Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02719/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02719-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 09CV2719

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYNE PARKS,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary of the

California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 09-2719-WQH(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS (11-1)

Wayne Parks (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro

se, has filed a Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §2254. Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition.

Petitioner has filed a “Memorandum of Points and Authorities In

Support of the Motion to Grant The Petition For Writ of Habeas

Corpus As Timeliness Filed,” which the Court construes as an

Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. The Court, having reviewed

Petitioner’s Petition, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s

Opposition, and the lodgments presented therewith, finds that

Petitioner’s Petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

be GRANTED.

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1/ The Court gives Petitioner the benefit of the “mailbox

rule” which deems that a petition is constructively filed

when it is delivered to prison officials for filing.

Houston v. Lack 487 U.S. 266(1988).

2 09CV2719

I

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 20, 2001, a jury convicted Petitioner of two counts

of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under the age of 14

years, in violation of California Penal Code §288(a) and one count

of sending harmful matter with intent to seduce a minor, in

violation of California Penal Code §288.2(a). (Respondent’s Lodgment

No. 1 at 46-48). The court sentenced Petitioner to ten years and

eight months in prison. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 200).

On January 17, 2002, Petitioner appealed his convictions in

the California Court of Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2). On

May 31, 2002, the California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s

appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5).

On July 12, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in

the California Supreme Court. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 6). On

August 14, 2002, the Petition for Review was denied. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 6).

On May 22, 2003, Petitioner constructively1/ filed a Petition

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 8). On January 22, 2004, the California Supreme

Court denied the Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 9).

On February 4, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition For Writ Of

Habeas Corpus with the San Diego Superior Court. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 10). On April 13, 2009, the Superior Court denied the

Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 11).

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3 09CV2719

On November 14, 2009, Petitioner filed a second Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 12). On January 13, 2010, the Petition was denied.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 13).

On January 22, 2010, Petitioner filed a second Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 14). On April 21, 2010, the San Diego Superior Court

denied Petitioner’s second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 15).

On May 7, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition For Writ Of

Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court, Eastern District

of California. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 16). On December 15, 2009,

the Eastern District transferred the action filed in that district

to the United States District Court, Southern District of California

[case no. 09-2824-BTM(CAB)]. On January 21, 2010, the District Judge

assigned to that case dismissed the Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment

No. 16).

On December 3, 2009, Petitioner filed the Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus that is now before this Court.

II

PETITIONER’S PETITION IS BARRED

BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

1. The AEDPA’s One-Year Statute of Limitations

Respondent argues that the Petition is barred by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“the AEDPA”)

statute of limitations. The provisions of the AEDPA apply to

petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed in federal court after

the AEDPA’s effective date of April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521

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U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068 (1997). Therefore, because the

Petition was filed on December 3, 2009, the AEDPA applies to this

case.

Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA on April 24, 1996, “state

prisoners had almost unfettered discretion in deciding when to file

a federal habeas petition.” Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118

U.S. 897 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United

States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

“[D]elays of more than a decade did not necessarily bar a prisoner

from seeking relief.” Id. 

With enactment of the AEDPA, a state prisoner’s time frame

for seeking federal habeas relief was dramatically limited. The

AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by, in part, adding subdivision (d),

which provides for a one-year limitation period for state prisoners

to file habeas corpus petitions in federal court. Section 2244(d)

states, in pertinent part:

 (d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of -

(A) the date on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review 

or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to

filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by

such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional

right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

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5 09CV2719

made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim

is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)

On August 14, 2002, the California Supreme Court affirmed

Petitioner’s convictions and sentence. Petitioner’s convictions and

sentence became final on November 12, 2002, 90 days after Petitioner

could have filed a petition for writ of certiori in the United

States Supreme Court. Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th

Cir. 2001).

Therefore, absent tolling, Petitioner had one year or until

November 12, 2003, to file his Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus

with this Court. However, as explained in detail below, Petitioner

waited over six years to file the Petition that is now before the

Court, thus making it untimely and barred by the statute of

limitations. 

Petitioner filed several petitions for post-conviction relief

in the California Superior and Supreme Courts. The statute of

limitations is tolled while a “properly filed” state habeas corpus

petition is “pending” in the state court. Under the holding of Nino

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), the “statute of

limitations is tolled from the time the first state habeas petition

is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects petitioner’s

final collateral challenge,” provided the petitions were properly

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6 09CV2719

filed and pending during that entire time. The statute of

limitations is not tolled from the time a final decision is issued

on direct state appeal and the time the first state collateral challenge is filed because there is no case “pending” during

that interval. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006

The meaning of the terms “properly filed” and “pending” in

Nino have been clarified by the United States Supreme Court. In

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), the Court held that the time

between denial in a lower California court and the filing of a

subsequent petition in the next higher court does not toll the

statute of limitations, if the petition is ultimately found to be

untimely. Id. at 223-226. In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408

(2005), the Court held that statutory tolling is not available for

the period a petition is under consideration, if it is dismissed as

untimely. Id. at 413

While statutory tolling may be available for intervals

between ascending filings (ie. from Superior Court, to the Court of

Appeal, to the Supreme Court), it is not available for the interval

between descending filings, unless a petitioner is attempting to

remedy a deficiency in the new filing. King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821,

823 (9th Cir. 2003) abrogated on other grounds by Evans v. Chavis,

546 U.S. 189 (2006); Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817, n. 3 (9th

Cir. 2003). Statutory tolling is similarly unavailable for the

interval between successive filings in the same court. Dils v.

Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2001); Purifoy v. Cullen, 2010 WL

4181169 at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Camacho v. Hernandez, 2009 WL 192483

at *4 (S.D. Cal. 2009).

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7 09CV2719

Petitioner’s first petition for relief after his convictions

and sentence became final was filed on May 22, 2003 in the California Supreme Court. On January 22, 2004, the California Supreme Court

denied the Petition. From November 12, 2002 (the date Petitioner’s

convictions and sentence became final) to May 22, 2003, (the date

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the

California Supreme Court) (6 months, 10 days), the statute of

limitations was not tolled because there was no case pending during

that interval. Nino 183 F.3d at 1006

From May 22, 2003 (the date Petitioner filed a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court) to January

22, 2004 (the date the California Supreme Court denied the Petition)

(8 months), the statute of limitations was tolled because Petitioner

was properly pursuing his state court remedies.

 Thereafter, on February 4, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court. On April

13, 2009, the San Diego Superior Court denied the Petition.

From January 22, 2004 (the date the California Supreme Court

denied Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus) to February

4, 2009 (the date Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus with the San Diego Superior Court) (5 years, 13 days), the

statute of limitations was not tolled because statutory tolling is

unavailable for intervals between descending filings. King 340 F.3d

at 823.

Thereafter, on November 14, 2009, Petitioner filed a second

successive Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California

Supreme Court. On January 13, 2010, the California Supreme Court

denied the Petition. 

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On January 22, 2010, Petitioner filed a second successive

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court.

On April 21, 2010, the Petition was denied.

From April 13, 2009 (the date of the Superior Court’s denial

of Petitioner’s first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus) to April

21, 2010 (the date of the Superior Court’s denial of Petitioner’s

second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus)(1 year, 8 days), the

statute of limitations was not tolled because statutory tolling is

not available for intervals when a petitioner is pursuing relief on

successive filings. Dils, 260 F.3d at 986; Purifoy, at *3; Camacho,

at *4.

 While applications for state post-conviction relief or other

collateral review may toll the statute of limitations, that is,

pause the statute of limitations clock, tolling does not restart the

statute of limitations period. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 802,

832 (9th Cir. 2003). Adding together the three periods of time when

the statute of limitations was not tolled (6 months, 10 days + 5

years, 13 days + 1 year, 8 days), results in a total of approximately six years and seven months, which is well beyond the one year

statute of limitations mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

Accordingly, Petitioner failed to file his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in a timely fashion and it is therefore barred.

2. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling of the

Statute of Limitations

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations because he has been diligent “to conform

by the way of Collateral review until 2009 when (he) filed his

Postconviction/Habeas Corpus.” (Opposition at 2). Respondent argues

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9 09CV2719

that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute

of limitations.

The one-year statute of limitations is subject to equitable

tolling. Calderon, 128 F.3d at 1288. Equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations is appropriate where a habeas petitioner

shows: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2)

that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Pace, 544

U.S. at 418; Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026

(9th Cir. 2005). The burden of demonstrating grounds warranting

equitable tolling rests with the petitioner. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418.

The obligation to act diligently “does not pertain solely to the

filing of the federal habeas petition, rather it is an obligation

that exists during the period appellant is exhausting state court

remedies as well.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 972 (9th Cir. 2006)

citing Lacava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 277 (3rd Cir. 2005). When

courts assess a habeas petitioner’s argument in favor of equitable

tolling, they must conduct a “highly fact-dependent” inquiry.

Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000), Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002). The extraordinary

circumstances must be the “but-for and proximate cause” of the

untimely filing. Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001).

In this case, Petitioner alleges that in 2002, prison

authorities “seized all of the Petitioner property including State

Post conviction/Habeas Corpus,” and that “(after) 6 years,” prison

authorities “return Petitioner State Postconviction Nov. 2008.”

(Opposition at 2).

However, Petitioner’s allegations are belied by the state

court record presented by Respondent. The state court record

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indicates that from January 2002 through May 2003, Petitioner filed

in the California courts at least three applications for relief.

(Respondent’s Lodgments Nos. 2, 6, 8). Therefore, even if Petitioner’s allegations regarding the seizure of his property were

true, he still was able to file applications for relief in the

California courts.

Moreover, Petitioner does not explain what property was

seized from him nor how the lack of that property hindered the

diligent pursuit of his state court remedies. Further, Petitioner

does not explain what, if anything, he did to obtain his property

after it was seized. Additionally, Petitioner did not seek relief

from this Court to have Respondent provide him with his legal

materials, if in fact those materials were seized from him. In other

words, Petitioner does not provide a valid reason why he waited from

2004, after the denial of his first Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus by the California Supreme Court, to 2009 before continuing

with any further state collateral action, or why he waited from 2004

to 2009 to file the Petition now before the Court. Under these

circumstances, the Court can not conclude that Petitioner was

diligently pursuing his rights or that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way of timely filing the Petition that is before

the Court. 

Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to

establish that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations. Accordingly, the Court declines to equitably toll the

statute of limitations and finds that his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus filed in this Court is untimely.

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11 09CV2719

 III

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the

Court has determined that Petitioner has failed to comply with the

AEDPA’s statute of limitations and that he is not entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C.A. §

2244(d).

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss is GRANTED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 4, 2011, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

February 18, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 5, 2011

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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