Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-10-01853/USCOURTS-ca7-10-01853-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 28, 2010*

Decided July 29, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 10‐1853

LISA J. GILLARD,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

PROVEN METHODS SEMINARS, LLC,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 09 C 5292

James B. Zagel,

Judge.

O R D E R

Lisa Gillard claims that Proven Methods Seminars, LLC, ran afoul of several federal

antidiscrimination statutes by kicking her out of an event because of her race, religion, and

disability.  The district court dismissed the complaint.  Gillard appeals, and we affirm the

judgment.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 10‐1853 Page 2

At this stage in the proceedings we must accept as true the facts Gillard alleges in her

complaint.  See Jay E. Hayden Found. v. First Neighbor Bank, No. 09‐2781, 2010 WL 2485678, at

*1 (7th Cir. June 22, 2010).  Gillard, an African American who practices Buddhism and

suffers from an unexplained mental disability, attended a seminar hosted by Proven

Methods.  She selected a seat on the west side of the room, but that side became crowded, so

she moved to the east side.  A man approached and interrogated her about why she had

switched seats.  Gillard refused to answer because she thought he was abrasive, and in any

event she had not been given written notice of any special seating arrangements.  The man,

who turned out to be a Proven Methods employee, told her to leave the seminar and

eventually had her escorted out.

In her complaint Gillard claims that Proven Methods violated Title II of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a‐6, by denying her “the full use and

enjoyment” of its seminar on the basis of her race and religion.  She also claims that the

company violated the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110‐325, 122 Stat. 3553,

and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, by removing her from the seminar

on the basis of a “legally cognizable mental disability that affects her reading.”  And, she

adds, her expulsion on the basis of her race violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d‐4, because Proven Methods “is a nationwide research and

educational organization and clearing house for federal, state and local government grants

and programs.”  She demands $80 million in damages.  The district court dismissed the

complaint on the company’s motion, although on one claim the dismissal was without

prejudice.

Gillard’s claims in this case mirror those in a baseless complaint she filed against

Northwestern University after the school removed her from its library.  See Gillard v. Nw.

Univ., No. 09‐3449, 2010 WL 939947 (7th Cir. Mar. 17), cert. denied, 78 U.S.L.W. 3729 (U.S.

June 14, 2010) (No. 09‐10581).  The arguments she presents to us here are essentially

identical to those she made in her appeal against Northwestern, which we rejected one

month before this appeal was filed.  See id.  As we have already explained to Gillard, see id.

at *2, the statutes she has invoked would all require proof that she was treated differently

because of her race, religion, or disability, yet the events she describes in her complaint do

not raise even a plausible inference that Proven Methods kicked her out of its seminar on

the basis of these forbidden grounds.  See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (prohibiting discrimination

against “qualified individual with a disability”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (prohibiting

discrimination “on the ground of” race or religion); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (prohibiting

discrimination “on the ground of race”); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (prohibiting discrimination

“on the basis of disability”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (holding that facts

pleaded in complaint must “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

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No. 10‐1853 Page 3

misconduct”); Golden v. Helen Sigman & Assocs., No. 08‐1506, 2010 WL 2630598, at *4 (7th

Cir. July 2, 2010) (dismissing claim that “lack[ed] the factual specificity required to raise it

above the speculative level”).  We do not see any reason to disturb the district court’s

judgment except that, because the lawsuit is frivolous, we modify the dismissal to be with

prejudice as to all claims.

Gillard’s appeal is also frivolous.  Proven Methods has suggested that we sanction

her, although the company stopped short of filing a separate motion as required by Federal

Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.  See Bingham v. New Berlin Sch. Dist., 550 F.3d 601, 605 (7th

Cir. 2008).  We do warn Gillard, however, that, if she continues to file frivolous appeals, she

will be subject to sanctions or restrictions on future litigation.  See Support Sys. Int’l, Inc. v.

Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186 (7th Cir. 1995).

AFFIRMED as MODIFIED.

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