Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00616/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00616-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The parties requested oral argument in connection with this Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment. (Docs. 37, 46). The parties have had the opportunity to submit briefing.

Accordingly, the Court finds the pending Motion suitable for decision without oral argument

and the parties’ request is denied. See LRCiv 7.2(f).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Superior Marble, L.L.C.,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Omya, Inc.,

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 10-00616-PHX-SMM

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Superior Marble, L.L.C.’s (“Superior”) Motion For

Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. 37). Defendant Omya, Inc. (“Omya”) responded (Doc.

46) and Superior replied (Doc. 49). After consideration of the issues, the Court finds the

following.1

BACKGROUND

Until 2010, Superior produced and sold sand, feed supplements, gravel, and specialty

products made from marble found in only a few locations in North America, including the

Queen Creek Quarry (the “Quarry”) owned and operated by Omya. (Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 47 at

1-2). On November 12, 1999, Superior and Omya entered into a long-term “Arizona Supply

Case 2:10-cv-00616-SMM Document 56 Filed 07/28/11 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Agreement” (the “Agreement”), which provided that Omya would supply Superior with

marble from the Quarry for at least twenty years. (Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 47 at 2; Doc. 47-4 at 5).

The Quarry is located on U.S. Forest Service land in Pinal County, Arizona. (Doc. 1

at 3; Doc. 47 at 2). Pursuant to federal regulations, Omya needed approval from the U.S.

Forest Service (the “Forest Service”) to operate and mine the Quarry. (Doc. 46 at 6; Doc. 47-

5 at 2). In 1997, Omya purchased the Quarry and asserts that it initially operated the Quarry

under existing temporary permits. (Doc. 47-5 at 2). By 1999, Omya had discussed with the

Forest Service a plan to expand the Quarry’s operations. (Doc. 47-5 at 2). On November 1,

2002, the Forest Service issued a Decision Notice and Finding of No Significant Impact (the

“Decision”) pertaining to Omya’s planned Quarry expansion. (Doc. 47 at 9). The Decision

allowed Omya to continue mining and processing marble and to expand operations to an

additional 123 acres of Forest Service land. (Doc. 47-7 at 2). 

The Decision also required Omya to comply with certain conditions, including that

Omya pave an access road to the Quarry. (Doc. 47-7 at 2). In November 2003, Omya

submitted and the Forest Service approved a revised Plan of Operation (the “Plan”). (Doc.

14 at 2; Doc. 47-1 at 6). In 2008, work commenced on the access road with an estimated cost

of $885,000. (Doc. 47 at 10). Omya avers that by about October 2008, it became apparent

that implementing the Plan would cost about $2.5 million. (Doc. 47 at 11; Doc. 47-5 at 5).

On February 6, 2009, citing the unexpected cost of implementing the Plan, Omya gave notice

to Superior that it was halting operations at the Quarry. (Doc. 47 at 7). Omya continued to

supply materials to Superior until about September 22, 2009, when Omya gave notice to

Superior that no further deliveries would be made. (Doc. 47 at 7). 

On March 19, 2010, Superior filed its Complaint alleging Breach of Contract and

Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. (Doc. 1). Omya’s Answer raised the

affirmative defense that Paragraph 3(b) of the Agreement (“Paragraph 3(b)”) precludes Omya

from liability for suspension of operations because Omya was obligated to incur significant

Case 2:10-cv-00616-SMM Document 56 Filed 07/28/11 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

liability and expense in order to obtain and maintain a permit to operate the Quarry. (Doc.

14 at 6, 8). Paragraph 3(b) of the Agreement reads as follows:

[Omya] shall use diligent effort to obtain all necessary permits,

licenses and/or approvals to enable [Omya] to extract stone and/or

operate the Quarry as presently conducted from all appropriate

federal, state, and local governmental agencies (the “Permits”). If

at any time during the Initial Term or Renewal Term (i) any Permit

assigned or transferred to [Omya] shall be terminated or suspended

by a court or governmental agency or (ii) [Omya] is unable to

obtain any of the Permits for any reason whatsoever, this

agreement, and all obligations of [Omya] to supply stone to

[Superior] shall cease until such time as any such Permit shall be

reinstated or granted, as the case may be. The suspension of any of

[Omya]’s obligations pursuant to the provision of this clause (b)

shall not extend the term of this Agreement. Nothing herein shall

require [Omya] to take any adverse action or to incur any

significant liability or expense in order to obtain any of the

Permits. [Omya] agrees to inform [Superior] at the time in which

[Omya]’s knowledge of a potential problem or impediment to

permitting exists, of any problem or impediment to obtaining or

renewing an applicable Permit for [Superior]’s successful

operation. The successful operation applies to [Omya]’s ability to

make available to [Superior] the Maximum Order specified herein.

(Doc. 38-4 at 5-6). On April 29, 2011, Superior filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

seeking a ruling that, as to Superior’s Breach of Contract Claim (Count 1), Paragraph 3(b)

does not excuse Omya’s alleged failure to perform its duties under the Agreement. (Doc. 37).

Omya responded that the permitting process was ongoing and that Paragraph 3(b) does not

limit when Omya must make a determination regarding whether an expense required for

“obtain[ing]” a Permit is “significant.” (Doc. 46 at 9, 12).

LEGAL STANDARDS

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “show that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Jesinger v.

Nev. Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive law determines

which facts are material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also

Case 2:10-cv-00616-SMM Document 56 Filed 07/28/11 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248. The dispute must also be genuine, that is, the evidence must be “such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.; see Jesinger, 24 F.3d

at 1130.

A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Summary judgment is appropriate against

a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

Id. at 322; see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994). The

moving party need not disprove matters on which the opponent has the burden of proof at

trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The party opposing summary judgment need not

produce evidence “in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary

judgment.” Id. at 324. However, the nonmovant must set out specific facts showing a genuine

dispute for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-88 (1986); Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995).

DISCUSSION

The interpretation of the language of a contract is a question of law for the court.

Hadley v. Sw. Props., 570 P.2d 190, 193 (Ariz. 1977). Where the plain language of an

agreement is unambiguous, it must be given effect as written. Id.; see Mining Inv. Group,

LLC v. Roberts, 177 P.3d 1207, 1211 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). If the court finds that the

contract language is “reasonably susceptible” to the interpretation asserted by its proponent,

extrinsic evidence may be admitted to determine the parties’ intent. Taylor v. State Farm

Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 854 P.2d 1134, 1140 (Ariz. 1993). However, parol evidence is

inadmissible to “vary or contradict the meaning of the written words” of the contract. Id.

In its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Superior contends Omya cannot invoke

Paragraph 3(b) to cease performance of their contractual obligations under the Agreement.

Case 2:10-cv-00616-SMM Document 56 Filed 07/28/11 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

(Doc. 37 at 5). Paragraph 3(b) defines “Permits” as “all necessary permits, licenses and/or

approvals required to enable [Omya] to extract stone and/or operate the Quarry” at the time

the parties entered into the Agreement. (Doc. 38-4 at 4). Superior asserts that Paragraph 3(b)

is inapplicable because Omya had obtained a Permit. (Doc. 37 at 5). Omya responds that the

permitting process was ongoing and that there is nothing in the language of Paragraph 3(b)

that states when Omya is obligated to determine whether an expense required for

“obtain[ing]” a Permit is “significant. (Doc. 46 at 12). Omya further contends that the Court

should consider extrinsic evidence related to Omya’s intent at the time that it entered into the

Agreement. (Doc. 46 at 16). Omya also asserts that the amount it would have needed to

spend on implementing the Plan was “significant” for the purposes of Paragraph 3(b). (Doc.

46 at 7-9).

The Court finds that Paragraph 3(b) does not allow Omya to cease performance of its

contractual obligations to Superior when Omya possessed “all necessary permits, licenses,

and/or approvals required to enable Omya to extract stone and/or operate the Quarry as . . .

conducted” at the time the parties entered into the Agreement. (Doc. 38-4 at 4). The language

is clear: “Nothing herein shall require [Omya] to take any adverse action or to incur any

significant liability or expense in order to obtain any of the Permits.” (Doc. 37 at 5). The

contract language says nothing about “maintaining” a Permit as Omya’s third affirmative

defense asserts. (Doc. 14 at 6). Omya submits that the proper definition of “obtain” is “to

gain or attain usually by planned action or effort.” (Doc. 46 at 10 (citing State v. Darby, 123

Ariz. 368, 373 (1979))). This definition does not support Omya’s argument here, where there

is no evidence that Omya had ever failed to “gain” or “attain” a Permit.

The Decision states that Omya was “allow[ed] . . . to continue mining and processing

limestone material, affecting an additional 123 acres of National Forest System lands.” (Doc.

47-7 at 2). In short, Omya had obtained a Permit. Omya could continue operating the Quarry

as it did when the parties reached the agreement.(Doc. 47-7 at 2). Omya avers that it was able

to continue operating the Quarry and supplying Superior with marble when it halted

Case 2:10-cv-00616-SMM Document 56 Filed 07/28/11 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

operations and delivery. (Doc. 47 at 7-8 ). Anthony Colak, Omya’s Chief Executive Officer

since 2003, acknowledged that Omya had the Forest Service’s permission to operate the

Quarry at the time operations were suspended. (Doc. 38-12 at 3).

Further, the Court will not admit the extrinsic evidence Omya offers in support of it

position. Omya presents the declaration of its former President, James Reddy, as extrinsic

evidence that the “purpose of [Paragraph 3(b)] was to give Omya the right to abandon the

approval process if the cost to Omya were ‘significant’ . . . in that event, Omya would not

be obligated to sell stone to Superior.” (Doc. 46 at 16). In his declaration, Mr. Reddy

discusses Omya’s concern at the time it entered into the Agreement that the Forest Service

might require Omya to expend significant sums of money in order to acquire a Permit. (Doc.

47-6 at 2). For this reason, according to Reddy, Omya understood the Agreement to give it

an “out” if the expense of obtaining approval became significant. (Doc. 47-6 at 2). The Court

finds that Paragraph 3(b) is not “reasonably susceptible” to Omya’s interpretation. Taylor,

854 P.2d at1139-1140. Parol evidence is never admissible to “vary or contradict the meaning

of the written words” of the contract. Id. The admission of Mr. Reddy’s statements would

“vary or contradict the meaning of the written words” of the contract and would violate

Arizona’s parol evidence rule. Id.; (Doc. 47 at 6).

Also, Omya’s contention that the amount that would have been spent on implementing

the Plan was “significant” for the purposes of Paragraph 3(b) is irrelevant and unavailing.

(Doc. 46 at 7). The issue is whether or not Paragraph 3(b) provides a legal defense for

Omya’s failure to perform its obligations to Superior so long as it possessed a Permit.

Because Omya had obtained a Permit, whether the prospective expenditure was “significant”

makes no difference for the purpose of this Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:10-cv-00616-SMM Document 56 Filed 07/28/11 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED GRANTING Superior’s Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment (Doc. 37) only to the extent that Paragraph 3(b) is an invalid affirmative defense

with respect to Superior’s Breach of Contract Claim (Count 1).

DATED this 27th day of July, 2011.

Case 2:10-cv-00616-SMM Document 56 Filed 07/28/11 Page 7 of 7