Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00077/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00077-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES M. MACIAS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SALINAS VALLEY STATE

PRISON WARDEN, SGT. ROGUE,

C. O. STUBER,

Defendants. ______________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C 06-0077 JSW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE

TO EXHAUST

(Docket nos. 12, 14)

Plaintiff James M. Macias is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the

California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility in Corcoran, California. On January 12,

2005, he filed a previous civil rights action under Case No. C 05-0180 JSW (PR),

alleging that officers at Salinas Valley State Prison failed to protect him from an assault

that occurred on September 20, 2003. On February 25, 2005, this Court dismissed that

complaint based on Plaintiff’s assertion that he failed to exhaust his complaint through

the administrative grievance system. In the original complaint, Plaintiff stated that he

had not exhausted the claims through the prison’s administrative grievance procedure

because he was only seeking monetary damages, and “because the issue will just get

denied[.]” The Court’s dismissal was without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a new

complaint after exhausting the administrative remedies available to him. 

Thereafter, on January 9, 2006, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint involving the

same subject matter. In the complaint, Plaintiff states that he has exhausted the

complaint to the highest level available to him and attaches several documents from the

Case 3:06-cv-00077-JSW Document 18 Filed 06/06/07 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

prison appeals coordinator, which document that Plaintiff’s two attempts to exhaust his

administrative grievances, filed on March 1, 2005 and July 5, 2005 were “screened out”

at the informal level because they were filed outside of the time limits for filing such

appeals. See, Plaintiff’s Exhibits in support of Complaint.

On May 17, 2006, after reviewing the allegations in the complaint pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court issued an Order of Service. On October 25, 2006,

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative

remedies, as mandated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. 

Plaintiff has filed an opposition and Defendant has filed a reply. Plaintiff has also filed a

motion seeking appointment of counsel (docket no. 14). 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense under the PLRA. 

Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919 (2007). Defendants have the burden of raising and

proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir.

2003). A nonexhaustion defense should be raised in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion

rather than in a motion for summary judgment. Id. In deciding such a motion, the

district court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at

1119-20. A prisoner’s concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal, so

long as no exception to exhaustion applies. Id. at 1120. If the court concludes the

prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal without

prejudice. Id. at 1120.

The PLRA's exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied "by filing an untimely or

otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal." Woodford v. Ngo,

126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382 (2006). "The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) strongly suggests that

the PLRA uses the term 'exhausted' to mean what the term means in administrative law,

where exhaustion means proper exhaustion." Id. at 2387. Therefore, the PLRA

Case 3:06-cv-00077-JSW Document 18 Filed 06/06/07 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion. Id. "Proper exhaustion demands

compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no

adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on

the course of its proceedings." Id. at 2386. (footnote omitted). 

The State of California provides its prisoners the right to appeal administratively

"any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those individuals as

adversely affecting their welfare." Cal Code Regs tit 15, § 3084.1(a). In order to

exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed

through several levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a

CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second level appeal to the institution head or designee,

and (4) third level appeal to the Director of the California Department of Corrections. 

Barry v Ratelle, 985 F Supp 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Cal Code Regs tit 15, §

3084.5). A final decision from the Director’s level of review satisfies the exhaustion

requirement under § 1997e(a). Id at 1237-38. Title 15, section 3084.6(c) of the

California Code of Regulations requires that inmates file an inmate appeal within fifteen

working days of date of the event or decision being appealed, or of receiving an

unacceptable lower level appeal decision. 

B. Analysis

The PLRA amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal

law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

Exhaustion is mandatory and not left to the discretion of the district court. Woodford v.

Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382 (2006) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). 

Exhaustion is a prerequisite to all prisoner lawsuits concerning prison life, whether such

actions involve general conditions or particular episodes, whether they allege excessive

force or some other wrong, and even if they seek relief not available in grievance

proceedings, such as money damages. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 532 (2002). 

Case 3:06-cv-00077-JSW Document 18 Filed 06/06/07 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Here, Defendants correctly raise nonexhaustion in an unenumerated motion to

dismiss and argue that Plaintiff’s prisoner action should be dismissed because Plaintiff

did not exhaust available administrative remedies under § 1997e(a) as to all claims

before he filed suit. In support of the instant motion, Defendants reference the two

appeals filed by Plaintiff on March 1, 2005 and July 5, 2005, which he included as

attachments to the complaint. Defendants further rely on Plaintiff’s statements in the

complaint that neither of his inmate appeals proceeded beyond the informal level of

review in the appeals process and that, as a result, he did not obtain a Director’s level

decision at the third formal level of review. See, Motion to Dismiss at 3.

In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff requests the Court to deny the motion and

alleges only that he was transferred a number of times as a means of explaining his

failure to exhaust the administrative remedies regarding these claims. Additionally, in

the complaint signed under penalty of perjury on September 23, 2004 in his initial case,

Plaintiff stated that he had not presented the facts underlying the complaint in the

grievance procedure because “the issue will just get denied [sic] I am asking for money

damages.” See, Case No. C 05-00180 JSW (PR), Complaint at 2. Plaintiff has conceded

that he failed to exhaust the issues underlying the complaint prior to filing the initial

complaint. See Wyatt at 1120. 

Plaintiff’s attempts at exhausting the claims in early 2005 came long after the

fifteen days required for proper exhaustion. The PLRA's exhaustion requirement cannot

be satisfied "by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative

grievance or appeal." Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382 (2006). "Proper

exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural

rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some

orderly structure on the course of its proceedings." Id. at 2386. (footnote omitted). As

set forth above, the deadline for filing a written grievance is fifteen days after the date of

incident of which one is complaining. The incident alleged in the complaint occurred on

September 30, 2003, more than eighteen months before the submission of his

Case 3:06-cv-00077-JSW Document 18 Filed 06/06/07 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

administrative appeals in March and July, 2005. As a result, these attempts at filing an

administrative appeal do not satisfy the exhaustion requirement because they were

untimely. Id. at 2382.

Plaintiff does not dispute that such administrative remedies were available to

inmates at the time of the incident alleged in his complaint. Plaintiff instead requests that

the Court find that his attempts to exhaust the claims after the expiration of the time to

exhaust them had passed were sufficient. In so doing, Plaintiff relies on case law that is

no longer good law. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 737, 741; Ngo, 126 S. Ct. at 2378. 

However, the Court is bound by these decisions of the Supreme Court in deciding the

motion. Consequently, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for

failure to exhaust. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20 (holding where court finds lack of

exhaustion, proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice).

MOTION FOR COUNSEL

On October 13, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking appointment of counsel,

based on the fact that he is indigent and suffers from mental illness, which makes him

sleepy and “forget things, that I read.” However, there is no constitutional right to

counsel in a civil case unless an indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses

the litigation. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Rand v.

Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (no constitutional right to counsel in §

1983 action), withdrawn in part on other grounds on reh'g en banc, 154 F.3d 952 (9th

Cir. 1998) (en banc). A court “may request an attorney to represent any person unable to

afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).

The decision to request counsel to represent an indigent litigant under § 1915 is

within “the sound discretion of the trial court and is granted only in exceptional

circumstances.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984). A finding of

the “exceptional circumstances” of the plaintiff seeking assistance requires an evaluation

of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and an evaluation of the

plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal

Case 3:06-cv-00077-JSW Document 18 Filed 06/06/07 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

issues involved. See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103

(9th Cir. 2004); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525; Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th

Cir. 1991); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). Both of these

factors must be viewed together before reaching a decision on a request for counsel

under § 1915. See id. In this case, Plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient ability to

articulate his claims and represent himself in these proceedings. As such, Plaintiff’s

motion is DENIED (docket no. 14).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies (docket no. 12) is GRANTED and the action is DISMISSED

without prejudice. The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions as decided by this

order, enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 6, 2007

 JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-00077-JSW Document 18 Filed 06/06/07 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES M. MACIAS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SALINAS VALLEY STATE PRISON et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-00077 JSW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on June 6, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

James Michael Macias

K78762

CSP Corcoran

900 Quebec

Corcoran, CA 93212-8800

Samantha D. Tama

California State Attorney General ‘s Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Dated: June 6, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Jennifer Ottolini, Deputy Clerk

Case 3:06-cv-00077-JSW Document 18 Filed 06/06/07 Page 7 of 7