Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-04181/USCOURTS-ca10-91-04181-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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FIL~ D 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United Stares Co-μrt qf Appea\G Tenth C1rcu1t 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

RICKI GENE SEARCY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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M,'\R O 2 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-4181 

(D.C. No. 91-CV-26-J) 

( D. Utah) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, TACHA and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Mr. Searcy appeals the decision of the district court 

dismissing his complaint without prejudice. 

* Th is order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

e xcept for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law o f 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36 . 3 . 

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Mr. Searcy filed a prose complaint asking for the right to 

copy and inspect "all documents in the agency files pertaining to 

Ricki G. Searcy" (R. and asking for damages and attorney fees 

for Defendant's failure to produce the documents. 

The matter was subsequently referred to a Magistrate Judge 

who reviewed Mr. Searcy's Motion for Summary Judgment and 

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, in 

addition to numerous other motions filed by Mr. Searcy. This 

report concluded Mr. Searcy's lawsuit was premature. The district 

court adopted the Magistrate Judge's report and held that 

Defendant had failed to comply wi t h either the Privacy Act or the 

Freedom of Information Act. The district court dismissed Mr. 

Searcy's complaint without prejudice to again maintain the suit 

after compliance. The district court overruled Mr. Searcy's 

remaining motions. 

Mr. Searcy appeals this decision prose arguing it is wrong 

as a matter of law and fact. 

The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation as filed on 

June 25, 1991, accurately sets forth the ''facts" and applicable 

law . It serves little purpose to reiterate both here. 

We have rev iewed the record on appeal and both of Mr. 

Searcy's briefs fil e d wi th this Court. This rev iew l eads us t o 

the c o nclusion the judgment of the dis trict court was c o rrect and 

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should be affirmed. 

The judgment of the district c o urt is AFFIRMED f o r 

substantially the same reasons set forth in the Magistrate Judge's 

Report and Recommendatio n o f June 25, 1991, and the district 

court's order of September 1 9, 1991, c opies of both being 

attached . The manda t e shal l i ssue f or t hwith. 

Entered f o r the Court : 

WADE BRORBY 

Uni t ed States Circui t Judge 

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Appellate Case: 91-4181 Document: 010110226711 Date Filed: 03/02/1992 Page: 3 
,·ILEu IM UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

co:.;1n. DISTfYCT OF UTAH 

~ 5"1991 

1.~ARKL:3 B. Z!i,'iMER. CLEP:!~ ~y ________ _ 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

RICKI GENE SEARCY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

Defendant. 

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Case No. 91-C-26 J 

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION 

This is a prose action under the Freedom of Information 

Act, 5 u.s.c. 552, and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 u.s.c. 552a. 

Plaintiff seeks an order that the Social Security Administration 

(SSA) produce all documents in its files pertaining to the 

plaintiff, Ricki G. Searcy, and an award of attorney's fees. 

Two dispositive motions are pending: Defendant filed a 

motion to dismiss and the plaintiff filed a motion for summary 

judgment (actually a motion for default judgment). Plaintiff has 

also filed a motion for attorney's fees and a motion styled, 

"Motion under Vaughn v. Rosen to Require Detailed Justification, 

Itemization and Indexing." 

This case has been referred to the magistrate judge pursuant 

to 28 u.s.c. §636(b) (1) (B). The magistrate judge has determined 

Appellate Case: 91-4181 Document: 010110226711 Date Filed: 03/02/1992 Page: 4 
that oral argument would not be of material assistance. D Utah 

Rule 202(d). 

I. Default Judgment 

Searcy moves for summary judgment and to strike defendant's 

motion to dismiss and memorandum on the grounds that defendant 

did not timely answer or otherwise respond to the complaint. 

The complaint was filed January 8, 1991, and served 

personally on the United States Attorney on the same day, 

according to the return of service in the record. The defendant 

filed the motion to dismiss on February 7, 1991. Searcy asserts 

that he didn't receive the motion and accompanying memorandum 

until April 21, 1991. See Plaintiff's Affidavit attached to 

Plaintiff's Motion to Strike. (4/9/91). However, the 

certificate of service attached to the motion to dismiss 

indicates the motion and memorandum were mailed on February 7, 

1991. Service by mail is complete upon mailing. Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 

5 (b). 

Under the Freedom of Information Act, the agency has thirty 

days after service of the complaint to file an answer. 1 Thus 

15 use §552 (a) (4) (C) reads: 

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 

defendant shall serve an answer or otherwise plead to any 

complaint made under this subsection within thirty days 

after service upon the defendant of the pleading in which 

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the responsive pleading was timely served on February 7, 1991. 

Moreover, there is no provision in the Federal Rules of 

civil Procedure for motions to strike motions and memoranda; only 

motions to strike unsigned papers under Rule 11, third-party 

claims under Rule 14(a), and certain matters in pleadings under 

Rule 12(f) are contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Motions and memoranda are not included within the 

definition of "pleading" under F.R.C.P. 7(a). See James Moore & 

Jo Desha Lucas, 2A Moore's Federal Practice 112.21 at 12-164 

(Matthew Bender, 2d ed 1991) ("a Rule 12(f) motion to strike is 

not appropriate with regard to affidavits, parties, or any other 

matter other than that contained in the actual pleadings"). 

Finally, F.R.C.P. 55(e) provides that an evidentiary hearing 

on the merits of the claim must be held before default judgment 

can be entered against an agency of the United States. 2 James 

Moore, Walter Taggart, and Jeremy Wicker, 6 Moore's Federal 

Practice 155.12 at 55-75, 55-76 (Matthew Bender, 2d ed 1991). 

Plaintiff has now had full opportunity to respond to the motion 

such complaint is made, unless the court otherwise 

directs, for good cause shown. 

2 F.R.C.P. 56(e) provides: 

No judgment by default shall be entered against the 

United States or an officer of agency thereof unless the 

claimant establishes a claim or right to relief by 

evidence satisfactory to the court. 

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to dismiss. It makes more sense to the magistrate to proceed on 

the merits of the suit than to schedule an evidentiary hearing 

under F.R.C.P. 55(e). 

Plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's motion to 

dismiss and memorandum in support is DENIED. The magistrate 

judge recommends that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be 

DENIED. 

II. The Motion to Dismiss 

Defendant's main argument is that the Searcy has not 

exhausted his administrative remedies because he failed to supply 

sufficient information to enable the SSA to respond to Searcy•s 

request for his own records under the Privacy Act: 1) Searcy 

failed to specify which records he wanted, or which system of 

records he wanted searched: and 2) Searcy failed to designate a 

physician who could review his medical records. 

Searcy seems to be arguing that he has complied with the SSA 

regulations under the Privacy Act for obtaining his own records: 

Searcy also seems to be saying that he made a proper request 

under FOIA, and he is not required to comply with the Privacy 

Act. 

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BACKGROUND 

The background facts are mostly derived from the complaint 

and copies of the correspondence between Searcy and the SSA 

attached to the complaint. In connection with the motion to 

dismiss, the SSA has filed an affidavit from an officer of the 

SSA containing a chronology of the events (mostly describing the 

same letters Searcy attached to his complaint) and also attaching 

copies of the correspondence. 

On March 3, 1990, Searcy sent a copy of a notarized letter 

to the District Director of the SSA, 461 South 4th East, Salt 

Lake City, requesting "all documents in agency files pertaining 

to the requester, Ricki G. Searcy." Complaint, Exhibit H. 

Apparently the SSA sent the letter back to Searcy with a post-it 

note attached to the front: the post-it note bears a handwritten 

message saying that the SSA needs an original letter with 

original signatures. Complaint, Exhibit B. 

On March 14, 1990, the branch manager of the Murray SSA 

office sent Searcy a letter saying that the Murray Office does 

not have any documents or files relating to him. 

Searcy claims he tried sending his request to the Salt Lake 

SSA office again on March 20, 1990; the photocopy attached to the 

complaint shows that the second request is identical to the 

first, except the notary public is different. Complaint, Exhibit 

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D. The magistrate judge infers the copy sent to the SSA included 

Searcy•s original signature. The SSA claims it has no record of 

the second request. Declaration of Jack Gallagher, 13. 

Having received no answer to his last request, on May 3, 

1990, Searcy wrote to the Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs 

in Washington, o.c. Complaint, Exhibit E. The letter is styled 

as a FOIA appeal of the SSA's failure to provide the documents 

Searcy had previously requested at least twice in March of 1990. 

On May 23, 1990, the HHS Office of Public Inquiries sent 

Searcy a letter purporting to respond to Searcy's letter of May 

3, but actually does not address the question of access to his 

SSA records, except to say that Searcy can get a copy of his 

application for a Social Security number and a list of all his 

reported earnings from any Social Security office, and suggesting 

that Searcy visit the nearest Social Security office: 

To determine which other records you want us to 

search, you might want to visit the nearest Social 

Security office to review a list of our systems of 

records. The people there will be glad to help you. 

Emphasis added. Complaint, Exhibit F. 

The SSA located Searcy's disability claims file. Affidavit 

of Jack Gallagher, 16. On July 13, 1991, the Salt Lake District 

Manager sent Searcy a letter informing him that HHS regulations 

required Searcy to designate a physician to review Searcy's 

medical records before the medical records could be released. 

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Complaint, Exhibit G. The letter also asked Searcy to send a 

request bearing his original signature, and attached a form for 

him to fill in the name and address of his physician and return 

to the SSA. Searcy did not return the form. 

Searcy filed this complaint on January 8, 1991. On January 

24, 1991, two weeks after the complaint was filed and nearly ten 

months after Searcy sent his first request to the SSA Salt Lake 

office, the SSA Freedom of Information Officer sent him a letter 

explaining the procedures for obtaining different types of 

records maintained by the SSA, and informing him of the HHS 

regulation requiring an individual desiring information to 

specify which system of records he wants HHS to search. 

DISCUSSION 

Congress intended that the Freedom of Information Act and 

the Privacy Act complement each other in providing access to 

government records: the Freedom of Information Act was designed 

to enable the public to obtain information about government 

processes and practices, while the Privacy Act was intended to 

help individuals gain access to government records about 

themselves, to correct erroneous information in those records, 

and to ensure the confidentiality of records pertaining to 

individuals. Robert F. Bouchard and Justino. Franklin, 

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Guidebook to the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts at 21-

22, 90-91 (Clark Boardman Co, Ltd, 1980). An individual who 

requests access to information about herself in agency records 

using both the Privacy Act and FOIA is entitled to the cumulative 

total of access rights under the two Acts. Clarkson v. IRS, 678 

F.2d 1368, 1377 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Bouchard and Franklin, 

Guidebook at 21). When an individual requests information about 

herself using both Acts, the agency may employ Privacy Act 

procedures to process the request. See Porter v. U.S. Dept. of 

Justice, 717 F.2d 787 at 799 (3rd Cir. 1983) (quoting 40 FR 

56742-43 (1975)). 

HHS has ruled that an individual's request for her own 

records, to the extent the records are contained in a "system of 

records," will be handled under the Privacy Act and HHS 

regulations under the Privacy Act. 45 C.F.R. §5.4(b) (1990). If 

a record need not be released under the Privacy Act, then HHS 

will consider the request under FOIA. Id. 

An individual making a request under the Privacy Act must 

address the request to the systems manager of a given system of 

records and specify which systems of records she wishes to have 

searched and the records to which she wishes to have access. 45 

C.F.R. §5b.5(a) (2). Pursuant to the authority given it in 5 

u.s.c. §552a(f) (3), HHS has promulgated a rule establishi ng 

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Appellate Case: 91-4181 Document: 010110226711 Date Filed: 03/02/1992 Page: 11 
"special procedures" for obtaining medical records. 45 C.F.R. 

§5b.6. The rule requires that the individual seeking access to 

her medical records designate in writing, at the time of the 

request, a physician, other health professional, or other 

responsible individual willing to review the record and inform 

the individual of its contents. §5b.6(b) (1) (ii). However, the 

SSA official may grant an individual direct access to her medical 

records if the official decides that direct access is unlikely to 

adversely affect the individual. §5b.6(b) (2). 

Unless the individual is personally known to the SSA 

official, an individual making a request for access to a record 

must verify her identity. 5 u.s.c. §552a(f) (2); 45 C.F.R. 

§5b.5(b). An individual who does not make the request in person 

or by telephone must submit a notarized request or certify in her 

request that she is the individual who she claims to be and that 

she understands that a request for records under false pretenses 

is a criminal offense subject to a $5,000 fine. 45 C.F.R. 

§5b.5(b) (2) (ii). 

This is a case where the SSA's bungling of Searcy's request 

has brought on an unnecessary lawsuit. First, the SSA never 

informed Searcy that it was handling his combined FOIA and 

Privacy Act request under the Privacy Act, and that he must first 

comply with the SSA regulations and procedures under the Privacy 

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Appellate Case: 91-4181 Document: 010110226711 Date Filed: 03/02/1992 Page: 12 
Act. Second, the SSA did not tell Searcy, until after the 

lawsuit was filed, that he must specify the systems of records he 

wants searched, nor outline the specific procedures for complying 

with the Privacy Act regulations. Third, the SSA has been very 

dilatory in responding to Searcy ' s letters, even though the 

Privacy Act, unlike FOIA, does not require the agency to respond 

to an individual's request for access to her record within a 

specified time. (However, a request for amendment of a record 

under the Privacy Act must be acknowledged within 10 days. 5 

U.s.c. §552a(d) (2) (A)). It is easy to see how Searcy could have 

thought that the SSA was refusing or ignoring his request. 

Nevertheless, this lawsuit is premature because the SSA 

never actually refused to comply with a properly framed request 

under the Privacy Act. The agency is justified in treating his 

request as one under the Privacy Act. Requests under the Privacy 

Act must specify a system of records; requests for all records 

held by the SSA under an individual's name or social security 

number are too broad. 

Nor has Searcy has indicated a valid reason the court should 

grant him relief from the SSA's requirement that he designate a 

physician or "other responsible individual" to review his medical 

records. The phrase, "other responsible individual" obviously 

refers to a third person, not Searcy himself. 

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The magistrate judge concludes that it would be 

inappropriate for the court to exercise jurisdiction at this 

juncture: pursuit along the proper administrative avenues will 

probably snag the documents plaintiff desires. 

Plaintiff's motion for statutory damages and attorney's fees 

is moot since he has not substantially prevailed. In any case, 

the Tenth Circuit has ruled that prose litigants are not 

entitled to attorney's fees under FOIA. Burke v. Dept. of 

Justice, 432 F.Supp. 251 (D.Kan. 1976), aff'd 559 F.2d 1182 (10th 

Cir. 1977). Nor are prose plaintiffs eligible for attorney's 

fees under the Privacy Act. Barrett v. U.S. Customs Service and 

Dept of Treasury, 482 F.Supp. 779 (ED La. 1980). The Supreme 

Court has recently ruled that even a lawyer who represents 

himself in a successful civil rights action may not recover 

attorney's fees under 42 u.s.c. §1988: 

A rule that authorizes awards of counsel fees to 

pro ll litigants ..• would create a disincentive to 

employ counsel whenever such a plaintiff considered 

himself competent to litigate on his own behalf. The 

statutory policy of furthering the successful 

prosecution of meritorious claims is better served by a 

rule that creates an incentive to retain counsel in 

every such case. 

Kay v. Ehrler & Kentucky Board of Elections, 111 s.ct. 1435, 1438 

(1991). The statutory policy of §1988 in favor of encouraging 

plaintiffs to hire attorneys to litigate meritorious claims 

applies to FOIA and Privacy Act claims as well. 

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Plaintiff's motion for detailed justification, itemization, 

and indexing under Vaughn v. Rosen is premature and irrelevant to 

the issues in this case: this type of motion is appropriate when 

the agency denies a request under FOIA because the requested 

information is claimed to be exempt. Keese v. U.S . , 632 F.Supp. 

85, 91-92 (SD Texas 1985). 

Recommendation 

THEREFORE, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's motion for 

summary judgment be DENIED, and the defendant's motion to dismiss 

be GRANTED without prejudice to the plaintiff should the 

defendant refuse to comply with a proper request under the 

Privacy Act and HHS regulations under the Privacy Act, or 

withhold records that would be available under FOIA, though not 

the Privacy Act. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's motion for 

statutory damages and attorney fees be DENIED, and that the 

plaintiff's motion for a detailed justification, itemization, and 

indexing under Vaughn v. Rosen be DENIED. 

Copies of the foregoing report and recommendation are being 

mailed to the parties. They are hereby notified of their right 

12 

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to file objections hereto within 10 days from the receipt hereof. 

DATED this -~12"-'--s~--- day of June, 1991. 

~' 11:Jd caPvin Gould 7 

United States Magistrate Judge 

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 

I hereby certify that I have mailed a copy of the foregoing 

Report and Recommendation to: 

this 

Ricki Gene Searcy 

Po Box 86 

Draper UT 84020-0086 

Margaret Nelson 

AUSA 

Salt Lake City UT 84101 

day of June, 1991. 

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:-- : :.. : ~· 

IN THE UNITED STATED DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DIS~f~~ 0~ ~f~ 'JI 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

) 

RICKI GENE SEARCY ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

) 

The plaintiff, Ricki Gene Searcy, 

,_. \ 1; ~ . r . ; :., )J ~ ~ 

• I ' 

SY _ _ . _ , • ~· . '1 __ ;:_r_< __ • •• , 1 

Case No . 91-C-OO26J 

ORDER 

filed an action with this court under the Freedom of 

Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 u.s.c. § 552, and the Privacy Act of 

1974, 5 u.s.c. § 552(a). Plaintiff seeks an order requiring the 

Social Security Admi nistration to produce all documents in its 

files pertaining to the plaintiff and awarding plaintiff attorneys 

fees. Plaintiff has filed a Moti on For summary Judgment and 

defendant has filed a Motion To Dismiss. Additionally, plaintiff 

has filed a Motion For Statutory Damages And Attorneys Fees and a 

Motion Under Vaughn v . Rosen For A Detailed Justification, 

Itemization And Indexing. 

The court referred the matter to the magistrate pursuant to 

28 u.s.c. § 636(b)(l) (B). After determining that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance, the magistrate issued a report 

recommending that plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment be 

denied. The magistrate's report further recommended that 

defendant's Motion To Dismiss be granted without prejudice to the 

Appellate Case: 91-4181 Document: 010110226711 Date Filed: 03/02/1992 Page: 17 
plaintiff should the defendant refuse to comply with a proper 

request under the Privacy Act and HHS regulations under the Privacy 

Act, or withhold records that would be available under the Freedom 

of Information Act, though not the Privacy Act. Additionally, the 

magistrate's report recommended that plaintiff's Motion For 

Statutory Damages And Attorneys Fees be denied and that plaintiff's 

Motion Under Vaughn v. Rosen For A Detailed Justification, 

Itemization And Indexing be denied. 

The plaintiff has filed an objection to the magistrate I s 

Report and Recommendation. After reviewing the file and carefully 

considering the magistrate's Report and Recommendation and the 

plaintiff's objection, the court adopts the magistrate's Report 

and Recommendation. Therefore, plaintiff's Motion For Summary 

Judgment is hereby DENIED. Additionally defendant's Motion To 

Dismiss is hereby GRANTED without prejudice to the plaintiff should 

the defendant refuse to comply with a proper request under the 

Privacy Act and HHS regulations under the Privacy Act, or withhold 

records that would be available under the Freedom of Information 

Act, though not the Privacy Act. Furthermore, plaintiff's Motion 

For Statutory Damages And Attorneys Fees is hereby DENIED and 

plaintiff's Motion Under Vaughn v. Rosen For A Detailed 

Justification, Itemization And Indexing is hereby DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this I~ day of September, 1991. 

ins, Chief Judge 

District Court 

Appellate Case: 91-4181 Document: 010110226711 Date Filed: 03/02/1992 Page: 18 
Re: 2:91-cv-00026 

United States District Court 

for the 

District of Utah 

October 17, 1991 

**MAILING CERTIFICATE OF CLERK** 

mw 

True and correct copies of the attached were mailed by the clerk to the 

following: 

Margaret R. Nelson, Esq. 

U.S. Attorney's Office 

350 South Main 

SLC, UT 84010 

Ricki Gene Searcy 

P.O. Box 86 

Draper, UT 84020-0086 

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