Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00042/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00042-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZANE HUBBARD, 

Plaintiff,

v.

GIPSON, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00042-AWI-JLT (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO DISMISS CASE AS BARRED BY 

HECK V. HUMPHRY, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)

AND FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

(Docs. 1, 9, 10, 13, 14)

I. Background

In his Second Amended Complaint, Zane Hubbard again seeks to challenge the legality or 

length of his prison sentence and, in particular, seeks his release from custody. (Doc. 10.) 

Despite being warned in the order that dismissed his First Amended Complaint of the 

parameters and application of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1994) to actions under 

section 1983, Plaintiff persists in complaining of the fact of his imprisonment and to seek his 

release in his verbose and prolix Second Amended Complaint.1 

Thus, on August 22, 2014, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause in writing why this 

action should not be dismissed as barred by Heck v. Humphrey. (Doc. 13.) On September 8, 

 

1

The Second Amended Complaint contains nineteen pages of pleading and one hundred forty-eight pages of 

exhibits. (Doc. 10.) Specific factual allegations only make up approximately a page and a half of the nineteen pages 

of pleadings. (Id., at 8:24-10:3.) 

Case 1:14-cv-00042-AWI-JLT Document 15 Filed 10/17/14 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

2014, Plaintiff filed his response which he titled as a motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 14.)

II. The Order to Show Cause -- Heck v. Humphrey

The OSC reminded Plaintiff that when one challenges the legality or duration of his 

custody, or raises a constitutional challenge which could entitle him to an earlier release, the sole 

federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Young v. 

Kenny, 907 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 11 S.Ct. 1090 (1991). Moreover, when seeking 

damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, "a § 1983 plaintiff must 

prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive 

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into 

question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254." Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1994). "A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a 

conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983." Id. at 

488. 

In his response to the OSC, Plaintiff states that he is pursuing his habeas corpus claims in 

other actions. (Doc. 14, p.2.) However, despite the pendency of those two actions and being

advised that claims which may lead to his earlier release are barred in an action under § 1983, in 

his OSC response, Plaintiff continues to assert that he is "convicted on an arbitrary imprisonment"

(id., p. 1) and that he is "beyond a reasonable doubt, falsely imprisoned, and because of [his] false 

imprisonment, the refuted civil rights violation is inhumane" (id.). Plaintiff further states that he 

"go[es] on about Guantanimo [sic] Bay, the Geneva Conventions interwoven with [his] 

arguments because the Eastern District Courts and CDCR seem to think Plaintiff has no rights 

and you can mistreat me which is not true. The Magna Carta decreed that no man would suffer 

the restraint Plaintiff currently suffers." (Id., at p. 2.) Thus, clearly, Plaintiff is complaining 

about his conviction and confinement and has failed to show cause why this action should not be 

dismissed as barred by Heck. 

However, even if this action were not barred by Heck, despite having been given the 

applicable pleading standards twice (see Docs. 7, 9), the Second Amended Complaint fails to 

state a cognizable claim upon which to allow this action to proceed.

Case 1:14-cv-00042-AWI-JLT Document 15 Filed 10/17/14 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

III. The Second Amended Complaint

A. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). 

B. Summary of the Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff complains of acts that occurred while he was an inmate at California State Prison 

("CSP") in Corcoran, California. Plaintiff names President Barrack Obama, Officer Usery of the 

Bakersfield Police Department, Corcoran's IGI Captain; Eastern District Court of California, the 

FBI, the Department of Justice, and the Solicitor General as the defendants in this action. As 

discussed below, the majority of these named Defendants are entitled to immunity on Plaintiff's 

claims. Further, as in the original and First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff fails to link the 

majority of the named defendants to his allegations and makes general references to "they," "the 

officials," and "authorities." The only Defendant that Plaintiff links to his factual allegations are 

the IGI Captain and the Solicitor General, but his allegations against them, as discussed below, 

are not facially plausible. Further, Plaintiff seeks to challenge various broad-scale activities such 

as "genocidal activity by persons under color of the United States Law who have abused power, 

subjecting or caused to be subjected, Plaintiff [Hubbard, Zane] a citizen of the United States of 

America to Sterilization, asexualization [sic] of a parolee for existing, (Re: [53 A.L.R. 3d 960] 

depriving Plaintiff of my citizenship . . . " and various other legal conclusions, but fails to support 

them with specific factual allegations. (See Doc. 10, p. 3.) 

The sparse factual allegations that Plaintiff makes are generally nonsensical and facially 

implausible and/or complain of esoteric activities that are not linked to any Defendant(s) in this 

action. To wit: "through electorconvlusive therapy, IGI Lieutenant S. Pina, during daily 

interrogations threatened to 'kill me' and 'set me up,' as a means to insteal [sic] fear in Petitioner;" 

Case 1:14-cv-00042-AWI-JLT Document 15 Filed 10/17/14 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

through the same line of conduct, IGI LT. J.S. Garcia told me to 'fuck my mom' in Spanish in 

order to anger me so his unidentified captain of IGI can galvanize me through the ect [sic] 

torture;" "the Superintendent of Corcoran on a daily basis calls Plaintiff a 'disgrace' and states I 

have 'tattoos on my face,' he calls me the 'black hand,' the 'Son of God,' and [sic] deserve all the

torture inflicted upon me;" "the IGI Captain must be the 'pilot,' the head of the interrogation 

torture. If Petitioner tenses in any form or manner he lets loose a buckshot [sic] of slander and 

other harassing verbage [sic] to irritate Plaintiff to act out violently, other times he galvanizes 

Petitioner. Plaintiff wakes up in a state of paralysis to a massive earthquake, or stops breathing in 

my sleep for an undetermined amount of time and wakes up gasping for air other times IGI 

Captain (Defendant) galvanizes Petitioners eyes depriving Plaintiff of sleep, Plaintiff already 

suffers insomnia from long use of methamphetamines;" "the IGI Captain (Defendant) is also 

responsible for holding Petitioner hostage in Corcoran as an 'enemy combatant' literally to the 

SNY inmates. He threatens that Petitioner will not walk out/parole from Corcoran or CDCR 

unless Plaintiff SNYs [sic] and halls [sic] called in favors to legislation [sic] at an attempt to 

obstruct all Petitioners litigations and appeal of unlawful conviction which has resulted in the 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. This behavior, while under the color of authority not only 

violates Petitioner's due process rights, but the Geneva Convention and the Genocide Convention. 

Not to mention, during a surgery in 2007, it is believed that the same IGI Captain ordered the 

implementation of a chip, tracking device '666' in my lower right leg tibia, exactly. This was done 

without my knowledge or consent and was newly discovered in Corcoran, during interrogation, 

Petitioner's lower right foot vibrates. The Department of Corrections also has or has attempted to 

destroy my identity, creative arts, and life as mentioned above and I find reason to believe this is 

genocide." (Doc. 10, 8:24-10:5.) These are the most specific allegations in the Second Amended 

Complaint. All of the other pages either identify parties or discuss various laws, Acts of 

Congress, international conventions, treaties, and the like. 

Among other things, Plaintiff seeks "1) a declaratory judgment that the Defendants' acts 

and practices described herein are genocidal to Petitioner. 2) . . . for a memorandum from the 

Department of Justice ("DOJ") to the CIA interpreting the 'Convention Against Torture,' 

Case 1:14-cv-00042-AWI-JLT Document 15 Filed 10/17/14 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

'Nuremberg Tribunal,' the 'Security Counsel Tribunal,' 'United Nations Treaty Series 277,' 'Rome 

Statute of the (ICC),' 'The Nationality Act Provisions,' 'the Hate Crime Act of (1990),' and the Klu 

Klux Klan Act of (1944). . . .." (Id.)

Despite having repeated opportunity to cure deficiencies and being provided applicable 

pleading standards, Plaintiff has not stated any cognizable claims. It thus appears futile to allow 

further efforts to amend as to do so may encourage fabrication.

C. Pleading Requirements

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

The prior screening orders have stated that "Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard 

applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 

actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A

complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). "Such a statement must simply give the defendant 

fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 

U.S. at 512. Despite being advised of these parameters, the Second Amended Complaint clearly 

violates the brevity requirement of Rule 8 as it ballooned to 167 pages in length when Plaintiff's 

First Amended Complaint was a mere 5 pages and his original Complaint was only 3 pages. 

Further, Plaintiff was also previously admonished that while detailed factual allegations 

are not required, A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Factual allegations are accepted as true, but 

legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557. Plaintiff was warned that he must set forth 

Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden 

of pleadings facts . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of 

pro se prisoners are still construed liberally and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. 

Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, courts are not required to indulge 

Case 1:14-cv-00042-AWI-JLT Document 15 Filed 10/17/14 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

unwarranted inferences. Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights 

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Bruns v. 

Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 

673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” 

is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of 

satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 

969.

The following of Plaintiff's allegations are simply not facially plausible: (1) that Plaintiff 

was subjected to "electroconvulsive therapy;" (2) that he has been "galvanized" through "ect 

torture;" (3) that the Superintendent of Corcoran daily calls Plaintiff names and thinks about 

torture being inflicted on him that the IGI Captain heads sessions of "interrogation torture" on 

Plaintiff to make him act out and/or to "galvanize" Plaintiff; (4) that Plaintiff is paralyzed only to 

wake up to a massive earthquake; that the IGI Captain "galvanizes" Plaintiff's eyes to subject him 

to sleep deprivation; that the IGI Captain has held Plaintiff in Corcoran as an "enemy combatant" 

to SNY inmates and has called in favors to pass legislation to obstruct Plaintiff's appeals to his 

conviction; and (5) that the IGI Captain ordered a tracking chip placed in Plaintiff's lower left leg 

during a surgical procedure back in 2007 that causes his foot to vibrate when he is being 

interrogated. These allegations, while certainly disturbing if Plaintiff truly believes them, appear 

at best fanciful, verging on delusional. However, none of these allegations, alone or in 

combination, state a facially plausible claim. 

2. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to 

be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of 

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 

other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. ' 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See

Case 1:14-cv-00042-AWI-JLT Document 15 Filed 10/17/14 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that A[a] person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 

in another=s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named 

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff=s 

federal rights. Further, Plaintiff cannot bring claims under section 1983 against other inmates as 

they are not persons acting under color of state law. 

The only named Defendants that Plaintiff links to his sparse factual allegations are the IGI 

Captain and the Superintendent of Corcoran, but as just previously discussed, his allegations 

against them are not facially plausible. None of the other named Defendants are linked to any of 

Plaintiff's allegations such that Plaintiff has not put the Defendants on notice of his claims against 

them. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004). 

3. Immunities

Even if Plaintiff had linked all of the named Defendants to his factual allegations, 

President Barrack Obama, Eastern District Court of California, the FBI, the Department of 

Justice, and the Solicitor General would all be entitled to immunity from suit. 

a. Presidential Immunity

President Obama is absolutely immune from suit for damages for conduct that is part of 

the President's official duties. See Forrester v. white, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988); Nixon v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756-58 (1982); Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1991); 

cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 694-95 (1997) (holding no immunity from suit for conduct not 

taken in official capacity). 

b. Judicial Immunity

Plaintiff does not link the Eastern District Court to any specific factual allegation. 

However, federal judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages and declaratory, 

injunctive, and other equitable relief for their judicial acts. Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Dist. 

Case 1:14-cv-00042-AWI-JLT Document 15 Filed 10/17/14 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040 (1988). A>A judge 

will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, 

or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in 

the clear absence of all jurisdiction.=@ Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1388 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 

U.S. 349, 356-357 (1978)). A clear absence of all jurisdiction means a clear lack of all subject 

matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1389. 

In addition, judicial immunity will be lost if the judge performs an act that is not Ajudicial@

in nature. The factors relevant in determining whether an act is judicial Arelate to the nature of the 

act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of 

the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.@ Stump v. Sparkman, 

435 U.S. at 362. 

Judicial immunity is not lost by allegations that a judge conspired with a third party. As 

long as the judge=s ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the court=s subject matter 

jurisdiction, immunity applies. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff 

does not specify any actions or rulings made by the judges and/or the Eastern District Court in 

any specific case. However, the actions or rulings made by the judges in connection with cases to 

which the judges were assigned were within their jurisdiction. Plaintiff cannot possibly win relief 

against the judges and/or the Eastern District Court because of absolute judicial immunity. See 

Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361-362 (9th Cir. 1981).

c. Prosecutorial Immunity

While Plaintiff names the FBI, the Department of Justice, and the Solicitor General as 

Defendants in this action, they are all entitled to prosecutorial immunity when persons employed 

by those departments are acting pursuant to their official roles as governmental advocates 

performing functions "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." 

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 124-26 

(1997); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 

S. Ct. 1872 (U.S. Apr. 14, 2008) (No. 07-854); Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 

2005); Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636-37 (9th Cir. 2005); KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 

Case 1:14-cv-00042-AWI-JLT Document 15 Filed 10/17/14 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 2004); Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003). 

D. Claims for Relief

Plaintiff did not delineate any claims for relief that he hoped to pursue in the Second 

Amended Complaint. He was previously given the standards for claims under the Eighth 

Amendment for use of excessive force and for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. 

Despite this, the Court is unable to identify any attempt by Plaintiff to state factual allegations to 

address the elements of a claim under the Eighth Amendment. As discussed above, Plaintiff's 

sparse fanciful/surreal allegations are not facially plausible. Plaintiff does not state any 

cognizable claims upon which to proceed in this action.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is barred by Heck v. Humphrey and fails to state a 

cognizable claim against any of the named Defendants. Given Plaintiff's persistence in 

attempting to pursue claims that he as previously been advised are not actionable and his apparent 

inability to state allegations to meet the elements of a cognizable claim, it appears futile to allow 

further amendment. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this entire action be dismissed and 

count as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §1915(g) as Plaintiff has both failed to state a 

cognizable claim and, pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), is barred from 

bringing this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. It is further recommended that Plaintiff's motion for 

reconsideration regarding the order to show cause, filed September 8, 2014 (Doc 14), be denied.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(l). Within 30 

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned AObjections to Magistrate Judge=s 

Findings and Recommendations.@ 

///

///

///

Case 1:14-cv-00042-AWI-JLT Document 15 Filed 10/17/14 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the District Court=s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 16, 2014 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00042-AWI-JLT Document 15 Filed 10/17/14 Page 10 of 10