Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-03782/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-03782-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1Plaintiff has named James Tilton, Director of the California

Department of Corrections as the respondent, but the proper

respondent is the Warden at Solano State Prison, Gary Swarthout.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DELANO TOLDEN,

Petitioner,

 v.

GARY SWARTHOUT, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 08-03782 CW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS 

On August 7, 2008, Petitioner Delano Tolden, a state prisoner

incarcerated at California State Prison in Solano, California filed

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting four claims: 

(1) his sentence for failure to register as a sex offender, in

violation of California Penal Code § 290(a)(1)(A)(g)(2), infringes

his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment; (2) his confession was unconstitutionally admitted into

evidence in violation of Miranda v. Arizona; and (3) and (4) his

Due Process right to a fair trial was violated by improper jury

instructions. On February 23, 2009, Respondent filed an answer.1

On May 27, 2009, Petitioner filed a traverse. Having considered

all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court denies the

petition.

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Petitioner’s first conviction was reversed on direct appeal

in People v. Tolden (Tolden I), 2004 WL 1175429 (Cal. App.). 

Tolden II addressed Petitioner’s conviction after his second trial.

3

Section 290 was subsequently amended to require registration

within five working days. See People v. Garcia, 25 Cal. 744, 750

(2001).

2

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the March 27, 2007 opinion

of the California court of appeal on direct appeal from a jury

verdict. People v. Tolden, (Tolden II), 2007 WL 906619 (Cal. App.)

(unpublished).2

In 1981, Petitioner was convicted of kidnaping, robbery,

assault with intent to commit rape, and oral copulation by force

stemming from one incident in which he kidnaped four teenagers with

a pellet gun and held them for one and one half hours. In 1991,

Petitioner was released on parole and was notified that he was

required to register as a convicted sex offender for the rest of

his life under the provisions of California Penal Code § 290,

which, at that time, required that he register within fourteen days

of moving to a new city.3 Between January 8, 1991 and March 1,

1994, Petitioner registered seven times. The last time he

registered was on March 1, 1994, with the Modesto Police

Department.

After his release on parole, Petitioner was convicted of two

misdemeanors: falsely identifying himself and possession of drug

paraphernalia. Between 1991 and 1995, Petitioner violated parole

eight times. Prior to being released from custody for the parole

violations, Petitioner was formally advised of the various

conditions of his parole and signed an acknowledgment that he

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understood his duty to comply with parole conditions.

Between November, 1993 and September, 1995, Petitioner

received ten admonishments on parole. On December 29, 1995,

Petitioner called his parole officer, Larry Owens, who informed him

that, because he had left Modesto without permission, he had

violated the travel parole condition and that he had to return to

Modesto by January 8, 1996. Petitioner failed to report to Officer

Owens, and, as a result, his parole was suspended and a warrant was

issued for his arrest. 

Law enforcement authorities had no record of Petitioner’s

whereabouts until November 16, 1997, when Officers David Lee and

John Cary of the San Jose Police Department received information

that Petitioner was living at the Casa Linda Motel in San Jose. 

Officer Lee further learned that Petitioner was a registered sex

offender, he had last registered in 1994 in Modesto, he had not

registered in San Jose and he had an arrest warrant for a parole

violation. Officer Lee arrested Petitioner for failing to register

as a sex offender. 

Later that day, Officer Lee interviewed Petitioner. Before

doing so, Officer Lee informed Petitioner of his Miranda rights and

asked if he understood them. Petitioner said that he did and that

he was willing to talk. Officer Lee asked where Petitioner had

been since he had last registered as a sex offender. Petitioner

replied that, in November, 1994, he had left Modesto and had lived

in various places in Alameda County. Sometime in 1997, he moved to

San Jose, where he was living until his arrest. Petitioner

admitted that he had not registered as a sex offender after leaving

Modesto in 1994. 

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The interview was tape-recorded and transcribed. The tape

and transcript were admitted into evidence at Petitioner’s trial.

4

The next day, Officer Gary Olsen of the San Jose Police

Department conducted a follow-up interview with Petitioner.4

Petitioner was sobbing and asked Officer Olsen to turn the recorder

off momentarily. Officer Olsen did so. After turning the recorder

back on, Officer Olsen said that, before they could talk, he had to

advise Petitioner of his Miranda rights. Petitioner said, “I know,

I know, I know that.” Officer Olsen then advised Petitioner of his

rights to remain silent and to have an appointed attorney present

at the interview and warned Petitioner that anything he said would

be used against him. After Petitioner indicated that he

understood, Officer Olsen asked whether he would discuss why he had

not registered as a sex offender in San Jose and where he had been

living. Before proceeding, Petitioner said he wanted to ask a

question off the record. Officer Olsen turned the tape-recorder

off and then, after a few minutes, turned it back on. He asked

questions, and Petitioner responded to them.

Officer Olsen could not recall what was said either time he

turned off the recorder. However, he stated that he did not

promise Petitioner anything because he never makes such promises. 

During the interview, Petitioner said he had been living in an

apartment in Sunnyvale for eighteen months, paying rent, and taking

the bus or train to his job in San Jose as a baggage handler for

Greyhound, where he had worked since January, 1996. When

Petitioner was asked why he had not registered as a sex offender

when he got to Sunnyvale, he replied that he was still scared and

was trying to get his life together. He thought he “might get hurt

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trying to hide something.” Petitioner said that one reason he

moved from Modesto to San Jose was fear, because he knew about the

murder of a man named Rick at the Modesto Inn in 1995. Petitioner

stated that he was with an armed man during the shooting. When the

man wanted to shoot back, Petitioner said they should leave. The

man threatened Petitioner, saying that he would kill Petitioner, a

police officer and Petitioner’s parole officer, if Petitioner ever

returned to Modesto. Petitioner explained that, as a parolee, he

has to talk to the police if they approach him, and he felt that if

people saw him talking to police, they would think he was

“snitching everybody off.” When Officer Olsen asked if Petitioner

was trying to hide from his parole officer, Petitioner replied that

he “couldn’t even go back down there man, because see the main

thing is I went back down there, they want to smoke my parole.” 

Officer Olsen understood this to mean that parole would be revoked.

Petitioner told Officer Olsen that he understood that his

obligation to register as a sex offender was a lifetime

requirement. Officer Olsen told Petitioner that a change in the

law required Petitioner to register as a sex offender within five

working days of coming to a new city and Petitioner replied that he

did not know that, observing that he “used to register in 15 days,

nowadays its five days.” Petitioner said that he didn’t register

when he got to Sunnyvale because “I figured since I was already

registered, you know, I didn’t know at that time, that I didn’t

know nothing about that at the time, you know.” Tolden II, 2007 WL

906619 at *1-4.

At his first trial, a bench trial in the Santa Clara County

superior court, Petitioner was convicted of failing to register as

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a sex offender and failing to notify the police of his new address

and was sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty-five years to life

under California’s Three Strikes Law. People v. Tolden (Tolden I),

2004 WL 1175429 *1-2. (Cal. App.) (unpublished). On May 27, 2004,

the California court of appeal ruled that the trial court committed

reversible error in holding that it was irrelevant whether

Petitioner actually knew he had a duty to register as a sex

offender, finding that Petitioner had presented to the trial court

“significant evidence” of his mental retardation and limited mental

functioning which refuted the allegation of willfulness. Id. at 4-

5.

The case was retried to a jury in Santa Clara County superior

court. On December 13, 2004, the jury found Petitioner guilty of

count one, failing to register as a sex offender in violation of

California Penal Code § 290(A)(1)(a)(g)(2), but acquitted him of

count two, failing to notify police of his change of address. The

court denied Petitioner’s motion to strike any prior convictions

and sentenced him to a term of twenty-five years to life. It also

imposed a $10,000 restitution fine, a $200 penalty assessment, and

a $20 court security fee. 

Petitioner timely appealed. On March 27, 2007, in a written

opinion, the California court of appeal affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction but reduced the fines imposed. Tolden II, 2007 WL

906619 at *18. On April 20, 2007, the California court of appeal

denied Petitioner’s petition for a rehearing. On June 20, 2007,

the California Supreme Court summarily denied his petition for

review.

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LEGAL STANDARD

A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state

prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA), a district court may not grant a petition

challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim

that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). A decision is contrary to clearly established federal

law if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if

it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts

materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th. Cir. 2003). Habeas relief is warranted only if

the constitutional error at issue had a "'substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Penry v.

Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795-96 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)). 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is the holdings of the Supreme Court as

of the time of the relevant state court decision. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).

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To determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest state

court that addressed the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a

reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). In the present case, the highest court to address the

merits of Petitioner's claim is the California appellate court on

direct review.

DISCUSSION

I. Eighth Amendment Claim

A. Established Supreme Court Authority

A criminal sentence that is not proportionate to the crime for

which the defendant was convicted violates the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Solem v. Helm,

463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (sentence of life imprisonment without

possibility of parole for seventh nonviolent felony violates Eighth

Amendment). But "outside the context of capital punishment,

successful challenges to the proportionality of particular

sentences will be exceedingly rare." Id. at 289-90. For the

purposes of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the only “clearly

established law amenable to the ‘contrary to’ or ‘unreasonable

application of’ framework is the gross disproportionality

principle, . . . applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and

‘extreme’ case.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72, 73 (2003)

(citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).

B. State Appellate Court Opinion (Tolden II)

After reviewing relevant federal and state court opinions, the

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state court of appeal held that Petitioner’s sentence was not more

cruel and unusual than that of other prisoners whose harsh

sentences were upheld by the courts. Tolden II, 2007 WL 906619 at

*15-17.

First, the state appellate court cited People v. Cooper, 43

Cal. App. 4th 815, 825 (1996), for the proposition that Petitioner

was punished not just for his current offense, but for his

recidivism, and that Petitioner’s sentence was “punishment for

willfully failing to register as a sex offender and doing so as a

recidivist offender.” Id. at *15. The state court cited Rummel v.

Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980), in which the Supreme Court

upheld the sentence of a defendant who was given a mandatory life

sentence for stealing $120.75 with prior convictions for fraud

involving $80 worth of goods and passing a forged check for $28.36. 

Id. The state court cited Rummel’s reasoning that the primary goal

of a recidivist statute is to 

deter repeat offenders and, at some point in the life of

one who repeatedly commits criminal offenses serious

enough to be punished as felonies, to segregate that

person from the rest of society for an extended period of

time. This segregation and its duration are based not

merely on that person’s most recent offense but also on

the propensities he has demonstrated over a period of

time during which he has been convicted of and sentenced

for other crimes . . . . 

Id. (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284-85).

The state court also cited Andrade, 538 U.S. at 77, in which

the Supreme Court upheld two life sentences of a defendant who was

convicted of petty theft with a prior for taking $153.84 worth of

videotapes from two stores on separate occasions. Id. at *16. The

defendant’s criminal history consisted of a misdemeanor theft

conviction, a few felony burglary convictions, two convictions for

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transporting marijuana, and a parole violation. Id. The state

court also cited Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003), in

which the Supreme Court upheld the life sentence of a defendant who

was convicted of grand theft for taking three golf clubs worth $399

each, with a past criminal history, spanning 1984 through 1999, of

convictions for grand theft, auto theft, battery, burglary,

robbery, possession of drugs, trespass, and unlawful possession of

a firearm. Id.

The court also cited California cases in which the courts

upheld the sentences of defendants who were convicted of failing to

register as a sex offender. For instance, the court cited People

v. Meeks, 123 Cal. App. 4th 695 (2004), where the defendant was

convicted of violating § 290--by failing to register within five

days after changing his address and failing to register within five

days of his birthday--and given a life sentence. Id. (citing

Meeks, 123 Cal. App. 4th at 700-01). Meeks had registered at least

nine times between 1982 and 1997 and then failed to do so until his

arrest in 2000. Id. (citing Meeks). Meeks had prior convictions

for burglary, possession of arson material, attempted rape, rape,

robbery, assault, possession of drugs and driving under the

influence and numerous parole violations. Id. (citing Meeks). The

Meeks court found that the defendant’s lengthy criminal record

brought him within the letter and spirit of the Three Strikes Law. 

Id. (citing Meeks, 123 Cal. App. 4th at 700-01). 

The state appellate court also cited People v. Poslof, 126

Cal. App. 4th 92 (2005), which upheld a sentence of twenty-seven

years to life under the Three Strikes Law for a defendant convicted

of failing to register who had prior convictions for inflicting

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corporal punishment on a child, lewd conduct with a child,

possession of drugs, and parole violations. Id. (citing Poslof,

126 Cal. App. 4th at 109).

The state court distinguished People v. Carmony, 127 Cal. App.

4th 1066 (2005), upon which Petitioner relied. Id. at *17. In

Carmony, the defendant was convicted of violating California Penal

Code § 290(a)(1)(C) for failing to update his previously reported

address, which had not changed, within five days after his

birthday. Id. (citing Carmony, 127 Cal. App. 4th at 1071). In

finding the defendant’s sentence of twenty-five years to life was

cruel and unusual, the Carmony court emphasized that the

defendant’s offense was passive and nonviolent and posed no direct

or immediate danger to society because he had correctly registered

the proper information the month before his birthday. Id. (citing

Carmony, 127 Cal. App. 4th at 1078). The state appellate concluded

that, unlike Carmony’s offense, Petitioner’s offense “directly

frustrated the central purpose of the law, and since 1994, he kept

local law enforcement authorities from knowing his whereabouts or

even that he was in their jurisdiction.” Id. at *17. 

The state court rejected Petitioner’s argument that his

criminal history was distinguishable from the prosecution’s cited

cases because his violent crimes stemmed from one incident in 1981. 

The court also rejected Petitioner’s argument that his mental

retardation distinguished him from the defendants in the

prosecution’s cited cases. Id. at *17. 

The court considered evidence regarding Petitioner’s mental

capacity and ability to function in society. Id. at *5-6. It

reviewed the testimony of Geraldine Fegley, Petitioner’s supervisor

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at the Greyhound terminal at which he was employed, as well as that

of Marylyn Beswick, the manager at Petitioner’s apartment building

in Sunnyvale. Id. at *4-5. Both testified that Petitioner did not

appear to have any major problems performing his duties and he

seemed to function normally. Id. Santa Clara County Jail

Correctional Officers Patricia Fountain and Martin Strosnider, who

supervised Petitioner intermittently for over six years, testified

that Petitioner satisfactorily performed his job functions as a

jail trustee. Id. at *5.

Doctor Timothy Derning, a clinical forensic psychologist,

testified that he had met with Petitioner for nine hours and

administered various psychological tests. Id. at *5. Doctor

Derning concluded that Petitioner had an Intelligence Quotient (IQ)

in the 60s. Id. Although Doctor Derning thought Petitioner was

capable of registering without help, he opined that the probability

that Petitioner would or could do so without help was low. Id.

The court found that Doctor Derning’s conclusion that

Petitioner’s retardation and low IQ rendered him incapable of

understanding and complying with his duty to register was rebutted

by evidence that he had registered on numerous occasions and by

testimony that he was able to understand and perform the duties of

his jobs at Greyhound and in jail and his obligation to pay rent

regularly. Id. The court found that the tasks Petitioner

completed were no less difficult to comprehend and perform than his

duty to register. Id. The court concluded, “Simply put, the

record does not compel a conclusion that defendant’s level of

mental functioning so reduced his criminal culpability as to render

his sentence grossly disproportionate or unconscionable.” Id.

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Gonzalez was decided after Tolden II. However, People v.

Carmony, distinguished in Tolden II, addressed the same issue.

13

C. Analysis

Given the facts and holdings in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.

263 (1980), Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), Ewing v.

California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), and Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63

(2003), the state appellate court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s

history was indistinguishable from established Supreme Court

precedent was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

that precedent. 

Petitioner cites Gonzalez v. Duncan, 551 F.3d 875 (9th Cir.

2008),5 where the Ninth Circuit held that a Three Strikes sentence

of twenty-eight years to life for violating California Penal Code 

§ 290 was cruel and unusual. Id. at 878-79. However, in Gonzalez,

the defendant violated § 290(a)(1)(D), which requires a convicted

sex offender to update his registration within five working days of

his birthday. Gonzalez had updated his address nine months before

his birthday and three months after his birthday, all the while

residing at the same address. Id. at 879. The court found that

the annual registration requirement was “only tangentially related

to the state’s interest in ensuring that sex offenders are

available for police surveillance,” and failure to comply with it

was merely a technical violation. Id. at 884. Furthermore, the

court could discern no harm from Gonzalez’ failure to register

because he had resided at the same address that he had registered

nine months before and three months after his birthday. Id.

In contrast, Petitioner violated California Penal Code 

§ 290(a)(1)(A)(g)(2), failing to register after a change of

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address. As noted by the Gonzalez court, under California law, the

distinction between these statutes is critical. Id. at 885. 

Failing to register after a change in address is not a technical

violation of the law, but thwarts the very purpose of the

registration statute, to ensure that the whereabouts of sex

offenders are known to police. See People v. Sorden, 36 Cal. 4th

65, 72-73 (2005) (purpose of § 290 is to ensure that individuals

convicted of sex crimes shall be readily available for police

surveillance because the state legislature deemed them likely to

recommit these offenses in the future). Exacerbating the

situation, Petitioner admittedly had moved several times since he

last registered in Modesto, and had failed to register after any of

these moves. Furthermore, during this time he had absconded from

his parole for committing sex crimes. 

Therefore, the Gonzalez decision does not aid Petitioner’s

claim that his sentence was cruel and unusual.

Finally, Petitioner argues that his sentence is cruel and

unusual because he is mentally retarded and has impaired mental

functioning. As indicated by the state appellate court, the

evidence concerning Petitioner’s mental limitations was

conflicting. Dr. Derning estimated that Petitioner’s IQ was 65 to

67, RT at 547, 551, and his reading ability was between the second

and fourth grade level, RT at 592. However, in other testing,

Petitioner scored from 69 to above 70. RT at 558, 565. And, on

cross-examination, Dr. Derning admitted that, on tests conducted by

other professionals, Petitioner scored in the average intelligence

range. RT at 594-95. 

Furthermore, the jurors listened to and read a transcript of

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the taped interview that Officer Olsen conducted of Petitioner. 

The jury also heard testimony from Ms. Fegley and Correctional

Officer Fountain, who supervised Petitioner at his jobs, and Ms.

Beswick, the manager of Petitioner’s apartment building. These

witnesses testified that Petitioner functioned well, understood

directions, was a hard worker and learned quickly, with the proper

training.

This record supports the state court’s conclusion that Dr.

Derning’s testimony that Petitioner’s impaired mental functioning

rendered him incapable of understanding his duty to register was

rebutted by other evidence. 

The Court concludes that the state court’s denial of

Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority or an

unreasonable finding of the facts in light of the evidentiary

record. Petitioner’s claim for relief on the ground that his

sentence violated the Eighth Amendment is denied.

II. Miranda Claim

A. Established Supreme Court Authority

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court

held that certain warnings must be given before a suspect's

statement made during custodial interrogation can be admitted in

evidence. Miranda requires that a suspect subjected to custodial

interrogation be advised that he has the right to remain silent,

that statements made can be used against him, and that he has the

right to have counsel appointed. These warnings must precede any

custodial interrogation, which occurs whenever law enforcement

officers question a suspect after taking him into custody or

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otherwise significantly depriving him of freedom of action. Id. at

444. Once properly advised of his rights, an accused may waive

them, if he does so voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Id.

at 475. The validity of a waiver of Miranda rights depends upon

the totality of the circumstances, including the background,

experience and conduct of the defendant. United States v. Bernard

S., 795 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1986). The government must prove

waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly,

479 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1986). The waiver need not be express as

long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that it was

knowing and voluntary. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373

(1979). A showing that a defendant knew his rights generally is

sufficient to establish that he knowingly and intelligently waived

them. Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2004).

B. State Appellate Court Opinion (Tolden II)

The state court reviewed the circumstances of Petitioner’s

interviews with Officer Lee and Officer Olsen and addressed his

claim that he did not waive his Miranda rights before his second

interview with Officer Olsen.

These circumstances support the trial court’s finding

that defendant implicitly waived his rights before

speaking to Officer Olsen. Indeed, courts have

repeatedly found implied waivers where, as here, a

suspect has been advised of his rights, the suspect

indicates he or she understands them, there is no

evidence of inducement or coercion, the suspect does not

request an attorney, and thereafter the suspect freely

talks to police and answers questions. (Citations

omitted).

Defendant claims we may not infer his waiver from a

silent record. (See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 498-99). 

However, the record is not silent, only the tape is, and

the circumstances noted above support a finding that

defendant was familiar with Miranda warnings and waiver

procedure, having just gone through it with Officer Lee

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the day before; Officer Olsen advised him of his rights;

he did not request an attorney; Officer Olsen did not

promise defendant anything or coerce him; and thereafter,

he freely discussed his case.

Defendant claims that a waiver should not be inferred

because his request that the recorder be turned off

showed that he was reluctant to speak to Officer Olsen

and had concerns about waiving his rights. This claim is

speculative because the record does not reveal the reason

for defendant’s request. Moreover, even assuming it was

reasonable to infer reluctance, that is not the only

reasonable inference, and the trial court rejected it. 

Furthermore, the circumstances do not compel a finding

that defendant was reluctant to talk or concerned about

waiving his rights. Rather, it appears that defendant

simply wanted to ask a more private or personal question

and keep the subject between him and Officer Olsen. He

certainly indicated no reluctance to talk when the

recorder was turned back on.

Defendant argues that even if his conduct implies a

waiver, his mental deficiencies and subnormal

intelligence negate a finding that he knew what he was

doing. However, there was no evidence before the trial

court when it admitted defendant’s statement that

defendant was suffering from any mental deficiency or was

otherwise incapable of understanding and voluntarily

waiving his rights. Moreover, his conversation with

Officer Olsen does not establish that he has a low IQ or

suffers from some mental impairment. On the contrary,

during the interview, he spelled names of people; he

recited his social security and driver’s license numbers;

he remembered dates, addresses, phone numbers, and the

names of a co-worker, a police officer, and a homicide

victim.

Tolden II, 2007 WL 906619 at *6-7.

C. Analysis

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court’s decision was an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority. He makes the

same arguments here that the state court rejected. After reviewing

the record, the Court concludes that the appellate court’s decision

was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

authority. This claim for habeas relief is denied.

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III. Jury Instructions

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under

state law does not state a claim cognizable in federal habeas

corpus proceedings. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). 

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge,

a petitioner must show that the ailing instruction by itself so

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates

due process. Id. at 72; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147

(1973). The instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation,

but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a

whole and the trial record. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. In other

words, the court must evaluate challenged instructions in the

context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the

entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169

(1982).

In order to obtain habeas relief for a due process violation,

the petitioner must show both an actual error and a "reasonable

likelihood" that the jury applied the instruction in a way that

violates the Constitution, such as relieving the state of its

burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Waddington v. Sarausad, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 823, 831 (2009)

(internal quotations and citations omitted.) A determination that

there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the

challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution

establishes only that an error has occurred. Calderon v. Coleman,

525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998). If an error is found, the court also

must determine that the error had a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, before

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granting relief in habeas proceedings. Id. at 146-47 (citing

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637).

A. Conflicting Instructions

Petitioner argues that it was error to give CALJIC No. 1.20

and CALJIC No. 3.30 because they conflicted with the instructions

about the requirement of actual knowledge of the registration

requirement.

The trial court gave the following jury instructions that are

relevant to the knowledge requirement.

The word “wilfully” when applied to the intent with which

an act is done or omitted means with a purpose or

willingness to commit the act or to make the omission in

question. The word “wilfully” does not require any

intent to violate the law or to injure another or to

acquire any advantage.

CALJIC No. 1.20, RT at 671.

Under the statutory definition of “wilfully,” an omission

to act would not be wilful if objective circumstances

beyond the defendant’s control prevented him from acting. 

For example, a debilitating injury, illness, or mental

infirmity might objectively prevent a defendant from

registering in a timely fashion, thereby rendering

“unwilful” the defendant’s failure to register.

RT at 671.

. . .

In the crimes charged in Counts 1 or 2 there must exist a

union or joint operation of act or conduct and general

criminal intent. General criminal intent does not

require an intent to violate the law. When a person

intentionally does that which the law declares to be a

crime, he is acting with general criminal intent, even

though he may not know that his act or conduct is

unlawful.

CALJIC No. 3.30, RT at 678.

In the crimes charged in Counts 1 and 2 there must exist

a union or joint operation of act or conduct and a

certain mental state in the mind of the perpetrator. 

Unless this mental state exists, the crimes to which it

relates are not committed.

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RT at 678.

In the crime of failure to register as a sex offender,

the necessary mental state is actual knowledge.

RT at 678-79.

The information in this case charges that the defendant,

Delano Tolden, committed the following felonies, to wit:

Count 1, on or about November 16, 1997, in the above

named judicial district, the crime of failing to register

as a sex offender in violation of Penal Code Section

290(a)(1)(A)/(G)(2), a felony, was committed by Delano

Tolden, who having been previously convicted of a felony

offense, which requires him to register pursuant to Penal

Code Section 290, was required to register under Penal

Code Section 290, wilfully failed to register with the

chief of police of the law enforcement agency in the city

in which he resided and or was domiciled, to wit, the

City of Sunnyvale, California, within 14 working days of

coming into the city.

RT at 679

. . .

The defendant is accused in Count 1 of the Information of

having violated Penal Code Section 290(a)(1)(A)/(G)(2), a

felony.

RT at 679.

Every person who, having been previously convicted of a

qualifying felony sex offense, and wilfully fails to

register with the chief of police of the law enforcement

agency of the city in which he resides or is domiciled

within 14 working days of coming into the city is guilty

of violating Penal Code Section 290(a)(1)(A)/(G)(2) of

the Penal Code, a felony.

In order to prove such a crime, each of the following

elements must be proved:

One, the defendant is a person who, having previously

been convicted of a qualifying felony sex offense, is

required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Penal

Code Section 290.

And, two, defendant moved into a city in the State of

California and established a new residence and domicile.

And, three, the defendant had actual knowledge of his

duty to register.

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And, four, having that knowledge, defendant wilfully

failed to register within 14 working days with a law

enforcement agency having jurisdiction over his place or

residence or domicile.

RT at 680.

After counsel’s closing arguments, the court repeated the

instruction on the elements of the crime of failing to register as

a sex offender. See RT at 757-58 (restating instructions at RT

679-80).

1. State Appellate Court Opinion (Tolden II)

Petitioner relied upon two California Supreme Court cases,

People v. Garcia, 25 Cal. 4th 744 (2001), and People v. Barker,

34 Cal. 4th 345 (2004). The state court gave several reasons for

rejecting his argument. The court first noted that both CALJIC

Nos. 1.20 and 3.30 are proper statements of the law, and that

neither Garcia nor Barker held otherwise. It distinguished

Garcia and Barker on the ground that in those cases the court did

not instruct that actual knowledge was required, as did the trial

court in Petitioner’s case. The court stated that neither case

suggests that it is error to give CALJIC Nos. 1.20 and

3.30 in registration cases because they would conflict

with a proper instruction requiring actual knowledge. 

Indeed, neither instruction expressly states that

actual knowledge is not a necessary element or that a

defendant may be convicted regardless of whether he

knew he had to register. Moreover, when given with an

explicit instruction requiring actual knowledge, CALJIC

Nos. 1.20 and 3.30 supplement it with additional and

correct legal principles. Together the instructions

inform jurors that to convict, they must find that the

defendant actually knew of the duty to register, and he

knew about it when he allegedly failed to do so;

however, they need not also find that he did so with a

specific intent to break the law. [Emphasis in

original].

Finally, we note again that counsel focused their

closing arguments on the element of actual knowledge. 

The prosecutor expressly acknowledged her duty to prove

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In Barker, the court instructed with CALJIC No. 4.36, which

is similar to CALJIC No. 3.30.

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actual knowledge; and defense counsel argued that

defendant’s mental disabilities prevented him from

knowing and understanding this duty. Thereafter, the

court’s instructions tracked counsel’s arguments and

expressly required a finding of actual knowledge. 

Moreover, after giving CALJIC 3.30, the court

reiterated it more specifically, stating, “In the

crimes charged in Counts 1 and 2 there must exist a

union or joint operation of act or conduct and a

certain mental state in the mind of the perpetrator. 

Unless this mental state exists, the crimes to which it

relates are not committed. [¶] In the crime of failure

[to] register as a sex offender, the necessary mental

state is actual knowledge.”

Thus, even assuming for purposes of argument that

CALJIC Nos. 1.20 and 3.30 could theoretically cause

some ambiguity concerning the knowledge requirement, we

would not find instructional error here. There is no

reasonable likelihood that the jurors misunderstood the

instructions to permit a conviction without a finding

of actual knowledge. (Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at

72, n.4; People v. Smithey, 20 Cal. 4th 936, 963

(1999)).

Tolden II, 2007 WL 906619 at *13.

2. Analysis

The state appellate court’s ruling is not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority, or even of

state law. In Garcia, the California Supreme Court first held

that a violation of § 290 required actual knowledge of the duty

to register. Garcia, 25 Cal. 4th at 752-53. Thus, the jury

instructions in Garcia and Barker, which was tried the year

before the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in Garcia,

did not contain an instruction on actual knowledge of the duty to

register. In both cases, the California Supreme Court held that

giving CALJIC Nos. 1.20 and CALJIC 3.306 constituted instructional

error because they would allow the jury to convict even if the

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7In both Garcia and Barker, the court found that the error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the record amply

reflected that the defendants were aware of the registration

requirement and counsel did not claim the contrary in trying the

case to the jury. Garcia, 25 Cal. 4th at 755; Barker, 34 Cal. 4th

at 271.

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defendant was unaware of his duty to register.7 

In contrast, in this case, the court instructed the jury

several times that actual knowledge was required to convict. The

jury was told that the necessary mental state necessary to commit

a violation of § 290 was actual knowledge. See RT 678. The jury

also was told twice that actual knowledge was an element of the

crime. See RT at 680; 757-58. Because the instructions here

contained the actual knowledge requirement that was lacking in

Garcia and Barker, those cases can be distinguished.

In People v. Edgar, 104 Cal. App. 4th 210 (2002), another

case cited by Petitioner where the court reversed based on

instructional error, the trial was likewise held before Garcia

was published and the instructions did not contain a knowledge

requirement. In People v. Poslof, 126 Cal. App. 4th 92 (2005),

the trial was held after Garcia and included instructions on

actual knowledge as well as CALJIC No. 3.30. The court held that

it was unlikely the jury disregarded the instructions to find

that the defendant had actual knowledge of the duty to register,

and that any error in giving CALJIC No. 3.30 was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt. Id. at 100.

Furthermore, the court noted that CALJIC Nos. 1.20 and 3.30

do not state that actual knowledge is not a necessary element of

the crime of failing to register as a sex offender or that a

defendant can be convicted regardless of whether he knew he had

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to register. The court noted that immediately after giving

CALJIC 3.30, the trial court specifically instructed that actual

knowledge is the mental state required to find that the defendant

committed the crime of failing to register. Further, the court

correctly concluded that a finding that the defendant did not

have the specific intent to break the law would not conflict with

a finding that the defendant actually knew of the duty to

register.

Thus, the state court’s conclusion that there was no

reasonable likelihood that the jurors misunderstood the

instructions to permit a conviction without a finding of actual

knowledge was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

the law. This claim for habeas relief is denied.

B. Failure to Instruct on an Element of the Offense 

Petitioner argues that the instructions allowed the jury to

convict him without finding that he had actual knowledge of the

requirement to register within fourteen days after moving to a

new city. 

1. State Appellate Court Opinion (Tolden II)

The state court rejected this claim as follows.

Under section 290, it is unlawful to “willfully”

violate any of the registration requirements in the

statute. In People v. Garcia, 25 Cal. 4th 744 (2001),

the Supreme Court held that a conviction under section

290 requires proof that the defendant had actual

knowledge of the registration requirement he or she

violated. Id. at 752. The court explained that

willfulness implies a purpose or willingness to make

the omission. “Logically one cannot purposefully fail

to perform an act without knowing what act is required

to be performed.” Id.

Defendant contends the court misinstructed on the

actual knowledge element. He quotes the following

portion of the court’s instruction: “In order to prove

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such a crime, each of the following elements must be

proved: [¶] One, the defendant is a person who, having

previously been convicted of a qualifying felony sex

offense, is required to register as a sex offender

pursuant to Penal Code Section 290. [¶] And, two,

defendant moved into a city in the State of California

and established a new residence and domicile. [¶] And,

three, the defendant had actual knowledge of his duty

to register. [¶] And, four, having that knowledge,

defendant willfully failed to register within 14

working days with a law enforcement agency having

jurisdiction over his place of residence and domicile.”

Defendant argues that the instruction is incomplete:

Although it required proof that defendant knew he had a

duty to register, it did not specifically require

knowledge of his duty to register within 14 days of

moving into a new city –- i.e., the requirement he was

accused of violating [Emphasis in original]. 

. . .

Here, defendant isolates a portion of the court’s

charge from what immediately preceded it: “[D]efendant

is accused in Count 1 in the Information of having

violated Penal Code Section 290(a)(1)(A)(G)(2), felony. 

Every person who, having been previously convicted of a

qualifying sex offense and willfully fails to register

with the chief of police of the law enforcement agency

of the city in which he resides and is domiciled,

within 14 days of coming into the city, is guilty of

violating Penal Code section 290 (a)(1)(A)(G)(2) of the

Penal Code, a felony.” [Emphasis added by appellate

court]. Indeed, the court read the complete charge to

the jury twice. Taken as a whole, the court’s charge

adequately conveyed the prosecution’s duty to prove

that defendant had actual knowledge of his duty to

register within 14 days of moving to a new city --

i.e., Sunnyvale.

. . .

Also, jurors . . . were instructed in this case –- “not

[to] single out any particular sentence or individual

point or instruction and ignore the others” but to

“consider the instructions as a whole and each in light

of the others.” (See CALJIC No. 1.01.)

Here, it was undisputed that (1) defendant was required

to register, (2) he moved from Modesto to Sunnyvale in

Santa Clara County and lived there for some time, and

(3) after moving, he never registered. Thus, the

central issue was whether defendant knew he was

supposed to register after he arrived in Sunnyvale. . .

. The prosecutor expressly told jurors that defendant

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was charged with willfully failing to register within

14 days of moving to a new city; she noted a few times

that defendant was repeatedly informed of that specific

duty; and she expressly acknowledged her duty to prove

that defendant had actual knowledge of his duty to

register within 14 days of moving to Sunnyvale. 

Defense counsel pointed out that the notification form

listed his duty to register within 14 days and argued

that due to defendant’s cognitive impairment, he did

not understand that duty.

After argument, the court reiterated what the

prosecutor had said. . . .

Given the arguments of counsel and the close temporal

connection between the two parts of the court’s charge,

we do not consider it reasonably likely that jurors

found that defendant had actual knowledge of some

unspecified general duty to register and not the

specific duty to register within 14 days of moving to a

city.

Tolden II, 2007 WL 906619 at *10-12.

2. Analysis

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s instruction on the

elements of § 290(a)(1)(A)(g)(2) was incomplete because it failed

to inform the jury that he must have actual knowledge of the

requirement to register fourteen days after moving to a new city. 

The Court has reviewed the jury instructions quoted above and

the closing arguments of the prosecutor and defense attorney. See

RT at 702 (prosecutor’s closing: “the defendant must have actual

knowledge of his duty to register, and having that knowledge,

knowing that he’s got to register, he’s got to willfully fail to

register within 14 days of coming into the city.”); RT at 727, 730

(defense closing). The instructions could have more clearly

stated the need for actual knowledge of the fourteen day

requirement. It is a close question whether the instructions

together with the closing arguments sufficiently informed the jury

that it had to find that Petitioner had actual knowledge that he

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was required to register within fourteen days of moving to a new

city. However, even if the instructions were insufficient, the

state court reasonably found no likelihood that the deficiency

affected the jury’s verdict.

There was evidence that Petitioner knew he had to register. 

In Petitioner’s interview with Officer Olsen, he told Officer

Olsen that he understood the registration requirement was a

lifetime obligation. When Officer Olsen informed Petitioner that

a change in the law required him to register within five days of

moving to a new city, Petitioner replied that he used to register

in fifteen days. The state court was not unreasonable in ruling

it unlikely the jury found that Petitioner knew he was required to

register but did not know that he was required to do so within

fourteen days. The jury knew that Petitioner had not registered

for three years.

 Any instructional error in failing to state more clearly that

actual knowledge of the fourteen day period was required would not

have caused a substantial or injurious effect or influence on the

jury verdict. The state court’s denial of this claim was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

authority or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. This

claim for habeas relief is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus is denied. The Clerk of the Court shall 

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enter judgment and close the file. The parties shall bear their

own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 1, 2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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