Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01140/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01140-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:0158 Notice of Appeal re Bankruptcy Matter (BAP)

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Case No.15-CV-01140-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

AMR MOHSEN,

Appellant,

v.

CAROL WU,

Trustee.

Case No. 15-cv-01140-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

Re: Dkt. No. 11

Before the Court is Appellant Amr Mohsen’s (“Appellant”) motion for leave to file motion 

for reconsideration of this Court’s denial of Appellant’s renewed motion for leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 9. Having considered Appellant’s motion, the relevant law, and 

the record in this case, the Court DENIES Appellant’s motion for leave to file motion for 

reconsideration. 

I. BACKGROUND

On March 11, 2015, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the Bankruptcy Court. The 

Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel transferred the instant action to this Court for the 

limited purpose of ruling on Appellant’s IFP application, as Appellant had appealed the 

Bankruptcy Court’s decision to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. See ECF No. 4.

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Case No.15-CV-01140-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

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Appellant filed an IFP application on March 11, 2015. On April 9, 2015, the Court denied 

without prejudice Appellant’s IFP application. ECF No. 5. In the Court’s April 9, 2015 order, the 

Court noted that the Ninth Circuit had previously denied Appellant’s IFP applications in two 

separate appeals in August 2011 and February 2014. In both Ninth Circuit appeals, Trustee Wu 

submitted declarations in opposition to Appellant’s IFP applications stating that Appellant owned 

real property in Egypt worth $125,000 that was lien free. See No. 11-60013, ECF No. 4; No. 13-

17256, ECF No. 5. In light of Appellant’s failure to acknowledge the property in the IFP 

application before this Court, the Court denied Appellant’s application without prejudice to give 

Appellant an opportunity to address whether Appellant’s financial circumstances had changed.

Appellant filed a renewed IFP application on April 23, 2015. ECF No. 8. On May 1, 2015, 

the Court denied with prejudice Appellant’s IFP application for failure to demonstrate any 

material change in his financial conditions since the time the Ninth Circuit had denied two of 

Appellant’s prior IFP applications. (“May 1, 2015 Order”), ECF No. 9. Appellant submitted a 

declaration indicating that he did not own or control the valuable piece of real property in Egypt, 

but the Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit had apparently found a nearly verbatim declaration 

unpersuasive on two separate occasions. Id.

Appellant filed the instant “motion for reconsideration” of the Court’s May 1, 2015 order 

on May 26, 2015. ECF No. 11. As Appellant is pro se, the Court treats the instant motion as a 

motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration, as required under the Northern District’s 

Civil Local Rules. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Civil Local Rule 7–9(a) states: “Before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all of the 

claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties in a case, any party may make a motion before 

a Judge requesting that the Judge grant the party leave to file a motion for reconsideration of any 

interlocutory order.... No party may notice a motion for reconsideration without first obtaining 

leave of Court to file the motion.” Civil Local Rule 7–9(b) provides three grounds for 

reconsideration of an interlocutory order:

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Case No.15-CV-01140-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

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(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in 

fact or law exists from that which was presented to the Court before 

entry of the interlocutory order for which reconsideration is sought. 

The party also must show that in the exercise of reasonable diligence 

the party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or law 

at the time of the interlocutory order; or

(2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law 

occurring after the time of such order; or

(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or 

dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the Court 

before such interlocutory order.

Rule 7–9(c) further requires that “[n]o motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration 

may repeat any oral or written argument made by the applying party in support of or in opposition 

to the interlocutory order which the party now seeks to have reconsidered.” Whether to grant leave 

to file under Rule 7–9 is committed to the Court’s sound discretion. See Montebueno Mktg., Inc. v. 

Del Monte Corp.–USA, 570 F. App’x 675, 676 (9th Cir. 2014).

III. DISCUSSION

In support of his motion, Appellant appears to be arguing that reconsideration is 

appropriate under 7–9(b)(1), based on “new” facts not presented to the Court in Appellant’s prior 

briefing. More specifically, Appellant contends that statements by the Trustee regarding the 

Trustee’s inability to sell the Egyptian property explain why Appellant should qualify for IFP 

status, notwithstanding Appellant’s apparent ownership interest in the property. 

Appellant quotes Trustee Wu’s motion to abandon real property, filed in one of 

Appellant’s bankruptcy cases. Br. Case No. 05-50662-SLJ, ECF No. 314. Appellant quotes a

portion of the Trustee’s motion that states:

[T]he Trustee has been unable to sell the property because it appears 

that the only way of doing so would be to open a legal proceeding in 

Egypt, retain Egyptian counsel and proceed to enforce Bankruptcy 

Code Section 541 in an Egyptian court to change title before 

marketing the property. The Trustee does not believe that it is costeffective to do so.

Id. at 1–2. Appellant contends that he is unable to control the property in Egypt for the same 

reasons that the Trustee was unable to sell the property. However, Appellant fails to quote the 

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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

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more relevant parts of the Trustee’s motion explaining that “The debtor listed the Subject Property 

in his Schedule A as having a market value of $125,000 with no secured debt against it,” and that 

the reason why real estate firms in Egypt would not cooperate with the Trustee was because 

“Trustee was not the owner of record of the subject property.” Id. The Trustee further explained 

that “the debtor never cooperated with the Trustee, never provided documents of title or any other 

documents relating to the property of any use and has never turned over any revenue collected by 

him, if any, for the property.” Id. The Bankruptcy Court granted the Trustee’s motion, which 

resulted in the property being “abandoned” back to Appellant. See Br. Case No. 05-50662-SLJ, 

ECF No. 321.

The Trustee’s statements regarding her inability to persuade Egyptian real estate brokers to 

cooperate with the Trustee because the Trustee was “not the owner of record,” does not explain 

why Appellant, who listed the property as belonging to him in his Schedule A, would be unable to 

control, benefit from, or sell the property. As the Court noted in its May 1, 2015 Order, Appellant 

provided nearly identical declarations regarding his financial status and “control” over the 

Egyptian property to the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit found Appellant’s explanation 

insufficient on two separate occasions. See May 1, 2015 Order at 2. Appellant’s reference to the 

Trustee’s motion to abandon the property back to Appellant does not present a “material 

difference in fact” from that which was presented to the Court on either Appellant’s initial or 

renewed applications for IFP status. See Civ. L.R. 7–9(b)(1). 

Furthermore, the Court further notes that Appellant’s motion does not dispute the Court’s 

prior conclusion that Appellant receives substantial monetary gifts from family members. The 

Court stated in its May 1, 2015 Order that at the time the Ninth Circuit denied Appellant’s prior 

two IFP applications, Appellant received “gifts” “totaling approximately $200 a month,” which 

Appellant appears to continue to receive. See May 1, 2015 Order at 2. Appellant now declares that 

he does not expect “any family gifts to increase in the future,” and that Appellant expects “the 

family gifts to decrease this year,” but does not contest that Appellant still receives a substantial 

sum of money from his family each month. See ECF No. 11. Based on Appellant’s submissions, 

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Case No.15-CV-01140-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

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the Court again concludes that Appellant’s financial conditions have not materially changed since 

the Ninth Circuit denied his prior IFP applications, and that Appellant has failed to identify any 

materially different fact or law that would support reconsideration of the Court’s decision.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Appellant’s motion for leave to file motion 

for reconsideration. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 9, 2015

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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