Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_19-cv-00270/USCOURTS-ared-4_19-cv-00270-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

ROBERT LARRY LYTLE PETITIONER

Reg. #16921-273

V. CASE NO. 4:19-CV-270-KGB-BD

CHARLES HENDRIX, Warden, 

Federal Correctional Institution-Low,

Forrest City, Arkansas RESPONDENT

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

I. Procedure for Filing Objections:

This Recommended Disposition (Recommendation) has been sent to Judge 

Kristine G. Baker. Either party may file written objections with the Clerk of Court within 

14 days. Objections should be specific and should explain the factual or legal basis for 

the objection.

By not objecting, parties may waive the right to appeal questions of fact. And, if 

no objections are filed, Judge Baker can adopt this Recommendation without 

independently reviewing the record.

II. Background:

On January 26, 2017, Robert Larry Lytle was federally indicted in the Western 

District of South Dakota on 18 counts, including conspiracy, criminal contempt, mail 

fraud, wire fraud, and obstruction. United States v. Robert Larry Lytle, No. 5:17-

CR50020-RAL-1 (W.D. S.D.) (#2). According to the indictment and a later superseding 

indictment, Mr. Lytle was “involved in the designing, manufacturing, packing, labeling, 

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holding, marketing, selling, and distributing of medical devices known as ‘QLasers,’ a 

collection of various apparatuses marketed as low-level laser therapy devices for home 

use.” Id. (#2 at 1-2, #176 at 2). It was further explained that, “Lytle marketed and 

distributed the QLaser devices to consumers throughout the United States by falsely 

claiming the QLaser devices safely and effectively treated a panoply of medical 

conditions at home, including e.g., cancer, heart attacks, paralysis, HIV/AIDS, and 

diabetes.” Id. (#2 at 3, #176 at 2-3). 

After ignoring warnings from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that 

selling QLaser devices for unapproved uses was unlawful under the Food, Drug, and 

Cosmetic Act, the Government successfully began a civil action against Lytle and his 

businesses resulting, in a permanent injunction in 2015. Id. (#2 at 3-4, #176 at 4). As a

result, Lytle was enjoined from manufacturing, storing, and distributing QLaser devices 

and was ordered to make restitution to any purchasers. Id. (#2 at 4-5, #176 at 5). The 

permanent injunction was affirmed on appeal. United States v. 2035, Inc., 668 Fed. 

App.’x 679, 680 (8th Cir. Sept. 6, 2015) (per curiam). 

Thereafter, Mr. Lytle was federally indicted, and, on January 26, 2018, he pleaded 

guilty, pursuant to a superseding indictment, to one count of criminal contempt in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) and one count of conspiracy to introduce misbranded 

medical devices into interstate commerce with the intent to defraud and mislead, a

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 21 U.S.C. §§331 and 333(a)(2). United States v. Robert 

Larry Lytle, No. 5:17-CR50020-RAL (W.D. S.D.) (#178). Subsequently, the sentencing 

court twice denied Mr. Lytle’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. (#246, #378).

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On April 23, 2018, Mr. Lytle was sentenced, below the guideline range, to 60 

months’ imprisonment on Count I and to 84 months on Count II, to run consecutively. Id. 

(#263). The remaining counts were dismissed. Id. An amended judgment was issued on 

November 21, 2018, adding a restitution requirement. Id. (#385, #402). 

Mr. Lytle initiated several appeals, which were consolidated and dismissed based 

on the appeal waiver in the underlying plea agreement. United States v. Lytle, No. 18-

1923 (8th Cir. April 26, 2019). On Mr. Lytle’s motion, the Court of Appeals for the 

Eighth Circuit granted an extension of time to petition for rehearing. Id. (Order May 8, 

2019). He currently has until June 7, 2019, to file his petition. Id. 

Mr. Lytle, now an inmate at the Federal Correctional Complex in Forrest City, 

Arkansas, brings this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

Specifically, Mr. Lytle contends that the permanent injunction issued in his civil case is 

void. (#1 at 7, 10-1) He also challenges the validity of the criminal indictment, asserting 

that it was “bogus.” (Id. at 7, 12-13) 

Mr. Lytle argues that, as a child of God, he is not subject to man’s law (#1 at 8-

10); he raises a myriad of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims (#1 at 14); he 

complains that the prosecution and Court used fraudulent grammar to confuse and 

deceive him (#1 at 16); he argues that he did not commit a trespass upon the Court (#1 at 

16-17); he contends that he is neither “contractually” obligated to nor “rebuttably 

presumed” to be subject to the jurisdiction of the sentencing court (#1 at 17-18, 19); he 

argues that there was no victim and , therefore, cannot be criminally liable (#1 at 18); and 

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he vaguely contends, without identifying how, that his constitutional rights were violated. 

(#1 at 20-23) Respondent Hendrix has responded to the petition. (#10)

III. Discussion:

A. Next Friend Standing

Mr. John Philip Ellis, Sr., who identifies himself as having Mr. Lytle’s power of 

attorney (POA), drafted and signed the federal habeas petition on Mr. Lytle’s behalf. (#1 

at 25-26) Mr. Lytle has informed the Court that he does not object to Mr. Ellis’s filing the 

habeas petition on his behalf. (#3) His acquiescence, however, is not enough. 

A habeas application may be signed and verified “by someone acting in [the 

petitioner’s] behalf.” 28 U.S.C. §2242; see also Rule 2 (c)(5) of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases. However, “[a] person generally lacks standing to prosecute a federal 

habeas corpus petition on behalf of another unless he or she can show a reasonable 

excuse as to why the detainee did not sign and verify the petition, and a sufficient 

relationship and interest linking the would-be next friend to the detainee.” Smith By and 

Through Missouri Pub. Def. Commn. v. Armontrout, 812 F.2d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 1987) 

(citing Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513-14 (5th Cir. 1978)). The burden of 

establishing standing rests with the “next friend”—that is, the person filing on behalf of 

the real party in interest. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 64 (1990). 

To have standing, a next friend must first “provide an adequate explanation—such 

as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability—why the real party in interest 

cannot appear on his [or her] own behalf to prosecute the action”; and “[s]econd, the 

‘next friend’ must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf 

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he seeks to litigate, and it has been further suggested that a ‘next friend’ must have some 

significant relationship with the real party in interest.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163 

(citation omitted). Importantly, “‘next friend’ standing is by no means granted 

automatically to whomever seeks to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Whitmore, 

495 at 163. In fact, the Fifth Circuit Court has determined that having a POA, standing 

alone, is insufficient to confer “next friend” status in a habeas corpus case. Weber v. 

Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513-14 (5th Cir. 1978). 

Here, Mr. Ellis does not explain why he is bringing the petition on Mr. Lytle’s 

behalf nor why he was given Mr. Lytle’s POA in the first place. Instead, he simply signs 

the petition as Mr. Lytle’s POA and attaches the designating document. (#1 at 25-26) In 

the POA document, Mr. Lytle appoints Mr. Ellis to “handle any and all court actions and 

appeals concerning the FDA, the Department of Justice or any federal agency concerning 

. . . Mr. Lytle . . . [and] QLasers.” (#1 at 26) The POA was executed on April 14, 2015, 

almost two years before the criminal indictment was filed. A review of Mr. Lytle’s 

criminal docket further reveals that his competency was never at issue. Rather, a cursory 

review of the docket demonstrates that on at least two occasions, Mr. Lytle filed pro se

pleadings. United States v. Robert Larry Lytle, No. 5:17-CR50020-RAL (W.D. S.D.) 

(#276, #292). And, the Government moved, without objection, to prevent Mr. Ellis from 

being presented as an expert or from sitting with Mr. Lytle during hearings. Id. (#119, 

#143).

The Court has no reason to believe Mr. Lytle is unable to bring a habeas petition 

for himself, if for no other reason, because Mr. Lytle has coherently written to the Court 

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five times. Besides informing the Court that he has no objection to Mr. Ellis’s filing the 

petition (#3), Mr. Lytle has also filed a four-page letter explaining why he believes he 

was wrongly prosecuted. (#6) In that letter, he states that his eyesight is compromised,

but only to explain why the letter may have grammatical errors. He does not assert a 

disability requiring a “next friend” to file on his behalf. (#6 at 4) Since filing the letter, 

Mr. Lytle successfully moved for a status update (#7) and twice let the Court know that 

he needs nothing further.

Regardless, Mr. Ellis has not met his burden of establishing that Mr. Lytle is

incapable of pursuing his own petition or that he is truly dedicated to Mr. Lytle’s best 

interests. Mr. Ellis lacks standing to bring this petition on Mr. Lytle’s behalf; thus, the 

Court lacks jurisdiction over the petition. 

B. General Jurisdiction

Even if the Court assumes that Mr. Ellis meets “next friend” requirements, the 

Court should still dismiss the petition. Although the petition was filed as a § 2241 habeas 

corpus petition, the claims relate to Mr. Lytle’s conviction, sentence, and separate civil 

proceedings in the Western District of South Dakota. 

Inmates challenging the lawfulness of the imposition of their federal sentences 

must do so in a motion filed with the sentencing court, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. LopezLopez v. Sanders, 590 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 

F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 2004)). In contrast, a § 2241 habeas corpus petition attacks the 

execution of a sentence, or the manner in which the sentence is being carried out, and is 

properly brought in the judicial district where the prisoner is incarcerated. Nichols v. 

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Symmes, 553 F.3d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 2009). It is clear Mr. Lytle challenges the validity of 

his underlying sentence, rather than the manner in which his sentence is being carried out.

A court cannot entertain a petition for habeas corpus under § 2241, “if it appears 

that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by [§ 2255] motion, to the court which 

sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the 

remedy by [§ 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his 

detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (emphasis added); Nichols, 553 F.3d at 650. The last 

clause is a provision generally referred to as a § 2255’s “savings clause.” Abdullah, 392 

F.3d at 959. The circumstances that allow a prisoner to invoke the savings clause are 

intentionally narrow and require a petitioner to show that seeking relief from the 

sentencing court would be inadequate or ineffective. Lopez-Lopez, 590 F.3d at 907 (citing

Abdullah, 392 F.3d at 959).

Mr. Lytle has not demonstrated that seeking relief under § 2255 from the 

sentencing court would be inadequate or ineffective. And, because he has until June 7, 

2019, to petition for rehearing of the denial of his direct appeal, it is currently premature 

to file a § 2255 motion. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Arkansas lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this §2241 petition.

IV. Conclusion:

Mr. Ellis has not established standing to act as Mr. Lytle’s next friend; and there 

has been no showing that it would be inadequate or ineffective to seek relief under 

§ 2255 from the sentencing court. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Judge Baker 

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DISMISS the pending petition for writ of habeas corpus (#1), without prejudice, under 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases.1

DATED this 31st day of May, 2019.

____________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 1 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases is applicable to petitions filed under 

28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

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