Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05091/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05091-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 134
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: 

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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ROBERT DOURANDISH,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-5091

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:14-cv-00937-CFL, Judge Charles F. 

Lettow. 

______________________ 

Decided: October 20, 2015

______________________ 

 ROBERT DOURANDISH, San Mateo, CA, pro se.

 PAUL D. OLIVER, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., REGINALD 

T. BLADES, JR. 

______________________ 

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2 DOURANDISH v. US

Before NEWMAN, CLEVENGER, and O’MALLEY, Circuit 

Judges.

CLEVENGER, Circuit Judge.

Pro se plaintiff Robert Dourandish is the co-owner of 

Quimba Software, Inc. (“Quimba”). This action arose out 

of a contract between Quimba and the Air Force Research 

Laboratory. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed Mr. 

Dourandish’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A separate action before that court, between Quimba 

and the United States based on the same contract, is 

currently pending. Quimba Software, Inc. v. United 

States, No. 1:12-cv-00142-MCW (Fed. Cl. filed Mar. 1, 

2012). For the reasons explained below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

On July 10, 2003, Quimba entered into a cost-plusfixed-fee contract with the Air Force Research Laboratory, 

number F30602-03-C-0185. Mr. Dourandish signed the 

contract for Quimba in his capacity as one of its executive 

officers, noting both the company’s name and his title in 

his own handwriting. 

The contract provided that Quimba would submit invoices for its costs to the Defense Contract Audit Agency 

(“DCAA”). The government would “make payments to 

[Quimba] when requested as work progresses . . . in 

amounts determined to be allowable by the Contracting 

Officer in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation 

(FAR) subpart 31.2 in effect on the date of this contract 

and the terms of this contract.” Those payments would 

reimburse Quimba’s “properly allocable and allowable 

indirect costs . . . .” 

The following discussion is drawn from Mr. Dourandish’s allegations. The contract was awarded to Quimba 

conditional on it bringing its accounting system into 

compliance with DCAA’s requirements. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 8, 

13. Quimba’s co-owners began work on the contract in the 

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DOURANDISH v. US 3

third quarter of 2003, but were told they would not be 

paid until Quimba’s system complied with DCAA’s standards and DCAA approved of Quimba’s indirect rates. Id. 

¶¶ 11, 14. 

In February 2004, after Quimba improved its accounting system, DCAA approved a payment of $30,321.77. 

Quimba also initiated an audit of its indirect rates. During that audit, DCAA and Quimba disputed whether the 

deferred salaries Quimba sought to pay its co-owners 

were allowable under the FAR’s cost-accounting standards. Id. ¶ 19. They worked to resolve the issue through 

multiple audits in 2004. Id. ¶¶ 20-41. 

On November 24, 2004, DCAA approved Quimba’s indirect rates, including its request for deferred compensation. Id. ¶ 42. Then, on January 26, 2005, DCAA sent 

Quimba a draft audit report that questioned whether the 

deferred compensation could be paid. Id. ¶ 47. At this 

point, Quimba had not yet been paid for salaries incurred 

during 2004, and DCAA initiated a Risk Review of the 

contract based in part on the fact that its founders were 

“not paying” themselves. Id. ¶¶ 48, 52. 

Quimba completed its performance under the contract 

in March 2005. Id. ¶ 57. Following completion, it submitted invoices for all of its unpaid work and was paid. Id. ¶¶

61–63. Then it submitted a rate proposal for all of its 

unpaid costs, including the deferred compensation. DCAA 

approved the proposal in June 2005, and Quimba was 

paid. Id. ¶¶ 65–66. 

In May 2007, DCAA initiated an audit of Quimba’s 

2004 incurred cost proposal. Id. ¶ 67. The record shows 

that the Contracting Officer issued a Final Decision in 

March 2011, disallowing $149,085 in executive compensation costs Quimba incurred during fiscal year (“FY”) 2004. 

Under the FAR provision in effect when the contract was 

formed, “[f]or closely held corporations, compensation 

costs covered by this subdivision shall not be recognized 

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4 DOURANDISH v. US

in amounts exceeding those costs that are deductible as 

compensation under the Internal Revenue Code and 

regulations under it.” FAR § 31.205-6(b)(2)(i) (2002). The 

Contracting Officer disallowed the compensation because

he agreed with the DCAA auditor’s report, which “questioned the proposed labor costs for the owners because 

they exceeded the actual labor costs paid and reported as 

compensation under IRS Regulations.” 

As a result, the government levied a debt of 

$91,992.77 against Quimba. Quimba challenged the debt 

in the Court of Federal Claims. Quimba Software, Inc. v. 

United States, No. 1:12-cv-00142-MCW (Fed. Cl. filed 

Mar. 1, 2012). That case remains pending, and we express 

no view on any aspect of that proceeding. 

On October 3, 2014, Mr. Dourandish separately filed 

this action in the Court of Federal Claims. The first count 

of his complaint alleges that the government breached its 

contract with Quimba. The second count alleges that the 

government “violated Mr. Dourandish’s rights, as guaranteed under the US Constitution and codified under the 

Civil Rights Act, by unjustly interfering with his ability to 

seek federal contracts.” 

Following the government’s motion, the court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Dourandish v. 

United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 467 (2015). Mr. Dourandish 

appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

This court reviews de novo whether the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction. Estes Express Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The plaintiff 

bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by 

a preponderance of the evidence. Id. When deciding a 

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 

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DOURANDISH v. US 5

we accept the complaint’s uncontested factual allegations 

as true and construe them in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff. Id.

The Tucker Act grants the Court of Federal Claims 

jurisdiction over claims for money damages against the 

United States that are “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract 

with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated 

damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1491(a)(1) (2011). It is a purely jurisdictional statute 

that does not itself create any substantive rights. See 

United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). To 

invoke jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, a party must 

therefore identify a substantive right in another source of 

federal law that “can fairly be interpreted as mandating 

compensation by the Federal Government for the damages sustained.” Id. at 400 (quotation omitted); see also 

United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983).

I 

“To maintain a cause of action pursuant to the Tucker 

Act that is based on a contract, the contract must be 

between the plaintiff and the government . . . .” Ransom v. 

United States, 900 F.2d 242, 244 (Fed. Cir. 1990). That is, 

the plaintiff and the government must be in privity of 

contract. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 194 F.3d 

1231, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Either direct privity or status 

as a third-party beneficiary confers standing to sue the 

government. See Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 

1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

“In order to prove third party beneficiary status, a 

party must demonstrate that the contract not only reflects 

the express or implied intention to benefit the party, but 

that it reflects an intention to benefit the party directly.”

Glass v. United States, 258 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir.

2001), opinion amended in other respects on reh'g, 273 

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6 DOURANDISH v. US

F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “Specifically, in order to make 

a shareholder a third party beneficiary, the contract must 

express the intent of the promissor to benefit the shareholder personally, independently of his or her status as a 

shareholder.” Id. at 1353–54.

Mr. Dourandish does not contend that there was a 

contract between himself and the government. Instead, he 

argues that he has standing to sue because he was an 

intended third-party beneficiary of the contract between 

Quimba and the Air Force Research Laboratory. The 

Court of Federal Claims found that Mr. Dourandish was 

at most an indirect beneficiary because the contract does 

not evidence any intent to benefit him personally. It 

therefore held that he lacked standing to sue. 

On appeal, Mr. Dourandish argues that the contract 

evidences an intent to benefit him directly. Some of the 

evidence he identifies arose before the parties entered into 

the contract. He tells us that Quimba’s proposal identified 

him by name as a Senior Investigator and included his 

salary as an expected cost, and also that before it awarded 

the contract the Air Force Research Laboratory asked him 

to provide documentation justifying his proposed hourly 

rate. The record does not contain the proposal or any 

documentation of pre-award discussions, and even if it 

were before us, the parol evidence rule would prevent it 

from changing the contract’s terms. See TEG-Paradigm 

Envtl., Inc. v. United States, 465 F.3d 1329, 1338–39 (Fed. 

Cir. 2006). Regardless, this evidence would show at most 

that Mr. Dourandish was an employee of Quimba who 

was expected to perform work on the contract. It does not 

show intent to benefit him directly.

Within the contract itself, Mr. Dourandish relies on 

FAR § 52.232-09, which it incorporates. That provision

limits the government’s ability to withhold payments, but 

excludes withholdings related to wages or hours from its 

coverage. Mr. Dourandish asserts that this clause shows 

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DOURANDISH v. US 7

the parties’ intent to benefit him as an employee of Quimba. It appears unlikely that this provision benefits employees, but assuming that it does, nothing in its adoption 

indicates the parties’ intent to benefit Mr. Dourandish 

directly.

Mr. Dourandish also points to the course of performance on the contract. He contends that, when DCAA

repeatedly determined that it could not pay Mr. Dourandish’s deferred salary, it demonstrated the parties’ intent 

to benefit him. He also notes that the government initiated a risk audit of Quimba’s contract on the basis that it 

was failing to pay its co-owners. Both are implausible; he 

was harmed, not helped, by DCAA’s refusal to pay deferred salaries, and the risk audit was for the government’s benefit. In any event, both happened after the 

contract was formed and is not evidence of the parties’ 

intent at the time of formation.

None of this evidence evidence indicates an intent to 

benefit Mr. Dourandish personally, independent of his 

status as a shareholder. He has therefore not established 

that he was a third-party beneficiary to the contract 

between Quimba and the Air Force Research Laboratory. 

Separate from his third party beneficiary argument, 

Mr. Dourandish presents three arguments as to why he 

has standing based on the contract between Quimba and 

the government.

First, he argues that he was the real party in interest 

in the contract between Quimba and the government. In 

support he cites Rule 17(a) of the Rules of the Court of 

Federal Claims, which provides in relevant part that “a 

party with whom or in whose name a contract has been 

made for another’s benefit” may sue in its own name 

“without joining the person for whose benefit the action is 

brought.” That rule governs the Court of Federal Claims’ 

procedures and does not purport to set out when a party 

has standing. See Rules Ct. Fed. Cl. 1.

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8 DOURANDISH v. US

Second, Mr. Dourandish analogizes himself to a subcontractor, where Quimba is the prime contractor. In 

general, subcontractors are not in privity with the government, but privity between the subcontractor and the 

government may exist if the prime contractor acted as an 

agent of the government when it entered into the subcontract. United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 713 F.2d 

1541, 1550–51 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Mr. Dourandish gives us 

no reason to think that the same rule should apply here, 

where he was a co-owner of Quimba rather than a subcontractor. He also presents no argument as to why the 

criteria Johnson Controls sets out for subcontractor 

privity are met. See id. at 1551.

Third, Mr. Dourandish contends that he has standing 

as a creditor beneficiary. See D & H Distrib. Co. v. United 

States, 102 F.3d 542, 546–47 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“In the case 

of a contract in which the promisee provides goods or 

services to the promisor, it has long been settled that a 

clause providing for the promisor to pay the proceeds of 

the contract to a third party is enforceable by the third 

party where the payment is intended to satisfy a present 

or future liability of the promisee to the third party.”).

That is not the case. No clause required Quimba to pay 

the proceeds of the contract to Mr. Dourandish. Further, 

there is no suggestion that any such payment would be 

intended to satisfy a debt of the government.

II

Mr. Dourandish contends that the government violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when it 

“knowingly refused to rescind an erroneous levy” by 

leaving the Contracting Officer’s Final Decision in place 

after admitting that it contained an error. 

The Court of Federal Claims dismissed this claim for 

lack of jurisdiction because the Fourteenth Amendment 

does not mandate the payment of money damages. 

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DOURANDISH v. US 9

We affirm. “The law is well settled that the Due Process clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not mandate the payment of money and thus do 

not provide a cause of action under the Tucker Act.” 

Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir.

2013) (citing LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 

(Fed. Cir. 1995)). 

III

Mr. Dourandish argued below that the government 

violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights through 

an “illegal exaction.” An illegal exaction claim arises when 

money is “improperly paid, exacted, or taken from the 

claimant [by the government] in contravention of the 

Constitution, a statute, or a regulation.” Norman v. 

United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 

1007 (Ct. Cl. 1967)). 

Illegal exaction claims are an exception to the general 

rule that the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction 

over due process claims. That court has jurisdiction over 

illegal exaction claims “when the exaction is based on an 

asserted statutory power.” Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d 1564, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996). “To invoke 

Tucker Act jurisdiction over an illegal exaction claim, a 

claimant must demonstrate that the statute or provision 

causing the exaction itself provides, either expressly or by 

‘necessary implication,’ that ‘the remedy for its violation 

entails a return of money unlawfully exacted.’” Norman, 

429 F.3d at 1096 (quoting Cyprus Amax Coal Co. v. United States, 205 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).

The court dismissed Mr. Dourandish’s illegal exaction

claim for lack of jurisdiction, because his claims derive not 

from an “asserted statutory power” but from contract. 

Mr. Dourandish did not appeal the dismissal of his 

Fifth Amendment due process claim. If he had, however, 

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10 DOURANDISH v. US

we would affirm. Mr. Dourandish points to no statutory 

basis for his illegal exaction claim.

IV 

Mr. Dourandish’s complaint alleges that the government violated the Civil Rights Act by “unjustly interfering 

with his ability to seek federal contracts.” Compl. ¶ 109. 

The court dismissed this claim for lack of jurisdiction 

because, by statute, “[t]he district courts shall have 

original jurisdiction of any civil action . . . [t]o recover 

damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any 

Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights

. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4) (2011). 

Mr. Dourandish also did not appeal the dismissal of 

his Civil Rights Act claim. If he had, we would affirm. 

Original jurisdiction over claims under the Civil Rights 

Act is vested in the district courts. 

V 

Finally, Mr. Dourandish argues that he has standing 

to sue on Quimba’s contract with the government because 

Quimba is a closely held corporation and, as one of its coowners, his interest overlap significantly with those of the 

company. In support, he points to Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 

Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). He contends that case 

held that the owners of a closely held corporation are 

indistinguishable from the corporation itself, and therefore that they may sue on its contracts. 

Mr. Dourandish’s argument misreads Hobby Lobby. 

Hobby Lobby interpreted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et 

seq., and held that regulations requiring closely held

corporations to provide health insurance coverage for 

methods of contraception that violated the sincerely held 

religious beliefs of the corporations’ owners violated that 

statute. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. It has no bearCase: 15-5091 Document: 18-2 Page: 10 Filed: 10/20/2015
DOURANDISH v. US 11

ing on whether the co-owner of a closely held corporation 

has standing to sue on the corporation’s contracts.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of 

Mr. Dourandish’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction is 

AFFIRMED.

COSTS

No costs.

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