Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01386/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01386-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRISHA HINES,

Plaintiff,

v.

WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, 

INC., a division of Wells 

Fargo Bank N.A.,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-CV-01386 JAM KJN

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant Wells Fargo Bank (“Defendant”) moves to dismiss 

Plaintiff Trisha Hines’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint for failure to 

state a claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) and 9(b). Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the 

following reasons, Defendant’s motion is granted with leave to 

amend.1

//

//

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 

for August 20, 2014.

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff secured a mortgage for her home in October 2003. 

Compl. ¶¶ 6-7. Unable to keep up with the monthly payments, 

Plaintiff sought refinancing in 2006. Compl. ¶ 8. In 2009, she

alleges that she entered into a further loan modification through 

“West Coast Financial,” a company that “worked closely with” and 

“act[ed] as an agent” for Defendant Wells Fargo. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 9.

The terms of Plaintiff’s loan modification included monthly 

payments starting at $791.08, increasing annually from September 

2009 to September 2014. Compl. ¶ 11; Defendant’s Request for 

Judicial Notice (“RJN”) Exh. G. The interest rate started at 

2.500% and increased annually by 0.500% throughout the same fiveyear period. Compl. ¶ 11. Thereafter, the monthly payments and 

interest rates were, according to Plaintiff, “set to skyrocket to 

$2,221.58 with an interest rate of 6.148%.” Compl. ¶ 12. 

Defendant has submitted a copy of a document it claims to be the 

Loan Modification Agreement signed by Plaintiff on July 6, 2009. 

See RJN at 3; id. at Exh. G.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s agent “steered [her] into 

[this] high-cost, high-risk loan modification” by concealing and 

misrepresenting important facts about the agreement. Compl. 

¶ 13. She asserts that Defendant’s agent “fail[ed] to disclose 

substantial negative information regarding Defendant’s loan 

products,” including that the payments would increase 

substantially at the end of the five-year period. Compl. ¶ 20. 

The agent further misinformed her that the loan modification 

included a fixed interest rate, whereas the true terms included 

the annually-increasing rate described above. Compl. ¶ 11. 

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Defendant also allegedly concealed the “risks” and the “predatory 

nature” of the loan, and failed to provide “NOTICE of the new 

terms,” “a written contract,” or “a chance to accept or refuse 

the new terms.” Compl. ¶¶ 22, 30, 46.

Due to the loan modification’s “usurious and continuously 

escalating interest rate,” Plaintiff has been unable to keep up 

with the payments. Compl. ¶ 14. As of the date of filing her 

complaint, Plaintiff was in default on her mortgage, but remained 

in her home. See Compl. ¶ 15; id. Exh. B.

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant in Sacramento County

Superior Court on May 1, 2014. Plaintiff did not name West Coast 

Financial as a defendant, because she alleges it is no longer in 

existence. Compl. ¶ 5. The Complaint contains the following 

seven causes of action: (1) Fraud in the Inducement, (2) Fraud in 

the Concealment, (3) Unfair Business Practices (Violation of Cal. 

Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.), (4) Violation of the Covenant 

of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, (5) Negligence, (6) Promissory 

Estoppel, and (7) Intentional Misrepresentation. Defendant 

removed the case to federal court on June 9, 2014, see Notice of 

Removal (Doc. #1), and subsequently filed this motion to dismiss.

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547

(2007). In considering a motion to dismiss, a district court 

must accept all the allegations in the complaint as true and 

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draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. 

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other 

grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 

405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). “[T]he factual allegations that are 

taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, 

such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be 

subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.” 

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Assertions 

that are mere “legal conclusions” are therefore not entitled to 

the presumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

Upon granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim, a district court has discretion to allow leave to amend 

the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 

A court should freely grant leave to amend. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 

15(a)(2). A court “is generally required to grant the plaintiff 

leave to amend, even if no request to amend the pleading was 

made, unless amendment would be futile.” Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, 

Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th 

Cir. 1990). Amendment is not futile if the plaintiff could 

“cure the defect requiring dismissal ‘without contradicting any 

of the allegations of [the] original complaint.’” Plascencia v. 

Lending 1st Mortgage, 583 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 

2008) (quoting Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 

(9th Cir. 1990)).

B. Judicial Notice

As an initial matter, Defendant requests that this Court 

take judicial notice of eight documents, detailed below. 

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Plaintiff has not objected to the request nor disputed the 

documents’ authenticity.

Generally, the Court may not consider material beyond the 

pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss. However, the Court 

may take judicial notice of matters of public record, provided 

that they are not subject to reasonable dispute. Fed. R. Evid. 

201; see Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica,

450 F.3d 1022, 1025 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006); Lee v. City of Los 

Angeles, 250 F.3d 662, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Moreover, under the doctrine of incorporation by reference,

the Court may consider a document that a plaintiff “necessarily” 

relied on in the complaint if “(1) the complaint refers to the 

document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff's claim; 

and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the copy attached 

to the 12(b)(6) motion.” Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 

(9th Cir. 2006). “The defendant may offer such a document, and 

the district court may treat such a document as part of the 

complaint, and thus may assume that its contents are true for 

purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” United 

States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Defendant first argues that the Court should take judicial 

notice of (1) a Deed of Trust recorded on September 15, 2005 in 

the Sacramento County Recorder’s Office and (2) a Notice of 

Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust similarly 

recorded on April 1, 2014. RJN at 2-3. Documents recorded in 

the Sacramento County Recorder’s Office are in the public 

record; therefore they are the proper subject of judicial 

notice. 

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Next, Defendant argues for judicial notice of (3) a 

Certificate of Corporate Existence dated April 21, 2006, issued 

by the Office of Thrift Supervision, Department of the Treasury; 

(4) a letter from the Department of the Treasury to Wachovia 

Corporation authorizing a name change; (5) the Charter of 

Wachovia Mortgage FSB; and (6) a certification of conversion to 

a national bank by the Comptroller of the Currency. RJN at 2-3. 

Defendant argues that these documents “reflect[] official acts 

of the executive branch of the United States and the State of 

California . . . .” RJN at 3:17-18. These documents may be 

properly judicially noticed. See, e.g., Hite v. Wachovia 

Mortgage, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57732, at *6-*7 (E.D. Cal. June 

11, 2010) (taking judicial notice of nearly identical documents 

and collecting sources noticing similar documents).

Defendant also requests judicial notice of (7) a printout 

from http://research.fdic.gov detailing the “History of World 

Savings Bank.” RJN at 2-3. A court may properly notice 

information obtained from government websites. Mitchell v. 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7803, at *9 (N.D. 

Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) (noticing a nearly identical document); 

Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. McPherson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

69542, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (collecting sources). 

Therefore, judicial notice is proper for this document. 

Finally, Defendant requests that the court consider (8) a 

document entitled “Loan Modification Agreement” dated July 6, 

2009. RJN Exh. G. Defendant states that this document is the 

loan modification agreement referenced in the complaint. RJN at 

3-4. The Court has taken judicial notice of this document since 

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it meets the requirements of Marder, supra, 450 F.3d at 448. 

C. Analysis

1. First Cause of Action: Fraud in the Inducement

Plaintiff first alleges fraud in the inducement. Compl. 

¶¶ 17-26. Defendant argues that this action is foreclosed by 

the statute of limitations set forth in California Code of Civil 

Procedure § 338(d). Mot. at 6. Plaintiff counters that the 

statute of limitations was tolled because she did not discover 

the alleged fraud until 2012. Opp. at 5.

A plaintiff must bring claims for fraud within three years 

of accrual of the cause of action. Cal. Code. Civ. Pro. 

§ 338(d). Such cause of action accrues either when all elements 

are complete or when “the aggrieved party [] [discovers] the 

facts constituting fraud[.]” Id.; Soliman v. Philip Morris 

Inc., 311 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2002); Nogart v. Upjohn Co., 

21 Cal.4th 383, 397 (1999). A plaintiff must plead and prove 

that she did not make the discovery until within three years of 

filing the complaint. Samuels v. Mix, 22 Cal.4th 1, 14 (1999). 

Specifically, the pleadings must demonstrate with 

“particularity” “(1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) 

the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable 

diligence.” Camsi IV v. Hunter Tech. Corp., 230 Cal.App.3d 

1525, 1536-37 (1991); Casualty Ins. Co. v. Rees Investment Co., 

14 Cal.App.3d 716, 719 (1971). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s cause of action for fraud 

in the inducement accrued in July 2009. Defendant is correct 

that — in the absence of delayed discovery — Plaintiff’s claim 

accrued in July 2009. Indeed, the final element of Plaintiff’s 

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claim occurred when she suffered injury by entering into the 

“high-cost” and “usurious” loan modification on June 6, 2009. 

See Compl. ¶ 13; Nogart, 21 Cal.4th at 397. Plaintiff’s cause 

of action therefore accrued at that the time of signing. See

Bonyadi v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2013 WL 2898143, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 

June 10, 2013) (“[P]laintiff’s cause of action accrued at the 

time she received her allegedly fraudulent loan . . . .”). 

This action commenced on May 1, 2014 — over four years 

after the parties entered into the agreement. Plaintiff’s 

claim, therefore, is barred by the three-year statute of 

limitations unless Plaintiff can demonstrate delayed discovery.

Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to establish

delayed discovery. In her opposition to this motion to dismiss, 

Plaintiff states that she did not find out that her interest 

rate was variable until 2012. Opp. at 5. According to 

Plaintiff, she found out at that time because “her interest rate 

continued to increase[.]” Id. at 5:13-17. However, these 

allegations do not appear in the complaint itself. Moreover,

they do not explain why she did not find out that the interest 

rate was variable when it increased in both 2010 and 2011. See

Compl. ¶ 11 (showing an increased interest rate of 3.000% and 

3.500% in 2010 and 2011 respectively).

Plaintiff has also failed to assert or explain an 

“inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable 

diligence.” See Camsi IV, 230 Cal.App.3d at 1536. As Defendant 

points out, Plaintiff appears to have had access to a document 

that would reveal the alleged fraud: the Modification Agreement. 

Indeed, Plaintiff does not dispute that the Agreement contains 

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the correct terms regarding the interest rate, about which 

Defendant allegedly misled her; nor does she dispute that it 

contains her signature. Plaintiff does assert that Defendant 

did not “provid[e] a written contract.” See Compl. ¶ 45. 

However this allegation is contradicted by her reference 

elsewhere in the complaint to “signing the loan modification,”

indicating that she had access to the written document at least 

at the time of signing. See Compl. ¶ 11. Thus, Plaintiff has 

not sufficiently explained why she could not learn of the true 

interest rate from the Modification Agreement despite having 

access to it. See Casualty Ins. Co., 14 Cal.App.3d at 719

(concluding that plaintiff had not sufficiently pled its failure 

to discover the allegedly unfair terms in a lease, because the 

complaint did not address the fact that plaintiff had access to 

that lease agreement for over five years).

Defendant argues that, by signing the Modification 

Agreement, Plaintiff is “estopped from claiming that they are 

[sic] entitled to delayed discovery.” Mot. at 4:11-12. For 

this proposition, Defendant relies on Edwards v. Comstock 

Insurance Co., 205 Cal.App.3d 1164, 1167 (1988), and Smith v. 

Occidental Etc. Steamship Co., 99 Cal. 462, 470-71 (1893). 

Neither case supports Defendant’s position. In Edwards, 

the court considered the admissibility of parol evidence 

regarding the meaning of “all claims” in a contract. 205 Cal 

App. at 1167. That case does not hold that a person who signs a 

document is estopped from asserting lack of knowledge of its 

terms. To the contrary, the Edwards court enumerated several 

reasons why such a person could lack knowledge. See id. at 

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1168. Similarly, the Smith court concluded that a party did not

assent to a contract when he signed the document because he was 

“ignorant of [its] contents” due to physical incapacity and 

ongoing pain. See Smith, 99 Cal. at 470. This Court therefore 

finds Defendant’s theory of estoppel unpersuasive. Plaintiff is 

not estopped from further clarifying her claim that she did not 

discover the fraud until 2012. 

Because Plaintiff’s lack of knowledge is not squarely 

contradicted by the complaint, cf. Edwards, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 

1168 (1988) (enumerating reasons why a person who signs a 

document could lack knowledge of its content), this Court must 

liberally grant leave to amend. See Plascencia, 583 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1095 (citing Reddy, 912 F.2d at 296). See also Eminence 

Capital, LLC v. Asperon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 

2003); Ohlsen v. Bank of Am., 2012 WL 3285587, at *3 n.3 (D. 

Idaho Aug. 10, 2012) (reiterating that Ninth Circuit’s policy of 

liberally granting leave to amend survived Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

and Twombly, 550 U.S. 544). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES

Plaintiff’s first cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

2. Second Cause of Action: Fraud in the Concealment

Plaintiff’s second cause of action is fraud in the 

concealment. Compl. ¶¶ 32-37. Defendant argues that this cause 

of action is foreclosed by the same statute of limitations set 

forth in California Code of Civil Procedure § 338(d). Mot. at 

6. As with her first cause of action, Plaintiff counters that 

the statute of limitations was tolled by late discovery of the 

fraud. Opp. at 5.

Defendant is correct regarding section 338(d), which 

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governs actions “for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake.” 

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 338(d). As discussed above, Plaintiff 

must plead with particularity that she first discovered “the 

facts constituting the fraud or mistake” within three years of 

filing this action. Samuels, 22 Cal.4th at 14; Casualty Ins. 

Co., 14 Cal.App.3d at 719. Plaintiff has not pled such facts, 

although she has suggested in her papers that she did not 

discover the fraud until 2012. Opp. at 5. Therefore, 

Plaintiff’s second cause of action is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND.

3. Third Cause of Action: Unfair Business Practices

In her third claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

engaged in unfair business practices in violation of California 

Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. (“UCL”). Compl. 

¶¶ 27-34. Defendant argues that this claim is barred by the 

four-year statute of limitations articulated in California 

Business and Professions Code § 17208. Mot. at 6.

A UCL claim accrues upon completion of the last element of 

the alleged violation. Aryeh v. Canon Bus. Solutions, Inc., 55 

Cal.4th 1185, 1197 (2013) (concluding that UCL cause of action 

accrued upon injury to plaintiff). Here, Plaintiff’s alleged 

injury occurred when Defendant deceptively induced her to enter 

into the Modification Agreement in July 2009. See Compl. ¶¶ 30-

33; RJN Exh. G. Her cause of action, therefore, accrued in July 

2009, over four years before filing this claim in May 2014. 

Thus, her claim is barred by the statute of limitations unless 

she can “demonstrate [that the] claim[] survive[s] based on one 

or more nonstatutory exemptions to the basic limitations 

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period.” Aryeh, 55 Cal.4th at 1197. These exemptions include 

the delayed discovery doctrine. Id. at 1195.

As discussed above, Plaintiff has raised the possibility 

that she could not discover the wrongful conduct until 2012, but 

she has not sufficiently pled delayed discovery. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s third cause of action is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND.

4. Fourth Cause of Action: Breach of the Implied 

 Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached the covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing by “le[ading] [her] to believe that 

after her loan modification, her loan was to be at a fixed rate 

. . . .” Compl. ¶ 37. Defendant asserts that this claim is 

barred by the statute of limitations. Mot. at 6.

A claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing is governed by the four-year statute of 

limitations provided in California Civil Procedure Code 

§ 337(1). Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 208 

(9th Cir. 1991). This claim accrued when Plaintiff entered into 

the loan modification agreement with Defendant. See Pascual v. 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 4066946, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 

8, 2013) (concluding that similar claim accrued upon entering 

into the loan). 

Plaintiff filed this action over four years after signing 

the Modification Agreement, so this claim is time barred unless 

Plaintiff can adequately demonstrate delayed discovery. See, 

e.g., Perez-Encinas v. Amerus Life Ins. Co., 468 F. Supp. 2d 

1127, 1134 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2006) (recognizing availability 

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of delayed discovery doctrine for this cause of action; 

collecting sources). For the reasons stated above regarding the 

previous three causes of action, Plaintiff has not adequately 

pled delayed discovery. Her fourth claim is therefore DISMISSED 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

5. Fifth Cause of Action: Negligence

Plaintiff labels her fifth claim “Negligence.” The 

allegations under that heading appear to relate to professional 

negligence. See Compl. ¶¶ 42-49. Specifically, Plaintiff 

asserts that Defendant did not meet the “duties of reasonable 

care” including “giving the borrower NOTICE of the new terms,” 

“providing a written contract,” and “giving the borrower a chance 

to accept or refuse the new terms,” which caused her to be 

injured by “high interest rate[s] and monthly payment[s].” 

Compl. ¶¶ 45, 47; see Cyr v. McGovran, 206 Cal.App.4th 645, 651 

(2012) (“The elements of a cause of action for professional 

negligence are failure to use the skill and care that a 

reasonably careful professional operating in the field would have 

used in similar circumstances, which failure proximately causes 

damage to plaintiff.”) (quoting Thomson v. Canyon, 198 

Cal.App.4th. 594 (2011)). Defendant argues that this claim is 

time-barred pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure

§ 335.1. Mot. at 6.

A claim for professional negligence is limited by California 

Code of Civil Procedure § 339(1)’s two-year limitations period. 

Cyr, 206 Cal. App. 4th at 651. The action accrues when a 

plaintiff “sustains damages” or upon discovery of the pertinent 

facts. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 339(1); Heighley v. J.C. Penney 

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Life. Ins. Co., 257 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Cyr, 

206 Cal. App. 4th at 652.

Once again, Plaintiff’s alleged injury occurred more than 

four years before filing this action and Plaintiff’s claim is 

time-barred unless she can demonstrate that she did not discover

the relevant facts until within two years of filing. Because the 

complaint does not contain adequate facts to support a theory of 

delayed discovery, the fifth claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND.

6. Sixth Cause of Action: Promissory Estoppel

Plaintiff asserts a cause of action of promissory estoppel. 

Compl. ¶¶ 50-54. Defendant again argues that the claim is timebarred pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 338(d). 

Mot. at 6.

Where “the gravamen of [a claim of] promissory estoppel is 

fraud,” the claim is subject to a three-year statute of 

limitations under California Code of Civil Procedure § 338(d). 

Ferguson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 2118527, at *6 

(E.D. Cal. May 21, 2014) (citing Agair Inc. v. Shaeffer, 232 Cal. 

App. 2d. 513 (1965)). In Ferguson, the plaintiffs alleged 

promissory estoppel where the defendant bank had “fraudulently 

induced [them] to participate in the [loan] modification process 

instead of seeking other alternative[.]” Id. Noting 

additionally that the promissory estoppel claim incorporated the 

preceding paragraphs detailing further fraud allegations, the 

court concluded that the gravamen of that claim was fraud. Id. 

The court therefore applied the statute of limitations in 

California Code of Civil Procedure § 338(d). Id.; see Cal. Code 

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Civ. Pro. § 338(d) (governing causes of action “on the ground of 

fraud”).

The claim in Ferguson is similar to Plaintiff’s claim here. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant deceived her into believing that 

the loan modification was “a fair and reasonable modification . . 

. that allowed Plaintiff the ability to become and remain current 

on her loans.” Compl. ¶ 53. Plaintiff asserts that this 

deception induced her to enter into the modification agreement. 

Compl. ¶ 52. These claims mirror Ferguson’s fraudulent 

inducement allegations. Furthermore, like in Ferguson, Plaintiff 

Hines “re-alleges and incorporate [sic] by reference” the 

preceding allegations of fraud and misrepresentation. Compl. ¶ 

60. Therefore, the gravamen of Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel 

claim is fraud and section 338(d)’s statute of limitations 

applies. 

Plaintiff’s claim is barred by section 338(d) unless she 

can demonstrate delayed discovery. Plaintiff has failed to plead 

the requisite facts. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s sixth cause of 

action is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

7. Seventh Cause of Action: Intentional 

Misrepresentation

In her final claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

intentionally misrepresented facts regarding the loan 

modification. Compl. ¶¶ 55-62. Defendant asserts that this 

claim too is time-barred. Mot. at 6.

This claim is also subject to California Code of Civil 

Procedure § 338(d). See Bonyadi, 2013 WL 2898143, at *4 (“[A] 

claim for intentional misrepresentation is grounded in fraud[.]); 

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Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 338(d) (governing claims “for relief on the 

ground of fraud”). Thus, Plaintiff’s third cause of action is 

subject to the same analysis as her first, second, and sixth 

causes of action, discussed above. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

seventh claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.2

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be filed within twenty (20) 

days from the date of this order. Defendant’s responsive 

pleading is due within twenty (20) days thereafter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 17, 2014

 

2 Defendant asserts numerous other arguments for dismissal, all 

of which address the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. However, the 

Court is procedurally barred from reaching these arguments, 

because the respective statutes of limitations have run on each 

of Plaintiff’s claims as currently pled.

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