Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-05420/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-05420-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 On February 20, 2008, Evans attempted to file a second amended complaint, changing his § 1983

claim to a claim under the California Tort Claims Act. As explained by the court in its September

11, 2008 order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff cannot amend his

complaint after an answer has been filed without leave of court. The County had filed an answer to

plaintiff's complaint on July 3, 2006. Evans did not seek leave of court to file a second amended

complaint. Moreover, if leave were granted, there would no longer be any basis for federal

jurisdiction. Therefore, the relevant complaint remains the first amended complaint filed on August

5, 2004.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

No. C-03-05420 RMW

CCL

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

E-FILED on 1/5/10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JAMAR JAMES EVANS,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNKNOWN NAMES OF DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS OFFICERS and SANTA

CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

Defendants.

No. C-03-05420 RMW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Re Docket No. 136]

On August 5, 2004, plaintiff Jamar James Evans ("Evans"), pro se in this matter, filed an

amended complaint against defendant Santa Clara County Department of Corrections ("the

County"), seeking damages and other relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his

constitutional rights.1

 The County moves for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the

court grants the motion. 

Case 5:03-cv-05420-RMW Document 176 Filed 01/05/10 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

No. C-03-05420 RMW

CCL 2

I. BACKGROUND

In his amended complaint, Evans alleges that he was assaulted by five or six correctional

officers when he was housed at the Santa Clara County Main Jail. He alleges these officers beat him

unnecessarily during a booking, then stripped him and chained him for a prolonged period of time. 

Evans alleges that these officers used excessive force on him and thereby violated his civil rights.

On February 5, 2008, the County filed a motion for summary judgment. Evans did not file a

written opposition to this motion, nor did he appear at the hearing held on March 14, 2008. On

September 11, 2008, the court granted the County's motion for summary judgment and entered

judgment in favor of the County and against Evans. On September 25, 2008 and on May 18, 2009,

Evans moved for relief from the court's order granting summary judgment and judgment thereon. 

The court granted his second motion for relief from judgment based on Evans' declaration that he

never received the motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to the court's order granting relief from

judgment, opposition and reply briefs have been filed responding to the County's motion for

summary judgment. 

II. ANALYSIS

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of

demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). "When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need

only point out 'that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.'"

Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). Once

the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or

denials but must present evidence sufficient to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.

Plaintiff has the burden of proof at trial. To prove liability for his § 1983 claim, plaintiff

must show either: (1) through an affirmative act, the County violated his rights or directed its

employees to do so, or (2) through its omissions, the County is responsible for a constitutional

violation committed by its employees. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185-86 (9th

Case 5:03-cv-05420-RMW Document 176 Filed 01/05/10 Page 2 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

No. C-03-05420 RMW

CCL 3

Cir. 2002). If liability is based on the County acting affirmatively to violate his constitutional rights

("Monell Liability"), plaintiff must show that the unconstitutional act "implements or executes a

policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that

body's officers" or was "pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not

received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels." Monell v. Dept. of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). If, instead, liability is based on the County's

omissions ("Canton Liability"), plaintiff must show: (1) a County employee violated his

constitutional rights, (2) the County has customs or policies that amount to deliberate indifference,

and (3) these policies were the moving force behind the County employee's violation of plaintiff's

constitutional rights. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1194; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89

(1989).

A. Monell Liability

Plaintiff contends that County employees engaged in the excessive use of force in violation

of the Eighth Amendment. Assuming this to be true, plaintiff still must show that their use of

excessive force was in accordance with either official policy or governmental custom in order to

prove Monell liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. 

Plaintiff's allegation that excessive force was used pursuant to policy or custom appears to be

based on his belief that the County failed to take corrective action against Department of Correction

officers after having been notified of their unconstitutional behavior. He contends that this alleged

failure to take corrective action shows the existence of a policy or custom of condoning

unconstitutional behavior. The only evidence plaintiff presents to support his claim that the County

failed to take corrective action is a letter from the Santa Clara County Department of Correction. 

Plaintiff appears to have misinterpreted the statement in the letter that "disclosure of the details

concerning the corrective action taken against Department of Correction Officers is prohibited" to

mean that the taking of corrective action itself is prohibited. Attach. No. 2 to Aff. in support of Pl.'s

Opp'n ("DOC Letter"); see Pl.'s Opp'n at 10. However, the letter unambiguously states that his

complaint regarding his treatment has been reviewed, investigated, and addressed at the supervisory

level. DOC Letter. Nothing in the letter suggests that the Department of Correction failed to take

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

No. C-03-05420 RMW

CCL 4

appropriate corrective action. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to present a genuine issue of material

fact regarding the existence of a County policy or custom condoning unconstitutional behavior and

thus cannot prevail on a theory of Monell liability. 

B. Canton Liability

Assuming as true plaintiff's contention that County employees violated his constitutional

rights, plaintiff must still establish both: (1) the County has customs or policies that amount to

deliberate indifference, and (2) these policies were the moving force behind the County employee's

violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights, in order to prove Canton liability. Gibson, 290 F.3d at

1194. To establish deliberate indifference, plaintiff must show that the County was on actual or

constructive notice that its omission would likely result in a constitutional violation. Id. at 1186. To

prove that the policies were the moving force behind the County employee's violation of plaintiff's

constitutional rights, plaintiff must show that the County could have prevented the constitutional

violation with an appropriate policy. Id. at 1194. 

Plaintiff makes three arguments for finding deliberate indifference. First, he contends that

because County officers violated clearly established law by using excessive force against him for no

reason, the County must have had policies or customs that amounted to deliberate indifference. 

However, a single incident of unconstitutional activity is insufficient to prove the existence of policy

or custom. Meehan v. County of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1988). Second, plaintiff

points to the County's alleged failure to take corrective action after having been put on notice of a

constitutional violation as evidence of deliberate indifference. As discussed above, plaintiff failed to

present any evidence showing that the County failed to take appropriate corrective action. Third,

plaintiff argues that the County had a custom of deliberate indifference because Officer Souza, the

alleged main tortfeasor, was the supervisor of all the Department of Corrections officers who

participated in the alleged use of excessive force and had ordered the officers to use excessive force. 

The mere fact that Officer Souza held a position of supervisory authority and allegedly abused that

position in violating plaintiff's constitutional rights does not show that the County was on actual or

constructive notice that a constitutional violation would likely occur. The County cannot be held

liable under § 1983 merely for having hired an employee who acted unconstitutionally. Meehan,

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

No. C-03-05420 RMW

CCL 5

856 F.2d at 106-07. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to present a genuine issue of material fact

regarding the existence of County customs or policies that amount to deliberate indifference and thus

cannot prevail on a theory of Canton liability. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the court grants the County's motion for summary judgment. 

Plaintiff's claims against the County are hereby dismissed. 

DATED: 1/4/10

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

Case 5:03-cv-05420-RMW Document 176 Filed 01/05/10 Page 5 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

No. C-03-05420 RMW

CCL 6

Notice of this document has been sent to:

Plaintiff:

Jamar James Evans

P. O. Box 25

Atwater, CA 95301

Counsel for Defendants:

Neysa A. Fligor neysa.fligor@cco.sccgov.org

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 1/5/10 CCL

Chambers of Judge Whyte

Case 5:03-cv-05420-RMW Document 176 Filed 01/05/10 Page 6 of 6