Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-15531/USCOURTS-ca9-15-15531-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID BERNARD CLARK,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES L. RYAN, Director of

the Arizona Department of

Corrections,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 15-15531

D.C. No.

4:13-cv-00129-JAS

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

James Alan Soto, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 12, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed September 2, 2016

Before: Michael Daly Hawkins and Susan P. Graber,

Circuit Judges, and James V. Selna,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Graber

* The Honorable James V. Selna, United States District Judge for the

Central District of California, sitting by designation.

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2 CLARK V. RYAN

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

Affirming the district court’s denial of a habeas corpus

petition, the panel held that the Arizona Court of Appeals’

decision that Arizona’s modern sex offender registration

statute is not an ex post facto law is neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, the Supreme Court’s decision in

Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).

COUNSEL

Sandra L. Slaton (argued) and Kristin Roebuck, Horne Slaton

PLLC, Scottsdale, Arizona, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Andrew S. Reilly (argued), Assistant Attorney General,

Capital Litigation Section; Lacey Stover Gard, Chief

Counsel; Mark Brnovich, Attorney General; Office of the

Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona; for RespondentAppellee.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CLARK V. RYAN 3

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner David Bernard Clark appeals the district court’s

denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner

contends that an Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision that

Arizona’s modern sex offender registration statute, Ariz. Rev.

Stat. § 13-3821, is not an ex post facto law is both contrary to

and involves an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. Reviewing the district court’s

decision de novo, Pollard v. White, 119 F.3d 1430, 1433 (9th

Cir. 1997), we affirm.

In 1982, Petitioner pleaded guilty to sexual misconduct,

a Class 2 felony in Arizona, arising from an incident in which

he engaged in sex with a fourteen-year-old, which is below

the legal age of consent, when he was eighteen years old. As

punishment, he received and completed a four-year term of

probation. Arizona enacted its modern sex offender

registration statute in 1983, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3821,

requiring Petitioner to register as a sex offender because of

his prior conviction for sexual misconduct. See State v.

Henry, 228 P.3d 900, 904 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that,

between 1978 and 1983, Arizona was without a sex offender

registration statute).

In December 2009, Petitioner was arrested in Cochise

County, Arizona, for failing to comply with the statute. In

January 2010, he pleaded guilty to a charge of failure to

register as a sex offender, a Class 4 felony, and was sentenced

to a stipulated prison term of three and one-half years. 

Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief with the

state trial court, arguing that his conviction violated the Ex

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4 CLARK V. RYAN

Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The

state trial court rejected that claim on the merits, relying on

Henry, 228 P.3d at 908. In Henry, the Arizona Court of

Appeals held that Arizona Revised Statute section 13-3821

did not violate the right against ex post facto punishment

protected by the United States or the Arizona Constitution. 

Id. Henry applied the United States Supreme Court’s

decision in Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), which upheld

Alaska’s sex offender registration statute against an ex post

facto challenge. Henry, 228 P.3d at 906–08. In Petitioner’s

case, the Arizona Court of Appeals followed Henry to hold

that Petitioner’s conviction was not an ex post facto violation. 

Petitioner appealed that decision to the Arizona Supreme

Court, which denied review.

Petitioner then filed a federal petition for writ of habeas

corpus. The district court denied the petition, holding that the

state court did not apply Smith unreasonably to the facts of

this case.

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), habeas relief is available if the last

reasoned state court decision—here, the decision of the

Arizona Court of Appeals—was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished federal law as

determined by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1). “A state court’s decision can involve an

‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law if it either

1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to

a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable,

or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal

principle to a new context in a way that is objectively

unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142

(9th Cir. 2002); see also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19,

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CLARK V. RYAN 5

24 (2002) (per curiam) (noting that AEDPA is a “highly

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which

demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the

doubt” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals relied on its earlier

decision in Henry.

1 Whether or not its decision was contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority

thus necessitates that we examine Henry’s logic.

The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States

Constitution “forbids the application of any new punitive

measure to a crime already consummated.” Kansas v.

Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370 (1997) (internal quotation

marks omitted). When determining whether a state’s sex

offender registration statute violates the Ex Post Facto

Clause, courts must first “ascertain whether the legislature

meant the statute to establish civil proceedings. If the

intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that

ends the inquiry.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). “If, however, the intention was to

enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive,”

courts must then “examine whether the statutory scheme is so

punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s

intention to deem it civil.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted).

In Smith, the United States Supreme Court held that

Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act, which established a

registration and public notification scheme similar to

Arizona’s, was “nonpunitive, and its retroactive application

1 Petitioner does not contend that the facts of this case are meaningfully

different from those in Henry.

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6 CLARK V. RYAN

does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Id. at 105–06. 

The Court reached its conclusion by reasoning that “the intent

of the Alaska Legislature was to create a civil, nonpunitive

regime,” id. at 96, and that the respondents could not show

“that the effects of the law negate Alaska’s intention to

establish a civil regulatory scheme,” id. at 105.

The first step in analyzing legislative intent thus requires

courts to “ask whether the legislature, in establishing the

penalizingmechanism, indicated either expresslyor impliedly

a preference for one label or the other.” Id. at 93 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Henry did just that, citing the

law’s regulatory, nonpunitive aim: “The purpose of the

[Department of Public Safety’s]internet sex offender website

is to provide sex offender information to the public.” Henry,

228 P.3d at 905 (alteration in original) (quoting 1998 Ariz.

Sess. Laws, ch. 291, § 5). Moreover, Henry noted that an

earlier decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals had found

that “the legislature furnished ample indication that it

intended to protect communities, not punish sex offenders”

through the registration requirements. Id. (quoting Ariz.

Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 983, 988

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1997)). Specifically, the earlier decision

found a “regulatory objective” in the registration

requirements—the legislature’s desire to protect the public

from repeat sex offenders. Ariz. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,

949 P.2d at 988.

From the facts that Arizona’s sex offender registration

scheme was enacted within the criminal code and that

noncompliance with the registration requirements can result

in punishment it does not necessarily follow that the

legislature’s intent was punitive. In Smith, the Supreme

Court expressly stated that “[t]he location and labels of a

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CLARK V. RYAN 7

statutory provision do not by themselves transform a civil

remedy into a criminal one.” 538 U.S. at 94. The Court also

held that Alaska’s registration statute, which likewise

contained criminal penalties for noncompliance, was

nonpunitive. Id. at 102. It was thus not unreasonable for the

Arizona Court of Appeals to conclude that Arizona’s

regulatory scheme is intended to be civil and nonpunitive.

Turning next to the question whether a law’s punitive

effects outweigh its regulatory purposes, courts consider a

nonexhaustive set of factors listed in Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963). Smith, 538 U.S. at

97. Smith identified the factors most relevant to the sex

offender registration inquiry as being whether, in its

necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: (1) has been

regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment;

(2) imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; (3) promotes

the traditional aims of punishment; (4) has a rational

connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or (5) is excessive with

respect to this purpose. Id.

There are two possible ways to consider whether the

Arizona decision unreasonably applies Smith. One way is to

examine the state court’s application of each nonexclusive

Smith factor. The other is to view the state court’s decision

as a whole, without parsing each factor. Either way, we

conclude that Henry does not apply Smith unreasonably. We

will begin by discussing each factor.

1. Regarded as Punishment in History and Traditions

The Henry court considered this factor. Although the

Arizona Supreme Court had previously held sex offender

registration to be a traditional form of punishment, that

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8 CLARK V. RYAN

holding was “undermined by Smith,” which held that “[o]ur

system does not treat dissemination of truthful information in

furtherance of a legitimate governmental objective as

punishment.” Henry, 228 P.3d at 906 (quoting Smith,

538 U.S. at 98; citing State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1223

(Ariz. 1992)).

Petitioner contends that the registration requirements of

the Arizona statute, unlike the Alaska scheme in Smith, “go

beyond the mere dissemination of factual information” and

are analogous to public shaming. Specifically, he argues that

Internet use has increased since the Supreme Court decided

Smith in 2003; the Arizona statute requires registrants to

provide online identifiers; and website identification will

likely facilitate harassment of registrants, as evidenced by the

recent adoption of cyber-stalking and cyber-harassment laws

in Arizona.

Although Internet use has indeed increased since the

Supreme Court decided Smith in 2003, the Court specifically

considered the vast “geographic reach of the Internet” in its

decision. The Court reasoned that “[w]idespread public

access is necessary for the efficacy of the scheme, and the

attendant humiliation is but a collateral consequence of a

valid regulation.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 99. Thus, the Henry

court’s analysis under this factor was not unreasonable.

2. Imposing Affirmative Disability or Restraint

Henry acknowledged that “Arizona’s scheme is even

more analogous to probation or supervised release than the

Alaska scheme addressed in Smith.” Henry, 228 P.3d at

906–07. The decision, however, went on to note that

“Arizona’s supreme court previously has upheld our sex

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CLARK V. RYAN 9

offender registration system as regulatory despite its

codification in . . . our criminal code; its enforcement solely

through criminal prosecution; and its designation of

registration violations as felony offenses.” Id. at 907 (citing

Noble, 829 P.2d at 1218–19). The decision also emphasized

that the Arizona legislature “has taken steps to tailor the

statutes to serve more precisely their nonpunitive ends.” Id.

For example, mandatory notification is required only for

offenders who are deemed to pose a high risk to the

community, some provisions limit public disclosure of an

offender’s online identifiers, and courts are allowed to

terminate both registration and community-notification

requirements for sex offenders younger than age 22. Id.

(citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-3821(H), 13-3825(C) & (L),

and 13-3827(A), (D) & (E)). Taking the Arizona Supreme

Court’s decision in Noble and the statute’s registration

exceptions into account, it was not unreasonable for the

Henry court to conclude that the statute is not so burdensome

as to impose an affirmative disability or restraint.

3. Promoting Traditional Aims of Punishment

Henry does not expressly consider this factor.2

Nonetheless, this factor does not weigh heavily in favor of a

conclusion that the punitive effects of Arizona’s registration

statute outweigh its regulatory purposes.

2 Petitioner does not argue that the mere failure to discuss every factor

renders the Arizona court’s decision contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, Supreme Court law. Nor would such an argument succeed

in view of the fact that the Mendoza-Martinez factors are “neither

exhaustive nor dispositive,” Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (quoting United States

v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980)).

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10 CLARK V. RYAN

The Supreme Court in Smith downplayed the importance

of this factor: “To hold that the mere presence of a deterrent

purpose renders . . . sanctions criminal would severely

undermine the Government’s ability to engage in effective

regulation.” 538 U.S. at 102 (internal quotation marks and

ellipsis omitted). The Court also noted that, because the

length of reporting requirements under the Alaska law were

“reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, . . . [the law]

is consistent with the regulatory objective.” Id. Moreover,

although Henry does not expressly discuss this factor, it does

list various exceptions to the notification and registration

requirements depending on the offender’s level of risk or age. 

228 P.3d at 907. Those exceptions undermine Petitioner’s

claim that the statute applies to all offenders indiscriminately. 

Similarly, the exceptions support a conclusion that, much

like the Alaska law in Smith, Arizona’s reporting

requirements are reasonably related to the danger of

recidivism.3

4. Rational Connection to Nonpunitive Purpose

Smith notes that a law’s “rational connection to a

nonpunitive purpose is a most significant factor” in the

determination that the law’s effects are consistent with a

regulatory objective because they are nonpunitive. 538 U.S.

at 102 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Much

like the law at issue in Smith, Arizona’s registration statute

3 Petitioner contends that this case is distinguishable from Smith because

he is challenging his criminal conviction for failing to register, rather than

merely challenging the registration requirements. This distinction is not

a meaningful one for present purposes. See United States v. Elkins,

683 F.3d 1039, 1043–45 (9th Cir. 2012) (relying on Smith to reject the

defendant’s claim that his prosecution under the Federal Sex Offender

Registration and Notification Act violated the Ex Post Facto Clause).

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CLARK V. RYAN 11

clearly has “a legitimate nonpunitive purpose of public safety

. . . advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex

offenders.” Id. at 102–03 (internal quotation marks omitted);

see also Henry, 228 P.3d at 907 (noting that the registration

and notification exceptions that apply depending on the

offender’s level of risk or age allow “the statutes to serve

more precisely their nonpunitive ends”). Therefore, as it did

in Smith, this factor weighs heavily in favor of a

determination that the registration scheme’s punitive effects

do not outweigh its regulatory purposes.

5. Excessive With Respect to Nonpunitive Purpose

Unlike the Alaska statutory scheme analyzed in

Smith—which required registration for only 15 years when

the offender had been convicted of a nonaggravated

offense—all offenders over the age of 22 must register for

life in Arizona. See Doe v. New Hampshire, 111 A.3d 1077,

1100 (N.H. 2015) (“We find the lifetime duration of the

registry in particular to be excessive, when considered with

all of the act’s other impositions.”). The Henry court was

troubled by the Arizona legislature’s removal of regulations

that limited disclosure, noting that the statutory scheme “now

specificallyrequires broad community disclosure . . .for most

classes of offenders.” 228 P.3d at 908. Despite those

concerns, though, Henry held that Arizona’s and Alaska’s

statutory schemes were “not meaningfully distinguishable.” 

Id. Taking into account the Arizona statute’s registration and

notification exceptions, which depend on the offender’s level

of risk or age, the state court’s conclusion was not

unreasonable.

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6. Remaining Factors

Smith counsels that “[t]he two remaining MendozaMartinez factors—whether the regulation comes into play

only on a finding of scienter and whether the behavior to

which it applies is already a crime—are of little weight” in

cases such as this one. Smith, 538 U.S. at 105; see also id.

(“The regulatory scheme applies only to past conduct, which

was, and is, a crime. This is a necessary beginning point, for

recidivism is the statutory concern.”). Thus, those factors do

little to support Petitioner’s claim.

We turn next to an overall consideration of Henry in light

of Smith. Considering all the relevant factors, taken together,

the Arizona Court of Appeals was not unreasonable in

holding that the statute’s punitive effects fail to outweigh its

regulatory purposes. The state court’s decision in the present

case is neither contrary to, nor does it unreasonably apply, the

relevant Supreme Court precedent, Smith.

AFFIRMED.

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