Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00802/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00802-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY V. NOLLER, Sr.,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA, et

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:07-cv-00802 JKS KJM P

ORDER

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this civil rights action seeking relief

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72-302. On June 6, 2007, the magistrate judge filed findings and

recommendations herein which were served on Plaintiff and which contained notice to Plaintiff that

any objections to the findings and recommendations were to be filed within twenty days. Plaintiff

has filed timely objections to the findings and recommendations.

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the Medical Board of California (“Board”) utilizes

different standards and procedures for evaluating complaints against medical practitioners,

depending on whether the complaints are submitted by prisoners or non-prisoners. Docket No. 1 at

10. Aside from a vague reference to the use of different matrices, Plaintiff fails to state specifically

how the complaints are treated differently. Id. He further alleges that the different standards for

processing prisoner complaints have negligently allowed unfit medical practitioners working for the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to maintain their licenses to

practice and continue working for the CDCR. Id. at 11. Plaintiff also asserts that the Board, as a

matter of practice, notifies the Health Care Services Division of the CDCR of complaints lodged by

prisoners, leading to retaliation against the complaining prisoners by the medical staff. Id. Plaintiff

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Plaintiff is not an attorney and it is well established that a layperson cannot ordinarily 1

represent the interests of a class. See McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1966). This

rule becomes almost absolute when, as here, the putative class representative is incarcerated and

proceeding pro se. Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975). Plaintiff simply

cannot “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 

Accordingly, this case will only be construed as an individual civil suit.

ORDER

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asks the Court to certify this as a class action, and for the appointment of a receiver to oversee the 1

restructuring of the Board’s standards and procedures used to investigate and process prisoner

complaints against medical practitioners employed by the CDCR. Id. at 12.

 The magistrate judge understandably misconstrued the complaint as alleging that the Board

uses different standards for licensing medical practitioners who work for the CDCR than for those

who work in other venues. Docket No. 9. Finding that this did not state a federal claim, the

magistrate judge recommended denying Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis for failure

to state a claim. Id. Plaintiff objects to this finding, arguing that he has stated an equal protection

claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Docket No. 13. In accordance with the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 72-304, this Court has conducted a de novo review of this

case.

LEGAL STANDARD

The duties of a district court in connection with a magistrate judge's report and

recommendation are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). The district court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . .

to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

A court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). A

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

"frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). 

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ORDER

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A court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless

legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The

critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal

and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at

1227.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S.

69, 73 (1984); Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). 

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, a court must accept as true the allegations of the

complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe

the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor,

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

DISCUSSION

At the outset, the Court recognizes that other federal courts have been critical of the medical

care furnished to prisoners in California. See Plata v. Schwarzenegger, et al., 2005 WL 2932253, 1

(N.D. Cal. 2005). In fact, the delivery of medical services to all California state prisoners confined

by the CDCR remains under the care of a judicially appointed receiver. See Plata v.

Schwarzenegger, et al., 2007 WL 2318898 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s complaint

must be dismissed for its failure to state facts sufficient to establish standing or a federal claim. 

To begin, Plaintiff has failed to allege even the most rudimentary of elements; standing. See

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996) (“If . . . a healthy inmate who had suffered no deprivation

of needed medical treatment were able to claim violation of his constitutional right to medical care

simply on the ground that the prison medical facilities were inadequate, the essential distinction

between judge and executive would have disappeared”). Plaintiff has not alleged any injury

whatsoever and consequently has not demonstrated standing.

Second, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded facts that would constitute a violation of equal

protection. The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated

alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal

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ORDER

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protection claim may be established in two ways. First, a plaintiff may establish an equal protection

claim by showing that the defendant has intentionally discriminated on the basis of the plaintiff’s

membership in a protected class, such as race. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 686

(9th Cir. 2001); Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). Second, if the

action in question does not involve a protected class, a plaintiff may establish an equal protection

claim by showing that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a

rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,

564 (2000); Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2004). To

state an equal protection claim under this theory, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the plaintiff is a

member of an identifiable class; (2) the plaintiff was intentionally treated differently from others

similarly situated; and (3) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. See Village of

Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564. Further, if an equal protection claim is based upon the defendant’s

selective enforcement of a valid law or rule, a plaintiff must show that the selective enforcement is

based upon an impermissible motive. Squaw Valley, 375 F.3d at 944.

Plaintiff has made only conclusory allegations that complaints to the Board from prisoners

are being treated differently than complaints from non-prisoners. Prisoners are not a suspect class. 

Glauner v. Miller, 184 F.3d 1053, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). Nor does this difference implicate a

fundamental right. The Plaintiff must therefore show that no rational basis exists for the alleged

difference in treatment. See Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564. Plaintiff has neither told the

Court how prisoner complaints are treated differently nor even alleged that the difference is not

rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Plaintiff has thus failed to state an equal protection

claim. The Court also notes that even if Plaintiff were to successfully amend his complaint, he is

very unlikely to win under a rationale basis standard. However, because the Court has not been

specifically apprised of how prisoner complaints are treated differently, the Court is unable to

determine if it is impossible for Plaintiff to state an equal protection claim. Plaintiff will thus be

given thirty days to amend his complaint.

If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the alleged

difference in treatment has actually injured him. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350. The complaint must

also allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under

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ORDER

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42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions

and the claimed deprivation. May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). Furthermore,

vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. 

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). As noted above, the complaint must

also allege that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of an identifiable class; (2) the plaintiff was

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated; and (3) there is no rational basis for

the difference in treatment. See Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564.

In addition, Plaintiff is informed that the Court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

make Plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once a plaintiff files an amended complaint the original pleading no longer

serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint,

each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Court declines to adopt the findings and recommendations filed June 6, 2007;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint at Docket No. 1 is dismissed with leave to amend;

3. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended

complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, and this Order; the amended complaint must bear the case number assigned to this case

and must be labeled “Amended Complaint”; failure to file an amended complaint that complies with

this Order will result in this action being dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

Dated this the 13th day of March 2008.

 /s/ James K. Singleton, Jr. 

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR. 

United States District Judge 

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