Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00127/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00127-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Herbert Owens,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 01-0127 FCD PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

Suzan Hubbard, et al.,

Defendants.

-oOoPlaintiff is a state prisoner without counsel prosecuting a

civil rights action against prison officials. 

The action commenced as a petition for habeas corpus, which

the court summarily dismissed. The court of appeals remanded for

consideration as a civil rights action.

Plaintiff alleges while he was at Mule Creek State Prison he

was cited for trafficking in drugs. (On appeal the charge was

changed to conspiracy to introduce narcotics into the prison.) He

was found guilty on evidence later found insufficient because the 

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confidential informant never before gave reliable information,

part of the information was contradicted by visitation records

and the hearing officer did not independently assess the

confidential informant’s reliability. Plaintiff was transferred

to California State Prison--Sacramento (SAC), where he was

approved to receive family visiting but then was transferred to

California State Prison--Solano (Solano) where visits were

denied. Plaintiff alleges defendants retaliated against him for

exercising his First Amendment rights; violated his Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment;

violated plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee;

and violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States

Constitution.

The court approved service of process upon defendants

Rothchild, Robinson, Campbell, Hubbard, Page, Newland, Butler,

Jensen, Melching and Nakagawa. Claims against Campbell were

dismissed October 20, 2004. Nakagawa has not appeared.

The other defendants moved January 3, 2005, for summary

judgment and plaintiff has not opposed. 

December 17, 2003, the court advised plaintiff of the

requirements for opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d

952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035

(1999), and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

A party may move, without or without supporting affidavits,

for a summary judgment and the judgment sought shall be rendered

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forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(c). 

An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A fact is

“material” if it affects the right to recover under applicable

substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit evidence that

establishes the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any’” that the moving party believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

at 323. If the movant does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue, the movant need only point to the absence of evidence to

support the opponent’s burden. To avoid summary judgment on an

issue upon which the opponent bears the burden of proof, the

opponent must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,

or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

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is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. The opponent’s

affirmative evidence must be sufficiently probative that a jury

reasonably could decide the issue in favor of the opponent. 

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Inc. v. Zenith Radio

Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). When the conduct alleged

is implausible, stronger evidence than otherwise required must be

presented to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 587.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that “supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth

such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein.” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has

held that the opponent need not produce evidence in a form that

would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the questions are (1) whether

the evidence could be submitted in admissible form and (2) “if

reduced to admissible evidence” would it be sufficient to carry

the party’s burden at trial. Id., at 327. Thus, in Fraser v.

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003), objection to the opposing

party’s reliance upon her diary upon the ground it was hearsay

was overruled because the party could testify to all the relevant

portions from personal knowledge or read it into evidence as

recorded recollection.

A verified complaint based on personal knowledge setting

forth specific facts admissible in evidence is treated as an

affidavit. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995);

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McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987). A verified

motion based on personal knowledge in opposition to a summary

judgment motion setting forth facts that would be admissible in

evidence also functions as an affidavit. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134

F.,3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th

Cir. 2004).

Defects in opposing affidavits may be waived if no motion to

strike or other objection is made. Scharf v. United States

Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979) (incompetent

medical evidence).

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s

retaliation claim. “Within the prison context, a viable claim of

First Amendment retaliation entails five elements: (1) An

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against a

prisoner (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct,

and that such action (4) chilled the prisoner’s exercise of his

First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably

advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408

F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

Defendants present evidence that when they found plaintiff

ineligible for family visits, they did so solely to preserve

institutional security by preventing plaintiff from having an

opportunity to introduce drugs into Solano. Plaintiff offers

nothing to controvert this evidence. 

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims as well. It is wellCase 2:01-cv-00127-FCD-PAN Document 49 Filed 07/13/05 Page 5 of 7
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settled that prisoners have no constitutional right to contact

visits while incarcerated. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v.

Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989) (no due process right to unfettered

visitation); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (pretrial

detainees have no constitutional due process right to contact

visits); Gerber, 291 F.3d 617 (inmates have no due process right

to procreate through artificial insemination); Toussaint v.

McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986) (denial of contact visits

does not violate Eighth Amendment); Cooper v. Garcia, 55 F. Supp.

2d 1090 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (plaintiff did not state claim for

procedural due process violation because inmates do not have

liberty interest in state family visitation program within the

meaning of Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)); see also Davis

v. Carlson, 837 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1988); Hernandez v. Coughlin,

18 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1994). 

To meet the threshold for his due process claim, plaintiff

must show defendants subjected him to a restraint imposing an

“atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S.

472, 483-84 (1995). Plaintiff offers nothing to show, or even

suggest, that conditions in administrative segregation during his

disciplinary term differed significantly from those of ordinary

prison life. 

Defendants also are entitled to summary judgment on

plaintiff’s Ex Post Facto claim. The Ex Post Facto Clause

applies to criminal penalties, not administrative regulations. 

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It prohibits making an act criminal which was not criminal at the

time done, increasing the penalty for a criminal act after the

act was done, or altering rules of evidence to disadvantage the

criminal offender. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1980);

Cummings v. State of Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 325-26 (1866). This

case does not involve criminal penalties.

Accordingly, the court hereby recommends the January 3,

2005, motion for summary judgment of defendants Rothchild,

Robinson, Hubbard, Page, Newland, Butler, Jensen and Melching be 

granted.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be

filed within 20 days of service of these findings and

recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: July 12, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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