Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00001/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00001-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Leon Calloway Morning, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 12-0001-PHX-NVW (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

This matter comes before this Court upon consideration of a pro se Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus, filed on September January 3, 2012, by Petitioner Leon Calloway

Morning, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison. (Doc. 1.) On April 9, 2012,

Respondents filed their Answer, (Doc. 11), and on May 9, 2012, Petitioner filed a Reply,

(Doc. 12).

BACKGROUND

I. Preliminary Proceedings.

On May 8, 2007, Petitioner was charged in an Information filed in the Maricopa

County Superior Court, with two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or

dangerous instrument, both class 3 dangerous felonies. (Doc. 11, Exh. A.) The State also

alleged that Petitioner had previously been convicted of aggravated assault, a class 3 felony,

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and possession/use of narcotic drugs, a class 4 felony, and multiple aggravating

circumstances other than prior convictions. (Id., Exhs. B, C.) 

II. Settlement Conference.

On July 2, 2007, Petitioner attended a settlement conference before a superior court

judge, who advised him that if convicted at trial on both felony counts, and assuming a

finding of one prior dangerous felony, that a prison sentence would be mandatory, that the

“presumptive” term on each count would be 111⁄4, which could be reduced to a minimum of

10 years or increased to a maximum of 20 years, that the sentences on the two counts could

be ordered to run consecutively, and that it was possible that Petitioner could be sentenced

to 40 years in prison. (Doc. 11, Exh. D, at 5-7, 10-11.) The judge explained to Petitioner

that the State’s plea offer would require him to plead guilty to one of the aggravated assault

counts, as a class 3 dangerous offense, which would expose Petitioner to a sentence between

71⁄2 and 15 years in prison, and the other aggravated assault count, with a stipulation to a

probation term that would be consecutive to his prison sentence. (Id., at 8-9.) Petitioner

rejected the State’s plea offer. (Id., at 12-14.)

III. Change of Plea Proceedings.

Trial commenced in Petitioner’s case, and on day two, just before opening statements,

Petitioner decided to plead guilty, without the benefit of a plea agreement, to the charges,

with one prior felony conviction. (Doc. 11, Exhs. G, H.) The trial court conducted a detailed

colloquy with Petitioner, ensuring that Petitioner understood that:

(1) Petitioner was pleading guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement with the

government.

(2) Petitioner would be pleading guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, and that

they were both class 3 dangerous felonies.

(3) the allegations to which Petitioner was pleading guilty included that he had a prior

felony aggravated assault conviction, a class 3 dangerous offense.

(4) Petitioner would necessarily be committed to the Department of Corrections,

because of the dangerous nature of the offense.

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(5) the presumptive term for each of the counts with one prior dangerous felony

conviction was 111⁄4 years, which could be increased to a maximum of 20 years, or decreased

to a minimum 10 years.

(6) by pleading guilty, Petitioner would be giving up his right to trial, to confront and

cross-examine witnesses, to present witnesses and evidence on his own behalf, to remain

silent, to be presumed innocent, to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, to have a jury

determine aggravating factors, and to appeal.

(7) the sentence imposed within the sentencing range for the offenses would be

entirely up to the court, and that this was the same range he would face if he was convicted

at trial. (Doc. 11, Exh. H, at 5-10.)

Petitioner then pleaded guilty to the two counts of aggravated assault with a prior

dangerous felony conviction, and admitted the factual basis. (Doc. 11, Exh. H, at 11-12.)

On February 15, 2008, the trial court entered judgments of conviction on the two counts, and

sentenced Petitioner to aggravated consecutive sentences of 15 years’ imprisonment. (Id.,

Exh. K, at 19-21; Exh. L.)

IV. Post-Conviction State Court Proceedings.

Petitioner subsequently filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief, and then a

petition for post conviction relief (“PCR”), in which he raised, through appointed counsel,

the following claims:

(i) the trial court failed to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of Petitioner’s

right to trial on the prior dangerous felony conviction, and failed to review with Petitioner

the range of sentence he faced without the prior conviction, in violation of the requirements

of Rule 17 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure;

(ii) The trial court violated Petitioner Sixth Amendment rights under Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), by not having a jury trial on the factors used to aggravate

his sentence. 

(Doc. 11, Exh. Q.) 

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Petitioner subsequently withdrew his second claim because the transcript clearly

showed that the court had advised Petitioner of his right to have a jury trial on the

aggravating factors and that Petitioner had waived that right. (Id., Exh. S, at 1, 5.)

On November 10, 2009, the trial court dismissed the PCR, finding that no colorable

claim had been established as to Petitioner’s remaining claim, finding as follows:

The defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated assault, class 3

dangerous felonies, and the state alleged that he had one prior dangerous

felony conviction. On the second day of trial, just before opening statements

and after the defendant saw that the victims appeared at trial, the defendant

pleaded guilty directly to the court without the benefit of a plea agreement.

Since the defendant chose to plead guilty to the court he was required to plead

to the charges as alleged in the indictment and any allegations properly filed

by the state.

The defendant pled guilty to both charges and admitted he had a prior

dangerous felony conviction. During the guilty plea proceeding, the court

advised the defendant of the range of sentencing on a class 3 dangerous felony

with a dangerous prior felony conviction. The court advised the defendant that

the range of sentencing he faced if he plead guilty to the court was the same

range of sentencing he faced if he continued with his trial and was found

guilty. The court further advised the defendant that, since this was a plea to

the court without the benefit of a plea agreement, there were no stipulations to

a particular sentence, and it would be entirely up to the court to determine his

sentence within the sentencing range allowed by law. This sentencing range

had been clearly explained by the court. The defendant was advised that he

was giving up his constitutional rights by pleading guilty including a jury

determination to any aggravating factors. The defendant admitted he had a

prior conviction for aggravated assault, a class 3 dangerous felony, the dates

of commission and conviction, the county and state, the cause number and that

he was represented by counsel.

Defendant claims that he was not properly advised of the consequence of

admitting his prior conviction during his plea to the court. Defendant claims

he should have been advised of the sentencing range for a class 3 dangerous

felony without a prior dangerous conviction. Since the defendant chose to

plead guilty directly to the court to all charges and allegations, however, the

range of sentencing that the defendant faced was a class 3 dangerous felony

with a dangerous prior felony conviction.

Accordingly the court properly advised the defendant of the sentencing range

the defendant faced as a result of his guilty plea.

(Doc. 11, Exh. T.)

Petitioner timely filed a pro se Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of Appeals,

raising the following claims:

(1) “The trial court abused its discretion in excepting plea of guilty without a signed

waiver, and this plea resulted in a manifest injustice,” and that “the trial court erred when it

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failed to inquire [about Petitioner] being on Geodon and Depakote medication,” and that his

trial counsel was ineffective.

(2) “The trial court did not conduct a proper admission of the prior felony conviction

under A.R.S. 13-604 or Rule 17.6 Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. Therefore, this is an illegal sentence

in violation of the 14th Amendment.” Although the heading of this claim refers to Rule 17.6,

the substance of Petitioner’s claim is that the allegations of prior felony convictions were too

stale to be used for enhancement.

(3) “Morning did not sign a written waiver or waive his 6th Amendment right to a jury

trial on aggravating factors.”

(4) “The Petitioner Morning was denied effective assistance of counsel.”

(Doc. 11, Exh. U.) On April 29, 2011, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied

review. (Id., Exh. X.)

V. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

On January 3, 2012, Petitioner filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus

(hereinafter “habeas petition”). Petitioner raises the following five claims in his habeas

petition: (1) Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the trial court accepted

Petitioner’s plea even though Petitioner was under psychotropic medication and never signed

a waiver, and that his trial counsel was ineffective at the plea bargaining stage; (2)

Petitioner’s sentence was illegal because the prior felony convictions used to enhance his

sentence were not proper enhancement because they were not committed within five or 10

years of the new offense; (3) Petitioner did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial

because he was coerced by his defense counsel and was on narcotic psychotropic medication,

in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; (4) Petitioner’s trial and postconviction relief counsel were ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment; and (5) the

trial court did not conduct a proper admission colloquy on his prior felony conviction

pursuant to Rule 17.6 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 1.)

///

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DISCUSSION

I. Exhaustion and Procedural Default. 

Before a federal court may grant habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner

must exhaust remedies available in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); O'Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). The

federal court will not entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless each and every

issue has been exhausted. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 230 (2004); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.

509, 521-22 (1982). A petitioner has the burden of alleging exhaustion. Cartwright v. Cupp,

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1983). To

properly exhaust state remedies, the prisoner must have afforded the state courts the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of his federal constitutional claims by "fairly presenting"

them to the state courts in a procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S.

346, 349 (1989); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (stating that "[t]o provide the

State with the necessary 'opportunity,' the prisoner must 'fairly present' her claim in each

appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim"). 

A petitioner must describe both the operative facts and the federal legal theory so that

the state courts have a "fair opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts

bearing on his constitutional claim. Id. A state prisoner “must include reference to a specific

constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts which entitle the petitioner to

relief.” Gray v. Netherdland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996). General appeals to broad

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial,

are not sufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. Lyons v.

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th

Cir. 2001). In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, claims are exhausted

once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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Where a prisoner fails to "fairly present" a claim to the state courts in a procedurally

appropriate manner, his claim is procedurally defaulted. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32. There are two types of procedural default.

First, a state court may have applied a procedural bar when the prisoner attempted to

raise the claim in state court. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 802-05. For example, a habeas

petitioner may be barred from raising federal claims that he failed to preserve in state court

by making contemporaneous objections at trial or by raising the claim on direct appeal or

post-conviction review. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 841-42 (9th Cir. 1995)(stating that

failure to raise contemporaneous objection at trial to an alleged violation of federal rights

constitutes a procedural default of that issue); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir.

1991)(finding procedural default where the Arizona Court of Appeals held that petitioner had

waived his claims by failing to raise them on direct appeal or in his first petition for postconviction review). If the state court found a procedural bar but also addressed the merits

of the underlying federal claim, the "alternative" ruling does not vitiate the independent state

procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d

329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (state supreme court found ineffective assistance of counsel claims

"barred under state law," but also discussed and rejected the claims on the merits, en banc

court held that the "on-the-merits" discussion was an "alternative ruling" and the claims were

procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review). A higher court's subsequent

summary denial of review affirms the lower court's application of a procedural bar.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. In order to "constitute adequate and independent grounds

sufficient to support a finding of procedural default, a state rule must be clear, consistently

applied, and well-established at the time of the petitioner's default." Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). Arizona courts have consistently applied their procedural default

rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002)(holding that Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32.2(a) is an adequate and independent procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d

923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998)(rejecting the argument that Arizona courts have not "strictly or

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regularly followed" Rule 32); Carriger, 971 F.2d at 333 (rejecting the assertion that Arizona

courts' application of procedural default rules had been "unpredictable and irregular"). 

In the second procedural default scenario, the state prisoner may not have presented

the claim to the state courts, but pursuant to the state courts' procedural rules, a return to state

court would be "futile." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989). Generally, any claim

not previously presented to the Arizona courts is procedurally barred from federal review

because any attempt to return to state court to properly exhaust a current habeas claim would

be "futile." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1, 32.2(a) & (b); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th

Cir. 2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27, 916 P.2d 1035, 1048-53 (1996); Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3) (relief is precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any

previous collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for

review must be filed within thirty days of trial court's decision). A state post-conviction

action is futile where it is time barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116

F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as

a basis for dismissal of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion

under Rule 32.2(a)). 

In either case of procedural default, federal review of the claim is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v.

Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To

establish cause, a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Id. The following objective

factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2) a showing that the factual

or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective

assistance of counsel. Id. To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate that the

alleged constitutional violation "worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting

his entire trial with error of constitutional dimension." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,

170 (1982). Where petitioner fails to establish cause, the court need not reach the prejudice

prong. 

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To establish a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” resulting in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent, a state prisoner must establish that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B).

II. Law and Applicable Facts.

Grounds 1through 4 of Petitioner’s habeas petition are procedurally barred because

he did not fairly present these claims in his PCR. Although in his petition for review to the

Arizona Court of Appeals he raised similar claims, they were not raised in a procedurally

correct manner and are barred by the exhaustion doctrine. Petitioner’s claims were not

presented to every level of state court in a procedurally correct manner. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(1)(A); see also Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29 (petitioner must fairly present his claim “in

each appropriate state court”). State prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity

to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking “one complete round of the State’s

established appellate review process.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2002), citing

O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845.

Ground 5 of Petitioner’s habeas petition is also procedurally barred because Petitioner

did not fairly present this claim in the state court as a federal claim. In his PCR, Petitioner

specifically argued that the plea colloquy conducted by the trial court was not in compliance

with Rule 17.6, in that Petitioner was not advised of his right under the Arizona Constitution

to a jury trial, or of the sentence he faced without a prior conviction, and therefore

Petitioner’s plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. (Doc. 11, Exh. Q, at 5-7.) 

Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to relief on the claim because the failures of the trial

court “resulted in a violation of the jury trial guarantees contained in Art. 2, §§ 23 and 24 of

the Arizona Constitution.” (Id., at 5.) Nowhere in his PCR and the Reply he filed to the

State’s Response does he state the federal basis for his claim. The mere “similarity between

a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to establish exhaustion.” Hiivala v. Wood,

195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999). “[A] petitioner must make the federal basis of the

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the

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federal basis is ‘self-evident’ or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on

the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds.” Rose

v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d at 1111. 

Additionally, citations to state cases that analyze federal constitutional principles do

not sufficiently constitute fair presentment. Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 912 n.13 (9th Cir.

2004) (a federal issue is not presented merely because a state case cited discusses federal law;

the citation must be accompanied by “some clear indication that the case involves federal

issues.”). Although the case cited by Petitioner in support of his claim, State v. Morales, 215

Ariz. 59 (2007), discussed the interplay between a defendant’s right to due process and Rule

17.6, Petitioner did not alert the court to these federal principles or how they were applicable

to his claim, but chose to emphasize the application of Rule 17.6, Ariz. R.Crim.P. In fact,

the Arizona Supreme Court granted review in Morales, because it determined that the proper

application of the rule “presents an important question of state law.” Id., at 61.

 Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of

justice to excuse his procedural default. There is simply no basis to conclude that Petitioner

could not have properly raised these issues in a timely manner. Petitioner argues several

grounds to excuse his procedural default: that his PCR counsel was ineffective by not

mailing him a copy of the original PCR until the state had filed an answer, and that PCR

counsel abandoned Petitioner by not filing a petition for review, and by not fairly presenting

the issues in the superior court as federal claims, and that Petitioner was unable to cite any

federal law due to the lack of law books. (Doc. 12, at 2, 11-14.) Petitioner has not

demonstrated that his procedural default is caused by interference by state officials, or that

the factual or legal basis for his claims was not reasonably available.

Recently, the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct.

1309, 1313 (2012), held that a federal court in a habeas proceeding may find cause for a

procedural default of an ineffective-assistance of trial counsel claim when the claim was not

properly presented in state court due to ineffective assistance of PCR counsel. The facts of

Martinez are distinguishable, primarily because Martinez had raised his claim of ineffective

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assistance of PCR counsel in the state court, in a subsequent PCR proceeding. Here,

Petitioner raises this claim for the first time in his habeas petition. Although he raised the

issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct review, he never argued that his PCR

counsel was ineffective in not raising this claim in the PCR proceedings.

Even if Martinez could be interpreted to stand for the proposition that ineffective

assistance of PCR counsel (in not raising ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims) may

be raised for the first time in a habeas petition, Petitioner has not identified proper claims.

In his habeas petition, Petitioner claims that his PCR counsel was ineffective for “fail[ing]

to raise several other issues in which were of violation of [Petitioner]’s constitutional rights

in her petition of post-conviction relief,” but does not identify these other issues. (Doc. 1,

at 13.) He also claims, generally, that his PCR counsel abandoned him and withdrew the

second argument in his PCR petition “due to ineffectiveness.” (Id.) 

Petitioner does not claim in his habeas petition that PCR counsel was ineffective in

not raising his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In his Reply, however, he

comes marginally closer to doing so. He argues more specifically that, “Respondents claim

that ground 1 through 5 should be barred because the claims where not fairly presented to the

superior court as a federal claim, this in fact shows that the (PCR) counsel was ineffective

for not properly doing so.” (Doc. 12, at 12.) 

Even if Petitioner has properly raised an ineffective assistance of PCR counsel claim,

the type that the Supreme Court in Martinez has held can constitute cause for procedural

default, he has not demonstrated that his PCR counsel was “ineffective” under Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), or that his current ineffective assistance of counsel claims

are “substantial.” Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1319. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

451-54 (2000). For instance:

1. Petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance at the plea bargaining

stage because his counsel coerced him into pleading guilty without a plea agreement and that

Petitioner was uninformed and ill prepared to enter his guilty plea. (Doc. 1, at 6-7, 10.) This

claim is belied by the record of the change of plea proceedings, during which Petitioner was

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clearly aware that he was pleading guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement, after

having previously rejected the State’s prior plea offer. (Doc. 11, Exhs. D, H.) He was also

informed of the consequences of his decision and the range of sentence he faced. (Id.)

Petitioner affirmatively reassured the court that he had not been coerced into pleading guilty.

(Id., Exh. H, at 7.) Furthermore, he does not present any evidence, other than his bare

assertion, that he was coerced into his guilty plea.

2. Petitioner claims that his trial counsel failed to investigate any of the witnesses, or

present medical records that would impeach the claims of one of the victims, but fails to

provide any specifics, or any evidence of these claims. Petitioner claims that his trial counsel

coerced him into pleading guilty while he was on psychotropic drugs, but fails to produce

any evidence of this claim. Petitioner claims that his trial counsel failed to argue during a

prior hearing that the state could not properly allege his prior convictions because they were

too old. Petitioner’s claim here fails because, pursuant to A.R.S. §13-105, as amended, no

time limit is imposed on allegations of a prior offense involving “the intentional or knowing

infliction of serious physical injury,” and/or “the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon or

dangerous instrument.” A.R.S.§ 13-105 (22)(a)(ii). Petitioner’s admitted prior was for a

dangerous offense. (Doc. 11, Exh. H, at 4, 9.)

Petitioner has not demonstrated that his PCR counsel was ineffective, and therefore

has not established cause for his procedural default, and, as he has also not established a

fundamental miscarriage of justice, this Court will recommend that his habeas petition be

denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc.V1)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to

file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge's recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 20th day of June, 2012.

Case 2:12-cv-00001-NVW Document 14 Filed 06/20/12 Page 13 of 13