Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01500/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01500-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DAVID LEMUS, 

CDCR #K-84252, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

T. GUTIERREZ, et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No. 17cv1500-MMA (JLB) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

[Doc. No. 46] 

Plaintiff David Lemus, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil 

rights action against two prison officials and a medical professional alleging violations of 

his Eighth Amendment rights. See Doc. No. 28. Defendants T. Gutierrez, A. 

Hernandez, Jr., and Dr. S. Ko move for summary judgment as to the merits of Plaintiff’s 

claims. See Doc. No. 46. Additionally, Dr. Ko seeks summary judgment on the ground 

that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. See id. The 

Court notified Plaintiff of the requirements for opposing summary judgment pursuant to 

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). See Doc. No. 47. Plaintiff 

filed a response in opposition to the motion, to which Defendants replied. See Doc. Nos. 

48, 49. Subsequently, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a sur-reply. See Doc. No. 

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54. The Court took the matter under submission on the briefs pursuant to Civil Local 

Rule 7.1.d.1 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, 

the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the merits of 

Plaintiff’s claims. 

PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

 On October 17, 2016, Plaintiff and his cellmate, Rickey Cruz, were “summoned 

for court appearance at the administrative building.” Doc. No. 28 at 3.1

 Plaintiff claims 

that they were both “accosted by” Defendants Gutierrez and Hernandez who handcuffed 

them behind their backs “for transport” via a cart. Id. Cruz was permitted to “sit on a 

passenger seat in the front of the cart” while Plaintiff was told to “sit on a makeshift 

plywood seat at the back.” Id. Defendant Gutierrez was the “driver of the cart” and 

Plaintiff claims he drove “fast on the road and rounding corners.” Id. While Hernandez 

was “hanging onto the side of the cart,” Plaintiff claims he “didn’t have anything to grab, 

as he started sliding off of the cart.” Id. Plaintiff yelled for Gutierrez to stop but “was 

ignored.” Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Gutierrez “continued driving fast, then turned a 

corner that threw Plaintiff from the cart.” Id. “Instead of stopping, both defendants kept 

going” because they wanted to “make sure Plaintiff’s cellmate wasn’t late for court.” Id. 

As a result, Plaintiff claims he was “tossing and turning in pain on the pavement for 

many minutes before both defendants appeared in hostile fashion.” Id. 

 Plaintiff contends Defendants Gutierrez and Hernandez “refused to activate their 

alarms for medical attention” on his behalf. Id. However, they “took it upon themselves 

to snatch him up” and attempted to “place him in the cart for court.” Id. Plaintiff alleges 

that he told Gutierrez and Hernandez he was in “excruciating pain” but they “ignored him 

by saying that he had to get to court.” Id. at 4. However, “after medical personnel started 

yelling for the defendants to take Plaintiff to the infirmary, they retrieved a wheelchair” 

                                               

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and took Plaintiff to the Correctional Treatment Center (“CTC”). Id. 

At the CTC, Dr. Seeley2

 examined Plaintiff and directed that Plaintiff be taken to 

the El Centro Regional Medical Center (“ECRMC”) by ambulance. See id. At ECRMC 

Dr. Kajitani3

 examined Plaintiff and “diagnosed Plaintiff’s condition as suffering from 

forearm hematoma, closed head injury [without] cranial wound and thoracic myofascial 

strain.” Id. Plaintiff was provided with an “arm brace.” Id. However, when Plaintiff 

returned to prison, “Defendant Ko confiscated Plaintiff’s arm brace without replacing it 

or accommodating his medical needs associated with forearm hematoma.” Id. Plaintiff 

“expressed that he was in tremendous pain” but Dr. Ko purportedly “indicated that he 

would be alright.” Id. As Plaintiff “continued to express discomfort with his arm,” he 

claims Dr. Ko “told him that the matter was beyond his control.” Id. 

 Based on these allegations, Plaintiff seeks various forms of injunctive and 

declaratory relief as well compensatory and punitive damages. See id. at 6. 

LEGAL STANDARD

 “A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense – or 

the part of each claim or defense – on which summary judgment is sought. The court 

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing 

the basis of its motion and of identifying the portions of the declarations, pleadings, and 

discovery that demonstrate absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the 

suit under applicable law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 

(1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a 

                                               

2

 Dr. Seeley is not a defendant in this action. 

3

 Dr. Kajitani is not a defendant in this action. 

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reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248. 

 The party opposing summary judgment cannot “rest upon the mere allegations or 

denials of [its] pleading but must instead produce evidence that sets forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Estate of Tucker v. Interscope Records, 

515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 827 (2008) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In applying the standard set forth under Rule 56, district courts must 

“construe liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and . . . avoid 

applying summary judgment rules strictly.” Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th 

Cir. 2010). 

 When a defendant seeks judgment based on the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies prior to filing suit, the defendant must prove that there was an 

available administrative remedy which the plaintiff failed to exhaust. See Williams v. 

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). If they do, the burden of production then 

shifts to the plaintiff “to show that there is something in his particular case that made the 

existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” 

Id. at 1191; see also McBride v. Lopez, 807 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 

“circumstances where the intervening actions or conduct by prison officials [may] render 

the inmate grievance procedure unavailable.”). 

DISCUSSION

I. Exhaustion 

As an initial matter, Dr. Ko seeks summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff 

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) before 

filing suit. 

 A. Legal Standards for Exhausting Administrative Remedies 

 “The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) mandates that an inmate 

exhaust ‘such administrative remedies as are available’ before bringing suit to challenge 

prison conditions.” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1854-55 (2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(a)). “There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA[.]” 

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Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (citation omitted). The PLRA also requires that 

prisoners, when grieving their appeal, adhere to CDCR’s “critical procedural rules.” 

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 91 (2006). “[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and not the 

PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. 

 The exhaustion requirement is based on the important policy concern that prison 

officials should have “an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their 

responsibilities before being haled into court.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 204. The “exhaustion 

requirement does not allow a prisoner to file a complaint addressing non-exhausted 

claims.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). Therefore, regardless 

of the relief sought, a prisoner must pursue an appeal through all levels of a prison’s 

grievance process as long as that process remains available to him. “The obligation to 

exhaust ‘available’ remedies persists as long as some remedy remains ‘available.’ Once 

that is no longer the case, then there are no ‘remedies . . . available,’ and the prisoner 

need not further pursue the grievance.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 

2005) (original emphasis) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). “The 

only limit to § 1997e(a)’s mandate is the one baked into its text: An inmate need exhaust 

only such administrative remedies as are ‘available.’” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1862; see also 

Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2010) (PLRA does not require 

exhaustion when circumstances render administrative remedies “effectively 

unavailable.”). 

 Grievance procedures are available if they are “‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some 

relief for the action complained of.’” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859 (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. 

at 738); see also Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191 (“To be available, a remedy must be 

available ‘as a practical matter’; it must be ‘capable of use; at hand.’”) (quoting Albino v. 

Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171) (9th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted)). In Ross, the 

Supreme Court noted “three kinds of circumstances in which an administrative remedy, 

although officially on the books, is not capable of use to obtain relief.” 136 S. Ct. at 1859 

(emphasis added). These circumstances arise when: (1) the “administrative procedure . . . 

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operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide 

any relief to aggrieved inmates;” (2) the “administrative scheme . . . [is] so opaque that it 

becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use ... so that no ordinary prisoner can make 

sense of what it demands;” and (3) “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking 

advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or 

intimidation.” Id. at 1859-60 (citations omitted). 

Applying these principles, the Ninth Circuit has specifically found that “[w]hen 

prison officials fail to respond to a prisoner’s grievance within a reasonable time, the 

prisoner is deemed to have exhausted available administrative remedies within the 

meaning of the PLRA.” See Andres v. Marshall, 854 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(per curiam) (finding RJD’s 6-month failure to respond to an inmate grievance rendered 

prisoner’s administrative remedies unavailable); accord Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 

809, 811 (7th Cir. 2006) (officials’ failure to respond to a “timely complaint that was 

never received” rendered prisoner’s administrative remedies unavailable). The Ninth 

Circuit has further found administrative remedies “plainly unavailable” where prison 

officials “screen out an inmate’s appeals for improper reasons,” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 

F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2010), and “effectively unavailable” where they provide the 

inmate mistaken instructions as to the means of correcting a claimed deficiency, but upon 

re-submission, reject it as untimely after compliance proved impossible. See Nunez, 591 

F.3d at 1226. Administrative remedies may also prove unavailable if the prisoner shows 

an “objectively reasonable” basis for his belief that “officials would retaliate against him 

if he filed a grievance.” McBride, 807 F.3d at 987. 

 B. CDCR’s Exhaustion Requirements 

 With respect to the initial burden on summary judgment, the Court finds Dr. Ko 

has offered sufficient evidence, which Plaintiff does not contradict, to prove that the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) has established an 

“administrative remedy” for prisoners like Plaintiff to pursue before filing suit under 

§ 1983. See Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191 (citing Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172) (quotation 

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marks omitted). 

Specifically, a California prisoner may appeal “any policy, decision, action, 

condition, or omission by the department or its staff that [he] can demonstrate as having a 

material adverse effect upon his . . . health, safety, or welfare.” CAL CODE REGS., tit. 15 

§ 3084.1(a). Since January 28, 2011, and during the time period encompassing the events 

at issue in this case, Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations has required three 

formal levels of appeal review. See Gibson Decl., Doc. No. 46-7 at ¶¶ 2-5. Thus, in 

order to properly exhaust, a California prisoner must, within 30 calendar days of the 

decision or action being appealed, or “upon first having knowledge of the action or 

decision being appealed,” CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3084.8(b), “use a CDCR Form 602 

(Rev. 08/09), Inmate/Parolee Appeal, to describe the specific issue under appeal and the 

relief requested.” Id. § 3084.2(a). The CDCR Form 602 “shall be submitted to the 

appeals coordinator at the institution.” Id. § 3084.2(c), § 3084.7(a). 

If the first level CDCR Form 602 appeal is “denied or not otherwise resolved to the 

appellant’s satisfaction at the first level,” id. § 3084.7(b), the prisoner must “within 30 

calendar days . . . upon receiving [the] unsatisfactory departmental response,” id.

§ 3084.8(b)(3), seek a second level of administrative review, which is “conducted by the 

hiring authority or designee at a level no lower than Chief Deputy Warden, Deputy 

Regional Parole Administrator, or the equivalent.” Id. § 3084.7(b), (d)(2). “The third 

level is for review of appeals not resolved at the second level.” Id. § 3084.7(c). “The 

third level review constitutes the decision of the Secretary of the CDCR on an appeal, and 

shall be conducted by a designated representative under the supervision of the third level 

Appeals Chief or equivalent. The third level of review exhausts administrative remedies,” 

id. § 3084.7(d)(3), “unless otherwise stated.”4

 Id. § 3084.1(b); see also CDCR 

                                               

4

 For example, “[a] second level of review shall constitute the department’s final action on appeals of 

disciplinary actions classified as ‘administrative’ as described in section 3314, or minor disciplinary 

infractions documented on CDC[R] Form 128-A (rev. 4-74), Custodial Counseling Chrono, pursuant to 

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OPERATIONS MANUAL § 541100.13 (“Because the appeal process provides for a 

systematic review of inmate and parolee grievances and is intended to afford a remedy at 

each level of review, administrative remedies shall not be considered exhausted until 

each required level of review has been completed.”). 

C. Analysis 

Dr. Ko argues that Plaintiff did not timely file an administrative grievance against 

him. It is undisputed that the CDCR exhaustion requirements require an inmate to “file a 

grievance within thirty calendar dates of the incident being appealed.” See Gibson Decl. 

at ¶ 5 (citing CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3084.8). The factual allegations made by 

Plaintiff against Dr. Ko arise from events that are alleged to have occurred on October 

17, 2016. See Findley Decl., Doc. No. 46-5, Pl. Dep 104:23 – 105:5. Dr. Ko argues that 

Plaintiff did not “submit his appeal related to Dr. Ko until January 17, 2017, three months 

after Dr. Ko removed his brace.” Def. Memo. at 22. 

 Dr. Ko submits the declaration of S. Gates, Chief of the Health Care 

Correspondence and Appeals Branch (“HCCAB”), “formerly named the Inmate 

Correspondence and Appeals Branch,” which is “part of California Correctional Health 

Care Services (“CCHCS”).” Gates Decl., Doc. No. 46-6 at ¶ 1. “All levels of health care 

appeals are tracked through a computer database known as the Health are Appeals and 

Risk Tracking System (“HCARTS”). Id. at ¶ 4. Gates was directed to conduct a “review 

of inmate health care appeals in the HCARTS database regarding David Lemus, CDCR 

No. K-84252” and to locate “any health care appeals relating to allegations of deliberate 

indifference to medical care or negligent or improper medical care against Dr. Ko, for 

any reason, including, but not limited to confiscating Plaintiff’s arm brace.” Id. at ¶ 7. 

 According to Gates, Plaintiff submitted a grievance on January 17, 2017 which 

was designated “Health Care Appeal Log No. CEN-HC-17027852.” Id. at ¶ 7(a). In this 

                                               

section 3312(a)(2), and shall exhaust administrative remedy on these matters.” CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 

§ 3084.7(b)(1). 

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grievance, Plaintiff requested that his “arm brace be returned to him a.s.a.p,” that he 

receive “appropriate care for his ongoing pain,” and to be “evaluated by another 

physician.” Id., Ex. B, Doc. No. 46-6 at 12. Plaintiff also claimed, “Dr. Ko confiscated” 

his arm brace “without legitimate reason.” Id. at 14. The appeal was “cancelled” at the 

first level of review on January 19, 2017 because the “time limits for submitting the 

appeal [were] exceeded even though” Plaintiff “had the opportunity to submit within the 

prescribed time restraints.” Id. at 16. In addition, it was also found that the “appeal 

makes a general allegation, but fails to state facts or specify an act or occasion consistent 

with the allegation.” Id. 

 On February 9, 2017, J. Lewis, “Deputy Director of Policy and Risk Management 

Services,” informed Plaintiff that it “has been determined your appeal submitted for 

Director’s Level Review does not comply with appeal procedures” and is “being 

cancelled and returned” to Plaintiff.” Id. at 11. 

 Plaintiff argues that he “submitted his 602 appeal against Defendant Ko in 

November 2016 but received no response.” Pl.’s Sur-Reply at 7. Plaintiff further claims 

that on January 3, 2017, he “forwarded an inquiry to the medical appeals coordinator who 

told him to resubmit the appeal for processing.” Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff has attached to his 

Declaration in opposition to Defendants’ motion, signed under penalty of perjury, a copy 

of a letter to the “appeals coordinator” dated January 3, 2017, with the subject heading 

“unheard 602 appeal.” Pl.’s Decl., Doc. No. 54 at 29. This letter is stamped “CENReceived Jan 6 2017 HC Appeals.” Id. In this correspondence, Plaintiff writes: “Please 

take notice that I submitted to your office a medical 602 appeal against Dr. Ko, for 

confiscating my arm brace and denying me medical care.” Id. He further claims that the 

“appeal was submitted about a month and a half ago, nevertheless, I never received notice 

that it was processed by your office.” Id. 

 Plaintiff also attaches a copy of a “Memorandum” dated January 9, 2017 from “T. 

Kirby, Health Care Appeals Coordinator” which contains the subject heading “[r]eceipt 

of letter dated 1/3/2007.” Id. at 30. In the body of this memorandum, it is stated that 

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they are responding to Plaintiff’s January 3, 2017 letter and informed Plaintiff that a 

“review of your medical appeals history was conducted and there is no Centinela appeal.” 

Id. Plaintiff was specifically instructed to “re-write your appeal and submit it in a U-SavEm envelope, attention R. Kirby, Medical Appeals Coordinator.” Id. In addition, 

Plaintiff was informed that “although time constraints may have expired, we will process 

your appeal when it is received.” Id. 

As noted above, “the [D]efendant[s]’ burden is to prove that there was an available 

administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” 

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. The burden then shifts to Plaintiff “who must show that there 

is something particular in his case that made the existing and generally available 

administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191; 

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172; Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. He may do so by “showing the local 

remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously 

futile.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172 (citation omitted); see also Ngo v. Woodford, 539 F.3d 

1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting potential “unavailability” of administrative remedies 

if officials “obstruct[ed] [the prisoner’s] attempt to exhaust,” or “prevented [him] from 

exhausting because procedures for processing grievances weren’t followed.”); Nunez, 

591 F.3d at 1224 (finding prisoner’s lack of exhaustion “excused” where record showed 

he “took reasonable and appropriate steps to exhaust ... [but] was precluded from 

exhausting, not through his own fault but by the Warden’s mistake.”) 

“Under § 1997e(a), the exhaustion requirement hinges on the ‘availab[ility]’ of 

administrative remedies: An inmate, that is, must exhaust available remedies, but need 

not exhaust unavailable ones.” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1858; Andres, 854 F.3d at 1104. Here, 

the Court is unable to conclude as a matter of law that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust 

his administrative remedies against Dr. Ko. In the memorandum sent to Plaintiff by T. 

Kirby, he was specifically instructed to “re-write [his]appeal and submit” the appeal to 

the attention of “T. Kirby, Medical Appeals Coordinator.” Pl.’s Sur-Reply at 30. 

Plaintiff was further informed that while “time constraints may have expired, we will 

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process your appeal when it is received.” Id. It is undisputed that Plaintiff complied with 

this directive and resubmitted his appeal regarding Dr. Ko on January 17, 2017. See id.

at 31. However, despite T. Kirby’s purported directive that they would “process 

[Plaintiff’s] appeal when it is received,” even though “time constraints may have 

expired,” this appeal was not “processed” but rather was “cancelled” due to time 

constraints. Id. at 31-32. 

Plaintiff’s sworn testimony, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, 

satisfies Plaintiff’s burden of production under Albino and Williams insofar as it shows 

that administrative remedies were not “available” to him because officials “thwarted the 

effective invocation of the administrative process through threats, game-playing, or 

misrepresentations, ... in [his] individual case.” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1862; see also 

Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191 (unavailability may be shown if grievance process, as 

administered “through machination,” proved “ineffective, unobtainable, unduly 

prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.” (quoting Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172) (internal 

citation omitted). 

Because “the defendant[s] in a PLRA case must plead and prove non-exhaustion as 

an affirmative defense,” and it is not clear as a matter of law whether Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust the remedies made “available” to him, the Court finds that summary judgment 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) is not warranted, and “the case may proceed to the 

merits.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171; Williams, 775 F.3d at 1192 (“[P]ermitting a defendant 

to show that remedies existed in a general sense where a plaintiff has specifically alleged 

that official action prevented [him] from filing a particular grievance would force a 

plaintiff to bear the burden of proof, a burden which the plaintiff does not bear.”) 

(quoting Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172). 

II. Eighth Amendment Claims against Defendants Hernandez and Gutierrez 

Prison officials display a deliberate indifference to an inmate’s well-being when 

they know of and consciously disregard an excessive risk of harm to that inmate’s health 

or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “[T]he official must both be 

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aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. Thus, “deliberate indifference” 

entails something more than mere negligence, but may be satisfied with proof of 

something less than acts or omissions “for the very purpose of causing harm,” or that a 

particular official “acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an 

inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a 

substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. 

 To show that a prisoner has been subject to cruel and unusual punishment by an 

officer’s failure to protect him, he must point to evidence in the record which shows that 

the alleged deprivation was objectively “sufficiently serious,” i.e., that the conditions he 

faced posed a “substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Second, 

because “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth 

Amendment,” evidence must exist to show the defendant acted with a “sufficiently 

culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (internal quotation 

marks, emphasis and citations omitted); see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5, 8. 

The failure to protect claim against Defendants Hernandez and Gutierrez arises out 

of the allegations that they placed Plaintiff on a golf cart in handcuffs, Plaintiff was 

thrown from the cart as a result of Gutierrez driving too fast, and “took it upon 

themselves to snatch him up” after he fell off the car. FAC at 3. Defendant Hernandez 

declares that he did place Plaintiff in the golf car while in handcuffs but prior to this 

incident he was “not aware of an inmate ever falling off the back of a cart.” Hernandez 

Decl., Doc. No. 46-9 at ¶ 3. Likewise, Defendant Gutierrez declares that he had “driven 

that cart numerous times with inmates sitting in the back in the same manner as 

[Plaintiff]” but he had “never had an inmate fall out of the back of the cart” before 

Plaintiff. Gutierrez Decl., Doc. No. 46-8 at ¶ 3. In addition, Gutierrez declares that he 

was “not aware of an inmate ever falling off the back of a cart prior to this incident.” Id. 

 Plaintiff does not dispute these assertions. While he generally states that the 

declarations of Hernandez and Gutierrez are “based on lies and further coverups,” he 

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does not point to any evidence in the record that would contradict the assertion that they 

were unaware of any prior incidents of inmates falling off the golf carts. Pl.’s Sur-Reply 

at 5. In fact, Plaintiff argues that “as a direct result of the above incident, all staff 

personnel underwent training on the use of carts, while banning transportation of cargo 

cart for passenger use.” Id. The fact that there was training and new regulations 

instituted after Plaintiff’s fall from the cart supports the argument that Defendants were 

unaware of a serious risk to Plaintiff’s safety. At best, Plaintiff’s claims support a finding 

of negligence which is not enough to establish a deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 842 (deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence). Thus, 

the Court finds that there is no triable issue as to whether either Defendant had the 

“requisite knowledge of a substantial risk” to Plaintiff’s safety when they used a golf cart 

to transport Plaintiff. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. 

Plaintiff also claims that after he fell from the cart, there was a delay by 

Defendants in providing him with assistance. He alleges that after he fell, Gutierrez 

“shouted repeatedly for Plaintiff to stand up, but when he didn’t he forced him up against 

his cries of pain, then forced him into the cart.” Pl.’s Sur-Reply at 5. He further claims 

Hernandez “stood by watching and allowed Defendant Gutierrez to man handle Plaintiff 

without intervention of any kind.” Id. However, in Plaintiff’s deposition he testified that 

once the cart stopped, Hernandez approached Plaintiff and asked him “are you all right? 

Can you get up?” Pl.’s Dep. At 72:19-22. Plaintiff testified he told Hernandez he was in 

pain. See id. at 77:22. Plaintiff testified that Gutierrez then told him to “get up.” Id. at 

78:8-9. When Plaintiff told Gutierrez he was in pain, he testified that Gutierrez “yanked” 

him up and had Plaintiff walk to the cart. Id. at 78:11-19. Gutierrez had Plaintiff sit in 

the cart again and he “drove him to CTC.” Id. at 82:11-16. 

 Plaintiff argues that the risk of pulling him up to standing after the fall was 

“obvious” due to the fact that he “showed discoloration and scratch marks to many parts 

of his body.” Pl.’s Sur-Reply at 6. While there may have been a risk that Plaintiff would 

suffer an additional injury when he was picked up off the ground by Gutierrez, he does 

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not identify an injury or provide any evidence that he suffered an injury from this action. 

 Plaintiff also claims that both Defendants “refused to activate their alarm for 

medical attention on [his behalf].” Pl.’s Decl. at ¶ 13. However, there are no 

allegations, or any evidence introduced, to raise a triable issue of material fact as to 

whether the purported failure to “activate” an alarm caused a delay in treatment for 

Plaintiff or any harm as a result of the purported delay. Delays in providing care, without 

more, are insufficient to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. See Sanchez v. Vild, 

891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir.1989); Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 

404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

 In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not presented evidence to rebut 

Defendants’ showing that they were not “deliberately indifferent” to a “substantial risk of 

serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Accordingly, Defendants Hernandez and 

Gutierrez are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims. 

III. Eighth Amendment Claim against Defendant Ko

 Following his fall from the golf cart and preliminary examination at the prison’s 

CTC, Plaintiff was taken to “El Centro Regional Medical Center.” FAC at 4. While 

there, Plaintiff was examined and provided treatment which included an “arm brace.” Id. 

It is undisputed that when Plaintiff returned to CEN, Dr. Ko “confiscated Plaintiff’s arm 

brace.” Id.; Ko Decl., Doc. No. 46-10 at ¶¶ 3-4. 

The Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments clause is violated when 

prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Estelle 

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). “Medical” needs include a prisoner’s “physical, 

dental, and mental health.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). To 

show “cruel and unusual” punishment under the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner must 

point to evidence in the record from which a trier of fact might reasonably conclude that a 

defendant’s medical treatment placed the prisoner at risk of “objectively, sufficiently 

serious” harm, and that the defendant had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” when he 

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either provided or denied the prisoner medical care. Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 

1076 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). 

 Dr. Ko does not dispute Plaintiff’s assertions that he was the party responsible for 

“order[ing] staff to remove the brace” upon Plaintiff’s return from the outside hospital. 

Ko Decl. at ¶ ¶ 3, 4. The records supplied by the parties in this action also show that 

Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Ko the day after Plaintiff fell from the golf cart on October 

18, 2016. See Pl.’s Sur-Reply, Ex. 8, at 27, Medical Progress Note dated Oct. 18, 2016; 

Ko Decl. at ¶ 5. Dr. Ko told Plaintiff that the brace was not “medically necessary” and 

offered “an ace wrap in place of the brace” which Plaintiff “declined.” Id. at ¶ 6. Dr. Ko 

also prescribed Plaintiff “Carbamazepine and Naproxen for the pain and swelling.” Id. 

 Plaintiff argues that Dr. Ko “fail[ed] to provide ice packs” or provide him “with 

something to elevate his forearm.” Pl.’s Sur-Reply at 6-7. However, a difference of 

opinion between medical professionals concerning the appropriate course of inmate 

treatment or care is not enough, by itself, to support a claim of deliberate indifference. 

Sanchez, 891 F.2d at 242. Nor does a difference of opinion between the prisoner and his 

doctors constitute deliberate indifference. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 

(9th Cir. 1996). 

Here, Plaintiff’s own claims, and the evidence he has submitted, indicates that Dr. 

Ko disagreed with the treatment Plaintiff was provided at the outside hospital and it also 

indicates that Plaintiff was provided medical treatment by Dr. Ko. Plaintiff 

acknowledges that he was offered an “ace wrap in place of the arm brace” and he 

provides no evidence or allegations contradicting Ko’s assertion that he was provided 

with pain medication. Pl.’s Decl., Doc. No. 54 at 15. Where a plaintiff demonstrates 

“nothing more than ‘a difference of medical opinion’ as to the need to pursue one course 

of treatment over another [is] insufficient, as a matter of law to establish deliberate 

indifference.” Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332. Plaintiff would have to be able to demonstrate 

that the treatment plan provided was “medically unacceptable under the circumstances” 

and that his medical treatment was chosen “in conscious disregard of an excessive risk” 

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to his health. Id. There is no evidence in the record that the treatment provided to 

Plaintiff was “medically unacceptable.” Id.

 The Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Ko 

acted with deliberate indifference in his treatment of Plaintiff’s medical condition. 

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Plaintiff has provided no evidence to dispute Dr. Ko’s 

showing that he provided Plaintiff with adequate treatment for his medical condition. 

Accordingly, Dr. Ko is entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

claim. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment as to the merits of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims.5

 The Court 

DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly and close the case. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: June 17, 2019 _______________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

 

                                               

5

 Defendants also move for summary judgment on the ground that they are entitled to qualified 

immunity. See Def. Memo. at 23-24. Because the Court has found that Defendants are entitled to 

summary judgment as to the merit of Plaintiff’s claims, it need not reach any issues regarding qualified 

immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been 

violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified 

immunity.”); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (“[The better approach to 

resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the 

plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”) 

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