Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01214/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01214-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES MARION SIMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. GUTIERREZ,

Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-01214-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITH 

PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 

CLAIM

(ECF NO. 13)

DISMISSAL COUNTS AS A STRIKE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

CLERK TO TERMINATE ALL PENDING 

MOTIONS AND CLOSE CASE

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 4.) Plaintiff has 

consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 8.) No other parties have appeared 

in the action.

On August 5, 2015, Plaintiff filed his first civil rights complaint. (ECF No. 1.) On 

February 4, 2016, the Court issued an initial screening order dismissing Plaintiff’s 

complaint with leave to amend. (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff filed the instant first amended 

complaint on March 10, 2016. (ECF No. 13.)

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I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

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that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

The acts giving rise to this complaint occurred at California Correctional Institution 

(“CCI”) where Plaintiff was incarcerated. He names CCI Chief Deputy Warden J. 

Gutierrez as Defendant. 

Plaintiff’s claims arise from his confinement in the Security Housing Unit (“SHU”)

at CCI. Documents attached to Plaintiff’s complaint reflect the following background 

facts, relevant to his allegations:

On June 18, 2013, while housed at Salinas Valley State Prison, Plaintiff received 

a Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) for Battery on an Inmate with Serious Bodily Injury. He 

was assessed a 24 month SHU term with a minimum eligible release date (“MERD”) of 

December 18, 2014. Subsequently, Plaintiff received three additional “SHU-able” RVRs

while at SVSP and, later, at CCI: (1) on August 10, 2013, for Threatening Violence 

Against Staff for which he was assessed a 9 month SHU term with a MERD of March 3, 

2014; (2) on February 17, 2014, for Refusing Housing; and (3) on March 25, 2014, for 

Refusing to Accept Assigned housing. For the latter two offenses, Plaintiff was 

assessed a 3 month mitigated consecutive SHU term with a controlling MERD of August 

26, 2015.

Plaintiff appealed the RVR for Battery on an Inmate with Serious Bodily Injury and 

on March 21, 2014, a Modification Order was issued ordering Plaintiff’s RVR be reissued/re-heard due to evidentiary issues. The charges were re-adjudicated on April 13, 

2014 and, on April 22, 2014, the RVR was signed off on by the Chief Disciplinary Officer. 

Plaintiff’s 24 month SHU term for Battery on an Inmate with Physical Injury was upheld. 

On October 3, 2014 Plaintiff was transferred to CCI and placed in the SHU. Upon 

Plaintiff’s arrival at CCI he informed Defendant that he was being held illegally in the 

SHU as he “had no lock-up order or RVR.” On December 18, 2014, Defendant audited 

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Plaintiff’s RVR and concluded that the guilty charge of Battery on an Inmate with Serious 

Bodily Injury was not supported by the evidence presented at the April 13, 2014 hearing. 

Accordingly, on January 5, 2015, Defendant Gutierrez notified Plaintiff that the charge 

would be modified and reduced to Battery on an Inmate. Plaintiff’s 24 month SHU term 

was voided. Plaintiff was scheduled for the Institutional Classification Committee (“ICC”) 

to reassess his SHU term, given that Plaintiff had received two additional SHU terms for 

unrelated offenses, and Battery on an Inmate still qualified as a “SHU-able” offense. On 

January 22, 2015, the CCI Chief Disciplinary officer imposed an 18 month SHU term. 

Plaintiff states Defendant wrongly reduced, rather than dismissed, the charges 

against Plaintiff without first holding a hearing. Plaintiff further alleges the time 

limitations pursuant to California Code of Regulations title 15, section 3313(c) had run 

out and the “third level modification order” was never carried out. Defendant also is 

alleged to have retaliated against Plaintiff for complaining about prison officials’ conduct.

Plaintiff also claims efendant also recommended Plaintiff be transferred to Pelican 

Bay State Prison (“PBSP”), falsely noting that Plaintiff had requested the transfer to be 

closer to family and friends. Plaintiff has no family or friends in the vicinity of PBSP; he 

is from Los Angeles County.

Plaintiff attaches a letter to his complaint, addressed to “whom it may concern,” in 

which he states Correctional Officer F. Martinez is refusing to give Plaintiff and his 

cellmate their mail and has directed other COs to do the same. CO Martinez is not 

named as a defendant.

Plaintiff accuses Defendant of cruel and unusual punishment, violating Plaintiff’s 

due process rights, and retaliation. He seeks monetary damages.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Due Process

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without 

due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a 

cause of action for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish 

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the existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may 

arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 

460, 466 (1983). The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty 

interest in being confined in the general prison population instead of segregation. See id.

at 466-68. Liberty interests created by state law are limited to freedom from restraint 

which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). 

“Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full 

panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff, 418 U.S. 

at 556. The minimum procedural requirements that must be met in such proceedings 

are: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the time the prisoner 

receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may prepare his 

defense; (3) a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence they rely on and 

reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his 

defense, when permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional 

safety or correctional goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is 

illiterate or the issues presented are legally complex. Id. at 563-71. As long as the five 

minimum Wolff requirements are met, due process has been satisfied. Walker v. 

Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. 

Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).

In addition, “some evidence” must support the decision of the hearing officer, 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985), and the evidence must have some 

indicia of reliability, Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987). The “some 

evidence” standard is not particularly stringent and the relevant inquiry is whether “there 

is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached. . . .” Hill, 472 

U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). 

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Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to demonstrate that his confinement in the 

SHU presented an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents 

of prison life. 

Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to allege any deficiencies in the procedures 

afforded to him. As stated, Plaintiff appeared before ICCs more than once in relation to 

these charges. If, during those proceedings, Plaintiff was afforded the five protections 

described in Wolff, due process has been satisfied. Thus, to state a claim, Plaintiff must 

allege that he was not afforded one of the following: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) 

at least 24 hours between the time the prisoner receives written notice and the time of 

the hearing, so that the prisoner may prepare his defense; (3) a written statement by the 

fact finders of the evidence they rely on and reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) 

the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his defense, when permitting him to do so 

would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; and (5) legal 

assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the issues presented are 

legally complex. 

Plaintiff also has failed to link Defendant to any due process violation. Under § 

1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in 

the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009); Simmons v. Navajo 

Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d

1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). “A 

person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 

section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of 

which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff seems to argue that upon his arrival at CCI, he should have had a new 

hearing on his RVR for Battery on an Inmate with Serious Injury, and Defendant’s 

decision to reduce that charge rather than dismiss it without a hearing violated due 

process. These arguments appear to be based primarily on the California regulations. 

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However, California regulations do not dictate the outcome of the federal due process 

analysis. Nor do the Title 15 regulations governing the conduct of prison officials entitle 

an inmate to sue civilly for their violation. See e.g., Vasquez v. Tate, No. 1:10-cv-1876-

JLT (PC), 2012 WL 6738167, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012); Davis v. Powell, 901 F. 

Supp. 2d 1196, 1211 (S.D. Cal. 2012). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegation that regulations 

were not followed, standing alone, fails to state a claim. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff has provided no support for his claim that the charge 

should have been dismissed rather than reduced or for his assertion that Defendant was 

required to conduct a de novo hearing on Plaintiff’s RVR. Plaintiff’s documentation 

shows that Plaintiff’s RVR was already re-heard and re-adjudicated, as ordered by the 

March 21, 2014 Modification Order, while Plaintiff was still housed at SVSP. When 

Plaintiff transferred to CCI, Defendant merely audited the RVR and, based on that audit, 

decided to reduce the charge. Plaintiff has not shown that either due process or the 

applicable regulations required Defendant to do anything further. See 15 Cal Code 

Regs. § 3315(g); see also Foster v. Statti, No. 2:10-cv-0929-TLN-AC, 2013 WL 

5348098, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2013) (discussing audit procedure). 

In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a due process claim. Plaintiff previously 

was advised of the legal standards applicable to his claims and has failed to cure noted 

defects. Further leave to amend this claim appears to be futile and will be denied.

B. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 

protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and inhumane conditions of 

confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations 

omitted). “[A] prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying 

humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk 

of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate 

it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).

A conditions of confinement claim has both an objective and a subjective 

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component. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “First, the deprivation alleged must be . . . 

sufficiently serious,” and must “result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of 

life’s necessities.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) “[E]xtreme 

deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).

Second, the prison official must have acted with “deliberate indifference” to inmate 

health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “Mere negligence is not sufficient to establish 

liability.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). Rather, a plaintiff must 

show that a defendant knew of, but disregarded, an excessive risk to inmate health or 

safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. That is, “the official must both be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 

must also draw the inference.” Id.

Plaintiff has not alleged any excessive risk to his health or safety resulting from 

the RVR, his SHU term, or his transfer to PBSP. Nor has he alleged that Defendant was

aware of such risks but failed to take measures to abate them. Accordingly, he has failed 

to state a claim for deliberate indifference. Plaintiff previously was advised of these 

defects and nonetheless failed to cure them. Further leave to amend will be denied. C.

C. Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff for filing complaints 

against CCI staff.

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails 

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against 

an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

The second element of a prisoner retaliation claim focuses on causation and 

motive. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff must show 

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that his protected conduct was a “‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind the 

defendant’s conduct.” Id. (quoting Sorrano’s Gasco. Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 

(9th Cir. 1989). Although it can be difficult to establish the motive or intent of the 

defendant, a plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 

1288-89 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that a prisoner establishes a triable issue of fact 

regarding prison officials’ retaliatory motives by raising issues of suspect timing, 

evidence, and statements); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997); Pratt 

v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995) (“timing can properly be considered as 

circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent”).

The third prong can be satisfied by various activities. Filing a grievance is a 

protected action under the First Amendment. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 

1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989). Pursuing a civil rights legal action is similarly protected under 

the First Amendment. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985).

With respect to the fourth prong, “[it] would be unjust to allow a defendant to 

escape liability for a First Amendment violation merely because an unusually determined 

plaintiff persists in his protected activity . . . .” Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 

192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999). The correct inquiry is to determine whether an 

official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First 

Amendment activities. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568-69 (citing Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 

F.3d at 1300). 

With respect to the fifth prong, a prisoner must affirmatively show that “the prison 

authorities’ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional 

institution or was not tailored narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 

532.

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is completely silent on the adverse action 

Defendant allegedly subjected him to in retaliation for his staff complaints.

Assuming that Plaintiff intends to allege that either his retention in SHU or his 

transfer to PBSP was retaliatory, his allegations nonetheless fail to state a claim. He 

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provides no facts on which to conclude that Defendant’s actions were motivated by 

Plaintiff filing complaints against CCI staff. He does not state when these alleged 

complaints were filed, who they were filed against, how Defendant came to know of 

them, or why they would spur Defendant to retaliate. 

Plaintiff previously was advised of the applicable legal standard and has failed to 

state a cognizable retaliation claim. Further leave to amend appears futile and will be 

denied.

D. Withholding Mail

CO Martinez is not a defendant; therefore, the Court need not analyze whether 

Plaintiff has made any cognizable claims against this individual for withholding Plaintiff’s 

mail. Furthermore, Plaintiff may not add new, unrelated claims against CO Martinez in 

this action. The alleged withholding of Plaintiff’s mail has no relation his forced 

confinement in the SHU, and any claims against CO Martinez therefore belong in a 

separate suit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (a plaintiff may only sue multiple defendants in

the same action if at least one claim against each defendant arises out of the same 

“transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and there is a 

“question of law or fact common to all defendants.”); Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348,

1351 (9th Cir.1997); Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of North America, 623 F.2d 1371, 

1375 (9th Cir.1980). 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to state a cognizable claim. He previously

was advised of his pleading deficiencies and afforded the opportunity to correct them. 

He failed to do so. Any further leave to amend reasonably appears futile and will be 

denied.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The action is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim;

2. Dismissal counts as a strike pursuant to the “three strikes” provision set 

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); and

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3. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all pending motions and close the 

case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 17, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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