Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-00550/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-00550-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 The proper spelling of Defendant’s name is Branham. [Docket No. 8].

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT MITCHELL,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 04cv550-WQH (WMc)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE: 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

BRANHAMWD1

, and GUTHRIE, 

Defendant.

In this prisoner civil rights case, Robert Mitchell (“Plaintiff”), is proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff alleges

that Correctional Officers Branham and Gutherie (“Defendants”) violated his civil rights while an

inmate at Centinela State Prison. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 25, 2007, Judge Hayes granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Equal

Protection claim and denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation and negligence

claims. Thereafter on June 8, 2007, Defendants filed an Amended Answer to Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”). On October 19, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion For Leave to File a

Second Amended Complaint. Defendants filed an opposition to that motion on November 15,

2007. On December 12, 2007, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”). 

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Thereafter, Judge Hayes issued an order denying Plaintiff’s Motion to File a Second Amended

Complaint and ordered that “[t]he First Amended Complaint remains the operative pleading in this

case.” [Docket No. 62, p. 4]. 

 Plaintiff was provided notice by the Court with notice of summary judgment in conformance with

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). On January 11, 2008, Plaintiff filed an

Opposition. [Doc. No. 65]. Defendants’ Reply was filed on January 18, 2008. [Doc. No. 66].

 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his civil rights have been violated

and he asserts three causes of action: 1) retaliation for filing a complaint against the prison and its

employees; 2) equal protection; and 3) negligence. 

The following is taken from the parties’ pleadings and is not to be construed as

findings of fact by the Court.

Plaintiff’s Factual Summary:

On July 2, 2002, was attending the law library, when he witnessed and overheard

Defendant Guthrie call Defendant Branham on the telephone and say, ‘the inmate who filed the

lawsuit suing everybody. . . yea (sic)! Inmate Mitchell, well he’s in here processing more lawsuits

lawsuits on correctional officers, you need to get in here and stop this right away.” Immediately

after the call, Defendant Branham stormed into the law library with approximately eight

correctional officers. refused to allow plaintiff to mail any legal document to court, then

confiscated all plaintiff’s legal documents and materials and forcefully removed him from the law

library. 

Plaintiff explained to both defendants several times that he was not finished, that all he had

to do was address his envelopes and mail out his legal documents. 

Defendants Guthrie and Branham both told plaintiff ‘we are not allowing you to mail out

anything. You have to get out the law library right now.’

Plaintiff told Defendants Guthrie and Branham several times that he had a Court deadline 

to file his legal documents with the Court. 

Plaintiff also explained to both defendants that it was only approximately 3:30 p.m, that the

law library doesn’t close until 4:00 p.m., that other inmates were being allowed to stay, continue

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their research and mail out their legal documents and that he should also be allowed to stay and

mail out his legal documents. (Pl.’s Opp. at 3-4.)

Plaintiff immediately started gathering up his legal documents and materials to exit the law

library, when Defendant Branham took his right hand and slammed it on top of Plaintiff’s legal

documents and said, “your not taking any of your legal documents or materials with you.”

Plaintiff again asked both defendants, why couldn’t he take his legal documents and

materials back to his housing unit and mail out his legal documents from there?

Both defendants replied “because we said so!” Plaintiff again asked for an explanation,

why was he not being allowed to mail out or leave with his legal documents, when other inmates

were being allowed to mail out their legal documents and take them back to their housing unit. (Pl.

Opp. at 5.)

Plaintiff told both defendants that he would be filing a complaint on them regarding their

conduct. Defendant Branham replied in a sarcastic ton, this is why your (sic) not mailing anything

out. I don’t care. Then pointed to his name tag on his uniform and said, Just be sure you spell my

name right because everyone spells my name wrong. 

Defendants Guthrie and Branham both started laughing, then confiscated all of plaintiff’s

legal documents and materials. Plaintiff was the forcefully extracted out of the law library. (Pl.

Opp. at 5.) One week later Plaintiff was allowed back in the law library and watched while his

legal documents were placed in an envelope for mailing. (FAC at 6.)

Defendants’ Version:

On July 2, 2002, Officer W. Guthrie was working at Centinela State Prison in the Facility

C law library as the law library officer, from 8:00 a..m. to 4:00 p.m. 

Officer Guthrie’s duties as the law library officer are to maintain order and security in the

law library, and supervise and count inmates. The Library Technical Assistant (LTA) is in charge

of inmates’ legal deadlines, priority library access, supervising inmate law clerks, and helping

inmates to find books and other materials.

On the afternoon of July 2, 2002, Plaintiff was working on copying and organizing some

legal documents in the law library. Officer Guthrie was not aware what case or what matter

Plaintiff was working on. Officer Guthrie knew Plaintiff has a suit against Orange County but he

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was not aware of any lawsuit Plaintiff had filed against the Department of Corrections.

At approximately 3:10 p.m., Officer Guthrie informed Plaintiff and the other C Facility

inmates that their law library time was up. All the other inmates except Plaintiff gathered up their

materials and left the law library. 

Plaintiff had completed his photocopies but had not yet completed stapling his papers and

putting his packages together for mailing, and his original legal materials were commingled with

the copies he had been making. Officer Guthrie allowed Plaintiff some extra time in order to try

and finish his project. After 3:30 p.m., Plaintiff still was not ready to mail out his copies. 

At approximately 3:40 p.m., Officer Guthrie told Plaintiff he needed to leave the law

library so staff could close things down. Because Plaintiff continued to argue with Officer Guthrie

when he was asked to leave, Officer Guthrie finally called Sergeant Branham to have Plaintiff

escorted out of the law library. 

Sergeant Branham reported to the law library to escort an unruly inmate from the library. 

Plaintiff was refusing to leave the library, insisting that he be given more time to finish copying his

legal materials before mailing out filings to the court. Plaintiff’s materials were confiscated and

put into a box and locked in a storage room to be returned to him on his next library visit. (MSJ at

4-6.)

III. DEFENDANTS’ FED.R.CIV.P. 56 MOTION

Defendants seek summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s Complaint on the grounds that: (1)

Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege a claim of retaliation; (2) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for an

equal protection violation; (3) Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege a negligence claim; and (4)

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the granting of a summary

judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The standard for granting a

motion for summary judgment is essentially the same as for the granting of a directed verdict. 

Judgment must be entered, “if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable

conclusion as to the verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986). 

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However, “[i]f reasonable minds could differ,” judgment should not be entered in favor of the

moving party. Id. 

The parties bear the same substantive burden of proof as would apply at a trial on the

merits, including plaintiff’s burden to establish any element essential to his case. Liberty Lobby,

477 U.S. at 252; Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045

(9th Cir. 1989). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the elements of the claim

in the pleadings, or other evidence, which the moving party “believes demonstrates the absence of

a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.

144 (1970); Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). “A material issue of

fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties’

differing versions of the truth.” S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982). 

More than a “metaphysical doubt” is required to establish a genuine issue of material fact.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that there

is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. To successfully rebut a properly supported

motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must point to some facts in the record that

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and, with all reasonable inferences made in the

plaintiff[]’s favor, could convince a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff[].” Reese v. Jefferson

School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000)(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 323; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).

While the district court is “not required to comb the record to find some reason to deny a

motion for summary judgment,” Forsberg v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1417-18

(9th Cir. 1988), Nilsson v. Louisiana Hydrolic, 854 F.2d 1538, 1545 (9th Cir. 1988), the court may

nevertheless exercise its discretion “in appropriate circumstances,” to consider materials in the

record which are on file but not “specifically referred to .” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch.

Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the court need not “examine the entire file

for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence is not set forth in the moving

papers with adequate references so that it could be conveniently found.” Id.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court need not accept legal conclusions

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“cast in the form of factual allegations.” Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th

Cir. 1981).

 A. Retaliation

Plaintiff argues in his First Amended Complaint that the confiscation and ejection from the

law library by Defendants were taken in retaliation for his free speech activities and as such

violated his First Amendment Rights. 

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim as “Plaintiff cannot

prevail on this claim because Defendants’ temporary confiscation of Plaintiff’s documents

reasonably advanced legitimate penological goals and Defendants did not act in retaliation for

Plaintiff’s exercising his First Amendment rights.” (MSJ at 6.) 

The Ninth Circuit has identified the elements necessary to establish a First Amendment

retaliation claim in the prison context:

Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took

some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's

protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his

First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir.

2005); see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000); Hines v.

Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiff has alleged in his First Amended Complaint that on July 2, 2002, Defendant

Branham, along with defendant Gutherie, “confiscated all of plaintiff's legal documents and

extracted him from the law library." (FAC at 4.) In particular, Plaintiff alleges Defendants arrived

in the law library after having been called by Defendant Guthrie and Librarian Assistant L.

Salgado to inform them that Plaintiff "was processing Civil Complaints." (Id.) Plaintiff claims

despite the fact that all he had to do was "address his envelopes and mail out his documents," he

was told by Defendant Branham "your (sic) not mailing anything out and you have to get out right

now!" (Id.) These statements are sufficient to prove the first three elements of the retaliation

claim.

In regard to the fourth element, the Ninth Circuit has held that in a First Amendment

retaliation action “an inmate is not required to demonstrate that his speech was actually inhibited

or suppressed.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 569. “[A]llegations that [an inmate’s] First Amendment rights

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were chilled, though not necessarily silenced, is enough to perfect [a] claim.” Id. The fact that

Plaintiff was deterred, even temporarily, in his ability to proceed with his pending civil lawsuit is

sufficient to demonstrate the defendants were acting intentionally to interfere with his outgoing

legal mail for the purpose of retaliating against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. 

In Plaintiff’s FAC, he claims that Defendants seized his legal papers related to ongoing

“state civil rights and state tort complaints” in retaliation for having previously filed an unrelated

federal civil rights lawsuit. Plaintiff reiterated in his deposition the following factual allegations

presented in his FAC:

Plaintiff: When I was processing my legal work in the law library, Defendant

Guthrie, I witnessed him pick up a telephone and I overheard him tell

Sargeant Branham that he had this inmate that is in here, Mitchell, the one

that is suing everybody, you need to get in here because he is processing more

civil complaints. You need to stop this, and immediately after the call, about a

minute later Defendant Branham stormed into the law library . . . 

immediately stopped me from doing any of my legal activities. Took his right

hand, slammed it on top of my legal documents and told me you’re not mailing

anything out, you have to get out of the library now. (Pl.’s Depo at 21.)

Here, Plaintiff has established the first four elements in support of a First Amendment

retaliation claim: 1) Plaintiff was ordered to leave the law library without his legal documents

despite Plaintiff’s claim that he was working pursuant to a court deadline; 2) & 3) Defendants’

actions were in retaliation for the grievances and civil law suits that Plaintiff regularly filed; and,

 4) Plaintiff was prevented from working on his pending court cases and missed a filing deadline in

state court. (FAC at 4.) 

However, there is no evidence Defendants’ actions were not motivated by a legitimate

correctional goal. “The Court must ‘afford appropriate deference and flexibility’ to prison officials

in the evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory.”

Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “The burden is on plaintiff to demonstrate ‘that

there were no legitimate correctional purposes motivating the actions he complains of.” Id. at 808.

Defendants rely heavily on the claim that their actions were necessary to advance a

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legitimate penological goal. ( MSJ at 9.) Specifically, Defendants assert Plaintiff overstayed his

allotted two hours at the law library in contravention of Department of Operations Manual

Supplement. (Exhibit G.) Defendants also cite to a memorandum relating to Law Library

Procedures dated April 25, 1997, providing in pertinent part, “There are no provisions for inmates

to be allowed extra time to prepare their documents for mailing, beyond the allotted library time.”

(Guthrie Decl. ¶ 11.) 

Here, Plaintiff fails to contradict the evidence presented in the declarations by Defendants

Branham and Guthrie. Both declarations assert Plaintiff was, in fact, removed from the library

without his legal papers because Plaintiff was repeatedly told by Officer Guthrie he needed to

leave the law library so staff could close things down and because “Plaintiff continued to argue

with Officer Guthrie when he was asked to leave.” (MSJ at 5.) Further, “Plaintiff’s materials were

temporarily held at the library because the copies he had made were inextricably commingled with

his legal materials” and “[a]ccording to Centinela’s Memorandum regarding Law Library

Procedures dated April 10, 1997, all completed photocopied legal documents will be mailed from

the Law Library.” “There are no provisions for inmates to be allowed extra time to prepare their

documents for mailing, beyond the allotted law library time.” (Guthrie Decl. at 2- 4.) Taken

together the declarations and exhibits produced by Defendants present strong circumstantial

evidence that the events which transpired in the prison law library on July 2, 2002 were motivated

by a legitimate correctional purpose. 

Plaintiff attempts to rebut Defendants’ declarations and exhibits by arguing that

Correctional Officers can use their discretion to allow an inmate to remain in the law library

beyond the two hour time limit. (Pl’s Depo. at 32 -35.) However, Plaintiff cannot overcome the

well established prison regulations limiting inmates library time to two hours and restricting the

manner in which legal documents can be mailed. (Pl’s Depo. at 35.) Therefore, the Court finds

Plaintiff has not met his burden. Plaintiff’s failure to meet his burden is fatal to his claim of

retaliation. Without evidence of all five elements, Plaintiff cannot succeed in establishing “a

viable claim of First Amendment retaliation.” Rhoades v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir.

2004). Accordingly, it is recommended Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim

be GRANTED. 

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B. Qualified Immunity

Defendants assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity

entitles government officials to “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and

like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” 

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis in original). Qualified immunity shields

government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citations omitted). Generally, qualified

immunity doctrine must “‘give [] ample room for mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,

229 (1991).

Analysis of qualified immunity begins with the two-step sequence of analysis set forth by

the Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). Initially, a court must determine

whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show

that the defendants’ conduct violated constitutional right. Id. at 201 (instructing federal courts not

to assume the existence of a constitutional right even if it is clear that the defendants would be

entitled to qualified immunity). If the answer to that question is no, then the case must be

dismissed as there is no valid cause of action. Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir.

2003). On the other hand, if a violation could be made out, the next step is to ask whether the

constitutional right was clearly established and, if so, “whether it would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” See Saucier 533 U.S. at 202; 

Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (explaining that “we

must ask first whether the facts taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff would establish a

[constitutional] violation.... Only if the answer is in the affirmative should we address the

immunity issue.”); Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002) (having concluded

there was no constitutional violation the court need not reach the issue of qualified immunity). 

Because the Court has found no violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, the Court

need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523

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U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (“[T]he better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of

qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation

of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 192, 201 (2001) (“If no

constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity

for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”). For the reasons herein, it is recommended

that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on basis of qualified immunity be DENIED as

moot. 

C. Judicial Notice

Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of various documents they have

submitted in support of their filings. 

Judicial Notice is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 201 which only concerns judicial

notice of adjudicative facts. “A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable

dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or

(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” FRE 201. “[A] party requesting judicial notice bears the burden of

persuading the trial judge that the fact is a proper matter for judicial notice.” In re Tyrone F.

Conner Corporation, 140 B.R. 771, 781 (United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. California 1992).

“To sustain its burden in persuading the trial judge that the adjudicative fact sought to be noticed is

in fact proper for notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the party must (1) persuade the court

that the particular fact is not reasonably subject to dispute and is capable of immediate and

accurate determination by resort to a source ‘whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned’....”

Id. at 781. In other words, “the fact must be one that only an unreasonable person would insist on

disputing.” United States v. Jones, 29, F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994). Documents that are part

of the public record may be judicially noticed to show, for example, that a judicial proceeding

occurred or that a document was filed in another court case, but a court may not take judicial

notice of findings of facts from another case. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1114 & n. 5

(9th Cir. 2003); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 698 (9th Cir. 2001); Jones, 29 F.3d at

1553. Nor may the court take judicial notice of any matter that is in dispute. Lee, 250 F.3d at 689-

90; Lozano v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 1160, 1165 (10th Cir. 2001). 

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Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of “docket and pleadings” for the case of

Mitchell v. California Department of Corrections, et al., 01cv2126-PCL (S.D. Cal). (Defendants’

Request for Judicial Notice.)

The Court may take judicial notice of another court’s opinion, but “not for the truth of the

facts recited therein, but for the existence of the opinion, which is not subject to reasonable dispute

over its authenticity.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001) citing Southern

Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group Ltd., 181 F.3d 410-426-27 (3rd Cir.

1999). 

For these reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ request for judicial notice be

GRANTED as to the case cited by Defendants, Mitchell v. California, Department of Corrections,

et al.. 01cv2126-PCL (S.D. Cal.)

For clarity of the record, all of the remaining exhibits submitted by Plaintiff and

Defendants may be properly considered by the Court without having to take judicial notice of them

pursuant to FRE 201. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

In his Opposition, Plaintiff requests that sanctions be imposed upon Defendants counsel

“for certifying that to the best of their knowledge, that there are no genuine issues of material fact

precluding summary judgment.” (Pl.’s Opp. at 25.) Plaintiff further contends that Defendants’

motion for summary judgment “is full of contradictions and has no sound basis.” (Pl.’s Opp. at

25.) Plaintiff cites Fed.R.Civ.P.11(b) in support of his motion.

Defendants assert “[d]efense counsel’s motion was brought in good faith, based on factual

grounds, and was not brought for the purpose of delay.” (Defs. Reply at 5.)

The Court finds no evidence in the record or papers submitted to justify imposing sanctions

against Defendants pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s

motion for sanctions be DENIED.

\\

\\

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V. NEGLIGENCE CLAIM

At Plaintiff’s deposition on October 18, 2007, Plaintiff stipulated to striking his negligence

claim. Specifically the deposition states:

Q. Tell me about your negligence claim?

A. Well, basicially I can – That is why I filed an amended pleading. 

On my amended pleading I believe I struck that claim off. So we

can stipulate to that being taken off. 

Q We can stipulate to dismissing the negligence claim?

A. Yeah, pursuant to 41, Federal Rule 41 I dismissed that claim. 

That one really has no standing so - - 

Accordingly, this Court recommends that Plaintiff’s negligence claim be DISMISSED 

pursuant to the oral stipulation made during Plaintiff’s deposition. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth herein, it is recommended:

 1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment

retaliation claim in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) be GRANTED. 

2. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment due process claim be DENIED as moot. 

3. Defendants’ motion for qualified immunity be DENIED as moot. 

4. Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions be DENIED.

5. The Parties oral stipulation dismissing Plaintiff’s negligence claim be GRANTED.

This report and recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636 (b)(1) (1988). Any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties by July 9, 2008. The document should be

captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation." Any reply to the objections shall be

served and filed by July 23, 2008. 

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 12, 2008

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

 

 

 

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