Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01037/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01037-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAUNN A. FULLMER,

Plaintiff, No. 2:09-cv-1037 JFM 

vs.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA, etc.,

et al.,

Defendants. 

 / ORDER

Defendants’ motions to dismiss came on for hearing May 20, 2010. Kimberlee A.

Rode appeared for plaintiff. LaShon Harris appeared for defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. 

Joshua Mandell appeared for defendant OneWest Bank, FSB. Upon review of the motions and

the documents in support and opposition, upon hearing the arguments of counsel and good cause

appearing therefor, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS: 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The court incorporates by reference the recitation of facts in its January 6, 2010

order.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 17, 2009, plaintiff filed the instant action and, proceeding on an

amended complaint, alleged that defendants: (1) violated the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15

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U.S.C. 1601 et seq., by failing to provide two accurate copies of Notice of Right to Cancel and

failing to timely respond to plaintiffs’ rescission letter; (2) violated the Real Estate Settlement

Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. by likewise failing to respond to the same

correspondence; (3) violated the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“RFDCPA”),

California Civil Code § 1788 et seq., by continuing to try to collect on the relevant loan after

receiving plaintiff’s letter; (4) violated California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), California

Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.; (5) breached the Implied Covenant of Good Faith

and Fair Dealing; (6) are pursuing wrongful foreclosure; (7) have recorded documents impairing

plaintiff’s title, constituting slander of title; and (8) have taken and/or failed to take actions

impairing plaintiff’s credit. 

On August 31, 2009, defendant OneWest Bank, FSB, filed a motion to dismiss

and a motion to strike. Also on August 31, 2009, defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., filed

a motion to dismiss.

On January 6, 2010, the undersigned (1) dismissed with prejudice the TILA

claims; (2) dismissed the RESPA claims; (3) denied plaintiff’s request for joinder; (4) dismissed

plaintiff’s RFDCPA claims with leave to amend, allowing plaintiff an opportunity to allege how

defendants violated the RFDCPA and the specific code section defendants allegedly violated; (5)

dismissed the UCL claims; (6) dismissed the Good Faith and Fair Dealing claims; (7) dismissed

the wrongful foreclosure claims; (8) dismissed the slander of title and credit claims; and (9)

granted defendant OneWest’s motion to strike plaintiff’s request for punitive damages, but

denied it in all other respects. To the extent plaintiff would be able to cure the deficiencies

discussed in the order, plaintiff was granted thirty days to file a second amended complaint. 

On February 4, 2010, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint in which he

again claims violations of TILA, RESPA, and RFDCPA, and further adds the following claims:

(1) negligence, (2) civil conspiracy, (3) constructive fraud, and (4) deceit. 

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On February 22, 2010, defendants filed separate motions to dismiss. On March

19, 2010, plaintiff filed an opposition. On March 25, 2010, defendants filed separate replies. 

STANDARDS

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal

sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir.

1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct.

1955, 1974 (2007). Thus, a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the court’s ability to

grant any relief on the plaintiff’s claims, even if the plaintiff’s allegations are true.

In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted,

the court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v.

United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The court is permitted to consider material properly submitted as part of the

complaint, documents not physically attached to the complaint if their authenticity is not

contested and the complaint necessarily relies on them, and matters of public record. Lee v. City

of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). Matters of public record include

pleadings and other papers filed with a court. Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d

1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). The court need not accept as true conclusory allegations,

unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt,

643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

On January 6, 2010, the court took judicial notice of the following:

1. Plaintiff and his wife acquired title to 4048 Monte Verde Drive, El Dorado Hills,

CA, by grant deed recorded on March 3, 2006.

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1

 Defendant avers plaintiff defaulted on or about January 1, 2009, and as of June 19,

2009, the defaulted amount was $16,205.28. 

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2. Plaintiff and his wife obtained a mortgage loan for $500,000.00 secured by a deed

of trust against said real estate recorded on March 3, 2006. The deed of trust

identifies 1st National Lending Services as the lender, Mortgage Electronic

Registration Systems, Inc. as the nominee beneficiary, and

Greenhead Investments, Inc. as the trustee, with plaintiff and his

wife as borrowers.

3. Plaintiff and his wife obtained a second mortgage loan in the sum of $45,000.00

on or about March 3, 2006. That deed of trust identifies 1st National as the

lender, Greenhead as the trustee and plaintiff and his wife as the borrowers.

4. Notice of default was recorded on June 23, 2009.1

 The notice of default was

signed by Clayton Goff for NDEx West, LLC as Agent for Beneficiary, and

directed plaintiff to contact OneWest Bank, FSB, c/o NDEx West, LLC, 15000

Surveyor Boulevard, Suite 500, Addison, Texas 75001-9813 to “find out the

amount [he] must pay, or to arrange for payment to stop the foreclosure, or if [the]

property is in foreclosure for any other reason.” 

On February 22, 2010, defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank requested judicial notice

of the grant deed recorded on March 3, 2006; the deed of trust recorded on March 3, 2006, and

the second deed of trust recorded on March 3, 2006. Because the court has already noticed these

documents, defendant’s request will be denied as redundant. 

ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, defendants argue that plaintiff’s newly added claims in the

second amended complaint go beyond the scope of this court’s January 6, 2010 order. In that

order, plaintiff was granted an opportunity to file a second amended complaint “[t]o the extent

[he] may be able to cure the deficiencies noted [in the order] . . . .” Interpreting the order

liberally, plaintiff was granted leave to (1) identify Lender Doe One and/or Lender Doe Two

with regard to the TILA claim; (2) plead sufficient facts showing a cognizable RESPA violation,

specifically by showing actual pecuniary damage; and (3) plead sufficient facts to allow the court

to determine whether the conduct alleged violates the RFDCPA. 

Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party may amend

its pleading once as a matter of course and, in all other cases, with leave of court. Fed. R. Civ. P.

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15(a)(1)-(2). The Ninth Circuit has held that the liberality in granting leave to amend under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) is subject to several limitations. See Ascon Properties,

Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Leave need not be granted where

the amendment of the complaint would cause the opposing party undue prejudice, is sought in

bad faith, constitutes an exercise in futility, or creates undue delay.”). “The district court's

discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended

the complaint.” Id. 

Plaintiff filed a complaint on April 17, 2009. Plaintiff filed a first amended

complaint on August 14, 2009. Plaintiff was granted leave to file a second amended complaint

on January 6, 2010. Although the court finds that plaintiff has gone beyond the scope of the

January 6, 2010 order by adding additional state law claims, the court will nonetheless address

them infra.

I. TILA

In the January 6, 2010 order, this court held that, because OneWest and JPMorgan

are loan servicers and not a creditor or assignee of the creditor, plaintiff’s TILA claims against

these defendants are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff was granted leave to amend to substitute

the true name or names of Lender Doe One and/or Lender Doe Two. 

In the second amended complaint, plaintiff revives his TILA claims against these

same defendants in substantially the same manner as in his first amended complaint. Plaintiff

does not substitute the true name or names of Lender Doe One and/or Lender Doe Two. In his

opposition to defendant OneWest’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff now seeks leave to amend his

complaint for the third time to add Duetsche Bank as Lender Doe Two and requests that

OneWest’s motion to dismiss be denied as moot. This latter request will be denied.

Further, plaintiff’s request to file a third amended complaint, first made in

plaintiff’s opposition to OneWest’s motion to dismiss, must be made, if at all, pursuant to Rule

15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

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2

 RESPA defines a QWR as:

a written correspondence, other than notice on a payment coupon

or other payment medium supplied by the servicer, that-[¶] (i)

includes, or otherwise enables the servicer to identify, the name

and account of the borrower; and [¶] (ii) includes a statement of

the reasons for the belief of the borrower, to the extent applicable,

that the account is in error or provides sufficient detail to the

servicer regarding other information sought by the borrower.

12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B) (2009). When a loan servicer receives a QWR, it must either correct

the borrower’s account or, after conducting an investigation, provide the borrower with a written

explanation of: (1) why the servicer believes the account is correct; or (2) why the requested

information is unavailable. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2).

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II. RESPA

In the January 6, 2010 order, this court held that the “Qualified Written Request”

(“QWR”)2

 sent by plaintiff was not mailed to JPMorgan. Rather, the QWR was mailed to

Washington Mutual. Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his complaint so as to state sufficient

facts that would demonstrate that JPMorgan had notice of and was required to respond to the

QWR, as well as to assert actual pecuniary damage as a result of the alleged RESPA violation. 

In his second amended complaint, plaintiff again brings the RESPA violation

against Doe Lender One and JPMorgan. Plaintiff attempts to cure the first deficiency noted

above by arguing that JPMorgan and Washington Mutual, which plaintiff alleges was acquired

by JPMorgan on September 28, 2008, were the same entity as of the date the QWR was mailed. 

As to damages, plaintiff claims that JPMorgan’s failure to respond to the QWR “resulted in

credit harm by credit lines being reduced or eliminated by other creditors.” (SAC at ¶ 153.) 

Plaintiff also claims that “[a]s a result of JPMorgan/Washington Mutual’s failure to act on the

request, Plaintiff was unable to resolve the matters pending with DOE1, unable to obtain the

amounts necessary to tneder [sic], unable to tender and as a direct result, the first mortgage

holder sold the property thereby harming the Plaintiff by the loss of the property.” (Id. ¶ 154.) 

In its motion to dismiss, JPMorgan argues the following: (1) it was not required to

respond to the QWR because the letter was not addressed to it, but rather to Washington Mutual;

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(2) assuming the court finds it was required to respond, the QWR contained insufficient details

regarding the loan as required by statute; and (3) plaintiff again fails to allege actual pecuniary

damage.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that defendant JPMorgan and Washington Mutual were the

same entity on the date the QWR was mailed and, as a result, JPMorgan was required to respond

to the QWR. JPMorgan contends this is false because it only acquired certain assets and

liabilities of Washington Mutual, not its name. On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, a court must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true and construe

them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. 

Accordingly, the court must assume that JPMorgan was the same entity as Washington Mutual at

the relevant times herein and, thereupon, find that JPMorgan had notice of the QWR and was

required to respond to it under RESPA.

Further, in the January 6, 2010 order, it was held that the contents of the letter

complied with the RESPA statute. 

As to JPMorgan’s final argument regarding damages, JPMorgan argues that

plaintiff fails to show how its alleged failure to respond to the QWR affected plaintiff’s ability to

tender with respect to the first loan, which was the loan that was foreclosed on. JPMorgan is

correct in that plaintiff has not shown how its alleged failure to respond to the QWR caused

plaintiff’s inability “to resolve the matters pending with DOE1.” Nonetheless, plaintiff does

allege that JPMorgan “reported the credit of the plaintiff . . . which resulted in credit harm by

credit lines being reduced or eliminated by other creditors,” which is sufficient to survive a

motion to dismiss. See Hutchinson v. Del. Sav. Bank FSB, 410 F. Supp. 2d 374, 383 (D.N.J.

2006) (holding that the plaintiffs adequately pled actual damages when they alleged that they

suffered “negative credit ratings on their credit reports [and] the inability to obtain and borrow

another mortgage loan and other financing”). 

/////

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3

 Pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a), “[e]veryone is responsible, not only for

the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or

her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person,

except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury

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Accordingly, defendant JPMorgan’s motion to dismiss will be denied as to this

claim.

III. RFDCPA

In the January 6, 2010 order, plaintiff was granted leave to file a second amended

complaint to provide guidance as to how defendants allegedly violated the RFDCPA and to

recite the specific code section defendants allegedly violated. 

In his second amended complaint, plaintiff argues that, despite requesting that

defendants refrain from contacting him except as authorized by law, defendants continued to

contact him to collect the debt “outside of the statutorily required notices under Civil Code 2924

et seq. related to non-judicial foreclosure.” Plaintiff provides a “partial list” of telephone calls

received from defendants, but he does not identify any other facts relating to those calls,

including whether defendants’ communications were made in a threatening or harassing manner,

see Cal. Civil Code § 1788 et seq; whether the defendants threatened plaintiff, see Cal. Civil

Code § 1788.10; used obscenity, see Cal. Civil Code § 1788.11; or used misleading or false

communications, see Cal. Civil Code § 1788.12. 

Here, plaintiff identifies the nature of the communication by defendants as solely

related to “non-judicial foreclosure[s].” However, because non-judicial foreclosure does not

constitute debt collection under the RFDCPA, see Izenberg v. ETS Services, LLC, 589

F.Supp.2d 1193, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 2008), and because plaintiff fails to allege specific RFDCPA

violations or violated RFDCPA sections, this claim will be dismissed with prejudice. 

IV. Negligence

Plaintiff asserts a negligence claim against all defendants pursuant to common

law and California Civil Code § 1714(a).3

 Plaintiff alleges that the defendants were negligent by

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upon himself or herself. The design, distribution, or marketing of firearms and

ammunition is not exempt from the duty to use ordinary care and skill that is required by

this section. The extent of liability in these cases is defined by the Title on Compensatory

Relief.”

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violating (1) TILA requirements and plaintiff’s request for rescission under TILA; (2) RESPA’s

requirements; and (3) RFDCPA’s requirements. Plaintiff seeks liability both directly and under

an agency theory. 

Plaintiff’s negligence claim is an attempt to bypass the court’s findings regarding

the TILA, RESPA, and RFDCPA claims. First, to the extent plaintiff’s negligence claim is

predicated on defendants’ alleged violations of TILA and the RFDCPA, it fails. In the January

6, 2010 order, plaintiff’s TILA claim was dismissed with prejudice as to both defendants. 

Further, based on the discussion above, his RFDCPA claim should also be dismissed with

prejudice. Finally, his attempt to predicate the negligence claim on any alleged RESPA violation

fails as to OneWest because this claim was previously dismissed with prejudice. The sole

question that remains is whether JPMorgan was negligent in allegedly failing to respond to the

QWR. 

“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are (1) a legal duty to use

reasonable care, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) proximate [or legal] cause between the breach

and (4) the plaintiff's injury.” Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1333, 1339, 78

Cal. Rptr. 2d 525 (1998). “The existence of a duty of care owed by a defendant to a plaintiff is a

prerequisite to establishing a claim for negligence.” Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan

Assn., 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1095 (1991). 

“The existence of a legal duty to use reasonable care in a particular factual

situation is a question of law for the court to decide.” Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc.,

118 Cal. App. 4th 269, 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). “The ‘legal duty’ of care may be of two

general types: (a) the duty of a person to use ordinary care in activities from which harm might

reasonably be anticipated [, or] (b) [a]n affirmative duty where the person occupies a particular

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relationship to others. . . . In the first situation, he is not liable unless he is actively careless; in

the second, he may be liable for failure to act affirmatively to prevent harm.” McGettigan v. Bay

Area Rapid Transit Dist., 57 Cal. App. 4th 1011, 1016-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 

There is no actionable duty between a lender and borrower in that loan

transactions are arms-length. A lender “owes no duty of care to the [borrowers] in approving

their loan. Liability to a borrower for negligence arises only when the lender ‘actively

participates’ in the financed enterprise ‘beyond the domain of the usual money lender.’” Wagner

v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (citing several cases). “[A]s a general

rule, a financial institution owes no duty of care to a borrower when the institution’s involvement

in the loan transaction does not exceed the scope of its conventional role as a mere lender of

money.” Nymark, 231 Cal.App.3d at 1096; see Myers v. Gurantee Sav. & Loan Assn., 79 Cal.

App. 3d 307, 312 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (no lender liability when lender did not engage “in any

activity outside the scope of the normal activities of a lender of construction monies”). This rule

has been applied to loan servicers. See Mulato v. WMC Mortgage Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

100070 at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Shepherd v. Am. Home Mortg. Servs., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

108523 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“[L]oan servicers do not owe a duty to the borrowers of the loans they

service.”). 

Plaintiff’s argument appears to rest on a statutory violation as evidence of

negligence. Negligence per se is an evidentiary presumption that a party failed to exercise due

care if:

(1) he violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity;

(2) the violation proximately caused death or injury to a person or property;

(3) the death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature within the statute,

ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and

(4) the person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of

the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was

adopted.

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Cal. Evid. Code § 669. 

The negligence per se doctrine does not establish a cause of action distinct from

negligence. Cal. Serv. Station & Auto. Repair Ass’n v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 62 Cal. App.

4th 1166, 1178 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (“[A]n underlying claim of ordinary negligence must be

viable before the presumption of negligence of Evidence Code section 669 can be employed.”). 

Rather, the negligence per se doctrine treats a statutory violation as evidence of negligence. See

Sierra-Bay Fed. Land Bank Assn. v. Superior Court, 227 Cal. App. 3d 318, 333 (Ca. Ct. App.

1991) (“[I]t is the tort of negligence, and not the violation of the statute itself, which entitles a

plaintiff to recover civil damages. In such circumstances the plaintiff is not attempting to pursue

a private cause of action for violation of the statute; rather, he is pursuing a negligence action

and is relying upon the violation of a statute, ordinance, or regulation to establish part of that

cause of action.”). Even if the four requirements of California Evidence Code section 669 are

met, the plaintiff is not entitled to a presumption of negligence in the absence of an underlying

negligence action. Coyotzi v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 09-1036, 2009 WL 2985497, at *6

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2009).

Here, plaintiffs fails to allege that JPMorgan’s involvement in the loan transaction

exceeded the scope of its conventional role as a loan servicer. Moreover, a negligence per se

claim fails because, although plaintiff seemingly asserts that JPMorgan owed him a statutory

duty of care, he does not point to any provision in RESPA that creates such a duty. See Peay v.

Midland Mortg. Co., 2010 WL 476677 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Even assuming, however, that

JPMorgan’s alleged failure to respond to the QWR was a statutory violation, plaintiff has not

alleged any injury or damage related to JPMorgan’s conduct. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s negligence claim will be dismissed.

V. Civil Conspiracy

Plaintiff also brings a civil conspiracy claim against all defendants. 

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The required elements of a claim for civil conspiracy under California law are (1)

the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the

conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from the wrongful conduct. Kidron v. Movie Acquisition

Corp., 40 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 

Under California law, civil conspiracy, unlike criminal conspiracy, “is not an

independent tort.” Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 Cal.4th 503, 510-11

(Cal. Ct. App. 2004). Civil “conspiracy itself is not actionable without a wrong.” Okun v.

Superior Court, 29 Cal.3d 442, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); see also Sebastian Intern., Inc. v.

Russolillo, 162 F.Supp.2d 1198, 1207 (2001). In Okun, the California Supreme Court dismissed

a claim for civil conspiracy when the plaintiff failed to state a claim for any underlying tort. 

Okun, 29 Cal.3d at 454. Because civil conspiracy allegations are only considered in the context

of tort claims, there is no separate and distinct tort cause of action for civil conspiracy. Entm’t

Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1228 (9th Cir.1997).

Plaintiff argues that the defendants are conspiring to violate various consumer

protection statutes. His claim, however, rests on conclusory allegations. Plaintiff again repeats

that the defendants failed to comply with TILA, RESPA, and RFDCPA and merely states that

“[a]ll of the Defendants are systematically conspiring to evade all of the consumer protection

statutes and delay and evade in order to foreclose the Plaintiffs [sic] consumer protection

statutes.” 

Plaintiff has not pled facts that would support a civil conspiracy claim and has not

shown the existence of an independent tort. Therefore, defendants’ motions to dismiss will be

granted as to this claim.

VI. Deceit

Plaintiff next brings a claim for deceit against OneWest and JPMorgan for their

alleged refusal to provide plaintiff with the name, address and telephone number of Doe Lender

One and Doe Lender Two as requested in the QWR. 

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To state a claim for deceit, a plaintiff must plead “‘(a) misrepresentation; (b)

knowledge of falsity (or scienter); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable

reliance; and (e) resulting damage.’” In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d 1078, 1096

(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Small v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 30 Cal.4th 167, 173 (2003)); see generally Cal.

Civ. Code §§ 1709-10. In relevant part, deceit is defined as the “suppression of a fact, by one

who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead

for want of communication of that fact.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1710.

“In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or

mistake shall be stated with particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 9(b). The allegations must be

“specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to

constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they

have done anything wrong.” Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Statements of the time, place and nature of the alleged fraudulent activities are sufficient, id. at

735, provided the plaintiff sets forth “what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is

false.” In re GlenFed, Inc., Secs. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994). Scienter may be

averred generally, simply by saying that it existed. Id. at 1547; see Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 9(b)

(“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred

generally.”). Allegations of fraud based on information and belief usually do not satisfy the

particularity requirements of Rule 9(b); however, as to matters peculiarly within the opposing

party’s knowledge, allegations based on information and belief may satisfy Rule 9(b) if they also

state the facts upon which the belief is founded. Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d

1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987).

It has previously been determined that OneWest did not receive the QWR as the

entity was not in existence when the document was mailed. Because OneWest could not have

concealed the information requested by plaintiff if it did not receive the request, plaintiff’s claim

fails as to OneWest and will be dismissed with prejudice. 

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As to JPMorgan, plaintiff’s allegations do not satisfy the heightened pleading

requirement for fraud as required by Rule 9(b). Specifically, plaintiff fails to allege scienter and

intent, and also fails to allege any resulting damage caused by JPMorgan’s conduct. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s deceit claim against JPMorgan will also be dismissed.

VII. Constructive Fraud

Finally, plaintiff brings a claim for constructive fraud against OneWest and

JPMorgan for their alleged refusal to provide plaintiff with the name, address and telephone

number of Doe Lender One and Doe Lender Two. 

To state a claim for constructive fraud, the plaintiff must allege facts establishing:

(1) a fiduciary or confidential relationship; (2) nondisclosure; (3) intent to deceive; and (4)

reliance and resulting injury, i.e., causation. Cal. Civ. Code § 1573; Younan v. Equifax Inc., 111

Cal. App. 3d 498, 516 n.14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).

Plaintiff’s allegations in support of this cause of action are conclusory and fail to

allege each of these elements with the level of particularity demanded by Rule 9(b). See Kearns

v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009). In addition, plaintiff has failed to allege

facts sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a fiduciary duty between himself and defendants,

which is a prerequisite for constructive fraud. See Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan Assn.,

231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1096 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). Although plaintiff claims that defendants

owe a duty under 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f)(2), the court has previously dismissed plaintiff’s TILA

claims with prejudice as to both defendants.

Thus, plaintiff’s constructive fraud claim will be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendant OneWest’s motion to dismiss is granted and all claims are

dismissed with prejudice;

/////

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2. Defendant JPMorgan’s motion to dismiss is granted and all claims are

dismissed except plaintiff’s RESPA claim; and 

3. Plaintiff’s request to amend his second amended complaint is denied; any

further request to amend the complaint shall be filed as required by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

DATED: June 16, 2010.

/014; fullmer.mtd4

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