Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00849/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00849-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Shaykh Muhammad Al Saud,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-15-0849-PHX-SPL (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Tucson, 

Arizona, filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on June 8, 2015 (Doc. 6). Respondents have filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29)

based on Petitioner’s failure to exhaust state remedies. Petitioner has not responded.

In addition, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause (Doc. 26), directing

Petitioner to show cause why the Court should not abstain based on ongoing state 

proceedings. Petitioner has responded (Doc. 27). 

The Motion to Dismiss is a dispositive motion, and resolution of the Order Show 

Cause is dispositive. Accordingly, the undersigned makes the following proposed 

findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On May 17, 2013, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court on 

charges of fraudulent schemes, theft, and five counts of forgery. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) 

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(Exhibits to the Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 29, are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

Petitioner eventually entered into a plea agreement, and on January 9, 2015 entered a 

plea of guilty to one count of fraudulent schemes. (Exhibit B, M.E. 1/13/15.) On the 

same date, Petitioner was sentenced to 9.25 years in prison. (Exhibit C, Sentence; 

Motion, Doc. 29 at 2.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Amend. Pet., Doc. 6 at 2.) Moreover, as a 

pleading defendant, Petitioner had no right to file a direct appeal. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

17.1(e); and Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258, 889 P.2d 614, 616 (1995).

C. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On April 21, 2015, Petitioner filed with the trial court a Notice of Post-Conviction 

Relief (Exhibit D). He followed with a series of motions seeking a hearing (Exhibits E, 

F, H), and a Petition to Return Property (Exhibit G). On August 17, 2015, the trial court 

appointed counsel and set a briefing schedule on Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction 

relief, the petition being due 60 days after completion of transcripts. (Exhibit I, M.E. 

8/17/15.) 

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his original Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on May 11, 2015 (Doc. 1). That 

Petition was dismissed with leave to amend, on the basis that Petitioner had not set out a 

violation of federal law. (Order 5/26/15, Doc. 3.) 

On June 8, 2015, Petitioner filed his Amended Petition (Doc. 6) (“Petition”), in 

which “Petitioner appears to allege that his sentence was illegal, that his attorney 

provided constitutionally deficient assistance, and that the State has violated the terms of 

his plea agreement.” (Order 6/15/15, Doc. 8 at 2.) Service and a response was ordered, 

with directions that a motion to dismiss should not be filed in lieu of an answer, without 

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leave. (Id.)

Motion to Dismiss - On September 2, 2015, Respondents filed a Motion for 

Leave to File Motion to Dismiss, arguing the efficiency of such an approach in light of 

the pending state proceedings. The Court set a deadline for a response to the Motion for 

Leave, and ordered Petitioner to show cause why the case should not be dismissed as a 

matter of Younger abstention. (Order 9/3/15, Doc. 26 at 3.) Petitioner did not timely 

respond to the Motion for Leave, and the Court granted leave to file the motion to 

dismiss. (Order 9/30/15, Doc. 28.) 

Consequently, Respondents filed their Motion to Dismiss on October 2, 2015 

(Doc. 29). Respondents argue that in light of the pending PCR proceedings, Petitioner’s 

state remedies are unexhausted and the Petition should be dismissed without prejudice.

On October 6, 2015, the Court alerted Petitioner to the need to respond to the 

Motion to Dismiss, and set a response deadline of October 19, 2015. (Order 10/6/15, 

Doc. 30.)

Petitioner has not responded.

Order to Show Cause – As noted above, upon advice that Petitioner’s PCR 

proceeding was on-going the Court ordered Petitioner to show cause why the case should 

not be dismissed as a matter of Younger abstention. (Order 9/3/15, Doc. 26 at 3.) 

On September 16, 2015, Petitioner responded (Doc. 27) to the Order, arguing that 

because of a lack of response by the state courts to his PCR notice and various motions, 

he had no choice but to seek federal habeas relief. Petitioner further argues the merits of 

his claims.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. ABSTENTION

Petitioner’s state post-conviction relief proceeding is on-going.

Federal courts cannot interfere with pending state criminal proceedings, absent 

extraordinary circumstances that create a threat of irreparable injury. Younger v. Harris, 

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401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). Irreparable injury does not exist if the threat to the plaintiff's 

federally protected rights may be eliminated by his defense of the criminal case. Id. at 

46. Moreover, even irreparable injury is insufficient to permit interference with the 

proceeding unless it is "both great and immediate." Id.

 "The Younger doctrine was borne of the concern that federal court injunctions 

might unduly hamper a state in its prosecution of criminal laws." Miofsky v. Superior 

Court, 703 F.2d 332, 336 (9th Cir. 1983). In practical terms, the Younger doctrine 

means that "only in the most unusual circumstances is a defendant entitled to have 

federal interposition by way of injunction or habeas corpus until after the jury comes in, 

judgment has been appealed from and the case concluded in the state courts." Carden v. 

Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 83-84 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980).

"When, as in the present case, an appeal of a state criminal conviction is pending, 

a would-be habeas corpus petitioner must await the outcome of his appeal before his 

state remedies are exhausted ..." Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 

1983). Dismissal is required, even where the issues raised in the federal petition are not 

part of the state appeal, because the appeal "may result in reversal on some other ground, 

thereby mooting the federal question." Davidson v. Klinger, 411 F.2d 746, 747 (9th Cir. 

1969); see Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d at 634. 

Dismissal without prejudice is the appropriate means to abstain in this case. 

While a stay is permitted in cases merely involving a claim at law for damages, see 

Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965 (2004), in a case seek equitable relief such as a 

habeas proceeding, dismissal is the appropriate response.

For the reasons described in Smith v. Williams, 2013 WL 1501583, 2 (D.Nev. 

2013), the undersigned concludes that abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 

43 (1971) is not necessary where the pending state proceeding is not a direct appeal, but 

merely a state post-conviction proceeding. In Smith, Judge Miranda concluded that 

Henderson v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2013) clarified “that the rule [of Sherwood 

v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.1983) (applying Younger)] applies to pending direct 

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appeals, and not to pending state post-conviction proceedings”). 

Here, however, Petitioner had pled guilty, and had no right of "direct appeal" as a 

result of his guilty plea. See A.R.S. § 13–4033(B) ("In noncapital cases a defendant may 

not appeal from a judgment or sentence that is entered pursuant to a plea agreement or an 

admission to a probation violation."). The Arizona courts have determined that a timely, 

first PCR proceeding of a pleading defendant (an “of right” petition) is the equivalent of 

direct appeal. 

Rule 32 incorporates this appeal right [provided under the Arizona 

constitution]: "Any person who pled guilty ... shall have the right to 

file a post-conviction relief proceeding, and this proceeding shall be 

known as a Rule 32 of-right proceeding." Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.1. 

Thus, even though this matter is a post-conviction relief proceeding, 

by virtue of Article 2, Section 24 of the Arizona Constitution, as 

interpreted by Montgomery [v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258-59, 889 

P.2d 614, 616-17 (1995), op. supp., 182 Ariz. 118, 893 P.2d 1281 

(1995)], it is the functional equivalent of a direct appeal. 

State v. Ward, 211 Ariz. 158, 162, 118 P.3d 1122, 1126 (Ariz.App. Div. 1,2005). 

Here, Petitioner’s PCR proceeding appears like it may be considered by the 

Arizona court to be an of-right proceeding. He pled guilty, and it is his first PCR 

petition, and counsel has been appointed. See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 715 

(9th Cir. 2007) (“To bring an of-right proceeding under Rule 32, a plea-convicted 

defendant must provide to the Arizona Superior Court, within 90 days of conviction and 

sentencing in that court, notice of his or her intent to file a Petition for Post-Conviction 

Review.”) Thus it is the equivalent of a direct appeal, and Younger abstention is 

required.

Accordingly, in light of the pending “appellate” proceeding, Petitioner’s Petition 

should be dismissed without prejudice.

B. EXHAUSTION

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s state remedies on all of his claims are 

unexhausted, and thus the claims are barred from federal habeas review, and the Petition 

should be dismissed with prejudice.

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1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

"A petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of 

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, 

(2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for 

the claim." Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005).

Proper Forum - “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, 

‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the 

Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 

(9th Cir. 2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1059 (1989). 

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

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now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

3. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

Here, Petitioner has yet to present any claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a 

direct appeal or a post-conviction relief proceeding. Because his “of-right” PCR 

proceedings are on-going, those remedies are still available, and no procedural default 

applies. 

Delay Did Not Render PCR Remedy Ineffective – Petitioner complains that the 

state court proceedings are taking too long. The failure to exhaust may be excused if 

“circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the 

applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii). State remedies may be found to be 

“ineffective” in cases involving extreme or unusual delay attributable to the state. 

Edelbacher v. Calderon, 160 F.3d 582, 586-87 & n. 5 (9th Cir.1998); Phillips v. 

Vasquez, 56 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1032 (1995). Petitioner 

fails to show that the Arizona PCR proceedings are ineffective.

Petitioner fails to show extreme or unusual delay. Here, there was a delay of less 

than four months between the filing of Petitioner PCR Notice on April 21, 2015 (Exhibit 

D), and the appointment of counsel on August 17, 2015 (Exhibit I). “Certainly the delay 

is not the kind of extreme delay that has caused habeas courts to find state procedures 

ineffective. See e.g. Phillips v. Vasquez, 56 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 1995) (delay of 

fifteen years, within “no end in sight”). Cf. Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 

1990) (discussing due process violation from delay of more than three years in appellate 

proceeding). Moreover, at the time Petitioner filed his Amended Petition (Doc. 6) on 

June 8, 2015, his state PCR proceeding had been pending less than 60 days. 

Moreover, Petitioner fails to show that any significant delay could be attributable 

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to the state. Petitioner’s PCR Notice was primarily labelled as a “Motion Vacate Plea 

Vacate Sentence,” making some delay in responding to the failing understandable. 

In sum, Petitioner’s PCR proceeding has been pending a little more than 6 

months, and has been actively worked for at least all but the eleven weeks it has been 

pending.

Moreover, the delay, even its totality, is not such as to convince the undersigned 

that the PCR remedy is ineffective. The delay is not, in the experience of the 

undersigned, extraordinary for Arizona PCR proceedings, the matter appears to be 

progressing, and there appears no reason to believe that it will not, within a reasonable 

time, result in the review of Petitioner’s claims. 

C. SUMMARY

Petitioner’s of-right PCR proceeding is on-going. It is the equivalent of a direct 

appeal, and accordingly this Court must abstain from addressing his claims, and dismiss 

the Petition without prejudice. 

Alternatively, Petitioner has made no foray to the Arizona Court of Appeals the 

Petition presents only unexhausted claims, and Petitioner has failed to show the 

ineffectiveness of those state remedies. Accordingly, the Petition must be dismissed 

without prejudice as wholly unexhausted, and the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29) should be 

granted.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

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Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on the merits. Under the reasoning set 

forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the district court was 

correct in its procedural ruling.

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Amended Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed June 8, 2015 (Doc. 6) be DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE as a matter of abstention.

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, in the alternative, Respondents 

Motion to Dismiss, filed October 2, 2015 (Doc. 29) be GRANTED and the Petitioner's 

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed June 8, 2015 (Doc. 6) be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as unexhausted.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: November 3, 2015

15-0849r RR 15 10 28 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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