Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03931/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03931-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 

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The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3931

___________

Gerald M. Tyler, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Craig D. Danielson; Erwin *

Danielson; The RiverBank, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: October 31, 2007

Filed: November 8, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Gerald M. Tyler appeals from the district court’s1

 dismissal with prejudice of

his pro se complaint, in which he alleged that The RiverBank and two of its officers,

Craig and Erwin Danielson, committed various acts of fraud in managing his bank

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Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker

v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

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accounts and in connection with litigation in state court. The district court based its

dismissal on the Rooker-Feldman2

 and claim-preclusion doctrines.

We review the district court’s dismissal de novo. See Heartland Acad. Cmty.

Church v. Waddle, 335 F.3d 684, 688-89 (8th Cir. 2003); Friez v. First Am. Bank &

Trust, 324 F.3d 580, 581 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). We conclude from a careful

examination of the record that Tyler brought some of the same claims against

RiverBank in a prior state-court action, that his purportedly new claims arose out of

the same series of transactions as his claims in the state-court action, and that the

Danielsons were in privity with RiverBank for all relevant purposes. See Friez, 324

F.3d at 582 (individuals sued in subsequent action because of statements made as

officers and managers of bank were in privity with bank and claims against them were

precluded); Vukelic v. Upper Third St. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 269 N.W. 273, 274-75

(Wis. 1936) (when principal’s liability rests on tortious act of agent, either principal

or agent may plead prior judgment as bar to subsequent suit though only one of them

was party to suit in which judgment was rendered).

We further conclude that all of the allegations of wrongdoing in the complaint

meet the requirements of claim preclusion under Wisconsin law, and we affirm the

dismissal of the entire complaint on that basis. See LeMay v. U.S. Postal Serv., 450

F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 2006) (court may affirm district court’s dismissal on any basis

supported by record); Hicks v. O’Meara, 31 F.3d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 1994) (federal

court gives preclusive effect to state-court judgment according to state’s law);

Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 694 N.W.2d 879, 884-85 (Wis. 2005) (elements of claim

preclusion under Wisconsin law are (1) identity between parties or their privies in

prior and present suits; (2) prior litigation resulted in final judgment on merits by court

with jurisdiction; and (3) causes of action in two suits arise out of same relevant facts,

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We note that our disposition should not have a preclusive effect on the pending

state-court litigation between Tyler and RiverBank. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Alban,

775 F.2d 389, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (declining to afford preclusive effect

to decisions which relied wholly on preclusive effect of prior decisions; preclusion

does not apply where issues were not “actually litigated” and decided “on the merits”);

see also 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal

Practice and Procedure, § 4404 (2d ed. 2002) (when ruling by first court has been

given preclusive effect by second court, first court should not be precluded in turn

from reconsidering its own ruling in continuing proceedings). 

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transactions, or occurrences); see also Smith v. Schreiner, 56 N.W. 160, 161 (Wis.

1893) (mere appeal does not affect judgment as bar to another action).3

Finally, we reject Tyler’s argument that his complaint presented a federal

question by referring to an individual retirement account (IRA). Tyler pleaded only

common-law fraud, which does not depend on resolution of a substantial question of

federal law. See Lundeen v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 447 F.3d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 2006)

(federal question is raised when well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal

law creates cause of action or that right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of

substantial question of federal law), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1149 (2007); cf. Reliance

Ins. Co. v. Zeigler, 938 F.2d 781, 783-84 (7th Cir. 1991) (IRA not established and

maintained by employer is not employee-benefit plan and cannot be subject to federal

preemption under Employee Retirement Income Security Act).

For the reasons stated, the judgment is affirmed. Tyler’s pending motions are

denied as moot.

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