Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06276/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06276-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

---

~11.;~D r . f"'A rt o{ Ap~b -" ,..;tttl Stat~ ~.,.,u · UNITED STATES COURT OF APP~-S- Te;fu Cirur': 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT J\PR Q S 1992 

CLARK NEWTON and JOYCE NEWTON, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

ENERTECH, INC., an Illinois ) 

corporation; CHALLENGER ELEC- ) 

TRICAL EQUIPMENT CORP., a ) 

Delaware corporation and sue- ) 

cessor corporation to Federal ) 

Pacific Electric Company, a/k/a) 

FPE; and RELIANCE ELECTRIC ) 

INDUSTRIAL COMPANY and/or ) 

RELIANCE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a ) 

Delaware corporation and ) 

holding corporation for Federal) 

Pacific Electric Company, a ) 

Delaware corporation, ) 

) 

Defendants, ) 

) 

FEDERAL PACIFIC ELECTRIC COM- ) 

PANY, a Delaware corporation, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

) -------------------------------) ) 

COMMERCIAL UNION INSURANCE ) 

COMPANY, INC . , ) 

) 

Intervenor. ) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 91-6174 and 91-6276 

(D.C. No. CIV-89-1054-W) 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

Appellate Case: 91-6276 Document: 010110240376 Date Filed: 04/06/1992 Page: 1
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and HUNTER, District 

Judge.** 

This appeal arises from a successful manufacturers' product 

liability diversity action in which Clark Newton was seriously 

injured while working on an electrical substation manufactured by 

the Federal Pacific Electric Company (FPE). FPE contends the jury 

verdict should be reversed because Mr. Newton is not a member of 

the class of persons protected by the manufacturers' product 

liability doctrine. FPE also asserts a new trial should be 

granted because the district court abused its discretion in 

removing a sleeping juror. Finding no merit in these claims, we 

affirm. 

Mr. Newton was engaged by Oberlin World Press to upgrade the 

power capacity of an electrical system Oberlin had purchased from 

FPE. The electrical system is divided into two substations which 

are connected electrically by a tie switch and a flat metal 

conductor, or "bus." Each substation is divided into cubicles 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

**The Honorable Elmo B. Hunter, 

Court Judge for the Western 

designation. 

United States Senior District 

District of Missouri, sitting by 

-2-

Appellate Case: 91-6276 Document: 010110240376 Date Filed: 04/06/1992 Page: 2
numbered one through thirteen, with the tie switch and bus for 

substation 2 in cubicle number 4. The power upgrade requested by 

Oberlin required an 800-amp spare switch in cubicle 5 in 

substation 2 to be replaced by a 1200-amp switch. 

Prior to entering cubicle 5, Mr. Newton de-energized 

substation 2 and assured there was no power in his cubicle. 

However, because of FPE's unusual system design, the link between 

the two substations was still "hot" and thus electricity could 

still enter substation 2. While working in the cubicle, Mr. 

Newton inadvertently touched a metal bar to the exposed tie bus in 

the adjacent cubicle and was seriously injured. 

Mr. Newton brought an action for his personal injuries in 

which his wife, Joyce, joined for loss of consortium. In his 

claim, Mr. Newton alleged the tie switch and bus were negligently 

designed and thus were unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary 

electrician. 

The jury awarded Clark Newton $1,455,600 and Joyce Newton 

$250,000. The trial court entered judgment against FPE and 

subsequently denied FPE's motions for a directed verdict, judgment 

n . o .v. and for a new trial . 

FPE contends the trial court erred in denying its motions for 

a directed verdict and for judgment n . o . v. We only reverse a 

trial court's denial of either motion when, after a de novo 

review, we determine that the evidence taken in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party and all reasonable inferences to 

be drawn therefrom point but one way, in favor o f the moving 

-3-

Appellate Case: 91-6276 Document: 010110240376 Date Filed: 04/06/1992 Page: 3
party. Transpower Constructors v. Grand River Dam Auth., 905 F.2d 

1413, 1416 (10th Cir. 1990). 

To establish manufacturers' product liability in Oklahoma, 

the plaintiff must prove three things. First, plaintiff must 

prove the product was the cause of the injury. Kirkland v. 

General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1363 (Okla. 1974). If some 

act of the plaintiff caused the injury, rather than the defective 

product itself, causation is missing and the plaintiff cannot 

recover. Kirkland, 521 P.2d at 1366. Similarly, if the plaintiff 

is using the product for some purpose for which it was not 

intended ("abnormal use") and is subsequently injured, causation 

is lacking. Id. 

Second, if the action is against the manufacturer, plaintiff 

must prove the defect existed in the product at the time the 

product left the manufacturer's possession and control. Id. at 

1363. Third, plaintiff must prove the defect made the article 

"unreasonably dangerous" to him or his property. Id. 

In Moss v. Polyco, Inc., 522 P.2d 622 (Okla. 1974), decided 

on the same day as Kirkland, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized 

the doctrine of manufacturers' product liability should extend to 

any third person injured as a result of the defect in the product. 

"A manufacturer who places in commerce 

dangerous to life or limb by reason of some 

a product 

defect is 

rendered 

strictly 

liable in tort to one who sustains injury because of the defective 

condition." Moss, 522 P.2d at 626 (citations omitted). 

-4-

Appellate Case: 91-6276 Document: 010110240376 Date Filed: 04/06/1992 Page: 4
FPE argues on appeal Mr. Newton is not within the class of 

plaintiffs protected by the manufacturers' product liability 

doctrine. FPE contends the power upgrade required Mr. Newton to 

redesign a portion of the substation. Because Mr. Newton was in 

the process of redesigning or "remanufacturing" the substation, 

FPE contends he is not a "user or consumer" of the substation and 

thus is not protected by the manufacturers' product liability 

doctrine. Thus, FPE asserts there was insufficient evidence for 

the jury to find Mr. Newton was a user of the substation. 

However, upon careful review of the record, we conclude there 

was sufficient evidence to establish Mr. Newton was not engaged in 

substantially altering the substation. Not only was there 

credible 

there was 

testimony 

ample 

that power upgrades are commonplace, but also 

evidence establishing no modification or 

alteration of either the tie bus which caused the injury or 

cubicle 4, in which the tie bus was located. Given the fact that 

power upgrades had been performed previously in the Oberlin 

substation, and that FPE had advertised its substations as 

flexible for expansion and had even shipped sections to Oberlin 

equipped for 1200-amp switches, FPE could have reasonably foreseen 

the occurrence of a power upgrade on the substation. 

FPE also moved for a new trial, claiming the trial court 

improperly replaced juror Johnson with an alternate juror in 

violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 47(b). We review the trial court's 

denial for a "manifest abuse of discretion." Trans power 

Constructors v. Grand River, 905 F.2d at 1417 (citing Patty 

-5-

Appellate Case: 91-6276 Document: 010110240376 Date Filed: 04/06/1992 Page: 5
Precision Prods. Co. v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 846 F.2d 1247, 

1251 (10th Cir. 1988)). 

Rule 47(b) provides that alternate jurors "shall replace 

jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its 

verdict, become or are found to be unable or disqualified to 

perform their duties." The controlling question on review is 

whether the trial court's removal of a juror tended to weaken the 

institution of the jury trial. Metropolitan Paving Co. v. 

International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 439 F.2d 300, 304 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971). The trial court has 

considerable discretion in deciding whether jurors are able to 

perform their duties. United States v. Ashby, 864 F.2d 690, 694 

(10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1070 (1990). 

After both parties had exercised their peremptory challenges, 

the trial court stated juror Ketcham would be the alternate juror 

unless, at the end of the case, the parties agreed to substitute 

another juror as the alternate or unless the court determined that 

another juror should be substituted as the alternate. During 

trial, the court observed that juror Johnson was at times 

inattentive and sleeping. Before instructing the jury, the court 

asked each party to suggest an alternate juror. When the parties 

disagreed upon the choice, the court chose juror Johnson as the 

alternate, based on her inattentiveness during argument. 1 

The conduct of juror Johnson in open court is a matter of 

which the trial court had judicial knowledge and could take 

1

The court just as easily could have disqualified Ms. Johnson and 

substituted Ms. Ketcham as the alternate. The difference is a 

matter of form and not substance. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 91-6276 Document: 010110240376 Date Filed: 04/06/1992 Page: 6
judicial notice. United States v. Carter, 433 F.2d 874, 876 (10th 

Cir. 1970). There can be little doubt that a juror who sleeps 

throughout portions of a trial is unable to adequately perform his 

or her duties and that a court's dismissal of that juror is 

properly within its discretion. See, e.g., United States v. 

Cameron, 464 F.2d 333, 335 (3d Cir. 1972). We have thoroughly 

examined the record, and we find no basis for setting aside the 

finding of the trial judge. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

-7-

Appellate Case: 91-6276 Document: 010110240376 Date Filed: 04/06/1992 Page: 7