Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03031/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03031-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HARVEY BLIGHT,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-15-3031 EMC

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Harvey Blight, proceeding pro se, initiated this lawsuit in June 2015. His case was

initially before Judge Westmore. Judge Westmore granted Mr. Blight’s application to proceed in

forma pauperis but dismissed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), explaining that “[i]t is

impossible to discern from Plaintiff’s complaint any of the essential details of the events that

triggered this lawsuit, or the legal theories under which he seeks relief.” Docket No. 9 (Order at 1). 

She also noted that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine could be a bar to Mr. Blight’s suit as, based on

other filings in the record, Mr. Blight seemed to be “attempting to appeal rulings in a state court

case.” Docket No. 9 (Order at 2). Judge Westmore gave Mr. Blight leave to amend. 

Mr. Blight subsequently filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”). Pursuant to a second §

1915(e) review, Judge Westmore dismissed the FAC because the pleading contained the same

deficiencies as the original complaint. See Docket No. 16 (order). As before, however, Judge

Westmore gave Mr. Blight leave to amend. Judge Westmore also referred Mr. Blight to resources

such as the Pro Se Handbook and the Federal Pro Bono Project’s Help Desk.

Case 3:15-cv-03031-EMC Document 22 Filed 09/22/15 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Mr. Blight filed a response to Judge Westmore’s order on September 8, 2015, which this

Court construes as a second amended complaint (“SAC”). In the SAC, Mr. Blight declined to

consent to the jurisdiction of Judge Westmore and thus the case was reassigned to the undersigned. 

At present, the obligation of this Court is to review Mr Blight’s SAC pursuant to § 1915(e) – i.e., to

determine whether the litigation of the case should continue.

Having reviewed the SAC, the Court has the same concerns as did Judge Westmore. More

specifically, the SAC as pled is confusing and difficult to understand. The most that the Court can

discern from the pleading is that Mr. Blight is unhappy with the decisions of the state courts in

several state court proceedings – for example, that they did not give him sufficient time to make

filings and that they declared him a vexatious litigant. It appears that Mr. Blight does seek relief

from this Court with respect to the state court orders.

That being the case, Mr. Blight’s SAC must be dismissed for several reasons. First, to the

extent Mr. Blight seeks relief against the state courts, Eleventh Amendment immunity applies. See

Blount v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 559 Fed. Appx. 623, 623 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that

“[d]ismissal of Blount’s claims against the Sacramento County Superior Court was proper because

the court is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment”). Second, to the extent Mr. Blight

seeks monetary relief against the state court judges, Eleventh Amendment immunity applies if they

are sued in their official capacities, see Mohiuddin v. Higa, No. CV 14-3454-DDP(CW), 2015 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 60134, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2015) (stating that “[s]uperior court judges are officers

of the superior court, and state officers named in an official capacity are also immune under the

Eleventh Amendment from suits for damages in federal court”), and judicial immunity if they are

sued in their individual capacities. Id. (stating that “[j]udges, named in an individual capacity, are

absolutely immune from suit for acts performed in a judicial capacity”). Third, to the extent Mr.

Blight seeks injunctive relief against the state court judges, Eleventh Amendment immunity may not

be a bar, but see Hiramanek v. Clark, No. C-13-0228 EMC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101450, at *24

(N.D. Cal. July 19, 2013) (noting that “the Ex Parte Young doctrine applies only where prospective

injunctive or declaratory relief is sought,” but, “[h]ere, at least some of the injunctive or declaratory

relief sought in Plaintiffs’ complaint seem to be for the purpose of addressing past harm, not present

Case 3:15-cv-03031-EMC Document 22 Filed 09/22/15 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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or future harm”), but 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. No such

showing was made here. Fourth, because Mr. Blight seems to be asking for relief from state court

orders, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a bar. See Hiramanek, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101450 , at

*19-20 (stating that, “[a]lthough, in the case at bar, Plaintiffs are seeking damages, the critical point

is that they are also seeking in effect to get relief from the state court rulings, and thus RookerFeldman is an obstacle”). Finally, on the merits, the Ninth Circuit has upheld California’s vexatious

litigant statute against a constitutional challenge. See generally Wolfe v. George, 486 F.3d 1120 (9th

Cir. 2007). But see Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting

that “[c]ourts should not enter pre-filing orders with undue haste because such sanctions can tread

on a litigant’s due process right of access to the courts”).

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Mr. Blight’s SAC. Because Mr. Blight has been given

multiple opportunities to amend his pleadings but has still failed to state a claim for relief, the Court

dismisses the SAC with prejudice (i.e., Mr. Blight does not have leave to amend). 

The Clerk of the Court is instructed to enter judgment in accordance with this opinion and

close the file in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 22, 2015

_________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

Case 3:15-cv-03031-EMC Document 22 Filed 09/22/15 Page 3 of 3