Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01980/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01980-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1331fr Fed. Question: Fraud

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HUSSAIN D. VAHIDALLAH,

Plaintiff,

v.

AT&T,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01980-GPC-AGS

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’s 

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

[ECF No. 14.]

Before the Court is Plaintiff Hussain D. Vahidallah’s First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”) against Defendant AT&T (“Defendant”). (Dkt. No. 14.) Based on the 

following reasons and the applicable law, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s FAC.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed his original Complaint against Defendant on 

August 5, 2016. (Dkt. No. 1.) On August 11, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion 

to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 4.) On October 5, 2016, the Court 

conducted an initial screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

and dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 11.) The Court

informed Plaintiff of the deficiencies in his Complaint and granted Plaintiff leave to 

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amend his Complaint within 45 days of the Court’s Order. (Id.) Plaintiff filed his FAC, 

nunc pro tunc, on November 1, 2016. (Dkt. No. 14.)

DISCUSSION

I. Initial Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

A. Legal Standard

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status or the payment of any filing fees, the Court 

must review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and must sua sponte dismiss 

any complaint, or any portion of a complaint, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state 

a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 

1915(e)(2)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining 

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that 

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard.

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

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particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of 

the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Plaintiff’s FAC

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against him due to his race, Iranian 

national origin, and disability. (Dkt. No. 14 at 3, 6–7.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that 

he has neuropathy. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff asserts that he needs a wireless phone, requesting 

the Court to order Defendant to provide him with a phone. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that on 

July 18, 2016, he underwent a colonoscopy and was unable to communicate with the 

endoscopy center because he had no phone. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

knew of his condition and discriminated against Plaintiff because he is enrolled in the 

“California LifeLine” program and receives social security benefits. (Id.) 

To substantiate the allegations in his FAC, Plaintiff attaches a number of exhibits 

regarding his social security benefits (id. at 9–14), a checking account statement (id. at 

13), his poetry and writings (id. at 14–20), a prescription from a physician for 

neuropathic pain (id. at 21), a letter from the California LifeLine program informing 

Plaintiff of his qualification for the program (id. at 22), an AT&T statement (id. at 23–

24), and a statement expressing Plaintiff’s need for a phone (id. at 25).

Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Americans 

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Id. at 7.)

C. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff brings claims under Title II and Title III of the ADA. Plaintiff first cites 

42 U.S.C. § 12132. (Dkt. No. 14 at 2.) To prove that a public program or service 

violated Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is a “qualified individual with a 

disability”; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a 

public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by 

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the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by 

reason of his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 

1135 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on denial of reh’g (Oct. 11, 2001). In his FAC, 

Plaintiff alleges that he receives social security and disability benefits and has 

neuropathy. (Dkt. No. 14 at 2, 6.) Even assuming Plaintiff sufficiently alleges facts 

showing that he is a qualified individual with a disability, Plaintiff does not allege any 

nonconclusory facts satisfying the other foregoing elements. Plaintiff fails to state a 

claim under Title II of the ADA.

Plaintiff next cites Title III of the ADA. (Dkt. No. 14 at 3.) To prevail on a Title 

III discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) he is disabled within the 

meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a 

place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations

by the defendant because of his disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a)-(b); Molski v. M.J. 

Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). As explained above, even assuming 

Plaintiff sufficiently alleges facts showing that he is disabled within the meaning of the 

ADA, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or 

operates a place of public accommodation, or that he was denied public accommodations 

by Defendant because of his disability. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for 

violation of his rights under Title III of the ADA.

Plaintiff brings a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Dkt. No. 

14 at 7.) Under Title VII, an employer may not “fail or refuse to refer for employment, 

or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, 

sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis 

of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). Plaintiff 

alleges no facts regarding his employment by Defendant or Defendant’s employment 

practices. Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Title VII.

Plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Dkt. No. 14 at 3.) 42 U.S.C. § 1981 

gives all citizens of the United States “the same right in every State or Territory to make 

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and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” The statute has been 

interpreted to prohibit discriminatory government interference with private contracts as 

well as purely private discrimination in contracts. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 

1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000). Proof of intent to discriminate is necessary to establish a 

violation of § 1981. Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1313 (9th Cir. 

1992). A plaintiff must at least allege facts that would support an inference that 

defendants intentionally and purposefully discriminated against him. Id. Here, Plaintiff 

does not allege nonconclusory facts supporting an inference of intentional discrimination 

by Defendant on the basis of race. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 14 at 5.) Nor does Plaintiff allege 

facts regarding discriminatory interference with his right to make and enforce contracts.

Plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 14 at 3.) Plaintiff asserts 

conclusorily that his federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 were violated, and that 

accordingly, he states a claim under § 1983. (Id. at 5.) A claim under § 1983 requires: 

“(1) a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) 

proximately caused (3) by conduct of a person (4) acting under color of state law.” 

Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). There is a presumption that “private parties are not generally acting under color 

of state law.” Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707–08 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, 

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant acted under color of state law and accordingly 

fails to state a claim for relief under § 1983. Indeed, Plaintiff admits that Defendant is a 

“private entity.” (Dkt. No. 14 at 7.) Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim fails for the additional 

reason that Plaintiff fails to allege a violation of a federal right. Accordingly, Plaintiff 

fails to state a claim under § 1983.

Finally, Plaintiff cites to language from 10 U.S.C. § 4361. (Dkt. No. 14 at 6–7.) 

10 U.S.C. § 4361 provides that the Secretary of Defense and the Superintendent of West 

Point are to “prescribe a policy on sexual harassment and sexual violence applicable to 

the cadets and other personnel of the Academy”, and provide “required training on the 

policy for all cadets and other Academy personnel.” Doe v. Hagenbeck, 98 F. Supp. 3d 

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672, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 4361). Plaintiff has not alleged any 

relevant facts regarding 10 U.S.C. § 4361.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court: 

1. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s FAC for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

2. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which 

to re-open the case by filing a Second Amended Complaint which cures all the 

deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. Plaintiff is reminded that if he 

elects to file a Second Amended Complaint, it must be complete by itself without 

reference to the original pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIV. LR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, 

Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n 

amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 

896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which 

are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not 

repled.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 12, 2016

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