Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00563/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00563-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Clifton Jerome Epps, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

R. Sullivan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-0563-PHX-DGC (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Clifton Jerome Epps filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging his 

convictions and sentences for transportation and possession of marijuana and drug 

paraphernalia. His Petition alleges that his proceedings were impermissibly delayed 

before and after his indictment, his indictment was improperly amended, his jury panel 

was not drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, and the trial court should have 

granted his motion for acquittal for insufficient evidence. As explained below, the Court 

recommends that Epps’ Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND

 In May 2009, police responded to the scene of a traffic accident after Epps’ 

commercial long-haul truck had tipped over onto its side. (Doc. 11, Ex. A, ¶ 2) The 

officers “smelled an overwhelming odor of fresh marijuana emanating from the truck’s 

cab. A short time later, two boxes and three duffle bags containing a total of eighty-three 

pounds of marijuana were discovered nearby the truck. In addition to the boxes and 

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duffle bags, officers discovered a personal toiletry bag belonging to Epps that contained a 

personal-use amount of marijuana.” (Id.) 

 In April 2011, Epps was indicted in Gila County Superior Court for one count 

each of transportation of marijuana for sale, possession of marijuana, and possession of 

the baggie containing the personal-use amount of marijuana. (Doc. 11, Ex. A, ¶ 3) In 

August 2012, at the conclusion of a four day trial, a jury found Epps guilty of all three 

counts. (Id.) The Superior Court sentenced Epps to presumptive, concurrent prison 

terms, the longest of which was five years. (Id.) 

 Epps’ motion to proceed pro per was granted and he timely appealed. (Doc. 11, 

Exs. G, H, I, L) In his appeal, Epps argued that his proceedings were impermissibly 

delayed before and after his indictment, his indictment was improperly amended, African 

Americans were improperly excluded from his jury pool, and his Rule 20 motion for 

acquittal was supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 11, Ex. L at viii-ix) On February 

19, 2014, at the conclusion of briefing, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Epps’ 

convictions and sentences. (Doc. 11, Ex. A) Epps did not move for reconsideration and 

he did not petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review. (Doc. 11, Ex. O) 

 On March 19, 2014, Epps filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this 

Court. (Doc. 1) His Petition argues that his proceedings were impermissibly delayed 

before and after his indictment, his indictment was improperly amended, African 

Americans were improperly excluded from his jury pool, and his Rule 20 motion for 

acquittal was supported by substantial evidence. (Id.) Respondents argue that his 

Petition includes some unexhausted arguments and that he is not entitled to relief under 

his exhausted arguments. (Doc. 11) Epps replied that his arguments were, in fact, all 

exhausted and that he is entitled to relief on the merits. (Doc. 12) 

Legal Standard of Review

 On habeas review of a timely petition with exhausted arguments, this Court can 

only grant relief if the petitioner has demonstrated prejudice from the adjudication of a 

claim that either “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

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unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(d). Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970, n.16 

(9th Cir. 2004); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000). This review is 

further limited because “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine 

state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-

68 (1991). Accordingly, “alleged errors in the application of state law are not cognizable 

in federal habeas corpus.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Epps’ Habeas Claims 

 Pre-Indictment Delay. Epps argues that his due process rights were violated by 

the two year gap between the accident and his indictment. (Doc. 1 at 7) As Respondents 

acknowledge, he raised this same argument to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 1, 

Ex. A, ¶¶ 5-9; Doc. 11 at 12-14) 

 In reviewing his pre-indictment argument, the Court of Appeals relied on the 

precedent set by State v. Lacy, 929 P.2d 1288, 1293-94 (Ariz. 1996). (Id.) In Lacy, the 

Arizona Supreme Court analyzed a similar argument about excessive pre-indictment 

delay, relied on federal and state case law that analyzed pre-indictment delay under the 

due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution, and concluded that a successful due process claim “must show that the 

prosecution intentionally slowed proceedings to gain a tactical advantage or to harass the 

defendant, and that actual prejudice resulted.” Lacy, 929 P.2d at 1294 (citing United 

States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977) and State v. Broughton, 752 P.2d 483, 486 

(1988)). Thus, for purposes of Section 2254(d), the Arizona Court of Appeals reviewed 

the merits of Epps’ federal claim. As a result, this Court can reach the merits of Epps’ 

pre-indictment argument to see if the decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals “was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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 Clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court 

and as applied by the Arizona Supreme Court has created a two-pronged test that required 

Epps to show both tactical delay and actual prejudice. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 795-96; 

Lacy, 929 P.2d at 1294. The Court of Appeals evaluated Epps’ arguments under both 

prongs. (Doc. 11, Ex. A, ¶¶ 6-8) The Court of Appeals first found that Epps had failed 

to prove any tactical delay when he repeatedly acknowledged that there was “no reason” 

and “no explanation” for the delay. (Id. at ¶ 6) Next, the Court of Appeals found that 

Epps had not demonstrated actual prejudice. Although he alleged that witness’ memories 

had faded, he never specified which witnesses and never explained how their memory 

loss would be prejudicial. He also claims that fingerprint evidence had not been 

preserved but he never explained how this was impacted by pre-indictment delay. 

Finally, he alleged that the police had misplaced driving log books after the accident but 

he never demonstrated how he was prejudiced by their absence. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8) The 

Court of Appeals concluded that Epps had failed to meet his burden under either prong of 

the applicable test and, thus, he did not meet his burden of showing a violation of his due 

process rights. (Id.) This Court cannot say that the Court of Appeals’ conclusion was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law. 

Accordingly, Epps is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

 Post-Indictment Relief. Epps argues that the 16 month gap between his indictment 

and trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. (Doc. 1 at 7) As 

Respondents acknowledge, he raised this argument to the Arizona Court of Appeals 

which relied on clearly established federal law to deny his claim. (Doc. 1, Ex. A, ¶¶ 10-

12) 

 The United States Supreme Court has established a four part test for analyzing a 

speedy trial claim: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) 

defendant’s assertion of the speedy trial right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker 

v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-531 (1972). This inquiry is triggered when, as here, the 

delay is over one year. Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 652, n.1 (1992). 

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 The Court of Appeals applied this four part test, reviewed the record and 

determined that most of the delays in this case could be attributed to “Epps’ actions and 

requests, including the substitution of counsel about one month prior to the original trial 

date.” (Doc. 11, Ex. A, ¶ 12) The Court of Appeals further found that Epps did not 

assert his speedy trial rights and that he was not prejudiced by any delay. (Id.) Because 

Epps did not meet the Supreme Court’s four part test, the Court of Appeals found no 

violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. (Id.) Because this Court cannot 

say that that conclusion was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, Epps is not entitled to habeas relief on his claim of postindictment delay. 

 Amended Indictment. At the start of his trial, without returning to the Grand Jury, 

the State amended the possession of marijuana charge in his indictment to remove the 

accomplice element. (Doc. 11, Ex. A, ¶ 14) Epps argues, as he did on direct appeal, that 

his due process rights were violated when the amended indictment was not presented to a 

Grand Jury. (Doc. 1 at 9-10) The Court of Appeals reviewed his claim, raised for the 

first time on appeal, under state law for fundamental, prejudicial error and found none. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. A, ¶ 15) This Court cannot review this claim because “alleged errors in the 

application of state law are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.” Langford, 110 F.3d 

at 1389. Moreover, “[s]ubmitting a new claim to the [Arizona Court of Appeals] in a 

procedural context in which its merits will not be considered absent special circumstances 

does not constitute fair presentation” and so this claim is procedurally barred from 

consideration. Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Castille v. 

Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)).

 Fair Cross-Section Claim. Epps argues that African Americans were improperly 

excluded from the venire panel because Gila County uses a system that is not based on 

random selection. (Doc. 1 at 11) Epps raised this issue at trial and on direct appeal. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. A, ¶ 21; Ex. B at 150) 

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 To establish a prima facie Sixth Amendment claim that the jury pool was not a fair 

cross-section of the community, the United States Supreme Court required Epps to “show 

(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) 

that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair 

and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that 

this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection 

process.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). The Arizona Court of Appeals 

analyzed his claim under this test and concluded that “Epps offered no evidence on any 

of these factors.”1

 (Doc. 11, Ex. A, ¶ 21) Again, this Court cannot say that that 

conclusion was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, and so Epps is not entitled to habeas relief on his jury selection 

claim. 

 Rule 20 Motion. Epps argues, as he did on appeal, that the Superior Court should 

have granted his motion for acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20 

because the State did not provide sufficient evidence for his conviction thereby violating 

his Fifth Amendment due process rights.2

 In other words, it appears that there are two 

parts to this argument: (1) the Superior Court should have granted his Rule 20 motion 

and (2) because his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence, his due process 

rights have been violated. 

 The Court of Appeals analyzed the first part of his claim – whether the Superior 

Court should have granted his Rule 20 motion – by looking to state law and found that 

substantial evidence supported Epps’ convictions. (Doc. 11, Ex. A, ¶¶ 22-25) Any 

“alleged errors in the application of state law are not cognizable in federal habeas 

 

1

 The trial court addressed the second Duren factor and opined that the venire pool appeared to represent the local community. (Doc. 11, Ex. B at 150-151) 

2

 In his habeas petition, as in his brief to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Epps argues this the failure to grant the Rule 20 motion amounts to a Fifth Amendment 

violation. (Doc. 1 at 13-14; Doc. 11, Ex. L at ix) Respondents argue that this Fifth Amendment claim is a new, untimely argument and do not address the merits of Epps’ Rule 20 argument. (Doc. 11 at 4, 7) Because this is a question of state law, additional 

briefing by Respondents is not necessary. 

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corpus.” Langford, 110 F.3d at 1389. Accordingly, this Court will not review this 

portion of Epps’ claim. 

 The Court of Appeals did not address the second, federal aspect of Epps’ 

insufficient evidence claim. (Doc. 11, Ex. A, ¶¶ 22-25) In these circumstances, this 

Court “must presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits.” Johnson v. 

Williams, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013). Although this presumption can be rebutted, Epps 

has not done so. Id. This means that this Court will review this claim to determine if the 

implied denial of Epps’ due process argument violated either part of Section 2254(d). Id. 

at 1097-98. 

 Deferring to the facts as described by the Court of Appeals, this Court cannot say 

that Epps’ convictions were not supported by substantial evidence. Sumner v. Mata, 449 

U.S. 539, 546–47 (1981); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 763, n.1 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The evidence established that, as they were investigating the accident 

scene, multiple officers noticed a strong odor of fresh marijuana emanating 

from the cab of the semi-trailer. A passenger in a vehicle immediately 

behind the semi-trailer who had witnessed the accident testified that she 

saw Dominique removing items from the cab and officers eventually 

located three duffle bags and two boxes containing marijuana, weighing 

approximately eighty-three pounds altogether. In addition, a toiletry bag 

was found containing a medical card and a lab report for Clifton Epps. 

Inside this toiletry bag was a ‘personal use bag’ of marijuana. Furthermore, 

one of the EMTs who provided Epps with medical care smelled an odor of 

marijuana smoke emanating from Epps’s person. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. A, ¶ 24) As the Court of Appeals noted, this evidence is substantial: 

Based on the evidence presented, reasonable persons could conclude that 

the baggie of personal use marijuana found in the toiletry bag belonged to 

Epps. In addition, the jury could reasonably conclude Epps and Dominique 

were transporting the large amount marijuana discovered on the other side 

of a barrier immediately adjacent to their truck, given that Dominique was 

seen removing items from the cab and that the cab had a very strong odor 

of marijuana. Accordingly, substantial evidence was presented at trial to 

sustain Epps’s convictions.

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(Id. at ¶ 25) Because substantial evidence supported Epps’ convictions, his due process 

rights have not been violated and so he is not entitled to habeas relief.

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Clifton Jerome Epps’ petition for 

writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling 

debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 12th day of June, 2015. 

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