Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00841/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00841-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

v. 

Jorge Daniel Lopez-Mejia,

Defendant/Movant.

No. CV-14-00841-PHX-GMS (ESW) CR-09-01145-PHX-GMS

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Two matters are currently ripe for the Court’s decision.1

 The first matter is 

Defendant/Movant Jorge Daniel Lopez-Mejia’s (“Movant”) amended “Motion under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody”

(Doc. 7), filed on June 2, 2014 (the “First Amended Motion to Vacate”). The second 

matter is the United States’ “Motion to Strike or Dismiss Second Amended Motion to 

Vacate Under § 2255” (Doc. 19), filed on February 19, 2015 (the “Motion to Strike 

Movant’s Second Amended Motion to Vacate”). In its January 23, 2015 Order (Doc. 17), 

the Court granted Movant leave to file a second amended Motion to Vacate. On February 

9, 2015, Movant filed a second amended “Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set 

1 The case was reassigned to U.S. Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett on November 14, 2014.

 

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Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody” (Doc. 18) (the “Second 

Amended Motion to Vacate”), but failed to comply with the Court’s Order (Doc. 17).

For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court grant 

United States’ Motion to Strike Movant’s Second Amended Motion to Vacate (Doc. 19). 

The undersigned further recommends that the Court deny and dismiss with prejudice 

Movant’s First Amended Motion to Vacate (Doc. 18).

I. BACKGROUND

On September 8, 2009, a federal grand jury indicted Movant and ten co-defendants 

on one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of 

cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1), and one count of aiding and abetting 

the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2 (Count 2). (CR-09-01145-PHX-GMS, CR Doc. 28.)2

 The 

District Court denied Movant’s Motion to Dismiss for Outrageous Government Conduct 

(CR Doc. 268), and Movant proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found Movant guilty on 

both counts and further found that Movant conspired with intent to distribute cocaine 

weighing five kilograms or more (CR Doc. 325). A motion for joint hearing on 

sentencing entrapment (CR Doc. 348) was considered. However, the District Court 

found no sentencing entrapment on either basis raised (RT 3/16/11 at 9). On March 16, 

2011, the District Court sentenced Movant to 120 months imprisonment on Count 1 with 

a consecutive 60 month term of imprisonment on Count 2 (CR Docs. 462 and 475).

Movant appealed his conviction on two issues: (1) whether the District Court 

erred in denying the Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Outrageous Government Conduct; 

and (2) whether the District Court erred in determining the government did not engage in 

sentencing entrapment (CA Doc. 37). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 

District Court (CA Doc. 37). The Ninth Circuit’s mandate issued on May 20, 2013.

2 All documents referred to in CR-09-01145 shall be designated “CR Doc. .” 

All documents referred to in C.A. No. 11-10139 shall be designated “CA Doc. .” All 

documents referred to in CV-14-00841 shall be designated “Doc. .”

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On June 2, 2014, Movant filed his First Amended Motion to Vacate (Doc. 7). He 

sets forth three grounds for relief: (1) the rule announced by the United States Supreme 

Court in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), is “a new substantive rule of 

statutory interpretation and should be given retroactive effect in [Movant’s] case”; (2) the 

“mandatory effect of the Mandatory Sentencing system, under which [Movant] was 

sentenced, is a violation of [Movant’s] Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights”; and (3) in 

light of Alleyne, Movant received “critically incorrect legal advice” when the Court, 

prosecutor, and defense counsel advised him “the requisite factual predicate was not an 

element of the crime with which he was charged” and, therefore, Movant suffered an ex 

post facto violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The Court required the 

United States to file a Response (Doc. 10). The United States filed its Response on July 

29, 2014 (Doc. 11).

II. UNITED STATES’ MOTION TO STRIKE MOVANT’S SECOND 

AMENDED MOTION TO VACATE

On September 18, 2014, Movant filed his Motion for Leave to Amend Petition 

under § 2255 (Doc. 13). The Court granted the Motion for Leave to Amend by Order 

filed January 23, 2015 (Doc. 17). The Court set forth specific, mandatory parameters for 

Movant to follow to file Movant’s Second Amended Motion to Vacate. Id. The purpose 

of the Court’s Order was to allow Movant the opportunity to amend Ground Three only 

of his First Amended Motion to Vacate (Doc. 7) to reflect that Movant proceeded to a 

jury trial, rather than a change of plea. The Court specifically set forth the manner in 

which Movant was to submit his Second Amended Motion to Vacate as follows:

Movant must comply with the following in submitting his Second 

Amended Motion to Vacate:

1. Movant must submit the Second Amended Motion to Vacate 

on the court-approved form and sign it under penalty of 

perjury. See Rule 2(c), Rules Governing Section 2255 

Proceedings; LRCiv 3.5(a); and the Court’s April 29, 2014 

Order (Doc. 6). The Clerk of Court will mail Movant the 

court-approved form.

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2. Movant must clearly designate on the face of the document 

that it is a “Second Amended Motion to Vacate.”

3. The Second Amended Motion to Vacate must be typed or

legibly written in its entirety on the court approved form and 

may not incorporate any part of the First Amended 

Motion to Vacate by reference. Movant must describe each 

ground for relief and the facts supporting each ground.

4. The Second Amended Motion to Vacate must conform to the 

grounds alleged in the First Amended Motion to Vacate, with 

the exception of Ground Three. Ground Three must conform 

to the proposed amendment set forth in Movant’s Motion for 

Leave to Amend (Doc. 13).

Failure to comply with any of the above requirements may result in the 

Second Amended Motion to Vacate to be stricken from the record.

(Doc. 17 at 1-2).

On February 9, 2015, Movant filed the Second Amended Motion to Vacate (Doc. 

18) which alleges three new grounds for relief, each on the basis of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. The facts supportive of each ground are also newly raised. The Motion to 

Strike Movant’s Second Amended Motion to Vacate (Doc. 19) may be granted on several 

grounds, as discussed below.

1. Summary Dismissal

Rule 12, Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District 

Courts, states that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied to 28 U.S.C. § 

2255 proceedings to the extent that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not 

inconsistent with the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States 

District Courts. LRCiv 7.2(c) allows an opposing party fourteen days to respond to a 

motion. Failure to respond to a motion may be deemed consent to the Court’s granting of 

the motion, and “the Court may dispose of the motion summarily.” LRCiv 7.2(i). 

Because Movant has failed to respond to the Motion to Strike Movant’s Second 

Amended Motion to Vacate (Doc. 19), the Court may summarily grant the Motion.

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2. Failure to Comply with the Court’s Order (Doc. 17)

The Court favorably may consider the merits of the United States’ Motion (Doc. 

19). Upon review of the Court’s Order filed January 23, 2015 (Doc. 17) and Movant’s 

Second Amended Motion to Vacate (Doc. 18), the Court finds that Movant has failed to 

comply with the Court’s Order both substantively and procedurally. Movant’s Second 

Amended Motion to Vacate (Doc. 18) is not clearly designated “Second Amended 

Motion to Vacate” as ordered. It does not conform in any way to Grounds One and Two 

for relief set forth in the First Amended Motion to Vacate (Doc. 7). It does not set forth 

Ground Three as reflected in the proposed amendment which was approved by the Court 

and contained in Movant’s Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 13). The Court clearly 

warned Movant that a failure to comply with its Order may result in striking the Second 

Amended Motion to Vacate (Doc. 17 at 2). Movant chose to file a document which 

alleges three new grounds for relief, none of which relate back factually to the First 

Amended Motion to Vacate (Doc. 7). For these reasons, the Second Amended Motion to 

Vacate (Doc. 18) should be stricken from the record.

3. Statute of Limitations and Rule 15(c)

The United States argues persuasively that the Court may dismiss Movant’s 

Second Amended Motion to Vacate (Doc. 18) because the grounds for relief set forth 

therein are time-barred and do not relate back to Movant’s original pleading under Rule 

15(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. Movant attempts to amend his First Amended Motion to Vacate to 

add three new ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are unrelated to the sentencing 

and Alleyne arguments set forth in his original and First Amended Motion to Vacate. 

Movant’s new claims are supported by facts that differ substantially in time and type 

from the facts alleged in his original claims. The new claims do not arise from the same 

core facts as the original claims. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 650 (2005) (holding 

that an amended habeas petition “does not relate back (and thereby escapes AEDPA’s 

one-year time limit) when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ 

in both time and type from those the original pleading set forth”). Therefore, the one year 

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statute of limitations set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (“AEDPA”)3 applies, and Rule 15(c)(1)(B), Fed. R. Civ. P., does not allow 

Movant’s new claims to relate back to the original Motion to Vacate.

III. MOVANT’S FIRST AMENDED MOTION TO VACATE

In its Response (Doc. 16), the United States argues that Movant’s First Amended 

Motion to Vacate should be denied because his claims are meritless or procedurally 

defaulted. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned finds that Movant’s claims are 

meritless. The Court will recommend that the First Amended Motion to Vacate be 

denied (Doc. 7).

1. Ground One: Retroactive Application of Alleyne

Movant requests that the Court apply and give retroactive effect to Alleyne v. 

United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), in Movant’s case. Movant asserts that the “Alleyne 

Rule announced by the Supreme Court on June 17, 2013 articulated a new substantive 

rule of statutory interpretation and should be given retroactive effect in Petitioner’s case.” 

(Doc 7 at 5).

In Alleyne, the Supreme Court overruled Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 

567-68 (2002) (judicial fact-finding that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a 

crime is permissible under the Sixth Amendment), finding Harris to be inconsistent with 

the Court’s holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“any fact that 

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 

submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”) and the Sixth Amendment. 

Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2163. If a fact constitutes an “element” or “ingredient” of a charged 

offense, that fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 2158 

(quoting United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 224 (2010)). If a fact increases a 

punishment above what is otherwise legally prescribed, that fact is by definition an 

element of the offense. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. In Alleyne, the Court specifically 

held that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence must be treated as an 

3 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

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element of the offense and submitted to the jury to be found beyond a reasonable doubt. 

133 S.Ct. at 2158. The Court found legally indistinguishable facts which raise the 

maximum punishment a defendant can receive from facts which raise the minimum 

punishment a defendant can receive. Id. at 2162.

Alleyne further held that a finding that the defendant had brandished a firearm, 

rather than merely carried a firearm, was an element of a separate aggravated offense 

which had to be submitted to the jury because it elevated the mandatory minimum 

sentence the defendant could receive for the offense. Brandishing a firearm as a factual 

finding, therefore, had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact under 

the Sixth Amendment. 133 S.Ct. at 2163-64.

In Movant’s case, however, the Indictment alleged the elements of both crimes 

charged. The drug type and quantity were set forth in Count 1. The jury found the 

Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute cocaine weighing five kilograms or more. The form of verdict specifically 

questioned the jury on the amount of cocaine Movant conspired to possess with intent to 

distribute (CR Doc. 325). Also, the Indictment in Count 2 reflected the manner in which 

the Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). There was no allegation that Movant 

brandished or discharged the firearm. (CR Doc. 28). The jury found Movant guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

crime. (CR Doc. 325). The Movant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentences 

for each Count: no enhanced mandatory minimum sentence was imposed.

Movant, therefore, fails to meet any basis for relief under Alleyne in his case. The 

Court will recommend denial of Ground One of Movant’s First Amended Motion to 

Vacate. The Court need not address whether Alleyne applies retroactively to Ground 

One. Even if Alleyne were applied retroactively, Alleyne has no application to this case.

2. Ground Two: Constitutionality of Statutory Mandatory Minimum Sentences

Movant argues in Ground Two that his mandatory minimum sentences received 

violate his Fifth and Sixth Amendment constitutional rights. Movant bases his argument 

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on application of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), to his case. However, 

as the Court has set forth in its analysis of Ground One, the Alleyne decision has no effect 

on Movant’s case as Movant’s sentence was a mandatory minimum sentence with no 

enhancers, decided by a jury which made all necessary findings beyond a reasonable 

doubt on its form of verdict, and presented by an Indictment which set forth all elements 

of each offense. The Supreme Court in Alleyne did not strike down all mandatory 

minimum sentences as unconstitutional. 133 S.Ct. at 2163 (noting its ruling “does not 

mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be found by a jury”). Further, 

mandatory minimum sentencing has been upheld by the Ninth Circuit subsequent to 

Alleyne. See United States v. Lizarraga-Carrizales, 757 F.3d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(statutory mandatory minimum sentences triggered by drug quantities found beyond a 

reasonable doubt by a jury or admitted by defendant are constitutional). Therefore, the 

Court will recommend denial of Ground Two.4

3. Ground Three: Alleyne’s Effect on Indictment, Plea, and Sentence

In Ground Three of Movant’s First Amended Motion to Vacate, Movant alleges as 

follows:

In light of the Alleyne Rule the record discloses that at the time of 

petitioner’s indictment and plea he was advised by the district court, his

own lawyer, and the prosecutor that the requisite factual predicate was not 

an element of the crime with which he was charged.

(Doc. 7 at 7).

Movant argues that, because of Alleyne, the indictment, plea agreement, and 

sentencing procedure were invalid, erroneous, and violated his “Fifth and Sixth 

Amendment rights Ex Post Facto.” (Doc. 7 at 20) Movant maintains that the District 

Court “misinformed [Movant] as to the elements of a § 924(c)(1) offense,” and therefore 

Movant’s guilty plea was “unintelligent.” (Doc. 7 at 21).

The record in this case is clear: Movant did not plead guilty. Movant was found 

4 The Court need not address whether Movant is procedurally defaulted for failure 

to raise Ground Two on direct appeal on the basis of Apprendi. Ground Two is without 

merit as a matter of law.

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guilty by a jury on all counts of the Indictment, and he was sentenced to the statutory 

mandatory minimum sentence on each count. The Supreme Court’s holding in Alleyne

has no effect on this Movant’s indictment, jury trial, or sentence. Movant’s arguments 

regarding a guilty plea are irrelevant. His indictment articulated all the elements of each 

crime, and the jury made the requisite findings beyond a reasonable doubt to support his 

conviction and sentence. The Judge thereafter sentenced Movant to the mandatory 

statutory minimum sentence based on the findings of the jury. Movant did not receive an

enhanced mandatory minimum sentence. The Court will recommend denial of Ground 

Three.

4. Rule of Lenity Does Not Apply

In his conclusion, Movant asks the Court to apply the rule of lenity to Movant’s 

sentence. The statutes under which Movant was convicted are unambiguous. See 21 

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) (mandatory minimum ten year sentence for intent to distribute 

five kilograms or more of cocaine) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (mandatory minimum five 

year sentence for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “[i]n the face of unambiguous congressional intent, the 

rule of lenity does not apply.” United States v. Hoyt, 879 F.2d 505, 512 (9th Cir. 1989), 

as amended by 888 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1989). Because the rule of lenity does not apply, 

the Court will recommend that Movant’s request for its application to his sentence be 

denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Strike Movant’s Second Amended 

Motion to Vacate (Doc. 19) be granted.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Second Amended Motion to 

Vacate (Doc. 18) be stricken from the record.

ALTERNATIVELY, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the new claims raised in the 

Second Amended Motion to Vacate (Doc. 18) be dismissed with prejudice as they are 

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time-barred and that the Court further consider only those claims raised in Movant’s First 

Amended Motion to Vacate (Doc. 7). 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the First Amended Motion to Vacate (Doc. 7) be 

DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis be DENIED because Movant has not made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007).

Dated this 2nd day of June, 2015. 

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