Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-03213/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-03213-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VASCO ESPINOZA,

Plaintiff,

v.

PATRICK A. CORVINGTON, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No. 2:10-CV-03213 JAM-GGH

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Patrick A. 

Corvington and Corporation for National and Community Service’s 

(“CNCS”) (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #18).1 

Plaintiff Vasco Espinoza (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion with 

respect to Defendant Corvington, but does not oppose dismissal of 

CNCS or the Doe defendants (Doc. # 22). Defendant Patrick 

Corvington, Chief Executive Officer of CNCS, is designated by CNCS 

as its representative against whom any civil action should be 

filed. Defendants filed a reply (Doc. #23). 

 

1

This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was originally 

scheduled on February 8, 2012. 

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action originated when Plaintiff filed a complaint (Doc. 

#2) with this Court on December 1, 2010. The allegations in the 

complaint focus on two interrelated series of events during 

Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant Corporation for National and 

Community Service. First, Plaintiff alleges that he was demoted in 

retaliation for reporting misconduct at CNCS to the Office of the 

Inspector General (“OIG”), thereby precipitating an investigation 

into certain practices at CNCS. Second, Plaintiff alleges that a 

subordinate employee, Willie Holmes, created a hostile work 

environment for Plaintiff by engaging in aggressive and threatening 

behavior. Mr. Holmes was the Facilities Manager within the 

Operations Department. Plaintiff alleges that this behavior was 

not properly addressed by their mutual supervisors, Merlene Mazyck 

and James Phipps. 

A. Plaintiff’s Promotion

Plaintiff alleges that he was given a new title on June 3, 

2008. Plaintiff claims that his title was changed from Deputy 

Director of Operations to Deputy Director to reflect expanded 

duties. Plaintiff asserts that his compensation and benefits were 

unchanged. Plaintiff considered this to be a promotion, but does 

not allege that it was so characterized by CNCS. 

B. The OIG Investigation

Central to Plaintiff’s allegations is an investigation 

allegedly started by Plaintiff’s report to the OIG that certain 

employees, particularly Mr. Holmes, were engaged in accounting and 

operational improprieties at CNCS. Plaintiff alleges that he made 

a report to the OIG shortly before December 1, 2008. Plaintiff was 

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allegedly contacted by the National Director of CNCS, Ms. Mazcyk,

to verify that he made the report to the OIG. The next month, 

January 2009, Plaintiff alleges that his title was changed back to 

Deputy Director of Operations. The allegations in the complaint 

indicate that his salary and benefits were not reduced. Plaintiff 

alleges that his title was changed “to undermine his status on 

campus, and to retaliate against him for his contact and 

cooperation with the Office of the Inspector General.” Complaint ¶

11. 

C. Plaintiff’s Allegations Regarding Mr. Holmes

Plaintiff’s complaint also includes allegations that a 

subordinate employee was given favorable treatment because of his 

race to Plaintiff’s detriment. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Holmes 

was generally threatening, aggressive, and hostile toward Plaintiff

and other employees. Plaintiff alleges that he first complained to 

superiors at CNCS about Mr. Holmes in May, 2008. In June, 2008 

Plaintiff alleges that he again reported Mr. Holmes’s behavior, 

which resulted in the issuance of a “Notice of Formal Reprimand” on 

August 19, 2008. On October 16, 2008, Plaintiff alleges that he 

again complained about Mr. Holmes’s behavior. This complaint 

resulted in Mr. Holmes being placed on administrative leave. Mr. 

Holmes was given a 30 day suspension, and allowed to return to CNCS 

in January, 2009. Plaintiff alleges that the original 

recommendation was to terminate Mr. Holmes, but that the 

recommendation was downgraded to a suspension.

At some time after that, Plaintiff alleges that the OIG 

investigation confirmed improper operational and fiscal activities 

on the part of Mr. Holmes. The then acting National Director of 

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CNCS, Mikel Herrington, issued a “Notice of Proposed Removal,” 

Plaintiff alleges, and Mr. Holmes subsequently stepped down from 

his position at CNCS. 

Plaintiff alleges that CNCS supervisors James Phipps and 

Merlene Mazyck, both African American, failed to properly deal with 

complaints directed toward Mr. Holmes by Plaintiff and other 

employees because Mr. Holmes is also African American.

D. Claims

Plaintiff’s complaint contains nine claims. Claims 2-5 and 8 

were voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff on November 16, 2011. (Doc. 

#16) Defendants’ current motion seeks dismissal of the remaining 

claims: (1) Retaliation in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; (6) 

Discrimination Based on Race in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; 

(7) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (9) Negligent 

Supervision, Hiring, and Retention. 

The Court has jurisdiction over the federal claims pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1331 and jurisdiction over the remaining claims 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

1. Motion to Dismiss

A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In considering a motion to dismiss, the 

court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw 

all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. 

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by

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Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 

322 (1972). Assertions that are mere “legal conclusions,” however, 

are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a 

plaintiff needs to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

Dismissal is appropriate where the plaintiff fails to state a claim 

supportable by a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica 

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Upon granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim, the court has discretion to allow leave to amend the

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 

“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not 

appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not 

be saved by amendment.” Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 

316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Discussion

1. Defendant CNCS and Doe Defendants

Defendants seek dismissal of CNCS and the Doe defendants, and 

Plaintiff does not oppose dismissal. Accordingly, CNCS and the Doe 

Defendants are dismissed from this action with prejudice. 

2. Claims Seven and Nine

Defendants argue that these claims should be dismissed because 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust agency remedies as required by the 

Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Plaintiff does not

oppose Defendants’ motion with regard to these claims. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss claims seven and nine is

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granted with prejudice. 

3. Plaintiff’s Title VII Retaliation Claim

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim 

because they argue that the complaint fails to allege 1) that 

Plaintiff engaged in activity protected by Title VII, 2) that 

Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, and 3) that there 

was a causal link between an adverse employment action and alleged 

protected activity. In short, Defendants argue that Plaintiff 

failed to allege a violation of Title VII. 

Plaintiff responds that the report he made to the OIG as well 

as the complaints about Mr. Holmes constituted protected activity. 

Plaintiff also argues that his demotion, allegedly resulting from 

the OIG report, as well as the decision not to immediately fire Mr. 

Holmes constituted adverse employment actions. Plaintiff explains 

that the latter adverse action is sufficient because Mr. Holmes 

created a hostile work environment for Plaintiff. Finally, 

Plaintiff argues that the short time period between his complaints 

and other events establish a causal nexus between the adverse 

employment action and his protected activity. For instance, 

Plaintiff mentions in his opposition that after he complained about 

Mr. Holmes, he was subjected to harassment by Mr. Holmes and his 

friends and family, but there is no corresponding allegation in the 

complaint. 

Absent allegations of direct discrimination, a Title VII 

retaliation claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3 is analyzed 

according to the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting standard. 

Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations 

omitted). A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing 

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“that (1) he engaged or was engaging in activity protected under 

Title VII, (2) the employer subjected him to an adverse employment 

decision, and (3) there was a causal link between the protected 

activity and the employer's action.” Id. (citations omitted). 

For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, a pleading does not 

need to contain all of the facts necessary to show a prima facie 

case. See Washington v. Certainteed Gypsum, Inc., No. 2:10–cv–

00204–GMN–LRL, 2011 WL 3705000, at *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 24, 2011). The 

relevant standard requires that the allegations in the complaint 

give fair notice of the nature of the claim to the opposing party, 

and that the factual allegations that are taken as true plausibly 

suggest entitlement to relief. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 

(9th Cir. 2011). While facts supporting all of the elements of a 

prima facie case are not required in a Title VII complaint, “those 

elements are nonetheless relevant to the court's analysis of the 

sufficiency of the complaint.” Sablan v. A.B. Won Pat Int'l 

Airport Auth., Guam, No. 10-00013, 2010 WL 5148202, at *4 (D. Guam 

Dec. 9, 2010).

(a) Plaintiff’s Alleged Protected Activity

Title VII retaliation claims only apply to activity protected 

by Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting discrimination 

against an employee who makes charges, testifies, participates, or 

assists in Title VII enforcement proceedings); Vasconcelos v. 

Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1990) (The purpose of section 

2000e-3's participation clause “is to protect the employee who 

utilizes the tools provided by Congress to protect his rights.”) 

(quoting Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th 

Cir.1978)). Thus, a plaintiff can only assert a Title VII 

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retaliation claim if he alleges that he participated in activity 

protected by Title VII. 

First, Plaintiff alleges that he complained to the OIG about 

operational and fiscal misconduct. This complaint is directly 

analogous to the Vasconcelos case. 907 F.2d 111. In that case, 

the plaintiff had no claim because he was fired for making 

statements during the course of an internal affairs investigation, 

not during an investigation pursuant to a Title VII complaint. Id.

at 113. Plaintiff’s allegation in this case that he made a 

complaint to the OIG and was punished for is not “protected 

activity” for Title VII purposes because Title VII only applies to 

complaints concerning discrimination because of race, sex, national 

origin, religion, or color. 

Plaintiff’s argument that he alleges protected activity beyond 

the report to the OIG fails for the same reason. In Plaintiff’s 

opposition, he points out that the complaint contains allegations 

that Plaintiff complained about Mr. Holmes’s behavior, and that his 

supervisors failed to respond because they favored Mr. Holmes’s

race. This failure to respond, according to Plaintiff, created a 

hostile working environment for Plaintiff. 

Missing from these allegations, however, is any indication 

that Plaintiff was complaining about activity prohibited by Title 

VII. According to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, it is unlawful for an 

employer to discriminate against an employee “because of such 

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 

Plaintiff’s allegations, however, only contain reference to 

generalized threatening and aggressive behavior from Mr. Holmes. 

There is no indication that Mr. Holmes was behaving in such a way 

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due to Plaintiff’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 

Additionally, there is no indication that Plaintiff’s complaints 

about Mr. Holmes touched on any of the protected attributes. Even 

if Defendants later favored Mr. Holmes because of his race, their 

activity does not impute to Plaintiff and make his activity, 

complaining about Mr. Holmes, protected for the purposes of a 

retaliation claim. A complaint by Plaintiff concerning favoritism 

based on race may be protected by Title VII, but this complaint 

does not allege that he ever went to his supervisors and complained 

on that basis. 

Neither Plaintiff’s report to the OIG nor his complaints about 

Mr. Holmes’s allegedly aggressive behavior, as pled, constitute 

protected activity for the purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 claim. 

(b) Adverse Employment Action

For the second element of the prima facie case, Plaintiff 

argues that his demotion, even though it was in name only, 

constituted adverse employment action. Defendants respond that 

since he did not experience economic harm, there was no adverse 

employment action.

“[A]n adverse employment action is one that materially affects 

the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of . . . 

employment.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (quoting Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 

1126 (9th Cir. 2000). An adverse employment action is one that “is 

reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected 

activity.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000). 

In this case, Plaintiff’s alleged demotion was not accompanied 

by a reduction in salary. His title was only changed from “Deputy 

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Director of Operations” to “Deputy Director.” Plaintiff also 

alleges that his job duties were reduced at the same time, but he 

does not allege what those duties were. Further, Plaintiff admits 

in the complaint that his “promotion” from “Deputy Director of 

Operations” to “Deputy Director” was not necessarily a promotion at 

all, explaining, “given the unambiguous nature of the increased 

responsibility, [Plaintiff] considered this to be a promotion, even 

though there was no increase in pay attached to the new role” 

Compl. ¶ 7. There is no allegation that CNCS also considered the 

title change to be a promotion. Further, Plaintiff pled that the 

old Deputy Director of Operations position was combined with the

Deputy Director position. Id. This Court finds that based on the 

allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff was not promoted from one 

position to another. 

 Plaintiff admits that he received no reduction in pay when 

he was allegedly demoted back to the previously held position of 

Deputy Director of Operations. He also has failed to allege exactly 

what privileges and responsibilities he lost in the purported 

demotion, and therefore the complaint does not plead facts 

sufficient to bring the occurrence of a demotion beyond 

speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (a plaintiff needs to plead 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face”). In the present complaint, it is unclear whether the 

alleged employment action was a mere change of title or a bona fide 

demotion, and thus the Rule 8 pleading standard is not met, and 

Plaintiff has not alleged the second element of a prima facie case. 

Id.

Plaintiff also argues that the continued presence of Mr. 

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Holmes at the workplace constituted a hostile work environment, 

which can be the basis for finding an adverse employment action. 

“For an atmosphere of . . . harassment or hostility to be 

actionable . . . the offending behavior must be sufficiently severe 

or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and 

create an abusive working environment.” Pa. State Police v. 

Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146–47 (2004) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, 

FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). A hostile work environment 

creates a constructive discharge amounting to an adverse employment 

action when a reasonable person in the same circumstance would feel 

forced to resign. Id. at 147 (citing Breeding v. Arthur J. 

Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1160 (C.A.8 1999)). 

Again, Plaintiff fails to meet the requisite pleading 

standard. The complaint repeatedly alleges that Mr. Holmes conduct 

was pervasively harassing, aggressive, and threatening, but it 

provides no indication as to what that behavior actually was. Rule 

8 requires not just a recitation of legal characterizations or 

labels, but the rule also requires Plaintiff to plead facts 

sufficient to bring the allegations from the realm of the 

speculative to the plausible. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

Plaintiff’s allegations also indicate that Plaintiff left CNCS in 

August 2009, several months after Mr. Holmes was actually removed 

from CNCS. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 26. The complaint does not plausibly 

allege that Mr. Holmes’s actions created a hostile work environment 

that caused Plaintiff to quit because Plaintiff quit well after Mr. 

Holmes was terminated. 

In short, The Court finds that Plaintiff has not properly 

alleged that he suffered an adverse employment action, either 

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directly or through the hostile work environment doctrine. 

(c) Causal Nexus

Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged the first two 

components of a prima facie case, and therefore the complaint 

cannot allege a causal nexus between the two. Additionally, 

Plaintiff’s complaint indicates that the reason that he was 

allegedly demoted was because he reported misconduct to the OIG. 

Compl. ¶¶ 10-11. Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning Mr. 

Holmes are unrelated to Plaintiff’s alleged demotion. As explained 

above, the report to the OIG is not protected by Title VII, and 

Plaintiff alleges that he was demoted for that reason. Plaintiff 

does allege, “As a result of the disparate treatment of Mr. Willie 

Holmes on the basis of his race (African American), the Plaintiff 

was subjected to an ongoing hostile working environment, continued 

harassment, and discrimination based on his race, color, and 

national origin.” Compl. ¶ 25. This allegation is a mere legal 

conclusion, however, and the complaint is devoid of supporting 

facts that make the allegation plausible. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not pled a causal nexus between an

alleged adverse employment action and any protected activity. 

In sum, the Court finds that the complaint places Defendants 

on notice of the nature of the claim against them, but Plaintiff 

fails to allege facts sufficient to make entitlement to relief

plausible. Without facts supporting the nature of Mr. Holmes’s

behavior, the nature of Plaintiff’s alleged demotion, and some 

connection to activity protected by Title VII Plaintiff’s complaint 

does not meet federal pleading requirements. Since Plaintiff may 

be able to cure the defects in his pleading through amendment,

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dismissal without prejudice is appropriate. 

4. Plaintiff’s Racial Discrimination Claim

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII 

discrimination claim on the grounds that the complaint does not 

contain a plausible discrimination claim. Plaintiff responds that 

there is a viable claim, and each element of a prima facie case is 

met on the theory that since Defendants treated Mr. Holmes 

favorably due to his race, Plaintiff was subjected to further 

harassment from Mr. Holmes.

The legal standard for Plaintiff’s race discrimination claim 

is the same as the standard for his retaliation claim except that 

the elements of the prima facie case are different. To establish a 

prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, Plaintiff must 

show “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he is qualified 

for his employment; (3) he experienced adverse employment action; 

and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class 

were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the 

adverse action give rise to an inference of discrimination.” 

Fonseca v. Sysco Food Services of Arizona, Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 847 

(9th Cir. 2004) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802). 

(a) Plaintiff’s Protected Class

There is no dispute that Plaintiff is Hispanic, a class 

protected by Title VII. 

(b) Plaintiff Was Qualified For His Position

Defendants argue that the complaint never states that 

Plaintiff was performing according to the employers legitimate 

expectations. Plaintiff responds that the complaint alleges that 

he was promoted after a short time in employment, which indicates 

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that he was performing according to Defendants’ legitimate 

expectations. Defendants do not rebut this argument, stating only 

that they disagree with Plaintiff’s argument.

Referring to the clear language in the complaint, the Court 

finds that Plaintiff’s qualifications for his position are properly

alleged. Plaintiff was hired by CNCS, given the title Deputy 

Director, and then returned to the job title Deputy Director of 

Operations. Plaintiff held these jobs and was not terminated, 

disciplined, or warned for poor performance. It is incongruous 

with Plaintiff’s alleged job history for Defendants to argue that 

he was somehow not qualified for the positions that he was hired by 

Defendants to fill. 

(c) Plaintiff Suffered An Adverse Employment Action

The Court finds that Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege 

that he suffered an adverse employment for the same reasons 

discussed above. 

(d) Similarly Situated Individuals Were Treated 

More Favorably

Defendant contends that the complaint fails with respect to 

this element of the prima facie case because Plaintiff claims only 

that Mr. Holmes was treated more favorably than Plaintiff. Since 

Mr. Holmes was Plaintiff’s subordinate, they were not similarly

situated. Plaintiff responds that the analysis is not so rigid, 

and that their roles were similar in all material respects. 

“In order to show that the [employees] allegedly receiving 

more favorable treatment are similarly situated . . ., the 

individuals seeking relief must demonstrate, at the least, that 

they are similarly situated to those employees in all material 

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respects.” Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2006)

(citing Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 

654, 660 (9th Cir.2002)). “[I]ndividuals are similarly situated 

when they have similar jobs and display similar conduct. . . . 

Employees in supervisory positions are generally deemed not to be 

similarly situated to lower level employees.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of 

L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003). To meet this element, 

Plaintiff may also allege “other circumstances surrounding the 

adverse employment action [that] give rise to an inference of 

discrimination.” Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 

603 (9th Cir. 2004).

In this case, it is clear from the face of the complaint that 

the allegations do not meet the similarly situated requirement. 

Plaintiff was either the Deputy Director or the Deputy Director of 

Operations, and Mr. Holmes was his subordinate. The two employees 

were not similarly situated for purposes of Title VII. 

Additionally, Plaintiff did not allege that he engaged in the 

conduct practiced by Mr. Holmes. Namely, Plaintiff does not allege 

that both he and Mr. Holmes were aggressive, hostile, and 

threatening to each other and other employees. Thus, Plaintiff 

does not allege that he and Mr. Holmes were treated differently 

despite displaying similar conduct. There are no facts or 

allegations in the complaint that show other circumstances that 

give rise to an inference of discrimination. 

The complaint again places Defendants on notice of the nature 

of the claim against them, but Plaintiff fails to allege facts 

sufficient to make his allegations plausible. Without facts 

supporting the nature of Mr. Holmes’s behavior, the nature of 

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Plaintiff’s alleged demotion, or some facts that give rise to a 

plausible inference of discrimination, Plaintiff’s complaint does 

not meet federal pleading requirements. Accordingly, this claim is

dismissed. Since Plaintiff may be able to cure the defects in the 

complaint through amendment, leave to amend is granted. 

III. ORDER

After carefully reviewing all of the papers filed in relation 

to this motion, the Court rules as follows:

1. All claims against defendant Corporation for National 

Community Service and all Doe defendants are dismissed with 

prejudice;

2. Plaintiff’s Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

and Negligent Supervision, Hiring, and Retention claims are 

dismissed with prejudice; and

3. Plaintiff’s remaining claims, Retaliation in Violation of 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) and Discrimination Based on Race in 

Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, are dismissed with leave to 

amend. 

If Plaintiff wishes to file an Amended Complaint that is in 

accordance with this Order, it must be filed within twenty (20) 

days. Otherwise, this case will be dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 27, 2012

Case 2:10-cv-03213-TLN-CMK Document 25 Filed 02/27/12 Page 16 of 16