Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00319/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00319-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOAQUIN SERRANO REYES, CASE NO. CV F 09-319 LJO SMS

Plaintiffs, ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS (Doc. 18)

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Joaquin Serrano Reyes (“Mr. Reyes”) is a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis with an action for damages and other relief based on defendant United Sates of America’s

(“government’s”) alleged failure to pay tax refunds for tax years 2001, 2002, and 2004. This Court has

jurisdiction over Mr. Reyes’ claims pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §1346(a)(1), which confers jurisdiction to the

district courts to hear cases involving claims for refund of taxes that allegedly have been illegally or

erroneously assessed or collected. The government moved to dismiss Mr. Reyes’ claims to refund for

tax years 2001 and 2002 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on grounds

that Mr. Reyes’ claims are untimely and Mr. Reyes does not qualify for the Earned Income Tax Credit

(“EIC”). Having considered the parties arguments and relevant documents, this Court GRANTS in part

and DENIES in part the government’s partial motion to dismiss. Although Mr. Reyes’ refund claim for 

for tax year 2002 is dismissed, he may proceed with his refund claim for tax year 2004 and his limited

claim for tax year 2001.

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BACKGROUND

Mr. Reyes contends that the government denied him a refund for tax years 2001, 2002, and 2004. 

In a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion that attacks factually subject matter jurisdiction, this Court “may

review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for

summary judgment.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, the facts from the complaint are taken as true. Balisteri v. Pacifica Police

Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The Court may also consider documents relied upon or

attached to the complaint, and judicially-noticed documents. Intri-Plex. Tech., Inc. v Crest Group, Inc.,

499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). 

2001 Tax Refund

Mr. Reyes filed his federal income tax return for tax year 2001 on March 4, 2002. The return

reflected a $4,008 EIC tax credit and $84 in an additional child tax credit. Compl, p. 12. Mr. Reyes

attached to his complaint correspondence from the Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service

(“IRS”). By a letter dated March 15, 2002, the IRS informed Mr. Reyes that they were auditing his 2001

tax return and requested Mr. Reyes to provide documentation to supporting, inter alia, his EIC claim. 

Mr. Reyes filed an administrative claim requesting a $4,008 refund for tax year 2001 on March 15, 2007. 

Id. at 48. Mr. Reyes claims that he qualifies for a $4,008 refund for tax year 2001 based on the EIC. 

On May 25, 2007, the government again requested Mr. Reyes to provide documentation to support his

EIC claim. Id. at 17. There is no evidence that Mr. Reyes provided documentation to support his claim. 

Ultimately, the government rejected Mr. Reyes’ credit claims on September 12, 2007. Id. at 21. 

In opposition, the government provided TreasuryForms 4340 for tax years 2001, 2002, and 2004.

These forms were generated under seal and signed by an authorized delegate of the Secretary of the

Treasury. According to the government’s exhibits, once the government rejected Mr. Reyes’ EIC and

additional child credit for the 2001 tax year, Mr. Reyes had a tax liability for 2001 in the amount of

$336.40. Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments, Payments, and Other Specified Matters for Joaquin

S. Reyes, for the tax year ending December 31, 2001, attached at Exhibit A to the Declaration of Lauren

M. Castaldi (Ex. A, Castaldi Decl.). Afer accounting for $293 in withholding credited to Mr. Reyes on

April 15, 2002, Mr. Reyes owed the government $43.40 for tax year 2001. Id.; see also, Compl., p. 13. 

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To satisfy this amount, the government applied a portion of Mr. Reyes overpayment of tax in 2004 in

the amount of $55.52. Ex. A, Castaldi Decl. 

2002 Tax Refund

Mr. Reyes seeks an $85 dollar refund for tax year 2002. Mr. Reyes filed his federal income tax

return for tax year 2002 on January 30, 2008. The return reflected $85 in withheld tax. Ex. B., Castaldi

Decl. Mr. Reyes’ return reported no tax due for tax year 2002. On March 24, 2008, the government

determined that Mr. Reyes was entitled to a refund of $85. Compl., p. 45. Mr. Reyes made a claim for

his $85 refund on January 30, 2008. The government denied his claim for refund for tax year 2002 as

untimely. Compl., p. 40.

2004 Tax Refund

Mr. Reyes seeks reimbursement in the amount of $128.45 for a penalty assessed on his 2004

income tax return. Mr. Reyes filed his 2004 income tax return on October 2, 2005. Ex. C, Castaldi

Decl. Mr. Reyes had $811.07 in withholding credited to his account on April 15, 2005. He also had an

EIC credit for $257. Mr. Reyes reported $19 in taxes. Id. A portion of Mr. Reyes overpayment credit

from the 2004 tax year was credited to Mr. Reyes’ account for the 2001 tax year.

Government’s Arguments and Procedural History

On December 18, 2009, the government moved to dismiss in part Mr. Reyes’ claims. The

government argues that: (1) Mr. Reyes’ claim for a $4,008 for tax year 2001 should be denied (except

$55.52 of the claim) because a claim for refund is limited to any overpayment of tax made within three

years of a request for refund; (2) Mr. Reyes’ claim for tax year 2001 should be dismissed because he

cannot claim an EIC for children that are not “qualified” as defined by the Internal Revenue Code; and

(3) Mr. Reyes’ $85 claim for refund for tax year 2002 should be dismissed as untimely because Mr.

Reyes failed to make a claim for refund within three years of overpayment of tax.

Mr. Reyes failed to oppose the motion to dismiss. Pursuant to Local Rule 230(l), Mr. Reyes’

opposition must be filed and served not more than twenty-one days from the date of service of the

motion. “Failure of the responding party to file an opposition or to file a statement of no opposition may

be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion and may result in the imposition of

sanctions.” L.R. 230(l). This motion was deemed submitted without a hearing twenty-eight days after

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the service of the motion. Id. Having considered the government’s arguments and exhibits and Mr.

Reyes’ complaint and the exhibits attached thereto, this Court issued the following order. 

DISCUSSION

Standards of Review

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) review standards

A Fed . R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d

1214, 1242 (9th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). The government’s current motion is a factual attack,

because it “relie[s] on extrinsic evidence and [does] not assert lack of subject matter jurisdiction solely

on the basis of the pleadings.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (quoting Morrison v. Amway

Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924 n. 5 (11th Cir.2003)). “In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the district

court mayreview evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismissinto a motion

for summary judgment.” Id. (citing Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n. 2 (9th

Cir.2003). No presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed

material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional

claims.” Thornhill Publ. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9 Cir. 1979). "Once the th

moving party has converted the motion to dismissinto a factual motion by presenting affidavits or other

evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or

other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction." Savage, 343

F.3d at 1039 n. 2.

“Jurisdictional dismissals in cases premised on federal-question jurisdiction are exceptional, and

must satisfy the requirements specified in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939

(1946)." Sun Valley Gas., Inc. v. Ernst Enters., 711 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir.1983). Under this standard,

jurisdictional dismissals arewarranted "where the alleged claim under the constitution or federal statutes

clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction or

where such claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous." 327 U.S. at 682-83, 66 S.Ct. 773. “[W]hen a

statute provides the basis for both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the plaintiffs'

substantive claim for relief, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction rather than for

failure to state a claim is proper only when the allegations of the complaint are frivolous.” Thornhill

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Publ., 594 F.2d at 734.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motion Standards

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a challenge to the sufficiency of the

pleadings set forth in the complaint. A Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either

a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court generally accepts as true the allegations of the complaint,

construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolves all

doubts in the pleader's favor. Lazy Y. Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008).

To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A court is “free to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions,

unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Farm

Credit Services v. American State Bank, 339 F.3d 765, 767 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Moreover,

a court “will dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, fails

to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of action.” Student Loan Marketing Ass'n v. Hanes,

181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). In practice, “a complaint . . . must contain either direct or

inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some

viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford

Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)). 

Tax Year 2002

The government’s argument begins with a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss Mr. Reyes’

tax year 2002 refund claim. The government argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

Mr. Reyes’ claim because it is untimely. Specifically, the government contends that Mr. Reyes is barred

jurisdictionally from recovering a refund to the extent that no taxes were paid within three years of filing

the tax return and making an administrative claim for refund. 

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Internal Revenue Code 6511 contains two timeliness provisions. Commissioner v. Lundy, 516

U.S. 235, 240 (1996). First, there is a filing deadline. Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6511(a), “a taxpayer’s

claim for credit or a refund is timely if it is filed within three years from the date his income tax return

is filed, regardless of when the return is filed.” Omohundro v. United States, 300 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th

Cir. 2002). Second, the Internal Revenue Code “imposes a ceiling on the amount of credit or refund to

which a taxpayer is entitled as compensation for an overpayment of tax.” Baral v. United States, 528

U.S. 431, 432 (2000). Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6511(b)(2)(A), “the amount of the credit or refund shall

not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim,

equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return.” This statute sets forth the

“look-back period” to determine how much of a refund, if any, the taxpayer may recover.

The government argues that Mr. Reyes’ 2002 claim is untimely because he paid no taxes during

the three year look-back period described in 26 U.S.C. §6511(b)(2)(A). 26 U.S.C. §6511(b)(2)(A) is

a “jurisdictional” statute. Zeier v. I.R.S., 80 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the

government moves to dismiss Mr. Reyes’ claim for a 2002 tax refund for lack of jurisdiction. 

Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6511(b)(2)(A), Mr. Reyes’ 2002 tax refund is limited to the amount of

taxes he paid for tax year 2002 during the look-back period of three years. According to his complaint,

the documents attached to his complaint, and the documents submitted by the government, Mr. Reyes

paid 2002 taxes through withholding during the 2001 year. Remittances of withholding tax are “paid”

on the due date of a calendar year of a taxpayer’s income tax return, e.g. April 15 of the year in which

the tax return is due to be filed. 26 U.S.C. §6513(b)(1); Baral, 528 U.S. at 435. Thus, Mr. Reyes “paid”

his 2002 taxes on April 15, 2003. On that day, Mr. Reyes “paid” $85. Mr. Reyes filed an administrative

claim requesting a refund for tax year 2002, however, on January 30, 2008. Looking back three years

from the time he filed his administrative claim for refund, Mr. Reyes paid no amount of taxes for 2002. 

That is, Mr. Reyes paid no taxes toward his 2002 tax year between January 30, 2008–the date he filed

his refund claim–and January 30, 2005. Mr. Reyes’ $85 payment on April 15, 2003 is outside of the

look-back period. Thus, Mr. Reyes is barred from recovering a tax refund for 2002, as his claim is

untimely. Accordingly, Mr. Reyes’ 2002 tax refund claim is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

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 Tax Year 2001

Timeliness

In a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion, the government moves to dismiss Mr. Reyes’ tax year 2001

refund claim, with the exception of $55.52 for that claim, as untimely. As set forth above, Mr. Reyes’

2001 tax refund is limited to the amount of taxes he paid for tax year 2001 during the look-back period

of three years. Mr. Reyes filed his administrative request for refund on March 15, 2007. Because Mr.

Reyes’ 2001 tax was paid through withholding remittances on April 15, 2002, that amount is outside of

the look-back period. During the look-back period, Mr. Reyes “paid” the amount of $55.52 toward the

2001 tax year when the government applied a portion of Mr. Reyes’ overpayment of tax in 2004 to his

2001 tax debt on April 15, 2005. Thus, Mr. Reyes is limited to a recovery ceiling of $55.52 for the 2001

tax year, as the amount paid toward the taxes due during the look back period. Accordingly, the

government’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss in part Mr. Reyes’ 2002 tax year refund claim

is granted.

“Qualified Child” under EIC 

In the alternative, in a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, the government claims that Mr. Reyes

fails to state a claim for his 2001 tax refund, because he did not qualify for the EIC. The EIC is available

to “eligible individuals” pursuant to Internal Revenue Code section 32(a), 26 U.S.C. §32(a). An

individual is eligible for the EIC if his or her claim is based on a “qualifying” child or children. 26

U.S.C. §32(c)(1)(A)(i). According to the applicable version of the statute, a “qualifying child” is a

person who, inter alia, bears a relationship with the taxpayer, as defined in the code. 26 U.S.C.

§32(c)(3)(A). In general, a “qualifying child” and a taxpayer “bear a relationship” if the child is: 

(I) a son or daughter of the taxpayer, or a descendant of either,

(II) a stepson or stepdaughter of the taxpayer, or

(III) an eligible foster child of the taxpayer.

26 U.S.C. §32(c)(3)(B)(i). An “eligible foster child” is:

(I) a brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister of the taxpayer (or a descendant of any such

relative) or is placed with the taxpayer by an authorized placement agency,

(II) the taxpayer cares for as the taxpayer’s own child, and

(III) has the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for the taxpayer’s entire

taxable year.

26 U.S.C. §32(c)(3)(B)(iii). 

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Mr. Reyes avers that he qualified for the EIC because he “supported Hilda Lantos and her 5

children and was granted this credit in 2000 for her youngest. She had some legal troubles and I paid

for her oldest and youngest in all 2001. I paid for an attorney to help her get into a program.” Compl.,

p. 3. The government points out that Mr. Reyes does not claim that he is the father of Hilda Lantos’

children, either through biology or adoption, and fails to claim that her children were his foster children

or stepchildren. The government concludes that Mr. Reyes’ 2002 claim should be dismissed, as he fails

to establish that he qualifies for the EIC credit.

In its argument, the government asks this Court to make a negative inference against the nonmoving party. The government further appears to impose a heightened pleading standard on Mr. Reyes 

beyond the notice pleading standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. The Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standards are

well-settled that in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court generally

construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and resolves all

doubts in the pleader's favor. Lazy Y. Ranch LTD, 546 F.3d at 588. Though Mr. Reyes does not aver

that Hilda Santos’ children are his own, he does state that he “supported” her children and that he “was

granted this credit in 2000 for her youngest.” That Mr. Reyes qualified for the EIC in 2000 based on one

of Ms. Santos’ children leads to a plausible inference that Mr. Reyes may qualify, at least partially, for

a 2001 EIC tax credit. Accordingly, the government’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion is denied. This

does not preclude adjudication in an appropriate motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, this Court ORDERS as follows:

1. The government’s motion to dismiss Mr. Reyes’ refund claim for tax year 2002 is

GRANTED. This Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Reyes’ 2002 claim, as it is

untimely pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6511(b)(2)(A);

2. The government’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, in part, Mr. Reyes’ tax

year 2001 claim is GRANTED. Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6511(b)(2)(A), Mr. Reyes is

limited to recover an amount no greater than $55.52 for the 2001 tax year;

3. The government’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is DENIED;

4. Mr. Reyes may proceed with his limited tax year 2001 claim and his tax year 2004

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claim.

5. The government shall file a responsive pleading no later than 20 days after this filing

date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 19, 2010 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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