Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-05766/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-05766-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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Case No. C 09-5766 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JOINDER AND TO REMAND

(JFEX1)

**E-Filed 3/15/2010**

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ALLSUN RUSCIGNO,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

HILLSTONE RESTAURANT GROUP INC., a

Corporation, dba LOS ALTOS GRILL, and DOES

1-10

 Defendant.

Case No. 09-5766-JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION 1

FOR JOINDER AND TO REMAND

[re: document no. 8]

Plaintiff moves to amend her complaint to add Arnolfo Ruiz as a defendant and to

remand the instant action to state court . The Court has considered the moving and responding

papers and the oral arguments of counsel presented at the hearing on February 26, 2010. For the

reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted.

 I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Allsun Ruscigno (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on November 2, 2009 in the Santa

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Case No. C 09-5766 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JOINDER AND TO REMAND

(JFEX1)

Clara Superior Court, naming her former employer, Hillstone Restaurant Group, Inc.

(“Hillstone”) as the sole defendant. Hillstone answered the complaint on December 8, 2009. 

The next day, Hillstone removed the action to this Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship.

Plaintiff alleges the following facts. She was hired by Hillstone to work at the Los Altos

Grill as a waitress and bartender. Complaint ¶ 7. She worked at the restaurant from March

2003 until May 2009, except for a period of approximately two months in late 2004 and a period

of approximately twelve months between September 2005 and October 2006. Complaint ¶ 13-

15, 25. During the majority of her employment, she was sexually harassed by Ruiz, a coemployee who worked as a member of the kitchen staff. Complaint ¶ 8. Ruiz would touch her,

follow her in the restaurant and parking lot, and press his body against hers. Complaint ¶¶ 10,

14, 17-18. Ruiz also sexually harassed other co-workers. Complaint ¶ 26. Plaintiff complained

to management about Ruiz’s conduct. Complaint ¶¶ 12, 19, and 24. Management responded by

apparently suspending Ruiz following each of Plaintiff’s first two complaints. Complaint ¶¶ 12,

22. In or about January of 2009, Plaintiff demanded that Ruiz be fired. Complaint ¶ 22, 24. 

Ruiz was fired two weeks later. Id. Plaintiff was fired in May 2009. Complaint ¶ 25.

Plaintiff alleges that Hillstone is liable for (1) maintaining a hostile work environment,

(2) failing to maintain an environment free from harassment, (3) retaliatory discharge, and (4)

negligent hiring and retention. She now seeks to amend her complaint to add Ruiz as a named

defendant. A proposed First Amended Complaint is attached to her moving papers. Because

Ruiz is a California resident, his presence as a defendant would destroy this Court’s diversity

jurisdiction. 

II. JOINDER AND REMAND

A. Legal Standard

Where a plaintiff seeks to add a defendant whose presence would destroy diversity in a

properly removed action, a court may either (1) deny joinder or (2) permit joinder and remand

the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (“Section 1447(e)”); Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d

686, 691 (9th Cir. 1998). Whether to permit the joinder under Section 1447(e) is in the

discretion of the Court. Id. at 691.

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Case No. C 09-5766 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JOINDER AND TO REMAND

(JFEX1)

In deciding whether to permit joinder under 28 U.S.C. 1447(e), the Court should consider

the following factors (“the 1447(e) factors”): (1) whether the party sought to be joined is needed

for just adjudication and would be subject to joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

19(a); (2) whether the applicable statute of limitations would prevent the filing of a new action

against the defendant sought to be joined if the court denied joinder; (3) whether there has been

unexplained delay in seeking joinder; (4) whether joinder is sought for the sole purpose of

defeating federal jurisdiction; and (5) whether the claim against the new party appears to be

valid. Clinco v. Roberts, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (citations omitted).

B. Discussion

Plaintiff contends that Ruiz is a joint tortfeasor, in that he engaged personally in the

subject sexual harassment. Plaintiff asserts that Ruiz’s whereabouts were unknown at the time

she filed her original complaint but that she now has this information.

1. Rule 19(a)

Rule 19(a) requires joinder of persons whose absence (1) would preclude the grant of

complete relief, (2) would impede such persons’ ability to protect their interests, or (3) would

subject any party to the danger of inconsistent obligations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a); Clinco, 41

F. Supp. 2d at 1082. However, “[a]lthough courts consider whether a [person] would meet Fed.

R. Civ. Proc. 19’s standard for a necessary party, amendment under § 1447(e) is a less restrictive

standard than for joinder under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 19.” IBC Aviation Servs. v. Compania

Mexicana De Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011-1012 (N.D. Cal. 2000); see

also Righetti v. Shell Oil Co., 711 F. Supp. 531, 535 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (finding that Section

1447(e), not the “more restrictive approach under Rule 19”, controls the court’s decision to deny

joinder or to permit joinder and remand.). “The standard is met when failure to join will lead to

separate and redundant actions,” but it is not met when the person to be joined is “only

tangentially related to the cause of action or [non-joinder] would not prevent complete relief.”

IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.

Plaintiff alleges that Ruiz was the active participant in the sexual harassment. To prevail

on her claims against Hillstone, Plaintiff first would have to show that Ruiz’s conduct actually

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Case No. C 09-5766 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JOINDER AND TO REMAND

(JFEX1)

created a hostile work environment. A separate action against Ruiz for sexual harassment thus

would be redundant and potentially could lead to inconsistent outcomes. This factor strongly

favors joinder and remand.

2. Statute of limitations 

Plaintiff agrees that the applicable statute of limitations would not preclude her from

filing a separate action against Ruiz in state court. Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint

naming Ruiz with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing in June 2009. 

The Department issued a right-to-sue notice on July 9, 2009. Cal. Gov. Code § 12965(b) allows

Plaintiff one year from the date of that letter to file an action based on any party named in her

administrative complaint. Because the applicable statute of limitations would not prevent

Plaintiff from filing a new action against Ruiz, this factor disfavors joinder and remand. 

3. Unexplained delay

Hillstone argues that Plaintiff’s motion should be denied because Plaintiff had notice of

all of her potential claims against Ruiz before she filed her original complaint. Plaintiff explains

that Ruiz was not named in the original complaint because his whereabouts were unknown when

the initial action was filed. Plaintiff filed the instant motion approximately two months after

filing her original complaint. 

A delay of approximately two months is not necessarily an unreasonable delay. See

Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 (finding a delay of six weeks to be “not unreasonable”); cf. Lopez

v. General Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1983) (a pre-Section 1447(e) case

finding that seeking to join a defendant after six months was “too late”). There has been no

activity in the case since Hillstone removed it except for activity related to the instant motion for

joinder and remand. 

From a legal standpoint, Plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of Ruiz’s whereabouts was not a

barrier to an action against Ruiz. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 583.210(a) provides that service can be

made upon a defendant within three years of filing the complaint. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 415.50

allows for service by publication upon a defendant whose whereabouts are unknown so long as

there is a showing that the defendant cannot “with reasonable diligence” be served by another

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Case No. C 09-5766 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JOINDER AND TO REMAND

(JFEX1)

method. 

4. Motivation for filing

Hillstone contends that Plaintiff’s motion for joinder represents a thinly-veiled attempt to

destroy diversity and argues that Plaintiff’s true motivation may be gleaned from her

unconvincing explanation regarding her delay in naming Ruiz as a defendant. However, it

appears to the Court on balance that Plaintiff simply was mistaken with respect to the legal

significance of her inability to locate Ruiz. Absent this mistake, the instant case only could have

been filed in state court. 

5. Apparent validity of the claim

Hillstone concedes that Plaintiff does have an apparently valid claim against Ruiz, based

upon the alleged sexual harassment itself. Hillstone argues that Plaintiff’s remaining claims

(failure to maintain an environment free from harassment, retaliatory discharge, and negligent

hiring and retention) cannot be valid against Ruiz as a co-employee. Nonetheless, the apparent

validity of the first claim favors for allowing joinder and remand.

III. CONCLUSION

Good cause appearing, the motion to amend and remand is granted. The Clerk shall

transmit the file to the Santa Clara Superior Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: 3/12/2010

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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