Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01401/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01401-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOCK McNEELY, NO. 2:05-cv-1401-MCE-DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; (consolidated cases)

SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT; SHERIFF LOU BLANAS

as an individual and in his

official capacity; and DOES

1 through 100, in their 

individual and official

capacities,

Defendants.

_______________________________

DOCK McNEELY, NO. 2:05-cv-2549-MCE-DAD

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF PLACER; PLACER COUNTY 

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; EDWARD

BONNER, individually and in

his capacity as Sheriff of 

Placer County, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO;

SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT; SHERIFF LOU BLANAS,

individually and in his official

capacity as Sheriff of Sacramento

County; and DOES 1 through 10, 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

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 Throughout this Memorandum and Order, the collective 1

defendants will be collectively referred to as either the

“Sacramento Defendants” or the “Placer Defendants” unless

otherwise noted.

 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 2

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2

Through the present consolidated action, Plaintiff Dock

McNeely (“Plaintiff”) seeks damages, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, for excessive pretrial incarceration in violation of his

rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution. Plaintiff has sued the Sacramento

County and Placer County, their respective Sheriff’s Departments,

and the individual Sheriffs themselves (Lou Blanas and Edward

Bonner) on grounds that he was wrongfully incarcerated at both 1

the Sacramento and Placer County jails. The Sacramento and

Placer County Defendants now move for summary judgment as to

Plaintiff’s complaint. Alternatively, the Sacramento Defendants

request summary adjudication as to various claims and issues. As

set forth below, summary judgment will be granted in favor of

Defendants as to the entirety of the case.2

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 Both the Sacramento and Placer Defendants have requested, 3

pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, that the Court take

judicial evidence of a number of court and county records. Those

requests are unopposed and consequently are granted. In

addition, Plaintiff has also requested judicial notice of certain

records, which also will be ganted.

3

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are essentially uncontroverted. On

March 25, 1994, Plaintiff was convicted in Placer County Superior

Court for felony violation of California Penal Code § 288.5(a),

lewd and lascivious conduct upon a minor. He was sentenced to 3

five years probation. Less than three years later, in Sacramento

County, Plaintiff was again charged with lewd and lascivious

conduct involving a minor and further was charged under

California Penal Code § 290 for failure to register as a sex

offender in Sacramento County. He was taken into custody in

Sacramento County. Thereafter, on September 17, 1998, the Placer

County Probation Department filed a Petition to revoke

Plaintiff’s probation based on the allegations in the Sacramento

case. On September 24, 1998, the Placer County Superior Court

summarily revoked Plaintiff’s probation and issued a bench

warrant for his arrest. A detainer warrant was subsequently on

March 18, 1999, noting that Plaintiff was wanted by Placer County

and that “if the subject is to be released by [Sacramento

County], please notify [Placer County] for pick up.” (Sacramento

County Undisputed Fact No. 11). That request was reiterated on

July 31, 2002, when the Placer County Corrections Department

again requested that Sacramento County contact them before

releasing Plaintiff. (Undisputed Fact No. 12). 

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4

In the meantime, on February 26, 2002, Plaintiff was arraigned on

a probation revocation petition. 

After Plaintiff’s Sacramento County proceedings were

repeatedly continued for various reasons, Plaintiff filed a writ

of habeas corpus on grounds that right to speedy trial under the

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution had been

violated. Ultimately, on July 17, 2003, the Ninth Circuit

granted Plaintiff’s petition and ordered that the Sacramento

County criminal charges be dismissed with prejudice. In

accordance with that directive, the District Court ordered that

Plaintiff be released on Friday, July 25, 2003.

On the next business day, Monday, July 28, 2003, Sacramento

County jail personnel notified, pursuant to Placer County’s

detainer warrant, that Plaintiff was available for pick up. 

Placer County was not a party to the proceedings which had

resulted in Plaintiff’s release from custody in Sacramento

County. Placer County retrieved Plaintiff on or about July 31,

2003 and transported him to Placer County. 

Plaintiff remained incarcerated in the Placer County Jail

until December 9, 2004, when Magistrate Judge Peter Nowinski

ordered him released. On July 15, 2005, District Judge David F.

Levi granted his petition for habeas corpus and ordered not only

that he be released from custody, but also that Placer County

make no further attempt to revoke his probation based on the

charges of the probation revocation petition. 

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 While the Sacramento defendants now attempt to argue that 4

the present suit is barred on res judicata grounds because of the

Magistrate’s April 12, 2005 Findings and Recommendations in

Plaintiff’s prior suit, because those recommendations were never

adopted, they were never reduced to a court order having any such

preclusive effect. Consequently Defendants’ res judicata

argument is misplaced.

5

Plaintiff also challenged his detention and release to

Placer County as unlawful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming as

defendants officials of both Sacramento and Placer Counties,

including Sheriffs Blanas and Bonner. Sheriff Blanas

subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss. On April 12, 2005, the

assigned Magistrate Judge issued findings recommending that the

motion be granted on grounds that because Blanas was acting on

behalf of the State of California in continuing to detain

Plaintiff based on the Placer County warrant, he consequently was

not amenable to suit under § 1983. The case was dismissed in its

entirety on procedural grounds, however, on July 22, 2005, before

the Magistrate’s findings and recommendations were ever adopted

by the District Judge.4

On July 11, 2005, before his previous suit was dismissed as

discussed above, Plaintiff filed suit against the County of

Sacramento, the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, and

Sheriff Blanas, also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arising from his

detention at the Sacramento County Jail for the period between

March 26, 2002 and August 4, 2003. Some five months later, on

December 15, 2005, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against both

the Sacramento defendants enumerated above as well as the Placer

County Sheriff’s Department and Sheriff Edward Bonner. 

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6

That suit also asserts claims sounding under § 1983, premised on

both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, for detaining and

incarcerating Plaintiff pursuant to a probation revocation

hearing premised on charges that Plaintiff alleges had already

been ordered dismissed by the Ninth Circuit.

By Order dated March 2, 2006, this Court ordered the two

actions consolidated. As indicated above, Defendants now move

for summary judgment, or alternatively for summary adjudication

with respect to certain claims and/or issues.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim ... may ... move ... for a

summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Township of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

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7

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must

examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). 

Once the moving party meets the requirements of Rule 56

by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the

non-moving party’s case, the burden shifts to the party resisting

the motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Genuine factual issues must exist that

“can be resolved only by a finder of fact, because they may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250. 

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does

not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting

evidence. See T.W. Elec. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809

F.2d 626, 630-631 (9th Cir. 1987), citing Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

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8

ANALYSIS

A. Both the County Defendants and Sheriffs Blanas and

Bonner in their Official Capacities are Immune from

Section 1983 liability.

Defendants Sacramento and Placer Counties, as well as

Sheriffs Blanas and Bonner in their official capacities, both

contend that they are entitled to absolute immunity with respect

to the § 1983 claims asserted by Plaintiff. While the Sacramento

and Placer Defendants frame the basis for that immunity on

somewhat different terms, as set forth below the Court concludes

that both positions are correct.

The Sacramento Defendants contend that Sheriff Blanas was

acting on behalf of the State of California in detaining

Plaintiff pursuant to pending criminal proceedings, and a

facially valid bench warrant issued by the Placer County Superior

Court. As such, according to the Sacramento Defendants, both

Blanas and the County are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment to the United Constitution for any purported liability

under § 1983.

While § 1983 does provide a method by which individuals can

sue for violations of their civil rights, one of the

prerequisites for imposition of § 1983 liability is that the

claimed violations are committed by a “person” acting under color

of state law. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 

(1989). 

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9

Significantly, under the sovereign immunity generally afforded to

states by the Eleventh Amendment, a state and its officials sued

in their official capacity do not qualify as “persons” within the

meaning of § 1983, and consequently neither are subject to suit

under the statute. Id. at 70-71; Cortez v. County of Los

Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001). Will explains the

extension of Eleventh Amendment immunity to state officials as

follows: “Obviously, state officials literally are persons. But

a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity

is not a suit against the official but rather a suit against the

official’s office.” Id. at 71. Hence a suit against an

individual in his official capacity is no different than suit

against the state itself, and immunity applies.

Plaintiff claims that § 1983 liability does attach to the

County on grounds that a municipality or other local governmental

entity can be deemed a “person” for purposes of the statute. 

Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In

McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama, 520 U.S. 781 (1997),

however, the Supreme Court articulated the parameters for

determining whether local governmental officials are final policy

makers for the local government, or instead represent the State

and consequently qualify for Eleventh Amendment immunity on that

basis. Whether or not local officials, like Sheriff Blanas, act

for the locality of the state in a particular area or on a

particular issue depends on an analysis of state law. Id. at

786; Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir.

2000).

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10

 California law deems elected sheriffs as state actors with

respect to their law enforcement activities. See Venegas v.

County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 820,839 (2004); County of Los

Angeles v. Superior Court (Peters), 68 Cal. App. 4th 1166, 1171

(1998). While the Ninth Circuit has treated the sheriff as a

county actor where his administrative or investigative

responsibilities are under scrutiny, those cases are

distinguishable from the present case, which concerns conduct

arising from simply detaining Plaintiff in jail pending the

outcome of ongoing criminal proceedings in Sacramento and Placer

Counties. See Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552 (9th

Cir. 2001) (when administering the county’s policy to delay

inmate release from local jails to check for all warrants and

holds, the Los Angeles County Sheriff acts as an official for the

county; sheriff acts for the county in the administration and

operation of jails); Brewster v. Shasta County, 275 F.3d 803 (9th

Cir. 2001) (Shasta County Sheriff acted on behalf of the county

when he was alleged to have manipulated a witness, failed to test

physical evidence and failed to disclose exculpatory evidence). 

Indeed in Streit, the Ninth Circuit recognizes that “[a]cting

upon a warrant is a law enforcement function with which [a

sheriff’s department is tasked under California state law. See

Cal. Gov. Code § 12560.” Streit, 236 F.3d at 564. Here, there

can be no question that Sheriff Blanas, as well as Sheriff

Bonner, were acting in accordance with both facially valid

warrants as well as duly authorized criminal proceedings

instituted by the District Attorneys of their respective counties

and pending before their courts. 

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11

“Persons who faithfully execute valid court orders are absolutely

immune from liability for damages in civil rights actions

challenging conduct authorized by the order.” Coverdell v. Dep’t

of Social & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1987).

The Sacramento Defendants correctly point out that it is not

up to the sheriff to release a detainee like Plaintiff while

criminal charges filed on behalf of the State of California are

pending, whether in Sacramento or Placer County. Plaintiff

himself concedes that a sheriff lacks discretion to simply

release a detainee while criminal charges are being pursued and

the detainee is held pursuant to court order. (See Placer

Undisputed Fact No. 22). Even after the Sacramento County

proceedings were dismissed following the Ninth Circuit’s ruling

of July 17, 2003, the Placer proceedings remained ongoing, and

Sacramento had notice of Placer County’s September 24, 1998 bench

warrant as well as the subsequent detainer warrant directing that

Placer County be notified if Plaintiff was released from the

custody of Sacramento County so that pickup by Placer could be

arranged.

Under California Penal Code § 4004, a sheriff is obligated

to keep a detainee in county jail “until legally discharged.” 

Significantly, too, the Northern District has recognized that the

sheriff is a state actor, and hence not subject to suit, in an

action arising from a detainee’s arrest and incarceration based

upon an outstanding warrant. Smith v. County of San Mateo, 1999

WL 672318 (N.D. Cal. 1999).

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12

While the arguments delineated above in favor of Eleventh

Amendment immunity apply equally to both the Sacramento and

Placer County Defendants, Placer County approaches the immunity

issue from a somewhat different, but equally compelling,

position. Placer argues that while an official like the sheriff

can be liable under Monell as a county actor, the cases so

holding relate to instances regarding the release of inmates who

have either completed their sentences or to situations where no

valid prosecution is pending. In Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764

(9th Cir. 2004), for example, the plaintiff was found to have a

potential Monell claim where he challenged administrative delays

that kept him incarcerated more than twenty-four hours after

being ordered released. In Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 918

(9th Cir. 2002), such liability hinged on the sheriff’s failure

to instigate procedures to alleviate the problem of detaining

individuals on the wrong warrant.

In this case, on the other hand, whether or not there was an

unreasonable delay in prosecution, as Plaintiff contends,

requires a complex factual and legal determination that is beyond

the expertise of either the sheriff or his deputies. The Court

agrees that those determinations are not within the sheriff’s

purview, but instead are for the prosecutor and defense counsel

to advocate and for the Court to decide. 

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 Nor is it logical to suggest, as Plaintiff does, that 5

Sacramento jail personnel has the responsibility of notifying all

pretrial detainees in their custody of all warrants, holds,

detainers, or notices that probation has been revoked. In so

doing, Plaintiff attempts to blame the Sacramento Defendants for

not keeping him apprised of notification in that regard from

Placer County as to the proceedings there. The court and

counsel, however, not jail personnel, whose primary role is to

house inmates, must be responsible for such notification. 

Similarly, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, Sheriff Bonner was

also not required to institute a system in the Placer County Jail

for alerting inmates who had not received timely probation

revocation hearings. The timing of such hearings is within the

particular province of the prosecutor and the court’s calendar.

13

The prosecutor would be cloaked with prosecutorial immunity for

his handling of such matters, and it would make no sense to hold

the sheriff liable for incarcerating individuals at the

prosecutor’s impetus, and with the court’s imprimatur in

authorizing the prosecution, when neither those individuals would

be liable under well-established principles of immunity.5

It follows that both Defendants Blanas and Bonner are

entitled to immunity, in their official capacities as Sheriffs of

Sacramento County and Placer County, with respect to the issues

raised by Plaintiff’s lawsuit with regard to his incarceration. 

Moreover, because the Court has determined that those issues

arise from the sheriffs’ status as state, rather than county

actors, neither the County of Sacramento or the County of Placer

are proper parties to this lawsuit. Finally, although

Plaintiff’s lawsuit also individually names both the Placer

County Sheriff’s Department and the Sacramento County Sheriff’s

Department as Defendants, their inclusion is unnecessary since

neither is a separate, distinct, legal entity apart from the

county itself. 

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14

See Alcala v. City of Corcoran, 147 Cal. App. 4th 666, 670 (2007)

(finding law enforcement agency and public entity

indistinguishable). Hence, the only other question that must be

answered in resolving this case in its entirety is whether either

Defendant Blanas or Defendant Bonner bear any personal liability

for Plaintiff’s claims, apart from their responsibility in an

official capacity which has already been addressed. The Court

now turns to that issue. 

B. No Viable Claims have been pled against either

Defendants Blanas or Bonner on an Individual Basis. 

To the extent Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks to hold Sheriffs

Blanas and Bonner liable on an individual supervisorial basis

apart from their official position in and of itself, that attempt

fails. Such liability does not lie unless 1) the supervisor

personally participated in the deprivation of constitutional

rights; 2) the supervisor knew of the violations and failed to

act to prevent them; or 3) the supervisor implemented a policy

“so deficient that the policy itself ‘is a repudiation of

constitutional rights and is the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942

F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991); cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1074

(1992; Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989).

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 While Plaintiff attempts to cite excerpts from court 6

proceedings suggesting that the two sheriffs worked together “to

defeat the release” of Plaintiff, (See Plaintiff’s Separate

Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 23), the statements in question

have been shown to in fact been from Plaintiff’s criminal defense

attorney rather than the prosecutor as Plaintiff originally

alleged. See Decl. of Craig S. Meyers, ¶¶ 10-14. 

15

There in no evidence here that either Blanas or Bonner

personally participated in any of the events surrounding

Plaintiff’s incarceration. There is also no evidence that 6

either sheriff implemented any policy so deficient that the

policy itself was not only unconstitutional but also was the

moving force behind Plaintiff’s alleged injury. As indicated

above, it was facially valid court orders, as well as an ongoing

criminal prosecution, that accounted for Plaintiff’s ongoing

detention, not any policy instituted by Blanas or Bonner.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law in their favor. Plaintiff’s remedy

with respect to any undue incarceration rested with habeas corpus

relief, which he obtained. His civil action against Defendants

herein for complying with facially valid orders for his detention

during ongoing criminal proceedings are, however, without merit.

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Summary judgment as to this consolidated matter is accordingly

GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 19, 2008

________________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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