Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02094/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02094-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 130
Nature of Suit: Miller Act
Cause of Action: 

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• 

• 

PILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TEN'l'B CIRCUIT 

United Stat~ Coun of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JAN IO 1991 

U.S.A. for the use of ) 

P.A. STARRY CONSTRUCTION, CO., INC., ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, ) 

a Connecticut corporation, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee, ) 

) 

AMAROK ENGINEERING, INC., a Utah ) 

corporation, ) 

) 

Defendant-Counter-Plaintiff. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

ltOBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-2094 

(D. C. No. 89-1114-JP) 

(D. N.M.) 

Before MCKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a): 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

P.A. Starry Construction Co., Inc. (Starry) appeals an 

adverse summary judgment. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-2094 Document: 010110076360 Date Filed: 01/10/1991 Page: 1 
Starry was a subcontractor to Amarok Engineering, Inc. 

(Amarok), which had been awarded a federal contract to repair 

certain roads in New Mexico. Starry provided hauling services 

under its contract with Amarok. On September 30, 1988, and prior 

to the completion of its contract, Starry refused to perform any 

further work on the project. Consequently, the last day on which 

Starry performed hauling services as required by the subcontract 

was September 30, 1988. Amarok immediately enlisted the services 

of another hauling subcontractor which began performing Starry's 

work on October 3, 1988, and continued working until the job was 

completed on October 22, 1988. On October 7, Amarok sent Starry a 

letter confirming that Starry had ceased to perform its contracted 

work as of September 30, 1988. Starry never submitted an invoice 

to Amarok requesting payment for any work performed by Starry 

after September 30, 1988. 

On October 11, 1989, Starry filed this suit against Amarok 

and Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. who had issued a payment bond in 

favor of the owner to assure payments due were made by Amarok, 

claiming that Starry had performed contract services on behalf of 

Amarok on the project after October 11, 1988. All parties agree 

that the applicable statute of limitation is provided by the 

Miller Act, 1 and that this statute provides that "no such suit 

shall be commenced after the expiration of one year after the day 

1 40 u.s.c. S 270(a) through (d). 

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Appellate Case: 90-2094 Document: 010110076360 Date Filed: 01/10/1991 Page: 2 
t 

on which the last labor was performed or material supplied by the 

party filing the action." 2 

In the process of resisting Amarok's motion for summary 

judgment, Starry caused affidavits to be filed, which stated that 

Starry left some trucks on the job site until October 13, 1988, 

and further that a fuel tank had been left at the job site by 

Starry who removed it on November 3, 1988. (R. Vol. I, Tab 6, 

Doc. 3 at 304.) Starry contends the presence of this equipment on 

the job site was the provision of services and materials under the 

contract, even though the record contains no evidence that this 

equipment was ever used after September 30, 1988. 

The district court held that Starry's leaving equipment on 

the job site did not create a genuine factual issue since the 

equipment was not used on the job and held that the applicable 

statute of limitations barred the suit. (Summary Judgment In 

Favor of Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, dated April 18, 1990.) 

Starry appeals this decision and asserts: (1) the fact the 

equipment was left on the job site creates a genuine issue of 

material fact precluding summary judgment; and (2) the Miller Act 

should be construed in favor of subcontractors. 

We review the grant or denial of a summary judgment exactly 

as would the trial court. The mere fact that Starry left 

2 40 U.S.C. S 270(b). 

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Appellate Case: 90-2094 Document: 010110076360 Date Filed: 01/10/1991 Page: 3 
• equipment on the job site after the cessation of his work does not 

give rise to even the inference that Starry provided labor or 

material for the benefit of the project. Starry has cited us no 

authority to the contrary. Moreover, Amarok concedes that Starry 

left trucks and a fuel tank on the project site after October 11, 

1988. (Appellee's Brief at 5.) There simply is no disputed issue 

of fact. We agree that the Miller Act has as its purpose the 

protection of persons supplying labor and services to federal 

projects and should be so construed. Such an argument fails when 

the subcontractor has failed to provide labor and services to a 

federal project. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED for 

substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court in 

its Summary Judgment entered on April 18, 1990, a copy of which is 

attached hereto. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 90-2094 Document: 010110076360 Date Filed: 01/10/1991 Page: 4 
:~ 

\ 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FILED 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

U.S.A. for the use of 

P.A. STARRY CONSTRUCTION 

COMPANY, INC. , 

Plaintiff, 

UNJTB> STATES DISTIICT COURT 

ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO 

/\PR 1 8 1990 

vs. CIV NO. 89-1114 JP 

AMAROK ENGINEERING, INC., a 

Utah corporation and AETNA 

CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, 

a Connecticut corporation, 

Defendants. 

SUMMARY JUDGEMENT IN FAVOR OF 

AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY 

ENTERED ON DOCKET 

Y-::1 z-qo 

The subject of this summary judgment is the motion to dismiss 

Count II filed November 6, 1989 by Aetna Casualty and Surety 

Company. The motion will be treated as one for summary judgement 

under Rule 56 since the parties have filed affidavits with exhibits 

on which they have relied in supporting and opposing the motion. 

Aetna has established by uncontroverted evidence that September 30, 

1988 was the last date on which P.A. Starry Construction Company 

performed work or furnished equipment or materials for use on the 

project. The affidavit of Larry Starry filed in opposition to the 

motion does not raise genuine issues of material fact as to the 

date labor was last performed or material supplied for use on the 

job. Larry Starry's affidavit concedes that on September 30, 1988 

he told AMAROK Engineering, Inc., with whom Starry had contracted, 

that he "would not continue" and that he "would pull P.A. Starry 

Appellate Case: 90-2094 Document: 010110076360 Date Filed: 01/10/1991 Page: 5 
Construction off the job." (Affidavit, paragraph 11) . 

Documentation in the nature of billings by Starry for services, 

payroll records and correspondence from Starry' s legal counsel 

established without question that Starry last performed work on 

September 30, 1988. The fact that Starry left equipment on the job 

site until late October does not create a genuine factual issue 

since the equipment was not used on the job and there is no 

evidence that anyone intended to use the equipment on the project 

after September 30. Starry's leaving its fuel tank on site after 

September 30 cannot be considered the furnishing of materials for 

the job because it is clear that AMAROK made efforts, opposed by 

Starry, soon after September 30 to remove the fuel (which Amarok 

owned) from Starry's tank. Consequently, September 30, 1988 must 

be considered the latest date, under the evidence, that Starry 

performed labor or supplied materials for use on the job. 

40 u.s.c. § 270 b(b) contains the limitations provision for 

Miller Act lawsuits and states "no such suit shall be commenced 

after the expiration of one year after the day on which the last 

of the labor was performed or materials was supplied ••• " by the 

claimant. Since Starry did not file this lawsuit until October 11, 

1989, more than one year after the date on which it last performed 

labor or supplied materials, § 270 b(b) bars Starry's bond claim 

against Aetna. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-2094 Document: 010110076360 Date Filed: 01/10/1991 Page: 6 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT summary judgment is hereby 

entered in favor of Aetna Casualty and Surety Company on Count II, 

the Miller Act claim of P.A. Starry Construction Company, which is 

dismissed with prejudice as to defendant Aetna. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-2094 Document: 010110076360 Date Filed: 01/10/1991 Page: 7