Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00201/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00201-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the 1

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

At the end of Plaintiff’s rebuttal case defense counsel 2

previously moved for JMOL under 50(a). That motion, which was

denied, was a prerequisite for bringing the present Rule 50(b)

motion. Janes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 279 F.3d 883, 886-87

(9 Cir. 2002). th

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ELAINE STEVENSON,

NO. CIV. S 03-0201 MCE PAN

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, CRAIG

HILL, JOHN McGINNESS and DOES

1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through this motion, Defendants move for Judgment as a

Matter of Law (“JMOL”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure1

50(b). Alternatively, the defense requests that the Court order 2

a new trial on grounds that the verdict reached by the jury was

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against the weight of the evidence and resulted in a miscarriage

of justice. As set forth below, Defendants’ Motion is denied.

ANALYSIS

A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

A JMOL is proper only if “the evidence, construed in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one

reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to that of

the jury.” White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1010 (9 Cir. th

2002). To justify relief through a JMOL, there must be a

“complete absence of probative facts to support ... [the]

conclusion reached so that no reasonable juror could have found

for ... [the] nonmoving party.” Eich v. Board of Regents for

Central Missouri State Univ., 350 F.3d 752, 761 (8 Cir. 2003). th

Although Defendants also request a Judgment Notwithstanding

the Verdict (“JNOV”), that in essence is an outdated reference to

what now is properly denominated as a JMOL. See United States ex

rel. A Homecare, Inc., v. Medshares Management Group, Inc., 400

F.3d 428, 447 n. 14 (6 Cir. 2005). The standards for granting th

a JMOL and JNOV are identical. 

Defendants argue that they are entitled to JMOL because of

the jury’s finding that Defendant McGinness would have made the

decision to transfer Elaine Stevenson irrespective of her

protected speech arising from the People v. Luna case. Because

McGinness made the ultimate decision to transfer Stevenson out of

the Homicide Bureau, the defense contends that Defendant Hill

cannot be liable since McGinness’ decision was based on

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legitimate grounds. 

In Mount Healthy City Bd. Of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274

(1977), the Supreme Court articulated the proper analysis for

assessing claims of illegal retaliation for the exercise of

protected speech. Under that analysis, once it is determined

that the speech in question is protected (an uncontroverted fact

in the present case), a plaintiff must show that such speech was

a “substantial” or “motivating” factor in the decision to take

adverse action against him/her. If the plaintiff carries that

burden, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the same decision would have

been reached even in the absence of the protected conduct. Id.

at 287.

The defense claims here that because the jury found (in

Question No. 3 of its verdict) that Stevenson’s protected speech

was not a substantial factor in McGinness’ decision to transfer

her, any improper motive of Hill’s in merely recommending the

transfer is “superceded and nullified”. The defense hence

contends that no damages can flow from McGinness’ decision under

a Mount Healthy analysis. 

To support its analysis, the defense relies on out-ofcircuit authority, most prominently the Eighth Circuit’s decision

in Ingrum v. Nixa Reorganized School Dist., 966 F.2d 1232 (8th

Cir. 1992). In that case, the jury awarded the plaintiff damages

even through it found that the school district would not have

renewed plaintiff’s teaching contract irrespective of her

protected speech in complaining about certain conduct on the part

of the school principal. The district judge entered JNOV on

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grounds that this posed an inconsistency. In affirming the

district court’s decision in that regard, the Eighth Circuit

found it did not matter that the principal’s underlying

recommendation was “impermissibly motivated”. Because only the

school board had actual power to nonrenew plaintiff’s contract,

the Ingrum court reasoned that the board’s decision not to do was

made regardless of plaintiff’s protected speech. According to

the defense herein, the decision in Ingrum is on all fours with

the present case and mandates that JMOL be granted. 

The problem with Defendants’ argument, as Plaintiff points

out, is that Ingrum is not Ninth Circuit precedent, and cases

that have been decided by the Ninth Circuit appear inapposite. 

In Ostad v. Oregon Health Sciences University, 327 F.3d 876 (9th

Cir. 2002), a medical resident claimed that his termination by

Oregon Health Sciences University (“OHSU”) was motivated by his

questioning of billing practices employed by an OHSU physician,

Dr. Alan Seyfer. Plaintiff’s challenge to Dr. Seyfer’s decision

to place him on administrative leave, allegedly as a result of

patient treatment issues, was referred to a panel of five doctors

for review. That panel, which knew nothing about plaintiff’s

challenge to Dr. Seyfer’s billing practices, ultimately decided

that plaintiff should be terminated. At trial, the jury

nonetheless found that defendants had failed to establish that

plaintiff would have been terminated in the absence of his

protected speech activity in protesting the billing practices. 

The district court denied defendants’ JMOL request, which was

made on grounds that the panel’s decision to terminate plaintiff

without knowledge of those activities cut off any chain of

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causation between Seyfer’s improper motives and plaintiff’s

ultimate termination. 

The Ninth Circuit, after framing the issue in terms of

whether the jury “properly could have found, on the record before

it, that [plaintiff’s] protected conduct played a substantial or

motivating factor in the decision to terminate his residency”, 

flatly disagreed with the defense argument that the panel’s

“independent decision severed any link between Seyfer’s allegedly

improper motives and [plaintiff’s] termination.” Id. at 882. 

The Ostad court approvingly cited the Ninth Circuit’s earlier

decision in Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 838, 855

(9 Cir. 1999). Gilbrook held that a subordinate like Defendant th

Hill cannot use the nonretaliatory motive of a superior

(McGinness) as a shield against liability if that superior would

never have considered adverse action but for the subordinate’s

retaliatory conduct. Although the Ostad court also cited

Gilbrook for the proposition that it did not express any opinion

on what the result would be if the facts “showed that the final

decision-maker made a wholly independent, legitimate decision to

discharge the plaintiff, uninfluenced by the retaliatory motives

of a subordinate” (Id. at 883), the circumstances of Ostad

demonstrated that Dr. Seyfer laid the groundwork for and

initiated the discipline hearings that resulted in plaintiff’s

termination. The Ninth Circuit therefore found that Seyfer could

properly be held liable for his recommendation even though the

panel, as the final decision maker, was not aware of plaintiff’s

protected activity. 

As indicated above, the Court, in determinating whether JMOL

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is appropriate, must resolve all inferences in favor of Detective

Stevenson as the non-moving party. Utilizing that standard, the

jury could have determined that Hill’s improperly-motivated

recommendation in fact “laid the foundation” for the process

leading to Stevenson’s transfer. That factor, along with the

fact that Dr. Seyfer’s testimony as to the plaintiff’s competence

was relied on by the hearing panel, was what the Ninth Circuit

accepted in Ostad as the underpinning for Seyfer’s liability. 

Here, the jury heard testimony that McGinness himself had no

adverse dealings with Detective Stevenson prior to discussions

initiated by Defendant Hill about Plaintiff’s allegedly

unacceptable behavior, and in fact McGinness had given Plaintiff

positive performance evaluations. Given those circumstances, the

jury could have reasonably concluded that McGinness would not

have taken the action he did absent Hill’s recommendations --

which the jury found were improperly motivated. 

As was the case in Gilbrook, the jury found here that while

Hill’s initial recommendation was made with a retaliatory motive,

the ultimate decision by McGinness did not share that motive. 

Nonetheless, where the retaliatory motive “set in motion the

chain of events that led .... to the adverse employment action”,

an employee like Hill is not immunized against liability. 

Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 855. That reasoning supports the jury’s

findings against Hill in this case. In addition, the evidence,

as construed most favorably to Stevenson, does not unequivocally

show that McGinness’ decision was “wholly independent” from the

recommendations he received from Hill so as to absolve Hill from

any liability. 

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Because the jury’s finding is not incompatible either with 

the facts or with applicable case law, JMOL is inappropriate and

must be denied.

B. Motion for New Trial 

As an alternative to their request for JMOL, Defendants also

argue that a new trial should be ordered because the verdict

ultimately reached by the jury was against the weight of the

evidence. A district court has discretion to grant a new trial

when the jury’s verdict is contrary to the “clear weight of the

evidence”, or is based on false evidence. Rattrary v. City of

Nat’l City, 51 f.3d 793, 800 (9 Cir. 1994). A verdict is th

against the clear weight of the evidence when, after giving full

respect to the jury’s findings, the judge “is left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed by

the jury.” Landes Const. Co., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833

F.2d 1365, 1371 (9 Cir. 1987). A new trial may also be ordered th

when needed to prevent a “miscarriage of justice”. Rattray, 512

F.3d at 800. In ruling on a motion for new trial, “the judge can

weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses, and

need not view the evidence from the perspective most favorable to

the prevailing party.” Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co.,

Ltd., 880 F.2d 176, 190 (9 Cir. 1989). th

In support of their request for a new trial, the defense

makes the same argument enumerated above -- that Hill was not the

ultimate decision maker -- in attempting to argue that the

verdict was against the weight of the evidence and/or would

result in a miscarriage of justice. Defendants also argue that

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virtually every witness except Plaintiff and her partner, Dave

Wright, testified that Plaintiff was confrontational and

disrespectful. They argue that the jury’s verdict should not

stand against that “overwhelming” evidence. Plaintiff, on the

other hand, argues that Defendant Hill made the recommendation to

transfer Plaintiff Stevenson just two months after she testified

in the People v. Luna suppression hearing, armed with instances

of alleged misconduct which for the most part occurred after

Stevenson reported Hill’s conduct regarding Luna to the District

Attorney. 

Although there was considerable evidence that Stevenson was

transferred due to her own volatile behavior, evidence indicating

that Hill made the recommendation to transfer Plaintiff soon

after she testified at the People v. Luna suppression hearing was

also presented. The jury decided that Hill’s retaliatory animus

as a result of People v. Luna prompted the process that led to

her transfer. That conclusion was a plausible one and not

contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. The Motion for New

Trial is denied.

C. Verdict Against Defendant McGinness

In assessing a verdict like the one returned by the jury in

the initial phase of this case, which consists of special

interrogatories comprising a general verdict, the Court has a

duty under the Seventh Amendment to harmonize any seemingly

inconsistent answers if permitted by a fair reading of the

verdict as a whole. See White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998,

1005 (9 Cir. 2002). th

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In this case, although the jury’s answer to Question No. 4

found that Defendant McGinness would have transferred Plaintiff

regardless of her protected speech arising from the People v.

Luna case (in response to the same question the jury also found

that Defendant Hill would not have recommended her transfer

absent her involvement in Luna), the jury nonetheless proceeded

to conclude in response to Question No. 5 that Stevenson had

suffered damage as a result of the acts or omissions of both Hill

and McGinness. In Question No. 6, the jury determined that

Plaintiff suffered past economic loss totaling $20,000 and noneconomic damages in the amount of $75,000 due to those acts or

omissions.

At oral argument on the post-trial motions in this case,

held on September 26, 2005, defense counsel contended that a fair

reading of the verdict as a whole cannot support imposition of

any damages against Defendant McGinness, since the jury concluded

that he acted without knowledge of Plaintiff’s protected speech.

The Court agrees. The jury concluded that Hill did have

retaliatory animus in recommending Plaintiff’s transfer and could

therefore incur liability on that basis for the transfer pursuant

to the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Ostad and Gilbrook as

discussed above. However, the jury also concluded in its answers

to the special interrogatories that McGinness was not

impermissibly motivated in making the actual decision to transfer

Plaintiff. As such McGinness is not personally liable for that

decision, and cannot be responsible for resulting monetary

damages, even if Plaintiff was in fact “damaged” by his approval

of Plaintiff’s transfer. In the Court’s view, this is the only

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fair reading of the jury’s response to Question No. 5 which must

be viewed in context of the remainder of the verdict, and is

therefore the only reading of the verdict that harmonizes any

potential inconsistency as required by the Ninth Circuit in

White. Hence, the monetary damages awarded by the jury can only

be against Defendant Hill.

Concurrently with the filing of this order a Second Amended

Judgment will also be filed which clarifies that the monetary

damages assessed by the jury are against Defendant Hill, only.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a

Matter of Law, or alternatively for a new trial, is DENIED. The

judgment in this matter will, however, be amended to reflect that

the monetary damages imposed by the jury are solely against

Defendant Hill and that a mistrial was declared on the issue of

punitive damages.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 28, 2005

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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