Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_10-cv-00141/USCOURTS-alnd-2_10-cv-00141-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

GERALD NEIL LINDLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

FREDIA L. TAYLOR,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:10-CV-141-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is set for trial on October 31, 2016. (Doc. 147 at 10 ¶ 13.a). Pending

before the court are 18 motions in limine (Docs. 154-156, 158-173) filed by

Defendant Fredia Taylor (“Ms. Taylor”) on October 3, 2016. No motions in limine

have been filed by Plaintiff Gerald Neil Lindley (“Mr. Lindley”). Consistent with the

rulings made at the hearing held on October 24, 2016, and as additionally addressed

below, Ms. Taylor’s motions are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

1

1 Concerning objections to witness and exhibit lists, Ms. Taylor never timely filed any as

required by the pretrial order. (See Doc. 147 at 8 (emphasizing that “[o]bjections not so disclosed

[i.e., within 7 days] are waived unless excused by the court for good cause, such as that the objecting

party could not determine the basis of the objection prior to trial.”)). Instead, she only submitted a

document to the court’s courtroom deputy via email on October 17, 2016, that purported to be

unresolved objections to Mr. Lindley’s list. Because Ms. Taylor failed even to acknowledge that she

missed the court’s deadline for stating her objections on the record, by a separate order entered by

the court, her objections are all HEREBY WAIVED except to the extent that they are dealt with by

virtue of her timely pending motions in limine. Mr. Lindley, on the other hand, timely filed

FILED

 2016 Oct-24 PM 03:22

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:10-cv-00141-VEH Document 191 Filed 10/24/16 Page 1 of 20
II. STANDARDS

A. Applicable Evidentiary Rules

Federal Rule of Evidence (“F.R.E.”) 401 defines “relevant evidence” as

“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than

it would be without the evidence.” FED.R.EVID. 401. Regarding the admissibility of

evidence generally, F.R.E. 402 provides:

All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the

Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or

by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory

authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

FED. R. EVID. 402.

The exclusionary standard pursuant to F.R.E. 403 states:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of

the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,

waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

FED. R. EVID. 403.

F.R.E. 901(a) generally provides that “[t]o satisfy the requirement of

authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce

objections to Ms. Taylor’s list (Doc. 176), but never submitted any unresolved objections for the

court to consider. Therefore, the court understands this to mean that all objections to Ms. Taylor’s

list initially asserted by Mr. Lindley have since been resolved by the parties. 

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Case 2:10-cv-00141-VEH Document 191 Filed 10/24/16 Page 2 of 20
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it

is.” FED.R.EVID. 901(a). F.R.E. 901(b) lists various examples of acceptable methods

for satisfying F.R.E. 901(a) including testimony of a witness with knowledge that “an

item is what it is claimed to be.” FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1). 

B. Standard of Review

The Supreme Court has steadfastly held that “abuse of discretion is the proper

standard of review of a district court’s evidentiary rulings.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,

522 U.S. 136, 141, 118 S. Ct. 512, 517, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1997) (citing United

States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54, 105 S. Ct. 465, 470, 83 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1984); Spring

Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 658, 25 L. Ed. 487 (1879)). “An abuse of discretion can

occur where the district court applies the wrong law, follows the wrong procedure,

bases its decision on clearly erroneous facts, or commits a clear error in judgment.”

United States v. Estelan, 156 F. App’x 185, 196 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing United States

v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005)).

Moreover, as the Eleventh Circuit has explained, not every incorrect

evidentiary ruling constitutes reversible error:

Auto-Owners’ second argument is that it is entitled to a new trial

on the basis of what it describes as a number of erroneous evidentiary

rulings by the district court. Evidentiary rulings are also reviewed under

an abuse of discretion standard. Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497,

1504 (11th Cir. 1989). Moreover, even if Auto-Owners can show that

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certain errors were committed, the errorsmust have affected “substantial

rights” in order to provide the basis for a new trial. See FED. R. EVID.

103(a). “Error in the admission or exclusion of evidence is harmless if

it does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Perry, 734 F.2d

at 1446. See also Allstate Insurance Co. v. James, 845 F.2d 315, 319

(11th Cir. 1988).

Haygood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 995 F.2d 1512, 1515 (11th Cir. 1993). Therefore,

even the existence of many evidentiary errors does not guarantee the appealing party

a new trial. Instead, such erroneous rulings by a district court must “affect the

substantial rights of the parties” in order for reversible error to occur. 

III. RULINGS2

Uncontested Motions in Limine

Within the case caption of each one, Ms. Taylor has indicated that the motion

is “OPPOSED.” The deadline for Mr. Lindley to state his opposition to these motions

ran on October 14, 2016, and he contested only Motionsin Limine Numbers 1-4, 7-9,

12-15, and 18. (Docs. 178-188). Therefore, Motions in Limine Numbers 5-6, 10-11,

and 16-17 (Docs. 172, 158, 162, 163, 168, 169) are GRANTED as unopposed and

2 The following rulings are subject to revision during trial, including, for example, if a party

“opens the door” to an area of evidence which the court prohibited on the motion of that particular

party, or if a party believes that a prohibited matter is appropriate to use for impeachment purposes.

However, the court cautions counsel to make sure, before covering any area of evidence prohibited

by this order, that the court is in agreement that such introduction before the jury is or has become

proper. Additionally, counsel are cautioned that they cannot allude to any excluded evidence and,

when referring to any evidence which is stated in this order to be admissible for some purposes, but

not for others, they may not argue such excluded purposes.

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the parties are HEREBY PROHIBITED fromreferring at any point during any stage

of thistrial, i.e., starting with jury selection and ending with closing arguments, to the

following precluded documents, witnesses, or other matters:

! Notices of claimunrelated to Mr. Lindley and generally filed with

the City of Birmingham (Doc. 172);

! Witnesses or exhibits not designated on a party’s witness and

exhibit lists, other than rebuttal witnesses and exhibits (Doc.

158);

! Wealth or poverty of the parties (Doc. 162);

! Evidence regarding allegations falling outside of the Pretrial

Order (Doc. 147) entered in this case on August 11, 2016 (Doc.

163);

! Evidence of Mr. Lindley’s good or bad character (Doc. 168); and

! Evidence or comments thatsuggest the City of Birminghamor the

City Attorney’s office is providing Ms. Taylor with legal

representation or willsatisfy any jury verdictreached or judgment

entered against her. (Doc. 169).

Contested Motions in Limine

As stated above, Mr. Lindley has specifically challenged Motions in Limine

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Case 2:10-cv-00141-VEH Document 191 Filed 10/24/16 Page 5 of 20
Numbers 1-4, 7-9, 12-15, and 18. (Docs. 178-188). These contested motions are

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as discussed below:

Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 1

Ms. Taylor objectsto Mr. Lindley’s introduction of numerousmedical bills and

records as lacking proper authentication pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 901(a) and on

hearsay grounds. (Doc. 154 at 2-3). Mr. Lindley respondsthat his medicalrecords and

bills can be authenticated by the applicable custodian of records. (Doc. 178 at 1 ¶ 3)

Mr. Lindley further respond that these records are admissible under one or more

exceptions to the hearsay rule, including specifically the business records exception

pursuant to F.R.E 803(6) (Doc. 178 at 1 ¶ 4) as established through a custodian or

other qualified witness. FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(D). Mr. Lindley also relies upon the

medical treatment and present sense impression exceptions to the hearsay rule for

these records. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (describing hearsay exception applicable to

statements about a medical diagnosis or treatment); FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (“A

statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately

after the declarant perceived it.”). 

The list of records includes:

! Medical records from Cytopath, P.C., and Dr. Regina S. Meara;

! Medical records from Anesthesiologist Assoc., P.C.;

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Case 2:10-cv-00141-VEH Document 191 Filed 10/24/16 Page 6 of 20
! Records from Kinetic Concepts, Inc.;

! Premier Medical P.C.;

! Medical records from Southview Medical Group, P.C. and Drs. David

W. Barnes and Lynn Crawford;

! Medical records from Birmingham Radiology Group, P.C.;

! Medical records from Southern Medical Group;

! Medical records from Shelby Baptist Medical Center;

! Pharmacy records and billing from the following pharmacies: CVS

Pharmacy, Snider’s Discount Pharmacy, Walgreens, Jerry’s Pharmacy;

! Medical Records from Parkway Medical Center; and

! MedicalRecordsfromCahaba Valley Surgical Group, P.C., and Dr. Rex

Sherer.

Ruling(s): Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 1 is DENIED if these

medical records are stipulated to as authentic by Ms. Taylor in advance of trial or are

properly authenticated by Mr. Lindley at trial. 

Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 2

Ms. Taylor objectsto Mr. Lindley’sintroduction of “medical bills, prescription

costs, doctor/psychology visits, surgery, transportation costs, and pain and suffering

unrelated to the injury allegedly caused by the Defendant.” (Doc. 155 at 1 (emphasis

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Case 2:10-cv-00141-VEH Document 191 Filed 10/24/16 Page 7 of 20
added)). Ms. Taylor also objects to Mr. Lindley’s introduction of past and future lost

wages as inadmissible because he “was not gainfully employed at the time of the

incident” and as an evidentiary issue requiring expert testimony. Id. Mr. Lindley

responds that he “is competent to testify regarding his lost wages claimed as a result

of his injuries.” (Doc. 178 at 1 ¶ 2). 

Ruling(s): Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 2 is GRANTED to the

extent that Mr. Lindley seeks to introduce any evidence unrelated to his injuries that

he claims Ms. Taylor caused him. The remaining portion of Ms. Taylor’s Motion in

Limine Number 2 is WITHDRAWN asstated by defense counsel during the hearing.

Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 3

Ms. Taylor objects to Mr. Lindley’s introduction of damages for permanent

injury/disfigurement and for further medical treatment attributable to his injuries on

the basis that such evidence is inadmissible in the absence of supporting expert

testimony. (Doc. 156 at 1). Ms. Taylor relies upon Jones v. Fortner, 507 So. 2d 908

(Ala. 1987), Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. James, 646 So. 2d 669 (Ala. 1994), 

Collins v. Windham, 167 So. 2d 690 (Ala. 1964), and also some non-binding cases

as support. See Fortner, 507 So. 2d at 910 (“It has been held that where there is

nothing from which a layman can form any well-grounded opinion as to the

permanency of the injury or where the injury is purely subjective, expert evidence

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Case 2:10-cv-00141-VEH Document 191 Filed 10/24/16 Page 8 of 20
must be introduced.” (citing 25 C.J.S. Damages § 62, at 813 (1966))); cf. James, 646

So. 2d 671-72 (finding no error in trial court’s admission of expert physician

testimony regarding claimfor future medical expenses); Windham, 167 So. 2d at 693-

94 (“In view of the authorities cited above, we are of the opinion that, where the

injury complained of is purely subjective, as in the present case, and where there is

no expert medical testimony tending to show the permanency of the alleged injury,

mortality tables are not admissible in evidence.”).

Mr. Lindley responds that he intends to “offer medical testimony through live

witnesses addressing the issue of permanency of injury and future medical needs.”

(Doc. 179 at 1 ¶ 2). 

Alternatively, Mr. Lindley counters that “an exception to the rule of necessity

of medical testimony [exists] in cases where lack of care is so apparent that it can be

understood by a layman, and requires only common knowledge and experience to

understand it.” (Id. ¶ 3). Mr. Lindley cites to Tuscaloosa Orthopedic Appliance Co.

v. Wyatt, 460 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1984), as legal support. In Wyatt, the Supreme Court

of Alabama explained:

Although this case does not involve a physician, it does involve

a claim of negligence in the delivery of health care. Therefore, the usual

rules relating to medical malpractice are applicable. In a medical

malpractice action, “expert medical testimony is required to establish

what is and what is not proper medical treatment and procedure.”

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Case 2:10-cv-00141-VEH Document 191 Filed 10/24/16 Page 9 of 20
Gilbert v. Campbell, 440 So.2d 1048 (Ala.1983). An exception to this

rule exists “in a case where want of skill or lack of care is so apparent

... as to be understood by a layman, and requires only common

knowledge and experience to understand it.” Dimoff v. Maitre, 432 So.

2d 1225, 1226–1227 (Ala.1983), quoting LloydNoland Foundation,Inc.

v. Harris, 295 Ala. 63, 66, 322 So. 2d 709, 711 (1975). In the recent

decision of Holt v. Godsil, 447 So. 2d 191 (Ala. 1984), this Court

specifically enumerated the types of medical malpractice casesin which

expert testimony is not required. None of these exceptions applies here.

The need for expert testimony does not necessarily depend upon

the type of profession which the defendant practices. Rather, it is

dependent upon whether the average person is able to decide without

expert testimony whether or not the procedure followed in any given

case falls below the acceptable standard.

Wyatt, 460 So. 2d at 161 (emphasis added).

Ruling(s): That portion of Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 3 relating

to disfigurement is DENIED. That portion of Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine

Number 3 relating to future medical needs is GRANTED absent Mr. Lindley’s

offering medical testimony to establish his future medical needs. Finally, the court

will allow Mr. Lindley the right to ask the court to reconsider whether medical

testimony is required for him to prove the issue of future medical needs to the extent

Mr. Lindley is, indeed, able to show that his future medical needs are objectively

obvious to a layman and non-speculative in nature. 

Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 4

Ms. Taylor objects to Mr. Lindley’s introduction of his notice of claim filed

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Case 2:10-cv-00141-VEH Document 191 Filed 10/24/16 Page 10 of 20
with the City of Birmingham on the bases of relevancy, F.R.E. 403, and hearsay.

(Doc. 173 at 1). 

Mr. Lindley counters that his sworn statement is admissible (as non-hearsay)

under F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). (Doc. 180 at 1 ¶ 2). F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) provides:

(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the

following conditions is not hearsay:

(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement. The

declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about

a prior statement, and the statement: . . .

(B) is consistent with the declarant's

testimony and is offered:

(i) to rebut an express or implied

charge that the declarant recently

fabricated it or acted from a

recent improper influence or

motive in so testifying; or

(ii) to rehabilitate the declarant's

credibility as a witness when

attacked on another ground[.]

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).

Ruling(s): Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 4 is DENIED with respect

to her relevancy and F.R.E. 403 objections. Specifically, Ms. Taylor offers no case

authority to support her relevancy and F.R.E. 403 objections to Mr. Lindley’s

introduction of his notice of claim and the court finds her objections to be

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Case 2:10-cv-00141-VEH Document 191 Filed 10/24/16 Page 11 of 20
undeveloped and unpersuasive. Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 4 is further

DENIED on hearsay grounds to the extent that Mr. Lindley introduces his notice of

claim within the confines of FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).

Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 7

Ms. Taylor objects to Mr. Lindley’s introduction of certain Shelby County

records on relevancy, F.R.E. 403, and hearsay grounds. (Doc. 159 at 2). Ms. Taylor

further objects to them as lacking proper authentication pursuant to FED. R. EVID.

901(a). Id. Mr. Lindley responds that these records are relevant, that they are more

probative than prejudicial, that they can be authenticated by the applicable custodian

of record, and that they are admissible under one or more exceptions to the hearsay

rule, including specifically the public records exception. (Doc. 181 at 1 ¶¶ -3); see

FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(A)(ii) (permitting “a record or statement of a public office” to

be admitted if “it sets out . . . a matter observed while under a legal duty to report

....”; cf. also White v. City of Birmingham, 96 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1273 (N.D. Ala.

2015), as amended (May 27, 2015) (“[T]he IO reportsthemselves are hearsay but are

admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rule [under F.R.E.

803(8)(A)(iii)] because they are the official reporting document for BPD for the

November 30, 2012 investigation.”).

The list of public records includes:

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Case 2:10-cv-00141-VEH Document 191 Filed 10/24/16 Page 12 of 20
! Recordsfromthe ShelbyCountySheriff’s Office regardingMr. Lindley;

! Photographs of Mr. Lindley’s injured leg taken by Shelby County

Sheriff’s Department;

! Jail inspection records;

! Shelby County Sheriff’s Office Records; and

! Recordsfrom the District and Circuit Court of ShelbyCounty regarding

Mr. Lindley’s criminal charge in Shelby County and the disposition of the charge.

Ruling(s): The court finds these records to be relevant and not subject to

exclusion under F.R.E. 403. The court further finds that the public records exception

applies to these documents. Accordingly, Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 7

is DENIED if these records are stipulated to as authentic by Ms. Taylor in advance

of trial or are properly authenticated by Mr. Lindley at trial. 

Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 8

Ms. Taylor objectsto Mr. Lindley’sintroduction of photographs of hisinjuries

on F.R.E. 403 grounds. (Doc. 160 at 1). Ms. Taylor argues that “because [Mr.

Lindley] cannot demonstrate that the injuries depicted in the photographs he seeksto

introduce were caused by [her], the photos have little to no probative value.” Id. Ms.

Taylor further contends these photographs “would serve only to mislead and highly

prejudice the jury against [her].” (Id. at 2). Ms. Taylor cites to no supporting case

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Case 2:10-cv-00141-VEH Document 191 Filed 10/24/16 Page 13 of 20
authority.

Mr. Lindley responds that he “can authenticate all of the photographs as

accurately depicting his person and his injuries.” (Doc. 182 at 1 ¶ 2). Mr. Lindley

further cites to Logan v. Chestnut, 522 F. App’x 668, 671 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Logan

was free to challenge the defense witness’s testimony, but the district court did not

err in admitting the photographs.”), as persuasive support and points out that Ms.

Taylor’s objection really goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its

admissibility. (Doc. 182 at 2 ¶ 3). 

Ruling(s): Consistent with the court’s ruling on Ms. Taylor’s Motion in

Limine Number 7 above, and in the absence of any case authority showing that it

would be appropriate to exclude photographs taken of Mr. Lindley’s injuries on

F.R.E. 403 grounds, Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 8 is DENIED.

Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 9

Ms. Taylor objects to Mr. Lindley’s introduction of “[a]ll newspaper,

magazine, internet publication, internet blog, twitter account, facebook page, or any

other hard document or electronic publication which contains an account of the

events made the basis of the Amended Complaint.” (Doc. 161 at 1). Ms. Taylor

primarily asserts a hearsay objection to these documents with citationsto several case

authorities and secondarily raises F.R.E. 403. (Doc. 161 at 1-2); see, e.g., United

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States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The Miami Herald articles

are also inadmissible hearsay, as they are relevant primarily to establish the truth of

their contents—the identity of the gunmen.”), abrogated on other grounds by Davis

v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006); Baker, 432

F.3d at 1211 n.23 (“In fact, the articles are likely a reporter’s account of what

eyewitnesses reported; in other words, double hearsay forbidden by Rule 805.”).

Mr. Lindley only superficially contests this motion and offers no cases which

bring into question Ms. Taylor’s hearsay and F.R.E. 403 positions. (Doc. 183 at 1).

Ruling(s): Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 10 is GRANTED on

hearsay and/or F.R.E. 403 grounds as to any materials covered by this motion which

are not listed on Mr. Lindley’s exhibit list.

Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 12

Ms. Taylor objects to Mr. Lindley’s introduction of evidence relating to

punitive damages as subject to exclusion under F.R.E. 403 because “a discussion of

punitive damages would serve only to confuse, mislead and prejudice the jury.” (Doc.

164 at 1). Ms. Taylor offers no supporting case authority for her position.

Mr. Lindley countersthat his deliberate indifference claimasserted against Ms.

Taylor in her individual capacity pursuant to § 1983 permits a recovery for punitive

damages if he can show she acted recklessly or with a callous indifference to his

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Case 2:10-cv-00141-VEH Document 191 Filed 10/24/16 Page 15 of 20
federally protected rights. (Doc. 184 at 1 ¶ 2).

Ruling(s): Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 11 is WITHDRAWN as

stated by defense counsel during the hearing. 

Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 13

Ms. Taylor objectsto Mr. Lindley’s introduction of “[a]ny statement, reference

to, or mention of any objection [that counsel for Ms. Taylor] has asserted to any

discovery in this case in front of the jury.” (Doc. 165 at 1). Ms. Taylor neither states

what groundsshe relies upon to preclude this evidence nor offers any supporting case

authority.

Mr. Lindley counters that “[t]he documents in question are relevant, material

to the issues and defenses in this case, are more probative than prejudicial, and are

otherwise admissible in the trial of the case.” (Doc. 185 at 1 ¶ 2). Mr. Lindley also

cites to Colonial Pac. Leasing Corp. v. N & N Partners, LLC, 981 F. Supp. 2d 1345

(N.D. Ga. 2013) as persuasive support. While Colonial Pac. initially analyzes the

admissibility of pleadings and discovery responses under Georgia law, the district

court in turn observes that “whether the deficiencies alleged in the state-court

complaint are admissible is a question of federal (not Georgia) law. The answer,

however, is the same: they are.” Id. at 1356 (citing Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp., 568

F.2d 1139, 1147 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Prior pleadings are admissible if such pleadings

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Case 2:10-cv-00141-VEH Document 191 Filed 10/24/16 Page 16 of 20
indicate that the party against whom they are admitted has adopted a position

inconsistent with that in the earlier litigation.”)).3

Ruling(s): Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 13 is GRANTED as

clarified on the record to apply only to objections to discovery asserted by defense

counsel. 

Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 14

Ms. Taylor objects to “[a]ny reference, suggestion or implication in front of the

jury that tends to lead the jury to believe that there are things about the case that

either party’s counsel cannot tell the jury.” (Doc. 166 at 1). Citing to Wilson v. Pepsi

Bottling Grp., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2009), Mr. Lindley counters with

that “[b]ecause the Motion fails to state what if any evidence it concerns, there is no

possible way that [he] can respond with any substance to the Motion.” (Doc. 186 at

1 ¶ 2); see also Wilson, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1359 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (“The moving party

has the burden of proving that the evidence sought to be excluded is inadmissible.”

(citing Plair v. E.J. Brach & Sons, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 67, 69 (N.D. Ill. 1994))).

Ruling(s): Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 14 is GRANTED as

explained on the record.

3

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the

Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down

prior to October 1, 1981.

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Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 15

Ms. Taylor objects to “[a]ny evidence or testimony the probative value of

which is significantly outweighed by a danger that it will subject the Defendant to

unfair prejudice.” (Doc. 167 at 1). Relying upon Wilson again, Mr. Lindley responds

that the motion is too indefinite for him to form a substantive response. (Doc. 187 at

1 ¶ 2).

Ruling(s): Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 15 is DENIED as too

vaguely worded.

Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 18

Ms. Taylor objects to Mr. Lindley’s introduction of City of Birmingham jail

logs on the grounds of relevancy, F.R.E. 403, and hearsay. (Doc. 170 at 2). This list

of jail records includes:

! Birmingham City Jail in-house reports for the period of January 24,

2008, to February 2, 2008;

! Birmingham City Jail roll/bed roster for the period of January 24, 2008,

to February 2, 2008; and

! Birmingham City Jail cell block ledgers for the period of January 24,

2008 to February 2, 2008.

Ms. Taylor argues that because she did not draft any of these records, they

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Case 2:10-cv-00141-VEH Document 191 Filed 10/24/16 Page 18 of 20
should not be admissible against her. (Doc. 170 at 1-2). Ms. Taylor cites to no case

authority to support her objections.

Mr. Lindley responds that these records are relevant because they confirm that

Mr. Lindley’s condition “was well known within the jail” (Doc. 188 at 2 ¶ 5), that

they are more probative than prejudicial, and relying, again, upon White as persuasive

authority, that they are admissible under one or more exceptions to the hearsay rule,

including specifically the public records exception. (Doc. 188 at 1 ¶¶ 2-3). Mr.

Lindley further arguesthat these records are admissible because the “contain ‘factual

findings’ that are ‘based upon the knowledge or observations of the preparer of the

report,’ as opposed to a mere collection of statements from a witness.” United Techs.

Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Miller v. Field, 35

F.3d 1088, 1091 (6th Cir. 1994)); cf. also Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1278 (“It is well

established that entries in a police report which result from the officer’s own

observations and knowledge may be admitted but that statements made by third

persons under no business duty to report may not.” (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting United States v. Pazsint, 703 F.2d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 1983))).

Ruling(s): Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine Number 18 is DENIED with

respect to her relevancy and F.R.E. 403 objections. Ms. Taylor’s Motion in Limine

Number 18 is further DENIED on hearsay and authentication grounds. 

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Concerning the issue of authentication more specifically, counsel for Ms.

Taylor stipulated to the court that Mr. Lindley would not be required to put on

evidence showing a document’s authenticity at trial if that record was produced by

any Defendant sued in this case as part of the discovery process.

Also, as confirmed at the end of the hearing, no party is planning to offer a

witness’s testimony through a deposition transcript.

If any party has any concern about the foregoing summary of the court’s

rulings and stipulations made by counsel during the hearing, then that party

must file a notice of objection and/or clarification with the court no later than

5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, October 26, 2016. Otherwise, any such objection to or

clarification of the contents of this order will be waived. 

DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of October, 2016.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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Case 2:10-cv-00141-VEH Document 191 Filed 10/24/16 Page 20 of 20