Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_11-cv-02458/USCOURTS-cand-5_11-cv-02458-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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Case No. 11-CV-02458-LHK 

ORDER DENYING CLAIM 8

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

DELANEY GERAL MARKS,

Petitioner,

v.

RON DAVIS, Warden, California State 

Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent.

Case No. 11-CV-02458-LHK 

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER DENYING CLAIM 8

Re: Dkt. Nos. 62, 63

In 1994, Petitioner Delaney Geral Marks (“Petitioner”) was convicted of two counts of 

first degree murder with personal use of a firearm, and two counts of attempted premeditated 

murder and infliction of great bodily injury, and sentenced to death. On December 14, 2011, 

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before this Court. ECF No. 3 (“Pet.”). 

The Court has ruled on 9 of Petitioner’s 22 claims. See ECF Nos. 52, 74, 75, 76. This 

Order addresses Claim 8 of the petition. Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing as to this 

claim. For the reasons discussed below, Claim 8 is DENIED, and Petitioner’s request for an 

evidentiary hearing is DENIED.

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ORDER DENYING CLAIM 8

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background1

On October 17, 1990, Petitioner entered a Taco Bell restaurant in Oakland, California. 

After ordering, he shot employee Mui Luong (“Luong”) in the head. Luong survived the shooting 

but remained in a persistent vegetative state. Petitioner then entered the Gourmet Market, not far 

from the Taco Bell. There, Petitioner shot John Myers (“Myers”) and Peter Baeza (“Baeza”). 

Baeza died at the scene but Myers survived. Later that evening, Petitioner and his girlfriend, 

Robin Menefee (“Menefee”), took a cab driven by Daniel McDermott (“McDermott”). Petitioner 

shot and killed McDermott. Marks, 31 Cal. 4th at 204–06.

Petitioner was arrested shortly after McDermott was shot. Lansing Lee (“Lee”), a 

criminalist, testified at trial with “virtual absolute certainty” that the bullets that shot Baeza and 

Myers came from Petitioner’s gun. Id. at 207. Lee also testified that his analysis “indicated” that 

the bullet that shot McDermott came from Petitioner’s gun and “suggested” that the bullet that 

injured Luong also came from the same source. Id. Eyewitness testimony also identified 

Petitioner as the shooter. Id. at 206–07. Additionally, Petitioner was overheard telling another 

defendant that “he was in for three murders” and that the victims had died because “I shot them.”

Id. at 208. 

Petitioner testified and denied all of the shootings. Id.at 207. The defense also presented 

evidence that Petitioner’s hands did not test positive for gunshot residue. Id. at 208. 

On April 24, 1994, the jury convicted Petitioner of two counts of first degree murder with 

personal use of a firearm, and two counts of attempted premeditated murder with personal use of a 

firearm and infliction of great bodily injury. 

During the penalty phase, the prosecutor presented in aggravation evidence of Petitioner’s 

past violent conduct, including incidents of domestic violence and violent conduct while 

 

1

 The following facts are taken from the California Supreme Court’s opinion on direct appeal. 

See People v. Marks, 31 Cal. 4th 197, 203–14 (2003). “Factual determinations by state courts are 

presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 

537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

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ORDER DENYING CLAIM 8

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incarcerated. Id. at 208–10. The prosecutor also presented evidence of the effect of the murders 

on the families of the victims. Id. at 210–11. In mitigation, Petitioner testified as to his history of 

seizures. Id. at 212. Other witnesses testified that Petitioner had grown up in a strong family 

environment, and had not engaged in problematic behavior until he was discharged from the army 

and began using drugs. Id. at 212–13. Petitioner’s daughter testified that Petitioner had never hit 

her, and that she saw him regularly when he was not incarcerated. Id. at 213. On May 6, 1994, 

the jury set the penalty for the capital crimes at death. Id. at 203. 

B. Procedural History

On July 24, 2003, the California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on 

direct appeal. People v. Marks, 31 Cal. 4th 197 (2003). The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari 

on May 3, 2004. Marks v. California, 541 U.S. 1033 (2004). 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. On 

March 16, 2005, that Court ordered Respondent to show cause in the Alameda County Superior 

Court why the death sentence should not be vacated and Petitioner re-sentenced to life without 

parole on the ground that Petitioner was intellectually disabled2 within the meaning of Atkins v. 

Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held that intellectually disabled individuals may not be 

executed. AG023690.3 The California Supreme Court denied the remaining claims in the petition 

on the merits without explanation. In addition to the merits decision, as separate grounds for 

denial, the California Supreme Court held that four of Petitioner’s claims were procedurally 

barred. 

The Alameda County Superior Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issue of 

Petitioner’s alleged intellectual disability. On June 13, 2006, the Superior Court denied the 

petition, and found that Petitioner had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is 

 

2 At the time Atkins was decided, the condition at issue was known as “mental retardation,” but the 

U.S. Supreme Court recently announced that it would henceforth use the term “intellectual 

disability.” Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014). This Court will do the same, except 

when quoting from the record.

3 Citations to “AG” refer to the Bates-stamped page numbers identified in the California Attorney 

General’s lodging of the state court record with this Court.

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intellectually disabled within the meaning of Atkins. AG023700–22. On August 14, 2006, 

Petitioner filed a further petition for writ of habeas corpus on the issue of his intellectual disability. 

The petition was denied by the California Supreme Court on December 15, 2010. AG028382.

On December 14, 2011, Petitioner filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in this 

Court. ECF No. 3. Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on Claims 2, 3, and 5 on 

March 26, 2013. ECF No. 37. Petitioner cross-moved for summary judgment on Claims 2, 3, and 

5 on March 28, 2013. ECF No. 38. Both Petitioner and Respondent filed opposition briefs on 

June 10, 2013. ECF Nos. 44, 45. On August 8, 2013, Petitioner and Respondent filed reply 

briefs. ECF Nos. 48, 49. The claims were denied, and summary judgment in favor of Respondent 

granted on June 25, 2015. ECF No. 52. 

On December 15, 2015, Petitioner and Respondent filed opening briefs on the merits as to 

Claims 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. ECF No 62 (“Resp’t’s Br.”); 63 (“Pet’r’s Br.”). Petitioner filed 

a response on February 11, 2016. ECF No. 64 (“Pet’r’s Opp.”). Respondent filed a response on 

February 12, 2016. ECF No. 65 (“Resp’t’s Opp.”). The Court denied Claims 1, 6, and 7 on 

September 15, 2016. ECF No. 74. The Court denied Claims 9 and 11 on September 20, 2016. 

ECF No. 75. The Court denied Claim 4 on September 27, 2016. ECF No. 76. The Court will 

address Claim 10 in a separate order.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d))

Because Petitioner filed his original federal habeas petition in 2011, the Anti-Terrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) applies to the instant action. See Woodford 

v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003) (holding that AEDPA applies whenever a federal habeas 

petition is filed after April 24, 1996). Pursuant to AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas relief 

on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court only if the state court’s adjudication “(1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

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ORDER DENYING CLAIM 8

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presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

1. Contrary To or Unreasonable Application of Clearly Established Federal Law

As to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” prongs 

have separate and distinct meanings. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000) (“Section 

2254(d)(1) defines two categories of cases in which a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas 

relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court.”). A state court’s decision is 

“contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to 

that reached by [the U.S. Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case 

differently than [the U.S. Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 

412–13. 

A state court’s decision is an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law 

if “the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that 

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A]n unreasonable application of federal 

law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 

101 (2011). A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit is not unreasonable “so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on [its] correctness.” Id. (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

Holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision are the sole 

determinant of clearly established federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Although a district 

court may “look to circuit precedent to ascertain whether [the circuit] has already held that the 

particular point in issue is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent,” Marshall v. Rodgers, 

133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (per curiam), “[c]ircuit precedent cannot refine or sharpen a general 

principle of [U.S.] Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule,” Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. 

Ct. 1, 4 (2014) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Unreasonable Determination of the Facts

In order to find that a state court’s decision was based on “an unreasonable determination 

of the facts,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a federal court “must be convinced that an appellate panel, 

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applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding 

is supported by the record before the state court,” Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 778 (9th Cir. 

2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] state-court factual determination is not 

unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion 

in the first instance.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013). That said, “where the state courts 

plainly misapprehend or misstate the record in making their findings, and the misapprehension 

goes to a material factual issue that is central to petitioner’s claim, that misapprehension can 

fatally undermine the fact-finding process, rendering the resulting factual finding unreasonable.” 

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004).

In examining whether a petitioner is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) or 

§ 2254(d)(2), a federal court’s review “is limited to the record that was before the state court that 

adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). In the event 

that a federal court “determine[s], considering only the evidence before the state court, that the 

adjudication of a claim on the merits resulted in a decision contrary to or involving an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or that the state court’s decision was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts,” the federal court evaluates the petitioner’s 

claim de novo. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 778. If error is found, habeas relief is warranted if that error 

“had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). Petitioners “are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial 

error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Id. at 637 (quoting United 

States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)).

B. Federal Evidentiary Hearing (28 U.S.C. § 2254(e))

Under Cullen v. Pinholster, habeas review under AEDPA “is limited to the record that was 

before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” 563 U.S. at 180–81. The Ninth 

Circuit has recognized that Pinholster “effectively precludes federal evidentiary hearings” on 

claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 

2013); see also Sully v. Ayers, 725 F.3d 1057, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Although the Supreme Court 

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has declined to decide whether a district court may ever choose to hold an evidentiary hearing 

before it determines that § 2254(d) has been satisfied . . . an evidentiary hearing is pointless once 

the district court has determined that § 2254(d) precludes habeas relief.”) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

In Claim 8, Petitioner contends that his trial was fundamentally unfair for four reasons: (1) 

the prosecution introduced improper and inflammatory arguments during the guilt phase opening 

statements; (2) the prosecution and trial court coerced favorable testimony from a witness; (3) the 

trial court failed to ensure that Petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment 

right not to testify; and (4) the admission of certain photographic evidence was prejudicial.

Petitioner presented this claim in his state habeas petition, and the California Supreme 

Court denied relief on the merits without explanation. AG023690 (“All other claims set forth in 

the petition for writ of habeas corpus are denied. Each claim is denied on the merits.”).4 Because 

the California Supreme Court did not provide reasons for its denial of Petitioner’s claim, this

Court must determine what arguments or theories could have supported the California Supreme 

Court’s decision. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 102 (“Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine 

what arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court’s 

decision.”). The Court then “must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that 

those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision” of the U.S. 

Supreme Court. Id.

The Court addresses Petitioner’s four subclaims under Claim 8 in turn.

1. Improper and Inflammatory Arguments

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor introduced improper and inflammatory arguments

during the prosecutor’s opening statement during the guilt phase of Petitioner’s trial. Pet’r’s Br. at 

 

4

The California Supreme Court also found that this claim was procedurally barred because the 

claim could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal. AG023690. In the briefing submitted 

to this Court, neither party addresses the procedural bar. Because the Court fully considers the 

claim on the merits, it need not reach whether the claim was procedurally barred. 

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32. Specifically, Petitioner claims that (a) the prosecutor introduced inflammatory argument about 

Petitioner’s character; and (b) the prosecutor made irrelevant and prejudicial arguments about the 

impact of the shooting on victim Luong. The Court addresses Petitioner’s challenges respectively.

a. Arguments About Petitioner’s Character

First, Petitioner contends that the prosecutor’s opening statement during the guilt phase 

improperly attacked Petitioner’s character. The opening statement began as follows:

MR. BURR [THE PROSECUTOR]: May it please the Court, ladies and gentlemen 

of the jury and alternates. This is the most malevolent, mean spirited individual 

you will ever encounter in your lifetime. His capacity for violence is exceeded 

only by his willingness to commit it. He has no conscience, he has no compassion 

for human life.

MR. THEWS [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He is entering into the area of argument. I 

will object at this time, your Honor.

THE COURT: I have indicated that this is the opportunity attorneys have to present 

what they believe the evidence will show. And to that extent you will consider any 

remarks made by either counsel in that light. Go ahead, Mr. Burr.

MR. BURR: The evidence will show that he has no compassion and no 

consideration for human life, he has no conscience for people who looked him in 

the eye and they saw nothing but death. He is an urban dweller’s worst nightmare 

come to life. You or a loved one is at work waiting on customers, and the total 

stranger comes up to you as you were working, without any warning, without any 

provocation he kills you.

. . .

The evidence will show that he is a cold hearted, vicious individual, who without 

any remorse needlessly extinguished three lives.

AG014545–46. Petitioner contends that these statements “eradicated [Petitioner’s] constitutional 

right to presumptive innocence and encouraged the jury to consider [Petitioner’s] alleged character 

as evidence of his guilt, in violation of due process.” Pet’r’s Br. at 33. 

“Improper argument does not, per se, violate a defendant’s constitutional rights.” Jeffries 

v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir. 1993). It “is not enough that the prosecutors’ remarks 

were undesirable or even universally condemned.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 

(1986). Rather, a defendant’s due process rights are violated when a prosecutor’s misconduct 

renders a trial “fundamentally unfair.” Id.; see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) 

(“[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the 

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fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor”). Under Darden, the first issue is 

whether the prosecutor’s remarks were improper; if so, the next question is whether such conduct 

infected the trial with unfairness. Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005). In order 

to prevail on federal habeas review, the prosecutor’s misconduct must have resulted in prejudice, 

that is, the misconduct must have had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 

the jury’s verdict. Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)). 

Factors that a court may take into account in determining whether misconduct was 

prejudicial are: (1) whether a curative instruction was issued, see Darden, 477 U.S. at 182; (2) the 

weight of the evidence of guilt, United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 19 (1985); (3) whether the 

misconduct was isolated or part of an ongoing pattern, see Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th 

Cir. 1987); (4) whether the misconduct relates to a critical part of the case, see Giglio v. United 

States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); and (5) whether a prosecutor’s comment misstates or 

manipulates the evidence, see Darden, 477 U.S. at 182. See also Tan, 413 F.3d at 1115 

(identifying factors to consider); Rogers v. Carey, 2005 WL 3560588, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 

2005) (same). If the court finds that no unfairness or prejudice resulted, the court need not 

determine whether the prosecutor’s comments were improper. Tatmon v. Haviland, 504 F. App’x 

631, 632 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Here, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined that, even if the 

prosecutor’s remarks during opening statements were improper, there was no prejudice and thus 

no constitutional violation. First, the trial court issued five curative instructions. Specifically, the 

trial court instructed the jury at least three times—before opening statements, and both before and 

after closing statements—that the arguments of the attorneys are not evidence. For example, 

before opening statements the trial court gave the following jury instruction: “What attorneys say 

in a case by way of opening statements or closing statements or at any tine [sic] they address the 

court or the jury is not evidence in the case, and it must not be considered as evidence by you. 

The purpose of an opening statement is to, in essence, give you a preview of what the attorneys 

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believe the evidence will show.” AG014538. The trial court repeated the same admonition in the 

jury instructions before closing statements: “Now the rules, so to speak, that you are to use to 

consider and evaluate the statements and closing statements of the attorneys are exactly the same 

now as they have been throughout this case. And that is that statements made by attorneys are not 

evidence in the case. . . . [A]s I have said the statements are not evidence.” AG016345. After 

closing statements, the trial court again instructed the jury, “As I’ve indicated to you several times 

now, statements made by the attorney’s during the trial are not evidence.” AG016506. The jury is 

presumed to follow its instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000); Tan, 413 F.3d 

at 1115 (“[W]e presume jurors follow the court’s instructions absent extraordinary situations.”). 

In addition, the trial court instructed the jury that opening statements provide “a preview of 

what the attorneys believe the evidence will show.” AG014538. After the prosecutor made the

comments during opening statements to which Petitioner objects, the trial court reaffirmed its

earlier jury instruction: “[T]his is the opportunity attorneys have to present what they believe the 

evidence will show. And to that extent you will consider any remarks made by either counsel in 

that light.” AG014545. 

Lastly, following closing statements, the trial court specifically instructed the jury: “You 

must not be influenced by pity for a defendant or by prejudice against him. You must not be 

biased against the defendant because he has been arrested for this offense, charged with a crime, or 

brought to trial. None of these circumstances is evidence of guilt, and you must not infer or 

assume from any or all of them that he is more likely to be guilty than innocent. You must not be 

influenced by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public 

feeling.” AG016505–06. 

Petitioner does not contend that there are “extraordinary circumstances” that would prevent 

the jury from following the trial court’s five curative jury instructions. Tan, 413 F.3d at 1115. 

Accordingly, the Court presumes that the jury understood that the prosecutor’s statements were 

not evidence, and that the jury did not base its decision on prejudice against Petitioner. 

Further, “[w]hen the case is particularly strong, the likelihood that prosecutorial 

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misconduct will affect the defendant’s substantial rights is lessened because the jury’s 

deliberations are less apt to be influenced.” United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1151 

(9th Cir. 2005); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 89 (1935) (finding “pronounced and 

persistent” misconduct was prejudicial, but noting that “[i]f the case against Berger had been 

strong, or, . . . the evidence of his guilt ‘overwhelming,’ a different conclusion might be reached”). 

In the instant case, there was substantial physical and testimonial evidence connecting Petitioner to 

the shootings. As discussed above, a criminalist testified with “virtual absolute certainty” that the 

bullets that shot Baeza and Myers came from Petitioner’s gun. Marks, 31 Cal. 4th at 207. In 

addition, ballistics analysis “indicated” that the bullet that shot McDermott came from Petitioner’s 

gun and “suggested” that the bullet that injured Luong came from the same source. Id. At least 

four eyewitnesses testified as to the shootings and firmly identified Petitioner as the shooter. Id. at 

205–06. Additionally, Petitioner was overheard telling another defendant that “he was in for three 

murders” and that the victims had died because “I shot them.” Id. at 208. The strength of the 

prosecution’s case against Petitioner weighs against finding that the remarks were prejudicial. 

Lastly, the prosecutor’s statements were not prominent in the context of the entire trial, or 

repeated throughout the trial. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 182; Lincoln, 807 F.2d at 809. The 

prosecutor’s opening statement spans 31 transcript pages, and the challenged comments appear on 

only two. While the prosecutor repeated during closing statements that Petitioner “is an urban 

dwellers worst nightmare actually come to life” and “a cold hearted, vicious, violent individual 

without a shred of humanity in his total human being,” AG016347, such comments appear on only 

two of the 71 transcript pages of the prosecutor’s closing statement. AG016347–419. No similar 

comments appeared in the prosecutor’s rebuttal statement. AG016444–502.

By comparison, in Darden, the prosecutor called the defendant an “animal,” stated that the 

defendant “shouldn’t be out of his cell unless he has a leash on him and a prison guard at the other 

end of that leash,” and that the prosecutor wished to see the defendant “sitting here with no face,

blown away by a shotgun.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 180 & n.12. “Almost every page [of the 

transcript of closing argument] contain[ed] at least one offensive or improper statement.” Id. at

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194 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court held that no prejudice 

resulted in light of the trial court’s multiple instructions that the arguments of counsel were not 

evidence and the “overwhelming” evidence of guilt. Id. at 182 (majority op.); see also 

Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 780, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding the prosecutor’s statements 

that the defendant’s alleged crime was “unspeakable horror” and that “[t]he evil is among us” in 

the courtroom were not prejudicial in light of the trial judge’s instructions and the substantial 

evidence of guilt).

Similarly, the trial court in the instant case specifically instructed the jury not to determine 

the case based on prejudice against Petitioner, and gave multiple curative instructions that the 

arguments of counsel were not evidence. AG016505–06. In addition, the evidence against 

Petitioner was strong, and the prosecutor’s comments were not pervasive throughout the trial. 

Accordingly, under Darden, the Court can not find that the California Supreme Court’s denial of 

this subclaim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or 

an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

b. Argument About Victim Impact

Next, Petitioner contends that the prosecutor introduced irrelevant and inflammatory 

evidence of purported victim impact. The prosecutor described the long-term physical 

consequences and necessary care of Luong, who was shot and left in a vegetative state. For 

example, at one point the prosecutor’s opening statement described the consequences of Luong’s 

injuries as follows:

Now, there is the possibility that she is what they call locked out. And what that 

means is that the brain is functioning and the brain is conscious. She is conscious 

of what’s going on around her, but she can’t communicate. She can’t communicate 

to the outside world. That is a possibility. Maybe she’s not in a vegetative state, 

maybe she is trapped in this vegetated body. . . . [T]here are some different 

techniques or methods that they have at this facility because they deal with head 

trauma patients to see if there’s any kind of communication, to see if she recognizes 

things, people, and responds to pain, sounds. And what they basically found is that 

she is very inconsistent. She does make sounds. There is a sound that she makes 

that the best description of it is mama, mama, and they don’t know whether she is 

saying mama, or whether she’s just making a sound that’s involuntary to whatever 

discomfort or whatever reason is causing her to say this, or it’s not even saying, 

assuming she’s saying anything.

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AG014560. Petitioner argues that this “irrelevant, highly inflammatory victim impact 

information” was designed to, and did, inflame the jury against Petitioner. Pet. at 182–83. 

As noted above, “[i]mproper argument does not, per se, violate a defendant’s constitutional 

rights.” Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1191. In evaluating a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on 

allegedly improper argument, the Court must determine if the allegedly improper remarks 

“rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair.” Id. (citing Darden, 477 U.S. at 181). 

In the instant case, the prosecutor’s statement about Luong accurately reflects the evidence 

that was later presented at trial. During the guilt phase, the prosecutor called Cynthia Amelon, a 

physician who oversaw the care of Luong at a rehabilitation center. AG014831–32. Dr. Amelon’s 

testimony about Luong’s persistent vegetative state described Luong’s physical condition in detail, 

including the sounds made by Luong that the prosecutor described in his opening statement:

[MR. BURR]: You say the cry comes out, a sound comes out that’s ma?

A: Yeah, she actually gets a sound voice pattern through every once in a while that 

says ma.

Q: So you don’t know whether it’s just a cry?

A: A cry that comes out with a voice response or if she’s trying to say, you know, 

mom or something like that.

AG014845. Moreover, Dr. Amelon described being “locked out” and explained why the doctors 

did not believe that Luong was locked out. AG014845–46. During Dr. Amelon’s testimony, the 

prosecutor also introduced a videotape depicting care being given to Luong. AG014850.

Petitioner does not challenge the introduction of Dr. Amelon’s testimony. In addition, the 

California Supreme Court upheld the admission of the videotape on direct review in 2003, and 

found that the prosecution was “entitled to provide visual evidence of Luong’s condition to prove 

that she had suffered great bodily injury,” an element of the crime charged. Marks, 31 Cal. 4th at 

226–27. Although Petitioner asserts that the videotape of Luong is prejudicial, Petitioner does not 

challenge the admission of the videotape before this Court. Pet. at 183. 

Based on this record, the California Supreme Court could have reasonably determined that 

the prosecutor’s opening statement about Luong’s physical condition accurately described the 

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evidence that would be presented at trial and that Petitioner was not prejudiced by the prosecutor’s 

description of the evidence. Thus, the prosecutor’s statement did not render Petitioner’s trial 

“fundamentally unfair.” See Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1191. Petitioner cites no case to the contrary. 

Accordingly, the California Supreme Court’s denial of this subclaim was not contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or an unreasonable determination of 

the facts.

2. Coercion of Testimony

Next, Petitioner contends that the trial court and prosecutor cooperated to coerce favorable 

testimony from witness Dr. Aguedo Retodo, a trauma surgeon who treated victims John Myers 

(“Myers”) and Luong after the shooting. Pet’r’s Br. at 33. According to Petitioner, the trial court 

and prosecutor’s coercion rendered Dr. Retodo’s testimony unreliable.

a. Background

Specifically, out of the presence of the jury, the prosecutor Mr. Burr explained to the trial 

court that Dr. Retodo had been uncooperative in other cases with the prosecution’s office. Dr. 

Retodo had attempted to evade subpoenas, refused to fully review medical records, and, on one 

occasion, claimed that Dr. Retodo had a lack of memory about the case. AG014872–81. Based 

on this history, the prosecutor expressed concern that Dr. Retodo may be uncooperative in his 

testimony in Petitioner’s case. The trial court had the oath administered to Dr. Retodo, and, in 

relevant part, had the following colloquy:

[THE COURT]: Okay. Have you reviewed the medical records that Mr. Burr’s 

referred to here regarding the treatment of Mui Luong and John Myers?

A: I did.

Q: And you reviewed those today?

A: Yes, I did.

Q: All right. . . . [D]o you have a recollection at this time of the events of October 

17th, 1990, with respect to your observation of Mui Luong and John Myers?

A: Yes, I can reconstruct the events, after reviewing the records that was given to 

me earlier.

Q: So you are prepared to answer questions –

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A: Yes, I am.

Q: – posed by – both Mr. Burr and by the attorneys representing [Petitioner]?

A: I’m ready. Can you hear me all right?

Q: Mr Burr, I’m prepared at this point to accept those representations. 

 What I’d suggest is, in view of the statements you have made, if there is 

difficulty that occurs during the testimony, I’ll recess the case, send the jury 

upstairs, and then I will discuss the sanctions that are available to this court at that 

time. 

 It may be, except – from what Dr. Retodo is indicating here, that we may not 

reach that problem. 

AG014885–86. Dr. Retodo and the trial court also discussed Dr. Retodo’s duty with regard to 

accepting service of subpoenas. AG014888–93. Upon completion of the court’s examination of 

Dr. Retodo, the jury was brought in and the prosecution called Dr. Retodo, who testified about his 

treatment of Myers and Luong. Petitioner did not cross-examine Dr. Retodo. AG014910.

Based on the above passage, Petitioner argues that the trial court improperly admonished 

Dr. Retodo that any claim of failed memory could lead to sanctions. According to Petitioner, the 

trial court’s mention of sanctions and “the prosecutor’s threats” were coercive and rendered Dr. 

Retodo’s testimony unreliable. Pet’r’s Br. at 34. 

b. Analysis

Petitioner supports this claim by relying on Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972) (per 

curiam), which held that the government’s substantial interference with the testimony of defense 

witnesses violates due process. See also United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 

1998) (“Unnecessarily strong admonitions against perjury aimed at discouraging defense 

witnesses from testifying have been held to deprive a criminal defendant of his Sixth Amendment 

right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”). In Webb, the U.S. Supreme 

Court reversed a defendant’s conviction after the trial judge “gratuitously singled out” the 

defense’s sole witness for a “lengthy admonition on the dangers of perjury,” including assuring the 

witness that if he lied on the stand, “he would be prosecuted and probably convicted for perjury.” 

Webb, 409 U.S. at 97–98. The witness then refused to testify. Id. at 95. The U.S. Supreme Court 

held that the trial judge’s remarks “effectively drove that witness off the stand,” and deprived the 

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defendant of due process. Id. at 98.

In the instant case, Petitioner’s reliance upon Webb is unavailing. Dr. Retodo was a 

government witness, who testified even after the mention of sanctions. The U.S. Supreme Court 

has not extended Webb to forbid the government’s interference with the testimony of the 

government’s witnesses. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit specifically acknowledged in United States v. 

Juan, 704 F.3d 1137, 1141 (2013), a direct appeal of a criminal case and not a habeas petition, that 

“no court applying Webb has ever extended its principles to prosecution witnesses.” Moreover, 

“no court applying Webb has ever extended it to situations, like this one, where the allegedly 

threatened witness continued to testify after the alleged threat. Instead, the prototypical Webb

challenge involves conduct so threatening as to effectively drive the witness off the stand.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

Because no U.S. Supreme Court holding extends Webb to the government’s interaction 

with Dr. Retodo, the California Supreme Court’s denial of this subclaim can not be “contrary to, 

or an unreasonable application of, any clearly established Federal law as determined by the United 

States Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Court also finds that the California Supreme 

Court did not make an unreasonable determination of the facts. See id. § 2254(d)(2).

3. Knowing and Intelligent Waiver

Petitioner’s next subclaim alleges that Petitioner did not validly waive his Fifth 

Amendment right against self-incrimination. According to Petitioner, the colloquy between 

Petitioner and the trial court during the guilt phase reveals that Petitioner did not understand his 

right not to testify. Petitioner also argues that Petitioner was not competent to validly waive his 

right not to testify.

a. Background

On March 31, 1994, outside of the presence of the jury, Petitioner’s defense counsel,

Albert Thews (“Thews”), informed the court that “[Petitioner] wants to testify, and we want him 

to testify.” AG015895. Thews confirmed that Thews had discussed Petitioner’s constitutional 

rights, including the right not to testify, with Petitioner over the last several months. 

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Petitioner interrupted the proceedings: “I’m listening. Somebody hasn’t asked me a 

question. They’re just citing the law. You’re telling me I have the right to remain silent if I wish 

to, if I want to voice my opinion or voice my testimony I can but nobody has directly given me a 

direct statement what’s given to [Petitioner] to respond, so I haven’t responded to that question.” 

AG015896. The trial court and Petitioner then engaged in a discussion:

THE DEFENDANT: – confident to what Mr. Thews said. And my choice is to 

take the stand and have on the record what actually took place, and note that I’m 

not dark complected, I’m not jet black, I’m medium brown with the fu Manchu, 

and I want to proceed on that. That I was –

. . .

THE COURT: Mr. Marks, you have indicated it is your intention to testify.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: I presume you understand you have a right to do that, you have a 

right to take the stand and testify in your own behalf, you understand you have that 

right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: You also understand you have a right not to do that, you have a right 

to remain there at the counsel table and put the People to the proof, and that is to 

rely on the state of the evidence and force the People to prove their case without 

any proof. Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: At this point I don’t believe the state of evidence, I have 

enough to pronounce on the presumption of innocence on the Defendant or I 

wouldn’t be taking the stand. Are you comfortable with what I’m saying, sir?

AG015897. In response, the trial court read aloud the instruction that would be read to the jury if 

Petitioner chose not to testify, including that the jury “must not draw any inference from the fact 

that a defendant does not testify.” AG015898. The Court then continued to question Petitioner:

THE COURT: So you understand if you decide not to testify that’s what the jury 

would be told by me. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand that.

THE COURT: I would also instruct the district attorney that they would not be a 

[sic] allowed to comment on that fact in any way in their closing argument. In 

other words, Mr. Burr would not be able to call the jury’s attention to the fact that 

the defendant had not testified. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Well, at this point I have been deprived of the right of 

freedom of speech, and that’s my right. I’m willing to get on the stand and speak 

because I want to tell them what I have been suffering as a victim.

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THE COURT: I appreciate that, Mr. Marks. I want to make sure – just a second. I 

want to make sure you understand what your rights are here. And in particular do 

you understand that if you decided not to testify, Mr. Burr could not comment on 

that point, that is he could not point out Mr. Marks has the right the right not [to] 

testify.

THE DEFENDANT: He has the right, he has brought out my whole career. 

THE COURT: Do you understand that you – you understand if you decide not to 

testify that he could not comment on that fact, that he could not comment to the 

jury that they should –

THE DEFENDANT: I think – I think open field if he took the stand.

THE COURT: Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: I’m fully competent, magistrate. I’m fully comprehend of 

what you say, Magistrate[,] and my wishes are to take the stand.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. Okay. Thank you.

AG015898–99.

Later, both Petitioner and Petitioner’s defense counsel confirmed that Petitioner wanted to 

testify. See AG015910 (Petitioner) (“That’s why I’m taking the stand, because I can say that. I 

can say I never fired the gun.”); AG016000 (Petitioner’s counsel Louis Wies) (“[Petitioner] is 

prepared to testify and wishes to testify.”). Petitioner testified during the guilt phase on April 6 

and 7, 1994.

b. Analysis

Due process and the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination entitle a 

criminal defendant to make a voluntary and knowing decision to remain silent or to testify in his 

own defense. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51–53 (1987). The Ninth Circuit has held that the 

right to testify “essentially is a strategic trial decision with constitutional implications” and is not a 

“personal right[] that a defendant must waive explicitly.” United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 

178 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated on 

other grounds by 928 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991)). Thus, a court has “no obligation to make an onthe-record determination as to whether a defendant wants to testify,” even when there appears to 

be some disagreement between defendant and counsel. Id. at 177. In other words, “the defendant 

by taking the stand waives this significant right even though the record gives no explicit assurance 

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that this waiver was knowing and intelligent.” Martinez, 883 F.2d at 756–57 (“The court has no 

obligation to inquire into whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right not 

to testify inherent in the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.”). For the trial court to 

inquire into the choice to testify or not testify “poses a danger that the judge will appear to 

encourage the defendant to invoke or waive this right.” Joelson, 7 F.3d at 178.

In the instant case, the trial court had no constitutional obligation to engage in a discussion 

with Petitioner as to whether Petitioner’s decision to testify was voluntary and knowing. Id. at 

177. Thus, in the absence of any colloquy with the court, Petitioner would have validly “waive[d] 

this significant right [not to testify]” by taking the stand on April 6 and 7, 1994. Martinez, 883 

F.2d at 756–57. 

Moreover, Petitioner does not dispute that Petitioner’s decision to testify was voluntary. 

During the trial, Petitioner repeatedly indicated that he wished to testify, and Petitioner’s counsel 

confirmed that counsel also wished Petitioner to testify. See AG015895, AG015898–99, 

AG015910, AG016000. Petitioner does not suggest any coercion or intimidation influenced 

Petitioner’s decision to testify. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 (1987) (citations omitted)

(“A waiver is voluntary if it was the product of free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, 

coercion, or deception.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the California Supreme 

Court could reasonably have concluded that Petitioner’s decision to testify was voluntary.

However, Petitioner contends that Petitioner did not make a knowing decision to testify, 

for two reasons. First, Petitioner contends that Petitioner could not make a knowing waiver of his 

Fifth Amendment rights because he was incompetent at the time of trial. Pet’r’s Br. at 34 n.10, 35. 

This challenge reiterates allegations raised in Claims 2, 3, and 4. In denying Claim 2, this Court 

held that Petitioner received constitutionally adequate psychiatric assistance, effective assistance 

of counsel, and adequate fact-finding procedures at the 1992 competency trial in which a jury 

found Petitioner competent to stand trial. Marks, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 959–69. In denying Claim 3, 

this Court found that the trial court did not err in refusing to suspend Petitioner’s guilt phase 

proceedings and redetermine Petitioner’s competency. Id. at 969–81. In denying Claim 4, this 

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Court determined that the evidence does not raise a substantial doubt as to Petitioner’s 

competency. ECF No. 76. For the reasons outlined in this Court’s orders denying Claims 2, 3, 

and 4, Petitioner’s argument about his competency lacks merit. 

Second, Petitioner argues that the colloquy between Petitioner and the trial court reveals 

that Petitioner did not understand his right not to testify. However, Petitioner cites no clearly 

established U.S. Supreme Court law demonstrating that Petitioner did not knowingly decide to 

testify. Petitioner explicitly acknowledged that he had a legal right not to testify: “You’re telling 

me I have the right to remain silent if I wish to, if I want to voice my opinion or voice my 

testimony I can but nobody has directly given me a direct statement what’s given to [Petitioner] to 

respond, so I haven’t responded to that question.” AG015895. When asked whether Petitioner 

wished to testify, Petitioner repeatedly indicated that he did. AG015897. 

Moreover, Petitioner’s counsel confirmed that counsel had discussed Petitioner’s decision 

to testify with Petitioner, including Petitioner’s right not to testify. Both counsel and Petitioner 

wanted Petitioner to testify. AG015895, AG016000. The trial court “should not interfere” with 

the decision of Petitioner and counsel, as “the decision [to testify] is a matter of trial strategy 

between the defendant and counsel.” Martinez, 883 F.2d at 757. 

In addition, Petitioner acknowledged that he understood that the trial court would instruct 

the jury not to draw any negative inferences from a decision not to testify. AG015898. Petitioner 

was less clear that he understood that the prosecutor could not comment on the decision if 

Petitioner chose not to testify. However, “[t]he Constitution does not require that a criminal 

suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment 

privilege.” Colorado, 479 U.S. at 574. Moreover, in light of the insistence of Petitioner and 

Petitioner’s counsel that Petitioner wished to testify, as well as Petitioner’s acknowledgement of 

the fundamental principle that he had a right not to testify, the California Supreme Court could 

have reasonably concluded that Petitioner understood Petitioner’s right not to testify. 

Because the California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded that Petitioner’s 

decision to testify was both voluntary and knowing, the California Supreme Court’s denial of this 

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subclaim was neither contrary to, nor the result of an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Moreover, the California Supreme Court’s decision was not an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. See id. § 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, this subclaim must be denied.

4. Admission of Certain Photographic Evidence

Lastly, Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by allowing 

the prosecution to introduce “false, unreliable and misleading” photographs during the guilt phase 

of Petitioner’s trial. Pet. at 184. The photographs depicted a velour shirt that Petitioner was 

wearing when arrested on October 17, 1990. In 1994, a prosecution investigator photographed the 

top at Taco Bell, the scene of one of the shootings, to test the effects of the lighting on the color of 

the shirt. AG015764–65. The photographs illustrate that the color of the top appears to vary 

under fluorescent lights, and were proffered to support why eyewitnesses gave different 

descriptions of the shirt on the night of the shooting. Petitioner contends that because there was 

no proof that the lighting in Taco Bell in 1994 was the same as it was in 1990, the photographs 

lacked foundation, were irrelevant, and were prejudicial. 

The trial court admitted the photographs on the following basis:

So I have been very careful to examine the photographs taken in 1994, Exhibit 52, 

and compare them with the photos taken in 1990 on the night of the shooting in the 

Taco Bell which are group Exhibit 12. I have compared various different photos in 

Exhibit 12 with various different photos in Exhibit 52 depicting the same general 

scenes. And I want to be very sure in my own mind that the lighting fixtures had 

not changed. It appears to me that they have not changed. . . . But there appear to 

be no changes at all in the lighting fixtures themselves. I have also been informed 

when counsel met with me in chambers that these pictures were taken at night and 

of course the shooting was done at night. And of course the importance would be 

of ambient sunlight coming in through the windows would have an effect on the 

lighting in either set of photos had taken in 1990 and the ones taken now.

Mr. Thews point is well taken in that the identity of the fluorescent tubes in the 

structures we can’t say what were in 1990 as compared to what were in 1994. But I 

do think in the context of this case and the Taco Bell interior, I agree with Mr. Burr 

that is something that goes more to the question of weight, not of admissibility. 

AG015768–69. On state habeas, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s claim without 

explanation.

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A state court’s evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas review unless a specific 

constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial of 

the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 

(9th Cir. 1999) (“A federal habeas court, of course, cannot review questions of state evidence 

law.”); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir.) (holding that admission of “irrelevant and 

highly prejudicial” testimony does not warrant habeas relief unless the admission was “arbitrary or 

fundamentally unfair”), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986).

To support that the admission of the photographs rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, 

Petitioner relies upon Ninth Circuit precedent, much of it pre-AEDPA. However, “even clearly 

erroneous admissions of evidence that render a trial fundamentally unfair may not permit the grant 

of federal habeas corpus relief if not forbidden by ‘clearly established Federal law,’ as laid out by 

the [U.S.] Supreme Court.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). “In cases 

where the [U.S] Supreme Court has not adequately addressed a claim, [the] court cannot use its 

own precedent to find a state court ruling unreasonable.” Id.

As relevant here, the U.S. Supreme Court “has not yet made a clear ruling that admission 

of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to 

warrant issuance of the writ.” Id. (finding that trial court’s admission of irrelevant pornographic 

materials was “fundamentally unfair” under Ninth Circuit precedent but not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent under 

§ 2254(d)); see also Zapien v. Martel, 805 F.3d 862, 869 (9th Cir. 2015) (because there is no 

United States Supreme Court case establishing the fundamental unfairness of admitting multiple 

hearsay testimony, Holley bars any such claim on federal habeas review). Absent such “clearly 

established Federal law,” the Court cannot conclude that the state court’s ruling was an 

“unreasonable application” thereof. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (“Given the 

lack of holdings from this Court . . . it cannot be said that the state court ‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] 

clearly established Federal law.”’).

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. Accordingly, this subclaim must be denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Claim 8. Because Petitioner’s arguments as 

to Claim 8 are unavailing, Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing as to Claim 8 is also 

DENIED. See Sully, 725 F.3d at 1075 (“[A]n evidentiary hearing is pointless once the district 

court has determined that § 2254(d) precludes habeas relief.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 27, 2016

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

Case 5:11-cv-02458-LHK Document 77 Filed 09/27/16 Page 23 of 23