Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02362/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02362-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CECILIA M.,

Plaintiff, 

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner 

of Social Security,

1

Defendant. 

Case No.: 18cv2362-WQH-MDD

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO 

REMAND

[ECF Nos. 11, 15]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local 

Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of California.

Plaintiff Cecilia M. (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g) for judicial review of the final administrative decision of the 

 

1 Andrew M. Saul became Commissioner of Social Security on June 17, 2019 and is 

therefore substituted for Nancy A. Berryhill as the Defendant in this action. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g); Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

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Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”). (ECF 

No. 1 at 1-2).2 The final administrative decision of the Commissioner denied 

Plaintiff’s application for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of 

the Social Security Act (“Title XVI”). (AR 37).3

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 11-1) be DENIED, Defendant’s 

Motion to Remand be DENIED, and the Commissioner’s decision finding 

Plaintiff not disabled and denying Supplemental Security Income be 

AFFIRMED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on October 27, 1964. (AR 219). At the time the 

instant application was filed on November 29, 2012, Plaintiff was 48 yearsold, which categorized her as a younger person. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563, 

416.963. Plaintiff subsequently changed age categories to closely 

approaching advanced age. 20 C.F.R. 416.963.

A. Procedural History

On November 29, 2012, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for a 

period of Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI. (AR 37). The 

application alleged a disability beginning September 5, 2003, but Plaintiff 

amended her alleged disability onset date to October 27, 2014 at the 

administrative hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (AR 37, 

56, 219). After her application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, 

Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing before an ALJ. (AR 37). An 

 

2 All pincite page references refer to the automatically generated ECF page number, not 

the page number in the original document.

3 “AR” refers to the Certified Administrative Record filed on February 13, 2019. (ECF Nos. 

9, 10).

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administrative hearing was held on March 17, 2016. (Id.). Plaintiff appeared 

and was represented by attorney John B. Martin. (AR 54). Testimony was 

taken from Plaintiff and from impartial vocational expert (“VE”) Kathleen 

Macy-Powers (AR 54, 306). On May 3, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision 

finding Plaintiff not disabled from October 27, 2014 through the date of the 

decision and therefore denied Plaintiff’s application for supplemental security 

income. (AR 37-48).

On June 13, 2016, Plaintiff sought review with the Appeals Council. 

(AR 4). On August 21, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request 

for review and declared the ALJ’s decision to be the Commissioner’s final 

decision in Plaintiff’s case. (AR 1). This timely civil action followed.

On May 16, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 

arguing the ALJ improperly considered the accommodations an employer 

must make to allow for a dog to be present in the workplace. (ECF No. 11-1). 

On August 15, 2019, Defendant filed a motion to remand, contending that the 

ALJ improperly included an ADA accommodation in assessing Plaintiff’s 

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) and that the accommodation is not 

medically necessary. (ECF No. 15-1). In opposition, Plaintiff avers that the 

RFC is correct and that remand is only warranted if it is limited to reevaluating step five of the sequential evaluation process. (See ECF No. 18). 

In reply, Defendant maintains that remand without limitation is required. 

(ECF No. 20).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Sections 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Act allow 

unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review of a final agency decision of 

the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The scope of judicial 

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review is limited in that a denial of benefits will not be disturbed if it is 

supported by substantial evidence and contains no legal error. Id.; see also 

Batson v. Comm’r of the SSA, 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla but less than a 

preponderance. . . .” Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[I]t is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 

1995)). The court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the 

evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusions. 

Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 

1988). If the evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the 

court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. When the 

evidence is inconclusive, “‘questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in 

the testimony are functions solely of the Secretary.’” Sample v. Schweiker, 

694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Waters v. Gardner, 452 F.2d 855, 

858 n.7 (9th Cir. 1971)). 

Even if a reviewing court finds that substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s conclusion, the court must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to 

apply the proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and reaching his or 

her decision. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. Section 405(g) permits a court to 

enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s 

decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand the 

matter to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id. 

B. Summary of the ALJ’s Findings

In rendering his decision, the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five step 

sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At step one, the 

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ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful employment 

since October 27, 2014. (AR 39).

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe 

impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and anxiety (20 

C.F.R. § 416.920(c)). (Id.).

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment 

or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the 

impairments listed in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (AR 40)

(citing 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 

416.925 and 416.926)).

Next, after considering the entire record, the ALJ determined that 

Plaintiff had the RFC “to perform unskilled sedentary or light work as 

defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) with the following modifications:”

lift and carry no more than five to 10 pounds at a time; lift and 

carry no more than five to 10 pounds occasionally; sit 10 to 15 

minutes at a time; stand and walk 10 to 15 minutes at a time; 

requires a sit/stand option every 10 to 15 minutes; sit for a total of 

six out of eight hours; stand and walk for a total of six out of eight 

hours; occasional stooping, bending, twisting or squatting; no 

kneeling, crawling or crouching; cannot climb or descend a full 

flight of stairs, but can go up or down a few stairs; no overhead 

reaching or lifting; frequent reaching, handling and fingering; and 

claimant requires a low stress work setting or work environment –

which means an office type work setting in an office with no 

wide/open spaces (e.g. no work in a large area like an airplane 

hangar or outdoors and no large, high ceilinged warehouses or 

factories); and must have the option to have with her, on the job, a 

small companion dog.

(AR 41) (emphasis added).

The ALJ then proceeded to step four of the sequential evaluation 

process and found Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (AR 46). For the 

purposes of his step five determination, the ALJ accepted the testimony of 

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the VE. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform the job of office 

helper (DOT code 239.567-010) identified by the VE that exists in significant 

numbers in the national economy. (AR 47). Accordingly, the ALJ found 

Plaintiff not disabled and denied her application for Supplemental Security 

Income. (AR 48).

 C. Issues in Dispute

The issues in dispute in this case are: (1) whether the ALJ erred by 

including an ADA accommodation in Plaintiff’s RFC; and (2) whether the 

ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff could perform the job of office helper.

1. RFC Formulation

Defendant argues the ALJ included a special job accommodation under 

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) in his RFC assessment in 

violation of the Commissioner’s own policies and persuasive authority. (ECF 

No. 15-1 at 6-8). Specifically, Defendant challenges the modification in 

Plaintiff’s RFC that Plaintiff have the option to have a small companion dog 

with her while on the job. (Id.). 

The Social Security Act (“SSA”) and ADA provide two distinct ways to 

help people with disabilities. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 

795, 801 (1999). The SSA provides monetary benefits to disabled individuals 

who are unable to engage in any kind of substantial gainful work that exists 

in the national economy and the ADA protects individuals from workplace 

discrimination based on disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 12112; see 

Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 801.

In particular, the ADA prohibits a covered entity from discriminating 

against a “qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job 

application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, 

employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and 

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privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination can include 

refusal to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 

limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an 

applicant or employee,” unless the covered entity can show that providing 

such an accommodation would “impose an undue hardship on the operation of 

the business.” Id. at (b)(5)(A). A qualified individual is one who “with or 

without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of 

the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 

12111(8). A reasonable modification is a modification or adjustment “to the 

work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the 

position is . . . customarily performed, that enable an individual with a 

disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.” 

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii).

Conversely, the SSA requires no determinations about reasonable 

accommodation in order to determine whether an individual is disabled and 

entitled to benefits. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 803. In fact, the Commissioner’s 

policy prohibits consideration of whether a claimant can perform “other work 

that exists in significant numbers in the national economy . . . with 

accommodations, even if an employer would be required to provide 

reasonable accommodations under the [ADA].” SSR 11-2p, 2011 SSR LEXIS 

2 at *19 (C.E. 2011).

An RFC is the most a person can do despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.945(a)(1). “Ordinarily, RFC is an assessment of an individual’s ability to 

do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on 

a regular and continuing basis.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 5at *1 (July 2, 

1996). Typically, an RFC describes a claimant’s abilities or limitations 

relating to general abilities required to engage in work, and the conditions 

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and characteristics of possible work environments. Here, for example, the 

ALJ found Plaintiff had the RFC to do jobs with a low stress work setting or 

work environment – which means an office type work setting in an office with 

no wide/open spaces. (AR 41). In contrast, the requirement that Plaintiff 

have the option to have with her, on the job, a small companion dog, imposes 

a condition on the employer beyond what is typical in the work environment. 

In other words, whereas other aspects of the RFC limit the types of jobs 

Plaintiff can perform due to her impairments, the companion dog part of the 

RFC requires modification to any job environment based on the nature of 

Plaintiff’s anxiety. As conceded by Plaintiff, such modification to the work 

environment is an accommodation. (See ECF No. 11-1 at 6-7).

It does not follow, however, that the ALJ is prohibited from 

incorporating an accommodation into an RFC. See Glaspy v. Berryhill, 771 F. 

App’x 747, 747 (9th Cir. 2019) (“The regulations do not require that the ALJ 

incorporate [ADA] accommodations into the [RFC] assessment.” (emphasis 

added)). Some courts have found that “the use of a service dog must be 

medically necessary to be considered in an RFC assessment.” See McGhee v. 

Berryhill, 386 F. Supp. 3d 80, 87 (D. Mass. 2019) (collecting cases). Other 

courts have found that the ALJ must consider the claimant’s use of a service 

dog when the evidence shows that the service dog was medically prescribed or 

recommended. See Rentfro v. Colvin, No. 14-cv-3015, 2015 WL 12868081, at 

*13 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2015) (finding the “ALJ’s failure to address adequately 

the evidence regarding the use of the service dog [was] material” and noting 

that it was unclear “that a person could perform a cleaning job if her RFC 

required her to take a service dog with her to the job site”). In Santos v. 

Colvin, a Western District of Washington case, the Court found there was 

credible evidence that use of a service dog was necessary in order for the 

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plaintiff to work where the record indicated use of a service dog “has been of 

significant benefit to him in terms of his mental health symptoms” and that 

the plaintiff’s doctor recommended a service dog at the plaintiff’s request. 

Id., No. 12-cv-05827-KLS, 2013 WL 5176846, at * 5 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 

2013). Notably, the record citations highlighted by that court appear to be 

from medical records—as opposed to the plaintiff’s testimony or third-party 

function reports—and the recommendation came from the plaintiff’s doctor.

Here, Plaintiff obtained a letter from Ross Jeffrey Quave, Licensed 

Clinical Social Worker (“LCSW”), recommending an emotional support 

animal to help “certain functional limitations,” including panic attacks. (AR 

1425). As an initial matter, an LCSW is not an acceptable medical source 

under the applicable regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502(a), 416.902,

416.913(a). Rather, an LCSW is an “other” medical source whose opinion is 

relevant to determining the severity of the claimant’s impairments and how 

they affect the claimant’s ability to function. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.902, 

416.913(d). Further, there does not appear to be any record evidence of the 

benefit of a companion dog beyond Mr. Quave’s letter and Plaintiff’s 

testimony that she “feel[s] better when [she has her] dog.” (AR 61, 1425). 

Absent evidence of a “significant benefit” due to a companion dog or an 

acceptable medical source prescription or recommendation, a companion dog 

is not medically necessary. Accordingly, it was error for the ALJ to 

incorporate the option to have a companion dog into the RFC.

2. Step Five Analysis

Plaintiff argues the ALJ errantly considered the accommodations an 

employer must make to allow for a dog to be present in the workplace at step 

five of the sequential evaluation process. (ECF No. 11-1 at 5; see ECF No. 18 

at 8). The Court does not address this argument because the Court finds that 

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it was error to incorporate the option to have a companion dog in the RFC.

3. Harmless Error

While the ALJ did err in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC to include an option 

to have a companion dog, the error was harmless. Harmless error only occurs 

if the error is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination. 

Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006). Errors that 

do not affect the ultimate result are harmless. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 

742, 747 (9th Cir. 2007).

Assuming the ALJ had not erred and appropriately omitted the 

companion dog requirement, the ALJ would have proceeded to step five of the 

sequential disability evaluation process. At step five, the ALJ must show 

there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant is 

able to do. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999). The ALJ 

can do this through the testimony of a VE. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 

1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2000); Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1100-1101. An ALJ’s step 

five determination will be upheld if the weight of the medical evidence 

supports the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert. Martinez v. Heckler, 

807 F.2d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 1987); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 

(9th Cir. 1984). The VE’s testimony must be reliable in light of the medical 

evidence to qualify as substantial evidence. Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 

422 (9th Cir. 1988). As such, the ALJ’s description of the claimant’s 

functional limitations “must be accurate, detailed, and supported by the 

medical record.” Desrosiers v. Sec. of Health and Human Servs., 846 F.2d 

573, 578 (9th Cir. 1988) (Pregerson, J., concurring). The ALJ may omit from 

that description those limitations he finds do not exist. Rollins v. Massanari, 

261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).

The first hypothetical the ALJ proffered to the VE accurately detailed 

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Plaintiff’s functional limitations without the modification that Plaintiff have 

the option to have a companion animal with her:

So here is the first hypothetical. Assume we have an 

individual of the claimant’s age, education, past relevant work as a 

sales clerk with the ability to handle sedentary or light skilled 

work. However, there are [a] number of limitations. She could lift 

no more than five to ten pounds at a time and carry no more than 

five to ten pounds occasionally. She could only be seated for ten to 

15 minutes at a time and could only be on her feet for ten to 15 

minutes. So we have a ten to 15 minutes sit/stand option. However, 

with all of these postural changes, she could log either six hours 

seated or six hours on her feet either way depending upon the work 

demands.

She could not handle any more than occasional stooping, 

bending, twisting or squatting. She could not work on the floor, 

that means no kneeling, crawling or crouching. She could not climb 

or descend full fights of stairs and could not do any overhead lifting 

or reaching due to the back. Also to protect the back, no more than 

frequent reaching, frequent handling and frequent fingering. The 

work would have to be at a low stress level, and here’s what I mean 

by that; this is kind of an unusual one we don’t hear too often. She 

could only do office type work, which means she could not work in 

wide open spaces like airport hang[a]rs, the outdoors, large highceilinged warehouses or factories. It must be in more of an office 

setting where the offices are not large open areas. So more of a 

cubicle, smaller office setting.

(AR 91-92). In response, the VE indicated there are a significant number of 

jobs in the national economy that a person with those hypothetical 

limitations could perform. (AR 92-94). The ALJ concluded that there were 

still a significant number of jobs in the national economy even with the 

additional limitation regarding a companion dog. (AR 47). As a result, the 

ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. (Id.).

The parties do not dispute that the limitations posed in the first

hypothetical are supported by the weight of the medical evidence. (See ECF 

Nos. 11-1, 15-1, 18, 20). As noted above, Plaintiff only takes issue with the 

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second hypothetical, arguing it was error to include the accommodations an 

employer must make to allow for a dog to be present in the workplace. (ECF 

No. 11-1 at 5-7). Accordingly, the ALJ would have found Plaintiff “not 

disabled” even had he not erred in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC to include the 

companion dog option. Payano v. Colvin, No. 2:15-cv-00294-RFB-GWF, 2017 

WL 4778593, at * 4 (D. Nev. Oct. 23, 2017) (finding harmless error where the 

ALJ omitted the need for a service dog in the hypothetical question to the 

vocational expert where the evidence failed to support that a service dog was 

necessary for Plaintiff to work). As such, the ALJ’s error was harmless. See 

Parra, 481 F.3d at 747.

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District 

Court AFFIRM the ALJ’s decision finding Plaintiff not disabled and denying 

Supplemental Security Income, DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, and DENY Defendant’s Motion to Remand. This Report and 

Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the 

United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions 

of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of California. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objection to this report 

must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than January 

6, 2020. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendations.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be 

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than January 13,

2020. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the 

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Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 19, 2019

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