Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-17858/USCOURTS-ca9-11-17858-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN DARIANO; DIANNA DARIANO,

on behalf of their minor child, M.D.;

KURT FAGERSTROM; JULIE ANN

FAGERSTROM, on behalf of their

minor child, D.M.; KENDALL JONES;

JOY JONES, on behalf of their minor

child, D.G.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MORGAN HILL UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT; NICK BODEN, in his

official capacity as Principal, Live

Oak High School; MIGUEL

RODRIGUEZ, in his individual and

official capacity as Assistant

Principal, Live Oak High School,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11-17858

D.C. No.

5:10-cv-02745-

JW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

James Ware, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 17, 2013—San Francisco, California

Filed February 27, 2014

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2 DARIANO V. MORGAN HILL UNIFIED SCH. DIST.

Before: Sidney R. Thomas and M. Margaret McKeown,

Circuit Judges, and Virginia M. Kendall, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge McKeown

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

in a civil rights suit brought by high school students who

were asked to remove clothing bearing images of the

American flag after school officials learned ofthreats of racerelated violence during a school-sanctioned celebration of

Cinco de Mayo.

The panel held that school officials did not violate the

students’ rights to freedom of expression, due process, or

equal protection. The panel held given the history of prior

events at the school, including an altercation on campus, it

was reasonable for school officials to proceed as though the

threat of a potentially violent disturbance was real. The

panel held that school officials anticipated violence or

substantial disruption of or material interference with school

activities, and their response was tailored to the

circumstances.

* The Honorable Virginia M. Kendall, District Judge for the U.S. District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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DARIANO V. MORGAN HILL UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 3

COUNSEL

Robert J. Muise (argued), American Freedom Law Center,

Ann Arbor, Michigan; William J. Becker, Jr., The Becker

Law Firm, Los Angeles, California; Erin Mersino, Thomas

More Law Center, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Don Willenburg (argued), Mark S. Posard, and Alyson S.

Cabrera, Gordon & Rees LLP, San Francisco, California, for

Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

We are asked again to consider the delicate relationship

between students’ First Amendment rights and the

operational and safety needs of schools. As we noted in

Wynar v. Douglas County School District, 728 F.3d 1062,

1064 (9th Cir. 2013), “school administratorsface the daunting

task of evaluating potential threats of violence and keeping

their students safe without impinging on their constitutional

rights.” In this case, after school officials learned of threats of

race-related violence during a school-sanctioned celebration

of Cinco de Mayo, the school asked a group of students to

remove clothing bearing images of the American flag.

1

The students brought a civil rights suit against the school

district and two school officials, alleging violations of their

1 Because the students’ names are confidential, we refer to them

collectively as “the students,” or by their initials, M.D., D.G., and D.M.

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4 DARIANO V. MORGAN HILL UNIFIED SCH. DIST.

federal and state constitutional rights to freedom of

expression, equal protection, and due process. We affirm the

district court’s grant of summary judgment as to the only

defendant party to this appeal, Assistant Principal Miguel

Rodriguez, and its denial of the students’ motion for summary

judgment, on all claims. School officials anticipated violence

or substantial disruption of or material interference with

school activities, and their response was tailored to the

circumstances. As a consequence, we conclude that school

officials did not violate the students’ rights to freedom of

expression, due process, or equal protection.

BACKGROUND

This case arose out of the events of May 5, 2010, Cinco

de Mayo, at Live Oak High School (“Live Oak” or “the

School”), part of the Morgan Hill Unified School District in

Northern California. The Cinco de Mayo celebration was

presented in the “spirit of cultural appreciation.” It was

described as honoring “the pride and community strength of

the Mexican people who settled this valley and who continue

to work here.” The school likened it to St. Patrick’s Day or

Oktoberfest. The material facts are not in dispute.

Live Oak had a history of violence among students, some

gang-related and some drawn along racial lines. In the six

years that Nick Boden served as principal, he observed at

least thirty fights on campus, both between gangs and

between Caucasian and Hispanic students. A police officer is

stationed on campus every day to ensure safety on school

grounds.

On Cinco de Mayo in 2009, a year before the events

relevant to this appeal, there was an altercation on campus

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DARIANO V. MORGAN HILL UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 5

between a group of predominantly Caucasian students and a

group of Mexican students.2 The groups exchanged

profanities and threats. Some students hung a makeshift

American flag on one of the trees on campus, and as they did,

the group of Caucasian students began clapping and chanting

“USA.” A group of Mexican students had been walking

around with the Mexican flag, and in response to the white

students’ flag-raising, one Mexican student shouted “f***

them white boys, f*** them white boys.” When Assistant

Principal Miguel Rodriguez told the student to stop using

profane language, the student said, “But Rodriguez, they are

racist. They are being racist. F*** them white boys. Let’s

f*** them up.” Rodriguez removed the student from the area.

At least one party to this appeal, student M.D., wore

American flag clothing to school on Cinco de Mayo 2009.

M.D. was approached by a male student who, in the words of

the district court, “shoved a Mexican flag at him and said

something in Spanish expressing anger at [M.D.’s] clothing.”

A year later, on Cinco de Mayo 2010, a group of

Caucasian students, including the students bringing this

appeal, wore American flag shirts to school. A female student

approached M.D. that morning, motioned to his shirt, and

asked, “Why are you wearing that? Do you not like

Mexicans[?]” D.G. andD.M.were also confronted about their

clothing before “brunch break.”

2 We use the ethnic and racial terminology employed by the district

court (Caucasian, Hispanic, Mexican). For example, the district court at

times referred to students of Mexican origin born in the United States and

students born in Mexico collectively as “Mexican.” We adopt the same

practice here, for the limited purpose of clarifying the narrative.

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As Rodriguez was leaving his office before brunch break,

a Caucasian student approached him, and said, “You may

want to go out to the quad area. There might be some—there

might be some issues.” During the break, another student

called Rodriguez over to a group of Mexican students, said

that she was concerned about a group of students wearing the

American flag, and said that “there might be problems.”

Rodriguez understood her to mean that there might be a

physical altercation. A group of Mexican students asked

Rodriguez why the Caucasian students “get to wear their flag

out when we [sic] don’t get to wear our [sic] flag?”

Boden directed Rodriguez to have the students either turn

their shirts inside out or take them off. The students refused

to do so.

Rodriguez met with the students and explained that he

was concerned for their safety. The students did not dispute

that their attire put them at risk of violence. Plaintiff D.M.

said that he was “willing to take on that responsibility” in

order to continue wearing his shirt. Two of the students, M.D.

and D.G., said they would have worn the flag clothing even

if they had known violence would be directed toward them.

School officials permitted M.D. and another student not

a party to this action to return to class, because Boden

considered their shirts, whose imagery was less “prominent,”

to be “less likely [to get them] singled out, targeted for any

possible recrimination,” and “significant[ly] differen[t] in

[terms of] what [he] saw as being potential for targeting.”3

 

3

 The students permitted to return to class were wearing “Tap Out” (or

“TapouT”) shirts, which bear the logo of a popular martial arts company,

sometimes (as here) with flag iconography.

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DARIANO V. MORGAN HILL UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 7

The officials offered the remaining students the choice

either to turn their shirts inside out or to go home for the day

with excused absences that would not count against their

attendance records. Students D.M. and D.G. chose to go

home. Neither was disciplined.

In the aftermath of the students’ departure from school,

they received numerous threats from other students. D.G. was

threatened by text message on May 6, and the same

afternoon, received a threatening phone call from a caller

saying he was outside of D.G.’s home. D.M. and M.D. were

likewise threatened with violence, and a student at Live Oak

overheard a group of classmates saying that some gang

members would come down from San Jose to “take care of”

the students. Because of these threats, the students did not go

to school on May 7.

The students and their parents, acting as guardians,

brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the California

Constitution against Morgan Hill Unified School District

(“the District”); and Boden and Rodriguez, in their official

and individual capacities, alleging violations of their federal

and California constitutional rights to freedom of expression

and their federal constitutional rights to equal protection and

due process.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district

court granted Rodriguez’s motion on all claims and denied

the students’ motion on all claims, holding that school

officials did not violate the students’ federal or state

constitutional rights. The district court did not address claims

against Boden, because he was granted an automatic stay in

bankruptcy. The district court dismissed all claims against the

District on grounds of sovereign immunity, a ruling not

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8 DARIANO V. MORGAN HILL UNIFIED SCH. DIST.

challenged on appeal. The question on appeal is thus whether

Rodriguez, in his official or individual capacity, violated the

students’ constitutional rights.

ANALYSIS

I. FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS

We analyze the students’ claims4

under the wellrecognized framework of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent

Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).5 Under

Tinker, students may “express [their] opinions, even on

controversial subjects . . . if [they] do[] so without materially

and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of

appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and

without colliding with the rights of others.” Id. at 513 (final

alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). To

“justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion,”

school officials “must be able to show that [their] action was

caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the

discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an

unpopular viewpoint.” Id. at 509.

4 Because California follows federal law for free expression claims

arising in the school setting, the students’ federal and state claims stand

or fall together. Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. Governing Bd. of San Diego

Unified Sch. Dist., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1383, 1391–92 (1996).

5 As we noted in Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1067, student speech that is

“vulgar, lewd, obscene [or] plainly offensive” is governed by Bethel

School District Number 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); speech that

is “school-sponsored” is governed by Hazelwood School District v.

Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); and speech that “falls into neither of

these categories” is governed byTinker. See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch.

Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992) (listing standards).

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DARIANO V. MORGAN HILL UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 9

That said, “conduct by the student, in class or out of it,

which for any reason— whether it stems from time, place, or

type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves

substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of

course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of

freedom of speech.” Id. at 513. Under Tinker, schools may

prohibit speech that “might reasonably [lead] school

authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material

interference with school activities,” or that constitutes an

“actual or nascent [interference] with the schools’ work or . . .

collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to

be let alone.” Id. at 508, 514; see also Wynar, 728 F.3d at

1067 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 514.). As we have

explained, “the First Amendment does not require school

officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they

may act. In fact, they have a duty to prevent the occurrence of

disturbances.” Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir.

1973) (footnote omitted). Indeed, in the school context, “the

level of disturbance required to justify official intervention is

relatively lower in a public school than it might be on a street

corner.” Id.

Although Tinker guides our analysis, the facts of this case

distinguish it sharply from Tinker, in which students’ “pure

speech” was held to be constitutionally protected. 393 U.S. at

508. In contrast to Tinker, in which there was “no evidence

whatever of petitioners’ interference, actual or nascent, with

the schools’ work or of collision with the rights of other

students to be secure and to be let alone,” id., there was

evidence of nascent and escalating violence at Live Oak. On

the morning of May 5, 2010, each of the three students was

confronted about their clothing by other students, one of

whom approached student M.D. and asked, “Why are you

wearing that? Do you not like Mexicans[?]” Before the

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brunch break, Rodriguez learned of the threat of a physical

altercation. During the break, Rodriguez was warned about

impending violence by a second student. The warnings of

violence came, as the district court noted, “in [the] context of

ongoing racial tension and gang violence within the school,

and after a near-violent altercation had erupted during the

prior Cinco de Mayo over the display of an American flag.”

Threats issued in the aftermath of the incident were so real

that the parents of the students involved in this suit kept them

home from school two days later.

The minimal restrictions on the students were not

conceived of as an “urgent wish to avoid the controversy,” as

in Tinker, id. at 510, or as a trumped-up excuse to tamp down

student expression. The controversy and tension remained,

but the school’s actions presciently avoided an altercation.

Unlike in Tinker, where “[e]ven an official memorandum

prepared after the [students’] suspension that listed the

reasons for the ban on wearing the armbands made no

reference to the anticipation of such disruption,” id. at 509,

school officials here explicitly referenced anticipated

disruption, violence, and concerns about student safety in

conversations with students at the time of the events, in

conversations the same day with the students and their

parents, and in a memorandum and press release circulated

the next day.

In keeping with our precedent, school officials’ actions

were tailored to avert violence and focused on student safety,

in at least two ways. For one, officials restricted the wearing

of certain clothing, but did not punish the students. School

officials have greater constitutional latitude to suppress

student speech than to punish it. In Karp, we held that school

officials could “curtail the exercise of First Amendment

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DARIANO V. MORGAN HILL UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 11

rights when they c[ould] reasonably forecast material

interference or substantial disruption,” but could not

discipline the student without “show[ing] justification for

their action.” 477 F.2d at 176; cf. Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1072

(upholding expulsion, despite its “more punitive character,”

as a justified response to threats); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist.,

257 F.3d 981, 992 (9th Cir. 2001). 

For another, officials did not enforce a blanket ban on

American flag apparel, but instead allowed two students to

return to class when it became clear that their shirts were

unlikely to make them targets of violence. The school

distinguished among the students based on the perceived

threat level, and did not embargo all flag-related clothing. See

Background, supra.

Finally, whereas the conduct in Tinker expressly did “not

concern aggressive, disruptive action or even group

demonstrations,” 393 U.S. at 508, school officials at Live

Oak reasonably could have understood the students’ actions

as falling into any of those three categories, particularly in the

context of the 2009 altercation. The events of 2010 took

place in the shadow of similar disruptions a year earlier, and

pitted racial or ethnic groups against each other. Moreover,

students warned officials that there might be physical fighting

at the break.

Our role is not to second-guess the decision to have a

Cinco de Mayo celebration or the precautions put in place to

avoid violence. “We review . . . with deference[] schools’

decisions in connection with the safety of their students even

when freedom of expression is involved,” keeping in mind

that “deference does not mean abdication.” LaVine, 257 F.3d

at 988, 992. As in Wynar, the question here is not whether the

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threat of violence was real, but only whether it was

“reasonable for [the school] to proceed as though [it were].”

728 F.3d at 1071; Karp, 477 F.2d at 175 (noting that “Tinker

does not demand a certainty that disruption will occur, but

rather the existence of facts which might reasonably lead

school officials to forecast substantial disruption”). Here,

both the specific events of May 5, 2010, and the pattern of

which those events were a part made it reasonable for school

officials to proceed as though the threat of a potentially

violent disturbance was real. We hold that school officials,

namelyRodriguez, did not act unconstitutionally, under either

the First Amendment or Article I, § 2(a) of the California

Constitution, in asking students to turn their shirts inside out,

remove them, or leave school for the day with an excused

absence in order to prevent substantial disruption or violence

at school.

II. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM

The students’ equal protection claim is a variation of their

First Amendment challenge. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§ 1 (stating that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). They

allege that they were treated differently than students wearing

the colors of the Mexican flag, and that their speech was

suppressed because their viewpoint was disfavored. We note

that the students had no response when asked why they chose

to wear flag clothing on the day in question. The school

responds that it had a viewpoint-neutral reason—student

safety—for suppressing the speech in question, and that they

treated “all students for whose safety they feared in the same

manner.”

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Government action that suppresses protected speech in a

discriminatorymanner mayviolate both the First Amendment

and the Equal Protection Clause. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,

505 U.S. 377, 384 n.4 (1992) (noting that the Supreme Court

“has occasionally fused the First Amendment into the Equal

Protection Clause in this fashion, but . . . with the

acknowledgment . . . that the First Amendment underlies its

analysis”). Where plaintiffs allege violations of the Equal

Protection Clause relating to expressive conduct, we employ

“essentially the same” analysis as we would in a case alleging

only content or viewpoint discrimination under the First

Amendment. Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 575 (6th Cir.

2008).

In the school context, we look again to Tinker. 393 U.S.

at 510; see also Barr, 538 F.3d at 576–77; Porter v.

Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2004)

(stating that Tinker “applies to school regulations directed at

specific student viewpoints”). According to Tinker, schools

are not forced to “prohibit the wearing of all symbols of

political or controversial significance” in order to justify a

prohibition against the wearing of a certain symbol, if such a

prohibition is “necessary to avoid material and substantial

interference with schoolwork or discipline.” 393 U.S. at

510–11. Schools may, under Tinker, ban certain images, for

example images of the Confederate flag on clothing, even

though such bans might constitute viewpoint discrimination.

See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166,

1184–85 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[w]hile the Confederate

flag may express a particular viewpoint, ‘[i]t is not only

constitutionally allowable for school officials’ to limit the

expression of racially explosive views, ‘it is their duty to do

so’” (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Sch. Bd. of

Alachua Cnty., 324 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003) (per

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curiam)), judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom.

Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 549 U.S.

1262 (2007); Scott, 324 F.3d at 1248 (upholding district court

order barring Confederate symbols based on “the potential

disruption that the displaying of Confederate symbols would

likely create”); West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260,

206 F.3d 1358, 1366–67 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding ban on

Confederate symbols based on a “series of racial incidents or

confrontations,” including “hostile confrontations between a

group of white and black students”).

As the district court noted, the students offered no

evidence “demonstrating that students wearing the colors of

the Mexican flag were targeted for violence.” The students

offered no evidence that students at a similar risk of danger

were treated differently, and therefore no evidence of

impermissible viewpoint discrimination.

Because the record demonstrates that the students’ shirts

“might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast

substantial disruption of or material interference with school

activities,” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514, the authorities’ actions

were permissible under Tinker. We reject the students’ equal

protection claim.

III. DUE PROCESS AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CLAIMS

The students further challenge the District’s dress code,

which prohibits clothing that “indicate[s] gang affiliation,

create[s] a safetyhazard, or disrupt[s]school activities.” They

seek to permanently enjoin the use of the dress code, claiming

that it fails to provide objective standards by which to referee

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DARIANO V. MORGAN HILL UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 15

student attire, in violation of the Due Process Clause.6 We

reject the students’ due process claims.

The Supreme Court has “recognized that maintaining

security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of

flexibility in school disciplinary procedures,” and has thus

specified that, “[g]iven the school’s need to be able to impose

disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated

conduct disruptive of the educational process, the school

disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code

. . . . ” Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 686 (holding that a

school had not violated a student’s due process rights by

disciplining him for lewd speech under a policy prohibiting

“obscene” speech). 

The District’s dress code is in line with others that the

federal courts have held to be permissible. See, e.g.,

Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 441,

444 (4th Cir. 2013) (upholding code prohibiting

“disrupt[ive]” or “offensive” clothing, including clothing that

“distract[s]” or “interfere[s]”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 201

(2013); A.M. ex rel. McAllum v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 224 (5th

Cir. 2009) (upholding code prohibiting clothing with

“inappropriate symbolism”).

Significantly, the dress code challenged here incorporates

the standards sanctioned in Tinker: safety and disruption. See

B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 508 F. Supp. 2d 740,

750–51 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (holding that a dress code that

contains language that “tracks Tinker” poses “no real danger”

6 Although the District is not a party to this appeal, we consider the

students’ dress code claims because they brought suit against Rodriguez

in his official capacity.

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of compromising the First Amendment rights of students),

aff'd 554 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Hardwick,

711 F.3d at 441. It would be unreasonable to require a dress

code to anticipate every scenario that might pose a safety risk

to students or that might substantially disrupt school

activities. Dress codes are not, nor should they be, a school

version of the Code of Federal Regulations. It would be

equally unreasonable to hold that school officials could not,

at a minimum, rely upon the language Tinker gives them.

We affirm the district court’s holding that the policy is

not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate the

students’ right to due process.

AFFIRMED.

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