropriate forum, where meritorious

claims may be vindicated and unfounded litigation obviated before resort to federal court."

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Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). The requirement is grounded in principles

of comity, and reflects a desire to protect state courts' role in the enforcement of federal law.

Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (citation omitted). The requirement is also based

on a pragmatic consideration that fully exhausted claims will usually be accompanied by a

complete factual record once they reach federal court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519

(1982). 

A petitioner must exhaust his claims by fairly presenting them to the state's highest court,

either through a direct appeal or collateral proceedings, before a federal court will consider the

merits of habeas corpus claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,

519 (1982). A petitioner must have also presented his claim in a procedural context in which

its merits will be considered. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). A habeas

petitioner's claims may be precluded from federal review on exhaustion grounds in either of two

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in

state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. See Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). Second, the claim may be procedurally defaulted

in federal court if the petitioner failed to present the claim in a necessary state court and "the

court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred." Id. at 735 n.1. If a

petitioner has procedurally defaulted a claim in state court, a federal court will not review the

claim unless the petitioner shows "cause and prejudice" for the failure to present the

constitutional issue to the state court, or makes a colorable showing of actual innocence. See

Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 337 (1992);

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986).

Petitioner has exhausted Grounds 1 and 3 of his Petition. Each of these grounds was

properly presented to the trial court in Petitioner's Rule 32 petition (Answer, Ex. E, pgs. 10 and

12) and to the Arizona Court of Appeals in Petitioner's petition for review of the trial court's

denial of his Rule 32 petition. (Answer, Ex. G, pgs. 14-18.) 

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Petitioner did not present Grounds 2 or 4 in his Rule 32 petition or in his petition for

review to the Court of Appeals. Because Petitioner did present Grounds 2 or 4 to the highest

state court on collateral proceedings prior to raising them in his federal Petition, the claims are

not exhausted, and they cannot be raised for the first time in his federal Petition. See Rose, 455

U.S. at 519. 

Petitioner is now precluded by Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4

from obtaining relief on Grounds 2 or 4 in state court absent an applicable exception under

Rules 32.2(b) and 32.1(d)-(h), Ariz. R. Crim. P., which he does not assert. Thus, Grounds 2 and

4 are technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted, absent a showing of cause and prejudice

or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-50

(1991) (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted); Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d

746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992). Petitioner does not allege either cause and prejudice or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice to overcome the default. Therefore, the Magistrate recommends that

Grounds 2 and 4 be dismissed as procedurally barred. 

C. Merits

Respondents did not brief the merits of the claims raised in the Petition, relying instead

on their argument that the Petition was not timely filed. Respondents requested additional time

to respond to the merits of Petitioner's properly exhausted claims, however, in the event that this

Court concluded that the Petition was timely filed. (Answer, pgs. 8-9.) Accordingly, the

Magistrate Judge recommends that Respondents be granted an additional 30 days to supplement

their Answer in order to respond to the Merits of Grounds 1 and 3 of the Petition.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as to Grounds 2 and 4. The

Magistrate Judge further recommends that Respondents be afforded 30 days in which to

supplement their Answer with respect to Grounds 1 and 3 of the Petition. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections are not

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timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the parties should use the

following case number: CV 05-2095-PHX-NVW.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner and

counsel for Respondents. 

DATED this 12th day of March, 2007.

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