Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00458/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00458-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Libel,Assault,Slander

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael Taraska, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Meigan Everett, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV16-0458 PHX DGC

ORDER 

 Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss this matter for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. Doc. 3. The motion has been fully briefed (Docs. 11, 15), and the Court 

concludes that oral argument will not aid in its decision.1

 For the reasons set forth below, 

the Court will grant the motion. 

I. Background. 

 Plaintiff currently resides in Arizona. Doc. 1, ¶ 1. For the past 26 years, Plaintiff 

has owned a condominium at 1 Jib Street in Marina Del Rey, California, where he has 

sometimes lived. Id., ¶ 7. Defendant Meigan Everett is a natural person who resides in 

California. Id., ¶ 2. Defendant Gold Coast Property Pros is a corporate entity based in 

California. Id., ¶ 3. 

 Plaintiff has sued Defendants for defamation. Doc. 1. He alleges that Defendants 

sent an email to him and at least eight other individuals who own homes at 1 Jib Street 

 

1

 The parties’ requests for oral argument are therefore denied. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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which falsely implied that Plaintiff had made death threats and anti-Semitic remarks 

towards other homeowners. Id., ¶¶ 9-12. Plaintiff seeks damages. Id., ¶ 14. 

II. Analysis. 

 “Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their 

jurisdiction over persons.” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (citation 

omitted). Arizona has authorized its courts to exercise jurisdiction to the maximum 

extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 

4.2(a). Thus, courts in the District of Arizona may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant 

who is not physically present in Arizona if the defendant has minimum contacts with the 

State, such that the suit can be maintained without offending traditional notions of fair 

play and substantial justice. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 

 Plaintiff agrees that Defendants are not subject to general personal jurisdiction. 

Doc. 11 at 2. The Court must therefore determine whether Defendants are properly 

subject to specific personal jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction can be established when the 

defendant purposely directed conduct at the forum, the claim arises out of the defendant’s

forum-related activities, and the exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play and 

substantial justice. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 2011). The first requirement – purposeful direction – can be satisfied when a 

defendant (1) commits an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum, (3) which 

causes foreseeable harm in the forum. Id. This test is sometimes referred to as the 

“effects test.” Id. 

As this Court has explained in a previous decision: 

The effects test does not “‘stand for the broad proposition that a 

foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum state always gives rise to 

specific jurisdiction.’” Wash. Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 

F.3d 668, 675 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta 

Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000)). Nor does the effects test 

mean that specific jurisdiction may be based solely on a defendant’s 

knowledge that the subject of his tortious activity resides in a particular 

state. See Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1125. The Court must always focus on the 

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“‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation’ [which] is 

the essential foundation of in personam jurisdiction.” Helicopteros 

Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (quoting 

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). “The proper question is not 

where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the 

defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.” 

Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1125. 

Wake Up & Ball LLC v. Sony Music Entm’t Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 944, 948 (D. Ariz. 

2015). 

 Plaintiff argues that specific jurisdiction exists because Defendants knew he was a 

resident of Arizona when they defamed him in an email. Indeed, Plaintiff provides an 

affidavit that explains in some detail how Defendants knew he resided here. Doc. 11 at 

13-15. But Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants had any other relevant contacts with 

Arizona. The only other contact identified by Plaintiff is that Defendants sent monthly 

bills to his Arizona address (Doc. 11 at 14), but the claims in this case do not arise out of 

that contact. Plaintiff does not allege that the bills were somehow related to the allegedly 

defamatory email. 

 The complaint, Plaintiff’s affidavit, and Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ motion 

all make clear that the only relevant link between Defendants and the State of Arizona is 

Defendants’ knowledge that Plaintiff resided here. That is not enough. As noted above, 

specific jurisdiction cannot be based “solely on a defendant’s knowledge that the subject 

of his tortious activity resides in a particular state.” Wake Up and Ball, 119 F.Supp.3d at 

948. The connection to Arizona “must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ 

creates with the forum State. . . . We have consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the 

defendant-focused ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry by demonstrating contacts between the 

plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum State.” Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122 (citations 

omitted; emphasis in original). 

 What is more, Plaintiff alleges that the email was sent to several individuals who 

own homes at the 1 Jib Street condominium complex in California, and that the email 

concerned Plaintiff’s conduct at the same complex. Doc. 1, ¶ 9. Thus, to the extent 

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defamation occurred, it occurred in California, where the third-party recipients of the 

email were located, not in Arizona, where Plaintiff opened the email or where he now 

resides. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124 (“because publication to third persons is a necessary 

element of libel, the defendants’ intentional tort actually occurred” where the article was 

published) (internal citations omitted). 

 The Court concludes that Defendants’ contacts with Arizona are not sufficient for 

personal jurisdiction. The Court will dismiss this action without leave to amend because 

it is plain that Plaintiff is the only relevant link between Defendants and Arizona. 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 3) is granted. The 

Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. 

 Dated this 20th day of May, 2016. 

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