Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00792/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00792-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Tatum contends the grand jury did not hear his case or issue an indictment against him. 

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JEREMY CHRISTOPHER TATUM, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:08-CV-792-TMH

) [WO]

)

D. T. MARSHALL, et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case is before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by Jeremy

Christopher Tatum [“Tatum”], a convicted inmate presently confined in the Montgomery

County Detention Facility. In this complaint, Tatum challenges the validity of a 2006

indictment issued against him by a Montgomery County, Alabama grand jury for assault

in the second degree. Tatum further argues his constitutional rights have been violated 1

during criminal proceedings before the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama at

the conclusion of which a conviction was imposed upon him for the charge contained in

the indictment. Tatum also attacks the constitutionality of his confinement pursuant to the

indictment and subsequent conviction under the challenged indictment. Finally Tatum

argues officials at the Montgomery County Detention Facility have tampered with his mail

and subjected him to unconstitutional overcrowded conditions. 

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 A prisoner who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in this court will have his complaint screened

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in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure requires the court to

dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if it determines that the complaint is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

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Tatum names D. T. Marshall, the Sheriff of MontgomeryCounty, Alabama, Johnny

Hardwick, the state judge who presided over his criminal proceedings, Eleanor Brooks, the

District Attorney for Montgomery County, Alabama, Larry Sasser, the attorney who

represented him in the state criminal proceedings, Melissa Rittenour, the Circuit Clerk of

Montgomery County, Alabama, and Ms. Wright, the detention facility’s mail clerk, as

defendants in this cause of action. Tatum seeks declaratory relief, monetary damages and

his release from confinement. Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1 at 5. 

Upon review of the allegations contained in the complaint, the court concludes that

the majority of claims for relief asserted by Tatum are due to be dismissed prior to service

of process pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii) and (iii). 

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I. DISCUSSION 

A. The Claims Against Judge Johnny Hardwick and Clerk Melissa Rittenour

1. The Request for Monetary Damages Against Judge Hardwick. Tatum complains

Judge Hardwick allowed his assault case to proceed through the criminal process despite

the alleged illegal indictment. Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1 at 2-4. It is clear

the allegations made by Tatum against Judge Hardwick emanate from actions taken by this

defendant in his judicial capacity during state court proceedings over which he had

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 Although Neitzke interpreted the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the predecessor to § 1915(e)(2), the 3

analysis contained therein remains applicable to the directives contained in the present statute.

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jurisdiction. The law is well established that a state judge is absolutely immune from civil

liability for acts taken pursuant to his judicial authority. Forrester v. White, 484 U. S. 219,

227-229 (1988); Paisey v. Vitale in and for Broward County, 807 F.2d 889 (11 Cir. 1986); th

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). Accordingly, Tatum’s claims for monetary

damages against Judge Hardwick are “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” and

are therefore due to be dismissed under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and

(iii). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). 

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2. Circuit Clerk Melissa Rittenour. It is clear from a review of the complaint that

any claims presented by Tatum against Melissa Rittenour relate to actions this defendant

undertook on behalf of the state court during Tatum’s criminal case either in accordance

with orders of a state court and/or pursuant to authority granted her by state law. When a

court clerk acts “under command of court decrees or under explicit instructions of a judge”

the absolute immunity of the judge extends to the clerk. Williams v. Wood, 612 F.2d 982,

985 (5 Cir. 1980). Additionally, where a court clerk acts pursuant to authority granted by th

state law and acts on behalf of a court, the clerk is absolutely immune from damages

liability when sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because she is performing a judicial function.

Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542 (11 Cir. 1983). In light of the foregoing, the court th

concludes that Tatum’s claims against Melissa Rittenour regarding her actions in the

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indictment process are frivolous as they are “based on an indisputably meritless legal

theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. These claims are therefore due to be dismissed upon

application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

3. The Request for Monetary Damages from Defendant Marshall Relative to

Tatum’s Confinement Upon Indictment and After Conviction. Tatum maintains his

incarceration in the Montgomery County Detention Facility initially resulted from his

indictment for second degree assault but is now based on his conviction for this criminal

offense. He argues that such incarceration is violative of his constitutional rights because

the grand jury did not actually issue an indictment against him. Neither the indictment nor

the subsequent conviction has been invalidated and, hence, defendant Marshall cannot be

held liable for monetary damages regarding such incarceration as he has at all times acted

pursuant to an order issued by a state court. 

4. The Request for DeclaratoryRelief. To the extent Tatum seeks declaratory relief

from adverse decisions issued by Judge Harwick in the state criminal proceedings over

which this defendant presided, this court lacks jurisdiction to render such judgment in an

action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents ...

lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’

challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings

commenced.’ Exxon Mobil Corp. V. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125

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S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460, 126 S.Ct. 1198,

1199 (2006). Although “Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doctrine,” it remains applicable to

bar Tatum from proceeding before this court as this case is “‘brought by [a] state-court

loser[] complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district

court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.’ 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. [at] 1517.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 464, 125 S.Ct. at

1201; District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983) (federal

district courts “do not have jurisdiction ... over challenges to state court decisions in

particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the

state court’s action was unconstitutional.”). Moreover, a § 1983 action is inappropriate

either to compel or to appeal a particular course of action by a state court. Datz v. Kilgore,

51 F.3d 252, 254 (11 Cir. 1995) (§ 1983 suit arising from alleged erroneous decisions of th

a state court is merely a prohibited appeal of the state court judgment); see also Rolleston

v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163 (11 Cir. 1988). th

In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that dismissal of Tatum’s request for

declaratory relief with respect to actions undertaken during proceedings related to the

plaintiff’s indictment by the grand jury and/or conviction for assault before the Circuit

Court of MontgomeryCounty, Alabama is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

See Clark v. State of Georgia Pardons and Paroles Board, 915 F.2d 636 (11 Cir. 1990); th

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see also Neitzke, 490 U.S. 319.

B. The Claims Against Eleanor Brooks

Tatum maintains the district attorney, Eleanor Brooks, violated his constitutional

rights by allowing his case to proceed on the challenged indictment. It is clear from the

complaint that the claims made against defendant Brooks emanate from this defendant’s

representation of the State during criminal proceedings before the Circuit Court of

Montgomery County, Alabama. 

“A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for all actions [she] takes while

performing [her] function as an advocate for the government. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509

U.S. 259, 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2615-16, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). The prosecutorial

function includes the initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecution, Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 424, 96 S.Ct. 984, 992, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), and all appearances before

the court, including examining witnesses and presenting evidence. See Burns v. Reed, 500

U.S. 478, 492, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1942 (1991).” Rowe v. Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271,

1279 (11 Cir. 2002); see also Mastroianni v. Bowers, 60 F.3d 671, 676 (11th Cir. 1998).

th

[A]bsolute immunity is an entitlement to be free from suit for

money damages.... [T]he purpose of the immunity is to shield

officials from the distractions of litigation arising from the

performance of their official functions. To fulfill its purpose,

official immunity protects government officials not only from

having to stand trial, but also from having to bear the other

burdens attendant to litigation, including pretrial discovery....

In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d

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128 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor is

absolutely immune from civil suit for damages under section

1983 for actions taken “in initiating a prosecution and in

presenting the State's case.” Id. at 431, 96 S.Ct. at 995.

Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d. 783, 788-89 (11 Cir. 1988). th

The actions of defendant Brooks about which the plaintiff complains have been

undertaken by this defendant in her role “as an ‘advocate’ for the state” and such actions

“are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Mastroianni

v. Bowers, 60 F.3d 671, 676 (11 Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Defendant Brooks is th

therefore “entitled to absolute immunity for that conduct.” Id. Thus, Tatum’s request for

damages against Eleanor Brooks lacks an arguable basis and, as such, is subject to

dismissal in accordance with the directives of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii).

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. As previously determined, Tatum is not entitled to declaratory

relief for any adverse action taken during the state court proceedings related to his

indictment by a grand jury or conviction by the Circuit Court of Montgomery County,

Alabama. 

C. The Claims Against Larry Sasser

Tatum complains that Larry Sasser, the attorney assigned to represent him in his

state criminal case, failed to provide effective assistance. Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court

Doc. No. 1 at 3. An essential element of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is that a person acting

under color of state law committed the constitutional violation about which the plaintiff

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complains. American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 119 S.Ct.

977, 985, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Willis v.

University Health Services, Inc., 993 F.2d 837, 840 (11 Cir. 1993). To state a viable th

claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must assert “both an alleged constitutional

deprivation ... and that ‘the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly

be said to be a state actor.’” American Manufacturers, 526 U.S. at 50, 119 S.Ct. at 985

(emphasis in original). An attorney who represents a defendant in criminal proceedings

does not act under color of state law. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); Mills

v. Criminal District Court No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 679 (5 Cir. 1988) (“[P]rivate attorneys, th

even court-appointed attorneys, are not official state actors and ... are not subject to suit

under section 1983.”). Since the conduct about which Tatumcomplains was not committed

by a person acting under color of state law, the § 1983 claims asserted against Larry Sasser

are frivolous as they lack an arguable basis in law. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The claims

against defendant Sasser are therefore due to be summarily dismissed pursuant to the

directives of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 

D. The Conspiracy Claim

Tatum makes the specious allegation that his detention is the result of a conspiracy

among the defendants. Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1 at 3. A conspiracy claim

justifiably may be dismissed because of the conclusory, vague and general nature of the

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allegations. Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-557 (11 Cir. 1984). The court has

th

carefully reviewed the instant complaint, as amended. At best, the assertions made by

Tatum relative to a conspiracy are self serving, purely conclusory allegations that fail to

assert those material facts necessary to establish the existence of a conspiracy between the

defendants. Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 425 (11 Cir. 1988) (to properly state a th

claim for relief based on a conspiracy, a plaintiff must plead that the offending parties

“reached an understanding” to deny the plaintiff his constitutional rights); Harvey v.

Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1133 (11 Cir. 1992) (merely “stringing together” acts, without th

showing parties “reached an understanding” to violate plaintiff’s rights, is insufficient to

demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy). Other than his suppositious allegation, Tatum

presents nothing, nor can this court countenance any evidence, which would indicate that

the defendants entered into a conspiracy to deprive Tatum of his constitutional rights. In

light of the foregoing, the court concludes that Tatum’s bare allegation of a conspiracy

among the defendants is insufficient to support a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1133; Fullman, 739 F.2d at 556-557. 

 E. The Challenges to Plaintiff’s Conviction

Tatum attacks the validity of the conviction and sentence imposed upon him for

assault by the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama on May 19, 2008.

Specifically, Tatum complains (i) the indictment made the basis for such conviction is

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invalid, (ii) the trial judge acted improperly in allowing his case to proceed on the

indictment, and (iii) counsel provided ineffective assistance during the criminal

proceedings. The aforementioned claims go to the fundamental legality of Tatum’s

conviction and resulting sentence. Consequently, these claims provide no basis for relief

at this time. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

477 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a claim for damages challenging the legality

of a prisoner’s conviction or confinement is not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action

“unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or

impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus” and complaints containing such claims

must thisefore be dismissed. 512 U.S. at 483-489. Under Heck, the relevant inquiry is

“whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence.” 512 U.S. at 487. The Court emphasized that “habeas corpus is

the exclusive remedy for a ... prisoner who challenges” a conviction or sentence, “even

though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983” and, based on the

foregoing, concluded that Heck’s complaint was due to be dismissed as no cause of action

existed under section 1983. 512 U.S. at 481. In so doing, the Court rejected the lower

court’s reasoning that a section 1983 action should be construed as a habeas corpus action.

In Balisok, the Court concluded that a state prisoner’s “claim[s] for declaratory [and

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injunctive] relief and money damages, ... that necessarily imply the invalidity of the

punishment imposed, is not cognizable under § 1983 ...” unless the prisoner can

demonstrate that the challenged action has previously been invalidated. 520 U.S. at 648.

Moreover, the Court determined that this is true not only when a prisoner challenges the

judgment as a substantive matter but also when “the nature of the challenge to the

procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment.” Id. at

645. The Court reiterated the position previously taken in Heck that the “sole remedy in

federal court” for a prisoner challenging the constitutionality of a conviction or sentence

is a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 645. Additionally, the Court

“reemphasize[d] ... that a claim either is cognizable under § 1983 and should immediately

go forward, or is not cognizable and should be dismissed.” Id. at 649. 

Several of the claims presented in the instant complaint challenge the

constitutionality of the 2008 assault conviction and resulting sentence imposed upon Tatum

by the Circuit Court of Montomgery County, Alabama. A judgment in favor of Tatum on

these claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of this conviction and sentence. It is

clear from the complaint that the conviction and sentence about which Tatum complains

have not been invalidated in an appropriate proceeding. Consequently, the instant collateral

attack on the conviction and sentence imposed upon Tatum is prohibited and subject to

dismissal by this court prior to service of process pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Balisok, 520 U.S. at 645; Heck, 512 U.S. at 481; Preiser, 411 U.S. at

488-490. 

 II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The plaintiff’s claims against Johnny Hardwick, Melissa Rittenour, Eleanor

Brooks and Larry Sasser be DISMISSED with prejudice prior to service of process in

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii) and (iii).

2. The plaintiff’s claims against defendant Marshall regarding the constitutionality

of his confinement based on the indictment and subsequent conviction be summarily

dismissed as Marshall acted pursuant to directives of a state court when ensuring such

confinement. 

3. The plaintiff’s challenge to the constitutionality of the conviction and sentence

imposed upon him by the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama for assault be

dismissed without prejudice pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as

such claims are not properly before the court at this time. 

4. This case, with respect to the plaintiff’s claims challenging the handling of his

personal mail and overcrowded conditions at the Montgomery County Detention Facility

lodged against defendants Marshall and Wright, be referred back to the undersigned for

further appropriate proceedings. 

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It is further 

ORDERED that on or before January 19, 2009 the parties may file objections to this

Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981,

en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit 

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 6th day of January, 2009.

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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