Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04144/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04144-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD STEWART,

Petitioner,

 v.

RODERICK Q. HICKMAN, Secretary of the 

California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, 

Respondent. /

No. C 05-04144 WHA

ORDER (1) DISMISSING

CERTAIN CLAIMS, 2)

ALLOWING AMENDMENT OF

PETITION TO DEMONSTRATE

EXHAUSTION OF STATE

REMEDIES and CURE

DEFICIENCIES, and 3) DENYING

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL

NOTICE

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Richard Stewart, a state prisoner, is serving a sentence of life in prison

following his conviction for three first-degree murders. With the assistance of two attorneys, he

seeks release from custody by way of federal habeas corpus relief. See 28 U.S.C. 2254. 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on two of his claims: (1) that it was error for the trial court not

to grant immunity to a potential defense witness and (2) that the court violated the Constitution

by refusing to tell jurors that the prosecutor but not the defense attorney could grant witnesses

immunity from prosecution. Those claims are DISMISSED, although petitioner may amend his

application to correct those deficiencies. Petitioner also has stated claims alleging ineffective

assistance of counsel. No showing has been made, however, that the exhaustion requirements

of 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1) have been met as to those claims. The Court therefore REQUESTS

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THAT PETITIONER AMEND THE APPLICATION to demonstrate exhaustion, if possible. 

Petitioner has not supported his request for judicial notice. It therefore is DENIED. 

STATEMENT

Petitioner was convicted in Superior Court on three counts of premeditated murder upon

his mother, stepfather and their boarder. The jury also found true separate contentions that

petitioner committed a multiple murder, used a gun to commit the offenses. He also was

convicted of attempted arson and possession of a concealable firearm by a felon. He admitted

that he had spent two prior terms in prison. Petitioner was sentenced to death on each count but

the the California Supreme Court later overturned the penalty. The sentenced was fixed at life

in prison. Final judgment was entered in February 2005, fixing the sentence at life in prison

without possibility of parole. People v. Stewart, 33 Cal. 4th 425, 431, 433, 522 (2004). 

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus October 13, 2005. 

ANALYSIS

1. JUDICIAL NOTICE. 

Petitioner asks for judicial notice of the transcripts and other court records in People v.

Stewart. A court is not required to take judicial notice of adjudicative facts unless a party

supplies the necessary information to decide the request. FRE 201(d). In this case, petitioner

has not supplied the relevant court records and transcripts. The Court therefore is not required

to take judicial notice of them. Furthermore, the Court declines to exercise its discretionary

power to take judicial notice of the documents. See FRE 201(c) (discretionary power). 

2. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Persons in custody pursuant to a state judgment may be granted a writ of habeas corpus

if they are held in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. They

must, however, first meet certain requirements. They must exhaust avenues for direct appeal in

state court, or demonstrate that such appeals either are not available or are not effective. The

petitioner must also establish that, as to any claim decided on the merits, either (1) the state

court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or (2) was based on an unreasonable

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determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court. 28 U.S.C. 2254(a),

(b)(1), (d). 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it fails to apply the correct

Supreme Court authority or if it applies it incorrectly to a case involving facts “materially

indistinguishable” from those in the controlling decision. A state court’s decision involves an

unreasonable application of federal law if it applies the governing Supreme Court rule to a new

set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends or fails to extend a clearly

established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable. Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–12 (2000). 

A court must either issue the writ or direct the respondent to explain why one should not

be granted, “unless it appears from the application that the [petitioner] is not entitled” to release. 

28 U.S.C. 2243. “If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief . . . the judge must dismiss the petition . . . .” Rule 4, Rules

Governing Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. 

Dismissal of a claim without requiring a response or holding a hearing is appropriate

where the claim has no legal validity. In Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.

1983), for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s summary dismissal of claims

that the state court violated defendant’s due-process rights by not giving certain jury

instructions related to duress. The Ninth Circuit held that the facts, as stated by petitioner,

showed that he was not entitled to duress instructions because his life was not in imminent or

immediate danger, as required by California law. See also Frank v. Mangum 237 U.S. 309, 332

(1915) (“duty of the court to refuse the writ if it appeared from the petition itself that appellant

was not entitled to it”). Similarly, in Johnston v. McDonald, 157 F.2d 275, 276 (9th Cir. 1946),

the court held that the petition should have been denied when it appeared “from the petition

itself” that the applicant was not entitled to the writ. Summary dismissal is appropriate,

however, only when the factual allegations in the petition are vague, conclusory, palpably

incredible or patently frivolous or false. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir.

1990). 

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 All further factual statements and legal contentions are taken from the petition and its supporting

memorandum, unless otherwise indicated. 

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Petitions for writs of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits notwithstanding failure

of the applicants to exhaust the effective state remedies available to them. 28 U.S.C.

2254(b)(2). Even if a petition is insufficient, however, “it may be amended in the interest of

justice.” Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 350 (1941). 

2. PETITIONER’S CLAIMS.

A. Failure to Immunize Witness.

Petitioner claims that a writ should issue because the trial court and prosecutor refused

to grant immunity to a potential defense witness who invoked the Fifth Amendment right

against self-incrimination. The witness, Maurice Solvang, allegedly told a defense investigator

that his previous statements to police blaming petitioner for the killings were false and that Mr.

Solvang himself was “possibly” the killer. Petitioner claims that the lack of immunity violated

his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.1

 

Petitioner moved the trial court to grant immunity to Mr. Solvang, claiming that his

testimony would be exculpatory and that the prosecution impermissibly had interfered with the

defendant’s constitutional right to call him to the stand. The trial court denied the motion. The

state Supreme Court upheld the judge’s decision, stating that there was a strong governmental

interest against granting immunity. The Supreme Court stated that this interest included the

government’s possible desire to be able to prosecute Mr. Solvang himself for the killings and to

prevent perjury by him (he had given conflicting accounts of the charged crimes). Even if he

were granted use immunity, so that the prosecution was only barred from using his testimony

and any fruits thereof against him, the prosecution would have been required at any future

prosecution to prove that evidence was not derived from the immunized testimony. Use

immunity also would have inhibited the prosecution’s cross-examination in the instant case,

because it presumably would have wanted to limit the scope of the immunized testimony. The

Supreme Court also held that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the prosecution

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had treated Mr. Solvang in a way that effectively discouraged him from testifying. 33 Cal. 4th

at 468–72. 

Petitioner claims that the trial was intentionally distorted when the state relied heavily

on circumstantial evidence provided by immunized witnesses but did not grant immunity to Mr.

Solvang, who purportedly could have contradicted those government witnesses. Petitioner

suggests that, by refusing to grant Mr. Solvang immunity, the state effectively deprived

petitioner of exculpatory evidence. Petitioner does not assert directly in his petition that the

state pressured Mr. Solvang not to testify or otherwise did anything to suppress his testimony or

to encourage him not to testify. This order nevertheless assumes that petitioner incorporates in

this claim his previous contentions before the California Supreme Court that prosecutors

impermissibly interfered with his constitutional right to call Mr. Solvang as a witness. 

In support of this claim, petitioner cites three U.S. Supreme Court decisions. None

provides any support. 

In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317–21 (1974), the Supreme Court held that a rule

barring cross-examination of a witness on his juvenile probationary record unconstitutionally

deprived the accused of his right to challenge the credibility of a witness against him. The

Supreme Court held further that the privacy interest protected by the state rule could not trump

the accused’s confrontation rights. In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 285–294, 298

(1973), one man was charged with a murder but there was significant evidence that another man

actually committed it. The state court refused, in keeping with its evidentiary rules, (1) to allow

the accused to cross-examine the other potential suspect and (2) to allow apparently reliable

hearsay evidence supporting the theory that the uncharged man was responsible for the killing. 

The Supreme Court held that the combined operation of these rules deprived the accused of his

due-process right to examine witnesses against him. In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,

14–17, 23 (1967), the Supreme Court held that the due-process clause was violated when Texas

denied the accused compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. The trial court had

barred the accused from calling a witness, solely on account of the witness’s role as an

accomplice to the crime. 

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 There are two additional Supreme Court decisions that, although not cited by petitioner, address

immunity issues. Neither of them, however, lends support to the notion that constitutional due process requires

grants of immunity — even if the prosecutor engages in misconduct. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New

York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964), held that when either a state or the federal government grants immunity to

a witness, the protections must also apply against any prosecution by the other sovereign. Thus, state immunity

prevents federal prosecution based on that testimony, and vise versa. That holding was based on the right to

protection against self-incrimination. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968), held that defendants’

testimony at Fourth Amendment suppression hearings cannot be used against them at trial. The holding was

intended to prevent a defendant from having effectively to give up his Fourth Amendment rights. 

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None of these Supreme Court decisions provides a basis for arguing now that there is

Supreme Court authority requiring state courts or prosecutors to give immunity to potential

defense witnesses. Indeed, none of them even mentioned immunity. They therefore provide no

support for petitioner’s the claim that the state court made a decision contrary to, or involving

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court. 28 U.S. 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). This order assumes that petitioner also alleges

that the state-court decision that there was no prosecutorial misconduct was unreasonable. Even

so, there would be no legal basis for alleging that a grant of immunity was therefore required.

Petitioner also cites three Ninth Circuit decisions concerning defense-witness immunity: 

United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Westerdahl, 945 F.2d 1083

(9th Cir. 1991); and United States v. Brutzman, 731 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1984). None of these

opinions rested their holdings on Supreme Court caselaw. Furthermore, all were federal

prosecutions and issued prior to the 1996 revision of the habeas statute, which added the

“clearly established . . . as determined by the United States Supreme Court” requirement. They

therefore now provide no controlling authority in the instant case.2

 

Without any basis for alleging that the defense had a clearly established right to

immunity for Mr. Solvang, petitioner fails to make out a viable habeas claim. The state

Supreme Court’s affirmance of the trial court denial of the motion for immunity clearly was not

contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court caselaw. This

claim therefore is DISMISSED, with leave to amend the petition to state a valid claim. 

B. Failure to Inform Jury that Only Prosecutor Could Grant Immunity.

Petitioner claims that his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

when the trial court refused to inform jurors that the prosecution has the “exclusive and sole

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power to grant immunity to witnesses.” He states that such an instruction would have

benefitted him because it would have suggested to jurors that Mr. Solvang did not testify

because the state did not grant him immunity and that, if it had, Mr. Solvang would have

presented exculpatory testimony. 

Petitioner cites only one Supreme Court decision in support of the proposition that due

process ever requires the court to permit the accused to present the jury with information on a

subject by way of a court instruction. In Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 , 154, 171

(1994), the jury asked whether the accused would be eligible for parole if sentenced to life in

prison, rather than death. The trial court refused to answer in the negative, despite a defense

request to do so. The Supreme Court held that the trial court was required to instruct the jury

that, even if it chose not to impose the death penalty, the accused would never go free on parole. 

The justices held that this instruction was required because the future dangerousness of the

accused was at issue in sentencing. 

This decision in no way supports the notion that the judge in the instant case was

required to tell jurors how decisions about immunity were made. Unlike the issue in Simmons,

the question of immunity did not go directly to any factor before the jury. No credible

argument can be made that Simmons clearly established a rule requiring instructions on

immunity in a case such as the one at bar. 

In addition to Simmons, petitioner cites another opinion that provides no support for this

claim. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 684, 688, 691 (1986), state courts had excluded

evidence of the conditions under which the accused had confessed to the charged crime. They

held that exclusion was proper because the evidence went to the voluntariness of the confession,

which had been resolved in the state’s favor during pretrial hearings. The Supreme Court,

however, noted that the evidence was also relevant to the credibility of the confession, an issue

to be determined by the jury. This decision thus has nothing to do with whether or not a court is

required to give a particular jury instruction. 

 This claim is DISMISSED because it does not assert any violation of or unreasonable

application of a constitutional rule clearly established by Supreme Court caselaw, as required by

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28 U.S.C. 2254. Furthermore, there is no allegation that this decision was based on an

unreasonable factual determination. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). Petitioner is, however, GRANTED

LEAVE TO AMEND the petition to state a valid claim, if possible. 

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

Petitioner claims that a writ should issue because his counsel, the Contra Costa Public

Defender’s Office, simultaneously or previously represented a key prosecution witness and Mr.

Mr. Solvang. He also claims that his rights were violated because his counsel did not seek to

introduce evidence suggesting that Mr. Solvang might have been the killer. 

A petitioner has the burden of asserting exhaustion of state remedies. Darr v. Burford, 

339 U.S. 200, 218–19 (1950). Petitioner has not submitted any documentation or allegation that

these claims were exhausted in California courts, that there is no corrective process available

from the state or that such process exists but would not be effective to protect petitioner’s

rights, as required by 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1). Furthermore, the California Supreme Court

opinion does not address these issues. See 33 Cal. 4th 425. 

Petitioner is ORDERED TO AMEND the petition to make clear, if possible, how the

requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2554(b)(1) have been met as to the ineffective assistance of counsel

claims. See 28 U.S.C. 2242 (amendment of petition allowed if in conformity with Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure). 

CONCLUSION

Petitioner is ORDERED TO AMEND the petition by noon, January 20, 2006. If neither an

amended petition nor an application for an enlargement of time is filed by then, the petition will

be dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 21, 2005 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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