Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00191/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 From pages 2-3 of the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD MARCELLE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

NORTEL NETWORKS, INC, ET AL.,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-00191 MJJ

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR ORDER ENLARGING

TIME

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Ronald Marcelle’s (“Plaintiff”) motion to enlarge the time allotted to file

his demand for a jury trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2). For the following reasons,

Plaintiff’s Motion for an Order Enlarging Time is DENIED. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1

This case was initially brought in Marin County Superior Court by Plaintiff, asserting claims

for breach of contract, fraud, constructive wrongful discharge, and related actions. The state court

complaint did not include a jury trial request. The last answer closing the pleading was filed on

April 4, 2004. Defendant Nortel Networks, Inc. (“Defendant”), Plaintiff’s former employer,

removed the action to this Court on January 12, 2005. On May 3, 2005, during the parties’ initial

case management conference, Plaintiff’s counsel first became cognizant of the need to demand a

jury trial under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which he had inadvertently overlooked. When

Case 3:05-cv-00191-MJJ Document 46 Filed 06/24/05 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2

 Although Plaintiff initially filed a Motion For Order of Trial By Jury As To All Issues under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b), he withdrew this motion on June 14, 2005. Therefore, Plaintiff

only seeks an Order Enlarging Time For Plaintiff To File Demand For Jury Trial under Rule 6(b).

2

Defendant’s counsel declined Plaintiff’s counsel’s request for a jury trial, this motion was filed on

May 17, 2005.2

LEGAL STANDARD 

A demand for a jury trial is waived if not made within the strictures of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d). Rule 81 addresses the required timing of any jury trial

demand in a removed action.

If all necessary pleadings have been served at the time of removal, a non-petitioning party

entitled to a jury trial under Rule 38 must serve his demand within ten days after being served the

petition for removal. FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c). A party who properly demanded a jury trial in state

court need not make another demand after removal. Id. If state law does not require the parties to

make express demands in order to claim trial by jury, they need not make demands after removal

unless directed to. The failure of a party to make a demand constitutes a waiver by that party of a

jury trial. Id. It is not disputed that Plaintiff missed the ten-day cutoff under Rule 81(c) which

ended on January 27, 2005. 

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly found that the time strictures of Rule 38 control the timing

of a jury trial demand in a removed action. See Blau v. Del Monte, 748 F.2d 1348, 1357 (9th Cir.

1985). In so doing, it repudiated the argument that California lacks an “express demand”

requirement. Lewis v. Time, 710 F.2d 549, 556 (9th Cir. 1983). Consequently, Rule 38(d) applies

absent a recognized exception. 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff initially argues that Defendant’s counsel failed to adhere to the Court’s local rules

when drafting and filing its opposition to his Motion, and therefore the Court should strike

Defendant’s Opposition to the Motion. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues his failure to meet the

deadline is excusable, and he consequently should be granted an enlargement in the time allotted by

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38 and 81 to request a jury trial pursuant to Rule 6(b)(2).

///

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United States District Court

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A. California Court Local Rule 6-3

In his Reply to the Opposition, Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant’s Opposition to his

motion on the grounds that Defendant violated Cal. Ct. Local R. 6-3(c) by exceeding the maximum

page limit, filing it late, and failing to include the required declaration. Cal. Ct. Local R. 6-3(c)

addresses the procedural requirements for motions requesting enlargement of a filing deadline. It

requires the party opposing the motion to file an opposition “not to exceed five pages, accompanied

by a declaration setting forth the basis for opposition, no later than the third court day after receiving

the motion.” Cal. Ct. Local R. 6-3(c). 

Here, the section of the opposition addressing the Rule 6(b) motion is only four pages, so

therefore Plaintiff is not in violation of the page limit set by Cal. Ct. Local R. 6-3(c). However,

Defendant failed to attach a declaration setting forth the basis for his opposition. Defendant also 

violated the three-day deadline by filing the Opposition on June 7, 2005, nearly three weeks after

Plaintiff filed the motion on May 17, 2005.

While a court’s local rules can be binding in some instances, courts generally have broad

discretion in determining when they must apply. Lance, Inc. v. Dewco Serv., Inc., 422 F.2d 778,

783-84 (9th Cir. 1970). The Court must determine if non-compliance with a local rule unjustly

prejudiced the opposing party. U.S. v. Simmons, 476 F.2d 33, 35 (9th Cir. 1973). Only when a

“departure from local rules . . . affects ‘substantial rights’” does it require reversal. Prof’l Programs

Group v. Dep’t of Commerce, 29 F.3d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1994).

Here, Defendant’s failure to include the separate declaration did not impact Plaintiff’s

substantive rights. Although Defendant failed to follow this procedural requirement, Plaintiff

received Defendant’s substantive arguments in the four-page Opposition. Consequently,

Defendant’s failure to include a summary of these arguments in a separate declaration, although

deviating from requirements set forth in Cal. Ct. Local R. 6-3(c), did not affect Plaintiff’s

substantive rights because he received the required information.

Furthermore, there is no indication that Defendant’s non-compliance with the three-day limit

for filing his Opposition prejudiced Plaintiff in any way. Although the delay in filing the Opposition

was substantial, Plaintiff argues that the delay itself is grounds for the Court to strike the Opposition. 

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For the Northern District of California

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3

 Defendant fails to address the Pioneer opinion, and instead focuses its argument on Rutledge

v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 511 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1975), which was decided prior to Pioneer. However, as the Ninth Circuit has held that Pioneer is the “leading authority on the modern concept of

excusable neglect,” the Court should look to cases utilizing and interpreting Pioneer when assessing

whether neglect is “excusable” as defined by Rule 6(b). Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir.

2004). Therefore, Defendant’s reliance on Rutledge is misplaced.

4

 Plaintiff presents no argument suggesting his mistake resulted from any ambiguity in Rule 81.

4

However, as mentioned, the Ninth Circuit emphasizes that Plaintiff must demonstrate that prejudice

resulted from the failure to comply. Id. Therefore, because no prejudice appeared to result from

Defendant’s delayed filing of its Opposition, the Court will not strike its Opposition due to

Defendant’s failure to comply with Cal. Ct. Local R. 6-3(c).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2) 

Plaintiff requests the Court to exercise its discretion under Rule 6(b)(2) to enlarge the time

period in which he could successfully motion for a jury trial. Rule 6(b)(2) allows the Court to

enlarge the time allotted to complete certain procedures, including requesting a jury trial under Rule

38, in cases where counsel engages in “excusable neglect” of the proper deadline. The appropriate

test for determining whether an action constitutes “excusable neglect” under Rule 6(b) is the

equitable test set forth in Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). The Pioneer

test emphasizes promoting equity when allowing enlargement, and its factors include: 1) the danger

of prejudice to the non-moving party; 2) the length of delay and its potential impact on proceedings;

3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within reasonable control of the movant; and 4)

whether the moving party’s conduct was in good faith.3

 Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. 

However, the four-part Pioneer test has not been utilized by the Ninth Circuit to determine

whether neglect is excusable when counsel commits a mistake of law involving an unambiguous

federal rule. Kyle v. Campbell Soup Co., 28 F.3d 928, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1994). In Kyle, the Ninth

Circuit considered whether an attorney’s mistake in adding three days for service by mail, under

Rule 6(e), to the time allotted for a motion from “entry of final judgment” can amount to excusable

neglect for purposes of allowing an enlargement. Id. at 929. The Kyle court chose to narrowly

interpret Pioneer, finding that the test could only be applied when a party’s failure to comply with a

deadline resulted from a “dramatic ambiguity” in a federal rule. Id at 931-32.4

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5

 Since there is no Ninth Circuit precedent regarding the enlargement of a jury trial deadline,

Plaintiff cites to Raymond v. IBM Corp., 148 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1998), where the Second Circuit

utilized the Pioneer test to conclude that inadvertently missing the jury trial deadline could constitute

“excusable neglect” under Rule 6(b)(2). However, the Raymond court emphasized that inadvertence

“usually [does] not constitute excusable neglect,” but found the neglect to be excusable in that case

because the memorandums filed with the court and the court’s own summary judgment opinion

demonstrated that all parties assumed that the case would ultimately be tried by a jury. Here, there is

no such indication. In any event, to the extent that Raymond is inconsistent with Kyle and Idaho, the

Court must follow valid Ninth Circuit precedent.

5

In The Comm. For Idaho’s High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F. 3d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1996), the

district court denied counsel’s motion under Rule 6(b) to order enlargement on the grounds that

counsel’s unfamiliarity with the Federal Rules caused him to miss a deadline for the filing of a

motion for attorney’s fees. The Ninth Circuit held that under Kyle, the district court properly did not

apply the Pioneer test because a mistake of law is never excusable neglect as defined by Rule 6(b). 

Id. at 825. The Idaho court consequently upheld the decision of the district court denying the

motion. Id. 

The present case is controlled by Kyle and Idaho.

5

 Although the Ninth Circuit has not

addressed enlargement of time allotted to demand a jury trial specifically, the broad sweeping

language of Idaho is applicable to the present case. As in Idaho, Plaintiff is seeking enlargement of

a deadline under Rule 6(b) by claiming excusable neglect. However, as in Idaho, Plaintiff’s counsel

has no reason for his neglect beyond mere inadvertence and unfamiliarity with the Federal Rules. 

Consequently, because a mistake of law cannot generally be considered excusable neglect as defined

in Rule 6(b), the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June _24___, 2005 /s/ 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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