Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00678/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00678-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEROLLY FORBS

Petitioner,

v.

DAVE DAVEY, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00678 MJS (HC)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DECLINING 

TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent, Dave Davey, Acting Warden of 

California State Prison Corcoran is hereby substituted as the proper named respondent 

pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent is 

represented by Kevin L. Quade of the office of the California Attorney General. Both 

parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF 

Nos. 7-8.)

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently incarcerated pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of 

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California, County of Kern, following a guilty verdict by a jury on October 25, 2010 of 

forcible rape, possession of a firearm by a felon, misdemeanor assault, and various 

enhancements. (Clerk's Tr. at 560-63.) On November 23, 2010, the trial court sentenced

Petitioner to an indeterminate term of sixty-one (61) years to life in state prison. Id.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District. (Lodged Doc. 1.) On January 24, 2013, the court remanded the matter for the 

trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to correct the numbering of two counts, but 

otherwise affirmed the judgment. (Lodged Doc. 4.) Petitioner filed a petition for review 

with the California Supreme Court on March 5, 2013. (Lodged Doc. 5.) The Supreme 

Court summarily denied the petition on April 10, 2013. (Lodged Doc. 6.) 

Petitioner sought collateral review in state court by filing a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus with the Kern County Superior Court on July 17, 2013. (Lodged Doc. 7.) 

The petition was denied in a reasoned decision on October 25, 2013. (Lodged Doc. 8.) 

Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. (Lodged Doc. 9.) The court summarily denied the petition 

on December 19, 2013. (Lodged Doc. 10.) Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus with the California Supreme Court on January 16, 2014. (Lodged Doc. 11.) The 

court summarily denied the petition on March 26, 2014. (Lodged Doc. 12.) 

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition on May 8, 2014. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) 

Petitioner presents two claims for relief: 1) that Petitioner’s rights to be free from double 

jeopardy under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by re-trying 

Petitioner after his first trial resulted in a mistrial; and 2) that his due process rights were 

violated by enhancements to his sentence based on his prior convictions. (Pet.)

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on July 22, 2014. (Answer, ECF No. 

11.) Petitioner did not file a traverse. Accordingly, the matter stands fully briefed and

ready for adjudication. 

///

///

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II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1

Appellant Derolly Forbs was charged with forcible rape (Pen. 

Code,[fn1] § 261, subd. (a)(2); count 1), forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, 

subd. (c)(2); count 2), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. 

(a)(1); count 3), and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); 

count 4). Appellant's first trial ended with the jury acquitting him on the oral 

copulation count. However, the jury was unable to reach a verdict and the 

trial court declared a mistrial as to the remaining counts.

FN1: Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 

specified.

On retrial, appellant was convicted of forcible rape (count 1), 

possession of a firearm by a felon (count 2), and misdemeanor assault (§ 

240), the lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon (count 

3). The jury also found true that appellant had a prior conviction of forcible 

rape, and the trial court found true enhancement allegations based on the 

prior conviction. The court sentenced appellant to prison for an aggregate 

term of 61 years to life.

People v. Forbs, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 541, 1-2 (Jan. 24, 2013).

III. GOVERNING LAW

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 

2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he 

suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the 

conviction challenged arises out of the Kern County Superior Court, which is located 

within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). Accordingly, the Court 

has jurisdiction over the action. 

B. Legal Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 

 

1The Fifth District Court of Appeal’s summary of the facts in its January 24, 2013 opinion is 

presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of 

the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions. 

Under AEDPA, an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody 

under a judgment of a state court may be granted only for violations of the Constitution 

or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 

7 (2000). Federal habeas corpus relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in 

state court proceedings if the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that 

contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts 

that are materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court case, yet reaches a different 

result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. 

"AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical 

factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied. . . . The statue recognizes . . . that 

even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner" Panetti v. 

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

"clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a ‘principle' 

or ‘general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state 

decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 

2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle 

(or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-

71 (2003). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal 

law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76, quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 

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409-10; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the 

Court further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from 

an incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011), (citing Williams, 529 

U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks 

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the 

correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. 

Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been 

squarely established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 

(2009), quoted by Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786.

2. Review of State Decisions

"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, 

later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same 

grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the 

"look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 

(9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an 

unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from 

the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. 

"Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas 

petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief." Id. ("This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does 

not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 

‘adjudicated on the merits.'").

Richter instructs that whether the state court decision is reasoned and explained, 

or merely a summary denial, the approach to evaluating unreasonableness under § 

2254(d) is the same: "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments 

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or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; then 

it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments 

or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Id. at 786. 

Thus, "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75). AEDPA "preserves 

authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 

disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents." Id. To put 

it yet another way:

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Id. at 786-87. The Court then explains the rationale for this rule, i.e., "that state courts 

are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Id. at 

787. It follows from this consideration that § 2254(d) "complements the exhaustion 

requirement and the doctrine of procedural bar to ensure that state proceedings are the 

central process, not just a preliminary step for later federal habeas proceedings." Id.

(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).

3. Prejudicial Impact of Constitutional Error

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether 

the error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 

verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 

U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the 

state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). Some constitutional 

errors, however, do not require that the petitioner demonstrate prejudice. See Arizona v. 

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 

(1984). Furthermore, where a habeas petition governed by AEDPA alleges ineffective 

assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the 

Strickland prejudice standard is applied and courts do not engage in a separate analysis 

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applying the Brecht standard. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918, n. 7 (2002). Musalin 

v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d at 834.

IV. REVIEW OF PETITION

A. Claim One – Double Jeopardy

Petitioner contends that his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated 

when he was convicted at a second trial on charges previously brought, but ultimately 

dismissed at the first trial based on the jury’s inability to reach a unanimous decision. 

(Pet.) 

1. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented his claim in his collateral appeal to the Kern County Superior 

Court. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the Superior Court and both the 

Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court summarily denied the claim in 

subsequent petitions. (See Lodged Docs. 7-12.) Since the California Supreme Court 

denied the petition in a summary manner, this Court “looks through” the decisions and 

presumes the Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the Superior Court, the last state 

court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 

& n.3 (1991) (establishing, on habeas review, “look through” presumption that higher 

court agrees with lower court’s reasoning where former affirms latter without discussion); 

see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding federal 

courts look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court’s 

rejection of petitioner’s claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal

law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 

In denying Petitioner’s claim, the Kern County Superior Court explained that:

Petitioner had a jury trial in the first trial which acquitted petitioner of 

two counts of oral copulation. The jury was deadlocked as to the 

remaining counts, and the judge declared a mistrial. 

In the second trial, the jury convicted petitioner of the instant 

charges on October 25, 2010 and petitioner also admitted to a forcible

rape conviction in 1995. Consequently, petitioner was sentenced on 

November 25, 2010 to fifty years to life plus six years for the firearm 

enhancement and five years for the felony conviction enhancement for an 

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aggregate term of fifty years to life plus the determinate term of eleven 

years. The felony conviction enhancement was attached to count one. 

Petitioner posits the following two arguments: prosecution is barred 

by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment of the U.S. 

Constitution and Art. I. clause fifteen of the California Constitution; and 

even if double jeopardy does not attach, the sentence is excessive. 

The court rejects both petitioners’ arguments and denies the 

petition for writ of habeas corpus for reasons explained below. 

I. Discussion

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Art. 1 Section 

XV of the California Constitution prohibits prosecution for the same 

offense once there has been an acquittal. This is commonly known as the 

double jeopardy clause. 

In this instance, jeopardy did not attach from the first trial to the 

second trial because the jury acquitted petitioner of two counts of oral 

copulation, but could not reach a verdict on the remaining counts. The trial 

judge thus discharged the jury after it rendered a verdict on two counts but 

not the remaining counts, Jeopardy did not attach on the remaining counts 

resulting in a mistrial. People v. Sullivan (2013) 217 Cal.App. 4th 242, 246. 

He was not retried on forcible oral copulation counts in the second trial. 

This is in contrast with where a trial judge dismisses a jury without stating 

on the record whether or not the jury has reached a verdict. 

People v. Stone (1981) 31 Cal.4th 303, 316. Petitioner thus fails in 

his first argument. 

(Lodged Doc. 8 at 1-2.)

2. Applicable Law

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States 

through the Fourteenth Amendment, "protects against successive prosecutions for the 

same offense after acquittal . . . ." Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1998) 

(citation omitted); Lemke v. Ryan, 719 F.3d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 2013). "Absent an 

'acquittal' in which the factfinder concludes that the prosecution failed to 'prove[ ] its 

case,' the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a retrial." Harrison v. Gillespie, 640 F.3d 

888, 898 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

"[I]n a jury trial, an 'acquittal,' whether express or implied, occurs only when the 

jury renders a verdict as to all or some of the charges against a defendant." Id. An 

"express" acquittal occurs when the jury returns a verdict in favor of the accused. Id.

(citation omitted). An "implied acquittal" is one that can be inferred from a jury's verdict 

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on other charges. Id. (citation omitted); see, e.g., Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 

119-20, 125, 129 S. Ct. 2360, 174 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2009) (Where the jury acquits on one 

count but is deadlocked on another, double jeopardy bars re-litigation of factual issues 

that were necessarily decided by the jury as to the count on which a verdict was 

reached.) (citation omitted); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1957) 

(conviction for second degree murder operates as implied acquittal on first degree 

murder count).

A jury's verdict is not final until "deliberations are over, the result is announced in 

open court, and no dissent by a juror is registered." United States v. Nelson, 692 F.2d 

83, 84-85 (9th Cir. 1982) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Lemke v. 

Ryan, 719 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that in Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. 

Ct. 2044, 2050-51, 182 L. Ed. 2d 937 (2012), the Supreme Court permitted a retrial of 

capital charges after a jury was unable to reach a verdict, even though the jury had 

reported itself as unanimously against conviction on the capital charge; further noting 

that no verdict had actually been entered).

When a mistrial is declared before a jury can render its verdict, a defendant may 

be re-tried for the same crime only if the defendant consents to the mistrial or the trial 

court determines that "manifest necessity" required the declaration of a mistrial (e.g., in 

the case of a "hung jury"). See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773-74, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 

176 L. Ed. 2d 678 (2010) ("clearly established" that "when a judge discharges a jury on 

the grounds that the jury cannot reach a verdict, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not 

bar a new trial for the defendant before a new jury") (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted); United States v. Lopez-Avila, 678 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he 

Double Jeopardy Clause usually does not bar retrial when a mistrial is declared with the 

consent of the defendant.") (citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676, 102 S. Ct. 

2083, 72 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1982)); Wilson v. Belleque, 554 F.3d 816, 830 (9th Cir. 2009) ("It 

is well-established that retrial following a hung jury does not constitute double jeopardy.") 

(citations omitted); United States. v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008) (if 

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case dismissed after jeopardy attaches but before jury reaches verdict, defendant may 

be tried again for same crime only if he consents to dismissal or if the district court 

determines that dismissal required by manifest necessity; noting deadlocked jury is 

classic basis for proper mistrial) (citation omitted).

3. Analysis

The Supreme Court has noted that declaring a mistrial based on the jury’s failure 

to reach a verdict “has long been considered the ‘classic basis’ establishing such a 

necessity” to declare a mistrial. Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2052 (2012). A

second trial on those offenses does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. That is 

precisely the case with Petitioner. The jury in his first trial was unable to reach a verdict 

as to all the other charges but for oral copulation. (Rept’r Tr. at 1101-02.) Petitioner was 

acquitted of oral copulation, and a mistrial was declared as to the other charges. (Id.) As 

double jeopardy only attached to the oral copulation charge, for which Petitioner was not 

retried, his claim fails. Double jeopardy did not bar the retrial of Petitioner on the other 

charges.

The state court decision denying this claim was not contrary to clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.

B. Claim Two – Enhancement of Sentence Based on Prior Convictions

Petitioner, in his second claim, contends that the state violated his due process 

rights by enhancing his sentence based on his prior convictions. (Pet. at 4.) 

1. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented his claim in his collateral appeal to the Kern County 

Superior Court. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the Superior Court and 

both the Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court summarily denied the claim in 

subsequent petitions. (See Lodged Docs. 7-12.) Since the California Supreme Court 

denied the petition in a summary manner, this Court “looks through” the decisions and 

presumes the Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the Superior Court, the last state 

court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 

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& n.3 (1991) (establishing, on habeas review, “look through” presumption that higher 

court agrees with lower court’s reasoning where former affirms latter without discussion); 

see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding federal 

courts look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court’s 

rejection of petitioner’s claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal 

law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 

In denying Petitioner’s claim, the Kern County Superior Court explained that:

The sentence is also proper. Petitioner received twenty-five years 

to life under the habitual sex offender statutes. P.C. § 667.61(d)(1), 

667.6(d)(1). Rape is also a serious or violent felony under P.C. Section 

667.5(c)(19), and 1192.7(c)(3). This resulted in the doubling of his 

sentence under P.C. Section 667(e)(1).

This resulted in the imposition of fifty years to life sentence. The 

remaining enhancements for firearm possession six years and the felony 

conviction enhancement five years constituted the remaining eleven years 

term consecutive to the fifty years to life term. The felony conviction 

enhancement attached to count one, and the six years sentence was for 

count two, being a felon in possession of a firearm. 

There were no mitigating sentencing factors given petitioner’s 

previous criminal convictions involving violence – terrorist threats, spousal 

abuse, and forcible rape of the mother of his child. In the instant case, 

petitioner forcibly raped his stepdaughter while her children were in the 

house. He ejaculated inside Marie C. which effectively negates his 

defense of impotence at the first trial. 

The appellate court affirmed the conviction in its entirety in a 

remittitur on January 24, 2013 finding no constitutional error warranting a 

reversal of the conviction. Apart from the contentions raised on appeal, the 

appellate court independently reviewed the entire record. 

On the basis of the foregoing, the petition for writ of habeas corpus 

is accordingly denied. 

(Lodged Doc. 8 at 2-3.)

2. Analysis

Regardless whether Petitioner contends that his sentence was illegally enhanced 

based on prior convictions, or cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment, his 

claims fails. The Supreme Court has held, in the context of AEDPA review, that the 

relevant, clearly established law regarding the Eighth Amendment's proscription against 

cruel and unusual punishment is a "gross disproportionality" principle, the precise 

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contours of which are unclear and applicable only in the "exceedingly rare" and 

"extreme" case. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 155 L. Ed. 2d 

144 (2003) (discussing decisions in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 

2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991), Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. 

Ed. 2d 637 (1983), and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 63 L. Ed. 2d 

382 (1980)); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 155 L. Ed. 2d 108 

(2003). "Successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences will be 

exceedingly rare." Solem, 463 U.S. at 289-90.

The Supreme Court has upheld prison sentences challenged as cruel and 

unusual, and in particular, has approved recidivist punishments similar to or longer than 

Petitioner's 61 years to life sentence for offenses of equivalent or lesser severity. See

Andrade, 538 U.S. at 77 (denying habeas relief on Eighth Amendment disproportionality 

challenge to Three Strikes sentence of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life for 

stealing $150.00 in videotapes when petitioner had a lengthy but nonviolent criminal 

history); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1008-09 (mandatory life sentence without parole for first 

offense of possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine is not so disproportionate as 

to violate the Eighth Amendment); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374-75, 102 S. Ct. 703, 

70 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1982) (per curiam) (upholding non-recidivist sentence of two 

consecutive 25 prison terms for possession of nine ounces of marijuana and distribution 

of marijuana); cf. Solem, 463 U.S. at 280-81 (sentence of life imprisonment without 

possibility of parole for seventh nonviolent felony violates Eighth Amendment).

Generally, so long as the sentence imposed by the state court does not exceed 

statutory maximums, it will not be considered cruel and unusual punishment under the 

Eighth Amendment or violative of due process. United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 

569, 576 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mejia-Mesa, 153 F.3d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 1998) 

("punishment within legislatively mandated guidelines is presumptively valid").

Here, Petitioner was sentenced to 61 years to life in prison for three separate 

crimes including forcible rape, possession of a firearm by a felon, and misdemeanor

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assault. The jury also found that Petitioner had a prior conviction for forcible rape, and 

his sentenced was enhanced based on the prior conviction. Petitioner's sentence was 

reasonably imposed and his is not "the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the 

crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to inference of gross 

disproportionality." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005.

Petitioner attempts to rely on Burgett v. Texas, to show that it violated his due 

process rights to rely on the prior conviction to enhance his sentence. 389 U.S. 109, 115 

(1967). Burgett was one decision in “a line of cases holding that a conviction obtained in 

violation of the Sixth Amendment could not be used in a subsequent prosecution to 

support guilt or enhance punishment. United States v. First, 731 F.3d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 

2013) (citing Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115; Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972); 

United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). 

However, “[a]t the time the prior conviction at issue in Burgett was entered, state 

criminal defendants' federal constitutional right to counsel had not yet been recognized, 

and so it was reasonable to presume that the defendant had not waived a right he did 

not possess.” Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31 (1992). Petitioner’s prior conviction for 

forcible rape occurred in 1995, well after the Supreme Court recognized the right to 

counsel in such criminal prosecutions. Regardless, records indicate that Petitioner was 

represented by counsel in the prior criminal proceeding. (Supp. Clerk’s Tr. at 24, 27-37.)

Burgett is not applicable to Petitioner’s case, and the state court did not error in using 

the prior conviction in determining his sentence. 

Accordingly, the state court adjudication of the claim did not result in a decision 

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, or result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

V. CONCLUSION

Petitioner is not entitled to relief with regard to the claims presented in the instant 

petition. The Court therefore orders that the petition be DENIED. 

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VI. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to 

appeal a district court’s denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain 

circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute 

in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which 

provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 

before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, 

by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to 

test the validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for 

commitment or trial a person charged with a criminal offense against the 

United States, or to test the validity of such person’s detention pending 

removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from–

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus 

proceeding in which the detention complained 

of arises out of process issued by a State 

court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under 

section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph 

(1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall 

indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing 

required by paragraph (2).

If a court denies a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of 

appealability “if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his 

constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to 

deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). While the petitioner is not required to prove the 

merits of his case, he must demonstrate “something more than the absence of frivolity or 

the existence of mere good faith on his . . . part.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

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In the present case, the Court finds that no reasonable jurist would find the 

Court’s determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief wrong 

or debatable, nor would a reasonable jurist find Petitioner deserving of encouragement 

to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court hereby DECLINES to issue a 

certificate of appealability.

VII. ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED; 

2) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the case; and

3) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 3, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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