Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01345/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01345-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

WILLIAM CUTLIP,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEUTCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 

COMPANY FOR THE HARBORVIEW 

MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST PASSTHROUGH CERTIFICATES 2007-7,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-01345-BLF 

ORDER DENYING EX PARTE 

APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER

[Re: ECF 2]

Before the Court is the “Emgency [sic] Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining 

Order and Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction” (“TRO Application”) by pro se 

plaintiff William J. Cutlip (“Plaintiff”).1 Pl.’s TRO Appl., ECF 2. For the reasons stated herein, 

Plaintiff’s TRO Application is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant Deutsche Bank National 

Trust Company (“Deutsche Bank”) accompanied by the instant TRO Application. A review of the 

Complaint, which is light on facts, suggests that Plaintiff is bringing this action in connection with 

a mortgage on a property in Campbell, California. See, e.g., Compl. at 18-19 (describing recorded 

deed documents), ECF 1; see also Pl.’s Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) Exh. A.,2ECF 3. It 

 

1

The Complaint in this action identifies Chikako Cutlip as an additional plaintiff, though the 

pleading is signed only by William Cutlip. See Compl., ECF 1. The Court notes that Chikako 

Cutlip is the appellant in an appeal from the bankruptcy court, also involving Deutsche Bank 

National Trust Company. See Cutlip v. Deutsche Bank National Trustee Company, No. 5:15-cv00271-BLF (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 20, 2015). 

2

Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED with respect to Exhibits A-F, and J, as these 

are recorded deeds or public court filings (including Exhibit D, a transcript of public court 

Case 5:15-cv-01345-BLF Document 13 Filed 03/27/15 Page 1 of 6
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appears that the same parties have already engaged in extensive litigation in state court regarding 

the property. See Compl. at 4-6, 17; see also Pl.’s RJN Exhs. B-D, J. In June 2014, the appellate 

division of the Superior Court for the County of Santa Clara affirmed an unlawful detainer 

judgment against Plaintiff and in favor of Deutsche Bank, as “Trustee for Harborview Mortgage 

Loan Trust Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-7.” Pl.’s RJN Exh. J. Plaintiff 

contends that unlawful detainer judgment was obtained through fraud on the part of Deutsche 

Bank and entered without jurisdiction and accordingly void. Compl. at 2, 4-6 (“Counts” One, 

Three, Four, Five and Six). More generally, Plaintiff asserts that he brings his federal claims 

against Deutsche Bank under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for “act[ing] jointly with the State to deprive him 

of his property without due process of law.” Id. at 3 (“Count” Two). 

In the present TRO Application, Plaintiff seeks to restrain defendant Deutsche Bank “from 

taking any action against the property known as 619 Union [A]venue Campbell C[A] 95008.” 

Pl.’s TRO Appl. 2, 20. It appears that the defendant “has already obtained a writ of possession,”

and Plaintiff believes that Deutsche Bank will move quickly to sell the property “as soon [a]s the 

property is vacated.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff also seeks “an order vacating the unlawful detainer 

judgment for fraud on the court and blatant and willful violation of the Cutlip’s due process under 

the color of law,” id. at 20, although it is not clear if that is a form of injunctive relief that Plaintiff 

is seeking or if that is a part of the relief that he seeks in connection with his underlying claims.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The substantive standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to the 

standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush 

& Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001); Lockheed Missile & Space Co. v. Hughes Aircraft, 

887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995). An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is 

 

proceeding) appropriate for judicial notice. See Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City 

of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998). The judicially noticeable court documents, 

however, are not be used “so as to supply, without formal introduction of evidence, facts essential 

to support a contention” in the present case. M/V Am. Queen v. San Diego Marine Const. Corp., 

708 F.2d 1483, 1491 (9th Cir. 1983). Plaintiff’s RJN Exhibits G and H appear to be private 

correspondence, and the source of Exhibit I is not clear. As such, the RJN is DENIED with 

respect to Exhibits G-I. 

Case 5:15-cv-01345-BLF Document 13 Filed 03/27/15 Page 2 of 6
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“an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is 

entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). 

A plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief must establish “[1] that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 

relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public 

interest.” Id. at 20. Alternatively, an injunction can issue where “the likelihood of success is such 

that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in 

plaintiff’s favor,” provided that the plaintiff can also demonstrate the other Winter factors. 

Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Showing “serious questions going to the merits” requires more 

than establishing that “success is more likely than not;” rather, it requires a plaintiff to demonstrate 

a “substantial case for relief on the merits.” Leiva–Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir.

2011). Under either standard, the plaintiff bears the burden of making a clear showing on these 

elements and on entitlement to this extraordinary remedy. Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 

462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010). 

III. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, an ex parte TRO Application must satisfy Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 65(b)(1), which demands “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint” that 

“clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant 

before the adverse party can be heard in opposition,” and a certification describing the “efforts 

made to give notice [to the adverse party] and the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A)-(B). Furthermore, applicants in this district must also comply with Civil Local 

Rule 65-1, which requires that “[u]nless relieved by order of a Judge for good cause shown, on or 

before the day of an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order, counsel applying for the 

temporary restraining order must deliver notice of such motion to opposing counsel or party.” 

Civ. L.R. 65-1(b). 

Plaintiff in his TRO Application avers that he is likely to suffer immediate and irreparable 

harm because “Deutsche has already obtained a writ of possession but [t]he Cutlip’s know as soon 

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[a]s the property is vacated Deutsche will sell it as quickly as possible to permanently deprive the 

Cutlip’s of their home.” TRO Appl. 2. It is unclear from what evidence Plaintiff derives this 

knowledge, as there is no evidence or allegation that Deutsche Bank has moved to enforce the 

unlawful detainer judgment or placed the subject property on sale. Moreover, there is no 

indication in Plaintiff’s TRO Application that he notified Deutsche Bank of this filing or even 

attempted to contact them regarding this application. On that basis alone, Plaintiff’s TRO 

Application should be denied for failure to comply with applicable local and federal rules. In 

consideration of Plaintiff’s pro se status, however, the Court proceeds to the merits. 

As to the first Winter factor of a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim, Plaintiff 

has made no showing that he is likely to succeed. To the extent the Complaint can be understood, 

Plaintiff appears to be invoking federal jurisdiction by asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

See Compl. at 3 (“The Cutlip bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”). What is pled, however, 

is Deutsche Bank’s alleged fraud in state court proceedings and a myriad of errors that Plaintiff 

contends the state courts committed in entering and affirming an unlawful detainer judgment 

against him. Id. at 2-6. The gravamen of Plaintiff’s claims appears to be that because Deutsche 

Bank’s allegedly committed fraud in state court, those proceedings lacked due process and, as 

such, Deutsche Bank acted jointly with the state courts to deprive Plaintiff of his property without 

due process of law.3 See id. at 3 (“in attaching his property, respondents had acted jointly with the 

State to deprive him of his property without due process of law”); see also Pl.’s TRO Appl. 3. 

It is unlikely that Plaintiff could prevail on his § 1983 claim against Deutsche Bank, a 

private party. A federal civil rights claim requires that “the conduct allegedly causing the 

deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 

U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Although in Lugar, the Supreme Court recognized that a private party 

could be held liable under § 1983 for causing state agents to seize a plaintiff’s property pursuant to 

 

3

To the extent the front page of the Complaint also identifies claims seeking to “set aside 

foreclosure sale” and for “fraud and fraudulent concealment” and “promissory estoppel,” the 

Court cannot find those claims in the body of the pleading. As such, the Court construes the 

Complaint to solely assert claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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statute upon that private party’s ex parte application, that is far from what is alleged here. Here, 

Deutsche Bank went through judicial proceedings to obtain an unlawful detainer judgment against 

Plaintiff.4 “[M]erely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not 

make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 

(1980); see also Basulto v. GMAC Mortgage, No. C-09-1438 MMC, 2009 WL 1658033, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. June 12, 2009) (rejecting similar arguments). Moreover, it is not clear from Plaintiff’s 

papers what actions Deutsche Bank has taken to enforce the unlawful detainer judgment and 

therefore it is not clear that there has been any seizure or attachment beyond the securing of an 

unlawful detainer judgment. As such, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate even a serious question 

going to the merits of his federal civil rights claims against Deutsche Bank. 

Furthermore, despite his fervent protestations to the contrary, it is not clear that any of 

Plaintiff’s claims survive the Rooker-Feldman bar against “exercising subject matter jurisdiction 

over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.” See, e.g., Kougasian v. TMSL, 

Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit explained the doctrine as follows: “If 

a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and 

seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision, Rooker–Feldman bars subject 

matter jurisdiction in federal district court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). 

While Plaintiff may allege that his claims comport with the extrinsic fraud exception to RookerFeldman described in Kougasian, see Compl. at 6-9, his allegations belie that assertion, 

particularly where he charges the state courts that ruled against him with fraud, perjury, and 

complicity in an “unconscionable plan to defraud Cutlip.” Compl. at 24; see also Pl.’s TRO Appl. 

4-8, 11-14. It is thus difficult to conceive of Plaintiff’s request that the Court vacate the unlawful 

detainer judgment, see Compl. at 25, as anything other than his assertion “as a legal wrong an 

allegedly erroneous decision by a state court” from which he seeks relief. Based on the foregoing, 

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate even a serious question going to the merits of his claims against 

 

4

To the extent Plaintiff contends that an antecedent foreclosure sale can also form the basis for a § 

1983 claim, that argument is foreclosed by Harper v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane, 878 F.2d 

1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1989), which held that use of a state’s foreclosure procedures is not state 

action. 

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Deutsche Bank, and certainly no likelihood of success on the merits. 

As to the remaining Winter factors, Plaintiff is correct that the loss of his home can be 

serious or even irreparable harm. See Pl.’s TRO Appl. 16. However, “in the absence of a 

likelihood of success on the merits, loss of property alone is not sufficient to obtain a TRO.” 

Michener v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, No. C 12-2003 PJH, 2012 WL 3027538, at *4 (N.D. 

Cal. July 24, 2012). Moreover, as the Court previously noted, Plaintiff offers nothing more than 

conjecture that he is imminently in danger of losing his home, as it is unclear what steps Deutsche 

Bank has taken to enforce the unlawful detainer judgment, let alone sell the property once it is 

vacated. Although the public interest and the balance of hardships do weigh in Plaintiff’s favor, as 

they generally do in cases where a homeowner is at risk of being displaced from his home, see 

Castellanos v. Countrywide Bank NA, No. 15-CV-00896-BLF, 2015 WL 914436, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

Feb. 27, 2015), those factors are insufficient to sustain the extraordinary injunctive relief that 

Plaintiff seeks here in the absence of any serious questions going to the merits of his underlying 

civil rights claims against Deutsche Bank. 

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Ex Parte

Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction 

is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2015

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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