Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-01380/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-01380-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Habeas Corpus Petition as Untimely; Denying Certificate of Appealability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES E. HOGG,

Petitioner,

 vs.

BEN CURRY, Warden, 

Respondent. 

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No. C 09-1380 RMW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS HABEAS CORPUS PETITION AS

UNTIMELY; DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

(Docket No. 5)

Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the petition

should not be granted. Respondent moved to dismiss the petition as untimely. Petitioner filed

an opposition. Respondent filed a reply. Having reviewed the papers and the underlying

record, the court concludes that petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely, GRANTS

respondent’s motion to dismiss and DISMISSES the petition. 

BACKGROUND

On December 1, 2005, petitioner was sentenced in San Mateo County Superior Court

to 25 years to life for a third-strike conviction of residential robbery. (Mot., p. 2.) On June

22, 2006, the California Court of Appeal affirmed. (Mot., Ex. 1.) Petitioner did not file a

petition for review. On July 11, 2008, petitioner filed a state habeas petition in San Mateo

County Superior Court, which was denied. (Mot., Ex. 2.) Petitioner filed a subsequent

habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, which was denied August 7, 2008. (Mot.,

Ex. 3.) The California Supreme Court also denied petitioner’s habeas petition on February

*E-FILED - 2/9/10*

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 1 Petitioner states that it was not until the beginning of 2008 that he discovered the factual

predicate of his claim, i.e., his sentence was cruel and unusual and thus, the statute of

limitation should begin from the date of discovery, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), rather than

the date his conviction became final. The court finds no merit to this argument. Under §

2244(d)(1)(D), the date of discovery is “when the prisoner knows (or through diligence could

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Habeas Corpus Petition as Untimely; Denying Certificate of Appealability

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11, 2009. (Mot., Ex. 4.) Petitioner thereafter filed the instant petition on March 24, 2009.

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) became law

on April 24, 1996 and imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a writ

of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital

state convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: 

(1) the judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for

seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional

state action was removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional

right asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate

of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1). Time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review is pending is excluded from the one-year time limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2). 

If a petitioner could have sought review by the state court of appeals or the state

supreme court, but did not, the limitation period will begin running against him the day after

the date on which the time to seek such review expired. See Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809,

812-13 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Moreno v. Harrison, 245

Fed. Appx. 606, 608 (9th Cir. 2007).

Here, petitioner was sentenced on December 1, 2005. (Pet., p. 2.) The California

Court of Appeal affirmed on June 22, 2006. His conviction became final on August 1, 2006,

after he failed to file a petition for review with the California Supreme Court within the 40-

day period for direct review. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.500; Smith, 297 F.3d at 812-13. Thus, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), AEDPA’s one-year limitation period began to run the following

day, and expired one year later, on August 1, 2007.1

 See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

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discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.” 

Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000). Petitioner’s only claim raised in

his state and federal habeas petitions is that his 25-year to life sentence is grossly

disproportionate to his crime. The predicate facts relevant to that claim were known at the

time that petitioner was sentenced, i.e., December 1, 2005. 

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Habeas Corpus Petition as Untimely; Denying Certificate of Appealability

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1246 (9th Cir. 2001). The instant petition was filed almost two years later, on March 24,

2009. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). Thus, absent tolling the instant

petition is untimely. 

The one-year statute of limitations is tolled under § 2244(d)(2) for the “‘time during

which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.’” Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724,

726 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)). Here, petitioner’s first state habeas

petition was not filed until July 11, 2008, approximately eleven months after the limitations

period had already expired. A state habeas petition filed after AEDPA’s statute of limitations

ended cannot toll the limitations period. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.

2003) (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has

ended before the state petition was filed,” even if the state petition was timely filed).

Accordingly, there is no basis for statutory tolling in this case, and petitioner does not argue

that he is entitled to any.

Because statutory tolling does not render the petition timely, only equitable tolling

may render it timely. The Supreme Court has “never squarely addressed the question whether

equitable tolling is applicable to AEDPA’s statute of limitations,” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 418 n.8 (2005), but Ninth Circuit authority holds that the one-year limitation period

may be equitably tolled because § 2244(d) is a statute of limitations and not a jurisdictional

bar. Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997),

overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly), 163

F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases

because extensions of time should be granted only if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). 

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Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Habeas Corpus Petition as Untimely; Denying Certificate of Appealability

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The Ninth Circuit has held that the petitioner bears the burden of showing that this

“extraordinary exclusion” should apply to him. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th

Cir. 2002). The petitioner must establish the following in order to be granted equitable

tolling:

(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The petitioner must

additionally show that the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his

untimeliness, and that the extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to

file a petition on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Here, as grounds for equitable tolling, petitioner claims that after his appellate lawyer

filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436 (1979), to the California Court of

Appeal, counsel failed to advise or prepare a petition for review to the California Supreme Court. 

Further, petitioner states that he was unaware that counsel would not be filing a petition for

review to the California Supreme Court. Additionally, petitioner asserts that from June 22, 2006,

the date California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction and sentence, to July 11, 2008, the

date petitioner filed his first state habeas petition, he was conducting legal research, presumably

to file either a petition for review or habeas petition.

In noncapital cases, an attorney’s negligence in general does not constitute an

extraordinary circumstance sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d

1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001). However, where the attorney’s conduct is sufficiently egregious, as

opposed to merely negligent, equitable tolling may be appropriate. See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345

F.3d 796, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2003). Attorney malfeasance standing alone, however, does not

warrant equitable tolling. Id. The prisoner must demonstrate reasonable diligence to get the

benefit of equitable tolling in circumstances evidencing attorney misconduct. See Brambles v.

Duncan, 330 F.3d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir.), amended, 342 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Welch

v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[t]olling accommodates effort, not

inaction”).

Further, the Ninth Circuit recently stated that counsel’s failure to perfect a timely notice

of appeal from a conviction, without more, is not an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting

equitable tolling and has “little to no bearing on [petitioner’s] ability to file a timely federal

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Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Habeas Corpus Petition as Untimely; Denying Certificate of Appealability

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habeas petition.” Randle v. Crawford, 578 F.3d 1177, 1186 (9th Cir. 2009). “Counsel’s failure

to perfect an appeal simply meant that [petitioner] had one year from the expiration of his time to

file a notice of appeal in which to initiate a federal habeas action -- it did not prevent him from

filing the petition.” Id.

Here, counsel did file a direct appeal on petitioner’s behalf. Petitioner does not allege

that counsel’s “abandonment” prevented petitioner from filing his federal habeas petition on time

or that it caused his late federal filing. See Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 997. Nor does petitioner allege

that he was unaware of the California Court of Appeal decision. In fact, it appears that petitioner

knew of the California Court of Appeal decision because he asserts that he immediately began

conducting legal research. (Opp., p. 3.) Further, petitioner had a full year from the expiration of

his time for filing a petition for review to file a federal habeas action. See, e.g,, Randle, 578 F.3d

at 1186. Counsel’s failure to file a petition for review or advise petitioner to do so did not

prevent petitioner from filing a federal petition. See id. Thus, without a showing that counsel’s

action or inaction was the cause of petitioner’s untimeliness, or that it made it impossible for

petitioner to file a petition on time, petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. See Ramirez,

571 F.3d at 997. 

As the petition was filed almost two years after the limitation period expired, and there is

no basis for delaying the commencement of the limitation period or for statutory or equitable

tolling, the instant petition must be dismissed as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently been

amended to require a district court that dismisses or denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a

certificate of appealability (“COA”) in its ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254

Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). 

For the reasons set out in the discussion above, petitioner has not shown “that jurists of

reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a

constitutional right [or] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court

was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Accordingly, a COA is DENIED. 

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Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Habeas Corpus Petition as Untimely; Denying Certificate of Appealability

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely

(docket no. 5) is GRANTED. A COA is DENIED. The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of

respondent and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: _________________ _________________________ 

RONALD M WHYTE

 United States District Judge

2/8/10

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