Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-03000/USCOURTS-ca10-88-03000-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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., 

FILED 

Uol 8TMo1Colrtoff\~ 

UNITED STATES couRT OF APPEALS Tenth Clrruit 

TENTH CIRCUIT JUN 2 7 1990 

.&OBERT L. HOECKER 

JEROME T. LOPEZ, ) Clerk 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

& ) 

) 

ADELE GRAHAM and DAVID ) 

GRAHAM, ) 

) 

Appellants, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY; ) 

DARLENE FOSTER; and ) 

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ) 

ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL ) 

2300, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

No. 88-3000 

(D.C. No. 83-C-692) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

f d . . d ** Be ore ANDERSON, BALDOCK, an EBEL, Circuit Ju ges. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant, Jerome Lopez, and his trial attorneys, 

appellants Adele and David Graham, appeal from the district 

court's award of attorney's fees in favor of defendants-appellees, 

Western Electric, IBEW Local 2300 and Darlene Foster. At the 

conclusion of Lopez' trial evidence, the court granted defendants 

motions to dismiss his Title VII claims and concluded that the 

defendants were "entitled to recover their attorneys' fees and 

costs from the plaintiff and his attorneys pursuant to the 

provisions of Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. P., 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 28 

U.S.C. § 1927 and the inherent powers of this court to correct 

abuses of its process that occur in its presence." 

We have reviewed the entire record in this matter including 

the district court's "memorandum findings of fact, conclusions of 

law and order on Title VII claims" and "order setting attorney's 

fees," and affirm the award of attorneys' fees substantially for 

the reasons stated in these orders, copies of which are attached 

hereto. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

-2-

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 2 
MAq 2 0 1986 

IN THE 

FOR 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUR'- ~ 

THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO -, / 

Ci vil Action No. 

JEROME T. LOPEZ, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

83-C-692 

WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al., 

Defendants. 

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MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 

ON TITLE VII CLAIMS 

CARRIGAN, J. 

. - - ' . 

This matter came on for trial beginning Monday, May 6, 

1985. On the morning trial began, before jury selection, the 

p l a i ntiff's counsel moved to dismiss, as to all defendants, the 

claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and those claims were dismissed 

wi th prejudice. The case proceeded to jury trial on claims 

against the employer Western Electric Company {now known as AT&T 

Technologies, Inc.) for breach of the collective bargaining 

agreement and against the defendant union, IBEW Local 2300, for 

a l leged breach of its duty of fair representation in the handling 

of the plaintiff's grievance. Tried to the court at the same time 

were the plaintiff's claims of national orig in and sex 

d i scrimination against Western Electric and the plaintiff's 

supervisor, Darlene Foster, and his claims of national origin 

d iscrimination against Local 2300. 

The plaintiff rested his case at the end of the third day 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 3 
.. _ .. _......_ ,_ .. 

of trial, having called a total of nine witnesses, most of whom 

were called as adverse witnesses. After the plaintiff rested, the 

court granted defense motions to dismiss the Title VII claims as 

to all defendants, and directed a verdict in favor of the 

defendants on the plaintiff's Section 301 hybrid action against 

the company and the union (29 u.s.c. S 185). 

Jurisdiction of the claims affected by this memorandum is 

not disputed; it arises out of 42 U.S.C. S 2000e il ~ This 

memorandum constitutes the findings and conclusions required by 

Rule 5 2 (a) Fed. R. Ci v. P. 

I. Findings of Fact. 

With respect to the actions pursuant to Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court makes the following findings 

of fact: 

A. Claim Against Western Electric Company 

The plaintiff at various times described himself as a 

Mexicano, Chicano, Hispanic, or of the Brown Race. He was 

employed at the defendant Western Electric Company's Denver Works 

in April 1979. The Denver Works is a large manufacturing facility 

and the plaintiff was an hourly employee assigned to assembly line 

type work. The hourly employees at the works are represented by 

IBEW Local 2300 which negotiated a collective bargaining agreement 

with the company known as the "General Agreement." 

Some time in late 1981 or early 1982, the plaintiff's 

supervisor, Darlene Foster, moved him from a job in which he 

applied epoxy to circuit boards to the job of "gold finger 

washer." The plaintiff complained to his union that he was being 

? 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 4 
taken off an easy job that he described as •woman's work" and put 

on a job that made him work harder. At that time, his union 

advised him that his supervisor had the authority under the 

General Agreement to assign him to any work within his grade 

level. 

On March 3, 1982, the plaintiff quit his job. Sometime 

thereafter he began to claim that his employment had been 

terminated under circumstances that he felt entitled him to 

commence this lawsuit. 

A fellow employee named Steve Becker had been assigned, 

with the plaintiff, to gold finger washing. This job involved 

washing the gold end contact points of circuit boards in either an 

automatic machine or by hand in a pan with brushes attached. Both 

the plaintiff and Becker were required to perform the same duties. 

However, if work was slack, the supervisor, Foster, on occasion 

"loaned" the plaintiff to another section or department. The 

supervisor selected the plaintiff to loan, rather than Becker, 

because Becker was faster at gold finger washing and could keep up 

with both his assembly line and the plaintiff's line when the 

plaintiff was absent on other assignments. There was no dispute 

at the trial that Becker was a faster worker. As will be seen, 

the main thrust of the plaintiff's complaint was that Becker was 

favored over him in work assignments because the plaintiff was 

Hispanic. 

On March 3, 1982, the plaintiff and Becker got into an 

argument over their respective work assignments. A layout 

operator, after checking with Darlene Foster, requested that 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 5 
the plaintiff go and work in another section where assistance was 

needed. This move would have had the incidental advantage of 

separating the protagonists, the plaintiff and Becker. Al though 

the layout operator had authority delegated from the supervisor to 

assign employees to other work, the plaintiff refused her 

instructions and insisted that only the supervisor, Foster, could 

order him to work in another area. 

Foster returned to the work area and was told of the events 

by the layout opera tor. Foster, as the plaintiff's supervisor, 

then personally directed him to go to another area to wash gold 

fingers. Plaintiff complained that he, and not Becker, was always 

being "loaned out" to other work areas. Foster explained that 

Becker was not loaned out because Becker was faster at the work. 

Plaintiff then refused to go to the other work area and 

declared that he "quit." Foster requested that the plaintiff 

complete certain paper work to terminate his job, but he refused. 

Then to emphasize his resignation, he threw his premises pass on 

Foster's desk and said, "I don't need this f---ing job, anyway." 

He then left the plant. 

somewhat different, did 

Plaintiff's version of the facts, _while 

not refute that he refused a work 

assignment, turned in his pass, and went home without following 

the established, appropriate procedures. On the basis of the 

evidence, I find and conclude that during this incident on March 

2, 1982, the plaintiff intended voluntarily to terminate his 

employment and his own statements and actions effectively did 

terminate it. 

The complaint and the amended complaints and other 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 6 
pleadings (including proposed jury instructions) submitted by the 

plaintiff's attorneys all relied on a theory of discrimination 

based upon the asserted fact that Becker had received preferential 

treatment over the plaintiff and that Becker was an Anglo. This 

was all the evidence the plaintiff had to support his claim of 

disparate treatment. At the trial, however, it was established by 

undisputed evidence from Becker and others, that Becker was also 

Hispanic (his father was named Gonzales and his mother named 

Padilla), and that he was recorded as Hispanic in the company 

records. Becker had changed his name from Gonzales to that of his 

stepfather, Becker, after his Hispanic mother had remarried. 

More importantly, it was undisputed that at all material 

times the plaintiff was fully aware of the fact that Becker 

claimed to be Hispanic, but the plaintiff testified that he did 

not believe Becker. Ms. Foster testified that she thought Becker 

might be Hispanic but did not pay any attention to the fact 

because his national origin was never taken into consideration in 

her management of the group. Becker testified that the 

plaintiff's attorneys never contacted him to ask whether he was or 

was not an Anglo, even though that fact was critical to their 

prima facie case and had been represented to the court repeatedly. 

Plaintiff also maintained that there was disparate 

treatment evidenced by the company's handling of an incident in 

1977 in which an Anglo employee had left the job without 

permission and was only punished with a one-day suspension. 

However, that employee, Clark Reeh, testified when called as a 

witness by the plaintiff, that he never had refused his 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 7 
supervisor's orders and never, through words or actions, evidenced 

an intention to quit his job. I find that there was no similarity 

between the actions of the Anglo employee in 1977 and the 

plaintiff's actions on March 3, 1982. Since the actions were not 

similar, the treatment was not disparate and could not furnish 

evidence of -r aee-e-r- national orig in discrimination. 

B. Claim Against Darlene Foster 

Plaintiff named as a party defendant in the Title VII claim 

his supervisor, Darlene Foster. However, Ms. Foster was not named 

as a respondent in the Charge of Discrimination filed with the 

EEOC nor was she identified in the body of the charge. She never 

received a copy of the charge or of the Notice of Right to Sue, 

nor was she ever invited to participate in any conciliation 

proceeding. Foster's only involvement with the administrative 

procedure was to respond to questions asked of her by the 

company's EEO coordinator who was responsible for preparing a 

position statement to the EEOC on behalf of the company. Ms. 

Foster never saw the position statement, nor did she have any 

role in its preparation other than to respond to questions in a 

telephone conversation. It was not even clear from the evidence 

that Ms. Foster was told by the EEO coordinator for the company 

that the reason for the questions was to prepare a response to a 

formal charge of discrimination. 

Plaintiff claims that he did inform the EEOC of Ms. 

Foster's identity, but he has no explanation for why he signed the 

charge containing language that does not identify her. 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 8 
C. Claim Against Local 2300 

Plaintiff contacted Local 2300 on March 4, 1982 to arrange 

an appointment to discuss his resignation. He was referred to 

Kristy Kretzer, a steward for Local 2300. Ms. Kretzer was 

assigned to act as the plaintiff's steward because she was the 

steward for Ms. Foster's section. Ms. Kretzer spoke to the 

plaintiff on March 4 and set an appointment to meet with him on 

March 5. 

In their meeting on March 5, the plaintiff told Ms. Kretzer 

that he had become upset at work because he was to be loaned for 

work in another area. He stated that after getting upset with his 

supervisor, he had given up his pass and had quit. Plaintiff also 

told Ms. Kretzer that there had been a witness to the incident --

Beverly Griego. He never mentioned his race, sex, national 

origin, or discrimination to Ms. Kretzer or anyone else 

representing Local 2300. 

After meeting with the plaintiff, Ms. Kretzer investigated 

the incident. She contacted Beverly Griego and was told by Ms. 

Griego that the latter had not witnessed the incident. Beverly 

Griego testified and confirmed that Ms. Kretzer had contacted her 

in the investigation and that she had told Ms. Kretzer that she 

had not been a witness to the incident. Ms. Kretzer further 

investigated where the plaintiff had been loaned. She discovered 

that he had always been loaned to the same department and, while 

on loan, had been given duties very similar to his gold fingering 

duties. After learning this, Ms. Kretzer explained to the 

plaintiff that his being loaned didn't affect his bonus since he 

., 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 9 
was already a group member. Ms. Kretzer also spoke to other 

possible witnesses in the area in which the plaintiff had worked. 

Since the plaintiff had admitted that he had not been fired 

but had quit his job, and Ms. Kretzer's investigation confirmed 

his statements, Local 2300 argued to the company that the 

plaintiff had been overwrought that day and that the company 

should show leniency by letting him withdraw his resignation and 

return to work. The company consistently responded that the 

plaintiff had clearly intended to resign that day and that it 

would not allow him to withdraw his resignation. 

Plaintiff was informed of the argument made on his behalf 

and the company's response after each step of the grievance 

process. At no time did the plaintiff ever complain about the 

argument made on his behalf or suggest to anyone from Local 2300 

any additional arguments that should be asserted on his behalf. 

Local 2300 processed plaintiff's grievance through all five 

steps of the grievance procedure. After exhausting these steps 

for the plaintiff, it became necessary for a decision to be made 

whether to take the plaintiff's grievance to ar bi tr a tion. This 

decision was made by a committee called the grievance committee. 

The committee consisted of four people Judy Williams, 

President; Ed DeFeyter, Vice President; Virginia Burgard; and 

Cheryl Schlenker. Ms. Burgard had been present at steps 4 and 5 

of the plaintiff's grievance proceedings and Ms. Williams had been 

present at step 5. 

The committee's determination was based on whether 

the plaintiff's grievance had sufficient merit to be successful at 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 10 
arbitration. The committee determined that it did not have 

sufficient merit. In reaching this conclusion, the committee 

examined the evidence that the plaintiff had voluntarily quit his 

job. They searched for any previous grievances that were possibly 

similar. The only similar grievance found was for an Anglo female 

-- Carlene Silchak. Ms. Silchak, who is the daughter of President 

Williams, had resigned under pressure. The grievance for Ms. 

Silchak was also unsuccessful. The committee also reviewed 

published arbitration decisions concerning resignations and could 

not find any that would support a successful arbitration. Ms. 

Williams also considered the Reeh grievance and found it to be 

dissimilar to the plaintiff's grievance inasmuch as Mr. Reeh had 

not resigned his job. 

II. Conclusions of Law - Title VII Claims 

This court has jurisdiction over the claims advanced by 

the plaintiff against Western Electric and Local 2300 under Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e il ll.9,• 

Those claims are to be decided by the court rather than the jury. 

However, I ruled at the close of the plaintiff's case that 

this court does not have jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims 

against the individual defendant, Darlene Foster, because she was 

not named in the charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC. 

Although the plaintiff may have informed the EEOC of Ms. Foster's 

identity, I do not find that fact dispositive. Under the test 

adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Romero v. Union Pac. R. R., 615 

F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1980), Ms. Foster was entitled to notice of 

the plaintiff's intention to proceed against her individually, and 

9 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 11 
., 

the plaintiff has not satisfactorily explained his failure to give 

her notice and an opportunity to participate as a party in the 

administrative proceedings. The claims against Ms. Foster, 

therefore, must be dismissed for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Even if Ms. Foster had been named in the charge, 

the action against her would be dismissed for the reasons stated 

below. 

This court finds that the plaintiff has failed to meet his 

burden of proof that the defendant Western Electric Company 

discriminated against him on the basis of either his national 

origin or sex. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 

(1973); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 

248 (1981). Although this court does not believe that the 

plaintiff established a prima facie case, the presentation of the 

evidence by the plaintiff including several adverse witnesses he 

called, established the leg i tirna te reasons for the def end ant's 

actions. Plaintiff clearly failed to carry his ultimate burden of 

proving that Western Electric's actions were motivated by 

intentional discrimination on the basis of national origin or sex. 

See, Nulf v. International Paper Co., 656 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 

1981). 

Moreover, the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence that 

Local 2300 discr irninated against him in violation of Title VII. 

He complained that he had been given a "rookie" for a steward, and 

that she did not know what she was doing. The evidence 

established that stewards were assigned areas of the plant 

corresponding to the supervisors' respective work areas. Ms. 

,n 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 12 
Kretzer was assigned Darlene Foster's area. The assignment of Ms. 

Kretzer to this area had nothing to do with the plaintiff's race, 

color, or national origin. 

Plaintiff also complained that he did not think that Local 

2300 was doing a good job with his grievance. In this regard, I 

credit the testimony of Ms. Williams and Ms. Kretzer that 

the plaintiff never complained about the union's handling of the 

grievance. Furthermore, the plaintiff never submitted any 

evidence to connect the union's handling of his grievance to his 

race, color, or national origin. 

In a Title VII "disparate treatment" case, the ultimate 

burden to persuade remains with the plaintiff. Plaintiff failed 

completely in meeting this burden. Therefore, Local 2300's Motion 

to Dismiss his claim against it is granted, and the plaintiff's 

Title VII action against Local 2300 is dismissed with prejudice. 

It is ordered that the claims against all defendants based 

upon Title VII 42 U.S.C. S 2000e et ~, are hereby dismissed 

with prejudice. 

This court further finds and concludes that the case for 

discrimination was so totally lacking in merit as to be frivolous, 

ground less, and unreasonable, entitling the de fend ants to 

attorneys' fees against the plaintiff and the plaintiff's 

attorneys pursuant to the standard announced by the Supreme Court 

in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). 

It seems inconceivable that the plaintiff's attorneys, as 

they claim, could have pursued this case for nearly two years 

without investigating and finding out that Mr. Becker was also 

11 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 13 
Hispanic and was perceived by the company and his supervisor to be 

Hispanic. Plaintiff even admitted that Mr. Becker told him that 

Mr. Becker was Hispanic and offered as his only defense for his 

actions the fact that he chose not to believe it. 

Several actions of the plaintiff's attorneys also violated 

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in representing to 

the court both facts and law that were not well grounded nor 

formed after reasonable inquiry nor made on a good faith argument 

for any modification of existing law. 

trial of this action, it appeared 

During the three days of 

to this court that the 

plaintiff's attorneys were wasting the time of the court and the 

jury, as well as opposing parties and counsel, to conduct 

discovery rather than to put on a well-organized presentation of 

evidence. Plaintiff's attorneys repeatedly failed to comply with 

the rules of this court concerning trial preparation and 

submitting trial materials sufficiently in advance of trial to 

allow the court to b e adequately prepared. 

Plaintiff's attorneys submitted proposed jury instructions 

with case authority that, not only did not support the proposed 

instructions, but in some instances supported the opposite 

contention. Moreover, they cited authority that had since been 

overruled by the Supreme Court. They also submitted numerous jury 

instructions on the claim of protected concerted activity which 

had been dismissed by this court long in advance of the trial. 

They called several witnesses and challenged the witnesses on 

their testimony that the plaintiff shared incentive pay with the 

entire group of workers. At the end of the second afternoon, the 

12 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 14 
attorney for the defendant company made a motion to restrict the 

testimony of the witness who would appear the next morning as the 

fourth witness to the subject of incentive pay. Plaintiff's 

attorneys represented to the court that this person, if permitted 

to testify, would offer entirely different facts concerning the 

incentive pay plan. On that representation, this court permitted 

the fourth witness to testify concerning the incentive pay plan. 

That witness, just like all the previous witnesses, confirmed that 

an employee in the incentive pay group shared the pay of all the 

members of the group regardless of whether he met his individual 

efficiency. 

What was most appalling to this court was the fact that the 

plaintiff himself, as the last witness, confirmed what the company 

and the union had been saying all through the trial -- that the 

plaintiff was in an incentive pay group and shared the incentive 

pay of the entire group. The foregoing examples of the conduct of 

the plaintiff and his attorneys are representative of many others 

that occurred throughout the trial. 

It is ordered that the plaintiff's complaint and action be 

dismissed with prejudice, as to all matters except attorneys' 

fees, costs and sanctions. 

I conclude that the defendants are entitled to recover 

their attorneys' fees and costs from the plaintiff and his 

at~orneys pursuant to the provisions of Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. P., 

42 u.s.c. § 1988, 28 u.s.c. S 1927 and the inherent powers of this 

court to correct abuses of its process that occur in its presence. 

Counsel are ordered to confer in person within the next twenty 

13 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 15 
days and agree upon a fair and reasonable amount to compensate 

each defendant for fees and costs, then jointly submit a proposed 

order. To the extent there is not agreement, either party shall 

apply for an expedited hearing at which any still outstanding 

issues will be resolved. 

Dated at Denver, Colorado, March 19, 1986. 

ENTERED 

""lME OOO<ET 

MAR 201986 

,/' 

l 

BY THE 

) 

14 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 16 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

JUDGE JIM R. CARRIGAN 

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 

I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 

Order signed by Judge Carrigan to: 

Jonathan Wilderman, Esq. 

4155 E. Jewell Ave., #500 

Denver, CO 80222 

Adele Graham, Esq. 

320 Paseo De Peralta, Suite D 

Santa Fe, NM 87501 

Lee Dale, Esq. 

633 Seventeenth St. 

Denver, CO 80202 

Dated: March 19, 1986 

Re: 83-C-692 

15 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 17 
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.::Jill ___________ __,, ....... __ _ 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

YILED ~ /1, I ~ ~ CASE NO. 83-C-692 

JEROME T. LOPEZ, 

Plaintiff, 

United States Distriot Court . Denver, Colorado 

J ... a B~ Manspeaker, Clerk 

.,.~,·;•·0,.wl M-4---

v. ~:~ · · ~ ~ hput7 Clerk 

WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY, DARLENE FOSTER, AND INTERNATIONAL 

BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS LOCAL 2300, 

Defendants. 

ORDER SETTING ATTORNEY'S FEES 

This matter came on for hearing before the court on May 9, 

1986, for purposes of setting the amount of attorney's fees to 

be awarded to the defendants in accordance with this court's 

order dated March 19, 1986. The court having reviewed the 

stipulations, arguments, and prior briefs of the parties makes 

the following findings and conclusions regarding the award of 

attorney's fees. 

The court's order of March 19, 1986, contains my findings 

supporting the conclusion that the actions of plaintiff and his 

counsel, Adele Graham and David Graham, were frivolous, 

g r oundless and unreasonable under the standard established by 

the Supreme Court in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 

U.S. 412 (1978). The defendants are entitled to their full 

attorney's fees under this statutory authority even though the 

lawsuit involved multiple claims. It is apparent that the 

claims of racial discrimination were at the base of all of the 

claims and the work required by the defendants' attorneys was 

• 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 18 
necessary to defend the racial discrimination charge under Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Even if the defendants 

could not recover their total fees under Title VII, the 

plaintiff's attorneys violated other rules and statutes which 

combined would certainly entitle the defendants to any amount of 

fees not otherwise attributable to the defense of the Title VII 

case. In addition, fees are awardable under 42 u.s.c. §1988 in 

favor of the defendants. 

The court further finds that the facts enumerated in the 

order of March 19, 1986, also support the conclusion that the 

proceedings were unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied by the 

actions of plaintiff's counsel. Therefore, the court finds and 

concludes that the plaintiff's counsel are liable for the fees 

of the defendants' attorneys for violation of 28 U.S.C. §1927. 

Further, the actions of the plaintiff's counsel throughout 

the pendency of the case, with respect to the issue of Mr. 

Becker's ethnicity and the baseless claim under other theories 

of recovery, some of which were disposed of by summary judgment, 

also violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Throughout the trial the plaintiff's attorneys made a multitude 

of representations to the court and submitted jury instructions 

and other statements of law which constituted violation of Rule 

11 and justify imposition of sanctions in the amount of the 

attorney's fees of the defendants. The purpose of these 

sanctions is to reimburse the legal expenses unfairly and 

irresponsibly imposed on the defendants as well as to deter the 

plaintiff's attorneys from similar conduct in the future. 

Finally, this court has inherent power to impose sanctions 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 19 
against both parties and counsel to correct abuses of its 

process that occur in its presence. I find and conclude that 

the entire conduct of this case and the trial constituted such 

an abuse and merits the imposition of these sanctions. 

The court rejects the arguments of the plaintiff's counsel 

to the effect that the defendants are responsible by virture of 

their failure to obtain summary judgment of the Title VII issue 

on the basis of Mr. Becker's ethnicity. The court also rejects 

the argument of the plaintiff's attorneys that the court must 

make some apportionment of the fees as between the various 

violations of statute and rule cited herein. 

The court has also considered the financial status of the 

plaintiff and his asserted inability to satisfy a substantial 

judgment for attorney's fees. However, the court finds that the 

actions of the plaintiff in the case, together with the fact 

that his attorneys are jointly and severally liable for the 

judgment, justifies the court in imposing judgment against the 

plaintiff for a substantial portion of the defendants• attorneys 

fees. The plaintiff's unbelievable testimony at the trial and 

the representations to his attorneys regarding the facts of his 

case outweigh the consideration the court gave to his apparent 

inability to answer for the judgment herein. 

Although the plaintiff and his attorneys resist the award of 

the full fee to the attorneys for the defendants they do 

stipulate as to the fair and reasonable amount of the fees. 

Therefore, there is no issue before the court as to the 

reasonableness of the number of hours or the hourly rates of the 

respective defendants' attorneys. Pursuant to that stipulation 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 20 
·J 

as to amounts, this court awards judgment in favor of the 

defendants AT&T Technologies (formerly the Western Electric 

Company) and Darlene Foster in the amount of $30,000 and in 

favor of the defendant Local 2300 of the International 

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers the amount of $12,000 together 

with statutory interest from the date of this order. 

Dated at Denver, Colorado, November 17, 1988. 

B 

_JIM R. CARRIGAN 

{ 

:UNITED STATES DIST I . 

' I 

4 

ENTERED 

ON THE DOCKEi 

NOV 18198S 

..:A!{ER 

CLER!i 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 21 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

JUDGE JIM R. CARRIGAN 

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 

I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the Order 

signed by Judge Carrigan to: 

Carl Stahl, Esq. 

1610 Wynkoop st. #250 

Denver, co 80202 

Lee Dale, Esq. 

633 17th St. #290 

Denver, CO 80202 

Jonathan Willderman, Esq. 

4155 E. Jewell Ave. 

Denver, CO 80222 

(;~-qi-~ 

~~ 

~~ 

/' tJ /h;<' qS-.:?;;;.. 

; d1P / /II JM1 ?7->7 / 

Deputy Cler'k 

/8 Dated: November ...l-?', 1988 

Re:83-C-692 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-3000 Document: 010110037450 Date Filed: 06/27/1990 Page: 22