Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00533/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00533-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 05cv0533 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERT HAYES,

Petitioner,

v.

J.E. TILTON, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 07-0533-JAH(LSP)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

I.STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Overview

Albert Hayes (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding

pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent Warden J.E. Tilton (“Respondent”),

has filed an Answer. Petitioner has filed a Traverse to Respondent’s Answer. The Court, having reviewed Petitioner’s Petition,

Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s Traverse and all documents

lodged therewith, finds the Petitioner is not entitled to the

relief requested and recommends that the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be DENIED. 

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B. Procedural Background

The San Diego District Attorney filed three charges against

Petitioner in the San Diego Superior Court. (CT 1-3.) In count

one Petitioner was charged with forcible rape [Ca. Pen

Code,§261(a)(2)]. (CT 1.) In count two, Petitioner was charged

with assault with intent to commit rape (Ca. Pen Code, §220). Id.

In count three, Petitioner was charged with assault by means

likely to produce great bodily injury [Ca. Pen Code, §245(a)(1)]. 

(CT 2.) The District Attorney also alleged that Petitioner had

been previously convicted of three prior “strikes” (Ca. Pen Code,

§667(b)) and three prior felonies [Ca. Pen Code, §§667(a)(1), 668,

and 1192.7(c)]. (CT 2-3). 

Petitioner represented himself at trial. (CT 593-620.) On

November 24, 2003, in the middle of the trial, Petitioner moved

for a mistrial. The trial court denied Petitioner’s Motion. (RT at

1256-62.) On December 4, 2003 a jury found Petitioner guilty as

charged on all counts, together with true findings regarding all

of the prior conviction allegations. (CT 621, 623-24, 626, 632-

638.)

On March 15, 2004 Petitioner, at this point represented by

counsel, filed a Motion for a New Trial based on a claim that the

prosecution failed to make timely disclosure of notes of a police

detective which were favorable to the defense. (CT 472-80.) On

March 29, 2004 the trial court denied the Motion. (CT 642, RT

2141.) 

On June 28, 2004 a sentencing hearing was held. (CT 653.) 

The court sentenced Petitioner to state prison for an indeterminate term of twenty five years to life one count one. Id. Twenty

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five year terms were also ordered for counts two and three but the

court stayed those terms pursuant to California Penal Code §654. 

Id. The trial court dismissed one of Petitioner’s three strike

priors but ordered a consecutive term of five years for each of

Petitioner’s three prior serious felony convictions, resulting in

a total enhanced sentence of fifteen years. Id. Finally, the

court ordered payment of a $2,000 restitution fine and payment of

victim restitution in an amount to be determined. Id.

Petitioner appealed his conviction to both the California

Court of Appeal (Resp’s Lodgment No. 1) and the California Supreme

Court (Resp’s Lodgment No. 4.) Both of his appeals were denied

(Resp’s Lodgment Nos. 3, 5.) Petitioner also filed two separate

Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the state courts. (Resp’s

Supp. Lodgment Nos. 5, 7, 9, 11.) The California Court of Appeal

and the California Supreme Court denied both of his Petitions. 

(Resp’s Supp. Lodgment Nos. 6, 8, 10, 12.)

On March 31, 2007 Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court claiming multiple grounds for relief. On June 25, 2007, Respondent filed an

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and a Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in support thereof. Petitioner filed a

Traverse to Respondent’s Answer. 

C. Factual Background

i. Reliance on State Findings

The facts which follow are taken substantially from the

California Court of Appeal opinion in People v. Hayes, No. D044714

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1

The Court relies upon these facts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e). See

Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981) (stating that deference is owed

to factual findings of both state and appellate courts).

4 05cv0533 

at 2-6 (Cal Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2005) (Resp’s Lodgment No. 3.)1

ii. Prosecution Evidence

Patricia, a resident of Bell Hotel in downtown San Diego,

testified that at about 8:30 p.m. on March 21, 2003, she was

outside the hotel talking to a White male (Robert Rohena) and a

Black male. Patricia had met Rohena before, but she had not

previously met the other man. During the conversation, Patricia

learned that the men had been roommates in room four of the Bell

Hotel, but the Black male had just moved out of the hotel that

day. After talking for about five to ten minutes with the two

men, Patricia walked down the street with the intention of panhandling for money to buy beer.

When she was about a block away from the hotel, she saw the

Black male again and he asked her if she wanted to smoke some

“crack.” Patricia walked with him for about a block, but because

she started “getting some really bad vibes from him,” she told him

she did not “want to do that with [him].” When they reached the

corner of a fence near a freeway ramp, she started “feeling really

like [she] was in danger.” She wanted to leave the area, but the

man grabbed her hand and told her to sit down. They started

arguing, and when she refused to sit down, he pulled her down by

the arm and slammed her to the ground. She asked, “What the hell

is going on?” He told her to [s]hut the hell up.” She resisted

him, and he hit her on the face with something hard that felt like

a brick or a rock. She felt that she had better do what he said

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or he would “do something more” to hurt her.

Patricia asked if she could at least sit on a mattress that

was leaning against the fence. The man pulled the mattress down

to the ground and let her sit on it. He told her to pull down her

pants. She complied, and the man had sexual intercourse with her. 

At one point during the rape, she saw someone standing by a fence

on the other side of the street. She started screaming to get the

person’s attention. Her assailant told her to shut up and choked

her until she “blanked out for a bit” and stopped yelling. After

the man finished and stood up, Patricia pretended like nothing had

happened because “she wanted to live.” As they walked back down

the street, the man stated, “you sure you don’t want me to give

you any money? I’ll give you $100.” Patricia responded, “I don’t

want your damn money.” Prior to the rape, they had not discussed

exchanging money for sex, and she did not smoke rock cocaine with

him or acquire the drug from him.

The man left the area and Patricia returned to the Bell

Hotel. As she walked back to the hotel, she had blood in her

mouth and could feel her face swelling up. After Patricia arrived

at her room and told her boyfriend what happened, she and her

boyfriend went to hotel manager Diedre Grant’s office. Patricia

told Grant that she thought the person who attacked her was “that

Black guy” who had just moved out of room number four. Grant

showed Patricia a copy of Petitioner’s picture on his transit card

and Patricia stated that he was her attacker. Grant called 911.

Grant testified that at about 10:30 or 11:00 p.m., Patricia

and her boyfriend came to the manager’s apartment. Patricia was a

“bloody mess.” She was bleeding from her nose and mouth, and her

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face was swollen and distorted. She was crying and hysterical and

told Grant she had been raped by the “Black man in room four.”

After reporting the rape, Patricia was transported by

ambulance to the hospital. The examining nurse testified that

Patricia had “massive facial trauma,” consisting of abrasions and

bruising on the entire left side of her face; a laceration on the

left side of her tongue consistent with having been it in the face

with a hard object such as a brick; and a vaginal laceration

consistent with nonconsensual intercourse.

DNA testing revealed a match between Petitioner’s DNA and

semen found in Patricia’s vagina. (Resp’s Lodgment No. 3).

iii. Petitioner’s Defense

Petitioner testified on his own behalf. He stated that on

March 21, 2003, he was moving out of the Bell Hotel to the Center

City Hotel because the Bell Hotel was plagued by drug users. 

Petitioner testified that he did not use drugs, and that he worked

for an organization called Christ Missionary that solicited funds

to assist the homeless and other individuals in need. On March

21, 2003 at about 3:30 p.m., Petitioner left the Bell Hotel and

went to a phone booth to call his sisters to ask them to come help

transport his possessions to his new hotel room. After Petitioner 

made the phone calls, he walked back to the Bell Hotel when he saw

Rohena walking up the street and Patricia coming out of the hotel. 

Petitioner, Rohena, and Patricia all arrived at the corner of 15th

and K Streets by the Bell Hotel. Rohena had been Petitioner’s

roomate in room four of the Bell Hotel. Petitioner spoke with

Rohena, telling him that he was moving out of the Bell Hotel. 

Patricia briefly participated in the conversation. All of a

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sudden Patricia, who smelled strongly of alcohol, started asking

for money. Rohena promptly walked away into the Bell Hotel, and

Petitioner angrily told Patricia to get away from him and to clean

herself up and get a job. Petitioner testified that Patricia used

drugs and alcohol, panhandled for money, and was out at all hours

of the night. When Petitioner told Patricia to get away from him,

she walked away and went to a nearby liquor store.

After Petitioner’s sisters and some friends helped him move

to the Center City Hotel, Petitioner returned to the Bell Hotel at

about 7:00 p.m. to retrieve some property he had forgotten in his

room. Between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m., he was standing outside the

Bell Hotel talking to Rohena. He saw Patricia come around the

corner from the other side of the hotel, where she was talking to

other people, including a “Black guy.” Patricia came and spoke to

Rohena. She then went and smoked rock cocaine with a “Black guy”

who was a drug dealer and whose name was A.C., or A.P., or William. This was the last time Petitioner saw Patricia on the night

of March 21, 2003. Petitioner testified that he never touched or

hit Patricia, and he did not have sex with her.

After finishing his conversation with Rohena at about 

7:30 p.m., Petitioner left the area and took the trolley back to

the Center City Hotel. He stayed in his room about ten to twenty

minutes, and then went to his sister’s residence at another downtown hotel near First Avenue and Broadway, and stayed there for

about five or ten minutes. Next, he took the bus and trolley to

Chula Vista, arriving at the Christ Missionary shelter at about

8:00 p.m. From Chula Vista, he was transported in a van to Northern San Diego County to solicit funds for the charity. He worked

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2

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides in pertinent part:The Supreme Court, a

Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.

8 05cv0533 

from about 8:30 p.m. until about 9:15 p.m., and arrived back at

the Christ Missionary shelter at about 9:40 p.m. He then took the

trolley and bus and returned to his sister’s hotel room at about

10:00 p.m. He ate dinner at his sister’s hotel room and stayed

there the rest of the night. 

Petitioner called several witnesses, including his sister

and a work colleague, to corroborate his alibi defense and to

confirm that the Bell Hotel was in an area rampant with prostitution and illegal drug usage. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Overview

Federal habeas corpus relief shall only be granted in order

to remedy violations of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.2 Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68(1991). A

state’s interpretation of its laws or rules provides no basis for

federal habeas corpus relief because no federal constitutional

question arises. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68 (1991) (federal habeas

corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law, and federal

courts may not reexamine state court determinations on state law

issues).

For petitions filed after April 24, 1996, federal habeas

corpus relief is limited by an amendment to 28 U.S.C. §2254 which

was enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). As amended, 28 U.S.C. §2254

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(d)provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceeding

28 U.S.C. §2254 (d) (West. Supp 2006); Lindh v. Murphy, 521

U.S. 320 (1997). To obtain federal habeas relief, a petitioner must satisfy either §2254 (d)(1) or §2254 (d)(2).

Williams, 529 U.S. at 403.

B. §2254 (d)(2)

With regard to factual determinations, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1), as amended, provides that “[A] determination of

a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be

correct.” Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d at 524-26. Petitioners

have “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1);

See also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26 (1992); Sumner v.

Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981) (stating that deference is

owed to findings of both state trial and appellate courts). 

C. §2254 (d)(1)

When a petitioner does not challenge the state court’s

determination of the evidence, he may receive relief only if he

establishes that the state-court decisions were “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law.” See Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634 (2003). “ClearCase 3:07-cv-00533-AJB-WVG Document 41 Filed 04/10/08 Page 9 of 41
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ly established Federal law” only includes United States Supreme

Court holdings, not dicta or circuit court authority, from the

time the state court rendered its decision. See Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); See also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 71-72(2003). Furthermore, only some Supreme Court

holdings are relevant as holdings which do not bind the state

courts, such as an application of the Supreme Court’s supervisory

power are “off the table” for AEDPA purpose. Early v. Packer, 537

U.S. 3, 10 (2002). 

While the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application”

prongs of §2254(d)(1) have different meanings, the two concepts

overlap and it is sometimes necessary to test a petitioner’s

allegations against both standards. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212F.3d

1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds, Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 75-76. A state court’s decision is “contrary to”

clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law set forth by the Supreme Court

or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court decision and nevertheless arrives

at a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; Andrade, 538

U.S. at 72-75. 

A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law under §2254(d)(1) if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from the

Supreme Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of

the particular state prisoner’s case, or, if the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle from the Supreme

Court precedent to a new context where it should not apply or

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unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407; Andrade, 538

U.S. at 76. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ

simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. . . Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s

highest court, the Court must “look[] through” to the underlying

appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-

06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish

a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an

independent review of the record to determine whether the state

court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of

clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled in part by Andrade, 538

U.S. at 74-77).

Because Petitioner has not challenged the State court’s

factual determinations, the Court must identify, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), whether the state court decisions contravened

or unreasonably applied “clearly established federal law”. Price,

538 U.S. 634; Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 23 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000).

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IV.DISCUSSION

A. Untimely Disclosure of Evidence 

i. Consent Note

Petitioner represented himself at trial. (Resp’s Lodgment

No. 3 at 10-13) His primary theory of defense was that Patricia

misidentified him as the assailant and he was not in the area at

the time of the assault. Id. Petitioner, who is Black, asserted

that if Patricia was raped, she was raped by another Black male

with whom she had been talking and smoking rock cocaine on the

night of the assault. Id. During pretrial discovery, Petitioner

requested, and the court ordered, disclosure of notes made by

police officers during witness interviews and DNA notes prepared

by the police department criminalists. During the trial, the

parties discovered that some of these notes had not been disclosed. Id. Upon this discovery, the notes were turned over to

Petitioner. Id.

Petitioner discovered the existence of the undisclosed

police investigative notes during the prosecution’s case-in-chief. 

Id. The revelation regarding these undisclosed notes occurred

while Petitioner was examining Officer John Serrano on Thursday,

November 20, 2003. Id. When the existence of the officer’s notes

was revealed, Petitioner requested, and the court granted, a

recess to allow Hayes to review the notes. Id. After the recess,

the court expressed its displeasure with the prosecution’s failure

to disclose the notes during discovery and asked Petitioner what

he wanted to do about the late disclosure. Id. The court offered

to allow Petitioner to delay his cross-examination of Officer

Serrano until the next court date so that he would have more time

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to review Serrano’s notes. Id. Instead, Petitioner requested

that he be allowed to continue his examination of Officer Serrano

so that the Officer could assist him with understanding the notes. 

Id. 

Petitioner proceeded to examine Officer Serrano about his

notes. One of Officer Serrano’s notes consisted of three notations set forth in a list, with the third notation stating: “#3 I

was there. It was consensual.” Id. Officer Serrano testified

that he thought the note consisted of a list of questions he

wanted to ask regarding the case, but he could not remember what

the third notation as about. Id. He testified that the only

persons he interviewed were hotel manager Grant and the victim

Patricia; he did not think the third notation referred to anything

specific that anybody told him; and he did not know “where [he]

got that statement [in notation number three] from.” Id.

Other than Petitioner’s request to examine Officer Serrano

regarding the contents of the notes, Petitioner did not make any

further requests for relief arising from the late discovery of the

Officer’s notes until he filed an unsuccessful Motion for a New

Trial after the jury found him guilty. Id. 

In Petitioner’s July 16, 2007 Motion for New Trial, Petitioner, now represented by counsel, argued that the note referring

to a consensual encounter constituted exculpatory evidence supporting a defense of consent. Id. He contended that if he had

been provided Officer Serrano’s notes before trial, he would have

developed a consent defense. Id. He asserted it was likely the

person observed by Patricia standing by the fence during the

sexual encounter was an eyewitness who made the statement regardCase 3:07-cv-00533-AJB-WVG Document 41 Filed 04/10/08 Page 13 of 41
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ing consent, and he would have had his investigator find this

eyewitness. Id. Further, he would have presented evidence that

Patricia traded sex for drugs, money, or alcohol. Id. To explain

Patricia’s facial injuries, he would have presented evidence from

two police officers to support a theory that Patricia’s boyfriend

was a violent drug addict who abused her. Id. He asserted the

late disclosure of the consent note compromised his effective

presentation of a consent defense because by the time of the

disclosure, he had already cross-examined Patricia on his misidentification defense. Id. He claimed that if he had known about

the consent note prior to trial, he would have sought to create a

reasonable doubt of guilt by focusing on the eyewitness who

described a consensual encounter plus Patricia’s history of

trading sex for drugs, alcohol, or money. Id. Petitioner also

stated that if he had known about the consent note, he would not

have himself testified and he would not have presented his alibi

defense. Id.

The trial court agreed there was a discovery violation that

should not have occurred. Id. However, the trial court concluded

that a new trial was not warranted. Id. The trial court reasoned

that it gave Petitioner the opportunity during the trial to

request relief based on the late disclosure of the consent note,

and Petitioner did not ask for a mistrial based on the consent

note, but only asked for additional time. Id. The trial court

noted it gave Petitioner time to review the note, and it would

have given Petitioner as much time as he wanted if he had asked

for it. Further, at the time of the disclosure, Patricia was

still subject to recall and Petitioner had not yet testified. Id.

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As to the issue of additional investigation that might have

occurred, the trial court stated that based on its discussion with

Petitioner at various points regarding his defense, the trial

court was satisfied a full investigation had been made as to all

possible defenses. Id. The trial court ascertained that Petitioner could have presented a consent defense if he had wanted to,

and that he made a tactical decision not to do so. The trial

court concluded that even if the consent note had been disclosed

prior to trial, there was no reasonable probability the outcome

would have been different. Id. 

In Petitioner’s appeal of his convictions, Petitioner again

argued that the untimely disclosure of the consent note impaired

his Due Process right to a fair trial. (Petition at 6-15.) He

argued that by the time the notes were discovered it was too late

for him to switch to a consent defense because he would have lost

credibility with the jury. (Resp’s Lodgment No. 3 at 10-13.) 

Petitioner’s appeal was denied. Ground One of his Petition to

this Court essentially asserts the same argument he made in the

Court of Appeal with respect to the consent note. (Petition 6-

15.) 

The Due Process clause requires the prosecution to disclose

to the defense any evidence that is material either to guilt or to

punishment. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987);

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674 (1985); United States

v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873 (1982); Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Evidence is material if, “there is a

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to

the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

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different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683. 

Thus, under clearly established united States Supreme Court law,

there are three components of a Brady violation: “The evidence at

issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is

exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have

been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently;

and prejudice must have ensued.” See Strickler v. Greene, 527

U.S. 263 (1999).

In the present case, the first two components of a Brady

violation have been met. The undisclosed consent note is favorable to Petitioner because it provides support for a possible

consent defense. Furthermore, the consent note was in fact either

purposefully or inadvertently suppressed by the prosecutor. Thus,

it is the third element, whether the untimely disclosure resulted

in prejudice to Petitioner, which is at issue. 

The California Court of Appeal addressed this issue in its

analysis. The court stated that it was required to “determine

whether the failure to disclose undermines confidence in the

outcome of the trial.” (Resp’s Lodgment No. 4 at 12). The court

stated that, while at the time the notes were discovered, Petitioner had already examined witnesses on the issue of

misidentification, ”there was nothing to prevent [Petitioner] from

also presenting a consent defense.” Id. at 15. The court further

found that, even if Petitioner had wanted to rely solely on a

consent defense once he discovered the consent note, he could have

asked the trial court for a mistrial. Id. at 16. The court also

noted that, while Petitioner argued that he did move for a misCase 3:07-cv-00533-AJB-WVG Document 41 Filed 04/10/08 Page 16 of 41
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Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that his

motion for a mistrial was unrelated to the untimely disclosure of the

detective’s notes. Id. He claims that his request for a mistrial was based

on “the combined effect of both” the delayed disclosure of the detectives

notes and an alteration of the transcript of Patricia’s taped interview.

Id. This contention is without merit. A review of the trial record clearly

reveals that Petitioner’s request for a mistrial was based solely on the

alterations of the transcript of Patricia’s taped interview. (Resp’s Supp.

Lodgment No. 2 at 1256-1262). 

17 05cv0533 

trial before the verdict was rendered, the trial record indicated

that Petitioner’s request for a mistrial was based solely on the

late discovery of the erroneous reference to “William[]” in the

transcript of Patricia’s recorded interview with the police.3

 Id.

at 16. Petitioner now contends that the Court of Appeal “underestimated the deleterious effect upon Petitioner which would have

flowed from the loss of credibility he invariably would have

suffered had he shifted to a consent theory after already committed [sic] himself to a misidentity/alibi theory.” (Petition at

12.) This argument reveals that Petitioner fails to understand

the Court of Appeal’s analysis. At no point did the Court of

Appeal deny that Petitioner may have lost credibility with the

jury had he shifted his theory of defense to a consent theory. 

(Lodgment No. 4 at 7-18.) Instead, the Court of Appeal emphasized

that, when the notes were discovered, Petitioner had at least two

options available to him which would have allowed him to compensate for the untimely disclosure: 1) he could have used alternative theories of defense, thus incorporating both the

misidentity/alibi theory and the consent theory or, 2) he could

have moved for a mistrial. Id. The Court of Appeal concluded

that Petitioner’s failure to take advantage of the latter option

“creates a strong inference that he did not want to abandon [the

misidentity/alibi] defense and place complete reliance on a conCase 3:07-cv-00533-AJB-WVG Document 41 Filed 04/10/08 Page 17 of 41
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sent defense. Id. at 16. The Court of Appeal concluded that “the

late disclosure of the consent note did not interfere with Petitioners selection of defense strategies”. Id. This conclusion is

also in accordance with the trial judge’s determination that the

untimely disclosure of Detective Serrano’s notes “did not effect

(sic) the outcome of the case.” (Resp’s Supp. Lodgment No. 2 at

2112.) Petitioner does not present any argument which would lead

the Court to conclude that both the trial and appellate courts’

determinations regarding this matter were unsound. The Court

finds that the late discovery of the consent note did not result

in any prejudice to Petitioner. 

ii. Report note

Petitioner also raises what could be perceived as a separate issue in his Petition. Id. at 14. He indicates that the

late-discovered detective’s notes also contained a note containing

the phrase “I didn’t Report on time,” which Petitioner indicates

was made by Patricia to Detective Serrano. Id. at 14. Petitioner’s purpose in referencing the note is not entirely clear.

However, the Court, constituting the Petition liberally, assumes

that Petitioner’s discussion of this note was meant to be a separate claim. The Court surmises that Plaintiff’s arguments are

that the note could have been used to impeach Patricia’s testimony

regarding her account of the events on the night in question and

the late discovery of the note resulted in a Brady violation. 

(Petition at 14, 28-29.) 

Much to Petitioner’s chagrin, this claim has not been

exhausted in the state courts because his appellate counsel refused to raise the issue and the appellate court would not allow

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him to file a pro se supplemental brief in which, as he now indicates, he would have raised the issue himself. (Resp’s Supp.

Lodgment No. 4)(Petition 28-29.) Regardless, the claim can be

summarily dismissed on the merits because the untimely disclosure

of the report note did not result in any prejudice to Petitioner. 

As the Court of Appeal recognized, at the time the notes were

discovered, Patricia was still subject to recall. (Resp’s Lodgment No. 3 at 10.) Furthermore, it would not have prejudiced

Petitioner or otherwise negatively affected his defense had he

recalled Patricia because the evidence he presented already laid a

foundation for questioning her credibility. (Lodgment No. 3 at

13.) Specifically, Petitioner’s examination of the witnesses up

to the point when the notes were discovered touched upon theories

of defense, which indicated that there were discrepancies in

Patricia’s story which cast doubt upon the veracity of her assault

claim and that she was not a credible person. Id. Thus, at the

time the report note was discovered, Petitioner still had the

opportunity to use it for impeachment purposes and it was consistent with testimony he had already presented to the jury. Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner suffered no prejudice as a

result of the untimely disclosure of the report.

iii. Conclusion

In sum, in Ground One of the Petition, Petitioner does not

cite any authority and does not present any legitimate arguments

which would lead the Court to conclude that the Court of Appeal’s

decision regarding Officer Serrano’s notes contravened or unreasonably applied the Supreme Court precedent established in Brady. 

Therefore, the Court finds that Ground One of the Petition fails.

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Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition is this regard

be DENIED.

B. Participation in Appellate Review

In Ground Two, Petitioner claims that his right to due

process was infringed because he was deprived of the “fundamental

liberty interest to participate in the [sic] gain access to appellate review process” (Petition at 16.) Petitioner argues that,

while his case did go through the state appeals process, there

were multiple issues which his appellate counsel declined to raise

and which he was not allowed to raise himself (Petition at 16-22).

In fact, Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File a Pro Se

Supplemental Opening Brief (Resp’s Supp. Lodgment No. 3.) His

Motion was denied by the Court of Appeal because appellants have

no right to self-representation in criminal appeals. [Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 4 (citing In Re Martinez v. Court of Appeal, Fourth

District 228 U.S. 152 (2000)] 

While an accused has the authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding his case, the Constitution does not

require appointed counsel to raise every nonfrivolous claim requested by the client. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-753

(1983) (recognizing that “a brief that raises every colorable

issue runs the risk of burying good arguments”). Accordingly, the

fact that Petitioner’s counsel refused to raise potentially legitimate claims on appeal was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of the established federal law. Therefore, the Court

finds that, under Ground Two of the Petition, Petitioner states no

grounds upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted.

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C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

i. Background

The Court of Appeal appointed an attorney to represent

Petitioner. (Lodgment No. 1.) In Petitioner’s February 22, 2005

opening brief, Petitioner’s appellate attorney argued that Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to a fair trial

was violated due to (1) the prosecution’s failure to timely disclose Officer Serrano’s notes. Specifically, he argued that the

“consent” note prevented Petitioner from presenting a consent

theory of defense, and (2) the prosecution’s untimely disclosure

of police lab bench notes prevented the independent testing of DNA

evidence by Petitioner’s expert. Id.

On April 1, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to

file a Pro Se Supplemental Opening Brief and a Request for Adequate Time for Preparation of the Supplemental Brief. (Resp’s

Supp. Lodgment No. 3.) Petitioner also filed a Request for an

Order for Law Library Access and an Order for an Extra Two Hours

Law Library Time. Id. On April 8, 2005, the Court of Appeal

denied both motions because appellants have no right to selfrepresentation in criminal appeals. (Resp’s Supp. Lodgment No. 4

(citing In Re Martinez, 228 U.S. 1520)) 

On February 1, 2006, Petitioner filed a Petition with the

California Supreme Court for review of the Court of Appeal’s

denial of his Motion and Request. (Resp’s Supp. Lodgment No. 4.) 

On April 12, 2006 his Petition was denied without explanation. 

(Resp’s Supp. Lodgment No. 5.) 

On April 17, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the Court of Appeal. (Resp’s Supp. Lodgment No.

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5.) Petitioner asked the court to reconsider its decision on the

Motion and Request. Petitioner claimed that the court’s refusal

to grant the Motion and Request deprived him of his “Due Process

Fundamental interest to participate in gaining access to Appellate

review of [his] meritorious arguable issues.” Id. On May 18,

2005, the court denied his Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment No.

6.) 

On June 13, 2005 Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court (Resp’s Supp. Lodgment No. 7.) In this Petition, he asserted the same issue he

asserted in his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in the

Court of Appeal, that the Motion and Request should not have been

denied. Id. On May 10, 2006 his Petition was denied. (Resp’s

Supp. Lodgment No. 8.)

December 29, 2005 the Court of Appeal affirmed his convictions. (Resp’s Supp. Lodgment No. 3.) The Court of Appeal agreed

with the trial court that the untimely disclosure of the detective’s notes did not deprive Petitioner of a fair trial. Id. at

7-18. The Court of Appeal also found that the untimely disclosure

of the DNA notes did not constitute a Due Process violation. Id.

at 18-21.

On May 12, 2006 Petitioner again filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus in the Court of Appeal. (Resp’s Supp. Lodgment

No. 9.) Petitioner raised multiple claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Id. On July 7, 2006, the Court of

Appeal, citing In re Hillery, 202 Cal. App. 293, 294 (2003),

denied the Petition because it was not brought in the Superior

Court in the first instance. (Resp’s Supp. Lodgment No. 10.) On

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July 18, 2006, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Resp’s Supp. Lodgment

No. 11.) On February 7, 2007 the California Supreme Court denied

this Petition as well, citing In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993),

and In re Miller, 17 Cal.2d 734 (1941). (Resp’s Supp. Lodgment

No. 12).

ii. Specific Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Ground Three of his Petition to this court, Petitioner

again claims he received ineffective assistance of his appointed

appellate counsel (“IAC”). (Petition at 23-44.) The Court interprets the somewhat imprecise Petition to comprise six separate

claims: (1) failure to challenge the trial court’s denial of

Petitioner’s request for advisory counsel or a “language interpreter” at the preliminary hearing; (2) failure to challenge the

trial court’s rulings related to third party culpability evidence

and evidence related to Patricia’s credibility; (3)failure to

raise the issue of the untimely discovered note containing the

phrase “I didn’t report on time,” which was apparently made by 

Patricia, and which Petitioner argues he would have used to impeach Patricia’s testimony; (4) failure to challenge the police

investigation of the crimes; (5) failure to challenge the prosecutor’s deliberate concealment of the address of potential witness

Robert Rohena from Petitioner; and (6)failure to conduct an investigation on newly discovered evidence in support of a habeas

petition or to assist in filing such a petition. Id.

/// 

///

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iii. Procedural Default Doctrine

Respondent contends that Ground Three is procedurally

defaulted by virtue of the California Supreme Court’s denial of

the claim with citations to In re Clark 5 Cal.4th 750, and In re

Miller, 17 Cal.2d 734. (Answer at 23-26.) Respondent argues that

these citations indicate that the California Supreme Court denied

this claim on the basis of both untimeliness and because it was

successive, and that such a procedural bar is independent of

federal law and adequate to bar federal review because it is

firmly established and regularly applied. Id.

The procedural default doctrine has its roots in the

adequate and independent state law doctrine, which provides that

the United States Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review a

judgment of a state court which rests on a state law ground that

is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the

judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). Because

the resolution of a federal claim would not affect a state court

judgment which rests on a ground independent of the federal claim,

the Supreme Court would in effect be issuing an advisory opinion

in addressing the federal claim, something that court lacks jurisdiction to do. Id. 

The adequate and independent doctrine has been extended to

federal habeas actions, but applies in a somewhat different manner

because a federal habeas court does not review a judgment of a

state court, but is required to decide whether a state prisoner is

in custody in violation of the federal Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States. Id. at 729-30. When the “adequate

and independent ground” for a state court’s rejection of a federal

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claim involves a violation of state procedural requirements, a

habeas petitioner is said to have procedurally defaulted his

claim, and this Court cannot reach the merits of the federal

claim. Id. To do so would not only be an end run around the

limitation on direct review by the Supreme Court, but would also

permit avoidance of the exhaustion requirement and infringe upon

“the States’ interest in correcting their own mistakes.” Id. at

730-32. 

However, “a procedural default does not bar consideration

of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the

last state court rendering a judgment in the case clearly and

expressly states that its judgment rests on a state procedural

bar.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). Additionally,

the Court may still reach the merits of a procedurally defaulted

claim, but only if the petitioner can demonstrate cause for the

procedural default and actual prejudice therefrom, or if the

failure of the Court to review the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

The citation to In re Clark in the California Supreme

Court’s decision could be either an invocation of California’s

“untimeliness bar” [see La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704-06

(9th Cir. 2001), In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (1998)], or

the bar on successive petitions (see In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at

788 n.9 (“Clark serves to notify habeas corpus litigants that we

shall apply the successiveness rule when we are faced with a

petitioner whose prior petition was filed after the date of finality of Clark.”)), or, as Respondent argues, both (In re Clark, 5

Cal.4th at 797-98 (“the general rule is still that, absent justiCase 3:07-cv-00533-AJB-WVG Document 41 Filed 04/10/08 Page 25 of 41
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fication for the failure to present all known claims in a single,

timely petition for writ of habeas corpus, successive and/or

untimely petitions will be summarily denied”). Although the

record is unclear which procedural bar the California Supreme

Court applied to Ground Three, as long as both procedural bars are

adequate and independent to uphold the judgment, the claim is

procedurally defaulted. Washington v. Cambra, 208 F.3d 832, 834

(9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the Court will undertake to determine whether both procedural bars are adequate and independent.

iv. Untimeliness

Habeas petitions filed within 90 days after appellant’s

reply brief on direct appeal was due are entitled to a presumption

of timeliness. In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 780. Past that

point, “in order to avoid the bar of untimeliness, petitioner has

the burden of establishing either (i) absence of substantial

delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, which is “measured from the

time the petitioner or counsel knew, or reasonably should have

known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the

legal basis for the claim,” or (iii) that his claims fall within

an exception to the bar of untimeliness.” In re Robbins, 18

Cal.4th at 784-787 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (The Clark exceptions are: (1) existence of fundamental

constitutional error; (2) lack of fundamental jurisdiction; (3)

acting in excess of all jurisdiction; and (4) change in law).

Even giving Petitioner the widest benefit of the doubt, it

is clear that he is not entitled to a presumption of timeliness. 

In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 780. While it is not clear from the

record if or when Petitioner’s reply brief was filed, it is cerCase 3:07-cv-00533-AJB-WVG Document 41 Filed 04/10/08 Page 26 of 41
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tain that Petitioner was aware of the basis for his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel on December 29, 2005, when the

Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction. (Resp’s Supp. Lodgment

No. 3.) Nonetheless, Petitioner did not file his habeas petition

based on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with the

California Supreme Court until July 19, 2006, over six months

later. (Resp’s Supp. Lodgment No. 11.) 

Petitioner failed to establish absence of substantial

delay, cause for the delay or that his case fell within one of the

four Clark exceptions. “A petitioner bears the burden of establishing, through his or her specific allegations, which may be

supported by any relevant exhibits, the absence of substantial

delay.” In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 780. Petitioner made no

effort to do so in his habeas petition to the California Supreme

Court. (Resp’s Supp. Lodgment No. 11.) Furthermore, the form

habeas petition Petitioner filed in the California Supreme Court

requested information explaining any delay in discovery of the

grounds upon which the claims were brought. (Resp’s Supp. Lodgment

No. 11 at 6.) Petitioner indicated, “The Appellate Counsel declined to investigate the available newly [sic] information of Mr.

Dixon’s Declaration and other grounds that should have been raised

on appeal.” Id. Petitioner’s indication in this regard merely

reasserted his claimed grounds for relief. He did not provide any

justification for his failure to timely raise the issue in a

petition to the California Supreme Court, nor did he allege that

his claim falls within one of the Clark exceptions. Id. 

In sum, the Court finds that Petitioner failed to present

sufficient arguments in his habeas petition to the California

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Supreme Court to avoid the bar of untimeliness. Thus, the citation to In re Clark by the California Supreme Court was a proper

assertion of California’s untimeliness bar. La Crosse, 244 F.3d

at 704-06; In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 780 and 814 n.34; In re

Clark, 5 Cal.4th at 767-68, 797-98. 

v. Successiveness

A petitioner is required to demonstrate due diligence in

presenting claims in a successive petition when they are based on

facts which could have or should have been discovered earlier. In

re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 775. “If a petitioner has reason to suspect

that a basis for habeas corpus relief was available but did nothing to promptly confirm those suspicions, that failure must be

justified.” Id.

Petitioner had ample opportunity to present his claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his first habeas

petition to the California Supreme Court. In that petition he

argued that the appellate court’s denial of his motions to file a

pro se supplemental brief in which he desired to raise issues that

his appellate counsel refused to raise was improper. (Resp’s

Supp. Lodgment No. 7.) Based on the nature of the claim, it is

apparent that Petitioner was aware of his own objections to the

quality of his appellate counsel’s performance. Furthermore, in

his second habeas petition to the California Supreme Court, Petitioner failed to justify his failure to raise the issue in his

first habeas petition to that court. Id. 

Thus, the Court concludes that the citation to In re Clark

by the California Supreme Court was recognition of the successive

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fication for not presenting the claim in his earlier petition. La

Crosse, 244 F.3d at 704-06; In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 780 and

814 n.34; In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th at 767-68, 797-98. Therefore,

the California Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s second

habeas petition was a proper imposition of California’s bar 

against successive petitions.

The Court must now determine whether the procedural bars of

untimeliness and successiveness were “adequate and independent” so

as to support a finding of procedural default in this Court. 

vi. Clark as an Independent Procedural Bar

In Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000),

the Ninth Circuit held that, prior to August 3, 1998, (the date

which the California Supreme Court decided In re Robbins), citation by a California court to In re Clark when denying a federal

habeas claim is not considered adequate and independent grounds

upon which to rest a federal procedural default. The Park Court

had no occasion to reach the issue with which this Court is now

faced, whether citation to that case after In re Robbins was

decided constitute adequate and independent grounds to support a

procedural default. However, in Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573

(9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit determined that invocation of

California’s untimeliness bar after August 3, 1998, satisfied the

“independent” prong of a procedural default analysis. Id. at 581. 

 In the present case, the rationale applied in finding the

untimeliness bar to be independent of federal law is equally

applicable to the successive petition bar. In re Robbins, 18

Cal.4th at 788 n. 9 (indicating the court intends to strictly and

regularly follow the bar on successive petitions and require

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explanation for delay as set forth in In re Clark and stating that

“Clark serves to notify habeas corpus litigants that we shall

apply the successiveness rule when we are faced with a petitioner

whose prior petition was filed after the date of finality of

Clark.”); In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th at 775 (“if a petitioner had

reason to suspect that a basis for habeas corpus relief was available, but did nothing to promptly confirm those suspicions, that

failure must be justified. . . . With the exception of petitions

which allege facts demonstrating that a fundamental miscarriage of

justice has occurred . . . unjustified successive petitions will

not be entertained on their merits”); Bennett, 322 F.3d at 581-582

(application of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception

set forth in In re Clark is independent of federal law).

Accordingly, the citation to In re Clark here is an application of an “independent” procedural bar. However, Bennett

remanded to the district court for a determination whether the

rule was consistently applied so as to satisfy the “adequate”

prong, and assigned the State the ultimate burden of demonstrating

adequacy. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 583. Thus, the Court must determine whether Respondent has carried his burden of demonstrating

that the imposition of the In re Clark bar satisfies the “adequate” prong of the procedural default analysis.

“A state procedural rule constitutes an adequate bar to

federal court review if it was ‘firmly established and regularly

followed’ at the time it was applied by the state court.” Poland

v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1999), quoting Ford v.

Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991). In re Robbins made clear that,

after August 3, 1998, the California Supreme Court would apply the

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untimeliness bar only after determining that the petitioner had

failed to establish the absence of substantial delay or good cause

for the delay, and that none of the four In re Clark exceptions

applied. In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 811-12 and 814 n. 32; see

also, In re Harris, 5 Cal.4th at 825 n. 3 and 825-841 (setting

forth the four In re Clark exceptions as (1) existence of fundamental constitutional error; (2) lack of jurisdiction; (3) acting

in excess of jurisdiction; and (4) change in law). The California

Supreme Court also has made clear in In re Robbins that successive

petitions filed after In re Clark was decided, with the exception

of petitions which allege facts demonstrating that a fundamental

miscarriage of justice has occurred, will not be entertained on

their merits unless the delay is justified. In re Robbins, 18

Cal.4th at 787 n.9; In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th at 775, 797-98. A

petition based on recently discovered facts is not justified if

the facts could or should have been discovered earlier and petitioner fails to demonstrate due diligence. In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th

at 775.

The record in this case supports a finding that, with

respect to Ground Three, the California Supreme Court followed its

own dictates as expressed in In re Robbins and In re Clark. The

Court finds that, at the time it was applied, on February 7, 2007,

well after In re Robbins and In re Clark were decided, following a

delay of over a six months without adequate explanation regarding

why the issue was not presented in the first habeas petition,

California’s untimeliness bar and its bar on successive petitions,

as they were applied here, were “firmly established.” Poland, 169

F.3d at 577; In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 788 n.9, 811-12, 814 n.

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34; In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th at 774-775.

However, in addition to being “firmly established” a state

procedural bar must also be “regularly followed” to support a

procedural default. Poland, 169 F.3d at 577. The Ninth Circuit

stated in Bennett that:

[W]e conclude that the ultimate burden of proving the

adequacy of the California state bar is upon the

State of California. . . . Once the state has

adequately pled the existence of an independent and

adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative

defense, the burden to place that defense in issue

shifts to the petitioner. The petitioner may satisfy

this burden by asserting specific factual allegations

that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating

inconsistent application of the rule. Once having

done so, however, the ultimate burden is the state’s.

Bennett, 322 F.3d at 585-586.

The Court finds that Petitioner has not carried his burden

of demonstrating that California’s untimeliness bar or bar on

successive petitions is not regularly followed. Thus, the burden

has not shifted back to Respondent. Id.

Having found that the imposition of the procedural bars by

the California Supreme Court is adequate and independent, the

Court concludes that Ground Three is procedurally defaulted. The

Court may still reach the merits of Ground Three if Petitioner can

establish cause and prejudice, or if a fundamental miscarriage of

justice will occur by this Court’s failure to reach the merits of

the claim. Park, 202 F.3d at 1150.

vii. Cause

The cause prong can be satisfied if Petitioner demonstrates

some “objective factor” that precluded him from raising his claims

in state court, such as interference by state officials or constitutionally ineffective counsel. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,

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493-94 (1991). In Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000),

the Supreme Court stated: 

Although we have not identified with precision exactly what constitutes “cause” to excuse a procedural

default, we have acknowledged that in certain circumstances counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing properly

to preserve the claim for review in state court will

suffice. [Murry v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89

(1986)] Not just any deficiency in counsel’s performance will do, however; the assistance must have been

so ineffective as to violate the Federal Constitution. Ibid. In other words, ineffective assistance

adequate to establish cause for the procedural default of some other constitutional claim is itself an

independent constitutional claim. And we held in

Carrier that the principles of comity and federalism

that underlie our longstanding exhaustion doctrinethen as now codified in the federal habeas statute,

see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b), (c)-require that constitutional claim, like others, to be first raised in

state court. “(A) claim of ineffective assistance,”

we said, generally must “be presented to the state

courts as an independent claim before it may be used

to establish cause for a procedural default.” Carrier, supra, at 289, 106 S. Ct. 2693.

Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451-52. 

Petitioner has not presented a separate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to advise him of

his rights or failure to raise that issue. Even to the extent a

liberal construction of his pleadings in this case and in the

state court would allow the Court to read his pleadings as presenting a claim of ineffective assistance on this basis, that

claim is procedurally defaulted for the same reasons discussed

above. Thus, Petitioner cannot demonstrate cause based on his

trial or appellate attorney’s performance. Edwards, 529 U.S. at

453. Furthermore, Petitioner’s does not make any attempt to

establish cause in his Petition to this Court. As such, the Court

finds that Petitioner has not demonstrated cause to excuse the

default. Id. at 451-53.

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viii. Prejudice

To establish prejudice in the context of overcoming a

procedural default, Petitioner must show not merely that the

claimed errors created a possibility of prejudice, but that they

worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his

case with “error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v.

Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). “Prejudice is actual harm resulting from the alleged error.” Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d

613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998).

Petitioner was not harmed by his counsel’s refusal to raise

these six claim on appeal because, even on the merits, these

claims would not afford Petitioner the relief he requests. The

standard for assessing IAC claims was established in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d

1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that Strickland “has long been

clearly established federal law determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States”). According to Strickland, for Petitioner to

succeed on an IAC claim, he would need show both incompetence of

counsel and prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.

 Incompetency means counsel’s performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688. However,

judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance should be highly deferential. Id. at 689. There is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.” Id. at 686-87. Furthermore, where the IAC claim is

based on appellate counsel’s failure to raise viable issues in a

merits brief, a petitioner’s burden is even higher. Smith v.

Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000). In such cases it is more

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difficult for a petitioner to establish that appellate counsel was

incompetent because “only when ignored issues are clearly stronger

than those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance

of counsel be overcome.” Id. (citing Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644,

646 (7th Cir. 1986). 

For IAC claims, prejudice means that “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Fretwell v.

Lockhart, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). With respect to claims of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this means that a

petitioner must demonstrate that he would have prevailed on appeal

absent counsel’s errors. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285 (2000) (citing

Smith, 477 U.S. at 535-36).

Petitioner first claims that it was error for his appellate

counsel to refuse to raise an issue with the trial court’s denial

of Petitioner’s request for advisory counsel at the preliminary

hearing. (Petition at 25.) However, any claim of, or refusal to,

appoint advisory counsel fails to state a constitutional claim

because there is no constitutional right to advisory counsel. 

Locks v. Sumner, 703 F.2d 403, 407-408 (9th Cir. 1983). Thus, it

was well within the trial court’s discretion to refuse to appoint

advisory counsel. Since there is no merit to the claim, Petitioner’s counsel cannot be deemed incompetent for refusing to

raise it as an issue on appeal. Furthermore, no prejudice resulted because the claim would not have been successful even if

Petitioner’s counsel had raised the issue in his merits brief. 

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Petitioner next contends that his appellate counsel should

have challenged the trial court’s rulings related to third party

culpability evidence Petitioner sought to introduce at an evidentiary hearing on November 12, 2003. Id. (Petition at 28.) Petitioner does not cite to the record to identify specifically to

which ruling he objects. Petitioner does not argue how the trial

court’s rulings violated his Constitutional protections. There is

no indication whatsoever that the trial court made any impermissible rulings on that date. Thus, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not overcome the presumption of competency because he

has not demonstrated that this was a viable issue on appeal. 

Petitioner also contends that his appellate counsel should

have presented argument with regard to the untimely disclosure of

evidence related to Patricia’s credibility; specifically the

report note discussed previously in Ground One. However, as

discussed previously, Petitioner’s arguments regarding the negative impact of untimely disclosure of the report note on his trial

are unpersuasive. Furthermore, even had Petitioner’s counsel

raised the untimely disclosure of the report note as an issue in

his merits brief, the Court of Appeal’s decision would most likely

not have been any different. Since both notes were discovered at

the same time, the Court of Appeal could have rejected the claim

for the same reason it rejected the untimely disclosure of the

consent note. That is, Petitioner had ample opportunity to request

relief from the trial court had this been an issue he felt would

significantly impact his trial. Thus, the Court finds that the

prejudice prong under Strickland has not been met. 

Petitioner next contends that his appellate counsel should

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have challenged the adequacy of police investigation of the crimes

of which Petitioner was charged. (Petition at 32.) Petitioner

argues that his counsel should have raised the issue on appeal

because the “shoddy” police investigation impacted his due process

right to a fair trial. Id. Petitioner’s appellate counsel explained why he did not raise this as an issue in a letter he wrote

to Petitioner on November 18, 2004. (Resp’s Supp. Lodgment No. 11

at Exhibit E.) In that letter, he told Petitioner that the cases

Petitioner would rely upon do not stand for the proposition that

the police have an obligation to “make extraordinary efforts to

investigate the case, just that they cannot destroy or lose evidence once they have obtained it.” Id. Even assuming that the

police investigation was “shoddy,” Petitioner cites no authority

which would lead the Court to conclude that the police had a duty

to investigate the crimes more thoroughly than they did. Consequently, the Court finds that Petitioner has not overcome the

presumption of competency with respect to this issue. 

Petitioner also argues that his appellate counsel should

have challenged the Prosecutor’s “deliberate concealment” 

of the address of potential witness Robert Rohena from Petitioner. 

(Petition at 35.) He argues that because of the Prosecutor’s

concealment, he was unable to subpoena Mr. Rohena for the purpose

of attacking Patricia’s credibility. However, as with the previous issue, Petitioner cites no authority that prosecutors have a

duty to investigate the location of potential defense witnesses. 

Furthermore, even if such a duty existed, Petitioner has made no

showing that had the issue been raised on appeal, the result of

the proceeding would have been different. Thus, the Court conCase 3:07-cv-00533-AJB-WVG Document 41 Filed 04/10/08 Page 37 of 41
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cludes that neither of the Strickland prongs have been met with

respect to this issue.

Lastly, Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel

should have conducted an investigation on newly discovered evidence in support of a habeas petition or to assist in filing such

a petition. Specifically, Petitioner argues that in September

2004, he discovered a man by the name of Richard Dixon who recalled being present in the area on the night in question and who

provided a declaration about Patricia’s “bizarre sexual activities”. Petitioner brought this information to his appellate

counsel who refused to investigate the matter or file a petition

for writ of habeas corpus in the state courts based on this newly

discovered information. In his November 18, 2004 letter to Petitioner, Petitioner’s appellate counsel stated that:

I can only file a petition for writ of habeas corpus if

one is necessary to present an arguably meritorious

issue based on matters outside of the record. While I

have not yet made a definitive decision that no such

issues exist, I do not see how Mr. Dixon’s declaration

would provide a basis for obtaining relief. First, the

declaration fails to explain why Dixon was not called

as a witness during the trial. Absent a solid reason

why he could not have been called at that time, it is

highly unlikely that the appellate court would even

consider the substance of his declaration. However,

even if the court were to consider the substance, I do

not see how it would support any viable issues.

(Resp’s Supp. Lodgment No. 11 at Exhibit E.) 

Petitioner does not argue or explain how appellate

counsel’s above rationale is invalid. Furthermore, even if

there was a chance that Petitioner might have won his appeal

on this issue, the issue is not stronger than either of the

two issues Petitioner’s counsel actually did raise on appeal. 

Thus, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not overcome

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the presumption of competency with respect to this issue.

In sum, since none of Petitioners IAC claims would

have succeeded on the merits under the Strickland standard,

the Court concludes that Petitioner is unable to overcome the

procedural default on the basis of prejudice.

ix. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

The Court may also reach the merits of Ground Three

if Petitioner can demonstrate that the failure of the Court

to reach the merits of his claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

The Supreme Court has limited the “miscarriage of

justice” exception to habeas petitioners who can show that “a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513

U.S. 298, 327 (1995). “Actual innocence” means factual

innocence, not merely legal insufficiency; a mere showing of

reasonable doubt is not enough. See Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d

373, 379 (9th Cir. 1997). To show actual innocence, Petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. Id. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate

actual innocence, as there was overwhelming evidence of guilt

adduced at trial, most significantly, Patricia’s accusatory

testimony, coupled the DNA match between Petitioner and the

semen found in Patricia’s vagina. (Resp’s Supp. Lodgment No.

3 at 4.)

Therefore, the Court concludes that Petitioner is

unable to overcome the procedural default on the basis of the

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existence of a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

x. Conclusion

Based on the forgoing, the Court finds that Ground

Three is procedurally defaulted, that Petitioner has failed

to demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse the default, and

that no fundamental miscarriage of justice would result in

the Court’s failure to consider the merits of the claim. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends that habeas relief be

denied as to Ground Three. 

Alternately, to the extent the Court could reach the

merits of Ground Three, the Court finds that Petitioner is

not entitled to habeas relief for the reasons set forth

above. 

V.CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the

undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED with prejudice.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned

Magistrate judge is submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than May 9, 2008, any

party to this action may file written objections with the

court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties

no later than May 23, 2008. The parties are advised that

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failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991).

DATED: April 10, 2008

Hon. Leo S. Papas

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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