Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02287/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02287-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 As the interim Director of the Arizona Department of

Corrections, Mr. Ryan is substituted for Dora Schriro as a respondent

in this matter. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ANTHONY ST. CLAIR SEALY, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 08-02287 PHX FJM (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

CHARLES RYAN and ) 

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE:

Petitioner filed a pro se petition seeking a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254 on December 15, 2008.

Respondents1 filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 8) on March 6, 2009. Respondents

argue the action for habeas relief was not timely filed and,

therefore, that the petition must be denied and dismissed with

prejudice. Petitioner filed a reply (Docket No. 9) to the

answer on March 31, 2009.

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I Procedural History

A grand jury indictment filed September 1, 2000,

charged Petitioner with 16 counts comprised of attempted sexual

conduct with a minor, sexual conduct with a minor, public sexual

indecency, sexual abuse, molestation of a child, and attempted

molestation of a child. See Answer, Exh. A. The alleged crimes

involved three different female victims under the age of fifteen

and crimes occurring on separate occasions. Id., Exh. A. A

pre-sentence report prepared August 14, 2001, indicates

Petitioner confessed to the charged crimes to the police officer

investigating the charges and to the Probation Officer preparing

the report. Id., Exh. B. 

On June 11, 2001, Petitioner signed a written plea

agreement by which he pled guilty to one count of sexual conduct

with a minor under the age of 15, a class 2 felony (Count 9 of

the indictment) and two counts of attempted sexual conduct with

a minor under the age of 15, classified as class 3 felonies

(Counts 1 and 4 of the indictment). Id., Exh. C & Exh. D. The

plea agreement provided the remaining charges against Petitioner

would be dismissed. 

The written plea agreement noted the presumptive

sentence of 20 years imprisonment for the crime of sexual

conduct with a minor and a maximum term of 27 years imprisonment

for this crime. Id., Exh. C. The plea agreement also noted the

presumptive sentence of 10 years imprisonment and a maximum

sentence of 15 years imprisonment regarding the charges of

attempted sexual conduct with a minor. Id., Exh. C. The plea

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agreement stated: “Defendant will be sentenced to prison on

Count 9 and to lifetime probation on Count 1. There are no

agreements regarding sentencing as to Count 4.” Id., Exh. C.

Petitioner’s guilty pleas were entered by the Court on July 6,

2001. Id., Exh. D.

On October 29, 2001, Petitioner was sentenced to a term

of 25 years imprisonment pursuant to his conviction on the

charge of sexual conduct with a minor. Id., Exh. E. Petitioner

was sentenced to a term of lifetime probation pursuant to his

conviction on each of the charges of attempted sexual conduct

with a minor under the age of 15. Id., Exh. E. 

Petitioner initiated an action for state postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, on November 9, 2001. Id., Exh. F. Petitioner was

appointed counsel in his Rule 32 action, who informed the state

court on May 31, 2002, that counsel could find no meritorious

issues to raise on Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. G.

Petitioner filed a pro per petition for state postconviction relief on August 22, 2002, asking the state trial

court to “reconsider[]” his sentences and asserting his trial

defense counsel was ineffective. Id., Exh. H. Petitioner

asserted that, although there was no physical evidence against

him, his trial defense counsel “coerced” him to accept a guilty

plea. Id., Exh. H. Petitioner stated he had committed a crime

and that he had changed since his incarceration. Id., Exh. H.

Petitioner stated that, although he felt he “deserved a

punishment for failing to uphold the standards in society” he

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2

 Subsection (c) provides:

 The court shall review the petition within

twenty days after the defendant’s reply was due.

On reviewing the petition, response, reply, files

and records, and disregarding defects of form,

the court shall identify all claims that are

procedurally precluded under this rule. If the

court, after identifying all precluded claims,

determines that no remaining claim presents a

material issue of fact or law which would entitle

the defendant to relief under this rule and that

no purpose would be served by any further

proceedings, the court shall order the petition

dismissed. If the court does not dismiss the

petition, the court shall set a hearing within

thirty days on those claims that present a

material issue of fact or law. If a hearing is

ordered, the state shall notify the victims, upon

the victims’ request pursuant to statute or court

rule relating to victims’ rights, of the time and

place of the hearing.

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was “requesting that a more lenient punishment be considered...”

Id., Exh. H. 

 On December 23, 2002, the Maricopa County Superior

Court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 action, citing

Rule 32.6(c),Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure2 and concluding

his petition failed “to identify issues of law or fact that

would justify an evidentiary hearing.” Id., Exh. J. Petitioner

did not seek review of this decision by the Arizona Court of

Appeals or the Arizona Supreme Court. See id., Exh. L.

Petitioner filed a second action seeking state postconviction relief on October 10, 2007. Id., Exh. K. Petitioner

alleged he did not understand the plea agreement as explained to

him by his trial counsel. Id., Exh. K. Petitioner asserted

that his right to due process required that what he believed to

be an ambiguous plea agreement be construed in accordance with

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his understanding of the agreement, citing United States v.

Palladino, 347 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2003). Id., Exh. K. Petitioner

also argued that his sentences violated the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington because the

sentencing court “enhance[d]” his sentences “without a jury.”

Id., Exh. K. 

The state trial court dismissed the Rule 32 action in

a decision issued October 30, 2007, noting Petitioner’s

conviction became final in December of 2002. Id., Exh. L. The

state court noted that the 2007 Rule 32 action was not timely

filed and that Blakely could not be applied retroactively to

Petitioner’s conviction. Id., Exh. L. The trial court further

stated that Petitioner had not demonstrated how Palladino, a

case involving the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, would apply to

his case or alter his sentence. Id., Exh. L. Petitioner sought

review of this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which

summarily denied review on October 21, 2008. Id., Exh. N.

In this federal habeas action Petitioner asserts his

right to access the courts was violated by the state prison

system’s inadequate legal facilities. Petitioner also contends

his right to due process of law was violated by his sentences.

Petitioner also asserts his right to be free of double jeopardy

was violated by an indictment which was comprised of multiple

charges for a “single offense.” Petitioner further maintains he

was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel, his

right to a jury trial, and his right to confront his accusers.

Additionally, Petitioner avers that his right to due process and

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equal protection were violated by the imposition of a sentence

of lifetime probation and also contends his sentences violate

his right to equal protection because he is a first-time,

indigent offender. With regard to the timeliness of this

action, in his habeas petition Petitioner asserts he was unaware

of the state of limitations governing habeas petitions found in

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). 

 II. Analysis

A. The petition is barred by the statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th

Cir. 2002). The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is entitled to

tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of a

“properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(2006 & Supp. 2008). See also

Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000);

Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Because Petitioner pled guilty and thereby waived his

right to a direct appeal, Petitioner’s convictions and sentences

became final at the conclusion of his first action for state

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711

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(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that, in Arizona, the statute of

limitations began to run upon “the conclusion of the Rule 32

of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or [upon] the

expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.”).

The state trial court denied relief in Petitioner’s first Rule

32 action on December 23, 2002. Accordingly, the AEDPA’s

statute of limitations began to run on or about January 23,

2003, when the time expired to seek review of the Maricopa

County Superior Court’s decision denying relief by the Arizona

Court of Appeals. Petitioner had one year from that date, i.e.,

until January 23, 2004, to seek federal habeas relief.

Petitioner did not file a habeas petition on or before January

23, 2004. 

Petitioner’s second action seeking state postconviction relief was filed on October 10, 2007, after the

federal habeas statute of limitations expired. That state Rule

32 action could not and did not restart the already-expired

statute of limitations for filing Petitioner’s federal habeas

action. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.

2003), citing Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir.

2001); Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000).

A state-court petition that is filed after the expiration of the

statute of limitations under the AEDPA does not revive the

running of the limitations period. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276

F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135,

1142-43 (10th Cir. 2001); Payton v. Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408

(6th Cir. 2001).

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B. Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations

Petitioner is not entitled to the equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. A petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must establish two elements: “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15 (2005).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 397 (2008); Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003), modified on other

grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling is

only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely claim. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See Jones

v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784, 789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219

F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding this remedy is

“typically applied sparingly”). The petitioner must establish

a causal connection between the alleged roadblock to their

timely filing of their federal habeas petition and the actual

failure to file the petition on time. See Gaston, 417 F.3d at

1034; Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th Cir.

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2005). It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable

tolling is warranted in his case. Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and

lack of representation during the applicable filing period do

not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable

tolling because such circumstances are not “extraordinary.”

See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.

2006); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004).

Additionally, a federal habeas petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must also act with “reasonable” diligence “throughout

the period he seeks to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111,

113 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969

(9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir.

1999). 

In his reply to the answer to his petition, Petitioner

contends the state court’s dismissal of his first Rule 32 action

denied him his right to access the courts. Petitioner asserts

his appointed post-conviction counsel was ineffective because he

did not inform Petitioner of the AEDPA’s time limitations. With

regard to the “untimeliness of his petition,” Petitioner asserts

“he did not know the existence of the AEDPA,” and that the State

of Arizona failed to provide “notice” of it’s statute of

limitations. Petitioner contends the failure to provide notice

voids any argument that he knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily “waive[d] such rights concerning the provisions of

the AEDPA ...” Docket No. 9 at 11. Petitioner contends the

state may not assert the statute of limitations as a defense to

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his habeas claims because the state did not give him “notice” of

the statute of limitations. Id. at 12. Petitioner asserts that

imposing the statute of limitations when he had no notice of

such has violated his right to due process because he has been

deprived of a protected liberty interest without notice. Id.

Petitioner argues he has a constitutional right to file a habeas

petition which has been denied by the State of Arizona.

Additionally, Petitioner maintains he has not procedurally

defaulted all of his federal habeas claims in the state courts.

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that

there were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which

made it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas

petition, or that any state action was the “but for” cause for

his failure to timely file his federal habeas action. See Brown

v. Barrow, 512 F.3d 1304, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding the

petitioner has a strong burden to plead specific facts

supporting their claim of extraordinary circumstances). See

also Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-19, 125 S. Ct. at 1815 (concluding

that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling

because he was not misled or confused about the exhaustion of

his state remedies and filing his federal habeas petition).

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that there

were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which made

it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas petition.

Compare Sanchez v. Cambra, 137 Fed. App. 989, 990 (9th Cir.

2005). Additionally, Petitioner did not act with reasonable

diligence throughout the time period he seeks to toll. See

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Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a

claim to equitable tolling where the petitioner “provided no

specificity regarding the alleged lack of access and the steps

he took to diligently pursue his federal claims”). Compare Roy,

465 F.3d at 969-72.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Sealy’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

 Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

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a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 7th day of April, 2009.

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