Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00305/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00305-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1335 Interpleader Action

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

M.R., et. al.,

Defendants. /

No. C-06-0305 EDL

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. insured decedent William A. Rollins under a

Federal Employees Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) policy. Unable to determine the proper

beneficiary or beneficiaries to the life insurance proceeds, Plaintiff filed this interpleader action.

Plaintiff deposited the proceeds, plus interest, into the Court’s registry. On April 11, 2006, Plaintiff

was dismissed from this case.

On May 9, 2006, Defendants M.R. and R.R. filed a motion for summary judgment alleging

that there is no triable issue of fact that they are the proper beneficiaries of the life insurance

proceeds. The motion is unopposed. Because this motion is appropriate for determination without

oral argument, the Court vacated the June 13, 2006 hearing. For the reasons set forth below,

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment “shall be

rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

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5 U.S.C. §8705 provides in relevant part: 

[T]he amount of group life insurance and group accidental death insurance in force on

an employee at the date of his death shall be paid, on the establishment of a valid claim,

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together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts

are those that may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a

reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. The court may not weigh the

evidence. See id. at 225. Rather, the nonmoving party’s evidence must be believed and “all

justifiable inferences must be drawn in [the nonmovant’s] favor.” United Steelworkers of America v

Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (citing Liberty Lobby, 447 U.S.

at 225). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis

for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers,

admissions and affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 447 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

FACTS

William Rollins, who was insured by a FEGLI policy, died on May 20, 2002. Aff. of Sheree

Watts at 2:23-24; Ex. H. It is undisputed that there was no beneficiary designated to receive the life

insurance proceeds. At the time of his death, decedent was not married and had one living natural

child, R.R., age 17, and one non-biological child, M.R., age 16. See Aff. of Dennis O’Brien at 2:3-4;

Watts Aff. at 1: 26-27; 2:16-19; 2:25-26. Both children are represented as Defendants/Claimants in

this action by their biological mother, Sheree Watts (Watts), who has been appointed to both as

Guardian Ad Litem. See Watts Aff. at 1:22-25. Watts has submitted claims for the Death Benefits

for the insurance proceeds on behalf of each child. Id. at 1: 22-25. 

DISCUSSION

The FEGLI statute governing the life insurance policy at issue provides that if the insured

has not designated beneficiaries and has no widow or widower, proceeds go to the insured’s “child

or children.” 5 U.S.C. §8705.1

 “Child” is defined as “a legitimate child, an adopted child, or a

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to the person or persons surviving at the date of his death, in the following Order of

Precedence:

First, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated by the employee in

a signed and witnessed writing received before death in the employing office or,

if insured because of receipt of annuity or of benefits...

Second, if there is no designated beneficiary, to the widow or widower

of the employee.

Third, if none of the above, to the child or children of the employee and

descendants of deceased children by representation...

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recognized natural child, of any age.” 5 C.F.R. §870.101. Where paternity is not established, a child

can be found to be a “recognized natural child” of an insured if there is evidence showing that the

child is eligible as a recognized natural child under “other state or federal programs” or if there is

proof that the insured included the child as a dependent on his income tax returns. Id. Secondary

evidence is admissible to establish a child as a recognized natural child. See Mobley v Metropolitan

Life Co., 907 F. Supp. 495 (D.D.C. 1995). 

Here, Defendants have shown that there is no triable issue of material fact as to the proper

beneficiaries of the interpled insurance proceeds. It is uncontested that R.R. is a legitimate child of

the insured and thus a beneficiary under FEGLI. Further, Defendant has provided considerable

secondary evidence which demonstrates that M.R. is a “recognized natural child” of the insured.

First, the insured obtained an identification and privilege card for M.R. Watts Aff. at 2:1-4; 2-22; Ex

G. Second, the Social Security Administration recognizes M.R. as a child of the decedent and pays

him social security death benefits based on his status as the decedent’s son. See id at 2:14-15. Third,

the insured indicated on a Health Benefits Registration Form that his relationship with M.R. was

“unmarried dependant child under age of 22.” O’ Brien Aff.at 1:24-28; 2:1-2; Ex B. Fourth, there is

evidence that the insured listed M.R. as a dependent on his tax returns prior to 1994. Watts Aff. at

3:1-3 (“After I began work [after 1994], I then took the boys as dependents on my tax returns”). In

addition, the insured had a second life insurance policy naming R.R. and M.R. as equal

beneficiaries. Watts Aff. at 2:9-10; Ex. E. Finally, the insured and the mother of M.R. and R.R.

signed an informal custody visitation schedule for both R.R. and M.R. Watts Aff. at 2:5-10; Ex. D.

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//

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendants M.R.

and R.R. are entitled to share equally in the full insurance proceeds that Plaintiff interpled with the

Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 15, 2006 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE

United States Magistrate Judge

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