Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_01-cv-00231/USCOURTS-alsd-1_01-cv-00231-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Death Penalty)

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IN	THE	UNITED	STATES	DISTRICT	COURT	FOR	THE

SOUTHERN	DISTRICT	OF	ALABAMA

SOUTHERN	DIVISION

GARY DAVIS HART II,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, 

Commissioner, Alabama 

Department of Corrections,1

Respondent.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.

01-00231-CB

			OPINION	and	ORDER

At	the	Court’s	direction,	the	parties,	some	time	ago,	submitted	briefs	

addressing	procedural	default	and	the	need	for	an	evidentiary	hearing.		This	order	

addresses procedural	default	and	other	grounds	for	dismissal	raised	by	Respondent.		

Procedural Background

In	1990,	Petitioner	Gary	Davis	Hart	II	was	convicted	of	capital	murder	in	the	

Circuit	Court	of	Mobile	County,	Alabama	and	was	sentenced	to	death.		He	appealed,	

and	both	his	sentence	and	conviction	were	affirmed	by	the	Alabama	Court	of	

Criminal	Appeals.		Hart	v.	State,	612	So.2d	520	(Ala.	Crim.	App.	1992).		That	decision	

was	affirmed	by	the	Alabama	Supreme	Court.	Ex	Parte	Hart,	612	So.2d	536	(Ala.	

1992).		Hart’s	petition	for	certiorari	was	denied	by	the	United	States	Supreme	Court.		

Hart	v.	Alabama, 508	U.S.	953	(1993).	 Following	the	conclusion	of	his	direct	appeal,	

Hart filed	a	petition	for	postconviction	relief	pursuant	to	Rule	32	of	the	Alabama	

Rules	of	Criminal	Procedure.		After	a	hearing,	the	trial court	denied	the	petition.		

																																																							 1 Pursuant	to	Fed. R.	Civ.	P.	25(d),	the	Court	has	substituted	Jefferson	S.	Dunn

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Hart	appealed,	but	the	Alabama	Court	of	Criminal	Appeals	affirmed	the	lower	court’s	

decision.		Hart	v.	State,	778	So.2d	869	(Ala.	Crim.	App.	1999)	(unpubl.),	cert.	denied,	

800	So.2d	140	(Ala.	2000).

On	March	28,	2001,	Hart	filed	the	instant	petition	for	habeas	corpus	pursuant	

to	28	U.S.C.	§	2254.		While	the	petition	was	pending,	the	United	States	Supreme	

Court	decided	Roper	v.	Simmons,	543	U.S.	551(2005),	which	held	that	the	imposition	

of	the	death	penalty	on	persons	under	18	when	the	crime	was	committed	violated	

the	Eighth	and	Fourteenth	Amendments.		Thereafter,	the	Court	entered	an	order	

directing	the	Respondent	to	show	cause	why	the	petition	should	not	be	granted	in	

part,	“insofar	as	petitioner	seeks	to	vacate	the	sentence	imposed	on the	ground	that	

it	violates	the	Eighth	Amendment’s	prohibition	on	cruel	and	unusual	punishment.”		

(Ord.,	Doc.	40.)		In	response,	Respondent	acknowledged	that	Petitioner,	who	was	16	

years	old	at	the	time	the	murder	was	committed,	was	due	to	be	resentenced	to	life	

imprisonment	without	the	possibility	of	parole	based	on	the	Supreme	Court’s	ruling	

in	Simmons.		(Rsp.,	Doc.	41.)		The	parties	agreed	that	the	case	should	be	remanded	to	

the	Circuit	Court	of	Mobile	County	for	resentencing.		Accordingly,	this	Court	granted	

the	petition,	in	part,	and	remanded	the	matter	to	the	Circuit	Court	of	Mobile	County	

for	resentencing,	but	retained	jurisdiction	to	decide	any	pending	guilt-phase	claims	

properly	raised	by	the	Petitioner.			(Remand	Ord.,	Doc.	43.)		On	August	16,	2005,	

Petitioner	was	resentenced	to	life	in	prison	without	the	possibility	of	parole,	the	

only	other	sentence	available	at	that	time	under	Alabama	law.

2 (Doc.	45.)

																																																							 2 Subsequent	to	Roper,	the	Supreme	Court	held	in	Miller	v.	Alabama,	____	U.S.	____,	132	

S.	Ct.	2455,	2469		(2012),	“that	the	Eighth	Amendment	forbids	a	sentencing	scheme	

that	mandates	life	in	prison	without	possibility	of	parole	for	juvenile	offenders.”		

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Facts

The	Underlying	Offense

In	its	opinion	on	direct	appeal,	the	Alabama	Court	of	Criminal	Appeals	

summarized	the	evidence	presented	at	trial	as	follows:

On	August	12,	1989,	the	appellant	and	his	accomplice,	who	were	each	

armed	with	a	handgun,	entered	the	rear	door	of	the	L	&	N	Seafood	

restaurant	in	Mobile,	Alabama.	Standing	near	the	rear	door	was	the	

restaurant's	bartender,	Steve	Mason.	Upon	entering	the	restaurant,	

the	appellant	grabbed	Steve	Mason	by	the	shirt,	prodded	him	in	the	

back	with	a	.38	caliber	pistol,	and	announced	“this	is	a	hold	up,	take	

me	to	the	safe.”	Mr.	Mason	led	the	appellant	to	the	office	where	the	

victim,	Todd	Evans,	was	working.	Mr.	Mason	then	informed	the	victim	

that	they	were	being	robbed	and	that	the	appellant	wanted	money.	

The	victim	did	not	reply	but	met	the	demand	for	money	with	a	look	of	

surprise.	The	appellant	then	shouted,	“This	ain't	no	bullshit,”	and	

brought	the	pistol	within	two	feet	of	the	victim's	head	and	fired.	The	

bullet	entered	the	left	side	of	the	victim's	face,	traveled	through	his	

brain,	and	then	lodged	under	the	scalp	on	the	right	side	of	his	head.

Immediately	following	the	shooting,	Steve	Mason	retrieved	a	cash	

drawer	from	a	filing	cabinet	in	the	victim's	office	and	gave	it	to	the	

appellant.	The	appellant	and	his	partner	then	fled	the	scene	on	foot.	

They	were	spotted	at	a	nearby	hotel	and	after	a	brief	chase	were	

apprehended.	During	the	chase,	the	appellant	discarded	a	.38	caliber	

pistol,	which	was	later	identified	as	the	murder	weapon.	At	the	time	of	

the	appellant's	arrest,	he	was	in	possession	of	$499	in	cash.

Hart	v.	State, 612	So.2d	520,	523	(Ala.	Crim.	App.	1992).

																																																																																																																																																																				

The	Eleventh	Circuit	has	held	that	Miller does	not	apply	retroactively	to	cases	on	

collateral	review.		In	re	Morgan,	713	F.3d	1365	(11th Cir.	2013).		However,	there	is	

disagreement	on	the	issue of	retroactivity.		Compare Johnson	v.	Ponton,	780	F.3d	219	

(4th Cir.	2015)	(Miller	not	retroactive);	Commonwealth	v.	Cunningham,	81	A.3d	1	(Pa.	

2013)(same);	State	v.	Tate,	130	So.	3d	829	(La.	2013)		(same)	with State	v.	Mantich,	

842	N.W.	2d	716	(Neb.	2014)	(Miller retroactive);	In	re	New	Hampshire,	103	A.	3d	

227	(N.H.	2014)(same),	petition	for	cert.	filed,		sub	nom.	New	Hampshire	v.	Soto (Dec.	

1,	2014)	(No.	14-639).		The	Supreme	Court	is	expected	to	resolve	the	issue	this	term,	

having	recently	granted	heard	oral	argument	in	Montgomery	v.	Lousiana,	141	So.3d	

264,	cert.	granted (U.S.	March	20,	2015)	(No.	14-280),	a	case	in	which	the	Louisiana	

Court	of	Criminal	Appeals,	following	Tate,	supra,	denied	retroactive	application	of	

Miller.

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Pretrial	&	Trial	Proceedings

Attorneys	Arthur	Madden	and	Vader	A.	(Al)	Pennington	were	appointed	to	

represent	Petitioner	Gary	Davis	Hart	following	his	indictment	on	a	charge	of	capital	

murder.		(R. Vol.	1,	Tab	R-1 at 9-10.	) Shortly	thereafter,	counsel	filed	a	Request	to	be	

Treated	as	a	Youthful	Offender.	Id.	11.		A	Youthful	Offender	Report,	including	a	

psychological	evaluation,	was	submitted	by	the	Alabama	Department	of	Probation	

and	Parole.	Id. 19.		After	a	hearing,	at	which	defense	counsel called	two	character	

witnesses,	the	trial	court	denied	Youthful	Offender	status.		(R. Vol. 2, Tab R-4.)		

Thereafter,	defense	counsel	filed	a	motion	for	change	of	venue,	which	was	denied,	as	

well	as	a	motion for	funds	to	hire	experts,	which	was	granted in	part	and	denied	in	

part.		(R.	Vol.	1,	Tab	R-1	at 33-38;	R. Vol.	2,	Tab	R-7.)		Defense	counsel	filed	various	

pretrial	motions	regarding	jury	selection	as	well	as	motions	in	limine.		

Prior	to	appointment	of	counsel,	the	trial	court	entered a	standard	discovery	

order.		(R.	Vol.	1,	Tab	R-1	at 12-13.)		That	order	required	the	District	Attorney	to	

turn	over	to	the	defendant’s	attorney	at	arraignment	various	forms	of	evidence,	

including	all	statements	made	by	the	defendant	(both	written	and	oral);	any	and	all	

exculpatory	evidence;	all	physical	evidence	to	be	offered	into	evidence	at	trial;	and	

results	of	scientific	tests,	experiments	or	examinations.		(Id. ) The	trial	court	also	

granted	the	State’s	motion	for	discovery,	which	requested	“copies	of photographs,	

documents	and	all	other	tangible	documents”	defendant	intended	to	introduce	into	

evidence	at	trial	as	well	as	“[c]opies	of	any	results	of	reports	of	physical	or	mental	

examinations,	and	of	scientific	tests	or	experiments”	to	be	introduced	into	evidence	

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at	trial	or	which	were	prepared	by	a	witness	and	related	to	the	witness’s	testimony.		

(Id. 49-51.)3		

At	trial,	the	State	presented	testimony	from	three	L&N	employees	who	had	

witnessed the	shooting	and	who	identified	Hart	as	the	shooter.		The	State	also	

presented	testimony	from	other	employees	who	saw	Hart	and/or	his	accomplice	at	

the	restaurant	shortly	before	or	shortly	after	the	shooting.		Other	witnesses	

included	several	police	officers	who	located	the	two	nearby	within	a	few	hours	of	

the	shooting	and	took	them	into	custody.		The	State	also	presented	the	testimony	of	

the	state	medical	examiner	and	a	firearms	expert.		

The	defense	did	not	deny	that	Hart	was	the	shooter	or	that	the	shooting	took	

place	during	the	course	of	a	robbery.		The	defense	strategy	was	to	portray	the	

shooting	as	accidental.		Hart	testified	in	his	own	defense	that	he	did	not	intend	to	

shoot	anyone	and	that	he	did	not	pull	the	trigger.		Through	Hart’s	testimony,	the	

defense	established	that	Hart	had	a	congenital	condition	that	caused	weakness	in	

his	right	hand	and	arm.		The	defense	elicited	testimony	from	the	State’s	firearms	

expert	that	the	firearm	Hart	used	was	of	inferior	quality	and,	when	cocked,	required	

less	than	2	pounds	of	pressure	to	pull	the	trigger.

Direct	Appeal

Hart	raised	numerous	issues	on	direct	appeal.4		Among	the	issues	raised	

were	the	state’s	use	of	peremptory	challenges,	the	denial	of	Youthful	Offender	status,	

																																																							 3 At	jury	selection,	the	State’s	motion	for	discovery	was	determined	to	be	moot	

because	the	defense	did	not	intend	to	offer	any	discoverable	evidence	at	trial.	R.	Vol.	

2,	Tab	R-8	at	196.

4 Hart	was	represented	on	direct	appeal	by	attorney	Ruth	Friedman.		

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restriction’s	on	voir	dire,	discovery	rulings,	prosecutorial	misconduct,	evidentiary	

rulings,	the	trial	court’s	jury	instructions,	and	the	sufficiency	of	the	evidence.	These	

issues	were	raised	before	both	the	Court	of	Criminal	Appeals	(R.	Vol. 5,	Tab	R-32)	

and	before	the	Alabama	Supreme	Court	(R.	Vol.	6,	Tab	R-38).		

State	Collateral	Proceedings

After	exhausting	his	direct	appeal,	Hart	filed	a	petition	for	relief	from	

judgment	pursuant	to	Rule	32	of	the	Alabama	Rules	of	Criminal	Procedure	(“state	

habeas”).5		The	petition	asserted	numerous	grounds	for	relief	from	the	conviction	

and	sentence	based	on	both	Federal	and	state	constitutional	violations,	including	

various	claims	of	ineffective	assistance	of	counsel.		Hart’s	petition	was	denied	after	

an	evidentiary	hearing	before	the	trial	court,	and	he	appealed	to	the	Alabama	Court	

of	Criminal	Appeals.		That	appeal	also	raised	a	number	of	issues	and	was	also	

unsuccessful.

Federal	Habeas	Petition	&	Roper	v.	Simmons

Hart	filed	the	instant	habeas	petition	on	March	28,	2001.		As	noted	above,	

supra	at	2-3,	this	action	was	remanded	to	the	sentencing	court	by	agreement	for	

resentencing	pursuant	to	Roper.		The	state	court	imposed	a	sentence	of	life	without	

parole	on	August	16,	2005.		Petitioner’s	guilt-phase	claims	are	ripe	for	review.

Petitioner’s	Habeas	Claims

The following	twenty-four	guilt-phase	claims6 remain	pending:

																																																							 5 Hart	was	represented in	the	state	habeas	proceedings	by	current	counsel.

6 The	Petition	raised	twenty-one	claims	related	solely	to	sentencing	issues,	which	

have	been	rendered	moot	by	subsequent	proceedings.	Some	of	the	remaining	claims	

are	“hybrid”	claims	which	raised	both	guilt-phase	and	sentencing-phase	issues.		

With	respect	to	such	claims,	only	guilt-phase	issues	will	be	identified	and	addressed.

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A.		Ineffective	assistance	of	counsel based	on	the	following:

1.		Counsel’s	performance	at	the	pretrial	transfer	hearing;

2.		Counsel’s	performance	at	the	pretrial	transfer	hearing	insofar	as	that	

performance	resulted	from	financial	limitations	placed	on	defense	counsel;

3.		Counsel’s	performance	at	the	youthful	offender	hearing;7

4.		Counsel’s	performance	at the	youthful	offender	hearing	insofar	as	that	

performance	resulted	from	financial	limitations	placed	on	defense	counsel;

8

5.		Counsel’s	failure	to	protect	Hart	from prejudicial	pretrial	publicity;

6.		Counsel’s	failure	to	protect	Hart	from	prejudicial	pretrial	publicity	due	to	

financial	limitations	placed	on	defense	counsel;

7.		Counsel	performance	at	voir	dire;

9.		Counsel	failure	to	obtain	and	present	evidence	related	to	intent	which	was	

the	result	of	financial	limitations	placed	on	defense	counsel;

10.	Errors	committed	by	counsel	during	trial;	and

13.		Cumulative	errors	of	counsel.

B.			Improper	denial	of	youthful	offender	status.

D.		The	jury	foreperson’s	misconduct	and	racial	bias	deprived	Hart	of	his	right	to	

trial	by	an	impartial	tribunal.

E.		The	trial	court’s	discovery	rulings	violated	Hart’s	constitutional	rights	under	the	

Sixth	Amendment.

F.		Prosecutorial	misconduct	violated	Hart’s	constitutional	right	to	a	fair	trial.

J.		Violations	of	the	Sixth,	Eighth	and	Fourteenth	Amendment	resulting	from	the	

following	improper	jury	instructions:

1.		Failure	to	give	an	adequate	charge	of	the	less-included	offense	of	felony

murder;

2.		Failure	to	give	a	reckless	murder	charge;	and

3.		Failure	to	give	a	reckless	manslaughter	charge.

K.		Constitutional	violations	occurred	during	voir	dire,	to	wit:

1-3.	The	state	used	its	peremptory	challenges	in	a	racially	discriminatory	

manner;9

																																																							 7The	caption	of	Claim	A3	relates	to	the	pretrial	transfer	hearing,	but	the	substance	of	

the	claim	addresses	the	youthful	offender hearing.		

8 Similar	to	Claim	A3,	the	caption	of	this	claim	refers	to	the	pretrial	transfer	hearing,	

but	the	body	of	the	claim	contains	references	to	the	youthful	offender	hearing.	

9 Claims	K1-K3	are	the	same	Batson claim	broken	into	separate	steps.		Specifically,	

K1	asserts	a	general	Batson	claim.		K2	addresses	Petitioner’s	prima	facie	case	of	

discrimination.	K3	discusses	evidence	to	rebut	the	state’s	race	neutral	reasons	for	

its	strikes.

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4. Violation	of	Hart’s	Sixth	and	Fourteenth	Amendment	Rights by	the	trial	

court’s	voir	dire;10

5.		The	trial	court	improperly	excluded	prospective	jurors	based	on	their	

capital	punishment	beliefs;

6.		The	trial	court’s	method	for	conducting	voir	dire	was	prejudicial.

L.		The	evidence	was	constitutionally	insufficient	to	sustain	a	guilty	verdict	because:

1.		The	state	failed	to	prove	the	element	of	intent	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt;

2.		The	jury	applied	an	unconstitutional	standard	of	proof	due	to	court’s	

confusing	jury	instructions.

N.		The	state	suppressed	favorable	evidence	in	violation	of	Brady	v.	Maryland.

11

Issues	Presented

Due	to	the	number	and	complexity	of	the	claims	and	issues,	the	Court	divided	

the	briefing	in	the	case	into	two	stages.	Stage	I	is	intended	to	address	procedural	

default	and the	need	for an	evidentiary	hearing,	with	the	merits	of	all	remaining to	

be	addressed	at	Stage	II.		In	the	Stage	I	brief,	Respondent	has	asserted	an	additional	

matter	for	resolution.		Respondent	argues	that	the	Court	should	dismiss certain	

claims	because	those	claims	raise solely	issues	of	state	law and	therefore	fail	to state	

a	claim	under	28	U.S.C.	§ 2254.		Below,	the	Court	will	address	Respondent’s	“state	

law	only”	argument,	then	proceed	to	a	review	of	the	claims	Respondent	argues	are	

subject	to	procedural	default.

“State	Law	Only”	Claims	

Respondent	argues	that	the	Court	should	dismiss	several	claims	(B,	D,	E.	G.	H,	

J,	M,	O	and	P)	“because	they	present	only	questions	of	state	law”	and	therefore	fail	to	

																																																							 10 There	are	no	facts	set	forth	in	support	of	this	claim,	which	also	invokes	the	Eighth	

Amendment.		Because	the	Eighth	Amendment	deals	with	issues	of	punishment,	any	

claim	arising	therefrom	is	moot.		

11 This	claim	is	broken	into	3	subparts	(M1-M3)	asserting	different	elements	of	the	

same	Brady	claim.		The	underlying	factual	basis	is	the	state’s	alleged	failure	to	

disclose	a	spontaneous	statement	made	by	Hart	on	the	night	of	his	arrest.		

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state	a	claim	for	relief	under	28	U.S.C.S	§	2254(a).		Respondent	points	out,	correctly,	

that	“[f]ederal	habeas	corpus	does	not	lie	to review	errors,	if	any,	under	state	law.”		

(Resp’t’s	Br. 35,	Doc.	38.)		In	support	of	this	proposition,	Respondent	cites,	first,	

federal	habeas	cases	in	which	the	petition raised	a	claim	that	was	based	purely	on	

state	law.		See	Pulley	v.	Harris,	456	U.S.	37,	41	(1984);	Carrizales	v.	Wainwright,	699	

F.2d	1053,	1055	(1983).		That	is	not	the	case	here.		Each	of	the	claims	identified	by	

the	Respondent is framed	as	a	federal	constitutional	violation.		Respondent	asserts	

that	the	claims	are	purely	issues	of	state law	because	the	state	court,	either	on	direct	

appeal	or	collateral	review,	resolved	these	or	similar	claims	based	solely	on	state	

law.		But	it	is	the	federal	habeas	petition,	not	a	state	court	opinion,	that	determines	

the	nature	of	the	claim	and	whether	it	raises	a	federal	constitutional	issue.		Cf.	Dye	v.	

Hofbauer,	546	U.S.	2	(2005)	(per	curiam)	(state	court’s	failure	to	mention	a	federal	

claim	does	not	mean	federal	claim	was	not	presented	to	it).		

Each	of	the	challenged	claims	raises	one	or	more	issues	of	federal	

constitutional	law.		Claim	B	asserts	that	Petitioner	was	“improperly	denied	Youthful	

Offender	treatment”	because	the	hearing	violated	Petitioner’s	constitutional	rights	

to	confrontation	and	to	avoid	self-incrimination.		(Pet.	¶¶	128-131,	Doc.	1.)	Claim	

D(1)	alleges	that	the	jury	foreperson’s	racial	bias	deprived	Petitioner	of	his	

constitutional	right	to	a	fair	trial.	(Id. ¶¶	146-47).	 Claim	J	asserts	that	the	trial	

court’s	failure	to	properly	instruct	the	jury	on	lesser-included	offenses	violated	the	

Sixth,	Eighth	and	Fourteenth	Amendments.		(Id. subheading	J.)			Finally,	Claim	P	

alleges	that	the	introduction	of	autopsy	photographs	violated	Petitioner’s	rights	to	

due	process	and	to	a	fair	trial	guaranteed	by	the	Sixth	and	Fourteenth	Amendments.		

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(Id. subheading	P.)		Because	the	claims,	as	presented	in	the	Petition,	are	not	based	

solely	on	state	law,	Respondent’s	argument	for	dismissal	fails.		

Procedural	Default

Introduction

Respondent	argues	that	the	doctrine	of	procedural	default	should	prevent	

the	Court	from	reaching	the	merits	of	all	or	part	the	following	guilt-phase	claims:		A2,	

A4,	A5,	A6,	A7,	A8,	A9,	A10,	A13,	F,	J,	K1,	K2,	K4,	K5,	L,	and	N.		Petitioner	counters	

that	all	of	the	claims	were	raised	in	state	court	and	were	fully	exhausted.		Therefore,	

Petitioner	asserts	that	none	are	procedurally	defaulted.		Before	addressing	the

applicability	of	procedural	default	as	to	each	claim,	the	Court	sets	out	the	law	of	

procedural	default	and	related	principles.		

Applicable	Law

The	doctrine	of	procedural	default,	as	it	relates	to	petitions	filed	under	28	

U.S.C.	§	2254,	arises	from	principles	of	comity	and	federalism.		Francis	v.	Henderson,	

425	U.S.	536,	541	(1976).		A	federal	court

will	not	consider	an	issue	of	federal	law	on	direct	review	from	a	

judgment	of	a	state	court	if	that	judgment	rests	on	a	state-law	ground	

that	is	both	“independent”	of	the	merits	of	the	federal	claim	and	an	

“adequate	basis	for	the	court’s	decision.		Although	this	doctrine	

originated	in	the	context	of	state-court	judgments	for	which	the	

alternative	state	and	federal	grounds	were	both	“substantive”	in	

nature,	the	doctrine“	has	been	applied	routinely	to	state	decisions	

forfeiting	federal	claims	for	violation	of	state	procedural	rules.

Harris	v.	Reed,	489	U.S.	255,	260-61	(1989)	(internal	citations	and	quotations	

omitted).		Generally,	violation	of	a	state	procedural	rule	is	adequate	to	foreclose	

federal	review	if	the	rule	is	“firmly	established	and	regularly	followed.”		Lee	v.	

Kemna,	534	U.S.	362,	376	(2002).		A	state	court’s	decision	is	independent	unless	the	

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resolution	of	the	state-law	issue	depends	on	a	federal	constitutional	ruling.		Stewart	

v.	Smith,	536	U.S.	856,	860	(2002).		While	a	federal	court	is	generally	precluded	from	

reviewing	the	merits	of	a	procedurally	defaulted	claim,	there	are	exceptions	to	the	

rule.

Procedural	default	may	be	overcome	in	one	of	two	ways.		First	the	claim	may	

be	considered	on	the	merits	if	the	petitioner	and show	both	cause	for	this	failure	to	

comply	with	the	state	procedural rule	and	prejudice	resulting	from	the	default.		

Murray	v.	Carrier,	477	U.S.	478	(1986).		“[C]ause	for	a	procedural	default	must	

ordinarily	turn	on	whether	the	prisoner	can	show	that	some	objective	factor	

external	to	the	defense	impeded	counsel’s	efforts	to	comply	with	the	State’s	

procedural	rule.”		Id. at	488.		Prejudice,	in	this	context,	means	a	reasonable	

probability	that	the	outcome	would	have	been	different.		Strickler	v.	Greene,	527	U.S.	

263	(1999).		The	second	circumstance	under	which	a	procedurally defaulted	claim	

may	be	considered	is	if	the	failure	to	review	the	claim	would	result	in	a	fundamental	

miscarriage	of	justice.”		Dugger	v.	Adams,	489	U.S.	401,	415	(1989).

While	procedural	default	obviously	applies	to	federal	constitutional	claims	

that	were	denied	by	the	state	court on	procedural	grounds,	it	may	also	apply	to	

federal	constitutional	claims	that	were	never	raised	at	all	in	state	court.		In	the	latter	

instance,	the	doctrines	of	procedural	default	and	exhaustion	converge.		“Exhaustion	

of	state remedies	requires	that	the	state	prisoner	‘fairly	present[t]	federal	claims	to	

the	state	court	in	order	to	give	the	State	the	opportunity	to	pass	upon	and	correct	

alleged	violations	of	its	prisoners’	federal	rights.’”		Snowden	v.	Singletary,	135	F.3d	

732, 735	(1998)	(quoting	Duncan	v.	Henry,	513	U.S.	364,	365	(1995)).		Generally,	

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unexhausted	claims	must	be	returned	to	the	state	court	for	consideration	on	the	

merits	unless	the	federal	court	determines	that	exhaustion	would	be	futile.		Id. at	

736.		If	state	procedural	rules	would	preclude	review	of	the	claim	on	the	merits,	

then exhaustion	would	be	futile.		Id.		Thus,	a	federal	court	may	conclude	that	an	

unexhausted	claim	would	be	procedurally	barred	because	of	the	petitioner’s	failure	

to	comply	with	state	procedure.		Id. at	737.		In	that	instance,	the	doctrine	of	

procedural	default	would	apply	even	though	the	state	court	had	never	specifically	

invoked	the	state	procedural	rule.

To	summarize,	a	federal	court	will	not	consider	the	merits	of	a	federal	

constitutional	claim	on	habeas	review	if	that	claim	has	been	procedurally	defaulted.		

If	the	constitutional	claim	asserted	by	the	petition	was	presented	and	denied	by	the	

state	court	on	adequate	and	independent	state-law	grounds,	then	procedural	default	

applies.		If	the	claim	was	never	raised in	state	court	but	now	would	be	barred	from	

consideration	by	state	procedural	rules,	the	procedural	default	also	applies.		A	

procedurally	defaulted	claim	may	nonetheless	be	considered	on	the	merits	if	

petitioner	can	demonstrate	either	(1)	cause	for	and	prejudice	from	his	failure	to	

raise	the	issue	in	state	court	or	(2)	that	failure	to	consider	the	merits	would	result	in	

a	fundamental	miscarriage	of	justice.

Claim	A2:		Ineffective	Assistance	of	Counsel	at	Pretrial	Transfer	Hearing	

Due	to	Financial	Limitations

Respondent	argues	that	this	claim	was	not	exhausted	in	state	court	because	it	

was	not	raised	on	appeal	either	on	direct	appeal	or	collateral	attack.		Because	

consideration	would	be	barred	by	state	procedural	rules,	Respondent	asserts,	the	

claim	is	procedurally	defaulted.		Petitioner’s	sole	response	is	that	the	claim	was	

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exhausted	because	it	was	raised	in	the	Rule	32	appeal	and,	for	that	reason,	is	not	

procedurally	barred.12		The	claim	asserted	in	this	Court is	that	“[d]efense	counsel	

did	not	have	the	funds	and	therefore	did	not	investigate	and	discover	any	evidence...”	

to	present	on	behalf	of	Petitioner	at the	pretrial	transfer	hearing (Pet.	¶	34)	and	

“[Petitioner] was	tried	as	an	adult	as	a	result	of	counsel’s	deficient	representation.	.	.	

due	to		inadequate	access	to	funds.”		(Id. ¶	35).			As	evidence	that	he	exhausted	this	

claim,	Petitioner	points	to	his	Rule	32	appellate	brief.		

The	Eleventh	Circuit	has	explained	what	the	exhaustion	requirement	entails	

as	follows:

In	order	to	be	exhausted,	a	federal	claim	must	be	fairly	presented	to	

the	state	courts. It	is	not	sufficient	merely	that	the	federal	habeas	

petitioner	has	been	through	the	state	courts	...	nor	is	it	sufficient	that	

all	the	facts	necessary	to	support	the	claim	were	before	the	state	

courts	or	that	a	somewhat	similar	state-law	claim	was	made.		Rather,	

in	order	to	ensure	that	state	courts	have	the	first	opportunity	to	hear	

all	claims,	federal	courts	have	required	a	state	prisoner	to	present	the	

state	courts	with	the	same	claim	he	urges	upon	the	federal	courts.

While	we	do	not	require	a	verbatim	restatement	of	the	claims	brought	

in	state	court,	we	do	require	that	a	petitioner	presented	his	claims	to	

the	state	court	such	that	a	reasonable	reader	would	understand	each	

claim's	particular	legal	basis	and	specific	factual	foundation.

McNair	v.	Campbell,	416	F.3d	1291,	1302	(11th Cir.	2005)	(internal	citations	and	

quotations	omitted).		

Petitioner	cites	two	separate	ineffective	assistance	of	counsel	claims	

presented	to	the	state	appellate	court.		The	first	claim	was	asserted	under	

subheading	A:		“Hart	was	deprived	of	his	right	to	a	fair	trial	by	Counsel’s	failure	to	

effectively	represent	him	at	the	pre-trial	transfer	hearing.”		(R.	Vol.	22	Tab	R-55	at	

																																																							 12 Petitioner	does	not	dispute	that	state	procedural	rules	would	bar	consideration	of	

the	claim,	nor	does	Petitioner	invoke	any	exception	to	procedural	default	rule.	

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6.)	On	pages	6-9 of	his	Rule	32	brief,	he	argued	that	counsel	rendered	

constitutionally	ineffective	assistance	at	the	pretrial	transfer	hearing	because	his	

failure	to	investigate	or	to	introduce	any	evidence	at	the	transfer	hearing	was	the	

result	of	counsel’s	incompetence as	opposed	to	a	strategic	decision. (Id. at	6-9.)		The	

only	mention	of	inadequate	funding	was	made	under subheading	F,	which can	best	

be	described	as	a	catch-all	subheading: “Gary	Hart	was	deprived	of	a	fair	trial	by	

counsel’s	failure to	otherwise	protect his	interests	before	and	during	the	trial.”		(Id.

21.)		Petitioner’s	entire	argument	regarding	insufficient	funding was	as	follows:

Gary	was	also	denied	effective	assistance	of	counsel	at	trial	and	

on	appeal	by	the	insufficient	funding	provided	by	the	State	for	the	

compensation	of	capital	defense	attorneys	for	their	expenses.	(v.5	at	

pp.	40-42).		In	this	regard	Pennington’s	affidavit	reflects	that	the	funds	

provided	by	the	State	of	Alabama	were	wholly	inadequate to	provide	a	

proper	defense.		(v.6	at	p.	532).	The	available	funds	“did	not	begin	to	

cover	the	fees	and	costs	which	are	necessary	to	effectively	defend	any	

one	charged	with	capital	murder”.	Id.

(Id.)

Petitioner	cannot	satisfy	the	exhaustion	requirement	by	cherry-picking		

portions	of	separate	and	distinct	state	court	claims.		“[T]o preserve	a	claim	of	

ineffective	assistance	of	counsel	for	federal	review,	the	habeas	petitioner	must	

assert	this	theory	of	relief	and transparently	present	the	state	courts	with	the	

specific	acts	or	omissions	of	his	lawyers	that	resulted	in	prejudice.”	Kelley	v.	Sect’y	

for	the	Dept.	of	Corrections,	377	F.3d	1317,	1344	(11th Cir.	2004).		The	legal	theories	

raised	in	state	court	must	have	been	supported	by	the	same	“specific”	facts	asserted	

in	the	federal	habeas	petition.			Id.		“[H]abeas petitioners	may	not	present	particular	

factual	instances	of	ineffective	assistance	of	counsel	in	their	federal	petitions	that	

were	not	first	presented	to	the	state	courts.”		Id.			Petitioner	did	not assert	in	his	Rule	

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32	appeal	a	claim	that	counsel	rendered ineffective	assistance	at	the	pretrial	

transfer	hearing	based	on	inadequate	funds.		Therefore,	that	claim	did	not	get	one	

full	round	of	review	in	state	court	and	was	not	exhausted.		See Ala.	R.	Crim.	P.	

32.2(a)(5)	(precluding	post-conviction	relief	for	non-jurisdictional	claims	that	could	

have	been	raised	on	direct	appeal).

Claim	A4:		Ineffective	Assistance	of	Counsel	at	Youthful	Offender	

Hearing	Due	to	Inadequate	Funding

This	claim	is	similar	to	the	claim	above,	except	that	it	based	on	counsel’s	

performance	at	the	Youthful	Offender	hearing,	rather	than	the	pretrial	transfer	

hearing.		As	with	he	did	with	that	claim,	Petitioner	has	pulled	together	unrelated	

portions	of	his	Rule	32	appellate	brief	in	an	effort	to	demonstrate	exhaustion.		

Petitioner	cites	his	claim	of	ineffective	assistance	of	counsel	at	the	youthful	offender	

hearing	on	pages	14-16	of	that	brief	along	with	his	generalized	ineffective	

assistance/insufficient	funding	claim	asserted	separately	on	page	21. (R.	Vol.	22	Tab	

R-55	at	14-16	&	21.)		For	the	same	reasons	cited supra at 12-15,	this	claim	is	not	

exhausted	and,	therefore,	is	procedurally	defaulted.

Claim	A5:		Counsel	Failed	to	Protect	Petitioner	from	Pretrial	Publicity

In	this	claim,	Petitioner	asserts	that	counsel	failed	to	subpoena	members	of	

the	media	to	testify	regarding	the	extent	of	pretrial	publicity,	failed	to	properly	

question	jurors	about	their	exposure	to	publicity,	and	failed	to	obtain	a	change	of	

venue.		Respondent	argues	that	this	is	not	the	same ineffective	assistance/pretrial	

publicity	claim asserted	in	the	amended	Rule	32	petition and	on	appeal.		Petitioner,	

on	the	other hand,	points	out	that	the	claim	was	“made	on	page	10	of	[his]	Rule	32	

Brief.	.	.	to	the	Alabama	Court	of	Criminal	Appeals.”			(Pet’r’s	Br.	25,	Doc.	37.)		As	

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Petitioner	acknowledges,	claims	raised	in	the	Rule	32	petition	and on	appeal	from	

the	denial	of	the	Rule	32	petition	are	preserved	for	habeas	review.		Pruitt	v.	Jones,	

348	F.3d	1355,	1358	(11th Cir.	2003)	(to	exhaust	constitutional	claim	prisoner	must	

invoke	one	full round	of	state	appellate	review).

Only	one	factual	basis	supporting	this	claim	was	raised	in	both the	amended	

Rule	32	petition	and	in	the	Rule	32	appeal.		On	appeal,	Petitioner’s	ineffective	

assistance/pretrial	publicity	argument	was	asserted	under	a	claim	of	ineffective	

assistance	in	“empaneling	the	jury.”	 (R.	Vol. 22 Tab	R-55	at 10.)		Therein,	Petitioner	

asserted	that	counsel’s	“failure	to	protect	[Petitioner] from	the	effects	of	pre-trial	

publicity	constituted	ineffective	assistance	of	counsel	[in	empaneling	the	jury].”		

(Id.)		Broadly	construed,	the	claim	asserted	on	appeal	(i.e.,	ineffective	

assistance/empaneling	the	jury/pretrial	publicity)	can	be	considered	to	encompass	

failure	to	properly	question	jurors	about	their	exposure	to	pretrial	publicity.		

Therefore,	that	portion	of	the	claim	is	exhausted	and is	not	procedurally	barred.		

However,	both	failure	to	obtain media	testimony	and failure	to	obtain	a	change	of	

venue	are	completely	unrelated	to	the	ineffective	assistance/empaneling	the	jury	

claim	asserted	in	the	Rule	32	appeal.		Consequently,	Petitioner’s	claim	is	not	

exhausted,	and	is	procedurally	barred,	to	the	extent	it	relies	on	those	underlying	

factual	bases.

Claim	A6:		Financial	Limitations	Placed	on	Defense	Counsel	did	not	

Provide	Defense	Counsel	with	Sufficient	Resources	to	Effectively	Protect	

Petitioner	from	Adverse	Pretrial	Publicity

Petitioner	alleges	that	counsel	rendered	ineffective	assistance	because	“the	

trial	court	refused	to	grant	him	funds	to	conduct	a	survey	of	the	community”	thus	

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rendering	counsel	unable	to	protect	Petitioner	from	prejudicial	pretrial	publicity.		

(Pet.	¶¶	68-69.)		According	to	the	petition,	counsel’s	deficient	performance	in	this	

regard	made	it	impossible	for	Petitioner	to	receive	a	fair	trial	and	resulted	in	his	

conviction.		(Id. ¶	69.)		Respondent	argues	that	this claim	was	not	raised	in	

Petitioner’s	Rule	32	appeal.		Petitioner	counters	that	“the	substance	of	the	claim”	

was	raised	on	appeal,	but	once	again	Petitioner	pulls	language from	two	disparate	

claims	and	attempts	to	pass	them	off	as	the	claim	now	asserted.		First,	he	cites	his	

claim	that	counsel	failed	to	protect	him	from	pretrial	publicity	on	page	10	of	his	Rule	

32	brief,	which	makes	no	mention	of	financial	limitations.		(R.	Vol.	22	Tab	R-55	at	

10.)		Next,	he	cites	his	argument	on	page	66	of	the	same	brief,	in	support	of	his	claim	

that	the	trial	court’s	discovery	rulings	deprived	him	of	the	fair	trial.		(Id. at	66.)	One	

of	the	rulings	cited	was	the	Court’s	denial	of	his	motion	for	funds	to	conduct	a	

survey	regarding	the	effects	of	pretrial	publicity.		No	powers	of	legal	intuition	are	

strong	enough	to	decipher	one	claim	from	these	two	wholly	unrelated	assertions	set	

apart	by	more	than	50	pages.		This	claim	was	not	exhausted	and	is,	therefore,	

procedurally	defaulted.

Claim	A7:		Petitioner	was	Deprived	of	his	Right	to	a	Fair	Trial	by	an	

Impartial	Jury	by	Defense	Counsel’s	Failure	to	Conduct	a	Proper	Voir	

Dire	and	by	Defense	Counsel’s	Failure	to	Question	Prospective	Jurors	

About	Racial	Bias

Respondent	argues	that	this	claims	is	partially	defaulted	in	that	certain	

factual	averments	set	forth	in	support	of	this	claim	were	not	raised	fully	exhausted.		

Specifically,	Respondent	asserts	that	the	facts	asserted	in	paragraphs	73	and	74	

were	not	raised	in	either	Amended	Rule	32	Petition	or	in	the	Rule	32	appeal	and	

that	the	facts	asserted	in	paragraph	76	were not	asserted	in	the	Rule	32	appeal.	

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Respondent	is	partially	correct.	 In	paragraph	73,	Petitioner	asserts	that	counsel	was	

ineffective	because	he	failed	“to	make	a	diligent	examination	of	the	venire	pool prior	

to	jury	selection	in	support	of	a	Batson challenge”	and	was	unable to	ask	

particularized	questions related	to	the	state’s	proffered	explanations	for	striking	

jurors.		Both	of	these	assertions	were	raised	in	the	Amended	Rule	32	Petition	(R.	Vol.	

8	Tab	R-48	¶¶	48	&	49)	and	in	the Rule	32	appeal	(R.	Vol. 22	Tab	R-55	at 11-12)	and	

are	therefore	preserved	for	review.		

However,	paragraphs	74	and	76,	have	not	been	exhausted	and	are	

procedurally	defaulted.		First,	Petitioner	does	not	dispute	Respondent’s	claim	that	

Paragraph	76	is	procedurally	defaulted.13 Respondent	argues	that	the	substance	of	

paragraph	74	was	raised	in	the	Amended	Rule	32	Petition	and	in	the	Rule	32	appeal.		

In	that	paragraph,	Petitioner	assets that	defense	counsel	was	unable	to	effectively	

empanel	an	impartial	jury	due	to	the	trial	court’s	unreasonable	time	limitations	on	

voir	dire	and	the	court’s	refusal	to	allow	sequestered	questioning	of	prospective	

jurors.		But	those	factual	assertions	were not	related	to	any	ineffective	assistance	of	

counsel	claim	in	the	Rule	32	proceedings.		Although	included	in	both	the	Amended	

Rule	32	Petition	and	in	the	Rule	32	appellate	brief,	these	assertions	were	raised	in	

support	of	Petitioner’s	claim	that	the	trial court	violated	his	right	to	a	fair	trial.		(R.	

Vol. 8	Tab	R-48	¶¶	114-16;	R.	Vol.	22	Tab	R-55	at	58-59.)		

Claim	A9: Financial	Limitations	placed	on	Defense	Counsel	Denied	

Defense	Counsel	Sufficient	Resources	to	Effectively	Represent	

Petitioner	Before	Trial

																																																							 13 That	paragraph	alleges	that	“[d]efense	counsel	allowed	a	juror	with	fixed	opinions	

about	the	case	to	remain	on	the	panel.”

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The	question	presented	is	whether	paragraph	85--which	asserts	that	defense	

counsel,	due	to	lack	of	funds,	was	“unable	to	investigate	[Petitioner’s]	background	to	

discover	and	offer	evidence	of	[his]	drug	and	alcohol	use	on	the	night	of	the	crime

[to	negate	intent]”--is	procedurally	defaulted.		Petitioner	admits	that	this	factual	

basis	was	never	specifically	raised	in	state	court	but,	citing	Vasquez	v.	Hillery,	474	

U.S.	254	(1986),	argues	that	the	inclusion	of	additional	facts	in	support	of	an	

otherwise	exhausted	claim	does	not	preclude	habeas	review.	 In	that	case,	however,	

the	federal	court	had	requested	additional	evidence	regarding	the	grand	jury’s	racial	

makeup	which,	in	turn,	was	related	to	the prisoner’s	“equal	protection	challenge	to	

the	grand jury	that	indicted	him.”		Id. 474	U.S.	at	256.	 The	Supreme	Court	rejected	

the	state’s	objection	on	exhaustion	grounds,	stating:	“We	have	never	held	that	

presentation	of	additional	facts	to	the	district	court,	pursuant	to	that	court's	

directions,	evades	the	exhaustion	requirement	when	the	prisoner	has	presented	the	

substance	of	his	claim	to	the	state	courts.”		Id. 474	U.S.,	257-58.	

These	are	not	merely	new	facts supporting	a	claim	presented	to	the	state	

court.		This is an	entirely	new claim.	 The	basis of	Petitioner’s	financial	

limitations/ineffective	assistance	before	trial	claim in	state	court	was	counsel’s	

failure	to	obtain	and	present	a	firearms	expert	(regarding	the	sensitivity	of	the	

trigger)	and	a	medical	expert	(regarding	the	medical	condition	of	his	arm)	both	of	

which	were	relevant	to	his	claim	that	the	gun	discharged	accidentally.		(R. Vol.	Tab	

R-55	at 13-16.)		Counsel’s	alleged	failure	to	discover	and	present	evidence	of	drug	

and	alcohol	abuse	on	the	night	of	the	crime	does	not	constitute	“additional	facts”	in	

support	of	counsel’s	alleged	failure	to	obtain	expert	testimony.		The	state	court	did	

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not	have	a	full	and	fair	opportunity	to	consider	this	new	rendition	of	Petitioner’s	

ineffective	assistance	of	counsel	claim.		Thus,	Petitioner’s	claim	that	counsel’s	failure	

to	discover	and	present	evidence	of	Petitioner’s	drug	and	alcohol	use	amounted	to	

ineffective	assistance	is	unexhausted	and	is	procedurally	barred.		The	remainder	of	

Claim	A9	has	been	exhausted	and	is	not procedurally	barred.

Claim	A10:		Petitioner	was	Deprived	of	his	Right	to	a	Fair	Trial	by	an	

Impartial	Jury	by	Defense	Counsel’s	Failure	to	Protect	his	Constitutional	

Rights	During	the	Trial

Within	this	claim,	the	Petition	alleges	a	laundry	list--twenty-four	separate	

instances--of	ineffective	assistance	of	counsel	at	trial.		Respondent	asserts	that	none	

of	these	specific	instances	are	exhausted	because	they	were	not	fully	presented	for	

review	at	the	Rule	32	stage—some	because	they	were	not	raised	in	the	either	the	

Amended	Rule	32	Petition	or	on	appeal	and	others	because	they	were	not	raised	on	

appeal.		Petitioner	insists	that	the	issues	were	raised	and	exhausted	and points	to	

his	Rule 32	appellate	brief.		But,	once	again,	Petitioner	attempts	to	satisfy	the	

exhaustion	requirement	by	pointing	to	general	legal	principles	asserted	in	state	

court	along	with	“’makeshift	needles	in	the	haystack	of	the	state	court	record.’”	

Kelley,	377	F.3d	at	1345	(quoting	Martens	v.	Shannon,	836	F.2d	715,	717	(1st Cir.	

1988)).		

Upon	careful	review	of	the	pleadings,	the	Court	concludes	that	two	of	these	

subclaims	have	been	exhausted	and	are,	therefore,	preserved	for	review.		Petitioner	

did	argue	in	his	Rule	32	appeal	that	“[d]efense	counsel	failed	to	timely	interject	

appropriate	objections	at	trial,	thereby	resulting	in	prejudicial	and	improper	

statements	by	the	prosecution	to	the	jury.”	(R.	Vol.	22	Tab	R-55	at 21.)		Although	no	

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supporting	evidence	was	discussed,	the	brief	noted	that	“[t]hese	omissions	were	

described	in	the	Rule	32	Petition	at	v1	pp.	34-38.”		In	other	words,	the	appellate	

brief	incorporated	by	specific reference	certain	claims	asserted	in	the	Amended	Rule	

32	Petition.		However,	only	three	guilt-phase	omissions	by	counsel	were	asserted	in	

the	cited	pages	of	the	Amended	Rule	32	Petition, and	only	two	of	those	are	

reasserted	in	the	federal	petition.		The	first	is	counsel’s	failure	to	object	to	the	State’s	

misstatement	of	the	law,	implying	that	the	burden	of	proof	was	on	the	Defendant	by	

stating	that intent	was	inferred.		(R.	Vol.	8	Tab	R-48	at	35.)		This	claim	is	equivalent	

to	the	subclaim	asserted	in	paragraph	95	of	the	federal	petition,	which	alleges that	

counsel	rendered	ineffective	assistance	by	“fail[ing]	to	object	to	the	State’s	

mischaracterization	of.	.	.	the	law	regarding	intent.”14 (Pet. ¶	95.)		The	second	

omission	incorporated	by	reference	into	the	Rule	32	appellate	brief	was	counsel’s	

failure	to	object	to	Biblical	quotations	made	by	the	prosecutor.		This	claim	is	nearly	

identical	to	paragraph	102	of	the	federal	petition	which	alleges	that	“[d]efense	

counsel	failed	to	object	to	the	State’s	citation	to	biblical	authority	or	religious	duty.”		

(Pet. ¶	102.)	

The	Court	finds	that	the	two	subclaims	cited	above,	found	in	paragraphs	95	

and	102	of	the	federal	petition,	are	exhausted	and	are	not procedurally	barred.		The	

remaining	guilt-phase	subclaims	set	forth	in	section	A10	have	not	been	exhausted	

and	are,	therefore,	procedurally	barred.

																																																							 14 This	paragraph	also	asserts	that	counsel	“failed	to	object	to	the	State’s	

mischaracterization	of	[Petitioner’s]	testimony.”		(Id.)		That	aspect	of	this	subclaim	

was	not	a	part	of	the	state	record	cited	and	is,	therefore,	not	exhausted	and	is	

procedurally	barred.

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CLAIM	A13:		Petitioner	was	Deprived	of	his	Right	to	a	Fair	Trial	by	an	

Impartial	Jury	by	the	Cumulative	Effect	of	Defense	Counsel’s	Errors

Petitioner sets	forth	two	alternative	responses	to	Respondent’s	argument	

that	this	claim	is	unexhausted.		First,	Petitioner	argues that	an	assertion	of	

cumulative	error	is	a	legal	argument,	not	an	independent	claim,15 and	therefore	

exhaustion	is	not	required.		Numerous	courts	have	rejected	this	argument.		See,	e.g.,	

Wooten	v.	Kirkland,	540	F.3d	1019,	1025	(9th Cir.	2008)	(raising	a	number	of	errors	

“does	not	automatically	require	the	court	to	consider	whether	the	cumulative	effect	

of	the	alleged	errors	prejudiced	the	petitioner”);	Harris	v.	Estelle,	487 F.2d	1293,	

1298	(5th Cir.	1974)	(dismissing,	for	failure	to	exhaust,	claim	that	cumulative	effect	

of	cumulative	effect	of	all	constitutional	errors	denied	him	due	process);	accord

Greene	v.	Cooper,	2013	WL	1567444,	*8	n.8	(W.D.	La.	Feb.	20,	2013)	(applying	

exhaustion	requirement	to	aggregate	effect	of	ineffective	assistance	of	counsel	

claim);	Moore	v.	Quarterman,	526	F.Supp.2d	654,	710	(W.D.	Tex.	2007)	(applying	

exhaustion	requirement	to	ineffective	assistance/cumulative	errors claim);	cf.	

McCormick	v.	Six,	306	Fed.Appx.	424	(10th Cir.	2009)	(denying	COA	and	discerning	

no	error	in	trial	court’s	finding	that	petitioner	failed	to	exhaust	claim	of	cumulative	

error	of	trial	counsel	claim).		This	Court,	too,	finds	that	an	ineffective	assistance	

claim	based	on	cumulative	error	is	a	separate	claim	that	must	be	presented	to	the	

state	court	for	one	full	round	of	review.

Petitioner	argues,	alternatively,	that	he	did	present	this	claim	to	the	state	

court	for	review	and	points	to	the	following	statement	in	his	Rule	32	appellate	brief:

																																																							 15 This	argument	begs	the	question:		If	it	is	not	a	separate	claim,	why	was	it	

presented	as	one	in	the	Petition?

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When	the	record	in	this	case	is	viewed	in	its	entirety	– from	the	pretrial	transfer	and	youthful	offender	hearings,	through	the	trial,	and	

finally	the	penalty	phase	– the	conclusion is	in	escapable:		counsel’s	

abysmal	representation	of	Gary	Hart	denied	him	of	his	constitutional	

right	to	counsel	during	trial.

(R.	Vol.	22	Tab	R-55	at	6.)		Even	assuming	the	inclusion	of	that	argument	could	be	

considered	an	ineffective	assistance	claim	based	on	cumulative	errors,16 it	does	not	

satisfy	the	exhaustion	requirement.		 The	issue was	not	raised	in	the	Amended	Rule	

32	petition	and,	therefore,	was	not	preserved	for	state	appellate	review.		Moody	v.	

State,	95	So.	3d	827,	854	(Ala.	Crim.	App.	2011)	(Rule	32	argument	not	raised	in	

state	circuit	court	“not	properly	before	[appellate	court]	for	review”).		In	conclusion,	

Petitioner’s	ineffective	assistance	claim	based	on	the	cumulative	effect	of	defense	

counsel’s errors	is	a	claim,	not	merely	a	legal	argument.		As	such,	it	is	procedurally	

barred	because	Petitioner	failed	to	exhaust	this claim	in	state	court.

Claim	B:		Mr.	Hart	Was	Improperly	Denied	Treatment	as	a	Youthful	

Offender

Respondent	argues	that	this	claim	is	partially	defaulted. Specifically,	

Respondent	argues	that	Petitioner	failed	to	exhaust	that	portion	of	the	claim	found	

in	paragraph	128,	which	states:

The	admission	of	prejudicial	hearsay	testimony	at	[the	

Youthful	Offender]	hearing	unfairly	deprived	[Petitioner]	[of]	a	

meaningful	opportunity	to	avail	himself	of	Alabama’s	youthful	

offender	laws	and	violated	[his]	Constitutional	rights	to	confrontation	

and	to	avoid	self-incrimination.			The	trial	court	improperly	denied	

[Petitioner’s]	challenge	to	the	propriety	of	the	court’s	use	of	two	

pieces	of	unreliable	hearsay	testimony	contained	in	Gary’s	youthful	

offender	report	admitted	at	his	youthful	offender	hearing.		[T]his	

																																																							 16 Whether	it	was	transparently	presented	to	the	state	appellate	court	as	a	separate	

claim	is	arguable.		The	state	court	did	not	interpret	it	as	such.		Moreover,	the	

statement	reads	more	like	a	dramatic	introductory	paragraph	rather	than	a	separate	

ineffective	assistance	of	counsel	claim.	

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report	included	the	double	hearsay	statement	of	Dr.	Catlin,	Gary’s	

former	school	principal...		Dr.	Catlin	expressly	testified	at	the	Rule	32	

hearing	that	he	had	no	recollection	of	[this	statement]	and	that	[the	

statement]	was	inconsistent	with	his	opinion	of	[Petitioner].

(Pet.,	Doc.	1,	¶	128.)		Petitioner	argues	that	this	claim	was	raised	on	direct	appeal,	

before	both	the	Alabama	Court	of	Criminal	Appeals	and	the	Alabama	Supreme	Court	

and	cites	to	portions	of	briefs	submitted	to	each	court.		However,	the	cited	portions	

of	these	briefs	cited	do	not	support	Petitioner’s	claim.		Neither	mentions	hearsay	

testimony	introduced	at	the	Youthful	Offender	hearing.		Both	appellate	briefs	do	

make	an	argument	regarding	hearsay	in	the	Youthful	Offender	report,	but	the	

evidence	cited	as	hearsay	is	not	the	same	evidence	that	Petitioner	relies	on	here.		On	

appeal,	Petitioner	argued that	the	psychological	evaluation	appended	to	the	report	

amounted	to	inadmissible	hearsay.	(R.	Vol. 5 Tab	R-32	at	63-65;	Vol.	6	Tab	R-32	at

98.)		Here,	Petitioner	argues	that	the	statement	of	his	former	high	school	principal	

amounted	to	hearsay.		The	legal	argument	may	be	the	same,	but	the	factual	basis	

clearly	is	not.		Consequently,	Petitioner	has	failed	to	exhaust	the	portion	of	Claim	B	

found	in	paragraph	128,	and	that	claim	is	procedurally	defaulted.		The	remainder	of	

Claim	B	is	ripe	for	review	on	the	merits.

Claim	F:		Prosecutorial	Misconduct	Deprived	Petitioner	of	a	Fair	Trial	in	

Violation	of	the	United	States	Constitution

Respondent	initially	argued	that	this	claim	was partially	defaulted	in	that	

three	of	the	factual	or	legal	bases	asserted	in	support	of	this claim—found	in	

paragraphs	158,	163	&	167--have	not	been	exhausted	because	they	were	not	raised	

on	direct	appeal.	 However,	Respondent subsequently	abandoned	some	of	those	

arguments	after	Petitioner cited	portions	of	the	record	that	contradicted	

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Respondent’s	assertions.		First, Petitioner’s	prosecutorial	misconduct	claim	in	

paragraph	158	of	the	Petition-- that	he	was	deprived	of	a fair	trial	because	“[t]he	

State	used	its	peremptory	challenges	in	a	discriminatory	manner,	depriving	[Hart]	

of	his	right	to	be	tried	by	a	jury	of	his	peers”-- was raised	on	direct	appeal	as	a

prosecutorial	misconduct	claim. (R.	Vol.	5,	Tab	R-32	at	83.)		Respondent	now	admits	

as	much.17			Similarly,	Respondent	concedes	that	the	prosecutorial	misconduct	claim	

asserted	in	paragraph	163—that	the	State	participated	in	the	investigation—was	

also	raised	on	direct	appeal.		

Finally,	Respondent	argues	that	the	claim	in	paragraph	167—that	“[t]he	

State’s	repeated	remarks	regarding	the	age	of	the	victim	were	an	attempt	to	

prejudice	the	jury	and	‘infect	the	trial	with	unfairness’”--has	not	been	exhausted	

because	it	was	not	raised	in	an	identical	manner	in	state	court.		When	a	claim	is	

presented	in	such	a	way	that	“a	reasonable	reader	would	have	understood”	the	

substance	of	that	claim,	the	exhaustion	requirement	is	satisfied.		Williams	v.	Allen,	

542	F.3d	1326,	1346	(11th Cir.	2008).			On	direct	appeal,	Petitioner	cited	the	

prosecutor’s	repeated	remarks	about	the	age	of	the	victim	as	evidence	of	

prosecutorial	misconduct	in	violation	of	the	United	States	Constitution.		(R.	Vol.	5	

Tab	R-32 at	85;	Vol.	6,	R-38	at	120.)		That	was	more	than	sufficient	to	raise	the	

substance	of	the	claim.

																																																							 17 However,	in	his	reply	brief,	Respondent	argues	that	the	citation	to	Trevino	v.	Texas,	

503	U.S.	562	(1992)	should	be	disregarded	because	it	was	not	cited	in	the	direct	

appeal.		A	case	citation,	standing alone,	is	not	a	claim.		The	claim	itself—that	the	use	

of	peremptory	challenges	amounted	to	prosecutorial	misconduct	in	violation	of	the	

United	States	Constitution—was	raised	on	direct	appeal.

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Claim	J:		The	Trial	Court’s	Failure	to	Properly	Instruct	the	Jury	on	Lesser	

Included	Offenses	at	the	Guilt/Innocent	Phase	Violated	the	Sixth,	Eight	

and	Fourteenth Amendments	of	the	United	States	Constitution

Initially, Respondent	argued	that	five	subclaims	were	partially	defaulted,	but	

that	number has	been	reduced	to	two.		The	first,	found	in	paragraph	215,	is	that	the	

trail	court’s	“failure	to	explain	the	difference	between	felony	murder	and	a	capital	

offense	with	regard	to	the	issue	of	intent”	resulted	in	an	ambiguous	instruction.		(Pet.

¶	215.)	This	ambiguous	instruction,	according	to	the	Petition,	violated	Petitioner’s	

due	process	rights	because there	was	a	reasonable	likelihood	that	the	jury	applied	

the	challenged	instruction	in	a	way	the	violates	the	Constitution.		(Id.)		The	second,	

found	in	paragraph	223,	is	that	the	trial	court’s	failure	to	instruct	the	jury	on	

reckless	manslaughter	violated	Petitioner’s	constitutional	rights.		(Id. ¶	223.)

While	the	facts	underlying	both	claims	were	set	out	in	Petitioner’s	direct	

appeal,	neither	was	asserted	as	a	federal	constitutional	violation	and	no	such	claims	

reasonably	could	be	gleaned	from	the	state	court	record.		Petitioner’s	direct	appeal	

brief	to	the	Alabama	Supreme	Court	cited	only state	law	in	support	of	the	claim	that	

Petitioner	was	entitled	to	a	reckless	manslaughter	instruction.		(R.	Vol.	6	Tab	R-38	at

97-98.)		With	respect	to	the	felony	murder/capital	murder	charges	and	the	issue	of	

intent,	Petitioner	argued	on	direct	appeal	that	the	felony	murder	charge	was	infirm	

because	it	did	not	“explicitly	explain”	that	the	difference	between	felony	murder	and	

capital	murder	was	intent.		That	argument	was	contained	in	a	footnote	to	an	

argument	that	the	trial	court	should	have	given	a	lesser	included	instruction	on	

reckless	murder.	Neither	an	objection	to	jury	instructions	on	state	law	ground	nor	a	

potential	claim	hidden	in	a	footnote	and	citing	no	law	could	have	put	the state	court	

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on	notice	that	Petitioner	was	attempting	to	raise	a	federal	constitutional	violation.	

As	the Eleventh	Circuit	has	held	that	“[t]he	exhaustion	doctrine	requires	a	habeas	

applicant	to	do	more	than	scatter	some	makeshift	needles	in	the	haystack	of	the	

state	court	record.”		McNair	v.	Campbell,	416	F.3d	1291,	1303	(11th Cir.	2005).		The	

subclaims	found	in	paragraphs	215	and	223	are	procedurally	defaulted;	the	

remaining	subclaims	are	ripe	for	review.

Claim	K:		Petitioner	Was	Denied	a	Fair	Trial	By	an	Impartial	Jury	Due	to	

Constitutional	Violations	During	Voir	Dire

The	Petition	asserts	several	subclaims	under	this	heading.		Respondent	

argues that	some	of	these	subclaims	are,	in	part, procedurally	defaulted because	

those	claims	were	not	exhausted.		Each	of	these	is	discussed	below.

Subclaim	1:		Improper	and	Prejudicial	Use	of	Peremptory	Challenges

Respondent	asserts	that	the	following	two	sentences	of	one	paragraph	of	this	

subclaim	is	procedurally	barred:

Without	an	adequate	voir	dire,	the	trial	court’s	responsibility	to	

remove	prospective	jurors	who	will	not	be	able	to	impartially	follow	

instructions	and	evaluate	evidence	cannot	be	fulfilled.		See	Conners	v.	

United	States,	158	U.S.	408,	413	(1895).		Yet,	despite	these	prevailing	

Constitutional	interpretations,	Gary	was	still	denied	the	opportunity	

to	be	tried	in	front	of	an	impartial	jury.	

(Pet. ¶	224.) 18		This	is	a	broad	statement,	and	the	specific	factual	basis	for	the	claim	

is	not	clear.		However,	the	direct	appeal	did	raise	a	constitutional	challenge	based	on	

restrictions	placed	on	voir	dire	by	the	trial	judge.		(R.	Vol.	5	Tab	R-32	at	76-77;	Vol.	6	

																																																							 18 Respondent	initially	argued	that	the	entire	subclaim	was	procedurally	barred	but	

subsequently	limited	his	argument	to	the	above-quoted	sentences.

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Tab	R-38	at	11-112.)		To	the	extent	this	subclaim	encompasses	that	challenge, it	has	

been	exhausted	and,	therefore,	is	not	procedurally	barred.

Subclaim	3: State’s	Proffered	Race	Neutral	Explanations	for	Strikes

In	order	to	understand	the	exhaustion	issue	with	respect	to	this	claim,	a	brief	

review	of	Batson	v.	Kentucky, 476	U.S.	79	(1986),	is	necessary.		Batson	set	forth	the	

framework	for	determining	whether	a	prosecutor’s	exercise	of	a	peremptory	

challenge	violates	the	Equal	Protection	Clause.		 This	is	a	three-step	process.		First,	

the	defendant	bears	the	burden	of	establishing	a	prima	facie	case	of	purposeful	

discrimination.		Id. at	94.	Next, the	burden	shifts	to	the	state	to	proffer	a	race	neutral	

explanation	for	his	strikes.		Id. at	97.		 Finally,	the	court	must	determine	whether	the	

defendant	has	met	his	burden	of	proving	purposeful	discrimination.		Id. at	98.		The	

second	step	of	the	inquiry	requires	the	trial	court	to	determine	only	whether	the	

explanation	offered	is,	on	its	face,	racially	neutral.		Hightower	v.	Terry, 459	F.3d	1066,	

1073	(11th Cir.	2006).		In	contrast,	the	final step	(step	three)	involves	evaluating	the	

“the	plausibility	of	that	reason	in	light	of	all	evidence	bearing	on	it.”	Id.			

Respondent	contends	that	Petitioner’s	Batson	argument	in	the	last	half	of	

paragraph	233	has	not	been	exhausted.		The	beginning	of	that	paragraph	asserts	

that	there	is	no	evidence	to	support	the	state’s	assertion	that	it	struck	two	

prospective	jurors—Haygood	and	Thompson—“because	of	the	former’s	demeanor	

and	the	latter’s	unemployment.”		There	is	no	dispute	that	this	portion	of	the	claim	is	

exhausted;	it	was	asserted	on	direct	appeal	as	a	Batson step	three	claim.		 The	issue	

arises	with	the	second	half	of	paragraph	233,	which	turn	this	into	a	different	claim--

a	Batson step	two	claim.		It	does	so	by	citing	cites United	States	v.	Horsley,	864	F.2d	

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1543,	1546	(11th Cir.	1989), for	the	proposition	that	vague	general	assertions do not	

suffice	as	race	neutral	explanations	to	rebut	a	defendant’s	prima	facie	case	of	

discrimination.		In	state	court,	Petitioner	argued	only	that	the	reasons	for	striking	

Haygood	and	Thompson	amounted	to	a	Batson step	three	claim	(because	the	

reasons	were	not	plausible)	and	never asserted	a	Batson	step	two	claim	(that	the	

reasons	were	insufficient	to	rebut	a	prima	facie	case)	based	on	these	facts.	

Consequently,	the	Court	finds	that	the	Batson step	two	claim	asserted	in	the	last	two

sentences	of	paragraph	233	has not	been	exhausted	and	is procedurally	defaulted.

In	paragraphs	235	through	238	(also	part	of	subclaim	3),	Petitioner	asserts	

constitutional	claims	arising	from	the	alleged	underrepresentation	of	AfricanAmericans	and	women	on	the	jury	venire.		Petitioner	does	not	contest	Respondent’s	

assertion	that	these claims	were	not	presented	to	the	state	court	for	review.		The	

claims	asserted	in	these	paragraphs	are	procedurally	barred for	failure	to	exhaust.

Subclaim	4:		Improper	&	Prejudicial	Voir	Dire/Right	to	Trial	by	Impartial	

Jury

This	claim	consists	of	one	sentence	(paragraph	240).		Petitioner does	not	

contest	Respondent’s	assertion	that	this	claim	was	not	presented	to	the	state	court	

for	review.		It	is,	therefore,	procedurally	barred.

Subclaim	5:		Exclusion	of	Prospective	Jurors	Based	on	Capital	Punishment	

Beliefs

In	this	subclaim,	Petitioner	asserts	that	the	prosecution	improperly	

questioned	jurors	regarding	their	views	on	capital	punishment,	then	used	the	

answers	to	exclude	prospective	jurors	for	cause.		Respondent	argues	that	Petitioner	

failed	to	exhaust	a	portion	of	this	subclaim	set	forth	in	paragraphs	241-43.		Contrary	

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to	Respondent’s	argument,	the	substance	of these	paragraphs	was	raised	on	direct	

appeal.19		(Vol.	6,	R.	38	at	112-15;	Vol. 5,	R.	32	at	78-79.)		The	challenged	portions	of	

this	subclaim	are	not	procedurally	defaulted.

Claim	L:		Sufficiency	of	the	Evidence

Respondent	asserts	that	three	portions	of	this	claim	are	procedurally	barred	

because “[t]he	factual	and	legal	averments	contained	in	paragraphs	254	(third	

Sentence),	257	(second	sentence),	and	258-59	(to	the	extent	that	Hart	argues	

anything	other	than	because	the	instructions	violated	Cage	v.	Louisiana,	498	U.S.	39	

(1990),	it	violated	Winship)	were	not	presented	to	the	state	courts.	.	.	on	direct	

appeal.”		(Resp’t’s	Br.	22,	Doc.	28.)			 To	be	clear,	paragraphs	258-59	have	been	

exhausted	and	are	not	procedurally	barred.20		The	third	sentence	of	paragraph	254	

is	not	procedurally	barred	because	it	was	asserted	verbatim	on	direct	appeal.21		

Finally,	the	substance	of	the	claim	asserted	in	the	second	sentence	of	paragraph	257	

is	merely	a	more	specific	description	of	the	shortcomings	of	the	trial	court’s	

instruction	on	the	element	of	intent.		That	claim	was	presented	to	the	state	court	on	

																																																							 19 Respondent’s	primary	objection	is	that	Petitioner	did	not	rely	on	Morgan	v.	Illinois,	

504	U.S.	719	(1992),	in	his	direct	appeal.			This	omission	is	quite	understandable	

since	Morgan	was	decided	while	this	case	was	on	direct	appeal	and	after	after	the	

briefs	was	filed.		

20 If	Petitioner	attempts	to	argue	the	assertions	made	in	these	paragraphs	to	

support	a	claim	that	has	not	been	exhausted,	then	Respondent may	reassert	the	

exhaustion/procedural	bar	defense	as	to	this	claim.

21 Confusion	has	arisen	because	Respondent	identified	the	alleged	unexhausted	

claim	as	“the	third	sentence”	of	paragraph	254	without	any	reference	to	the	

substance	of	the	sentence.		Petitioner	responded	by	quoting	the	third	sentence	of	

paragraph	254	and	pointing	to	the	portions	of	the	direct	appeal	containing	that	

sentence.		In	his	reply	brief,	Respondent	asserts	that	the	Petitioner	has	actually	

quoted	the	second	sentence	of	paragraph	254.		It	is	Respondent	who	is	mistaken.		

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direct	appeal	and	is,	therefore,	exhausted.		(R.	Vol.	5	Tab R-32	at	107;	R.	Vol.	6	Tab	

R-28	at 142.)

Claim	N:		The	State	Suppressed	Evidence	in	Violation	of	Brady	v.	

Maryland

Petitioner	claims	that	the	state	violated	Brady	v.	Maryland	by	failing	to	

disclose	a	post-arrest	statement	made	by	Petitioner	on	the	night of	the	shooting.		At	

the	Rule	32	hearing, Major	Lester	Hargrove	of	the	Mobile	Police	Department	

testified	that	he	was	in	charge	of	the	criminal	investigation.		On	the	night Petitioner	

was	arrested,	Hargrove	went	into	the	holding	room	at	police	headquarters	to	take	

Petitioner	a	pair	of	shoes	that	he	had requested.		Hargrove’s	testimony	regarding	his	

interaction	with	Petitioner	was	as	follows:

MR.	JASKOWIAK:		Did	Gary	tell	you	anything	about	the	crime	as	

far	as	his	intent	to	shoot	or	pull	the	trigger	on	the weapon?

MAJOR	HARGROVE:		Only	that:		I	didn’t	mean	to	shoot	that	guy.		

That’s	all	he	said.

(R.	Vol. 13	at	187.)

Respondent	argues	that	this	claim	is	procedurally	barred	because	it	was	not	

raised	on	direct	appeal	or	in	the	Rule	32	petition.		Further,	Respondent	points	out	

that	the	claim	was	raised	in	the	Rule	32	appeal	but	was	denied	based	on	procedural	

default.		

The	Alabama	Court	of	Criminal	Appeals	addressed	the	Brady	claim	as	

follows:

The	appellant	contends	that	the	State’s	suppression	of	

favorable	and	material	evidence,	in	violation	of	Brady	v.	Maryland,	373	

U.S.	83	(1963),	violated	his	federal	and	state	constitutionals	rights.		He	

argues	that	the	State	suppressed	evidence	of	his	statement	to	a	police	

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officer	on	the	night	of	the	murder	acknowledging	that	he	did	not	

intend	to	kill	the	victim.

This	argument,	however,	has	been	raised	for	the	first	time	on	

appellate	review.		Because	the	argument	was	never	before	the	trial	

court,	it	is	procedurally	precluded	from	appellate	review.		McNair	v.	

State,	supra;	Thompson	v.	State,	supra.

V.	22,	R.	59	at	13.		

The	state	appellate	court’s	ruling	on	procedural	default	is	conclusive.	22

“[F]ederal	habeas	corpus	principles	[are]	designed	to	prevent	federal	courts	from	

interfering	with	a	State's	application	of	its	own	firmly	established,	consistently	

followed,	constitutionally	proper	procedural	rules.	.	.	.	Those	principles	have	long	

made	clear	that	a	conviction	that	rests	upon	a	defendant's	state	law	‘procedural	

default’ (for	example,	the	defendant's	failure	to	raise	a	claim	of	error	at	the	time	or	

in	the	place	that	state	law	requires),	normally	rests	upon	‘an	independent	and	

adequate	state	ground.’”		Trevino	v.	Thaler,	___	U.S.	___133	S.	Ct.	1911,	1917, 185	L.	Ed.	

2d	1044	(2013).

Petitioner	alternatively	argues	that	he	can	overcome	the	procedural	default	

by	demonstrating	cause	for	and	prejudice	from	his	failure	to	raise	the	Brady

violation	in	the	Rule	32	petition.		He	contends	that	“the	‘cause’	of	not	including	the	

claim	in	his	original petition	was	the	State’s	illegal	withholding	of	evidence”	and	that	

“[t]he	prejudice.	.	.,	the	absence	of	[a]	Brady	claim	is	obvious.”		(Pet’r’s	Br.	at	37	n.	6,	

Doc. 37.)		The	Court	need	not	consider	whether	Petitioner	has demonstrated	cause	

																																																							 22 In	disagreement	with	the	Court	of	Criminal	Appeals,	Petitioner	argues	that	the	

Brady claim	was	added	to	the	Rule	32	petition	after the	hearing	and	has	attached	a	

copy	of	a	letter	mailed	to	the	trial	court	along	with	a	copy	of	the	proposed

amendment	adding	the	Brady	claim.	(Exs.	A	&	B	to	Pet’r’s	Br.,	Doc.	37.)		Apparently,	

the	proposed amendment	did	not	become	part	of	the	record.	In	any	event,	

Petitioner’s	argument	is	a	challenge	to	the	state	law’s	procedural	default	ruling,	a	

ruling	this	Court	cannot	disturb.		See	Trevino,	133	S.Ct	at	1917.

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because	he	clearly	cannot	prove	that	he	was	prejudiced	by	the	state’s	failure	to	

disclose	the	statement.		A	habeas	petitioner establishes	prejudice	for	failing	to	raise	

a	defaulted Brady	claim	by	convincing	the	court	“that	there	is	a	‘reasonable	

probability’	that	the	result	of	the	trial	would	have	been	different	if	the	suppressed	

[evidence] had	been	disclosed	to	the	defense.”		Crawford	v.	Head,	311	F.3d	1288,	

1328	(11th Cir.	2002).

There	is	no	reasonable	probability	of	a	different	result	here	because	the	

undisclosed	statement	would	not	have	been	admissible	at	trial.		“The	law	is	well	

settled	in	[Alabama]	that	[the]	self-serving	declarations	of	an	accused,	made	before	

or	after	the	offense	are	not	admissible	for	him	unless	they	are	part	of the	res	gestae.”		

Harrell	v.	State,	470	So.	2d	1303,	1306	(Ala.	Crim.	App.	1984).			Petitioner’s	

statement	would	not	qualify	as	part	of	the	res	gestae,	which	is	“broadly	[	]defined	as	

matter	incidental	to	the	main	fact	and	explanatory	thereof,	and	includes	acts	and	

words	which	are	so	closely	connected	therewith	as	to	constitute	a	part	of	the	

transaction.”		Moore	v.	State,	697	So.2d	800,	804.	(Ala.	Crim.	App.	1996)	(quoting	R.

Williams,	Williams	Alabama	Evidence	§ 139	(1967)(footnotes	omitted)).

Res	gestae	statements	are	admissible	as	an	exception	to	the	hearsay	rule	and	are	

considered	reliable	because	they	arise	from	“a	situation	which	presents	a	startling	

or	unusual	occurrence	sufficient	to	produce	a	spontaneous	and	instinctive	

reaction	.	.	.	made	under	such	circumstances	as	to	show	lack	of	forethought	or	

deliberate	design	in	the	formulation	of	their	content.”		Id.		An	accused’s	post-arrest	

exculpatory	statement	does	not	fall	within	this	exception,	as	demonstrated	by	a	

number	of	Alabama	cases.		See,	e.g.,	Kennedy	v.	State,	469	So.	2d	1333	(Ala.	Crim.	App.	

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1985)	(defendant’s	self-serving	statement	to	investigator	after	arrest	not	

admissible);	Miller	v.	State,	441	So.2d	1038	(Ala.	Crim	App.	1983)	(same).		Indeed,	

the	Alabama	Court	of	Criminal	Appeals	found	a	statement	to	be	inadmissible	under	

nearly	identical	circumstances.		In	Harrell	the	defendant	was	charged	with	capital	

murder	but	claimed	that	the	shooting	was	not	intentional.		The	trial	court	refused	to	

allow	into	evidence	the	defendant’s	post-arrest	statement	that	the	gun	accidentally	

discharged.		The	appellate	court	upheld	the	trial	court’s	ruling,	noting	the	statement	

“fit	the	classic	definition	of	hearsay.”		Harrell, 470	So.2d	at	1306.		This	claim	is	

procedurally	defaulted,	and	Petitioner	cannot	establish	prejudice	to	overcome	the	

procedural	default.

Conclusion

In	summary,	the	penalty	phase	claims	as	stated	in	the	original	petition	are	

moot due	to	the	resentencing.		Some	of	Petitioner’s	guilt	phase	claims	are	

procedurally	defaulted	and,	therefore,	due	to	be	dismissed.		

1. The	following	claims	are	dismissed	in	their	entirety:

• A2--Ineffective	assistance	of	counsel/pretrial	transfer	

hearing/financial	limitations

• A4--Ineffective	assistance	of	counsel/youthful	offender	

hearing/financial	limitations

• A6--Ineffective	assistance	of	counsel/insufficient	resources	to	protect	

petitioner	from	pretrial	publicity;	

• A13--Ineffective	assistance	of	counsel/cumulative	errors

• K4--Improper	and	prejudicial	voir	dire/right to	trial	by	impartial	jury

• N--Brady	violation

2. The	following	claims	are	dismissed	in	part:

• A7--Paragraphs	74	&	76

• A9—Paragraph	85

• A10—Paragraphs	90-94,	96-101,	and	103-113

• B—Paragraph	128

• J—Paragraphs	215	&	223

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• K3—Paragraphs	233	(last	two	sentences)	&	235-38

3. The	following	claims	remain	to	be	resolved	on	the	merits:

• A5

• A7—Paragraphs	70-73,	75-78

• A9—Paragraphs	86-89

• A10—Paragraphs	95	&	102

• B—Paragraphs	129-131

• D1

• E

• F

• J—Paragraphs	213-14	and	216-22

• K1

• K2

• K3--Paragraphs	230-32,	233	(first	two	sentences)	234	&	239

• K5

• K6

• L1-3

Finally,	the	Court	recognizes	that	the	Supreme	Court’s	decision	in	

Montgomery	v.	Louisiana,	141	So.3d	264,	cert.	granted (U.S.	March	20,	2015)	(No.	14-

280)	regarding	the	retroactive	application	of	Miller	v.	Alabama,	____	U.S.	____,	132	S.	

Ct.	2455,	2469	(2012),	could	have	an	impact	on	this	petition	for	habeas	relief.		

Therefore,	Stage	2	briefing	will	not	commence	until	that decision	is	rendered.		

Within	30	days	after	the	Supreme	Court	issues	its	opinion	in	Montgomery,	the	

parties	shall	submit	a	joint	proposed	briefing	schedule	for	resolving	the	remaining	

claims,	including,	if	applicable,	any	claims	to	be	raised based	on	Miller and	

Montgomery.

DONE and	ORDERED this	the	4th day	of	November,	2015.

s/Charles	R.	Butler,	Jr.

Senior	United	States	District	Judge

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