Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-04333/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-04333-21/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 For the sake of brevity, the court declines to list herein all plaintiff States and

entities represented by way of this action. Plaintiffs’ representatives who were present at the

hearing, however, included the following: Brad Phelps (AR); Nancy Bonnell (AZ); Kathleen

Foote (CA); Emilio Varanini (CA); Michael Undorf (DE); Emilian Bucataru (FL); Rod Kimura

(HI); Blake Harrop (IL); Maryellen Mynear (KY); Jane Johnson (LA); John Tennis (MD);

Bridgette Williams (MS); Todd Sattler (ND); Deyonna Young (NM); Brian Armstrong (NV);

James Roberts (OH); Tim Nord (OR); Alexis Barbieri (PA); Sonny Jones (SC); Jay Smith (SC);

Elizabeth Martin (TN); Mark Levy (TX); Ron Ockey (UT); Sarah Allen (VA); Brady Johnson

(WA); Gwendolyn Cooley (WI); and Doug Davis (WV).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. C 06-4333 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES AG, MOTION TO DISMISS

et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint came on for hearing before this

court on February 7, 2007. Plaintiffs, forty individual states acting through their Attorneys

General, and certain named government entities (collectively “plaintiffs” or “plaintiff States”),

appeared through their respective counsel.1 Defendants appeared through their counsel,

Julian Brew, Ronald C. Redcay, Joel S. Sanders, Peter Nemerovski, Kenneth R.

O’Rourke, Harrison J. Frahn, Gary L. Halling, and Robert B. Pringle. Having read all the

papers submitted and carefully considered the relevant legal authority, the court hereby

GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and DENIES the motion to dismiss in part,

for the reasons stated at the hearing, and as follows.

BACKGROUND

The instant case is closely related to a separate antitrust MDL action that is currently

pending before the court, In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litigation, M 02-

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2 The named defendants are: Infineon Technologies AG; Infineon Technologies

North America Corp.; Hynix Semiconductor, Inc.; Hynix Semiconductor America, Inc.; Micron

Technology, Inc.; Micron Semiconductor Products, Inc.; Mosel Vitelic, Inc.; Mosel Vitelic Corp.;

Nanya Technology Corporation; Nanya Technology Corporation USA, Inc.; Elpida Memory,

Inc.; Elpida Memory (USA), Inc.; and NEC Electronics America, Inc. (collectively “defendants”).

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1486 PJH. Both actions generally allege a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy in the U.S.

market for dynamic random access memory (“DRAM”), carried out by numerous

manufacturer defendants. Whereas the MDL case, however, is comprised of numerous

private actions brought by individuals and entities seeking relief against defendants, the

present action has been brought by forty individual plaintiff States, acting through their

respective Attorneys General, as well as certain government entities located within the forty

states. 

A. Background Allegations

DRAM is a semiconductor high-speed memory chip that is used to store electronic

data in a wide variety of electronic products, including personal computers and servers. 

See First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ¶ 9. DRAM is sold worldwide, with the United

States DRAM market accounting for a significant share of global DRAM sales – more than

$5 billion annually. See id. at ¶ 31. 

The complaint alleges that over a four year period beginning in 1998, the

defendants2 – various manufacturers of DRAM who collectively control the majority of U.S.

DRAM sales – conspired together to unlawfully fix, raise, and maintain the price for DRAM

in the U.S. market. See id. at ¶ 34. Defendants’ conspiracy was allegedly effectuated

through coordinated participation in meetings, frequent price communications, and

coordinated supply reductions. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 35-36, 39, 42, 60, 69, 79. Plaintiffs

allege that, as a result of defendants’ unlawful activity, DRAM prices were artificially inflated

during the conspiracy period, forcing consumers and businesses who purchased DRAM

during the period to pay more for DRAM than they would have in a free and competitive

market. See id. at ¶¶ 89-91. 

Plaintiffs define the victims of defendants’ illegal price fixing cartel to include: (1) the

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plaintiff States themselves, since they were and are “purchasers of electronic products;”

and (2) the “end user consumers” in the various plaintiff States, since they, too, are

purchasers of electronic products. See FAC at ¶ 4. To that end, plaintiff States, acting

through their various Attorneys General, proceed against defendants in various

representative capacities – i.e., “on their own behalf, and on behalf of state agencies,

political subdivisions, natural persons and/or businesses as warranted by federal and state

laws.” Id. In addition, certain state agencies and/or political subdivisions located within the

plaintiff States also proceed as named plaintiffs, and are pursuing the instant action in a

representative capacity on behalf of similarly situated entities. See generally FAC (named

plaintiffs include, for example, City and County of San Francisco, County of Santa Clara,

and the Los Angeles Unified School District “on behalf of all other political subdivisions

similarly situated”); see also id. at ¶ 12. 

All plaintiffs seek to recover “as damages, restitution, and/or disgorgement of the

illegal overcharges that consumers paid as a result of the DRAM manufacturers’ price

fixing.” See id. 

 B. Plaintiffs’ Claims

The instant complaint sweeps broadly. Although it is presented as stating only three

“claims for relief,” those claims for relief are further divided into several “counts,” which

collectively state numerous federal and state law claims alleged by varying combinations of

different plaintiff groups. See generally FAC. Regardless whether styled as a claim for

relief or a specific count, each of plaintiffs’ grounds for relief is based on the allegations that

defendants engaged in an unlawful conspiracy to restrain trade in the DRAM market: 

1. First Claim for Relief (Sherman Act)

Plaintiffs’ first claim for relief alleges that defendants violated section 1 of the

Sherman Act, and is further broken down into three separate counts. See FAC at ¶¶ 98-

113. Count one alleges a claim by all forty plaintiff States against all defendants, and

seeks injunctive relief against them to prevent and restrain the antitrust violations alleged

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by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs further allege that included among all plaintiff States are both direct

and indirect purchasers of DRAM. See id. at ¶¶ 101(c), 102. 

Count two alleges a claim for damages under section 1 of the Sherman Act, brought

by only seven plaintiff States. See FAC at ¶¶ 105-108. These seven plaintiff States allege

that they are entitled to damages against defendants as direct purchasers of DRAM, by

virtue of certain assignment clauses contained in contracts that were entered into between

the seven plaintiff States and certain Original Equipment Manufacturers (“OEM”s). Id. 

Count three alleges a claim for damages under section 1 of the Sherman Act,

brought by twenty plaintiff States. See id. at ¶ 111. As do the plaintiff States who proceed

pursuant to count two, these twenty plaintiff States allege that they, too, are entitled to

damages as direct purchasers of DRAM from defendants. They do not, however, rely on

the same grounds for claiming direct purchaser status. Rather, these twenty plaintiff States

at issue allege that they can recover as classic direct purchasers, because their state

agencies and/or political subdivisions purchased DRAM directly from defendant Micron,

through one of Micron’s company divisions, Crucial Technology. Id. at ¶¶ 110-12. 

2. Second Claim for Relief (Cartwright Act)

Plaintiffs’ second claim for relief alleges defendants’ violation of California’s state

antitrust statute, the Cartwright Act. This claim is alleged by seventeen plaintiff States and

named plaintiffs the City and County of San Francisco, the County of Santa Clara, and the

Los Angeles Unified School District, the latter three proceeding as class representatives for

other state agencies and political subdivisions similarly situated. See FAC at ¶ 114.

Plaintiffs allege that defendants’ unlawful conspiracy was carried out and effectuated

within California, and that defendants’ conduct within California in turn caused injury to

“natural persons and state agencies and political subdivisions” throughout the whole of the

United States. See id. at ¶ 115. Plaintiffs then divide their Cartwright Act claim in

accordance with these three distinct groups of injured parties. Specifically, plaintiffs allege

that their Cartwright Act claim is brought: (1) in a parens patriae capacity by the Attorneys

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3 Since the hearing on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, three plaintiff States –

New Hampshire, Ohio, and Texas – have filed voluntary notices of dismissal, and dismissals

were ordered by the court on July 6, 2007, June 25, 2007, and August 15, 2007, respectively.

Accordingly, those plaintiff States’ claims are no longer at issue, and for purposes of this order,

the court omits all reference to them. 

4 Defendants have also filed a motion to dismiss similar claims alleged in a

separate but related case brought by the New York State Attorney General. See In re DRAM

Antitrust Litigation, member case no. C 06-6436 PJH, State of New York v. Micron Technology,

et al. The merits of that motion are discussed by way of a separate order, filed concurrently

herewith. 

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General of eight plaintiff States, on behalf of all natural persons in those states; (2) in a

parens patriae capacity, or in a proprietary/representative capacity, or in a class capacity,

by the Attorneys General and/or class representatives of sixteen plaintiff States, on behalf

of all state agencies in those states; and (3) in a parens patriae capacity, or in a

proprietary/representative capacity, or in a class capacity, by the Attorneys General and/or

class representatives of eleven plaintiff States, on behalf of all political subdivisions in those

states.3

 Id. 

All three plaintiff groups appear to include both direct and indirect purchasers,

although this is not entirely clear from the allegations of the complaint. 

3. Third Claim for Relief (State Antitrust and Unfair Competition Laws)

Finally, plaintiffs’ third claim for relief alleges numerous violations of state antitrust

and unfair competition laws. The claim is separated into forty separate state law counts,

one for each of the forty plaintiff States before the court. See FAC at ¶¶ 123 et seq. 

Depending on the particular plaintiff State at issue in any given count, plaintiffs’ state law

claims are (a) alleged on behalf of the States themselves, natural persons, state agencies,

and/or political subdivisions, (b) brought by the States (and their Attorneys General) by

means of parens patriae or class action allegations, and/or (c) cover both direct and indirect

purchaser claims. See id. 

C. The Instant Motion to Dismiss

Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint in part, pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).4

 Specifically, defendants seek dismissal of plaintiffs’

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second and third claims for relief. They seek dismissal in part of the former – brought

under the Cartwright Act – on grounds that standing to sue under the Act is generally

lacking for non-California persons and entities. They seek dismissal in part of the latter –

brought pursuant to state antitrust and consumer protection claims – based on myriad

procedural and substantive arguments. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

In evaluating a motion to dismiss, all allegations of material fact are taken as true

and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Burgert v.

Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000)(citations omitted). 

In order to survive a dismissal motion, however, a plaintiff must allege facts that are

enough to raise his/her right to relief “above the speculative level.” See Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, --- U.S. ---, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007). While the complaint “does not

need detailed factual allegations,” it is nonetheless “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the

‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief’ [which] requires more than labels and conclusions,

and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.

In short, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face,” not just conceivable. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974. 

B. Cartwright Act Claims (Second Claim for Relief)

Defendants challenge nearly the whole of plaintiffs’ second claim for relief, seeking

dismissal of every claim stated therein by all non-California plaintiffs. Those claims, all

brought pursuant to California’s Cartwright Act, are alleged in a variety of representative

capacities on behalf of natural persons, state agencies, and political subdivisions. See,

e.g., FAC at ¶¶ 114-21. Defendants seek dismissal based on three overriding arguments. 

First, they argue that the six plaintiff States pursuing parens patriae claims on behalf of

non-California residents lack standing to do so under the Cartwright Act. Second,

defendants contend that the twelve plaintiff States pursuing representative claims on behalf

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5 For purposes of the instant order, the court refers to plaintiff Northern Mariana

Islands as a plaintiff “State.”

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of non-California government agencies – i.e., state agencies and political subdivisions –

also lack standing to bring such claims under the Act. Third, defendants assert that, in

addition to lack of standing under the Cartwright Act itself, none of the plaintiff States at

issue authorize their Attorneys General to bring suit under the Cartwright Act in the first

place. 

1. Non-California Claims on Behalf of Natural Persons/Businesses

Six plaintiff States – Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana

Islands5, South Carolina, and Utah – assert parens patriae claims under the Cartwright Act

on behalf of all natural persons. See FAC at ¶ 115. Defendants, however, contend that the

Cartwright Act does not authorize parens patriae actions brought by non-California

Attorneys General on behalf of non-California residents. Defendants argue that the plain

language of the Cartwright Act itself restricts parens patriae claims to those brought

exclusively by the California Attorney General, exclusively on behalf of California residents. 

Defendants are correct. In the section of the Cartwright Act specifically addressing

Attorney General enforcement suits brought as parens patriae actions, the Act provides:

“[t]he Attorney General may bring a civil action in the name of the people of the State of

California, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in the state, in the

superior court of any county which has jurisdiction of a defendant, to secure monetary relief

as provided in this section for injury sustained by those natural persons to their property by

reason of any violation of this chapter...”. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §

16760(a)(1)(emphasis added). This provision could not be plainer: where the Attorney

General is empowered to bring a damages action seeking relief for violation(s) of the

Cartwright Act, it is only the California Attorney General who is so empowered, and on

behalf of California residents only. The out-of-state Attorneys General therefore have no

parens patriae authority under the Act.

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Plaintiffs, for their part, have submitted no legal authority expressing a contrary view

of section 16760, nor do their opposing arguments persuade the court to find otherwise. 

Plaintiffs argue, for example, that even if the above conclusion is true, out-of-state

Attorneys General may still bring suit under the general enforcement provision of the Act,

which provides a private right of action to “any person” injured under the Act. See Cal.

Bus. & Prof. Code § 16750(a)(“Any person who is injured in his or her business or property

by reason of anything forbidden or declared unlawful by this chapter, may sue therefor”). 

According to plaintiffs, their parens patriae action should be considered nothing more than

a procedural device, similar to a class action, which could be filed on behalf of natural nonresidents under the Cartwright Act. For support, plaintiffs rely on California case law

purportedly holding that class actions under the Cartwright Act are not precluded. See,

e.g., Bruno v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 120, 134-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 

However, while plaintiffs are generally correct that Bruno sanctions the use of private class

actions under the Cartwright Act, this in no way establishes that parens patriae actions

should also be allowed pursuant to the Cartwright Act’s private right of action provision. 

This is because a parens patriae action is expressly defined as a means for a state to seek

redress for wrongs affecting the public at large, while a class action is generally a means by

which individual private rights may be collectively enforced. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard

Oil, 405 U.S. 251, 257-58, 266 (1972). Plaintiffs have furthermore failed to present the

court with any legal authority holding that parens patriae actions are the same as class

actions, for purposes of maintaining a private right of action under the Cartwright Act. 

Accordingly, and without express authority adopting plaintiffs’ position, the court will not

assume that out-of-state parens patriae actions are specifically contemplated by the

Cartwright Act’s private enforcement provisions.

Plaintiffs also contend that sections 16750(e) and 16760(f) of the Cartwright Act

authorize the non-California parens patriae claims before the court. This is wrong. Section

16750(e) permits the Attorney General to enter into contracts and cooperate with private

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parties and other government entities bringing antitrust actions. See Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Code § 16750(e)(“In any action brought by the Attorney General pursuant to either state or

federal antitrust laws ... the Attorney General may enter into contracts relating to the

investigation and the prosecution of such action with any other party plaintiff who has

brought a similar action...”). However, there is no legal authority that affirmatively interprets

this statute as granting express parens patriae authority to non-California Attorneys

General acting on behalf of non-California residents. Nor is such an interpretation

warranted. The plain language of section 16750(e) avoids mention of parens patriae

authority altogether, and merely grants the California Attorney General the right to

cooperate with other plaintiffs in jointly investigating and/or prosecuting cases in which the

other plaintiffs have brought “similar action[s] for the recovery of damages.” See id. In

other words, the California Attorney General is empowered to cooperate with other plaintiffs

who have already, and independently, filed a similar claim. It does not work the other way

around – i.e., other party plaintiffs are not authorized to state a claim under the Cartwright

Act, simply because they agree first to cooperate with the California Attorney General as

part of the Attorney General’s prosecution of an action under the statute. Even assuming,

therefore, that the non-California Attorneys General here do, in fact, proceed jointly with the

California Attorney General pursuant to section 16750(e) of the Act, this provision grants

them no greater authority than they otherwise would have under the Act. 

Furthermore, plaintiffs’ reliance on section 16760(f) of the Act is similarly misplaced. 

This provision states that the parens patriae powers enumerated in that section “are in

addition to and not in derogation of the powers granted to the Attorney General by common

law with respect to bringing actions parens patriae.” See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §

16760(f). Plaintiffs rely on this language for proof that plaintiffs’ authority to bring a parens

patriae suit under the Act is to be found in the common law parens patriae powers vested in

all Attorneys General – which the Act itself recognizes. This argument, however, is

inapposite. Section 16760(f) is but one provision contained within the broader section

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16760 – the Attorney General enforcement provision. As such, and when viewed in the

larger context of the section as a whole, section 16760(f) is more correctly viewed as a

modifier to the broader section, which is limited to actions by the California Attorney

General, as noted above. See generally Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16760. In other words,

the lesser provision relates only to those common law powers granted to the California

Attorney General, not to out-of state Attorneys General. 

Finally, plaintiffs assert that parens patriae authority on behalf of out-of-state

residents is suggested by the California Supreme Court’s holding in Pacific Gas & Electric

Co. v. County of Stanislaus, 16 Cal. 4th 1143 (1997). But this argument, too, fails. Pacific

Gas & Electric engaged in an exhaustive review of the statutory language of the Cartwright

Act, and specifically of the provisions of the Act that discuss the Attorney General’s

capacity to sue under the Act. See, e.g., id. at 1153. The court found that the statute was

to be interpreted expansively, and in such a way that a county should be deemed able to

bring a representative action under the Act, even though counties are not explicitly

referenced in the Act. See id. at 1154-55. However, the case provides no support for

plaintiffs’ sweeping conclusion that out-of-state Attorneys General should likewise be

allowed to bring suit under the Act. Indeed, even though construing the Act broadly, the

Pacific Gas & Electric court specifically referred to the Act as recognizing “that not only the

Attorney General and local district attorneys, but also ‘any county, city, public corporation or

public district of this state,’ may bring a civil action under the Cartwright Act.” Id. at 1157

(emphasis added). At no time did the court refer to out-of-state entities, let alone did it

touch upon the ability of such entities to state claims under the Act – in a parens patriae

capacity or otherwise. The California Supreme court having declined to so construe the Act

there, this court will refrain from such a holding here. 

Accordingly, the Cartwright Act claims asserted by plaintiff States Kentucky,

Louisiana, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, South Carolina, and Utah on behalf

of natural persons and/or residents, are hereby DISMISSED for lack of standing under the

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6 Specifically, plaintiffs assert claims on behalf of 12 plaintiff States’ state agencies,

and on behalf of 9 plaintiff States’ political subdivisions. See FAC at ¶ 115.

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Cartwright Act. 

2. Non-California Claims on Behalf of Government Entities

There are 12 non-California plaintiff States’ Attorneys General who assert claims

pursuant to the Cartwright Act in a parens patriae, proprietary, and/or class capacity, on

behalf of state agencies and political subdivisions (collectively “government entities”).6

 See

FAC at ¶ 115. Defendants seek dismissal of all these claims, once more arguing that

standing is lacking under the Cartwright Act. They contend that the non-California

government entities do not constitute “persons” authorized to bring suit under the

Cartwright Act. To that end, defendants seek dismissal of all claims brought on behalf of

government entities by the Attorneys General of plaintiff States Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii,

Kentucky, Louisiana, Northern Mariana Islands, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,

South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia. 

Defendants contend, as they did with respect to their arguments in support of

dismissing non-California claims on behalf of natural persons, that the provisions of the

Cartwright Act expressly contemplate that only California’s government entities may sue

under the Act, and that only the California Attorney General may sue as parens patriae on

their behalf. Plaintiffs, for their part, respond with the argument that California state cases

have interpreted the Cartwright Act to allow suit by out-of-state government plaintiffs to the

same extent as any other “person” under the Act. 

Defendants once again have the better argument. Beginning, as the court must,

with the language of the Cartwright Act, its plain meaning is that only California government

entities are granted standing to sue as “persons” under the Act. Section 16750, for

example – the civil enforcement provision that plaintiffs rely on for authority – provides that

“[a]ny person who is injured in his or her business or property by reason of anything

forbidden or declared unlawful by this chapter, may sue therefor...”. See Cal Bus. & Prof.

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Code § 16750(a). The term “person” is, however, specifically defined elsewhere in the Act

to include “corporations, firms, partnerships and associations existing under or authorized

by the laws of this State or any other State....” See id. at § 16702 (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, standing to sue under this provision of the Act is granted to all natural persons,

corporations, firms, partnerships and associations – regardless whether they are California

residents or not. 

While government entities are not included in this group of permissible plaintiffs, this

does not mean that they are precluded from bringing suit. Rather, the California legislature

saw fit to authorize government entities to bring suit by way of a separate provision,

codified at section 16750(b) of the Cartwright Act. That provision expressly states that the

term “person,” as set forth within the civil enforcement provision of section 16750, shall be

deemed to include “[t]he [S]tate and any of its political subdivisions and public agencies.” 

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16750(b). The meaning of this language is clear: the California

Attorney General, and any of its political subdivisions and public agencies, also have

standing to bring suit under the Act. 

Out-of-state government entities, however, do not. Section 16750(b) expressly limits

the government entities authorized to bring suit to “[t]he [S]tate” – i.e., California – and its

agencies and subdivisions. See id. The California legislature knew how to include out-ofstate government entities as “persons” capable of suit, had it wanted to. After all, it had

previously defined “person” to include out-of-state “corporations, firms, partnerships and

associations.” See id. at § 16702. Thus, its failure to broaden the definition of “person” to

include out-of-state government entities under section 16750(b) is logically viewed as proof

that the legislature did not intend for these entities to be included in the group of potential

plaintiffs capable of bringing suit pursuant to the Cartwright Act’s enforcement provisions. 

In the face of the Cartwright Act’s express language limiting suit on behalf of

government entities to California and its Attorney General, plaintiffs’ citation to alternative

case law in support of a contrary conclusion is unpersuasive. 

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Plaintiffs rely, for instance, on FTC v. MTK Mktg. Inc., for the proposition that out-ofstate government plaintiffs should be treated as “persons” under a given statute, wherever

that statute refers to the phrase “person.” See 149 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1998). In MTK

Mktg., the Ninth Circuit interpreted a California statute relating to bond enforcement, and

found that a federal government agency could constitute a “person” within the meaning of

the statute. See id. at 1039. Plaintiffs are correct that the Ninth Circuit there reasoned

that, in the face of statutory language that seemingly defined “person” to include only the

state and its political subdivisions and agencies, the court should nonetheless interpret the

statute in a manner that treated the federal government in the same manner as the state

government, absent some indication of legislative intent. Id. To that end, the Ninth Circuit

construed “person” to include the federal government agency. 

This reasoning does not apply here, however. For unlike the statute at issue in

MTK Mktg., the Cartwright Act here explicitly distinguishes between out-of-state

corporations, firms, partnerships and associations who can sue, and those out-of-state

government entities who cannot. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 16702, 16750(b, c). 

Moreover, defendants’ citation to legislative history further supports the conclusion that the

legislature did, in fact, intend to include only California government agencies as “persons”

capable of suit under the Cartwright Act. See Nemerovski Decl. ISO Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss (“Nemerovski Decl.”), Ex. 7 at 23-24. Accordingly, all indications here are that the

California legislature did not intend to grant out-of-state government entities standing to sue

under the Cartwright Act. And as the Ninth Circuit in MTK Mktg. indicated, courts should

defer to the legislative intent behind statutes, where ascertainable. 

Plaintiffs also rely on cases construing the Sherman Act, in which courts conclude

that state government entities are “persons” capable of suit under the Act. This reliance is

misplaced, however, as these cases are not controlling here. It is true enough that the

Sherman Act ordinarily provides helpful guidance in construing state antitrust laws that are

modeled on the Sherman Act. However, as even the California Supreme Court has

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explicitly noted, this is not necessarily so where the Cartwright Act is concerned. See

California v. Texaco, 46 Cal. 3d 1147 (1988)(noting that, contrary to popular belief,

Cartwright Act was modeled on Texas state law rather than federal antitrust law, and

holding Sherman Act cases to be not directly probative regarding Cartwright Act

interpretation). Even if the court were to rely on case law interpreting the Sherman Act, the

cases are not actually supportive of the point urged by plaintiffs. This is because, while the

cases plaintiffs rely on do construe state governments as “persons” for purposes of section

4 of the Clayton Act – the Sherman Act’s enforcement provision – the Clayton Act is

distinguishable from the Cartwright Act. Specifically, the Clayton Act does not contain any

provision expressly defining or limiting the types of government entities who may sue under

the Act. The Cartwright Act, as already explained above, does. See Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Code 16750(b)(“The [S]tate and any of its political subdivisions and public agencies shall

be deemed a person within the meaning of this section”.). Moreover, the Sherman Act

cases relied on by plaintiff consider only whether state governments may sue under the Act

in their own names, and do not consider the precise issue here – i.e., whether the state

government may sue on behalf of further removed state agencies and political subdivisions. 

All of the foregoing suffices to distinguish the Sherman Act cases from the case at bar. 

In sum, then, the court’s consideration of the statutory language of the Cartwright

Act and its supporting legislative history persuade the court that the Cartwright Act was not

intended to, and by its language does not, support the inclusion of out-of-state government

entities as “persons” capable of suit under the Act, and upon whose behalf the plaintiff

States in question may sue.

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss on this ground is granted, and plaintiffs’

Cartwright Act claims brought on behalf of government entities by the Attorneys General of

plaintiff States Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Northern Mariana Islands,

Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia, are hereby

DISMISSED.

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7 Defendants seek dismissal on this ground of the following plaintiff States’ claims

on behalf of natural persons: Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota, Northern Mariana Islands,

and South Carolina. Defendants seek dismissal of the following plaintiff States’ claims brought

on behalf of government entities: Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Northern

Mariana Islands, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia.

See FAC at ¶ 115; Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 19:9-11, 21:27-25:12. 

15

3. Individual State Law Authorization for Cartwright Act Claims

Finally, defendants also argue that, in addition to the language of the Cartwright Act

itself, a further reason supports dismissal of all non-California plaintiff States’ claims, on

behalf of both natural persons and government entities: namely, that these plaintiff States

do not authorize their Attorneys General to bring suit on behalf of persons or government

entities pursuant to another state’s laws.7 Defendants look to the states’ governing antitrust

laws in particular, and note that their plain statutory language restricts suits on behalf of

natural persons and government entities to violations of state antitrust law and in some

instances, federal law, and does not permit suits for violation of foreign states’ antitrust

laws. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 45.50.577(a-b); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6 §§ 2105, 2108; Haw.

Rev. Stat. § 480-14(b); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 367.200; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 51:128,

51:138; N.D. Cent. Code § 51-08.1-07; 4 N. Mar. I. Code § 5206; Okla. Stat. tit. 79 § 205;

71 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 732-204; R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-11(b); S.C. Code Ann. § 39-3-190; Va.

Code Ann. § 59.1-9.15(a, c).

In response, plaintiffs contend that reliance on antitrust statutes alone is insufficient,

as the plaintiff States’ Attorneys General are authorized to bring Cartwright Act claims on

behalf of residents and government entities by virtue of the powers and duties vested in

them by other sources. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 2504(3); Ky. Rev. Stat. §

15.020; N. Mar. I. Const. Art. III, § 11; N.D. Cent. Code § 54-12-02; Okla. Stat. tit 74 § 18b;

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-916(3). Plaintiffs also urge the court to place the burden on

defendants to prove that the individual plaintiff States affirmatively prohibit their Attorneys

General from bringing Cartwright Act claims, rather than requiring plaintiffs to prove that

state laws allow them to file such claims. 

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8 The only exception to this is Utah’s antitrust statute, which, as plaintiffs point out,

does contemplate suit by the Attorney General pursuant to “any” law. See Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-10-916(3)(“The attorney general may proceed under any antitrust laws in the state or

federal courts on behalf of this state, any of its political subdivisions or agencies, or as parens

patriae on behalf of natural persons in this state.“)(emphasis added). Despite this expansive

language, however, the Cartwright Act is nonetheless unavailable to plaintiff State Utah, for

the reasons given above in connection with standing under the language of the statute itself.

This result applies to parens patriae claims brought by Utah on behalf of residents, as well as

claims brought on behalf of government entities. See FAC at ¶ 115. 

16

Defendants are correct, in the first instance, that the statutory language of the

various state antitrust statutes at issue limits suits brought by the various State Attorneys

General to suits for violation of their own antitrust laws and in some instances, federal law. 

See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 45.50.577(a-b)(authorizing Attorney General to bring civil action

on behalf of government entities to secure monetary relief “by reason of any violation of AS

45.50.562-45.50.570")(emphasis added); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-14(b)(authorizing Attorney

General action on behalf of government agencies “to recover the damages provided for by

this section, or by any comparable provisions of federal law”)(emphasis added). There is

no language in any of the antitrust statutes, nor can plaintiffs point to any, that expressly

authorizes any State Attorney General to bring suit for antitrust violations pursuant to a

foreign state’s statute.8

Plaintiffs instead rely on alternative sources of authority – such as general

enforcement provisions, common law, and/or state constitutional provisions – in order to

invoke the authority that is lacking in the antitrust statutes themselves. See, e.g., Del.

Code Ann. tit. 29, § 2504(3)(general empowerment statute authorizing Attorney General to

“exercise all such power and authority as the public interest may from time to time

require”); Commonwealth v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., 1993 WL 476633, *3 (W.D. Va.

1993)(recognizing common law powers of Virginia Attorney General in bringing federal

Sherman Act claim in addition to state antitrust claim); La. Const. Art. IV, § 8 (“As

necessary for the assertion or protection of any right or interest of the state, the attorney

general shall have authority (1) to institute, prosecute, or intervene in any civil action or

proceeding...”)(emphasis added). According to plaintiffs, these alternative sources

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establish the right of the Attorneys General of the various states to do everything in their

power to represent the interests of the residents and entities within their states, and this

must necessarily include the ability to institute civil actions pursuant to another state’s

antitrust law. 

The problem with plaintiffs’ argument, however, is that while the types of authorities

they cite do generally establish the ability of the State Attorneys General to do their utmost

to institute and prosecute suits in order to protect the well-being of their state’s residents

and entities, those authorities also appear to contemplate that such representative suits will

be prosecuted under the laws of their own state, or in some instances, federal law. Not a

single source relied on by plaintiffs expressly provides or even implies that a representative

action by an Attorney General may be brought pursuant to another state’s laws, let alone

California’s antitrust law specifically. Nor could the court find any such authority. Indeed,

even the most expansive of the general empowerment statutes relied on by plaintiffs, while

recognizing the Attorney General’s ability to bring actions in out-of-state courts, stops short

of actually authorizing the Attorney General to bring actions in out-of-state jurisdictions

pursuant to out-of-state laws. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. § 15.020 (general rights and duties

provisions establishing that Attorney General “shall also commence all actions or enter his

appearance in all cases, hearings, and proceedings in and before all other courts, tribunals,

or commissions in or out of the state, and attend to all litigation and legal business in or out

of the state required of him by law, or in which the Commonwealth has an

interest”)(emphasis added). 

This being the case, the court declines plaintiffs’ invitation to find that the majority of 

plaintiff States’ Attorneys General are authorized, pursuant to their own state laws, to bring

suit pursuant to California’s Cartwright Act, in addition to pursuing their own state law

claims. In so holding, the court has also declined plaintiffs’ invitation to place upon

defendants the burden of persuading the court that the plaintiff States affirmatively prohibit

their Attorneys General from bringing representative Cartwright Act claims, and has instead

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placed upon plaintiffs the burden of persuading the court that state laws allow them to file

the instant claims. This is because, as the court has stated on prior occasions in

connection with related litigation, the court desires to avoid making affirmative

pronouncements regarding state law that would have the effect of substantially broadening

the legal rights available pursuant to that law, without some indication that such a result has

been expressly contemplated by the courts of a given state. 

A conservative approach is also warranted, in the court’s view, given the basic

nature of representative and/or parens patriae actions instituted by State Attorneys

General. Parens patriae actions, for example, are unique vehicles that allow states to

vindicate “quasi-sovereign interests” – such as interests in the physical and economic

health and well-being of state residents and/or entities. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son,

Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). And while neither party before the court has

expressly raised the issue, it appears to the court that an inherent presumption in state

actions brought to vindicate “quasi-sovereign” interests is that a state will necessarily

vindicate those interests through enforcement of its own state – or, where warranted,

federal – laws, given that the persons and entities from whom the state’s quasi-sovereign

interests stem, and the authority for vindicating such interests, are both rooted in the state

itself and by extension, within its boundaries. Here, because of the unduly broad nature of

plaintiffs’ allegations, it is impossible for the court to tell at this juncture whether plaintiffs

are in fact asserting a parens patriae claim, a specifically defined “representative” claim, or

a class claim on behalf of both natural persons and government entities. See FAC at ¶ 115

(asserting Cartwright Act claim on behalf of non-California state agencies and political

subdivisions “in either a parens patriae, a proprietary/representative, or a class

capacity”)(emphasis added). However, in view of plaintiffs’ alternative allegations, the

concerns just noted counsel in favor of a conservative approach to the question whether

the non-California State Attorneys General have been expressly authorized to bring suit

pursuant to the Cartwright Act. 

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9 Defendants originally moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim for disgorgement or

restitution pursuant to Texas state law. However, in view of the court’s August 15, 2007 order

granting plaintiff State Texas’ voluntary dismissal of its claims, defendants’ argument is now

moot.

19

In sum, therefore, the court concludes that the state laws of Alaska, Delaware,

Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota, Northern Mariana Islands, Oklahoma,

Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia also fail to provide the necessary

standing for the plaintiff States’ Attorneys General to bring their Cartwright Act claims on

behalf of natural persons and/or government entities. Accordingly, these claims are

DISMISSED on this ground, in addition to lack of standing under the Cartwright Act itself. 

C. State Antitrust and Unfair Competition Claims (Third Claim for Relief)

Defendants also challenge the state law claims that are alleged by way of forty

separate counts in plaintiffs’ third claim for relief. Plaintiffs’ claims are rooted in either state

antitrust statutes, or state unfair competition/consumer protection statutes, or both. 

Regardless of the source of plaintiffs’ claims, defendants target the majority. They argue

that dismissal in whole or in part is required, for one or more of the following four reasons:9

(1) the Illinois Brick doctrine bars certain state law claims that seek recovery on behalf of

indirect purchasers; (2) certain state law claims are barred because plaintiffs have failed to

allege any intrastate activity, as required pursuant to state law; (3) that certain state law

claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations; and (4) certain state law claims

alleging parens patriae authority on behalf of natural persons and businesses are deficient,

because plaintiffs lack the parens patriae capacity to sue for monetary damages on behalf

of those entities. 

1. Illinois Brick

Defendants urge the court to dismiss several plaintiff States’ claims brought

pursuant to their own antitrust and/or unfair competition/consumer protection statutes. 

They argue that, to the extent plaintiffs seek recovery for indirect purchasers pursuant to

these statutes, relevant laws of these states specifically prohibit or limit indirect purchasers

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from bringing antitrust suits, in accordance with Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720

(1977). According to defendants, since these states follow Illinois Brick’s general

prohibition on indirect purchaser suits alleging antitrust violations, the indirect purchaser

relief plaintiffs seek here is improper. Defendants argue that, on this basis, the indirect

purchaser claims brought by Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana,

Maryland, Oklahoma, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia must be dismissed.

a. Alaska

Plaintiffs allege claims pursuant to Alaska’s Monopolies and Restraint of Trade Act,

as well as Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (“AUTPCPA”). 

See Alaska Stat. § 45.50.562 et seq.; § 45.50.471 et seq.; see also FAC at ¶¶ 123-28.

Specifically, plaintiffs seek relief – through Alaska’s Attorney General – on behalf of the

state, and as parens patriae on behalf of state agencies, political subdivisions, and natural

persons. See FAC at ¶¶ 125-27. 

Defendants target all of these claims to the extent they seek relief on behalf of

indirect purchasers. They contend that Alaska’s antitrust statute does not cover indirect

purchaser claims that are based, as here, on conduct occurring prior to July 1, 2003, and

that Alaska’s consumer protection statute cannot be used as an alternative to circumvent

the prohibition imposed by the state’s antitrust statute. In response, plaintiffs recognize

that Alaska did not enact a law granting indirect purchasers standing to sue until July 1,

2003, but they assert that indirect purchaser standing under both the antitrust and

consumer protection statutes was nonetheless recognized prior to passage of the 2003

law. 

Beginning with Alaska’s antitrust statute, both parties acknowledge that the statute

was amended in 2003 to expressly allow for indirect purchaser standing. The amended

statute now empowers the Attorney General – and the Attorney General alone – to seek

monetary relief on behalf of indirect purchasers. See Alaska Statute § 45.50.577(i)(“Only

the attorney general, in a suit brought under this section, may seek monetary relief for

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injury indirectly sustained for a violation of [the Act]”). Plaintiffs are therefore generally

correct that Alaska’s antitrust statute would normally permit suit by the Attorney General for

monetary relief on behalf of indirect purchasers. However, this is not the case here. For as

defendants point out, the historical and legislative notes to the statute indicate that the

amended provision of the statute governing Attorney General actions applies “to civil

actions alleging a violation of [the state antitrust statute] that occurred on or after July 1,

2003.” See id. (editor’s notes to the statute)(emphasis added). Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges

violations of the antitrust statute that occurred between 1998 and 2002. See FAC at ¶¶ 96,

99. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ allegations are not covered by the amended provision of the

statute that would allow the Alaska Attorney General’s suit to go forward on behalf of

indirect purchasers. 

Plaintiffs attempt to avoid this conclusion by arguing that, even prior to passage of

the amended provision discussed above, Alaska’s antitrust statute was already construed

to allow for suits by the Attorney General on behalf of indirect purchasers. Plaintiffs would

invoke this prior authority as alternative grounds for the instant suit on behalf of indirect

purchasers. The court, however, is unpersuaded by these arguments. The obvious

implication of Alaska’s amendment to its antitrust statute is that, prior to amendment, no

indirect purchaser standing existed under the statute. Else, there would have been no

need to amend the statute to permit indirect purchaser claims. This conclusion is further

buttressed by the fact that the editor’s notes to the statute explicitly state that the amended

statute applies prospectively to conduct occurring after July 1, 2003. 

Having concluded, therefore, that the instant claims by the Alaska Attorney General

on behalf of indirect purchasers are barred under the state’s antitrust statute, the issue

remains whether the Attorney General may nonetheless bring indirect purchaser claims

pursuant to the state’s unfair competition statute. 

The AUTPCPA provides: “A person who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or

property as a result of another person's act or practice declared unlawful [under AUTPCPA]

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may bring a civil action to recover for each unlawful act or practice three times the actual

damages or $500, whichever is greater.” See Alaska St. § 45.50.531. There is nothing in

the statute’s language or definitions that specifically designates either direct or indirect

purchasers as “persons,” or that distinguishes between the two. Nor has either party

submitted any controlling case authority directly on point as to this issue, although plaintiffs

have pointed to one case that provides persuasive authority for the argument that the

Alaska Attorney General may seek restitution on behalf of indirect purchasers under the

unfair competition statute. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D. D.C.

1999). The court does not find Mylan instructive, however, in light of the fact that the

Mylan case predated Alaska’s 2003 amendment to its antitrust statute, and did not contain

any discussion of indirect purchaser standing under AUTPCPA in light of the state’s Illinois

Brick policy. Specifically, the facts of the Mylan case provided no occasion for that court to

consider – as is squarely before the court here – the wisdom of allowing plaintiffs’ claims to

proceed under Alaska’s consumer protection statute where those exact same claims were

explicitly barred under the state antitrust statute. 

As such, and furthermore recognizing that this court is not in the best position to

decide unresolved legal issues for the State of Alaska, the court adopts – as it has done

previously – the interpretation that will wreak the least amount of havoc on the existing law

in Alaska. To that end, the court declines to read AUTPCPA to permit the Attorney General

to assert indirect purchaser claims here, since no court has affirmatively found to the

contrary, and since, under the current status of the antitrust laws in Alaska, the Attorney

General may only seek relief on behalf of indirect purchasers for conduct that is alleged to

have occurred after July 1, 2003. 

For the above reasons, the court concludes that the indirect purchaser claims

brought by the Attorney General pursuant to Alaska’s antitrust and consumer protection

statutes must be, and hereby are, DISMISSED.

b. Arkansas 

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Plaintiffs also assert claims under Arkansas law pursuant to the state’s antitrust and

consumer protection statutes. See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-301 et seq. (Arkansas Unfair

Practices Act (“AUPA”)) ; Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-101 et seq. (Arkansas Deceptive Trade

Practices Act (“ADTPA”)); see also FAC at ¶ 130. Acting through the Arkansas Attorney

General, they seek relief for plaintiff State Arkansas, its state agencies, and its natural

persons. FAC at ¶ 130. 

Defendants once again target the indirect purchaser claims. As they did with

respect to plaintiffs’ claims under Alaska law, defendants argue that Arkansas’ antitrust

statute was only recently amended to allow the Attorney General to sue on behalf of

indirect purchasers, and that this amendment did not become effective until April 8, 2003 –

thereby failing to cover the pre-2003 conduct alleged by plaintiffs here. See Ark. Code

Ann. § 4-75-315(b) (“The Attorney General also may bring a civil action in the name of the

state, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in this state, to secure

monetary relief as provided under this section for injury, directly or indirectly sustained by

those persons...”)(effective April 8, 2003). This being the case, defendants contend that

the indirect purchaser claims are barred under the Arkansas antitrust statute, and that such

claims under the state’s consumer protection statute should also be barred, lest plaintiffs be

allowed to circumvent the Illinois Brick policies contemplated by the antitrust statute. 

Although these arguments were persuasive with respect to claims under Alaska’s

state laws, they are not similarly persuasive here. For as plaintiffs point out, the Arkansas

antitrust statute here is not as narrow as Alaska’s antitrust statute. This is because the

2003 version of the Arkansas antitrust statute – including its amendments – does not

explicitly apply only to violations occurring after its enactment. Rather, the Arkansas

statute elsewhere merely indicates that it does not “allow for the commencement of any

action by the Attorney General under the provisions of [the Act] for events occurring prior to

[April 8, 2003] of which the Attorney General had actual knowledge.” See Ark. Code Ann. §

4-75-320(c). Thus, as plaintiffs argue, a fair reading of the amended statute is that it

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applies to actions commenced by the Attorney General that allege conduct occurring prior

to April 8, 2003, but only where the Attorney General had no actual knowledge of the

conduct at the time. 

Pursuant to this plain reading of the statute, plaintiffs’ claims here on behalf of

indirect purchasers pass muster. For there are no allegations anywhere in plaintiffs’

complaint indicating that the Arkansas Attorney General had actual knowledge of

defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct. To be sure, plaintiffs’ complaint comes close to

alleging as much in the section of the complaint that alleges defendants’ fraudulent

concealment of their activities. See FAC at ¶¶ 4, 40, 84 (defendants concealed their

conduct “[f]rom approximately 1998 to June of 2002"). However, although defendants

argue that these fraudulent concealment allegations are sufficient to demonstrate that the

Attorney General had actual knowledge of defendants’ purported antitrust violations – and

thus, that the amended statute does not apply – the court is not convinced. The fraudulent

concealment allegations state only that the defendants stopped concealing their activities

from plaintiffs in 2002, not that plaintiffs – or more specifically, the Arkansas Attorney

General – actually knew of defendants’ activities as of 2002. As such, and in the absence

of allegations or proof indicating that the State Attorney General affirmatively had

knowledge of defendants’ conduct prior to April 8, 2003, the antitrust claims alleged on

behalf of indirect purchasers are viable at this time.

Having ascertained that plaintiffs’ claims on behalf of indirect purchasers pursuant to

the Arkansas antitrust statute may proceed, the court turns to plaintiffs’ indirect purchaser

claims pursuant to the Arkansas consumer protection statute – ADTPA. See Ark. Code

Ann. § 4-88-101 et seq.

While both parties rely on non-controlling authority for support of their contrary

positions, plaintiffs rely on the only case cited by the parties that specifically considered

whether antitrust indirect purchaser claims may be asserted pursuant to ADTPA. See In re

New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 160, 178-79 (D. Me.

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2004). The In re New Motor Vehicles court stated: there is “no support in the ADTPA or

Arkansas case law for a ban on indirect purchaser suits. The ADTPA provides a private

cause of action for damages for any person injured by a violation of the ADTPA, and is not

limited to a cause of action for direct purchasers.” The court also noted that Arkansas

“does not prohibit indirect purchaser suits under its antitrust laws.” See id. 

Given that In re New Motor Vehicles is the only case to construe indirect purchaser

claims under the ADTPA in light of the amended Arkansas antitrust statute, and in view of

defendants’ failure to cite any directly contrary authority insofar as the ADTPA is

concerned, the court finds In re New Motor Vehicles persuasive. For these reasons, and in

view of the fact that Arkansas’ antitrust statute additionally allows for plaintiffs’ indirect

purchaser claims as alleged in the instant complaint, the court concludes that plaintiffs’

claim under the ADTPA, on behalf of indirect purchasers, is viable and may proceed. 

Accordingly, the court hereby DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’

indirect purchaser claims pursuant to Arkansas’ antitrust and consumer protection statutes. 

The denial with respect to the antitrust statute is without prejudice, as the issue may be

revisited on summary judgment should discovery reveal that the Attorney General had

actual knowledge of the claims before the effective date of the statute.

c. Florida

Plaintiffs assert a claim pursuant to Florida’s Antitrust Act, brought by plaintiff State

Florida, and on behalf of its natural persons, state agencies, and political subdivisions. See

Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 542.18 and 542.22; see also FAC at ¶¶ 134-39. Defendants seek to

dismiss it, arguing that to the extent the claim seeks damages on behalf of indirect

purchasers, Florida courts have expressly held that indirect purchaser standing is barred

under the Act. Plaintiffs respond by pointing to the portion of their complaint alleging that 

Florida’s state agencies and political subdivisions were the recipients of valid claim

assignments executed by direct purchaser OEMs. Plaintiffs contend that, by virtue of these

assignments, any claims on behalf of state agencies and political subdivisions are direct

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purchaser claims, not indirect purchaser claims, thereby justifying recovery pursuant to

Florida’s Antitrust Act. 

Preliminarily, defendants are correct – and plaintiffs do not dispute – that Florida’s

Antitrust Act prohibits indirect purchaser standing. See Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,

673 So. 2d 100, 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(neither plaintiff nor court “challenge[d] the

trial court's conclusion that under [Illinois Brick, plaintiff] and the others in her class, all of

whom are indirect purchasers, cannot bring a Florida antitrust claim”). As such, the only

issue before the court is whether plaintiffs have adequately alleged direct purchaser claims

under the Act, as opposed to indirect purchaser claims. 

With respect to claims brought by plaintiff State on behalf of state agencies and

political subdivisions, the court finds that plaintiffs have satisfactorily done so. Plaintiffs’

direct allegations under the Act leave much to be desired; there is not a single allegation

that adequately describes or even alludes to the direct/indirect purchaser status of any of

the persons/entities on whose behalf plaintiffs purport to bring suit. See FAC at ¶¶ 134-39. 

Nonetheless, despite this lack of clarity, the court is persuaded that the allegations

contained in paragraphs 106 through 108 of the complaint do adequately state that

Florida’s state agencies and political subdivisions are proceeding as direct purchasers, by

virtue of certain assignment clauses contained in executed contracts. Accordingly, to the

extent that plaintiffs seek recovery under the Florida Antitrust Act on behalf of state

agencies and political subdivisions, it is reasonable to infer that plaintiffs are seeking such

recovery as direct purchasers, pursuant to the same assignment clauses that plaintiffs

allege earlier in the complaint. If this is indeed the case, those claims may proceed under

the Act. 

To the extent, however, that this is not the case, and plaintiffs in reality seek

recovery on behalf of state agencies and political subdivisions who do not invoke direct

purchaser status, such claims must fail. For as noted above, only direct purchasers may

sue under Florida’s Antitrust Act, and any indirect purchaser claims brought on behalf of

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state agencies and political subdivisions are accordingly barred. 

Indeed, this is the conclusion that the court reaches with respect to plaintiffs’ claims

pursuant to Florida’s Antitrust Act on behalf of natural persons. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges

these claims, in addition to claims brought on behalf of government entities. Despite the

fact that defendants’ motion to dismiss is also aimed at them, however, plaintiffs’ opposition

mentions nothing about them – perhaps because plaintiffs’ complaint is completely silent on

the question whether claims brought on behalf of natural persons are brought as

direct/indirect purchaser claims. At any rate, given the lack of either argument or allegation

establishing that claims brought on behalf of natural persons under the Act are direct

purchaser claims, the court finds it more likely than not that plaintiffs’ complaint alleges

indirect purchaser claims on behalf of natural persons. As such, defendants’ arguments in

favor of dismissing all such claims is well-taken, in view of Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb

Co. 

Accordingly, the court concludes that, to the extent that plaintiffs’ complaint alleges

(1) claims on behalf of state agencies and political subdivisions who do not invoke direct

purchaser status by virtue of direct claim assignments or otherwise; and (2) indirect

purchaser claims on behalf of natural persons, defendants’ motion is granted and all such

claims under the Florida Antitrust Act are hereby DISMISSED. Plaintiffs’ claims under the

Act may proceed, however, with respect to state agencies, political subdivisions, and

natural persons who seek recovery as direct purchasers. 

d. Hawaii

Plaintiffs assert a claim, brought by the Hawaii Attorney General on behalf of all

state agencies, pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statute § 480-2 et seq. See FAC at ¶ 140.

Defendants challenge this claim, to the extent it includes claims on behalf of indirect

purchasers. While they acknowledge that Hawaii’s antitrust statute permits indirect

purchasers to sue for damages, and further permits the State Attorney General to sue as

parens patriae on behalf of indirect purchasers who are natural persons, they assert that

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the statute does not similarly recognize indirect purchaser standing for suits on behalf of

government entities. Plaintiffs, for their part, object to defendants’ challenge, referring to

the broad rights granted to all indirect purchasers under the statute, as indicated by the

legislative history and the statutory language.

The court’s resolution of this issue begins and ends with the plain language of

Hawaii’s antitrust statute. The statute provides: “The [A]ttorney [G]eneral may bring an

action on behalf of the [s]tate or any of its political subdivisions or government agencies to

recover the damages provided for by this section, or by any comparable provisions of

federal law.” See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-14(b). Accordingly, it is clear from the outset that

the State Attorney General is expressly empowered to bring suit under the state antitrust

statute on behalf of government entities. This says nothing, however, regarding suits on

behalf of government entities who are indirect purchasers. For guidance as to this indirect

purchaser issue, the court must look to section 480-14(c) of the statute, which separately

grants the Attorney General the express right to bring “a class action for indirect purchasers

asserting claims under this chapter.” See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-14(c). In granting this

express right, however, the statute also limits such actions to those brought on behalf of

natural persons only. See id. (“Actions brought under this subsection shall be brought as

parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in the State”). Accordingly, and

considering each of the foregoing provisions of the state antitrust statute, the statute

appears to limit actions brought by the Attorney General on behalf of indirect purchasers to

those on behalf of natural persons. They do not encompass state government entities – on

whose behalf the Attorney General is also permitted to sue, by way of a separate provision

that contains no authorization for indirect purchasers. 

In sum, then, the court concludes that plaintiffs’ claim, brought by the Hawaii

Attorney General on behalf of its state agencies, is barred to the extent it seeks relief on

behalf of indirect purchasers. Defendants’ motion to dismiss such claims is granted, and

the claims are accordingly DISMISSED.

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e. Kentucky

Plaintiffs assert claims pursuant to both the antitrust and consumer protection

provisions of Kentucky’s Consumer Protection Act. See Ky Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 367.175,

367.170; see also FAC at ¶¶ 145-46. These claims are brought by plaintiff State Kentucky

on behalf of itself and its state agencies and political subdivisions, and as parens patriae on

behalf of natural persons within the state. See FAC at ¶ 145. Defendants claim that, to the

extent indirect purchaser claims are alleged under both statutes, they must be dismissed,

since Kentucky does not recognize indirect purchaser standing. 

For support of their argument that dismissal of indirect purchaser claims is required,

defendants cite In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., and In re New Motor Vehicles. See

241 F. Supp. 2d 563, 565 (D. Md. 2003); 350 F. Supp. 2d at 186 n.39. Both cases held

that indirect purchaser claims are prohibited, regardless whether they are brought pursuant

to the state’s antitrust or consumer protection provisions. See id. Although neither case

emanates from a court with any controlling authority over Kentucky state law, they both rely

on an unpublished decision that does emanate from a controlling jurisdiction, and which

specifically holds that indirect purchaser standing is prohibited under Kentucky law – i.e.,

the Kentucky Court of Appeal’s opinion in Arnold v. Microsoft Corp., 2001 WL 1835377 at

**3, 7 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2001)(holding that Illinois Brick bars suits by indirect

purchasers under Kentucky's version of the Sherman Act and Kentucky's Consumer

Protection Act). 

In response, plaintiffs urge the court to ignore all of defendants’ cited case law, since

the Arnold decision at the heart of all of them is unpublished and not available for citation

pursuant to Kentucky’s rules of civil procedure. Rather, plaintiffs direct the court’s attention

to Federal Trade Comm'n v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., 99 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1999). 

According to plaintiffs, Mylan recognizes the authority of the Kentucky Attorney General to

bring claims pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act, on behalf of Kentucky citizens. 

On the whole, the court finds that defendants have the better argument. It is true, as

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plaintiffs contend, that the Arnold decision is unpublished and thus has limited precedential

value in Kentucky. See Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.28(4)(C). However, both In re Microsoft Corp.

and In re New Motor Vehicles relied on Arnold substantively, and as the only Kentucky

guidance directly on point. This court therefore relies on Arnold to the same extent as In re

Microsoft Corp. and In re New Motor Vehicles, finding these cases instructive. Mylan, by

contrast, is not as helpful, as it is a district court case that relies on off-point Kentucky

authorities, and pre-dates the Arnold decision, at any rate. 

Accordingly, and in the absence of directly contrary authority, the court adopts

Arnold’s underlying reasoning here, and holds that indirect purchaser standing is prohibited

under the antitrust and consumer protection provisions of Kentucky’s Consumer Protection

Act. All indirect purchaser claims asserted under either statute are therefore DISMISSED. 

f. Louisiana 

Defendants move to dismiss all claims brought on behalf of indirect purchasers

under Louisiana’s antitrust statute. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 51:122 et seq.; see also FAC

at ¶ 147. Defendants argue that, pursuant to the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Free v. Abbott

Laboratories, Inc., indirect purchaser standing does not exist under the Act. See 176 F.3d

298 (5th Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs respond that a decision by a federal court of appeal is not

controlling on state law interpretation, and that Louisiana’s antitrust statute must be

interpreted instead in pari materia with the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer

Protection Act, which would allow indirect purchasers to sue. 

In Free, the Fifth Circuit interpreted Louisiana state law, and concluded that

Louisiana state courts would hold that indirect purchasers of consumer products lack

standing under the state antitrust statute to pursue price fixing claims. See 176 F.3d at 299

(“In our best judgment, the Louisiana courts would follow the federal indirect purchaser rule

and deny standing to the appellants”). In arriving at this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit

engaged in a thorough discussion of relevant Louisiana precedent, and noted that the

Louisiana Supreme Court had previously found federal precedent useful in interpreting

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state antitrust statutes that were analogous to federal antitrust statutes. See Louisiana

Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 493 So.2d 1149, 1158 (La.1986)(“the

United States Supreme Court's interpretation ... should be a persuasive influence on the

interpretation of our own state enactment.”). The Fifth Circuit then went on to hold that,

since the federal antitrust statute contains language virtually identical to Louisiana’s

antitrust statute, the United States Supreme Court’s finding that indirect purchaser standing

is prohibited under the Clayton Act, should also extend to interpretation of the state antitrust

statute. 

Free is not a decision of the Louisiana state courts, as plaintiffs point out. 

Nonetheless, the opinion issues from the highest federal court of appeals with jurisdiction

over Louisiana. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit is well-versed in applying Louisiana law, and is

undoubtedly better-situated than this court to predict how Louisiana courts would interpret

questions of state law. As such, the court finds Free’s reasoning instructive in interpreting

Louisiana’s antitrust statute, and is persuaded that the statute should be interpreted so as

to deny indirect purchaser standing for plaintiffs’ claims brought pursuant to that statute. 

Moreover, although plaintiffs are correct that federal precedent is not controlling on

state law interpretation, plaintiffs have not actually cited any precedent that is controlling,

and that argues against the interpretation adopted by Free and urged on this court by

defendants. In other words, plaintiffs have offered no convincing authority that indirect

purchasers should have standing under Louisiana’s antitrust statute. 

At best, plaintiffs can only point to Louisiana’s consumer protection statute – which

expressly defines trade or commerce covered under the statute to include indirect

purchasers – and argue that its definitions should be read into the antitrust statute on the

theory that the two statutes must be read in pari materia. The court, however, finds this

argument unavailing. It is true enough that Louisiana law requires statutes to be construed

in harmony with each other where possible, see La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 13 (“Laws on the

same subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other.“); see also City of

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Opelousas v. Waterbury, 674 So.2d 1128, 1133 (La. Ct. App. 1996)(Courts have duty to

harmonize and reconcile statutes if possible). However, it is simply not true that this

principle of construction requires or permits – as plaintiffs urge here – the definitions

contained in one law to be imported wholesale into another law. 

Moreover, the court is not persuaded that the two statutes at issue – Louisiana’s

antitrust statute and its consumer protection statute – must by force be harmonized here. 

The two statutes have different goals and regulate different activity, even though they may

generally be related to commerce and/or trade. As such, it is not necessarily problematic

to hold that the former does not allow for indirect purchaser standing, even if the latter

does. Indeed, defendants do not even seek dismissal of plaintiffs’ consumer protection

claim. Accordingly, plaintiffs do not lose any right available to them as indirect purchasers

under that statute, as a result of the court’s conclusion that they are prohibited from

asserting indirect purchaser claims under the antitrust statute. 

In sum, then, and in view of all the above, the court adopts the Fifth Circuit’s

reasoning as expressed in Free, and holds that indirect purchaser standing is unavailable

to plaintiffs under Louisiana’s antitrust statute. All indirect purchaser claims asserted

pursuant to that statute are accordingly DISMISSED. 

g. Maryland 

Plaintiffs bring claims pursuant to Maryland’s Antitrust Act (“MATA”). See Md. Com.

Law Code Ann. § 11-201 et seq. The claims are brought by plaintiff State Maryland, on

behalf of itself, its state agencies and political subdivisions, and as parens patriae on behalf

of all natural persons who purchased DRAM or DRAM-containing products. See FAC at ¶¶

149-51. Defendants target all claims except for those brought on behalf of the state itself,

to the extent they seek relief on behalf of indirect purchasers. Defendants argue that

indirect purchaser standing under MATA has been flatly rejected by Maryland courts. 

Plaintiffs, by contrast, insist that MATA expressly authorizes the Attorney General to seek

both restitution and damages on behalf of indirect purchasers. 

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MATA allows the Attorney General to enforce the Act by instituting proceedings in

both law and equity. With respect to equitable relief, the Attorney General is specifically

authorized to commence equity proceedings “to prevent or restrain violations” of MATA,

and is further authorized to seek equitable remedies from the court, including injunctive

relief and “restitution to any person of any money or real or personal property....” See Md.

Com. Law Code Ann. § 11-209(a)(1). MATA also contains a separate subsection on civil

enforcement, however, that expressly authorizes actions for monetary damages. This

section allows the Attorney General to file an action for damages “on behalf of the State or

any of its political subdivisions or as parens patriae on behalf of persons residing in the

State....” See id. at § 11-209(b)(2)(ii)(5). In sum, then, the Maryland Attorney General is

empowered to bring (1) suits in equity in the name of the state and its state agencies and

political subdivisions; and (2) suits for damages on behalf of the state and its government

entities, or in a parens patriae capacity on behalf of natural persons. 

The issue before the court is whether MATA contemplates that suits brought by the

Attorney General may include indirect purchasers. On balance, the court finds that they

may not. 

 In Davidson v. Microsoft Corp., a Maryland appellate state court held that “only

direct purchasers may bring suit to recover an alleged illegal overcharge.” See 792 A.2d

336, 344 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002). Although Davidson involved a private suit under the

statute and not an action filed by the Attorney General, the suit was nonetheless brought

under the same general statutory enforcement subsection that plaintiffs invoke here. See

Md. Com. Law Code Ann. § 11-209. For that reason, and since the decision stems from a

controlling jurisdiction, the court finds Davidson persuasive here, and adopts its reasoning

that only direct purchasers are authorized to bring suit under MATA. 

Furthermore, at least one federal court, has expressly rejected the Maryland

Attorney General’s attempt to sue on behalf of indirect purchasers, based on Davidson. 

See In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, 225 F.R.D. 14, 25-26 (D. Mass. 2004). While this

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decision issues from a non-controlling jurisdiction, the court finds it persuasive, in view of

Davidson. Plaintiffs, for their part, have not submitted any contrary authority that would

support a differing construction of MATA. 

For these reasons, plaintiffs’ indirect purchaser claims pursuant to MATA are hereby

DISMISSED.

h. Oklahoma 

Plaintiffs assert claims pursuant to both the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act and the

Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act. See Okla. Stat. Ann. 79, § 201 et seq.; Okla. Stat.

Ann. 15, § 751 et seq. Plaintiffs’ claims are brought on behalf of all natural persons and

state agencies. See FAC at ¶ 175. Defendants challenge plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to

both statutes to the extent they seek recovery on behalf of indirect purchasers, arguing that

Oklahoma state courts have specifically interpreted both statutes to preclude indirect

purchaser standing. In response, plaintiffs concede that neither statute allows indirect

purchaser claims for damages to go forward, but assert that Oklahoma’s Consumer

Protection Act does allow for indirect purchaser claims for restitution and other equitable

relief.

Plaintiffs’ arguments fail. For as defendants note, at least one Oklahoma state court

has expressly held that indirect purchaser standing under both the Oklahoma Antitrust

Reform Act and the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act is barred. See Major v. Microsoft

Corp., 60 P.3d 511, 512-13 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002)(affirming trial court’s finding that Illinois

Brick applied to Antitrust Reform Act and that plaintiff could not make end-run around

Illinois Brick by alleging same claim under the Consumer Protection Act). This case is

controlling, and compels the conclusion that plaintiffs’ indirect purchaser claims under both

Oklahoma statutes must be dismissed for lack of standing. 

Plaintiffs themselves appear to concede the inevitability of this conclusion, as their

opposition omits entirely any argument that either statute permits damages, and contains

only a suggestion that equitable relief is nonetheless available under the Consumer

Protection Act. Even as to this latter point, however, plaintiffs’ argument falters. Plaintiffs,

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for example, rely exclusively on Mylan for support. See 99 F. Supp. 2d at 8-9. But Mylan is

a non-controlling case that was decided approximately three years prior to Major, the

decision expressly holding that Oklahoma’s Consumer Protection Act is unavailable to

indirect purchasers asserting claims based on antitrust violations. Mylan is therefore

outdated, in addition to the fact that it issues from a court with no controlling authority over

Oklahoma law. As such, it cannot be used to help plaintiffs overcome the Oklahoma

court’s pronouncement in Major – or this court’s resulting conclusion that all indirect

purchaser claims, regardless whether they seek monetary or equitable relief, are barred

pursuant to Oklahoma’s antitrust and consumer protection statutes. 

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims on behalf of indirect purchasers, pursuant to both

statutes, are hereby DISMISSED.

i. Virginia

Plaintiffs assert a claim pursuant to the Virginia Antitrust Act, brought by plaintiff

Commonwealth of Virginia on its own behalf, and on behalf of state agencies and political

subdivisions who purchased DRAM or DRAM-containing products. See Va. Code Ann. §

59.1-9.15(a-c); see also FAC at ¶ 188. Defendants contend that the claim must be

dismissed because, while there is no law or statute explicitly prohibiting indirect purchaser

standing, Virginia has no Illinois Brick repealer statute, and the Antitrust Act contains a

harmonization provision requiring that the statute be interpreted in accordance with federal

law. All of which, say defendants, requires the conclusion that the Virginia Antitrust Act

should be construed in conformity with the federal Illinois Brick prohibition on indirect

purchaser standing. Plaintiffs, in response, state that the Virginia Attorney General has

express statutory authority under the Act to represent all indirect purchasers in Virginia –

including, presumably, all state agencies and political subdivisions. 

The Virginia Antitrust Act is, as defendants point out, silent on the specific question

whether indirect purchasers have standing to bring suit under the Act. See Va. Code Ann.

§ 59.1-9.1 et seq. In the face of this silence, the court looks to the surrounding language of

the Act, along with the relevant legal authority cited by the parties, for some clue as to

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whether standing for indirect purchasers should be inferred. Ultimately, and for the reasons

cited below, the court concludes that indirect purchaser standing should not be inferred. 

First, defendants are correct that the Antitrust Act contains a construction provision

that mandates that the Act “shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general

purposes in harmony with judicial interpretation of comparable federal statutory provisions.” 

Va. Code Ann. § 59.19.17. And since defendants are further correct that the Antitrust Act’s

provision governing civil suits for injunctive relief and damages is substantively similar to

the federal antitrust provision that was construed to prohibit indirect purchaser standing in

Illinois Brick, it stands to reason that the Virginia Antitrust Act should similarly be construed

to prohibit indirect purchaser standing. See Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-9.12; cf. 15 U.S.C. § 15. 

Such a construction has the added benefit of doing the least amount of violence to the

existing state of law in Virginia, by avoiding any unwarranted expansion of the rights

available pursuant to Virginia’s Antitrust Act, at least until Virginia courts themselves have

the occasion to weigh in on the issue. 

Moreover, contrary to what plaintiffs would have this court believe, they have not

actually established that the Virginia Attorney General has express statutory authority

under the Antitrust Act to represent Virginia indirect purchasers, including state agencies

and/or political subdivisions. To be sure, the Act does provide express statutory authority

for the Attorney General to bring suit on behalf of the Commonwealth, political subdivisions,

or natural persons for violation(s) of the Act. See Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-9.15. As noted

above, however, the statute is silent on the indirect purchaser question specifically. It

therefore cannot be viewed as providing “express statutory authority” for indirect purchaser

claims brought by the Virginia Attorney General. 

Nor have the parties cited, or the court discovered, any legal authority that would

provide plaintiffs with the express authority they are looking for. Plaintiffs rely on two noncontrolling cases, In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., and In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate

Antitrust Litig. See 218 F.R.D. 508, 521 (D. Mich. 2003); 205 F.R.D. 369, 386 (D. D.C.

2002). Both cases, however, held only that under the Virginia Antitrust Act, the Attorney

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General has the “express state statutory authority to represent consumers in a capacity

that is the functional equivalent of parens patriae authority.” See In re Cardizem, 218

F.R.D. at 521; In re Lorazepam, 205 F.R.D. at 386. This is accurate. See Va. Code Ann. §

59.1-9.15(d). It is not to be confused, however, with an express grant of statutory authority

to represent indirect purchasers specifically.

In sum, then, and for the above reasons, the court concludes that the Virginia

Antitrust Act does not provide for indirect purchaser standing in the instant action, and

plaintiffs’ claims, to the extent they state indirect purchaser claims under the Act, are

DISMISSED. 

j. Washington 

Plaintiffs allege a cause of action pursuant to Washington’s Consumer Protection

Act, brought by plaintiff State Washington on behalf of itself, its state agencies, and all

natural persons who purchased DRAM and DRAM-containing products. See Wash. Rev.

Code § 19.86; see also FAC at ¶ 189. Defendants assert that all indirect purchaser claims

under the statute must be dismissed, pursuant to Blewett v. Abbott Labs – a Washington

state appellate decision they claim prohibits indirect purchaser standing. See 938 P.2d

842, 844 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). Plaintiffs, for their part, challenge defendants’

characterization of Washington case law, and argue that indirect purchaser standing has

been expressly recognized in cases like this one, which are brought by way of an Attorney

General’s suit. 

The court’s analysis begins with discussion of Washington’s case law, for the parties

have both relied on Washington cases for support of their contrary arguments, and where

possible, the court endeavors to follow the guidance provided by controlling jurisdictions. 

In Blewett v. Abbott Labs, relied on by defendants, a state appellate court

considered head-on the question whether indirect purchaser standing exists under the

state’s Consumer Protection Act. See generally 938 P.2d 842. The court answered this

question in the negative, concluding that indirect purchasers do not suffer “cognizable

injury” under the Act. The court was emphatic: “[a]n indirect purchaser is not injured for

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the purpose of an antitrust claim, not injured for the purpose of a unfair trade claim, and not

injured for the purpose of injunctive relief.” See id. at 847. The court limited this holding,

however, to actions brought under section 19.86.090 of the statute – the provision of the

Act that governs civil suits for damages. See Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.090 (“Any person

who is injured in his or her business or property by a violation of [the Act] ... may bring a

civil action” for injunctive relief and/or damages). In the Blewett court’s view, the prohibition

on indirect purchaser standing stemmed from that provision’s express language requiring

any “person” bringing suit under the Act to “be injured in his or her business or property.” 

See id. Since that language is absent, however, from other sections of the statute –

specifically, the provisions of the Act governing suits by the Attorney General – the

prohibition on indirect purchaser standing does not extend to these sections. See, e.g.,

Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.090 (second paragraph)(“Whenever the state of Washington is

injured, by reason of a violation of [the Act] ... it may sue therefor in the superior court to

recover the actual damages sustained by it...”); § 19.86.080 (attorney general may bring

action in name of the state to restrain and prevent unlawful conduct under the Act). To that

end, the court directly implied that indirect purchasers who are barred from seeking

damages under section 19.86.090 of the statute may seek relief via Attorney General

actions. Id. (“If direct purchasers decide not to sue, the indirect purchaser is not entirely

without a remedy ... We conclude that direct purchasers and the attorney general are the

enforcers of antitrust law in Washington.”). 

This same result was contemplated earlier by a Washington superior court in State

v. American Tobacco Co., Inc., 1996 WL 931316 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1996). This

case, relied upon by plaintiffs, concerned the State of Washington’s suit for damages

against numerous tobacco defendants who had allegedly conspired to prevent the

development and sale of safer tobacco products. The state was seeking recovery for the

increased healthcare costs that it claimed had resulted from state consumers’ use of

unsafe tobacco products. See 1996 WL 931316 at *1. Although the State of Washington

was not a purchaser in the allegedly restrained market – i.e., the market for tobacco

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products – the court nonetheless took the opportunity to analyze the indirect purchaser

standing issue vis-a-vis the Consumer Protection Act. The court framed the question

before it as follows: “whether the ‘antitrust injury’ and/or ‘direct purchaser’ tests are

applicable to a claim brought under the section of the [Consumer Protection Act]

authorizing damage actions by the State whenever it is ‘injured.’” See id. at 82. 

The court concluded that a direct purchaser requirement was not applicable to state

actions for damages resulting from indirect injuries. In reaching this decision, the court first

noted, as did the Blewett court later, that recovery for private plaintiffs pursuant to section

19.86.090 is restricted to direct purchasers, by virtue of that provision’s inclusion of

language requiring any “person” bringing suit to “be injured in his or her business or

property.” Id. at *3. The American Tobacco court then went on to hold, however, that the

provision of the Act that authorizes damages suits brought by the state whenever “injured”

– i.e., the second paragraph of section 19.86.090 – is not restricted to direct purchasers,

because it does not contain “business or property” language similar to the provision

governing private actions. As such, the court reasoned that Attorney General actions for

damages as a result of indirect injuries are permissible. See id. at **3-4. In reconciling the

differences between the provisions governing private and state actions, the court stated: “It

is ... reasonable to assume that the legislature intended to define indirect injuries as a

violation of the [Consumer Protection Act] and then authorized the State, but not private

parties, to bring a damage action whenever it was indirectly injured.” Id. at *4. 

The holdings of both the Blewett and American Tobacco decisions are consistent,

and provide guidance to this court. Both cases indicate that, while indirect purchaser

standing is prohibited pursuant to the provision of the Act governing private suits for

damages, this same prohibition does not extend to actions brought pursuant to provisions

authorizing Attorney General suits, since the language of those provisions does not contain

the relevant “business or property” limitation discussed above. Accordingly, the court

concludes that plaintiffs’ action, brought by the Washington Attorney General on behalf of

the state, its state agencies and all persons who purchased DRAM and/or DRAMCase 4:06-cv-04333-PJH Document 209 Filed 08/31/07 Page 39 of 72
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containing products, is not barred by the indirect purchaser standing doctrine of Illinois

Brick. 

Defendants urge the court to hold differently, attempting to distinguish Blewett and

American Tobacco to the extent that either or both suggest that Attorney General actions

are not subject to a direct purchaser standing requirement. Defendants assert, for

example, that insofar as Blewett observed that indirect purchasers may seek recovery via

the Act’s provision governing suits by the Attorney General, the Blewett court was referring

only to the provision of the Act allowing Attorney General suits for equitable relief – not

damages. For support, defendants point to In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 225 F.R.D. 14, 26

n.5 (D. Mass. 2004). Defendants also claim that American Tobacco is irrelevant, since it is

not an indirect purchaser case, and therefore failed to implicate the policy concerns

encompassed within Illinois Brick. 

The court is unpersuaded by these challenges. First, defendants read Blewett too

narrowly. In suggesting that indirect purchasers have standing vis-a-vis Attorney General

actions, Blewett reasoned that this is because the direct purchaser requirement is

compelled by the ”business or property” language reflected in the Act’s private right of

action provision – and which “does not exist in the section of the Act that enables actions

by the Attorney General.” See 938 P.2d at 847 (emphasis added). Although defendants

correctly note that Blewett referred to the equitable relief provision of the Act in making

these observations, the take-away point from Blewett should be that all provisions of the

Act which enable Attorney General actions and do not contain the relevant “business or

property” language, allow for recovery regardless of direct or indirect injury. This is true of

the second paragraph of section 19.86.090, which governs civil suits for damages. In re

Relafen does not compel a contrary conclusion, for it is non-controlling authority that rests

on the Massachusetts district court’s own “interpretation” of Blewett. 

As for defendants’ contention that American Tobacco is irrelevant since the state

was not an indirect purchaser, this is not so. Regardless of the state’s status as indirect

purchaser, the court’s analysis and decision addressed head-on the question of indirect

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purchaser standing under the Act in suits for civil damages brought by the Attorney

General. This is precisely the issue before the court here, and a state court decision

opining on that issue is not only relevant, it constitutes instructive guidance that this court

declines to overlook. 

Moreover, the court finds added support for its ultimate conclusion here by way of

the Washington state legislature’s recent amendments to the provisions of the Act

discussed herein. As the court discovered in preparing the instant order, and plaintiffs have

since pointed out, the state legislature recently amended sections 19.86.080 and

19.86.090. The amendments make clear (1) that the Attorney General has the express

authority to bring parens patriae actions for equitable relief on behalf of natural persons in

the state; and (2) the state has authority to institute suits for damages whenever it is injured

by violations of the Act, regardless whether the injuries be directly or indirectly sustained. 

See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 19.86.080 and 19.86.090 (as amended April 17, 2007). While

the court does not base its conclusion herein on the strength of these amendments, the

court nonetheless finds that the amendments suggest that the state legislature intends for

the Consumer Protection Act to be construed so as to give the Attorney General the right to

seek recovery for indirect injuries sustained by the state and its citizens, even as individual

recovery for indirect injuries continues to be denied. 

In sum, and for all the above reasons, the court finds that plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to

Washington’s Consumer Protection Act is permissible, even to the extent it seeks recovery

for damages on behalf of indirect purchasers. Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is

therefore DENIED.

k. West Virginia 

Plaintiffs state claims pursuant to West Virginia’s Antitrust Act, and Consumer Credit

and Protection Act. See W. Va. Code § 47-18-16; W. Va. Code § 47-18-16; see also FAC

at ¶ 190. Defendants argue that all indirect purchaser claims asserted under both statutes

must be dismissed. Specifically, defendants contend that the Antitrust Act is to be

construed in accordance with federal law prohibiting indirect purchaser standing, and that

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the Consumer Credit and Protection Act should not be deemed to provide an alternate

remedy. Plaintiffs, in response, point out that the West Virginia Attorney General has

promulgated a legislative rule, adopted by the legislature in 1990, that specifically grants

indirect purchaser standing, and that such standing should be recognized under both the

state antitrust and consumer protection statutes. 

Generally speaking, defendants are correct that federal decisional law interpreting

the Sherman Act is to be applied in interpreting West Virginia’s parallel antitrust statute,

and that this application would normally suggest that the state antitrust statute be

construed in accordance with Illinois Brick. See W. Va. Code § 47-18-16; Gray, 367 S.E.

2d 751. However, as plaintiffs point out, this conclusion is called into question by the fact

that the West Virginia Attorney General has promulgated a legislative rule expressly

permitting antitrust suits brought by indirect purchasers. The Attorney General’s ability to

promulgate such a rule is contemplated by the state’s antitrust statute itself, which explicitly

grants the Attorney General the right to adopt rules and regulations interpreting and

enforcing it. See W. Va. Code § 47-18-20 (“[t]he attorney general may make and adopt

such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the enforcement and administration of

[the statute]”).

Moreover, at least two federal courts have found that the West Virginia legislative

rule allowing indirect purchaser standing is valid, and should be given effect. See In re

New Motor Vehicles, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 173-75; In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust

Litigation, 160 F.Supp.2d 1365, 1376, n.8 (S.D. Fla. 2001). While neither case emanates

from a court with jurisdictional authority over West Virginia, they are nonetheless

instructive. In re New Motor Vehicles is particularly helpful. The federal court there dealt

with the precise issue now before the court – i.e., whether indirect purchaser standing is

permitted under West Virginia law, in the face of apparent conflict between the State

Attorney General’s rule, and the harmonization provision of the state antitrust statute. After

engaging in a fairly comprehensive overview of West Virginia rules of statutory

interpretation and the relevant legislative history, the In re New Motor Vehicles court

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concluded that, since the harmonization provision at issue did not speak to indirect

purchaser standing specifically, but was more broadly worded to provide for a “liberal”

general interpretive approach, the State Attorney General’s subsequent rule interpreting the

statute to allow for indirect purchaser standing was a “permissible” reading of the statute,

and entitled to deference. See id. 

The court applies that reasoning here. Moreover, unless and until this issue is

raised and resolved by West Virginia state courts, the West Virginia Attorney General –

who is expressly granted the authority to interpret the very antitrust statute at issue here –

is entitled to some deference. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiffs’ claims on behalf of

indirect purchasers under the state antitrust statute are permissible.

With respect to the state consumer protection statute, however, defendants’

arguments are more persuasive. Plaintiffs claim that the statute applies to indirect

purchaser claims because “bid-rigging” is considered an unfair or deceptive act or practice

that is covered under the statute. As defendants point out, however, bid-rigging is an act

that is specifically prohibited by the state’s Antitrust Act, not the Consumer Credit and

Protection Act. See W. Va. Code § 47-18-3. As such, the court does not read this activity

to be covered by the Consumer Credit and Protection Act, which is generally intended to

apply to conduct that generally “creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding”

regarding goods and services. See W. Va. Code § 46A-6-102. This conclusion is further

buttressed by the fact that plaintiffs have failed to cite any controlling authority that

construes the state consumer protection statute to cover bid-rigging. Moreover, even if bidrigging were covered under the state’s consumer protection statute, the fact remains that

plaintiffs have not pointed to any allegations in their complaint that affirmatively plead bidrigging. As a result, the court is compelled to conclude that plaintiffs’ indirect purchaser

claims under the state consumer protection statute are barred. 

In sum, the court finds that the indirect purchaser claims brought pursuant to West

Virginia’s state antitrust statute are not barred from suit, while the indirect purchaser claims

brought pursuant to the state consumer protection statute are DISMISSED. Defendants’

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10 Defendants originally sought dismissal of all claims brought pursuant to Illinois’

antitrust statute, as well. However, in their reply brief in support of their motion to dismiss,

defendants stated that, upon review of the authorities cited in plaintiffs’ opposition brief,

defendants had decided “not to seek dismissal of Illinois’ claims on intrastate commerce

grounds” at the present time. Defendants’ argument as to Illinois was, and is, accordingly

withdrawn. 

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motion to dismiss as to both statutes is therefore denied in part and granted in part. 

2. Intrastate Activity Allegations

Defendants also seek dismissal of all claims brought under the state antitrust

statutes of Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.10 Defendants contend that

dismissal of these claims is appropriate because plaintiffs have failed to allege the

existence of any “intrastate” activity in connection with each claim, as required by the

governing state statutes. 

a. Maryland

Plaintiffs have alleged a cause of action pursuant to the Maryland Antitrust Act

(“MATA”). See Md. Com. Law Code Ann. § 11-201 et seq.; see also FAC at ¶¶ 149-51. 

According to defendants, MATA “is concerned exclusively with intrastate commercial

activity,” and therefore requires plaintiffs to specifically allege that Maryland’s intrastate

activity has been affected by defendants’ conduct – something that plaintiffs have failed to

do. In response, plaintiffs contend that MATA is to be liberally construed and has been

interpreted more broadly than defendants suggest, so that allegations of interstate

commerce activity – which plaintiffs point out are present in paragraph 29 of their complaint

– are sufficient to invoke coverage under the statute. 

MATA, similar to federal law, makes it unlawful for a person “[b]y contract,

combination, or conspiracy with one or more other persons, [to] unreasonably restrain trade

or commere.” See Md. Comm. Code Ann. § 11-204(a). However, unlike federal law –

which reaches interstate commerce activity – MATA explicitly defines “[t]rade or commerce”

to include “all economic activity within the State.” See id. at § 11-201(h)(emphasis added). 

Indeed, MATA expressly states that its overall purpose is to regulate intrastate, as opposed

to interstate, activity. See id. at § 11-202(a)(1)(emphasis added)(declaring purpose to be

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that of “complement[ing] the body of federal law governing restraints of trade, unfair

competition, and unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent acts or practices in order to protect the

public and foster fair and honest intrastate competition.”). Given these express limitations,

the court interprets MATA to mean what it says – that its reach shall extend over economic

activity that is intrastate in nature. 

This does not mean that MATA should be read as reaching conduct that is

exclusively intrastate in nature. For as plaintiffs point out, in its provision setting forth the

governing principles to be employed in interpreting and construing MATA, the statute

expressly states that, “in deciding whether conduct restrains or monopolizes trade or

commerce or may substantially lessen competition within the State, determination of the

relevant market or effective area of competition may not be limited by the boundaries of the

State.” See id. at § 11-202(a)(3)(emphasis added). In other words, in determining whether

conduct within the state is unlawful under MATA, anticompetitive activity outside the state

will also be considered. 

This brings the court to the central issue presented by the parties’ arguments –

whether plaintiffs’ allegation that defendants “engaged in the business of marketing and

selling DRAM throughout the United States,” see FAC at ¶ 29, is sufficient to allege

economic activity within Maryland, such that MATA’s protections are triggered. 

On balance, the court finds that this allegation is not sufficient. It sets forth what is

essentially interstate economic activity. As such, while it may be useful to plaintiffs in

establishing the scope or character of any violations under MATA, see, e.g., Md. Comm.

Code Ann. § 11-201(h), it does not aid plaintiffs in establishing that MATA applies

preliminarily. This is because the allegation sweeps too broadly – and without any

distinction among the forty plaintiff States – to credibly suggest that economic activity within

the State of Maryland has been affected in any way, thereby triggering MATA’s protection

for economic activity occurring “within the State.” Md. Comm. Code Ann. § 11-201(h). 

This conclusion is reinforced upon examination of the legal authority cited by the

parties. Defendants, for example, have cited Maryland Staffing Serv., Inc. v. Manpower,

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Inc., a case that expressly holds that MATA targets intrastate conduct, and that dismissed

claims under MATA for failure to allege any intrastate conduct. See 936 F. Supp. 1494,

1504-05 (E.D. Wisc. 1996). While Maryland Staffing does not emanate from a controlling

jurisdiction, the court finds the case instructive nonetheless. Furthermore, while plaintiffs

have relied on case law that stems from Maryland state courts, the case law does not

intimate, as plaintiffs suggest, that interstate commerce allegations are sufficient, standing

alone, to invoke MATA. In fact, none of the state cases relied on by plaintiffs even address

the issue whether allegations of interstate or intrastate conduct are necessary to invoke

MATA’s coverage, although it is true enough that they involved nationwide conspiracies. 

Indeed, to the extent the issue of intrastate activity is even tangentially mentioned, the

cases presume the opposite – that allegations of economic activity or harm within Maryland

are prerequisites to invocation of MATA. See, e.g., Maryland v. Philip Morris Inc., 934 F.

Supp. 173, 176 (D. Md. 1996)(remanding MATA and other claims to Maryland state court,

noting that state court had jurisdiction where it alleged “redress for harm inflicted in

Maryland on Maryland residents”)(emphasis added). 

In sum, and in view of all the above, the court concludes: (1) in order to state a claim

under MATA, plaintiffs are required to allege that economic activity within the State of

Maryland is implicated; and (2) plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege as much in their

complaint. Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to MATA, as stated in their third claim for relief, are

accordingly DISMISSED. 

In view of the fact that dismissal of plaintiffs’ MATA claim is based on a deficiency

that might be cured by amendment, however, the court also grants plaintiffs leave to

amend their complaint in order to cure the above pleading deficiency.

b. Mississippi

Plaintiffs assert state law claims pursuant to Mississippi’s Antitrust Act. See Miss.

Code Ann. § 75-21-1 et seq.; see also FAC at ¶ 155. As with plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to

Maryland’s antitrust statute, defendants contend that Mississippi’s Antitrust Act requires

plaintiffs to allege at least some intrastate activity in their complaint, and that plaintiffs have

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failed to do so. Plaintiffs, in response, assert that Mississippi’s Antitrust Act is not limited to

intrastate conspiracies. To that end, they claim that as long as they sufficiently allege the

presence of a nationwide conspiracy involving interstate commerce, sufficient intrastate

effects are established such that a viable claim under Mississippi’s Antitrust Act may be

stated.

The question whether Mississippi’s Antitrust Act applies exclusively to intrastate

conduct has not been conclusively decided by Mississippi state courts. As defendants

note, the issue was first addressed by the Mississippi Supreme Court in 1914, in the case

of Standard Oil Co. v. State ex rel. Attorney General, 65 So. 468 (Miss. 1914), overruled on

other grounds in Mladinich v. Kohn, 164 So.2d 785 (Miss. 1964). In Standard Oil, the court

addressed allegations of a nationwide conspiracy to monopolize the trade in petroleum and

in petroleum products “throughout the United States and its territories...”. See id. Although

no petroleum was actually produced in Mississippi, plaintiff alleged that defendants sold

and distributed petroleum products in Mississippi after having received the petroleum

products in interstate commerce, and that the petroleum products were therefore

incorporated into the “general mass of property” located within the State of Mississippi. Id.

at 471. 

In considering whether plaintiff’s allegations were cognizable under the Mississippi

Antitrust Act, the court preliminarily noted that, in order for an act to be punishable under

the Mississippi Antitrust Act, the act “must have as one of its objects a monopoly in the

intrastate trade [of Mississippi] to be accomplished in part at least by transactions which are

also wholly intrastate.” See id. at 471. The Standard Oil court then went on to conclude

that plaintiff had sufficiently stated a claim under the Act, because the alleged conspiracy to

monopolize the petroleum market had “as one of its objects a monopoly of that portion of

the trade in petroleum products which lies wholly within the [s]tate of Mississippi, to be

accomplished in part at least by transactions lying wholly within the state.” Id. 

While Standard Oil may rightly be read to suggest, as defendants contend, that

allegations of at least some intrastate activity must be made before the Mississippi Antitrust

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Act may be invoked, no subsequent case from the Mississippi Supreme Court has ever

confirmed this, nor has any published decision emanating from the state courts. Further

casting doubt on the import to be given Standard Oil is the fact that, as at least one case

cited by the parties demonstrates, Standard Oil’s reasoning appears to have been largely

based on the now discredited “dual sovereignty” view of the Commerce Clause, pursuant to

which the exclusive authority of federal law was presumed over all things interstate in

nature, and the exclusive authority of state laws presumed over all things intrastate in

nature. 

Ultimately, the court is persuaded – based on review of the parties’ cited authorities

and the absence of subsequent controlling authority demanding otherwise – that the

Mississippi Antitrust Act should be construed to require allegations of at least some activity

or conduct occurring in intrastate commerce or trade. Plaintiffs, for example, rely on

Moore ex rel. State of Mississippi v. Abbott Labs. See 900 F. Supp. 26 (S.D. Miss. 1995). 

In Moore, the court declined to hold that the Mississippi Antitrust Act is limited to intrastate

conspiracies, and allowed plaintiff’s claim to go forward under the Act. Although the claim

was allowed to go forward, however, the court did not actually hold that the Act is not

limited to intrastate conspiracies and furthermore noted that plaintiff’s claim was

nonetheless supported by allegations of intrastate activity. See, e.g., id. at 28 (allegations

that defendants shared 80% of the Mississippi market allegedly restrained, that defendants

conspired to fix prices in Mississippi sales market, and that Mississippi consumers were

“grossly overcharged” for products). Likewise, defendants’ reliance on In re Microsoft

Corp. Antitrust Litig., see 2003 WL 22070561 (D. Md. 2003), also supports the notion that

at least some allegations of wholly intrastate conduct are required under the Mississippi

Antitrust Act. See id. at *8 (“The question thus becomes whether plaintiffs have alleged at

least some conduct by [defendant] which was performed wholly intrastate”). 

Turning, then, to plaintiffs’ complaint, such allegations are conspicuously absent. 

Plaintiffs have nowhere alleged any activity of any kind – sales, purchases, or other

activities in trade or commerce – that took place in Mississippi and are in any way related to

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defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct. Plaintiffs urge the court to overlook this deficiency

by arguing that, as in Standard Oil, some of the DRAM and DRAM-containing products

whose prices were allegedly restrained by defendants here were actually “incorporated into

the general mass” of property within Mississippi, and sold there – thereby becoming

intrastate sales. This argument, however, is unavailing. While it might ultimately aid

plaintiffs in demonstrating that such allegations, if made, state a viable claim under the

Antitrust Act, the argument is not a substitute for alleging intrastate sales in the first place. 

In sum, the court finds that plaintiffs’ complaint, since it is wholly devoid of any

allegations relating to intrastate trade or commerce, fails to properly allege a claim under

the Mississippi Antitrust Act, as contemplated by Standard Oil and subsequent

interpretations of that case. Accordingly, the court grants defendants’ motion on this

ground, and plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to the Mississippi Antitrust Act is accordingly

DISMISSED.

The dismissal is with leave to amend, so that plaintiffs might attempt to cure the

deficiency noted above. 

c. Tennessee

Plaintiffs’ third cause of action states a claim pursuant to the Tennessee Unfair

Trade Practices Act (“TTPA”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-101 et seq.; see also FAC at

¶ 184. Defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to properly allege this claim, since they

fail to allege that defendants’ conduct affected Tennessee commerce to a “substantial

degree,” as required by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman

Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. 2005). In response, plaintiffs do not dispute that

Freeman is controlling authority, or that it requires plaintiffs to allege “substantial effects” on

Tennessee commerce. Rather, they contend that their allegation that consumers paid

artificially high prices for DRAM and DRAM products, sufficiently alleges that Tennessee

commerce has been affected to a substantial degree. See, e.g., FAC at ¶¶ 89-91. 

The Freeman case dealt with similar allegations of a nationwide price fixing

conspiracy, and sought to resolve a motion to dismiss brought against an indirect

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purchaser plaintiff’s claims, including a claim brought under the TTPA. See 172 S.W.3d at

516. In ruling on defendant’s motion, the Freeman court had occasion to pass upon the

issue whether the TTPA targets only intrastate commerce and/or activity. The court stated:

“The [TTPA] does not contain any language indicating that the legislature intended that the

scope of the act be limited to intrastate commerce.” See id. at 522. The court held,

however, that a “substantial effects” standard nonetheless applies to claims under the

TTPA, pursuant to which “courts must decide whether the alleged anticompetitive conduct

affects Tennessee trade or commerce to a substantial degree.” Id. at 523 (emphasis

added). 

Since neither party disputes the applicability of either Freeman or the substantial

effects test enunciated therein to the case at bar, the sole question is whether the

substantial effects standard is satisfied here. 

Freeman compels the court to answer this question in the negative. In Freeman, the

court applied the substantial effects test and found that plaintiff’s allegations – which stated

that defendant had taken sales orders and implemented sales to customers at artificially

raised prices from its principal place of business in Tennessee – were too “bare” to

sufficiently establish that Tennessee commerce was substantially affected. See id. at 524. 

Despite the fact that plaintiff had alleged that the Tennessee defendant had engaged in

sales activity within the state, the court found that plaintiff failed to allege that defendant’s

anticompetitive conduct had any actual effect on Tennessee commerce or, at a minimum,

that the Tennessee defendant had manufacturing ties to the product that plaintiff, a New

York resident, ultimately purchased at an inflated price. Id. 

Here, plaintiffs’ complaint is completely devoid of any mention of Tennessee

commerce. Plaintiffs do not specifically allege that any defendant engaged in sales in

Tennessee specifically, that defendants manufactured any product that Tennessee

residents or plaintiffs purchased, or even that Tennessee residents or plaintiffs purchased

any product in Tennessee at artificially raised prices. At most, and as plaintiffs themselves

note, they have alleged in broadest fashion that “they” paid artificially high prices for DRAM

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and DRAM-containing products. See FAC at ¶¶ 89-91. This allegation, however, is made

with no differentiation among particular states as to which plaintiffs and consumers paid the

artificially high prices, or even purchased DRAM and DRAM-containing products. In short,

the court can glean no allegations that sufficiently describe any connection between

defendants’ allegedly anticompetitive conduct and Tennessee commerce, or otherwise

allege any impact upon Tennessee commerce. 

As such, the court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to properly allege that

defendants’ anticompetitive conduct affects Tennessee trade or commerce to a substantial

degree. Plaintiffs’ claim brought pursuant to the TTPA must accordingly fail, and is hereby

DISMISSED. 

As was the case in connection with the court’s review of plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to

MATA, however, dismissal of plaintiffs’ TTPA claim is based on a deficiency that might be

cured by amendment. The court therefore grants plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint

as to this claim.

d. Wisconsin 

 Plaintiffs have alleged a cause of action pursuant to Wisconsin’s antitrust statute. 

See Wis. Stat. § 133.03; see also FAC at ¶ 191. As part of their claim, plaintiffs allege that

defendants’ unlawful activity “substantially affected the people of Wisconsin and had

impacts within the State of Wisconsin,” such that relief is warranted. See id. Defendants,

however, contend that this general allegation is insufficient to state a claim under

Wisconsin’s antitrust statute, because plaintiffs are required to demonstrate with more

particularized allegations the manner in which Wisconsin commerce was “substantially

affected” by defendants’ purportedly unlawful conduct. Plaintiffs, for their part, contend that

more detailed allegations need not be made, and that their general allegation that the

people of Wisconsin were substantially affected, as a result of artificially inflated prices

stemming from defendants’ conduct, is sufficient. Both parties rely on competing

Wisconsin case law for support.

The parties’ dispute is capable of ready resolution without resort to that competing

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case law, thanks to the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s recent decision in Meyers v. Bayer AG,

735 N.W.2d 448 (Wis. 2007). In Meyers, the state Supreme Court faced head-on the issue

pressed upon this court by the parties – i.e., the degree of detail needed to allege that a

defendant’s conduct “substantially effects” Wisconsin commerce, such that a claim may be

stated under Wisconsin’s antitrust statute. The Meyers court concluded: “a complaint

under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, where the circumstances involve interstate commerce

and the challenged conduct occurred outside of Wisconsin, is sufficient if it alleges price

fixing as a result of the formation of a combination or conspiracy that substantially affected

the people of Wisconsin and had impacts in this state.... [R]equiring greater specificity []

would create a heightened pleading standard for Chapter 133 actions that would bar

otherwise legitimate suits, thus undermining the Act’s purposes of fostering competition and

prohibiting unfair discriminatory business practices.” See 735 N.W.2d at at 461. The

Meyers court then went on to hold that plaintiff’s allegation that “thousands of Wisconsin

residents” suffered harm as a result of defendant’s nationwide and anticompetitive actions

sufficiently stated a claim under the Act. See id. at 464.

The Meyers decision is controlling legal authority that is directly on point. It clearly

dictates that, as long as plaintiffs allege in their complaint that defendants unlawfully

conspired to fix the price of DRAM, in a manner that substantially affected the people of

Wisconsin and had impacts in this state, a claim is stated under Wisconsin’s antitrust

statute. It matters not that the allegation is bare, so long as it is made. See id. at *12

(“Turning to [defendant’s] contention that the ‘substantially affects’ standard requires more

than ‘bare allegations’ that indirect purchasers in Wisconsin paid higher prices as a result of

the challenged conduct, we disagree.”).

With this legal standard in mind, the court turns to plaintiffs’ complaint, and finds that

the allegations stated therein are sufficient to state a claim under Wisconsin’s antitrust

statute. Plaintiffs have alleged that defendants engaged in unlawful price fixing in the

market for DRAM, that consumers and businesses who purchased DRAM during the

conspiracy period paid artificially high prices for DRAM, and that these violations

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“substantially affected the people of Wisconsin and had impacts within the State of

Wisconsin.” See, e.g., FAC at ¶¶ 29, 34, 89-91, 191. Under Meyers, this is all that is

required to state a viable claim pursuant to Wisconsin’s antitrust statute.

For these reasons, the court hereby DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’

claims brought under Wisconsin’s Antitrust Act, pursuant to their third claim for relief. 

3. Timeliness Claims

Defendants assert that claims brought by the Attorneys General under the state laws

of Oklahoma and South Carolina are time-barred. Specifically, defendants argue that,

pursuant to the allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint, plaintiffs either knew or should have

known of defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct as of June 2002. See FAC at ¶¶ 4, 40,

49, 84 (allegations regarding DOJ investigation announcements in June 2002 and

defendants’ fraudulent concealment until June 2002). As of this date, defendants contend

that the statutes of limitations began to run under the above States’ laws, with the end

result that Oklahoma’s and South Dakota’s claims, filed as part of this action on July 14,

2006, were untimely. 

a. Oklahoma

Plaintiffs assert a claim pursuant to Oklahoma’s Consumer Protection Act. The Act

provides a statute of limitations of either one, or three years. See 12 Okla. Stat. ' 95(A)(2)

and (A)(4). Assuming that the longer 3 year statute of limitations applies, defendants argue

that Oklahoma’s complaint should have been filed by June 2005 -- three years after

plaintiffs became aware in June 2002 of the underlying facts supporting plaintiffs’ claim in

June 2002. 

Preliminarily, the court accepts, as do the parties, that the governing statute of

limitations is 3 years. This being the case, plaintiffs had three years from the point at which

their claim accrued, to file the instant complaint. The critical inquiry, of course, is to

determine when plaintiffs’ claim accrued.

Oklahoma recognizes the “discovery rule” which provides that the statute of

limitations on a claim does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should

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have known of its injury due to defendants’ conduct. See, e.g., Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v.

Neustadt, 917 P.2d 1005, 1009 (1996)(“Discovery rule” in tort cases tolls running of

applicable limitations period until damaged party knows, or in exercise of reasonable

diligence should have known, of damage). To establish the accrual date of plaintiffs’ claim

here, then, the relevant question is whether plaintiffs’ complaint discloses the time as of

which plaintiffs knew or should have reasonably known of their claim. According to

defendants, plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the June 2002 announcement of the DOJ’s

criminal investigation demonstrate that as of June 2002, plaintiffs “became aware” of their

claim. Plaintiffs, by contrast, argue that the complaint does not disclose sufficient facts

from which to conclude whether plaintiffs knew or should have known of defendants’

unlawful conduct as of June 2002. 

The court agrees with plaintiffs on this point. None of the allegations of plaintiffs’

complaint actually establishes the date when plaintiffs became aware of their claim against

defendants. At most, plaintiffs’ allegations state only that, as of June 2002, defendants’

activity was no longer being concealed from plaintiffs. See FAC at ¶ 84. This is not the

same, however, as alleging that plaintiffs were actually aware of their claim, or even that

they reasonably should have been aware of it. It is likely, for example, that upon learning of

defendants’ alleged misconduct, plaintiffs would have needed additional time to conduct a

reasonable investigation of facts, in order to determine whether they in fact

had any claim against defendants. Only after having had sufficient time to do so, could the

argument be made that plaintiffs should have reasonably been aware of their legitimate

claims. While the court cannot say, without additional facts that discovery may provide,

what would constitute a sufficient amount of time for investigation in the context of the instant

case, it is clear that, at this juncture, no allegations are present that would allow the court to

conclude that plaintiffs should have reasonably been aware of their claim as of June 2002. 

Moreover, the court notes that plaintiffs have argued in opposition to defendants’

motion that they entered into a tolling agreement with defendants in August 2005. If this is

indeed the case, then the question before the court is really whether the allegations of

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the complaint are sufficient for the court to conclude that plaintiffs should have been

reasonably aware of their claims against defendants prior to August 2002. This is a mere

two months after the DOJ announced its criminal investigation in June 2002. 

Given that a pre-filing investigation of some sort is mandatory, see Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 11, the court is not prepared to find that two months was a sufficient

amount of time within which plaintiffs should have reasonably discovered their claims

against defendants. Indeed, plaintiffs argue that the earliest date the statute of limitations

could have begun to run was May 11, 2005 -- the date that the first defendant actually pled

guilty to violations of the Sherman Act. While it is probable that plaintiffs should have

reasonably known of their claims prior to this date, the court is at the very least convinced

that plaintiffs may not reasonably have known of their claims by August 2002. 

In sum, the court concludes that plaintiffs’ complaint fails to set forth any allegations

that would allow the court to determine, at the pleading stage, the actual date of accrual of

plaintiffs’ claim under Oklahoma’s consumer protection statute. Accordingly, defendants’

motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to Oklahoma’s consumer protection statute, on

grounds that the claim is time-barred, is DENIED. The denial is without prejudice; the issue

may be revisited on summary judgment should discovery reveal facts that establish the

actual accrual date. 

b. South Carolina

Plaintiffs bring a claim on behalf of South Carolina, and its state agencies and

natural persons, pursuant to the state’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”). Like

Oklahoma’s statute, the Unfair Trade Practices Act is subject to a three year statute of

limitations. See S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-150 (“any such claim must be brought “within three

years of discovery of [defendants’] unlawful conduct.”). Defendants once more assert that

plaintiffs’ complaint violates this three year deadline.

Like Oklahoma, South Carolina has adopted the discovery rule for claim accrual.

Indeed, the UTPA’s statute of limitations codifies the rule. See id.; see also Grillo v.

Speedrite Prod., Inc., 532 S.E.2d 1, 3 (S.C. App. Ct. 2000)(claim must be commenced

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“within three years after [plaintiffs] knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should

have known that they had a cause of action”). Defendants are also correct that, under

general principles of South Carolina law, “the exercise of reasonable diligence means

simply that an injured party must act with some promptness where the facts and

circumstances of an injury would put a person of common knowledge and experience on

notice that some right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party

might exist.” See Grillo, 532 S.E.2d at 3. South Carolina courts have also said, in

interpreting the general personal injury statute of limitations – which also recognizes the

discovery rule – that the statute of limitations is triggered “not merely by knowledge of an

injury, but by knowledge of facts, diligently acquired, sufficient to put a person on notice of

the existence of a cause of action against another.” Id. This is an objective determination. 

Id. 

Applying these principles here, the court comes to the same conclusion as it did with

respect to Oklahoma’s law. In sum, there is no basis from which to conclude, based on

plaintiffs’ complaint, that plaintiffs were in fact aware of their claim against defendants as

early as June 2002, and the court is furthermore unwilling to find that plaintiffs’ should have

been aware of their claims by July 2002 -- a mere month after the DOJ investigation was

announced. 

Moreover, in determining under South Carolina law whether plaintiffs should have

known of their claims against defendants, South Carolina requires an objective factual

basis from which to decide whether plaintiffs acted with promptness to diligently acquire

facts, such that they could have had sufficient notice of their claim. Since this objective

factual basis does not appear in the complaint, the court is not in a position to identify here

the date that plaintiffs’ claim began to accrue. 

For these reasons, the court similarly DENIES without prejudice defendants’ motion

to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to South Carolinas UTPA on grounds that the claim is

time-barred. 

4. Individual State Authority for Parens Patriae Actions

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Finally, defendants target the claims brought by eight different plaintiff States, this

time on grounds that those plaintiff States do not permit plaintiffs to allege – as they try to

do here – parens patriae actions for damages on behalf of natural persons or businesses. 

Specifically, defendants contend that the parens patriae claims brought by plaintiff States

Arizona, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, and

Wisconsin must be dismissed because those states have not expressly authorized their

Attorneys General to sue for damages in a parens patriae capacity on behalf of natural

persons, consumers, or businesses. See, e.g., FAC at ¶¶ 129, 143, 155, 159, 169, 183-

84, 191. The gist of defendants’ argument is that, pursuant to Ninth Circuit authority as set

forth in California v. Frito-Lay, 74 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1973), no state can recover damages

on behalf of individuals or entities absent a specific legislative grant of parens patriae

authority. Since no such statutory authority exits in the above named plaintiff States, all

such parens patriae claims for damages must fail. 

Plaintiffs, in response, argue that contrary to defendants’ argument, the Ninth Circuit

has acknowledged that states have a parens patriae interest in protecting the health of their

citizens by redressing antitrust violations, and that this authority includes the right to seek

both damages and injunctive relief. See, e.g., In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919,

927 (9th Cir. 1991), aff’d in part & rev’d in part sub nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,

509 U.S. 764 (1993). Furthermore, plaintiffs point out that the laws of each of the above

states generally grant parens patriae authority to their Attorneys General to act for the

benefit of each state’s citizens, and that this grant of power is sufficient for the damages

claims asserted here. 

The issues that the court must therefore resolve are whether, in fact, the Attorneys

General of the above plaintiff States must have specific legislative authority prior to seeking

damages on behalf of individuals and businesses via parens patriae actions, and if so,

whether such authority has in fact been granted. 

The court answers the first inquiry in the affirmative. Preliminarily, however, it is

worth noting that Frito-Lay, on which defendants rely in support of the argument that no

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11 In response to Frito-Lay, Congress passed the Scott-Hart-Rodino Act, which

does specifically grant state Attorneys General the parens patriae authority to sue for monetary

damages on behalf of natural persons, pursuant to federal antitrust law. 

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state can assert a parens patriae claim for damages without express statutory authority, is

not wholly on point. In Frito-Lay, the California Attorney General asserted the right to bring

a parens patriae action on behalf of its citizens, in order to recover damages pursuant to

section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Ninth Circuit squarely rebuffed this attempt, noting that

parens authority to seek injunctive relief is different from parens authority to seek monetary

relief, and while the former can be grounded in common law, the latter must be grounded in

a legislative grant of authority. See Frito-Lay, 74 F.2d at 775-76. To that end, the absence

of legislative authority granting the Attorney General the right to institute a parens patriae

action for damages meant that no such authority could be presumed.11 

Frito-Lay therefore dealt with parens patriae authority vis-a-vis federal antitrust law.

Here, by contrast, plaintiff States are asserting parens patriae authority via individual state

laws. As such, while the general principle espoused by Frito-Lay is instructive, it is not

controlling. 

With these distinctions in mind, the court nonetheless concludes that Frito-Lay’s

general reasoning should govern the court’s decision here. To that end, in order to

determine whether the Attorneys General here have the authority to bring parens patriae

suits for monetary damages on behalf of their citizens, businesses and/or consumers, the

court looks to those states’ individual laws to determine whether such authority has been

provided. Unlike Frito-Lay, however, the court does not require that any affirmative grant of

authority be rooted solely in statutes. Rather, the court employs the following principle: 

where there exists controlling legal authority specifically indicating that monetary damages

– as opposed to other types of relief – may be sought through a parens patriae claim, the

court will presume such authority to be present, regardless whether such authority is

indicated by common law, statutory law, or otherwise. Where no such authority exists,

however, the court will not make the same presumption. 

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With the above principles in mind, the court turns to each plaintiff State at issue.

a. Arizona

Defendants correctly contend that nothing in Arizona’s antitrust statute grants the

Attorney General parens patriae authority to bring claims for monetary damages. Arizona’s

antitrust statute contains two relevant provisions: Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-1407 and 44-1408. 

The former grants the Attorney General permission to bring an appropriate action for

“injunctive or other equitable relief ... in the name of the state for a violation of this article,”

and the latter affirms that “[t]he state, a political subdivision or any public agency

threatened with injury or injured in its business or property by a violation of this article may

bring an action for appropriate injunctive or other equitable relief, damages sustained and

...[costs and fees].” See id. (emphasis added). The first provision governs injunctive and

equitable relief, and the second governs damages. Notably lacking from the provision

governing damages, however, is any express grant of authority to the state or its Attorney

General to bring suit on behalf of “natural persons” – i.e., parens patriae authority. Cf. Cal.

Bus. & Prof. Code § 16760 (a)(1)(“Attorney General may bring a civil action ... as parens

patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in the state”). 

Plaintiffs respond that, notwithstanding the language of Arizona’s antitrust statute,

two district courts have held that Arizona has “express statutory authority to represent

consumers in a capacity which is the functional equivalent of parens patriae.” See In re

Cardizem, 218 F.R.D. at 521; In re Lorazepam, 205 F.R.D. at 386-87. However, plaintiffs’

reliance on these cases is misplaced. 

First, both cases – neither of which constitutes controlling authority – deal with the

ability of State Attorneys General to settle and release parens patriae claims on behalf of

consumers, not the ability of State Attorneys General to bring parens patriae claims for

damages on behalf of consumers. See id. Moreover, the In re Lorazepam decision, upon

which the In re Cardizem decision heavily relies, expressly noted that no challenge to the

states’ parens patriae authority had been made. This is not the case here. 

Second, although it cannot be disputed that both courts found Arizona Revised

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Statute § 44-1407 to set forth “the functional equivalent of parens patriae” authority, it is

equally undisputed that this section, as noted above, provides for actions by the Arizona

Attorney General for injunctive and equitable relief in the “name of the state.” See In re

Cardizem, 218 F.R.D. at 521; In re Lorazepam, 205 F.R.D. at 386-87; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-

1407. Accordingly, even if the court were to credit both courts’ finding that statutory

authorization for Attorney General actions in the “name of the state” are equivalent to an

express grant of parens patriae authority, this would extend only to suits for equitable relief,

not damages. Indeed, even applying both courts’ reasoning, damages suits cannot be

authorized, since Arizona’s provision governing damages – Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1408 –

lacks similar language that allows for suits by the Attorney General in the “name of the

state.”

In sum, therefore, the court concludes that no authority has been presented that

expressly authorizes the Arizona Attorney General to assert a parens patriae claim for

damages on behalf of Arizona consumers. Accordingly, to the extent such relief is sought,

plaintiff State Arizona’s claim is hereby DISMISSED. 

b. Illinois

The Illinois antitrust statute expressly addresses actions brought by the State

Attorney General, and provides that the Attorney General may bring an action “on behalf of

this State, counties, municipalities, townships and any political subdivision ... to recover the

damages under this subsection or by any comparable federal law.” See 740 Ill. Comp.

Stat. 10/7(2). The statute also provides that only the Attorney General is authorized to

maintain a class action in any court of th[e] State for indirect purchasers....” Id. Thus, as

does the Arizona antitrust statute, the Illinois antitrust statute nowhere provides the

Attorney General with a direct mandate to bring suit in a parens patriae capacity, on behalf

of Illinois persons or businesses. 

Plaintiffs, for their part, contend that aside from this statute, the Illinois Attorney

General does have parens authority, and that this authority is rooted in the Attorney

General’s constitutional and common law powers. In support of this argument, plaintiffs

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rely on Illinois case law, as well as case law that issues from non-controlling jurisdictions. 

See, e.g., People ex rel. Barrett v. Finnegan, 378 Ill. 387, 392-93 (1941)(recognizing

common law power of Attorney General to institute actions affecting the public); In re

Volpert, 175 B.R. 247, 256 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994); Illinois v. Bristol-Myers Co., 470 F.2d

1276, 1278 (D. D.C. Cir. 1972)(Attorney General has legal authority, based on common law

powers and duties, to sue for the state “to recover damages wrought by alleged antitrust

violations outside the assertedly restrictive terms of the Illinois Antitrust Act”). Plaintiffs also

once again invoke In re Cardizem, and In re Lorazepam, for the proposition that Illinois’

antitrust statute conveys to the Attorney General the “functional equivalent” of parens

patriae authority. See 218 F.R.D. at 521; 205 F.R.D. at 386-87.

With the exception of Bristol-Myers, plaintiffs’ cited authority largely establishes a

proposition with which defendants have no quarrel – i.e., that the State Attorney General is

vested with broad common law rights and duties that allow him to institute civil actions for

the purpose of vindicating the interests of the state and the public at large. The court has

no trouble finding that this is so. It does not, however, answer the question that is actually

before the court: whether the broad common law rights and duties vested in the Attorney

General allow for parens patriae suits that specifically seek damages on behalf of persons

or businesses. 

Bristol-Myers is the only authority relied on by plaintiffs that answers this question in

the affirmative. In Bristol-Myers, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district

court’s denial of appellants’ request for leave to intervene in an action filed by the State of

Illinois, seeking treble damages for Sherman Act violations. The state – through the Illinois

Attorney General – had brought suit on behalf of all political subdivisions pursuant to Illinois’

antitrust statute, and as the class representative for private purchasers and consumers,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. See 470 F.2d at 368. Appellants also

sought to represent all consumers and purchasers of the products at issue, claiming that

the Illinois Attorney General lacked authority under state law to represent the interests of

private consumers. Id. The appellate court found that the Attorney General was

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12 Plaintiff State Illinois submitted an opposition objecting to defendants’ request

that the court take notice of the Daicel Chemicals decision. The court hereby OVERRULES

the objection. 

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empowered to act as the class representative of private purchasers, once it had properly

invoked a lawsuit on behalf of itself and its political subdivisions under federal law. Id. The

court then went on to find that, even under Illinois state law, the Attorney General would be

empowered to seek relief on behalf of private purchasers, due to the broad duties and

powers vested in the Attorney General under state law. Id. at 369. 

While Bristol-Myers might normally be compelling, however, defendants have

pointed the court to more recent Illinois case law that rejects Bristol-Myers’ reasoning. See

State of Illinois v. Daicel Chem. Indus., No. 02 CH 19575 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 2003),

attached as Exhibit 1 to Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff State of Illinois’ Opp. Re Request

for Judicial Notice.12 The Daicel Chemicals court expressly considered the question

whether the Illinois Attorney General may assert parens patriae claims on behalf of Illinois

citizens in the absence of express authorization in the antitrust statue, and held: “the law of

the State of Illinois does not support the Attorney General’s argument that parens patriae

standing, which covers quasi-sovereign interests, can be used to recover individual injuries

to citizens under the Illinois Antitrust Act.” See id. at 7. In so holding, the Illinois court

expressly rejected Bristol-Myers, and noted that other courts with jurisdiction over Illinois

state law had done the same. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange

Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1127 (7th Cir. 1979)(“In the absence of statutory authorization, Illinois

cannot maintain this action in federal court as a [p]arens patriae action”); In re Rusty Jones,

Inc., 128 B.R. 1001, 1008 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ill.1991)(“if [Illinois] has not suffered the same injury

as members of the putative class, it may not act on behalf of its citizens unless it is

authorized to do so under state statutory law, regardless of whether the state constitution

recognizes the role of the State as parens patriae”).

So here. As such, in view of plaintiffs’ inability to demonstrate that express parens

patriae authority to bring claims for monetary damages on behalf of natural persons and

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businesses has been vested in the Illinois Attorney General, plaintiff State Illinois’ parens

patriae claim for monetary damages on behalf of natural persons and businesses is hereby

DISMISSED. 

c. Mississippi

Defendants assert that neither Mississippi’s antitrust law nor its consumer protection

law grant the State Attorney General the requisite parens patriae authority to sue for

damages on behalf of natural persons and businesses. As a practical matter, this is

correct; the state consumer protection law allows for Attorney General actions only where

the Attorney General is seeking injunctive relief “in the name of the State,” while the state

antitrust statute appears to limit Attorney General actions brought “in the name of the State”

to those seeking the imposition of penalty amounts only. See Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-9

(limiting Attorney General actions to those seeking injunctive relief only); Miss. Code Ann. §

75-21-7 (setting forth penalty for violation of statute). 

 This does not the end the inquiry, however. Plaintiffs rely on common law and legal

precedent holding that the Mississippi Attorney General is empowered to bring a parens

patriae action for damages on behalf of its natural persons. See Hood ex rel. Mississippi v.

Microsoft Corp., 428 F. Supp. 2d 537, 545-46 (S.D. Miss. 2006)(finding that Mississippi

Attorney General had parens patriae authority to bring damages claim under state law, on

behalf of state and natural persons); Moore ex rel. Mississippi v. Abbott Labs., 900 F. Supp.

26, 31 (S.D. Miss. 1995)(Mississippi Attorney General has parens patriae authority to

assert claims on behalf of state). These cases, which issue from federal district courts

familiar with Mississippi law, recognized the State Attorney General’s parens patriae

authority to sue for damages and other relief under the private right of action provisions of

the above statutes, despite the lack of any language therein affirmatively granting parens

patriae authority. See id. As such, the cases are instructive here, and ultimately

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13 Defendants have also moved to dismiss plaintiff State Mississippi’s parens

patriae claims on behalf of businesses specifically, on grounds that the statutes pursuant to

which plaintiffs bring suit do not expressly authorize suits on behalf of “businesses.” However,

since defendants make this argument conclusorily, and provide no controlling authority in

support thereof, the court accordingly rejects it. 

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persuasive.13 

Accordingly, based on the express authority recognized by Mississippi legal

authorities, the court concludes that plaintiff State Mississippi is entitled to pursue its

parens patriae claim seeking damages on behalf of natural persons and businesses, and

hereby DENIES defendants’ motion. 

d. New Mexico

The relevant language of the New Mexico antitrust statute provides: “The attorney

general may bring an action under Subsection A of this section on behalf of the state, a

political subdivision thereof or any public agency.” See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-3. 

Subsection A in turn grants “any person” – defined as “an individual, corporation, business

trust, partnership, association or any governmental or other legal entity with the exception

of the state” – the right to sue for injunctive relief and damages. See id.; see also N.M.

Stat. Ann. § 57-1-1.2. In other words, the Attorney General may sue for injunctive relief

and damages on behalf of the state, a political subdivision thereof, or any of its public

agencies, and a natural person may sue for damages on his own behalf. The question

here, is whether the Attorney General may sue for damages on behalf of natural persons. 

Plaintiffs have not relied on any authority that answers this question in the

affirmative. In re Lorazepam and In re Cardizem, both state only that New Mexico is a

state that has had a federal court interpret its antitrust statute to effectively “grant parens

patriae authority.” See 205 F.R.D. at 386; 218 F.R.D. at 521. These statements, however,

say nothing of the Attorney General’s ability to bring a parens patriae suit for damages on

behalf of natural persons, and set forth only the generic proposition that the Attorney

General is, in fact, vested with parens patriae authority. Likewise, the federal district court

opinion that these two cases – and plaintiffs – rely upon also contains no express

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statement that parens patriae authority for damages actions are authorized, even while

expressly recognizing that parens patriae authority is vested in the New Mexico Attorney

General. See State of N. M. v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 1981 WL 2167, at *1 (authorizing

parens patriae action in order to “enforce[] of the ‘due-on-sale’ law”)(emphasis added).

In sum, and in the absence of any authority specifically indicating or implying that the

New Mexico Attorney General’s suit for damages may go forward in a parens patriae

capacity on behalf of natural persons, the court concludes that this claim must be, and is

hereby DISMISSED. 

e. North Dakota

North Dakota’s antitrust statute has two relevant provisions. First, the statute

provides for civil penalties and enforcement by the State Attorney General, who “may bring

an action for appropriate injunctive relief and civil penalties in the name of the state for a

violation of this chapter.” See N.D. Cent. Code § 51-08.1-07. Second, the statute provides

that an action for damages may be brought by “[t]he state, a political subdivision, or any

public agency threatened with injury or injured in its business or property by a violation of

this chapter.” See id. at § 51-08.1-08. 

The former provision grants the North Dakota Attorney General the right to bring a

suit “in the name of the state.” This, as plaintiffs point out, has been relied upon by other

district courts as an express grant of authority which is the “functional equivalent of parens

patriae.” See In re Cardizem, 218 F.R.D. at 521; In re Lorazepam, 205 F.R.D. at 386-87. 

However, this provision is also expressly limited to injunctive and equitable relief. It is only

the latter provision that allows for the recovery of damages, and this provision specifically

limits damages actions brought by the Attorney General to those brought on behalf of the

state and its government entities – i.e., in the state’s own proprietary capacity. See N.D.

Cent. Code § 51-08.1-08 (omitting all reference to phrase “in the name of the state”).

Plaintiffs contend that North Dakota’s antitrust statute need not include an express

legislative grant of parens patriae authority in order for the Attorney General to sue for

damages sustained by North Dakota citizens. Plaintiffs base this assertion on state legal

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authorities that have recognized the common law right of the state to institute any and all

suits when required for the general welfare of the North Dakota citizenry. See, e.g., State

ex rel. Burgum v. Hooker, 87 N.W.2d 337, 340 (N.D. 1957)(“It has been repeatedly held

that the [S]tate has the right, independent of any statutory provision, to institute a suit in any

of its courts when it is required for the general welfare of its people.”). 

In making this argument, however, plaintiffs ignore the fact that the common law

right of the states to sue as parens patriae on behalf of the general welfare of their people,

has not traditionally included suits for monetary damages. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp &

Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. at 600-07 (describing history of common law parens

patriae authority and citing relevant case law, under which state attorneys general sought

injunctive relief). Indeed, the recognition that common law parens patriae authority did not

embrace damages actions is precisely what led the Ninth Circuit in California v. Frito-Lay to

decline to allow a parens patriae action for damages to go forward, absent affirmative

authorizing legislation. See 74 F.2d 777 (parens patriae actions for damages are “not the

type of state action taken to afford the sort of benefit that the common law concept of

parens patriae contemplates”). This same rationale has led this court, too, to demand that

some conclusive authority be present that expressly permits such claims. 

To that end, and plaintiffs having failed to present the court with any indication that

North Dakota’s Attorney General has been vested with the express authority to bring

parens patriae suits for damages on behalf of natural persons and/or businesses, the court

concludes that any such claim must be and is hereby DISMISSED. 

f. South Carolina

Plaintiffs assert that South Carolina’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (“SCUTPA”), and

state common law, vest the South Carolina Attorney General with parens patriae authority

to sue for monetary damages on behalf of natural persons. However, while both sources of

law do contemplate that the Attorney General has the authority to bring parens patriae

claims, there are no grounds for holding that either contemplates extending parens patriae

authority to suits for monetary damages. 

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SCUTPA, for example, allows the Attorney General to “bring an action in the name

of the State against [violators of the statute] to restrain by temporary restraining order,

temporary injunction or permanent injunction the use of [any unlawful] method, act or

practice.” See S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-50(a). On its face, this language condones actions

by the Attorney General that seek injunctive relief, not monetary damages. And while it is

true, as plaintiffs point out, that SCUTPA also allows courts to issue additional orders

restoring to any persons property that was acquired by reason of a defendant’s violations of

the statute, this provision reaches only equitable relief, as is indicated by use of the word

“restore,” within a statutory provision targeted at injunctive relief. See S.C. Code Ann. § 39-

5-50(b)(courts may “make such additional orders or judgments as may be necessary to

restore to any person ... any moneys or property, real or personal, which may have been

acquired by means of any practice declared to be unlawful in this article”). 

The conclusion to be reached from this is that, to the degree that the Attorney

General may proceed under SCUTPA in a parens patriae capacity on behalf of natural

persons – as plaintiffs note is suggested by In re Lorazepam, 205 F.R.D. at 386-87 – he

may only do so in order to seek injunctive relief, not damages. 

Consideration of South Carolina common law does not compel a different result. 

Plaintiffs rely on Condon v. Hodges, 562 S.E.2d 623, 627 (S.C. 2002). However, while

Condon does, indeed, embrace the general principle that the State Attorney General has

constitutional and statutory authority to bring whatever claims he sees fit in the name of the

state, Condon did not address monetary damages. Rather, it dealt with the Attorney

General’s right to bring an equitable claim against the governor of the state. Id. This being

the case, Condon’s general affirmation of the Attorney General’s parens patriae authority,

as recognized at common law, fails to provide support for a finding that such authority

extends beyond its normal common law boundaries, to include suits for monetary

damages. 

In short, the court declines to hold that South Carolina’s parens patriae claim for

damages on behalf of natural persons may go forward. Such claim is accordingly

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DISMISSED.

g. Tennessee

Plaintiffs argue that the Tennessee Attorney General has parens patriae authority to

sue for monetary damages on behalf of consumers, by virtue of the Attorney General’s

status as a constitutional officer, with statutory and common law duties and powers. See,

e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-6-109 (noting constitutional and statutory rights and duties of

Attorney General); State v. Heath, 806 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tenn. Ct. App.1990)(“the attorney

general may exercise such authority as the public interest may require and may file suits

necessary for the enforcement of state laws and public protection”). 

None of these sources, however, provide express authority for the filing of a parens

patriae action for monetary damages on behalf of natural persons or consumers. Indeed,

Tennessee’s antitrust statute fails to even grant the Attorney General the authority to bring

any type of suit under the statute, let alone a parens patriae right suit seeking monetary

damages. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-106 (stating only that “[a]ny person who may be

injured or damaged by” unlawful conduct under the statute may sue for and recover “the full

consideration or sum paid by the [injured] person for any goods, wares, merchandise, or

articles....”). Tennessee’s Consumer Protection Act – pursuant to which its Attorney

General also brings suit here – does allow for Attorney General actions “in the name of the

state” and on behalf of injured citizens, but such relief is limited to injunctive and equitable

relief. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-108(a-b). Finally, while it is true that other statutory

provisions empower the Attorney General to generally institute all actions necessary to

enforce the laws, including actions on behalf of the state and its agencies to recover “public

funds,” this is not synonymous with the power to seek monetary damages specifically. See

id. at § 8-6-109 (district attorney empowered to sue on “behalf of the state, local

government units or local education agencies to recover public funds from entities financed

by such funds and their directors or officers when such funds through the improper actions

of such directors or officers have been used for unauthorized purposes, misapplied or

misappropriated”). At most, this could be seen as support for the Attorney General’s ability

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to seek equitable relief on behalf of appropriate government entities. 

Moreover, as defendants point out, at least one Tennessee court has expressly

rejected the very proposition urged by plaintiffs here. In State ex rel. Leech v. Levi Strauss

& Co., a Tennessee chancery court expressly considered the State Attorney General’s

request to seek monetary damages on behalf of private citizens under Tennessee’s

antitrust laws. See 1980 WL 4696, at *4 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. 1980). After noting that parens

patriae actions had received “no judicial recognition in this country as a basis for recovery

of money damages for injuries suffered by individuals,” the court concluded that “such a

drastic departure from accepted practice must result from acts of the Legislature.” Id. at *5. 

Finding no affirmative grant of authority to be present in the Tennessee antitrust statute, the

court dismissed the Attorney General’s parens patriae claim for damages. 

The same result is compelled here. For as noted both above and by the Tennessee

Chancery Court, there is simply no statutory authority relied on by plaintiffs that expressly

grants the Attorney General the right to assert a parens patriae claim for damages on

behalf of natural persons or consumers. Absent such authority, Tennessee’s parens

patriae claim for damages on behalf of natural persons and businesses, is accordingly

DISMISSED. 

h. Wisconsin

Plaintiffs concede that the Wisconsin Attorney General has no authority to prosecute

litigation on behalf of Wisconsin citizens unless such authority is granted by statute. See,

e.g., State v. City of Oak Creek, 605 N.W.2d 526, 533 (Wis. 2000). They contend,

however, that Wisconsin’s antitrust statute expressly grants the Attorney General the

authority to prosecute any and all violations of state antitrust law, including the authority to

seek monetary redress for consumers harmed by antitrust violations. See Wis. Stat. §§

133.16-133.17. 

This is incorrect. The Wisconsin antitrust statute expressly limits the department of

justice – which includes the State Attorney General – and district attorneys to suits for

injunctive relief only. See Wis. Stat. § 133.16. And while it does empower the Attorney

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General to prosecute any and all violations under the act, the antitrust statute does not

define the contours of this authority, stating only that the department of justice shall have all

powers conferred upon district attorneys in prosecuting violations under the act. Id. at §

133.17. In other words, there is no express grant of parens patriae authority to sue for

damages on behalf of consumers in Wisconsin’s antitrust statute. 

Plaintiffs also rely on In re Lorazepam for the proposition that the Wisconsin antitrust

statute expressly grants the Attorney General the “functional equivalent” of parens patriae

authority to seek damages on behalf of consumers. For the reasons already detailed

above, In re Lorazepam is distinguishable, and fails to provide the requisite support. 

Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff State Wisconsin asserts a parens patriae claim for

damages on behalf of natural persons, this claim is DISMISSED. 

D. Request for Judicial Notice

In conjunction with the instant motion to dismiss, defendants have also submitted a

request for judicial notice of various documents that include state legislative reports,

legislative bills, and pleadings or decisions filed in unrelated actions. See Declaration of

Peter Nemerovski ISO Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice. Finding the documents to

be appropriate subjects for judicial notice, the court hereby GRANTS defendants’ request. 

E. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ second and third

claims for relief is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. Specifically, the court holds as

follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ second claim for relief is GRANTED. 

To the extent plaintiffs’ claim under the Cartwright Act alleges claims on behalf of nonCalifornia Attorneys General seeking relief on behalf of non-California residents, state

agencies and political subdivisions, plaintiffs lack standing and/or authority to do so. These

claims are therefore DISMISSED with prejudice. 

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ third claim for relief is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part, as follows: 

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(a) Defendants’ motion to dismiss indirect purchaser claims brought

pursuant to the antitrust statutes and provisions of Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky,

Louisiana, Maryland, Oklahoma, and Virginia, is GRANTED, based on those states’

adherence to the Illinois Brick doctrine. All such claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

However, defendants’ motion with respect to the indirect purchaser claims brought

pursuant to the antitrust statutes and provisions of Arkansas and West Virginia, is DENIED. 

The denial with respect to Arkansas is without prejudice to the parties’ ability to raise the

issue on summary judgment once relevant discovery is completed;

(b) Defendants’ motion to dismiss indirect purchaser claims brought

pursuant to the consumer protection statutes and provisions of Alaska, Kentucky,

Oklahoma, and West Virginia is GRANTED, also based on those states’ adherence to the

Illinois Brick doctrine. All such claims are similarly DISMISSED. Defendants’ motion with

respect to the indirect purchaser claims brought pursuant to the consumer protection

statutes and provisions of Arkansas and Washington, is DENIED;

(c) Defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims brought pursuant to the

antitrust statutes of Maryland, Mississippi, and Tennessee is GRANTED, based on

plaintiffs’ failure to allege intrastate activity, as required pursuant to these statutes. These

claims are DISMISSED. The dismissal is without prejudice, however, and leave to amend

is granted to allow plaintiffs to cure the deficiencies with respect to these claims. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to Wisconsin’s antitrust statute on

similar grounds, is DENIED;

(d) Defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims brought pursuant to

Oklahoma’s consumer protection statute and South Carolina’s antitrust statute, on grounds

that the claims are barred under the applicable statutes of limitations, is hereby DENIED. 

The denial is without prejudice, however, to the parties’ ability to raise the issue on

summary judgment, once relevant discovery is complete; and

(e) Defendants’ motion to dismiss all parens patriae claims seeking

monetary damages on behalf of natural persons and/or businesses is GRANTED in part

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and DENIED in part. The motion is GRANTED with respect to plaintiff States Arizona,

Illinois, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. All such

claims are therefore DISMISSED with prejudice. Defendants’ motion to dismiss all such

claims brought by plaintiff State Mississippi, however, is DENIED. 

Leave to amend is permitted only as specified herein. Amendment as to additional

matters is not permitted without prior leave of court. The court does note, however, that in

addition to the complaint’s deficiencies highlighted throughout this order, plaintiffs’

complaint also appears to suffer from an additional deficiency. Namely, plaintiffs’ complaint

fails to set forth with any degree of clarity or specificity the nature of DRAM purchases

made by any given plaintiff State, its entities, and its citizens (e.g., purchases of freestanding DRAM v. products in which DRAM is a component). While the court believes this

deficiency is significant, given that the complaint is already unwieldy and difficult to review

or manage, the court declines to order additional amendment on this point at the present

juncture. 

Any amended complaint shall be filed no later than October 1, 2007.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2007

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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