Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01685/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01685-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

NANCY E. APPLETON, Trustee of

the 4347 Vintage Oaks Lane J &

N Appleton Trust of 1999,

NO. CIV. S-05-1685 WBS KJM

Plaintiff, 

v. ORDER RE: REQUEST FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff has filed an ex parte application for a

temporary restraining order enjoining a state court proceeding,

People of the State of California v. Alden Jonathan Appleton,

First Financial, Inc., & First Financial, Case No. 99AS00592,

currently pending in the Superior Court in and for the County of

Sacramento. That application will be denied by this order.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The following facts are taken verbatim from Judge

Levi’s August 24, 2005 order denying plaintiff’s request for a

temporary restraining order. The state case was filed in 1999. 

In August 2001, the state court appointed a receiver to

Case 2:05-cv-01685-WBS -KJM Document 45 Filed 10/14/05 Page 1 of 3
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administer assets to pay victims’ claims. In October 2001, the

state court found the residence at 4347 Vintage Oaks Lane (the

“property”) subject to the receivership estate. Although

plaintiff was not a party to the state court action, she does not

claim she was unaware of the court’s decision. In addition,

plaintiff failed to intervene, move for reconsideration, or

appeal the court’s decision. In January 2004, the receiver

sought permission from the state court to sell the property. At

that time, plaintiff filed an opposition. However, in February

2004, when the court granted the receiver permission to sell the

property, plaintiff, again, failed to seek intervention,

reconsideration, or appeal. In July 2005, the receiver filed a

petition for an order confirming sale of the property. Once

again, plaintiff filed an opposition, but did not intervene in

the state action. On August 23, 2005, the receiver’s petition

was set for hearing before the state court judge.

On August 19, 2005, plaintiff filed this 42 U.S.C. §

1983 action in federal court. Plaintiff claims that a decision

of the state court permitting sale of the residence will violate

her constitutional rights because she has not had a sufficient

opportunity to participate in the state court action to defend

her property rights.

Plaintiff’s earlier motion for a temporary restraining

order was 

denied principally because it [was] untimely. There [was]

no reason why this . . . request for stay should not have

been filed in October 2001, February 2004, or July 2005. By

waiting to file this action until the state court was

prepared to issue a final ruling, plaintiff . . . misused

the temporary restraining order. E.D. Cal. L.R. 65-231(b).

 

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1 The likelihood of success on the merits is slim at best

because the underlying state proceedings were akin to a quasicriminal action pursued by the state, and Younger abstention

would apply. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, *592, 95

S.Ct. 1200, 1202 (1975) (extending Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37

(1971) to certain civil proceedings).

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Furthermore, the showing on the merits [was] not

persuasive. It is unclear whether plaintiff has any

interest in the property. The state court recently found

the claim “meritless” in a tentative ruling.

(Aug. 24, 2005 Order (per Chief Judge Levi)). 

There is no difference in the relief sought, nor in

plaintiff’s legal basis in seeking that relief, from when she

brought the issue before Chief Judge Levi. Therefore, this case

is governed by the principle of stare decisis. Moreover, the

merits of the application, even if this issue had not already

been decided, do not require a temporary restraining order. See

Arcamuzi v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 819 F.2d 935, 937 (9th

Cir. 1987) (applicants for a TRO must meet the general equitable

requirements for an injunction by showing a likelihood of success

on the merits, a significant threat of irreparable injury, and

that legal remedies are inadequate).1 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for a

temporary restraining order be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

DATED: October 14, 2005

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