Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00459/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00459-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

FREDDIE LEE BELL, :

AIS 134318,

:

Petitioner,

:

vs. CA 06-0459-KD-C

:

WARDEN JERRY FERRELL,

:

Respondent.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Freddie Lee Bell, a state prisoner presently in the custody of the

respondent, has petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter has been referred to the undersigned for the

entry of a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)

and Local Rule 72.1(c). It is recommended that the instant petition be

dismissed as time barred under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act’s one-year limitation provision contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Bell was convicted in the Circuit Court of Mobile County,

Alabama on April 1, 1983 of first-degree robbery. (Doc. 1, at 2) On March 16,

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 1 of 25
2

1984, petitioner was sentenced to a thirty-five (35) year term of imprisonment.

Bell v. State, 466 So.2d 167, 169 (Ala.Crim.App. 1985) (“The record shows

that at the time of trial the appellant was serving a term in the State

penitentiary for another crime, and that prior to the initial sentencing date set

by the court, he was given an early release by the prison authorities. He could

not be found and brought to court for sentencing until March 16, 1984. This

accounts for the delay in sentencing.”). 

2. Bell’s conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal by

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on February 12, 1985. Bell v. State,

466 So.2d 167 (Ala.Crim. App. 1985).

The record discloses that on October 13, 1982, two black males

armed with pistols, wearing stocking facemasks and traveling in

a stolen automobile, pulled up to three bank tellers and a

security guard in a shopping center in Mobile, Alabama. The

bank personnel were employees of the Commercial Guaranty

Bank of Mobile. The masked bandits robbed them of a bank bag

containing bank supplies, having the approximate value of

$8.00, and a .38-caliber pistol. The tellers and the guard were

unable to identify the robbers. After taking the pistol and the

bank bag, the robbers jumped back into their vehicle, sped

across the shopping center, and after colliding with a parked

vehicle, pulled up to another stolen vehicle, where they changed

vehicles, leaving the first vehicle and speeding away in the

second. Prior to changing vehicles the robbers had removed

their masks, and during the vehicle exchange were observed by

three witnesses. The witnesses were Leonard Rigsby, James Ian

McIlwain, and James Green. The witnesses observed that the

robber who drove the getaway car had a pistol in his hand which

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 2 of 25
3

he pointed at them. Shortly after the robbery the three witnesses

were shown a photographic array or lineup by Detective Wayne

Farmer of the Mobile Police Department and each of the

witnesses picked the same photograph from the array and

identified it as being the photograph of the driver of the getaway

car during the robbery. This photograph had been taken by

Detective Farmer shortly after the robbery and was a photograph

of the appellant, Freddie Lee Bell. At the time the photograph

was taken, appellant had long red-tinted hair, a goatee, and a

mustache. At the time of trial he had cut his long hair and

removed his goatee and mustache, thus altering his appearance

to that extent.

Witness Leonard Rigsby testified on direct examination: “Do

you see the man that you saw point that gun at you that day

anywhere in this courtroom?” His answer was: “No, sir.” Mr.

Rigsby, further testified on direct examination that shortly after

the robbery he was shown the photographic lineup or array by

Detective Farmer, and he picked out a photograph and identified

it as a photograph of the driver of the getaway car and the

person who pointed a gun at him. He was shown the

photographic array on the witness stand at trial and promptly

picked the photograph which he had previously selected, and

again identified it as a photograph of the driver of the getaway

car. It was marked with an “X” to identify it and distinguish it

from the other photographs. No objection was made by

appellant to this testimony. The prosecuting attorney did not

question the witness further concerning his inability to make an

in-court identification, and the defense counsel did not crossexamine the witness in that regard.

The State called Detective Farmer, who testified that shortly

after the robbery he showed Mr. Rigsby a spread of

photographs. He identified the photographic spread which he

had shown Rigsby. It was the same spread that Rigsby had just

identified in his testimony. No objection was made to this

testimony by appellant. The prosecuting attorney then asked

Detective Farmer if witness Rigsby had picked one of the

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 3 of 25
4

photographs out of the line-up prior to trial. Appellant objected

to this question, and the trial judge sustained the objection.

Detective Farmer was asked if the appellant’s photograph was

in the group or spread, and over the objection of appellant, he

answered in the affirmative. He was then asked to identify the

appellant’s photograph in the spread, and over the objection of

the appellant, he identified a photograph from the group as being

that of the appellant. It was the same photograph which Mr.

Rigsby had just identified in his testimony from the witness

stand as the photograph of the driver of the getaway car in the

robbery, and was the photograph which had been marked with

an “X” for identification. Farmer further testified that he was

personally acquainted with the appellant and that it was he who

took the photograph of the appellant and that he took it three

days after the robbery. He testified that appellant’s physical

appearance had changed between the time the photograph was

taken and the date of trial. He stated that since the photograph

was taken, appellant had shortened the hair on his head and

removed his facial hair. The photograph was admitted into

evidence over the objection of the appellant. The substance of

appellant’s objections to the testimony of Detective Farmer and

to the admission of the photograph was that it constituted

impeachment by the State of its own witness or amounted to

rehabilitation of its witness when there had been no attempt by

appellant to impeach such witness.

The appellant raises only one issue on appeal, and states this

issue in his brief as follows: “[Whether the] trial court erred in

allowing the State to use an out-of-court identification as

substantive evidence of guilt, when the eye-witness did not

identify the defendant at trial.” The State presents the issue

somewhat differently, and states it as follows: “Whether the trial

court properly allowed into evidence the testimony of Detective

Sergeant Farmer identifying defendant from a series of

photographs?”

Although one may not generally impeach his own

witness, where a party is put to a disadvantage by unexpected

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 4 of 25
5

answers, a party may, for purposes of showing surprise or for

refreshing the witness’s recollection, ask his witness if he had

not made prior statements contrary to his instant testimony. This

is permissible, after proper predicate, even though its incidental

effect is to impeach the witness’s testimony. Under the theory

of surprise, the prosecution may elicit from a witness testimony

that he in fact made prior contradictory statements, and through

questioning may further elicit from the witness the contents of

prior statements through questioning. However, if the witness

denies having made the prior inconsistent statements, the

prosecution would not be allowed to bring in other parties to

prove the contents of the prior inconsistent statements. While

one’s own witness may be impeached by the use of prior

contradictory statements, such statements should not be treated

as original evidence of the facts of the case, nor be received for

any other purpose than that of contradicting or impeaching the

witness.

In the instant case, it is reasonable to assume that the

prosecution was surprised by witness Rigsby’s testimony that he

could not make an in-court identification of the appellant. He

had picked out the appellant in a photographic line-up prior to

trial. The prosecution certainly was put to a disadvantage to the

same extent by the unexpected testimony of the witness. Under

these circumstances the prosecution would have been entitled to

ask the witness about his prior identification of the appellant

upon laying the proper predicate. However, the prosecution did

not follow this course. When Rigsby was unable to make an incourt identification of appellant, the prosecuting attorney,

without attempting to lay a predicate for the purpose of showing

a prior inconsistent statement, continued questioning Rigsby and

elicited from him, without objection of appellant, the details

concerning his extrajudicial identification of the robber which

he had made at the photographic line-up. Rigsby identified the

photographs which he had been shown in the pre-trial

photographic spread and identified the photograph of the person

he saw fleeing the scene of the robbery, which he marked with

an “X” for identification. This testimony does not constitute

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 5 of 25
6

impeachment of witness Rigsby, as claimed by appellant. The

appellant did not cross-examine Rigsby in reference to his

testimony concerning the photographic line-up. The appellant

made no objection to the admission of witness Rigsby’s

testimony concerning the photographic line-up and extrajudicial

identification, and was apparently willing for it to come into

evidence.

The defendant may not raise an objection to evidence for

the first time on appeal, which was not raised at trial. Absent an

objection and an adverse ruling nothing is presented to this court

for review. Review on appeal applies only to rulings of the trial

court.

To preserve error there must be a timely and

appropriate objection prior to the witness’s

answer to a question or a motion to exclude.

Ordinarily, a witness’s testimony becomes legal

evidence if it is received without objection.

Hearsay evidence which is admitted without

objection becomes lawful evidence. The fact that

evidence which is introduced in a case may be, if

objected to, incompetent evidence under some

one or more exclusionary rules of evidence does

not destroy its probative effect, if it is admitted

without objection.

Since no objection was made by appellant to the

testimony of witness Rigsby concerning the photographic lineup and his extrajudicial identification of the robber, there is

nothing before us for review in this regard, and we believe that

any available objection which appellant may have had to this

testimony was waived. This testimony was therefore before the

jury for its consideration.

Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously allowed

Detective Farmer to testify about Rigsby’s extrajudicial

identification. The record does not support the appellant’s

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 6 of 25
7

contention that Farmer so testified. The trial court carefully

prevented Farmer from testifying about Rigsby’s out-of-court

identification, and sustained all of appellant’s objections to such

testimony. As we have heretofore stated, all of the testimony

regarding the extrajudicial identification came from Rigsby

without objection by appellant. Farmer testified that he showed

an array of photographs to Rigsby shortly after the robbery, and

he identified the photographs which made up the array. They

were the same photographs previously identified from the

witness stand by Rigsby. No objection was made by appellant

to this testimony. Farmer then, over the objection of appellant,

testified that the appellant’s photograph was in the array, and

that he knew this of his own personal knowledge, as he was

personally acquainted with the appellant and, in fact, had taken

the photograph himself. At that point, over the objection of

appellant, Farmer picked a photograph from the array and

positively identified it as being that of the appellant. The

photograph he picked was the photograph marked with an “X”,

which Rigsby had previously testified about and identified as a

photograph of the person he observed driving the getaway car at

the time of the robbery.

Evidence by a third party of an extrajudicial

identification is admissible in rebuttal of testimony tending to

impeach or discredit the identifying witness, or to rebut a

charge, imputation, or inference of falsity. This rule has no

application in the instant case, as no attempt was made by

appellant to impeach or discredit the witness, Rigsby, and

Farmer was not permitted to testify about Rigsby’s extrajudicial

identification, as alleged by appellant.

A party is not precluded by his witness’s unexpectedly

adverse or hostile testimony from proving by some other witness

that the facts in issue were otherwise than as stated by him, even

though such evidence directly contradicts and, hence, incidently

discredits the witness first called by him. In Southern Ry. Co. v.

Parks, supra, the Alabama Supreme Court stated the following:

A party has the right to contradict his own witness by

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 7 of 25
8

independent evidence showing the facts to be different from

those testified to by such witness, although the incidental effect

of the introduction of such evidence is to materially discredit the

witness, but a party cannot contradict his own witness where the

only effect of the contradiction is to impeach the witness, and

not give any material evidence upon any issue in the case.

A party may always correct or contradict the testimony

of his own witness, regardless of the restrictions or limitations

as to his impeachment of such witness, and such contradiction

may be made without a foundation therefor or a showing of

surprise. The testimony of one witness contradicting another is

not an impeachment of the witness so contradicted.

The identification by Detective Farmer of the photograph

of appellant tends to contradict Rigsby’s statement that he could

not identify the appellant in the courtroom. On the other hand,

it tends to support and corroborate the testimony of Rigsby in

that Rigsby’s identification of the photograph as that of the

robber is in fact an identification of the photograph of the

appellant at the time of the robbery. The testimony of Farmer

concerning the identification of the photograph of appellant was

independent and relevant evidence on the important issue of

identification, and was obviously not offered to impeach Rigsby,

but to explain, correct, and contradict the possible adverse

implications of Rigsby’s failure to make an in-court

identification of appellant. The State had the right to present the

testimony as it did, and its admission was proper.

The witness, Rigsby, made a positive identification of the

photograph soon after the robbery, when the robber’s image was

still fresh in his mind. He made a positive in-court identification

of the same photograph. His inability to make an in-court

identification of the appellant as the robber was obviously due

to the alteration of appellant’s appearance between the time of

the incident and the trial. The detective’s identification of the

photograph was based on his first-hand knowledge, and his

testimony was relevant to aid the jury in determining if the

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 8 of 25
9

person whose picture had been identified as that of the robber

was the same person who sat in the courtroom as the defendant.

Witnesses James Ian McIlwain and James Green testified at

trial, without objection, that they picked a photograph from the

pre-trial photographic array and identified it as a photograph of

the driver of the getaway car. The photograph they picked from

the array was the photograph of the appellant which had been

taken by Detective Farmer, and it was the same one identified

by Rigsby at the pre-trial line-up and at trial. They also, without

objection, identified the same photograph from the array of

photographs shown to them while on the witness stand. In

addition, they made a positive in-court identification of the

appellant as the driver of the getaway car and the person who

pointed a gun at them. It is clear from their testimony that their

in-court identification was based upon their observations of the

appellant at the scene of the robbery. It is equally clear that their

in-court identification was not influenced or tainted by the

photographic identification.

To summarize, there were three eye-witnesses involved

in the identification of appellant. Two of the witnesses

independently identified the appellant in court and related their

prior identification as well. The third witness independently

identified a photograph of the robber at trial, and related his

prior identification as well. The photograph picked by the third

witness at trial, and before, was the same photograph picked by

the other witnesses and was a photograph of the appellant. The

detective verifies that the photograph is that of the appellant. In

this situation each witness’s identifications, both at trial and

before, corroborate the other witnesses’s identifications. The

witnesses constitute three independent sources of identification,

each reaching the same conclusion, with one exception. That

exception being that the third witness failed to make an in-court

identification, which is understandable in view of the appellant’s

changed appearance. Great weight must be given to this

collective testimony. The failure of the third witness to make an

in-court identification was a fact for the jury to consider along

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 9 of 25
10

with all the other evidence of identification.

Assuming, arguendo, that the testimony of Detective

Farmer concerning the photograph of the appellant was

inadmissible at the time it was offered, it was rendered

prejudicially innocuous by subsequent trial testimony. The rule

is that testimony apparently illegal upon admission may be

rendered prejudicially innocuous by subsequent or prior legal

testimony to the same effect or from which the same facts can

be inferred. Witnesses McIlwain and Green, without objection

from the appellant, identified the same photograph previously

identified by Farmer as a photograph of the robber. If Farmer’s

testimony was inadmissible when presented, the later testimony

of McIlwain and Green to the same effect, and admitted without

objection, rendered Farmer’s testimony prejudicially innocuous.

It is also the rule that the admission of evidence though

it be incompetent, if it be of undisputed facts, is harmless. And,

the defendant cannot complain of the admission of improper

evidence where he himself testified to the same facts. The record

fails to disclose that appellant disputed the testimony that the

photograph marked “X” was a photograph of him. In fact, the

record indicates that appellant admitted on cross-examination

that he was the subject in the photograph. On page R-101 of the

transcript, the prosecuting attorney asked appellant the

following question: “Now, that is what you looked like back

then, is it not (indicating)?” Appellant’s answer was, “Yes, sir.”

It is obvious that the prosecuting attorney was referring to the

photograph in controversy, and it is equally obvious that

appellant admitted that it was a photograph of him. 

At trial, the case against the appellant was strong and

convincing. His defense was alibi. In addition to the

eyewitnesses who made positive in-court identifications of the

appellant as one of the robbers, there was additional evidence

presented by the State. The appellant attempted to sell a pistol

to his employer several days after the robbery. He told his

employer that the pistol was “hot” and might be the one used in

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 10 of 25
1 “Bell . . . filed two post conviction petitions in the late 1980's and early 1990's.”

(Doc. 14, at 2 ¶ 2)

11

the bank robbery. He did not tell his employer that he did not

participate in the robbery. He claimed that a person named

“Gyro” had had the gun. The police and F.B.I. agents could not

locate such a person and appellant’s efforts to assist them in

locating “Gyro” seemed less than wholehearted. One of the

automobiles used in the robbery was stolen from the street in

front of the house where appellant and others lived. The

testimony of the appellant, as well as that of his brother, who

attempted to support his alibi defense, was, to say the least,

unpersuasive.

For the reasons stated we find that the trial court was not in error

in admitting the testimony of witness Rigsby as to his

extrajudicial identification. Likewise, we find no error in the

trial court’s admitting the testimony of Detective Farmer as to

his identification of the photograph as that of appellant.

We have carefully searched the record for errors injuriously

affecting the substantial rights of appellant and have found none.

The judgment of conviction is due to be, and is hereby,

affirmed.

Id. at 170-175 (internal citations and case-specific quotation marks omitted).

Petitioner did not file a petition for rehearing in the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals nor did he file a petition for writ of certiorari to the Alabama Supreme

Court. (Doc. 1, at 3)

3. On November 15, 2004, Bell filed his third1

 post-conviction

collateral attack on his conviction and sentence in the Circuit Court of Mobile

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 11 of 25
12

County, Alabama. (Doc. 14, Exhibit A) The trial court summarily denied the

Rule 32 petition on January 13, 2005 and, on May 20, 2005, the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision by memorandum

opinion. (Id.)

In his petition, Bell claimed that he was convicted of

first-degree robbery, but had been indicted for second-degree

robbery. He also claimed that there was a fatal variance between

the indictment against him and the proof presented at trial. On

appeal, Bell reiterates his claims and contends that the circuit

court erred by denying his petition.

“[W]hen the facts are undisputed and an appellate court

is presented with pure questions of law, that court’s review in a

Rule 32 proceeding is de novo.” Ex parte White, 792 So.2d

1097, 1098 (Ala. 2001). “If the circuit court is correct for any

reason, even though it may not be the stated reason, we will not

reverse its denial of the petition. See Roberts v. State, 516 So.2d

936 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987).” Reed v. State, 748 So.2d 231, 233

(Ala.Crim.App. 1999).

Initially, we note that Bell’s claim that there was a fatal

variance between the indictment against him and the proof

presented at trial did not implicate the subject matter jurisdiction

of the trial court and, therefore, was subject to preclusion under

Rule 32. See Daniels v. State, 650 So.2d 544, 551

(Ala.Crim.App. 1994). Accordingly, this claim was precluded

by the period of limitations in Rule 32.2(c), and summary

disposition thereof was appropriate. See Rule 32.7(d),

Ala.R.Crim.P.

As for Bell’s indictment claim, we note that the

indictment against Bell charged that he

“did[,] in the course of committing a theft of

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 12 of 25
13

office supplies . . ., use force against the person of

[the victim], with intent to overcome her physical

resistance or physical power of resistance, while

[Bell], or another participant in the theft, was

armed with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a gun, in

violation of § 13A-8-41 of the Code of Alabama.”

(C. 33.) Section 13A-8-41 states that, in order for a person to

commit the crime of first-degree robbery, the person must

violate § 13A-8-43, Ala. Code 1975, and must be “armed with

a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument[] or [c]auses serious

physical injury to another.” Section 13A-8-43, Ala. Code 1975,

provides, in pertinent part, that a person commits the crime of

third-degree robbery “if in the course of committing a theft he

[u]ses force against the person of the owner or any person

present with intent to overcome his physical resistance or

physical power of resistance . . . .” The indictment tracked the

language of the statute and sufficiently apprised Bell of the

charge against him; therefore, the indictment was sufficient.

Smith v. State, 797 So.2d 503, 515 (Ala.Crim.App. 2000).

Because Bell failed to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted, summary disposition thereof was appropriate.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuit

court is affirmed.

(Id.) Bell’s petition for writ of certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court was

denied on August 12, 2005. (Doc. 14, Exhibit B)

4. On August 11, 2005, Bell filed another Rule 32 petition in the

Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, his fourth collateral attack on his

conviction and sentence. (Doc. 14, Exhibit C) The trial court summarily

dismissed Bell’s Rule 32 petition and, on January 26, 2006, the Alabama Court

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 13 of 25
14

of Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the petition by memorandum

opinion. (Id.) 

In his petition Bell claimed that the trial court did not

have jurisdiction to render judgment or to impose sentence

because, according to Bell, bank robbery, the conduct

underlying his robbery conviction, concerns federal subject

matter jurisdiction. Absent a response from the State, the circuit

court summarily dismissed the petition on the grounds that there

was no variance between the proof at trial and the indictment--a

claim not raised in the petition. We note that this claim was

raised in the petition Bell filed prior to the instant petition.

Bell reiterates his claim on appeal and claims that he is

entitled to a hearing on what he contends is a meritorious claim.

He also claims that the circuit court’s ruling should be reversed

because the trial court’s order was not responsive to his claim.

In reviewing the circuit court’s denial of Bell’s petition,

we will affirm the circuit court “[i]f the circuit court is correct

for any reason, even though it may not be the stated reason . . .

. See Roberts v. State, 516 So.2d 936 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987).” Reed

v. State, 748 So.2d 231, 233 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999); Ex parte

City of Fairhope, 739 So.2d 35, 39 (Ala. 1999).

There was no jurisdictional impediment to the State

trying Bell for bank robbery. Bell’s crime was subject to

prosecution by the State for first-degree robbery and by a federal

district court for bank robbery. See Brown v. United States, 551

F.2d 619, 620 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Although both convictions were

for the same acts they were obtained by separate sovereigns

under separate laws; thus, such convictions do not amount to

double jeopardy.[”).] . . . Thus, Bell was properly prosecuted for

the offense of first-degree robbery under § 13A-8-41, Ala. Code

1975.

As this claim is not jurisdictional, it is precluded by: Rule

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 14 of 25
15

32.2(b), Ala.R.Crim.P., because there has been no assertion

establishing “good cause” for failing to raise the claim in Bell’s

first petition; Rule 32.2(c), Ala.R.Crim.P., because Bell’s

petition was filed outside the limitations period; and by Rules

32.2(a)(3) and (5), Ala.R.Crim.P., because the claim could have

been, but was not, raised at trial and on appeal. Additionally, as

the premise of Bell’s claim is incorrect, the claim has no merit.

For the reasons set forth above, the circuit court’s

summary dismissal of Bell’s petition is affirmed.

(Id.) Bell’s petition for writ of certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court was

denied on April 14, 2006. (Doc. 14, Exhibit D) 

5. On August 3, 2006, Bell filed the present section 2254 petition

in this Court. (See Doc. 1, at 13-14 (petition signed by Bell on foregoing date

and this date is the date of the certificate of service))

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) was enacted on April 24, 1996 and, pertinent to this case, added

a new subdivision to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 providing for a one-year period of

limitations within which state prisoners must file their habeas corpus petitions

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Wilcox v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 158

F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998) cert. denied sub nom. Wilcox v. Moore, 531

U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 103, 148 L.Ed.2d 62 (2000). 

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 15 of 25
16

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run

from the latest of— 

 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review; 

 

 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted

toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

2. Subsections (B), (C), and (D) of § 2244(d)(1) clearly do not

apply to petitioner’s case and therefore, the timeliness of Bell’s petition must

be calculated under § 2244(d)(1)(A) based upon the date on which his

conviction became final. “For prisoners whose convictions became final prior

to the effective date of the AEDPA, the one-year statute of limitations

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 16 of 25
2 Under Alabama law, “[a]n application for rehearing and the brief in support of the

application must be filed with the clerk of the appropriate appellate court within 14 days (2

weeks) of the date the decision being questioned is issued[.]” Ala.R.App.P. 40(c). The filing of

an application for rehearing is a prerequisite for certiorari review by the Alabama Supreme

Court. Ala.R.App.P. 40(d)(1) (“In all criminal cases except pretrial appeals by the state, the

filing of an application for rehearing in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals is a prerequisite

to certiorari review by the Alabama Supreme Court.”). Bell’s failure to file an application for

rehearing in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and, thereafter, to seek certiorari review by

the Alabama Supreme Court prevented the court of last resort in Alabama from considering his

direct appeal; therefore, the Supreme Court of the United States clearly would have been unable

to consider Bell’s case on direct review. See Pugh v. Smith, 465 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir.

2006) (“The Supreme Court of the United States may grant a writ of certiorari to review the final

judgment of ‘the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had.’ . . . A defendant has

90 days from the judgment of the state court of last resort to file a petition for a writ of certiorari

in the Supreme Court of the United States. . . . In the absence of a clear statutory or

constitutional bar to higher state court review . . . the Supreme Court requires petitioners to seek

review in the state’s highest court before filing a petition for writ of certiorari.”). 

17

instituted by the AEDPA began to run on its effective date, i.e., April 24,

1996.” Guenther v. Holt, 173 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations

omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1085, 120 S.Ct. 811, 145 L.Ed.2d 683 (2000).

This rule from Guenther is applicable in this case since Bell’s conviction

became final in early 1985, that is, on or about March 2, 1985. See

Ala.R.App.P. 41(a) (“The certificate of judgment of the court shall issue 18

days after the entry of judgment unless the time is shortened or enlarged by

order. The timely filing of an application for rehearing2

 will stay the certificate

of judgment until disposition of the application unless otherwise ordered by the

court. If the application is denied, the certificate of judgment shall issue 18

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 17 of 25
3 Bell’s two collateral attacks on his conviction and sentence filed in the late 1980's

and the early 1990's do not have any impact upon the Court’s analysis of this issue since the oneyear limitations period did not begin to run until April 24, 1996. Tellingly, petitioner makes no

argument that either of these petitions tolled the limitations period. (See Doc. 18)

18

days after entry of the order denying the application unless the time is

shortened or enlarged by order.”). Accordingly, Bell’s limitations period

commenced on April 24, 1996 and expired on April 23, 1997, see Guenther,

supra, 173 F.3d at 1331, some nine years before he filed his § 2254

application.

3. Bell is unable to take advantage of the tolling provision built

into § 2244(d), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (“The time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted

toward any period of limitation under this section.”); Guenther, supra, 173

F.3d at 1331 (“‘The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation in [subsection (d)].’”), because the collateral attacks on his

conviction and sentence upon which he attempts to rely were not filed until

November 15, 2004 and August 11, 2005,3

 respectively, that is, after the oneyear statute of limitations expired under § 2244(d)(1). Cf. Webster v. Moore,

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 18 of 25
19

199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.) (“Under § 2244(d)(2), even ‘properly filed’

state-court petitions must be ‘pending’ in order to toll the limitations period.”),

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 991, 121 S.Ct. 481, 148 L.Ed.2d 454 (2000).

4. Bell asserts that the statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1) should not bar his petition since equitable tolling principles

apply. (See Doc. 18) It is Bell’s contention that since he is actually innocent

of the charge this Court should equitably toll the limitations period. (Id. at 3-8)

5. Recent decisions of the Eleventh Circuit have clearly embraced

the doctrine of equitable tolling with regard to the one-year limitations period

at issue: “Equitable tolling is to be applied when ‘”extraordinary

circumstances” have worked to prevent an otherwise diligent petitioner from

timely filing his petition.’ . . . Thus, the petitioner must show both

extraordinary circumstances and due diligence in order to be entitled to

equitable tolling.” Diaz v. Secretary for the Dept. of Corrections, 362 F.3d

698, 700-701 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “Section 2244 is a statute of

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Therefore, it permits equitable tolling

‘when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are

both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.’” Steed v. Head,

219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). Thus, the one-year

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 19 of 25
20

limitations provision need not be equitably tolled unless there is evidence that

“extraordinary circumstances” beyond petitioner’s control made it impossible

for him to file his petition on time. See Miller v. New Jersey State Dept. of

Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 618-619 (3rd Cir. 1998) (“[E]quitable tolling is

proper only when the ‘principles of equity would make [the] rigid application

[of a limitation period] unfair.’ . . . Generally, this will occur when the

petitioner has ‘in some extraordinary way . . . been prevented from asserting

his or her rights.’ . . . The petitioner must show that he or she ‘exercised

reasonable diligence in investigating and bringing [the] claims.’ . . . Mere

excusable neglect is not sufficient.”); Calderon v. United States District Court

for the Central District of California, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997)

(“Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time

will only be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s

control make it impossible to file a petition on time.”), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

1099, 118 S.Ct. 899, 139 L.Ed.2d 884 (1998) and cert. denied sub nom. Beeler

v. Calderon, 523 U.S. 1061, 118 S.Ct. 1389, 140 L.Ed.2d 648 (1998). “The

burden of establishing entitlement to this extraordinary remedy plainly rests

with the petitioner.” Drew v. Department of Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278, 1286

(11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Drew v. Crosby, 537 U.S. 1237, 123

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 20 of 25
21

S.Ct. 1364, 155 L.Ed.2d 205 (2003). Because of the onerous nature of the

burden on petitioners, the Eleventh Circuit has “rejected most claims for

equitable tolling.” Diaz, supra, 362 F.3d at 701(citations omitted). In this case,

Bell does not argue that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control

prevented him from filing a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

Court and, therefore, he is ineligible to take advantage of the type of equitable

tolling recognized in this circuit. Sibley v. Culliver, 377 F.3d 1196, 1204 (11th

Cir. 2004) (“‘In order to be entitled to the benefit of equitable tolling, a

petitioner must act with diligence, and the untimeliness of the filing must be

the result of circumstances beyond his control.’ . . . Sibley makes no effort to

demonstrate that he meets these criteria, and so is ineligible for equitable

tolling.”).

6. The Eleventh Circuit, to date, has not decided “whether there is

an ‘actual innocence’ exception to AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations.”

Helton v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections, 259 F.3d 1310, 1315

n.2 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Helton v. Moore,

535 U.S. 1080, 122 S.Ct. 1965, 152 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2002). In Wyzykowski v.

Department of Corrections, 226 F.3d 1213, 1218 (2000), the Eleventh Circuit

held that “the factual issue of whether the petitioner can make a showing of

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 21 of 25
22

actual innocence should be first addressed, before addressing the constitutional

issue of whether the Suspension Clause requires such an exception for actual

innocence.” Following Wyzykowski and Sibley, this Court should “decline to

reach the merits of this issue because, even assuming that § 2244's limitations

period could not be constitutionally applied to a prisoner who made a

sufficient showing of actual innocence,” 377 F.3d at 1205, Bell has failed to

do so. In this instance, of course, Bell contends that he has established, through

new evidence, his factual innocence of the crime for which he was convicted.

In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 317, 115 S.Ct. 851, 862, 130

L.Ed.2d 808 (1995), the Supreme Court held that a prisoner

attempting to make such a showing must raise “new facts” that

cast “sufficient doubt upon [his] guilt to undermine confidence

in the result of a trial without the assurance that the trial was

untainted by constitutional error.” In practical terms, this means

that the petitioner must show that “‘a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent.’ To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner

must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 327, 115 S.Ct. at 867 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at

496, 106 S.Ct. at 2649).

Sibley, supra, 377 F.3d at 1205; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324,

115 S.Ct. 851, 865, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) (A claim of actual innocence

“requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new

reliable evidence--whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 22 of 25
23

eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence--that was not presented at

trial.”). While petitioner has provided this Court with certain documents (FBI

interviews, etc.) he claims were not presented at his trial over twenty (20)

years ago (see Doc. 1, Attachments; Doc. 18, Attachments), this evidence

simply does not provide any basis for this Court to second-guess the jury’s

verdict. In fact, one of the FBI interviews which Bell has provided this Court

serves only to underscore the jury’s verdict inasmuch as it contains the

information that the eyewitness “advised that the photograph of Freddie Lee

Bell looked identical to the black male that was driving the aforementioned

Chevrolet sedan prior to entering the Plymouth Duster that sped away from the

Bel Air Mall parking lot.” (Doc. 1, Attachment 1) Nothing in this compilation

amounts to exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts,

or critical physical evidence which tends to establish that petitioner is not

guilty of first-degree robbery as the testimony of at least two eyewitnesses

established during his trial more than twenty years ago. Because Bell has failed

to make a sufficient showing of actual innocence, this Court need not address

the issue of whether there is an “actual innocence” exception to AEDPA’s

statute of limitations. 

 7. Because petitioner did not file his habeas corpus petition until

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 23 of 25
24

August 3, 2006, over nine years after the one-year limitations period expired,

his petition is due to be dismissed as time-barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d).

CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the instant petition be dismissed

as time-barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

The attached sheet contains important information regarding objections

to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DONE this the 7th day of December, 2006.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 24 of 25
25

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must,

within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual

findings of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en

banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate

Judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in

a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),

by filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation’

within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation,

unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is

made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to

the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be

reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a

brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection. 

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals;

only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 and FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and original

records in this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this

recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the

cost of the transcript.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00459-KD-C Document 19 Filed 12/07/06 Page 25 of 25