Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00799/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00799-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DORIS RAY KNOX; JERRY WAYNE 

KNOX; JEREMY EDWARD MOORE, 

individually and as successor-in-interest to 

VERONICA LYNN CANTER, deceased,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF FRESNO, a municipal 

corporation;

EDWARD CHRISTOPHER LOUCHREN,

individually and in his capacity as a police 

officer for the CITY OF FRESNO; 

DOUGLAS EDWARD COX, individually 

and in his capacity as a police officer for the 

CITY OF FRESNO,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00799-EPG

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO BIFURCATE

(ECF Nos. 65, 70)

On May 27, 2016, this Court heard the motions to bifurcate of Plaintiffs Doris Ray 

Knox, Jerry Wayne Knox, and Jeremy Edward Moore (APlaintiffs@) and Defendants City of 

Fresno, Edward Christopher Louchren, and Douglas Edward Cox. (ECF Nos. 65, 70.) 

Plaintiffs appeared by counsel Arturo Gonzalez, Wesley Overson, Robert Esposito, and Sabrina 

Larson. Defendants appeared by counsel Bruce Praet. The Court further considered the 

arguments of counsel on the record at the time of the hearing. The Court ruled from the bench 

on the motions and incorporates those rulings herein. For the reasons described on the record 

Case 1:14-cv-00799-EPG Document 93 Filed 06/02/16 Page 1 of 4
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and in this Order, the Court issues the following written order confirming its rulings on the 

Defendants= and Plaintiffs‟ motions to bifurcate. 

Defendants request that the Court bifurcate the trial with respect to individual liability 

and Monell liability for the City of Fresno. Under Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, a trial court may “order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, 

crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims,” for “convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to 

expedite and economize” the resolution of those claims. District courts enjoy “broad discretion 

to order separate trials.” Davis v. Mason Cty., 927 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir. 1991), superseded 

by statute on other grounds as recognized in Davis v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 

1536, 1556 (9th Cir. 1992); Estate of Lopez v. Suhr, No. 15-CV-01846-HSG, 2016 WL 

1639547, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2016) (“Rule 42(b) confers „broad authority,‟ and giv[es] 

the district court virtually unlimited freedom to try the issues in whatever way trial convenience 

requires.”)

Under City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986), municipal liability 

requires that the individual officer defendants inflicted a constitutional harm on the victim. Id.

(“neither Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 

L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), nor any other of our cases authorizes the award of damages against a 

municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury has 

concluded that the officer inflict no constitutional harm.”); Scott v. Heinrich, 39 F.3d 912, 916 

(9th Cir. 1994) (“While the liability of municipalities doesn‟t turn on the liability of individual 

officers, it is contingent on a violation of constitutional rights.”). In this case, there is no policy 

alleged to have caused harm on Veronica Canter separate and apart from the actions of the 

individual officer defendants‟ actions. Thus, if Defendants demonstrate that the individual 

officers did not violate Canter‟s constitutional rights, Plaintiffs will be unable to establish 

Monell liability.1 Bifurcation would thus streamline the resolution of Plaintiffs‟ claims.

 

1 Defendants have agreed to stipulate to vicarious liability with respect to Plaintiffs‟ state claims, should Plaintiffs 

demonstrate individual liability.

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The Court also finds that there is a risk of juror confusion if the individual liability 

claims are considered at the same time as the municipal liability claims. While the individual 

liability claims will require the jury to consider what a reasonable officer would or should have 

known in construing the objective reasonability of the officers‟ actions, the municipal claims 

will involve the introduction of evidence that the officers did not know and that no reasonable 

officer would know.

Moreover, combining the claims is prejudicial to both sides. It is prejudicial to the 

individual defendants because it would introduce a number of other bad acts by the city for 

which the individual defendants bore no responsibility. It is also prejudicial to plaintiffs 

because it suggests to jurors that they could render a verdict in favor of the individual officers 

but against the city, which could force the to invalidate that verdict in order to conform to the 

law. 

Many other courts have found bifurcation appropriate under similar circumstances. 

Qunitanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 356 (9th Cir. 1996); Amato v. City of Saratoga 

Springs, N.Y., 170 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir. 1999). The Court thus finds it appropriate to 

bifurcate the trial into two phases: Phase One will determine individual liability for the officer 

defendants, along with vicarious liability for the City as to the third, forth and fifth causes of 

action, and Phase Two will determine municipal liability for the City of Fresno as to the first 

and second causes of action. 

Plaintiffs also move to bifurcate the trial for the purpose of separating liability and 

damages. Defendants are not opposed to this request and propose trifurcating the trial. 

Plaintiffs asked that the Court give them time to consider the possibility of trying the issue of 

damages in Phase Two, along with the Monell claims, and asked to have until May 31, 2016 to 

make that decision. The Court granted both parties leave to file briefing notifying the Court of 

their intent to bifurcate the trial in this way no later than May 31, 2016. Neither party filed any 

briefing on this issue. Thus, the issue of damages will be heard after Phase Two is completed. 

The Court finds that dividing the phases as requested by both parties would increase efficiency 

and would not create undue prejudice or confusion.

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For the reasons set forth above and on the record, the Court orders as follows:

1. The Court GRANTS the Motions to Bifurcate (ECF Nos. 65, 70) and trial in this 

matter shall be trifurcated into three phases: Phase One shall determine liability 

on the part of the individual officer defendants along with vicarious liability of 

the City of Fresno as to causes of action three, four and five; Phase Two shall 

determine liability on the part of the City of Fresno as to causes of action one 

and two; and Phase Three shall determine damages for all defendants.

2. The parties are DIRECTED to submit proposed jury instructions, as detailed in 

the Court‟s pretrial order (ECF No. 64), no later than June 3, 2016. The parties 

are invited to include limiting instruction(s) concerning the use of evidence 

concerning Canter‟s mental health history for state causes of action (as detailed 

on the record and in the Court‟s Order re: Motions in Limine);

3. The parties are directed to submit supplemental briefing as detailed on the 

record, no later than June 3, 2016, on the issues of:

a. The admissibility of police policies and procedures into Phase One of 

trial; and,

b. Whether qualified immunity is properly a question for the court (rather 

than the jury) to decide and, if so, which factual issues must be submitted 

to the jury for these purposes.

4. The Court SETS a hearing on the above issues for June 13, 2016 at 10:00 a.m.

in Courtroom 10.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 1, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00799-EPG Document 93 Filed 06/02/16 Page 4 of 4