Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01773/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01773-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

George W. Miller, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-01773-PHX-NVW (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner George W. Miller has filed a pro se Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 13.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

Petitioner’s direct appeal concluded on February 10, 2005, and his conviction 

became final on May 8, 2005. The Petitioner timely filed his Notice of Post-Conviction 

Relief (PCR) on April 1, 2005. On September 24, 2008, the Arizona Supreme Court 

denied Petitioner’s first PCR, which is the date the one-year limitations period began to 

run. Petitioner filed his initial Petition on August 7, 2014. Because there are no grounds 

for equitable tolling or gap tolling, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claims are 

untimely. Therefore, the Court will recommend that the Amended Petition be denied and 

dismissed with prejudice. 

Case 2:14-cv-01773-NVW Document 31 Filed 02/08/16 Page 1 of 12
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

II. BACKGROUND

a. Summary of Investigation of Petitioner’s Crimes 

 On May 14, 2003, Petitioner was found guilty by a jury of three counts of sexual 

conduct with a minor, one count of kidnapping, and one count of sexual molestation of a 

child, all class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against children. (Doc. 24-2, Ex. C, at 1.) 

The victim in all the counts was his then-girlfriend’s eight-year-old daughter “D.J.” 

(Doc. 24-2, Ex. G, at 231; Doc. 24-3, Ex. K, at 8.) On June 16, 2003, the trial court 

sentenced Petitioner to consecutive terms of imprisonment as follows: an aggravated 37 

years on each of the sexual conduct offenses and an aggravated 35 years for the 

kidnapping and sexual molestation offenses. (Doc. 24-2, Ex. G, at 231.) 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals set forth the following facts1

 in its Memorandum 

Decision affirming Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal: 

 The offenses took place over a period of several weeks during the 1992-93 school year, while defendant was living in Phoenix with his girlfriend Joyce and her four children, 

including the victim, her then eight-year-old daughter D.J. The victim testified that, during that period, defendant had sexual intercourse with her on three separate occasions when she had come home from school and they were alone in the house. 

 The first time it happened, D.J. was either taking a nap 

or doing homework and defendant had come up behind her and given her a hug. He then ran his hand down her back and 

proceeded to put her on an ottoman in the living room and take her clothes off. D.J. was “kicking and screaming, trying to get him off” her, but defendant was able to place his penis in her vagina. D.J. testified that she remembered that “[i]t 

hurted” and that it “was hard to walk” afterward. Later that 

evening, when she was coming out of the shower, defendant 

“shoved” her into her room and said “if you tell anyone, I'll kill you.” She believed he could follow through on his threat 

because defendant kept guns at the house. 

 The scenario was similar the second time. D.J. had 

come home from school and was on the couch with defendant 

1 See 28 U.S.C § 2254(e)(1) (stating that “a determination of factual issues made 

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.”); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 

763 (9th Cir. 2012) (affording the Arizona Supreme Court’s statement of facts “a presumption of correctness that may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) and Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2009)). 

Case 2:14-cv-01773-NVW Document 31 Filed 02/08/16 Page 2 of 12
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

when he started holding her. D.J. started kicking, screaming, and scratching, and she managed to get away. Unfortunately, she “tripped over something and fell,” and defendant was able 

to seize her and hold her down on the floor. He held her two 

hands over her head by the wrists and once more inserted his 

penis in her vagina. 

 On the third and last time, D.J. had come home from 

school and thought that defendant was not there because she 

did not see his truck in the driveway. She entered the house 

and began to do her homework when defendant “appeared” and took her to the ottoman again. He again began to take her 

clothes off; but, this time, as he was doing that, he also told her to “hold this” and placed his penis in her hand. He then 

had sexual intercourse with her again. 

. . . 

 D.J.’s mother reported the matter to police, and a detective associated with the Child Help Center eventually interviewed D.J. about the offenses. The state subsequently filed the present charges, which defendant denied, and the 

matter was set for trial. 

. . . 

 The state’s witnesses at trial consisted of D.J., Joyce, 

Phyllis, Krizay, and Wendy Dutton, the state’s expert witness on the characteristic behaviors of child sexual abuse victims. 

Defendant elected to testify, admitting that he had molested both his daughters when they were eight, but contending that sexual abuse counseling had ”cured” him of his attraction to 

pre-pubescent girls. He flatly denied any inappropriate sexual conduct with D.J. 

(Doc. 24-3, Ex. K, at 123). 

b. Petitioner’s Direct Appeal

 After being convicted and sentenced on June 16, 2003, Petitioner filed a direct 

appeal (Doc. 24-3, Ex. K, at 123), arguing that the trial court: (1) abused its discretion 

when it permitted the State to present evidence of other acts of sexual misconduct 

pursuant to Rule 404(c) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence; (2) erred in instructing the jury 

regarding the permissible uses of 404(c) evidence; and (3) abused its discretion in 

admitting the victim’s handwritten statement. (Doc. 24-3, Ex. H, at 2; Doc. 24-3, Ex. J, 

at 105.) 

 On June 8, 2004, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief, finding that: (1) the 

record clearly provided a sufficient basis for the trial court’s admission of the Rule 404(c) 

Case 2:14-cv-01773-NVW Document 31 Filed 02/08/16 Page 3 of 12
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

evidence; (2) the trial court did not commit fundamental error in failing to sua sponte 

include a portion of Arizona’s standard Rule 404(c) instruction during final jury 

instructions; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted D.J.’s 

handwritten statement. (Doc. 24-3, Ex. K, at 123.) 

 The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review on February 10, 2005. 

(Doc. 24-3, Ex. M, at 156.) 

c. Petitioner’s Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings 

i. First Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

 On April 1, 2005, Petitioner filed a PCR Notice. (Doc. 24-3, Ex. N, at 158.) 

Petitioner’s PCR petition raised the following claims: (1) trial defense counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance by failing to investigate D.J’s alleged pretrial hypnosis; and (2) the 

trial court’s imposition of aggravated sentence violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 

296 (2004). On April 19, 2007, the state trial court dismissed the PCR proceeding, 

finding that Petitioner had failed to set forth a colorable claim for relief. (Doc. 24-4, Ex. 

S, at 150.) 

 On August 8, 2007, Petitioner filed for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals 

raising the same two claims. (Doc. 24-4, Ex. T, at 152.) The Arizona Court of Appeals 

denied review on April 9, 2008. (Doc. 24-4, Ex. U, at 184.) The Arizona Supreme Court 

summarily denied review on September 24, 2008. (Doc. 24-4, Ex. W, at 201.) 

ii. Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

 On June 24, 2009, nine months after the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of 

Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding, Petitioner initiated a successive PCR proceeding, 

raising the following claims: (1) the trial court improperly imposed consecutive 

sentences; (2) the trial court sentenced him in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause; (3) 

trial defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the 

credentials of the State’s expert witness; (4) a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 

confrontation and cross-examination; (5) the State failed to properly disclose the subject 

of its expert testimony; and (6) the court erred in allowing the State to amend the 

indictment. (Doc. 24-4, Ex. X, at 203; Doc. 24-5, Ex. Y, at 2.) During this PCR 

Case 2:14-cv-01773-NVW Document 31 Filed 02/08/16 Page 4 of 12
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

proceeding, on August 20, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for writ of habeas corpus (No. 

CV-09-1739-PHX-NVW (MEA)), which was dismissed without prejudice for failure to 

exhaust state court remedies and as premature because of the pending PCR proceeding in 

state court. 

 On November 20, 2009, the state trial court dismissed the proceeding, finding that 

it was both: (1) untimely under Rule 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure; 

and (2) precluded under rule 32.2(a) because the claims either were or could have been 

raised on appeal or in a prior Rule 32 proceeding. (Doc. 24-7, Ex. Z, at 2.) Petitioner did 

not seek appellate review. 

iii. Third Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding 

 On May 6, 2011, Petitioner filed a third Notice of PCR relief (Doc. 24-7, Ex. AA, 

at 5) raising the following claims: (1) there was insufficient evidence supporting his 

convictions; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; (3) the state trial court abused its discretion in 

allowing the prosecution to admit evidence pursuant to Arizona Rules of Evidence 404(b) 

and 404(c); and (4) defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. (Doc. 24-7, Ex. BB, at 11.) 

 On June 3, 2011, the state court dismissed the third PCR proceeding as untimely 

and for a failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted in an untimely 

proceeding. (Doc. 24-8, Ex. CC, at 2.) Petitioner did not seek appellate review. 

iv. Fourth Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding 

 On September 12, 2011, Petitioner filed his fourth PCR Notice, raising four 

claims: (1) defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; 

(3) judicial misconduct; and (4) actual innocence. (Doc. 24-8, Ex. DD, at 5.) On 

September 15, 2011, the state trial court dismissed the fourth PCR proceeding as both: (1) 

untimely under Rule 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (2) 

precluded under Rule 32.2(a) because the claims either were or could have been raised on 

appeal or in a prior Rule 32 proceeding. (Doc. 24-8, Ex. EE, at 38.) 

 On February 2, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Court 

of Appeals, primarily arguing that the state PCR court erred in dismissing his claims 

Case 2:14-cv-01773-NVW Document 31 Filed 02/08/16 Page 5 of 12
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

because he was actually innocent and that there was insufficient evidence to support the 

convictions. (Doc. 24-8, Ex. FF, at 41.) 

 On June 24, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review but denied relief. 

The court found Petitioner failed to establish how the state PCR court abused its 

discretion in dismissing the Notice. (Doc. 24-8, Ex. GG, at 69.) The Arizona Supreme 

Court summarily denied review on March 4, 2014. (Doc. 24-8, Ex. II, at 88.) 

c. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition 

On August 7, 2014, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 

1.) On March 27, 2015, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition raising six grounds for 

relief. (Doc. 13.) On March 31, 2015, this Court issued an Order directing Respondents 

to file an answer. (Doc. 18 at 1.) Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 26) and a 

Supplemental Reply (Doc. 29). 

III. THE PETITION IS UNTIMELY. 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

Whether a petition is barred by the statute of limitations is a threshold issue that must be 

resolved before considering other procedural issues or the merits of individual claims.

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). This Petition was due on May 9, 2006, absent statutory or equitable 

tolling. 

 Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and 

sentences on June 8, 2004. (Doc. 24-3, Ex. K, at 123.) Petitioner then had 35 days to file 

a petition for discretionary review with the Arizona Supreme Court. See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 31.19(a) (“Within 30 days after the Court of Appeals issues its decision, any party may 

Case 2:14-cv-01773-NVW Document 31 Filed 02/08/16 Page 6 of 12
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

file a petition for review with the clerk of the Supreme Court . . . .”); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

1.3 (expanding time limits by five days after service by mail); State v. Rabun, 162 Ariz. 

261, 782 P.2d 737 (1989). Petitioner filed for review with the Arizona Supreme Court, 

which was summarily denied on February 10, 2005. (Doc. 24-3, Ex. L, at 142; Doc. 24-

3, Ex. M, at 156.) Petitioner’s conviction thus became final 90 days later on May 8, 

2005, when the period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States 

Supreme Court expired. 

a. Statutory Tolling 

 The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Arizona, post-conviction 

review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed. See Isley v. Arizona 

Dep’t of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) 

(“A proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the 

court in which the conviction occurred.”). 

 A state petition that is not filed within the state’s required time limit, however, is 

not “properly filed,” and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a post-conviction petition is untimely 

under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”); Allen v. 

Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 6 (2007) (finding that inmate’s untimely state post–conviction 

petition was not “properly filed” under the AEDPA’s tolling provision). Thus, the 

AEDPA grants a criminal defendant one year from the conclusion of his direct appeal, 

minus time spent litigating a “properly filed” post–conviction claim, to file a federal 

habeas corpus petition. 

 Petitioner originally filed a timely Notice of PCR relief in the state trial court on 

April 1, 2005 and, thus, the statute of limitations was tolled until the Arizona Supreme 

Court denied review of Petitioner’s first PCR proceedings on September 24, 2008. The 

Petitioner had until September 25, 2009 to file his federal habeas petition. 

Case 2:14-cv-01773-NVW Document 31 Filed 02/08/16 Page 7 of 12
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 On June 24, 2009, nine months after the Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s first 

PCR proceeding, the Petitioner filed a second PCR proceeding, which was within the 

AEDPA’s one-year statutory period. On November 20, 2009, the state court dismissed 

the proceeding as both untimely under Rule 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure and precluded under Rule 32.2(a) because the claims either were or could have 

been raised on appeal or in a prior Rule 32 proceeding. Thus the second PCR proceeding 

did not toll the statute of limitations because it was not a “properly filed” action for state 

post-conviction relief. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 413 (holding that a state petition that is not 

filed within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed.”). During this PCR 

proceeding, on August 20, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(No. CV-09-1739-PHX-NVW (MEA)), which was dismissed because of the pending 

PCR in state court. 

 Even if the second PCR proceeding did toll the AEDPA’s one-year statutory 

period, Petitioner failed to appeal the decision of the second PCR proceeding and would 

have had until January 30, 2010 to reinitiate his writ of habeas corpus. It was not until 

August 7, 2014 that the Petitioner filed his initial Petition in this matter. (Doc. 1 at 1.) 

 Petitioner filed his third PCR on May 6, 2011, and filed his fourth PCR on 

September 12, 2011. Both petitions were filed after the expiration of the statute of 

limitations period and thereby do not toll the limitations period. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (announcing that, “[l]ike the Eleventh Circuit, we hold 

that section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has 

ended before the state petition was filed”) (citing Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 

(11th Cir. 2001)); Jimenez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the 

federal habeas petitioner’s filing of a state post–conviction relief petition “well after the 

AEDPA statute of limitations ended” constituted a delay that “resulted in an absolute 

time bar to refiling after his state claims were exhausted”). 

b. Gap Tolling

 The Petitioner is not entitled to toll the time gap between his four PCR 

Case 2:14-cv-01773-NVW Document 31 Filed 02/08/16 Page 8 of 12
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

proceedings under the Ninth Circuit’s two-part test. See King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 

(9th Cir. 2003). As set forth by the Ninth Circuit, the two-part “gap tolling” test reads as 

follows: 

First, we ask whether the petitioner’s subsequent petitions are limited to an elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the first petition. If not, these petitions constitute a “new round” and the gap between the rounds is 

not tolled. But if the petitioner simply attempted to correct the deficiencies, 

then the petitioner is still making “proper use of state court procedures,” and his application is still “pending” for tolling purposes. We thus construe 

the new petitions as part of the first “full round” of collateral review. We 

then ask whether they were ultimately denied on the merits or deemed untimely. In the former event, the time gap between the petitions is tolled; in the latter event it is not. 

King, 340 F.3d at 823 (citations omitted); see also Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1075. 

Petitioner’s successive PCR proceedings were not “limited to an elaboration of the facts 

relating to the claims in the first petition.” King, 340 F.3d at 823. Rather, Petitioner’s 

successive PCR petitions raised newly-presented claims that were not intended to merely 

correct or enhance claims made in the prior petition, and, as such, were not offered to 

remediate any previous deficiencies. Second, the petitions were deemed untimely under 

state law. 

Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding alleged (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for 

failing to investigate the victim’s “alleged pretrial hypnosis” (Doc. 24-4, Ex. P, at 9), and 

(2) the “trial court’s reliance on both the fact and nature of [Petitioner’s] prior conviction 

as an aggravator” violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (Doc. 24-4, Ex. P, 

at 21). Petitioner’s three successive PCR petitioner raised entirely distinct claims, thus, 

gap tolling does not apply.

c. Equitable Tolling 

 The Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling because there has not been a 

showing of extraordinary circumstances. Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, 

e.g., Waldron–Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009). “A petitioner 

who seeks equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one–year filing deadline must show that (1) 

some ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing on time, and (2) he has 

Case 2:14-cv-01773-NVW Document 31 Filed 02/08/16 Page 9 of 12
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

diligently pursued his rights.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). Luna v. 

Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th Cir. 2015). The Petitioner bears the burden of showing 

that equitable tolling should apply. Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 

1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external forces, rather 

than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely habeas action. 

Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010). Petitioner must show that “the 

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary 

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 

952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling 

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda v. Castro, 

292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Marcello, 212 F.3d at 1010). 

 Here, Petitioner filed several PCR motions and appeals prior to the filing of his 

initial Petition in this matter. Petitioner filed a third PCR on May 6, 2011(Doc. 24-7, Ex. 

BB, at 11) and a fourth PCR on September 12, 2011 (Doc. 24-8, Ex. EE, at 38). On 

February 2, 2012, Petitioner filed an appeal with the Arizona Court of Appeals regarding 

his denial of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 24-8, Ex. FF, at 40.) On November 15, 2013, 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 24-8, Ex. 

HH, at 73.) Petitioner had access to records and materials sufficient to file a Petition in 

this Court. Petitioner was aware of his habeas right because he filed a Petition for writ of 

habeas corpus (No. CV-09-1739-PHX-NVW (MEA)) on August 20, 2009, which was 

dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state court remedies and as premature 

because of the pending PCR proceeding in state court. Petitioner asserts no facts to 

establish that equitable tolling should apply in this case. 

 In his Reply, Petitioner asserts that equitable tolling based upon laches and 

“egregious lawyer conduct” should apply. (Doc. 29 at 1.) The doctrine of laches does 

not apply because Petitioner cannot establish that a lack of access to documents caused 

the delay in filing the Petition. Petitioner filed numerous PCR motions and appeals, 

which demonstrates he had significant access to documents. See Garcia v. Wong, 404 F. 

Case 2:14-cv-01773-NVW Document 31 Filed 02/08/16 Page 10 of 12
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

App'x 182, 183 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (affirming a denial of equitable tolling 

because “he failed to demonstrate that [the withholding of documents] caused the 

untimely filing of his petition). Petitioner also cites to Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249, 

1256–57 (10th Cir. 2007) for the proposition that lawyer conduct can establish equitable 

tolling. (Doc. 29 at 1.) Petitioner fails to present any facts that “professional 

misconduct” caused the delay in the filing of the Petition. Petitioner is not entitled to 

equitable tolling. 

IV. CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that 

Petitioner’s claims are untimely. The Court will therefore recommend that the Amended 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 13) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Doc. 13) be DENIED and DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Case 2:14-cv-01773-NVW Document 31 Filed 02/08/16 Page 11 of 12
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 8th day of February, 2016. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle 

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:14-cv-01773-NVW Document 31 Filed 02/08/16 Page 12 of 12