Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08087/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08087-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Rocky Vulgamore, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Tuba City Regional Healthcare 

Corporation, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-11-8087-PCT-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Rocky Vulgamore, a registered nurse, has a history of addiction to 

prescription drugs. He successfully completed a rehabilitation program in February 

2008. As part of a program for recovering nurses, Plaintiff is subject to random drug 

testing, mandatory Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and worksite monitoring. 

 Tuba City is the largest community on the Navajo reservation, located in 

northeastern Arizona. Defendant Tuba City Regional Health Care Corporation operates a 

hospital and provides community health services. In May 2010, Defendant offered 

Plaintiff the position of nurse anesthetist. The offer was withdrawn six months later. The 

offer was rescinded, according to Plaintiff, because Defendant’s credentialing committee 

felt uncomfortable with his history of drug addiction and determined that there was 

nothing in Tuba City to keep him sober. See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 12-27. 

 Plaintiff filed a charge of disability discrimination in January 2011. Doc. 1-1 

at 1-3. The EEOC dismissed the charge on the ground that Defendant is a tribal entity. 

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Id. at 4. Plaintiff filed suit in June 2011, asserting disability discrimination in violation of 

Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the 

ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, and Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 20 U.S.C. § 794. Doc. 1. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and 

compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 10-11. 

 Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. 7. The motion is fully briefed. Docs. 11, 12. 

Oral argument has not been requested. For reasons that follow, the Court will grant the 

motion in part and dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on tribal 

sovereign immunity. 

I. Legal Standards.

 “Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity 

from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 

436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). In practice, this means that Indian tribes “may not be sued 

absent an express and unequivocal waiver of immunity” by the tribe or by Congress. 

Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project, 276 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Santa 

Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58-59). “This immunity applies to the tribe’s commercial as 

well as governmental activities.” Cook v. AVI Casino Enters., Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 725 

(9th Cir. 2008) (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754-55 

(1998)). Stated differently, “tribal corporations acting as an arm of the tribe enjoy the 

same sovereign immunity granted to a tribe itself.” Id.

 The question whether sovereign immunity has been waived is, in the first instance, 

a question of subject matter jurisdiction. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 

(9th Cir. 1988). On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists. Thornhill 

Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). The complaint’s 

factual allegations must be accepted as true, but “conclusory allegations of law and 

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unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. 

F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).

II. Analysis.

 Plaintiff admits that Defendant is a tribal entity, that is, Defendant is owned and 

operated by the Navajo Nation. Docs. 1 ¶ 8, 11 at 12; see Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo 

Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 946 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Nation is a federal recognized 

Indian tribe); Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc., 157 F.3d 1185, 1187-88 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (finding health services corporation created and controlled by Indian tribes to 

be “an arm of the sovereign tribes”). Defendant argues, correctly, that “the Nation has 

not waived its sovereign immunity and Congress has not clearly abrogated tribal 

sovereign immunity in [disability discrimination] cases.” Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 

1159.

 The language of the ADA itself leaves no doubt that Congress exempted Indian 

tribes and tribal entities from Title I coverage when it specified that “[t]he term 

‘employer does not include . . . a corporation wholly owned by . . . an Indian tribe[.]” 

42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(b)(i); see Barnes v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, No. 3:06-

CV-693 (RNC), 2007 WL 685179, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 3, 2007); Charland v. Little Six, 

Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 858, 865 (D. Minn. 2000); see also Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 

1159 n.9 (noting that that the Navajo Nation fell within the scope of the Indian tribe 

exemption of Title VII); Pink, 157 F.3d at 1188 (same with respect to tribal health 

services corporation). 

 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 makes clear that the term “disability” is to be 

interpreted broadly, see Rohr v. Salt River Project, 555 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 2009), but 

nothing on the face of that statute purports to subject Indian tribes or tribal entities to the 

jurisdiction of the federal courts in civil actions for injunctive relief or damages. Nor 

does Plaintiff present any legal authority or argument that the statute somehow waives 

tribal sovereign immunity. 

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 The Rehabilitation Act allows suits against a local agency of an Indian tribe, but 

only where the agency “has an agreement with the designated State agency to conduct a 

vocational rehabilitation program[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 705(24). “This isolated provision, 

concerned with a particular kind of program, does not suggest an unequivocal, broad 

abrogation of tribal immunity with respect to all claims against an Indian tribe.” Barnes,

2007 WL 685179, at *1. Plaintiff does not allege that the Navajo Nation maintains a 

covered vocational rehabilitation program. In short, Plaintiff “has pointed to no express 

provision in the Rehabilitation Act unmistakably demonstrating that Congress intended to 

abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in these circumstances.” Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe, 

243 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2001). 

 Plaintiff’s reliance on Fleming v. Yuma Regional Medical Center, 587 F.3d 938 

(9th Cir. 2009), is misplaced. That case held only that the Rehabilitation Act applies to 

independent contractors. 587 F.3d at 941. Nothing in Fleming suggests that Congress, in 

passing the Rehabilitation Act, expressly and unequivocally waived tribal immunity. 

 Plaintiff asserts that pursuant to the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 

No. 100-259, the anti-discrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act apply 

“institution wide.” Doc. 11 at 15. Plaintiff cites, and the Court has found, no case in 

which the Restoration Act has been construed as having waived tribal immunity. 

 Plaintiff further asserts that by accepting federal funds under the American 

Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, Defendant agreed to comply 

with all federal discrimination laws (Docs. 1 ¶¶ 10-11, 11 at 16), but Plaintiff cites no 

legal authority in support of this assertion. Nor has Plaintiff otherwise shown that 

Defendant’s acceptance of federal funds constitutes a waiver of tribal immunity on the 

part of the Navajo Nation. See Sanderlin, 243 F.3d at 1286-89 (concluding that a tribe’s 

promise not to discriminate in return for federal financial assistance “in no way 

constitute[d] an express and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity and consent to be 

sued in federal court”). 

 

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III. Conclusion.

 “The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared a presumption favoring tribal 

sovereign immunity.” Demontiney v. United States, 255 F.3d 801, 811 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58; Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizens Band of 

Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991)). “Unless [Plaintiff] satisfies the 

burden of establishing that [his] action falls within an unequivocally expressed waiver of 

sovereign immunity by Congress [or the Nation], it must be dismissed.” Dunn & Black, 

P.S. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff has not met his 

burden. The Court therefore will grant Defendant’s motion to the extent it is brought 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Leave to amend the complaint is denied as futile. See Pink, 157 F.3d at 1189.1

IT IS ORDERED:

 1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 7) is granted to the extent it is 

brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and denied as moot with respect to Rule 12(b)(6). 

 2. This action is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

 3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 11th day of August, 2011. 

 

 

1

 Defendant asserts in its reply that it is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs (Doc. 12 at 13), but it is well established that “courts will not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.’” Bach v. Forever Living Prods. U.S., Inc., 473 

F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1122 n.6 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (citing Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, 370 F.3d 837, 843 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004)); see Gadda v. State Bar of Cal., 511 F.3d 933, 937 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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