Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00926/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00926-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1001 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Retirement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carol Wilcox, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company;

et al.,

Defendants. _________________________________

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No. CV 04-0926 PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Dkt. #98. The motion seeks

reconsideration of the Court’s recent order regarding her discovery requests. See Dkt. #97.

The Court will deny the motion.

Plaintiff complains that this case has been delayed through no fault of her own. She

asserts, for example, that the Court took more than one and one-half years to rule on her

motion for summary judgment. This is not correct. The Court ruled on the parties’ summary

judgment motions less than five months after Plaintiff filed her reply memorandum. See

Dkt. ##52, 53. Moreover, the parties have submitted several requests for extensions of time

in this case (e.g., Dkt. ##34, 49, 88) while the Court repeatedly has urged the parties to

complete discovery and motion practice expeditiously (e.g., Dkt. ##38, 78, 79, 89, 97). 

The Court entered an order on January 8, 2009, that permitted limited discovery and

set a discovery deadline of April 3, 2009. Dkt. #85. Rather than serving discovery requests

immediately, Plaintiff waited until February 26, 2009, to serve her written discovery. When

Defendant had not served responses by the Court’s deadline, Plaintiff stipulated with

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Defendant to extend the discovery period another 90 days. Dkt. #88. The Court agreed to

the stipulation and extended the discovery period to June 20, 2009, but specifically advised

the parties that it would not grant additional extensions. Dkt. #89. It was not until May 7,

2009 – some five months after the Court’s original discovery order and just over one month

short of the extended discovery cut-off date – that Plaintiff sought the Court’s assistance in

obtaining responses to her discovery requests. The Court ruled less than two weeks later,

specifying the requests to which Defendants must provide responses and, in light of

Defendant’s delayed responses, allotting an additional five weeks for Plaintiff to complete

discovery. See Dkt. #97.

Plaintiff complains that the Court’s ruling “strikes” a number of her discovery

requests and otherwise grants relief not timely requested by Defendant. But, consistent with

ERISA, the Court imposed specific limitations on the discovery in this case. Dkt. #85. A

number of Plaintiff’s discovery requests exceeded those limitations, and the Court declined

to enforce them. Some of Plaintiff’s other requests were clearly overbroad. Plaintiff

complains that the Court did not allot her time to narrow the requests and seek additional

responses, but the Court has already afforded significantly more time than it initially intended

for the limited discovery in this case. As noted above, Plaintiff did not seek assistance in

obtaining discovery until some five months after the Court’s order establishing a limited

discovery schedule. Given this delay, the Court will not grant additional time for Plaintiff

to re-draft and re-serve her discovery requests. Had Plaintiff acted promptly after the Court’s

January 8, 2009 order, she could have obtained assistance during the original discovery

period, not to mention the extended discovery period.

Plaintiff asserts that the delay was due to her patience in awaiting Defendant’s late

responses to her requests and her efforts to avoid a discovery dispute and the need for court

intervention. The Court surely favors efforts to avoid discovery disputes, but when the Court

enters an order establishing a limited, three-month period for discovery, it is incumbent on

a party seeking discovery to move quickly enough to obtain the necessary discovery using

the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court’s assistance if necessary. Plaintiff waited for

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 The Court also notes that a number of Plaintiff’s arguments take issue with the breadth of

discovery allowed by the Court in this case. Those issues should have been raised in

response to the Court’s January 8, 2009 order limiting discovery, not near the end of a twiceextended discovery period.

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more than half of the three-month period before even serving discovery, and then waited

almost two and one-half additional months before seeking the Court’s assistance. Plaintiff

has not satisfied the “good cause” standard for seeking an extension of the discovery period

in this case (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)), a standard that primarily considers the diligence of

the party seeking the amendment. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreation, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609

(9th Cir. 1992). The Court concludes that Plaintiff could have obtained discovery through

the exercise of reasonable diligence, and that extending the schedule at this late date to allow

further discovery requests is not warranted.1

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. #98) is denied.

DATED this 2nd day of June, 2009.

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