Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-14-70034/USCOURTS-ca5-14-70034-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

---

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-70034

TROY CLARK, 

 Petitioner–Appellant, 

v. 

LORIE DAVIS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL 

JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION, 

 Respondent–Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Texas 

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and OWEN, Circuit 

Judges. 

PRISCILLA R. OWEN, Circuit Judge: 

Troy Clark, convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Texas 

state court, appeals the district court’s denial of his Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b)(6) motion for relief from the district court’s judgment denying

his federal habeas petition. Clark contends that his state habeas counsel, who 

was also his federal habeas counsel, was ineffective because he failed to 

investigate fully, and consequently failed to present fully, a claim that Clark’s 

trial counsel was ineffective. The federal district court denied habeas relief;

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 10, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

2 

this court affirmed the district court’s judgment;1 and the Supreme Court 

denied Clark’s petition for certiorari.2 

The Rule 60(b)(6) motion is based on the change in decisional law 

effectuated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Trevino v. Thaler,3 which held 

that when “it [is] highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a 

meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

on direct appeal,” a habeas petitioner’s procedural default of a claim not 

presented during an initial-review collateral proceeding can be excused if the 

default was caused by state habeas counsel’s ineffectiveness.4 This holding 

was an extension of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Martinez v. Ryan.5

After the Trevino decision issued, the state habeas court appointed new 

counsel for Clark, and Clark filed a successive claim for habeas corpus relief in 

state court, contending that a more fulsome ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim should be considered by the state courts, in light of Martinez and 

Trevino. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed that petition as an 

abuse of the writ.6 Clark proceeded to federal district court and filed a Rule 

60(b)(6) motion for relief from the district court’s prior denial of habeas relief. 

Clark contended that his counsel in the federal habeas proceeding had a 

conflict of interest because he could not be expected to argue his own 

ineffectiveness as state habeas counsel. The district court denied the motion 

and declined to issue a certificate of appealability (COA). We granted a COA, 

and we now affirm the district court’s judgment. The district court did not 

 

1 Clark v. Thaler, 673 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 2012).

2 Clark v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 179 (2012) (mem.). 3 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).

4 Id. at 1921.

5 566 U.S. 1 (2012).

6 Ex parte Clark, No. WR-55,996-02, 2014 WL 1910597, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. May 7, 

2014) (per curiam) (unpublished).

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

3 

abuse its discretion in concluding that Clark’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion was 

untimely.

I 

Clark was convicted of capital murder in Texas state court in March 

2000. The decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on direct appeal 

reflects facts that were presented to the jury during the guilt phase of the trial

regarding Christina Muse’s murder: 

Clark lived with Tory Bush in Tyler, Texas, where the two 

used and sold methamphetamine. The victim, Christina Muse, 

lived with them for a short period of time. When Muse moved out, 

Clark became concerned that she would talk to the wrong people 

and “snitch” on him about his drug dealings. 

According to Bush, Muse came by Clark’s house on May 19, 

1998, and talked with Bush in the front bedroom. At some point 

during their conversation, Clark stunned Muse with a stun gun to 

her neck and told her she “should have kept [her] mouth shut.” 

When Muse fell to the floor, Clark bound her hands, legs, and 

mouth with duct tape. Clark then placed Muse in a closet in the 

second bedroom, and Bush could hear Clark talking to her. After 

“a couple of hours,” Clark moved Muse into the bathroom and told 

Bush to get him a board. Bush complied and returned to the 

kitchen, shortly after which she heard the loud “whack” of a board 

striking something. Clark yelled for Bush to come to the bathroom 

where she found Muse in the bathtub, blood on the back wall of the 

tub, and Clark filling the tub with water. Clark told Bush to help 

him hold Muse’s head under water and threatened her when she 

hesitated. 

After drowning Muse, Clark told Bush to go buy some lime. 

Bush then went across the street to Amber Scoggin’s [sic] house to 

get a ride to the store. When Bush returned, she took the lime to 

Clark in the back storage room of the house where she saw Muse’s 

body in a blue barrel filled with cement mix. Clark poured the lime 

into the barrel, mixed in water, and put a lid on the barrel. The 

next morning, Clark woke Bush and instructed her to clean up the 

backyard and to put some debris and garbage in the barrel over 

Muse’s body. When Ben Barnett, Mike Coats, and Amber Scoggins 

arrived later, Clark and the two men loaded the blue barrel in the 

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

4 

back of Clark’s truck. After the others left, Clark and Bush 

transported the barrel and other trash to the property of their 

landlord, Velva Young. Bush told the jury that the last time she 

saw the barrel it was in Clark’s truck, which was parked by the 

trash pile on Young’s property. Bush then went to Young’s house, 

while Clark borrowed Young’s tractor and returned to the trash 

pile by himself for about an hour.7

With regard to the punishment phase, Clark’s counsel conducted a 

limited investigation to determine if potentially mitigating evidence existed 

and did not present any mitigating evidence at trial. Clark’s counsel was 

prepared to subpoena Clark’s mother, father and other potential mitigation 

witnesses to testify, but Clark confirmed in response to questions from the trial 

court that he had instructed his counsel not to subpoena any witnesses. 

Accordingly, counsel focused on Clark’s future dangerousness, calling one 

expert witness who testified that Clark would not be a future danger in prison, 

based on a risk assessment founded in actuarial data.8 

Clark rejected his counsel’s advice and testified during the punishment 

phase. As we set forth in a prior opinion, 

Clark took the stand on his own behalf, against the advice of 

counsel . . . . In a colloquy with counsel outside the presence of the 

jury, Clark confirmed that he had refused to allow his attorneys to 

call his mother and father to testify. Clark also acknowledged that 

he had personally contacted other potential mitigation witnesses 

and instructed them not to testify on his behalf. He expressed his 

desire to tell the jury that he wanted to receive the death penalty. 

In a contentious exchange with the prosecutor on crossexamination, Clark ultimately so testified.9

The jury determined that Clark was a future danger to society and that no 

mitigating factors warranted a life sentence. The trial court sentenced Clark 

 

7 Clark v. Texas, No. 73,816 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 2002) (unpublished).

8 Clark v. Thaler, 673 F.3d 410, 414 (5th Cir. 2012).

9 Id.

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

5 

to death as state law required. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed

on direct appeal.10 

 The state trial court appointed new counsel, Craig Henry, to represent 

Clark in state habeas proceedings. Henry submitted an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus asserting nine grounds for relief, the principal ground being 

that Clark’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 

investigate potentially mitigating facts and by failing to present mitigating 

evidence. Henry included a two-page affidavit from Clark’s mother, Cleta 

Barrington, which recounts Clark’s troubled upbringing. Barrington’s 

affidavit stated that: Clark was born with a cleft palate that led to speech 

difficulties and ridicule by his peers; she used drugs for most of her adult life 

and supported her habit through prostitution, resulting in her incarceration 

for much of Clark’s life; Clark’s father had “very little to do with” him; Clark 

cycled between living with different family members during his formative 

years; while Clark lived with his mother’s brother-in-law he was subjected to 

physical abuse; Clark married at fifteen to avoid being placed in the foster care 

system; Clark’s brother committed suicide when Clark was twenty, and Clark 

blamed himself because he had had an argument with his brother the night 

before; and that she (his mother) had not been contacted by trial counsel but 

would have spoken with counsel if given the opportunity. Henry spent a total 

of five hours investigating possible mitigating circumstances in support of the 

state habeas claim. The affidavit from Clark’s mother was the only evidence 

submitted in support of the application. 

The state habeas court denied relief, concluding that trial counsel’s 

performance was not deficient and that Clark had not demonstrated 

 

10 Clark v. Texas, No. 73,816 at *16 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 2002) (unpublished).

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

6 

prejudice.11 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief based on the 

trial court’s findings and its own review.12

Henry was appointed to represent Clark in federal habeas proceedings. 

He filed a federal habeas petition, again arguing that trial counsel’s failure to 

investigate and failure to present mitigating evidence amounted to ineffective 

assistance of counsel. However, Henry conducted further investigation and 

found evidence that was potentially mitigating. In response to the State’s 

motion for summary judgment, Henry attached a thirty-page report from a 

mitigation specialist that detailed Clark’s social history through interviews 

with Clark and Clark’s family members and an affidavit from one of Clark’s 

trial attorneys stating that neither he nor co-counsel conducted any mitigation 

investigation in preparation for the punishment phase. The mitigation 

specialist’s report was prepared for the federal habeas proceeding and was not 

part of the record before the state habeas courts. 

The district court, considering the affidavits from Clark’s mother, trial 

counsel, and the mitigation specialist’s report, found that trial counsel’s failure 

to investigate mitigating evidence amounted to ineffective assistance but 

denied habeas relief because the federal district court found that the state 

court’s conclusion that Clark had not demonstrated prejudice was not an 

unreasonable application of federal law. The district court reasoned that the 

mitigating evidence was not as strong as in some other habeas cases and that 

it was “double-edged.” The district court also explained that there was 

“overwhelming evidence of . . . future dangerousness”: in addition to the

heinous nature of the murder, “the jury heard evidence that [Clark] had 

murdered two other people, committed several aggravated assaults and thefts, 

 

11 Clark, 673 F.3d at 415 (citing Ex parte Clark, No. 55996-01, 2003 Tex. Crim. App. 

LEXIS 1033 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 1, 2003) (not designated for publication)).

12 Id. 

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

7 

and dealt drugs over a long period of time.” The district court noted that Clark 

testified before the jury, “often assuming a taunting, argumentative, and 

sarcastic demeanor.” He “sparred with the prosecutor, stating that he wanted 

the death penalty rather than spending the rest of his life locked up for 

something he ‘didn’t do,’” thereby refusing to accept responsibility for the crime 

and exhibiting no remorse. The district court denied habeas relief but granted 

a COA on the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. 

Subsequently, the Supreme Court held in Cullen v. Pinholster that under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), federal courts are limited to the record that was before 

the state court when reviewing the state court’s denial of habeas relief.13 

Accordingly, in Clark’s first appeal to this court, we considered only the facts 

presented to the state habeas court.14 We concluded that “fairminded jurists 

could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s determination that 

counsel’s performance was not deficient.”15 We also concluded, as an alternate 

basis for affirming the district court’s judgment denying habeas relief, that the 

state court’s determination that Clark did not demonstrate prejudice was not 

an unreasonable application of federal law.16 Among other considerations, we 

concluded “most importantly, the aggravating evidence in Clark’s case was 

overwhelming, a circumstance which . . . makes it ‘virtually impossible to 

establish prejudice.’”17 We noted that along with his long criminal history, the 

State also “demonstrated that Clark had committed two other murders, 

including one murder that occurred after Muse’s death but prior to Clark’s 

apprehension. As the Supreme Court recently recognized, evidence that a 

 

13 563 U.S. 170, 180-81 (2011).

14 Clark, 673 F.3d at 416-17, 419-20. 15 Id. at 422.

16 Id.

17 Id. at 424 (quoting Ladd v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 349, 360 (5th Cir. 2002)). 

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

8 

defendant ‘committed another murder [is] the most powerful imaginable

aggravating evidence.’”18

Two weeks after our decision, the Supreme Court held in Martinez v. 

Ryan that ineffective assistance by state habeas counsel in an initial-review 

collateral proceeding may establish cause to overcome procedural default of an 

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim when state law required that such 

a claim be raised for the first time during the initial collateral proceeding.19 

The following term, in Trevino v. Thaler, the Court extended the rationale of

Martinez to Texas convictions when state procedural rules do not require the 

defendant to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in an initialreview collateral proceeding but also do not provide a meaningful opportunity 

to raise such a claim on direct appeal.20 

The Supreme Court denied Clark’s petition for certiorari on October 1, 

2012, after Martinez but before Trevino was decided on May 28, 2013.21 On 

August 21, 2013, the state trial court held a hearing to set Clark’s execution 

date. Bobby Mims, one of Clark’s trial counsel, Jeffrey Haas, Clark’s counsel 

for his direct appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and Henry, his 

state and federal habeas counsel, were present at the hearing. All three

attorneys argued to the court that in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in 

Martinez and Trevino, additional counsel should be appointed to determine if 

there were claims that should have been raised in state habeas court that were 

not raised due to Henry’s potential ineffectiveness as state habeas counsel. 

The court and the attorneys expressed confusion about where a newlyappointed attorney should file Clark’s potential claims based on Martinez and 

 

18 Id. (quoting Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 28 (2009) (per curiam)).

19 566 U.S. 1, 13-17 (2012).

20 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918, 1921 (2013).

21 Clark v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 179 (2012) (mem.). 

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

9 

Trevino. The state court stated that it would be the new counsel’s decision 

whether to file in state or federal court. Nonetheless, the court subsequently 

appointed the Office of Capital Writs (OCW), a state agency prohibited by a 

Texas statute from representing a defendant in federal habeas proceedings,22

as Clark’s new counsel. 

On February 19, 2014, OCW filed Clark’s Subsequent Application for a 

Writ of Habeas Corpus in state court. The application was supported by 

evidence that was not presented in the initial state habeas proceeding, 

including affidavits from Mims and Henry discussing the limits of the 

mitigation investigations they performed; affidavits from two experts on Fetal 

Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) concluding that Clark likely suffers from FAS and 

that evidence was available at the time of trial that should have led trial 

counsel to conduct an FAS evaluation; and affidavits from nine of Clark’s 

family members providing detailed accounts of Clark’s troubled upbringing 

and family history. On May 7, 2014, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 

dismissed Clark’s application “as an abuse of the writ without considering the 

merits of the claim.”23

Six days later, on May 13, 2014, a motion seeking to substitute David 

Dow and Jeffrey Newberry as Clark’s counsel and to permit Henry to withdraw

was filed in the federal district court. That motion did not assert that Henry 

had a conflict of interest but stated that “Mr. Henry was not involved in the 

successive state court litigation,” and that “Mr. Dow and Mr. Newberry are 

conversant with the issue raised in the state court litigation.” The motion was

granted on May 19, 2014. On September 19, 2014, four months after the 

 

22 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 78.054(b) (West) (“The office may not represent a defendant 

in a federal habeas review.”).

23 Ex parte Clark, No. WR-55,996-02, 2014 WL 1910597, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. May 

7, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished).

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 9 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

10

motion for substitution was granted, Clark, through new counsel, filed a Rule 

60(b)(6) motion for relief from the district court’s judgment denying Clark’s 

federal habeas petition. Clark argued that Henry had an inherent conflict of 

interest once the decision in Martinez issued and that extraordinary 

circumstances existed for granting Rule 60(b)(6) relief because Henry had 

remained Clark’s counsel of record before the federal district court for 

seventeen months after Martinez was decided. 

In support of the Rule 60(b) motion, Clark also submitted a Proposed 

Amended Claim indicating what he would file with the district court if granted 

Rule 60(b) relief. The Proposed Amended Claim contains one ground for relief: 

Clark’s trial counsel was ineffective by failing to conduct a reasonable 

mitigation investigation. This claim is supported by the evidence submitted to 

the state trial court in the second state habeas application: affidavits from 

Clark’s previous counsel, FAS experts, and numerous family members. 

A magistrate judge recommended that Clark’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion be

denied as untimely and meritless and denied a COA. The district court agreed 

and adopted the magistrate’s recommendations. This court granted a COA.24

II

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) permits a court to relieve a party 

from a final judgment for “any . . . reason that justifies relief.”25 To obtain 

relief under Rule 60(b)(6), Clark’s motion must have been made “within a 

reasonable time”26 and must “show ‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying 

the reopening of a final judgment.”27 We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) 

 

24 Clark v. Stephens, No. 14-70034, 2015 WL 5730638 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) 

(unpublished).

25 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6).

26 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1). 27 Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005) (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 

340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)).

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 10 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

11

motion for abuse of discretion.28 The district court determined that Clark’s 

motion should be denied as both untimely and without merit. 

III 

We first address whether Clark’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion is prohibited 

under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(AEDPA) pertaining to second-or-successive habeas petitions.29 As the 

Supreme Court explained in Gonzalez v. Crosby, “Rule 60(b), like the rest of 

the Rules of Civil Procedure, applies in habeas corpus proceedings under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 only ‘to the extent that [it is] not inconsistent with’ applicable 

federal statutory provisions and rules.”30 Three requirements are imposed on 

second or successive habeas petitions by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)-(3).31 They are 

(1) “any claim that has already been adjudicated in a previous petition must 

be dismissed;”32 (2) “any claim that has not already been adjudicated must be 

dismissed unless it relies on either a new and retroactive rule of constitutional 

law or new facts”33 that “could not have been discovered previously through 

the exercise of due diligence”34 and “show[] a high probability of actual 

innocence;”35 and (3) “before the district court may accept a successive petition 

for filing, the court of appeals must determine that it presents a claim not 

 

28 Hernandez v. Thaler, 630 F.3d 420, 428 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Diaz v. Stephens, 

731 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 2013) (“In applying such a standard, ‘[i]t is not enough that the 

granting of relief might have been permissible, or even warranted[—]denial must have been 

so unwarranted as to constitute an abuse of discretion.’”) (quoting Seven Elves, Inc. v. 

Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981)). 29 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

30 545 U.S. at 529 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11fJuni) (footnote omitted). 31 Id. 32 Id. at 529-30 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)).

33 Id. at 530.

34 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i).

35 Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 530 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)).

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 11 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

12

previously raised that is sufficient to meet § 2244(b)(2)’s new-rule or actualinnocence provisions.”36

However, “when a Rule 60(b) motion attacks, not the substance of the 

federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the 

integrity of the federal habeas proceedings,”37 it is properly considered a Rule 

60(b) motion for relief from judgment. A Rule 60(b) motion based on “habeas 

counsel’s omissions ordinarily does not go to the integrity of the proceedings, 

but in effect asks for a second chance to have the merits determined 

favorably.”38 Clark argues in his initial brief in our court that his Rule 60(b) 

motion challenges a defect in the integrity of his federal habeas proceeding and 

is therefore not barred by AEDPA because, he contends, Henry, who served as 

both state and federal habeas counsel, had a conflict of interest in light of the 

Supreme Court’s decisions in Martinez39 and Trevino,40 and could not be 

expected to argue his own ineffectiveness to overcome the “default” in state 

habeas proceedings of Clark’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective. Though 

the principal issue that Henry raised in the initial state habeas proceeding was 

trial counsel’s failure to investigate for mitigation evidence, Clark asserts that 

Henry was himself ineffective in failing to investigate mitigation evidence 

more thoroughly and consequently failing to present a fully developed claim in 

the initial state habeas proceeding. 

Henry did not contend in the federal habeas proceeding that he had been 

ineffective in the state habeas proceeding, and when Martinez issued shortly 

after this court affirmed the denial of habeas relief, Henry did not withdraw or 

seek reconsideration or further relief based on Martinez. Clark contends that 

 

36 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)).

37 Id. at 532.

38 Id. at 532 n.5 (citation omitted).

39 Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012).

40 Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 12 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

13

this prevented him from having his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 

claim reviewed on the merits in the federal habeas proceeding and that the 

federal habeas proceeding should be reopened to allow him to present his now 

fully-developed claim that trial counsel was ineffective because they did not 

discover or present mitigating evidence. 

 Capital habeas petitioners have a statutory right to conflict-free 

counsel.41 We have recently indicated in an unpublished opinion that a Rule 

60(b) motion premised on federal habeas counsel’s conflict of interest need not 

be considered a successive habeas petition.42 To the extent that Clark’s Rule 

60(b)(6) motion attacks not the substance of the federal court’s resolution of 

the claim of the merits, but asserts that Henry had a conflict of interest that 

resulted in a defect in the integrity of the proceedings, the motion is not an 

impermissible successive petition. 

IV

A motion under Rule 60(b)(6) must be made “within a reasonable time,”43

“unless good cause can be shown for the delay.”44 Reasonableness turns on the 

“particular facts and circumstances of the case.”45 We consider “whether the 

 

41 See Juniper v. Davis, 737 F.3d 288, 290 & n.2 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Mendoza v. 

Stephens, 783 F.3d 203, 210 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (mem.) (OWEN, J., concurring) 

(“Mendoza is statutorily entitled to conflict-free counsel at this stage in his habeas 

proceedings.”) (citing Juniper, 737 F.3d 288; Gray v. Pearson, 526 F. App’x 331 (4th Cir. 

2013); 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)); Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891, 895 (2015) (recognizing that 

grounds for substitution under § 3599 exist when an attorney’s personal interests prevent 

her from advancing her client’s best arguments).

42 In re Paredes, 587 F. App’x 805, 822-23 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“Paredes has 

presented an issue that cannot be considered a successive motion for habeas corpus relief. 

He contends that in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Martinez and Trevino, his 

initial federal habeas counsel, Gross, had a conflict of interest because Gross also served as 

state habeas counsel.”).

43 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1).

44 In re Osborne, 379 F.3d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 

769 F.2d 281, 287-88 (5th Cir. 1985)).

45 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1410 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing 

First RepublicBank Fort Worth v. Norglass, Inc., 958 F.2d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 13 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

14

party opposing the motion has been prejudiced by the delay in seeking relief 

and . . . whether the moving party had some good reason for his failure to take 

appropriate action sooner.”46 “[T]imeliness . . . is measured as of the point in 

time when the moving party has grounds to make [a Rule 60(b)] motion, 

regardless of the time that has elapsed since the entry of judgment.”47

Because Clark’s contention that his Rule 60(b)(6) motion was timely is 

intertwined with arguments he asserts regarding the Supreme Court’s 

decisions in Martinez v. Ryan,48 and Trevino v. Thaler,49 we again briefly 

address the import of those decisions. Prior to Martinez, the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Coleman v. Thompson foreclosed federal habeas petitioners from 

asserting, as excuse for the procedural default of an issue, that state habeas 

counsel had provided ineffective assistance.50 The Martinez decision changed 

the law in this regard by recognizing an exception that applies when state law 

prohibits a defendant from raising any ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 

claim on direct appeal.51 In such a circumstance, because collateral review is 

the first opportunity to raise a contention that trial counsel was ineffective, a 

petitioner seeking federal habeas relief may assert that his state habeas 

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness and 

therefore that the procedural default of the claim regarding trial counsel’s 

 

Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (“What constitutes 

‘reasonable time’ depends upon the facts of each case, taking into consideration the interest 

in finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the 

grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties.”).

46 Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting 11

WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2866, at 228-29).

47 First RepublicBank, 958 F.2d at 120.

48 566 U.S. 1 (2012).

49 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).

50 501 U.S. 722, 757 (1991).

51 Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9, 13-14; see also Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1914 

(2013) (explaining that the procedural rule at issue in Martinez “required a defendant 

convicted at trial to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during his first state 

collateral review proceeding—or lose the claim”).

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 14 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

15

ineffectiveness should be excused.52 Under Texas law, few ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claims can be asserted and decided on direct 

appeal.53 In Trevino, the Supreme Court extended the Martinez exception to a 

Texas conviction because the first opportunity to obtain review of the 

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in that case could not have been 

adjudicated on direct appeal and therefore, the first opportunity to obtain 

review would have been in a state collateral review proceeding.54

Clark argued in his Rule 60(b)(6) motion that “Henry should have asked 

[the federal district court] to appoint new counsel as soon as the Supreme Court 

handed down its opinion in Martinez,” and that Henry “became fatally afflicted 

by a conflict of interest on March 20, 2012,” the date that Martinez issued. If 

March 20, 2012 is utilized as the date that the grounds for Clark’s Rule 60(b) 

motion materialized, then Clark’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion, filed September 19, 

2014, was submitted two years and six months after Martinez was decided. 

His motion would be untimely, based on that analysis.55

However, it is more appropriate to conclude that Henry’s potential 

conflict of interest while acting as Clark’s federal habeas counsel did not arise 

until Trevino v. Thaler56 was decided. The Supreme Court explained in 

Trevino that “we qualified our holding” in Martinez.57 “We said that the 

holding applied where state procedural law said that ‘claims of ineffective 

 

52 Id. at 13-14, 16.

53 Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1918-1919. 54 Id. at 1921.

55 Tamayo v. Stephens, 740 F.3d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (holding that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a Rule 60(b) motion when the 

relevant change in law occurred eight months prior, and petitioner filed the motion two days 

before his execution); In re Paredes, 587 F. App’x 805, 824-25 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) 

(holding that a defendant who had waited thirteen months after Trevino was decided before 

seeking appointment of conflict-free counsel had not filed his Rule 60(b) motion within a 

reasonable time). 56 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).

57 Id. at 1914.

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 15 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

16

assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral 

proceeding.’”58 Texas law, the Court noted, did not come within that 

qualification.59 The decision in Trevino extended Martinez to convictions from 

Texas and other jurisdictions when an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 

claim could not be raised effectively in a direct appeal.60 The contention that 

a conflict of interest may arise when state habeas counsel in Texas is also 

federal habeas counsel flows from Trevino.61 Accordingly, the touchstone for 

Clark’s Rule 60(b) motion, which is that Henry had a conflict of interest, came 

into existence on May 28, 2013, the date of the Trevino decision. 

Clark contends that the relevant date for determining timeliness of his 

Rule 60(b)(6) motion is the date on which the federal district court permitted 

new counsel to be substituted for Henry, which was May 19, 2014. The federal 

district court disagreed, concluding that “Rule 60(c) timeliness requirements 

are not reset every time a litigant obtains a new attorney,” and reasoned that 

the motion was filed “more than fifteen months after Trevino was decided.” We 

agree with this analysis. Additionally, we note that conflict-free counsel was 

appointed by the state court to represent Clark in August of 2013. The Trevino

decision had been extant for twelve months, since May 2013, by the time that 

Clark asked the federal district court to substitute new counsel for Henry. 

 

58 Id. at 1914-15.

59 Id. at 1915 (The court explained: “In this case Texas state law does not say ‘must.’ 

It does not on its face require a defendant initially to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim in a state collateral review proceeding. Rather, that law appears at first glance 

to permit (but not require) the defendant initially to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel on direct appeal. The structure and design of the Texas system in actual 

operation, however, make it ‘virtually impossible’ for an ineffective assistance claim to be 

presented on direct review. We must now decide whether the Martinez exception applies in 

this procedural regime. We conclude that it does.” (citation omitted)). 

60 See id. 61 In re Paredes, 587 F. App’x 805, 824-25 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); see also Pruett 

v. Stephens, 608 F. App’x 182, 186 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (noting that Trevino “provided 

the basis for the conflict of interest argument” raised in the Rule 60(b) motion).

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 16 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

17

Clark’s Rule 60(b) motion did not explain why he did not seek new counsel in 

the federal district court sooner than he did. The date that the federal district 

court permitted new counsel to appear should not be the starting point for 

measuring timeliness of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion in this case. 

As noted, Clark filed his Rule 60(b) motion on September 19, 2014, 

almost sixteen months after Trevino was decided on May 28, 2013.62 If, rather 

than the date Trevino issued, we utilize August 2013, the date that conflictfree counsel was appointed by the state habeas court, then the Rule 60(b)(6)

motion was filed twelve months after new counsel was appointed. Using either 

date, the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was untimely. 

This court and others have concluded that periods of delay similar to or 

shorter than the period at issue here can constitute unreasonable delay under 

Rule 60(b).63 In Tamayo v. Stephens, we affirmed the district court’s judgment, 

which held that a Rule 60(b) motion, filed nearly eight months after the 

pertinent change in decisional law, was untimely.64 In Pruett v. Stephens, the 

petitioner waited more than nineteen months after Trevino was decided to file 

his Rule 60(b) motion.65 We concluded that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in holding the motion was not filed within a reasonable time.66 

 

62 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013). 

63 See, e.g., Tamayo v. Stephens, 740 F.3d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (eight 

months after change in law was untimely); Trottie v. Stephens, 581 F. App’x 436, 438 (5th 

Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (three years from district court denial of petition and over a year from 

denial of a COA not timely); Buck v. Thaler, 452 F. App’x 423, 429-30 (5th Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam) (over a year after denial of certiorari and no extenuating circumstances not within 

reasonable time); cf. Lewis v. Lewis, 326 F. App’x 420, 420 (9th Cir. 2009) (mem.) 

(unpublished) (six-month delay without any explanation not reasonable); Tredway v. Parke, 

79 F.3d 1150, at *1 (7th Cir. 1996) (unpublished) (five-month delay was unreasonable when 

motion only challenged court’s prior analysis).

64 Tamayo, 740 F.3d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 2014).

65 Pruett, 608 F. App’x at 186.

66 Id. 

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 17 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

18

Clark asserts that his motion was nevertheless timely because (1) the 

nine-month period during which his 2014 state habeas petition was prepared 

and pending should be excused; and (2) the four months in 2014 in which newly 

appointed federal counsel prepared the Rule 60(b) motion should be excused. 

Under Rule 60(b), unreasonable delay can be excused if “good cause” is shown 

for the delay.67 “What constitutes ‘good cause’ . . . ‘must necessarily be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.’”68 

Clark could have made concurrent state and federal filings, and 

therefore, the nine month period in which OCW prepared his 2014 successive 

state habeas petition and during which that petition was pending before the 

state court should not be excused. Although OCW was barred by a Texas 

statute from representing Clark in any federal proceeding,69 OCW was not 

barred from advising Clark to seek federal habeas counsel and pursue 

concurrent federal proceedings.70 Furthermore, Clark was physically present 

in August 2013 when the state trial court considered whether a conflict of 

interest had arisen in the wake of Trevino due to Henry’s representation of 

Clark in both state and federal habeas proceedings. In addition to Henry, 

Clark’s trial counsel and direct appeal counsel were also present and voiced 

their concerns about Henry’s conflict of interest in that proceeding. Henry 

indicated to the trial court that it would be prudent to appoint additional 

habeas counsel. There was a discussion as to whether further filings should 

be made in state or federal court. That question was not resolved by the state 

 

67 In re Osborne, 379 F.3d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 2004).

68 In re Jasper, 559 F. App’x 366, 372 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Osborne, 379 F.3d at 

283)).

69 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 78.054(b) (West). 70 Cf. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 § 2(e) (West) (providing time periods 

for when state habeas counsel must move to appoint federal habeas counsel after the court of 

criminal appeals denies relief).

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 18 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

19

trial court during the hearing. Clark could have filed in federal court and then 

sought a stay of the federal petition while he exhausted state court remedies. 

The defect which forms the basis of Clark’s Rule 60(b) motion—conflicted 

counsel—was removed in August 2013 when conflict-free counsel was 

appointed, not in May 2014 when Clark’s 2014 state petition was denied and 

additional counsel was appointed for federal habeas proceedings. 

In In re Paredes, an unpublished decision, Paredes argued that as long 

as a conflicted attorney remained his counsel, there were no grounds for filing 

a Rule 60(b) motion and that period of time should not be counted in assessing 

whether Paredes’s Rule 60(b) motion was timely.71 We rejected that argument, 

noting that Paredes had the basis for asserting that his counsel was conflicted 

as soon as Trevino was issued.72 We are persuaded that this conclusion is 

sound. 

We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in finding 

Clark’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion untimely.

V 

The district court denied Clark’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion on additional, 

independent grounds, which were that Clark was attempting to relitigate 

issues that had been decided on the merits in the federal habeas corpus 

proceeding, and that Clark had not shown extraordinary circumstances, as 

required by Rule 60(b)(6). The district court adopted all of the magistrate 

judge’s finding and conclusions, which addressed these issues as well. Because 

we conclude that the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was untimely, we do not address 

whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that Clark 

 

71 In re Paredes, 587 F. App’x 805, 824-25 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).

72 Id.

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 19 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

20

failed to demonstrate “circumstances that are sufficiently extraordinary to 

warrant relief from final judgment.”73

Nor do we address whether, to the extent that Clark seeks in his Rule 

60(b)(6) motion to have the district court reopen and reconsider the ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim, his claim is a successive habeas petition that 

must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244. We note that the Supreme Court 

held in Gonzalez v. Crosby that a change in substantive law is not a “reason 

justifying relief” under Rule 60(b)(6), and that a Rule 60(b)(6) motion cannot 

be “used to circumvent § 2244(b(2)(A)’s dictate that the only new law on which 

a successive petition may rely is ‘a new rule of constitutional law, made 

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was 

previously unavailable.’”74 Neither Martinez nor Trevino announced a new 

rule of constitutional law, and neither has been made retroactive to cases on 

collateral review. The Supreme Court further observed in Gonzalez that “an 

attack based on . . . habeas counsel’s omissions . . . ordinarily do[] not go to the 

integrity of the proceedings, but in effect asks for a second chance to have the 

merits determined favorably.”75

Clark contends, somewhat inconsistently, that the mitigation evidence 

developed by his new state habeas counsel, which Clark has presented to the 

district court in his Rule 60(b)(6) motion, is so “fundamentally different” from 

the claim raised in state court, it is a new claim not previously reviewed on the 

merits. He asserts in his reply brief that though the claim is new, it should not 

be barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

We need not decide whether Clark presents a new claim because, to the 

extent that he does, any such claim would be time-barred under 28 U.S.C. 

 

73 Diaz v. Stephens, 731 F.3d 370, 375 (5th Cir. 2013). 74 545 U.S. 524, 531-32 (2005).

75 Id. at 532 n.5 (citation omitted). 

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 20 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 14-70034

21

§ 2244(d). We first note that Clark has not sought leave to file a successive 

petition from this court; he has only appealed the district court’s denial of the 

Rule 60(b)(6) motion. If we were to consider part of his motion a new claim, 

however, it was not filed until September 19, 2014, almost two years after the 

Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari.76 Clark contends that 

equitable tolling excuses any delay and the resulting noncompliance with the 

statute of limitations requirements of § 2244(d)(1). Although § 2244(d)(1) is 

subject to equitable tolling,77 tolling is only available in “rare and exceptional 

circumstances.”78 For the same reasons we conclude that Clark’s Rule 60(b)(6)

motion is untimely, any available equitable tolling ended when Clark had 

actual knowledge in August 2013 that his federal habeas counsel had a conflict 

of interest. Furthermore, Clark was in fact appointed conflict-free counsel in 

August 2013, over a year before any new habeas petition was filed. Clark’s 

claim, if new, is time-barred.

* * * 

We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment denying relief from its prior 

September 19, 2007 judgment, in which it denied Clark’s petition for writ of 

habeas corpus on the merits. 

 

76 Clark v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 179 (2012) (mem.).

77 See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (holding that § 2244(d) is subject 

to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented 

timely filling” (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005))).

78 Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998).

 Case: 14-70034 Document: 00513905975 Page: 21 Date Filed: 03/10/2017