Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-05849/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-05849-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCIE E. MOELLER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

TACO BELL CORP.,

Defendant. /

No. C 02-5849 MJJ

ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs seek a ruling that Defendant Taco Bell Corporation’s violations of dimensional

standards required under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.,

may only be justified as “conventional building industry tolerances for field conditions,” and may

not be excused as “de minimis” or analyzed as “equivalent facilitation.” The parties also dispute

whether the Plaintiff class has standing to challenge violations of accessibility standards governing

1) the continuous delivery of toilet paper and 2) the usability of hardware with one hand without

tight grasping, pinching, or twisting. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In their Joint Supplemental Case Management Statement dated August 23, 2004, the parties

agreed to a procedure to resolve the equitable issues in this case. The procedure called for counsel

to meet and confer about more than 630 accessibility elements at each of Defendant’s more than 200

company-owned restaurants in California. To assist in the meet and confer process, the parties have

worked together to identify and reach agreement on a non-exclusive list of legal principles over 

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which the parties disagree. 

The parties have briefed three issues for the Court, and each of these issues concern whether

there can be liability or injunctive relief for specific accessibility elements that vary from the

Department of Justice Standards for Accessible Design (the “DOJ” standards) or Title 24 of the

California Code of Regulations, but nonetheless provide equal or greater access to disabled

individuals. Defendant asserts that deviations from the DOJ and California Standards that exceed

applicable construction tolerances can be excusable as either “de minimis” or “equivalent

facilitation.” Plaintiffs urge the Court to reject the “de minimis” exception in its entirety, and to

limit the “equivalent facilitation” exception to only “alternative designs and technologies.”

In addition to the legal principles on which the parties seek the Court’s guidance, the parties

also seek a ruling on a standing issue – whether the certified class has standing to seek equitable

relief regarding two accessibility elements currently being surveyed by the Special Master: 1) the

continuous delivery of toilet paper; and 2) the usability of hardware with one hand without tight

grasping, pinching, or twisting. Plaintiffs contend that because many class members have

disabilities that affect their hands and arms, these two accessibility standards are appropriate for

adjudication on a class-wide basis. Defendant asserts that because the Plaintiff class is defined as

individuals with disabilities who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility, the class only has

standing to pursue equitable relief for those accessibility standards that specifically target

individuals who use wheelchairs and scooters for mobility. 

ANALYSIS

A. Equivalent Facilitation

Defendant argues that the “equivalent facilitation” provision allows facilities to bypass the

technical requirements laid out in the ADA when alternative designs and technologies will provide

equivalent or greater access to and usability of the facility. According to Defendant, there are only

two requirements for an equivalent facilitation: 1) it is different from DOJ Standards; and 2) it

provides equal or greater access to the subject facilities. Plaintiffs assert that an “equivalent

facilitation” must be an alternative design and technology, and covered elements that simply deviate

from the standards do not qualify. 

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Section 2.2 of the DOJ standards reads as follows:

Equivalent Facilitation. Departures from particular technical and scoping

requirements of this guideline by the use of other designs and technologies

are permitted where the alternative designs and technologies used will

provide substantially equivalent or greater access to and usability of the

facility.

When initially proposed, section 2.2 read, “Departures from particular technical and scoping

requirements of this guideline by the use of other methods are permitted where the alternative

methods used will provide substantially equivalent or greater access to and usability of the facility.” 

56 Fed. Reg. at 2327 (emphasis added). Following a notice and comment period, the phrase “design

and technologies” was substituted for the word “methods.” The Access Board explained that “[t]he

purpose of the provision is to allow for flexibility to design for unique and special circumstances and

to facilitate the application of new technologies.” 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,413.

Here, the central dispute between the parties revolves around the language “alternative

designs or technologies.” Plaintiffs assert that Defendant is attempting to substitute the phrase

“alternative designs and technologies” for “different from.” Meanwhile, Defendant argues that

Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the equivalent facilitation exception would deem it only applicable to

“new technology.”

As an initial matter, the Court disagrees with Defendant’s contention that an equivalent

facilitation need only be “different from” the DOJ standards. This interpretation is too broad and

inconsistent with the plain language of Section 2.2. The fact that the Access Board replaced the

word “methods” with “design and technologies” is telling. Defendant’s interpretation of Section 2.2

would essentially read this phrase out of the equivalent facilitation exception. 

Furthermore, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Defendant should not be permitted to use

anthropometric or other data to argue that a measurement that merely falls short of the DOJ

standards constitutes “equivalent facilitation.” Defendant cites no cases in which a noncompliant

element was excused as “equivalent facilitation” based on one party’s evidence of how many people

it accommodated. 

A simple example illustrates the inherent problem with Defendant’s position. A survey

conducted by the Special Master in this case revealed that the height of the side and rear grab bars in

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Indeed, when “[p]roperly read, the ‘Equivalent Facilitation’ provision does not allow facilities

to deny access under certain circumstances, but instead allows facilities to bypass the technical

requirements laid out in the [Accessibility] Standards when alternative designs will provide ‘equivalent

or greater access to and usability of the facility.’” Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm’t Ctr., 193

F.3d 730, 739 (3d. Cir. 1999).

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the women’s restroom of Restaurant No. 2423 was 37 inches, whereas the maximum allowed height

is 33 inches. Under Defendant’s interpretation of “equivalent facilitation,” Defendant could assert,

based on an expert’s testimony, that a grab bar height of 37 inches actually allows greater

accessibility to wheelchair users, and therefore is a “equivalent facilitation.” Such an argument is

unfounded. In this example, the four-inch deviation from the DOJ standard was not the product of

an “alternative design or technology,” but rather a grab bar simply being mounted too high.

Furthermore, the Court finds that the “equivalent facilitation” exception was not intended to

apply only to “new technology.” The ADAAG itself provides various examples of equivalent

facilitation which undermine such an approach. For example, while hotels are required to install a

text telephone next to a pay phone, the ADAAG permits hotels to keep portable text telephones at

the desk, if they are available 24 hours per day, and other conditions are met. This cannot be

considered “new technology.” Moreover, the “new technology” argument finds no support in the

case law. See Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 727 (D. Or.

1997) (rejecting the “new technology” argument, and finding that the use of folding chairs to

provide companion seats at a sports arena was an acceptable equivalent facilitation).

Therefore, the Court finds that there are only two requirements for an equivalent facilitation:

1) it is an alternative design or technology; and 2) it provides equal or greater access to subject

facilities.1

 It appears that the purpose of the exception is to give architects the flexibility to design

facilities that may not strictly comply with the Accessibility Standards but nonetheless provide

equivalent facilitation. Moreover, while the exception provides flexibility, it does not prevent strict

compliance, as many of the Accessibility Standards are not susceptible to equivalent facilitation. 

See id. at 727-28. 

B. De Minimis Exception

Defendant has indicated that it will seek to excuse deviations from the DOJ and California

Standards as “de minimis.” Plaintiffs argue that the Ninth Circuit has rejected such an exception and

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Both the DOJ Standards and the California Standards require certain types of hardware to be

“operable with one hand” and not to “require tight grasping, pinching or twisting of the wrist.” See, e.g., DOJ Stds. § 4.27.4. Both sets of standards have requirements similar to this that apply to door

hardware, faucets, flush controls, and general controls and operating mechanisms. Both the DOJ

Standards and the California Standards prohibit toilet paper dispensers “that control delivery or that do

not permit continuous paper flow. DOJ Stds. § 4.16.6; Cal. Stds. 11115B.9.3.

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urges the Court to analyze any deviation from the required standards under the provision for

tolerances. Defendants respond that the bright line rule set forth by Plaintiffs is impractical and

improvident.

Federal courts do not “sit to decide hypothetical issues or to give advisory opinions about

issues as to which there are not adverse parties before [them].” Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S.

100, 102 (1982). To proceed in the absence of a case or controversy would involve the Court in

rendering a forbidden advisory opinion. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,

240-41 (1937). Here, the application of the “deminimis” defense will vary with the circumstances of

the individual accessibility elements in this case. However, Defendant has not provided the Court

with a factual record detailing the specific violations of the ADA it believes are “de minimis.” 

Therefore, the Court refrains from ruling on this issue until the factual record in this case is more

fully developed.

C. Class-Wide Standing for Continuous Delivery of Toilet Paper or Hardware

Defendant argues that the Plaintiff class does not have standing to seek injunctive relief for

inaccessible hardware and inaccessible toilet paper rollers.2

 Defendant asserts that because the

definition of the class is limited to individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility, the

class should only have standing to pursue injunctive relief with respect to two kinds of accessibility

elements: 1) elements designed to accommodate wheelchairs or scooters; and 2) ancillary elements

designed to provide full accommodation for persons who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility. 

Plaintiffs respond that because at least one-third of the class will suffer injury in fact if these

elements are out of compliance, the class has standing to challenge such violations.

It is Plaintiffs’ burden to establish standing to assert their claims. See Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). An individual with a disability has “standing to seek relief for

any ADA violations . . . affecting his specific disability,” and does not have standing to pursue

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claims that do not affect his disability. Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 894 (8th Cir. 2000). In

evaluating standing in the class context, the Court should “consider those injuries in the context of

the harm asserted by the class as a whole[.]” Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 861, (9th Cir.

2001).

In Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Restaurant, the plaintiff suffered from the disability of nonmobility, and sought relief from barriers that were not related to non-mobility, such as braille sign

violations. 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Haw. 2000). The Parr court concluded that the plaintiff could

not prove the requisite “injury in fact.” Id. at 1082. Accordingly, the court held “that Plaintiff’s

claims not specifically related to non-mobility must be denied due to lack of standing.” Id. at 1083. 

Other courts that have considered the issue are in agreement. See Delil v. El Torito Rest., Inc., 1997

WL 714866, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 24, 1997) (holding that a disabled individual cannot “vindicate the

rights of disabled persons generally”); Vandermolen v. City of Roosevelt, 1997 WL 853505, at *2

(W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 1997) (finding that the standing requirement “exclude[s] claims for relief

brought for purely academic reasons”); Steger, 228 F.3d at 893-94 (finding that standing exists for

the blind only for those ADA violations that necessarily affect a vision impaired person). 

Here, there is no dispute that the “class as a whole” consists of individuals who use

wheelchairs and scooters who have encountered disability discrimination at corporate Taco Bell

restaurants in California. However, according to Plaintiffs, 38% of the class have difficulty using

their hands to grasp, handle or hold objects, and thus will incur “injury in fact” when they encounter

inaccessible toilet paper rollers and hardware. The Court cannot agree. Plaintiffs have not offered

any case authority to support their novel proposition that an injury to only 38% of the class is

sufficient to qualify as an “injury in fact” to the “class as a whole.” Simply stated, the Plaintiff class

has not been defined as to encompass persons with limited use of their hands and arms without

regard to mobility. Therefore, the Court agrees with Defendant that the continuous delivery

requirement is not directly related to mobility, but rather to individuals who have limited use of their

hands or arms. Likewise, the hardware standards (doors, lock, flush controls) do not depend on

mobility impairments. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established standing to

challenge violations of the accessibility standards governing these elements.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that there are only two requirements for an

equivalent facilitation: 1) it is an alternative design or technology; and 2) it provides equal or greater

access to subject facilities. The Court refuses to rule on the application of the “de minimis”

exception until the factual record in this case is more fully developed. Finally, the Court finds that

Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge violations of the accessibility standards governing

inaccessible hardware and inaccessible toilet paper rollers.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August_10___, 2005 _______________________________

 MARTIN J. JENKINS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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