Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_06-cv-02036/USCOURTS-arwd-2_06-cv-02036-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of 1

 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has been substituted for acting Commissioner Jo Anne

 B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

CHARLES C. BEALS PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 06-2036

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Charles C. Beals appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court.

On February 13, 2007, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 12). Plaintiff now moves for an award

of $4,033.59 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice

Act (hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 23.10 attorney hours of work before the

court at an hourly rate of $161.84, and $295.10 in expenses. (Doc. # 13-15). Defendant has filed

a response, objecting to the hourly rate requested. (Doc. # 16).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

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sentence-four judgment reversing theCommissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. After reviewing the file, we find plaintiff is a

prevailing party in this matter. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficultyof questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

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However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for the EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Plaintiff's counsel requests an award under the EAJA at an hourly rate of $161.84, for the

23.10 hours which he asserts he devoted to the representation of plaintiff in this court. The party

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seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving that the claimed fees are reasonable. Hensley

v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 437. 

Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour - the maximum

statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase in the cost of living

or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not automatic and remains

at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In

Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the hourly rate may be

increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify

hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the Consumer Price Index.

Plaintiff's counsel has attached a summary of the Consumer Price Index as an exhibit (Doc. # 13)

and has presented evidence of an increase in the cost of living. Therefore, the undersigned

believes his argument for enhanced fees based on a cost of living increase has merit. 

The Commissioner has raised an objection to the hourly rate requested. We agree that

the requested hourly rate is excessive and find that an award based upon an hourly rate of

$150.00 per hour, reflecting an increase in the cost of living, will result in consistent hourly

fee awards in cases in Arkansas. See Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir.1990).

Thus, based upon the above factors, we find that an appropriate hourly rate for the award of

attorney's fees in this case is $150.00 per hour.

We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claims he spent working on this

case. Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.20 hour on April 4, 2006 (preparation of letters serving

complaint and summons on Commissioner, U.S. Attorney General and U.S. Attorney), from

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which we deduct 0.20 hour; 0.20 hour on April 10, 2006 (preparation of affidavit of completion

of service for Commissioner and U.S. Attorney), from which we deduct 0.10 hour; and 0.10 hour

on April 18, 2006 (preparation of affidavit of completion of service for U.S. Attorney General),

from which we deduct 0.05 hour. This time cannot be compensated, in full, under the EAJA.

Granville House, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir.1987) (work which

could have been completed by support staff is not compensable under the EAJA). Accordingly,

0.35 hour must be deducted from the total compensable time sought by counsel.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.20 hour on May 23, 2006 (receipt and review of letter from

U.S. Magistrate regarding scheduling letter and order; preparation of letter to client enclosing

scheduling letter and order), from which we deduct 0.10 hour. This court concludes that the time

submitted on the above referenced date, should not have taken an attorney experienced in

handling social security cases more than five or six minutes to review this document. Bowman

v. Secretary of H.H.S., 744 F.Supp 898 (E.D.Ark. 1989). Accordingly, 0.10 hour must be

deducted from the total compensable time sought by counsel.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total of 15.30 hours for reviewing the transcript, researching

and writing plaintiff’s appeal brief. There were no unique or complex issues to be developed in

this particular case. Plaintiff’s counsel frequently represents social security plaintiff’s before this

court and should be well versed in social security law and we find that the time submitted for

preparing this brief to be excessive. Therefore we are reducing the number of hours submitted

for the preparation of plaintiff’s brief to 13.30 hours.

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Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $295.10 in expenses incurred with regard to the

filing fee, photocopying and postage. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we

find $295.10 to be a reasonable award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Based on the above, we recommend awarding plaintiff's attorney fees under the EAJA

for: 20.65 (23.10-2.45) attorney hours, at the rate of $150.00 per hour, and for $295.10 in

expenses, for a total attorney's fee award of $3,392.60. This amount should be paid in addition

to, and not out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future. The

parties have ten days from receipt of our report and recommendation in which to file

written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections

may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that

objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

The parties are reminded that the award herein underthe EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 20 day of March 2007. th

/s/ J. Marschewski 

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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