Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02142/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02142-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL3.Jnited States Court or Apptili 

Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

LAGUNA GATUNA, INC., a New 

Mexico Corporation, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

JUN~O 1995' 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 94-2142 

CAROL BROWNER, Administrator of ) 

the Environmental Protection ) 

Agency; JOE D. WINKLE, Acting ) 

Regional Administrator, Region ) 

VI of the Environmental Pro- ) 

tection Agency; ENVIRONMENTAL ) 

PROTECTION AGENCY, Carol M. ) 

Browner, Administrator, ) 

Defendants-Appellees, 

STONE SOUTHWEST CORPORATION, 

a Delaware Corporation, 

Intervenor. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of New Mexico 

D.C. No. CIV-93-772-JC 

Todd S. Welch (William Perry Pendley with him on the briefs), 

Mountain States Legal Foundation, Denver, Colorado, for PlaintiffAppellant. 

John A. Bryson (Robert L. Klarquist and Joshua M. Levin, 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Lois J. Schiffer, 

Assistant Attorney General; John J. Kelly, United States Attorney; 

and Raymond Hamilton, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Albuquerque, New Mexico; Stephen J. Sweeney, U.S. Environmental 

Appellate Case: 94-2142 Document: 01019279511 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 1 
Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., with him on the brief), 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, and MOORE and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

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Appellate Case: 94-2142 Document: 01019279511 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 2 
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether a 

compliance order issued by 

(EPA) under the Clean Water 

the Environmental Protection Agency 

Act (CWA) is subject to judicial 

review. Following the lead of our sister circuits which have 

already considered this issue, we conclude the CWA provides no 

basis for such a proceeding, despite strong due process arguments 

advanced by the appellant. We therefore affirm the judgment of 

the district court. 

Plaintiff Laguna Gatuna, Inc., is a New Mexico corporation 

whose sole business is disposing of industrial waste water. It 

dumps the water in a 11 Sinkhole 11 known as Laguna Gatuna, to which 

the company has appropriate rights. Defendants are the 

Environmental Protection Agency and its Administrators. 

In 1987, Laguna's predecessor in interest inquired of the EPA 

whether the sinkhole.was included in 11 waters of the United States 11 

as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, subjecting it to EPA 

jurisdiction. The EPA responded by letter that it was not, based 

on the representation the sinkhole was 11 not hydrologically 

connected 11 to other waters and there were 11 no recreational, 

industrial, or other uses that could affect interstate commerce. 11 

In 1991, in the course of a study of playa lakes in New Mexico, 

the EPA discovered dead migratory birds near the sinkhole. In 

1992, the EPA issued a compliance order to Laguna, directing it to 

cease dumping wastes into the sinkhole. Laguna complied with the 

order and discontinued operations. 

Laguna filed an action for declaratory relief in district 

court, claiming the EPA had no jurisdiction to regulate the 

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Appellate Case: 94-2142 Document: 01019279511 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 3 
sinkhole because it was not "waters of the United States," and the 

issuance of the compliance order violated Laguna's procedural and 

substantive due process rights. The district court dismissed the 

action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This appeal was 

brought to review that dismissal. 

Questions of jurisdiction are reviewed de novo. Communi~ 

Action of Laramie County, Inc. v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 347, 351 n.l 

(lOth Cir. 1989). When deciding a question of jurisdiction, a 

court must construe all relevant allegations in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. See Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385, 

386 (lOth Cir. 1976). Accordingly, the facts set forth above are 

as alleged in the complaint. Laguna has asserted federal question 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

This court has not yet spoken on this precise issue. But see 

Child v. United States, 851 F. Supp. 1527 (D. Utah 1994); Howell 

v. United States~ Cor.ps of Eng'rs, 794 F. Supp. 1072 (D. N.M. 

1992). We follow the authority of our sister circuits in Southern 

Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, 20 F.3d 1418 (6th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994); Rueth v. United States 

EPA, 13 F.3d 227 (7th Cir. 1-993); and Southern Pines Assocs. v. 

United States, 912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, we 

affirm the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 

In Southern Pines, the EPA issued a compliance order to cease 

dumping in the wetlands on its land in Chesapeake, Virginia, 

required Southern Pines to commence restoration, and requested 

further information to make a "final determination" about the 

wetlands. 912 F.2d at 714. Southern Pines filed a complaint for 

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Appellate Case: 94-2142 Document: 01019279511 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 4 
declaratory and injunctive relief, and the district court 

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Based on 

the legislative history and language of the CWA, and analogous 

authority concerning the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 

Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Clean Air Act 

(CAA), the court was 11 persuaded that Congress meant to preclude 

judicial review of compliance orders under the CWA. 11 Id. at 716. 

Southern Pines argued lack of review was a denial of due process, 

but the court rejected this argument. Id. at 717. 

In Rueth, the EPA issued Rueth a compliance order to cease 

discharges into a wetlands area and to commence restoration of the 

wetlands. 13 F.3d at 228. Rueth sought an injunction in district 

court against enforcement of the order, and the case was dismissed 

for lack of jurisdiction. Id. On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, 

Rueth challenged the EPA's jurisdiction to regulate the wetlands, 

. claiming, as Laguna does in the instant case, that the wetlands 

were not part of the 11 waters of the United States. 11 Id. at 231. 

The Seventh Circuit nevertheless upheld the dismissal. Id.; see 

also Hoffman Group, Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1990). 

In Southern Ohio, the plaintiff coal company proposed to 

discharge 11 untreated and minimally treated 11 floodwater from a coal 

mine into tributaries of the Ohio River. 20 F.3d at 1420. The 

Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and Enforcement of the 

Department of the Interior (OSM) issued a cessation order against 

the company. The company filed suit seeking a temporary 

restraining order against OSM. The cessation order was vacated, 

and Southern Ohio began pumping. Id. at 1421. The EPA then 

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threatened to issue a cease and desist order if Southern Ohio did 

not cease pumping. Southern Ohio joined the EPA as a party and 

obtained a restraining order against the EPA as well. The EPA 

moved to vacate the order for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 1422. 

The district court denied the motion. 

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit joined the Fourth and Seventh 

Circuits in holding Congress did not intend to allow judicial 

review of compliance orders. Id. at 1427. 

the "enforcement provisions of the CWA were 

It reversed, noting 

modeled after the 

enforcements provisions of the Clean Air Act," and "review of the 

caselaw under the CAA reveals the uniform holding that judicial 

review of pre-enforcement orders, similar to those issued under 

the CWA, is not available." Id. at 1426 .. 

Laguna argues Southern Ohio is distinguishable because it 

involved a different quality of waste water from that discharged 

into the sinkhole in the instant case. This argument goes to the 

merits of Laguna's dispute with the EPA, not to the federal 

court's jurisdiction to hear that dispute. Laguna further argues 

Rueth and Southern Pines are distinguishable because in the 

instant case the EPA is not in the process of conducting any factfinding and has issued a final response to Laguna. However, these 

distinctions speak to the issue of finality, not reviewability. 

The EPA accurately points out that finality and reviewability are 

separate issues. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, U.S. 

114 s. Ct. 771, 782 n.23 (1994). A decision must be final to be 

reviewable, but all final decisions are not reviewable. 

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We consider Rueth, Southern Pines, and Southern Ohio to be 

indistinguishable from this case. The plaintiffs in those cases 

made challenges to the compliance orders similar to those brought 

by Laguna: that their land lay without the definition of "waters 

of the United States" and that the compliance order and lack of 

federal review violated guarantees of substantive and procedural 

due process. Our sister circuits held there was no jurisdiction 

to make such challenges, and we see no reason to disagree. 

Laguna argues Riverside Irrigation Disc. v. Stipo, 658 F.2d 

762 (lOth Cir. 1981), is binding authority for the proposition 

judicial review is available when "the penalties are so severe 

that they foreclose a testing of authority by proceeding with the 

work." Id. at 767. However, Laguna takes this proposition out of 

context. Riverside is factually distinguishable: it did not 

involve a compliance order; it involved denial of a nationwide 

permit for which there was no application procedure; and it 

involved the contemplated construction of a water reservoir 

requiring a large capital outlay. Riverside is doctrinally 

distinguishable: it was written before the 1987 amendment to the 

CWA providing for judicial review of civil penalties;l and like 

Laguna's arguments on appeal, Riverside addressed the issue of 

finality, not reviewability. 

1 The Water Quality Act of 1987 added a mechanism for the 

assessment of administrative penalties and judicial review in 

federal court of any such penalties. Pub. ·L. No. 100-4, Title 

III, § 314(a), 101 Stat. 48 (1987) (codified as amended at 33 

u.s.c. § 1319 (g)). 

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Laguna's policy argument that it should not be necessary to 

violate an EPA order and risk civil and criminal penalties to 

obtain judicial review is well taken. Nevertheless, following the 

reasoning of our sister circuits, we reject Laguna's conclusion 

such a situation is "constitutionally intolerable." Judicial 

review of every unenforced compliance order would undermine the 

EPA's regulatory authority. 

The law in other circuits squarely precludes jurisdiction on 

these facts. The district court's order dismissing this case is 

AFFIRMED. 

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