Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00407/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00407-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

2ND CHANCE MORTGAGES, INC., a 

California Corporation, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

TODD KURVERS, et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 17-CV-407-AJB-BLM 

(1) SUA SPONTE REMANDING 

ACTION TO STATE COURT FOR 

LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER 

JURISDICTION (Doc. No. 1); AND 

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO REMAND AS MOOT 

(Doc. No. 3.) 

 On February 28, 2017, Defendant Todd Kurvers (“Removing Defendant”), acting 

pro se, filed a notice of removal of an unlawful detainer action filed in San Diego Superior 

Court. (Doc. No. 1.) On March 16, 2017, Plaintiff 2nd Chance Mortgages, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) 

filed an ex parte motion to remand this action back to state court.1

 (Doc. No. 3.) For the 

                                                                

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 The Court notes that Plaintiff failed to follow the procedures for filing an ex parte motion as laid out in 

Judge Battaglia’s chamber rules. Due to the nature of the present action, the Court will overlook 

Plaintiff’s failure to follow proper protocol and submits Plaintiff’s motion on the papers according to 

Local Civil Rule 7.1.d.1. 

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reasons set forth below, the Court sua sponte REMANDS the action for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, and DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s motion to remand. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction 

only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See Kokkonen v. Guardian 

Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A defendant may remove a civil action to federal 

court only if the district court would have original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441(a). Removal statutes are strictly construed against removal. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 

F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). A defendant seeking removal has the burden to establish 

that removal is proper and any doubt is resolved against removability. Luther v. 

Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008). However, a 

plaintiff seeking remand has the burden to prove that an express exception to removal 

exists. See Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 698 (2003).

 “[F]ederal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own 

jurisdiction[.]” FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990). Accordingly, 

“[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the 

court must dismiss the action.”). 

DISCUSSION 

 Removing Defendant alleges that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this 

matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, § 1441(a), and § 1446. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.)2

 Federal 

question jurisdiction exists over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 

Jurisdiction in federal question cases is “governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ 

                                                                

2

 Page numbers refer to the CM/ECF page numbers and not the automatically generated page numbers 

on the original document. 

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which provides that federal [question] jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 

presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. 

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1987). Diversity jurisdiction exists where there is 

complete diversity among opposing parties and the amount in controversy exceeds 

$75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 

 Removing Defendant claims that federal question jurisdiction exists because his 

claim is based upon a notice which incorporates the “Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act 

of 2009.”3

 (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 7.) The complaint attached as Exhibit A to the notice of removal, 

however, affirmatively shows that Removing Defendant’s complaint alleges only a single 

claim for unlawful detainer, which is a California state law cause of action. (Doc. No. 1-2 

at 8.) Wells Fargo Bank v. Lapeen, No. C 11-01932 LB, 2011 WL 2194117, at *3 (N.D. 

Cal. June 6, 2011) (“An unlawful detainer action, on its face, does not arise under federal 

law but is purely a creature of California law.”) (citing Wescom Credit Union v. Dudley, 

No. CV 10-8203 GAF (SSx), 2010 WL 4916578, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2010)). 

 The Court also notes that Removing Defendant makes no claims that removal is 

appropriate based on diversity jurisdiction. Looking at the complaint, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff is a California Corporation, and Removing Defendant is a citizen of California. 

(Doc. No. 1 at 1.) The superior court complaint also states on its face that the demand for 

damages does not exceed $10,000. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 8.) Moreover, Plaintiff asks for 

damages in the amount of $133.33 per day since 11/26/2016. (Id. at 10.) As of the day of 

this order, that only amounts to $14799.63, which is far less than the $75,000 needed to 

qualify for diversity jurisdiction. 

 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not “necessarily raise a stated federal 

issue, actually disputed and substantial,” which this Court “may entertain without 

disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial 

                                                                

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The Court highlights that the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 expired at the end of 2014. 

Nativi v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 223 Cal. App. 4th 261, 268 (2014). 

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responsibilities.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 

314 (2005); see also Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Montoya, No. 2:11-cv-2485- MCE-KJNPS, 2011 WL 5508926, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011) (“[P]laintiff filed its Complaint in 

Superior Court asserting a single claim for unlawful detainer premised solely on California 

law. Because a claim for unlawful detainer does not itself present a federal question or 

necessarily turn on the construction of federal law, no basis for federal question jurisdiction 

appears on the face of the Complaint.”). As the complaint does not present a federal 

question, and diversity jurisdiction is not present, the Court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court sua sponte REMANDS the action to San 

Diego Superior Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

motion to remand is DENIED AS MOOT. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

Dated: March 20, 2017 

 

 

 

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