Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01069/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01069-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN ANTHONY SEXTON, Civil No. 09cv1069-W (POR)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THAT RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS BE GRANTED AND

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS BE DISMISSED

[Document No. 10]

v.

DERRAL G. ADAMS, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Steven Anthony Sexton, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the conviction and sentence

imposed by San Diego County Superior Court in case number SCE220004. [Doc. 1.] Respondent

moves to dismiss the Petition asserting it is time barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). [Doc. 10.]

Petitioner did not file an opposition. After a thorough review of the pleadings and all supporting

documents, the Court finds the Petition is statutorily barred by the expiration of the limitations period.

Accordingly, the Court recommends Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and the Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DISMISSED. 

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II. BACKGROUND

On May 23, 2002, a bifurcated jury found petitioner guilty of two counts of robbery and use of

a handgun to commit the robbery. On June 20, 2002, the San Diego County Superior Court sentenced

petitioner to a term of seventy years to life. 

Petitioner directly appealed his convictions to the California Courts of Appeal and California

Supreme Court on the grounds that the trial court denied his request for a jury that accurately reflected

a cross-section of the community and the trial court either abused its discretion or was unaware of its

discretion to strike petitioner’s prior convictions. Those courts denied petitioner’s appeal on November

25, 2003 [Lodgment 4] and February 4, 2004 [Lodgment 5], respectively.

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego County

Superior Court on August 13, 2004 and claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

[Lodgment 7.] Petitioner asserted his trial counsel did not move to suppress his identification,

adequately raise the issue of the jury not being representative of the community or object to CALJIC

No. 17.41.1 which violated jury secrecy. The Court denied the petition on September 20, 2004.

[Lodgment 8.] 

On October 3, 2005, petitioner filed another habeas petition with the same court that also alleged

ineffective assistance of counsel. [Lodgment 9.] However, in this instance petitioner claimed his trial

counsel did not object to a witness’ identification of him at trial. The Court found that petitioner had

substantially delayed in filing this petition and denied it on November 28, 2005. [Lodgment 10.]

On January 25, 2006 petitioner filed a third habeas petition with the San Diego County Superior

Court that claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. [Lodgment 11.] In this petition, petitioner claimed

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena particular witnesses and not objecting to witnesses

that gave false testimony and hearsay statements. The Court determined this was a successive petition

that had already been brought in that Court and denied the petition on February 16, 2006. [Lodgment

12.] 

A fourth habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel was filed by petitioner in the

San Diego County Superior Court on February 13, 2007. [Lodgment 13.] Petitioner stated his trial

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counsel did not object to hearsay testimony and the trial judge imposed an unconstitutional sentence

under the Supreme Court’s then- recent ruling in Cunningham v. California. On April 6, 2007, the

Court denied petitioner’s Cunningham claim and found the other claim had already been raised in

petitioner’s prior petitions. [Lodgment 14.]

Petitioner also filed a federal habeas petition in this Court based on the same grounds alleged

in his fourth state court habeas petition, as well as an additional ground claiming an unconstitutional

line-up, on February 16, 2007. [Lodgment 15.] The Court dismissed this petition for failure to plead

exhaustion and failure to pay the filing fee. [Lodgment 18.] Petitioner then filed a First Amended

Petition with this Court on March 20, 2007 [Lodgment 17] that was subsequently dismissed for failure

to provide adequate information about his financial status. [Lodgment 16.] Petitioner filed a Second

Amended petition in this Court on May 8, 2007 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and

prosecutorial misconduct. [Lodgment 19.] Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended

Petition on August 6, 2007. [Lodgment 21.] 

On October 29, 2007, petitioner filed a fifth habeas petition in the San Diego County Superior

court that also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. [Lodgment 22.] The Court found this claim had

already been raised in petitioner’s prior petitions and denied that petition on October 30, 2007.

[Lodgment 23.] Petitioner then filed a motion to withdraw the Second Amended Petition pending in

federal court on December 12, 2007. [Lodgment 24.] The Court granted that motion on January 3, 2008.

[Lodgment 25.]

On April 23, 2008 petitioner filed a petition in the California Supreme Court. [Lodgment 26.]

This petition alleged that petitioner was not given an opportunity to confront his witnesses, the jury did

not fairly represent the community, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The California Supreme Court

denied the petition on September 17, 2008. [Lodgment 27.] Petitioner subsequently filed another

habeas petition with the California Supreme Court on May 4, 2009 claiming ineffective assistance of

counsel. [Lodgment 28.] 

While that petition was pending in the California Supreme Court, petitioner filed the instant

petition on May 14, 2009 claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and trial court error based on the

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court’s denial of plaintiff’s request to have a jury panel that accurately reflected the makeup of the

community. [Doc. 1.]

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the instant petition on September 21, 2009 on the grounds

that the petition is statutorily time barred under 28 U.S.C. §2244(d) and petitioner has a habeas petition

currently pending in state court. [Doc. 10.] Petitioner did not file an opposition.

III. DISCUSSION

Statute of Limitations

Respondent argues the Petition is barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s

one-year statute of limitations. (MTD.) As a result, Respondent contends the Petition should be

dismissed as untimely. (Id.)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.

1214, applies to all federal habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320 (1997).

 The AEDPA provides for a one-year limitations period for state prisoners to file a federal habeas

petition. The section states, in pertinent part:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of—

 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

The AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations begins to run on “the date on which judgment

became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”

Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The period of “direct review,” pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(A), includes the ninety

(90) day period within which Petitioner could have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari from the

United States Supreme Court. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Therefore,

where the petitioner seeks direct review but does not file a petition for writ of certiorari to the United

States Supreme Court, the one-year filing period begins to run ninety (90) days following the decision

by the California Supreme Court. Id. 

Here, Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certioari. Thus, the one-year filing period for

federal habeas petitions expired on May 5, 2005, one year and ninety days following the California

Supreme Court’s denial of his appeal. Petitioner filed the Petition on May 14, 2009, more than four

years after AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations expired. Therefore, the Petition is untimely unless

AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision or the doctrine of equitable tolling extend the filing deadline. See

Tilleman v. Long, 453 F.3d 494, 498 (9th Cir. 2001). 

1. Statutory Tolling

AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision provides:

The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C.A. 2244(d)(2)(emphasis added). 

AEDPA’s one-year limitations period is tolled during the period of time a petitioner seeks postconviction relief in state court. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). The statute

of limitations is not tolled “from the time a final decision is issued on direct state appeal and the time

the first state collateral challenge is filed because there is no case ‘pending’ during that interval.” Id.

Tolling begins “from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court

rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge” as long as the petitions are properly filed. Evans v.

Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2005). An untimely petition

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is not “properly filed” and thus does not toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Townsend v. Knowles,

562 F.3d 1200, 1205 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 In California there is no determinate time-frame for filing or appealing a habeas petition. See

Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). A filing is timely if done within a “reasonable” time. Id. 

Moreover, a petitioner need not restrict his filing in a higher court to an appeal of the lower court’s

decision. Under California law, the superior court, courts of appeal, and state supreme court each have

original jurisdiction to review a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Cal. Const. Art. VI § 10. Thus, a

petitioner can file an original petition in both the Courts of Appeal and California Supreme Court

without first seeking review in a lower court. “[A]s long as [a] prisoner filed a petition for appellate

review within a ‘reasonable time,’ he could count as ‘pending’ (and add to the 1-year time limit) the

days between (1) the time the lower state court reached an adverse decision, and (2) the day he filed a

petition in the higher state court.” Evans, 546 U.S at 193 (2006). If, however, the petitioner

“unreasonably” delays in seeking review from the California Supreme Court the period between the

lower court denial and filing in the California Supreme Court is not tolled. Carey, 536 U.S. at 225. 

Here, Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition in San Diego County Superior Court on

August 13, 2004. (Lodgment 7.) The AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations is not tolled during the

ninety nine (99) day period between the end of petitioner’s direct appeals on May 5, 2004 and

petitioner’s first state collateral challenge on August 13, 2004. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006

(9th Cir. 1999). Thus, petitioner had 266 days left to file his federal habeas petition once he finished

the state collateral review process. The San Diego County Superior Court denied Petitioner’s first

habeas petition on September 20, 2004. [Lodgment 8.] Over one year later, on October 3, 2005,

petitioner filed a second habeas petition in the San Diego County Superior Court. [Lodgment 9.] That

Court found the second petition was a “successive” petition because it contained claims that either were

brought or could have been brought in the first petition. [Lodgment 10.] The Court also found that

petitioner’s filing almost three and a half years after his conviction “constitutes a substantial delay.”

Id. The Court then denied the petition because petitioner “failed to justify the delay.” Id. 

The Ninth Circuit recently reiterated that an untimely petition does not toll AEDPA’s statute of

limitations. White v. Martel, 2010 WL 1338129, at *1 (9th Cir. April 7, 2010) (“tolling under section

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1

 As a result, Petitioner’s previous habeas filings in this Court on February 16, 2007, March 20, 2007, and May

8, 2007 were also untimely.

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2244(d)(2) is unavailable where a state habeas petition is deemed untimely under California’s timeliness

standards.”). Consequently, the period between the Superior Court’s denial of petitioner’s first petition

and the filing of his untimely second petition was not tolled. See Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149

(9th Cir. 2005) (“if a state court denies a petition as untimely, none of the time before or during the

court’s consideration of that petition is statutorily tolled”). The statute of limitations clock thus started

again as soon as the Superior Court denied petitioner’s first habeas petition on September 20, 2004. At

that point, petitioner had 266 days left to file his federal habeas petition. Petitioner filed the instant

habeas petition 1,697 days later on May 14, 2009.1

The Court notes that petitioner also filed additional habeas petitions in the San Diego State

Superior Court on January 25, 2006, February 13, 2007, and October 29, 2007, as well as petitions in

the California Supreme Court on April 23, 2008 and May 4, 2009. While the California Supreme Court

found the petition filed on April 23, 2008 untimely, none of the other petitions were denied for that

reason. However, the statute of limitations expired on June 13, 2005 (266 days after September 20,

2004). Petitioner did not file his third habeas petition until January 25, 2006. Once the statute of

limitations expired, it could not be restarted by filing additional state court petitions. See Ferguson v.

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, the instant habeas petition is untimely unless

petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling for the period between June 13, 2005 and May 14, 2009. 

2. Equitable Tolling

 “AEDPA’s statute of limitations provision is subject to equitable tolling.” Corjasso v. Ayers,

278 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the Court’s determination “whether there are grounds for

equitable tolling [is] highly fact-dependent.” Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir.

2000). To be entitled to equitable tolling, a petitioner must demonstrate some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way of his timely filing, and he has been pursuing his rights diligently.

Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, equitable tolling will be

allowed only if Petitioner demonstrates “extraordinary circumstances” beyond his control were the

proximate cause of his untimeliness, rather than merely a lack of diligence on his part. Spitsyn v.

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28 2

 Respondents also contend this petition should be dismissed under the abstention doctrine because petitioner also

has a habeas petition pending in the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court denied the aforesaid petition

on September 23, 2009. As there is no longer a petition pending in the California Supreme Court, this argument is moot.

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Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003).

Petitioner has not filed any document requesting equitable tolling or otherwise demonstrating

he would be entitled to equitable tolling. Accordingly, the Court finds equitable tolling is not warranted

in this case. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis2, the Court RECOMMENDS the respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss be GRANTED and the instant petition be DISMISSED. The Court further recommends

petitioner be ordered to attach a statement demonstrating he is entitled to equitable tolling to any

subsequent habeas filings in this Court. This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned

Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, the Honorable

Thomas J. Whelan, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C § 636 (b)(1) (2007) and Local Rule 72.1 (d).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than May 9, 2010, any party may file and serve

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objection shall be filed and served no later

than seven days after being served with the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 9, 2010

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: The Honorable Thomas J. Whelan

 All parties

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