Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00243/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00243-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN HAGAN,

CDCR #AM-6145,

Plaintiff,

vs.

RYAN BARENCHI, 

Doctor CMO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-00243-JLS-JLB

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, 

(ECF NO. 2); AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

Plaintiff Kevin Hagan, incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility 

(“RJD’”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See “Compl.,” ECF No. 1.)

Plaintiff claims RJD’s Chief Medical Officer Ryan Barenchi, and three other RJD 

doctors (Santos, Clayton, and Mezzles), have “failed to address” his “severe pain” in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment in December 2014, and on other unspecified occasions 

in 2015, 2016, and 2017. (Id. at 1–3.) He seeks injunctive relief preventing retaliation and 

requiring “adequate pain medication,” as well as $150,000 in general and punitive 

damages. (Id. at 7.)

Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he 

filed his Complaint; instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), (ECF No. 2). 

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I. Plaintiff’s IFP Motion

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 

(9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance 

in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no 

assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody 

of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding 

month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those 

payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 

136 S. Ct. at 629.

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Inmate Statement Report, 

together with a certificate of funds certified by a prison official at RJD, as required 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and Civ. L. R. 3.2. (See ECF No. 3, at 1–4); Andrews, 398 F.3d at 

1119. These documents shows Plaintiff had average monthly deposits of $25.24, an 

average monthly balance of $36.68 over the 6-month period preceding the filing of his 

Complaint, and an available balance of $10.14 at the time of filing. (See ECF No. 3 at 1.)

Based on this accounting, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, (ECF 

No. 2), and assess an initial partial filing of $7.33 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

However, the Court will direct the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect 

this initial fee only if sufficient funds are available in Plaintiff’s account at the time this 

Order is executed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a 

prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal 

judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the 

initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP 

case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered”). The remaining balance of the $350 total fee owed in this case must 

be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, 

the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which 

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Byrd v. Phoenix Police Dept., No. 16-16152, 2018 WL 1352916,

at *2 (9th Cir. 2018) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is 

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‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of 

responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler 

v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

Moreover, while the court is obliged to “construe the pleadings liberally and to 

afford the [plaintiff] the benefit of the doubt,” Byrd, 2018 WL 1352916, at *2 (citing Bretz 

v. Kelman, 773 F.3d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)), it may not “supply essential 

elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University 

of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff’s claims are conclusory, and his factual allegations are practically 

nonexistent. However, he alleges he is in “severe pain 24/7” and was “seen by” RJD 

Doctors Santos, Clayton, and Mezzles on an unspecified day in December 2014, and on 

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other unspecified occasions over a three-year period spanning from 2015 through 2017. 

(See Compl. 1–3.) Plaintiff claims each doctor “saw” him, “refused” to prescribe 

“adequate pain medication,” and “failed to address [his] issues.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff further 

admits he was referred to a neurologist who “says [he] need[s] a fusion L-3-L-2 and all 

surgical hardware removed,” but “CDCR denied,” and Dr. Barenchi, RJD’s Chief Medical 

Officer, “allowed this to go on.” (Id. at 2, 3.)

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under 

color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 

263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive 

rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a 

right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation 

was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 

698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

D. Eighth Amendment Medical Care

There is no question that Defendants, all alleged to be physicians or medical 

personnel employed by the State of California to “provide medical services to state prison 

inmates, acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 54 (1988). 

However, only “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury [will]

state[] a cause of action under § 1983.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976); see 

also Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1241-44 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying 

Estelle’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard to inadequate medical care 

claims alleged to violate a pretrial detainees’ due process rights). 

First, Plaintiff must allege a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that “failure 

to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and 

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wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), 

overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(en banc) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The “existence of an injury that a reasonable 

doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence 

of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the 

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a 

‘serious’ need for medical treatment.” Id. at 1059-60.

Plaintiff claims he is in “severe pain 24/7,” and while he does not identify his

medical condition or the source of his pain, the Court infers from his referral to a 

neurologist and claimed need for a “fusion” at “L-3-L-2,” (see Compl. 3), that Plaintiff 

suffers from back pain, for which he has already undergone, or claims to require, surgical 

intervention. (Id.) Thus, the Court will assume, for purposes of screening pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, that Plaintiff’s medical need is sufficiently and 

objectively serious. See Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)), Asberry v. Beard, No. 13CV2573 

WQH JLB, 2014 WL 3943459, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2014) (finding allegations of 

chronic lower back pain severe enough to compromise prisoner’s ability to “walk any 

distance” without “collaps[ing]” sufficient to allege an objectively serious medical need) 

(citing McGuckin, 914 F.2d at 1059); Garcia v. Pido, No. 1:11-CV-0972-LJO-JLT, 2013 

WL 3815884, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2013) (noting that allegations of chronic and severe 

pain have been recognized as serious medical conditions necessitating medical treatment); 

Garner v. Hazzard, No. 06-CV-0985, 2008 WL 552872, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2008) 

(holding that severe back pain, especially if long-lasting, can amount to a serious medical

need).

However, even assuming Plaintiff’s back pain was sufficiently objectively serious 

to invoke Eighth Amendment protection, he must also include in his pleading enough 

factual content to show that each Defendant he seeks to hold liable acted with “deliberate 

indifference” to his needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; see also Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

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“This second prong–defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent–is 

satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to [the] prisoner’s pain or 

possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard,” and claims of medical malpractice or 

negligence are insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation. Simmons v. Navajo 

County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 

1060 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims only that Defendants collectively “refused” to give 

him “adequate pain medication,” and therefore, violated the Eighth Amendment by failing 

to properly “address” his issues. (See Compl. 2–3.) “Deliberate indifference” is a legal 

conclusion, however; and to the extent Plaintiff’s pleading “offers ‘labels and conclusions’ 

or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’” but no “further factual 

enhancement,” it “will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 

557).

Instead, “[d]eliberate indifference” is evidenced only when a prisoner alleges the 

official he seeks to hold liable “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate 

health and safety; the official must be both aware of facts from which the inference could 

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and he must also [have] draw[n] 

the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Specifically, Plaintiff must 

allege “factual content,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, which demonstrates “(a) a purposeful act 

or failure to respond to [his] pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the 

indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state 

of mind is one of subjective recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of due 

care. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122. 

Here, while Plaintiff obviously disagrees with Defendants’ assessment of his 

medical need for specific medication or pain management, this disagreement, without 

more, does not provide sufficient “factual content” to plausibly suggest that either CMO 

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Barenchi, or any of Plaintiff’s treating physicians acted with “deliberate indifference.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ 

but it ask for more than the sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”). 

“A difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner—or between medical 

professionals—concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate 

indifference.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 

242 (9th Cir. 1989)); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122-23. Rather, Plaintiff “must show that the 

course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances 

and that the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to 

[his] health.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th 

Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, in Estelle the Supreme Court 

rejected a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim that prison doctors should have done more 

by way of diagnosis and treatment after he injured his back, and emphasized that “the 

question whether an X-ray or additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment is 

indicated is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment” and “does not represent 

cruel and unusual punishment.” 429 U.S. at 107. 

The same is true here as to Plaintiff’s alleged denial of “adequate pain medication.”

(See Compl. 2); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (rejecting prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim 

that “Seroquel is superior to Triafon” as a mere “difference of medical opinion” insufficient 

to show deliberate indifference). “While plaintiff is certainly free to refuse specific 

medications or types of medication, he does not have a right to dictate what medications 

he will be prescribed.” Peacock v. Horowitz, No. 2:13-CV-2506-TLN-ACP, 2016 WL 

3940346, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2016) (citing Stiltner v. Rhay, 371 F.2d 420, 421 n.3 

(9th Cir. 1967)).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to adequate allege an Eighth 

Amendment claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 

1915A(b); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. Because he is 

proceeding without counsel, however, the Court having now provided him with “notice of 

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the deficiencies in his complaint,” will also grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend it. See 

Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 

1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a),

(ECF No. 2).

2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $7.33 initial filing fee assessed, if those funds are available at 

the time this Order is executed, and to forward whatever balance remains of the full $350 

owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in Plaintiff’s account

exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE 

CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS 

ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), and 

GRANTS him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an 

Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies noted. Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original pleading. 

Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See Civ. L. R. 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 

Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the 

original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims 

dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be 

“considered waived if not repled.”).

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If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, the Court 

will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff’s failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

1915A(b)(1), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring 

amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does 

not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 

dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 29, 2018

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