Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05565/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05565-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORIO MUNOZ, CASE NO. CV-F-03-5565 REC DLB P

Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

RE DISMISSAL OF ACTION FOR FAILURE

TO STATE A CLAIM

vs.

GRAY DAVIS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff Gregorio Munoz (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s amended

complaint.

I. Screening Standard

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court

must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous

or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any

filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time

if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

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granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984),

citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners

Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must

accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees,

425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve

all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

In his amended complaint, plaintiff seeks relief against several state and prison officials for

denying him adequate care for injuries sustained as a result of several falls while performing his prison

job assignment duties. Plaintiff states that in July 1999, he fell while working in the kitchen at Calipatria

State Prison, injuring his finger and right ankle. He was examined and referred for additional medical

review. He was granted time off from work and received Motrin.

Plaintiff alleges in May 2000, a food cart that weighed approximately 1000 pounds fell on top

of him injuring his forehead, back of head, back, and ankles. He was given x-rays and Motrin. Plaintiff

alleges that since the injury and after several institutional transfers, he has suffered increasing pain in

his back and feet. Plaintiff was again injured in the kitchen in September 2000 when he dropped a

mixing bowl full of flour on both knees and hurt his back while attempting to maintain balance. 

Plaintiff alleges that despite the compound injuries he has sustained and his chronic pain, he has

never been given proper medicines to manage his pain.

In late 2000, plaintiff was transferred to Avenal State Prison where he alleges he continued to

receive medical attention in the form of muscle relaxants and Motrin. However, he states that he has

since learned that prolonged use of Motrin causes liver damage. 

In 2001, plaintiff was transferred to Pleasant Valley State Prison where he claims his medical

care did not improve. He only received Motrin for pain. Plaintiff states that he has filed several

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unsuccessful inmate appeals regarding his medical care. He states that he is in constant pain and the

indifference to his condition by medical staff is a violation of his constiuional rights. 

Plaintiff names as defendants former Governor Gray Davis; Timothy Gage, Director of the

Department of Finance; Robert Presley, Secretary for the California Youth and Corrections Agency;

Susan Steinberg, Deputy Director for Health Care; Gail Lewis, Warden of PVSP; Paul Ward, Associate

Warden; W.J. Juarez, Associate Warden; Dr. Klarich; and N.E. Villa, Correctional Counselor. Plaintiff

seeks, among other things, compensatory and punitive damages. 

III. Discussion

A. Eighth Amendment Claim

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment

unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference” standard involves an objective and

a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.”

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).

Second, the prison official must act with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which entails more than

mere negligence, but less than conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the

official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner's

civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere

‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton

v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A]

complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state

a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not

become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); McGuckin v. Smith,

974 F.2d 1050, 1050 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d

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1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990).

A prisoner’s mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not support a claim of deliberate

indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Deliberate indifference can be manifested by prison guards intentionally denying or delaying

access to medical care or intentionallyinterferingwith the treatment once prescribed. Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. at 104-05. However, where a prisoner alleges a delay in receiving medical treatment, the

prisoner must allege that the delay led to further injury. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th

Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9 Cir. th

1997); Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9 Cir. 1985). th

Although neither a physician’s negligence nor a prisoner’s disagreement with a particular course

of treatment states a claim for deliberate indifference, a prison medical staff’s acts or omissions will

constitute deliberate indifference if staff members knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to an

inmate’s health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a

prisoner’s serious medical needs when they “interfere with treatment once prescribed.” Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05. The Ninth Circuit has found deliberate indifference where prison officials

“deliberately ignore the express orders of a prisoner’s prior physician for reasons unrelated to the

medical needs of the prisoner.” Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9 Cir. 1992) (reversing th

summary judgment where prison officials forced prisoner to endure a plane flight that resulted in ear

injury, in direct contravention of a treating physician’s previous orders); Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884

F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curium) (reversing summary judgment where medical staff knew

that pretrial detainee had head injury, but prescribed contraindicated medications, disregarding evidence

of complications to which they had been specifically alerted by private treating physician); Tolbert v.

Eyman, 434 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970)(finding cognizable claim for deliberate indifference where warden

refused to authorize prisoner’s receipt of medicine that had been previously prescribed by a physician);

Cf. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1062 (9 Cir. 1992) (where surgery recommended by prisoner’s

th

prior physician was severely delayed, court was unable to hold doctors liable because prison

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administrators, not the doctors, were responsible for scheduling treatment).

The Courts of other federal Circuits have also found deliberate indifference where prison officials

ignore a previous physician’s treatment plan. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103 (3 Cir. 1990) (finding rd

cognizable claim for deliberate indifference where prison officials ignored private hospital’s treatment

orders and refused inmate’s access to prescribed medication); Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192 (2nd Cir.

1987) (finding cognizable claim where prison officials refused to permit plaintiff to participate in

exercise program prescribed by doctor); Eades v. Thompson, 823 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding

cognizable claim where prisoner alleged that prison officials made him travel and carry a heavy box,

causing a surgical incision to gape open, in violation of prior medical orders); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443

F.2d 921 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 983, cited with approval by Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

at 105 n.10 (finding deliberate indifference where prison staff forced post-surgical prisoner-patient to

walk, ignoring warnings from hospital personnel that inmate should not be moved); see also Carl T.

Drechsler, Annotation, Relief Under Federal Civil Rights Acts to State Prisoners Complaining of Denial

of Medical Care, 28 A.L.R. Fed. 279 (1976) (recognizing that, on the whole, courts do not condone the

practice of prison officials ignoring orders rendered by a prisoner’s previous physician). 

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment violation. Plsaintiff acknowedges

receiving treatment for his various injuries and for pain management. Plaintiff simply is not satisfied

with the level of treatment he has received. Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the quality of his medical

care, does not implicate constitutional concerns. Plaintiff is not entitled to his choice of treatment. The

Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Plaintiff’s allegations

to do not rise to such level.

Further, plaintiff has failed to link any of the named defendant to an affirmative act or omission

giving rise to his alleged constitutional violation and plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any of the

named defendants “knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety.” 

B. Supervisory Liability Claim

In his amended complaint, plaintiff once again names several department heads as defendants.

As plaintiff has been advised, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the

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actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant

holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must

be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld,

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To show a prima facie case of

supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege facts indicating that supervisory defendants either: personally

participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act

to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen

v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)(internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to

support claims under Section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163,

168 (1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged specific facts indicating that defendants personally participated in the

alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or

promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional

rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black at 646. 

C. Inmate Appeals

Plaintiff also makes reference to his many inmate appeals. To the extent plaintiff seeks to bring

claims against any of the named defendants based on the denial of his inmate appeals, such claims are

not cognizable. “[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any

substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez

v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th

Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance

procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure

confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). “Hence, it

does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp.

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315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). Actions in reviewing prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the

basis for liability under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff has failed to state any cognizable claims for relief. Accordingly, it is HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that this action be DISMISSED in its entirety for failure to state a claim. The Court

does not recommend that leave to amend be granted because plaintiff was already given the opportunity

to amend the complaint and was unable to cure the deficiencies noted in the first screening order.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30) days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written objections with

the court. The document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and

Recommendations." The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 8, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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