Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00039/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00039-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DARIUS BUTLER, 

Petitioner,

v. 

W. L. MONTGOMERY, et al., 

Respondents.

Case No.: 16cv39-GPC-MDD 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

RE DENIAL OF PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

 

 Petitioner Darius Butler, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 

has filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 

1.) He challenges his San Diego Superior Court convictions for attempted murder, 

kidnapping, forcible sodomy and forcible oral copulation, for which he was sentenced to 

50 years-to-life plus 19 years in state prison. (Pet. at 1-2, 15.) He claims that his federal 

constitutional rights were violated by the failure of the trial court to sua sponte instruct the 

jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of attempted murder 

(Claim 1), on his reasonable but mistaken belief the victim consented (Claim 2), and on 

the defense of accident (Claim 3). (Id. at 17-31.) He also claims the trial court failed to 

adequately investigate potential juror misconduct (Claim 4), and that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel’s failure to object to comments 

made by the prosecutor during closing argument (Claim 5). (Id. at 32-46.) 

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 Respondent has filed an Answer and lodged the state court record. (ECF Nos. 12-

13.) Respondent argues that habeas relief is unavailable because: (a) Claims 1 and 2 do 

not present a federal question, but even if they do the adjudication of those claims by the 

state court is objectively reasonable; (b) Claim 3 is unexhausted, procedurally defaulted 

and does not present a federal question, but can be denied irrespective of the failure to 

exhaust because it is without merit; and (c) the state court denial of Claims 4 and 5 is 

objectively reasonable. (Answer at 22-61.) 

 Petitioner has filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 20.) He admits Claim 3 is unexhausted 

and procedurally defaulted, and requests it be withdrawn from his Petition, but argues that 

his remaining claims have merit. (Traverse at 2, 13-37.) 

 For the following reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner has exhausted his state 

court remedies with respect to Claim 3, that it is not procedurally defaulted, and that all of 

Petitioner’s claims were adjudicated on their merits in the state court. The Court finds that 

the adjudication by the state court is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law, and is not based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court. Finally, the 

Court finds that even if Petitioner could satisfy that standard and show that an error 

occurred which rose to the level of a federal Constitutional violation, any such errors are 

harmless. The Court therefore recommends the Petition be denied. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On March 26, 2012, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed a third 

amended felony complaint charging Petitioner with kidnapping for the purpose of 

committing sodomy and/or oral copulation in violation of Penal Code section 209(b)(1) 

(count 1), forcible oral copulation in violation of Penal Code section 288(c)(2)(A) (count 

2), forcible sodomy in violation of Penal Code section 288(c)(2)(A) (count 3), and 

attempted murder in violation of Penal Code section 187(a) (count 4). (Lodgment No. 2, 

Clerk’s Tr. [“CT”] at 21-25.) As to all counts the complaint alleged that Petitioner used a 

deadly weapon (a knife) and committed the offenses while he was released on bail. (Id.) 

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As to counts 2-4 the complaint alleged he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the 

victim, and as to counts 2 and 3 it alleged he substantially increased the risk of harm by 

kidnapping the victim. (Id.) 

 Following a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty on all counts. (CT 371-80.) The 

jury found true the allegations that he was released on bail at the time of the offenses, that 

he substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim by kidnapping her with respect to 

counts 2 and 3, that he personally inflicted great bodily injury during the commission of 

counts 3 and 4, and that he personally used a deadly weapon during the commission of 

count 4. (Id.) The jury returned not true findings that he used a deadly weapon during the 

commission of counts 1-3 and inflicted great bodily injury during the commission of count 

2. (Id.) A new trial motion argued, inter alia, that the investigation into juror misconduct 

was inadequate. (CT 184-208.) That motion was denied and Petitioner was sentenced to 

50 years-to-life plus 19 years in state prison. (CT 383-85.) 

 Petitioner appealed, raising Claims 1-4 presented here. (Lodgment Nos. 3-6.) While 

the appeal was pending in the appellate court, Petitioner’s appellate counsel withdrew 

Claim 3 on the basis that the claim “has been resolved by the California Supreme Court 

and there is no longer a sua sponte duty for the court to instruct on the defense of accident.” 

(Lodgment No. 4.) The state appellate court affirmed the convictions in a written opinion.

(Lodgment No. 7, People v. Butler, No. D063890 (Cal.Sup.Ct. July 22, 2014).) Petitioner 

then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court presenting Claims 1-4 

raised here. (Lodgment No. 8.) Petitioner included the previously withdrawn Claim 3 and 

requested a remand for the appellate court to consider the claim. (Id. at 26.) On October 

16, 2014, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for review in an 

order which stated: “The petition for review is denied.” (Lodgment No. 9.) 

 Petitioner thereafter filed habeas petitions in the state superior, appellate and 

supreme courts raising Claim 5. (Lodgment Nos. 10, 12, 14-15.) The claim was denied 

on the merits by the superior and appellate courts, and summarily denied without citation 

of authority by the state supreme court. (Lodgment Nos. 11, 13, 16.) 

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion affirming 

Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. This Court gives deference to state court findings 

of fact and presumes them to be correct. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981). 

 In 2010, Butler was in his early 20’s and a tall, strong ex-Marine when 

he met 20-year-old Danielle (5’3” tall). They had a harmonious romantic and 

sexual relationship for about four months. He gave her a knife and taught her 

how to use it. They started to argue and physically fight about their 

relationship and mutual infidelity and periodically broke up, but they 

continued their sexual relationship off and on for about a year. 

These charges arose out of an October 2011 incident involving 

Danielle’s overnight visit to his apartment, involving drinking and consensual 

sex, and then the next day of being together drinking, arguing, and eventually, 

fighting in which she was badly injured. Additionally, the prosecution 

presented evidence about several incidents of Butler’s earlier uncharged 

violent criminal conduct toward Danielle, occurring from June through 

September 2011. In June 2011, they argued by phone about infidelity and a 

sexually transmitted disease. Butler went to Danielle’s home, grabbed her 

around the neck, threw her into a wall and a door, then choked her and pushed 

her to the ground. Danielle’s friend, Samantha P., was present and called 911, 

reporting that Butler was threatening to cut Danielle’s throat with his knife. 

After less than 10 minutes, Butler handed the knife to Danielle and left. Butler 

was arrested and his knife confiscated from Danielle. Butler told police that 

he gave the knife to Danielle because he was afraid something would happen. 

Butler did not have any explanation for police about the reasons for the June 

2011 fight. 

After the June 2011 incident, the court issued a criminal protective 

order dated July 18, 2011 that prohibited Butler from contacting Danielle. 

However, they continued to call, text and see each other occasionally. 

In August 2011, Butler and Danielle were driving when he angrily hit 

her in the throat a few times, then stopped, pulled her out of the car, and kicked 

her in the face and stomach. She did not go home to her parents until the next 

day because her injuries looked so bad. She then called police and a report 

was taken. 

On September 2011, Butler pled guilty to dissuading a witness from 

reporting a crime and was released on bail, pending sentencing in November 

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2011. Later in September 2011, Danielle sent him some nude photographs of 

herself and a female friend in sexual positions together, but she then asked for 

the pictures back. Butler refused and told her he was going to post the 

photographs on the Internet. Danielle threatened to file a police report. 

On September 30, 2011, Butler sent text messages to Danielle and 

asked her to call him, but she did not do so. She and a friend were driving 

away from her home when they saw Butler in his car waiting around, and he 

then followed her car, honked his horn and interfered with her driving, trying 

to get her car to veer off the road. After a few days, Danielle made a police 

report about the incident. 

In mid-October, Danielle sent text messages to Butler, and on October 

15, 2011, they had a two-hour phone conversation. They started arguing about 

their relationship and infidelity, and Butler wanted to come to her house, 

which her parents had forbidden. She wanted to keep him away from her 

friends and family and agreed to come to his apartment, so she could say 

goodbye and have “closure.” Bringing her overnight bag, Danielle drove her 

car to Butler’s apartment around 2 a.m. For about two hours, they drank wine, 

talked, had consensual conventional sex, then fell asleep. 

In the morning, Danielle told Butler she was going to church, but he 

discouraged her from doing so, and they spent the day together, eating and 

drinking numerous cocktails and beers at a few bars near his apartment, where 

they walked. He carried a knife in his pocket, as he usually did. They went 

to a sushi bar for dinner, but Danielle became nauseated and went to the 

restroom. According to her testimony, when she returned, Butler looked 

angrily at her and started asking her about her unfaithfulness, and telling her 

she had messed with the wrong person and was not going to have a good night. 

When he slapped her face, Danielle did not want to talk to the employees at 

the restaurant or make a scene, so they left, walking through a dark alley. 

In the alley, Butler hit and kicked her, knocked her to the ground, and 

kicked her some more. When he pulled her up, she could not move her arm. 

Butler told her he was going to kill her and punched her in the stomach and 

beat her head into the ground. For about an hour, Butler dragged and pulled 

Danielle back toward his house, while he continued to hurt her. When they 

reached her parked car, Butler shoved her into the passenger seat and got in 

the driver’s seat. She did not run away because she was afraid he would catch 

her and hurt her again. He unzipped his pants, showing he had an erection, 

and pulled Danielle’s head down to his penis while he told her to orally 

copulate him. According to Danielle, he was holding the knife on his lap and 

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hitting her. She told him to stop, but he continued to threaten her and force 

his penis into her mouth while he drove. After they traveled this way for about 

a half-mile, Butler parked the car, took his clothes off, pulled Danielle by the 

hair into the back seat, and ripped off her clothes. Danielle was on her hands 

and knees while he penetrated her anus several times with his penis, which 

hurt her. When he finished, he got dressed and started driving toward a park 

at the end of the street, saying he was going to kill her there where it was dark 

and quiet, and she believed him. He parked the car and started to pull her out 

by her hair. As they struggled and she screamed, his knife went into her back 

about an inch and she started bleeding. 

Butler then started walking Danielle toward the park, and they noticed 

that a neighbor near the park and others were watching. Butler decided to go 

back to the car, Danielle got into the passenger seat, and he closed the door 

and walked around to the driver’s seat. At that point, Danielle opened her 

door, jumped out and ran toward the neighbor’s house and bolted into it, 

crying, “He is going to kill me.” The neighbor, Anthony Lawrence, shut and 

locked the door, and had her sit down because she seemed to be 

hyperventilating. Next, Danielle ran up the stairs to another room and 

collapsed, telling Lawrence and his roommate that Butler had raped, beaten 

and threatened her. Lawrence called 911, telling the dispatcher that a young 

woman, who was a stranger to him, had run into his house to get away from a 

man who had been “dragging” her back to their car, while apparently using 

his knife to control her. Before police responded, Butler knocked on the door 

and called for Danielle, but they did not answer and he left. 

The responding police officer testified he found Danielle on a bed in 

Lawrence’s house, in a bruised and hysterical condition. She had a puncture 

wound in the center of her back and was bleeding all over the bed. Blood was 

found on the sidewalk outside the house. While being taken to a hospital, 

Danielle was crying and in pain. She described to the responding officer and 

a detective how Butler attacked, threatened and forced her into sex acts. She 

also reported she had consumed three beers and a gin and tonic that evening. 

She gave a similar account to a deputy district attorney and the investigating 

detective the next day, and later at Butler’s preliminary hearing. 

At the hospital, Danielle was examined by medical personnel, including 

an orthopedic surgeon and a sexual assault response team (SART) nurse. 

Danielle’s injuries included a fractured wrist with significant displacement, 

caused by blunt force trauma, and a lacerated liver. She was very “banged 

up” and in pain, with bruising and soreness in her face, back and anus, where 

she was bleeding. The nurse could not fully examine Danielle’s anal area, 

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due to the pain, but the nurse saw one laceration there. The nurse’s findings 

about injuries were consistent with Danielle’s description of the incident, but 

the nurse could not rule out consensual sex as a causative factor. 

Butler was arrested a few days later, at his new girlfriend’s home in 

Oceanside. His vehicle was found in her garage. 

At trial, Lawrence testified he heard a commotion outside his house at 

about 7:30 p.m. that day, so he looked outside and saw Butler “shepherding” 

Danielle by the arm back to a white car. She looked like she had been crying. 

After Danielle got in the car, Lawrence saw her jump out and run toward his 

house, screaming that her boyfriend was going to kill her, and saying she 

couldn’t move her arm. He didn’t think she seemed intoxicated. 

The prosecution presented evidence about several incidents of Butler’s 

earlier uncharged criminal violent conduct toward his ex-wife Jessica Butler, 

who was then also in the Marine Corps. They were married in January 2007 

and had a violent argument in October 2007. When Butler slapped, pushed, 

and choked his then-wife, she lost consciousness. As a result, Butler pleaded 

guilty to a crime of domestic violence, and a criminal protective order 

prohibited him from contacting her. However, they continued to have a 

relationship. 

Another violent incident took place between them in May 2008, when 

he threatened and chased Jessica, then seven months pregnant, and she jumped 

off a second-story balcony to get away from him. He ran after her and 

punched or kicked her, knocking her down. Butler served time in jail and in 

2009, was dishonorably discharged from the Marine Corps for domestic 

violence. 

At trial, the jury heard testimony from a domestic violence expert who 

explained the usual dynamics of such a relationship, such as why an abused 

woman might continue to return to her abuser. [Footnote: Rebuttal evidence 

was presented about an attack by Butler on a couple in November 2008, but it 

need not be summarized here.] 

Butler testified in his defense, first explaining that in the Marines, he 

had received special training in martial arts and was a black belt instructor. 

He was a weapons enthusiast and usually carried a knife. During their 

relationship, he gave a knife to Danielle and taught her how to use it. 

However, he did not get his own knife back after he gave it to Danielle after 

the June 2011 incident. 

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 Butler acknowledged that both he and Danielle disrespected each other 

when they cheated on each other, during their relationship of one and a half 

years. By June 2011, when they had the fight at her home, they had been 

together for about a year and she was angry that he had relationships with 

other women. That day, she told him she was unfaithful to him, using a racial 

slur. Butler said he pushed her against the wall, she apologized, and they both 

calmed down. He did not open his knife that day. 

During the incident in August 2011, he said Danielle got upset when he 

lost the keys to a car that she was driving, but they did not fight about it. When 

he was arrested a few days later for assaulting Danielle, he denied it. When 

Danielle sent him nude photographs of herself and a female friend in 

September, Butler refused to give them back. He was upset about the August 

arrest and claimed that Danielle was threatening to lie to the police and file a 

false police report. He testified he did not follow Danielle in his car on 

September 30. By then, he had a new girlfriend and had moved on from 

Danielle and past relationships. 

Butler testified that Danielle texted him “out of the blue” on October 

13. Although he was already in his new relationship and had decided to move 

on, he still had feelings for Danielle. Two days later, he and Danielle talked 

on the phone for about two hours. When he told Danielle about his new 

girlfriend, who was out of town, Danielle got upset that he had replaced her 

and she came to his apartment around 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. They got along well 

and had consensual sex. Danielle told him there was nobody like him among 

other men, and she wanted to “wait” for him until after his upcoming sentence 

was over (for dissuading a witness). 

The next day they were happy to be together and went to a restaurant 

and several bars, and both of them had a number of drinks (beer and gin and 

tonics). They were both drunk but able to talk about and plan on having anal 

sex at the park, which they had done before a few times. At the restaurant 

where they went to eat dinner, they discussed infidelity, but without arguing 

about it. Butler understood that he and Danielle had cheated on each other, 

but testified that this did not upset him, because that was the type of women 

that he dated, so he wasn’t surprised. 

Butler testified that when he and Danielle left the restaurant, they 

strolled back toward his apartment, taking in the night air, although they 

stumbled a bit because they were drunk. They were still planning to drive 

together in Danielle’s car to the nearby park to have sex, because Butler’s 

roommate might be at home and he did not approve of their relationship. 

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When they got to the car, Danielle voluntarily performed oral sex on him. 

They found that the park was barricaded so they parked the car nearby, and 

Danielle went into the back seat and undressed. They continued the oral 

copulation and then they moved around to have anal sex, while she 

encouraged him. Butler testified that throughout the episode, he did not beat, 

punch, kick or push Danielle down, and he did not have his knife with him. 

Afterwards, they got dressed and moved around in the car. Danielle 

didn’t want to go home, even though she knew Butler’s new girlfriend was 

coming back to him the next day. Butler and Danielle were both upset and 

frustrated about the way the day was going, and they argued about the new 

girlfriend. Butler heard a click, which he recognized as the sound of 

Danielle’s knife opening, and she lunged at him with the knife. He was 

surprised and afraid because he had taught Danielle where to stab a person to 

kill him, and he thought she would do so. As he had been trained to do, he 

lunged at Danielle to disarm her, reaching for her wrist and hand and using 

his head and weight to pin her into the back seat. He bent and twisted her 

wrist, probably breaking it, then hit her in the chest a few times as “softening 

blows,” for distraction. When he pulled Danielle’s arm toward her body and 

twisted her wrist, he felt the blade “slide into her back” and saw that she 

arched up her back, causing the knife to drop out, so he put it in his pocket. 

They then got out of the car and walked toward the park. Butler could 

see that Danielle’s arm was hurt, but he did not seek medical help, since he 

knew he was violating the restraining order, they had just had a fight, and 

Danielle had a stab wound in her back. They were both stumbling and he held 

Danielle by the arm. When Butler noticed a neighbor was watching them, he 

was afraid that the noise of the fight had been heard from the car, so he decided 

to get away from the car. Danielle then slapped him and he pushed her to the 

ground. When he bent down to pick her up, she kicked him in the mouth. He 

kicked her about six more times, then picked her up, told her to stop because 

she was being unreasonable, and they went back toward the car. 

Once Danielle ran away to the neighbor’s house, saying that Butler was 

going to kill her, Butler decided he needed to “fix this,” because it did not 

“look good.” When he knocked on Lawrence’s door, no one answered, so he 

walked back to his house. He then drove his truck to Oceanside to visit his 

girlfriend, where he was arrested a few days later. 

 In his testimony, Butler denied forcing Danielle to orally copulate him, 

and denied that any forcible sodomy took place, as she had agreed to all their 

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sexual conduct. He did not intend to stab her in the back. Discussing 

infidelity with either his ex-wife or Danielle did not upset him. 

 The trial court took judicial notice of the protective order issued on July 

18, 2011, prohibiting Butler from all contact with Danielle and requiring that 

he stay 100 yards away, and admitted the document into evidence. Butler’s 

felony conviction of September 8, 2011, for dissuading a witness from 

reporting a crime was also judicially noticed and admitted into evidence. 

(§136.1, subd. (b)(1).) The document showed that Butler was out on bail, 

awaiting sentencing, at the time of the October 2011 incidents. 

The court held a series of jury instruction discussions, and Butler’s 

counsel explained he was in a “delicate position” about the problem of 

proposing lesser included offense instructions, due to his concerns the jury 

might then enter into some kind of compromise. The prosecutor withdrew 

that proposed instruction. After doing some more research over the weekend, 

the court decided that no instructions on the lesser included offenses of 

attempted involuntary manslaughter would be appropriate, because no 

evidence supported them. 

Before the case was submitted to the jury, one of the jurors notified the 

court he had received a Facebook advertisement about a criminal background 

check business that had a mug shot photo that looked somewhat like Butler. 

The court questioned all of the jurors about it, then denied Butler’s request for 

a mistrial. Later, a new trial request on the same ground, and others, was 

denied. 

During deliberations, the jury sent out notes requesting that several 

portions of the testimony be read back, but changed its request to hear only 

Butler’s account. Ultimately, the jury convicted Butler on all four counts, but 

did not find true that he had used a knife during the kidnapping or sex offenses, 

nor did he inflict great bodily injury, except in the forcible sodomy and the 

attempted murder. 

(Lodgment No. 7, People v. Butler, No. D063890, slip op. at 5-15.) 

III. DISCUSSION 

 Petitioner alleges his federal constitutional rights were violated by the failure of the 

trial court to sua sponte instruct the jury on: (a) attempted voluntary manslaughter as a 

lesser included offense of attempted murder (Claim 1); (b) his reasonable but mistaken 

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belief that the victim consented to the sexual activity (Claim 2); and (c) the defense of 

accident as to the stabbing of the victim (Claim 3). (Pet. at 16-31.) He also alleges the 

inquiry into the internet search of his criminal history by a juror was inadequate (Claim 4), 

and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to object 

when the prosecutor accused him of tailoring his testimony, attacked defense counsel’s 

integrity, expressed her personal opinion regarding his guilt, vouched for witnesses, and 

invited the jurors to put themselves in the place of the victim (Claim 5). (Id. at 32-46.) 

Respondent argues that habeas relief is unavailable because Claims 1 and 2 do not 

present a federal issue, but even if they do the state court denial is objectively reasonable, 

that Claim 3 is unexhausted, procedurally defaulted and does not present a federal issue, 

but it can be denied notwithstanding the failure to exhaust because it is without merit, and 

that the state court denial of Claims 4 and 5 is objectively reasonable. (Answer at 22-61.) 

Petitioner agrees Claim 3 is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted and asks to withdraw 

it, but argues that his remaining claims have merit. (Traverse at 2, 13-37.) 

A. Standard of Review 

 In order to obtain federal habeas relief with respect to claims which were adjudicated 

on their merits in state court, Petitioner must demonstrate that the state court adjudication 

of the claims: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.A. 

§ 2254(d) (West 2006). Even if he can satisfy § 2254(d), or demonstrate it does not apply, 

he still must show that a federal constitutional violation occurred. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 

112, 119-22 (2007); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 

Petitioner must also demonstrate that any constitutional error is not harmless, unless it is 

of the type included on the Supreme Court’s “short, purposely limited roster of structural 

errors.” Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993, 1015 (9th Cir. 2007), citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 

499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991) (stating that “most constitutional errors can be harmless.”) 

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 A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent (1) “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth 

in [the Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different 

from [the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state 

court decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal 

law, “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases 

but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. 

Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is available “if, and only 

if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there 

could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. ___, 

134 S.Ct. 1697, 1706-07 (2014), quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). 

 “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes 

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. . . . Rather, that application must be 

objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). In order to satisfy § 2254(d)(2), a federal habeas 

petitioner must demonstrate that the factual findings upon which the state court’s 

adjudication of his claims rest, assuming it rests upon a determination of the facts, are 

objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

“As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 

103. “If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be . . . [as it] 

preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists 

could disagree that the state court decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents.” Id. at 

102. 

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B. Claim 1 

Petitioner alleges in Claim 1 that his federal constitutional rights were violated by 

the failure of the trial court to sua sponte instruct the jury on attempted voluntary 

manslaughter as a lesser included offense of attempted murder. (Pet. at 16-21.) He claims 

the record is replete with evidence that he acted under the heat of passion and with an actual 

but unreasonable belief in the need to defend himself, and the trial court therefore erred in 

finding there was insufficient evidence of attempted voluntary manslaughter to support the 

instruction. (Id. at 17-18.) 

 Respondent answers that the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense does not 

raise a federal question. (Answer at 22-23.) Respondent acknowledges that the Ninth 

Circuit has found that a federal due process violation can arise from the failure to instruct 

where the evidence warrants it, but argues that no federal due process violation arose here 

because the state court correctly found there was insufficient evidence to support the 

instruction. (Id. at 23-37.) Respondent argues that the state court denial of the claim on 

that basis is not contrary to, and did not involve an objectively unreasonable application 

of, clearly established federal law. (Id.) 

 Petitioner presented this claim to the state supreme court, which summarily denied 

it without a statement of reasoning. (Lodgment Nos. 8-9.) It was previously presented to 

the state appellate court and denied in a written opinion. (Lodgment Nos. 3-7.) There is a 

presumption that “[w]here there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal 

claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest 

upon the same ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991). 

The last reasoned state court decision with respect to this claim is the appellate court 

opinion affirming Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal, which stated: 

Butler claims the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the 

attempted murder count, without adding, sua sponte, instructions on the lesser 

included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. He argues his rights 

were not fully protected, to have the jury determine every material issue 

presented by the evidence, including his theories of “‘sudden quarrel or heat 

of passion’ (§ 192, subd. (a)),” or his “unreasonable but good faith belief in 

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having to act in self-defense.” (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 198–

199 (Barton); People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1007–1009 

(Cunningham).) 

In criminal cases, “‘“even in the absence of a request, the trial court 

must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by 

the evidence. (Citations.) The general principles of law governing the case 

are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the 

court, and which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.”’” 

(Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 154.) In this context, substantial evidence 

means evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude the defendant 

committed the lesser offense, instead of the greater one. (Id. at p. 162.) In 

deciding if there is substantial evidence of a lesser offense, however, the 

courts will not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, which is the jury’s 

prerogative. (Ibid.) On review in this context, we construe the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the appellant. (People v. Turk (2008) 164 

Cal.App.4th 1361, 1368, fn. 5.) 

In Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 153–154, the court set out the 

distinctions between murder (the unlawful killing of a human being with 

malice aforethought, § 187, subd. (a)), and voluntary manslaughter (§ 192), 

where a defendant has killed intentionally and unlawfully, but without malice. 

(Breverman, at p. 153; Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 199.) “But a defendant 

who intentionally and unlawfully kills lacks malice . . . in limited, explicitly 

defined circumstances: either when the defendant acts in a ‘sudden quarrel or 

heat of passion’ (§ 192, subd. (a)), or when the defendant kills in 

‘unreasonable self-defense’—the unreasonable but good faith belief in having 

to act in self-defense.” (Barton, at p. 199; italics added.) 

The jury was instructed that the People were required to prove that 

Butler took at least one direct but ineffective act toward accomplishing 

attempted murder, and that he intended to kill Danielle. (CALCRIM No. 600.) 

Such “intent or intention is manifested by the circumstances connected with 

the offense.” (§ 29.2, subd. (a).) The court further instructed the jury about 

how to complete its verdict forms, including those for any lesser included 

offenses that it concluded had been proven by the evidence. These included 

forms of kidnapping, false imprisonment, and assault. If the jury was not 

persuaded by the evidence that Butler was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 

it must find him not guilty. 

During several court sessions the court thoroughly discussed the 

proposed instructions with counsel, and inquired whether an instruction was 

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being pursued to state that attempted voluntary manslaughter was the only 

lesser included offense for attempted murder. Although the prosecutor had 

requested such an instruction, she withdrew it. Defense counsel told the court 

that in light of the defense being presented, that Butler had acted in selfdefense, a lesser included offense instruction would put the defense in a “very 

delicate situation,” and he was reluctant to give the jury that option of 

“split(ting) the baby (in half)” (e.g., convicting on a lesser offense instead of 

acquitting). The court concluded that no instruction on attempted voluntary 

manslaughter would be given, because there were no facts to support it, and 

“I don’t believe there’s any evidence to support that.” Defense counsel agreed. 

On Butler’s contention that the sequence of events proven at trial does 

not demonstrate the required element of malice, we next examine the record 

for substantial support in the evidence of his claimed extreme provocation by 

Danielle. (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 866–867.) Some levels 

of provocation can cause a person to take actions out of a heat of passion, not 

out of reflective judgment. (Le, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 525; People v. 

Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515; People v. Borchers (1958) 50 Cal.2d 321.) 

In this context of intimate partner violence, such “provocative conduct may 

be physical or verbal, and it may comprise a single incident or numerous 

incidents over a period of time.” (Le, at p. 528.) “‘The provocation which 

incites the defendant to homicidal conduct in the heat of passion must be 

caused by the victim (citation), or be conduct reasonably believed by the 

defendant to have been engaged in by the victim.’” (Ibid.; Berry, at pp. 515–

516.) 

Butler thus argues the evidence showed the unlawful attempted killing 

might constitute voluntary manslaughter, such as “if the killer’s reason was 

actually obscured as the result of a strong passion aroused by a ‘provocation’ 

sufficient to cause an ‘“‘ordinary (person) of average disposition . . . to act 

rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather 

than from judgment.’”’” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 163.) 

Butler points to the evidence in the record that his relationship with 

Danielle had been tumultuous for about a year, including violence, and that 

she acknowledged that when the topic of infidelity came up, they often argued 

and fought. Danielle nevertheless kept up this roller coaster relationship with 

Butler and initiated contact several times, including October 2011. She 

ignored the July 2011 criminal protective order that prohibited Butler from 

contacting her, and thus seemed to become accustomed to being beaten by 

him. According to Butler, she had recently enticed him into sexual situations 

by coming over to his home to spend the night, and recently sent him 

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suggestive nude photos of herself. He points out that he and Danielle had 

been getting along well the day of the incident, until they suddenly started 

fighting about her infidelity while waiting for dinner. Butler thus argues that 

both objectively and subjectively speaking, he showed to the jury that he was 

likely provoked by such interactions into attacking Danielle in a heat of 

passion. 

We disagree. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the defendant, we cannot say there was enough evidence of actual provocation 

by Danielle to send to the jury, for consideration whether such a heat of 

passion defense was tenable. Unlike in Le, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 529, 

this was not a long term relationship or marriage in which a spouse used her 

affair with a third party as a tool to humiliate the other spouse and to create a 

taunting event that “simply served as the spark that caused this powder keg of 

accumulated provocation to explode.” (Ibid.) Rather, the evidence showed 

that Butler understood that the type of women he dated were prone to cheating 

on him, and he in turn consistently cheated on his girlfriends. The evidence 

about ongoing infidelity in the relationship does not support any finding that 

Butler’s acts of violence on this date arose out of that type of provocation. 

(Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) 

To assert this ground of instruction, the evidence need not show any 

specific type of provocation, and “the passion aroused need not be anger or 

rage, but can be any ‘“‘“(v)iolent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic 

emotion”’”’ (citations) other than revenge.” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 

at p. 163.) When they left the restaurant, Danielle thought Butler seemed 

“enraged” while they walked into the alley. Even though he had angry 

exchanges with Danielle on the day of this incident, Butler has raised no 

evidence to show that his attacks on her were in reaction to any identifiable 

provocative words or actions that directly precipitated his conduct. Even 

when describing how she lunged at him with a knife, Butler’s version was that 

he kept his head and defended himself according to his training. 

Finally, we note that during jury instruction discussions, Butler’s 

counsel did not object when the prosecutor withdrew the instruction on the 

lesser included offenses of attempted voluntary manslaughter, or when the 

court decided not to give it. The evidence simply did not justify a conviction 

of such a lesser offense, with respect to any provocation or instigation by 

Danielle. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 153–154; Cunningham, supra, 

25 Cal.4th at pp. 1007–1008.) 

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“(I)mperfect self-defense is not a true defense; it is rather ‘a shorthand 

description’ of one form of the crime of voluntary manslaughter. (Citation.) 

Thus, a trial court’s duty to instruct on this theory arises ‘whenever the 

evidence is such that a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant 

killed the victim in the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in 

self-defense.’” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 883, citing Barton, supra, 12 

Cal.4th at p. 201.) 

The doctrine of imperfect self-defense is a narrow one, that will apply 

“only when the defendant has an actual belief in the need for self-defense and 

only when the defendant fears immediate harm that ‘“‘must be instantly dealt 

with.’”’” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 883.) If the defendant can show his 

“‘honest but unreasonable belief that it is necessary to defend (himself) from 

imminent peril to life or great bodily injury,’” he is entitled to a conclusion 

that no malice existed, and the charged offense is reduced to manslaughter. 

(Ibid.) 

Here, the trial court instructed the jury on the doctrine of justifiable selfdefense, and stated the People had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Butler did not act in self-defense. The court explained to the jury 

that it could find Butler had acted lawfully if he acted in self-defense in 

stabbing Danielle, if he reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of 

suffering bodily injury, and if he reasonably believed that the immediate use 

of force was necessary to defend against that danger, and if he used no more 

force than was reasonably necessary to defend against the danger. 

These instructions also told the jury, “If the defendant used more force 

than was reasonable, the defendant did not act in lawful self-defense. (¶) 

When deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, consider all 

the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and 

consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar 

knowledge would have believed.” Further, the jury was instructed that a 

person does not have a right to self-defense if he or she provokes a fight or 

quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force. The instructions next 

stated that the right to use force in self-defense will continue only as long as 

the danger exists or reasonably attempts to exist, or while the attacker appears 

capable of inflicting injury. 

According to Butler, the sequence of events proven at trial does not 

demonstrate the required element of malice for the attempted murder charge, 

because of his reasonably formed and honest, but mistaken, belief that he 

needed to defend himself from Danielle’s immediate threat to his bodily 

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integrity and his life. (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 883.) The jury rejected 

his claim of actual self-defense, but he continues to argue that he could have 

been reasonably mistaken about the need to defend himself. For example, he 

points out that Danielle is smaller and weaker than he is, and he was highly 

trained in the martial arts and probably should have been readily able to fight 

her off, but he mistakenly went on to resist her, taking her knife away, and 

then felt the knife go in her back. 

This record does not show substantial evidentiary support that Butler 

could have been reasonably misled by Danielle’s offensive, aggressive actions 

toward him that day in the car, to cause him to mistakenly conclude that he 

had to defend himself. Danielle testified that she did not carry the knife he 

had given her, but that Butler had a knife that day. Although Butler told the 

jury he taught Danielle how to use a knife, and feared that she would fatally 

stab him, such testimony did not support a theory of imperfect self-defense. 

He has brought forward no evidence to support his appellate contention that 

he was somehow mistaken into believing that Danielle’s physical condition, 

actions and circumstances posed a credible threat to his life and well-being, 

and this caused him to use the knife on her. There was no substantial evidence 

from which the jury could have concluded he tried to kill Danielle “due to an 

honest but unreasonable belief that he needed to defend himself from an 

imminent threat to his life or to his bodily integrity.” (Rogers, supra, 39 

Cal.4th at p. 883.) 

Again we note that during jury instruction discussions, the court stated 

it would not instruct on attempted voluntary manslaughter because there was 

no evidence in support of that charge. Butler was pursuing a different 

approach, by claiming true self-defense. No sua sponte instructional duty 

arose in this respect. 

(Lodgment No. 7, People v. Butler, No. D063890, slip op. at 15-23.) 

Clearly established federal law provides that in order to establish a federal due 

process violation by the failure to give a jury instruction, Petitioner must demonstrate that 

its omission “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” 

Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977), quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 

147 (1973). Where the failure to give an instruction is in issue, the burden on the petitioner 

is “especially heavy.” Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 155. 

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A state court’s “failure to correctly instruct the jury on a defense may deprive the 

defendant of his due process right to present a defense.” Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 

1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Fejes, 232 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 

2000) (“A defendant is entitled to have the judge instruct the jury on his theory of defense 

provided it is supported by law and has some foundation in the evidence.”) Even if the 

trial court’s failure to give the instruction violated due process, habeas relief would still not 

be available unless the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); 

California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996). 

 As the state court pointed out, there is insufficient evidence Petitioner acted from 

heat of passion to support an instruction on attempted voluntary manslaughter as a lesser 

included offense of attempted murder. The victim testified that she and Petitioner argued 

at a restaurant, and that he kicked, punched, grabbed and dragged her from the restaurant 

to her vehicle where he sexually assaulted her. (Lodgment No. 1, Reporter’s Tr. [“RT”] at 

345-62.) Petitioner testified they did not argue, but were “strolling, enjoying the night air, 

talking,” on their way from the restaurant to her vehicle where they engaged in consensual 

sex. (RT 1084-87.) He testified that after they had sex he told the victim that his former 

girlfriend was moving back in with him and that he and the victim could no longer see each 

other, a subject they had discussed earlier in the day, the victim responded by getting upset 

and attacking him with a knife. (RT 1093-95.) Petitioner testified that he kept his head 

and relied on his military training to defend himself and disarm her, but she was 

accidentally stabbed during the struggle. (RT 1096-99.) 

As the state court pointed out, Petitioner and the victim both testified that they 

routinely cheated on each other. (RT 329, 341, 465, 1049-50.) The victim testified that 

they had discussed that issue calmly earlier in the day, but all the other times they had ever 

discussed it Petitioner had become violent. (RT 329, 485.) Even if the state court erred in 

finding that it was a subject unlikely to give rise to the kind of provocation necessary to 

show Petitioner acted under the heat of passion, there was no evidence from which the jury 

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could have found that Petitioner intentionally stabbed the victim in the heat of passion. 

Such a finding would have been incompatible with the testimony of both Petitioner and the 

victim. Moreover, it was not only unnecessary to allow Petitioner to present his defense 

of self-defense, but would have conflicted with his defense. The state court denial of Claim 

1 on the basis that no federal due process violation arose from the failure to give an 

instruction on attempted voluntary manslaughter, is therefore neither contrary to, nor 

involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and is not based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; Williams, 529 

U.S. at 405-06; Bradley, 315 F.3d at 1099; Fejes, 232 F.3d at 702. 

 Furthermore, even if Petitioner could satisfy the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), 

he must still show that a federal due process violation occurred, and that the failure to 

instruct had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. Fry, 551 

U.S. at 119-22; Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. The victim testified that when she left the 

restaurant with Petitioner he kicked, punched, grabbed and pulled her for over an hour as 

he forced her to walk with him toward his residence where her car was parked, telling her 

“over and over again” along the way that he was going to kill her. (RT 345-52.) She said 

he then forced her into her vehicle, forced her to orally copulate him while he drove toward 

a park where he raped her, along the way telling her he was taking her to the park to kill 

her, and then stabbed her as she tried to escape. (RT 353-62.) She said Petitioner was 

holding a knife “the whole time.” (RT 361.) Petitioner, on the other hand, testified that 

they left the restaurant together in a good mood, took a pleasant stroll back toward his 

residence, and had consensual sex in her vehicle. (RT 1085-91.) He testified that after 

they had sex she attacked him with a knife when he told her they would have to stop seeing 

each other because a former girlfriend was moving back in with him, and that he 

accidentally stabbed her and broke her wrist as he was acting in self-defense attempting to 

disarm her in a manner consistent with his military training. (RT 1085-1104, 1121.) 

 Thus, the jurors were faced with a credibility determination whether to believe the 

victim’s story that Petitioner brutally beat, kidnapped, raped and tried to kill her, or his 

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story of a romantic evening which suddenly turned violent when she attacked him with a 

knife in response to his telling her he was abandoning their relationship and returning to a 

former girlfriend. The jurors were instructed that in order to convict Petitioner of attempted 

murder the prosecution had to prove he intended to kill the victim. (RT 1224.) Petitioner 

is incorrect that evidence of their tumultuous past supported further instructing the jury that 

they could convict him of attempted voluntary manslaughter if they found he deliberately 

stabbed the victim in response to provocation. It was not supported by the victim’s 

testimony that he said he was going to kill her and stabbed her when she tried to escape, 

and was not supported by Petitioner’s testimony that he kept his head and inadvertently 

stabbed the victim while using his military training to disarm her. It would have conflicted 

with his chosen defense of self-defense resulting in an accidental stabbing. Even if there 

is some evidence in the record that the nature of their relationship could have given rise to 

provocation under some circumstances, there is no evidence such circumstances arose. 

Thus, the lack of evidence to support the instruction, and the fact that it was unnecessary 

to present a defense and could have undermined Petitioner’s chosen defense, precludes a 

finding of a federal due process violation arising from the failure to sua sponte give the 

instruction. Bradley, 315 F.3d at 1099; Fejes, 232 F.3d at 702. Petitioner has not satisfied 

his “heavy burden” of showing that the failure to sua sponte instruct the jury on the lesser 

included offense of attempted voluntary manslughter “so infected the entire trial that the 

resulting conviction violates due process.” Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 154-55; Cupp, 414 U.S. at 

147. But even if the failure to give the instruction violated due process, it is clear that the 

error did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 

verdict,” not only because the jury found Petitioner intended to kill the victim, but because 

there was no evidence from which the jury could find that he intentionally stabbed the 

victim in the heat of passion. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

 The Court finds that the adjudication of Claim 1 by the state court is objectively 

reasonable, that Petitioner has not demonstrated a federal due process violation, and that 

any error is harmless. The Court recommends habeas relief be denied as to Claim 1. 

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C. Claim 2 

Petitioner alleges in Claim 2 that his federal constitutional rights were violated by 

the failure of the trial court to sua sponte instruct the jury on the defense of mistaken belief 

in consent. (Pet. at 22.) He points to evidence which he argues supports a finding that he 

reasonably, although perhaps mistakenly, believed the victim consented to the sex acts, 

including: (a) his testimony that the sex acts were consensual; (b) the victim recently reinitiated their relationship by sending him nude photographs of herself; (c) their history of 

consensual sex, including earlier that day; and (d) the fact that the jury found not true the 

allegations that he used a knife during the sex offenses and inflicted great bodily injury 

during the forcible oral copulation count, despite the victim’s testimony that he did, 

indicating they did not believe at least some of her testimony. (Id. at 22-25.) 

 Respondent answers that this claim does not present a federal question because the 

failure to instruct did not rise to the level of a federal due process violation. (Answer at 

37.) Respondent argues that even if the failure to instruct could have risen to the level of 

a federal due process violation, the state court correctly found there was insufficient 

evidence to support the instruction, and the denial of the claim by the state court on that 

basis is therefore neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. (Id. at 37-42.) 

 The Court will look through the silent denial of this claim by the state supreme court 

to the last reasoned state court decision, the appellate court opinion on direct appeal, which 

stated: 

The jury instructions given by the trial court included CALCRIM Nos. 

1015 and 1030 on the People’s obligation to prove that the charged sexual acts 

had occurred, without the free and voluntary consent of the victim, who knew 

the nature of the act. The instruction stated, “Evidence that the defendant and 

the person dated is not enough by itself to constitute consent.” Additionally, 

the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the evidence that 

Danielle had previously had consensual sexual intercourse with Butler, but 

only to help it decide whether she had consented to the charged acts, and 

whether Butler reasonably and in good faith believed that she consented in 

that way. 

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Counsel for Butler argued to the jury that Butler had an actual and 

reasonable belief that Danielle had consented to the sexual acts that occurred, 

which provided him the defense of actual consent to the charges of forcible 

oral copulation and sodomy. On appeal, Butler argues the trial court violated 

his constitutional right to fully present his defense that he mistakenly believed 

Danielle had consented to their sexual activity, since the court did not give a 

Mayberry instruction, sua sponte (Mayberry, supra, 15 Cal.3d at pp. 153–

158). The focus of such an instruction is to guide the jury’s consideration of 

any existing “substantial evidence that the defendant honestly and reasonably, 

but mistakenly, believed that the victim consented to sexual intercourse.” 

(Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 361, italics added.) 

Generally, a sua sponte instruction on a defense must be supported by 

substantial evidence and may not be inconsistent with the defendant’s theory 

of the case. (People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1047.) A trial court 

must give such a consent instruction sua sponte “only when the defense is 

supported by ‘substantial evidence,’ that is, evidence sufficient to ‘deserve 

consideration by the jury,’ not ‘whenever any evidence is presented, no matter 

how weak.’” (Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 360–361.) 

This Mayberry defense “has two components, one subjective, and one 

objective. The subjective component asks whether the defendant honestly and 

in good faith, albeit mistakenly, believed that the victim consented. . . . In 

order to satisfy this component, a defendant must adduce evidence of the 

victim’s equivocal conduct on the basis of which he erroneously believed there 

was consent. (¶) In addition, the defendant must satisfy the objective 

component, which asks whether the defendant’s mistake regarding consent 

was reasonable under the circumstances. Thus, regardless of how strongly a 

defendant may subjectively believe a person has consented to sexual 

intercourse, that belief must be formed under circumstances society will 

tolerate as reasonable in order for the defendant to have adduced substantial 

evidence giving rise to a Mayberry instruction.” (Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th 

at pp. 360–361, fn. omitted; italics added.) 

In People v. Hernandez (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 337, 345–346, this 

court explained that even if a defendant can bring forward facts of the victim’s 

equivocal conduct that supported his claim he subjectively believed she had 

consented to sexual conduct, those facts that are arguably equivocal “must be 

viewed in the context of the circumstances surrounding the conduct he 

described.” There, the objective portion of the test could not be satisfied to 

support instructions on a theory of consent, because the record showed the 

defendant had broken into the victim’s home, in the early hours of the 

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morning, carrying and showing a two-foot long metal bar, thrown her phones 

out of reach, told her he had killed a policeman, and he “gave her 10 minutes 

to give in to his demands for sex or ‘something bad was going to happen.’” 

(Hernandez, at p. 345.) Also, the victim was attempting to protect her baby 

when she stopped physically resisting his demands, and only after the 

defendant threatened her with “‘“force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of 

immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.”’ (Ibid., 

citing Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 364.) This court found it was not error 

for the trial court to omit instructions about the victim’s supposed consent, 

because the objective standard for the defendant’s reasonable reliance on her 

conduct was not met. Thus, “it was unreasonable as a matter of law for 

Hernandez to believe the victim consented to sexual intercourse.” 

(Hernandez, at pp. 345–346.) 

According to Butler, the sequence of events proven at trial is consistent 

with his theory that if Danielle did not actually consent to the oral copulation 

and sodomy incidents, he mistakenly believed that she did so. The evidence 

showed that for over a year, their relationship had included breakups, 

reconciliations, and incidents of violence, but Danielle was not deterred from 

associating with him. He thus argues she displayed “equivocal conduct that 

could be reasonably and in good faith relied on to form a mistaken belief of 

consent, despite the alleged temporal context in which that equivocal conduct 

occurred.” (Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 364; Hernandez, supra, 180 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 345–346.) This might satisfy the subjective component 

required to justify presentation of this defense. 

On the objective portion of the test, Butler points out that the jury did 

not find true the weapons use enhancements on the sex offenses, and thus the 

jury did not believe Danielle’s testimony that he had the knife in his lap while 

the oral copulation was going on. In Williams, the court acknowledged that 

in such situations, a jury might believe parts of the defendant’s version of 

events and also parts of the victim’s version. (Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 

364.) Thus, Butler contends all the evidence would have justified submitting 

“the full issue of consent to the jury for determination,” such as whether he 

was led into mistake and formed a reasonable belief of her consent. 

When we view Danielle’s “equivocal” conduct, we do so “in the 

context of the circumstances surrounding the conduct (defendant) described.” 

(Hernandez, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at pp. 345–346.) Whether or not Butler 

subjectively believed that Danielle consented to sexual conduct that day, the 

circumstances of how they got to the car, where the conduct occurred, do not 

satisfy the objective component of the Williams analysis. (Ibid.) Butler 

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suddenly got angry with Danielle in the restaurant, told her she was not going 

to have a good night, marched her to an alley where he beat her, then marched 

her back to the car while beating her some more, then forced her into the car. 

Although they had participated in consensual sex approximately 12 hours 

earlier, those intervening circumstances must be considered in evaluating 

whether Butler could have formed a reasonable but mistaken belief, based 

upon the history of their relationship, that she consented to these acts that day 

in the car. The objective component of the Williams analysis is not satisfied 

here. This proposed defense of mistake is unsupported by any substantial 

evidence in the record. 

The trial court would have had no justification for giving a sua sponte 

instruction on a possible mistaken but reasonable belief in Danielle’s consent 

to the sexual conduct. Butler did not carry his burden to present evidence 

raising a reasonable doubt about an objectively reasonable but mistaken belief 

that he was not forcing sex. 

Because we have found no error occurred on either this ground or a 

lesser included offense instruction, we need not reach Butler’s arguments 

about the application of harmless error theory or federal constitutional 

standards for evaluating such error. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 

836; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) 

(Lodgment No. 7, People v. Butler, No. D063890, slip op. at 23-27.) 

 As with the previous claim, Petitioner must overcome a “heavy burden” of showing 

that the failure to instruct the jury on his possible but mistaken belief in the victim’s consent 

“so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Kibbe, 431 

U.S. at 154-55; Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. Petitioner has not made that showing because, as 

the appellate court correctly found, even if he subjectively but mistakenly believed the 

victim consented based on their stormy history, there is insufficient evidence in the record 

to show he could have objectively but mistakenly believed she consented. 

The victim testified that Petitioner got angry at the restaurant and forced her to walk 

to his residence, kicking, punching, dragging and pushing her along the way and telling her 

he was going to kill her. (RT 345-46.) When they arrived at her car, which was parked 

near his residence, she said he pulled out his knife and pushed her into the car. (RT 352.) 

She testified that Petitioner then got in the car, unzipped his pants to reveal his erect penis, 

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and pulled her hair by the back of her neck and forced her mouth onto his penis; he then 

drove away while forcing her to orally copulate him. (RT 354-56.) Petitioner parked, 

undressed, and forced her into the back seat of the two-door car. (RT 356.) He ripped her 

clothes off, and when she was completely naked he penetrated her anus with his penis 

without lubricant, which caused her great pain. (RT 357-58.) She testified that after he 

ejaculated inside her anus, he climbed back into the front seat, dressed quickly and drove 

away saying he was taking her to a park to kill her. (RT 358-60.) They stopped near a 

park where Petitioner pulled her out of the car by her hair, and when she screamed for help 

he put his hand on her mouth and stabbed her in the back. (RT 360-61.) At that point a 

stranger intervened and she was taken to the hospital in an ambulance. (RT 361-64.) Her 

treating physicians testified that she had a stab wound to her back, a tear in her anus, a 

lacerated liver probably caused by being punched or kicked in the stomach, bruises to both 

inner thighs, and a left wrist fracture so severe and “horrific” as to warrant surgery, all 

resulting in four days of hospitalization. (RT 431, 738-48.) Petitioner, on the other hand, 

testified that they had a pleasant stroll to the car, consensual oral sex as he drove to the 

park, and consensual anal sex in the back seat while they were parked. (RT 1087-91.) He 

testified that the victim got angry and attacked him with a knife when he told her, 

immediately after they had sex, that a former girlfriend was moving back in with him and 

he and the victim would stop seeing each other, and that he inadvertently broke her wrist 

and accidentally stabbed her while disarming her. (RT 1093-1101, 1121.) 

 It was objectively reasonable for the state appellate court to find that insufficient 

evidence existed to support instructing the jury that if Petitioner mistakenly believed the 

victim consented to the sex acts he could not be found guilty of the forcible sex offenses. 

The jury was instructed that the prosecution bore the burden of proving beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the victim did not consent to the sex acts, and that Petitioner 

accomplished the sex acts “by force, violence, duress, menace or fear of an immediate and 

unlawful bodily injury.” (RT 1231-32.) Defense counsel argued to the jury that the victim 

was “a vengeful woman” who lied in order to hurt Petitioner, and that Petitioner actually 

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and reasonably believed that the victim consented. (RT 1301.) The jury obviously rejected 

that defense, and it was objectively reasonable for the state court to find that in light of the 

evidence regarding how Petitioner and the victim left the restaurant and arrived at the car, 

and in particular the severity of the victim’s injuries, insufficient evidence existed to give 

an instruction on a reasonable but mistaken belief that the victim consented to the sex acts. 

Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; Bradley, 315 F.3d at 1099; Fejes, 

232 F.3d at 702. Because there is no evidence from which the jury could have found that 

Petitioner had an actual but mistaken belief the victim consented, and because the 

instruction was not necessary for his defense, and in fact conflicted with his testimony that 

she initiated the sex (RT 1088), he has not carried his “heavy burden” of showing that a 

federal due process violation arose from the failure to give the instruction. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 

at 154-55; Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. 

 Even assuming Petitioner could satisfy the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and 

further assuming he could demonstrate a federal due process violation arose from the 

failure to give the instruction, any error is clearly harmless because it could not have had a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. The jury was provided 

with two stark versions of the events, and chose to believe the victim. Petitioner argues 

that the jury did not believe her testimony that he brandished a knife during the sex acts, 

and did not believe her testimony that he inflicted great bodily injury on her during the 

forcible oral copulation count, because they returned not true findings on those allegations. 

(Pet. at 25.) However, the five-foot, three-inch tall victim testified that she was forced to 

engage in the sex acts by a young, strong ex-Marine, and the jury could have reasonably 

found she was forced to submit irrespective of whether he brandished a knife during the 

sex acts. Her testimony was vague regarding his use of the knife during the sex acts. (RT 

361: “I saw [the knife] the whole time.”; RT 352: “He pulled the knife out even before we 

got into my car.”) She testified that the knife was on his lap while he forced her to orally 

copulate him (RT 354), but was not sure if the knife was open. (RT 506.) Thus, it is clear 

that the jury could have found the allegations that Petitioner used a knife during the sex 

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acts had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, without finding that the victim 

testified untruthfully. Likewise, evidence they had consensual sex earlier that day and 

throughout their relationship, when viewed in light of the severity of the victim’s injuries 

arising from the events of that night, does not support an instruction that Petitioner actually 

but mistakenly believed the victim consented to the sex acts that night. The Court finds 

that the failure to instruct the jury in that manner did not have a “substantial and injurious 

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637; Roy, 519 

U.S. at 5. 

The Court finds that the adjudication of Claim 2 by the state court is objectively 

reasonable, that Petitioner has not demonstrated a federal due process violation, and that 

any error is harmless. The Court recommends habeas relief be denied as to Claim 2. 

D. Claim 3

Petitioner alleges in Claim 3 that his federal constitutional rights were violated by 

the trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury on the defense of accident. (Pet. at 

28-31.) He argues that the victim’s knife wound was caused during a struggle, and that 

there was a factual dispute as to whether the wound was accidental or intentional. (Id.) 

 Respondent answers that this claim is not cognizable on federal habeas because it 

presents an issue of state law only. (Answer at 42-43.) Respondent argues that if the claim 

is read as presenting a federal issue, it is unexhausted because no state court has ever 

addressed it, and that it is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner no longer has state 

court remedies available to him. (Id.) Respondent also argues that the claim can be denied 

notwithstanding the failure to exhaust because there is insufficient evidence to support the 

instruction, and because any federal error is harmless. (Id. at 43-45.) Petitioner agrees the 

claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, and seeks to withdraw it from the 

Petition. (Traverse at 2, 22.) 

 Claim 3 was presented to the state supreme court in the petition for review. 

(Lodgment No. 8 at 22-25.) In that petition, Petitioner’s appointed appellate counsel 

argued that: “Because of the Court of Appeal’s failure to address this contention, and in 

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light of other issues passed over by the court, appellant requests remand and rehearing so 

the Court of Appeal can address all of his contentions and grant the requested relief.” (Id. 

at 26.) His same counsel had presented Claim 3 to the appellate court in the opening brief 

on direct appeal (Lodgment No. 3 at 40-44), but prior to the People filing a responsive brief 

sent a letter to the appellate court stating: “It has been brought to my attention that the 

argument raised in Claim III of the appellant’s opening brief has been resolved by the 

California Supreme Court and there is no longer a sua sponte duty for the court to instruct 

on the defense of accident. Please strike that argument at pages 40 to 44 of the brief. I 

apologize for the error and any inconvenience to the court.” (Lodgment No. 4 at 1.) 

The record is not clear why counsel raised the claim in the state supreme court after 

withdrawing it from the appellate court, and unclear why counsel thereafter requested the 

state supreme court to remand to the appellate court with instructions to address the claim. 

The appellate court was certainly bound by state supreme court precedent rejecting the 

claim, and withdrawing it from consideration by the appellate court after discovering that 

precedent is understandable, as is presenting it to the state supreme court which is not 

precluded from reconsidering their own precedent. Respondent argues, without analysis, 

that the claim is unexhausted because it was withdrawn from the appellate court brief. 

(Answer at 43.) Respondent also contends it is now procedurally defaulted because 

Petitioner no longer has state court remedies available. (Id.) 

In order to exhaust state judicial remedies, a state prisoner must present the state’s 

highest court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised in their 

federal habeas petition. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987); Duncan v. 

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). The claim must be “fairly presented” to the state 

court, that is, in a manner which allows that court to have “the first opportunity to hear the 

claim sought to be vindicated in a federal habeas proceeding.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 

270, 275-76 (1971). The “fair presentation” requirement is not satisfied where a claim is 

presented in a manner which precludes consideration by the state court. Castille v. Peoples, 

489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). 

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The exhaustion requirement also can be met if there is an absence of state judicial 

remedies. Castille, 489 U.S. at 351 (“The requisite exhaustion may nonetheless exist, of 

course, if it is clear that respondent’s claims are now procedurally barred under [state] 

law.”), citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 n.28 (1982) (“[The exhaustion] 

requirement, however, refers only to remedies still available at the time of the federal 

petition.”) In addition, federal courts have discretion to deny a habeas application on the 

merits notwithstanding a petitioner’s failure to exhaust state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, 

notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts 

of the State.”) 

 Although Petitioner’s appointed appellate counsel withdrew the claim from the 

appellate court brief, counsel included it in the state supreme court petition for review and 

requested a remand for consideration of the claim. Thus, it does not appear that Claim 3 

was presented to the state supreme court in a manner which precluded that court from 

considering the claim, and the exhaustion requirement is therefore satisfied. Castille, 489 

U.S. at 351. As set forth below, the silent denial of the claim by the state supreme court is 

presumed to be an adjudication on the merits of the claim. The Court recommends rejecting 

Respondent’s contention that because the claim was withdrawn from the appellate court it 

is unexhausted. Because Respondent’s argument the claim is procedurally defaulted is 

predicated on a failure to exhaust, the Court also recommends rejecting Respondent’s 

contention that the claim is procedurally defaulted. 

 In his Traverse Petitioner states: “The claim of failure to sua sponte instruct on 

accidental stabbing is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner withdraws this claim as it is 

procedurally defaulted.” (Traverse at 22.) He also states he “withdraws this claim as it is 

unexhausted.” (Id. at 2.) Because Claim 3 is exhausted and not procedurally defaulted, 

and because Petitioner’s request to withdraw it on that basis is apparently predicated on the 

unsupported and erroneous representation in the Answer that the claim is unexhausted, the 

Court recommends rejecting Petitioner’s request that the claim be withdrawn from his 

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Petition. See Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal courts are 

required to liberally construe pro se prisoner habeas petitions, especially with regard to the 

determination as to which claims are presented). 

 The Court will presume that the silent denial by the state supreme court was an 

adjudication on the merits of the federal Constitutional claim presented. See Richter, 562 

U.S. at 99 (“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court 

has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits 

in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.”) 

Because the state supreme court did not articulate the reasons for denying the claim, this 

Court “must determine what arguments or theories . . . could have supported the state 

court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could 

disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 

decision of” the Supreme Court. Id. at 102. 

 By convicting Petitioner of attempted murder, the jury obviously rejected his 

testimony that the victim was stabbed inadvertently during their struggle over the knife. 

The jurors were instructed that in order to convict Petitioner of attempted murder the 

prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had “the intent to kill 

another person.” (RT 1224.) The state court could reasonably have found that it was 

unnecessary to further instruct the jury that Petitioner could not be convicted of attempted 

murder if the stabbing was an accident, and that the failure to instruct therefore did not 

violate his federal due process rights. See Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 154 (holding that an 

instructional error violates federal due process where its omission “so infected the entire 

trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.”), quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. 

 Even assuming Petitioner could satisfy the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), or 

show they do not apply, and assuming he could demonstrate a federal due process violation 

from the failure to give the instruction, any error is clearly harmless because it could not 

have had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. The jury was 

already instructed that the prosecution bore the burden of proving Petitioner intended to 

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kill the victim when he stabbed her. She testified that he told her numerous times that he 

was going to kill her. (RT 360.) He testified the stabbing was inadvertent and accidental. 

(RT 1098-1100, 1100-22.) His trial counsel argued in closing that the victim “is a vengeful 

woman” lying about the events, and that the forensic evidence which showed the stab 

wound was “fairly superficial” was consistent with the victim’s statement to the police that 

she had not even realized she had been stabbed, and consistent with an accidental and 

inadvertent stabbing. (RT 1301-04.) In light of the jury instruction placing the burden of 

proof on the prosecution to show Petitioner intended to kill the victim, and the clear choice 

the jury was given whether to believe her story of an intentional stabbing or Petitioner’s 

story of an accidental stabbing, it is clear that the failure to further instruct the jury on the 

defense of accident did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637; Roy, 519 U.S. at 5. 

The Court finds that Claim 3 is exhausted and is not procedurally defaulted, and 

recommends rejecting Petitioner’s request to withdraw the claim. The Court also finds that 

the adjudication of Claim 3 by the state court is objectively reasonable, that Petitioner has 

not demonstrated a federal due process violation, and that even if he could the alleged error 

is harmless. The Court therefore recommends habeas relief be denied as to Claim 3. 

E. Claim 4

Petitioner contends in Claim 4 that the trial court failed to conduct an adequate 

investigation into potential juror misconduct. (Pet. at 32-38.) He asserts that when a juror 

informed the trial judge he had received a Facebook post with what appeared to be 

Petitioner’s photograph and a reference to the availability of a criminal background check, 

the trial court failed to contact the companies involved or ask the juror if he had conducted 

an internet search about Petitioner which may have generated the Facebook post. (Id.) 

Respondent answers that the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry when it 

questioned every juror and discovered no evidence that extrinsic material entered the jury 

room, and argues that any suggestion of juror misconduct is speculative. (Answer at 45.) 

Respondent contends that the state court denial of the claim on that basis is neither contrary 

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to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Id. at 45-

49.) 

The Court will look through the silent denial by the state supreme court to the last 

reasoned state court decision, the appellate court opinion on direct appeal, which stated: 

Butler contends the trial court did not carry out an adequate 

investigation of potential juror misconduct, when a juror notified the court he 

had received an advertisement for a criminal background check service on his 

Facebook page, during trial. Butler requested a mistrial and brought a motion 

for new trial on the same ground, which the court denied. On appeal, we 

examine the trial court’s rulings on the issue for any abuse of discretion. 

(Virgil, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1284.) 

“‘“When a trial court is aware of possible juror misconduct, the court 

‘must “make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary”’ to resolve the 

matter.” (Citation.) Although courts should promptly investigate allegations 

of juror misconduct “to nip the problem in the bud” (Citation), they have 

considerable discretion in determining how to conduct the investigation.’ 

(Citation.) . . . The court does not abuse its discretion simply because it fails 

to investigate any and all new information obtained about a juror during trial.” 

(Virgil, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1284; People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 343 

(Ray).) The courts will not reach issues of prejudice unless jury misconduct 

is found. (People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 242.) 

At the outset of trial and when the case was submitted to it, the jurors 

were instructed in the language of CALCRIM No. 201 about their duty not to 

use the Internet or a dictionary in any way in connection with the case. Also, 

they were told under CALCRIM No. 200, in relevant part: “You must decide 

what the facts are. It is up to all of you, and you alone, to decide what 

happened, based only on the evidence that has been presented to you in this 

trial.” 

At trial, since Butler was charged with committing the crimes while 

released on bail, he did not oppose informing the jury that he had a prior 

criminal conviction. The court took judicial notice of that prior felony 

conviction, and it was admitted into evidence. 

During trial, Juror No. 11 sent a note to the court stating he had received 

a Facebook advertisement about a criminal background check business, and it 

had a mug shot photo that looked somewhat like Butler. The court brought 

the juror into chambers to question him individually. Juror No. 11 explained 

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there were no names on the post and he could not tell who sent it to him. It 

appeared to be an advertisement for a company called “United States 

Background Checks,” and it offered criminal background checks on all 

criminals in a given area. It was illustrated with a photo that looked like 

Butler. Although Juror No. 11 ignored the post, he thought it was kind of 

strange and was concerned enough to notify the court he had received it. 

When asked, he said that he could set aside any consideration of that post and 

make his decision based on the evidence presented in the courtroom. 

Butler’s attorney moved for a mistrial, on the grounds that another juror 

might have sent the information to Juror No. 11, or he might have been 

researching the case on his own. The prosecutor stated that the jury had 

already been told that Butler was out on bail when these incidents occurred. 

In response, the court called all the jurors in separately, and asked whether 

they had been communicating through e-mail or Facebook with each other, 

and they each answered no. The court found no basis to conclude any of the 

other jurors had communicated with Juror No. 11 in that manner, and no 

prejudice to Butler had arisen. The court denied the motion for mistrial. 

Later, Butler filed a new trial request on the same ground, and others. 

He supplied additional information about the wide availability of such 

unsolicited criminal background check services and advertisements on the 

Internet. The prosecutor inquired of the arresting authorities whether they had 

released any mug shots of Butler to such services, and they said no. The 

motion was denied. 

Butler contends his motion for mistrial should have been granted 

because the trial court did not conduct an adequate investigation into the 

juror’s activities, thus abusing its discretion, such as when it did not accept 

the juror’s offer to show the judge his Facebook page. Defense counsel’s new 

trial motion attached material retrieved from the Internet about the advertised 

Web site, showing it listed several court index links, warrant links, and arrest 

links. Butler thus argues this information made it appear to Juror No. 11 that 

Butler “had a long and extensive criminal record, far more than the jury was 

told.” 

The jurors were made aware of the restrictions on their use of the 

Internet or other sources to research matters in connection with the case. Juror 

No. 11 conscientiously reported the matter in court, and he told the judge he 

could set aside any consideration of the posted advertisement and would make 

his decision based on the evidence presented in the courtroom. 

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Only speculative concerns were raised by defense counsel. In response, 

the court questioned not only Juror No. 11 but also all the other jurors, and 

evaluated their responses. No evidence was produced to support defense 

counsel’s contention that this juror might have done anything improper or 

inappropriately communicated with other jurors. There was no indication any 

of the jurors had violated the court’s instructions or committed misconduct of 

any kind. (Virgil, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1284; Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 

343.) 

On this record, the trial court had an adequate basis to conclude that the 

purported misconduct did not require any further investigation. “(A) hearing 

is required only where the court possesses information which, if proven to be 

true, would constitute ‘good cause’ to doubt a juror’s ability to perform his 

duties and would justify his removal from the case.” (Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th 

at p. 343.) The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying the 

defense’s motion for mistrial or a new trial. 

(Lodgment No. 7, People v. Butler, No. D063890, slip op. at 28-31.) 

 Petitioner has a Sixth Amendment right to trial by a jury in which the verdict is based 

on evidence presented at the trial. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965). This 

right is implicated if a jury is “exposed to prejudicial extrinsic information . . . during jury 

deliberation.” Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2002); Sassounian v. Roe, 

230 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). When extrinsic evidence is introduced in the jury 

room, a defendant is entitled to a new trial “if there existed a reasonable possibility that the 

extrinsic material could have affected the verdict.” United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 

192, 193 (9th Cir. 1979); Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 1980). 

 As the appellate court here found, an inquiry was held where all the jurors were 

questioned, and there is nothing in the record to suggest extrinsic evidence was presented 

to the jury, much less that the verdict was affected. In fact, Petitioner appears to admit as 

much. He contends here, as he did in state court, that the scope of the inquiry was too 

narrow, and with a proper investigation evidence might have been discovered to support 

his claim. (Pet. at 36-38; Traverse at 24-25.) Thus, the appellate court properly viewed 

this claim as speculative. In any case, the juror who received and reported the Facebook 

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post said he could set the post aside and make his decision based on the evidence presented 

at trial. (RT 967.) All the other jurors were questioned and denied being exposed to the 

post. (RT 973-80.) This Court must defer to the trial judge’s determination that the only 

juror who was exposed to the post was able to remain impartial. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 

U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (holding that a state trial judge is in a far superior position to assess 

juror bias than federal habeas judges); see also Austad v. Risley, 761 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th 

Cir. 1985) (“The Supreme Court has clearly established that the determination of a juror’s 

partiality or bias is a factual determination to which section 2254(d)’s presumption of 

correctness applies.”), citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036 (1984). Accordingly, 

the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court adjudication of 

this claim is contrary to, or involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law, or is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Even if Petitioner could demonstrate that extrinsic evidence was introduced into the 

jury deliberations, or that the state court’s adjudication of the claim is objectively 

unreasonable, habeas relief is not available unless he can also demonstrate that the extrinsic 

evidence had a substantial or injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. Sassounian, 

230 F.3d at 1108 (holding that harmless error standard of Brecht applies to claims of jury’s 

consideration of extraneous evidence). Evidence was presented at trial that Petitioner had 

a criminal record. Jessica Butler, Petitioner’s ex-wife, testified that Petitioner slapped, 

pulled, pushed, choked, and tried to punch her on one occasion, which led to his arrest and 

conviction for domestic violence. (RT 610-15.) She testified that Petitioner was later 

arrested for violating a restraining order arising from those charges. (RT 614-18.) 

Additional evidence was presented showing that when the offenses in this case were 

committed Petitioner was on bail awaiting sentencing for a felony conviction of attempting 

to dissuade a witness (the victim in this case), and for violating a restraining order which 

precluded him from having contact with the victim in this case. (RT 885-89, 1026-27.) 

Thus, in light of the evidence presented at trial that Petitioner did have a criminal record, 

and the assurance from the only juror to be exposed to a Facebook post which indicated 

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Petitioner may have a criminal record, that he could set the information aside and decide 

the case on the evidence presented at trial, it is clear that the alleged error here (failure to 

further investigate the origin of the Facebook post in order to determine if it was generated 

by the juror), did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 

the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637; Roy, 519 U.S. at 5. 

The Court finds that the adjudication of Claim 4 by the state court is objectively 

reasonable, that Petitioner has not demonstrated a federal due process violation arising 

from the alleged error, and that any error is clearly harmless. The Court recommends 

habeas relief be denied as to Claim 4. 

F. Claim 5

Petitioner alleges in his final claim that he was deprived of his federal constitutional 

right to the effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to object to 

numerous instances of misconduct during the prosecutor’s closing argument. (Pet. at 39-

43.) He contends the prosecutor: (a) improperly commented on Petitioner’s right to be 

present at trial and testify; (b) attacked the defense counsel’s integrity; (c) expressed a 

personal opinion of Petitioner’s guilt; (d) vouched for witnesses; (e) and “made a Golden 

Rule argument coupled with a law and order appeal.” (Id.) Respondent answers that the 

denial of this claim by the state court, on the basis that the prosecutor made no 

objectionable comments and therefore the failure of defense counsel to object did not 

constitute ineffective assistance, is objectively reasonable. (Answer at 50-60.) 

 Petitioner presented this claim to the state superior, appellate and supreme courts in 

consecutive habeas petitions. (Lodgment Nos. 10, 12, 14-15.) The superior court denied 

the petition, stating: 

 Petitioner has not provided any documentary support to show that the 

prosecution actually made the statements and that if it did, that counsel failed 

to object to the statements. There is no record from the trial court to confirm 

that the statements were made and to show the context of those statements. 

Context is essential. The statements read as if they were part of the 

prosecution’s closing arguments. If this was the case they would have been 

entirely appropriate for the prosecution to make. “(T)he prosecution has broad 

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discretion to state its views regarding which reasonable inferences may or may 

not be drawn from the evidence. (Citation.) Arguments by the prosecutor that 

otherwise might be deemed improper do not constitute misconduct if they fall 

within the proper limits of rebuttal to the arguments of defense counsel. 

(Citation.)” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1026, as modified 

(Aug. 15, 2001).) Petitioner has not made a basic showing that the statements, 

if in fact made by the prosecution, were made in a context and manner which 

rendered them objectionable such that counsel’s failure to object was error. 

 Even if petitioner has shown the prosecution made the statements and 

counsel failed to object, there is no guarantee the court would have been 

required to issue curative instructions. 

 Indeed, on appeal the court found the trial court did not have a sua 

sponte duty to instruct on petitioner’s defenses of consent, self-defense, and/or 

accident. Therefore, it seems objections by trial counsel to prosecution 

arguments on these grounds would have been futile and would not have 

resulted in curative instructions. 

 In sum, petitioner has not shown that counsel failed to act as counsel 

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and that this failure resulted in prejudice 

to petitioner. 

(Lodgment No.11, In re Butler, HC21948, order at 4-5 (Cal.Sup.Ct. Apr. 20, 2015).) 

 Petitioner presented the same claim to the appellate court, again without attaching 

the trial transcripts which contained the allegedly objectionable remarks of the prosecutor. 

(Lodgment No. 12.) The appellate court denied the petition, first remarking that it could 

be denied on the basis that it is untimely and that the trial transcripts were not attached, and 

then stating: 

 Butler’s claim also fails on the merits. None of the various remarks by 

the prosecutor during closing argument Butler quotes in his petition amounted 

to misconduct. The prosecutor’s remarks that defense counsel’s argument the 

victim consented to oral copulation and sodomy was “absolutely 

preposterous,” that the defense theory was “completely unreasonable,” and 

that defense counsel “glossed over” both the law and Butler’s testimony, did 

not denigrate counsel personally. Those remarks, which were “‘aimed solely 

at the persuasive force of defense counsel’s . . . argument(s), and not at counsel 

personally’” (People v. Hajek (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1230), “fell well within 

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the latitude allowed in commenting upon deficiencies in opposing counsel’s 

tactics” (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 736). By arguing that the 

victim did not consent to oral copulation and sodomy, that Butler did not act 

in self-defense, that the victim’s testimony was credible based on the evidence 

introduced at trial, and that the victim was vulnerable and endured a 

“nightmare,” the prosecutor did not impermissibly express personal opinions 

on Butler’s guilt, vouch for the victim’s credibility, or appeal to the jurors’ 

sympathy. The prosecutor was entitled to attack the sincerity of Butler’s and 

his counsel’s assertions regarding consent and self-defense. (People v. 

Shazier (2014) 60 Cal.4th 109, 146.) The prosecutor also was entitled to 

“comment upon the credibility of witnesses based on facts contained in the 

record, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.” (People 

v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 958.) Further, the prosecutor did not 

impermissibly ask jurors ‘to step into the victim’s shoes and imagine . . . her 

suffering,” but instead permissibly “identif(ied) traits that made the victim 

particularly vulnerable to attack where such facts bear on the charged crimes 

and are not otherwise inadmissible on their face.” (People v. Millwee (1998) 

18 Cal.4th 96, 137.) The prosecutor’s remarks were not objectionable, and 

any objection by Butler’s trial counsel properly would have been overruled. 

“Failure to make meritless objections cannot be the basis of an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim.” (People v. Sanamiego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 

1148, 1170.) 

(Lodgment No. 13, In re Butler, No. D068111 (Cal.Ct.App. June 15, 2015).) 

 Petitioner thereafter raised the same claim, this time accompanied by the trial 

transcripts of the prosecutor’s closing argument, in a habeas petition in the state supreme 

court. (Lodgment Nos. 14-15.) That petition was denied with an order which stated: 

“Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.” (Lodgment No. 16.) 

“Before we can apply AEDPA’s standards, we must identify the state court decision 

that is appropriate for our review. When more than one state court has adjudicated a claim, 

we analyze the last reasoned decision.” Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th 

Cir. 2005). Here, the last reasoned decision is the appellate court opinion. Although the 

appellate court remarked that it could deny the claim on the basis that Petitioner did not 

attach the relevant trial transcripts, it went on to address the merits of the claims. Because 

Petitioner attached the transcripts to his subsequent state supreme court habeas petition, 

there is nothing in the record to rebut the presumption that the state supreme court adopted 

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the reasoning of the appellate court with respect to the denial of the claim on its merits, 

rather than on the procedural defect of failing to attach the transcripts or the passing 

reference to its option to deny the petition on the basis of untimeliness. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 

805; Barker, 423 F.3d at 1091-92. 

 For ineffective assistance of counsel to provide a basis for habeas relief, Petitioner 

must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687 (1984). “This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 

was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” 

Id. Petitioner must also show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense, 

which requires showing that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive [Petitioner] of 

a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. To show prejudice, Petitioner need only 

demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been 

different absent the error. Id. at 694. A reasonable probability in this context is “a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Petitioner must 

establish both deficient performance and prejudice in order to establish ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Id. at 687. “The standards created by Strickland and section 2254(d) 

are both ‘highly deferential’ and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (citations omitted). These standards are “difficult to meet” and 

“demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 

563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). 

Clearly established federal law provides that prosecutorial misconduct, in order to 

constitute a federal due process violation, must be “‘of sufficient significance to result in 

the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.’” Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 

(1987), quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). The misconduct must 

be reviewed in the context of the entire trial. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 

643 (1974). Even where misconduct rises to the level of a federal constitutional error, 

federal habeas relief is not available if the error was harmless. Fields v. Woodford, 309 

F.3d 1095, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002), citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

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Petitioner first objects to the prosecutor’s comment that he tailored his testimony 

when she said: “As we sit here in this room today, it’s hard to imagine the gentleman who 

testified to you from the stand yesterday, the clean, dressed, well-spoken intelligent guy 

with an explanation for everything, based on the fact that he is the single witness in this 

case who got to sit here and listen to all the evidence against him before he ever raised his 

hand and took an oath to tell the truth. He knew every single piece of evidence. And before 

he ever had to utter to you an explanation, he was able to tailor it to try to explain away the 

overwhelming evidence, the overwhelming physical injuries that he inflicted to Danielle 

D. in this case.” (RT 1245.) The state court denial of this claim, on the basis the remark 

was not objectionable and therefore counsel was not deficient in failing to object, did not 

constitute an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 

Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 64-65 (2000) (holding that prosecutor’s comment in 

summation that the defendant had the opportunity to hear the testimony of all the other 

witnesses and tailor his testimony accordingly did not constitute error.); Pinholster, 563 

U.S. 181; Richter, 562 U.S. at 105; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. 

Petitioner next contends the prosecutor expressed her personal opinion of his guilt 

and vouched for witnesses. He objects to the prosecutor’s expression of her personal 

opinion through her comments: “Now, he selected Danielle for specifically one reason: He 

thought he could get away with what he did.” (RT 1248); “I think his right to have a 

relationship with Danielle D. ended when he forcefully sodomized her in the back of the 

car, when he ripped her anus open to the point where she was oozing blood, when he stuck 

a knife in her back when she was crying in terror, running into the arms of a complete 

stranger, begging for help.” (RT 1249); “And when I take you through the evidence in this 

case, I suggest to you that the defense’s theory is completely unreasonable.” (RT 1255); 

“He did not act in self-defense in this case. His actions are not reasonable in any way.” 

(RT 1354); and “I know it’s been a long day, but it is important in this case to talk about 

the reasonableness of the defendant’s version and the unreasonableness.” (RT 1355.) 

Petitioner also argues the prosecutor vouched for witnesses when she said: “Jessica Butler 

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[Petitioner’s ex-wife] is a totally credible witness.” (RT 1327); “but in this case he has to 

disarm this young, small girl to the point where he breaks her wrist and stabs her in the 

back. Is that the kind of martial arts training he got? That’s the kind of force he needs to 

use in order to get a knife away from somebody Danielle’s size? I don’t think so, because 

that’s not what happened.” (RT 1329); “But what I can tell you is this: She was being 

forcefully taken down to the park.” (RT 1329); and “She was honest with you about her 

shortcomings. She is not a liar. She was honest about the fact that she had had consensual 

vaginal sex with him that morning. She never hid that fact from anyone. She never told 

anyone that didn’t happen. She didn’t have to volunteer that information. If she was trying 

to make herself look better, she absolutely didn’t need to be forthcoming about that 

information, but she was, because she was telling the truth.” (RT 1251.) 

It is improper for a prosecutor to express her personal opinion of the defendant’s 

guilt, United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1190 (9th Cir. 2005), or to place the 

prestige of the government behind a witness by a personal assurance the witness is telling 

the truth. United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1444 (9th Cir. 1991). Vouching is 

especially problematic where the credibility of the witnesses is crucial. Id. at 1445. 

However, the appellate court correctly found that these remarks fit within the reasonable 

latitude prosecutors have to argue that one of the two sides are lying. Id.; see also Lawn v. 

United States, 355 U.S. 339, 359 n.15 (1958) (vouching does not occur where the 

comments are invited by defense counsel’s attack on credibility, and where the prosecutor 

does not say or insinuate that her statement was based on personal knowledge or anything 

other than witness testimony). The trial judge reminded the jurors immediately before 

closing arguments began of their previous instruction that the attorney’s comments did not 

constitute evidence, but were presented merely to “outline for you his or her interpretation 

as to what the evidence has shown.” (RT 1243.) Those instructions mitigated any possible 

prejudice from the statements. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182 (1986) (holding 

that instructing the jury “that their decision was to be made on the basis of the evidence 

alone, and that the augments of counsel were not evidence” mitigated against unfairness, 

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as did the fact that the prosecutor did not manipulate or misstate the evidence.) It was 

objectively reasonable for the state court to find defense counsel was not ineffective for 

failing to object. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. 

Petitioner next argues that the prosecutor attacked the integrity of defense counsel 

when she began her rebuttal closing argument by saying: “I want to start by talking about 

the fact that defense counsel just indicated, you know, ‘I’m not here –’ and his words, ‘I’m 

not here to pick apart Danielle D. I’m not here, but it’s my job, however, to point out these 

inconsistencies.’ Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you how much time did he just spend talking 

about Danielle D.’s testimony? The bulk of his argument. He glossed over the law. He 

glossed over his client’s testimony. . . . But when you sit here and you are given two 

different versions of evidence, two different versions of the truth of what happened, and 

the defense attorney stands up and glosses over his own client’s testimony, you as a jury 

are called upon to use your common sense and to wonder how much sense that makes to 

you. How much sense does it make to quickly go over his client’s explanation for how all 

these events happened? Not to pick apart what his client said, but to gloss over it, to gloss 

over the law, and then spend the bulk of the argument going into every little detailed 

statement Danielle made, then to tell you as a jury if the most traumatic event of your life 

ever happened, you would remember everything, you would remember every footstep, you 

would remember every breath?” (RT 1324-25.) 

The Ninth Circuit has found that it is improper for the prosecutor to attack defense 

counsel’s integrity without evidence to support the attack, Bruno v. Rushen, 721 F.2d 1193, 

1195 (9th Cir. 1983), or to attack defense counsel’s legitimate trial tactics, United States v. 

Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 1996). The prosecutor is, however, “free to 

voice doubt about the veracity of a defendant’s story [since] the inference that one side is 

lying is unavoidable.” Dubria v. Smith, 224 F.3d 995, 1004 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United 

States v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Criticism of defense theories 

and tactics is a proper subject of closing argument.”) 

/ / / 

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Assuming Petitioner has demonstrated that the prosecutor’s comments were 

objectionable, clearly established federal law provides that improper comments violate 

federal due process only whether they “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the 

resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-83. Because the 

jury was provided with a stark choice between the versions of events given by the victim 

and Petitioner, comments by the prosecutor challenging defense counsel’s strategy of 

focusing on inconsistencies in the victim’s statement rather than his own client’s testimony 

or the law, did not infect the trial with unfairness. In addition, Petitioner has not shown 

that defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s statements in this regard was not 

a legitimate trial strategy designed to avoid drawing further attention to the weaknesses of 

his defense strategy. Neither was Petitioner prejudiced by the failure to object because any 

curative instruction would be repetitive of the instructions the jury were given that 

comments of counsel are not evidence and merely reflect their personal opinions. In light 

of the double deference owed to the state court determination that defense counsel was not 

deficient in failing to object to these comments, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the 

state court adjudication is objectively unreasonable. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 1398; Richter, 

562 U.S. at 105; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. 

 Finally, Petitioner contends the prosecutor improperly invoked the golden rule and 

appealed to law and order when she said: “At the beginning of trial I told you as jurors 

that you had the power to end the nightmare for Danielle D.” (Pet. at 42.) Placing the 

comments in context, the prosecutor continued: “And for one year she has waited, ladies 

and gentlemen. In this case he’s guilty of each and every charge and allegation. He is used 

to being in power and control. And the power and control is in your hands collectively, 

together, as jurors. You can take your time if you need to, but in this case you need to do 

justice because it is the right thing and the only consistent and inescapable truth in this case 

is that he is guilty of each and every one of these crimes.” (RT 1363-64.) 

 It is misconduct for a prosecutor to invite the jurors to put themselves in the place of 

the victim because it “inappropriately obscure[s] the fact that his role is to vindicate the 

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public’s interest in punishing crime, not to exact revenge on behalf of an individual victim.” 

Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 712-13 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, however, as in Darden, the 

prosecutor did not manipulate or misstate evidence, and the jurors were instructed that the 

comments of counsel were not evidence but merely opinion. Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-82. 

When viewed in the context of the entire trial as it must be, Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643, the 

prosecutor was commenting on the strength of the evidence against Petitioner and the 

severity of the crime, not appealing for revenge. Nevertheless, even if the comments went 

further than asking the jury to vindicate the public’s interest in punishing crime, in light of 

the strength of the evidence against Petitioner, including his past history of similar 

domestic violence, it is clear the comments did not “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as 

to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 182 (finding 

no due process violation where the weight of the evidence was against the petitioner, the 

prosecutor’s remarks were invited by defense argument and did not misstate or manipulate 

the evidence, and were cured by the instructions). 

The Court finds that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by his 

counsel’s failure to object to these comments because they did not violate due process, and 

because an objection, had it been made and sustained, would have resulted in a curative 

instruction identical to those already given, namely, informing the jury that the argument 

of counsel is not evidence but merely an expression of their opinion as to what the evidence 

shows. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (holding that prejudice requires showing “a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”); Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 

(“The standards created by Strickland and section 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential’ and 

when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.”) (citations omitted). The Court finds 

it was therefore objectively reasonable for the state court to find that defense counsel was 

not ineffective for failing to object to these comments by the prosecutor. Richter, 562 U.S. 

at 105; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181 (holding that those 

standards are “difficult to meet” and “demands that state court decisions be given the 

benefit of the doubt.”) 

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 The state court adjudication of Claim 5, on the basis that defense counsel was not 

ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s remarks, is neither contrary to, nor 

involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and is not based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state 

court proceedings. The Court recommends habeas relief be denied as to Claim 5. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court 

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) 

directing that Judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than November 1, 2016, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should 

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than November 11, 2016. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise 

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 

(9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 11, 2016

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