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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

DENNIS MUNDT, individually and as 

next friend and parent of D.J.M., a minor 

child, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CAMILLE GADZIALA; JOI JOHNSON, 

in their individual capacity, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 24-1041 

(D.C. No. 1:23-CV-00051-CNS-SKC) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, KELLY, and EID, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Dennis Mundt claimed two Douglas County, Colorado Department of Human 

Services (“DHS”) caseworkers, Camille Gadziala and Joi Johnson, violated his 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by knowingly removing his fourteen-yearold child, D.J.M., from his care based on false and unsupported allegations and then 

failing to meet with him afterwards. The district court dismissed the action under 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 12, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), ruling that Johnson was entitled to absolute 

immunity and Gadziala was entitled to qualified immunity. 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse and remand for 

further proceedings. The district court improperly credited as true the contents of 

exhibits attached to the motion to dismiss, including factual assertions that are 

inconsistent with the allegations in the complaint. Because the district court’s 

incorrect factual assessment permeated its qualified immunity analysis, we remand 

for reconsideration of Mundt’s claims against Gadziala’s assertion of qualified 

immunity based on Gadziala’s conduct as alleged in the complaint. The district 

court’s grant of absolute immunity to Johnson does not suffer from the same error in 

crediting the exhibits, but the ruling is unsupported by the allegations in the 

complaint. Consequently, we remand for the district court to reconsider Mundt’s 

claims against Johnson as well and her alternative request for qualified immunity. 

I 

A. Factual Allegations in the Complaint 

1. Allegations Concerning Gadziala 

Because this case comes to us on appeal from a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), 

we must accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Those allegations indicate that Mundt 

shared equal parenting time of his son, D.J.M., with D.J.M.’s mother, Debra 

Hennesy, but Hennesy had sole medical decision-making authority. 

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In November 2020, D.J.M.’s middle school reported concerns to DHS about 

D.J.M.’s ability to participate in strenuous activities and Hennesy’s failure to address 

those concerns. Two months later, Gadziala obtained D.J.M.’s medical records from 

Rocky Mountain Pediatric Cardiology. The medical records confirmed D.J.M. had 

been diagnosed with chest pain and tachycardia or dysrhythmia. 

On January 5, 2021, Gadziala received an email from Hennesy accusing Mundt 

of having Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy, a disorder where a caretaker inflicts 

physical harm on another person to gain sympathy from medical providers, see Roska 

ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1238 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2003). Apparently 

under the parenting plan then in effect, Mundt was restricted to attending one 

appointment annually with each of D.J.M.’s medical providers. Hennesy reported to 

Gadziala that Mundt had recently participated in several unauthorized appointments 

with D.J.M. and may have given D.J.M. amphetamines or marijuana to induce 

symptoms. 

Gadziala immediately contacted a nurse at D.J.M.’s pediatrician’s office, who 

confirmed Mundt was restricted to one appointment per year with D.J.M.’s providers. 

But according to the nurse, Mundt was still “in his limitations,” Aplt. App. at 7, ¶ 18 

(bolding and internal quotation marks omitted). According to the complaint, the 

nurse’s statement meant that Mundt had not exceeded his authority to attend one 

appointment per year with each of D.J.M.’s medical providers. 

The next day, January 6, Hennesy contacted the police, claiming Mundt was 

medically abusing D.J.M. An officer went to Mundt’s home to conduct a welfare 

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check and “met extensively with both” Mundt and D.J.M. Id. at 9, ¶ 28 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The officer observed that D.J.M. “seemed to be in good 

spirits and had all of his schoolwork complete. The residence was clean and 

organized.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Concluding there were no safety 

concerns for D.J.M., the officer left the residence and memorialized his observations 

in a police incident report (“Police Report”). 

Despite the officer’s conclusion that there were no safety concerns, Gadziala 

petitioned a state court for an ex parte emergency order to remove D.J.M. from 

Mundt’s care and place him with Hennesy. Mundt alleged Gadziala had no basis for 

seeking to remove D.J.M. because she knew from the only evidence she had—the 

nurse’s statement that Mundt was still “in his limitations” and the records from 

Rocky Mountain Pediatric Cardiology confirming D.J.M.’s cardiac condition—that 

Hennesy’s allegations were false. See id. at 12, ¶ 33. According to Mundt, the 

medical records from Rocky Mountain Pediatric Cardiology “utterly contradict the 

medical neglect or abuse [claims] Ms. Hennesy made about” him and provided no 

basis for removing D.J.M. Id. at 8, ¶ 22. 

Nevertheless, the state court granted the petition and ordered D.J.M. removed 

from Mundt. Mundt alleged that seven specific findings in the state court’s removal 

order were attributable to Gadziala and inconsistent with or unsupported by the 

evidence she had obtained. But Gadziala and two officers went to Mundt’s residence 

and forcibly removed D.J.M. Citing footage from body cameras worn by the two 

officers, Mundt alleged that during the removal, D.J.M. repeatedly told Gadziala that 

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he felt safer with Mundt than with Hennesy and that Hennesy had previously made 

false accusations about Mundt. Gadziala replied to D.J.M. that he was “stalling” and 

would “have to roll with the punches.” Id. at 14, ¶¶ 39, 40 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

On January 7, DHS petitioned for temporary custody of D.J.M. based on a 

supporting affidavit filed by Gadziala (“Gadziala Affidavit”). Mundt challenged the 

veracity of the Gadziala Affidavit as unsupported or contradicted by the evidence. 

He also alleged the Gadziala Affidavit included information from a Parental 

Responsibility Evaluation (“PRE”) that discredited him but omitted information from 

the PRE that discredited Hennesy. He quoted excerpts from the PRE indicating 

Hennesy “exhibits habitual manipulation of others[,]” “a careless disregard for their 

rights,” and “a somewhat undisciplined imagination that takes liberties with objective 

reality.” Id. at 16, ¶ 44 (internal quotation marks omitted). He averred the PRE 

revealed “major if not fatal issues with Ms. Hennesy’s credibility, but . . . Gadziala 

failed to take these [credibility] issues . . . into consideration when completing her 

investigation.” Aplt. App. at 16, ¶ 47. Mundt alleged that based on the Gadziala 

Affidavit, he was ordered to have no contact with D.J.M., whom he lost the ability to 

parent. 

Following D.J.M.’s removal, Gadziala continued her investigation. She spoke 

again with the pediatric nurse, as well as with the nurse’s supervising pediatrician, 

both of whom indicated no new referrals were made during a recent appointment. 

The pediatrician also noted that D.J.M. had gained 21 pounds in four months while in 

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Mundt’s custody, which corroborated Mundt’s concern that D.J.M. was malnourished 

in Hennesy’s custody. Another provider indicated that any proposed change to 

D.J.M.’s medication was made by the provider, not Mundt. And D.J.M. underwent a 

hair follicle test that was negative for drugs. 

Mundt alleged that all of this new information should have been obtained by 

Gadziala before she petitioned for D.J.M.’s removal. He pointed out that the nurse 

had no concerns with his involvement in D.J.M.’s care, the providers indicated at 

least three times that no new referrals were made at Mundt’s request, and the records 

from Rocky Mountain Pediatric Cardiology confirmed D.J.M.’s condition and refuted 

Hennesy’s allegations that he was abusing D.J.M. Yet Gadziala failed to correct her 

false statements upon which the state court had relied in ordering D.J.M.’s removal. 

She also failed to notify the state court of D.J.M.’s negative hair follicle test. 

2. Allegations Concerning Johnson 

According to the complaint, Johnson was a “permanency” caseworker who 

was required by law to meet with Mundt at least once a month but never did. Id. at 

23, ¶ 88. Mundt averred that Johnson’s failure to meet with him prolonged D.J.M.’s 

separation. 

As a result of Gadziala and Johnson’s conduct, Mundt had no contact with 

D.J.M. for three months, and it was ten months before he regained equal, albeit 

supervised, parenting time. DHS’s dependency and neglect case eventually was 

dismissed, Hennesy left the state of Colorado, and Mundt now has full custody and 

decision-making authority over D.J.M. 

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3. Allegations Concerning Documents Referenced in the Complaint 

As indicated above, the complaint referenced several documents, including the 

Police Report, the state court’s emergency removal order, and the Gadziala Affidavit. 

Of those documents, however, Mundt endorsed only the Police Report. He alleged it 

contradicted many of Hennesy’s accusations, including her allegation that he gave 

D.J.M. amphetamines and marijuana, which was a significant reason for removing 

D.J.M. He also quoted the police officer’s observations that D.J.M. “seemed to be in 

good spirits and had all of his schoolwork complete. The residence was clean and 

organized.” Id. at 9, ¶ 28 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Mundt directly challenged the state court’s removal order and the Gadziala 

Affidavit. He quoted the seven specific findings in the state court’s removal order 

and the four specific statements in the Gadziala Affidavit, all of which he alleged 

were unsupported or refuted by the evidence. Mundt did not attach these or any other 

documents to the complaint, nor did he incorporate any document wholesale by 

reference. 

B. Procedural History 

Based on the foregoing allegations, Mundt claimed Gadziala violated his 

Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully seizing D.J.M., and both Gadziala and 

Johnson violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive and procedural due 

process by interfering in his right of familial association with D.J.M.1

 

1

 Mundt disavowed a Fourth Amendment claim against Johnson in his 

response to the motion to dismiss. See Aplt. App. at 72. 

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Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), attaching as exhibits the 

Police Report, the state court’s removal order, and the Gadziala Affidavit. They 

argued the district court could consider these exhibits without converting the motion 

into one for summary judgment because the documents were referenced in the 

complaint and central to Mundt’s claims. Id. at 37 n.1. And relying on information 

contained in those exhibits, they argued Mundt failed to state a claim for relief. 

The district court accepted defendants’ arguments and dismissed the action. 

As explained below, the court relied on defendants’ exhibits to hold Gadziala was 

entitled to qualified immunity. And it held Johnson’s alleged status as a permanency 

caseworker indicated her function was close to the state judicial process, which 

entitled her to absolute immunity. 

II 

A. Standard of Review. 

“We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo.” Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d 

1183, 1191 (10th Cir. 2014). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the 

complaint must contain allegations of fact, accepted as true, “to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “An allegation is 

conclusory where it states an inference without stating underlying facts or is devoid 

of any factual enhancement.” Clinton v. Sec. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 63 F.4th 1264, 

1275 (10th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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“At the motion-to-dismiss stage, we must accept all the well-pleaded 

allegations of the complaint as true and must construe them in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff.” Thomas, 765 F.3d at 1190. A defendant’s assertion of 

absolute or qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage subjects the defendant 

to a more demanding standard than that which governs at summary judgment because 

on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the availability of absolute or qualified immunity turns on 

the facts “as alleged in the complaint.” Id. at 1194 (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see id. at 1192-93 (evaluating availability of absolute immunity based on 

the allegations in the complaint); Bledsoe v. Vanderbilt, 934 F.3d 1112, 1114 & n.1, 

1118 (10th Cir. 2019) (same). 

B. Reliance on Documents Outside the Complaint 

Mundt challenges the district court’s consideration of the three exhibits 

attached to the motion to dismiss—the Police Report, the state court’s removal order, 

and the Gadziala Affidavit. He says the district court could review these exhibits, but 

the court erred in “weighing what it considered to be conflicting evidence between 

the Complaint and the exhibits, eventually holding that the exhibits were more 

probative.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 16. 

Defendants respond by characterizing Mundt’s allegations as conclusory, 

particularly his allegation that the findings and statements in the state court’s removal 

order and the Gadziala Affidavit were false. Defendants point out the district court is 

not required to credit conclusory allegations and they were entitled to attach the 

exhibits to their motion to dismiss. Yet they also describe the content of the exhibits 

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as “inconvenient probative evidence,” Aplee. Br. at 14, which they assert prevails 

over the inconsistent allegations in the complaint. And although they acknowledge 

the district court “expressed skepticism” with Mundt’s allegations, they argue the 

district court “nevertheless presumed the truth of the allegations,” id. at 15.2

 

Defendants misapprehend the proper analytical framework for evaluating the 

exhibits attached to their motion. “The court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is 

not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess 

whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which 

relief may be granted.” Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Generally, a court considers only the contents of 

the complaint when ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, but exceptions to this general rule 

include . . . documents incorporated by reference in the complaint[ and] documents 

referred to in and central to the complaint, when no party disputes its authenticity[.]” 

Clinton, 63 F.4th at 1275 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]f . . . 

the document is referred to in the complaint and is central to the plaintiff’s claim, a 

defendant may submit an indisputably authentic copy to the court to be considered on 

a motion to dismiss.” Berneike v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 708 F.3d 1141, 1146 (10th Cir. 

2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, defendants were entitled to 

2

 We are not so sure the district court was merely skeptical of Mundt’s 

allegations. The complaint challenged eleven findings and statements in the state 

court’s removal order and the Gadziala Affidavit. The district court rejected Mundt’s 

allegations challenging them by overlooking other allegations in the complaint and 

crediting the exhibits. 

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attach the exhibits to their motion to dismiss because the documents were referenced 

in the complaint and their authenticity is undisputed. Defendants are incorrect, 

however, to the extent they contend the contents of the exhibits prevail over the 

allegations in the complaint. 

 Generally, “if there is a conflict between the allegations in the complaint and 

the content of the attached exhibit, the exhibit controls.” Brokers’ Choice of Am., 

Inc., v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1105 (10th Cir. 2017); see Clinton, 

63 F.4th at 1275 (recognizing the court “need not accept . . . allegations plainly 

contradicted by properly considered documents or exhibits”); Goines v. Valley Cmty. 

Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 2016) (same). Importantly, however, this 

rule typically applies only to a document that qualifies as a “written instrument,” 

which is “a legal document that defines rights, duties, entitlements, or liabilities, 

such as a statute, contract, will, promissory note, or share certificate.” Smith v. 

Hogan, 794 F.3d 249, 254 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); see

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading 

is a part of the pleading for all purposes.” (emphasis added)); 5A Charles Alan 

Wright, Arthur R. Miller & A. Benjamin Spencer, Federal Practice & Procedure

§ 1327 (4th ed. June 2024 Update) (“Wright & Miller”) (explaining that “certain 

documents and other material attached to a pleading that, strictly speaking, [do] not 

qualify as a ‘written instrument’ . . . [do] not fall within the meaning of the language 

in Rule 10(c)”); cf. Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941-42 (10th Cir. 

2002) (holding in a copyright action that “[w]hen a district court considers the 

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original work and the allegedly copyrighted work in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, 

the legal effect of the works are determined by the works themselves rather than by 

allegations in the complaint”). 

Neither the Police Report nor the Gadziala Affidavit constituted a written 

instrument for purposes of ruling on the motion to dismiss. See Goines, 822 F.3d 

at 168 (concluding district court erred in accepting as true the factual statements in a 

police incident report, which the court should have treated as “a document prepared 

by [an officer] . . . representing the [o]fficers’ view of events, not a document 

representing the true facts”); Smith, 794 F.3d at 254 (observing that affidavits are not 

“written instruments” and refusing to credit a party’s affidavit that was merely “a 

personal, narrative summary of his experiences”); see also Fin. Acquisition Partners 

LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 285-86 (5th Cir. 2006) (concluding district court did 

not abuse its discretion in refusing to credit opinions and conclusions in an affidavit); 

Wright & Miller, § 1327 n.2 (collecting cases that refuse to credit affidavits and other 

evidentiary materials as “written instruments”). Similarly, the state court’s removal 

order does not define any legal rights or duties; it instead described D.J.M.’s 

circumstances based on “the statements of Caseworker Camille Gadziala, and having 

reviewed all available information.” Aplt. App. at 56. The order is authentic but its 

content is hearsay. See Johnson v. Spencer, 950 F.3d 680, 705 (10th Cir. 2020). 

Such “documents may only be considered to show their contents, not to prove the 

truth of matters asserted therein.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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Additionally, before treating the content of any documents as true, the district 

court should have considered the nature of those documents and why the complaint 

referenced them. See Goines, 822 F.3d at 167 (“[I]n cases where the plaintiff 

attaches or incorporates a document for purposes other than the truthfulness of the 

document, it is inappropriate to treat the contents of that document as true.”). Indeed, 

“[a]nimating the exhibit-prevails rule is the presumption that the plaintiff, by basing 

his claim on the attached document, has adopted as true the contents of that 

document.” Id. But the opposite is true here. Mundt did not attach any documents 

to his complaint. And although he referenced several documents, he endorsed only 

the Police Report. He directly challenged the accuracy and veracity of the state 

court’s removal order and the Gadziala Affidavit. See id. (observing that a plaintiff 

need not adopt every word within an exhibit as true, otherwise “a libel plaintiff 

would plead himself out of court simply by attaching the libelous writing to his 

complaint”). Thus, defendants incorrectly asserted in their motion that the exhibits 

were “central” to Mundt’s claims; they were not. Aplt. App. at 37 n.1. Notably, 

defendants did not attach other material that might have undermined their arguments, 

particularly the medical records from Rocky Mountain Pediatric Cardiology, the 

PRE, or footage from body cameras worn by the officers during the removal, all of 

which Mundt also referenced in the complaint. This underscores how improper 

consideration of evidentiary material on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion can “blur the 

distinction between summary judgment and dismissal for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief could be granted.” Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 339 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989). 

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Given Mundt’s challenge to the state court’s removal order and the Gadziala 

Affidavit, the district court should not have credited the content of those exhibits 

over the allegations in the complaint. 

C. The Foundational Error Warrants Remand 

1. Gadziala—Qualified Immunity 

With respect to the claims against Gadziala, we would typically review the 

district court’s qualified immunity analysis de novo. Roska, 328 F.3d at 1239. But 

our review is hampered because the district court did not delineate the salient facts 

and inferences solely from the complaint, and defendants have embraced the district 

court’s flawed factual assessment. Although they defend that assessment by 

expending a considerable portion of their brief disputing Mundt’s allegations, see 

Aplee. Br. at 30-40, such arguments are inappropriate at the pleading stage, see

Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098. We could undertake the qualified immunity analysis 

ourselves, but because defendants’ briefing is not predicated on the relevant 

allegations, and the district court did not parse the complaint for well-pleaded facts 

and inferences, we think the better approach is to remand to the district court for 

reevaluation of Mundt’s claims and Gadziala’s assertion of qualified immunity based 

solely on the allegations in the complaint. 

2. Johnson—Absolute Immunity 

As for the claims against Johnson, we review de novo the district court’s grant 

of absolute immunity. Malik v. Arapahoe Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 191 F.3d 1306, 

1313 (10th Cir. 1999). “Absolute immunity offers certain government officials total 

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protection from a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Thomas, 765 F.3d at 

1191. “In determining whether particular acts of government officials are eligible for 

absolute immunity, we apply a functional approach which looks to the nature of the 

function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Malik, 191 F.3d 

at 1314 (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). “In limited circumstances, 

absolute immunity is . . . available to . . . government officials who perform functions 

closely associated with the judicial process.” Thomas, 765 F.3d at 1191 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Generally, though, “child welfare workers investigating 

claims of child abuse are analogous to law enforcement officers who are entitled only 

to qualified immunity.” Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 691 (10th Cir. 1990). 

The district court determined Johnson was entitled to absolute immunity 

because her function as a permanency caseworker was close to the judicial process. 

The district court reasoned that a state statute cited in the motion to dismiss required 

the state court to advance the child-separation case toward permanent placement 

goals. The district court also observed that a state regulation cited in the motion to 

dismiss required “case contacts . . . to assure child safety and well-being” during the 

permanent placement process. Aplt. App. at 98. The district court inferred from the 

statute, the regulation, and Johnson’s alleged status as a permanency caseworker that 

she was acting on behalf of the state court to advance its permanency goals and 

therefore was entitled to absolute immunity. 

These inferences are too attenuated to warrant absolute immunity. The 

complaint did not allege Johnson was acting at the direction of the state court; it 

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alleged she was a permanency caseworker who failed to meet with Mundt as required 

by law.3

 Johnson’s alleged status as a permanency caseworker does not, by itself, 

establish that her function was close or integral to the state judicial process absent 

some allegation that she actually acted at the direction of the court. See Snell, 

920 F.2d at 689 (“An important prerequisite of absolute immunity in this context is 

that the defendant social worker act as an actual functionary of the court, not only in 

status or denomination but in reality.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). There are 

no allegations that she acted in a ministerial function to execute a judicial order. See 

Malik, 191 F.3d at 1313. And the complaint’s allegation that she failed to meet with 

Mundt as required by law suggests she neglected a legislative mandate, not a judicial 

directive. Because these allegations do not indicate that Johnson functioned close to 

the state judicial process, there was no basis for extending absolute immunity to her. 

Although Johnson alternatively requests qualified immunity on Mundt’s 

Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process claims, the district 

court did not consider those issues. Consequently, we remand to the district court to 

reevaluate Mundt’s claims and the availability of qualified immunity for Johnson. 

3

 Defendants mischaracterize Mundt’s argument on this score. They suggest 

he denies that he alleged Johnson was a “permanency caseworker.” Aplee. Br. at 19 

(citing Aplt. Opening Br. at 29). But Mundt does not deny he alleged Johnson was a 

permanency caseworker; he challenges the district court’s determination that she 

“was a court-appointed” permanency caseworker. Aplt. Opening Br. at 23 (emphasis 

added). 

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III 

 The district court’s judgment is reversed, and this case is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this Order and Judgment. Defendants’ notice of 

substitution of counsel, which is construed as a motion for substitution of counsel, is 

granted. 

Entered for the Court 

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

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