Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03802/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03802-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 990
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3802

___________

In re: Charter Communications, Inc., *

Subpoena Enforcement Matter *

*

___________________ *

*

The Recording Industry Association *

of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

United States of America, *

*

Intervenor on Appeal, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri. 

Charter Communications, Inc., *

* 

Appellant. *

*

___________________ *

*

Consumer and Privacy Groups; *

SBC Internet Services; Verizon *

Internet Services, Incorporated; *

Bellsouth Telecommunications; *

United States Internet Service *

Providers Association; United *

States Internet Industry Association; *

Progressive Internet Action; *

Frontier Communications of America, *

Appellate Case: 03-3802 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/04/2005 Entry ID: 1850794 
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Incorporated; Southern Star; *

*

Amici on behalf of Appellant. *

*

Motion Picture Association *

of America, Incorporated; *

Association of American Publishers; *

Association for Independent Music; *

American Federation of Musicians *

of the United States and Canada; *

AFMA; American Federation of *

Television and Radio Artists; *

American Society of Media *

Photographers; the Authors Guild, *

Incorporated; Broadcast Music, *

Incorporated; Business Software *

Alliance; The Church Music * 

Publishers Association; Directors *

Guild of America, Incorporated; *

Entertainment Software Association; *

GraphicArtists Guild, Incorporated; *

Office of the Commissioner of Baseball; *

Professional Photographers of America; * 

Recording Artists Coalition; *

Screen Actors Guild, Incorporated; *

SESAC, Inc.; Songwriters Guild of *

America; Software & Information *

Industry Association; Writers Guild *

of America, West, Incorporated, *

*

Amici on Behalf of Appellee. *

*

___________

Submitted: June 14, 2004

Filed: January 4, 2005 (Corrected 1/18/05)

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1

Charter is a cable company that serves markets throughout the United States.

In addition to offering traditional cable television service, it offers broadband internet

access.

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___________

Before MURPHY, BYE, and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

This case concerns whether the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),

specifically 17 U.S.C. § 512(h), permits copyright owners and their representatives

to obtain and serve subpoenas on internet service providers (ISPs) to obtain personal

information about an ISP's subscribers who are alleged to be transmitting copyrighted

works via the internet using so-called "peer to peer" or "P2P" file sharing computer

programs. The dispute arose when the Recording Industry Association of America

(RIAA) requested the clerk of the district court to issue subpoenas under § 512(h) to

Charter Communications, Inc. (Charter),1

 in its capacity as an ISP, requiring Charter

to turn over the identities of persons believed to be engaging in unlawful copyright

infringement. The district court issued the subpoenas and denied Charter's motion to

quash. We reverse.

I

Starting in the 1980s, internet users began "posting" copyrighted works on

electronic bulletin boards (BBSs). A BBS allows a user to post files for others to

download to their computers. Other internet users would then copy and download

the posted works from the BBS. Beginning in the early 1990s, copyright owners

began suing individuals who unlawfully disseminated copyrighted music,

photographs, and software. Such litigation targeted BBSs operated from home

computers. Advances in technology, however, including the use of MP3 format (a

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compressed digital format) facilitated the piracy, and by 1998 approximately three

million sound recordings were believed to be downloaded from the internet daily.

In 1999, such activity reached new heights with the emergence of so-called

peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. Like BBS sites, P2P systems allow users to disseminate

files stored on their computers to other internet users. Napster was the first and most

notorious P2P system, and the courts ultimately shut it down via an injunction. See

A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002); A & M

Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001). Other P2P

systems have emerged since then, including KaZaA, Grokster, Morpheus, and iMesh.

It is this new generation of P2P systems being implicated in the present case. 

Unlike earlier centralized P2P file-sharing programs which rely upon a single

facility for identifying files, the new generation of P2P file sharing programs allow

an internet user to access the files located on other computers through the internet.

By utilizing the new technology, an internet user can search directly the MP3 file

libraries of other users, with no web site being involved because the transferred files

are not stored on the computers of the ISP providing the peer-to-peer users with

internet access. See Recording Ind. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351

F.3d 1229, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 2004 WL 1175134 (U.S.

May 24, 2004) (No. 03-1579). Significant to this case is that Charter's role in

disseminating the allegedly copyright protected material is confined to acting as a

conduit in the transfer of files through its network. 

Approximately 90% of the content on P2P systems is copyrighted movies,

software, images, and music disseminated without authorization. It is estimated more

than 2.6 billion allegedly infringing music files are downloaded monthly. This

Circuit has never determined whether music downloaded from P2P systems violates

the copyright owner's rights or is a fair use. The RIAA, to our knowledge, has never

prevailed in any infringement actions brought against individual downloaders.

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The DMCA has been the principal legislative response to such activities; it was

enacted, however, in 1998, prior to the emergence of P2P systems. The DMCA is

designed to advance "two important priorities: promoting the continued growth and

development of electronic commerce[] and protecting intellectual property rights."

H. Rep. No. 105-551(II) at 23 (1998). Title II of the DMCA was the product of

lengthy negotiations between copyright owners and internet service providers. It was

designed to strike a balance between the interests of ISPs in avoiding liability for

infringing use of their services and the interest of copyright owners in protecting their

intellectual property and minimizing online piracy. See discussion below. The scope

of the DMCA is a primary issue in this appeal.

The RIAA is a trade association representing record companies which create,

manufacture and distribute most of the sound recordings produced and sold in the

United States. In June 2003, the RIAA announced a nationwide effort to identify and

sue individuals committing copyright infringement using P2P systems. In this case,

by using tracking programs, the RIAA ascertained the internet protocol (IP) addresses

and user names (e.g., paulina400@KaZaA) of ninety-three Charter subscribers

suspected of trading copyrighted music files. The RIAA logged onto P2P networks

and observed certain users offering the copyrighted songs for downloading. It

confirmed the infringement by downloading files offered by individuals and verifying

such as being unauthorized copies of copyrighted sound recordings. The RIAA

alleges such subscribers collectively made more than 100,000 copyrighted songs

available for illegal copying and downloading. Significantly, with an IP address, the

RIAA can identify the ISP providing internet access to an alleged infringing party.

Only the ISP, however, in this case Charter Communications, Inc. (Charter), can link

a particular IP address with an individual's name and physical address. 

In this case, purportedly pursuant to § 512(h) of the DMCA, the RIAA obtained

subpoenas from the clerk of the district court requiring Charter to produce the names,

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2

We note that until the filing of this opinion, there have been no obstacles to

prevent the RIAA from making use of the information obtained pursuant to the

subpoenas at issue in this case.

3

This case has wide-reaching ramifications, because as a practical matter,

copyright owners cannot deter unlawful peer-to-peer file transfers unless they can

learn the identities of persons engaged in that activity. However, organizations such

as the RIAA can also employ alternative avenues to seek this information, such as

"John Doe" lawsuits. In such lawsuits, many of which are now pending in district

courts across the country, organizations such as the RIAA can file a John Doe suit,

along with a motion for third-party discovery of the identity of the otherwise

anonymous "John Doe" defendant.

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physical addresses, telephone numbers, and email addresses of approximately 200 of

Charter's subscribers. On October 3, 2003, Charter filed a motion to quash the

subpoenas on several grounds. During a November 17, 2003, hearing, the district

court denied Charter's motion to quash, and ordered Charter to disclose by November

21 the names, addresses, and email addresses of 150 subscribers who had received

notice of the subpoeanas, and to produce the same information by December 1 for

another fifty to seventy subscribers who had not yet received notice. See In Re:

Charter Communications, No. 4:03MC273CEJ at 1 (Nov. 17, 2003) (Minute Order

directing Charter to comply with the terms of the subpoenas with the exception of

providing the telephone numbers of the subscribers). 

On November 20, 2003, Charter filed a notice of appeal and a motion to stay

the district court's order. The district court declined to act on the motion to stay its

order before the compliance deadline. Consequently, on the deadline, November 21,

2003, Charter filed with this court an emergency motion to stay order of enforcement

of the subpoenas pending appeal, which was denied then.2

 As a result, Charter turned

over the subpoenaed names and addresses of its subscribers to the RIAA. This appeal

followed.3

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On appeal, Charter contends the district court erred in enforcing the subpoenas

because (1) Section 512(h) applies only to ISPs engaged in storing copyrighted

material and not to ISPs, such as Charter, engaged solely as a conduit for the

transmission of information by others; (2) a judicial subpoena is a court order that

must be supported by a case or controversy at the time of its issuance and no case or

controversy existed here; (3) the enforcement of a § 512(h) subpoena violates the

privacy protections for cable subscribers in the Communications Act of 1934 set forth

in 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(1); and (4) Section 512(h) violates the First Amendment rights

of internet users.

II

This court reviews de novo the district court's rulings on questions of statutory

interpretation. Haug v. Bank of Am., N.A., 317 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 2003). 

We begin our analysis with the language of the statute itself. United States

Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Zahareas, 272 F.3d 1102, 1106 (8th Cir. 2001). Section

512(h) permits a copyright owner to "request the clerk of any United States district

court to issue a subpoena to [an ISP] for identification of an alleged infringer."

Significantly, one of the items to be included in any subpoena request is "a copy of

a notification described in subsection [512](c)(3)(A)." 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(2)(A).

This notification is a mandatory part of the subpoena request and a condition

precedent to the issuance of a subpoena because the statute further provides, as the

"[b]asis for granting subpoena," that "the notification filed satisf[y] the provisions of

subsection (c)(3)(A)." 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(4). Thus, Charter argues § 512(h) only

authorizes copyright owners to obtain and serve a subpoena on an ISP if the ISP is

notified in accordance with the provisions of § 512(c)(3)(A). We turn, then, to the

notification provision.

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4

A fifth safe harbor, under § 512(e), applies when the ISP is a nonprofit

educational institution.

5

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A), the notification provision, (to which 17 U.S.C

§ 512(h)(2)(A) cross-references) provides:

Elements of notification.--

(A) To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed

infringement must be a written communication . . . that includes

substantially the following:

(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to

act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is

allegedly infringed.

(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have

been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single

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The notification provision of § 512(c)(3)(A) is found within one of the four

safe harbors created by the statute to protect ISPs from liability for copyright

infringement under certain conditions. Each safe harbor applies to a particular ISP

function.4

 The first safe harbor, under § 512(a), limits the liability of ISPs when they

do nothing more than transmit, route, or provide connections for copyrighted material

– that is, when the ISP is a mere conduit for the transmission. The second safe

harbor, under § 512(b), protects ISPs for "system caching," that is, instances when

they provide intermediate and temporary storage of material on a system or network

under certain conditions. The third safe harbor, under § 512(c), limits the liability of

an ISP for infringing material "residing on [the ISP's] system or network at the

direction of its users." The fourth safe harbor, under § 512(d), protects an ISP when

it merely links users to online locations containing infringing material. 

As stated above, the notification provision is found within § 512(c), or the

storage-at-the-direction-of-users safe harbor.5

 The notification provision is also

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online site are covered by a single notification, a

representative list of such works at that site.

(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be

infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and

that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled,

and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service

provider to locate the material.

(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service

provider to contact the complaining party, such as an

address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic

mail address at which the complaining party may be

contacted.

(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith

belief that use of the material in the manner complained of

is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the

law.

(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is

accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the

complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the

owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added).

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referenced, however, in two other safe harbors – subsections (b) and (d) – the "system

caching" and "linking" safe harbors. Each of these three subsections protect an ISP

from liability if the ISP "responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the

material that is claimed to be infringing upon notification of claimed infringement as

described in [§ 512](c)(3)." 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(b)(2)(E), 512(c)(1)(C), and 512(d)(3)

(emphasis added). In other words, a specific purpose of the notification provision is

to allow an ISP, after notification, the opportunity to remove or disable access to

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infringing material and thereby protect itself from liability for copyright infringement.

Therefore, as one might expect, each safe harbor which covers an ISP function

allowing the ISP to remove or disable access to infringing material (i.e., the storage,

caching, and linking functions) refers to the notification provision and contains a

remove-or-disable-access provision.

As Charter notes, the safe harbor provision implicated here is § 512(a), which

limits the liability of an ISP when it merely acts as a conduit for infringing material

without storing, caching, or providing links to copyrighted material. Section 512(a)

does not reference the notification provision of § 512(c)(3)(A), nor does it contain the

remove-or-disable-access provision found in the three safe harbors created for the

storage, caching, and linking functions of an ISP. The absence of the remove-ordisable-access provision (and the concomitant notification provision) makes sense

where an ISP merely acts as a conduit for infringing material – rather than directly

storing, caching, or linking to infringing material – because the ISP has no ability to

remove the infringing material from its system or disable access to the infringing

material.

Based on this analysis of the statute, Charter argues § 512(h) does not allow a

copyright owner to request a subpoena for an ISP which merely acts as a conduit for

data transferred between two internet users. Charter avers the text and structure of

the DMCA require the ISP to be able both to locate and remove the allegedly

infringing material before a subpoena can be issued against it. Thus, where Charter

acted solely as a conduit for the transmission of material by others (its subscribers

using P2P file-sharing software to exchange files stored on their personal computers),

Charter contends the subpoena was not properly issued. We agree.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

recently considered this identical issue in holding § 512(h) only permits a copyright

owner to obtain and serve a subpoena on an ISP for identifying information about an

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alleged infringer if the ISP is provided statutory notification under 17 U.S.C.

§ 512(c)(3)(A), which in turn, requires the ISP to be able to both locate and remove

the allegedly infringing material. Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1233-36. 

The court held where an ISP performs only the "conduit" functions addressed

in § 512(a), § 512(h) does not authorize the subpoenas because the ISP "can not

remove or disable [a requirement of § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii)] one user's access to

infringing material resident on another user's computer." Id. at 1235. The court

further concluded the concept of removing or disabling access to particular material

could not be equated with the distinct remedy of termination of a subscriber's account.

Id. As to the RIAA's failure to comply with the requirement of identifying material

to be removed or disabled, the court also rejected the RIAA's argument it had

"substantially" met the notification requirements of § 512(c)(3)(A), despite its failure

to identify material to be removed or disabled. Id. at 1236. Additionally, the court

emphatically rejected the RIAA's reliance on a broad definition of "service provider"

in § 512(k)(1)(B), concluding however broadly that internet service provider may be

defined in that section, a subpoena may issue to an ISP only under the prescribed

conditions regarding notification set forth in § 512(c)(3)(A). Id.

The court also analyzed the structure of § 512 as a whole, and in particular the

fact that § 512(h) cross references § 512(c)(3), and subsection (c) pertains to the safe

harbor for "Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users." The

court concluded "the references to § 512(c)(3)" in subsections (b) through (d) "lead

inexorably to the conclusion that § 512(h) is structurally linked to the storage

functions of an ISP and not to its transmission functions, such as those listed in §

512(a)." Id. at 1237. 

The court further concluded it is the province of Congress, not the courts, to

decide whether to rewrite the DMCA "in order to make it fit a new and unforeseen

internet architecture" and "accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing

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interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology." Id. at 1238 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). 

We agree with and adopt the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit in Verizon as it pertains to this statutory issue.

Thus, because the parties do not dispute that Charter's function was limited to acting

as a conduit for the allegedly copyright protected material, we agree § 512(h) does not

authorize the subpoenas issued here. As a court we are bound to interpret the terms

of the statute and not to contort the statute so as to cover the situation presented by

this case.

For purposes of this appeal, we do not address the constitutional arguments

presented by Charter, but do note this court has some concern with the subpoena

mechanism of § 512(h). We comment without deciding that this provision may

unconstitutionally invade the power of the judiciary by creating a statutory framework

pursuant to which Congress, via statute, compels a clerk of a court to issue a

subpoena, thereby invoking the court's power. Further, we believe Charter has at

least a colorable argument that a judicial subpoena is a court order that must be

supported by a case or controversy at the time of its issuance. We emphasize,

however, for purposes of this appeal we do not reach these issues and have decided

this case on the more narrow statutory grounds.

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered the November 17, 2003, order of the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri enforcing various subpoenas

for personal information about Charter's subscribers is hereby vacated. This matter

is hereby remanded so the district court may: (1) Order the RIAA to return to Charter

any and all information obtained from the subpoenas; (2) Order the RIAA to maintain

no record of information derived from the subpoenas; (3) Order the RIAA to make

no further use of the subscriber data obtained via the subpoenas; and (d) Grant such

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other relief not inconsistent with this order the district court deems appropriate in

these circumstances.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Because the court focuses too narrowly in its reading of the DMCA, overlooks

certain plain language used by Congress, and fails to give effect to the statute as a

whole, I respectfully dissent. The subpoena power created by Congress in § 512(h)

does not limit the type of service provider for whom subpoenas may be issued in the

fight against internet piracy. Section 512(h) authorizes a copyright owner or its

representative to request a subpoena to a service provider in order to identify

infringers, and the statutory definition of "service provider" in § 512(k) specifically

includes conduit service providers such as Charter. Moreover, no other section of the

statute imposes the limitation on the subpoena power urged by Charter.

In enacting the DMCA Congress sought to protect both the interests of

copyright holders and of internet service providers concerned about their own liability

for infringement by their customers. The legislative solution in response to these

concerns significantly limited the liability of ISPs for infringement by their customers

and provided copyright holders more direct means to attack digital piracy. The

subpoena provision in § 512(h) is one of these means, and this provision is of special

value to a copyright owner seeking to stop infringement through conduit service

providers. That is because a conduit ISP does not store materials for downloading

and is thus cannot directly remove or disable access to any infringing material. By

using the § 512(h) subpoena power to learn the identity of conduit service subscribers

who infringe, copyright holders are able to take steps to protect their interests, seek

compensation for their misappropriated property, and stop infringement.

To interpret the statute in the way Charter urges, and the court adopts, is to

block copyright holders from obtaining effective protection against infringement

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through conduit service providers. The repercussions of infringement via the internet

are too easily ignored or minimized. Regarded by some as an innocuous form of

entertainment, internet piracy of copyrighted sound recordings results in substantial

economic and artistic costs. See Jeff Leeds, Music Industry Turns to Napster Creator

for Help, N.Y. Times, December 3, 2004, at C1 (internet file trading networks permit

fans to obtain "virtually any song at any time...gratis" while "ravaging CD sales and

weakening the underpinnings of the industry"). It is not just faceless corporations

who pay the cost. Local music retailers are also vulnerable to the allure of free music,

see David Segal, Requiem for the Record Store; Downloaders and Discounters Are

Driving Out Music Retailers, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 2004 at A1 (sales of record retailers

"hammered by Internet piracy" and now in "serious trouble"), and artists can lose

economic incentive to create and distribute works.

Copyright laws were foreseen by the framers of the Constitution as "the engine

of free expression." Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., v. Nat’l Enters., 471 U.S. 539,

558 (1985); see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power to "promote

the Progress of...useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors...the exclusive

Right to their respective Writings"). Piracy substantially undermines this incentive.

Annual losses to copyright owners even before the expansive growth in peer to peer

file sharing were estimated to be $11 to $20 billion. H. Rep. No. 105-339, at 4

(1997). Since copyright holders are effectively unable to recover from the designers

of file trading software, see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd.,

380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 2004 WL 2289054 (2004), or from

internet service providers, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)-(d), action against identified

infringers offers the only practical means to protect the interests of copyright holders.

The subpoena requested by the RIAA in this case was authorized by and in

compliance with the DMCA, and the district court's order enforcing it should be

affirmed.

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I.

The increasing use of peer to peer file sharing programs makes the DMCA

subpoena power very significant. Such programs were already being developed at

the time of the congressional hearings preceding the passage of the DMCA. See

Electronic Piracy and the No Electronic Theft (NET) Act: Hearing Before the

Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th

Cong. 17-18 (1997) (statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin

DiGregory about the direct transfer of copyrighted material through electronic

bulletin boards, file transfer protocol sites, and email). Peer to peer programs allow

individual internet users to access infringing materials located on the personal

computers of others and to download them onto their own equipment. These

programs are used to transmit infringing materials through conduit services.

Congress recognized the need to address infringement through conduit service

providers in the DMCA, and its opening section applies to networks which transmit

infringing materials at the direction of their users. § 512(a).

While copyright owners are now able to use special software to identify the

internet protocol (IP) addresses and the service providers used by traders in

copyrighted files, it is the ISPs who have the names and personal addresses of the

infringers. The only viable way for copyright owners to vindicate their intellectual

property rights in a timely manner when infringing materials are transmitted across

peer to peer networks is to subpoena the ISPs for disclosure of the identities of

alleged infringers.

The effectiveness of the § 512(h) mechanism may be seen in this case.

Appellant RIAA, which represents the owners of copyrights to an extensive collection

of sound recordings, used a tracking program to discover that ninety three of Charter

Communication's internet subscribers were offering more than 100,000 copyrighted

recordings of its members for downloading. RIAA downloaded the files and

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-16-

confirmed that the offerings were illegal copies of copyrighted materials. It then

requested a subpoena from the clerk of the Eastern District of Missouri to obtain from

Charter the names, physical and email addresses, and telephone numbers of the

infringing subscribers. The clerk issued the subpoena. After it was served on

Charter, it filed a motion in the district court to quash it. The district court held a

hearing before ruling, then issued an order denying Charter's motion to quash.

Although the court enforced the subpoena, it denied RIAA's request for subscriber

telephone numbers. Charter's motion for an emergency stay was denied by this court,

and Charter then provided RIAA with the subpoenaed information.

The statutory right to request a subpoena is not limited by the type of ISP. Any

copyright owner or authorized agent "may request the clerk of any United States

district court to issue a subpoena to a service provider for identification of an alleged

infringer." § 512(h)(1) (emphasis added). A request is to be made by filing with the

clerk the following: a copy of a notification containing information outlined in §

512(c)(3)(A), a proposed subpoena, and a sworn declaration that the applicant's

purpose is solely to identify the alleged infringer to protect its statutory rights. §

512(h)(2). If the notification and declaration are in proper form, the clerk shall issue

the subpoena "expeditiously." § 512(h)(4). This permits a copyright owner to

proceed directly against an infringer without delay and thereby avoid further losses.

Although Charter contends that the subpoena power in the DMCA is limited

by the function of the ISP, such a limitation is not to be found in a plain reading of

the DMCA. To the contrary, the statute defines "service providers" in § 512(k) as all

"provider[s] of online services or network access," including conduit providers who

offer the "transmission...of material of the user's choosing, without modification." §

512(k)(1). If Congress had wanted to limit the type of ISP subject to a statutory

subpoena, it could have easily specified that in § 512(h), but it did not. In the absence

of such a limitation, the statute's definition of "service provider" in § 512(k)(1)

controls, and it includes Charter. See United States v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 213 F.

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169, 173 (8th Cir. 1914) ("[W]here the legislative body makes no exception to a

general and clear declaration..., the conclusive presumption is that it intended to make

none, and it is not the province of the courts to do so.").

Following the approach of the D.C. Circuit in Verizon, the majority relies on

the § 512(h) reference to the notice provision in § 512(c)(3)(A) to read a limitation

into the availability of subpoenas. One of the documents to be included in a

subpoena request is "a copy of a notification described in subsection (c)(3)(A)."

§ 512(h)(2)(A). The notification subsection is entitled "Elements of notification" and

it lists six: (i) the signature of someone authorized to act on behalf of the owner of the

infringed copyright; (ii) identification of the copyrighted work claimed to be

infringed; (iii) identification of the infringing material; (iv) information reasonably

sufficient to allow the ISP to contact the complaining party; (v) a statement of the

complaining party's good faith belief that the material is being used in an

unauthorized manner; and (vi) a statement that the notification is accurate and the

complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner. See § 512(c)(3)(A).

The majority focuses on just one of these six elements to arrive at its position

that § 512(h) subpoenas were not intended by Congress to be directed at conduit

service providers. Its focus is on the third notice element which requires

identification of the infringing material. That subsection reads as follows:

Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the

subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to

which is to be disabled, and the information reasonably sufficient to

permit the service provider to locate the material.

§ 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). The majority claims that this language excludes

conduit ISPs, but the language does not say that. The subsection defines the material

to be identified in two ways: (1) material that is "claimed to be infringing" and (2)

material that is "the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access

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to which is to be disabled." Id. In the statute, the two definitions are joined by the

word "or," a word commonly used to distinguish between alternatives. See United

States v. Wilson, 41 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Terms connected by 'or'

...normally are read to have separate meanings and significance."); United States v.

Smeathers, 884 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Normally, the word 'or' connotes

disjunction."). The majority's reading of the subsection ignores the use of the

disjunctive form in describing the infringing material (the subsection also contains

a second use of the disjunctive form to distinguish "to be removed or...to be

disabled"). Were we to disregard the disjunctive form in this case, we would fail in

our "obligation...to give effect to congressional purpose so long as the congressional

language does not itself bar that result." Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 710

n.10 (2000).

The distinction within § 512(c)(3)(A) between material "claimed to be

infringing" and material that is "the subject of infringing activity and that is to be

removed or access to which is to be disabled" appears to carry forward the initial

distinction in the DMCA between § 512(a) conduit ISPs and §§ 512(b)-(d) storage

ISPs. The copyrighted material stored on an ISP's network becomes the subject of

infringing activity when it is unlawfully duplicated by subscribers. In order to

remove such material or disable access to it, a storage ISP needs it to be identified.

On the other hand, when a subscriber transfers copyrighted material through a conduit

ISP, that service provider cannot remove the material from the network. It can,

however, provide identifying information about the offeror of the material "claimed

to be infringing." Indeed, as the government points out, the subsection's two

categories of material are not mutually exclusive, and a conduit ISP can indirectly

disable access to material by terminating the accounts of an infringing subscriber.

Section 512(h), which creates the subpoena power, only references

§ 512(c)(3)(A) to indicate the kind of information which needs to be given to the

clerk to request a subpoena. By referencing the elements of the notification in

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§ 512(c)(3)(A), Congress avoided the necessity of repeating such notice details in

§ 512(h). The statutory requirement that storage service providers expeditiously

remove or disable access to infringing materials in order to avoid secondary liability

is not rooted in this notification provision, but rather in those sections of the DMCA

which set out the obligations of storage providers. See §§ 512(b)(2)(E), 512(c)(1)(C),

512(d)(3).

Charter's restrictive view of the subpoena power rests entirely on its reading

extra words into § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) to limit its applicability to storage ISPs. It reads

the provision as if the subsection referred to material that is (1) "claimed to be

infringing" and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, or material

that is (2) "the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to

which is to be disabled." That is not what Congress said, however. To the extent that

the § 512(h) cross reference to § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) is fairly seen to be subject to

different interpretations, it is ambiguous, and any ambiguity must be resolved by

looking to the intent of Congress in its enactment of the legislation. See

Premachandra v. Mitts, 727 F.2d 717, 727 (8th Cir. 1984).

The intent of Congress in enacting the DMCA was to address “massive piracy”

of copyrighted works over digital networks without hampering technological

development of the internet by the threat of third party liability for service providers.

Sen. Rep. 105-190, at 8 (1998). ISPs were only shielded from monetary and

injunctive liability in exchange for their assistance in identifying subscribers who

engage in acts of piracy over their networks and in removing or disabling access of

infringers to protected works when technically possible. Congress wanted to create

“strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect

and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked

environment,” while at the same time providing “greater certainty to service providers

concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may occur in the course of their

activities.” Id. at 40.

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The majority's interpretation of the statute undermines this structure. It denies

copyright holders the ability to obtain identification of those subscribers who purloin

protected materials through § 512(a) conduit ISPs. This interpretation also shields

conduit ISPs from liability without requiring their assistance in protecting copyrights.

The suggestion that copyright holders should be left to file John Doe lawsuits to

protect themselves from infringement by subscribers of conduit ISPs like Charter,

instead of availing themselves of the mechanism Congress provided in the DMCA,

is impractical and contrary to legislative intent. John Doe actions are costly and time

consuming. Nowhere in the DMCA did Congress indicate that copyright holders

should be relegated to such cumbersome and expensive measures against conduit

ISPs. The legislative history shows that the purpose of the subpoena power in the

DMCA was to obtain the assistance of ISPs in an expeditious process to stop

infringement. See Sen. Rep. 105-190, at 51 (1998) ("The issuing of the [subpoena]

should be a ministerial function performed quickly for this provision to have its

intended effect.").

Had Congress wanted to limit the reach of the subpoena power to ISPs engaged

in storage functions, it could have easily stated that. It did not, however. Instead, it

provided that § 512(h) subpoenas could be requested for a "service provider," and it

defined "service provider" in § 512(k) to include conduit ISPs like Charter. A

coherent reading of the text and structure of the statute reinforces the message of

these sections, which is that the subpoena power created by § 512(h) was intended for

use against all types of service providers. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534

U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (statutory scheme should be read as "coherent and consistent");

U.S. Nat. Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439,

455 (1993) ("Statutory construction is a holistic endeavor, and, at a minimum, must

account for a statute's full text, language as well as punctuation, structure, and subject

matter.") (internal citations omitted).

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Since the subpoena to Charter complied with the DMCA and was authorized

under it, the district court did not err by enforcing it, and its order should be affirmed.

II.

Based on its interpretation of the DMCA, the majority vacates the order of the

district court without addressing the other arguments Charter raises against

enforcement of RIAA's subpoena. It claims that the subpoena provision in the

DMCA violates the case or controversy requirement of Article III and that such

subpoenas may not constitutionally be issued by a federal court clerk. It also argues

that the subpoena would violate the Communication Act, as well as First Amendment

rights of its subscribers, and that the district court erred by ordering disclosure of

email addresses. RIAA responds to all these arguments, while the intervening United

States concentrates on refuting Charter's constitutional attacks.

A.

Under Article III of the Constitution, the judicial power is limited to the

resolution of "cases" and "controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Whether a court

is presented with a case or controversy is a question of substance, not form. To

obtain constitutional jurisdiction there must be "an adversary proceeding, involving

a real, not a hypothetical, controversy." Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v.

Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933).

Charter argues that since Article III courts only have jurisdiction if there is a

case or controversy, a federal court clerk cannot constitutionally issue a § 512(h)

subpoena in the absence of a case. RIAA responds that issuance of a § 512(h)

subpoena is a ministerial act by the clerk which has been authorized by Congress and

which does not invoke the judicial power. No case or controversy is therefore

required it says. Intervenor United States points out that a § 512(h) subpoena would

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not be requested in the absence of a controversy between a copyright owner and an

infringer so there is no Article III violation; RIAA makes a similar argument. We

review the existence of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Simes v. Huckabee, 354

F.3d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 2004).

Charter alleges that the issuance of a § 512(h) subpoena requires a judicial act,

and the majority suggests in dictum that § 512(h) "may unconstitutionally invade the

power of the judiciary" by compelling a court clerk to issue a subpoena, "thereby

invoking the court's power." Charter and the majority do not, however, explain why

the clerk's act of issuing a DMCA subpoena is judicial in nature. The terms of §

512(h) do not leave any discretion to the clerk nor do they require any action by the

court. The clerk is required to issue a subpoena to an ISP when the desired

information is included in a request. Such a request initiates a ministerial act by the

clerk. See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 498 (1866) ("A ministerial duty...is

one in respect to which nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple, definite duty,

arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law."). Here it

was Charter which decided to invoke the judicial power, by filing a motion to quash.

No judge was involved in issuance of the subpoena.

In the compromise Congress legislated between the interests of copyright

owners and ISPs, it created a ministerial process through which information can be

obtained without the necessity of a civil action. See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 51

(1998) ("The issuing of the order should be a ministerial function performed quickly

for this provision to have its intended effect."). Ministerial acts have long been

recognized as nonjudicial by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Custiss v. Georgetown &

Alexandria Turnpike Co., 10 U.S. 233, 236 (1810) (statutory duty of court clerk to

record jury inquisitions a "ministerial act" that "requires no exercise of judicial

functions").

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Over the years Congress has enacted a number of other laws that similarly

authorize district court clerks to issue subpoenas in the absence of judicial action or

pending litigation. Congress has authorized clerks to issue subpoenas requiring

witness testimony in such circumstances as election disputes, 2 U.S.C. § 388, patent

and trademark contests, 35 U.S.C. § 24, railroad employment arbitrations, 45 U.S.C.

§ 157(h), and plant variety protection proceedings, 7 U.S.C. § 2354(a). There is no

record that any of these statutory subpoenas have been held to violate the case or

controversy requirement of Article III, and no good reason has been shown to hold

that the clerk’s issuance of a subpoena under § 512(h) is barred by the Constitution.

Federal courts engage in a number of functions in both civil and criminal

contexts that do not directly involve adversarial proceedings. See Morrison v. Olson,

487 U.S. 654, 681 n.20 (1988) ("[F]ederal courts and judges have long performed a

variety of functions that...do not necessarily or directly involve adversarial

proceedings within a trial or appellate court."). In the criminal context, federal courts

issue warrants, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, review applications for wire taps, see 18

U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518, and assist grand juries in their investigative functions,

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 681 n.20. In the civil context, federal judges are authorized to

order depositions even in the absence of a filed case in order to “prevent a failure or

delay of justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(3). District courts also oversee requests for

discovery from foreign or international tribunals, regardless of whether there is a

pending case in a United States court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782; In re Letters Rogatory

from the First Court of the First Instance in Civil Matters, 42 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir.

1995).

These precedents indicate that Congress may constitutionally create a subpoena

mechanism like that in the DMCA and that the subpoena power of § 512(h) does not

violate the case or controversy requirement of Article III.

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B.

Charter contends that the disclosures obtained under § 512(h) subpoenas

violate the Communications (Cable) Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551. Under the Cable Act,

cable operators are prohibited from disclosing personal information that could

identify subscribers without obtaining their prior written or electronic consent, and

operators are required to take actions to prevent unauthorized access to such

information. Id. § 551(c). Charter maintains that these privacy provisions conflict

with the disclosure authorized by the DMCA because a § 512(h) subpoena does not

require advance notice to an alleged infringer. It argues that a cable operator cannot

comply with a DMCA subpoena without violating the Cable Act.

This argument overlooks what Congress did to protect operators from such a

dilemma. The DMCA explicitly states in § 512(h) that a subpoenaed service provider

must "expeditiously disclose...the information required by the subpoena,

notwithstanding any other provision of law." § 512(h)(5) (emphasis added). The

"notwithstanding" provision in § 512(h) indicates that the DMCA subpoena power

is intended to "supersede[] other statutes that might interfere with or hinder the

attainment of [its] objective." See Campbell v. Minneapolis Pub. Hous. Auth. ex rel

City of Minneapolis, 168 F.3d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Cisneros v. Alpine

Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18 (1993) ( "As we have noted previously in construing

statutes, the use of such a 'notwithstanding' clause clearly signals the drafter's

intention that the provisions of the 'notwithstanding' section override the conflicting

provisions of any other section.").

Section 551(c) of the Cable Act is thus superseded by the subpoena provision

in the DMCA, and a cable operator can comply with a § 512(a) subpoena without

violating the earlier statute.

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6

Blount does not mention any presumption of protected anonymity, but the

Supreme Court has elsewhere recognized a right to communicate messages

anonymously. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995)

(pamphleteer's "decision to remain anonymous...is an aspect of the freedom of speech

protected by the First Amendment"). Even if Charter were determined to have

standing to assert First Amendment rights of its subscribers, it has not shown that the

DMCA suppresses the content of any messages.

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C.

Charter recognizes that the First Amendment does not protect copyright

infringement, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., v. Nat’l Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560

(1985), but it argues that § 512(h) violates protected rights of subscribers by

compromising their anonymity interests without procedural safeguards to ensure that

they have in fact engaged in illegal file sharing. RIAA responds that there is no First

Amendment interest at stake in this case and that § 512(h) provides significant

procedural protections. The United States agrees and asserts that § 512(h) does not

impose any restraint on speech, let alone a substantial burden on protected speech.

We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. United States v. Koons, 300

F.3d 985, 990 (8th Cir. 2002).

Charter contends that "internet speakers" have a "presumptively protected

anonymity" and that § 512(h) permits the disclosure of subscriber identity based only

on suspicion of infringing conduct. In support of this argument it cites Blount v.

Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971).6 In Blount, the Supreme Court overturned a federal

statute authorizing the Postmaster General to refuse delivery of materials

administratively determined to be obscene. 400 U.S. at 421-22. Since the statute

permitted suppression of expressive material without a judicial determination of

obscenity, it lacked the "sensitive tools" required to separate protected speech from

that which may be regulated. Id. at 417. Here in contrast, there is no suppression of

material based on its expressive content and the First Amendment is not implicated.

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Moreover, the DMCA has considerable procedural safeguards in its requirements for

a subpoena request. These include identification of the work claimed to have been

infringed and of the infringing material, statement of a "good faith belief" that

unlawful use has occurred, verification of the accuracy of the statements, and a sworn

declaration that the information disclosed is sought for and will be used only to

enforce ownership rights. See §§ 512(h)(2)(C), 512 (c)(3)(A).

Charter has not shown that the DMCA restrains or censors speech or that it

violates the First Amendment.

D.

In its final argument, Charter contends that the district court erred in ordering

the disclosure of the email addresses of its subscribers because § 512(h) only requires

disclosure of “information sufficient to identify” subscribers and their mailing

addresses sufficiently meet that requirement. § 512(h)(3). RIAA counters that

§ 512(h) entitles it to disclosure of email addresses and that the statute’s purpose

would be undermined without access to this quick and economical way to contact

alleged infringers. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Haug

v. Bank of Am., N.A., 317 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 2003).

Section 512(h)(3) states that the subpoena shall authorize the ISP receiving it

to disclose to the copyright owner or his agent “information sufficient to identify” the

alleged infringer. While the subsection does not define what information is

“sufficient” for identification, the disclosure provision is best read in the light of the

statute's "expeditious" requirement. See id.; § 512(h)(5). Since electronic mail

provides the fastest and surest means of contacting individuals alleged to have

engaged in digital piracy over the internet, email addresses are a most appropriate

form of identification. Nothing in § 512(h) precludes the disclosure of email

addresses, and the statute in fact includes electronic mail addresses as part of that

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"[i]nformation reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the

complaining party." § 512(c)(3)(A)(iv). Finally, as noted by the district court, email

is a less intrusive form of notification than the telephone. The district court did not

err by requiring the disclosure of email addresses by Charter.

III.

Because the subpoena to Charter was properly issued and was authorized under

the terms of the DMCA, and there being no constitutional or statutory impediments

to its enforcement, the order of the district court should be affirmed.

______________________________

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