Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00787/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00787-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 08cv0878 H (CAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER ADAME,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08cv787 H (CAB)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

On April 30, 2008, Petitioner, Christopher Adame, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner contends a violation of his federal constitutional

rights occurred when the trial court admitted the previous testimony of an unavailable witness, and

that his rights were violated by ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.) On June 19, 2008, Respondent

answered. (Doc. No. 8.) On July 23, 2008, the Petitioner filed a traverse. (Doc. No. 9.) On July 25,

2008, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. No. 10.) On August 25,

2008, Petitioner filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Doc. No. 11.) This Court

considered these documents and all the supporting documents submitted by the parties. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the petition. 

Case 3:08-cv-00787-H-CAB Document 12 Filed 04/21/09 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 08cv0878 H (CAB)

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On June 7, 2004, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed a consolidated

information in Case Nos. SCD176307 and SCD180441, charging Petitioner with the following counts:

(1) forcible rape, in violation of California Penal Code § 261(a)(2); (2) forcible oral copulation, in

violation of California Penal Code § 288a(c); (3) false imprisonment by violence, menace, fraud, and

deceit, in violation of California Penal Code §§ 236, 237(a); (4) robbery in violation of California

Penal Code § 211; (5) receiving stolen property, in violation of California Penal Code § 496(a); (6)

forcible rape, in violation California Penal Code § 261(a)(2); (7) forcible oral copulation, in violation

of California Penal Code § 288a(c); (8) robbery, in violation of California Penal Code § 211; (9) false

imprisonment by violence, menace, fraud, and deceit, in violation of California Penal Code §§ 236,

237(a); (10) receiving stolen property, in violation of California Penal Code § 496(a); and (11)

soliciting an act of prostitution, in violation of California Penal Code § 647(b). (Clerk’s Transcript

(“CT”) at 6-10.)

On September 15, 2004, a jury found Petitioner guilty of all counts except for counts nine and

ten, which the People subsequently dismissed. (CT at 391-411.) The trial court sentenced Petitioner

to 74 years, 8 months, to life. (CT at 411.)

Petitioner filed an appeal in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division

One. (Lodgment No. 3.) In his appeal Petitioner argued: (1) the trial court erred in admitting the

preliminary hearing testimony of witness Pamela because the people failed to establish that they had

exercised due diligence in attempting to secure her presence at trial; (2) the trial court erred in failing

to suppress evidence police found after they unconstitutionally seized and searched his car; (3) his trial

counsel was ineffective when he failed to raise certain arguments in support of a motion to suppress

evidence; (4) the applicable statute of limitations required reversal of his conviction for receiving

stolen property; and (5) his felony false imprisonment convictions must be reversed because felony

false imprisonment is a lesser included offense of forcible rape and forcible oral copulation. (Id.) On

November 3, 2006, the Court of Appeal affirmed unanimously affirmed the judgment in an

unpublished opinion. (Lodgment No. 6.)

Case 3:08-cv-00787-H-CAB Document 12 Filed 04/21/09 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 08cv0878 H (CAB)

Petitioner sought review from the Supreme Court of California arguing that: (1) the trial court

erred in admitting Pamela’s preliminary hearing testimony at trial because the People failed to

establish that they had exercised due diligence in attempting to secure her presence at trial; (2) the trial

court erred in failing to suppress evidence police found after they unconstitutionally seized and

searched his car; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to raise certain arguments in

support of a motion to suppress evidence. (Lodgment No. 7.) On February 14, 2007, the California

Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for review. (Lodgment No. 8.) Following the

California Supreme Court’s denial, Petitioner filed a federal petition on April 30, 2008. (Doc. No. 1.)

B. Factual History

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact, presuming them to be correct;

Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts and trial history as

follows: 

The Offenses Against Erin

On the evening of May 27, 2003, Erin was working as a prostitute on El Cajon

Boulevard in the City of San Diego. Petitioner approached her and asked her if she

was “working.” Erin indicated that she was, and got into his car. Petitioner drove to

a parking lot in Mission Valley.

Petitioner agreed to pay Erin $60 to have sex. When Erin asked for the money,

Petitioner responded that he would give it to her in a minute. Petitioner told her to get

in the back seat, and she did so. Petitioner then got in the back seat and pulled out a

knife from a pocket on the seat back. Petitioner held the knife to Erin’s throat and told

her to give him her money. Erin complied. Petitioner demanded that Erin give him

a “blow job” and also demanded that she have vaginal intercourse with him. Erin

complied with these demands as well. After Petitioner finished sexually assaulting

Erin, he ordered out of the car and drove away.

The Offenses Against Pamela

On the evening of June 8, 2003, Pamela was sitting at a bus stop on El Cajon

Boulevard, working as prostitute. Petitioner approached her in his car and told her that

he wanted her to orally copulate him. Pamela and Petitioner agreed on a price for her

services, and Pamela got into the car. Petitioner drove to an underground parking

garage in Mission Valley. After they arrived at the garage, Pamela asked to be paid.

Petitioner hesitated, then grabbed a knife and told her to “shut up and suck his dick.”

Petitioner held the knife to Pamela’s face while she orally copulated him. After “a few

minutes,” Petitioner told Pamela to take off her jeans, but Pamela refused. Petitioner

ordered Pamela out of the car, and again ordered her to take off her jeans. Pamela got

out of the car and took off her jeans. Petitioner then raped Pamela by penetrating her

vaginally from behind with his penis. Pamela was crying during the rape. After

approximately 10 minutes, Petitioner stopped raping Pamela, and she left the area on

Case 3:08-cv-00787-H-CAB Document 12 Filed 04/21/09 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 08cv0878 H (CAB)

foot. Petitioner drove away.

The Offense Against Roxanne

In July 2003, Roxanne was working as a prostitute on El Cajon Boulevard. Petitioner

approached Roxanne while driving his car, and nodded at her. Roxanne got into

Petitioner’s car. Petitioner drove to an underground parking structure in Mission

Valley. Once they arrived at the parking garage, Petitioner and Roxanne discussed

prices for vaginal sex and for oral copulation. Roxanne told Petitioner that oral

copulation would cost $50 and that sexual intercourse would cost $100. Petitioner told

Roxanne that he wanted to have intercourse.

Petitioner and Roxanne got in the back seat of the car and had vaginal intercourse.

While they were having sex, they heard a woman’s voice coming from outside of the

car. Petitioner pulled out a knife from a pocket in the car, held it to Roxanne’s neck,

and ordered Roxanne out of the car. Roxanne complied, but inadvertently left her

purse in the car. She asked Petitioner for the purse, but he drove away.

The Offense Against Stephanie

In February 2001, Stephanie was working as a prostitute in Oceanside. Petitioner

approached Stephanie, and she got into his car. Petitioner and Stephanie agreed on a

price for sex. Petitioner then drove to a residential neighborhood and parked.

Petitioner and Stephanie got in the back seat of his car. Petitioner started to become

a “little bit too physical,” and Stephanie became frightened. She got out of the car,

without her purse. When she asked Petitioner for her purse, Petitioner held the purse

out of the car and told Stephanie to come and get it. Petitioner drove off without

allowing Stephanie to retrieve the purse. Stephanie’s military identification card was

in her purse.

The Defense

Petitioner testified and admitted to having contact with all of the women. Petitioner

said he had consensual intercourse with both Erin and Roxanne, but claimed that he

had disagreements with each of them regarding their fees, afterward. Petitioner

admitted that he had used a knife during each of these two incidents to force the

women out of the car.

Petitioner testified that he paid Pamela for oral sex. After he paid her, Petitioner

received a call from his girlfriend on his cellular telephone. Petitioner’s girlfriend said

she was annoyed with him for being late. Petitioner decided that he no longer wanted

to have oral sex with Pamela and demanded that Pamela return his money. When she

refused, he grabbed the money from her breast area, took her purse, and threw the

purse from the car. When Pamela went to retrieve the purse, Petitioner drove off.

Petitioner admitted that he had picked up Stephanie, intending to pay her to have sex

with him. However, after Stephanie got into Petitioner’s car, he became concerned

that she might be a minor. Petitioner asked her if she could prove that she was an

adult. After examining her identification, Petitioner realized that she was only 16. He

asked Stephanie to get out of his car. Stephanie became angry and got out of the car.

She left her identification card behind. Petitioner later put Stephanie’s identification

card in the trunk of his car.

Case 3:08-cv-00787-H-CAB Document 12 Filed 04/21/09 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 08cv0878 H (CAB)

Motion To Suppress

In September 2003, Adame filed a motion to suppress evidence, which he claimed had

been illegally obtained as a result of a police inventory search of his car in July 2003.

Adame claimed the warrantless search of his car was unconstitutional because it was

performed in order to obtain evidence of a crime, rather than to conduct an inventory

of the car’s contents. In the alternative, Adame claimed the People had failed to

establish that the inventory search was conducted pursuant to standardized procedures.

The People filed an opposition in which they argued that a warrantless evidentiary

search of a car is proper whenever police have probable cause to believe the car

contains evidence of a crime or is itself an instrumentality of a crime. The People

argued that the police has such probable cause in this case. Alternatively, the People

contended that the search was a proper inventory search. Finally, the People

maintained that although a search warrant was not required, police obtained a warrant

on July 23, 2003 to authorize an additional search of the car. Thus, even if the initial

search of Adame’s car was unlawful, all of the evidence seized from Adame’s car

would have inevitably been discovered.

During Adame’s preliminary hearing, the People offered testimony of San Diego

Police Detective Sharon McFalls, San Diego Police Sergeant Kenneth Stewart, and

San Diego Police Officer Stephen Shebloski, regarding the circumstances of the

seizure and searches of Adame’s car. Detective McFalls testified that on May 27,

2003, Erin told police that she had been sexually assaulted in a car whose license

plates matched a car registered to Adame. Erin also provided police with a physical

description of the car. Roxanne told police on July 17, 2003 that a man had robber her

of her purse at knifepoint in a car that matched the description of Adame’s car.

Roxanne identified Adame as her assailant in a photographic lineup.

On July 19, 2003, after police had obtained Roxanne’s photographic identification of

Adame and the license plate information, they seized and searched Adame’s car.

Sergeant Stewart testified that police “seized the car as evidence...and we searched for

evidence in the [car].” On cross-examination, Sergeant Stewart testified on crossexamination that Adame’s car was seized pursuant to Vehicle Code section 22655.5

Officer Shebloski testified that after police seized Adame’s car, it was towed down the

street. Officer Shebloski then searched the car. During his search, Shebloski

discovered a woman’s purse that contained Roxanne’s identification.

On July 23, 2003, police obtained a warrant to search Adame’s house and car. On

August 6, police performed a further search of Adame’s car at their crime laboratory.

During the August 6 search, police discovered a knife and a pair of woman’s

underwear in the trunk of Adame’s car, under the spare tire. Erin, Pamela, and

Roxanne identified the knife as the one Adame used during the offenses. Police also

found Stephanie’s identification in the trunk of Adame’s car during the August 6

search. Between July 19 and August 6, Adame’s car was secured in a locked location.

After hearing argument from defense counsel, the trial court denied the motion to

suppress. The court ruled, “there was clear, probable cause to seize and search this

vehicle...[The police] seized the vehicle as evidence, which the police have a right to

do.” The court also noted that the most of the evidence from the car was obtained

during the August 6 search, after the police had obtained a search warrant, and that

Adame had not raised any challenge with respect to the warrant. The court found that

any evidence that was not discovered during the July 19 search of the car were

admissible pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine. Finally, the court ruled that

“clearly there was an inventory search,” referring to the July 19 search.

(Lodgment No. 6.)

Case 3:08-cv-00787-H-CAB Document 12 Filed 04/21/09 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 08cv0878 H (CAB)

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court reviews Federal Habeas claims under the standard set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),

which provides that:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim

that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication

of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Therefore, to obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254

(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets these clauses

as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently that this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from the Court’s decision but unreasonable applies that principle to the facts

of the prisoner’s case.

Id. at 412-13.

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, this Court “looks through”

to the underlying appellate decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado

v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court

precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long

as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court

precedent]”, the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. 

Case 3:08-cv-00787-H-CAB Document 12 Filed 04/21/09 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 08cv0878 H (CAB)

B. Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause Claim

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses

by allowing the prosecution to introduce at trial Pamela’s testimony from the preliminary hearing.

(Doc. No. 1.) The Sixth Amendment prevents the prosecution from admitting a prior statement that

is testimonial in nature unless: (1) the accused has had a meaningful opportunity to confront the

witness; and (2) the witness is unavailable to testify at trial. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,

68 (2004); United States v. Yida, 498 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Barber v. Pager, 390 U.S.

719, 724-25 (1968) (holding that the admission of prior testimony that had been subjected to crossexamination violated the Confrontation Clause because the state did not prove that the witness was

unavailable). 

1. Opportunity to Confront the Witness

The Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). Petitioner claims he was deprived of an adequate

opportunity to cross-examine Pamela because his trial counsel may have taken a different approach

to crossing the witness than his counsel at the preliminary hearing took. This does not amount to a

Confrontation Clause violation. See id. Counsel represented Petitioner at the preliminary hearing,

and Pamela was subjected to cross-examination by Petitioner’s counsel at that time. (Reporter’s

Transcript (“RT”) at 492-504; 507.) The cross-examination addressed several issues, including

Pamela’s admission that she initially lied to the investigator when she told him she only engaged in

oral copulation with Petitioner, and not sexual intercourse. (RT at 493.) During closing argument,

Petitioner’s trial counsel emphasized the fact that Pamela had initially lied to the investigator. (RT

at 1968.)

2. Unavailability

Regardless of a previous meaningful opportunity to confront the witness, a prior testimonial

statement will not be admitted unless the witness is unavailable. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. The party

seeking to admit testimonial statements carries the burden of establishing that the witness is

“unavailable.” See Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1988). Establishing

Case 3:08-cv-00787-H-CAB Document 12 Filed 04/21/09 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 08cv0878 H (CAB)

unavailability requires the proponent to show a good faith effort was made to obtain the witness’s

presence at trial. See Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-25. Although the appropriate amount of diligence and

effort remains unclear, the Ninth Circuit previously stated that “herculean efforts are not

constitutionally required.” Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 1994).

Petitioner contends, however, that the Prosecution’s efforts were so unheroic as to be

“perfunctory” and “window-dressing.” (Doc. 1 at 28, Doc. 11 at 6.) Petitioner relies heavily on U.S.

v. Mann, 590 F.2d 361 (1st Cir. 1978) for the proposition that Prosecution should have used “other

reasonable means” to secure the witness’s presence at trial than a subpoena. (Doc. 11 at 7.) Although

Mann does require the Prosecution to use other means besides a subpoena to ensure the voluntary

appearance of an important witness, this does not mean that the Prosecution needed to do more than

it did here. See id. at 367. For example, in Mann, part of the problem was that the Prosecution did

not fulfil the implicit duty to prevent the witness from becoming absent. Id. at 368. Here, however,

there is evidence that for the year between the hearing and the trial, the prosecution made numerous

attempts to stay in contact with Pamela, including providing her with a pager. (RT at 19.) 

Other evidence demonstrating that the Prosecution made a good faith effort to locate Pamela

includes the fact that a month prior to the August 11, 2004 court date, the Prosecutor implored Pamela

to stay in touch with Investigator Garcia and ensured that Pamela had numbers where staff members

could be reached. (RT at 22.) At that time, Pamela was told that a subpoena had been left for her at

her sister’s house, and she was notified of the August 11, 2004 court date. (Id.) Following the failure

of Pamela to appear at the August 11, 2004, court date, Investigator Garcia went to Pamela’s sister’s

house and left her telephone number with instructions for the sister to call if she had any information

regarding Pamela’s whereabouts. (Id. at 21.) Five days later, on August 16, 2004, Pamela contacted

her sister and said she was living in Las Vegas with her boyfriend and did not intend to come to court.

(Id. at 12-13.) Consequently, Investigator Garcia contacted the Las Vegas police, and specifically the

vice squad, but they had no contact with Pamela. (Id. at 13.) Investigator Garcia also checked local,

national, and international police databases in an attempt to find an alternative address at which

Pamela could be reached. (Id. at 12.) Investigator Garcia’s attempt to trace Pamela or her boyfriend

through the use of their social security numbers and personal credit proved unsuccessful. (Id. at 13-

Case 3:08-cv-00787-H-CAB Document 12 Filed 04/21/09 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 08cv0878 H (CAB)

14.) Similarly, efforts to trace Pamela or her boyfriend through the California and Nevada Department

of Motor Vehicles failed, as did attempts to locate Pamela through local hospitals. (Id. at 14-15. )

Investigator Garcia also checked two of the boyfriend’s former addresses, but neither Pamela nor the

boyfriend were present at either location. (Id.)

3. Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause Claim Denied

Petitioner had a meaningful opportunity to cross Pamela at the preliminary hearing, and

Prosecution exercised due diligence in making a good faith effort to obtain the witness’s presence at

trial. As a result, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s claim.

C. Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Petitioner bases his second ground for relief, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, on

the fact that his lawyer failed to raise several arguments in support of a motion to suppress evidence

found during a search of Petitioner’s car. These arguments include: (1) the constitutionality of

California Vehicle Code Section 22655.5; (2) the legality search of a closed purse found during an

inventory search of petitioner’s vehicle was unreasonable; and (3) the fact that the search of

Petitioner’s vehicle was executed after the warrant to do so had expired. (Doc. 1 at 32-35.) The

Supreme Court laid out a two prong test requiring a petitioner for writ of habeas corpus alleging

ineffective counsel to prove: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that counsel’s

errors were so egregious as to deprive petitioner of a fair trail. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984). 

Regarding counsel’s performance, a petitioner must show counsel’s representation fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that

were not the result of reasonable professional judgment considering the circumstances. Id. Judicial

scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly deferential, and there is a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls withing the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. Even

if a petitioner can show that his lawyer made unreasonable mistakes to the point of a meritorious

Fourth Amendment issue, the petitioner must also prove with “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.

The prongs of this test may be taken in either order. Id. at 697. 

Case 3:08-cv-00787-H-CAB Document 12 Filed 04/21/09 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 08cv0878 H (CAB)

1. Constitutionality of California Vehicle Code § 22655.5

Petitioner contends that his trial counsel ineffectively assisted him by failing to argue that

California Vehicle Code § 22655.5 was both facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional in violation

of the Fourth Amendment as applied to the facts of his case. (Doc. No. 1 at 35-40; Doc. No. 11 at 11-

13.) The Fourth Amendment requires police to secure a warrant before a search, but there is an

exception to this requirement for the search of vehicles. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466

(1999). In California, Vehicle Code section 22655.5 codifies. It provides in relevant part:

A peace officer...may remove a motor vehicle from the highway or from public or

private property within the territorial limits in which the officer may act under the

following circumstance:

(a) When any vehicle is found upon a highway or public or private property and a

peace officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle was used as the means of

committing a public offense.

(b) When any vehicle is found upon a highway or public or private property and a

peace officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle is itself evidence which

tends to show that a crime has been committed or that the vehicle contains evidence,

which cannot be readily removed, which tends to show that a crime has been

committed.

Cal. Vehicle Code § 22655.5(a)-(b).

The police relied upon this statute to perform a search of Petitioner’s car in his driveway.

Petitioner argues that this statute is both facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to

the facts of the case because “it authorizes warrantless seizures of vehicles located on private

property.” (Doc. No. 11 at 11.) Petitioner raised the same argument in front of he California Court

of Appeal. (Lodgment No. 6.) In an opinion unanimously affirming the decision, the state appellate

court dismissed the Petitioner’s argument as follows:

We begin by considering Adame’s challenge to Vehicle Code section 22655.5 as

applied. Adame attempts to distinguish [Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938

(1996)] and several other cases involving the automobile exception [to the Fourth

Amendment] on the ground that in those cases, “police formed probable cause based

on a particularized suspicion as to the circumstances of the individual case, rather than

a statute granting them sweeping powers to seize vehicles from private property.” We

reject this argument. Vehicle Code section 22655.5 itself requires that police have

probable cause to seize and search his car for evidence relating to their sexual assault

investigations. Because police had probable cause to believe Adame’s car contained

such evidence, the July 19th seizure of Adame’s car was constitutional pursuant to the

automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. [citing Labron, 518 U.S. at 940.] Accordingly, we reject Adame’s claim that the seizure of his car

pursuant to Vehicle Code section 22655.5 was unconstitutional as applied to the facts

of this case.

Case 3:08-cv-00787-H-CAB Document 12 Filed 04/21/09 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 08cv0878 H (CAB)

We also reject Adame’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. Vehicle

Code section 22655.5 plainly has numerous constitutional applications, as is evident

by our rejection of the defendant’s challenge to the statute as applied, and the [People

v. Auer, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1664 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)] court’s rejection of the defendant’s

challenge to the application of the statute in that case. Because Vehicle Code section

22655.5 appears to be based on the automobile exception, it is clear that the statute

does not “present [a] total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional

prohibitions.’ [citation.]

(Lodgment No. 6 at 15-16.) 

Review of the California Court of Appeal opinion reveals that the decision was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable interpretation of, Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In

analyzing the vehicle exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement, the Supreme Court has held

that the exception may be satisfied by a finding of probable cause alone, and there is no exigency

requirement. Dyson, 527 U.S. at 466-67. According to the Supreme Court, this exception also

applies to vehicles found on private property. Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 939 (1996). As

a result, this Court rejects the argument that Petitioner’s trial counsel was deficient.

2. Search of Closed Purse

Petitioner also contends that his trial counsel ineffective ly assisted him by failing to argue to

that searching a closed purse found during an inventory search of Petitioner’s vehicle was

unreasonable because there was no showing that the police followed established department

guidelines. The Court of Appeal’s unanimous decision rejected this argument stating:

An inventory search is the search of property lawfully seized and detained in order to

ensure that it is harmless, to secure valuable items (such as might be kept in a towed

car), and to protect against false claims of loss or damage.” (Whren v. U.S. (1996) 517

U.S. 806, 812, fn. 1.) An inventory search need not be accompanied by probable

cause. (Id. at pp. 811-812.) However, “an inventory search must not be a ruse for a

general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.” (Florida v. Wells

(1990) 495 U.S. 1, 4.)

As discussed in the previous subsection, Adame does not dispute the trial court’s

finding that police had probable cause to seize and search his car on July 19.

Therefore, the July 19 seizure and search of Adame’s car was constitutional pursuant

to the automobile exception. 

Since police could lawfully seize and search Adame’s vehicle pursuant to the

automobile exception, any inquiry into the lawfulness of an “inventory search” of his

car is moot.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 16-17.)

Case 3:08-cv-00787-H-CAB Document 12 Filed 04/21/09 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 - 08cv0878 H (CAB)

Again, this Court cannot find that the state court determination was unreasonable. The

warrantless search of containers discovered in the course of a lawful vehicle search is well established

under the law. See e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (stating that “[i]f probable

cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle

and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”). Here, it is undisputed that the police had

abundant probable cause to lawfully seize and search Petitioner’s vehicle. Accordingly, the police

could search the close purse pursuant to the lawful vehicle search, and the Court of Appeal properly

determined that any inquiry as to whether the search of the closed purse would also constitute a valid

inventory search was moot. Consequently, this Court also rejects the argument that Petitioner’s trial

counsel was deficient on this ground.

3. August 6, 2003 Search

Finally, Petitioner argues the search of his car on August 6, 2003, during which the police

discovered the knife and a pair of underwear, was illegal because the search warrant was not executed

within the ten day time limit of California Penal Code § 1534(a). (Doc. No. 1. at 43-47.) Petitioner

also argues that the automobile exception no longer applied to the August 6 search because it was

conducted approximately 18 days after the car was seized. (Id. at 45.) In rejecting this claim, the

California Court of Appeal wrote:

Section1534, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part, “A search warrant shall be

executed and returned within 10 days after date of issuance. A warrant executed within

the 10-day period shall be deemed to have been timely executed and no further showing

of timeliness need be made. After the expiration of 10 days, the warrant, unless

executed, is void.”

Adame has cited no case, and we have found none, in which a court has held that

suppression is an appropriate remedy for the failure of police to timely execute a

warrant pursuant to section 1534, subdivision (a). On the contrary, in People v. Bowen

(1982) 137 Cal. App. 3d 1020, the court stated, albeit in dicta, that suppression would

not ordinarily be an appropriate remedy for a violation of section 1534, subdivision (a),

“Even were we to find a violation of section 1534, it would not raise an issue of

constitutional magnitude and would not result in the suppression of evidence absent a

showing of prejudice to the defendant.” [Citation.]

Adame does not claim that the circumstances supporting the issuance of the expired

warrant had changed as of August 6. We also not that the search was conducted only

a few days after the expiration of the warrant. There is nothing in the record to suggest

that Adame objected to the search on the ground that it was untimely, or that he suffered

any undue prejudice from the untimeliness of the search. Under these circumstances,

we doubt that suppression would be the proper remedy for the failure of police to timely

execute a warrant in accordance with section 1534, subdivision (a).

Case 3:08-cv-00787-H-CAB Document 12 Filed 04/21/09 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 - 08cv0878 H (CAB)

In any event, assuming for the sake of argument that suppression would be the

appropriate remedy for a violation of section 1534, subdivision (a) in a case in which

a warrant was required, here, no warrant was required. Although Adame suggests that

the automobile exception no longer applied because the August 6 search was conducted

approximately two and a half weeks after the initial seizure of his car, he provides no

authority to support this assertion. Further, Adame does not claim that the probable

cause that authorized the seizure and search of his car on July 19, 2003 had grown stale

by August 6. (Cf. Florida v. White (1999) 526 U.S. 559, 565, fn 4 [“We express no

opinion about whether excessive delay prior to a seizure could render probable cause

stale, and the seizure therefore unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment”].) Under

these circumstances, we conclude that the August 6 search was lawful under the

automobile exception. (See, e.g., United States v. Gastiaburo (4th Cir. 1994) 16 F.3d

582, 587 [“Not a single published federal case speaks of a ‘temporal limit’ to the

automobile exception. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a warrantless

search of a car (1) need not occur contemporaneously with the car’s lawful seizure and

(2) need not be justified by the existence of exigent circumstances that might have made

it impractical to secure a warrant prior to the search”]...)

We conclude that irrespective of any violation of section 1534, subdivision (a), the

search of Adame’s car on August 6, 2003 was lawful pursuant to the automobile

exception.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 17-19.)

The ruling of the California Court of Appeal on this issue was not unreasonable. Following the

seizure and initial search of Petitioner’s car on July 19, 2003, the police laboratory conducted a more

thorough search of the car on August 6, 2003. Petitioner argues that the automobile exception no

longer applies, but provides no Supreme Court authority to support such a temporal limit on the

automobile exception. Furthermore, although there is no Supreme Court decision clearly establishing

temporal limits for a search to be conducted pursuant to the automobile exception, there is ample

Supreme Court authority showing that a warrantless search of a car need not occur contemporaneously

with the car’s lawful seizure. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 570 (1991); Johns, 469 U.S. at 484-

85. As a result, the decision of the California Court of Appeal was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Accordingly, Petitioner’s counsel was not

ineffective for failing to raise this argument in the motion to suppress.

4. Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Denied

Given the fact that Petitioner’s counsel was not deficient for failing to raise the three arguments

proposed by Petitioner, this Court DENIES the Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.

Case 3:08-cv-00787-H-CAB Document 12 Filed 04/21/09 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 - 08cv0878 H (CAB)

D. Additional Requests

In light of the foregoing, the Court denies Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing and

for appointment of counsel for this petition. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991); Cheney

v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above and in the Report and Recommendation, this Court DENIES

the Petitioner’s request for a writ of habeas corpus.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: April 21, 2009

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 3:08-cv-00787-H-CAB Document 12 Filed 04/21/09 Page 14 of 14