Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05041/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05041-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 On July 30, 2002, the District Court adopted this Court’s recommendation that this action proceed only on 1

plaintiff’s retaliation claim against defendant Aboytes, thereby dismissing all claims against the CDC, Cambra,

Carey, Winett and Papac. 

 Plaintiff was notified of the requirements for opposing a summary judgment motion on September 10, 2

2002.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARION BURNETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

ABOYTES, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:02-cv-5041-AWI- DLB (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED

(Doc. 40)

I. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Marion Burnett (“plaintiff”) is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on

plaintiff’s complaint, filed December 7, 2001, against defendant Aboytes (defendant”) for

retaliation. On August 11, 2005, defendant filed the present motion for summary judgment. 1

Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the motion.2

B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”

Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436

(9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

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dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c).

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the

opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

C. Undisputed Facts

1. During the year 2000, defendant Aboytes was a correctional sergeant at the California

Correctional Institution, (CCI) Tehachapi, California. Declaration of Aboytes, ¶ 1. 

2. On August 28, 2000, defendant Aboytes issued a Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) charging

plaintiff with an attempted battery on a peace officer. Declaration of Aboytes, ¶ 2. 

3. Plaintiff submitted an inmate appeal on August 16, 2000 alleging that on July 31, 2000,

defendant Aboytes would not allow him to take a piece of fruit from the dining hall. The

appeal was not assigned by the appeals coordinator until September 5, 2000. Certification

of Gloria Perkins, Records Officer of the Department of Corrections, at 0003-0004. 

4. On December 2, 2000, plaintiff submitted an inmate appeal, Log # CCI-03-00-02720

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complaining of defendant Aboytes’ submission of falsified legal documents in connection

with the August 28, 2000 RVR. Id. at 0005-0010. 

5. This appeal was consolidated with appeal Log No. CCI-03-00-1936, and both were denied

at the second level on April 12, 2001. Id. at 0011.

6. Plaintiff then submitted both appeals to the director’s level, where a denial was issued

September 21, 2001. Id. at 0012-0014.

7. On January 23, 2002, plaintiff submitted an inmate appeal, Log No. CCI-01-02-00320,

complaining that he was denied a meal. Id. at 0015-0017.

8. Not satisfied with either the first or second level partial grants, he received February 15, 2002

and April 23, 2002, respectively, plaintiff also submitted this appeal to the third level, where

it was denied July 10, 2002. Id. at 0018, 0028.

9. On April 10, 2003, plaintiff was transferred to the California Institution for men (CIM). Id.

at 0002.

10. Plaintiff submitted a reasonable accommodation appeal, Log No. CIM-M-03-0695, on May

12, 2003. Id. at 0019-0023.

11. After denial at the first level, plaintiff appealed to the second level on June 19, 2003. Id. at

0020.

12. Not satisfied with the second level response, plaintiff submitted his appeal to the third level

on August 1, 2003 and a denial was issued on August 28, 2003. Id. at 0024-0026.

13. Also, while at CIM, plaintiff submitted two separate property appeals, on April 22, 2003 and

May 19, 2003, respectively, neither of which were assigned appeal log numbers. Id, at 0027.

14. On three separate occasions, plaintiff submitted staff complaints to the third level, December

6, 2000, April 30, 2001 and May 1, 2001, respectively, all of which were screened out. Id.

at 0029.

15. Defendant Aboytes states that she was not aware of the August 16, 2000 inmate appeal until

sometime after September 5, 2000 and she wrote the August 28, 2000, RVR because she

believed that plaintiff intentionally threw an orange at her and almost hit her. Declaration

of Aboytes, ¶ ¶ 3 and 4.

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A verified complaint in a pro se civil rights action may constitute an opposing affidavit for purposes of the 3

summary judgment rule, where the complaint is based on an inmate’s personal knowledge of admissible evidence,

and not merely on the inmate’s belief. McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curium); Lew

v. Kona Hospital, 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985); F.R.C.P. 56(e). 

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16. At that time, oranges were being used by inmates to make pruno, an illicit inmate

manufactured alcoholic beverage. Id. at ¶ 5.

17. For this reason, oranges were being confiscated during the summer of 2000. Id. at ¶ 6.

18. While attempting to confiscate plaintiff’s orange on August 28, 2000, he reacted in a way

which defendant Aboytes believed threatened the safety and security of the institution. Id.

at ¶¶ 7 and 8. 

19. Defendant Aboytes issued the RVR for the purpose of preserving institutional order and

discipline, thereby maintaining the safety and security of the institution. Id. at ¶ 9. 

20. In his inmate appeal, plaintiff admits that when defendant Aboytes told him to get rid of the

orange on August 16, 2000, he “tossed it down on the ground and it rolled in the direction

of Sgt. Aboytes” but it was plaintiff’s opinion that Sgt Aboytes was never in any danger.

Certification of Gloria Perkins, Records Officer of the Department of Corrections, at 0003-

0007. 

D. Plaintiff’s Allegations3

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that on several dates, including July 31, 2000, August 1,

2000, August 15, 2000, and August 16, 2000, he attempted to take an orange with him from the

dining hall, but defendant Aboytes told him to discard the orange each time. Plaintiff informed

defendant Aboytes that pursuant to prison procedures, inmates are allowed to remove one whole

piece of fresh fruit from the dining hall. Plaintiff also informed defendant Aboytes that he was an

insulin-dependent diabetic and that he should be allowed to keep the orange for medical reasons. 

Plaintiff alleges that on August 16, 2000, he submitted a 602 inmate appeal grievance against

Aboytes for misconduct. Compl., p. 4. Plaintiff alleges that on August 28, 2000, Aboytes took

retaliatory action against plaintiff for filing a grievance by submitting a false report that plaintiff

threw an orange at her, and that she had to step aside to avoid being hit with the orange. Compl., p.

5. On August 28, 2000, plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation pending adjudication of

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the disciplinary charge filed by defendant Aboytes. On October 6, 2000, plaintiff was found not

guilty of the disciplinary charge of attempted battery on a peace officer (throwing an orange at

defendant Aboytes). Compl., p. 6. Plaintiff was held in administrative segregation for 45 to 50 days

pending the adjudication of the disciplinary charges brought against him by defendant Aboytes.

(Compl., p. 6). 

E. Discussion

An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison

grievance is sufficient to support claim under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th

Cir. 2003). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five

basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)

because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise

of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). The court must

“‘afford appropriate deference and flexibility’ to prison officials in the evaluation of proffered

legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory.” Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802,

807 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)). The burden is on

plaintiff to demonstrate “that there were no legitimate correctional purposes motivating the actions

he complains of.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808. 

On August 16, 2000, plaintiff filed an inmate appeal against defendant Aboytes; however the

appeal was not assigned by the appeals coordinator until September 5, 2000. Undisputed Fact 3.

On August 28, 2000, defendant Aboytes issued a RVR charging plaintiff with attempted battery on

a peace office. Undisputed Fact 2. Defendant Aboytes states that she was not aware of the August

16, 2000 inmate appeal until sometime after September 5, 2000 and that she issued the August 28,

2000 RVR because she believed plaintiff intentionally threw an orange at her and almost hit her.

Undisputed Fact 3 and 4. 

Defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of showing that the retaliation

for the exercise of protected conduct was the substantial or motivating factor behind her actions.

Defendant argues that the “because of” element is not met here because the inmate appeal was not

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assigned for response by the appeals coordinator until September 5, 2000 and defendant did not even

become aware of the inmate appeal until after she issued the RVR on August 28, 2000. Further,

defendant argues that her RVRhad no chilling or deterrent effect on plaintiff’s continuing to exercise

his First Amendment rights, as evidenced by his continuing to file appeals. Undisputed Fact 4, 7,

10, 13, 14. Finally, defendant argues that the RVR was not retaliatory, but rather was based on a

legitimate penological need brought about by plaintiff’s actions and defendant’s belief that those

actions threatened the safety and security of the institution. Undisputed Fact 16, 17 and 18.

Defendant has met her initial burden of informing the court of the basis for her motion, and

identifying those portions of the record which she believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. The burden therefore shifts to plaintiff to establish that a genuine issue as to

any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 586 (1986). As stated above, in attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but is required

to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material,

in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11;

First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1973). 

Filing prison grievances is a protected activity, see Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68, and the

issuance of a Rules Violation Report, which can lead to a variety of punishments, is without question

an adverse action. However, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that defendant issued the RVR

because of his protected activity. Defendant has presented evidence that the appeal was not assigned

until September 5, 2000, after the issuance of the RVR and plaintiff has failed to present any

evidence refuting this. 

Plaintiff also bears the burden of proving “that there were no legitimate correctional purposes

motivating the actions he complains of.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808. Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions in

his complaint that the RVR was false and that defendant issued it to retaliate against him are

insufficient to meet this burden. In his inmate appeal, plaintiff admits that when defendant Aboytes

told him to get rid of the orange, he “tossed it down on the ground and it rolled in the direction of

Sgt. Aboytes” but it was his opinion that Sgt Aboytes was never in any danger. Undisputed Fact 20.

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Defendant believed that plaintiff intentionally threw the orange at her and that plaintiff’s actions

threatened the safety and security of the institution. Following this incident, defendant issued the

RVR for attempted battery on a peace officer. Maintaining order is a legitimate correctional goal.

When defendant attempted to confiscate the orange, plaintiff threw it in her direction. Plaintiff’s

conduct was at least arguably deserving of subsequent disciplinary action. The only alternative

evidence on this point is plaintiff’s self serving statement in his inmate appeal that defendant was

never in any danger of being hit by the orange. Based on his subjective belief, plaintiff argues that

the RVR was false and was issued against him because he filed an inmate appeal. In light of the

plaintiff’s admission that he “tossed” the orange in defendant’s direction on the day in question and

prior to the issuance of the RVR, his argument is insufficient to meet his burden of demonstrating

that defendant’s action did not serve a legitimate correctional goal. It is not enough for plaintiff to

proffer an alternate theory behind the issuance the RVR. Plaintiff must submit evidence that the

action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Plaintiff has not done so.

Further, plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that defendant’s actions chilled the exercise

of his First Amendment rights. At this stage in the action, plaintiff must present some evidence in

support of his claim. Plaintiff may not simply rely on conclusory assertions in his complaint that his

rights were chilled.4

In conclusion, the court finds that plaintiff has not submitted evidence raising any triable

issues of fact with respect to his retaliation claim. Specifically, plaintiff has not submitted any

evidence that the issuance of the RVR following the August 16, 2000 incident was in retaliation for

his inmate appeal or that it did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. The fact that

because plaintiff filed an inmate appeal prior to the issuance of the RVR, the timing is plausible to

support retaliation claim is, alone, insufficient where it is also a fact that plaintiff engaged in conduct

that defendant perceived as threatening prior to the issuance of the RVR. In addition, although

plaintiff the issuance of the RVR was adverse to him, plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that

he suffered a chilling effect. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on

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plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

E. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendant Aboytes’ motion

for summary judgment, filed August 11, 2005, be GRANTED.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty (20)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 14, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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