Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01368/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01368-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEJANDRO RODRIGUEZ-PRECIADO,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 14-CV-1368; 11-CR2880

ORDER DENYING 28 U.S.C.

§2255 HABEAS PETITION AND

DENYING PENDING MOTIONS

AS MOOT

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On July 20, 2011, pursuant to a plea agreement, Rodriguez-Preciado pled guilty to

importation of cocaine and methamphetamine. On December 16, 2011, he was sentenced

to 135 months in custody, followed by five years of supervised release and a $100

assessment. (Docket no. 33.) On December 19, 2011, Rodriguez-Preciado filed a habeas 1

corpus petition to modify his sentence on the ground that his ineligibility for a two-point

sentence reduction through a drug program based on his alien status was a violation of his

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on his alien status. (Docket no. 34.) The Court

concluded that his ineligibility was not a violation of his due process or equal protection rights

and denied his petition.

On May 27, 2014, Rodriguez-Preciado submitted a new §2255 petition, alleging that

his counsel was ineffective for failure to file a notice of appeal. See 28 U.S.C. §2255.

 All docket numbers in this order are from Case No. 11-CR-2880. 1

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(Docket no. 40.) He also requested this Court grant him retroactive leave to appeal, or

extend the time in which he could file a notice of appeal. (Docket nos. 37, 38.) 

I. IFP Motion

Along with his §2255 petition, Rodriguez-Preciado filed a motion to proceed in forma

pauperis. No filing fee is required for his habeas petition. See Rule 3, Rules Governing

§2255 Proceedings, Advisory Comm. Notes (1976) (“There is no filing fee required of a

movant under these rules.”) See also United States v. Thomas, 713 F.3d 165, 173 (3d Cir.

2013). The motion is therefore DENIED AS MOOT. 

II. The Statute of Limitations

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255(f), there is a one-year statute of limitations period on

filing habeas petitions. Unless any exception applies, the statutory period begins to run when

the judgement becomes final. See 28 U.S.C. §2255(f)(1). A judgement of conviction

becomes final on the date when the time to file an appeal expires. See United States v.

Buckles, 674 F.3d 883, 889 (9 Cir. 2011); United States v. Schwartz, 274 F.3d 1220, 1221

th

(9 Cir. 2001). Rodriguez-Preciado’s conviction became final fourteen days after the entry th

of judgement, on December 30, 2011. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). He filed his §2255

petition on May 27, 2014, more than two years following finality of the judgement. The

Petitioner does not claim that any of the three exceptions to the rule apply. See 28 U.S.C.

§2255(f)(1). 

The limitations period might be tolled for statutory or equitable reasons. The limitation

period between two habeas petitions filed in the same court will only be tolled by statute

when the second petition is limited to an elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the

first petition. See Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 951 (9 Cir. 2012). As to equitable tolling,

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Petitioner has to show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.” See Holland v. Florinda, 130 S. Ct. 2549,

2562 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)); accord Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9 Cir. 1999). Such extraordinary circumstances include, for th

example, deprivation of access to legal resources, see Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556

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F.3d 1008, 1013 (9 Cir. 2009), or egregious attorney misconduct, see Holland, 130 S. Ct. th

at 2563. Here, Rodriguez-Preciado does not identify any grounds for tolling. He does not limit

his second petition to an elaboration of facts or identify any circumstances beyond his control

preventing him from filing on time. The petition is therefore time-barred and for that reason

it must be DENIED. 

III. Waiver of Collateral Review

Rodriguez-Preciado entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea and waived his right

to appeal or collaterally attack his sentence. A defendant validly waives his right to appeal

or collaterally attack a sentence if the language of the waiver encompasses his right to

appeal on the grounds raised and he knowingly and voluntarily agrees to waive those rights.

See United States v. Rahman, 642, F.3d 1257, 1259 (9 Cir. 2011). However, a waiver th

cannot bar a claim that relates to the validity of the waiver itself, such as ineffective

assistance of counsel. See United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9 Cir. 1994). th

The Ninth Circuit has upheld the enforceability of waivers, reasoning that the right to

bring a collateral attack is derived by statue, and “[a] knowing and voluntary waiver of a

statutory right is enforceable.” See United States v. Abarca, 958 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9 Cir. th

1993). Petitioner’s plea agreement explicitly waived the right to collaterally attack his

sentence unless the Court imposed a custodial sentence above the high end of the guideline

range recommended by the United States. (Docket no. 15 at 11: 6-9.) At sentencing, the

United States recommended a range of 168 to 210 months in custody, and the Court

sentenced Rodriguez-Preciado below this range. Therefore, pursuant to the plea agreement,

Petitioner validly waived all grounds for collateral review except ineffective assistance of

counsel for the plea. 

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Rodriguez-Preciado’s petition seeks relief on the grounds that his counsel was

ineffective for failing to file a requested notice of appeal. Petitioner identified only one matter

that should have been appealed: a “two point enhancement” sentencing issue. (Docket no.

40.) But Petitioner’s pre-sentence report shows that there was no two-point enhancement

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at sentencing. (Docket no. 23.) Although the petition gives no further details, the Court

believes that Petitioner is referring to the two-point sentence reduction for which he is

ineligible under the Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”). This is precisely the issue

Petitioner raised in his first habeas petition, which the Court rejected on the merits. (Docket

no. 35.) 

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Rodriguez-Preciado would have

to first show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s

representation fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” and that, but for

counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would

have been different. Id. at 694.

Here, Rodriguez-Preciado claims that his counsel was ineffective because he failed

to file a notice of appeal which prevented him from raising the RDAP eligibility sentencing

issue. (Docket no. 40.) The Ninth Circuit has ruled that when a petitioner claims that he

asked his attorney to file a notice of appeal, and the attorney fails to do so, the district court

should not dismiss the motion prior to an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. SandovalLopez, 209 F.3d 1193, 1198 (9 Cir. 2005). But “merely conclusory statements in a §2255 th

motion are not enough to require a hearing.” See United States v. Johnson, 988 F. 2d 941

(9 Cir. 1993). Rodriguez-Preciado’s petition is as conclusory as they come: his petition’s th

grounds for relief in their entirety are based on “whether counsel was ineffective for failure

to file a notice of appeal, when Defendant requested to do so.” Finally, Sandoval-Lopez will

not get Petitioner around the fact that his stated grounds for an appeal have already been

adjudicated on the merits. The relief Petitioner seeks - leave to appeal - is at best moot. 

Rodriguez-Preciado also fails to demonstrate counsel’s deficient performance on any

other ground. The plea agreement adequately establishes the factual basis for the plea.

There is no indication on the record that Defendant was inadequately advised or mis-

/ / /

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understood his constitutional rights. There was no basis to file a notice of appeal because 2

he waived his right to appeal and the specific grounds for appeal he claims would have been

meritless. As noted above, Rodriguez-Preciado already asserted the purported grounds for

appeal in the first habeas corpus petition in December 2011, (Docket no. 34), which was

denied by the Court on the merits, (Docket no. 35). If the Petitioner had appealed on those

grounds, it would have been denied on the same merits. Therefore, Petitioner was not

prejudiced by the lack of an appeal. Under these circumstances, no constitutional error

occurred. Accordingly, the petition is DENIED.

IV. Successive Petition 

Rodriguez-Preciado’s petition filed on May 27, 2014 is his second habeas corpus

petition under 28 U.S.C. §2255. Because his first petition on the same sentencing issue was

denied in 2012, the second petition is a successive petition. Section 2255(h) provides that

“a second or successive petition must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of

the appropriate court of appeals.” See 28 U.S.C. §2255(h). Section 2244(b)(3)(A), in turn,

provides that “before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in

the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order

authorizing the district court to consider the application.” Id. §2244(b)(3)(A). To date,

Rodriguez-Preciado has not sought or obtained an order from the appropriate court

authorizing him to file a successive §2255 petition. 

There are several situations where a “second or successive” challenge to the same

judgment does not fall within the bar provided by sections 2244(b) and 2255(h). One of

them is when a §2255 petition raises a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for

failure to file an appeal from a criminal conviction. See Johnson v. United States, 362 F.3d

636, 637 (9 Cir. 2004). However, the Johnson ruling made clear that the exception only th

applies where the petition asserting ineffective assistance of counsel was filed initially rather

than subsequently. The Court declines to extend the Johnson ruling to Petitioner’s situation

 Petitioner was represented by an experienced criminal defense attorney. There is 2

no evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. Indeed, Petitioner’s 135 months sentence

is below the potential 168 month sentence he may have received absent plea negotiations.

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where the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not presented until the second petition.

There is no indication in the record why Petitioner could not have presented his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim in his first petition. Therefore, the petition must be DENIED as

a successive petition. 

V. Conclusion and Order 

For the reasons given above, the Court DENIES Rodriguez-Preciado’s petition in its

entirety. The petition is barred both by the statute of limitations and as a successive petition.

Further, the record makes clear Rodriguez-Preciado voluntarily waived his right to appeal or

collaterally attack his sentence, and he failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of

counsel. The petition is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 3, 2014

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN Burns

United States District Judge

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