Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00238/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00238-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 08cv0238

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL J. LANG, Civil

No.

08cv0238-JLS (CAB)

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT 

[Doc. No. 49]

v.

CANLAS, DOCTOR; ESCALANTE,

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER (C/O);

ALLAMBY, LIEUTENENT; WHITEHEAD,

R.N.; M.RUIZ, DOCTOR; SINAGA,

REGISTERED NURSE,

Defendants.

On February 6, 2008, plaintiff Daniel J. Lang, a California prisoner proceeding pro se and

in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights suit against several defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

[Doc. No. 1.] On May 12, 2008, the Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to stae

and claim and granted plaintiff time to file an amended complaint. [Doc. Nos. 3, 7.] On

September 10, 2008, plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). [Doc. No. 10.] On

September 9, 2009, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FAC with leave to

amend. [Doc. Nos. 30 and 36.] On January 7, 2010, plaintiff filed a Second Amended

Complaint (“SAC”). [Doc. No. 43.] The defendants named in the SAC have now filed a motion

to dismiss the SAC. [Doc. No. 49.] On March 29, 2010, plaintiff filed an opposition to the

defendants’ motion to dismiss the SAC. [Doc. No. 53.] On April 5, 2010, defendants filed a

Case 3:08-cv-00238-JLS-CAB Document 55 Filed 06/22/10 Page 1 of 18
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reply to plaintiff’s opposition. [Doc. No. 54.]

The Court finds the issues appropriate for decision on the papers and without oral

argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). After a thorough review of the motion,

Plaintiff’s SAC, and the applicable case law, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion to

Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint be GRANTED as set forth below.

II. THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

In the FAC, plaintiff named the following individuals as defendants: Robert J. Hernandez,

Warden; Matthew Meunier, M.D., U.C.S.D.; Canlas, M.D.; I. Choo, Chief Physician Surgeon; E.

Romero, Chief Medical Officer; Whitehead, R.N.; Escalante, Correctional Officer. Plaintiff

alleged that he is a state prisoner incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San

Diego, California (“Donovan”). [Doc. No. 10 at 1.] In brief, plaintiff’s 46-page FAC alleged

that during the course of two to three years (from 2005 to 2008), defendants violated his

constitutional rights by delaying or denying his requests for medical attention. Plaintiff alleged

that he needed medication for his “severe arthritis pain” and the medications were not provided

to him. [Doc. No. 10 at 3.] In addition, plaintiff alleged that he needed various treatments for

his knee injury and shoulder pain, and defendants also denied him these treatments. [Doc. No. 10

at 5.] Plaintiff claimed that these alleged acts constituted cruel and unusual punishment in

violation of the 8th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution. [Doc. No. 10 at 2-

5.] 

On April 29, 2009, this Court recommended that the motion to dismiss the FAC as to

defendants Hernandez, Canlas, Choo, Romero, Whitehead and Escalante be granted with leave

to amend because plaintiff failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference under the Eight

Amendment. [Doc. No. 30 at 8 - 9.] This Court also recommended that defendants Muenier and

Kahng be dismissed because they were never properly served. [Doc. No. 30 at 9.] On September

22, 2009, District Judge Sammartino adopted the report and recommendation and granted the

defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC with leave to amend, and dismissed the non-served

defendants. [Doc. No. 36.]

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This corresponds with the Second Count of the Ancillary Complaint.

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3 08cv0238

III. THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

In the SAC, plaintiff has dropped five defendants from his FAC: Hernandez, Meunier,

Choo, Romero and Kahng. Thus, the three defendants remaining from the FAC are Canlas,

Whitehead and Escalante. Plaintiff has also added three new defendants in the SAC: Allamby,

M. Ruiz, M.D. and Sinaga, R.N. Plaintiff also adds a new claim for relief against each of these

new defendants.

The SAC is very difficult to follow. Plaintiff lists four counts/causes of action on the

Form Complaint, but only three in his Ancillary Complaint. It appears that plaintiff intends the

first two counts on the Form Complaint to constitute only one count, and to correlate with the

first count in the Ancillary Complaint. [See Doc. No. 43 at 4, 5 and 10 - 22.] Therefore, the First

and Second Counts in the Form Complaint will be referred to jointly as the First Count. 

In the First Count, which is directed at defendants Canlas, Whitehead and Escalante,

plaintiff alleges that, from October 2005 to November 2009, he was delayed or denied treatment

for knee, back, foot and shoulder pain. [Doc. No. 43 at 4, 5, and 10-22.] Plaintiff claims that the

denial or delay of treatment has resulted in deliberate indifference to his medical needs in

violation of the Eighth Amendment, and/or medical negligence. [Doc. No. 43 at 4 - 5.] 

In the Third Count of the Form Complaint (hereinafter the “excessive force/First

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Amendment claim”), which is directed at defendants Allamby and Escalante, plaintiff claims

that he suffered a physical injury after an incident that occurred on July 14, 2008. [Doc. No. 43

at 6.] Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he “was proceeding to the RJDCT Law Library” when an

alarm sounded and he sat down as required. [Doc. No. 43 at 6, ¶ 1.] After the incident plaintiff

“was complaining to his friend Nicky Israel, and Mark, and others when Plaintiff was attacked

from behind.” [Doc. No. 43 at 6, ¶ 2.] Plaintiff further alleges that his “arms were twisted

violently behind him and although Plaintiff told guard Escalante that he was hurting plaintiff due

to his shoulder disability that plaintiff had a chrono in his pocket stating that he was only to be

waist cuffed” [Doc. No. 43 at 6, ¶ 3], Escalante allegedly proceeded to cuff him and then hold

him in a cell for a whole day. [Doc. No. 10 at 6, ¶ 3, 4.] All of this, according to plaintiff,

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This corresponds with the Third Count of the Ancillary Complaint.

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amounted to assault and battery, excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment and

suppression of free speech in violation of the First Amendment as well as violations of various

California Penal Code statutes. [Doc. No. 43 at 6.]

In the Fourth Count (hereinafter the “retaliation claim”), which is directed at defendants 2

Sinaga and Ruiz, plaintiff claims that he was retaliated against “for the lawful filing of his suit

against other doctors and nurses.” [Doc. No. 43 at 7, ¶ 1.] Plaintiff claims that “Nurse Sinaga

and Doctor M. Ruiz [retaliated against plaintiff] by the filing of [a] false report that plaintiff

‘CUPPED’ his morphine 30mg medication when in fact he has never done such an action.” [Id.]

Plaintiff further alleges that “[o]n or about December 21, 2009 Nurse Sinaga and Doctor M.

Ruiz conspired to Discontinue (DC) (i.e. using medication as punishment) plaintiff’s pain

medication, morpahine [sic] 30mg 2xdaily, and intentionally leaving plaintiff in severe back,

shoulder, knee, and foot pain.” [Doc. No. 43 at 7, ¶ 2.] Plaintiff claims that all of this has led to

his civil rights being violated as follows: “Falsifying of State Documents to deny Medical Care,

and Due Process of Law and Equal Protection of Law, Corporal Punishment and Cruel and

Unusual punishment freedom From Negiligence; Deliberate Indifference; Retaliation for Filing

Suite [sic]; DC Medication as Punishment for Actions not done by plaintiff (Violation of PC

§2650-2653).” [Doc. No. 43 at 7.]

IV. DISCUSSION

A. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal

sufficiency of a claim” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because rule

12(b)(6) focuses on the “sufficiency” of a claim rather than the claim’s substantive merits, “a

court may [typically] look only at the face of the complaint to decide a motion to dismiss,” Van

Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002), and at any exhibits

which are attached. See FED.R.CIV.P. 10(c) (“A copy of any written instrument that is an

exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”); Schneider v. California Dept. of

Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998).

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A motion to dismiss should be granted if a plaintiff’s complaint fails to contain “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556, 570.)

While allegations of material fact are accepted as true and construed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th

Cir. 1996), the court need not accept as true generic legal conclusions, unwarranted deductions

of fact or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988

(9th Cir. 2001); Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(on motion to dismiss court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation.”). The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.).

Thus, “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should

assume their veracity and then decide whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to

relief.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully.” 

Id. at 1949. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s

liability, however, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement

to relief.’” Id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (when a plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across

the line from conceivable to plausible, [his] complaint must be dismissed.”).

“In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual

content,’ and reasonable inferences [drawn] from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a

claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969

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(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949).

In addition, where there is an amended complaint (here the SAC), “an amended pleading

supersedes the original.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546

(9th Cir. 1990); see also Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 878 n. 40 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). “All causes of action alleged in an original

complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d

565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). 

C. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Claim (Count One)

According to the SAC, plaintiff filed a health services request on October 18, 2005, to

Doctor Canlas because he was in “severe debilitating pain, in both [his]left and right shoulders.

[Doc. No. 43 at 4, ¶ 1.] Plaintiff also claims to suffer from knee, back and foot pain. [Doc. No.

43 at 12, 13.] Plaintiff then chronicles numerous visits that he made to Doctor Canlas and/or

Nurse Whitehead from 2005 to 2009 where plaintiff allegedly requested treatment and treatment

was either denied or delayed. [Doc. No. 43 at 12 - 22.]

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. [Doc. No. 49-1 at 11-13.] Defendants also argue that the claim

fails because plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. [Doc. No. 49-1 at 15.]

a. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Plaintiff alleges that he filed an administrative (“CDC 602") appeal on 6/22/05 and that

the appeal was granted on 7/17/05. [Doc. No. 43 at 4.] Plaintiff also alleges that he filed

“several grievances (i.e. Medical CDCR 602 Appeals) that specifically requested needed medical

care for severe pain and plaintiff’s medical problems. . . ” [Doc. No. 43 at 20, 21.]

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference must fail because “he

did not attach any supporting documentation to the SAC and has therefore failed to show that he

exhausted the requisite administrative remedies.” [Doc. No. 49-1 at 15.] 

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

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exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Compliance with the exhaustion requirement is mandatory. 

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). Section 1997e(a) “applies to all inmate suits about

prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they

allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Id. at 532; see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.

731, 739-40 & n.5 (2001) (requiring exhaustion regardless of whether the specific remedy

sought by the prisoner is “available” within the administrative grievance procedure).

However, nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense--defendants have the

burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct.

910, 919 (2007); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); see also Brown

v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]here can be no ‘absence of exhaustion’

unless some relief remains ‘available,’” therefore, “a defendant must demonstrate that pertinent

relief remained available, whether at unexhausted levels of the grievance process, or through

awaiting the results of the relief already granted as a result of that process.”). 

Here, in the SAC, plaintiff does make some allegations that he filed “CDC 602" appeals

with regard to the alleged failure to provide him with necessary medical treatment. [See Doc.

No. 43 at 4, 20, 21.] Thus, the burden is on defendants to prove that plaintiff did not exhaust his

administrative remedies with regard to this claim. Merely stating that plaintiff failed to attach

documents to the SAC does not meet the defendants’ burden to affirmatively prove that plaintiff

failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 

Moreover, the plaintiff did attach documents to the FAC showing that he filed a 602

Appeal in 2005 with regard to the medical treatment claim and appealed that decision all the way

to the Director’s Level of Appeal, which is the last level of administrative appeal. [Doc. No.

10-4 at 34-41.] When resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a district court

may not consider materials outside the complaint and the pleadings. See Gumataotao v. Dir. of

Dep’t of Revenue & Taxation, 236 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 2001); Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d

616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998). The court may, however, consider materials properly submitted as part

of the complaint, see Gumataotao, 236 F.3d at 1083; Cooper, 137 F.3d at 622-23, as well as

“document[s] the authenticity of which [are] not contested, and upon which the plaintiff’s

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complaint necessarily rel[y],” even if they are not attached to the complaint, Parrino v. FHP,

Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in

Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Dent v. Cox

Commc’ns Las Vegas, Inc., 502 F.3d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 2007); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250

F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the documents regarding plaintiff’s administrative appeals

with regard to the deliberate indifference to medical needs claim were attached to the FAC.

[Doc. No. 10 at 34-41.] In the motion to dismiss the FAC, defendants did not dispute the

authenticity of those documents, nor did they argue that plaintiff had failed to exhaust

administrative remedies as to the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. [See Doc.

No. 23.] Thus, the court may consider the documents attached to the FAC. When those

documents are viewed together with the allegations of the SAC, it appears that plaintiff did

exhaust his administrative remedies as to his Eight Amendment deliberate indifference to

medical needs claim; or certainly defendants have not proven (as is their burden) that plaintiff

did not exhaust administrative remedies.

b. Failure to State an Eight Amendment Claim

Defendants argue that plaintiff fails to establish a claim for deliberate indifference. [Doc.

No. 49-1 at 11-12.] According to defendants, plaintiff in the SAC, “like in the FAC, . . . merely

expresses displeasure with the treatment he received from Defendants.” [Doc. No. 49-1 at 11.]

“The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon incarcerated individuals under color

of law constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

1056-57 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992)). A

violation of the Eighth Amendment occurs when prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a

prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.i; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). 

To constitute “cruel and unusual” punishment, the prisoner must allege facts which

demonstrate that he was confined under conditions posing a risk of “objectively, sufficiently

serious” harm and that prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying him

proper medical care. Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations

omitted.) Thus, there is both an objective and a subjective component to an actionable Eighth

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Amendment violation. Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002); Toguchi, 391 F.3d

at 1057 (“To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner ‘must satisfy both the

objective and subjective components of a two-part test.’”)(quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 f.3d

732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Although the “routine discomfort inherent in the prison setting” is inadequate to satisfy

the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment inquiry, see Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731

(9th Cir. 1999), this pleading component is generally satisfied so long as the prisoner alleges

facts to show that his medical need is sufficiently “serious” such that the “failure to treat [his]

condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain.” Clement, 298 F.3d at 904 (quotations omitted); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-31

(9th Cir. 2000); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994)(serious

medical conditions are those a reasonable doctor would think worthy of comment, those which

significantly affect the prisoner’s daily activities, and those which are chronic and accompanied

by substantial pain).

The subjective component requires the prisoner to also allege facts which show that the

officials had the culpable mental state, which is “‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of

serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998)(quoting Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994)). “Deliberate indifference” is evidenced only when “the official

knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be

aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Toguchi, 391 F.3d

at 1057 9citing Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002)). “If a [prison

official] should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the

Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188 (citation

omitted). This “subjective approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude

actually was.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839.

Here, the SAC does not satisfy either prong of the Eighth Amendment inquiry, as the

allegations are either too vague and conclusory, or simply do not amount to deliberate

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indifference. Plaintiff’s FAC contained over 100 pages of allegations and exhibits, detailing

requests he made for medical attention and the visits he made to the doctors who were on duty. 

The FAC contained numerous allegations that the defendants had either denied him requested

treatment, or gave him treatment with which he disagreed. [See e.g. Doc. No. 10 at 21.] On the

other hand, plaintiff’s SAC is only 27 pages long and has no exhibits attached. It appears that

plaintiff has omitted some of the more detailed allegations in the FAC regarding the treatment he

did receive and with which he disagreed. Instead, in the SAC, plaintiff merely chronicles the

numerous times he was seen by Doctor Canlas and Nurse Whitehead, but he does not provide

any description of the visits. As a result, plaintiff is left with allegations that are vague and

conclusory. Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Of Ala., 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

The few allegations that are more detailed in the SAC continue to show plaintiff’s disagreement

with the treatment provided, but do not show deliberate indifference. Differences in judgment

between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and

treatment are not enough to establish a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d

240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).

1. Defendant Canlas

The SAC contains numerous allegations that Doctor Canlas “denied or delayed”

treatment for approximately two years. [Doc. No. 43 at 5.] Plaintiff acknowledges having been

seen by Dr. Canlas on approximately 20 occasions between 2005 to 2008, but claims that Dr.

Canlas denied or delayed the requested treatment. [Doc. No. 43 at 12-27.] While some of the

allegations in the SAC state that plaintiff was completely denied treatment [See e.g. Doc. No. 43

at 4, ¶ 1], other allegations state that plaintiff was either denied or delayed treatment. [See e.g.

Doc. No. 43 at 5, ¶¶ 1 and 3.] As set forth above, those allegations are too vague. Ivey, 673 F.2d

at 268.

To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a specific

injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant to show an affirmative link between the

injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976); May v.

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Interestingly, in the FAC, plaintiff alleges that “[o]n or about 5-18-06, plaintiff reported to the 3

Doctor’s-Line and requested reasonable accommodation and pain treatment, but the doctor on duty,

doctors Kahng/Canlas denied plaintiff any requested pain medications and merely gave plaintiff

medication that plaintiff told the doctor did not work to relieve his pain . . .” [Doc. No. 10 at 23, ll. 6-

10.] Thus, in the FAC, plaintiff claimed that he was given medication, but not the medication he

preferred. Now, in the SAC, plaintiff claims he was never seen at all on that date.

11 08cv0238

Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.

1978). Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are

not sufficient. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. 

Here, there is allegation after allegation that plaintiff went to see Dr. Canlas and

requested “medical care [] but none was given.” [See e.g. Doc. No. 43 at 14, ll. 10-11.] Other

allegations claim that plaintiff requested to see Dr. Canlas but was not allowed to see him. For

example, plaintiff alleges:

On 5-18-06, plaintiff again requested pain medications and reasonable

treatment for his disabilities and injuries but the Doctor Canlas did not even see me

and delayed treatment and diagnosis again.

[Doc. No. 43 at 14, ll. 2-4.]3

This allegation does not state what particular disability or injury plaintiff was seeking

treatment for, nor what pain medication was requested, nor whether Doctor Canlas was even

aware of the requested treatment. See Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d at 731 (prisoner must allege

facts to show that his medical need is sufficiently “serious” such that the “failure to treat [his]

condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain.”) While plaintiff does allege at other points that he suffers from knee, shoulder and back

pain, he does not tie specific visits to specific ailments or specific requests for treatment. Thus,

the allegations are too vague and conclusory. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268.

Moreover, other allegations show that plaintiff was being seen by Doctor Canlas and

other physicians at the prison, and that he was being prescribed various pain medications through

the end of 2009. For example, plaintiff alleges:

On 11-28-08 Plaintiff contacted Doctor Choo due to the fact that Dr. Canlas

had not done any followup, and because plaintiff was experiencing bad

psychological side-effects from the medication given and because that medication

did not work and he requested other medication for pain.

[Doc. No. 43 at 18.]

Here, plaintiff acknowledges that, as of 11-28-08, he was receiving medication for pain. 

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Moreover, in Count Four for retaliation, plaintiff admits that, as of 12/21/09, he was receiving

30 mg of morphine twice daily. [Doc. No. 43 at 7.] Thus, these admissions, coupled with vague

allegations about the denial of treatment, fail to show deliberate indifference and are simply

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me” accusations. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. At 1949

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

There are other allegations where plaintiff acknowledges that he was seen by Dr. Canlas,

but plaintiff did not like the way Doctor Canlas undertook the examination:

On ‘1-15-07, plaintiff informed doctor Canlas again about his injuries and

pain, but doctor Canlas merely asked a few questions as he usually does, and

without a physical examination sent plaintiff away without treatment and diagnosis

of plaintiff’s injuries and disabilities stated above. . . . 

On 1-25-07, plaintiff again requested urgent needed medical care of Doctor

Canlas, but not [sic] was given. Again Doctor Canlas only asked a few questions

as usual and sent plaintiff on his way to suffer in pain and on an increasingly daily

basis function less and less.”

[Doc. No. 43 at 15.]

These allegations do not amount to deliberate indifference, as they merely chronical

plaintiff’s disagreement with the treatment provided. “A difference of opinion does not amount

to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez, 891 F.2d at 242. 

Moreover, the allegations do not specify what “urgent needed medical care” plaintiff was

requesting and for which disability treatment was being sought. Thus they are also too vague.

Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268.

Finally, plaintiff has failed to prove the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference

test. “In order to show deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege sufficient facts to indicate

that prison officials acted with a culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302

(1991). The indifference to medical needs also must be substantial; inadequate treatment due to

malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429

U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Deliberate indifference is

a high legal standard.”) (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 1204 (9th Cir. 2002); Wood v.

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

Here, plaintiff alleges that Dr. Canlas made some statements with which plaintiff

disagreed. For example, plaintiff alleges:

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On 2-21-06, Plaintiff went to the Facility One Clinic to see the Doctor

Canlas because he was experiencing severe pain and inflammation in his back due

to lumps, yet the Doctor has refused to treat and diagnose plaintiff by stating: “I

think you could be imagining it all.”

[Doc. No. 43 at 12.]

Assuming Doctor Canlas made this statement, it does not amount to deliberate

indifference. Rather, this allegation shows that plaintiff was seen by Dr. Canlas on that date, but

that Dr. Canlas did not treat plaintiff to plaintiff’s satisfaction. “A difference of opinion does

not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s serious medical needs.” Sanchez, 891 F.2d

at 242. Moreover, even if Dr. Canlas was negligent in not examining plaintiff further on that

occasion, medically inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not

amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060.

Plaintiff also alleges:

On 12-15-06 plaintiff requested needed medical care for pain and the stated

disabilities and injuries, yet none was given. Plaintiff asked Doctor Canlas why no

medications were given, and he said that too many drug addicts in prison seek

drugs.

[Doc. No. 43 at 12.]

When plaintiff saw Doctor Canlas he informed Doctor Canlas that he was

going through serious psychological changes, such as increased depression,

vegitative [sic] depression, bi-polar disorder, and not sleeping due to pain causing

plaintiff not to be able to work on a daily basis. Doctor Canlas said that “If you

wanted good healthcare, you should not have ever come to prison.” 

[Doc. No. 43 at 13.]

Again, assuming Dr. Canlas made such statements, they do not amount to deliberate

indifference. First, the allegations show that plaintiff was being seen by Dr. Canlas on those

dates. Second, they appear to show disagreements between plaintiff and Dr. Canlas over what

treatment plaintiff should be given and, therefore, do not rise to the level of deliberate

indifference. Sanchez, 891 F.2d at 242. Finally, even if Dr. Canlas was discourteous in

expressing personal opinions, that does not mean he was being deliberately indifferent to

plaintiff’s medical needs. “Discourtesy” does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

violation. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir. 1997) (allegations of verbal

harassment and abuse fail to state a claim cognizable under § 1983); Rutledge v. Ariz. Bd. Of

Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981), aff’d sub nom. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719

(1983); see e.g., Keenan v. Hall, 83 f.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996), amended 135 F.3d 1318

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(9th Cir. 1998) (disrespectful and assaultive comments by prison guard not enough to implicate

Eighth Amendment); Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 f.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (directing

vulgar language at prisoner does not state constitutional claim); Burton v. Livingston, 791 f.2d

97, 99 (8th Cir. 1986) (“mere words, without more, do not invade a federally protected right”). 

Thus, plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference

test. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. at 302. 

Accordingly, given that this is plaintiff’s third attempt to state an Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference claim against defendant Canlas, the Court RECOMMENDS that the

Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Canlas be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

2. Defendant Whitehead.

The are numerous allegations against defendant Whitehead where plaintiff merely alleges

that he was “denied or delayed treatment” by defendants Canlas and Whitehead. [See e.g. Doc.

No. 43 at 5, ¶ ¶ 1 and 5.] For the reasons set forth above, these allegations are vague and

conclusory. 

There are some allegations specific to Nurse Whitehead where plaintiff claims that she

denied him access to Dr. Canlas or deferred him access. [See e.g. Doc. No. 43 at 14, ll. 26-28;

15, ll. 19-23; 16, ll. 15-16; 17, ll. 21-26.] Again, these allegations are vague and conclusory.

Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. Moreover, a mere delay in medical care, without more, is insufficient to

state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indiffience. Shapley, 766 F.2d at 407. 

Finally, plaintiff alleges that Nurse Whitehead denied him access because she “failed to follow

procedure.” [Doc. No. 43 at 17.] This does not show a culpable state of mind on the part of

Nurse Whitehead. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. at 302. 

Given that this is plaintiff’s third attempt to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim against defendant Whitehead, this Court RECOMMENDS that the Eighth

Amendment claim against defendant Whitehead be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

3. Defendant Escalante

There are very few specific allegations as to defendant Escalante. Plaintiff alleges that

defendant Escalante was employed as a correctional officer. [Doc. No. 43 at 2.] The only

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allegations regarding Escalante with regard to this claim are as follows:

On or about 2-21-07 plaintiff went to the facility one clinic and requested

needed urgent medical care for his hip, shoulders, knee, back, and foot from Nurse

Whitehead, and Escalante and requested access to the Doctor, but was denied

treatment and access to the doctor and medical care. Plaintiff complained of

severe pain also. 

[Doc. No. 43 at 15.]

On information and belief it is the responsibility of Doctor Canlas and

Nurse Whitehead and Escalante to provide medical services for inmates, that are

based on medical necessity and supported by outcome date as effective medical

care. 

[Doc. No. 43 at 19.]

Plaintiff has filed additional grievances Related to the actions and inactions

alleged herein throughout the Complaint. One complaint 602 Appeal requested

reasonable accommodations and that his current disabilities be documented on an

1845 form as is procedurally required, yet plaintiff is denied procedural and

Substantive Due Process of Law by Doctor Canlas, Doctor M. Ruiz, and Nurse

Whitehead, and Correctional Officer Escalante as they refused to document

plaintiff’s requests for urgent needed medical care and documentation of his

disabilities.

[Doc. No. 43 at 21.]

These allegations are vague and conclusory, Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268, and fail to show a

culpable state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. at 302. Given that this is plaintiff’s third

attempt to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against defendant Escalante,

this Court RECOMMENDS that the Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Escalante be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

D. Plaintiff’s Negligence (and other State Law) Claims

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s First Count, to the extent it purports to state a claim for

negligence, should be dismissed because plaintiff (1) failed to comply with the California Tort

Claims Act and (2) fails to state a claim for negligence. [Doc. No. 49-1 at 14-15.] Regardless of

whether plaintiff has complied with the CTCA or sufficiently alleges all of the elements of a

claim for negligence, negligence is a state law claim which can only be heard by this court

pursuant to supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has

original jurisdiction, the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims

in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy

under Article III,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). “[O]nce judicial power exists

under § 1367(a), retention of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is

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discretionary.” Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). “The district

court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ...

the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before

trial, ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of America v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the court has discretion to dismiss state law claims when it

has dismissed all of plaintiff's federal claims. "In the usual case in which federal law claims are

eliminated before trial, the balance of factors ... will point toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S.

343, 350 n.7 (1988); Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Here, this Court is recommending that all of plaintiff’s federal claims be dismissed. 

Therefore, this Court also recommends that the District Court decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) as to any state law claims, including a claim for

negligence. As a result, the claim for negligence (and all other state law claims) should be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

E. Plaintiff’s Excessive Force/First Amendment Claim (Count Three)

The original complaint in this action was filed on February 6, 2008. [Doc. No. 1.] 

Plaintiff’s third count is a new claim in the SAC and is based upon an incident that allegedly

occurred on July 14, 2008, or over 5 months after the original complaint in this action was filed. 

To the extent that plaintiff tries to bring in claims for events that happened after February 6,

2008, he may not do so in this action because pre-suit exhaustion is a temporal impossibility. 

The plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that no § 1983 action “shall be brought . . .

until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a)(emphasis added). A prison conditions claim may not proceed unless the prisoner has

exhausted his available administrative remedies before he files suit; he may not exhaust while

the already filed suit is pending. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002); see

also Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (where administrative remedies

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are not exhausted before the prisoner sends his complaint to the court it must be dismissed even

if exhaustion is completed by the time the complaint is actually deemed filed by the Clerk). For

this reason, the Third Count for excessive force/First Amendment (and related federal and state

law claims) should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

F. Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim (Count Four).

Similarly, plaintiff Fourth Count for retaliation is based upon an incident that allegedly

occurred on December 22, 2009, almost two years after the original complaint was filed. As a

result, pre-suit exhaustion for that claim is a temporal impossibility. McKinney, 311 F.3d at

1199. Thus, the Fourth Count for retaliation (and related federal and state law claims) should be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, the Court recommends defendants’ motion to dismiss under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) be GRANTED as follows:

1) the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims in Count One (and Count

Two in the Form Complaint) against Defendants Canlas, Whitehead and Escalante

be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

2) the negligence claim (and all other state law claims) in Count One (and Count Two

in the Form Complaint) against Defendants Canlas, Whitehead and Escalante be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

3) the claim for excessive force/First Amendment (and related federal and state law

claims) in Count Three against defendants Escalante and Allamby be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

4) the claim for retaliation (and related federal and state law claims) in Count Four

against defendants Sinaga and Ruiz be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

/ / / / / 

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IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 23, 2010, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than ten days after being served with the objections. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the

right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 22, 2010

CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

United States Magistrate Judge

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