Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-16-02254/USCOURTS-ca7-16-02254-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 12, 2016*

Decided December 13, 2016

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 16-2254

JEANETTE STEPHENS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 3117

Jeffrey T. Gilbert,

Magistrate Judge.

O R D E R

Jeannette Stephens appeals from the district court’s judgment upholding the 

Social Security Administration’s denial of her application for Disability Insurance 

Benefits. She argues that her application should be reevaluated because an 

administrative law judge later found her disabled based on a separate application she 

 

* We have unanimously agreed to decide this case without oral argument 

because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral 

argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 16-2254 Page 2

filed. But Stephens never apprised the district court of the later finding, let alone sought

a timely reassessment of the denial of benefits, so we affirm.

In September 2010, Stephens first applied for disability benefits based on several

conditions that included lumbar pain, depression, asthma, sleep apnea, and forearm 

strain. The Social Security Administration denied her application both initially and 

upon reconsideration. Some time later, assisted by counsel, she had a hearing before 

ALJ Lee Lewin. On November 20, 2012, ALJ Lewin concluded that Stephens was not 

disabled. The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision.

In April 2014 Stephens, represented by new counsel, sought judicial review.

Stephens contended that ALJ Lewin erred by (1) not sufficiently accounting for the 

opinion of her treating physician, (2) rejecting all medical opinions in favor of the ALJ’s 

own lay opinion, and (3) failing to account for all of her limitations when computing her

residual functional capacity.

Around that same time, Stephens filed a second application for disability benefits 

with the Social Security Administration. (This application is not included in the record, 

but presumably was based on more recent medical documents than those included in 

the prior application.) The agency again initially denied benefits to Stephens, but this 

time after a hearing a different ALJ (William Spalo) found her disabled as of 

November 21, 2012 (just one day after ALJ Lewin had found Stephens not disabled) 

based on the Medical–Vocational Guidelines, and thus entitled to benefits.

Even though Stephens’s first application was still pending in the district court at 

the time ALJ Spalo found her disabled, Stephens never informed the court of the

favorable ruling. Magistrate Judge Gilbert (to whom both parties consented to conduct 

all proceedings in the case) reviewed only the denial of Stephens’s first application, and 

concluded that substantial evidence supported ALJ Lewin’s ruling. As Magistrate Judge 

Gilbert explained, the ALJ proffered legitimate reasons for discounting the treating 

physician’s opinion, gave proper weight to the medical opinions, and correctly 

accounted for Stephens’s limitations when determining her Residual Functional 

Capacity.

Stephens, now proceeding pro se, argues that ALJ Spalo’s finding of disability

undercuts ALJ Lewin’s finding in this case that she was not disabled through 

November 2012. But Stephens does not pinpoint any errors in the decision of either ALJ 

Lewin or Magistrate Judge Gilbert.

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No. 16-2254 Page 3

Stephens could have asked for a reassessment of ALJ Lewin’s decision based on 

ALJ Spalo’s favorable finding, either under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (“newly 

discovered evidence”) or sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (allowing for remand based 

on new and material evidence, as long as she could show “good cause” for failing to 

incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 

501 U.S. 89, 98–99 (1991), but she waived these arguments by failing to raise them in the 

district court. See Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2013). In any event, 

Stephens may not introduce ALJ Spalo’s disability finding as “new evidence” here 

because she has not shown good cause for previously failing to introduce it in the 

district court. Veal v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 693, 699–700 (7th Cir. 1987) (deciding in 

procedurally analogous case, where claimant tried to introduce evidence of later finding 

of disability in appellate court even though finding had been available while case was 

pending in district court, that she failed to show good cause for not supplementing the 

record earlier); see also Midwest Fence Corp. v. United States Dep't of Transp., No. 15-1827, 

2016 WL 6543514, at *10 (7th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016).

Stephens also restates the three issues that she raised in the district court, but she 

does not develop any challenge to the court’s handling of them, nor does she cite to 

legal authority or the record in support. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8); Long v. Teachers' Ret. 

Sys. of Ill., 585 F.3d 344, 349 (7th Cir. 2009); Jones v. InfoCure Corp., 310 F.3d 529, 534 

(7th Cir. 2002).

AFFIRMED.

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