Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01558/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01558-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELVIN ALLEN WOOD, 

Petitioner,

v.

DERRAL G. ADAMS,

Respondent. 

CIV-S-01-1558 DFL PAN P 

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

AND ORDER

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed an 

application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254, challenging two separate state court convictions: (1) his

April 10, 1998 conviction for stalking under Cal. Penal Code §

646(b); and (2) his March 31, 1998 conviction under Cal. Penal

Code § 288(c) for a lewd act upon a child. Respondent filed an

answer on October 21, 2002. The petition was taken under

submission on December 5, 2002, after the court denied

petitioner’s request for an extension of time to file his

traverse.

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Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”), habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim

decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to

or an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The “contrary to” clause applies when a

state court applies a rule different from the governing law set

forth in the Supreme Court’s cases, while the “unreasonable

application” clause applies if the state court correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s

cases, but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular

case. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843 (2002). 

The petitioner has the burden to show that the state court’s

decision was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of

state law. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25, 123 S.Ct. 357

(2002). It is appropriate to look to lower federal court

decisions to determine what law has been “clearly established” by

the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular

application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597,

598 (9th Cir. 2000). The court looks to the last reasoned state

court decision as the basis for the state court judgment. Avila

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v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). In determining

whether the state court decision is entitled to deference, it is

not necessary that the state court cite the controlling federal

authorities, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of

the state court decision is contrary to federal law. Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362 (2002). 

A. Stalking Conviction

Petitioner’s October 21, 2002 conviction for stalking was

based on repeated violations of a restraining order obtained by

his wife Penny. (Answer at 5-7.) The restraining order was in

effect beginning August 1, 1997. (Id.) The testimony at trial

indicated that, between August and October 1997, petitioner

violated the restraining order on at five occasions. (Id.) For

this conduct, petitioner was convicted under Cal. Penal Code §

646(b). 

Petitioner makes two claims as to this conviction: (1) that

the trial judge erred in denying his request for a continuance;

and (2) that the reasonable doubt instruction given provided

insufficient guidance to the jury on the degree of certainty

required to convict. (Pet. at 6, 6E.)

Petitioner sought a continuance to obtain the testimony of

Officer Locatelly, who prepared a computer-aided dispatch report

which indicated that Penny had encouraged petitioner to violate

the restraining order on one occasion. (Court of Appeal Decision

“Ct. App.” at 8-10.) After hearing from both sides, the trial

court denied the request, stating that it did not appear that

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Locatelly’s testimony would add “any additional evidence which

would either lay a foundation or provide any exception to the

court’s ruling.” (Id. at 10.) 

To state a due process claim based on the denial of a

continuance, the petitioner must show that the denial was an

abuse of discretion, considering such factors as: (1) the degree

of diligence of the party requesting the continuance; (2) whether

the continuance would have served a useful purpose; (3) the

inconvenience to the court and the prosecution of granting the

continuance; and (4) the prejudice suffered from the denial. 

Armant v. Marquez, 772 F.2d 552, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1985). 

While the California Court of Appeal did not mention or

apply Armant in rejecting this claim, its reasoning and its

decision are consistent with federal law. The court of appeal

evaluated petitioner’s diligence, as well examining the probative

value and admissibility of the evidence sought. (Ct. App. at 10-

11.) The court of appeal’s decision was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of state law. This claim is DENIED.

Petitioner also challenges the reasonable doubt instruction,

CALJIC 2.90, which defined reasonable doubt as doubt that “leaves

the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say

they feel an abiding conviction in the truth of the charge.” 

(Pet. at 6E.) In general, a challenge to jury instructions does

not state a federal constitutional claim. Engle v. Issac, 456

U.S. 107, 119-123, 102 S.Ct. 1558 (1982). To warrant federal

habeas relief, the challenged jury instruction “cannot be merely

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‘undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned’” but must

“violate some due process right guaranteed by the fourteenth

amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir.

1988), quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146, 94 S.Ct. 396

(1973). An erroneous reasonable doubt instruction can violate

due process. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239

(1994). To satisfy the due process clause, the instruction must:

(1) convey to the jury that it must consider only the evidence;

and (2) properly state the government’s burden of proof. Id. at

13. 

Both the state and federal courts have universally rejected

petitioner’s claim that CALJIC 2.90 violates the due process

right to conviction upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Lisenbee v. Henry, 166 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999); People v.

Hearon, 72 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1287, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 424 (1999). 

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of this claim was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. This claim is DENIED.

B. Lewd and Lascivious Conduct Conviction

The conviction under Cal. Penal Code § 288(c) arises out of

an incident in September 1997, where petitioner touched the

crotch area of a 15-year old girl, Sara C., while she was on

horseback. (Answer at 5.) Petitioner makes three claims as to

this conviction: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to

support the conviction; (2) that the court erred in refusing his

request for an instruction on the lesser-included offense of

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battery; and (3) that the reasonable doubt instruction was

constitutionally flawed. (Pet. at 5A, 5B, 5C, 6E.)

In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, petitioner

argues that there was insufficient evidence that he had the

specific intent, as required by Cal. Penal Code § 288(a), to

sexually gratify himself or Sara C. with the touching. (Id. at

5A.) In reviewing a claim of sufficiency of the evidence, the

court must determine “whether, after reviewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979) (emphasis in original). The

California Court of Appeal, applying the identical state

standard, found that a rational trier of fact could have

determined that petitioner had the requisite specific intent

given that the record was devoid of any circumstances indicative

of innocent touching. (Ct. App. at 7.) The determination of the

state court of appeal was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of existing Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts. This claim is

DENIED.

Petitioner’s second claim as to the lewd and lascivious

conduct conviction is that he was entitled to an instruction on

the lesser-included offense of battery. (Pet. at 5B, 5C.) The

failure of a state court to instruct on lesser-included offenses

in a non-capital case does not present a federal constitutional

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question unless the failure to instruct interferes with the

defendant’s right to adequate instructions on his theory of

defense. Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 1998);

James v. Reese, 546 F.2d 325, 327 (1976); Bashor v. Risley, 730

F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 1984). To state a claim under the

Bashor exception, defendant’s theory of the case must support the

lesser-included offense instruction and there must be some

evidence that only the lesser-included offense was committed. 

Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 928-30 (9th Cir. 2000). In

rejecting petitioner’s claim, the court of appeal found that

there was no evidence of a non-sexual intentional touching that

would support a battery instruction. (Ct. App. at 8.) This

decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

established federal law. Nor was this an unreasonable

determination of the facts, as petitioner’s theory of the case

was that the touching, if it occurred, was accidental. (Rep.’s

Tr. at 66-, 71-72, 88-93, 104-08, 110-16, 152-59.) This claim is

DENIED.

Finally, petitioner claims that the reasonable doubt

instruction given in this case was constitutionally flawed. 

(Pet. at 6E.) The reasonable doubt instruction given was CALJIC

2.90, the same instruction given in the stalking case. For the

reasons discussed above, this claim is DENIED. 

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For the set forth above, the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/25/2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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