Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01789/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01789-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRANDON SHAWN BURRUS, Civil No. 13-1789 LAB (WVG)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE:

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

v.

WARDEN J. SOTO, et. al.,

Respondents.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Brandon Shawn Burrus, a state prisoner represented by counsel, has filed

a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his

conviction in San Diego County Superior Court Case No. SCD219172 for kidnaping to

commit rape or forcible oral copulation, rape, and forcible oral copulation. (Pet. at 6-18,

ECF No. 1 (Pet.).)1

 The Court has reviewed the Petition, the Answer and Memorandum

of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer, the Traverse, the lodgments, the

record, and all the supporting documents submitted by both parties. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court recommends the Petition be DENIED. 

/ / /

1

 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer

to those imprinted by the Court’s electronic case filing system.

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); see also Parle v. Fraley,

506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences

properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). 

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion:

a. The People’s Case

In February 2009, Cristina, age 21, attended college and lived in Pacific Beach. She regularly went to a local bar to socialize with friends. 

On one such occasion, Cristina drank two cocktails at home and then rode

her bicycle to the bar to meet her sister and other friends.

While at the bar, Cristina continued drinking cocktails and became “pretty intoxicated” as the night went on. At some point, Burrus

approached Cristina and offered to buy her a shot, but she declined. Burrus

talked to Cristina and her friends for several minutes and then walked away. Cristina chatted with Burrus two or three additional times before the bar

closed, but she was not attracted to, and did not flirt, with him. [FN 2:

Cristina’s friends also testified, based on their observations of her

interactions with Burrus at the bar, that Cristina had no romantic or sexual

interest in him.] 

By the time the bar closed at 2:00 a.m., Cristina had drunk seven or

eight cocktails. Burrus offered to give her a ride home because he had an

SUV that could accommodate her bicycle. Cristina accepted the offer with the understanding that Burrus would pick up her bicycle, return to the bar to pick up her friends and then drop them all off at her house. As Cristina

walked with Burrus to his SUV, she sent text messages to a friend she planned to meet at her house. [FN 3: The friend testified he planned to meet Cristina at her house and went there, but Cristina never showed up.] 

After Cristina’s bicycle was loaded into the SUV, Cristina and Burrus

got in, and Burrus drove away from the bar. When Cristina asked Burrus

where he was going, he said he was not going back to the bar. Cristina then directed Burrus toward her house, but he did not proceed in that direction. 

Cristina started to panic and continued to ask Burrus where he was going, but he simply told her to “shut up.”

Burrus drove onto a side street, parked the SUV, turned to Cristina and said, “Bitch, suck my dick.” When Cristina asked whether he was

kidding Burrus said he was serious. Cristina tried to exit the SUV but could

not get out because the door was locked. Burrus then exposed his penis, hit

Cristina’s face and arms, grabbed her head and forced his penis into her

mouth. Cristina could not breathe because she was “crying hysterically.” Burrus kept on hitting her and calling her a bitch.

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Burrus started driving again and proceeded to a freeway. He pulled over to the side of the freeway and told Cristina to perform fellatio and get on top of him. Cristina tried to get out of the SUV, but Burrus struck her,

threatened to sell her in Mexico, and forced his penis into her mouth. 

Burrus then allegedly grabbed Cristina’s neck, choked her, and told her he

knew from serving in the military how to strangle people without leaving a mark. He again pushed his penis into her mouth, but she “squeezed on his penis really hard and tried to hurt him.” Cristina feared for her life and told

Burrus she thought he was going to kill her and dump her body on the side of the road. Burrus assured her he was not going to kill her and said, “I’m going to take you to a motel and f*** you. I’m not done with you.”

Burrus then drove to a motel several miles away from Pacific Beach. He made Cristina pay for the room so he could “cover his tracks.” When

they arrived in the room, Burrus disrobed and ordered Cristina to do

likewise. Cristina refused, and Burrus tore off her clothes. Once they were naked, Burrus climbed on top of Cristina in the bed and inserted his penis into her vagina. Burrus removed his penis from Cristina’s vagina before ejaculation, forced her to perform fellatio, and ordered her to swallow his

semen. After Burrus ejaculated in Cristina’s mouth, he went to the

bathroom, and Cristina spit his semen on the floor.

Burrus then told Cristina to get in the shower to rinse off. After

showering briefly, Cristina returned to the bedroom and started to dress

while Burrus showered. Burrus came back into the bedroom, told Cristina

to get undressed, and inserted his penis into her vagina a second time. Burrus eventually withdrew his penis from Cristina’s vagina and made her perform fellatio so that he could ejaculate in her mouth. Burrus ended up masturbating instead.

After Burrus finished, Cristina told him she needed to get to class, and he agreed to take her home. When Burrus dropped Cristina off, he said, “Please don’t call the cops.” As soon as Cristina was safely inside, she called 9-1-1 to report the attack. The police arrived, interviewed Cristina, and took her to have a sexual assault examination.

The nurse who performed the physical examination of Cristina documented the following injuries: abrasions behind the left ear, on the neck

and below the left knee; and bruises on the face, the left leg, and vulva and the perineum. The nurse also closely examined Cristina’s vagina, where she found numerous abrasions and lacerations. [FN 4: The People introduced

photographs of Cristina’s injuries at trial.] Based on the examination and her performance of approximately 800 sexual assault examinations since

2000, the nurse testified Cristina “had much more injury than the majority of my patients by far.” The nurse further testified Cristina’s injuries were of the type expected in cases of sexual assault.

The People also presented DNA evidence through police investigators. A forensic biologist analyzed a blood stain found on the

carpet of Burrus’s SUV and determined the blood contained DNA profiles matching Cristinas’s profile. A criminalist who tested the bed sheet from

the motel room in which Burrus had sexual intercourse and orally copulated Cristina found sperm cells with DNA profiles matching Burrus’s profile. 

Another criminalist analyzed a sample collected from Cristina’s vagina and found sperm cells with DNA profiles matching Burrus’s profile.

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b. Defense Case

Burrus testified to a different version of the events at trial. He

admitted having sexual relations with Cristina but claimed everything was consensual. Specifically, Burrus testified that as he was driving Cristina

home from the bar, she touched his leg and asked, “So what now?” Burrus parked his SUV on “some random street” so they could “start making out.” 

He and Cristina then came up with a plan to go to a motel room to have sex. 

Burrus then drove on the freeway toward the motel. He and Cristina were

fondling each other on the way when she grew impatient and “moan[ed], ‘Are we there yet?’” Because Cristina was so eager to have sex, Burrus

drove off the freeway onto a street, where Cristina performed fellatio. Still wanting to have sexual intercourse, but not in the SUV, Burrus and Cristina

continued to the motel. When they finally arrived at the motel, Cristina agreed to pay for a room, and they had sexual intercourse twice in the room. 

After they had sex, Burrus drove Cristina home. On the way, Cristina asked Burrus if he was going to call her, and he said “no” because he thought it was “a one-night stand.” Upon hearing this, Cristina “was kind of pissed off” and told Burrus to take her home. Burrus complied.

Burrus called a forensic psychiatrist to testify about the intoxicating effects of alcohol. Based on a test that determined Cristina’s blood alcohol

level the morning after her sexual encounter with Burrus, the psychiatrist extrapolated that at 2:00 a.m. that day, when Cristina left the bar, her blood alcohol level would have been so high that “alcoholic blackouts” were

possible. According to the psychiatrist, during such blackouts intoxicated

persons may be walking around and appear awake, “but their ability to understand their surroundings [and] their ability to remember what

happened is very impaired, and usually they will wake up the next morning and not remember what had happened.”

Burrus called witnesses who examined the articles of clothing Cristina wore on the night she met him and also inspected Burrus’s SUV. No rips, frays or tears were found on any of Cristina’s garments. The

witnesses also testified the passenger door could be opened from the inside when the door was locked simply by pulling on the interior door handle.

Finally, Burrus called family members and friends to testify about his character. These witnesses testified Burrus was truthful and treated young women politely and respectfully.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 5-10.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 1, 2009, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed an

Information charging Brandon Shawn Burrus with one count of kidnaping Cristina B. to

commit oral copulation, (count one), a violation of California Penal Code (Penal Code)

§ 209(b)(1), six counts of forcible oral copulation against Cristina B. (counts two, three,

four, five, seven, and ten) and one count of forcible oral copulation against Andrea A.

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(count eleven), a violation of Penal Code § 288(c)(2), two counts of forcible rape of

Cristina B. (counts six and nine), a violation of Penal Code § 261(a)(2), one count of

forcible rape of Cristina B. with a foreign object (count 8), a violation of Penal Code

§ 289(a)(1), and one count of forcible oral copulation in concert against Andrea A. (count

12), a violation of Penal Code § 288a(d). (Lodgment No. 1 at 0008-17.) As to count one,

the complaint alleged Burrus was armed with a deadly weapon and that he personally

used a deadly weapon, within the meaning of Penal Code §§ 12022.3(b) and

1192.7(c)(23). (Id.) As to counts two through ten, the complaint alleged Burrus had

committed an offense listed in Penal Code § 667.61(c) against more than one victim,

within the meaning of Penal Code § 667.61(a)(c)(e), and that Burrus had kidnaped the

victim, within the meaning of Penal Code § 667.61(b)(c)(e). (Id.) As to count five, the

complaint alleged Burrus had personally used a deadly weapon, a knife, within the

meaning of Penal Code §§ 1192.7(c)(23) and 12022.3(a). Finally, as to counts eleven and

twelve, the complaint alleged Burrus had committed an offense listed in Penal Code §

667.61(c) against more than one victim, within the meaning of Penal Code §

667.61(b)(c)(e). (Id.)

Following a jury trial, Burrus was convicted of counts one, two, four, five, six,

seven, nine, and ten, all charges involving Christina B. The jury also found true the

kidnaping and kidnaping for the purpose of committing a sexual offense allegations,

including those involving Andrea A. (Id. at 0241-62.) Burrus was found not guilty of

the remaining counts and allegations. He was sentenced to 105 years-to-life in prison. 

(Id. at 0174-76.)

Burrus filed a direct appeal of his conviction in the California Court of Appeal,

Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment Nos. 3-5.) The state appellate court

affirmed Burrus’s convictions in an unpublished written opinion. (Lodgment No. 6.) 

Burrus then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which denied the

petition without citation of authority. (Lodgment Nos. 7-8.) 

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On July 31, 2013, Burrus simultaneously filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

in the California Supreme Court and in this Court. (Lodgment No. 9, ECF No. 1.) 

Burrus filed a motion for stay on September 4, 2013, and asked this Court to stay the

petition while he exhausted new claims in state court. (ECF No. 4.) The Court granted

the motion for stay. (ECF No. 6.) 

The California Supreme Court directed the Attorney General to file an informal

response to Burrus’s state court habeas corpus petition on the issue of whether California

Penal Code 667.6(d) is constitutional, and the response was filed on October 25, 2103. 

(Lodgment No. 10.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of habeas

corpus without citation of authority. (Lodgement No. 11.)

Respondent filed an Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of the Answer (Answer) on July 30, 2014 [ECF No. 17]. Burrus did not file a

Traverse.

IV. DISCUSSION

Burrus raises six claims in his Petition.2

 First, Burrus argues the trial court erred

when it admitted evidence of a prior uncharged sexual assault. Second, he claims the 

trial court erred when it denied his severance motion. In claim three, Burrus contends the

trial judge improperly denied the jury’s request for readback of Burrus’s and Cristina’s

testimony. Fourth, Burrus argues the evidence was insufficient to support his

convictions. Fifth, he contends the mandatory consecutive sentencing scheme of

California Penal Code § 667.6(d) was rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court’s

decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). And sixth, he claims his

Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the trial court sentenced him to

consecutive sentences, and thereby increased his sentence, based upon facts not found by

a jury. (Pet. at 6-9, 38-80.) Respondent argues the state courts’ resolution of the claims

2

 As noted by Respondent, the numbering of claims in the Petition differs from the numbering

of claims in the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities. (Answer at 18, fn. 2.) The Court will

address Burrus’s claims in the same order as Respondent.

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was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. (Answer at 18-38.) 

A. Standard of Review

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 

Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim

adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s

habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the

state court’s determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review,

inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th

Cir. 2004).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases,

or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant

relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified

the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied

those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable

application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or

erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly established

federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

75 (2003). 

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Where there is no reasoned decision from the highest state court to which the claim

was presented, the Court “looks through” to the last reasoned state court decision and

presumes it provides the basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst

v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not

“furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent

review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v.

Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538

U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However,

a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus

claim. See Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision

will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal

law, for purposes of § 2254(d), means “the governing principle or principles set forth by

the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S.

at 72.

B. Introduction of Propensity Evidence

In his first claim, Burrus contends the trial court improperly admitted evidence of 

a prior, uncharged sex offense of which Burrus was accused. (Pet. at 6, 51-59.) 

Respondent contends the state court’s resolution of this claim was neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer at 19-

22.)

Burrus raised this claim in the petition for review in his direct appeal to the

California appellate court. (Lodgment No. 7.) The state supreme court denied the

petition without citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 8.) Accordingly, this Court must

“look through” to the state appellate court’s opinion denying the claim as the basis for its

analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. That court wrote:

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1. Additional Facts

Before trial, Burrus moved to exclude evidence pertaining to an uncharged sexual assault against Jessica. As described in Burrus’s motion,

the uncharged assault occurred after midnight on October 7, 2007, when Burrus was stationed on a military base and he and Jessica were together in a friend’s apartment. Jessica had been drinking heavily, recently smoked

marijuana and taken one pill of ecstasy. [FN 6 omitted]. Jessica claimed that after the friend went to bed, Burrus grabbed her, threw her onto a couch

and ordered her to “suck his dick.” When Jessica objected, Burrus told her to “shut up,” choked her and forced her to perform fellatio. In his motion, Burrus did not dispute the potential admissibility of this evidence under

Evidence Code section 1108, but argued the evidence should be excluded

under Evidence Code section 352 because of “the extreme consumption of

time; the severe burden to Mr. Burrus in defending the allegations; and the significant lack of certainty that the incident occurred as alleged.” The trial court denied Burrus’s motion.

At trial, several witnesses testified about Burrus’s alleged assault against Jessica. Jessica herself testified to the events as they were described in Burrus’s motion. On cross-examination, Burrus’s trial counsel

impeached Jessica by getting her to admit several inconsistencies between

her then-present recollection of the uncharged assault and the version she previously had reported to authorities. Other witnesses called by Burrus

testified Jessica had a reputation for dishonesty and adultery. Burrus testified he had an ongoing consensual sexual relationship with Jessica, and she willingly performed fellatio on him at the friend’s apartment on October 7, 2007.

2. Legal Analysis

Generally, evidence of a defendant’s character is not admissible to

prove his conduct on a specific occasion conformed to his character. (Evid. Code, § subd. (a).) An exception to this rule provides: “In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the

defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made

inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant

to [Evidence Code] Section 352.” (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a).) Because evidence a defendant committed prior sex offenses is “particularly

probative” in a sex offense case (People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1293) [FN 7], such propensity evidence is presumably admissible unless, 

[FN 7: Regarding evidence of prior crimes in general, our Supreme Court has observed: “‘[T]he recurrence of a similar

result . . . tends (increasingly with each instance) to negative

accident or inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or other innocent mental state, and tends to establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the presence of the normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act . . . .’” (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402; accord, Alcala v. Superior Court, (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1223-1224 (Alcala). Under this reasoning, Burrus’s prior acts of forcible oral copulation

against Jessica would tend to negate his assertion that a later

victim consented to perform fellatio on him. (Cf. People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 532 (Stitely) [“The chance that

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defendant acted with innocent intent [in committing a sex act

on one victim] is sharply reduced by evidence that he committed a forcible, nonconsensual sex act upon [another

victim] a few months earlier.”].)

under Evidence Code section 352, its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will necessitate undue

consumption of time or create a substantial danger of undue prejudice [FN8 omitted], confusing the issues or misleading the jury. (People v. Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 62 (Loy).)

On appeal, a trial court’s ruling under Evidence Code section 1108 is subject to review for abuse of discretion. (Loy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 61; People v. Dejourney (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1091, 1104.) We will reverse such a ruling only if the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (People v. Nguyen (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1116 (Nguyen).) Here, Burrus contends “the trial court abused its discretion in

allowing [a] mini-trial to unfold, unduly burdening the defense, unduly

consuming time to present the highly suspect and far from credible

propensity evidence, and giving the jury the opportunity to ‘convict’ [him] of this incident on the lesser preponderance of the evidence standard,

causing the jury undue confusion.” We disagree.

The evidence regarding Burrus’s uncharged sexual assault on Jessica was probative of his disposition or propensity to commit sex offenses. 

“Evidence of a prior sexual offense is indisputably relevant in a prosecution for another sexual offense.” (People v. Fitch (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 172, 179; see also People v. Van Winkle (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 133, 141 [evidence of other offense is “extremely relevant, especially with regard to sexual offenses”].) The uncharged assault on Jessica and the assault on

Cristina bore striking similarities: Both incidents occurred late at night after the victim had consumed intoxicants; using the same obscene language,

Burrus ordered the victims to perform fellatio on him; and, when the victims

refused, Burrus became angry and choked them. Thus, the propensity evidence was highly probative because “the uncharged conduct [was]

similar enough to the charged behavior to tend to show the defendant did in

fact commit the charged offense.” (Nguyen, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 1117.) [FN 9 omitted.]

Burrus contends, however, that “the prejudicial effect of the propensity evidence outweighed the probative value, and [the evidence] should not have been admitted.” (See Evid. Code, § 352.) Burrus’s main argument, which is based on his view of the evidence, is that the “degree of certainty” of his commission of the uncharged assault on Jessica was so low that the trial court should not have admitted evidence of that assault. (See People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 917 [listing degree of uncertainty of commission of prior offense as one of many factors to be considered in undue prejudice analysis].) It is true, as Burrus points out in his brief, that Jessica’s credibility was impeached, and her version of the assault was

contradicted by other testimony. But, her testimony, if believed, would constitute evidence of Burrus’s disposition to commit acts of forcible oral

copulation, including those charged in this case. (See id. at p. 915 [evidence defendant committed other sex offenses is circumstantial evidence he

committed charged sex offenses]; fn. 7, ante.) Whether to believe Jessica,

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or instead believe Burrus and the other witnesses who contradicted her, was

for the jury to decide. (See, e.g., Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 403.) We cannot say Jessica’s testimony that Burrus forced her to perform fellatio on him was so equivocal or lacking in certainty that it had little or no probative value, or that its admission unduly prejudiced him.

Burrus also complains the jury was “presented with irrelevant, inflammatory details surrounding the incident,” including Jessica’s adultery and illicit drug use. It was Burrus, however, who brought these details to the jury’s attention through his trial counsel’s cross-examination of Jessica

and direct examination of witnesses he called to impeach her credibility. Because “the testimony about which [Burrus] now complains was elicited by his own counsel[,] any error was invited, and [Burrus] may not challenge that error on appeal.” (People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 620.)

Finally, Burrus contends the propensity evidence likely confused, misled or distracted the jury from its main inquiry of determining his guilt

for the current offenses by “turn[ing the trial] into a mini-trial regarding the incident in Kansas.” We agree with Burrus there was a risk the jury would be tempted to convict him of the current charges to assure he was punished for the prior uncharged offense. (See People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 284; People v. Frazier (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 30, 42.) We conclude, however, that instructions which focused the jury’s attention on the current charges and the limited way in which the jury could consider the evidence of the uncharged assault on Jessica in relation to those charges [FN 10 omitted] effectively “counterbalanced” that risk. (Frazier, at p. 42; see also Miramontes, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1103 [instructing jury on limited purpose of evidence of prior uncharged sex crimes reduced possibility of jury confusion].)

In sum, we hold the probative value of the evidence of the uncharged sexual assault on Jessica was not “substantially outweighed” by the possibility of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the

jury. (Evid. Code §§ 352, 1108, subd. (a).) Thus, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting that evidence. (Loy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at

pp. 61-64; Nguyen, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 1119.)

(Lodgment No. 6 at 15-21.)

As Respondent correctly notes, there is no clearly established Supreme Court law

which holds that propensity evidence is inadmissible or violates due process. Indeed, the

Supreme Court expressly reserved deciding that issue in Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

75 n.5 (1991). See Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2008); Alberni v.

McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 2006). As the Ninth Circuit has noted:

The Supreme Court has made very few rulings regarding the admission of evidence as a violation of due process. Although the Court has been clear that a writ should be issued when constitutional errors have

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, [citation omitted], it has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial 

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evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance

of the writ. Absent such “clearly established Federal law,” we cannot

conclude that the state court’s ruling was an “unreasonable application.”

Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000) and Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006)).

Ninth Circuit precedent “squarely forecloses” the claim that admission of

propensity evidence violates due process. Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir.

2008; see also Greel v. Martel, No. 10-16847, 2012 WL 907215, 472 Fed. Appx. 503,

504 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that “Ninth Circuit precedent ‘squarely forecloses [the]

argument’ that admission of evidence of sexual misconduct to show propensity violates

due process”) (quoting Mejia, 534 F.3d at 1046). 

The state court’s decision also was not based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The state court

correctly noted that there were significant similarities between Burrus’s actions during

the alleged assault on Jessica and the charges involving Andrea A. and Cristina B.,

particularly the words Burrus used, the fact that he assaulted intoxicated victims, and

choked his victims when they resisted. In addition, the state court correctly noted that

while Jessica’s credibility was impeached, the evidence was not so unreliable that it

should have been excluded.

For all the foregoing reasons, the state court’s denial of the claim cannot be said

to be contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court

law, nor was the state court’s decision based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts. See Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76-77; Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2). He is not entitled to relief as to this claim. 

//

//

//

//

//

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C. Denial of Severance

Next, Burrus argues the trial court improperly denied his motion to sever the

charges involving the two victims, Andrea A. and Cristina B.. (Pet. at 7, 59-62.) 

Respondent counters the state court’s resolution of this claim was neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer at 22-

25.)

Burrus raised this claim in the petition for review he filed in the California

Supreme Court on direct appeal. (Lodgment No. 7.) That court denied the petition

without citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 8.) Accordingly, this Court must “look

through” to the state appellate court’s opinion as the basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S.

at 805-06. That court wrote:

1. Additional Facts

Before trial, Burrus moved to sever the charges arising out of the alleged assault on Cristina from those arising out of the alleged assault on Andrea. Burrus advanced four grounds for separate trials on the two sets of charges: (1) the facts underlying the charges were “materially dissimilar”; (2) evidence would not be cross-admissible if the charges were tried separately; (3) the weight of the evidence regarding the charges was “greatly different”; and (4) the punishment for the charges was life in prison.

In his motion, Burrus summarized the facts supporting the two sets of charges. His factual summary pertaining to the assault on Cristina was consistent with the testimony as summarized in part II.A.1.a, ante. Burrus’s

factual summary pertaining to the alleged assault on Andrea was as follows: 

On the evening of December 27, 2008, Andrea, age 19, and two female friends were socializing at the home of a third female friend. Andrea

was drinking alcoholic beverages. At approximately 9:00 p.m., a boyfriend of one of Andrea’s friends arrived at the house with Burrus and another

man. Andrea had never met Burrus or the other man.

A short while after the men arrived, Andrea and two of her friends got into Burrus’s vehicle and accompanied the men to a local liquor store. Andrea went into the store with Burrus, who purchased a bottle of vodka. 

The two returned to the vehicle. 

Burrus then drove the group to a park near the liquor store. he asked Andrea to get out of the vehicle with him so that one of his friends could

have sex with one of her friends. Andrea knew her friend was a prostitute.

Andrea exited the vehicle, and Burrus led her down an embankment. 

When they reached the bottom, Burrus pushed Andrea up against a fence; grabbed her throat; called her a “bitch”; “told her that he was a pimp and that she was going to suck his dick”; and slapped her. When Andrea

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resisted, Burrus grabbed her by her hair, pushed her onto her knees and put his penis in her mouth. He ejaculated in her mouth and forced her to

swallow the semen.

After orally copulating Andrea, Burrus telephoned his friend and invited him to come down the embankment so that Andrea could perform fellatio on him. When the friend arrived, Andrea orally copulated him. When Andrea finished, Burrus told her “she performed [fellatio] so well that he was going to take her with him to Reno the following day, and that she was his bitch.” Burrus and Andrea exchanged telephone numbers, and he drove her back to her friend’s house.

Andrea notified the police the following day. The police did not contact Burrus, however, until he was arrested after the sexual assault on

Cristina.

. . . .

At the hearing on the motion [to sever], the trial court noted the legislative preference for joint trials and Burrus’s burden to demonstrate a

substantial danger of undue prejudice to overcome that preference. In

assessing prejudice, the court stated that highly inflammatory offenses were not joined with noninflammatory offenses; the offenses involved similar

conduct; the evidence supporting the offense was very similar in weight;

and the evidence was most likely cross-admissible. The trial court therefore

denied Burrus’s motion for severance.

2. Legal Analysis

In reviewing a challenge to a denial of a motion to sever charges for trial, we begin with the premise that “[t]he law prefers consolidation of charges.” (People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 423; accord People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 349-350; Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1220.) We review the trial court’s denial of a defendant’s severance motion

for abuse of discretion (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 924 (Stanley)), which occurs only if the trial court’s ruling falls outside the bounds of reason (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 774 (Soper)). We consider the record before the trial court when it ruled on the motion. 

(Alcala, at p. 1220.) As we shall explain, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Burrus’s severance motion.

a. Joinder Was Permissible

The People were entitled to join the charges arising out of Burrus’s alleged assault on Andrea with those arising out of his assault on Cristina. If offenses are “of the same class of crimes,” the People may charge them in the same accusatory pleading. (§ 954.) Here, both sets of charges included a common offense, forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)); counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10 alleged Burrus committed that offense against Cristina; and counts 11 and 12 alleged he committed it against Andrea. Hence, these charges were subject to joinder because they involved offenses “of the same class of crimes.” (§ 954; see Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 771 [charges of same crime against two victims were of same class]; People v. Poon (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 55, 69 (Poon) [sex offenses against two victims were properly joined].)

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b. Severance Was Not Required

Although the statutory requirements for joinder were met, the trial court had discretion to order severance of the charged offenses “in the interests of justice and for good cause shown.” (§ 954.) “The burden is on the party seeking severance to clearly establish that there is a substantial

danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried.” (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 938; see also Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 934 [“defendant can only predicate error in the denial of severance on a

clear showing of potential prejudice”].) This is a heavy burden, for the

benefits to the state in conserving judicial resources and public funds “often

weigh strongly against severance of properly joined charges,” and also give the trial court broader discretion in ruling on a severance motion that it has in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 774, 775, fn. 7.) Thus, where, as here, charges meet the requirements for joinder, the burden of showing prejudice from denial of a severance motion

“‘is so great that the courts almost invariably reject the claim of abuse of discretion.’” (People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 39; accord, Poon, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at p. 69.) Burrus has not met his burden here.

Burrus argues the joint trial prejudiced him because the evidence

underlying the charges involving Cristina and the evidence underlying the charges involving Andrea would not have been cross-admissible in separate trials. According to Burrus: (1) the incidents involving Cristina and Andrea

were so dissimilar that evidence of one incident would not have been

admissible in a trial concerning the other if separate trials had been ordered;

(2) the charges involving Andrea were likely to inflame the jury; and (3) because both cases were weak, especially the case involving Andrea, the “spillover effect” of the aggregate evidence most likely resulted in the convictions of the charges involving Cristina. We reject these arguments.

First, contrary to Burrus’s contentions, the incidents involving Cristina and Andrea were not so dissimilar that evidence concerning one

incident would have to be excluded in a trial concerning the other. As we explained earlier (see pt. II.B.2., ante), in a trial of sex offenses, evidence that a defendant committed other sex offenses is presumptively admissible. (Evid. Code § 1108, subd. (a); Loy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 62.) Here, both sets of charges included forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd.(c)(2)), one of the sex offenses enumerated in Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision

(d)(1)(A). As long as sex offenses committed on separate occasions are enumerated in that section, as they are here, the offenses are considered

sufficiently similar for purposes of admissibility under Evidence Code

section 1108. (Miramontes, supra, 189 Cal.App. 4th at p. 1099.)

Second, the similarity between the incidents involving Cristina and Andrea was so great that it removed any likelihood that either incident would unduly inflame the jury against Burrus. In both incidents: (1) the

victims were young women who had been drinking; (2) Burrus was a stranger to both victims; (3) he transported the victims to secluded locations; (4) he called the victims “bitch”; (4) using the same obscene language, he ordered the victims to perform fellatio on him; (6) when the victims resisted, Burrus slapped them and grabbed their throats; and (7) he forced the victims to orally copulate him and swallow his semen. Contrary to Burrus’s assertions, then, the two sets of charges were “similar in nature and equally egregious — hence neither, when compared to the other, was likely to

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inflame a jury against defendant.” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 780; see also Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1227 [one set of offenses was not

unusually likely to inflame the jury against defendant when both sets were

similar in nature and equally gruesome].)

Third, the purported weakness of the evidence supporting the two cases, especially that involving Andrea, did not, as Burrus erroneously contends, “result[] in a prejudicial spillover effect.” “As an initial matter,

based upon the information before the trial court at the time it ruled on the

severance motion, it was not clear that the evidence supporting [one set of charges] was significantly weaker than that underlying [the other set].” 

(Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 780.) The information before the trial court

consisted of Cristina’s and Andrea’s preliminary hearing testimony, as summarized in Burrus’s motion and in the People’s opposition. That testimony, if repeated at trial and believed by the jury, would have been sufficient to support convictions of the charged offenses. (See Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 326 [“In California conviction of a sex crime may be sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix.”].) “In any event, as between any two charges, it always is possible to point to individual aspects of one case and argue that one is stronger than the other. A mere imbalance in the evidence, however, will not indicate a risk of

prejudicial ‘spillover effect,’ militating against the benefits of joinder and

warranting severance of properly joined charges.” (Soper, at 781.)

In sum, we hold Burrus has not sustained his burden to “show that a

substantial danger of prejudice compelled severance.” (Stitely, supra, 35

Cal.4th at p. 531.) Accordingly, he has not shown the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his motion to sever counts for trial. (Soper, supra, 45

Cal.4th at p. 774.)

Our conclusion Burrus has not shown error in the trial court’s denial

of his severance motion does not end our inquiry, however. Our Supreme

Court has “held that even if a trial court’s ruling on a motion to sever is

correct at the time it was made, a reviewing court still must determine whether, in the end, the joinder of counts or defendants for trial resulted in

gross unfairness depriving the defendant of due process of law.” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 851.) We hold there was no such deprivation here, for several reasons: (1) the evidence of each offense was “‘“simple and distinct”’”; (2) there was not “great disparity in the nature of the two charges — the facts pertaining to each crime, compared to the other[s], were not likely to unduly inflame the jury”; (3) the evidence underlying the two sets of charges did not differ significantly in strength; (4) the trial court instructed the jury that each count charged was separate crime the jury had to consider separately and for which it had to return a separate verdict (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 784; see CALCRIM No. 3515); and (5) the jury found Burrus guilty of some charges, not guilty of others, and

was unable to reach verdicts on others, indicated “‘that the jury was capable of differentiating [among his] various [crimes]’” and that “‘no improper spillover effect is evident here.’” (Soper, at p. 784.)

(Lodgment No. 6 at 22-29.)

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“The Supreme Court has never held that a trial court’s failure to provide separate

trials on different charges implicates a defendant’s right to due process.” Collins v.

Uribe, No. 11-56297, 564 Fed. Appx. 343 (9th Cir. 2014) citing Collins v. Runnels, 603

F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Martinez v. Yates, No. 13-16154, 2014 WL

5293673 (9th Cir., Oct. 17, 2014); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 774 (9th Cir.

2012). “Because [there is] no clear answer to the question presented, . . . ‘it cannot be

said that a state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.’” Wright v.

Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008) (quoting Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77).

In any event, even if Burrus had identified clearly established federal law

permitting him to exert a due process right, it was not violated here because his trial was

not fundamentally unfair. Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the

question, the Ninth Circuit has stated that ‘[f]ederal habeas is available for improper

consolidation only if the simultaneous trial ‘actually render[ed the] state trial

fundamentally unfair and hence, violative of due process.” Park v. California, 202 F.3d

1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1503 (9th

Cir.1991). California Penal Code section 954 states “[a]n accusatory pleading may

charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, or . . . two

or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts

. . . .” (Cal. Penal Code § 954.) Joinder of counts is favored because it promotes

efficiency. People v. Myles, 53 Cal. 4th 1181, 1200 (2012). Burrus was charged with

forcible oral copulation against both Andrea and Cristina, and thus, as the state court

found, joinder of the two crimes was proper under § 954. 

Further, although under California law, a trial court “may in its discretion order

that the different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried

separately,” Cal. Penal Code § 954, the first consideration in whether to grant severance

is whether the evidence would have been cross-admissible in separate trials. People v.

Soper, 45 Cal. 4th 759, 774-75 (2009). “If the evidence underlying the charges in

question would be cross-admissible, that factor alone is normally sufficient to dispel any

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suggestion of prejudice and to justify a trial court’s refusal to sever properly joined

charges.” Id. at 775. In Burrus’s case, the evidence was clearly cross-admissible

pursuant to California Evidence Code section 1108(a), which provides:

(a) In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual

offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of another sexual offense

or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352. . . . .

(d) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply:

(1) “Sexual offense” means a crime under the law of a state or of the United States that involved any of the following:

(A) Any conduct proscribed by Section 243.4, 261, 261.5, 262, 264.1, 266c, 269, 286,

288, 288a [forcible oral copulation], 288.2, 288.5,

or 289, or subdivision (b), (c), or (d) of Section

311.2 or Section 311.3, 311.4, 311.10, 311.11,

314, or 647.6, of the Penal Code.

(Cal. Evid. Code § 1108) (West 2009). 

Further, the state court’s decision was not based on a unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The state court

thoroughly and accurately discussed why severance was not required to protect Burrus’s

rights, including that the incidents were similar, neither incident was so egregious that it

would be likely to inflame the jury against him, and neither case was significantly weaker

than the other such that a “spillover effect” would occur, prompting the jury to convict

him of the charges in the weaker case based on the strength of the evidence of the

stronger case. Indeed, as the California court noted, the jury acquitted Burrus of the

charges involving Andrea and was unable to reach verdicts on others. (Lodgment No.

1 at 0240-62.)

For all the foregoing reasons, the state court’s denial of this claim was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Burrus is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

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D. Refusal to Read Back Testimony to the Jury

Burrus contends the trial judge improperly denied the jury’s request for readback

of Burrus’s and Cristina’s testimony, which violated his federal due process rights to a

fair trial. (Pet. at 62-68.) Respondent contends Burrus has not stated a federal claim,

and, in the alternative, no due process violation occurred because the jury, which was

reconstituted after two alternates were seated, did not ask for a readback of testimony

after they began deliberations anew. (Answer at 20-22.)

Burrus raised this claim in the petition for review he filed in the California

Supreme Court on direct appeal. (Lodgment No. 7.) That court denied the petition

without citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 8.) Accordingly, this Court must “look

through” to the state appellate court’s opinion as the basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S.

at 805-06. That court wrote:

1. Additional Facts

During deliberations, a juror sent a note to the trial court requesting a readback of the testimony of Cristina and Burrus. The following day, the court replaced two jurors with alternates. After the replacement, the court advised the jury:

“[W]e had some issues, including we’re going to have to

substitute in a couple people for personal reasons. And, so,

I’m going to . . . reread you an instruction, and you’re going to go back in and deliberate. Before we do that, if you want readback, that’s fine. But readback, you read both direct and cross, redirect, recross. And it can take — take some

time . . . . It may take a day or so. But it’s up to you. I’m not discouraging you, I’m just making you aware of that fact . . . .

“I just want to be very clear . . . . You’re going to start your deliberations from the beginning. I’m going to disregard those other notes about readback . . . . Until you tell me you need

them, I’m not going to act on them, because you’re starting from scratch. So until you tell me you need them. But just understand this is not Monday Night Football. There is no instant replay. [The court reporter] will go in and read to you, but it takes time. And, again, if you want it, it’s there. I’m not discouraging it, but I just want to let you know that it does take some time. So, again, start anew.” (Italics added.)

After beginning deliberations anew, the jury did not request readback of either Burrus’s or Cristina’s testimony.

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2. Legal Analysis

The trial court did not err by refusing to read back certain trial testimony to the jury. If a jury desires to rehear certain testimony after it has begun deliberations, the testimony must be read back upon request. (§ 1138; People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 506 (Hillhouse).) Although section 1138 is primarily concerned with a jury’s right to

information needed to reach a verdict, it also implicates a defendant’s right to a fair trial. (People v. Soloman (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 824; People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 288.) A trial court does not violate a defendant’s rights under section 2238 when, in response to a jury request for a readback of testimony, the court advises the jury that testimony may take a long time to read, provided the court also advises the jury that the

testimony will be read back if requested. (People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189, 202-203 (Anjell), disapproved on unrelated grounds by

People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 943, fn. 13.) That is all that happened here.

When the court received the note requesting a readback of Cristina’s and Burrus’s testimony, it advised the jury that the readback “may take a day or so”; but the court also stated that it was “not discouraging” a readback and that testimony would be read upon request. After the jury was reconstituted and restarted deliberations, however, it did not request a readback of the testimony. Hence, because “the court made clear it would

provide any requested rereading of material testimony,” its comments about the amount of time it might take to read the requested testimony did not amount to impermissible jury coercion or otherwise violate “defendant’s

right to have the jury provide a rereading of testimony on request.” (Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 506, 507, citing Anjell, supra, 100

Cal.App.3d at pp.202-203.) [FN 11 omitted.]

(Lodgment No. 6 at 29-31.)

Burrus has not cited, and the Court has been unable to locate, any clearly

established Supreme Court law holding that a failure to read back testimony to a jury

upon request violates the federal constitution. That alone dooms Burrus’s claim under

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has

stated that “a trial court has wide latitude in deciding whether to have testimony requested

by the jury read back.” Riley v. Deeds, 56 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 1995).

To the extent Petitioner contends the state court’s decision involved an

unreasonable determination of the facts, the record does not reflect the trial judge refused

to read back testimony. The readback request was made by the jury before two alternate

jurors were substituted in. Due to the alternates joining the jury, the jury was required

to begin deliberations from the beginning. Readback of testimony would not have made

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sense to the newly constituted jury, since neither the new additions nor the existing jurors

had discussed the evidence with their fellow jurors yet. And, the trial judge was quite

clear that if the newly constituted jury wanted readback of any testimony once they had

the chance to consider the evidence from the beginning, he would gladly accommodate

that request. There was no error.

For the foregoing reasons, the state appellate court’s denial of this claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

law, nor did it involve an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1), (2). Burrus is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

E. Sufficiency of Evidence

Burrus argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him. (Pet. at 9, 68-75.) 

Burrus raised this claim in the petition for review he filed in California Supreme Court

in his direct appeal. (Lodgment No. 7.) That court denied the petition without citation

of authority. (Lodgment No. 8.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the state

appellate court’s opinion as the basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. That

court wrote:

2. Legal Analysis

In deciding Burrus’s claim of insufficient evidence, we examine the

record as a whole to determine whether it contains evidence that is

reasonable, credible and of solid value from which a rational jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1028; People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303 (Barnes). We defer to the jury’s determinations of credibility and the truth or falsity of the facts on which those determinations depend, and we presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury reasonably could deduce from the evidence. (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739; People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) Viewing the record in this light, we ask whether “any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

(Jackson v. Virginia, (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.)

Applying these standards, we shall analyze separately the evidence supporting the two rape convictions and the evidence supporting the five

forcible oral copulation convictions. [FN 5]. We shall then address Burrus’s arguments for reversal.

[FN 5: Burrus does not expressly challenge his conviction on count 1 of kidnaping to commit rape or forcible oral copulation (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)) or separately discuss the evidence as it

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pertains to that conviction. We therefore deem Burrus to have

forfeited any claim of error regarding the count 1 conviction and do not separately discuss the elements of the crime or the

evidence supporting the conviction. (See, e.g., Moore v. Shaw

(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 182, 200, fn. 10; People v. Baniqued (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 13, 29.)] 

a. Evidence to Support Rape Convictions (Counts 6 & 9)

To find Burrus guilty of rape, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had “sexual intercourse” with Cristina against her will “by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and

unlawful bodily injury.” (§ 261, subd. (b)(2).) For example, Cristina testified: (1) she was not attracted to Burrus; (2) she got into his SUV

expecting to be driven home; (3) Burrus beat her and threatened to take her

to Mexico to sell her; (4) Cristina told Burrus she feared he would kill her

and dump her body on the road; and (5) she refused his demands that she

disrobe so they could have intercourse at the motel. (See People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 611 (Hart) [sexual assault victim’s “own testimony, which provided graphic detail of the attack, would have been sufficient by itself”].) In addition, the nurse who performed the sexual assault examination found multiple injuries on Cristina’s body, including the vulva,

vagina and perineum, which were consistent with a sexual assault. On these

facts, a reasonable jury could have found Cristina’s acts of sexual

intercourse with Burrus were “induced by either force, fear, or both, and, in any case, fell short of a consensual act.” (Barnes, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 305; see, e.g., People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403 (Maury) [inference victim did not consent to sexual intercourse arose from her

testimony she feared for her life, defendant refused to take her home, and

she disrobed only after defendant ordered her to do so]; People v. Knox (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 197, 204 [force or fear of bodily injury element of rape was established by evidence defendant accosted victims in remote areas

late at night, beat them and drove them away in his vehicle]; People v. Ogden (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 447, 454 [“battered and bruised condition of

[rape victim’s] body” constituted evidence of force].) Sufficient evidence

therefore supports the two rape convictions.

b. Evidence To Support Forcible Oral Copulation Convictions (Counts 2, 4, 5, 7 & 10)

To find Burrus guilty of forcible oral copulation, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he inserted his penis into Cristina’s mouth against her will “by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of

immediate and unlawful bodily injury.” (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2).) “Any penetration of the mouth, no matter how slight, constitutes a violation of this

section.” (People v. Hickok (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 621, 628.)

There was ample evidence to support the convictions of forcible oral

copulation. Burrus admitted one act of fellatio occurred when he pulled off the freeway on the way to the motel. Cristina testified Burrus inserted his

penis into her mouth on at least five separate occasions: once on a side street in Pacific Beach (count 2); twice on the freeway on the way to the motel, before and after he strangled her (counts 4 & 5); and twice at the motel, after

each of the two acts of sexual intercourse (counts 7 & 10). Cristina’s

additional testimony that she feared for her life; that Burrus duped her into

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entering his SUV, drove to various locations, beat her, strangled her, threatened to sell her in Mexico and repeatedly grabbed her head to push his penis into her mouth; and that she tried to hurt Burrus by squeezing his penis, showed that Burrus orally copulated Cristina against her will “by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful

bodily injury.” (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2); see, e.g., People v. Minor (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 194, 197 [“The offense is complete when, as occurred here according to the testimony of the victim, the mouth is forcibly placed upon

the genital organ of another.”]; People v. King (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 696, 701-702 [misleading victim as to defendant’s intent, taking victim to a

secluded area, order victim to perform oral copulation, and threatening victim that she was “‘going to go through it again’” established forcible

compulsion element of the offense]; People v. Campbell (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 678, 684 [defendant’s threatening victim with bodily injury and choking victim establishe d forcible compulsion

element of offense].) Sufficient evidence therefore supports Burrus’s convictions of five counts of forcible oral copulation.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 10-14.)

 In assessing a sufficiency of the evidence claim on federal habeas review, the

Supreme Court has stated that “‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Juan H. v.

Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005), quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. In

determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented, the Court must accept the

elements of the crime as defined by state law. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324, n. 16. 

As both the state appellate court and Respondent note, there was sufficient

evidence presented at trial to convict Burrus. Burrus was convicted of five counts of

forcible oral copulation. (Lodgment No. 1 at 0240-62.) To be convicted of forcible oral

copulation, the prosecution had to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Burrus

inserted his penis into Cristina’s mouth without her consent and by force, fear or threats. 

(Lodgment No. 1 at 0115-16; CALCRIM No. 1015.) To be convicted of forcible rape,

the prosecution had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Burrus had sexual

intercourse with Cristina, i.e. penetrated her vagina with his penis, without her consent

by force, fear or threats. (Id. at 0117; CALCRIM No. 1000.) 

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Cristina testified she got into Burrus’s car with the understanding he was going to

drive her and her bike back to her house. Instead, Burrus drove her away from her house,

which frightened her. (Lodgment No. 2, vo1. 13 at 2270.) When she asked where he was

going, Burrus told her to shut up. (Id.) He then pulled over to the side of the road and

said, “Bitch, suck my dick.” (Id.) She refused, and testified that she did not want to suck

his penis. (Id. at 2271.) Burrus then hit her, grabbed her head, and forced his penis into

her mouth. (Id. at 2272.) This is sufficient evidence to convict Burrus of

count two (forcible oral copulation, to wit: first occasion – Pacific Beach). (Lodgment

No. 1 at 0242.)3

Burrus continued to hit her. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 13 at 2273.) At this point,

Cristina was very scared because she didn’t know Burrus and did not know what he was

capable of doing. (Id. at 2275.) Burrus then began driving again and got on the freeway. 

(Id. at 2277.) At some point, Burrus pulled over to the side of the freeway and told

Cristina to get on top of him. (Id.) When Cristina refused, Burrus began hitting her again

and then began to strangle her. (Id. at 2277-78.) Burrus also threatened to sell her in

Mexico, pulled out a knife and held it to her throat. (Id. at 2279.) Burrus then told

Cristina he knew how to strangle people without leaving a mark. (Id.) Cristina was

scared for her life and thought Burrus was going to kill her. (Id. at 2280-81.) After

3

 The state appellate court did not address Burrus’s conviction for kidnaping for the purpose of

committing rape or forcible oral copulation because it concluded Burrus had not expressly challenged

that conviction and thus had “forfeited any claim of error” regarding that conviction. (Lodgment No.

6 at 11, fn. 5.) Burrus also did not challenge that count in the petition for review. It is clear, however,

that were Burrus to present the claim to the California Supreme Court in a habeas corpus petition, the

state court would reject it as untimely. See In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 814-15. In cases like these,

the Ninth Circuit has held such claims are “technically exhausted,” but procedurally defaulted if the

procedural rule that would be imposed is independent and adequate. Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322,

327 (9th Cir. 2011). The United States Supreme Court found California’s timeliness rule independent

and adequate in Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1128 (2011). The claim is without

merit, however, even under de novo review. Kidnaping for the purpose of rape or oral copulation

requires the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Burrus intended to commit rape or

oral copulation when he took or detained Cristina by using force or fear. (See Lodgment No. 1 at 1003-

14; CALCRIM No. 1203.) Burrus induced Cristina to get into his car by telling her he would take her

home, then drove away from her house, parked in a secluded location, told her to “suck his dick,” and

when she refused, beat her. (Lodgment No. 2, vol .13 at 2272-74.) That is sufficient evidence to

support his conviction for kidnaping for the purpose of rape or forcible oral copulation. See Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275.

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Burrus strangled her, he forced his penis into her mouth again, and Cristina tried to hurt

him by squeezing his penis. (Id. at 2282-84.) Burrus became angry and continued to tell

Cristina to “suck his dick.” (Id. at 2283-84.) He then forced her face and mouth onto his

penis. (Id. at 2284.) This is sufficient evidence to convict Burrus of counts four (forcible

oral copulation, to wit: first occasion – freeway) and five (forcible oral copulation, to wit:

second occasion – freeway). (Lodgment No. 1 at 246-48.)

Burrus then drove Cristina to a motel. (Id. at 2286-88.) Once inside the room,

Burrus ordered Cristina to take her clothes off, and when she refused, he threatened to

sell her in Mexico again. (Id. at 2293.) When Cristina took too long taking her clothes

off, Burrus began ripping them off. (Id. at 2294.) Burrus then had sexual intercourse

with Cristina without her consent. (Id. at 2294.) At some point, Burrus took his penis

out of Cristina’s vagina and told her to orally copulate him. (Id. at 2295.) This is

sufficient evidence to support Burrus’s convictions for counts six (forcible rape, to wit:

first occasion – Econo Lodge) and seven (forcible oral copulation, to wit: first occasion

– Econo Lodge).

Burrus then told Cristina to get into the shower in an apparent attempt to remove

evidence of the sexual assaults from her body. (Id. at 2298.) When she got out of the

shower and began putting her clothes back on, Burrus told her he was “not done yet,” and

told her to take her clothes off again. (Id. at 2300.) Burrus then had sexual intercourse

with Cristina again without her consent. (Id. at 2301-02, 2305.) He then forced Cristina

to orally copulate him again. (Id. at 2302.) This is sufficient evidence to support

Burrus’s convictions for counts nine (forcible rape, to wit: second occasion, Econo

Lodge) and ten (forcible oral copulation, to wit: second occasion, Econo Lodge). There

is no merit to Burrus’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the

crimes against Cristina, and thus the state court’s resolution of this claim is neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. He is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

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 F. Burrus’ Sentence and the Constitutionality of Penal Code § 667.6(d)

Finally, in claims five and six, Burrus contends his sentence violates the Federal

Constitution because it increases the punishment for his crimes based on facts found by

a judge and not a jury, in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 

Specifically, Burrus argues the recent Supreme Court case of Alleyne v. United States, __

U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), invalidated California’s mandatory consecutive

sentencing scheme under which Burrus was sentenced (Penal Code § 667.6(d)), and that

Burrus’s sentence violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because it was based

on facts found by a judge and not by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. (Pet. at 38-51.) 

Respondent counters that Alleyne did not render Penal Code § 667.6(d) unconstitutional

because consecutive sentencing is governed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Oregon

v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009). (Answer at 33-37.)

Burrus raised these claims in the habeas corpus petition he filed in the California

Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 9.) That court denied the petition without citation of

authority. (Lodgment No. 11.) Accordingly, because it was not presented to any other

state court, this Court must conduct and independent review of the record to determine

whether the state court’s denial was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

Penal Code section 667.61(c) provides that a defendant convicted of rape or

forcible oral copulation who kidnaped the victim is subject to a term of imprisonment of

fifteen years-to-life. Cal. Penal Code § 667.61(b), (c)(1), (c)(7), (e)(1). Penal Code

section 667.6 provides for mandatory consecutive sentencing for those crimes under

certain circumstances:

A full, separate, and consecutive term shall be imposed for each violation of [rape and/or forcible oral copulation] if the crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions.

In determining whether crimes against a single victim were committed on separate occasions under this subdivision, the court shall

consider whether, between the commission of one sex crime and another,

the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to reflect upon his or her actions and nevertheless resumed sexually assaultive behavior. Neither the duration

of time between crimes, nor whether or not the defendant lost or abandoned

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his or her opportunity to attack, shall be, in and of itself, determinative on

the issue of whether the crimes in question occurred on separate occasions.

Cal. Penal Code § 667.6(d).

In Burrus’s case, the judge concluded that each crime against Cristina was a

separate occasion, and sentenced Burrus to a term of fifteen years-to-life on each count,

with counts four, five, six, seven, nine and ten to be served consecutively to count two;

his sentence on count one was stayed pursuant to Penal Code § 654.4

 (Lodgment No. 1

at 0174-76.) 

Citing Alleyne and Apprendi, Burrus argues his sentence violates his Sixth

Amendment rights because by sentencing him to consecutive terms, the judge increased

the “sentencing floor” for his crimes based on facts (that the crimes were committed on

separate occasions) that were not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. But

Alleyne addressed a situation different from Burrus’s. In Alleyne, the defendant was

subject to three possible mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment, five, seven or ten

years, for a using or carrying a firearm during the commission of a crime. Five years was

the presumptive floor, while a defendant found to have brandished the firearm faced a

mandatory minimum of seven years, and a defendant found to have discharged the

firearm faced a mandatory minimum of ten years. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155-56. The

judge sentenced Alleyne to seven years, finding he had brandished the firearm. The

Supreme Court reversed, concluding Alleyne’s sentence had been increased over the

statutory minimum of five years using facts found by a judge (that the firearm was

4

 Penal Code § 654 states: 

a) An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions

of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term

of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than

one provision. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution

for the same act or omission under any other.

(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), a defendant sentenced pursuant to

subdivision (a) shall not be granted probation if any of the provisions that would

otherwise apply to the defendant prohibits the granting of probation.

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discharged) and not by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in violation of the Sixth

Amendment. Id. at 2158. 

By contrast, in Ice, the defendant sought to invalidate a sentence similar to the one

in Burrus’s case. Ice was sentenced to consecutive sentences after the sentencing judge

found, pursuant to Oregon law, that the two burglaries of which Ice was convicted were

“separate incidents,” and that each sexual offense Ice committed indicated a “‘willingness

to commit more than one . . . offense’ during each criminal episode, and his conduct

‘caused or created a risk of causing greater, qualitatively different loss, injury or harm to

the victim.’” Ice, 555 U.S. at 165-66. Upholding the sentence, the Supreme Court noted

that historically, “the jury played no role in the decision to impose sentences

consecutively or concurrently. Rather, the choice rested exclusively with the judge.” Ice,

555 U.S. at 168. The Court concluded that sentencing a defendant to consecutive rather

than concurrent sentences based on judge-found facts did not offend the Sixth

Amendment. Id. at 171-72.

Ice, and not Alleyne, controls Burrus’s case. The prescribed sentencing range for

Burrus’s offenses was fifteen years-to-life. Penal Code §§ 667.61(b), (c)(1), (c)(7),

(e)(1). Burrus received a sentence of fifteen years-to-life on for each of his crimes, and

thus, unlike the defendant in Alleyne, he was not subject to an increased base penalty

based on facts not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision to run those

terms consecutively did increase the total amount of prison time he faced. But, as Ice

instructs, the judge’s decision to run the terms consecutively, even if based on “judgefound facts,” does not offend the Sixth Amendment. Ice, 555 U.S. at 171-72.

It was reasonable, and indeed in this Court’s view correct, to apply the Supreme

Court’s holding in Ice to Burrus’s claim and deny it. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.

__, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (stating that “a state court’s determination that a claim

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’

on the correctness of the court’s decision”). Alleyne does not invalidate or render

unconstitutional the sentencing scheme of Penal Code § 667.6 because, as discussed in

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Ice, the decision whether to run sentences consecutively rests with the sentencing judge,

even if the decision is made based upon “judge-found facts.” Accordingly, Burrus is not

entitled to relief as to this claim and it should be denied.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District

Judge Larry Alan Burns under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(d)(4) of

the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an order: (1)

approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that

Judgment be entered DENYING Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 19, 2014, any party to this action

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than January 16, 2015. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 19, 2014

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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