Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02603/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02603-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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Plaintiff states in his motion that oral argument is *

unnecessary. This matter was submitted for decision without oral

argument. L.R. 78-230(h). 

On January 23, 2008, Defendant E. Bidwell & Glenn LLC were 1

dismissed from this action pursuant to a Stipulation and Order filed 

January 23, 2008. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONY MARTINEZ, )

) 2:06-cv-2603-GEB-KJM

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., dba )

RITE-AID #6071; E. BIDWELL & GLENN )

LLC, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Plaintiff moves for $15,829.43 in attorneys’ fees and costs under

42 U.S.C. § 12205 and California Civil Code section 52(a). (Dkt. No.

28.) Defendant Thrifty Payless contends only $6,827.68 in fees and

costs should be awarded. (Opp’n at 17:18-19. 1

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“Because the court finds that plaintiff is entitled to 2

attorney’s fees and costs under the ADA, the court does not address the

standards for an award under California law.” Chapman v. Pier 1

Imports, Inc., 2007 WL 2462084, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2007).

2

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants Thrifty Payless,

Inc., dba Rite Aid # 6071 (“Defendant”) and E. Bidwell & Glenn LLC,

under the federal Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”) and California

statutes relating to access of public facilities after he allegedly

encountered architectural barriers at a Rite Aid in Sacramento,

California. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-2.) On February 18, 2008, Plaintiff

accepted Defendant Rite Aid's Offer of Judgment, which encompassed

both injunctive relief and $4,001 in monetary damages. (Dkt. No. 25.) 

On February 21, 2008, the Clerk of the Court entered judgment in

Plaintiff’s favor in accordance with Plaintiff’s acceptance of the

offer of judgment. (Dkt. No. 26.)

STANDARD

Plaintiff, as the prevailing party in an ADA action, may

recover “reasonable attorney’s fees, including litigation expenses,

and costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. When determining the reasonableness 2

of a fee request, courts typically begin by using the lodestar method. 

Under this approach, “a reasonable hourly rate [is multiplied] by the

number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Widrig v.

Apfel, 140 F.3d 1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 1998). The lodestar figure may

be adjusted based on an evaluation of the following Kerr factors:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty

and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the

skill requisite to perform the legal service

properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment

by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5)

the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or

contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the

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client or the circumstances, (8) the amount

involved and the results obtained, (9) the

experience, reputation, and ability of the

attorneys, (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case,

(11) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client, and (12) awards in

similar cases.

Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000); Kerr v.

Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975). A “strong

presumption” exists that the lodestar figure represents a “reasonable

fee,” and therefore, it should only be enhanced or reduced in “rare

and exceptional cases.” Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119 n.9 (citing

Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S.

546, 565 (1986)). 

ANALYSIS

I. Reasonable Hourly Rate

The parties dispute the appropriate hourly rates to be used

in calculating the fee award. Plaintiff requests rates of $350 per

hour for attorney Lynn Hubbard, $225 per hour for associate attorneys

Scottlynn Hubbard and Mark Emmett, and $90 per hour for paralegals. 

(Mot. at 3:18.) Plaintiff submitted the declaration of his attorney

Lynn Hubbard III in support of the requested rates, in which Mr.

Hubbard declares: “My current billing rate for services performed in

non-complex litigation is $350 per hour. This rate is based upon my

education, knowledge and experience as a litigation strategists and

trial lawyer, my years of practice, and my success rate.” (Hubbard

Decl. at 3.) Plaintiff argues the rates he seeks were awarded in 

similar cases in this district, citing Dodson v. Albertson’s, Inc.,

2008 WL 298823, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2008), a case in which these

rates were awarded, and Hooper v. Calny, Inc., CIV-S-03-0167 (E.D.

Cal. Apr. 25, 2005), a case in which Plaintiff sought lower rates

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($265 for Lynn Hubbard, $175 for Scott Hubbard, and $75 for

paralegals), and in which the court awarded what it found to be

reasonable rates of $250 for an experienced attorney, $175 for an

associate attorney, and $75 for paralegals. Plaintiff argues that the

higher rates awarded in Dodson should be awarded in this action “based

on [his attorneys’] years of experience, credentials and skill in a

given area of law.” (Mot. at 3:23-24.) Defendant counters these

hourly rates are “excessive” and should be reduced to $250 per hour

for Lynn Hubbard, $150 per hour for the associate attorneys, and $75

per hour for paralegals. (Opp’n at 11:22-25.)

Plaintiff also argued for the first time in his reply brief

“there is another reason that the requested hourly rate is reasonable.

Simply put, plaintiff’s counsel is asking this court ‘for a raise,’ as

district judges have awarded the same hourly rate in this district

since 1998, and it’s time for a cost-of-living raise to match

inflation.” (Reply at 4:4-9 (citations omitted).) This new argument

will not be addressed since “[t]he district court need not consider

arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Zamani v.

Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2007). 

“[B]illing rates ‘should be established by reference to the

fees that private attorneys of an ability and reputation comparable to

that of prevailing counsel charge their paying clients for legal work

of similar complexity.’” Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942,

946 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Davis v. City and County of San

Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir. 1992)). “Reasonable fees are

thus to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the

relevant community, with close attention paid to the fees charged by

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lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” 

Id. at 1545-46 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

The fee applicant has the burden of “producing satisfactory

evidence-in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits-that the

requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for

similar legal services by lawyers. A rate determined in this way is

normally deemed to be reasonable, and is referred to-for convenienceas the prevailing rate.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11

(1984). 

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to produce satisfactory

evidence that the rates he requests are in line with those prevailing

in the community for similar legal services by lawyers. All that

Plaintiff has produced is an affidavit from one of his attorneys in

which the rates Plaintiff now requests are included (this affidavit

says nothing about the prevailing market rate in the community), and

two cases: one in which the court approved the requested rates, and

the other in which the court found lower rates to be the prevailing

rates in the community. Plaintiff’s mere citation to Dodson, without

any other supporting documentation showing that the rates sought are

the prevailing rates in the community, is insufficient to satisfy his

burden. Since Hooper discusses the prevailing rates in the community,

those rates will be awarded. Therefore, Plaintiff is awarded rates of

$250 per hour for Lynn Hubbard, $175 per hour for the associate

attorneys, and $75 per hour for paralegals.

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28 The $15,829.43 figure includes $15,451.24 for attorneys fees 3

and $378.18 for litigation expenses and costs. (Mot. at 4.)

6

II. Hours Reasonably Expended

Plaintiff requests $15,829.53 in attorneys’ fees and costs

for 66.0 hours expended on this case. (Mot. at 1:11-13; 3:26-27.) 3

Defendant challenges the reasonableness of the time billed by

Plaintiff’s attorneys for the following reasons: (1) the Kerr factors

favor an adjustment of the lodestar calculation; (2) Plaintiff failed

to split time between the two Defendants; (3) Lynn Hubbard should have

used his associate attorneys to perform more of the “legwork”; (4)

Plaintiff improperly billed clerical work to paralegals; and (5) some

of the specific time entries should be reduced or eliminated as

excessive. (See Opp’n at 7:13-17:0.) Plaintiff rejoins that 66 hours

of work, “for a case that lasted over a year [is] an extremely modest

and reasonable amount of work for this case.” (Reply at 3:18-21.)

A. Splitting Fees Between Defendants

Defendant argues it “should not be held responsible for the

fees and expenses Plaintiff incurred with respect to [E. Bidwell &

Glenn LLC]” and requests fees and expenses to be apportioned equally

between the two defendants. (Opp’n at 10:4-5, 10:15.) Plaintiff

rejoins that Defendant “provides absolutely no legal support

whatsoever for this novel request” and the Defendants can indemnify

each other if necessary. (Reply at 8:11-22.)

Defendant Thrifty Payless “is not required to pay

[Plaintiff] for expenses that are related exclusively to claims

against” Defendant E. Bidwell & Glenn LLC. Martinez v. Longs Drug

Stores, Inc., 2005 WL 3287233, *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2005). A review

of Plaintiff’s counsel’s time entries reveals that time spent for a

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Defendant argues that a conflict check is not a billable task, 4

citing Eiden v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (E.D.

Cal. 2005) (“The court . . . was not persuaded that Lynn Hubbard

routinely bills paying clients and collects from them for time spent on

conflict checks.” (internal quotations omitted)). However, because a

conflict check “is ‘necessary and directly related to [] litigation,’ it

is recoverable as attorneys’ fees.” Dodson v. Albertson’s, Inc., 2008

WL 298823, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2008) (quoting Michigan v. U.S.

Envtl. Prot. Agency, 254 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (awarding fees

for conflict checks)).

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conflict check and researching the proper defendants to name in the

lawsuit should be reduced by 2.15 hours as that amount of time was

related exclusively to Defendant E. Bidwell & Glenn LLC. The record 4

reveals, however, that the remainder of fees Plaintiff seeks are for

“expenses that he would have incurred even if [Thrifty] had been the

sole defendant.” Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores, 2005 WL 3287233, at

*2 (denying request to reduce by 50% fees generated while dismissed

defendant was still a party to the action). Accordingly, the request

for a further apportionment of fees between the two Defendants is

denied. 

B. Use of Associates to Perform Legwork

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees should be

reduced because Lynn Hubbard, “the most expensive attorney in

counsel’s office,” should have used his associate attorneys to perform

the “legwork” in this case. (Opp’n at 10:16-21.) Lynn Hubbard billed

39.4 hours of the 66 total hours billed in this action. (Mot. at

4:13-21.) “The staffing and division of labor undertaken by

plaintiff’s lawyers, however, appears reasonable. . . . With a limited

number of lawyers, it may simply be impractical to staff tasks with

perfect efficiency.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports, Inc., 2007 WL

2462084, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2007). 

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C. Billing of Clerical Time

Defendant argues “paralegal assistants cannot charge for

time incurred on performing ‘clerical’ tasks. . . . Time entries

including the service of documents, creating files, faxing, copying,

and calendaring are clerical in nature.” (Opp’n at 10:24-25, 11:15-

16.) Plaintiff does not respond to this argument in his Reply. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for fees for clerical tasks is

denied. See Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores, Inc., 2005 WL 3287233, at

*7 (denying fee request for clerical tasks when Plaintiff failed to

establish a reasonable rate for clerical tasks); Martinez v. Thrifty

Payless, Inc., 2006 WL 279309, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2006)

(reducing paralegal fees because some clerical tasks were reclassified

as paralegal tasks. “[S]ecretarial costs are deemed by courts within

this circuit to constitute overhead . . . and are thus not separately

reimbursable.”) 

D. Specific Time Entries Should be Reduced or Eliminated

Defendant argues Mr. Hubbard and his staff over-billed and

improperly billed for many tasks and makes detailed objections based

largely on the assertion that Plaintiff’s counsel billed for creating

boilerplate documents used in prior cases. Based on a review of the

record, the following reductions are made: preparation of fee

agreement and letter to client regarding fee agreement reduced to .4

hours, see Eiden, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1170 (making same reduction);

acceptance to offer of judgment reduced to .2 hours, see Dodson, 2008

WL 298823, at *3 n.3 (making same reduction); preparation of bill of

costs reduced to .3 hours, see id. (making similar reduction);

preparation boilerplate motion for attorney fees reduced to 1.0 hour,

see Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores, Inc., 2005 WL 3287233, at *8

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(making same reduction); preparation of request for admissions reduced

to .5 hours, propounded interrogatories reduced to .6 hours, request

for documents reduced to .5 hours, draft demand letter reduced to .4

hours, see Eiden, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1170 (making same or similar

reductions); phone calls with Arnold’s office and McCleary reduced to

a total of .3 hours, (see McCleary Decl. ¶ 2) (declaring calls lasted

no more than 4 minutes), see Dodson, 2008 WL 298823, at *3 n.4 (making

same reduction). Additional reductions for excessive time are also

made for reviewing short letters, meeting with staff regarding initial

disclosures, and for “gathering exhibits” for the attorney’s fee

motion when only one exhibit was filed. Defendant’s additional

requests for reductions are denied as the time billed is reasonable. 

III. Kerr Factor Adjustment

Defendant argues that the Kerr factors require a downward

adjustment in the fee award for this action. (Opp’n at 7-9.)

“Reviewing the Kerr factors not already addressed in arriving at the

lodestar figure, the court finds that this is not a rare or

exceptional case. Accordingly, no upward or downward adjustment to

the lodestar figure is appropriate.” Dodson, 2008 WL 298823, at *4.

IV. Litigation Expenses and Costs

Plaintiff requests $378.18 in litigation expenses and costs,

which comprises a $350.00 filing fee, $15.00 for service of process,

and $13.18 for overnight delivery of a discovery request. (Mot. at

4:19-20; Hubbard Decl., Ex. A.) However, Plaintiff already claimed

$365.00 of these costs in his Bill of Costs. (Opp’n, Ex. 12.) 

Therefore, Plaintiff is awarded $13.18 for litigation expenses and

costs.

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SUMMARY 

For the stated reasons, Plaintiff is awarded $8,075.68 in

attorney’s fees and costs. This award is based on the following

calculation:

Lynn Hubbard 20.65 hours @ $250/hr = $5,162.50

Lynn Hubbard 12.00 hours @ $125/hr = $1,500.00

Scottlynn Hubbard 2.10 hours @ $175/hr = $367.50

Mark Emmett 2.85 hours @ $175/hr = $498.75

Mark Emmett 4.00 hours @ $87.50/hr = $350.00

Paralegals 2.45 hours @ $75/hr = $183.75

Litigation expenses and costs = $13.18

Total attorneys fees and costs = $8,075.68

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 23, 2008

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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