Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01999/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01999-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Upon screening, the Court dismissed Schriro, Ryan, Goldsmith, Sigona, John Doe

Deputy Warden, Jane Doe Nurse, John Doe Correctional Officer, and Jane Doe Correctional

officer as Defendants (Doc. 28).

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The other remaining Defendants—Montgomery, Allen, and Cofield—have not been

served (see Docs. 32-33, 35).

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Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated (see Docs. 31, 36).

JDN

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Henry Enrique Montoya, Jr., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 08-1999-PHX-DGC (ECV)

ORDER

Plaintiff Henry Enrique Montoya, Jr. filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against multiple Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) officials (Doc. 25).1

Before the Court is Defendant Billy Austin’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies (Doc. 41),2

 to which Plaintiff did not respond. The Court will grant

Austin’s Motion to Dismiss and terminate the action.

I. Background

Plaintiff’s claims arose during his confinement at the Arizona State Prison ComplexStiner Detention Unit in Buckeye, Arizona (Doc. 25 at 1).3

 He alleged that on September 1,

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Plaintiff’s allegations were set forth in Count VII of his Second Amended Complaint

(Doc. 25 at 5(h)-5(k)). Upon screening, the Court dismissed Counts I-VI (Doc. 28).

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2007, Montgomery and Allen sprayed him with chemical agents while he was naked even

though he posed no threat (id. at 5(h)). Plaintiff claimed that he was then handcuffed and

placed on a gurney for 30 minutes before Austin directed Montgomery and Allen to

decontaminate Plaintiff by placing him under extremely hot water (id. at 5(h)-5(i)). Plaintiff

asserted that he was screaming that he was on fire for the 10 or 15 minutes he was under the

hot water. He alleged that he was then placed face down on the gurney for three hours,

during which time he repeatedly told Montgomery, Allen, Austin, and Cofield that he felt

burning pains (id. at 5(i)-5(j)). Plaintiff stated that whenever he tried to move to alleviate the

pain, Montgomery and Allen—pursuant to Cofield’s and Austin’s orders—pushed Plaintiff

back down on the gurney (id.). 

The Court found that Plaintiff’s allegations stated a claim for excessive force under

the Eighth Amendment and directed the four named Defendants to respond (Doc. 28).4

Austin moved for leave to file a untimely responsive pleading (Doc. 37), which the Court

granted (Doc. 40), and Austin filed his Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 41).

II. Motion to Dismiss

Austin moves for dismissal on the ground that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (id.). In support, he submits the declaration of Aurora Aguilar, a Hearing

Officer at the ADC’s Central Office in Phoenix (id., Ex. 1, Aguilar Decl. ¶ 1). Aguilar

explains that the ADC inmate grievance system is governed by Department Order (DO)

802—Inmate Grievance System (id. ¶ 3; Attach. A). She states that a copy of DO 802 is

available to all inmates in the library of each unit (id. ¶ 8). Aguilar further states that under

DO 802, inmates may grieve issues related to, among other things, staff, visitation, mail,

institutional procedures, medical care, and conditions of confinement (id. ¶ 4). 

Aguilar describes the four steps in the prison’s grievance system: (1) the inmate

attempts to informally resolve the issue by filing an inmate letter; (2) if not satisfied with the

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inmate-letter response, the inmate may file a formal grievance to the grievance coordinator;

(3) if not satisfied with the grievance coordinator’s response, the inmate may file a grievance

appeal to the Deputy Warden or Warden; (4) the inmate may appeal the Deputy

Warden/Warden’s response to the ADC Director, whose response is final (id. ¶¶ 5-6).

According to Aguilar, all appeals to the Director are recorded in the Grievance Appeal Log

and the Grievance Appeal File, which are both maintained in the Central Office (id. ¶ 9).

Aguilar avers that she reviewed the Appeal Log and the Appeal File in the Central Office;

however, there was no record that Plaintiff filed any appeals related to the September 1, 2007

incident (id. ¶¶ 10-11).

Austin submits that based on this evidence, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies for his excessive-force claim and his Second Amended Complaint

should therefore be dismissed (Doc. 41 at 4-5). 

The Court issued an Order notifying Plaintiff of his obligation to respond to Austin’s

motion (Doc. 42). This Order informed Plaintiff that if Austin’s motion is granted by the

Court, it will end his case (id. at 1). The Order also cited Local Rule of Civil Procedure

7.2(i) in its entirety; this rule provides that a party’s failure to respond to a motion may be

deemed a consent to the granting of the motion (id.). LRCiv 7.2(i). Plaintiff was given until

September 10, 2010 to respond to the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 42 at 2). To date, Plaintiff

has not filed a response, and the time for responding has expired.

III. Exhaustion

A. Legal Standard

Under the PLRA, a prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies before

bringing a federal action concerning prison conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Griffin

v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009). Exhaustion is required for all suits about

prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered

through the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). And a

prisoner must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable

rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006). 

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Exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007). Thus,

the defendant bears the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt, 315

F.3d at 1119. Because exhaustion is a matter of abatement in an unenumerated Rule 12(b)

motion, a court may look beyond the pleadings to decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-

20. Further, a court has broad discretion as to the method to be used in resolving the factual

dispute. Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th

Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted).

B. Analysis

In his verified Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff indicates that administrative

remedies were available for his claim, but he states that he did not submit a grievance or an

appeal because he feared for his life and was afraid that the defendants named in Count VII

would kill him if he sought administrative relief (Doc. 25 at 5(k)-5(l)). Plaintiff also states

that he was on suicide watch from August 6, 2007 until September 13, 2007, during which

time he did not have any writing materials (id. at 5(l)). 

Plaintiff need only exhaust available remedies. Any theoretically available remedies

prison officials prevented him from pursuing need not be exhausted. See Abney v.

McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 2004) (inability to utilize inmate appeals process due

to prison officials’ conduct may justify failure to exhaust); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523,

529 (3d Cir. 2003) (remedies prison officials prevent a prisoner from utilizing are not

“available” for § 1997e(a) purposes) (citation omitted); Lyon v. Vande Krol, 305 F.3d 806,

808-09 (8th Cir. 2002). The Second Circuit has found that “threats or other intimidation by

prison officials may well deter a prisoner of ‘ordinary firmness’ from filing an internal

grievance . . . .” Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 688 (2d Cir. 2004). The Hemphill

Court devised a multi-step approach for resolving whether remedies were rendered

unavailable or whether a defendant’s exhaustion defense was estopped by threats made to

the plaintiff. Id. First, a court must determine if remedies existed and whether the defendant

forfeited or waived the defense of nonexhaustion. If remedies were available, a court is to

“consider whether ‘special circumstances’ have been plausibly alleged that justify the

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prisoner’s failure to comply with administrative procedural requirements.” Id. at 686. 

Here, the Court finds that Austin has not forfeited or waived a nonexhaustion defense,

and he submits evidence that a grievance system was available for Plaintiff’s excessive-force

claim (Doc. 41, Ex. 1, Aguilar Decl. ¶¶ 3-5). Thus, under the Hemphill inquiry, the Court

must determine if Plaintiff’s allegations concerning his fears and lack of writing materials

justify his failure to file a grievance. Plaintiff alleges that he was afraid of retaliation if he

pursued administrative remedies; however, he does not explain why he held this fear. He

does not claim that he was threatened by any specific official or Defendant, nor does he

indicate whether his fear was based on a previous attempt to file grievances or other inmates’

experiences when using the grievance system. As to the lack of writing materials, Plaintiff

does not allege that he requested and was denied writing materials while he was on suicide

watch, nor does he explain why he could not attempt to grieve his claim upon release from

suicide watch. Without more, Plaintiff’s general assertions are insufficient to justify his

failure to attempt to use the grievance system.

Moreover, in failing to respond to Austin’s motion, Plaintiff did not refute evidence

that a grievance system was available and he failed to avail himself of that system. On this

record, the Court finds that Austin has met his burden to demonstrate nonexhaustion, and the

Motion to Dismiss will be granted.

IV. Lack of a Response

Alternately, the Court has the discretion under Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(i)

to grant Austin’s motion in light of Plaintiff’s failure to respond. As stated, Plaintiff was

specifically warned of this possibility in an Order from the Court (Doc. 42). Previous Court

Orders also repeatedly warned Plaintiff that failure to comply with any order of the Court

could result in dismissal (Docs. 5, 23, 28). 

Failure to comply with a district court’s local rule is a proper ground for dismissal.

Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). But before dismissal on this basis, the

Court must weigh “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the

court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public

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policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic

sanctions.” Id. at 53 (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)).

If the court does not consider these factors, the record may be reviewed independently on

appeal for abuse of discretion. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. 

Here, the first two factors favor dismissal. “[T]he public’s interest in expeditious

resolution of litigation always favors dismissal,” Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983,

990 (9th Cir. 1999), and the second factor favors dismissal in most cases. Wanderer v.

Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990). In the instant case, the Court finds that the

public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the Court’s interest in managing

the docket weigh in favor of dismissal. The third factor also favors dismissal. There is no

risk of prejudice to Austin to grant his motion. 

Public policy favors disposition of cases on their merits, so the fourth factor weighs

against dismissal. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The final factor requires the Court to consider the availability of less drastic sanctions.

Plaintiff was given ample time to respond to Austin’s Motion to Dismiss, which was filed

over two months ago. The Court explicitly warned Plaintiff that failure to respond could

result in the granting of the motion (Doc. 42). Plaintiff nonetheless failed to respond or move

for an extension. Thus, in weighing this last factor, the Court finds that dismissal without

prejudice is an available and less drastic sanction in this case.

In sum, the five-factor analysis supports dismissal for failure to respond to the Motion

to Dismiss. The Court’s decision to grant the motion in these circumstances is further

supported by the fact that it is premised upon a local rule that expressly permits the Court to

summarily grant unopposed motions. Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 53 (“Only in rare cases will we

question the exercise of discretion in connection with the application of local rules”), quoting

United States v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1979). 

Austin’s Motion to Dismiss will therefore be granted based on Plaintiff’s failure to

respond. See LRCiv 7.2(i). 

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IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendant Austin’s

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 41).

(2) Defendant Austin’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 41) is granted; the Second Amended

Complaint is dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust; in the alternative, it is

dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(i).

(3) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 18th day of October, 2010.

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