Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-06602/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-06602-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Defendant Grayson has not been served.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANNY DEAN DELL’ANTONIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. CV-F-00-6602 REC SMS P

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

PROPOUND ADDITIONAL

INTERROGATORIES, DENYING MOTION

TO DEPOSE WITNESSES BY WRITTEN

QUESTIONS, DENYING MOTION TO

COMPEL, GRANTING MOTION FOR

EXTENSION OF DEADLINES, DENYING

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUPPLEMENT,

AND DENYING MOTIONS IN LIMINE

(Docs. 122, 123, 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, and

131)

I. Order Addressing Pending Motions

Plaintiff Danny Dean Dell’Antonia (“plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on plaintiff’s third

amended complaint, filed March 12, 2002, against defendant Edger for use of excessive force, and

defendants Grayson and Snow for acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical

needs.

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 Pending before the court are plaintiff’s motion for leave to propound interrogatories in

excess of Rule 33 limitations, two motions for leave to supplement his complaint, motion to depose

defendants and witnesses by written form, motion to compel, motion for an extension of deadlines,

and two motions in limine.

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A. Discovery Motions

1. Motion for Leave to Propound Additional Interrogatories

On January 24, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave of court to propound an additional

fifteen interrogatories each on defendants Snow and Edger (“defendants”), in excess of the limit set

in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33. (Doc. 122.) Defendants did not file a response. 

The court has reviewed plaintiff’s proposed interrogatories. Defendants did not object to

plaintiff’s request, and the interrogatories appear to be relevant and do not appear to be unduly

burdensome. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 33. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion shall be

granted. Plaintiff is limited to propounding the interrogatories that were included with his motion

and reviewed by the court. 

2. Motion to Depose Defendants and Witnesses in Written Form

On January 31, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave of court to depose defendants and

nonparty witnesses by written questions. (Doc. 125.) Defendants did not file a response to the

motion.

It is unnecessary for plaintiff to obtain leave of court to depose defendants and nonparty

witnesses who are not incarcerated. Fed. R. Civ. P. 31(a). If plaintiff chooses to depose defendants

and other unincarcerated witnesses by written questions, plaintiff is cautioned that he must comply

with Rule 31. Depositions by written questions entail more than simply mailing questions to the

deponents and awaiting their written responses. With respect to incarcerated witnesses, plaintiff has

not identified these witnesses. Therefore, the court declines to grant plaintiff leave to depose

unidentified incarcerated witnesses by written questions.

3. Motion to Compel

On March 2, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion to compel the California Department of

Corrections (CDC) to release defendant Grayson’s personnel file contents to the Marshal so that

service may be effected. (Doc. 127.) Defendants filed an opposition on March 15, 2005, and

plaintiff filed a reply on March 28, 2005. (Docs. 132, 135.) 

CDC is not a party to this action and cannot be compelled to release the information sought

by plaintiff in this manner at this time. The issuance of a subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure 45 is plaintiff’s only avenue of relief available in discovery. The court will, in a separate

order issued concurrently with this order, again direct the Marshal to initiate service on defendant

Grayson and seek the necessary assistance of the prison and CDC headquarters. The court and the

Marshal have a statutory duty to service process on plaintiff’s behalf, and the response given to the

Marshal by CDC to date is insufficient to allow the court to discharge this duty on the ground that

defendant Grayson cannot be located. 28 U.S.C. 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2). In the event that

the Marshal is unsuccessful, the court will consider a motion by plaintiff for the issuance of a

subpoena pursuant to Rule 45, should plaintiff choose to make such a request. 

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to compel is denied, without prejudice.

B. Extension of Deadlines

On March 2, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion seeking a ninety day extension of the deadlines

set forth in the court’s order of January 7, 2005. (Doc. 128.) Defendants filed an opposition on

March 15, 2005, and plaintiff filed a reply on March 28, 2005. (Docs. 133, 137.)

The discovery phase of this litigation opened on June 4, 2004, and the deadline for the

completion of all discovery was March 2, 2005. Pursuant to the court’s order of June 4, 2004,

plaintiff’s request for an extension of the discovery, amended pleadings, and pre-trial dispositive

motion deadlines was timely. Although plaintiff has been out of custody during this phase of the

litigation, plaintiff is a non-lawyer proceeding pro se, and there is no evidence in the record

indicating that plaintiff has abused the litigation process or failed to initiate discovery until the

eleventh hour. Therefore, the court will grant plaintiff’s request for an extension of the deadlines.

Because plaintiff did not specify what further discovery he needs, the court will limit the

extension of the discovery deadline to the interrogatories and depositions by written questions at

issue in plaintiff’s pending discovery motions. If plaintiff needs further discovery, he must seek

leave of court within thirty days and specify in his request what he needs and why he was not able

to seek it earlier. In addition, the court will extend the amended pleadings and pre-trial dispositive

motion deadlines for all parties.

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C. Motions to Supplement

On January 31, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to supplement his third amended

complaint along with a proposed supplemental complaint. (Doc. 123.) Defendants filed an

opposition to the motion on February 2, 2005. (Doc. 126.) On March 2, 2005, plaintiff filed a

second motion seeking leave to supplement his third amended complaint. (Doc. 124.) Although the

court docket reflectsthat plaintiff lodged a proposed supplemental complaint, the court does not have

the proposed supplement and therefore cannot review it. (Doc. 129.) 

Rule 15(d) provides that “upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and

upon such terms as are just, permit the party to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth

transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to

be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Rule 7 requires that an application to the court for leave

to file an amended complaint must “state with particularity the grounds therefor.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

7(b)(1). 

Neither of plaintiff’s motions satisfies Rule 7, as neither specifies the grounds for

supplementing the third amended complaint. Turning to the second motion first, the court cannot

ascertain from the motion what the proposed supplement to the third amended complaint is and the

court does not have the proposed supplement to review. Therefore, plaintiff’s second motion for

leave to supplement must be denied.

With respect to the first motion, in plaintiff’s proposed supplement, plaintiff requests that

CDC or its head of operations be added as a defendant, and that CDC stand accused with respect to

liability. First, plaintiff’s reliance on Rule 15(d) is misplaced. Where, as here, the claim against the

proposed party did not arise after the events set forth in the operative pleading, Rule 15(a) rather than

Rule 15(d) must be utilized to add the party.

Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend the party’s

pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. Otherwise,

a party may amend only by leave of the court or by written consent of the adverse party, and leave

shall be freely given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a). In this instance, a responsive

pleading has been served and plaintiff may not amend without leave of court.

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Plaintiff may not add either CDC or its head as a defendant in this action. The Eleventh

Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an unconsenting state.

Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted);

see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996); Puerto Rico Aqueduct

Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939

F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state agencies as well

as those where the state itself is named as a defendant. See Natural Resources Defense Council v.

California Dep’t of Tranp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996); Brook, 951 F.2d at 1053; Taylor v.

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that Nevada Department of Prisons was a state

agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College

Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). Because CDC is a state agency, it is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity from suit.

With respect to the Director of CDC, plaintiff has set forth no facts that give rise to a

cognizable claim for relief under section 1983 against the Director. The Civil Rights Act under

which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell

v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The

Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right,

within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In

order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named defendant with

some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights.

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Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld,

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief

under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that

supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional

rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a

policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving

force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal

citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading

standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

In sum, neither plaintiff’s motion nor plaintiff’s proposed supplement set forth any facts that

support allowing plaintiff to amend to name CDC or its Director as a defendant in this action.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion shall be denied.

D. Motions in Limine

Finally, on March 2, 2005, plaintiff filed two motions in limine seeking to exclude evidence

of his military and criminal records. (Docs. 130, 131.) Defendants filed an opposition on March 15,

2005, and plaintiff filed a reply on March 28, 2005. (Docs. 134, 136.)

Plaintiff’s motions are premature. In the event that this matter is set for trial, the court will,

at the appropriate juncture, issue an order setting the deadline for filing and opposing motions in

limine. Until such time, plaintiff’s motions are premature and shall be denied on that ground.

E. Order

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to propound additional interrogatories, filed January 24,

2005, is GRANTED, subject to the limitations set forth in this order;

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2. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to depose to defendants and witnesses by written

questions, filed January 31, 2005, is DENIED as to defendants and unincarcerated

witnesses as unnecessary, and is DENIED as to incarcerated witnesses because

plaintiff failed to identify the witnesses;

3. Plaintiff’s motion to compel, filed March 2, 2005, is DENIED, without prejudice;

4. Plaintiff’s request for an extension of the deadlines, filed March 2, 2005, is

GRANTED;

5. The discovery deadline is extended to June 29, 2005, and is limited to the

interrogatories and depositions by written questions addressed in this order;

6. If plaintiff needs further discovery, he must seek leave of court within thirty (30)

days from the date of service of this order and must specify in his request what he

needs and why he was not able to seek it earlier;

7. If defendants need further discovery, they may, within thirty (30) daysfrom the date

of service of this order, file a request for an extension of the discovery deadline;

8. The deadline to amend the pleadings is extended for all parties to July 29, 2005;

9. The deadline for filing pre-trial dispositive motions is extended for all parties to

August 29, 2005;

10. Plaintiff’s motions for leave to supplement his complaint, filed January 31, 2005, and

March 2, 2005, are DENIED; and

11. Plaintiff’s motions in limine, filed March 2, 2005, are DENIED as premature.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 26, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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