Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-03435/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-03435-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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All pleaded factual allegations are taken to be true for the purposes of a Motion to Disiss

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOUIS MANNING, JR.,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CITY OF ROHNERT PARK, a

municipal corporation; THOMAS

BULLARD individually and in his

official capacity as chief of police for

the CITY OF ROHNERT PARK;

JEFFREY JUSTICE individually and in

his official capacity as police officer for

the CITY OF ROHNERT PARK;

DOES 1-100, inclusive, individually

and in their capacities as police officers

for the CITY OF ROHNERT PARK,

Defendants. ________________________________

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No. C 06-03435 SBA

ORDER

[Docket No. 18]

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 

BACKGROUND1

This case arises out of the false arrest and detention of Plaintiff Louis Manning who was, at

the time of the incident, a 28 year old African American male resident of Defendant City of Rohnert

Park. Am. Compl. at ¶1.

On or about May 27, 2005, Rohnert Park Public Safety Officer Jacy Tatum was dispatched to

investigate a reported robbery that took place at or around 6:30 a.m. at a Shell gas station located at

1484 E. Cotati Avenue in the City of Rohnert Park. Am. Compl. at ¶12. During the course of his

investigation, Tatum interviewed the gas station's cashier, Ms. Elizabeth Olivera, who was working

alone at the time of the robbery. Id. at ¶13. She provided Tatum with a description of two male

suspects who committed the robbery as being between 22 and 27 years old, with one suspect being

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white and the other being black. Id. Tatum then interviewed a second eyewitness, Mr. Robert Beals

who initially described the white suspect as being about 6'1'' tall, and the black suspect as being

5'11" tall, and described both suspects as being about 25 years old. Id. at ¶14. Plaintiff Manning is

approximately 5'5" tall. Id.

Before leaving the scene, Tatum reviewed the store's surveillance videotape of the incident

and requested the City of Rohnert Park ID Tech/PSO Dan Lusk to respond to the scene to collect

any forensic evidence that might assist in identifying the robbery suspects. Id. at ¶15. Lusk arrived

on the scene at approximately 7:30 a.m. and took 15 photos of the crime scene and processed the

sales counter and front entrance for latent fingerprints. Id. Lusk recovered several sets of latent

fingerprints and booked into evidence the fingerprints along with an item that one of the suspects

had touched during the robbery. Id. 

On May 31, 2006, City of Rohnert Park Detective Jeffrey Justice was assigned to further

investigate this robbery. Id. at ¶16. According to Justice's Incident/Investigation Report, he

contacted eyewitness Mr. Beals who told him that "both suspects appeared to be in their early 20's

and thin." Id. Later that day, he went to the gas station and reviewed the surveillance tape and

determined that one of the suspects was a black male wearing an employee issued "Scandia"

sweatshirt. Id. He then went to Scandia to inquire about whether an employee may have been

involved in the robbery. Id. 

A Scandia manager, Ms. Kelsey Mendoza, advised Justice that the particular sweatshirt

Justice observed the black male suspect wearing had been used for approximately a year and a half. 

Id. at ¶17. Mendoza also provided Justice with the names of three persons working at Scandia at

that time that she believed resembled the description Justice had given her. Id. According to

Justice's report, one of the names Mendoza gave him was Louis Manning. Id

Justice subsequently checked the records of all three persons and declared that Plaintiff

Manning was the prime suspect, although (aside from the fact that Plaintiff is African American)

Plaintiff bears no resemblance to either the African American male suspect on the videotape, or the

description provided by the only two eyewitnesses. Id. at ¶18. Justice then pieced together a photo

line-up that included a picture of Plaintiff and five other subjects. Id. at ¶19. Justice personally

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Plaintiff's Amended Complaint also alleges four causes of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983

against all Defendants: (1) Violation of Plaintiff's right to be free from unreasonable seizures without

probable cause under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) Violation of Plaintiff's right to be free

from unreasonable seizures and excessive and/or arbitrary force without reasonable or probable cause

under the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) Violation of Plaintiff's civil right to life and liberty and

deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights not to be deprived of life or liberty without due

process, the right to equal protection under the laws, and the right to be free from pre-conviction

punishment; and (4) Violation of Plaintiff's civil rights to a familial relationship without due process of

law by seizing Plaintiff by use of a false arrest and false imprisonment. None of these federal claims

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showed eyewitness Oliver the photo lineup. Id. Oliver pointed to Plaintiff's photo but expressly told

Justice that while Plaintiff bore some resemblance to the black male suspect, she did not think he

was the person who participated in the robbery. Id.

Still, Justice pursued Plaintiff as the robbery suspect despite the fact that Plaintiff did not

match the description of the black male suspect provided by the second eyewitness, none of the

latent fingerprints obtained by Lusk matched Plaintiff's fingerprints, and Plaintiff's fiancé accounted

for Plaintiff's whereabouts on the morning in question. Id. at ¶20. Plaintiff alleges that Justice

"inexplicably arrested" Plaintiff for robbery without probable cause and Plaintiff was taken to jail

and remained there for 14 days until his preliminary hearing on June 14, 2005. Id. at ¶21. At

Plaintiff's preliminary hearing, and after a brief direct and cross-examination of Justice and

eyewitness Oliver, the Judge refused to hold Plaintiff in custody on the charges and dismissed the

case against him. Id. at ¶22.

Prior to being arrested, Plaintiff was gainfully employed, but as a consequence of being

incarcerated on these charges, he lost his job. Id. at ¶24. Consequently, Plaintiff and his family

suffered a financial crisis as Plaintiff and his fiancé were expecting the birth of their first child. Id.

Consequently, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the City of Rohnert Park, the Chief of

Police Thomas Bullard, Officer Jeffrey Justice and Does 1-100 on May 26, 2006. Plaintiff

subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on September 21, 2006. Defendants collectively filed

the instant Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on October 10, 2006.

Defendant is challenging each of Plaintiff's Fifth through Ninth and Eleventh through

Fourteenth Causes of Action, all of which are premised on state law, as failing to state claims upon

which relief can be granted.2

 The Fifth through Ninth and Eleventh through Thirteenth Claims are

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28 are challenged in the present motion. Plaintiff's Tenth Cause of Action is for False Imprisonment, and

is also not challenged in the present Motion to Dismiss.

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against all Defendants and are as follows:

• the Fifth Cause of Action is for a violation of Plaintiff's right to be free from

unreasonable seizures without probable cause under the California Constitution

Article I, section 13;

• the Sixth Cause of Action is for violations of Plaintiff's right not to be deprived of

life, liberty or property without due process of law as guaranteed under the California

Constitution Article I, section 13; 

• the Seventh Cause of Action is for violations of Plaintiff's right to equal protection as

guaranteed under the California Constitution Article I, section 7(a); 

• the Eighth Cause of Action is for violations of California Civil Code section 52.1;

• the Ninth Cause of Action is for violations of California Civil Code section 51.7;

• the Eleventh Cause of Action is for Negligence; the Twelfth Cause of Action is for

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; and 

• the Thirteenth Cause of Action is for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

 Last, Plaintiff's Fourteenth Cause of Action alleges that Chief Bullard is liable for Negligent

Hiring, Training, Supervision, and Discipline.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss should be granted if it

appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). For purposes of

such a motion, the complaint is construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and all properly

pleaded factual allegations are taken as true. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969);

Everest & Jennings, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1994). All

reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Jacobson v. Hughes Aircraft, 105

F.3d 1288, 1296 (9th Cir. 1997).

The Court does not accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusory allegations cast in

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the form of factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981);

See Miranda v. Clark County, Nev., 279 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[C]onclusory allegations

of law and unwarranted inferences will not defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.");

Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); McGlinchy v. Shell Chem Co.,

845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[C]onclusory allegations without more are insufficient to defeat

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.").

When a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, "leave to amend should be granted

unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading

could not possibly cure the deficiency." Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d

1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). The Court should consider factors such as "the presence or absence of

undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous

amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party and futility of the proposed amendment." 

Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). Of these factors, prejudice

to the opposing party is the most important. See Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387

(9th Cir. 1990) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330-31

(1971)). Leave to amend is properly denied "where the amendment would be futile." DeSoto v.

Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). 

ANALYSIS

A. California Government Code section 821.6 does not render Defendants statutorily

immune from Plaintiff's state law claims.

Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff's state law claims except Plaintiff's tenth cause of action

(for false imprisonment), are premised on the allegation that Detective Justice maliciously,

recklessly, or at best incompetently, pursued and arrested Plaintiff without probable cause, and are

barred under California law on the basis of absolute immunity. Def.s' Mot. at 3. In support of this

argument, Defendants cite California Government Code section 821.6, which states that a "public

employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or

administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and

without probable cause." Defendants further argue that this immunity extends to the public entity

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The applicability of California Government Code section 815.2(b) (extending immunity to a

public entity where its liability results from the act of its employee and that employee is immune from

liability) depends entirely on the applicability of California Government Code section 821.6 to this case.

Therefore, if 821.6 does not provide Detective Justice or Chief Bullard immunity, then 815.2(b)

necessarily does not extend immunity to Defendant City of Rohnert Park.

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Defendant in this case under California Government Code section 815.2(b), which exempts a public

entity from liability "for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public

entity where the employee is immune from liability." Def.s' Mot at 4. Thus, Defendants argue these

California Government Code provisions grant Defendants immunity even if all of Plaintiff's

allegations are true.

Plaintiff responds that Defendants mischaracterize Plaintiff's allegations as asserting claims

under a malicious prosecution theory, when in fact Plaintiff is alleging Defendants falsely arrested

and imprisoned Plaintiff as the basis of all of his claims. Pl.'s Opp. at 4. Plaintiff argues further that

Defendants reliance on California Government Code section 821.6 is misplaced, as this provision

grants immunity from liability for claims based on malicious prosecution, not false arrest and

imprisonment. Id. Plaintiff argues that the applicable law here is California Government Code

section 820.4, which provides that "nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from

liability for false arrest or false imprisonment." Id. Thus, Plaintiff argues that California law does

not provide police officers or their public employers with immunity for false arrest and

imprisonment. Id. 

Thus, critical to whether these state law causes of action can survive a 12(b)(6) motion is

whether the claims should be characterized as deriving from allegations of false arrest and

imprisonment or malicious prosecution, because that will determine whether California Government

Code section 821.6 or 820.4 is applicable to each of the claims challenged here.3

 Plaintiff correctly

states the law. The Ninth Circuit has held that under California law, public employees are not

entitled to immunity from claims of false arrest and/or false imprisonment as well as other state law

claims that are derived from allegations of false arrest and/or false imprisonment. Martinez v. City

of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir. 1998); Robinson v. Solano County 278 F.3d 1007,

1016 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, Plaintiff is correct that if his state law tort claims, such as negligence,

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Defendants cite Amylou v. County of Riverside for the proposition that statutory immunity under

section 821.6 applies to intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, but Defendants

reading of the case is overbroad as the court in Amylou held only that the plaintiff's intentional and

negligent infliction of emotional distress claims were barred by section 821.6 as the claims were

premised on acts incidental to the investigation of crimes and committed in the course of a prosecution

of a judicial proceeding against another person. 28 Cal. App. 4th 1205, 1209-1212 (Cal. App. 1994).

 Defendants next cite Johnson v. City of Pacifica as holding that section 821.6 grants police officers

statutory immunity from negligence claims, but here again, the Defendants extend the reasoning of the

case too far; the court in Johnson only held that police officers were statutorily immune from plaintiff's

negligence claim under section 821.6 as the plaintiff's claim alleged the police officers negligently

conducted an investigation that resulted in the plaintiff's arrest pursuant to a warrant and the plaintiff's

temporary incarceration. 4 Cal. App. 3d 82, 83-84 (Cal. App. 1970). Finally, Defendants cite O'Toole

v. The Superior Court of San Diego County for the proposition that section 821.6 bars claims brought

under California Civil Code section 52.1. However there the court only held that summary judgment

for defendants was proper because defendants were immune from liability under section 820.6 (a

different statute than the one Defendants rely on) where plaintiffs' California Civil Code section 52.1

claims were premised on First Amendment violations; the court also held that one of the plaintiffs' false

arrest claim failed because the officers had reasonable cause to arrest him. 140 Cal. App. 4th 488, 493,

501-08, 510 (Cal. App. 2006).

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negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, are

derivative of a valid claim of false arrest or imprisonment, these claims are also not precluded by

section 821.6. c.f., Martinez, 141 F.3d at 1380 (because plaintiff's California Tort Claims of

negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress

were derivative of a false imprisonment claim that survived summary judgment, these claims also

survived summary judgment). 

Defendants reply that they have already conceded that California Government Code section

821.6 does not apply to claims of false arrest and imprisonment, and that is why they are not

challenging Plaintiff's tenth cause of action for false imprisonment. Def.s' Reply at 2. Defendants

contend that Plaintiff's Opposition fails to rebut their argument that section 821.6 applies to all of

Plaintiff's remaining state law tort claims, but Defendants' do not address the rule provided in

Martinez and Robinson. Id. Instead, in support of their argument, Defendants cite legal authority

for the proposition that immunity under this provision has been applied to each of the remaining

state law causes of action alleged in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and argue that Plaintiff cannot

cite any cases to defeat the application of section 821.6 immunity to his challenged state law tort

causes of action. Id. However, none of the cases Defendant cites dealt with tort claims that were

derived from claims of either false arrest or false imprisonment,4

 and thus these cases are not

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In Plaintiff's Opposition, Plaintiff refers to "Plaintiff's Exhibit B," which indicates that Officer

Justice arrested Plaintiff without a warrant, but no such exhibit exists in the Court's file.

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inconsistent with Martinez and Robinson, which permit a plaintiff to allege other state law tort

claims, (such as negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, or intentional infliction of

emotional distress), where such claims are derived from allegations of false arrest or imprisonment.

Thus, Plaintiff correctly states the law as to when section 821.6 applies. What remains at

issue, however, is whether Plaintiff's Amended Complaint adequately alleges that each of Plaintiff's

state law claims is premised on allegations of false arrest/false imprisonment or malicious

prosecution. The critical difference between false arrest and malicious prosecution is "whether there

is valid legal authority for the arrest." Martinez, 141 F.3d at 1380 (finding that the plaintiff's claim

of false arrest failed, as the plaintiff was arrested in Mexico by Mexican police pursuant to an

apparently valid Mexican warrant, and thus the claim could at best be construed as a malicious

prosecution claim, barred by section 821.6).

Plaintiff argues that his entire case is premised on a false arrest and imprisonment action and

is not based on malicious prosecution. Pl.'s Opp. at 2. False imprisonment consists of the unlawful

violation of the personal liberty of another person, and a false arrest is merely one way in which

false imprisonment may be accomplished. Hagberg v. California Federal Bank, 32 Cal. 4th 350,

372 (2004). The two are not separate torts. Id. Here, Plaintiff specifically alleges Defendants

falsely arrested him. See Amend. Compl. at ¶¶1, 25. Although Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is

unclear as to whether Plaintiff was arrested without a warrant, Plaintiff does clearly allege that

Office Justice "inexplicably arrested [Plaintiff] . . . without probable cause," that Plaintiff was

"arrested on . . . false charges," that Plaintiff was "taken to jail and remained there for 14 days" and

that Plaintiff suffered a violation of his constitutional rights to be free from "an unreasonable search

and seizure of his person." Amend. Compl. at ¶21-24.5

 Thus, as Plaintiff is only alleging that

Defendants unlawfully arrested and held Plaintiff without probable cause, and that all damages

resulted from these actions, all of Plaintiff's claims derive from his claim of false arrest/false

imprisonment. Thus, Defendants do not have statutory immunity as to any of Plaintiff's state law

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claims.

Therefore, this Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth, Ninth,

Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Causes of Action. 

B. The California Constitutional Provision forming the basis of Plaintiff's Sixth and

Seventh Causes of Action does not support claims for damages, but the Court should

request supplemental briefing on whether the same is true for provisions forming the

basis of Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff's fifth, sixth and seventh causes of action based on the

California Constitution fail, because those provisions do not support causes of action for money

damages. Def.'s Mot. at 6. Plaintiff did not respond to this argument.

Plaintiff's fifth claim alleges violations of Plaintiff's right to be free from unreasonable

seizures without probable cause as guaranteed under Article I, Section 13 of the California

Constitution. Am. Compl. at ¶42. Article I, Section 13 reads, "The right of the people to be secure

in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be

violated; and a warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,

particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized."

Plaintiff's sixth claim is for violations of Plaintiff's right not to be deprived of life, liberty or

property without due process of law as guaranteed under Article I, Section 7(a) of the California

Constitution. Id. at ¶44. Plaintiff's seventh claim is for violations of Plaintiff's right to equal

protection as guaranteed under Article I, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution. Id. at ¶46. 

Article I, Section 7(a) reads in relevant part, "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws . . . ."

It is unclear whether Plaintiff is seeking money damages for any of these alleged violations,

as his prayer for relief does not specify whether damages are for each and all causes of actions, and

Plaintiff requests this Court enjoin the City of Rohnert Park from authorizing, allowing, or ratifying

the practice of any police officer of falsely arresting law abiding citizens. In the event that Plaintiff

is requesting money damages for these alleged violations of the California Constitution, Defendant

correctly argues that California law precludes the recovery of money damages for claims brought

under Article I, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution. See Katzberg v. Regents of University of

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California, 29 Cal. 4th 300, 324 (2002) (holding there is "no evidence from which to infer within

Article I, section 7(a), an intent to afford a right to seek damages to remedy a violation of the due

process liberty interest"). Thus, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Sixth and Seventh Claims

is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages. Plaintiff is GRANTED

leave to amend these claims so as to request declaratory or injunctive relief where appropriate.

As for Plaintiff's fifth claim, this Court cannot decide the issue of whether this claim fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted until after supplemental briefing. Defendant only

argues that money damages are inappropriate for claims arising under Article I, Section 13 by

analogy, but offers no case law specifically holding this is true for claims brought under Article I,

Section 13. Given that the California Supreme Court in Katzberg felt the need to thoroughly

examine whether Article I, section 7(a) specifically allowed for a damages remedy, despite the fact

that the California Supreme Court had found that "only two [California] decisions, each filed two

decades ago, have recognized an action for damages to remedy a violation of the state Constitution .

. . [and] [a]ll subsequent decisions addressing the issue have declined to find such an action for

damages," this Court cannot accept Defendant's conclusory analysis of the issue.

Instead, this Court ORDERS supplemental briefing on whether a damages remedy is

appropriate for an asserted violation of Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution. The

supplemental briefing must specifically employ the framework approved by the California Supreme

Court in Katzberg. There, the court held that the appropriate framework to employ when

determining whether a damages remedy is appropriate for an asserted constitutional violation is: (1)

whether there is evidence from which a court may find or infer, within the constitutional provision at

issue, an affirmative intent either to authorize or to withhold a damages action to remedy a violation

(permitting the review of the language and history of the constitutional provision at issue); and (2) in

the event no affirmative intent either to authority or withhold a damages remedy is found, whether a

"constitutional tort" analysis under Bivens and its progeny permits recognition of a damages remedy. 

 29 Cal. 4th at 317. If the latter form of analysis is applied, the factors to be considered are: (1)

whether an adequate remedy exists; (2) the extent to which a constitutional tort action would change

established tort law, and the nature and significance of the constitutional provision; and (3) whether

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any special factors exist counseling hesitation in recognizing a damages action, including deference

to legislative judgment, avoidance of adverse policy consequences, considerations of government

fiscal policy, practical issues of proof, and the competence of courts to assess particular types of

damages. Id.

Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Sixth and Seventh Claims is

GRANTED. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to amend these claims to so as to request declaratory or

injunctive relief where appropriate. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Fifth Claim is neither

granted nor denied, but instead this Court ORDERS SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING on the issue of

whether Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution permits recovery of money damages. 

C. California Law does not recognize a cause of action for the negligent hiring, training or

supervision of a governmental employee without a statutory basis for such a claim, and

thus Plaintiff's Fourteenth Cause of Action should be dismissed with prejudice.

Defendants argue that the liability of public entities under California law is strictly confined

to causes of action authorized by the Government Code. Def.'s Mot. at 8-9. Defendant further

argues that Plaintiff's Fourteenth Cause of Action against Defendant Chief Bullard is a claim

attempting to hold Chief Bullard directly liable for the alleged shortcomings of the public agency he

heads, as Bullard was not personally involved in Plaintiff's arrest, and that California courts have not

permitted such a cause of action where a plaintiff does not provide a statutory basis for liability. Id.

Plaintiff did not respond to this argument.

Defendants are correct. The California Supreme Court held that public entities in California

are immune from direct common law claims of negligence under the California Tort Claims Act,

California Government Code section 815(a), unless there is a statutory basis for the negligence

claim. Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority, 31 Cal. 4th 1175, 1179-80 (2003). A year

later a California appellate court extended this same reasoning to a common law tort claim of

negligence against a city and police chief by a plaintiff attempting to hold the police chief, not

directly involved in the incident in that case, liable for the negligent "selection, training, retention,

supervision, and discipline of police officers" in Munoz v. City of Union City. 120 Cal. App. 4th

1077, 1111-12 (Cal. App. 2003). There, the court rejected this tort claim and reversed the portion

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of a jury's verdict, assigning liability based on a theory of direct negligence for not developing

clearer police procedures or better officer training, against both the city and the police chief. Id.

Thus, as Plaintiff's Fourteenth Cause of Action provides no statutory basis for liability, and

Plaintiff has offered no contrary case law on the matter, this Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff's Fourteenth Cause of action with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, this Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff's Eight, Ninth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Causes of Action as Defendants are not

statutorily immune from liability for these claims. 

This Court also GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Sixth and Seventh

Causes of Action, and GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint as to these claims. 

This Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Fourteenth Cause of Action

with prejudice. 

This Court ORDERS supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the California

constitutional provision relied on in Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action permits recovery of money

damages. Plaintiff and Defendant shall each file and serve a supplemental brief no later than ten

(10) days from the date of this Order. Each brief shall not exceed ten (10) pages. After the

supplemental briefs are filed, the Court will consider this matter fully submitted on the papers. 

Should the Court later determine that oral argument is necessary, the clerk will contact the parties

and place the matter back on calendar.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated: 12/11/06 SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

Case 4:06-cv-03435-WDB Document 32 Filed 12/11/06 Page 12 of 12