Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902-62/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LIONEL HARPER, DANIEL SINCLAIR, 

HASSAN TURNER, LUIS VAZQUEZ, and 

PEDRO ABASCAL, individually and 

on behalf of all others 

similarly situated and all 

aggrieved employees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

Defendant.

No. 2:19-cv-00902 WBS DMC

ORDER

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Lionel Harper and Daniel Sinclair move for 

partial summary judgment on various alleged violations of the 

California Labor Code. (Mot. (Docket No. 360).) The violations 

relate to plaintiffs’ claim for unlawful calculation, deduction, 

and payment of commission wages (Claim 5); and claim for failure 

to provide timely and complete copies of employment records 

(Claim 8). Harper also requests that the court determine that he 

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is an “aggrieved employee” pursuant to his Private Attorneys 

General Act (“PAGA”) claim (Claim 10).

A. Unlawful Calculation, Deduction, and Payment of 

Commission Wages (Claim 5)

Harper alleges that defendant violated Labor Code 

Sections 2751, 204, 221, 223, and 224 by improperly calculating, 

documenting, deducting, and withholding payment of his commission 

wages. (See Mot. at 15-27.)

Defendant previously moved for partial summary judgment 

on this claim, requesting that the court find that defendant did 

not violate any of the above Labor Code provisions. (See 

generally Order (Docket No. 111).) The court denied that motion 

as to every one of these alleged violations because “the 

testimony and declarations of the parties are in direct conflict” 

regarding whether Harper knowingly agreed to the terms of 

defendant’s commission plan in the first place. (See Order at 

26-27 (§ 2751(b)); 29-30 (§ 204); 32-33 (§§ 221, 224); 34 (§ 

223).) The court concluded that this direct conflict in the 

evidence precluded summary judgment for defendant on alleged 

violations of Sections 2751, 204, 221, 223, and 224. (See id.)

Notwithstanding the three years that have passed since 

the court’s initial summary judgment order, neither party brings 

any materially new evidence on this threshold issue. Even though 

the court now views the record in the light most favorable to 

defendant, the same conflict remains, and the same conclusion 

results: there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding 

whether Harper knowingly agreed to the terms of defendant’s 

commission plan in the first place. Accordingly, the court 

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cannot conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff prevails on any 

of the alleged violations of Sections 27511, 204, 221, 223, and 

224. 

B. Failure to Provide Timely and Complete Copies of 

Employment Records (Claim 8)

Harper also alleges that defendant failed to timely 

provide wage statements and personnel files in violation of Labor 

Code §§ 226(b)-(c) and 1198.5(a)-(c). (See Mot. at 11-15.) 

Sinclair joins as to alleged violations under Section 1198.5.

1. Section 226(b)-(c): Timely Production of Wage 

Statements

The court previously denied defendant’s request for 

summary judgment on Section 226(b)-(c) because there were genuine 

issues of material fact on whether (1) plaintiffs’ requests to 

inspect and receive copies of their wage statements were 

reasonable, and (2) the timing of defendant’s production of 

Harper’s wage statements fully satisfied § 226(b). (See Order at 

50-51.)

Neither party provides any new material facts to 

augment the record. Viewing the record now in the light most 

favorable to defendant, the court still concludes that genuine 

issues of material fact remain regarding when plaintiff first 

made a “reasonable request” due to (1) the form of Mr. 

1 Harper moves for summary judgment on violations of both 

subsections (a) and (b) of Section 2751. Previously, the court 

only considered violations of subsection (b). However the 

predicate issue of whether plaintiffs knowingly entered into the 

commission agreement at issue applies squarely to alleged 

violations of Section 2751(a) as well.

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Soderstrom’s initial June 4, 2018 request, and (2) Harper’s and 

Mr. Soderstrom’s conflicting representations to defendant on 

whether Mr. Soderstrom was in fact Harper’s representative.

2. Section 1198.5(a)-(c): Timely and Complete 

Production of Personnel Records

The court previously denied summary judgment for 

defendant regarding Section 1198.5 because “personnel records” 

are expansively defined to encompass things such as corrective 

action reports, letters related to termination, and commission 

plan documents, which defendant produced after the statutory 

deadline to do so had passed. (See Order at 49.)

However, on February 26, 2024, defendant paid Harper 

and Sinclair $750 each as statutory penalties owed under Labor 

Code Section 1198.5(a)-(c). (Docket No. 377-3 ¶ 3.) Defendant 

argues that this moots plaintiffs’ individual claim. (See Opp’n 

(Docket No. 377) at 2 n.1.) The court agrees. While plaintiffs 

argue otherwise because they have not received costs and fees

(see Reply (Docket No. 381) at 9), Section 1198.5(k) identifies 

$750 in statutory penalties as the sole remedy available to 

plaintiffs.2 See Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 819 F.3d 1136, 1145 

(9th Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim becomes moot once the plaintiff 

actually receives all of the relief to which he or she is 

entitled on the claim.”).

Accordingly, the court will not grant summary judgment

to plaintiff on this claim.

2 Compare Lab. Code § 1198.5(l), which provides for costs 

and reasonable attorney’s fees were plaintiffs to instead bring 

an injunctive action seeking compliance with the Labor Code. 

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C. PAGA Aggrieved Employee

Harper also requests that the court confirm his

standing to sue under PAGA by declaring him an “aggrieved 

employee” pursuant to the statute. (See generally Mot.) 

Pursuant to its discretion, the court declines to do so at this 

time. See West v. Circle K Stores, Inc., No. CIS040438 WBS GGH, 

2006 WL 355214, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2006) (district courts 

have discretion on considering summary judgment motions pre-class 

certification; motion addressing only scope of damages found 

“premature” (citing Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 544-45 (9th 

Cir. 1984))). Harper identifies no binding authority compelling

the court to do otherwise. Neither does he offer good reasons

why “it will be prudent to decide a PAGA plaintiff’s aggrieved 

status first” in this present case, at summary judgment. (See

Reply at 7.) Neither can the court discern any.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for 

partial summary judgment (Docket No. 360) be, and the same hereby 

is, DENIED.

Dated: March 19, 2024

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