Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02103/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02103-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUFUS B. LEVELS, JR., )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

HARRINGTON, Warden, ) 

 )

Respondent. )

)

 )

1:09-cv—2103-SMS-HC

INFORMATIONAL ORDER CONCERNING

DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

AND ORDER REQUIRING PETITIONER TO

FILE WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS OF

SERVICE OF THIS ORDER

A STATEMENT OF INTENTION TO

PROCEED WITH THE MOTION FOR

DISMISSAL

ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO

SHOW GOOD CAUSE WITHIN FOURTEEN

(14) DAYS OF SERVICE OF THIS

ORDER FOR DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the

parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States

Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings in the case,

including the entry of final judgment, by manifesting consent in

signed writings filed by Petitioner on December 17, 2009, and on

behalf of Respondent on January 12, 2010. (Docs. 5, 10). 

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for dismissal of

the petition “WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO PERSUE (sic) UNEXHAUSTED

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CLAIM,” filed in this Court by Petitioner on August 4, 2010.

I. Background

In the petition, which was filed on December 3, 2009,

Petitioner challenged his 2007 convictions of assault, corporal

injury to a co-habitant, pimping, and disobeying a domestic

relations order sustained in Fresno County. An amended petition

was filed on March 24, 2010. In the twenty-four-page answer to

the first amended petition (FAC) filed by Respondent on May 21,

2010, Respondent admitted the timeliness of the petition and that

the claims appear to have been exhausted; Respondent argued that

to the extent any claim might be deemed unexhausted, the claims

should be denied on the merits. (Ans. 6.) The answer responds

on the merits to Petitioner’s first and third claims concerning

alleged violations of due process based on the sufficiency of the

evidence and the trial court’s instruction the elements of the

offense of pimping. Likewise, the answer addresses the merits of

Petitioner’s second claim that California’s pimping statute is

unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad, and his fourth claim

that the instruction on reasonable doubt violated due process. 

No traverse was filed, although the time for filing a

traverse has expired.

II. Informational Order re: Dismissal without Prejudice

Petitioner now moves for a dismissal without prejudice of

the petition in order to exhaust another claim, namely, that the

trial court erred in denying Petitioner’s new trial motion. 

(Mot. 2.) 

However, it is possible and even likely that should the

instant petition be dismissed, Petitioner would be unable to file

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a subsequent petition. This is because the pendency in this

Court of a properly filed petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

does not toll the running of the statute of limitations under 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001).

The Court notes that Petitioner acknowledges the principle

that it is a petition for habeas relief that is properly filed in

a state court that tolls the running of the statute. (Mot. 1.) 

It therefore appears that Petitioner proceeds with an

understanding that the running of the statutory period of

limitations has not been tolled by the pendency of the instant

proceedings, and that considering the circumstances of

Petitioner’s case, dismissal might result in the loss of an

opportunity to file a timely petition in this Court, despite such

a dismissal otherwise being described as a dismissal “without

prejudice.”

However, in an abundance of caution, the Court will direct

Petitioner to file in this Court no later than fourteen (14) days

after the date of service of this order either a withdrawal of

the motion to dismiss, or a statement that Petitioner intends to

proceed with his motion for dismissal despite his understanding

that the statute of limitations may preclude him from being able

to file a timely petition in the future.

II. Showing Good Cause for Dismissal

A. Background

On December 22, 2009, there issued a scheduling order

setting forth deadlines for submission of an answer to the

original petition and for filing a traverse. (Doc. 6.) In

denying a motion to dismiss on March 24, 2009, the Court noted

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that the terms of the previous scheduling order remained in

effect. (Doc. 14, 6.) The initial scheduling order 

stated that if no traverse were filed, then the petition would be

deemed submitted upon the passage of thirty (30) days after the

date the answer was filed. (Doc. 6, 2.) Thus, the petition in

the instant action is deemed to have been submitted to the Court

thirty (30) days after the answer was filed, or on June 21, 2010.

Further, with respect to the unexhausted claim concerning

denial of Petitioner’s new trial motion, this Court has

previously ruled in connection with Respondent’s motion to

dismiss that the claim was not exhausted. Indeed, about five

months ago, Petitioner admitted non-exhaustion in response to

Respondent’s motion to dismiss, and Petitioner requested that the

claim be dismissed and that he be allowed to proceed on the

exhausted claims. (Docs. 13, 14 at 5.) The Court granted

Petitioner’s motion to file an amended petition without the

unexhausted claim. (Id. at 5-6.) Thereafter, Respondent filed a

lengthy answer addressing the merits of all of Petitioner’s

exhausted claims.

On August 11, 2010, Respondent filed a statement of nonopposition to Petitioner’s motion to dismiss in which Respondent

expressly stated that there is no waiver of the right to assert

any defense or procedural default arising from the dismissal of

the current amended petition and any subsequent filing by

Petitioner that may be time-barred.

B. Legal Standards 

Although habeas corpus proceedings are characterized as

civil in nature, Rule 12 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in

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the United States District Courts (Habeas Rules) provides that

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are

not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or the rules, may

be applied to a proceeding under Rule 12 of the Rules Governing §

2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. The Advisory

Committee’s Notes caution that the civil rules apply only when it

would be appropriate to do so and would not be inconsistent or

inequitable in the overall framework of habeas corpus. Mayle v.

Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 654-655 n. 4 (2005).

The instant motion presents the Court with concerns that are

analogous with those presented by similar motions in other civil

actions. The Court seeks to achieve the orderly disposition of

cases and to conserve the resources of the Court and the parties. 

The Court will thus apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in

considering Petitioner’s motion for dismissal of the case. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) provides that an action may be

dismissed voluntarily by a plaintiff without a court order by

noticing the dismissal before an answer is filed, or by

stipulation; otherwise, an action may be dismissed at a

plaintiff’s request “only by court order, on terms that the court

considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) provides that a schedule may be

modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.

III. Disposition

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

1) Petitioner is DIRECTED to file in this Court no later

than fourteen (14) days after the date of service of this order

either a withdrawal of the motion to dismiss, or a statement that

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Petitioner intends to proceed with his motion for dismissal

despite his understanding that the statute of limitations may

preclude him from being able to file a timely petition in the

future; and

2) Petitioner is DIRECTED to show good cause in writing no

later than fourteen (14) days after the date of service of this

order for granting dismissal of this action at this advanced

stage of the proceedings; thereafter, the motion will be deemed

submitted to the Court for decision; and

3) Petitioner is INFORMED that a failure to comply with this

order will be considered to be a failure to comply with an order

or the Court and may result in dismissal of the action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 12, 2010 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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