Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-04008/USCOURTS-ca10-95-04008-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UaltedF J L E D 

States Court or Ap ~" • ... UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit p~_, 

MAY 0 7 1996 

_____________ PATRICK FISf!EP 

Cler:~ ' 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DALE TAYLOR, 

Plaintiff- Appellant, 

v. 

LLOYD MEACHAM and UINTAH 

COUNTY, 

Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 95-4008 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. NO. 93-CV-883) 

Gregory J. Sanders (Sandra L. Steinvoort with him on the briefs), Kipp and Christian, 

P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Robert R. Wallace, Hanson, Epperson & Smith, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, Attorneys for 

Defendants - Appellees. 

Before PORFILIO, ANDERSON, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 95-4008 Document: 01019276895 Date Filed: 05/07/1996 Page: 1 
Dale Taylor brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Uintah County Sheriff 

Lloyd Meacham, in his individual and official capacities, claiming he-- Mr. Taylor-- was 

illegally arrested, charged with capital homicide in connection with a murder and rape 

which occurred twenty years previously, and jailed for seven weeks. When DNA tests 

led County authorities to drop the charges against Mr. Taylor, he was released from 

custody. Mr. Taylor included supplemental state claims for false arrest, malicious 

prosecution, and false imprisonment. The district court granted defendants' motions for 

summary judgment. For the reasons set out below, we hold: (1) the Fourth Amendment 

governs a malicious prosecution claim brought under§ 1983; (2) Sheriff Meacham had 

probable cause to seek and obtain an arrest warrant and, therefore, committed no Fourth 

Amendment violation; (3) any malicious prosecution claim against Sheriff Meacham 

based on events occurring after Mr. Taylor's arrest is vitiated, in this case, by the 

preliminary hearing and judicial determination to bind Mr. Taylor over for trial; and ( 4) 

because Sheriff Meacham committed no constitutional violation, the County is not liable. 

We therefor affirm the district court's decision. 

BACKGROUND 

On November 26, 1972, Gregory Nickells was shot and killed while sitting in his 

car with a female companion, Ranelle Stanger, at a remote overlook near the city of 

Vernal in Uintah County, Utah. Ms. Stanger, along with Mr. Nickells' body, was driven 

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around for some time by the murderer and his companion. Ms. Stanger was raped by 

each man and eventually released. Mr. Nickells' car was set on fire, with his body inside. 

Ms. Stanger gave a lengthy statement at the time of the murder and rape, 

describing the incident and the two perpetrators. Approximately one and one-half years 

later, in March 1974, a Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office detective met with Susan 

Dixon, Mr. Taylor's stepdaughter, who gave a statement implicating Mr. Taylor in 

the Nickells murder. Soon thereafter Ms. Dixon gave another statement to the detective 

and the Salt Lake County Attorney. However, no arrests were made and the case became 

inactive. 

In 1990, defendant Lloyd Meacham was elected Sheriff ofUintah County. He 

reopened the Nickells murder case and conducted further investigation. He found the 

statement of Susan Dixon, reinterviewed her twice and reinterviewed Ms. Stanger twice. 

He eventually went to the Uintah County Attorney, Harry Souvall, with the evidence he 

had collected. Mr. Souvall authorized prosecution pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 

§§ 17-18-1(1)(b), (3)(b), and 77-2-1. Sheriff Meacham prepared an Affidavit of Probable 

Cause and executed it on August 11, 1992, before Judge A. Lynn Payne, who issued a 

warrant for Mr. Taylor's arrest. Mr. Taylor was arrested at his home in Salt Lake City on 

August 12, 1992, and charged with first degree murder. Pursuant to his wife's consent, 

Mr. Taylor's home and cars were searched. 

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On September 10 and 11, 1992, a preliminary hearing was conducted before Judge 

John R. Anderson. Mr. Taylor was represented by counsel. Both his stepdaughter, Susan 

Dixon, and Ms. Stanger testified, as well as other witnesses. The court found the 

evidence sufficient to establish probable cause and bound Mr. Taylor over for trial. 

Subsequently, before Mr. Taylor was tried for the murder and rape, a pair of 

unlabeled women's pants were found in the evidence area of the Uintah County Sheriffs 

Department. No one, including Ms. Stanger, could positively identify them as belonging 

to Ms. Stanger. They were nonetheless sent to a crime lab for analysis, and the DNA 

results from evidence on the pants did not match Mr. Taylor's DNA. The prosecutor, Mr. 

Souvall, thereafter dropped the charges against Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor had been 

incarcerated in the Uintah County jail for seven weeks before he was released. This 

§ 1983 action followed. 

In his complaint, Mr. Taylor alleged that Sheriff Meacham's investigation and his 

decision to charge Mr. Taylor were "done with reckless disregard for the actual facts and 

included willful misstatements of fact and lies to individuals who were interviewed, to 

prosecutors, and to courts." Am. Compl. at~ 14, Appellant's App. at 3. He further 

alleged that the arrest was "without probable cause and constitutes circumstances of 

wrongful arrest and malicious prosecution." liL. at ~ 15. He alleged that the above actions 

amounted to a denial of due process. He sued Sheriff Meacham in his individual capacity 

and in his official capacity as the "final policymaking authority" for Uintah County. llL. 

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at,, 21-22, Appellant's App. at 6. He included supplemental state law causes of action 

for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment and false arrest. He sought actual 

damages, punitive damages and attorney's fees. 

Sheriff Meacham filed motions for summary judgment, on the ground that he was 

qualifiedly immune from suit in his individual capacity and on the ground that he, in his 

official capacity, and Uintah County, were immune from suit because the allegedly 

unlawful actions taken against Mr. Taylor were not pursuant to a custom or policy, nor 

was Sheriff Meacham the final policy-making authority for either investigations or 

prosecutions. Mr. Taylor filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The district 

court granted Sheriff Meacham's motions, both in his individual and his official 

capacities, and the motion.ofUintah County, and denied Mr. Taylor's motion for partial 

summary judgment. 1 

1

The district court granted defendants' motions and denied Mr. Taylor's with little 

explanation, stating as follows: 

(1) the Motion ofUintah County and SheriffMeacham in his Official 

Capacity for Summary Judgment, for the reasons stated in defendants' 

memoranda and on the record is granted, and Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for 

Partial Summary Judgment is denied for the same reasons; and 

(2) the Motion of Lloyd Meacham in his Individual Capacity for Summary 

Judgment is granted on the grounds that immunities apply to him under the 

circumstances, that he was at least qualifiedly immune. 

Summ. J. at 2, Appellant's App. at 326. 

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DISCUSSION 

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Pallottino v. 

City ofRio Rancho, 31 F.3d 1023, 1026 (lOth Cir. 1994). When a defendant asserts 

qualified immunity in a summary judgment context, "we apply special rules to determine 

whether the motion was properly granted or denied." Pino v. Hiflgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1467 

(lOth Cir. 1996). We must "first ask if a plaintiff has asserted the violation of a 

constitutional right at all, and then assess whether that right was clearly established at the 

time of a defendant's actions." Id. (quoting Gehl Groyp v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1533 

(lOth Cir. 1995)); see Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991) ("A necessary 

concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff 

is 'clearly established' at the time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the 

plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all."). Thus, to avoid summary 

judgment on qualified immunity grounds, a plaintiff must '"present facts which if true 

would constitute a violation of clearly established law."' Pueblo Neighborhood Health 

Ctrs .. Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 646 (lOth Cir. 1988) (quoting Dominique y. Telb, 

831 F.2d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1987)). "'Whether an asserted federal right was clearly 

established at a particular time ... presents a question of law ... [that] must be resolved 

de novo on appeal."' Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1475 (lOth Cir. 1995) (quoting Elder 

v. Holloway, 114 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 (1994) (citation omitted)). 

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Mr. Taylor alleges that his wrongful arrest and seven-week detention constituted 

an unreasonable seizure and deprivation of his liberty, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. In Albri~ht v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994), a plurality of the 

Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment governed "pretrial deprivations of 

liberty." liL. at 813. Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process standards have no 

applicability. We therefore address Mr. Taylor's claim only in a Fourth Amendment 

context. 

Mr. Taylor alleges wrongful arrest and malicious prosecution as the basis for his 

§ 1983 claim. As the Supreme Court has observed, while there is '"an embarrassing 

diversity of judicial opinion"' on the question of whether a malicious prosecution claim is 

actionable under§ 1983, "[m]ost of the lower courts recognize some form of malicious 

prosecution action under§ 1983." Albriiht, 114 S. Ct. at 811 n.4 (quoting Albriiht v. 

Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1992), affd on other ~ounds, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994)). 

See Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1180-81 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991) (collecting cases on 

the question), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 965 (1992). Our court has recognized the viability of 

malicious prosecution claims under § 1983, as well as claims for wrongful arrest. ~ 

Wolford v. Lasater, 78 F.3d 484 (lOth Cir. 1996); Romero, 45 F.3d 1472; Cottrell v. City 

of Kaysville, 994 F.2d 730 (lOth Cir. 1993); Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395 (lOth Cir. 

1992); Robinson v. Marufti, 895 F.2d 649 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

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While most circuit courts recognize that a malicious prosecution claim is 

cognizable under§ 1983, differences arise over the elements necessary to establish such a 

claim. Some courts hold that the "elements of liability for the constitutional tort of 

malicious prosecution under§ 1983 coincide with those of the common law tort." Lee v. 

Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Eu~:ene v. Alieflndep. Sch. Dist., 65 

F.3d 1299, 1303 (5th Cir. 1995) ("This circuit has explicitly held that malicious 

prosecution, false arrest and bodily harm are actionable under Section 1983 because they 

violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."); Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 79 (2d 

Cir. 1994) ("Though section 1983 provides the federal claim, we borrow the elements of 

the underlying malicious prosecution tort from state law."); Streni:fh v. Hubert, 854 F .2d 

421,425-26 (11th Cir. 1988). Other courts require the showing of an injury of a 

constitutional magnitude, as well as the traditional elements of the state tort of malicious 

prosecution. See Sin~:er v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1995) ("'In 

some cases, the interests protected by a particular branch of the common law of torts may 

parallel closely the interests protected by a particular constitutional right;' still, it is only 

the violation of the constitutional right that is actionable and compensable under 

§ 1983.") (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978)), petition for cert. filed, 64 

U.S.L.W. 3642 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1996) (No. 95-1452); Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1145 

(8th Cir. 1993) ("This claim fails because a claim of malicious prosecution, without more, 

does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides redress only for federal 

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.. 

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constitutional or statutory violations."); Mahoney v. Kesety, 976 F.2d 1054, 1060 (7th 

Cir. 1992) (holding that although "malicious prosecution as such" is not actionable under 

the Constitution, it "can be a link in a chain showing a deprivation of liberty or property 

without due process of law"); Torres v. SYPerintendent of Police, 893 F.2d 404, 409 (1st 

Cir. 1990) (plaintiff alleging malicious prosecution claim must prove elements of state 

malicious prosecution tort but also must show the "misuse of the legal proceedings ... so 

egregious as to subject the individual to a deprivation of a constitutional dimension"); 

Coo~an v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1987) (same); Usher v. City of 

Los An~eles, 828 F.2d 556, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he general rule is that a claim of 

malicious prosecution is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if process is available 

within the state judicial system to provide a remedy .... However, 'an exception exists to 

the general rule when a malicious prosecution is conducted with the intent to deprive a 

person of equal protection of the laws or is otherwise intended to subject a person to a 

denial of constitutional rights.'") (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F .2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 

1985) (en bane) (other citation omitted)); cf. Reid v. New Hampshire, 56 F.3d 332, 341 

(1st Cir. 1995) ("Since New Hampshire recognizes the common-law torts of false arrest 

... and malicious prosecution, ... the claim that Reid was arrested without probable 

cause should have been addressed under New Hampshire law, not section 1983.").2 

2

W e have cited a non-exclusive list of cases addressing the availability and 

elements of a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution. There are others, and the general 

(continued ... ) 

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Our own circuit has not always written consistently on this issue. In Lusby v. T .G. 

& Y. Stores, 749 F.2d 1423, 1431 (lOth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818 (1985), we 

stated that "[ m ]alicious prosecution does not automatically constitute a denial of due 

process." We further observed, however, that "if the misuse of the legal procedure is 

egregious there may be a deprivation of constitutional dimensions for which a plaintiff 

can invoke§ 1983." ld. We reiterated that view in Anthony v. Baker, 767 F.2d 657, 662-

63 (lOth Cir. 1985).3 In Robinson, 895 F.2d at 654, on the other hand, we appeared to 

require only the common law elements of malicious prosecution.4 Most recently, we 

stated that "[i]t is generally accepted that the common law of torts is the starting point for 

determining the contours of a malicious prosecution claim under§ 1983." Wolford, 78 

F.3d at 489. We went on in Wolford, however, to consider whether the plaintiff had 

2

( ••• continued) 

confusion surrounding this area is exemplified by the conflicting opinions within many 

circuits. Compare Sin~er, 63 F.3d at 116 (while common law tort actions may parallel 

constitutional claims, "it is only the violation of the constitutional right that is actionable 

and compensable under§ 1983.") with CQQk, 41 F.3d at 79 ("Though section 1983 

provides the federal claim, we borrow the elements of the underlying malicious 

prosecution tort from state law.") 

3

We note, however, that those decisions of our court requiring an "egregious" 

misuse of the legal procedure for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim proceeded on the 

basis that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause was the relevant constitutional 

provision. Albri~t has changed that, holding that a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim 

does not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process standards. 

4

The Supreme Court in Albri~ht cited Robinson as being among those circuit court 

cases which allow a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim to proceed with only the 

common law elements of malicious prosecution. ~ Albriiht, 114 S. Ct. at 811 n.4. 

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established a Fourth Amendment violation. Reconciling these various cases, we conclude 

that our circuit takes the common law elements of malicious prosecution as the "starting 

point" for the analysis of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, but always reaches the 

ultimate question, which it must, of whether the plaintiff has proven a constitutional 

violation. Following Albri~, in the § 1983 malicious prosecution context, that 

constitutional right is the Fourth Amendment's right to be free from unreasonable 

seizures. 5 

As we acknowledged with respect to New Mexico tort law in Wolford, lack of 

probable cause is an essential element of the tort of malicious prosecution under Utah tort 

law. Hod~es v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 158 (Utah 1991). Similarly, an arrest 

5 As many courts have observed, in many ways Albri~ht muddied the waters rather 

than clarified them. Albri~ht's discussion about the Fourth Amendment governing 

pretrial deprivations of liberty is dicta, inasmuch as Mr. Albright never alleged a Fourth 

Amendment violation. Thus, the Supreme Court specifically avoided deciding whether a 

Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim would succeed. 

Moreover, it is unclear how far the Fourth Amendment's protection against 

unreasonable "seizures" can reach in the pretrial context. In Albri~ht, the petitioner, Mr. 

Albright, had voluntarily submitted to the arrest process, and was released after he posted 

bail. The Supreme Court did not decide, as it did not need to, whether he remained 

effectively "seized" in that situation. Justice Ginsburg's concurrence suggests a theory 

under which a person is effectively "seized" for constitutional purposes as long as a 

prosecution is pending. See Albri~ht, 114 S. Ct. at 815-16 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 

~ ~enerally Reed v. City ofChica"o, 77 F.3d 1049, 1053-54 (7th Cir. 1996); Sinier v. 

Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d at 117 & n.6. 

In this particular case, however, the "seizure" issue is fairly straightforward, 

because Mr. Taylor remained in detention, and therefore effectively "seized," throughout 

the time period in question. 

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warrant must be supported by probable cause to comply with the Fourth Amendment. 

"Probable cause for an arrest warrant is established by demonstrating a substantial 

probability that a crime has been committed and that a specific individual committed the 

crime." Wolford, 78 F.3d at 489 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 4; Won~ Sun v. United States, 

371 U.S. 471, 481 n.9 (1963)). 

Mr. Taylor alleges that he was illegally seized-- arrested-- and charged with first 

degree murder without probable cause. He argues that the affidavit prepared by Sheriff 

Meacham in support of the arrest warrant contained deliberately false statements and 

omissions, thereby misleading the judge into issuing the arrest warrant. "It is a violation 

of the Fourth Amendment for an arrest warrant affiant to 'knowingly, or with reckless 

disregard for the truth,' include false statements in the affidavit." ld. (quoting Franks v. 

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)). Similarly, it is a Fourth Amendment violation 

to "knowingly or recklessly omit from the affidavit information which, if included, would 

have vitiated probable cause." ld. (citing Stewart v. Don~es, 915 F.2d 572, 581-83 (lOth 

Cir. 1990)). If an arrest warrant affidavit contains false statements, "the existence of 

probable cause is determined by setting aside the false information and reviev:ing the 

remaining contents of the affidavit." Id. Where information has been omitted from an 

affidavit, we determine the existence of probable cause "'by examining the affidavit as if 

the omitted information had been included and inquiring if the affidavit would still have 

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given rise to probable cause for the warrant."' Id. (quoting Stewart, 915 F.2d at 582 

n.13). 

Applying those principles to this case, we agree with the district court's implicit 

conclusion that the inaccurate statements in the arrest warrant affidavit, as well as the 

information omitted, would not have altered the probable cause determination.6 The 

inaccuracies Mr. Taylor points out are the following: the affidavit stated that Ms. Stanger 

described the perpetrator's vehicle as a "white or light col[ ored] older model Chevy." 

Aff. of Probable Cause at~ 8, Appellant's App. at 257. Ms. Stanger, in her statement 

given immediately after the incident, stated that the car was light-colored, "maybe a 

cream or light gold or something" and that she thought it was a Ford. Statement of 

Ranelle Stanger, Appellant's App. at 143. The affidavit states that "Ranelle [Stanger] 

stated that the tall assailant called the trigger man 'Tex"' and that Ms. Dixon, in her 1974 

interview, stated that a friend ofMr. Taylor's called him "Tex." In fact, as Mr. Taylor 

points out, Ms. Stanger referred to one of her assailants in her statement as "Tex" simply 

because he had a Texas accent, not because the other assailant called him that name. Mr. 

Taylor also asserts that "Sheriff Meacham in weaving together the story for the probable 

cause affidavit to support an arrest warrant, relied heavily on Taylor's stepdaughter," and 

6

W e describe the district court's findings as "implicit" because the district court 

granted summary judgment with little explanation, ~ ~ n.1, stating that it granted 

the motions for the reasons set forth in defendants' memoranda, which is not a part of the 

record on appeal. 

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selectively included only the inculpatory parts of her statement, while omitting the 

exculpatory parts. The parts he believes are exculpatory are, apparently, some statements 

to the effect that Mr. Taylor may have been involved in a drug deal with Mr. Nickells and 

perhaps Ms. Stanger. He also alleges that Sheriff Meacham ignored other witnesses who 

provided statements he interprets as exculpatory. 

Against these inaccuracies are a wealth of uncontested facts which demonstrate a 

substantial probability that Mr. Taylor committed the Nickells murder and rape of Ms. 

Stanger. Specifically, the affidavit, in its concluding paragraph, summarized a number of 

similarities between Susan Dixon's statement and Ranelle Stanger's: 

[B ]oth stated that Mr. Taylor used to brag about raping a thirteen year old 

girl; the trigger man stated that he owned a horse named "Trigger", this 

information was confirmed by Susan and Susan's sister in a conversation 

with Susan. Ranelle stated that the tall assailant called the trigger man 

"Tex." In the 1974 interview of Susan, she was asked if anyone called 

Taylor "Tex," she stated yes, that David Reynolds does. Evidence at the 

scene of the murder indicates that a .22 caliber pistol was used to murder 

Nickells. Ranelle stated that the trigger man used a pearl handled revolver 

to commit the crime. In 1974, Susan stated that Mr. Taylor carried a .22 

caliber revolver and in 1992 she stated that the revolver had a pearl handle. 

In the 1972 interview with Ranelle she stated that the suspect drove a white 

or light colored Chevy or Ford with blue interior with decals in the rear 

window including a decal of the American Flag in the rear window. The 

description of the vehicle and color of interior was also confirmed in 

conversations with Adrian Hansen and Gene Saxton. Also, Ranelle 

indicated that the trigger man wore cowboy boots and western style 

clothing and had an intimidating personality and that he insisted on burning 

the Nickells vehicle after killing him. Susan indicated that Taylor wore 

cowboy boots and western wear in 1972, was a cocky braggart and would 

repeatedly threaten to kill certain people, including her, and bum them. 

Finally, Mr. Taylor came home the morning of the murder smelling like 

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smoke and admitted to killing Nickells 7 before any report had been 

broadcast of the incident. Both Ranelle Stanger and Susan Dixon deny ever 

having met or discussing this case. 

Affidavit of Probable Cause at~ 22, Appellant's App. at 274-75. Setting aside the false 

statements, about the name "Tex" and the make, and perhaps the color, of the car, and 

even including the omissions, which are by no means exculpatory, the affidavit contains 

ample facts supporting a finding of probable cause. 

Moreover, Mr. Taylor has presented us with no evidence which even suggests that 

Sheriff Meacham included the false statements, or omitted any facts, knowingly or with 

reckless disregard for the truth, rather than out of negligence or inadvertence. We 

therefore conclude that Sheriff Meacham did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he 

presented the arrest warrant affidavit to a judge, resulting in the issuance of an arrest 

warrant for Mr. Taylor. 

As we have indicated, Mr. Taylor remained incarcerated for seven weeks after his 

arrest, during which time a preliminary hearing was conducted, in which numerous 

witnesses testified, including Ms. Dixon and Ms. Stanger, and following which another 

judge determined that there was probable cause to bind Mr. Taylor over for trial on the 

first degree murder charge. Having concluded that no Fourth Amendment violation 

7

In Ms. Dixon's statement, she did not state that Mr. Taylor admitted killing Mr. 

Nickells by name. She stated that he told her he had killed a man in Vernal and burned 

his body in a car. 

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occurred in connection with his arrest, we could proceed to determine whether Mr. 

Taylor's Fourth Amendment rights were violated during this seven-week period.8 

We need not make that determination, however, because Mr. Taylor's complaint 

alleged no impropriety by Sheriff Meacham following his investigation and his 

preparation of the arrest warrant affidavit. He does not seriously allege that Sheriff 

Meacham made false or misleading statements following his arrest, nor that he somehow 

caused false or perjured testimony to be presented at the preliminary hearing. 9 As the 

Seventh Circuit has recently observed in a similar case, "[i]t is conceivable that a 

wrongful arrest could be the first step towards a malicious prosecution. However, the 

8

As Justice Ginsburg observed in her concurring opinion in Albri2ht, pursuing a 

malicious prosecution claim against a police officer is "anomalous." Albright, 114 S. Ct. 

at 816 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). As she explained further: 

The principal player in carrying out a prosecution -- in "the formal 

commencement of a criminal proceeding," ... -- is not police officer but 

prosecutor. Prosecutors, however, have absolute immunity for their 

conduct. ... 

By focusing on the police officer's role in initiating and pursuing a criminal 

prosecution, rather than his role in effectuating and maintaining a seizure, 

Albright's theory raises serious questions about whether the police officer 

would be entitled to share the prosecutor's absolute immunity. 

Id. (quoting Albright, id. at 824 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 

9

ln his amended complaint, Mr. Taylor alleged that Sheriff Meacham made 

"willful misstatements of fact and lies to individuals who were interviewed, to -

prosecutors, and to courts." Am. Compl. ~ 14, Appellant's App. at 3. However, he never 

develops this argument beyond the context of the arrest warrant, which we have 

discussed. 

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chain of causation is broken by an indictment, absent an allegation of pressure or 

influence exerted by the police officers, or knowing misstatements made by the officers to 

the prosecutor." Reed v. City ofChical:o, 77 F.3d 1049 (7th Cir. 1996). Here, too, there 

was a preliminary hearing, which, under Utah law is an adversarial proceeding, State v. 

Pledier, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995), in which a judge independently listened to 

testimony, evaluated the credibility of those testifying, reviewed evidence, and concluded 

that the evidence was sufficient to bind Mr. Taylor over for trial. Thus, to the extent 

Sheriff Meacham set in motion a malicious prosecution, which we do not suggest that he 

did, the preliminary hearing broke the "chain of causation."10 We therefore conclude that 

Sheriff Meacham did not violate Mr. Taylor's constitutional rights in connection with his 

arrest and incarceration. 

Having concluded that no constitutional right was violated, under Sie~:ert, 500 U.S. 

at 232, we proceed no further on the qualified immunity issue. We accordingly affirm the 

district court's grant of summary judgment to SheriffMeacham on the§ 1983 action 

against him in his individual capacity. 

Mr. Taylor sued Sheriff Meacham in his individual and official capacities. We 

have already discussed the individual capacity suit, and concluded that Sheriff Meacham 

10SheriffMeacham does not argue that the preliminary hearing's probable cause 

determination should collaterally estop Mr. Taylor from relitigating the existence of 

probable cause in this § 1983 action. We note that some other courts have so held. ~, 

~.,Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285, 289-90 (9th Cir. 1994); Cooian, 820 F.2d at 175; l:rn1 

~'Schertz v. Waupaca County, 875 F.2d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 1989). 

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committed no constitutional violation. "[A ]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other 

than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 

166 (1985); Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 929 n.4 (lOth Cir. 1995). Thus, 

Mr. Taylor's official-capacity suit against Sheriff Meacham is simply a suit against 

Uintah County. We have held that, once we conclude that the employee -- Sheriff 

Meacham -- committed no constitutional violation, the claim against the supervisory 

authority-- Uintah County-- is properly dismissed. Webber v. Mefford, 43 F.3d 1340, 

1344-45 (lOth Cir. 1994) ("A claim of inadequate training, supervision, and policies 

under § 1983 cannot be made out against a supervisory authority absent a finding of a 

constitutional violation by the person supervised."). We therefore also affirm the district 

court's grant of summary judgment to Sheriff Meacham and Uintah County in the 

official-capacity suit. 11 

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

11 The district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants did not 

specifically address Mr. Taylor's state law claims. Once a federal court dismisses claims 

over which it has original jurisdiction, it may decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over related state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); ~ Panis v. Mission 

Hills Bank. N.A., 60 F.3d 1486, 1492 (lOth Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1045 

(1996). 

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Appellate Case: 95-4008 Document: 01019276895 Date Filed: 05/07/1996 Page: 18