Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06663/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06663-63/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Contitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CENTRAL VALLEY CHRYSLER- )

JEEP, INC. et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. )

 )

James N. GOLDSTENE, in his official )

capacity as Executive Officer of the )

California Air Resources Board, )

 )

Defendant, )

 )

THE ASSOCIATION OF )

INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOBILE ) 

MANUFACTURERS, )

 )

Plaintiff-Intervenor, )

 )

SIERRA CLUB, NATURAL )

RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, )

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, )

BLUE WATER NETWORK, GLOBAL )

EXCHANGE, AND RAINFOREST )

ACTION NETWORK, )

 )

Defendant-Intervenors. )

____________________________________ )

CV F 04-6663 AWI LJO

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFFINTERVENOR’S MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION

AND PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION

FOR MODIFICATION OF

TERMS OF INJUNCTIVE

RELIEF

[Documents 665 and 672]

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In its memorandum opinion and order filed January 16, 2007, the court enjoined the

“State of California and/or any of its political subdivisions and agencies:”

from the enforcement of any provision of California Health and Safety Code,

section 43018.5(b)(1), such injunction to remain in effect until the earlier of

such time as [Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)] may issue a waiver

of federal preemption to the State of California or the time Congress may pass,

and the President may sign into law, legislation permitting California to carry

out such regulation.

Doc. # 606 at 23 (hereinafter, the “January 16 Order”). The court’s memorandum opinion

and order filed December 11, 2007, and refiled as corrected on March 26, 2008, (the “March

26 Order”) granted motions for summary judgment by defendant State of California

(“Defendant”) and defendant intervenors, Sierra Club, et al. (‘Defendant-intervenors”) as to

the remaining claims in this case and left the injunction established by the January 16 Order

undisturbed. As of the present time, EPA has not granted a waiver of federal preemption, nor

has Congress passed any legislation that would allow California to implement the fuel

economy provisions of California Health and Safety Code section 43018.5(b)(1) (hereinafter

the “AB1493 regulations”).

Now before the court are two motions, one by Plaintiff-intervenor, Association of

International Automobile Manufacturers (“AIAM”) and the other by plaintiffs Central Valley

Chrysler-Jeep, et al. (“Plaintiffs”), that together request the court modify the scope of

injunctive relief granted by the January 16 Order and re-visit its interpretation of the

preemptive force of the Clean Air Act. For the reasons that follow, the court will deny the

motions.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

AIAM filed its motion to modify the scope of the injunction and to re-interpret the

preemptive language of section 209 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543, on April 4, 2008. 

Doc. # 665. Opposition to AIAM’s motion was filed on April 25, 2008, and AIAM’s reply

was filed on May 5, 2008. Plaintiffs filed their motion to modify injunctive relief on April

28, 2008. Defendant and Defendant-intervenors filed their opposition on May 23, 2008. 

Plaintiffs filed their corrected reply on June 12, 2008. The court vacated the scheduled

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hearing date of May 12, 2008, set a further briefing schedule, and took the matter under

submission as of June 9, 2008. 

The focus of both AIAM’s and Plaintiffs’ motions is an executive order promulgated

by California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) that Plaintiffs and AIM contend constitute an

attempt by CARB to enforce the AB1493 regulations (the “Executive Order”). The

Executive Order, as provided by AIAM in their moving brief, states as follows in pertinent

part:

A January 16, 2007 Order currently enjoins the Executive Officer from

enforcing any provision of California Health and Safety Code section

43018.5(b)(1) concerning certification to the requirements for 2009 and

subsequent model passenger cars, light duty trucks and medium-duty vehicles

adopted pursuant to AB 1493. (Document 606, Case No. 1:04-CV-06663 -

AWI - GSA, U.S. Dist. CT. E. Dist. Of CA (Fresno Div.)). If said injunction

ceases to be in effect, the manufacturer will have 45 days from the ARB

notification to demonstrate compliance with AB 1493 requirements,

including determination of the greenhouse gas values for the test group listed

in this Executive Order. Nothing in this Executive Order is intended to

constitute enforcement of any requirement under AB 1493 for 2009 model

year vehicles.

Doc. # 665 at 4:10-4:16 (emphasis provided by AIAM).

LEGAL STANDARD

AIAM’s contends, in part, that section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act, which generally

preempts state regulation of motor vehicle emissions, should be interpreted as being

disjunctive from the provisions of 209(b) of the Clean Air Act, which provides that EPA may

grant a waiver of federal preemption for automotive emissions standards developed by

California. Because the court did not adopt this interpretation of section 209 of the Clean Air

Act in either the January 16 or the March 26 Orders, the court construes AIAM’s request for

re-interpretation of the Clean Air Act as a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 60(b)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Rule 60(b) permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment on

grounds of: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (3) fraud . . . of an

adverse party, . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the

judgment.” The motion for reconsideration must be made within a reasonable time, in any

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event “not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” 

Id.

Motions to reconsider are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Combs v.

Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456,

460 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly

convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision. See, e.g., Kern-Tulare

Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and

rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015, 108

S.Ct. 1752, 100 L.Ed.2d 214 (1988). 

AIAM and Plaintiffs also request that the court exercise its power to modify the

existing injunction. A court’s authority to modify the terms of injunctive relief is inherent,

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002), being derived both

from the court’s powers in equity and from Rule 60(b). Earth Island Inst. v. S. California

Edison, 166 F.Supp.2d 1304, 1309 (S.D. Cal. 2001). A court has discretionary power to

modify an injunction when changing circumstances, or a better appreciation of the facts in

light of experience indicate existing injunctive orders are not well adapted to the purpose for

which they were made. Id.; see also System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647-

648 (1961).

DISCUSSION

I. Re-interpretation of Section 209 of the Clean Air Act

Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act provides as follows, in pertinent part:

No state or political subdivision shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard

relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor

vehicle engines subject to this part.

42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). Section 209(b) provides, in pertinent part:

 (1) The Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing,

waive application of this section to any State which has adopted standards

(other than crankcase emission standards) for the control of emissions from

new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, if

the State determines that the State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least

as protective of public heath and welfare as applicable Federal standards. No

such waiver shall be granted if the Administrator finds that – 

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¶ . . . . ¶

(C) such State standards and accompanying enforcement

procedures are not consistent with section 7521(a) of this title

 (2) If each State standard is at least as stringent as the comparable applicable

Federal standard, such State standard shall be deemed to be at least as

protective of health and welfare as such Federal standards for purposes of

paragraph (1).

 (3) In the case of any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine to

which State Standards apply pursuant to a waiver granted under paragraph (1),

compliance with such State standards shall be treated as compliance with

applicable Federal standards for purposes of this subchapter.

42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (italics added).

“In statutory interpretation, courts must adhere to the plain language of a statute

unless ‘literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the

intentions of its drafters.’ [Citation.]” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bayside Developers, 43 F.3d

1230, 1236 (9th Cir. 1995). AIAM contends that the disjunctive wording in section 209(a),

providing that no “political subdivision shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard”

means that “adopting a regulation and enforcing it are two statutorily, and indeed

conceptually, different government activities and must be treated as such by courts.” Doc. #

665 at 7: 8-9. AIAM contends that because the word “or” indicates disjunction between the

two categories of adoption and enforcement, the doing of either by a state violates the terms

of section 209(a). See Zorich v. Long Beach Fire Dept., 118 F.3d 682, 684-685 (9th Cir.

1997) (“or” rather than “and” shows intent to apply statutory provision to each category listed

so long as congressional intent is not defeated).

It is not necessary to resort to the cannons of statutory interpretation to see the flaw in

AIAM’s argument. The use of the word “or” in section 209 indicates a disjunction between

the two verbs on either side of the word “or;” those verbs being “adopt” and “attempt to

enforce.” There is absolutely no support for the proposition that, because the word “or” is

used to indicate a disjunction between two verbs in subsection 209(a), that the provisions of

the entire subsection are somehow disjoined from the provisions of any other subsection,

including subsection 209(b). The meaning and purpose of subsection 209(b) is plain on its

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face – it constitutes an exception to the preemptive force of section 209(a). Subsection

209(b) provides that where California (the only state that fits the qualifying description of

having regulated prior to March 30, 1966), has adopted a regulation of motor vehicle engine

emissions, those regulations shall be granted a waiver from the preemptive force of

subsection 209(a) if the specified requirements are met. Although section 209(a) may

prohibit a state from adopting or attempting to enforce “any standard relating to the control of

emissions from new motor vehicles,” that prohibition simply does not apply where California

adopts regulations under the terms and conditions specified by section 209(b). There is

absolutely rule of statutory construction that does what AIAM invites the court to do; that is,

to invalidate the exception because the rule contains the word “or.”

AIAM contends its interpretation of the interplay between subsections 209(a) and

209(b) of the Clean Air Act must prevail because that interpretation does not negate

congressional intent. This is simply not the case. Without any support for the proposition,

AIAM contends that it was Congress’s intent to prevent the sort of harm that AIAM alleges

the automobile manufacturers will suffer – being burdened with the dilemma of whether to

invest in carbon dioxide reducing technology or risk being out of compliance with standards

that may or may not be granted waiver of preemption sometime in the future. Whether or not

Congress actually had that intent, it is indisputable that the plain language of subsection

209(b) provides an exception to subsection 209(a) that allows California to adopt automobile

emissions regulations and submit same to EPA for their consideration. AIAM cannot escape

the fact that their interpretation of the interplay between subsections 209(a) and 209(b) would

require that courts thwart the clearly stated intent of Congress to allow California to adopt

regulations under subsection 209(b) that would be granted waiver from the application of

subsection 209(a) if the statutory prerequisites are met. 

The court will decline AIAM’s invitation to interpret the provisions of subsection

209(a) of the Clean Air Act as disjunctive from the provisions of subsection 209(b) because

the interpretation requested is without support in law, logic, or grammar.

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II. Scope of Injunctive Relief

Both Plaintiffs and AIAM contend that the Executive Order quoted above constitutes

an attempt by CARB to enforce the terms of the AB 1493 regulations even though a waiver

of federal preemption has been denied by EPA. In addition, Plaintiffs contend that EPA’s

denial of California’s request for waiver of federal preemption constitutes a change in

circumstances such that the injunctive relief previously granted by the court should be

modified to prevent California’s attempt to enforce the AB 1493 regulations.

A. The Executive Order Does Not Attempt Enforcement of the AB 1493

Regulations

Plaintiffs and AIAM contend that the Executive Order is an impermissible attempt to

enforce the AB 1493 regulations because it requires proof of compliance from manufacturers

within 45 days of notification by CARB following the grant of waiver of federal preemption

by EPA. Plaintiff’s contention derives from the undisputed fact that compliance with

substantially more stringent carbon dioxide emissions standards requires a multi-year period

of research and development before necessary changes can be made at the level of the

production line. Plaintiffs contend the need for a multi-year development period means that

manufacturers will be forced into the unpalatable Hobson’s choice of undertaking substantial

current investment to meet standards they believe may never be imposed or to forego current

investment and be caught in non-compliance if and when the standards are granted waiver of

preemption. 

Plaintiffs contend that EPA’s determination of whether proposed California

Regulations allow sufficient lead time to implement the changes necessary uses the state’s

final adoption of their AB 1493 regulations as the starting point for the EPA’s determination

of sufficient lead time for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2). Thus, they argue, the clock for

compliance with the terms of AB 1493 began to run in 2004, when California adopted the

AB 1493 regulations, rather than at some future time when EPA may grant the waiver of

federal preemption. Defendant does not dispute this contention and evidence offered by

Defendant supports the contention. See California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control

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Standards; Waiver of Federal Preemption; Decision of the Administrator (Medium-duty

Waiver); 59 Fed. Reg. 48625 (Sept 22, 1994) and supporting Decision Document Excerpt;

Exhibit 1 to Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice, Doc. # 670-3 (hereinafter the “Decision

Document”) at 39 (holding that the “lead time clock” starts when California “adopts” the

regulations).

From these undisputed facts, Plaintiffs contend that CARB’s Executive Order

announcing its intent to enforce the AB 1493 regulations if and when EPA grants a waiver of

federal preemption without committing to the provision of further lead time is tantamount to

enforcement of the AB 1493 regulations. Plaintiffs content CARB’s stated intent to enforce

the AB 1493 regulations presents the manufacturers with a Hobson’s choice that requires

manufacturers to investing now to comply with regulations that may never be promulgated so

that they are not caught at some later time out of compliance with regulations whose lead

time is inadequate by the time the regulations are finally put into effect. The court disagrees

with Plaintiff’s characterization of CARB’s Executive Order.

CARB’s Executive Order does not, on its face, invoke the provisions of AB 1493 or

impose any present restriction on manufacturers’ ability to market automobiles that are not in

compliance with the emissions regulations of AB 1493 in California. The Executive Order,

to the extent it has been quoted by Plaintiffs, merely states what has been assumed, or should

have been assumed by the parties all along – California intends to enforce its AB 1493

regulations if and when it can. 

In its January 16 Order, the court enjoined California or any of its political

subdivisions from enforcement of the provisions of AB 1493 until such time as EPA may

grant a waiver of federal preemption or the legislature may pass and the President sign a law

otherwise permitting enforcement of the AB 1493 regulations. The court’s January 16 order

acknowledged that CARB would be able to enforce the AB 1493 regulations so far as the

Clean Air Act is concerned if and when a waiver of federal preemption is granted. EPA to

this point has refused to grant the waiver. So far as the Clean Air Act is concerned, CARB is

in no more or less of a position to enforce its AB 1493 regulations now than it was at the time

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the January 16 Order was filed. While it is true that the court’s March 26 Order made the

imposition of the AB 1493 regulations more of a present possibility by holding that those

regulations were not preempted by the Energy Policy Conservation Act (“EPCA”) or by the

foreign policy of the United States, the preemptive effect of the Clean Air Act on the AB

1493 regulations remains the same. CARB’s Executive Order changes absolutely nothing. 

Characterizations of CARB’s Executive Order aside, the substance of Plaintiff’s

contentions with regard to CARB’s Executive Order are no different, qualitatively or

quantitatively, from their contentions with regard to the scope of the injunctive relief offered

by the January 16 Order. Plaintiffs’ and AIAM’s basic contention is that the court should

broaden the scope of the injunctive relief so that the manufactures are not subjected to the

Hobson’s choice of unnecessary research and development or risk of regulatory noncompliance. The court will next undertake examination of Plaintiffs’ and AIAM’s arguments

with respect to the scope of the court’s injunctive orders with the understanding that CARB’s

Executive Order is a non-issue in that discussion.

B. Changing Circumstance and the January 16 Injunctive Order

As previously noted, changing circumstance justifies a court’s reexamination of

previously-issued injunctive orders. Earth Island Inst., 166 F.Supp.2d at 1309. Plaintiffs and

AIAM allege two circumstances have changed since the court issued its injunctive relief in

the January 16 Order. First, Plaintiffs contend that CARB’s Executive Order, to the extent

quoted above, constitutes a changed circumstance. The court has examined and rejected that

contention. Second, Plaintiffs and AIAM contend that the fact EPA has rejected California’s

request for waiver of federal preemption with respect to its AB 1493 regulations is a changed

circumstance warranting re-examination of the injunctive orders. This contention is similarly

not persuasive.

While it is certainly true that the Administrator has issued a rejection of California’s

application for waiver of federal preemption, the rejection cannot be considered final where

California has made clear its intent to appeal the decision and the DC Circuit has not made

any determination of the validity of EPA’s rejection as yet. Indeed, if the decision of the

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EPA were final, there would be no point in the instant motions because the January 16

injunction against enforcement by California would remain in effect. The fact that Plaintiffs

and AIAM have moved to enlarge the scope of the court’s injunctive relief in light of EPA’s

action on California’s waiver request is implicit recognition that EPA’s rejection of

California’s request for waiver remains very much a contested issue that is subject to reversal

either by EPA or by judicial review or by legislative action at sometime in the future. 

While EPA’s refusal to grant California its request waiver of federal preemption is an

event of sorts in California’s effort to enforce its AB 1493 regulations, it does not represent a

change of circumstances that would compel reexamination of this court’s injunctive relief

granted in the January 16 Order. At the time the January 16 Order was filed, California had

not been granted a waiver of federal preemption. That remains the case as of this writing. 

Plaintiffs are not entitled to a revision of the injunctive relief granted by this court on a theory

of changing circumstances.

C. Equitable Considerations and the Scope of Injunctive Relief

The remainder of Plaintiffs’ arguments concerning the scope of relief granted by the

January 16 Order focus on the inequity Plaintiff-manufacturers claim they face in confronting

the Hobson’s choice of committing financial resources to compliance with regulations that

may never be implemented, but will place non-compliant manufacturers at a significant

disadvantage if they ever are implemented. In its January 16 Order, the court held:

Plaintiffs’ concerns with respect to the lead time necessary for regulatory

compliance, as expressed in their opposition to the Plaintiffs’ instant motion

for summary judgment, cannot be redressed by the court because the FAC

does not request the court to mandate some particular lead time for

compliance should an EPA waiver become effective and does not offer any

legal basis for altering the California legislation to require such a mandate.

January 16 Order at 10:9-13. The court further opined in its order that discretion to make the

determination of adequate lead time was vested in EPA by the terms of the Clean Air Act and

there is no legal support for the contention this court has authority to modify or circumscribe

the authority vested in EPA by the Clean Air Act. 

Plaintiffs contend that the court was erroneous to the extent it opined that EPA has

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At a minimum, information submitted by Defendants strongly suggests that, 1

should EPA determine that lead time provided by California be insufficient, EPA can make that

determination thereby forcing California to revise and re-adopt its regulation incorporating leadtimes that are in accord with EPA findings. The re-adopted regulation is then approved by EPA. 

See Decision Document at 40.

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authority to modify or determine lead times for the enforcement of new standards adopted by

California. As Plaintiffs put it, EPA is without “plenary authority to modify a California

regulation in the manner suggested by Defendant.” Combining this assertion with the

undisputed fact that the starting point for the running of the lead-time clock is the date of

final adoption of the regulation by California, Plaintiffs assert that EPA is not able to address

inequities that may arise from the eventual grant of a waiver of federal preemption where, as

here, the waiver may occur at a time well after a substantial part of the lead time has run. 

From this, Plaintiffs contend that it is this court that must prevent an inequitable outcome by

expanding the scope of injunctive relief so that the Plaintiff auto manufacturers are not

unfairly burdened.

For purposes of Plaintiffs’ motions under consideration here, the court need not make

a determination of whether EPA can, in fact, make adjustments to the lead time provided by

California’s AB 1493 regulations. In its January 16 Order, the court observed: 1

. . . whatever California may seek to impose by way of enforcement dates, the

fact is that the final decision with respect to the establishment of reasonable

enforcement dates rests with EPA’s discretion. EPA is not a party to this case,

and this court consequently has no authority to impose limits on EPA’s

exercise of discretion, should it choose to exercise that discretion at some time

in the future.

January 16 Order, Doc. # 606, at 10:10-14. The court’s observation derives from the

statutory structure of the waiver process. The waiver provisions of the Clean Air Act provide

that a waiver of federal preemption shall be granted if, inter alia, the Administrator [i.e., the

Director of the EPA] finds that the proposed regulations and enforcement procedures are not

inconsistent “with section 7521(a) of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(C). Section

7521(a)(2) provides that:

Any regulation prescribed under paragraph (1) of this subsection (and any

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revision thereof) shall take effect after such period as the Administrator finds

necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite

technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within

such period.

Id. (italics added). Thus, Congress has allocated the determination of what lead-time is

required to implement a given regulation to the Administrator [Director of the EPA] in the

first instance, not the courts. 

Defendant and Defendant-intervenors contend, and the court has agreed, that the issue

of determination of the required lead time for implementation of changes necessary to comply

with the AB 1493 regulations has been committed to the EPA, not the courts. Defendant

disputes Plaintiffs’ contention that EPA lacks power to adjust the starting point for the

running of any time limits for compliance imposed by the AB 1493 regulations. Defendants

cite Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F.Supp.2d 295, 349 (D.

Vt. 2007), to illustrate their point that EPA may, if it finds the statutory lead-time

insufficient, delay implementation of the waiver in order to provide adequate lead time.

Defendants also allege in their opposition, somewhat in passing, that experts for Plaintiff

automobile manufacturers are currently capable of complying with the near-term standards

set by the AB 1943 regulations. 

In their reply, Plaintiffs seize upon Defendant’s allegation that compliance with the

near-term standards set by the AB 1493 regulations is not possible and that injunctive relief is

necessary to avert future economic harm. Plaintiffs devote a good deal of effort and a great

deal of documentation to show that, should EPA grant a waiver of federal preemption now,

there is no reasonable possibility that the Plaintiff auto manufacturers will be able to comply

with the AB1493 regulations within the time limits that began to run when California

adopted the regulations. Plaintiffs look to this court to supply protection against what they

perceive as the possibility of exposure to economic harm from non-compliance with a

regulatory regime whose requirements they are unprepared to meet. 

In requesting this court modify the scope of injunctive relief granted by the January 16

Order, Plaintiffs and AIAM fundamentally misperceive the purpose of the court’s injunction. 

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The court’s purpose in granting the injunction was to prevent California from enforcing the

terms of their AB1493 regulations so long as such enforcement is unlawful under the Clean

Air Act, nothing more. 

While the court is mindful of the concerns raised by Plaintiff automobile

manufacturers in their motion, it is not this court’s role to assure that they will have sufficient

time to actually implement the required changes if and when the waiver of federal preemption

is granted. This court is not empowered to make the necessary determination of how much

lead time is necessary where Congress has clearly and unequivocally delegated that

determination to EPA. 

To the extent it is Plaintiffs’ contention that the court has jurisdiction to preemptively

override any possible future determination by EPA as to the appropriate lead-time, Plaintiffs

have not provided adequate legal support for that contention. However, even if the court was

empowered to address the equitable concerns raised by Plaintiffs by expanding the scope of

the injunctive relief, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any entitlement to equitable relief

from the application of California’s AB 1493 regulations. 

Equitable relief is the result of, among other things, a balancing of hardships in favor

of the party requesting the injunctive relief. International Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A.,

Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir.1993). While Plaintiffs complain of the unfairness to them

from being forced into the previously discussed Hobson’s choice, they fail to address how the

harm they may experience in having to make a difficult business decision outweighs the harm

to California from lost opportunity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and harm to those

automobile manufacturers who made the decision to devote resources to meeting the AB

1493 regulations within the lead time provided. See Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478

F.2d 615, 637,638 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (examining adequacy of EPA’s examination of effects of

relaxation of lead-time provisions on public welfare and on companies that invested in

methodologies to achieve compliance within the original lead time). To the extent Plaintiffs

claims there is an inherent inequity in being force to make the complained-of decision,

Plaintiffs are obliged to recognize and address the burdens that a court-imposed modification

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of the proper lead time as determined by EPA would place on others. Plaintiffs are then

required to show how the burden placed on them by the un-modified regulations is more

weighty. This balancing of burdens has not been addressed to any significant degree.

At an even more fundamental level, Plaintiffs have failed to show how issues of

equity are implicated here. Plaintiffs’ argument invites the court to view the choice the auto

manufacturers feel forced into as being inequitable in and of itself, but provides no legal

foundation for such a view. Environmental regulation is a constantly evolving part of the

normal business landscape and Plaintiffs provide no basis for the notion that courts should

insulate businesses from the consequences of business decision that are related to pending

environmental regulation. 

There is no suggestion by any party that Plaintiffs were unaware of California’s AB

1493 regulations at the time of their adoption, if not before. Plaintiffs’ arguments suggest,

without actually so stating, that at least some of the Plaintiff auto manufacturers made a

conscious decision to proceed on the assumption that a waiver of federal preemption would

never be granted by EPA. If it turns out that the manufacturers that made that assumption are

wrong, those Plaintiff auto manufacturers may well be at a significant disadvantage relative

to auto manufacturers that are currently positioned more favorably with respect to

compliance. But, so far as this court can discern, the choice to proceed as though California

would never be granted waiver of federal preemption is fundamentally just a business

decision that, like any other, may have negative consequences if wrongly made. It is not up

to the courts to deflect the burden of such business decisions. 

In accordance with the foregoing discussion, the motions of Plaintiffs and AIAM to

modify the injunctive relief granted by this court’s January 16 Order is DENIED. AIAM’s

motion to reexamine the court’s prior interpretation of section 209 of the Clean Air Act is

likewise DENIED. The parties are ORDERED to meet and confer to determine if there are

any remaining issues in this case. The parties shall file a stipulation, or, if agreement is not

reached, shall file separate letters stating their determinations of whether any issues remain

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for this court to decide. If the parties agree that no issues remain for decision in this case, the

parties shall jointly or separately file a proposed order of judgment. Letters or stipulations

regarding issues remaining in this case and/or joint or separate proposed orders of judgment

shall be filed not later that thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 23, 2008 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

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