Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00852/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00852-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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06cv852

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY L. ARMSTRONG,

Plaintiff,

v.

L. E. SCRIBNER, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 06cv852 L (RBB)

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART THE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION;

OVERRULING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

OBJECTIONS [doc. #46]; GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

AND REQUEST TO STRIKE PUNITIVE

DAMAGES [doc. #19]; DENYING

MOTIONS TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL

PLEADINGS [doc. #10, 29, 38] and

DIRECTING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

In his 42 U.S.C. §1983 amended complaint (“AC”), plaintiff Jerry Armstrong, who is

proceeding without counsel, alleges his right of access to the courts has been violated. 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a request to strike punitive damages from the amended

complaint. Plaintiff filed three motions to file supplemental pleadings. These motions were

referred to the assigned magistrate judge for a Report and Recommendation (“Report”) under 28

U.S.C. § 363. After full briefing, Magistrate Judge Brooks filed his Report with respect to all

the pending motions. Plaintiff filed timely objections to some of the recommendations. 

A. Standard for reviewing a report and recommendation

The district court’s role in reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation is

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under this statute, the district court “shall make a de novo

Case 3:06-cv-00852-L-RBB Document 53 Filed 07/10/08 Page 1 of 8
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1 Petitioner was appealing the denial of a habeas corpus petition that challenged his

criminal conviction.

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determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge.” Id. Under this statute, “the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings

and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 238 (2003).

B. First Cause of Action: Access to Computer

Plaintiff alleges in his AC, that defendants prohibited him from accessing a computer

which prevented him from filing a timely petition for certiorari before the United States

Supreme Court.1

 Because plaintiff had not requested in forma pauperis status, he was required

to meet the Supreme Court’s procedural rules concerning proper formatting of documents. 

Plaintiff was given notice that he had 60 days in which to file a complying petition. 

Once given notice of the Supreme Court’s procedural requirements, plaintiff sent a letter

dated March 13, 2004, to Stuart Ryan (“Ryan”), the Warden of Calipatria prison, requesting the

use of a computer to comply with the Supreme Court’s Rules of Court. Plaintiff’s letter set forth

the approximate date in which the corrected petition was required to be resubmitted; the

deficiencies in the original petition, i.e., the font size and the format; and that these requirements

were mandatory because he was not proceeding in forma pauperis. (Objection, Exh. D at 1.) 

Plaintiff contends Ryan failed to respond to his letter. Because he was not given access to a

computer, he was unable to meet the formatting requirements and his petition before the

Supreme Court was dismissed. 

Plaintiff filed objections to the Report that found he had not exhausted this claim and that

defendant Ryan had qualified immunity. The Report also recommended that the other

defendants be dismissed because plaintiff failed to connect the defendants with the violation

alleged. Plaintiff has not objected to the other defendants being dismissed.

1. Exhaustion of Claim

The magistrate judge found plaintiff’s claim based on his denial of access to a computer

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to be unexhausted and plaintiff acknowledges that he did not exhausted the claim. (Objection at

11.) But in his objection, plaintiff contends that the letter he sent to Ryan gave notice of his

grievance sufficient to exhaust the claim, and even if the letter did not exhaust this claim, a

special circumstance applies to waive the exhaustion requirement.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) prohibits prisoners from filing a suit in

federal court “with respect to prison conditions until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

As noted above, plaintiff sent a single letter to Ryan requesting the use of a computer to

meet the Supreme Court’s procedural rules for filing a petition for certiorari. When plaintiff

heard nothing in response to his letter, plaintiff took no additional action. He did not send a

follow-up letter to Ryan. Nor did he file an administrative grievance directed to either Ryan’s

lack of response or plaintiff’s need for access to a computer. (See Objection at 11, ¶ 4.) As the

magistrate correctly concluded, plaintiff’s first claim is unexhausted unless a special

circumstance justified the failure to exhaust.

In his objection, plaintiff first relies on the district court case, Phillips v. Hust, 338 F.

Supp.2d 1148 (D. Or. 2004), in support of his argument that his letter to Warden Ryan

sufficiently gave notice of his grievance to demonstrate exhaustion. Plaintiff states that the

“only grievance procedured [sic] employed by Phillips was an inmate communication (“a kite”)

that asserted some short-coming in the prison’s law library system.” (Objection at 13.)

Plaintiff’s contention is a misreading of Phillips. 

In the Phillips case, plaintiff sent a kite requesting access to a comb punch binder and in

response, defendant stated that the binder was unavailable to prisoners. The Phillips court did

not mention or even suggest in any manner that the kite served to administratively exhaust

plaintiff’s claim: exhaustion was not at issue in the Phillips case. There is nothing in the

Phillips case about the administrative grievance procedure employed. Thus, Armstrong’s

assertion that the Phillips case supports his position, i.e., that a single letter requesting some

action can administratively exhaust a claim, is without merit. 

Plaintiff also asserts that a special circumstance exists excusing the exhaustion

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requirement. Here plaintiff relies on two cases: Brownell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305 (2nd Cir.

2006) and Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2002).

In Brownell, the district court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment finding

that plaintiff had not exhausted his claims. But the Court of Appeals reversed recognizing that

“in some cases ‘special circumstances’ may justify a prisoner’s failure to comply with

administrative procedural requirements.” Brownell, 446 F.3d at 312 (citations omitted). The

special circumstance found in Brownell was a prison official’s advice to Brownell to follow a

particular course of action that prevented him from properly exhausting his claim. Id. The

Brownell Court noted “Brownell did, in fact, take his grievance through all three layers of

administrative appeal, thereby giving superior prison officials a chance to correct errors below.” 

Id. Brownell is a special circumstance case with facts not applicable to plaintiff here.

In Strong, plaintiff filed two intraprison grievances. 297 F.3d at 647. After the first

grievance was fully reviewed administratively, plaintiff was transferred to a new prison where he

filed a second grievance which repeated the factual basis of the first grievance but sought

additional relief. In granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground Strong

had not exhausted his administrative remedies, the district court found that (1) the first

grievance, which admittedly was properly exhausted, nevertheless was inadequate because it

neither covered all the same legal theories nor requested the same relief that he sought in the

district court and (2) plaintiff had neglected to take an administrative appeal of the second

grievance. 

 On appeal, the Court determined the district court’s belief that the second grievance had

not been administratively appealed was factually incorrect. Id. at 648 (“The discovery that

Strong actually submitted his second grievance to the Administrative Review Board pulls the rug

from under the district court’s decision.”). The Strong case therefore does not suggest a special

circumstance permitting waiver of the requirement for exhaustion. Instead, the Strong case

considered the level of specificity needed to adequately alert the prison to the nature of the

wrong for which redress is sought in the administrative process. Id. Here, plaintiff does not fall

within the situation presented in Strong. 

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2 Plaintiff relies on both the district court’s and the Court of Appeal’s decisions in

discussing qualified immunity.

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Plaintiff did not exhaust this claim and cannot demonstrate any special circumstance that

would permit waiver of the exhaustion requirement. Accordingly, plaintiff’s objection is

overruled and defendants are entitled to dismissal of this claim.

2. Qualified Immunity

The Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz, set out a two step inquiry in determining whether

an official has qualified immunity. 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In the Report, the magistrate

judge found plaintiff’s first claim alleged a constitutional violation, i.e., plaintiff’s right of access

to the court was violated when he was unable to file a petition for certiorari because he was not

given access to a computer so as to comply with Supreme Court procedural rules. The

magistrate judge then undertook the second prong of the test for qualified immunity: determining

whether the right alleged to have been violated was clearly established. Id., 533 U.S. at 206. 

Here, the magistrate judge found, based upon the numerous cases that hold prisoners are not

entitled to use computers or typewriters, “it would not be apparent to a reasonable officer in

Defendant Ryan’s position that failing to provide Plaintiff with computer access would violate

his right of access to the court.” (Report at 40-41.) In so finding, the magistrate judge

concluded Ryan would be entitled to qualified immunity. 

In his objection to this finding, plaintiff relies upon Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070 (9th

Cir. 2007) in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court with respect to the issue of

qualified immunity.2

 In Phillips, the court found a constitutional violation because the prison

librarian had prevented Phillips from timely filing his petition for certiorari in the United State

Supreme Court by refusing to allow him to use the prison's binding machine, although Phillips

had been allowed to use it in the past. Id. at 1079. Defendant had argued that Phillips's right of

access to the courts was not clearly established as no case specifically required that prison

officials must provide comb-binding to inmates filing petitions with the Supreme Court. Id. But

the Court of Appeals disagreed: 

The fact that no case has held specifically that prison officials must make

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comb-binders available does not render it reasonable to deny access to a

comb-binder when that is the only means readily available at the facility for

binding a legal pleading. . . .

[A] reasonable officer would know that failing to provide access to equipment and

supplies needed in order “to prepare, serve and file” court documents would result

in prisoners' claims being “dismissed for failure to satisfy . . . technical

requirements” or would otherwise frustrate prisoners' litigation efforts. 

Id. at 1079-80 (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346(1996). The Phillips Court therefore

concluded, as the district court had, defendant Hust was not entitled to qualified immunity from

Phillips's access to the courts claim. Id. at 1080.

The Court finds no factual basis to deviate from the Ninth Circuit’s analysis and holding

concerning qualified immunity. Accordingly, plaintiff’s objection is sustained. Defendant Ryan

is not entitled to qualified immunity. Nevertheless, because plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies, defendant is entitled to dismissal of this claim.

C. Second Cause of Action: Denial of Adequate Law Library Access

The magistrate judge found that plaintiff’s claim of denial of adequate law library access

was exhausted properly but plaintiff failed to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). The magistrate judge reasoned that because the underlying claim was frivolous as a

matter of law, plaintiff had failed to allege how additional library access would have cured any

defects in the underlying claim. The Report also recommended that the Court find defendants

were entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff has not objected to the Report with respect to this

cause of action. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss the second cause of action is

granted.

D. Third Cause of Action: Access to Photocopies

The magistrate judge concluded that this claim not exhausted and that plaintiff failed to

alleged that he had any pending litigation that was impacted by the prison’s photo copying

policy. Plaintiff has not objected to the Report with respect to this cause of action. The Court

therefore adopt the Report concerning access to photocopies and dismisses this claim. 

E. Punitive Damages

Plaintiff objects to the Report’s recommendation that his punitive damage request be

stricken contending it is premature to strike the request. 

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As the Report accurately notes, punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are allowed

only where a defendant’s "conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it

involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v.

Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1986). In his AC, plaintiff alleges that he did not receive a response

from Warden Ryan to his request to use a computer. There are no other allegations in the AC

that would entitle him to punitive damages. 

Further, because all the substantive claims alleged in the AC will be dismissed, there is no

basis for finding that punitive damages would be available to plaintiff. Plaintiff’s objection to

the striking of his request for punitive damages is overruled. Defendants’ motion to strike

punitive damages is granted. 

F. Supplemental Pleadings

Plaintiff has not objected to the Report with respect to his three motions to file

supplemental pleadings concerning alleged violations that have occurred after the filing of the

amended complaint.

G. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED in its

entirety but for its determination that defendant Ryan is entitled to qualified immunity. In all

other respects, plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first

amended complaint and to strike request for punitive damages are GRANTED with prejudice.

Plaintiff’s three motions to supplement the amended complaint are DENIED. The Clerk of the

Court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 10, 2008

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. RUBEN B. BROOKS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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