Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-55079/USCOURTS-ca9-13-55079-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM C. COHEN, an individual,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CULVER CITY; EXCHANGE

CLUB OF CULVER CITY, a California

corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-55079

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-00156-

RGK-PJW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 2, 2013—Pasadena, California

Filed June 6, 2014

Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, Kim McLane Wardlaw,

and Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw;

Dissent by Judge Rawlinson

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 1 of 25
2 COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY

SUMMARY*

Americans with Disabilities Act

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district

court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants on

claims under Title II the Americans with Disabilities Act and

related California statutes.

The plaintiff, an elderly man suffering from dementia

who required a cane for mobility, was injured when he

tripped and fell as he tried to walk around a car show

vendor’s display blocking a curb ramp that provided disabled

access to a sidewalk in Culver City, California. The plaintiff

claimed that the City violated its obligations under Title II of

the ADA by allowing the vendor’s display to completely

block the curb ramp, impeding disabled access to the public

sidewalk, and by failing to post signs identifying alternative

disabled access routes.

The panel held that there was a genuine dispute of

material fact as to whether the City denied the plaintiff access

to the sidewalk by reason of his disability. It held that the

district court erred in reasoning that because the plaintiff

could have accessed the sidewalk by taking a “marginally

longer route” to a different curb ramp, he failed to establish

that he was denied access to the sidewalk, because this

standard applies when a public entity is modifying existing

facilities to achieve ADA compliance under 28 C.F.R.

§ 35.150. Here, by contrast, the City was in compliance with

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 2 of 25
COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY 3

the ADA but allowed elimination of the disabled access it had

built. The panel concluded that the City’s conduct was more

analogous to altering its sidewalks for reasons unrelated to

ADA compliance, as contemplated by 28 C.F.R. § 35.151.

The panel reversed the judgment of the district court as to

the plaintiff’s claims against the City. It addressed claims

against another defendant in an accompanying memorandum

disposition.

Judge Rawlinson dissented from the portion of the

majority’s opinion reversing the district court’s summary

judgment in favor of the City on the plaintiff’s claims under

the ADA and related California statutes. She agreed with the

district court that there was no showing that the plaintiff was

excluded from accessing the public sidewalk because two

available access routes existed when viewing the sidewalk in

its entirety.

COUNSEL

Doreen L. Kushner (argued), Law Office of Doreen L.

Kushner, Huntington Beach, California, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Byron Michael Purcell (argued) and Rupert Byrdsong, Ivie,

McNeill & Wyatt, Los Angeles, California, for DefendantsAppellees.

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 3 of 25
4 COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY

OPINION

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

William Cohen, an elderly man suffering from dementia

who requires a cane for mobility, walked through an outdoor

car show on public streets while in Culver City, California, to

attend his grandson’s wedding. A vendor’s display at the car

show blocked the curb ramp that provided disabled access to

the sidewalk in front of Cohen’s hotel. Cohen was injured

when he tripped and fell as he tried to walk around the

display and step up on to the sidewalk.

Cohen filed this action against the City of Culver City

(“the City”) and the Exchange Club of Culver City (“the

ECCC”), alleging violations of the federal Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 and various California

statutes.1 He appeals the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of the defendants. We must decide

whether the Citymay have violated its obligations under Title

II of the ADA by allowing the vendor’s display to completely

block the curb ramp, impeding disabled access to the public

sidewalk, and by failing to post signs identifying alternative

disabled access routes. We conclude that a genuine dispute

of material fact exists as to whether the City denied Cohen

access to the sidewalk by reason of his disability, and,

accordingly, we reverse in part and remand.

1 We address Cohen’s claims against the ECCC under the DPA and the

Unruh Act in an unpublishedmemorandumdisposition accompanying this

opinion.

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 4 of 25
COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY 5

I.

Cohen, a Florida resident, visited Culver City in May

2011 to attend his grandson’s wedding. He stayed at the

Culver Hotel in downtown Culver City. Four years earlier,

Cohen had been diagnosed with moderate dementia. He

subsequently suffered from declining cognitive function and

poor balance. In February 2011, Cohen was reevaluated by

his physician. He exhibited increased difficulty with his

balance and lower than expected learning and memory scores.

On May 7, 2011, the City and the ECCC sponsored their

annual car show on the public streets and sidewalks of

downtown, including those immediately adjacent to the

Culver Hotel. The streets, closed to automobile traffic for

exclusive use by pedestrians, were lined with vintage

automobiles and vendors’ displays. Drivelines, a

participating vendor, positioned its display so as to straddle

the pedestrian crosswalk and sidewalk between the car show

and the main entrance to the Culver Hotel. The display,

which included a golf cart, several tables, and a large canopy,

also completely blocked the disabled access curb ramp

connecting the sidewalk to the street at that point.

On the day of his grandson’s wedding, Cohen attended

the car show. On his way back to the hotel, Cohen saw that

the curb ramp was blocked, so he tried to walk around the

vendor’s display and step up over the curb on to the sidewalk. 

Instead he slipped and fell face first on to the sidewalk,

sustaining facial abrasions and contusions. Other curb ramps

connected the street to the sidewalk about twenty yards and

ninety yards away in either direction, but there were no signs

that might point Cohen in those directions, and the City,

which deposed Cohen, adduced no evidence that he was

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 5 of 25
6 COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY

aware of the other ramps. Drawing all reasonable inferences

in Cohen’s favor, he reasonably believed he had no choice

but to negotiate the curb ramp.

Cohen asserts claims for damages against the City and the

ECCC under Title II of the federal ADA and three California

statutes: the Disabled Persons Act (DPA), the Unruh Civil

Rights Act, and California Government Code sections 830

and 835.2 The district court granted summary judgment in

favor of the defendants on all claims.3

We address only Cohen’s claims against the City under

the ADA, the DPA, and the Unruh Act. The district court

ruled that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to

whether Cohen is disabled under the ADA. It found,

however, that Cohen could have accessed the public sidewalk

by traveling a “marginally longer route” to another disabled

access curb ramp twenty yards down the street. On this basis,

the district court held that the City did not denyCohen access

to the public sidewalk under Title II of the ADA. Because

Cohen’s DPA and Unruh Act claims are based on his ADA

claim, the district court granted summary judgment for the

City on all three.

2 Cohen named three other private defendants in addition to the City and

the ECCC, but he subsequently dismissed them. The district court denied

Cohen leave to amend his complaint to assert a claim against the ECCC

under Title III of the ADA, which governs public accommodations.

3 Cohen does not appeal the grant of summary judgment for both

defendants on his claims under California Government Code sections 830

and 835. Nor does he challenge the district court’s ruling that the ECCC

cannot be liable under Title II of the ADA because it is not a public entity

or an instrumentality thereof.

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 6 of 25
COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY 7

II

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo, viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party. Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th

Cir. 2011). We must determine whether there are any

genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court

correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Del. Valley

Surgical Supply Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 1116,

1119 (9th Cir. 2008).

III.

A.

The ADA aims to “provide clear, strong, consistent,

enforceable standards addressing discrimination against

individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2). 

Congress enacted the statute on the premise that

discrimination against the disabled is “most often the product,

not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and

indifference—of benign neglect.” Alexander v. Choate,

469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985). Therefore, the ADA proscribes not

only “obviously exclusionary conduct,” but also “more subtle

forms of discrimination—such as difficult-to-navigate

restrooms and hard-to-open doors—that interfere with

disabled individuals’ full and equal enjoyment” of public

places and accommodations. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.)

Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 7 of 25
8 COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY

Title II is the portion of the ADA that applies to state and

local governments. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131. It provides that

“no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of

such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied

the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public

entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 

Id. § 12132. Title II emphasizes “program access,” meaning

that a public entity’s programs and services, viewed in their

entirety, must be equally accessible to disabled persons.4

See

Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1215–16, 1222

(9th Cir. 2008). A public entity must make reasonable

modifications to avoid discrimination against persons with

disabilities, unless it can demonstrate that doing so would

fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or

activity it provides. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7); McGary v.

City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265–66 (9th Cir. 2004).

We construe the language of the ADA broadly to advance

its remedial purpose. Hason v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 279 F.3d

1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002). We have explained that the broad

language of Title II brings within its scope “anything a public

entity does.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 691

(9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). A city

sidewalk is therefore a “service, program, or activity” of a

4

In contrast, Title III of the ADA, which governs places of public

accommodation, imposes more stringent requirements aimed at ensuring

that every facility is equally accessible to disabled persons. See Disabled

Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 882 (9th

Cir. 2004).

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 8 of 25
COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY 9

public entity within the meaning of Title II. Barden v. City of

Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002).5

To prevail under Title II, the plaintiff must show that:

(1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was

either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of

a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was

otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and

(3) this exclusion, denial, or discrimination was by reason of

his disability. Weinreich v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth.,

114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997). Title II authorizes private

suits for money damages.642 U.S.C. § 12133; see Tennessee

v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004).

As authorized by the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 12134, the

United States Attorney General has promulgated a vast body

of regulations implementing Title II. The regulations flesh

out public entities’ statutory obligations with more

5 We do not address whether the car show held on city streets also falls

within the meaning of the phrase “service, program, or activity” of the

City.

 

6 Recovery of damages under Title II requires a showing of intentional

discrimination. See Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th

Cir. 2001). The plaintiff must prove that the defendant public entity acted

with “deliberate indifference,” meaning that it knew that harm to a

federally protected right was substantially likely and failed to act upon that

knowledge. Id. at 1139. However, Cohen may recover damages for an

ADA violation under the California statutes he invokes without a showing

ofintentional discrimination. See Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 208 P.3d 623,

625 (Cal. 2009) (holding that a plaintiff need not prove intentional

discrimination to recover for an ADA violation under the Unruh Act). 

Accordingly, we do not decide whether Cohen has demonstrated that the

City acted with deliberate indifference or whether he may be able to do so

at trial.

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 9 of 25
10 COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY

specificity, but a public entity may violate the ADA even if

no regulation expressly proscribes its particular conduct. See,

e.g., Barden, 292 F.3d at 1076–78 (applying Title II to

sidewalks even though no implementing regulations

specifically addressed sidewalks). We give Department of

Justice (DOJ) regulations construing Title II “controlling

weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly

contrary to the statute.” Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger,

622 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

We rely heavily on two of these regulations in reviewing

the district court’s decision. 28 C.F.R § 35.150 governs

existing facilities. It requires the City to operate each

program, service, or activity in a manner that, viewed in its

entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by persons with

disabilities. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a). To comply with this

mandate, the City may make structural changes to its existing

facilities, but it need not do so if other methods, such as

relocating services to different buildings, would be effective. 

Id. § 35.150(b)(1). The City must prioritize methods of

compliance that enable it to provide services to disabled

persons in “the most integrated setting appropriate.” Id. If

the City chooses to comply by modifying its existing

facilities, additional requirements follow.

For instance, if the City chose to modify facilities that

existed when the ADA took effect on January 26, 1992, it was

required to complete the modifications within three years of

that date. Id. § 35.150(c). If the City employed fifty or more

persons, it was also required to develop, within six months of

January 26, 1992, a transition plan setting forth its planned

modifications. Id. § 35.150(d)(1). If the City had authority

over streets or walkways, its transition plan was required to

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 10 of 25
COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY 11

include a schedule for installing disabled access curb ramps

at intersections, giving priority to intersections located near

important public services. See id. § 35.150(d)(2). However,

because § 35.150 generally allows the City to choose its

method of making programs and services accessible, it does

not necessarily compel the construction of curb ramps in

every situation.

By contrast, 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 governs facilities that the

City begins to build or alter after January 26, 1992. Id.

§ 35.151(a)(1), (b)(1). It provides that every newly built or

altered portion of such a facility must be “readily accessible

to and usable by individuals with disabilities,” id., unless

doing so would be “structurally impracticable,” id.

§ 35.151(a)(2). It also requires compliance with detailed

accessibility standards, id. § 35.151(c)(1), (2), and sets forth

additional requirements specific to dormitories, stadiums,

prisons, and other kinds of facilities, id. § 35.151(f), (g), (k). 

With respect to curb ramps, § 35.151 provides:

(1) Newly constructed or altered streets,

roads, and highways must contain curb ramps

or other sloped areas at any intersection

having curbs or other barriers to entry from a

street level pedestrian walkway.

(2) Newly constructed or altered street level

pedestrian walkways must contain curb ramps

or other sloped areas at intersections to

streets, roads, or highways.

Id. § 35.151(i) (emphasis added).

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 11 of 25
12 COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY

Together, these two regulations effectuate the ADA’s

mandate that public entities make reasonable modifications

to their programs and services to accommodate disabled

persons. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 532. Congress recognized

that it would be unreasonable to require a public entity to

extensively renovate all of its existing facilities to bring itself

into compliance with the ADA. See id. Once public entities

choose to build new facilities or renovate existing ones,

however, they can reasonably be required to do so in a

manner that complies with “specific architectural

accessibility standards.” Id. For this reason, § 35.150 does

not require the City to build curb ramps at every corner

during its transition to compliance with the ADA. See Frame

v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 232 (5th Cir. 2011) (en

banc). When the City is already altering or building a

sidewalk anyway, § 35.151 requires it to construct a curb

ramp at every affected intersection because the additional

cost of doing so is minimal. See id.

B.

The district court erred by holding that the City is entitled

to summary judgment. It mistakenly reasoned that, because

Cohen could have accessed the sidewalk by taking a

“marginally longer route” to a different curb ramp, he failed

to establish that he was denied access to the sidewalk. The

district court relied on Schonfeld v. City of Carlsbad, 978 F.

Supp. 1329, 1335–41 (S.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 172 F.3d 876

(9th Cir. 1999), and Parker v. Universidad de P.R., 225 F.3d

1, 6–7 (1st Cir. 2000). These cases are inapposite, however,

because they address public entities’ obligations only when

they modify existing facilities to achieve ADA compliance

under 28 C.F.R. § 35.150. We confront entirely different

circumstances here, where the City was in compliance with

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 12 of 25
COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY 13

the ADA, but allowed elimination of the disabled access it

had built.

In Schonfeld, the city of Carlsbad, California, was

working toward compliance with the ADA by modifying its

existing facilities, including its city hall, library, bus stops,

and sidewalks, under 28 C.F.R. § 35.150. A putative class of

disabled plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that Carlsbad

had failed to timely adopt the transition plan mandated by

§ 35.150(d)(1) and failed to install curb ramps at certain

intersections within three years of January 26, 1992, as

required by § 35.150(c). Schonfeld, 978 F. Supp. at 1333,

1335. The plaintiffs introduced evidence that curb ramps had

not been built at various corners, but they did not introduce

evidence that they were unable to access city streets or

parking facilities at those locations. Id. at 1340. The court

held that the plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to create a

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Carlsbad had

denied them access to a public service under the ADA, and it

granted summary judgment in Carlsbad’s favor.7Id. at 1341.

The court in Schonfeld correctly reasoned that § 35.150

did not require Carlsbad to build a curb ramp at every

intersection. Rather, that provision simply required

Carlsbad’s programs and services to be accessible as a whole,

and it allowed Carlsbad to choose its method of complying

with this requirement. Id. at 1339 n.11. The ADA allowed

Carlsbad to compel disabled persons to travel a “marginally

longer route” under some “limited circumstances,” as long as

its programs were still accessible as a whole. Id. The mere

 

7

Schonfeld was decided before we held that the sidewalk is a “service,

program, or activity” under Title II. Barden v. City of Sacramento,

292 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002).

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 13 of 25
14 COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY

fact that some city sidewalks did not have curb ramps was

therefore insufficient to create a triable issue as to whether

Carlsbad violated Title II. Id. at 1341. In reaching this

conclusion, the court in Schonfeld relied on the ADA Title II

Technical Assistance Manual, a DOJ publication that

provides guidance to public entities on ADA compliance. See

id. at 1339 n.11. The Technical Assistance Manual similarly

explains that, under 28 C.F.R. § 35.150, “public entities are

not necessarily required to construct a curb ramp at every

such intersection,” and that it may be appropriate to compel

disabled persons to take a “marginally longer route.” THE

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: TITLE II TECHNICAL

ASSISTANCE MANUAL (1993), § II-5.3000, available at

http://www.ada.gov/taman2.html.

In Parker, the disabled plaintiff attended an awards

ceremony held at the Botanical Gardens of the University of

Puerto Rico, a public institution. See Parker, 225 F.3d at 3. 

Park staff directed the plaintiff, who required a motorized

wheelchair for mobility, to use a particular path to travel to a

garden in which the ceremony was held. Id. at 3. The

plaintiff introduced evidence that the path was not designed

for disabled access. Id. The plaintiff’s wheelchair flipped

over when, according to a witness, it fell off a two-inch lip at

the bottom of the path. See id. The plaintiff broke his

clavicle and lost the ability to use his right arm, which he had

previously regained through two years of physical therapy

after having suffered the stroke that caused his disability. Id.

The court in Parker applied 28 C.F.R. § 35.150. It

explained that, pursuant to its duty under § 35.150(b)(1) to

prioritize methods of compliance that would allow it to

administer its programs in “the most integrated setting

appropriate,” the university was required to ensure that

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 14 of 25
COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY 15

disabled persons could access the ceremony site “using safe

walkways, ramps, and curb cuts.” Id. at 6–7 (internal

quotation marks omitted). The court observed that the

university was “not required to make every passageway in

and out of the [site] accessible,” but was required to provide

“at least one” safe access route for a person in a wheelchair. 

Id. at 7. Consequently, the court in Parker held that judgment

as a matter of law in favor of the university was improper. Id.

A jury could have concluded that the disabled plaintiff used

the path intended for wheelchair access, that the path was

maintained in an unsafe manner, and that the unsafe

conditions caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Id.

Here, the City was not renovating its existing sidewalks

under a plan to achieve ADA compliance. It was allowing its

sidewalks to be used by private vendors for the purpose of

holding a street fair. The curb ramp in front of the Culver

Hotel was not under construction or renovation. It already

existed. The district court therefore erred by relying on the

“marginally longer route” standard of Schonfeld and the

Technical Assistance Manual, which applies when the City is

modifying its sidewalks to achieve program accessibility

under § 35.150. Similarly, the district court erred by relying

on the Parker court’s observation that the university was not

required to provide multiple disabled access routes to the

garden in which the ceremony was held. This statement

simply defines the scope of the university’s duty under

§ 35.150 to provide an “integrated” method of access to the

programs it held in the garden.

To the extent the regulations governing the construction

and renovation of facilities apply to the City’s blockage of an

existing curb ramp, 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 is more relevant than

28 C.F.R. § 35.150. As we explain above, when the City

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 15 of 25
16 COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY

builds new sidewalks or alters existing ones for reasons other

than retrofitting to achieve ADA compliance, § 35.151

plainly requires it to build a curb ramp at every intersection

unless doing so would be structurally impracticable. See 28

C.F.R. § 35.151(i). A DOJ publication discussing the

implementation of Title II states:

[W]hen new sidewalks or walkways are built

or altered, they must contain curb ramps or

sloped areas wherever they intersect with

streets or roads. . . . At existing roads and

sidewalks that have not been altered, however,

city governments may choose to construct

curb ramps at every point where a pedestrian

walkway intersects a curb, but they are not

necessarily required to do so.

Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The ADA and City

Governments: Common Problems 5, available at

http://www.ada.gov/comprob.pdf. It follows that, under

§ 35.151, the City cannot justify the failure to build a curb

ramp at an intersection on the ground that a marginally longer

route was available down the street. The DOJ Technical

Assistance Manual, which expressly permits a “marginally

longer” disabled access route under § 35.150, contains no

such language in its discussion of § 35.151. See TITLE II

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra, § II-6.6000.

The City’s conduct here is more analogous to altering its

sidewalks for reasons unrelated to ADA compliance, as

contemplated by § 35.151, than it is to retrofitting a sidewalk

to achieve program accessibility under § 35.150. The City

chose to alter the existing arrangement of the public sidewalk

by allowing private vendors to set up displays for the purpose

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 16 of 25
COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY 17

of holding a car show. The vendors’ presence was entirely

unrelated to the goal of making the City’s programs or

services accessible to disabled persons. It would not have

imposed an additional burden on the City for it to require the

vendors to locate their booths a few feet in either direction to

avoid blocking disabled ramps.

Sections 35.150 and 35.151 both implement, in different

circumstances, the ADA’s requirement that public entities

make reasonable modifications to accommodate persons with

disabilities. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 532. The less stringent

demands of § 35.150 govern when it would be unreasonable

to expect public entities to comply with the more exacting

standards of § 35.151. See id.; Frame, 657 F.3d at 232. This

is not such a circumstance. When the City has already built

a direct route that is accessible to disabled persons, it is

reasonable to require the City not to force disabled persons to

look for and take even a marginally longer route. Because

§ 35.150 does not apply, the existence of an arguably

marginally longer alternative route does not entitle the City

to summary judgment on Cohen’s Title II claim.

C.

A genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether the

City denied Cohen access to the sidewalk on the basis of his

disability by permitting a private vendor’s display to

completely block the existing curb ramp.

For example, the City may have violated a regulation

requiring it to maintain disabled access features in good

working order. The City must “maintain in operable working

condition those features of facilities and equipment that are

required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 17 of 25
18 COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY

with disabilities by the Act or this part.” 28 C.F.R.

§ 35.133(a). Because the regulations define “facility” to

include “any portion of . . . roads, walks, or passageways,”

city sidewalks are among those facilities that the City must

maintain in operable working condition. See id. § 35.104. 

Only “isolated or temporary interruptions in service or access

due to maintenance or repairs” are permissible. Id.

§ 35.133(b). The rationale for this requirement is obvious:

there is little point in building an accessible route if it is not

kept in a condition that allows disabled persons to use it. See

28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B. As the guidance accompanying this

regulation makes clear, the City is therefore required to keep

disabled access routes “free of obstructions.” Id. While

temporary obstructions do not violate the ADA, obstructions

that persist beyond a reasonable period of time do violate the

statute. Id.

A jury could conclude that the City violated this

provision. The vendor’s display obstructed the disabled

access curb ramp that connected the city streets with the

public sidewalk in front of the Culver Hotel. A genuine

dispute of material fact exists as to whether this particular

curb ramp was “required” to make the sidewalk “readily

accessible” to persons with disabilities. 28 C.F.R.

§ 35.133(a). The City would have been required to build this

curb ramp if it altered this particular segment of the street or

the sidewalk after January 26, 1992. See 28 C.F.R.

§ 35.151(i). The City, which bore the burden of production

on its motion for summary judgment, did not produce any

evidence showing that the street or sidewalk had not been

altered since January 26, 1992. See Nissan Fire & Marine

Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.

2000). A genuine dispute of material fact also exists as to

whether the City failed to maintain this curb ramp in

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 18 of 25
COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY 19

“operable working condition,” 28 C.F.R. § 35.133(a), by

allowing the private vendor’s booth to block the ramp for

more than “a reasonable time,” 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B. The

trier of fact must determine whether the duration of the

obstruction was reasonable. Cf. Crowder v. Kitagawa,

81 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that whether a

plaintiff’s proposed modifications to a defendant’s policies

are “reasonable” under Title II is a question of fact).8

Our discussion of this particular theory of liability is not

meant to imply that it is the only way the City may have

denied Cohen access to the sidewalk by reason of disability. 

8 The Seventh Circuit requires that a plaintiff show more than an

“isolated instance[] of employee negligence” to prove a violation of a

Department of Transportation regulation implementing Title II that is

substantially identical to 28 C.F.R. § 35.133(a). Foley v. City of Lafayette,

359 F.3d 925, 930 (7th Cir. 2004). We are not necessarily convinced that

this requirement is warranted by the text of the regulation, which contains

no mens rea standard and simply commands public entities to maintain

disabled access features in operable condition. Nonetheless, we need not

decide whether to adopt the Seventh Circuit’s gloss on what otherwise

appears to be a strict liability statute because the City would not be

entitled to judgment as a matter of law even under that heightened

standard.

The City introduced evidence that it never approved the specific

layout or placement of the vendors’ booths at the car show. Cohen

introduced evidence that the City entered into a license agreement with the

ECCC that authorized the ECCC to hold the car show but contained no

nondiscrimination provision and made no reference to disabled access. A

jury could reasonably infer from the evidence in the record that the City

had failed to give any consideration to whether the car show would

interfere with its obligations under the ADA. A jury could therefore

conclude that the obstruction of the curb ramp was the result of a

“systemic problem with the policies of the City” rather than isolated

employee negligence. Foley, 359 F.3d at 930.

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 19 of 25
20 COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY

More generally, Title II imposes upon public entities a “duty

to accommodate” disabled persons. Lane, 541 U.S. at 532. 

Even facially neutral government actions that apply equally

to disabled and nondisabled persons may violate Title IIif the

public entity has failed to make reasonable accommodations

to avoid unduly burdening disabled persons. See McGary,

386 F.3d at 1265–66; Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1484. For this

reason, poorly maintained public sidewalks may be a form of

discrimination proscribed by Title II. See Barden, 292 F.3d

at 1076–77. Obstructed sidewalks exclude disabled persons

from ordinary communal life and force them to risk serious

injury to undertake daily activities. This is precisely the sort

of “subtle” discrimination stemming from “thoughtlessness

and indifference” that the ADA aims to abolish. Chapman,

631 F.3d at 944–45.

Here, a jury could conclude that the City discriminated

against Cohen by reason of his disability by failing to take

simple, low-cost, reasonable measures to accommodate

persons who rely on curb ramps to navigate public sidewalks. 

The City could have reviewed and approved the placement of

the vendors’ displays before the car show, as the permit it

issued to the ECCC said it would but as it apparently did not. 

It could have required vendors to avoid positioning their

displays in front of disabled access ramps, or to set their

displays back a few feet from the curb to allow disabled

pedestrians to pass. The City could have posted a temporary

sign in front of this particular display directing pedestrians to

the other curb ramp twenty yards down the block. Any of

these modest measures may have avoided the injuries Cohen

suffered. By failing to adopt them, the City may have

engaged in the “simple exclusion” of disabled persons

through “thoughtlessness” and “inaction” that constitutes

discrimination under the ADA. McGary, 386 F.3d at 1267

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 20 of 25
COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY 21

(quoting Presta v. Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Bd.,

16 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 1998)).

Because the district court relied on an inapplicable legal

standard, and because there is a genuine dispute of material

fact as to whether the City denied Cohen access to a public

service or otherwise discriminated against him under Title II,

the district court erred by granting summary judgment in

favor of the City.

IV.

Cohen also alleges that the City violated two California

statutes: the Disabled Persons Act (DPA) and the Unruh Civil

Rights Act. A violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of

the California DPA. Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(d). Similarly, a

violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f); see Munson v. Del Taco, Inc.,

208 P.3d 623, 625 (Cal. 2009) (holding that no showing of

intentional discrimination is required to state an Unruh Act

claim on the basis of an ADA violation). Because the City is

not entitled to summary judgment on Cohen’s ADA claim,

the district court erred by granting summary judgment for the

City on Cohen’s claims under the DPA and the Unruh Act.

V.

We take no position on whether the City did in fact deny

Cohen access to a public service or discriminate against him

by reason of disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12132. As the

district court held, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as

to whether Cohen is disabled at all. Various other disputed

issues may also be resolved at trial. We simply hold that the

City is not entitled to summary judgment because, drawing all

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 21 of 25
22 COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY

reasonable inferences in Cohen’s favor, it may have violated

the ADA and, consequently, the DPA and the Unruh Act.

We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court as

to Cohen’s claims against the City. As we explain in a

memorandum disposition accompanying this opinion, we

reverse the judgment of the district court as to Cohen’s DPA

claim against the ECCC, but we affirm the judgment of the

district court as to Cohen’s Unruh Act claim against the

ECCC. We remand for further proceedings. Each party shall

bear its own costs.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND

REMANDED.

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:

I respectfully dissent from the portion of the opinion

reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment in

favor of Culver City on William Cohen’s claims under the

Americans With Disabilities Act and related California

statutes. The district court ruled that “Culver City has

presented evidence that two wheelchair access ramps were

located 20 yards east and ninety yards west, respectively,

from where Plaintiff incurred his injury.” The district court

then observed that Cohen “has not disputed this evidence or

offered any explanation as to why he did not utilize an

alternative route. . . .” The district court concluded that

because alternative routes were available, Cohen failed to

raise a material issue of fact regarding his alleged exclusion

from use of the sidewalk.

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 22 of 25
COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY 23

The district court’s grant of summary judgment was

consistent with cases that have addressed the issue raised by

Cohen, equal access. As we stated in Bird v. Lewis & Clark

Coll., 303 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2002), “the central

inquiry is whether the program, when viewed in its entirety,

is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with

disabilities.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

This language counsels against a narrow view of access and

underscores the importance of the other access routes

available to Cohen. I agree with the district court that there

was no showing that Cohen was “excluded from accessing

the public sidewalks.” Rather, Cohen complains that the

ramp “most directly accessible to him . . . was blocked by a

vendor booth.” Nothing in the ADA, the governing

regulations or case precedent requires access at a particular

location in relation to the plaintiff’s destination. Instead, the

ADA focuses on ready access. See Bird, 303 F.3d at 1021. 

Ready access within twenty yards fulfilled the City’s

obligation under the ADA. See id. at 1021 (focusing on ready

access rather than conformity to the plaintiff’s subjective

expectations).

In my view, the district court’s reliance on Schonfeld v.

City of Carlsbad, 978 F. Supp. 1329, 1339 n.11 (S.D. Cal.

1997), aff’d 172 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 1999), was entirely

appropriate. Schonfeld interpreted 28 C.F.R. § 35.150, the

same regulation the majority opinion “rel[ies] heavily on.” 

Majority Opinion, p. 10. The portion of the Schonfeld

opinion relied on by the district court was under the heading

“Existing Facilities,” and addresses the same access points at

issue in this case.

We affirmed the district court’s decision in Schonfeld,

including its ruling that:

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 23 of 25
24 COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY

[P]ublic entities are not required to construct

a curb ramp at every intersection. Alternative

routes to buildings that make use of existing

curb ramps may be acceptable under the

concept of program accessibility in limited

circumstances where disabled individuals

need only travel a marginally longer route . . .

Schonfeld, 978 F. Supp. at 1339 n.11.

Similarly, the district court properly relied on the First

Circuit decision in Parker v. Universidad de P.R., 225 F.3d

1, 6–7 (1st Cir. 2000). In Parker, the First Circuit also

addressed a claim of lack of access to an existing facility. See

id. at 5. The First Circuit noted that “Title II’s emphasis on

‘program accessibility’ . . . was intended to ensure broad

access to public services, while, at the same time, providing

public entities with the flexibility to make access

available. . . .” Id. at 6. The First Circuit also observed that

each program must be viewed in its entirety when

determining accessibility. See id. Applying that view, the

First Circuit held that the University was required to provide

“at least one route that a [disabled] person . . . [could] use to

reach the [program] safely . . .” Id. at 7. The First Circuit

explicitly held that not every passageway had to be accessible

so long as there was one route that a disabled person could

use. See id.

In this case, the undisputed evidence is that there were

two readily accessible routes that Cohen could have used to

reach his destination safely. Under the rationale of Parker

and Schonfeld, and viewing the program in its entirety, Cohen

was not denied access. In summary, the only cases that have

come close to addressing this issue focus on viewing the

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 24 of 25
COHEN V. CITY OF CULVER CITY 25

program in its entirety and determining whether all access

was denied. See Bird, 303 F.3d at 1021; Schonfeld, 978 F.

Supp. at 1339 n.11; Parker, 225 F.3d at 6–7. Because two

available access routes existed when viewing the sidewalk in

its entirety, Cohen was provided sufficient access. I agree

with the district court that Cohen failed to raise a material

issue of fact on his ADA claims and on his related state law

claims. I would affirm the district court’s entry of judgment

in favor of Culver City in its entirety.

 Case: 13-55079, 06/06/2014, ID: 9122351, DktEntry: 26-1, Page 25 of 25