Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01687/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01687-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL HICKS,

Plaintiff,

v.

BEHROZ HAMKAR et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-1687 KJM CKD P (TEMP)

ORDER AND

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with this civil rights 

action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Several matters are pending before the court, including 

plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief, plaintiff’s motion to amend, and defendants’ 

motion for a protective order. The court will address these matters in turn. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is proceeding on a first amended complaint against defendants Hamkar, Venes, 

Johnson, Sayre, and Nangalama. Therein, plaintiff claims that defendants’ refusal to provide him 

adequate medical care for his arthritic condition (moderate multilevel cervical spondylosis) 

violates his rights under the Eighth Amendment. 

On December 8, 2014, defendants filed a motion to revoke plaintiff’s in forma pauperis 

(“IFP”) status. On March, 25, 2015, then-Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd issued findings and 

recommendations, recommending defendants’ motion to revoke plaintiff’s IFP status be denied

Case 2:13-cv-01687-KJM-DB Document 61 Filed 12/03/15 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

and defendants be ordered to file a response to plaintiff’s first amended complaint within fortyfive days. Although defendants had demonstrated that plaintiff had accrued three or more strikes 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), Judge Drozd found that the allegations in plaintiff’s original 

complaint satisfied the imminent danger exception to the three strikes rule. Judge Drozd also, by 

order, denied plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief as having been rendered moot

because plaintiff had filed a notice of change of address in this action indicating he was no longer 

subject to the alleged conditions he complained of in his motion. 

Plaintiff filed objections to Judge Drozd’s findings and recommendations. On September 

22, 2015, United States District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller adopted the findings and 

recommendations in full and denied defendant’s motion to revoke plaintiff’s IFP status. Judge 

Mueller also construed plaintiff’s objections as a motion for reconsideration of Judge Drozd’s 

order denying plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief as moot. Judge Mueller vacated 

that order because plaintiff had raised arguments in his objections that called into question 

whether his motion had in fact been rendered moot by his transfer. Judge Mueller referred the 

matter back to the magistrate judge for further proceedings and issuance of findings and 

recommendations on plaintiff’s motion. 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

In plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief, plaintiff’s allegations center on his 

conditions of confinement at CSP-Sacramento and at High Desert State Prison where he believed 

he was not receiving adequate physical therapy as a physical therapist at CSP-Sacramento had 

previously recommended for his medical condition. In various subsequent filings with this court, 

plaintiff maintained that he still was not receiving adequate physical therapy at Mule Creek State 

Prison and most recently at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility. In this regard, plaintiff claims 

that prison officials have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).

Having reviewed plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief and his subsequent

filings with the court, the undersigned finds that plaintiff is not entitled to preliminary injunctive 

relief. “The proper legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate 

Case 2:13-cv-01687-KJM-DB Document 61 Filed 12/03/15 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 

absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction 

is in the public interest.’” Stormans v. Selecky, 571 F.3d 960, 978 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2)

(preliminary injunction “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the 

harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to 

correct the harm.”). Here, plaintiff has not shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his 

claims. 

In the Ninth Circuit, a deliberate indifference claim has two components: 

First, the plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by 

demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could 

result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.’” Second, the plaintiff must show the 

defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent. This 

second prong – defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent – is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure 

to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) 

harm caused by the indifference. Indifference “may appear when 

prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical 

treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison 

physicians provide medical care.” (internal citations omitted)

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).

Although it appears plaintiff’s moderate multilevel cervical spondylosis is a serious 

medical need, plaintiff has not provided evidence to show that any defendants or prison officials

have acted with deliberate indifference to this serious medical need. Based on plaintiff’s 

submissions to the court, this court simply cannot discern at this time whether defendants or 

prison officials are denying plaintiff necessary and reasonably available care or whether 

plaintiff’s claims represent mere differences of opinion between a prisoner and prison medical 

staff as to the proper course of treatment for his medical condition. See Snow v. McDaniel, 681 

F.3d 978, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 

F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); 

Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff has not provided this court 

with evidence demonstrating that the care he is receiving is medically unacceptable under the 

Case 2:13-cv-01687-KJM-DB Document 61 Filed 12/03/15 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

circumstances or that defendants are acting in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to 

plaintiff’s health. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). See also Toguchi 

v. Soon Hwang Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). 

In fact, the evidence before the court indicates that defendants and prison officials have 

attempted to address plaintiff’s medical needs. For example, plaintiff acknowledges that Dr. 

Bobbala started to facilitate a medical transfer for him to California Medical Facility prior to 

plaintiff’s transfer to High Desert State Prison. Plaintiff also acknowledges that prison officials 

have provided him with some physical therapy and have submitted additional requests and 

referrals for physical therapy and neurosurgeon appointments on his behalf. While this evidence 

is not conclusive of defendants’ or prison officials’ subjective state of mind as to plaintiff's 

treatment, it is probative thereof and gives rise to a reasonable inference that they have not acted

with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 834 (1994) (deliberate indifference to a medical need is shown only when a prison official 

knows that an inmate has a serious medical need and disregards that need by failing to respond 

reasonably). See also Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980)

(“Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of 

action.”) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). 

Finally, plaintiff has not provided evidence to show that he is likely to suffer irreparable 

harm in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief and has not addressed how the balance of 

equities tips in his favor or why an injunction is in the public interest. Accordingly, for all of the 

foregoing reasons, the court will recommend that plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive 

relief be denied. 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND

Plaintiff has filed a motion to amend his first amended complaint to clarify some of his 

factual allegations against the defendants. Plaintiff does not name any new defendants or state 

any new causes of action in his proposed second amended complaint. The defendants have filed a 

statement of non-opposition to plaintiff’s motion. In addition, defendants have requested an 

extension of time to file a response to plaintiff’s complaint until after this court has ruled on 

Case 2:13-cv-01687-KJM-DB Document 61 Filed 12/03/15 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

plaintiff’s motion to amend. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides in relevant part:

(1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its 

pleading once as a matter of course within:

(A) 21 days after serving it, or

(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is 

required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days 

after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is 

earlier.

(2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its 

pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the 

court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so 

requires.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.

Under the circumstances of this case, and having screened plaintiff’s proposed second 

amended complaint, the court will grant plaintiff’s motion to amend and order the parties to 

proceed on plaintiff’s second amended complaint. In addition, the court will grant defendants’ 

motion for an extension of time to respond to plaintiff’s complaint and order defendants to file 

their response to plaintiff’s second amended complaint within seven days. Finally, the court 

notes that prior to plaintiff filing his motion to amend and second amended complaint, defendants

Zamora and Venes filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In light of the case developments discussed herein, the 

court will deny defendants’ motion to dismiss as having been rendered moot. 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER

Defendants have filed a motion for a protective order staying discovery pending 

adjudication of defendants’ forthcoming motion to dismiss. Defendants argue that allowing 

discovery before ruling on a qualified immunity defense in a pre-answer motion to dismiss would 

deprive defendants of one of the benefits of qualified immunity, namely, avoiding the burdens of 

unnecessary discovery. According to the defendants, plaintiff has already served defendants

Hamkar and Sayre with discovery requests. Plaintiff has not opposed or otherwise responded to 

defendants’ motion.

Case 2:13-cv-01687-KJM-DB Document 61 Filed 12/03/15 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1), the court may, for good cause, issue a 

protective order that forbids or limits discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). A district court’s 

stay of discovery pending a ruling on questions of immunity “furthers the goal of efficiency for 

the court and litigants.” Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Good cause appearing, the court will grant defendants’ motion for a protective order and 

will stay discovery until thirty days after the court rules on defendants’ forthcoming motion to 

dismiss. 

OTHER MATTERS

On June 17, 2015, plaintiff moved the court for an order to show cause as to why 

defendants should not have to pay monetary sanctions for failing to respond to plaintiff’s first 

amended complaint. As defendants argue in opposition to plaintiff’s motion, however, at the time 

plaintiff filed his motion for an order to show cause, defendants were under no obligation to file a

response to plaintiff’s complaint. As noted above, on March, 25, 2015, then-Magistrate Judge 

Drozd issued findings and recommendations, recommending defendants’ motion to revoke 

plaintiff’s IFP status be denied and defendants be ordered to file a response to plaintiff’s first 

amended complaint within forty-five days. Judge Mueller did not adopt Judge Drozd’s 

recommendations until September 22, 2015. Accordingly, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion

for an order to show cause. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to amend (Doc. No. 51) is granted. The parties shall now proceed on 

plaintiff’s second amended complaint in this action.

2. Defendants’ motion for an extension of time to file a response to plaintiff’s complaint 

(Doc. No. 59) is granted. Defendants shall file a response to plaintiff’s second amended 

complaint within seven days of the date of this order; 

3. Defendant Zamora and Venes’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 40) is denied as having 

been rendered moot;

/////

Case 2:13-cv-01687-KJM-DB Document 61 Filed 12/03/15 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

4. Defendants’ motion for a protective order (Doc. No. 55) is granted. Discovery is 

stayed until thirty days after the court rules on defendants’ forthcoming motion to dismiss based 

on qualified immunity; and

5. Plaintiff’s motion for an order to show cause as to why defendants should not have to 

pay monetary sanctions (Doc. No. 38) is denied.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive 

relief (Doc. No. 27) be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: December 3, 2015

ec

hick1687.mta

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:13-cv-01687-KJM-DB Document 61 Filed 12/03/15 Page 7 of 7