Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-03103/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-03103-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Plaintiff’s request for oral argument is denied because the parties have thoroughly

briefed the issues and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Mahon v. Credit

Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Fitzsimmons, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Phoenix, 

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-06-3103-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. #38. A response and reply

have been filed. Dkt. ##46, 49. The Court will deny the motion.1

I. Background.

Plaintiff James Fitzsimmons began working as a police officer for Defendant City of

Phoenix in 1985. Plaintiff was placed on paid administrative leave in 2004 and thereafter

underwent a series of fitness-for-duty evaluations. Plaintiff remained on paid administrative

leave for 17 months and ultimately retired in lieu of termination in January 2006.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant on December 26, 2006. Dkt. #1.

The complaint asserts violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”),

42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he had surgery to remove a brain tumor

in 1994 and that his resulting medical condition constitutes a disability under the ADA.

Case 2:06-cv-03103-DGC Document 50 Filed 05/28/08 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Defendant’s motion notes that the ADA requires proof that (1) Plaintiff is disabled

under the ADA; (2) he is a qualified individual, meaning he can perform the essential

functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) he was terminated

because of his disability. Dkt. # 38 at 11. Although Defendant’s motion suggests in passing

that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the second step (id.), it makes no argument and identifies no

specific evidence on this issue, and instead focuses solely on the third step (id. at 11-12).

This order, therefore, will not consider whether Plaintiff can prove that he is a qualified

individual – that he could perform the essential functions of his job with or without a

reasonable accommodation.

- 2 -

Id. ¶¶ 9-10. Plaintiff further alleges that he has been able to perform the duties of a police

officer despite his disability. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated the ADA by

forcing him to retire from his position as a police officer because of his disability and by

failing to provide him the reasonable accommodation of working for Defendant in a different

position. Id. ¶¶ 12-15. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive

damages. Id. at 3-4.

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

The “party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the

record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. Dist.,

157 F. 3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate only where the

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

III. Analysis.

A. Disability Discrimination.

The ADA prohibits discrimination against a “qualified individual with a disability

because of the disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Defendant contends that a jury could not

reasonably conclude that Defendant terminated Plaintiff “because of a disability.” Dkt. #38

at 12.2

Case 2:06-cv-03103-DGC Document 50 Filed 05/28/08 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

 Defendant forced Plaintiff to retire based on medical opinions indicating that Plaintiff

was unable to perform the essential functions of his job as a police officer. Id. at 10.

Defendant notes that this Circuit held in Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054

(9th Cir. 2002), that “‘courts only require that an employer honestly believed its reason for

its actions, even if its reason is foolish or trivial or even baseless[.]’” Id. at 12. Defendant

argues that it is entitled to summary judgment under Villiarimo because even if the opinions

of the doctors who evaluated Plaintiff were wrong, Plaintiff has presented no evidence of

pretext or otherwise shown that Defendant intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff

because of a disability. Id.; Dkt. #49 at 2-4.

Villiarimo was a Title VII sex discrimination case in which the employer asserted a

non-discriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff. 281 F.3d at 1062-63. The Court of

Appeals applied the burden-shifting analysis developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), for suits brought under Title VII. Id. at 1062. The McDonnell

Douglas legal framework applies to ADA cases, however, only “if the employer disclaims

any reliance on the employee’s disability in having taken the employment action[.]”

Mustafa, 157 F.3d at 1175-76 (citing Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d

511, 514-16 (2d Cir. 1991)); see Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1340 (9th Cir. 1990) (the

McDonnell Douglas analysis applies in ADA cases only “where the defendant disavows any

consideration of the plaintiff’s handicap and the plaintiff alleges invidious discriminatory

intent”) (citing Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 766 (2d Cir. 1981)); Snead v. Metro. Prop.

& Cas. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093 n.10 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Mustafa); Shields v. BCI CocaCola Bottling Co. of L.A., No. Co4-928JLR, 2005 WL 2045887, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25,

2005) (citing Mustafa and Snead). 

Although Defendant asserts that its decision to force Plaintiff to retire was not based

on any alleged disability, but instead was based on the medical evidence indicating that

Plaintiff was not able to perform his job, Plaintiff has presented evidence that the problems

he experienced at work were caused by his disability. While discussing his performance

problems with Lieutenant Silbert, Plaintiff discussed his brain surgery and the fact that “he

Case 2:06-cv-03103-DGC Document 50 Filed 05/28/08 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

had no adrenal or pituitary gland.” Dkt. #39-2 at 27. Plaintiff told Lieutenant Pina and

Commander Swanson that his medical condition “may be affecting his performance.” Id. at

33. Lieutenant Benson informed Plaintiff that several coworkers were concerned that “he

had health issues that could be affecting his performance.” Id. Defendant required Plaintiff

to undergo psychological evaluations based on these very concerns. Dkt. #38 at 12; see Dkt.

#45-4 at 10, 17. Defendant’s decision to force Plaintiff to retire was based on the medical

opinions that Plaintiff’s neurological condition precluded him from performing the duties of

a police officer. Dkt. ##46 at 3, 49 at 3. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this

evidence shows that Defendant cannot disclaim any reliance on Plaintiff’s disability – the

decision was based on conditions caused by the disability. The burden shifting approach of

McDonnell Douglas therefore does not apply in this case and Defendant cannot obtain

summary judgment on the basis of Villiarimo.

Nor can Defendant obtain summary judgment on the ground that it did not force

Plaintiff to retire “because of the disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). An employer relies on

a disability when it justifies termination based on conduct caused by the disability. See

Teahan, 951 F.2d at 516. Indeed, for purposes of the ADA, “conduct resulting from a

disability is considered to be part of the disability, rather than a separate basis for

termination.” Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2001).

In this case, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, suggests that

Plaintiff’s poor work performance was due to the neurological conditions caused by his

disability. See Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1140 (“[A] jury could reasonably find the requisite

causal link between a disability . . . and Humphrey’s absenteeism and conclude that MHA

fired Humphrey because of her disability.”). 

The “because of the disability” inquiry “is designed to weed out [ADA] claims where

an employer can point to conduct or circumstances that are causally unrelated to the

plaintiff’s [disability].” Teahan, 951 F.2d at 516 (citing Smith, 914 F.2d at 1340). Defendant

has identified no such conduct or circumstances in this case. The Court will deny the motion

for summary judgment to the extent Defendant contends that it did not force Plaintiff to retire

Case 2:06-cv-03103-DGC Document 50 Filed 05/28/08 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Defendant’s reliance on Timmons v. GM Corp., 469 F.3d 1122 (7th Cir. 2006), is

misplaced. The adverse action taken by the employer in Timmons was based in part on

performance problems unrelated to the plaintiff’s disability. 469 F.3d at 1124, 1128.

- 5 -

because of a disability.3

B. Reasonable Accommodation.

The ADA not only prohibits employers from taking adverse actions against employees

because of their disabilities, but also requires employers to reasonably accommodate disabled

employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). An employer violates the ADA by not making

reasonable accommodation for a qualified employee with a disability “‘unless the employer

can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation

of the business of the employer.’” Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th

Cir. 2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)) (brackets omitted).

Plaintiff claims that Defendant failed to reasonably accommodate him by refusing to

consider his request to be transferred to another position within the City. Dkt. ##1 ¶¶ 14-15,

46 at 9-10. Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff requested a transfer (see Dkt. ##45-2

at 14-16, 45-4 at 18-19), that “reassignment to a vacant position” is a reasonable

accommodation under the ADA (see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(a)(9)(B)), or that Defendant failed

to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disability by looking for other positions within the

City of Phoenix (see Dkt. #38 at 2, 4). Rather, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not

shown that he was qualified for another position within the City or that other City jobs were

available. Dkt. #49 at 4-5.

This is not a sufficient basis for summary judgment. “Once an employer becomes

aware of the need for accommodation, that employer has a mandatory obligation under the

ADA to engage in an interactive process with the employee to identify and implement

appropriate reasonable accommodations.” Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1137 (citing Barnett v.

U.S. Air., Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds by U.S.

Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002)); see Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at 1089 (same); see

also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (o)(3). “The interactive process requires that employers analyze job

Case 2:06-cv-03103-DGC Document 50 Filed 05/28/08 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

functions to establish the essential and nonessential job tasks.” Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1115.

“Employers should ‘meet with the employee who requests an accommodation, request

information about the condition and what limitations the employee has, ask the employee

what he or she specifically wants, show some sign of having considered [the] employee’s

request, and offer and discuss available alternatives when the request is too burdensome.”

Id. (citation omitted). “Employers, who fail to engage in the interactive process in good

faith, face liability for the remedies imposed by the statute if a reasonable accommodation

would have been possible.” Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1137-38 (citing Barnett, 228 F.3d at

1116). 

Defendant’s Police Administrator, Patti Moore, testified that the police department

made no attempt to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff despite his request to be transferred

to another position. Dkt. #45-4 at 17. Moore stated that Plaintiff was not considered for

another position because several doctors had opined that Plaintiff was not capable of

performing even light duty work. Id. at 18-21. But Moore admitted that she did not ask the

doctors whether Plaintiff “could work anywhere else in the City.” Id. at 18-20. Moore stated

that it was not her “job to find [Plaintiff] a job elsewhere.” Id. at 18. While Moore

acknowledged that she was one of the individuals responsible for ensuring that Defendant

complied with the ADA, she demonstrated a lack of knowledge about Defendant’s duty

under the ADA to engage in an interactive process with Plaintiff to find an appropriate

reasonable accommodation. Id. at 15-19. This evidence, construed in Plaintiff’s favor,

supports a finding that Defendant did not consider Plaintiff’s transfer request or “explore in

good faith the possible accommodations.” Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at 1089.

Defendant contends that to prevail on his reasonable accommodation claim, Plaintiff

“must point to evidence that vacant positions within the City existed and that he was

qualified to fill those positions.” Dkt. #49 at 5. But as Plaintiff’s employer, Defendant has

“superior knowledge regarding the range of possible positions and can more easily perform

analyses regarding the ‘essential functions’ of each [position].” Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1113.

To put the entire burden for finding an alternative position on Plaintiff, or to exempt

Case 2:06-cv-03103-DGC Document 50 Filed 05/28/08 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Defendant from the process of identifying other possible positions, “conflicts with the goals

of the ADA.” Id. at 1113.

To survive summary judgment on a reasonable accommodation claim, the plaintiff

“must only provide evidence sufficient to make ‘at least a facial showing that reasonable

accommodation is possible.’” Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 740 (9th Cir.

1993) (citation omitted). Plaintiff has made such a showing. Assistant Chief Michael Frazier

testified that the City has “placed many employees over the years outside the police

department in other City departments” by engaging in an interactive process with the

disabled employees. Dkt. #45-4 at 27-28. Both Frazier and Moore testified that Plaintiff was

not necessarily disqualified to work in other departments within the City. Id. at 20, 24-28.

A jury reasonably could conclude from this evidence that Defendant’s “failure to engage in

the interactive process foreclosed [a] potentially reasonable accommodation.” Barnett, 228

F.3d at 1117.

Defendant further contends that Plaintiff’s paid administrative leave constitutes a

reasonable accommodation. Dkt. ##38 at 13, 49 at 5. But Plaintiff remained on leave only

until he qualified for retirement benefits (see Dkt. #39 ¶ 79), not until he was able to return

to work and perform the essential functions of his job. See Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1135-36.

Moreover, “the duty to accommodate is a continuing duty that is not exhausted by one

effort.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Defendant does not dispute that rather

than considering Plaintiff’s request to work in another position, it forced Plaintiff to retire

in lieu of termination. Dkt. #45-4 at 15; see Dkt. #45-2 at 17.

An employer “may not merely speculate that a suggested accommodation is not

feasible.” Buckingham, 998 F.2d at 740. The ADA requires employers to engage in an

interactive process with disabled employees because the “process is the key mechanism for

facilitating the integration of disabled employees into the work place. Employers who reject

this core process must face liability when a reasonable accommodation would have been

possible.” Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1116.

Plaintiff has presented evidence showing that Defendant breached its “duty to ‘gather

Case 2:06-cv-03103-DGC Document 50 Filed 05/28/08 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

sufficient information from [Plaintiff] and qualified experts as needed to determine’” whether

Plaintiff could perform other available jobs within the City. Buckingham, 998 F.2d at 740

(citation omitted). Triable issues therefore exist as to whether Defendant reasonably

accommodated Plaintiff, and the Court must deny summary judgment. See Barnett, 228 F.3d

at 1116 (“[A]n employer cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage if there is a genuine

dispute as to whether the employer engaged in good faith in the interactive process.”); Fuller

v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 562 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Whether the [employer] has provided

‘reasonable accommodation’ is ordinarily a question of fact.”); Lujan v. Pac. Maritime Ass’n,

165 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1999) (same).

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #38) is denied.

2. The Court will set a final pretrial conference by separate order.

DATED this 28th day of May, 2008.

Case 2:06-cv-03103-DGC Document 50 Filed 05/28/08 Page 8 of 8