Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01831/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01831-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 05:552 Freedom of Information Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Daniel Saul Coven, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. 07-CIV-01831-PHX-RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

United States Office of )

Personnel Management )

)

Defendant. ) )

Currently pending before the court is a motion for attorney’s

fees and costs by plaintiff pro se Daniel Saul Coven (doc. # 65). 

Bluntly (and accurately) stating that “[p]laintiff has not carried

his burden to establish the amount and basis for awarding

anything[,]” defendant, the United States Office of Personnel

Management (“OPM”), opposes this motion. Resp. (doc. # 67) at

1:20-21. For the reasons set forth herein, the court denies

plaintiff’s motion in its entirety.

Background

In Coven v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2009 WL

3174423 (D.Ariz. Sept. 29, 2009) (“Coven I”), familiarity with 

Case 2:07-cv-01831-RCB Document 68 Filed 04/05/10 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 FOIA exemption two protects from disclosure “matters that are – related

solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency[.]” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(2) (West 2007). 

- 2 -

which is assumed, the court, inter alia, denied plaintiff’s motion

for attorney’s fees. Id. at *19 - *20. In denying such relief,

the court explained that “as a pro se litigant,” plaintiff was not

entitled to recover attorney’s fees under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4). 

Id. at *19 (citations omitted). Recognizing that plaintiff’s pro se

status did not preclude an award of costs under that statute, the

court, nonetheless, denied that claim without prejudice to renew. 

The court reasoned that an award of costs would be “premature”

because no judgment had been entered at that time. Id. at *20. 

After entry of judgment, plaintiff Coven filed the pending

motion seeking an “award [of] costs and fees or alternatively [an]

award [of] partial costs.” Pl. Mot. (doc. # 65) at 1 (emphasis

added). Plaintiff is relying upon a 2007 amendment to FOIA,

allowing for recovery of “reasonable attorney fees and other

litigation costs . . . if the complainant has obtained relief

through . . . - a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the

agency, if the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II) (West Supp. 2009). Plaintiff asserts that

because OPM denied his original request for job vacancy

information, and OPM “effectively upheld that decision” by

“claim[ing] exemption 21

 in their Answer . . . , [his] claim was

not insubstantial.” Pl. Mot. (doc. #65) at 1:24-2:2 (citation

omitted) (footnote added). Plaintiff realizes that 

§ 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II) did not become effective until December 31,

2007, and so he is limiting his request for fees and costs to those

Case 2:07-cv-01831-RCB Document 68 Filed 04/05/10 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

incurred after the effective date of that amendment. See id. at

2:4-8. 

OPM opposes this motion on three grounds. First, it argues

that plaintiff is not eligible for an award of fees or costs

because he did not “substantially prevail” under the amended or

pre-amendment version of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii). Second, OPM

contends that plaintiff cannot rely upon the amended version of

that statute because it cannot be applied retroactively. Third,

even if plaintiff is “eligible” to recover his costs under the

amended statute, OPM asserts that he is not entitled to such an

award because the four factors which a court must assess to

determine entitlement all weigh in favor of denying costs. Thus,

OPM argues that the court must deny this motion.

 Discussion

At the outset, the court observes that “[a]ttorney fee [and

cost] issues are ancillary to the underlying action and hence

survive independently under the court’s equitable jurisdiction.” 

Crews v. Internal Revenue, 2000 WL 900800, at *6 (C.D.Cal. April

26, 2000) (citing, inter alia, Carter v. Veterans Admin., 780 F.2d

1479, 1481 (9th Cir. 1986)). Moreover, because this court denied

plaintiff’s motion for costs without prejudice to renew, obviously 

it retains jurisdiction to consider that motion now, even after

entry of judgment. 

Turning briefly to his renewed request for attorney’s fees,

the court adheres to its prior ruling that because plaintiff Coven

is pro se, he is not entitled to collect such fees under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(a)(4). See Coven I, 2009 WL 3174423, at *19 (citing cases). 

Accordingly, the court denies plaintiff’s motion to the extent he

Case 2:07-cv-01831-RCB Document 68 Filed 04/05/10 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

is seeking attorney’s fees. 

Before addressing OPM’s opposition to an award of costs

herein, there is a glaring deficiency in plaintiff’s motion which

OPM did not mention. There is a complete lack of supporting

documentation for plaintiff’s cost request. Plaintiff’s motion

does not include an affidavit or declaration specifying the nature

of the litigation costs which he purportedly incurred, and when he

incurred those costs. Without such supporting proof, there is no

way to determine whether plaintiff’s claimed litigation costs were

“reasonably incurred” within the meaning of the relevant statute. 

Even if plaintiff had provided the necessary supporting

documentation, as will be seen, still, he is not entitled to

recover his costs.

 An award of attorney’s fees or costs, or both, under the FOIA

requires a plaintiff to “demonstrate both eligibility and

entitlement to the award.” Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Locke, 572

F.3d 610, 614 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Eligibility

requires a showing that a plaintiff “has ‘substantially prevailed’

on his claim.” Id. (citation omitted). Once a court determines

that “a plaintiff is eligible for [costs] under the FOIA, the

district court has the discretion to determine whether the

plaintiff is entitled to fees.” Id. (citation and footnote

omitted). “These are separate considerations governed by their own

standards.” Waage v. I.R.S., 656 F.Supp.2d 1235, 1238 (S.D.Cal.

2009) (citation omitted).

 “Prior to its most recent amendments, the FOIA had a basic

fee provision: ‘The court may assess against the United States

reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably

Case 2:07-cv-01831-RCB Document 68 Filed 04/05/10 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Generally speaking, the catalyst theory “posits that a plaintiff is a

‘prevailing party’ if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought

about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home,

Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t. of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 601, 121 S.Ct. 1835,

1838, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001).

- 5 -

incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant

has substantially prevailed.’” Or. Natural Desert Ass’n, 572 F.3d

at 614 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (prior to amendment)). The

2007 OPEN Government Act made several amendments to the FOIA,

including expanding the conditions under which a plaintiff can 

recover attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 552(a)(4)(E). 

One of those amendments modified the “substantially prevailed”

language, making a plaintiff eligible for such recovery if the

agency makes a voluntary or unilateral change in position. See 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i)(ii)(II). In reviving that catalyst theory

for costs and fee recovery under FOIA,2 Congress was directly

responding to the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon and its

progeny which had “‘eliminated the ‘catalyst theory’ for attorneys’

fees recovery under certain federal civil rights laws[,]’” as well

as under FOIA. Or. Natural Desert Ass’n, 572 F.3d at 615 (quoting

153 Cong. Rec. S15701-04 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2007) (statement of

Sen. Leahy, sponsor of the 2007 Amendments)). 

The Ninth Circuit in Or. Natural Desert Ass’n, unequivocally

held that the “2007 Amendments contain a new waiver of sovereign

immunity for recovery of attorney fees [and costs] under the

catalyst theory, and they do not explicitly apply that waiver

retroactively.” Or. Natural Desert Ass’n, 572 F.3d at 617. 

Heavily relying upon that holding, OPM simply asserts that the

“catalyst theory is inapplicable” here. Resp. (doc. # 67) at 2:25. 

Case 2:07-cv-01831-RCB Document 68 Filed 04/05/10 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

OPM offers no analysis. Presumably OPM’s theory is that because,

as noted earlier, plaintiff filed this action on September 25,

2007, prior to the December 31, 2007, effective date of this

amendment, he cannot avail himself of the catalyst theory of

recovery. Hence, evidently it is also OPM’s position that to

establish his eligibility for costs under section 552(a)(4)(E)(i),

plaintiff Coven must show that he “substantially prevailed” as the

courts interpreted that phrase pre-2007 amendment. 

There is no need to delve into that retroactivity issue here

because even assuming arguendo that plaintiff Coven can avail

himself of the 2007 amendment, adopting the catalyst theory for fee

recovery, he cannot prevail on the merits. As alluded to earlier,

plaintiff is focusing upon whether his claim was “not

insubstantial.” See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)94)(E)(i)(II). Plaintiff’s

motion omits any discussion however of the preceding requirement in

that statute – “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the

agency [OPM][.]” See id. To satisfy that requirement, plaintiff

Coven must show that “(1) the filing of the action could reasonably

have been regarded as necessary to obtain the information; and (2)

the filing of the action had a substantial causative effect on the

delivery of the information.” Church of Scientology of Cal. v.

U.S. Postal Service, 700 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphases in

original) (citation omitted). “Whether a party has shown, in a

particular case, that the suit was reasonably necessary and that a

causal nexus exists between the action and surrender of information

. . . is a factual determination for the district court to

resolve.” Id. at 489. The difficulty here is that plaintiff Coven

has not brought any facts whatsoever to the court’s attention to

Case 2:07-cv-01831-RCB Document 68 Filed 04/05/10 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

establish either of those threshold conditions. 

Moreover, as the court recognized in Coven I, and Deputy

Director of the USAJOBS® program detailed in his previously filed

declaration, “due to a change in [its] policy[,] . . . OPM decided

to provide all available records requested by Plaintiff.” Coven I,

2009 WL 3174423, at *3 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Harrison Decl’n (doc. #39-2) at 3, ¶ (10), et

seq.. The foregoing substantially undermines any theory plaintiff

might have that the filing of this lawsuit had a substantial

causative effect on his ultimate receipt of the requested

information. Thus, because plaintiff Coven has not met his burden

of showing that he is eligible for costs pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 

§§ 552(a)(4)(E)(i) and 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II), his motion is denied.

Having concluded that plaintiff Coven cannot clear the first

hurdle of eligibility for costs under FOIA, the court does not

reach the issue of plaintiff’s entitlement to such an award. See

Sterrett v. Department of the Navy, 2010 WL 330086, at *6 (S.D.Cal.

Jan. 20, 2010) (citation omitted) (because “Plaintiff has not shown

that she is eligible for an award of attorney’s fees and costs

pursuant to FOIA[,] . . . the court need not address whether

Plaintiff is entitled to such an award.”) 

In sum, for the reasons set forth above, the court DENIES in

all respects plaintiff’s “Motion for Costs and Fees” (doc. # 65).

DATED this 2nd day of April, 2010.

Case 2:07-cv-01831-RCB Document 68 Filed 04/05/10 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

Copies to counsel of record and plaintiff pro se

Case 2:07-cv-01831-RCB Document 68 Filed 04/05/10 Page 8 of 8