Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04975/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04975-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH P. BATT,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF OAKLAND, OAKLAND POLICE

DEPARTMENT, and DOES 1–20,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 02-04975 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff Keith Batt filed this action, alleging federal civil rights violations and state law torts

in connection with his employment by defendant Oakland Police Department (“OPD”). Now before

the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Having considered the parties’ arguments

and submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the court enters the following memorandum

and order.

BACKGROUND

The court reviewed the factual history of this case in some detail in its order on defendants’

motion for judgment on the pleadings, and need not repeat the full history here. For purposes of

resolving the current motion, it is only necessary to review a few critical facts, which are either

undisputed or are taken from plaintiff’s submissions and accompanying argument.

Plaintiff graduated from the Oakland Police Academy in June, 2000 and began work for the

OPD as a trainee on June 18, 2000. Chuck Mabanag was appointed plaintiff’s Field Training

Officer (“FTO”). During plaintiff’s two-week tenure under officer Mabanag, he witnessed

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numerous illegal and brutal acts on the part of his supervising officer and three other OPD officers. 

The group of four officers subsequently became known as the “Riders,” and were subjected to

partially successful criminal prosecution. Declaration of Keith P. Batt in Opposition to Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment or Alternatively Summary Adjudication (“Batt Dec.”) ¶¶ 3–4, 21.

Mabanag told plaintiff to keep quiet about what happened within their car and to bring any

problems to him or the other three members of the squad. One of the other Riders, Officer Vazquez,

was similarly clear about his views on officer misconduct and reporting misconduct to superiors. 

Vazquez instructed plaintiff never to tell what another officer had done. He said that “[s]nitches lie

in ditches” and that if plaintiff was a snitch, Vazquez would beat him. Vazquez also told plaintiff to

“[f]uck probable cause. Fuck all that shit you learned in the academy . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 3–4, 7, 22.

After witnessing the Riders’ unlawful acts and receiving the threat from Vazquez, plaintiff

had a conversation with his former instructor, Mary Guttormson, in which he revealed that Mabanag

had beaten and planted drugs on suspects. According to plaintiff, Guttormson took no action in

response to plaintiff’s disclosure other than to advise plaintiff to “stand up to” Mabanag, and “not to

tolerate that anymore.” Declaration of Bruce M. Towner in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment or Alternatively Summary Adjudication (“Towner Dec.”), Exh. 5 at 55–68.

After enduring several more days with the Riders, during which plaintiff witnessed more

brutality and deliberate falsification of police reports, plaintiff informed Mabanag that he was going

to quit because he could no longer participate in these illegal activities. Mabanag told plaintiff to

speak to Vazquez. Vazquez said he respected that plaintiff was not comfortable with the acts of the

Riders and that they would not do anything bad in front of him again. Plaintiff still felt he had no

choice but to resign to avoid participating in or condoning illegal police actions, and was afraid to

report the wrongdoing out of fear of retaliation. He resigned from the OPD on July 3, 2000. Id. at

17, 40. One to two days after his resignation, plaintiff discussed what had happened with OPD

Internal Affairs. Batt Dec. ¶¶ 15–17.

Plaintiff identifies a number of pieces of evidence in support of his contentions that he feared

retaliation in the event of speaking out, and that the OPD had a general culture of punishing officers

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who reported misconduct. First, during his time at the academy, plaintiff heard the story of an

officer who had “snitched” on one of his colleagues and ruined his chances of being successful at the

OPD. Id. ¶ 21. Second, the “snitches in ditches” comment by Vazquez was clearly intended to

prevent plaintiff from reporting misconduct. Third, after he resigned, plaintiff heard that he would

“get his ass kicked” if he returned to the OPD, and another officer overheard a locker room

discussion of going to plaintiff’s house to “do a special project.” Virtually everyone he trained with

stopped talking to him. Two instructors told him not to return to work and that it would be very

difficult if he did. Id. ¶¶ 23–24. Fourth, Oakland Police Chief Word stated during his deposition

that plaintiff would have had difficulty advancing as an officer had he decided to remain with OPD

after reporting the Riders to internal affairs. Finally, plaintiff provides evidence that the department

was lax in responding to previous complaints about Mabanag, and that other officers who spoke out

against the Riders suffered harassment.

Plaintiff subsequently filed this lawsuit, alleging violations of his rights under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as various state law torts. 

Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings as to each of plaintiff’s claims, which this court

granted in part. Defendants now move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s four remaining claims,

for violation of plaintiff’s rights under the First Amendment, constructive discharge, and intentional

and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is

“no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the

case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is

genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving

party. Id. The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of identifying those portions

of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

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material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On an issue for which the

opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out “that

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Mere allegations or denials do not defeat a moving

party’s allegations. Id.; Gasaway v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir.

1994). The court may not make credibility determinations, and inferences to be drawn from the

facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Masson v. New

Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

The moving party may “move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment

in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in

evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated

therein.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

DISCUSSION

I. First Amendment Claim

This court considered the viability of plaintiff’s First Amendment claim in its order on

defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Defendants objected to plaintiff’s claim

principally based on the lack of a causal connection between plaintiff’s protected speech and any

adverse employment action. The court found that plaintiff had succeeded in stating a prima facie

First Amendment violation, noting that plaintiff’s resignation and his conversation with internal

affairs occurred “virtually simultaneously.” The court will now revisit that ruling in light of the

more fully developed evidentiary record and in light of a recent Supreme Court decision which

limits the scope of speech protected under the First Amendment.

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A. Retaliation

In order to make out a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment,

plaintiff must establish three elements. 

[T]o state a claim against a government employer for violation of the First

Amendment, an employee must show (1) that he or she engaged in protected

speech; (2) that the employer took “adverse employment action”; and (3) that

his or her speech was a “substantial or motivating” factor for the adverse

employment action.

Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, plaintiff provides evidence of two instances of arguably protected speech. The first

instance is plaintiff’s conversation with his former instructor, Guttormson, during his two-week

period of supervision by Mabanag. The second instance is plaintiff’s report of the Riders’

misconduct to internal affairs on July 4 or 5, 2000.

Defendants argue that the speech at issue in this lawsuit is not protected under the First

Amendment because one of plaintiff’s job duties was to report misconduct to his superiors. In

support of this argument, defendants cite Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006), which was

decided after oral argument on defendants’ motion.

Richard Ceballos, the plaintiff in Garcetti, was a deputy district attorney whose job

responsibilities included supervising other prosecutors and making recommendations as to the

prosecution of their cases. Id. at 1955. At the request of a defense attorney, Ceballos reviewed a

search warrant which was used to obtain critical evidence in a pending criminal case. Id. Ceballos

concluded that the warrant contained “serious misrepresentations” and wrote a memorandum

recommending dismissal of the case. Id. at 1955–56. His supervisors rejected his recommendation,

and the warrant survived a motion to suppress. Id. at 1956. Ceballos claimed that as a result of his

recommendation, he was subjected to retaliatory employment actions. Id.

The Supreme Court held that the memorandum was not protected speech under the First

Amendment. Although the memorandum addressed matters of public concern, the Court held that

Ceballos did not speak as a citizen when writing the memorandum, but rather acted “pursuant to his

duties as a calendar deputy”: “We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to

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their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and

the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Id. at 1960. 

The Court rooted its holding in concerns about a government employer’s ability to manage its

employees. “Official communications have official consequences, creating a need for substantive

consistency and clarity. Supervisors must ensure that their employees’ official communications are

accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer’s mission.” Id.; see also id. at

1961 (finding that the “displacement of managerial discretion by judicial supervision finds no

support in our precedents.”).

The Court later qualified its apparently categorical exclusion of speech made pursuant to a

job duty:

We thus have no occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the

scope of an employee’s duties in cases where there is room for serious debate. We

reject, however, the suggestion that employers can restrict employees’ rights by

creating excessively broad job descriptions. . . . The proper inquiry is a practical one.

Formal job descriptions often bear little resemblance to the duties an employee

actually is expected to perform, and the listing of a given task in an employee’s

written job description is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that

conducting the task is within the scope of the employee's professional duties for First

Amendment purposes.

Id. at 1961–62. As the preceding passage makes clear, an employer’s articulation of a “duty,”

without more, does not eliminate any obligation to comply with the First Amendment. Rather, a

court must determine whether the employee is “actually expected to perform” the potentially

protected act.

Here, defendants’ argument that plaintiff had a duty to report misconduct rests on OPD rules

and regulations—materials which the Garcetti Court suggested are not dispositive. The central

premise of plaintiff’s case is that notwithstanding any official policy of the OPD, the culture of the

OPD and the express commands of his direct supervisors established that plaintiff had a duty not to

report misconduct. Plaintiff has offered a variety of evidence in support of his claim, including

plaintiff’s experiences at the academy, his interaction with his superiors, his interaction with his

peers following his report to internal affairs, and the testimony of Chief Word that plaintiff’s career

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would have been impaired as a result of his report. Thus a fact issue remains as to whether

plaintiff’s speech was protected under the First Amendment.

The same facts also rebut defendants’ claim that plaintiff has not provided prima facie

evidence that the department had a custom or policy of condoning retaliation against officers who

reported misconduct, as required for establishing municipal liability under Monell v. Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Blair v. City of Pomona, 223 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir.

2000). As the Ninth Circuit has observed, acts similar to those described by plaintiff can support an

inference that the OPD “had the custom of chastising whistleblowers.” See id. (finding that

evidence of hostility towards the plaintiff could suggest that “those in charge of the Department . . .

were aware of the police code of silence”). Here, as well, plaintiff has provided evidence that other

members of the department were angered at plaintiff’s decision to report the Riders to internal

affairs, and that Chief Word recognized that plaintiff’s actions may have limited plaintiff’s ability to

pursue a career with the OPD.

Turning now to the second element of a retaliation claim, plaintiff identifies only two

adverse employment actions. First, plaintiff notes Vazquez’s threat to harm plaintiff in the event

that he reported any misconduct to supervisors. As the court has already observed, this threat would

tend to discourage plaintiff from exercising his First Amendment rights, and thus qualifies as an

adverse employment action under Coszalter. See 320 F.3d at 976. Second, plaintiff provides

evidence that his work environment was so intolerable as to render his resignation a constructive

discharge. As discussed in more detail below, the evidence offered in opposition to defendants’

motion is sufficient to support a constructive discharge claim. Thus plaintiff has provided evidence

of an adverse employment action.

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails with respect to the third element of the Coszalter standard,

“that [plaintiff’s] speech was a ‘substantial or motivating’ factor for the adverse employment

action.” See id. at 973. This element requires that there be some causal connection between an act

of protected speech and a retaliatory adverse employment action. See id. at 977 (proving a First

Amendment violation requires that the “jury logically could infer that the plaintiff was terminated in

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retaliation for his speech.”). Under the present record, which was not available at the time of this

court’s previous order, it is clear that plaintiff has failed to establish any causal relationship between

his speech and either of the two claimed adverse actions.

With respect to Vazquez’s threat, the undisputed record reflects that the threat took place at

the beginning of plaintiff’s service under Mabanag, days or weeks before plaintiff engaged in either

act of protected speech. Thus it cannot be said that plaintiff’s speech motivated Vazquez to make

his threat.

With respect to the constructive discharge, plaintiff’s claim is necessarily based on facts

arising on or before July 3, 2000—the date he offered his resignation. On the now-clarified record,

this resignation took place one to two days prior to plaintiff’s conversation with internal affairs. 

Thus any actions taken in response to plaintiff’s conversation with internal affairs cannot have had

an effect on his already-offered resignation (and, by extension, his constructive discharge).

Plaintiff’s conversation with Guttormson, in contrast, took place prior to his resignation. 

According to plaintiff’s own evidence and arguments, however, neither Guttormson nor plaintiff

mentioned their conversation to anybody. There is absolutely no indication on the record that any of

the individuals who contributed to plaintiff’s allegedly intolerable working conditions were acting in

retaliation against plaintiff’s protected speech.

The court’s conclusion that plaintiff has not succeeded in creating a triable issue as to

retaliation does not end the First Amendment inquiry, as plaintiff argues in the alternative that the

policy of the OPD to punish officers who report misconduct is actionable as a prior restraint. The

court now turns to that contention.

B. Prior Restraint

The parties agree that a prior restraint on speech, as well as an act of retaliation, can serve as

the basis for a First Amendment claim by an employee against a government employer. See, e.g.,

United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466–67 (1995) (applying the

standard set forth in Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)

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to a restriction on the right of government employees to accept honoraria for speeches given at

private functions). Defendants argue, however, that only “administrative and judicial orders

forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications

are to occur” are actionable as prior restraints. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550

(1993). According to defendants, the alleged informal and uncodified practice within the OPD of

retaliating against officers who report misconduct is not an “administrative . . . order” and is

therefore not actionable.

In Alexander, a plaintiff who was previously convicted on multiple obscenity and RICO

counts sought to prevent the forfeiture of his business assets on the grounds that the loss of his

business would prevent him from engaging in constitutionally protected speech. Id. at 548–49. The

Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the forfeiture was a penalty for past illegal conduct, and did

not purport to enjoin the plaintiff from engaging in any future activities: “Assuming, of course, that

he has sufficient untainted assets to open new stores, restock his inventory, and hire staff, petitioner

can go back into the adult entertainment business tomorrow, and sell as many sexually explicit

magazines and videotapes as he likes, without any risk of being held in contempt for violating a

court order.” Id. at 551. Alexander thus held only that the challenged restraint must forbid future

conduct, and did not consider the types of administrative or judicial acts which might be viewed as

prior restraints.

Here, based on the facts offered by plaintiff, despite the existence of official policies

requiring officers to report misconduct, the OPD in fact tolerated significant hostility to

whistleblowers such as plaintiff. The fact that the alleged practice is not pursuant to a written policy

is not relevant; it is sufficient to establish that it was tacitly condoned by management. Thus,

plaintiff has provided evidence of a prior restraint sufficient to defeat defendants’ motion for

summary judgment.

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II. Constructive Discharge

Defendants renew their challenge to plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim on three

grounds. First, defendants claim that plaintiff’s supervisor did not have actual notice of the

allegedly intolerable conditions. Second, defendants argue that plaintiff did not provide defendants

with an opportunity to correct the conditions before resigning, but instead “quit and sued.” Third,

defendants argue that the threats plaintiff received prior to resignation are not sufficiently intolerable

to support a constructive discharge claim. Defendants do not take issue with the accuracy of the

facts put forward by plaintiff, or identify portions of plaintiff’s pleadings which are unsupported by

admissible evidence. Rather, defendants argue that the facts as alleged and supported are

insufficient to establish the elements of a constructive discharge.

With respect to the first and second arguments, the court has already concluded that there is

no clearly established notice-and-opportunity-to-correct requirement under California law, and that

plaintiff’s direct supervisors—including Mabanag—are arguably members of management for the

purposes of constructive discharge law as laid out by this Circuit. With respect to the third

argument, the court has already noted that plaintiff’s witnessing of the Riders’ illegal acts, coupled

with Vazquez’s explicit threat, arguably rise to the level of intolerable conditions required for a

constructive discharge to occur. See generally Batt v. City of Oakland, No. 02–04975, slip op. at

9–12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2003). Defendants’ attempt to reargue the same points in moving for

summary judgment is unavailing.

III. Emotional Distress Claims

 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s emotional distress claims must fail for two reasons. First,

defendants argue that plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants violated a mandatory statutory duty

in order to recover for infliction of emotional distress. Defendants’ argument is based on Haggis v.

City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 4th 490, 498–99 (2000), which considered a lawsuit under California

Government Code section 815.6. Section 815.6 provides that “Where a public entity is under a

mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular

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kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to

discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to

discharge the duty.” This statute is inapplicable to plaintiff’s claims for infliction of emotional

distress, which are based on principles of respondeat superior as codified in Government Code

section 815.2(a). See § 815.2(a) (“A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act

or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or

omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or

his personal representative.”). Section 815.6, in contrast, creates primary liability for a

municipality’s failure to carry out a statutory command.

Second, defendants argue that the facts as alleged and supported by evidence do not evince

“extreme and outrageous conduct.” As discussed above in connection with plaintiff’s constructive

discharge claim and in the court’s previous order, a jury could reasonably conclude that the Riders’

requirement that plaintiff witness and participate in illegal acts, coupled with Vazquez’s explicit

threat, were outrageous. See Batt, No. 02-04975, slip op. at 15–16. Defendants’ motion with

respect to plaintiff’s claims of emotional distress is therefore denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby DENIES defendants’ motion for summary

judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 12, 2006 

MARILYN HALL PATEL

District Judge

United States District Court

Northern District of California

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