Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-05215/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-05215-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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28 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 1

Case No. C 05-5215 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

**E-Filed 7/17/2007**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ERNEST A. FLORES,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,

 Defendant.

Case Number C 05-5215 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 1

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[re. docket no. 48]

This action arises from alleged discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and

age suffered by Plaintiff Ernest Flores while employed by the Department of Homeland Security

(“DHS”) and its predecessor agencies since 1987. Defendant Michael Chertoff, Secretary of

DHS (“the Secretary”), moves for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, the

motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 16, 2000, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the initial complaint in Flores

v. Ashcroft, Case No. C 00-21168 JF (“Flores I”). Cormier Decl. Ex. 1. Plaintiff alleged that the

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 The Secretary requests that the Court take judicial notice of the order granting summary 2

judgment in Flores I. That request will be granted.

 Plaintiff states that he filed this complaint in August 2002. However, it appears that 3

while Plaintiff’s first contact with the EEO regarding the complaint occurred in August, it

actually was filed in September.

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Case No. C 05-5215 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

Immigration and Naturalization Service had failed to promote him on four separate occasions

because of his race and national origin, in retaliation for his prior EEO activity, or both. This

complaint was based upon allegations made by Plaintiff in EEO complaints filed in 1995, 1996,

1998, and 2000. On September 17, 2001, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of

Defendant, on the ground that Plaintiff’s claims were time-barred because the complaint was

filed more than ninety days after receipt of notice of final action by the agency.2

On September 23, 2002, Plaintiff filed EEO complaint number I-03-W043 (“the 2002

EEO Complaint”). Cormier Decl. Ex. 11. In that complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he had “been

3

denied the opportunity to promote into the positions of Immigration Agent or Special Agent

because of the Hiring Officials [sic] exclusive use of the TAPS test as a basis to hire into these

positions.” Id. Plaintiff also alleged that “the hiring Officials [sic] act of exclusively utilizing

the TAPS test has created a disparate impact towards me. Furthermore, the Upward Mobility

Test mirrors the TAPS test, which is also a contributory factor of adverse impact.” Id. Plaintiff

did not describe any acts of reprisal in the written portion of his complaint, but indicated on the

front of his complaint that he also wished to complain of reprisal. Id. On February 19, 2004, the

EEOC issued a decision without a hearing denying Plaintiff’s complaint. Flores Decl. Ex. 30. 

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Flores could not establish a prima facie case of

discrimination because his age disqualified him from the position that he sought, that too much

time had elapsed between the matters about which Plaintiff complained and his earlier EEO

activity for there to be a viable retaliation claim, and that the agency had provided nondiscriminatory and legally sufficient reasons for its actions that Plaintiff did not rebut or discredit

by a showing of pretext. Id. On September 20, 2005, the Secretary issued a final decision

denying the 2002 EEO Complaint. Flores Decl. Ex. 24. 

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 Plaintiff filed a timely opposition on May 18, 2007, and a corrected version on May 29, 4

2007, that incorporated a few minor edits. The Court has considered the corrected version in

resolving this motion.

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Case No. C 05-5215 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

On June 29, 2005, Plaintiff filed EEO complaint number ICE-05-W300 (“the 2005 EEO

Complaint”). West Decl. Ex. A. Plaintiff alleged race and national origin discrimination, age

discrimination, and retaliation. Plaintiff claimed that he was denied training from January 2004

to May 2005, and that on or about May 17, 2005, he was denied equal consideration with other

applicants, denied an interview, and denied promotion to the position of Entry Level GS-1811

Special Agent. Id. Plaintiff also claimed that he was “exempt from the age restriction and . . .

eligible to compete and have reinstatement rights for open 6c Covered Law Enforcement

positions.” Id. On December 16, 2005, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the initial complaint in

the instant action, Flores v. Chertoff, Case No. C 05-5215 JF (Flores II). On July 11, 2006, the

Secretary issued a final decision denying Plaintiff’s EEO complaint, concluding that the factual

allegations made in that complaint were the same as those made in the instant action. Flores

Decl. Ex. 33.

 On April 14, 2006, Plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint in this Court. 

That pleading names the Secretary as the sole defendant and asserts claims for: (1) employment

discrimination based on race and/or national origin (disparate impact); (2) employment

discrimination based on race and/or national original (disparate treatment); (3) retaliation; and (4)

employment discrimination based on age. On May 25, 2006, the Secretary answered the

complaint. On April 27, 2007, the Secretary moved for summary judgment on the grounds that

res judicata bars a portion of Plaintiff’s claims, that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust other portions

of his claims, and that Plaintiff cannot prove that the actions taken were motivated by

discrimination or retaliation. On May 9, 2007, Plaintiff moved to vacate the hearing date in light

of the pendency of his previously-filed motion to compel discovery. On May 15, 2007, the Court

denied that motion and set a briefing schedule for the opposition and reply, with which the

parties complied. The Court stated that it would not rule on the instant motion until the 4

discovery motion had been resolved by Magistrate Judge Trumbull. Plaintiff failed to appear at

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

the hearing on June 1, 2007. On June 20, 2007, the Secretary filed a letter confirming the

agreements among the parties as to how to resolve the motion to compel. In light of that

resolution of the discovery motion and because the discovery anticipated in that letter will not

affect the Court’s resolution of the instant motion, the Court concludes that it now should rule on

the instant motion. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

1. Claim Preclusion

Under the doctrine of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, a valid final judgment

on the merits of an action bars the parties or their privies from later asserting claims that were or

could have been raised in the earlier action. Riven v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470,

476 (1998). The phrase “were or could have been raised” refers to “legal theories arising out of

the same transactional nucleus of facts, rather than to distinct causes of action.” Hells Canyon

Preservation Council v. United States Forest Service, 403 F.3d 683, 686 n.2 (2005). The Ninth

Circuit has made clear that the doctrine does not go so far as to bar any claims that could have

been joined in the original action, but only those claims arising out of the same facts that were

litigated in the original action. Id.

2. Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party bears

the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for the motion and identifying the portions

of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that

demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A genuine issue for trial exists if the non-moving party

presents evidence from which a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to that party, could resolve the material issue in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 248-

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 The Secretary describes TAPS/LEOC as follows: TAPS stands for “Telephone 5

Application Processing System” and LEOC stands for “Law Enforcement Officer Corps.” TAPS

is a method by which to start an application. LEOC is a test that comprises part of the

application process. Motion 4.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

49; Barlow v. Ground, 943 F. 2d 1132, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 1991). 

III. DISCUSSION

1. Reassertion of Allegations Included in Prior Action

The Secretary argues that the doctrine of res judicata bars the relitigation of claims that

were included or should have been included in the prior action brought by Plaintiff in this Court. 

Plaintiff effectively concedes that Flores I has preclusive effect with respect to events occurring

between 1995 to 2000. See Opposition 13. The Court concludes that Flores I has such

preclusive effect. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning

Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that dismissal on statute of limitations

grounds is a judgment on the merits). Accordingly, the Secretary is entitled to summary

judgment to the extent that racial and national origin discrimination or retaliation claims in

Flores II are based upon events occurring between 1995 to 2000 that are part of the same nucleus

of facts as those at issue in Flores I.

2. Allegations of Continued Use of the TAPS/LEOC Test

The Secretary argues that the doctrine of res judicata also bars allegations of continued

racial or national origin discrimination or retaliation on the basis of continued use of the

TAPS/LEOC test. Where a plaintiff is “essentially seeking relief from the same alleged wrongs 5

it unsuccessfully protested before,” res judicata applies. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 322

F.3d at 1078. Plaintiff appears to argue that the instant action is different from Flores I in that

this action alleges that “Defendant mainly utilized only the TAPS when it had other less

discriminatory alternative hiring authorities under the Leuvano Consent Decree available, and

that when Defendant did selectively use other methods under the Consent Decree, specifically the

Bilingual-Bicultural (BLBC) authority, Defendant used the BLBC to hire only Caucasians [sic]

males.” Opposition 9 (emphases in original). This distinction is insufficient to avoid the

preclusive effect of Flores I, as, fundamentally, Plaintiff complains of the same allegedly

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 This case involved the predecessor regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(1)(i), which 6

required contact with an EEOC counselor thirty days of the alleged discrimination. On October

1, 1992, the regulation was renumbered as 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 and amended to allow initiation

of contact with the EEOC within forty-five days.

29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(2) also provides: “The agency or the Commission shall extend

the 45-day time limit in paragraph (a)(1) of this section when the individual shows that he or she

was not notified of the time limits and was not otherwise aware of them, that he or she did not

know and reasonably should not have been known that the discriminatory matter or personnel

action occurred, that despite due diligence he or she was prevented by circumstances beyond his

or her control from contacting the counselor within the time limits, or for other reasons

considered sufficient by the agency or the Commission.” Plaintiff does not argue that he made

such a showing to the relevant agency or the EEOC. Nor does Plaintiff argue that the forty-five

day period should be tolled or otherwise extended. See Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1105

(9th Cir. 2002) (holding forty-five day deadline constitutes an administrative requirement that,

like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling).

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Case No. C 05-5215 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

discriminatory policy as he did in Flores I. Even if he did not allege exactly the same

misconduct in Flores I, Plaintiff does not explain why he could not have brought comparable

claims in that action. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the first and second claims for racial

and national origin discrimination are barred by the doctrine of res judicata to the extent that they

are premised upon the use of TAPS/LEOC.

3. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies by filing a timely charge

with the EEOC, or the appropriate state agency, thereby affording the agency an opportunity to

investigate the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). “The jurisdictional scope of a Title VII

claimant’s court action depends upon the scope of both the EEOC charge and the EEOC

investigation.” Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir.1990); see generally B.K.B. v.

Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing exhaustion requirement for

district court subject matter jurisdiction over Title VII claims). An individual who believes that

he or she has been subjected to actionable discrimination must initiate contact with an EEOC

counselor within forty-five days of the alleged discriminatory actions. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105. 

Failure to contact an EEOC counselor within the forty-five day period bars suit in federal court. 

Girard v. Rubin, 62 F.3d 1244, 1246 (9th Cir. 1995). When 6

a plaintiff pursues several disparate treatment claims, based on discrete

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 A hostile work environment claim will not be time barred so long as all acts which 7

constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice and at least one act falls

within the time period. Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1105-06 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. 101). 

 The date of first contact with an EEO counselor regarding each complaint was August

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22, 2002 and May 6, 2005, respectively.

 The alleged denial of promotion and retaliatory conduct occurred after the initial 9

contact by Flores with the EEOC regarding the 2005 EEO Complaint, but before that complaint

was filed.

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Case No. C 05-5215 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

discriminatory acts, the limitations period will begin to run for each individual

claim from the date on which the underlying act occurs. If a plaintiff chooses to

bring separate claims based on each discriminatory act, his assertion that this

series of discrete acts flows from a company-wide, or systematic, discriminatory

practice will not succeed in establishing the employer’s liability for acts occurring

outside the limitations period because the Supreme Court has determined that

each incident of discrimination constitutes a separate actionable unlawful

employment practice. 

Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). The instant action involves discrete incidents of alleged 7

discrimination; Plaintiff does not allege a hostile work environment. Accordingly, Plaintiff may

assert only claims arising from conduct that occurred within forty-five days of the first contact

with an EEOC counselor regarding the 2002 EEO Complaint and the 2005 EEO Complaint.

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Plaintiff does not identify such conduct in opposition to the motion, but it appears that it is

limited to the denial of training and a special agent position in May 2005 because of alleged

retaliation, age discrimination, and race and national origin discrimination; and the allegedly

retaliatory placement of EEO handouts outside Plaintiff’s door by Supervisory Special Agent

Francisco E. Fernandez (“Fernandez”) in May 2005, see Flores Decl. ¶¶ 7-10, 81. The Court has 9

reviewed the record closely and can identify no specific conduct in the relevant period of 2002

that falls outside of the preclusive effect of Flores I with respect to the TAPS/LEOC test. It

appears that Plaintiff may have filed a more recent complaint with the EEOC, but he has not

exhausted his administrative remedies as to that EEO complaint.

4. Denial of Promotion and Denial of Training 

Plaintiff alleges that Acting Assistant Special Agent in Charge for the San Jose office of

DHS, George Escobar (“Escobar”), denied him a Personal Identification Number (“PIN”) for the

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 Flores also fails to point to evidence supporting his belief that he was eligible for re- 10

entry within the meaning of that term under the grandfather clause of the relevant policy. See

Flores Decl. Ex. 4; see also Flores Decl. Ex. 25 (Fernandez affidavit, dated, May 23, 2003, in

which Fernandez states that Plaintiff was selected for an agent position twice and that in 1995 or

1996, he failed the required qualification course, and that in 1999, he refused to go to the

Academy), Flores Decl. Ex. 26 (affidavit of Mark Riordan, stating that Plaintiff “was never

actually placed in the Agent position because he could not pass the course, and he remained in

his position as Investigative Assistant”).

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Case No. C 05-5215 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

ongoing Entry Level Special Agent (GS-1811) recruitment for the Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) Office of Investigations. Escobar states that he did not give a PIN to

Plaintiff because he had a limited number and Plaintiff appeared to be beyond the maximum age

for applying to such a position. Escobar Decl. ¶¶ 4-13. This is a valid business justification for

denial of the PIN. Even assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiff has established a prima facie

case of discrimination, in light of this valid business justification, Plaintiff must identify

substantial evidence that the given reason is “a pretext for another motive which is

discriminatory.” Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff must

“tender a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext in order to avoid summary judgment.” Id. at

890. Plaintiff has not done so. Instead, he offers his personal speculation as to an underlying

motive for Escobar’s actions.

Plaintiff also alleges that unnamed officials knew that he was eligible for re-entry into the

GS-1801 Immigration Enforcement Law Enforcement Position, but that they chose not to inform

him because of retaliatory and discriminatory motives. Flores Decl. ¶ 7. However, Plaintiff 10

supports this allegation with no evidence of discrimination relevant to the period for which he

has exhausted his administrative remedies nor explains why such a claim could not have been

brought in Flores I. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Escobar and Fernandez have denied him training opportunities

because of his race, national origin, age, or prior EEO activity. However, Fernandez has stated

that he denied Plaintiff training that did not relate to his job duties and that he never denied

training to Plaintiff for discriminatory reasons. Fernandez Decl. ¶¶ 4-6. Escobar states that he

does not recall ever denying training to Plaintiff. Escobar Decl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff offers no

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

evidence that contradicts these declarations or that supports a finding of pretext. 

Accordingly, the Secretary is entitled to summary judgment to the extent that Plaintiff’s

claims are based upon alleged discrimination in the denial of promotion or training.

5. Retaliation Claim

To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, Plaintiff must show: (1) he engaged in

protected activity; (2) the employer subjected him to an adverse employment action; and (3) a

causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Ray v. Henderson, 217

F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff offers no evidence of a causal link between the

protected activity and the adverse action at issue in this case: the placing of EEO fliers outside

his office. Nor does Plaintiff identify any evidence of retaliatory intent on the part of Fernandez. 

Instead, the record reflects the fact that Fernandez also had prior EEO activity and that Plaintiff

believed that Fernandez did not have retaliatory intent. See Fernandez Decl. ¶ 2; Flores Decl. Ex.

34. Accordingly, the Secretary is entitled to summary judgment as to the retaliation claim.

6. Age Discrimination Claim

Plaintiff alleges that he suffered unlawful discrimination when he was denied certain law

enforcement positions because of his age. Because by regulation holders of such lawenforcement positions must retire at the age of fifty-seven, and because such personnel must

remain in a covered position for twenty years in order to gain retirement benefits, the age cut-off

for such positions is thirty-seven. This is a valid business reason for the age-based limitation. 

As with his other claims, Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of identifying specific evidence

showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial; he provides no explanation why the

regulation in question is illegal and conceded at deposition that it is not. Flores Deposition 66. 

Plaintiff fails to identify any evidence that the policy was applied in a discriminatory fashion

against him as opposed to other applicants. Accordingly, the Secretary is entitled to summary

judgment as to the age discrimination claim.

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Secretary’s objections to evidence submitted by Plaintiff in opposition to the motion.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefor appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED.11

DATED: 7/17/07

__________________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 05-5215 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFLC1)

Copies of Order served on:

Claire T. Cormier claire.cormier@usdoj.gov

Ernest A. Flores

Post Office Box 6715

San Jose, CA 95150

Case 5:05-cv-05215-JF Document 75 Filed 07/17/07 Page 11 of 11