Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01329/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01329-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jo Lesly Désiré, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Michael Mukasey, Attorney General of the

United States, in his official capacity;

Katrina Kane, Director, Phoenix Field

Office, Office of Detention and Removal

Operations, U.S. Bureau of Immigrations

and Custom Enforcement, in her official

capacity; Michael Chertoff, Secretary of

Homeland Security, in his official

capacity, 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 08-1329-PHX-SRB

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Jo Lesly Désiré’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. 1). Petitioner filed the instant Petition on July 18, 2008, arguing

that the immigration removal proceedings pending against him are barred by res judicata and

by Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (“ICE”) own regulations. (Doc. 1-1, Pet. for a

Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Pet.”) at 2.) Respondents filed a Response in Opposition to the

Petition on August 18, 2008, arguing that the Court lacked jurisdiction. (Doc. 11, Resp. in

Opp’n to Pet. (“Resp. to Pet.”) at 2.) Petitioner filed his Reply on September 8, 2008. (Doc.

13, Pet’r’s Reply to Resp. to Pet. (“Pet’r’s Reply to Pet.”) at 1.) 

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The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation on January 28, 2009,

recommending that the Court find that jurisdiction is not barred by the immigration statutes,

but that the Petition should be dismissed because Petitioner is not “in custody” as required

by 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). (Doc. 16, Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) at 9-13.) The

Report and Recommendation did not reach the merits of Petitioner’s claims. (See id.) The

Court adopted the Report and Recommendation’s jurisdictional findings in part and rejected

the Report and Recommendation’s “in custody” determination, finding that the Court has

jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s res judicata claim but not Petitioner’s claim that ICE violated

its own regulations. (Doc. 20, Dec. 14, 2009, Order (“Order”) at 3-10.) The Court then

referred the matter back to the Magistrate Judge for a supplemental report and

recommendation regarding the merits of Petitioner’s res judicata claim. (Id. at 10.) 

The Magistrate Judge issued a Supplemental Report and Recommendation on June

4, 2010, recommending that the Court find that Petitioner’s res judicata claim is without

merit and deny the Petition. (Doc. 26, Supplemental Report and Recommendation (“Supp.

R&R”) at 11.) Petitioner filed a timely Objection to the Supplemental Report and

Recommendation. (Doc. 28, Pet’r’s Objection to the Supp. R&R (“Pet’r’s Obj. to Supp.

R&R”) at 1.) The Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s Supplemental Report and

Recommendation and overrules Petitioner’s Objection.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Haiti and was admitted to the United States as a

lawful permanent resident in 1967 at the age of 14. (Pet. at 2.) In 1998, Petitioner was

convicted of selling or transporting a controlled substance under California Health and Safety

Code § 11352(a) (the “California conviction”). (Pet., Ex. D, Abstract of J.). On August 16,

1999, the government served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear based on Petitioner’s

California conviction, charging Petitioner with being removable on the ground that his

California conviction was an aggravated felony. (Pet., Ex. E, Notice to Appear.) On June 2,

2000, an immigration judge (“IJ”) sustained the charges against Petitioner and issued an

order for his removal to Haiti. (Pet., Ex. F, IJ Order.) On January 17, 2001, the Board of

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Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. (Pet., Ex. H, BIA Order.)

Petitioner filed a habeas petition challenging the order of removal. Petitioner was removed

from the United States in 2006. (Pet. at 2.) On August 15, 2007, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review and vacated the removal

order. Desire v. Gonzales, 245 F. App’x 627, 629 (9th Cir. 2007) (unpublished

memorandum). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, following a change in the law,

Petitioner’s California conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under either the

categorical approach or the modified categorical approach. Id. The Ninth Circuit granted

Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and vacated the order of removal. Id.

On December 21, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) filed a

Motion for Remand to the Immigration Court with the BIA. (Pet., Ex. J, DHS Mot. to

Remand to Immigration Ct.) The BIA treated the DHS’s motion as a motion to reopen the

proceedings. (Pet., Ex. K, Decision of BIA.) Although the BIA agreed with Petitioner that

res judicata barred the DHS from attempting to establish that Petitioner’s California

conviction was an aggravated felony, it held that res judicata did not bar the DHS from

charging that the same California conviction rendered Petitioner removable under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) as an alien convicted of a controlled substance offense. (Id.) On February

11, 2008, the BIA granted the DHS’s motion to remand Petitioner’s removal proceedings to

the immigration court. (Id.) Petitioner then filed the instant Petition arguing that the

government is prohibited from reopening the prior immigration proceedings both by the

doctrine of res judicata and the relevant immigration regulations. (Pet. at 7-12.) The

immigration proceedings have since been “administratively closed,” essentially stayed,

pending the resolution of the current Petition. (Pet’r’s Obj. to Supp. R&R at 4.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars further litigation of a claim by

the parties and their privies following a final judgment on the merits. Poblete Mendoza v.

Holder, 606 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010). Under res judicata, a final judgment on the

merits precludes parties and their privies from re-litigating all issues that were or could have

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been raised in the prior action. ProShipLine Inc. v. Aspen Infrastructures Ltd., 609 F.3d 960,

968 (9th Cir. 2010); Valencia-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1319, 1323 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006)

(“Res judicata or claim preclusion bars a subsequent action ‘not only as to every matter

which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other

admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.’” (quoting Cromwell v.

County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1877)). In the immigration context, res judicata prohibits

the government “from initiating a second deportation case on the basis of a charge that [it]

could have brought in the first case, when, due to a change of law that occurred during the

course of the first case, [it] lost the first case.” Bravo-Pedroza v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 1358,

1358 (9th Cir. 2007).

The BIA has the discretion to reopen “any case in which it has rendered a decision.”

8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). The BIA’s discretion is, however, limited, and “[a] motion to reopen

proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be

offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented

at the former hearing.” Id. § 1003.2(c). The fact that removal proceedings may be reopened

does not change the fact that a final decision on the merits is res judicata in any subsequent,

separate proceeding. Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 824 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir. 1987). However,

courts have recognized that the regulations governing motions to reopen or reconsider

decisions in immigration proceedings permit reopening or reconsidering a case even after a

final judgment on the merits. See Rana v. Gonzales, 175 F. App’x 988, 995 (10th Cir. 2006)

(noting that “there are situations in which claim preclusion does not prevent the reopening

or reconsideration of a final judgment,” including for example review of a district court

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), and ultimately finding “no

reason . . . that the doctrine of claim preclusion should bar reopening a ‘final’ decision of an

agency in accordance with the immigration regulations but allow relief from a ‘final’

judgment of a district court under Rule 60(b)”); Hamzavi v. INS, 46 F.3d 1141, *2 (9th Cir.

1995) (unpublished table decision) (rejecting the petitioner’s assertion that the decision to

reconsider an administratively final decision violated res judicata and stating that the

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“[p]etitioner’s position is untenable [and] [t]he Ninth Circuit has consistently acknowledged

the BIA’s and the IJ’s right to reopen or reconsider cases in accordance with INS

regulations”); see also Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 969 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that

“[the court’s] affirmance [of the BIA’s denial of the petitioner’s request for asylum and

withholding of removal] has no res judicata effect upon [the petitioner’s] motion to reopen,

should he choose to file one”).

In the instant matter, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the merits of the

Petition and found that Petitioner’s California conviction “cannot be categorized as an

aggravated felony.” Desire, 245 F. App’x at 629. The Ninth Circuit then granted Petitioner’s

Petition and vacated the removal order. Id. In the Supplemental Report and

Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge found that the Ninth Circuit’s decision only

precluded further litigation related to determining whether Petitioner’s California conviction

was an aggravated felony. (Supp. R&R at 11.) The Magistrate Judge also noted that “no

separate removal proceeding has been initiated against Petitioner.” (Id.) Ultimately, the

Magistrate Judge concluded that res judicata does not “prevent[] the Government from

seeking to reopen the administrative proceedings and allege new grounds for removal” and

that “Petitioner’s res judicata claim is without merit, and his Petition should be denied.” (Id.)

Petitioner objects to the Supplemental Report and Recommendation, arguing that the Ninth

Circuit’s decision, vacating the removal order and granting his Petition, was a final judgment

on the merits and that res judicata thus prohibits the government from reopening the

proceedings on the basis of a charge that the government could have brought prior to the

Ninth Circuit’s decision. (Pet’r’s Obj. to Supp. R&R at 7-9.)

Res judicata does prohibit the government from bringing a subsequent immigration

proceeding based on charges that could have been brought in a prior proceeding. See BravoPedroza, 475 F.3d at 1359. Res judicata does not, however, prohibit a motion to reopen

following a final decision in immigration proceedings. See Rana, 175 F. App’x at 995;

Hamzavi, 46 F.3d at *2. Here, the DHS moved to reopen the immigration proceedings

against Petitioner. Petitioner does not cite a single case, and the Court cannot find one, where

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res judicata limited the ability to reopen an immigration proceeding. Additionally, every case

cited by Petitioner in support of the application of res judicata applies res judicata only to

prevent subsequent, separate proceedings not initiated through the reopening procedure. See

Bravo-Pedroza, 475 F.3d at 1361; Ramon-Sepulveda, 824 F.2d at 750-51. The process for

reopening an immigration proceeding is governed and limited by regulations, not the doctrine

of res judicata. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2; Rana, 175 F. App’x at 995; Hamzavi, 46 F.3d at *2.

As held in the Court’s previous Order, this Court is without jurisdiction to review the BIA’s

discretionary decision to reopen pursuant to the immigration regulations. (Order at 6.)

Petitioner must raise any challenges to the BIA’s decision to reopen and remand by appealing

to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (See id.)

III. CONCLUSION

While the doctrine of res judicata applies to immigration proceedings, it does not

prohibit the reopening of an immigration proceeding in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.

Petitioner’s challenge to the decision to reopen fails, and the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus is denied.

IT IS ORDERED overruling Petitioner’s Objections to the Supplemental Report and

Recommendation (Doc. 28).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED adopting the Supplemental Report and

Recommendation (Doc. 26).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Petitioner Jo Lesly Désiré’s Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

DATED this 23rd day of December, 2010.

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