Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_13-cv-00013/USCOURTS-ared-4_13-cv-00013-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

WESTERN DIVISION 

JOHN BRACEY PLAINTIFF 

VS. CASE NO.: 4:13-cv-00013-JM-JTR 

LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, CITY OF DEFENDANT 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been 

sent to United States District Judge James M. Moody, Jr. You may file written 

objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections 

must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and 

(2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of this 

Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions 

of fact. 

I. Introduction 

Plaintiff John Bracey (“Bracey”) is an African-American who was formerly 

employed as a police officer for Defendant City of Little Rock (“City”). After the 

City terminated his employment, he initiated this action alleging he was terminated 

because of his race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended; 

42 U.S.C. § 1981; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). 

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The City has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, a Brief in Support, and 

a Statement of Undisputed Facts.1

 (Docs. 34-36). Bracey has filed a Response, 

Brief in Support and Statement of Facts. (Docs. 42-44, 48). The City has filed a 

Reply. (Doc. 55). Thus, the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment is ripe for 

decision. 

II. Recitation of Material Facts 

Before addressing the merits, the Court will recite the material facts relevant 

to the resolution of the Motion. Virtually all of these facts are undisputed. The 

few material facts in dispute are explicitly noted by the Court, and it has viewed all 

of those disputed facts in a light most favorable to Bracey, the non-moving party. 

Brown v. City of Jacksonville, 711 F.3d 883, 885 n. 3 (8th Cir. 2013). 

A. Bracey’s Employment and Later Termination 

1. On September 11, 1995, the Little Rock Police Department (“LRPD”) 

hired Bracey as a patrol officer. He worked in that position until his termination 

 

1

 Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

249-50 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a 

genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once that has been done, the 

nonmoving party must present specific facts demonstrating that there is a material dispute for 

trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 

2011). 

“While employment discrimination cases are often fact intensive and dependent on 

nuance in the workplace, they are not immune from summary judgment, and there is no separate 

summary judgment standard for employment discrimination cases.” Fercello v. Cnty. Of 

Ramsey, 612 F.3d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 2010). 

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on May 11, 2012. During his career, Bracey became a respected, veteran police 

officer. (Complaint, Doc. 1 at ¶ 5; Termination Letter, Doc. 34-4 at pp. 1-2; 

Letter, Doc. 48-1). 

2. LRPD Police Chief Stuart Thomas (“Chief Thomas”) was the final 

decision-maker who terminated Bracey.2

 Chief Thomas based that decision on: 

(a) an Internal Affairs (“I/A”) investigation into Bracey’s misconduct during and 

after a domestic violence incident with his wife; (b) an administrative hearing on 

Bracey’s alleged misconduct; and (c) the recommendations of Bracey’s chain of 

command. (Thomas Aff., Doc. 34-3 at pp. 3-6). 

3. Chief Thomas’s termination letter, dated May 11, 2012, advised 

Bracey that he was being discharged for violating the following: 

General Order 310 - § VIII.J.1 

“Any sworn member of this Department who witnesses or has 

firsthand knowledge of a domestic violence related incident involving 

a sworn member of this Department as the alleged suspect and who 

fails to officially report this information, will be subject to 

disciplinary action up to and including termination.” 

Rules and Regulations - §1/4002.00 

“Officers shall not engage in any conduct which constitutes conduct 

unbecoming an officer or neglect of duty.” 

Rules and Regulations - §1/4003.00 

 

2

 Thomas served as Police Chief from April 11, 2005 until his retirement on June 30, 

2014. (Thomas Aff., Doc. 34-3 at p. 1, ¶ 1). 

Under the LRPD’s General Order 211, which governed the disciplinary process at the 

time of Bracey’s termination, the Chief of Police was responsible to make “a final 

determination” based on the recommended discipline. (Doc. 34-3 at pp. 1-2, 12, 15). 

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“No officer shall engage in any personal act or conduct which, if 

brought to the attention of the public, could result in justified criticism 

of that officer or the Department. No officer shall be personally 

involved in disturbances or police incidents to his/her discredit.” 

Rules and Regulations - § 1/5006.00

“Failure or deliberate refusal of any officer to obey a lawful order 

given by a supervisory officer of this Department shall be considered 

insubordination.” 

Rules and Regulations - § 1/8005.00 

“No officer shall willfully misrepresent any matter, sign any false 

statement or report, commit perjury or give false testimony before any 

court, grand jury, commission, official hearing or departmental 

hearing or investigation.” 

(Termination letter, Doc. 34-4 at pp. 1-2). 

 4. Chief Thomas’s termination letter also described Bracey’s specific 

misconduct that constituted violations of General Order 310 and Rules and 

Regulations (“R&R”) §§ 1.4002.00, 1.4003.00, 1/5006.00, and 1/8005.00: 

(1) You [Bracey] were involved in a domestic disturbance with 

your wife, Mary Bracey, on December 9, 2011, in which you choked 

and struck her in the face; 

(2) You [Bracey] failed to report the domestic disturbance, which 

resulted in the police being dispatched; 

(3) You [Bracey] left the scene and evaded apprehension for 

several days that resulted in a warrant being obtained for your arrest; 

(4) You [Bracey] failed to obey a direct order from supervisors to 

report to the Downtown Patrol Division on several occasions; 

(5) You [Bracey] made untruthful statements to supervisors and 

during your Internal Affairs’ interview. 

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(Termination letter, Doc. 34-4 at p. 2). 3

5. A domestic dispute occurred on Friday, December 9, 2011, at the 

Little Rock home Bracey shared with his wife, Mary Bracey. Earlier in the week, 

Mary raised the possibility of their 14-year-old son, Markus, going on a hunting 

trip with one of her male friends, and this resulted in an argument.4

 (Stmt. of 

Facts, Doc. 43 at ¶¶ 13-15). 

6. On Friday afternoon, after school, Bracey and Mary again discussed 

the issue of Markus going hunting with one of Mary’s male friends. Both Markus 

and his sister, Marissa, were present.5

 Bracey “grabbed the computer” Mary was 

using, “threw it in the kitchen,’” and asked her if she understood what he was 

saying. Mary then grabbed the laptop computer that Marissa was using. In doing 

so, Bracey later claimed that Mary hit herself in the face with the laptop, which 

was still attached to headphones Marissa was wearing. According to Bracey, he 

started laughing; Mary “chest-bumped” him; and then she began hitting him. 

Bracey claims he: grabbed his wife “to restrain her;” put his right hand under her 

 

3

 The Eighth Circuit has instructed that “the critical inquiry in discrimination cases like 

this one is not whether the employee actually engaged in the conduct for which he was 

terminated, but whether the employer in good faith believed that the employee was guilty of the 

conduct justifying the discharge.” McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis., 559 F.3d 855, 

861-862 (8th Cir. 2012); see also Pulczinski v. Trinity Structural Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d 996, 

1002-1003 (8th Cir. 2012) (reaffirming “honest belief rule” and the fact that an employer’s belief 

turns out to be wrong is not enough to prove discrimination). 

4

 This is not to suggest the hunting trip was their only issue. The Braceys were 

apparently already in discussions about a possible divorce. 

5

 Marissa was eight years old. 

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lip and above her chin; and pushed her back down on the couch. He then told her 

to stop hitting him. (Bracey depo., Doc. 34-1 at pp. 29-34; Bracey statement, Doc. 

34-4 at pp. 4-5; Bracey hearing testimony, at pp. 38-40). 

7. Bracey’s version of the fight is disputed by both Markus and Mary. 

During or shortly after the fight started, Markus ran out of the house and called 

911. He reported to the police dispatcher that Bracey “started choking” his mom 

and that Bracey might be armed. Mary Bracey also called 911, separately, and 

reported that Bracey had hit her.6

 (Doc. 34-5, at pp. 1, 3-4, 11; Doc. 34-4, at p. 

22). 

8. After the fight, Bracey left his residence with Marissa, who 

voluntarily accompanied him. Bracey drove to the parking lot of Playtime Pizza in 

West Little Rock. (Doc. 43 at ¶ 19). 

9. Bracey and Marissa remained at Playtime Pizza for about 1 hour. 

During that time, Bracey received a phone call from Little Rock Police Officer 

Amber Kalmer, who advised him that: (a) police officers were on their way to his 

house; and (b) Mary had alleged that Bracey hit her. Bracey told Officer Kalmer 

that Mary must have called 911. (Doc. 43 at ¶ 20). 

 

6

 Markus has submitted an Affidavit, which the City relies on to support its Motion for 

Summary Judgment. Attached to his Affidavit is a transcript of his 911 call and a portion of 

Mary’s 911 call. (See Doc. 34-5 at pp. 11-12). 

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 10. Although Bracey knew that Little Rock police officers were on their 

way to his residence, he left Playtime Pizza, drove with Marissa to a hotel in Saline 

County, and remained there for the rest of the night. (Doc. 43 at ¶ 21). 

 11. According to Bracey, he believes his wife told the investigating 

officers that he hit her as part of a scheme to gain custody of their children in a 

divorce proceeding that he anticipated she would file. Bracey thought that, if he 

returned to his home to meet the police officers investigating the incident, they 

would not believe his version of events because he is black and his wife is white.7

 

(Doc. 43 at ¶ 21). 

 12. Later that evening, shortly after 7:00 p.m., Bracey received a 

voicemail on his cell phone from Sergeant Sloan, a Little Rock Police Officer. 

Sloan’s message asked Bracey if he was okay. Bracey responded with a text 

message, stating: “10-4.” (Doc. 43 at ¶ 22). 

13. That same evening, Bracey also texted and spoke by phone with 

Sergeant Zebbie Burnett, another Little Rock police officer. He offered Bracey 

assistance in hiring a lawyer to represent him in defending possible criminal 

charges arising from his physical altercation with his wife. He also asked Bracey if 

 

7

 Bracey had been an LRPD officer for 17 years and undoubtedly had many friends on 

the force. Because Bracey didn’t know which officers might show up at his house, he had no 

way of knowing if they might be his friends or even share his ethnicity. For Bracey to suggest 

that those unknown officers would disbelieve his story simply because he was married to a white 

woman strains credulity. 

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he had been in contact with anyone from the Black Police Officers’ Association. 

Finally, Burnett told Bracey that the LRPD had broadcast a BOLO (“Be On the 

Look-Out”) describing Bracey as armed and dangerous. (Doc. 43 at ¶¶ 22, 24). 

 14. Bracey’s direct supervisor was Sergeant Clarence Davis, not Sergeant 

Sloan or Sergeant Burnett. Bracey failed to contact Sgt. Davis, or anyone else in 

his chain of command, to report his personal involvement in a domestic incident 

with Mary Bracey. The explicit language of General Order 310 required Bracey to 

“officially report” that domestic incident to Sergeant Davis, his supervisor, or 

another officer in his chain of command.8

 (Doc. 43 at ¶ 23). 

 15. On Saturday morning, December 10, 2011, Bracey took Marissa home 

and then drove to a casino in Greenville, Mississippi. About 12:20 p.m., Bracey 

received a telephone call from Sergeant Sloan. He told Bracey that Lieutenant 

Speer, who was in Bracey’s chain of command, had directed Sergeant Sloan to call 

Bracey and given him a direct order to report to the VA in Little Rock at 1:00 p.m. 

 

8

 It is undisputed that Bracey: (1) had “firsthand knowledge of a domestic violence 

incident” between him and his wife; (2) knew his wife had made a 911 call and told the 

dispatcher Bracy had “hit her”; (3) knew that police officers had been dispatched to his 

residence to investigate the incident; and (4) knew he was “the alleged suspect.” This 

unquestionably required Bracey to officially report the incident to his supervisor or someone in 

his chain of command or “be subject to disciplinary action up to and including termination.” 

(General Order 310, quoted at Doc. 34-4, p. 1). 

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that day (Saturday) to be “officially relieved of duty.” Bracey told Sergeant Sloan 

that there was no way he could comply with that order.9

 (Doc. 43 at ¶¶ 24, 32). 

16. On Sunday, December 11, 2011, Bracey left the casino in Mississippi 

and returned to Little Rock. On Monday, December 12, 2011, Bracey turned 

himself in at the Little Rock District Court Third Division.10 (Doc. 43 at ¶¶ 25, 

26). 

B. The City’s Investigation of Bracey’s Misconduct 

17. Shortly after the December 9, 2011 domestic incident between Bracey 

and his wife, Chief Thomas indirectly learned what had happened. He 

immediately authorized an I/A investigation. Chief Thomas assigned the 

investigation to Officer Robert Mourot.11 (Thomas Aff., Doc. 34-3 at pp. 2-3, ¶¶ 

4-5). 

 

9

 Bracey testified at his administrative hearing that, although Sergeant Sloan 

communicated this direct order to him, it was “a direct order that could not be fulfilled” because 

he could not drive from Greeneville, Mississippi to Little Rock in 50 minutes. This led Bracey 

to conclude that the order “could not be considered a lawful order.” Bracey also testified that he 

advised Sergeant Sloan that he planned to turn himself in on Monday. (Doc. 34-4 at p. 35). 

10 According to Bracey, all of his actions on Saturday and, thereafter, were based on the 

advice he received from his attorney, Marshall Nash. While Bracey may have relied on that 

“advice,” it in no way can excuse his actions, after the domestic incident, which violated four 

different LRPD Rules and Regulations and one General Order. 

After turning himself in, Bracey was placed on administrative leave, with pay, where he 

remained until his termination on May 11, 2012. 

11 This set in motion the process and procedures outlined in General Order 211, a copy 

of which is attached to Chief Thomas’s Affidavit. (Doc. 34-3, at pp. 12-31). Upon completion 

of the internal investigation, General Order 211 specifies that the assembled file “gathered during 

the investigation” must be “forwarded to the involved employee’s Chain of Command for review 

and evaluation” and for “recommendations regarding the disposition of each allegation.” (Id. at 

p. 18). 

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18. Bracey was interviewed twice by I/A officers. In his initial interview, 

he told I/A that, on the night of the fight with his wife, the only person from the 

LRPD he spoke to was Sergeant Sloan. Bracey did not truthfully disclose that he 

also had spoken with LRPD Sergeant Zebbie Burnett. (Doc. 43 at ¶¶ 26, 27; Doc. 

34-4, at pp. 6-7). 

19. Bracey gave a second I/A interview on December 15, 2011, during 

which he admitted his left hand “fell around her [Mary’s] neck” as he held her 

head and chin to restrain her. During the interview, Bracey was shown 

photographs of his wife’s injuries, which depicted abrasions and redness or 

bruising on her left forehead and eyebrow, left check, and neck (both sides). The 

injuries to her neck were consistent with being choked, something Markus reported 

in his 911 call and something Bracey seemed to admit in his second I/A interview 

when he said his left hand “fell around her neck.” Nevertheless, Bracey claimed 

that all of the injuries to his wife, including the injuries to her neck, were caused 

by her striking herself with Marissa’s laptop computer, or Bracey “defending 

himself.” (Doc. 34-4 at p. 23-24; Photos, Doc. 34-3, pp. 32-34). 

 

Bracey does not dispute that General Order 211 applied or was followed. He does, 

however, make the conclusory allegation that Chief Thomas was inadequately trained and 

deliberately indifferent to Bracey’s right to be free from unlawful discrimination. (Complaint, 

Doc. 1 at ¶ 18). Bracey’s Response to the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment provides no 

facts to support that allegation. 

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20. After considering all of the facts associated with Bracey’s physical 

altercation with his wife, an initial decision was made to charge him with felony 

“aggravated assault on family or a household member.”12 Eventually, Bracey was 

charged with misdemeanor domestic battery, third degree.13 That charge was later 

dropped.14 (Complaint, Doc. 1 at ¶ 9; Thomas Aff., Doc. 34-3, ¶5). 

21. On February 21, 2012, Bracey received a written Notice of Intent 

advising him that a disciplinary action was being considered against him based on 

the results of the I/Ainvestigation. The Notice informed him of the charged 

violations, the alleged acts supporting the charges, and his right to an 

administrative hearing. (Doc. 43 at ¶ 29; Doc. 34-3, at ¶7). 

22. During the administrative hearing, which was conducted on March 14, 

2012, Bracey testified that he believed the LRPD was going to “presume his guilt” 

because his wife was white. He also testified about perceived deficiencies in his 

wife’s statement and in the LRPD’s investigation. Bracey produced a photograph 

of his wife’s injuries that was taken by their son Markus. Bracey believed the 

photograph supported his story that the injuries to her face were caused by Mary 

 

12 See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-204. 

13 See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-305 (the charge can be a felony if committed against a 

pregnant woman or the offender has prior battering offenses). 

While the record does not directly address why the initial felony charge was reduced, it 

appears to have been based on Mary Bracey deciding she did not want to pursue the more serious 

charge. 

14 The record suggests that, on December 12, 2011, Mary Bracey sent a detective a text 

message stating she wanted to drop the charges, and on December 14, 2011, she presented a 

handwritten note to the same effect. (Doc. 34-3 at p. 51). 

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striking herself with Marissa’s laptop.15 The picture showed, among other injuries, 

a straight bruise on Mary’s face, which Bracey contended was consistent with the 

edge or side of a laptop computer striking her face.16 (Doc. 43 at ¶ 30). 

23. Sergeant Chunda Owens, Lieutenant Brewer, Lieutenant Speer, and 

Captain Bewley were the hearing officers who evaluated the evidence presented 

during the I/A investigation and administrative hearing.17 Each made separate 

written findings and recommendations, which sustained most of the charges 

against Bracey. All of them recommended that Bracey be terminated, except 

Sergeant Owens, who recommended that Bracey be suspended for 15 days. (Doc. 

43 at ¶¶ 31, 32; Doc. 34-3 at pp. 46-63). 

24. Chief Thomas reviewed the recommendations from the reviewing 

officers and then made his independent, final decision to terminate Bracey’s 

employment. (Thomas Aff., Doc. 34-3, p. 5, ¶ 12). 

 

15 The photograph was made a part of the record in the administrative hearing. 

16 In his Response to the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Bracey does not address 

one important aspect of the photographs of Mary Bracey’s injuries, which show marks on Mary 

Bracey’s neck which are consistent with her being choked. The marks on both sides of her neck 

are not consistent with her striking herself with a laptop computer. (See Photos , Doc. 34-3, at 

pp. 32-34). Additionally, it would have required Mary to hit herself repeatedly with the laptop 

computer – first to the eye area and then in the neck area. During the administrative hearing, 

Bracey offered hearsay testimony that his wife had allegedly advised prosecutors that the marks 

on her neck were somehow caused by Bracey’s watch. (Exh. 34-4, at p. 37). 

17 Of those four officers, only Lieutenant Brewer was not in Bracey’s chain of command. 

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25. Bracey appealed his termination to the Little Rock Civil Service 

Commission, which upheld Chief Thomas’s decision. (Stmt. of Facts, Doc. 43 at ¶ 

33). 

26. Bracey strongly denies that he violated General Order 310. See ¶ 3, 

supra. He contends that, because he “acted lawfully throughout the incident with 

his wife,” he had no “firsthand knowledge of a domestic violence related incident.” 

In other words, because he subjectively believed that he “acted lawfully throughout 

the incident,” he was relieved of any obligation to self-report anything that 

happened at his home on December 9, 2011. (Doc. 43 at ¶ 31). 

III. Discussion 

Race discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. 

1981 are evaluated under the same legal standards. See Schaffhauser v. United 

Parcel Service, Inc., 794 F.3d 899, 902 (8th Cir. 2015) (Race discrimination claims 

under § 1981, Title VII and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act “are evaluated 

identically”); Richmond v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn., 957 F.2d 595, 598 

(8th Cir. 1992) (applying the same legal analysis to discrimination claims under 

Title VII, § 1981, § 1983; and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); 

Briggs v. Anderson, 796 F.2d 1009, 1021 (8th Cir. 1986) (confining discussion of 

plaintiff's claims to Title VII after finding that “[t]he inquiry into intentional 

discrimination is essentially the same for individual actions brought under §§ 1981 

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and 1983”); Craik v. Minn.State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 468 n. 5 (8th Cir. 1984) 

(“The issue of discriminatory intent is common to analyses under the Fourteenth 

Amendment, § 1983, and Title VII.”). 

Because Bracey offers no direct evidence of discriminatory intent, his 

discrimination claims must be analyzed using the McDonnell Douglas18 burdenshifting framework. 

First, Bracey has the threshold obligation of establishing a prima facie case 

of employment discrimination. Davis v. KARK-TV, Inc., 421 F.3d 699, 703 (8th 

Cir. 2005); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-804. 

“Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a presumption of discrimination is 

created when the plaintiff meets [her] burden of establishing a prima facie case of 

employment discrimination.” Davis, 421 F.3d at 704 (quotation and citation 

omitted). 

Second, if Bracey establishes a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the 

[City] to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse 

employment action.” Id., at 704 (quotation and citation omitted). 

Finally, if the City meets that burden of production, the presumption of 

discrimination disappears, and Bracey must then “prove that the [City’s] proffered 

justification is merely a pretext for discrimination.” Id. (quotation and citation 

 

18 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). 

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omitted). At all times, Bracey “has the burden of persuasion.” Id. (citation 

omitted). 

A. Prima Facie Case 

To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, Bracey must show 

that: “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he met [the City’s] legitimate 

expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the 

circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination (for example, similarly 

situated employees outside the protected class were treated differently).” Young v. 

Builders Steel Co., 754 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Gibson v. Am. 

Greetings Corp., 670 F.3d 844, 854-854 (8th Cir. 2012). 

It is undisputed that Bracey, as an African-American, is a member of a 

protected class and that the City terminated his employment. Accordingly, the 

Court concludes that Bracey has established the first and third essential elements of 

his prima facie case of employment discrimination. 

While the City contests whether Bracey has shown that he was meeting the 

City’s “legitimate expectations” when he was terminated, it is undisputed that, 

before the December 2011 incident resulting in his termination, Bracey had 

worked as an LRPD patrol officer for 17 years. During that time, he received only 

one disciplinary action, which resulted in a written reprimand. (Doc. 43, at ¶ 4). 

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To establish that he was meeting the City’s legitimate expectations at the 

time of his termination, Bracey need only show that he was qualified for the 

position. Haigh v. Gelita USA, Inc., 632 F.3d 464, 469-70 (8th Cir. 2011). 

Importantly, to make that showing, Bracey is “not required to disprove [his 

employer’s] asserted reason for firing him.” Lake v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 596 F.3d 

871, 874 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that if a plaintiff was required to disprove his 

employer’s alleged conduct violations, to establish a prima facie case, “the 

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis would collapse into the second 

element of the prima facie case”). 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Bracey has made the showing 

necessary to establish the second essential element of his prima facie case of 

employment discrimination. 

The problem for Bracey, in defending against the City’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment, is that the undisputed material facts, even when viewed in a 

light most favorable to him, show nothing that could give rise to or support an 

inference that race discrimination played a role in Chief Thomas’s decision to 

terminate him. “Evidence of pretext, normally considered at step three of the 

McDonnell Douglas analysis, can satisfy the inference-of-discrimination element 

of the prima facie case.” Lake, 596 F.3d at 874. Bracey could have attempted to 

show such pretext, for example, by presenting evidence that the City: “(1) failed 

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to follow its own policies [in terminating him]; (2) treated similarly situated [police 

officers] in a disparate manner; or (3) shifted its explanation of the employment 

decision.” (Id. at 874-875). Instead of presenting such facts in his Response to the 

City’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Bracey makes only conclusory allegations 

and relies on speculative or hearsay opinions to support his claim that he was 

discharged because of his race. In contrast, the City has presented strong, 

objective evidence to support its position that Bracey was discharged “for cause” 

arising from his serious misconduct, which violated four LRPD rules and 

regulations and a General Order. 

For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, 

that Bracey has failed to establish the fourth essential element of his prima face 

case, i.e., “circumstances” surrounding his discharge that are capable of supporting 

an inference of race discrimination. 

In his Response to the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Bracey makes 

no showing of how he has satisfied his burden at stages one and three of the 

McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis, i.e., how he has satisfied each of the 

elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination; and why

the City’s racially neutral explanation for his discharge is a “pretext.” Instead, 

almost all of Bracey’s nine-page Response is devoted to: (1) an entirely 

subjective and self-serving discussion of the events that resulted in his termination; 

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(2) broad and conclusory assertions that are not supported by any facts (i.e., Chief 

Thomas was not trained “to do the right thing” by minority officers); (3) a request 

for the Court to take “judicial notice” of the LRPD’s long history of discrimination 

against black police officers, without citing any facts to establish such a 

proposition; and (4) relying on hearsay and conclusory deposition testimony from 

other black officers in the LRPD who make vague and speculative allegations 

about white officers being treated more favorably.19 (Response, Doc. 44). 

The Affidavit of Chief Thomas and the other exhibits filed in support of the 

City’s Motion for Summary Judgment establish the following undisputed facts: (1) 

 

19 Bracey’s Response cites generally to excerpts from the depositions of four other black 

officers in the LRPD. The cited testimony of those officers is either not helpful, not admissible, 

or both. 

For example, Bracey cites, without explanation, to the testimony of Lieutenant Johnny 

Gilbert, who offered his subjective opinion that Bracey’s inter-racial marriage “caused tension” 

within the police department and in public. He also opined that he found it “odd” or “extreme” 

that a BOLO was issued for Bracey. (Doc. 44 at p. 8; Gilbert testimony, Doc. 48-3, at pp. 1-13). 

In contrast, the City has offered the deposition testimony of Lt. Gilbert, who found Bracey’s 

infractions to be “glaring” and, in his judgment, “an affront to anything that a police agency 

stands for.” According to Lt. Gilbert, such misconduct could not be tolerated “by anyone.” Lt. 

Gilbert specifically could not recall any white officers who engaged in similar conduct as Bracey 

and were treated more leniently. (Doc. 34-6 at pp. 2, 4). 

Bracey also relies on the deposition testimony of LRPD officer Jonathan White. He 

acknowledged he didn’t have any personal knowledge of Bracey’s termination “other than what 

[he had] heard.” (Doc. 34-8 at p. 4). Yet, Bracey cites to White’s deposition testimony to 

support his assertion that similarly situated employees were treated more leniently. A review of 

the cited testimony reveals nothing other than White’s purely subjective opinion that Bracey may 

have been terminated because of his imposing size, 6’6” and 300-plus pounds, and the fact that 

his wife was white. Yet, White also testified that, in his opinion, Bracey should have been 

terminated if there was “a very very strong suspicion” that he battered his wife. (Doc. 48-5 at 

pp. 4-5, 11). 

Bracey has the burden of coming forward with facts, based on admissible evidence, that 

create “circumstances” capable of supporting an inference of discrimination in the City’s 

decision to terminate his employment. Bracey cannot meet that burden by polling officers 

sympathetic to his cause and having them offer conclusory and speculative opinions. 

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19 

Bracey and his wife had a physical altercation in their home, in front of their 

children, on December 9, 2011; (2) Bracey’s son and wife each called 911 and 

reported that Bracey had inflicted physical injuries on Mary Bracey during a 

domestic dispute; (3) Immediately after the fight, Bracey left the home; (4) 

LRPD officer Amber Kalmer called Bracey shortly after the fight and told him 

police officers had been dispatched to his home on a domestic disturbance call; (5) 

When police officers arrived at Bracey’s home they found his wife with injuries 

that were consistent with domestic violence; (6) Rather than going home to meet 

with the officers investigating the incident, Bracey left Pulaski County and spent 

the night in a Saline County hotel; (7) Bracey did not call his supervisor or 

anyone else in his chain of command to report his personal involvement in “a 

domestic violence related incident,” as required by LRPD General Order 310; (8) 

On Friday night, a friend, Sgt. Burnett, called and told him that the LRPD had 

issued a BOLO, which described him as “armed and dangerous”; (9) On Saturday 

morning, rather than turn himself in to the LRPD, Bracey left the State and drove 

to a casino in Greenville, Mississippi where he spent the rest of the day and night 

and did not return to Little Rock until Sunday afternoon; (10) While in the casino 

in Greenville on Saturday, at approximately noon, LRPD Sgt. Sloan called Bracey 

and told him that, Lt. Speer, a superior officer in Bracey’s chain of command, had 

ordered Bracey to surrender in Little Rock by 1:00 p.m. on Saturday; (11) Bracey 

Case 4:13-cv-00013-JM Document 58 Filed 11/15/16 Page 19 of 41
20 

disobeyed that order and remained at the casino, waiting until Sunday afternoon to 

drive back to Little Rock; (12) On Monday, Bracey surrendered to the LRPD and 

was suspended pending the outcome of a disciplinary investigation; (13) After an 

I/A investigation and an administrative hearing on the disciplinary charges, Chief 

Thomas terminated Bracey for violating General Order 310 and four other LRPD 

regulations related to the December 9, 2011 domestic violence incident and 

Bracey’s subsequent misconduct.20

After considering all of the evidence developed during the I/A investigation 

and the administrative hearing, Chief Thomas (and Captain Bewley, Lieutenant 

Speers, and Lieutenant Brewer) believed that Bracey had choked and hit his wife 

and that he had violated General Order 310, as well as four separate Rules and 

Regulations.21 Scroggins v. Univ. of Minn., 221 F.3d 1042, 1045 (8th Cir. 2000) 

 

20 Bracey has not disputed any of these facts, except to: deny he caused any of his 

wife’s injuries; claim she was the “aggressor” in the fight; and assert that all of her injuries were 

self-inflicted. The Court must, at the summary judgment stage, accept Bracey’s version of the 

facts as true. However, even under his version of the facts, he admits to being involved in a 

serious “domestic violence related incident” with his wife. Bracey is 6’5” and weighs 300-plus 

pounds. (Doc. 48-5, at pp. 4-5). The size differential between Bracey and his wife put her in 

considerable danger of being seriously injured even if Bracey did nothing more than the things 

he admits: place his wife in a defensive head and chin hold; pin her against the couch; and let 

his left hand “fall around her neck” (whatever that means). Accepting all those facts as true, the 

plain language of General Order 310 still required Bracey to report that “domestic violence 

related incident” to an officer in his chain of command. Bracey admits that he never reported the 

incident to his immediate supervisor or to anyone else in his chain of command. 

21 The additional violations included Rules and Regulations §§ 1/4002.00 (prohibiting 

“conduct unbecoming an officer”); § 1/4003.00 (prohibiting “any personal act or conduct which, 

if brought to the attention of the public, could result in justified criticism of that officer or the 

Department”; § 1/5006 (“failure or deliberate refusal of any officer to obey a lawful order”; § 

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21 

(“The relevant inquiry is whether the [employer] believed [the employee] was 

guilty of the conduct justifying the discharge.”) (internal quotation omitted); 

Richey v. City of Independence, 540 F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 2008) (“The normal 

rule in discrimination cases is that if an employer honestly believes that an 

employee is terminated for misconduct, but it turns out later that the employer was 

mistaken about whether the employee violated a workplace rule, the employer 

cannot be liable for discrimination.). 

The Court’s decision in Richey makes it clear that the relevant issue is not

whether, as Bracey contends, his wife was the “aggressor” in the altercation and he 

was only “defending himself.” Rather, the narrow issue is whether Chief Thomas 

“honestly believed” the strong evidence that supported his decision to terminate 

Bracey for violating General Order 310 and the four other LRPD Rules and 

Regulations. Bracey has offered no facts or circumstances capable of supporting 

an inference that his race played a role in Chief Thomas’s decision or that his 

decision was based on anything other than his “honest belief” that the strong 

evidence of Bracey’s serious and repeated misconduct over a three day period 

required him to fire Bracey. 

In Bracey’s Response to the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the only 

“circumstances” he cites to support an inference of discrimination are: (1) vague, 

 

1/8005.00 (“no officer shall willfully misrepresent any matter . . . or give false testimony” in a 

departmental investigation). 

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22 

conclusory, and factually unsupported opinions expressed by him and several other 

black officers in the LRPD that Bracey was discharged because of his race; and 

(2) his contention that white and hispanic “comparators,” who allegedly engaged 

in the same kind of conduct that resulted in his discharge, were not terminated.22 

As explained below, Bracey has not made the required showing of any “other 

circumstances” capable of supporting “an inference of discrimination.” 

1. The Vague, Conclusory and Unsupported Opinions 

Bracey Relies On To Show Race Played a Role In His 

Termination Are Not Sufficient To Support an 

Inference of Discrimination. 

Bracey believes that he did nothing wrong in the fight with his wife because 

she was the aggressor and all of the force he used against her was either to defend 

himself or to restrain her. Based on the undisputed facts, no reasonable fact-finder 

could regard Bracey’s version of events as anything other than far-fetched and 

unbelievable. Among other things, it would require such a fact-finder to ignore: 

(1) separate 911 calls placed by Bracey’s wife and son immediately after the fight 

 

22 In his Response, Bracey also requests the Court to take “judicial notice” that the 

LRPD disciplinary system operates “in an atmosphere previously known as the ‘[good] old boys 

system’” for which the LRPD has “previously been subjected to federal, court-ordered 

remediation.” (Doc. 44 at pp. 7-8). Similarly, Bracey makes conclusory and vague references to 

“a favoritism system” that disparately impacted unnamed black police officers and created a 

“hostile work environment.” However, Bracey provides no facts to support any of those 

allegations. (Id. at p. 8). 

The only issue before this Court relates to Bracey’s race discrimination claims – not those 

of other unnamed officers in other unspecified cases. Accordingly, the Court declines Bracey’s 

nebulous request that it take “judicial notice” of “the fact”: (1) the LRPD once operated under a 

“[good] old boys system”; and (2) it now operates under a “favoritism system” that disparately 

impacts black officers and creates a hostile work environment. 

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23 

ended, which reported that Bracey had hit and choked Mary Bracey during a fight 

at their residence;23 (2) separate police statements made by Bracey’s wife and son 

that were consistent with their 911 calls; and (3) photographs of visible injuries to 

Mary’s face and neck, consistent with being hit and choked by Bracey. Finally, it 

would require the fact finder to believe Bracey’s preposterous assertion that his 

wife’s injuries were self-inflicted when she “accidentally” hit herself (apparently 

several times) with her daughter’s laptop computer.24 

Under LRPD General Order 310, any police officer “who witnesses or has 

firsthand knowledge of a domestic violence related incident involving a sworn 

member of [the LRPD] as the alleged suspect and who fails to officially report this 

information, will be subject to disciplinary action up to and including termination.” 

On December 9, 2011, Bracey was a “sworn member of the LRPD” and he was 

personally involved in a “domestic violence related incident” with his wife. 

 

23 While Markus’s 911 call focused on Bracey choking his mother, in Mary’s 911 call 

she stated that Bracey hit her. While Bracey made much of this alleged discrepancy in his 

administrative hearing, he overlooked two very damaging aspects of their 911 calls: (1) they 

both claimed Bracey had used aggressive physical force (choking and hitting) against Mary; and 

(2) all of Mary’s physical injuries were consistent with her being choked and hit. 

24 Notably, of the total of five officers, including Chief Thomas, who evaluated Bracey’s 

conduct and made findings of fact, four of them found that Bracey had hit and choked his wife. 

(Doc. 34-3, at pp. 52-54, 56-62). While Sergeant Owens did not find that Bracey’s version of 

events was truthful, she rhetorically asked the following question: “[C]an we be certain that the 

incident did not occur exactly as Officer Bracey said it did?” Sergeant Owens also rhetorically 

asked whether Bracey’s long tenure with the LRPD entitled him to “the benefit of the doubt.” 

(Doc. 34-3 at p. 49). By their findings, the other four officers answered the first question, “Yes” 

and the second question, “No.” 

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24 

Even under Bracey’s own version of events, this regulation required him to 

“officially report” the physical altercation with his wife, even if all of his physical 

contact with his wife during the incident was defensive in nature. The facts are 

undisputed that, after the fight, Bracey failed to make an official report of the 

incident to anyone in his chain of command. Instead, despite knowing that the 

police had been dispatched to his house to investigate the fight, and that there was 

a BOLO out for him, he left Pulaski County to spend the night in a Saline County 

hotel and, the next morning, left the State to go to a casino in Greenville, 

Mississippi. After arriving at the casino, Bracey disobeyed a direct order from an 

officer in his chain of command to turn himself in by 1:00 p.m. on Saturday in 

Little Rock. Bracey remained at the casino until the next day, when he returned to 

Little Rock. Finally, on Monday, three days after the domestic incident with his 

wife, he turned himself in to the LRPD. During the subsequent I/A investigation, 

Bracey lied about speaking with Sergeant Burnett, one of the two supervisors 

outside of his chain of command, with whom he spoke during the twenty-four 

hours immediately after the incident. 

In conclusion, the undisputed facts show that Chief Thomas terminated 

Bracey for violating General Order 310 and four other LRPD Rules and 

Regulations. Bracey’s papers filed in Response to the City’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment contain no facts to support his conclusory assertion that he was 

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25 

terminated because of his race. Instead, Bracey has only come forward with 

vague, speculative, “opinion evidence,” which is not capable of supporting an 

inference of race discrimination, the fourth essential element necessary for him to 

establish a prima facie case. See Richey, 540 F.3d at 784. 

2. Bracey Has Failed to Identify Any “Comparators” 

Capable of Supporting An Inference of 

Discrimination. 

Relying on the evidence put forth by the City to support its Motion for 

Summary Judgment,25 Bracey claims that several white or hispanic LRPD officers 

engaged in “similar misconduct,” but were treated “more leniently,” i.e., they were 

not terminated. In Chappell v. Bilco Co., 675 F.3d 1110 (8th Cir. 2012), the 

Eighth Circuit made it clear that, even at the prima facie stage, the inquiry is 

whether the employees are “similarly situated in all relevant respects.” Id., at 

1118. Thus, “‘[w]hat is relevant is [whether they] are involved in or accused of the 

same offense and are disciplined in different ways.’” Id. (quoting Boner v. Bd. of 

Comm’rs, 674 F.2d 693, 697 (8th Cir. 1982)). The Court defined “all relevant 

respects” to mean “the conduct of the employees and any disparity in their 

discipline.” Id. at 1119 (citation omitted). 

Importantly, while the City’s summary judgment papers identify and discuss 

eight current or former LRPD officers, only one of whom, Cristie Young (a white 

 

25 (See, e.g., Doc. 34-3, at pp. 6-10; Doc. 34-4 at pp. 45-62). 

Case 4:13-cv-00013-JM Document 58 Filed 11/15/16 Page 25 of 41
26 

female), is offered as a comparator. The other seven officers are discussed in the 

context of explaining why none of them are “similarly situated” to Bracey, and 

therefore, are not valid comparators. 

Chief Thomas determined that both Bracey and Cristie Young: (1) were the 

aggressor in a domestic violence incident; (2) failed to report the incident, a 

violation of General Order 310; (3) committed conduct unbecoming an LRPD 

officer, a violation of R&R § 1/4002.00; (4) engaged in conduct that would 

subject the officer and the LRPD to justified criticism, a violation of §1/4003.00; 

(5) failed to obey a lawful order, a violation of § 1/5006.00; and (6) gave 

untruthful statements in the investigation into the incident, a violation of § 

1/8005.00. (Letters of Termination, Doc. 34-4, at pp. 1-2, 45-47).26 Chief Thomas 

terminated Cristie Young for her misconduct, the same penalty he imposed on 

Bracey for his misconduct.27

In his Response, Bracey argues that Cristie Young is not a valid comparator. 

Instead, he argues that Chris Young, who was involved in the same domestic 

incident with Cristie, is a valid comparator. Because Chief Thomas did not 

terminate Chris Young for his role in the domestic incident with Cristie, Bracey 

 

26 Chief Thomas also found that Cristie Young had failed to report her “off-duty” 

employment, a charge that was not made against Bracey. (Doc. 34-4, at p. 45). 

27 Cristie Young appealed her termination to Pulaski County Circuit Court and was 

reinstated by Arkansas Circuit Judge Alice Gray. 

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27 

claims it creates “other circumstances” that support an inference of race 

discrimination in connection with his discharge. 

Chris Young is the only alleged comparator that Bracey identifies by name 

and discusses in his Response. However, he makes vague references to “other 

comparators,” which broadly construed might include some of the seven other 

individuals identified and discussed by the City in its summary judgment papers.28 

Out of an abundance of caution, the Court will explain why the other seven LRPD 

officers identified by the City are not valid comparators. 

(a) Cristie and Chris Young 

Cristie and Chris Young were involved in a domestic altercation in an 

apartment complex parking lot on June 28, 2011.29 At the time, they were married 

and both of them were LRPD officers. After the incident, neither “officially 

report[ed]” the incident to their chain of command. No evidence suggests the fight 

was serious enough that either party was injured or that police were called to 

investigate it. Nor does it appear that any domestic abuse related charges were 

filed against either Chris or Cristie. 

 

28 Of course, the City’s purpose in identifying and discussing all of those individuals, 

except Cristie Young, was to demonstrate why they were not valid comparators. It appears the 

City went to this effort because Bracey, during discovery, may have referred to those individuals 

as comparators, something he fails to do in his Response. 

29 (Doc. 34-4, at p. 45-49). 

Case 4:13-cv-00013-JM Document 58 Filed 11/15/16 Page 27 of 41
28 

Chief Thomas found that Cristie Young was “the aggressor,” and that Chris 

tried to avoid the incident. Although neither Cristie nor Chris sustained any 

injuries, Cristie was found to have engaged in the following serious misconduct 

after the incident: (1) she gained access to Chris Young’s apartment by breaking 

open the back door; (2) she locked a sergeant out of the apartment; (3) she failed 

to provide all the keys to the apartment despite being ordered to do so; (4) she 

contacted Chris Young after a superior ordered her not to do so; and (5) she was 

untruthful in statements to supervisors, Internal Affairs, and a Circuit Judge 

regarding the incident.30 

 Chief Thomas terminated Cristie Young because her conduct, during and 

after the fight, violated numerous LRPD regulations.31 Chief Thomas found that 

Chris had failed to report a domestic incident but otherwise did not engage in any 

post-incident misconduct. As punishment, Chris was suspended for two days.32 

Albeit not as egregious, Cristie Young’s misconduct clearly is very similar 

to Bracey’s misconduct. However, because she was also terminated, Bracey 

argues that she is not a valid comparator. In doing so, he ignores all of the 

similarities in their misconduct and claims their cases are “fundamentally 

dissimilar” because: Ms. Young was “clearly the aggressor”; she was a 

 

30 (Doc. 34-4 at p. 46). 

31 (Stmt. of Facts, Doc. 43 at ¶ 6; Thomas Aff., Doc. 34-3 at pp. 7-8; Letters, Doc. 34-4, 

at 45-49). 

32 (Doc. 34-3, at pp. 7-8; Doc. 34-4, at pp. 48-49).

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29 

supervisory officer held to a higher standard under departmental policy; and she 

had a more substantial record of prior disciplinary issues. Of course, Chief 

Thomas also found Bracey to be “the aggressor” and, as a respected seventeen-year 

veteran of the LRPD, it is hard to see any distinction between Bracey and Ms. 

Young that might justify her being held to a “higher standard” as Bracey argues. 

Finally, while Bracey alleges that Ms. Young had a more substantial record of 

“prior disciplinary violations,” that distinction is largely immaterial in light of the 

seriousness of their misconduct (particularly Bracey’s) during and after their 

respective domestic altercations.33 

 As between Cristie and Chris Young, only Cristie Young is arguably 

similarly situated “in all relevant respects” with Bracey. Chappell, 675 F.3d at 

1119. Unlike Bracey, Chris Young was not found to have engaged in any postincident misconduct other than his failure to report the initial domestic incident. 

Finally, there is no suggestion that Chris Young was charged with a crime, 

attempted to avoid apprehension, fled the jurisdiction, refused a direct order from a 

superior officer, or made false statements during an I/A investigation. 

Bracey has come forward with no facts suggesting that Chris Young is a 

valid comparator. As a result, Chief Thomas’s decision not to terminate Chris for 

 

33 (See Stmt. of Facts, Doc. 43 at ¶ 6; Thomas Aff., Doc. 34-3 at pp. 5-8; Termination 

letter, Doc. 34-4 at pp. 45-47). 

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30 

his much different conduct during and after a domestic incident cannot be used by 

Bracey to support an inference of discrimination in connection with his own 

termination. 

(b) Corey Hall & Lisa Hernandez 

At the time of their domestic dispute, Officers Corey Hall, an AfricanAmerican, and Lisa Hernandez, a Hispanic, were both LRPD officers. While their 

domestic dispute “escalated into a physical confrontation,”34 Chief Thomas noted 

that there were no visible injuries to either of them, and the evidence was 

insufficient to prove who was the victim and who was the aggressor. Additionally, 

there was no extrinsic evidence that bolstered or detracted from the credibility of 

either officer; although Chief Thomas noted that Officer Hernandez admitted her 

guilt and exhibited a good attitude toward correction. Chief Thomas suspended 

Hall for thirty days (which was later reduced to ten days) and suspended 

Hernandez for five days.35 

Bracey has presented no facts suggesting that Hall engaged in any post-fight 

misconduct. Hernandez’s only post-fight misconduct was calling Hall one time the 

day after the incident, something she was directed not to do.36 Neither of them 

was accused of a crime, left the jurisdiction to avoid apprehension for several days, 

 

34 (Doc. 34-4 at p. 57). 

35 (Stmt. of Facts, Doc. 43 at ¶ 8; Thomas Aff., Doc. 34-3, at pp. 8-9; Hall Letter, Doc. 

34-4 at p. 56-57; Hernandez letter, Doc. 34-4 at p. 50). 

36 This was found to be a violation of R&R 1/5006. (Doc. 34-4 at pp. 58-59). 

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31 

refused to obey a direct order from a supervisor to surrender, delayed turning 

themselves in to face pending criminal charges, or lied during an I/A investigation. 

Bracey has come forward with no facts suggesting that Hall and Hernandez 

are valid comparators. As a result, the fact that neither of them was terminated, for 

engaging in much different conduct, during and after the domestic incident, cannot 

be used by Bracey to support an inference of discrimination in connection with his 

own termination. 

 (c) Fred Lee 

On September 11, 2011, Fred Lee, a hispanic LRPD officer, and his wife 

were involved in a physical altercation at their Sherwood home. Police were called 

and responded. After the incident, Lee followed his wife to another residence in 

Alexander where a second physical altercation occurred. Police were once again 

dispatched. Based on these facts, Chief Thomas terminated Lee. However, he was 

later reinstated by the Civil Service Commission. 

Nothing in the record suggests that, after the incident, Lee attempted to 

evade arrest, refused to turn himself in, or lied to I/A investigators.37 Even without 

those additional violations, Chief Thomas decided to terminate Lee’s employment, 

 

37 The record does not indicate whether Lee was charged with a crime. Unlike Bracey, 

Lee was not found to have failed to obey a lawful order given by a supervisory officer (R&R 

§1/5006.00) or to have given false testimony in a departmental investigation (R&R § 1/8005.00). 

Case 4:13-cv-00013-JM Document 58 Filed 11/15/16 Page 31 of 41
32 

the same decision he made regarding Bracey.38 Lee’s situation, like Cristie 

Young’s and Bracey’s, underscored the seriousness with which Chief Thomas 

viewed domestic abuse incidents, particularly when the officer involved was the 

aggressor. 

In Bracey’s deposition, he speculated that Fred Lee’s chain of command 

knew that the Civil Service Commission would reinstate his employment after 

Chief Thomas terminated him. However, he later admitted that he had no evidence

to support his speculation.39 Thus, while Bracey’s Response refers to the “Fred 

Lee situation” as alleged evidence of “the arbitrary disciplinary system persisting 

in the department,” there are no facts to support that conclusory assertion.40 

To the extent that Bracey may be relying on Lee as a comparator, he was not

treated more leniently than Bracey and, therefore, is not helpful to his case. 

Furthermore, there are no facts suggesting that Lee is a valid comparator to Bracey, 

and even if he was, he was terminated by Chief Thomas. Thus, nothing about the 

circumstances surrounding Lee’s termination by Chief Thomas and his subsequent 

reinstatement by the Civil Service Commission can even arguably support an 

inference of discrimination in connection with Bracey’s termination. 

 

38 Chief Thomas found that Lee: (1) failed to report the incidents to his supervisor in 

violation of General Order 310; (2) engaged in conduct unbecoming an LRPD officer in 

violation of R&R 1/4002.00; and (3) engaged in conduct that could result in justified criticism 

of the officer or the LRPD in violation of R&R 1/4003.00. (Stmt. of Facts, Doc. 43 at ¶¶ 9, 11, 

12; Doc. 34-4, at 51-52; Letter, Doc. 34-4 at pp. 51-52). 

39 (Exh. 34-1 at pp. 27-28 ). 

40 (Stmt. of Facts, Doc. 43 at ¶ 12). 

Case 4:13-cv-00013-JM Document 58 Filed 11/15/16 Page 32 of 41
33 

 (d) James Youngblood 

James Youngblood is white and a former LRPD officer. On December 16, 

2012, he was involved in a domestic incident with his wife. His chain of command 

recommended his termination. Chief Thomas concurred, but Youngblood resigned

before the disciplinary process was completed. While Youngblood did not face 

charges of failure to obey a lawful order or being untruthful during the 

investigation, he admitted to “a third domestic incident during the investigation.”41 

To the extent that Bracey may be relying on Youngblood as a comparator, 

he was not treated more leniently than Bracey and, therefore, is not helpful to 

Bracey’s case. Furthermore, there are no facts suggesting that Youngblood is a 

valid comparator, and even if he was, Bracey has shown nothing surrounding 

Youngblood’s decision to resign that could support an inference of discrimination 

in connection with Bracey’s termination. 

(e) Robert Coors 

Robert Coors is a white LRPD officer. On October 18, 2012, he was 

involved in a domestic incident with his wife. Even though Chief Thomas found 

that Coors was the victim in the case, he still suspended him for 20 days because 

 

41 (Doc. 34-4 at p. 53; Doc. 34-3 at p. 8). 

Case 4:13-cv-00013-JM Document 58 Filed 11/15/16 Page 33 of 41
34 

Coors failed to report the incident.42 Nothing suggests that Coors engaged in any 

post-incident misconduct. 

Bracey fails to offer any facts to explain how he and Coors were “similarly 

situated in all relevant respects,” the required legal standard for making Coors a 

valid comparator. In short, Bracey has shown nothing about Coors’ much different 

and relatively minor misconduct, which resulted in his 20 day suspension, that is 

capable of supporting an inference of discrimination in connection with Bracey’s 

termination. 

(f) Arthur McDaniel 

Arthur McDaniel is a white LRPD officer. McDaniel was involved in a 

verbal confrontation with another man who was having an extramarital affair with 

McDaniel’s wife. Because only words were exchanged between the two men, 

there were no physical injuries. The “other man” obtained a misdemeanor warrant 

for McDaniels’ arrest. McDaniel was relieved of duty until the misdemeanor 

charge was nolle prossed. There is no evidence that McDaniel engaged in any 

post-incident misconduct. As punishment for his misconduct, Chief Thomas 

suspended McDaniel for thirty days, without pay.43 

While it is unclear whether Bracey proposes to rely on McDaniel as a 

comparator, the undisputed facts make that proposition legally unsustainable. 

 

42 (Doc. 34-3 at p. 8; Doc. 34-4 at pp. 54-55). 

43 (Doc. 34-3 at p. 9; Letter, Doc. 34-4 at pp. 61-62). 

Case 4:13-cv-00013-JM Document 58 Filed 11/15/16 Page 34 of 41
35 

Thus, nothing about McDaniel’s much different misconduct, for which he received 

a suspension, is capable of supporting an inference of discrimination in connection 

with Bracey’s termination. 

(g) Dana Jackson 

Bracey has offered the deposition testimony of Kaward Jolly, a black LRPD 

officer who was terminated for sleeping on duty, to support the contention that 

Dana Jackson, who is white, is a valid comparator. In his deposition, Jolly 

expressed the speculative opinion that similarly situated white officers, who were 

charged with sleeping on duty or domestic incidents like the one involving Bracy, 

were not terminated or even subjected to serious disciplinary action.44 

 Jolly testified that “it was told” to him that Dana Jackson, a white lieutenant 

in the LRPD, got into a fight with his daughter’s husband that resulted in serious 

injury, but Jackson was not disciplined.45 This vague hearsay testimony from Jolly 

is Bracey’s only support for his argument that Jackson is a valid comparator. At 

the summary judgment stage, the Court cannot consider hearsay testimony for any 

purpose, much less rely on it to find someone to be a valid comparator in a race 

discrimination case. Brunsting v. Lutsen Mountains Corp., 601 F.3d 813, 817 (8th 

Cir. 2010). 

 

44 (Doc. 48-6, pp. 1-9). Jolly attended Bracey’s civil service hearing and talked to 

Bracey and other officers about what happened. Thus, it appears that all of the proffered 

portions of Jolly’s deposition testimony are based on hearsay. 

45 (Id. at pp. 1-2). 

Case 4:13-cv-00013-JM Document 58 Filed 11/15/16 Page 35 of 41
36 

Chief Thomas’s Affidavit states that Lieutenant Jackson responded to a 

domestic incident in which his daughter had been injured by her husband. Jackson 

had a physical altercation with his son-in-law. Chief Thomas noted that Jackson 

“immediately called and reported the incident,” “had a positive attitude toward 

discipline” and “admitted his guilt.” Chief Thomas found that Jackson’s conduct 

had violated R&R § 1/4003.00 and issued him a letter of reprimand.46 These 

undisputed facts in Chief Thomas’s Affidavit make it clear that Jackson was in no 

way “similarly situated in all relevant respects” to Bracey such that he can be 

considered a valid comparator. 

Thus, Bracey has presented no facts to establish that Jackson is a valid 

comparator, or that anything about Jackson’s much different situation is capable of 

supporting an inference of discrimination in connection with Bracey’s termination. 

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes that Bracey has failed 

to establish the fourth essential element of his prima facie case, a fatal legal 

deficiency that entitles the City to summary judgment on all of Bracey’s claims. 

Nevertheless, the Court will continue with its McDonnell Douglas analysis to 

demonstrate that, even if Bracey had been successful in establishing a prima face 

case, his Response fails to present any evidence of pretext capable of rebutting the 

City’s “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” for terminating his employment. 

 

46 (Doc. 34-3 at p. 9). 

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B. Bracey Fails, At Step 3, To Present Any Evidence of Pretext 

For purposes of this analysis, the Court assumes, arguendo, that Bracey’s 

Response to the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment establishes a prima facie 

case, thereby creating a rebuttable presumption of unlawful discrimination. The 

Court must then consider whether the City’s summary judgment papers establish 

“a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” for terminating Bracey. Tyler v. Univ. of 

Ark. Bd. of Tr., 628 F.3d 980, 990 (8th Cir. 2011). 

The City has produced an abundance of undisputed facts47 to support Chief 

Thomas’s decision to terminate Bracey for violating an LRPD Order and four 

different Rules and Regulations. As a matter of law, that constitutes “a legitimate 

nondiscriminatory reason” for his termination. See Putman v. Unity Health Sys., 

348 F.3d 732, 736 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Our cases have repeatedly held that 

insubordination and violation of company policy are legitimate reasons for 

termination.”). Thus, any “presumption of discrimination disappears, requiring 

[Bracey] to prove that the proffered justification is merely a pretext for 

discrimination.” Twiggs v. Selig, 679 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal 

citation and quotation omitted). 

 

47 The Court has already discussed the City’s evidence in great detail in its recitation of 

the facts and in discussing whether Bracey satisfied the fourth essential element of a prima facie 

case. 

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38 

At this final stage, Bracey “‘must prove more than the prima facie case to 

show pretext, because unlike evidence establishing the prima facie case, evidence 

of pretext and discrimination is viewed in light of the employer's justification.’” 

Id. (citing Chappell v. Bilco Co., 675 F.3d 1110, 1117 (8th Cir. 2012)). Thus, 

Bracey must now establish the existence of “a genuine issue of material fact 

regarding pretext [which] merges with [his] ultimate burden of persuading the 

court that [he was] the victim of intentional discrimination.” Bone v. G4S Youth 

Services, LLC, 686 F.3d 948, 954 (8th Cir. 2012). 

Furthermore, if comparators are used to show pretext, the standard for 

determining whether such employees are “similarly situated” is “rigorous”: “[T]he 

individuals used for comparison must have dealt with the same supervisor, have 

been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct without any 

mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.” Id. at 956 (emphasis added) (citing 

Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000). Finally, “[t]o be probative 

evidence of pretext, the misconduct of more leniently disciplined employees must 

be of comparable seriousness.” Harvey v. Anheuser–Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 

972-73 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

The Court has already determined that Cristie Young is the only arguable 

comparator who is “similarly situated in all relevant respects” so as to permit a 

comparison at the prima facie stage. The Court now concludes that she also is the 

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only potential comparator who is arguably “similarly situated” at the pretext stage. 

In deciding to terminate her employment, Chief Thomas found that: (1) she was 

the aggressor in the domestic incident; (2) she failed to officially report the 

incident; and (3) after the incident she engaged in repeated violations of other 

Rules and Regulations, including disobeying a direct order and being untruthful. 

The fact that Cristie Young and Bracey both engaged in similar misconduct and 

were both terminated greatly undermines Bracey’s claim that he was terminated 

because of his race. As explained by the Court in its earlier analysis, all of the 

other LRPD officers mentioned by Bracey clearly are not valid comparators at the 

prima facie stage. A fortiori, none of those LRPD officers are valid comparators at 

the pretext stage. 

Finally, Bracey has presented no facts to support a finding in his favor on the 

issue of pretext. The legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Bracey’s 

termination that are offered by the City “cannot be proved to be ‘a pretext for 

discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that 

discrimination was the real reason.” Bone, 686 F.3d at 955 (emphases in original) 

(quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515-516 (1993)). 

 Even accepting Bracey’s version of events and viewing those facts in a light 

most favorable to him, he has shown only that: (1) He did not hit or choke his 

wife; (2) The LRPD’s investigation into the incident was flawed; and (3) He 

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should have not have been found guilty of violating some of the Rules and 

Regulations. As a matter of law, this showing by Bracey is insufficient to 

demonstrate that the City’s reasons for discharging him were a pretext. This 

Court’s role is not to second-guess the City’s decision. As the Eighth Circuit 

observed in Hill v. St. Louis University, 123 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir.1997) 

(internal citation omitted): 

Title VII [is] not meant to transform “at will” employment into 

perpetual employment where equal treatment is guaranteed to all 

employees and termination is legal only “for cause.” Nor do these 

statutes entitle courts to “sit as super-personnel departments,” secondguessing the wisdom of businesses’ personnel decisions. Rather, these 

statutes serve the narrow purpose of prohibiting discrimination based 

on certain, discreet classifications such as age, gender, or race. These 

statutes do not prohibit employment decisions based upon poor job 

performance, erroneous evaluations, personal conflicts between 

employees, or even unsound business practices. 

Accordingly, at the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, Bracey’s 

race discrimination claims fail because he has not made the required showing of 

pretext. 

C. Bracey’s § 1983 Claim that Chief Thomas Was Not 

Adequately Trained 

Bracey has asserted, under § 1983, that Chief Thomas was not adequately 

trained to “do the right thing” by minority and female officers and that he failed to 

promote or maintain adequate training and practices to prevent discrimination in 

the LRPD. To prove that a municipality is liable on a failure to train allegation, 

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Bracey must show “deliberate indifference.” City of Canton, Ohio v Harris, 489 

U.S. 378 (1989). Thus, to prevail on this claim, Bracey must show that the 

inadequate training was “ so likely to result in the violation of constitutional 

rights,” that the City “can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent 

to the need.” Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 998 (8th Cir. 2010). Here, there is no 

evidence from which a rational finder of fact could find a constitutional violation, 

arising from the City’s decision to terminate Bracey. Accordingly, as a matter of 

law, Bracey cannot prevail on his § 1983 failure to train claim. 

IV. Conclusion 

The Court concludes that in his Response to the City’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, Bracey has failed to present admissible evidence sufficient to allow a 

reasonable jury to return a verdict in his favor on any of his claims.48 As a result, 

the City is entitled to summary judgment on all of Bracey’s claims, and 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT Defendant City of Little 

Rock’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 34, be GRANTED and that all claims 

asserted by Plaintiff John Bracey be DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE. 

DATED this 15th day of November, 2016. 

____________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

48 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

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