Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05427/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05427-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 22, 1999 Decided June 18, 1999

No. 98-5427

M. Victoria Cummock,

Appellant

v.

Albert Gore, Jr., et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv00981)

Herbert L. Fenster argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs were Michael J. Haungs and Todd A. Suko.

Michael S. Raab, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were

David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Wilma

A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney, Mark B. Stern, Attorney, U.S.

Department of Justice, Nancy E. McFadden, General CounUSCA Case #98-5427 Document #443562 Filed: 06/18/1999 Page 1 of 21
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sel, U.S. Department of Transportation, Paul M. Geier, Assistant General Counsel, and Peter J. Plocki, Senior Trial

Attorney.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Wald and Rogers, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Edwards, Chief Judge: On August 22, 1996, in the aftermath of the TWA Flight 800 air disaster, President Clinton

established the White House Commission on Aviation Safety

and Security ("Commission"). The Commission was chaired

by Vice President Gore and included among its members

appellant M. Victoria Cummock, who was widowed in the

1988 Pan Am Flight 103 crash and has been an active

advocate for improved safety and security measures ever

since. Cummock dissented from the Commission's final report, which was delivered to the President on February 12,

1997. Subsequently, she filed this lawsuit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Government for a host of

Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA") and Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") violations. Cummock alleged

that, due to various procedural irregularities beginning before

the Commission's official inception and lasting through its

disbandment six months later, she was excluded from meaningful participation in the Commission's deliberations.

The District Court dismissed Cummock's lawsuit in its

entirety, finding that she lacked either an enforceable right or

standing with respect to each of her claims. On appeal, we

find that Cummock raises only one claim warranting our

consideration: her allegation that the Commission violated

FACA by denying her access to certain documents and

information, and thereby compromised her ability to participate in Commission proceedings and prepare a fully informed

dissent. We reject the Government's contention that Cummock, as a committee member, possessed only those rights

enjoyed under FACA by members of the general public.

Like members of the public, Cummock has an enforceable

right to obtain information pursuant to s 10(b) of FACA.

However, Cummock also has a right to fully participate in the

deliberations of the Commission. To hold otherwise would

completely undermine the stated purposes of FACA. On the

record at hand, we find that Cummock was unlawfully denied

the opportunity to review documents that were prepared for

or relied upon by the Commission in formulating its recommendations, and to amend her dissent if necessary to reflect

this information. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the

District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

I. Background

A. Federal Advisory Committee Act

Congress passed FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 ss 1-16, in 1972 to

address whether and to what extent committees, boards, and

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councils should be maintained to advise Executive Branch

officers and agencies. See 5 U.S.C. app. 2 s 2(a); Public

Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 445-46

(1989). "FACA was enacted to cure specific ills, above all the

wasteful expenditure of public funds for worthless committee

meetings and biased proposals...." Id. at 453; accord

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Pena, 147 F.3d 1012,

1026 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("NRDC"). Congress recognized that

advisory committees "are frequently a useful and beneficial

means of furnishing expert advice, ideas, and diverse opinions

to the Federal Government." 5 U.S.C. app. 2 s 2(a). However, Congress also feared the proliferation of costly committees, which were often dominated by representatives of industry and other special interests seeking to advance their own

agendas. See H.R. Rep. No. 92-1017 (1972), reprinted in 1972

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3491, 3496 ("One of the great dangers in the

unregulated use of advisory committees is that special interest groups may use their membership on such bodies to

promote their private concerns."); see also Public Citizen,

491 U.S. at 453; Food Chem. News v. Department of Health

and Human Servs., 980 F.2d 1468, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1993);

Richard O. Levine, Comment, The Federal Advisory Committee Act, 10 Harv. J. on Legis. 217, 219, 225 (1973).

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In enacting FACA, Congress struck a balance between

these concerns, by preserving the advisory committee mechanism for informing policy decisions, while ensuring

that new advisory committees be established only when

essential and that their number be minimized; that they

be terminated when they have outlived their usefulness;

that their creation, operation, and duration be subject to

uniform standards and procedures; that Congress and

the public remain apprised of their existence, activities,

and cost; and that their work be exclusively advisory in

nature.

Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 446 (citing 5 U.S.C. app. 2 s 2(b)).

Congress aimed, in short, " 'to control the advisory committee

process and to open to public scrutiny the manner in which

government agencies obtain advice from private individuals.' "

National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive Comm. of the

President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d

1071, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Food Chem. News, Inc. v.

Davis, 378 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (D.D.C. 1974)); accord Public

Citizen, 491 U.S. at 459; Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v.

Shalala, 104 F.3d 424, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

In order to achieve these objectives, Congress enacted in

FACA a series of requirements governing the creation and

operation of bodies falling within the Act's definition of "advisory committee." See 5 U.S.C. app. 2 s 3(2). For instance,

FACA bars the initiation of new advisory committees absent

express authorization by statute or the President, or a formal

determination by an agency that such establishment would be

in the public interest. See id. s 9(a). In addition, FACA

mandates that advisory committee membership be "fairly

balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the

functions to be performed," and that a committee's advice

reflect its "independent judgment" without improper influences from the appointing authority or special interests. Id.

s 5(b)(2), (3). Moreover, FACA provides that, once established, an advisory committee must conform its operations to

various procedural requirements by, inter alia, filing a charter before beginning its operations, see id. s 9(c), opening its

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meetings to the public, see id. s 10(a)(1), publishing advance

notice of its meetings, see id. s 10(a)(2), keeping detailed

minutes of its meetings, see id. s 10(c), and making available

to the public records, drafts, studies, and other documents

that were made available to or prepared by or for the

committee, see id. s 10(b). The Act also charges the General

Services Administration ("GSA") with prescribing regulatory

guidelines and management controls applicable to advisory

committees, and providing such committees with advice and

assistance to improve their performance. See id. s 7(c).

Finally, FACA imposes various oversight and reporting requirements on congressional committees, GSA, and the President, in order to monitor advisory committees and ensure

their ongoing usefulness and productivity. See id. ss 5(a),

6(c), 7(b).

Sometimes dubbed the "fifth branch" of Government, see,

e.g., Mary Kathryn Palladino, Survey, Ensuring Coverage,

Balance, Openness and Ethical Conduct for Advisory Committee Members under the Federal Advisory Committee Act,

5 Admin. L.J. 231, 231 (1991), advisory committees today

remain a fixture in the Nation's Capital. In fiscal year 1997,

a total of 36,586 individuals served on 963 committees, see

U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Advisory Committee Act: Advisory Committee Process Appears to Be Working,

but Some Concerns Exist, GAO/T-GGD-98-163, at 3 (July 14,

1998) (Statement of L. Nye Stevens), available at <http:

//www.gao.gov>, addressing almost all imaginable topics,

from national policy matters to technical or scientific issues.

See generally U.S. General Services Administration, Federal

Advisory Committee Act (FACA) Database, available at

<http: //cm.policyworks.gov/cms> (listing advisory committees by relevant agency). In other words, to this date, the

Government continues to draw heavily upon the advisory

committee process as a part of its political machinery.

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B. White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security

On July 25, 1996, in the wake of the TWA Flight 800

disaster, President Clinton announced his intention to form a

committee to study aviation safety and security issues. The

White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security

filed a charter on August 21, 1996, and was officially established by Executive Order dated August 22, 1996. See Exec.

Order No. 13,015, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,937 (1996). This order

charged the Commission with recommending a strategy to

improve aviation safety and security, both domestically and

internationally. See id. It provided that the Commission

would be chaired by Vice President Gore and supported by

the Department of Transportation. See id. It further provided that the Commission would consist of no more than

twenty-five members to be appointed by the President from

the public and private sectors. See id. Finally, it provided

that the Commission would terminate after six months unless

extended by the President. See id.

On August 14, 1996, President Clinton invited Cummock,

the widow of a Pan Am Flight 103 victim and an advocate for

disaster victims and improved airline safety measures, to join

the Commission. Additional members included the Vice

President, as noted, as well as former Central Intelligence

Agency Director John M. Deutch, then Department of Transportation Secretary Federico F. PeNa, retired Air Force

General John Michael Loh, and other individuals with experience or expertise in aviation safety and security matters.

Once the Commission was established, it immediately began its work, which progressed quickly. On August 22, 1996,

the day after the Commission filed its charter, five Commission members held a meeting at which Commissioner Loh

presented a document containing draft recommendations.

The full Commission then held its first executive session on

September 5, 1996, and on September 9, the Commission

submitted its initial report to the President, advancing twenty

recommendations to enhance aviation security. The Commission continued to meet for several months thereafter, and its

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final report, containing over fifty recommendations, was delivered to the President on February 12, 1997. The presentation of this report garnered extensive media attention. See,

e.g., Matthew L. Wald, Panel to Recommend Steps for Cutting Air Crash Rate, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1997, at A1;

Robert Davis, 53 Air-Safety Proposals Come Out Today,

USA Today, Feb. 12, 1997, at 3A; Ralph Vartabedian &

Elizabeth Shogren, Tougher Security, Safety Rules for Airlines Proposed, L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 1997, at A1; J. Lynn

Lunsford, Panel Urges Changes to Improve Air Safety, Dallas Morning News, Feb. 13, 1997, at 6A. Neither the report

nor the accompanying transmittal letter indicated the existence of any dissenting views.

Cummock, alone, dissented from the final report. Her

letter of dissent, dated February 19, 1997, was published with

the printed version of the final report, which also included an

editor's note stating as follows:

This edition contains as Appendix I a dissent by Commissioner Cummock which was transmitted to the Commission one week after the report was voted on in public

session and presented to President Clinton.

During the public session, Commissioner Cummock dissented from three recommendations. The dissent published in this document goes far beyond those registered

in public. It presents for the first time material and

arguments the other Commissioners did not have an

opportunity to consider. However, many of the arguments made in the dissent were considered and rejected

by the other members of the Commission.

White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security,

Final Report to President Clinton (Feb. 12, 1997), reprinted

in Appendix ("App.") 38. The final report included only the

narrative portion of Cummock's dissent and excluded the

supporting materials that accompanied the dissent. The editor's note to the final report indicated that interested persons

could obtain the supporting materials by writing to a specified

address. See id.

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C. Cummock's Lawsuit

Several months after the Commission was disbanded, Cummock filed suit in District Court, naming Vice President Gore,

the Secretary of Transportation, and the Commission as

defendants. Cummock alleged, inter alia, that the Commission failed to operate in accordance with FACA and the APA,

thereby violating her right as a member to participate in the

Commission's work. She claimed that, by a series of "procedural irregularities," she was effectively excluded from Commission proceedings. In her view, the Clinton Administration

had formed the Commission simply to obtain rubber-stamp

endorsement of a predetermined policy agenda, rather than

to facilitate genuine deliberations. See Brief of Appellant at

14-15. Cummock's allegations fall into four categories, which

we summarize briefly as follows.

First, Cummock argues that the Commission violated

FACA's charter provision, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 s 9(c), by "tak[ing]

... action" prior to the filing of its charter on August 21,

1996. The Commission's alleged "action" consisted of a trip

led by Vice President Gore to observe aviation operations at

Dulles Airport, a presentation regarding Commission activities made by Commissioner Loh at a meeting of the Federal

Aviation Administration Security Baseline Work Group, the

preparation of draft recommendations, and various other

"informational briefings, site visits, and studies" engaged in

by Commission members before the Commission's official

inception. Brief of Appellant at 5-6.

Second, Cummock claims that the Commission violated

FACA's notice provision, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 s 10(a)(2), by failing

to publish timely notice of its meetings in the Federal Register. According to Cummock, notice was never provided fifteen days in advance of meetings, as required by 41 C.F.R.

s 101-6.1015(b)(1), and on one occasion, notice did not appear

until after the meeting had occurred.

Third, Cummock contends that the Commission violated

the provision of FACA requiring the Commission to make

available the records, reports, and other documents made

available to it in the course of its deliberations, 5 U.S.C. app.

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2 s 10(b). Cummock points to several instances in which she

allegedly requested particular information to no avail. For

instance, she asked for a copy of an inch-thick briefing paper

that she saw Commissioners Gore and Deutch reviewing, but

subsequently received only four pages of that document from

the Commission's Staff Director. She also requested that she

be provided with documents submitted to or received from

the Air Transport Association ("ATA"), but allegedly did not

receive all such documents. In addition, when she heard

mention of a "classified annex," she sought access to those

materials, but never received them, despite her security

clearance. Lastly, she requested information on the availability of protective breathing equipment for passengers, but

received no documents and was assured by Commission staff

that no such information was available, only later to learn

that at least one company had submitted a letter concerning

its equipment two weeks prior to her request.

Finally, Cummock alleges that the Commission violated the

APA, by failing to publish her complete dissent and including

a misleading editor's note with the final report. According to

Cummock, the Commission did not take up her concerns until

immediately before the final report was scheduled to be

delivered to the President, thereby delaying her preparation

of a dissent. Thus, although Vice President Gore allegedly

told her at a public meeting on the morning of February 12,

1997 that the Commission would "make available a place in

the report for the full expression of any dissenting views that

[she] would like to contribute," Complaint p 40, reprinted in

App. 21, the report was delivered to the President later that

same day without Cummock's dissent. Subsequently, the

Commission published only the narrative portion of her dissent, without the supporting materials that she had attached

thereto. In addition, the Commission included a misleading

editor's note, which inaccurately suggested that Cummock's

dissent had presented issues that the full Commission did not

have an opportunity to consider, and had been submitted late.

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sion's Staff Director, requesting information relating to the

publication of the final report, the basis for the editor's note,

and various aspects of Commission operations. Upon receiving no response, counsel reiterated this request in another

letter. Although receipt of these letters was acknowledged

by the Department of Transportation's Office of General

Counsel, no response was ever received.

Subsequently, on May 8, 1997, Cummock filed this lawsuit,

alleging multiple violations of FACA and the APA. As relief,

Cummock sought an injunction prohibiting the final report

from being published, distributed, or used without her "complete dissent," requiring the final report to be amended to

correct misstatements in the editor's note, requiring all Commission documents and records to be made available to

Cummock, requiring that Cummock be given an opportunity

to amend her dissent, and prohibiting distribution of the final

report as a FACA advisory committee report. See Complaint

at 27, reprinted in App. 32. Cummock also sought a declaration that "the Commission has operated in violation of FACA

and GSA implementing regulations and that the actions taken

by the Commission to date are ultra vires." Id. at 28,

reprinted in App. 33.

In July 1997, the Government filed a motion to dismiss

Cummock's complaint for lack of standing or failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. According to the

Government, Cummock was subsequently permitted to review

at least some non-classified Commission documents, and was

given copies of most of the documents she requested. "Those

documents not produced were determined, upon initial review, to include information that might be exempt from

disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act [FOIA]."

Brief for the Appellees at 20-21.

On June 15, 1998, the District Court dismissed all of

Cummock's claims. See Cummock v. Gore, Civ. No. 97-981

(D.D.C. June 15, 1998) (Memorandum), reprinted in App. 228.

In sum, the trial court held that Cummock lacked a judicially

enforceable right to participate in Commission activities, that

her request for documents was untimely, and that she lacked

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standing to challenge the Commission's notice of its meetings

as inadequate. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

FACA is not new legislation, having been enacted more

than a quarter of a century ago. There has been considerable litigation over the statute's meaning, so there is a wealth

of case law to guide us in this case. For example, in recent

years, this court has considered and decided whether a given

group constitutes an advisory committee for the purposes of

FACA, see, e.g., Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Gaus, 61 F.3d

929 (D.C. Cir. 1995), when a member of the public has

standing to sue under FACA, see, e.g., Byrd v. EPA, No.

98-5180, 1999 WL 252643 (D.C. Cir. April 30, 1999), and what

are the appropriate remedies for violations of FACA, see, e.g.,

California Forestry Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 102

F.3d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Although the instant case presents

a unique factual scenario, it is clear that the issues posed here

are readily resolved by reference to the terms of the statute,

the supporting legislative history, and well established precedent.

The Government seeks to cast Cummock as essentially a

disgruntled Commission member, who failed to convince her

fellow Commissioners of her view and then pursued this

lawsuit as an alternative avenue of recourse. The District

Court agreed with the Government that Cummock had no

valid legal claims and dismissed Cummock's complaint in its

entirety. Our review of the District Court's ruling is de novo,

see Systems Council EM-3 v. AT&T, 159 F.3d 1376, 1378

(D.C. Cir. 1998). We reject the Government's self-serving

characterizations. In point of fact, Cummock has raised a

viable claim under FACA and her lawsuit was improperly

dismissed. Accordingly, we reverse.

A.

Our first task is to explain what is truly at issue here. In

the District Court, Cummock alleged a slew of FACA violations and sought a broad range of injunctive and declaratory

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relief. It is apparent on appeal, however, that Cummock's

position turns principally on her lack of access to information

relied upon by the Commission, and her concomitant inability

to prepare an informed dissent. To be sure, Cummock

continues to argue--at least in her briefs--that the Commission violated FACA's charter and notice provisions, as well as

the APA. See Brief of Appellant at 17-20, 35-37. However,

she has also made it quite clear that "[s]he does not seek to

enjoin use of the report, but only a declaration that FACA

was violated, and an opportunity to obtain relevant information and to modify, correct, and publish her complete dissent." Reply Brief of Appellant at 16. In other words, she

seeks relief solely in connection with her claim under s 10(b)

of FACA.

Cummock's counsel conceded as much at oral argument,

stating that what Cummock desires, in a nutshell, is the

opportunity to obtain and review all documents relied upon by

the Commission in formulating its recommendations, and to

amend her dissent if necessary to ensure a complete and fully

informed expression of her objections. Under these circumstances, we find that the only claim before us warranting our

attention is Cummock's assertion that the Commission denied

her access to relevant documents, and thereby thwarted her

dissenting voice.

Cummock's claim is rooted in s 10(b) of FACA, which

provides as follows:

Subject to [FOIA], the records, reports, transcripts, minutes, appendixes, working papers, drafts, studies, agenda,

or other documents which were made available to or

prepared for or by each advisory committee shall be

available for public inspection and copying at a single

location in the offices of the advisory committee or the

agency to which the advisory committee reports until the

advisory committee ceases to exist.

This provision "affirmatively obligates the Government to

provide access to the identified materials." Food Chem.

News, 980 F.2d at 1472. In other words, the Government

must make such materials available for public inspection and

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copying, even in the absence of a particular request, unless

"the agency reasonably claims [the materials] to be exempt

from disclosure pursuant to FOIA." Id. at 1469. According

to Cummock, the Commission violated s 10(b) by failing to

make the required information available to her, even when

she specifically requested it in connection with her work on

the Commission. She identifies particular documents to

which she was allegedly entitled (i.e., the inch-thick briefing

paper, the ATA correspondence, the classified annex, and the

information on protective breathing equipment), adding that

she "is unable at this point to say how much she has not

seen." Brief of Appellant at 22. Cummock argues, in short,

that the Commission's FACA violations interfered with her

right and responsibility to participate in its deliberations, and

compromised her ability to prepare a fully informed dissent.

B.

Before proceeding to the merits of Cummock's claim, we

must confirm our jurisdiction to hear this dispute. See Steel

Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1010 (1998).

In particular, we must assure ourselves of Cummock's standing to sue for a violation of FACA based on the Commission's

failure to supply her with the information required under the

Act. The constitutional standing requirements are familiar:

Cummock must show that she has suffered a particularized

injury to a cognizable interest, her injury is fairly traceable to

the Government's actions, and a favorable judicial ruling will

likely redress her injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).

Cummock readily satisfies the standing requirements in

this case. First, she suffered an injury under FACA insofar

as the Commission denied her requests for information that it

was required to produce. See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449;

Byrd, 1999 WL 252643, at *3. Second, her injury was

directly caused by the Commission's alleged violation of

FACA. Finally, her injury is redressable by the relief she

seeks--namely, access to documents to which she is entitled

under FACA and an opportunity to amend her dissent to

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als. See NRDC, 147 F.3d at 1023 ("[T]he appellees plainly

have standing to request injunctive relief directing the [agency] to make Committee documents and records available to

the full extent permitted by FACA....").

We turn next to the question of whether Cummock possesses an enforceable right under FACA. In the Government's

view, Cummock possesses no cause of action here. The

Government contends that it does not matter that Cummock

was a Commission member, because her claim of entitlement

to documents represents merely an "internal dispute[ ] among

committee members," for which there are no meaningful

standards to guide judicial review. Brief for the Appellees at

15. Thus, the Government argues that Cummock, like any

member of the public, had only a limited right, while the

Commission was in existence, to obtain information pursuant

to s 10(b) of FACA. According to the Government, even

during the course of Commission deliberations, Cummock had

no right under FACA to obtain documents that were exempt

from public disclosure under FOIA. Furthermore, because

the Commission no longer exists, the Government asserts

that Cummock must seek Commission documents via a properly filed FOIA request, which the Government "stands ready

to process." Brief for the Appellees at 20. Under this

scenario, if the Government refuses to release certain information, Cummock would then be required to file suit under

FOIA, challenging that decision.

In short, the Government would have us adopt the broad

principle that a duly appointed advisory committee member,

who has all necessary security clearances, has no rights

beyond those enjoyed by the public-at-large. Under this

view--from which Government counsel stubbornly refused to

budge at oral argument--advisory committee membership

accords no real right to participate in committee proceedings.

Indeed, counsel went so far as to suggest that the Government could, without violating FACA, appoint an individual to

an advisory committee and then wall that individual off from

the committee's operations, rendering membership essentially

meaningless. The Government's position is rather astonishing, and we reject it.

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It would be quite absurd for us to hold that a FACA

advisory committee--a public deliberative body that is subject to precise statutory mandates designed to ensure openness and fair deliberations--may simply exclude unpopular

viewpoints from participation. Yet, according to the Government, this outcome is reasonable, because Congress, in drafting FACA, said nothing about committee members obtaining

rights of access beyond those of the public. We are told that

sanctions short of judicial review will flow to committees that

operate to exclude particular members: an unhappy member

can refuse to sign the committee's report, and FACA's sunshine provisions will ensure that such irregularities are exposed to the public. In the Government's opinion, however,

appointed committee members possess no particular rights of

participation, and may even be denied access to information

underscoring the committee's recommendations.

We flatly reject the Government's view, for it is simply

untenable in light of the stated purposes of FACA. In

passing this legislation, Congress emphasized the need "to

ensure that persons or groups directly affected by the work

of a particular advisory committee would have some representation on the committee," National Anti-Hunger Coalition,

711 F.2d at 1074 n.2, and to protect against "the risk that

governmental officials would be unduly influenced by industry

leaders," Public Citizen v. National Advisory Committee on

Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 886 F.2d 419, 437 (D.C.

Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part); see also Cargill, Inc. v. United States, No. 97-31190,

1999 WL 225205, at *2 (5th Cir. April 19, 1999) ("FACA is

designed to ensure that advisory committees are fairly constituted and properly monitored so that they will provide sound

advice."). These concerns were expressly embodied in the

provisions of FACA requiring that committee membership be

fairly balanced in terms of viewpoints and functions, and that

committees exercise independent judgment free from improper influences. See 5 U.S.C. app. 2 s 5(b)(2), (3). Yet, an

interpretation of FACA that permitted a given advisory committee to exclude a disfavored member would fly in the face

of the principle established by these requirements: a commitUSCA Case #98-5427 Document #443562 Filed: 06/18/1999 Page 15 of 21
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tee might be nominally balanced, because an individual was

appointed to represent certain views, but effectively unbalanced, because that individual was precluded from meaningful

participation. Moreover, contrary to the Government's assertions at oral argument, FACA's sunshine provisions, while a

central feature of the Act, are not a substitute for the Act's

provisions requiring balance and independence.

In Food Chemical News, we found that, in order to give

meaning to FACA's sunshine provisions, s 10(b) must be

read to impose an affirmative obligation on the Government

to, "whenever practicable, [provide] access to the relevant

materials before or at the meeting at which the materials are

used and discussed." 980 F.2d at 1472. Likewise, in order to

give meaning to FACA's fair balance and independent judgment provisions, the Act must be read to confer on a committee member the right to fully participate in the work of the

committee to which he or she is appointed. Any other

reading would nullify Congress's express intent.

We find the Government's position somewhat disingenuous,

moreover, as committee membership is manifestly not meaningless in the "real world" of Washington policy making.

Appointment to an advisory body is often coveted and highly

esteemed, and the benefits flow both ways: while the individual member gains "recognition and even prestige," the Government obtains valuable advice and political legitimacy with

respect to its policy decisions. Association of Amer. Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 914 (D.C.

Cir. 1993); see also Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President:

Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory Committee

Act, 104 Yale L.J. 51, 58-59 (1994) ("The government ...

uses advisory committees to legitimize agency viewpoints.

An agency decisionmaker may have reached a tentative or

even a firm conclusion about a particular matter, and may

look to an advisory committee to validate that conclusion.

Politically, the agency's decision will not be salable without

some outside, 'neutral' support.") (footnote omitted); id. at 59

("[P]residential advisory committees may serve purely political ends, as vehicles for communicating with Congress and

the people, building support for proposals, or masking the

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government's unwillingness to act."). Thus, we have observed that:

When the executive branch endorses [a committee's]

advice and seeks to promote the policy course suggested

by the committee, the executive branch draws upon the

committee's political legitimacy. Congress' effort to ensure that these committees are balanced in terms of

viewpoint recognizes their usefulness for political (and

patronage) purposes.

Association of Amer. Physicians and Surgeons, 997 F.2d at

914. Given these realities, it is apparent that committee

membership bestows both rights and obligations beyond

those given to members of the general public.

In any event, the Government does not dispute that committee members have at least the same rights under FACA

as the public. Although we disagree with the Government's

position that the rights of a committee member extend no

further than the rights of a non-member, even taking only

this limited view, the Government's concession is significant.

Because there is no question under our precedent that members of the public possess enforceable rights to obtain information under FACA, see Food Chem. News, 980 F.2d at 1472,

it follows a fortiori that committee members have at least

these same rights. And we have also made it clear that

FACA rights are enforceable even after an advisory committee has been disbanded. See, e.g., Byrd, 1999 WL 252643, at

*4 (rejecting argument that plaintiff's injury was not redressable where panel had already completed its work and been

disbanded).

The Government's concession that committee members

have at least the same rights under FACA as the public goes

to the heart of Cummock's document request. Cummock

clearly possesses an enforceable right to information under

FACA, because any member of the public possesses such a

right. Moreover, Cummock possesses an even greater right

than a member of the public, because, as a Commission

member, she is entitled to fully participate in its deliberations. Thus, provided that Cummock was granted the requiUSCA Case #98-5427 Document #443562 Filed: 06/18/1999 Page 17 of 21
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site security clearance, the Commission could not deny her

access to information that it reviewed and relied upon in

formulating its recommendations--even if, for instance, that

information might have been withheld from the public pursuant to a FOIA exemption.

For the purposes of this case, two avenues of relief follow

from our conclusion that Cummock has an enforceable right

under FACA. First, to the extent that Cummock seeks

information that was made available to the Commission during the course of its deliberative process and without which

her ability to fully and adequately participate in that process

was impaired, she is entitled to review such materials. On

this score, no one seems to know precisely what Cummock

still needs. At oral argument, Cummock's counsel was unable to pinpoint what documents Cummock is entitled to

receive to which the Government has yet to provide her

access. Government counsel, while indicating that Cummock

has received certain documents, was likewise unable to assure

us that she has obtained everything that she might be entitled to review. Therefore, on remand, the District Court

must engage in the necessary discovery and fact finding to

determine whether any additional materials fall within the

parameters of information to which Cummock is entitled. Cf.

Animal Legal Defense Fund, 104 F.3d at 431 (remanding to

district court, after finding that committee was subject to

FACA, "so that the district court may determine whether

there are documents to which the appellants may obtain

access under FACA and whether other injunctive relief

should issue"); California Forestry Ass'n, 102 F.3d at 613

("We are unable to determine the propriety of injunctive

relief at the summary judgment stage because the district

court has yet to make factual findings.").

Second, assuming that Cummock is entitled to review certain Commission documents to which she has heretofore been

denied access, she must also be given an opportunity to

amend and publish a dissent incorporating her fully enlightened views. We note that there is no dispute here over

Cummock's right to have her dissent published with the final

report. The Government gave her that right by publishing

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her dissent initially, so the question is no longer at issue.

Because the Commission's FACA violations frustrated Cummock's ability to prepare a complete and informed dissent,

the Government must allow Cummock to revise that dissent if

she wishes to do so. Furthermore, because the final report is

still widely available, including on the internet, see <http:

//www.aviationcommission.dot.gov>, and may still be in use

by agency decision makers, the Government must publish and

distribute Cummock's revised dissent in the same places as it

originally circulated the final report and dissent. Finally, the

District Court should consider whether, in light of any

amendments that are made to Cummock's dissent, modification of the editor's note would be appropriate.

III. Conclusion

For the above reasons, we reverse the decision of the

District Court and remand the matter for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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Rogers, Circuit Judge, concurring: I write separately to

clarify two points.

First, notwithstanding the broad language in the court's

opinion, see Opinion at 16-17, 19, the court is not foreclosing

the government from showing that it would not be "practicable" to disclose information to all members of a committee

established under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Cf.

Food Chem. News Inc. v. Department of Health and Human

Servs., 980 F.2d 1468, 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Although the

court concludes that members of a FACA committee are

entitled to "fully participate" in committee deliberations, see

Opinion at 19, the court has not considered, and expresses no

view about, whether "full" participation necessarily entails an

equal opportunity to participate at all times. For example, a

FACA committee might plausibly claim that it may consider

classified information even if such information cannot be

made available to all of its members for want of a security

clearance or "need to know." Exec. Order 12,958, s 4.2(a)(3),

60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (1995). However, whether denial of

access to classified or sensitive information would constitute

an actionable denial of "full" participatory rights is not before

the court (but may arise on remand) because the government

has not identified any reason to treat Cummock on less-thanequal footing with other committee members. She asserts

that she had the necessary security clearance and the government does not contest that assertion. See Appellee's Brief at

20 n.8. To the extent the government maintains there is still

a "need to know" threshold requirement before classified

information can be disclosed, see id. (citing Exec. Order

12,958), the court's holding that Cummock has a right to

participate fully in the committee's deliberations, which includes a cause of action to obtain the same information

provided other members, appears to satisfy the need-to-know

requirement, although the issue could be explored as necessary by the district court on remand.

Second, following from the court's holding that there is a

cause of action under FACA for a committee member to

obtain information considered during committee deliberaUSCA Case #98-5427 Document #443562 Filed: 06/18/1999 Page 20 of 21
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tions is the question of what a member may do with that

information, i.e., whether FACA allows additional equitable

remedies entitling Cummock to amend her dissent or delete

the editor's note. Broad remedies may be available. Cf.

California Forestry Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 102

F.3d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,

78 (1975), and its progeny, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,

Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v.

Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979). Neither party has

fully briefed the question of remedies, the district court did

not address it, nor has this court previously considered the

scope of remedies available to committee members who, after

a committee has disbanded and released its final report,

challenge the manner in which the committee deliberated.

Still, in view of the publication of Cummock's dissent, her

right to participate fully would be seriously diminished were

she unable to correct her dissent in light of information

previously wrongfully withheld from her and to have it published in corrected form. See Opinion at 20. Given congressional intent to avoid the wasteful expenditure of public

money and biased proposals, see Public Citizen v. United

States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453 (1988), in part by

requiring committee membership to be "fairly balanced" and

the advice to be the result of the committee's "independent

judgment," see 5 U.S.C. app. 2 s 5(b)(2), (3), the court

reasonably concludes that such a remedy reflects congressional intent. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.,

441 U.S. at 25. Contrary to the government's suggestion, see

Appellee's Brief at 15-17, such relief does not represent

judicial intrusion in intra-committee disputes; the committee

has already decided to publish Cummock's dissent. But, in

view of the posture of the case on appeal, the district court

retains leeway to consider the scope of its remedial authority

in light of arguments that the parties may advance on remand. See, e.g., Opinion at 20.

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