Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_92-cv-05471/USCOURTS-caed-1_92-cv-05471-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD L. SANDERS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

ROBERT L. AYERS, JR., Warden )

of San Quentin State Prison, )

)

Respondent. )

)

Case No. CIV. F-92-5471-LJO-P

DEATH PENALTY CASE

Order Regarding Petitioner’s

Motion for Reconsideration of

March 27, 2007 Order

Date: May 9, 2007

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Petitioner Ronald L. Sanders (“Sanders”) filed a motion to reconsider the

ruling that the State will have an opportunity to contest the truth and/or strength

of the proffered mitigating evidence supporting the remanded ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. Respondent Robert L. Ayers, Jr., (“the State”) filed an

opposition to the motion for reconsideration April 19, 2007.

Sanders argues that the State waived its opportunity to contest the

proffered mitigation, and at the most, the only question to decide is the truth of

the allegations regarding the proffered mitigation. Sanders requests that based

on the above argument, the order to bifurcate the evidentiary hearing also should

be reconsidered. The State opposes Sanders’ motion, asserting it has not waived

an opportunity to contest the proffered mitigation, the remand opinion did not

Case 1:92-cv-05471-JLT Document 190 Filed 05/02/07 Page 1 of 6
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decide the prejudice prong of ineffective representation in this case, and this

court properly set the parameters for the evidentiary hearing.

First, Sanders argues the State has waived the opportunity to contest the

proffered mitigation since it has consistently contended this claim can and should

be resolved on legal grounds alone, and has failed to present any alternative

argument concerning disputed facts. Sanders observes that in his motion for

evidentiary hearing in federal court, and later in his brief on appeal to the Ninth

Circuit, he specifically noted the State’s failure to deny or dispute the proffered

mitigation. The State did not challenge this characterization in its opposition to

the motion for evidentiary hearing or in its brief on appeal, instead reiterating the

argument that the proffered mitigation was irrelevant and immaterial. The State

contends that, contrary to Sanders’ claim, the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly or

implicitly hold that it waived the right to test the value of the proffered

mitigation. The State asserts the record does not show that it ever conceded the

truth or weight of Sanders’ proffered mitigation, or waived an opportunity to do

so.

Second, even if the State made no waiver, Sanders argues the remand

opinion left only the truth of the allegations at issue. Sanders contends the

remand opinion concluded the proffer undermines confidence in the death

sentence, thus finding that prejudice is established if the proffered mitigation is

true. Sanders argues this settles the persuasive value and strength of the proffer

in his favor, leaving at most the question of whether the proffer is true, that is,

whether it could have been presented at the penalty phase trial.

The State disagrees with Sanders’ assertion, contending the remand

opinion in context reveals the Ninth Circuit addressed prejudice only to the

extent that it found Sanders had made a colorable claim of ineffective assistance

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of counsel, which included allegations of prejudice. The State argues that if the

Ninth Circuit had found prejudice for the purposes of the ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing would have been

meaningless. The State argues that to perform the task assigned on remand, the

judge presiding at the evidentiary hearing needs to evaluate the substance and

credibility of the evidence presented at the hearing and determine if it

undermines confidence on the outcome of the penalty trial.

Lastly, Sanders requests that the order dividing the evidentiary hearing

into two stages be reconsidered. Sanders asserts that the order should be

modified because it: (1) misstates the legal standard governing ineffective

assistance of counsel claims; (2) appears to eliminate part of the remanded claims;

and (3) appears to too narrowly limit the first stage to the “proffered mitigation

evidence,” while not sufficiently explaining how that evidence will be handled at

the hearing.

Sanders contends the legal standard does not require conclusive proof, but

only the demonstration of a reasonable probability, enough to undermine

confidence in the result. Sanders asserts the order’s requirements, that he show

“how it [the proffered mitigation] might have been used to convince him to

change his mind” and if he had changed his mind, “whether the mitigation

evidence would have convinced the jury to sentence him to life without parole,”

equal a showing of conclusive proof. As to the burden of proof, the State does

not read the order as contrary to the standard set out in Strickland, but views the

order as compatible with the “reasonable probability” standard.

Sanders contends he has advanced an alternative to whether Hoover could

have changed his mind about presenting a penalty defense which would have

allowed presentation of mitigation. Sanders contends that had Hoover

Case 1:92-cv-05471-JLT Document 190 Filed 05/02/07 Page 3 of 6
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sufficiently investigated and acted as reasonably competent trial counsel, he

would not have acquiesced to Sanders’ wishes but would have presented the

mitigation in spite of Sanders’ objections. Sanders contends the Ninth Circuit

remanded for a hearing on the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, so the alternative argument is not inconsistent with the mandate.

The State submits the order correctly assessed the scope of the hearing, as

the Ninth Circuit did not include in the remand opinion the argument that

Hoover should have presented mitigation even over Sanders’ objection. The

State asserts the remand opinion does not say the hearing was granted on the

entire claim as briefed, or imply that defense counsel had a duty to override his

client’s objections to mitigation or to present such evidence if the client objects. 

The State contends the issue on remand is whether counsel fully investigated and

presented mitigation to Sanders, along with all information necessary to make an

informed decision about presenting mitigation evidence at the penalty phase

trial.

The issue about the extent to which trial counsel is bound by a client’s

objection to presenting mitigation is currently pending before the United States

Supreme Court. Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted sub

nom. Schriro v. Landrigan, __ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 35 (Sept. 26, 2006) (No. 05-1575,

argued January 9, 2007). Ninth Circuit authority on this issue indicates that the

issue must be determined based on the available evidence, and that although the

client’s desires are not to be ignored entirely, the decision not to present

mitigating evidence must be “informed and knowing,” and it may be

inappropriate for counsel to acquiesce to the client’s desires. Douglas v. Woodford,

316 F.3d 1079, 1089 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Sanders contends the evidence which reasonably competent trial counsel

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would have used to persuade Sanders to change his mind, or to decide to present

mitigation in spite of Sanders’ objections, is broader than the proffered mitigation

evidence and includes any additional facts about Sanders’ background or family

that could have helped inform him about the possibility and modes of presenting

mitigation. 

The State asserts it does not read the court’s order as limiting the hearing

to the proffered mitigation evidence, but views the phraseology as encompassing

possible evidence about Sanders’ own views, or information about him or his

family, that defense counsel could have used in his discussions with Sanders. 

The State asserts this would include information about what defense counsel, the

trial court, and others actually did to attempt to persuade Sanders or to discuss

the matter with him. The State concurs with Sanders’ view about this aspect of

the first stage, but sees nothing in the court’s order precluding such evidence.

Finally, Sanders contends the order does not set out how the proffer will be

handled at the first stage, but asserts the implication is that the documents and

declarations will be assumed true. The State agrees that since the proffered

mitigation will not be presented or challenged until the second stage of the

hearing, it should be assumed true for purposes of the first stage of the hearing.

Conclusion

Sanders’ motion to reconsider the ruling of March 27, 2007, that the State

will have an opportunity to contest the truth and/or strength of the proffered

mitigating evidence is DENIED. The State did not waive its opportunity to

contest the mitigation. The Ninth Circuit did not determine the ultimate issue of

whether trial counsel’s failure to investigate was prejudicial, but left that

determination to be made on remand. The March 27, 2007 order did not impose

a requirement of conclusive proof for the evidentiary hearing. The standard from

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Strickland will be imposed. The mitigation evidence at the hearing will not be

limited to the proffer, and will be assumed true for first stage of the proceeding.

The argument that trial counsel should have ignored Sanders’ objections to

presenting mitigation is an unresolved issue, but current precedent indicates it is

not prohibited. “Although our case law ‘does not quite say that the defendant

absolutely controls’ counsel’s representation, ‘[t]he client’s wishes are not to be

ignored entirely.’ “ Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal

citations omitted). However, the first stage of the evidentiary hearing will be

approached in two parts, with Sanders’ current position on the presentation of

mitigation being made part of the record in this case before any further evidence

is considered.

The March 27, 2007 order set the date for the next case management

conference on May 14, 2007 at 8:00 a.m. to discuss the progress the parties have

made in preparing for the first issue of the evidentiary hearing. That date is

changed to Wednesday, May 9, 2007, at 8:30 a.m. An ex parte budgeting

conference will be held immediately following the case management conference.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 2, 2007 

 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

United States District Judge

Case 1:92-cv-05471-JLT Document 190 Filed 05/02/07 Page 6 of 6