Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02090/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02090-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUSSO BAILEY,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07cv2090 JM(BLM)

ORDER GRANTING JUDGE

PRECKEL’S MOTION TO DISMISS; 

GRANTING CITY OF EL CAJON

AND M. BEVAN’S MOTION TO

DISMISS; GRANTING LEAVE TO

AMEND

vs.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE; ALLEN J. PRECKEL; CITY

OF EL CAJON; M. BEVAN; SAN DIEGO

COUNTY; DONNIE DUMANUS;

WILLIAM KOLENDER ,

Defendants.

Judge Allan J. Preckel moves to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

based upon principles of absolute judicial immunity. Defendants City of El Cajon and

M. Bevan move to dismiss all claims asserted against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Plaintiff Russo Bailey opposes all motions. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), this

matter is appropriate for decision without oral argument. For the reasons set forth

below, the motion of Judge Preckel is granted with prejudice and the motion of City of

El Cajon and M. Bevan is granted with 20 days leave to amend. The court also denies

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions.

Case 3:07-cv-02090-JM-BLM Document 37 Filed 06/25/08 Page 1 of 8
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BACKGROUND

On October 31, 2007 Plaintiff Russo Bailey, prosecuting this civil rights action

in forma pauperis and in propria persona, filed a complaint alleging six causes of action

against Defendants. On December 8, 2006 Plaintiff alleges that defendant M. Bevan,

Jason Sargent, James Brai, Eric Taylor and 15 unknown City of El Cajon police officers

falsely arrested Plaintiff while he was parked in a public business parking lot in the City

of El Cajon. (FAC at p.3:12-16). Plaintiff generally alleges that the individually named

police officers and the 15 unknown police officers kidnaped Plaintiff, vandalized

Plaintiff’s car, and “illegally took plaintiff’s personal property.” FAC p.3:24).

Plaintiff was arrested on December 9, 2006 and a criminal complaint filed against

him in the Superior court of California, charging Plaintiff with violation of Penal Code

sections 12025(a)(1) and 12031(a)(1), carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle and

carrying a loaded firearm by a convicted person. (Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”),

Exh. A). On May 17, 2007 Plaintiff pled guilty to Penal Code section 12025(a)(1) and

an enhancement for being a felon in possession of a firearm. (RFN Exh. B). 

Plaintiff alleges that certain unidentified officers of the California Highway

Patrol witnessed the alleged “felonies committed by El Cajon City Police.” (FAC at

p.8:8). Plaintiff also alleges that he was subjected to excessive force and that he

“sustained damages by loss of his freedom, property, loss of continued usage of his

property and loss of business.” (FAC at p.7:13-14). 

Based upon this generally described conduct, Plaintiff alleges six causes of action

for (1) municipal liability under Monell; (2) false arrest, false imprisonment, and

assault; (3) violation of 42 U.S.C. §1986(c); (4) excessive force; (5) violation of the

Unruh Act, Cal.Civ.Code §52.1; and (6) breach of contract. Plaintiff also seeks

injunctive relief to prevent Defendants from disseminating any “bad history of the

Plaintiff.” (Compl. at p.8:16-17)

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only in

"extraordinary" cases. United States v. Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir.

1981). Courts should grant 12(b)(6) relief only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a

"cognizable legal theory" or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts should

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim when the factual allegations are

insufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp

v. Twombly, __550 U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). The defect must appear on the face

of the complaint itself. Thus, courts may not consider extraneous material in testing its

legal adequacy. Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir. 1991).

The courts may, however, consider material properly submitted as part of the complaint.

Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir.

1989). 

Finally, courts must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 116

S. Ct. 1710 (1996). Accordingly, courts must accept as true all material allegations in

the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Holden v.

Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992). However, conclusory allegations of

law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In

Re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996).

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights case, the court must

construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. KarimPanahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621 at 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of

liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil

rights complaint, however, the court may not “supply essential elements of claims that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in

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civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also

Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984)

(conclusory allegations unsupported by facts are insufficient to state a claim under

section 1983.) “The plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt

acts which defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones, 733 F.2d

at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Motion of Judge Allan Preckel

Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Preckel relate to Plaintiff’s May 17, 2007 guilty

plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Pen. Code §§12025(a)(1)

and (b)(1), and subsequent sentence imposed by Judge Preckel. On March 18, 2008 the

court granted Judge Preckel’s motion to dismiss with prejudice and without leave to

amend (“March Order”). As the court’s prior order terminated this action against Judge

Preckel with prejudice, the present motion is moot.

Motion of Defendants City of El Cajon and M. Bevan

The First and Second Claims for Relief

As in the March Order, Defendants move to dismiss the first claim for municipal

liability under Monell and the second claim for false arrest, false imprisonment, and

assault on the ground that such claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that “in order to recover damages for

allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by

actions whose unlawfulness could render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983

plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make

such a determination, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87.

A claim for damages which bears a direct relationship to the length or validity of a

sentence which has not already been shown to be invalid is not cognizable under §

1983. Id. at 487. 

The Supreme Court has held that even those claims which challenge the validity

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of a particular procedure, but do not directly attack a conviction, sentence, or its result,

are subject to the threshold requirements of Heck since it is often the case that “the

nature of the challenge to the procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the

invalidity of the judgment.” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997). Accordingly,

“when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider

whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of

his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the

plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; Edwards, 520 U.S. at 643. In other words, if a criminal

conviction, prison disciplinary hearing or other judgment “arising out of the same facts

stands and is fundamentally inconsistent with the unlawful behavior for which the

section 1983 damages are sought, the 1983 action must be dismissed.” Smithart v.

Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996). Edwards makes clear that this reasoning

applies to a prisoner challenging a conviction underlying the original sentence.

Edwards, 520 U.S. at 645-646; Sheldon v. Hundley, 83 F.3d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1996).

Thus, to determine whether Heck and Edwards bar a claim for damages arising from a

prison disciplinary hearing, the court must examine “not the relief sought, but the

ground of the challenge.” Miller v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 75 F.3d 330, 331 (7th

Cir. 1996).

In the March Order, the court concluded that it could not determine the precise

nature of these claims. The amended complaint sheds no further light on whether

Plaintiff’s claims are based upon his arrest for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

With respect to the claim of false arrest, Plaintiff alleges that he was “falsely arrested

while Plaintiff was legally parked in a public business parking lot.” (FAC at p.3:14-15).

There are no allegations to establish the circumstances of the arrest. Consequently, as

on the first round of motions to dismiss, the court cannot determine whether such

allegations run afoul of Heck. Whether or not a judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the

false arrest claim necessarily invalidates the felon in possession conviction cannot be

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determined and therefore Defendants cannot provide an adequate response to the

complaint. 

In his opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff argues, among other

things, that the state criminal complaint filed against him was time-barred. (Oppo. Exh.

A). As set forth above, if this is the basis for Plaintiff’s claims, he must first move to

set aside the conviction prior to bring a §1983 action. 

In sum, the court grants the motion to dismiss the first and second claims with 20

days leave to amend from the date of entry of this order. Plaintiff is instructed to set

forth sufficient allegations to inform Defendants whether his claims are based upon his

arrest for being a felon in possession or whether there is some other basis for the claim.

Plaintiff is advised that the failure to set forth sufficient allegations in a Second

Amended Complaint may result in the dismissal of these claims with prejudice.

The Third Claim for Violation of §1986

In the March Order, the court dismissed this claim for failure to set forth a claim

under 42 U.S.C. §1985. The FAC provides no additional allegations regarding this

claim. Consequently, the court dismisses this claim for the reasons set forth in the

March Order, with 20 days leave to amend. Plaintiff is advised that the failure to set

forth sufficient allegations in a Second Amended Complaint may result in the dismissal

of these claims with prejudice.

The Fourth Claim for Excessive Force

In the March Order, the court dismissed this claim for failure to allege that he

suffered any personal injuries. The FAC provides no additional allegations regarding

this claim. Consequently, the court dismisses this claim for the reasons set forth in the

March Order, with 20 days leave to amend. Plaintiff is advised that the failure to set

forth sufficient allegations in a Second Amended Complaint may result in the dismissal

of these claims with prejudice.

The Fifth Claim for Violation of the Unruh Act

In the March Order, the court dismissed this claim for failure to allege that he

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complied with the prerequisites to filing a California’s Tort Claim Act. The FAC

provides no additional allegations regarding this claim. Consequently, the court

dismisses this claim for the reasons set forth in the March Order, with 20 days leave to

amend. Plaintiff is advised that the failure to set forth sufficient allegations in a Second

Amended Complaint may result in the dismissal of these claims with prejudice.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions

Plaintiff moves for an award of sanctions against Defendants on the ground that

their motions are brought in bad faith. Plaintiff’s motion is denied as Defendants’

motions have substantial merit.

Plaintiff’s Opposition

In order to provide some guidance to Plaintiff, the court separately addresses

Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant City and Bevan’s motion. The thrust of Plaintiff’s

opposition is two-fold. First, Plaintiff repeats his meritless argument that Plaintiff could

not possibly be guilty of violating California Penal Code Sections 12025(a)(1) and

(b)(1) because the criminal minute notes indicate that he pleaded guilty to PC

12025(A)(1) and PC 12025(B)(1), with capital letters “A” and “B,” and not small letters

“a” and “b.” Plaintiff then wrongfully concludes that he pleaded guilty to non-existing

crimes. Second, Plaintiff argues that could not be criminally liable for being a felon in

possession of a firearm because he is “an ex-felon and all constitutional rights are

restored [i]ncluding the right to ‘Carrying a concealed firearm.’” (Oppo at p.8:4). Not

only does such an argument appear to lack a basis in fact or law, such an argument

directly impacts the rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey, discussed above. In

sum, Judge Preckel is dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend, the claims

against City of El Cajon and M. Bevan are dismissed with 20 days leave to amend from

the date of entry of this order, and Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is

/ / /

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denied. Plaintiff is advised that his failure to state a claim in a Second Amended

Complaint may result in the dismissal of the action with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 25, 2008

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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