Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04898/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04898-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 751
Nature of Suit: Labor - Family and Medical Leave Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

QUO VAT ESTELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN MCHUGH,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-04898-MEJ 

ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

SAC

Re: Dkt. No. 18

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Quo Vat Estell (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendant John McHugh 

(“Defendant”) as Secretary of the United States Army (the “Army”), alleging the Army 

discriminated against her based on her disability and failed to accommodate that same disability. 

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint 

(“SAC”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). Mot., Dkt. No. 29. 

Plaintiff filed an Opposition (Dkt. No. 33), and Defendant filed a Reply (Dkt. No. 35). Pursuant to 

Rule 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without 

oral argument and hereby VACATES the December 1, 2016 hearing. Having considered the 

parties’ positions, the relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court GRANTS IN 

PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Motion for the following reasons.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed her original complaint in this Court on October 24, 2015. Compl., Dkt. No. 

1. Her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed February 4, 2016, set forth a claim under the 

Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq. (“FMLA”), and two claims 

under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, et seq. (a failure to accommodate claim 

and a disability discrimination claim). See FAC, Dkt. No. 9. The Court dismissed the FAC. See

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Order Dismissing FAC, Dkt. No. 27.1 First, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s FMLA claim with 

prejudice after Plaintiff acknowledged the claim was not viable. Id. at 5. Second, the Court 

dismissed Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claims to the extent they were based on conduct occurring 

prior to December 27, 2013, because the FAC did not allege Plaintiff had exhausted her 

administrative remedies for claims based on conduct predating that date; however, the Court did 

so with leave to amend, as Plaintiff might be able to allege facts showing that equitable tolling (or 

another doctrine) applied that would allow her to rely on conduct occurring prior to that date. Id. 

at 7. Third, the Court found Plaintiff failed to state a claim because she did not adequately plead 

that her disability was a factor in Defendant’s actions, and because she did not adequately plead 

the Army’s failure to accommodate her disabilities. Those claims also were dismissed with leave 

to amend. Id. at 9. 

Plaintiff filed the SAC, asserting two claims under the Rehabilitation Act. See SAC. 

Defendant once again moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff is employed by the Army as a Human Resources Assistant. SAC ¶ 10, Dkt. No. 

28. She alleges she is disabled due to Systemic Lupus Erythematosus (“SLE”). Id. ¶ 18. As a 

result of her disability, Plaintiff experiences sensitivity to light. Id. ¶ 19. From the time she began 

working for the Army, her employer accommodated her sensitivity by modifying her position so 

she did not have to work at the front desk or in the file room, places where Plaintiff would have 

been working directly under fluorescent lights. Id. Plaintiff alleges she could perform the 

essential functions of her job with this accommodation. Id. ¶ 23. This arrangement changed 

when Captain Spohr became Plaintiff’s supervisor. Id. ¶ 20. (Plaintiff does not allege when Spohr 

became her supervisor.) Spohr allegedly insisted Plaintiff work in the file room or at the front 

 

1 Although Plaintiff conceded she could not proceed with her FMLA claim (Opp’n to Mot. to 

Dismiss FAC, Dkt. No. 24 at 1), and the Court dismissed her FMLA claim (Order Dismissing 

FAC at 5), she nonetheless includes allegations in the SAC related to the FMLA, see SAC ¶¶ 11-

13. The Court reiterates Plaintiff’s FMLA claim was dismissed, with prejudice. See Order 

Dismissing FAC at 5.

2

For purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations as 

true and construes them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See infra.

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desk; she also refused to allow Plaintiff to work at an empty cubicle, where Plaintiff had 

previously worked. Id. ¶ 21. 

Plaintiff’s doctor gave her a note taking her off work from November 8, 2013 until January 

14, 2014. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff alleges the Army refused to honor this request for accommodation

without engaging in the interactive process mandated by the Rehabilitation Act. Id. ¶ 25.

3

 

Plaintiff further alleges that while she “was taking the time off directed by her doctors,” the Army 

refused her entry to the building, “purportedly based on her request for accommodation.” Id. ¶ 26. 

When her doctor’s note expired and Plaintiff was able to return to work, the Army refused to allow 

her to do so. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff eventually returned to work on March 12, 2014. Id. ¶ 27. 

Plaintiff further alleges that between 2013 and 2014, the Army took the following adverse 

employment actions: (1) repeatedly warning and disciplining her for being tardy or missing work 

due to her disability; (2) refusing to complete disability paperwork; (3) refusing Plaintiff entry to 

the building where she worked; (4) giving Plaintiff a negative performance review based in part on 

the time off she took due to her disability; and (5) disparaging Plaintiff to her co-workers, 

including warning them to avoid her and stating she was “trouble” for undescribed reasons. Id. 

¶ 34. She alleges the Army took these actions because of her disability. Id.

On February 10, 2014, Plaintiff contacted an Army Equal Employment Opportunity 

(“EEO”) counselor relating to the Army’s failure to accommodate her disability. Reding Decl.

¶ 2, Dkt. No. 18-1 & Ex. A (EEO Counselor’s Report) at 1.4 The Department of Defense 

 

3

This interactive process requires employers, once they become aware that an employee needs 

accommodation, to engage with the employee to identify and implement appropriate reasonable 

accommodations. See Aki v. Univ. of Cal. Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 

1176 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 

4 When ruling upon a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider documents alleged in a 

complaint that are essential to a plaintiff’s claims and whose authenticity no party questions. See 

Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith 

v. City of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover, “[c]ourts can consider an 

employee’s administrative record even if the documents were not referenced in the complaint.” 

Lacayo v. Donahoe, 2015 WL 993448, *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015) (citing cases). Plaintiff does 

not challenge the authenticity of the documents attached to the Reding Declaration. Exhausting 

her administrative remedies is essential to her claim; and the documents attached to the Reding 

Declaration are all part of Plaintiff’s administrative record. The Court accordingly may consider 

the documents attached to the Reding Declaration without converting Defendant’s Motion into a 

motion for summary judgment. 

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(“DOD”) sent Plaintiff a Notice of Right to File a Formal EEO Complaint of Discrimination on 

March 26, 2014. Id. ¶ 3 & Ex. B (Notice). Plaintiff signed her Formal EEO Complaint on April 

13, 2014. Id. ¶ 4 & Ex. C (Formal EEO Complaint). In the EEO Complaint, Plaintiff alleges she 

“was discriminated against because of [her] history of . . . physical disability with fluorescent 

lights, sun sensitivity and prior EEO involvement.” Id., Ex. C at 3. Throughout the EEO 

Complaint, Plaintiff identifies Spohr as one of the individuals discriminating against her; she also 

identifies other individuals. See id., Ex. C at 3-6. She alleges Spohr engaged in various 

discriminatory and retaliatory actions between November 13, 2013 and January 31, 2014. Id., Ex. 

C at 2-5. On April 28, 2014, the DOD informed Plaintiff it had accepted her discrimination claims 

for investigation. Id. ¶ 5 & Ex. D (DOD Letter). The DOD letter informed Plaintiff that the 

investigation must be completed within 180 days and that she “may file a civil action” “if the 

Army has not issued a final decision on this complaint, after 180 days from the date the formal 

complaint was filed.” Id., Ex. D. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint must therefore 

provide a defendant with “fair notice” of the claims against it and the grounds for relief. Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) when it does not contain enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 570. “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 557). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need 

detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

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speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and parentheticals omitted).

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all of the plaintiff’s allegations as 

true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 550; Erickson v. Pardus, 

551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). In 

addition, courts may consider documents attached to the complaint. Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. 

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 

If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, the “court should grant leave to amend even if no 

request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 

be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc) (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, the Court may deny leave to amend 

for a number of reasons, including “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 

movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice 

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” 

Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Foman v. 

Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claims on the same grounds it 

argued in moving to dismiss the FAC. He argues Plaintiff has not alleged facts giving rise to 

equitable tolling that would allow Plaintiff to state Rehabilitation Act claims based on conduct that 

predates December 27, 2013. Defendant also argues Plaintiff’s amended allegations still fail to

state a claim for either disparate treatment or failure to accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act.

A. Administrative Exhaustion and EEO Allegations

The Court previously found that “[o]nly wrongful acts occurring within 45 days of 

Plaintiff’s initial contact with the EEO Counselor—i.e., before December 27, 2013—are timely 

under EEO regulations. . . . To the extent Plaintiff’s claims are based on incidents occurring 

before December 27, 2013, they are not properly exhausted. As such, they are time-barred and 

cannot be the basis for a claim under the Rehabilitation Act.” Order Dismissing FAC at 7. The 

Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend to “allege facts showing that equitable tolling (or another 

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doctrine) applies that allow her to rely on conduct occurring prior to that date.” Id. at 8. In doing 

so, the Court noted Plaintiff’s allegations that her doctors requested she take two months off from 

work were insufficient because they did not show the issues that prevented her from working also 

prevented her from contacting an EEO counselor. Id.

“Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations applies when the plaintiff is prevented from 

asserting a claim by wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant, or when extraordinary 

circumstances beyond the plaintiff’s control made it impossible to file a claim on time.” Stoll v. 

Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999), as amended (Mar. 22, 1999) (equitable tolling 

applied where the plaintiff provided “overwhelming evidence that she was completely 

psychiatrically disabled during the relevant limitation period [and . . .] presented compelling 

evidence that her mental illness, caused by the Post Office’s wrongful conduct, precluded her from 

exercising an agency relationship with the attorney who handled her EEOC case.” (citing AlvarezMachain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1997))). Thus, Plaintiff must allege either 

wrongful conduct on the part of the Army preventing her from contacting her EEO counselor, or 

allege that extraordinary circumstances beyond her control made it impossible for her to contact

her EEO counselor within 45 days of the allegedly discriminatory acts.

In the SAC, Plaintiff includes new factual allegations in an attempt to show equitable 

tolling applies to her claims. She alleges that “[i]n the period prior to [her] initial contact with an 

EEO counselor[,]” she (1) suffered severe health issues because of her disability, which required 

multiple hospitalizations; (2) could not contact an EEO counselor on account of the demands of 

her work, which she was performing even though her doctor advised her not to work; and (3) was 

responsible for her mother’s care, which required she accompany her mother to medical, hospice, 

and court appointments on more than nine occasions between November 20, 2013 and February 

25, 2014. See SAC ¶¶ 3-4. 

These facts do not give rise to equitable tolling. First, Plaintiff fails to allege facts 

sufficient to show that Spohr’s work-related demands rise to the level of wrongful conduct courts 

have found sufficient to trigger equitable tolling, or that Spohr’s conduct prevented her from 

contacting an EEO counselor. See Stoll, 165 F.3d at 1242 (the “effects of the repeated sexual 

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abuse, rape, and assault she experienced [at the hands of post office employees] left her severely 

impaired and unable to function in many respects. She has attempted suicide numerous times-and 

may do so again. She is unable to read, open mail, or function in society. Thus, her failure to assert 

her claim within the statutory period was a direct consequence of the Post Office’s wrongful 

conduct”). Second, she fails to allege facts sufficient to show that it was impossible for her to

meet or otherwise contact an EEO counselor. The facts she pleads in fact suggest the opposite. 

Despite being excused from work for medical reasons between November 8, 2013 and January 4, 

2014, Plaintiff was able to work, including “respond[ing] to constant phone calls, emails, and 

paperwork.” SAC ¶ 3. During this same time frame, Plaintiff also was able to care for and attend 

multiple appointments with her mother. The new allegations undercut Plaintiff’s argument that 

equitable tolling should apply because they suggest it was not impossible for her to accomplish a 

task such as contacting her EEO counselor. See Long v. Paulson, 349 F. App’x 145, 146 (9th Cir. 

2009) (no equitable tolling where plaintiff was hospitalized for first eight days of 90-day period 

and did not show he was incapacitated); Lacayo v. Donahoe, 2015 WL 993448, at *11-12 (N.D. 

Cal. Mar. 4, 2015) (no equitable tolling where allegations in complaint indicate that plaintiff 

successfully applied for disability benefits and made written requests for copies of employment 

file during period she requested be tolled). 

Similarly, Plaintiff does not explain how being placed off work by her doctor (SAC ¶ 24), 

and prohibited from entering her work building between November 8, 2013 and January 4, 2014 

(id. ¶ 26), prevented her from timely contacting her EEO counselor about her claims. Plaintiff 

does not allege that she was hospitalized during this period or advised not to pursue EEO remedies 

by her doctor, or that she could not contact her EEO counselor because the counselor worked in 

the building Plaintiff was prohibited from entering.

The standard for equitable tolling is exacting, and requires Plaintiff to show she was unable 

to contact her EEO counselor in the 45 days following the discriminatory conduct—whether the 

incapacitation was due to physical or mental conditions. Instead of addressing Defendant’s 

arguments and case law, Plaintiff invokes an EEOC decision. See Opp’n at 3 (citing Complainant 

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v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Req. No. 05980475, 1998 WL 518389 (Aug. 6, 1998)).5 This 

administrative decision does not advance Plaintiff’s argument. The decision affirms the agency’s 

dismissal of a complaint for failure to meet the 45-day deadline, holding the appellant had not 

demonstrated she was so ill due to bronchitis and a viral infection that she was “so incapacitated 

that she could not timely file her appeal.” EEOC Req. No. 05980475 (citing Weinberger v. Dep’t 

of the Army, EEOC Req. No. 05920040, 1992 WL 1374483 (Feb. 21, 1992) (“[W]hen an appellant 

claims that a physical condition prevented him/her from meeting a particular deadline, the 

appellant must be so incapacitated by the condition as to render him/her unable to make a timely 

filing.”)). Like the agency, this Court finds Plaintiff has failed to show she was so incapacitated 

that she was unable to timely contact an EEO counselor. Plaintiff cites no authority demonstrating

that equitable tolling should apply under the factual circumstances she relies upon. 

The Court accordingly dismisses Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation claims to the extent they are 

based on conduct predating December 27, 2013. The Court will grant Plaintiff one more chance to 

amend her claims to show equitable tolling applies based on the standards enunciated in Stoll.

B. Failure to State a Claim under Rehabilitation Act

The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim because Plaintiff did 

not allege facts plausibly indicating her disability was a factor in Defendant’s employment actions. 

The Court previously dismissed her failure to accommodate claim because Plaintiff did not allege 

sufficient facts as to when and how she was denied reasonable accommodation, to whom she made 

those requests, or why these requests were necessary to accommodate her disability. See Order 

Dismissing FAC at 7-11. Plaintiff reasserts these two Rehabilitation Act claims, and Defendant 

once again moves to dismiss them for failure to state a claim. 

1. Disparate Treatment

To state a disparate treatment claim, Plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to plausibly allege 

that “(1) she is a person with a disability, (2) who is otherwise qualified for employment, and (3) 

suffered discrimination because of her disability.” Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 

 

5

Plaintiff represents she attached a copy of the cited decision to her brief (Opp’n at 3), but did not 

in fact do so.

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1005 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleged that “[d]uring 2013-2014, defendants took numerous adverse 

employment actions against plaintiff, including: repeatedly warning and disciplining her for being 

late and/or missing work because of her disability, refusing to fill out the employer portion on 

disability paperwork plaintiff provided, refusing to allow plaintiff to enter the building, giving 

plaintiff a negative performance review, and telling negative things about plaintiff to her coworkers, including warning them to avoid her and stating that plaintiff was ‘trouble.’” FAC ¶ 31. 

Plaintiff then conclusorily alleged Defendant discriminated against her because of her disability. 

Id. ¶ 31. The Court found Plaintiff adequately alleged the first two elements of her claim, but that 

her “conclusory statements are not sufficient to allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the Army took these employment actions because of Plaintiff’s disability.” Order Dismissing 

FAC at 10-11.

In the SAC, Plaintiff fleshes out her allegations. She now attributes most of the conduct to 

a specific individual, Captain Spohr, and provides some basis for alleging Spohr’s conduct was 

motivated by discrimination. The Court paraphrases the relevant allegations:

(1) Plaintiff was repeatedly warned and disciplined by “defendants” for being late and/or 

missing work, even when she had doctor’s notes covering such absences and informed 

Spohr that the absences and/or late arrivals were due to her disability;

(2) Spohr refused to fill out the employer portion on disability paperwork Plaintiff 

provided;

(3) Spohr told Plaintiff that she could not enter the building at all because of her disability, 

even though her doctor’s restrictions did not prohibit her from doing so;

(4) Spohr gave Plaintiff a negative performance evaluation, and included the time Plaintiff 

took off from work due to her disability as a factor contributing to the negative 

performance evaluation;

(5) Supervisory level employees in Plaintiff’s workplace spoke negatively about Plaintiff 

to her co-workers, including warning them to avoid her and stating that Plaintiff was 

“trouble.”

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See SAC ¶ 34.6 While Plaintiff could provide more specificity, the Court finds some of these 

allegations are sufficient to state that Spohr’s conduct was motivated by discrimination. At the 

very least, the allegations that Spohr disciplined Plaintiff for missing work while knowing 

Plaintiff’s doctor had medically excused her from work because of her disability, and gave 

Plaintiff negative performance evaluations in part because Plaintiff took time off due to her 

disability, are sufficient to state a claim for disparate treatment. 

Plaintiff does not allege in the SAC the dates on which Spohr and the Army took these 

actions; however, she does identify specific dates in her EEO Complaint. A review of the EEO 

Complaint suggests that some of the conduct upon which Plaintiff bases her claim occurred before 

December 27, 2013. For example, Plaintiff alleges in her EEO Complaint that on November 8, 

2013, Spohr rejected her medical slip “for 60 days of Temporary Disability ending 2014 January 

15” and refused to fill out disability paperwork. Reding Decl., Ex. C at 3. The ultimate viability 

of claims based on such conduct therefore depends on Plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate equitable 

tolling applies at the pleading stage and beyond, should Defendant choose to challenge tolling on 

summary judgment.

2. Failure to Accommodate

To state a failure to accommodate claim, Plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to plausibly 

allege (1) she is disabled, (2) she is a qualified individual, and (3) a reasonable accommodation is 

possible that would enable her to perform the essential functions of her job. See Zukle v. Regents 

of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). A “reasonable 

accommodation” is defined as “modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the 

manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that 

enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position.” 

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). 

In dismissing Plaintiff’s claim in the FAC, the Court found Plaintiff adequately alleged the 

first two elements of her claim, but did adequately allege the third because she did “not indicate 

 

6

There are two paragraphs labeled “34” in the SAC; this citation refers to the paragraph starting 

on page 6 of the SAC.

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when she made the requests, to whom she made those requests, or why these requests were 

necessary.” Order Dismissing FAC at 11 (citing Gladle v. McDonald, 2016 WL 1573421, at *4 

(C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2016) (granting motion to dismiss where plaintiff failed to allege “when and to 

whom” she requested accommodation or how requested accommodations would enable her to 

perform essential job functions); Abdul-Haqq v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 2015 WL 335863, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2015) (dismissing claim brought under California’s Fair Employment and 

Housing Act where complaint failed to describe substance of requests for accommodation); see 

also Anaya v. Marin Cty. Sheriff, 2014 WL 6660415, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2014) (dismissing 

Americans with Disabilities Act claim where plaintiff failed to explain why defendant’s actions 

were inappropriate for her disability: “[s]he must [] explain how her disability created physical 

limitations or symptoms . . . so that she needed specifically identified reasonable 

accommodations”)).

Plaintiff argues the following allegations in the SAC address the Court’s Order by showing 

“how and when plaintiff was denied reasonable accommodations” (Opp’n at 5 (citing SAC ¶¶ 17-

28)):

(1) As soon as Spohr became Plaintiff’s supervisor, she took away the prior 

accommodations that had allowed Plaintiff to work away from fluorescent lights, and 

refused to accept these were accommodations for Plaintiff’s disability. SAC ¶ 20.

(2) Spohr insisted Plaintiff work in the file room or front desk. When Plaintiff explained 

that working in those areas impacted her disability, Spohr criticized Plaintiff and 

accused her of shirking. Spohr “ignored Plaintiff’s doctors’ communications about 

what ‘avoiding working directly under fluorescent light’ meant.” Id.

(3) Plaintiff and her doctors asked Spohr to continue to allow Plaintiff to work in an 

unoccupied cubicle, but Spohr refused to grant the requested accommodation. Id. ¶ 21.

(4) On November 8, 2013, Plaintiff’s doctor took her off work for two months because of 

her disability “which was worsening because of Captain Spohr’s harassment and 

refusal to accommodate Plaintiff. This note constituted a request for accommodation.” 

Id. ¶ 24. The Army refused to accommodate this request, without making any effort to 

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engage in the interactive process. Id. ¶ 25 (see supra at n.2).

(5) Plaintiff took the time off, and during this time, the Army prohibited Plaintiff from 

entering her work building, “purportedly based on her request for accommodation.” Id. 

¶ 26.

(6) Plaintiff’s doctor cleared her to return to work on January 14, 2014, but “the Army” 

refused to allow her to do so until March 12, 2014. Id. ¶ 27.

(7) When she returned to work on March 12, 2014, she worked in the cubicle she had 

asked to be allowed to work in before her leave. Id.

(8) “The U.S. Army also failed to accommodate plaintiff in other ways, including not 

allowing time to attend doctors’ appointments, and refusing to make allowances for 

plaintiff at times being late or missing work, even when caused by her disability.” Id. ¶ 

28.

The conduct described in paragraphs 1-4 occurred at the latest on November 8, 2013, 

predates December 27, 2013, and thus cannot form a basis for Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate 

claim. See infra Sec. A (declining to apply equitable estoppel to allow Plaintiff to base claims on 

conduct predating December 27, 2013). To the extent they purport to illustrate requests for 

accommodation, paragraphs 5, 6, and especially 8 continue to suffer from the same deficiencies 

the Court identified in dismissing the FAC in that they fail to identify when and to whom the 

requests were made. See Order Dismissing FAC at 11. Paragraph 7 appears to be an example of 

an accommodation Defendant provided, not a failure to accommodate. Accordingly, the Court 

finds Plaintiff once again fails to state a claim and grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

failure to accommodate claim, without prejudice. 

Plaintiff may amend this claim by providing the information the Court outlined in its Order 

dismissing the FAC, and again in this Order. In doing so, Plaintiff must identify “when the 

requests were made, to whom, and why they were necessary.” Order Dismissing FAC at 11.

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss the SAC. Any amended complaint shall be filed by December 15, 2016. Plaintiff is 

advised that this will be her last opportunity to cure any deficiencies in her Complaint. Defendant 

shall respond to any amended complaint by January 12, 2017.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2016

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:15-cv-04898-MEJ Document 36 Filed 11/21/16 Page 13 of 13