Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02296/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02296-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RENE HERRERA WILSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

KELLY, POLICE OFFICER ID #6540;

DIERDORFF, POLICE OFFICER

ID#5442, 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 11-CV-2296 LAB(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANTS KELLY AND

DIERDORFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 28] AND

ORDER DISMISSING DEFENDANTS

SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

AND CITY OF SAN DIEGO UNDER

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE 4(m)

Plaintiff Rene Herrera Wilson, proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against San Diego Police Officers Kelly and Dierdorff,

alleging that Defendants used excessive force during his arrest and

refused to provide him with medical attention. (Complaint 2-5, ECF

No. 1.) Defendants Kelly and Dierdorff subsequently filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment ("Motion") [ECF No. 28]. Plaintiff's

opposition to the Motion was titled "Motion Opposed [sic]

Defendants['] Sum[m]ary Judgment" [ECF No. 36] and was filed nunc

pro tunc to November 1, 2012. Defendants subsequently filed their

Reply Regarding Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 38]. 

1 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 1 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends that

Defendants Kelly and Dierdorff's Motion for Summary Judgment on

Wilson's excessive force claim be GRANTED. The Court DISMISSES

Defendants San Diego Police Department and the City of San Diego

from this action pursuant to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

4(m).

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 10, 2011, Plaintiff filed his Complaint alleging

claims for excessive force and deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need. (Compl. 2-5, ECF No. 1.) Wilson's Complaint arises

out of Plaintiff's arrest on May 22, 2011,1 and names San Diego

Police Officers Kelly and Dierdorff as Defendants. (Id. at 3.) 

Along with the Complaint, Wilson filed a Motion for Leave to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis [ECF No. 2], which the Court granted on

November 10, 2011 [ECF No. 3]. The Clerk of the Court issued a

summons on the original Complaint and sent it to Plaintiff along

with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each Defendant [ECF No. 4]. 

Wilson filled out the forms with the Defendants' information, and

the U.S. Marshal served the original Complaint and summons on

Defendants Kelly and Dierdorff on November 23, 2011 [ECF Nos. 6,

7].

On December 9, 2011, before Kelly and Dierdorff filed an

answer, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, repeating his

allegations and adding the San Diego Police Department and the City

of San Diego as Defendants [ECF No. 8]. A new summons and IFP

1

 At the time of the original Complaint, Plaintiff was

incarcerated at the San Diego Central Jail in San Diego,

California. (See ECF No. 3, at 1.) Plaintiff is currently

incarcerated at the California Institute for Men in Chino,

California.

2 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 2 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

package were prepared and mailed to Wilson [ECF No. 9]. On

December 20, 2011, the Court received a change of address form from

the Plaintiff [ECF No. 12]. On December 22, 2011, the IFP package

was returned as undeliverable [ECF No. 13]. On the same date, the

Clerk of the Court mailed the package to the new address listed on

the docket. (Id.) The package was sent to the address provided by

Plaintiff, and because it was not returned, it was presumably

delivered to Wilson. See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Warwick

Sewer Auth., 334 F.3d 161, 168 (1st Cir. 2003)(stating that

testimony that documents were properly mailed with return addresses

and not returned gives rise to presumption that documents were

received); Wallace v. Busch Entm't Corp., No. 09–cv–2785–L(RBB),

2013 WL 356859 at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2013)(same). To date, the

Plaintiff has not filed proof of service of the Amended Complaint

on any Defendant. Defendants San Diego Police Department and the

City of San Diego have not been served and have not appeared in

this case.

On December 19, 2011, Defendants Kelly and Dierdorff filed

their Answer to the original Complaint [ECF No. 10], and on

September 5, 2012, they filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF

No. 28]. The Court issued a Notice to Pro Se Plaintiff pursuant to

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988), directing

Wilson to file an opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment by

October 1, 2012 [ECF No. 29]. He failed to timely oppose the

Motion. The Court subsequently issued a second Klingele/Rand

notice [ECF No. 30] and sua sponte extended Wilson's deadline for

filing an opposition to October 8, 2012. That Order did not reach

3 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 3 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff due to a change of address [ECF Nos. 31, 32], so the

Court issued a third Klingele/Rand notice, once again extending

Wilson's deadline to file a response in opposition to Defendants'

Motion for Summary Judgment. (Order Issuing Third Klingele/Rand

Notice 3, ECF No. 33.)

Plaintiff's "Motion Opposed [sic] Defendants['] Sum[m]ary

Judgment" was filed nunc pro tunc to November 1, 2012 [ECF No. 36]. 

There, Plaintiff reiterated his allegations of being assaulted and

beaten by Defendants, and stated he had "proof and evidence,"

including eye witnesses and photographs, to oppose Defendants'

Motion for Summary Judgment. He also sought an extension to file

an opposition. (Mot. Opposed [sic] Defs.['] Summ. J. 1-2, ECF No.

36.) The Court denied Wilson's request for extension as moot,

noting that his opposition was not due until November 26, 2012. 

(Order Denying Pl.'s Mot. 2, ECF No. 37.] That deadline has

passed, and Wilson has not filed any additional opposition to

Defendants' Motion. The Court will construe Wilson's submission as

his opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. See

Christ v. Deberry, No. 2:10–cv–1786 LKK KJN P, 2013 WL 310557 at *2

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2013) (construing all pro se plaintiff's

filings following defendants' motion for summary judgment as his

complete opposition to defendants' motion). Defendants Kelly and

Dierdorff filed a Reply Regarding Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF

No. 38.]

Because the allegations related to Plaintiff's claims against

Kelly and Dierdorff are not materially different from the

allegations in his original Complaint, and because Defendants based

their motion on the original Complaint, the Court will refer to

4 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 4 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff's original Complaint in the discussion of facts. See

George v. Jones, No. C 06-2800 CW (PR), 2008 WL 859439 at *2 n.2

(N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008) (granting defendants' motion for summary

judgment and closing the file although defendants were not served

with the first amended complaint).

II. STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS2

On May 22, 2011, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Jessica Harris

was walking with her boyfriend, Michael Venturella, on 600 Park

Boulevard in San Diego, California. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach.

#4 Harris Decl. 1, ECF No. 28.) As they approached Venturella's

car, they saw Plaintiff punching a parked van. (Id.) Fearing

Plaintiff's behavior, Harris crossed the street and observed Wilson

kick the grill on Venturella's car. (Id.) As Venturella

approached his car, Plaintiff ran up to him and exposed himself. 

(Id. Attach. #5 Venturella Decl. 2.) Venturella turned around and

attempted to run away, but Wilson chased him and struck him in the

back. (Id.) Venturella turned and faced Wilson, who pulled down

his pants, exposed himself again, and proceeded to walk away. 

(Id.) Harris called 911 and reported the incident to the police. 

(Id. Attach. #4 Harris Decl. 2.) 

Within minutes, San Diego Police Officers Kelly and Dierdorff

responded to a radio call to investigate a report of battery in

downtown San Diego at the intersection of Park Boulevard and G

Street. (Id. Attach. #2 Kelly Decl. 2.) The officers spotted

Plaintiff, who matched the description of the suspect from the

call, and asked him to stop. (Id.) When Plaintiff kept walking,

2

 These facts are taken from Defendants' Motion and its

supporting exhibits and declarations. 

5 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 5 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Officer Dierdorff approached Wilson from the back, while Kelly

blocked his path from the front. (Id. Attach. #3 Dierdorff Decl.

2.) Dierdorff asked Wilson to place his hands behind his back, but

Plaintiff refused. (Id.) Wilson resisted attempts to handcuff

him, so Defendants took Wilson to the ground, face down, to cuff

him. (Id.) Once on the ground, Plaintiff continued to resist and

pull away, and Officer Dierdorff placed his chest on Wilson's back

to keep him from rolling over. (Id.) Once handcuffed, Plaintiff

continued to struggle by kicking his feet and arching his back. 

(Id. at 3.) Throughout the encounter, Wilson appeared disoriented,

was yelling, and mumbled incoherently in Spanish. (Id. at 2; id.

Attach. #2 Kelly Decl. 3.)

After handcuffing Wilson, Officer Kelly interviewed Harris and

Venturella who remained at the scene and were able to observe

Defendants' attempts to handcuff Plaintiff. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #2 Kelly Decl. 3, ECF No. 28.) Both Harris and Venturella

stated that neither Defendant battered Wilson in any way. (Id.

Attach. #4, Harris Decl. 2; id. Attach. #5 Venturella Decl. 3.)

While taking Wilson into custody, Defendants noticed a slight

abrasion on Plaintiff's right cheek, but concluded that no medical

attention was needed. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 Dierdorff

Decl. 3, ECF No. 28.) Once at police headquarters, Officer

Dierdorff took pictures of Wilson's face and body. (Id.) 

Defendants then transported Wilson to the county jail where he was

evaluated by a nurse for injuries and admitted. (Id.) Plaintiff

did not complain about pain or ask for medical assistance from

Defendants at any time. (Id. at 4.)

6 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 6 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides, "The court

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Like the

standard for a directed verdict, judgment must be entered for the

moving party "if, under the governing law, there can be but one

reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citing Brady v. S. Ry. Co.,

320 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1943)). "If reasonable minds could differ,"

judgment should not be entered in favor of the moving party. Id.

at 250-51; see also Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463,

470 (9th Cir. 2007).

The parties bear the same substantive burden of proof that

would apply at a trial on the merits, including plaintiff's burden

to establish any element essential to his case. Cleveland v.

Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805-06 (1999); Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

at 252; see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989). "When the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at

trial, summary judgment is warranted if the nonmovant fails to

'make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to [its] case.'" Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590

(1993) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322). The absence of a

genuine issue of material fact on a single element of a claim is

sufficient to warrant summary judgment on that claim. Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

7 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 7 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the

pleadings and evidence it "believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323; Adickes v. S.H. Kress

& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d

1178, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2003). The burden then shifts to the

nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that there is a

genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. To

successfully rebut a defendant's properly supported motion for

summary judgment, the plaintiff "must point to some facts in the

record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and, with

all reasonable inferences made in the plaintiff[']s[] favor, could

convince a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff[]." Reese v.

Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323; Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249). Material issues are those that "might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano, 224

F.3d 1030, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2000); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d

1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982). More than a "metaphysical doubt" is

required to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

In deciding whether any genuine issue of material fact remains

for trial, courts must "view[] the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party . . . ." Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image

Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992) (stating that the

nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed and all reasonable

inferences drawn in the nonmoving party's favor). "When opposing

8 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 8 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could

believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for

purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). While the district court is not

required to search the entire record for an issue of fact, the

court may nevertheless exercise its discretion to consider

materials in the record that are not specifically identified. 

Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031

(9th Cir. 2001); Forsberg v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d

1409, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1988).

When the nonmoving party is proceeding pro se, the court has a

duty to consider "all of [the nonmovant's] contentions offered in

motions and pleadings, where such contentions are based on personal

knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence,

and where [the nonmovant] attested under penalty of perjury that

the contents of the motions or pleadings are true and correct." 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted). Although pro se documents are construed liberally,

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), a pro se plaintiff "may

not rest on conclusory allegations, but must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Leer v.

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 631 (9th Cir. 1988).

A district court may not grant a motion for summary judgment

solely because the opposing party has failed to file an opposition. 

Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488, 1494-95 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A court may, nonetheless, "grant an unopposed motion for summary

judgment if the movant's papers are themselves sufficient to

9 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 9 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

support the motion and do not on their face reveal a genuine issue

of material fact[.]" Williams v. Santa Cruz Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't,

234 F. App'x 522, 523 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Henry v. Gill Indus.,

Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff alleged that Defendants used excessive force during

his arrest, and they failed to take him to the hospital to treat

his injuries. (Compl. 2-5, ECF No. 1.) Defendants Kelly and

Dierdorff move for summary judgment on the excessive force claim,

arguing that they acted reasonably to effectuate Plaintiff's

arrest. (Defs.' Mot. Summary J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 4, ECF No.

28.) Defendants also contend they are entitled to qualified

immunity on the excessive force claim. (Id. at 7-8.)

"Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil

damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of

the challenged conduct." Reichle v. Howards, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.

Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012). When considering a claim for qualified

immunity, courts engage in a two-part inquiry: Do the facts show

that the defendant violated a constitutional right, and was the

right clearly established at the time of the defendant's purported

misconduct? Delia v. City of Rialto, 621 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir.

2010) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). A

right is clearly established if the contours of the right are so

clear that a reasonable official would understand his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted. Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d

1196, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2010). This standard ensures that

10 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 10 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

government officials are on notice of the illegality of their

conduct before they are subjected to suit. Hope v. Pelzer, 536

U.S. 730, 739 (2002). "This is not to say that an official action

is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in

question has previously been held unlawful . . . ." Id. (citations

omitted).

"[L]ower courts have discretion to decide which of the two

prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first." Ashcroft

v. al-Kidd, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011); see also

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. "If the Officers' actions do not amount

to a constitutional violation, the violation was not clearly

established, or their actions reflected a reasonable mistake about

what the law requires, they are entitled to qualified immunity." 

Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1022 (citing Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 471); see

James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232, 236).

Courts should attempt to resolve this threshold immunity

question at the earliest possible stage in the litigation "before

expending 'scarce judicial resources' to resolve difficult and

novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that

will 'have no effect on the outcome of the case.'" al-Kidd, ___

U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2080 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236-37);

see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (noting

that the purpose of resolving immunity issues early is so that

officials are not subjected to unnecessary discovery); Hunter v.

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). "If no constitutional violation

is shown, the inquiry ends." Cunningham v. City of Wenatchee, 345

F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2003).

11 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 11 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Qualified immunity protects an officer who makes a decision

that, even if constitutionally deficient, is based on a reasonable

misapprehension of the law governing the circumstances he

confronted. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004); see also

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) ("Qualified immunity

operates . . . to protect officers from the sometimes 'hazy border

between excessive and acceptable force[]' . . . .") (quoting

Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926-27 (11th Cir. 2000)). 

The inquiry is whether the officer knew his conduct was unlawful,

and "reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law at

the time of the conduct." Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198. If at the

time, the law did not clearly establish that the conduct violated

the Constitution, the officer should not be subject to liability. 

Id. "The plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that the

right was clearly established." Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., Idaho, 119

F.3d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

The constitutional claim Wilson raises involves principles

enunciated in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). See Brosseau,

543 U.S. at 197. In Graham, the United States Supreme Court held

that where an excessive force claim arises "in the course of an

arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen[,]

[it] should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its

'reasonableness' standard . . . ." Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. Under

this standard, "the question is whether the officers' actions are

'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or

motivation." Id. at 397. "'Not every push or shove, even if it

may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers,'

12 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 12 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

violates the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 396 (quoting Johnson v.

Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973).

Applying Graham, the Ninth Circuit uses a three-step analysis

to determine the reasonableness of nondeadly force used to effect a

seizure:

First, we assess the gravity of the particular intrusion

on Fourth Amendment interests by evaluating the type and

amount of force inflicted. Second, we assess the

importance of the government interests at stake by

evaluating: (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2)

whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the

safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether the

suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to

evade arrest by flight. Third, we balance the gravity of

the intrusion on the individual against the government's

need for that intrusion to determine whether it was

constitutionally reasonable.

Miller v. Clark Cnty., 340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations

omitted).

"Because [the excessive force inquiry] nearly always requires

a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, and to draw

inferences therefrom, we have held on many occasions that summary

judgment or judgment as a matter of law in excessive force cases

should be granted sparingly." Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853

(9th Cir. 2002); accord Maxwell v. Cnty. of San Diego, ___ F.3d

___, 2013 WL 542756 at *8 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2013). To defeat a

motion for summary judgment in a case alleging excessive force, the

plaintiff must provide evidence that establishes the existence of a

triable issue of fact. See Washington v. Alton, No. C-00-2579 PJH,

2002 WL 1349504 at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2002).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the

evidence in light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Rene v.

MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (en

13 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 13 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

banc). It should not, however, consider "mere allegation and

speculation" of the parties. Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 83 F.3d

1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, Plaintiff alleged that he was stopped by Officers Kelly

and Dierdorff, accused of being under the influence, pushed to the

ground, handcuffed, placed in the police car, and taken to the

station. (Compl. 3, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff maintains that he was

punched in the stomach and the right eye, and kicked while he was

on the ground. (Id.) Wilson claims his face and left wrist were

bleeding, and he asked to be taken to the hospital. (Id.) Because

Wilson is pro se, the Court must consider as evidence all of his

contentions that are based on personal knowledge, set forth facts

that would be admissible in evidence, and are signed under penalty

of perjury. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d at 923. Neither Plaintiff's

Complaint nor First Amended Complaint is signed under penalty of

perjury, and therefore neither is a verified pleading sufficient to

serve as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)(4). Consequently,

the Court will not consider the facts contained in Wilson's

unverified pleadings.

Defendant officers presented evidence in the form of

declarations that they responded to a 911 call reporting a battery,

and after identifying Wilson as the suspect, they attempted to stop

him. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2 Kelly Decl. 2, ECF No. 28.) 

Defendants first tried to talk with him, but Wilson ignored their

requests to stop and kept walking. (Id. Attach #3 Dierdorff Decl.

2.) Plaintiff appeared to be intoxicated and was breathing

heavily, mumbling, and yelling. (Id.) The officers tried to block

14 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 14 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

his path and handcuff Wilson; he resisted, and a struggle ensued. 

(Id.) Defendants took Wilson to the ground and attempted to

handcuff him, but Plaintiff continued to resist. (Id.) Officer

Dierdorff placed his chest on Wilson's back and grabbed Plaintiff's

right wrist. (Id.) Wilson hid his left hand under his stomach,

and Officer Kelly struggled to grip Wilson's left wrist. (Id.) 

Eventually, Kelly was able to grab Wilson's left hand, and the

officers handcuffed Plaintiff. (Id.) At no time during the

encounter did the Defendants strike or hit Wilson. (Id. at 4.) 

Defendants later noticed a small abrasion on Plaintiff's right

cheek and concluded that Wilson obtained it during the struggle. 

(Id. at 3.)

The injury to Plaintiff's right cheek is consistent with

Defendants' description of the struggle to handcuff Wilson. 

Plaintiff was face down on the ground when he twisted his body to

free his left arm and hid his left hand under his stomach. (Id. at

2.) The scrape on his right cheek may have occurred while Wilson

was on the pavement and resisting arrest. In any event, the "core

judicial inquiry" in an excessive use of force claim is "not

whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather

'whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause

harm.'" Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1175,

1178–79 (2010) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)).

Police officers are not required to use the least intrusive

force possible; the question is "whether the force used was

reasonable in light of all the relevant circumstances." Forrester

v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

15 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 15 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1991)). In fact, an

officer's right to make an arrest necessarily includes the right to

use some degree of force. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Cunningham v.

Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1290 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Cal. Penal

Code § 835a (West 2008) ("A peace officer who attempts to make an

arrest need not retreat or desist from his efforts by reason of the

resistance or threatened resistance of the person being

arrested.").

In his opposition, Wilson alleges he has "proof and evidence

like eye witnesses" and "four color pictures" to support his

excessive force claim. (Mot. Opposed [sic] Defs.['] Summ. J. 1,

ECF No. 36.) He has not, however, presented any declarations or

testimony to rebut Defendants' evidence that Plaintiff did not

comply with Dierdorff's request to stop and that Wilson resisted

when officers attempted to place him in handcuffs. (See Defs.'

Mot. Summary J. Attach. #3 Dierdorff Decl. 2, ECF No. 28.) 

Plaintiff's allegations of "assault and beating" by Defendants

Kelly and Dierdorff, without more, are insufficient to demonstrate

that the force used during Wilson's arrest was excessive. (Mot.

Opposed [sic] Defs.['] Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 36.) Wilson's

opposition is not signed under penalty of perjury and, therefore,

cannot be considered on summary judgment. See Jones, 393 F.3d at

923.

Defendants used some force to apprehend Wilson when they took

him to the ground. Still, under the circumstances, the officers

applied reasonable force necessary to subdue Wilson by pinning and

handcuffing him. They did not deploy a taser or pepper spray, and

did not use batons or other weapons. There is no evidence that

16 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 16 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendants kicked, struck, or punched Plaintiff to make the arrest. 

Plaintiff did not suffer any serious physical injury as a result of

the arrest. Defendants have offered sufficient evidence that the

use of force did not constitute a serious intrusion on Plaintiff's

Fourth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Brooks v. City of Seattle, 599

F.3d 1018, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2010)(holding that the application of

the taser three times against a pregnant woman during a traffic

stop did not constitute excessive force). But cf. Davis v. City of

Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that officer used

excessive force when he swung a handcuffed plaintiff into a wall

head-first multiple times, punched him in the face while he lay

face-down on the ground, and broke his neck as a result).

In considering the government interest at stake here, the

Court looks at the severity of crime, the threat presented by

Wilson, and his attempts to resist arrest. See Miller, 340 F.3d at

964. The most important factor in determining reasonableness is

whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of

officers or others. Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir.

1994). In this case, Plaintiff was kicking cars, exposing himself,

and hitting a victim. Defendant officers responded to the scene of

a reported battery and were met with resistance when they attempted

to apprehend the suspect. Under the circumstances, no genuine

issue of material fact remains that Wilson was a threat to public

safety and actively resisted when the officers attempted to arrest

him. Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090,

1096–97 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding no excessive force where officer

used a control hold on a suspect that was resisting arrest by

trying to spin out of the officer's grasp); see also Scott v.

17 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 17 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 384 (2007) (holding that when balancing

governmental interest in using force against individual's interest

in being free of excessive force, it is appropriate to consider the

"relative culpability" of the parties, including which party was

responsible for escalating the situation).

Viewing all facts in favor of Wilson, Plaintiff failed to

raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the officers

used excessive force in subduing and handcuffing him. See Luchtel

v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 980–83 (9th Cir. 2010) (granting summary

judgment for officers where the plaintiff had actively resisted

arrest and the defendants "applied the least amount of force

necessary to subdue [the plaintiff] by pinning her to the ground

and handcuffing her"). No Fourth Amendment violation occurred;

therefore, no further inquiry into qualified immunity is necessary. 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's excessive force claim should be

GRANTED.

B. Plaintiff's Remaining Deliberate Indifference Claim

Kelly and Dierdorff's Notice of Motion states that Defendants

move for summary judgment "as to Plaintiff's Complaint and/or each

and every [c]laim for [r]elief;" however, their Memorandum of

Points and Authorities is directed only at Plaintiff's excessive

force claim and does not address the alleged deliberate

indifference claim. (See Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 28; id.

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A 1-10.) Because the Defendants have not

discussed the deliberate indifference claim in their briefs, the

Court does not address this claim in considering the Motion for

Summary Judgment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326 ("[D]istrict courts

18 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 18 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary

judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice

that she had to come forward with all of her evidence."); Cool

Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 311-12 (9th Cir. 1982)

(stating that court may grant summary judgment sua sponte if "party

against whom summary judgment was rendered had a full and fair

opportunity to ventilate the issues involved in the motion[]").

C. Dismissing Unserved Defendants Under Rule 4(m)

Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes a

time limit for service of the complaint and summons in a civil

case. 

If a defendant is not served within 120 days after the

complaint is filed, the court--on motion or on its own

after notice to the plaintiff--must dismiss the action

without prejudice against that defendant or order that

service be made within a specified time. But if the

plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court

must extend the time for service for an appropriate

period.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); see Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1041

(9th Cir. 2007). Whether good cause exists is determined on a

case-by-case basis. In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d 507, 512 (9th Cir.

2001). "At a minimum, 'good cause' means excusable neglect." 

Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1991). A

plaintiff may show good cause where he attempted to serve a

defendant but has not yet completed service, was confused about the

requirements for service of process, or was prevented from serving

a defendant because of events outside of his control. See Wei v.

State of Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying the

good cause standard in Rule 4(j) which was replaced by Rule 4(m) in

1993). "'The 'good cause' provision of Rule 4(j) [now Rule 4(m)]

19 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 19 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

should be read narrowly to protect only those plaintiffs who have

been meticulous in their efforts to comply with the Rule.'" 

Despain v. Salt Lake Area Metro Gang Unit, 13 F.3d 1436, 1438 (10th

Cir. 1994) (quoting In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 123 F.R.D.

512, 514 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1988)).

"[A]n incarcerated pro se plaintiff proceeding in forma

pauperis is entitled to rely on the U.S. Marshal for service of the

summons and complaint, and having provided the necessary

information to help effectuate service, plaintiff should not be

penalized by having his . . . action dismissed for failure to

effectuate service." Puett v. Blandford, 912 F.2d 270, 275 (9th

Cir. 1990). "So long as the prisoner has furnished the information

necessary to identify the defendant, the marshal's failure to

effect service of process is 'automatically good cause within the

meaning of Rule [4(m)].'" Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422

(9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472 (1995) (quoting Sellers v. United States, 902 F.2d

598, 603 (7th Cir. 1990)). Nonetheless, a "plaintiff may not

remain silent and do nothing to effectuate such service." Rochon

v. Dawson, 828 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1987).

Here, after the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis, the Clerk of the Court issued summons on

the original complaint and sent it to Plaintiff along with a blank

U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each Defendant [see ECF No. 3]. Wilson

filled out the forms with the Defendants' information, and the U.S.

Marshal served the original complaint and summons for Defendants

Kelly and Dierdorff on November 23, 2011 [see ECF Nos. 6, 7]. 

Plaintiff subsequently filed his First Amended Complaint naming new

20 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 20 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendants [ECF No. 8], and the Clerk of the Court prepared and

mailed a new summons and IFP package to Wilson [see ECF No. 9]. On

December 20, 2011, the Court received a change of address form from

the Plaintiff [ECF No. 12]. On December 22, 2011, the IFP package

was returned as undeliverable [ECF No. 13]. On the same date, the

Clerk mailed the package to the new address listed on the docket

[ECF No. 13]. The package was sent to the address provided by

Plaintiff, and because it was not returned, it was presumably

delivered to Wilson. See Narragansett Indian Tribe, 334 F.3d at

168; Wallace v. Busch Entm't Corp., No. 09–cv–2785–L(RBB), 2013 WL

356859 at *2.

Wilson filed his First Amended Complaint on December 9, 2011

[ECF No. 8]. More than a year has passed since the filing, and

proper service still has not been made. The delay is nearly four

times the 120-day period that is presumptively proper for service

under Rule 4(m). Plaintiff has had ample opportunity to provide

the U.S. Marshal with addresses to serve Defendants City of San

Diego and San Diego Police Department. He did not seek an

extension of time from this Court to serve the First Amended

Complaint. Given Wilson's silence and delay, Plaintiff has not

shown good cause for his failure to timely effect service of

process on the newly added defendants. Therefore, his claims

21 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 21 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

against Defendants City of San Diego and San Diego Police

Department should be dismissed without prejudice.3

Plaintiff has consented to this Court's jurisdiction. (Compl.

7, ECF No. 1; First Am. Compl. 7, ECF No. 8.) "Upon the consent of

the parties," a magistrate judge "may conduct any or all

proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry

of judgment in the case." 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(c)(1) (West 2006). 

The Court does not require the consent of Defendants City of San

Diego and San Diego Police Department to dismiss an action when

they have not been served and are not parties under 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c). See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995)

(holding that magistrate judge had jurisdiction to dismiss prison

inmate's § 1983 action as frivolous without consent of defendants

because they had not been served and were not parties); see also

Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Brenneke, 551 F.3d 1132, 1135

(9th Cir. 2009) ("A federal court is without personal jurisdiction

over a defendant unless the defendant has been served in accordance

with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.")(internal quotation marks omitted); United

States v. Real Property, 135 F.3d 1312, 1317 (9th Cir. 1998)

(holding that magistrate judge had jurisdiction to enter default

judgment in an in rem forfeiture action even though property owner

3 The Court also notes that Plaintiff's First Amended

Complaint fails to state a claim against these defendants. First,

the San Diego Police Department is not a "person" subject to suit

under § 1983. Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996

(N.D. Cal. 1996). Second, to the extent Plaintiff names the City

of San Diego based on allegations that individual police officers

employed by the city violated his constitutional rights, "a

municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a

tortfeasor -- or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held

liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell v.

Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Gibson v. Cnty.

of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002). 

22 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 22 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

had not consented to it because 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) only requires

the consent of the "parties" and the property owner, having failed

to comply with the applicable filing requirements, was not a

"party").

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Defendants City of San Diego

and San Diego Police Department for failure to serve them within

the time limits of Rule 4(m).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court recommends that

Defendants Kelly and Dierdorff's Motion for Summary Judgment on

Plaintiff's excessive force claim be GRANTED, but their Motion for

Summary Judgment on the deliberate indifference claim should be

DENIED. The Court DISMISSES the case against Defendants San Diego

Police Department and the City of San Diego without prejudice.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before April 8, 2013. The document should be captioned "Objections

to Report and Recommendation." Any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed on or before April 22, 2013. The parties are 

23 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 23 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the district court's order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 7, 2013 _____________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Burns

All Parties of Record

I:\Chambers Brooks\CASES\_1983\WILSON2296\MSJ\R&R grant Defs' MSJ 4.wpd 24 11cv2296 LAB(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-02296-LAB-RBB Document 40 Filed 03/07/13 Page 24 of 24