Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-08006/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-08006-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

KENNETH B. QUANSAH,

Plaintiff,

v.

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-08006-BLF 

ORDER DISMISSING THE CASE 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

[Re: ECF 8]

This is a civil rights action brought by pro se Plaintiff Kenneth B. Quansah against several 

employees of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California and the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals.1 The Court granted the United States amicus curiae status in this case to 

assert its independent interest in the impact of this litigation. ECF 7; 28 U.S.C. § 517 (“The Solicitor 

General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may be sent by the Attorney General to any 

State or district in the United States to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending 

in a court of the United States.”). The United States filed an amicus curiae brief in support of 

dismissal without leave to amend. Brief for United States in Support of Dismissal (“U.S. Br.”), ECF 

8. The United States asserts that Defendants have not been properly served, but nevertheless 

requests that the case be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. Id. at 2. Plaintiff 

has filed no opposition or response. 

The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument pursuant to Civil 

Local Rule 7-1(b) and VACATES the April 30, 2020 hearing. For the reasons discussed below, the 

Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

1 While the Justice Department is a named Defendant in the Complaint, Plaintiff also states that 

“[t]he Justice Department is not sued in this complaint.” Compl. at 2 (¶ 6).

Case 5:19-cv-08006-BLF Document 10 Filed 03/26/20 Page 1 of 4
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

BACKGROUND

The Complaint names as Defendants (1) three Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals employees: 

Molly C. Dwyer (Clerk), Cyntharee K. Powells (Deputy Clerk), and Monica Fernandez (Motions 

Attorney Deputy Clerk) and (2) three Northern District of California District Court employees: 

Richard W. Wieking (Clerk), Elizabeth Garcia (Deputy Clerk), and Cynthia Hernandez (Case 

Systems Administrator) (collectively, “Defendants”). Compl., ECF 1. 

On December 23, 2013, Plaintiff filed Quansah v. Soc. Sec. and Disability Admin., Comm’r

et al., No. 13-cv-5940 EJD in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. 

His case was dismissed in part on May 28, 2014, and in full on June 27, 2014. See id. ECF 23, ECF 

26. Plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on June 25, 2014. 

See id. ECF 25. Plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed on August 19, 2014. See id. ECF 28. Plaintiff 

seeks relief against Defendants in their individual capacities for their actions in “issu[ing] orders 

and judgments” in his District Court case (Case No. 13-cv-05940-EJD) and the subsequent appeal 

to the Ninth Circuit (Case No. 14-16223). Compl. at 2 (¶ 5). 

Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 42 U.S.C. Section 1985,

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See generally 

Compl. Plaintiff seeks millions of dollars from each Defendant in damages. See Compl. at 5 (¶¶ 6-

13).

DISCUSSION

The United States presents three grounds for dismissal: (1) Defendants have absolute quasijudicial immunity; (2) Plaintiff’s claims are beyond the statute of limitations; and (3) Plaintiff’s 

claims are implausible. See generally U.S. Br. The Court addresses each argument in turn. 

A. Immunity

First, Defendants, as Federal Court personnel, “enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity 

where, as here, the alleged wrongdoing stems from the performance of their official duties.” OuYoung v. Roberts, No. C-13-4442 EMC, 2013 WL 6732118, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2013); see

also Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) 

Case 5:19-cv-08006-BLF Document 10 Filed 03/26/20 Page 2 of 4
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(“Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when 

they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.”) 

Plaintiff’s sole factual allegation against Defendants is that they “issued orders and 

judgments” – tasks that are inherently “an integral part” of the judicial process. See Compl. at 2 (¶ 

5); Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390. Thus, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial 

immunity. 

B. Statute of Limitations

Second, Plaintiff cannot state a claim because the statute of limitations has expired. Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendants violated his civil rights2and caused him personal injuries. See Compl. at 3-

4. But Plaintiff’s claims exceed the two-year statute of limitations for such claims. See Cal. Civ. 

Proc. Code § 335.1; Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that 

starting in 2003, personal injury actions in California must be brought within two years after the 

cause of action arose); Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying the statute 

of limitations of the forum state to Bivens actions); Forsythe v. U.S., 502 F. App’x 689, 692 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (applying the California two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions under 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 to Bivens actions). 

Plaintiff’s sole factual allegation against Defendants is that they “issued orders and 

judgments.” See Compl. at 2 (¶ 5). No orders or judgments were issued by the District Court or the 

Ninth Circuit after August 2014. See Quansah v. Soc. Sec. and Disability Admin., Comm’r et al., 

No. 12-cv-5940 EJD (N.D. Cal.); Kenneth Quansah, Jr. v. Social Security and Disability, et al.; No. 

14-16223 (9th Cir.). Because more than two years have passed since any orders or judgments were

issued by either court, the statute of limitations has expired on Plaintiff’s claims related to those 

cases. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. 

2 Plaintiff cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is not applicable to federal actors. In Bivens v. Six Unknown 

Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court recognized “an implied private 

action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (citation and internal quotes omitted). Accordingly, 

Bivens is “the federal analog to suits brought against state officials under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675-75 (internal quotation omitted). 

Case 5:19-cv-08006-BLF Document 10 Filed 03/26/20 Page 3 of 4
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

C. Sufficiency of the Complaint

Finally, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief. The United States points out that

“Plaintiff’s allegations – which generally show that Defendants were doing their jobs in issuing 

orders and judgments – do not allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that any of the 

Defendants are liable for any sort of misconduct.” U.S. Br. at 4. The Court agrees. While a 

complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially 

plausible when it “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 

the misconduct alleged.” Id. Here, however, Plaintiff merely alleges that “Defendants issued orders

and judgments,” and provides no other factual allegations. See Compl. Even drawing all reasonable 

inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court cannot discern a plausible claim under any theory of 

liability. 

D. Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants stem from acts for which they are absolutely 

immune, granting leave to amend would be futile. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants therefore 

are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. See Yakama Indian Nation v. State of Wash. 

Dep’t of Revenue, 176 F.3d 1241, 1249 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of claims without leave 

to amend where amendment would have been futile in light of Eleventh Amendment immunity).

ORDER

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 26, 2020

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

Case 5:19-cv-08006-BLF Document 10 Filed 03/26/20 Page 4 of 4