Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-05725/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-05725-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERT ANTHONY ARTEAGA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF OAKLEY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-05725-JCS 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 15

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Albert Arteaga brings this civil rights action against officers of the City of Oakley 

Police Department and the City of Oakley, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on 

alleged malicious prosecution in violations of the First and Fourth Amendments. Presently before 

the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6) (“Motion”). The Court finds that the Motion is suitable for determination without oral 

argument and therefore vacates the Motion hearing scheduled for February 7, 2020 pursuant to 

Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). The Initial Case Management Conference currently scheduled for the 

same date is continued to May 15, 2020 at 2:00 p.m. For the reasons stated below, the Motion is 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.1

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Complaint

In the Complaint, Arteaga alleges that on November 9, 2017, his girlfriend called 9-1-1 to

report a domestic dispute between herself and Arteaga’s uncle. Complaint ¶ 12. He alleges that 

1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c).

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Officer Defendants Garrett Wayne and Daniel Buck (“the Officer Defendants”) were dispatched to 

his residence. Id. According to Arteaga, when he observed his uncle being subjected to excessive 

force by the officers, he said “that’s enough” and was then tased by Officer Buck, even though 

Arteaga was “not interfering, obstructing, or delaying” the officers’ official duties in any way and 

also was not disobeying any lawful command. Id. ¶ 13.

Arteaga alleges that he was arrested on a fabricated violation of California Penal Code 

section 148(a)(1) (resisting arrest) and that he was subjected to excessive force. Id. ¶ 14, 17. He 

further alleges that he was prosecuted for violation of section 148(a)(1) based on a deliberately 

and materially false report by Officer Buck that was provided to the Contra Costa County District 

Attorney’s Office. Id. ¶ 15. According to Arteaga, Officer Buck misrepresented the facts about 

the incident “with the knowledge and purpose of causing [Arteaga] to defend himself against 

criminal charges which [Officers Wayne and Buck] knew were false and/or to protect and coverup [Officer Buck’s] abuse of authority which included [Arteaga’s] false/wrongful arrest, false 

imprisonment, excessive force, and the violation of his rights to free speech.” Id. ¶ 15. Arteaga

alleges that on July 19, 2019 he was acquitted of the charge of violating California Penal Code § 

148(a)(1) after a trial by jury where the jury deliberated approximately ten minutes before 

reaching its verdict. Id. ¶ 14.

Arteaga asserts three claims based on these alleged facts. He asserts his First Claim under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on alleged violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights against the 

Officer Defendants and Does 1-20. He asserts his Second Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the 

basis of municipal and supervisorial authority against Defendants City of Oakley Police Chief 

Chris Thorsen (“Chief Thorsen”), the City of Oakley and Does 21-30. While styled as a single 

claim, this claim asserts two distinct claims: a claim against Chief Thorsen and Does 21-30 based 

on supervisory liability (hereinafter, the “Supervisor Liability Claim”) and a claim against the City 

of Oakley under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (hereinafter, the “Monell 

Claim”). Arteaga’s Third Claim is a state law claim for malicious prosecution, which he asserts 

against the Officer Defendants.

Arteaga’s Supervisor Liability Claim is set forth in Paragraph 32 of his complaint, in 

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which he alleges as follows:

The to-be-identified supervisors, including any already-individuallynamed Defendants and DOES 21-30, each permitted and failed to 

prevent the unconstitutional acts of other Defendants and individuals 

under their supervision and control, and failed to properly supervise 

such individuals, with deliberate indifference to the rights of 

PLAINTIFF. Each of these supervising Defendants either directed his 

or her subordinates in conduct that violated PLAINTIFF’S rights, OR 

set in motion a series of acts and omissions by his or her subordinates 

that the supervisor knew or reasonably should have known would 

deprive PLAINTIFF of rights, OR knew his or her subordinates were 

engaging in acts likely to deprive PLAINTIFF of rights and failed to 

act to prevent his or her subordinate from engaging in such conduct, 

OR disregarded the consequence of a known or obvious training 

deficiency that he or she must have known would cause subordinates 

to violate PLAINTIFF’S rights, and, in fact, did cause the violation 

of PLAINTIFF’S rights. (See, Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury 

Instruction 9.4). Furthermore, each of these supervising Defendants 

is liable in their failures to intervene in their subordinates’ apparent 

violations of PLAINTIFF’S rights.

Complaint ¶ 32.

Arteaga’s Monell Claim is based on three theories: 1) policy, custom or practice; 2) failure 

to train; and 3) ratification. The policy, custom or practice allegations are set forth in Paragraph 

33, in which Arteaga alleges that the conduct of the Officer Defendants was the result of the 

following policies, customs or practices:

a. Failure to supervise and/or discipline deputies for misconduct that 

results in the violation of citizens’ civil rights; and/or,

b. “Hurt a person – charge a person,” pursuant to which if an officer 

wrongly hurts, detains, or arrests a person, the officer will falsely 

seek to secure the filing and prosecution of a false criminal charge 

against the person; the officer seeks the filing and prosecution of 

such charges with the belief that a conviction (or plea) will 

prevent the person from suing for their injuries wrongfully 

inflicted by the officer, or that the person will plea to a lesser 

charge thereby severely limiting the person’s right to sue the 

officer. Tolerating or condoning “hurt a person – charge a person” 

encourages deputies to use excessive force and/or to falsely arrest 

and criminally charge persons; and/or; 

c. Using or tolerating excessive and/or unjustified force and/or false 

arrests and false incident reporting; and/or;

d. Using or tolerating inadequate, deficient, and/or improper 

procedures for handling, investigating, and reviewing complaints 

of excessive force or deputy misconduct, including claims made 

under California Government Code section 910 et seq.; and/or

e. Failing to institute, maintain, or effectively administer and 

enforce proper and adequate training, supervision, policies, 

protocol and procedures concerning appropriate/constitutional 

responses to and investigation of 9-1-1 calls for service that, 

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among other things, do not permit and authorize the immediate 

pointing of weapons at suspects (excessive force); and/or to 

cover-up violations of constitutional rights by any or all of the 

following:

i. by failing to properly investigate and/or evaluate 

complaints or incidents of excessive and unreasonable 

force, unlawful seizures;

ii. by ignoring and/or failing to properly and adequately 

investigate and discipline unconstitutional or unlawful 

activity by officers; and

iii. by allowing, tolerating, and/or encouraging officers to: 

to not file complete and accurate reports by officers; to file 

false reports; make false statements; and/or obstruct or 

interfere with investigations of unconstitutional or 

unlawful conduct by officers, by withholding and/or 

concealing material information;

f. Allowing, tolerating, and/or encouraging a “code of silence” 

among law enforcement officers whereby an officer or member of 

the department does not provide adverse information against a 

fellow officer or member of the department;

g. Using or tolerating inadequate, deficient, and/or improper 

procedures for handling, investigating, and reviewing complaints 

of officer misconduct;

h. Allowing, encouraging and fostering a course of action by OPD’s 

officers that they could use their powers of arrest and force to 

retaliate against a citizen who was profane, verbally challenging, 

insulting and/or disrespectful and/or critical of them and then 

cover up their abuse of power by violating their duty to truthfully 

report their conduct with the citizen to avoid being held 

accountable for such abuse of authority. In the parlance used, 

Defendants de facto policy and custom of punishing a citizen who 

failed the “attitude test” encouraged, fostered, and is implemented 

in the subject claims brought by PLAINTIFF; and

i. Failing to have and enforce necessary, appropriate, and lawful 

policies, procedures, and training programs to prevent or correct 

the unconstitutional conduct, customs, and procedures described 

in this Complaint and in subparagraphs (a) through (h) above, 

with deliberate indifference to the rights and safety of 

PLAINTIFF and the public, and in the face of an obvious need for 

such policies, procedures, and training programs.

Id. ¶ 33.

Arteaga’s failure-to-train allegations are set forth in Paragraph 34, in which he alleges that 

the City of Oakley “may have instituted policies or training addressing some or all of the topics 

listed [in Paragraph 33] but has, either through negligence or deliberate indifference to citizen’s 

rights, failed to properly oversee and enforce such policies and/or training.” Finally, in Paragraph 

36, Arteaga alleges that the City of Oakley is “liable for the violations of [Arteaga’s] rights by its 

final policy makers, as described above.” This may be a reference to Paragraph 33, in which 

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Arteaga alleges that the unconstitutional actions and omissions of Defendants was “ratified by 

policy making officials” for the City of Oakley and/or Oakley Police Department. 

B. The Motion

In the Motion, Defendants argue that both the Monell Claim and the Supervisor Liability 

Claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because Arteaga’s 

allegations are too conclusory to state claims that are plausible on their face, as is required under 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 679 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Motion at 1. 

With respect to Arteaga’s Monell Claim based on policy, custom or practice, Defendants 

contend Arteaga’s allegations are insufficient because he has not alleged any facts suggesting

either that the policies he has pled are express policies that have been formally adopted by the City 

of Oakley or that there is a “‘widespread’ practice of unconstitutional conduct which is ‘so 

permanent and well settled as to constitute a “custom or usage.”’” Id. at 4-5 (quoting City of 

Saint Louis v. Praprotnick, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 

U.S. 144, 167-168 (1970)).2 With respect to the latter, Defendants quote the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision in Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) holding that “[l]iability for an 

unconstitutional custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents.” Id. at 4. 

Defendants argue that courts (including the undersigned) have relied on this rule in requiring

specific allegations that there have been other similar incidents to raise a plausible inference of 

custom or usage under Monell. Id. at 4 (citing Cardenas v. Cty. of Alameda, No. C 16-05205 

WHA, 2017 WL 1650563, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2017); Bedford v. City of Hayward, No. 3:12-

CV-00294-JCS, 2012 WL 4901434, at *12-13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2012)). Focusing in particular 

on Arteaga’s allegation that the City of Oakley has a custom or practice of “hurt a person – charge 

a person,” Defendants contend Arteaga’s allegations are too conclusory to state a claim because 

2 The Praprotnik pin cite provided by Defendants (p. 123) is incorrect; the language from the 

Adickes decision that is quoted above is found at page 127 of Praprotnik. The undersigned made 

the same error in Bedford v. City of Hayward, No. 3:12-CV-00294-JCS, 2012 WL 4901434, at 

*12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2012). Although the undersigned regrets the error in Bedford, this mistake 

has no impact on the reasoning or holding of that case. 

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they “only pertain to [Arteaga’s] single isolated interaction with two [Oakley Police Department 

Officers] on November 9, 2017, and make no mention of any other person being subjected to the 

unconstitutional conduct associated with the “hurt a person – charge a person” theory.” Id. at 6.

With respect to Arteaga’s Monell claim based on ratification, Defendants argue that 

Arteaga’s allegations are insufficient because he has alleged no facts showing that any final policy 

maker made a “‘conscious, affirmative choice’ . . . to approve the subordinate’s decision.” Id. at 7 

(quoting Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1992)). It is not enough, they contend, 

to allege merely that a policy maker refused to overrule a subordinate’s completed act. Id. at 6 

(citing Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999)). To the extent Arteaga asserts that 

Chief Thorsen or any other final policy maker ratified the conduct of the Officer Defendants, 

Defendants argue that the claim fails because Arteaga has not “provide[d] any facts demonstrating 

Chief Thorsen made a ‘conscious, affirmative choice’ to ratify the alleged unconstitutional 

conduct.” Id. at 7 (citing Stein v. City of Piedmont, No. 16-CV-01172-JCS, 2016 WL 4269514, at 

*7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2016)). Defendants further assert Arteaga’s allegations are so “jumbled” 

that it is not clear he is even asserting a Monell claim based on ratification. Id. 

Defendants argue that Arteaga’s Monell Claim also fails to state a claim to the extent he 

asserts it based on failure to train. Id. at 7-8. Defendants acknowledge that failure to train may 

give rise to liability on the part of a municipality where the “training deficiency is so egregious 

that it ‘amount[s] to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come 

into contact.’” Id. at 7 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). Arteaga’s 

allegations here, however, are so conclusory as to the alleged failure to train, that he has not raised 

a plausible inference that the conduct in this case was the result of any such training deficiency, 

Defendants contend. Id. 

Finally, Defendants argue that Arteaga’s claim of Supervisor Liability must be dismissed 

because he has alleged no facts that give rise to a plausible inference that there is a “causal 

connection demonstrating a wrongful action taken by Chief Thorsen caused the alleged 

unconstitutional conduct of Officers Wayne and Buck.” Id. at 8-9 (citing Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 

1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)). Defendants further assert that he has alleged no such conduct on the 

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party of any city supervisor. Id.

Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Arteaga’s Second Claim in its entirety and without 

leave to amend. Id. at 3, 9. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard under Rule 12(b)(6)

A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. “The purpose of a motion to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. 

Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). Generally, a plaintiff’s burden at the pleading stage 

is relatively light. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a “pleading which 

sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court analyzes the complaint and 

takes “all allegations of material fact as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party.” Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).

Dismissal may be based on a lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of facts that 

would support a valid theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1990). A complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material 

elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 

1106 (7th Cir. 1984)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[C]ourts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 

265, 286 (1986)). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of 

‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)

(alteration in original). Rather, the claim must be “‘plausible on its face,’” meaning that the 

plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable 

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inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 570).

B. Whether Monell Claim is Adequately Alleged

1. Legal Standards Governing Monell Liability

Under Monell, a municipality cannot be held liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by 

its employees on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. “Instead, it is when 

execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose 

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government 

as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. A plaintiff seeking to establish municipal 

liability under section 1983 may do so in one of three ways: 1) the plaintiff may demonstrate that a 

municipal employee committed the alleged constitutional violation “pursuant to a formal 

governmental policy or longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating 

procedure of the local governmental entity;” 2) the plaintiff may demonstrate that the individual 

who committed the constitutional violation was an official with “final policy-making authority and 

that the challenged action itself thus constituted an act of official government policy;” or 3) the 

plaintiff may demonstrate that “an official with final policy-making authority ratified a 

subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 

F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992).

2. Discussion

a. Custom or Practice Allegations

Under § 1983, a municipality may be held liable based on an unconstitutional policy even 

where it is not an express municipal policy that has been formally adopted. In particular, the 

Supreme Court has recognized that a municipality may be held liable on the basis of an 

unconstitutional policy if the plaintiff can “prove the existence of a widespread practice that, 

although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is ‘so permanent and well 

settled as to constitute a “custom or usage” with the force of law.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 

485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-168 (1970)). 

In order to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a Monell claim must consist 

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of more than mere “formulaic recitations of the existence of unlawful policies, conducts or habits.” 

Warner v. County of San Diego, No. 10–1057, 2011 WL 662993, *4 (S.D.Cal. Feb.14, 2011).

Here, Arteaga has alleged a series of unofficial policies based on custom or practice, 

including policies of “hurt a person – charge a person,” using excessive force and encouraging a 

“code of silence.” Yet he has not alleged any specific facts that render his allegations of an 

unconstitutional custom or practice plausible. He has alleged no other similar incidents that would 

tend to support an inference that these policies were “well settled.” See Lozano v. Cty. of Santa 

Clara, No. 19-CV-02634-EMC, 2019 WL 6841215, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2019) (dismissing 

Monell claim based on custom and practice on the pleadings because the plaintiff had not alleged 

that any other person was subjected to similar treatment). Nor has he alleged any other specific 

facts that give rise to a plausible inference as to the existence of any of the customs and practices 

alleged in the Complaint. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Arteaga’s Monell Claim to the extent 

it is based on an alleged unconstitutional custom or practice.

b. Ratification Allegations

The Supreme Court has held that “municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where . . . a 

deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the 

official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in 

question.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986). Thus, “[i]f the authorized 

policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, their ratification [is] chargeable 

to the municipality . . . .” Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127.

Arteaga’s allegations as to ratification are scant and entirely conclusory. He alleges on 

information and belief that the unconstitutional actions “of Defendants herein” were pursuant to 

the customs, policies and/or practices listed in Paragraph 33 or “stated in the alternative . . . were 

directed, encouraged, allowed, and/or ratified by policy making officials” for the City of Oakley 

“and/or” the Oakley Police Department. Complaint ¶ 33. Yet he alleges no specific facts that 

would give rise to a plausible inference that any official with policy-making authority made a 

“deliberate” choice or approved the basis for the unconstitutional conduct alleged by Arteaga as 

would be required to hold the City of Oakley liable on a theory of ratification. Therefore, the 

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Court dismisses Arteaga’s Monell Claim to the extent it is based on a theory of ratification.

c. Failure to Train Allegations

“In limited circumstances, a local government’s decision not to train certain employees 

about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an official 

government policy for purposes of § 1983.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). 

However, “[a] municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a 

claim turns on a failure to train.” Id. Thus, a municipality may be held liable based on a failure to 

train only where it “amount[s] to ‘deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the 

[untrained employees] come into contact.’” Id. (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 

378, 388 (1989)). The Supreme Court has explained that this high threshold for establishing 

municipal liability is consistent with its holding in Monell because “permitting cases against cities 

for their ‘failure to train’ employees to go forward under § 1983 on a lesser standard of fault 

would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities” and would “engage the 

federal courts in an endless exercise of second-guessing municipal employee-training programs.” 

City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392. 

In City of Canton, the Court addressed the circumstances under which a municipality can 

be held liable under § 1983 based on inadequate training, describing the inquiry as follows:

In resolving the issue of a city's liability, the focus must be on 

adequacy of the training program in relation to the tasks the particular 

officers must perform. That a particular officer may be 

unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the 

city, for the officer's shortcomings may have resulted from factors 

other than a faulty training program. See Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 

U.S., at 268, 107 S.Ct., at 1120 (O’CONNOR, J., dissenting); 

Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, supra, 471 U.S., at 821, 105 S.Ct., at 2435 

(opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). It may be, for example, that an 

otherwise sound program has occasionally been negligently 

administered. Neither will it suffice to prove that an injury or accident 

could have been avoided if an officer had had better or more training, 

sufficient to equip him to avoid the particular injury-causing conduct. 

Such a claim could be made about almost any encounter resulting in 

injury, yet not condemn the adequacy of the program to enable 

officers to respond properly to the usual and recurring situations with 

which they must deal. And plainly, adequately trained officers 

occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do says little about the 

training program or the legal basis for holding the city liable.

Id. at 390-391.

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Arteaga has alleged that the City of Oakley is liable for the conduct of the Officer 

Defendants based on inadequate training but has alleged no specific facts regarding the type of 

training that was deficient, the nature of the alleged deficiencies or how the allegedly 

unconstitutional conduct of the Officer Defendants resulted from the training. Moreover, he has 

alleged that the failure to train was “through negligence or deliberate indifference.” Complaint ¶ 

35. As discussed above, though, a negligent failure to train is not sufficient to establish an 

unconstitutional policy; rather, faulty training can support a Monell claim only where it rises to the 

level of deliberate indifference. In short, the allegations in Arteaga’s complaint do not give rise to 

a plausible inference that the City of Oakley can be held liable on the basis of any inadequate 

training program. 

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Arteaga’s Monell Claim to the extent it is based on 

inadequate training.

C. Whether Supervisor Liability Is Sufficiently Alleged

Under § 1983, a supervisor can be held liable in his or her individual capacity “if there 

exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a 

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). In the 

Complaint, the allegations of supervisor liability are entirely conclusory. No specific facts are 

alleged that would support a plausible inference that Chief Thorsen (or any other supervisor) was 

personally involved in the incident or that there was any causal connection between the Officer 

Defendants’ conduct and the unconstitutional conduct of any supervisor. 

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Arteaga’s Second Claim to the extent it is based on 

alleged supervisor liability.

D. Whether Plaintiff Should be Permitted to Amend

“The power to grant leave to amend . . . is entrusted to the discretion of the district court,

which ‘determines the propriety of a motion to amend by ascertaining the presence of any of four 

factors: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and/or futility.’” Serra v. Lappin, 

600 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting William O. Gilley Enters. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 588 

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F.3d 659, 669 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Court concludes 

that Arteaga might be able to amend his Second Claim to state a claim. Because amendment is not 

futile, he will be permitted to amend his Complaint to address the deficiencies set forth in this 

Order.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion. 

Plaintiff’s Second Claim is dismissed with leave to amend. Arteaga may file an amended 

complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 31, 2020

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

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