Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-00144/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-00144-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Daniel Weldon Hackman, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. _________________________________

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No. CV-05-144-PCT-SMM (MS)

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Daniel Hackman’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (the “Petition”), filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Dkt. 1.) Petitioner challenges his

convictions for kidnaping, burglary, aggravated assault, and five counts of sexual assault

following a jury trial in Navajo County Superior Court. On January 13, 2005, the matter was

referred to Magistrate Judge Morton Sitver for a Report and Recommendation. (Dkt. 2.) On

February 10, 2006, Judge Sitver issued a Report and Recommendation, advising this Court that

Petitioner’s Petition should be denied and dismissed with prejudice. (Dkt. 18.) Petitioner has

filed Objections (Dkt. 26) to Judge Sitver’s Report and Recommendation. After considering

Judge Sitver’s Report and Recommendation and Petitioner’s Objections thereto, the Court now

issues the following ruling. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also Baxter v.

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991). The Court must review the legal analysis in the

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Report and Recommendation de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court must review

the factual analysis in the Report and Recommendation de novo for those facts to which

Objections are filed and for clear error for those facts to which no Objections are filed. See id.;

see also Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998) (failure to file objections relieves

the district court of conducting de novo review of the magistrate’s factual findings).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner has objected to the February 10, 2006 Report and Recommendation filed by

Judge Sitver, stating he does not agree with its findings and asking this Court, instead, to find

for him. (Dkt. 26.) Petitioner raised essentially the same issues in his objections as those raised

initially in his Petition and his Reply to Respondents’ Answer to the Petition. (Dkt. 1, 14, 26.)

Having reviewed the factual analysis and legal conclusions of Judge Sitver’s Report and

Recommendation, and Petitioner’s objections thereto, the Court hereby incorporates and adopts

Judge Sitver’s Report and Recommendation, with the following additions.

Petitioner objects to the “Background” portion of the Report and Recommendation on

the grounds that it is “materially misleading” because it omits that he (i) did not testify at trial;

(ii) was found not guilty of sexual abuse; (iii) did not file a pro se petition for post conviction

relief until after he received copies of the trial transcripts; and (iv) was represented by counsel

during the filing of the Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals but not represented by

counsel during the filing of the Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court. (Dkt. 26 at

4-5.) The omission of these facts does not render the Report and Recommendation misleading,

nor does it prejudice Petitioner, because none of the omitted facts are pertinent to the claims

asserted in the instant Petition. Thus, this objection is overruled.

For various reasons, Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation’s finding that

Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, parts of 11, and 12 are procedurally defaulted. (Dkt. 26 at 5-10.)

First, Petitioner contends Claims 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 were “properly exhausted” because

each of the grounds stated in the instant Petition were properly presented in his pro se Rule 32

petition. (Dkt. 26 at 7.) The Court overrules this objection. The record confirms that Claims

4, 5, 6, and 7 were not “fairly presented” in state court. See Dkt. 1 at 8-11; Dkt. 10, Ex. A at

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1

 Similarly, Claim 3 was not “fairly presented” in state court because Petitioner failed

to base his claim on either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, and did not support such claim

with federal authority. See Dkt. 1 at 7; Dkt. 15, Ex. 3, Item 1 at 15-16. A petitioner must make

the federal basis of a claim explicit either by citing specific provisions of federal law or federal

case law, even if the federal basis of a claim is “self-evident,” Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882,

888 (9th Cir. 1999), or by citing state cases that explicitly analyze the same federal

constitutional claim, Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

2

 With respect to Claim 11, Judge Sitver properly determined that Petitioner did not

fairly present two claims for ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) based on defense

counsel’s (i) failure to challenge prosecutorial misconduct during opening statements; and (ii)

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88d-88f, 66f-66g, 170a-170b; Dkt. 15, Ex. 3, Item 1 at 3-4, 9. Although Petitioner asserted

similar facts in state court, he failed to specifically indicate that the claims were based on

violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendments. See Anderson v. Harless, 459

U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (a claim is “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative facts

and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that the state courts have a fair

opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional

claim); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669-70 (2000), as amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir.

2001) (a state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and thus exhausted) federal claims in state

court unless he specifically indicated to that court that the claims were based on federal law);

Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000) (broad reference to “due process”

insufficient to present federal claim).1

 

Similarly, although Petitioner did present Claim 8 in his Rule 32 petition, the Navajo

County Superior Court expressly determined that such claim was procedurally barred from

consideration under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 32.2(a)(3) because it could have

been raised on direct review but was not. (Dkt. 10, Ex. A at 170h.) Petitioner does not dispute

that the preclusive effect of Rule 32.2(a)(3) is both independent and adequate, nor can he. See

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (per curiam); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932

(9th Cir. 1998) (Rule 32.2(a)(3) independent and adequate).

Second, Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation’s finding that two parts

of Claim 11 were not exhausted,2

 on the grounds that his Rule 32 pro se petition “did fairly

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failure to emphasize a photograph submitted to the jury that depicted the victim wearing a

necklace. (Dkt. 18 at 11-12.)

3

 Similarly, Petitioner did not “fairly present” Claim 12 because the instant Petition

alleges a violation of his federal rights based on evidence gathered in connection with an alleged

illegal arrest. See Dkt. 1 at 17. In state court, however, Petitioner alleged the fundamentally

different claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to evidence that was

“fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Dkt. 15, Ex. 3, Item 1 at 9. The IAC claim Petitioner raised

in state court is fundamentally different from the federal claim challenging the admissibility of

evidence. The same is true of Claims 1 and 2 of the instant Petition, which allege violations of

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, because in state court Petitioner did not

allege that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated. See Dkt. 1 at 5-6; Dkt.

15, Ex. 1 at 2, 22; Ex. 3, Item 1 at 6, 14-16.

4

 The Court rejects Petitioner’s contention that the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing judge did

not permit him to raise the allegation of IAC based on counsel’s failure to emphasize a

photograph in which the victim was wearing a necklace. See Dkt. 10, Ex. A at 12-13, 170g.

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present these two issues.” (Dkt. 26 at 8.) This objection is overruled because Claim 11’s

allegation of IAC based on counsel’s failure to challenge prosecutorial misconduct was not

asserted in state court; in state court Petitioner asserted a fundamentally different claim of

prosecutorial misconduct alone, see Dkt. 1 at 16; Dkt. 10, Ex. B at 7-10; Dkt. 15, Ex. 3, Item

1 at 15-16. 3 See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (petitioner must fairly present

the “substance of federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to

pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights”); Vasquez v. Hillery,

474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986) (federal claim may be considered unexhausted if new factual

allegations not presented in state court “fundamentally alter” the legal claim presented and

considered there).

Moreover, Claim 11’s allegation of IAC based on the failure to emphasize a photograph

of the victim wearing a necklace was not properly exhausted because, although it was raised at

the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing,4

 it was not presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals and thus

was not properly raised for the first time in the Arizona Supreme Court, see Dkt. 15, Ex. 1 at

1-2; Ex. 3, Item 1 at 16. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999) (“except

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in habeas petitions in capital cases, claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes

of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them”). 

Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation on the grounds that “the entire

proceedings is [sic] a fundamental miscarriage of justice” because Claim 8 is an “actual

innocence” claim. (Dkt. 26 at 9-12.) In Claim 8, Petitioner alleges that the victim’s perjured

statement to the police was unconstitutionally used against him during the grand jury

proceedings and at trial. (Dkt. 1 at 12.) In Schlup v. Delo, the United States Supreme Court

held that, to prevail on a claim of “actual innocence,” a petitioner “must show that it is more

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.” 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must

show that, considering all the evidence, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have convicted him.” Id. at 327-28. Furthermore:

[A] substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an

innocent person is extremely rare. . . . To be credible, such a claim requires

petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable

evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness

accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial. Because

such evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast majority of cases, claims of

actual innocence are rarely successful.

Id. at 324.

In the present case, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of showing that, considering

all the evidence, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him,”

nor has he supported his allegations with new reliable evidence that was not presented at trial.

Id. Thus, Petitioner’s actual innocence objection is overruled. 

Finally, Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation’s finding that “no basis

for barring or dismissing Respondents’ Answer” exists. (Dkt. 18 at 1-2.) The Court finds that

the Magistrate Judge properly rejected all of Petitioner’s arguments in support of his request to

dismiss Respondents’ Answer, and Petitioner includes no new arguments in his objections.

(Dkt. 26.) Therefore, this objection is overruled. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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CONCLUSION

Having reviewed de novo the facts at issue in the instant action and the legal analysis

in the Report and Recommendation issued by Judge Sitver, and finding that the analysis in

the report is correct, the Court hereby adopts its conclusions. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation

of Magistrate Judge Sitver (Dkt. 18), after reviewing de novo his factual findings and legal

conclusions, with the above additions.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING Petitioner’s request to bar or dismiss

Respondents’ Answer (Dkt. 9). (Dkt. 14.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is

DENIED AND DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, thereby terminating this case.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall send a copy of this

Order to all parties as well as to Magistrate Judge Morton Sitver.

DATED this 11th day of May, 2006.

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