Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02321/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02321-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 The court granted defendants’ request for permission to file their cross-motion late. See 1

order, filed on January 6, 2010.

 Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to file his reply to defendants’ opposition to 2

his partial summary judgment motion and his opposition to the defendants’ cross-motion was

granted by order, filed thereafter, on February 3, 2010. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT MITCHELL,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-2321 GEB GGH P

vs.

D.G. ADAMS, et al., ORDER &

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Introduction

 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Pending before the court are: 1) plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, filed on

November 24, 2009, to which defendants filed their opposition on December 28, 2009, to which

plaintiff filed his reply on January 29, 2010; 2) defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment,

filed on December 28, 2009, to which plaintiff filed his opposition on January 29, 2010, after

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 Defendants were granted two extensions of time to file their reply to plaintiff’s 3

opposition to their cross-motion for summary judgment. See orders, filed on February 23, 2010

(docket # 93) and on March 1, 2010 (docket # 96).

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which defendants filed their reply on March 15, 2010 ; 3) plaintiff’s motion for sanctions for 3

failing to file a timely opposition to plaintiff’s November 24, 2009, motion for partial summary

judgment, filed on December 15, 2009 (docket # 76). 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions

Regarding plaintiff’s motion for sanctions for defendants’ failure to file a timely

opposition to his motion for partial summary judgment, plaintiff is correct that the court had

stated in the order, filed on April 16, 2009 (docket # 68), wherein the discovery deadline was

extended until July 31, 2009, and the pretrial dispositive motion deadline re-set to November 30,

2009, that there would be no further extension. Nevertheless, by order, filed on December 15,

2009 (docket # 75), preceding the entry in the case docket of plaintiff’s motions for sanctions, the

court granted defendants an extension of time, until December 29, 2009, to file their opposition

to plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment. Defendants filed their opposition on

December 28, 2009, as well as a cross-motion for summary judgment. By order, filed on January

6, 2010, the court permitted defendants to file the cross-motion beyond the dispositive motion

deadline, deeming it timely filed as well. Thereafter, the court granted plaintiff’s request for an

extension of time to file a reply to defendants’ opposition to his motion for partial summary

judgment and also granted plaintiff additional time to file his opposition to the defendants’ crossmotion. See order, filed on February 3, 2010 (docket # 92). As noted in footnote 3, the court

subsequently permitted defendants extensions of time to file their reply. As the undersigned had

already granted the request for an extension of time for defendants to file their opposition to

plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, the court must deny plaintiff’s motion for sanctions.

Summary of Complaint

In accordance with the order, filed on February 4, 2008 (doc. # 29), the following

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 Felker, McDonald, Billings, Gunter, Marshall, Harnden, McCraw, Wright, and Lynn.

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 Plaintiff’s most recent notice of change of address, filed on April 28, 2010, indicates 5

that plaintiff is currently housed at Folsom State Prison.

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four of the twenty-nine defendants were voluntarily dismissed: Babich, Ingwerson, Lockard and

C. Adams. Pursuant to the March 3, 2008, order (docket # 34) adopting the findings and

recommendations of Feb. 4, 2008, nine more defendants, along with certain claims, were

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dismissed and the complaint now proceeds on plaintiff’s claim for money damages only. 

The defendants include Corcoran State Prison (CSP) employees: D. G. Adams,

D.D. Ortiz, K. Daviega, J.A. Diaz, T. Galaviz, B. Streeter, P. Chatham, J. Hill, R. Hubach, A.

Morrison, J. Diaz, S. Tellerico; and High Desert State Prison (HDSP) employees: D. Vanderville,

B. Epperson, J. Owen, D. Hellwig. Plaintiff was incarcerated at High Desert State Prison

(HDSP) at the time of filing his complaint, on October 20, 2006. He alleges that defendants at

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both Corcoran State Prison (CSP) and HDSP violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth

Amendments. 

Defendants Adams, Ortiz, Daviega, J.A. Diaz, Galaviz, Streeter, Chatham, Hill,

Hubach, Morrison, Diaz, and Tellerico at CSP, conspired together to transfer him to High Desert

State Prison in retaliation for his filing grievances and to avoid responding to or returning his

pending appeals and increased his security housing level and confiscated and destroyed his

property in violation of his First Amendment rights. The CSP defendants threatened to

physically harm him and place him in ad seg if he did not withdraw his grievances, which he did

out of fear in violation of his rights under the First Amendment. 

 Defendants Vanderville, Epperson, Owen and Hellwig at High Desert State

Prison (HDSP) all ratified the retaliatory conduct of the CSP defendants by refusing to take

corrective measures and by increasing his security housing level, by confiscating and destroying

plaintiff’s personal and legal property, all at the request of the CSP defendants, in violation of

plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. 

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 Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief were previously dismissed. See order filed on 6

March 3, 2008.

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Plaintiff alleges that all of the defendants “maintain segregationist policies,”

harboring a discriminatory animus against plaintiff and other African American inmates,

requiring them to be double celled only with African Americans, and in separate holding cells, a

claim of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff also

alleges a state tort claim of negligence, contending that defendants inflicted physical, mental and

emotional injuries upon him by their acts and omissions. He claims that he has lost wages, legal

and personal property, and suffered “severe pain, humiliation, indignities....” Plaintiff also

claims defendants’ conduct was willful, wanton, malicious and oppressive. Plaintiff seeks

compensatory and punitive damages and a declaratory judgment. See Complaint, pp. 1-55.6

Motions for Summary Judgment

In reviewing plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and defendants’

cross-motion for summary judgment, as well as the respective oppositions and reply briefs, the

court notes at the outset that plaintiff has, since filing his motion for partial summary judgment,

sought to voluntarily dismiss defendants Streeter, Chatham and Galaviz with prejudice, pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), as well as “only” his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection

segregated housing claim against defendants Adams, Morrison, Daviega, Hill and Hubach. Opp.

to CMSJ, Doc. 87, pp. 2, 7. In their reply, defendants note plaintiff’s request for dismissal of

defendant Streeter and his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims against the

immediately preceding defendants. Reply to CMSJ, pp. 2-3. Although, due to an apparent

oversight, they do not specifically state that plaintiff also moved for dismissal of defendants

Chatham and Galaviz with prejudice as well, defendants do state “the court should dismiss the

claims that [plaintiff] concedes lack merit.” Id. The undersigned, therefore construes that the

defendants and claims for which plaintiff has sought dismissal with prejudice have been

stipulated to as well by defendants and finds that the parties have agreed to the voluntary

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 Defendants more accurately could have stated that they move for summary judgment, 7

not dismissal.

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dismissal of these defendants and claims with prejudice under Fed. R. 41(a)(ii), and they will not

be further addressed within the pending motion and cross-motion. 

As modified immediately above, plaintiff, therefore, brings his motion for partial

summary judgment (PMSJ) as to CSP defendant Morrison for violation of plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights in the form of retaliation, violation of plaintiff’s right to petition the

government for redress and his right to access the court; as to CSP defendants Ortiz, J.A. Diaz, J.

Diaz and Tellerico for violating plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by

their unconstitutional policy and practice of racial segregation; as to HDSP defendants

Vanderville, Owen and Hellwig for violating plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by retaliating

against him with regard to housing; and as to all HDSP defendants, Vanderville, Epperson, Owen

and Hellwig, for violating plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by their

unconstitutional policy and practice of racial segregation. PMSJ, pp. 2-3. 

Also with the modification noted above, in their cross-motion for summary

judgment (CMSJ), defendants move for dismissal of plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against

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defendant Morrison for destroying plaintiff’s legal property because no harm resulted; of

plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against defendants because defendants did not subject

plaintiff to segregated housing; of plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims against

defendants for transferring him to HDSP and maintaining him in their 180-design housing

because legitimate correctional goals were thereby advanced. CMSJ, Document 82-2, pp. 10-13. 

Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity, that the court should decline

supplemental jurisdiction of plaintiff’s state law negligence claim and that the negligence claim

should be dismissed on the ground that defendants’ conduct was reasonable. Id., at 13-14.

Legal Standards for Summary Judgment

Burdens on summary judgment motion differ depending on who will carry the

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burden of persuasion at trial. With respect to plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment,

“[a]s the party with the burden of persuasion at trial, the [moving party] must establish “beyond

controversy every essential element of its’ [ ] claim. [The non-moving party] can defeat summary

judgment by demonstrating the evidence, taken as a whole, could lead a rational trier of fact to

find in its favor.” Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir.

2003). 

As to defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, summary judgment is

appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive

issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. 

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at

2553.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

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opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356

(1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may

not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its

contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11,

106 S. Ct. at 1356 n. 11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is

material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986); T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct.

at 1356. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards

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v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902

(9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (citation omitted).

On December 13, 2006, and again on May 11, 2007, the court advised plaintiff of

the requirements for opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988).

There is no easy way to organize this motion which includes allegations involving

distinct constitutional claims against many defendants at two different institutions. The best the

undersigned can do is to clearly delineate the organization chosen:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment – retaliation against defendant Morrison and

denial of right to court access as to Morrison;

2. Defendant Morrison’s cross-motion on (1) above;

3. Fourteenth Amendment equal protection housing claims both as to plaintiff’s motion and

defendants’ cross-motion;

4. Plaintiff’s retaliation in transfer motion against HDSP defendants;

5. CSP and HDSP defendants’ cross-motion with respect to retaliatory transfer.

Defendant Morrison

Plaintiff makes the following specific allegations against defendant Morrison

within his verified complaint. On November 12, 2005, defendant Morrison stopped plaintiff as

he carried envelopes with legal material, whereupon plaintiff told Morrison he was headed to the

law library to conduct legal research and to mail out his legal documents, showing Morrison the

documents. Defendant Morrison snatched up the documents and tore them up, telling plaintiff he

could not have them. Plaintiff explained that they had been sent to him by the state attorney

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general’s office and concerned a pending case of his and were not contraband. Defendant

Morrison told plaintiff that the documents pertained to a lawsuit against correctional staff and

that they were “‘FLSA’ time sheets” that plaintiff could not have. Plaintiff told defendant

Morrison that his having destroyed the documents sent by the attorney general’s office before

plaintiff had had a chance to address appeal issues violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment

rights, to which Morrison replied that he did not care about plaintiff’s rights, stating that since

plaintiff had arrived, inmates had started filing lawsuits and staff complaints had increased. 

Complaint, pp. 22-23. When defendant Morrison tore up the documents, plaintiff informed him

that he would file a complaint against him to which Morrison responded that he did not care

“because don’t you know that correctional staff at Corcoran don’t find other correctional staff

guilty of rule violations. Nothing is going to happen.” Id., at 24.

When defendant Hill asked defendant Morrison if plaintiff’s version of events had

occurred as plaintiff told it, defendant Morrison stated “yes,” and also said that he had told

plaintiff they were tired of him and his complaint filing. When plaintiff told defendant Hill that

in light of Morrison’s admission that plaintiff expected Hill to hold Morrison accountable to

departmental policy and procedure, defendant Hill “became enraged,” approaching plaintiff with

a clenched fist and shouting, inter alia, “I don’t give a rat’s ass about you or your complaints. 

We run this fucking yard the way we see fit and we don’t have to answer to anyone. Now, I’m

telling you to drop your complaints, if you know what’s good for you.” Id., at 24-25.

Defendant Morrison then threatened plaintiff with a “blanket party,” saying “if

you keep on snitching and filing complaints, we’re going to come an[d] pay your ass a visit

dressed all in black and snatch your ass out of your cell at 2 or 3 o’clock in the morning and beat

your ass! We’ve done this shit before and we’ll do your ass too!” Both defendants laughed and

warned plaintiff to drop grievances nos. CSPC-3-06-00115 and CSPC -3-06-00652, and were

heard by unidentified inmates and correctional staff. The next day, Feb. 23, 2006, plaintiff filed

a complaint against defendants Hill and Morrison for the incident of Feb. 22, 2006, no. CSPC-3-

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 Although defendants cite L.R. 56-260(a) more than once in their objections, as the 8

currently the Local Rules have been amended, the court will refer to L.R. 260(a).

 As plaintiff points out in his reply to this objection and objection 5, defendants cite an

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inaccurate (non-existent) Fed. R. Evid. in support of this objection, identifying it as Fed. R. Evid.

810. The appropriate rules are Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) and 802. 

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6-01022. Id., at 25-26. 

Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to summary judgment on his claims that this

defendant violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for the filing of

grievances, and violating his right to petition the government for redress and right to access the

court by destruction of certain of plaintiff’s legal documents. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment (PMSJ), pp. 8-13, 16, 26-37. 

Defendants posit five objections to plaintiff’s evidence in support of his PMSJ: 1)

that plaintiff has stated facts in his points and authorities that he has omitted from his separate

statement in violation of Local Rule (L.R.) 56-260(a) (now, simply, L.R. 260(a)) ; 2) that 8

plaintiff has cited his declaration in support of his 36 undisputed material facts without

referencing page, line or paragraph numbers, again not in compliance with L.R. 260(a); 3) that

the statements plaintiff includes in his declaration purportedly by defendants Adams, Ortiz and

Daviega relayed to plaintiff by other defendants are inadmissible hearsay; 4) that plaintiff 9

mischaracterizes defendants’ discovery responses as admissions in support of the following

PSUF 8-13; 18-25; 27-36; 5) that plaintiff’s Ex. A, Appeal Log n. CSP-03-06-00652, First Level

Appeal Response, and particularly the inmate request for interview, verifying that Correctional

Officer S.G. Vasquez gave plaintiff’s 602-appeal to defendant Morrison on 12/7/06 and gave him

until 12/14/05 to issue an informal level response, cited in support of PSUF 1-6, on grounds of

hearsay. See defendants’ objections to plaintiff’s evidence in support of PMSJ, Doc. # 79. 

In response, plaintiff maintains that he has enumerated his separate statement of

undisputed facts accurately, or at least for an incarcerated pro se litigant, adequately; that

defendants are posing objections to divert attention from a lack of evidence they proffer; that

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statements attributed to certain defendants by other defendants are not inadmissible hearsay but

statements made by co-conspirators (Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)). Plaintiff’s response to

defendants’ objections to plaintiff’s evidence in support of PMSJ. Plaintiff counters that under

Fed. R. Evid. 301 he is not mischaracterizing defendants’ discovery responses, but merely simply

applying a presumption based on the responses which defendants must produce evidence to

rebut. Id. Finally, as to C/O Vasquez alleged statement, plaintiff argues that her statement is not

hearsay because it meets the factors set forth under Fed. R. Evid. 807. Id.

As to defendants’ objection that plaintiff does not point to any specific portion of

his declaration in support of a number of his putative undisputed facts, defendants are correct that

plaintiff has simply failed to comply with the requirement under L.R. 260(a) to “cite the

particular portions of any pleading, affidavit, deposition, interrogatory answer, admission, or

other document relied upon to establish” and undisputed fact. [Emphasis added]. Plaintiff’s

effort to rectify this deficiency by placing the specific citations within his response to defendants’

statement of disputed and undisputed facts is simply too late to have provided any help to

defendants in trying to formulate their response to the motion’s initial statement of undisputed

facts. However, plaintiff did make an effort in the original statement to explicitly set forth the

other documentary evidence he relied on in his statement of undisputed facts. To the extent,

nevertheless, that plaintiff includes within his points and authorities allegations that he has not

provided evidentiary support for in his separate statement of undisputed facts in support of

PMSJ, defendants’ objection is well-taken and is sustained, although the court will consider

statements not referenced therein that he makes in his declaration(s). Also, objections to

evidence that could be made admissible at trial may be considered on summary judgment. See

Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (evidence which could be made

admissible at trial may be considered on summary judgment); see also Aholelei v. Hawaii

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 It is unclear to the undersigned what rules of procedure on summary judgment are 10

applicable to litigants appearing pro se. See Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666 (9th Cir.

2010), a case in which the pro se plaintiff not only failed to supply documents required by the

local rules, but more importantly, failed to tender any evidence on the facts he desired to

controvert. However, these deficiencies were not important to the Richardson court.

 Fair Labor Standards Act. 11

 This section of the declaration is only identified among the reply papers.

12

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 Dept.of Public Safety, 220 Fed. Appx. 670 (9th Cir. 2007).10

Plaintiff in his statement of undisputed facts asserts in PSUF 1 that on November

12, 2005, his legal documents, consisting of 602-staff complaints and FLSA time sheets, were

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confiscated and subsequently destroyed by defendant Morrison. In plaintiff’s undisputed fact 2,

plaintiff asserts that he submitted a 602 appeal regarding defendant Morrison’s actions, and that

on December 7, 2005, C/O S. G. Vasquez personally gave plaintiff’s appeal to defendant

Morrison for an informal level response pursuant to CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, § 3084.5, and gave him

until December 14, 2005, to issue the response. In support of these facts, plaintiff relies on his

own declaration (pages 5-8 ) in support of his PMSJ and his Ex. A to that declaration, a copy of 12

his 602 appeal, Log No. CSP-06-0652 and the first formal level appeal response, along with a

copy of plaintiff’s request for interview (“verifying that [] Vasquez gave plaintiff’s 602-appeal to

to defendant Morrison on December 7, 2005 and gave him until December 14, 2005, to issue an

informal level response”), as well as a copy of CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, § 3084.5(a)(1)(2). The Nov.

12, 2005, appeal states that plaintiff had shown the confidential legal documents defendant

Morrison had confiscated had been sent to plaintiff by Deputy Attorney General Terrence Sheehy

of the Attorney General’s Office and that plaintiff had shown defendant Morrison verification

that the documents had been provided to him and that he was permitted to have them. Although

it appears that plaintiff dated the original appeal 11/12/05, he identifies in his January 23, 2006,

request for interview regarding the status of the appeal as having been filed on 11/22/05. In any

event in the portion of the request form under “disposition,” and signed “C/O Vasquez,” it is

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stated: “[o]n 12-07-05 a 602 regarding staff complaint was routed [sic] Sgt. Morrison it was

assigned date of 12-14-05.” See docket # 72, pp. 1-2; docket # 73, plaintiff’s Dec. pp. 5-8; Ex.

A, pp. 23-25; Ex. B, pp. 28-29. 

In addition to positing their second and fifth objections noted above, defendants

cite in their response to plaintiff’s undisputed facts 1 and 2, ¶¶ 3-5 of defendant Morrison’s

declaration in Ex. A of their evidence in opposition to the PMSJ (and in support of their own

MSJ). Docket # 80, defendants’ response to PUF, p. 2. In his declaration, defendant Morrison

avers that he was summoned by a yard officer to plaintiff’s location on or about Nov. 12, 2005,

who had conducted a body search of plaintiff as is customary when inmates are being released to

the yard, and found the FLSA timesheet documentation, dated December 21, year unknown, with

a staff name, position, pay number, and signatures on it. See docket # 81-2, Ex. A, Defendant

Morrison’s Dec. in support of defendants’ opp. to PMSJ, ¶ 3. Defendant Morrison states that he

told plaintiff he was going to keep the FLSA documentation pending an investigation as to

whether plaintiff could have it in his possession. Id., at ¶ 4. He declares that he was told by the

litigation department that plaintiff could only have FLSA timesheet copies pertaining to his case

number. Id. Defendant Morrison declares that the date of the FLSA documentation did not

correspond to plaintiff’s court case and that he so notified plaintiff that day and also informed

him that he was going to destroy the FLSA documents. Id. Defendant Morrison denies having

told plaintiff that he could not have 602 appeals or FLSA time sheets or other documents

pertaining to a lawsuit against correctional staff and denies having torn up documents in

plaintiff’s presence and denies having told plaintiff that since plaintiff’s arrival, filings of

lawsuits and complaints against staff had increased. Id., at ¶ 5. 

Only one of plaintiff’s undisputed facts, relevant to his claims against defendant

Morrison (PUF) is, in fact, expressly undisputed by defendants: PSUF 4: on January 27, 2006, 13

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approximately 4 days after [plaintiff’s] inquiring about the status of the 602-appeal, defendant

Morrison issued an informal level response: “(a) that he received plaintiff’s 602-appeal on

January 27, 2006 and (b) denied plaintiff’s 602-appeal pursuant to CCR tit. 15 sec. 3084.6(c)

appeal time limits.” PSUF, p. 4; DSD&UF, p. 3. 14

In plaintiff’s undisputed fact 5, he states that on January 27, 2006, after he had

received defendant Morrison’s informal level response and realizing that defendant Morrison was

not being truthful regarding the date he actually received plaintiff’s 602-appeal from C/O

Vasquez, plaintiff contacted Vasquez, informing her of defendant Morrison’s allegations. C/O

Vasquez filled out the January 23, 2006, request for interview stating that the 602 appeal had

been given to Sgt. Morrison on 12/7/05, with an assigned due date of 12/14/05. C/O Vasquez 

then told plaintiff to fill out the formal level of the 602 appeal, attaching the inmate request for

interview, explaining that Morrison was not being truthful. Plaintiff was also told by C/O

Vasquez that she would contact the inmate appeals coordinator and explain about Morrison not

being truthful. On January 27, 2006, plaintiff filled out section D of the formal level, stating:

“Sgt. Morrison is not telling the truth, C/O S.G. Vasquez 3B Education Officer personally gave

Sgt. Morrison my 602 on 12/7/05 and gave him a due [date] of 12/14/05. See attachment page

#2. This verifies that Sgt. Morrison got my 602 on 12/7/05 not 1/27/06. Sgt. Morrison withheld

my 602 pass [sic] its due date to keep from answering it. I want my legal papers back.” In

support of PUF 5, plaintiff again relies on his declaration (pages 5-8) in support of his PMSJ and

his Ex. A to that declaration, a copy of his 602 appeal, Log No. CSP-06-0652 and the first formal

level appeal response, along with a copy of plaintiff’s request for interview (“verifying that []

Vasquez gave plaintiff’s 602-appeal to to defendant Morrison on December 7, 2005 and gave

him until December 14, 2005, to issue an informal level response”). 

Defendant Morrison disputes this fact with his declaration at ¶ 6, and objects

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again with reference to defendants’ objections 2 and 5, pointing out, in addition, that plaintiff’s

declaration does not mention plaintiff’s interactions and conversations with regard to the

grievance. Docket # 80, defendants’ response to PUF, p. 4. In his declaration, defendant

Morrison swears that he did not hold plaintiff’s grievance relating to the FLSA documentation so

that plaintiff’s time limits for filing would be exceeded and further declares that he was not

aware of plaintiff’s grievance concerning that documentation until, as he maintains, he received it

on January 27, 2006. Docket # 81-2, Morrison’s Dec. in support of defendants’ opp. to PMSJ, ¶

6.

In PUF 6, plaintiff states that after the inmate appeals coordinator spoke with C/O

S.G. Vasquez and confirmed that defendant Morrison was not being truthful, plaintiff’s

602-appeal was given a log no. CSP-03-06-06452 and was immediately processed. On February

22, 2006 approximately 100 days after plaintiff had submitted his 602-appeal Log No.

C.S.P.-03-06-0652, he was interviewed by defendant Correctional Lieutenant Hill. After the

hearing, plaintiff’s 602 appeal Log No. C.S.P.-03-06-0652, was partially granted and defendant

Morrison was found to have confiscated and destroyed plaintiff’s legal documents in violation of

C.S.P.-Operational Procedure No. 202, Paragraph VII Destruction of Evidence and

CDC-Operations Manual Section 52051.15, which requires that all information, property, and

evidence confiscated by correctional staff shall be retained for “at least 6 months,” before being

prepared for destruction or returned. Plaintiff relies once more on his declaration in support of

his PMSJ and his Ex. A to that declaration, a copy of his 602 appeal, Log No. CSP-06-0652 and

the first formal level appeal response, along with a copy of plaintiff’s request for interview

(“verifying that [] Vasquez gave plaintiff’s 602-appeal to to defendant Morrison on December 7,

2005 and gave him until December 14, 2005, to issue an informal level response”); he also cites

a copy of C.S.P. Operational Procedure No. 202 Control of Evidence; and copy of CDC 

Operational Manual Section 52051.15 Handling of Evidence.

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 Defendants’ Statement of Disputed and Undisputed Facts in support of Opposition to 15

PMSJ.

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In disputing PUF 6, defendants (Docket # 80, p. 5 ) cite Ex. A, Docket # 81-2, 15

defendant Morrison’s Dec. in support of defendants’ Opp. to PMSJ, ¶¶ 3-6, and their Objections

2 and 5. They further maintain that plaintiff’s declaration does not mention the appeals

coordinator’s alleged confirmation of Morrison’s untruthfulness and that plaintiff misstates

defendant Hill’s appeal response, inasmuch defendant Hill’s grievance response does not state

that defendant Morrison confiscated and destroyed plaintiff’s legal documents in violation of

C.S.P.-Operational Procedure No. 202, Paragraph VII Destruction of Evidence and

CDC-Operations Manual Section 52051.15, which requires that all information, property, and

evidence confiscated by correctional staff shall be retained for “at least 6 months,” before being

prepared for destruction or returned. Defendants aver that plaintiff lacks foundation to testify

about Morrison’s alleged violation of C.S.P. Operational Procedure No. 202 Control of

Evidence; and CDC Operational Manual Section 52051.15 Handling of Evidence. Docket # 80,

p. 5. 

Defendant Hill’s first formal level appeal response on the partially granted

February 22, 2006 CSP-3-06-652 grievance states in relevant part: 

Findings:

On February 22, 2006, Correctional Sergeant A. Morrison was

interviewed regarding your allegations. Sergeant Morrison stated

the papers confiscated that consisted of Fair Labor Standard [sic]

Act documents, (staff sign in sheets) were dated November 24,

2004. The dates you provided as received from the Attorney’s

General [sic] Office, did not include the date of the documentation

confiscated. I also asked if you were given a receipt of the items

confiscated and you said no. Furthermore, may [sic] interview

with staff reveals that a receipt was not provided.

Appeal Decision:

After a review of all available information, your requested actions

at the First Formal Level is [sic] PARTIALLY GRANTED,

granting no retaliation for filing this inmate appeal, training is

ongoing with all staff regarding staff and inmates [sic] relations. 

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The confiscated documents were held for approximately thirty

days, pending a response and subsequently disposed of per

institutional procedures. 

PMSJ, docket # 73, plaintiff’s Dec., Ex. A, p. 24.

 In his response to defendants’ assertion that the fact is disputed, plaintiff 

breaks down his undisputed fact 6 in a fashion which he should have used in setting such facts

forth at the outset. He correctly points out that defendant Morrison has not disputed the fact that

plaintiff’s 602-appeal was given a log no. CSP-03-06-0652 and was immediately processed,

although he is incorrect that he has provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that this occurred

following the appeals coordinator having spoken with C/O Vasquez. Docket # 88, p. 8. Plaintiff

is also correct that defendant Morrison has not shown there is a dispute that, on February 22,

2006, approximately 100 days after plaintiff had submitted his 602-appeal Log No.

C.S.P.-03-06-0652, he was interviewed by defendant Correctional Lieutenant Hill and that after

the hearing, plaintiff’s 602 appeal Log No. C.S.P.-03-06-0652, was partially granted. Id. But

plaintiff does not set forth sufficient evidentiary support for his assertion that the appeals

coordinator confirmed defendant Morrison’s untruthfulness with C/O Vasquez.

Plaintiff argues that it is the discovery produced to him by defendants that shows

that defendant Morrison violated certain prison procedures in confiscating and destroying

plaintiff’s legal documents. Docket # 88, pp. 8-13. However, in plaintiff’s purported undisputed

fact 6, plaintiff contends that Morrison was expressly found to have violated C.S.P.-Operational

Procedure No. 202, Paragraph VII Destruction of Evidence and CDC-Operations Manual Section

52051.15, but defendants accurately maintain that this is not what is contained within the appeal

response. It may be that by reliance on the procedures he cites that plaintiff can argue that

defendant Morrison violated those procedures, asserting that defendant Hill’s response is not

logical because he says the documents were destroyed within thirty days of having been

confiscated but the interview did not occur until some 100 days after the initial filing of

plaintiff’s grievance. But when the interview was held does not mean that the appeal response

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cannot recount the history of when the documents were destroyed. Plaintiff argues that there is

no dispute that he was not provided with a receipt for the documentation confiscated by

defendant Morrison, and this appears to be substantiated by the grievance response. Plaintiff

believes he is justified in inferring that defendant Morrison was found to have destroyed his

documentation in violation of operational procedure because defendants produced documents to

him which indicate that. But defendants are correct in stating that plaintiff has not set forth the

basis for his conclusion that the procedures referenced apply in this context or that defendant Hill

tried to cover it up. Plaintiff further contends that defendants simply fail to rebut the evidence

he produced. But defendant Morrison flatly denies, under oath, that he delayed processing

plaintiff’s appeal, etc. It is not for this court to make a credibility determination on a motion for

summary judgment. Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dept., 424 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9 Cir. th

2005) (“[I]t is axiomatic that disputes about material facts and credibility determinations must be

resolved at trial, not on summary judgment.”) [internal citation omitted]. 

Plaintiff, as noted, in addition to moving for summary judgment against defendant

Morrison on his First Amendment claims that defendant Morrison, in confiscating and destroying

his legal documents, was retaliating against plaintiff for having filed grievances, also maintains

that defendant Morrison denied him his right of access to the courts by destruction of the FLSA

and 602-appeals concerning staff complaints in his case, Mitchell v. Villa, Case No. 03cv1157

WQH (POR), which caused him to miss a filing deadline leading to dismissal of his case. PMSJ,

pp. 28-37. 

Retaliation Claims Legal Standard

Retaliation by prison officials for the exercise of a prisoner’s constitutional right

of access to the courts violates the federal constitution. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th

Cir. 1995); Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995); Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d

1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994); Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1995); Rizzo v.

Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit treats the right to file a prison

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grievance as a constitutionally protected First Amendment right. Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265

(9th Cir. 1997); see also Hines v. Gomez, 853 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that the

right to utilize a prison grievance procedure is a constitutionally protected right, cited with

approval in Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995)); Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d

75 (2nd Cir. 1996) (retaliation for pursing a grievance violates the right to petition government

for redress of grievances as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Sprouse v.

Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (filing disciplinary actionable if done in retaliation

for filing inmate grievances); Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 589 (2nd Cir. 1988) (“Intentional

obstruction of a prisoner’s right to seek redress of grievances is precisely the sort of oppression

that section 1983 is intended to remedy” (alterations and citation omitted)); Cale v. Johnson, 861

F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1988) (false disciplinary filed in retaliation for complaint about food

actionable).

In order to state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plead facts which suggest that

retaliation for the exercise of protected conduct was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor

behind the defendant’s conduct. See Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th

Cir. 1989). The plaintiff must also plead facts which suggest an absence of legitimate

correctional goals for the conduct he contends was retaliatory. Pratt at 806 (citing Rizzo at 532). 

Verbal harassment alone is insufficient to state a claim. See Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d

136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987). However, even threats of bodily injury are insufficient to state a claim,

because a mere naked threat is not the equivalent of doing the act itself. See Gaut v. Sunn, 810

F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). Mere conclusions of hypothetical retaliation will not suffice, a

prisoner must “allege specific facts showing retaliation because of the exercise of the prisoner’s

constitutional rights.” Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 (n. 1) (10th Cir. 1990).

This is not to say that a vexatious grievance filer can never be punished. 

Vexatious litigants may be the subject of court discipline, and the undersigned would find it

incongruous that while the courts can punish vexatious filings, prison officials may not. Indeed,

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the right to petition for grievances is not absolutely protected; such a right has no greater

protection than speech in general. Rendish v. City of Tacoma, 123 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 1997). In

the prison context, one’s free speech rights are more constricted from what they would be on the

outside. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987). However, like

court procedures for disciplinary vexatious litigants, a modicum of due process must be

employed before punishment. Again, plaintiff must show that the actions or omissions

constituting the “retaliation” served no legitimate penological goal.

Access to the Courts

Plaintiff has not met the requisite “actual injury” necessary to support a claim for

denial of access to the courts under the First Amendment. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-53,

355, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996) (prisoner must allege actual injury). The court held that before a

denial of access to the courts claim can go forward, an inmate must “demonstrate that a

nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded.” Id. Accordingly, before a

claim of denial of access to the courts can proceed, an inmate must demonstrate that he was

precluded or thwarted in his efforts to present a legally or factually arguable claim to the courts. 

Plaintiff has failed to do so in this instance. 

“Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, state prisoners

have a right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135

L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). “[A]ccess to the courts means the opportunity to prepare, serve and file

whatever pleadings or other documents are necessary or appropriate in order to commence or

prosecute court proceedings affecting one's personal liberty.” Id. at 384, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (quoting

Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 637 (9th Cir.1961)). This right “requires prison authorities

to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners

with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds v.

Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977).” Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d

1070, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2007).

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Resolution

While plaintiff’s evidence does raise a question of the propriety of the manner in

which defendant Morrison destroyed the FLSA sheets and other documents he confiscated from

plaintiff, the material issue that remains in dispute is whether defendant Morrison acted in

retaliation for plaintiff’s filing of grievances and as to whether or not plaintiff was deprived

thereby of his right of court access, the right of access to the courts being an issue for which he

does not set forth any fact as undisputed in his partial motion for summary judgment. Nor does

plaintiff produce evidence demonstrating that the case he references, Mitchell v. Villa, was

dismissed due to defendant Morrison’s actions. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment

as to defendant Morrison should be denied.

Defendant Morrison’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

In the cross-motion, defendant Morrison contends that plaintiff’s First

Amendment claim against him fails because any destruction of plaintiff’s legal property did not

harm plaintiff. Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (CMSJ), Docket # 82-2, p. 6. 

Defendant Morrison contends that it is undisputed that he (Morrison) did not retaliate against the

plaintiff. CMSJ, DUF no. 28, Doc. # 82-1, citing Doc. # 81-1, Defs. Ex. A, Morrison Dec., ¶ 8.

Defendant Morrison further contends that he, along with all other defendants, is entitled to

qualified immunity. (CMSJ), Docket # 82-2, p. 6. 

Defendant Morrison’s Undisputed Facts

Counsel sets forth the following as undisputed facts as to defendant Morrison. 1.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Morrison confiscated Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) time

sheets and other legal documents from him and destroyed them, for which they cite plaintiff’s

complaint at 22:14-23:5. Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (DUF) in Support of

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (CMSJ) (hereafter, DUF), Docket # 82-2, p. 18. 2.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Morrison’s destruction of his legal property caused his case,

Mitchell v. Villa, Case No. 03-CV-1157 WQH (POR), to be dismissed, citing PMSJ 33:1-6. Id. 

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3. On March 7, 2007, the court dismissed Mitchell v. Villa because plaintiff had failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies before filing suit on June 11, 2003, citing CMSJ, Ex. Q, Order

dismissing Mitchell v. Villa, 5:20-8:3. Id. 

As to DSUF 1, plaintiff disputes only what he characterizes as the “vague and

unspecific” characterization of the term “other legal documents.” Plaintiff’s Statement of

Disputed and Undisputed Facts (PD&UF) in Support of his Opp. to defendants’ CMSJ, Docket #

89, p. 2. However, within the allegations of the complaint cited by defendants, plaintiff

specifically referred only to FLSA time sheets sent to him by the state Attorney General. 

Nevertheless, plaintiff cites his declaration at 3:1-25 and defendants’ Ex. A, Morrison Dec., in

support of his contention that the documentation seized included both 602-appeal staff

complaints and FLSA time sheets. The court has located within his declaration in support of his

PMSJ, docket # 73, p. 6 (and not where plaintiff has cited), plaintiff’s statement that defendant

Morrison told him that the documents “pertained to a lawsuit against correctional staff and that

they were 602-appeals staff complaints and ‘FLSA’ time sheets that I could not have.” The

reference within defendant Morrison’s own declaration is also indirect: “I did not tell Mitchell

that he could not have 602 appeals, FLSA time sheets, or other documents pertaining to a lawsuit

against correctional staff.” Defendant Morrison’s Dec., Docket # 81-2, ¶ 5. 

With regard to DSUF 2, plaintiff contends that again defendants are being too

vague in describing the documentation seized by not identifying the 602 staff complaint

grievances pertaining to his Mitchell v. Villa case. Docket # 89, p. 2. Plaintiff does, indeed,

state within his own motion for partial summary judgment that the documents he contends were

improperly confiscated and destroyed by defendant Morrison included 602 appeals, but plaintiff

never provides information as to how these appeals would have shown administrative exhaustion

of the claims at issue in Mitchell v. Villa. Further, defendants have produced the order wherein

defendant Villa’s January 4, 2007, motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to file an

administrative claim alleging retaliation against plaintiff for filing complaints by informing

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inmate gang members plaintiff was a snitch was granted; the court therein notes that plaintiff

filed no response to either the motion or to a subsequent Rand notice that the court had served

upon plaintiff on February 5, 2007. See defendants’ evidence in support of MSJ, Docket # 81-

17, Ex. Q (and Ex. Q to Reply, Docket # 97). After analyzing the claim and the evidence, the

court, on March 7, 2007, dismissed the action without prejudice. Id. 

Plaintiff fails altogether to demonstrate why he omitted to file any opposition to

the motion in Mitchell v. Villa in February or March of 2007, concerning the confiscation and

destruction of evidence that he says could have saved that case which occurred in November of

2005. Defendants note that while plaintiff contends that the documents destroyed by defendant

Morrison were produced to plaintiff by the Attorney General’s Office during discovery in the

Mitchell v. Villa case, plaintiff does not produce any admissible evidence showing that the

grievances were destroyed or how they could have altered the outcome of that case and moreover

that plaintiff had filed grievances in support of his opposition to his opposition to the summary

judgment motion in that case on May 11, 2006 (adjudicated prior to the previously discussed

motion to dismiss). Reply to Opp. to CMSJ, p. 3, Doc. # 97, citing defs. Ex. R, Declaration of G.

Michael German. 

While it would appear to be patently unfair to burden plaintiff with producing

evidence that had been destroyed, plaintiff fails herein to demonstrate how the grievances he says

were destroyed showed administrative exhaustion of his claim in that case. Moreover, Deputy

Attorney General German declares that he was assigned to represent defendant Villa in Mitchell

v. Villa, that he prepared the discovery responses to plaintiff’s document requests in that case,

that based on his review and recollection, he did not produce any inmate grievances to plaintiff in

Mitchell v. Villa. Reply, Docket # 97, Ex. R. Defendants produce a duplicate of the grievances

apparently attached to plaintiff’s declaration in support of his opposition to the summary

judgment motion in Mitchell v. Villa, (which motion preceded the motion to dismiss for failure

to exhaust administrative remedies), supporting the averment that no inmate grievances were

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produced to plaintiff in that case from defendant Villa. Id., pp. 41-55. Moreover, defendants

produce a copy of grievances plaintiff filed on May 11, 2006, in support of his opposition to the

summary judgment motion in Mitchell v. Villa (which preceded the motion to dismiss for failure

to exhaust administrative remedies against Villa in that case). Reply, Docket # 97, pp. 41-55. 

Therefore, as to plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against defendant Morrison

regarding a denial of his right of access to the courts, defendant Morrison is entitled to summary

judgment. However, as to plaintiff’s claim of retaliation by defendant Morrison for plaintiff’s

having filed grievances/complaints in the manner of Morrison’s confiscation and destruction of

the plaintiff’s documents on November 12, 2005, genuine issues of material fact remain in

dispute. This is not to say that defendants could not find plaintiff to have been a vexatious filer

based on his having filed an allegedly excessive number of complaints, but in order to do so they

must have demonstrated that an appropriate procedure was followed, not simply, as plaintiff

maintains, punish him arbitrarily for filing grievances. As to the contention that defendant

Morrison is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s First Amendment claims because

defendant Morrison did not violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights and a reasonable officer would

consider the actions taken by this defendant to be lawful inasmuch as they advanced legitimate

goals of housing and institutional efficiency (CMSJ, Doc. 82-2, p. 13), the court finds that

defendant Morrison is not entitled to summary judgment on the remaining retaliation claim

against him. 

In resolving a claim for qualified immunity the court addresses two questions: (1)

whether the facts, when taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, demonstrate that the

officer’s actions violated a constitutional right and (2) whether a reasonable officer could have

believed that his conduct was lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the

officer possessed. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (1987). Although the

Supreme Court at one time mandated that lower courts consider these two questions in the order

just presented, more recently the Supreme Court announced that it is within the lower courts’

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discretion to address these questions in the order that makes the most sense given the

circumstances of the case. Pearson v. Callahan, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).

The undersigned first considers the first qualified immunity prong, i.e. whether

the facts, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, demonstrate that the defendant violated his

constitutional rights. The facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, that defendant Morrison

confiscated and destroyed legal documentation of plaintiff’s without conforming to prison

regulations and in retaliation for plaintiff’s prior grievances and civil complaints and proceeded

to hold his plaintiff’s timely grievance about those actions until the time when he could reject the

grievance based on its untimeliness demonstrate a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Nor could a reasonable officer in light of clearly established law and information defendant

Morrison possessed have believed such conduct to be lawful. This matter should proceed on

plaintiff’s claim of retaliation for the filing of grievances by defendant Morrison. 

Defendants Ortiz, J.A. Diaz, J. Diaz and Tellerico -CSP & Defendants 

Vanderville, Epperson, Owen and Hellwig-HDSP

In his verified complaint (as subsequently modified), plaintiff contends that his

conflict with defendants Ortiz, J.A. Diaz, J. Diaz and S. Tellerico started following his arrival at

CSP on December 17, 2004, and continued until March 21, 2006. Complaint at 17.

On December 6, 2005, plaintiff submitted a grievance to the abovenamed defendants, alleging discrimination against African American inmates in compelling

them, including plaintiff, to double cell with African American prisoners only, forcing nonaffiliated African American inmates, including plaintiff, to double cell with those who

participated in active inmate gangs and by punishing plaintiff and other non-gang affiliated

African American inmates for serious rule violations committed by the gang participants. Id.

On December 21, 2005, plaintiff was interviewed by defendant J.A. Diaz,

regarding the Dec. 6, 2005, grievance, who stated: “Mitchell, your ass is still here! I’m going to

see to it that your ass gets transferred out of Corcoran because we’re tired of you filing

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complaints.” He went on to tell plaintiff that defendant Warden D. G. Adams told him to

interview plaintiff as to the Dec. 6, 2005, grievance, J.A. Diaz noting that plaintiff’s complaint

involved the potential lockdown of the entire African American inmate population related to the

Dec. 13, 2005, scheduled execution of “Crip gang leader, Stanley ‘Tookie’ Williams,” and

discrimination against African American inmates in housing and punishment. Id., at 17-18.

After plaintiff explained his complaint as to housing and punishment of African

American inmates, defendant J.A. Diaz noted that plaintiff had been filing complaints against

CSP administration every month since his arrival and informed plaintiff that he had just attended

a staff meeting with defendant Associate Warden Ortiz, and several correctional officers (C/O’s)

from the yard “where we discussed your complaint filing and your assisting other inmates with

their complaint filing against staff.” Defendant J.A. Diaz told plaintiff that “we’re” not going to

tolerate his continued complaint filing, that the method of housing and disciplining of African

American inmates would not change, and that plaintiff would be transferred from CSP. Id., at

18-19. 

On Jan. 4, 2006, plaintiff was called to defendant J. Diaz’s office, where J. Diaz

was present along with defendants J.A. Diaz and S. Tellerico, and plaintiff was informed by these

defendants that they were putting plaintiff up for transfer to “a 180 prison” because plaintiff had

filed too many complaints and defendant Warden Adams had told them to transfer plaintiff out of

CSP. Plaintiff informed these defendants that he had not gotten any disciplinary write-ups in the

form of CDC-115’s at CSP and asked why his security housing level was being upgraded and he

was to be transferred to a “180 design prison.” Id., at 20.

Defendants J. Diaz and Tellerico told plaintiff that “we don’t want your kind here,

so you’re being transferred,” while defendant J.A. Diaz referred back to his Dec. 21, 2005,

interview with plaintiff, telling plaintiff that people like him “who file lawsuits and complaints

are troublemakers and they have to go.” Plaintiff replied that he would be filing a complaint

against each of these individuals, to which defendant J. A. Diaz responded: “[T]his is why we’re

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transferring you, to avoid having to respond to anymore of your complaints. We’ll get rid of you

and we won’t have to respond to, or return any of your complaints you have pending.” Id., at 21.

On March 21, 2006, before plaintiff received any appeal responses to grievances

CSPC-3-06-00115, CSPC-3-06-00652 or CSPC-3-06-01022 or his complaint relating to

classification and cell assignment of African American inmates, plaintiff was transferred to

HDSP, with increased security level housing status, where he was housed on a 180 design yard

for inmates with serious disciplinary problems. Upon his arrival at HDSP, he was forced into a

holding cell for African American inmates only. On March 23, 2006, plaintiff was interviewed

by three unit classification committee members (UCC), defendants D. Vanderville, D. Hellwig,

and J. Owen, who told plaintiff that he was “a non-adverse transfer from Corcoran,” but that

there was a memo from CSP UCC members, defendants J.A. Diaz, J. Diaz, and Tellerico, saying

that plaintiff files complaints and lawsuits and must be housed at an increased security housing

level and on 180 design special housing. Id., at 30-32.

Plaintiff was told by defendants Vanderville, Hellwig, and Owen that he would be

housed on the C-Facility 180 yard because he was black, there were no open “black cells” on the

270 yard, and because Corcoran (CSP) had so advised them. When plaintiff protested that he

could be housed with any race, according to departmental policy and procedure, and that he had

no disciplinary sanctions from CSP and did not display aberrant behavior to warrant increasing

his security status from 270 to 180, he was told by these defendants that he was being upgraded

because he filed “too many lawsuits and complaints on staff,” and this way he could be confined

to his cell for 23 hours a day which would prevent him from engaging in such activity. Id., at 32-

33.

 Plaintiff complained that the CSR endorsed him for housing on a 270 design 16

yard, to which defendants Vanderville, Hellwig, and Owen replied that they did not have to

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follow the endorsement, that plaintiff was black and no black cells on the 270 yard were open,

that even if there were, he would not be housed there based on Corcoran’s administration having

said to upgrade his security housing level. Plaintiff said that when he had arrived at HDSP

Receiving and Release (R&R), he had arrived with white, Hispanic, and Asian inmates who were

taken to be housed on the 270 yard. In addition to being housed on a 270 design yard, he asked

that he receive a clerk position equivalent to the job assignment as GED clerk he had had at CSP

with a pay number. These defendants told plaintiff the other inmates who were sent to be housed

on the 270 design yard were not black and did not file complaints and lawsuits against staff and

that at HDSP, “everything is done according to race” and black inmates who sue correctional

staff do not receive clerk assignments. Id., at 33-34. 

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on his claims that defendants Ortiz, J.A.

Diaz, J. Diaz, and Tellerico at Corcoran (CSP) and defendants Vanderville, Epperson, Owen and

Hellwig at High Desert State Prison (HDSP) pursue an unconstitutional, race-based

classification/housing assignment policy and practice at those prison facilities. PMSJ, Doc. #71,

pp. 13, 17-18, 25, 38-48, 54-64. 

Equal Protection Claim

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o

state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” See

Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005) (under equal protection challenge,

state corrections department’s unwritten policy of double-celling new/transferred inmates in

initial 60-day evaluation with cellmates of same race is subject to strict scrutiny standard of

review). Johnson did not determine whether the CDC policy at issue violated the Equal

Protection Clause, remanding for that determination, but did hold strict scrutiny to be the

applicable standard of review. Johnson, supra, at 515, 125 S. Ct. at 1152. To survive strict

scrutiny, defendants must demonstrate that any prison racial classification “policy is narrowly

tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Johnson, supra, at 509, 125 S. Ct. at 1148.

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 Defendant D.G. Adams has been voluntarily dismissed with prejudice apparently only 17

as to plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection housing claims. 

 Evaluation of the following factors for housing of newly arrived inmates at CSP “will 18

be based on, but not limited to, the following case factors: ethnic background, medical factors,

psychological factors, enemy problems, gang affiliations, escape potential, region of

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Undisputed Facts

Defendants expressly do not dispute, with regard to plaintiff’s claims against

defendants Ortiz, J.A. Diaz, J. Diaz and Tellerico, plaintiff’s undisputed fact (PUF) no.7, wherein

plaintiff states that from December 17, 2004, until March 21, 2006, plaintiff was housed at CSP

and during his entire stay at CSP, he was classified as African American. They also concede

with respect to plaintiff’s PUF no. 14 that, from December 17, 2004 to March 21, 2006, plaintiff

did not live in a cell with a Caucasian or Hispanic inmate. Although plaintiff cites in support of

his PUF no. 8, that defendants admit through discovery that for Level 3 and Level 4 inmates

“race is one of several factors used in the making of housing assignments at C.S.P,” a document

produced during discovery by defendant Adams, the CSP Operational Procedure No. 801 Intake 17

Housing Unit/Inmate Orientation for General Population (dated June 2004), defendants object

that plaintiff mischaracterizes the response by reading an admission into the mere production of

documents, assuming that one defendant’s discovery response applies to all defendants and

assuming facts not in evidence. In addition in defendant Adams’ declaration in Opp. to PSUF

(doc. # 81–3) at ¶ 7, Adams denies any admission as to race being one of several factors in the

housing assignments for inmates in Levels 3 and 4 inmate, only conceding that he did produce

Operational Procedure 801. This procedure does not, as Adams’ maintains, contain the specific

statement as to race that plaintiff puts in quotation marks. However, plaintiff, in response, points

to the statement within the procedure which references “ethnic background” as a case factor

(which, in fact, appears to be the first or primary factor, see footnote 21) for evaluating a newly

arrived general population inmate for a cell assignment, although it is unclear that this is limited

to Level 3 and 4 inmates. PMSJ Doc. # 73, p. 43; Doc. # 88, p. 15. In addition, in light of 18

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commitment, age and any other special characteristics of the individual inmate prior to cell

assignment.” Doc. # 73, p. 43 [emphasis added].

 Or, alternatively, the paragraph begins: “I did not prevent Mitchell from being housed 19

with inmates of other races.” See, e.g., Ex. E., J. Diaz Dec. ¶ 5.

 Ex. D, Daviega Dec. ¶ 4, also relied on by defendants, as well as Exs. G, H, I, J, K in 20

the declarations of Galaviz, Streeter, Chatham, Hill, Hubach, respectively, they generally simply

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Adams’ concession that he produced the document, the authenticity of which he does not

challenge, to the extent that defendants object to it, the objection is not well-founded; however,

this document dated June 2004, does not of itself dispositively implicate defendants in a racebased policy following the Johnson decision. Plaintiff maintains as PUF no. 9 that from

December 17, 2004 to March 21, 2006, during his entire stay at C.S.P., defendants refused to

allow him to be housed with inmates classified as white, Hispanic, or Asian. Plaintiff relies on

defendant Adams, Supplemental Response to Request for Production of Documents, Set One,

RFP No. 9, but the court is unable to locate any document identified as such. PMSJ Doc. # 72. 

He also relies on his own declaration. PMSJ Doc. # 72, p. 8; Doc. # 73 (plaintiff’s Dec., pp. 2-4,

8-10; Doc. # 88, 16. In dispute, defendants reference some eleven (11) declarations from

defendants (and former defendants), five of which state in relevant part:

I did not refuse to allow Mitchell to be housed with inmates of

other races. Corcoran State Prison has not had a policy or 19

practice of segregating inmates based on race. Corcoran State

Prison’s policy and practice for cell housing of compatible inmates

has been governed by Title 15, Section 3375-Classification, and

Departmental Operations Manual, Sections 62010.5 through

62010.12. An inmate in General Population may request cell

housing with a particular inmate of another race— having similar

classification scores and factors— if that inmate gives his consent. 

Inmates of different races who wish to house together assume the

increased risk of violence against them by other inmates who

disapprove of integrated housing. But two inmates of different

races— who do not both give their consent— will not be housed

together because of the danger of racial violence between them, or

by other inmates. [Emphasis added herein.]

Defendants’ D&UF in support of Opp. to PMSJ, p. 6, citing defendants’ Ex. B, Adams’ Dec. ¶ 4; 

Ex. C, Ortiz Dec. ¶ 4, Ex. E, J. Diaz Dec. ¶ 5; Ex. F, J.A, Diaz ¶ 6; Ex. L, Tellerico Dec., ¶ 5. 20 21

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disavow any involvement in plaintiff’s housing

 The spelling of “Tellerico” in his declaration and in defendants’ statement of 21

undisputed facts in support of their summary judgment motion is typed as “Tallerico,” elsewhere,

however, in defendants’ filings, the “Tellerico” spelling is maintained.

 This inmate’s declaration does not support defendants’ insistence that they have no 22

race-based housing. Within his declaration, Inmate Chiamulon avers that he sought to be

reassigned to a cell with plaintiff on 1/12/06, but was told by correctional staff: “Mitchell is black

and your [sic] Asian, so we can’t put you guys in the same cell, because it goes against our

policy.” Defs. Ex. R, Doc. # 81-18. 

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Defendants pose objections attempting to dispute plaintiff’s statement of undisputed facts by

asserting that they have no race-based housing, plaintiff did not present them with Inmate

Chiamulon’s consent to be housed with plaintiff, and more. But it is defendants’ own 22

declarations in support of the opposition to plaintiff’s PMSJ that prove plaintiff’s argument. 

Although CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, § 3375 does not appear to reference race or ethnicity as a housing

factor and the undersigned is unable to determine whether the sections of the DOM referenced

above make any such reference as defendants have not provided those sections in support of their

opposition to the PMSJ (or in support of their to CMSJ), the actual policy as articulated which

the court has italicized both expressly on its face and implicitly violates Johnson v. California,

543 U.S. 499, 125 S. Ct. 1141. Defendants’ argument – that a compelled segregation unless an

inmate of a different race/ethnicity “allows” the integration does not implicate an actionable

discrimination claim in violation of equal protection – is mystifying. It is as though post-Brown

v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954), school authorities

maintained that they had no race-based policy because so long as a student of one race could

obtain the consent-to-attend of a student or students of another race at a given school, he or she

would be permitted to attend that particular school. The obviously deficient rationale in the

school setting is equally deficient in the prison setting. The idea that somehow because all

inmates are segregated by race or ethnicity, African American inmates are not thereby subjected

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 “[I]in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. 23

Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and

others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the

segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Brown v. Board of Ed., supra, at 495, 74 S. Ct. at 692.

 “The necessities of prison security...are a compelling government interest justifying 24

only those uses of race that are narrowly tailored to address those necessities.” Johnson, supra, at

512, 125 S. Ct. 1141 [citations and internal quotations omitted].

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to racial discrimination smacks of the spurious, long discredited “separate but equal” doctrine.23

Of course, a compelling reason to discriminate may be justified. The court

understands that violence occurs in prisons for any number of reasons. What defendants have

failed to make any showing of, however, is how the housing policy or practice at issue is in any

compliance whatsoever with the ruling of Johnson. That is, defendants have not demonstrated

that the practice or policy of requiring consent from inmates of differing races — simply because

they are of different races — before they may be housed together could survive the application of

the “strict scrutiny” standard of review mandated by Johnson. It is not enough for defendants

simply to cite the applicable Johnson standard for racial classification as they do in their motion

for summary judgment. MSJ, Doc. # 82-2, p. 11. As plaintiff contends, defendants neither

demonstrate nor even adequately address the question of how the housing policy is narrowly

tailored to meet a compelling state interest. PMSJ, Doc. # 71, pp. 40-45. Plaintiff is willing to

presume within his motion that inmate/prison safety is a compelling state interest, which, of

course, the Johnson Court acknowledges, nevertheless contending that the method of 24

considering race is not shown to be narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of prison safety. Id., at

45. As plaintiff observes (id.), “[t]he purpose of the narrow tailoring requirement is to ensure

that ‘the means chosen “fit” th[e] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility

that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.’” Grutter v.

Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488

U.S., at 493, 109 S.Ct. 706 (plurality opinion). In addition, the court notes that plaintiff

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maintains that despite the segregated housing, he and other African-Americans share dayroom,

toilet and shower facilities with inmates of other races. PMSJ, Doc. # 71, p. 22. If so, this would

tend to undermine defendants’ ability to show that the present policy could be defended as

narrowly tailored, even had they attempted to do so. 

Thus, it is that plaintiff need not provide evidence to support his statements of fact

that plaintiff was housed only with inmates classified as African American; that inmates Perea,

Victor Castill E-28486 and Chavez, Florencio V-45896 were not allowed to be housed with

plaintiff because they were classified as Hispanic-Mexican American; that inmate Richard A.

Chiamulon V-48226 was not allowed to be housed with plaintiff because he was classified as

Asian American; that from December 17, 2004 to March 21, 2006, they were not acting in

accordance with department policy/procedure relating to cell housing integration of African

American inmates with Caucasian and/or Hispanic inmate inmates on Facility 3B, all of which

plaintiff maintains defendants have “admit[ted] through discovery.” PMSJ, Doc. # 72, pp. 8-9;

Doc. # 88, pp. 18-22. As to plaintiff’s assertion, as previously noted, that from December 17,

2004 to March 21, 2006, plaintiff did not live in integrated cell living/housing with Caucasian

and/or Hispanic inmates while incarcerated at C.S.P. on Facility 3B, plaintiff’s do not dispute

that much of PUF no. 14. Def. D&UF in support of Opp. to PMSJ, Doc. # 80, p. 7. 

It is not plaintiff’s insistence that defendants failed to comply with CDCR housing

and classification regulations by means of the race-based housing that make this issue dispositive

for him. Rather, it is because defendants themselves, perhaps unwittingly, have affirmatively set

forth a housing/classification policy that is flatly discriminatory based on race. Defendants’ own

facts and evidence set forth in their statement of disputed and undisputed facts in opposition to

the PMSJ state in relevant part: 

7. An inmate in General Population may request cell housing with

a particular inmate of another race—having similar classification

scores and factors—if the other inmate gives his consent. (Defs.’

Ex. B, Adams Decl. ¶ 4; Defs.’ Ex. M, Vanderville Decl. ¶ 6.) 

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8. Inmates of different races who wish to house together assume

the risk of increased violence against them by other inmates who

disapprove of integrated housing. (Defs.’ Ex. B, Adams Decl. ¶ 4;

Defs.’ Ex. Vanderville ¶ 6.)

9. But two inmates of different races—who do not both give their

consent—will not be housed together because of the increased

danger of racial violence between them, or by other inmates.

(Defs.’ Ex. B, Adams Decl. ¶ 4; Defs.’ Ex. M, Vanderville Decl. ¶

6. ) 25

Defs. D&UF in Opp. to PMSJ, Doc. # 80, p. 14. These statements are echoed in defendants’

own statement of undisputed facts in support of their own cross-motion for summary judgment. 

DUF nos. 13 through 15 in support of CMSJ, Doc. # 82-2, p. 19. And both sets of facts rely for

their support upon the declarations of CSP defendant Adams and HDSP defendant Vanderville,

implicating the defendants at both facilities in this Fourteenth Amendment violation. Thus,

defendants’ effort to dispute plaintiff’s undisputed fact no. 10 in support of his PMSJ, which, in

essence, states that defendants have admitted that they housed plaintiff only with inmates

classified as African American, fails on its face by way, ironically, of the very declarations on

which defendants rely in seeking to dispute PUF no. 9. Moreover, defendants’ contention, in

support of their own MSJ, in DUF no. 16, that the Asian inmate named Chiamulon, whose

written consent to be housed with plaintiff at CSP they evidently do not question (defendants’

Ex. R), never gave that consent to defendants is a red herring (see footnote 22), even if literally

true as to these particular defendants. CMSJ, DUF, Doc. # 82-2, p. 19. Again, it is the

defendants’ self-proclaimed requirement of the consent at all that implicates the housing policy at

CSP and HDSP as unconstitutionally discriminatory on its face. Bottom line – Johnson would be

a completely idle act on the part of the Supreme Court if all that were needed to be done to avoid

its import, and to justify omnibus prison segregation, would be a general statement of “danger in

prison” if the races were mixed.

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The only exception applies to defendant Epperson, wherein plaintiff expressly

states it is undisputed that he was not involved in plaintiff’s housing at HDSP, thus, no genuine

issue of material fact as to this claim against this defendant remains to be resolved and summary

judgment should be entered for defendant Epperson on plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. 

CMSJ, DUF 12, Doc. # 82-2, p. 19; plaintiff’s D&UF in Opp. to CMSJ, p. 4.

Qualified Immunity 

The only question that remains is whether the defendants at CSP and HDSP

against whom plaintiff alleges Fourteenth Amendment violations based on the race-based

housing policy are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants contend that they are entitled to

qualified immunity on plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims because, they argue,

defendants did not violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights and a reasonable officer would consider

the actions taken by defendants to be lawful inasmuch as they advanced legitimate goals of

housing and institutional efficiency. CMSJ, Doc. 82-2, p. 13. 

In resolving a claim for qualified immunity, as previously set forth, the court

addresses two questions: (1) whether the facts, when taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff,

demonstrate that the officer’s actions violated a constitutional right and (2) whether a reasonable

officer could have believed that his conduct was lawful, in light of clearly established law and the

information the officer possessed. Anderson v. Creighton, supra, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034. 

Lower courts may consider these two questions in the order that makes the most sense given the

circumstances of the case. Pearson v. Callahan, supra,--- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 808. 

In defendants’ CMSJ, defendants conclusorily and wrongly state that they are

entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

CMSJ, Doc. # 82-2, p. 13. With regard to the second prong for qualified immunity, they contend

that “a reasonable officer would consider defendants’ actions — which advanced legitimate

correctional goals of housing and institutional efficiency — to be lawful.” Id. Unfortunately,

however, for defendants, this is not the applicable standard for a reasonable officer, in light of

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Johnson. The only possible basis under which any of these defendants could be entitled to

qualified immunity would be if it could be shown that the law was not clearly established at the

time that the race-based classification and housing practices and policies were enforced by them. 

The incident took place on February 18, 2005. At the time, the

Ninth Circuit held that a prison racial segregation policy only had

to be “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” See

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see also Johnson v.

California, 321 F.3d 791, 799 (9th Cir.2003), overruled by

Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). On February 23, 2005,

the United States Supreme Court decided Johnson v. California,

543 U.S. 499 (2005). Johnson held that all racial classifications

were subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 509. Therefore at the time

Plaintiff's equal protection claim arose, Defendants were not on

notice that racial segregation related to safety reasons clearly

violated inmates' equal protection rights. Moreover, even Johnson

did not hold that racial segregation motivated by security

considerations was unconstitutional. See id. at 515 (“We do not

decide whether the CDC's policy violates the Equal Protection

Clause. We hold only that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of

review....”). Therefore the contours of the right remain undefined.

Consequently, Defendants are shielded by qualified immunity on

the equal protection claim.

Mayweathers v. Hickman, 2006 WL 4395859 *6 (S.D. Cal. 2006). Of course, defendants do not

themselves flesh out any such argument and the court should not be burdened with undertaking

that analysis. “[Q]ualified immunity is an affirmative defense, and the burden of proving the

defense lies with the official asserting it.” Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th

Cir.1992). Defendants do not meet that burden by simply stating the standards for qualified

immunity without showing how the evidence establishes the defense and without setting forth

how the principles of qualified immunity doctrine apply to the facts of the case and to each

defendant. Nevertheless, the undersigned, by reviewing the evidence that defendants either do

not address or fail to sufficiently refute demonstrate that although plaintiff, as to the CSP

defendants, has demonstrated that he was subjected to race-based cell housing assignments from

December 17, 2004, until March 21, 2006. (In fact, it is undisputed that from December 17,

2004, until March 21, 2006, plaintiff was housed at CSP and during his entire stay at CSP, he

was classified as African American). 

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Whether a right is clearly established “turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness

of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was

taken.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. at 822, quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614,

119 S.Ct. 1692 [] (1999). Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 125 S. Ct. 1141, was decided on

February 23, 2005, so that defendants could have argued that prior to that date, and thus for the

period from December 17, 2004, until February 22, 2005, or thereabouts, the reasonableness

standard of the now-overturned Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) was the

applicable established law. If so, any of the CSP defendants (this would not apply to the HDSP

defendants because plaintiff undisputedly was not transferred there until March 21 of 2006) who

could establish a discrete involvement in plaintiff’s housing that occurred before the Supreme

Court’s decision in Johnson, 543 U.S. 499, 125 S. Ct. 1141, might make a showing of being

entitled to qualified immunity. However, plaintiff states specifically in his declaration that a

grievance with regard to alleged discrimination against African Americans inmates by requiring

such inmates, including himself, to be double celled with African American inmates was

submitted to CSP defendants Ortiz, J.A. Diaz, J. Diaz and Tellerico on December 6, 2005. 

Plaintiff’s Dec. in Support of PMSJ, Doc. # 73, p. 2, ¶ 5. 

[U]nder Johnson, the defendants had to show that reasonable men

and women could not differ regarding the necessity of a racial

classification in response to prison disturbances and that the racial

classification was the least restrictive alternative (i.e., that any

race-based policies are narrowly tailored to legitimate prison

goals). See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505, 125 S.Ct. 1141. They have

failed to carry this burden on Richardson's equal protection claim,

as they have made no evidentiary showing at all concerning the

basis for regarding all African-Americans as a security risk when

one or a few African-American inmates are responsible for an

assault.

Richardson v. Runnels, supra, 594 F.3d at 671-72 (9 Cir. 2010). In their argument for th

entitlement of qualified immunity, defendants make no argument that the Supreme Court’s

decision in Johnson was not clearly established at the times relevant to this lawsuit. In any event,

it does not appear that any of the defendants could avail themselves of such an argument. In

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addition to the declaration noted above, within the allegations of the verified complaint, plaintiff

first specifically implicates the issue of segregated housing with reference to a December 6,

2005, grievance plaintiff avers that he submitted to the CSP defendants, alleging discrimination

against African American inmates in compelling them, including plaintiff, to double cell with

African American prisoners only, forcing non-affiliated African American inmates, including

plaintiff, to double cell with those who participated in active inmate gangs and by punishing

plaintiff and other non-gang affiliated African American inmates for serious rule violations

committed by the gang participants. Complaint, pp 17, 55. Nothing in any of the defendants’

declarations addresses or refutes the timing of any such grievance. For example, defendant Ortiz,

while stating that to his knowledge he was not involved in plaintiff’s CSP housing or his transfer

to HDSP and denies participation in any discussions of plaintiff’s complaint filing, also declares

that he served as associate warden at CSP from late 2005 and early 2006 and, although he denies

that CSP had a practice or policy of segregating inmates, he nevertheless sets forth and evidently

endorses the very consent procedure that implicates Johnson. Defendant Ortiz, therefore, cannot

claim entitlement to qualified immunity [emphasis added]. Defs. evidence in support of Opp. to

PMSJ, Ex. C, Ortiz Dec., Doc. # 81-4, pp. 2-4. 

Defendant J.A. Diaz, similarly, declares that in late 2005 and 2006, he was

employed as facility captain at CSP and is currently a correctional lieutenant in the facility denies

having made disparaging or threatening comments to plaintiff or threatening him with a transfer

because he filed grievances and denies having told plaintiff that housing and discipline of

African American inmates would not change, but he, too, sets forth the same CSP consent policy

for inmates of different races. Defs. evidence in support of Opp. to PMSJ, Ex. E., J.A. Diaz

Dec., Doc. # 81-7, pp. 1-3. Defendant Diaz, declaring that in late 2005 and 2006, he was a CSP

correctional counselor and is now a correctional counselor II there, follows a similar pattern,

setting forth the unconstitutional housing practice. Id., J. Diaz Dec., Doc. # 81-6, pp. 2-3. 

Finally, defendant Tellerico (or Tallerico) declares that he was a correctional counselor at CSP in

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 “In cases of institutional need, staff may house inmates in the same cell who have not 26

previously requested to be housed together. (1) Should the need arise to involuntarily double-cell

inmates, the following criteria will be considered: (a) Age (b) Ethnicity (c) Term Status

(d) Gang Affiliation (e) County/Area of Commitment (f) Commitment Offense (g) Special

Security Needs (h) Psychiatric Needs (I) History of Assaultive Behavior (j) Previous Cell Fights

(k) In custody misconduct (l) Victimization Concerns (m) DPP Status (n) DDP Status.” 

Plaintiff’s Dec. in support of PMSJ, Doc. # 73, p. 120, 122.

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late 2005 and 2006, and while he, too, denies plaintiff’s allegations concerning disparaging

comments or telling plaintiff that he was being transferred to CSP because of his filing

grievances, also sets forth the infirm CSP housing policy. Id., Tellerico/Tallerico Dec., Doc. #

81-13, pp. 2-3. None of these defendants because they make no showing whatever that the

housing practice and policy they followed, endorsed or implemented was limited to a period of

time preceding the highest standard of review for race-based prison policies established by the

Johnson decision in early 2005, or that plaintiff’s efforts to be housed with a cellmate of another

race, for purposes of this action, pre-dated that decision. Moreover, they make clear that the

policy is on-going. Thus, they make no showing whatever of entitlement to qualified immunity. 

As to the HDSP defendants, Vanderville, Owen and Hellwig, they do not dispute

that ethnicity is a factor for classification/housing. All deny any wrongdoing, but each set forth

the same housing/cell-assignment policy that is endorsed and implemented at CSP. Defs.

evidence in support of Opp. to PMSJ, Ex. M., Vanderville Dec., Doc. # 81-14, pp. 2-5; Ex. N,

Owen Dec., pp. 2-4; Ex. O, Hellwig Dec., pp. 2-4. Moreover, it is undisputed by defendants that

while plaintiff was housed at HDSP from March 21, 2006 to December 5, 2007, he was

classified as African American and housed only with inmates classified as African American. 

Defs. D&UF in Opp. to PMSJ, PUF # 26, Doc. # 80, p. 10. In addition, plaintiff’s Ex. V is a

copy of HDSP’s Operational Procedure # 502, “[e]thnicity” is set forth as the second criterion to

be considered with regard to “[i]nvoluntary [d]ouble [c]elling.” Plaintiff’s Dec. in support of 26

PMSJ, Doc. # 73, p. 120, 122. Contradictorily, it would appear, in light of the espoused consent

requirement for inmates of different races to be housed together, that even in the instance of

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“involuntary” double celling at HDSP, the consent of both such inmates would have to be

obtained first. In addition, defendants expressly do not dispute RUF no. 31: which sets forth that

they admit through discovery that on June 27, 2006, Correctional Counselor II S. Babich issued

plaintiff a CDC-General Chrono 128-B which stated: 

On 3/30/06, inmate Mitchell P-87230 currently housed in C4-101,

filed an appeal that was formally reviewed as Log. No. HDSP-C06-00807 (copy of which is located in the miscellaneous section of

this file). In that appeal he contends that he, as an African

American, can house with anyone. By implication, this means

Mexican Americans, European Americans, Indian Americans,

Asian Americans, etc. This is highly commendable and should be

noted for future housing considerations.

Doc. # 80, p. 12; see Doc. #73, Ex. S, p. 113. Again, unwittingly or not, by this undisputed fact

defendants makes the inference inescapable that the apparent uniqueness of such a claim by

plaintiff signifies that housing at HDSP was/is based, at least in part, on an inmate’s racial or

ethnic identity. And as the events that occurred at HDSP began in 2006, they could not avail

themselves of even a colorable argument of entitlement to qualified immunity on the basis that a

reasonable officer could have believed that his conduct was lawful, in light of clearly established

law and the information the officer possessed. 

Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment as

to his claims of Fourteenth Amendment violations in the race-based classification and housing

policies/practices against defendants Ortiz, J.A. Diaz, J. Diaz and Tellerico/Tallerico at Corcoran

State Prison and against defendants Vanderville, Owen and Hellwig at High Desert State Prison

should be granted and judgment entered for plaintiff on these claims. Correspondingly,

defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment for these defendants on the Fourteenth

Amendment violations should be denied.

Retaliation Claim relating to the Transfer

By his motion, plaintiff also seeks summary judgment in his favor against

defendants Vanderville, Owen and Hellwig on his claim of retaliation in violation of his First

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Amendment rights for housing plaintiff in a higher security Level IV 180 design facility when he

had been classified for a Level IV- 270 design upon his transfer from Corcoran State Prison to

High Desert State Prison. PMSJ, pp. 23. In his verified complaint, plaintiff alleges that on

March 23, 2006, plaintiff was interviewed by three unit classification committee members

(UCC), defendants D. Vanderville, D. Hellwig, and J. Owen, who told him he was “a nonadverse transfer from Corcoran,” but that there was a memo from CSP UCC members,

defendants J.A. Diaz, J. Diaz, and Tellerico, saying that plaintiff files complaints and lawsuits

and must be housed at an increased security housing level and on 180 design special housing.

Complaint, pp. 30-32.

Plaintiff was told by defendants Vanderville, Hellwig, and Owen that he would be

housed on the C-Facility 180 yard because he was black, there were no open “black cells” on the

270 yard, and because Corcoran (CSP) had so advised them. When plaintiff protested that he

could be housed with any race, according to departmental policy and procedure, and that he had

no disciplinary sanctions from CSP and did not display aberrant behavior to warrant increasing

his security status from 270 to 180, he was told by these defendants that he was being upgraded

because he filed “too many lawsuits and complaints on staff,” and this way he could be confined

to his cell for 23 hours a day which would prevent him from engaging in such activity. Id., at 32-

33.

 Plaintiff complained that the CSR endorsed him for housing on a 270 design 27

yard, to which defendants Vanderville, Hellwig, and Owen replied that they did not have to

follow the endorsement, that plaintiff was black and no black cells on the 270 yard were open,

that even if there were, he would not be housed there based on Corcoran’s administration having

said to upgrade his security housing level. Plaintiff said that when he had arrived at HDSP

Receiving and Release (R&R), he had arrived with white, Hispanic, and Asian inmates who were

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taken to be housed on the 270 yard. In addition to being housed on a 270 design yard, he asked

that he receive a clerk position equivalent to the job assignment as GED clerk he had had at CSP

with a pay number. These defendants told plaintiff the other inmates who were sent to be housed

on the 270 design yard were not black and did not file complaints and lawsuits against staff and

that at HDSP, “everything is done according to race” and black inmates who sue correctional

staff do not receive clerk assignments. Id., at 33-34. 

Plaintiff contends that this higher level security housing placement by the HDSP

defendants occurred at the direction of the defendants at CSP. PMSJ, pp. 23, 49. Plaintiff

asserts that the DOM section 61010.11.6 sets forth “Special Case Factors” for classification staff

to use for Level IV inmates before increasing their housing security status. Id. Should an inmate

meet the criteria for such an increase in security housing, that inmate is excluded from a Level IV

design institution. Id. Despite not meeting the guidelines for 180-design housing, plaintiff

maintains he was nevertheless excluded from a 270-design institution and forced to be housed in

the higher security 180-design facility from March 21, 2006 to December 5, 2007. Id., at 23-24,

49-51. Plaintiff claims that he was confined to his cell in 180-design housing while inmates of

various races who arrived at HDSP months after he had were housed in the lower security 270-

design facility. Id. at 23, 49-52. 

It is undisputed that since his July of 2000 arrival at the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation he has always been classified as Level IV 270-design and housed

at institutions (i.e. Centinela Level IV-270 design and Corcoran Level IV 270-design) consistent

with his classification and housing security level endorsement. It is also undisputed that plaintiff

was transferred from CSP to HDSP on March 21, 2006. While plaintiff maintains that he was

transferred from CSP in retaliation for filing complaints, he does not set this forth as an

undisputed fact with supporting evidence within his PMSJ, and even expressly disavows this

allegation within the context of his motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff’s Response

to Defs. D&UF in Opp. to PMSJ, Doc. #88, p. 24. 

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Within his declaration, although not apparently set forth in his statement of

undisputed facts, plaintiff avers that he was interviewed by defendants Vanderville, Owen and

Hellwig, three unit classification committee members (UCC), at which time he was told that

while he was “a non-adverse transfer from Corcoran,” a memo from CSP (UCC members J.A.

Diaz, J. Diaz, and S. Tellerico), said that “this inmate files complaints and lawsuits and he must

be housed at an increased security housing level and on 180 design special housing.” Plaintiff’s

Dec. in support of PMSJ, Doc. # 73, p. 12. In addition, plaintiff asserts that defendants

Vanderville, Owen and Hellwig told him he would be housed on the C-facility 180-design yard

because he was black, there were no open “black cells” on the 270-design yard and because CSP

had told them to house him in that fashion. Id. He then avers that he protested that he had no

disciplinary sanctions from CSP, that he did not display aberrant behavior warranting an increase

in his security status, but was told by the defendants that he was being upgraded because he filed

“too many lawsuits and complaints on staff” and that housing him at the higher custody level

would prevent him from “engaging in this type of activity.” Id. at 12-13. Plaintiff does not,

however, provide any supporting documentation, other than his declaration, from which his

quoted remarks derive and defendants Vanderville, Owen and Hellwig flatly deny these

exchanges. See Defs. Doc. # 81-14, Ex. M, Vanderville Dec. ¶¶ 2-4; Ex. N, Doc. # 81-15, Owen

Dec. ¶¶ 2-4; Doc. # 81-16, Ex. O, Hellwig Dec., ¶¶ 2-4. In opposition, each of these defendants

maintain that plaintiff was placed in 180-design housing at HDSP because there was no bed

space available for him in the 270-design housing and all assert that his classification score

mandated his placement in a 270-design facility. See id., and defs. D&UF in Opp. to PMSJ,

Doc. # 80, DF no. 16, p. 15. 

Defendants purport to dispute the following PUFs: PUF no. 21: defendants admit

through discovery that from March 21, 2006 to December 5, 2007, plaintiff was on the waiting

list to be housed on Facility B (Level IV-270-design). Defs. Doc. # 80, p. 9. However,

defendant Vanderville states “[i]nmates in 180-design housing who requested housing in 270-

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design Facility B were placed on a waiting list.” Defs. Doc. # 81-14, Ex. M, Vanderville Dec. ¶

5. Also, defendant Vanderville, as plaintiff points out, declares: “I, and not defendants Owen and

Hellwig, made the statement in discovery that plaintiff was on the waiting list to be housed on

Facility B.” Vanderville Dec., ¶ 9; plaintiff’s Doc. # 88, p. 30. While defendants’ objection that

one defendant’s statement should not be imputed to others is correct, it does not undermine the

gravamen of the response. As to PUF no. 22, plaintiff states that defendants admit through

discovery that from April 22, 2006 to December 15, 2007, plaintiff remained housed on Facility

C Level-IV 180 design while numerous inmates of various races (i.e., white, Hispanic, and black,

etc.) who arrived at High Desert State Prison for permanent housing several months after plaintiff

were housed on Facility B Level-IV-270 design. Plaintiff’s Doc. # 72, p. 13. While defendants

assert that this is disputed (defs. Doc. # 80, p. 22), plaintiff points to defendant Owen’s response

request for admission, set 2, no. 1, admitting that inmates of various races arrived during that

period of time were housed on Facility B. Plaintiff’s Doc. # 73, Ex. AA, p. 162; plaintiff’s Doc.

# 88, p. 31.

As to ostensibly disputed PUF no. 25, that defendants, through discovery, admit

that from March 21, 2006 to December 5, 2007, there was available bed space to house plaintiff

on Facility B 270-design housing, and despite his having seniority to be moved there and

available bed space, defendants passed him over and housed other inmates there who arrived

several months after plaintiff, defendant Vanderville states in his declaration that while 180-

design inmates who asked for housing in 270-design Facility B were placed on a waiting list, “[a]

times, inmates who came from other institutions were placed on available 270-design housing

before those on the waiting list. Placing newly-arrived inmates directly in 270-design housing

involved less paperwork than transferring an existing inmate such as Mitchell from 180-design

housing, and having to fill that inmate’s vacancy in 180-design housing.” Vanderville Dec. ¶ 5. 

Both defendants Owen and Hellwig confirm this declaration. Owen Dec. ¶ 5; Hellwig Dec. ¶ 5. 

Further, defendant Vanderville, while asserting that neither defendants Owen or Hellwig made

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the statement, confirmed that he did make the statement in discovery “that the actual movement

or transfer of inmates to Level IV-270-design Facility B is done on a seniority date of eligibility

meaning first come first moved based on bed space availability, ethnic balance and overall

security and program needs.” Vanderville Dec. ¶ 8. It is a logical inference to be drawn that

defendants are reaching for an explanation as to why plaintiff was not placed on, or moved to

Facility B 270-design housing since it was conceded that plaintiff was on the waiting list for

housing in Facility B 270-design housing and that such movement on the one hand is done, at

least in part, on a seniority date of eligibility when they contradictorily assert it is not done on

that basis because placing newly arrived inmates there somehow involves less paperwork. 

While the court does not find that plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on his

claim of retaliation on this showing with regard to his housing at HDSP, given his burden,

neither do defendants make a dispositive showing that what occurred advanced legitimate

correctional goals rather than being retaliatory and that they are entitled in their cross-motion to

qualified immunity on this claim. Genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute on this claim

that should be resolved by a jury. 

In defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment on the claim that plaintiff has

not shown retaliation by the CSP defendants in transferring him to HDSP, defendants Ortiz, J.A.

Diaz, J. Diaz and Tellerico, although conceding that plaintiff was endorsed for 270-design

housing, declare that the transfer occurred because the 3B COR IV yard was being converted to a

Level III non-CCCMS yard, Level IV inmates were among those reviewed for a transfer to a

facility that could accommodate their needs, plaintiff’s classification score mandated his

placement in a Level IV facility and he could be housed in a 180-design facility consistent with

his Level IV placement score. Defs. Ex. E, Doc. # 81-6, J. Diaz Dec. ¶ 6; Defs. Ex. B, Doc.# 81-

3, Adams Dec., ¶ 5; Defs. Ex. F, Doc. # 81-7, J.A. Diaz Dec. ¶ 7. Plaintiff in opposition points

to his declaration that defendants J.A. Diaz, J. Diaz and Tellerico told him he was being

transferred out of CSP to a higher security 180-design prison because of plaintiff’s filing of

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numerous complaints. Opp. to CMSJ, p. 8; Doc. # 73, plaintiff’s Dec., pp. 4-5, ¶¶ 9-10. Plaintiff

also argues that defendants have not met their burden to provide any policy or regulation they

were following in transferring plaintiff from a lower security level at CSP to a higher security

level at HDSP. Opp. to CMSJ, p. 8. Defendants contend in reply that his retaliation claim fails

if the adverse action advances a legitimate correctional goal, that a prison policy’s validity does

not depend on whether it is written or verbal and that plaintiff has not disputed their evidence

that he was transferred from CSP 180-design housing to HDSP so that CSP could provide

housing for Level III inmates. Reply to Opp. to CMSJ, pp. 4-5, citing Rhodes v. Robinson, 408

F.3d 559, 567-68 (9 Cir. 2005) and Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 218 (9 Cir. 1998). th 28 th

As defendants argue (CMSJ, Doc. # 82-1, p. 12 in the context of a defendant who

plaintiff has dismissed), relying on Rhodes, supra, at 567-568, for a claim to implicate First

Amendment retaliation, it must involve the following five elements: “(1) [a]n assertion that a

state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected

conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and

(5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” In citing Talib for the

proposition that a prison policy does not rest on whether or not it is written or verbal, defendants

omit that the question that remains “whether or not the record supports a finding that a policy

exists.” Talib at 215. 

It is true that, in general, prison officials’ housing and classification decisions do

not give rise to federal constitutional claims encompassed by the protection of liberty and

property guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Board of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972). Nor does the Constitution guarantee a prisoner

placement in a particular prison or protect an inmate against being transferred from one

institution to another. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-225, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2538 (1976). 

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See Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985) (prison authorities may change a

prisoner’s “place of confinement even though the degree of confinement may be different and

prison life may be more disagreeable in one institution than in another” without violating the

prisoner’s due process rights). 

However, defendants have not shown a legitimate reason for having transferred

plaintiff if plaintiff can make a case that the transfer occurred because of complaints that he filed

regarding what this court has found to be a policy not in compliance with Johnson. As the Ninth

Circuit has stated, in agreeing with other circuits on this point “prison officials may not defeat a

retaliation claim on summary judgment simply by articulating a general justification for a neutral

process, when there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the action was taken in

retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right.” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9 Cir. th

2003).

Nor do these defendants make an adequate showing of entitlement to qualified

immunity, Rhodes, supra, citing Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 & n. 4 (9th Cir.1995)

(“[T]he prohibition against retaliatory punishment is ‘clearly established law’ in the Ninth

Circuit, for qualified immunity purposes. That retaliatory actions by prison officials are

cognizable under § 1983 has also been widely accepted in other circuits.”) .

 As to defendants Hill, Adams, Daviega and Hubach, plaintiff does not 

move for summary judgment on his First Amendment claims of retaliation with regard to these

CSP defendants on his claims that they retaliated against him for filing of grievances. 

Moreover, with regard to defendant Daviega, plaintiff has stated that it is undisputed that this

defendant did not retaliate against him, leaving no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved

and summary judgment for this defendant should be granted. CMSJ, DUF 31, Doc. # 82-2, p.

21; plaintiff’s D&UF in Opp. to CMSJ, p. 8. 

As to his claims for retaliation against defendants Hill, Adams, and Hubach, the

gravamen of his claim of retaliation against these defendants, within his verified complaint

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 As noted, although plaintiff included defendant Daviega as one of the supervisors,

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plaintiff does not dispute that Daviega did not retaliate against him.

 Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Morrison were more particularly addressed in 30

plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment.

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appears to arise from plaintiff’s interview, on Feb. 25, 2006, by defendant R. Hubach about

grievance no. CSPC-3-06-00115, wherein Hubach allegedly told plaintiff that defendants Adams

and Ortiz, his supervisors, were tired of plaintiff’s constant “snitching” and complaint filing 29

and had told Hubach to make the complaint “go away.” Defendant Hubach is alleged to have

told plaintiff that it could be in his “best interest” to withdraw CSPC-3-06-00115. When plaintiff

protested, defendant Hubach told him that if the complaint was not dropped, plaintiff would be

put in administrative segregation (ad seg), “and we will see to it [] that you don’t go home on

your release date.” Plaintiff withdrew the grievance in fear for his life and of losing his release

date. Defendant Hubach’s statements were made in front of unidentified inmates and

correctional staff. Complaint, pp. 26-27. 

In addition, defendants J.A. Diaz, Hill, and Hubach are alleged to have conspired 30

together and threatened to physically harm plaintiff and place him in ad seg if he did not

withdraw his grievances, which he did out of fear in violation of his rights under the First

Amendment. Defendants Adams, Ortiz, J.A. Diaz, Hill, Hubach, J. Diaz, Tellerico/Tallerico, all

threatened plaintiff with physical harm, with delaying his release date, with placing him in ad

seg, and conspired to retaliate against him in the form of a prison transfer, and denied him full

exhaustion of his administrative remedies. Complaint, pp. 39-40.

As to defendant Epperson, within the verified complaint, plaintiff alleges that on

April 6, 2006, escorted plaintiff to where much of his legal and personal property had been

damaged and was confiscated, including, a cassette radio, new razors, a doctor-prescribed

knee/ankle brace wrap, Nike shower shoes, and other personal items and legal property,

including plaintiff’s case law and federal and state writs, and writing supplies. Defendant

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Epperson told plaintiff his property was being confiscated because plaintiff had had his lawyer

call and because he was black and housed on the C-Facility 180 design yard. When plaintiff

stated that he was filing a complaint alleging violation of his constitutional rights, he was told by

Epperson that at HDSP things were done by racial classification and they did not answer to the

courts. Id., at 36-38.

Defendants state that it is undisputed that defendants Adams, Ortiz, J. Diaz, J.A.

Diaz, Hill, Hubach and Epperson did not retaliate against Mitchell, citing as to DUF nos. 29-30,

32-33, 37-38 and 43, their respective declarations in support. CMSJ, DUF, Doc. # 82-1,pp. 21-

22; Doc. # 81-2, Defs. Ex. B, Adams Dec. ¶ 5; Doc. # 81-3, Ex. C, Ortiz Dec., ¶ 5; Doc. # 81-5,

Ex. E, J. Diaz Dec. ¶ 4; Doc. # 81-6, Ex. F, J.A. Diaz Dec., ¶ 5; Doc. # 81-10, Ex. J, Hill Dec., ¶

6; Doc. # 81-11, Ex. K, Hubach Dec. ¶ 4; Ex. P, Epperson Dec. ¶ 4. Defendants Adams and

Ortiz declare that they did not retaliate against plaintiff for his complaints in any way or by

having him transferred to CSP. They both state that they believe he was transferred based on

departmental needs because a CSP yard was being converted to Level III housing (as already

stated earlier) and that plaintiff, although endorsed for 270-design housing could be housed in a

180-design facility consistent with his Level IV placement score. Defendants J. Diaz and J. A.

Diaz declare flatly that they took no retaliatory action against plaintiff for his filing of

complaints. Defendant Hill declares that his actions were not motivated by retaliation for the

filing of grievances or complaints by plaintiff. Defendant Hubach declares that he did not tell

plaintiff it was in his best interest to drop his grievance or threaten him with placement in ad seg. 

Plaintiff seeks to dispute the DUF, citing his own declaration, wherein he avers

that he was told by defendant J.A. Diaz, at a December 21, 2005 interview regarding his racial

discrimination complaint, that defendants Adams and Ortiz and unnamed others had discussed

plaintiff’s complaint filing and his assisting other inmates in filing complaints and that such

action was not going to be tolerated and the housing of African Americans was not going to

change and that his filing of so many complaints against staff was going to get him transferred

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out of Corcoran. Plaintiff’s D & UF in Opp. to CMSJ, Doc. # 89; plaintiff’s Dec. in support of

Reply brief (PMSJ) & Opp. to CMSJ, Doc. # 86 ¶¶ 17-18. According to plaintiff, he was told, on

January 4, 2006, by defendants J. Diaz, J.A. Diaz, and Tellerico that he was being transferred out

of CSP to a higher security 180-design prison because he filed too many complaints and lawsuits. 

When plaintiff asked why his security level was being increased, he states he was informed by

defendants J. Diaz and Tellerico that it was due to his complaints and lawsuits and by defendant

J.A. Diaz, when plaintiff said he was going to file a complaint about it, that this was why he was

being transferred so they would no longer have to respond to plaintiff’s complaints. Doc. # 86,

¶¶ 19-20. Plaintiff declares that on February 25, 2006, he was told by defendant Hubach,

regarding his staff complaint CSPC 03-06-00115 that his supervisors, including Warden Adams

were tired of plaintiff’s “constant snitching” and complaint filing and that Hubach had been told

to make them go away, that it would be in his best interest to drop or withdraw that complaint or

he would be placed in ad seg and that he would not be allowed to leave on his release date. Doc.

# 86, ¶ 28. Plaintiff states that he was told by defendant Hubach to drop that complaint and not

to pursue anymore; plaintiff avers that he did drop that appeal based on fear for his life and losing

his release date. Doc. # 86, ¶¶ 28-29. As to defendant Hill, plaintiff implicates him by way of

his declaration in the alleged actions taken by defendant Morrison with regard to plaintiff’s legal

property (see above) and when plaintiff told Hill that he expected Morrison to be held

accountable, Hill became very upset and told plaintiff that the yard was run as “we see fit and we

don’t have to answer to anyone. Now, I’m telling you, if you know what’s good for you, you’ll

drop your complaints.” Doc. # 86, ¶¶ 21-25. Thereafter, after defendant Morrison threatened

plaintiff with a “blanket party” for all his “snitching and filing complaints,” both Morrison and

Hill laughed and said: “if you know what’s good for you you better drop these complaints no.

CSPC-3-06-00652 and CSPC-3-06-00115.” Id., at ¶ 25. With regard to defendant Epperson,

plaintiff itemizes the property plaintiff maintains this defendant confiscated and destroyed and

reasserts that she told him that his property was being confiscated because he had had his lawyers

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call and because of his C-yard 180 housing. Id, at ¶ 44. 

As to defendants Adams and Ortiz about which plaintiff recounts no direct contact

or evidence but only indirect references through others, plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of

fact and defendants Adams and Ortiz should be granted summary judgment on this claim. 

However, plaintiff’s disputes as to each of the declarations of defendants J.A. Diaz, Hill, Hubach,

J. Diaz, Tellerico/Tallerico, and Epperson with his own becomes a credibility determination

which the court has previously observed cannot be made on this motion. Dominguez-Curry v.

Nevada Transp. Dept., 424 F.3d at 1036. Nor can these CSP defendants make a showing of

entitlement to qualified immunity, Rhodes, supra, citing Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 & n.

4 (9th Cir.1995).

Supplemental State Law Claim of Negligence

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s supplemental state law negligence claim

should be dismissed on the ground that defendants’ conduct was reasonable. The basis for his

state law claim appears to be that defendants have inflicted physical, mental and emotional

injuries upon him by their acts and omissions and that he has lost wages, legal and personal

property, and suffered “severe pain, humiliation, indignities....” Complaint, pp. 49-50. The

gravamen of plaintiff’s allegations, however, do not implicate the state tort claim of negligence. 

All of the acts of which plaintiff complains constituted wrongly motivated or not, were

intentional, not negligent, conduct. Plaintiff is simply relabeling his constitutional claims as

“negligent.” To the extent that plaintiff might seek to proceed upon a claim regarding negligent

infliction of emotional distress, under California state law, there is no independent tort of

negligent infliction of emotional distress. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965,

984, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 550 (1993). Moreover, under the PLRA, there is a physical injury 31

requirement before plaintiff can seek damages for emotional distress on his Fourteenth

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Amendment claims. Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9 Cir. 2002) (“42 U.S.C. 1997e(e) th

requires a prior showing of physical injury that need not be significant but must be more than de

minimis”). Section 1997e(e) does not foreclose plaintiff from seeking mental or emotional injury

damages based on his First Amendment claims. Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9 Cir. th

1998). However, as noted, plaintiff has no negligent infliction of emotional distress claim with

respect to his state law negligence claim when there is no colorable underlying negligence claim. 

The court finds that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The court having found that the parties have stipulated to the voluntary

dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff’s claims against defendants Streeter, Chatham and Galaviz,

as well as plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim of a violation of his right to equal protection

against defendants Adams, Morrison, Daviega, Hill and Hubach based on plaintiff’s having been

subjected to segregated housing, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(ii), these claims and

defendants have been voluntarily dismissed with prejudice and the Clerk of the Court is to note

their dismissal in the docket.

2. Plaintiff’s December 15, 2009 (docket # 76), motion for sanctions for

defendants’ failure to file a timely opposition to plaintiff’s partial summary judgment motion is

denied. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, filed on November 24, 2009

(docket # 71) be granted in part and denied in part:

a) Granted as to plaintiff’s claims of a violation of his rights under the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as to defendants Ortiz, J.A. Diaz, J. Diaz,

Tellerico/Tallerico, Vanderville, Owen and Hellwig, and judgment be entered for plaintiff on

these claims;

b) Denied as to plaintiff’s claims of a violation of his First Amendment

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rights on plaintiff’s claim of retaliation by defendant Morrison for plaintiff having filed

grievances and complaints and for his allegedly having denied him access to the courts; 

c) Denied as to plaintiff’s claims that defendants Vanderville, Owen and

Hellwig retaliated against him by placing him at a higher custody level;

2. Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, filed on December 28, 2009

(docket # 78), be granted in part and denied in part:

a) Granted as to plaintiff’s claim of a violation of his First Amendment

rights by defendant Morrison with regard to a denial of his right to access to the courts only;

b) Denied as to plaintiff’s claim that defendant Morrison retaliated against

plaintiff in violation of the First Amendment for filing inmates grievances/complaints, and that

this claim proceed;

c) Granted as to defendant Epperson on plaintiff’s claim of a Fourteenth

Amendment Equal Protection violation;

d) Granted as to defendant Daviega on plaintiff’s First Amendment

retaliation claim;

e) Denied as to plaintiff’s claims that defendants Vanderville, Owen and

Hellwig retaliated against him by placing him at a higher custody level and that these claims

proceed;

f) Granted as to plaintiff’s claims against defendantsAdams and Ortiz on

plaintiff’s claims of retaliation;

g) Denied as to plaintiff’s claims of retaliation by defendants J.A. Diaz,

Hill, Hubach, J. Diaz, Tellerico/Tallerico and Epperson because of grievances and complaints by

plaintiff and that these claims proceed;

h) Granted as to plaintiff’s supplemental state law negligence claim

against all defendants.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 07/26/10

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

mitc2321.msj

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