Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00008/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00008-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MARIA HARRIS, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

COCHISE COUNTY, 

Defendant. 

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 No. CIV 08-008-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine Re: Dr. Leon’s Untimely

Affidavit and Opinions [Doc. # 174], Defendant’s Motion in Limine Re: Damages [Doc. #

175], and Defendant’s Motion in Limine Re: Spousal Communications [Doc. # 176].

Responses and Replies have been filed and, on May 13, 2010, the parties presented oral

argument.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine # 2, RE: Dr. Leon’s Untimely Affidavit and Opinion RE:

Gerd/Acid Reflux Disease

Defendant Cochise County (“the County”) has indicated in the Joint Pretrial Order

that it will present Dr. Robert G. Leon (“Dr. Leon”) and the opinions in his affidavit,

including those regarding GERD and/or acid reflux disease at trial. Plaintiffs Maria Harris

(“Harris”) and Dr. Glenn Harris (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) assert that Harris’s medical

records regarding the medical condition at issue were disclosed early in the case. Plaintiffs

point out that the deadline for Cochise County to disclose expert testimony was August 9,

Case 4:08-cv-00008-CKJ Document 188 Filed 07/02/10 Page 1 of 13
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The deadline for written discovery was August 27, 2008. Doc. # 16. The deadline

for rebuttal expert witness testimony and the completion of discovery was September 30,

2008. Doc. # 16.

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2008.1 In compliance with the deadline, Cochise County disclosed Dr. Leon, a

gastroenterologist, to testify in accordance with his August 5, 2008, report. Dr. Leon

indicates in his report that he has reviewed, among other things, Harris’s medical records

from both Dr. Jaya Maddur (“Dr. Maddur”) and Dr. James Buttke. Plaintiffs assert that Dr.

Leon’s report discusses only peptic ulcer disease, and how purported stress aggravated “Mrs.

Harris’ peptic symptomology” and how “he has never written a medical excuse for a patient

to miss work for over 1 month because of peptic symptomology.” Motion, Ex. C. Plaintiffs

assert that Dr. Leon’s report does not make any mention of GERD or acid reflux disease and

does not indicate that Dr. Leon would be offering any opinions regarding the relationship

between stress and GERD/acid reflux disease. Plaintiffs further assert that the County’s

disclosure statement makes no reference in its disclosure of Dr. Leon that he would be

offering opinions regarding acid reflux disease or GERD or any relationship between stress

and GERD/acid reflux disease. Plaintiffs also assert that they subpoenaed records from Dr.

Leon, and that none of the records produced pursuant to Dr. Leon’s subpoena mentioned

GERD or acid reflux disease, or any opinions regarding GERD or acid reflux disease.

Motion, Ex. D.

Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that the County did not supplement Dr. Leon’s expert

opinions before the written discovery deadline or supplement his opinions in any way that

would have put Plaintiffs on notice that Dr. Leon also planned to provide opinions regarding

GERD or acid reflux disease. Plaintiffs assert that the County attached to its motion for

summary judgment an affidavit from Dr. Leon that included opinions regarding GERD and

acid reflux disease. Plaintiffs point out that the affidavit was signed on December 9, 2008,

more than eight weeks after the close of discovery and due date for expert rebuttal testimony.

Motion, Ex. E, Affidavit.

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The County asserts, however, that the Amended Complaint makes reference to

Harris’s stomach condition, referring to “stomach ulcers” caused by “plyori bacterial

stomach infection” and/or “bacterial infection.” Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 8, 9, and 14.

Further, the County points out that Plaintiffs alleged that Brian Oertel defamed and/or

portrayed Plaintiff in a false light by claiming that her stomach condition was “stressrelated.” Id. at ¶¶ 13, 27 and 35. The County asserts that its Rule 26(a)(2) expert disclosure

named Dr. Leon as a witness to testify that, in fact, Plaintiff’s peptic condition was

stress-related. The County asserts that Dr. Leon’s August 5, 2008, report does not

distinguish Harris’s peptic disease as being either an acid reflux disease or a peptic ulcer

disease related to bacterial infection, but merely describes his report as being based on a

number of documents, including the medical records of Harris’s physician Dr. Maddur. The

County asserts that, on August 26, 2008, Dr. Maddur testified that Harris’s peptic condition

includes both a history of peptic ulcers from bacterial infection and his own treatment of her

for acid reflux disease in the August to September 2005 timeframe. Additionally, in his

December 9, 2008, affidavit, Dr. Leon described peptic disease as including both peptic ulcer

disease and acid reflux disease and states that stress is related to the aggravation of both

forms of peptic disease.

Plaintiffs assert that the County had an affirmative obligation to disclose Dr. Leon and

all of his opinions to be presented at trial by the expert disclosure deadline. The County does

not disagree with this assertion, but asserts, however, that Dr. Leon timely disclosed opinion

was that Harris’s peptic symptomology and/or peptic disease was stress related and that, in

his August 5, 2008, Report, Dr. Leon did not limit his opinion to either peptic ulcer disease

or acid reflux disease. Further, the report indicates that it is based on Dr. Maddur’s

documentation which includes both a history of peptic ulcer disease and the presence of acid

reflux disease. Therefore, the County asserts that Dr. Leon’s opinions regarding both forms

of peptic illness are timely and supported by the record and, ultimately, are the same - that

both forms of peptic illness are stress-related.

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The County does not respond to this argument.

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The County points out that the reason for expert disclosure is “to provide opposing

parties reasonable opportunity to prepare for effective cross examination and perhaps arrange

for expert testimony from other witnesses.” Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir.

2008). The County asserts that Dr. Leon’s report sufficiently permits Plaintiffs a reasonable

opportunity to understand the opinions and bases of the opinions, prepare for cross

examination, and to decide whether a rebuttal expert is necessary. While the County

acknowledges that the statements in Dr. Leon's affidavit are not identical to the statements

in his expert report, they do not substantially differ. Further, the County asserts that the

additional detail that peptic disease or symptomology includes both peptic ulcer disease and

acid reflux disease does not offend Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2). In re Stand "N Seal Products

Liability Litigation, 623 F.Supp.2d 1355, 1361-62 (N.D.Ga., 2009); Rowe Int'l Corp. v.

Ecast, Inc., 586 F.Supp.2d 924, 935 (N.D.Ill. 2008); In re Young Broadcasting Inc., 2010

WL 1544401, 5 (Br. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (where expert affidavit provides evidentiary details for

an opinion expressed in the report, those portions of his or her affidavit can be considered).

The County asserts that Dr. Leon’s report does not limit itself to a discussion of either peptic

ulcer disease or acid reflux disease. The County asserts that, while the report talks in general

terms about Harris’s peptic symptomology, the source of that peptic symptomology and

history comes from Dr. Maddur’s records, which refer to both a peptic ulcer disease and acid

reflux disease history. 

Plaintiffs argue, however, that while the December 9, 2008, affidavit was consistent

with the original opinion, there is nothing in the August 2008 report that places Plaintiffs on

notice that Dr. Leon would give any specific opinions about acid reflux disease. Tompkin

v. Philip Morris, U.S.A., 362 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs assert that, since the County

did not provide an expert opinion by the expert deadline, the County had an obligation to

timely supplement Dr. Leon’s opinions no later than the discovery deadline in this case.2

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Plaintiffs assert that, if the County wished to supplement Dr. Leon’s opinions after the close

of discovery, the County was required to file a motion for leave of court supported by a

showing of good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (permitting modification of the court’s

scheduling order only on showing of “good cause”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2) (requirements for

disclosure of experts). Plaintiffs assert that good cause in this context requires a showing,

among other things, that the party seeking the extension was diligent in its discovery efforts

yet could not complete discovery. Plaintiffs point out that Dr. Leon’s records indicate that

the County did not retain him until August 1, 2008, and the County did not receive the report

until August 5, 2008 – just a few days before the expert disclosure deadline. Further,

Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Leon’s records indicate that the County did not contact Dr. Leon

again until December 9, 2008, to obtain his affidavit and opinions regarding

GERD/acid-reflux disease. Plaintiffs assert that the County’s lack of diligence in obtaining

and disclosing Dr. Leon’s opinions undermines any claim that there was good cause for the

untimely disclosure.

Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that they are prejudiced from the untimely disclosure

because they has been deprived of all opportunity to depose or otherwise conduct discovery

regarding Dr. Leon’s new opinions regarding GERD/acid reflux disease or to disclose a

rebuttal expert on the matter. Indeed, Plaintiffs assert that they would undoubtably be subject

to the County’s non-disclosure objections at trial if Plaintiff solicited testimony from Harris’s

treating physicians regarding Dr. Leon’s affidavit and opinions regarding GERD/acid reflux

disease. 

Plaintiffs compare this case to Marcin Engineering, LLC. v. Founders at Grizzly

Ranch, LLC., 219 F.R.D. 516, 521 (D.Colo. 2003), where the defendant disclosed revised

expert reports months after the court’s expert disclosure deadlines. Indeed, one of the expert

affidavits was attached to briefing on motions for summary judgment. In denying a request

to reopen expert discovery, the Marcin court considered that (1) the defendant had the

materials required to issue the untimely opinions and reports four months before the expert

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disclosure deadline, but did not review the materials until just five days before the expert

disclosure deadline; (2) the records and other materials on which the expert’s untimely

opinions were based were discussed in the timely expert report, and were discussed at length

in witness depositions; (3) defendant did not seek an extension of the expert disclosure

deadline, and (4) the expert’s untimely affidavit did not include any new information or

evidence not available to defendant before the disclosure deadline. Id. at 521-523. The court

concluded that the defendant’s dilatory conduct did not justify reopening discovery and

would irreparably prejudice the plaintiff. Id. at 523 -524 (“reopening expert discovery at this

point would also prejudice Marcin because it relied on Erkan's timely filed expert report in

preparing its motions to exclude his testimony and motion for partial summary judgment and

because the further delay that would result from reopened discovery would only add to

Marcin's burden in prosecuting what has already been an unnecessarily contentious, time

consuming and expensive action for all concerned”).

Plaintiffs assert that the County had all of the materials necessary to issue Dr. Leon’s

untimely affidavit and opinions regarding GERD/acid reflux disease in August, well in

advance of the discovery cut-off and expert rebuttal disclosure deadline, that the issues raised

by Dr. Leon’s untimely affidavit and opinions – and GERD/acid reflux disease in particular

– had been discussed at length in witness depositions, and were available to the County and

Dr. Leon far in advance of the discovery cut off. Moreover, Plaintiffs assert that the County

did not seek an extension of the expert disclosure deadline or leave of court to supplement

Dr. Leon’s opinions and Dr. Leon was not retained until just a few days before the expert

disclosure deadline. Plaintiffs assert that, like Marcin, there is no good cause to permit the

untimely opinions and affidavit and doing so would prejudice Plaintiffs.

The County’s Response states that, “Dr. Maddur testified that Plaintiff’s peptic

condition includes both a history of peptic ulcers from bacterial infection and his own

treatment of her for acid reflux disease[.] Response, p. 3. Dr. Maddur testified as to Harris’s

history of ulcers, history of Helicobacter pylori infection, and acid reflux. Response, Ex. B,

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Doc. # 181-1, pp, 16-17 of 22. However, the County has not pointed to any specific

testimony that Harris’s condition included both peptic ulcers and acid reflux disease. In other

words, there is no evidence in the record where any doctor/expert/report indicated that peptic

disease included both ulcers and acid reflux until Dr. Leon’s December 9, 2008, affidavit.

The County has pointed out, however, that Harris herself used peptic disease to

interchangeably include acid reflux, as well as bacterially caused peptic ulcers. In the

Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs referred to “stomach ulcers” caused by “plyori bacterial

stomach infection” and/or “bacterial infection.” Further, Harris’s medical records showed

that Harris’s only illness during September and October 2005 was a peptic condition

described by her doctor as acid reflux disease, nausea, and heartburn. The County asserts:

Plaintiff cannot genuinely feign any surprise here. She, better than anyone, knows

full well that in May 2005 she had the presence of the bacteria that causes peptic

ulcers, that in September 2005 she was tested and did not have the bacteria that causes

peptic ulcers, and that in October 2005 it was confirmed that she merely suffered from

acid reflux disease, nausea, and heartburn and that Dr. Maddur’s records, upon which

Dr. Leon’s opinions are based, reflects this complete history. Moreover, she knows

full well that, in her own Amended Complaint, she refers to all of these conditions as,

generally, peptic ulcer disease.

Indeed, if Dr. Leon’s opinions are artificially limited, as Plaintiff suggests, than

Plaintiff should not be allowed to testify about any illness suffered during August,

September, or October 2005 because the only material health condition that she had

in that period was the peptic illness characterized by acid reflux, nausea, and

heartburn and not, as her own Amended Complaint suggests, the peptic illness

characterized as peptic ulcer disease.

Response, p. 4. However, the County cannot pick and choose what Plaintiffs “knew” to

assert an expert opinion is not needed.

Dr. Leon did state in his report that stress is a factor in peptic disease – he did not limit

that opinion to just peptic ulcers. However, that Dr. Leon’s later opinions regarding acid

reflux do not contradict the original report, does not mean that Plaintiffs were on notice that

Dr. Leon would be testifying as to the additional opinions.

During argument, the County asserted that the affidavit simply contained more

specific information that was consistent with the original opinion. However, the County

simply has not provided an adequate reason why the more specific consistent opinions could

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The Court notes that counsel for the County asserted during argument that there

would probably be no prejudice to the County if Dr. Leon was limited to the opinions

included in the August 5, 2008, report.

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not have been offered prior to the expert disclosure deadline. Although counsel for the

County asserted during argument that he did not think a deposition of Dr. Leon is needed

based on the more specific information, that conclusion precludes Plaintiffs from determining

how best to present their case. The Court finds Plaintiffs have been prejudiced by the

untimely disclosure of the more specific opinions.

Plaintiffs assert that the only way to cure the prejudice to Plaintiffs of Dr. Leon’s

untimely affidavit and opinions is to permit a deposition of Dr. Leon and, because the County

is responsible for the untimely disclosure the cost of the deposition – including any payment

for Dr. Leon’s professional time and Plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees and costs – should be the

responsibility of the County. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1)(A) (“in addition to or instead of this

sanction [of exclusion of the evidence] the court on motion ... may order payment of the

reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by” the failure to timely supplement

disclosures); Schuette v. City of Phoenix, 2010 WL 1253193, *4 (D.Ariz.,2010) (awarding

sanctions of attorney’s fees and costs necessitated by incomplete expert disclosure); Yeti by

Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir.2001) (upholding

exclusion of expert); Jarritos, Inc. v. Reyes, 345 Fed.Appx. 215, 217 (9th Cir. 2009)

(upholding th exclusion of expert reports).

Because the County asserts that Dr. Leon’s proposed testimony has not changed since

August 5, 2008, when Dr. Leon’s expert report was submitted, the County asserts that

Plaintiffs’ decision not to bother disclosing a rebuttal expert witness or deposing Dr. Leon

does not warrant permitting a deposition at this time, much less at the County’s expense.

The Court finds that, because the more specific details of Dr. Leon’s opinions

prejudice Plaintiffs, admission of this evidence is not appropriate without giving Plaintiffs’

counsel the opportunity to depose the witness.3

 Because the trial date is not scheduled until

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Although not discussed by the parties, back pay is an equitable remedy to be awarded

by a court, not a jury, under Title VII (i.e., under the ADA and Civil Rights Act of 1991).

2 Disability Discrimination Workplace § 25:2; see also Lutz v. Glendale Union High School,

403 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2005).

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September, the Court finds it appropriate to permit the County to elect to have Dr. Leon

deposed by Plaintiffs, at the County’s expense, if the County wishes to present the expanded

opinions at trial. In the event the County chooses to permit Plaintiffs to depose Dr. Leon so

the more specific opinions may be used at trial, the County shall arrange for the deposition

within 30 days of this Order and Plaintiffs shall disclose any rebuttal expert opinions within

21 days of the deposition of Dr. Leon. Because Plaintiffs did not elect to depose Dr. Leon

based on the original expert opinions, the opinions of Dr. Leon inquired into in any

deposition conducted pursuant to this Order shall be limited to those disclosed in Dr. Leon’s

December 9, 2008, affidavit. 

Defendant’s Motion in Limine Re Damage Issues [Doc. # 175]4

The County asserts that any evidence, testimony, or argument that Harris was

damaged monetarily, emotionally, or otherwise by her resignation from employment or that

supports a punitive damages award should be precluded. Plaintiffs agree that evidence that

is solely relevant to punitive damages is not admissible (i.e., Plaintiffs are not seeking

punitive damages).

The County points out that this Court determined that the County was entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on the claim that Harris was constructively discharged from her

employment. September 30, 2009, Order, p. 16. The County asserts that it cannot be held

accountable for any losses that Harris might have sustained, of any nature, due to her

voluntary decision to resign her employment. The County asserts that Plaintiffs’ damages

evidence, testimony, and argument must be limited to emotional distress for Harris alleged

to be proximately caused by the defamation, false light, and/or ADA-disclosure claims

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arising from the September 30, 2005, Oertel letter and/or claimed emotional distress for

Harris alleged to be proximately caused by the ADA retaliation claim arising from the

October 4, 2005 Carper letter. 

Plaintiffs assert, however, that job-loss related damages are recoverable under other

remaining claims. Plaintiffs point out that Harris’s claims for violations of the privacy

provisions of the ADA and retaliation under the ADA remain pending and that Harris is

entitled to recover all damages proximately caused by the County's misconduct under the

ADA, including her job-loss related damages. Plaintiffs argues that 42 U.S.C.

§12112(d)(4)(c) and 42 U.S.C. §12112(d)(3)(B)-(C), permits her to recover damages as

provided in 42 U.S.C. §12117, including all remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4

through § 2000e-9. Plaintiffs assert that this includes front pay, back pay, lost wages, and

compensatory damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1981a(b)(3). Similarly, Plaintiffs argue that

Harris’s job-loss related damages are clearly relevant and admissible to establish her

damages recoverable pursuant to her retaliation claim.

During argument, counsel for Plaintiffs cited to EEOC v. Ford Motor Credit

Company, 531 F.Supp.2d 930 (M.D.Tenn. 2008), and Garrison v. Baker Hughes Oilfield

Operations, Inc., 287 F.3d 955 (10th Cir. 2002), for the assertion that Harris has access to

the damage provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 based on the privacy violations. These cases

having not been cited in Plaintiffs’ response to the motion in limine, the County requested

an opportunity to respond to this authority. The Court finds it appropriate to permit the

parties to file supplemental briefs regarding this issue.

Defendant’s Motion in Limine RE Spousal Communications [Doc. # 176]

The County requests that testimony by Plaintiffs concerning communications between

each other be precluded because both Plaintiffs, during discovery, raised the issue of spousal

privilege on multiple occasions in order to refuse to answer questions during the discovery

phase. Because Plaintiffs selectively employed the spousal privilege, the County was

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Plaintiffs assert that, if the County believed the privilege was inappropriately invoked

during depositions, the appropriate remedy was to pursue a motion to compel. Plaintiffs

assert that the County's failure to file a motion to compel is not a basis for a motion in limine

or any basis for a blanket exclusion of all testimony regarding spousal communications.

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precluded from obtaining full discovery regarding communications between the Plaintiffs.5

The County argues that Plaintiffs should not be allowed to use the privilege as a “sword,” by

allowing discovery on spousal communications of their choosing, but then precluding

discovery on other spousal communications by raising the privilege 

Plaintiffs argues that the appropriate remedy for the selective invocation of the

privilege is to find that Plaintiffs, by testifying to some communications have waived the

privilege to all communications. Testimony on all spousal communications would,

therefore, be permitted. 

Plaintiffs point out that the County has not been prejudiced by the reliance on the

spousal communication privilege because, when the privilege was invoked, it was on matters

that are not relevant to the disputed issues in this case. The invocation of the spousal

communication privilege on irrelevant issues has not impaired the County's ability to conduct

discovery or prejudiced the County in any way and provides no basis for the County's

motion. Plaintiffs also assert that, as a practical matter, any issue of privilege or

non-disclosure may be raised and dealt with at trial on the basis of actual questions and

testimony and that the County can simply refrain from asking Plaintiffs to testify to any

spousal communications.

The Court conducted a hearing on a discovery dispute regarding the marital

communications privilege. During that hearing, counsel for Plaintiffs objected to being

required to assert the privilege as to all topics or waive the privilege as to all topics. During

the hearing, counsel indicated that she was not aware, at that time, of any conversations

between her clients that would constitute relevant evidence at trial. The minute entry states:

The Court discusses the federal common law marital communications privilege and

its possible waiver with counsel during the deposition of Plaintiff.

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Counsel agree that, at this time, Defendants will not inquire into privileged

communications. If Plaintiff subsequently determines that she will partially waive the

privilege, leading to additional discoverable facts, a subsequent deposition may be

conducted at the expense of Plaintiff. If needed at that time, counsel may contact the

Court to determine the limits of any waiver.

July 17, 2008, Minute Entry. 

In In re Sause Bros. Ocean Towing, 144 F.R.D. 111 (D.Or. 1991), the court discussed

whether the inadvertent disclosure of documents waived a privilege. Factors to be

considered include “(1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken against disclosure; (2)

the time taken to rectify the error; (3) the scope of the discovery; (4) the extent of the

disclosure; and (5) the overriding issue of fairness.” 144 F.R.D. at 155. In this case, there

appears to be a deliberate selective waiver of the privilege. The appropriate remedy is to find

that the privilege has been waived as to all communications (any exclusion, then, would be

based on irrelevance or prejudice). However, based on the agreement of counsel during the

July 17, 2008, hearing, the County was not provided a full opportunity to inquire into marital

communications during the depositions. Plaintiffs now assert that they wish to present

communications that were discussed during the depositions. However, inquiry into marital

communications was limited based on the agreement of counsel. Counsel for the County

raised this issue at the time of the depositions and counsel for Plaintiffs objected to a blanket

waiver. To now permit Plaintiffs to present the evidence that is available only because

Plaintiffs chose to answer those questions while objecting to others would be unfair to

Cochise County given the agreement counsel reached during discovery. The Court will

preclude evidence of marital communications between Plaintiffs at trial.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine Re: Dr. Leon’s Untimely Affidavit and Opinions

[Doc. # 174] is GRANTED. Dr. Leon shall be limited at trial to the opinions he set forth in

his August 5, 2008, report. Alternatively, the County may elect to have Dr. Leon deposed

by Plaintiffs, at the County’s expense, if the County wishes to present the expanded opinions

at trial. In the event the County chooses to permit Plaintiffs to depose Dr. Leon so the more

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specific opinions may be used at trial, the County shall arrange for the deposition within 30

days of this Order and Plaintiffs shall disclose any rebuttal expert opinions within 21 days

of the deposition of Dr. Leon.

2. The parties may file simultaneous supplemental briefs regarding the Motion

in Limine Re: Damages [Doc. # 175] on or before July 16, 2010.

3. The County’s Motion in Limine Re: Spousal Communications [Doc. # 176]

is GRANTED. Evidence of marital communications between the Plaintiffs is precluded from

being presented at trial.

DATED this 1st day of July, 2010.

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