Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01672/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01672-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12181 Americans with Disabilities Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jonathan Paolino, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

US Airways, Inc., 

Defendant. 

No. CV-14-01672-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 64) and the 

parties’ competing statements of facts and briefs. Also before the Court are the parties’ 

cross-motions to exclude expert testimony (Docs. 62, 63) and accompanying briefs. For 

the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted, 

rendering moot the motions to exclude expert testimony. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

US Airways, Inc. (“US Airways”) hired Jonathan Paolino in April 2013. Months 

later, a manager thought he saw Paolino asleep in the breakroom and fired him. Paolino 

now claims he was fired because of his disability: an anxiety disorder that sometimes 

manifests in a “dissociative state” resembling sleep. US Airways moves for summary 

judgment on the grounds that (1) the manager did not know of Paolino’s disability and 

(2) even if he did, it was not the reason he fired Paolino. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A motion for summary judgment tests whether the opposing party has sufficient 

evidence to merit a trial. Summary judgment should be granted if the evidence reveals no 

genuine dispute about any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of 

the suit under the governing law, and a factual dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

The movant has the burden of showing the absence of genuine disputes of material 

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). However, once the movant shows 

an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case, the burden shifts to the party 

resisting the motion. The party opposing summary judgment must then “set forth specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” and may not rest upon the pleadings. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. To carry this burden, the nonmoving party must do more than 

simply show there is “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, must not weigh the evidence or assess its 

credibility, and must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Reeves 

v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

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III. MATERIAL FACTS 

The following facts are drawn from the undisputed portions of US Airways’ 

statement of facts (Doc. 65), Paolino’s controverting statement of facts (Doc. 70), and 

parts of the record. 

A. Paolino’s Disability 

In 2012, Paolino was diagnosed with a general anxiety disorder. (Doc. 70 at ¶ 52.) 

This disorder can cause unexpected panic attacks. (Id. at ¶¶ 53-54.) Sometimes these 

attacks feel like a heart attack. (Doc. 65-1 at 16.) Other times they result in a temporary 

change in or loss of consciousness, known as a “dissociative state.” (Doc. 70 at ¶ 49.) 

Since diagnosis, Paolino has been receiving psychiatric treatment. (Id. at ¶¶ 52, 55.) 

B. Paolino’s Employment

US Airways hired Paolino in April 2013. (Doc. 65 at ¶ 1.) At a pre-employment 

drug screening, Paolino disclosed that he was taking medication for his anxiety disorder. 

(Doc. 70 at ¶ 57.) He also told his immediate supervisor, Michelle Paxton, about his 

medication. (Id. at ¶¶ 58, 63.) 

US Airways management hierarchy was organized as follows. Paxton reported to 

various shift managers, including Jesse Stewart. (Id. at ¶ 58.) These shift managers 

reported to senior manager Tim James. (Id.) James reported to director John Daley. 

(Doc. 65 at ¶¶ 5, 7.) Paolino received assignments from Paxton, shift managers, and 

James, and therefore considered them all his direct supervisors. (Doc. 70 at ¶¶ 59-60.) 

In May 2013, Paolino had a panic attack. (Doc. 65 at ¶ 39.) He felt like he was 

having a heart attack, so Paxton called paramedics. (Id. at ¶ 40; Doc. 70 at ¶ 66.) After 

the attack, Paolino was told to take the rest of the day off. (Doc. 70 at ¶ 67.) 

The next several months were less eventful. Paolino experienced anxiety relating 

to upcoming dental surgery and requested leave. (Id. at ¶¶ 72-73.) Paxton teased him 

about this anxiety and asked him to return to work early. (Id. at ¶¶ 74-75.) Paolino 

voiced his concerns to a Human Resources manager. (Id. at ¶¶ 71, 76.) Paolino did not 

suffer a panic attack comparable to the May 2013 incident during this time. (Id. at ¶ 70.) 

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The incident preceding termination occurred on December 16, 2013. (Doc. 65 at 

¶ 9.) While James was conducting a meeting, Daley’s assistant interrupted and 

summoned James and Stewart to the employee breakroom. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.) In the 

breakroom, James saw Paolino reclining in a chair near a wall. (See id. at ¶ 11.) His eyes 

were closed, and his head was back. (Id.) James called Paolino’s name, but he did not 

respond. (Doc. 65-3 at 9.) James then tapped Paolino’s arm, at which point he became 

alert or startled. (Id. at 11-12.) It took a moment for Paolino to come to his senses and 

understand who was standing in the room, and he seemed in shock. (Doc. 70 at ¶ 79.) 

James then sent Paolino home for the day. (Id. at ¶ 80.) 

Later that day, Paolino emailed James, Paxton, Stewart, and another shift manager 

about the incident. (Doc. 65 at ¶ 15; Doc. 70 at ¶ 15.) The email stated in full: 

I wanted to apologize for the incident that happened in the temporary break 

room in conference room E. I understand that falling asleep no matter for 

how short or long a time anywhere at work is not only against company 

policy but also inexcusable and reflects bad not only on myself but the 

department as a whole and wanted to simply say this has never happened to 

me before in my 7+ months with the company. My recollection of the event 

was that I completed the audit of the December 1st folder returned it to the 

file cabinet, proceeded back to my desk, locked my computer at 10:08 and 

proceeded to the break room to check my personal email. The last thing I 

recall after sitting down was opening an email regarding an amazon.com 

order and logging in it check the shipping status. I realize my actions most 

likely will result in my termination as there is no excuse for falling asleep at 

your place of employment. If this is the case I will return my company 

property promptly and without issue. If you decide to not terminate me for 

this incident I can promise I will do everything in my power to ensure that 

this never occurs again. Again I want to profusely apologize and express 

how sorry I am for the event and the embarrassment it brought upon myself 

and the department. 

(Doc. 65 at ¶ 15.) 

The next day at work, Stewart told Paolino he did not think Paolino had been 

sleeping in the breakroom the previous day. (Doc. 70 at ¶ 84.) Paolino agreed and said 

he had suffered a panic attack. (Id.) Stewart said Paolino would probably be suspended 

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but not fired. (Id.)

1

 Near the end of the day, Paolino met with James, Stewart, and 

Paxton in James’s office. (Id. at ¶ 86.) There, James directed Stewart to hand Paolino a 

letter signed by a shift manager. (Doc. 65-1 at 31.) The letter terminated Paolino for 

sleeping on the job in violation of company policy. (See Doc. 70 at ¶ 86.) 

C. The Termination Decision 

1. Who made the decision 

James testified that he alone made the decision to terminate Paolino and did not 

discuss the decision with anyone else—including Stewart and Paxton—before making it. 

(Doc. 65-2 at 2; Doc. 65-3 at 14.) Stewart testified he was not involved in the decision. 

(Doc. 65-4 at 4.) Paxton testified she was not involved in the decision. (Doc. 65-6 at 4.) 

James further testified that he directed a shift manager to draft the termination letter. 

(Doc. 65-3 at 15.) 

In his controverting statement of facts, Paolino “disputes” that James was the sole 

decision maker. (Compare Doc. 65 at ¶ 29 with Doc. 70 at ¶ 29.) But he identifies no 

specific portion of the record rebutting James’s testimony, as required by Local Rule 

LRCiv 56.1(b). Instead he argues that (1) the statement that James was the decision 

maker is an improper legal conclusion, and (2) James’s decision was based on inaccurate 

or insufficient information. (See Doc. 70 at ¶ 29.) These arguments fail. The identity of 

the decision maker is an issue of fact, not law, and is not affected by whether the decision 

was based on adequate information. Therefore it is undisputed, for purposes of summary 

judgment, that James made the sole decision to terminate Paolino. 

 1

 There is conflicting testimony as to whether Stewart actually made these 

remarks. (Compare Doc. 70-3 at 42 with Doc. 65-4 at 11.) But the Court views the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Paolino. 

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2. What was known to the decision maker 

James testified that when he saw Paolino in the breakroom, he thought Paolino 

was asleep. (Doc. 65-2 at 2.) James considered sleeping at work to be an immediately 

terminable offense. (Doc. 70 at ¶ 92.) 

James also testified that he reviewed Paolino’s overall work history before firing 

him. (Doc. 65-3 at 17-18.) James found Paolino’s work product to contain errors. (Doc. 

65-2 at 2.) James had previously counseled Paolino about professionalism after Paolino 

criticized the manner in which James conducted a training presentation. (Id.) Further, 

James knew that Stewart had counseled Paolino about professionalism after Paolino 

referred to an African-American co-worker as “Mrs. Butterworth.” (Id.) 

In his controverting statement of facts, Paolino “disputes” that James reviewed 

Paolino’s overall work history. (Compare Doc. 65 at ¶¶ 22-27 with Doc. 70 at ¶¶ 22-27.) 

But again, he identifies no specific portion of the record rebutting James’s testimony, as 

required by LRCiv 56.1(b). Indeed, for the most part he cites no portion of the record at 

all. (See Doc. 70 at ¶¶ 22-27.) Instead he objects that evidence of his work history is 

irrelevant because James considered sleeping at work to be an immediately terminable 

offense. (See id.) This objection fails. Paolino’s work history is relevant because James 

said he reviewed it before deciding to fire him. Nothing indicates otherwise. Therefore it 

is undisputed, for purposes of summary judgment, that James reviewed Paolino’s work 

history before terminating him. 

3. What was not known to the decision maker 

James testified that he did not know Paolino suffered from an anxiety disorder or 

panic attacks, even though he knew Paolino took some sort of medication and he knew 

the paramedics had been called in May 2013. (Doc. 65-2 at 3; Doc. 65-3 at 16.) Paolino 

does not remember ever telling James about his anxiety disorder. (Doc. 65-1 at 21.) 

Paolino assumed Paxton told James about his disorder, but Paxton testified she never did. 

(Id. at 29; Doc. 65-7 at 2.) 

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James further testified that he did not know Paolino experienced “dissociative” 

episodes. (Doc. 65-2 at 3.) Paolino does not remember telling James, or anyone at US 

Airways, about his dissociative episodes. (Doc. 65-1 at 28.) Prior to termination, 

Paolino did not tell James that the December 16 incident in the breakroom was a medical 

episode. (Id. at 31.) 

In his controverting statement of facts, Paolino “disputes” James’s ignorance 

about his anxiety disorder and dissociative episodes. (Compare Doc. 65 at ¶¶ 47, 51 with

Doc. 70 at ¶¶ 47, 51.) Specifically, Paolino argues that statements about James’s 

ignorance (1) are irrelevant, (2) lack evidentiary foundation, (3) are improper legal 

conclusions, (4) ignore James’s affirmative duty to investigate discrimination or 

disabilities, and (5) ignore the fact that Paolino told other managers about his disorder. 

(See Doc. 70 at ¶¶ 47, 51.) 

The first four arguments are easily dismissed. Whether James knew of Paolino’s 

disability is (1) relevant to Paolino’s claim of disability discrimination, (2) founded on 

James’s testimony, (3) an issue of fact, not law, and (4) not affected by whether James 

should have investigated the matter. 

The fifth argument deserves more consideration and will be addressed in the 

“Analysis” section below. 

4. Whether similar decisions had been made 

James testified that he knows of only one other employee in Paolino’s department 

who slept at work: Bridget Alarcon, who fell asleep during a training class in August 

2012. (Doc. 65-2 at 2.) James fired her as a result. (Id.) He had no reason to believe she 

had a disability. (Id.) 

In his controverting statement of facts, Paolino “disputes” this incident. (Compare

Doc. 65 at ¶¶ 34-37 with Doc. 70 at ¶¶ 34-37.) But he identifies no specific portion of the 

record rebutting James’s testimony, as required by LRCiv 56.1(b). (Doc. 70 at ¶¶ 34-37.) 

Indeed, he cites no portion of the record at all. (Id.) Instead he objects that statements 

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about Alarcon’s termination (1) are irrelevant, (2) lack evidentiary foundation, and (3) 

fail to specify whether James reviewed Alarcon’s overall work history. 

These objections fail. Alarcon’s termination is relevant to whether Paolino was 

terminated for sleeping on the job. The circumstances surrounding Alarcon’s termination 

are founded on James’s testimony. And the admissibility of this evidence does not turn 

on whether James reviewed Alarcon’s work history. Therefore it is undisputed, for 

purposes of summary judgment, that James fired the only other employee in Paolino’s 

department who he thought slept at work. 

IV. ANALYSIS 

Paolino claims he was fired “on the basis of disability,” in violation of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). On summary 

judgment, Paolino’s claim proceeds under the familiar McDonnell Douglas three-step 

burden-shifting framework: (1) Paolino must first establish a prima facie case of 

discrimination; (2) if he does, US Airways must then articulate a legitimate 

nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct; and (3) if it does, Paolino must then 

demonstrate that the articulated reason is a pretext for discrimination. Snead v. Metro. 

Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2001). 

1. Prima facie case 

To state a prima facie case of ADA discrimination, Paolino must show that (1) he 

is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA, (2) he was able to perform the 

essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) he 

suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability. Allen v. Pac. Bell, 348 

F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003). The requisite degree of proof is “minimal,” and Paolino 

“need only offer evidence which gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” 

Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994) (in context of age 

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discrimination and Title VII retaliation claims); see also Kinney v. Emmis Operation Co., 

291 F. App’x 789, 790 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying this standard to ADA claim). 

US Airways contends Paolino has not satisfied the third element of the prima facie 

case because there is no evidence he was fired “because of” his anxiety disorder. 

However, given the low threshold required at this first step of the McDonnell Douglas

framework, the Court assumes without deciding that Paolino has established a prima 

facie case. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1282 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(taking this approach with respect to age discrimination claim). 

2. Legitimate nondiscriminatory reason 

The burden now shifts to US Airways to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory 

reason for firing Paolino. US Airways has articulated such a reason: James fired Paolino 

for sleeping on the job. 

3. Pretext 

The burden now shifts back to Paolino to demonstrate that this articulated reason 

was merely a pretext for discrimination. The evidentiary threshold is higher at this step 

than at the prima facie case. Snead, 237 F.3d at 1094 (finding evidence insufficient to 

show pretext even though it was sufficient for prima facie case); see also Finical v. 

Collections Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1045 (D. Ariz. 1999) (indirect evidence 

of pretext must be “specific” and “substantial” to withstand summary judgment). Paolino 

has not carried this burden. 

a. Lack of evidence that the decision maker was aware of 

Paolino’s disability 

As an initial matter, there is no specific evidence that James knew about Paolino’s 

anxiety disorder at the time of termination. James affirmatively testified that he did not 

know of Paolino’s disorder, and there is no evidence that anyone informed James of 

Paolino’s disorder. Without such knowledge, James’s decision could not have been a 

pretext for disability discrimination. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 54 n.7 

(2003); see also Nilles v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 521 F. App’x 364, 368 (6th Cir. 2013) 

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(“[A]n employee cannot be considered to have been fired ‘on the basis of disability’ 

unless the individual decision-maker who fired the individual had knowledge of that 

disability.” (citations omitted)). 

Paolino argues that knowledge of his anxiety disorder may be “imputed” to James 

because Paolino mentioned his disorder to several US Airways employees, including his 

immediate supervisor. In support of this theory, Paolino relies on the Ninth Circuit’s 

opinion in Kimbro v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Paolino’s reliance on Kimbro is misplaced. Although the facts in Kimbro are 

analogous—the employee’s supervisor knew of the employee’s disability while upper 

management did not—the legal conclusion is inapposite. The Kimbro court held that, 

because the supervisor knew of the disability, the employer was responsible for failing to 

accommodate the disability. 889 F.2d at 874. That holding does not apply to 

discriminatory discharge cases such as this one, where the question is whether the 

decision maker acted with discriminatory intent. See Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 

1169, 1184 (11th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing Kimbro on this basis). James cannot have 

intended to discriminate on the basis of something unknown to him. To argue otherwise 

“simply defies logic.” Id.

Paolino also argues that James must have known of his anxiety disorder because 

James saw external signs of an underlying disorder. Specifically, James saw Paolino take 

some sort of medication, and he knew paramedics were called for Paolino in May 2013. 

But these instances show only that James knew Paolino had a health issue, not that James 

knew Paolino had a disability. 

b. Lack of evidence that the decision maker was motivated 

by Paolino’s disability 

Even if James knew of Paolino’s anxiety disorder, there is no evidence that it was 

the reason James fired him. Quite the contrary, all the evidence indicates the termination 

decision was motivated by James’s sincere belief that Paolino was sleeping on the job. 

When James entered the breakroom, he saw Paolino reclining in a chair, head back, eyes 

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closed, and unresponsive until James tapped his arm. Later that day, Paolino sent James 

an email in which he apologized for “falling asleep” and did not mention any disorder. 

Naturally, James believed Paolino. And the following day, he gave Paolino the same 

consequence that he gave the other employee who slept at work: termination. 

Paolino’s contention that he was not sleeping on the job is beside the point. 

Courts “only require that an employer honestly believed its reason for its actions, even if 

its reason is foolish or trivial or even baseless.” Villarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 

F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Johnson v. Nordstrom, Inc., 260 F.3d 727, 733 

(7th Cir. 2001)). What matters is the sincerity of James’s belief, not its accuracy. 

Paolino attempts to challenge James’s sincerity in several ways. First, Paolino 

says that after the breakroom incident, he told Stewart that his sleep-like state was likely 

a panic attack. But Paolino’s statement to Stewart does not relate to James’s belief about 

the incident, since Stewart was not involved in the termination decision and there is no 

evidence that Stewart communicated Paolino’s statement to James. 

Paolino also identifies an alleged inconsistency in James’s testimony: James said 

he considered sleeping at work to be an immediately terminable offense but reviewed 

Paolino’s work history before firing him. These statements are not actually inconsistent. 

A manager is free to review an employee’s work history when considering whether to fire 

him for an immediately terminable offense. Moreover, any inconsistency here would be 

between two nondiscriminatory reasons for firing Paolino and therefore innocuous. 

Finally, Paolino identifies an ambiguity in US Airways’ policy. Company policy 

prohibits sleeping “on the job,” while other parts of the policy use terms such as “on 

duty” and “at work” without defining such terms. But Paolino does not explain how this 

ambiguity relates to the sincerity of James’s belief that Paolino violated company policy. 

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V. CONCLUSION 

US Airways claims Paolino was fired for sleeping on the job, and Paolino has 

produced no evidence that the decision maker was aware of, much less motivated by, 

Paolino’s disability. Therefore the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier 

of fact to find for Paolino with respect to his disability discrimination claim. Because this 

action is entirely resolved by summary judgment, the parties’ cross-motions to exclude 

expert testimony will be denied as moot. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 64) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Expert Opinion 

Testimony (Doc. 62) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Report and Testimony of 

Defendant’s Expert (Doc. 63) are denied as moot. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of 

Defendant and against Plaintiff. The Clerk shall terminate this case. 

 Dated this 26th day of January, 2016. 

Neil V. Wake

United States District Judge

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