Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01307/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01307-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 230
Nature of Suit: Rent, Lease, Ejectment
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Injunction

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28 Because the thirtieth day fell on a Sunday and a holiday, Defendants were required 1

to vacate the premises no later than Monday, April 25, 2011. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10cv1307-LAB (BGS)

ORDER DENYING

CERTIFICATION OF ISSUES FOR

APPEAL;

ORDER DENYING STAY

PENDING APPEAL; AND

ORDER GRANTING ADDITIONAL

EQUITABLE RELIEF

vs.

DAVID MEDNANSKY, MARTINE

MEDNANSKY, individually,

Defendants.

I. Procedural Background

On March 8, 2011, the Court issued an order granting in part the United States’

motion for summary judgment, which it construed as a motion for partial summary judgment.

That order directed the United States to submit a proposed order granting the requested

injunctive relief, and Defendants were given an opportunity to object to the proposed order.

Defendants filed no objections, and the order was issued on March 25, 2011. Among other

things, the March 25 order granted injunctive relief, requiring Defendants to vacate the

property that is the subject of this litigation within 30 days.1

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28 The Response seeks a stay “pursuant to FRCP 8(a)(1).” (Response, 1:4.) 2

Presumably this should be Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c).

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On April 5, counsel for the parties jointly contacted the Court, during which time

Defendants’ counsel announced she would, that same day, be filing a motion appealing the

Court’s grant of summary judgment and seeking a stay of the March 25 order. No such

motion was filed, however, until now.

On April 29, the United States filed an ex parte application representing that the

Defendants had not vacated the cabin, and seeking an order both authorizing the use of

reasonable force to remove them and requiring them to show cause why they should not be

held in contempt. On May 3, the Court issued an order to show cause, requiring Defendants’

counsel to file a response to the April 29 application. The Court’s order specified that the

response was not to exceed seven pages, and was to address the application only, not to

seek reconsideration of earlier orders.

Defendants’ counsel then on May 4 filed a ten-page response (the “Response”)

asserting the Court had erred in its grant of summary judgment. The Response also

incorporates the motion Defendants’ counsel said she would be filing April 5. In spite of the

Response’s failure to comply with the Court’s order, it will be accepted and addressed on the

merits. Later that same day, Defendants’ counsel filed a notice of appeal of the Court’s

order of March 25. They have not paid the filing fee, moved to proceed in forma pauperis,

or sought a stay from the Ninth Circuit.

II. Relief Requested in the Response

The Response seeks entry of judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) as to the claims

on which summary judgment was granted. It also seeks a stay of the injunction pending

appeal. The notice of appeal does not automatically stay the injunction; a stay may be 2

granted either by this Court or the appellate court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(a),(c), (g). Neither the

Response nor the notice of appeal addresses the issue of a bond, and in fact the

Response’s allegations suggest Defendants are unprepared to post a bond or other security.

See Rule 62(c), (d) (providing for posting of bond to protect appellees’ rights).

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The Response expresses doubt whether the Ninth Circuit will find the Court’s order

of March 25, which grants an injunction, falls within the category of orders immediately

appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and requests Rule 54(b) certification as a backup.

There is no need for such an additional certification. Because the Court granted injunctive

relief, Defendants’ request for Rule 54(b) certification is moot. See TCR Holdings, LLC v.

Nye County, Nev., 2010 WL 2773432, slip op. (D.Nev., July 12, 2010) (following grant of

injunctive relief, holding that motion for final judgment was inappropriate) (citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(1)). 

Defendants bear the burden of showing that a stay is appropriate. See Nken v.

Holder, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 1761 (2009) (“The party requesting a stay bears the burden of

showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.”) A stay pending

appeal “is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result.” Id. at 1760.

Rather, the Court considers four factors: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable

injury, substantial injury to other parties, and the public interest. Id. at 1761 (citing Hilton v.

Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). 

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Response argues Defendants are likely to prevail on the merits. It recites its own

distorted reading of the facts and of the Court’s order granting partial summary judgment.

And it offers some authority and evidence that could have been presented before, but that

would not have changed the outcome in any event. 

This is the third in a series of lawsuits concerning Defendants’ use of this property,

and Defendants have prevailed in none of them, either in this Court or on appeal. In the first,

07cv1425, Mednansky v. Gillett, the Mednanskys sued Forest Service officials under a

Bivens theory for a wide variety of perceived wrongs. This Court granted summary

judgment, and the Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed, dismissing the appeal as frivolous. In

the second, 09cv1478, Mednansky v. Metz, the Mednanskys sued Forest Service officials

seeking relief for Forest Service officials’ allegedly improper refusal to renew the use permit

that gave them the right to live in the cabin where they are now squatters. This Court

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 The docket in that case, number 10-56524, shows nothing has been filed in the 3

docket and no action has been taken since the appeal was docketed on September 27,

2010. The docket contains a single document, a scheduling order. Under that scheduling

order, the Mednanskys were to have filed their opening brief and excerpts of record no later

than January 3, 2011. Although the scheduling order cautions appellants that if they don’t

comply with the scheduling order their appeal will automatically be dismissed, the docket is

still open. The inactivity of the appeal was pointed out in the Court’s March 8 order.

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dismissed some claims without leave to amend, and others without prejudice. Rather than

attempting to amend, the Mednanskys took an appeal, which they have apparently now

abandoned.

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The Court did not, as the Response charges, weigh evidence, ignore admissible

evidence, orrepeatedly disregard the standard for summary judgment; and the Court’s order

is in harmony with the Response’s newly-cited authority. The Response also focuses on the

narrow issue of whether Defendants were or were not in violation of applicable regulations

while their now-expired use permit was in force, if that were the determining issue of this

case. Furthermore, the Response is peppered with claims and supported by assertions

already found meritless in earlier actions. Defendants’ remedy for adverse decisions on

those issues was to seek reconsideration or appeal (which they did, without success), not

to relitigate them afresh in this case. The Court finds no likelihood of success on the merits

on appeal.

B. Irreparable Harm to Defendants

Defendants can show they would suffer some irreparable harm, since denial of the

stay would result in eviction, and possibly in destruction of the buildings they hoped to

reclaim. Defendants assert the eviction itself would be degrading and injurious, but whether

they merely suffer the inconvenience of a voluntary, orderly departure or incur the emotional

trauma of involuntary removal by the authorities was and is entirely up to them. Defendants

also assert they are having a difficult time finding a new place to live, and would have to live

on the street if forced to leave now. But they provide no evidence they have been diligently

looking or taking steps to move since the Court made clear nearly two months ago they

would be required to leave. 

/ / /

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The Response argues Defendants are at special risk because the cabin is the only

place they can live. As pointed out in the March 8 order, it was undisputed that permit

holders were not allowed to rely on cabins as their sole residences, but were required at

least to have some other residence available to them. If Defendants were violating this

requirement, the resulting harm is their responsibility. Requiring the government or the

public to bear the burden is unjust.

In short, Defendants’ own self-imposed hardships do not weigh heavily in this

analysis.

C. Harm to Other Parties

The Response argues the United States will suffer “absolutely no harm” if the stay is

granted (Response, 8:4), but this is not true. Defendants have been squatting in a cabin on

public land since their use permit expired in 2009. They are not paying annual fees, which

are the equivalent of rent. The Court has determined they will owe back rent for those years.

For several years they have also refused to maintain the lot and buildings as the Forest

Service determined was required, and instead are using the area as they deem fit. The

Court has determined they will be responsible for cleanup costs on the lot. Defendants may

also be responsible for the costs of removing buildings, and any property they may abandon

when they leave.

The Response implies Defendants will be unable to pay the full amount of a

judgment, and makes no proffer of a bond or any other security. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c)

(authorizing district court to stay an injunction pending appeal “on terms for bond or other

terms that secure the opposing party’s rights”). Granting a stay pending a full appeal, and

allowing Defendants to continue squatting indefinitely in the cabin rent-free would impose

a monetary loss on the United States. Because they are effectively unregulated by the

Forest Service, a stay would continue to thwart the Forest Service’s efforts to enforce land

use regulations. None of these injuries would be compensable by a damages award. The

United States’ loss of money and of use of public land therefore figures into the analysis.

/ / /

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28 In fairness to the United States, the Court is prepared to rule now, and will not 4

require a response.

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D. Public Interest

 The public interest factor weighs against the Defendants. The land Defendants are

squatting on is public land, not their own land. The public has a legitimate interest in using

it, rather than being excluded by trespassers. The public also has an interest in seeing the

land’s use effectively regulated by the Forest Service. Likewise, the public interest is not

served by accommodating or encouraging dilatory tactics to prolong the trespass.

E. Equity

In making rulings affecting equitable relief, the Court is also mindful of equitable

principles. Defendants’ counsel has been aware of the basis for the Court’s ruling since

March 8, nearly two months ago and could have filed a notice of appeal then. She was

prepared on April 5 to file a motion seeking a stay pending appeal, but never did so until

now, well after Defendants were in violation of the injunction and on the eve of their removal

from the property by the United States This apparently strategic delay bespeaks an intention

to buy time and interfere with the removal, without regard for the merits of the action or the

appeal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1) (identifying unnecessary delay as an improper purpose

for filing a motion). 

The lengthy delay and last-minute filing also meant the request for a stay could not

be filed as a noticed motion, or even a noticed motion with an shortened briefing schedule,

see Civil Local Rule 7.1(e)(5), but had to be filed ex parte. See Response, Proof of Service

(Docket no. 35-4) (showing that the United States was served with the Response after it was

filed). Defendants did not comply with applicable local rules in doing so. See Civil Local

Rule 83.3(h)(2) (“A motion for an order must not be made ex parte unless it appears by

affidavit or declaration . . . that within a reasonable time before the motion the party informed

the opposing party or the opposing party's attorney when and where the motion would be

made . . . .”) The needlessly delayed filing therefore unwarrantedly put on the United States

the task of responding in haste to a ten-page brief, while trying to enforce the injunction.

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This too bespeaks an intent to impose needless delay or extra burdens, or both, on an

opposing party. 

Considering the required factors, the Court therefore finds a stay would be

inappropriate. General considerations of equity further support the denial of a stay.

F. Request for 30-Day Stay

The Response alternately seeks a 30-day stay of eviction to allow them time to

relocate. But if, as the Response argues, Defendants are having a difficult time finding a

new place to live, they should have raised this long before now, and provided evidence of

their diligence. As discussed in the following section, the Response falls far short of doing

so. Defendants have not shown why a 30-day stay would be appropriate.

III. Order to Show Cause and Additional Equitable Relief

Because the Court ordered Defendants to show cause why the order should not

issue, they were obliged to provide any relevant information, explanations or evidence. The

Response makes no substantial effort to respond to the order to show cause.

The only gesture towards complying with the Court's order to show cause was the

inclusion of arguments that moving out would be hard on Defendants. But this hardship

appears to be entirely their own fault. Defendants have long resisted efforts to move them

from the cabin they once held a permit to use, and they should have anticipated being

evicted. In Mednansky v. Metz, they attempted unsuccessfully to show that their use permit,

which had expired in 2009, should be renewed. After that effort faltered, the fact that they

no longer had a valid use permit should have put them on notice that they risked eviction

from national forest land. And they have known for almost two months that their departure

was imminent. The Response says almost nothing, and certainly nothing very specific,

about their efforts to comply. 

The Response relies chiefly on general and unsupported representations. It alleges,

for example, that the Defendants are "in good faith, attempting to secure a place to live in

the event the stay and/or the appeal are denied." (Response 8:24–9:5.) This is insufficient

for three reasons. First, they have known since at least March 8, 2011 that the Court would

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issue an order resulting in their eviction, and that when the order issued they would have no

more than 30 days to move. They should have begun preparing for that date immediately,

not pinning their hopes on a motion for a stay or an appeal that wasn’t filed until almost two

months later, well after they should have been out. In fact, their working assumption at this

point should be that they must immediately leave. 

Second, this general allegation, unsupported by evidence, doesn't show they have

been making adequate preparations to move out; looking for a place to live is only one of the

steps they should have taken. 

Third, this allegation about a good-faith attempt does little to demonstrate their

diligence. It doesn't say when they started attempting to find a place to live, or discuss how

extensive their efforts have been, or even what they have done. It discusses in generalized

terms a work-for-rent situation the Defendants are hoping for, but it doesn't address any

other options they have pursued. The Defendants have a modest disability income, and

reside near the town of Alpine, where housing costs are relatively low, so some evidence or

at least detailed explanation why they could not find any affordable, acceptable housing

anywhere in the last two months would have been in order. 

The Response also, without elaboration or support, predicts "economic hardship,

emotional and physical hardship, and [inability to] meet their medical needs." (Response,

8:20–22.) The only pertinent evidence is an affidavit from David Mednansky discussing his

and his wife's poor fragile condition and predicting if evicted they will be forced to live on the

streets. There is no showing why the Defendants’ medical needs prevent them from

voluntarily moving anywhere else. And, bearing in mind the lack of information about the

Defendants' efforts to secure alternate housing, the prediction about living on the streets

appears to be little more than a conclusion. 

The Response also attempts to resurrect a claim that the Forest Service is to blame

for the Defendants’ financial condition. (Response, 8:15–18.) Those claims were fully

litigated and rejected in 07cv1425, Mednansky v. Gillett, which is final, the appeal having

been summarily dismissed as frivolous. 

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IV. Clarification of Earlier Order

The Court has reviewed its March 25 order, and finds the first numbered paragraph

somewhat unclear. That paragraph says “The Government’s motion for partial summary

judgment is granted, and judgment is entered in favor of the Government.” The Court now

clarifies that summary judgment was granted only as set forth in the March 8 order, which

granted summary judgment only on some claims, not all. The purpose of this paragraph was

to explain that summary judgment had already been granted on some claims, not to extend

summary judgment to other claims. 

V. Conclusion and Order

Defendants’ request for a Rule 54(b) certification is DENIED as moot. Their request

for a stay is DENIED without prejudice to any ruling by the Ninth Circuit. Their request for

a 30-day stay is also DENIED. 

The Court finds the Defendants have failed to show cause as ordered why the order

sought by the United States should not issue, and GRANTS IN PART the unopposed ex

parte application. For good cause shown, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. United States law enforcement officers, including the U.S. Marshals

Service and U.S. Forest Service Law Enforcement, along with any other

supporting law enforcement agencies (collectively, "Law Enforcement") may

use all reasonable force to enforce the Court's March 25, 2011 order at any

time.

2. Law Enforcement may use all reasonable force to physically remove

Defendants, and all persons found on Lot 7 who have notice of the March

25, 2011 Order, from Lot 7 of the Pine Creek Recreation Residence Tract in

the Cleveland National Forest at any time.

The Court will not at this time require the Defendants to show cause why they should

not be held in contempt. Nevertheless, the Court’s order issued March 25, 2011, and all

other orders of the Court, remain in effect and Defendants remain obligated to obey them.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 5, 2011

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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