Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-01895/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-01895-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

LORETTA MAXINE MALONE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 5:13-cv-01895-SGC

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The plaintiff,Loretta M. Malone, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the Social

Security Administration (“Commissioner”), denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits

(“DIB”). Ms. Malone timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies, and the decision of

the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). After

consideration of the record and for the reasons stated below, the court is of the opinion that this action

is due to be AFFIRMED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Ms. Malone initially filed an application for benefits on September 19, 2011, alleging a disability

onset date of April 10, 2010 (R. 58, 117),1 due to glaucoma which has resulted in a complete loss of

vision in her left eye. (R. 44, 157).2 After the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied her

1 Reference to a record number (“R. ___ ”), refers to the page number in the bound physical copy of the

transcript of the entire record of the proceedings.

2 Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to May 15, 2012 (R. 36, 140) due to questions regarding her receipt

of unemployment compensation through that date. (R. 40). The Administrative Law Judge determined that plaintiff’s

unemployment benefits actually ended in 2011, that plaintiff worked briefly in 2011, and that plaintiff had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since her original alleged onset date of April 2010. (R. 26).

FILED

 2015 Mar-18 AM 09:55

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:13-cv-01895-SGC Document 14 Filed 03/18/15 Page 1 of 12
application,she requesteda hearingbefore anAdministrative Law Judge (“ALJ”),which was heldJune

19, 2012. (R. 34). After the hearing, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or a

combination of impairments listed in or medically equivalent to one listed intheListings of Impairments.

(R. 27); see 20C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). The ALJ further found plaintiff retained the residualfunctional

capacity to performa fullrange of work at all exertional levels, limited only by no climbing of ladders,

ropes, and scaffolds, no workplace hazards such as moving machinery or unprotected heights, and no

jobs which require “far visualdefinition.” (R. 27). The ALJ determined plaintiff could not return to her

past relevant work but could perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

economy. (R. 29). In light of these findings, the ALJ denied plaintiff’srequest for a period of disability

and DIB on August 9, 2012. (R. 30).

The decision of the ALJ became the final decision of the Commissioner on August 8, 2013,

when the Appeals Councildenied review of the ALJ’s decision. (R. 1). Plaintiff then filed an appeal

in this court on October 14, 2013,seeking reversal or remand of the Commissioner’s decision. (Doc.

1; Doc. 10 at 10). On April10, 2014, the parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 11).

A. Plaintiff’s Medical Records

Plaintiff is followed for vision problems by an optometrist, Dr. Ann Chastain. (R. 200-201).

In October 2011, Dr. Chastain recorded that plaintiff was legally blind in her left eye with corrected

vision of 20/20 in her right eye. (R. 200). However, Dr. Chastain also noted plaintiff was losing vision

in her right eye. (R. 201).

Dr. Dwight Luckett and Dr. Christopher Cole withCentralHealthCare-Athens are plaintiff’s

treating physicians. Their records reflect that plaintiff is followed for high blood pressure,

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hyperlipidemia, and insomnia. (R. 207-226). Beginning in November 2011, the diagnoses of diabetes

was added. (R. 227-232, 234-235). On July 24, 2012, Dr. Cole wrote a letter “To Whom It May

Concern” stating plaintiff:

has a diagnosis of blindness in her left eye and low vision in her right eye. It is my

medical opinion,she would be limited to fulltime employment at the sedentary leveldue

to her medical condition.

(R. 239).

B. Plaintiff’s Testimony

On the date of her hearing, plaintiff was fifty-six years old, having been born June 7, 1956. (R.

38). She completed the twelfth grade but did not receive a high schooldiploma. (R. 39). Plaintiff had

a valid driver’s license but drove “very little” due to her eyesight. (R. 39). Although plaintiff left her

previous job because the company went out of business, prior to thatshe had limitations because of her

eyesight. (R. 41, 43). Due to glaucoma, she first had problems with her vision in 2010, which

progressively worsened untilshe lost vision in her left eye completely. (R. 44). Although she has been

diagnosed with diabetes, plaintiff testified she had no limitations associated with the diagnosis. (R. 45).

Plaintiff’s high blood pressure was well under control untilshe began having problems with glaucoma

and diabetes. (R. 45).

On a typical day, plaintiff gets up, fixes breakfast, and sits around the house. (R. 48). She

readsthe newspaper and visits with her grandchildren severaldays a week. (R. 48-49). She doesmost

daily household chores but does not cook because of her eyesight. (R. 49, 53). She occasionally uses

a computer to check her email. Id. Plaintiff alleged she sometimes has problemswithdepthperception

whenreachingfor something. (R. 50-51). Plaintiff further testified she had recently developed tingling

in the bottom of her feet when walking. (R. 52). At the time of her hearing, Plaintiff had scheduled

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an appointment to test this sensation. (R. 52).

C. Vocational Expert Testimony

During the hearing, a vocational expert (“VE”) testified that plaintiff’s prior work was in the

semi-skilled range with exertionallevels of light to heavy. (R. 54). When askedwhether a person such

as the plaintiff, with a high school education, who could perform a full range of work at all exertional

levels, limited by visualdeficits, blindness in the left eye, no climbing of ladders,ropes, or scaffolds, and

no exposure to workplace hazards such as unprotected heights and moving machinery, could return to

plaintiff’s past relevant work, the VE responded “No,” but did identify jobs such as house parent, hand

packager, and laundry laborer, all at the medium level, which fit the given description. (R. 54-55). A

limitation of no jobs which require “far visual definition” did not change the jobs identified. (R. 55-56).

A limitation on near vision would eliminate the house parent job but not the other two. (R. 56).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing claims broughtunder the SocialSecurity Act, the court “is limited to an inquiry into

whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commissioner, and whether the

correct legalstandards were applied.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11thCir. 2002);see

also Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988). The court “may not decide the facts anew,

reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner], rather [it] must

scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by

substantial evidence.” Martin v. Sullivan,894F.2d1520, 1529 (11thCir. 1990) (quoting Bloodsworth

v.Heckler,703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11thCir. 1983)) (internalquotations and other citation omitted). “The

Commissioner’s factualfindings are conclusive if supportedbysubstantialevidence.” Wilson,284 F.3d

at 1221 (citing Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529; Allen v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 600, 602 (11th Cir. 1987)).

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Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260

(11th Cir. 2007) (citing Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Five-Step Evaluation

The regulations require the Commissioner to follow a five-step sequential evaluation to

determine whether a claimant is eligible for a period of disability and DIB. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(1)-(2); Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986). “[A]n individualshallbe

considered to be disabled for purposes of [determining eligibility for DIB] if he is unable to engage in

any substantialgainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The specific steps in the

evaluation process are as follows:

1. Substantial Gainful Employment

First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in “substantialgainful

activity.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987).3If the claimant is engaged in substantial

3

20 C.F.R. § 404.1572 defines “substantial gainful activity” as:

(a) Substantial work activity. Substantial work activity is work activity that involves doing significant

physical or mental activities. Your work may be substantial even if it is done on a part-time basis or if

you do less, get paid less, or have less responsibility than when you worked before.

(b) Gainful work activity. Gainful work activity is work activity that you do for pay or profit. Work

activity is gainful if it is the kind of work usually done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is

realized.

(c) Some other activities. Generally, we do not consider activities like taking care of yourself,

household tasks, hobbies, therapy, school attendance, club activities, or social programs to be

substantial gainful activity.

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gainful activity, the Commissioner will find the claimant is not disabled, regardless of the claimant’s

medical condition or her age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).

Here, the ALJ found plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity fromher alleged

onset date through the date of his decision. (R. 26).

2. Severe Impairments

If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner must next

determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe impairment or combination of impairments that

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). A claimant must provide “medical evidence consisting of signs,symptoms, and

laboratory findings.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508. A physical or mental impairment is an impairment that

results from“anatomical,physiological,or psychologicalabnormalitieswhichcanbe shownbymedically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id.

The burden is on the claimant to “provide medical evidence showing ... impairment(s)” and the

severity of them during the time the claimant alleges disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(c). An

impairment is “severe” if it “significantly limits [a] claimant’s physicalor mentalabilityto do basic work

activities.”

4 Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

“[A]n impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a

4 Basic work activities include:

(1) Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or

handling; (2) [c]apacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) [u]nderstanding, carrying out, and

remembering simple instructions; (4) [u]se of judgment; (5) [r]esponding appropriately to supervision,

co-workers, and usual work situations; and (6) [d]ealingwith changes in a routine work setting.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b)(1)-(6).

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minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual’s ability to

work, irrespective of age, education, or work experience.” Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th

Cir. 1984); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a). A claimant may be found disabled based on a

combinationof impairments even though none of the individualimpairments alone are disabling. Walker

v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1985); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523.

The ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairment: glaucoma with left eye

blindness. (R. 26). The ALJ found plaintiff’s hypertension tobe a non-severe impairment because she

did not allege any limitations from hypertension and her medical records indicated it was controlled.

(R. 26). Plaintiff’s diabetes diagnosis was found not to meet the durational requirement, and her

medical records did not reflect any resulting limitations which could reasonably be expected to have

more than a minimal effect on her ability to do basic work activities. (R. 26-27).

3. The Listings

If the claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner must then determine whether the

claimant’s impairment meets the duration requirement and whether it is equivalent to any one of the

listed impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d)-(e); § 404.1525; § 404.1526. Listed

impairments are so severe that they prevent an individualfromperforming substantialgainful activity.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (d); see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the Listings). If the

claimant’s impairment meets or equals a Listing, the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled,

regardless of the claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). The

claimant has the burden of proving that her impairment meets or equals the criteria contained in one of

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the Listings. Reynolds–Buckley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 457 F. App’x 862, 863 (11th Cir. 2012).5

Here, the ALJ found plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

met or medically equaled any Listing. (R. 27). The ALJspecificallyconsideredwhether plaintiff’s loss

of vision and glaucoma met or equaled Listings 2.02, 2.03, or 2.04 but found they did not. (R. 27).

4. Residual Functional Capacity and Past Relevant Work

If the impairmentdoes notmeetor equalthe criteria of any Listing, the claimant must prove that

her impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f). At step four, the Commissioner “will first compare [the Commission’s]

assessment of [the claimant’s] residual functional capacity [“RFC”] with the physical and mental

demands of [the claimant’s] past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b). “Past relevant work is

work that [the claimant has] done within the past 15 years, thatwassubstantialgainful activity, and that

lasted long enough for [her] to learn to do it.” 20C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1). If the claimant is capable

of performing her past relevant work, the Commissioner will find she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1560(b)(3).

Here, the ALJ found plaintiff could not return to her past relevantworkbutretainedthe residual

functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, except she should avoid

unprotected heights,moving machinery, ladders, ropes, and scaffolding and was limited to jobs which

required no far visual definition. (R. 27).

5 Eleventh Circuit Rule 36–2 provides, in pertinent part, “An opinion shall be unpublished unless a majority of

the panel decides to publish it. Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as

persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (emphasis added).

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5. Other Work in the National Economy

If the claimant establishes an inability toperformher pastrelevantwork,theCommissioner must

show the claimant – in light of her RFC, age, education, and work experience – is capable of

performing other workexistinginsubstantialnumbersinthe nationaleconomy.Reynolds–Buckley, 457

F. App’x at 863-864; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(1). The regulations provide:

If we find that your residual functional capacity does not enable you to do any of your

past relevant work ... we will use the same residual functional capacity assessment

when we decide if you can adjust to any other work. We will look at your ability to

adjust to other work by consideringyour residualfunctional capacity and the vocational

factors of age, education, and work experience.... Any other work (jobs) that you can

adjust to must exist in significant numbers in the national economy (either in the region

where you live or in several regions in the country).

20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(1). If the claimant is not capable of performing such other work, the

Commissioner must find the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g).

The ALJ consulted a VE to determine whether any jobs exist in the national economy that

plaintiff, considering her RFC and her vocationalfactors, could perform. Relying on that testimony, the

ALJ determined “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the

claimant can perform.” (R. 29).

B. Ms. Malone ’s Claim -- Whether the ALJ’s RFC Findings are Based on

Substantial Evidence: 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of plaintiff’s treating physicians

because they lacked specificity. (Doc. 10 at 7). Plaintiff focuses on the post-hearing opinion of Dr.

Cole that plaintiff would be limited to sedentary jobs because of her vision. (Doc. 10 at 6). The ALJ

considered this opinion of Dr. Cole but found his July 24, 2012 letter lacked any functional limitations

whichwouldlimitplaintiff to sedentary work and noted that Dr. Cole did not treatplaintiff for glaucoma.

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(R. 28). The ALJ also considered the report of Dr. Chastain, who treats plaintiff for her loss of vision.

(R. 28). Plaintiff asserts the ALJ failed to address the effects of monocular vision. (Doc. 10 at 8).

However, the hypotheticalto the VE specifically included a limitation of blindness in one eye. (R. 54).

Additionally, the reports of Dr. Chastain reflect plaintiff’s vision in her right eye, as corrected, was

20/20 and her intra-ocular pressure was good. (R. 200, 237). Thus, the court finds the ALJ had good

cause for not giving substantialweight to Dr. Cole’s opinion, that plaintiff would be limited to sedentary

work, as the same was conclusoryandnotsupportedby his own medicalrecords or the medicalrecords

of Dr. Chastain. See e.g., Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11thCir.2004) (Good cause for

not giving substantial weight to the opinion of treating physicians exists when: “(1) the treating

physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) [the] evidence supported a contrary finding;

or (3) [the] treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical

records.”).

Plaintiff also faults the ALJ for not incorporating the limitations found by non-examining state

agency physician Dr. James Kelly. (Doc. 10 at 8). Specifically, plaintiff states the ALJ did not

incorporate the limitations of limited depth perception in both eyes, limited accommodation in the left

eye, and field of vision limited left and right. (Id.;see R. 63). However, the ALJ included the limitation

of no jobs requiring “far visualdefinition” and limitations of “visual deficits and ... blind in the left eye”

when crafting hypotheticals for the VE (R. 54-55). “In order for a vocational expert’s testimony to

constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the

claimant’s impairments.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219,1227(11thCir. 2002). The hypothetical

need only include the claimant’s impairments, not each and every symptom of the claimant. Ingram

v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007). The hypothetical

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posed here included blindness in one eye, visualdeficits, and the elimination of jobs which required far

visual definition. The court finds no error in the hypothetical posed to the VE.

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have recontacted either the treating physicians or

obtained a consultative examination for clarification of Ms. Malone’s functional limitations. (Doc. 10

at 8-9). Plaintiff does notidentifywhatfunctionallimitations needed clarification. Nothing in Dr. Cole’s

records suggests he treated plaintiff for anything which would result in functional limitations. Those

records reflect treatment for well-controlled high blood pressure, a recent diagnoses of diabetes which

had not resulted in any limitations, insomnia, and hyperlipidemia. Additionally, the only limitations

plaintiff alleged were from glaucoma, which is well-documented in the record.

Medical sources should be recontacted when the evidence received from that source is

inadequate todetermine whetherthe claimantis disabled. See 20C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)(1). However,

a record need not be further developed if the ALJ has sufficient evidence to decide the case. Graham

v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1423 (11thCir.1997) (holding that where the record is complete and adequate

to make a decision, no showing of prejudice is made). In considering whether the record is fully

developed, this court must consider whether the record reveals evidentiary gaps which result in

“unfairness or clear prejudice.” Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 935 (11th Cir. 1995).

No such gaps appear in the record before the court. The plaintiff alleged no limitations on her

ability to walk, stand, lift, carry, or any other functionallimitations apart fromthe limitations caused by

her eyesight. Recontacting plaintiff’s physicians or obtaining a consultative examination likely would

nothave clarified any functionallimitations and, thus, not likely providedsubstantialevidence for limiting

the plaintiff to light, unskilled work, as suggested by plaintiff. (Doc. 10 at 9). The court finds no error

in the ALJ’s failure to recontact plaintiff’s physicians or seek a consultative examination.

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V. CONCLUSION

Upon review of the administrative record and considering all of Ms. Malone’s arguments, the

court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the

applicable law. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner is due to be AFFIRMED. A separate

order will be entered.

DONE this 18th day of March, 2015.

STACI G. CORNELIUS

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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