Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03564/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03564-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHEARWOOD FLEMING,

Petitioner,

v

ANTHONY KANE,

Respondent.

 /

BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS,

Real party in interest.

 /

No C 05-3564 VRW

 ORDER

Petitioner Shearwood Fleming has filed a petition for writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 USC section 2254. Doc # 1. 

According to the petition, petitioner pled guilty to second degree

murder for his role in a homicide that occurred in 1980, when he was

twenty years old. Ptn at 9-10. He was sentenced in the superior

court for Los Angeles County to a term of fifteen years to life with

a two-year enhancement for use of a handgun. Id at 10. He is now

incarcerated at Soledad Correctional Training Facility in Monterey

County. Id at 9, 23. The petition does not allege that petitioner

has presented the claims of the petition to the state courts. 

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Case 3:05-cv-03564-VRW Document 11 Filed 07/05/06 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The gravamen of the petition is that petitioner has sought

parole on several occasions beginning in 1990 but has been denied

parole on each occasion. The most recent parole hearing, the one

specifically challenged by the petition, was on July 29, 2002. Ptn

at 15. Petitioner alleges that he has participated in numerous

programs available to him in prison, earned his high school

equivalency certificate, developed marketable skills through prisonbased vocational training and matured emotionally. Ptn at 7-8, 12-

13. He alleges that the stated justifications for denial of his

parole were legally insufficient in light of the terms of his plea

agreement and in light of his subsequent personal and vocational

accomplishments. 

The court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas

corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

USC § 2254(a); Rose v Hodges, 423 US 19,21 (1975).

A district court shall “award the writ or issue an order

directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be

granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant

or person detained is not entitled thereto. 28 USC § 2243. Summary

dismissal is appropriate only where the allegations in the petition

are vague or conclusory, palpably incredible, or patently frivolous

or false. Hendricks v Vasquez, 908 F2d 490, 491 (9th Cir 1990)

(quoting Blackledge v Allison, 431 US 63, 75-76 (1977)). 

While there is "no constitutional or inherent right of a

convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration

of a valid sentence," Greenholtz v Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr

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Case 3:05-cv-03564-VRW Document 11 Filed 07/05/06 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Complex, 442 US 1, 7 (1979), a state's statutory parole scheme, if

it uses mandatory language, may create a presumption that parole

release will be granted when or unless certain designated findings

are made, and thereby give rise to a constitutionally-protected

liberty interest, see Board of Pardons v Allen, 482 US 369, 376-78

(1987) (Montana parole statute providing that board "shall" release

prisoner, subject to certain restrictions, creates due process

liberty interest in release on parole); Greenholtz, 442 US at 11-12

(Nebraska parole statute providing that board "shall" release

prisoner, subject to certain restrictions, creates due process

liberty interest in release on parole). In such a case, a prisoner

gains a legitimate expectation in parole that cannot be denied

without adequate procedural due process protections. See Allen, 482

US at 373-81; Greenholtz, 442 US at 11-16. 

California's parole scheme uses mandatory language and is

largely parallel to the schemes found in Allen and Greenholtz to

give rise to a protected liberty interest in release on parole:

The panel or board shall set a release date

unless it determines that the gravity of the

current convicted offense or offenses, or the

timing and gravity of current or past convicted

offense or offenses, is such that consideration

of the public safety requires a more lengthy

period of incarceration for this individual, and

that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed

at this meeting.

Cal Penal Code § 3041(b). Accordingly, under the framework of Allen

and Greenholtz, "California's parole scheme gives rise to a

cognizable liberty interest in release on parole." McQuillion v

Duncan, 306 F3d 895, 902 (9th Cir 2002). The scheme creates a

presumption that parole release will be granted unless the

statutorily defined determinations are made. Id. This is true

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Case 3:05-cv-03564-VRW Document 11 Filed 07/05/06 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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regardless of whether a parole release date has ever been set for

the inmate, because "[t]he liberty interest is created, not upon the

grant of a parole date, but upon the incarceration of the inmate." 

Biggs v Terhune, 334 F3d 910, 915-16 (9th Cir 2003) (finding initial

refusal to set parole date for prisoner with 15-to-life sentence

implicated prisoner's liberty interest).

For good cause shown, the court now orders as follows: 

1. The clerk shall serve by certified mail a copy of this

order and the petition and all attachments thereto upon the

respondents and the respondent’s counsel, the Attorney General of

the State of California. The clerk shall also serve a copy of this

order on the petitioner’s counsel. 

2. Respondent shall file with the court and serve upon

the petitioner, within sixty (60) days of the issuance of this

order, an answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases, showing cause why a writ of habeas

corpus should not be issued. Respondent shall file with the answer

a copy of all portions of the state trial and appellate record that

have been transcribed previously and that are relevant to a

determination of the issues presented by the petition.

3. If the petitioner wishes to respond to the answer, he

shall do so by filing a traverse with the court and serving it upon

the respondents within thirty (30) days of his receipt of the

answer. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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