Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01599/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01599-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1 

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOHN SCOTT MCCLINTOCK, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

GENA JONES, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:24-cv-01599 TLN AC P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Currently pending before the court is respondent’s motion to 

dismiss the petition. ECF No. 11. Petitioner has filed an opposition and respondent has filed a 

reply. ECF Nos. 13, 15. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends granting 

respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

I. Factual and Procedural History 

On January 9, 2003, petitioner was sentenced to two indeterminate terms of 15 years to 

life to be served consecutively to one another following his conviction in the San Diego Superior 

Court on eight counts of lewd or lascivious acts with a child under fourteen.1 ECF No. 11 at 10-

14. His habeas corpus application, however, challenges petitioner’s June 18, 2023 prison 

1

 Petitioner was also sentenced to additional determinate and indeterminate terms, but they were 

all ordered to be served concurrently. ECF No. 11 at 10-14. 

Case 2:24-cv-01599-TLN-AC Document 18 Filed 11/15/24 Page 1 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2 

disciplinary violation for possession of alcohol, which resulted in a 30 day loss of privileges.2 

ECF No. 1 at 1. In his habeas application, petitioner asserts that his disciplinary hearing was a 

sham and violated his due process rights, and the false disciplinary charge constitutes cruel and 

unusual punishment because it impacts his chances of being found suitable for parole. By way of 

relief, petitioner requests that the administrative grievance related to his disciplinary conviction 

be granted, the disciplinary violation be reversed, his good time credits be restored, and his 

central prison file be corrected. ECF No. 1 at 22. 

II. Motion to Dismiss 

In a motion to dismiss filed on August 26, 2024, respondent asserts that petitioner’s 

claims for relief are not cognizable in this federal habeas action because success on his claims 

would not implicate the fact or duration of his confinement.3

 ECF No. 11 at 6 (citing Nettles v. 

Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). According to respondent, since 

petitioner’s actual release date will be determined by the California Board of Parole Hearings, the 

reversal of the prison disciplinary violation will not necessarily result in petitioner’s speedier 

release from confinement. Therefore, respondent ask the court to dismiss the habeas petition for 

failing to present a cognizable claim for relief. See Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases. 

In opposition to the motion, petitioner asserts that he does state a cognizable habeas claim 

because he is being denied early consideration for elderly parole as a result of his disciplinary 

violation. Petitioner also submitted evidence that the Board of Parole Hearings denied his 

petition to advance his next parole suitability hearing based on this disciplinary violation. ECF 

No. 13 at 13-16. According to petitioner’s evidence, he met the criteria for the Elderly Parole 

Program as of September 6, 2021. ECF No. 13 at 14. 

2

 Neither petitioner nor respondent actually submitted a copy of the Rules Violation Report 

(“RVR”) that is challenged in this case. Therefore, there is no indication in the record that 

petitioner lost any good time credit as a result of the disciplinary violation. Petitioner alleges that 

he was denied phone and visitation privileges after the guilty finding. 

3

 In the interests of judicial economy, the court limits its discussion to this dispositive issue and 

does not address respondent’s remaining arguments in the motion to dismiss. 

Case 2:24-cv-01599-TLN-AC Document 18 Filed 11/15/24 Page 2 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3 

By way of reply, respondent points out that petitioner’s first parole suitability hearing was 

scheduled for September 2022, but petitioner voluntarily waived that hearing for one year. ECF 

No. 15 at 2 (citing California Incarcerated Records & Information Search (CIRIS) – CDCR, 

available at https://ciris.mt.cdcr.ca.gov/details?cdcrNumber=T79940 (last visited Nov. 14, 2024). 

Based on this information, respondent argues that the 2023 disciplinary violation did not delay his 

elderly parole consideration. Moreover, expunging the violation would not necessarily lead to his 

earlier release on parole. 

After respondent’s reply was filed, petitioner filed a motion to stay these proceedings in 

order to exhaust his state court remedies. ECF No. 16. In the motion, petitioner “agrees that the 

State of California’s Highest Court must have the opportunity to respond.” ECF No. 16 at 1. 

III. Legal Standards 

Claims in a federal habeas petition must lie at the core of habeas corpus in order to 

proceed. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973); Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 

931 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 580 U.S. 1063 (2017). Specifically, habeas 

jurisdiction extends only to claims challenging the validity or actual duration of a prisoner’s 

confinement. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004); Dominguez v. Kernan, 906 F.3d 

1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). This requirement is readily met when a prisoner challenges his 

conviction or sentence. When the challenge is to internal prison disciplinary proceedings, 

however, habeas jurisdiction exists only if success on petitioner's claims would necessarily result 

in his speedier release from custody. Nettles, 830 F.3d at 934-35; see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 

334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Ninth Circuit has found habeas jurisdiction lacking where a California petitioner was 

serving an indeterminate sentence and had not been found suitable for parole. Nettles, 830 F.3d 

at 934-35. In such circumstances, expungement of disciplinary violations and restoration of 

credits might increase the likelihood of a future grant of parole, but would not guarantee parole or 

otherwise “necessarily result in speedier release” under state law. Id. 

IV. Analysis 

As explained above, this court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s habeas challenge to 

Case 2:24-cv-01599-TLN-AC Document 18 Filed 11/15/24 Page 3 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4 

his 2023 disciplinary violation only if relief would lead to his speedier release from confinement. 

See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 525 & n.13 (2011) (emphasizing that federal habeas 

jurisdiction lies only where the success on a claim would “necessarily spell speedier release from 

prison”) (internal quotations omitted). In this case, there is no indication in the record that the 

challenged disciplinary violation even led to a loss of good time credit. Petitioner indicates only 

that he lost certain privileges. Because petitioner is serving an indeterminate life sentence, and 

has not previously been found suitable for parole and granted a concrete release date, this 

disciplinary violation has only a speculative effect on the ultimate duration of his incarceration. 

See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 935 (explaining that because future parole suitability decisions turn on 

multiple factors, “the presence of a disciplinary infraction does not compel the denial of parole, 

nor does the absence of an infraction compel the grant of parole.”); see also Neal v. Shimoda, 131 

F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that relief which would improve prospects for future 

parole eligibility does not “guarantee parole or necessarily shorten... prison sentences by a single 

day.”). Petitioner’s specific argument regarding eligibility for elderly parole is not supported by 

the record. Petitioner was eligible for elderly parole prior to receiving the disciplinary violation, 

yet it was not granted. For all these reasons, petitioner’s challenge to his 2023 disciplinary 

violation falls outside the core of federal habeas corpus.4 Accordingly, the undersigned 

recommends granting respondent’s motion to dismiss.5 

4

 The Ninth Circuit adopted the “core of habeas” standard articulated in Skinner v. Switzer, 562 

U.S. 521 (2011), because it did “not require... guess[ing] at the discretionary decisions of state 

officials in order to determine whether an action sounds in habeas or § 1983....” Nettles v. 

Grounds, 830 F.3d at 934. 

5

 The court recognizes its discretion to convert petitioner’s § 2254 application to a § 1983 action, 

however, it declines to exercise its discretion in this case. See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d at 

936 (stating that “a district court may construe a petition for habeas corpus to plead a cause of 

action under § 1983 after notifying and obtaining informed consent from the prisoner”). 

However, provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) complicate a court’s 

decision to recharacterize a habeas petition as a civil rights complaint. Due to the PLRA's filing 

fee requirements, its provisions requiring sua sponte screening of complaints, and its limits on the 

number of actions a prisoner may be permitted to file in forma pauperis, a prisoner should not be 

obligated to proceed with a civil rights action unless he or she clearly expresses a desire to do so. 

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Instead, it is recommended that the habeas 

corpus petition be dismissed without prejudice to filing a § 1983 action should petitioner choose 

to do so. 

Case 2:24-cv-01599-TLN-AC Document 18 Filed 11/15/24 Page 4 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5 

Based on this recommendation, petitioner’s motion for a stay of these proceedings in 

order to exhaust his state court remedies is moot. The undersigned therefore recommends 

denying petitioner’s motion for a stay. 

V. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party 

Since petitioner is acting as his own attorney in this case, the court wants to make sure 

that the words of this order are understood. The following information is meant to explain this 

order in plain English and is not intended as legal advice. 

The court has reviewed the motion to dismiss and your opposition, and concludes that the 

challenge to your disciplinary conviction is not something you can present in a habeas petition. It 

is recommended that your petition be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a federal civil 

rights action. 

If you disagree with this recommendation, you have 21 days to file a written explanation 

why it is wrong. Label your explanation as “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” The district judge assigned to your case will review any objections and 

make the final decision. 

CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11) be granted. 

2. Petitioner’s motion for a stay (ECF No. 16) be denied as moot. 

3. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be dismissed without 

prejudice to refiling as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” In his objections petitioner 

may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue in the event he files an appeal of 

the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (the district 

Case 2:24-cv-01599-TLN-AC Document 18 Filed 11/15/24 Page 5 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6 

court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the 

applicant). Where, as here, a habeas petition is dismissed on procedural grounds, a certificate of 

appealability “should issue if the prisoner can show: (1) ‘that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling;’ and (2) ‘that jurists of 

reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right.’” Morris v. Woodford, 229 F.3d 775, 780 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Any response to the objections shall be served and filed 

within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: November 15, 2024 

Case 2:24-cv-01599-TLN-AC Document 18 Filed 11/15/24 Page 6 of 6