Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00009/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00009-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 11cv0009 DMS (WMc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EMMANUEL TYRONE BULL,

CDCR #J-45987, Civil No. 11cv0009 DMS (WMc)

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

LARRY SMALL; T. OCHOA;

T. BOREN; HURTADO,

Defendants.

I. Procedural History

On January 3, 2011, Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at Calipatria State

Prison located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff did not prepay the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1914(a); instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). On February 17, 2011, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP

and sua sponte dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim. See Feb. 17, 2011 Order at

4-5. Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct the

deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. Id. After granting Plaintiff two extensions of

time, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on June 10, 2011. 

Case 3:11-cv-00009-DMS-WMC Document 10 Filed 10/12/11 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 11cv0009 DMS (WMc)

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

As the Court stated in its previous Order, the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (“PLRA”)

amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 obligate the Court to review complaints filed by all persons

proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility

[and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the

terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP

complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which

seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A;

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v.

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. However, 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing an IFP or prisoner’s suit

make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing that the Complaint be served by the

U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits,

but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a

claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing

§ 1915A). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Here, however, even

presuming Plaintiff’s allegations true, the Court finds his First Amended Complaint fails to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A(b); Lopez,

203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446, n.1.

/ / /

Case 3:11-cv-00009-DMS-WMC Document 10 Filed 10/12/11 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 11cv0009 DMS (WMc)

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) the conduct he complains

of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that conduct violated a

right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Humphries v. County of Los

Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1184 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).

B. Property Claims

Once again, Plaintiff claims that prison officials have unlawfully confiscated and

destroyed his personal property. (FAC at 6.) Where a prisoner alleges the deprivation of a

liberty or property interest caused by the unauthorized negligent or intentional action of a prison

official, the prisoner cannot state a constitutional claim where the state provides an adequate

post-deprivation remedy. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 129-32 (1990); Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”) provides an

adequate post-deprivation state remedy for the random and unauthorized taking of property.

Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, Plaintiff has an adequate state

post-deprivation remedy and his claims relating to the taking of his property are not cognizable

in this § 1983 action, and must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and

1915A(b)(1).

C. Retaliation claims

Throughout his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that he has been subjected to

retaliation by Defendants. In order to prevail on a claim of retaliation, Plaintiff must be able

to prove the following five factors: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against [Plaintiff]; (2) because of (3) [Plaintiff’s] protected conduct, and that such action (4)

chilled [Plaintiff’s] exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably

advance a legitimate correctional goal.” See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-568 (9th

Cir. 2005). (citing Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000); Barnett v. Centoni, 31

F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to inform

the Court whether he was actually engaged in protected conduct or that any of the named

Defendants took any action against him because of his exercise of his First Amendment rights.

Case 3:11-cv-00009-DMS-WMC Document 10 Filed 10/12/11 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 11cv0009 DMS (WMc)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are dismissed for failing to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.

D. Respondeat Superior

Finally, Plaintiff also seeks to hold Defendants Small and Ochoa liable in their

supervisory capacity. However, there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, “[t]he inquiry into

causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual

defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer

v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71

(1976)). In order to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff must allege personal acts by each

individual Defendant which have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation at

issue. See Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Supervisory prison officials may only be held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional

violations of a subordinate if Plaintiff sets forth allegations which show: (1) how or to what

extent they personally participated in or directed a subordinate’s actions, and (2) in either acting

or failing to act, they were an actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As currently pleaded,

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to set forth facts which might be liberally construed

to support an individualized constitutional claim against Defendants Small and Ochoa.

Accordingly, the Court must DISMISS Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for all the

reasons set forth above but will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to amend his Complaint

to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. 

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and

§ 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is further GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date

Case 3:11-cv-00009-DMS-WMC Document 10 Filed 10/12/11 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 11cv977

this Order is filed in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies

of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without

reference to his previous pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1. Defendants not named and all

claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh,

814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Further, Plaintiff is cautioned that should he elect not to amend, or if his Amended

Complaint still fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the dismissal of this

action may hereafter be counted as a “strike” against him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 12, 2011

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

Case 3:11-cv-00009-DMS-WMC Document 10 Filed 10/12/11 Page 5 of 5