Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00121/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00121-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision *

without oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h). 

The caption has been amended to substitute R. James “Jim” 1

Nicholson as the Acting Secretary of Veterans Affairs. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BERTRAM L. CLARKE, )

) 2:05-cv-0121-GEB-KJM

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

R. JAMES “JIM” NICHOLSON, )

Secretary of Veterans Affairs, )

)

Defendant. )

1

)

Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

discrimination claim. (Def.’s Mot. at 1.) Plaintiff opposes the

motion. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 1.) 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a former employee of the Veterans Affairs

Medical Center located in Chico, California. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 3.) 

Plaintiff received a letter terminating his employment in March 2004;

the letter listed four charges as the basis for his termination. 

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges all four charges are discriminatory and he

was terminated because of his race. (Id.) 

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2

On April 23, 2004, Plaintiff contacted an Equal Employment

Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor with the Department of Veterans Affairs

(“DVA”) to discuss his termination. (Def.’s Ex. A at 1.) The EEO

counselor subsequently sent Plaintiff, care of his attorney George

Kucera, a Notice of the Right to File a Discrimination Complaint

(“Notice”). (Id.) The Notice stated that if Plaintiff decided to

file an EEO complaint, he was required to do so within fifteen days

from receipt of the Notice. (Id.) The Notice also stated that an EEO

complaint would be deemed timely only if it was postmarked or received

before the expiration of the fifteen-day filing period. (Id.) 

Mr. Kucera received the Notice via certified mail on June 3,

2004, and prepared Plaintiff’s EEO complaint on June 16, 2004. (Aff.

Kucera ¶¶ 4-5.) Mr. Kucera believes he deposited the EEO complaint in

a mail repository on either June 16, 2004, or June 17, 2004. (Id.) 

However, he has no knowledge of when the mail was taken from the

repository. (Id. ¶ 6.) 

The DVA received Plaintiff’s EEO complaint on July 6, 2004;

the envelope was postmarked June 29, 2004. (Def.’s Ex. A at 6.) The

DVA subsequently sent Plaintiff, care of Mr. Kucera, a letter

acknowledging receipt of the EEO complaint and listing the official

filing date of the complaint as June 29, 2004. (Def.’s Ex. D.) The

letter explained that if the EEO complaint was accepted, an

investigation would follow, but that if it was dismissed, Plaintiff

would receive a letter stating the reasons for the dismissal. (Id.) 

Several months later, the DVA sent Mr. Kucera a letter

stating that Plaintiff’s EEO complaint had been dismissed because he

had raised the same claim in a Merit Systems Protection Board Appeal. 

(Def.’s Ex. A at 7.) The letter also stated the dismissal constituted

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28 The standards applicable to motions for summary judgment 1

are well known and need not be repeated here. 

3

a final agency decision and informed Plaintiff of his right to either

appeal the decision or file a civil action in federal district court. 

(Id.) Plaintiff then filed this action, in which he alleges a single

discrimination claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 

(Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 9.) 

DISCUSSION1

Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to timely exhaust his

administrative remedies because he did not file his EEO complaint

within fifteen days of receiving the Notice. (Def.’s Mot. at 1;

Def.’s Reply at 2.) A plaintiff must timely exhaust administrative

remedies before filing a Title VII action in federal court. Ester v.

Principi, 250 F.3d 1068, 1071 (7th Cir. 2001). One administrative

remedy a plaintiff “must pursue is the filing of a formal complaint of

discrimination within 15 days of receiving notice of the right to do

so.” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106). Failure to timely file a

formal complaint “precludes a plaintiff from pursuing his

discrimination claim in federal court,” unless the plaintiff “can

prove waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling.” Girard v. Rubin, 62

F.3d 1244, 1246 (9th Cir. 1995); Boyd v. U.S. Postal Service, 752 F.2d

410, 414-15 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Plaintiff argues his EEO complaint was timely filed because

his attorney deposited it in a mail repository on either June 16,

2004, or June 17, 2004. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.) However, EEO regulations

provide that a complaint is timely filed only if it is postmarked or

received within fifteen days of receipt of the Notice. 29 C.F.R.

§§ 1614.106, 1614.604. Plaintiff received the Notice on June 3, 2004;

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 In Kushner, 1997 WL 419402, *6, the court stated that 2

“because Title VII assists lay people in resolving discrimination

complaints by requiring that they initiate the administrative

process first, the procedural requirements are not to be

interpreted too technically.” The court noted the plaintiff was

not an attorney, and then concluded that her complaint was timely

even though she filed her complaint after the fifteen-day deadline.

Id. Unlike Kushner, Plaintiff was represented throughout the

administrative process by an attorney who was aware of the

pertinent procedural requirements. (See Aff. Kucera ¶ 4.) 

4

thus, to be considered timely, his EEO complaint must have been

postmarked or received before June 18, 2004. However, Plaintiff’s EEO

complaint was postmarked June 29, 2004, and received July 6, 2004. 

(Def.’s Ex. A at 6.) Therefore, Plaintiff did not timely file his EEO

complaint. Miller v. Runvon, 32 F.3d 386, 388 (8th Cir. 1994) (EEO

complaint was untimely because it was filed five days after fifteenday deadline); Rice v. New England College, 676 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir.

1982) (EEO complaint was untimely because it was filed one day late);

Rao v. Baker, 898 F.2d 191, 197-98 (D.D.C. 1990) (EEO complaint was

untimely because it was filed three days late); but see Kushner v.

Glickman, 1997 WL 419402, *6 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (EEO complaint was

timely even though the plaintiff “missed the deadline by a matter of

days”). Consequently, Plaintiff cannot pursue his discrimination 2

claim in federal court unless the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, or

equitable tolling apply. 

Plaintiff argues the DVA waived its timeliness objection

because it accepted and processed his EEO complaint. (Pl.’s Opp’n

at 4.) However, the DVA had two options after receiving Plaintiff’s

complaint: to dismiss it, or to accept it and investigate the charges. 

(Def.’s Ex. D.) The DVA dismissed the complaint, a priori, it did not

accept or investigate it. (Def.’s Ex. A at 7.) Furthermore, even if

the DVA had accepted the complaint, “[t]he mere receipt and

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Plaintiff cites Huntly v. Dep’t of Health, Educ., & 3

Welfare, 550 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1977), for the proposition that an

agency waives an objection to a late filing when the agency

processes and acts on a claim. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 5.) “However, in

Oaxaca v. Roscoe, 641 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit

subsequently confined Huntly to cases where the agency

investigation resulted in a finding of discrimination.” Saltz v.

Lehman, 672 F.2d 207, 209 (D.D.C. 1982). Therefore, the Fifth

Circuit has “rejected the contention that, by merely accepting and

investigating a tardy complaint, an agency waives its objection to

a [plaintiff’s] failure to comply with time-filing prescriptions.”

Id. 

5

investigation of a complaint does not waive [a timeliness] objection”

if the “investigation does not result in an administrative finding of

discrimination.” Boyd, 752 F.2d at 414; Ester, 250 F.3d at 1071, 3

n.1. Since the DVA dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint without making a

finding of discrimination, it did not waive its timeliness objection. 

(Def.’s Ex. A at 7.)

Plaintiff argues the doctrine of equitable estoppel should

apply because the DVA “made a final agency decision on his claim and 

. . . in reliance on [that] final agency decision . . . [he filed]

this action in this Court.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.) Equitable estoppel

“focuses primarily on the actions taken by the defendant in preventing

a plaintiff from [timely] filing suit.” Johnson v. Henderson, 314

F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 2002) (“equitable estoppel . . . come[s] into

play ‘if the defendant takes active steps to prevent the plaintiff

from suing in time’ . . . [i.e.] fraudulent concealment”); Boyd, 752

F.2d at 414 (equitable estoppel applies when the plaintiff is

“affirmatively mislead” by the defendant). However, Plaintiff has

produced no evidence that Defendant affirmatively mislead him or took

active steps to prevent him from filing his complaint within the

fifteen-day filing period. 

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Further, the doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply. 

Equitable tolling excuses a plaintiff’s “failure to comply” with a

filing deadline if he “had neither actual or constructive notice of

the filing period.” Johnson, 314 F.3d at 414; Boyd, 752 F.2d at 414

(equitable tolling applies when the plaintiff is “unaware of the

appropriate administrative procedures”). Plaintiff had constructive

knowledge of the fifteen-day filing period because he was represented

by an attorney throughout the administrative process. See Leorna v.

U.S. Dept. of State, 105 F.3d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1997) (“once a

[plaintiff] retains counsel, [equitable] tolling ceases because [he]

has gained the means of knowledge of [his] rights and can be charged

with constructive knowledge of the law’s requirements”). 

Therefore, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s discrimination claim is granted. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 15, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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