Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01151/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01151-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERT GEORGE CURTIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

HOME DEPOT U.S.A., Inc., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:13-cv-01151-AWI-GSA

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF‟S 

MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

(Doc. 18)

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Albert George Curtis (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against Defendants Home 

Depot U.S.A., Inc. and HD Development of Maryland, Inc. (“Defendants”) under Title III of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and related 

California disability laws. Plaintiff, who is physically disabled and uses a wheelchair, alleges 

that he visited a Home Depot store (“Store”) owned and/or operated by Defendants, on several 

occasions. Doc. 2, ¶¶ 7-10. Each time, his full and equal enjoyment of the facilities, goods and 

services offered by the Store was allegedly impeded by the lack of an accessible travel route 

from the designated disabled parking space to the Store‟s entrances in violation of the ADA. 

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Doc. 2, ¶ 10. Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, an injunction under the ADA requiring the Store to 

remove barriers to access related to his disability and monetary damages pursuant to provisions 

of California law. Doc. 2 at 8.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff‟s motion to amend his original complaint pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to include 

allegations that the Store has additional barriers to access related to Plaintiff‟s disabilities beyond 

those identified in the original complaint. Doc. 18-2, ¶ 11. Plaintiff‟s original complaint 

included only barriers that Plaintiff personally encountered when visiting the Store. Doc. 2. ¶ 10. 

The additional barriers Plaintiff now seeks to include were identified pursuant to a siteinspection conducted after the filing of the original complaint. Doc. 18-1 at 2.

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on July 24, 2013. Doc. 2. The Court‟s scheduling 

order thereafter set a deadline of January 10, 2014 for any amendments to the pleadings. Doc. 

17. Plaintiff filed the instant motion to amend the complaint on January 10, 2014. Doc. 18. 

Defendants filed an opposition on January 31, 2014. Doc. 20. Plaintiff filed a reply on February 

7, 2014. Doc. 23. The matter was set for hearing on March 7, 2014, but was taken under 

submission on the papers pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). 

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff‟s motion for leave to file a first amended 

complaint is GRANTED.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs amendments to pleadings. Rule 

15 provides that a complaint may be amended as a matter of course within 21 days after serving 

it or 21 days after service of a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 15(a)(1)(A) and (B). 

Rule 15 further provides that “[i]n all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the 

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opposing party‟s written consent or the court‟s leave. The Court should freely give leave when 

justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 15(a)(2). As a general matter, courts apply Rule 15(a) 

with “extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 

2003); also see DCD Programs Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[r]ule 15‟s 

policy of favoring amendments to pleadings should be applied with extreme liberality”) 

(parentheses in original, internal quotation marks omitted). 

In determining whether to grant leave to amend, courts consider a number of factors 

identified by the Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962). These factors, known 

as the Foman factors, include (1) bad faith on the part of the movant; (2) undue delay or dilatory 

motive on the part of the movant; (3) repeated failure on the part of the movant to cure 

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed; (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party by 

virtue of allowance of the amendment; and (5) futility of the amendment. Eminence Capital, 316 

F.3d at 1052; also see Griggs v. Pace. Amer. Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(consideration of a motion to amend based on Foman factors “should generally be performed 

with all inferences in favor of granting the motion”). 

The Foman factors do not all merit equal weight. Rather, the Ninth Circuit has held that 

“it is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the greatest weight,” such 

that “[p]rejudice is the touchstone of the inquiry under rule 15(a).” Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d 

at 1052 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[a]bsent prejudice, or a strong 

showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in 

favor of granting leave to amend.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also DCD Programs, 833 F.2d 

186-87 (noting that the party opposing amendment “bears the burden of showing prejudice” and 

that “delay, by itself, is insufficient to justify denial of leave to amend”).

///

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III.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings multiple claims under the ADA in this action. Plaintiff alleges that 

“Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff” by denying him “full and equal enjoyment” and 

“use of the goods, services, facilities, privileges and accommodations” of the Store during 

repeated visits. Doc. 2, ¶ 18. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants discriminated against him 

by failing to remove architectural barriers which could readily be removed; failing to modify 

existing policies and procedures to make goods, services and facilities accessible to people with 

disabilities; failing to design and construct an accessible facility; and failing to make an altered 

facility accessible. Doc. 2, ¶¶ 19- 32. Plaintiff‟s original complaint identified a barrier to access 

that he personally encountered when visiting the Store, i.e., the lack of an accessible route of 

travel from a designated disabled parking space to the Store‟s entrances. Doc. 2, ¶ 10. Plaintiff 

now seeks leave to amend the complaint to include additional barriers to his access that were 

identified during an on-site inspection of the subject premises that took place after the original 

complaint was filed. 

Defendants oppose Plaintiff‟s motion to amend on grounds that it is brought in bad faith 

to increase the nuisance settlement value of this lawsuit; that the proposed amendment is futile 

because it contravenes the pleading standard for ADA barriers cases set forth in Chapman v. Pier 

1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 631 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2011); that the proposed amendment is futile and 

prejudicial because the barriers it seeks to add are not located on premises owned or controlled 

by Defendants; and, finally, that the proposed amendment would prejudice Defendants by 

affecting their internal case management processes. Doc. 20. 

///

///

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A. The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)

The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in the “full and equal 

enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any 

place of public accommodation” with a nexus in interstate commerce. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a), 

2000a(b). In the context of existing facilities, discrimination includes, inter alia, “a failure to 

remove architectural barriers ... where such removal is readily achievable” as well as “a failure 

to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications 

are necessary to afford such ... facilities ... to individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. §§

12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (iv). In the case of newly constructed facilities, compliance with the 

ADA‟s antidiscrimination mandate requires these facilities to be “readily accessible to and 

usable by individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1).

Private plaintiffs may only sue for injunctive relief under the ADA. Chapman v. Pier 1 

Imports (U.S.), Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011). The ADA clarifies that the ability to 

pursue this relief extends to “any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of 

disability ... or who has reasonable grounds for believing that such person is about to be 

subjected to discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1). Further, in order to establish standing to 

sue under the ADA, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that he has suffered an injury-in-fact, that the 

injury is traceable to the [defendant] Store‟s actions, and that the injury can be redressed by a 

favorable decision.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 946; also see Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 

F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing includes 

three elements: (1) injury in fact; (2) causation; and (3) redressability.”) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted); Doran, 524 F.3d at 1042 n. 5 (“Once a disabled individual has 

encountered or become aware of alleged ADA violations that deter his patronage of or otherwise 

interfere with his access to a place of public accommodation, he has already suffered an injury in 

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fact traceable to the defendant‟s conduct and capable of being redressed by the courts, and so he 

possesses standing under Article III.”). In addition, in order to establish standing to pursue the 

injunctive relief available under the ADA, a plaintiff “must demonstrate a real and immediate 

threat of repeated injury in the future.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 946 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

B. An ADA Plaintiff Can Sue for Injunctive Relief as to Encountered and Unencountered Barriers Related to His Disability

Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to add unencountered barriers to access that were 

not included in his original complaint. Therefore, the Court briefly addresses at the outset 

whether an ADA plaintiff may sue for the removal of unencountered barriers to his access that 

exist at the facility in question.

In the landmark Chapman case, the Ninth Circuit clarified “that when an ADA plaintiff 

has suffered an injury-in-fact by encountering a barrier that deprives him of full and equal 

enjoyment of the facility due to his particular disability, he has standing to sue for injunctive 

relief as to that barrier and other barriers related to his disability.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 944; 

also see Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[a]n ADA plaintiff who 

has Article III standing as a result of at least one barrier at a place of public accommodation may, 

in one suit, permissibly challenge all barriers in that public accommodation that are related to his 

or her specific disability”). Thus, under Chapman and Doran, an ADA plaintiff “need not have 

personally encountered all the barriers that impede his access to the [defendant] Store in order to 

seek an injunction to remove those barriers.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 951. In sum, if an ADA 

plaintiff “has standing to pursue injunctive relief as to some of the barriers that he actually 

encountered, then he has standing to seek an order requiring the removal of all barriers at the

[defendant] Store that are related to his disability and that he is likely to encounter on future

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visits.”1 Id.

C. Propriety of the Proposed Amendment under the Foman Factors2

(i) There is no Prejudice to the Defendant

Plaintiff‟s original complaint identified only the barriers that Plaintiff personally 

encountered during visits to the Store. Doc. 2, ¶ 10. However, the complaint specifically noted 

that Plaintiff would amend the complaint to add unencountered barriers related to his disability

that may exist at the Store, if and when any such barriers were identified. Doc. 2, ¶ 11 (“it is 

Plaintiff‟s intention to have all barriers which exist at the Facility and relate to his disabilities 

removed to afford him full and equal access”). 

Plaintiff also noted his intent to amend the complaint to add unencountered barriers, in 

the parties‟ joint scheduling report. Doc. 15 at 2. Specifically, Plaintiff stated as follows:

Plaintiff reserves the right to amend his complaint after he has had the 

Facility inspected by a Certified Access Specialist[,] should additional 

barriers to his full and equal access be identified[,] as urged and required by 

the Ninth Circuit. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 

944 (9th Cir. 2011); Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 909 (9th 

Cir. 2011). 

Doc. 15 at 2. The Court‟s scheduling order subsequently set a deadline of January 10, 2014 for 

any amendments to the pleadings, which deadline Plaintiff has met here. See Doc. 18.

Since Defendants have been on notice since the inception of this case that Plaintiff would 

amend his complaint to specify additional barriers to access related to his disability after an 

appropriate investigation, Plaintiff‟s proposed amendment does not unduly prejudice 

 

1 The rationale for this rule is clear: “[t]he ADA‟s remedial scheme is not limited to orders for the removal of 

encountered barriers, but instead dictates that „injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such 

facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.‟” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2)).

2

Since this is the first amendment sought by Plaintiff, the Foman factor of “repeated failure on the part of the 

movant to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed” is not applicable here. See Eminence Capital, 316 

F.3d at 1052.

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Defendants.3 Defendants were aware that such an amendment was forthcoming, and were thus 

in a position to plan for it and factor it into their defense of this case. The Foman factor of 

prejudice to the defendant therefore militates in favor granting the proposed amendment. 

(ii) There is no Bad Faith or Undue Delay on Plaintiff’s Part

In his moving papers, Plaintiff explains that his expert consultant inspected the Store‟s 

premises on December 11, 2013 and provided a report to Plaintiff‟s counsel on January 2, 2014. 

Shortly thereafter, on January 6, 2014, Plaintiff “provided the proposed First Amended 

Complaint, together with a stipulation for its filing via email to counsel for Defendants.” Doc. 

18-1 at 2. When Defendants‟ counsel did not stipulate to the filing of the proposed First 

Amended Complaint, Plaintiff timely filed the instant motion to amend on January 10, 2014. 

Doc. 18-1 at 2. These facts demonstrate to the Court‟s satisfaction that the proposed amendment 

is not sought in bad faith or with a dilatory motive on Plaintiff‟s part.4 

(iii) The Proposed Amendment is not Futile

Leave to amend may be denied where the proposed amendment would be futile or legally 

insufficient. Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants argue 

that the proposed amendments are futile because Plaintiff has not shown that the newlyidentified barriers are connected to his disability or “explain[ed] how he was denied full and 

 

3 Given that Defendants have been on notice that Plaintiff would seek to amend its complaint and the fact that the 

Court‟s scheduling order authorized amendments to the pleadings initiated on or before January 10, 2014, 

Defendants‟ argument that the proposed amendment is prejudicial because it will force them to “re-start its 

discovery and internal investigation efforts” is unavailing. Doc. 20 at 9. Moreover, Defendants‟ argument that the 

proposed amendment is prejudicial because one of the barriers that Plaintiff seeks to add would “implicate areas that 

Defendant neither owns nor controls,” is also not persuasive, because it is premised on a factual dispute that is not 

appropriately resolved at the pleadings stage of the proceedings. Doc. 20 at 9.

4 Defendants‟ argument that Plaintiff is attempting to “shake down” Defendants and his motion to file an amended 

complaint is brought in bad faith so as to “increase the nuisance settlement value of this law suit” is unpersuasive. 

Doc. 20 at 2-3. See Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1062 (9th Cir. 2007); Morales v. Ralphs 

Grocery Co., 2012 WL 6087699, *8 (E.D. Cal., Dec. 6, 2012). Defendants‟ counsel is also admonished for citing 

authorities that were vacated and/or overruled, in support of this argument. See Morales, 2012 WL 6087699 at *8 

(admonishing Defendants‟ counsel for citing the same authorities in support of a similar argument).

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equal access as a result of these alleged barriers as required by Chapman.” Doc. 20 at 8. 

In Chapman, the Ninth Circuit clarified “that when an ADA plaintiff has suffered an 

injury-in-fact by encountering a barrier that deprives him of full and equal enjoyment of the 

facility due to his particular disability, he has standing to sue for injunctive relief as to that 

barrier and other barriers related to his disability.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 944. The plaintiff in 

Chapman, however, failed to “sufficiently allege the essential elements of Article III standing” in 

the first instance. Id. at 954. Specifically, the plaintiff never clarified which architectural 

barriers he personally encountered when visiting the defendant store in that case. Id. at 954. The 

Ninth Circuit therefore found that because the plaintiff had not satisfied the injury-in-fact 

requirement of Article III standing (i.e., that he personally suffered discrimination under the 

ADA on account of his disability), he lacked standing to bring any ADA claim at all. Id. at 944, 

954-955.

Here, the Plaintiff satisfied the requirements of Article III standing in his original 

complaint, which fact Defendants do not challenge. Plaintiff‟s original complaint states that 

Plaintiff is physically disabled and restricted to a wheel chair, and has personally encountered a 

barrier related to his disability (i.e., the lack of an accessible travel route from the disabled 

parking space to the Store‟s entrances), that interfered with his access to the Store‟s facilities, 

goods and services during multiple visits to the Store. Doc. 2, ¶¶ 7-10. The complaint also 

alleges that Plaintiff intends to return to the Store once the barriers are removed. Doc. 2, ¶ 12. 

Plaintiff now seeks to amend his original complaint only to include additional, unencountered barriers related to his disability, which were identified after the filing of the original 

complaint. Under Ninth Circuit precedents, Plaintiff must include in his complaint all barriers 

that form the grounds for his ADA discrimination claims. See Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 

F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2011) (an ADA plaintiff must identify barriers to access in his complaint 

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rather than permitting notice of each barrier to defendants through discovery); Pickern v. Pier 1 

Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 969 (9th Cir. 2006). Both Oliver and Pickern clarify that 

when an ADA plaintiff identifies, after the filing of his initial complaint, additional barriers to 

access that are related to his disability, he must, in order to comply with the pleading 

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), include those additional barriers in an 

amended complaint. Under Rule 8(a), the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what 

the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007) (internal ellipses and citation omitted); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 

512 (2002) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires that the allegations in the complaint “give the 

defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff‟s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”); also 

see Oliver, 654 F.3d at 908-909 (“Where the claim is one of discrimination under the ADA due 

to the presence of architectural barriers at a place of public accommodation, we have held that 

the relevant „grounds‟ are the allegedly non-compliant architectural features at the facility,” 

which must be alleged in the complaint.); Pickern, 457 F.3d at 968-969.

Under Oliver and Pickern, Plaintiff is required to include all barriers that relate to his 

discrimination claim in his complaint, so as to give fair notice to Defendants of the grounds 

underlying his ADA claims. Plaintiff‟s proposed first amended complaint specifically alleges 

that the un-encountered barriers he now seeks to add are related to his disability, and the barriers 

identified in the proposed amendment do appear to be reasonably related to Plaintiff‟s disability. 

Hence, the proposed amendment is proper under Rule 8(a) and Chapman’s holding that upon 

establishing standing, an ADA plaintiff may sue for the removal of all barriers to access that are 

related to his disability. 5 In other words, Plaintiff‟s proposed First Amended Complaint

 

5 The “proper test to be applied when determining the legal sufficiency of a proposed amendment is identical to the 

one used when considering the sufficiency of a pleading challenged under Rule 12(b)(6)).” Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, 

Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

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adequately pleads facts to demonstrate that Plaintiff has standing to bring his discrimination 

claims in this action and provides fair notice to Defendants of all the grounds underlying these 

claims.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff‟s proposed amendment comports with the holdings of 

Chapman, Oliver, and Pickern, and is not futile.6 Consequently, the final Foman factor, i.e. 

whether the proposed amendment is futile, also weighs in favor of allowing the amendment.

ORDER

Given that all the applicable Foman factors favor allowing Plaintiff‟s proposed 

amendment, Plaintiff‟s motion for leave to file a first amended complaint is GRANTED. The 

Clerk of this Court is directed to file the First Amended Complaint provided as Exhibit A to 

Plaintiff‟s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of his motion. Doc. 18-2. The first 

amended complaint shall be deemed filed as of the date of this order. Defendants shall file a 

responsive pleading on or before May 2, 2014.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 11, 2014 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (internal punctuation and citations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678.

6 Moreover, Defendants‟ argument that the proposed amendment is futile because one of the barriers that Plaintiff 

seeks to add would “implicate areas that Defendant neither owns nor controls,” is also not persuasive, because it is 

premised on a factual dispute that is not appropriately resolved at the pleadings stage of the proceedings. Doc. 20 at 

9.

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