Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01209/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01209-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH USUNUBU ALUYA,

Plaintiff

v.

MANAGEMENT & TRAINING 

CORPORATION and DOES 1-9,

Defendant

_____________________________________

DEMOND HAMMOND,

Plaintiff

v.

MANAGEMENT & TRAINING 

CORPORATION and DOES 1-9,

Defendant

_____________________________________

BRUCE DWIGHT SUTTON,

Plaintiff

v.

MANAGEMENT & TRAINING 

CORPORATION and DOES 1-9,

Defendant

_____________________________________

CASE NO. 1:13-CV-1345 AWI JLT 

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Doc. # 50

____________________________________

CASE NO. 1:13-CV-1209 AWI JLT

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Doc. # 57

____________________________________

CASE NO. 1:13-CV-1344 AWI JLT 

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Doc. # 60

___________________________________

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In this order, the court addresses motions for summary judgment filed in each of three 

separate but related cases by defendant Management & Training Corporation (“Defendant” or 

“MTC”) a private entity that manages the federal correctional facility at Taft, California, under 

contract with the federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). The plaintiffs in each of the three cases, 

Joseph Usunubu Aluya, Demond Hammond, and Bruce Dwight Sutton (collectively, 

“Plaintiffs”) arise from the undisputed fact that each of the Plaintiffs contracted the disease 

Coccidiomycosis (“Cocci”) or (“Valley Fever”) while incarcerated in the Taft Correctional 

Institution (“Taft CI”). Defendant is a Delaware corporation with headquarters in Utah. The 

parties do not dispute that diversity jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). Venue is 

proper in this court.

The three cases that are combined for purposes of this order are the most similar of a total 

of six cases seeking money damages from MTC in its role as managing entity of Taft CI. The 

similarities that set these cases apart, aside from the fact they allege identical claims, are that 

they were all filed in the same month by the same set of attorneys, they all do not allege claims 

against the United States, and in each of these cases, the Plaintiffs have requested and received 

permission to file sur-replies that address the issue of qualified immunity as raised by the 

Magistrate Judges Findings and Recommendations in Smith v. Schwartzenegger, 14cv0060 LJO 

– SAB. Two of the six similar cases, Newintore v. United States and Edison v. United States, 

were filed prior to the three cases under consideration in this order and alleged claims against the 

United States that were dismissed under the “contractor exception” to the Federal Tort Claims 

Act (“FTCA”). The issue of the scope of the federal government’s immunity under the 

contractor exception to the FTCA is currently under review by the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals. See Nuwintore v. United States, 13cv0967 AWI JLT, Doc. # 79 at p.5. The court 

notes that there are no jurisdictional disputes in the three cases considered in this order.

UNDISPUTED FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following background facts are drawn from the parties’ joint statements of 

undisputed facts (the “Joint Statements”). 

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Taft CI is located in Kern County in the South-Western corner of the San Joaquin Valley. 

It is owned by the United States Bureau of Prisons and has been operated under contract by 

MTC since 2007. The causative agent of the disease coccidiomycosis or “Valley Fever” is a 

fungus, Coccidioidies immitis, which inhabits the soil in many arid portions of the American 

Southwest. Coccidioidies immitis is particularly prevalent in the soil in the Southern San 

Joaquin Valley, including the area where Taft CI is located. Coccidioidies immitis forms spores 

in the soil and the spores can become airborne along with dust from the soil. These spores can 

travel hundreds of miles on the wind. When the spores are inhaled, a respiratory infection may 

occur. The infection is typically self-limiting and has symptoms similar to viral respiratory flu. 

There is no human-to-human spread of coccidiomycosis. A small percentage of persons – about 

one percent – who are infected with Coccidioidies immitis will develop a more serious, 

disseminated form of the disease. This disseminated form is not self-limiting and can affect a 

number of different organ systems and can cause serious and persistent disease symptoms and 

even death.

The parties’ joint statements allege facts that establish that Defendant was aware of the 

increase in cases of Valley Fever in both the inmate and general populations in Kern County 

well before the time period at issue in these cases. See e.g. 13cv1345, Doc. # 50-3 at p.3. It is 

also not disputed that MTC formulated Standard Operating Procedure 4002 (“SOP 4002”) in 

2007 and that SOP 4002 was approved by BOP. SOP 4002 addresses “Treatment of Inmates 

with Cocci/Valley Fever” and includes recommendations for the screening of incoming inmates 

to exclude those whose immune systems are highly compromised as, for example, in persons 

with HIV disease, solid organ transplant or undergoing chemotherapy for cancer. 

Plaintiff Alaya was received at Taft CI on April 8, 2011. He received medical screening 

upon arrival and was found not to have any immune deficiencies. There is not disputed that 

Plaintiff Alaya did not meet the criteria for exclusion from Taft CI according to the criteria 

established by SOP 4002. Plaintiff underwent a serological test for infection with Cocci in May 

2011 and tested positive. Plaintiff Alaya’s complaint alleges he suffered severe flu-like 

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respiratory symptoms. Defendant Alaya alleges affirmatively that he did not suffer disseminated 

disease. Plaintiff Sutton was incarcerated at the federal correctional facility as Safford, Arizona 

prior to being transferred to Taft CI on November 8, 2011. Sutton was housed at Taft CI from 

November 8, 2011 until February, 2012. Plaintiff was medically screened upon his arrival at 

Taft CI and did not fit any of the criteria for exclusion. Plaintiff Sutton was diagnosed with 

coccidiomycosis in December 2011. It is clear from the facts alleged in Sutton’s complaint that 

Sutton suffered a severe acute pulmonary disease requiring surgical intervention. It is not clear 

that Sutton’s pulmonary disease was not self-limiting or that he suffers or suffered from the 

disseminated form of the disease. Plaintiff Hammond was received at Taft CI in March 2009. 

Like the other Plaintiffs, Hammond was medically screened upon arrival at Taft CI and was 

found to have no significant diseases or any conditions that would have placed him in any 

category for exclusion under SOP 4002. Hammond underwent a serological test for infection 

with Coccidioidies immitis, the results of which indicated he had been infected. According to 

his complaint, Hammond had acute phase pulmonary symptoms similar to those experienced by 

the other Plaintiffs. It appears from the stipulated facts that Hammond’s infection was selflimiting and there is no evidence he ever suffered symptoms of disseminated disease. 

Notwithstanding the small differences in the factual backgrounds of the three Plaintiffs, 

the court will presume for the sake of this discussion that: (1) all of the Plaintiffs had not been 

exposed to Coccidioidies immitis prior to their incarceration at Taft CI; (2) each of the Plaintiffs 

was exposed to, and infected by, spores of Coccidioidies immitis at some point during their 

incarceration at Taft CI; and (3) the court will presume that the infections experienced by the 

Plaintiffs, whether disseminated or not, caused damage within the meaning of Plaintiffs’ state 

common law claims for negligence and premises liability.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine 

issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Poller v. 

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Columbia Broadcast System, 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 710 

(9th Cir. 1985); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th 

Cir. 1984).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the 

initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its 

motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Although the party moving for summary 

judgment always has the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion, 

the nature of the responsibility varies “depending on whether the legal issues are ones on which 

the movant or the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial.” Cecala v. Newman, 532 

F.Supp.2d 1118, 1132-1133 (D. Ariz. 2007). A party that does not have the ultimate burden of 

persuasion at trial – usually but not always the defendant – “has both the initial burden of 

production and the ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion for summary judgment.” Nissan 

Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). “In 

order to carry its burden of production, the moving party must either produce evidence negating 

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving 

party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of 

persuasion at trial.” Id. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. 

Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 

1280 (9th Cir. 1979). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the 

opposing party may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings, but is required 

to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery 

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 

586 n.11; First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1973). 

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The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might 

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 

630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-49; Wool v. 

Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need 

not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed 

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the 

truth at trial.” First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the 

“purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see 

whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments); International Union of Bricklayers v. 

Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any. Rule 56(c); Poller, 368 U.S. at 468; SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th 

Cir. 1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and 

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be 

drawn in favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. 

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)(per curiam); Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 

F.2d 202, 208 (9th Cir. 1979). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the 

opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be 

drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 

810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). 

//

//

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DISCUSSION

The Plaintiffs’ complaints each allege negligence under California common law on three 

theories; negligent failure to take action to limit exposure to Cocci, negligent failure to insure 

safe premises and negligent breach of the relationship between prisoner and jailer. To prove 

negligence under California law, a “plaintiff must show that the defendant had a duty to use due 

care, that he breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the 

resulting injury.” Hayes v. County of San Diego, 57 Cal.4th 622, 629 (2013) (citation and 

internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “Although state law sets out the elements 

required to prove negligence, the standard of care for the BOP is ‘fixed by 18 U.S.C. § 4042, 

independent of [any] inconsistent state rule’ allowing for a local jailor's immunity from suit, or a

lesser duty.” Smith v. U.S., 207 F.Supp.2d 209, 214 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (quoting United States v. 

Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 164-165 (1963)). In pertinent part, section 4042 provides that the Bureau 

of Prisons shall “provide suitable quarters and provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence 

of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States, or held as 

witnesses or otherwise.” 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(2). The standard imposed by section 4042 is one 

of ordinary or reasonable care under the circumstances. Smith, 207 F.Supp.2d at 214. While 

federal statute determines the duty of care owed to an inmate, it is generally the case that state 

law informs an analysis of the contours of questions of duty and breach. See Cohen v. United 

States, 252 F.Supp. 679, 688 (N.D. Georgia 1966) (“the duty owed prisoners under state law is 

persuasive and is of some value as to the standards which ought to be imposed”). The court will 

therefore borrow liberally from its experience with similar claims related to the many state 

correctional facilities located in the Southern San Joaquin County. 

I. Plata and Cocci in State Prisons

Since 2002, the ability of the California prison system to provide constitutionally 

sufficient mental, dental and medical care to its inmates has been a matter of review and, 

eventually, of supervision by federal courts. In terms of medical care, CDCR stipulated to a 

consent decree based on a finding of constitutionally deficient medical care in 2002. CDCR’s 

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inability to implement the consent decree resulted in the placement of medical care in the 

California prison system under a court-appointed receiver in 2006. See Plata v. Brown, 754 F.3d 

1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Plata”) (case appendix providing timeline for various events from 

2001 when the class action was filed to 2013 when the order under review was filed). During 

the period of receivership, Plata has been the judicial vehicle by which a number of 

improvements to medical care in the California prison system, among them control of exposure 

to Coddicioidies immitis, have been pursued. An overview of the development of policies and 

procedures for state prisons pertaining to coccidiomycosis during the time California prisons 

have been in receivership is summarized in Plata v. Brown, 3013WL3200587 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 

(hereinafter, “Plata II”). For purposes of this court’s review of Defendant’s motions for 

summary judgment, the following features of the Plata II stand out as particularly significant.

First, it is important to note that the decision of the receiver to impose or not impose 

additional mitigation strategies to minimize the rate of Cocci infection is driven primarily by the 

extent to which the incidence of coccidiomycosis at a particular prison exceeds the rate of 

infection in the community and/or county in which the prison is located. See id. at *5 (pointing 

out that of eight state prisons located in the Southern San Joaquin Valley, four – Pleasant Valley 

State Prison (“PVSP”), Avenal State Prison (“Avenal”), Wasco State Prison, and Northern Kern 

County State Prison – had rates of coccidiomycosis significantly higher than their surrounding 

communities). Of the four state prisons with higher rates, nearly the entirety of the receiver’s 

attention is directed to the two prisons with the highest rates; PVSP with a cocci rate 52 times 

higher than the surrounding county and Avenal with a rate 10 times higher. Id. It is significant 

to note that the court’s order in Plata II mandating expansion of exclusion criteria to include 

persons of African-American and Filipino descent and persons with diabetes applied only to 

those two prisons.

Second, it is important to note that the attention the receiver of the California Department 

of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) had devoted to the issue of coccidiomycosis in 

Southern San Joaquin Valley prisons has not resulted in any prescriptions or standards regarding 

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environmental mitigation efforts to manage the risk of disease. In particular, the Plata II court 

quoted expert opinion that reported:

“[T]he chance that [environmental abatement] measures would reduce 

cocci risk is marginal at best, and in any event it would take many years to 

determine whether such measures have any value;” [citation] (“. . . .”) 

(“Environmental issues are difficult to address and will require additional 

studies and months to years before additional data are available, and the 

efficacy of any environmental abatement/control effort will be difficult to 

assess.”); [Citation]. 

Plata II, 2013 WL 3200587 at *11 n.17 (citing expert opinions of Dr. Gil Chavez, State 

Epidemiologist, and Dr. John Galgiani, plaintiff’s expert). The only mitigation strategy 

ultimately recommended by the receiver and approved by the court in Plata II was the expansion 

of exclusion criteria and the removal of persons fitting within the expanded exclusion criteria set 

from PSVP and Avenal prisons.

II. Application to Taft CI

In light of the above, there is a single disputed material fact that is essentially 

determinative of the outcome of this case. Defendant’s proffered Undisputed Material Fact # 5

(“UMF”) alleges “there is no evidence that the rate of coccidiomycosis is higher at [Taft CI] than 

in the surrounding areas.” Doc. # 58-2 at 8-9. Plaintiffs dispute Defendant’s UMF # 5 by

referring to exhibits “E,” “F,” “G,” and “H” of the Declaration of Brian Bush in opposition to 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. # 57-4. The court will briefly discuss each of 

these exhibits to assess whether there remains an issue of material fact as to whether conditions 

at Taft constituted a danger of exposure to or acquisition of coccidiomycosis that exceeds or 

exceeded the risk faced by the public generally.

Exhibit “E” is a study titled “Evaluation of an Enhanced Diagnosis and Treatment 

Program for coccidioidomycosis, Kern County, CA.” The report was prepared by Lauren A. 

Burwell, MD, et al. and includes researchers from both Centers for Disease Control, the Federal 

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Bureau of Prisons and Kern County Public Health. The report does not appear to be dated but 

includes demographic data regarding the occurrence of coccidiomycosis from 1999 through a 

portion of 2003. The court’s first observation regarding the content of Exhibit “E” is that it 

makes recommendations regarding the early diagnosis and treatment of Cocci infections but 

makes no observations or recommendations regarding environmental factors either at the prison 

or in the community. 

At the end of Exhibit “E” is a set of tables showing the occurrence of coccidiomycosis 

among Kern County residence, the residents of the community of Taft and among inmates of 

Taft CI. The court notes that the United States Census Bureau lists the population of the town of 

Taft as approximately 9,000 persons during the time period between 1999 and 2003. The 

Federal Bureau of Prisons official website puts the inmate population of Taft Correctional 

Institution Taft CI at slightly over 2,200 inmates. From these facts the court finds that the 

inmate population of Taft CI is 20% of the community of Taft.1 It follows that, if the rate of 

acquisition of clinical cases of Valley Fever is the same for both Taft CI and the community of 

Taft, the number of prisoner cases as a percentage of the total number of cases in the community 

[prisoner cases] divided by [prisoner + community cases] should not be significantly different 

that about 20%. 

The table at the final page of Exhibit “E” presents the total number of cases (community 

+ inmate cases) and number of inmate cases as a percentage of the total number of cases for each 

of the years, 1999 through 2003. In 1999 the inmate cases constituted 11.5% of the total (3 

inmate, 26 total); in 2000 the inmate cases were 30% of the total (6 inmate, 20 total); in 2001 the 

inmate cases were 13.6% of the total (8 inmate, 59 total); in 2002 inmate cases were 17.1% of 

 

1

 Computed as [Inmate Population] divided by [Inmate population] + [Population of City], or; 2200/ 

[2200 + 9000] = 0.196.

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total (7 inmate, 41 Total); and in 2003, the data collected to the date of the report indicate inmate 

cases were 25.8% of the total (32 inmate, 124 total). The court finds that the data presented in 

Plaintiff’s Exhibit “E” fails to show that the rate of Valley Fever was significantly higher at Taft 

CI than in the community of Taft at any time between 1999 and 2003. While the rate in 2000 is 

reported to be 30% of the total number of Valley Fever cases, the court notes that this represents 

an increase of only two cases in the inmate population and thus is likely the result of normal 

variation around an even distribution of cases between the prison population and the population 

of the residents of the community.

Exhibit “F” presents a report that appears to be a supplement to the Burwell Report 

presented in Exhibit “E.” The report is dated September 27, 2005, and includes data concerning 

inmate cases of Valley Fever diagnosed in 2003 and 2004. The report set forth at Exhibit “F” 

shows that the incident of Valley Fever at Taft CI hit a peak of 50 cases in 2003 and that the 

incidence declined the following year to 38 cases. There is no information concerning the 

incidence of Valley Fever in the community of Taft in the report for those two years, so the court 

can draw no conclusion regarding the rates for Taft CI as compared to the community.

Exhibit “G” consists of a letter or email from Dr. Burwell at CDC to persons who the 

court presumes received the email on behalf of Defendant. Plaintiff referenced this email for the 

apparent purpose of supporting the proposition that “[t]here are risk factors in the prison 

population that predisposes them to severe disease.” The court finds that the email that 

comprises Exhibit “G” does not support this proposition. What the email from Dr. Burwell does 

is set forth a series of “hypotheses” which Burwell proposes to research further after consultation 

with the recipients of the email. Among these hypotheses is the one quoted above. There is no 

indication from the email that any of the listed hypotheses – including the one quoted above –

are true. Certainly the fact that the rates of Valley Fever do not differ significantly between the 

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inmate population and the native population tends to counsel caution in adopting the hypothesis 

Plaintiff seeks to support.

Exhibit “H” to the Declaration of Brian Bush is an email correspondence dated May 25, 

2005, that appears to be from a person named Newton Kendig directed to officials at Taft CI. It 

is not clear what connection these individuals have with the litigation, but the court presumes 

that at least the originator and/or some of the addressees are agents or employees of Defendant. 

Basically, the email that comprises Exhibit “H” acknowledges the communications between 

Defendant and CDC and attempts to briefly summarize some of the recommendations from CDC 

and references actions contemplated to be taken in the future. Among other things, the email 

states “[t]he incidence of cocci among inmates was higher among inmates was higher than 

persons in the community but the CDC attributes this to the fact that the inmates transferred to 

the facility were susceptible to the infection whereas many Kern County residents have 

developed host immunity.” Doc. # 57-4 at 65. The court does not know if this statement is the 

result of misreading the same information that is presented in the other exhibits, is a result of 

communications not presented in exhibits, or is simply one person’s interpretation of things read, 

heard or discussed. In any event, the court finds that this single sentence is insufficient to show 

that there is an issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff has shown there was a higher rate of 

coccidiomycosis among inmates at Taft CI than among the population of the community of Taft.

There are two crucial evidentiary deficits that defeat Plaintiff’s claims for negligence. 

The first is the absence of any consensus, legal or otherwise, as to the environmental mitigations 

that are both effective and economically reasonable for the purpose of mitigating the risk of 

exposure to Coccidioidies immitis. It is significant that in the state cases, consultation with both 

the CDC and the state Department of Public Health failed to produce recommendations for 

environmental mitigations. At best, consultation indicated that environmental mitigations might 

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be approached on a trial basis, but determining which, if any, were effective and reasonable 

would me a matter of long term research. In the absence of any clear guidance as to effective 

environmental mitigations, a showing that the efforts being made by Defendant fall below the 

standard of care would require a showing that rates of acquisition of Valley Fever by Taft CI 

inmates are significantly higher than those of the surrounding community. This showing has not 

been made.

Not only have Plaintiffs failed to show that rates of acquisition of Valley Fever were any 

higher in the prison population than in the surrounding community for the years for which data 

were provided, Plaintiffs have alleged nothing regarding the rates of exposure to and acquisition 

of coccidiomycosis in the prison population of Taft CI for any year after 2004. The earliest year 

relevant to this determinative question for any of the Plaintiffs is 2009. Having failed to allege 

anything to show that the rates of exposure to or acquisition of cocciciomycosis were higher in 

the inmate population of Taft CI than in the surrounding community during the time relevant to 

this action, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts necessary to show breach of any duty of care. 

Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment as to each of Plaintiffs’ negligence 

claims.

III. Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply

Plaintiffs moved for leave to file a sur-reply following the filing of an order granting a 

motion for dismissal on the grounds of qualified immunity. Plaintiff contends that Defendant is 

not entitled to qualified immunity because no constitutional claim is at issue. The court agrees. 

Qualified immunity is not relevant to this action.

In accord with the foregoing discussion, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant 

Management and Training Corporation is entitled to summary judgment as to all claims by each 

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of the Plaintiffs. It is therefore hereby ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter 

judgement in favor of Defendant in each of the above-captioned cases:

Aluya v. Management & Training Corp. 13cv1345

Hammond v. Management & Training Corp. 13cv1209

Sutton v. Management & Training Corp 13cv1344

The Clerk of the Court shall CLOSE each of the above-listed cases.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 10, 2015 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-01209-AWI-JLT Document 69 Filed 07/13/15 Page 14 of 14