Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01059/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01059-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN ANDREW STOLL,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF KERN, EDWARD JAGELS,

EDWARD LAWRENCE KLEIER, CAROL

DARLING, VELDA MURILLO,

BRADFORD JAMES DARLING, COUNTY

ERICSSON, KERN COUNTY

SHERIFF’S OFFICE, KERN COUNTY

WELFARE DEPARTMENT, and DOES

1-30, inclusive,

Defendants.

1:1:05-CV-01059 OWW SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

RE GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF

THE COURT’S RULE 12(b)(6)

ORDER (DOC. 39) 

1. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff John Stoll (“Plaintiff”) sues under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 claiming violations of his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants County of Kern, Edward

Jagels (“Jagels”), Edward Lawrence Kleier (“Kleier”), Carol

Darling (“C. Darling”), Bradford James Darling (“B. Darling”),

the Kern County Sheriff’s Office (“KCSO”), and the Kern County

Welfare Department (“KCWD”) moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s first,

sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action, and to dismiss or

strike the Brady portions of the fourth cause of action. 

Defendants Velda Murillo (“Murillo”) and Conny Ericsson

(“Ericsson”) also moved to dismiss the first, fourth, sixth,

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seventh, and eighth causes of action, and to strike the Brady

portions of the fourth cause of action. A January 27, 2006 Order

dismissed Plaintiff’s first cause of action and Plaintiff’s Brady

claims as stated in the fourth cause of action. Plaintiff moves

for a reconsideration of these dismissals. 

 2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed the complaint on August 16, 2005. (Doc. 1,

Complaint.) County of Kern, Jagels, Kleier, C. Darling, B.

Darling, the KCSO, and the KCWD filed their motion to dismiss on

November 7, 2005. (Doc. 20, Motion to Dismiss I.) Defendants

Murillo and Ericsson filed their motion to dismiss on November 8,

2005. (Doc. 25, Motion to Dismiss II, collectively with Motion

to Dismiss I, “Motion to Dismiss”.) Plaintiff filed a

memorandum/response in opposition to Motion to Dismiss on

December 23, 2005. (Doc. 32, Memorandum in Opposition.) County

of Kern, Jagels, Kleier, C. Darling, C. Darling, the KCSO, and

the KCWD filed a reply on December 29, 2005. (Doc. 33, Reply.) 

An order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was filed on January

27, 2006. (Doc. 35, Order.) Plaintiff filed a motion for

reconsideration on February 16, 2006. (Doc. 39, Motion for

Reconsideration, “MR”.) Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint

on February 16, 2007. (Doc. 38, First Amended Complaint, “FAC”.)

County of Kern, Jagels, Kleier, C. Darling, C. Darling, the KCSO,

and the KCWD filed a memorandum/response in opposition to

Plaintiff’s MR on March 3, 2006. (Doc. 44, Response to MR.) 

3. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on June 14, 1984, Ericsson, a deputy

sheriff, entered Plaintiff’s home in Kern County and arrested

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Plaintiff without a warrant and without exigent circumstances. 

(Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 44.) Plaintiff was brought to the KCSO and

jailed. (Doc. 38, FAC, ¶ 45.) Plaintiff asserts that he was not

given a probable-cause hearing until more than 100 hours

following his warrantless arrest. (Id.) Plaintiff further

alleges that Ericsson, Kleier, and District Attorney Jagels

failed to provide Plaintiff a constitutionally timely

arraignment. (Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 46.) Plaintiff was not

arraigned until June 19, 1984, 5 days after his initial arrest. 

(Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that shortly after he was jailed on

charges of child sexual abuses, Ericsson and county social worker

Murillo conducted interviews with various children whom they

suspected Plaintiff had molested. (Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 94.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Ericsson and Murillo failed to disclose

exculpatory statements, made by each of the children during the

interviews, who repeatedly denied that they had been sexually

abused. (Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 95.) Plaintiff asserts that the

interviews were recorded, but the tapes containing these

exculpatory statements were never disclosed to him during the

criminal proceedings. (Id.) 

On January 17, 1985, Plaintiff was convicted of child

molestation. (Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 16.) Plaintiff's accusers

were six alleged child-abuse victims who testified at trial,

including Plaintiff's six year-old son. (Id.) Plaintiff

maintains that the six child witnesses had all previously been

interviewed by Murillo and Ericsson, and during the interviews

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all denied that Plaintiff molested them. (Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶

94.) No physical evidence corroborated the children's

testimonies. (Id.) On September 27, 1985, the Kern County

Superior Court sentenced Plaintiff to a total term of

imprisonment of forty years. (Id.) On November 27, 1987, the

California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed

Plaintiff's conviction. (Id.)

In December 2000, Plaintiff petitioned the Kern County

Superior Court for a writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1, Complaint,

¶ 17.) On April 30, 2004, Superior Court Judge John I. Kelly

granted Plaintiff's petition, finding that improper interview

techniques employed by Ericsson and Murillo as to the alleged

child-abuse victims created a substantial risk that their trial

testimony was unreliable, in violation of Plaintiff's

constitutional due process rights to a fair trial. (Id.) Four

of the six alleged child victims, now adults, testified under

oath at Plaintiff's habeas corpus evidentiary hearing that their

trial testimony against Plaintiff was completely false. (Id.) A

fifth witness testified that he had no memory of any molestation. 

(Id.) Jagels declined to retry Plaintiff and all charges against

him were dropped. (Id.) Plaintiff was released from custody on

May 4, 2004. (Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 18.) Following his

warrantless arrest and subsequent conviction, Plaintiff alleges

he was subject to actual, uninterrupted incarceration from June

13, 1984 through May 4, 2004. (Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 45.) 

4. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court’s power to reconsider an interlocutory order is

recognized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) which states that an “order

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 The underlying decision on the merits, United States v. 1

Navarro, 959 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Cal. 1997), was reversed by

United States v. Navarro, 160 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 1998), cert.

denied 119 S. Ct. 2354, 144 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1999). This reversal

did not affect the district court's denial of reconsideration.

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or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time

before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the

rights and liabilities of all the parties.” A motion for

reconsideration is appropriate where the district court (1) is

presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear

error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, (3) if there

was an intervening change in controlling law. See School

District No. 1J, Multnomah County v. Acands, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255,

1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A reconsideration motion should not merely

present arguments previously raised, or which could have been

raised in the initial summary judgment motion. See Backlund v.

Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1985). ("The motion was

properly denied here because . . . it presented no arguments that

had not already been raised in opposition to summary judgment.");

United States v. Navarro, 972 F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (E.D. Cal.

1997) ("[M]otions to reconsider are not vehicles permitting the 1

unsuccessful party to "rehash" arguments previously presented...

Nor is a motion to reconsider justified on the basis of new

evidence which could have been discovered prior to the court's

ruling....Finally, "after thoughts" or "shifting of ground" do

not constitute an appropriate basis for reconsideration."). See

Local Rule for the Eastern District of California 78-

230(k)(moving party is required to show in a motion for

reconsideration “new or different facts or circumstances claimed

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to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior

motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion.”) E.D. Cal.

Local R. § 78-230(k).

5. DISCUSSION

I. First Cause of Action: 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 actions are governed by the state statute of

limitations for personal injury actions. Azer v. Connell, 306

F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2002). Effective January 1, 2003 the new

California statute of limitations was extended from one year to

two years. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1; Jones v. Blanas,

393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). However, while state law

determines the length of the limitations period, “federal law

determines when a civil rights claim accrues.” Morales v. City

of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2000). Under

federal law, “a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has

reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” 

Morales, 214 F.3d at 1154. 

a. Accrual of Stoll’s § 1983 Claim

The first issue is when Stoll’s § 1983 claim accrued and

commenced the running of the statute of limitations. Defendants

argue that Stoll’s § 1983 claim “has been lost... because

Plaintiff became aware of the alleged violation in June of 1984,

when he was “wrongfully incarcerated, not timely arraigned and

did not take any action with regard to the cause of action for

over twenty one years.” (Doc. 44, Opposition to MR, P. 3; see

also Doc. 20, Motion to Dismiss I, P. 5.) 

//

i. Failure to Obtain Timely Judicial Review

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The Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),

provided guidance for determining when Plaintiff’s § 1983 Fourth

Amendment failure to obtain timely judicial review claim accrues.

In the January 1, 2007 Order on this motion to dismiss the court

stated the Heck rule as follows:

In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that when

a state prisoner seeks damages in a [Section] 1983

suit, the district court must consider whether a

judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily

imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if

it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the

plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or

sentence has already been invalidated.

(Doc. 35, Order (citing, Heck, 512 U.S. at 487).); see also,

Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 583 (9th Cir. 2007).

Heck stands for the proposition that where a § 1983 claim

brought by a prisoner would invalidate his conviction, the § 1983

claim should be dismissed. See Whitaker, 486 F.3d at 581. 

Stoll was convicted in 1985. On April 30, 2004 Stoll’s

petition for a writ of habeas corpus was granted and his

conviction was set aside. Stoll has met his burden

“demonstrating that the conviction or sentence has already been

invalidated.” In its January 1, 2005 Order, the court

erroneously engaged in an analysis of whether Stoll’s § 1983

cause of action necessarily invalidated his underlying

conviction. This analysis was unnecessary in light of the grant

of Stoll’s habeas petition and his subsequent release. “[A]

prisoner... has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until

the conviction is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by

the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 489. 

“[A] § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an

unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the

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conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” Id. at 489-490. 

In this case, Stoll’s cause of action for failure to obtain

timely judicial review under § 1983 did not begin to accrue until

April 30, 2004, the day his conviction was invalidated. 

ii. Warrantless Arrest

The Supreme Court’s Wallace v. Kato, 127 S.Ct. 1091 (2007)

decision, is the latest expression as to accrual of Fourth

Amendment false arrest claims. The new rule, limiting the Heck

deferred accrual rule, is that regardless of subsequent events,

the statute of limitations for false arrest claims begins to run

when a claimant is wrongfully detained pursuant to the legal

process. Id., at 1100. Heck does not toll the statute of

limitations. The Wallace court noted that “[e]ven assuming,

however, all damages for detention pursuant to legal process

could be regarded as consequential damages attributable to the

unlawful arrest, that would not alter the commencement date for

the statute of limitations.” Id., at 1097. The court specifically

rejected the argument that the statute of limitation for false

arrest begins only after “an anticipated future

conviction...occurs and is set aside.” Id., at 1098. However, it

did observe that after a suit is filed, a district court could

stay the action until the underlying criminal case has ended, if

a claim for false arrest is timely filed. Id.; see also E.Holley

v. County of Yolo, No. CIV S-06-2586 GEB EFB PS, 2007 WL 2384680,

at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007) (citing Wallace, 127 S.Ct. at

1098.) However, after Wallace no Heck tolling applies to save

unfiled Fourth Amendment false arrest claims. 

b. California’s Statute of Limitations

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The next issue is whether Stoll’s § 1983 claims for failure

to obtain timely judicial review and warrantless arrest were

filed within California’s two year statute of limitations for

personal injury claims. 

Plaintiff’s cause of action for failure to obtain timely

judicial review began to accrue on April 30, 2004, the day his

conviction was vacated. Plaintiff’s deadline for filing his §

1983, failure to obtain timely judicial review claim pursuant to

California’s two year statute of limitations law was April 30,

2006. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1; Blanas, 393 F.3d at 927.

Stoll was released from jail on May 4, 2004. Stoll filed his §

1983 claim on August 16, 2005, well within California’s two year

statutory period. (Doc. 1, Complaint.) The court erroneously

dismissed Stoll’s § 1983 claim for failure to obtain timely

judicial review in its January 27, 2006 Order, except for the

false arrest claim. 

Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED as to the

first claim for failure to obtain timely judicial review. 

Plaintiff’s cause of action for warrantless arrest began to

accrue when he was first detained by the criminal justice system

in June 1984, not April 30, 2004 the day his conviction was

invalidated. Under California’s two year statute of limitations,

Plaintiff did not file his claim within the statutory period. 

Plaintiff’s false arrest claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND. 

The order dismissing Plaintiff’s first cause of action as

to the failure to obtain timely judicial review is VACATED. 

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II. Defendant Jagels and Prosecutorial Immunity 

The January 27, 2006 Order found that even if Plaintiff’s

first cause of action is not time-barred, the claim as to Jagels

is nonetheless barred by prosecutorial immunity. (Doc. 35, Order,

13: 21, 22.) Plaintiff now argues that prosecutorial immunity

has no application to a prosecutor sued only in his or her

official capacity, and requests that the ruling on this matter be

reconsidered. (Doc. 41, MR, 7:22-24.) 

The first cause of action is against Jagels only in his

official capacity. A suit against an individual officer in his

or her official capacity is “only another way of pleading an

action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” 

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). In other words,

the real party in interest here is the entity for which Jagels

works. See id. State law determines whether, for § 1983

purposes, a district attorney acts as a county official or state

official when performing a particular function. Weiner v. San

Diego County, 210 F.3d. 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000). Under

California law, a district attorney acts as a state official for

purposes of § 1983 liability, rather than a county official, when

preparing to prosecute and while prosecuting crimes. Pitts v.

County of Kern, 17 Cal.4th 340, 362 (1998). A district attorney

also represents the state, and not the county, when training and

developing policy in these areas because “[n]o meaningful

analytical distinction can be made between these functions.” Id.

The first cause of action alleges that Jagels failed to

obtain a constitutionally timely arraignment for Plaintiff and

had a policy or practice of failing to ensure that county jail

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inmates are promptly arraigned after arrest. (Doc. 1, Complaint,

¶¶ 46, 48.) Arraignment in court to enter a plea to a criminal

charge is a core judicial function which leads directly to

prosecution. (Doc. 35, Order, 13:15, 16.) As such, arraignment

falls under a district attorney’s prosecutorial capacity to

prepare for the prosecution of crime. Under Pitts, Defendant

Jagels represented the State when performing the functions of a

prosecutor. Kern County cannot be liable for the district

attorney’s alleged failure to timely arraign. Rather, the State

is the real party in interest. The Eleventh Amendment, however,

bars suits against a state for damages or injunctive relief,

unless the state has consented to or waived immunity. In re

Harleston, 331 F.3d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 2003). It is not alleged

that the State has expressly or implicitly waived sovereign

immunity. The State cannot be held liable for Defendant Jagels’

core prosecutorial, alleged misconduct. A federal action against

a state officer acting in his official capacity is barred by the

Eleventh Amendment in the same way that an action against the

State is barred. Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d

836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). The first cause of action as to

Defendant Jagels was properly dismissed with prejudice. The

motion to reconsider is DENIED. 

III. Defendant Ericsson and Prosecutorial Immunity 

In the first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Ericsson committed three constitutional errors: (1)

failing to secure a timely probable-cause review of Plaintiff’s

warrantless arrest; (2) contributing to the delayed arraignment

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for Plaintiff; and (3) arresting Plaintiff without a warrant

under nonexigent circumstances. (Doc. 41, MR, 9:12-18.) 

Defendant Ericsson is sued only in his individual capacity. 

(Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 43.) The January 27, 2006 Order held that

even if Plaintiff’s first cause of action is not time-barred, the

claims that Defendant Ericsson failed to secure a timely

probable-cause review and arraignment are still barred by

prosecutorial immunity. (Doc. 35, Order, 14: 12-16.) Plaintiff

argues that the January 27, 2006 Order’s characterization of

Defendant Ericsson as a “prosecutor” in performing these

functions is overly narrow, and requests that the ruling on this

matter be reconsidered. (Doc. 41, MR, 9:23-24, 10:1:4.) 

Defendant Ericsson was a deputy sheriff who investigated the

criminal case. A prosecutor sued in his or her individual

capacity is protected by absolute immunity from liability for

damages under § 1983 “when performing the traditional functions

of an advocate.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997). 

To qualify as advocacy, an act must be “intimately associated

with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); Kalina, 522 U.S. at 125. 

Such activity is sometimes called “quasi-judicial” conduct. 

E.g., Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003). 

However, “the actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely immune

merely because they are performed by a prosecutor.” Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). Prosecutorial immunity

depends on “the nature of the function performed, not the

identity of the actor who performed it.” Forrester v. White, 484 

U.S. 219, 229 (1988). The fact that Defendant Ericsson was

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deputy sheriff, not a prosecutor, does not prevent prosecutorial

immunity from shielding him from allegations that he improperly

discharged a prosecutorial function. See Kalina, 522 U.S. at

127. 

In Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1993), the United States

Supreme Court held that prosecutors are absolutely immune from

suit under § 1983 for actions undertaken in participating in a

probable-cause hearing: 

Immunity for that action under [Section] 1983

accorded with the common-law absolute immunity of

prosecutors and other attorneys for eliciting

false or defamatory testimony from witnesses or

for making false or defamatory statements during,

and related to, judicial proceedings. Under that

analysis, appearing before a judge and presenting

evidence in support of a motion for search warrant

involved the prosecutor’s role as advocate for the

State. Because issuance of a search warrant is a

judicial act, appearance at the probable-cause

hearing was intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process[.] 

If a prosecutor is sued in his or her individual capacity for

failure to perform a constitutionally-required function and he

or she is entitled to prosecutorial immunity, a sheriff that

fails to perform the same function is entitled to the same

immunity. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 276 (holding that when the

functions of prosecutors and detectives overlap, the immunity

that protects them is the same). Under Burns, a prosecutor is

absolutely immune from unconstitutionally failing to secure a

timely probable-cause hearing for an arrestee, it follows that

Defendant Ericsson, a deputy sheriff engaged in the identical

functions, is also entitled to prosecutorial immunity for

failing to secure a timely probable-cause hearing for Plaintiff. 

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Plaintiff argues that Defendant Ericsson cannot be treated as a

“prosecutor” here because California Penal Code § 849 requires

that a peace officer promptly bring an arrestee before a

magistrate for a probable-cause review when making an arrest

without a warrant. (Doc. 41. MR, 10:5-16.) However, there is

no inconsistency in simultaneously recognizing the two. 

Ultimately, prosecutorial immunity under § 1983 depends not on

whose duty it is to perform a certain function, but rather on

whether the function performed is “intimately associated with

the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); Kalina, 522 U.S. at 125. 

The ruling that Defendant Ericsson has prosecutorial immunity

for failing “to provide” a timely probable-cause hearing for

Plaintiff is affirmed. 

Plaintiff’s second claim against Defendant Ericsson is that

he contributed to causing the delayed arraignment for Plaintiff. 

(Doc. 41, MR, 9:12-18.) Arraignment in court to enter a plea to

a criminal charge is another core judicial function that leads

directly to prosecution and is “intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at

125. Although a deputy sheriff can affect the time of

arraignment if a suspect is detained and intentionally not taken

before a court for arraignment, such specific action has not

been alleged. Accordingly, the Court’s ruling that Defendant

Ericsson has prosecutorial immunity for contributing to

Plaintiff’s delayed arraignment is affirmed. Plaintiff’s motion

for reconsideration as to defendant Ericsson is DENIED.

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Plaintiff’s final claim against Defendant Ericcson is for

warrantless arrest. Plaintiff correctly observes that the Order

made no ruling nor offered an immunity rationale protecting

Ericcson for the alleged constitutional error. (Doc. 41, MR.)

A police officer may be entitled to immunity if there is

probable cause for the warrantless arrest or if there was belief

that his or her conduct was lawful. see, e.g., Blankenhorn v.

City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 473 (9th Cir. 2007). “A police

officer may make a warrantless arrest when the officer has

probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has

committed a felony, whether or not a felony, in fact, has been

committed.” Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 976 (9th

Cir. 2003)(quoting Cal. Penal Code Section 836(a)(3)(West

2003)). Even without probable cause, qualified immunity may be

available “if a reasonable police officer could have believed

that his or her conduct was lawful, in light of the clearly

established law and information the searching officers

possessed.” Peng, 335 F.3d at 980. Such an inquiry “must be

undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as

a broad general proposition... [t]he contours of the right must

be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (citation omitted). 

Whether Defendant Ericsson is entitled to qualified

immunity for the warrantless arrest of Plaintiff depends on

whether Defendant Ericsson had probable cause or a reasonable

belief that his conduct was lawful based on clearly established

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law. Although there are allegations that Ericsson in effect

knew of evidentiary problems and insufficiencies that might have

caused him to question whether to effect an arrest under clearly

established law and that a reasonable officer would not have

arrested Stoll, the motion to dismiss the first cause of action

for false arrest as to Ericcson must be GRANTED as it is time

barred. Under the recent Wallace decision, the Supreme Court

held that the limitation period for a § 1983 claim for false

arrest “begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained

pursuant to legal process,” even where the arrest is followed by

criminal proceedings. Wallace, 127 S. Ct. at 1100. The Supreme

Court expressly limited its decision only to Fourth Amendment

false arrest claims. Id. at 1094 n.1.

IV. Defendant Kleier and Prosecutorial Immunity

In the first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Kleier committed two constitutional errors: (1)

failing to obtain a timely probable-cause review of Plaintiff’s

arrest; and (2) contributing to the delay in arraignment for

Plaintiff. (Doc. 35, Order.) Defendant Kleier is sued in his

official and personal capacities (Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 43.) The

January 27, 2006 Order addresses Defendant Kleier’s liability,

but not his immunity (if any), from suit. (Doc. 35, Order.) 

Plaintiff argues that there is no basis for dismissing the first

count as to Kleier on immunity grounds. (Doc. 41, MR.) 

However, Defendant Kleier did not move to dismiss the first

cause of action on immunity grounds. Reconsideration as to

Defendant Kleier is unnecessary. 

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 In Brady, the prosecution, upon defense’s request to 2

examine the extra-judicial statements made by the defendant’s

confederate, withheld a statement in which the confederate

admitted he had perpetrated the actual killing. The Court held

that the suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable to an

accused upon request violates due process “where evidence is

material either to guilty or to punishment, irrespective of good

faith of prosecution.” 

Devereaux v. Abbey, 262 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2001); 3

Cunningham v. City of Wenatchee, 345 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2003);

and Gausvik v. Perez, 345 F.3d 813(9th Cir. 2003).

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V. Fourth Cause of Action (Brady Violation)

The fourth cause of action names Ericsson, Kleier, Murillo,

and B. Darling as Defendants. (Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 83.) All

named Defendants are sued in their individual capacities. (Id.)

 B. Darling is also sued in his official capacity. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendants' reckless or deliberately

indifferent failure to disclose exculpatory evidence violated

Plaintiff's due process rights under Maryland v. Brady, 373 U.S.

83, 87 (1963). Plaintiff's Brady claims were dismissed based 2

on three "directly analogous and binding precedent[s]" which 3

hold that the Ninth Circuit has restricted the range of § 1983

claims based on faulty investigation in child sexual abuse

contexts to those involving deliberate or bad faith

falsification of evidence. (Doc 35, Order, 18:11-17; 19:16-18;

20:16-18.) Plaintiff now argues that no Ninth Circuit

precedent, including the three cases cited by the Court,

prohibits a plaintiff from pleading Brady claims in a civil case

and requests that this Court reconsider its prior decision. 

(Doc. 41, MR, 2:24; 3:1- 9-24.)

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A Brady violation occurs where the prosecution suppresses

material exculpatory evidence. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. To

constitute a Brady violation in the criminal context, three

elements must be met. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82

(1999). First, the State must have suppressed some evidence,

either purposefully or inadvertently. Id. Second, the evidence

must be favorable to the accused because it is either

exculpatory or impeachment material. Id. Third, the evidence

must be material to the outcome. Id. Evidence is material for

Brady purposes "if there is a reasonable probability that, had

the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." United States v. Bagley,

473 U.S. 667, 681-82 (1985). The inquiry at hand is "not

whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a

different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence

he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a

verdict worthy of confidence." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,

434 (1995). 

In the criminal context, Brady imposes a “no fault”

obligation upon prosecutors to turn over exculpatory evidence. 

See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. A prosecutor’s withholding of

exculpatory material evidence is grounds for a new trial,

whether the withholding was innocent, negligent, or intentional. 

Id. However, circuit courts are divided on the question of

whether a similar “no fault” standard applies in civil cases

where liability is based upon a Brady violation. There is a

split in the circuits. Compare McMillan v. Johnson, 88 F.3d

1154, 1567 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that investigators have a

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duty to disclose under Brady in a § 1983 action, irrespective of

good or bad faith) with Villasana v. Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 979, 980

(8th Cir. 2004)(holding that bad faith is required to state

Brady claims against law enforcement officials in a § 1983

action). Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has

addressed this issue. 

The Supreme Court in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328

(1986), held that “the Due Process Clause is simply not

implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended

loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.” Daniels does

not require bad faith for a due process violation; rather, it

requires only a deliberate decision on the part of an officer to

deprive a person of life, liberty or property. Daniels, 474

U.S. at 331. The Supreme Court in County of Sacramento v. Lewis,

523 U.S. 833 (1998), provided further guidance for a due process

challenge to executive action, “the threshold question is

whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so

egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock

the conscience.” Lewis, at 847, n.8. What constitutes

conscious-shocking action depends on the facts and circumstances

of each case. Id., at 850. Lewis concerned a substantive due

process claim in a police high-speed car chase, where the Court

required the police officers’ conduct to rise above deliberate

indifference, reasoning deliberate indifference is more suitable

to a situation where “actual deliberation is practical.” Id., at

851. While the Supreme Court has not fully explicated standards

of culpability for substantive due process claims, the above

provides some guidance. 

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A Brady due process claim makes the non-disclosure of

exculpatory evidence a violation of the Due Process Clause

irrespective of the good or bad faith of the non-disclosing

officer in a criminal case; bad faith is not required to

establish a civil Brady violation. Under Daniels, Plaintiff must

establish that Defendants deliberately withheld exculpatory

evidence from Plaintiff; not that the withholding was in bad

faith; deliberate, purposeful withholding of material evidence

by law enforcement officers is sufficiently outrageous to

support an inference of bad faith, even if such a state of mind

is not specifically required as a separate element of this

constitutional tort.

Under the existing case law, Plaintiff has pled sufficient

facts to withstand dismissal of his civil Brady claims. First,

Plaintiff alleges that two kinds of evidence were intentionally

suppressed by one or more of named law enforcement Defendants

who were under a constitutional duty to disclose: (1) tape

recordings or verbatim transcriptions of the recordings of

investigative interviews of some of the child witnesses were

withheld, and (2) children's statements made during their

interviews that Plaintiff had not sexually molested them were

suppressed. (Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶¶ 95, 96.) Second, the

evidence allegedly withheld could have been both exculpatory and

impeachment evidence. Denials of sexual abuse by the alleged

victims were potentially exculpatory evidence. The evidence

against Plaintiff in his child molestation trial consisted

solely of the testimony of child witnesses. The children's

prior inconsistent statements could have materially called their

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 “Brady information includes ‘material...that bears on the 4

credibility of a significant witness in the case.’” United

States v. Brumel-Alvarez, 991 F.2d 1452, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993)

(quoting United States v. Strifler, 851 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9 Cir. th

1988)). Prior inconsistent statements of a pertinent witness may

be material to the outcome. United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d

1456, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995). 

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reliability and credibility into question. See United States v.

Williams, 668 F.2d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that

prior inconsistent statements may be introduced to impeach a

witness). The described evidence asserted to have been withheld

was allegedly favorable to Plaintiff. Third, because the

evidence against Plaintiff in his criminal trial consisted

solely of children's testimonies with no corroborating physical

evidence, the credibility of the child witnesses could have been

dispositive of the trial outcome. If believed by the jury,

there is a reasonable probability that, had the witnesses' prior

inconsistent statements been disclosed to the defense and

introduced at the trial, the result of the trial would have been

different. The prosecution's failure to disclose such evidence

could have prejudiced Plaintiff so as to deny Plaintiff a fair

trial. The evidence allegedly withheld was potentially material

to the outcome. Finally, Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to 4

show that Defendants deliberately withheld the exculpatory

statements from Plaintiff. 

In dismissing Plaintiff’s Brady claims, the Order cited

three cases – Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2001);

Cunningham v. City of Wenatchee, 345 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2003);

and Gausvik v. Perez, 345 F.3d 813, (9th Cir. 2003). (Doc. 35,

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 Plaintiff alleges a deliberate-fabrication-of evidence 5

claim in his fifth cause of action. (Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 104.) 

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Order, 10-17.) All three cases pled a deliberate-fabricationof-evidence claim, but none of the three cases dealt directly

with a Brady claim. The Order erroneously inferred from these

cases that the Ninth Circuit no longer permits Brady claims

because deliberate falsification of evidence is required to

state a § 1983 claim. Plaintiff alleges Brady claims, not

deliberate-fabrication-of-evidence claims, in his fourth cause

of action. (Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 85.) Deliberate 5

falsification of evidence is not a requirement for stating a

Brady claim. The previous dismissal of Plaintiff’s Brady claims

is vacated. The motion to reconsider the claim is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, 

(1) the motion to reconsider dismissal of Plaintiff’s first

cause of action is GRANTED, except as to § 1983 Fourth Amendment

false arrest. That claim is time barred as a matter of law and

is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

(2) The motion to reconsider Jagel’s and Ericsson’s

absolute immunity defenses is DENIED.

(3) The motion to reconsider dismissal of Plaintiff’s Brady

claims is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 24, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

bb4ed UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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