Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01342/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01342-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARMANDO TINAJERO,

CDCR No. AX-3761

Plaintiff,

v.

RAYMOND MADDEN; L. MARIN,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-01342-BAS-BGS

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; 

and

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

Plaintiff Armando Tinajero (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Centinela State 

Prison located in Imperial, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights 

complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff did not prepay 

the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he filed his Complaint; instead, 

he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a). (ECF No. 4.) 

I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

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United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the 

entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See 

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the plaintiff is a 

prisoner and he is granted leave to proceed IFP, he remains obligated to pay the full 

entire fee in “increments,” see Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), 

regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & 

(2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”), prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the 

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the . . . six-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 

King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the 

Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the 

account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the 

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then 

collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any 

month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the 

Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 4) and assesses 

no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 balance 

of the filing fee owed must be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant

to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

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The PLRA obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons 

proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any 

facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of 

criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or 

diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any 

complaint, or any portion of a complaint, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a 

claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether 

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

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§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n. 7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of 

the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations” are not “sufficient to 

withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

1. Individual Liability and Causation

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains virtually no factual allegations as to who violated 

his constitutional rights and contains no “further factual enhancement” which describes 

how, or to what extent, any individual became aware of, or were actually aware of, 

alleged constitutional violations. “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . §1983 

suits, a plaintiff must plead that each government-official defendant, through the 

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; 

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see also Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 

(9th Cir. 1984) (even pro se plaintiff must “allege with at least some degree of 

particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in” in order to state a claim). 

“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.” Estate of Brooks 

v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999). “The inquiry into causation must 

be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual 

defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional 

deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988), citing Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). 

Instead of supplying specific factual allegations with regard to either Defendant, 

Plaintiff refers to the exhibits attached to his Complaint. Plaintiff does claim, in general 

terms, that Defendant Marin “knew of his violations” and Defendant Madden “is aware 

of acts of this capacity” but offers no other specifics. (Compl. at 2.) As such, Plaintiff’s 

allegations are insufficient to state a section 1983 claim. Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 678 (noting 

that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation,” and that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is 

plausible on its face.’”), quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570).

C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims

Based on the Exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint, it appears that he may be 

attempting to allege due process violations based on the manner in which the Defendants 

handled and responded to his administrative grievances. While the Fourteenth 

Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 

property, without due process of law,” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, “[t]he requirements 

of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 

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408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may grant prisoners 

liberty or property interests sufficient to invoke due process protection. Meachum v. 

Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, to state a procedural due process claim, 

Plaintiff must allege: “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a 

deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] (3) lack of process.” Wright v. 

Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that inmates have no property interest protected by the 

Due Process Clause in an inmate grievance procedure. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 

850, 869 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a 

specific prison grievance procedure”) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 

1988) (finding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment creates “no 

legitimate claim of entitlement to a [prison] grievance procedure”)). Even the nonexistence of, or the failure of prison officials to properly implement, an administrative 

appeals process within the prison system does not raise constitutional concerns. Mann, 

855 F.2d at 640; see also Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993).

In this matter, Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts sufficient to show that 

Defendants deprived him of a protected liberty interest by allegedly failing to respond to 

any particular prison grievance in a satisfactory manner. While a liberty interest can arise 

from state law or prison regulations, Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223-27, due process 

protections are implicated only if Plaintiff alleges facts to show that Defendants: (1) 

restrained his freedom in a manner not expected from his sentence, and (2) “impose[d] 

atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 

life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Here, Plaintiff pleads no facts to 

suggest how Defendants’ allegedly inadequate review or failure to consider inmate 

grievances restrained his freedom in any way, or subjected him to any “atypical” and 

“significant hardship.” Id. at 483-84.

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D. Respondeat Superior

Based on the minimal allegations as to Warden Madden, it appears that Plaintiff is 

seeking to hold him liable for constitutional violations based on his supervisory status. 

However, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no “factual contact” describing Madden’s direct 

involvement in Plaintiff’s claims which would “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the [Warden] is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

“All § 1983 claims must be premised on a constitutional violation.” Nurre v. 

Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009). To state a claim, Plaintiff must 

demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his 

constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 673; Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1070 

(9th Cir. 2014). Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the acts or 

omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

672-673; Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Instead, supervisors may be held liable only if they 

“participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to 

prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 

625 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011).

Because Plaintiff fails to allege any “factual matter” to suggest how or to what 

extent Defendant Madden personally participated in Plaintiff’s situation, his Complaint 

“fails to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and his 

claims against Defendant Madden must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

and § 1915A(b).

Accordingly, for all the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Complaint requires 

dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 

1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

III. Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons, the Court: 

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1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 4).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and GRANTS

him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an Amended 

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his original pleading. 

Defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard 

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading 

supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

5. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a 

blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983” for his use in amending. 

//

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//

//

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 2, 2016

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