Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35747/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35747-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TRISTAN COOMES; SEAN COOMES, a

marital community,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

EDMONDS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 15;

CHRISTINE AVERY; JOE WEBSTER,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-35747

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-00319-

JCC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

John C. Coughenour, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 1, 2015—Seattle, Washington

Filed March 23, 2016

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A. Wallace Tashima,

and M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain

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2 COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part the district

court’s summary judgment and remanded in an action

brought by a public school teacher who alleged that she was

wrongfully discharged, in violation of her First Amendment

rights and state law, after she voiced concerns about her

school’s special education program to her supervisors and her

students’ parents.

The panel held that even when construing the evidence in

the light most favorable to plaintiff, her speech to her

supervisors and the school district administrators was

unprotected “up-the-chain-of-command” complaints, and her

speech to parents regarding their students’ educational

programs was, by her own admission, part of her job as head

of the school’s special education program. The panel

therefore concluded that plaintiff failed to meet her burden to

show that the relevant speech was made in her capacity as a

private citizen, and that the district court’s judgment with

respect to the First Amendment claim was proper. 

Addressing plaintiff’s claim under Washington law for

wrongful discharge, the panel held that because an

intervening authority had overruled the Washington state

decision upon which the district court’s analysis was based,

it was required to vacate the district court’s judgment. The

panel remanded to the district court for consideration of the

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15 3

wrongful discharge claim in light of Rose v. Anderson Hay &

Grain Co., 358 P.3d 1139, 1143 (Wash. 2015). However,

because the panel affirmed the district court’s grant of

summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim under

federal law, it advised the district court to first consider

whether to continue to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction.

COUNSEL

Sidney C. Tribe, Talmadge/Fitzpatrick PLLC, Tukwila,

Washington, argued the cause on behalf of plaintiffsappellants. With her on the brief were Philip A. Talmadge,

Talmadge/Fitzpatrick PLLC, Tukwila, Washington, and Neal

J. Philip, Fulton & Philip PLLC, Seattle, Washington.

Duncan K. Fobes, Patterson Buchanan Fobes & Leitch, Inc.,

P.S., Seattle, Washington, argued the cause for defendantsappellees. With him on the brief was Sarah S. Mack,

Patterson Buchanan Fobes & Leitch, Inc., P.S., Seattle,

Washington.

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4 COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether a public school teacher speaks

as an employee or a private citizen when she voices concerns

about the school’s special education program to her

supervisors and her students’ parents.

I

Tristan Coomes worked for four years at Meadowdale

Middle School (“Meadowdale”), in Edmonds School District

(“District”), as the manager of the school’s new

Emotional/Behavioral Disorders (“EBD”) program and the

primary teacher for students in the program.

Initially, Coomes got along with the administration,

including Joe Webster, the Assistant Principal of

Meadowdale, and Christine Avery, the school’s Principal. 

Coomes received “satisfactory” performance evaluations. 

But Coomes’s relationship with the school administration

later deteriorated, arising from her disagreement with

Webster and Avery over the “mainstreaming” of her students. 

Coomes believed that some of her students who were ready

for mainstream classes were not being allowed access to such

classes for impermissible financial reasons.

A

In March 2010, Coomes sent Andi Nofziger, her union

representative, and DebbyCarter, a District human resources

manager, an email complaining about treatment by

Meadowdale administrators, includingAvery. Coomes noted

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COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15 5

that she had expressed concerns that EBD students who were

ready to move to mainstream classes were not moved or had

moves delayed based on improper financial considerations. 

Coomes forwarded the email to a group of other Meadowdale

teachers, and the email chain was then forwarded to Avery in

April 2010.

Avery forwarded the email chain to District

administrators, stating that it contained false accusations and

that she hoped the District would “take a very strong position

in stopping this behavior.” A few weeks later, Avery emailed

Carter and District Assistant Superintendent Ken Limon to

express her disagreement with a proposal to reassign Coomes

to another school because Avery believed that the

reassignment would publicly validate Coomes’s complaints

about Avery.

Then, during the next school year, the EBD program

experienced a significant change. EBD students were placed

in more “mainstream” academic classes than in past years as

part of “a concerted effort to move the EBD program from a

self-contained model to a more inclusive . . . model.” 

Coomes objected to this change when it was originally

proposed. She sent Webster an email stating that she thought

that new students who had been in self-contained classrooms

for sixth grade should start the year in her EBD classroom

full time so she could get to know their needs and help them

adjust to the new school setting.

Coomes continued to express concerns about changes to

the EBD program. Meanwhile, Coomes’s evaluations began

to worsen, and Webster and Avery wrote Coomes a number

of letters criticizing her performance or reiterating their

expectations regarding the curriculum and the EBD program.

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6 COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15

B

After Coomes complained to District superintendent Nick

Brossoit in the spring of 2011, the District agreed to transfer

Coomes to a position at nearby Lynnwood High School for

the 2011–2012 school year. However, prior to the start of the

academic calendar, Coomes collapsed in the school’s halls,

“falling to the floor and sobbing uncontrollably.” Coomes

then requested and was granted medical leave from

September 1 to December 31, 2011. But, on the advice of her

therapist, Coomes decided not to return to work, and on

September 9, 2011, Coomes’s attorney sent the District a

letter stating that it was “impossible for her to continue

working” and that she had been constructively discharged. 

After the District’s counsel contacted Coomes’s counsel to

confirm that Coomes would not be returning to work, the

District processed her employment separation.

C

Thereafter, Coomes filed suit against Edmonds School

District in Washington state court, alleging that she had been

wrongfully discharged under Washington law, that her First

Amendment rights were infringed, that she was retaliated

against for exercising such rights, and that she was entitled to

recovery under a variety of other state law claims. Her case

was removed to the United States District Court for the

Western District of Washington, where she added Avery and

Webster as defendants. After discovery, the District and

administrators moved for summary judgment on the federal

and state claims, and the motion was granted. Coomes filed

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COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15 7

a timely notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291.1

II

On appeal, Coomes contends that genuine issues of

material fact exist and that the district court improperly

entered summary judgment. Specifically, she contends that

her speech to supervisors and parents about the treatment of

students in the EBD program related to matters of public

concern, was not made pursuant to her official duties, and

was a substantial or motivating factor in the District’s adverse

employment actions. She also contends that the district court

incorrectly concluded that special education and

whistleblower laws foreclose a wrongful discharge claim

under Washington law.

A

Coomes first contends that her First Amendment rights

were violated by the adverse employment actions taken

against her because of her expressed views about the

treatment of students in the EBD program.

1 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See

Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003). Because

this appeal is taken from an order of summary judgment in favor of the

District, the evidence of Coomes “is to be believed, and all justifiable

inferences are to be drawn in [her] favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to Coomes, we must determine whether there are any genuine

issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the

relevant substantive law. See Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 973.

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8 COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15

1

“[P]ublic employees do not surrender all their First

Amendment rights by reason of their employment.” Garcetti

v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006). “Rather, the First

Amendment protects a public employee’s right, in certain

circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of

public concern.” Id. While the protection of government

employee speech serves both the individual’s interest and

“the public’s interest in receiving the well-informed views of

government employees engaging in civic discussion,” the

public interest is also served by “respect[ing] the needs of

government employers attempting to perform their important

public functions.” See id. at 419–20. As such, “while the

First Amendment invests public employees with certain

rights, it does not empower them to ‘constitutionalize the

employee grievance.’” Id. at 420 (quoting Connick v. Myers,

461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)).

In Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2009), we set

forth the five-factor inquiry for evaluating First Amendment

retaliation claims. First, the plaintiff bears the burden of

proof at trial of showing (1) that she spoke on a matter of

public concern; (2) that she spoke as a private citizen rather

than a public employee; and (3) that the relevant speech was

“a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment

action.” Id. at 1070–71. If the plaintiff establishes such a

prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the government

to show that (4) “the state had an adequate justification for

treating the employee differently from other members of the

general public”; or (5) “the state would have taken the

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COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15 9

adverse employment action even absent the protected

speech.” Id. at 1070–72.2

All of the Eng “factors are necessary, in the sense that

failure to meet any one of them is fatal to the plaintiff’s case.” 

Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1067 n.4 (9th Cir. 2013)

(en banc). Because “all five factors are independently

necessary,” a reviewing court is free to address a potentially

dispositive factor first rather than addressing each factor

sequentially. Id.

2 While Eng delineates the burden of proof at trial, courts must be

“mindful of the shifting burden of proof governing motions for summary

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.” In re Oracle Corp.

Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). On a motion for summary

judgment,

The moving party initially bears the burden of proving

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Where

the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial,

the moving party need only prove that there is an

absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s

case. Where the moving party meets that burden, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate

specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine

issues for trial. This burden is not a light one. The

non-moving party must show more than the mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence. The non-moving

party must do more than show there is some

“metaphysical doubt” as to the material facts at issue. 

In fact, the non-moving party must come forth with

evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a

verdict in the non-moving party’s favor.

Id. (citations omitted).

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10 COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15

2

With the foregoing in mind, we focus on the second Eng

factor: whether Coomes spoke as a private citizen or as a

public employee.

Again, we are guided by ample precedent. The First

Amendment does not protect speech bypublic employees that

is made pursuant to their employment responsibilities—no

matter how much a matter of public concern it might be. See

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423–24. In Garcetti, the Court

explained “that when public employees make statements

pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not

speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the

Constitution does not insulate their communications from

employer discipline.” Id. at 421. Consequently, “[r]estricting

speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s

professional responsibilities does not infringe anylibertiesthe

employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.” Id. at

421–22.

The Supreme Court recently emphasized in Lane v.

Franks that the “mere fact that a citizen’s speech concerns

information acquired by virtue of his public employment does

not transform that speech into employee—rather than

citizen—speech.” 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014). Instead, the

“critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at

issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s

duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.” Id.

Thus, to the extent that Coomes’s speech was within the

scope of her employment duties, such speech is not protected

by the First Amendment.

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COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15 11

Whether Coomes was speaking as a private citizen or a

public employee is a mixed question of law and fact. Hagen

v. City of Eugene, 736 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 2013). The

“scope and content of [Coomes’s] job responsibilities” is a

factual question. Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658

F.3d 954, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Eng, 552 F.3d at

1071). This inquiry is not limited to a formalistic review of

Coomes’s job description, but is “practical.” Id. (quoting

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424); see Marable v. Nitchman, 511

F.3d 924, 932–33 (9th Cir. 2007).

Also, the Court must, as a matter of law, decide the

“‘ultimate constitutional significance’ of those facts.” 

Johnson, 658 F.3d at 966 (quoting Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071). If

Coomes’s “speech ‘owes its existence’ to [her] position as a

teacher, then [she] spoke as a public employee, not as a

citizen, and our inquiry is at an end.” Id. (quoting Garcetti,

547 U.S. at 421–22).

Regarding the factual inquiry, the Garcetti Court had “no

occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework for

defining the scope of an employee’s duties . . . where there is

room for serious debate.” Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch.

Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424).3 Likewise, in Lane, the Court did

not provide such a framework because it was “undisputed that

[the employee’s] ordinary job responsibilities did not

include” the speech at issue. 134 S. Ct. at 2378 n.4; see id. at

2383 (Thomas, J., concurring). In resolving this factual

3

In Garcetti, “there was no dispute” that the speech at issue—an internal

memorandum drafted by Deputy District Attorney Ceballos—“had been

written in execution of Ceballos’s official employment responsibilities.” 

Posey, 546 F.3d at 1127.

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12 COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15

question, we consider a set of non-exhaustive “guiding

principles” drawn from our case law applying Garcetti. See

Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1074–76.

III

So the central question becomes whether any genuine

issue of material fact exists with respect to the second Eng

factor: did Coomes speak as a private citizen or a public

employee? Because the plaintiff bears the burden of proof at

trial on this factor, a defendant moving for summary

judgment must either produce evidence establishing that the

plaintiff spoke as a public employee or show, through

argument, that the plaintiff does not have enough evidence to

establish that she spoke as a private citizen. See Nissan Fire

& Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102

(9th Cir. 2000). Where the defendant meets that burden, the

burden then shifts to the plaintiff to designate specific facts

demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial. See

Oracle, 627 F.3d at 387.

A

Here, the District initially bore the burden of production

to show that Coomes spoke as a public employee or lacked

evidence sufficient to establish that she spoke as a private

citizen. To meet that burden, the District submitted

Coomes’s formal job description and submitted her emails

that allegedly formed the basis for retaliation. In addition, the

District argued that “Coomes focused her complaints on

things that happened in her classroom, with individual

students, during the school day,” that her complaints to her

supervisors occurred in her role as teacher, and that she

referred to herself as a teacher and employee in her email to

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COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15 13

the District’s human resources manager and her union

representative. On appeal, the District cites both Coomes’s

job description and her declaration to show that she was

responsible for managing the EBD program and was part of

the IEP team. Coomes does not argue that the District failed

to meet its initial burden and thus the burden shifts to Coomes

to demonstrate that genuine issues of material fact exist.

Before the district court and now on appeal, it appears

that Coomes neglected to designate specific facts in the

record demonstrating the existence of genuine issues of

material fact for trial. Although she argued below that her

duties “did not include battling with District representatives

over the special education rights of her students” and did not

“include speaking out on behalf of herself and her fellow staff

members about bullying and harassment by Meadowdale

administrators,” she cited only one piece of evidence to

establish the scope of her duties—her formal job description.4

Coomes’s conclusory statements about her duties and her

lone citation to the factual record were insufficient to meet

her burden to show that genuine issues of material fact exist. 

See Bader v. N. Line Layers, Inc., 503 F.3d 813, 820 n.4 (9th

Cir. 2007) (“[B]are assertions of a legal conclusion, not

supported by any other ‘specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial,’” are insufficient to raise a genuine

issue of material fact. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

4 For the first time on appeal, Coomes points to claims in her declaration

that she was “harassed” for “voicing [her] concerns” to parents and

ordered “not to share [her] opinions” to demonstrate that her speech was

not part of her employment responsibilities. We decline to address new

evidence cited for the first time on appeal to seek reversal of a lower

court’s summary judgment determination. See Pardi v. Kaiser Found.

Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 848 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bankamerica

Pension Plan v. McMath, 206 F.3d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 2000)).

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14 COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15

“Where . . . the case turns on a mixed question of fact and

law and the only disputes relate to the legal significance of

undisputed facts, the controversy is a question of law suitable

for disposition on summary judgment.” Wash. Mut. Inc. v.

United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Here,

Coomes failed to establish that there were any genuine issues

of material fact for trial, but rather focused her argument on

the relevant case law. As a result, summary judgment would

be appropriate if legally supportable.

B

Coomes describes her speech as relating to two topics—

the “illegal and improper treatment of vulnerable students in

the public school system” and “bullying and harassment by

Meadowdale administrators in retaliation for taking a stand.” 

Coomes’s speech was transmitted to two distinct

audiences—District personnel and parents. We address

Coomes’s speech as directed to each audience in turn.

1

As we have explained, “whether or not the employee

confined [her] communications to [her] chain of command is

a relevant, if not necessarilydispositive, factor in determining

whether [s]he spoke pursuant to [her] official duties.” 

Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1074. Thus, “generally, ‘when a public

employee raises complaints or concerns up the chain of

command at [her] workplace about [her] job duties, that

speech is undertaken in the course of performing [her] job.’” 

Id. (quoting Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 313 (5th Cir.

2008)).

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COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15 15

In addition to this guiding principle from Dahlia,

Coomes’s job description and her declaration both shed light

on the factual question of the scope of her duties. Coomes’s

declaration states that she “was put in charge of the EBD

program” and “successfully managed the EBD program.” 

Accordingto her job description, Coomes was responsible for

assisting and supporting building staff regarding EBD

students, participating with staff to develop strategies to

address behavior problems, developing IEPs, providing

instruction within the EBD classroom, implementing positive

behavior supports for all students, and attending to the

physical and safety needs of students. Lastly, the job

description notes: “This position will have significant contact

with parents, students, and District staff requiring the ability

to work collaboratively with a variety of people.”

Based on the job description and declaration, the district

court concluded that “it was part of Coomes’s job as the IEP

manager and a member of the IEP team to point out failures

to abide by IEPs” and that “it was part of Coomes’s job as the

EBD teacher to communicate with administrators and parents

about her views on the placement and progress of EBD

students and appropriate management of the EBD program.” 

As discussed above, Coomes has not identified sufficient

record evidence to demonstrate that an issue of fact exists

with respect to the scope of her duties.

Coomes’s speech to District administrators raised

complaints or concerns about poor treatment by the

Meadowdale administration and about potential

mismanagement of the EBD program. Coomes complained

about the administration’s treatment of teachers in an email

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16 COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15

sent on March 26, 2010 from her to Carter and Nofziger.5

Coomes stated that she believed Avery created a “hostile

work environment” by targeting teachers who openly

disagreed with administrative decisions. Coomes noted that

she was a target of administration hostility because she

expressed concerns that EBD students who were ready to

move to mainstream classes were not moved or had moves

delayed based on financial considerations. She stated without

elaboration that this late mainstreaming practice was, “in

some opinions, unethical.” Coomes forwarded the email to

a group of other Meadowdale teachers, and it was eventually

forwarded to Avery.

In addition to complaints about treatment by the

administration, Coomes raised concerns about the

management of the EBD program in numerous

communications. For example, she emailed her union

representative and Assistant Superintendent Anthony Byrd

with concerns that students’ placements were inconsistent

with their IEPs and said that she wanted to put her concerns

on the record “before something seriously negative happens.” 

Two days later, Coomes emailed Nofziger and Limon

claiming that Webster’s decision tomainstream EBD students

was not supported by research. She again referenced

discrepancies with student IEPs and stated that Meadowdale

5 Coomes copied her union representative on several of the relevant

emails to District administrators. Although Coomes’s counsel suggested

at oral argument that Coomes’s copying her union representative on

correspondence with District administrators might be significant, her

briefs in this court and below do not argue that communications with her

union fall into a separate category of communications that is outside the

scope of her duties. As a result, Coomes has waived any such argument

on appeal. See Chadd v. United States, 794 F.3d 1104, 1109 n.4 (9th Cir.

2015).

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COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15 17

was not following “best practices” with respect to EBD

students.

Later that month, Coomes sent an email to Webster and

the rest of the team managing the EBD program expressing

concerns about a student’s placement and stating that the

student’s guardian did not agree with the placement.

In October 2010, Coomes emailed Nofziger, Limon, and

Carter to voice her concerns over a pending meeting with

Webster “regarding my students and program and my

continued distress over my current position.” She

complained that “everything” in her program was now

“dependent upon [Webster’s] approval,” and noted that she

was being denied the “ability to manage [her] students

programs.” She also asserted that in at least one instance

Webster inappropriately “de-escalat[ed]” a fight and put his

hands on an EBD student without proper training. Further,

she voiced her fear that she could not “protest any of this with

[Webster] as it has resulted in belittling comments and veiled

threats.”

On February 15, 2011, Coomes sent an email to Avery

and Webster regarding an incident with an EBD student that

had occurred the previous Friday, and which Avery, Webster,

and Coomes had apparently discussed. Coomes stated she

needed to ensure that her “professional input is recorded and

documented,” recounted that she had disagreed with the

choice to mainstream the student, and implied that if she had

been listened to, and the student had been placed in a more

restrictive environment, the incident would not have

occurred.

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18 COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Coomes, we conclude that her speech to Meadowdale and

District administrators is made up of the “complaints or

concerns” raised “up the chain of command at [Coomes’s]

workplace about [her] job” that this court has concluded are

generally not protected under Garcetti. Dahlia, 735 F.3d at

1074 (quoting Davis, 518 F.3d at 313).

Moreover, Coomes has failed to raise a genuine issue of

material fact with respect to the scope of her duties, and the

evidence indicates that her communication with District staff

about the implementation of IEPs and management of the

EBD program fell within her job duties as manager of the

EBD program. Therefore, we are satisfied that such speech

was made in her role as a public employee and is not

protected by the First Amendment.

2

Coomes also spoke to parents—clearly outside of her

chain of command. However, communicating with parents

about students’ IEPs and their progress in the EBD program

was part and parcel of Coomes’s job. Coomes’s own

declaration repeatedly emphasizes that her responsibilities

included collaborating with parents and encouraging parent

involvement in the IEP process. Indeed, one of her

complaints about the District’s activity was that it interfered

with the collaboration with parents that was part of her job. 

In an email from Coomes to Webster—relating Coomes’s

discussions with parents regarding their children’s classroom

placements—Coomes implied she did not agree with the

placement choices being made, but also indicated that she

believed communicating with parents regarding placement

choices was part of her job. Coomes even stated in one of her

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COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15 19

emails to Avery that “[a]s case manager, it is my role to talk

with parents about developments at school.” (emphasis

added). In her own self-assessment, Coomes stated that she

believed she had been successful in fulfilling her

responsibility to communicate with students’ parents and

guardians regarding “their students progress, needs, and

successes as well as changes in the program or expectations.”

Of course, even if Coomes’s duties as the EBD program

manager and instructor included speaking to parents

regarding their children’s participation in the program, she

could have gone outside her duties in speaking to parents

about other matters. However, Coomes has not pointed to

any record evidence indicating that her conversations with

parents went beyond discussion of IEPs and the

implementation of such IEPs within the District’s EBD

program. In fact, Coomes’s own declaration indicates that

the very “concerns” she voiced to parents, and which she was

“ordered” not to share, all involved her disagreement with the

District over its handling of students’ IEPs and management

of her EBD program. Her “concerns” regarded her objections

to the District’s process of mainstreaming students, and the

administration’s “refus[al] to pull [students] out of the

mainstream classes and allow them to be in the EBD

classroom.”

We therefore conclude that Coomes’s speech to parents

was within the scope of her duties and is not protected by the

First Amendment.

C

Even when construing the evidence in the light most

favorable to Coomes, her speech to her supervisors and

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20 COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15

District administrators is unprotected “up-the-chain-ofcommand” complaints, and her speech to parents regarding

their students’ educational programs was, by her own

admission, part of her job as head of the EBD program. We

therefore conclude that Coomes failed to meet her burden to

show that the relevant speech was made in her capacity as a

private citizen, and that the district court’s judgment with

respect to Coomes’s First Amendment claim was proper.

IV

Coomes also contends that the district court improperly

granted summary judgment on her claim under Washington

law for wrongful discharge against public policy.

To determine whether a plaintiff has a cause of action for

this tort under Washington law, courts analyze:

(1) the existence of a “clear public policy”

(clarity element), (2) whether “discouraging

the conduct in which [the employee] engaged

would jeopardize the public policy” (jeopardy

element), (3) whether the “public-policylinked conduct caused the dismissal”

(causation element), and (4) whether the

employer is “able to offer an overriding

justification for the dismissal” (absence of

justification element).

Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co., 358 P.3d 1139, 1143

(Wash. 2015) (citation omitted). As part of the “jeopardy

element,” Washington courts had required a plaintiff to

“show that other means of promoting the public policy are

inadequate.” Korslund v. DynCorp Tri-Cities Servs., Inc.,

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COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15 21

125 P.3d 119, 126 (Wash. 2005), overruled by Rose, 358 P.3d

1139. Here, the district court relied entirely on Korslund’s

“adequacy of alternative remedies” analysis to dismiss

Coomes’s claim for wrongful discharge.

It turns out that, after oral argument in this appeal, the

Washington Supreme Court overruled Korslund in Rose.

6

The state supreme court expressly discarded the “adequacyof

alternative remedies” analysis and held that “the existence of

alternative statutory remedies, regardless of whether or not

they are adequate, does not prevent the plaintiff from bringing

a wrongful discharge claim.” Rose, 358 P.3d at 1141.

Because an intervening authority has overruled the

Washington state decision upon which the district court’s

analysis was based, we must vacate the district court’s

judgment with respect to Coomes’s claim for wrongful

discharge. See Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 236–37

(1944) (“[A] judgment of a federal court ruled by state law

and correctly applying that law as authoritatively declared by

the state courts when the judgment was rendered, must be

reversed on appellate review if in the meantime the state

courts have disapproved of their former rulings and adopted

different ones.”).

We remand to the district court for consideration of the

wrongful discharge claim in light of Rose. However, because

we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment with

respect to Coomes’s claim under federal law, the district

court should first consider whether to continue to exercise its

supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Sanford

v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010)

6 We ordered supplemental briefing on the impact of Rose on this case.

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22 COOMES V. EDMONDS SCH. DIST. NO. 15

(“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are

eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered

under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward

declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law

claims.” (citation omitted)).

V

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is affirmed with respect to Coomes’s First Amendment

claims and vacated with respect to her state-law wrongful

discharge claim. Each party shall bear its own costs on

appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and

REMANDED.

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