Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cv-00201/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cv-00201-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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The Johnsons requested a hearing pertaining to their motion to dismiss. However, after

reviewing the briefs submitted by the parties, the Court finds a hearing would not be

helpful in resolving this matter. As such, the Johnsons’ request for a hearing is denied.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GLENDA WALLS, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

SONORA BEHAVIORAL HEALTH

HOSPITAL, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 05-201-TUC-CKJ 

ORDER

 

Pending before the Court is the Johnsons’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim. For the reasons stated below, the motion is denied.1

I. Standard of Review for a Motion to Dismiss

Dismissal is appropriate only when the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of her claims that would entitle her to relief. No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council

Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 2003). This court

must take as true all allegations of material fact and construe them in the light most favorable

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 Sunwest Employer Services has been dismissed from the case.

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to the nonmoving party. See Cervantes v. United States, 330 F.3d 1186, 1187 (9th Cir.

2003). The Court of Appeals generally limits its review to the contents of the complaint, but

if support exists in the record, it may affirm a dismissal on any proper ground. See Lee v. City

of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004,

1011 (9th Cir. 2002). As a general matter, a “motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is

viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.” Gilligan v. Jamco Develop. Corp., 108 F.3d 246,

249 (9th Cir. 1997).

II. Background

Plaintiff Glenda Walls (“Walls”) has filed suit against her former employer, Sonora

Behavioral Health Hospital (“Sonora”); Sonora C.E.O. Karen Wiese; Sunwest Employer

Services, Inc.2

; Carl Johnson (“Johnson”), a pharmacist at Sonora; and Johnson’s wife, Dorill

Johnson.

Walls alleges that she was sexually harassed by Johnson during her employment as

a Mental Health Technician at Sonora. According to Walls, Johnson subjected her to

unwelcome and unsolicited sexual advances for approximately three years from 2000 to

2003. For example, Johnson allegedly asked Walls to have sex with him in his “fuck-mobile”

in the Sonora parking lot, touched Walls’ shoulder suggestively, told her “Let me touch you,”

and licked his tongue suggestively while looking at her. Walls also alleges that Johnson

sexually assaulted her daughter, Mykal Huish (“Huish”), also a Sonora employee. During

Walls’ employment at Sonora, her oldest daughter was hospitalized and died at Sonoroa,

causing Walls to emotionally suffer. Johnson allegedly knew about this death and was

allegedly aware of Walls’ vulnerable emotional state.

Walls has filed a six-count complaint which includes: (1) Sexual harassment pursuant

to the Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”); (2) Sexual harassment pursuant to Title VII of

the 1964 Civil Rights Act; (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) under

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Arizona common law; (4) Retaliation in violation of the ACRA; (5) Retaliation in violation

of Title VII; and (6) Negligent Hiring and Supervision.

The Johnsons filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (“failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”) arguing that Walls fails to adequately

plead a claim of IIED, and that the other counts are inapplicable to them.

III. Discussion

A. Counts One, Two, Four, Five, and Six

Walls concedes that the only proper claim against the Johnsons is Count Three for

IIED under Arizona law. As such, the Johnsons ask the Court to dismiss with prejudice all

counts other than the IIED claim. In response, Walls argues she never asserted those claims

against the Johnsons, and this request should be denied as moot. However, a review of the

complaint shows Plaintiff did not specifically exclude the Johnsons from the other counts,

and otherwise makes claims against all of the Defendants in general throughout Counts One

through Six. Accordingly, as Plaintiff concedes that all of the counts, except Count Three,

are legally inapplicable to the Johnsons, Counts One, Two, Four, Five and Six against the

Johnsons are dismissed with prejudice.

B. Count Three: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The tort of IIED requires proof of three elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct

by the defendant; (2) intent to cause emotional distress, or reckless disregard of the near

certainty that such distress will result from the defendant’s conduct; and (3) the actual

occurrence of severe emotional distress. Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller, 210 Ariz. 513, 516,

115 P.3d 107, 110 (2005), citing Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 153 Ariz. 38, 43, 734 P.2d 580, 585

(1987). “One may recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress only where the

defendant's acts are so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all

possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a

civilized community.” Patton v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Phoenix, 118 Ariz. 473,

476, 578 P.2d 152, 155 (1978) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

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In Arizona, sexual harassment does not automatically rise to the level of IIED. See

Ford, 153 Ariz. at 42-43; see also Davis v. United States Steel Corp., 779 F.2d 209, 211 (5th

Cir. 1985), cited in Ford. However, determining whether the alleged harassment rises to that

level requires the sort of factual determination that is inappropriate on a motion to dismiss.

See Coffin v. Safeway, 323 F.Supp.2d 997, 1004 (D.Ariz. 2004) (refusing to dismiss an IIED

claim based on sexual harassment because plaintiff met minimum pleading requirements);

see also Bowersox v. P.H. Glatfelter Co., 677 F.Supp. 307, 310-11 (M.D.Pa. 1988) for a

survey of cases where IIED claims based on sexual harassment were upheld.

Here, Walls alleges that Johnson sexually harassed her through unwanted touching,

gestures and sexual advances. She also alleges that Johnson sexually assaulted her daughter.

Even after she complained of his behavior, Johnson touched Walls again. She further alleges

that all of this happened during a time when Johnson knew Walls was emotionally vulnerable

due to the death of her daughter. Lastly, she alleges Johnson’s actions caused her extreme

emotional distress as she suffered humiliation, anxiety, and anguish. Therefore, taking all of

Plaintiff’s allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to her, the

Johnsons’ motion to dismiss is denied as Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts for her IIED

claim to survive.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Johnsons’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #6) is granted in part and denied in part.

2. Counts One, Two, Four, Five and Six against the Johnsons are dismissed with

prejudice.

DATED this 27th day of April, 2006.

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