Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01912/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01912-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Thomas Lovejoy and Carolyn Lovejoy, 

husband and wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

Sheriff Joseph Arpaio and Ava Arpaio, 

husband and wife, 

Defendants.

No. CV 09-01912-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

Before the Court is “Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 3 Regarding Evidence of 

Prosecutorial Support of Charging Decision” (Doc. 124). The motion will be denied. 

As the Court stated at summary judgment, this dispute need not be decided now, 

and Lovejoy’s motion still does not compel a decision now whether Hartman1

 abrogated 

Smiddy I.

2

 Hartman concerned itself entirely with the presumption of independent 

prosecutorial judgment. As noted at oral argument on this motion, however, Smiddy I

makes clear that the entire question of independent prosecutorial judgment only becomes 

relevant “where police officers do not act maliciously or with reckless disregard for the 

rights of an arrested person.” Smiddy I, 665 F.2d at 267. Thus, if Lovejoy can prove 

(i) lack of probable cause, (ii) that Arpaio was culpably involved in the decision to arrest, 

and (iii) that Arpaio was motivated by desire for publicity of political gain, Lovejoy 

 1 Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006). 

2 Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1981). 

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would prove “malicious[ness]” or “reckless disregard for” his rights and he can hold 

Arpaio responsible for all of his damages, including those caused by the prosecution. 

Lovejoy’s position at oral argument — that he still needs to show that Arpaio 

somehow caused his prosecution before he can recover damages incurred during the 

prosecution — is incorrect. The plaintiff in Smiddy I sued only for the unconstitutional 

arrest. See Smiddy I, 665 F.2d at 264. The Ninth Circuit held that damages for both the 

arrest and prosecution would be appropriate if the “police officers . . . act[ed] maliciously 

or with reckless disregard for the rights of [the] arrested person.” Id. at 267. 

Accordingly, if Lovejoy proves that Arpaio acted “maliciously or with reckless disregard 

for” his rights with respect to the arrest, Lovejoy proves all he needs to prove to recover 

his full damages.3

Lovejoy’s other concern at oral argument — that he needs a directed verdict on 

probable cause before he can dispense with evidence regarding the what happened at the 

County Attorney’s Office — is also incorrect. The basis of this argument is unclear, but 

Lovejoy may believe that he needs the evidence from the County Attorney’s Office to 

shore up his case that probable cause did not exist. But the goings-on at the County 

Attorney’s Office are not relevant under Smiddy I’s “maliciously or with reckless 

disregard” inquiry. To repeat, the plaintiff in Smiddy I sued only for the unconstitutional 

arrest. The evidence in that case related entirely to what the police knew when they 

chose to make the arrest. Id. at 263–64. This Court’s summary judgment analysis 

likewise focused on what the Sheriff’s Office knew at the time of the arrest. (Doc. 115 at 

25–32; see also id. at 24 (“In Lovejoy’s case . . . the arrest and prosecution were both 

justified on [the same theory]. There was no post-arrest investigation that modified that 

 3

 As discussed in the Court’s summary judgment order, one line of cases following 

Smiddy I have acknowledged that the injuries incurred through the prosecution can be 

viewed as “a foreseeable consequence of the arrest, and therefore the injuries caused by 

the prosecution are natural extensions of the injuries caused by the unconstitutional 

arrest. See, e.g., Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1991); Borunda v. 

Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir. 1988).” (Doc. 115 at 36.) 

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theory. Accordingly, the arrest and prosecution stand or fall together . . . .”).) Lovejoy 

can obtain all the damages he seeks if he proves that Arpaio acted “maliciously or with 

reckless disregard for” his rights at the time of his arrest. 

In sum, given that Smiddy I provides a path to complete recovery without reaching 

the question of independent prosecutorial judgment, the Court need not resolve whether 

Hartman abrogated Smiddy I’s treatment of the independent judgment issue if Lovejoy 

proves malice or reckless disregard as part of his unconstitutional arrest case.4

 And if 

Lovejoy intends to prove that Arpaio acted maliciously or with reckless disregard 

concerning the arrest, Lovejoy would not need his malicious prosecution or civil 

conspiracy causes of action. Focusing entirely on the arrest and whether it was done with 

maliciousness or reckless disregard would permit the parties to cut the entire post-arrest 

portion of the evidence from their trial presentations, save for testimony that the case 

went to trial and Lovejoy was acquitted (which is undisputed), and testimony regarding 

damages arising post-arrest. 

However, if Lovejoy still wishes to pursue his malicious prosecution cause of 

action or the conspiracy cause of action, or both, then all the evidence relating to the 

County Attorney’s Office — both what the dissenting attorneys thought, and what 

Thomas and Aubuchon thought — is relevant to the elements of Lovejoy’s case, 

notwithstanding Hartman’s potential effect on Smiddy I. In the malicious prosecution 

context, Lovejoy must prove that Arpaio somehow procured the prosecution. The 

 4

 It is perhaps worth noting that Smiddy I’s “maliciously or with reckless 

disregard” qualification is effectively the same standard established in Hartman. 

Hartman asks for a retaliatory motive and lack of probable cause. Smiddy I asks for 

maliciousness or reckless disregard and lack of probable cause. In both cases, it suffices 

to show an unconstitutional motive and lack of probable cause. This is in contrast to 

Beck, which speculates that Hartman’s effect on Smiddy I, if any, is to cut the inquiry 

down to lack of probable cause alone, regardless of motive. See Beck v. City of Upland, 

527 F.3d 853, 864 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Proof of the absence of probable cause, it appears, is 

the sole factor necessary to resolve the chain of causation problem.”). 

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conspiracy case requires effectively the same showing. The evidence from the County 

Attorney’s Office is relevant to whether Arpaio had sufficient involvement. 

But there is another possibility. Lovejoy could drop his malicious prosecution and 

conspiracy causes of action but still lack confidence that he can prove malice or reckless 

disregard with respect to the arrest. In that instance, Smiddy I would require Lovejoy to 

rebut the presumption of independent prosecutorial judgment before he could recover 

prosecution-related damages. Thus, without knowing if Hartman abrogated Smiddy I on 

the issue of the independent judgment presumption, Lovejoy would need to put on his 

evidence from the County Attorney’s Office. 

However, Hartman’s effect on Smiddy I still does not become concretely relevant 

until and unless the jury concludes that (a) malice and reckless disregard did not exist as 

to the arrest and (b) Lovejoy has not rebutted the independent judgment presumption. 

Thus, as the Court stated at summary judgment, no ruling is necessary at this point 

because its relevance here turns on the jury’s conclusions. (Doc. 115 at 37–38 n.6.) The 

jury instructions and verdict form can be framed to isolate whether the jury indeed 

concluded that malice and reckless disregard did not exist and the independent 

prosecutorial judgment presumption had not been rebutted. 

Lovejoy nonetheless argues, 

If . . . Defendants [are] permitted to present evidence of the 

alleged independent decision-making by the Maricopa 

County Attorney’s Office (“MCAO”)[, s]uch evidence would 

likely mislead the jury into concluding that Arpaio might not 

be liable for Sergeant Lovejoy’s post-charge damages 

because of the MCAO’s decision-making; or at least that the 

MCAO’s decision-making is a mitigating factor that should 

reduce any punitive damages award against Sheriff Arpaio. 

(Doc. 124 at 4.) However, this concern is largely of Lovejoy’s own making. If Lovejoy 

intends to put on evidence of what the dissenting Deputy County Attorneys concluded 

(which he intends to do no matter what, according to counsel at oral argument), it is only 

relevant to proving (a) elements of the malicious prosecution or conspiracy claims, or 

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(b) a lack of independent prosecutorial judgment. As to both issues, Arpaio must be 

allowed to present whatever countervailing evidence he has, including Thomas’s and 

Aubuchon’s expected testimony that they reached their own independent judgment. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that “Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 3 

Regarding Evidence of Prosecutorial Support of Charging Decision” (Doc. 124) is 

DENIED. 

Dated this 4th day of April, 2012. 

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