Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-1_06-cv-01019/USCOURTS-arwd-1_06-cv-01019-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

JAMES F. BROWN PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 06-1019

 

KEN JONES, Sheriff, Union 

County, Arkansas; JUAN M. 

REYES, Deputy Sheriff; GREG

STEVENSON, Deputy Sheriff;

SHELBY MURPHEE; and

UNION COUNTY, ARKANSAS DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

James F. Brown filed this civil rights action on February 17, 2006. The complaint was

filed in forma pauperis (IFP) subject to a later determination of whether it should be served upon

the defendants.

 On April 20, 2006, the undersigned entered an order (Doc. 6) directing the plaintiff to

sign and return an addendum to his complaint. The court received the addendum (Doc. 9) on

May 9, 2006.

BACKGROUND

Brown alleges that Shelby Murphee made a false statement to the Union County Sheriff’s

Office on December 18, 2005. Addendum at ¶ 2(a). Specifically, Brown alleges Murphee reported

that someone had pulled fence off of his property. Id. Brown also maintains Murphee entered

Brown’s property on December 18th at the request of Deputy Greg Stevenson. Id. at ¶ 2 & ¶ 3. 

On December 19, 2005, Brown was arrested and charged with criminal mischief and theft

of property. Addendum at ¶ 1. Although a warrant had been issued for his arrest, Brown maintains

the officers who arrested him did not have the warrant with them when he was arrested. Id. 

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The criminal mischief and theft of property charges are still pending. Addendum at ¶ 7.

Brown maintains these charges are frivolous, groundless, malicious, and slanderous. Id. at ¶ 2.

DISCUSSION

Brown’s claims are subject to dismissal. First, no claim is stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against ShelbyMurphee. A § 1983 complaint must allege that each defendant, acting under color

of state law, deprived plaintiff of "rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution

and laws" of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A private individual who complains of

criminal conduct and is a witness for the prosecution does not act under color of law. See e.g.,

Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 1975)("The mere fact that the individual defendants

were complainants and witnesses in an action which itself was prosecuted under color of law

does not make their complaining or testifying other that what it was, i.e., the action of private

persons not acting under color of law."); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc., 596 F. Supp.

13, 21 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985)(A private citizen does not act under

color of law when reporting a crime). 

Furthermore, it has been “uniformly held that malicious prosecution by itself is not

punishable under § 1983 because it does not allege a constitutional injury.” Kurtz v. City of

Shrewsbury, 245 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 2001). Similarly, a cause of action for defamation is

not cognizable under § 1983. Loftin v. United States, 72 F.3d 133 (8th Cir. 1995); Miner v.

Brackney, 719 F.2d 954, 955 (8th Cir. 1983).

Second, because the criminal charges are currently pending, Brown’s claims are not

presently cognizable under § 1983. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129

L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a claim for damages for "allegedly

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unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid" is not cognizable until "the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a

federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck, 512 U.S. 486-87. The Court noted

that if a successful claim would not demonstrate the invalidity of an outstanding criminal

judgment, it should be allowed to proceed.

The rationale of Heck has been applied to § 1983 complaints filed while the criminal

charges are pending. See e.g., Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996). In Smith, the

Third Circuit stated:

We find that [the Heck] concerns apply equally to claims that, if successful,

would necessarily imply the invalidity of a future conviction on a pending

criminal charge. A claim by a defendant in an ongoing criminal prosecution

which necessarily challenges the legality of a future conviction on a pending

criminal charge lies at the intersection of the federal habeas corpus statute and the

Civil Rights Act of 1871. If such a claim could proceed while criminal

proceedings are ongoing, there would be a potential for inconsistent

determinations in the civil and criminal cases and the criminal defendant would

be able to collaterally attack the prosecution in a civil suit. In terms of the

conflicts which Heck sought to avoid, there is no difference between a conviction

which is outstanding at the time the civil rights action is instituted and a potential

 conviction on a pending charge that may be entered at some point thereafter.

Smith, 87 F.3d at 113.

In footnote seven, the Supreme Court in Heck explained that a damages action for an

illegal search does not necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction. Heck, 114 S. Ct. at 2372

n. 7. Specifically, the Court said:

a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even

if the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a state criminal

trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff's still-outstanding conviction. Because of

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doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery, and especially

harmless error, such a § 1983 action, even if successful, would not necessarily

imply that the plaintiff's conviction was unlawful. In order to recover

compensatory damages, however, the § 1983 plaintiff must prove not only that

the search was unlawful, but that it caused him actual, compensable injury,

which, we hold today, does not encompass the "injury" of being convicted and

imprisoned (until his conviction has been overturned).

Id. 

To the extent Brown’s claims are not barred by Heck, abstention is appropriate. "In

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971), the Supreme

Court advanced the position that federal courts should refrain from interfering with pending state

judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances." Harmon v. City of Kansas City, 197

F.3d 321, 325 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1038, 120 S. Ct. 1534, 146 L. Ed. 2d 348

(2000). Abstention under Younger "is warranted if the action complained of constitutes the basis

of an ongoing state judicial proceeding, the proceedings implicate important state interests, and

an adequate opportunity exists in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges." Id.

(citing Fuller v. Ulland, 76 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 1996)).

Here, Brown’s claims stem from the fact that he was arrested and charged with criminal

mischief and theft of property. These charges are currently pending. The issue of whether his

property was illegally searched, whether the evidence should be suppressed, and whether

probable cause existed for his arrest can be litigated in the state court criminal case. To allow

Brown’s action to proceed at this point would require this court to interfere in ongoing state

criminal proceedings, and this court will not do so absent extraordinary circumstances. No such

circumstances exist here and abstention is appropriate. 

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CONCLUSION

I therefore recommend that Brown’s claims against Shelby Murphee be dismissed prior

to service of process as the claims are frivolous and fail to state claims upon which relief can be

granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii)(IFP action, or any portion thereof, may be

dismissed because it fails to state a claim or states a claim that is not presently cognizable). I

further recommend Brown’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims be dismissed on the

grounds they are barred by Heck. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii)(IFP action, or any

portion thereof, may be dismissed because it fails to state a claim or states a claim that is not

presently cognizable). Finally, to the extent the remaining claims, such as the illegal search

claim are not barred by Heck, I recommend the claims be stayed and administratively terminated.

Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Stroud, 179 F.3d 598, 603-04 (8th Cir. 1999)(stay rather than dismissal

appropriate when damages are sought and the court is not being asked to declare a state statute

unconstitutional). Brown may reopen his claims after the conclusion of the state criminal case.

Brown hasten days from receipt of the report and recommendation in which to file

written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections

may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. Brown is reminded that

objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

DATED this 16th day of May 2006.

/s/ Bobby E. Shepherd 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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