Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_12-cv-00167/USCOURTS-cand-5_12-cv-00167-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 All further unspecified statutory references are to the California Penal

Code.

Order Denying Petition; Denying COA

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD WASON MIGUEL,

Petitioner,

 v.

CONNIE GIPSON, 

Respondent.

 

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No. C 12-0167 EJD (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding with counsel, has filed a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his state conviction from

Santa Clara County Superior Court. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition for

a Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was found guilty by a jury of ten counts of sexual intercourse or

sodomy with a minor ten years of age or younger (Penal Code § 288.7(a))1

 and

thirteen counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration with a minor ten years of age

or younger (§ 288.7(b)). Petitioner was sentenced to state prison for 445 years to

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life on March 27, 2009.

Petitioner appealed his conviction. On July 26, 2010, the California Court of

Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Ans. Ex. 6.) The California

Supreme Court denied review on October 13, 2010. (Id., Ex. 8.) 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of

Appeal: 

I. Prosecution Case

In March of 2008 eight-year-old J.D. told her mother that defendant

had been touching her on her rectum. J.D. also said that defendant

had “kissed” her “down there,” indicating her vaginal area. 

Defendant admitted to J. D.'s mother that he had touched J. D.'s

rectum.

After this revelation, J. D.'s mother left defendant, who was her

live-in boyfriend, and moved J.D. and the mother's other children

into a homeless shelter and a domestic violence center. Later she

moved to her own mother's residence.

J.D. testified as follows:

J.D. was about six or seven years old when defendant began to

sexually abuse her. At times she would yell for her mother, but she

would be asleep and not come to her aid.

Defendant would penetrate J. D.'s vagina and anus with his penis. 

He would pull down her pants and insert his penis in both orifices. 

His penis was not erect on these occasions and he would use a

lubricant. He committed the vaginal penetrations “A lot of times,”

specifically about 50, and the anal penetrations more than 10 times. 

These acts caused J.D. pain and she would notice bleeding afterward.

Defendant would use his hands to touch J.D. on her external

genitalia and rectum, either under or over J. D.'s clothing. He did

this “A lot.”

Approximately twice, defendant inserted a finger or fingers into J.

D.'s vagina.

Defendant would use his mouth to contact J. D.'s external genitalia

and rectum. J.D. thought that this occurred 12 times.

Once or twice, defendant tried to force J.D. to orally copulate him.

He grabbed her leg while she was climbing the stairs in the house

and toppled her. He took the back of J. D.'s head and forced her

mouth onto his penis, trying to insert it.

Defendant would grab J. D.'s wrist and make her rub his penis. He

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did this “A lot of times.”

A police officer testified that J.D. gave him similar information when

he interviewed her. The police videotaped a second interview, in

which J.D. provided details also consistent with her testimony, and

the jury watched the recording. In addition, J.D. had testified at the

preliminary examination and the jury heard her testimony. J. D.'s

extrajudicial and preliminary examination statements were largely

consistent with her testimony in court. Some estimates of the

number of assaults varied from her in-court testimony, however. She

estimated the number of acts of intercourse at 30 to 50, sodomy at

50, oral copulations by him of her at 50, by her of him at one, of

vaginal penetrations with fingers at three, and the total number of

sexual assaults at 200.

The police videotaped an interview with defendant in which he

admitted sexually abusing J.D. but denied any acts of sexual

intercourse, sodomy, or sexual penetration with his fingers. The jury

watched the recording.

II. Defense Case

Defendant presented no defense case. Of course, through the taped

interview of him that the jury heard, he was able to suggest to the

jury that he committed much less sexual abuse than J.D. described in

and out of court.

(Ans. Ex. 6 at 2-3.) 

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The writ may not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

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Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the]

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). The only definitive source of clearly established federal

law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the

Supreme Court as of the time of the state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412;

Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004). While circuit law may be

“persuasive authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is

an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s

holdings are binding on the state courts, and only those holdings need be

“reasonably” applied. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.), overruled

on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from

[the Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts

of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. “Under § 2254(d)(1)’s

‘unreasonable application’ clause, . . . a federal habeas court may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable

application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly

established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. The federal

habeas court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a

state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The state court decision to which Section 2254(d) applies is the “last

reasoned decision” of the state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-

04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there

is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court considering a petitioner’s claims,

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the court “looks through” to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805. 

The Supreme Court has vigorously and repeatedly affirmed that under

AEDPA, there is a heightened level of deference a federal habeas court must give to

state court decisions. See Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490, 491 (2011) (per curiam);

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 783-85 (2011); Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct.

1305 (2011) (per curiam). As the Court explained: “[o]n federal habeas review,

AEDPA ‘imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’

and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Id. at

1307 (citation omitted). With these principles in mind regarding the standard and

limited scope of review in which this Court may engage in federal habeas

proceedings, the Court addresses Petitioner’s claim.

Claim and Analysis

Petitioner’s sole ground for federal habeas relief is his claim that the trial

court issued improper jury instructions that did not adequately distinguish between

violations of Pen. Code § 288.7(a) and§ 288.7(b). Section 288.7(a) requires penile

penetration of the victim, while any type of sexual penetration is sufficient to find a

violation of § 288.7(b). Petitioner argues that because the instructions did not

describe the difference between “sexual intercourse” and “sexual penetration,” the

jury could have thought that any sexual penetration could be considered sexual

intercourse and thus they found Petitioner guilty of § 288.7(a), which resulted in a

lengthier prison term.

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not

state a claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). See, e.g., Stanton v. Benzler, 146 F.3d 726,

728 (9th Cir. 1998) (state law determination that arsenic trioxide is a poison as a

matter of law, not element of crime for jury determination, not open to challenge on

federal habeas review). Nor does the fact that a jury instruction was inadequate by

Ninth Circuit direct appeal standards mean that a petitioner who relies on such an

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inadequacy will be entitled to habeas corpus relief from a state court conviction. See

Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 744 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Estelle, 502 U.S. at

71-72). 

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner

must show that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the

resulting conviction violates due process. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; Cupp v.

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S.

637, 643 (1974) ("'[I]t must be established not merely that the instruction is

undesirable, erroneous or even ‘universally condemned,’ but that it violated some

[constitutional right].'"). The instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but

must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. 

See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. In other words, the court must evaluate jury instructions

in the context of the overall charge to the jury and as a component of the entire trial

process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing Henderson v.

Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)); Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir.

1988); see, e.g., Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 434-35 (2004) (per curiam) (no

reasonable likelihood that jury misled by single contrary instruction on imperfect

self-defense defining "imminent peril" where three other instructions correctly stated

the law).

The state appellate court rejected Petitioner’s claim of improper jury

instructions:

Defendant claims that, with regard to counts 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6, i .e.,

the charges on which the jury was instructed to consider the sexual

intercourse evidence against him, the trial court erred under state law

by failing to instruct, sua sponte, in a clear manner on the elements

of section 288.7, subdivision (a), i.e., the law giving rise to the

accusations that he unlawfully engaged in sexual intercourse with

J.D. Specifically, defendant contends that the court was required to

define sexual intercourse as penetration of a vagina with a penis and

failed to do so, and failed to distinguish sexual intercourse from

other forms of sexual penetration.

. . . 

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With regard to counts 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6, the trial court provided the

jury with CALJIC No. 10.59.5. We quote the instruction in pertinent

part: “Any person 18 years of age or older who engages in sexual

intercourse with a child who is 10 years of age or younger is guilty

of a violation of Penal Code section 288.7, subdivision (a), a crime. 

[¶] Any sexual penetration, however slight, constitutes engaging in

an act of sexual intercourse. Proof of ejaculation is not required.”

“A defendant challenging an instruction as being subject to

erroneous interpretation by the jury must demonstrate a reasonable

likelihood that the jury understood the instruction in the way asserted

by the defendant.” (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67-68

[speaking of both state law and federal constitutional claims].)

We discern no such reasonable likelihood.

To be sure, trial courts must provide clarifying instructions when a

word or phrase has a technical or legal meaning different from its

commonly understood meaning. “‘“A word or phrase having a

technical, legal meaning requiring clarification by the court is one

that has a definition that differs from its nonlegal meaning.”

[Citations.]’” ( People v. Cross, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 68.)

“Sexual intercourse,” as used in CALJIC No. 10.59.5, has no such

obscure meaning. Part of the question is resolved by Supreme Court

decisions holding that “sexual intercourse” is commonly understood

by jurors to refer to penetration of the vagina. (See People v. Stitely

(2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 554 [“‘sexual intercourse’ has a common

meaning ... the term can only refer to vaginal penetration or

intercourse”]; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 676 [“sexual

intercourse” is not “a technical term with various meanings”; juries

understand that it requires “penetration of the victim's vaginal

genitalia”].) The other part of the question is resolved elsewhere in

the instructions given. Although, perhaps because the point is

obvious, Stitely and Holt do not refer to the penis as the organ doing

the penetrating, the jury here was instructed that “[a]ny sexual

penetration, however slight, constitutes engaging in an act of sexual

intercourse. Proof of ejaculation is not required.” That both defined

the penetration referred to in the challenged portion of the instruction

as sexual intercourse and, to a reasonable likelihood, informed jurors

that intercourse is accomplished with a penis. The court had no duty

to define yet further “sexual intercourse” in its instructions. In sum,

defendant's claim is without merit. 

(Ans. Ex. 6 at 3-6) (footnote omitted). 

The petition, which was prepared by counsel, makes no reference to any

federal authority and cites no federal law other than 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The claim

solely challenges the jury instructions as an error under state law and fails to state a

federal claim. See Estelle, at 71-72. While federal habeas relief can be obtained if

Petitioner shows that the ailing jury instruction so infected the entire trial that the

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resulting conviction violates due process, see Estelle, at 72, no such allegations are

present in the petition. Regardless, the Court will still construe the claim as alleging

a violation of due process.

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the jury instructions were confusing,

let alone that a due process violation occurred. As noted by the state court, sexual

intercourse is a commonly used and understood term, and the jury instruction noted

that proof of ejaculation was not required, which reinforced that sexual intercourse

involved the penis. Furthermore, in closing argument the prosecutor specifically

described what was required to find sexual intercourse: 

The judge told you the first five counts - - or five of the

counts are for sexual intercourse.

. . . 

And for this act - - any penetration of the vagina by

defendant’s penis is sufficient to complete the crime. . . . That means,

literally, penis inside the lip of the vagina. Rubbing up against the

vagina, that’s penetration. It doesn’t need to be full penetration of

the penis. Any penetration, however slight.

(Ans. Ex. 9, Reporter’s Transcript at 393.) Later in the closing argument the

prosecutor again discussed how sexual intercourse involves the penis. (Id., at 417.)

The prosecutor also explained the other counts against Petitioner including

“sexual penetration.” (Id., at 394, 418.) The prosecutor described sexual

penetration as, “[w]e’re talking about the finger, him putting his finger either inside

her vagina or even rubbing it out on the lips of the vagina, which is still

penetration.” (Id., at 418.) The differences of these two counts were clear, and

Petitioner’s trial counsel also noted the differences. (Id., at 480-83.) 

This claim is denied because Petitioner has failed to present a federal claim,

and regardless, the jury instructions did not violate due process because there was no

likelihood that the jury was confused and because the attorneys specifically

described the differences of the various counts.

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CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the Court concludes

that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus must be DENIED.

Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner has not made “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has

Petitioner demonstrated that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not appeal the denial of a Certificate of

Appealability in this Court but may seek a certificate from the Court of Appeals

under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Clerk shall terminate any pending motions, enter judgment in favor of

Respondent, and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 1/7/2015 

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge 

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