Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-07122/USCOURTS-caDC-12-07122-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 9, 2014 Decided August 29, 2014 

No. 12-7122 

AYANNA BLUE, 

APPELLANT

v. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:10-cv-01504) 

Natalie A. Baughman argued the cause for appellant. 

With her on the briefs was Scott D. Gilbert. Mark A. 

Packman entered an appearance. 

Carl J. Schifferle, Assistant Attorney General, Office of 

the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the 

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Irvin B. 

Nathan, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, 

and Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General. 

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and SRINIVASAN and 

PILLARD, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PILLARD. 

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PILLARD, Circuit Judge: Robert Weismiller, a 57-yearold teacher at a public high school for emotionally disturbed 

teens, started a sexual relationship with his 18-year-old 

student, Ayanna Blue, in the fall of 2008. Weismiller had 

been fired repeatedly from other area schools for 

inappropriate sexual contact with students, yet the District of 

Columbia hired him to teach emotionally vulnerable youths. 

In the chaotic and poorly supervised school at which he 

taught, Weismiller preyed on Blue, and within five months 

she was pregnant with his child. Blue sued Weismiller and 

the District of Columbia for damages from violations of her 

constitutional, statutory, and common-law rights arising out 

of Weismiller’s actions.1

 

In this appeal, Blue now seeks review of the district 

court’s order granting the District’s motion to dismiss. Blue’s 

appeal is premature, however, because this case lacks a final 

judgment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and no 

exception to that rule applies. Accordingly, we dismiss for 

lack of appellate jurisdiction. 

 

1

 The facts recited here are from the Second Amended Complaint, 

and are taken as true on appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a 

claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Atherton 

v. D.C. Office of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009). For 

simplicity we refer to the three municipal defendants collectively as 

the District. Blue also sued the District of Columbia Public 

Schools (DCPS) and former DCPS Chancellor Michelle Rhee, but 

the district court held that Rhee and DCPS are improper or 

redundant defendants, and Blue does not appeal that aspect of the 

district court’s decision. 

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I. 

The District of Columbia created the Transition Academy 

at Shadd (Shadd) as a special school for emotionally disturbed 

students. But the school was under-resourced and poorly run, 

with uncertified teachers, inadequate classrooms, and a lack 

of supervision and control so pervasive it was described as 

“unsafe for any student.” Education experts and District 

political leaders described the school as an “extreme 

disappointment,” a “failure,” and a “disaster.” Into this 

precarious setting the District hired Robert Weismiller, a man 

with a record of unlawful sexual contact with children at area 

schools. Before he joined the Shadd faculty, Weismiller had 

moved from school to school in the Washington D.C. area 

(the complaint lists nine different schools over more than 

three decades), had unlawful sexual relationships with at least 

four of his students, and was repeatedly fired for misconduct. 

Ayanna Blue was a student at Shadd in the fall of 2008. 

While Blue was enrolled in Weismiller’s class, he began to 

make sexual advances toward her. He told her, “If I were 30 

years younger, I would marry you.” He flirted with her, gave 

her his personal phone number, called her at home, and 

frequently drove her home from school in his car. Faculty 

and staff observed Weismiller spending time alone with Blue 

in the classroom almost every day, sometimes with the lights 

off. Weismiller had intercourse with Blue in the classroom 

and in his car. It was an open secret at Shadd that Weismiller 

and Blue were having sex. 

Shadd personnel knew that Weismiller’s conduct toward 

Blue was inappropriate. Several Shadd employees remarked 

on how much time the two spent alone together. Rumors 

spread that they were having sex. An aide reports that he told 

Weismiller not to allow Blue in his classroom when the aide 

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was there; another opined that he would not let an emotionally 

disturbed young woman spend so much time alone with a 

male teacher who was not her counselor. A teacher sought to 

“investigate” by going into Weismiller’s classroom at lunch a 

few times in an effort to observe the two together, but 

apparently took no further steps. In December 2008, Blue 

told school personnel that she thought she was pregnant. 

They sent her to the school’s health office for a pregnancy 

test. That test result was negative, but only a few months 

later, by early 2009, Blue was pregnant. The District 

investigated, found no reason to conclude that Weismiller had 

done anything wrong, and declined to fire or discipline him. 

Blue sued the District and Weismiller for compensatory 

and punitive damages arising out of the school’s and 

Weismiller’s treatment of her. Against the District she raised 

claims for negligent hiring and retention, and violation of her 

right to freedom from sex discrimination in education under 

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1681. Against both the District and Weismiller she claimed 

violations of her constitutional right to equal protection and 

bodily integrity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and breach of 

fiduciary duty and intentional infliction of emotional distress 

in violation of District of Columbia law. 

The District, but not Weismiller, moved to dismiss, and 

the district court granted that motion, dismissing Blue’s 

claims. Blue v. Dist. of Columbia, 850 F. Supp. 2d 16, 38 

(D.D.C. 2012). Blue’s Section 1983 claims failed for want of 

factual allegations that her harms resulted from a District 

custom, policy, or practice, id. at 23-31 (relying on Monell v. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)), and the Title IX 

claims foundered on the absence of allegations that an 

appropriate District official had actual knowledge of 

Weismiller’s conduct, id. at 31-36. Blue’s claims against the 

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District for violations of District of Columbia law failed 

because Blue did not comply with the District of Columbia’s 

sovereign immunity waiver statute, D.C. Code § 12-309, 

which requires that suits against the District be preceded by 

advance written notice to the Mayor, which Blue failed to 

provide.2

Following the district court’s order dismissing claims 

against the District, Blue moved that court to enter final 

judgment against the District pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 54(b). The court declined to do so while the 

claims against Weismiller remained unresolved because, 

according to the district court, “the issues [raised by the legal 

claims against each defendant] are largely intertwined and 

could thus result in piecemeal appeals.” J.A. 60.

Seven months later, Blue entered a joint stipulation of 

dismissal with Weismiller under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), agreeing that “this action shall be 

dismissed without prejudice, subject to a tolling agreement 

entered between the Parties.” J.A. 61-62. The docket reflects 

a Minute Order entered the same day that reads: “Pursuant to 

the parties’ joint stipulation of Dismissal, the Court ORDERS 

that the case against Defendant Weismiller is DISMISSED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.” J.A. 8. 

Blue now appeals the district court’s order dismissing her 

claims against the District. 

 

2

 Blue relied on the DCPS investigative report into Weismiller’s 

conduct, which she argued gave District officials actual notice of 

her claims, but the district court held that the report did not suffice 

under the District of Columbia courts’ precedents requiring that the 

District’s sovereign immunity waiver be strictly interpreted. Blue, 

850 F. Supp. 2d at 36-38. 

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II. 

In order to establish that we have jurisdiction over her 

appeal, Blue must show that she appeals from a final order of 

the district court. Our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 is generally limited to review of “final decisions.” A 

decision is not final unless it “ends the litigation on the merits 

and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the 

judgment.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 521-

22 (1988) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 

(1945)). The final judgment rule means that “a party must 

ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal following 

final judgment on the merits.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 

v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981). The rule serves the 

policy of the federal courts, dating from the Judiciary Act of 

1789, disfavoring piecemeal appellate review. That policy 

protects the district court’s independence, prevents multiple, 

costly, and harassing appeals, and advances efficient judicial 

administration. See Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. 

198, 203-04 (1999). The district court here has not 

denominated any order in this case as final and appealable. 

The difficulty for Blue is that she has not appealed her 

claims against both defendants, but only the order dismissing 

her claims against the District, while she relies on a voluntary 

dismissal and tolling agreement to hold her claims against 

Weismiller for later resolution. The finality of any order, like 

Blue’s, that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims, or claims 

against fewer than all of the parties, is determined by Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). According to that Rule: 

[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, 

that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights 

and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end 

the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be 

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revised at any time before the entry of a judgment 

adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights 

and liabilities. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Under the terms of Rule 54(b), the 

order from which Blue seeks to appeal is non-final and so 

non-appealable because it did not adjudicate the claims 

against Weismiller. 

Rule 54(b) has two exceptions of potential relevance 

here. First, if the district court finds that there is no reason for 

delay and that entry of final judgment is warranted, it may 

enter final judgment on fewer than all the claims. Second, if 

the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the remaining claims, she 

can in some circumstances thereby finalize the district court 

proceedings for purposes of appeal. We consider in turn each 

of these exceptions as they relate to Blue’s appeal. 

A. 

The district court has authority under Rule 54(b) to 

“direct entry of a final judgment” as to less than the entire 

case by making an express determination “that there is no just 

reason for delay” in entering an appealable order as to some 

of the claims or parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). That exception 

enables the district court to “meet the demonstrated need for 

flexibility” in providing for appellate review in complex 

cases, by acting as a “dispatcher . . . permitted to determine, 

in the first instance, the appropriate time when each final 

decision upon one or more but less than all of the claims in a 

multiple claims action is ready for appeal.” Sears, Roebuck & 

Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 435 (1956) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The Rule thus creates an avenue by which a 

district court may expressly authorize an appeal from an order 

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disposing of part of a case “without waiting for final decisions 

to be rendered on all claims in the case.” Id. 

That exception is unavailable to Blue here, however, 

because the district court expressly denied her motion for 

entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b), in view of the thenpending, related claims against Weismiller. Blue has since 

stipulated to dismiss the claims against Weismiller, and she 

now points to that stipulation in support of her contention that 

judgment is final. The joint stipulation of dismissal with 

Weismiller was sufficient to finalize proceedings in the 

district court, she urges, because she voluntarily dismissed the 

“entire action” against him, rather than “only a complaint” or 

a “single claim.” Appellant Br. at 14-18; Appellant Reply Br. 

at 5-7. But Blue does not now seek to appeal any dismissal of 

“the entire action,” nor could she, as the claims against 

Weismiller have not been decided. And Blue concedes that 

the district court has not revisited its earlier denial of final 

judgment as to the order dismissing the claims against the 

District that is under appeal, see Oral Arg. Rec. at 10:55-

11:30, nor has she moved it to do so. The district court’s 

denial of Blue’s motion for final judgment remains the court’s 

last word on Blue’s claims against the District despite Blue’s 

subsequent voluntary dismissal, so the order from which Blue 

appeals is not final and appealable. 

B. 

The second exception is also unavailable to Blue, because 

her stipulation of voluntary dismissal does not suffice to 

finalize the order she seeks to appeal. The dismissal was 

party-initiated, without prejudice, and subject to a confidential 

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settlement agreement with a tolling provision.3

 Such a 

dismissal does not create a single, final disposition for 

appellate review because it does not merge the claims thereby 

dismissed into the court’s earlier order. It accordingly fails to 

provide the requisite assurance that the trial court proceedings 

were complete and will not result in multiple, piecemeal 

appeals. As noted, the record fails to show that the district 

court ever took the steps Rule 54(b) requires. The district 

court neither (1) found that there is no reason for delay of 

appeal of the claims against the District nor (2) directed entry 

of judgment separately on those claims. The voluntary 

dismissal does nothing to cure that defect. 

Every circuit permits a plaintiff, in at least some 

circumstances, voluntarily to dismiss remaining claims or 

 

3

 The parties filed their stipulation “pursuant to Rule 

41(a)(1)(A)(ii),” but that subpart limits voluntary dismissal—once 

the opposing party has answered, as Weismiller had—to cases in 

which the plaintiff files a stipulation of dismissal “signed by all 

parties who have appeared.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). The 

District had appeared, yet did not sign the stipulation. Blue 

alternatively contends that, even if her failure to get the District 

defendants’ signatures made her ineligible for a Rule 41 voluntary 

dismissal under subsection (a)(1), the voluntary dismissal was 

nonetheless effective under subsection (a)(2). That provision 

empowers a court to permit a voluntary dismissal “by court order,” 

on “terms that the court considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). 

Blue characterizes the Minute Order as a Rule 41(a)(2) court order 

authorizing her voluntary dismissal, but there is no indication that 

the district court meant it as such. It is thus unclear both whether 

the incompletely signed stipulation was valid under Rule 41(a)(1) 

and whether the court meant to approve dismissal under Rule 

41(a)(2). Because it is immaterial whether the dismissal in this case 

was pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) or Rule 41(a)(2), we need not resolve 

these Rule 41 issues. 

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remaining parties from an action as a way to conclude the 

whole case in the district court and ready it for appeal. In 

order to thus produce an appealable final order, however, a 

voluntary dismissal typically must be made with prejudice. 

In Robinson-Reeder v. American Council on Education, for 

example, where we lacked jurisdiction over an appeal as to 

Title VII claims because related defamation claims had been 

dismissed only without prejudice, we noted that “[t]here is 

little doubt” that the Title VII claims would have been 

appealable “had the remaining claim been dismissed with

prejudice.” 571 F.3d 1333, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Other 

circuits, too, treat voluntary dismissals of all remaining claims 

as sufficient to finalize a district court order for review when 

those dismissals are made with prejudice. See John’s 

Insulation, Inc. v. L. Addison & Assocs., Inc., 156 F.3d 101, 

107 (1st Cir. 1998); Ali v. Fed. Ins. Co., 719 F.3d 83, 89-90 

(2d Cir. 2013); Trevino-Barton v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Bank, 919 

F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1990); Independence News, Inc. v. City 

of Charlotte, 568 F.3d 148, 153 & n.2 (4th Cir. 2009); 

Marshall v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 378 F.3d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 

2004); Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 

Mut. of Ohio, 982 F.2d 1031, 1034 (6th Cir. 1993); West v. 

Macht, 197 F.3d 1185, 1188 (7th Cir. 1999); Helm Fin. Corp. 

v. MNVA R.R., 212 F.3d 1076, 1080 (8th Cir. 2000); 

Romoland Sch. Dist. v. Inland Empire Energy Ctr., LLC, 548 

F.3d 738, 750 (9th Cir. 2008); Martin v. Franklin Capital 

Corp., 251 F.3d 1284, 1288 (10th Cir. 2001); OFS Fitel, LLC 

v. Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., 549 F.3d 1344, 1356 (11th 

Cir. 2008). 

Where the voluntary dismissal is without prejudice to 

refiling the dismissed claims, as was Blue’s stipulation here, 

there is no similarly universal consensus. Some circuits allow 

dismissals without prejudice to finalize trial court proceedings 

for appellate review at least some of the time. See, e.g.,

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James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th 

Cir. 2002); Mo. ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 164 

F.3d 1102, 1106 (8th Cir. 1999). Every circuit, however, 

appears to acknowledge a presumption against that practice. 

See Robinson-Reeder, 571 F.3d at 1338-39 & n.6; see also 

Scanlon v. M.V. SUPER SERVANT 3, 429 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 

2005); Ali, 719 F.3d at 88; Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. 

Scottsdale Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 431, 438 (3d Cir. 2003); Waugh 

Chapel S., LLC v. United Food & Commercial Workers 

Union Local 27, 728 F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 2013); Swope v. 

Columbian Chems. Co., 281 F.3d 185, 192 (5th Cir. 2002); 

Laczay v. Ross Adhesives, 855 F.2d 351, 354 (6th Cir. 1988); 

Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 322 F.3d 918, 923 

(7th Cir. 2003); Helm Fin. Corp., 212 F.3d at 1080; 

Romoland Sch. Dist., 548 F.3d at 748; Jackson v. Volvo 

Trucks N. Am., Inc., 462 F.3d 1234, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006); 

State Treasurer v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 14-16 (11th Cir. 1999); 

15A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. 

Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3914.8, at 623-

24 (2d ed. 1992) (endorsing a rule that would require 

plaintiffs to fully abandon their remaining claims in exchange 

for the right of immediate appeal). 

In keeping with that broad consensus, our circuit treats 

voluntary but non-prejudicial dismissals of remaining claims 

as generally insufficient to render final and appealable a prior 

order disposing of only part of the case. See RobinsonReeder, 571 F.3d at 1338-40. In Robinson-Reeder, we found 

insufficient the plaintiff’s effort to finalize for appeal the 

district court’s dismissal of her Title VII claim because her 

stipulated dismissal of her other claim was without prejudice. 

Id. at 1335-36. We held that we lacked jurisdiction over that 

appeal because dismissal of the “only remaining . . . claim” 

was insufficient “to permit appeal of those . . . claims that the 

court did adjudicate.” Id. at 1338-40. 

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The purpose of Rule 54(b) is to prevent parties from 

taking over the “dispatcher” function that the Rule vests in the 

trial judge to control the circumstances and timing of the entry 

of final judgment. Id. at 1340 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co., 

351 U.S. at 435). Rule 54(b) empowers the district judge to 

balance the benefits of quick review of an order disposing of 

part of a case against the risks of multiple appeals. The judge, 

not the parties, is meant to be the dispatcher who controls the 

circumstances and timing of the entry of final judgment. See 

id. We have declined to treat dismissals without prejudice as 

finalizing trial court proceedings for appellate review because 

routinely allowing appeals from non-prejudicial dismissals 

would undermine Rule 54(b)’s careful limits on piecemeal 

appeals. If a party’s non-prejudicial dismissal of any stillpending claims could, without more, render final and 

appealable any earlier order disposing of other claims, 

litigants, not district judges, would control the timing of 

appeal. Parties could agree to appeal their suit in stages, 

periodically dismissing all remaining claims without prejudice 

as they went, agreeing to reinstate them once the court of 

appeals weighed in on individual issues. The resulting 

fragmentary appeals would burden courts and litigants, foster 

uncertainty, and undermine the salutary aims that Rule 54(b) 

and the final judgment rule promote. 

Blue counters that, at least in some circumstances, 

dismissal without prejudice can render a district court order 

final and appealable. But Blue invokes cases of courtordered, involuntary dismissal, not the party-initiated 

voluntary dismissal at issue here. See, e.g., United States v. 

Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 794 n.1 (1949); 

Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

Involuntary dismissal, even when it is without prejudice, 

unlike party-initiated voluntary dismissal, does not threaten 

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the role of the district court as gatekeeper for the court of 

appeals. A court’s order of involuntary dismissal does not 

risk empowering parties to take over the district court’s 

“dispatcher function” and can therefore be treated as final and 

appealable consistent with Rule 54(b). 

The fact that Blue’s two groups of claims are against two 

different defendants does not mean that they should be treated 

differently from the distinct claims in Robinson-Reeder, all of 

which ran against the same defendant. The language and 

purposes of Rule 54(b) and Robinson-Reeder do not support 

any such distinction. Rule 54(b) was amended in 1961 to 

treat dismissals of fewer than all claims and fewer than all 

parties identically. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) advisory 

committee’s note to 1961 Amendment. The amendment 

reflects the reality that the values of Rule 54(b) are equally 

applicable in both situations. See Shirey v. Bensalem Twp., 

663 F.2d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 1981). Non-prejudicial dismissals 

of remaining parties, like non-prejudicial dismissals of 

remaining claims, could be used to generate overlapping 

lawsuits, piecemeal appeals, and splintered and harassing 

litigation. In each situation, it is equally important to avoid 

opportunities for party manipulation and wasteful litigation 

while empowering the district court, in appropriate 

circumstances, to authorize immediate review of orders 

disposing of only part of a case. 

Blue contends that, even if the joint stipulation of 

dismissal were alone insufficient to finalize the case for 

appeal, the district court’s entry of a Minute Order 

distinguishes this case from Robinson-Reeder. But the 

Minute Order appears to have been a ministerial 

acknowledgement of the parties’ joint stipulation and Blue’s 

attendant motion for voluntary dismissal. A district court 

must grant a motion for voluntary dismissal unless it finds 

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“that dismissal will inflict clear legal prejudice on a 

defendant.” Kellmer v. Raines, 674 F.3d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 

2012) (quoting Conafay v. Wyeth Labs., 841 F.2d 417, 419 

(D.C. Cir. 1988)). Because dismissal of claims against a 

defendant rarely prejudices that party, the grant of a voluntary 

dismissal is virtually automatic. There is thus no reason in 

law nor in the record in this case to conclude that the district 

court’s Minute Order was an affirmative finality 

determination intended to satisfy the requirements of Rule 

54(b). 

* * * 

Blue will be able to obtain appellate review of the district 

court’s dismissal of her claims against the District, but first 

she will have to obtain a final judgment from the district 

court. She might do so by asking the district court to 

reconsider its decision to deny her motion to enter judgment 

against the District pursuant to Rule 54(b) and expressly 

certify that there is no just reason for delay of Blue’s appeal 

of that dismissal. Alternatively, she might reinstate her 

claims against Weismiller by filing a Rule 15 motion to 

amend her complaint and litigate them to a final disposition, 

dismiss those claims with prejudice, or otherwise resolve 

them in a manner that satisfies the district court that entry of 

final judgment is warranted. 

Because we conclude that there is no final judgment 

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we dismiss this 

appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 

 So ordered. 

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