Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00512/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00512-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

These dates are the dates on which Anderson delivered the petition and amendment to prison officials

for mailing. The law is well settled that a pro se inmate’s petition is deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison

officials for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-272 (1988); Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339,

1340-41 (11th Cir. 1999); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11th Cir. 1993). In light of the foregoing and for

purposes of the proceedings herein, the court considers June 1, 2008 as the date Anderson filed his initial petition

and October 5, 2008 as the date he filed the amendment to the petition.

2

The indictment in this case charged “CURTIS L. ANDERSON, alias CURTIS LAMARIO ANDERSON,

whose name is otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, did, in the course of committing a theft of clothing, of some

value, ... use force against the person of the owner or any person present, ... with intent to overcome their physical

resistance or physical power of resistance, or threaten the imminent use of force against the person of the owner

or any person present ... with intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property, while

the said Curtis L. Anderson, alias was armed with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, a gun, a better

description of which is unknown to the Grand Jury, in violation of Section 13A-8-41 of the Code of Alabama.”

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CURTIS L. ANDERSON, #141707, )

)

 Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:06-CV-512-WHA

) [WO]

)

GWENDOLYN MOSLEY, et al., )

)

 Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This cause is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief

filed by Curtis L. Anderson [“Anderson”], a state inmate, on June 1, 2006 and amended on

October 5, 2008.1

 In this petition, as amended, Anderson challenges a conviction for first

degree robbery imposed upon him by the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama

on September 25, 2001.2

 On October 10, 2001, the trial court sentenced Anderson as a

Case 2:06-cv-00512-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 01/29/09 Page 1 of 17
Under Ala Code § 13A-8-41(a)(1), “[a] person commits the crime of robbery in the first degree if he violates

Section 13A-8-43 and he ... is armed with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument....” Section 13A-8-41(b) of

the Code further states that “[p]ossession then and there of an article used or fashioned in a manner to lead any

person who is present reasonably to believe it to be a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, or any verbal or

other representation by the defendant that he is then and there so armed, is prima facie evidence under subsection

(a) ... that he is so armed.” Robbery in the third degree is defined in Ala. Code § 13A-8-43(a) as follows:

“A person commits the crime of robbery in the third degree if in the course of committing a theft he:

(1) Uses force against the person of the owner or any person present with intent to overcome his

physical resistance or physical power of resistance; or 

 (2) Threatens the imminent use of force against the person of the owner or any person present

with intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property.”

3

The federal limitation period is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Congress added this section upon

adoption of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the “AEDPA”). The AEDPA became

effective on April 24, 1996. Regardless of the respondents’ assertion of a limitation defense, a federal “district

court may review sua sponte the timeliness of the section 2254 petition.” Jackson v. Secretary for the Department

of Corrections, 292 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2002). Such authority is afforded this court regardless of whether

the respondents simply failed to plead the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense or made a patently

erroneous concession of timeliness. Day v. Crosby, 391 F.3d 1192, 1194 (11th Cir. 2004), aff’d, Day v.

McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 126 S.Ct. 1675, 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006). 

2

habitual offender to life imprisonment. By operation of law, Anderson’s first degree

robbery conviction became final on May 7, 2002.

Pursuant to the orders of this court, the respondents filed a supplemental answer in

which they argue that Anderson’s federal habeas petition, as amended, is barred by the oneyear period of limitation applicable to petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents’

December 2, 2008 Supplemental Answer - Court Doc. No. 24 at 2.3

 The law directs that

because Anderson’s robbery conviction became final after the effective date of the federal

statute of limitations Anderson must have filed his § 2254 petition within a year of this

conviction’s becoming final, exclusive of the time that any properly filed state postconviction petition related to the conviction remained pending in the state courts. The

evidentiary materials filed in this case establish that Anderson filed a state post-conviction

Case 2:06-cv-00512-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 01/29/09 Page 2 of 17
4

Anderson certified before a notary public that he executed the Rule 32 petition on August 30, 2005.

Respondents’ Exhibit E at 12 - Rule 32 Petition at 10. Although the state court stamped this petition “filed” on

September 21, 2005, it is clear that Anderson submitted the petition to prison officials for mailing prior to the date

the state court received the petition. A pro se inmate’s petition is deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison

officials for mailing. Houston, 487 U.S. at 271-272. “Alabama courts have [adopted this rule and] held that a pro

se incarcerated petitioner/appellant is considered to have ‘filed’ a Rule 32 petition, a notice of appeal, or a petition

for a writ of certiorari when those documents are given to prison officials for mailing.” Ex parte Allen, 825 So.2d

271, 272 (Ala. 2002); Holland v. State, 621 So.2d 373, 375 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993) (“[A] pro se incarcerated

petitioner ‘files’ a Rule 32 petition when he hands the petition over to prison authorities for mailing.”).

Consequently, the prison “mailbox rule” applies to pro se Rule 32 petitions filed in the state courts of Alabama.

“Absent evidence to the contrary in the form of prison logs or other records, [this court] must assume that [the

Rule 32 petition] was delivered to prison authorities the day [Anderson] signed it.....” Washington v. United

States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). Thus, August 30, 2005 is the appropriate date of filing for

Anderson’s Rule 32 petition.

5

In its order denying Anderson’s Rule 32 petition, the trial court held “Rule 32.2(c) bars the Constitutional

claim in this petition because it was filed beyond the statute of limitations period. The sentence date was over 4

3

petition pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure on August 30,

2005.4

 However, this state post-conviction action did not toll the one-year period of

limitation because Anderson filed the petition after expiration of the federal limitation

period and, therefore, such action was not “pending” during the requisite time period as

required by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) to warrant tolling. Moore v. Crosby,

321 F.3d 1377, 1381 (11th Cir. 2003); Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333-1335 n.4 (11th

Cir. 2001); Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 991,

121 S.Ct. 481, 148 L.Ed.2d 454 (2000). Additionally, under well settled law, Anderson’s

Rule 32 petition was untimely under Alabama’s one-year period of limitation applicable

to Rule 32 petitions filed by petitioners whose convictions became final after July 31, 2001,

Rule 32.2(c), Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, and, therefore, the petition was not

properly filed for purposes of statutory tolling of the federal limitation period under 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)5

 Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 1814

Case 2:06-cv-00512-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 01/29/09 Page 3 of 17
years ago in this case. The petitioner failed to file his claim in the prescribed time.” Respondents’ Exhibit ECourt Doc. No. 10-6 at 24. On appeal from the trial court’s decision, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

issued a memorandum opinion in which the appellate court deemed the claim presented by Anderson “precluded

[from review] because he could have raised it at trial and on direct appeal, but did not, and because [the petition]

is time-barred” under Rule 32.2(c), Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Respondents’ Exhibit H - Court Doc.

No. 10-9 at 2. 

6

In Pace, the Supreme Court noted that under the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure “a court ‘shall

not entertain’ a time-barred petition....” 544 U.S. at 417, 125 S.Ct. at 1814, n.7.

4

(2005) (“[I]t must be the case that a petition that cannot even be initiated or considered due

to the failure to include a timely claim is not ‘properly filed.’ ... For these reasons, we hold

that time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’ conditions. Because the state court

rejected petitioner's [state post-conviction] petition as untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,’

and he is not entitled to statutory tolling [of the limitation period] under § 2244(d)(2).”);6

Allen v. Siebert, --- U.S. ---, ---, 128 S.Ct. 2, 4-5 (2007) (“When a postconviction petition

is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of [tolling the

limitation period under] § 2244(d)(2).”); Sweet v. Secretary, Department of Corrections,

467 F.3d 1311, 1317 (11th Cir. 2006) (untimely collateral motion “was not ‘properly filed’

under § 2244(d), and it could not toll the federal one-year period of limitation.”). Hence,

the respondents maintain Anderson failed to file the instant § 2254 petition prior to

expiration of the one-year period of limitation. 

Based on the foregoing, the court entered orders advising Anderson of his failure to

file the present federal habeas action within the one-year limitation period established by

28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1). Order of August 2, 2006 - Court Doc. No. 11; Order of December

2, 2008 - Court Doc. No. 25. Each of the orders provided Anderson an opportunity to show

Case 2:06-cv-00512-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 01/29/09 Page 4 of 17
5

cause why his federal habeas petition should not be barred from review by this court as

untimely filed. In response to these orders, Anderson reiterates his claims for relief and

argues this court should address the merits of these claims because he is actually innocent

of first degree robbery as he “didn’t have a gun nor any weapon” when he committed the

crime. Petitioner’s December 10, 2008 Response - Court Doc. No. 26 at 1. Anderson also

argues that the Alabama Constitution violates his equal protection rights and maintains that

this court’s failure to address his claims “will be discriminatory to [him].” Id. at 2-3. 

Upon review of the pleadings filed by the parties, the undisputed state court records

and applicable federal law, the court determines no evidentiary hearing is required, Rule

8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts, and concludes

the present habeas petition is due to be denied as Anderson failed to file the petition within

the applicable one-year period of limitation. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Actual Innocence - Independent Claim

Anderson argues he is entitled to federal habeas relief because he is actually

innocent of first degree robbery. Anderson bases this assertion on his allegation that he

was not armed with a gun or other deadly weapon at the time of the theft of property.

Anderson also asserts he did not use or threaten the use of force against the alleged victims.

The law is well settled “that ‘[c]laims of actual innocence based on newly discovered

evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an

Case 2:06-cv-00512-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 01/29/09 Page 5 of 17
6

independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding.’

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400, 113 S.Ct. 853, 860, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993). It is

not our role to make an independent determination of a petitioner’s guilt or innocence based

on evidence [presented at trial or evidence] that has emerged since the trial. ‘This rule is

grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not

imprisoned in violation of the Constitution--not to correct errors of fact.’ Id.” Brownlee

v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1065 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, Anderson is entitled to no relief from

this court on his independent claim of actual innocence. 

B. Actual Innocence - Gateway to Excuse Time Bar

This court must determine whether Anderson has made a showing of actual

innocence before addressing whether the claims for federal habeas relief are barred by the

statute of limitations. Wyzykowski v. Department of Corrections, 226 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th

Cir. 2000). “To establish actual innocence, [a habeas petitioner] must demonstrate that ...

‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable [trier of fact] would have convicted him.’

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-328, 115 S.Ct. 851, 867-868, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).”

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). “[T]he Schlup standard is demanding

and permits review only in the ‘“extraordinary’” case.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538,

126 S.Ct. 2064, 2077 (2006). Thus, “[i]n the usual case the presumed guilt of a prisoner

convicted in state court counsels against federal review of [untimely] claims.” Id. at 537.

“It is important to note in this regard that ‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not

Case 2:06-cv-00512-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 01/29/09 Page 6 of 17
7

mere legal insufficiency. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518-

2519, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992).” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-624; Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d

147, 162 (2nd Cir. 2004) (“As Schlup makes clear, the issue before [a federal district] court

is not legal innocence but factual innocence.”). Schlup observes that “a substantial claim

that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent person is extremely rare....

To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional

error with new reliable evidence – whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence,

trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence – that was not presented at

trial. Because such evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast majority of cases, claims

of actual innocence are rarely successful.” 513 U.S. at 324.

At trial, one of the victims testified that during the commission of a theft of clothing

from Weil’s Clothing by Anderson she saw the handle of a gun protruding from Anderson’s

pants and observed Anderson place his hands on the gun. Respondents’ Exhibit A - Court

Doc. No. 10-2 at 83-85. This witness also testified that Anderson repeatedly threatened to

“blow [her] f----ing brains out[,]” an act she believed Anderson capable of committing. Id.

Two other eyewitnesses likewise testified that Anderson threatened to blow their heads off

and each admitted they believed this a credible threat causing them to fear for their lives.

Id. at 100-102, 115-117. These witnesses also stated they believed Anderson possessed a

weapon at the time he committed the theft of property from Weil’s Clothing. Id. 

Anderson again proceeds on his conclusory allegation that he is actually innocent

Case 2:06-cv-00512-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 01/29/09 Page 7 of 17
7

The trial court charged the jury on third degree theft of property, third degree robbery and first degree

robbery. Respondents’ Exhibit A - Court Doc. No. 10-2 at 140. After hearing all the evidence, the jury rejected

all arguments presented by the defense and convicted Anderson of first degree robbery.

8

of robbery because he did not possess a gun or other weapon during the commission of the

crime. This is the same argument Anderson which presented at trial and the jury rejected.7

Anderson further alleges he did not use nor threaten the use of force against either of the

victims named in the indictment with the requisite intent to escape with the property.

Based on these arguments, Anderson asserts the crime he committed is merely theft of

property. These assertions, however, do not constitute “new reliable evidence” of

Anderson’s actual innocence nor has Anderson demonstrated that any such evidence exists

to establish his actual innocence so as to meet the standard set forth by Schlup. The instant

petition for federal habeas corpus relief is therefore properly analyzed under the provisions

of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

C. The Federal Period of Limitation

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 became effective on

April 24, 1996 and amended the habeas corpus statute to include a one-year period of

limitation on petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This limitation period is codified

at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and provides that:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

Case 2:06-cv-00512-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 01/29/09 Page 8 of 17
9

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation

under this subsection.

The statute clearly directs that the limitation period for filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2254

petition begins to run at the conclusion of direct review or upon expiration of the time for

seeking direct review, whichever is later. Where a petitioner preserves his right to file a

petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, the statute of limitations

is tolled during the ninety-day period in which such action may be undertaken. Coates v.

Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000) (“A judgment does not become ‘final by the

conclusion of direct review or by the expiration of the time for seeking such review,’ see

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), until the Supreme Court has had an opportunity to review the

case or the time for seeking review has expired.”). Accordingly, a state court judgment of

conviction becomes final under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 when the United States Supreme Court

denies certiorari, the time to apply for certiorari expires or this avenue of relief no longer

exists. Id.

Case 2:06-cv-00512-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 01/29/09 Page 9 of 17
8

 Where further action is not undertaken upon a ruling by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, the

appellate court issues the certificate of judgment eighteen (18) days after entry of the court’s opinion. Rule 41(a),

Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

10

The Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama convicted Anderson of first

degree robbery on September 25, 2001. The trial court imposed sentence upon Anderson

for this conviction on October 10, 2001. Anderson filed a direct appeal of his robbery

conviction and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals entered an unpublished

memorandum opinion affirming this conviction on April 19, 2002. Respondents’ Exhibit

C - Court Doc. No. 10-4. Anderson did not further appeal his conviction and the appellate

court therefore issued the certificate of judgment on May 7, 2002. Respondents’ Exhibit D -

Court Doc. No. 10-5.

8

 Since Anderson failed to pursue the direct appeal process fully, he

relinquished his right to file a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court

and the time for seeking review of his robbery conviction therefore lapsed upon expiration

of the time for filing an application for rehearing in the appellate court -- fourteen (14) days

after rendition of judgment by that court on April 19, 2002. Rule 40(c), Alabama Rules of

Appellate Procedure; see Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531

U.S. 1166, 121 S.Ct. 1129 (2001); see also Rule 13.1, Rules of the United States Supreme

Court (a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court may only be filed

to review a judgment or order entered by a state court of last resort and must be filed within

ninety (90) days of the action undertaken by the aforementioned state court). Thus,

Anderson’s conviction for first degree robbery became final, at the latest, on May 7, 2002,

Case 2:06-cv-00512-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 01/29/09 Page 10 of 17
11

upon entry of the certificate of judgment, and the one-year period of limitation contained

in section 2244(d)(1)(A) began to run no later than May 8, 2002. In the absence of

statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) or equitable tolling, the limitation period

expired on May 8, 2002. 

 1. Equitable Tolling of the Limitation Period. Case law directs that the limitation

period “may be equitably tolled” on grounds apart from those specified in the habeas

statute “when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both

beyond his control and unavoidable with diligence.” Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d

1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000);

Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2002). “Equitable tolling will not be

available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary

circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Calderon v. United States District Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.1997). Such tolling

applies only in truly extraordinary circumstances. Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035,

1039-1040 (11th Cir. 2002); Drew v. Department of Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th

Cir. 2002). “The burden of establishing entitlement to this extraordinary remedy plainly

rests with the petitioner.” Drew, 297 F.3d at 1286; see Helton v. Secretary for the Dept.

of Corrections, 259 F.3d 1310, 1313-1314 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1080,

122 S.Ct. 1965, 152 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2002). 

Anderson presents no arguments relative to equitable tolling. Moreover, a thorough

Case 2:06-cv-00512-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 01/29/09 Page 11 of 17
12

review of the record establishes that Anderson has not set forth the existence of any

extraordinary circumstance that prevented him from filing a timely habeas petition.

Additionally, Anderson presents nothing which demonstrates that he exercised diligence

in pursuing his claims for relief before this court in a § 2254 petition. The record is

therefore devoid of evidence that Anderson’s delay in filing the instant § 2254 petition

resulted from extraordinary circumstances beyond his control and unavoidable with the

exercise of diligence. Drew, 297 F.3d at 1290; Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3rd

Cir. 1999). Thus, this court “cannot say that [Anderson] has acted with the ‘conscience,

good faith, and reasonable diligence’ necessary ‘to call into action the powers of the court.’

This conclusion is based on the longstanding, firmly rooted principle that a court cannot

grant equitable tolling unless it is satisfied that the party seeking such relief has acted with

diligence.” Drew, 297 F.3d at 1291 n.5. Consequently, Anderson is not entitled to

equitable tolling of the limitation period. 

2. Statutory Tolling of the Limitation Period. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction

or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this section.” Although Anderson

filed a state post-conviction petition pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal

Procedure on August 30, 2005, this collateral action did not warrant statutory tolling of the

federal limitation period as Anderson failed to properly file this Rule 32 petition, i.e.,

Case 2:06-cv-00512-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 01/29/09 Page 12 of 17
13

Anderson did not file the petition within the applicable one-year period of limitation

established under state law. See Rule 32.2(c), Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure (as

amended March 22, 2002, effective August 1, 2002) (“[T]he court shall not entertain any

petition for relief from a conviction or sentence ... unless the petition is filed ... within one

(1) year after the issuance of the certificate of judgment by the Court of Criminal

Appeals.”). With respect to Anderson’s robbery conviction, the date on which the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals issued the certificate of judgment – the triggering date –

occurred on May 7, 2002, and Anderson had “one year from the triggering date within

which to file a postconviction petition pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P.” Id. - Court

Comment of January 27, 2004 - Amendment to Rule 32.2 Effective August 1, 2002 at (3).

Thus, Anderson failed to file his Rule 32 petition within the time prescribed by state law

and the state courts which addressed the Rule 32 petition denied the petition on this ground.

“For purposes of determining what are ‘filing’ conditions, there is an obvious

distinction between time limits, which go to the very initiation of a petition and a court’s

ability to consider that petition, and the type of ‘rule of decision’ procedural bars at issue

in Artuz [v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000)], which go to the

ability to obtain relief.... [I]t must be the case that a petition that cannot even be initiated

or considered due to the failure to include a timely claim is not ‘properly filed.’... For these

reasons, we hold that time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’ conditions. Because the

Case 2:06-cv-00512-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 01/29/09 Page 13 of 17
9

Anderson filed his Rule 32 petition in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama on August

30, 2005 -- over two years after § 2244(d)’s one-year period of limitation had expired.

14

state court rejected petitioner’s [state post-conviction] petition as untimely, it was not

‘properly filed,’ and he is not entitled to statutory tolling [of the limitation period] under

§ 2244(d)(2).” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 1814 (2005). The

Supreme Court, when again called upon to determine whether an untimely state postconviction petition constitutes a “properly filed” action under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2),

emphatically held:

“When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end

of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” 544 U.S. at 414, 125 S.Ct.

1807.... Because [petitioner’s] petition for state postconviction relief was

rejected as untimely by the Alabama courts, it was not “properly filed” under

§ 2244(d)(2). Accordingly, he was not entitled to tolling of AEDPA’s 1-

year statute of limitations. 

Allen v. Siebert, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 4-5. 

In addition, Anderson’s Rule 32 petition did not affect the running of the federal

limitation period applicable to the instant habeas action because Anderson filed the petition

after the federal limitation period had expired.9

 “[E]ven ‘properly filed’ state-court

petitions must be ‘pending’ [during the one-year period of limitation] in order to toll the

limitations period. A state court petition ... that is filed following the expiration of the

limitations period cannot toll that period because there is no period remaining to be tolled.”

Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 991, 121

S.Ct. 481, 148 L.Ed.2d 454 (2000); Moore v. Crosby, 321 F.3d 1377, 1381 (11th Cir. 2003)

Case 2:06-cv-00512-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 01/29/09 Page 14 of 17
15

(“The plain language of the statute provides for tolling ‘[t]he time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review ... is pending.’ 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). While a ‘properly filed’ application for post-conviction relief tolls

the statute of limitations, it does not reset or restart the statute of limitations once the

limitations period has expired. In other words, the tolling provision does not operate to

revive the one-year limitations period if such period has expired.”); Tinker v. Moore, 255

F.3d 1331, 1335 n.4 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[A] properly filed petition in state court only tolls

the time remaining within the federal limitation period.”). 

For the foregoing reasons, Anderson is not entitled to statutory tolling of the federal

limitation period during the pendency of his Rule 32 petition. 

3. Expiration of the Limitation Period. Anderson’s robbery conviction became

final on May 7, 2002. The record before this court is devoid of any basis for either

statutory or equitable tolling of the limitation period with respect to its running after

Anderson’s conviction became final. The limitation period therefore began to run May 8,

2002 and ran interrupted without either statutory or equitable tolling until its expiration on

May 8, 2003. Anderson filed the instant petition for federal habeas relief on June 1, 2006,

over 3 years after expiration of the federal limitation period, and the amendment to the

petition on October 5, 2008, well over 5 years after expiration of the requisite period of

limitation. Anderson has failed to demonstrate that this federal habeas petition should not

be dismissed as untimely filed. 

Case 2:06-cv-00512-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 01/29/09 Page 15 of 17
16

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Curtis L.

Anderson be denied as Anderson failed to file the petition within the one-year period of

limitation set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

2. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before February 11, 2009 the parties may file objections to

the Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981,

Case 2:06-cv-00512-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 01/29/09 Page 16 of 17
17

en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done, this 29th day of January, 2009.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:06-cv-00512-WHA-SRW Document 27 Filed 01/29/09 Page 17 of 17