Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_13-cv-00051/USCOURTS-alsd-2_13-cv-00051-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CAROLYN BATES, )

 Plaintiff, )

 ) 

v. )

 ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:13-00051-KD-C

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

 Defendant. )

 ORDER

This matter came before the Court for a non-jury trial on September 30, 2015. Upon 

consideration of the parties’ arguments and documentary and testimonial evidence presented at 

trial,1 the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I. Findings of Fact

On the morning of August 27, 2009, pro se Plaintiff Carolyn Bates (Bates) visited the 

federal courthouse in Selma, Alabama to attend a disability hearing where she was scheduled to

serve as a volunteer non-attorney representative of a disability claimant for the child of Bernetta 

and Marvin Shields (Mr. and Mrs. Shields). After taking the elevator to the second floor, Bates

exited the elevator and walked down the hallway. Mr. and Mrs. Shields were already present in 

the second floor hallway at that time.

The second floor hallway of the courthouse contains wooden benches. These benches 

have extended seat lips (i.e., the bench seat lip extends several inches out from the bench base 

and is not flush with the bench base). These benches are not fastened or secured to the floor. 

 

1 Witnesses at trial were Bates, Marvin Shields, and Bernetta Shields for Bates; and Kevin Lear and 

Frances Davis for the Government.

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Before the Shields’ disability hearing, at approximately 1:30 p.m., Bates decided to sit on 

a courthouse bench on the second floor hallway. Bates sat down and when she did the bench 

moved forward and Bates lost her balance. The evidence indicates that the bench either tipped 4-

5 inches forward (away from the wall) striking Bates in the neck and then tipped back to the 

wall, or tipped completely over onto Bates striking her and pinning her to the floor.

2

 Either way, 

the evidence supports a finding that the bench struck Bates on the back of her right side, hitting 

her neck, shoulder, back, and hip. Bates testified that subsequently on her way to the elevator 

she saw court reporter Frances Davis on the second floor hallway and told her the bench fell on 

her. 

About 20 minutes after the bench struck Bates, she reported the incident to the court 

officer on duty, Security Guard Bettie Davis (Davis) who prepared an Offense/Incident Report. 

Davis then reported the incident to Sergeant Ernest Barnes (Barnes) of the Federal Protection 

Service. GSA Supervisory Building Manager Kevin Lear (“Lear”), who oversees the operations 

and maintenance of the Selma courthouse,3 thereafter received the report.

 2 Three (3) witnesses testified to the circumstances of the bench striking Bates. First, Bates testified that 

the bench flipped over when she sat on it and that she fell to the floor with the bench on top of her. Her testimony is 

consistent with her prior reports, and her descriptions and testimony match the ER records noting that she was 

seeking treatment for being struck by the bench that had fallen on her on August 27, 2009. The court finds Bates 

credible as to the fact that the bench hit her. 

Second, Mr. and Mrs. Shields testified that the bench flipped or toppled over onto Bates and that they 

assisted in lifting the bench off of her. However, the Shields could not recall anything else from that date, even 

though it was their child’s disability hearing. The undersigned finds that their testimony is unreliable. 

Third, Court Reporter Frances Davis testified that on one occasion she witnessed Bates sit on a second 

floor hallway bench that tilted forward, 4-5 inches away from the wall, and then titled back to the wall, causing

Bates to lose her balance and drop some papers, but did not see the bench fall over on top of Bates. The Court does 

not doubt the veracity of Davis' attempt to recollect the event. However, the Court questions whether Davis’ recall 

is correct. This is because Davis had no independent recollection of even when the event she described occurred. 

And it appears that the first time she was asked to recall the event was five years after it occurred. Moreover, while 

Davis’ description of the incident at trial appears to minimize the significance of the event, Ms. Davis also testified 

that she felt the need to, and in fact did, report the incident to the presiding Judge. 

3 Lear had been appointed to the Selma courthouse one (1) month prior to the August 27, 2009 incident.

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After being struck, Bates waited a bit, thinking she was not seriously injured. But at 

approximately 3:45 p.m., Bates went to the emergency room at Vaughan Regional Medical 

Center because the pain would not go away. (Plf’s Ex. C). The ER notes indicate that Bates was 

treated for an accident with a chief complaint of traumatic pain related to a bench flipping onto 

her, and that she was complaining of pain in her neck, right hip and back radiating to her legs. 

(Id.) On physical exam Bates had muscle spasms, and she was given a hip injection. (Id.) She 

was prescribed pain medication by the ER physician. (Id.)

On November 25, 2009, Bates wrote to Kevin Lear of GSA, regarding the incident and 

her injuries and submitted her medical bills for payment totaling $1,543.33. (Def’s Ex. 2). Bates 

also put GSA on notice that she was going to seek further treatment. 

Following her August 2009 ER visit, Bates did not seek further medical treatment again 

until December 17, 2009, when she saw Dr. Park. Dr. Park performed an MRI and CT scan to 

determine whether Ms. Bates’ pain complaints were the result of a compression fracture or disc 

bulge. (Plf's Ex. D, p. 9-15). Dr. Parks determined that there was “no compression fracture 

identified.” (Id. at p. 10). Also, he found “no significant disc bulge” but did see “multilevel disc 

desiccation.” (Id.) Dr. Park further described Ms. Bates problem as “discogenic and facet 

degenerative changes.” (Id. at 13). Although not explained by the doctor, degenerative change 

usually refers to arthritis. However, the court cannot determine whether the multilevel disc 

desiccation is the result of the aging process or the bench trauma because Dr. Parks did not 

express any opinion regarding the origin of the mild disc desiccation. 

Thereafter, Bates sought treatment on March 14, 2011, from Dr. Laura Kezar. Bates 

opined to Dr. Kezar that her pain was the result of the bench incident in August 2009. Bates 

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underwent: 1) a lumbar spine x-ray which showed no malalignment of the lumbar spine; 2) a 

C/T/L spine series x-ray which showed only mild degenerative changes; 3) a cervical spine x-ray

which showed osteopenia; and 4) a thoracic spine xray which showed osteopenia and minimal 

mid thoracic spondylosis. (Plfs Tr. Ex. P). Again, there is no indication from Dr. Kezar that Dr. 

Kezar determined that any of Bates problems were the result of trauma or specifically the trauma 

of August 2009.

 Bates continued to seek treatment and each time she relayed to the medical professional 

her history of trauma in August 2009 and her belief that this was the cause of her pain. The 

following is a synopsis of her treatment through September 2015:

-March 28, 2011: Dr. Kirksey found Bates had "abnormal study" with chronic lumbar 

radiculopathy in right extremity and L5/S1 nerve root. (Plf's Tr. Ex. D). 

-June 6, 2011, Dr. Kezar of Spine Network Department of Physical Medicine and Rehab 

diagnosed Bates with chronic low back pain and degenerative disc disease, right buttock 

and hip pain multifactorial in origination, greater trochanteric bursitis/tendonitis “may 

be post-traumatic” or from an injection, osteoporosis and chronic neck pain, nerve 

damage, and chronic thoracic pain. (Plf’s Tr. Ex. C) (emphasis added). 

-May 24, 2012, Dr. Nagi gives Bates a plan for treatment of pain. (Plf's Tr. Ex. D)

-June 18, 2012, Bates sees Dr. Peter Nagi (Nagi). It was noted that Bates reported that 

prior to the incident she was independent with all activities and was pain free.4

-July 15, 2013, a workplace impairment functional test is preformed. The Report states 

that "[b]ased upon today's testing, she demonstrates the ability to perform within the 

sedentary work category." (Plf's Tr. Ex. F). The OT noted that even though Bates may not 

have been exerting maximal effort, "it is my opinion that even with her maximal effort 

that she would not exceed the light work classification at this point..." (Id.)

-September 9, 2015: Dr. Kidd clinic notes. Notes her history of chronic right sided back, 

neck and hand pain since bench fell on her neck in 2009. Bates reported she had a fall 

 

4 The court notes that Ms. Bates testified that she had been totally disabled and received Social Security 

disability for several years prior to the August 2009 incident. Although not clear, Ms. Bates testified that this 

disability determination was based on asthma and pain unrelated to her neck and back. 

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about 3 months prior and "feels her symptoms were worsened by this fall and have 

continued to progress since that time." (Plf's Tr. Ex. E/F). He diagnosed her with 

sacroiliac joint dysfunction, troachaeric bursitis. Sent her for lumbar spine exam related 

to her recent fall.

-September 2015, UAB Selma Family Medicine Center physician Dr. Laura B. Kezar 

concluded that Bates’ chronic low back pain radiating into the legs identified with an 

onset of pain after her injury at the courthouse in August 2009 with gradual worsening 

“may have been the cause of her pain or this may simply represent normal aging 

wear and tear changes of the spine with exacerbation related to an acute contusion 

or sprain.” (Def’s Tr. Ex. 11). Dr. Kezar added that Bates’ hip bursitis was possibly 

related to her back pain. (Id.) As for Bates’ neck pain, Dr. Kezar noted that this chronic 

neck pain was suspected as cervical spondylosis and degenerative disk disease although 

there were no diagnostic studies and that while she had a history of “remote trauma” she 

had no recent injury. (Id.) As for Bates’ nerve damage, Dr. Kezar noted that her 12/17/09 

MRI of the thoracic and lumbar spine showed mild disc degeneration and facet 

arthropathy but “no significant nerve root compression.” (Id.) (emphasis added)

 Thus, only Dr. Kezar provides any medical support for Bates contention that the trauma of 

August 2009, is the cause of her pain. However, Dr. Kezar merely posits that the August 2009 

may have been the cause or exacerbation of Bates’ pain. 

At trial, Bates testified that the injuries sustained when the bench fell on her include: 

“excruciating pain in my neck, my back and my hip” and shoulder, right hip bursitis, and a 

swollen right foot (Plf’s Tr. Ex. C-2 (7/3/2010 photograph)) with sciatic nerve damage causing 

“excruciating pain” on her rights side from her hip down to her foot from 2009 through the 

present. Bates testified that since the August 2009 incident, she takes daily pain medication, has 

injections three (3) or more times per year, is in continued physical therapy, and has been 

diagnosed with a bulging disc related to her neck pain, bulging disc related to the lower part of 

her back with sciatic nerve damage down to the right side of her foot and that her right arm 

“stopped working” recently. Bates testified that she has not been released from physical therapy 

or medical treatment and that she is scheduled for another injection for hip bursitis following 

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trial. According to Bates, she can no longer drive due to excruciating pain, clean house (pick up 

a clothes basket or stand and wash dishes), or use her hands for a certain length of time, and has 

“excruciating pain” in her hands and shoulders. 

As explained infra, the court does not find Bates’ allegations about her level and 

continuity of pain to be credible. 

II. Conclusions of Law

This case involves a claim of negligence against the United States (the Government). 

“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from 

suit...Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature. Indeed, the ‘terms of [the United States'] 

consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’” F.D.I.C. v. 

Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 474 (1994). The United States has consented to be sued via the Federal 

Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 et seq. as follows:

Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title [i.e., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680], the 

district courts...shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the 

United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or 

loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 

omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office 

or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would 

be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or 

omission occurred.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). As explained in Zelaya v. United States, 781 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2015):

Translated, any time the federal government is sued based on the act of an employee 

performed within the scope of his employment duties, federal district courts will have 

exclusive jurisdiction of such claims. In addition, § 1346(b)(1) sets, as a predicate, a 

requirement that the circumstances be such that a private person would be liable under 

the law of the state where the federal employee's act or omission occurred, had a private 

person so acted.

Thus, the law of the state in which the suit arises applies – here Alabama.

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“In a negligence action asserted under the FTCA, a plaintiff... must show the prima facie 

elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages.” Perry v. United States, 2012 WL 

4340057, *2 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 18, 2012) (citing Sessions v. Nonnenmann, 842 So.2d 649, 651 

(Ala. 2002) and DiBiasi v. Joe Wheeler Elec. Membership Corp., 988 So.2d 454, 460 (Ala. 

2008)). Specifically in Alabama, to establish negligence, Bates must prove that: 1) the 

Government owed her a duty of care; 2) the Government breached that duty; 3) Bates suffered a 

loss or injury; and 4) the Government’s negligence was the actual and proximate cause of her 

injury. Lollar v. Poe, 622 So.2d 902, 905 (Ala. 1993); Martin v. Arnold, 643 So.2d 564, 567 

(Ala. 1994); John R. Cowley & Bros., Inc. v. Brown, 569 So.2d 375, 379 (Ala. 1990). 

A. Duty of Care

“[T]his is a premises liability case...[and] ‘[t]he duty owed by a landowner to an injured 

party depends upon the status of the injured party in relation to the landowner's land, i.e., is the 

injured party a trespasser, a licensee, or an invitee.” Manning v. Tractor Supply Co., 2015 WL 

1578158, *2 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 9, 2015) (quoting Galaxy Cable, Inc. v. Davis, 58 So. 3d 93, 98 

(Ala. 2010)). The Government is the premises owner. The parties agree, and the undersigned 

finds, that Bates was an invitee. At the time of the incident, Bates was actually a business invitee 

as she was at the courthouse to contribute to a legal proceeding as a non-attorney representative 

for a claimant during a hearing before the Social Security Administration. Freeman v. Freeman, 

67 So.3d 902, 907-908 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (“A business visitor is a person who is invited to 

enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings of 

the possessor of the land.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

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In Alabama, the premises owner owes its invitees a duty to “use reasonable care and 

diligence to keep the premises in a safe condition or, if the premises [are] in a dangerous 

condition, to give sufficient warning so that an invitee might avoid danger by the use of ordinary 

care.” Hunter v. Durr Sys., Inc., 2007 WL 1215075, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2007). This duty 

does not extend to “open and obvious” dangers. Id. Additionally, “[t]here is no presumption of 

negligence which arises from the mere fact of an injury to an invitee[,]”and a premises owner is 

not an insurer of the safety of its invitees. Ex parte Harold L. Martin Distrib. Co., 769 So.2d 

313, 314 (Ala. 2000). See also Giles v. Winn-Dixie Montg., LLC, 574 Fed. Appx. 892, 894 (11th

Cir. 2014) (same). The “duty is...‘to exercise reasonable care to provide and maintain 

reasonably safe premises...injured ‘plaintiffs must prove that the injury was proximately caused 

by the negligence of [the premises owner] or one of its servants or employees. Actual or 

constructive notice of the presence of the...[instrumentality that caused the injury] must be 

proven before [the premises owner] can be held responsible for the injury.’” Dolgencorp, Inc. v. 

Hall, 890 So.2d 98, 100 (Ala. 2003) (internal citations omitted). As noted in Edwards v. 

Intergraph Servs. Co., 4 So.3d 495, 503-504 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008), when an owner 

“affirmatively created” the defective condition, such as by placing items in an aisle, or when the 

owner fails to perform reasonable inspections or maintenance of the premises to discover or 

prevent the defective condition, notice can be inferred.

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B. Breach of Duty of Care5

Bates alleges that the Government breached its duty of care and was negligent by failing 

to maintain the courthouse bench in question in a reasonably safe condition. Specifically, Bates 

contends the bench was defective because it was not securely bolted to the floor. 

The evidence establishes that the second floor hallway benches, including the bench at 

issue, were “part of the premises.” As explained in Mims v. Jack’s Restaurant, 565 So.2d 609, 

610-611 (Ala. 1990):

....in cases where the alleged defect is a part of the premises....once a plaintiff has made 

a prima facie showing that a defect in a part of the premises has caused an injury, then the 

question whether the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the defect will go to 

the jury, regardless of whether plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the defendant 

had or should have had notice of the defect at the time of the accident. For example, in 

Winn–Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. Weeks, 504 So. 2d 1210 (Ala. 1987), a mother was 

going through a grocery store pushing a shopping cart, in which her son was sitting. The 

only unusual thing she noticed about the cart was that the wheels made a loud noise and 

were wobbly. While she left the cart for a moment, the child leaned over to reach for 

candy in a display rack, and, as he did so, the cart tilted over and his left cheek was 

impaled on an allegedly broken wire that was sticking up on the display rack. The 

defendants, appealing from a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, 

argued that there was no evidence that they had constructive notice of the defect. This

Court affirmed, holding that the question whether the grocery store had constructive 

notice of the alleged defect was for the jury....

In both this case and in Weeks, the alleged defect or instrumentality was a part of the 

premises. Unlike a spilled substance, a defective threshold or a cart or a display rack is a 

fixture that requires ordinary and reasonable maintenance in order to provide safe 

premises for the store's customers. Because it was the main entrance of the restaurant, we 

find that the question whether [the restaurant] should have known that the threshold was 

defective was a question for the jury.

Subsequently, in Isbell v. Aztecas Mexican Grill, 78 So.3d 420, 423 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011), the 

Alabama Court of Civil Appeals followed Mims and concluded that the trier of fact should 

 

5 The Government did not argue or present evidence of any purported contributory negligence on Bates’ 

part, or that the danger of the bench was “open and obvious.” As such, such contentions were not at issue at trial. 

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determine whether a premises owner had notice of an alleged defect in a booth seat that 

collapsed. Isbell at 425. Specifically, that court stated as follows:

Given our supreme court's holding in Mims...we must agree with [Bates] that, because the 

booth seat that collapsed under him was a fixture or “a part of the premises,” the issue 

whether [the owner] had actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect in the booth 

seat should “go to the jury, regardless [of the fact that [Bates] failed to make] a prima 

facie showing that [the owner] had or should have had notice of the defect at the time of 

the accident.”...For that reason, we reverse the summary judgment in favor of [the 

owner] and remand the cause for further proceedings.

Isbell, 78 So.3d at 425. Like the restaurant entrance in Mims, the shopping cart in Weeks, and 

the booth seat in Isbell, the bench at issue in this case “is a fixture that requires ordinary and 

reasonable maintenance in order to provide [a] safe premises” and no prior notice of the defect to

the Government was required. Mims, 565 So.2d at 611. 

The court finds that a bench that would, when used for its intended purpose, either readily 

tilt 4-5 inches away from the wall and strike an individual when sitting on it, or flip over on top 

of an individual is a defective condition which should not be present in public spaces. Thus, the 

Court finds that the Government breached its duty of care to Bates as an invitee because it 

“affirmatively created” a defective condition at the Selma courthouse or failed to perform 

reasonable inspections or maintenance of the bench in question to discover or prevent the 

defective condition. Having found the Government liable for breach of its duty of care to Bates, 

the Court turns to causation.

C. Causation

Bates seeks recovery for the following “bench incident” injuries: right hip bursitis, 

“excruciating pain in my neck, my back and my hip” and shoulder, and a swollen right foot with 

sciatic nerve damage causing “excruciating pain” from her hip down to her foot. Throughout 

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trial, Bates repeatedly testified that she had not suffered from these injuries/ailments before 

August 27, 2009 or from any problems on the right side of her body, but that since the incident

she suffers from such injuries/problems and that her life has changed dramatically as she is in 

constant pain. As stated previously, the court does not find Bates’ testimony credible as to the 

extent or continuity of her pain since the August 2009 incident. First, after her visit to the 

emergency room on the day of the incident, Bates did not seek treatment again until four months 

later. Moreover, at trial her testimony appeared to be an exaggeration of her symptoms and 

ability to function. 

Next, and most importantly, Bates’ self-diagnosis of the origins of her pain are not 

adequately supported by any medical documentation or expert testimony. “A plaintiff can testify 

to what his injuries are, so long as his testimony is based on facts and does not present medical 

conclusions or opinions that require expert testimony.” Marcus v. Lindsey, 592 So.2d 1045, 

1046 (Ala. 1992) (citation omitted). In this case, because of the type of injuries alleged, 

including bursitis and sciatic nerve damage, expert opinion is required. The court is unable to 

determine, based on Bates’ testimony alone, whether the need for medical treatment starting in 

December 2009, was in fact related to the trauma experienced in August 2009. And in fact, the 

December 2009 diagnostic conclusion of Dr. Parks would appear to indicate that any pain 

experienced in December 2009 was the result of the aging process. Moreover, as stated by Dr. 

Kezar, in September 2015, Bates’ injury at the courthouse in August 2009 “may have been the 

cause of her pain or this may simply represent normal aging wear and tear changes of the spine 

with exacerbation related to an acute contusion or sprain.”6 (Def’s Tr. Ex. 11).

 6 The court also notes that on September 9, 2015, Bates reported she had fallen about 3 months prior.

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Thus, the court finds that while Bates has established that the pain she experienced on the 

day of the incident was related to the bench incident, she has not established that the trauma in 

August 2009 is the cause of her complaints thereafter. 

D. Damages

Based on her testimony and the evidence submitted, the Court finds that Bates is entitled 

to damages in this case in the amount of $1,543.33. This amount represents the medical bills 

submitted on November 25, 2009 to GSA, which the court finds to represent Bates’ expenses 

related to her visit to the emergency room in August 2009. 

III. Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of Bates 

and against the Government and that Bates is awarded $1,543.33. A Final Judgment shall be 

entered in conjunction with this Order.

IV. Costs

Bates has also requested costs. This request is ripe after a party has prevailed. Because 

Bates is pro se, the court construes her request as a request to tax costs. As provided in Epling v. 

United States, 958 F. Supp. 312, 317 (W.D. Ky. 1997):

[P]ursuant to §2412(a) the prevailing FTCA claimant is left with the waiver of 

sovereign immunity as to costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 that has been a traditional 

component of § 2412 since its inception. See generally 10 Wright, Miller & Kane, 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 2672, at 236 (noting that, prior to 1966, § 2412 

contained an express provision shifting costs in FTCA actions); Wax v. United 

States, 183 F.Supp. 163, 164 (E.D.N.Y.1960) (quoting the cost-shifting language 

of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(c)). Plaintiffs' motion in this matter seeks payment of six 

categories of costs by the government: expert witness costs; deposition costs; 

travel and lodging costs; telephone, postage and copying costs; trial exhibit costs; 

and other miscellaneous costs. Whether these litigation expenses are indeed 

“costs” for purposes of § 1920 is of dispositive importance. If they fall outside the 

scope of § 1920, federal law mandates that the United States may not be held 

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accountable because it retains sovereign immunity as to the fees and expenses for 

claims sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); Campbell, 835 F.2d at 196.

45 Title 28, United States Code, section 1920 reads in relevant part as follows:

A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the 

following: (1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees of the court reporter 

for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for 

use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) 

Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use 

in the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; (6) 

Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, 

and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services 

under section 1828 of this title.

 The court has reviewed Bates submissions and determined that the following may be 

appropriate for reimbursement under section 1920:

1) Copies of depositions of Bernetta Shields, Marvin Shields, Furlona Davis and Irene 

McNeil totaling $620.75.

2) Clerk fees of $30.00 for CD of hearing before Judge Cassady.

3) Court Reporter fee of $111.55 for transcript of pre-trial conference.

4) Witness fee of $40.00 and mileage from Selma for both Bernetta and Marvin Shields.

 The government should file any objections to this initial determination of costs to be taxed 

on or before October 23, 2015. Any costs taxed will issue by separate order. 

DONE and ORDERED this the 14th day of October 2015.

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose

KRISTI K. DuBOSE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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