Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01328/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01328-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jermaine Pledger, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Unknown Barnes, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-01328-PHX-DJH (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 On October 5, 2015, Petitioner Jermaine Pledger filed an Amended Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 raising four grounds for relief. 

(Doc. 12.) On November 13, 2015, Respondents filed an answer arguing that the Court 

should deny relief. (Doc. 14.) Although Petitioner filed a “supplement” and a 

“clarification” to his Amended Petition, he did not file a reply.1

 On February 11, 2016, 

 

1

 On January 5, 2016, Petitioner filed a supplement to his Amended Petition using the Court’s approved form for filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 16.) The Court ordered the supplement stricken as improper because it appeared to be an attempt to file a second amended petition, but Petitioner had not complied with the applicable rules for filing an amended pleading. (Doc. 17.) The Court explained how to file an amended pleading and granted Petitioner until February 5, 2016 to seek leave to do so. 

(Id.) Petitioner did not seek leave to file an amended pleading. 

However, on January 25, 2016, Petitioner filed a “Clarification/More Definite 

Statement of Petition of Writ of Habeas Corpus.” (Doc. 18.) The Court does not 

consider this filing as a second amended petition because Petitioner again failed to comply with the requirements for filing an amended pleading. The Court declines to construe this filing as a reply because it includes arguments that were not included in the Amended Petition and it does not respond to Respondents’ answer. Additionally, it appears to argue claims that were raised in the July 15, 2015 petition (Doc. 18 at 4), which was superseded by the filing of the Amended Petition. (Doc. 12.) 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 1 of 18
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Petitioner filed a “Voluntary Dismissal for (Records),” which referred to an “extension of 

time to answer Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” and, therefore, the Court construed it 

as a motion for extension of time to file reply in support of the Amended Petition. 

(Doc. 20.) The Court granted Petitioner until February 26, 2016 to file a reply, but he did 

not file a reply by the deadline. (Id.) 

 Instead, on March 7, 2016, he filed a “Voluntary Dismissal for (Records) 

Amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Expeditiously),” which refers to the February 26, 2016 reply 

deadline, and states that “Petitioner set forth (Expeditiously) Motion for Records and 

Voluntary Dismissal for purpose of State post-conviction relief Fundamental Error Rule 

32.1(a) has not been responded to.” (Doc. 21.) To the extent Petitioner seeks to dismiss 

this proceeding, the Court recommends that the request be denied because dismissal 

would be prejudicial to Respondents who filed an answer to the Amended Petition in 

November 2015. (Doc. 14.) Accordingly, the Court recommends that, to the extent 

Petitioner seeks to dismiss the Amended Petition, that request be denied. The Court also 

recommends that the Amended Petition be dismissed. (Doc. 17.) 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing 

In December 2012, the State indicted Petitioner in Maricopa County Superior 

Court on conspiracy to possess marijuana for sale, a class two felony (Count One), armed 

robbery, a class two dangerous felony (Count Two), aggravated assault, a class three 

dangerous felony (Count Three), kidnapping, a class two dangerous felony (Count Four), 

possession of marijuana for sale, a class two felony (Count Five), aggravated assault, a 

class two dangerous felony (Count Six), misconduct involving weapons, a class four 

felony (Count Seven), and misconduct involving body armor, a class four felony (Count 

Eight). (Doc. 14, Ex. A.) 

 A jury found Petitioner guilty of the charged offenses, and found aggravating 

circumstances on some counts. (Doc. 14, Ex. C.) The trial court sentenced Petitioner to 

concurrent terms of nine years’ imprisonment on Counts One and Five, fifteen years’ 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 2 of 18
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

imprisonment on Counts Two, Four, and Six, ten years’ imprisonment on Count Three, 

and two-and-one-half years’ imprisonment on Counts Seven and Eight. (Doc. 14, Ex. D.) 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the events leading to Petitioner’s 

conviction as follows.2

 Petitioner sought to purchase approximately 170 pounds of 

marijuana from a person known as Ruiz. (Doc. 14, Ex. N.) At Petitioner’s direction, 

Ruiz drove a car containing the marijuana into a residential garage. (Id.) Petitioner 

closed the garage door and as Ruiz walked into the house, another person put a gun to 

Ruiz’s chest and told him it was “a rip,” meaning they were going to steal the marijuana. 

(Id.) Petitioner and two other armed men held Ruiz inside the house at gunpoint. (Id.) 

At that time, they did not know that Ruiz was a paid informant working with an 

undercover police officer who was monitoring the house from an unmarked car parked up 

the street. (Id.) Ruiz later escaped through the back door of the house. Petitioner and the 

other two men also left the house. (Id.) Petitioner and one of the men left in Petitioner’s 

car, and the other man left in Ruiz’s car with the marijuana. (Id.) 

 Ruiz approached the undercover officer and told him it was a “drug rip.” (Id.) 

Ruiz and the undercover officer followed Petitioner and eventually found his car stopped 

in a cul-de-sac. The officer stopped his car near the cul-de-sac, retrieved a bullet-proof 

vest from the trunk, and put it on. (Id.) The vest was emblazoned in yellow letters with 

the word “Police.” (Id.) After the officer got back in his car, Petitioner drove straight 

toward him. (Id.) As Petitioner approached the officer’s vehicle, he lowered his window, 

held a gun out the window, and pointed it at the officer. Petitioner did not shoot. (Id.) 

Other officers subsequently apprehended Petitioner. (Id.) 

B. Direct Review 

 Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. (Doc. 14, Ex. E.) In July 2013, 

Petitioner filed an opening brief, asserting that the prosecutor committed misconduct 

 

2

 This Court presumes the correctness of the court of appeals’ statement of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 762 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2012) (stating that the court of appeals’ factual findings are accorded a “presumption of correctness” and that a petitioner has the burden of rebutting that presumption with clear and convincing evidence.) 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 3 of 18
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

during closing argument by impermissibly vouching for Ruiz, and the trial court erred by 

ruling that the aggravated assault statute under which Petitioner was convicted, Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 13–1204(E), did not require the State to prove that Petitioner knew the victim 

was a police officer. (Doc. 14, Ex. F.) On December 10, 2013, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claims in a memorandum decision. (Doc. 14, Ex. I.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 14, Ex. J.) 

The State filed a motion to redesignate the December 10, 2013 court of appeals’ decision 

as an opinion;3

 the court of appeals granted the motion and replaced that decision with an 

opinion and a memorandum decision issued on January 8, 2015. (Doc. 14, Exs. M, N, O, 

V.) In its memorandum decision and opinion, the court of appeals rejected Petitioner’s 

claims and affirmed his convictions and sentences. (Doc. 14, Exs. N, O.) On March 17, 

2015, the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review. (Doc. 14, Ex. P.) 

C. Post-Conviction Proceedings 

 On May 14, 2015, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to 

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 14, Ex. Q.) The trial court 

issued a minute entry noting that Petitioner “does not wish for the Court to appoint a 

lawyer” and ordered Petitioner to file a petition by July 17, 2015. (Doc. 14, Ex. R.) On 

September 18, 2015, Petitioner filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the post-conviction 

proceeding. (Doc. 14, Ex. S.) That same day, the trial court dismissed the postconviction proceeding, noting that the court had ordered Petitioner to file a petition by 

July 17, 2015, and that “[t]he due date ha[d] passed and the defendant ha[d] not filed a 

petition and ha[d] not secured any additional extensions from the Court.” (Doc. 14, 

Ex. T.) 

D. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On October 5, 2015, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus in this Court raising the following claims: (1) the prosecutor committed 

 

3

 In May 2014, the Arizona Supreme Court stayed the proceedings while the State’s motion to redesignate the memorandum decision as an opinion was pending in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 14, Ex. L.) 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 4 of 18
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

misconduct by impermissibly vouching for a paid informant during closing argument 

(Ground One); (2) the trial court erred by ruling that the State, in establishing that 

Petitioner had committed aggravated assault on a peace officer, was not required to prove 

Petitioner knew that the victim was a police officer when he pointed a gun at him 

(Ground Two); (3) Petitioner was deprived of due process and equal protection because 

he did not receive a Donald hearing or a settlement conference (Ground Three); and 

(4) there was insufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s conviction for possession of 

marijuana for sale (Ground Four). (Doc. 12 at 6-9.) 

 In their answer, Respondents argue that the Amended Petition should be denied 

for the following reasons: (1) the Arizona Court of Appeals’ rejection of Ground One was 

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent, and did not involve an unreasonable determination of facts; (2) Ground Two is 

not cognizable on habeas corpus review; (3) Ground Three fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted; and (4) Grounds Three and Four are procedurally defaulted 

and barred from federal habeas corpus review. (Doc. 14.) 

 As set forth below, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on 

Ground One, Ground Two is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review, and 

Grounds Three and Four are procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review. 

Therefore, the Court recommends that the Amended Petition be dismissed and does not 

consider Respondents’ alternative argument pertaining to Ground Three. 

II. Petitioner’s Claims 

 A. Ground One 

 As Respondents note, Ground One is properly before the Court because Petitioner 

presented it to the Arizona Court of Appeals on direct review. The appellate court 

rejected that claim. Therefore, Ground One was adjudicated on the merits by the state 

courts and this Court’s reviews that claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As set forth below, 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground One. 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 5 of 18
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 1. Review of Claims Adjudicated on the Merits 

 Under § 2254(d), if a habeas corpus petition includes a claim that has been 

“adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” federal habeas relief is not 

available unless petitioner shows: (1) that the state court’s decision “was contrary to” 

federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the United States Supreme Court at 

the time of the state court decision, Greene v. Fisher, __ U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011); 

or (2) that it “involved an unreasonable application of” such law, § 2254(d)(1); or (3) that 

it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the record before 

the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 

S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). When conducting this review, the court considers the last 

reasoned state court decision addressing the claim. See Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 

943, 950 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805 (1991)); Barker v. 

Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (“When more than one state court has 

adjudicated a claim, [this Court] analyze[s] the last reasoned decision.”). 

 To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the 

Supreme Court that existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 

44. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v. 

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). A state court decision is an 

“unreasonable application of” federal law if the court identifies the correct legal rule, but 

unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 

133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal 

habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state 

court’s decision’” Richter, 562 U.S.___, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. 

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 6 of 18
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 When a state court decision is deemed to be “contrary to” or an “unreasonable 

application of” clearly established federal law, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus 

relief unless the erroneous state court ruling also resulted in actual prejudice as defined in 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). “Actual prejudice” means that the constitutional error at issue 

had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631. 

 2. Petitioner has not Satisfied § 2254(d)(1) or (2) 

 In Ground One, Petitioner alleges the prosecutor “committed misconduct by 

impermissibly vouching for her paid informant during closing argument.” (Doc. 12 at 6.) 

Petitioner presented this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals on direct review. 

(Doc. 14, Ex. F at 12-15.) In its decision rejecting this claim, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals first discussed Petitioner’s counsel’s closing argument. (Doc. 14, Ex. O at 3.) 

The court noted that Petitioner’s counsel argued that Ruiz lied to the police, called Ruiz a 

liar, mentioned inconsistencies in his testimony, and told the jury “to disregard 

everything that he said, because that’s justice.” (Id.) The appellate court also noted 

Petitioner’s counsel’s argument in which he stated that “the ridiculous things that [Ruiz] 

says trump everything else that he says, where you cannot derive or find a fact from 

him,” and stated that the jury could not accept Ruiz’s credibility because he was 

“working for straight cash,” “facing potential charges,” and biased. (Doc. 14, Ex. O at 3-

4.) 

 The appellate court next set out the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument. (Doc. 14, 

Ex. O at 4.) The prosecutor argued that Ruiz swore to tell the truth, “[h]e was honest 

with you when he told you that he lied to the police when he was stopped with $30,000 in 

his car. He was honest with you in telling you that []he lied to the police when he had 80 

pounds of marijuana in his car. He was honest with you when he told you that at that 

point in his life he was working for a drug trafficking organization, and he was honest 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 7 of 18
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

with you when he relayed the events that happened between January 26th, 2011 and 

February 16th, 2011.” (Doc. 14, Ex. O at 4.) 

 The appellate court noted that there are two forms of impermissible prosecutorial 

vouching: “(1) when the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its 

witness; and (2) where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury 

supports the witness’s testimony.” (Id.) The court also noted that “a lawyer is prohibited 

from asserting personal knowledge of acts in issue before the tribunal unless he testifies 

as a witness.” (Id.) The court rejected Petitioner’s assertion that the prosecutor’s rebuttal 

closing argument placed the prestige of the government behind Ruiz or constituted an 

expression of the prosecutor’s opinion that Ruiz was truthful. (Id.) 

 The court concluded that the “prosecutor’s argument was fair rebuttal to 

[Petitioner’s] counsel’s attack on Ruiz’s credibility.” (Id.) The court stated that 

The prosecutor’s argument addressed evidence introduced at trial that 

counsel referenced directly and indirectly in his attack on Ruiz: how Ruiz admitted he lied to police when stopped with $30,000 in his car, how Ruiz 

admitted he lied to police when he was later stopped with a large quantity of marijuana in his car, and how Ruiz admitted he had worked for a drug organization. It was fair rebuttal for the prosecutor to argue that Ruiz’s honesty regarding this unfavorable evidence showed he was also honest 

when he testified about the events that led to the charges against [Petitioner]. Further, the prosecutor did so in a manner that did not place the prestige of the government behind Ruiz, did not suggest that information not before the jury supported Ruiz’s testimony, and did not express the prosecutor’s personal opinion. 

(Doc. 14, Ex. O at 5.) 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision is not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, federal law, and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. In Parker v. Matthews, ___U.S.___, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2153 (2012), the Supreme 

Court held that Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), is the “clearly established 

Federal law” applicable to a prosecutor’s alleged improper comments for purposes of 

review under the AEDPA. The appropriate standard for a claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct is “the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory 

power.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. Furthermore, to succeed on a claim of prosecutorial 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 8 of 18
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

misconduct, a petitioner must prove that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper and that 

they so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of 

due process. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974); see also Smith v. 

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (“the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of 

alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 

prosecutor.”). A petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief in the absence of a due 

process violation even if the prosecutor’s comments were “undesirable or even 

universally condemned.” Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642. 

 When evaluating a petitioner’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, the court 

“must consider the probable effect of the prosecutor’s [comments] on the jury’s ability to 

judge the evidence fairly.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). To make such 

an assessment, the court must consider the prosecutor’s remarks in context. See Boyde v.

California, 494 U.S. 370, 385 (1990); Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 745 (9th Cir. 

1998). The Supreme Court has assessed the fairness of a petitioner’s trial by considering, 

among other circumstances, whether the prosecutor’s comments manipulated or misstated 

the evidence, whether the trial court gave a curative instruction, and “the weight of the 

evidence against the petitioner.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-82. 

 Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals recognized the controlling legal principles and 

did not unreasonably apply Darden when concluding that the prosecutor’s rebuttal 

closing argument did not constitute impermissible vouching and did not deny Petitioner a 

fair trial. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals reasoned that the prosecutor’s 

argument “was a fair rebuttal to [Petitioner’s] counsel’s attack on Ruiz’s credibility” and 

“addressed evidence introduced at trial.” (Doc. 14, Ex. O at 5.) The prosecution has 

“reasonable latitude to fashion closing arguments,” and “[i]nherent in this latitude is the 

freedom to argue reasonable inferences based on the evidence.” United States v. Molina, 

934 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991). Further, the court of appeals appropriately 

considered the prosecutor’s argument in the context of Petitioner’s counsel’s closing 

argument. See Young, 470 U.S. at 12 (“In order to make an appropriate assessment, the 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 9 of 18
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

reviewing court must not only weigh the impact of the prosecutor’s remarks, but must 

also take into account defense counsel’s opening salvo.”). 

 During closing argument, Petitioner’s counsel attacked Ruiz’s credibility based on 

Ruiz’s trial testimony in which he admitted that he lied to police when he was stopped 

with $30,000 in his car, admitted he lied to police when he was later stopped with a large 

quantity of marijuana in his car, and admitted he had worked for a drug organization. 

(Doc. 14, Ex. O at 5.) Based on Petitioner’s counsel’s argument, it was not improper for 

the prosecutor to argue that Ruiz’s honesty regarding these unfavorable incidents 

indicated that he was also honest when he testified about the events that formed the basis 

of the charges against Petitioner. Additionally, Petitioner has not presented evidence 

indicating that the prosecutor suggested that information or evidence that was not before 

the jury supported Ruiz’s testimony. Thus, the appellate court reasonably concluded that 

the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument was not improper. 

 Even assuming the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument amounted to 

prosecutorial misconduct, Petitioner has not shown that the prosecutor’s misconduct “so 

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 

process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. The prosecutor’s reference to Ruiz’s honesty during 

rebuttal closing argument was not so persistent as to have “infected the trial with 

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” See Darden, 477 

U.S. at 181. Rather, it was an isolated incident during Petitioner’s six-day trial. See 

Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 743 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Assuming it was improper the 

comment did not deprive Duckett of a fair trial. It was an ‘isolated moment’ in a lengthy 

trial, in which the jury was clearly instructed that statements made by attorneys during 

closing argument were not evidence to be considered in deciding the facts.”); Hall v. 

Whitley, 935 F.2d 164, 165-66 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Put in proper context, the comments 

were isolated moments in a three day trial.”). 

 For these reasons, Petitioner has not shown that the appellate court’s resolution of 

Ground One was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that is was 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 10 of 18
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

contrary to, or based on an unreasonable application of, federal law and he is not entitled 

to habeas corpus relief on this claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

 B. Ground Two is not Cognizable on Federal Habeas Corpus Review 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that the “trial court erred when it ruled that the 

state was not required to prove [he] knew [the victim] was a police officer when he 

pointed a gun at him.” (Doc 12 at 7.) Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal. 

(Doc. 14, Ex. F at 6.) The appellate court rejected this claim, holding that under Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. §§ 13-1204, “the defendant’s knowledge that the victim was a peace officer is 

not an element of the offense.” (Doc. 14, Ex. N.) Respondents argue that this claim is 

not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. (Doc. 14 at 16-17.) As discussed 

below, the Court agrees and finds that it is not authorized to review the appellate court’s 

interpretation of state law in this habeas corpus proceeding.4

 Only claims alleging a violation of the federal Constitution, laws, or treaties are 

cognizable on federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Federal habeas corpus relief is unavailable for violations of state 

law or for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Estelle, 502 U.S. 

at 67-68. Petitioner’s claim that the state court erred when it determined that the State 

was not required to show that Petitioner knew the victim was a police officer to obtain a 

conviction under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-204 is based on an interpretation of state law and, 

therefore, it does not state a cognizable claim for federal habeas corpus relief. Ground 

Two should be dismissed because it is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. 

 C. Grounds Three and Four 

 Respondents argue that because Petitioner did not present Grounds Three and Four 

to the Arizona Court of Appeals, those claims are procedurally barred from federal 

habeas corpus review. (Doc. 14 at 19-24.) As discussed below, the Court agrees. 

 

4

 Moreover, even if Ground Two presented a cognizable claim, the state court 

concluded that a defendant’s knowledge that a victim is a peace officer is not an element of the offense of aggravated assault under § 13-204, and this Court is bound by the state court’s interpretation of state law. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 11 of 18
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 1. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner.5

 Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 

31-32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes 

of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper 

forum . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and 

legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

 

5

 In Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction proceedings. Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931-33 (D. Ariz. 2007). 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 12 of 18
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

 A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not 

depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s 

application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” 

See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally 

excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar 

inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). “The independent 

and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own 

mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 13 of 18
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of comity, the federal court 

will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 

§ 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

 2. Grounds Three and Four are Procedurally Barred 

 In Ground Three, Petitioner claims his “due process” and “equal protection” rights 

were violated. (Doc. 12 at 8.) In Ground Four, Petitioner appears to raise an insufficientevidence claim pertaining to his conviction for possession of marijuana for sale. (Id. at 9 

(stating that “I was charged for the possession and convicted for something I never seen 

or touched.”).) As Petitioner acknowledges, he did not present these claims to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals either on direct or collateral review. (Doc. 12 at 8-9.) 

Therefore, Grounds Three and Four are technically exhausted and procedurally barred 

from federal habeas corpus review because it would be futile for Petitioner to return to 

the state courts to try to exhaust these claims. 

 Specifically, Petitioner is time-barred from a filing a petition for post-conviction 

relief under Rule 32. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a); McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 

913 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding claims procedurally defaulted because petitioner was 

barred from exhausting his claims in the first instance by Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a)). 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 14 of 18
- 15 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Additionally, these claims would be precluded under Rule 32.2(a) because they could 

have been raised on direct appeal. See Rule 32.2(a) (providing that a defendant is 

precluded from relief on ground “[t]hat has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any 

previous collateral proceeding”). 

 Additionally, Petitioner’s claims in Grounds Three and Four do not implicate any 

exceptions to the timeliness rules referred to in Rule 32.4(a) and Rule 32.2(b), including 

being held in custody after the imposed sentence expired, the presentation of newly 

discovered material facts that probably would have changed the verdict or sentence, the 

failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief or a notice of appeal that was not 

the defendant’s fault, a change in the law, or the petitioner’s actual innocence. See Rule 

32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) and (h). Accordingly, federal habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s 

claims asserted in Grounds Three and Four is procedurally barred. 

 3. Petitioner has not Established a Basis to Overcome the 

 Procedural Bar 

 Because Petitioner’s claims asserted in Grounds Three and Four are procedurally 

defaulted, federal habeas corpus review is unavailable unless Petitioner establishes a 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” or “cause and prejudice” to overcome the 

procedural bar. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749. For the reasons below, the Court finds 

that Petitioner has not established a basis to overcome the procedural bar. 

 a. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of that claim will result in a 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when “‘a constitutional violation has 

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Id. (citing Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). 

 To establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must present “new 

reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 15 of 18
- 16 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that “it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 327. Petitioner does not argue that failure to consider his claims will result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. (Doc. 12.) Additionally, Petitioner has not presented 

new evidence and has not shown that failure to consider his procedurally defaulted claims 

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Thus, he has not met Schlup’s high 

standard and this exception does not excuse the procedural bar. 

 b. Cause and Prejudice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if a 

petitioner establishes “cause” and “prejudice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To establish 

“cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense 

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Teague, 489 U.S. at 298. 

A showing of “interference by officials,” constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel, or “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available” may 

constitute cause. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 

 “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

habeas petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional 

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial 

with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 

(1982) (emphasis in original); see Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). 

If petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, then the court need not 

consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

 Petitioner does not allege cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural bar. 

(Doc. 12.) Additionally, Petitioner’s status as an inmate, lack of legal knowledge, and 

limited legal resources do not establish cause to excuse the procedural bar to review of 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 16 of 18
- 17 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

his claims. See Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (an 

illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a 

procedural default); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (petitioner’s 

reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause); see also Rasberry v. Garcia, 

448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) ( “a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is 

not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling”). 

III. Conclusion 

 As set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on Ground 

One, Ground Two is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review, and federal habeas 

corpus review of Grounds Three and Four is procedurally barred and Petitioner has not 

established a basis to overcome that bar. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the 

Amended Petition be denied. In addition, to the extent Petitioner seeks to dismiss the 

Amended Petition, the Court recommends that the request be denied. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 12) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent Petitioner seeks to 

dismiss the Amended Petition (Doc. 21), the request be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. The parties have fourteen days within which to file 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 17 of 18
- 18 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s acceptance of the Report 

and Recommendation without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 31st day of March, 2016. 

Case 2:15-cv-01328-DJH Document 22 Filed 03/31/16 Page 18 of 18