Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00750/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00750-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL R. DELARM,

Petitioner, No. CIV-S-11-0750 CKD P 

vs.

M.D. MCDONALD,

Respondent. ORDER

 /

Petitioner is a California prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges 2006 convictions from the Superior Court

of San Joaquin County for attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. The convictions

arise from petitioner stabbing Danny Burroughs on April 14, 2005. CT 869-871. Petitioner is 1

serving a sentence of thirteen years imprisonment. Both parties have consented to all

proceedings in this matter being held before a United States Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. §

636(c).

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss for violation of the applicable statute of

limitations. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides as follows:

 For a lengthy summary of the facts presented at trial, see the California Court of 1

Appeal’s decision with respect to petitioner’s direct appeal; respondent’s lodged document

number 5.

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A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentence to the California Court of

Appeal. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. #2. A decision was rendered with respect to the appeal on

August 6, 2008. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. #5. Petitioner sought review of that decision in the

California Supreme Court. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. #6. The petition for review was denied

November 12, 2008. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. # 7. Direct review with respect to the convictions at

issue in this action became final for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) 90 days later on February 10,

2009, when time expired for petitioner to seek a writ of certiorari with respect to the California

Supreme Court’s denial of petitioner’s request for review. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157,

1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We hold that the period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such

a petition.”). Absent tolling, the limitations period applicable to this action began running the 

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next day on February 11, 2009 and ran out one year later on February 10, 2010. The action was

commenced by petitioner on March 18, 2011. 

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However, Title 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2) provides that “the time during which a

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under

this subsection.” The records reveal, and respondent concedes, that petitioner had properly filed

applications for state post-conviction relief pending between July 19, 2009 and August 11, 2010.3

Therefore, the court will deem the limitations period applicable to this action tolled during that

time. There is no statutory basis to toll the limitations period between February 11, 2009 and

July 18, 2009, however, which means that during that period of time, 158 days of the limitations

period ran. The limitations period began running again when the California Supreme Court

denied the habeas petition on August 12, 2010 and, absent any equitable tolling, ran out on

March 6, 2011.

Petitioner asserts, however, that he is entitled to equitable tolling. The statute of

limitations may be subject to equitable tolling if a petitioner can demonstrate that (1) he had been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance prevented him from filing

on time. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010). Petitioner must show that the

“extraordinary circumstance” was the cause of the untimeliness. See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d

796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling . . . is very high,

 Normally, the court would deem this action commenced when petitioner submitted his 2

habeas petition to prison officials for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). 

However, it is not clear when that occurred, although petitioner signed his habeas petition on

March 15, 2011. Pet. at 214. 

 On July 19, 2009 petitioner delivered a habeas petition to prison officials for filing in 3

the San Joaquin County Superior Court; that petition was denied on September 25, 2009. 

Resp’t’s Lodged Docs. #8 and 9. On November 23, 2009, petitioner filed a habeas petition in the

California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, which was denied on December 10, 2009.

Resp’t’s Lodged Docs. #10 and 11. On January 6, 2010, petitioner filed a habeas petition in the

California Supreme Court, which was denied on August 11, 2010. Resp’t’s Lodged Docs. #12

and 13. 

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lest the exception swallow the rule.” Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th

Cir. 2009) quoting Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner claims that he should be entitled to equitable tolling because he has

been subjected to “limited access to the law library for research and copies.” However, lack of

access to the prison law library is not a per se “extraordinary circumstance” for purposes of

equitable tolling. Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997-98 (9thCir. 2009). Also, as indicated

above, petitioner was finished pursuing state court remedies with respect to his claims August 11,

2010. While petitioner asserts that some of the time between the date he exhausted state court

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remedies and the day he filed here was lost attempting to gain access to his prison law library for

research and copies, he fails to point to anything suggesting it took the entire time or that the 5

amount of time he was permitted to access the law library was somehow insufficient. 

Furthermore, petitioner fails to indicate why he needed to undertake lengthy legal research after

his petition for writ of habeas corpus had been denied by the California Supreme Court as

petitioner cannot obtain relief here unless his claim had been presented to and denied by the

California Supreme Court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). Accordingly, petitioner

has not shown he had been pursuing his rights arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 diligently nor that

any extraordinary circumstance caused him to file late. For these reasons, petitioner is not 6

 Petitioner may not obtain relief with respect to any claim in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 action 4

unless state court remedies have been exhausted. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

 For example, in a document attached to petitioner’s opposition which appears to be a 5

request for an extension of time to file a § 2254 petition in this court, petitioner asserts he was

denied law library access for some portion of December, 2010 and all of January, 2011.

 Petitioner asserts he sought two requests for extensions of time to file his habeas 6

petition in this court before he actually filed his habeas petition. With his opposition to

respondent’s motion to dismiss, he submits two documents which appear to be requests for

extensions of time directed to this court. However, the court has no record of ever receiving

petitioner’s requests, the documents submitted by petitioner are not stamped as having been

received by the court and nothing submitted by petitioner indicates the court ever responded to

his requests. In any case, filing a request for an extension of time to file a § 2254 habeas petition

before the petition has actually been filed is not proper as there is no § 2254 action until the

petition has been filed and therefore no basis for the court to enter any orders.

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entitled to equitable tolling of the applicable limitations period. 

Finally, petitioner asserts the court should excuse the fact that he has filed outside

the applicable limitations period because he is “actually innocent.” An otherwise time-barred

habeas petitioner may proceed with his habeas claims if he can show that, in light of new and

reliable evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 938 (9thCir. 2011). In order to

determine if the habeas petitioner has met the “actually innocent” standard described above, the

court considers the new evidence presented in conjunction with the evidence which was

presented at trial. Id. In the Ninth Circuit, “new” evidence is simply evidence which was not

presented at trial. Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 962 (9thCir. 2003). 

The court will waive the applicable limitations period and hear a habeas

petitioner’s claims under the “actual innocence” exception only in the extraordinary case. Lee,

653 F.3d at 938. This is not such a case.

Victim Danny Burroughs was the main witness at petitioner’s trial. The most

important part of his testimony is the portion where he indicated that, following an evening of

turmoil during which Burroughs could be fairly described as the primary instigator, he was struck

and knocked down by a car driven by Tappetha Hossack and carrying petitioner. Burroughs

attempted to stand, whereupon Hossack drove into him again. As Burroughs again tried to stand,

petitioner jumped out of Hossack’s car and stabbed Burroughs repeatedly. While stabbing

Burroughs, petitioner said “You don’t know who you are dealing with, you’re dead.” Eventually,

petitioner got back into the car with Hossack and they drove away. At the time of these events,

Burroughs had been dating Hossack, but petitioner had previously been in a relationship with

Hossack, Hossack and petitioner had a child together, and Hossack was pregnant with their

second child.

Dr. John Dowbak testified that he examined Burroughs the day after the events at

issue. He noted multiple knife wounds to Burroughs’s right arm, right leg and knee. He also

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observed a fracture to his right tibia.

The first piece of “new” evidence presented by petitioner in support of his “actual

innocence” argument is a letter by investigator Aaron Jenkins regarding statements made by

Brandy Feltz-Patelzick who was present the night of the events at issue. In the letter, Jenkins

asserts Ms. Feltz-Patelzick told him: 

1. Petitioner was not in the car driven by Tappetha Hossack when she drove that

car into Burroughs. Petitioner was in the nearby house where Brandy was.

2. Petitioner went to Hossack after she hit Burroughs and got into her car. She

did not see petitioner leave Hossack’s car and then stab Burroughs, but Brandy did admit it was

“really dark.”

Pet., Ex. 4.

Next, petitioner points to a report authored by Officer Gordon Gray of the

Stockton Police Department (Pet., Ex. 18) and various medical records (Pet. Exs. 2, 8 & 11-15). 

Petitioner asserts these documents suggest Burroughs was not stabbed “multiple” times as

indicated by Dr. Dowbak. 

In spite of the evidence petitioner now presents, there is still nothing before the

court which reasonably suggests that petitioner did not stab Danny Burroughs at a time when

Burroughs was in no position to be a physical threat to petitioner. While Feltz-Patelzick

indicates petitioner was not in the car driven by Hossack when she hit Burroughs, Feltz-Patelzick

does indicate petitioner approached Burroughs after Burroughs was hit and indicates she could

not tell if petitioner stabbed Burroughs. While the medical records and the report of Officer Gray

presented by petitioner could have been used by petitioner’s attorney to possibly impeach or

clarify the testimony of Dr. Dowbak as to the location of stab wounds and the number of times

Burroughs was stabbed, there is nothing which undermines Dowbak’s testimony and the

testimony of petitioner to cast any reasonable doubt on the conclusion that Burroughs was

stabbed.

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While the evidence petitioner presents might have helped his case to a minimal

degree, it does not give the court any reason to believe there is any chance no reasonable juror

would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the limitations period

applicable to this action will not be waived via the “actual innocence” exception and this action

will be dismissed as time-barred. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Respondent’s July 28, 2011 motion to dismiss is granted;

2. Petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed;

3. This case is closed; and

4. The court declines to issue the certificate of appealability referenced in 28

U.S.C. § 2253. 

Dated: December 1, 2011

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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dela0750.157

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