Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02117/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02117-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS CORONA, Civil No. 07-2117 BTM (NLS)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN

PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

V.M. ALMAGER, Warden, 

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Carlos Corona, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his San Diego County Superior Court conviction in case

number SCD160797 for one count of attempted murder. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 1 at 0016.) The jury

also found he personally used and discharged a firearm, that he caused great bodily injury or death by

personally using a firearm and that the attempted murder was committed for the benefit of a street gang.

(Id. at 0017.) 

Corona claims his federal constitutional rights were violated for the following reasons: (1) The

prosecutor removed African-Americans from the jury, in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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1

 The Court has renumbered the pages of the petition in numerical order for the sake of clarity.

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Amendment rights; and (2) he was prevented from presenting favorable evidence from a witness, in

violation of his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Pet. at 6-10.1

)

The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer and Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of the Answer, the Lodgments submitted by Respondent, and all the supporting

documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the documents and evidence presented in this case, and

for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the Petition be GRANTED as to claim one

of the petition and DENIED as to claim two.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct.

Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1)(West 2006); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings

of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory

presumption of correctness). The facts as found by the state appellate court are as follows:

On the night of August 13, 2003, Kenneth Guyton was shot five times by a man

whom Guyton identified as Corona. Guyton, age 38 at the time of trial, had used

methamphetamine since he was 19 years old. He had five felony convictions, and had

repeatedly been in prison. He was a member of an Otay gang, and when he was in prison

he was a member of the Hispanic “Southern” gang. His gang moniker was “Chapo.”

One of Guyton’s methamphetamine suppliers was Monica Yanez. Yanez sold

methamphetamine for the Mexican Mafia gang. Yanez frequently “fronted” Guyton the

drugs with the understanding that he would pay her later. In June or July 2003, Guyton

lost his job and was living in hotels or his truck. During the days preceding the shooting,

Corona had allowed Guyton to spend the night at a house in Eastlake where Corona was

living with a girlfriend. Corona, known as “Li’l Man,” was a member of the National

City “Locos” gang.

During this time period, Guyton had not paid Yanez for drugs she sold him

because he was unemployed. He owed Yanez $500, but he reduced the debt to $250 by

trying to help Yanez’s brother post bail. Guyton and Yanez had repeated phone

conversations about the money he owed her.

On August 13, 2003, Guyton played chess and smoked methamphetamine with

some visitors at the Eastlake house, and then “vegged out” at the house the rest of the

day. At some point Guyton noticed his cell phone, which had been plugged into the

wall, was no longer there. He asked Corona about the phone, but Corona stated he had

not seen it. Guyton never found his cell phone. That same day Yanez’s brother, Jose

Yanez, known as “Trips,” arrived at the Eastlake house. Trips and Corona worked on

installing a stereo in Trips’s car, an older model, black, two-door Bronco vehicle.

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 Corona was originally charged, along with 34 codefendants, in a 56-page indictment. His case was

eventually severed. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 0418.)

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In the evening, about two carloads of gang members arrived at the house. Yanez

was with the group. Guyton approached Yanez as she got out of her vehicle. Yanez

asked Guyton “Where’s my fucking money, Chapo?” Guyton told her he was working

on getting it. Yanez and the rest of the group entered the house, sat around for “a

minute,” and then left. The group had been getting ready to smoke methamphetamine,

but all of a sudden Yanez “looked disgusted” and changed her mind. Guyton walked

with Yanez out to the street and told her he was going to get her money to her. Yanez

gave him a look as if she were disgusted.

After the group left, Guyton started sorting laundry. However, Corona

interrupted him and told him to “get ready to go.” Around 9:30 p.m., Corona, Guyton,

and Trips left the house in Trips’s black Bronco. Trips was driving; Corona was sitting

in the front passenger seat; and Guyton was sitting in the backseat behind Corona.

Guyton thought they were going out “[t]o come up with the money” owed to Yanez.

While they were driving, Guyton fell asleep. When he woke up, he noticed they were

in east San Diego; he then fell asleep again until Corona woke him up and told him to

get out of the vehicle. Corona got out of the vehicle and moved the front passenger seat

back to allow Guyton to exit. When Guyton was outside the vehicle, Corona shot

Guyton, saying that the shooting had been “okayed by the homies,” and “‘this is for the

money that you owe Monica [Yanez]. [¶] ... [¶] This is for fucking with my bitches.’”

After he was shot, Guyton saw the headlights of another car coming up the street; he

managed to get in front of the car and told a man in the car he needed help.

During their investigation of the shooting, the police discovered that phone calls

to Yanez from Guyton’s cell phone were made minutes before and after the shooting.

At Yanez’s residence, the police found evidence of methamphetamine sales and a “pay

and owe” sheet indicating that “Chapo” (Guyton) owed Yanez $500. There was also a

notation indicating that “Li’l Man” (Corona) owed $1,090 to Yanez. Expert witnesses

testified that a drug debt can be “clean[ed] ... up” by performing a “hit” for the gang, and

that a gang may order a shooting or assault to set an example to other people who owe

money for drugs.

Corona presented an alibi defense through the testimony of a girlfriend, who

stated that Corona spent the night with her at her home in Lemon Grove on the night of

August 13, 2003.

(Lodgment No. 7 at 2-4.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 24, 2004, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office charged Carlos Corona

with one count of attempted murder in violation of California Penal Code (“Penal Code”) sections

187(a) and 664. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 1 at 0016.)2

 The District Attorney’s Office also alleged in the

amended indictment that Corona personally used a handgun, within the meaning of Penal Code section

12022.53(b), personally discharged a handgun, within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53(c),

personally used a handgun and proximately caused great bodily injury or death, within the meaning of

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Penal Code section 12022.53(d) and committed the attempted murder for the benefit of, at the direction

of, and in association with a criminal street gang, within the meaning of Penal Code section

186.22(b)(1). (Id. at 0017.) Corona was also alleged to have suffered a prior conviction for which he

had served a prison sentence. (Id. at 0050.)

Following a jury trial, Corona was convicted of attempted murder. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at

0455.) The jury also found the gun and gang allegations to be true. (Id. at 0455-56.) At a bench trial

following the verdicts, Corona admitted the prior conviction allegation. (Id. at 0452.) He was sentenced

to seventeen years on the attempted murder and gang enhancement charges and twenty-five years-to-life

for the charge of personally using a handgun which proximately caused great bodily injury or death.

(Id. at 0409-10.)

Corona appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate

District, Division One. (Lodgment No. 4.) The state appellate court affirmed his conviction in an

unpublished opinion filed October 20, 2006. (Lodgment No. 7.) He then filed a Petition for Review

in the California Supreme Court, which that court denied without citation of authority. (Lodgment Nos.

8, 9.) 

Corona filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court on November

5, 2007 [doc. no. 1]. Respondent filed an Answer and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of the Answer to the Petition on February 26, 2008 [doc. no. 8]. Corona did not file a Traverse.

IV. DISCUSSION

 A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (West 2006) (emphasis added). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

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claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 

“[The Anti Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act] establishes a ‘highly deferential standard

for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the

doubt.’” Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Woodford v. Viscotti, 537

U.S. 19, 24 (2002)). To obtain federal habeas relief, Corona must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or

§ 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets

§ 2254(d)(1) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.

Id. at 412-13; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through”

to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes

v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). A state court, however, need not cite Supreme Court

precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as

neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]”

id., the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

/ / /

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B. Analysis

Corona alleges the following claims in his petition. First, he claims he was denied his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights when the prosecutor improperly struck African-Americans from his jury

in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Second, he alleges that his Fifth, Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the prosecutor failed to disclose the fact that a

possibly exculpatory witness had moved out of state and the trial court refused to grant a continuance

to permit the defense to locate her or grant a motion for a new trial. (Pet. at 7-9.) Respondent contends

the state court’s adjudication of these claims was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Answer at 5-10.)

1. Batson Claim

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

prevents a prosecutor from systematically eliminating potential jurors on the basis of racial identity.

Batson, 476 U.S. 79. Corona argues the prosecutor systematically used his peremptory challenges to

exclude the only two African-American jurors, George O. and Edmund O., from his jury in violation

of the federal Constitution and Batson. Corona raised this claim in his petition for review filed in the

California Supreme Court which denied it without citation to authority. (Lodgment No. 9.)

Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the California appellate court’s opinion denying this

claim as the basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. 

a. Voir Dire of George O. and Edmund O. and The Trial Court’s Batson Inquiry

In its opinion, the state appellate court summarized the following facts, which are supported by

the record, and which lead up to the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes of George O. and Edmund O.:

The jury venire consisted of 50 prospective jurors. George O. and Edmund O.,

the only African-American prospective jurors, were seated next to each other and

identified as juror numbers 28 and 29.

As part of the voir dire process, the jurors orally answered a list of standard

questions the court had provided to elicit general background information. George O.

answered the questions on the questionnaire by stating he works in manufacturing; he

is single with no children; he had no prior jury duty and no friends in law enforcement

or the legal profession; and he thought he could be fair. Next, Edmund O. answered the

questions by stating he works as a senior custodian at a college; his wife works at the

same college; he has two children who work at a department store and at a community

college; he had two cousins in law enforcement both of whom are deceased; he has a

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3

 People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258 (1978) is the California version of Batson.

4

 On August 13, 2008, the Court directed Respondent to lodge a copy of the piece of paper upon which

the prosecution’s and defense counsel’s peremptory strikes were written. (See Order dated Aug. 13, 2008 [doc.

no. 9].) Respondent did so on October 20, 2008. (See doc. no. 10.)

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cousin who works as a detective for the Chicago police department; and there was no

reason he could not be fair.

The trial court then inquired whether any of the jurors had close friends or

relatives who had been victims of crimes similar to the ones alleged against Corona; i.e.,

attempted murder or assault with a firearm. Edmund O. advised the court that about 10

years earlier three of his cousins had been murdered in San Diego. Edmund O. explained

that detectives met with his family and told them they knew who committed the crimes,

but the detectives stated no charges would be filed because there was not enough

evidence. When asked how he felt about the fact that law enforcement did not pursue

the case, Edmund O. indicated that he understood they did not have any witnesses and

thus they could not make a case. Edmund O. stated there was nothing about the situation

that would prevent him from being a fair juror and that he believed he could set aside any

feelings he might have from the case involving his cousins.

During voir dire by defense counsel, defense counsel asked if the lives of any of

the jurors, or the lives of people they know, had been affected by gang activity. Edmund

O. stated that his mother was compelled to sell some property because she was contacted

by the City and was unable to control the gang activity on her property. Further,

Edmund O. stated he had two cousins who were in the Crips gang. In response to

defense counsel’s questions, Edmund O. stated he would not automatically convict, nor

would he lighten the prosecution’s burden of proof, if Corona was a gang member.

(Lodgment No. 7 at 5-9.)

Using two of his peremptory challenges, the prosecutor struck both George O. and Edmund O.,

the only two African-American prospective jurors, after which defense counsel made a Batson/Wheeler3

motion. (Lodgment No. 3 at 112-13; Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 53; Supp. Lodgment at 1-2.4) The trial

judge concluded that the defense had not made a prima facie showing under Batson and that there was

“sufficient indication from both [jurors] that gave rise to a peremptory challenge.” (Lodgment No. 2,

vol. 1 at 54.) With respect to George O., the judge stated he had difficulty understanding George O.’s

English and “that probably translated into a difficultly, at least not a sophistication, in understanding

English to the extent we are going to need it in this case . . . .” (Id.) With regard to Edmund O., the

judge said he had family members with criminal histories and who were in law enforcement, and that

there were “some issues with regard to those facing charges and having been victims of charges.” (Id.)

The following day, defense counsel made a motion for reconsideration of the Batson/Wheeler

motion in light of Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005) which the United States Supreme

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5

 It is not entirely clear what the judge was referring to, as Corona’s case had nothing to do with the sale

of cars. It appears that the judge may have been referring to the charges in the original indictment from which

Corona was severed.

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Court had decided the previous day. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 55-56.) In Johnson, the Supreme Court

held California’s requirement under Wheeler that a defendant must show it was “more likely than not”

a peremptory challenge was based on race was inconsistent with Batson, and the proper inquiry was

whether a challenge raised an “inference of discriminatory purpose.” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172-73. The

trial judge stated he had employed the appropriate “inference of discriminatory purpose” standard in his

prior ruling and not the “more likely than not” standard, and “[t]here were valid reasons that appeared

to be obvious to me on the record to support the challenges, whether [the jurors] were black, white or

green . . . .” (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 56.) Nevertheless, the judge gave counsel an opportunity to

make any further arguments with the clarified standard in mind. (Id. at 56-57.) 

Following the renewed arguments, the trial judge again noted George O.’s accent as the basis

for his conclusion there was no inference of a discriminatory purpose. The judge stated as follows:

THE COURT: I’ll reiterate what I said yesterday. With regard to – were both

individuals black? Yes, they were both black.

Obviously, [Edmund O.] was – the impression I got certainly was that he was

born in this country and raised in this country.

The impression I got from [George O.] was – just based upon what I perceived

to be a very thick accent, I, at times, had some difficulty understanding him. He

probably immigrated to this country and – is of African descent and immigrated to this

country. Not the fact that he’s black or immigrated, but the difficulty I had in

understanding him, notwithstanding the responses, would, in my mind, probably make

him not the appropriate juror for this particular case given the facts of this case.

There are a series of, from what I recall, some relatively complex issues that the

jury is going to have to resolve in the matter with regard to the sales of the cars and

people coming over and what they were doing.5

 I thought there was a basis for it.

(Id. at 57-58.) 

In an attempt to ensure compliance with Johnson, the judge then asked the prosecutor to explain

his reasons for the strike, and the prosecutor stated as follows:

MR. CAMPAGNA: Thank you. With respect to [George O.], I echo the court’s

thinking on it. That’s what I had noted. 

Also, in my mind, I had thought – because of the responses that he gave and the

way that he gave them, I had trouble understanding him. I felt that English was not his

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first language, at least it appeared to me to be the case from when he answered questions

in court.

Because of the nature of this case, there’s going to be a lot of – I think the court

is right on that. There’s going to be a lot of terminology. This case is going to be a lot

based on street slang terms regarding the Mexican Mafia that I think it’s going to be

difficult for someone who English is not their first language to maybe get up to speed on

that and maybe comprehend that as much as a person who does not have a language

difficulty. That was the primary reason I kicked him.

The other people – and I think there are cases – I don’t have them off the top of

my head, but there are cases that state that it’s a proper reason. I had people behind him

that were – that I wanted to get on the jury more, people that I felt would be better jurors.

I think that’s a proper reason in and of itself, although not the primary reason, as I stated

before. The primary reason was the language barrier.

With respect to [Edmund O.], . . .[t]he big thing I noted with him was that while

he did have relatives in law, he had three cousins, I think, that were murdered. And then

when we explored that more in depth with him, he actually said he had family members

that were Crips.

To me, just the nature of this case and the fact that he’s had such close ties with

the issues that are going to surround this case, being that he had family members who

were Crips – and my understanding from it, the inference that I drew was that the

murders and the family members who were Crips were somehow related. That may have

been an inference that I drew, but it was one that I drew. There was a relation. These

weren’t completely separate incidents.

And so based on those things, I felt – he also stated – I noted that he said that the

cops knew who did it. And he obviously didn’t – I don’t think he expressed animosity

towards the police. I didn’t get that feeling. But I just thought that added into sort of the

whole picture as someone who was just not right for this case.

In addition, I would note the order of these two men. And I think that is another

factor to consider. They were seated right next to each other in line. It’s true that they

were the only two African-American men on the panel. But had one been no. 1 and the

other been no. 50, I think it was basically because they were next to each other that then

obviously they are in a position where they are going to get – they are ripe for going to

be kicked. Had one been no. 50, I don’t think we would have ever gotten to that issue.

(Id. at 58-61.)

Defense counsel and the trial judge then had the following exchange:

MS. BRAUER: Your Honor, first of all, [George O.], I personally had no

problem understanding [George O]. It may be because I have an accent as well.

THE COURT: No.

MS. BRAUER: And certainly someone having an accent, I don’t think that’s a

legitimate reason for exercising a peremptory. 

There were absolutely no questions asked by anyone as to whether he had

sufficient command of the English language. So we really don’t know about that. We

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are drawing conclusions. The prosecution and the court is [sic] drawing conclusions

from his accent.

I would point out that an accent does not necessarily indicate that the person

doesn’t have a command of the language or doesn’t understand.

In regard to –

THE COURT: Let’s say, for example, that you are right and Tony is mistaken

in that assumption. I don’t believe that it was in this particular case. But for the sake of

argument, let’s say that it was an incorrect assumption.

Does that mean that because he exercises the challenge based upon a good faith

belief that that’s what would take place, that he should be penalized for it with the loss

of the panel that was picked? I don’t think that, in and of itself, smacks of a

discriminatory reason in the rejections.

MS. BRAUER: Your Honor, it would appear to me if he had been concerned

about that, he would have asked some questions about that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BRAUER: In regards to [Edmund O.], again, there was certainly no

animosity towards law enforcement that was expressed. The fact that he had both family

members who were murdered and family members that were gang members, I think that

cancels each other out.

The man was, I believe, a school custodian for a long period of time. I believe

his brother-in-law is in law enforcement. His friend’s daughter is a police officer. He’s

holding a city job. I don’t think that’s the type of person that would be hostile to the

prosecution’s arguments.

Again not enough questions were asked of him; what his feelings are, whether

or not he could give an impartial consideration of the evidence relating to gangs in this

case. So I still submit that the challenges were made improperly, in violation of Batson.

The fact that they were sitting next to each other, they were drawn at random.

I don’t see how that adds anything to the prosecution’s argument.

THE COURT: Thank you. The motion is denied.

(Id. at 61-62.)

b. Analysis of the Batson Claim 

An evaluation of the record leads this Court to conclude that the state appellate court’s denial

of this claim as it relates to George O. was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in state court. The denial also resulted in a decision that involved an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Accordingly, the

Court recommends the petition be GRANTED with respect to ground one. 

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i. The Appellate Court’s Opinion

As noted above, the prosecutor stated he struck George O. because (1) he had trouble

understanding George O.’s responses; (2) he felt English was not his first language; (3) it would be

difficult for a person whose first language was not English to understand the terminology and “street

slang” which would be used in Corona’s case; (4) he did not “get a feeling from him” and did not hear

a lot about why he would make a good juror; and (5) there were other individuals he wanted to get on

the jury more. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 58-59.) Regarding Edmund O., the prosecutor gave the

following reasons for the strike: (1) he had three cousins who had been murdered; (2) he had family

members who belonged to the Crips; (3) he drew an inference from Edmund O.’s responses that the

murders were related to his family’s membership in the Crips; (4) Edmund O.’s “close ties” with the

issues surrounding the case; and (5) the police told Edmund O. that they knew who had committed the

murders but could not pursue the case because there was not enough evidence. (Id. at 59-60.) 

The trial court did not rule on the question whether Corona had proved purposeful

discrimination, but simply denied the motion. (See Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 62.) The appellate court

concluded that the trial judge’s denial of the motion was proper and supported by the record:

Alternatively, even assuming a prima facie case of discrimination was presented

and the trial court erred in speculating about the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing the

two jurors, we are satisfied the court did not influence the prosecutor to present reasons

that he did not genuinely entertain. (See People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 680,

fn. 7.) As to Edmund O., the trial court referred to reasons arising from family members’

involvement with crime (i.e., gangs) and the criminal justice system that would have

been obvious to any observer. Similarly, as to George O., the trial court stated a fact that

was facially observable; i.e., heavily-accented English that was difficult to understand.

Thus, the trial court was not providing the prosecutor with any information that was not

readily apparent. Also, when the trial court in an abundance of caution required the

prosecutor to set forth his reasons, the trial court credited the prosecutor’s claims that his

motivations for the challenges were George O.’s possible English language difficulty and

Edmund O.’s family associations and experiences with gangs and the criminal justice

system. Under well-settled principles, we defer to this credibility assessment.

Corona further argues that the prosecutor’s statement that the two jurors were

“ripe” for being challenged because they were sitting next to each other shows that the

prosecutor excused them because of their race. This is not a reasonable inference.

Reviewing the entirety of the prosecutor’s remarks, it is apparent that the prosecutor was

merely pointing out that if one of the men had been one of the last jurors in the jury

venire (i.e., towards number 50), it is likely the requisite number of jurors would have

been selected before they reached him and the issue of the exclusion of two

African-Americans in the venire would not have surfaced.

/ / /

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Corona also asserts the pretextual nature of the prosecutor’s stated reasons for

excusing the two jurors is shown by the fact that the prosecutor did not ask George O.

more questions about his English language ability or whether he would make a good

juror for the prosecution, and did not ask Edmund O. about the details of his family

members’ gang membership or whether the murder of his cousins was tied to gang

activity. Although the failure to question a juror about the claimed area of concern is a

valid factor to consider, here the jurors’ answers provided enough information to support

the race-neutral reasons and thus the lack of further questioning does not require an

inference of pretext. (See People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1018, and

fn. 14.) We defer to the trial court’s assessment that George O.’s strong accent was

readily apparent and made him difficult to understand; thus, the prosecutor could draw

inferences from this fact without further questioning. The prosecutor is not required to

present reasons that rise to the level of a challenge for cause, and could reasonably

decide

to peremptorily challenge a juror whose English was difficult to understand without

further inquiry about his English language ability. Similarly, as to Edmund O., it was

not necessary for the prosecutor to inquire about the details of the gang membership of

his family members or the possible connection between the murders of his cousins and

gang

activity, because these factors-even without further details and even if

unconnected-could legitimately support a “hunch” that Edmund O. might not be

favorable to the prosecution.

Finally, Corona contends that a comparative analysis with Juror No. 11 (who is

not Black and who was not excused) shows the prosecutor’s discriminatory purpose.

Juror No. 11 stated that he had uncles and cousins who were gang members although

“nothing really like ... they had been incarcerated,” and that one cousin was involved in

a National City gang. We will assume arguendo that a comparative analysis is proper

for the first time on appeal. (See People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p.

1017; People v. Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 232.) Under a comparative analysis

review, “ ‘[i]f a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just

as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence

tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.’ “

(People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1017.) In making the comparative

analysis, the proper inquiry is whether the prosecutor “honestly found pertinent and

legitimate dissimilarities between members of the group he challenged and [members of]

the group he accepted.” (People v. Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 233.)

Juror No. 11 and Edmund O. were not similarly situated so as to show that the

prosecutor excused Edmund O. because of his race. Edmund O., unlike Juror No. 11,

had experienced the murders of three cousins, and law enforcement had failed to

prosecute those responsible for the murders. Even though Edmund O. stated this

experience would not bias him, the prosecutor was entitled to reject this statement and

decide not to risk keeping a juror who might have some resentment towards law

enforcement. Given Edmund O.’s family history involving gangs and murders, the trial

court could reasonably credit the prosecutor’s overall assessment that Edmund O. was

not a desirable juror for the prosecution because he had experiences too closely

associated with the circumstances of the current case. The fact that Juror No. 11 also had

family ties to gangs does not override the trial court’s conclusion the prosecutor was not

setting forth sham reasons regarding Edmund O.

We conclude the trial court made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate

whether the peremptory challenges were exercised for race-neutral reasons, and there is

substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding of no discriminatory purpose.

Accordingly, Corona’s appellate challenge based on the denial of his Batson/Wheeler

motion fails.

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(Lodgment No. 7 at 15-18.)

ii. Clearly Established Supreme Court Law

In Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995), the United States Supreme Court outlined the steps a

court must follow in conducting a Batson analysis:

Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the opponent of a peremptory challenge

has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of

production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral

explanation (step two). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then

decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial

discrimination. 

Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1865-66, 114 L.Ed.2d

395 (1991) (plurality opinion); id., at 375, 111 S.Ct. at 1874 (O’CONNOR, J.,

concurring in judgment); Batson, supra, at 96-98, 106 S.Ct., at 1722-1723. 

Id. at 1170-71; see also Mitleider v. Hall, 391 F.3d 1039, 1047 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A state court’s determination as to whether a prima facie case has been made is a factual

determination entitled to a presumption of correctness. Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 685 (9th Cir.

1999). The Supreme Court has held, however that “[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral

explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of

intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie

showing becomes moot.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991). Such is the case here.

After defense counsel made a motion for reconsideration of her Batson motion, the trial judge reiterated

the basis for his pervious denial. Lodgment No. 2, vol. 55-58.) He then asked the prosecutor to give

his reasons for the strikes and denied the Batson motion again. (Id. 58-62.) The question whether a

prima facie case has been rendered moot, and this Court’s analysis must therefore focus on steps two

and three of the Batson inquiry and the portion of the state appellate court’s opinion which analyzes the

prosecutor’s reasons for the strikes. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359. The Supreme Court has fleshed out

step two of the Batson inquiry in Hernandez as follows:

A neutral explanation in the context of our analysis here means an explanation

based on something other than the race of the juror. At this step of the inquiry, the issue

is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is

inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.

Id. at 360.

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Difficulty with the English language has been held to be a valid race neutral reason to exercise

a peremptory strike. See United States v. Changco, 1 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 1993); but see Hernandez,

500 U.S. at 371-72 (upholding strikes of Spanish speaking jurors where reason for strikes was

prosecutor’s fear they would substitute their own translation of Spanish testimony for interpreter’s but

stating that “a policy of striking all who speak a given language without regard to the particular

circumstances of the trial or the individual responses of the jurors may be found by the trial judge to be

a pretext for racial discrimination”). The other reasons for the strike of George O., the possible

difficulty a person who did not have a command of the English language would have with street or slang

terminology and the fact that the prosecutor wanted other people on the jury more, are facially race

neutral as well. In addition, the reasons put forth for the strike of Edmund O. are facially race neutral.

Having put forth race neutral reasons for his strikes, the trial court was required to proceed to

the third step of the Batson inquiry and determine “whether the opponent of the strike has proved

purposeful racial discrimination.” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168 (citing Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767). At this

stage, the judge is required to “assess the plausibility of that reason in light of all evidence with a

bearing on it.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252 (2005). The trial judge must determine whether

the reasons advanced by the prosecutor are “pretextual” and the judge’s conclusion “‘largely will turn

on evaluation of credibility.’” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98)). As the

Hernandez court noted, “[i]n the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be

whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.” Id. It is

this stage of the Batson inquiry which the Court finds requires granting the petition.

iii. Unreasonable Determination of the Facts

In Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit held that challenges to

factual findings which are based entirely on the state court record are governed by 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2)’s unreasonableness standard, that is, a federal court may only overturn such findings if they

are “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 999-1000. In contrast, challenges to a state court’s factual

findings which are based on evidence presented to a federal court for the first time are governed by 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)’s requirement that a petitioner must rebut those findings by “clear and convincing

evidence.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1); Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. The United States Supreme Court,

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however, has not decided which provision applies to situations, such as this one, where a petitioner

challenges the facts upon which a state court decision rests and all the operable facts were before the

state court. See Collins v. Rice, 546 U.S. 333, 338-39 (2006) (declining to decide which section applies

to a state court’s credibility finding in a Batson challenge). The Court in Collins did, however, state

unequivocally that “[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the prosecutor’s

credibility, but on habeas review that does not suffice to supercede the trial court’s credibility

determination.” Rather, the state court’s credibility determination must be unreasonable. Id. at 339.

This Court is bound by Ninth Circuit authority. Accordingly, because Corona’s Batson claim,

and this Court’s decision, is based entirely on the state court record, the Court will employ § (d)(2)’s

standard in its review of Corona’s claim, i.e., whether the state court’s factual findings were objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2);

Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999-1001.

The state appellate court concluded the prosecutor’s first reason for striking George O., his

accent and the inference of lack of English proficiency the prosecutor drew from it, was not pretextual.

It also found that the prosecutor could have properly “drawn inferences” from George O.’s strong accent

and could “reasonably decide to peremptorily challenge a juror whose English was difficult to

understand without further inquiry about his English language ability.” (Lodgment No. 7 at 16-17.)

There is no factual support in the record, however, for such inferences. As defense counsel pointed out,

an accent does not automatically translate into a lack of English proficiency. (See Lodgment 2, vol. 1

at 61.) In fact, the record supports the opposite inference – that George O. was proficient in English.

He read the juror questionnaire and answered the questions appropriately in open court, which

establishes he could read English proficiently. (See Lodgment No. 3 at 44.) When he spoke in open

court, his English was grammatically correct, which strongly suggests he spoke English proficiently,

albeit with an accent. (See id.) There were no questions from the court reporter or pauses in the

proceedings. (Id.) He was employed in the manufacturing field, which established he could speak and

understand English sufficiently to hold a job. (Id.) Most importantly, neither the prosecutor nor anyone

else asked any questions of George O. regarding his ability to speak and understand English, whether

he was a native English speaker, whether he was an immigrant to this country and, if so, how long he

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6

 Contreras testified about the structure and operation of the Mexican Mafia and street gangs in general,

the symbols, colors, hand signals and names used by the Mexican Mafia, validation as a gang member, how gang

members are initiated, the definitions of various street slang terms, gang monikers and how debts are repaid and

repayment is enforced. Darby testified about Monica Yanez’s drug business, how it was conducted, its

connection to the Mexican Mafia, how she managed her “crew” of gang members and how she enforced

repayment of her debts. Grande testified about the structure and operation of National City gangs, who is

involved in those gangs, how they are validated, what crimes they are known to have committed, what monikers

gang members use, what territory they claim, what symbols, colors and hand signals they use to identify

themselves, how members are initiated and documented, and how Monica Yanez and the Mexican Mafia were

involved in National City gangs.

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had lived here or how long he had spoken English. There are simply no objective, factual grounds in

the record which support the state appellate court’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s strike appropriately

rested on George O.’s inability to speak or understand English sufficiently. 

A second reason given by the prosecutor for the strike of George O., that it would be difficult

for a person whose first language was not English to understand the terminology and “street slang”

which would be used in Corona’s case, is without factual support for the same reasons discussed above

– there is no evidence George O. could not speak and/or understand English sufficiently. Moreover, the

record suggests the prosecutor anticipated that all the jurors would have difficulty understanding and

interpreting the street slang and terminology which was to be used in Corona’s case because he

presented expert testimony designed to educate and explain to the jury the terminology and slang used

in the case. (See Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 75-128 [testimony of Steve Contreras, Special Agent with

the California Dept. of Corrections], 129-49 [testimony of Matthew Darby, Special Agent with the FBI];

vol. 3 at 424- 62, 471-500 [testimony of David Grande, Sergeant, National City Police Department].)6

The prosecutor’s last reason, that he “did not get a feeling from [George O.] and did not hear a

lot about why he would make a good juror” is both without tangible support in the record and

unbelievable. As previously noted, no one asked any questions of George O. Thus, it is unclear how

the prosecutor would have been able to determine he did not “hear a lot about why he could make a

good juror” without a single question being asked about that juror’s beliefs and experiences. 

The Ninth Circuit has found Batson violations in three recent cases where, as here, the record

either did not support or flatly contradicted the prosecutor’s stated reasons for the strike. In McClain

v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2000) the prosecutor stated she struck the first African-American

juror, SR, because she “mistrusted the system” and “believed that she had been treated unfairly” by it.

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7

 The prosecutor in Kesser struck three Native American women and one Asian woman. The Ninth

Circuit focused only on the strike of one of the Native American women and granted the petition on that ground

alone, stating that “[b]ecause just one racial strike calls for a retrial, we will not determine here whether there was

any genuine nonracial reason for striking each of [the other] jurors.” Kesser, 465 F.3d at 369.

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Id. at 1211. The prosecutor also believed SR had lied when she said she was a stewardess because she

was a heavyset woman. Id. The prosecutor’s third reason for striking SR was that she lacked any group

decision-making experience. Id. The prosecutor stated she struck the second and only remaining

African-American juror, JH, because he was a drug rehabilitation counselor and would therefore “root

for the underdog.” In addition, he “didn’t speak in ordinary language” and gave “highly intellectual

answers” which she believed would make it difficult for him to get along with other jurors. Id.

Upon review of the voir dire, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the reasons given by the

prosecutor for the strikes were contradicted by the jurors’ own answers. SR never stated she distrusted

the system and gave her occupation as a maintenance worker at U.S. Airlines, not a stewardess. Id. at

1214-15, 1221-22. In addition, after conducting a comparative analysis with another white juror who,

like SR, also did not have decision-making experience but who was not struck, the court found the third

reason put forth by the prosecutor for SR’s strike was pretextual. Id. at 1211-22. The court also

concluded the reasons given by the prosecutor for JH’s strike were pretextual. Id. at 1222- 23. JH

worked as a drug research pharmacist at the Veteran’s Administration, not a drug rehabilitation

counselor. Id. The transcript of the voir dire also contradicted the prosecutor’s assertion that JH did

not speak in “ordinary language” or gave “highly intellectual answers.” Id. The court concluded that

the state court’s denial of the Batson claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in state court. Id. at 1223.

The Court came to the same conclusion in Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 2006) and,

most recently, Green v. Lamarque, 532 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2008), as amended. In Kesser, the court

concluded that the reasons the prosecutor gave for his strike of a Native American woman from the jury

venire were pretextual based on a comparative analysis with other jurors and because they conflicted

with the juror’s own statements on voir dire.7

 In particular, the court noted that although the prosecutor

gave as reasons for the strike that she was “pretentious” and “self-important” because she believed she

was the only one who could complete certain paperwork for her job, “he did not ask her further

questions about her work or her interpersonal experiences.” Kesser, 465 F.3d at 354, 364. Quoting

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8

 In Green, the prosecutor struck all six African-American jurors and noted the race of each potential

juror next to their name. Green, 532 F.3d at 1033. As in Kesser, the Court noted this was additional evidence

supporting the conclusion that the strike of Deborah P. was racially based, but reversed solely on the basis of

Deborah P.’s strike. Id. (citing Kesser, 465 F.3d at 369.)

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Miller-El, the court stated that “‘unless he had an ulterior reason for keeping [the juror] off the jury we

think he would have proceeded differently . . . . [W]e expect the prosecutor would have cleared up any

misunderstanding by asking further questions before getting to the point of exercising a strike.’” Id. at

364 (quoting Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 244). 

In Green, the prosecutor struck an African-American juror, Deborah P., because “she had visited

her stepfather in prison” and would therefore “likely assume imprisonment would be the outcome of

[the] case,” she “failed to complete two questions on the juror questionnaire” and “she had held five

jobs, suggesting she must have ‘problems getting along with others [and] responding to authority.’”

Green, 532 F.3d at 1031.8 The court concluded that the first two reasons set forth by the prosecutor

were shown to be pretextual when compared with other white jurors who were not struck. Id. at 1032-

33. As to the third reason, Deborah P.’s five jobs, the court stated that the validity of the reason “was

undermined by the fact that he did not ask her a single question about why she changed jobs.” Id. at

1033. The court again quoted Miller-El, stating that “‘[t]he State’s failure to engage in any meaningful

voir dire examination on a subject the State alleges it is concerned about is evidence suggesting that the

explanation is a sham and a pretext for discrimination.’” Green, 532 F.3d at 1033 (quoting Miller-El,

545 U.S. at 246).

Although the strike of George O. does not appear on the surface to be as egregious as the strikes

in McClain, Kesser and Green, the principles are the same. In each of those cases, the prosecutor put

forth reasons for the strikes that were found to be pretextual either because there was no factual support

in the record for them or because the prosecutor did not ask the juror any questions about the topic of

concern. As in McClain, where the court found the reasons set forth by the prosecutor to be contradicted

by the record, the prosecutor’s assertion here that George O. was not sufficiently proficient in English,

and that this insufficiency would preclude him from being able to understand the terminology used in

the trial, was contradicted by George O.’s ability to read and appropriately respond to the juror

questionnaire. See McClain, 217 F.3d at 1214-23. The prosecutor’s actions in this case are also similar

to the prosecutors in Kesser and Green where the court found the prosecutors’ reasons for their strikes

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to be pretextual because they did not ask any questions about the topics which they claimed were of

concern. Here, the prosecutor’s claim that George O.’s accent meant he could not speak and/or

understand English sufficiently and would not be able to understand the street slang and difficult

terminology to be used in the trial, is belied by the prosecutor’s failure to ask any questions at all of

George O. and his use of expert testimony to explain the slang to the jury. See Kesser, 465 F.3d at 354-

64; Green, 532 F.3d at 1032-33; see also Paulino v. Castro (“Paulino II”), __ F.3d __, 2008 WL

4070694 (9th Cir., Sep. 4, 2008) (stating that speculation is insufficient to support a finding that the

reason for a peremptory strike was race neutral). In any event, “[b]ecause just one racial strike calls for

a retrial,” it is immaterial to this Court’s decision that McClain, Kesser and Green involved more

racially based strikes than occurred in Corona’s case. See Kesser, 465 F.3d at 369.

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the state appellate court’s denial of this

claim was based on an objectively unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999-1001. 

iv. Unreasonable Application of Supreme Court Law

The state court’s denial of the claim was an unreasonable application of Batson and its progeny.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The first error committed by the state courts is the trial judge’s sua sponte

statement that George O.’s accent, and the inference of a lack of English proficiency he drew from it,

was a sufficient reason for the prosecutor’s strike before either ruling on whether a prima facie case had

been made or asking the prosecutor to state his reasons for the strike. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 54.)

This error was compounded by the state appellate court’s failure to recognize this as contrary to the

Supreme Court’s Batson jurisprudence. (See Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 54, 57-58.) The Supreme Court

has cautioned against a court substituting its own reasons for a strike for the prosecutor’s. See Miller-El,

545 U.S. at 252 (stating that “[i]f the stated reason [for a strike] does not hold up, its pretextual

significance does not fade because a trial judge, or an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not

have shown up as false”). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has specifically held that such a procedure is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. See Paulino v. Castro (“Paulino I”), 371 F.3d 1083,

1089-90 (9th Cir. 2004).

The failure of the state courts to adequately investigate the unsupported reason for George O.’s

strike, combined with the questionable strike of the only other African-American juror, Edmund O., also

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9 In upholding the trial court’s conclusion that Corona had not stated a prima facie case under Batson,

the appellate court stated that “[g]iven the need for jurors to . . . deliberate with each other as a group, the trial

court could reasonably conclude that a juror whose English was difficult to understand evinced a potential

language difficulty that conclusively established a race-neutral justification for a peremptory challenge.”

(Lodgment No. 7 at 14.) George O.’s potential difficulty communicating with fellow jurors, however, was never

put forth by the trial judge or the prosecutor as a reason for the strike, but rather was generated by the appellate

court for the first time. This lends further support to this Court’s conclusion that the appellate court did not

conduct the serious and searching inquiry into George O.’s strike that clearly established Supreme Court law

requires. See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252. As discussed above, that the appellate court could “imagine” a race

neutral reason for the strike does not abate the pretextual nature of it. Id.

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renders the state court’s denial of this claim an unreasonable application of Batson. At Batson’s third

step, a judge must “assess the plausibility of that reason in light of all evidence with a bearing on it,”

Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252, and determine “whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory

challenge should be believed.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98)). The

appellate court’s analysis of the Batson claim fell short of this standard for two important reasons.

First, as discussed above, the state appellate court’s denial of this claim despite the lack of

factual support in the record for the prosecutor’s inference regarding George O.’s English proficiency

and his total lack of questioning regarding this purported reason for the strike illustrates that the

appellate court did not engage in the kind of “sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct

evidence of intent as may be available” when deciding whether the reasons put forth by the prosecutor

for the strike were pretextual. Green, 532 F.3d at 1030 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 93). Indeed, as

previously noted, the trial court began by suggesting the rationale for the strike. (See Lodgment No. 2,

vol. 1 at 53-54; 57-58.) “‘A Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any

rational basis’” for a strike. Kesser, 465 F.3d at 359 (quoting Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252). The state

courts then compounded this error by failing to engage in any inquiry about the basis for the

prosecutor’s unsupported beliefs about George O.’s English proficiency, his concomitant concerns about

George O.’s ability to understand the slang that would be used at trial and the prosecutor’s “feeling” that

he would not be a good juror. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 58-62.) The appellate court simply reiterated

the trial court’s conclusion that George O.’s accent alone was sufficient to permit an inference that he

could not speak or understand English sufficiently to competently participate as a juror. (Lodgment No.

7 at 15-18.)9

 

Second, when the strikes of George O. and Edmund O. are considered together, which the state

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court was required to do under Batson, the reasons for the strikes appear even more pretextual. See

Miller-El, 545 U.S. 252; see also Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F.3d 824, 830 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that “[i]f

a review of the record undermines the prosecutor’s stated reasons, or many of the proffered reasons, the

reasons may be deemed a pretext for racial discrimination”). A court has the duty to “consider each

explanation within the context of the trial as a whole because ‘[a]n invidious discriminatory purpose

may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant circumstances.’” Kesser, 465 F.3d at 359 (quoting

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363) (internal quotations omitted). The appellate court did not follow this

mandate, but instead considered the strikes independently and without regard to the reasons set forth for

the strikes as a whole.

The state appellate court did conduct a comparative analysis of the strike of Edmund O. with

another juror, juror number 11, who was not African-American and who was not struck by the

prosecutor. Both jurors had family members who were involved in gangs. Edmund O. stated that he

had “two cousins who were in the Crips.” (Lodgment No. 3 at 85.) Juror No. 11 stated he had “uncles

and cousins who are involved or who were gang members,” one of whom was involved in National City

gangs. (Id. at 87.) The court concluded that “Juror No. 11 and Edmund O. were not similarly situated,”

however, because although both had family members who were involved in gangs, “Edmund O., unlike

Juror No. 11, had experienced the murders of three cousins, and law enforcement had failed to prosecute

those responsible for the murders.” (Lodgment No. 7 at 18.) The appellate court also stated that

“[g]iven Edmund O.’s family history involving gangs and murders, the trial court could reasonably

credit the prosecutor’s overall assessment that Edmund O. was not a desirable juror for the prosecution

because he had experiences too closely associated with the circumstances of the current case.”

(Lodgment No. 7 at 18.) 

The comparative analysis conducted by the state appellate court, however, suffers from many

of the same problems as the analysis it conducted of the strike of George O. In justifying Edmund O.’s

strike, the prosecutor stated that he inferred that his cousins’ murders were connected to his cousins’

gang membership. There was no evidence, however, of any connection between the two, and the

prosecutor did not ask Edmund O. if the murders were gang related. Indeed, the discussion of the

murders and the gang membership occurred nearly twenty pages apart in the transcript. (See Lodgment

No. 3 at 68, 85.) Moreover, Juror No. 11’s gang connections were more closely related to the facts of

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Corona’s case than Edmund O.’s. At least one of Juror No. 11’s cousins was connected with National

City gangs, the very gangs involved in Corona’s case, unlike the gang connections in Edmund O.’s

family. (See Lodgment No. 3 at 87.) The only other justification given by the prosecutor was Edmund

O.’s experience with law enforcement’s inability to pursue and prosecute those responsible for his

cousins’ murders, which the prosecutor stated “added into sort of the whole picture as someone who was

just not right for this case.” (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 60.) The murders occurred ten years prior to

Corona’s trial, however, and Edmund O. unequivocally stated that the experience would not affect his

ability to be fair. (Lodgment No. 3 at 68-69.) 

Moreover, the state appellate court’s comparative analysis examined the strike of Edmund O.

and the seating of Juror No. 11 independently from the strike of George O. It did not, however, consider

the comparative analysis in conjunction with the strike of George O., the only other African-American

prospective juror, as it was required to do by clearly established Supreme Court law. See Miller-El, 545

U.S. at 252. Although the strike of Edmund O. may be questionable by itself due to the discrepancies

between the prosecutor’s stated reasons for the strike and the evidence in the record, this Court cannot

say the state court’s conclusion regarding Edmund O.’s strike alone was objectively unreasonable.

When the two strikes are considered together, however, as required by clearly established Supreme

Court law, the pretextual nature of the prosecutor’s justification for the strikes is more apparent. See

Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252. In both strikes, the prosecutor’s stated reasons were not supported by the

record or were based on inferences that were not supported by the record. 

Batson and its progeny required the state court to consider the strikes of George O. and Edmund

O. together to “assess the plausibility of that reason in light of all evidence with a bearing on it.” MillerEl, 545 U.S. at 252. The state court’s failure to do so renders the decision an unreasonable application

of Batson and its progeny. See Batson, 476 at 93; Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252.

v. Conclusion

As the Supreme Court has noted, “AEDPA is demanding but not insatiable.” Miller-El, 545 U.S.

at 240. After careful consideration of the record and the applicable legal authorities, the Court finds that

Corona has satisfied his burden under AEDPA by establishing that the state court’s denial of this claim

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court

and involved and unreasonable application of Batson and its progeny. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2);

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Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the federal habeas relief

be GRANTED as to claim one of Corona’s petition.

2. Defense Witness Claim

Corona also contends that he was denied his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when

the trial court denied him the right to secure the presence of a defense witness. (Pet. at 8, 9.)

Specifically, Corona complains that he was prevented from presenting the testimony of Delfina Miller

because the prosecutor failed to notify the defense she had moved to Arizona during the pendency of

the case and the trial court denied him a continuance to permit him to subpoena her to the trial. (Id.)

Corona contends Miller was a crucial defense witness who could have impeached the victim Guyton’s

testimony about the identity of the shooter. (Id.) Respondent counters that the state court’s resolution

of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. (Resp’ts Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Answer at 8-10.) 

Corona raised this claim in the petition for review he filed in the California Supreme Court,

which denied the claim without citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 9.) Accordingly, this Court must

“look through” to the California appellate court’s denial of this claim for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at

801-06. That Court recounted the underlying facts surrounding this claim, to which this Court must

defer under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1):

[On] or about February 2004, Corona’s counsel learned from a police report

provided during discovery that Delfina [footnote omitted] was a relevant defense

witness. Delfina subsequently moved to Arizona, but the defense did not discover this

until trial had already started. Finding that the defense had not been diligent in looking

for Delfina before trial, the trial court denied the defense request for a continuance to

secure Delfina’s attendance at trial, and also denied the defense’s new trial motion.

Delfina was interviewed by Officer Damian Ballardo at the time of the shooting

and by defense investigator Esteban Hernandez after the trial had concluded. [footnote

omitted.] Delfina, who at the time of the shooting lived near the intersection of Paradise

Drive and East 10th Street where the shooting occurred, provided the following

information. At about 11:00 p.m., she was in bed when she heard an argument that made

her dogs bark. She then heard three gunshots. She jumped out of bed and ran to her

front window that faces East 10th Street. She saw a man, who appeared to come from

the same area as the shots, run past the front of her house. After she alerted her husband

and as her husband went to the man lying on the street, Delfina saw a car driving the

wrong way down the one-way street. The car stopped on the corner of East 10th Street

and Paradise Drive, picked up the man who had run past her house, and then drove

southbound on Paradise Drive. The car was an older, white, “Cholo-type” car with four

doors. She only heard one car on the street.

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Corona’s counsel, Inge Brauer, considered Delfina an important impeachment

witness because her description of the white vehicle at the scene was different from the

black, two-door vehicle described by Guyton.

It was apparent from the police report provided during discovery that Delfina was

an important defense witness. Because Delfina’s address was redacted from the police

report, on December 15, 2004, Attorney Brauer requested that the prosecutor provide

Delfina’s address and telephone number. On January 7, 2005, the prosecutor provided

Attorney Brauer with an address for Delfina on East 10th Street. On this same date, the

prosecutor notified Attorney Brauer that Delfina’s husband, James Miller, was a

potential

prosecution witness. The prosecutor was contemplating having James testify because

he had called 911 on the night of the shooting; however, according to the prosecution,

he did not have any further information pertinent to the issues.

On January 7, 2005, Attorney Brauer instructed defense investigator Hernandez

to locate and interview Delfina. Hernandez’s efforts to locate Delfina were unsuccessful.

In a report he prepared for Attorney Brauer dated June 19, 2005, Hernandez delineated

these efforts. Hernandez stated he went to the 10th Street address provided by the

prosecutor at varying times on January 8, 10, 13, and 19; February 8, 19, and 23; and

April 11 and 22, 2005. There was no answer at the door, and the neighbors had no

information on Delfina’s schedule. Hernandez believed Delfina still lived at the

residence but that she was “‘dodging’” him. On May 19, 2005, a woman answered the

door and told Hernandez that Delfina did not live there, and she had no information

about her whereabouts. On May 20, 3005, Hernandez performed a database search for

Delfina’s address, but the search failed to provide a Social Security number for Delfina.

Hernandez reported he could not locate her without a Social Security number. On June

10 and 14, 2005, Hernandez left a subpoena for Delfina at her last known address on

10th Street.

According to Attorney Bauer, during the week before the scheduled trial date of

June 13, 2005, the prosecutor informed her that he would likely call James Miller as a

witness. At the time of this discussion regarding James, there is no indication that [the]

defense advised the prosecutor that she was having trouble locating James’s wife

Delfina, and apparently the prosecutor did not yet know the Millers had moved.

On June 9, 2005, the prosecutor’s investigator went to subpoena James at the

10th Street address and discovered the Millers had moved to Arizona. The prosecutor’s

office did some investigation and found an address and telephone number for the Millers

in Arizona. However, the prosecutor decided it was not worth bringing James from

Arizona to testify about the 911 call and accordingly did not attempt to make contact

with him. The prosecutor did not advise Attorney Brauer of the fact that Miller had

moved to Arizona.

The jury was selected on June 13, 2005, and the prosecutor’s witnesses began

testifying on June 14, 2005.

On June 15, 2005, the defense discovered that the Millers had moved to Arizona.

On that date, defense investigator Hernandez received a telephone call from Pete Matey

advising that he had bought the house from the Millers the previous year and that the

Millers had moved to Arizona. Hernandez performed a records check on the 10th Street

property which confirmed the sale to Matey and listed the transfer date as May 2004.

Attorney Brauer immediately told the prosecutor about this information and the

prosecutor gave her the telephone number and address for the Millers in Arizona that his

office had uncovered. Hernandez attempted to call the telephone number in Arizona on

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June 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19, 2005, but the phone was answered by a fax machine.

On June 15, 2005, while the prosecution was still presenting its case in chief,

Attorney Brauer orally advised the court of the problems she was having securing

Delfina’s testimony. Attorney Brauer explained to the court that the prosecutor had

provided her an address where Delfina no longer lived, that she had just received

Delfina’s Arizona address, and that she would try to have her subpoened in Arizona.

Attorney Brauer also stated she would do everything possible to have Delfina available

when it was time for her to testify, but that a recess might be necessary. The trial court

indicated that the decision as to whether [to] allow a recess would be made at the

appropriate time.

On June 16 and 17, 2005, Attorney Brauer obtained a certificate for attendance

of a material out-of-state witness from the trial court, and communicated with the public

defender’s office in Arizona about the need to secure Delfina’s attendance in court on

June 21, 2005. On June 20, 2005, the Arizona public defender’s office responded that

it took one month to complete the out-of-state subpoena process through the Arizona

courts and that it would be impossible to have Delfina available to testify on June 21.

On June 20, 2005, after the prosecution had rested, Corona moved for a mistrial,

or for a continuance until Delfina’s attendance could be secured. Corona asserted the

prosecution was dilatory in providing an up-to-date address for Delfina, and because of

the prosecution’s delay it was unlikely Delfina’s attendance could be secured through

an out-of-state subpoena before the conclusion of the trial. Corona’s counsel

acknowledged that the prosecution generally has no duty to keep track of noninformant

witnesses. However, defense counsel asserted that because the address had been

redacted from the police report and the prosecution did not provide the address until

much later, the prosecution was obligated under Brady [v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963)] to verify Delfina’s address at the time it was disclosed.

On June 20, 2005, the court denied Corona’s requests for relief. The court found

the prosecutor satisfied its duty by disclosing Delfina’s last known address; the

prosecutor had no affirmative duty to maintain a current address for Delfina; and there

was no indication the prosecutor had tried to hide Delfina’s current address from the

defense. Further, the court found the defense failed to conduct an adequate investigation

to find Delfina. The court stated that repeatedly returning to the residence was

insufficient, and that the defense could have searched such common sources as

Department of Motor Vehicle records, voter registration records, and tax records.

[footnote omitted.]

On June 21, 2005, trial proceeded with the presentation of defense witnesses,

closing arguments, and instructions. The jury reached its verdict on June 22, 2005.

On September 12, 2005, Corona filed a motion for a new trial on essentially the

same grounds as his midtrial request for a mistrial or continuance. To support his

motion, Corona submitted a report from defense investigator Hernandez who, after the

trial was over, interviewed Delfina on September 7, 2005, in Arizona, confirming the

substance of what her testimony would have been. The trial court denied the new trial

motion, again finding the prosecution did not violate Brady’s disclosure requirements.

The court also found there was no newly discovered evidence warranting a new

trial. With respect to the issue of due diligence, during oral arguments on the new trial

motion, defense counsel offered to have the defense investigator testify as to his pretrial

efforts to contact Delfina. Defense counsel stated that the investigator had – in addition

to going to the residence – looked in a database which revealed only the same 10th Street

address. Although at one point during the discussions the trial court suggested the

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defense’s efforts may have been sufficiently diligent, the court determined it was not

necessary for the investigator to testify, and ultimately the court was not persuaded to

grant the new trial motion.

The court also found that the absence of Delfina’s testimony was not prejudicial.

The court concluded that although Delfina’s testimony might have been beneficial to the

defense as “fodder for argument,” it would not have altered the outcome because the

“victim/witness, was extremely credible, believable to the panel, notwithstanding the

other baggage he had.”

(Lodgment No. 7 at 19-25.)

a. Brady Violation

Corona contends, as he did in state court, that the prosecution violated his due process rights by

preventing him from presenting Delfina’s testimony when they failed to inform the defense of the

Millers’ move to Arizona. The state appellate court analyzed Corona’s claim under Brady and

California cases applying Brady as follows:

Brady establishes that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to

an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material to either guilt or

punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” (Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87.) Regardless of whether the defendant has requested disclosure,

the prosecution must seek out and disclose all material exculpatory and impeachment

evidence known to those acting on the government’s behalf. (In re Brown, (1998) 17

Cal4th 873, 879-880; People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1042.) When

exculpatory evidence involves an eyewitness, the prosecution must disclose the witness’s

identity and “‘all pertinent information which might assist the defense to locate [the

witness].’” (People v. Robinson (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 494, 499; see In re Littlefield

(1993) 5 Cal.4th 122, 132.) [footnote omitted.] The prosecution may not avoid this

obligation by deliberately failing to learn the whereabouts of a witness. (See Littlefield, supra, at p. 132.) Further, the prosecution is obligated to preserve exculpatory evidence

that the defendant cannot obtain by other means. (People v. Caitlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th

81, 159-160.)

However, there is generally no Brady violation when the government fails to

provide information that it does not know about. (United States v. Chen Hsieh Hui Mei

(9th Cir. 1995) 67 F.3d 1421, 1428-1429.) These limits on the Brady disclosure

requirements are consistent with the principle that the prosecution does not have a

general duty to gather evidence that might be useful to the defense. (In re Littlefield, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 135.) Similarly, as to the location of witnesses who are not

informants, the government generally has no duty to “produce or keep track of witnesses

the defendant may later wish to have testify.” (People v. Rance (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d

245, 253-254.) [footnote omitted.] There is no due process violation if the defendant

had the opportunity to assure the witness’s presence at trial, and the prosecutor does not

engage in conduct which deprives the defendant of this opportunity. (Bellizzi v. Superior

Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 36-37, and fn. 2.)

Here, once law enforcement obtained Delfina’s address at the time of the

shooting, it was not obligated to keep track of her whereabouts for the defense. The

prosecution provided Corona with the address it had for Delfina, and Corona had six

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months before trial to verify if the address was correct and to research a new address.

The prosecution did not know that the Millers had moved until shortly before trial, and

did not know that Corona was having trouble locating Delfina. Thus, the prosecution did

not suppress any information about Delfina in its possession nor attempt to mislead

Corona about her whereabouts. There was no Brady violation, and the trial court did not

err in denying Corona’s request for a mistrial, continuance or new trial on this ground.

(Lodgment No. 7 at 25-27.)

As the state court properly noted, the Supreme Court held in Brady that a prosecutor must

disclose all material evidence, including impeachment evidence, to the defendant. Brady, 373 U.S. at

87; United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 678 (1985). In order to establish a Brady violation,

Petitioner must show (1) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or

inadvertently; (2) the withheld evidence was exculpatory or impeachment material; and (3) he was

prejudiced by the failure to disclose. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); Benn v.

Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 678 and United States

v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976).)

i. Suppression by the Prosecution

The first hurdle Corona must clear is whether the prosecutor willfully or inadvertently

suppressed evidence. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82. The California appellate court concluded, citing

California cases and federal cases which predate Strickler, that because “the prosecution did not know

that the Millers had moved until shortly before trial, and did not know that Corona was having trouble

locating Delfina” no Brady violation occurred. (Lodgment No. 7 at 27.) This is contrary to Strickler,

which states that a Brady violation can occur when the prosecutor inadvertently suppresses evidence.

Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82. Moreover, in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995), the Supreme

Court concluded that in addition to exculpatory or impeaching evidence they are actually aware of,

prosecutors “‘[have] a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the

government’s behalf in [the] case, including the police.’” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280-81 (quoting Kyles,

514 U.S. at 437-38). While “Brady does not necessarily require that the prosecution turn over

exculpatory material before trial.” United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1988)

(emphasis in original), the material must be disclosed “‘at a time when disclosure would be of value to

the accused.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Davenport, 753 F.2d 1460, 1462 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

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Thus, although it appears the prosecutor himself was not aware of Delfina Millers’ move until

about a week before trial, he cannot escape Brady liability. At a minimum, the prosecutor should have

disclosed the Millers’ Arizona address as soon as he became aware of it through his investigator on June

9, 2005. (See Lodgment No. 2, vol. 3 at 516; Lodgment No. 7 at 21.) The prosecutor did not disclose

the information to defense counsel, however, until June 15, 2005 when defense counsel told the

prosecutor she had learned from her investigator that the Millers had moved from the 10th Street address

over a year before and asked if he had a current address. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 2 at 198.) Moreover,

it is unclear whether the information was disclosed in sufficient time for defense counsel to decide

whether to use it in her defense strategy. By the time the information was turned over, defense counsel

had already given her opening statement and had told the jury that Delfina would be testifying.

Accordingly, the Court concludes Corona has satisfied the first prong of the Brady test. See Strickler,

527 U.S. at 281-82. 

ii. Whether the Evidence Was Exculpatory or Impeachment 

Corona must also establish the claimed evidence had exculpatory or impeachment value.

Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82; see also United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 1984)

(stating that “[e]xculpatory evidence includes material that goes to the heart of the defendant’s guilt or

innocence, as well as that which might alter the jury’s judgment of the credibility of a crucial

prosecution witness.”) The victim, Kenneth Guyton, testified Corona and “Trips” drove him around in

Trips’ black Bronco. They stopped in a remote area in National City where Corona ordered him out of

the car and shot him in retaliation for failing to pay a drug debt to Trips’ sister, Monica Yanez.

(Lodgment No. 2, vol. 2 at 233-44.) Delfina Miller was to testify that she heard the shots, then saw a

young man run past the front of her house. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 399.) She went outside and saw

the victim lying in street. As she looked up, she saw an older, white, four-door vehicle driving the

wrong way down the one-way street. (Id.) The white car picked up the man who had been running.

(Id.) 

Corona’s defense was that Guyton was misidentifying Corona as the shooter due to Guyton’s

drug use and because he had been woken up just prior to the shooting and was disoriented. (Lodgment

No. 2, vol. 2 at 201-72, 284-327.) The defense also tried to suggest that Guyton did not know who shot

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him and was simply assuming Corona had done so at Yanez’s direction due to his drug debt. (Id.) Thus,

it is clear that Delfina’s testimony that she saw a man she thought was associated with the shooting get

into a white car and drive away would have impeached Guyton’s identification of Corona as the shooter.

iii. Materiality or Prejudice

Finally, Corona must establish he was prejudiced by the withholding of the evidence because

it was material. Benn, 283 F.3d at 1053 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676.) “[E]vidence is material only

if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; see also Downs v. Hoyt, 232 F.3d

1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Corona has failed to establish such a “reasonable probability.” Delfina’s testimony about the

white car does not directly contradict Guyton’s testimony that Corona was traveling in a black Bronco

when he shot Guyton, nor does it cast doubt in any significant way on Guyton’s identification of Corona

as the shooter. Delfina may indeed have seen an individual connected with Guytons’ shooting get into

a white car after the shooting. The jury could easily have concluded after hearing both Guyton’s and

Delfina’s testimony that they were both correct – that Corona and Trips drove Guyton to a deserted

location, Corona shot Guyton, then either Corona or Trips ran to the white car and drove away. The

most compelling evidence of Corona’s guilt was Guyton’s steadfast identification of Corona as the

shooter. In the face of this testimony, Delfina’s testimony was not material to Corona’s defense, and

he was not prejudiced by his inability to present it.

iv. Conclusion

While Corona has established that the prosecution suppressed impeachment evidence in violation

of Brady and its progeny, he has failed to establish the evidence was material and that he was prejudiced

by his inability to present it to the jury. Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this claim was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Early, 537

U.S. at 8 (stating that “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision

contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court decision will not be contrary to clearly

established federal law). 

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he is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).

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b. Denial of a Continuance

Corona also claims the state court’s denial of a continuance based on the failure of the

prosecution to provide an accurate address for Delfina violated his due process rights. (Pet. at 6-10.)

Respondent contends the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Answer at 9-10.)10

Corona raised this claim in the petition for review he filed in the California Supreme Court,

which denied it without citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 9.) Accordingly, this Court must “look

through” to the California appellate court’s denial of the claim as the basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501

U.S. at 801-06. That court, citing California law, wrote:

When Corona requested a continuance midtrial, he submitted a report reflecting

that his defense investigator went to the 10th Street address on 10 occasions between

January and April 2005 during morning, afternoon and evening time, and on each

occasion, there was “no answer at [the] door.” On two occasions the investigator spoke

to neighbors who “had no information on Delfin[a]’s schedule.” There is nothing in the

report to indicate that the investigator took any steps to try to find Delfina during this

time period other than visit her residence. It was not until May 20, 2005, after contacting

a woman at the residence who stated Delfina did not live there, that the defense finally

performed a database search, which was apparently abandoned when no Social Security

number was obtained. The trial court could reasonably conclude that the defense should

have taken other investigative measures once it discovered that visits to the residence

over a four-month period were not fruitful, and that the database search finally conducted

in May 2005 should have been more extensive. The court also could reasonably

determine that a one-month delay of the trial to secure the out-of-state subpoena was

unreasonable in light of the lengthy period of time that the defense had to find Delfina

after the disclosure of her identity and address and before the commencement of the trial.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the midtrial continuance based on

lack of diligence by the defense.

(Lodgment No. 7 at 28-29.)

In Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964), the Supreme Court stated in the context of the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel as follows:

The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge,

and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process even if the

party fails to offer evidence or is compelled to defend without counsel. Avery v.

Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 [citations omitted.] Contrariwise, a myopic insistence upon

expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to

defend with counsel an empty formality. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 [citations

omitted.] There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is

so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances

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present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time

the request is denied. Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 [citations omitted]; Torres

v. United States, 270 F.2d 252 (C.A. 9th Cir.) cf. United States v. Arlen, 252 F.2d 491

(C.A. 2d Cir.)

Id. at 589; see also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983).

As the state court noted, under California law, in order to obtain a continuance to secure the

testimony of a witness, the party requesting the continuance must establish they were diligent in

preparing for the trial. See Cal. Penal Code § 1050; People v. Jenkins, 22 Cal. 4th 900, 1037 (2000).

The state court’s conclusion that counsel was not diligent was not “myopic insistence upon

expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.” Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589; see also Harper

v. Scribner, 244 Fed. Appx. 773, 773-774 (2007) (holding that a state court’s denial of a continuance

to secure the testimony of a witness where diligence had not been shown did not violate Petitioner’s

Sixth Amendment due process rights); Harris v. Henry, 228 Fed. Appx. 710, 712 (2007) (same). Rather,

the state court reasonably concluded that defense counsel should have used other measures to locate

Delfina during the six months she had Delfina’s last known address and the beginning of trial. Given

the high level of deference this Court is required to give the state court’s decision, both under AEDPA

and under Ungar, the state court’s decision was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

c. Denial of a Motion for a New Trial

Finally, Corona argues the state court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based on what

Delfina would have testified to violated his federal due process rights. (Pet. at 6-10.) Respondent does

not address this claim in the Answer.

Corona exhausted this claim by presenting it in his petition for review to the California Supreme

Court. (See Lodgment No. 8.) That court denied the claim without citation of authority. (See Lodgment

No. 9.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the California appellate court’s opinion denying

this claim for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. Relying on California law, that court concluded as

follows:

During the trial Corona knew Delfina’s address in Arizona and the substance of her

testimony, and the trial court ruled that a continuance should not be granted to secure

Delfina’s attendance because of the defense’s lack of diligence. There was nothing new

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regarding Delfina’s location or testimony presented at the new trial motion. Although

at the hearing on the new trial motion defense counsel proffered evidence regarding

additional pretrial efforts made by the defense investigator to find Delfina, defense

counsel offered no explanation as to why any additional information regarding the

investigator’s efforts were not fully delineated at the time of the midtrial continuance

motion. Thus, no newly discovered information was presented requiring the trial court

to grant the new trial motion.

(Lodgment No. 7 at 30.)

In Corona’s case, the state court made a factual finding, which is supported by the record, to

which this Court must defer under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), that “no newly discovered evidence was

presented . . . .” (Id.) Further, even if Delfina’s testimony was “newly discovered evidence,” Corona

would not be entitled to federal habeas relief. The Supreme Court has stated as follows:

Where newly discovered evidence is alleged in a habeas application, evidence

which could not reasonably have been presented to the state trier of facts, the federal

court must grant an evidentiary hearing. Of course, such evidence must bear upon the

constitutionality of the applicant’s detention; the existence merely of newly discovered

evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal

habeas corpus.

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)).

As discussed in Section IV(B)(2) of the Report and Recommendation, the inability of Corona

to present Delfina Miller’s testimony did not result in any Constitutional violation. Accordingly, the

state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge Barry Ted

Moskowitz under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered conditionally granting the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 3, 2008, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

/ / /

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than December 13, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: November 3, 2008

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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