Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00958/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00958-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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ORDER 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

AT SACRAMENTO 

TOVIA LAFAELE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

J. ARNOLD, J.L. HERRERA, 

Defendants. 

Case No. CIV 08-0958-JCC 

ORDER 

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Revoke Plaintiff’s IFP 

Status and Dismiss Case (Dkt. No. 17), Plaintiff’s Motion to Oppose Defendants’ Motion (Dkt. 

No. 21), which the Court takes as a Response, and Defendants’ Reply (Dkt. No. 23). Having 

thoroughly considered the parties’ briefing and the relevant record, the Court finds oral 

argument unnecessary and hereby GRANTS the motion for the reasons explained herein. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. His complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

alleges that Defendants have refused to assign him a job at the prison laundry, which allegedly 

has caused him to suffer from “extreme idleness.” (Compl. 2 (Dkt. No. 1).) He claims that 

Defendants are discriminating against him because he is incarcerated for life, and because he is 

Samoan. (See id. at 6.) The Court previously denied Plaintiff’s request for counsel, and 

observed serious legal and factual deficiencies with his complaint. (Order (Dkt. No. 9) 

(citations omitted).) Defendant now moves to revoke Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status and 

dismiss his claim without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). (Mot. 3 (Dkt. No. 17).) 

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II. DISCUSSION 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act prohibits an inmate from proceeding in forma 

pauperis if the inmate, while incarcerated, has on three or more occasions brought an action 

that was dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

could be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This is commonly known as the “three strikes” 

provision. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2005). The defendant bears the 

initial burden of producing sufficient evidence demonstrating that each of a plaintiff’s prior 

cases was dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim. Id. at 1120. 

Once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to 

persuade the court that the prior dismissal should not count as a strike. Id.

Defendants have carried their burden here. Plaintiff has filed at least four prior federal 

cases while incarcerated that were dismissed for failure to state a claim. LaFaele v. Smith, C00-

2763-FCD-DAD (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2001) (district judge adopted magistrate judge’s 

recommendation that the matter be dismissed for failure to state a claim); LaFaele v. Largent, 

C02-2469-WBS-PAN (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2004) (same); LaFaele v. Largent, C04-0385-DFLKJM (E.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2005) (same); LaFaele v. Carter, C07-2091-GEB-JFM (E.D. Cal. 

Jan. 11, 2008) (same). In each of these cases, Defendants provided sufficient documentary 

evidence to demonstrate that either the district judge or the magistrate iudge explicitly found 

that Plaintiff was (1) a state prisoner proceeding pro se and seeking to proceed in forma 

pauperis, and (2) that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable 

claim.1

 Therefore, Defendants adequately proved that Plaintiff has accumulated four strikes. 

 

1

 There is no heightened definition of “failure to state a claim” for the prior matter to 

count as a strike under § 1915(g). The standard merely parallels Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). See Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121. Upon review, it is evident that each of 

Plaintiff’s prior cases was dismissed under this standard.

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Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the three-strikes provision should not apply. 

Construing Plaintiff’s motion and complaint liberally, Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 339 

F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003), Plaintiff (1) challenges the definition of those cases as “strikes,” 

and (2) claims that he suffers from “imminent danger of serious physical injury,” which would 

shoehorn his case into the exception to the three-strikes provision. 

Plaintiff’s arguments against classifying his prior cases as strikes are meritless. First, he 

alleges that two of his prior cases (the two titled LaFaele v. Largent) are actually the same 

case, but the case numbers alone demonstrate that they were filed over two years apart, 

assigned different case numbers, and decided by different judges. Second, Plaintiff attempts to 

create a host of exceptions to the statute out of whole cloth—none of which the Court can 

countenance. Plaintiff first claims that the Smith and Carter cases should not count as strikes 

because they were dismissed prior to service under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), but § 1915(g) does 

not contain any such exception.2 See also Burgess v. Conway, 631 F. Supp. 2d 280, 282 

(W.D.N.Y. 2009) (counting a § 1915(e)(2) screening dismissal as a strike); Fiorentino v. 

Biershbach, 64 F.App’x 550, 2003 WL 1870720 at *3 (7th Cir. Apr. 9, 2003) (same). Next, 

Plaintiff asserts that his Carter case will be “rekindled based on new evidence,” but this fact, 

too, is immaterial; it does not undermine the fact that the Carter case was previously dismissed 

for failure to state a claim, bringing it into the plain language of § 1915(g). Again, there is no 

exception for cases that may, speculatively, be reopened in the future. Similarly, Plaintiff 

claims that the fact that the Court never appointed Plaintiff counsel should mean that his prior 

 

2

 In fact, the § 1915(g) strike standard contains the exact same language as the § 

1915(e)(2) screening standard. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that, 

when Congress uses the same language even in different parts of the same statute, it generally 

intends the language to have the same meaning. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 

(2005) (“To give these same words a different meaning for each category would be to invent a 

statute rather than interpret one.”) Here, Congress presumably intended both provisions to 

apply to the same sorts of cases, not for one provision to be an exception for the other. 

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cases should not count as strikes, but he cites only § 1915(e)(1) for this proposition, which 

merely provides that the court may appoint counsel to an indigent plaintiff. No part of the 

statute creates an exception to the three-strikes rule for pro se prisoners, and this proposition is 

squarely belied by the case law. In short, the Court cannot read into the statute exceptions that 

are not there. All four of Plaintiffs’ prior cases count as strikes. 

Plaintiff’s next major argument is that, even if all of his prior cases count as strikes, he 

should nonetheless be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis because his case fits into the 

narrow exception to the three-strikes provision. (Opp. 2, 3 (Dkt. No. 21).) The three-strikes 

provision applies “unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g). Construing his complaint liberally, Plaintiff is arguing that his life 

confinement, his extreme idleness, and his inability to seek redress, either through freedom or 

through repeated requests to prison officials, constitutes “imminent danger of serious physical 

injury.” (Opp. 3 (Dkt. No. 21).) The “physical injury” to which he refers is the destruction of 

his “once-active ability in physical activities.” (Id.) 

Plaintiffs’ argument is not cognizable. “Restlessness and inactiveness” are not the type 

of physical injury that Congress had in mind when it created the “safety valve” in the threestrikes provision for ongoing, life-threatening harms. See Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 

1050 (8th Cir. 2003). The case law focuses on imminent, direct dangers of serious harm or 

death, such as denying necessary medical attention, or placing a prisoner in close proximity to 

dangerous enemies. See, e.g., Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004) 

(withdrawing treatment for HIV and hepatitis); Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th 

Cir. 2003) (withdrawing psychiatric medicine), Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 

1998) (placing inmate near prison enemies, despite two prior stabbings). The case law does not 

countenance less dangerous, or less imminent, threats. See Polanco v. Hopkins, 510 F.3d 152, 

155 (2d Cir. 2007) (no imminent danger for exposure to mold in a gym shower or allegedly 

unjust discipline); Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 2009), (no imminent 

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danger for improper prosecution and inmate classification); Martin, 319 F.3d at 1050 (no 

imminent danger for two past occasions of forced work in inclement weather). The Court 

cannot find that Plaintiff is in imminent danger of serious physical injury simply because he is 

not employed in the prison laundry. 

None of Plaintiff’s other claims—concerning the procedure of this case, the opportunity 

for Plaintiff to rebut the allegation that he has accumulated three strikes, whether Plaintiff’s 

inability to work in the laundry affects his chances of parole, or Plaintiff’s ability to pay the 

filing fee (see Opp. 3, 4 (Dkt. No. 21))—are germane to the issue at bar. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Revoke Plaintiff’s IFP Status and 

Dismiss Case (Dkt. No. 17) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status is REVOKED 

and this matter is DISMISSED without prejudice. 

 DATED this 18th day of February, 2010. 

 /s/ John C. Coughenour

John C. Coughenour 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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