Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00825/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00825-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARLETTE GILBERT,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-0825 DAD

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, ORDER

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff brought this action seeking judicial review of a final administrative

decision denying her claims for Social Security disability insurance benefits and Supplemental

Security Income. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). By previous order of the court, the decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying benefits was reversed and this

matter was remanded for an award of benefits. Counsel for plaintiff has now filed a petition for

attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).

Counsel for plaintiff seeks an award of $8,828.59. The petition claims 54.45

hours of attorney time. Attorney fees under EAJA are set at the market rate but capped at

$125.00 per hour. See Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 987 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(2)(A)). However, an increase is allowed to adjust for “cost of living” inflation, which is

calculated by multiplying the $125 statutory rate by the annual average consumer price index

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figure for all urban consumers ("CPI-U") for the years in which the fees were earned. Thangaraja

v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 877 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1148-

49 (9th Cir. 2001)). Based on these calculations, the rate for services provided in 2006 is

$161.85, and $163.75 for services rendered in 2007. Id. 

Defendant does not dispute plaintiff’s rate calculations, that plaintiff was the

prevailing party in this case, nor that plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees. 

Rather, defendant opposes the petition on the ground that the amount of time claimed is

excessive, reflecting unnecessary efforts and clerical work that should have been delegated to a

non-attorney, and inflated billing for review of the record and drafting plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment. Defendant urges the court to reduce Attorney Bess Brewer’s time by 17.75

hours, resulting in $2,872.83 reduction in fees. 

The EAJA provides that “a court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and

other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United

States . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). See also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002). “Fees and

other expenses” include “reasonable attorney fees.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). “The statute

explicitly permits the court, in its discretion, to reduce the amount awarded to the prevailing

party to the extent that the party ‘unduly and unreasonably protracted’ the final resolution of the

case.” Atkins, 154 F.3d at 987 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(C), 2412(d)(2)(D)). The

prevailing party must apply for attorney fees within thirty days of the final judgment in the

action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).

A party who obtains a remand for an award of benefits further proceedings in a

social security case is clearly a prevailing party for purposes of the EAJA. Gutierrez v. Barnhart,

274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001) (“An applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing

party for the purposes of the EAJA if the denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded

regardless of whether disability benefits ultimately are awarded.”); see also Shalala v. Schaefer,

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509 U.S. 292, 296-302 (1993). Accordingly, it is undisputed that plaintiff is a “prevailing party”

in this case, and defendant does not contend that the position of the Commissioner was

“substantially justified.” 

With regard to defendant’s argument that the hours claimed are unreasonable, the

EAJA expressly provides for an award of “reasonable” attorney fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)A). 

However, it has been said that “there is more to deciding what is a ‘reasonable’ fee than

calculating a reasonable expenditure of hours times a reasonable rate.” Atkins, 154 F.3d at 989

(citing Hensley v. Eckhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983)). The court must also consider “‘the relationship

between the amount of the fee awarded and the results obtained.’” Id. (quoting Hensley, 461

U.S. at 437.)

Here, plaintiff’s counsel secured a remand for award of benefits. Defendant

argues that the claimed 54.45 hours of attorney time is excessive. The undersigned declines to

conduct a line-by-line analysis of counsel’s billing entries. See, e.g., McDannel v. Apfel, 78 F.

Supp. 2d 944, 954 (S.D. Iowa 1999); Stewart v. Sullivan, 810 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (D. Haw.

1993). However, having carefully reviewed the pending motion, the court finds the claimed

54.45 hours of attorney time to be a reasonable amount of time expended on this matter. The

court notes that counsel did not represent plaintiff at the administrative level and had to become

familiar with the case, which included a 375-page administrative transcript. It is clear that

plaintiff’s counsel paid close attention in reviewing the record, as evidenced by the nineteen page

summary set forth in the opening brief filed on plaintiff’s behalf. The court finds unpersuasive

defendant’s argument that counsel’s billing of 8.75 hours for reviewing and marking the

transcript, as well as identifying issues and outlining the brief is excessive. The court further

finds that the time plaintiff’s counsel spent on drafting, editing and finalizing the motion for

summary judgment, 32.25 hours, to be reasonable and not excessive. The court addressed each

of plaintiff’s proffered arguments, and found them all to be compelling in justifying a remand for

an award of benefits. The court also appreciates that social security cases are often fact-intensive

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and recognizes the successful result obtained by counsel. Finally, defendant’s argument that the

1.75 hours billed for “intake” was excessive is equally unavailing. Plaintiff’s counsel spent this

time discussing the referral with the attorney who represented plaintiff at the administrative level,

speaking with plaintiff and answering her questions, including those related to the retainer

agreement. Further, the 1.75 hours for drafting the complaint and completing plaintiff’s in forma

pauperis (“ifp”) application was not excessive, and was not work that should have been

completed by clerical staff, as defendant contends. Drafting of pleadings and review of

supporting documents to be filed with the court is compensable attorney work. Plaintiff’s

counsel avers that she exercises reasonable billing judgment and has excluded time from her

EAJA petition that would be inappropriate to bill a client, such as copying. See Declaration of

Bess Brewer, at ¶ 4, 5; Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, at 2:1-16. In reviewing the transcript, counsel’s

extensive briefing on the motion for summary judgment, the order remanding for an award of

benefits, and the time expended on tasks as set forth in counsel’s schedule of hours, the court

finds the hours claimed by plaintiff’s counsel to be reasonable. Therefore, counsel for plaintiff is

entitled to an EAJA fees award in the amount requested.

The court will grant the motion for attorney fees under EAJA and counsel for

plaintiff will be awarded a total EAJA award of $8,828.59.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s petition for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d), is granted; and

2. Counsel for plaintiff is awarded $8,828.59 in attorney fees.

DATED: December 17, 2007.

DAD:mb

gilbert0825.attyfees.EAJA

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