Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04027/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04027-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTORIA ROGER-VASSELIN,

et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL,

INC., et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C04-4027 TEH 

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER

GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter came before the Court on Monday, May 22, 2006, on the following

motions: (1) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to exhaustion and statute of

limitations issues; (2) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to state law jurisdiction

issues; and (3) Defendant Owen’s motion for summary judgment. On May 24, 2006, this

Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part all three motions. However, the

May 24 order was designed only to give the parties notice of the Court’s rulings prior to the

parties’ May 25 mediation date. The Court now issues this order to explain the reasoning

behind the rulings announced in its May 24 order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Victoria Roger-Vasselin, Kenneth M. Arrick, and Richard Kittner assert age

discrimination, retaliation, and harassment claims against Defendants Marriott International,

Inc. (“Marriott”); two subsidiaries of Marriott, Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., doing

business as Marriott Vacation Club International, and Ritz-Carlton Development Company,

doing business as the Ritz-Carlton Club; and Rick Owen, an individual supervisor. Plaintiffs

bring their claims under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) as

well as under California and Hawaii state anti-discrimination statutes. Under all three bodies

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of law, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are liable for age discrimination, harassment on the

basis of age, failure to prevent age discrimination and harassment, and retaliation for

complaining about age discrimination and harassment. Plaintiffs’ claims stem, in part, from

denials for promotion to various positions throughout the country and in several international

locations.

The three pending motions for summary judgment seek resolution only of limited

issues; Defendants do not move for summary judgment on a majority of Plaintiffs’ claims. In

these motions, Defendants raise four main challenges: (1) that some of Plaintiffs’ claims

based on promotion denials are time-barred or barred for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies; (2) that some of Plaintiffs’ California and Hawaii claims are barred because they

lack a sufficient connection to California or Hawaii; (3) that Plaintiffs may not recover on

certain of their claims against Defendant Owen because the law does not allow for recovery

against individual employees on those claims; and (4) that Plaintiff Arrick may not assert any

claims against Defendant Owen because Arrick failed to name Owen in any administrative

charge and therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to claims against Owen. 

This order addresses each of Defendants’ arguments in turn below.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to material

facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The

court may not weigh the evidence and must view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Id. at 255. 

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of

the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery

responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

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It is inapposite that Plaintiffs group more than one claim into a single cause of action. 

Plaintiffs have cited no authority for the proposition that summary judgment is only

appropriate where it resolves an entire cause of action as pleaded in the complaint.

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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at

trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than

for the moving party. Id. at 322-23. However, on an issue for which its opponent will have

the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by “pointing out to the

District Court . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s

case.” Id. at 325. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then

“set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” to defeat the motion. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

DISCUSSION

A. Propriety of Defendants’ Motions

As an initial matter, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ assertion that Defendants’ motions are

procedurally improper. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ arguments, Defendants do not seek resolution

of non-determinative issues; nor do they seek a ruling from the Court that certain factual

issues or elements of a claim are not materially in dispute. Instead, Defendants only seek

rulings from the Court that they are not liable on certain of Plaintiffs’ claims, and the Court

has the authority to issue such rulings where appropriate.1

 E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b)

(providing that a defending party may move for summary judgment “as to all or any part” of

a claim).

The cases cited by Plaintiffs are not to the contrary, nor would they be controlling on

this Court in any event. The cited cases, all from other district courts, stand only for the

proposition that some courts look with disfavor on summary judgment motions that seek

rulings on factual issues other than liability. See SEC v. Thrasher, 152 F. Supp. 2d 291,

295-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (improper to move for summary judgment on elements of a claim

when such rulings would not resolve that claim, but proper to move for summary judgment

on liability); Arado v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp., 626 F. Supp. 506, 509 (N.D. Ill. 1985)

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Plaintiffs argued in their opposition that a three-year statute of limitations period

applied to willful violations of the ADEA. However, Plaintiffs acknowledged in their

surreply that the correct limitations period is 300 days.

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(improper to move for summary judgment on claims for compensatory, consequential, and

liquidated damages under the ADEA when defendant did not seek summary judgment on

liability or claim for actual damages under the same statute); Capitol Records, Inc. v.

Progress Record Distributing, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 25, 28-30 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (proper to grant

partial summary judgment on liability, but improper to grant partial summary judgment on

undisputed portion of damages). Unlike the moving parties in those cases, Defendants here

move for summary judgment on liability, and not on an element of a claim or some other

non-dispositive factual issue.

B. Defendants’ Motion as to Exhaustion and Statute of Limitations Issues

Defendants’ first motion challenges the ability of Plaintiffs Arrick and Roger-Vasselin

to recover for certain promotion denials based on exhaustion and statute of limitations issues.

1. Plaintiffs Arrick’s and Roger-Vasselin’s Federal Claims

Under the ADEA, an aggrieved employee must file an administrative charge with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 300 days of the last alleged

unlawful act if 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) applies to the case; otherwise, the employee must file suit

within 180 days of the last alleged unlawful act. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). Section 633(b) applies

to this case because both California and Hawaii have “a law prohibiting discrimination in

employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek

relief from such discriminatory practice.” 29 U.S.C. § 633(b). As a result, a 300-day

limitations period applies to Plaintiffs’ claims.2

 Once the EEOC has issued a right-to-sue

letter, the employee must file any civil action within 90 days. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e).

Defendants contend that Plaintiff Arrick’s ADEA claims for promotions sought in

1998, 1999, 2000, and 2002 are barred because Arrick did not file a timely EEOC claim or

because he failed to file suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 

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Defendants also argue that Plaintiff Roger-Vasselin may not recover for five of her

challenged promotion denials for the same reasons. 

Plaintiffs “do not contest the exclusion of [Arrick’s] 1998-99 positions as an

independent basis for damages.” Opp’n at 7. Similarly, Plaintiffs do not challenge exclusion

of Arrick’s 2000 promotion denials or any of Roger-Vasselin’s contested denials when the

correct 300-day limitations period is applied. Instead, Plaintiffs only challenge exclusion of

Arrick’s 2002 promotion denials. See Surreply at 3 (arguing only that Arrick’s 2002

promotion denials are not time-barred when applying the correct limitations periods under

the ADEA); see also Opp’n at 7, 10 (arguing that Arrick’s 2000 promotion denials and

Roger-Vasselin’s challenged denials fall within a three-year statute of limitations but making

no other argument as to why summary judgment on these promotions should be denied). 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to the challenged promotion denials for

Plaintiff Arrick occurring in 1998, 1999, and 2000, and all five of the challenged promotion

denials for Plaintiff Roger-Vasselin.

As to Arrick’s challenged 2002 promotion denials, Plaintiffs rely on Arrick’s

administrative charge number 345A200380 (Ex. J to Defs.’ Req. for Judicial Notice), signed

on February 20, 2002, to oppose Defendants’ motion. In that charge, Arrick asserted that,

“[o]n a continuous basis since on or about March 1, 1999 through the present,” Defendants

denied his applications for promotion due to age discrimination and retaliation for filing a

previous charge of age discrimination. The EEOC did not issue a right-to-sue letter on this

charge until November 19, 2004 – after this lawsuit was filed. Thus, Arrick contends that he

did not have to file a new administrative charge based on the 2002 promotion denials because

those promotion denials were reasonably related to the allegations in charge number

345A200380, and a complaint may include incidents that are not included in the EEOC

charge if such incidents are “like or reasonably related to the allegations of the EEOC

charge.” Brown v. Continental Can Co., 765 F.2d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations

omitted).

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Defendants relied on Shelton in their response to Plaintiffs’ surreply, but they

inexplicably failed to mention that a subsequent Eighth Circuit panel distinguished Shelton in

Wedow.

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Defendants argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in National Railroad Passenger

Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), precludes Plaintiffs’ theory. In Morgan, the

Court held that discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation, including promotion denials,

cannot form the basis for continuing violation claims; instead, such claims “are not

actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” 

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113. However, Morgan is factually distinguishable from the present

case because the issue in Morgan was how far back an EEOC charge may reach; here, by

contrast, the issue is whether an EEOC charge can reach forward to include related claims

that occurred while the charge was pending. While some courts have applied Morgan’s

rationale to bar recovery for subsequent discrete acts of the sort claimed by Arrick here, e.g.,

Shelton v. Boeing Co., 399 F.3d 909, 912-13 (8th Cir. 2005), courts have not “wholly

abandoned the theory that reasonably related subsequent acts may be considered exhausted”

if the subsequent acts can reasonably be expected to grow out of the EEOC’s investigation,

Wedow v. City of Kansas City, 442 F.3d 661, 672-75 (8th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing Shelton

and holding that an additional administrative charge is not required for reasonably related

subsequent acts). The Ninth Circuit does not appear to have directly ruled on this issue, but

it has, post-Morgan, held that jurisdiction extends to “all claims of discrimination that fall

within the scope of the EEOC’s actual investigation or an EEOC investigation that could

reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge.” Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349

F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2003).

In this case, Arrick’s EEOC charge alleges denied promotions as a result of

discrimination and retaliation “since on or about March 1, 1999 through the present.” Ex. J

to Defs.’ Request for Judicial Notice (emphasis added). Thus, this case is unlike Shelton,

which put a discrete time limit on the charges of discrimination, and more like Wedow, where

the retaliation, including denials of promotion, was alleged to be ongoing.3

 Shelton, 399 F.3d

at 912-13; Wedow, 442 F.3d at 674. As the Wedow court explained, “a reasonable EEOC

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investigation of alleged ‘ongoing and continu[ing]’ retaliation in this case would certainly

have focused on whether or not the retaliation alleged was in fact existent at the time of the

filing of the charges and if it did indeed continue to exist at the time of the investigation.” 

Wedow, 442 F.3d at 674. That is, it would be reasonable to expect an investigation of

Arrick’s 2002 EEOC charge, which alleged discrimination and retaliation on a “continuous

basis,” to include an investigation of whether such retaliation was, in fact, continuing. 

Consequently, Defendants have failed to persuade the Court that the challenged 2002

promotions are barred because Arrick failed to file subsequent or amended administrative

charges while charge number 345A200380 was pending, and the Court accordingly DENIES

Defendants’ motion as to the challenged 2002 promotion denials for Plaintiff Arrick.

2. Plaintiff Arrick’s Hawaii Claims

Hawaii’s anti-discrimination statute contains statutory limitations periods similar to

the ADEA. Under Hawaii law, an aggrieved employee must file an administrative charge

with the Hawaii Civil Rights Commission (“HCRC”) within 180 days of the date “(1) [u]pon

which the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice occurred; or (2) [o]f the last occurrence in

a pattern of ongoing discriminatory practice.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 368-11(c). Once the HCRC

has issued a right-to-sue letter, the employee must file any civil action within 90 days. Haw.

Rev. Stat. § 368-12.

Defendants contend that certain promotions denied to Arrick in 1998, 1999, 2000, and

2002 fall outside these limitations periods, but Plaintiffs contend that the continuing violation

theory saves claims based on all of these promotion denials. Neither party cites to any

Hawaii law on the issue of the continuing violation doctrine, and the parties’ primary dispute

is whether Hawaii courts are likely to follow federal law on this point. Plaintiffs, however,

do not dispute that Hawaii courts look “to the interpretations of analogous federal laws by the

federal courts for guidance” when construing discrimination claims under Hawaii state law. 

French v. Haw. Pizza Hut, Inc., 105 Haw. 462, 467 (2004) (citation omitted). Indeed, the

Hawaii Supreme Court has specifically “adopted the [burden-shifting] analysis governing the

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federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)” when construing claims under

Hawaii’s state anti-discrimination statute. Id. at 473.

Plaintiffs’ only argument in opposition is that Defendants’ position fails to take into

account Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Company, 76 Haw. 454 (1994). In Ross, the Hawaii Supreme

Court declined to follow federal precedent when determining whether the 90-day statutory

period for filing a wrongful discharge lawsuit begins to run after the plaintiff is actually

discharged or, as under federal law, when the plaintiff is notified that he or she would be

terminated. Id. at 460-61. Although the court rejected federal precedent in that instance, it

did so because it concluded that the plain language of the Hawaii statute precluded an

alternate interpretation. Id. Plaintiffs in this case point to no statutory language compelling a

result contrary to the ADEA, and Plaintiffs’ reliance on Ross is therefore unavailing.

As a result, Plaintiffs have presented no authority or persuasive argument to indicate

that Hawaii courts are likely to deviate from analogous federal law in this instance. 

Accordingly, the Court’s rulings on Defendants’ motion as to Arrick’s claims under Hawaii

law mirror the Court’s rulings on Defendants’ motion as to Arrick’s ADEA claims. Thus,

the motion is GRANTED as to the challenged 1998, 1999, and 2000 promotion denials, but

DENIED as to the challenged 2002 promotion denials.

3. Plaintiffs Arrick’s and Roger-Vasselin’s California Claims

Like the ADEA and Hawaii state law, California’s anti-discrimination statute also

contains statutory time limitations. Under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”),

an employee must file an administrative charge with the Department of Fair Employment and

Housing (“DFEH”) within one year of the last alleged unlawful act. Cal. Gov’t Code

§ 12960(d). Once the DFEH has issued a right-to-sue letter, the employee must file any civil

action within one year. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12965(b).

Defendants contend that Plaintiff Arrick’s FEHA claims for promotions sought in

1998, 1999, and 2000 are barred because Arrick did not file a timely DFEH claim or because

he failed to file suit within one year of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the DFEH. 

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff Roger-Vasselin may not recover for five of her

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Defendants do not move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ wrongful termination

claims, raised in opposition by Plaintiffs, and the Court therefore need not decide whether

summary judgment on such claims would be appropriate. Nor need the Court decide at this

time whether Defendants are correct that Plaintiffs’ complaint does not include any wrongful

termination claims. Even if Plaintiffs brought valid wrongful termination claims, they have

not demonstrated how such claims would resuscitate claims based on promotion denials that

occurred outside FEHA’s statutory periods.

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challenged promotion denials for the same reasons.4

 Plaintiffs do not dispute that Arrick’s

claims based on the 1998 and 1999 promotion denials are time-barred, Opp’n at 3-4, and

Defendants’ motion is therefore GRANTED as to those claims.

However, Plaintiffs contend that Arrick’s 2000 claims and all five of RogerVasselin’s claims are permissible under the continuing violation doctrine. In Richards v.

CH2M Hill, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 798 (2001), a disability case involving allegations of failure to

accommodate and hostile work environment, the California Supreme Court adopted a threepart test for continuing violations. The court held that the continuing violation doctrine

applies “if the employer’s unlawful actions are (1) sufficiently similar in kind . . .; (2) have

occurred with reasonable frequency; (3) and have not acquired a degree of permanence.” Id.

at 823 (citations omitted). By “permanence,” the court meant “that an employer’s statements

and actions make clear to a reasonable employee that any further efforts at informal

conciliation to obtain reasonable accommodation or end harassment will be futile.” Id. The

statute does not begin to run “when the employee first believes that his or her rights have

been violated, but rather, either when the course of conduct is brought to an end, as by the

employer’s cessation of such conduct or by the employee’s resignation, or when the

employee is on notice that further efforts to end the unlawful conduct will be in vain.” Id.

The California Supreme Court applied the Richards three-part test to discrimination and

retaliation claims in 2005, refusing to adopt the analysis in Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, that

treated discrimination and retaliation claims differently than hostile work environment

claims. Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1057-59 (2005).

The parties disagree over whether the continuing violation doctrine applies to claims

based on discrete acts such as promotion denials, and both sides can find support in

Yanowitz. For example, the court stated that the continuing violation doctrine applies “where

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the plaintiff alleges a retaliatory course of conduct rather than a discrete act of retaliation.”

Id. at 1058-59 (emphasis added). Here, each promotion denial arguably constituted a

discrete act of retaliation such that Yanowitz is distinguishable. On the other hand, the

Yanowitz court also explained that “a series of separate retaliatory acts collectively may

constitute an ‘adverse employment action’ even if some or all of the component acts might

not be individually actionable.” Id. at 1058. This implies that even if some or all of the

component acts are individually actionable, as they would be in the case of allegedly

discriminatory promotion denials, the three-part test for applying the continuing violations

theory nonetheless applies. Given the “liberal construction mandated by FEHA” and the

“twin policy goals of encouraging informal resolution of disputes and avoiding premature

lawsuits,” id. at 1058 & n.17, this Court finds that Plaintiffs have the stronger position, and

that the continuing violation theory may apply to claims based on allegedly unlawful

promotion denials as long as the three-part test established by the California Supreme Court

is satisfied.

Applying that test to Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims is straightforward. The only

way to cure a discriminatory promotion denial would be to grant the aggrieved employee the

sought-after promotion; subsequently promoting an employee to another position would not

cure a prior discriminatory denial of a promotion to a different position. In this case,

Plaintiffs point to no evidence of statements or actions by Defendants that indicate that any

further efforts would have resulted in Plaintiffs’ being granted any of the promotions they

sought. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the promotion denials have not

acquired a degree of permanence such that the continuing violation doctrine would apply,

and Defendants’ motion is therefore GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims based

on promotion denials outside of the statutory limitations period.

As to Plaintiffs’ retaliation and harassment claims, Arrick testified that he believed, at

the time he learned of each of the challenged promotion denials, that each denial was based

at least in part on his age and on retaliation for complaining about age discrimination. Arrick

Dep. at 535:18-539:25 (Ex. A to Davis Decl. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. as to State

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In fact, Roger-Vasselin’s own evidence indicates the contrary. She states that she

“complained frequently” to one Marriott executive and informed another in 2000 of the

alleged discriminatory, harassing, and retaliatory actions towards her, but that these

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Law Jurisdiction Issues). He also filed several DFEH and EEOC employment discrimination

charges alleging that the promotion denials were discriminatory and based on retaliation. 

However, the trigger for starting the limitations period under a continuing violation theory is

not when an employee first believes that his or her rights have been violated; instead, the

relevant test is “when an employee is on notice that further efforts to end the unlawful

conduct will be in vain.” Richards, 26 Cal. 4th at 823. Here, Arrick presented evidence that

he continued to engage in settlement negotiations as to one of his EEOC charges in 2002 and

2003, and a reasonable trier of fact might therefore conclude that Arrick believed those

negotiations might result in the end of retaliatory and harassing conduct and that, by

extension, Arrick was not on notice prior to that time that further conciliatory efforts would

have been futile. Thus, when viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the

permanence prong has been satisfied as to Arrick’s retaliation and harassment claims, and the

Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion as to those claims to the extent they are based

on Arrick’s challenged 2000 promotion denials. 

Unlike Arrick, however, Roger-Vasselin points to nothing in the record that indicates

she was attempting in any way to resolve her retaliation and harassment claims informally

with Defendants, or that she believed such resolution was possible or that anyone ever told

her that they were attempting to resolve her complaints. Instead, Roger-Vasselin’s evidence

establishes only that, over a five-year period, she was subjected to a series of promotion

denials that she believed to be based on her age, and that she was told at one point in 2004

that she would be given a particular promotion. This is insufficient to raise a triable issue of

fact as to whether Roger-Vasselin’s challenged promotion denials – which occurred between

1999 and 2002 – achieved the necessary degree of permanence because it provides no

indication that a reasonable person in Roger-Vasselin’s position would have believed that

future conciliatory efforts to end the alleged retaliation or harassment in the form of

promotion denials would have been fruitful.5

 Accordingly, Defendants’ motion on RogerCase 3:04-cv-04027-TEH Document 121 Filed 07/19/06 Page 11 of 20
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executives “did nothing in response to [her] complaints.” Roger-Vasselin Decl. ¶ 11. Such

inaction arguably would have put a reasonable person on notice that further conciliatory

efforts would have been futile.

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Vasselin’s retaliation and harassment claims based on the five challenged promotion denials

is GRANTED.

C. Defendants’ Motion as to State Law Issues

Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs may not challenge promotion denials under

California and Hawaii law when those promotion denials lack any connection to California

or Hawaii, respectively.

1. California Claims by Plaintiff Arrick

First, Defendants argue that Arrick may not recover under FEHA, a California statute,

for denials of promotion to non-California positions when no California managers were

involved in the promotion denials and when Arrick was not living or working in California. 

Plaintiffs acknowledge that FEHA does not apply to non-residents’ claims when the tortious

conduct did not occur in California, Campbell v. Arco Marine, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 4th 1850,

1859-60 (1996), but they oppose Defendants’ motion on grounds that “[t]he location of the

unlawful acts is a disputed factual issue, requiring trial testimony,” Opp’n at 4.

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ failure to seek summary judgment on four promotion

denials in which California-based Defendant Owen was arguably involved “permit[s] the

Court to conclude that any conduct that can be factually connected to Owen is actionable

under FEHA.” Id. Defendants agree that this is correct – i.e., that summary judgment would

be improper on any promotion denials that can arguably be connected to Owen – but they

contest whether Plaintiffs have met their burden of coming forth with sufficient evidence

connecting Owen to the promotions Arrick was denied to jobs outside California while

Arrick was not living or working in California.

Defendants correctly observe that much of Plaintiffs’ proffered evidence is either

objectionable or irrelevant. For example, the Court need not consider deposition testimony

that is not cited by page and line number. Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 775 (9th

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Cir. 2002). In addition, declarations based on information and belief are “entitled to no

weight” at summary judgment because they are not based on personal knowledge. Bank

Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1412-13 (9th Cir. 1995). Beyond that, Plaintiffs’

evidence that Owen was involved in Arrick’s promotion denials in 1998 and 1999, that Owen

purportedly made ageist remarks and was involved in other potentially harassing behavior,

that Owen disliked Arrick, and that other managers hired younger workers instead of Arrick

or told Arrick not to apply for positions above a certain level shed no light on the question of

whether Owen was involved in any of the challenged promotion denials, which range in time

from 2000 to 2004. Likewise, although Arrick cites one paragraph in his opposition relating

to the January 2004 denial of a promotion to Project Director at Canyon Villas, this does not

aid his cause because Defendants do not challenge a FEHA claim based on that promotion

denial in this motion.

However, the Court nonetheless agrees with Plaintiffs that they have presented

sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on these claims. Although Owen

submitted a declaration stating that he “had no involvement (either as a decision-maker or in

providing input) into the hiring decision related to” the challenged positions, e.g., Owen

Decl. ¶ 22, that declaration is contradicted by Owen’s deposition testimony. During his

deposition, Owen explained that by “no involvement in the hiring decision,” he meant that he

“didn’t determine the final outcome,” but that this did not “foreclose the idea that [he] could

have provided input.” Owen Dep. at 99:14-101:6 (Ex. Q to Supplemental Grunfeld Decl.). 

This is sufficient to create a material factual dispute such that summary judgment would be

improper, and the Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion as to Arrick’s FEHA claims

based on promotion denials to non-California positions while Arrick neither lived nor

worked in California.

2. Plaintiffs’ Hawaii Claims

On Plaintiffs’ claims under Hawaii state law, Plaintiffs agree that Plaintiffs Kittner

and Roger-Vasselin may not pursue any claims under the Hawaii Employment Practices

statute. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to such claims.

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Next, Plaintiffs correctly assert in their opposition that Defendants’ motion does not

challenge Roger-Vasselin’s or Kittner’s ability to bring a claim under Hawaii common law,

but Plaintiffs also fail to identify any such claims. Thus, the issue of whether these plaintiffs

may assert Hawaii common law claims is not properly before the Court.

As to Plaintiff Arrick, Defendants argue that Hawaii law cannot be applied to claims

arising from promotion denials to non-Hawaii positions while Arrick neither lived nor

worked in Hawaii: “[I]f a State has only an insignificant contact with the parties and the

occurrence or transaction, application of its law is unconstitutional.” Allstate Ins. Co. v.

Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 310-11 (1981) (plurality). Plaintiffs counter that the constitutional

issue only arises if there is a conflict of laws; however, Plaintiffs ignore the threshold

question of whether there is any contact between a jurisdiction and the challenged conduct. 

It would defy all logic to apply a state’s laws to conduct occurring entirely in other states and

involving residents of other states, and Plaintiffs cite no authority to the contrary. 

Plaintiffs also fail to cite any authority to support the proposition that all of Arrick’s

promotion denials should be considered as a single practice when determining whether

claims based on those promotion denials have sufficient contacts with Hawaii. Under federal

law, promotion denials are clearly treated as discrete, separately actionable acts: “Discrete

acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to

identify. Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision

constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114. 

Plaintiffs do not argue that Hawaii follows a different rule and, as noted above, Hawaii courts

look to analogous federal law in interpreting state anti-discrimination statutes. French, 105

Haw. at 467. In the absence of any authority from Plaintiffs to the contrary, this Court

therefore concludes that each of Arrick’s promotion denials must be analyzed separately to

determine whether they have sufficient contacts with Hawaii before Arrick can be allowed to

assert claims under Hawaii law based on those promotion denials. Because Plaintiffs failed

to present any evidence that the specific promotion denials challenged by Defendants had

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Because the Court has denied Defendants’ motion as to Arrick’s claims under

California law, its ruling on Arrick’s Hawaii claims appears to be moot. At oral argument,

Plaintiffs explained that they would not pursue Arrick’s Hawaii claims if the Court

concluded that Arrick’s claims survived under California law.

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any contact with Hawaii, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion as to Hawaii state law

claims based on those promotion denials.6

D. Defendant Owen’s Motion

Defendant Rick Owen separately moves for dismissal of certain claims against him

based on an asserted lack of statutory liability and Plaintiff Arrick’s alleged failure to

exhaust.

1. Plaintiffs’ Federal Claims

First, as Plaintiffs acknowledge, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that the ADEA does

not impose liability on individual employees. Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583,

587-88 (9th Cir. 1993). Thus, the Court GRANTS Owen’s motion as to Plaintiffs’ ADEA

claims.

2. Plaintiffs’ California Claims

Similarly, Plaintiffs also acknowledge that “individuals who do not themselves qualify

as employers may not be sued under the FEHA for alleged discriminatory acts.” Reno v.

Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640, 663 (1998). Plaintiffs do not dispute that Owen is not an employer

under the statute, and the Court therefore GRANTS Owen’s motion as to Plaintiffs’ claims

for discrimination under FEHA.

As to Plaintiffs’ claims for harassment under FEHA, “commonly necessary personnel

management decisions such as . . . promotion or demotion . . . do not come within the

meaning of harassment,” which “consists of actions outside the scope of job duties which are

not of a type necessary to business and personnel management.” Janken v. GM Hughes

Elecs., 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 64-65 (1996); see also Reno, 18 Cal. 4th at 645-47, 657

(summarizing Janken with approval and rejecting criticisms of Janken’s delineation between

harassment and discrimination). Personnel management decisions “may retrospectively be

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As Owen correctly observes, the Court need not decide at this time whether Plaintiffs

may introduce evidence regarding the promotions at issue to support their harassment claims

against Owen based on other grounds.

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found discriminatory if based on improper motives, but in that event the remedies provided

by the FEHA are those for discrimination, not harassment.” Id. at 65. Because Owen cannot

be held individually liable for discrimination under FEHA, he therefore cannot be held

individually liable for the promotion denials asserted in this lawsuit. Of course, Owen may

still be found liable under FEHA for his alleged “overall harassing and retaliatory conduct,”

Opp’n at 15, but the only question before the Court at this time is whether failure to promote

can, as a matter of law, qualify as harassment under FEHA. Based on the authority cited

above, the Court concludes that it cannot. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Owen’s motion

as to Plaintiffs’ FEHA harassment claims to the extent that such claims are based on denials

of promotion.7

Finally, as to Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims under FEHA, Owen withdrew his request

for summary judgment in his reply papers. Reply at 3 n.5. Summary judgment is therefore

DENIED as to those claims.

3. Plaintiffs’ Hawaii Claims

Owen next moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims under the Hawaii

Employment Practices Act (“HEPA”) on grounds that individual employees are not liable

under that statute, just as they are not liable under the ADEA. Owen asserts that Hawaii

courts have not yet addressed this issue, and that the courts are therefore likely to look to

analogous language in the ADEA and Title VII to conclude that the statute does not provide

for individual liability. French, 105 Haw. at 467. However, as Plaintiffs observe, federal

district courts in Hawaii have reached conflicting results on this issue, with some judges

ruling in favor of allowing individual liability and other judges ruling against it. Sherez v.

Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1146 n.7 (D. Haw. 2005) (collecting cases). By

making no effort to explain why this Court should resolve the split in authority in favor of no

individual liability, Owen has failed to convince the Court that summary judgment is

appropriate. Accordingly, Owen’s motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs’ claims under HEPA. 

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If anything, the charge only puts Owen on notice that Arrick may be asserting a claim

against him for breach of oral contract.

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4. Exhaustion of Plaintiff Arrick’s Claims

Owen’s final argument is that summary judgment is appropriate on all claims asserted

against him by Plaintiff Arrick because Arrick failed to name or describe Owen in any of the

charges he filed with the EEOC, DFEH, or HCRC. Arrick does not dispute that

administrative exhaustion is a prerequisite to filing suit. Instead, Arrick asserts that he met

this requirement by naming Owen in the body of his 1999 EEOC charge, number 345990303,

and that this charge was specifically incorporated by reference as the basis for Arrick’s

retaliation and discrimination claim in EEOC charge number 345A200380. See Ex. G to

Defs.’ Req. for Judicial Notice (charge number 345990303); Ex. J to Defs.’ Req. for Judicial

Notice (charge number 345A200380). Arrick further asserts that his right to sue Owen under

FEHA stems from a 2002 right-to-sue letter from DFEH based on charge number

345A200380. See Ex. N to Grunfeld Decl.

However, in Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendants’ motion based on exhaustion and

statute of limitations issues, Plaintiffs conceded that claims based on charge number

345990303 are time-barred because Arrick did not timely file a complaint after receiving a

right-to-sue letter. Thus, any reliance on naming Owen in that charge is misplaced.

In addition, charge 345A200380 only states that Arrick believed that he was being

discriminated against in retaliation for filing the earlier charge. Nowhere does this charge

mention Owen. Even if this Court were to consider charge number 345990303 to have been

fully incorporated by reference in charge number 345A200380, the earlier charge stated only

that Arrick “accepted employment with respondent in reliance on a verbal promise of

promotion to the position of Director of Sales within a year by Rick Owen, Project Director.” 

The charge goes on to list names of individual employees who denied promotions “[o]n at

least ten different occasions,” but Owen is not included in that list of employees. Thus, the

earlier charge does not in any way assert that Owen discriminated against, harassed, or

retaliated against Arrick.8

 Accordingly, this Court finds that Arrick did not sufficiently name

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Owen in either of the charges Arrick relies upon to satisfy the exhaustion requirement against

Owen. He therefore also cannot rely on the 2002 right-to-sue letter from the DFEH based on

charge number 345A200380 to support his right to sue Owen.

Arrick attempts to salvage a claim against Owen by stating he has a claim against

Owen for “tortious discharge in violation of California public policy” that does not require

administrative exhaustion. Opp’n at 17. However, in their opposition papers, Plaintiffs

failed to cite to any specific text in the second amended complaint that alleges a wrongful

termination claim by Arrick. In fact, the complaint states that Arrick “is out on disability

leave as of February 2005,” not that he resigned or was terminated. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 8;

see also Arrick Decl. ¶ 45. Similarly, at oral argument, the Court specifically asked where in

the complaint Arrick asserted a wrongful termination claim, and Plaintiffs responded that the

Court need not address this issue because it was only an alternative argument. Because

Plaintiffs failed to cite to any part of the complaint that alleges a wrongful termination claim,

and because Arrick has failed to demonstrate that he named or described Owen as a potential

wrongdoer in any of his administrative claims, the Court finds good cause to GRANT

Owen’s motion for summary judgment on all claims asserted against him by Arrick. 

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons discussed above, and consistent with the Court’s May 24, 2006

order, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to exhaustion and statute of

limitations issues is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

a. The motion is GRANTED as to (1) Arrick’s challenged promotion denials in

1998 and 1999 and all five of Roger-Vasselin’s challenged promotion denials as to all of

Plaintiffs’ claims; (2) Arrick’s challenged promotion denials in 2000 as to his ADEA and

Hawaii statutory claims and as to his FEHA claim based on discrimination; and (3) Arrick’s

challenged promotion denials in 2002 as to his FEHA claim based on discrimination.

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b. The motion is DENIED as to (1) Arrick’s challenged promotion denials in

2000 as to his FEHA claims based on retaliation and harassment and (2) Arrick’s challenged

promotion denials in 2002 as to his ADEA and Hawaii statutory claims and as to his FEHA

claims based on retaliation and harassment.

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to state law issues is GRANTED

IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

a. The motion is GRANTED as to (1) Kittner’s and Roger-Vasselin’s claims

under the Hawaii Employment Practices statute and (2) Arrick’s Hawaii statutory claims

based on promotion denials that occurred for jobs outside of Hawaii while Arrick neither

lived nor worked in Hawaii.

b. The motion is DENIED as to Arrick’s FEHA claims based on promotion

denials that occurred for jobs outside of California while Arrick neither lived nor worked in

California.

3. Defendant Owen’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART as follows:

a. The motion is GRANTED as to (1) Plaintiffs’ ADEA claims; (2) Plaintiffs’

FEHA claims based on discrimination; (3) Plaintiffs’ FEHA claims based on harassment to

the extent that such claims are based on allegedly unlawful promotion denials; and

(4) Plaintff Arrick’s claims.

b. The motion is DENIED as to (1) Plaintiffs’ FEHA claims for retaliation,

including retaliation claims based on allegedly unlawful promotion denials, and

(2) Plaintiffs’ claims under the Hawaii Employment Practices statute.

The Court also reminds the parties that it set the new trial date in this case based in

part on the parties’ representation that setting trial to begin in September would allow

sufficient time for the parties to continue attempting to finalize a settlement agreement while

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also providing adequate time for the parties to prepare for trial if the case does not settle. 

Thus, while the Court remains optimistic that the parties may be able to fully resolve this

case or significantly narrow the disputed issues prior to trial, the Court does not anticipate

granting any further continuances in the trial date or pretrial dates and deadlines. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 07/19/06 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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