Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-05334/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-05334-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Property Damage

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BIBEKANAND SATPATHY, d/b/a AMADORE

ENTERTAINMENT,

Plaintiff,

v.

CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD.;

COVENANT AVIATION SECURITY, LLC;

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION; CITY AND COUNTY OF

SAN FRANCISCO; THAI AIRWAYS

INTERNATIONAL, LTD. and DOES 1 to 50,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-5334 CW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR FINAL

JUDGMENT

Defendants Cathay Pacific Airways, LTD. (Cathay Pacific) and

Thai International Airways International, LTD. (Thai Airways) have

filed a motion for entry of final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 54(b). Collectively, Cathay Pacific and Thai

Airways are referred to as Moving Defendants. Plaintiff Bibekanand

Satpathy did not file an opposition. This matter was submitted on

the papers. Having considered all of the papers, the Court DENIES

Moving Defendants' motion for entry of final judgment.

Case 4:04-cv-05334-CW Document 64 Filed 10/31/05 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff originally filed a civil complaint in the Superior

Court of the State of California against multiple defendants

alleging damage to baggage containing motion picture film. The

case was subsequently removed to federal court on December 16,

2004. On February 10, 2005, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his

claims against Defendant Transportation Security Administration

(TSA), and on March 25, 2005, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his

claims against Defendant City and County of San Francisco (San

Francisco).

On September 9, 2005, the Court granted a motion for summary

judgment submitted by Moving Defendants, finding that the rights

and liabilities of those parties are governed exclusively by the

Warsaw Convention, 49 U.S.C. § 40104, and Plaintiff's claims were

barred for failure to give timely notice. Defendant Covenant

Aviation Security, LLC (Covenant) did not join the motion.

The Court ordered Covenant and Plaintiff to show cause why the

case should not be remanded to State court. Covenant answered in

opposition to remand. On October 14, 2005, the Court decided that

the parties were diverse and declined to remand the case. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 54(b), the Court may enter final judgment on one or

more claims "upon an express determination that there is no just

reason for delay . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Curtiss-Wright

Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1 (1980) articulates a two

step test for determining when there is no just reason for delay. 

First, the Court must determine if the judgment is a final

Case 4:04-cv-05334-CW Document 64 Filed 10/31/05 Page 2 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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judgment. Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 7. Second, the Court must

determine whether there is any just reason for delay. Id. at 8. 

The analysis of a just reason for delay examines first whether the

claims under review are separable from those remaining to be

adjudicated and, second, whether there is a likelihood that an

appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than

once. Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1518-20 (9th Cir.

1989).

DISCUSSION

Moving Defendants contend that there is no just reason for

delay of a final judgment in their favor. They explain that they

have been granted summary judgment resolving all of Plaintiff's

claims against them under the Warsaw Convention. In addition,

Moving Defendants argue that, because Covenant and Plaintiff will

not be governed by the Warsaw Convention or by federal law, the

issues of liability for them are severable from those of Covenant.

The Ninth Circuit has described the standard for entering

judgment under Rule 54(b) as follows:

Judgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the

unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying

the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the

appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the

litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some

claims or parties. The trial court should not direct

entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) unless it has made

specific findings setting forth the reasons for its

order. Those findings should include a determination

whether, upon any review of the judgment entered under

the rule, the appellate court will be required to address

legal or factual issues that are similar to those

contained in the claims still pending before the trial

court. A similarity of legal or factual issues will

weigh heavily against entry of judgment under the rule,

and in such cases a Rule 54(b) order will be proper only

where necessary to avoid a harsh and unjust result,

Case 4:04-cv-05334-CW Document 64 Filed 10/31/05 Page 3 of 5
United States District Court

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documented by further and specific findings.

Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981)

(internal citations omitted). 

Moving Defendants correctly observe that summary judgment

resolved all of Plaintiff's claims against them under the Warsaw

Convention. Because Covenant did not join Moving Defendants'

summary judgment motion, however, the Court has not reached the

issue of whether Plaintiff's claims against Covenant are governed

by State law, preempted by the Warsaw Convention or controlled by

other federal law. Accordingly, the possibility remains that

Plaintiff's claims against Covenant will proceed under the Warsaw

Convention invoking similar legal issues as the resolved claims

against Moving Defendants. Thus, entering final judgment in favor

of Moving Defendants at this time potentially would burden the

Ninth Circuit should duplicative appeals raising the same legal

issues be taken. 

Significantly, even if the claims against Covenant are

severable legally from the claims against Moving Defendants, the

factual basis for both claims is the same. Thus, a piecemeal

appeal to the Ninth Circuit involving similar factual issues would

not serve the interests of judicial economy. See Wood v. GCC BEND,

LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 20-21 (9th Cir. 2005) (court found that Rule

54(b) request was improperly granted where the facts on all claims

and issues overlap). 

Finally, Moving Defendants have not presented any pressing

needs for early and separate judgment to outbalance the concern for

efficient, sound judicial administration. See Archer, 655 F.2d at

Case 4:04-cv-05334-CW Document 64 Filed 10/31/05 Page 4 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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965. Therefore, the Court denies Moving Defendants' 54(b) motion. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Moving Defendants'

motion for entry of final judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/31/05

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-05334-CW Document 64 Filed 10/31/05 Page 5 of 5