Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00724/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00724-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DIANE M. PAWLOSKI, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI, SECRETARY, 

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS’ 

AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA, 

 Defendant. 

______________________________/

Civ-S-05-00724 DFL JFM 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Diane Pawloski, a nurse at a local Veteran’s Administration 

facility, brings this suit against the Veterans’ Administration 

for sexual harassment and retaliation. Before the court is 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court GRANTS 

defendant’s motion as to the sexual harassment claim and DENIES 

the motion as to the retaliation claim. 

I. Facts

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

Diane Pawloski is a nurse at the VA. From March until June of 

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2003, she dated Sergeant James Hicks, then a VA police officer 

assigned to the same facility. Shortly after plaintiff ended 

the relationship, Hicks allegedly began sexually harassing her – 

staring at her, cursing at her, threatening her, and exposing 

himself to her. The last alleged interaction between Hicks and 

plaintiff was on September 19, 2003, when Hicks allegedly told 

her to “remember who has the gun.” 

On September 23, 2003, plaintiff spoke with EEO counselor 

Marlene Lewis. She asked Lewis general questions about the 

process of making a sexual harassment complaint, but did not 

actually make a complaint. Rather, she told Lewis her questions 

were hypothetical. Lewis encouraged plaintiff to come back if 

she wanted to make a complaint. 

On October 15, 2003, plaintiff avers, a coworker named Roy 

Gras called her at home and told her that Hicks was spreading 

rumors about her. The next day, plaintiff contacted VA Police 

Chief Reginald Winbush and told him she wanted to file charges 

against Hicks. 

On October 17, plaintiff reported Hicks’s alleged 

harassment to Chief Nurse Donna Iatarola. Iatarola told her to 

pursue her complaint through Chief Winbush. 

On October 20, plaintiff again met with Winbush, who 

informed her that Hicks had complained that she had sexually 

harassed him. On October 21, plaintiff faxed Winbush a written 

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complaint about Hicks. The next day, October 22, Winbush 

forwarded the complaint to EEO counselor Marlene Lewis. 

On October 24, plaintiff informed her direct supervisor, 

Valerie DeLise, of her allegations against Hicks. She 

complained to DeLise that nobody was doing anything about the 

situation. DeLise told her to tell someone at EEO. 

On October 25, plaintiff called the VA EEOC office, but the 

answering machine informed her that the office was moving and 

would be closed until October 27. On October 28, plaintiff 

filed a complaint against Hicks at the Sacramento County 

Sheriff’s Department. She also submitted a written complaint to 

DeLise, who again told her to contact someone at EEO. DeLise 

then contacted Helen Jew, an EEO officer, and notified her of 

plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff and Hicks were placed on 

administrative leave that day. 

An Administrative Board Investigation (ABI) was convened on 

November 3, 2003, which began investigating plaintiff and 

Hicks’s cross complaints. 

Meanwhile, on November 5, plaintiff was permitted to return 

to work and assured that Hicks would be transferred to another 

facility. On November 12, however, plaintiff spotted Hicks on 

the property. The same day, she informed EEO officer Helen Jew 

that she had seen Hicks on the property. She also told Jew 

about her allegations against Hicks. This was the first time 

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plaintiff had directly complained to an EEO officer about 

Hicks’s alleged harassment. 

The ABI interviewed witnesses, including plaintiff, Hicks, 

Winbush, DeLise and Iatarola. Among other things, the ABI 

recommended that Hicks be removed as a police supervisor and 

that plaintiff receive closer supervision. As a result of the 

ABI’s findings, the VA moved plaintiff’s office closer to her 

supervisor’s and fired Hicks. 

Later in November, plaintiff submitted a request for 

promotion to Nurse III. This triggered an evaluation of her 

work performance by her first-line supervisor, DeLise, and her 

second-line supervisor, Iatarola. DeLise wrote a very positive 

evaluation, but Iatarola told her she thought plaintiff 

unqualified for promotion and asked DeLise to revise the 

evaluation four times. DeLise had never been asked to rewrite 

an evaluation before. Plaintiff alleges that Iatarola’s actions 

introduced a negative quality to the evaluation. Defendant 

contends that the final evaluation, including Iatarola’s 

portion, were wholly positive. 

Once the evaluation was finished, Iatarola contacted 

Marilyn Kerhoff, Chair of the Nurse Professional Standards Board 

(“Board”), the body that makes promotion decisions. Iatarola 

urged Kerhhoff to “look really closely at the comments that I 

made in my section before you go into that board meeting.” 

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Although Kerkhoff avers that Iatarola’s call did not influence 

the Board’s decision, the Board went on to find plaintiff 

unqualified and denied her the promotion. This decision was 

affirmed by the VA Central Office Nurse Professional Standards 

Board in Washington, D.C. (“Central Board”). 

In April, 2005, plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the 

Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs for harassment 

and retaliation under Title VII. Defendant filed this motion 

for summary judgment in October 2006. 

II. Harassment Claim

Plaintiff’s first claim is for sexual harassment under 

Title VII. As discussed below, the court GRANTS summary 

judgment for defendant on this claim. 

A. Exhaustion 

To bring an employment discrimination action under Title 

VII, an aggrieved federal employee “must initiate contact with 

a[n] [EEO] Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter 

alleged to be discriminatory.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). 

This counseling is intended to create an opportunity “to 

informally resolve the matter.” Id. § 1614.105(a); see also

Brown v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 8, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“Exhaustion is 

required in order to give federal agencies an opportunity to 

handle matters internally whenever possible and to ensure that 

the federal courts are burdened only when reasonably 

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necessary.”). Unlike courts in some other jurisdictions and the 

EEOC itself, which hold that complaining to a supervisor who is 

not an EEO counselor may satisfy the regulation,1 the Ninth 

Circuit holds that only contact with an EEO counselor suffices. 

Johnson v. Henderson, 314 F.3d 409, 415 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Defendant persuasively argues that plaintiff did not make 

the required contact with an EEO counselor within 45 days. The 

last incident of alleged harassment of which plaintiff has 

produced admissible evidence occurred on September 19, 2003.2 

Although she complained to supervisors within 45 days, she did 

not report the harassment to an EEO counselor until November 12, 

well over 45 days later.3 Thus, under the Ninth Circuit’s 

 

1 E.g., Lloyd v. Chao, 240 F.supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002); 

Guerra v. Runyon, App. No. 01944190, 1994 WL 744965 (E.E.O.C. 

Nov. 9, 1994). 

2 Plaintiff alleges that the last incident of harassment 

occurred on October 15, when a fellow employee named Roy Gras 

called her at home to say that Hicks was spreading rumors about 

her. However, plaintiff has not provided a declaration from 

Gras. Therefore, her statement as to what Gras allegedly heard 

is hearsay and cannot be considered. See Blair Foods, Inc. v. 

Ranchers Cotton Oil, 610 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1980). She 

does not claim that Gras’ call was itself an act of harassment 

by Gras. Such an assertion would be implausible. 

3 Plaintiff did have a meeting on September 23 with EEO 

counselor Marlene Lewis. But at that meeting plaintiff asked 

only hypothetical questions about the complaint process and 

declined to make a complaint. The requirement that an aggrieved 

employee seek EEO counseling is not satisfied by asking 

hypothetical questions of an EEO counselor. See Bailey v. U.S. 

Postal Service, 208 F.3d 652, 654-55 (8th Cir. 2000); Steinert 

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interpretation of the 45-day rule, plaintiff missed the 

deadline. 

Plaintiff argues that she made adequate “indirect” contact 

with an EEO counselor because her supervisor, Valerie DeLise, 

relayed her complaint to EEO counselor Helen Jew within 45 days. 

Her argument might be persuasive in a jurisdiction where contact 

with a supervisor “logically connected to the EEO process” has 

been held to satisfy § 1614.105(a). Briggs v. Henderson, 34 

F.Supp.2d 785, 786 (D. Conn. 1999) (citations omitted). But 

under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the regulation, only 

direct contact with an EEO counselor appears to suffice, because 

only through direct contact can the EEO counselor “attempt 

informal resolution of the dispute prior to the filing of a 

complaint.” Leorna v. United States Dep’t of State, 105 F.3d 

548, 551 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996). Moreover, here plaintiff had 

been in direct contact with the EEO counselor but had been 

unprepared and unwilling to make a complaint or to go beyond 

asking hypothetical questions. The strict interpretation of the 

rule respects her apparent decision to keep the matter private. 

The premise of the 45-day requirement is that the aggrieved 

 

v. Gober, 32 F.Supp.2d 842, 845-46 (D.S.C. 1998) (“[T]he cases 

have held uniformly that in making . . . contact, the aggrieved 

employee must allege acts of discrimination and manifest a 

desire to begin the EEO process.”) (emphasis original and 

citation omitted). 

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employee must take the first step in bringing harassment 

allegations forward and that it is not the place of the EEO 

counselor to institute a complaint on behalf of someone who does 

not want to become involved in the complaint process. One can 

well imagine a different rule that would shift the 

responsibility to the EEO counselor once certain facts were made 

known to the counselor from any source. Such a rule would have 

certain benefits in some circumstances but also might detract 

from the efficacy of the 45-day rule. It would also shift 

control of the process away from the employee. 

In light of the language of the regulation as interpreted 

by the Ninth Circuit, plaintiff missed the deadline, and her 

sexual harassment claim fails.4

 

 

4 Plaintiff does not argue that her failure to meet the 45-

day deadline is excused by equitable tolling or estoppel. It is 

undisputed that plaintiff was on notice of the 45-day deadline, 

so she would not be entitled to equitable tolling. See Johnson, 

314 F.3d at 414. Neither would she be entitled to equitable 

estoppel, which is available only where “the defendant takes 

active steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The evidence 

here does not support the conclusion that defendant sought to 

prevent plaintiff from seeking EEO counseling within 45 days. 

Indeed, on October 28, 2003 – less than 45 days after the last 

incident of harassment – DeLise advised plaintiff to contact 

someone at EEO. 

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B. Defendant’s Liability on the Merits

Defendant argues that even if plaintiff’s claim were 

timely, it would not be liable for Hicks’s alleged sexual 

harassment because he was not plaintiff’s supervisor. 

Under Title VII, “[a]n employer is subject to vicarious 

liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile 

environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or 

successively higher) authority over the employee.” Farragher v. 

City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). An employer is 

strictly liable if “the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a 

tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or 

undesirable reassignment.” Id. at 808. In contrast, “[i]f . . 

. the harasser is merely a coworker, the plaintiff must prove 

that . . . the employer knew or should have known of the 

harassment but did not take adequate steps to address it.” 

McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1119 (9th Cir. 

2004). 

Plaintiff asserts that Hicks acted in a supervisory 

capacity over her because: (a) he was a supervisor in the VA 

police department, (b) he told her what questions he wanted her 

to ask and which candidates should be chosen when she served on 

an interview panel to select VA police, and (c) he allegedly 

told her “I will take you down and get your job.” 

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Plaintiff’s first assertion is irrelevant, because she must 

establish not only that Hicks supervised somebody, but that he 

had “immediate (or successively higher) authority over [her].” 

Id. (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). That Hicks may have supervised police officers 

does not demonstrate that he supervised plaintiff. 

In her declaration, plaintiff avers that Hicks “did give me 

and the other nurses orders from time to time” and that “[w]e 

were expected to follow those orders.” In her declaration, 

however, Chief Nurse Iatarola states that Hicks “had absolutely 

no authority to supervise nurses in my service.” She notes that 

in an emergency, “all VA employees are expected to take 

direction from safety personnel which could include VA police 

officers.” Chief Winbush likewise declares that “Hicks did not 

supervise Ms. plaintiff nor was he authorized to hire, fire, 

discipline or promote, or participate in or recommend such 

decisions with regard to Ms. plaintiff.” He also avers that 

“Hicks was without authority to make demands upon selection 

panel members . . . , [and that] [i]f Hicks did attempt to 

direct Ms. Pawloski’s actions and Ms. Pawloski refused such 

direction, Mr. Hicks would have had no remedy.” 

Plaintiff’s vague assertion that Hicks sometimes gave her 

orders that she was expected to follow is inadequate to create a 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was her 

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supervisor. It is clear that he was not. Only in emergency 

situations was he authorized to give her directions. If he 

sometimes told her what to do in other circumstances, he did so 

without official authority. Nor does an unfounded threat to 

take someone’s job make someone a supervisor. Accordingly, 

because Hicks was not plaintiff’s supervisor, defendant may be 

liable for Hicks’s alleged misconduct only if it “knew or should 

have known of the harassment but did not take adequate steps to 

address it.” McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1119. 

Here, defendant’s response was adequate as a matter of law. 

“Where . . . the employer takes prompt steps to stop the 

harassment, liability cannot be premised on perceived 

inadequacies in the investigation.” Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 

1184, 1197 (9th Cir. 2001). Although plaintiff points to 

certain possible, minor flaws in the investigation, it is 

undisputed that once plaintiff reported the alleged harassment, 

defendant promptly initiated an investigation, separated 

plaintiff and Hicks, and ultimately fired Hicks. Under Swenson, 

this is enough to shield defendant from liability. Accordingly, 

the court holds that even if plaintiff had exhausted her sexual 

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harassment claim, defendant would be entitled to the Farragher

defense.5

III. Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff claims that defendant retaliated against her for 

complaining about Hicks’s alleged harassment by: (1) moving her 

to a new office, (2) “hyper-scrutinizing” her work, (3) not 

talking to her, (4) warning her that she might be fired if she 

committed misconduct, and (5) denying her a promotion from Nurse 

II to Nurse III. Defendant does not contend that her 

retaliation claim is untimely or barred by a failure to exhaust. 

To state a prima facie case for retaliation under Title 

VII, a plaintiff must show that “(1) she engaged in protected 

activity; (2) the [defendant] took an adverse employment action 

against her; and (3) there exists a causal connection between 

the protected activity and the adverse action.” Annett v. Univ. 

of Kansas, 371 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 2004). Once the 

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of 

production shifts to the defendant “to articulate a legitimate 

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action at 

 

5 Defendant submits a report from a human resources expert, 

Craig Pratt, concluding that defendant’s response to plaintiff’s 

complaints was adequate. Plaintiff argues that Pratt’s report 

should be excluded as improperly infringing on the role of the 

court. Expert testimony concerning the proper response of an 

employer to harassment complaints is admissible. But even if it 

were not, the court would reach the same conclusion 

independently. 

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issue.” Hernandez v. Spacelabs Medical Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 

1112 (9th Cir. 2003). If the defendant proffers such a reason, 

the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to provide evidence that 

the defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason is 

pretextual, “either directly by persuading the court that a 

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or 

indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation 

is unworthy of credence.” Id. (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). “A fact-finder may infer the ultimate fact of 

retaliation without proof of a discriminatory reason if it 

rejects a proffered nondiscriminatory reason as unbelievable.” 

Id. (citation omitted). 

It is undisputed that plaintiff engaged in protected 

activity when she complained of Hicks’s alleged harassment. It 

is also undisputed that failure to promote is an adverse 

employment action.6 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 

U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (citation omitted). Close temporal 

proximity between the protected action and alleged retaliation 

suffices to establish the causal connection required to make out 

a prima facie case. Annett, 371 F.3d at 1239-40 (citation 

 

6 Therefore, the court does not consider whether the other 

alleged acts of retaliation – i.e., moving plaintiff’s office, 

carefully monitoring her work, giving her the cold shoulder, and 

warning her against future misconduct – amount to adverse 

employment actions. 

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omitted). It is undisputed that the decision not to promote 

plaintiff closely followed her complaints about Hicks. 

Moreover, plaintiff avers that Iatarola told her she thought 

plaintiff’s harassment allegations were false, and that she 

[Iatarola] had gotten in trouble for failing to handle them 

properly. These allegations are more than adequate to state a 

prima facie case. 

Defendant’s asserted nondiscriminatory reason for denying 

plaintiff the promotion is that the Board impartially determined 

she was unqualified, and that its decision was affirmed by the 

Central Board in Washington, D.C. Defendant contends that 

because no one on either board knew that plaintiff had filed a 

complaint, the boards’ decisions could not have been 

retaliatory. 

Plaintiff counters that the Board’s decision, and the 

Central Board’s affirmance of that decision, were affected by 

Nurse Iatarola’s alleged retaliatory tampering with plaintiff’s 

proficiency report and improper contact with Board Chair Marilyn 

Kerkhoff. According to Valerie DeLise, plaintiff’s direct 

supervisor, Iatarola said that she did not think plaintiff was 

qualified for the promotion and took the unprecedented step of 

asking DeLise to rewrite plaintiff’s performance evaluation four 

times. DeLise, who did believe plaintiff qualified, found this 

so troubling that she raised concerns with Iatarola that 

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plaintiff was not being treated fairly. Iatarola also called 

Kerkhoff and told her, “I want you to look really closely at the 

comments that I made in my section [of plaintiff’s performance 

evaluation] before you go into that board meeting.” Plaintiff 

alleges that Iatarola’s statement conveyed a strong negative 

message to the Board, and that it was made to retaliate against 

her for having reported Hicks’s alleged sexual harassment. 

Defendant proffers a declaration by Kerkhoff stating that 

Iatarola’s contact with her had no effect on the Board’s 

decision, and that she did not know plaintiff had filed a 

harassment complaint when the Board made its decision. In light 

of these assertions, defendant argues, the Board’s decision not 

to promote plaintiff could not have been retaliatory. 

Although much remains unexplained, there is sufficient 

evidence in the record for a reasonable jury to find that 

Iatarola tampered with the Board’s review process to retaliate 

against plaintiff, and that this tampering affected the Board’s 

decision. Despite a very positive performance evaluation,7 the 

 

7 Plaintiff’s contention that Iatarola caused DeLise to 

place negative comments in her performance evaluation is 

contradicted by the body of the evaluation itself, which is 

extremely positive. It rates plaintiff as outstanding or highly 

satisfactory in every performance area. The short section 

containing Iatarola’s own comments is also positive, at least 

superficially. It may take on a negative aspect, however, when 

coupled with an admonition to look at it “very closely”: 

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Board found that plaintiff lacked each of the many 

qualifications required for promotion. Because this finding is 

so at odds with the performance review upon which it ostensibly 

was based, a reasonable jury could infer that Iatarola’s contact 

with Kerkhoff sent a negative message that played a role in the 

Board’s adverse decision. 

Defendant argues that the nonretaliatory nature of the 

decision not to promote plaintiff is demonstrated by the Central 

Board’s review and affirmance of the Board’s decision. But 

defendant provides no information about the standard under which 

 

Diane has contributed greatly to the success of the 

recruitment program that was set up by her supervisor. 

She quickly grasped the process and has had great 

outcomes in helping to keep new and vice positions 

filled. She has researched the community practices to 

look at benefits as well as pay and will present this 

to the leadership group. Diane is in the beginning 

stages of setting up a Retention Committee. She is 

growing in her abilities to lead this team. This 

could lead to a significant contribution as it moves 

through our system. She is strengthening her problem 

solving and communication skills to lead a system wide 

team. She is encouraged to build the links between 

the individuals and the sites. This will lead to very 

positive outcomes. She is enthusiastic and wants to 

succeed. She took an active role in the Employee 

Appreciation Day with a very successful and 

appreciated outcome. 

Iatarola’s comments suggesting that plaintiff was “growing” and 

“strengthening” certain abilities and skills might have been 

read to imply that she did not yet possess them to the degree 

required for promotion. 

 

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the Central Board conducted that review. Therefore, defendant 

fails to establish that the decision not to promote plaintiff 

was insulated from any retaliatory tampering. 

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is 

DENIED as to the retaliation claim. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 1, 2007 

 /s/ David F. Levi___________

 DAVID F. LEVI 

United States District Judge 

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