Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02584/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02584-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Defendants also moved separately for summary judgment on the

grounds that Plaintiff's claim against Don Hunter was barred by the

statute of limitations. Defendants later withdrew this motion. 

The Court previously dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's claims

against Defendants Board of Supervisors of the County of Marin and

Office of the Assessor/Records. See November 5, 2004 Order Granting

in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss at 2. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY GAYLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF MARIN; BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

OF THE COUNTY OF MARIN; OFFICE OF THE

ASSESSOR/RECORDER; JOAN C. THAYER,

ASSESSOR/RECORDER; DON HUNTER;

GILBERT GUADINA; KAREN SMALL and DOES

1 TO 10, 

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-2584 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Defendants County of Marin, Joan C. Thayer, Don Hunter,

Gilbert Guadina and Karen Small (collectively, Defendants) move

for summary judgment on grounds of res judicata and claim

preclusion.1 Plaintiff Jerry Gayle opposes the motion. The matter

was heard on November 18, 2005. 

Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties,

including supplemental briefing by both parties, the Court GRANTS

Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
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BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff's November 22,

2004, First Amended Complaint (FAC) or are undisputed, unless

otherwise noted. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants deprived him

of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection

guarantee, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is a

former employee of the Marin County Office of the Assessor

Recorder. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered "illegal employment

practices, discrimination [on the basis of race] and harassment in

a hostile environment for employment . . . including retaliatory

and wrongful discipline." FAC ¶ 15. Plaintiff claims that this

"discrimination has led to his termination," noting in the FAC

that the termination was "subject to an appeal before the

Personnel Commission which has traditionally upheld terminations." 

Id. ¶ 49. 

Prior to his termination, on December 22, 2000, Plaintiff

filed a grievance alleging that he was subjected to a hostile work

environment and asked that a negative evaluation be expunged from

his record. The grievance was heard by the Marin County Personnel

Commission (hereinafter the Commission) on July 24 and 27, 2001. 

Plaintiff was represented by attorney Carl Shapiro, who represents

him in this lawsuit as well, and allowed to submit evidence and

testify. On August 13, 2001, the Commission denied Plaintiff's

request for expungement. 

Plaintiff's employment was terminated after an incident

involving a co-worker that occurred on February 25, 2003. 

Plaintiff filed an appeal of his termination, and the Commission
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The Court also grants Plaintiff's request for judicial notice

of two excerpts from the transcripts. 

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conducted a preliminary conference on September 1, held an

evidentiary hearing on October 1 and 5, and then convened and

issued an oral decision on November 24, 2004. Defendants have

submitted the official reporter's transcript for all four days of

the proceedings.2 Pattison Decl., Ex. 7, Transcripts. At the

hearing, Plaintiff was represented by an attorney, Bruce Harland,

who was allowed to subpoena witnesses, examine and cross-examine

witnesses under oath, and produce documentary evidence. Pattison

Decl. ¶ 11. Both Plaintiff and Defendant County of Marin

submitted preliminary submissions as well as post-hearing briefs. 

At the preliminary conference, counsel for County of Marin

sought to introduce a witness to rebut Plaintiff's claim of

discrimination, explaining "throughout at least the last several

years of Mr. Gayle's employment, and throughout the proceedings

involving his discipline, he's made allegations of racial

discrimination." Prelim. Hr'g Tr. 15:6-8. In response to the

Commission's inquiry as to whether there were "any pending

discrimination allegations," Marin County counsel replied that he

believed that Plaintiff would assert racial discrimination as a

defense. Id. 16:3-17. The chairman of the Commission continued,

I just want to make sure we don't waste your time and ours by

hearing a case and find out there is something pending

somewhere in the mill which would preclude us from hearing

the case.

Id. 16:10-13. Mr. Harland confirmed, "There is no grievance

pending." Id. at 16:14. 
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After the evidentiary hearing, briefing and public

deliberation, the Commission denied Plaintiff's appeal and upheld

his termination. It specifically found that Plaintiff violated

Marin County Personnel Rules and Regulations "when he

intentionally bumped [co-worker] Michael Infante twice without

provocation and that such bumps served to intimidate Michael

Infante." Pattison Decl., Ex. 11, Commission's Findings and

Decision ¶ 7. It further specifically found "that the County did

not abuse its discretion in determining that termination is the

appropriate penalty." Id. ¶ 8. The Commission's findings note a

"seriously troubled relationship" between management and

Plaintiff, past disciplinary actions and poor performance

evaluations, Plaintiff's refusal to admit culpability, and the

failure of attempts at rehabilitation. Id. The Commission's

findings do not address Plaintiff's allegations of discrimination.

On February 4, 2005, Plaintiff, through his union, appealed

the Personnel Commission's order. Sauer Decl., Ex. 1, February 4,

2005 Letter from Kris Organ to Diane Sauer. The Marin County

Board of Supervisors heard the appeal at its March 22, 2005 board

meeting, where a union representative, Sean Webb, spoke on

Plaintiff's behalf. Sauer Decl. ¶ 4. An outside attorney

represented the Board of Supervisors at the hearing. Id. The

Board of Supervisors denied Plaintiff's appeal and affirmed the

Personnel Commission's findings and decision. Sauer Decl., Ex. 3,

March 24, 2005 Order of the Marin County Board of Supervisors

Affirming the Decision of the Marin County Personnel Commission. 

In its order, the Board of Supervisors advised Plaintiff
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that, should he choose to seek judicial review, "the provisions of

the California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1094.6 govern the

time within which such judicial review must be sought." Id.

Section 1094.6 requires that a petition for a writ of mandate

seeking judicial review of a decision of a local agency be filed

no later than ninety days after the decision become final. 

Plaintiff did not file a petition for writ of mandate challenging

the decision. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as

true the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or

other evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg,

815 F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences

in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952

F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the
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outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which

facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986).

Where the moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue

at trial, it must, in order to discharge its burden of showing

that no genuine issue of material fact remains, make a prima facie

showing in support of its position on that issue. See UA Local

343 v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). 

That is, the moving party must present evidence that, if

uncontroverted at trial, would entitle it to prevail on that

issue. See id.; see also Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc.,

939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). Once it has done so, the

non-moving party must set forth specific facts controverting the

moving party's prima facie case. See UA Local 343, 48 F.3d at

1471. The non-moving party's "burden of contradicting [the moving

party's] evidence is not negligible." Id. This standard does not

change merely because resolution of the relevant issue is "highly

fact specific." See id.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that the Board of Supervisor's adverse

decision bars Plaintiff's § 1983 suit, under the doctrines of res

judicata and collateral estoppel, because he failed to seek review

of it. Conceding that no petition for writ of mandate was filed,

Plaintiff notes that exhaustion of State remedies is not required

in order to bring an action under § 1983. This point, however, is

inapposite. The doctrine of res judicata is separate from the

issue of exhaustion of remedies, and Defendants' motion rests only
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on the former. See Embury v. King, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1083

(N.D. Cal. 2001) (explaining that doctrine of claim preclusion,

but not that of judicial exhaustion, applies to § 1983 actions). 

 Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits the re-litigation

of any claims that were raised or could have been raised in a

prior action. Western Radio Servs. Co., Inc. v. Glickman, 123

F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Federated Dep't Stores,

Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981)). The purpose of the

doctrine is to "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of

multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing

inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication." 

Marin v. HEW, Health Care Financing Agency, 769 F.2d 590, 594 (9th

Cir. 1985) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)). 

Res judicata operates only where there is "1) an identity of

claims, 2) a final judgment on the merits, and 3) identity or

privity between parties." Western Radio, 123 F.3d at 1192 (citing

Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,

323-324 (1971)). 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738 requires that federal courts give

State court judgments the same preclusive effect as federal

judgments. As a matter of federal common law, the fact-finding of

a State agency, acting in a judicial capacity in a proceeding

where "the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,"

is also given preclusive effect. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478

U.S. 788, 799 (1986) (quoting United States v. Utah Construction &
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As Plaintiff notes in his "rejoinder," the common law

presumption of administrative estoppel of Elliott and Utah

Construction does not apply in the presence of a statute to the

contrary. In Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 501 U.S. 104, 110

(1991), the Supreme Court held that the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act (ADEA), like Title VII, "carries an implication that

the federal courts should recognize no preclusion by state

administrative findings with respect to age-discrimination claims."

In so holding, it contrasted the ADEA and Title VII with suits brought

under "42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which the Court discerned '[n]othing . . .

remotely express[ing] any congressional intent to contravene the

common-law rules of preclusion.'" Id. (quoting Elliott, 478 U.S. at

797). Elliott, rather than Astoria, clearly controls Plaintiff's

§ 1983 claims here. 

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Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966)).3 

The Ninth Circuit has extended Elliot to give preclusive

effect to "state administrative adjudications of legal as well as

factual issues, as long as the state proceeding satisfies the

requirements of fairness outlined in [Utah Construction]." Miller

v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 1994)

(quoting Guild Wineries and Distilleries v. Whitehall Co., 853

F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1988)). Those fairness requirements are

"(1) that the administrative agency act in a judicial capacity,

(2) that the agency resolve disputed issues of fact properly

before it, and (3) that the parties have an adequate opportunity

to litigate." Id. (citing Utah Construction, 384 U.S. at 422); 

see also Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d 1279,

1283-84 (9th Cir. 1986) (no preclusive effect afforded to informal

unemployment benefits hearing because the plaintiff did not have

an adequate opportunity to litigate factual issues related to

discrimination). 

The Ninth Circuit found that California has adopted the Utah

Construction standard, and therefore that federal courts need only
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look at "whether the administrative hearing met the requirements

of California law such that a California court would have accorded

the determination preclusive effect." Id. at 1033 (citing Eilrich

v. Remas, 839 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1988)). In Miller, the

court held that California law would have accorded preclusive

effect to a county civil service commission's decision sustaining

dismissal of a public employee after “a public evidentiary hearing

at which Miller was represented by counsel and was permitted to

present oral and documentary evidence and to call witnesses.” 39

F.3d at 1032. Because Miller had not sought judicial review as

provided in California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5, the Ninth

Circuit found that the unreviewed administrative determination of

the civil service commission precluded his federal § 1983 claim.

39 F.3d at 1034 (relying on Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego, 3

Cal. App. 4th 896 (1992)). 

Defendants have provided evidence that Plaintiff, like

Miller, was given a public evidentiary hearing, where he was

represented by counsel, and permitted to present oral and

documentary evidence and to call witnesses. Plaintiff fails to

raise any dispute of material fact regarding the sufficiency of

the administrative proceedings. 

Plaintiff dismisses as "far-fetched" the prospect that the

findings of the lay members of the Commission could be accorded

preclusive effect in this Court. However, the Ninth Circuit in

Miller considered this question and came to the opposite

conclusion, finding that there was no sound basis for a

distinction between lay and attorney decision-makers, and that
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such a rule would cause confusion. 39 F.3d at 1037. Had

Plaintiff taken advantage of the State court review available

under § 1094.5, it would be that court's ruling that would be

preclusive in this Court. 

Plaintiff also maintains that because he did not raise

discrimination as a defense before the Commission, and the

Commission did not make any findings regarding discrimination, its

decision has no relevant preclusive effect on the current action. 

As Defendants correctly note, however, the standard is not whether

issues involving discrimination were litigated in the

administrative proceeding, but whether there was an “adequate

opportunity to litigate” in the administrative proceeding. 

Miller, 39 F.3d at 1033 (citing Utah Construction factors). The

transcript makes clear that Plaintiff’s attorney could have raised

discrimination as a defense had he chosen to do so. As the Ninth

Circuit noted in Miller at 1034, quoting Swartzendruber, 3 Cal.

App. 4th at 909,

There can be no justification for plaintiff's position that

she should be permitted to fail to assert at the

administrative hearing constitutional and civil rights

violations as reasons that made her termination wrongful,

fail to prevail on the writ without attempting to urge or to

bring before the court those reasons, and then be allowed to

recover damages in this consolidated action that resulted

from termination of her employment alleged to be wrongful

based on those same reasons. 

Therefore, the Commission's decision does have a preclusive effect

on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim in this Court. 

Defendants have made a successful prima facie showing in

support of their position that the Commission's findings and

decision are entitled to preclusive effect. Plaintiff has set
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forth no specific facts controverting this. Therefore, the Court

finds that the findings and decision are entitled to preclusive

effect in Plaintiff's § 1983 action. 

The Commission found that Plaintiff violated Marin County

rules and regulations by bumping another colleague intentionally

and in an intimidating manner. The Commission also found, in

light of the history between Plaintiff and management, that the

County of Marin did not abuse its discretion in determining that

termination was the appropriate penalty. Plaintiff's complaint

clearly arises from the termination that was litigated in the

administrative proceeding, as well as from the prior hostile work

environment grievance which was also litigated in the same

administrative forum. Therefore, the Court concludes that

Plaintiff is precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and

collateral estoppel from bringing a § 1983 claim for

discrimination based on his employment with Marin County, and its

termination. Plaintiff's claims against the individual Defendants

are summarily adjudicated for the same reason. See Miller, 39

F.3d at 1038 (applying preclusion to § 1983 claims against

individual named defendants acting within the course and scope of

their employment). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants'

motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 81). Plaintiff's requests
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for judicial notice are GRANTED (Docket Nos. 86 and 87). Judgment

shall enter accordingly; each party shall bear its own costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/6/05

______________________________

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge