Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01270/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01270-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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A portion of the decision is also attached to Lodgement number 1, Superior Court Petition, but

pages of the record and decision are missing from Lodgement number 1.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TROY A. BARTHOLOMEW,

Petitioner,

v.

KATHY MENDOZA-POWERS, Warden,

Respondent.

 

 

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Civil No.08cv1270-IEG (NLS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE MOTION TO DISMISS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

 

 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Irma E. Gonzalez

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California. 

I. FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS

Troy A. Bartholomew (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a California prisoner proceeding pro se with a

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Pet.”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner

challenges the Board of Parole Hearings’ (“Board”) decision of November 14, 2006 denying parole. 

(Lodgement Number 3, Court of Appeals Petition at pp 42-48).1 Petitioner alleges that his confinement

without being granted parole after his minimum eligible parole date has elapsed violates his due process

//

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2

 In these proceedings, Petitioner does not challenge his conviction or sentence, only the denial

of parole.

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 and equal protection rights under the United States Constitution.2 Plaintiff claims that the Board

“[f]ailed to conduct a fair and balance [sic] duly considered individualized consideration hearing for

Petitioner [sic] individualized case factors; which did not add to further seriousness of the convicted

offense; violating the Sixth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment and the State and Federal Equal

Protection Clause.” (Pet. at 6- 6a.). Petitioner claims that the decision deprived him of his liberty

interest in release on parole. 

Respondent Kathy Mendoza-Power (“Respondent”) filed the Motion to Dismiss Writ of Habeas

Corpus, currently before the Court. Respondent argues that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his available

state judicial remedies as to his Equal Protection claim and, therefore, the Petition is mixed and must be

dismissed. Respondent argues in the alternative that Petitioner’s Equal Protection claim must be

dismissed for failure to allege sufficient facts to state an actionable claim for habeas corpus relief, and to

the extent Petitioner claims Equal Protection rights under the State Constitution, such claim fails to

allege a Federal question. (Respondent’s Motion at 2.)

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 25, 1991, Dr. Hassim Seedat granted Petitioner’s request for a ride to work. (Superior

Court Petition (“Sup. Ct. Pet.”, Lodgement Number 1 at 2.) After Dr. Seedat stopped for gas, Petitioner

pointed a gun at him and said “pow”. Petitioner then said it was only a cap gun and he was only trying

to scare Seedat. After Seedat pulled away from the gas station, Petition again pulled out the gun and

shot Seedat five times, hitting him in the arm, shoulder, jaw, and back of the head. The police found

Petitioner hiding in a linen closet and arrested him. (Sup. Ct. Pet, Statement of Case at 2.) Petitioner

was tried by a jury and found guilty of attempted first degree murder with great bodily injury, gun use,

and prior enhancement. Plaintiff was convicted on November 15, 1991 and sentenced on December 26,

1991 to an indeterminate term of seven years to life, plus twelve years. (Id. at 2.). 

Petitioner appealed his conviction, claiming that the trial court erred in excluding third party

culpability and in unduly restricting cross examination of witnesses. The Court of Appeals affirmed his

conviction on November 9, 1992. (Id. at 5.) Petitioner sought review from the California Supreme

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Court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, untimely notification of appellate opinion, and

prejudicial error in jury instructions. The California Supreme Court denied his appeal on April 27,

1994. Petitioner’s minimum eligible parole date (“MEPD”) was July 12, 2005. Petitioner’s first parole

consideration hearing was held on September 8, 2004 and Petitioner was found unsuitable for parole for

two years. Petitioners’s next parole hearing was held on November 14, 2006. Petitioner was again

found unsuitable for parole. (Id. at Statement of Facts, p. 3., Lodgement 3, appellate habeas petition at

42-49). The Board relied upon the following factors in concluding that Petitioner was not yet suitable

for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released: 1) the offense was

carried out in an especially cruel and callous manner in that Seedat was particularly vulnerable while

giving Petitioner a ride in his van; 2) the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner in that Petitioner first pretended he had a toy gun, then loaded the gun and shot Seedat in the

face; 3) the offense demonstrated exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering, especially the

fear Seedat must have felt as Petitioner loaded the gun; 4) Petitioner has a prior history of assaultive

behavior and an escalating pattern of criminal conduct, including the fact that Petitioner was on

probation at the time of the offense; and 5) that the motive for the crime is inexplicable. The Board was

most troubled by the fact that as recently as a 2004 psychological interview, Petitioner had claimed he

did not commit the crime. The Board found that it “has to believe that your insight and therefore your

understanding of the nature and magnitude of this crime is as of yet undetermined, and you remained

unpredictable and a threat to public safety.” (Decision page 4, Lodgement 3 at 45.)

The Board also noted many positive factors in Petitioner’s favor, including: 1) good work

reports; 2) completion of vocational training and college courses; 3) solid self-help programming; 4)

absence of misconduct; 5) psychological report of low risk for violence; and 6) documented plans for

residence and employment. (Id. at 43.) The Board specifically noted that Petitioner “presented as a

mature adult. You obviously have talents and have done impressive programming here in the institution

and other institutions. And you have embarked on a program of disciplinary behavior. It really appears

that you have gotten it.” (Id. at 45.) The Board, however, concluded that Petitioner’s unsuitability

factors outweighed the suitability factors. (Id. at 47.)

//

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III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 21, 2007, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in the San Diego County Superior

Court, alleging that the Board violated his state and federal due process rights by failing to give

adequate weight to the factors tending toward his suitability for parole. (Lodgement 1, Sup. Ct. Pet. at

12.) In the conclusion of the “Statement of the Case” Petitioner states that his “Due Process and Equal

Protection rights has [sic] been violated.” (Id. at 16.) Nowhere in the Petition, however, does Petitioner

state any facts relevant to an equal protection claim. On August 10, 2007, the Superior Court, in a

reasoned opinion, denied the Habeas Petition. (Lodgement 2, Superior Court Opinion.) The Superior

Court found that Petitioner did have a liberty interest in release on parole that is protected by the

procedural safeguards of the due process clause. The Court also found that there was no violation of

Petitioner’s due process rights because parole had properly been denied. (Id. at 7.) The opinion makes

no mention of equal protection rights. 

On December 4, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Fourth District

Court of Appeal. (Lodgement 3.) Petitioner again argued that his state and federal due process rights

had been violated by the Board’s decision. Petitioner again included the term “Equal Protection” in the

conclusion section despite having alleged no facts in the Petition to state an Equal Protection claim. 

(Id.) On March 14, 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Petition in reasoned decision. (Lodgement

4.) The Appeals Court found that the Board properly considered all the right factors and that the

Petition had to be denied because the standard of review did not permit it to reweigh those factors. (Id.

at 3.) 

On March 24, 2008, Petitioner appealed the Appellate Court’s denial of his Habeas Petition to

the California Supreme Court. (Lodgement 5.) On May 21, 2008, the Supreme Court denied the

petition for review. The entire Order consisted of: “The petition for review is denied.” (Id.) 

IV. DISCUSSION

In order to properly exhaust state judicial remedies, a California state prisoner must generally

present the California Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised

in his or her federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-

34 (1987). The petitioner must have raised the very same federal claims brought in the federal petition

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before the state supreme court. See Picault v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971); Duncan v. Henry,

513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). Applications for writs of habeas corpus that contain unexhausted claims

generally must be dismissed. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). However, federal courts have

the discretion to deny a habeas application on the merits notwithstanding a petitioner’s failure to fully

exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(2) (West 2006); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d

614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “a federal court may deny an unexhausted petition on the merits

only when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim.”)

A. Exhaustion of the Equal Protection Claim 

The Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment states that no

state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.

Amend. XIV §1 . The Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause “is essentially a direction that

all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.

432, 439 (1985). To assert a claim under the equal protection clause, petitioner must show that he was

similarly situated to other defendants who received preferential treatment. See Fraley v. Bureau of

Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 1993); see also McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834-35 & n.6

(9th Cir. 1991). 

1. The Claim Was Not Properly Presented

A habeas petitioner must exhaust his state court remedies before a habeas petition is properly

before the federal court. A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by presenting the state court

with both the controlling legal principles and the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim. See

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). A petitioner cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement by a

mere reference to a broad constitutional guarantee. “[I]t is not enough to make a general appeal to a

constitutional guarantee as broad as ‘due process,’ ‘equal protection’ and ‘the right to a fair trial’ to

present the substance of such a claim to a state court.” Hudson v. California Dept. of Corrections, 2008

WL 2676943 at * 4 (C.D. Cal July 7, 2008), quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996).

Respondent asserts that Petitioner failed to exhaust his equal protection claim because he did not

allege any federal or state equal protection claims in any of his state court petitions. (Respondent’s

Motion at 3.) Petitioner fails to assert that he brought the equal protection claim in any of his state court

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actions. Petitioner’s only mention of exhaustion is to state that “inmates are not reqired [sic] to

specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaint.” (Oppositional [sic] Briefing at 1.) 

Petitioner cites Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007) as support for this assertion. Jones involved an

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. §1997e. Accordingly,

Jones is not on point. 

Moreover, Respondent argues a failure of exhaustion, not merely the failure to affirmatively

plead exhaustion. In this case, Petitioner has not shown that he actually exhausted his equal protection

claim. The Court’s review of the record demonstrates that Petitioner did not present any equal

protection claim to any state court. Petitioner only mentioned the phrase “equal protection” in the

conclusion sections of his superior court and appellate court habeas petitions. Petitioner did not

demonstrate any facts or legal authority in either petition that would support a claim for equal

protection. Accordingly, the claim is not exhausted.

2. The Claim is Technically Exhausted

Respondent argues that the equal protection claim is unexhausted. Therefore, dismissal of the

entire petition is warranted because the petition is “mixed.” A mixed petition, one that contains both

exhausted and unexhausted claims, is subject to dismissal. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520-22 (1982).

Respondent further argues that Petitioner has an available judicial remedy because he can bring an

original habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. Respondent is mistaken. Petitioner cannot

now bring his equal protection claim before the California Supreme Court because it would be

procedurally barred. When a claim is procedurally barred, the claim is technically exhausted.

The exhaustion requirement may be satisfied notwithstanding a failure to present a claim to the

state supreme court, “if it is clear that (the habeas petitioner’s) claims are now procedurally barred under

(state) law.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 16-62 (1996), quoting Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S.

346, 351 (1989); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125-26 n.28 (1982) (noting that the exhaustion

requirement applies “only to remedies still available at the time of the federal petition.”); Valerio v.

Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 770 (9th Cir. 2002) (a procedurally barred claim satisfies exhaustion

requirement), citing Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2001) (“the district court correctly

concluded that [the] claims were nonetheless exhausted because ‘a return to state court for exhaustion

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The claim is likely procedurally defaulted. In order to proceed on a procedurally defaulted

claim, a Petitioner must show good cause for his failure to properly present his claim to the state

supreme court, and prejudice as a result of this Court’s imposition of a procedural default, or show that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if habeas relief was denied as a result of the default.

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would be futile.’”). “A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the

technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.” 

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005), quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

732 (1991); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(c) (West 2006) (“An applicant shall not be deemed to have

exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has

the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.”) 

The State of California will not consider either successive petitions or delayed petitions without

a showing of good cause. “Before considering the merits of a second or successive petition, a California

court will first ask whether the failure to present the claims underlying the new petition in a prior

petition has been adequately explained, and whether that explanation justifies the piecemeal presentation

of the petitioner's claims.” In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 774, rehearing denied (1993). A petitioner must

show that he reasonably was unaware of the facts giving rise to the claim. “ With the exception of

petitions which allege facts demonstrating that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has occurred . . .

unjustified successive petitions will not be entertained on their merits. Id. Similarly, an unexplained

delay in filing a habeas petition would require the state court to reject the petition. See e.g. People v.

Amsbary, 51 Cal.App.3d 75, 79 (1975) (“a petition for habeas corpus must be rejected where there is an

unreasonable unexplained delay in filing it.”); Evans v.Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 199-200 (time periods of

30 to 60 days between filings is reasonable); Culver v. Director of Corrections, 450 F. Supp.2d 1135,

1140-41 (C.D. Cal 2006) (finding unexplained and unjustified delays of 71 and 97 days unreasonable

under California law)

In this case, Petitioner’s last habeas petition was denied by the California Supreme Court on May

21, 2008. If Petitioner were to bring a new petition, the delay would be at least nine months. This

delay would not be found reasonable by the state courts and the petition would be rejected. 

Accordingly, Petitioner does not have any remaining state remedies and his equal protection claim is

technically exhausted.3

 Because the claim is technically exhausted, the Petition is not mixed and

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dismissal of the entire Petition is unwarranted. 

B. The Equal Protection Argument Fails to State Sufficient Facts

A Court may dismiss a claim in a habeas application on the merits notwithstanding a petitioner’s

failure to fully exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(2) (West 2006); Cassett v.

Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “a federal court may deny an unexhausted

petition on the merits only when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable

federal claim.”)

To assert a claim under the equal protection clause, petitioner must show that he was similarly

situated to other defendants who received preferential treatment. See Fraley v. Bureau of Prisons, 1

F.3d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 1993); see also McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834-35 & n.6 (9th Cir.

1991). Once Petitioner makes that showing, the state would have to show that its actions were rationally

related to a legitimate governmental interest. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980)

(presumption of validity attaches when distinction not based on “suspect” classification, which would

trigger strict scrutiny).

Petitioner does not make the threshold showing necessary because he does not state that he was

similarly situated to anyone who received preferential treatment. In his “Oppositional Briefing”

Petitioner explains that his equal protection claim is based upon the argument that the Board treated

attempted murder (the crime for which he was convicted) as harshly as felony murder. Thus, Petitioner

argues that the Board violated his rights by treating him as harshly as people who commit what he

considers to be a more serious crime. This does not, and cannot, state a valid claim under the Equal

Protection clause. Because there is no way that Petitioner can state a colorable claim under this

argument, the equal protection claim should be dismissed. 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an

Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) directing that

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN PART in that the Equal Protection claim be

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dismissed and DENIED as to Dismissal of the entire Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 20, 2009 any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and 

served on all parties no later than May 4, 2009. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s

order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156

(9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 13, 2009

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

CC: HON. IRMA E. GONZALEZ

 ALL PARTIES

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