Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00852/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00852-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY L. ARMSTRONG,

Plaintiff,

v.

L. E. SCRIBNER, Warden; STUART

RYAN; TIM OCHOA; VIOLET THOMAS;

ANTHONY VARIZ; JEFF SCHALLER;

NANCY GRANNIS; M. E. BOURLAND,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 06cv0852-L (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS THE COMPLAINT AND

STRIKE PUNITIVE DAMAGES [DOC.

NO. 19], DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTIONS TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL

PLEADINGS [DOC. NOS. 10, 29,

38], AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION [DOC. NO. 34]

ORDER SUSTAINING DEFENDANTS’

OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATIONS

[DOC. NO. 46]

Plaintiff Jerry L. Armstrong, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis, filed an Amended Complaint on December 8,

2006 [doc. no. 6], pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Armstrong claims

that his right of access to the courts was violated when Defendant

Stuart Ryan failed to provide Plaintiff with access to a computer

to complete a petition for writ of certiorari, and as a result his

petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court. (Am. Compl. 3.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated his right of access

to the courts by adhering to policies that limited his ability to

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access the prison law library. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff is seeking

compensatory and punitive damages and an injunction requiring

Defendants to provide inmates with better access to legal materials

and computers. (Id. at 7.)

On March 30, 2007, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the

First Amended Complaint [doc. no. 19]. Defendants claim the

Amended Complaint should be dismissed because (1) Armstrong failed

to exhaust his administrative remedies; (2) Plaintiff’s allegations

fail to state a federal claim; and (3) Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity. (Mot. to Dismiss 1-2.) Defendants also

request that the Court dismiss the claims asserted against them in

their official capacities because they are entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. (Defs.’ 3.) Lastly, Defendants move the Court

to strike Armstrong’s request for punitive damages. (Id. at 11-

12.) Defendants also filed the Declaration of D. Edwards in

Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [doc. no. 19] and a

Request for Judicial Notice [doc. no. 19].

Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

[doc. no. 21] on April 16, 2007. Defendants filed a Reply [doc.

no. 22] on April 26, 2007. Armstrong also submitted a Response to

Defendants’ Reply [doc. no. 26], which the Court accepted for

filing nunc pro tunc to May 7, 2007 [doc. no. 25].

Also pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motions to file

supplemental pleadings [doc. nos. 10, 29, 38]. Armstrong’s Rule 15

Motion to Amend [doc. no. 10] was filed nunc pro tunc to January

19, 2007; Plaintiff seeks to add a claim that he was denied access

to the courts when he could not access the prison law library in

time to file a timely petition for rehearing in another § 1983

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case, Armstrong v. Garcia, No. 03cv0279-WQH(POR) (S.D. Cal. filed

Feb. 10, 2003). (First Mot. to Supplement 2-4.) 

Plaintiff filed a second motion, titled a Motion Pursuant to

Rule 15(d) for Permission to Serve a Supplemental Pleading of a

Concurrent Denial of Access Claim [doc. no. 29], which was filed

nunc pro tunc to May 31, 2007. He asserts an additional claim of

denial of access to the courts based on the fact that he tried to

file an application for relief from default in an another case,

Armstrong v. Superior Court, No. B197634 (Cal. Super. Ct.), but the

application was not timely received by the California Supreme

Court. (Second Mot. to Supplement 4-5.) Armstrong claims the

prison mail system is to blame for the untimeliness of his

application. (Id. at 5-6.) 

Plaintiff also submitted a Supplemental Motion for Permission

to Serve Additional Pleadings of a Concurrent Denial of Access

Claim [doc. no. 38] that was filed nunc pro tunc to July 12, 2007. 

In this third Motion, Armstrong repeats the allegations made in his

first and second Motions to Amend. (Third Mot. to Supplement 5-6.) 

Additionally, Plaintiff claims that the prison officials failed to

mail two documents that Armstrong deposited for mailing. (Id. at

1-2, 6-7.) The Defendants have not filed any opposition to the

three motions to file a supplemental complaint.

Plaintiff submitted a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and/or

Temporary Restraining Order [doc. no. 34], which was filed nunc pro

tunc to June 28, 2007. Armstrong asks the Court to issue an

injunction preventing CDC officials from transferring him from

Calipatria to a different prison. (Mem. Supp. Mot. for Prelim.

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Inj. 3-4.) The Defendants have not filed an opposition to this

Motion.

On July 9, 2007, the Court issued a Klingele/Rand Notice [doc.

no. 35] warning Plaintiff of the pending Motion to Dismiss for

failure to exhaust. Armstrong filed a Response [doc. no. 44], with

the Declaration of Jerry L. Armstrong, Exhibits A through H, the

Declarations of Inmate Denton and Dontea Woods, and the unsigned

Declarations of G. Silva, M. A. Hernandez, and Marie Davidoski. 

Defendants filed an Objection to Plaintiff’s Response [doc. no. 46]

on August 9, 2007. Armstrong filed a Reply to Defendants’

Objection, which was filed nunc pro tunc to August 23, 2007 [doc.

no. 48].

The Court found Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss suitable for

decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule

7.1(d)(1) [doc. no. 23]. The Court also finds Plaintiff’s Motions

to supplement and Motion for Preliminary Injunction suitable for

resolution on the papers.

For the reasons set forth below, the district court should

GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, DENY Plaintiff’s Motions to

file supplemental pleadings, and DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for

Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Armstrong is a state prisoner incarcerated at Calipatria State

Prison. (Am. Compl. 1.) On February 23, 2004, Plaintiff attempted

to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States

Supreme Court, appealing from the denial of a habeas corpus

petition challenging his criminal conviction. (See Pl.’s Mem. 5-6,

Ex. A at 4, Ex. C.) Jennifer Sutton, from the Office of the Clerk

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of the Supreme Court, returned the petition to Armstrong on

February 26, 2004, because it did not comply with several

formatting rules. (Pl.’s Mem. Ex. A at 4.) Plaintiff was given

sixty days to file a corrected petition. (Id.)

On March 13, 2004, Armstrong sent a letter to Defendant Ryan,

the warden of Calipatria prison, requesting that Plaintiff be

allowed to access a computer to correct his certiorari petition. 

(Id. at 1.) According to Armstrong, Defendant Ryan never responded

to the letter. (Pl.’s Mem. 4-5.) Plaintiff was not able to

correct and resubmit his certiorari petition in a timely manner,

and it was dismissed on May 4, 2004. (Id. at 5.)

Armstrong filed a § 1983 case in this Court on July 27, 2004,

alleging that the Supreme Court Clerk denied him access to the

courts by refusing to file his certiorari petition. (Am. Compl. 6;

Pl.’s Mem. 9-10, Ex. C at 1.) The case was transferred to the

District Court for the District of Columbia. (Pl.’s Mem. Ex. C at

1-2.) The case was subsequently dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction. (Pl.’s Mem. Ex. D at 1.) Plaintiff refiled the case

in the United States Court of Federal Claims, but it was again

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on March 3, 2005. (Pl.’s Mem.

Ex. E at 1-2, Ex. F at 1.)

On November 14, 2004, Armstrong submitted an inmate grievance

form (known as a “602 form”), complaining that the prison’s policy

of only allowing inmates to access the law library on their regular

days off was unconstitutional and should be changed to allow better

access. (Am. Compl. Ex. A at 3.) The grievance was denied at the

informal level, and Plaintiff submitted it for the first formal

level of review. (Id.) It was denied at the first formal level on

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January 27, 2005, and Armstrong submitted it for second level

review. (Id. at 3-4, 7-8.) The appeal was again denied. (Id. at

4, 9.) Plaintiff submitted the appeal to Director’s level review,

and it was denied on January 12, 2006. (Id. at 1-2, 4.)

Armstrong claims that Defendant Ryan violated Plaintiff’s

right of access to the courts when he did not give Armstrong

computer access to correct his certiorari petition. (Pl.’s Mem. 5-

8.) He also asserts that he was denied access to the courts

because the prison’s policies for law library use and for the

photocopying of legal materials, which were enforced by all

Defendants, did not provide him with adequate time and materials to

conduct legal research. (Id. at 11-16.) Plaintiff claims it was

his inability to conduct research in a timely manner that caused

his federal case against the Supreme Court Clerk to be dismissed by

both the district court and the court of federal claims. (Id. at

10-11.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE FAILURE TO EXHAUST

A. Motion to Dismiss Unexhausted Claims Pursuant to the 

Unenumerated Portions of Rule 12(b)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) states: “No action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West 2003). The

exhaustion requirement applies regardless of the relief sought. 

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 

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“‘[A]n action is “brought” for purposes of § 1997e(a) when the

complaint is tendered to the district clerk[]’ . . . .” Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ford v.

Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2004)). Therefore, prisoners

must “exhaust administrative remedies before submitting any papers

to the federal courts.” Id. at 1048 (emphasis added).

Section 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement creates an

affirmative defense. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th

Cir. 2003). “[D]efendants have the burden of raising and proving

the absence of exhaustion.” Id. (footnote omitted). Defendants in

§ 1983 actions properly raise the affirmative defense of failure to

exhaust administrative remedies through an unenumerated motion to

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). Id. 

Unlike Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a

claim for which relief may be granted, “[i]n deciding a motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may

look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id.

at 1119-20 (citing Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s

Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988)). “A court ruling on a

motion to dismiss also may take judicial notice of ‘matters of

public record.’” Hazleton v. Alameida, 358 F. Supp. 2d 926, 928

(C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

688 (9th Cir. 2001)). But “if the district court looks beyond the

pleadings to a factual record in deciding the motion to dismiss for

failure to exhaust[,] . . . the court must assure that [the

plaintiff] has fair notice of his opportunity to develop a record.” 

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.14. 

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“[When] the district court concludes that the prisoner has not

exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of

the claim without prejudice.” Id. at 1120 (citing Ritza v. Int’l

Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d at 368 & n.3). 

B. The Administrative Grievance Process

“The California Department of Corrections [CDC] provides a

four-step grievance process for prisoners who seek review of an

administrative decision or perceived mistreatment: an informal

level, a first formal level, a second formal level, and the

Director’s level.” Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1048-49 (citing Brown v.

Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2005)). The administrative

appeal system can be found in title 15, sections 3084.1, 3084.5,

and 3084.6 of the California Code of Regulations. See Brown, 422

F.3d at 929-30 (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(a),

3084.5(a)-(b), (e)(1)-(2), 3084.6(c)). 

To comply with the CDC’s administrative grievance procedure,

an inmate must file his grievance at the informal level “within 15

working days of the event or decision being appealed . . . .” Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c) (2006); see also Brown, 422 F.3d at

929. An inmate must proceed through all levels of the

administrative grievance process before initiating a § 1983 suit in

federal court. See Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1051. 

III. PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO EXHAUST

A. Judicial Notice

Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the

Declaration of D. Edwards, which was submitted in support of

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Request for Judicial Notice 1.) 

The Declaration indicates that a search of the CDC’s Inmate/Parolee

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Appeals Tracking System showed Plaintiff has only filed one

prisoner appeal relating to library access, identified as Log No.

04-1655. (Edwards Decl. ¶¶ 4-6.) It further states that Armstrong

has not filed any appeals relating to lack of computer access or

lack of sufficient time to conduct library research. (Id. ¶ 7.) 

The Court may take judicial notice of any fact that is “not

subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally

known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)

capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid.

201(b). “A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a

party and supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid.

201(d).

Judicial notice may be taken of records of state agencies and

other undisputed matters of public record. Disabled Rights Action

Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866 n.1 (9th Cir.

2004) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th

Cir. 2001)). But the Court should not take judicial notice of

agency records when the facts contained in them are subject to

reasonable dispute. Brown, 422 F.3d at 931 n.7 (quoting City of

Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1224 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004));

Lee, 250 F.3d at 689. Also, a court should only take judicial

notice of facts contained in agency records that bear “sufficient

indicia of reliability . . . .” United States v. Perez-Corona, 295

F.3d 996, 1001 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The Court will take judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff

filed the 602 form bearing log number 04-1655, which is attached to

his Amended Complaint. (See Am. Compl. Ex. A.) The Court also

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judicially notices the fact that the grievance contained in that

form was denied at all available levels of administrative review. 

These facts are not disputed by either party, and the 602 forms and

accompanying documents bear stamps, markings and signatures

indicating their authenticity.

Additionally, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that

the 602 form bearing log number 04-1655 is the only inmate

grievance filed by Plaintiff from 2004 to the present alleging lack

of library access, access to a computer, or lack of time to conduct

legal research. Armstrong does not dispute this fact. This fact

is sufficiently reliable because it is contained in the records of

the CDC, which are kept in the ordinary course of business.

B. Defendants’ Objections to Plaintiff’s Evidence

On July 9, 2007, the Court issued an Order [doc. no. 35]

providing notice pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th

Cir. 1998), and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir.

1988), that Defendants had moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint for failure to exhaust his administrative Remedies. The

Order provided that if Armstrong had any additional evidence,

declarations, or affidavits regarding the issue of exhaustion, he

could submit them no later than July 31, 2007, before the Court

ruled on the Motion to Dismiss. (Klingele/Rand Notice 2.) 

Plaintiff filed a Response to the Court’s Klingele/Rand Notice

[doc. no. 44], which included the Declaration of Jerry L.

Armstrong, Exhibits A through H, the Declarations of Inmate Denton

and Dontea Woods, and the unsigned proposed Declarations of G.

Silva, M. A. Hernandez, and Marie Davidoski. Exhibits A, C, D and

E are duplicative of exhibits previously filed with Armstrong’s

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Amended Complaint. (See Am. Compl. Ex. A; Pl.’s Mem. Exs. A, C,

F.)

Defendants filed an Objection to Plaintiff’s Response [doc.

no. 46]. Defendants object to Armstrong’s Declaration “because it

contains argument and is full of irrelevant additional allegations

unrelated to this case or to the issue of exhaustion.” (Defs.’

Objections 2.) Plaintiff’s Declaration contains argument in favor

of his underlying claims, and it also contains complaints about the

prison mail system not previously alleged in this suit. (See

Armstrong Decl. 1-6.) He asserts that he has attempted to file

several documents in the present case but when he deposited them in

the prison mail system, the prison officials withheld the documents

and refused to mail them. (Armstrong Decl. ¶¶ 15-17.) Exhibits F

and G to Armstrong’s Declaration are copies of his prison mail log

which track his outgoing legal mail. (See Armstrong Decl. Exs. F,

G.) These logs do not list several documents that Armstrong

prepared for this case; he claims that prison officials

intentionally withheld these documents. (See Armstrong Decl. ¶¶

15-22, Ex. F, Ex. G.) 

Defendants’ Objection to Armstrong’s Declaration is sustained. 

Plaintiff’s arguments are not relevant to the claims in this case. 

The Court also notes that Armstrong’s fears are misplaced. The

four documents that Plaintiff claims were withheld by prison

officials were in fact mailed to the Court, received, and filed

[doc. nos. 24, 32, 34]. (See Armstrong Decl. ¶¶ 29-30.)

Defendants also object to the proposed Declarations of Marie

Davidoski, M. A. Hernandez, and G. Silva because they are unsigned. 

(Defs.’ Objections 2.) These declarations were drafted by

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Armstrong and proffered to Davidoski, Hernandez, and Silva, but the

individuals refused to sign them. (See Armstrong Decl. ¶¶ 31-32;

Silva Decl.; Davidoski Decl.; Hernandez Decl.) Defendants’

objection to these declarations is sustained. The declarations

have no evidentiary value because they were not signed by the

declarants.

Defendants object to the Declaration of Inmate Denton as

irrelevant. (Defs.’ Objections 2.) Denton is an inmate at

Calipatria Prison who states that he has witnessed Armstrong

deposit documents for mailing to the Court, and he has heard

Plaintiff complain that they were never mailed. (Denton Decl. ¶¶

2-5.) Denton also declares that he is currently experiencing

problems with the prison mail system in connection with his own

litigation. (Id. ¶ 6.) Defendants’ objection to Denton’s

Declaration is sustained. This litigation is not concerned with

any alleged deficiencies of the prison mail system. Rather, the

issue before the Court is whether Armstrong properly exhausted his

administrative remedies before filing his Complaint alleging that

he was denied access to the courts. 

Defendants also object to the Declaration of Dontea Woods on

relevance grounds. (Defs.’ Objections 2.) Woods is another inmate

at Calipatria prison. (Woods Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.) His Declaration

relates some of Plaintiff’s complaints about the prison mail

system. (See id. ¶¶ 5-10.) Defendants’ objection is sustained

because Woods’s Declaration is irrelevant to the issue of

exhaustion, and it concerns claims about the prison mail system

that are not a part of this lawsuit. 

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C. Merits of Defendant’s Claim that Armstrong Failed to Exhaust

Defendants assert that because Armstrong only filed an

administrative grievance complaining about the prison’s policy of

allowing law library access on an inmate’s regular day off (“RDO”),

none of Plaintiff’s other claims are exhausted. (Defs.’ Mem. 5.) 

Accordingly, Defendants move the Court to dismiss Armstrong’s

claims “regarding access to a computer, lack of time to conduct

adequate research, or complaints regarding the prison’s photocopy

policy” because prison officials were never put on notice of these

allegations through the administrative process. (Id.) 

To adequately exhaust his administrative remedies, a

prisoner’s administrative grievances must be “sufficient under the

circumstances to put the prison on notice of the potential claims

and to fulfill the basic purposes of the exhaustion requirement.” 

Irvin v. Zamora, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1135 (S.D. Cal. 2001).

Exhaustion serves several important goals, including “allowing a

prison to address complaints about the program it administers

before being subjected to suit, reducing litigation to the extent

complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and improving litigation

that does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful record.” 

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 910, 923 (2007) (citing

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387-88 (2006);

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002)). 

1. Claim One: Denial of Access to a Computer

In count one, Armstrong claims he requested that Defendant

Ryan allow him to access a computer to correct Plaintiff’s petition

for writ of certiorari, but Ryan did not respond to his request. 

(Am. Compl. 3.) Armstrong argues that because he was not given

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computer access, he was not able to timely correct the formatting

errors in his certiorari petition, and consequently, the petition

was dismissed as untimely. (Id.)

The PLRA provides that before filing a lawsuit in federal

court, a prisoner must exhaust all available administrative

remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2382. 

This is true regardless of the relief sought, whether monetary or

injunctive. Id. at 1283 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 734). The PLRA

requires proper exhaustion, meaning that the prisoner must comply

with the “agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural

rules . . . .” Id. at 2386. In California, administrative

remedies are exhausted when a prisoner files a 602 within fifteen

days of the event complained of and pursues it through all three

levels of review. Brown, 422 F.3d at 935; Butler v. Adams, 397

F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005); Hazleton v. Alameida, 358 F. Supp.

2d 926, 929 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 

On March 13, 2004, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant Ryan,

the Warden of Calipatria State Prison. (See Pl.’s Mem. Ex. A.) 

Armstrong informed Ryan that his certiorari petition was returned

to him by the Supreme Court because it did not comply with the

Court’s formatting rules. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff asked Ryan to

allow him to use a computer to correct his petition. (Id.) He

indicated that his certiorari petition was due by April 26, 2004,

so Ryan’s immediate attention was requested. (Id. at 1-2.) 

According to Armstrong, Ryan never responded to the letter, and

Plaintiff was never given computer access. (Pl.’s Mem. 5.) 

Armstrong’s petition was dismissed on May 4, 2004, for failure to

timely submit a corrected petition. (Id.) 

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Plaintiff did not submit a 602 form either to request computer

access or to complain after his certiorari petition was dismissed

by the Supreme Court. Armstrong argues, however, that claim one of

his Amended Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to

exhaust because the letter to Defendant Ryan put Defendants on

notice of his need to access a computer to complete his certiorari

petition within the Supreme Court’s deadline. (Pl.’s Surreply 3-

4.) Also, Plaintiff contends he was not required to submit an

administrative grievance because “Defendants had already refused to

respond to Plaintiff’s lettered communication to the Warden,” so

there was no reason for him to believe the prison officials would

have responded to a 602. (Pl.’s Opp’n 4.) Brown v. Sikes, 212

F.3d 1205, 1209-10 (11th Cir. 2000), relied upon by Armstrong, only

holds that the prisoner’s failure to name the prison warden and

Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections in the

administrative grievance was not a failure to exhaust because the

prisoner did not have that information. It is not authority for

reading claims into a grievance that were not stated.

Plaintiff cites Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876, 878 (6th Cir.

1999), in support of his argument that informally written

complaints, such as his letter to Defendant Ryan, are sufficient to

satisfy the exhaustion requirement. (Pl.’s Surreply 3.) In Wyatt

v. Leonard, the court found the plaintiff had satisfied the

exhaustion requirement by giving the prison officials informal

notice of his complaint, even though he did not file a grievance on

the standardized form. Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d at 880. The

court stated that substantial compliance with the exhaustion

requirement was sufficient. Id. The court’s holding in that case,

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however, does not save Armstrong’s claim. The incident that was

the subject of the plaintiff’s complaint in Wyatt occurred before

the PLRA went into effect. See id. Since the PLRA, substantial

compliance with exhaustion rules is no longer sufficient. A

prisoner must properly exhaust all claims administratively before

filing suit in federal court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. at __, 126

S. Ct. at 2386.

Plaintiff admits that he did not fully develop the factual and

legal basis of his claim at the administrative level. (See Pl.’s

Opp’n 4.) He argues, essentially, that he should be excused from

this requirement because filing an administrative grievance would

not have produced a different outcome. (Id.) Since Booth v.

Churner, exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are limited. The

Supreme Court explained: “Thus, we think that Congress has

mandated exhaustion clearly enough, regardless of the relief

offered through administrative procedures.” Booth, 532 U.S. at 741

(citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). 

Specifically, the Court stressed that there is no futility

exception to the exhaustion requirement; the Court would not create

such a rule because Congress did not include such an exception in

the text of the PLRA. Id. at 741 n.6. The congressional mandate

precludes Armstrong from arguing that he need not exhaust because

exhaustion would be futile or that the agency has no power to award

the monetary relief requested. Claim one of Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint is not exhausted and, therefore, should be dismissed.

2. Claim Two: Lack of Adequate Law Library Access

In count two of his Amended Complaint, Armstrong contends that

he was denied access to the courts because the CDC’s library

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policies gave him an inadequate opportunity to access the prison

law library to conduct research. (Am. Compl. 4.) Plaintiff

complains that allowing inmates to access the law library for one

two-hour period of time each week, and only on the inmate’s regular

day off from work and training programs, does not provide

sufficient time for meaningful research. (Pl.’s Mem. 4, 11-12.)

Armstrong’s 602 form, which was submitted for informal review

on November 14, 2004, and denied at the director’s level on January

12, 2006, contained one complaint: “Your policy of ducating

inmates only on their RDO’s for law library access is

unconstitutional.” (Am. Compl. Ex. A at 3.) Plaintiff requested

that the prison “[r]evert to [its] former policy of ducating

inmates to [the] law library.” (Id.) This 602 was pursued through

all available levels of administrative review. (See id. at 1-9.)

Defendants contend that this administrative grievance was not

sufficient to put the prison staff on notice of Plaintiff’s claim

that he was denied sufficient time to access the law library. 

(Defs.’ Mem. 5; Reply 3.) Defendants, however, construe

Armstrong’s administrative appeal too narrowly. 

When Plaintiff pursued his grievance to the first formal level

of review, he was interviewed by E. Garcia. (Am. Compl. Ex. A at

7.) During the interview, Armstrong complained that Library

Technical Assistant Raske refused to allow Plaintiff to access the

law library during his regular work hours, which forced him to

choose between library access and other activities such as family

visits and outdoor exercise. (Id.) Armstrong also complained

“that two ducats in the same day is not enough time for individuals

with court deadlines” to conduct library research. (Id.) When

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Plaintiff’s grievance was denied at the first formal level, he

appealed to the second formal level and claimed that although he

submitted a request for law library access seven days earlier, he

had not yet received a library ducat. (Id. at 4.) 

Armstrong’s 602 was accompanied by a copy of a memorandum from

Plaintiff to Defendant Violet Thomas, Supervisor of Education

Program, dated November 4, 2004. (Id. at 11-12.) The memorandum

complained that Armstrong had a civil case pending in the District

of Columbia, but he was not getting enough time in the law library

to conduct the necessary “lengthy research and study.” (Id.)

These specific allegations were included with Armstrong’s

administrative grievance. During the pursuit of that grievance,

the prison administrators at each level of review were put on

notice that Plaintiff claimed he was not being given adequate

access to the law library. The Defendants read Armstrong’s

grievance too narrowly. (See Motion to Dismiss 4-5.) Because

Plaintiff presented the claim alleged in count two

administratively, it is properly exhausted. See Irvin, 161 F.

Supp. 2d at 1135 (finding a claim exhausted where “plaintiff’s

grievances were sufficient under the circumstances to put the

prison on notice of the potential claims and to fulfill the basic

purposes of the exhaustion requirement”).

3. Denial of Photocopies

In Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support

of his Amended Complaint, Armstrong also asserts that the CDC’s

policy for photocopying legal materials is unconstitutional. 

(Pl.’s Mem. 13.) He claims that the prison will not provide

inmates with photocopies of case opinions, pages from legal

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treatises, or trial transcripts. (Id. at 13-14.) Plaintiff

contends it is useful to attach copies of these documents to court

filings, but it is not practical for an inmate to replicate them by

hand due to their length. (Id. at 14-15.) 

Armstrong did not raise these factual or legal allegations in

the 602 form submitted to prison staff. He claims to have “alerted

prison officials on several occasions” to this problem, but he does

not provide any documentary support for this allegation. (Id. at

15.) Because Plaintiff did not follow any of the proper procedures

for presenting this complaint to the prison administrators, it is

unexhausted and cannot be considered by the Court.

Armstrong properly exhausted his administrative remedies with

regard to claim two of his Amended Complaint, and accordingly he

may proceed with that claim. Claim one of Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint and Armstrong’s allegations about photocopy policies,

however, were not exhausted through the CDC’s administrative

grievance process before the present suit was filed. These claims

should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff may only proceed

with the one exhausted claim. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at __,

127 S. Ct. at 924-25 (holding that unexhausted claims should be

dismissed and the complaint allowed to proceed with exhausted

claims); Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1051 (citing Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120)

(requiring that a dismissal under the PLRA for failure to properly

exhaust administrative remedies be a dismissal without prejudice).

III. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Motions to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

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sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Davis v. Monroe County

Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). A claim can only be

dismissed “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to

relief.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 n.7 (1980) (quotations and

citations omitted). The Court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to

be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,

382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank,

352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 The Court looks not at whether the plaintiff will “ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally proper only where

there “is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient

facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v.

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001); Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The Court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must “examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden

v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 973 (citing Clegg v.

Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994))

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(stating that on Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “is not required to

accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if

those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts

alleged[]”). “Nor is the court required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, the Court may not generally consider materials

outside the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d

1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay

Television Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th

Cir. 1995). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes

consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a

plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232,

236 (7th Cir. 1993); 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal

Practice § 12.34[2] (3d ed. 1997) (“The court may not . . . take

into account additional facts asserted in a memorandum opposing the

motion to dismiss, because such memoranda do not constitute

pleadings under Rule 7(a).”). 

But “[w]hen a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the

complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether

dismissal [i]s proper . . . .” Parks Sch. of Bus., 51 F.3d at 1484

(citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

The Court may also consider “documents whose contents are alleged

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in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which

are not physically attached to the pleading . . . .” Branch v.

Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other

grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th

Cir. 2002); Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am. W., Inc., 101 F.3d 1312,

1313-14 (9th Cir. 1996). 

These Rule 12 (b)(6) guidelines apply to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss.

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights

cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

complaint, however, the Court may not “supply essential elements of

claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of

the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” 

Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones,

733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

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Nevertheless, the Court must give a pro se litigant leave to

amend his complaint unless it is “absolutely clear that the

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” 

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, before

a pro se civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the court must

provide the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint’s

deficiencies. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. Where amendment

of a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave

to amend is appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077

(9th Cir. 2000).

C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show (1) a person acting “under color of state law”

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

(West 2003); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir. 1986). 

IV. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants move to dismiss Armstrong’s Amended Complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to allege

facts sufficient to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. (Defs.’ Mem. 5.) They assert that Plaintiff’s allegations

do not show the personal involvement of the six individual

Defendants, and thus he cannot prove that they caused a violation

of his rights. (Id. at 7.) Also, Defendants claim Armstrong has

not alleged facts constituting a violation of his right of access

to the courts. (Id. at 8.) Additionally, Defendants contend they

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are entitled to qualified immunity and that they are entitled to

absolute Eleventh Amendment immunity for all actions taken in their

official capacities. (Id. at 3, 9-10.) Finally, Defendants ask

the Court to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. (Id.

at 11-12.)

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment grants the states immunity from private

civil suits. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Henry v. County of Shasta, 132

F.3d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended, 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir.

1998). This immunity applies to civil rights claims brought under

§ 1983, so an inmate cannot recover damages from the state under §

1983 unless the state waives its immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). A federal court only has

jurisdiction over a suit against a state when the relief sought is

“prospective injunctive relief in order to end a continuing

violation of federal law.” Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019,

1025 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,

517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996)) (internal quotations omitted). 

Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to state officials

sued in their official capacities. “[A] suit against a state

official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the

official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” 

Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471

(1985)). “As such, it is no different from a suit against the

State itself.” Id. (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-

66 (1985); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,

690 n.55 (1978)).

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Armstrong’s Amended Complaint asserts claims against each of

the Defendants in both their individual and their official

capacities. (Am. Compl. 2-2a.) Defendants argue that they are

entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for actions taken

in their official capacities, and Plaintiff agrees. (Defs.’ Mem.

3; Pl.’s Opp’n 2.) Armstrong’s claims against Defendants in their

official capacities constitute claims against the State of

California, which is immune from liability for damages. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims should be DISMISSED to the extent

that Defendants are sued in their official capacities. Armstrong

may only proceed against Defendants as individuals.

B. Failure to Allege the Personal Involvement of Defendants

To be liable under § 1983, a person acting under color of 

state law must cause the plaintiff to suffer the violation of a

constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 1983. “A person ‘subjects’

another to the deprivation of a constitutional right . . . if he

does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act,

or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing Sims v. Adams, 537

F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976)). Thus, to state a claim under § 1983,

Plaintiff must allege that each of the Defendants committed some

act, or failed to act in some way, which caused Armstrong’s alleged

injury. See Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1384 (11th Cir.

1982). “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and

focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual

defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a

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constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633

(9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because

he has not alleged that the individuals each committed actions that

denied him access to the courts. (Defs.’ Mem. 7.) Armstrong’s

Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss attempts to refute this

argument with the conlcusory statement that his Amended Complaint

“alleges facts sufficient to show that he had been actually injured

by specific actions of the Defendants.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 7.)

The first cause of action states, “On March 13, 2004,

Plaintiff wrote a letter to S. Ryan (defendant), asking for

assistance to make a computer accessible to correct the Petition

for Writ of Certiorari. Defendant S. Ryan failed to respond to my

request.” (Am. Compl. 3.) Armstrong further states that Defendant

Ryan’s failure to provide Plaintiff with computer access violated

his right of access to the courts because it caused his petition

for certiorari to be dismissed as untimely. (Id.; Pl.’s Mem. 4-5.) 

Armstrong’s Amended Complaint alleges a specific omission by

Defendant Ryan that purportedly caused a specific injury. 

The Amended Complaint, however, does not allege that specific

actions or omissions by the other Defendants caused Plaintiff any

injury. For each of the Defendants except Defendant Ryan, the only

allegation is that each Defendant “[c]ontinuously cited DOM sec.(s)

53060.10, and 14010.21.2, 14010.21.3, as sufficient to overcome

Plaintiff’s Constitutional right to access to the courts.” (Am.

Compl. 2-3.) Armstrong does not provide any specific facts

regarding acts or omissions by Defendants that denied him access to

the courts. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims cannot survive without any

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factual allegations showing that Defendants “actually and

proximately caused” a violation of Armstrong’s constitutional

rights. Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 659, 663

(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Leer, 844 F.2d at 634). Accordingly, all

of Plaintiff’s claims, except for count one as alleged against

Defendant Ryan, should be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim

because Armstrong does not allege facts that would show the

remaining Defendants were personally involved in actions causing a

deprivation of his rights.

C. Failure to Allege Facts Establishing a Violation of the Right

to Access the Courts

“Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the

Constitution, state prisoners have a right of access to the

courts.” Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 346). “[T]he fundamental constitutional

right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist

inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by

providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate

assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430

U.S. 817, 828 (1977). Access to the courts means that a prisoner

has the opportunity to prepare, serve, and file court documents in

cases affecting his liberty. Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1075-76

(quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 384).

There are two types of access to courts claims: backwardlooking and forward-looking. A backward-looking claim concerns a

lost opportunity to litigate a particular case or to obtain a

particular result or type of relief in a case that was litigated

poorly. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-14 (2002). A

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forward-looking claim, on the other hand, concerns “official action

[which] is presently denying an opportunity to litigate for a class

of potential plaintiffs.” Id. at 413.

Both of Armstrong’s causes of action are backward-looking

claims. In claim one, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Ryan did

not allow him to use a computer, and as a result his certiorari

petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court. (Am. Compl. 3.) In

his second claim, Armstrong argues that the prison policies

enforced by Defendants denied him adequate time in the law library,

which caused his lawsuit against Jennifer Sutton to be dismissed by

the Court of Federal Claims. (Id. at 4.) 

To adequately plead a backward-looking denial of access claim,

Plaintiff must allege three elements: “1) the loss of a

‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; 2) the official acts

frustrating the litigation; and 3) a remedy that may be awarded as

recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future suit.” 

Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1076 (citing Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413-

14). 

1. Claim One: Denial of Access to a Computer

Defendants argue that Armstrong’s first cause of action fails

to state a claim because Plaintiff was not denied the ability to

access the courts by Defendant Ryan’s failure to provide a computer

for his use. (Defs.’ Mem. 9.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff

could have submitted a handwritten certiorari petition within the

applicable time period, thus avoiding dismissal for untimeliness,

so he has not suffered an actual injury caused by Defendants’

conduct. (Id.) 

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a. Frivolous Nature of the Underlying Claim

The first element –- loss of a nonfrivolous claim -- concerns

Armstrong’s standing to file suit. Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1076. To

have standing to assert a claim for denial of access to the courts,

Plaintiff must allege that he suffered an actual injury. Lewis,

518 U.S. at 351; Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 798 (9th Cir.

1994). A prisoner will only succeed on an access-to-courts claim

if he was denied the necessary tools to litigate a nonfrivolous

claim attacking his conviction, sentence, or conditions of

confinement. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415; Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353

& n.3. 

Armstrong’s certiorari petition sought review of the lower

federal courts’ denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus

which challenged the legality of his conviction. (See Pl.’s Mem.

Ex. B (Pet. for Cert.) at 3-7.) The certiorari petition appears to

allege that at Plaintiff’s preliminary hearing he received

ineffective assistance of counsel, he was denied the right to

produce exculpatory evidence, and the prosecutor knowingly

presented false testimony. (See id. at 8-13.) The petition also

complains that Armstrong was not given an evidentiary hearing on

his federal habeas petition. (Id. at 15-16.)

Several courts have addressed what constitutes a frivolous

claim. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit

either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th

Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Frivolous claims are those with

“little or no chance of success.” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392,

393 (11th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff need not show that he would have

been successful on the merits of his claims, but only that they

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were not frivolous. Simkins v. Bruce, 406 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th

Cir. 2005); Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1998);

Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1085, 1091 & n.12 (9th Cir. 1994). 

There is nothing before the Court to suggest that the claims

Armstrong presented in his certiorari petition were frivolous. 

Indeed, Defendants do not make such a contention. Viewing

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to him,

the Court is satisfied, for the purposes of resolving Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss, that Armstrong’s certiorari petition was a

nonfrivolous attack on his criminal conviction. 

b. Causation

The second element requires Plaintiff to show “the alleged

violation of his rights was proximately caused” by the state actor. 

Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1077 (citing Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d

1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991)). The proximate cause analysis focuses

on foreseeability –- was it foreseeable that the state actor’s

actions would cause the deprivation of the prisoner’s right to

access the courts? Id. (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.

Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 784-85 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “inmates have no right to a

typewriter [or computer] to prepare legal documents where court

rules permit pro se litigants to hand-write their pleadings.” Id.

(citing Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 776 F.2d 851, 858

(9th Cir. 1985)); see also Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1169 (9th

Cir. 1989). Supreme Court Rule 39 allows petitioners proceeding in

forma pauperis to file documents that do not comply with strict

formatting requirements. Sup. Ct. R. 39. Defendants argue the

dismissal of Plaintiff’s certiorari petition was not caused by

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Defendant Ryan’s actions because Armstrong did not need computer

access to complete a certiorari petition under the applicable

Supreme Court rules. (Defs.’ Mem. 9.)

Defendants’ argument ignores one fact: Plaintiff was not

proceeding in forma pauperis before the Supreme Court. (See Pl.’s

Mem. Ex. A Attach. at 2 (stating that a $300.00 filing fee had

accompanied his certiorari petition).) Accordingly, Rule 39, which

allows for in forma pauperis petitioners to file documents that do

not comply with ordinary formatting rules, did not apply to

Armstrong. Plaintiff’s certiorari petition was required to comply

with the formatting rules contained in Supreme Court Rule 33. Cf.

Attwood v. Singletary, 516 U.S. 297, 297 (1996) (requiring pro se

petitioner’s certiorari petition to comply with Rule 33 when the

Court denied him in forma pauperis status). Rule 33 provides that

all documents filed with the Court must be prepared in a booklet

format and must comply with strict formatting requirements

including font size, paper type and size, and binding. See Sup.

Ct. R. 33.

Defendants are correct in asserting that prisoners do not have

a constitutional right to use a computer. (See Defs.’ Mem. of P. &

A. 9 (citing Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1084).) But that is not the end

of the inquiry. Prison officials are not required to provide

inmates with all the materials they request, but inmates must be

provided with “some means of preparing documents that comply with

the rules of the court” where the case will be filed. Phillips,

477 F.3d at 1077 (denying plaintiff access to a comb-binding

machine) (emphasis added). Armstrong was required by Supreme Court

Rule 33 to file a certiorari petition that met very strict

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formatting specifications. By denying Armstrong computer access,

the prison officials may have denied him the only means to submit a

petition that complied with the rules of the Supreme Court.

This case is similar to Phillips. In that case, the plaintiff

alleged that prison officials violated his right to access the

courts when they did not allow him to use a comb-binding machine to

bind his certiorari petition. Id. at 1074-75. He was not able to

use the comb binder prior to the deadline for filing his petition,

and it was dismissed as untimely when submitted. Id. at 1074. The

court found that although the Constitution did not require

prisoners be given access to comb-binding machines, access to the

comb binder was required in that case because Supreme Court rules

required certiorari petitions to be bound, and the comb binder was

the means the prison had available for that purpose. Id. at 1077. 

Where court rules required binding, the prison was required to give

prisoners access to a means of binding their petitions. See also

Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding

prison officials violated plaintiff’s right to access the courts by

giving him a pencil rather than a pen to complete court papers

because Hawaii court rules required handwritten documents to be in

ink).

Armstrong was required to comply with the Supreme Court’s

formatting requirements, and accordingly, Defendants were required

to provide him with a means of completing a petition that complied

with those requirements. Cf. American Inmate Paralegal Assoc. v.

Cline, 859 F.2d 59, 61 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding no denial of access

to the courts when plaintiff was not allowed to use typewriter

because he could have submitted a handwritten complaint). Because

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the Court is analyzing this claim in connection with a motion to

dismiss, the Court accepts as true Plaintiff’s allegation that

access to a computer is the only means by which he could have

completed a certiorari petition that complied with the Supreme

Court rules. See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 406 (citing Leatherman

v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507

US. 163, 164 (1993)) (accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true and

viewing them in the light most favorable to her when reviewing

motion to dismiss); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 236 (stating

that when deciding a motion to dismiss, the issue is not whether

plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he is entitled to

offer evidence in support of his claims). Although Plaintiff may

not ultimately succeed on his denial of access claim, the Amended

Complaint adequately alleges an injury caused by Defendant Ryan’s

failure to make a computer available for Armstrong’s use.

c. Remedy

The third element is satisfied where the plaintiff has no

remedy, save for the one requested in his denial-of-access suit, by

which he can obtain relief. The plaintiff’s complaint must

identify a remedy that may be awarded by the Court and which is

unique to the denial of access claim. Christopher, 536 U.S. at

422.

Armstrong does not have an independent tort cause of action

separate from his denial of access claim that he can pursue. See

Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1079. Additionally, Plaintiff prays for

monetary damages, which could not be awarded by the filing of a

successive certiorari petition or other state petition for postconviction relief. See id. There is no other means by which he

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can obtain the relief sought and thus, Armstrong sufficiently

alleges facts to establish this element of the denial of access

claim.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint adequately alleges facts that,

if true, would satisfy each of the elements of an access-to-courts

claim. Armstrong’s first cause of action should not be dismissed

for failure to state a claim.

2. Claim Two: Denial of Adequate Law Library Access

Defendants contend that Armstrong’s second cause of action 

fails to state a claim because Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Jennifer

Sutton was frivolous, and Armstrong fails to allege how additional

library access would have cured the jurisdictional defect that

caused the court to dismiss his case. (Defs.’ Mem. 9.)

a. Frivolous Nature of the Underlying Claim

Plaintiff’s complaint filed in the underlying case, Armstrong

v. Sutton, No. 04cv1513-IEG(RBB) (S.D. Cal. filed July 27, 2004),

alleged that Jennifer Sutton, a Supreme Court Clerk, violated his

right to access the courts by refusing to file his petition for

certiorari. (See Pl.’s Mem. Exs. C, D, E.) Armstrong also

asserted that he submitted a motion under Supreme Court Rule 22,

directed to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor individually, which Sutton

refused to file. (Pl.’s Mem. 9.) 

The Clerk of the United States Supreme Court enjoys absolute

quasi-judicial immunity for activities that are an integral part of

the judicial process. Sharma v. Stevas, 790 F.2d 1486, 1486 (9th

Cir. 1986) (citing Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir.

1979)). The filing of documents is “a basic and integral part of

the judicial process” for which court clerks enjoy quasi-judicial

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immunity unless they acted in “the clear absence of all

jurisdiction.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th

Cir. 1987). Accordingly, a clerk is immune from liability for

civil damages for making a decision not to file documents submitted

to the court. Id. In light of this well-established rule,

Armstrong’s claim for monetary damages from Jennifer Sutton arising

from her failure to file his certiorari petition and his Rule 22

motion was frivolous. 

Plaintiff’s complaint in the underlying case also requested

that the district court issue an injunction requiring Sutton to

transmit his Rule 22 motion to Justice O’Connor. Armstrong v.

Sutton, Compl. 7, No. 04cv1513-IEG (RBB) (S.D. Cal. filed July 27,

2004). A lower court lacks jurisdiction to compel the Clerk of the

Supreme Court to take specific action. In re Marin, 956 F.2d 339,

340 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Only the Supreme Court has supervisory

authority over its Clerk. Id. Thus, Armstrong’s request for

injunctive relief was also frivolous because it sought relief that

the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant.

b. Causation

Plaintiff’s civil case was dismissed by the district court for

lack of jurisdiction because the court did not have power to review

the Supreme Court Clerk’s actions. (Pl.’s Mem. Ex. D at 1.) It

was subsequently refiled in the Court of Federal Claims, and it was

again dismissed. (Pl.’s Mem. Ex. E at 1-2.) The court found it

did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Armstrong’s suit

because it lacked authority to entertain general civil rights

claims, tort claims, or claims seeking injunctive relief from

federal officials. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he was not aware

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of these jurisdictional defects when the original complaint was

filed. (Pl.’s Mem. 10-11.) It was only after his case was

dismissed that he completed his legal research on the

jurisdictional issues. (Id. at 11.) Thus, he argues, it was the

lack of adequate time to conduct research in the law library that

resulted in the dismissal of his case. (Id.; Am. Compl. 4.)

Armstrong does not explain how additional research time would

have cured his case’s jurisdictional defects. Indeed, even with

more time to conduct research, Plaintiff would have been confronted

with the same jurisdictional barriers. Neither the district court

nor the Court of Federal Claims had the power to hear his claims

and grant him the requested relief. Armstrong has not

“demonstrate[d] that the alleged shortcomings in the library or

legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal

claim.” See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; see also Simkins, 406 F.3d at

1244 (stating that when the underlying case was adversely decided

based on a deficiency unrelated to the lack of access, plaintiff

has not suffered an actual injury). Therefore, Plaintiff’s second

cause of action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

3. Claims Relating to Access to Photocopies

Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for denial of access to

the courts caused by the prison’s policies for photocopying legal

and non-legal materials. 

“The Constitution requires that prison officials make it

possible for inmates to prepare, file, and serve pleadings and

other documents essential for pleading their causes.” Phillips,

477 F.3d at 1077 (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 346). Courts have

upheld a prisoner’s right to have legal papers photocopied where

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the inmate is willing to pay for the copies and where multiple

copies of documents are required by the courts. See, e.g., Allen

v. Sakai, 48 F.3d at 1089; Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504, 1510

(9th Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Parke, 642 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1981);

Giles v. Tate, 907 F. Supp. 1135, 1137-38 (S.D. Ohio 1995). 

“[A]lthough a prisoner does not have an unlimited right to free

copying, some reasonable means of access to a photocopy machine

will be necessary to protect an inmate’s right of access to the

courts.” Giles, 907 F. Supp. at 1138. 

But Armstrong has not identified any specific litigation,

either past or present, that was impeded by his inability to

photocopy nonlegal materials. (See Pl.’s Mem. 14-16.) “[T]he

underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an

element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as

allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the

litigation.” Christopher, 536 U.S. at 424. Plaintiff has not met

his burden of pleading the existence of an actual injury caused by

Defendants’ conduct. Armstrong has not made out a prima facie case

of denial of access to courts because he has not shown that he had

any pending litigation that was prejudiced by the prison’s

photocopy policy. See Giles, 907 F. Supp. at 1137 (citing Oswald

v. Graves, 819 F. Supp. 680, 683 (E.D. Mich. 1993)). Plaintiff’s

claim relating to the denial of photocopies should be dismissed. 

D. Qualified Immunity

“[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions,

generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

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known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A

constitutional right is “clearly established” if it is

“sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand

that what he is doing violates that right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536

U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,

640 (1987)). This standard ensures that government officials are

on notice of the legality of their conduct before they are

subjected to suit. Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206

(2001)). Qualified immunity is immunity from suit for monetary

damages, but it is not immunity from suit for declaratory or

injunctive relief. Hydrick v. Hunter, 449 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir.

2006). It protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986).

“The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified

immunity analysis is whether plaintiff’s allegations, if true,

establish a constitutional violation.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 736; see

also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 201. If the allegations make out

a constitutional violation, the next step is to determine whether

the right alleged to have been violated is “clearly established.” 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. In ruling on qualified immunity, the

court must decide the “‘purely legal’ issue of ‘whether facts

alleged [by the plaintiff] support a claim of violation of clearly

established law.’” Lytle v. Wondrash, 182 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th

Cir. 1999) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 n.9

(1985)). 

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1. Claim One: Denial of Computer Access

a. Violation of a Constitutional Right

Although Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified

immunity, their focus on the Eighth Amendment is misplaced. (Defs.

Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 10.) As discussed above,

Armstrong’s Amended Complaint adequately alleges that he suffered

an actual injury when Defendants’ actions caused him to miss the

deadline for filing a nonfrivolous certiorari petition. 

b. Whether the Right Was Clearly Established

Plaintiff’s claim that he missed the deadline to file his

petition for certiorari alleges a constitutional violation, so the

qualified immunity analysis requires this Court to determine

whether the right was clearly established. Saucier, 533 U.S. at

201. “Whether the right is clearly established in a particular

case is judged as of the date of the incident alleged, and is a

pure question of law.” Phillips, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 1162 (citing

Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993)). If

the right complained of was not clearly established at the time of

the incident alleged in Armstrong’s Amended Complaint, the

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they would

not have been able to anticipate that their conduct would result in

the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Anderson

v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). 

The general right to access the courts is a clearly

established constitutional right. But in undertaking a qualified

immunity analysis, the Court must look at Plaintiff’s allegations

“in light of the specific context of the case[]” and not in a

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general, abstract manner. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; see also

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-40. 

The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that

a reasonable official would understand that what he is

doing violates that right. This is not to say that an

official action is protected by qualified immunity unless

the very action in question has previously been held

unlawful, . . . but it is to say that in the light of

pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. 

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (citations omitted). 

Courts have repeatedly held that a prisoner does not have a

constitutional right to use a computer or a typewriter. See, e.g.,

Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1077; Cody v. Weber, 256 F.3d 764, 770 (8th

Cir. 2001); Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989);

Sands, 886 F.2d at 1169; Am. Inmate Paralegal Assoc. v. Cline, 859

F.2d 59, 61 (8th Cir. 1988); Lindquist, 776 F.2d at 858; Sasnett v.

Dept. of Corrs., 891 F. Supp. 1305, 1313 (W.D. Wis. 1995).

Armstrong’s case differs from many prisoner cases because Supreme

Court rules required Plaintiff to submit a petition for certiorari

that complied with strict formatting requirements, whereas the

majority of prisoners proceed in forma pauperis and are thus

allowed to submit handwritten documents. It may not have been

possible for Armstrong to submit a compliant petition without being

given computer access. 

But in light of the pre-existing law, it would not be apparent

to a reasonable officer in Defendant Ryan’s position that failing

to provide Plaintiff with computer access would violate his right

of access to the courts. 

The concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge

that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal

constraints on particular police conduct. It is

sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the

relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply to the factual

situation the officer confronts. . . . If the officer’s

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mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable,

however, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity.

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. Although Plaintiff has sufficiently pled

a violation of his right to access the courts, the right to access

a computer was not clearly established at the time that Defendant

Ryan failed to provide him such access. In light of the numerous

cases holding that prisoners are not entitled to use computers or

typewriters to create legal documents, a reasonable officer in

Defendant Ryan’s position would not be on notice that denying

Plaintiff computer access would violate his right of access to the

courts. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for

Armstrong’s first cause of action.

2. Claim Two: Denial of Adequate Law Library Access

a. Violation of a Constitutional Right

As discussed, Armstrong cannot establish that he suffered a

constitutional injury by receiving limited access to the prison law

library. Even with additional library access, his underlying case

against the Supreme Court Clerk would have been dismissed because

neither the district court nor the Court of Federal Claims had

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s suit. The qualified immunity inquiry

need proceed no further.

b. Whether the Right Was Clearly Established

Even if Plaintiff’s claim alleged a constitutional violation, 

Defendants are nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity because

the right to have additional library access was not clearly

established.

Inmates have a fundamental right to access the courts, and

this right places an affirmative obligation on prison officials to

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assure prisoners meaningful access. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. The

obligation may be fulfilled “by providing prisoners with adequate

law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the

law.” Id. (footnote omitted). No particular methodology is

required, but prisoners must be given the capability to file

nonfrivolous legal claims. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356. 

Armstrong complains about Defendants’ enforcement of the CDC

policy reflected in the Department Operations Manual section

53060.10. (Am. Compl. 4; Pl.’s Mem. 4.) This policy allows

inmates to access the law library for one two-hour period of time

each week. (Id.) Inmates with verified court deadlines are given

an extra two-hour period each week. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that

this policy deprived him of “meaningful access to the courts.” 

(Pl.’s Mem. 4.)

Several courts have refused to find constitutional violations

where inmates’ access to law libraries was restricted. See, e.g.,

Rhinehart v. Gomez, No. 93cv3747, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8382, at

*20-21 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 1995) (finding no denial of access to

courts where prisoner could access law library for two hours every

two weeks); Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir. 1987)

(finding one hour per week in law library of city jail did not

violate inmate’s constitutional rights). But cf. Williams v.

Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1338, 1340 (4th Cir. 1978) (finding three

forty-five minute library sessions per week to be inadequate

access); United States v. Janis, 820 F. Supp. 512, 515 (S.D. Cal.

1992) (ordering that inmate representing himself in criminal trial

be given library access ten hours per week if requested). 

Restrictions identical to those at issue here, allowing two hours

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of library access per week for inmates without court deadlines and

four hours per week for those with verified deadlines, were held to

be “reasonable as a matter of law” by another district court. 

Zatko v. Rowland, 835 F. Supp. 1174, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 

Allen v. City & County of Honolulu, 39 F.3d 936, 940 (9th Cir.

1994), cited by Armstrong, does not change this conclusion. (Opp’n

10.) In Allen, the plaintiff was housed in the special housing

unit (“SHU”) of the prison and was forced to choose between two

clearly established rights: the right to outdoor exercise and the

right to law library access. Allen, 39 F.3d at 940. Armstrong did

not face an analogous Hobson’s choice. The first level appeal

response to Armstrong’s 602, reiterated in the director’s level

appeal decision, noted that “[t]he library sessions are two (2)

hours in length and therefore do not preclude you from obtaining

time on the yard for exercise, nor do they prevent you from

attending family visits.” (Surreply Ex. A at 7, 11.)

“While Bounds guarantees the right of access to the courts

under the Fourteenth Amendment, prisoners have no inherent or

independent right of access to a law library or to legal

assistance.” Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir.

1998) (citing Lewis, 510 U.S. at 349-51). Supreme Court law does

not dictate a minimum number of hours or any other requirement for

satisfying the right of access to law libraries or legal

assistance. Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d at 796; Walker v. Mintzes,

771 F.2d 920, 931 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that Supreme Court, in

Bounds, did not prescribe a specific amount of library time);

Oswald v. Graves, 819 F. Supp. 680, 685 (E.D. Mich. 1993).

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The right to a specified number of hours in the library, or to

go to the library on days other than one’s regular day off (Comp.

Mem. of P. & A. 4), has not been recognized by the Supreme Court. 

It is not clearly established. Consequently, Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity. Reasonable officers in their

position could have believed that authorizing an inmate (like

Armstrong) to access the law library for two hours each week, or

four hours if he presented proof of a pending deadline, was a

reasonable limitation. 

E. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Request for Punitive

Damages

Armstrong’s Amended Complaint seeks injunctive relief,

compensatory damages, and punitive damages. (Am. Compl. 7.) 

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages

because Armstrong’s allegations do not establish that Defendants

acted with evil intent. (Def.’s Mem. 11-12.) 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the Court “may

order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(f). “[A] motion to strike may be used to strike any

part of the prayer for relief when the damages sought are not

recoverable as a matter of law.” Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp.

1450, 1479 n.34 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Tapley v. Lockwood Green

Engineers, Inc., 502 F.2d 559, 560 (8th Cir. 1974) (per curiam)). 

Punitive damages are available in § 1983 cases only where a

defendant’s “conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or

intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the

federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,

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56 (1986); see also Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266

F.3d 959, 969 (9th Cir. 2001)); Glosson v. Morales, 469 F. Supp. 2d

827, 830 (S.D. Cal. 2007). This test is alternately stated as

allowing punitive damages only when the defendant acts maliciously,

wantonly, or oppressively. Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 808 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not contain any factual

allegations that would establish Defendants acted with an evil

motive or with reckless or callous indifference to his federally

protected rights. Armstrong claims that Defendant Ryan “failed to

respond” to Plaintiff’s request to use a computer. (Am. Compl. 3;

Pl.’s Mem. 5.) The assertion adds little to Plaintiff’s claims for

punitive damages. (Opp’n 12.) The Amended Complaint does not

include any specific allegations about the mental state or motive

of the other Defendants. Armstrong has failed to adequately plead

the existence of facts that would entitle him to punitive damages. 

Therefore, Defendants’ request to strike his prayer for punitive

damages should be GRANTED. See Hayes v. Woodford, 444 F. Supp. 2d

1127, 1136 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (striking punitive damage claim from §

1983 complaint where plaintiff did not allege any facts regarding

defendants’ evil motive).

V. PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

Armstrong has filed three Motions pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15(d) in which he seeks to file supplemental

pleadings asserting additional causes of action for instances where

he was allegedly denied his right of access to the courts, all of

which have occurred since the filing of his Amended Complaint. 

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) provides: “Upon motion

of a party the court may . . . permit the party to serve a

supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or

events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to

be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). This rule is one of

judicial economy and convenience, allowing the Court to award

complete relief to a plaintiff and avoid the cost, delay, and waste

of time that would occur if a separate lawsuit was filed. Keith v.

Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing New Amsterdam

Casualty Co. v. Waller, 323 F.2d 20, 28-29 (4th Cir. 1963)). 

Claims asserted for the first time in a supplemental pleading

must bear some relationship to the claims in the original pleading. 

Keith, 858 F.2d at 474. But “[w]hile some relationship must exist

between the newly alleged matters and the subject of the original

action, they need not all arise out of the same transaction.” Id.

The Court has broad discretion in deciding whether to allow a

supplemental pleading; it should generally allow supplemental

pleadings unless they will prejudice Defendants. Id. at 475

(citations omitted); see also La Salvia v. United Dairymen of

Arizona, 804 F.2d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 1986) (allowing plaintiff to

file a supplemental complaint because it would not unduly prejudice

the defendants). In deciding whether to allow a supplemental

pleading, the Court may consider the merits of the proposed new

claims. Burka v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 945 F. Supp. 313, 317

(D.D.C. 1996) (citing Weekes v. Atlantic Nat. Ins. Co., 370 F.2d

264 (9th Cir. 1966)). 

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A. Plaintiff’s First Motion to Supplement

In his first Motion, Armstrong requests that he be allowed to

supplement his pleadings to allege a denial of access to the courts

arising out of a separate lawsuit. On December 3, 2002, Plaintiff

filed a civil rights complaint in the case of Armstrong v. Garcia,

No. 03cv0279-WQH(POR) (S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2005). (First Mot. to

Supplement 2.) The district court granted summary judgment in

favor of the defendants. (See id. at 2-3.) Armstrong appealed the

judgment, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed on November 13, 2006. 

(Id. at 3.) If Plaintiff wanted to file a petition for rehearing,

it had to be filed by December 2, 2006. (Id.) 

Armstrong alleges that he tried to access the prison law

library on December 2, 2006, to make photocopies of his petition

for rehearing so that it could be filed, but the library was

closed. (Id.) He did go to the law library on December 4, 2006,

and he completed and photocopied his petition. (Id.) He deposited

the petition in the prison’s internal mail system that day. (Id.

at 4.) Plaintiff states that his petition was not received by the

Ninth Circuit until December 8, 2006, at which time it was denied

as untimely. (Id.) 

The Court may deny a motion to file supplemental pleadings

when supplementation would be futile, such as where the newlyasserted claims would not survive a motion to dismiss. San Luis &

Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. San Francisco Bay Assoc., 236

F.R.D. 491, 500 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton,

Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988)). Plaintiff’s newlyasserted claim of denial of access to the courts would not survive

a motion to dismiss because Armstrong failed to exhaust his

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administrative remedies. A prisoner must exhaust all available

administrative remedies before filing a federal § 1983 lawsuit. 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Vaden, 449 F.3d 1050. “[When] the district

court concludes that the prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial

remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without

prejudice.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (citing Ritza, 837 F.2d at 368

& n.3). 

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that he filed an

administrative grievance complaining about the prison mail system

or about not being allowed to access the library to photocopy his

petition for rehearing so that it could be filed by the deadline. 

Under CDC regulations, Armstrong was required to file a 602

grievance within fifteen days of the event he complains of, but as

of March 22, 2007, Plaintiff had not filed any inmate grievances

complaining that he could not access the library in December 2006

to copy his petition for rehearing. (See Edwards Decl. ¶ 7.) 

Accordingly, even if the Court were to allow Armstrong to file a

supplemental complaint alleging these facts, the supplemental

complaint would be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. Supplementation would be futile. The district court

should DENY Plaintiff’s first Rule 15 Motion to Amend.

B. Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Supplement

In his second Motion, Armstrong describes another occurrence

in which he claims he was denied access to the courts. Plaintiff

filed a case in California state court, Armstrong v. Superior

Court, No. B197634, in which he sought to obtain police personnel

files pursuant to the California Public Records Act. (Second Mot.

to Supplement 4.) After he was denied relief by the superior court

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and the court of appeal, Armstrong attempted to file a petition for

review in the California Supreme Court. (Id.) The court rejected

his petition as untimely because his last day to file a timely

petition was April 7, 2007, but his petition did not reach the

court until April 20, 2007. (Id. at 5, Ex. A at 1.) 

Plaintiff was instructed to file an application for relief

from default no later than April 27, 2007. (Id. Ex. A at 1.) 

Armstrong placed his application for relief from default in the

mail on April 24, 2007, but it was not received by the court until

May 2. (Id. at 5, Ex. B at 1, Ex. D at 1.) By the time it was

received, the supreme court had lost jurisdiction to consider

Plaintiff’s application. (Id. Ex. D at 1.) 

In his Motion, Armstrong alleges that “there is no legitimate

reason” why it took seven days for the supreme court to receive his

application after it was mailed. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff appears to

claim that prison administrators prevented his application from

arriving at the supreme court on time, and they did so in

retaliation for his commencement of the underlying lawsuit. (Id.

at 6.)

Armstrong deposited his application in the prison mail on

April 24, 2007. (Id. at 5.) His outgoing mail log shows that it

was mailed from Calipatria State Prison to the California Supreme

Court the following day, April 25, 2007. (Id. Ex. C at 10.) It

was received by the supreme court seven days later, on May 2, 2007. 

(Id. Ex. D at 1.) Plaintiff does not allege any facts that would

show that Defendants, or any other specific individuals, committed

any act that caused Armstrong’s legal mail to be delayed in

reaching the supreme court. Evidence presented by Plaintiff shows

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that the prison mailed his application on April 25, 2007. Anything

that happened to Armstrong’s mail from the time it was deposited

with the United States Postal Service until the time it was

received by the California Supreme Court was not under the control

of Calipatria prison officials. 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would establish

Defendants caused a violation of his constitutional rights. He has

failed to allege the elements of a § 1983 claim –- that a person

acting under color of state law committed conduct that deprived him

of a constitutional right. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Shah v. County of

Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the

filing of a supplemental complaint making these factual allegations

would be futile because the supplemental pleading would be subject

to dismissal for failure to state a claim. 

Armstrong’s Motion also complains that a document he filed in

the present case –- his Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Order

Requiring Plaintiff to Pay Filing Fees [doc. no. 24] –- was not

received by the Court until ten days after it was deposited in the

prison mail system, and as a result it was filed late. (Id. at 7.) 

This allegation would similarly be subject to dismissal for failure

to state a claim because Armstrong does not allege any facts

showing that Defendants committed any acts which caused his

Opposition to arrive at the Court late. Additionally, Plaintiff

cannot establish that he suffered an actual injury because the

Court accepted his Opposition for filing. Armstrong was not harmed

or prejudiced in any way by the late filing of his Opposition. See

Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d 191, 194 (finding plaintiff did not

establish constitutional injury where his legal mail from the

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prison was delayed in reaching the court). Plaintiff’s second

Motion Pursuant to Rule 15(d) for Permission to Serve a

Supplemental Pleading should be DENIED.

C. Plaintiff’s Third Motion to Supplement

In his third Motion, Armstrong recounts the facts alleged in

his second Motion. (Third Mot. to Supplement 5-6.) Additionally,

he claims that the prison administrators committed further acts

that denied him access to the courts when they refused to mail

certain documents to the Court. (Id. at 1-2, 6-7.) On June 16,

2007, Plaintiff placed his Objection to Notice of Motion for

Protective Order in the prison deposit box, but as of June 28,

2007, his outgoing prison mail log indicated that it had not yet

been mailed. (Id. at 1, 6.) Also, on June 26, 2007, Armstrong

placed his Motion for Preliminary Injunction And/or Temporary

Restraining Order in the deposit box, but as of June 28, 2007, his

mail log showed that it had not been mailed. (Id. at 2, 6-7.) 

Plaintiff contends that prison administrators refused to mail these

documents in retaliation for his filing of the present lawsuit. 

(Id. at 9.)

Armstrong’s allegations fail to state a claim for denial of

access to the courts. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, his

Objection to Motion for Protective Order [doc. no. 32] was received

by the Court and filed on June 19, 2007. Armstrong’s Motion for

Preliminary Injunction [doc. no. 34] was received by the Court and

filed nunc pro tunc to June 28, 2007. Plaintiff’s allegation that

“prison authorities have yet to actually forward either of the

documents to the parties so addressed” is erroneous. Both

documents were received by the Court and accepted for filing. 

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Armstrong was not harmed or prejudiced in any way in his attempts

to file these two documents. The district court should DENY his

Supplemental Notice of Motion for Permission to Serve Additional

Pleadings because he has not, and cannot, allege facts that would

constitute a violation of his right to access the courts.

VI. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Armstrong filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and/or

Temporary Restraining Order [doc. no. 34] pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 65. Plaintiff asks the Court to issue a

preliminary injunction preventing the CDC from transferring him

from Calipatria to another prison. (Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 4.) He

asserts that Facility Captain A. Miller recommended a transfer from

Calipatria to James Town Prison Camp, even though Plaintiff is not

eligible for placement in a camp, in retaliation for this lawsuit. 

(Id. at 3-4.)

“A preliminary injunction is appropriate if the moving party

demonstrates either (1) a probability of success on the merits and

a possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) serious questions going

to the merits and the balance of hardships tipping sharply in his

favor.” Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing

Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

“Under any formulation of the test, plaintiff must demonstrate that

there exists a significant threat of irreparable injury.” Oakland

Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th

Cir. 1985). The threatened injury must be imminent. Los Angeles

Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1202

(9th Cir. 1980). 

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This Court does not have the authority to issue an injunction

directed at an entity that is not a party before it. Zenith Radio

Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 112 (1969); United

States v. Marshall, 526 F.3d 1349, 1354 (9th Cir. 1975); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 65(d). Armstrong filed the present lawsuit against eight

Defendants: L. E. Scribner, Warden of Calipatria State Prison;

Violet Thomas, Supervisor of Education Program; Anthony Variz,

Supervisor of Vocational Instruction; Jeff Schaller, Supervisor of

Correctional Education Program; Tim Ochoa, Chief Deputy Warden;

Nancy Grannis, Inmate Appeals Branch Coordinator; Stuart Ryan,

former Acting Warden; and M. E. Bourland, Chief Deputy Warden. 

(Am. Compl. 2-2a.) Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction,

however, complains about the actions taken by the Classification

Committee on June 12, 2007, over which Captain A. Miller and P.

Alaniz presided. (Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 3.) Armstrong objects to

Miller’s decision to recommend him for a transfer to a prison camp. 

(Id. at 7-8.)

Neither Miller nor Alaniz are defendants in the present

action. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would link

Defendants in any way to the actions of the Classification

Committee. Armstrong’s Motion seeks to enjoin persons who are not

parties to the present suit and conduct that is unrelated to the

claims contained in the Amended Complaint. The Motion should be

denied. See James v. Scribner, No. CV F-04-5878 OWW DLB P, 2007

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8023, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2007) (refusing

to grant preliminary injunction against prison staff because they

were not named as defendants and the plaintiff failed to link their

conduct to the named defendants). 

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The Motion should also be denied because Plaintiff cannot show

that any prison transfer was made in retaliation for this lawsuit. 

Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to be held in the

prison facility of their choice. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,

225 (1976); Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806. But prison authorities are not

permitted to transfer a prisoner in retaliation for the prisoner’s

exercise of a constitutional right, such as his right under the

First and Fourteenth Amendments to access the courts for redress of

grievances. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806. Armstrong asserts that the

proposed prison transfer is retaliation for litigating the present

lawsuit. (Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 4.) Plaintiff, however, has

failed to allege any facts that would establish a link between the

present lawsuit and the Committee’s decision to recommend Armstrong

for placement in a prison camp. See Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807 (finding

prison transfer was not retaliatory when plaintiff presented “no

probative evidence to establish a crucial link” between the

transfer and plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights).

Armstrong’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction also fails

because he has not demonstrated a likelihood that irreparable

injury would result from his transfer to a different institution. 

Plaintiff asserts that a transfer will cause irreparable injury

because if housed in a prison camp, it would be impossible for him

to conduct research, file timely documents, gather evidence, and

conduct discovery in the present lawsuit. (Pl.’s Decl. in Support

of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 2.) These arguments are unavailing

because, as discussed, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should be

dismissed by the district court. Armstrong cannot proceed with the

present litigation because his first cause of action and his

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allegations regarding photocopying are unexhausted, his second

cause of action and his photocopy allegations fail to state a claim

under § 1983, and Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for

all asserted claims. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

and/or Temporary Restraining Order should be DENIED.

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

should be GRANTED, and this action should be DISMISSED in its

entirety. Defendant’s request to strike Armstrong’s request for

punitive damages should be GRANTED. Plaintiff’s three Motions to

serve supplemental pleadings should be DENIED. Armstrong’s Motion

for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order

should also be DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before October 31, 2007. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before November 16,

2007. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991). 

Dated: September 28, 2007 _____________________________

 Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Lorenz

All Parties of Record

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