Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02313/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02313-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

3:18-CV-02313 JLS (MSB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FELIPE GARCIA, CDCR #H-74821,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SCOTT T. KERNAN; DANIEL 

PARAMO; E. ALVAREZ; IGNACIO 

BRAVO; S. HALL; J. JUAREZ; 

B. VOGEL; M. VILLAFUERTE; 

P. BRACAMONTE; P. COVELLO,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-CV-02313 JLS (MSB)

ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION 

TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS, (2) DISMISSING 

DEFENDANT KERNAN PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) AND 

1915A(b), AND (3) DIRECTING U.S. 

MARSHAL TO EFFECT SERVICE 

UPON REMAINING DEFENDANTS 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) 

AND Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)

(ECF No. 2)

Plaintiff Felipe Garcia, currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional 

Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983, on October 6, 2018. See Compl., ECF No. 1, at 

1. Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. section 1914(a) at the time of 

filing; instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. section 1915(a). See ECF No. 2.

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:18-cv-02313-JLS-MSB Document 5 Filed 01/07/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 10
2

3:18-CV-02313 JLS (MSB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

section 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes (“Cervantes”), 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 

2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). A prisoner granted leave 

to proceed IFP, however, remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or 

“installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. 

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is 

ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King (“King”), 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the 

certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the 

average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has 

no assets. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1), (b)(4). The institution having custody of the 

prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s 

income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to 

the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. 

at 629.

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

Case 3:18-cv-02313-JLS-MSB Document 5 Filed 01/07/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 10
3

3:18-CV-02313 JLS (MSB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate

Statement Report as well as a Prison Certificate completed by an accounting officer at RJD. 

See IFP Mot. at 5–9; ECF No. 3 at 1–4; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. Civ.L.R. 3.2; 

King, 398 F.3d at 1119. These statements show that Plaintiff has carried an average 

monthly balance of $148.69, had an average monthly deposit of $55.21 credited to his 

account over the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint, and 

an available balance of $95.60 on the books at the time of filing. See ECF No. 3 at 1, 3. 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) and 

assesses his initial partial filing fee to be $29.73 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1915(b)(1). 

The Court will further direct the Acting Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect 

this initial $29.73 filing fee only if sufficient funds are available in Plaintiff’s account at 

the time this Order is executed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (“In no event shall a prisoner 

be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment 

for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial 

filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. 

section 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case 

based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment 

is ordered”). The remaining balance of the $350 total fee owed in this case must be 

collected by the agency having custody of the prisoner and forwarded to the Clerk of the 

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1915(b)(2).

II. INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who 

are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

Case 3:18-cv-02313-JLS-MSB Document 5 Filed 01/07/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 10
4

3:18-CV-02313 JLS (MSB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to section 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff claims that between the months of February and September 2017, he was 

engaged in settlement negotiations in Civil Case No. CV-14-00625 LJO-SAB, which he 

had filed in the Eastern District of California. See Compl. at 5–6. During that time, 

Plaintiff claims Defendant Bravo escorted him from his assigned job to meet with a Deputy 

Attorney General and, as a result, Bravo “found out . . . [he] was suing CDCR.” Id. at 6. 

On July 24, 2017, Plaintiff claims Defendants Bravo and Alvarez arrived at his 

worksite to inspect for contraband. When none was found, Plaintiff claims Bravo escorted 

Case 3:18-cv-02313-JLS-MSB Document 5 Filed 01/07/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 10
5

3:18-CV-02313 JLS (MSB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

him “out of site,” pushed him against a wall, and conducted a “strip search in a very 

truculent and disrespectful” manner by “grabbing [his] privates.” Id. After Bravo re-cuffed 

Plaintiff and ordered him to dress, Bravo escorted Plaintiff back to Alvarez and 

“commented” that Plaintiff was “suing CDCR.” Id. at 6–7. Plaintiff contends that Alvarez 

stated, “[H]ere at Donovan we don’t care if you sue us,” and that Bravo “emphasized that 

his sexual and retaliatory harassment was because of [Plaintiff’s] lawsuits” and “voiced a 

credible threat[:] ‘You better quit or else it’s going to get real bad for you.’” Id. at 7. On 

the next day, Plaintiff claims Bravo again threatened that it Plaintiff didn’t “quit 

voluntarily,” he would “write [Plaintiff] up a ‘115’ violation to get [him] fired.” Id. at 7.

Two days later, on July 27, 2017, Plaintiff claims Bravo “made his promise true,” 

and issued a “false” CDC 115 Rule Violation Report charging Plaintiff with 

“overfamiliarity” and “fired Plaintiff from [his] job.” Id. While Plaintiff was later found 

not guilty of the disciplinary offense, he claims Bravo denied him access to his job, and 

“commented that [he] would not get [it] back due to [the] submi[ssion of]a 602 staff 

complaint.” Id. at 7–8. Plaintiff claims he was eventually allowed back to work on 

October 17, 2017, after which Warden Paramo “authored a letter” finding Plaintiff’s claims 

of retaliation on Bravo’s part “unfounded.” Id. at 8.

Several months later, on February 6, 2018, Plaintiff claims that Bravo again 

“falsified [and] altered a[n] incident report alleging Plaintiff [had] threatened to kill a subcontractor-supervisor.” Id. Plaintiff was “illegally placed in Ad-Seg” due to “false Rule 

Violation [Report] (“RVR”) Log No. RJD-CEN-18-02-0072.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff contends 

Bravo again commented, “That’s what happens when you file lawsuits,” and that Bravo 

“pressured” Defendant Hall to “write fictitious and false reports to have [him] removed 

from his job assignment in retaliation for [Plaintiff’s] filing [a] sexual misconduct staff 

complaint and lawsuits.” Id. at 9, 11.

Plaintiff contends that as a result of this second “false” RVR, he was retained in AdSeg “past [his] earliest release date,” and “stripped of his privileges [and] credits” as the 

result of a “kangaroo hearing” during which Defendants Villafuerte, Bracamonte, Paramo, 

Case 3:18-cv-02313-JLS-MSB Document 5 Filed 01/07/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 10
6

3:18-CV-02313 JLS (MSB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Covello, Juarez, and Vogel also violated his rights to due process in retaliation for his 

having exercised his First Amendment rights. Id. at 9–10, 11–12, 14, 15–16. 

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 

1035–36 (9th Cir. 2015).

D. Respondeat Superior

In addition to the RJD officials named as Defendants, Plaintiff also names the former 

Secretary of the CDCR, Scott Kernan, as a party to this case. See Compl. at 1, 3. Plaintiff’s 

only allegation as to Kernan, however, is that he is “responsible for the management of all 

California Correctional State Prisons,” and that he “tolerates abuse” which “create[s] a 

corrupt culture,” “the code of silence[,] and green wall.” Id. at 3, 12–13. 

“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead 

that each government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has 

violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); see also Jones v. 

Community Redev. Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even 

pro se plaintiff must “allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which 

defendants engaged in” in order to state a claim). Thus, in order to avoid the respondeat 

superior bar, Plaintiff must include sufficient “factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678, including personal acts by each individual defendant that show a direct, causal 

connection to a violation of specific constitutional rights. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 

1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) (supervisor 

may be held liable under Section 1983 only if there is “a sufficient causal connection 

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation”) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted).

Case 3:18-cv-02313-JLS-MSB Document 5 Filed 01/07/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 10
7

3:18-CV-02313 JLS (MSB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff’s Complaint sets forth no facts which might be liberally construed to 

support any individualized constitutional claim against Secretary Kernan or establish any 

causal connection between Kernan and the RJD officials who are alleged to have personally 

used excessive force and/or retaliated against Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court finds sua 

sponte dismissal of Defendant Kernan is required pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1915(e)(2) 

and 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

E. Excessive Force and Retaliation

As to Plaintiff’s excessive force and retaliation allegations against the remaining 

RJD Defendants, the Court finds his Complaint contains plausible claims sufficient to 

survive the “low threshold” set for sua sponte screening as required by 28 U.S.C. 

sections 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain 

violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment); Wilkins v. 

Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam) (for claims arising out of the use of excessive 

physical force, the issue is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or 

restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm”) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. 

at 7); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Within the prison 

context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An 

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of 

(3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise 

of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.”).

Therefore, the Court will order the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon all the 

remaining RJD Defendants on Plaintiff’s behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers 

of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal 

or deputy marshal . . . if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 

/ / /

Case 3:18-cv-02313-JLS-MSB Document 5 Filed 01/07/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 10
8

3:18-CV-02313 JLS (MSB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S.C. § 1915.”).2

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

section 1915(a) (ECF No. 2);

2. ORDERS the Acting Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $29.73 initial filing fee assessed, if those funds are available 

at the time this Order is executed, and to forward whatever balance remains of the full $350 

owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in Plaintiff’s account 

exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE 

CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS 

ACTION;

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Ralph Diaz, 

Acting Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001;

4. DISMISSES Defendant Scott Kernan and DIRECTS the Clerk to terminate 

him as a party to this matter based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against him pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. sections 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1);

5. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 

1) upon the remaining Defendants, and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. 

Marshal Form 285 for each of them. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a 

certified copy of this Order, a certified copy of his Complaint (ECF No. 1), and the 

summons so that he may serve the remaining Defendants. Upon receipt of this “IFP 

Package,” Plaintiff must complete the USM Form 285 as completely and accurately as 

 

2 Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, and not a 

substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant] may choose to bring.” Teahan v. 

Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007). 

Case 3:18-cv-02313-JLS-MSB Document 5 Filed 01/07/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 10
9

3:18-CV-02313 JLS (MSB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

possible, include an address where each Defendant may be found and/or subject to service

pursuant to S.D. Cal. Civ.L.R. 4.1c., and return them to the United States Marshal 

according to the instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying his IFP package;

6. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint (ECF No. 1) and 

summons upon the Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s provided to 

him. All costs of that service will be advanced by the United States, see 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3);

7. ORDERS Defendants, once they have been served, to reply to Plaintiff’s 

Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(a), see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be 

permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any 

jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has conducted 

its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) and has 

made a preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has 

a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” Defendants are required to respond); 

and

8. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 

serve upon Defendants, or if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendants’

counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the 

Court’s consideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b). Plaintiff must 

include with every original document he seeks to file with the Clerk a certificate stating 

the manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been was served on 

Defendants or their counsel and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. Civ.L.R. 5.2. Any

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:18-cv-02313-JLS-MSB Document 5 Filed 01/07/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 10
10

3:18-CV-02313 JLS (MSB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

document received by the Court that has not been properly filed with the Clerk or that fails 

to include a Certificate of Service upon the Defendants or their counsel may be disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 7, 2019

Case 3:18-cv-02313-JLS-MSB Document 5 Filed 01/07/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of 10