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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

NORRIS B. HOWARD 

ADC #83225 PETITIONER 

 

VS. 5:14CV00062 DPM/JTR 

WENDY KELLEY, Director, 

Arkansas Department of Correction1

 RESPONDENT 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

 The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been 

sent to United States District Judge D. P. Marshall Jr. You may file written 

objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections 

must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and 

(2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of the entry of 

this Recommendation. The failure to timely file objections may result in waiver of 

the right to appeal questions of fact. 

 Mail any objections to: 

 Clerk, United States District Court 

 Eastern District of Arkansas 

 600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite A149 

 Little Rock, AR 72201-3325

 1

 Wendy Kelley became Director of the Arkansas Department of Correction on January 13, 2015, and is 

automatically substituted as Respondent pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 

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I. Background

 In 2000, Petitioner, Norris B. Howard (“Howard”), was convicted of 

attempted capital murder and third-degree carnal abuse, and sentenced to twenty 

years in the Arkansas Department of Correction (“ADC”). Doc. 12-1. On February 

20, 2014, he filed this § 2254 habeas action challenging the prison disciplinary 

conviction that allegedly resulted in the “rescission” of his parole. Doc. 2. 

 In his habeas Petition, Howard asserts that, on October 27, 2011, the Parole 

Board authorized his release from the ADC on parole, “subject to approval of [a] 

suitable [release] plan.”2 Doc. 2 at 59. However, he “experience[d] problems 

locating a residence to parole to” because of his criminal history and sex-offender 

registration. Doc. 2 at 10. This caused him to remain incarcerated in the Randall L. 

Williams Unit (“RLWU”) while he attempted to obtain a suitable residence for a 

release plan. Id. 

 On January 17, 2013, Captain J. Herrington, an officer in the RLWU, signed 

a Major Disciplinary charging Howard with: (1) unauthorized use of mail; (2) 

failure to obey an order; and (3) inducing another to violate ADC policy.3 Doc. 31-

1 at 12. The charges arose from a letter Howard wrote and mailed to Marcus 

Richardson, the husband of Lt. A. Richardson, an officer at the RLWU. In a 

 2

 In the nomenclature of the Parole Board, Howard’s “parole” was a “Transfer To DCC [Department of 

Community Correction] Supervision.” Doc. 2 at 59. 3

 Howard received the Major Disciplinary on January 24, 2013, while he was a prisoner in the RLWU. 

Doc. 2 at 39. 

Case 5:14-cv-00062-DPM Document 37 Filed 12/28/15 Page 2 of 11
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memorandum supporting the charges in the Major Disciplinary, Captain 

Herrington states the following: 

On January 16, 2013 at approx. 4:30 pm Lt. A. Richardson arrived at the RLW 

unit and spoke to me, Captain J. Herrington. Lt. Richardson advised me that a 

letter had arrived at her home addressed, “Mr. Marcus Richardson 3203 Orchid 

Drive Pine Bluff, AR. 71603.” The sender was address [sic] Norris Howard 

83225 R.L.W. Unit CBII 7206 West 7th St. Pine Bluff, AR. 71603.The letter was 

post marked 01/15/2013 with the code 045J83097040. On the letter in red print 

was "LETTER ORIG FROM CORRECTIONAL FACU". This letter was 

unopened when Lt. Richardson handed it to me. An investigation was started at 

this time. 

On January 16, 2013 at approx. 4:45 pm Lt. A Richardson and I, Captain J. 

Herrington, arrived at the captain's office. Inmate N. Howard 083255 arrived and 

I, Captain Herrington, started question [sic] inmate N. Howard concerning the 

letter. Inmate N. Howard stated that he wrote Mr. Marcus Richardson the letter a 

couple of days ago. Inmate N. Howard stated that he and Mr. Richardson were old 

class mates and friends. Inmate N. Howard stated that he got the address from the 

Pine Bluff Commercial Newspaper Bankruptcy Section. Inmate Howard was 

asked if he knew that Lt A. Richardson and Mr. Marcus Richardson was [sic] 

married. Inmate Howard stated that he did know. On page one of the letter, third 

paragraph down, “Got married to Annette, congratulations. She doesn't know that 

I know you guys are married and I'll keep you [sic] business a secret around here 

being her work place." I advised inmate Howard that it was against the rules for 

inmates to contact staff or staff’s family members outside of work. Inmate 

Howard did not respond. I asked inmate Howard, why he offered money to Mr. 

Richardson? Inmate Howard did not respond. Page two paragraph four [of 

Howard’s letter], “Say perhaps you might know someone that I could pay to let 

me parole to their residence. Then I'd transfer my parole to a local motel until I fix 

my house back up to live in. Anywhere, it doesn’t have to be Pine Bluff or 

Arkansas. And if they're also down with getting money I have other hook up’s for 

them & you.”[4

] 

Inmate N. Howard completed a witness statement and returned to his barracks. 

 4

 Howard’s letter states, in pertinent part: “Say, perhaps you might know someone that I could pay to let me 

parole to their residence. Then, I’d transfer my parole to a local motel until I fix my home back up to live in. 

Anywhere — It doesn’t have to be Pine Bluff or Arkansas. And — If they’re also down with gettin money, I have 

other hook up’s for them & you. Rental cars for 30 days free plus get paid. Free motel for 30 days plus get paid. Free 

rent for 7 months plus get paid & etc. It’s details — particulars. I’d rather not mention right now — okay. And if 

such prospective person of interest be a female and also down for other gigs in the skin biz as an entertainer, she’d 

make thousands for just a few minutes. I believe you know the biz. I have an elite service of prominent clients.” 

Doc. 31-1 at 15. 

Case 5:14-cv-00062-DPM Document 37 Filed 12/28/15 Page 3 of 11
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I questioned Lt. Richardson concerning the letter. Lt. Richardson stated that she 

got the letter out of the mail box and realized that the letter was from an inmate 

housed at the RLW unit. Lt. Richardson stated that she brought the letter straight 

up here and wanted to let us know as soon as possible. Lt. Richardson stated that 

she did not know inmate N. Howard but that her husband M. Richardson did 

know him from the past. 

Doc. 31 at 10-11. 

 On January 29, 2013, a Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) conducted a 

hearing, during which Howard submitted the following written statement: “Mr. 

Richardson and I are old friends. I did get the address from the newspaper. I was 

eager to get in touch with him. I did ask him if he could help me to get a place to 

live because of my charge. Lt. Richardson asked me not to write her house again. I 

did not know she was there.” Doc. 2 at 40. 

 The DHO convicted Howard of: (1) unauthorized use of mail; (2) failure to 

obey an order; and (3) inducing another to violate ADC policy. Doc. 2 at 40. The 

DHO credited the charging officer’s report that “Inmate Howard offered money to 

Inmate [sic] Richardson if he would assist him in finding him a location to live.” 

Doc. 2 at 41. The DHO additionally found that “[Howard] . . . must learn that 

asking anyone to violate departmental policy, unauthorized use of the mail and 

failure to obey staff orders are against ADC rules and regulations and will not be 

tolerated for security purposes.” The sanctions imposed by the DHO included: (1) 

30 days of punitive isolation; (2) a reduction in good-time classification; and (3) 

the disallowance of 300 days of good-conduct time. Doc. 2 at 40. Howard pursued 

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an administrative appeal, which was affirmed by the ADC Director on April 11, 

2013. Doc. 2 at 58. 

 According to Howard, his parole was automatically “rescinded” due to his 

major disciplinary conviction and the reduction in his good-time classification. On 

June 27, 2013, the Parole Board “deferred” Howard’s parole, subject to him 

completing the ADC RSVP [Reduction of Sexual Victimization] program. Doc. 2 

at 61. On July 21, 2013, the Parole Board denied Howard’s request for 

reconsideration. Doc. 2 at 62. 

 In his habeas Petition, Howard argues that: (1) his disciplinary convictions 

are not supported by substantial evidence; (2) he received inadequate notice of the 

disciplinary charges; (3) he did not receive notice of the evidence that ADC 

officials relied on to convict him; and (4) his parole “rescission,” based on the 

disciplinary conviction, violated his Due Process rights. Doc.2 at 19-36. 

Respondent argues that Howard’s habeas claims are: (1) barred by the 

statute of limitations; (2) not cognizable in a habeas action; (3) procedurally 

defaulted; and (4) fail on the merits. Doc. 4. 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends that the Petition for 

a Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied, and that the case be dismissed, with prejudice.5

 

 5

 Respondent’s statute of limitations defense is based on the argument that AEDPA’s one-year limitations 

period was triggered on January 29, 2013, when Howard received his disciplinary convictions. Doc. 12 at 2. In a 

recent decision, United States Magistrate Judge Beth Deere noted a split among circuits on the question of whether 

the habeas statute of limitations is triggered when a prison disciplinary is first imposed, as opposed to when a 

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II. Discussion

 A. Howard’s Disciplinary Convictions 

 In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-58 (1974), the Court held that a 

disciplinary conviction which results in a prisoner losing good time credits 

implicates a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.6

 However, in 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985), the Court clarified that the Due 

Process Clause only requires a DHO’s decision imposing a disciplinary conviction 

to be supported by “some evidence in the record.” As long as that low evidentiary 

threshold is met, a DHO’s decision cannot be characterized as arbitrary. Id. at 457. 

Thus, in prison disciplinary matters, federal courts must defer to the judgment of 

prison officials as long “as some evidence in the record” supports the disciplinary 

conviction and the due process requirements of Wolff are satisfied.7

 Finally, because the loss of good time credits affects the duration of a 

prisoner’s sentence, a habeas action is a prisoner’s exclusive remedy to challenge 

 

prisoner later exhausts his administrative appeal. See Gaston v. Hobbs, 2014 WL 122681, *2-3 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 10, 

2014) (citing cases). The Eighth Circuit has not addressed this question. See id. Because Howard’s claims fail for 

other reasons, it is unnecessary for this Court to address Respondent’s statute of limitations argument. 6

 The Court in Wolff also held that due process requires that an inmate, who is the subject of a disciplinary 

proceeding, must receive: (1) written notice of the disciplinary charges at least 24 hours before the disciplinary 

hearing; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and 

present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement from an impartial decision maker 

identifying the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 

563-67 (1974). 7

 This limited review does not require a court to examine the entire record, make an independent 

assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weigh evidence. Prison officials can permissibly rely on violation 

reports and hearsay to find inmates guilty of disciplinary infractions. See Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 831 

(8th Cir. 2008). Finally, the Eighth Circuit has held that, as long as the disciplinary proceeding is conducted by an 

impartial decision maker, a report from a correctional officer constitutes “some evidence” upon which to base a 

disciplinary decision. See Hartsfield, 511 F.3d at 831. The “some evidence” standard is satisfied even if the inmate 

disputes the facts in the report and the only support for the DHO’s decision is the report itself. Id.

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the constitutionality of the final disciplinary conviction. See Portley-El v. Brill, 288 

F.3d 1063, 1066-67 (8th Cir. 2002). 

 Howard acknowledges that he received a copy of the Major Disciplinary on 

January 24, 2013. Doc. 2 at 9, 39. The Major Disciplinary described the 

disciplinary charges being brought against him and states that those charges arose 

from the letter he wrote to M. Richardson, the husband of Lt. A. Richardson, 

“offer[ing]money to Mr. Richardson if Mr. Richardson would assist him in finding 

a location to live.” Doc. 2 at 39. While Howard strongly disputes how the charging 

officer interpreted his letter, the DHO accepted that interpretation and explained 

his reasons for doing so in his decision.8

 This was sufficient to satisfy the due 

process requirements of Wolff and constituted a decision based on “some evidence” 

as required by Hill. 

 B. The Parole Board’s Alleged “Rescission” of Howard’s Parole 

 Howard also argues that the Parole Board’s “acceptance of the [DHO’s] 

decision was arbitrary and wholly without due process protection.” He complains 

 8

 Because Howard admitted in his letter that he knew that Marcus Richardson was married to Lt. A 

Richardson, the DHO fairly could have inferred that Howard’s “offer” to Marcus was also made to his wife. 

Notably, ADC inmates and personnel are prohibited from any association in business relationships, partnerships, 

loans, or “legal or financial transactions.” ADC Administrative Regulation § 210. Additionally, “ADC policy 

prohibits business relationships, partnerships, loans of money, close personal associations, dating or marriage and 

legal or financial transactions with ex-inmates, parolees, or probationers except when they are family members and 

this should be disclosed to the Warden/Supervisor and be in writing and placed in their personnel file for future 

reference.” ADC Employee Handbook at 32. 

 It is unclear to the Court what “staff order” Howard allegedly disobeyed. In addressing the “some 

evidence” standard, Respondent does not explain the ADC’s position other than to argue that the “records submitted 

with Howard’s petition indicate there was some evidence of guilt.” Doc. 12 at 6. However, even if no evidence 

supported the charge of “disobeying a staff order,” the other two convictions for improper use of the mail and 

inducement of another to violate policy were sufficient to support the sanctions imposed by the DHO. See ADC 

Inmate Disciplinary Manual at § VII(G)(1) (establishing the range of sanctions). 

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that the Parole Board did not comply with various statutory provisions for 

adjudication contained in the Arkansas Administrative Procedures Act. Doc. 2 at 

30-36. 

 Respondent correctly points out that, under well-established Eighth Circuit 

case law, Howard has not stated a cognizable habeas claim based on the Parole 

Board’s alleged failure to follow state law in “rescinding” his parole, based on him 

receiving the Major Disciplinary conviction. See Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 

847 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no federal constitutional interest in having 

state officers follow state law or prison officials follow prison regulations). 

 Respondent also argues that, even if Howard had stated a federal 

constitutional claim, it is procedurally defaulted because he never challenged the 

Parole Board’s decision in state circuit court as he was required to do under the 

Arkansas Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See Ark. Code Ann. § 25-15-

212 (Repl. 2014). In pertinent part, this statute provides as follows: 

In cases of adjudication, any person, except an inmate under sentence 

to the custody of the Department of Correction, who considers himself 

or herself injured in his person . . . by final agency action, shall be 

entitled to judicial review of the action under this subchapter. 

Ark. Code Ann. § 25-15-212(a) (Repl. 2014). 

 The plain language of this provision prohibits ADC inmates from asserting 

claims for judicial review under the APA. However, in Clinton v. Bonds, 306 Ark. 

554, 816 S.W.2d 169 (1991), the Court held that this provision of the statute was 

Case 5:14-cv-00062-DPM Document 37 Filed 12/28/15 Page 8 of 11
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unconstitutional because it denied ADC inmates judicial review of federal or state 

constitutional claims: “we emphasize that Act 709 [codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 

25-15-212(a)] unconstitutionally deprives inmates of review of constitutional

questions because judicial review of all other administrative questions may be 

granted, or withheld, according to the Legislature’s discretion.” Id. at 172, 559 

(emphasis in original). 

 Habeas claims are, by definition, federal constitutional claims. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Thus, under the Court’s holding in Clinton, such claims, arising 

from allegedly unconstitutional actions by the state Parole Board, must be fully 

exhausted in an APA action in state court before they can be pursued in a § 2254 

habeas action in federal court. Courts in the Eastern District of Arkansas have 

consistently cited Clinton as authority for dismissing habeas claims challenging 

Parole Board decisions where the petitioner failed to pursue timely judicial review 

under the APA in state court.9

 

 9 See e.g Tucker v. Norris, 2009 WL 5066761, *3 (E.D. Dec. 16, Ark. 2009) (unpublished) (“Petitioner 

could have filed a claim raising his constitutional claims under the Administrative Procedures Act in the circuit court 

within thirty days after he was served the Board's decision denying his request for parole reconsideration dated May 

10, 2009. The time has passed for Petitioner to file such an action, and there are no other non-futile state court 

remedies available to Petitioner.”); Wells v. Burl, 2014 WL 6892177, *3 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 4, 2014) (unpublished) 

(“Here, [petitioner] could have sought review of the Parole Board's decision as required by the Arkansas 

Administrative Procedure Act[.] He did not seek such review and as such, no state court has been afforded an 

opportunity to consider his matter. Because [petitioner] failed to do so, his claims are procedurally defaulted.”); 

Tyler v. Guntharp, 2010 WL 2330276, *3 (E.D. Ark. May 20, 2010) (unpublished) (“[I]n Clinton v. Bonds . . . the 

Arkansas Supreme Court held unconstitutional the portion of the statute barring inmates from bringing constitutional 

challenges. As a result, Mr. Tyler could have filed a claim pursuing his constitutional claims in state circuit court 

within 30 days after he was served with the Arkansas Board of Parole's December 18, 2009, decision. The time for 

filing such an action has now passed, and there are no other non-futile state court remedies available to Mr. Tyler.”). 

Case 5:14-cv-00062-DPM Document 37 Filed 12/28/15 Page 9 of 11
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 The Parole Board’s decision became “final” after it denied Howard’s last 

request for reconsideration, on July 21, 2013. Doc. 2 at 62. Under the APA, 

Howard had thirty days from service of the Parole Board’s final decision to file an 

APA action for judicial review in either Pulaski County Circuit Court or the circuit 

court in the county where he was incarcerated. See Ark. Code Ann. § 25-15-

212(b)(1) (Repl. 2014). Because he did not do so, he has procedurally defaulted his 

habeas claim arising from the allegedly unconstitutional actions of the state Parole 

Board. 

 Nonetheless, if the requirements of the narrow “cause and prejudice” or 

“actual innocence” exceptions to procedural default are satisfied, the Court can still 

reach and decide the merits of Howard’s procedurally defaulted habeas claim.10

Morgan v. Javois, 744 F.3d 535, 538 (8th Cir. 2013). 

 As “cause” to excuse his procedural default, Howard correctly argues that 

the codified text of Ark. Code Ann. § 25-15-212(a), prohibiting ADC inmates from 

filing actions for judicial review of agency decisions, has remained unchanged

since the Court’s decision in Clinton, over two decades ago. 

 10 “Cause” requires a showing of some impediment, external to the petitioner’s defense and not fairly 

attributable to him, preventing him from constructing or raising his claims in state court or complying with the 

state’s procedural rules. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991). An external impediment may be shown 

where “the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available.” Id. 

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 Admittedly, the Arkansas legislature’s decades-long refusal to remove the 

unconstitutional text from the statute is perplexing.11 Nonetheless, as a pro se

litigant, Howard is still charged with knowing the law relevant to his habeas 

claims. See Weeks v. Bowersox, 106 F.3d 248, 249 (8th Cir. 1997) (“A prisoner's 

illiteracy and pro se status are not cause.”). Thus, the “cause and prejudice” 

exception to procedural default does not apply. Finally, Howard has not come 

forward with any argument or new evidence to satisfy the “actual innocence” 

exception to procedural default. 

III. Conclusion

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for a Writ of 

Habeas Corpus be DENIED, and that the case be DISMISSED, WITH 

PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases. 

 Dated this 28th day of December, 2015. 

 

 ____________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

 11 As early as 1995, United States District Judge G. Thomas Eisele noted that “[t]he Arkansas legislature 

has apparently not yet amended § 25–15–212(a) so as to bring that statute’s language into harmony with the 

Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Clinton v. Bonds.” Richmond v. Duke, 909 F. Supp. 626, 628 n.6 (E.D. Ark. 

1995). 

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