Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02282/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02282-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1402 Medical Malpractice

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-1- 06cv2282

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NAHIR RAMOS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06-CV-2282 W (CAB)

ORDER GRANTING

MOTION TO DISMISS

v.

THOMAS J. MARCISZ, M.D., David

J. Oblon, M.D., and Tri-City Medical

Center,

Defendants.

On October 11, 2006, Plaintiff Nahir Ramos filed a complaint alleging four claims

against the defendants arising out of a hospital stay in October 2005. Defendant TriCity Medical Center (Tri-City), the hospital, filed a motion to dismiss the entire

complaint, or in the alternative, two of the individual claims. The court decides the

motion on the papers submitted and without oral argument. Civ. L.R. 7.1(d(1)).

Because Ramos failed to present the claim to Tri-City, a public entity, or obtain a court

order excusing the failure, the court will GRANT the motion to dismiss the complaint.

Case 3:06-cv-02282-W-CAB Document 16 Filed 02/06/07 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-2- 06cv2282

I. Legal Standards

Under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), the court may dismiss a cause of action for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the claim’s sufficiency. See N. Star Int’l. v. Ariz.

Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the

court assumes the truth of all factual allegations and construes them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002).

The court may dismiss if it “appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Levine v. Diamanthuset,

Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45–46 (1957)).

To determine the sufficiency of a claim based on state law, a federal court

exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive law of that state. Erie R.R.

Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). In California, no one may sue a public entity

without first complying with Title 1, Part 3 of the Government Code, section 900 et seq.

Ordinarily, a plaintiff either timely presents the claim under section 911.2, or obtains

leave to present a late claim under section 911.4. Then, the plaintiff must wait 45 days

from either the presentation date or the date the board grants leave to present a late

claim. Thereafter, section 945.4 allows the plaintiff to sue only if the board (i) rejects

all or part of the claim, or fails to act on the claim (deemed a total rejection under

section 912.4(c)); or (ii) denies leave to present a late claim, or fails to act within 45

days (deemed a denial under 911.6(c)).

If the plaintiff neither timely presents the claim, nor obtains leave to present a

late claim, a court may relieve the plaintiff of the claim-presentation requirement. The

plaintiff must petition the court within six months after the board denies or fails to act.

If the court grants the petition, the plaintiff must file the complaint within 30 days.

Thus, to state a cause of action under California law, the plaintiff must allege

compliance with Title 1, Part 3. Failure to allege compliance, or circumstances excusing

Case 3:06-cv-02282-W-CAB Document 16 Filed 02/06/07 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-3- 06cv2282

compliance, subjects the complaint to a general demurrer—i.e., it fails to state facts

sufficient to constitute a cause of action. State v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 4th 1234,

1243 (2004). In other words, the claim-presentation requirement is an indispensable

element of any tort claim against a public entity under California law. See id.

Therefore, in federal court, a plaintiff cannot survive a 12(b)(6) motion without alleging

presentation (ordinary or late) or relief (by court order).

II. Discussion

Ramos does not allege that she validly presented the claim or obtained a court

order excusing the failure. She alleges only that she transmitted a notice of intent to sue

a health care provider (¶ 15), that Tri-City twice “erroneously” rejected her claim (¶¶

15–16), and that she commenced a petition with the San Diego Superior Court to

obtain an order relieving her of the claim-presentation requirement (¶ 17).

By her own admission, then, Ramos transmitted a notice—not a claim—on June

30, 2006, more than six months after the decedent’s hospital stay in October 2005.

Thus, she tacitly admits that she has not timely presented a claim. Contrary to her

assertions, characterizing the rejection of her tardy notice as “erroneous” does not

change the result because it was still tardy. Thereafter, Ramos failed to obtain leave to

present a late claim, and has yet to obtain an order excusing her failure.

Consequently, Ramos has not stated a cause of action under California law. She

quotes several outdated cases in an attempt to convince the court otherwise. For

example, she argues that “compliance with the tort claims act is a procedural

prerequisite; it neither creates, nor is an element of a cause of action for tort against a

government entity,” citing Bahten v. County of Merced, 59 Cal. App. 3d 101, 107

(1976). She further argues that “compliance with the tort claims prerequisites, being

merely a procedural predicate to suit and not an element of a cause of action, need not

be alleged in the [c]omplaint,” citing Bell v. Tri-City Hospital District, 196 Cal. App.

3d 438, 444 (1987).

Case 3:06-cv-02282-W-CAB Document 16 Filed 02/06/07 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-4- 06cv2282

She is wrong. In State v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1244 (2004), the

California Supreme Court specifically disapproved of these very statements in Bahten and

Bell. They are no longer good law for the point Ramos argues. Further, the cases that

survived State v. Superior Court involved either a timely claim or a successful petition

for leave to present a late claim (either directly from the board or by court order). See

id. at 1243–44. No California case has ever permitted a tort claim against a public entity

to survive a demurrer under these circumstances. Thus, Ramos’s claims cannot survive

a 12(b)(6) motion either. See id.

To reiterate, Ramos’s pending petition in Superior Court to present a late claim

does not satisfy the claim-presentation element. In Bell, for example, the plaintiffs,

William and Lillian Bell, amended their complaint to add that they had successfully

petitioned the court under section 946.6. Only then did the defendant demur. Tri City

argued that the Bells filed their suit too soon—before the thirty-day period commencing

on the date the court granted the petition for relief, as section 946.6(f) provides. Bell,

196 Cal. App. 3d at 442. To dismiss at that point would indeed have elevated form over

substance, because Tri-City was on notice of the suit and failed to demur until after the

Bells’ complaint alleged relief from the claim-presentation requirement. As State v.

Superior Court recognizes, Bell’s holding is entirely consistent with the rule that a

plaintiff must either present the claim (timely or late) or obtain relief under section

946.6.

Further, because all four causes of action sound in tort, the court will dismiss all

counts against Tri-City in their entirety and need not address Tri-City’s other two

arguments. The court will not grant leave to amend the complaint because Ramos

admits that the Superior Court has not granted her pending petition, and the Superior

Court may never grant that petition. Thus, no amendment can cure the fatal defect in

her complaint against Tri-City without further action from the Superior Court.

///

///

Case 3:06-cv-02282-W-CAB Document 16 Filed 02/06/07 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-5- 06cv2282

III. Conclusion

The court hereby GRANTS Tri-City’s motion to dismiss, DENIES leave to

amend the complaint against Tri-City, and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE all

claims against Tri-City in their entirety. The Clerk shall dismiss Tri-City as a defendant

in this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 6, 2007

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-02282-W-CAB Document 16 Filed 02/06/07 Page 5 of 5