Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00496/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00496-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HIGH SIERRA HIKERS ASSN. et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

)

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FISH)

AND GAME, CALIFORNIA TROUT, )

INC., BACK COUNTRY HORSEMEN )

OF CALIFORNIA, INC., MID VALLEY ) 

UNIT, KENNEDY MEADOWS )

RESORT AND PACK STATION, INC., )

JAMES L. PHELAN, )

)

Defendant Interveners, )

____________________________________)

CV F 05-0496 AWI DLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN

PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Document # 93

INTRODUCTION

This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief by plaintiffs High Sierra Hikers

Association and Wilderness Watch (collectively “Plaintiffs”) against defendant United States

Forest Service, and two individual Forest Service officials (“Defendants”) and intervenerdefendants, California Trout, Inc., Tuolumne County Sportsmen, Kennedy Meadows Resort,

James Phelan, and the California Department of Fish and Game (collectively, “Interveners”). 

The action is pursuant to the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C., §§ 1131, et seq., and the National

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Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C., §§ 4321 et seq. The action challenges a

decision by Defendants to repair and maintain and operate certain small water impoundment

structures located in the Emigrant Wilderness Area. In the instant motion, Plaintiffs seek

summary judgment of their claims that Defendants’ actions were contrary to law and for

injunctive relief to prohibit the maintenance or repair of any dam structures in the Emigrant

Wilderness. Defendants and Interveners counter-move for summary judgment on all Plaintiffs’

claims. Federal subject matter jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C., § 1331. Venue is proper

in this court.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case was transferred from the Northern District of California on April 14, 2005. 

Apparently, the operative pleading in the case at the time of transfer was the first amended

complaint. On September 12, 2005, Plaintiffs moved to amend/correct the complaint. That

motion was granted in part on October 24, 2005, and the currently-operative Second Amended

Complaint (“SAC”) was filed on October 28, 2005. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on

November 11, 2005. Interveners filed an opposition on December 19, 2005, which Defendants

joined on December 22, 2005. Defendants filed their opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment and cross-motion for summary judgment on December 22, 2005. Interveners

joined Defendants opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment on January 3, 2006. 

Plaintiffs filed their reply on January 20, 2006, and filed a motion to strike certain extra-record

materials on January 23, 2006. Defendants/Interveners filed their opposition to the motion to

strike on January 25, 2005, and Plaintiffs filed their reply on February 2, 2006.

Hearing on the parties’ motions and cross-motions for summary judgment was held on

March 24, 2006. At the hearing the parties requested leave to file additional briefing regarding

congressional intent. Leave was granted. Plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief on March 27,

2006; Defendants filed a response to the supplemental brief on March 30, 2006; and IntervenerDefendants filed a supplemental brief on March 28, 2006.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND/UNDISPUTED FACTS

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Plaintiffs and Defendants have filed statements of undisputed facts as to their respective

motions for summary judgment, and filed objections to the factual aversions of the opposing

parties. The facts set forth below represent a synthesis of the facts submitted by the parties. 

Disputed facts are noted and factual disputes are resolved to the extent possible.

Although neither party offers undisputed facts to explain the why the controversy is

before the court at this time, it is helpful, as an initial matter, to briefly address the history and

nature of the controversy. The introductory portion of the Draft EIS summarizes the historical

antecedents of the current controversy. 

Following designation of the Emigrant Wilderness in 1975, a document titled the

“Emigrant Wilderness Management Plan” was prepared in 1976, which contained a requirement

for a study to determine “. . . the condition, value and cost-effectiveness of the various [water

control structures] as well as their effects on the natural hydrological processes.” AR at 3460. 

The water control structures had been built beginning in the 1920's to develop a local fishery that

had begun during the 1890's when the natural lakes in the area were planted with trout by

cattlemen who use the meadows in the area for grazing. The dams, which had been constructed

mostly of mortar and local stone were operated on a shared basis by the Forest Service,

California Department of Fish and Game (“CDFG”), sportsmen’s groups, and others. Since

1988, operation of the stream flow releases has been done primarily by CDFG. Fisheries in the

Emigrant Wilderness are co-managed through a local Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”). 

Controversy over the status of the dams in the Emigrant Wilderness “resulted in recent

Congressional consideration of legislation related to the Emigrant dams. No specific legislation

has been enacted.” “The Forest Service has conducted several planning efforts related to the

disposition of the dams since designation of the Emigrant Wilderness. Public and legislative

requests have been received to maintain, repair and operate twelve of the dams. No maintenance

has occurred since 1989 due to appeal decisions on previous planning efforts.” AR at 3460.

The following facts have been compiled from the statements of undisputed facts

submitted by both parties. The facts are not disputed unless otherwise noted.

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On January 3, 1975, Public Law 93-632 (Section 2(b)) designated 106,988 acres as

Emigrant Wilderness, and on September 28, 1984, Public Law 98-425 designated an additional

6,100 acres as part of the Emigrant Wilderness. The Emigrant Wilderness is a glaciated area of

high mountain peaks, granite domes, glacial valleys, and alpine and subalpine meadows

interspersed with patches of subalpine coniferous forest. The elevation of the Emigrant

Wilderness ranges from 4,700 feet to 11,700 feet at Leavitt Peak. The Emigrant Wilderness

contains over 100 named lakes and over 500 small, unnamed lakes. At the time the Emigrant

Wilderness was designated, 18 dams existed within it; a fact that was known to Congress at the

time of the designation. 

The parties differ as to the status and characterization of the fish populations in the

Emigrant Wilderness. Plaintiffs aver, and Defendants do not dispute, that the high mountain

lakes of the Emigrant Wilderness were originally without any native fish population. Plaintiffs

characterize the lakes of the region as having been stocked with “non-native” trout, beginning in

the 1890's. Defendants state, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that 77 of the 100 named lakes in the

Emigrant Wilderness have historically been stocked with fish. Defendants point out the fish that

were stocked were Rainbow Trout, a species that is native to both the Stanislaus and Tuolumne

river systems. The waterways of the Emigrant Wilderness drain into the Stanislaus and

Tuolumne rivers. Defendants contend, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that the trout populations

that have been established in those areas of the Emigrant Wilderness that were historically

stocked are at least partially self-reproducing and that current fish stocking operations are for the

purpose of enhancing populations for the benefit of anglers.

The parties agree that, of the 18 dams in the Emigrant Wilderness, 15 are associated with

lakes, and except for Y-Meadow, impound water on naturally existing lakes. All the dams are

constructed of local stone and mortar, except for one dam which is earthen. The dams are of

three functional types. Twelve of the dams are streamflow augmentation dams that are intended

to increase downstream flow during dry weather in late summer or early fall. These dams raise

the height of natural lakes from about 6 to 10 feet. Three of the dams are lake level dams that

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add approximately three feet of height to existing natural lakes, but do not regulate downstream

flows. Three dams are meadow enhancement dams that are not associated with lakes. These

dams are located in stream channels and serve to raise water tables to sub-irrigate meadows. 

The parties do not generally dispute the foregoing except that Plaintiffs characterize the

lakes whose natural levels are raised by dams as “reservoirs.” Defendants consistently oppose

this characterization, contending the impoundments do not meet the dictionary definition as they

do not impound water for irrigation, domestic, industrial or other human use. Plaintiffs also aver

the meadow enhancement dams originally served to sub-irrigate meadows for the benefit of

livestock. 

Plaintiffs allege a number of undisputed facts that relate to the decline in importance of

the dam structures in the Emigrant Wilderness since the 1950's. Defendants have disputed the

proffered facts, but the disputations pertain mostly to the appropriateness of individual

descriptive words, rather than the overall facts themselves. An examination of the Draft

Environmental Impact Statement (“Draft EIS”) supports the following factual allegations: The

dam system in what would eventually be incorporated in the Emigrant Wilderness began in the

1920's for the purpose of increasing the area’s trout population and to “provide downstream

benefits to fish habitat, food production, and power production outside the Emigrant.” Draft EIS

at 3536. Local stockmen, who had been planting trout in the Emigrant since the turn of the

century noticed increased numbers of fish during wet years. They developed the system of dams

to enhance stream flows during dry years and to thereby improve the population of trout. 

In 1957 the Cherry Lake Dam, which lies outside the Emigrant Wilderness, was

completed; thereby flooding Cherry Valley and creating the 268,000 acre-foot Cherry Lake

Reservoir. As a result of the construction of the Cherry Lake reservoir, the importance of the

system of dams in the Emigrant Wilderness diminished in terms of their importance to flood

control and power production. In addition, the Draft IES states that the role of the dams in

supporting a fishery diminished with the advent of aerial stocking of fish in remote areas. 

The Draft IES states the dams in the Emigrant Wilderness continue to augment stream

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flows during the dry season, but that augmented stream flows are probably not necessary to

maintain natural fish reproduction. The Draft EIS points to fish populations which have been

sustained in Yosemite National Park, an area similar to the Emigrant Wilderness, even though

the stocking of trout in Yosemite National Park has been phased out over the last 25 years. The

parties do not dispute that the dam structures in the Emigrant Wilderness have deteriorated to

varying degrees since they were originally constructed. It is also not disputed that those dams

structures that were built to manipulate streamflow have not been operated for that purpose for

roughly 13 years.

The Draft EIS gives particular attention to the effects of the various proposed actions on

two amphibian species, the Mountain Yellow-legged Frog (“MYLF”) and the Yosemite Toad

(“YT”). Both species are classified as “sensitive” under the Endangered Species Act, meaning

there has been significant decline in population in the past and/or significant reduction of species

distribution. For purposes of this case it is sufficient to briefly note only the potential effects of

proposed action and the no action option on these species. The parties disagree in their

respective characterizations of the effects of the proposed and alternative actions with respect to

these species. The Draft EIS supports the following conclusions: See AR at 3714-3715 and

3718-3719.

The MYLF is rarely far from water and depends on deep pond water for escape from

predators and for overwintering habitat. The Draft EIS notes a reciprocal relationship between

trout populations, which feed on the MYLF, and MYLF populations. Based on the Draft EIS it is

difficult to draw a clear conclusion that one option or the other clearly favors or disfavors MYLF

populations. MYLF populations may be benefitted under the preferred option by the

maintenance of the dams because access to deep water would be maintained. On the other hand,

enhanced trout populations resulting from fisheries enhancements may increase predation on the

MYLF. Thus the no-action option may benefit the MYLF to the extent trout populations decline. 

The Draft EIS points out CDFG oversees trout stocking activities and consequently populations

of trout are more depentant on CDFG actions than on Forest Service actions. Additionally, there

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is some small probability that MYLF habitats could be disturbed by repair and maintenance

operations. 

With respect to YT populations, there is evidence in the Draft EIS to support the

contention that the species would be relatively more benefitted by the no-action option than by

the preferred option. The YT inhabits primarily wet meadows and seasonal ponds. AR at 4147. 

The no-action option would gradually reduce lake volumes as the dams deteriorated thereby

potentially increasing meadow habitat for the YT. AR at 3719. The Final EIS notes that the noaction option may reduce YT habitat to the extent non-maintenance of the meadow maintenance

dams may result in loss of wet meadow area. Because the YT does not inhabit deep water, it is

less susceptible to predation by trout.

Defendant Forest Service prepared a Final EIS for the Emigrant Wilderness dam project. 

The Final EIS incorporated the facts set forth in the Draft EIS with a few corrections that are not

important here. In the Final EIS the Forest Service considered 11 alternatives. Of those 11

alternatives, three were considered in detail. Plaintiffs’ objection to the word “considered” on

the ground it represents a legal conclusion, rather than fact, is noted and rejected. In the Record

of Decision (“ROD”) for the Emigrant Wilderness Dams Final EIS, the Forest Supervisor

decided that 11 of the existing 18 dams within the Emigrant Wilderness would be maintained. 

The Forest Supervisor determined that these eleven structures are the minimum necessary for

administration of the wilderness for reasons that include the following: (a) seven of the

maintained dams are eligible for the Historic Register, and they protect and preserve historic

values for future interpretative, educational and scientific benefits; (b) the other four maintained

dams improve natural reproduction capabilities within existing fisheries which is beneficial for

wilderness as it reduces impacts on natural processes and supports the reduction or elimination of

the need by CDFG for fish stocking in these lakes; and (c) the dams are a highly valued cultural

connection in the local history. Plaintiffs disputations as to the correctness of the

characterizations and conclusions reflected in the Final EIS are noted.

Plaintiffs allege the dam structures in the Emigrant Wilderness are “non-conforming”

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under the Wilderness Act. To support the proffered fact, Plaintiffs cite the introduction to the

Draft EIS, which contains a single sentence referencing “non-conforming structures.” In its

entirety, the sentence states: “Congress, which often includes what the disposition of nonconforming structures and uses should be [in a wilderness area], did not address the Emigrant

Wilderness dams in either act.” AR at 3459. Defendants contend the statement is misleading

and point out that the Forest Service’s ROD found that the eleven dams for which ongoing

maintenance is proposed are compatible with the Wilderness Act and necessary for the minimum

requirements for the wilderness’ administration. This proffered fact lies close to the heart of

Plaintiffs’ argument for summary judgment. How the court should regard the eleven dam

structures vis-a-vis the Wilderness Act is a subject that will be taken up in the discussion that

follows.

Defendants allege the Forest Supervisor’s decision, as reflected in the ROD, does not

authorize the reconstruction of any dam within the Emigrant Wilderness. Plaintiffs’ dispute this

proffered fact on the ground the term “reconstruction” is a legal and not factual term. Plaintiffs

consistently refer to the proposed actions pertaining to the dams as “reconstruction.” Defendants

consistently object to the use of that term and insist the actions proposed in the ROD are

maintenance, repair and operations. Regardless of any ambiguity between the terms 

“reconstruct,” “repair” and “maintain,” Forest Service has defined the terms it uses for purposes

of its planning documents. 

The ROD defines the term “maintain” to include “routine activities such as log removal,

mortar replacement and rock replacement.” The term “repair” is defined as “activities necessary

to restore the structure to its original full functioning condition, such as valve replacement and

slide-gate replacement.” AR at 4193. The Final EIS states that, pursuant to the Forest Service

Manual, “Only the Chief [of the Forest Service] may authorize reconstruction of water

developments within [the] designated wilderness.” AR at 4144, 4192. The Final EIS also states

that the activities proposed do not include the reconstruction of the Cow Meadow Dam, because

such reconstruction cannot be authorized by the Forest Supervisor. Elsewhere, the ROD states

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the Cow Meadow Dam was destroyed by storms in the late 1990's and the existing lake is at its

natural level. Thus, by implication, the term “reconstruction” as used in the Draft and Final EIS

and in the ROD means to replace that which once existed but no longer exists. In other words to

make operable a structure that repair would not be sufficient to make operable. The court finds

the documents cited by Defendants support their allegation the ROD does not authorize

reconstruction of any dam structures as that term is defined by the ROD and by the Final EIS.

Of the eleven dams that have been selected for repair, maintenance and/or operation by

the ROD, ten are streamflow augmentation dams that were constructed predominantly in the

1920s and 1930s and up to the early 1950s. All these dams were built primarily by a person

named Fred Leighton, who, Defendants allege, made significant contributions to streamflow

maintenance dams and fisheries improvements in California. Seven of the eleven dams

(Bigelow, Emigrant, Emigrant Meadow, Leighton, Long, Lower Buck, and Red Can) qualify as

historic properties under the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and are eligible for

listing on the National Register of Historic Places (“Historic Register”). Structures that are

included in the Historic Register must meet at least one of four possible criteria and must retain

their integrity. Forest Service determined that the seven dams listed above met two of the four

criteria: (1) they “are associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the

broad patterns of our history;” and, (2) they “are associated with the lives of persons significant

in our past.” AR at 2679.

The parties agree that defendant Forest Service applied the criteria for inclusion in the

National Register and came to the conclusion the seven above-named dams met the criteria. The

parties also do not dispute that the California State Office of Historic Preservation of the

California Department of Parks and Recreation concurred in the Forest Service’s determination. 

Plaintiffs contend the dams should not be listed because they hinder, rather than enhance the

wilderness, and that regardless of the criteria employed the continuing existence of the dam

structures is in conflict with the Wilderness Act. For a more extensive discussion of the

historical context of the Emigrant Wilderness dams, and the application of Historical Register

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A number of individual alleged undisputed facts proffered by Defendants are 1

omitted because they are redundant or not relevant to the determination of the issue before the

court.

Plaintiffs’ characterize the activities authorized by the Forest Service’s decision as 2

“rebuilding.” Defendants do not dispute the fact generally, but elsewhere have characterized the

activities authorized as “repair, maintain and operate,” but not “rebuild.” Pursuant to the

foregoing discussion the court uses the words “repair/maintain” in place of Plaintiffs’ preferred

terminology as that use is consistent with the definitions of terms as contained in the AR.

10

criteria to the issue of their eligibility for inclusion in the Register, see pages 2656 to 2685 of the

Administrative Record.1

In 1988, the Forest Service issued an Environmental Assessment and Decision Notice

under NEPA determining that one more of the dam structures is eligible for listing NHPA, and

deciding to maintain/repair twelve of the eighteen dam structures. That decision was appealed. 2

On appeal, the Regional Forester reversed the decision and ordered all of the dam structures to be

removed. Subsequently, the Regional Forester reversed that decision, allowing the Forest

Supervisor to determine if new information related to the dam structures was available. In 1991,

the Forest Service issued a Land Resource Management Plan for the Stanislaus National Forest,

Which directed that a management plan for the Emigrant Wilderness be written within two years. 

In 1998, the Forest Service issued an EIS and ROD to adopt “Emigrant Wilderness

Management Direction” that stated that the Forest Service could rebuild eight of the dam

structures, in order to maintain streamflows. In 1999, the Regional Forester reversed the Forest

Supervisor’s decision, stating that adequate documentation did not exist to explain why each dam

structure might be necessary to meet minimum requirements for administering the wilderness. 

Since the 1999 decision, no specific plan or disposition exists for the dam structures. 

In 1995, the Forest Service and CDFG entered into a Memorandum of Understanding

(“MOU”) related in part to managing fish and wildlife in certain wilderness areas. The MOU

states that removal of existing water-related improvements is among the activities that require

joint decisions by the two agencies. In 2000, the Forest Service and CDFG adopted a “Joint

Strategy” for future management of these specific dam structures. Plaintiffs characterize the

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Again, the word chosen by Plaintiffs is “rebuild,” which is not used here because

3

the actions contemplated by the Draft EIS and Final EIS do not include rebuilding as Defendants

define that term.

11

Joint Strategy as being based on an agreed-upon rationale of streamflow maintenance. 

Defendants dispute this characterization and contend the Joint Strategy “was a cooperative

framework that left the agencies to each make an independent final decision based upon a site

specific analysis.” The Draft EIS supports Defendants’ characterization of the Joint Strategy. 

AR at 3490-91. After review of the Joint Strategy, the court concludes it reflects a rationale to

support fishery maintenance or enhancement, along with a commitment to further monitor to

determine whether actions are necessary to benefit fairy shrimp and yellow-legged frogs.

In 2002, the Forest Service began preparing the EIS at issue in this case. In 2003, the

Forest Service issued a draft EIS stating that “[m]aintenance of water impoundment structures

will be consistent with the USDA Forest Service/[CDFG] Joint Strategy.” The draft EIS includes

a proposed action to repair/maintain/operate twelve of the eighteen dam structures in the 3

Emigrant Wilderness. The Draft EIS analyzed two other alternatives: letting all of the structures

naturally deteriorate (the “do nothing alternative”), and a “heritage” alternative, which would

have maintained the seven dam structures eligible for listing under the NHPA. The Final EIS,

issued in December 2003 corrected a few portions of the Draft EIS and otherwise adopted the

Draft EIS as final. The ROD, which was also issued in December 2003, modified the action

proposed in the Final EIS slightly by authorizing action on eleven, rather than twelve of the

dams.

Plaintiffs allege a number of additional undisputed facts, most of which pertain to alleged

beneficial effects of the operation of streamflow dams on trout populations, and negative effects

on populations of the mountain yellow-legged frog and the Yosemite toad, and negative effects

on riparian habitats generally. Generally, Defendants aver the evidence cited in the

administrative record does not support Plaintiff’s contentions or that Plaintiff’s contentions are

misleading. Specific contentions with respect to environmental effects will be discussed and

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resolved, if and when they may be germane to the issues being discussed.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine

issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Poller v.

Columbia Broadcast System, 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 710

(9th Cir. 1985); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th

Cir. 1984).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the moving party has the burden of

proof at trial, that party must carry its initial burden at summary judgment by presenting evidence

affirmatively showing, for all essential elements of its case, that no reasonable jury could find for

the non-moving party. United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th

Cir.1991) (en banc); Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986); see also

E.E.O.C. v. Union Independiente De La Autoridad De Acueductos Y Alcantarillados De Puerto

Rico, 279 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2002) (stating that if “party moving for summary judgment bears

the burden of proof on an issue, he cannot prevail unless the evidence that he provides on that

issue is conclusive.”) 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities

Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1280

(9th Cir. 1979). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing

party may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender

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evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in

support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11;

First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1973). The

opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th

Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-49; Wool v. Tandem

Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review of Agency Actions

Defendants correctly contend that, because neither the Wilderness Act or NEPA create a

private right of action, judicial review of agency action is governed by Administrative Procedures

Act (“APA”). Pursuant to the provisions of the APA as codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706, an agency

action may only be set aside if it is “‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise

not in accordance with law.’ [Citation.]” Wilderness Soc’y v. United States Fish & Wildlife

Serv., 316 F.3d 913, 921 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The parties disagree as to the amount of deference that should be accorded to Forest

Service in making its decisions. The analytical framework employed in assessing the deference

due agency decisions in the context of the Wilderness Act is well established:

In Wilderness Society v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service, our en

banc panel addressed the question of the level of deference due to the Forest

Service when it makes decisions implementing the Wilderness Act. 353 F.3d

1051, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). We apply the framework articulated in

that case to determine what level of deference to apply to the facts at hand. If the

statute is clear and unambiguous, no deference is required and the plain meaning

of Congress will be enforced. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

467 U.S. 837, 842-43[. . .] (1984); Wilderness Soc’y, 353 F.3d at 1061. If the

statute is ambiguous, the agency’s decision is entitled to Chevron deference if it

has the force of law. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 [. . .] (2001). If

the decision does not have the force of law, it is reviewed with “respect”

according to the factors set out in Mead and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.

134, 140 [. . .] (1944); Wilderness Soc’y, 353 F.3d at 1067.

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Wilderness Society v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service consists of two 4

decisions. The first, located at 316 F.3d 913, (hereinafter “Wilderness Society (Alaska)”)was

decided by a three-judge panel on January 13, 2003. The second, located at 353 F.3d 1051

(“Wilderness Society”), was submitted to an en banc panel on September 16, 2003, and decided

on December 30, 2003. The cases differ markedly as to the analytical frameworks used to

determine the amount of deference due to the agency, the conclusion reached regarding

deference, and the final determination of the case. In Wilderness Society (Alaska), the court

began the analysis by determining whether the agency’s determination carried the force of law as

described in Mead. Applying Mead, the Wilderness Society (Alaska), court determined the

agency’s actions were due highest deference under Chevron, and that the agency’s actions were

reasonable and therefore lawful. See Wilderness Society (Alaska), 316 F.3d at 921-925. In

contrast, the en banc panel in Wilderness Society began its analysis under Chevron’s first step,

which is the determination of whether the agency action offends manifest congressional intent. 

The Wilderness Society court, focusing on the commercial nature of the project, found the

project incompatible with Congress’s intent and therefore due no deference under Chevron.

Wilderness Society, 353 F.3d at 1062. Under this analysis, the Wilderness Society court held the

project violates the Wilderness Act. Id. at 1067. The difference in outcomes of the two analyses

underscores the importance of the analytical approach. Wilderness Society represent the nowauthoritative approach in the Ninth Circuit as recognized by Blackwell, 390 F.3d at 638-639.

14

High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 638-639 (9th Cir. 2004).

Following Wilderness Society , the court begins by asking whether the dam improvement 4

project “offends the plain meaning and manifest congressional intent of the Wilderness Act.” 

353 F.3d at 1060. Under Chevron, the inquiry is “‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the

precise question at issue.’” Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842). 

A. Applying Chevron

The first task in the application of the Chevron analysis is to enlist the “[c]anons of

statutory construction [to] help give meaning to [the] statute’s words.” Wilderness Society, 353

F.3d at 1060. It is important to note that, following Wilderness Society, the inquiry is not

exhaustive. Rather, the question is, did Congress speak to the issue directly? Id. By definition,

this analysis includes only what can be discerned by examination of the text of the statute itself;

and specifically excludes any resort to non-statutory materials. See Bedroc, LLC v. United

States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (“our inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as

well if the text is unambiguous.”); United States v. McNeil, 362 F.3d 570, 574 (9th Cir. 2004)

(“resort to legislative history is justified only where the ‘face of the act is inescapably

ambiguous.”). Thus, where the issue is whether Congress has spoken to the issue at hand directly

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and unambiguously, the court may not, as a matter of logic, be guided by evidence of legislative

history since to do so the court would be required to resolve the question of whether Congress

has spoken directly in the negative.

The en banc court in Wilderness Society set forth the interpretive canons relevant to this

enquiry:

We begin with the language of the statute. [Citation.] Another fundamental

canon of construction provides that “unless otherwise defined, words will be

interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. [Citations.]

¶ It is also “a fundamental canon that the words of a statute must be read in their

context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” 

[Citations.] If necessary to discern Congress’s intent, we may read statutory terms

in light of the purpose of the statute. Thus the structure and purpose of a statute

may also provide guidance in determining the plain meaning of its provisions. 

[Citation.] 

Wilderness Society, 353 F.3d at 1060-1061 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Plaintiffs claim that Forest Service’s decision to repair/maintain/operate eleven of the

eighteen dams in the wilderness violates the categorical prohibition against structures contained

in the Wilderness Act. Pertinent to the issues presented in this motion, the Wilderness Act

declares the purposes of land designated as wilderness area and limits permissible activities on

designated lands. These purposes and limitations are set forth in 16 U.S.C. § 1133 as follows in

pertinent part:

(b) Agency responsibility for preservation and administration to preserve wilderness

character; public purposes of wilderness areas

Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, each agency administering any area

designated as wilderness shall be responsible for preserving the wilderness character of

the area and shall so administer such area for such other purposes for which it may have

been established as also to preserve its wilderness character. Except as otherwise

provided in this chapter, wilderness areas shall be devoted to the public purposes of

recreational, scientific, educational, conservation, and historical use.

(c) Prohibition provisions: commercial enterprise, permanent or temporary roads,

mechanical transports, and structures or installations; exceptions: area

administration and personal health and safety emergencies

Except as specifically provided for in this chapter, and subject to existing private

rights, there shall be no commercial enterprise and no permanent road within any

wilderness area designated by this chapter and, except as necessary to meet minimum

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requirements for the administration of the area for the purpose of this chapter (including

measures required in emergencies involving the health and safety of persons within the

area), there shall be no temporary road, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment or

motorboats, no landing of aircraft, no other form of mechanical transport, and no

structure or installation within any such area.

The parties agree that dams are “structures” or “installations” within the meaning of the

Wilderness Act. The question the court must first answer is therefore whether dams are the sort

of “structures” or “installations” the maintenance and operation of which would offend

Congress’s intent when it declared that designated wilderness areas would have “no structure or

installation within any such area.” 

Congress may speak to an issue of permissible uses in an area designated as wilderness by

specifying those uses at the time the area is designated. The parties agree that Congress made no

mention in the legislation that created the Emigrant Wilderness of any dams or water

impoundment structures. 

Congress may also speak to the precise question at issue within the statute itself. 

Congress at least touched on the issue of dams and reservoirs in wilderness areas by providing,

pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4) that the President may authorize certain water development

projects within wilderness areas for the public good. Neither party contends section 1133(d)(4)

is at play in this case. Aside from the provisions of section 1133(d)(4), the text of the Wilderness

Act provides no indication that Congress intended to exempt existing dams in wilderness areas

from the general prohibition against “structures” or “installations.” The court must conclude the

plain and unambiguous text of the Wilderness Act speaks directly to the activity at issue in this

case – repairing, maintaining and operating dam “structures” – and prohibits that activity.

In addition, the overall language of subdivision (d) of section 1133, along with case

authority and Forest Service Policy, imply that “when there is a conflict between maintaining the

primitive character of the area and between any other use [. . .] the general policy of maintaining

the primitive character of the area must be supreme.” Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v.

Butz, 401 F.Supp. 1276, 1331 (D.Minn. 1975) (overruled on other grounds in Minnesota Pub.

Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1975); see also 23 U.S.C. § 1133(d);

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The court has focused its analysis of deference due on the question of whether the 5

effect of the proposed action – in this case the repair, maintenance or operation of the dams – is

congruent with the purposes of the Wilderness Act. The court recognizes that Defendants have

implied that the court’s analysis should start with an analysis of the deference due Forest

Service’s underlying rationale for the proposes action. In this case, Defendants suggest the

court’s analysis should start with a determination of the deference due Forest Service’s

determination that the maintenance, repair, or operation of the dam structures is “necessary to

meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area for the purpose of this chapter.”

While the court believes the analysis presented above is most in accord with Wilderness Society

and High Sierra Hikers Ass’n, the court is aware those cases could be read to direct district courts

to start with an analysis on the agency’s underlying rationale, rather than with the effect of the

proposed action. In the interests of a more complete discussion, the analysis of the deference due

Forest Service’s rationale is presented below as an alternative analysis following the court’s main

analysis.

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AR at 2076 (“Where there are alternatives among management decisions, wilderness values shall

dominate over all other considerations except where limited by the Wilderness Act, subsequent

legislation, or regulations”); 36 C.F.R. § 293.2(c) (“wilderness values will be dominant to the

extent not limited by the Wilderness Act”).

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes the proposed actions in this case – the repair,

maintenance and operation of the dam structures – are clearly and unambiguously contrary to the

provisions of the Wilderness Act. Consequently, Forest Service’s determination to undertake

those actions is not due deference under Chevron.5

B. Deference Due to Forest Service’s Technical Determinations

Having determined, as this court has, that Chevron deference is not due with respect to

the agency’s determination of the ultimate issue that is the subject of challenge, the court follows

Wilderness Society, where the court looked to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mead and

Skidmore to determine what deference the court was to accord the agency’s non-legal

determinations. The Wilderness Society court summarized the standard for determining

deference as follows:

Under Mead and Skidmore, the weight that we are to give an

administrative interpretation not intended by an agency to carry the general force

of law is a function of that interpretation’s thoroughness, rational validity, and

consistency with prior and subsequent pronouncements. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at

140 [. . . .] Mead adds as other relevant factors the “logic[ ] and expertness” of an

agency decision, the care used in reaching the decision, as well as the formality of

the process used. Mead, 533 U.S. at 235.

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Wilderness Society, 353 F.3d at 1068.

Applying the factors in Mead and Skidmore to the present case, it is clear that the

determinations by Forest Service that are technical or categorical in nature are due great

deference. Therefore the Forest Service’s observations and conclusions concerning the

conditions of the dams, the effect of operation of the dams on various species, the effect of

operation of the dams on riparian habitats, and the status of the dams vis-a-vis their historical

designations or qualifications are due great deference. 

II. Agency Actions Under the Wilderness Act

The parties agree that Forest Service’s determination that the repair, maintenance and

operation of the dams in the Emigrant Wilderness is lawful under the Wilderness Act is based on

the agency’s determination that those actions are “necessary to meet minimum requirements for

the administration of the area for the purpose of this chapter.” Following the analysis in

Wilderness Society, the court, having determined that Forest Service’s decision to repair,

maintain and operate the dams is not entitled to deference under Chevron, reviews de novo

whether the actions authorized by the ROD are, in fact, “necessary to meet the minimum

requirements.”

Because the court defers to Forest Service’s technical observations and conclusions, the

Forest Service’s conclusion that operation of the streamflow dams will enhance trout populations

is accepted as fact. The court further gives deference to Forest Service’s categorization of certain

of the dam structures as qualifying for inclusion in the Historical Register, and to Forest

Service’s conclusion that maintenance and repair of those dams will preserve their historical

value. The question for the court is whether the Forest Service plan of repair, maintenance and

operation of the streamflow dams is “necessary to meet minimum requirements for the

administration of the area for the purpose of this chapter.”

Not surprisingly, case authority directly or indirectly addressing the issue of repair,

maintenance or operation of stream flow dams in wilderness is sparse. Pertinent to the issue of

whether a fishery enhancement project in a wilderness area is compatible with the Wilderness

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Act, the Wilderness Society court observed:

We thus deal with an activity with a benign aim to enhance the catch of

fishermen, with little visible detriment to wilderness, under the cooperative

banner of a non-profit trade association and state regulators. Surely this fishstocking program, whose antecedents were a state run research project, is nothing

like building a McDonald’s restaurant or a Wal-Mart store on the shores of

Tustumena Lake. Nor is it like conducting a commercial fishing operation within

designated wilderness, which we have previously proscribed. [Citation.] Nor is

the project like cutting timber, extracting minerals, or otherwise exploiting

wilderness resources in a way that is plainly destructive of their preservation. ¶

Conversely, the challenged activities do not appear to be aimed at furthering the

goals of the Wilderness Act. The project is not aimed at preserving a threatened

salmon run. Looked at most favorably for the proponents of the fish-stocking

project, it might be concluded that the project only negligibly alters the wild

character of Tustumena Lake and is not incompatible with refuge values, though

those issues are disputed.

Wilderness Society, 353 F.3d at 1062-1063 (footnotes and internal citations omitted). 

Ultimately, the decision in Wilderness Society was pegged to the court’s determination

that the fish-stocking activity was commercial. However, the scope of facts considered by the

Wilderness Society court is instructive in the present case. Significantly, the Wilderness Society

court recognized that the fish-stocking operation, in and of itself, was not an activity that

furthered the goals of the Wilderness Act because the activity was not aimed at preservation of

the activities of established populations of fish that were later threatened. The situation in the

instant case is analogous. What the planned action seeks to accomplish in this case is to regulate

flows in streams whose flows were not historically regulated for the purpose of enhancing a

population of fish that did not historically exist and whose continuing existence is not dependent

on the repair, maintenance or operation of the dam structures.

While the outcome of the case in Wilderness Society turned ultimately on the commercial

nature of the fish-stocking operation, the present case turns on man-made structures whose

presence in a wilderness area are no less at odds with the textual provisions of the Wilderness

Act. Forest Service’s own information acknowledges that the operation of the stream flow dams

alters the dynamic of populations of fish and amphibians. While Forest Service casts the changes

brought about by the dams as achieving a balance of sorts between amphibians and fish; the fact

remains that the balance is being struck between the historically established amphibious species,

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whose habitat is diminished in the balance, and the historically absent fish species, whose

presence is the result of relatively recent human endeavor. 

While fishing is an activity that is common among visitors to wilderness areas, neither

fishing nor any other particular activity is endorsed by the Wilderness Act, nor is the

enhancement of any particular recreational potential a necessary duty of wilderness area

management. Rather, the Wilderness Act seeks to “secure for the American people of present

and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness.” 23 U.S.C. § 1131(a). 

The wilderness that the Act seeks to preserve is not defined by reference to any particular

recreational opportunity or potential utility, but rather by reference to the land’s status or

condition as being “Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without

permanent improvements or human habitation [. . . .]” § 1131(c). 

Because it is not possible to infer from this language that establishment (much less

enhancement) of opportunities for a particular form of human recreation is the purpose of the

Wilderness Act, it is not possible to conclude that enhancement of fisheries is an activity that is

“necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area for the purpose of

this chapter.” 

Defendants have argued that Wilderness Society can be distinguished from the present

case on the basis of the nature of the activity being challenged. In Wilderness Society, the

activity in question was of a commercial nature. Wilderness Society, 353 F.3d at 1062. The fact

the challenged activity in Wilderness Society was of a commercial nature is a distinction without

a difference. Both “commercial enterprises” and “structures” are prohibited by the same

sentence within the Wilderness Act and the only distinction between the two is that “structures”

may be maintained to the extent they may be “necessary to meet minimum requirements for the

administration of the area.” The court does not find, and the parties present no argument, that the

existence of that exception implies that a structure offends the Wilderness Act any less than a

commercial enterprise where that exception clause is not applicable.

The Wilderness Act presents no textual basis for the proposition that the prohibition

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against “structures or installations,” of which the dams in this case are an example, is somehow

less compelling than the prohibition against “commercial activity.” Indeed, if one considers the

overall legislative intent of the Wilderness Act to preserve “area[s] where the earth and its

community of live are untrammeled by man,” 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c), one must conclude that the

sort of commercial activity that was found offensive to the Wilderness Act in Wilderness Society

is no more offensive, and perhaps less so, than the activity proposed in the present case. In

Wilderness Society, the activity at issue was “an activity with a benign aim to enhance the catch

of fishermen, with little visible detriment to wilderness . . . .” Wilderness Society, 353 F.3d at

1062. In the instant case, the proposed activity creates permanent structures that alter the

hydrological scheme of the area and alter the natural distribution of species and habitats. 

When the court applies the analytical process in Wilderness Society that resulted in the

prohibited of a relatively benign commercial enterprise in the wilderness area in that case, the

court can find no distinction that would justify a different decision in this case. Lacking a textual

reason to hold that a commercial enterprise, no matter how benign, is more compellingly or

categorically prohibited than the Wilderness Act’s prohibition against “structures”, the court

must presume the same categorical prohibition that applied in Wilderness Society against

commercial enterprises must also apply here against the “structures” that are at issue in this case. 

There is a similar paucity of authority with respect to the repair, maintenance, or

operation of “structures” within wilderness areas on the basis of their status as being eligible for

or entered into the National Register of Historic Places. In Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375

F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Mainella”), the court examined the effect of the Wilderness Act on

the obligations of the Park Service to maintain certain historical structures and an associated

access road located in a designated wilderness area on Cumberland Island. Id. at 1091. In

Mainella the Eleventh Circuit addressed primarily the use of motorized public access to certain

historical structures in and adjacent to the wilderness area, and secondarily the duty of the agency

to preserve the historical structures within. With respect to the historical structures, the Mainella

court observed:

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. . . [16 U.S.C.] Section 1133(b) mentions “historical use” along with

“recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, [and] conservation” uses. However,

this list tracks the definition of wilderness areas in § 1131(c), which describes “a

primitive and unconfined type of recreation” and “ecological, geological, or other

features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value.” 16 U.S.C. §

1131(c). Given the consistent evocation of “untrammeled” and “natural” areas,

the previous pairing of “historical” with “ecological” and “geological” features,

and the explicit prohibition on structures, the only reasonable reading of

“historical use” in the Wilderness Act refers to natural, rather than man-made,

features. 

Id. at 1092. The court went on to observe that “Congress wrote the wilderness rules and may

create exceptions as it sees fit. Absent these explicit statutory instructions, however, the need to

preserve historical structures may not be inferred from the Wilderness Act nor grafted onto its

general purpose.” Id. 

The only other case cited by any party having directly to do with the maintenance of

historical structures in wilderness areas is Olympic Park Associates v. Mainella, 2005 WL

1871114 (D.Wash. 2005) (“Olympic Park”). In Olympic Park, the court considered whether the

repair and maintenance of wilderness shelters, which were eligible for inclusion in the National

Historical Register, was “necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the

area for the purpose of this chapter.” The Olympic Park court noted that Congress did not

specifically provide for the repair, maintenance or continued presence of the shelters and

therefore that the Park Service’s proposed actions were based on the exemption provision of 16

U.S.C. § 1133(c). 

The Olympic Park court found persuasive the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wilderness

Society, which took a restrictive view of the exception language. Olympic Park, 2005 WL

1871114 at *6. The Olympic Park court examined the conflict between the Wilderness Act’s

purpose of preserving wilderness values with both the historic or safety-related purposes of the

exception language of section 1133(c). The court determined that, to the extent the Wilderness

Act seeks to preserve historical values, the reference is to the historical values of the natural

environment, not to the structures placed there by man. Olympic Park, 2005 WL 1871114 at *6. 

The Olympic Park court also held that agency actions necessary to meet “requirements for the

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administration of the area for the purpose of this chapter (including measures required in

emergencies involving the health and safety of persons within the area),” does not justify the

maintenance or repair of wilderness shelters where it is evident from the language of the

Wilderness Act that it is an integral part of the wilderness experience that visitors to the

wilderness area “meet nature on its own terms.” Id. 

Thus, such authority or case law as exists indicates that where courts have considered the

issue of whether man-made structures may be maintained in a wilderness area under either the

general exception clause or for the purpose of preservation of historical values, the preservation

of wilderness values had been predominant. See Mainella, 2005 WL 1871114 at *8 (designation

under Wilderness Act is a specific provision which takes precedence over status under the

NHPA, which is a general provision). As Plaintiffs point out, the dams in question, while

perhaps exemplars of the contributions of a particular historical individual to small-dam

construction, are not unique. Absent a declaration by Congress of the need to restore and

preserve the dam structures in recognition of their historical significance, there is nothing the

court can point to that would authorize such an action where the maintenance of the dams would

otherwise come into conflict with the Wilderness Act.

Further, courts have construed the phrase “necessary to meet the minimum requirements

for administration of the area” narrowly. The analysis in Olympic Park indicates how “necessity”

in this context has been interpreted in the strict sense of “that which much be by the nature of

things: that cannot be otherwise by reason of inherent qualities: [. . .] that is determined and fixed

and inevitable.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, 1510 (1993). In Olympic Park, even the

utility of the shelters as a safety feature for visitors who might find themselves unprepared in the

face of harsh weather was not sufficient to justify the repair or replacement of the shelters. The

Olympic Park court held that the phrase “necessary to meet minimum requirements for the

administration of the area for the purpose of this chapter (including measures required in

emergencies involving the health and safety of persons within the area),” 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c),

“most logically refers to matters of urgent necessity rather than to conveniences for use in an

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emergency.” Olympic Park, 205 WL 1871114 at *4. Thus, even safety considerations will

authorize only those actions that are strictly and immediately necessary and are not sufficient to

authorize the repair of structures where some other administrative approach not involving

structures would suffice.

Although Olympic Park is merely persuasive and not binding on this court, the

application of the principles in Wilderness Society by the Olympic Park court to the issue of

historical structures is highly relevant to the instant case. Defendants attempt to distinguish the

case at hand from Olympic Park by pointing out that in Olympic Park the structures were to be

removed, completely rebuilt and replaced. To the extent Defendants are trying to build a

distinction based on rebuilding rather than maintaining or repairing, the difference is more one of

semantics than substance. It is not the activity itself that is at issue, it is the object of the activity. 

Here, as in Olympic Park, the object of the activity is to perpetuate the existence of structures in a

designated wilderness area. The rationale set forth in Olympic Park that produced the conclusion

that the repair and replacement of the structures was not permissible under the Wilderness Act is

equally applicable in the instant case.

Here, there is no logical necessity in maintaining, repairing, or operating the dams in

order to administer the area for purposes of the Wilderness Act. The area manifested its

wilderness characteristics before the dams were in place and would lose nothing in the way of

wilderness values were the dams not present. What would be lost is some enhancement of a

particular use of the area (fishing), but that use, while perhaps popular, is not an integral part of

the wilderness nature of that area. 

Defendants also attempt to differentiate the present case with that of Mainella by pointing

out the agency involved in that case (and in Olympic Park) was the National Park Service

(“NPS”) rather than the Forest Service. Although Defendants contend the NPS administers parks

for purposes “different than the Forest Service multiple use objectives,” they offer no authority

for the implied contention that application of the Wilderness Act should yield different results

under similar factual circumstances where the objectives of the administrating agency are

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different. The court can find nothing in the Wilderness Act that supports that contention and is

aware of no case authority to that effect. 

Defendants also contend Mainella can be differentiated factually because the structures at

issue there were historical houses or structures associated with a historical settlement on the

island. See Mainella, 375 F.3d at 1088-1089 and n.3 (describing the Plum Orchard, a mansion

complex located just outside the wilderness area, and the Settlement, an area occupied by freed

slaves after the Civil War). Defendants draw a distinction between the settlement structures in

Mainella, and the dams in the instant case which, Defendants contend, are small, low, and

visually integrated into the natural surroundings. Again, the court is unaware of, and Defendants

do not cite, any textual basis for making that type of distinction, nor is it clear how such a

distinction would or could be pertinent if the issue is the preservation of historical structures in a

wilderness area. Distinctions such as unobtrusive and harmonious with the natural environment

involve subjective judgments that may vary depending on the interests of the observer. The

Wilderness Act’s prohibition against structures is categorical so far as the court can determine,

allowing only those exceptions that are specifically set forth in the Act or in Congress’s

designation of a particular wilderness area, neither of which apply here. 

In sum, Defendants’ basic argument with regard to the Wilderness Act centers around the

level of deference owed to Forest Service with regard to its findings and conclusions. The flaw

in Defendants’ argument is that, regardless of how carefully and thoroughly Forest Service

considered the various action plans, the plans considered and the plan finally chosen are

predicated on the legal contention that maintenance, repair and operation of the dams is

“necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area for purposes of this

chapter” – a contention that is without legal or logical support. While Forest Service’s factual

findings are due considerable deference under Skidmore, the legal foundations of Forest

Service’s actions are due no deference because the proposed actions are contrary to the express

purposes of the Wilderness Act, and are in the nature of permitting and do not carry the force or

effect of legal determinations. See Wilderness Society, 353 F.3d at 1059-160 (discussing factors

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governing deference under Chevron, Mead, and Skidmore). The legal basis for Forest Service’s

preferred plan is without support and runs afoul of the Wilderness Act because the actions

contemplated are not “necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the

area” in conformity with 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c).

B. Interveners’ Contentions

Interveners filed an “Amended Notice of Opposition,” which the court refers to as

“interveners’ opposition” hereinafter. Interveners’ opposition contains a number of grounds not

mentioned in Defendants opposition and therefore separate consideration of those arguments is

appropriate.

Interveners’ first contention is summarized completely by the heading given to the

argument – “The Wilderness Act Is Not A Purist Manifesto.” The gist of this argument is that

the Wilderness act does not favor any particular viewpoint of wilderness. Interveners examine

the text of the Wilderness Act and seek by way of argument to blunt the effect of certain words

like “untrammeled” by urging the court to interpret their meaning in a more moderate way so as

to conclude the Wilderness Act, while prohibiting overt development, does not prohibit

“improvements” for the benefit of human enjoyment of the area. The conclusion Interveners

promote is that dams of the sort found in the Emigrant Wilderness are not prohibited by the

Wilderness Act; or, in the alternative, the Wilderness Act does not impose an affirmative duty on

the Forest Service to remove the dams.

This section of Interveners opposition is remarkable in that it comprises seven pages of

argument without a single citation to legal authority, except for the excerpts from the Wilderness

Act, which Interveners seek to define to their advantage. Interveners point to environmental

benefit, or non-detriment, and argue at some length that maintaining and operating the dams as

streamflow regulation would have a beneficial impact on fish populations at minimal ecological

cost to the Emigrant Wilderness as a whole.

Interveners’ arguments are, at least to some extent, self-defeating. First, subjective

characterizations aside, the Wilderness Act is as close to an outcome-oriented piece of

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environmental legislation as exists. Unlike NEPA, or the Clean Air or Clean Water Acts, the

Wilderness Act emphasizes outcome (wilderness preservation) over procedure. As such, it is as

close to a “purist manifesto” as may be found in the area of environmental law. Interveners

comments relative to whether the Wilderness Act is or is not a purist manifesto miss the

necessary legal points: whether the repair, operation or maintenance of man-made water

impoundment structures are non-conforming under the Wilderness Act, and, if so, whether the

repair, maintenance or operation of the dams is otherwise authorized by the exception language

because of the historical status of the structures or because of the necessity of the dams in the

administration of the wilderness area. 

Interveners point out that while there are about 100 named lakes in the Emigrant Basin

and about 85 of those are stocked with trout, only 15 lakes are implicated by Forest Service’s

plan. Further, Interveners correctly point out only a small percentage of the riparian habitat in the

wilderness is affected by the dam structures. From these facts, Interveners contend there is little

ecological prejudice (or burden) from repairing, maintaining or operating the dam structures. 

Using the same facts, one can conclude there is little prejudice to interveners or fishermen

generally if the dam structures are not maintained and are allowed to deteriorate naturally. As

Plaintiffs point out, there are a number of other lakes in the Emigrant Wilderness, and Forest

Service’s own research leads to the conclusion that the introduced trout populations in the lakes

are probably self-sustaining. Thus, to the extent some comparison of ecological burdens is

appropriate, Interveners own contentions, as well as Defendants’ determinations regarding both

the effect of the dams on the local environment and the Emigrant Wilderness as a whole, fail to

show that the ecological burdens of non-operation, non-repair and non-maintenance of the dams

are more onerous than the ecological burdens of operation, repair and maintenance.

Interveners next attempt to differentiate High Sierra Hikers Ass’n from the present case

on factual grounds. To the extent Interveners’ argument has merit, it applies, if at all, to the

discussion pertaining to Plaintiff’s allegation that Forest Service’s plan was adopted in violation

of NEPA. Interveners’ arguments will be addressed infra to the extent they are relevant.

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Next, Interveners contend Plaintiff’s arguments based on the Wilderness Act fail to take

into account the exceptions contained in 16U.S.C. § 1133(d) that preserve existing state water

rights and state rights to manage and regulate wildlife and fisheries. Section 1133(d) of Title 16

provides, in pertinent part:

(6) Nothing in this chapter shall constitute and express or implied claim or

denial on the part of the Federal Government as to exemption from State water

laws.

(7) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting the jurisdiction

or responsibilities of the several States with respect to the wildlife and fish in the

national forests.

Interveners contend that federal jurisdiction within the Emigrant Wilderness is

“subordinate to the state’s sovereign interest in the fish and waters affected by this case.”

Interveners’ opp. at 17:3-4. Interveners further assert “California has a direct legal interest in the

fish as well as in the navigable waters of the lakes impounded by the dams. The state may

lawfully assert a right to sustain the fishery and to maintenance of the dams in issue that is

unimpaired by the Wilderness Act.” Interveners’ opp. at 6-9. Interveners cite NRDC v.

Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1131-1132 (9th Cir. 1998); NRDC v. Patterson, 333 F.Supp.2d 906,

917 (E.D. Cal. 2004); and California Trout v. State Water Resources Control Board, 207

Cal.App.3d 585 (1989), for the proposition that an owner of a dam is required, pursuant to

California Fish & Game Code, section 5937, to release sufficient water from the dam to sustain

downstream fish populations. 

The court has examined the cited cases and finds their applicability in the present case is

problematic because none of these cases deal with the intersection of the Wilderness Act with

this particular portion of the California Fish & Game Code. It is not clear that section 5937

compels the continuing existence of a dam where the dam has no owner and no utility other than

stream flow regulation. Nor is it clear that concerns of stream flow create an obligation to repair,

maintain or operate a dam where there has been no operation of the dam for purposes of stream

flow enhancement for a period of many years and there is no compelling evidence of “necessity.” 

Finally, notwithstanding the applicability of the cited authority to the present case, the fact

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remains no party with standing to do so has chosen to assert state water rights. Interveners

appear to recognize this and have opted to not develop this argument any further; perhaps leaving

it to the state to assert rights in the regulation of stream flows at some later time.

In their final argument with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims under the Wilderness Act,

Interveners contend Plaintiffs cannot maintain the present suit because Forest Service’s decision

to repair, maintain and operate the dams is not a final decision within the meaning of the APA. 

Interveners’ contentions in this regard are without merit.

The APA authorizes suit by “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of

an agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the

meaning of relevant statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. Where no other statute provides a

private right of action, the “agency action” complained of must be final agency

action.” § 704 (emphasis added). “Agency action” is defined in § 551(13) to

include “the whole or part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or

equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.” (Emphasis added).

Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 61-62 (2004) (“SUWA”).

The SAC seeks relief both from agency action – the decision to repair, maintain and

operate the dams – under 4 U.S.C. § 706(2); and for agency inaction – the failure to fully

consider removal of the dams – under 4 U.S.C. § 706(1). Suits under the APA challenging both

agency action under section 706(2), and agency inaction under section 706(1), require that the

action or inaction being challenged be a “final agency action” as defined in section 551(13) of

Title 4. See SUWA, 542 U.S. at 62 (action under section 706(1) demands final agency action);

Montana Wilderness Ass’n, Inc. v. United States Forest Service, 314 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir.

2003) (the challenged activities must constitute final agency action for suit under 5 U.S.C. §

706(2)). 

With respect to Plaintiff’s suit seeking relief pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) for Forest

Service’s proposed affirmative actions to repair, maintain and operate the dams, the relief

requested is pursuant to a final action within the meaning of section 511(13). “Two conditions

must be met for agency action to be considered final under the APA. [Citation.] First ‘the agency

action should mark the consummation of the agency’s decision making process; and [second],

the action should be one by which rights or obligations have been determined or from which

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legal consequences flow.’ [Citation.]” Montana Wilderness Ass’n, 314 F.3d at 1150 (quoting

Ecology Ctr. Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., 192 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, there is

no question that Forest Service’s ROD represented the culmination of the agency’s decision

making process. The ROD also determined the legal obligation of Forest Service with respect to

the repair, maintenance and operation of the dam structures and the rights of interested parties,

including Interveners, with respect to the continuing operation of the dam structures. 

Irrespective of whether the facts of the case warrant relief pursuant to either or both

subsections (1) and (2) of 5 U.S.C. § 706, the jurisdictional requirement for the consideration of

entitlement to either remedy on the merits is satisfied if the decision of the agency represents a

final agency decision. It is sufficient for jurisdictional purposes that Forest Service’s ROD

authorizing the repair, maintenance and operation of the dams is final from the standpoint of

Forest Service. That Forest Service may later act in concert with CDFG is not pertinent to the

jurisdictional question because the APA, which forms the legal basis for this action, only reaches

the federal agency’s decision making process and the ROD represents the final determination of

the extent of action the federal agency may take.

The court notes Plaintiffs have moved to strike Interveners’ opposition for untimely

filing. The court will exercise its discretion to deny the motion to strike in the interest of

providing consideration to as broad a range of arguments as possible and because consideration

of Interveners’ opposition does not prejudice Plaintiffs.

C. Additional Arguments Presented at Hearing

At oral argument on March 24, 2006, Defendants asserted evidence not previously

brought to the attention of the court to bolster their argument that there is evident congressional

intent that supports the action plan set forth in the ROD. Specifically, Defendants cite the

comments presented at a meeting of the congressional Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs

that preceded the enactment of the legislation as reported in the House Report. The comments

that were referenced at oral argument appear as follows in the House Report:

There are 54 million board feet of commercial timber, but it has not been

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counted in the allowable cut. Four grazing allotments cover about 5900 (?) acres

and this grazing shall continue. Water production is important and this will not

be curtailed. Certain small weirs and flow dams are present but are essentially

unnoticeable.

¶ . . . . ¶

Within the area recommended for wilderness designation, there are drift

fences (5 miles) which will be maintained, but several cabins and barns will be

removed within ten years. Two snow cabins will be retained. The weirs and

small dams will likewise be retained.

¶ . . . .¶

In addition, Forest Service has recommended exclusion of two areas. ¶ Exclusion

1 contains [illegible number] acres. Within it are located the Relief dam and

reservoir, a dam tender’s cabin and other permanent improvements and

mechanical [illegible] needed for the operation of the dam and reservoir. There is

no disagreement regarding the exclusion of this area.

H.R. Rep. No. 93-989 at 9-10 (1974) (as provided in copy to the court, emphasis added).

Notwithstanding any reservations the court may have with the use of comments presented

during congressional committee discussion to indicate congressional intent, the court does not

agree that the comments presented above constitute proof of an intent by Congress to exempt the

dams from the general rule of the Wilderness Act prohibiting structures. Nor does it evince

Congress’s judgment that the repair, maintenance or operation of the dams is “necessary to meet

minimum requirements for the administration of the area .” Two lines of reasoning lead to this

conclusion. 

Just as the court must first examine the plain language of a statute, the court here relies on

the plain language of the House Report to determine what was said, and perhaps more

importantly, what was not said. The House Report makes it abundantly clear Congress chose the

verbs it applied to various aspects of the Emigrant Wilderness purposefully. The choice of verbs

in the House Report indicates that Congress intended (to the extent the comments contained in

the House Report can be held to actually reflect congressional intent) that cabins would be

removed, drift fences would be maintained and the weirs would be retained, along with some

snow cabins. To this court, the ambiguity contained in the word “retained” is purposeful. If

Congress had intended that the weirs should continue in operation for an indefinite time in the

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future, the report should have specified the weirs would be maintained and/or repaired. In the

context of Congress’s observation that the weirs are “essentially unnoticeable,” the term “retain”

is as compatible with the concept of allowing natural degradation as it is with the concept of

repair and operation. The only thing the comments definitely indicate in an intention that the

weirs are not to be actively removed.

Second, the comments contained in the House Report do not establish, or even infer, any

necessity for the maintenance, repair or operation of the weirs or dam structures. Enhancement

of fish populations is not mentioned, nor is preservation of historic values. At most, the

comments evince an intent that water production in the Emigrant Wilderness will not be

impeded. If anything, this comment seems to diminish the importance of the dams in the overall

management of the area. The parties do not dispute that the dams have no significant role in

overall water production or flood control, since that function is filled by the Cherry Creek

Reservoir. Furthermore, the comment that the dams or weirs are “essentially unnoticeable” tends

to indicate Congress recognizes the non-importance of the dams as structures affecting overall

water production from the wilderness area.

The language of the Wilderness Act establishes at least the presumption that structures,

including the dams here in question, are incompatible with the purposes of the Wilderness Act,

and are therefore prohibited structures unless something within or without the text of the Act

clearly indicates they are “necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the

area.” The court finds the above-noted ambiguous statements in a congressional committee

hearing are not sufficient to alter the court’s prior conclusion that the dams in question are not

necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area. Consequently, the

court must conclude that Forest Service’s determination that it is acting in conformity with the

Wilderness Act by authorizing the repair, maintenance and operation of the dams is erroneous

and contrary to law.

D. Additional Briefing After Oral Argument

At oral argument on March 24, 2006, the court granted all parties the opportunity to

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submit limited briefing on the significance of the House Report No. 93-989, which Interveners

contended was contained in the Administrative Record, but which none of the parties had

brought to the attention of the court or the other parties. Plaintiffs filed their supplemental brief

on March 27, 2006. Interveners filed a summary of their additional points on March 28, 2006, in

which they summarized the points of their arguments and stated an intent not to further brief the

subject unless requested. The Federal Defendants filed their brief on March 30, 2006. There

followed an additional round of briefs filed by Plaintiffs and Interveners, both on April 10, 2006,

and by Federal Defendants on April 11, 2006.

All the additional filings followed the arguments set out in Plaintiffs’ first brief filed on

March 27. There, Plaintiffs set forth two basic arguments. First Plaintiffs argued that the

statutory language is not ambiguous and therefore resort to consideration of legislative history is

not appropriate. Plaintiffs argued further that, even if resort to legislative history is warranted,

the legislative history that is available fails to resolve the ambiguity. With respect to the latter

argument, Plaintiffs point out that the comments recorded in the House Report previously noted

are, to some extent, contradicted by comments by Sen. Cranston to the effect that improvements

noted in the Emigrant Wilderness at the time of its creation where of a nature that could be dealt

with by “time and removal.” See AR at 14. Defendants contend this statement is not indicative

of any intent with respect to the dams, rather Defendants contend the comment had to do with

some primitive cabin structures located in the area. Plaintiffs point to a letter written by Sen.

Cranston in 1997 in connection with legislation that was then pending sponsored by Sen.

Doolittle that would have required maintenance of the eighteen dam structures. In the letter, Sen.

Cranston clarified the intent of the comments he made in 1974 that are recorded in the House

Report. Sen. Cranston stated in the letter it was his intent in 1974 to state that the dam structures

would be left to deteriorate. See AR at 698. 

The parties have argued back and forth on this issue and have cited one portion or the

other of the legislative record to support the claim that the record does or does not evince an

intent to maintain, repair or operate the dam structures, or that these activities were deemed

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necessary for the administration of the wilderness area. The court has examined the portions of

the Administrative Record cited by the parties and has considered the arguments briefed. The

court remains convinced that even if the intent of Congress as reflected in statute is ambiguous

and resort to legislative history is warranted, the material cited does not resolve the ambiguity.

The court’s reasoning pertaining to the issues raised by the parties in the additional

briefing has been covered for the most part in prior discussion. Only a brief summary will be

repeated here. First, the court has examined the statute and the case law interpreting it and finds

the general prohibition of structures is not ambiguous. Second, the review of the materials

reflecting the legislative history of the Emigrant Wilderness indicates Congress is fully capable

of carving out exceptions at the time of designation, if that is its intent, and of differentiating

between maintenance, repair and simple retention of structures. It is also capable of eliciting

comments as to the necessity of structures that are to be excepted from the general prohibition

against structures and is capable of making that necessity explicit. Third, the court has examined

the proffered evidence of congressional intent and finds no specific intent with respect to the dam

structures is manifest. 

As previously discussed, courts only look to congressional intent when examination of

statutory text fails to resolve the issue. A court examining legislative history for evidence of

intent must find that intent is manifest or else the examination is just a matter of substituting one

ambiguity for another. Particularly in cases such as the one at bar where congressional intent is

being proffered to rebut a presumption established by statute, congressional intent must be plain

or it is absent. If Congress intended that the maintenance, repair or operation of the dam

structures is “necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area,” then

the court must assume Congress would have made a clear and unequivocal statement to that

effect. Such is not the case here. The court concludes the proffered evidence of legislative intent

fails to establish that congress intended to declare the dam structures conforming with the aims

of the Wilderness Act or to otherwise permit their repair, maintenance or operation.

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II. Alternative Analysis

The logical structure of the court’s analysis of deference due Forest Service’s decisions

has been to ascertain first whether the actions authorized by Forest Service’s ROD – the repair,

maintenance and operation of the dams – is compatible with the purposes and terms of the

Wilderness Act. The court found the proposed actions incompatible with the purposes of the

Wilderness Act, and consequently the court held Forest Service’s determination the proposed

action was lawful was not due deference under Chevron. As a final step, the court reviewed de

novo Forest Service’s proposed action to determine whether the action is nonetheless lawful

under the exception clause contained at section 1133(c) because the repair, maintenance and

operation of the dams is “necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the

area.” In making this de novo determination, the court deferred to Forest Service’s technical and

categorical determinations. While the court believes this is the appropriate analysis in light of

High Sierra Hikers Ass’n and Wilderness Society, the court recognizes those cases could

reasonably be interpreted to require that the court consider first what level of deference is due to

Forest Service’s determination that the repair, maintenance and operation of the dams was

necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area. In the interest of a

more inclusive discussion, the court undertakes this analysis below. 

The exception language at 23 U.S.C. § 1133(c) permits otherwise prohibited structures

“as necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area for the purpose of

this chapter.” The parties do not dispute that Forest Service has specifically referenced this

“exception” provision to support the actions proposed in the ROD. Because the exception

language of section 1133(c) references the necessity of non-conforming activities or structures in

the administration of the area, the focus is not so much on the non-conforming activity or

structure itself as on the role that activity or structure plays in the administration of the area. 

This approach finds elaboration in Wilderness Society where the court, considering the

question of whether the fishery enhancement project was a commercial activity prohibited by the

Wilderness Act, determined that “as a general rule both the purpose and effect of challenged

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activities must be carefully assessed in deciding whether a project is a ‘commercial enterprise’

within the wilderness that is prohibited by the Wilderness Act.” 353 F.3d at 1064. Although the

context here is not exactly analogous to the context in Wilderness Society, the court finds the

examination of purpose and effect as necessary here as in that case and finds the discussion in

Wilderness Society equally supportive of that approach in this case. See id. at 1063-1064

(discussing supporting authority for examination of “purpose and effect”). 

The purpose of the activity proposed by the Forest Service in the ROD is twofold; to

enhance fisheries by enhancing downstream flows, and to preserve historical values. Of the two

purposes, the former is predominant. Both Wilderness Society and Wilderness Society (Alaska)

deal with a fishery enhancement project in a wilderness area on the Kenai Peninsula in Alaska. 

The enhancement project did not involve any dams or other structures, but involved the

harvesting of sockeye salmon eggs at Tustumena Lake, the hatching of the eggs in a hatchery and

the release of the salmon fry into the lake where they would mature prior to returning to the

waters of the Cook Inlet. The project was supported by, and intended to benefit, the commercial

salmon fishery in the Cook Inlet. 

In Wilderness Society (Alaska), the court focused first on the question of whether the

agency’s decision to permit the enhancement project was equivalent to rule-making or carried the

force of law within the meaning of Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-227. The court reasoned that, since

the decision was issued pursuant to a congressional grant of power to manage the refuge, and was

issued following notice and comment, and because the enhancement project was consistent with

the final plan, which is analogous to a rule, the decision to permit was due deference under

Chevron. Focusing solely on the fishery enhancement nature of the project, the Wilderness

Society (Alaska) court reasoned the Wilderness Act was ambiguous as to the fishery

enhancement projects because Congress had not spoken to that particular issue. The court’s

analysis focused on the ambiguous nature of the terms “wilderness conditions” and “natural

character.” Wilderness Society (Alaska), 316 F.3d at 923-924. Finding the Forest Service’s

decision was “reasonable,” the court found the decision valid. Id. at 930.

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In contrast, the en banc decision in Wilderness Society focused on the nature of the

fishery enhancement project and determined that the project’s purpose and effect were

fundamentally commercial since the objective was to enhance the numbers salmon for the benefit

of the commercial salmon fishers in the Cook Inlet. 353 F.3d at 1064. The en banc panel’s

focus on the purpose and effect lead directly to the conclusion the planned enhancement project

offended the plain meaning and intent of the Wilderness Act and was therefore due no deference. 

Id. at 1067.

The difference between the facts of this case and those of Wilderness Society is that in

this case there is no allegation of any commercial purpose or effect in the planned agency action. 

The decision that remains is whether fishery enhancement, in and of itself, offends the plain

meaning and intent of the Wilderness Act. The court in Wilderness Society (Alaska) considered

this question directly – albeit erroneously omitting any consideration of the commercial nature of

the enhancement project – and concluded that Congress had not “expressly prohibited fishery

enhancement within wilderness areas.” Wilderness Society (Alaska), 316 F.3d at 923. Although

the ultimate conclusion reached by Wilderness Society (Alaska) was later rejected by the en banc

panel based on its flawed analytical framework, the en banc panel did not correct the observation

in Wilderness Society (Alaska) that the Wilderness Act is ambiguous with respect to fishery

enhancement as such. For the purposes of this discussion only, the court will assume the finding

by the Wilderness Society (Alaska) court is valid; that is, that fishery enhancement does not

directly offend the plain meaning and intent of the Wilderness Act.

The second purpose of Forest Service’s proposed action – to preserve historical values –

requires less discussion. The Wilderness Act, as quoted above, specifically acknowledges

“historical use” as one of the values the Wilderness Act seeks to promote. Thus, while it remains

ambiguous whether “historical use” can justify the maintenance repair or operation of structures

that would otherwise be offending, at least it is clear that the purpose of the Wilderness Act is not

directly offended by actions that seek to preserve historical use. Thus, at minimum, the

Wilderness is ambiguous with respect to the proposed preservation of dam structures on the

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grounds of historical use.

Having found the Wilderness Act is ambiguous with respect to the Forest Service’s

planned actions to repair/maintain/operate the dams, the court proceeds to the next step in the

analytical framework set forth in High Sierra Hikers Ass’n ; that is, whether the Forest Service’s

determination has the force of law. 390 F.3d at 638-639. In Mead, the Supreme Court held that

“administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron

deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make

rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was

promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-227. 

The Wilderness Society court considered whether, as an alternative to their holding that

the project was a commercial enterprise that offended the clear intent of the Wilderness Act, the

court’s decision would change if the court had found the Wilderness Act was ambiguous with

respect to the fishery enhancement project contemplated. Wilderness Society 353 F.3d at 1067. 

The Wilderness Society court concluded the case involved only “an agency’s application of law

in a particular permitting context, and not an interpretation of a statute that will have the force of

law generally for others in similar circumstances.” Id. Similarly, the Mead Court concluded

“classification rulings are best treated like ‘interpretations contained in policy statements, agency

manuals, and enforcement guidelines.’ [Citation.] They are beyond the Chevron pale.” Mead

533 U.S. at 234; see also High Sierra Hikers Ass’n, 390 F.3d at 684 (Chevron deference not due

where agency is not acting in a way that would have precedential value for subsequent parties).

The determination Forest Service made with regard to the dam structures involved the

application of set criteria to the particular factual context reflected in each of the dam structures. 

Because each determination was dependant on an individualized set of facts, the determinations

have no precedential effect outside the set of decisions that were actually made. Following

Mead, Wilderness Society, and High Sierra Hikers Ass’n, the court concludes Forest Service’s

determinations with regard to the compatibility of the individual dam structures in the Emigrant

Wilderness with the purposes of the Wilderness Act are not due Chevron deference. For the

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reasons already discussed, the court determines the factual and categorical determinations by

Forest Service are due complete deference.

Using this foregoing alternative analysis, the court arrives at the same conclusion

concerning deference to agency decisions as stated previously; that is, the court must examine the

lawfulness of the actions authorized by the ROD de novo while accepting as factual the facts set

forth by Forest Service. Having arrived at the same conclusion regarding deference, the

remainder of the court’s analysis concerning agency action remains the same and the court

reaches the same overall conclusion. The Forest Service’s determination to repair/maintain or

operate the dam structures is in conflict with the purposes of the Wilderness Act and Forest

Service’s decision as reflected in the ROD is therefore contrary to law and an abuse of discretion. 

III. Plaintiffs’ Claim Under NEPA

Plaintiffs alleges Forest Service violated the provisions of NEPA because it failed to

consider a reasonable range of alternatives. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend Forest Service did

not consider a course of action that would have resulted in the removal of the dams and the

restoration of stream beds and adjoining riparian areas to their original (pre-dam) condition. 

Plaintiffs contend the Draft EIS and the subsequent Final EIS were prepared with the specific

goal in mind of facilitating the MOU between Forest Service and CDFG. Plaintiffs contend the

MOU embodied a “side agreement” with CDFG that includes a joint commitment to repair,

maintain and operate the dams structures. Plaintiffs contend that, as a consequence of the MOU,

Forest Service was prevented from giving serious consideration of other reasonable alternatives;

such as the removal of the dams and affirmative restoration of lake beds and stream courses. 

As an initial matter, Defendants contend Plaintiff is barred from bringing any action on

grounds of NEPA violation because Plaintiffs failed to challenge Forest Service’s plan on the

ground of NEPA violation during the comment period on the Draft EIS. Defendants rely on

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), and

Dep’t of Transportaton v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004), for the proposition that objection

to an EIS must be made to the agency during the time the EIS is under consideration so that the

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agency has the opportunity to give adequate consideration to the objection. Failing timely notice

of objection to the agency preparing the EIS, the right to raise the objection in subsequent

litigation is waived. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 764.

Plaintiff cites Vermont Pub. Int. Res. Group v. United States Fish &Wildlife Ser., 247

F.Supp.2d 495, 514 (D. Vt. 2002) to support their contention that they are not barred from raising

an issue that was not directly raised during the comment portion of the administrative

proceeding. A review of both the cited and related case authority indicates the issue of issue

exhaustion is somewhat unsettled as yet in the Ninth Circuit. 

The Supreme Court’s decision in Public Citizen appears to have confronted the issue

directly:

What is not properly before us, despite respondents’ argument to the contrary, [. .

.] is any challenge to the EA due to its failure properly to consider possible

alternatives to the proposed order [. . . .] Persons challenging an agency’s

compliance with NEPA must “structure their participation so that it . . . alerts the

agency to the [parties’] position and contentions,” in order to allow the agency to

give the issue meaningful consideration. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.

v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 533 [. . .](1978). None

of the respondents identified in their comments any rulemaking alternatives

beyond those evaluated in the EA and none urged [Appellant] to consider

alternatives. Because respondents did not raise these particular objections to the

EA, [Appellant] was not given the opportunity to examine any proposed

alternatives to determine if they were reasonably available. Respondents have

therefore forfeited any objection to the EA on the ground that it failed adequately

to discuss potential alternatives to the proposed action.

Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 764.

Perhaps significantly, the case Plaintiffs rely upon, Vermont Public Interest Research

Group, was decided two years before Public Citizen. In Vermont Public Interest Research

Group, the court analyzed issue exhaustion in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sims v.

Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107-108 (2000). There, the Supreme Court noted that requirements of issue

exhaustion are largely matters of statute, and that, in the absence of a specific statutory

requirement, “a judicially imposed requirement of issue exhaustion is based on the extent to

which the particular administrative proceeding is ‘analog[ous] to normal adversarial litigation.’

[Citation.]” Vermont Public Interest Research Group, 247 F.Supp.2d at 515 (quoting Sims, 530

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U.S. at 109). Plaintiffs observe that in Sims, the Supreme Court noted that the requirements of

issue exhaustion “are largely creatures of statute.” 530 U.S. at 107-108. Plaintiffs follow

Vermont Public Interest Research Group in contending that under Sims, if administrative issue

exhaustion is required under NEPA, then there should be a statutory provision so stating. Since

there is no such statute, Plaintiffs reason there is no such requirement and their claim under

NEPA is not barred for failure to raise the issue during the comment period. 

So far as the court can determine, Vermont Public Interest Research Group has not been

widely followed. Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 352 F.Supp.2d 909, 926 (D. Minn. 2005) is the only

case that has come to this court’s attention that directly follows Vermont Public Interest Research

Group for the proposition that issue exhaustion is not required where a plaintiff challenges the

range of alternatives addressed by an EIS. The Ninth Circuit has not addressed the issue directly

under the rubric of “issue exhaustion.” Rather the Ninth Circuit has analyzed the problem as

akin to the issue of notice and waiver. The Ninth Circuit has stated “those who challenge an EIS

‘bear a responsibility to structure their participation so that it is meaningful, so that it alerts the

agency to the [parties’] position and contentions.’ [Citations.]” A party has participated in a

sufficiently meaningful way when it has alerted the agency to its position and claims.” City of

Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1208 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803

F.2d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 1986). 

In Vermont Public Interest Research Group, the court recognized that the decision in

Sims arose in the context of administrative proceedings in a social security case. Vermont

Public Interest Research Group, 247 F.Supp.2d at 515. It appears to this court that the extent of

the holding in Sims has been narrowed by Public Citizen. This court believes the Ninth Circuit’s

approach in City of Sausalito conforms to the holding in Public Citizen while at the same time

providing a realistic means of ascertaining whether a party challenging an EIS on the ground of

exclusion of a particular alternative from detailed consideration “has participated in a sufficiently

meaningful way” in the administrative process. The question thus becomes whether the

challenging party has placed the agency on notice as to the specific alternative it favors.

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Here, Defendants have alleged Plaintiffs did not raise the issue of removal of the dams to

the Forest Service at all during the comment period. Plaintiffs do not dispute the allegation and

instead have made the foregoing argument. Baring any further showing of notice by Plaintiffs to

Forest Service, Plaintiffs’ claim under NEPA should be barred under City of Sausalito.

Even if Plaintiff’s claim under NEPA is not barred, the claim fails on substantive

grounds.

As with claims under the Wilderness Act, judicial review of federal agency actions under

NEPA are reviewed under the APA. Olympic Park, 2005 WL 1871114 at *2. Unlike the

Wilderness Act, “NEPA does not work by mandating that agencies achieve particular substantive

environmental results. Rather, NEPA promotes its sweeping commitment to ‘prevent or

eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere’ by focusing Government and public

attention on the environmental effects of proposed agency action.” Marsh, 490 U.S. at 360, 109

S.Ct. At 1858. Thus, “NEPA is a procedural statute that does not ‘mandate particular results, but

simply provides the necessary process to ensure that federal agencies take a hard look at the

environmental consequences of their actions.’ [Citation.]” High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v.

Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). “[S]o long as the agency has taken a ‘hard look’ at

the environmental consequences, a reviewing court may not impose its preferred outcome on the

agency.” Mainella, 375 F.3d at 1094.

 Judicial review of an agency’s EIS under NEPA is extremely limited. Nat’l Parks &

Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 222 F.3d 677, 680 (9th cir. 2000). “The reviewing

court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency concerning the wisdom or prudence

of a proposed action.” Oregon Envtl. Counsil v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 492 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Although the “alternative section is ‘the heart of the environmental impact statement,’ 40 C.F.R.

§ 1502.14,” Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1519 (9th Cir. 1992),

“NEPA does not provide an agency much guidance regarding which alternatives must be

considered.” Texas Comm. On Natural Res. v. Van Winkle, 197 F.Supp.2d 586, 608 (N.D. Tex.

2002). Pertinent to the issue before the court, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 provides only that the agency

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must:

(a) Rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and

for alternatives that were eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss the

reasons for their having been eliminated. 

(b) Devote substantial treatment to each alternative considered in detail including

the proposed action so that reviewers may evaluate their comparative merits.

(c) Include reasonable alternatives not within the jurisdiction of the lead agency.

(d) Include the alternative of no action.

“This circuit employs a ‘rule of reason’ that asks whether an EIS contains a ‘reasonably

thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences.

[Citations.] The district court must make a ‘pragmatic judgment whether the EIS’s form, content

and preparation foster both informed decision-making and informed public participation.” 

Oregon Envt’l Council, 817 F.2d at 492. An agency must explain the basis for each conclusion

that further consideration of a suggested alternative is unwarranted, but the universe of possible

alternatives “must be bounded by some notion of feasibility.” Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 550-

551.

Plaintiffs contend the EIS was deficient because the alternative labeled “Maximize

Amphibian Habitat Benefits” was not selected for detailed study, and was not selected because

the Joint Strategy memorialized in the MOU had previously committed Forest Service to the

preferred option to the exclusion of all other options; in particular the Amphibian Habitat option.

Defendants allege, and the record indicates, that Forest Service did, in fact, consider the option of

removal of all the dams in question. As stated in the Draft EIS:

2.4.1. Maximize Amphibian Habitat Benefits

An alternative was considered that did not maintain any of the dams and called for

the physical removal of the dams. The alternative was dropped because it is not

consistent with the Forest Plan direction, which says, “Dams without a high

enough value to warrant retention should be allowed to deteriorate naturally (no

maintenance) consistent with FSM direction, rather than removed (Forest Plan

Direction, 2002, p. 65).” This alternative does not meet the need to implement the

Forest Plan or move forward on the Joint Strategy. In addition, this alternative

does not address social and cultural values associated with recreational fisheries

and historical resources.

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AR at 3521 (underscore in original).

The Joint Strategy mentioned above refers to the agreement between the Forest Service

and the CDFG, as memorialized in the MOU, “to work cooperatively on site-specific analysis

and additional data collection for future management of the dams.” AR at 3462. Specifically,

the Joint Strategy “did not make a decision to maintain or not maintain dams, but it established a

cooperative framework for future management decisions.” Id. (underscore in original). 

The court cannot conclude that, as a matter of law, the EIS was deficient because it did

not give detailed consideration to Plaintiff’s preferred alternative. Forest Service gave bases for

its conclusion that the Amphibian Habitats option did not require detailed consideration and

those bases are reasonable, whether or not the court or the parties agree. Forest Service also gave

detailed consideration to the no action option. Further, there is no allegation that public input

was somehow impeded or that the examination of the options that were studied in detail was

somehow insufficient. Here, the bottom line is that Plaintiffs are displeased with the choice

made, but do not offer sufficient grounds for the court to find that the basis upon which the

decision was made was deficient.

RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiffs’ SAC requests both declaratory and injunctive relief. As to declaratory relief,

Plaintiffs request the court declare Defendants violated both NEPA and the Wilderness Act and

hold unlawful and set aside those actions authorized by the ROD pursuant to 5 U.S.C., section

706(2). Pursuant to the foregoing discussion, the court will deny Plaintiffs request for relief as to

their claims under NEPA, and grant the requested relief as to the claim under the Wilderness Act.

Plaintiffs also request relief pursuant to 5 U.S.C., section 706(1) to set aside Forest

Service’s decision to not fully consider the physical removal of the dam structures and require

Forest Service to fully consider that option. The court is without authority to grant that relief. 

Plaintiff has failed to make any showing that Forest Service is required to affirmatively remove

non-conforming structures. See SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64 (“a claim under § 706(1) can proceed

only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is

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required to take”). Indeed, such authority as the court has found, as well as indications of

congressional intent as reflected in the House Report indicate there is no such obligation. In the

absence of any showing that the Wilderness Act imposes a duty to physically remove pre-existing

non-conforming structures, there is no basis to compel agency action under the APA. A

challenge to the scope of options considered by Forest Service must similarly fail. The range of

options considered implicates the agency’s decision making process which is subject to the terms

of NEPA. As previously discussed the court has determined there is no NEPA violation. 

Consequently, there is no basis for challenge under NEPA as well. Plaintiff’s request to compel

Forest Service consideration of the option of removal of the dam structures will be denied.

Plaintiffs have also requested Defendants be enjoined from any maintenance, repair or

operation of any dam structure in the Emigrant Wilderness. To prevail, the moving party must

show either: “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury; or

(2) that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips

sharply in its favor.” Walczak v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 198 F.3d 725, 731 (9 Cir.1999); Oakland th

Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Company, Inc., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9 Cir. 1985). The th

two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale with the focal point being the degree of

irreparable injury shown. Walczak, 198 F.3d at 731; Oakland Tribune, 762 F.2d at 1376. The

greater the relative hardship to [the moving party], the less probability of success must be shown. 

Walczak, 198 F.3d at 731. “Under either formulation of the test, plaintiff must demonstrate that

there exists a significant threat of irreparable injury.” Oakland Tribune, 762 F.2d at 1376. In the

absence of a significant showing of irreparability, the court need not reach the issue of likelihood

of success on the merits. Id.

Defendants correctly contend that Plaintiffs, if successful on either or both of their claims,

are not entitled to injunctive relief. This is due to the lack of any possible immediate irreparable

harm. The grant of Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment under the Wilderness Act merely

means nothing happens. Forest Service, lacking legal authority to proceed with the maintenance

or repair of the dams is automatically foreclosed from doing either. Further, the court’s ruling

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setting aside the ROD means simply that the dams will continue to be not operated as has been

the case for the past several years. Invalidation of the ROD will, by its nature, continue the status

quo making the grant of injunction unnecessary.

Defendants cross-motion for summary judgment will correspondingly be granted as to

Plaintiffs’ claim under NEPA and denied as to Plaintiffs’ claim under the Wilderness Act.

ORDERS

THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing discussion, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on their claim for relief pursuant to 5 U.S.C.,

section 706(2) to declare Forest Service’s decision as reflected in the Report of Decision

to repair, maintain and operate the several dam structures in the Emigrant Wilderness

unlawful and to set aside same is hereby GRANTED. Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on the same issue is correspondingly DENIED.

2. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on their claim for relief pursuant to 5 U.S.C.,

section 706(1) to declare unlawful Forest Service’s decision to not consider or adopt

actions that would cause the several dam structures in the Emigrant Wilderness to be

physically removed, and to compel Forest Service consider and/or adopt same is hereby

DENIED. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the same issue is

correspondingly GRANTED.

3. Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief is hereby DENIED.

4. That portion of Forest Service’s Report of Decision that authorizes the repair,

maintenance and operation of the several dam structures in the Emigrant Wilderness is

hereby SET ASIDE pursuant to 5 U.S.C., section 706(2). Forest Service may take further

action consistent with this memorandum opinion and order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 8, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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