Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00398/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00398-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2003 Job Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

SHARON L. LEUZINGER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF LAKE,

Defendant. 

No. C 06-0398 SBA

ORDER

[Docket Nos. 24, 36, 37, 38]

Before the Court is defendant County of Lake’s motion for summary judgment [Docket No. 24].

The County of Lake has also submitted three objections to declarations submitted by the plaintiff

[Docket Nos. 36-38]. 

After reading and considering the arguments presented by the parties, the Court finds these

matters appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See FED.R.CIV.P. 78. For the reasons that follow,

the motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The three objections to the declarations are

SUSTAINED. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Sharon L. Leuzinger is alleging that her former employer, defendant County of Lake,

violated various federal and state disability statutes by refusing to allow her to return to her position

after she took medical leave for breast cancer treatment. Leuzinger worked for sixteen years as a

correctional officer at the Juvenile Hall of County of Lake’s Probation Department. Since 2000,

Leuzinger was a Senior Juvenile Correctional Officer. In July 1998, while supervising a game,

Leuzinger was struck with a baseball and sustained a fracture of the pisiform bone in her left wrist. In

July 2002, Leuzinger underwent surgery to repair her wrist. Leuzinger had a second operation on her

left wrist on June 6, 2003. 

On March 28, 2004, Leuzinger stopped working because she had been diagnosed with breast

cancer. Leuzinger took medical leave for surgery and for follow-up radiation treatments. The medical

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leave commenced on March 31, 2004, and continued through November 1, 2004. 

In March 2004, Leuzinger was scheduled to rotate to the “graveyard shift.” On April 12, 2004,

Leuzinger met with Chief Probation Officer Steven Buchholz to express her concern that she had been

scheduled to work with a new part-time employee on the graveyard shift. On the nighttime shift only

two correctional officers are on duty. Leuzinger mentioned that she was still experiencing problems

with her wrist and that it might be aggravated by working with a new employee if that new officer was

unable to effectively back her up in the event she needed to restrain a ward. Leuzinger requested that

she be paired with an experienced correctional officer when she was to come back and take the

graveyard shift. 

On May 8, 2004, Leuzinger received a letter from the County’s workers compensation insurance

carrier declaring that she could not return to her regular job duties because she could not perform the

essential functions of her position due to the problems related to her wrist. 

On May 20, 2004, Leuzinger met with Jennifer Hammond, an employee in the County’s Risk

Management Department. Leuzinger again raised her concern about working on the graveyard shift

with an inexperienced officer and suggested that she could perform on the graveyard shift as long as she

was paired with an experienced officer. Leuzinger states that despite her efforts, Hammond appeared

unwilling to consider placing her back in her former position. Instead, Hammond suggested that

Leuzinger apply for a lateral transfer, which Leuzinger did on May 25th. See Docket No. 33, Ex. 18.

Leuzinger later received a letter dated June 4, 2004, from Jeff Rein, Lake County Risk Manager,

stating that there was “no manner in which [her] work restriction [could] be reasonably accommodated

in order for [her] to return to work as a Senior Juvenile Correction Officer,” and that until an

accommodation or alternate position was located, Leuzinger could not work in Juvenile Hall. Docket

No. 33, Ex. 19.

On June 16, 2004, Leuzinger applied for industrial disability retirement. In her application,

Leuzinger stated that “I am to avoid lifting more than 7 pounds and limit the amount of time I have to

restrain a juvenile. I have to be able to restrain a juvenile at any time.” Docket No. 29, Ex. B23. On

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December 21, 2004, Leuzinger was approved for disability retirement and retired from the Juvenile Hall

corrections position. 

It is Leuzinger’s position that “[i]t was not until shortly after she informed her employer of her

diagnosis of breast cancer and began a medical leave for surgery and radiation in mid-2004 that the

County decided that she was no longer able to perform the duties of her corrections officer job allegedly

because of restrictions related to her wrist injury.” Docket No. 32, at 1. Despite her wrist injury,

Leuzinger had been performing the position of a Senior Juvenile Correctional Officer for nine months

without a problem prior to her medical leave. 

Leuzinger filed a complaint of discrimination with the California Department of Fair

Employment and Housing around September 9, 2004. The Department issued a notice of right to sue

on September 6, 2005. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued a right to sue letter on

October 20, 2005. 

In her amended complaint before this Court, Leuzinger asserts causes of action for: (1) violation

of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) discrimination based on a disability in violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act; (3) disability-based discrimination in contravention of California Government Code

section 12940(a); (4) discrimination on the basis of a medical condition in violation of California

Government Code sections 12940(a) and 12926(h); (5) failure to engage in an interactive process

pursuant to California Government Code section 12940(n); (6) failure to accommodate a disability under

California Government Code section 12940(m); (7) unlawful discharge and discrimination under the

Family and Medical Leave Act; (8) unlawful discharge and discrimination under the California Family

Rights Act; and (9) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. See Docket No. 22 (Am.

Compl.). 

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED.R.CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

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U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate that there are no

genuine issues of material fact. See Horphag v. Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir.

2007). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Rivera v. Philip

Morris, Inc., 395 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005). An issue is “material” if its resolution could affect

the outcome of the action. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Rivera, 395 F.3d at 1146. 

In responding to a properly supported summary judgment motion, the non-movant cannot merely

rely on the pleadings, but must present specific and supported material facts, of significant probative

value, to preclude summary judgment. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 586 n.11 (1986); Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002); Federal

Trade Comm’n v. Gill, 265 F.3d 944, 954 (9th Cir. 2001). In determining whether a genuine issue of

material fact exists, the court views the evidence and draws inferences in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Sullivan v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 365 F.3d 827,

832 (9th Cir. 2004); Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 362 F.3d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 2004).

ANALYSIS

Lake County’s summary judgment motion is based on the following arguments: (1) Leuzinger

should be estopped from asserting a claim for disability discrimination; (2) Leuzinger is not a “qualified

individual” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the California Fair Employment and

Housing Act (FEHA); (3) the County engaged in the “interactive process” required and sought

reasonable accommodation for Leuzinger; (4) the employment decisions made by the County were

based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons; (5) Leuzinger was not eligible nor on leave pursuant

to the Lake County Family Care and Medical Leave Policy; and (6) Leuziner was not terminated from

her employment. Because several of the County’s arguments are cursory, the motion is best analyzed

in terms of the relevant statutes and whether the County has demonstrated that are no genuine issues of

material fact with regard to Leuziner’s asserted causes of action pursuant to those statutes. Both parties

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focus mostly on the Leuzinger’s claim under the ADA, so that is an appropriate starting point. 

1. ADA and FEHA

Under the ADA, an employer discriminates against a qualified individual with a disability by

“not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise

qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the employer] can

demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business

of [the employer].” Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)) (emphasis omitted). To sustain a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff

must show that (1) she is “disabled” within the meaning of the Act; (2) she is a “qualified individual”

able to perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation; and (3) she suffered

an adverse employment action because of her disability. See Allen v. Pacific Bell, 348 F.3d 1113, 1114

(9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003).

a. “Disabled”

Lake County does not challenge that Leuzinger is “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA

and FEHA for the purposes of the present motion. See Docket No. 24, at 3 n.2. 

b. “Qualified Individual”

Lake County does maintain that Leuzinger is not a “qualified individual” under the ADA and

FEHA. Lake County proffers two main arguments: (1) that Leuzinger should be judicially estopped

from claiming that she is a qualified individual; and (2) Leuzinger is not a qualified individual within

the meaning of the ADA or FEHA because she cannot perform the essential functions of the Supervisor

Juvenile Correctional Officer with or without an accommodation. 

i. Judicial Estoppel

Lake County maintains that the allegations of Leuzinger’s complaint are irreconcilable with and

contradictory to statements made in her applications for a lateral transfer and industrial disability

benefits. In her complaint, Leuzinger takes the position that she is a “qualified individual” that could

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perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodation. In her June 16, 2004

application for industrial disability retirement, Leuzinger stated that “I am to avoid lifting more than 7

pounds and limit the amount of time I have to restrain a juvenile. I have to be able to restrain a juvenile

at any time.” Docket No. 29, Ex. B23. Lake County argues that based on her representations that she

lacked the capacity to perform her job functions in her disability application, Leuzinger should be

judicially estopped from now claiming that she is a qualified individual who could perform the essential

functions of her position. 

The County relies primarily upon Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795

(1999), in support of judicial estoppel. In Cleveland, the Supreme Court noted that 

a plaintiff’s sworn assertion in an application for disability benefits that she is, for

example, “unable to work” will appear to negate an essential element of her ADA

case—at least if she does not offer a sufficient explanation. For that reason, we hold that

an ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore the apparent contradiction that arises out of the

earlier SSDI total disability claim. Rather, she must proffer a sufficient explanation.

Id. at 806.

Leuzinger offers the following explanation:

Having received no information about other jobs, by mid-June 2004, Plaintiff became

very concerned that once her accrued sick leave and compensatory time off ran out, she

would have no source of income and while she was battling cancer, no health insurance.

At 52 years old, she had no plans or desire to retire but feeling despondent about having

been forced out of her long-time career, she saw no alternative other than to apply for

disability retirement benefits. She was aware that if the County did at some point, permit

her to return to her job or provide a comparable job, she could withdraw the application.

Docket No. 32, at 8.

Leuzinger further explains that the filing of her application for disability retirement benefits was

prompted solely by the County’s refusal to allow her to return to her job. In an addendum to her

disability application Leuzinger specifically stated that “I have had limited ability in regards to take

downs since the injury to my wrist in 1998 and although I feel that I am still able to do the job, I was

fired anyway.” Docket No. 33, Ex. 20. At the time she applied for disability benefits, Leuzinger had

been informed by the County that it regarded her as disabled and as unable to perform the essential

functions of her position. Leuzinger was at the time using up accrued time to accommodate her medical

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leave of absence. 

This is a sufficient explanation in light of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Johnson v. Oregon

Department of Human Resources, 141 F.3d 1361 (9th Cir. 1998). In that case, the Ninth Circuit held

that a person’s representation that she is disabled for purposes of disability benefits is not an automatic

bar to an ADA claim that she is a qualified individual with a disability. Id. at. 1367. The court noted

that due to different definitions of “disability,” it is possible to qualify for disability benefits and to

satisfy the ADA’s definition of a qualified person with a disability and therefore that a person’s

representations that she is disabled for purposes of disability benefits is not necessarily inconsistent with

her representation that she is a qualified individual under the ADA. Id. at 1366-67. And the Johnson

court made very clear that in most cases, a straight-forward summary judgment analysis rather than

theories of estoppel is appropriate. Id. at 1369. Judicial estoppel should be limited to situations where

a party’s position is tantamount to a knowing misrepresentation to or even fraud on the court. Id. 

The statement that she had to “limit the amount of time I have to restrain a juvenile,” is not the

same as flat declaration that she could not restrain a juvenile ward. Cf. id. at 1368 (distinguishing

unconditional assertions as to disability and the ability to work) And it was reasonable for Leuzinger

to apply for disability benefits given that at the time it was the County’s position that she was disabled

and would not be allowed to return to her former employment. There is nothing in Leuzinger’s

statements suggesting that she is attempting to work a fraud upon the Court. Therefore it is more

appropriate to engage in a more traditional summary judgment analysis rather than invoke an equitable

doctrine to preclude Leuzinger from asserting her claim. 

ii. “Qualified Individual” under the ADA and FEHA

Lake County’s main contention in its summary judgment motion is that Leuzinger is not a

“qualified individual” within the meaning of the ADA or FEHA because she cannot perform the

essential functions of the Supervisor Juvenile Correctional Officer with or without an accommodation,

due to her left wrist. In particular, the County maintains that the ability to physically restrain wards and

to be capable of lifting up to fifty pounds are essential functions of a Senior Juvenile Correctional

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Officer. 

The ADA defines a “qualified individual” as an individual “with a disability who, with or

without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that

such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving she

is “qualified.” See Dark v. Curry County, 451 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.

1252 (2007); Hutton v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The term “essential functions” refers to the “fundamental job duties of the employment position

the individual with a disability holds or desires;” it does not “include the marginal functions of the

position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1); see also Dark, 451 F.3d at 1087. If a disabled person cannot

perform a job’s “essential functions” (even with a reasonable accommodation), then the ADA’s

employment protections do not apply. See Cripe v. City of San Jose, 261 F.3d 877, 884 (9th Cir. 2001).

The ADA does not require an employer to exempt an employee from performing essential functions or

to reallocate essential functions to other employees. See Dark, 451 F.3d at 1089. To avoid summary

judgment, however, the plaintiff need only show that an accommodation seems reasonable on its face.

See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-02 (2002); Dark, 451 F.3d at 1088. 

For her part, the “Plaintiff does not contest the fact that restraint of wards was an essential

function of her job . . .” Docket No. 32, 13. Leuzinger counters that she was able to perform the

essential functions and the necessary duties of the correctional officer position, as proven by her

working in that capacity from July 8, 2003 (when she was released back to work following the second

wrist surgery) through March 31, 2004 (when she left for medical leave due to breast cancer), without

difficulties. Leuzinger asserts the fact that she did the job for nine months without problem belies any

contention that she is not able to do the job. Such an empirical fact would seem to seriously undermine

the County’s contrary position. 

As for the ability to lift up to fifty pounds as an “essential function” of being a Senior Juvenile

Correctional Officer, Lake County’s job description for a “Senior Juvenile Correctional Officer” states

that the ability to “lift and move objects weighing up to 50 lbs. without assistance” is a “typical”

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physical requirement for the position. Docket No. 29, Ex. 9. A “typical” physical requirement is not

quite the same as a “fundamental job dut[y] of the employment position the individual with a disability

holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Moreover, as will be touched upon below, her doctor

suggested that she was limited to lifting no more than seven pounds with her left wrist. Assuming this

was the case, this does not show how much Leuzinger could or could not lift in total when using both

extremities. As suggested by her doctor, Leuzinger was capable of compensating her physical activities

with the use of her right hand. 

The County also suggests that “physician-imposed limitations precluding her from performing

the essential functions of her position as SJCO.” Docket No. 24, at 12. The are two relevant physician

reports on the issue of Leuzinger’s work-related limitations, neither of which conclusively demonstrates

that she could not perform the essential functions of the position. 

Dr. David Nelson reported that Leuzinger could return to work as a Senior Juvenile Correctional

Officer without restrictions effective July 8, 2003. On December 1, 2003, Dr. Nelson issued the

following report on Leuzinger’s condition:

In terms of preclusions and work restrictions, I have suggested that the patient can return

to normal duties without restrictions, since any time we gave her restrictions, placed her

into a different job which ended up being actually more demanding to her wrist and it

was unacceptable to the patient. I think it is reasonable for her to avoid lifting more than

approximately seven pounds with her left wrist. She should not do handwriting for more

than fifteen minutes at a time without taking at least a five-minute break and she needs

to limit the amount of times that she has to forcefully restrain a client. By that I am

referring to the physical restraining of a juvenile, having to force them to the ground or

stop them from doing something they are aggressively trying to do. However, I don’t

think that any of these should stop her from doing her normal job since she is able to

compensate using her right hand, have a co-workers assist her, making two trips rather

than carrying everything at once, etc.

Docket No. 29, Ex. 18. 

Dr. Joseph Matan was asked to evaluate whether he agreed with Dr. Nelson’s work preclusions.

On March 1, 2004, Dr. Matan issued his report largely concurring with Dr. Nelson’s assessment. In the

section of his report addressing work restrictions, Dr. Matan stated:

Dr. Nelson, who has seen her on multiple occasions and operated on her twice, has come

up with very specific restrictions. In my opinion she should have those restrictions. I

would state from an overall point of view she has disability precluding heavy or

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repetitive use of her left upper extremity.

Docket No. 29, Ex. 19.

There are a number of difficulties with relying on these physician reports as “physician-imposed

limitations.” First, the limitations imposed are equivocal. Dr. Nelson suggests both that she can return

to work without restrictions and that there are some limitations or restrictions on the use of her left wrist.

In either case though, Dr. Nelson explicitly declares that Leuzinger could continue doing her normal

work. What his report seems to be are suggestions to prevent Leuzinger from aggravating her left wrist;

it is not a conclusion that she was unable to perform the functions of her job. 

Second, the suggestion that “she needs to limit the amount of times that she has to forcefully

restrain a client” is not an declaration that Leuzinger was incapable of performing the essential function

of restraining wards; it an assertion that Leuzinger needed to limit how often she had to use force. And

given that Leuzinger apparently did restrain wards as necessary for a period of nine months takes away

some credence from the County’s reliance upon this finding to support its conclusion that Leuzinger

could not perform this essential function. 

Therefore, there is at least a genuine factual dispute as to whether Leuzinger was a “qualified

individual” for the purposes of the ADA and FEHA at the time of the adverse employment action. The

facts viewed favorably to Leuzinger show that she was performing as a Senior Juvenile Correctional

Officer for almost nine full months, apparently satisfactorily and capably. And although it is not

specified in the summary judgment record, this also apparently included the ability to physically restrain

wards. If so, she was performing the essential functions of the position without accommodation. If, on

the other hand, Leuzinger was not physically restraining wards during that nine month period, this

would suggest that this is not truly an essential function of the position. 

Leuzinger did suggest that she needed accommodation to perform duties of the position in

anticipation of being place on the graveyard shift with only one inexperienced co-worker. As an

accommodation, Leuzinger suggested that she be placed on the graveyard shift with an experienced coworker instead. Viewed favorably to Leuzinger, the facts suggest that in reacting to this request, the

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County engaged in the following line of deliberation: Leuzinger requested an accommodation—that she

be paired with an experienced correctional officer when assigned to the graveyard shift. The County

determined that it could not accommodate this request. Because it could not accommodate this request,

Leuzinger could not perform the essential functions of her position. Because she could no longer

perform an essential function of her position, she could not continue as a correctional officer. 

The problem with this is that merely because the County could not accommodate a particular

request, it did not follow that Leuzinger could not perform the essential functions of her position. It is

not clear that Leuzinger ever took the stance that if her request was not granted, she would refuse to

continue in her job. It appears that the County jumped from the mere fact of the request being made to

the conclusion that Leuzinger was disabled and this disability was one that could not be accommodated.

There is then at least a fact issue as to whether Leuzinger was a “qualified individual” within the

meaning of the ADA. 

iii. Adverse Employment Action

Lake County contends that Leuzinger was not terminated from her employment. It is the

County’s position that Leuzinger’s employment ended upon her retirement as a result of her own

request, not as the result of any termination. An “adverse employment action,” however, is not limited

merely to terminations. The ADA prohibits discrimination “in regard to job application procedures, the

hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,

conditions and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 

Leuzinger has therefore stated a prima facie claim under the ADA. The County has not

demonstrated a lack of a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether Leuzinger is or was “disabled;”

that she was a “qualified individual;” or that she suffered an “adverse employment action.” The

County’s motion for summary judgment on Leuzinger’s claim under the ADA should be denied. 

Turning next to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, the requirements for making

a claim under that statute are fairly similar to the ADA. A plaintiff can establish a prima facie claim of

discrimination by proving that: (1) she suffered from a disability; (2) with or without reasonable

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accommodation, she could perform the essential functions of the employment position she held or

desired; and (3) that she was subjected to an adverse employment action because of her disability. See

Jenkins v. County of Riverside, 138 Cal. App. 4th 593, 603 (2006); Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co.,

76 Cal. App. 4th 33, 44 (1999). From the above analysis, it is clear that the first and third elements are

not at issue. With respect to the second, the County largely assumes that this element parallels federal

law under the ADA, and that because it is the County’s position that Leuzinger is not a “qualified

individual” under the ADA, she also has no claim under FEHA. While California courts look to the

ADA when construing those sections of FEHA that are similar to federal law, a number of California

courts have noted that FEHA provision requiring reasonable accommodation is markedly different from

the ADA’s “qualified individual” analysis. See, e.g., Bagatti v. Department of Rehabilitation, 97 Cal.

App. 4th 344, 359-61 (2002). It is an open question whether FEHA requires that an employee be “a

qualified individual with a disability” as does the ADA. The Supreme Court of California is reviewing

this question. See Green v. California, 123 P.3d 154 (Cal. 2005). Thus, even if the County’s “qualified

individual” argument had not already been rejected in the ADA analysis, it still would not necessarily

defeat Leuzinger’s claim under FEHA. Accordingly, the County has not demonstrated that summary

judgment is warranted on the FEHA claim. 

 

2. FMLA and CFRA

Turning to the other statutes briefly touched upon by the parties, Lake County argues that

Leuzinger was not taking leave under the provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) or

the California Family Rights Act (CFRA) during her medical leave of absence from March 31, 2004

through November 1, 2004. Lake County seems to be advancing three arguments in support of this

contention: (1) that Leuzinger did not request FMLA leave and therefore was not entitled to FMLA

protections; (2) that Leuzinger was not entitled to FMLA protections because she did not exhaust all of

her other available types of accrued leave provided by the County; and (3) Leuzinger overextended any

FMLA leave she may have had. None of these arguments are fatal to her FMLA claim. 

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First, an employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA, or even mention the FMLA,

to be entitled to the protections of that statute. See Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th

Cir. 2003); Bailey v. Southwest Gas Co., 275 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002). If an employee requests

medical leave, it is the employer’s responsibility to determine whether FMLA leave is appropriate and

to inform the employee of her entitlements under the statute. See Xin Liu, 347 F.3d at 1134; Bailey, 275

F.3d at 1185. In this case, Leuzinger informed the County that she was taking medical leave for breast

cancer treatment and additionally provided certification from her physician to that effect. This provided

sufficient notice that the FMLA might apply; whether Leuzinger specifically invoked the FMLA is not

relevant to whether she is protected by the statute.

The County’s second argument is that it requires that an employee use up all sick time, “comp

time,” and all except forty hours of vacation time first, before using FMLA medical leave. Since

Leuzinger had not exhausted these other forms of leave, Leuzinger was not on FMLA leave according

to Lake County. This precise argument was addressed and persuasively rejected by the court in

Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd. of the City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1204-06 (11th Cir.

2001). In that case, the court explained that it is a misinterpretation of the FMLA to maintain that an

employee who has not exhausted all of his or her other forms of leave is not entitled to the protections

of the FMLA. Id. at 1206. The court examined 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(1) and found that “this provision

obviously means that an employer cannot escape liability under the Act for the period during which the

employee, whose leave qualifies under the FMLA, is receiving his wages in the form of sick (or other)

pay.” Id. at 1205. In other words, while an employer may require an employee to use various forms

of accrued leave while on FMLA leave, this does not change the fact that it is FMLA leave and that the

employee is entitled to the protections of the FMLA.

The County also argues that Leuzinger’s “medical leave was in excess of the 12 weeks afforded

by the FMLA and CFRA.” Docket No. 24, at 24. This argument fails because Leuzinger began her

leave on March 31, 2004. She was removed from her job five weeks later on May 8, 2004. Even if

Leuzinger ended up using more than the amount of leave she may be entitled to under the FMLA, the

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adverse employment action took place within the time allowed under the Act.

Thus, the County has not demonstrated that summary judgment is appropriate on Leuzinger’s

FMLA claim. Under the FMLA, “any eligible employee who takes leave . . . shall be entitled, on return

from such leave” “(A) to be restored by the employer to the position of employment held by the

employee when the leave commenced; or (B) to be restored to an equivalent position with equivalent

employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a). The

County had not shown that the FMLA did not apply here or that the above protections of the FMLA

were afforded to Leuzinger. 

The County does not address the California Family Rights Act apart from the FMLA.

Accordingly, it has not demonstrated that summary judgment is appropriate on either Leuzinger’s

FMLA or CFRA claims.

 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, defendant County of Lake’s motion for summary judgment [Docket No. 24] is

DENIED. The defendant’s objections to the three declarations submitted by the plaintiff [Docket Nos.

36-38] are SUSTAINED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

April 30, 2007 _________________________________

Saundra Brown Armstrong 

United States District Judge

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