Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01416/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01416-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:3601 Fair Housing Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TODD WHITE, on behalf of himself, and 

as proposed guardian ad litem for JAMES 

WHITE, an individual

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAN DIEGO SUNRISE 

MANAGEMENT COMPANY, a 

California corporation; NICKIE WHITE, 

an individual; SILVIA CHAIREZ, an 

individual; and DOES 1-100

Defendants.

Case No.: 17cv1416-JAH (LL)

ORDER:

1. GRANTING PLAINTIFF TODD 

WHITE’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[DOC. NO. 4]; AND

2. DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

This matter comes before the Court on motion for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis. On September 1, 2017, the Court received the First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”) signed by Todd White, a non-attorney, suing on behalf of himself and as a

proposed guardian ad litem for his disabled father, James White, (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”)

against Defendants San Diego Sunrise Management, Nickie White, Silvia Chairez, and 

Does 1-100 (collectively, “Defendants”). See Doc. No. 5. Todd White alleges Defendants 

violated specific sections of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and requests to proceed on behalf of himself and his father. 

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Todd White also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on 

behalf of himself, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Doc. No. 2. After careful review 

of the record and for the reasons set forth below, the Court (1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion 

for leave to proceed IFP, [doc. no. 2]; and (2) DISMISSES the FAC [doc. no. 1], as to 

Plaintiff Todd White, without prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief and DENIES 

Todd White’s request to proceed on Plaintiff James White’s behalf.

I. Plaintiff Todd White’s IFP Motion

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 492 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Courts grant leave to proceed IFP when 

plaintiffs submit an affidavit, including a statement of all assets, showing the inability to 

pay the statutory filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

Todd White, in support of his IFP motion, has applied to proceed in district court 

without paying fees or costs. See Doc. No. 2. Plaintiff is a self-employed legal professional,

earns an average monthly income of $125.00 per month, and during the 12 months

preceding his application, collected $195.00 per month in public assistance. Id. at 1-2. He 

lists no other income. Id. Plaintiff has a prepaid American Express account but lists no 

other bank accounts. Id. at 2. Plaintiff anticipates no major changes to his income over

the next twelve months and currently transitions between food pantries and soup kitchens.

Id. at 5. Based on the information presented, the Court finds Plaintiff sufficiently 

demonstrates his inability to pay the filing fee required to pursue the instant action. 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS the motion for leave to proceed IFP as to Plaintiff Todd 

White. 

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II. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

A. Legal Standard 

Notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or portion thereof, a complaint filed by 

any person seeking to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject 

to a mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal by the court to the extent it is 

“frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking 

monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 

Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (en banc). Section 1915(e)(2) mandates that the Court reviewing a complaint 

filed pursuant to the in forma pauperis provisions make and rule on its own motion to 

dismiss before directing that the complaint be served by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 4(c)(2). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127.

Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); 

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 

12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter 

Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 

326 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a 

dispositive issue of law.”). Alternatively, a complaint may be dismissed where it presents 

a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson, 

749 F.2d at 534. While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual allegations,” he must 

plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007).

To meet the requirements of Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). A 

claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In other 

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words, “the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, 

must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. Moss v. U.S. Secret 

Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

B. Insufficiency of Todd White’s Claim 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants San Diego Sunrise Management Company and 

Chairez failed to make necessary repairs or provide reasonable accommodations, increased 

the monthly rent by two-hundred dollars, and refused to renew the lease agreement with 

his father, James White unless Plaintiff, Todd White, vacated the rental unit. Plaintiff 

further alleges that Defendants’ acts are in violation of the American with Disabilities Act 

by denying him the opportunity to benefit from full and equal access to the dwelling and 

refusing to add him to the lease agreement. 

1. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1): Denial of a Dwelling

Plaintiff primarily relies on 42 U.S.C §3604(f) of the Federal Housing Act (“FHA”). 

Section 3604 (f)(1) makes it unlawful to discriminate in the rental of a dwelling, or to

otherwise deny a dwelling to any renter because of a handicap of: (a) the renter, (b) a person 

residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling, or (c) any person associated with the 

renter. To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) a plaintiff must prove 

discrimination in the rental, or denial, of a living space attributable to the plaintiff’s 

handicap, the handicap of a cohabitant or potential cohabitant, or the handicap of a person 

associated with the plaintiff. Plaintiff Todd White does not allege that he, himself, suffers 

from any physical or mental handicap. Although he sufficiently alleges that his father, 

James White is wheelchair bound, Plaintiff fails to allege a causal link between his father’s 

handicap and Defendants’ refusal to allow Plaintiff “full and equal access to the dwelling.”

Instead, Plaintiff alleges he was denied access to the rental dwelling as a form of retaliation 

for initiating a lawsuit against Defendants, not as a result of any handicap he or his father 

suffer. Accordingly, Todd White fails to state sufficient facts to state a claim under section 

3604(f)(1). 

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2. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2): Discrimination in the Terms, Conditions or Privileges

Section 3604(f)(2) makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the 

terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services 

or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap of: (a) that person, (b) 

a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling, or (c) any person associated 

with that person.1 For the purposes of this subsection, discrimination may include refusal 

to permit reasonable modifications of the premises, refusal to make reasonable 

accommodations in the polices or practices when necessary for use and enjoyment of the 

dwelling, or failure to design and construct dwellings accessible to physically handicapped 

persons. See 42 U.S.C §3604(f)(3). Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3), a plaintiff must prove 

all of the following elements: (1) that the plaintiff or his associate is handicapped within 

the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); (2) that the defendant knew or should reasonably be 

expected to know of the handicap; (3) that accommodation of the handicap may be 

necessary to afford the handicapped person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the 

dwelling; (4) that the accommodation is reasonable; and (5) that defendant refused to make 

the requested accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); United States v. California 

Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d 1374, 1380 (9th Cir. 1997).

Although Todd White alleges that the terms and conditions of James White’s lease 

agreement were modified, Plaintiff Todd White does not allege that he was a party to the 

lease agreement, nor that he has been discriminated against due to a physical or mental 

handicap. Accordingly, Todd White fails to state sufficient facts to state a claim under 

section 3604(f)(2). 

 

1 Plaintiff also references 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3) and (f)(4). Section 3604(f)(3) describes the various ways 

in which discrimination may occur for the purposes of this subsection and (f)(4) refers to the standard by 

which compliance is governed. 

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C. Todd White’s Standing to Bring Suit on Behalf of James White

The Complaint alleges that Defendants failed to make reasonable accommodations

including the installation of a wheel-chair ramp at the entry way to the apartment, a 

handicap accessible bathroom facility and “other necessary repairs” - presumably for James 

White’s use and enjoyment. Even assuming James White is an “aggrieved person” who 

either “claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice” or believes that 

such an injury “is about to occur” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 3613(a), 3602(i), Todd White 

must be appointed to bring suit on James White’s behalf.

Todd White filed the instant action on behalf of himself and as “proposed guardian 

ad litem2 for James White.” He requests permission of the Court to allow him to proceed 

on behalf of his disabled father and refers to Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Rule 17 states that “an action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party 

in interest,” unless brought by a duly appointed representative. Rule 17(a)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P.

The court must appoint a guardian ad litem--or issue another appropriate order--to protect 

a[n]... incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.” Rule 17(c)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. 

If a need is sufficiently pled, “[t]he [appointed representative] must be truly dedicated to 

the best interests of the [person] on whose behalf he seeks to litigate,” and not motivated 

by any personal gain. Smith v. Adamas, No. C 09-3764 PJH (PR), 2010 WL 458913, at *1 

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010).

The Complaint alleges James White is wheelchair bound and benefits from the inhome health care services of his wife and named co-defendant, Nikie White. The facts, as 

pled, are insufficient to determine whether James White is incompetent or incapacitated

and whether Todd White would be an appropriate legal representative. The Court therefore 

 

2 A guardian ad litem is appointed to represent minors or infants, but may also represent the legal interest 

of an adult who is incompetent or incapacitated. In California, however, a conservator is appointed to 

exercise the legal rights of another adult who cannot care for him or herself, is developmentally disabled 

or has been seriously impaired.

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DENIES Plaintiff Todd White’s request to proceed, as guardian ad litem on behalf of 

James White, or otherwise represent James White’s legal interests in this action.

D. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his pleading to state a claim unless it 

is absolutely clear the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 

1130 (noting that leave to amend should be granted when a complaint is dismissed under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect”). 

The facts, as pled in the FAC, call into question Todd White’s status as a “renter” as 

required under 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(1) and (2) of the Federal Housing Act. Further, the 

Complaint is ambiguous as to whether Plaintiff is alleging a physical or mental disability 

himself or only on behalf of James White. 

Nonetheless, the Court grants leave to amend to allow Plaintiff Todd White to allege

facts sufficient: (1) to state a claim for relief under the FHA and/or ADA on behalf of 

himself, (2) for the Court to determine whether James White is incompetent or 

incapacitated, and if so, the suitability of Todd White to proceed as guardian ad litem. 

Nothing contained within this order shall be construed to affect the legal rights and 

remedies of James White. Therefore, while the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to 

state a claim for relief, it will provide one final opportunity to cure the pleading deficiencies

as discussed in this order. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

III. Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY:

1. GRANTS Todd White’s Motion to Proceed IFP, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a) [Doc No. 4];

2. DISMISSES Todd White’s claims under the Federal Housing Act and the 

Americans With Disability Act without prejudice; and

3. GRANTS Plaintiff thirty (30) days leave to amend his Second Amended 

Complaint (“SAC”) in a manner that cures all the deficiencies of pleading 

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described in this order. Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that should he 

choose to file a SAC, it must be complete by itself, comply with the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 8(a), and that any claim not realleged 

will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. 

v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n 

amended pleading supersedes the original.”; Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 963 

F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to 

amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered 

waived if not repled.” 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 25, 2019

 

_________________________________

HON.JOHN A. HOUSTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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