Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-03262/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-03262-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALFRED JAMES FOY, No. 2:11-cv-3262-MCE-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

VALLEJO POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.

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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court are defendants City of Vallejo and Williams’ motions

for partial summary judgment (Docs. 72, 73). Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motions (Doc.

74), and defendants filed a reply thereto (Docs. 75, 76).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

This case proceeds on plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 9). In his amended 

complaint, plaintiff alleges he was subjected to the use of excessive force by several officers

from both the Vallejo Police Department and the Fairfield Police Department. He claims that

officer Whitney used his Taser gun without provocation; officer Yates directed a K-9 unit to bite

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plaintiff when he was already down and not resisting; officers Whitney, Bauer, Huff, and

Williams, then proceeded to kick and beat plaintiff until he became unconscious. In addition,

plaintiff claims the Vallejo Police Department has “a deliberate policy which has violated

plaintiff’s constitutional rights to be free of excessive police force.” 

B. Defendants’ Evidence

Defendants submitted statements of undisputed fact in support of their motions for

summary judgment. The statement of undisputed facts is supported by declarations from

defendant Williams, as well as declarations from defense counsel Kevin Gilbert and Kelly

Trujillo. The relevant evidence is summarized below: 

Declaration of Defendant Williams

• Defendant Williams declares that he is a police officer with the City of

Fairfield 

• On November 18, 2011, defendant Williams was assigned to partner with

officers from the City of Vallejo; he was partnered with officer Huff.

• While dispatched on assignment, he observed plaintiff, and pursued

plaintiff on foot.

• While pursuing plaintiff on foot, defendant Williams yelled for plaintiff to

stop, identifying himself as a police officer; plaintiff proceeded to jump a

fence.

• Defendant Williams was not present at the time plaintiff was confronted or

arrested by other officers.

• Defendant Williams did not ever have any physical contact with plaintiff

in regards to the November 18, 2011, incident.

Declaration of Kevin Gilbert

• Mr. Gilbert, attorney for defendant Williams, provides copies of police

reports for the incident plaintiff’s claim is based on. 

Declaration of Kelly Trujillo

• Ms. Trujillo, attorney for the City of Vallejo, provides plaintiff’s responses

to interrogatories in support of the City’s motion.

• Plaintiff’s responses to the interrogatories indicate that plaintiff’s claim

against the City of Vallejo is based on his discussion with other inmates he

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met during his incarceration who claimed they suffered injuries due to

excessive use of force by Vallejo Police Officers, where no need for force

was warranted. 

C. Plaintiff’s Evidence

Plaintiff contends there is a genuine issue of material facts as to whether

defendant Williams was involved in the use of force against him. In support of his claims,

plaintiff signed a declaration indicating the following event occurred: 

• At the time of the incident, plaintiff attempted to prevent an encounter

with the officers, and ran.

• Defendant Williams pursued plaintiff on foot.

• Plaintiff voluntarily surrendered, getting down on his knees and placing

his hands behind his head.

• Defendant Whitney deployed a taser in dart mode, hitting him in the left

arm/wrist, which caused him to fall face down.

• Defendant Yates deployed a K-9 officer, who bit plaintiff in the right leg

while he laid on the ground paralyzed.

• Defendants Whitney, Bauer, Huff, and Williams then proceeded to kick

and beat plaintiff with their service batons, knocking plaintiff unconscious.

• Plaintiff has no documentary evidence as the City of Vallejo, because he

was unsuccessful in obtaining it through discovery.

To the extent plaintiff is asking for additional time to obtain the necessary

evidence to support his claims under Rule 56(d), plaintiff’s motion to compel and for additional

discovery has already been denied. Plaintiff fails to provide any reasons, much less good cause,

why he was unable to obtain the evidence he needed during discovery, and especially why he was

unable to obtain the affidavits or declarations from the individuals who claim to also have been

subjected to excessive force. He does not outline any steps he has taken to contact those

individuals, explain why he did not obtain affidavits from them during the six months he was

incarcerated with them or anytime during the more than three years this action has been active,

and how he could obtain them if provided additional time in which to do so. In fact, he states

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one of the individuals he would like to obtain an affidavit from is Mr. Cooley, who has been

assisting plaintiff in this matter. However, there is not even an affidavit from Mr. Cooley

included in the opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and no explanation for that

failure. The undersigned therefore finds no good reason why to delay ruling on the motions for

summary judgment based on Rule 56(d). 

D. Undisputed Facts

From the submitted declarations and evidence, there is no dispute that defendant

Williams was involved in the pursuit of plaintiff on the date of the incident. Defendant Williams

states in his declaration that as a Fairfield Police Officer, he was assigned to work with the

Vallejo Police and was partnered with defendant Huff the night in question. He pursued plaintiff

on foot when plaintiff attempted to run from the officers. However, that is the extent of the

undisputed facts as to defendant Williams’ involvement in plaintiff’s arrest. In addition, there is

no dispute that plaintiff’s claim against the City of Vallejo is based on his conversations with

other inmates, and he has no evidence in support of his claim that the City of Vallejo has a policy

supporting the use of excessive force. 

II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment or summary

adjudication when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The

standard for summary judgment and summary adjudication is the same. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a), 56(c); see also Mora v. ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). One

of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. 

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Under summary judgment practice, the

moving party:

/ / /

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always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the

basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.

Id. at 323 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The

opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

1436 (9th Cir. 1987). To demonstrate that an issue is genuine, the opposing party “must do more

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,

there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). It is

sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a trier of fact to resolve the

parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. 

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, see

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

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before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Ultimately, “[b]efore the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for

the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury

could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof

is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251.

III. DISCUSSION

A. City of Vallejo

Plaintiff alleges the City of Vallejo has a custom or policy supporting the use of

excessive force by the police officers. In his amended complaint, plaintiff specifically alleges

that “[t]he City of Vallejo has a deliberate policy which has violated plaintiff’s Constitutional

rights to be free of excessive police force.” (Am. Compl., Doc. 9 at 3). Defendants’ move for

summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim against the City of Vallejo on the basis that plaintiff’s

Monell claim is undisputedly unsupported by any facts or admissible evidence. This position is

supported by plaintiff’s responses to interrogatories. Specifically, defendants propounded

interrogatory number 12, which asked plaintiff to “[d]escribe all facts and circumstances to

support your claim that ‘the City of Vallejo has a deliberate policy which has violated plaintiff’s

constitutional right to be free from excessive police force’ as stated in paragraph III.B. of your

COMPLAINT.” (Motion, Doc. 73). In response, plaintiff stated, “[s]ubsequent to my arrest I

was incarcerated in the Solano County Detention Center’s Medical section for approximately six

months due to my injuries. During that time I met over forty different arrestees that sustained

injuries due to the excessive use of force by Vallejo Police Officers. All arrestees claimed there

was no need for force to cause the injuries as I do.” (Motion, Doc. 73). 

/ / / 

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Defendant City of Vallejo moves for summary judgment on the basis that there is

no genuine dispute of material facts, and plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that the City

of Vallejo has a longstanding practice of allowing excessive force. Plaintiff’s vague references

to alleged incidents of excessive force is insufficient to establish a custom or policy. 

“[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely

by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom,

whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”

Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 

In order to establish municipal liability, plaintiff must satisfy one of three

conditions:

First, the plaintiff may prove that a city employee committed the

alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a formal governmental

policy or a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the

standard operating procedure of the local governmental entity.

Second, the plaintiff may establish that the individual who

committed the constitutional tort was an official with final

policy-making authority and that the challenged action itself thus

constituted an act of official governmental policy. Whether a

particular official has final policy-making authority is a question of

state law. Third, the plaintiff may prove that an official with final

policy-making authority ratified a subordinate's unconstitutional

decision or action and the basis for it.

Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47 (9th Cir.1992) (citations and internal quotations

omitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 932 (1993). “After proving that one of the three circumstances

existed, a plaintiff must also show that the circumstance was (1) the cause in fact and (2) the

proximate cause of the constitutional deprivation.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (1996)

(citing Arnold v. International Business Machines Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir.1981).

A plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality due to an official policy

must establish the existence of a formal policy pursuant to which the defendant was acting when

he or she violated the plaintiff's rights. See Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918. “[A]n unjustified shooting

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by a police officer cannot, without more, be thought to result from official policy.” City of St.

Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.

808, 821 (1985)). 

Here, plaintiff has failed to identify any formally adopted policy of the City of

Vallejo that caused the alleged excessive use of force during his arrest. It would therefore appear

that the basis of this claim is some type of alleged longstanding practice or custom. However, a

longstanding practice or custom “must be so ‘persistent and widespread’ that it constitutes a

‘permanent and well settled city policy.’” Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at

691). But again, plaintiff offers no evidence or explanation of any longstanding practice or

custom that was the cause of the officer’s use of excessive force as alleged. Accordingly, there is

insufficient evidence for a finder of fact to find that plaintiff was subjected to the use of

excessive force during his arrest based on an official policy or longstanding practice or custom of

the City of Vallejo. Municipal liability, therefore, may not be established on this basis. The final

basis of municipal liability cannot be established, because the only defendants to this action are

individual police officers. There are no allegations in this case which could lead to a finding that

an official with final policy-making authority for the City of Vallejo acted in such a way to

violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

While the question of whether a policy or custom exists might normally be a

question of fact for the jury, plaintiff fails to provide any evidence to support his claim that the

City of Vallejo had a policy or custom the officers were acting in accordance with during his

arrest, authorizing the use of excessive force in violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Even

if plaintiff is successful in his claims against the officers, and he is able to show the officers used

excessive force against him during his arrest, a single, isolated occasion is simply not enough to

show a persistent and widespread custom or policy. And plaintiff fails to present any evidence or

specific facts as to any other similar incidents. The City of Vallejo has met its burden of

informing the court and plaintiff as to the basis for its motion. The burden then shifts to plaintiff

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to provide sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to each element

essential to his claim. Plaintiff fails to provide any evidence, much less sufficient evidence, to

show the court that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Thus, plaintiff fails to meet his

burden, and entry of summary judgment is appropriate as to the City of Vallejo.

B. Defendant Williams

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges defendant Williams was one of the

police officers involved in his arrest, who personally participated in the use of excessive force. 

Under the Fourth Amendment, police may use only such force as is objectively

reasonable under the circumstances. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). “Excessive

force claims . . . are evaluated for objective reasonableness based upon the information the

officer had when the conduct occurred.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). The

determination of whether force used is excessive or reasonable requires a “balancing of the

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the

countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v.

Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (internal marks omitted)). The most important single factor is

whether the individual poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others. See

Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994).

Here, defendant Williams contends he is entitled to summary judgment on the

basis that he was not involved in the take down and arrest of plaintiff. In support of his position,

he has submitted his declaration and Vallejo Police Department records which support his

position that while involved in the pursuit of plaintiff, he was not an active participant in

plaintiff’s actual arrest. 

In response, plaintiff has submitted his own declaration that counters defendant

Williams’ statements. In direct conflict with defendant Williams’ statements, plaintiff states in

his declaration that defendant Williams was personally involved in his arrest and participated in

the use of excessive force by kicking and hitting plaintiff after he was down. 

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Defendant Williams argues that plaintiff’s one sentence declaration as to his

alleged involvement in the arrest and use of force is insufficient to prevail on a summary

judgment motion. However, in a case such as this, where a prisoner plaintiff is proceeding in pro

se, the court must liberally construe all of plaintiff’s pleadings and declarations. While no doubt

minimal in comparison to the support defendant Williams’ declaration has in the police reports,

plaintiff’s statement that he actually witnessed defendant Williams kick and hit him during the

arrest raises enough of a question to establish a genuine issue of material fact for a jury to

consider. Accordingly, entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant Williams is not

appropriate. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Defendant City of Vallejo’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 73) be

granted; 

2. Defendant Williams’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 72) should be

denied; 

3. Judgment should be entered in favor of defendant City of Vallejo only;

and 

4. This action continue as to defendants Williams, Bauer, Huff, Whitney and

Yates. 

/ / / 

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/ / / 

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. 

See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 3, 2015

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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