Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01466/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01466-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIMBERLY THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN DIEGO HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES AGENCY; ADRIANNA 

VALDEZ; CLAUDIA BELL; and 

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18cv1466-MMA (NLS)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

[Doc. No. 9]

On June 27, 2018, Plaintiff Kimberly Thomas (“Plaintiff”) filed this action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Adrianna Valdez (“Valdez”), Claudia 

Bell (“Bell”), and County of San Diego1(“County”) alleging violations of Plaintiff’s First 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights and raising a claim for municipal liability against the 

County under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S 658 (1978). Doc. No. 1 

(“Compl.”). Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. No. 9-1 (“MTD”). Plaintiff filed an opposition [Doc. 

 

1 The County was also erroneously sued as San Diego Health and Human Services Agency (“HHSA”). 

Doc. No. 9-1 at 1.

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No. 11 (“Oppo.”)], to which Defendants replied [Doc. No. 12 (“Reply”)]. The Court 

found the matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument 

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. Doc. No. 13. For the reasons set forth below, the 

Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND2

In June of 2016, Plaintiff gave birth to Zane Wolfgang Thomas (“Zane”) at 35 

weeks gestation. Compl. ¶ 11. Zane was admitted to the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit 

(“NICU”) at Scripps Memorial Hospital, Encinitas, because he was exposed to drugs in 

utero and born prematurely. Id. After several meetings between County social workers 

and Plaintiff, “it was determined that Zane would be placed in voluntary out-of-home 

placement while Plaintiff received inpatient and/or outpatient substance abuse treatment.” 

Compl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff provided the County and hospital social workers with her 

preferred caregivers, including her mother, Maria Thomas (“Maria”), and family friends. 

Id.

The County, through social workers Valdez and Bell, placed Zane into the custody 

of foster parents Carmen and John Richards (“the Richards”) on June 27, 2016. Compl. ¶ 

13. Plaintiff alleges that at that time, the County knew the Richards were in their 

seventies, had several other small children placed with them, that Mr. Richards suffered 

from dementia and was incapable of caring for Zane, and that an infant had previously 

died in the Richards’ care. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that the County knew Zane would 

require “exceptional care and supervision following hospital discharge” as a premature, 

drug-addicted infant, and that the Richards did not receive training in the proper care and 

supervision of such infants. Id. As a result, Plaintiff contends the County knew or 

should have known that placing Zane with the Richards would overwhelm them and that 

 

2 Because this matter is before the Court on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true 

the allegations set forth in the Complaint. See Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 

(1976).

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they would not be able to provide adequate care and supervision to Zane. Id. According 

to Plaintiff, she and her family members requested on numerous occasions that the 

County place Zane with a responsible relative or Non-Related Extended Family Member 

(“NREFM”) caregivers. Compl. ¶ 14. The County, Valdez, and Bell allegedly ignored 

these requests and instead “falsely represented . . . that the [County] was in the process of 

investigating placement alternatives . . . .” Id.

During July and August of 2016, Maria was allowed extended visitation with Zane. 

Compl. ¶ 15. “On all such occasions, it was reported to the [County], . . . [Valdez,] and 

[Bell] that [the Richards] were overwhelmed and that Zane was not receiving adequate 

attention or care, including missing doctors’ appointments.” Id. Despite these reports, 

the County, Valdez, and Bell, allegedly left Zane in “the overwhelmed and overburdened 

household of the Richards.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that the County, Valdez, and Bell’s 

“intentional and/or reckless” behavior resulted in Zane not receiving the care and 

supervision required. Compl. ¶ 16. On September 8, 2016, the Richards allegedly placed 

Zane in his crib on his stomach to sleep and left him unsupervised and unmonitored. Id. 

“Hours later, Zane died.” Id. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that Zane’s 

death is a “direct result of being placed on his stomach to sleep.” Id.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff alleges that Valdez and Bell violated her First 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights to familial association with Zane by failing “to provide 

reasonable safety and minimally adequate care to, and safeguard the well-being of, 

Zane.” See Compl. ¶¶ 21-22. Plaintiff also brings one cause of action against the County

for municipal liability (“Monell”).

LEGAL STANDARDS

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claims made in the 

complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A pleading must 

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, plaintiffs must also plead “enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

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544, 570 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The plausibility standard demands more than 

“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” or “naked assertions devoid 

of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). Instead, the complaint “must contain sufficient 

allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to 

defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assume the truth 

of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The court need not take legal conclusions as true merely because they are cast in the form 

of factual allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Similarly, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to 

defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Where dismissal is appropriate, a court should grant leave to amend unless the 

plaintiff could not possibly cure the defects in the pleading. Knappenberger v. City of 

Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2009).

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, 

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 

laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) he or she was deprived of a right secured by the 

United States Constitution or federal laws; and (2) the deprivation was caused by a 

person acting under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), 

overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986).

Here, the parties do not contest that Defendants were acting under the color of state 

law; rather, the parties question whether Plaintiff was deprived of a right secured by the 

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First and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, Defendants argue that the Court should 

dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint because Plaintiff fails to allege violations of her 

constitutional rights, Valdez and Bell are entitled to qualified immunity,3and Plaintiff 

insufficiently pleads her Monell claim. See generally, MTD; see also Reply.

A. Defendants Valdez and Bell

First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not plausibly allege violations of her 

First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to familial association. Specifically, Defendants 

contend that Plaintiff insufficiently pleads causation4and deliberate indifference. MTD 

at 8-16. Plaintiff opposes both assertions. See Oppo. at 9-11.

“To amount to a violation [of Plaintiff’s right to familial association with her son, 

the social workers’] harmful conduct must ‘shock[] the conscience’ or ‘offend the 

community’s sense of fair play and decency.’” 5 Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cnty., 663 F.3d 

1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952)). 

“Conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ is ‘deliberate indifference to a known or so 

obvious as to imply knowledge of, danger.’” Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 

630 F.3d 833, 844 (9th Cir. 2010). As applied to this case, deliberate indifference 

 

3

In light of Plaintiff’s failure to sufficiently plead a constitutional violation, the Court declines to 

analyze qualified immunity. However, The Court notes that at the time of the alleged constitutional 

deprivation, the rights to familial association and to reasonable safety and minimally adequate care in 

foster homes were both clearly established. See Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833,

847 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding the right to reasonable safety and minimally adequate care in foster homes 

clearly established); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 685 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that “[i]t is 

well established that a parent has a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in ‘the companionship and society of 

his or her child’ and that ‘the state’s interference with that liberty interest without due process of law is 

remediable under [42 U.S.C. §] 1983’” under both the First and Fourteenth Amendments).

4 The Court also declines to analyze causation in light of Plaintiff’s failure to sufficiently plead a 

constitutional violation. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ requests for judicial notice 

because it did not rely on the documents in ruling on the instant motion. Doc. No. 9-2; Ruiz v. City of 

Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543, 548 n.13 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that judicial notice is inappropriate where 

the facts to be noticed are not relevant to the disposition of the issues before the court).

5 The right to familial association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments are analyzed in the same 

manner. See Mann v. City of Sacramento, -- Fed. App’x --, No. 17-17048, 2018 WL 4268534, at *2 (9th 

Cir. Sept. 7, 2018); see also Lee, 250 F.3d at 686.

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requires: (1) “a showing of an objectively substantial risk of harm” and (2) “a showing 

that the officials were subjectively aware of facts from which an inference could be 

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed and that either the official actually 

drew that inference or that a reasonable official would have been compelled to draw that 

inference.” Id. at 845.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff does not allege that Valdez and Bell were aware 

of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

existed. MTD at 12. Plaintiff counters that she adequately “alleges the social worker 

defendants knew about her son’s fragile condition, knew or should have known that the 

Richards were incapable of providing him with the care that he needed, and knew the 

Richards were not taking her son to critical doctor’s appointments.” Oppo. at 10.

According to the allegations in the Complaint, Valdez and Bell “decided to place 

Zane into the custody” of the Richards. Compl. ¶ 13. Thereafter, Plaintiff and her family 

members requested on numerous occasions that Zane be placed with a responsible 

relative or NREFM caregivers, but Valdez and Bell “ignored such requests,” and instead 

“falsely represented . . . that the [County] was in the process of investigating placement 

alternatives. . . .” Compl. ¶ 14. Following Maria’s several visits with Zane, “it was 

reported to . . . [Valdez] and [Bell] that [the Richards] were overwhelmed and that Zane 

was not receiving adequate attention or care, including missing doctors’ appointments.” 

See Compl. ¶ 15. Despite these reports, Valdez and Bell “failed and refused” to remove 

Zane from the Richards’ care and “left Zane in the[ir] overwhelmed and overburdened 

household.” Id.

Based on these allegations, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not adequately 

pleaded that Valdez and Bell were subjectively aware of facts from which an inference 

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm to Zane in the Richards’ care 

existed. For example, Plaintiff does not allege that Valdez and Bell knew that the 

Richards were in their seventies, that they had several other small children placed with 

them, that Mr. Richards suffered from a form of dementia, that an infant had died 

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inexplicably in the Richards’ care in the past, or that the Richards had not received 

training in the proper care and supervision of premature and drug-addicted infants. See 

Compl. ¶ 13. Moreover, as noted by Defendants, Plaintiff does not allege that Valdez 

and Bell knew the Richards’ placed Zane on his stomach to sleep. See Compl.; see also 

Reply at 4. Rather, Valdez and Bell would have had to draw an inference that a 

substantial risk of harm to Zane in the Richards’ care existed from the fact that the 

Richards’ were overwhelmed and that Zane had missed doctors’ appointments. See

Compl. ¶ 15. While Plaintiff also alleges that Valdez and Bell received reports that Zane 

was not receiving adequate care or attention, there are no specific factual allegations 

explaining how Valdez and Bell knew that Zane’s care was inadequate or inattentive 

beyond missing some doctor’s appointments. See id. These facts do not support a 

plausible inference that a substantial risk of serious harm to Zane existed by remaining in 

the Richards’ care. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded that Valdez and 

Bell acted with deliberate indifference, and therefore, Plaintiff also has not sufficiently 

pleaded a violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

B. Defendant the County

Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Monell claim fails for several reason, 

including that Plaintiff fails to allege the deprivation of a constitutional right. Mtn. at 17-

18. For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a violation of her 

First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Moreover, the allegations relating to Plaintiff’s 

Monell claim lack factual specificity and are conclusory. See Compl. ¶¶ 27-34; Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678; Pareto, 139 F.3d at 699. Thus, Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim 

brought pursuant to Monell fails. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 

(1986) (“[N]either [Monell], nor any other of our cases authorizes the award of damages 

against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact 

[the factfinder] has concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm.”);

Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A] public entity is not 

liable for § 1983 damages under a policy that can cause constitutional deprivations, when 

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the factfinder concludes that an individual officer, acting pursuant to the policy, inflicted 

no constitutional harm to the plaintiff.”); Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 808 

(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a “finding that the arrests did not involve the use of 

unreasonable force . . . . moot[s] the question of whether the city’s policy authorized the 

use of constitutionally excessive force”).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff insufficiently pleads a 

violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS Defendant’s motion and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice 

and with leave to amend. Plaintiff must file an amended complaint that cures the 

deficiencies addressed herein on or before December 11, 2018.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 26, 2018

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