Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-06123/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-06123-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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Case No.: 5:18-cv-06123-EJD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MIGUEL PADILLA,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,

Defendant.

Case No. 5:18-cv-06123-EJD 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 1, 12, 20, 25

Miguel Padilla (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration’s (“Defendant”) administrative decision denying Plaintiff’s application 

for disability benefits. Both parties move for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for a 

remand for further administrative proceedings. Having considered the Parties’ papers, Plaintiff’s 

motion for summary judgment and remand is DENIED and Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment is GRANTED.

1

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff was 49 years old when he applied for disability benefits. Admin. R. at 181. 

Plaintiff was an iron worker from 1992 to 2006 and a mechanic from 2007 to July 2012. Id. at 

211. Plaintiff has not been gainfully employed since July 8, 2012 (the asserted onset date of his

disabling condition). See id. at 17, 181.

1 Because the Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, it does not reach 

Defendant’s request for remand.

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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Plaintiff’s conditions include asthma, vertiginous syndromes and other disorders of the 

vestibular system, affective disorders, anxiety disorder, organic mental disorder, and tinnitus. Id.

at 17. Plaintiff is also considered obese. Id. at 18. Plaintiff has been diagnosed with “mild” sleep 

apnea and headaches. Id. at 18.

1. Joan Hoffman, M.D.

In September 2014, Dr. Hoffman, Plaintiff’s examining physician, determined that 

Plaintiff suffered from chronic asthma, vertigo, and tinnitus. Plaintiff’s brain MRI revealed that 

he suffered from an “empty sella.” Id. at 702. In Dr. Hoffman’s opinion, the MRI explained 

Plaintiff’s history of frequent attacks of balance disturbance, tinnitus, and progressive loss of 

hearing. Id. Dr. Hoffman also found that Plaintiff suffered from headaches, imbalance, reduced 

cognitive function, ringing in ears, temporary hearing loss, motion sickness, nausea and vomiting, 

sensitivity to bright lights and noise, lack of coordination, and dizziness. Id.

While Dr. Hoffman could not predict how often Plaintiff’s symptoms interfered with his 

daily life, she did note that certain factors, like “stress, exertion, sudden exertion, sudden 

movement, or change in head position” tended to negatively affect Plaintiff’s health. Id. at 703 

(noting that Plaintiff uses a cane to walk and to aid his balance); see also id. at 703 (finding it 

impossible to predict how often Plaintiff would need breaks during 8-hour workday because it was

hard to predict when vertigo would worsen). Dr. Hoffman found that Plaintiff’s “impairments 

[are] likely to produce ‘good days’ and ‘bad days,’” and that Plaintiff is thus likely to be absent 

from work more than four times a month. Id. Despite these symptoms, Dr. Hoffman found that 

Plaintiff “rarely” experienced pain or other symptoms severe enough to interfere with the attention 

and concentration needed to perform simple work tasks. Id.

2. Lance Gee, M.D.

On July 6, 2012, Dr. Gee diagnosed Plaintiff with “dizziness.” Id. at 317–18. Dr. Gee 

regularly examined and consistently diagnosed Plaintiff with “dizziness” and “persistent vertigo.” 

See id. at 323, 325–26, 348, 358–60, 372–73, 384, 402, 412, 419, 426, 429. Dr. Gee prescribed 

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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Plaintiff Xanax “when needed for anxiety.” Id. at 358–60, 372–73. Dr. Gee ordered an MRI, 

which revealed “[n]onspecific moderate ventriclomegaly of the lateral and third ventricles with an 

empty sella [and] [p]atent2aqueduct of Sylvius and normal fourth ventricle.” Id. at 325–26. 

Dr. Gee determined that Plaintiff’s dizziness and vertigo were worsening. For instance, on 

October 17, 2012, Dr. Gee diagnosed Plaintiff with vertigo, asthma, and “worsening vertigo,” and 

prescribed Albuterol “when needed for shortness of breath.” Id. at 386–88. On January 10, 2013, 

after confirming his vertigo and asthma diagnosis, Dr. Gee noted that “[Plaintiff] [is] still severely 

symptomatic and is unable [to] work with sensitive equipment or dangerous objects.” Id. at 398–

401; see also id. at 404–06 (same). Later that year, on May 15, 2013, Dr. Gee diagnosed Plaintiff 

with memory loss and dizziness. Id. at 408. And, on January 6, 2014, after noting Plaintiff’s 

history of chronic vertigo, Dr. Gee stated that Plaintiff is “unable to do more [than] 4 hours of 

meaning[ful] work at home.” Id. at 434.

3. Thomas McCord, Ph.D.

Dr. McCord evaluated Plaintiff and performed several different procedures and tests, 

including a complete Mental Status Evaluation and Psychological Testing, a Fourth Edition 

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, a Fourth Edition Wechsler Memory Scale, and “Trials A and 

B.” Id. at 782–84.

Plaintiff received a composite score of 67 for the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, which 

is “extremely low.” Id. at 783. Plaintiff received a composite score of 49 for the Auditory 

Memory Index, which is also “extremely low.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff received a composite score 

of 85 for the Visual Memory Index, which is a “low average” classification. Id. Dr. McCord also 

diagnosed Plaintiff with “mild depression with anxiety.” Id. at 784.

Dr. McCord performed a psychological evaluation of Plaintiff. The evaluation was based 

on a single session, performed in a structured environment, and derived from the aforementioned 

2 Patent refers to a vessel, duct, or aperture being “open and unobstructed.” Definition of Patent in 

English, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/patent (last visited Feb. 25, 2020).

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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tests. Id. at 782-84. Dr. McCord found that Plaintiff suffered from anxiety and possible 

depression. Id. at 784. He also found that these symptoms were recent and were likely rooted in 

Plaintiff’s lack of work. Id. Dr. McCord continued:

[Plaintiff] shows minimal impairment in his ability to understand and 

carry out simple instructions and tasks and severe impairment as the 

instructions and tasks become more complex. [Plaintiff] 

demonstrates severe impairment in his ability to attend to usual work 

situations, including attendance, safety, etc. and severe impairment in 

his ability to deal with changes in a routine work environment. 

[Plaintiff] demonstrates moderate to severe impairment in his 

concentration, pace, and persistence. [Plaintiff] demonstrates 

minimal impairment in his ability to interact appropriately with 

supervisors, co-workers, peers, and the public.

Id. at 784.

4. Parimal Shah, M.D.

Dr. Shah evaluated Plaintiff at the request of the Social Security Administration, Admin. 

R. at 772, and found that Plaintiff has:

Exertional Limitations

The claimant can lift and/or carry (including upward pulling) 100 pounds 

occasionally and 50 pounds frequently. Pushing and/or pulling (including operation 

of hand and/or foot controls) is not limited other than for lift/carry. Standing and/or 

walking (with normal breaks) can be done without limitations in a normal 8-hour 

workday. It is deemed, in the opinion of this examiner that a medically required 

hand-held assistive device, (i.e. a cane) is not required for ambulation. Sitting (with 

normal breaks) can be done without restrictions. Outside of the normal break 

periods, the claimant does not need to periodically alternate sitting, and standing to 

relive pain/discomfort.

Postural Limitations

Climbing ramps and stairs can be done frequently. Climbing ladders, ropes, and 

scaffolds can be done frequently. Balancing can be done without restrictions. 

Stopping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling can be done frequently.

Manipulative Limitations

The [Plaintiff] can reach without limitations in all directions, including overhead. 

Gross manipulation (handling) can be done without limitations. Fine manipulation 

(fingering) can be done without limitations. Feeling (skin receptors) can be done 

without limitations.

Visual/Communicative Limitations

There are no limitations in vision appreciated. There are no limitations in hearing 

appreciated. There are no limitations in speaking appreciated.

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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Environmental Limitations

The [Plaintiff] has no environmental limitations, except for based on this exam, to 

avoid all exposure to hazards such as machinery. Explanation of limitations: This is 

because of [Plaintiff’s] vertigo and frequent falls with safety reasons in mind and 

common-sense approach.

Id. at 778–79.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed an application for disability benefits on October 22, 2014. Id. at 181. He 

alleges that his disabling condition began on July 8, 2012. Id. After his application was denied,

Plaintiff filed a Request for Reconsideration. Id. at 119. The Social Security Administration 

(“SSA”) affirmed its decision and maintained that Plaintiff is not “disabled under [their] rules.” 

Id. at 119, 125–26. In response, on December 17, 2015, Plaintiff submitted a Disability Appeal

and requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Id. at 132. 

Plaintiff received this hearing on May 19, 2017. Id. at 15. After considering Plaintiff’s 

arguments and the supporting evidence, the ALJ concluded that, pursuant to the Social Security 

Act, Plaintiff was not disabled. Id. at 15–28. 

Although Plaintiff requested a review of the ALJ’s decision, the Appeals Council

determined that there was no reason to conduct a review. Id. at 180. Hence, on July 31, 2018, the 

ALJ’s decision became the final administrative decision. Id. at 1. Plaintiff then filed this action. 

Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Mot.”), Dkt. 20. 

Defendant filed a cross motion for summary judgment on July 26, 2019. Defendant’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment (“D Mot.”), Dkt. 25. On August 9, 2019, Plaintiff filed an 

opposition to this cross-motion. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Cross Motion (“P Opp.”), 

Dkt. 26. Defendant filed a reply on November 4, 2019. Defendant’s Reply re Cross-Motion 

(“Reply”), Dkt. 28.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard for Reviewing the ALJ’s Decision

A court has jurisdiction over social security appeals when the plaintiff files the appeal 

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within 60 days. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).3 The jurisdiction of federal courts, however, is limited to 

judging whether substantial evidence was used in the denial of benefits. Id. The substantial

evidence standard is met when the record contains sufficient evidence supporting the ALJ’s 

factual conclusions. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). In other words, the court 

must ask whether a reasonable mind, based on the evidentiary record, could reach the ALJ’s 

holding. Id. Further, if the evidence provided supports multiple rational interpretations, then the

administrative decisions reached below must be upheld. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 

(9th Cir. 2005). However, if legal error occurred in the administrative process or if the 

administrative decision is not supported by substantial evidence, the decision may be set aside. 

Treviso v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 676 (9th Cir. 2017). 

B. Standard for Determining Disability

An applicant is “disabled” if their “physical or mental impairment or impairments are of 

such severity that [they] [are] not only unable to do [their] previous work but cannot, considering 

[their] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work 

which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). A five-step process is used to 

make this determination. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4). In steps one through four,4the claimant 

carries the burden of proof; in step five, however, the ALJ carries the burden of proof. Burch, 400 

F.3d at 679. In the fifth step, the SSA considers the applicant’s residual functional capacity, age, 

education, and work experience to see if the applicant can “make an adjustment to other work.” If 

an adjustment can be made, the applicant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). 

C. Standard for Evaluating Medical Opinion Evidence

Physicians fall into three categories: (1) treating physicians, (2) examining physicians, and 

(3) non-examining physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (1995). Treating physician 

3

See Admin. R. at 2 (“You have 60 days to file a civil action . . . . The 60 days start the day after 

you receive this letter. We assume you received this letter 5 days after the date on it.”).

4 Because these four steps are not relevant to the Parties’ arguments, the Court does not analyze 

them. The Court thus only states the rule for step five, which is in dispute.

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opinions are accorded more weight than examining physician opinions and examining physician 

opinions are accorded more weight than non-examining physician opinions. Ryan v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830). 

Clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence are required to reject an 

uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician. Ryan, F.3d at 1198 (citing Bayliss v. 

Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005)).

5

If treating and examining physician opinions are 

contradicted by another physician’s opinion, they may be rejected as long as there are specific and 

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence supporting the rejection. Ryan, 528 F.3d at 

1198 (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830). 

However, a contradicting opinion of a non-examining physician does not alone constitute 

substantial evidence. Rather, a non-examining physician must provide justification as to why they 

rejected the decision of a treating or examining physician opinion. Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1202 

(quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 831). It is legal error to reject a medical opinion, or assign it little 

weight, without offering a substantive basis for doing so. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012-

1013 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1996)).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that Defendant improperly evaluated the medical evidence. Mot. 7:13–

12:6. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant: (1) incorrectly assessed Dr. Hoffman’s opinion as

subjective and inconsistent with other evidence; (2) failed to address Dr. Gee’s statement that 

Plaintiff could not work more than four hours; (3) gave too little weight to Dr. McCord’s opinion 

5 Defendant argues that the Biestek opinion prevents this Court from using the “clear and 

convincing” standard. Reply at 3:1–4. The Court disagrees. The Supreme Court confined its 

opinion in Biestek to a narrow question—whether an expert who testified about the availability of 

certain jobs in the economy and refused to provide the private market-survey data underlying her 

testimony could be categorically precluded from counting as “substantial evidence.” 139 S. Ct. at 

1152. That same question is not at issue here. Id. at 1154 n.1 (“[N]or did [Petitioner’s] briefing 

and argument focus on anything other than the Seventh Circuit’s categorical rule. We confine our 

opinion accordingly.”). Therefore, the standard remains that if uncontradicted by another 

physician, clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence are required to reject a 

treating or examining physician’s opinion.

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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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that Plaintiff had more than a minimal limitation; and (4) gave too much weight to Dr. Shah’s 

opinion. Id. at 8:14–16, 9:21–24, 10:23–24, 11:12–23.

Plaintiff also argues that Defendant improperly rejected symptom testimony. Id. at 12:7–

15:11. This, Plaintiff contends, was error, especially when combined with Defendant’s improper

evaluation of the medical evidence. Id. at 15:12–16:21. In Plaintiff’s view, by improperly

weighing the medical opinions and symptom testimony, the hypotheticals presented to the 

vocational expert in the fifth step were erroneous and should have no evidentiary value. Id. at

16:12–21. This Court disagrees; Defendant correctly evaluated the medical evidence and 

symptom testimony and formed proper conclusions.

A. ALJ’s Evaluation of Medical Opinion Evidence

Defendant assigned partial weight to Dr. Hoffman’s medical opinion, little weight to Dr. 

Gee’s medical opinion, partial weight to Dr. McCord’s medical opinion, and significant weight to 

Dr. Shah’s medical opinion. Admin. R. at 24–25. According to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a), Dr. 

Hoffman was an examining physician, see id. at 702–10; Dr. Gee was a treating physician, see id. 

at 279-435; Dr. McCord was an examining physician, see id. at 782–84; and Dr. Shah was a nonexamining physician, see id. at 772. Dr. Hoffman, Dr. Gee, and Dr. McCord’s opinions were

contradicted by other medical opinions. Compare Admin. R. at 434 (stating that Plaintiff was 

“unable to do more [than] 4 hours of meaning[ful] work at home”), and id. at 703 (“[Plaintiff] 

sometimes need[s] to take unscheduled breaks during an 8-hour working day”), and id. at 784

(“[Plaintiff] demonstrates severe impairment in his ability to attend to usual work situations, 

including attendance, safety, etc.”), with id. at 87 (finding that Plaintiff is not significantly limited 

in his ability “to be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions” or “perform 

activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary 

tolerances”), and id. at 778–779 (“Standing and/or walking (with normal breaks) can be done 

without limitations in a normal 8-hour workday.”). Therefore, as noted, Defendant needed (and 

had) specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence to reject Dr. Hoffman, Dr. 

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Gee, and Dr. McCord’s medical opinions. See Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198 (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 

830).

1. Dr. Hoffman’s Medical Opinion

Dr. Hoffman’s medical opinion was properly evaluated using the substantial evidence 

standard. Dr. Hoffman was an examining physician. See Admin. R. at 702–10 (examining and 

diagnosing Plaintiff, but only seeing Plaintiff occasionally and not over a long period of time); 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). In evaluating Dr. Hoffman’s medical examinations, Defendant

acknowledged and assigned significant weight to the finding that “[Plaintiff] used a cane to 

ambulate for balance because this observation is consistent with the claimant’s treatment notes.”

Admin. R. at 25. However, the remainder of Dr. Hoffman’s findings were assigned little weight, 

especially as related to Plaintiff’s need for unscheduled breaks and monthly absences. Id. at 25. 

This is because Dr. Shah’s medical opinion contradicted Dr. Hoffman’s medical opinion. For 

instance, Dr. Hoffman found that Plaintiff needs a cane to help with balance and would need to 

take unscheduled breaks during an 8-hour workday. Id. at 702–03. In contrast, Dr. Shah found 

that Plaintiff does not require a cane and can stand and walk with normal breaks, without 

limitations, during a normal 8-hour workday. Id. at 772–79. 

Because of the differing medical opinions, specific and legitimate reasons supported by 

substantial evidence, not clear and convincing reasons, was the requisite standard. See Ryan, 528 

F.3d at 1198 (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830). Defendant described Dr. Hoffman’s limitations as 

“not consistent with the objective findings, . . . based on the [Plaintiff’s] self-reports, . . . [and] 

overly restrictive in light of the [Plaintiff’s] conservative treatment and [] reports that Plaintiff’s 

dizziness lasts approximately 1 minute.” Admin. R. at 25. Through this description, Defendant 

thus properly provided specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for 

rejecting Dr. Hoffman’s opinion. See Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198 (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830).

2. Dr. Gee’s Medical Opinion

Plaintiff next argues that Defendant failed to properly account for Dr. Gee’s determination 

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that Plaintiff was unable to work more than 4 hours. Mot. 10:6–8. This argument is improper. A

medical opinion indicating disability or an inability to work is not equivalent to a legal finding of 

disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; see also Wennet v. Saul, 777 Fed. Appx. 875, 878 (9th Cir. 

2019); Sarkiss v. Colvin, 623 Fed. App’x 329, 330 (9th Cir. 2015); McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 

881, 884 (9th Cir. 2011). Only Defendant (the Social Security Administration) has the power to 

make such a disability determination. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). 

Plaintiff further argues that Defendant improperly weighed Dr. Gee’s medical opinion. Dr. 

Gee was a treating physician. See Admin. R. at 279–435; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). And, Dr. 

Gee’s medical opinion was contradicted by Dr. Shah. While Dr. Gee concluded that Plaintiff is 

“unable to do more [than] 4 hours of meaning[ful] work at home,” Admin. R. at 434, Dr. Shah 

determined that standing, walking, and sitting, with normal breaks, can be done without 

restrictions in a normal 8-hours workday. Id. at 778. Due to this contradiction, specific and 

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence was the applicable standard in weighing Dr. 

Gee’s medical opinion. See Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198.

In evaluating Dr. Gee’s medical treatment, Defendant found that Dr. Gee’s medical 

opinion was “temporary in nature, . . . overly reliant on the [Plaintiff’s] self-reports, and . . . not 

supported by the objective medical evidence in the record.” Id. at 26. Defendant thus had specific 

and legitimate reasons, based on substantial evidence, supporting its decision to reject Dr. Gee’s 

medical conclusions. See Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198 (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830). Accordingly, 

Defendant’s determination was proper.

3. Dr. McCord’s Medical Opinion

Defendant properly evaluated Dr. McCord’s medical opinion by using the substantial 

evidence standard. Dr. McCord was an examining physician. See Admin. R. at 782–84

(examining Plaintiff, performing various evaluations, but only seeing Plaintiff once), 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c). Plaintiff argues that the “clear and convincing reasons” standard governs Dr. 

McCord’s medical opinion. Mot. 11:9–11. This is incorrect; Dr. McCord’s medical opinion was 

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contradicted. Dr. McCord noted:

[Plaintiff] shows minimal impairment in his ability to understand and 

carry out simple instructions and tasks and severe impairment as the 

instructions and tasks become more complex. He demonstrates 

severe impairment in his ability to attend to usual work situations, 

including attendance, safety, etc. and severe impairment in his ability 

to deal with changes in a routine work environment. He demonstrates 

moderate to severe impairment in his concentration, pace, and 

persistence. He demonstrates minimal impairment in his ability to 

interact appropriately with supervisors, co-workers, peers, and the 

public.

Admin. R. at 784. 

Dr. Celine Payne-Gair, who performed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment, found:

[Plaintiff] can understand and remember simple instructions, . . . can 

adapt to routine change in the workplace . . . can complete simple 

tasks, maintain attention and concentration for periods of at least two 

hours, complete a normal workday and workweek w/o significant pyrelated interruptions, and perform at a consistent 

pace . . . [and] . . . can relate appropriately to the public, peers and 

supervisors.

Id. at 87. 

Because of this contradiction, the appropriate standard is whether Defendant utilized 

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence when evaluating Dr. McCord’s 

medical opinion. Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198 (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830). Defendant explained that 

“Dr. McCord’s findings . . . are overly restrictive in light of the claimant’s minimal mental health 

treatment of record and Dr. McCord’s one-time evaluation of [Plaintiff].” Admin. R. at 25. Thus, 

because Defendant had specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence, it 

properly rejected Dr. McCord’s medical findings. See Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198. 

4. Dr. Shah’s Medical Opinion

Plaintiff argues Defendant gave Dr. Shah’s medical opinion too much weight. Mot. 

11:12–23. This is incorrect. Dr. Shah was a non-examining physician. See Admin. R. at 772 

(“[Plaintiff] understands that no treatment would result from today’s examination and was made 

aware of the fact that usual patient-physician confidentiality does not exist.”); 20 C.F.R. 

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING 

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§ 404.1527(c)(3). The weight of non-examining physician opinions depends “on the degree to 

which they provide supporting explanations for their medical opinions.” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404,1527(c)(3). Dr. Shah’s opinion includes statements about the examinations performed and 

the conclusions reached based on these examinations. Admin. R. at 772–79. Further, Dr. Shah 

explained her medical conclusions. Admin. R. at 772–79. Defendant thus properly agreed with

Dr. Shah’s opinion because it “was based on a physical evaluation of the claimant and objective 

medical findings consistent with the evidence as a whole.” Id. at 24. Therefore, because Dr. Shah 

provided supporting explanations for her medical opinion, it was appropriate for Defendant to 

assign “significant weight to Dr. Shah’s opinion.” Id.

B. ALJ’s Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony

Plaintiff argues that Defendant improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 

Testimony about symptoms alone does not establish disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). 

Objective medical evidence is required to corroborate assertions of medical impairments. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); see also Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (2014). If Plaintiff’s 

testimony is medically supported, Defendant needs clear and convincing reasoning to reject 

Plaintiff’s testimony. Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (2002). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “identifies no specific records contrary to any of 

[Plaintiff’s] specific statements regarding his limitations.” Mot. 13:12–13. The record, however, 

shows that the contrary occurred. Indeed, Defendant first noted “that the [Plaintiff’s] medical 

records only partially support his allegations.” Admin. R. at 21. Defendant next identified

conservative treatments for Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms and tracked specific instances of such 

treatments and explained why such incidences were given weight. Id. at 21–23. Finally, 

Defendant points out that the testimony about Plaintiff’s vertigo episodes lasting one-hour is

inconsistent with the medical records describing two-minute episodes. Id. at 21, 48, 320.

Plaintiff next argues that “[Defendant] has not specified which testimony he found not 

credible and has not provided clear and convincing reasons supported by evidence in the record to 

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support [Defendant’s] credibility determination.” Mot. 13:23–25. Defendant, however, did 

exactly that. Admin. R. at 21–23 (explaining inconsistency between hearing testimony about 

vertigo and the medical documentation regarding this reported symptom). Defendant determined

that “[Plaintiff’s] medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the 

alleged symptoms; however the [Plaintiff’s] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and 

limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other 

evidence in the record for the reasons explained throughout this decision.” Admin. R. at 23. The

Court thus sees no reason to question Defendant’s determinations concerning Plaintiff’s symptom 

testimony.

C. ALJ’s Disability Determination

Defendant utilized the appropriate standard when determining whether Plaintiff could

adjust to other work. The fifth step of the disability determination concerning adjustment to other 

work in the national economy incorporates residual functional capacity, age, education, and work 

experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s residual functional 

capacity determination is inconsistent with the jobs Plaintiff could perform. Mot. 16:1–9. 

The determination about whether an applicant can adjust to other work is not made using 

only the Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v) (“[W]e 

consider our assessment of your residual functional capacity and your age, education, and work 

experience to see if you can make an adjustment to other work.” (emphasis added)). Defendant 

properly considered the “[Plaintiff’s] age, education, work experience, and residual functional 

capacity.” Admin. R. at 27. Plaintiff provides no legal authority for why Defendant’s 

determination is problematic. See Mot. 15:13–16:9. To the contrary, the relevant precedent 

indicates that Defendant’s methodology was proper. Thus, Defendant’s “adjustment to other 

work” determination was reasonable.

Plaintiff next argues that Defendant’s reliance on the vocational expert’s testimony is 

problematic because it fails to account for all of Plaintiff’s limitations and restrictions. Mot.

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING 

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16:10–21. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant failed to properly include symptom testimony and 

medical opinions from Dr. Hoffman, Dr. Gee, and Dr. McCord. Mot. 16:15–17. This argument, 

however, depends on the Court finding an error in Defendant’s evaluation of the relevant medical 

opinions or symptom testimony. The Court held that no such error exists. See supra. Plaintiff’s 

argument is thus meritless. Accordingly, Defendant’s “fifth-step” determination was proper. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The proper standards were applied in Defendant’s disability determination. Therefore, the

Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and GRANTS Defendant’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment.6

 The Clerk shall close the file and a judgment in favor of 

Defendants shall follow. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 28, 2020

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

6 Defendant’s Motion for Remand is thus also DENIED. See Mot. 2:10.

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