Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02415/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02415-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SALVADOR AVILA-CERVANTES,

Defendant-Movant,

CIV. CASE NO. 12cv2415-BTM

CRIM CASE NO. 12cr2462-BTM

ORDER DENYING § 2255 MOTION

AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Respondent.

Salvador Avila-Cervantes (“Defendant”), a federal inmate proceeding pro se, has

filed a motion for sentence reduction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Def. Mot. 2, ECF No.

27.) Defendant asks the Court to reduce his sentence based on the fact that as a deportable

alien, he is ineligible for (1) housing in a minimum security facility or community confinement

or (2) a one-year sentence reduction through a drug program and/or early release to a

halfway house. Defendant also contends his ineligibility as a deportable alien violates his

right to due process and equal protection of the law. For the reasons discussed below,

Defendant’s § 2255 motion is DENIED.

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I. BACKGROUND

In an Information filed on June 21, 2012, Defendant was charged with violating 8

U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b), attempted reentry of a removed alien. Defendant waived

indictment and subsequently pled guilty pursuant to a Plea Agreement. As part of the Plea

Agreement, Defendant acknowledged that sentencing was in the sole discretion of the judge. 

(Plea Agreement 7, ECF No. 18.) Defendant also agreed to an order of removal from the

United States upon serving his imposed sentence and waived his right to appeal or

collaterally attack the conviction or sentence. (Id. at 10.) The Government recommended

a sentencing guideline range of six to twelve months. (ECF No. 23.) On October 4, 2012,

the Court sentenced Defendant to an eight-month term of imprisonment and two-year term

of supervised release. (ECF No. 26.)

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues for sentence reduction based on the fact that he is ineligible for

(1) housing in a minimum security facility or community confinement or (2) a one-year

sentence reduction through a drug program and/or early release to a halfway house. 

Defendant further contends that his ineligibility as a deportable alien violates his right to

due process and equal protections under the law. Defendant’s claim, however, fails for

two reasons. First, Defendant waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence under

the Plea Agreement. Second, even assuming Defendant did not waive his right to attack

his sentence, his equal protections claim fails on the merits. 

A. Waiver

Defendant argues for sentence reduction, but Defendant waived his right to

collaterally attack his sentence. “A defendant's waiver of his appellate rights is

enforceable if (1) the language of the waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the

grounds raised, and (2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made.” United States v.

Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d

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1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005)). The Ninth Circuit has also recognized that a waiver barring

collateral attack of a conviction or sentence is enforceable when voluntarily made. See

United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, Defendant entered

a Plea Agreement, filed on August 23, 2012, that expressly waived his right to collaterally

attack his sentence:

Defendant waives, to the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or to

collaterally attack the conviction and sentence, except a post-conviction

collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

unless the Court imposes a custodial sentence above the high end of the

guideline range recommended by the Government pursuant to this

agreement at the time of sentencing.

(Plea Agreement 10.) Defendant has not alleged a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, and the Court imposed a sentence of eight months, which is well within the

Government’s recommended guideline range of six to twelve months. Thus, the

language of the waiver encompasses the grounds raised in the instant motion. 

Defendant has not alleged, and there is nothing in the record to indicate, that his waiver

was not knowingly and voluntarily made. Because Defendant waived his right to

collaterally attack his sentence, the Court denies Defendant’s motion.1

B. Merits of Equal Protection Claim

Even assuming Defendant did not waive his right to collaterally attack his

sentence, his equal protections claim fails on the merits. The Equal Protections Clause

applies to aliens who are present in the United States unlawfully. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.

202, 210 (1982). To state a claim for an equal protections violation, however, Defendant

must allege that he was treated differently from other similarly situated persons. See City

of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Unless a suspect

classification is present, the unequal treatment must only be “rationally related to a

The Court notes that even without a waiver, Defendant’s status as a deportable 1

alien is not grounds for a downward departure for a § 1326 violation. See United States v.

Martinez-Ramos, 184 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that “departure on account

of deportable status for aliens convicted of § 1326 offenses fits squarely within Koon 's

perimeters and is proscribed”).

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legitimate state interest.” Id. at 440. Illegal aliens are not a suspect classification, Plyler,

457 U.S. at 223, and therefore rational basis scrutiny applies, which “accords a strong

presumption of validity.” McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999) cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 1086 (2000).

The policy of excluding deportable aliens from participating in community-based

treatment programs, and consequently from being eligible for sentence reductions upon

competition of the programs, survives rational basis scrutiny. See McLean, 173 F.3d at

1186 (holding that “excluding prisoners with [Immigration and Naturalization] detainers

from participating in community-based treatment programs, and consequently from

sentence reduction eligibility, is at least rationally related to the BOP's legitimate interest

in preventing prisoners from fleeing detainers while participating in community treatment

programs”). Deportable aliens “pose a flight risk during the community-based treatment

phase because they are subject to possible deportation upon release from custody, and

therefore have reason to flee a halfway house.” Id. at 1184. Prisoners without detainers,

such as United States citizens, however, “have more incentive to complete the

community requirement because upon its completion they will likely qualify for sentence

reduction and be permitted to rejoin their communities.” See id. at 1184. Thus,

deportable aliens are not “similarly situated” to United States citizens regarding eligibility

for community-based or early release programs. See, e.g., Patterson-Romo v. United

States, No. 10-3119, 2012 WL 4754962, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 7, 2012); United States v.

Roman-Gutierrez, No. 12-1422, 2012 WL 4754962, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2012); United

States v. Nguyen, No. 97-152-05, 2000 WL 1133055 (D. Or. Aug. 10, 2000) (“the Ninth

Circuit has unequivocally held that the denial of such benefits to deportable aliens

pursuant to immigration detainers does not violate the Constitution”); Santos v. United

States, 940 F. Supp. 275, 281 (D. Haw. 1996) (“one's status as a deportable alien, which

may result in ineligibility for less restrictive terms of confinement, nevertheless cannot

justify a downward departure”). Therefore, there is no equal protections violation, and

Defendant’s claim fails on the merits.

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C. Merits of Due Process Claim

To the extent Defendant raises a separate due process claim, the claim is also

denied. The Ninth Circuit has held that a prisoner does not have a recognized liberty

interest in sentence reduction. See Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983, 986 n.4 (9th Cir.

1997) (“[D]enial of the one year reduction doesn’t impose atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. In fact, denial

merely means that the inmate will have to serve out his sentence as expected.”) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Defendant has not stated a claim for

a due process violation, and therefore his claim is denied.

III. CONCLUSION

Defendant’s collateral attack to reduce his sentence is barred by a valid waiver, and

Defendant’s equal protections and due process claims fail on the merits. Therefore, the

Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for sentence reduction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and

DENIES a certificate of appealability. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 29, 2012 

HONORABLE BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ

United States District Judge

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