Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01823/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01823-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Chico Mendiola; Terra Mendiola, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

J. Love, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-05-1823-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 32), plaintiffs'

response (doc. 33), and defendants' reply (doc. 40). 

I-Background

On June 3, 2004, at approximately 5:00 a.m., the Pinal County Sheriff's Office

received a 911 call reporting that a man and woman were fighting in the median of Interstate

10. Defendant Deputy Love was dispatched to the scene, along with another sheriff's deputy

and an officer from the Arizona Department of Public Safety. At approximately 6:00 a.m.,

Deputy Love found plaintiffs Chico and Terra Mendiola at the location the individuals were

reported to have been fighting. Deputy Love placed both plaintiffs under arrest and

transported them to the jail, where they were booked and charged with disorderly conduct

and domestic violence. They were released at approximately 4:00 p.m. on that same day.

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The Pinal County Attorney's Office subsequently chose not to prosecute the case, concluding

that there was "no reasonable likelihood of a conviction." PSOF, Exhibit 4. 

Plaintiffs filed this action against Deputy Love, current Pinal County Sheriff Chris

Vasquez, and the Pinal County Board of Supervisors, alleging that their civil rights were

violated due to their wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, and defendants' failure to properly

hire, train or supervise the deputies. Plaintiffs seek both compensatory and punitive

damages. 

II-Wrongful Arrest

In Count I of the complaint, plaintiffs allege that Deputy Love deprived them of their

constitutional rights when he arrested and detained them without probable cause. A

warrantless arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause

to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543

U.S. 146, 152, 125 S. Ct. 588, 593 (2004). Probable cause exists if "at the moment the arrest

was made . . . the facts and circumstances within [the officer's] knowledge and of which [he]

had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing

that [plaintiffs] had violated [the law]." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S. Ct. 534,

537 (1991). Law enforcement officials who " 'reasonably but mistakenly conclude that

probable cause is present' are entitled to immunity." Id. at 227, 112 S. Ct. at 536 (quoting

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3040 (1987)). Accordingly,

Deputy Love is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that

probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiffs. 

"The determination of whether a reasonable officer could have believed his conduct

was lawful given the totality of the circumstances is a determination of law that can be

decided on summary judgment if the material facts are undisputed." Collins v. Jordan, 110

F.3d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original). "If, however, there is a material

dispute as to the facts and circumstances that an officer knew or should have known, or as

to the facts regarding what the officer or the plaintiff actually did, the case must proceed to

trial." Id. at 1370. 

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1

We note that defendants' reference to A.R.S. § 13-3601(B) to support the propriety

of the arrest is unavailing in that it also requires a showing of probable cause prior to an

arrest for domestic violence, with or without a warrant. 

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The testimony concerning the plaintiffs' arrest is sharply conflicting. Plaintiffs

contend that Deputy Love responded to the "anonymous" 911 call and immediately arrested

them upon arriving at the scene, without first questioning them or otherwise investigating the

911 report. They claim that they stopped their car along the interstate because Terra

Mendiola was ill, and at no time had they been fighting. PSOF, Exhibits 1, 2. They argue

that the 911 call was insufficient to establish probable cause. Conversely, Deputy Love

asserts that the information presented in the 911 call was corroborated when he arrived at the

scene. In his report, he stated that he interviewed both individuals prior to their arrest, that

both individuals confirmed there had been an argument, and that he saw a scratch on Chico

Mendiola's neck. DSOF, Exhibit 2. 

A police officer has "a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness'

report." Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1444 (9th Cir. 1991). "Although a police

officer is entitled to rely on information obtained from fellow law enforcement officers, this

in no way negates a police officer's duty to reasonably inquire or investigate these reported

facts." Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1293 n.16 (9th Cir.

1999) (citation omitted); see also Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912,

925 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[i]n establishing probable cause, officers may not solely rely on the

claim of a citizen witness that he was a victim of a crime, but must independently investigate

the basis of the witness' knowledge or interview other witnesses"). 

Whether it was objectively reasonable for Love to believe that probable cause existed

turns on the resolution of whether Deputy Love interviewed the plaintiffs prior to their arrest,

or otherwise verified the report in the 911 call. Because a material issue of fact exists, we

deny defendants' motion for summary judgment on Count I.1

III–False Imprisonment/Abuse of Power

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2

Plaintiffs do not respond to defendants' argument that the Board of Supervisors

should be dismissed, instead choosing to "submit th[e] issue[] to the court on the pleadings."

Response at 4. However, an adverse party may not "rest upon the mere allegations or denials

of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response . . . must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond,

summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party." Fed. R. Civ.

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Defendants argue that Pinal County Sheriff Chris Vasquez should be dismissed

because he was not sheriff at the time of the incident. Although it is not clear from the face

of the complaint whether Vasquez is being sued in his official or individual capacity, because

plaintiffs do not allege that Vasquez himself took any actions under color of state law, see

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3105 (1985), we construe the

claims against Vasquez as official capacity claims. 

"[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit

against the entity." Id. at 166, 105 S. Ct. at 3105. In an official capacity action in federal

court, death or replacement of the named official will result in automatic substitution of the

official's successor in office. Id. at at 166 n.11, 105 S. Ct. at 3105 n.11. If plaintiffs had

named the sheriff who was in office at the time of the incident, Vasquez, the current Pinal

County sheriff, would have been automatically substituted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1).

Therefore, Vasquez is properly named in this action.

In Count II, plaintiffs allege that their civil rights were violated by false imprisonment

and abuse of power, and they assert that Sheriff Vasquez and the Pinal County Board of

Supervisors are liable on a respondeat superior theory. It is well established, however, that

"a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its

employees or agents." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018,

2037 (1978). Instead, an entity is liable under § 1983 only for constitutional violations

occurring pursuant to an official government policy or custom. Id. at 690-91, 98 S. Ct. at

2036. Plaintiffs do not allege that Vasquez or the Board of Supervisors acted pursuant to a

policy or custom; therefore, the Count II claims against Vasquez and the Pinal County Board

of Supervisors and its members are dismissed.2

 

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P. 56 (e). Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the Board of

Supervisors and its individual members is also granted on this alternative basis. 

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IV-Failure to Hire, Train, Supervise

In Count III, plaintiffs allege that Sheriff Vasquez failed to properly train, hire and/or

supervise the deputies who deprived them of their constitutional rights. In order to hold a

municipality liable under § 1983 for failing to train or supervise an employee, the plaintiff

must show that the municipality had a policy or custom, which amounts to "deliberate

indifference" to constitutional rights, and that the policy is the "moving force" behind the

constitutional violation. Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204-05 (1989)). 

In their motion for summary judgment, defendants argue alternatively that Vasquez

is improperly named (which we have already addressed), or that he cannot be liable under

a respondeat superior theory. But plaintiffs do not present a respondeat superior theory of

liability in Count III; instead they allege that Vasquez, in his official capacity, failed to train,

hire, or supervise the deputies. Defendants do not effectively oppose this claim; therefore

the motion for summary judgment on Count III is denied.

V–Punitive Damages

Finally, defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages, asserting

that under Arizona law, "[n]either a public entity nor a public employee acting within the

scope of his employment is liable for punitive or exemplary damages." A.R.S. § 12-820.04.

Again, plaintiffs do not respond to this argument, but instead "submit th[e] issue[ ] to the

court on the pleadings." Response at 4. Accordingly, we grant summary judgment in favor

of the defendants on the issue of punitive damages. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (e). 

VI–Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED GRANTING defendants' motion for summary

judgment on Count II, and GRANTING defendant's motion for summary judgment on the

claim for punitive damages (doc. 32). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING

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defendants' motion for summary judgment on Counts I and III (doc. 32). To clarify, the Pinal

County Board of Supervisors and its members are dismissed from this action.

DATED this 6th day of February, 2007.

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