Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05294/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05294-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 19, 2003 Decided December 12, 2003

No. 02-5294

CAREY DUNAI LOHRENZ,

APPELLANT

v.

ELAINE DONNELLY, CENTER FOR MILITARY READINESS, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv00777)

Rodney A. Smolla argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Kent Masterson Brown argued the cause for appellees.

With him on the brief was Frank M. Northam.

Before: ROGERS and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-5294 Document #791014 Filed: 12/12/2003 Page 1 of 23
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ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The principal issue in this appeal is

the scope of the voluntary limited-purpose public figure doctrine. Carey Dunai Lohrenz became one of the first two

women combat pilots in the United States Navy at a time

when there was a public controversy about the appropriateness of women serving in combat roles. In appealing the

grant of summary judgment on her defamation complaint

against Elaine Donnelly and the Center for Military Readiness (‘‘CMR’’), Lohrenz contends that, because she was simply doing her job and was at most a peripheral figure in the

controversy about whether the Navy was applying a double

standard for women combat pilots, the district court erred in

ruling she was a public figure. To the extent that the court

might hold that she was an involuntary limited-purpose public

figure, Lohrenz attacks this court’s application of that doctrine in Dameron v. Washington Magazine, 779 F.2d 736

(D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986), and urges

that its application be limited or the case overruled. Finally,

Lohrenz contends that the district court erred in finding that

she failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury

could find by clear and convincing evidence that Donnelly and

CMR published the alleged defamations with actual malice.

Because Lohrenz’s evidence shows that she chose the F–14

combat jet while well aware of the public controversy over

women in combat roles, her challenge to the ruling that she

was a voluntary limited-purpose public figure once the Navy

assigned her to the F–14 combat aircraft rings hollow: she

chose combat training in the F–14 and when, as a result of

that choice, she became one of the first two women combat

pilots, a central role in the public controversy came with the

territory. Having assumed the risk when she chose combat

jets that she would in fact receive a combat assignment, Lt.

Lohrenz attained a position of special prominence in the

controversy when she ‘‘suited up’’ as an F–14 combat pilot.

Therefore, because the alleged defamations were germane to

her position as a woman combat pilot, we hold that the

district court did not err, upon applying the three-part test of

Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287

(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980), in ruling

USCA Case #02-5294 Document #791014 Filed: 12/12/2003 Page 2 of 23
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that Lohrenz was a limited-purpose public figure. Hence, we

do not reach Lohrenz’s challenge to the analysis in Dameron,

which only the en banc court can properly entertain. See

LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en

banc). Further, because a review of the evidence, again

viewed in the light most favorable to Lohrenz, shows that she

failed to meet the stringent standard established by the

Supreme Court for public figures, who must demonstrate by

clear and convincing evidence that defamation defendants

acted with actual malice, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

I.

Upon de novo review of the grant of summary judgment,

see Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Lohrenz as the

non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in

her favor, see Forman v. Small, 271 F.3d 285, 291 (D.C. Cir.

2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 958 (2002); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c), shows the following:

Carey Dunai Lohrenz served as a member of the United

States Navy following graduation from college in 1990, and

continued to serve in the Navy until early 1999. She graduated from Aviation Officer Candidate School with academic

honors and received her commission on May 17, 1991. She

successfully completed Primary Flight Training on February

3, 1992 with first place honors (Commodore’s List). As was

tradition, in light of Lt. Lohrenz’s graduation in the top ten

percent of her class at Primary Flight School, the Navy

recognized her superior performance as a student pilot by

assigning her to be trained in a preferred class of aircraft.

Lt. Lohrenz selected jets from among several alternatives.

Following completion of Intermediate and Advanced Training,

she received her designation as a naval aviator on June 25,

1993.

At the end of advanced jet training, pilots were given one

opportunity to suggest which particular jet they would like to

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pilot. Shortly before she had to make her choice, a personnel

specialist in the Bureau of Naval Personnel advised Lt.

Lohrenz that, because women jet pilots were only permitted

to fly noncombat planes and all noncombat jets were being

decommissioned, the Navy had no place for women jet pilots;

she could either temporarily serve as a flight instructor or

leave the Navy. However, in the intervening days, the Navy

changed its policy, and permitted women to train for combat

aircraft. As Lohrenz alleged in her complaint, she then

‘‘chose combat aviation.’’ Amended Complaint ¶ 22. In June

1993, the Navy assigned Lt. Lohrenz to the West Coast F–14

program. Along with Lt. Kara Hultgreen, an experienced

Navy pilot, Lt. Lohrenz began training in the F–14 Tomcat

fighter jet in July 1993.

The Navy’s decision to assign Lt. Lohrenz and Lt. Hultgreen as the first women to pilot United States armed forces

combat aircraft occurred amidst an ongoing public controversy about the appropriateness of women serving in combat

roles in the military. A subcontroversy concerned whether

the military should relax physical strength and other standards to account for differences between male and female

members of the armed services. And another subcontroversy

related to whether women should serve as combat pilots in

particular. These controversies persisted even after 1991,

when Congress repealed the law barring women from combat

fighters and bombers, and after April 1993, when, on the

heels of the Tailhook scandal involving allegations that Navy

officers had sexually harassed enlisted women, the Secretary

of Defense lifted the Defense Department’s ban on women

serving in such positions.

Although she never initiated any contacts with the media

prior to the alleged defamations, Lt. Lohrenz’s new combat

assignment made a few headlines. Her hometown newspapers in Green Bay and Milwaukee, Wisconsin published brief

human interest stories about her and her family members,

most of whom have been military pilots. Further, in response to Navy encouragement that Lt. Lohrenz did not feel

at liberty to decline, she granted an interview to KNSD–TV,

a local San Diego, California station. Also, The Compass, a

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publication for the naval community in San Diego where Lt.

Lohrenz was posted, covered her assignment to the F–14.

Lt. Lohrenz explained in The Compass that the Navy’s

decision to allow her to choose combat aircraft came as a

great relief; she had been ‘‘in tears’’ because she ‘‘couldn’t

believe that all the guys [she] had gone through flight school

with, and had worked so hard and competed with and done

well, were going to go out to the fleet and get a chance and

[she] wasn’t going to have [her] chance.’’ Scott D. Williams,

First Women Join Fleet Fighter Squadron: The Jet Doesn’t

Know the Difference, The Compass, Sept. 9, 1994, at A1. Her

Commanding Officer, however, succeeded in deflecting most

of the media attention directed at her. This changed after

October 28, 1994.

After eleven months of training in the F–14, Lieutenants

Hultgreen and Lohrenz satisfied requirements for posting

with a carrier-based flight squadron. In August 1994, the

Navy assigned both women to fighter Squadron 213 attached

to the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln in the Pacific Fleet. They

participated in regular training exercises to maintain their

combat readiness. In the course of such an exercise, on

October 28, 1994, Lt. Hultgreen died while attempting to land

an F–14 on the U.S.S. Lincoln; the Navy subsequently

determined that the plane did not signal to the pilot that one

of its engines was not working until it was too late to avoid a

crash. After Lt. Hultgreen’s death, the media turned its

attention to the question of whether the Navy had established

a ‘‘double standard’’ in order to enable women to qualify as

combat pilots, initially focusing on Lt. Hultgreen. Three

months after Lt. Hultgreen’s crash, Elaine Donnelly, who had

long opposed permitting women to serve in combat positions,

drew attention to Lt. Lohrenz. Starting in the 1970s, Donnelly had testified before Congress in opposition to women in

combat, published on the subject, and, in the early 1990s,

served on the Presidential Commission on Assignment of

Women in the Armed Services. In 1992, Donnelly incorporated the Center for Military Readiness and served as its

president; the CMR has regularly published articles and

issued press releases opposing women serving in combat

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positions, including as combat pilots. As relevant here, Donnelly and CMR published four allegedly defamatory publications about Lt. Lohrenz.

First, on January 16, 1995 Donnelly wrote on CMR letterhead to Senator Strom Thurmond to alert the then-Chairman

of the Senate Armed Services Committee to ‘‘certain practices designed to assure that women will not fail [that] have

now been extended to the demanding and dangerous field of

carrier aviation in the F–14 community.’’ Donnelly characterized both Lt. Hultgreen and the other woman combat pilot,

‘‘Pilot B,’’ as unqualified pilots. She quoted at length from a

letter she had received from Lt. Patrick Jerome Burns, who

had briefly been an F–14 instructor for both women; however, she did not then identify Lt. Burns by name. Donnelly

and Lt. Burns cast the Navy’s decision to break down a

gender barrier and permit women pilots to fly combat aircraft

as ‘‘politically driven.’’ They wrote, ‘‘Navy policy on the

integration of women into fleet F–14 squadrons is, thus far,

an abject failure. It is indicative of the problems of gender

integration, which must be corrected, across the spectrum.’’

Second, a few months later, on April 25, 1995, Donnelly

republished the letter to Senator Thurmond as part of a more

comprehensive CMR ‘‘special report’’ on alleged double standards in naval aviation. The Donnelly Report included excerpts from Lt. Lohrenz’s confidential training records, parts

of which had been sent to Donnelly by Lt. Burns. The

Donnelly Report reiterated that Lt. Hultgreen and Pilot B

were unqualified pilots, and noted special accommodations the

Navy had made for Pilot B. The Report also referenced

several of the Navy’s specific rejections of Donnelly’s conclusions. The Donnelly Report was circulated to the media,

online, and within the naval aviator community, including on

the U.S.S. Lincoln, where Lt. Lohrenz was still based. Even

though Lt. Lohrenz was referred to in the Donnelly Report

as ‘‘Pilot B,’’ as the only remaining carrier-qualified woman

F–14 pilot, her identity was known within the naval aviation

community, particularly on the U.S.S. Lincoln. Shortly

thereafter, the media revealed Lt. Lohrenz’s name. See, e.g.,

James W. Crawley, Navy Grounds Female F–14 Pilot for

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Evaluation of Flying Skills, San Diego Union–Trib., June 30,

1995, at B–1.

Third, almost a year later, on March 28, 1996, Donnelly

restated her conclusion that Lt. Lohrenz was an incompetent

combat pilot in a speech at the Army–Navy Club in Washington, D.C. Fourth, twenty months later, on November 6, 1997,

after Lt. Lohrenz had filed suit, Donnelly repeated this

conclusion in a CMR press release, referring to Lt. Lohrenz

by name. The press release further asserted that the Navy’s

integration of women into combat squadrons was part of a

‘‘reckless’’ ‘‘race’’ with the Air Force that had been ‘‘instigated by aggressive female officers, feminist advocates, and

Navy public affairs officers.’’

On April 24, 1996, Lt. Lohrenz filed a defamation action

against Donnelly and CMR as well as the Copley Press (d/b/a

The San Diego Union Tribune), News World Communications, Inc. (d/b/a The Washington Times), and John Does 1–

100 (retired officers of the Navy and other military services,

who allegedly assisted Donnelly and republished her statements). Lohrenz alleged in her complaint that she had

become the victim of a campaign by Donnelly and the other

defendants, ‘‘the gist of which was that the Navy engaged in

preferential treatment of female aviators, passing and promoting them despite their substandard performance.’’ Appellant’s Br. at 2. Lt. Lohrenz sued the three non-press defendants, Donnelly, CMR, and the John Does, for libel and

slander. Her complaint also included causes of action for

libel against the two media defendants, and an invasion of

privacy claim against all defendants.

Lt. Lohrenz sought compensatory and punitive damages of

not less than $50,000 in view of the injuries proximately

caused, including her removal from flight status by the Navy

on May 30, 1995. Whereas she had been evaluated as an

above-average pilot until the publication of The Donnelly

Report, her instructors gave her only average marks in April

and May 1995. Lt. Lohrenz further alleged that despite the

conclusion of a Field Naval Aviation Evaluation Board that

she received no preferential treatment, was a qualified pilot,

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and should have her flight status reinstated but be assigned

to a different aircraft, she had been unable to obtain reinstatement as any type of naval aviator because of the damage

done to her reputation as a fighter pilot by the false and

defamatory statements of the defendants. Although two

years later the Navy Inspector General overturned the

Board’s decision that Lt. Lohrenz be assigned to fly in a

different aircraft and also found that the failure to return her

to flight status lacked substantial justification, Lt. Lohrenz

was never again assigned to fly a naval combat plane. As a

result of being out of the field for two years, Lt. Lohrenz

alleged, she lost her career as a naval aviator.

The district court entered summary judgment for Donnelly

and CMR. Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 223 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C.

2002). The court ruled that Lt. Lohrenz had become a

limited-purpose public figure, albeit possibly involuntarily, id.

at 44, and had failed to meet her burden to show that

Donnelly and CMR had published the defamatory material

with actual malice, id. at 58. The court found that Lt.

Lohrenz was a public figure because of her past conduct,

including taking on a role as one of the first two women

combat pilots, her numerous appearances in the media before

and after Lt. Hultgreen’s crash, and the fact that ‘‘she was a

forerunner in the military’s attempt to integrate women into

combat positions.’’ Id. Rejecting Lohrenz’s argument that

notwithstanding numerous interviews she had not ‘‘thrust’’

herself into the media spotlight, the district court pointed to

Dameron, 779 F.2d 736, stating that it was ‘‘well-settled that

private individuals may become limited-purpose public figures

unwillingly without voluntarily thrusting themselves into the

public eye.’’ Id. The court, citing Clyburn v. News World

Comm., Inc., 903 F.2d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1990), also noted she

‘‘voluntarily gave statements about her F–14 assignment’’ and

‘‘was well-aware that her position as one of the first women

F–14 pilots would attract public attention.’’ Id. The court,

therefore, concluded that as ‘‘a central figure in the public

controversy over the place of women in the military’’ and

given the media coverage in which she was often ‘‘featured

prominently,’’ Lt. Lohrenz was a limited-purpose public figUSCA Case #02-5294 Document #791014 Filed: 12/12/2003 Page 8 of 23
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ure. Id. The district court, having found that Lohrenz failed

to meet her burden to prove actual malice, rejected the

alternative defense that the published allegations were substantially true, id. at 59, and did not reach the fair reporting

defense based on the Navy Inspector General’s Report, id. at

60. The district court had previously dismissed the complaints against the Copley Press for lack of jurisdiction,

Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 958 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1997), and

against the John Does, who were never identified, Lohrenz v.

Donnelly, No. 96–777 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2002) (order of dismissal). News World Communications, Inc. settled Lt. Lohrenz’s complaint against it. Lohrenz, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 30.

II.

On appeal, Lohrenz contends that the district court erred

in ruling, under Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc.,

627 F.2d 1287, 1296–1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449

U.S. 898 (1980), that she was a limited-purpose public figure,

albeit possibly involuntarily. Devoting precious little of the

argument in her brief to an examination of the district court’s

application of the three-part test of Waldbaum, Lohrenz does

not challenge the appropriateness of Waldbaum’s analysis of

the voluntary limited-purpose public figure doctrine, acknowledging that it was ‘‘faithful to the balance struck in Gertz.’’

Appellant’s Br. at 21. Rather, Lohrenz’s brief focuses on the

involuntary public figure analysis in Dameron v. Washington

Magazine, 779 F.2d 736, 741–42 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,

476 U.S. 1141 (1986), which, she contends, is ‘‘fundamentally

unsound.’’ Appellant’s Br. at 5. She maintains that because

she was ‘‘at most on the broad periphery of a broad debate

that intensified when a different female aviator lost her life in

a crash,’’ she is not a public figure under Dameron. Id. at 5–

6. Lohrenz also contends that, even if the court determines

she is an involuntary public figure, the district court erred in

ruling that she failed to present evidence from which a

reasonable jury could find that Donnelly and CMR acted with

actual malice in publishing defamatory statements about her,

and hence summary judgment was inappropriate. Lohrenz

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does not challenge the district court’s resolution of her invasion of privacy claims.

As a threshold matter, Lohrenz’s focus on the involuntary

public figure doctrine in Dameron is misplaced, because the

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to her, shows

that Lt. Lohrenz was a voluntary limited-purpose public

figure. In Waldbaum, the court addressed the question of

‘‘when an individual not a public official has left the relatively

safe harbor that the law of defamation provides for private

persons and has become a public figure within the meaning of

the Supreme Court’s decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,

418 U.S. 323 (1974).’’ Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1289. Eric

Waldbaum was the president and chief executive officer of a

diversified food cooperative that ranked second largest in the

country. He played an active role in setting the policies and

standards within the supermarket industry: ‘‘He battled the

traditional practices in the industry and fought particularly

hard for the introduction of unit pricing and open dating in

supermarkets.’’ Id. at 1290. He held several meetings to

which the press and public were invited, and his policy of

consolidation to eliminate unprofitable outlets generated considerable comment in the affected area and in trade journals

as well as general interest publications, such as the Washington Post. Id. & n.3. Waldbaum sued for libel when a trade

publication reported that he had been dismissed by the Board

of Directors and that the cooperative ‘‘ ‘has been losing

money the last year and retrenching.’ ’’ Id. The district

court ruled that Waldbaum was a public figure for purposes

of the limited range of issues concerning the company’s

unique position within the supermarket industry and his

efforts to advance that position. Id. at 1291.

This court affirmed. In concluding that ‘‘a person has

become a public figure for limited purposes if he has attempted to have, or realistically can be expected to have, a major

impact on the resolution of a specific public dispute that has

foreseeable and substantial ramifications for persons beyond

its immediate participants,’’ id., the court established a threepart test: (1) The court must isolate the public controversy,

that is, ‘‘a dispute that in fact has received public attention

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because its ramifications will be felt by persons who are not

direct participants.’’ Id. at 1296. (2) The court must analyze

the plaintiff’s role in it. ‘‘Trivial or tangential participation is

not enoughTTTT [To be a limited-purpose public figure, a

plaintiff] must have achieved a ‘special prominence’ in the

debate.’’ Id. at 1297 (citation omitted). The court can look to

the plaintiff’s past conduct, the extent of press coverage, and

the public reaction to his conduct or statements. Id. The

court noted that a plaintiff ‘‘would be a public figure if the

defamation pertains to the subcontroversy in which he is

involved but would remain a private person for the overall

controversy and its other phases.’’ Id. at 1297 n.27. (3)

Finally, the court must determine whether the alleged defamation was germane to the plaintiff’s participation in the

controversy. Id. at 1298. In the end, the court concluded

that notwithstanding Waldbaum’s active role and involvement

with the media, he was a limited purpose public figure only

for the purposes of the subcontroversy about his supermarket

innovations. Id. at 1300.

We are mindful that, although Waldbaum ‘‘provides us with

useful analytic tools[,] nevertheless, the touchstone remains

[the standard the Supreme Court set forth for classifying an

individual as a public figure, namely] whether an individual

has ‘assumed [a] role[ ] of especial prominence in the affairs

of society TTT [that] invite[s] attention and comment.’ Gertz,

418 U.S. at 345.’’ Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 773

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc). In Gertz, the Supreme Court

balanced the constitutional commitment to free speech and

press and the interests served by the defamation law in

protecting the dignity and worth of every human being, 418

U.S. at 341, and set the dividing line between public and

private figures based on those who assumed the risk of

publicity and had access to channels of communication to

defend themselves, and those who did not, id. at 344. The

Court in Gertz rejected the plurality’s broad view in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), that the actual

malice standard applied if the relevant controversy ‘‘is a

matter of public or general concern without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous.’’ Id. at 44.

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Concluding that the Rosenbloom approach paid inadequate

attention to the State’s interest in protecting private persons

from defamatory injury, Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346, the Court

observed that while some persons would be public figures by

virtue of their positions of ‘‘persuasive power and influence,’’

typically, public figures will be persons who ‘‘have thrust

themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies

in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.’’

Id. at 345.

As applied here, Waldbaum’s analysis is faithful to Gertz.

The first and third prongs of the Waldbaum test are essentially uncontested by Lohrenz, for she concedes there was a

public controversy about women in combat and also about the

circumstances surrounding Lt. Hultgreen’s death, see Appellant’s Br. at 32–33, and the alleged defamatory statements by

Donnelly and CMR plainly were germane to the subcontroversy about women combat pilots and the Navy’s alleged

double standards. See Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 223 F. Supp. 2d

at 44. Thus, the remaining question is whether Lt. Lohrenz,

at the time she became an F–14 combat pilot, achieved ‘‘a

‘special prominence’ in the debate,’’ thereby satisfying Waldbaum’s second prong. 627 F.2d at 1297. She both rejects

that conclusion, maintaining that she was only trying to do

her job and her involvement in the public controversy was

tangential at best, see Appellant’s Br. at 32, and contests

whether the general controversy about women in combat was

sufficiently linked to her performance as an F–14 combat

pilot to render her a public figure. Id.

To satisfy the Waldbaum inquiry’s ‘‘ ‘special prominence’ ’’

requirement, ‘‘[t]he plaintiff must either have been purposefully trying to influence the outcome or could realistically

have been expected, because of his position in the controversy, to have an impact on its resolution.’’ 627 F.2d at 1297.

This phrasing incorporates both Gertz’s analysis that, through

‘‘purposeful action of his own,’’ 418 U.S. at 345, a plaintiff

attains a position in the limelight, see, e.g., Curtis Publishing

Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (l967), as well as Gertz’s

general observation that the media is entitled to act on the

assumption that public officials and public figures have exUSCA Case #02-5294 Document #791014 Filed: 12/12/2003 Page 12 of 23
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posed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamation.

418 U.S. at 345. Although, as we understand Lohrenz’s

position on appeal, it was the Navy, not she, that placed her

at the center of the controversy about women as combat

pilots, the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to

her, does not support her position. Lohrenz not only alleged

that she ‘‘chose to be trained in combat aviation,’’ Amended

Complaint ¶ 22, her actions and statements belie any basis on

which to conclude that she did not voluntarily seek to be in

the combat pilot position to which the Navy assigned her.

Once she ‘‘choseTTTcombat aviation’’ by indicating her preference for the F–14 while knowing of the preexisting public

controversy over the appropriateness of women in combat

positions, Lt. Lohrenz assumed the risk that if she succeeded

in qualifying for a combat assignment and the Navy made

such an assignment, she would find herself at the center of

the controversy as a result of the special prominence that she

and only one other woman combat pilot attained upon receiving their F–14 assignments. That Lt. Lohrenz might have

preferred a combat assignment that did not place her in the

center of the public controversy is legally irrelevant.

Under the circumstances, Lohrenz’s contention that she

was, in effect, an anonymous Navy pilot, rings hollow as there

is no evidence to support such a conclusion. By choosing to

remain in the Navy as a combat pilot, and indicating her

preferences among combat aircraft, Lt. Lohrenz became a

limited purpose public figure at the point she ‘‘suited up’’ as

an F–14 pilot. ‘‘[A] reasonable person would have concluded

that this individual would play or was seeking to play a major

role in determining the outcome of the controversy [about the

appropriateness of women serving in combat roles].’’ Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1298. By choosing a path of endeavor as a

combat pilot she assumed the risk that she would attain such

an assignment, which, in light of the public controversy,

meant she would be in a position of special prominence in that

controversy. So long as defamatory statements made about

her were germane to her role in that controversy, the Waldbaum inquiry is satisfied, and she is a voluntary public figure

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for the limited purpose of the debate about whether and how

women should be integrated into combat aviation roles. And,

as the district court found, after the crash of Lt. Hultgreen’s

F–14, Lt. Lohrenz also became a central figure in the subcontroversy about whether the Navy was applying double standards for its women combat pilots. At both points, when she

was assigned to the F–14 and in the aftermath of Lt. Hultgreen’s crash, Lt. Lohrenz was a public figure whose performance would be of interest to the public. See Gertz, 418

U.S. at 344–45; Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297.

Lohrenz fails in her attempt to suggest that her position

was no different than that of the criminal trial attorney in

Gertz or the consultant in Clyburn, 903 F.2d 29, who hobnobbed with government officials. In neither of those cases

was there a preexisting public controversy comparable to that

of which Lt. Lohrenz was aware when she ‘‘chose to be

trained in combat aviation.’’ Moreover, to the extent Lohrenz

contends that the district court erred in ‘‘allowing the undeniable ‘public interest’ in the general question of ‘women in

combat’ to morph into the public controversy germane to

Lohrenz’s defamation claim, which should have been focused

on a public controversy regarding the fitness or competence of

Carey Lohrenz herself,’’ Appellant’s Br. at 32, she ignores

that the substance of the controversy about the appropriateness of women in combat positions embraced concerns about

Lt. Lohrenz’s performance as a pathbreaking woman combat

pilot of unknown ability. In sum, the evidence, viewed most

favorably to Lohrenz, fails to show the media was not entitled

to assume that she had voluntarily exposed herself to an

increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehoods about her

role as a combat pilot.

With this conclusion, the court has no occasion to hold that

either her earlier conduct or the media coverage following her

assignment to the F–14 showed that Lt. Lohrenz was wellknown or attempting to influence a public controversy, see

Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167–68; prior to ‘‘suiting up’’ as an F–14

pilot, she had not been a general-purpose public figure or a

voluntary limited-purpose public figure. See Gertz, 418 U.S.

at 351–52. Neither her Navy enlistment and non-combat

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pilot training, which did not render her ‘‘fam[ous]’’ or ‘‘notori[ous]’’, see id., nor her mere acquiescence to press inquiries

fairly characterized as of a hometown-girl human interest

variety, see Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1298 n.31, nor her

attempts to defend herself through the media against allegedly defamatory statements by Donnelly and CMR, see id. at

n.34; cf. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 n.3 (1976),

rendered her a public figure. Instead, it was her voluntary

act of ‘‘cho[osing] combat aircraft,’’ thereby assuming the risk

of a combat assignment, followed by her ‘‘suiting up’’ as one

of the first two American women combat pilots, that gave her

‘‘ ‘special prominence’ ’’ in the controversy about women in

combat and established her voluntary limited-purpose public

figure status.

The result here is in accord with a principle alluded to by

Justice Harlan in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.

130, 154 (1967) (with three Justices concurring and the Chief

Justice concurring in the result), namely, the First Amendment requires that where, as here, recovery by a defamation

plaintiff could be viewed as vindicating a government policy, a

plaintiff must make the higher showing required by the actual

malice standard. Further, our approach adheres to the principle that, unless a plaintiff accepted a role in which she

reasonably could have been expected to play a role in resolving a controversy, see Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297, merely

accepting an anonymous assignment in an arena where there

is a public controversy is not alone sufficient to transform a

private person into a public figure. Cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134–35 (1979); see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at

352. Lt. Lohrenz was not just any fighter pilot; when she

‘‘suited up,’’ she could reasonably have been expected to know

that she was assuming a position of ‘‘ ‘special prominence’ ’’ in

the controversy about women in combat roles. Again, it was

not Lt. Lohrenz’s decision to pursue a Navy career as a

combat jet pilot that made her a public figure, but rather that

in so doing she assumed the risk of success whereby she

would become one of the first few women combat pilots and

thus necessarily attain ‘‘ ‘special prominence’ ’’ in an ongoing

public controversy about such opportunities. Finally, the

result here is consistent with Gertz’s principle that only those

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with access to the media to defend themselves should be

designated public figures. See 418 U.S. at 345. Lt. Lohrenz

possessed ready access to the channels of public discourse, as

evidenced not only by the media attention she received when

first assigned as a combat pilot along with Lt. Hultgreen, but

by her appearance on April 19, 1998, on the CBS television

program 60 Minutes.

Our conclusion about Lt. Lohrenz’s public figure status

does not suggest that she was not a good naval aviator trying

to do her job, and it does not penalize her for acting with

‘‘professionalism,’’ see Appellant’s Br. 32, 35. Lt. Lohrenz

was confronted with the choice of piloting a supersonic combat fighter jet as a voluntary public figure, or giving up her

dream of being a Navy pilot in order to remain a private

figure. But given that potentially difficult choice, it was

nonetheless she who ‘‘chose jets’’ when she knew there was a

public controversy about women in combat, and she must live

with the consequences of that choice and her resulting assignment as one of the first women combat pilots. We hold that

as an F–14 combat pilot Lt. Lohrenz became a voluntary

limited-purpose public figure. Therefore, we do not reach

Lohrenz’s attacks on Dameron.

III.

As a public figure, Lohrenz bore the burden of proving that

Donnelly and CMR acted with actual malice, and not merely

ordinary negligence, in publishing allegedly defamatory statements about her. The district court found that Lohrenz

failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could

so find. Lohrenz contends that the district court did not give

her the benefit of the aggregate of her evidence, as she was

entitled, see, e.g., McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d

1296, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d

762, 794 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc), and that she presented ‘‘highly probative’’ evidence of actual malice by showing

that ‘‘Donnelly and CMR were on a mission to advance a preconceived story line, and may have targeted Lohrenz to ‘get’

her out of their more generalized zeal to drum women from

combat positions.’’ Appellant’s Br. at 38–39.

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In a civil action where the subjective state of mind determination turns on credibility and nuance, Lohrenz’s position

that the issue should never have been decided on summary

judgment has facial appeal. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Ginzburg,

414 F.2d 324, 336–37 (2d Cir. 1969). The difficulty in agreeing with her contention that the district court erred in

granting summary judgment stems not from the general

proposition she asserts but from the nature of the heavy

burden she bears. To determine whether Lohrenz met her

burden to show actual malice by Donnelly and CMR in

publishing the alleged defamations, the court must be able to

find that there is clear and convincing evidence ‘‘to permit the

conclusion that the[y] in fact entertained a serious doubt as to

the truth of [their] publication.’’ St. Amant v. Thompson, 390

U.S. 727, 731 (1968). In that regard, the Supreme Court

acknowledged in St. Amant that:

It may be said that such a test puts a premium on

ignorance, encourages the irresponsible publisher

not to inquire, and permits the issue to be determined by the defendant’s testimony that he published the statement in good faith and unaware of its

probable falsityTTTT New York Times [v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. 254 (1964)] and succeeding cases have

emphasized that the stake of the people in public

business and the conduct of public officials is so

great that neither the defense of truth nor the

standard of ordinary care would protect against selfcensorship and thus adequately implement First

Amendment policies. Neither lies nor false communications serve the ends of the First Amendment,

and no one suggests their desirability or further

proliferation. But to insure the ascertainment and

publication of the truth about public affairs, it is

essential that the First Amendment protect some

erroneous publications as well as true ones.

Id. at 731–32.

In the two decades since St. Amant, this court has elaborated on the evidentiary thresholds that a plaintiff must meet

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to prove actual malice in a defamation claim. The court

explained in Tavoulareas, 817 F.2d at 788–98, that the plaintiff must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that when

the defendants published the alleged defamations they were

subjectively aware that it was highly probable that the story

was ‘‘(1) fabricated; (2) so inherently improbable that only a

reckless person would have put [it] in circulation; or (3)

based wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone call or

some other source that appellees had obvious reasons to

doubt.’’ Id. at 790 (internal quotations omitted). Viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to Lohrenz as the nonmoving party, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), we hold that she

failed to meet her burden.

Evidence that the publishers of the alleged defamatory

statements were on a mission to reinstate the ban against

women being assigned to combat positions in the military

does not suffice to show actual malice. That Donnelly and

CMR acted on the basis of a biased source and incomplete

information does not ‘‘demonstrate with clear and convincing

evidence that the defendant[s] realized that [their] statement

was false or that [they] subjectively entertained serious

doubts as to the truth of [their] statement.’’ Bose Corp. v.

Consumers’ Union of U.S., 466 U.S. 485, 511 n.30 (1984).

Lohrenz’s position — that Donnelly and CMR had to

resolve doubts about the specific facts of Lt. Lohrenz’s performance record once credible evidence was placed before

them to cause them ‘‘obvious reasons’’ to doubt the reliability

of the information they had previously trusted — assumes the

proposition to be decided, namely whether the Navy’s assertions and evidence that Lt. Lohrenz was a qualified F–14

combat pilot were credible. If the mere proffering of purportedly credible evidence that contradicts a publisher’s story

were enough to meet the Tavoulareas test, the resolution of

the motion for summary judgment filed by Donnelly and

CMR could have taken a different turn. As the law stands,

Lohrenz’s evidence must show more than ‘‘highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the

standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to

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by responsible publishers.’’ Harte-Hanks Communications,

Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666 (1989) (internal quotation omitted). Lohrenz’s evidence also must show Donnelly’s

and CMR’s ‘‘reckless disregard for the truth, TTT [such as] a

high degree of awareness of TTT probable falsity, or TTT

serious doubts as to the truth of [their] publication.’’ Connaughton, 491 U.S. at 667 (internal citations omitted).

Donnelly stated in her letter to Senator Thurmond that Lt.

Lohrenz (‘‘Pilot B’’) was a substandard pilot who should not

be flying and who had been assigned to the F–14 program on

account of a ‘‘politically driven policy.’’ Prior to writing the

letter, Donnelly had obtained information about the sole

surviving woman F–14 pilot from Lt. Burns, who briefly was

one of Lt. Lohrenz’s training officers. Whatever bias Lt.

Burns may be shown to have against women in combat flight

positions, Lohrenz’s evidence shows that Donnelly’s publication was based on a knowledgeable, non-anonymous source.

Under the circumstances, Tavoulareas does not require more

of a publisher. 817 F.2d at 790. Additionally, by the time

she published The Donnelly Report, Donnelly also had portions of Lt. Lohrenz’s training records that supported Lt.

Burns’ assertions that the Navy made special accommodations for Lt. Lohrenz.

Although failure to investigate does not in itself establish

bad faith, see St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 733 (citing New York

Times, 376 U.S at 287–88), it is true, as Lohrenz contends,

that once the publisher has obvious reasons to doubt the

accuracy of a story, the publisher must act reasonably in

dispelling those doubts. See id. at 731 (citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967)). ‘‘Thus, where the

publisher undertakes to investigate the accuracy of a story

and learns facts casting doubt on the information contained

therein, it may not ignore those doubts, even though it had no

duty to conduct the investigation in the first place.’’ Masson

v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 960 F.2d 896, 901 (9th Cir.

1992) (on remand from the Supreme Court).

Donnelly and CMR never discovered any facts sufficient to

cause them to doubt their conclusion about Lt. Lohrenz’s

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incompetence as an F–14 combat pilot. The evidence offered

by Lohrenz is not comparable to the football game films

available to the publisher in Curtis Publishing that demonstrated the falsity of the report it was relying on concerning

the former football coach. 388 U.S. at 158. Even where

doubt-inducing evidence could be discovered, a publisher may

still opt not to seek out such evidence and may rely on an

informed source, so long as there is no ‘‘obvious reason to

doubt’’ that source. See, e.g., McFarlane, 74 F.2d at 1305.

In fact, the information that Donnelly and CMR received

reasonably led them not to investigate allegedly contradictory

evidence. By the time Donnelly published The Donnelly

Report, she had additional information from the Navy that

appeared to confirm much of what Lt. Burns had told her

about Lt. Lohrenz. Rear Admiral Lyle Bien’s report, produced in reaction to Donnelly’s letter to Senator Thurmond,

confirmed Lt. Burns’ allegations that Lt. Lohrenz had received a number of accommodations during training and

stated that some of the officers, especially junior officers,

thought the accommodations were excessive. Admiral Bien’s

report did not confirm that Lt. Lohrenz or the other woman

pilot were unqualified. He viewed concessions as a matter

within the discretion of the commanding officer so long as

safety and common standards were maintained, but he did

confirm that there were perceptions that a double standard

was being applied. Admiral Bien nonetheless concluded that

gender based bias had not tainted the Navy’s training or

rating of women combat pilots.

Donnelly had also been told by the Vice Chief of Naval

Operations, Admiral Stanley Arthur, and other Navy officers

that her conclusion about Lt. Lohrenz was wrong, that her

information was coming from someone ‘‘working their own

agenda,’’ and that she should be aware that she had not seen

the entire training record. The following year, prior to her

Army–Navy Club speech, Donnelly had again been warned by

Navy officials that her conclusion about Lt. Lohrenz was

inaccurate. Yet publishers need not accept ‘‘ ‘denials, however vehement; such denials are so commonplace in the world

of polemical charge and countercharge that, in themselves,

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they hardly alert the conscientious reporter to the likelihood

of error.’ ’’ Connaughton, 491 U.S. at 691 n.37 (citing Edwards v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 121 (2d Cir.

1977)). See also Coliniatis v. Dimas, 965 F. Supp. 511, 519

(S.D.N.Y. 1997). Unlike evidence that could be readily verified, see, e.g., Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 158; McFarlane,

74 F.3d at 1299, the Navy’s denials did not give Donnelly

‘‘obvious reasons’’ to doubt the veracity of her publication.

Donnelly, for example, could reasonably infer that Admiral

Bien had not been objective in concluding, despite contrary

evidence in his report that detailed special accommodations

made for Lt. Lohrenz, that the pilot was safe to fly and that

she had not been promoted based on a double standard.

Furthermore, Admiral Bien wrote that no instructor interviewed had stated that Lt. Lohrenz and Lt. Hultgreen were

unsafe to fly, yet Donnelly knew that Lt. Burns had been

interviewed and claimed that he had said precisely that to

Admiral Bien.

Hence, despite the Navy’s denials, no reasonable juror

could find either that Donnelly knew her charges were false,

or that she had cause to ‘‘obviously doubt’’ her story. See

Sparshott v. Feld Entertainment, Inc., 311 F.3d 425, 429

(D.C. Cir. 2002). Although Lohrenz maintains that Donnelly

and CMR should have pursued ‘‘easily available documentary

or witness sources,’’ Appellant’s Br. at 42, and that it was

improper for them to publish their allegations without seeing

Lt. Lohrenz’s full performance records, the records were not

available without Lt. Lohrenz’s consent, see Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 187 F.R.D. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1999). Lohrenz has pointed to

no authority establishing that publishers must withhold publication merely because they have not consulted particular

documents, the procuring of which would effectively render

the story’s publication reliant on the subject’s consent, and

two district courts have reached a contrary conclusion. See

Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F. Supp. 779, 788–89 & n.8 (D.D.C.

1990); Loeb v. New Times Communications Corp., 497 F.

Supp. 85, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see also generally St. Amant,

390 U.S. at 731. As the district court in Loeb observed, the

‘‘failure to verify statements with the plaintiff and reliance

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upon some biased sources, in themselves, do not amount to

reckless disregard of the truth.’’ 497 F. Supp. at 93 (citing

St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 730). Donnelly and CMR thus were

not required to remain silent until the day Lt. Lohrenz

agreed to disclose her confidential training records to them.

Furthermore, The Donnelly Report and CMR’s press release embraced Donnelly’s conclusions about Lt. Lohrenz but

also reported that Navy officials held different views. Such

admissions, i.e., reporting perspectives at odds with the publisher’s own, ‘‘tend[ ] to rebut a claim of malice, not to

establish one.’’ McFarlane, 74 F.3d at 1304. Donnelly’s and

CMR’s dissemination of the Navy’s denials of Donnelly’s

conclusion about Lt. Lohrenz, combined with the reasonable

implication that those denials tended to demonstrate the

Navy’s desire to conceal double standards even after confirming that at least Donnelly’s allegations of a double standard

were ‘‘substantially true,’’ weighs against, rather than for, a

finding of actual malice.

For these reasons, we hold that because no reasonable

juror could find by clear and convincing evidence that Donnelly or CMR acted with actual malice in any of the four

publications at issue, Lohrenz failed to meet her burden of

proof.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court,

granting summary judgment to Donnelly and CMR.

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