Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06371/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06371-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Orlando Javier Gonzalez,

Plaintiff,

v.

City of Fresno; Sgt. Michael

Manfredi; Officers Sean T.

Plymale, Sammy Ashworth, Brian

Phillips, Marcus Tafoya, Art

R. Rodriguez; Jerry Dyer,

Chief of the Fresno Police

Department, in Their

Individual and Official

Capacities,

Defendants.

1:04-cv-06371-OWW-SMS

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

BY THE DISTRICT COURT OF

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S RULING 

(Doc. 78) AND CLARIFYING

ORDER re: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF

DOCUMENTS; ANSWERS TO

INTERROGATORIES AND

DEPOSITION TESTIMONY (Doc.

77) 

I.Introduction

Before the Court for decision is defendants’ request for

reconsideration of Chief Magistrate Judge Sandra M. Snyder’s

order compelling defendants to produce information related to an

internal affairs investigation known as the “Celdon matter” (Doc.

77) (“Discovery Order”). (Doc. 78).

Defendants seek to set aside the Discovery Order on the

grounds that it is clearly erroneous and contrary to law because

it requires production of an internal affairs investigation into

the Celdon matter–a separate incident not involving

plaintiff–that occurred two and one-half years after the incident

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 Defendants do not seek reconsideration of the Discovery 1

Order to the extent it requires them to produce information

related to eight internal affairs investigations regarding

allegations of unprofessional conduct by defendant Michael

Manfredi. (Doc. No. 80, ¶ 1).

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at issue here. 

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II.Background

A. Procedural Background of Plaintiff’s Lawsuit

Plaintiff, Orlando Javier Gonzalez, originally filed this

civil rights lawsuit in Fresno Superior Court in the latter part

of 2004. Defendants removed the lawsuit to federal court and

subsequently filed a motion to dismiss portions of plaintiff’s

complaint. By stipulation and court order, the parties took

defendants’ motion to dismiss off calendar, and plaintiff filed

his first amended complaint. 

The first amended complaint alleges that defendants violated

plaintiff’s civil rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983

and 1988; Article 1, §§ 7 and 13 of the California Constitution;

California Civil Code §§ 52 and 52.1; and assault and battery. 

The crux of plaintiff’s first amended complaint is the City of

Fresno, its police chief, and several of its officers violated

plaintiff’s civil rights when one of the officers unleashed a

police canine, which bit plaintiff’s leg and caused injuries

requiring surgical repair. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint

further alleges that defendants City of Fresno and its police

chief negligently hired, trained, staffed, and supervised the

defendant officers.

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On July 28, 2006, plaintiff filed his motion to compel

responses to requests for production of documents, answers to

interrogatories, and deposition testimony. (Doc. 40). When

plaintiff filed his motion to compel, the discovery cutoff date

was September 8, 2006. Plaintiff’s motion to compel was set for

hearing on September 1, 2006. 

Also on July 28, 2006, defendant filed a motion for summary

judgment to plaintiff’s Monell claims against the City of Fresno

and Fresno Police Chief Jerry Dyer (Doc. 41); defendants’ motion

for summary judgment was set for hearing on August 28, 2006. 

Shortly after defendants filed their motion for summary judgment,

plaintiff filed an ex parte application to continue defendants’

motion for summary judgment from August 28, 2006, to September

24, 2006. Plaintiff sought a continuance of defendants’ motion

for summary judgment because of an ongoing discovery dispute

between the parties regarding internal affairs investigations of

defendants Manfredi and Plymale for incidents that occurred after

the incident involving plaintiff. Plaintiff contended the

internal affairs investigations involving defendants Manfredi and

Plymale are discoverable under the authority of Henry v. County

of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512 (9th Cir. 1997). By court order and over

defendants’ objection, defendants’ motion for summary judgment

was continued to September 25, 2006. (Doc. 54). 

Judge Snyder held a hearing on plaintiff’s motion to compel

on September 1, 2006 and took the matter under submission. On

September 12, 2006, plaintiff filed a motion to continue

defendants’ motion for summary judgment pending the outcome of

his motion to compel. (Doc. 65). At a status conference

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hearing on September 21, 2006, and again over defendants’

objection, the motion for summary judgment hearing date of

September 25, 2006, and the trial date of October 24, 2006, were

vacated, and a further status conference was ordered to be set

after a ruling on plaintiff’s motion to compel. (Doc. 74).

On February 13, 2007, Judge Snyder issued the Discovery

Order granting plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery. (Doc.

77). Eight days after the Discovery Order was entered on the

docket, defendants timely filed their “Request for

Reconsideration by the District Court of Magistrate Judge’s

Ruling” under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Rule 72-303 

(Doc. 78), which is now before the court.

B. Factual Background of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel

On July 28, 2006, plaintiff filed his motion to compel

discovery seeking responses to his request for production of

documents, answers to interrogatories, and deposition testimony. 

On August 28, 2006, the parties filed their “Joint Stipulation

Regarding Discovery Disagreement” setting forth their respective

positions on how the court should resolve their dispute.

1. Brief Factual Background of the Case

According to the first amended complaint, the Fresno Police

Department responded to a domestic violence complaint by

plaintiff’s ex-girlfriend. Defendants Manfredi and Plymale,

among others, responded to plaintiff’s house and entered a small

bedroom where plaintiff and another individual were hiding. 

Defendant Manfredi ordered plaintiff to lay on his stomach. 

Apparently a scuffle ensued, according to the police report,

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 Plaintiff denies wrapping his arm around defendant 2

Manfredi’s leg.

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where plaintiff wrapped his arm around defendant Manfredi’s leg.2

In response, defendant Plymale released his canine on plaintiff. 

The canine bit plaintiff’s right calf and caused injuries that

required surgical repair. 

Plaintiff was arrested for making terrorist threats, child

endangerment, domestic battery, resisting arrest, and parole

violation. The Fresno County District Attorney did not file

charges for these offenses. Plaintiff did, however, plead no

contest to obstructing a police officer.

2. Issues Presented in Joint Stipulation Regarding

Discovery Disagreement

Plaintiff propounded discovery on defendants through a

request for production of documents and for the production of

documents for the depositions of defendants Manfredi and Plymale. 

Plaintiff’s requests and defendants’ responses are as follows.

Plaintiff’s Demand for Production of Documents to

Deposition of Manfredi and Plymale 

20. Please produce all documents in your possession

custody or control relating to complaints from any

source concerning excessive use of force on the

part of Officer Sean T. Plymale and Sgt. Michael

Manfredi from the date of the incident to March 13,

2006. This request includes, but is not limited,

to the complaints themselves, any follow-up

internal affairs investigations of the complaints,

and conclusions rendered after the investigations.

Defendants’ Response

This category is objected to on the grounds that it

is vague ambiguous and overbroad. Further, it

seeks documents that are not relevant to the

subject matter of this litigation, nor are they

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likely to lead to the discovery of admissible

evidence. These documents are also protected by

evidence code section 1040 and 1043, Penal Code

section 832.7, the official information privilege,

as well as the individual officers rights to

privacy. (Please see privilege log and declaration

of deputy chief Roger Enmark, previously served

with the responses of defendant city of Fresno to

plaintiffs request for production, set number one.)

Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set 2

Request For Production No. 1.

2. Please produce all documents in your possession

custody or control relating to complaints from any

source concerning excessive use of force on the

part of Officer Sean T. Plymale and Sgt. Michael

Manfredi from the date of the incident to March 13,

2006. This request includes, but is not limited,

to the complaints themselves, any follow-up

internal affairs investigations of the complaints,

and conclusions rendered after the investigations.

Defendants’ Response

Same response as above.

While the incident at issue in this case occurred on May 10,

2003, plaintiff seeks discovery from defendants of documents

containing complaints of excessive force on the part of

defendants Manfredi and Plymale after this date.

a. Plaintiff’s Contentions

Plaintiff’s theory of the case is that defendants Manfredi

and Plymale have a history of making false or inaccurate

statements in police reports to justify the use of excessive

force.

In this case, defendant Plymale’s report stated that

according to plaintiff’s ex-girlfriend, plaintiff is always armed

with a knife. However, officer Ia, the only officer to speak

with plaintiff’s ex-girlfriend, did not include this information

in his report, and it does not appear in any other officer’s

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 Citing Henry v. County of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 518-19 3

(9th Cir. 1997), Judge Beck ordered the City of Fresno in

Rodriguez to provide the requested information for the time

beginning with the start of one of the defendants’ employment

through the present.

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report. Nor is there an assertion officer Ia provided Plymale

with a verbal report of the ex-girlfriend’s alleged statement. 

The Celdon case involved Plymale, Manfredi, and Tymo, the

same officers (and dog) involved in this case. Plaintiff,

therefore, argues the internal affairs investigation into the

Celdon matter is discoverable in this case because it may contain

relevant information relating to defendants Manfredi’s and

Plymale’s making inaccurate statements to justify excessive use

of force. Plaintiff contends that his case is indistinguishable

from Rodriguez v. City of Fresno, 1:05-cv-01017-OWW-DLB (holding

that post-event evidence in section 1983 municipal liability

cases is, at the very least, discoverable).3

Plaintiff contends that defendant Manfredi, as in Rodrigeuz,

falsified police reports and was a supervisor at the scene of the

alleged incident, making Manfredi’s history of complaints and

investigations regarding falsification of reports relevant on the

issues of modus operandi, intent, common scheme or plan, absence

of mistake, and notice to the city and its chief policy-maker of

former and continuing unjustified use of force on suspects,

knowing ratification and disregard of continuing violations of

citizens civil rights for supervisor’s liability and Monell

purposes. Plaintiff further contends that defendant Plymale had

previous claims made against him for use of excessive force and

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that he has been involved in numerous instances both before and

after the incident involving plaintiff where his dog bit a

suspect. Plaintiff also contends that the City of Fresno did not

properly supervise defendant Plymale. 

b. Defendants’ Contentions 

Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the Celdon

matter is not discoverable in this case for several reasons. 

First, the Celdon incident occurred two and one-half years after

the incident involving plaintiff, and such remoteness in time

negates any discoverability under Henry v. County of Shasta, 132

F.3d at 512. Additionally, plaintiff’s case is factually

distinguishable from Henry. Second, Henry does not stand for

the proposition that post-event complaints of excessive force

involving third parties are discoverable. Third, plaintiff

failed to demonstrate how the Celdon matter is relevant and

admissible. Fourth, the Celdon matter is not relevant to the

Monell cause of action because it demonstrates defendant City of

Fresno does not have a custom of ignoring complaints of excessive

force. Fifth, plaintiff’s case is factually distinguishable from

Rodriguez v. City of Fresno, et al., 1:05-cv-01017-OWW-DLB. 

3. Judge Snyder’s Discovery Order

The Discovery Order granting plaintiff’s motion to compel

relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 26(b)(1) and

Henry. Citing Henry for the proposition “we reiterate our rule

that post-event evidence is not only admissible for purposes of

proving the existence of a municipal defendant’s policy or

custom, but is highly probative with respect to that inquiry[,]”

Henry, 132 F.3d at 519, Judge Snyder found “[a]s to both officer

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Manfredi as well as officer Plymale and his canine, Tymo, any and

all information set forth throughout the Celdon IA investigation

is relevant to plaintiff’s claims and is therefore discoverable.” 

Based on this finding, the Discovery Order required

defendants to “provide the requested information relating to

these officers for the time period beginning with the start of

their employment with the Fresno Police Department to the

present, including any and all complaints, investigations,

reports, interviews, etc., in the Celdon matter.” (Doc. 77, p. 6

lns. 10-15). The Discovery Order further required that

“[p]roduction shall include the conclusions and recommendations

from the IA investigations, including Celdon, which are relevant

to Monell issues raised in the complaint.” (Doc. 77, p. 6 lns.

15-17). 

III.Standard of Review

A district judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear

and determine certain pretrial matters before the court,

including motions to compel discovery. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 

The district judge, however, retains authority to reconsider any

pretrial matter “where it has been shown that the magistrate

judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Id.;

Grimes v. City and County of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 240

(9th Cir. 1991); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (The district judge to

whom the case is assigned shall consider such objections and

shall modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge’s

order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.). 

“A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

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evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been committed.” United States v. United States

Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). “An order is contrary to

law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case

law, or rules of procedure.” DeFazio v. Wallis, 459 F. Supp. 2d

159, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 

IV.Law and Analysis

Defendants contend the Discovery Order requiring them to

produce post-incident internal affairs investigations is clearly

erroneous and contrary to law for four reasons. First, the

Discovery Order compelled disclosure of documents beyond the

scope of what plaintiff requested. Second, Henry v. County of

Shasta, 132 F.3d 512 (9th Cir. 1997), a case plaintiff and Judge

Snyder relied on, is not applicable to this case. Third,

Rodriguez v. City of Fresno, et al., 1:05-CV-01017-OWW-DLB, a

case plaintiff and the Discovery Order relied on, is

distinguishable from this case. Fourth, plaintiff’s anticipated

use of internal affairs investigations that occurred after the

incident between plaintiff and defendants are not discoverable or

relevant. 

A. Whether the Discovery Order Comports With the Scope of

Plaintiff’s Discovery Request

Plaintiff requested documents for the time period beginning 

May 10, 2003, and ending March 13, 2006, which represents the

period from the date of the alleged incident to the date of

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 Plaintiff’s discovery request provided: “Please produce 4

all documents in your possession custody or control relating to

complaints from any source concerning excessive use of force on

the part of Officer Sean T. Plymale and Sgt. Michael Manfredi

from the date of the incident to March 13, 2006. This request

includes, but is not limited, to the complaints themselves, any

follow-up internal affairs investigations of the complaints, and

conclusions rendered after the investigations.

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plaintiff’s original discovery request. The Discovery Order, 4

however, required the production of documents “beginning with the

start of [the defendants’] employment to the present, including

any and all complaints, investigations, interviews, etc., in the

Celdon matter.” (Doc. 77 p. 6, lns. 12-15).

Defendants argue that the scope of discovery ordered may

date back 21 years for defendant Manfredi and 12 years for

defendant Plymale. Defendants contend that the Court erred by

ordering the production of documents that were not requested by

plaintiff, that are not relevant, and that will not lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence in this case. Plaintiff

contends that defendants misinterpret both his request and the

Discovery Order.

Plaintiff’s original discovery request spanned from the date

of the incident at issue to the date of the discovery request. 

To the extent the Discovery Order requires production of

information from the start of defendant Manfredi’s and defendant

Plymale’s employment, the Discovery Order exceeded the scope of

the plaintiff’s discovery request. Defendants shall therefore

provide the requested information relating to officers Manfredi

and Plymale from the time period beginning three years prior to

May 10, 2003, to the date of service of this Order. The

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requested information shall include, but is not limited to, all

findings, conclusions, and recommendations in internal affairs

reports or other disciplinary findings entered in the Celdon

matter or other incidents of claimed misconduct regarding

officers Manfredi and Plymale.

B. Whether the Discovery Order’s Reliance on Henry v.

County of Shasta is Contrary to Law

Defendants contend that Henry does not hold that subsequent

complaints of excessive force made against a police officer in a

use of force case are discoverable and distinguishes the current

case from Henry on three grounds. First, the remoteness in time

between the incident at issue in this case and the Celdon matter

negates any possible discovery of the subsequent incident and is

clearly beyond the scope of the time span considered in Henry. 

Second, the cases cited in Henry are not applicable to the

instant matter because they dealt with the department’s response

to the subject incident itself, not a separate incident as in the

current case. Third, the facts in Henry are distinguishable from

the circumstances presented in this case.

Plaintiff argues that the issue is whether evidence from the

Celdon incident itself is reasonably calculated to lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence on any of plaintiff’s theories

of liability.

There is little distinction between Henry and this case. 

The Celdon incident occurred two and one-half years after the

subject incident and the Henry post-incident events occurred two

to three months and two and one-half months after Henry was

arrested. Whether the events are close in time is neither

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dispositive nor probative of whether the Celdon report is

discoverable. Here, plaintiff alleges a continuing pattern of

wrongful misconduct, ratified and condoned by the policy makers

of the Fresno Police Department.

The case for discoverability is stronger than in Henry. 

Henry involved an appeal of the granting of a summary judgment

motion, in which the court found that post-incident evidence was

admissible. This motion is for discovery under FRCP 26(b)(1),

which sets forth a broader standard than that for admissibility

of evidence. Rule 26(b)(1) provides as follows:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any

matter, not privileged, which is relevant to

the claim or defense of any party, including

the existence, description, nature, custody,

condition, and location of any books,

documents, or other tangible things and the

identity and location of persons having

knowledge of any discoverable matter...The

information sought need not be admissible at

trial if the information sought appears

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery

of admissible evidence.

For the Celdon matter to be discoverable, it need not be

admissible at trial; it only needs to appear “reasonably

calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence.” 

Discovery of the Celdon matter is relevant to the

plaintiff’s Monell theories. Stringent relevancy standards would

cause difficulties for plaintiffs because it is unlikely that

they know the exact content of confidential police files. Kelly

v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 667-68 (N.D. Cal. 1987). It

should be “sufficient for a [p]laintiff to show how information

of the kind that is likely to be in the files could lead to

admissible evidence.” Id. At 668. The reasoning in Kelly is

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persuasive. Under Kelly’s reasoning, the plaintiff’s request for

discovery of the Celdon matter is relevant and is not overbroad. 

The time distinction between the two cases does not affect

the discoverability of the Celdon matter. However, it may bear

on the sufficiency of notice the city had regarding the officers’

action, and ultimately to the success of plaintiff’s Monell

claim. Remoteness in time goes to weight of the evidence, not

whether the Celdon matter is discoverable.

Further, Judge Snyder reviewed in camera, substantial

quantities of information and determined that portions were

relevant to plaintiff’s claims and are discoverable. FRCP 72(a)

provides magistrate judges with broad discretion in resolving

discovery disputes. The standard of review is lenient and

deferential to the magistrate judge. See Clark v. Milam, 847 F.

Supp. 424, 424-25 (S.D. W. Va. 1994). Judge Snyder’s Discovery

Order requiring defendants to produce certain information

contained in the the Celdon matter is not contrary to law.

Defendants argue that the Larez, McRorie, and Grandstaff

cases cited in Henry, are not applicable to the current case and

do not hold that other unrelated complaints of excessive force

against defendant officers are discoverable. Defendants contend

that the post-event evidence in such cases is the department’s

response to the subject incident itself, not other incidents. 

Defendants further contend that the Henry facts are

distinguishable from the this case because Henry cites cases

where “the county permitted an almost identical incident as that

complained of by Henry to occur after the county was sued and

after being put on notice unequivocally of its deputies’ and

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nurses’ unconstitutional treatment of Henry.” Id. at 519. It is

not the province of a district court to decide whether the Ninth

Circuit correctly relied on out-of-circuit cases when deciding

Henry. Rather, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Henry binds this

Court. According to Henry, “...post-event evidence is not only

admissible for purposes of proving the existence of a municipal

defendant’s policy or custom, but is highly probative with

respect to that inquiry.” Id. At 519.

This case is not factually distinguishable from Henry. 

While the defendants contend that Henry involved jail strip

search and this case involved an arrest with excessive force by a

canine, and false reports to provide probable cause, this

discrepancy is insignificant because both cases involve a

municipal defendant and its policies or customs. Furthermore,

both cases involve post-incident events that are separate

incidents that could demonstrate the existence of a municipal

defendant’s policy or custom. This case is not factually

distinguishable from Henry and the Discovery Order is not

contrary to law.

C. Whether Rodriguez v. City of Fresno Can Be

Distinguished

Defendants argue that there are significant differences

between the current case and Rodriguez v. City of Fresno. First,

the extended time span distinguishes the case from Henry. The

Celdon incident occurred approximately seven months after the

Rodriguez incident, while the Celdon incident occurred

approximately two and a half years after the Gonzalez incident. 

Second, Judge Beck’s findings in Rodriguez were based upon the

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plaintiff’s allegations that defendant Manfredi acted with

Officer Tafoya in falsifying police reports. In this case, there

could not be any complicity in falsifying a report because

defendant Manfredi did not prepare any reports related to

plaintiff’s arrest. Third, Judge Beck never ruled that the

Celdon investigation should be disclosed, as the case was

resolved while he was in the process of conducting an in camera

review of the Fresno Police Department files.

Plaintiff responds by stating that the underlying factual

allegations of excessive force and falsification of police

reports in Rodriguez are indistinguishable from Gonzalez and the

reasoning of Judge Beck’s decision is equally valid and

compelling. 

As previously explained, the time distinction between the

two cases does not affect the discoverability of the Celdon

matter.

Even if Sergeant Manfredi did not prepare any reports

related to plaintiff’s arrest, Manfredi was a supervisor at the

scene. As a supervisor, Manfredi likely set the tone for his

subordinate officers’ actions, and his history of complaints or

investigations of excessive force are entirely relevant and

discoverable.

Although Judge Beck never rendered a decision regarding the

disclosure of the Celdon matter in Rodriguez, the Discovery Order

did not misapply the Rodriguez case. The Discovery Order also

correctly relies on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Henry, which

is binding on all lower courts in this circuit.

D. Whether Plaintiff’s Anticipated Use of the Celdon

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Matter Internal Affairs Investigation Renders It

Discoverable

Defendants argue that the information in the Celdon matter

would not be admissible or relevant. Plaintiff argues that

information sought need not be admissible at trial as long as it

“appears reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible

evidence.” FRCP 26(b)(1). Whether information sought would be

admissible at trial is not the test to determine whether

information is discoverable. The test is, as plaintiff correctly

points out, that relevant information may be discoverable if it

“appears reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible

evidence.” FRCP 26(b)(1). FRCP 26 permits discovery of

inadmissible facts that appear reasonably calculated to lead to

the discovery of admissible evidence. Thompson v. Department of

Housing and Urban Dev., 199 F.R.D. 168, 171 (D. Md. 2001). 

Defendants’ argument that information in the Celdon matter is

inadmissible fails as a matter of law as it misconstrues the

standard governing discoverability under FRCP 26. The Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Henry controls the discoverability and

admissibility of post-event evidence. “We reiterate our rule

that post-event evidence is not only admissible for purposes of

proving the existence of a municipal defendant’s policy or

custom, but is highly probative with respect to that inquiry.”

Henry, 132 F.3d at 519. The facts of this case do not dictate a

different result. Under FRCP 26 and Henry, information regarding

officers Manfredi and Plymale are discoverable; the Discovery

Order is not contrary to law.

 

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V. Conclusion

The Discovery Order is not clearly erroneous or contrary to

law. Defendants’ request to reconsider the Discovery Order is

DENIED, subject to the following clarification: 

Defendants shall provide the requested information

relating to officers Manfredi and Plymale from the time

period beginning three years prior to May 10, 2003, to

the date of service of this Order. The requested

information shall include, but is not limited to, all

findings, conclusions, and recommendations in internal

affairs reports or other disciplinary findings entered in

the Celdon matter or other incidents of claimed

misconduct regarding officers Manfredi and Plymale.

Counsel for defendants shall arrange for production of the

internal affairs and personnel records relating to the Celdon

matter and any other misconduct by either defendant officer

within ten (10) business days after service by the Clerk of this

Order.

Counsel for defendants shall also arrange to pick up the

packet of documents produced for the in camera review relating to

this discovery dispute within ten (10) business days after

service by the Clerk of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 20, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

474bb4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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