Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00812/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00812-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:1651 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM TERRY MACDONALD,

Petitioner,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:13-cv-00812 DAD MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He is represented by the Law Offices of David Mugridge. 

Respondent Daniel Paramo, Warden at the R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility, is 

substituted as the proper respondent under Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Respondent is represented by Darren K. Indermill of the office of the 

California Attorney General. The parties have not consented to Magistrate Judge 

jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 5, 10.)

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

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and Rehabilitation pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of 

Mariposa, following his conviction by jury trial on April 29, 2010, of fifteen counts of lewd 

acts upon a child. (Clerk's Tr. at 674-78.) On July 23, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to

an indeterminate term of ninety (90) years to life plus twenty-two (22) years in state

prison. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District on February 4, 2011. (Lodged Docs. 25-27.) The appeal was denied on 

December 9, 2011. (Lodged Doc. 28.) On January 19, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for 

review with the California Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc. 29.) The petition was summarily 

denied. (Id.)

On March 8, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the 

Mariposa County Superior Court. (Lodged Doc. 30.) The petition was dismissed on April 

2, 2013. (Id.) Petitioner proceeded to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the 

California Supreme Court. The petition was summarily denied on July 10, 2013. (See

Lodged Doc. 31.)

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on May 29, 2013. (Pet., ECF No. 1.)

The petition raised two different claims for relief. Petitioner asserts that:

(1) Trial counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to object to the prosecution's 

questioning of witnesses, (b) failing to object to the admission of 

photographic evidence, and (c) opening the door to damaging rebuttal 

testimony; and 

(2) That errors by the trial judge and prosecutorial misconduct were prejudicial 

to his defense. (Id.)

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on September 18, 2013, and Petitioner 

filed a traverse on February 12, 2014.

1

(Answer & Traverse, ECF Nos. 14, 18.) The 

 

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Petitioner's counsel filed the wrong opposition to the answer on February 12, 2014. On October 

25, 2014, Petitioner filed the correct opposition and a declaration from Randy Bell, paralegal, for 

Petitioner's counsel. (ECF No. 19, 20.) In the declaration, Bell explained that he inadvertently filed the 

wrong traverse. While the traverse is technically untimely, the Court shall review the merits of arguments 

(continued...)

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matter stands ready for adjudication. 

II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2

On April 8, 2010, the district attorney filed a second amended 

information that charged MacDonald with committing 15 lewd or lascivious 

acts with three children under the age of 14 with the intent to arouse, 

appeal to, or gratify his or the children's lust, passions, or sexual desires 

(Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)), that alleged his eligibility for 15-to-life 

indeterminate terms due to commission of some of the offenses against 

more than one victim (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (c)(8), (e)(4)), that alleged his 

ineligibility for probation due to commission of some of the offenses 

against more than one victim (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(7)), and that alleged 

his ineligibility for probation due to substantial sexual conduct with one of 

the victims (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)).

On April 29, 2010, a jury found MacDonald guilty as charged on all 

of the counts and found all of the allegations true. On July 23, 2010, the 

court imposed an aggregate term of 112 years to life in prison consisting 

of six 15-to-life indeterminate terms (counts 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, & 15) 

consecutive to one six-year determinate (middle) term (count 8) and 

consecutive to eight two-year determinate (one-third the middle) terms on 

counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 11.

People v. Macdonald, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9454, 1-2 (Cal. App. Dec. 9, 2011)

(footnote omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 

2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he 

suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the 

conviction challenged arises out of the Mariposa County Superior Court, which is 

located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). Accordingly, 

the Court has jurisdiction over the action. 

 

(...continued)

presented in the traverse. 

2

The Fifth District Court of Appeal’s summary of the facts in its December 9, 2011 opinion is 

presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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B. Legal Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 

114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of 

the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions. 

Under AEDPA, an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody 

under a judgment of a state court may be granted only for violations of the Constitution 

or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 

7 (2000). Federal habeas corpus relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in 

state court proceedings if the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that 

contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts 

that are materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court case, yet reaches a different 

result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. 

"AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical 

factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied. . . . The statue recognizes . . . that 

even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner" Panetti v. 

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

"clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a ‘principle' 

or ‘general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state 

decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 

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2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle 

(or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-

71 (2003). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal 

law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76, quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 

409-10; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the 

Court further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from 

an incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011), (citing Williams, 529 

U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks 

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the 

correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. 

Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been 

squarely established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 

(2009), quoted by Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786.

2. Review of State Decisions

"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, 

later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same 

grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the 

"look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 

(9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an 

unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from 

the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. 

"Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas 

petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief." Id. ("This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does 

not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 

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‘adjudicated on the merits.'").

Richter instructs that whether the state court decision is reasoned and explained, 

or merely a summary denial, the approach to evaluating unreasonableness under § 

2254(d) is the same: "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments 

or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; then 

it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments 

or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Id. at 786. 

Thus, "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75). AEDPA "preserves 

authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 

disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents." Id. To put 

it yet another way:

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Id. at 786-87. The Court then explains the rationale for this rule, i.e., "that state courts 

are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Id. at 

787. It follows from this consideration that § 2254(d) "complements the exhaustion 

requirement and the doctrine of procedural bar to ensure that state proceedings are the 

central process, not just a preliminary step for later federal habeas proceedings." Id.

(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).

3. Prejudicial Impact of Constitutional Error

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether 

the error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 

verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 

U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the 

state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). Some constitutional 

errors, however, do not require that the petitioner demonstrate prejudice. See Arizona v. 

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Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 

(1984). Furthermore, where a habeas petition governed by AEDPA alleges ineffective 

assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the 

Strickland prejudice standard is applied and courts do not engage in a separate analysis 

applying the Brecht standard. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918, n. 7 (2002). Musalin 

v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d at 834.

III. REVIEW OF PETITION

A. Claim 1: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner presents several arguments that his right to effective assistance of 

counsel was violated. 

1. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented this claim by way of direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the 

appellate court and summarily denied in subsequent petition for review by the California

Supreme Court. (See Lodged Docs. 25-29.) Because the California Supreme Court’s 

opinion is summary in nature, this Court “looks through” that decision and presumes it 

adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal, the last state court to have 

issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n.3 (1991) 

(establishing, on habeas review, “look through” presumption that higher court agrees 

with lower court’s reasoning where former affirms latter without discussion); see also

LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding federal courts look 

to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court’s rejection of 

petitioner’s claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 

In denying Petitioner’s claim, the California Court of Appeal explained:

MacDonald argues that ineffective assistance of counsel denied 

him a fair trial. The Attorney General argues the contrary.

The right to counsel protects the due process right to a fair trial by 

guaranteeing "access to counsel's skill and knowledge" and by ensuring 

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an "'ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution.'" (Strickland v. 

Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 684-686 (Strickland).) To establish 

ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant has the burden of 

showing that counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness" and prejudiced the defense. (Id. at pp. 687-692; People 

v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217 (Ledesma).) To establish 

prejudice, the defendant must make a showing of a "reasonable 

probability" "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" that but for 

counsel's performance "the result of the proceeding would have been 

different." (Strickland, supra, at pp. 693-694; Ledesma, supra, at pp. 217-

218.) A reviewing court can adjudicate a claim of ineffective assistance 

solely on the issue of prejudice without evaluating counsel's performance. 

(Strickland, supra, at p. 697.) We do so here.

"Here," MacDonald argues, "the record illustrates that defense 

counsel acted as a mere observer throughout the vast majority of the trial. 

Indicative of counsel's observer status was his near abject failure to object 

to improper questioning by the prosecution." "By way of specific example," 

he quotes the "relevant part" of Evidence Code section 767[fn2] and, with 

citations to the record, perfunctorily claims that his attorney "ignored 

and/or failed to object to myriad leading questions," "to myriad questions 

that had already been asked and answered," "to myriad questions where 

the prosecution was testifying," and "to many compound questions." He 

claims, too, that his attorney "failed to object to many questions asked by 

the prosecution during her cross examination that were beyond the scope 

of defense direct examination," "to questions which had no relevance to 

issues presented," and "to myriad prosecution questions that called for 

hearsay." Finally, he claims that his attorney "failed to raise objections to 

multiple questions by the prosecution that called for speculation." Apart 

from quoting a statute, however, he cites no authority and makes no 

attempt to articulate any theory of prejudice to establish how the 

omissions of which he complains show a "reasonable probability" 

"sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" that but for counsel's 

performance "the result of the proceeding would have been different." 

(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 693-694; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at 

pp. 217-218.)

FN2: "(a) Except under special circumstances where the 

interests of justice otherwise require: [¶] (1) A leading 

question may not be asked of a witness on direct or redirect 

examination. [¶] (2) A leading question may be asked of a 

witness on cross-examination or recross-examination." 

(Evid. Code, § 767.)

The rule is well settled that an "appellant cannot prevail on a claim 

of error if [he or] she makes no effort to establish that [he or] she was 

prejudiced by the alleged error." (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 

422 (S.C.), citing, e.g., Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) That is so here.

The next single-sentence paragraph in MacDonald's brief is equally 

conclusory. "In fact," he claims, "the trial record is absolutely replete with 

examples where defense counsel was duty-bound to object to improper 

questions and failed to do so." At the end of the sentence is a footnote 

with four single-spaced pages of citations to the record. Yet he cites no 

authority and makes no attempt to articulate any theory of prejudice. 

"When a point is asserted without argument and authority for the 

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proposition, 'it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no 

discussion by the reviewing court.'" (S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 

408.) That is so here.

Quoting Evidence Code section 352,[fn3] MacDonald then 

articulates, for the first time, a rationale for a claim of prejudice: "The 

prejudicial effect of defense counsel's ineffectiveness is shown by his 

failure to object to the prosecution admitting a particular photo into 

evidence." Noting that the prosecutor had established the age of a child 

victim before showing the jury a photograph of her "dressed up as a cute 

little cowgirl for the beauty pageant" he argues, "The purpose behind the 

unnecessary admission of this photo was obviously nothing but to put the 

image of a cute little girl in the minds of the jurors." He elaborates, "Proof 

of the undue prejudice created by the 'cuteness' of the photo was shown 

by the prosecutor referring to the photo twice during her closing 

argument."

FN3: "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability 

that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of 

time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of 

confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." (Evid. Code, 

§ 352.)

The record refutes MacDonald's claim. First, as the prosecutor 

stated while showing the photograph to the jury during opening statement, 

the child "is going to tell you that she recalls that pageant. And it helped 

solidify for her when she had a first really good memory of something 

happening." Second, as she noted during argument to the jury, the child's 

"first real clear recollection" of a lewd or lascivious act was around the 

time of the pageant. Third, as she stated in argument to the jury, the 

photograph was relevant to the passage of time between the initial lewd or 

lascivious acts and trial, when she was 24 years old. "Helps to have an 

idea of what someone looked like as to the time they are testifying when 

they come in here as an adult and they don't look like a child that could 

easily be taken advantage of." Fourth, she argued, a contemporary 

photograph showing a beautiful child and expert testimony about child 

sexual assault accommodation syndrome showing "how someone who is 

sexually abused as a child might respond" can help the jury understand 

"how he got away with it."

The evidence at issue was more probative than prejudicial, so an 

objection by MacDonald's attorney would have been meritless. (Evid. 

Code, § 352.) Since the law neither does nor requires idle acts, an 

attorney has no duty to make a futile request and does not render 

ineffective assistance of counsel by not doing so. (Civ. Code, § 3532; see

People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 587.)

MacDonald next complains that his attorney withdrew an objection 

"so that he could get back to his office earlier" and that the prosecutor 

"misstated the evidence four times" by questioning a witness about his 

having touched a child victim's "breast, instead of chest, before [his 

attorney] objected." With reference to his first complaint, the record shows 

that the court and counsel agreed to change the order of testimony to 

accommodate his attorney's responsibilities of "an office to maintain and a 

practice to maintain" and the prosecutor's costs of housing witnesses and 

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the court's late arrival that day. With reference to his second complaint, 

the record shows that, after his attorney objected, not only did the witness 

correct his testimony to reflect the child victim's use of the word "chest," 

not "breast," when she told him about the molestation but also that the 

child victim had already used the word "breast," not "chest," when she 

testified about the molestation. "While exaggeration may not violate rules 

of court and standards of review, it is not an effective tool of appellate 

advocacy." (S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 416.) Both complaints are 

meritless.

Finally, MacDonald complains that his attorney's question on direct 

examination, "In your whole life, have you ever, ever, abused a child 

physically?," not only elicited his reply, "Never," but also opened the door 

to impeachment by a witness who the prosecutor stated (outside the 

presence of the jury) had told law enforcement that MacDonald "did a full 

hand grab of her breast" when she was 13 or 14. His attorney 

acknowledged he was aware of the witness but the police report 

documented her saying "in no uncertain terms" she "would not be willing 

to come to testify." Contrary to the police report, the witness, 22 years old 

at the time of trial, testified that one time when MacDonald was drinking he 

"sort of slid his hand close to [her] chest area" but that she got up and 

"went somewhere else" and did not "let him get to [her] boob."

"'Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task,'" the 

United States Supreme Court emphasized recently. (Harrington v. Richter

(2011) U.S. , [178 L.Ed.2d 624, 642; 131 S.Ct. 770, 787-788] 

(Richter), quoting Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. , [176 L.Ed.2d 

284, 297; 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485].) "With respect to prejudice, a challenger 

must demonstrate 'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.' It is not enough 'to show that the errors had 

some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.' Counsel's 

errors must be 'so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 

whose result is reliable.'" (Richter, supra, U.S. at p. [178 L.Ed.2d at p. 

642; 131 S.Ct. at pp. 787-788], quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 

687, 693-694, cit. omitted.)

MacDonald falls far short of the mark. The witness at issue testified 

that he once "sort of slid his hand close to [her] chest area" but did not 

even touch her breast. In sharp contrast, some of his child victims testified 

to his repetitive commission of horrific acts of sexual molestation. For 

example, one child testified that he touched her breasts and her vagina 

with his hands, that he digitally penetrated her, that he orally copulated 

her, and, while holding her head, that he put his penis in and out of her 

mouth until he ejaculated. Another child testified that he touched her 

vagina a few times a week, that he frequently had her masturbate him to 

ejaculation, that he digitally penetrated her more than 15 times and orally 

copulated her more than 15 times, and that he had sexual intercourse with 

her two to three times a week. Testimony like that far more effectively 

refuted MacDonald's denial of ever having abused a child physically than 

the trifling testimony of the witness at issue. He fails to discharge his 

burden to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the trial 

would have been different in the absence of her testimony. (Richter, 

supra, U.S. at p. [178 L.Ed.2d at p. 642; 131 S.Ct. at pp. 787-788]; 

Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687, 693-694.)[fn4]

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FN4: At oral argument, MacDonald's appellate counsel relied 

on United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648 for the 

proposition that his attorney's performance at trial created "a 

classic case of cumulative error" from which a presumption 

of prejudice arises. As our reading of the record differs from 

his, Cronic offers him no solace.

People v. Macdonald, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9454 at 9-12. 

2. Law Applicable to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established 

for the purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Canales v. Roe, 151 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1998). In a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court must consider two factors. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Lowry 

v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner must show that counsel's 

performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel made errors so serious that 

he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel's alleged acts 

or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional judgment considering 

the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 

(9th Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential. A court 

indulges a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also, Harrington v. 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011).

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ... would have been different," 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Petitioner must show that counsel's errors were so 

egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, one whose result is reliable. Id. at 687. 

The Court must evaluate whether the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable 

because of counsel's ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1348; United 

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States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994).

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before 

examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Since the defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice, any 

deficiency that does not result in prejudice must necessarily fail. However, there are 

certain instances which are legally presumed to result in prejudice, e.g., where there has 

been an actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel or where the State has 

interfered with counsel's assistance. Id. at 692; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S., at 659, 

and n.25 (1984).

As the Supreme Court reaffirmed recently in Harrington v. Richter, meeting the 

standard for ineffective assistance of counsel in federal habeas is extremely difficult:

The pivotal question is whether the state court's application of the 

Strickland standard was unreasonable. This is different from asking 

whether defense counsel's performance fell below Strickland's standard. 

Were that the inquiry, the analysis would be no different than if, for 

example, this Court were adjudicating a Strickland claim on direct review 

of a criminal conviction in a United States district court. Under AEDPA, 

though, it is a necessary premise that the two questions are different. For 

purposes of § 2254(d)(1), "an unreasonable application of federal law is 

different from an incorrect application of federal law." Williams, supra, at 

410, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389. A state court must be granted a 

deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case involves 

review under the Strickland standard itself.

A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes 

federal habeas relief so long as "fairminded jurists could disagree" on the 

correctness of the state court's decision. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938 (2004). And as this 

Court has explained, "[E]valuating whether a rule application was 

unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general 

the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-bycase determinations." Ibid. "[I]t is not an unreasonable application of 

clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a 

specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court." 

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419, 173 L. Ed. 

2d 251, 261 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785-86.

"It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state 

court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. at 786. "As amended by AEDPA, § 

2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims 

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already rejected in state proceedings." Id. "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus 

from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error 

well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement." Id. at 786-87.

Accordingly, even if Petitioner presents a strong case of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, this Court may only grant relief if no fairminded jurist could agree on the 

correctness of the state court decision.

3. Analysis

The crux of Petitioner's argument is that trial counsel repeatedly failed to object to

improper questions from the prosecutor. Petitioner asserts that counsel did not object to 

questions that were leading, asked and answered, testimonial in nature, compound, 

irrelevant, speculative, and solicited hearsay. (See Pet. at 53.) In a footnote, Petitioner 

provides a list of hundreds of references to the trial transcript that involve "examples 

where defense counsel was duty-bound to object to improper questions and failed to do 

so." (Id. at 49-53.) The state court denied the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

because Petitioner did not describe how the failure to object to the prosecution's 

questions prejudiced Petitioner. 

The Court agrees. Petitioner has presented no basis to doubt that, even if the 

objections had been made and sustained, the prosecutor could have simply rephrased 

the questions and elicited the same substantive testimony. Further, failure to object to 

the form of the questions from the prosecution is a matter of trial strategy. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 ("Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law 

and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable."). There could have 

been perceived benefits to not objecting. For example, objecting to the questions could 

have slowed the examination of the witnesses and caused the jury to dwell on the 

witnesses’ allegations of molestation for a longer time. Petitioner has not shown that the 

failure to object caused counsel's conduct to fall below an objective level of 

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reasonableness, or that Petitioner was prejudiced by the conduct. 

Petitioner also claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

admission into evidence of a photograph of one of the victims as contestant in a beauty

pageant as a child. Petitioner argues that the age of the witness at the time of the 

molestation had been established, and that the picture was overly prejudicial by showing 

the "cuteness" of the victim as a thirteen year old girl. (Pet. at 54-55.) The state court 

relied on the prosecution's argument that the victim recalled the pageant as an event 

occurring around when the sexual abuse started, and that the photo was helpful for the 

jury to gain perspective on the appearance and actions of the victim at the time of the 

sexual abuse. At trial, the victim was 24 years old, and her appearance would not 

necessarily convey to the jury how the victim might have been susceptible to abuse as a 

child. Based on the arguments presented by the prosecution, the state court found the

photograph was more probative than prejudicial, and that the failure of Petitioner's 

counsel to object was without merit. The state court's decision was reasonable, and 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the decision was "so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility 

for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct.786-87.

Petitioner presents several other actions of counsel that he claims show 

ineffectiveness. Petitioner complains that in order to enable an earlier return to his office,

counsel withdrew an objection to the admission of evidence On appeal, the state court 

denied the claim because the trial court agreed to change the order of testimony to 

accommodate Petitioner's trial counsel. Petitioner also contends that trial counsel 

allowed the prosecutor to misstate the evidence by stating that Petitioner touched a child 

victim's "breast" rather than "chest." The state court denied the claim as the child victim 

had already used the word "breast" when she testified about the molestation. Neither 

claim shows that counsel was ineffective nor that the state court's determination was 

unreasonable. 

Petitioner's final ground for ineffectiveness in the petition is that counsel, by 

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asking Petitioner whether he had ever physically abused a child, opened the door for 

impeachment testimony by a witness who stated that when Petitioner was drinking he 

"sort of slid his hand close to [her] chest area" but that she got up and "went somewhere 

else" and did not "let him get to [her] boob." People v. Macdonald, 2011 Cal. App. 

Unpub. LEXIS 9454 at 9-12. Counsel was aware of the impeachment witness, but noted 

that the police report stated that she was not willing to testify. In denying the claim, the 

state court explained that the witness testified that Petitioner was not successful at 

attempting to touch her breast, and in light of the exceedingly more damaging testimony 

of child victims regarding his repetitive commission of acts of sexual molestation

including digital penetration, oral copulation, forced masturbation, and sexual 

intercourse, that the impeachment testimony was "trifling" in comparison. The state 

court's reasoning was sound. Regardless whether Petitioner's conduct was ineffective, 

Petitioner has not shown prejudice especially in light of the large amount of incriminating

testimony that was admitted. 

Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of showing that he was prejudiced as 

required under Strickland. The state court decision that Petitioner was not prejudiced by 

counsel's conduct was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Supreme Court law, nor was its decision based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts.

In his traverse, Petitioner asserts that his claim was not alleging ineffectiveness 

under Strickland, but that "counsel entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution's case to 

meaningful adversarial testing" as required by United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 

659 (1984). Under Cronic, The attorney's failure must be complete. Id.; Bell v. Cone, 535 

U.S. 685, 695-97 (2002). Further, a claim of denial of the right to counsel under Cronic

does not require a showing of prejudice. Id. at 466 U.S. at 659. The Cronic exception to 

the requirement of showing prejudice is "narrow" and the presumption of ineffectiveness 

is "infrequently" justified. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190, 125 S. Ct. 551, 160 L. Ed. 

2d 565 (2004).

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Petitioner argues that Cronic error was committed by Petitioner's counsel in failing 

to object to the prosecution's questions to several witnesses. Counsel's failure to object,

by itself, does not constitute a complete failure to test the prosecution's case. In the 

example provided by Petitioner, counsel rarely objected to questions of Holly Eaton. 

(Traverse at 11-14.) Instead, Petitioner's counsel cross-examined Eaton at length. (See

Rep. Tr. at 2022-82.) During the cross-examination, counsel attempted to undermine the 

witness's testimony by pointing out that she had not told anyone about the sexual abuse 

until just before trial (Id. at 2024); that she hated Petitioner and wanted him to be found 

guilty (Id.); that the witness was confused and misstated dates during her direct 

testimony (Id. at 2027); that when she reported Petitioner's conduct to the sheriff's

department as a teenager, she only reported that Petitioner touched her, but lied and 

told them she was not engaging in intercourse with Petitioner (Id. at 2040-41.); and that 

the victim moved back to Petitioner's ranch for several years with her two young 

daughters even with the knowledge that Petitioner sexually abused her when she was 

not much older than her daughters. (Id. at 2045-61.)

Petitioner's assertion that the state court misinterpreted and misapplied Cronic is 

without merit. Although counsel did not raise objections, Petitioner has not shown that 

"counsel entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial 

testing." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). Counsel elicited beneficial 

testimony during cross-examination of the witness in question, and otherwise actively 

participated throughout trial. Counsel's failure to represent Petitioner was not complete, 

and Petitioner is not entitled to relief under Cronic. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695-

97 (2002). 

Petitioner has not shown that counsel was ineffective under either Strickland or 

Cronic. The state court decision denying Petitioner's claim was neither contrary to, nor 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law, nor was its 

decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Petitioner is not entitled 

to relief on claim one.

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B. Claims 2 and 3 – Procedural Bar

Respondent asserts that the second and third claims presented in the petition are 

subject to procedural default. Petitioner presented the claims in his direct appeals before 

the California Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. (Lodged Docs. 25-29.) Because the 

California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in nature, this Court “looks through” that 

decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal, the 

last state court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 

797, 804-05 & n.3 (1991). 

The California Supreme Court denied the petition based on a state procedural 

bar. The court addressed Petitioner’s claims as follows:

MacDonald argues that "judicial complacency and incompetence" 

together with "prosecutorial misconduct" denied him a fair trial. The 

Attorney General argues that MacDonald forfeited his right to appellate 

review of those issues by failing to object at trial and, alternatively, that the 

record shows neither judicial complacency nor prosecutorial misconduct.

At the outset, we turn to the issue of forfeiture. The law is settled 

that failure to raise the issue of judicial conduct at trial forfeits the right to 

appellate review of that issue (People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 

1110; People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 114) and that failure to 

raise the issue of prosecutorial conduct at trial forfeits the right to appellate 

review of that issue (People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 491-492; 

People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966). On the premise that 

MacDonald "failed to assert arguments of judicial and prosecutorial 

misconduct or bias below," the Attorney General invokes the forfeiture 

doctrine. In his reply brief, MacDonald retorts that the Attorney General 

"evidently chose to ignore the myriad examples" of "judicial and 

prosecutorial impropriety" in his opening brief.

Our review of each citation to the record that MacDonald argues 

shows "judicial and prosecutorial impropriety" confirms the premise of the 

Attorney General's argument. MacDonald did not raise the issues of 

judicial or prosecutorial conduct at trial. His new trial motion likewise was 

silent. On that record, he forfeited his right to judicial review. In any event, 

his argument has no merit since he fails to establish judicial or 

prosecutorial misconduct, let alone judicial or prosecutorial misconduct 

that deprived him of a fair trial. "A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not 

a perfect one." (Lutwak v. United States (1953) 344 U.S. 604, 619.) 

MacDonald received the fair trial to which he was constitutionally entitled.

People v. Macdonald, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9454 at 12-13.

Based on the cases cited by the California Supreme Court, it appears that the 

California Supreme Court found the claims procedurally barred for failure to raise the 

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claims on direct appeal. 

1. Legal Framework for Procedural Default

The Supreme Court recently described the legal requirements that prevent review 

of claims that were rejected on state court grounds:

"A federal habeas court will not review a claim rejected by a state 

court 'if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law ground that is 

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the 

judgment.' " Kindler, 558 U.S., at 55, 130 S.Ct., at 615 (quoting Coleman 

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 

(1991)). The state-law ground may be a substantive rule dispositive of the 

case, or a procedural barrier to adjudication of the claim on the merits. 

See Sykes, 433 U.S., at 81-82, 90, 97 S.Ct. 2497.

***

To qualify as an "adequate" procedural ground, a state rule must be 

"firmly established and regularly followed." Kindler, 558 U.S., at 60, 130 

S.Ct., at 618 (internal quotation marks omitted). FN4 [omitted] "[A] 

discretionary state procedural rule," we held in Kindler, "can serve as an 

adequate ground to bar federal habeas review." Ibid. A "rule can be 'firmly 

established' and 'regularly followed,'" Kindler observed, "even if the 

appropriate exercise of discretion may permit consideration of a federal 

claim in some cases but not others." Ibid. California's time rule, although 

discretionary, meets the "firmly established" criterion, as Kindler

comprehended that requirement. 

Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127-1128 (2011) (abrogating 

Townsend v. Knowles, 562 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2009)).

Respondent contends that Petitioner's claim is barred by the procedural default 

doctrine as stated in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). Coleman bars review 

of a petitioner's federal habeas claim when the claim was rejected in state court based 

on an adequate and independent state procedural bar. Id. at 729-30.

In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in 

state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural 

rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can 

demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the 

alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the 

claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Id. at 750.

Respondent points out that a procedural bar must have risen from explicit and 

independent state law. Id. at 735; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 

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103 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1988). For the procedural bar to be adequate, the bar must be clear, 

consistently applied, and well established at the time of the alleged default. Collier v. 

Bayer, 408 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2005). Also, the opinion of the last state court 

rendering a judgment in the case must clearly and expressly state that its judgment rests 

on a state procedural bar. Harris, 489 U.S. at 263; see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30.

Petitioner's counsel failed to raise claims of judicial or prosecutorial misconduct at 

trial. The state court ruled that "[t]he law is settled that failure to raise the issue of judicial 

conduct at trial forfeits the right to appellate review of that issue and that failure to raise 

the issue of prosecutorial conduct at trial forfeits the right to appellate review of that 

issue." Macdonald, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9454 at 12-13. (citations omitted). In 

making this ruling, the state court relied on California's contemporaneous objection rule, 

"that a defendant cannot complain on appeal of misconduct by a prosecutor at trial 

unless in a timely fashion he made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the 

jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety." People v. Ayala, 23 Cal.4th 225, 284, 

96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682, 1 P.3d 3 (2000); People v. Ochoa, 19 Cal.4th 353, 427, 79 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 408, 966 P.2d 442 (1998); e.g., People v. Samayoa, 15 Cal.4th 795, 841, 64 

Cal. Rptr. 2d 400, 938 P.2d 2 (1997); People v. Benson, 52 Cal.3d 754, 794, 276 Cal. 

Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330 (1990). The Supreme Court has held that a violation of a state

contemporaneous objection rule can indeed result in a habeas petitioner's claim being 

barred under the procedural default doctrine. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90, 97 

S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594. The Ninth Circuit has held that the California 

contemporaneous objection rule results in a procedural default of a prosecutorial 

misconduct claim. Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1999); Howard v. 

Campbell, 305 Fed. Appx. 442, 444 (9th Cir. 2008)3; Miles v. Hedgpeth, 514 Fed. Appx. 

 

3

Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(b) provides: "Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court issued on 

or after January 1, 2007 may be cited to the courts of this circuit in accordance with FRAP 32.1." However, 

Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(a) provides: "Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not precedent, 

except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or rules of claim preclusion or issue 

preclusion."

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673 (9th Cir. 2013). Based on the same reasoning, the Court finds that Petitioner's 

judicial misconduct claim would be procedurally barred by the contemporaneous 

objection rule. Muhammad v. Martel, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76445 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

The Ninth Circuit uses a burden-shifting analysis to determine adequacy. Bennett 

v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-586 (9th Cir. 2003). Under this analysis, when the state 

pleads, as an affirmative defense, that a claim is procedurally barred, the burden shifts to 

the petitioner to challenge the adequacy of that bar by showing that it has been 

inconsistently applied. Id. Where the petitioner challenges the adequacy of the bar, the 

state retains the ultimate burden of proving adequacy. Id.

Respondent argues that the contemporaneous objection rule in question is an 

explicit and independent state law. The opinion of the last state court rendering 

judgment, the Fifth District Court of Appeal, citing several California Supreme Court 

cases, clearly and expressly stated that Petitioner's failure to preserve his challenge was 

grounds to deny his claim.

In this case, Petitioner provides no response to the procedural bar asserted by 

Respondent and therefore fails to meet his burden of shifting the burden back to 

Respondent. See King v. LaMarque, 464 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Bennett

requires the petitioner to 'place [the procedural default] defense in issue" to shift the 

burden back to the government"). It should also be noted that when challenged, federal 

courts have questioned whether the contemporaneous objection rule is consistently 

applied and well established. See e.g., Steele v. Ayers, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70731 

(E.D. Cal. July 14, 2010) (failing to rely on other federal courts review of procedural 

default based on the contemporaneous objection rule due to the lack of review of 

whether the bar is consistently applied). However, in light of recent Supreme Court 

authority, even if not applied entirely consistently, a state rule can be considered 

consistently applied. See Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1128, 179 L. Ed. 2d 62 

(2011) ("A discretionary state procedural rule ... can serve as an adequate ground to bar 

federal habeas review. A rule can be firmly established and regularly followed even if the 

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appropriate exercise of discretion may permit consideration of a federal claim in some 

cases but not others.") (citations and internal quotations omitted). Petitioner has not 

provided any evidence to establish that contemporaneous objection rule was not 

consistently applied. The Court finds that Petitioner has not met his burden of 

challenging the procedural default and his claim is barred from federal review.

To overcome a procedural default a prisoner must "demonstrate cause for the 

default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or 

demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. "'[C]ause' under the cause and prejudice test must 

be something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him: 

'[W]e think that the existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on 

whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense 

impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule.'" Id. at 753 (citing 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986)).

2. Reasons to Overcome Procedural Default

Even when a federal claim has been procedurally defaulted, "[t]he bar to federal 

review may be lifted, if 'the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the [procedural] default 

[in state court] and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.' " 

Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912, 922, 181 L. Ed. 2d 807 (2012) (quoting Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 750, 746-47); see also Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 

2012). Adequate "cause" for a default must be an "external" factor that cannot fairly be 

attributed to the petitioner. Coleman, 501 US. at 753. 

a. Cause

In Coleman, the court noted that attorney error which rises to the level of 

ineffective assistance of counsel is considered "cause" within the meaning of this rule. 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753-54. This is because a defendant has a right to effective 

assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, and a violation of that must be seen 

as an external factor, and thus the error must be imputed to the state. Id.; Murray, 477 

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U.S. at 488. Here, Petitioner has alleged claims of prosecutorial misconduct and judicial 

misconduct. Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor and the judge acted improperly, 

preventing Petitioner from having a fair trial. The Court shall assume, without deciding,

that Petitioner has shown cause for the procedural default. 

b. Prejudice

In addition to cause, prejudice is a required element for Petitioner to overcome a 

procedural bar. In order to establish prejudice to overcome a procedural default, 

Petitioner must show "not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of 

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his 

entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 

152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982) (discussing prejudice where 

defendant failed to object to jury instructions in proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255); 

Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012). "Prejudice [to excuse a 

procedural default] is actual harm resulting from the alleged error." Vickers v. Stewart, 

144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998).

1. Judicial Misconduct

Petitioner asserts that the judge committed misconduct based on several events:

he failed to make rulings or made vague rulings with regard to several objections; he

noted that the court of appeal might disagree with his decision to admit evidence; he

denied defense counsel's request to declare his own witness as hostile; he read juror

questions into the record without providing defense counsel the right to review the 

questions beforehand; he misstated when he would interview a juror about contact with 

a witness; he admonished defense counsel for asking leading questions, but did not 

admonish the prosecution for the same actions; and he allowed the prosecution to read 

Petitioner his advisements after conviction rather than reading them himself. (Pet. at 58-

64.)

The Due Process Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a fair and 

impartial judge. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 99 L. Ed. 942 

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(1955). There are two general ways in which a defendant may establish that he was 

denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial judge: (1) the appearance of judicial 

bias or advocacy, or (2) the judge's pecuniary or personal interest in the outcome of the 

proceedings. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501-04, 94 S. Ct. 2697, 41 L. Ed. 2d 

897 (1974). A claim of judicial misconduct by a state judge in the context of federal 

habeas review does not simply require that the federal court determine whether the state 

judge committed judicial misconduct; rather, the question is whether the state judge's 

behavior "rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process 

under the United States Constitution." Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 

1995). A state judge's conduct must be significantly adverse to a defendant before it 

violates constitutional requirements of due process and warrants federal intervention. 

See Garcia v. Warden, Dannemora Corr. Facility, 795 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1986). 

"[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in 

the course of the current proceedings, or prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for 

a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism 

that would make fair judgment impossible." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 

114 S. Ct. 1147, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994).

Petitioner argues that many small actions of the judge over the course of the trial 

illustrated that the judge was biased towards the prosecution and that Petitioner was 

denied a fundamentally fair trial. However, while Petitioner may have disagreed with 

many of the decisions made by the judge, he has not provided any evidence of overt 

bias against him. 

Petitioner claims that the judge failed to make rulings on objections or made 

vague rulings, at best. (Pet. at 58-59.) Petitioner cites to over forty objections that he 

claims the court failed to properly rule. (Id.) Upon review of the objections, it appears that 

on several occasions the judge did not rule on the objection because the opposing 

counsel rephrased the question prior to a ruling. Further, other rulings on objections 

appear to have been stated on the record with sufficient clarity as to allow the parties to 

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understand whether the judge was sustaining or overruling the objections. Neither the 

trial judge’s silence nor rulings on objections pointed out a bias towards either party that 

would have made trial fundamentally unfair. 

The only specific evidentiary ruling that Petitioner raises is where the judge 

improperly ruled to allow the admission of evidence while noting that the appeals court 

might disagree: Petitioner claims this violated his duty of professional competence. (Pet. 

at 66.) The judge stated that he would admit the evidence based on the arguments he 

heard, but that he "would like to admonish the district attorney that, you know, you might 

have to face an appeals court that feels that this is going too far with the evidence." 

(Rep. Tr. at 2004-05.) The judge's admonishment that his ruling was a close one, and 

may be subject to reversal on appeal, does not show that his conduct was unreasonable 

or based on his bias. Judges are constantly required to make difficult decisions without 

time for serious reflection. Stating that an appeals court might reverse an evidentiary 

ruling does not show that the judge acted with improper intent, and moreover does not 

show that the judge displayed "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make 

fair judgment impossible." Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.

Petitioner also complains of the manner in which the trial court handled defense 

counsel’s questioning of defense witness Kathy Wallis – Petitioner’s wife and the mother 

and grandmother of the victims. (Pet. at 59-60.) Petitioner contends that the trial court 

failed to allow him to treat Ms. Wallis as a hostile witness and ask her leading questions. 

Upon review of the transcript, prior to calling the witness, defense counsel requested the 

right to treat the witness as hostile. (Reptr’s Tr. at 2355-57.) The judge did not 

specifically rule, and the defense counsel requested that the witness not be considered 

hostile unless there was evidence of hostility towards defense counsel. (Id.) Defense 

counsel stated that he understood, and the witness was called. (Id.) 

After substantial questioning of the witness, the prosecution started to object to 

the questions presented by defense counsel. However, most were technical objections 

to the form of the questions asked, such as the question being vague or compound. 

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(Reptr’s Tr. at 2376-87.) From the written record, there is no indication that the witness 

was failing to respond to the questions posed by defense counsel. (Id.) However, 

defense counsel did ask several leading questions, and the judge sustained objections 

to those questions. (Id.) Upon review of the transcript, it appears that the witness was 

answering questions and did not evince overt signs of hostility. The witness was not 

refusing to answer questions, and usually provided relevant responses to the questions 

presented by defense counsel. 

Defense counsel requested a sidebar, at which the judge and the prosecutor 

attempted to calm defense counsel down, and explain how to elicit testimony from the 

witness. (Reptr’s Tr. at 2387-2398.) For example, the judge explained, “”But the point is 

if you ask a question. Why didn’t you just – Did you do this? Did you do that? It is 

leading. And she has a right to object.” (Id. at 2393.) At no point did the court prevent 

Petitioner from questioning the witness, it only limited leading questions, because at the 

time, the witness had yet to display signs of hostility. Nothing about the conduct of the 

judge during the questioning of this witness demonstrated judicial bias as to make the 

trial fundamentally unfair.

Next, Petitioner claims judicial misconduct based on the judge’s action in reading 

questions posed by jurors to the entire jury before defense counsel had an opportunity to 

review the questions. (Pet. at 68.) Even if the judge failed to follow appropriate 

procedures with regard to juror questions, Petitioner has shown no basis for bias or other 

misconduct on behalf of the judge. Petitioner argues that the questions possibly could 

have tainted the entire jury, but failed to present argument that the questions indeed did 

so. Petitioner has not shown that the judge’s actions in reading the questions to the 

entire jury rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. 

Petitioner next contends that there was evidence of bias by the judge because the 

judge failed to remember to call and question jurors the next day after they were seen 

talking to a witness. (Pet. at 68.) The issue of tainting the jury was raised by the 

prosecution, not defense counsel. (Rept’rs Tr. at 2826-30.) Regardless, upon the 

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prosecution’s renewed request, made without objection by defense counsel, the court 

proceeded to question the jurors. Nothing about this exchange raises the specter of 

judicial misconduct or bias. 

Petitioner argues that the judge improperly found witness Lance MacDonald to be 

argumentative, and repeatedly admonished him to answer the questions asked. Upon 

review of the record it appears that MacDonald provided unresponsive answers, perhaps 

even attempting to argue with the prosecution. An example is an exchange during the

examination of Mr. MacDonald:

“Q. Now, have known your dad to have a drinking problem?

A. Everyone has a few beers now and then.

THE COURT: I am going to stop there. See what I mean, all you want to 

do is argue.

THE WITNESS: I’m not arguing.

THE COURT: She’s asking you a question. And you want to give make 

some general statement about what is going on in the world. Answer her 

question if you can.”

(Rept’rs Tr. at 2879.) While the judge admonished this witness repeatedly, it appears 

that the witness provided several non-responsive answers to direct questions rather 

than relevant testimony. The fact that the judge attempted to curtail such commentary 

prior to objections from the prosecution does not show bias. If anything, it demonstrates 

the efforts of the judge to control the proceeding. Further, the testimony of the witness 

was objectionable, and had the Court not taken action, there is little doubt that the 

prosecution would have properly objected to the testimony. Again, Petitioner’s claims do 

not evidence misconduct by the judge that would make the trial fundamentally unfair. 

Finally, Petitioner argues that the fact that the judge allowed the prosecutor to 

read some of the advisements onto the record shows that the judge was either 

incompetent or favored the prosecution. (Pet. at 71.) What Petitioner fails to mention is 

that the judge was a visiting judge from a different county, and that the prosecutor 

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assisted the judge in finding a copy of the proper advisements. (Rep. Tr. 3891-95.) While 

the prosecutor assisted the judge, the judge's concern was that Petitioner received 

proper notice of his rights regarding his sentence and his right to appeal. (Id.) Petitioner 

has not shown that the actions of the judge rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. 

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Petitioner would not be 

successful in his claim of judicial misconduct. As the claim would not be successful, 

Petitioner is unable to show prejudice from counsel's failure to present the claim at trial.

2. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner also asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct based on 

several events, including: asking leading questions; asking for nine sidebars as a part of 

objections to defense counsel's questioning of witnesses; and improperly objecting to 

prevent Petitioner from presenting impeachment evidence. (Pet. at 65-68.) 

In general, a prosecutor's actions will not be grounds for habeas relief unless they 

"'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 

process.'" Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 91 L. Ed. 2d 144 

(1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 40 L. Ed. 2d 

431 (1974)). This is a "very general" standard, "leaving courts 'more leeway . . . in 

reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.'" Parker v. Matthews, U.S. , 132 

S. Ct 2148, 2155, 183 L. Ed. 2d 32 (2012) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 

652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938 (2004)) (alteration in original).

A prosecutor's "misleading . . . arguments" to the jury may rise to the level of a 

federal constitutional violation. Sechrest v. Ignacio, 549 F.3d 789, 807 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citing Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-82); see also Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 997 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (citing Darden for conclusion that improper prosecutorial argument may 

violate federal constitutional rights). "[A] prosecutor's improper comments will be held to 

violate the Constitution only if they 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the 

resulting conviction a denial of due process.'" Parker, 132 S. Ct. at 2153 (quoting 

Darden, 477 U.S. at 181); see also Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340, 105 S. Ct. 

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2633, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1985). 

Petitioner cannot establish prejudice with regard to his claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct. Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking 

leading questions and that the admitted to doing so on the record. (Pet. at 66.) 

Petitioner's claims are without merit. Even assuming the prosecutor asked leading 

questions, that, by itself, would not rise to the level of misconduct or make the underlying 

trial fundamentally unfair. Further, where Petitioner claims that the prosecutor admitted 

to asking improper questions, the prosecutor corrected her questions to prevent 

misleading testimony from being admitted. (See Rep. Tr. at 1703; 1876.) The 

prosecutor's statements that "I guess I should have said it the other way" and "I think my 

question was misleading. I misspoke. Hygienist. I don't want to mislead. You're in school 

correct?" do not illustrate misconduct. (Id.) If anything, the comments show that the 

prosecutor was being trying to present accurate evidence to the jury. 

Petitioner claims that the prosecution committed misconduct by preventing

Petitioner from presenting evidence of a witness's relationship with an ex-boyfriend. (Pet. 

at 67.) Petitioner claims this was improper because the prosecution based the objection 

on a false claim that she lacked knowledge of the ex-boyfriend. In reality, the 

prosecution objected to the questions posed by defense counsel because they were 

outside the scope of her re-direct. Regardless, the judge allowed Petitioner to question 

the witness with regard to whether the witness knew that her boyfriend had admitted to 

child molestation during the time they were cohabitating. (Rep. Tr. at 2147.) Petitioner 

has not shown that the prosecutor's objections were improper, or that he was prejudiced 

by the objections. 

The Court finds that Petitioner would not be successful in his claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct. As the claim would not be successful, Petitioner is unable to 

show prejudice from counsel's failure to present the claim at trial.

c. Miscarriage of Justice

Finally, Petitioner can avoid a procedural default if he can demonstrate that a 

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fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from the default. The United States 

Supreme Court has limited the "miscarriage of justice" exception to petitioners who can 

show that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is 

actually innocent." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808 

(1995). "In order to pass through Schlup's gateway, and have an otherwise barred 

constitutional claim heard on the merits, a petitioner must show that, in light of all the 

evidence, including evidence not introduced at trial, "it is more likely than not that no 

reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Majoy 

v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 775-76 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. In 

applying this standard, "A petitioner need not show that he is "actually innocent' of the 

crime he was convicted of committing; instead, he must show that ""a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial.'" Majoy, 296 F.3d at 776, quoting Carriger v. 

Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 478 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc), quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316.

Petitioner has not presented any credible evidence to undermine the factual 

assertions that form the basis of his convictions. Without presenting reliable, credible 

evidence of his innocence, Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing of actual 

innocence to serve as an equitable exception to procedural default. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

324 ("To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of 

constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific 

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not 

presented at trial. Because such evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast majority of 

cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.") Petitioner has not shown that it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt in light of the alleged errors at trial described above. Id. at 314-15. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is procedurally barred from presenting his second and third 

claims.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED with 

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prejudice. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned District Judge, 

pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days after 

being served with the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation." Any reply 

to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 

834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 26, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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