Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08021/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08021-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

William Denning, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Laura Schweitzer; et. al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 07-8021-PCT-PGR (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. No. 6). Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this

Court, this matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for Report and

Recommendation. For the following reasons the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as untimely.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. State Proceedings

1. Indictment and Conviction

On June 12, 1986, Petitioner was indicted for four counts of Sexual Assault, class 2

felonies, three of which were dangerous crimes against children; three counts of Sexual

Conduct With A Minor, class 2 felonies, each of which were dangerous crimes against

children; and five counts of Kidnapping, class 2 felonies, four of which were dangerous

crimes against children. (Answer (Doc. No. 15), p. 2 & Exh. A). 

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1

Counsel for Respondents has sequentially numbered the bottom right corner of each

page of the exhibits submitted in support of Respondents’ Answer. (See Answer, p.2).

Citations herein to Respondents’ exhibits refer to the pagination supplied by Respondents’

counsel.

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On October 1, 1986, Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of Sexual Assault, both

dangerous crimes against children, pursuant to a plea agreement providing for a stipulated

sentence of two consecutive, mitigated 15-year prison terms. (Answer, p. 2 & Exh. B, C).

However, on October 30, 1986, defense counsel informed the trial court that Petitioner

wanted to withdraw from the plea agreement on the grounds that all of the statements he gave

to police when he admitted guilt and the admissions that he made at the change of plea

hearing were false. (Answer, p. 3 & Exh. E, p. 321

, Exh. F, pp. 35-37). Petitioner argued

that during his initial interview with police, one officer promised “he would receive lenient

treatment if he confessed,” including the ability to serve his sentence in a mental institution,

instead of prison. (Answer, p.3; see also Answer, Exh. F, p.36). The State opposed

Petitioner’s request to withdraw his plea and the matter was set for an evidentiary hearing

to determine whether “manifest injustice” required that Petitioner be permitted to withdraw

from the plea agreement. (Answer, p.3; see also Answer, Exh. F, pp. 36, 40-41). 

On December 15, 1986, upon conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court

found Petitioner’s plea was voluntary because no evidence showed that, in exchange for an

admission of guilt, Petitioner was promised the ability to serve his sentence in a mental

institution. (Answer, p.3 & Exh. H). The trial court found no “manifest injustice...to correct

by allowing [Petitioner] to withdraw his guilty plea.” (Answer, Exh. H, p. 55).

On December 30, 1986, in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the trial

court sentenced Petitioner to two consecutive, mitigated 15-year terms of imprisonment.

(Answer, p.3 & Exh. J, pp. 63-73).

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In 1986, when Petitioner pled guilty, Arizona allowed direct appeals for defendants

who had entered guilty pleas. (See Answer, p. 13). 

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2. Direct Appeal

On January 5, 1987, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a notice of appeal and his

opening brief was filed on May 22, 1987.2

 (Answer, Exh. K). On appeal, Petitioner argued

that:

1. His guilty plea was invalid because the record did not establish a factual basis

for the plea; and

2. His plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary.

(Id.). 

On December 15, 1987, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and

sentence. (Answer, Exh. L; see also State v. Denning, 155 Ariz. 459, 747 P.2d 620 (App.

1987)). Petitioner did not seek review of the appellate court’s decision. (Petition, p.2).

3. First Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

On November 15, 1988, Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction

relief (hereinafter “PCR”) under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32, and, thereafter, counsel was appointed

to represent him. (Answer, p.4 & Exh. N, O). Petitioner raised the following claims in his

pro se First PCR Petition:

1. The introduction at trial of a coerced confession;

2. The introduction at trial of a statement obtained in absence of a lawyer at a

time when representation was constitutionally required;

3. Ineffective assistance of counsel at every critical stage of the proceeding;

4. An unlawfully induced plea of guilty;

5. “The existence of newly-discovered material which requires the court to vacate

the conviction or sentence [because] Defendant was not in Mojava [sic]

counties [sic] jurisdiction 3-31-88. If crime happened outside Majave [sic]

county, this court has no jurisdiction”; and

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6. Lack of jurisdiction of the court which entered the conviction or sentence.

(Answer, Exh. N). 

The trial court granted Petitioner’s counsel leave to file an amended petition.

(Answer, Exh. O). Although the trial court granted Petitioner’s requests for extensions of

time to file an amended PCR petition, Petitioner did not file an amended petition within the

time allowed, nor did he request further extensions of time to file same. (Answer, Exh. O,

P). On April 6, 1989, the trial court denied Petitioner’s PCR Petition.(Answer, Exh. Q).

Specifically, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s claims based on a coerced confession

(ground 1); the use of a statement obtained without a lawyer at time when representation was

constitutionally required (ground 2); an unlawfully induced plea of guilty (ground 4); and

lack of jurisdiction (ground 6), because each of those grounds either was raised or could have

been raised on direct appeal. (Id.). The trial court rejected Petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel (ground 3) which was based on “newly-discovered material” because

such claim was not supported by “affidavits or even unsworn statements clarifying which

attorney was ineffective or in what manner he may have been ineffective. The Court [found]

that Defendant’s Petition does not raise even a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel that would justify the setting of an evidentiary hearing on this issue.” (Id. at pp.123-

124). The trial court also rejected Petitioner’s claim, based upon “newly-discovered

material”, that he was not within the jurisdiction of Mohave county at the time of the offense

(ground 5):

The Court can determine no particular significance that the date March 31,

1988, or March 31 of any other year, has with regard to this case. If this Court

had no jurisdiction over the Defendant or this case at a time when it acted in

a manner affecting either the Defendant or this case, such lack of jurisdiction

could have been discovered early in this case with the exercise of very little

diligence and could have been brought to the Court’s attention more promptly

than 2 years after sentencing.

(Id. at p.124). 

Petitioner did not seek review from the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Answer, p. 4;

Petition, p.2).

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4. Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

On December 17, 1990, Petitioner filed a pro se Second PCR Petition and

accompanying affidavit. (Answer, Exh. R, S). Therein, Petitioner claimed that:

1. His statement was used against him although it was obtained in the absence of

a lawyer when representation was constitutionally required; and

2. He should have received concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences,

“because of weight of mitigating circumstances out-weighing the aggravating

circumstances.” 

(Id.). 

On January 21, 1991, the trial court denied Petitioner’s Second PCR Petition.

(Answer, Exh. U). The trial court held that Petitioner’s claim of an unlawfully obtained

confession was waived by his guilty plea; was addressed and denied by the trial court’s

ruling on Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea; was addressed and denied on direct

appeal; and was addressed and denied in the First PCR proceeding. (Id.). The trial court also

held that Petitioner’s sentencing claim was waived by his guilty plea and could have been

raised on appeal and in his First PCR Petition. (Id.). Thus, the court held that both of

Petitioner’s claims were precluded by his guilty plea and under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)

governing PCR proceedings. (Id.).

Petitioner did not seek appellate-court review from the Arizona Court of Appeals.

(Answer, p. 5; Petition, p. 3).

5. Third Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

On July 1, 2005, Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a third notice of PCR, asserting the

following claims:

1. Miranda rights violation;

2. Illegal plea agreement;

3. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel;

4. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel;

5. Illegal sentences; and

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6. Preclusion.

(Answer, Exh. V). On September 9, 2005, Petitioner filed his pro se Third PCR Petition

wherein he alleged facts in support of the first five claims set out in his Notice. (Answer,

Exh. X). He also included a claim of unlawful arrest. (Id.). To support his claims of illegal

plea agreement and illegal sentences, Petitioner asserted that “new information...from...trial

transcripts from Nevada...” state court showed that one of the victims in the present case

“was 15 at the time of the offense. That changes the sentence structure. That, therefore,

makes the sentence illegal.” (Answer, Exh. X at p. 155 (emphasis in original); see also Id.

at pp. 160-161). “[N]o affidavits, records or supporting evidence were attached to...”

Petitioner’s Third PCR Petition. (Answer, p.6; see also Answer, Exh. X).

On September 21, 2005, the trial court denied Petitioner’s Third PCR Petition because

“[a]ny colorable claims for relief raised by the Defendant in his Petition either were raised

or could have been raised more than 10 years either on his direct appeal under Rule 31 or his

petition for post-conviction relief. The Defendant’s claims are precluded under Rule

32.2(a).” (Answer, Exh. Y at p.170).

On September 28, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s request for

review. (Answer, p. 6; Petition, Exh. D).

6. Fourth Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

On October 21, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the

state trial court asserting the following claims:

1. “[W]rong sentence based on perjured testimony...” presented to the grand jury

concerning the age of one of the victims;

2. Neither victim could identify Petitioner;

3. Illegal photo array;

4. Illegal plea agreement; and

5. The trial court failed to provide records to enable Petitioner “to fully include

issues in PCR.”

(Answer, Exh. AA).

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Two of the submitted pages were the title pages for each proceeding.

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On November 15, 2005, pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.3, the trial court construed

Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus as a fourth PCR Petition. (Answer, p.4 & Exh. BB). In

denying Petitioner’s Fourth PCR Petition, the trial court held that Petitioner’s claims were

precluded under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a) because his claims either could have been or actually

were raised on direct appeal or in a prior PCR proceeding. (Id.) The court went on to

address Petitioner’s claim that one of the victims in his case was not the age claimed which

affected the sentence he received, stating in pertinent part:

The Defendant asserts that perjured testimony was presented to the Grand Jury

regarding the victim’s age, that she was really 15 years of age and that he

never learned this fact until he read the ‘trial transcripts’ from some

unidentified proceeding in Nevada. The Defendant has attached no exhibits

or affidavits to his petition. He has not included any transcript of the Nevada

proceeding referred to in his petition. He has not indicated when he first

learned of this discrepancy regarding the Defendant’s [sic] age. He has not

indicated how it is that neither he nor any of his previous court-appointed

attorneys could [sic] have discovered the age of the victim until almost 20

years after the crime that he pled to. The Court determines that the Defendant

has failed to state a colorable claim for relief under Rule 32.1(e) based on

newly discovered material facts.

(Id. at p. 183).

On December 5, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the trial court

and attached two transcript pages from a December 7, 1987 evidentiary hearing and three

pages from a December 8, 1987 jury trial in the State of Nevada’s criminal prosecution of

Petitioner.3

 (Answer, Exh. CC). Petitioner claimed that at the Nevada evidentiary hearing,

one of the victims who he pled guilty to sexually assaulting in the Arizona case testified that

she was 15 years of age on April 24, 1986 which was the date of the time of the offense

alleged in Count IV of Petitioner’s Arizona indictment. (Id. at pp. 190, 193; see also Answer

Exh. A). During the Nevada jury trial, another of Petitioner’s victims testified that she lived

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4

Although Petitioner did not amend his Fourth PCR Petition to add a specific

jurisdictional claim, he argued in his motion for reconsideration that “[t]he transcripts not

only covered the age but location of one of the alleged incidents being out of Arizona.”

(Answer, p.7 n.6; see also Answer, Exh. CC, pp.189-190). 

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in Bullhead City at the time of the offense and was sexually assaulted by Petitioner in the

vacant lot of a nursery located near Highway 95.4

 (Answer, Exh. CC, p.196). 

In his motion for reconsideration, Petitioner asserted that “he has waited for years to

obtain the trial records from Nevada. He recently obtained them, and then promptly filed his

3rd Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as required under Rule 32.1(e)....” (Id. at p.187).

Petitioner also attached to his motion for reconsideration a “copy of an envelope...” which

according to Petitioner “show[ed] that the transcripts were sent to the wrong address for 17

years. He finally received them in August, 2005!” (Id. at p.190). Petitioner argued that if

the trial court had held an evidentiary hearing on his Third PCR Petition, then “the transcripts

showing testimony by the victims at the hearing and trial in Nevada would have been seen

by this Court as proof, as the testimony was under oath.” (Id.).

On January 4, 2006, the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration

stating, “[i]t is not clear why the Defendant attached to his Motion for Reconsideration

transcripts which he could have attached to his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus but chose

not to.” (Answer, Exh. DD).

Petitioner asserts that his petition for review was denied by the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Petition, p.3).

7. Fifth Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

On January 26, 2006, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the trial court wherein he raised the following claims:

1. Illegal sentence based on perjured testimony presented to the grand jury

concerning one of the victim’s age;

2. Failure of identification;

3. Illegal photo array;

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4. The trial court “refused to supply records so Petitioner could fully include

issues in PCR.”

(Answer, Exh. EE). In support of his claim of perjured testimony, Petitioner attached two

transcript pages from the December 7, 1987 Nevada evidentiary hearing during which,

Petitioner maintained, one of the victims who he pled guilty to sexually assaulting in the

Arizona case testified that she was 15 years-old at the time of the offense. (Id. at p. 213).

Petitioner argued, inter alia, that “[v]ictim [WG] testified that she was 15 at the time of the

incident....That changes the charge from Dangerous Crimes Against Children to a regular

charge, thus changing the sentence as well.” (Id. at pp. 202-203). 

On February 7, 2006, the trial court construed Petitioner’s second petition for writ of

habeas corpus as Petitioner’s Fifth PCR Petition and denied the petition. (Answer, Exh. FF).

The trial court stated that the claims were precluded under Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure. (Id. at p.214). With regard to Petitioner’s claim that perjured

testimony was presented to the grand jury as to the age of one of the victims, the trial court

express[ed] the same concerns about this claim for relief as it did in the Order

dated November 15, 2005 [denying Petitioner’s Fourth PCR Petition]. In

addition, it is now clear that the Defendant is basing his claim on testimony

from a hearing in Nevada on December 7, 1987, at which he was apparently

present when the victim testified that she was 15 years old at the time of this

incident. Knowing that he had just recently been sentenced to 15 years in

prison in Arizona for a crime based on the fact that the victim was under 15 at

the time, it is hard to understand why the Defendant waited 18 years before

making this claim. The Defendant has not exercised due diligence in raising

this claim of “newly discovered” evidence.

The Court also notes that he is basing his claim at least in part on the

assertion that perjured testimony was presented to the Grand Jury. He has

submitted, however, no police reports or other documentation as to the

victim’s true age to suggest that any witness testifying before the Grand Jury

knew her correct age and deliberately or recklessly misrepresented her age in

order to secure an Indictment on a more serious charge.

The Court is not convinced that the Defendant has raised a material

factual claim entitling him to an evidentiary hearing for which the State would

have to track down a possible witness 18 years after the Defendant became

aware of the basis for his claim.

(Id. at p. 215). 

On April 20, 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s request for

review. (Answer, p.9; Petition, Exh. D).

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5

Within Ground IV, Petitioner also advances claims that his attorney lied to him and

“did not actively pursue the correct ages of the alleged victims.” (Petition, p.8) In Ground

V, Petitioner again raises his claim that counsel failed to “actively challenge the age

question.” (Id. at p.9). Any claim regarding trial counsel’s alleged failure to determine the

victim’s age is addressed in the Court’s analysis of Ground V.

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B. Petitioner’s Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

The instant pro se Petition for federal habeas relief was signed by Petitioner on May

24, 2007 and filed-stamped by the Clerk of the Court on May 29, 2007. (Doc. No. 6). A

federal habeas petition is deemed filed when handed by the inmate to a prison official for

mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-271 (1988); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d

1243, 1245 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Under the prison mailbox rule...a pro se petitioner's petition

is deemed constructively filed at the moment it is delivered to prison officials to be

forwarded to the court clerk.") The Court deems the Petition commencing this action as filed

on May 24, 2007. See id. 

Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief:

 1. Violation of his 5th and 14th Amendment rights to due process based upon

unlawful arrest without a warrant, that Arizona detectives lacked jurisdiction

to arrest him in Nevada, and that one of the offenses “may have taken place in

California–not in Arizona...” (Ground I);

2. Violation of the “5th and 6th Amendment-Miranda violation” (Ground II);

3. Violation of the 6th and 8th Amendments in that he received an illegal sentence

and was “over-charged” (Ground III);

4. Violation of the 6th Amendment because he was denied the right to withdraw

from his plea agreement and, inter alia, had Petitioner been permitted to

proceed to trial, the victim’s age would have come to light thus resulting in a

lower sentence (Ground IV)5

;

5. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel based upon, inter alia, counsel’s failure

to “actively challenge the age question” and because counsel “took the word

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of the prosecutor who said that the victims did not want to testify....Yet, the

victims went to Nevada, and testified there!” (Ground V); and

6. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based upon, inter alia, counsel’s

failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel on the ground that trial

counsel failed to “learn the correct ages of the alleged victims” and that

appellate counsel “did not try to change the wrong charge or illegal sentence

on one of the counts” (Ground VI).

(Petition) (emphasis in original).

Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. No. 15) on September 5, 2007. Petitioner filed

his Reply on September 20, 2007. (Doc. No. 19).

II. DISCUSSION

Respondents argue that the Petition is time-barred under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (hereinafter “AEDPA”).

Because Petitioner’s federal habeas petition was filed after the AEDPA’s effective

date of April 24, 1996, “the provisions of the [AEDPA] apply to this case.” Patterson, 251

F.3d at 1245 (citing Smith v. Robbins 528 U.S. 259, 268 n.3 (2000)). The AEDPA "imposes

a one-year statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in federal

court." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)) (footnote omitted). Pursuant to section 2244, the

limitations period:

shall run from the latest of– 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D).

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The record herein is clear that Petitioner’s conviction became final prior to enactment

of the AEDPA in 1996. See infra, at II.D. “State prisoners, like [Petitioner herein], whose

convictions became final prior to AEDPA’s enactment, had a one-year grace period [–until

April 24, 1997–] in which to file their petitions.” Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1245-1246 (citations

omitted). 

Because Petitioner initiated this action on May 24, 2007, more than ten years after the

AEDPA limitations period expired, his Petition is untimely filed unless 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(B),(C), or (D) operate to delay commencement of the statute of limitations or

tolling applies.

A. Section 2244(d)(1)(B) does not apply

Respondents are correct that “Petitioner has neither alleged nor proved that a later

statute-of-limitations starting date applies under section 2244(d)(1)(B) because of an

‘impediment to filing an action created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States’...” that prevented Petitioner from filing a timely application. (Answer,

p.10 n.7 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(B)). Consequently, section 2244(d)(1)(B) does not

alter the statute of limitations calculation in this case.

B. Section 2244(d)(1)(C) does not apply

Respondents also correctly assert that Petitioner neither alleges nor establishes that

the commencement of the statute of limitations herein involves a newly recognized

constitutional right that applies retroactively to Petitioner’s case. (Answer, p.10 n.7).

Consequently, section 2244(d)(1)(C) does not apply to alter the statute of limitations

calculation in this case.

C. Section 2244(d)(1)(D) does not apply

Where, despite the exercise of due diligence, the petitioner was unable to discover the

“factual predicate” of his claim, the statute of limitations does not begin to run on that

particular claim until either the discovery of such facts or the time when Petitioner could

have discovered such facts, whichever is earlier. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).

Respondents address the applicability of section 2244(d)(1)(D) to Grounds I and III only of

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the instant Petition. A fair reading of the Petition also supports the conclusion that Ground

Grounds V and VI as they relate to ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel

concerning the issue of the age of the victim in Count IV of the Indictment, fall within the

section 2244(d)(1)(D) analysis as well. However, Respondents are correct that section

2244(d)(1)(D) is inapplicable to Ground II, IV, and portions of Grounds V and VI that do

not involve claims based on the victim’s age given that the factual predicate for those claims

was known or should have been known by Petitioner at the time of his conviction and/or

appeal.

With respect to the claims based on the Nevada testimony, i.e., Grounds I, III, and

portions of Grounds V and VI, there is no dispute on the instant record that in December

1987, during the Nevada criminal proceedings against Petitioner, Petitioner was made aware

of the fact that one victim’s testimony suggested that the Arizona offense occurred outside

of Arizona and another victim testified that she was 15 at the time of the offense upon which

Count IV of the Arizona Indictment is based. (See e.g. Petition, p.12 (“When W. Gannon said

she was age 15 when the crime took place (while under oath), I knew I needed a copy of the

testimony to prove my suspicions all along were right.”)). Thus, the record is clear the

Petitioner knew about these “new” facts in 1987.

Petitioner argues that he required evidence of these facts to pursue his claims, and

thus, he could not proceed until 2005 when he obtained the transcripts. (See Petition, p.12).

As to diligence, Petitioner represented to the Arizona court that “the transcripts were sent to

the wrong address for 17 years. He finally received them in August, 2005!” (Answer, Exh.

CC, p. 190). Petitioner represents to this Court that when he “tried to obtain the transcripts,

he was told they would cost around $4,000.00 from the court in Nevada. He did not have the

funds to purchase them. After many years, Petitioner found someone who knew how to get

them at no cost.” (Reply, p.6) (emphasis in original) Further according to Petitioner, “the

records were sent twice to a wrong address.” (Id.). Petitioner also asserts that “he never

knew of the A.E.D.P.A. restrictions for filing until he met the person who was able to obtain

the Nevada transcripts without charge.” (Reply, pp.9-10) (emphasis in original). He also

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Additionally, as to Petitioner’s claim in Ground V that trial counsel was ineffective

for taking “the word of the prosecutor who said that the victims did not want to testify, but

put it behind them. Yet, the victims went to Nevada, and testified there[]” (Petition, p.9), it

is clear on the instant record that Petitioner was aware in 1987 that the victims testified in

Nevada. 

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attached to his Petition correspondence written in 2005 requesting transcripts of a May 1986

Nevada extradition hearing. (Petition, Exh. C). 

The Ninth Circuit has been clear that the AEDPA statute of limitations commences

when the petitioner knows the important facts. See Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154

n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) (the statute of limitations begins to run when the petitioner knows the

important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance). The record shows

that Petitioner knew the important facts relating to each victim’s testimony in December

1987.6

 Because Petitioner knew about the “new” facts in 1987, section 2241(d)(1)(D) does

not apply to alter the statute of limitations calculation in Petitioner’s case. 

D. Statutory tolling does not apply

The AEDPA limitations period is statutorily tolled when a "properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending...." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). When Petitioner was convicted, Arizona law

permitted defendants who pled guilty to seek direct appeal. In 1992, Arizona rules were

amended to reflect that defendants in noncapital cases who pled guilty waived their right to

file a conventional direct appeal, and instead could seek review only by filing a petition for

post-conviction relief. See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 715 (9th Cir. 2007) (referring

to such post-conviction relief proceedings as “Rule 32 of-right proceedings....”). In 2003,

the Ninth Circuit held that a Rule 32 of-right proceeding is a form of direct review, not

collateral review, for purposes of the AEDPA statute of limitations. Id. at 715-717. 

Respondents persuasively argue that Summers does not apply to petitioners, like the

instant Petitioner, who pled guilty before 1992 and who thereafter filed a direct appeal.

(Answer, p.14). If Summers does not apply, then Petitioner’s state conviction became final

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on January 14, 1988, the date his opportunity to petition the Arizona Supreme Court for

review of the appellate court’s decision expired. (See Answer (citing Ariz.R.Crim.P.

31.19(a)). Moreover, even if Summers did apply, Petitioner’s conviction would have become

final at the conclusion of his First PCR Proceeding, including review of that proceeding, or

upon the expiration of the time available to initiate such a proceeding. Summers, 481 F.3d

at 711. Here, the trial court denied Petitioner’s First PCR Petition on April 6, 1989 and the

time for Petitioner to file a petition for review expired thirty days later on May 6, 1989. See

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c). Under either scenario, Petitioner’s conviction became final long

before enactment of the AEDPA, thus rendering April 24, 1997 the applicable statute of

limitations absent tolling. See Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1256. Therefore, to any extent that

section 2244(d)(2) would have applied to Petitioner’s case, that section would work to toll

the time during which any properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review was pending if such application was filed between April 24, 1996–the date

of AEDPA’s enactment– and April 24, 1997. No PCR proceedings were initiated or pending

between April 24, 1996 and April 24, 1997. Under these circumstances, Petitioner’s

limitations period was not statutorily tolled and, instead, expired on April 24, 1997.

Petitioner’s three PCR petitions filed after April 24, 1997 did not restart or otherwise

impact the AEDPA statute of limitations. A state post-conviction relief proceeding filed after

expiration of the AEDPA statute of limitations period has no effect whatsoever on the statute

of limitations calculation because such state proceeding can neither revive the limitations

period nor toll the already-expired period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th

Cir. 2003) ("[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that

has ended before the state petition was filed."); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir.

2001) (where petitioner filed his state post-conviction relief proceeding "after the AEDPA

statute of limitations ended...[t]hat delay resulted in an absolute time bar..."); Rashid v.

Khulmann, 991 F.Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Once the limitations period is expired,

collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid a statute of limitations."). Consequently,

section 2244(d)(2) does not render Petitioner’s petition timely.

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E. Equitable tolling is not warranted

Respondents argue that in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Bowles v.

Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), the AEDPA is not subject to equitable tolling. (See Answer

at pp. 18-19). The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that the Supreme Court has never

explicitly determined whether section 2244(d) allows for equitable tolling. Waldron-Ramsey

v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, __ S.Ct.__,

2009 WL 2058179 (Oct. 5, 2009). See also Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054 n.4, cert.

den., __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 397 (2008). However, the Ninth Circuit has specifically held that

“Bowles did not invalidate equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations.” WaldronRamsey, 556 F.3d at 1011 n.2. Therefore equitable tolling remains viable for Petitioner

herein.

"Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way." Pace v. DiGulglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). See also

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011. Additionally, “[a] petitioner must show that his

untimeliness was caused by an external impediment and not his own lack of diligence.”

Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007). See also WaldronRamsey, 556 F.3d at 1011 (an external force must cause the untimeliness, thus mere

oversight, miscalculation or negligence on the petitioner’s part would preclude the

application of equitable tolling). The petitioner must also establish that the extraordinary

circumstances asserted were, in fact, the reason why the federal habeas petition was

untimely. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). Moreover, a pro se

petitioner's "lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance

warranting equitable tolling." Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006).

Petitioner asserts that “when...[he] tried to obtain the transcripts he was told they

would cost around $4,000.00 from the court in Nevada. He did not have the funds to

purchase them. After many years, Petitioner found someone who knew how to get them at

no cost. As shown the records were sent twice to the wrong address. Once he recieved the

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transcripts, he file[d] a Petition in State Court.” (Reply, p.6)(emphasis in original).

According to Petitioner, he never knew of the AEDPA statute of limitations “until he met

the person who was able to obtain the Nevada transcripts without charge.” (Id. at pp. 9-10).

He also maintains that “[s]ince A.E.D.P.A. started in 1996, the same year that prison law

libraries were being removed, only a few ‘jail house lawyers’ would have learned about the

new rules of time for filing Habeas petitions. Petitioner was not knowledgeable in the law.”

(Id. at p. 10) (emphasis in original). He further claims that he was “impeded by not being

able to obtain the required proof for 18 years.” (Id. at p.9) (emphasis in original). Finally,

he argues that the Nevada testimony establishes his actual innocence and “the claim of actual

innocence does not have a time period to file.” (Id.). 

Petitioner’s ignorance of the law and lack of legal sophistication, alone, do not

constitute extraordinary circumstances to warrant equitable tolling. See Raspberry, 448 F.3d

at 1154. Petitioner concedes that he was unaware of the AEDPA statute of limitations.

There is no showing that Petitioner attempted to ascertain his rights with regard to federal

habeas review at any time prior to the filing of the instant action. Under the instant

circumstances, any alleged lack of legal materials during the relevant limitations period

herein –between April 1996 and April 1997–would not serve to demonstrate a causal

connection between the unavailability of such information and the untimeliness of the

Petitioner’s habeas petition. See Bryant, 499 F.3d at 1060-1061. 

Further, Petitioner fails to explain why he waited 18 or more years, 10 of which were

after the AEDPA’s enactment, to seek federal habeas relief on his claims that are unrelated

to the Nevada testimony, i.e., Grounds II, IV and portions of Grounds V and VI that do not

involve claims based on the Nevada testimony, given that the factual bases for such claims

was known or should have been known to Petitioner at the time of conviction and/or appeal.

The instant record overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that Petitioner did not act

diligently to seek federal habeas relief as to Grounds II, IV and portions of Grounds V and

VI that do not involve claims based on the Nevada testimony.

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7

Petitioner’s Third PCR Petition was signed by Petitioner on June 27, 2005 and filed

stamped by the state court on July 1, 2005. (Answer, Exh. V).

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Nor is there any support that Petitioner’s claim of “actual innocence” based on the

Nevada testimony, which is unrelated to Grounds II, IV and portions of Grounds V and VI

that do not involve claims based on the Nevada testimony, would work to equitably toll the

limitations period as to these claims. When rejecting a similar argument, the Honorable

Margaret A. Nagle, United States Magistrate Judge, stated in an Amended Report and

Recommendation adopted by the District Court for the Central District of California that:

The Supreme Court has made clear that equitable tolling cannot be afforded

when a petitioner has not pursued his rights diligently. There is no tenable

basis for finding that a state prisoner such as Petitioner can allow the AEDPA

limitations period to expire as to known claims and then, after a decade has

passed, assert an entitlement to equitable tolling as to such long-known claims

simply because he pleads additional claims premised on actual innocence. The

equitable tolling doctrine plainly is inapplicable to Grounds Five through

Twenty-Eight and Thirty, and they are grossly untimely.

Perez v. Evans, 2009 WL 2104853, *14 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2009). This Court agrees. Even

if “actual innocence” factored into the AEDPA statute of limitations analysis, see discussion

infra, at II.F, Petitioner would not be entitled to tolling, with regard to Grounds II, IV and

portions of Grounds V and VI not related to the Nevada testimony. 

With respect to Petitioner’s claims based on the Nevada testimony, i.e., Grounds I, III,

and portions of Grounds V and VI, which Petitioner contends establishes his actual

innocence, Petitioner was aware of such testimony in 1987. Yet, Petitioner took no steps to

assert or prove his actual innocence until arguably late June 2005 when he filed his Third

PCR Petition.7

 He asserts that he did not proceed earlier because of an 18-year delay in

obtaining the transcripts. He also asserted to the state court that he did not receive the

transcripts until August 2005. (Answer, Exh. CC at p.190) The fact that Petitioner first

raised the issue of the Nevada testimony before the Arizona court on July 1, 2005, before his

claimed August 2005 receipt of the transcripts, brings into question the veracity of his

assertion that he was waiting for the transcripts before seeking relief. (See Petition, p.12).

More importantly, once Petitioner became aware in 1987 that the Nevada testimony could

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perhaps establish his actual innocence, one can only assume that he would have been highly

motivated to act promptly in seeking relief. See Perez, 2009 WL 2104853 at *14 (“the Court

can only assume that Petitioner, like any other prisoner claiming to be innocent, would have

been highly motivated to act promptly in seeking relief.”) (emphasis in original). Yet, he did

nothing to establish his innocence over the many intervening years between 1987 and 1997

when the statute of limitations expired. Petitioner claimed to the state court that mail from

Nevada was “sent to a wrong address for 17 years.” (Answer, Exh. CC, p.190). Yet, nothing

in the record demonstrates that Petitioner did anything during that 17-year period to obtain

the transcripts, or to inquire as to why he had not received them, or to inform the appropriate

Nevada parties of his current address. Instead, the record reflects correspondence dated 2005

regarding his request for the transcript of a 1986 Nevada extradition hearing. (Petition, Exh.

C). To this Court, Petitioner claims that “the records were sent twice to a wrong address.

Once he received the transcripts, he file[d] a Petition in State Court.” (Reply, p.6). 

Petitioner also states that “when...[he] tried to obtain the transcript, he was told they would

cost around $4,000.00 from the court in Nevada. He did not have the funds to purchase

them. After many years, Petitioner found someone who knew how to get them at no cost.”

(Id.). Such position flatly contradicts his prior assertion that the transcripts had been sent to

an incorrect address for 17 years. Petitioner does not provide correspondence or any other

information suggesting that after the 1987 Nevada proceedings he immediately sought the

transcripts but could not obtain them because of cost. Petitioner did not immediately go to

the Arizona court with his claim and/or request for assistance to obtain the transcripts despite

his actual knowledge of the 1987 testimony. There is no basis on this record for concluding

that Petitioner pursued his rights diligently with respect to his claims related to the Nevada

testimony.

“As both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have made abundantly clear,

‘equitable tolling is unavailable where...a petitioner did not exercise reasonable diligence.’”

Perez, 2009 WL 2104853 at *15 (citing Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1016, 1018);

Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007)). See also Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1015

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8

“‘Actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not merely legal insufficiency.”

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-624 (1998). To meet this test, the petitioner

must show that in light of new and reliable evidence not present at trial, “it is more likely

than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable

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(“The Supreme Court and the policies behind AEDPA require that equitable tolling be used

only to protect diligent petitioners facing extraordinary circumstances that prevent them from

timely filing federal habeas petitions.”). Petitioner herein has failed to satisfy his burden of

showing that he pursued his rights diligently as required for application of the equitable

tolling doctrine to Grounds I, III, and portions of Grounds V and VI relating to the Nevada

testimony. 

For the foregoing reasons, the equitable tolling doctrine does not apply to any of

Petitioner’s grounds for relief.

F. Petitioner’s claim of “actual innocence” does not alter the statute of limitations

calculation

Petitioner argues that the AEDPA statute of limitations does not apply to claims of

actual innocence (Reply, p.9 (“the claim of actual innocence does not have a time period to

file.”)). Petitioner claims that the Nevada testimony supports his claim that he is actually

innocent of the facts giving rise to the sentencing enhancement in this case because,

according to Petitioner, the victim was 15 years of age at the time of the offense. See State

of Arizona v. Denning, 155 Ariz. 459, 461, 747 P.2d 620, 622 (App. 1987) (“A.R.S. § 13-

1406 does not establish the additional element that a defendant know the victim is under

fifteen years of age. Instead, it merely allows for the enhancement of the sentence if the

victim is under fifteen years of age. In this case, both victims were indisputedly under fifteen

years of age, and this fact triggers the enhancement provision.”)).

The Supreme Court has held that a petitioner may establish a procedural “gateway”

permitting consideration of the merits of procedurally defaulted claims if he demonstrates

“actual innocence”, thus bringing him within the “narrow class of cases...” implicating a

fundamental miscarriage of justice.8

 Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315-317. See also House, 547 U.S.

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doubt.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,327 (1995). See also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518,

536-539 (2006). The Ninth Circuit has expressly declined to decide whether the actual

innocence gateway applies in cases where the petitioner has pled guilty or no contest. See

Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d. 1127, 1140 n. 9 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“We do not determine

whether the Schlup actual innocence gateway always applies to petitioners who plead guilty

(or no contest), but in this case the state has not raised the argument and more importantly,

[petitioner] has failed to satisfy the requirements of Schlup. Thus, the question is ultimately

irrelevant for purposes of the habeas petition under consideration.”); Griffin v. Johnson, 350

F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2003) (examining the actual innocence gateway in a case where the

petitioner had pled guilty). See also Chestang v. Sisto, 2009 WL 2567860 (E.D. Cal. 2009)

(noting that unlike Schlup which involved a jury verdict, a petitioner who has pled guilty has

“essentially convicted himself.”). Respondents herein have argued in the context of

procedural default that “Petitioner does not deny that he committed the offenses to which he

pleaded guilty.” (Answer, p.20 n. 10 (citing Petition; Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327)). Herein, as

in Smith, Respondents have not argued that the actual innocence gateway does not apply to

a petitioner who has pled guilty. See Smith, 510 F.3d at 1140 n.9.

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at 536-539. To pass through the Schlup actual innocence gateway, the petitioner must

demonstrate that a constitutional violation occurred that “has probably resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327 (citations omitted). “A

petitioner need not show that he is ‘actually innocent’ of the crime he was convicted of

committing; instead he must show that ‘a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the

trial.’” Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 776 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Carriger v. Stewart, 132

F.3d 463, 478 (9th Cir. 1997)). Moreover, the actual innocence “standard is somewhat

different for claims of sentencing error (as opposed to conviction)....[T]he Supreme Court

has stated that where a petitioner claims to be actually innocent of the death penalty to which

he has been sentenced, he must ‘show by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a

constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death

penalty under the applicable state law....” Cruz v. Clark, 2009 WL 363399, *6 (C.D. Cal.

Feb. 12, 2009) (quoting Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992)). The Supreme Court

has declined to address application of the actual innocence exception to claims challenging

noncapital sentencing error. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004). Circuit courts

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9

On remand, the district court determined that the petitioner in Majoy failed to

establish actual innocence. Majoy v. Roe, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2009 WL 2489217 (C.D. Cal.

Aug. 4, 2009).

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are split as to whether Sawyer’s actual innocence exception applies to claims of sentencing

errors in noncapital cases such as Petitioner’s and “the Ninth Circuit [has] yet to voice an

opinion on this issue.” Cruz, 2009 WL 363399 at *6 (footnote omitted). Regardless whether

the exception is applicable to claims of noncpatial sentencing error, as discussed below,

Petitioner is not entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations in this case. 

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has held that a showing of actual

innocence may excuse an untimely section 2254 habeas petition. See Majoy, 296 F.3d at

776 (“the question to be answered is whether surviving the rigors of this gateway has the

consequence of overriding AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitation, a legal question not yet

decided by this Circuit or the Supreme Court.”); Perez, 2009 WL 2104853 at *16 (setting out

comprehensive survey of law on this issue); Chestang, 2009 WL 2567860 (same); Larsen

v. Adams, 2009 WL 2481978 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2009) (same); Jones v. Marshall, 2009 WL

2189892 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2009). In Majoy, the Ninth Circuit expressly declined to

consider whether an adequate showing of actual innocence would override AEDPA’s statute

of limitation. Majoy, 296 F.3d at 776-777. Instead, the Majoy court remanded the matter for

a determination whether an adequate showing of actual innocence could be made in that

case.9

 Id. at 778. In a 2008 unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit “assum[ed]” that

Schlup’s actual innocence gateway provided a basis for equitable tolling and held that the

petitioner in that case failed to make the requisite showing of actual innocence. Hartawan

v. Gordon, 265 Fed.Appx. 666 (9th Cir. Jan.31, 2008).

As recognized by Magistrate Judge Nagle in Perez, “[o]ther circuits have reached

varying conclusions on the issue of whether a claim of untimeliness may be avoided by a

claim of ‘actual innocence.’” Perez, 2009 WL 2104853 at *16. The First Circuit, citing the

petitioner’s lack of diligence in raising his claim of actual innocence, has rejected the

argument that it was unconstitutional to apply AEDPA’s statute of limitations to bar a

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petition even though the petitioner claimed actual innocence. David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343,

347 (1st Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 815 (2003). In so holding, the First Circuit stated:

In general, defendants who may be innocent are constrained by the same

explicit statutory or rule-based deadlines as those against whom the evidence

is overwhelming: pre-trial motions must be filed on time, timely appeals must

be lodged, and habeas claims must conform to AEDPA. In particular, the

statutory one-year limit on filing initial habeas petitions is not mitigated by any

statutory exception for actual innocence even though Congress clearly knew

how to provide such an escape hatch. 

Id. The court went on to note that:

In AEDPA Congress adopted a form of actual innocence test as one

component of its threshold requirements for allowing a second or successive

habeas petition; but it also provided that this second petition is allowed only

where the factual predicate for the claim of constitutional error could not have

been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(2)(B).

Id. n.5. The court also recognized the

strong public interest in the prompt assertion of habeas claims. Normally, the

grant of habeas relief leaves the state free to retry the petitioner, but this

becomes increasingly hard to do as memories fade, evidence disperses and

witnesses disappear. A defendant who could not have filed his petition earlier

is at least a sympathetic figure; one who has a known claim, defers presenting

it, and then asks to be excused for the delay is unlikely to get cut much slack.

Id. at 347. 

Other circuits have discussed the issue within the rubric of an equitable tolling

analysis. See Akrawi v. Booker, 572 F.3d 252 (6th Cir. 2009) (The statute of limitations

defense, “per the restrictions on habeas relief prescribed by Congress in AEDPA, effectively

bars relief absent a showing that a petitioner’s untimeliness should be excused based on

equitable tolling and actual innocence”) (citing McCray v. Vasbinder, 499 F.3d 568, 571 (6th

Cir. 2007) (wherein the Sixth Circuit recognized a claim of “actual innocence” as “[o]ne

form of equitable tolling...” and rejected an untimely petition because the petitioner had not

met the Schlup standard)); Balsewicz v. Kingston, 425 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 546 U.S. 1144 (2006), (“This Court has stated that actual innocence, instead of

comprising a freestanding exception to the AEDPA, must be presented in conjunction with

a claim that the habeas statute of limitations should be equitably tolled.” (citing Gildon v.

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10However, the Seventh Circuit has also stated that

“actual innocence” is unrelated to the statutory timeliness rules...Actual

innocence without a newly discovered claim does nothing at all. Although the

statute leaves some (limited) room for equitable tolling, see Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, ___ -___, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 1814-15, 161 L.Ed.2d

669 (2005), courts cannot alter the rules laid down in the text. Section 2244(d)

has a rule for when new factual discoveries provide a fresh period for

litigation; unless that standard is met, a contention that the new discoveries add

up to actual innocence is unavailing. Prisoners claiming to be innocent, like

those contending that other events spoil the conviction, must meet the statutory

requirement of timely action.

Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868, 871-172 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Araujo v. Chandler,

435 F.3d 678, 681-682 (7th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that tolling argument based on actual

innocence “does not comfortably fall within any of the statutory or equitable principles...”

and, instead, applying section 2244(d)(1)(D) analysis).

11The petitioner in Gibson did not claim that the actual innocence exception should

toll the AEDPA statute of limitations. 

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Bowen, 384 F.3d 883, 887 (7th Cir. 2004))10; Flanders v. Graves, 299 F.3d 974, 977-978 (8th

Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1236 (2003), (finding that equitable tolling did not apply

to facts of petitioner’s claim of actual innocence because the petitioner had not shown any

circumstances external to him that were the cause of his delay, and also noting that “[f]or

such a claim to be viable...a petitioner would have to show some action or inaction on the

part of the respondent that prevented him from discovering the relevant facts in a timely

fashion, or at the very least, that a reasonably diligent petitioner could not have discovered

these facts in time to file a petition within the period of limitations.”); Gibson v. Klinger, 232

F.3d 799 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating in dicta that “[e]quitable tolling would be appropriate, for

example, when a prisoner is actually innocent...” and the petitioner has “diligently pursue[d]

his federal habeas claims.”)11. 

The Fifth Circuit has held that a claim of actual innocence is not a sufficient

circumstance to warrant equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See Cousins v.

Lensing, 310 F.3d 843, 849 (2002); Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 173 (5th Cir. 2000)

(petitioner’s “actual innocence claim also does not constitute a ‘rare and exceptional’

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circumstance given that many prisoners maintain they are innocent” and petitioner did not

make a showing of actual innocence.). The published decisions of the Second and Eleventh

Circuits reflect that these courts have avoided addressing the issue. See Doe v. Menefee,

391 F.3d 147, 173-174 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 961 (2005); Johnson v. Florida

Dep’t. Of Corr., 513 F.3d 1328, 133 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 348

(2008); Wyzkowski v. Department of Corr., 226 F.3d 1213, 1281-1219 (11th Cir. 2000).

Further, “[t]he Third Circuit has not yet issued a published decision on this issue.” Perez,

2009 WL 2104853 at *17 (noting that unpublished decisions from the Third circuit indicate

that “assuming arguendo that actual innocence may permit avoidance of the limitations

period, the analysis must be conducted under the rubric of the equitable tolling doctrine...”).

Finally, the Fourth Circuit has not issued a published or unpublished decision regarding this

issue.

This Court finds persuasive the rationale that, assuming arguendo that a claim of

actual innocence factors into the AEDPA statute of limitations calculus, such a claim must

be brought diligently:

Indeed, the AEDPA statute of limitations does not even commence to run until

the factual predicate for the claim could have become known with reasonable

diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). It becomes absurd to think that one

who knows, or should know, of a claim for actual innocence may pocket the

claim, and only spring it years or decades after the fact. In essence, a

suspension or ignoring of the AEDPA statute of limitations is not necessary for

claims of actual innocence. If petitioner had knowledge of the factual

predicate of his claim of actual innocence years ago, as he must have if it is

true, or should have had such knowledge years ago, his lack of diligence

precludes him (and should preclude him) from proceeding at present. Congress

anticipated newly discovered factual predicates, including those for actual

innocence claims, and provided for such in the AEDPA limitations statute

itself....[T]here is no reason to allow a petitioner to sit on [new evidence] after

discovery until such time as petitioner feels the time is right to bring it.

Chestang, 2009 WL 2567860 at *13 (explaining that the AEDPA limitations provisions do

not prevent a petitioner from bringing a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered

evidence or newly discovered testing procedures) (emphasis in original); see also Perez,

2009 WL 2104853 at *19 n. 25 (“the existence of Section 2244(d)(1)(D)-which provides a

basis for a diligent state prisoner, who has belatedly discovered new facts that give rise to an

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actual innocence argument, to obtain a delayed accrual date for his limitations period-begs

the question of whether it is appropriate at all to infer into the statute an additional basis for

reaching the same result, whether as a freestanding exception or as an equitable tolling

circumstance.”) (emphasis in original). Moreover, to the extent that such a claim may not

fit within section 2244(d)(1)(D), the doctrine of equitable tolling is available to habeas

petitioners. Under that analysis, “diligence unquestionably is a prerequisite to assertion of

actual innocence as a basis for avoidance of a petition’s untimeliness. Indeed, the Supreme

Court has made clear that, in the context of Section 2254 habeas petitions and the AEDPA

limitations period, equitable tolling cannot be afforded absent proof of a petitioner’s

diligence.” Perez, 2009 WL 2104853 at * 19 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).

Further, this Court agrees that “[t]here is no apparent justification for concluding that claims

of actual innocence should be not required to be brought diligently just as any other habeas

claims, nor is there any apparent justification for affording a petitioner, who claims to be

actually innocent, equitable tolling when he has failed to proceed with diligence.” Id. 

Even if an actual innocence exception to the statute of limitations did not fall under

the rubric of equitable tolling, this Court is persuaded that any such exception would

necessarily include a diligence component:

In the sole instance within the AEDPA in which Congress expressly provided

for actual innocence to serve as a basis for avoiding a procedural limitation,

Congress conditioned that exception on proof that the habeas petitioner

exercised “due diligence.” Section 2244, the same statute containing the

AEDPA limitations period, also limits the ability of state prisoners to bring

second or successive habeas petitions. They are precluded from doing so

unless they show the existence of a claim, not previously presented, that either:

is based on a new and retroactive rule of constitutional law; or rests on a

factual predicate “that could not have been discovered previously through the

exercise of due diligence” and, if proven, establishes actual innocence. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) and (B)....It would be incongruous to imply into

Section 2244 a basis for avoiding one of the statute's procedural bars (the

timeliness requirement) without imposing a diligence component, when the

statute's only express basis for avoiding its other procedural bar (the second or

successive petition prohibition) does contain such a requirement.

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12The Perez court also astutely points out that: 

The existence of the remedies provided by these two provisions for petitioners

who have been proceeding diligently, but learn of facts supporting actual

innocence claims after the one-year limitations period has run under Section

2244(d)(1)(A) and/or after a federal habeas petition already has been brought

and ruled upon shows that Congress apparently anticipated newly discovered

actual innocence claims and provided mechanisms that allow them to be raised

on a delayed basis. These existing remedies, thus, arguably assuage

Suspension Clause or similar constitutional concerns.

Perez, 2009 WL 2104853 at *19 n.25. Here, the claims relating to the Nevada testimony

were available to Petitioner from 1987 onward and, had he diligently exhausted state

remedies immediately upon learning of such claims, he would have had ample time after

AEDPA’s enactment in which to bring his claims within the statutory deadline. See e.g.

David, 318 F.3d at 347. He failed to do so. 

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 Perez, 2009 WL 2104853 at *19 (footnotes omitted) (also noting that 2254(e)(2) permitting

evidentiary hearings where a petitioner failed to develop the factual basis for his claim in

state court, also contains a due diligence requirement) (emphasis in original).12

As discussed supra, at II.E., Petitioner’s claim of actual innocence based on the

Nevada testimony has no relevance to Grounds II, IV and portions of Grounds V and VI not

relating to that testimony. Further, with regard to Petitioner’s remaining grounds for relief,

i.e., Grounds I, III, and portions of Grounds V and VI relating to the Nevada testimony, for

the reasons stated above see supra, at II.E., Petitioner did not pursue his claim, known to him

since 1987, of actual innocence with reasonable diligence.

There is no compelling reason why a petitioner who delays in presenting

claims based on known facts should be permitted to avoid the statute of

limitations simply because he asserts ‘actual innocence’ and claims an

attendant exemption from the procedural requirements to which other Section

2254 habeas litigants must adhere....A litigant who knows of the circumstances

giving rise to such claims and of his asserted innocence and yet does nothing

but sit on his claims for over 15 years, should not be permitted to avoid the

requirements with which other prisoner litigants struggle to comply simply

because he decides to claim that he is innocent [over] a decade and a half after

his conviction.

Id. at *19. Like the petitioner in Perez, Petitioner herein “did not act in a timely manner and

is now subject to the consequences of his own dilatory conduct. The habeas remedy is not

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inadequate or ineffective for those who pursue it.” Id. at *3. In light of Petitioner’s lack

of diligence, the Petition herein is untimely filed.

III. CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely filed and, thus, barred

from federal court review.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court,

after its independent review, dismiss Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc.

No. 6).

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(B), an party may serve and file written objections within

ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If objections

are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 07-8021-PCT-PGR. A party

may respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with a copy

thereof. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 26th day of October, 2009.

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