Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02559/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02559-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,

ANDREW R. LOPEZ,

Petitioner, No. CIV-S-02-2559 GEB KJM P 

vs.

WARDEN, CALIFORNIA STATE 

PRISON, CORCORAN, et al.,

 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a California prisoner proceeding with an application for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a prison disciplinary proceeding

which occurred in 2000 and resulted in petitioner’s losing ninety days of good conduct sentence

credit.

I. Standards For Granting Habeas Relief

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas corpus relief also is not available for any

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 In Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 1

held in a § 2254 action that “any independent opinions we offer on the merits of constitutional

claims will have no determinative effect in the case before us . . . At best, it is constitutional

dicta.” However, to the extent Bell stands for the proposition that a § 2254 petitioner may obtain

relief simply by showing that § 2254(d) does not preclude his claim, this court disagrees. Title

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) still requires that a habeas petitioner show that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution before he or she may obtain habeas relief. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71;

Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 773-75. 

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claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d)” or “AEDPA). See Ramirez v. Castro,

365 F.3d 755, 773-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court’s grant of habeas relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that petitioner was in custody in violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights and that § 2254(d) does not preclude relief); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003) (Supreme Court found relief precluded under § 2254(d) and therefore did

not address the merits of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim). Courts are not required to 1

address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on the ground

that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (overruling Van Tran v.

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000) in which the Ninth Circuit required district

courts to review state court decisions for error before determining whether relief is precluded by

§ 2254(d)). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show he is not precluded from obtaining relief

by § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

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 Petitioner indicates his claims were denied for failure to exhaust administrative 2

remedies at the Superior Court level. Pet. at consecutive page 5. (All subsequent citations to the

Petition are to consecutive page numbers.) Petitioner’s claims were denied without comment at

the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court. Id. Respondents concede that

petitioner exhausted state court remedies prior to filing suit. Answer at 3:26. 

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The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are

different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court does not apply a rule different from the

law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or unreasonably apply such law, if the state court simply

fails to cite or fails to indicate an awareness of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). 

The court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining

whether the law applied to a particular claim by the state courts was contrary to the law set forth

in the cases of the United States Supreme Court or whether an unreasonable application of such

law has occurred. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed, 538 U.S.

919 (2003). Where, as in this case, the state court fails to give any reasoning whatsoever in

support of the denial of a claim arising under Constitutional or federal law, the Ninth Circuit has 2

held that this court must perform an independent review of the record to ascertain whether the

state court decision was objectively unreasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th

Cir. 2003). In other words, the court assumes the state court applied the correct law, and

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 Petitioner asserts in his traverse that he did not receive the “written statement by the 3

fact-finders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action” to which he

was entitled. Traverse at 23. It is not appropriate to raise new claims in a traverse. Cacoperdo v.

Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, the written statement provided to

petitioner by the hearing officer at the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings complies with

Hill. See Answer, Ex. B. 

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analyzes whether the decision of the state court was based on an objectively unreasonable

application of that law. 

It is appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions to determine what law has

been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular

application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999). 

II. Arguments and Analysis

A. Cognizable Claims

Petitioner asserts a number of violations of law arising from the disciplinary

proceedings at issue. However, petitioner’s rights arising under federal law concerning prison

disciplinary proceedings that result in the loss of good conduct sentence credit are, generally

speaking, limited to the following:

1) Advance written notice of the charges;

2) An opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional

goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense;

3) A written statement by the fact-finder of the evidence relied on and the reasons

for the disciplinary action; and 

4) That the findings of the prison disciplinary board be supported by some

evidence in the record.

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).

The only cognizable claims the court gleans from petitioner’s habeas petition are a

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the disciplinary proceedings at issue, and

that petitioner’s right to call witnesses and present evidence in his defense was violated. Pet. 3

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at 4; Pet., Attach. at 7-10. 

Respondents suggest that this action should be dismissed because petitioner is

serving an indeterminate sentence of 17-years-to-life imprisonment and he does not challenge

any action of prison staff that would have an effect on the fact or length of his confinement. 

Answer at 6. Their argument is not well-taken. Respondents fail to point to anything indicating

that restoration of the 90 days of sentence credit taken away from petitioner at the disciplinary

proceedings at issue would have no effect on the length of petitioner’s sentence, for example, that

petitioner would not be for eligible for parole or actually released any sooner than he would

under the current circumstances.

B. Sufficiency Of The Evidence

On January 20, 2000, petitioner was assessed 90 days loss of sentence credit for

“Delaying A Peace Officer” following prisoner disciplinary proceedings. Pet., Ex. A at 4, 5. At

the hearing, the hearing officer indicated the finding of guilt as to the charge was based primarily

upon the following report submitted by Correctional Officer R. McKean:

On December 10, 1999, at approximately 1635 hours, while

working as “A4 Floor Officer #1" I was requested by “A-4 Control

Officer” McFarland to lock up Inmate Lopez . . . and Inmate

Norman . . . Prior to Officer McFarland asking me to assist him, I

overheard Officer McFarland instruct both inmates, via the “Public

Address System,” several times to lock it up as showers were

ended. As I came out of the building office, I observed both

Inmate Lopez and Norman talking with an inmate in cell #225 and

not paying any attention to the control officer’s instructions. I

proceeded up to the cell and instructed both inmates (Lopez and

Norman) to lock up as it was count time. Norman started toward

his cell, while Lopez stepped towards me and stopped in front of

me at a very close distance. Lopez then started arguing in a very

loud manner that he was talking to his brother and that he was not

a punk kid to be yelled at.

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Lopez further stated that us, meaning the officers, were not being

fair to the “Northern Hispanics” on showering and that he would

lock it up when he was ready. As I continued to talk with Lopez in

a calm manner, I could see that Lopez was very agitate[d]. Lopez

would continue to argue with me and at times taking steps toward

me even though I would back up one or two steps for my own

safety zone. Lopez continued to argue with clenched fists down to

his side and in somewhat of a “Bladed Stance” as if ready to fight. 

After seeing that this might possibly lead to a physical altercation, I

told Lopez to finish his conversation and meet me in my office. 

After a few moments Lopez came into my unit office and appeared

somewhat calmed down. At this time I explained to Lopez if 2 to 3

cells are let out we have 6 showers and give 10 minute showers. If

9 cells are let out (One Section), that we give 20 minutes for

showers. Lopez continued to argue that we (The officers) were

prejudice against “Northern Mexicans” and favoring other races by

allowing more time. Lopez refused to see any reasoning in the way

that we ran the “Shower Program.” During the course of my

conversation with Lopez, I told him that I expected no further

problems over the times on the showers and I told him there would

be no further episodes or displays that he put on today [December

10, 1999] as I did not want anyone injured over showers. I also

explained that I expected no further posturing that could lead to a

violent situation. As this conversation continued, Lopez, told me

that he had a federal lawsuit against CDC and that he was not

afraid of violence and if he had to he would resort to such actions if

he continued to be treated unfairly. 

Id. 

Under Title 15, California Code of Regulations, Section 3005(b), “[i]nmates . . .

must promptly and courteously obey written and verbal orders and instructions from department

staff . . .” Officer McKean’s report constitutes “some evidence” that petitioner delayed the

officer by failing to return to his cell when McKean ordered him to do so. Petitioner attacks the

credibility of Officer McKean in a number of respects. For example, he claims McKean was

retaliating against petitioner for a prisoner grievance petitioner had filed against McKean, and

that Officer McFarland was not actually working on December 10, 1999. Petitioner’s arguments

appear to presume this court can overturn the finding that he delayed a peace officer if significant

evidence suggests he did not. See Pet., Attach. at 11-12; Traverse at 3-6. This is not the case. 

As indicated above, the standard of review for this court is whether the finding of the hearing

officer can be supported by “some evidence.” Nothing before the court suggests Officer

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McKean’s report is so devoid of credibility as to render it patently unbelievable. See Hill, 472

U.S. at 455-56 (“[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”). Petitioner’s claim challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence presented at the prison disciplinary proceedings at issue must be

rejected. 

C. Witnesses

Petitioner alleges he was refused certain witnesses at his disciplinary hearing. 

Pet., Attach. at 4, ¶ 29. However, petitioner fails to point to any evidence indicating he ever

made a specific request to the hearing officer that certain witnesses appear live at the disciplinary

hearing, and that such a request was rejected. Rather, the hearing record indicates that Lopez was

given an opportunity to request the presence of witnesses at hearing, and did not. Pet., Ex. A at

4. The record also shows that petitioner was interviewed by an investigative employee before his

hearing. Id. at 5-7. When asked if he requested witnesses petitioner named inmates Richard

Norman and John Amaral. Id. at 8. In response to this, the hearing officer interviewed Norman

and Amaral. Id. at 8-9. A summary of those interviews was provided to the hearing officer in

the investigative report reviewed by the hearing officer before petitioner’s hearing. Based on

these facts, petitioner has not shown he was denied the right to present witnesses.

D. Evidence

Petitioner asserts that the hearing officer at his disciplinary hearing failed to

obtain certain records despite the fact that petitioner requested that the officer consider those

records. Petitioner requested that the hearing officer consider the daily log book from his

housing unit for December 9, 1999 through December 14, 1999. Pet., Ex. A at 7. According to

petitioner, these documents would show that “showers” did not end at 4:35 p.m. on December

10, 1999, nor was it “count time” then. Pet., Attach. at 6, ¶ 48. Petitioner also requested

employee assignment records for several officers including Officers McKean and McFarland for

December 10, 1999 through January 1, 2000. Pet., Ex. A at 7. Petitioner claims these documents

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would show that Officer McFarland was not the “A-4 Control Officer” on December 10, 1999. 

Pet., Attach. at 6, ¶ 48. 

Petitioner fails to show any reason why documents from dates other than

December 10, 1999 would have been helpful to his defense and such does not appear from the

record. He also fails to show any reason why employee assignment records for anyone other than

Officer McFarland would have helped his defense. That the hearing officer did not consider

these documents did not result in a violation of petitioner’s right to due process as petitioner does

not have a right to present irrelevant evidence. Pannell v. McBride, 306 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir.

2002). 

With respect to the employee assignment records as they pertain to Officer

McFarland on December 10, 1999 and the daily log book for petitioner’s housing unit for that

day, the court allowed petitioner to obtain these documents through discovery. July 20, 2006

Order at 8:19-9:14. It appears petitioner in fact did so. See Resp’ts’ December 13, 2006 Request

To Expand The Record. Petitioner fails to explain how the documents obtained support any

aspect of his habeas application including his assertion there was not sufficient evidence

presented at the disciplinary proceedings at issue for this court to sustain the finding of the

hearing officer. Respondents have provided the court with at least some of the documents they

turned over to petitioner. Id.; see also Order filed Sept. 28, 2007 (expanding record with

documents provided). The court has reviewed those documents and finds they contain nothing

that undermines any aspect of the January 20, 2000 findings of the hearing officer. Therefore,

the hearing officer’s failure to consider the evidence did not violate petitioner’s right to present

evidence in defense of the charges brought against petitioner. 

III. Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, and because petitioner has not shown he is not

precluded from obtaining relief by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the court will recommend that his

application for writ of habeas corpus be denied. 

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a

writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within five days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 14, 2008.

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lope2559.157(c)

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