Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06068/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06068-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405g Review of HHS Decision (RSI)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

KENNETH L. GARDNER PLAINTIFF

Civil No. 04-6068

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, 

Commissioner, Social

Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending now before the undersigned on this 14th day of November, 2005, is the

Motion for Attorney’s Fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §406(b) filed on November 1, 2005, by

Richard S. Muse, attorney for the plaintiff (Doc #23). The defendant filed her Response on

November 10, 2005 (Doc. #24). 

On February 16, 2005, the undersigned remanded this matter for further proceedings

pursuant to sentence four, 42 U.S.C. §405(g) (Doc. #14 & 15). Upon remand, the plaintiff

received a favorable decision. Counsel now seeks an attorney’s fee in the amount of

$6,285.00 (Doc. #23, p.1). Counsel seeks this amount for the 27.25 hours he asserts were

devoted to representation of the plaintiff before the district court. Such an award would

represent an attorney’s fee at the rate of $230.64 per hour. 

As always we decline to approve a fee for time spent in the representation of plaintiff

at the agency level. The matter of attorney’s fees for services performed at the administrative

level is committed by 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1), to the responsibility of the Commissioner, and

such fees may not be awarded by the courts. Pittman v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 42, 45 (8th

Cir.1990). 

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In the instant case, the defendant does not object to the requested award, stating:

Defendant...has no objection to Counsel’s motion seeking authorization for

attorney fees. Specifically, the Commissioner does not object to an award of

attorney fees in the amount of $6,285.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). 

Even so, the Commissioner would have appreciated seeing the following [list

of 4 documents] attached to Counsel’s motion to properly document his request

for the benefit of the Court and Counsel’s client (Plaintiff)... 

(Doc. #24, p. 1). The four documents referenced above are: 1) a copy of Plaintiff’s award

letter showing that $6,285.00 is being withheld for payment of attorney fees; 2) a copy of the

contract/fee agreement entered between Plaintiff and Counsel for Plaintiff; 3) a statement

from Counsel verifying Counsel’s understanding that he must refund to Plaintiff the lesser

amount of the Equal Access to Justice Act (hereinafter "EAJA") fee award and the 42 U.S.C.

§ 406(b) fee award; and, 4) a statement of Counsel’s normal hourly billing amount and other

information to ensure that Counsel will not receive a windfall (Doc. #24, pp. 1-2).

Additionally, the docket reflects that Counsel for Plaintiff received $2,031.25 in

attorney fees pursuant to the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Upon receipt of the fees awarded

under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), Plaintiff’s counsel is required to refund Plaintiff the lesser amount

of the fees paid under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and the EAJA. See Weakley v. Bowen, 803 F.2d

575 (10th Cir. 1986). 

Attorney's fees for representation at the district court level are limited by 42 U.S.C. §

406(b)(i), not to exceed twenty-five percent of past due benefits. We note this so that the

Commissioner may coordinate any fees granted for services at the administrative level with

its award, approved herein, so that the total allowed fee would not exceed twenty-five

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 Other circuits which have addressed the issue agree that the aggregate of fees

awarded at the judicial and administrative levels may not exceed twenty-five percent of past

due benefits. Guido v. Schweiker, 775 F.2d 107, 108 (3d Cir.1985); Morris v. Social Sec.

Admin., 689 F.2d 495, 497-98 (4th Cir.1982); Webb v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 529, 536 (6th

Cir.1972); Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830, 91

S. Ct. 60, 27 L. Ed.2d 60 (1970); see also Harris v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,

836 F.2d 496, 498 n. 1 (10th Cir.1987) (noting agreement among circuits).

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percent of past due benefits.1 Davis v. Bowen, 894 F.2d 271, 273 (8th Cir.1989). 

We have reviewed counsel’s Itemized Statement, purporting to itemize 27.25 hours

spent in the representation of plaintiff before the district court, and find the time claimed to

be reasonable. Thus, we note that it appears counsel is entitled to compensation for 27.25

hours for work performed at the district court level. 

In determining the applicable hourly rate, we note that the United States Court of

Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has found the lodestar approach more consistent with the

statutory mandate of a reasonable fee, with 25% of past due benefits representing the

maximum, as opposed to the standard attorney's fee. See Rodriquez, 865 F.2d at 748-49 (J.

Wellford, concurring in part and dissenting in part); Starr v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 872, 874 (9th

Cir.1987). See generally Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 109 S. Ct. 939, 945, 103

LED.2d 67 (1989) (noting "lodestar" approach forms the "centerpiece" of attorney's fee

awards under section 1988). In calculating the lodestar in this case, we find that an hourly

rate of $150 is reasonable, in light of the twelve factors initially set forth in Johnson v.

Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974), and referred to by the

Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1937 n. 3,

76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). See Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 363-364 (8th Cir.1989). The

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twelve factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the

questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of

employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether

the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;

(8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability

of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the

professional relationship with the client; and, (12) awards in similar cases. See Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 430 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. at 1937 n. 3, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). 

Since Hensley, the Supreme Court has interpreted these factors several times as they

apply to fee decisions under fee-shifting statutes, such as section 1988. See Blanchard v.

Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 109 S.Ct. 939, 943-45, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989); id. 109 S.Ct. at

946-47 (J. Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Pennsylvania v. Delaware

Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley II), 483 U.S. 711, 107 S.Ct. 3078,

3085-86, 97 L.Ed.2d 585 (1987); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Citizens' Council for Clean Air

(Delaware Valley I), 478 U.S. 546, 562-66, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3096-99, 92 L.Ed.2d 439

(1986); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 893-95, 897 n. 13, 104 S.Ct. 1541,1548 n. 13, 79

L.Ed.2d 891 (1984).

In Hensley, the Supreme Court noted that while the Johnson factors may be employed

to adjust the lodestar fee upward or downward, "many of these factors usually are subsumed

within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate."

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. at 1940 n. 9. 

Further, the court is not bound to award to counsel the full 25% of past due benefits.

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Dowdy v. Bowen, 636 F.Supp 591 (W.D.Mo. 1986); Garber v. Heckler, 607 F.Supp. 574,

575 (E.D.N.Y.1985). In fact, it has been noted that in the vast majority of cases, a

reasonable award will be less than the statutory maximum of 25%. See Allen v. Heckler, 588

F.Supp. 1247, 1250 (W.D.N.Y.1984).

 Thus, these factors, along with the particular facts of this case, have been considered by

the undersigned. We find the hourly rate of $150.00 to be reasonable, and we note also that it

is slightly more than the statutory maximum allowed for EAJA attorneys fees awards, after the

passage of The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996. See Public Law 104-121, §

232(b)(1). After considering the above described criteria for the determination of a reasonable

attorney's fee, and a review of the actual time expended in this representation, it is found that

a reasonable fee under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is $4,087.50, or 27.25 hours at an hourly rate of

$150.00 per hour.

Conclusion:

Accordingly, we approve an attorney’s fee in the amount of $4,087.50, representing

27.25 hours spent in representing the plaintiff before the district court at an hourly rate of

$150.00, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).

Counsel may petition the SSA for the balance of the fee he asserts is due to him, the total

fee award not to exceed 25% of the total of past due benefits to which the plaintiff is entitled.

Counsel is reminded that he must fulfill his obligation with respect to the receipt of EAJA

fees in addition to the award of fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), by refunding the lesser of

the amount of the fees paid under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and the EAJA to Plaintiff. See also 28

U.S.C. §2412.

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ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2005.

/s/Bobby E. Shepherd 

Honorable Bobby E. Shepherd 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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