Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02291/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02291-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael P Lasso, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of the 

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-12-02291-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Slepian, has filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Doc. 29. Defendant does not oppose the motion. Doc. 30. For the 

reasons stated below, the Court will grant the motion. 

I. Background. 

 On September 10, 2013 the Court ruled in favor of Plaintiff and remanded this 

case to Defendant for an award of benefits. Doc. 21. Plaintiff and his dependents were 

awarded $72,234.00 in past-due benefits. Doc. 29 at 2. Mr. Slepian filed a request for 

attorney’s fees pursuant to EAJA, and the Court awarded $6,931.63. Doc. 28. Pursuant 

to the fee agreement, Mr. Slepian now moves for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 406(b), requesting $18,058.50 for 37.2 hours of work. Doc. 29 at 2-3. 

II. Legal Standard. 

Section 406 provides: 

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who was 

represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the 

Case 2:12-cv-02291-DGC Document 31 Filed 10/20/15 Page 1 of 3
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment[.] 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). 

 In Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002), the Supreme Court discussed the 

meaning of the term “reasonable fee” in § 406(b). The Court concluded that “§ 406(b) 

does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set 

for successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court.” 535 U.S. at 

807. “Rather, § 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent 

check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Id. The Court 

noted that “Congress has provided one boundary line: Agreements are unenforceable to 

the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past-due benefits.” Id. 

The Court should begin with the fee due under the fee agreement, and then may “reduce 

the fee for substandard performance, delay, or benefits that are not in proportion to the 

time spent on the case.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009).

 Gisbrecht also established that a claimant’s attorney who has received fees under 

the EAJA and § 406(b) must refund to the claimant the smaller fee award. 535 U.S. at 

796. This offset should be considered when determining whether a requested § 406(b) 

fee is reasonable. Id. at 797. 

III. Analysis. 

According to the fee agreement, Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to 25% of the total 

past-due benefits awarded. Doc. 29 at 5. That award equates to an hourly rate of 

$485.44 per hour ($18,058.50/37.2 hours).1

 Mr. Slepian has met his burden of proving 

that this is a reasonable fee in light of the services performed. 

 First, the fee is within the statutory maximum recovery of 25 percent of past-due 

benefits. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. Second, Mr. Slepian’s representation yielded a 

very favorable result for Plaintiff. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. Plaintiff has 

recovered past-due benefits of $72,234.00 and will continue to receive benefits in the 

 

1

 Because Mr. Slepian will be required to remit his $6,931.63 EAJA award to 

Plaintiff, that award is not included in calculating his effective hourly rate. 

Case 2:12-cv-02291-DGC Document 31 Filed 10/20/15 Page 2 of 3
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

future. Doc. 29 at 10-11. Third, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Mr. Slepian 

did anything to delay the proceeding to increase the past-due benefits. See Crawford, 586 

F.3d at 1151. Fourth, courts have recognized that attorneys working under contingent fee 

agreements in Social Security cases should be permitted to recover a favorable hourly 

rate when they are successful to offset the losses they incur when they are not. See In re 

Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1299 (9th Cir. 1994). Fifth, the 

fee requested is not disproportionate with the time spent on this case. Id. Mr. Slepian has 

spent several years on this case. See Doc. 29 at 2-3. Finally, the effective hourly rate is 

below rates that courts have found reasonable for this type of work. See Grunseich v. 

Barnhart, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (awarding hourly rate of $600); 

Yarnevic v. Apfel, 359 F. Supp. 2d 1363,1365-67 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (awarding hourly rate 

of $643); Claypool v. Barnhart, 294 F. Supp. 2d 829, 833-34 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) 

(awarding fee equivalent to $1,433 hourly rate); Brown v. Barnhart, 270 F. Supp. 2d 769, 

772-73 (W.D. Va. 2003) (awarding fee equivalent to $977 hourly rate). 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Counsel’s application for attorney’s fees in the amount of $18,058.50 

(Doc. 29) is granted. 

2. Counsel is ordered to remit the EAJA fees of $6,931.63 to Plaintiff. 

 Dated this 20th day of October, 2015. 

Case 2:12-cv-02291-DGC Document 31 Filed 10/20/15 Page 3 of 3