Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03259/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03259-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 368
Nature of Suit: Asbestos Personal Injury - Prod.liab.
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

United Stat~s Co~rt <?f Appeals Tenth C1rcmt , 

OCT 2 11991 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L. HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LARRY D. WALLER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

PITTSBURGH CORNING CORP.; 

JOHN CRANE, INC.; CARLOCK, INC.; 

CELOTEX CORPORATION; and 

CAREY-CANADA, INC., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 90-3259 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 90-1233-K) 

Clerk 

Desa A. Ballard of Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, 

P.A., Barnwell, South Carolina (Paul H. Hulsey and Karl E. Novak 

of Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson·& Poole, P.A., Charleston, 

South Carolina, with her on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Virginia M. Giokaris of Polsinelli, White, Vardeman & Shalton, 

P.C., Kansas City, Missouri (Dennis J. Dobbels with her on the 

brief), for Defendant-Appellee Pittsburgh Corning Corporation. 

James C. Morrow of Gordon N. Myerson, P.C., Kansas City, Missouri, 

on the brief for Defendant-Appellee John Crane, Inc. 

Before SEYMOUR, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-3259 Document: 01019291264 Date Filed: 10/21/1991 Page: 1 
This action seeks damages for personal injury suffered by 

Larry D. Waller allegedly as a result of his exposure to 

defendants' asbestos products. The district court granted 

defendants' motion for summary judgment upon concluding that the 

action was barred by the applicable Kansas statute of repose. See 

Waller v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 742 F. Supp. 581 (D. Kan. 

1990). As discussed briefly below, we are in substantial 

agreement with the analysis and authorities relied on by the 

district court, and we therefore affirm. 

This case was originally filed in the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Texas and subsequently 

transferred to the District Court of Kansas. It is clear that the 

choice-of-law rules of the transferor court, in this case the 

Texas rules, must be followed by the transferee court in 

ascertaining whether the action is barred. See Ferens v. John 

Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990). 

Plaintiff argues that Texas choice-of-law rules require the 

application of Texas statutes of limitations, which in this case 

would provide a two year period after accrual of the cause of 

action and under which the action would be timely. We disagree. 

In Crisman v. Cooper Indus., 748 S.W.2d 273, 280 (Tex. Ct. App. 

1988), writ of error denied (Sep. 14, 1988), the Texas Court of 

Appeals held that a Florida statute of repose analogous to the 

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Appellate Case: 90-3259 Document: 01019291264 Date Filed: 10/21/1991 Page: 2 
Kansas statute of repose at issue here is a matter of substantive 

law. Upon determining under Texas choice-of-law rules that 

Florida substantive law applied to the claim in that case, the 

Texas court applied the Florida statute of repose and held the 

action barred. Id. at 280-81. The district court here held that 

the substantive law of Kansas applies to this diversity action, 

and plaintiff does not challenge that ruling on appeal. Under 

Texas law as set out in Crisman, the Kansas statute of repose 

applies. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b) (Cum.Supp. 1990). That 

statute provides that "in no event shall an action be commenced 

more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the 

cause of action." Id. 

The district court held that Waller's last exposure to 

asbestos occurred in 1976, and plaintiff does not argue to the 

contrary on appeal. The court then ruled the action barred by 

section 60-513(b). In so doing, the court held invalid as a 

matter of Kansas law an amendment to that provision, effective 

after this action was filed, purporting to revive actions which 

would otherwise be barred by operation of the statute. We agree. 

In Jackson v. American Best Freight System, Inc., 238 Kan. 322, 

709 P.2d 983, 985 (1985), the Kansas Supreme Court held that the 

vested right to a limitations defense cannot be taken away by a 

statute which provides for revival of an action barred prior to 

that statute's effective date. We are not persuaded by 

plaintiff's contention that Kansas would apply a different rule 

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Appellate Case: 90-3259 Document: 01019291264 Date Filed: 10/21/1991 Page: 3 
where, as here, the action is barred by a statute of repose rather 

than a statute of limitations. 1 

This case was filed on June 19, 1989. On that date, the tenyear statute of repose provided a complete defense to the action. 

The right to the defense provided by that statute was therefore 

vested. Accordingly, under Kansas law as articulated in Jackson, 

the subsequently enacted reviver statute, effective May 16, 1990, 

could not operate retroactively to defeat that vested defense. 

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. 

1 Statutes of limitation bar a claim after a time period that 

begins to run when the cause of action accrues. Statutes of 

repose, on the other hand, bar a claim after a period that is 

triggered by an arbitrary event unrelated to the accrual of the 

cause of action. See generally Menne v. Celotex Corp., 722 F. 

Supp. 662, 665-66 (D. Kan. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 861 F.2d 

1453 (lOth Cir. 1988). Thus, as in this case, it is possible for 

a statute of repose to bar a claim before it has accrued. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3259 Document: 01019291264 Date Filed: 10/21/1991 Page: 4