Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01440/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01440-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

STACIA TATUM, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

TERESA SCHWARTZ, JONATHAN ZEH, 

and LANCE JENSEN, 

Defendants. /

No. Civ. S-06-01440 DFL EFB 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Stacia Tatum, a former secretary with the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“the CDCR”), 

brings this § 1983 action for sexual harassment, retaliation and 

disability discrimination against the CDCR and CDCR employees 

Jonathan Zeh, Lance Jensen and Teresa Schwartz. Defendants now 

move to dismiss. The motion will be GRANTED in part and DENIED 

in part. 

I. 

Tatum worked as an administrative assistant at the CDCR 

medical facility in Vacaville from February 1998 until June 10, 

2004. She alleges that her supervisors, Jensen and Zeh, 

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sexually harassed her by watching her inappropriately, making 

sexual advances, and forcing her to work in close proximity to 

an inmate convicted of rape. Tatum alleges that she complained 

to Schwartz, the warden, in June 2004, but that Schwartz refused 

to remedy the situation. The last day Tatum worked was June 10, 

2004, though she allegedly had a final meeting with Schwartz on 

June 30. 

Tatum alleges that she could not “function or think clearly 

for several months after she left work in June 2004.” On 

November 17, 2005, a workers’ compensation ALJ found that Tatum 

had been “temporarily totally disabled from June 10, 2004 to 

date and continuing.” 

Tatum alleges that “[a] year later” (in early 2006), her 

doctor told her that she could return to work as long as she was 

not supervised by Jensen or Zeh. She did not return, however, 

because the CDCR allegedly told her she would be placed in a 

lower-paying position and refused to guarantee that she would 

not be supervised by Jensen or Zeh. 

Tatum filed this lawsuit on June 27, 2006. She filed a 

first amended complaint (“FAC”) on September 1. Defendants 

filed this motion to dismiss on October 10. 

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II. 

Defendants argue that Tatum’s first two claims, for 

harassment and retaliation, are time barred. The statute of 

limitations for § 1983 claims is determined by the forum state’s 

statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Wilson v. 

Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985). In California, this is two 

years. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1. Tatum’s § 1983 claims 

arise primarily, if not entirely, from events that took place on 

or before June 10, 2004, her last day of work. She filed this 

lawsuit more than two years later, on June 26, 2006. 

Tatum argues that her claims are not time barred because: 

(1) equitable tolling applies because the alleged harassment 

left her mentally disabled and unable to discern when she needed 

to bring her claims, and (2) the continuing violations doctrine 

also applies because defendants continued to violate her rights 

at least until June 30, 2004. 

California equitable tolling doctrine applies to this § 

1983 action. See Donoghue v. Orange County, 848 F.2d 926, 930 

(9th Cir. 1987). In California, a statute of limitations is 

equitably tolled if the plaintiff was “insane” when the claim 

accrued. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 352. A person is insane 

under the statute if “incapable of caring for his or her 

property or transacting business or understanding the nature of 

effects of his or her acts.” Feeley v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 234 

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Cal. App. 3d 949, 951-52 (1991) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Given Tatum’s allegations of severe 

mental disability, the possibility that her first and second 

claims are timely due to equitable tolling cannot now be 

decided. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (“[A] 

complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim 

unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 

set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 

relief.”).1 

Because the possibility that Tatum is entitled to equitable 

tolling precludes granting defendants’ motion to dismiss Tatum’s 

first two claims, it is not necessary to consider the continuing 

violations issue. 

III. 

Defendants also argue that Tatum has not alleged sufficient 

facts to state a claim for sexual harassment or retaliation. 

Their argument lacks merit. 

A complaint must set out “a short and plain statement of 

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “The Rule 8 standard contains a powerful 

presumption against rejecting pleadings for failure to state a 

 

1 Defendants may wish to focus their initial discovery 

efforts on matters relevant to the timeliness of Tatum’s claims. 

The court would entertain a motion for summary judgment based on 

timeliness before the close of discovery. 

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claim.” Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Tatum alleges that Jensen and Zeh made unwelcome sexual advances 

toward her for approximately two years. Specifically, she 

alleges that Zeh “would sneak into her office 30 to 40 times a 

day and stand behind her watching her.” She alleges that Jensen 

made inappropriate comments about her clothing and unwelcome 

sexual advances “suggesting that she and he needed ‘to spend 

more time together.’” She alleges that Zeh and Jensen forced 

her to work in close proximity to an inmate convicted of rape, 

and that they intimidated her when she complained. Tatum 

alleges that Schwartz failed to prevent the discrimination 

despite her complaints, and that Tatum’s sex was a motivating 

factor in Schwartz’s refusal to take action. Finally, she 

alleges that when she sought to return to work in 2006, the CDCR 

told her she would be assigned to a lower paying position and 

that she might be supervised by Jensen and Zeh. 

Tatum’s allegations are adequate because she has “allege[d] 

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which 

defendants engaged in that support [her] claim[s].” Jones v. 

Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).2 

 

2 Defendants place great weight on Jones, where the court 

affirmed the dismissal of a § 1983 race discrimination claim 

because it found the plaintiff’s allegations to be “conclusional 

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Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss Tatum’s first and 

second claims is DENIED. 

IV.

Defendants argue that Tatum’s third claim, which is against 

the CDCR for retaliation, should be dismissed because Tatum 

failed to timely serve CDCR with a summons and complaint. 

Tatum timely served the three individual defendants, but, 

apparently because she inadvertently omitted the CDCR from the 

FAC’s caption, failed to name the CDCR in the summons. Although 

the CDCR was not named in the summons or the caption of the FAC, 

service on the three individual defendants was effected through 

the CDCR. Also, the CDCR is named as a defendant in the body of 

the FAC. 

On October 20, 2006, after defendants had raised this issue 

in their motion to dismiss, Tatum sent the CDCR a proper summons 

via certified mail. But for some reason, though it had to 

travel only from Oakland to Sacramento, the summons did not 

arrive until October 27, which was 122 days after this case was 

 

and unsupported by any facts as to how race entered into any 

decision.” 733 F.2d at 649. But unlike the plaintiff in Jones, 

Tatum has pled facts indicating that Jensen and Zeh made 

unwelcome sexual advances, which is evidence of discrimination 

based on membership in a protected class. Also, Jones predates 

the Supreme Court’s decision in Leatherman v. Tarrant County 

Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993), 

in which the Court re-emphasized that notice pleading applies to 

section 1983 claims. 

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filed. Thus, it arrived two days beyond the period allowed 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 

Relying on Wei v. State of Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 

1985), defendants argue that the claim against the CDCR should 

be dismissed because Tatum has not shown good cause for her 

failure to timely serve the CDCR. Rule 4(m) requires dismissal 

if service is not timely effected, absent good cause for the 

failure shown by the plaintiff. 

In Wei, the court upheld dismissal of a complaint where the 

plaintiff had “made no attempt to serve any of the defendants 

within the 120 day period.” Id. at 371. The circumstances here 

are far less egregious. First, although technically not timely 

served, the CDCR undoubtedly was apprised of the action against 

it by the timely service of its employees. Second, there is no 

question that the CDCR was aware of the claims against it before 

the service period expired, because it filed a motion to dismiss 

the complaint during the service period. Third, Tatum’s failure 

to properly serve the CDCR appears to have been the result of a 

typographical error, not a total failure of diligence as in Wei. 

Fourth, Tatum made a reasonable attempt to serve CDCR in a 

timely manner by mailing service on October 20. It is 

reasonable to expect a letter mailed in Oakland to arrive in 

Sacramento within five days. Finally, Tatum was just two days 

late with proper service. For these reasons, the court finds 

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that Tatum has shown good cause for the delay and DENIES 

defendants’ motion to dismiss the third claim. 

V. 

Tatum’s fourth and final claim is against the CDCR for 

discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities 

Act (“the ADA”). Defendants point out that the Eleventh 

Amendment bars state employees from bringing ADA suits against 

their employers. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. 

Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372-74 (2001). Tatum tacitly concedes 

this claim by failing to address defendants’ argument in her 

opposition. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss the 

fourth claim is GRANTED. 

CONCLUSION 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss claims one, two and three is 

DENIED. Their motion to dismiss claim four is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 2/5/2007 

______________________________ 

DAVID F. LEVI 

United States District Judge

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