Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02283/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02283-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael Ray Weeks, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV 14-2283-TUC-DCB (JR) 

 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Michael Ray Weeks’ Amended Petition 

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 2) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In 

accordance with the Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the 

Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. As explained below, the 

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of 

the record, dismiss the Petition with prejudice. 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background 

 Weeks was convicted on July 6, 2007, following a jury trial in Cochise 

County Superior Court, case #CR2005-00442, of six counts of sexual assault, one 

count of kidnapping/domestic violence, and three counts of aggravated 

assault/domestic violence and was sentenced to a total of 44.5 years in prison. In its 

Memorandum Decision affirming Weeks’s conviction and sentence, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals summarized the factual background as follows:1

Weeks and the victim, M., lived together in his grandparents’ house. 

After coming home on the night of June 4 or early morning of June 5, 

2005, Weeks got into bed with M., removed her clothes, forced her to 

perform oral sex on him, and sexually assaulted her several times. He 

also choked and hit her. 

 The next morning M. went to work, where a co-worker noticed 

she was upset. After someone contacted the police, an officer arrived 

at M.’s workplace, interviewed her, and photographed her physical 

injuries. The officer then transported her to a hospital emergency room. 

A nurse examined her, documented her injuries, and collected DNA 

[FN1: Deoxyribonucleic acid] evidence, which was later identified as 

belonging to Weeks. 

 Weeks was charged with six counts of sexual assault, four 

counts of aggravated assault, and one count of kidnapping. His first 

trial in September 2006 ended in a mistrial. Weeks testified at his 

second trial, claiming he had consensual sex with M, but had not hit or 

hurt her. The jury found him guilty on all counts except one of the 

aggravated assault charges. 

 

1

 The factual summary of the Arizona Court of Appeals is accorded a presumption of 

correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n. 1 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

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State v. Weeks, 2011 WL 1532368 (Ariz. App. Apr. 20, 2011); Ex. 3 (copy of 

decision).2

 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Weeks convictions and 

sentences. Id. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review of Weeks’ claims. Ex. 5. 

The trial court then denied Weeks’ PCR petition and the court of appeals affirmed the 

trial court’s decision. Exs. 9, 12. Weeks then sought review of the decision by the 

Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review. Ex. 14. 

 Weeks commenced this action with the filing of his original petition on 

August 12, 2014. (Doc. 1). He contemporaneously filed the now pending amended 

petition. (Doc. 2). In his Amended Petition, Weeks raises the following nine 

grounds for relief: 

 1. Petitioner was not competent to stand trial or to consider 

the plea offer and was tried in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 

Due Process Clause; 

 2. The Court failed to order, and counsel failed to obtain, a 

competency hearing for Petitioner in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment Due Process Clause; 

 3. Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective in violation of 

the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; 

 4. Petitioner’s second trial was in violation of the Fifth 

Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment 

Due Process Clause; 

 

2

 Numbered exhibit references are to the exhibits attached to the Petitioner’s 

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 2). Lettered exhibit references 

are to the exhibits attached to the Respondents’ Answer to Amended Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 13). 

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 5. The trial court admitted hearsay testimony over 

Petitioner’s objections in violation of the Sixth Amendment 

Confrontation Clause; 

 6. Petitioner was forced to testify in violation of the Fifth 

Amendment Right to Remain Silent and Privilege Against SelfIncrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause 

because the trial court admitted his and the victim’s hearsay statements 

in violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause; 

 7. Petitioner’s kidnapping class two felony conviction and 

sentencing was in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments’ 

right to trial by jury; 

 8. There was insufficient evidence to sustain Petitioner’s 

convictions in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 

Clause; and 

 9. The physical, financial, or emotional harm aggravator is 

duplicitous and was not proved unanimously in violation of Petitioner’s 

Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by jury and the Fourteenth 

Amendment Due Process Clause. 

 

Amended Petition, pp. 30-75. 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Default 

 Respondents contend that Grounds One, Two, Four and Five of the petition 

were not properly exhausted and are procedurally barred from habeas review. With 

the exception of Ground Four, the Court agrees with Respondents. 

 A state prisoner must exhaust his available state remedies before a federal 

court may consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999). “[A] petitioner 

fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the 

exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through 

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the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the 

claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations 

omitted). 

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts in order to give them a “fair opportunity to act” upon these 

claims. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). “To exhaust one's 

state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct 

appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief 

pursuant to Rule 32,” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then 

present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 Additionally, a state prisoner must not only present the claims to the proper 

court, but must also present them fairly. A claim has been “fairly presented” if the 

petitioner has described the operative facts and federal legal theories on which the 

claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 

F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). “Our rule is that a state prisoner has not ‘fairly 

presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically 

indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law.” Lyons v. 

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 

904 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must alert the state court to the specific federal 

constitutional guaranty upon which his claims are based, Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 

F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001), however, general appeals in state court to broad 

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constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair 

trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. 

Lyons, 232 F.3d at 669. Moreover, it is not enough that a petitioner presented to the 

state court all the facts necessary to support an inadequately identified federal claim 

or that a “somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

27, 28 (2004); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (mere similarity 

between a claim of state and federal error insufficient to establish exhaustion). 

“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of 

an underlying federal legal theory.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th 

Cir. 2005). 

A. Grounds One and Two 

 Weeks’s Ground One claim is that he was not competent to stand trial or to 

reject a plea offer prior to trial. His Ground Two claim is that the trial court and his 

counsel should have recognized the competence issue and the trial court erred in 

failing to sua sponte order a competency evaluation. Amended Petition, pp. 31-51. 

Respondents assert that these claims were first raised by Weeks in his PCR petition 

and, although the trial court addressed them on the merits, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals found them precluded, explaining that: 

the [trial] court could have found, and we do find, that Weeks’s claims 

of trial error, relating to his competency to stand trial and the court’s 

duty to order a competency evaluation sua sponte, are precluded 

because he did not raise them on appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(a)(3), (c). Weeks has not established that these claims fall within 

any of the exceptions to preclusion. 

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Ex. 12, p. 3. Because the Court of Appeals was the last state court to render a 

judgment on these claims and found them procedurally defaulted, they ordinarily are 

not subject to federal court review. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (“When a 

state law default prevents the state court from reaching the merits of a federal claim, 

that claim can ordinarily not be reviewed in federal court.”). 

 In his Reply, Weeks does not contend that these claims were exhausted. 

Rather, he contends that they are subject to review because the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ “’waiver’ decision is wrong,” because incompetency cannot be waived. 

Reply, pp. 4-5. In support of his argument, Weeks block quotes from several 

decisions from the Eighth and Eleventh circuits which hold that claims of substantive 

incompetence cannot be procedurally defaulted and must be addressed on the merits. 

Reply, pp. 6-7 (citing Adams v. Wainwright, 764 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir. 1985); Medina 

v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095 (11th Cir. 1995); Vogt v. United States, 88 F.3d 587 (8th

Cir. 1996); and Battle v. United States, 419 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2005)). However, 

neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has adopted such a rule. 

 In LaFlamme v. Hubbard, 225 F.3d 663, 2000 WL 757525 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(unpublished per curiam decision), the Ninth Circuit noted that the courts that have 

held that substantive competency claims cannot be procedurally defaulted either 

conflated waiver doctrine and procedural default or relied on earlier cases that had 

done so. LaFlamme, 2000 WL 757525 at *2; see also Hodges v. Colson, 727 F.3d 

517, 540 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that substantive incompetency claims are subject to 

procedural default rules); Smith v. Moore, 137 F.3d 808, 819 (4th Cir. 1998) (same). 

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As the Ninth Circuit explained, “unlike waiver, the procedural default rule does not 

rely on the petitioner’s voluntary abandonment of a known right, but only on the fact 

that the claim was rejected by the state court on independent and adequate state 

grounds.” LaFlamme, 2000 WL 757525 at *2. Thus, Weeks’s waiver arguments do 

not serve to overcome the Arizona Court of Appeals’ finding of procedural default on 

his claims of substantive incompetence. 

B. Ground Four 

 In Ground Four, Weeks contends that his second trial violated his Fifth 

Amendment right to be free from double jeopardy. Amended Petition, pp. 51-60. 

Respondents argue that, although Weeks cited the Fifth Amendment in his state court 

briefs, “his argument there focused (as it does in his habeas petition) on the double 

jeopardy clause of art. 2, § 10 of Arizona’s constitution,” and Weeks therefore did 

not properly exhaust his federal double jeopardy claim. Answer, p. 13. The Court 

disagrees. 

 “In this circuit, the petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit 

either by specifying particular provisions of the federal Constitution or statutes, or by 

citing to federal case law.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 

2005). Here, Weeks cited both the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause and 

two United States Supreme Court cases, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) 

and Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). Benton is often cited for its 

holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause is enforceable against the states through the 

Fourteenth Amendment and for the general proposition that “an accused should not 

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be tried twice for the same offense.” 395 U.S. at 787, 809. In Abney, the Court 

explained that, “the guarantee against double jeopardy assures an individual that, 

among other things, he will not be forced, with certain exceptions, to endure the 

personal strain, public embarrassment, and expense of a criminal trial more than once 

for the same offense.” 431 U.S. at 661. Thus, although Weeks did also cite Arizona 

authority on the issue, he identified the federal constitutional guarantee on which he 

was relying and cases which interpreted that guarantee. This was enough and the 

claim was properly exhausted. See Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir.2009) 

(“Full and fair presentation additionally requires a petitioner to present the substance 

of his claim to the state courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional 

guarantee”). 

C. Ground Five

 Respondents’ next contention is that Weeks failed to exhaust his Ground Five 

claim that his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights and his Fourteenth Amendment 

due process rights were violated by the trial court’s admission of testimony from a 

police officer regarding Weeks’s out of court statement denying that he had assaulted 

his girlfriend. Amended Petition, pp. 60-66. Although the Arizona Court of Appeals 

reviewed a related claim under Arizona’s evidentiary rules, it did not review the 

claim under federal constitutional standards, explaining that: 

 Although the issue statement in Weeks’s opening brief includes 

a claim that the trial court’s admission of this evidence violated the 

Sixth Amendment, he fails to further develop or discuss the issue. See

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.13(c)(1)(vi). And at trial, he only objected on 

hearsay ground under Rule 801, not the Confrontation Clause. See 

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State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 94 P.3d 1119, 1136 (2004) (objection 

“must state specific grounds in order to preserve the issue for appeal”). 

Therefore, he did not adequately preserve the issue for appeal. Id; see 

also Alvarez, 213 Ariz. 467, 143 P.3d at 670. And we do not review 

for fundamental, prejudicial error, see Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 115 

P.3d at 607, because weeks waived that issue by failing to argue it on 

appeal. See Carver, 160 Ariz. at 175, 771 P.2d at 1390. 

Ex. 1, p. 12, n. 3. 

 In his Reply, Weeks challenges neither the Respondents’ assertion of 

procedural default nor the Arizona Court of Appeals’ determination of waiver. 

Rather, he contends that “the state procedural bars of ‘waiver’ and ‘abandonment’ 

employed by the Appellate Court against Weeks were not adequate to bar habeas 

review because they are not regularly and consistently applied.” Reply, pp. 23-24. 

The rule applied by the Arizona Court of Appeals, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.13(c)(1)(vi), 

provides that an appellant's opening brief “shall contain the contentions of the 

appellant . . . and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and 

parts of the record relied on.” Courts have found that the application of Rule 

31.13(c)(1)(vi) is firmly established and regularly followed in Arizona. See State v. 

Carver, 771 P.2d 1382, 1390 (Ariz. App. 1989); State v. Lopez, 175 P.3d 682, 687 n. 

5 (Ariz. App. 2008) (declining to address defendant's argument that did not comply 

with Rule 31.13(c)(1) (vi)); State v. Burdick, 125 P.3d 1039, 1042 n. 4 (Ariz. App. 

2005); State v. Eddington, 244 P.3d 76, 85 (Ariz. App. 2010). 

 Despite the cases indicating otherwise, Weeks contends that the waiver bar is 

not consistently applied. In support of his argument, Weeks relies on State v. West, 

233 P.3d 1154 (Ariz. App. 2010), vacated on other grounds, 250 P.3d 1188 (Ariz. 

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2011). In West, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that it had “discretion to address 

a significant, albeit waived, issue on the merits.” 233 P.3d at 1157 (citations 

omitted). However, the Arizona court’s exercise of discretion to address a waived 

claim in West does not undermine the finding that the waiver rule is consistently 

applied. The Supreme Court has held that “a discretionary state procedural rule can 

serve as an adequate ground to bar federal habeas review,” and that “a discretionary 

rule can be ‘firmly established’ and ‘regularly followed’ -- even if the appropriate 

exercise of discretion may permit consideration of a federal claim in some cases but 

not in others.” Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60-61 (2009). Thus, with respect to the 

Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause claim asserted in Ground Five of Weeks’s 

habeas petition, the Arizona Court of Appeals finding of waiver and abandonment in 

violation of Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.13(c)(1)(vi) is independent and 

adequate, and the claim is not subject to review. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 728, (1991) (federal courts “will not review a question of federal law decided by 

a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is 

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.”). 

D. Federal Review of Defaulted Claims 

 In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts on either direct 

appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review because any 

attempt to return to state court to present them would be futile unless the claims fit 

into a narrow range of exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) 

(precluding claims not raised on direct appeal or in prior post-conviction relief 

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petitions), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty 

days of trial court’s decision). Because these rules have been found to be 

consistently and regularly followed, and because they are independent of federal law, 

either their specific application to a claim by an Arizona court, or their operation to 

preclude a return to state court to exhaust a claim, will procedurally bar subsequent 

review of the merits of such a claim by a federal habeas court. Stewart, 536 U.S. at 

860; Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998) (Rule 32, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

is strictly followed); State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996) (waiver and 

preclusion rules strictly applied in postconviction proceedings). 

 Respondents contend and Weeks does not contradict, that Weeks is 

procedurally barred from now raising his defaulted claims in State court. See 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) (“A defendant shall be precluded from relief under [Rule 

32] based upon any ground . . . [t]hat has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any 

previous collateral proceeding.”) Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 

2002). As such, the merits of the claims need not be addressed unless Weeks 

establishes cause and prejudice or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has 

occurred. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). To establish cause, a 

petitioner must point to some objective factor external to the defense impeded his 

efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (2004). “[C]ause is an external impediment such as government interference 

or reasonable unavailability of a claims factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 

1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Ignorance of the state’s procedural 

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rules or lack of legal training does not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for a 

petitioner’s failure to fairly present a claim. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of 

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908-10 (9th Cir. 1986); Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 

1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the 

constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 

1984); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). Weeks does not argue 

that cause and prejudice exist in this case and, therefore, the procedurally defaulted 

claims are not subject to review. 

III. Merits 

A. AEDPA Standards 

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect 

to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court’s decision can be “contrary to” federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts “materially indistinguishable” from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

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court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2002). A state court’s decision can be an unreasonable application of 

federal law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies 

it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or 

fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is 

objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

B. Grounds 

 1. Ground Three – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 In Ground Three, Weeks contends that he was “psychotic, delusional, 

hallucinating, intoxicated, and suicidal prior to and during the trials,” and that his 

counsels’ “[f]ailure to discover incompetency and request a hearing constitutes IAC.” 

Amended Petition, p. 50. 

 a. Clearly Established Law 

 The operative legal standard applicable to this claim is addressed by the 

United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The 

standards enunciated in Strickland are applied unless there is other Supreme Court 

precedent directly on point. See Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120 (2008). Under 

Strickland, Weeks must show both deficient performance and prejudice in order to 

establish that his counsels’ representation was ineffective. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687. Deficient performance is established by a petitioner’s showing that counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Hill v. Lockhart, 

474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). To establish prejudice, 

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the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Lafler 

v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

 If, as in this case, the state court has already denied the claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a federal habeas court may grant relief only if it finds the state 

court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of the Strickland

standards. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). The court’s evaluation 

of counsel’s performance must be “highly deferential” and must avoid “the distorting 

effects of hindsight” by analyzing the challenged decision from counsel’s perspective 

at the time. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There is a strong presumption that counsel’s 

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance, id., and the Supreme 

Court had described federal review of a state court’s decision on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel as “doubly deferential.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 

U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 

111, 112–113 (2009)). 

 b. State Court Ruling 

 In rejecting this claim in Weeks’s PCR proceedings, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals found that the required indicia were not present: 

In this case, there was substantial evidence at the evidentiary hearing, 

including his own testimony, that Weeks had “actively hid[den]” his 

drug use and its effects, including its alleged effects on his mental 

health, from his trial attorneys. And, in affidavits submitted with 

Weeks’s petition for post-conviction relief, both attorneys who had 

represented Weeks at trial averred that they were not aware of his 

suffering from any mental health issues, current drug use, suicidal 

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ideation, or hallucinations around the time of his trial. In view of this 

evidence, we cannot say that court abused its discretion in concluding 

counsel’s performance had not been deficient. Therefore, although we 

grant the petition for review, relief is denied. 

Ex. 12, pp. 4-5. 

 c. Discussion 

 Weeks contends that counsels’ “[f]ailure to discover incompetency and 

request a hearing constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.” Amended Petition, p. 

44. To establish ineffective assistance under the Strickland standards, the failure to 

discover incompetency and request a competency hearing must be accompanied by 

“sufficient indicia of incompetence to give objectively reasonable counsel reason to 

doubt the defendant’s competency, and . . . a reasonable probability that the 

defendant would have been found incompetent to stand trial had the issue been raised 

and fully considered.’” Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 862 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 283 (3rd Cir. 2001)). As the Arizona Court of Appeals 

concluded, the required indicia of incompetence was not present in this case. 

 Weeks asserts that his counsel failed to discover his “[s]ocial background, 

family history, drug addiction, delusions, mental illness, physical health history, and 

suicide attempts,” all of which, he contends, establish that he was not competent 

during his trials and at sentencing. As Respondents note, however, the record shows 

that, at the time of trial and sentencing, Weeks was secretive about his drug use and 

testified at the PCR hearing that he worked to convince his lawyers “that I was 

normal, and so that, you know, they wouldn’t see that I was on any type of drugs, or 

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that I was suffering from any kind of problems.” Ex. C, pp. 142-144. This sort of 

behavior, as noted by the Court of Appeals, resulted in Weeks’s counsel being 

unaware of any potential competency problems. Weeks has failed to identify any 

instance, during the course of his trials or sentencing, where he behaved irrationally, 

appeared not to understand the proceedings, or did not communicate effectively with 

counsel. Without such evidence, the Court cannot conclude that counsel was 

ineffective for failing to request and examination of Weeks’s competence to stand 

trial. See Alexander v. Dugger, 841 F.2d 371, 375 (11th Cir. 1988) (rejecting 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim when defendant made only “conclusory 

allegations that he was incompetent to stand trial” and gave “no concrete examples 

suggesting that at the time of his trial he did not have the ability to consult with his 

lawyer or he did not understand the proceedings against him.”); Stanley, 633 F.3d at 

863 (finding that state court reasonably rejected prisoner’s ineffective assistance 

claim where the record contained “insufficient evidence of [the prisoner’s] 

incompetence during the guilt phase to justify a conclusion that defense counsel were 

ineffective in failing to move for competency proceedings.”). The Arizona Court of 

Appeals was therefore not unreasonable in denying this claim. 

 2. Ground Four – Double Jeopardy

 In Ground Four of the Petition, Weeks alleges that his second trial was barred 

by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Amended Petition, pp. 51-60. Before his first trial, 

Weeks moved pursuant to Rule 404(b), Ariz. R. Evid., to preclude any evidence of 

“prior bad acts” toward the victim, who was his girlfriend at the time. Ex. 3, ¶¶ 1, 6. 

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The State agreed not to introduce evidence of any prior bad acts and stated that it 

would instruct its witnesses to refrain from testifying about any prior acts. The trial 

court memorialized the agreement in a minute entry stating, “the State’s response is 

that no prior act evidence will be introduced, and [the prosecutor] will instruct her 

witnesses that no prior acts will come in as testimony . . . . [T]he State has conceded, 

therefore, this motion is moot.” Ex. 3, ¶ 6. 

 On the second day of Weeks’s first trial, the victim took the stand and was 

questioned by the Deputy County Prosecutor Marc Offenhartz. Offenhartz 

proceeded to question the victim about her previous drug use and asked if she had 

ever used illegal drugs with Weeks. Ex. 3, ¶ 7; Ex. G (transcript), pp. 7-9. When the 

victim responded affirmatively, Weeks’s counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. 

Id. The trial court did not immediately rule on the motion, but deferred its decision 

until it could “review the file.” Ex. G, p. 9. Offenhartz explained that he thought that 

“the prior bad acts that were excluded had to do with previous fighting between the 

couple.” Ex. G, p. 10. 

 Shortly after the resumption of questioning, the following exchange occurred 

between Offenhartz and the victim: 

Q. When you guys would engage in sex together, describe what 

you mean by that. 

A. I man, we would just have sex. I don’t know. We didn’t really, 

are you talking about before or – 

Q. Well, before June 5th of 2005? 

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A. Well in the beginning when we were going out, it was pretty 

normal. It wasn’t like he made me do anything, and then later on, it 

changed. 

Ex. G, p. 11. At that point, Weeks’s counsel objected and again moved for a mistrial, 

arguing that: 

This is the second flagrant violation of the Court’s order in as many 

minutes. First, we had the offer of testimony concerning my client’s 

alleged drug use, and second, the violence statement concerning 

violence [against the victim]. Mr. Offenhartz appears to be working 

from a script, does not appear this is an accident. 

 

Ex. G, p. 12. After hearing lengthy argument, and after initially denying the motion, 

the trial court stated that “this case was to be about June 5th, and it was not.” Ex. G, 

p. 36. The trial court therefore granted Weeks’s motion for a mistrial. Ex. G, pp. 35-

36. 

 A week after the mistrial, Weeks moved to dismiss all charges against him 

with prejudice on double jeopardy and due process grounds. Ex. 3, ¶ 10. After 

conducting a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied the motion. Weeks then 

sought special action relief, but the Arizona Court of Appeals declined jurisdiction 

and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Id. The trial was then rescheduled 

and Weeks sought reconsideration of the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. 

The trial court again denied the motion and Weeks proceeded to trial and was 

convicted. Id. 

 a. Clearly Established Law 

 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a criminal 

defendant from repeated prosecutions for the same offense. United States v. Dinitz, 

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424 U.S. 600, 606 (1976). When a mistrial is declared over a defendant’s objection, 

retrial is generally barred unless the mistrial was justified by “manifest necessity.” 

Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982); see also United States v. Bonas, 344 

F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 2003) (after mistrial, defendant may be tried again for same 

crime only if defendant consented to dismissal or court determined that dismissal was 

required by “manifest necessity”). The Double Jeopardy Clause, however, ordinarily 

does not prohibit a retrial when the court has declared a mistrial at the defendant’s 

request. See Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 607–08; United States v. Lopez–Avila, 678 F.3d 955, 

962 (9th Cir. 2012). A “narrow exception” to that general rule “exists where the 

government engages in prosecutorial misconduct ‘intended to provoke the defendant 

into moving for a mistrial.’” United States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 

2004) (quoting Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673). But “[o]nly where the governmental 

conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a mistrial 

may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having 

succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion.” Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676. 

However, “[p]rosecutorial conduct that might be viewed as harassment or 

overreaching, even if sufficient to justify a mistrial on [a] defendant’s motion, . . . 

does not bar retrial absent intent on the part of the prosecutor to subvert the 

protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Id. at 675–76. Before finding 

a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, a court must make a factual finding that 

the prosecutor actually intended to cause the defendant to move for a mistrial. Id. at 

675; see also Greyson v. Kellam, 937 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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 b. State Court Decision 

 In its decision denying relief on this claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

found that it was at least arguable that “the mistrial was caused by the prosecutor’s 

action—his direct questioning—which elicited the improper testimony.” Ex. 3, ¶ 13. 

However, the court then determined that the question about Weeks’s prior drug use, 

while improper, “could have been cured without ordering a mistrial,” and therefore 

did not alone unduly prejudice Weeks or require a mistrial. Ex. 3, ¶ 14. 

 Turning then to the second question asked by the prosecutor, the court found 

that it was the victim’s answer, rather than the prosecutor’s question, “that introduced 

the forbidden subject matter.” The court further noted that the pretrial order did not 

prohibit all evidence about Weeks and victim’s relationship prior to June 5, but only 

prohibited evidence of “Weeks’s ‘prior bad acts’ before the June 5 incident.” Ex. 3, 

¶ 15. As such, although the court indicated that the question could have been “better 

tailored,” because question was intended to elicit testimony about the consensual 

nature of Weeks and the victim’s relationship, the pretrial order was not 

automatically violated. The court then concluded that in light of these considerations 

and the prosecutor’s “vehement opposition to a mistrial, the record does not compel a 

finding that [the prosecutor] intentionally asked M. about a prior violent act or acted 

with indifference to causing a mistrial.” Ex. 3, ¶¶ 15-16. 

 Next, the court addressed and rejected Weeks’s contention that the prosecutor 

sought to provoke a mistrial because the case was not going well. The court noted 

that although there was some indication after the mistrial that the jury did not believe 

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the State’s case was going well, at the time the mistrial was declared by the court, 

“the state had presented only three witnesses, one as a ‘first responder” and the other 

two for ‘chain of custody.’ The two witnesses who linked M.’s injuries to Weeks—

the nurse and DNA expert—had not testified.” Ex. 3, ¶ 17. For these reasons, the 

Court of Appeals found that the trial court had not abused its discretion by denying 

Weeks’s motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy and due process grounds. Ex. 

3, ¶ 19. 

 c. Discussion 

 Weeks argues that “Offenhartz’s misconduct was intentional, known to be 

prejudicial and improper, and the questioning was pursued with a clear indifference 

to a significant resulting danger of mistrial.” Amended Answer, p. 54. Weeks argues 

that the Offenhartz’s purposeful intentions can be discerned from the facts that he 

twice asked questions on impermissible topics and because the case was going poorly 

for the prosecution. However, “[i]n cases where the prosecution wants to force a 

mistrial,” it is presumed that “the prosecution is unprepared or is unhappy with the 

trial’s progress and wants another opportunity to retry the defendant.” Greyson, 937 

F.2d at 1413. As the State points out, Offenhartz vigorously argued against Weeks’s 

request for a mistrial and sought to move forward. See Lopez–Avila, 678 F.3d at 962 

(noting that under Kennedy, “[t]he only relevant intent is intent to terminate the trial, 

not intent to prevail at this trial by impermissible means” (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, although Offenhartz’s performance was 

clearly deficient and was the cause of the mistrial, neither the trial court nor the Court 

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of Appeals found that he actually intended to cause Weeks to move for a mistrial. 

See Greyson, 937 F.2d at 1415. Thus, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ ruling 

regarding the trial court’s denial of Weeks’s motion to dismiss was not contrary to, 

nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law and Weeks is not 

entitled to habeas relief on Ground One. 

 3. Ground Six – Right to Remain Silent

 In Ground Six, Weeks argues that his right to remain silent and the privilege 

against self-incrimination were violated “[b]ecause of the [trial court’s] erroneous 

admission of hearsay testimony.” The testimony about which he complains consists 

of the statements he made when he was interviewed by detectives. In the heading of 

his argument, Weeks also references hearsay testimony from his victim that was 

improperly admitted; however, in his argument, he does not identify that testimony 

with any specificity. Amended Petition, pp. 66-67. 

 a. Clearly Established Law 

 Under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a defendant 

cannot be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal proceeding. U.S. 

CONST. amend. V; Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984). To prove a 

Fifth Amendment violation, a petitioner must establish that (1) the elicited testimony 

carried a threat of incrimination, and (2) the penalty suffered was essentially 

compulsion. U.S. v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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 b. State Court Decision 

In its decision denying relief on this claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

noted that it was within the trial court’s discretion to admit the challenged statements 

and, therefore Weeks was not “forced to testify” by the admission of “erroneously 

admitted . . . hearsay statements.” Ex. 3, ¶ 28. 

 c. Discussion 

 As the Arizona Court of Appeals held, Weeks forfeited the constitutional 

argument underlying this claim. Weeks’s claim that his statements were improperly 

admitted hearsay was rejected based on state law grounds. Ex. 3, ¶¶ 23-27. In the 

instant petition, Weeks continues to primarily rely on Arizona law to support his 

argument that his statements were not admissions and therefore constituted 

inadmissible hearsay. Amended Petition, pp. 60-66. He does pepper his argument 

with a few federal cases, but none of the cases he cites contain clearly established 

Supreme Court authority prohibiting the introduction of a defendant’s prior 

statements because they are admissions rather than denials. Thus, as a threshold 

matter, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ finding that Weeks’s statements were 

admissible is not clearly erroneous. 

 Despite the inability to articulate a federal constitutional basis for the 

inadmissibility of his out of court statements, Weeks nevertheless argues that the 

admission of those statements “violated [his] 5th Amendment right to remain silent 

and his 14th Amendment right to Due Process of Law.” Amended Petition, pp. 66-

67. However, the cases he cites in support of his argument are off the mark. 

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Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), is of no help to Weeks’s cause 

because it did not involve a defendant who was forced to testify due to the admission 

of improper evidence. Rather, the Supreme Court determined that Chambers did not 

get a fair trial because the trial court excluded critical evidence and refused to allow 

him to cross-examine a witness. Id. at 302. Weeks alleges neither of those 

circumstances here. 

 In Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), after the prosecution 

introduced three confessions allegedly made by Harrison while he was in police 

custody, Harrison, who was charged with felony murder, took the stand and offered 

his version of the event’s leading to the victim’s death. Id. at 220. The appellate 

court reversed Harrison’s conviction, finding that the confessions had been illegally 

obtained and were therefore inadmissible. Id. On remand, the prosecutor did not 

offer the confessions, but read to the jury Harrison’s testimony from the previous 

trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that Harrison’s trial testimony, which 

was presented in an attempt to avoid the effects of the three illegally obtained 

confessions, was inadmissible as “fruit of the poison tree.” Id. Although the Court 

can see that Weeks is attempting to liken the admissibility of allegedly hearsay 

statements during his trial to the admission of Harrison’s prior testimony, the 

argument is not compelling. Harrison has been interpreted to require that a 

defendant show that illegally obtained and improperly admitted evidence compelled 

his testimony. See United States v. Mortensen, 860 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Here, Weeks argues only that his statements were improperly admitted, but nowhere 

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does he contend that the statements were illegally obtained. As such, Weeks has 

failed to provide the requisite authority to support his conclusion that the trial court’s 

evidentiary ruling implicated his constitutional right to refuse to testify. United 

States v. Burreson, 643 F.2d 1344, 1349 (9th cir.1981) (holding that defendants’ 

testimony was not “compelled” even though it was motivated by a desire to respond 

to evidence they argued was erroneously admitted against them). 

 4. Ground Seven – Right to a Jury Trial 

 In Ground Seven, Weeks contends that his class two felony kidnapping 

conviction under A.R.S. § 13-1304(A) violated the rule set out in Apprendi v. New 

Jersey, 530 U.S. 460 (2000) because the jury was not instructed to consider what 

Weeks contends are elements of the offense listed in A.R.S. § 13-1304(B). Weeks 

argues his conviction cannot stand because the jury did not consider the enumerated 

factors in section 13-1304(B) which, if found to exist, would reduce the kidnapping 

conviction to a class four felony. 

 a. Clearly Established Law

 In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that “‘any fact (other than 

prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in 

an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 530 

U.S. at 476 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n. 6 (1999)). 

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 b. State Court Decision

 The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Weeks’s argument based on State v. 

Tschilar, 27 P.3d 331 (Ariz. App. 2001). The court explained that, in Tschilar, 

Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals: 

determined that § 13-1304(B) is not an element of kidnapping that has 

to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, that 

subsection is relevant to sentencing and “has no bearing on the jury’s 

determination that the offense of kidnapping had been committed.” 

Tschilar, 27 P.3d at 337; see also State v. Eagle, 994 P.2d 394, 399 

(2000) (voluntary release of kidnapping victim is “mitigating factor 

relevant solely for sentencing purposes”). As the court in Tschilar

concluded, “Apprendi does not affect the analysis [or holding] in 

Eagle,” which Weeks does not address, and does not require a jury to 

determine the non-element, mitigating sentencing factor under § 13-

1304(B) of “the victim's safe release.” 27 P.3d at 337, 336. Therefore, 

the trial court did not err by failing to sua sponte include § 13-1304(B) 

in its jury instructions on kidnapping or to reduce Weeks’s conviction 

to a class four felony when he failed to request either action below and 

his position on appeal is legally incorrect. 

Ex. 3, ¶ 37. 

 c. Discussion 

 Weeks attempts to overcome the Arizona court’s Apprendi analysis by citing 

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), where the Supreme Court stated: 

“Merely using the label ‘sentence enhancement’ to describe the [second 

act] surely does not provide a principled basis for treating [the two acts] 

differently.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476. 

 The dispositive question, we said, “is one not of form, but of 

effect.” Id., at 494. If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s 

authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no 

matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See id. at 482–483. A defendant may not be “expose 

[d] . . . to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if 

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punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.” Id. 

at 483. 

Ring, 536 U.S. at 602 (citations altered for clarity). This statement from the Ring 

cannot carry the weight Weeks places upon it. 

 Under Apprendi and Ring, the jury must determine any facts that would 

support “an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 

482-83; Ring, 536 U.S. at 602. As the Arizona court noted, however, the mitigating 

factors provided for in section 1304(B) were not elements of the crime of kidnapping. 

Moreover, a determination that Weeks had satisfied the factors in that section would 

not have subjected him to an increased sentence, but to a decreased sentence. Under 

section 2254, Weeks is obligated to establish that the Arizona court’s decision was 

“contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as 

determined by the United States Supreme Court.” He has not pointed to clearly 

established authority in support of his argument and he has not shown that the 

decision was contrary to Apprendi or Ring. 

 5. Ground Eight – Sufficiency of the Evidence

 In Ground Eight, Weeks argues that there “was insufficient evidence to sustain 

his convictions in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.” 

Weeks contends that “[i]n this case there was simply no evidence to support the 

allegations but the word of the victim . . . .” Amended Petition, p. 72. 

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 a. Clearly Established Law

 The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 

which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). When a challenge is 

brought alleging insufficient evidence, habeas corpus relief is available if, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court finds 

that no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Jackson

established a two-step inquiry for considering a challenge to a conviction based on 

sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 

2010) (en banc). First, the court considers the evidence at trial in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution. Id., citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. “‘[W]hen faced 

with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences,’ a reviewing 

court ‘must presume– even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record– that the 

trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to 

that resolution.’” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326). “Jackson leaves juries 

broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw from the evidence presented at 

trial,” and it requires only that they draw “‘reasonable inferences from basic facts to 

ultimate facts.’” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) (per curiam) 

(citation omitted). 

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 b. State Court Decision 

 In rejecting this claim on direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals reasoned 

as follows: 

Weeks argues that “there was simply no evidence to support the 

allegations but the word of the victim” and that her credibility was 

“seriously in doubt.” But, in Arizona, a conviction may be based on 

“the uncorroborated testimony of the [victim] unless her story is 

physically impossible, or so incredible that no reasonable [person] 

could believe it.” State v. Polluck, 57 Ariz. 415, 417, 114 P.2d 249, 250 

(1941); see also State v. Navarro, 90 Ariz. 185, 189, 367 P.2d 227, 230 

(1961). And, the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given 

their testimony are exclusively matters for the jury. See State v. Cox, 

217 Ariz. 353, ¶ 27, 174 P.3d 265, 269 (2007); State v. Cañez, 202 

Ariz. 133, ¶ 39, 42 P.3d 564, 580 (2002). 

 M.’s testimony, apparently credited by the jury, is substantial 

evidence that supports Weeks’s convictions. Additionally, although 

Weeks claims “there was no scientific connection” between M.’s 

injuries and Weeks, physical evidence corroborated M.'s testimony. 

The forensic testing of the samples taken during M.’s medical 

examination identified Weeks’s DNA in M.’s vagina, on her abdomen, 

and in her underwear. The nurse and a police officer testified about 

M.’s scratches and bruises on her head, neck, and back, areas where she 

stated Weeks had hit or choked her. Weeks and M. testified at trial, 

permitting the jury to observe both of them and evaluate their 

demeanor and credibility. See Cañez, 202 Ariz. 133, ¶ 39, 42 P.3d at 

580. Although a clear conflict existed between the differing accounts 

they gave, it was for the jury to resolve any inconsistencies in the 

evidence, and we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. State v. 

Miller, 16 Ariz.App. 96, 99, 491 P.2d 485, 488 (1971) (we will “not 

substitute our opinion for the jury’s if there is any evidence to support” 

its conclusion); see also State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, ¶ 6, 99 P.3d 

43, 46 (App.2004); State v. Patterson, 4 Ariz.App. 265, 266, 419 P.2d 

395, 396 (1966). Viewing the evidence and inferences in the light most 

favorable to upholding the convictions, we conclude a reasonable jury 

easily could find beyond a reasonable doubt Weeks had committed 

each of the charged offenses against M. See [State v.] Davolt, 207 Ariz. 

191, ¶ 87, 84 P.3d [456] at 477 [(2004)]. 

Ex. 3, ¶¶ 40-41. 

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 c. Discussion

 In his Amended Petition, Weeks reiterates the argument he presented to the 

state courts. He contends that “there was simply no evidence to support the 

allegations but the word of the victim.” Amended Petition, p. 72. As clearly 

established in the decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals, this assertion is simply 

not accurate. The jury was able to consider the testimony of Weeks, that of his 

victim, and the physical evidence that corroborated her story. 

 However, even if Weeks’s conviction was based entirely on M.’s testimony, 

the jury’s credibility determination is entitled to near-total deference. Bruce v. 

Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004), citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 330 

(1995) (stating that “under Jackson, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is 

generally beyond the scope of review.”). This is true even in cases where a 

conviction is based entirely on uncorroborated testimony of the victim. See People v. 

McGravey, 14 F.3d 1344, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1994). Given these standards, and the 

fact that this Court must apply Jackson and Winship with an additional layer of 

deference to the state court decision, see Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th 

Cir. 2005), the Arizona Court of Appeals decision cannot be characterized as an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

 6. Ground Nine – Jury Determination of Aggravating Factors 

 Weeks’s final claims relate to the jury’s finding of the aggravating 

circumstance of “physical, emotional, or financial harm” to the victim as provided in 

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A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(9).3

 Weeks first claims that he was deprived of a unanimous 

verdict on this aggravator because it is stated in the disjunctive “for unless polled or 

asked to return a special verdict, there is no way to determine whether any one of the 

three factors was proved unanimously.” Amended Petition, p. 74. Weeks also 

contends that the aggravator is “duplicitous” because it is an “element of a greater 

crime . . . .” Id. 

 a. Clearly Established Law 

 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the United States Supreme 

Court held that “‘any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum 

penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 476 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 

227, 243 n. 6 (1999)). In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Supreme 

Court held that the “statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum 

sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury 

verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. 

 b. State Court Decision

 The Arizona Court of Appeals found no error in relation to these claims, 

explaining that: 

 Immediately after the jury returned its verdicts of guilty on the 

charges against Weeks, the trial court instructed the jurors on the state’s 

allegation, to be determined by them beyond a reasonable doubt in a 

 

3

 Formerly A.R.S. § 13-702(C)(9). 

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separate but immediately sequential trial, “that the circumstances of 

this case are aggravated by the physical, emotional or financial harm 

suffered by the victim.” The victim then testified on that allegation, and 

the jury returned its verdicts on all charges finding the allegation 

proven. In later imposing presumptive prison terms on each count, the 

trial court considered as an aggravating factor “the very severe 

emotional harm to the victim” and as mitigating factors Weeks’s “age, 

his relatively minor criminal history, and his family support.” 

* * * 

 Pursuant to Arizona's statutory mandate, the jury found and the 

trial court considered as an aggravator any “physical, emotional or 

financial harm” the victim suffered. [A.R.S.] § 13-701(D)(9). “[W]hen 

the evidence is sufficient to satisfy each alternative prong of an 

aggravating circumstance,” the circumstance may be established even 

when it has not been shown that the jurors all relied on the same prong. 

State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, ¶ 128, 111 P.3d 369, 397 (2005). It is 

only “when the evidence is insufficient to support one or more of the 

alternative grounds” that it must be clear on which ground the jury 

relied. Id. ¶¶ 128-30, 111 P.3d 369. The evidence presented to the jury 

here was uncontested and sufficient to support a finding of physical, 

emotional and financial harm to the victim. Weeks does not argue 

otherwise. Thus, he has failed to establish any error, fundamental or 

otherwise, relating to his new constitutional claim. 

 In a related argument that was raised below, Weeks maintains 

the aggravating circumstance of physical harm is “an element of a 

greater crime,” “inherent in most of the counts alleged” against him, 

and, therefore, “duplicitous.” He asserts that because “the aggravating 

circumstance repeats an element of the offense,” it “cannot be used to 

aggravate the crimes.” “[W]hether a particular aggravating factor used 

by the court is an element of the offense and whether the court properly 

can use such a factor in aggravation are questions of law, which we 

review de novo.” [Arizona v.] Tschilar, 200 Ariz. 427, ¶ 32, 27 P.3d 

[331] at 339 [(App. 2001)]. 

 As the state correctly points out, with only one exception, 

physical harm is not an element of any of the other offenses of which 

Weeks was convicted. To commit sexual assault, one must 

“intentionally or knowingly engag[e] in sexual intercourse or oral 

sexual contact with any person without consent of such person.” A.R.S. 

§ 13-1406(A). Although it is possible that physical harm could “flow 

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from” that crime, as Weeks argues, a defendant need not physically 

harm the victim in order to commit sexual assault. Likewise, the crime 

of kidnapping is complete when one “knowingly restrain[s] another 

person with the intent to ... [i]nflict death, physical injury or a sexual 

offense on the victim.” A.R.S. § 13-1304(A)(3). The defendant need 

only intend to cause physical injury or to commit a sexual offense in 

order to complete the crime-no actual physical harm to the victim is 

required. Id. Similarly, two of the three aggravated assault charges of 

which Weeks was convicted did not require the victim to suffer any 

physical harm, but only a showing that he had acted “with the intent to 

injure, insult or provoke” the victim while the “victim’s capacity to 

resist [was] substantially impaired.” A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(3), 13-

1204(A)(4). 

 Thus, on only one of the counts of which Weeks was convicted--

a third aggravated assault charge--was physical harm arguably an 

element. See § 13-1204(A)(3) (person commits aggravated assault by 

using “any means of force that causes ... temporary but substantial loss 

or impairment of any body organ or part”). Even assuming physical 

harm is an element of that one offense, however, the trial court could 

have considered it as an aggravating factor. 

 “An element of an offense may be used as an aggravating factor 

if the legislature has specified that it may be so used.” Tschilar, 200 

Ariz. 427, ¶ 33, 27 P.3d at 339; see also State v. Lara, 171 Ariz. 282, 

284, 830 P.2d 803, 805 (1992). As the state points out, the legislature 

has specifically provided that “physical, emotional or financial harm” is 

an aggravating circumstance that, if proven to the jury, shall be 

considered by the court in sentencing. § 13-701(D)(9). And, in any 

event, the trial court expressly found as an aggravating circumstance 

only the victim’s “severe emotional harm,” not physical harm. 

 Weeks argues Tschilar and Lara have “been relegated to the 

jurisprudential past” by Apprendi and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 

296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). But the court in Tschilar 

discussed Apprendi in other portions of its opinion and did not suggest 

that Apprendi had any relevance on this point. Tschilar, 200 Ariz. 427, 

¶ ¶ 15-21, 27 P.3d at 336-37. And our supreme court recently declined 

to overrule Lara on general constitutional grounds. State v. Cruz, 218 

Ariz. 149, ¶ 130, 181 P.3d 196, 216 (2008). Like the defendant in Cruz, 

Weeks has failed to explain how consideration of physical harm to the 

victim as an aggravating circumstance, even assuming the trial court 

did consider it, violates the constitution or is inconsistent with the 

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holdings of Blakely and Apprendi. We therefore reject his argument 

that Tschilar and Lara are no longer good law on that point. 

Ex. 3, pp. 22-26. 

 c. Discussion 

 Initially, the Court finds the Arizona Court of Appeals opinion to constitute a 

reasonable application of federal law. That court found that “[t]he evidence 

presented to the jury here was uncontested and sufficient to support a finding of 

physical, emotional and financial harm to the victim.” That factual determination, 

which weeks did not challenge in state court and does not challenge here, completely 

undermines any argument he might offer in support of his contention that he suffered 

any prejudice from the disjunctive presentation of the aggravating factors contained 

in A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(9). This is because, even if constitutional error existed, a 

habeas court must determine whether the error was harmless under Brecht. See 

Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 221–22 (2006) (holding that harmless error 

analysis applies to a claim of Sixth Amendment Blakely error based on the failure to 

submit a sentencing factor to a jury). Any error is harmless unless it had a 

“substantial and injurious effect” upon the sentence. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 

U.S. 619, 623 (1993). Under that standard, the court must grant relief if it has “grave 

doubt” as to whether a jury would have found the relevant aggravating factors 

beyond a reasonable doubt. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995). 

Obviously, in Weeks’s case, no reasonable juror could have failed to find each of the 

the three aggravating factors listed in section 13-701(D)(9) proven beyond a 

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reasonable because Weeks did not, and has not here, challenged the victim’s 

testimony. Thus, Weeks is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

 The substance of Weeks’s claims is equally unavailing. In support of his 

argument that the disjunctive wording of the aggravating factors of section 13-

701(D)(9) violates Apprendi and Blakely, Weeks cites to two federal cases. The first, 

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), emphasizes the requirement that the accused in a 

criminal trial be proven guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 

constitute the crime with which he is charged.” Id. at 364. However, nothing in the 

decision addresses, much less clearly establishes, that it is a violation of federal 

authority to present to the jury alternative factors for finding aggravated 

circumstances in relation to an underlying charge. In the second case cited by 

Weeks, Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), Justice White in dissent from the 

majority opinion noted that the application of a Georgia statutory provision 

disjunctively “would arguably be assailable on constitutional grounds.” Id. at 454. 

While Justice White’s statement could arguably support Weeks’s argument, the issue 

itself, to this Court’s knowledge, has not been fully addressed by the Supreme Court. 

As such, Justice White’s warning does not constitute the “clearly established federal 

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court” that is a prerequisite to 

habeas relief. 

 Moreover, to the extent the Supreme Court has addressed related issues, the 

existing authority does not support Weeks’s argument. As the Government notes in 

its argument, in a capital murder case, the Supreme Court held that jury unanimity is 

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satisfied when a jury agrees that a defendant “murdered either with premeditation or 

in the course of committing a robbery.” Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 630 (1991). 

There, the Court concluded that a unanimity instruction is not required in cases where 

alternative theories of guilt are presented, such as first degree murder based on 

premeditation or based on the felony murder doctrine. Id. at 636. Thus, to the extent 

authority addressing Weeks’s claim exists, it suggests a jury’s finding of the 

existence of aggravation under section 13-701(D)(9) need not be unanimous as to any 

one factor, particularly where there is unchallenged evidence supporting each of the 

factors individually. 

 Weeks also argues that the aggravating factors of section 13-701(D)(9) are 

“element[s] of a greater crime” and are thus duplicitous. The Arizona Court of 

Appeals fully and convincingly rejected this claim on state law grounds and Weeks 

has offered no federal authority supporting his claim or undermining the state court’s 

reasoning. As such, he has not shown that he is entitled to relief on this claim. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Weeks’s Amended Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 2). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

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 However, the parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a 

copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the 

District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. Replies shall not be filed without first 

obtaining leave to do so from the District Court. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 14-2283-TUC-DCB. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). 

 Dated this 13th day of January, 2017. 

Honorable Jacqueline M. Rateau 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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