Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08243/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08243-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Bradley Corwin Binkley,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-18-08243-PCT-MTL

ORDER 

Before the Court is Bradley Binkley’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 

1.) The Court has reviewed the Petition, Response to the Petition (Doc. 9), Reply to the 

Response (Doc. 10), Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 13), Objection to the 

R&R (Doc. 21), and Response to the Objection (Doc. 18). The Court will overrule the 

Objection and adopt the recommendation to dismiss the Petition.

I. BACKGROUND

A jury convicted Petitioner for luring a minor for sexual exploitation and 

tampering with evidence. (Doc. 9-1 at 5.) The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. 

(Doc. 9-2 at 15.) Petitioner sought discretionary review by the Arizona Supreme Court, 

which was denied. During a subsequent state post-conviction relief process, he presented 

two issues to the Arizona Court of Appeals: that Petitioner was sentenced under a facially 

overbroad statute and that his convictions violated the Arizona and federal double 

jeopardy clauses. State v. Binkley, No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0072-PR, 2017 WL 1193699, at 

*1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). The Court of Appeals granted review and denied relief. Id. at 

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*2. On September 12, 2017, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s request for

review. (Doc. 9-2 at 122.)

Petitioner mailed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to this Court on 

September 27, 2018. (Doc. 1.) He asserted five grounds for relief: (1) facial overbreadth 

of the statute which defines luring a minor for exploitation; (2) lack of jurisdiction in the 

county where he was tried; (3) violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Double Jeopardy 

Clause; (4) prosecutorial vindictiveness in his post-conviction proceedings; and (5) the 

statute authorizing lifetime probation is overbroad and violates due process. (Id.)

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

“When a federal district court reviews a state prisoner’s habeas corpus petition 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, it must decide whether the petitioner is ‘in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254). Habeas petitions are 

governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 28 

U.S.C. § 2244. AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations concerning habeas 

petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). That period runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was 

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has 

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for 

State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect 

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to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be 

counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), (d)(2).

This Court reviews de novo those portions of the Magistrate Judge’s report subject

to an objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in 

whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. 

District courts are not required to review “any issue that is not the subject of an 

objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). 

B. Petitioner’s Objections

The R&R found that ADEPA’s one-year statute of limitations ended on September 

12, 2018, one year after the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of the post-conviction 

proceedings. (Doc. 13 at 5.) Further, it found that none of the criteria for equitable tolling 

applied. (Id. at 5-7.) Additionally, the R&R found that all claims were either 

procedurally defaulted or non-exhausted. (Doc. 13 at 8-9.) The R&R found that none of 

the exceptions allowing a habeas court to hear a procedurally defaulted claim apply. 

(Doc. 13 at 10.)

In his Objection, Petitioner argues that his post-conviction relief proceedings were 

his first opportunity to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims, thus making it an ofright proceeding. (Doc. 21 at 13.) As a result, Petitioner argues, he had the right to seek 

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, tolling the statute of limitations beyond 

the September 2017 statute of limitations deadline calculated in the R&R. (Id.) He also 

alleges that Arizona Department of Corrections facilities “do not have law libraries,” thus 

providing a basis for equitable tolling. (Id. at 20.) Finally, he alleges that any procedural 

default would be excused under Martinez v. Ryan, which holds that “inadequate 

assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a 

prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Martinez v. 

Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012). (Doc. 21 at 21.)

Petitioner’s state court post-conviction proceedings were collateral rather than

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direct, of-right review because he was convicted by a jury. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 

(“A defendant who plead guilty or no contest . . . may file an of-right notice of postconviction relief.”). Thus, the time for Petitioner to seek certiorari did not fall within the 

scope of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)’s tolling provision. The Court finds that the R&R 

correctly calculated the statute of limitations. Petitioner’s claim that Arizona prisons do 

not have law libraries is dubious, especially in light of his detailed statutory and 

constitutional interpretation arguments with case citations. His cursory assertion does not 

meet his “heavy burden to show that [he] is entitled to equitable tolling. . . .” See Rudin 

v. Myles, 781 F.3d 1043, 1055 (9th Cir. 2014). Finally, Martinez v. Ryan does not apply 

as Petitioner suggests in his Objection. Martinez allows a habeas court to hear certain 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims that would otherwise be procedurally defaulted. 

Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9. While Petitioner does attribute his procedural default to 

attorneys, none of the claims before this Court are ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims. Therefore, Martinez does not apply. The Court overrules the Objection and 

adopts the R&R.

C. Certificate of Appealability

The R&R finds that because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing that a

state court denied a constitutional right, the Court should deny a certificate of 

appealability. (Doc. 13 at 12.) The Objection requests a certificate of appealability

without making a sufficient supporting argument. (Doc. 21 at 22.) This Court finds that 

jurists of reason would not “find it debatable whether the Petition states a valid claim of 

the denial of a constitutional right . . . [or that] the district court is correct in its 

procedural ruling” that the claims are time-barred and procedurally defaulted. See Slack 

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Therefore, the Court will deny the certificate of 

appealability.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED adopting the Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 13.)

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1) and dismissing it with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Petitioner’s request for a Certificate of 

Appealability. (Doc. 21 at 22.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment. 

Dated this 18th day of March, 2020.

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