Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01655/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01655-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOUIS BRANCH,

Plaintiff,

v.

N. GRANNIS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:08-cv-01655-SKO PC

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF EITHER TO

FILE AMENDEDCOMPLAINT OR TONOTIFY

COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED

ONLY ON CLAIMS FOUND TO BE

COGNIZABLE

(Doc. 13)

RESPONSE DUE WITHIN 30 DAYS

Plaintiff Louis Branch (“Plaintiff”)is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is in the custody of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and is currently incarcerated at Soledad

Correctional Training Facility (“CTF”). Plaintiff is suing under Section 1983 for the violation of his

rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff names N. Grannis (Chief of

Inmate Appeals), K. Mendoza-Powers (Warden, ASP), A. Mancinas (Classification and Parole

Representative, ASP), D. Umphenour (Officer, ASP), and Does 1 and 2 (Officers, ASP) as

defendants. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint states only

some cognizable claims for relief. The Court will order Plaintiff to either notify the Court of his

willingness to proceed only on the claims found to be cognizable, or to file an amended complaint

which cures the deficiencies in his non-cognizable claims.

///

///

1

Case 1:08-cv-01655-SAB Document 21 Filed 06/28/10 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading

standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570.) “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s

liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.) Further, although a court must accept as true all factual

allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. 

Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

II. Background

A. Procedural Background

On July 7, 2008, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District of

California. (Doc. 1.) On April 7, 2009, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. 10.) The

court found that Plaintiff’s complaint stated some cognizable claims and gave Plaintiff the option

2

Case 1:08-cv-01655-SAB Document 21 Filed 06/28/10 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to either file an amended complaint that cured the deficiencies in his non-cognizable claims, or notify

the Court that Plaintiff wished to only proceed on the cognizable claims. On 05/11/2009, Plaintiff

submitted an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 13.) The Court will now consider Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint.

B. Factual Background

Plaintiff claims that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff because Plaintiff participated in

an investigation into misconduct within the CDCR. Plaintiff alleges that in August 2002, the Office

of the Inspector General formally investigated Plaintiff’s complaints that the CDCR had a policy of

retaliating against Plaintiff’s “exercise of the right to seek redress.” (Am. Compl. 4:26-5:7.) 

Plaintiff was housed at San Quentin State Prison (“SQSP”) at the time and alleged that CDCR

officials repeatedlytransferred Plaintiff, vandalized his personal property, committed “criminal fraud

and forgery,” accused Plaintiff of “bogus disciplinaries[sic],” and “incit[ed] violence through

calumny and obloquy,” in retaliation against Plaintiff’s complaints. (Am. Compl. 4:26-5:7.)

Plaintiff was transferred to Avenal State Prison (“ASP”) and housed there from November

2002 through May 2003. Plaintiff claims that officials at ASP retaliated against Plaintiff for his

participation in the Inspector General’s investigation by “filing a fraudulent chronological report

ostensibly referencing documentation from plaintiffs[sic] case records that in fact did not exist,”

denying Plaintiff access to the law library, physically attacking Plaintiff, and confiscating Plaintiff’s

property and distributed it to other prisoners while identifying Plaintiff as a “snitch.” (Am. Compl.

5:11-22.) Plaintiff filed complaints against ASP officials. Plaintiff claims that ASP officials then

“confederated” with a CDCR official and arranged for Plaintiff’s transfer to CTF-Soledad with

Plaintiff’s “known documented enemy gang member.” (Am. Compl. 5:25-6:2.)

Plaintiff was housed at CTF-Soledad from May 2003 through November 2003. Plaintiff

informed CTF-Soledad officials about the presence of the enemy gang member, but his requests to

be transferred to SQSP or CMF-Vacaville were refused. Plaintiff claims that CTF-Soledad officials

“staged and set-up a physical confrontation between plaintiff and his known documented enemy.” 

(Am. Compl. 6:15-16.) CTF-Soledad officials also confiscated Plaintiff’s property and gave it to

///

3

Case 1:08-cv-01655-SAB Document 21 Filed 06/28/10 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

other inmates. Plaintiff was allegedly transferred to Folsom State Prison (“FSP”) pursuant to a

habeas petition filed in Monterey Superior Court.

Plaintiff was housed at FSP from November 2003 to May 2004. Upon his arrival at FSP,

Plaintiff requested a transfer to SQSP or CMF-Vacaville. Plaintiff’s request was approved by the

facility captain. However, Plaintiff’s counselor forged the captain’s signature and “confederated

with the very same CDCR official who had previously authorized plaintiffs[sic] 5/2003 transfer to

Soledad, to deny the SQSP/CMF-Vacaville transfer recommendation ordered by the Facility

Captain.” (Am. Compl. 6:28-7:4.) Plaintiff filed a complaint accusing his counselor and the CDCR

official of committing fraud. In April 2004, Plaintiff alleges that his counselor “machinated

plaintiffs[sic] “Emergency” transfer to Avenal State Prison in direct violation of CDCR’s

“Emergency” transfer protocols.” (Am. Compl. 7:8-10.) When Plaintiff refused to board the bus

to ASP because he feared for his safety, he was carried from his cell to the bus and taken to ASP.

Plaintiff was housed again at ASP between May 2004 and July 2004. When Plaintiff arrived

at ASP, he wrote a letter to Defendant Mendoza-Powers informing him about Plaintiff’s “safety

concerns due to retaliatory animus of defendant Mancinas.” (Am. Compl. 7:18-24.) Plaintiff also

informed Mendoza-Powers about the retaliatorytransfer from ASP to CTF-Soledad in May2003 and

the current “unlawful” transfer from FSP to ASP. (Am. Compl. 7:18-24.) Plaintiff also requested

a transfer to San Quentin or CMF-Vacaville. Mendoza-Powers did not respond to Plaintiff’s letter.

Plaintiff then filed a grievance against Defendant Mancinas accusing Mancinas of

“Inexcusable Neglect of Duty for MANCINAS’ failure to remedy plaintiffs[sic] inappropriate

transfer from Folsom to Avenal.” (Am. Compl. 7:25-28.) In May 2004, Plaintiff informed the

Classification Committee about his safety concerns. The Committee referred Plaintiff’s case to

Defendant Mancinas. Mancinas “failed and refuse[d] to perform his duty to ‘effect adherence to

classification procedures and goals’ for Folsom’s inappropriate ‘Emergency’ transfer to Avenal.” 

(Am. Compl. 8:10-12.)

In June 2004, Plaintiff submitted a declaration as an eyewitness on behalf of a fellow inmate

who alleged that he was attacked by an ASP officer. Defendant Umphenour confronted Plaintiff and

told Plaintiff that he would be “dealt with” for submitting a false declaration against an officer. (Am.

4

Case 1:08-cv-01655-SAB Document 21 Filed 06/28/10 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Compl. 8:17-19.) Plaintiff claims that he was then transferred five times in a period of two weeks

“amid the calumny and obloquy that plaintiff was a ‘snitch’ and a ‘baby raper.’” (Am. Compl. 8:20-

23.) Plaintiff complains that the repeated transfers “virtually guaranteed” that Plaintiff’s complaints

would be ignored. Plaintiff was eventually transferred to “Building 250” where he was stabbed four

times, bludgeoned in the head, and beaten into semi-consciousness while Defendants Umphenour,

Doe 1, and Doe 2 observed. Plaintiff claims that Umphenour, Doe 1 and Doe 2 did not intervene

by activating the alarm or ordering plaintiff’s assailants to stop. Plaintiff was hospitalized and then

placed in segregation. Plaintiff was transferred to Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”) in August

2004.

When Plaintiff arrived at MCSP, MCSP officials indicated that Plaintiff’s property had been

sabotaged. Plaintiff claims that it was Umphenour’s responsibilityto gather and inventoryPlaintiff’s

personal property. Plaintiff submitted a grievance complaining about Mendoza-Powers, Mancinas,

and Umphenour, but the grievance was denied as untimely by Defendant Grannis. In June 2005,

Plaintiff was scheduled to be transferred back to ASP. Plaintiff’s requests to cancel the transfer due

to safety concerns was rejected by MCSP officials. In January 2005, the transfer was canceled by

MCSP Associate Warden Bunnell.1

III. Discussion

A. First Amendment

Plaintiff alleges Defendants retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment. In

the prison context, allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech

or to petition the government may support a Section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527,

532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v.

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “[A] viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate

(2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s

The dates June 2005 and January 2005 are as they appear in Defendant’s Amended Complaint. The Court

1

notes the chronological conflict of the dates and assumes Defendant intended the dates to be June 2005 and January

2006.

5

Case 1:08-cv-01655-SAB Document 21 Filed 06/28/10 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). An allegation of

retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison grievance is sufficient to

support a claim under Section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003).

Such claims must be evaluated in light of the deference that must be accorded to prison

officials. See Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807; see also Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The prisoner must submit evidence to establish a link between the exercise of constitutional rights

and the allegedly retaliatory action. Compare Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807 (finding insufficient evidence)

with Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding sufficient

evidence).

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable retaliation claim against Defendant Grannis. Plaintiff

alleges that Grannis denied Plaintiff’s administrative appeal as untimely. However, Plaintiff has

provided absolutely no factual support for the contention that Grannis rejected Plaintiff’s appeal

because of Plaintiff’s exercise of protected conduct.

Plaintiff also fails to state a cognizable retaliation claimagainst Defendant Mendoza-Powers. 

Plaintiff’s onlyallegation against Mendoza-Powersis that Plaintiff wrote letters to Mendoza-Powers

requesting a transfer to SQSP or CMF-Vacaville and Mendoza-Powers ignored the requests. 

Plaintiff fails to provide any factual support for the conclusion that Mendoza-Powers ignored

Plaintiff’s requests because of Plaintiff’s exercise of protected conduct. It is Plaintiff’s burden to

allege sufficient facts to cross the line between possibility and plausibility. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Plaintiff deduces that, in deliberately ignoring his letters, MendozaPowers’ actions constitute an adverse response to Plaintiff’s protected conduct. However, as alleged,

Plaintiff’s conclusion does not cross the line between possibility and plausibility; it is mere

speculation.

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable retaliation claim against Defendant Mancinas. Plaintiff

provides scant details of anything that Mancinas did or failed to do. Plaintiff alleges that he had

“safety concerns due to the retaliatory animus of defendant MANCINAS.” (Am. Compl. 7:20-21.) 

Plaintiff does not explain the basis for his safety concerns. Plaintiff complains that Mancinas

6

Case 1:08-cv-01655-SAB Document 21 Filed 06/28/10 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“fail[ed] to remedy plaintiffs[sic] inappropriate transfer from Folsom to Avenal.” (Am. Compl.

7:25-28.) However, Plaintiff provides no factual support for his contention that Mancinas’ failure

to “remedy” Plaintiff’s transfer was based on Mancinas’ “retaliatory animus.” Plaintiff’s vague

allegations regarding “the calumny and obloquy that plaintiff was a ‘snitch’ and a ‘baby raper’” do

not sufficientlysupport the conclusion that Mancina’s acted in retaliation against Plaintiff’s protected

conduct. Plaintiff provides no allegations to suggest that Mancinas was personally involved with

spreading the rumor that Plaintiff was a “snitch” or a “baby raper.” Similarly, Plaintiff’s allegations

regarding retaliatory treatment he received at ASP between November 2002 and May 2003 do not

sufficiently support the conclusion that Mancinas acted in retaliation. Plaintiff provides no facts to

suggest that Mancinas was personally involved with the events that occurred between November

2002 and May 2003.

Plaintiff also attempts to hold Mendoza-Powers and Mancinas liable for retaliation because

Plaintiff’s “verbal and written pleas and entreaties to defendants POWERS and MANCINAS

resulted in plaintiffs[sic] transfer to another Facility or Building, while the calumny and obloquy of

‘snitch’ and ‘baby raper’ continued unabated.” Plaintiff provides no factual support for his

conclusion that his written and verbal requests to Mendoza-Powers and Mancinas “caused” the

transfers. Plaintiff does not allege that Mendoza-Powers or Mancinas were personally involved in

transferring Plaintiff or were personally involved in spreading the rumor that Plaintiff was a “snitch”

or a “baby raper.” Further, Plaintiff fails to adequately explain how his transfers to other facilities

and buildings could be characterized as an “adverse action.” Plaintiff claims that the transfers

“virtually guaranteed” that Plaintiff’s administrative grievances would be lost or ignored. It is

unclear how a transfer to another building would have any effect on the processing of Plaintiff’s

grievances. It is implausible to assume that the prison would completely lose track of Plaintiff’s

grievances merely because Plaintiff was transferred to another building.

Plaintiff does state a plausible retaliation claim against Defendants Umphenour, Doe 1 and

Doe 2. Plaintiff claims that he helped another inmate by filing a declaration on his behalf related to

an incident where the other inmate was attacked by an ASP official–an exercise of Plaintiff’s First

Amendment right to free speech that could also be construed as an exercise of Plaintiff’s protected

7

Case 1:08-cv-01655-SAB Document 21 Filed 06/28/10 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

right to file grievances against the government. Plaintiff claims that Umphenour confronted Plaintiff

and told Plaintiff that he would be “dealt with.” Plaintiff claims that he was attacked and stabbed

later, while Defendants Umphenour, Doe 1, and Doe 2 observed without intervening. Plaintiff also

suggests that Umphenour “sabotaged” Plaintiff’s property during his transfer to MCSP. Plaintiff has

alleged enough facts to plausibly support the conclusion that Umphenour, Doe 1, and Doe 2

retaliated against Plaintiff for helping another inmate litigate his claims.

B. Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth

Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments and “embodies ‘broad and

idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)). A prison

official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) the objective

requirement that the deprivation is “sufficiently serious,” and (2) the subjective requirement that the

prison official has a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). The objective requirement that the

deprivation be “sufficiently serious” is met where the prison official’s act or omission results in the

denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (quotingRhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). The subjective requirement that the prison official has a “sufficiently

culpable state of mind” is met where the prison official acts with “deliberate indifference” to inmate

health or safety. Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-303). A prison official acts with deliberate

indifference when he/she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” 

Id. at 837. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that

a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Umphenour, Doe 1, and Doe 2 violated Plaintiff’s right under

the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by their failure to prevent other

inmates from stabbing Plaintiff. Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect

inmates from physical abuse. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1982). To

establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison officials were “deliberately

8

Case 1:08-cv-01655-SAB Document 21 Filed 06/28/10 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

indifferent” to serious threats to the inmate’s safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To demonstrate

that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to the inmate’s safety, the

prisoner must show that “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate...

safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Umphenour, Doe 1, and Doe 2 observed Plaintiff as he “was

stabbed four times, blugeoned [sic] about the head and beaten into semi-consciousness... but did not

activate the alarm, intervene, or command Plaintiff’s assailants to desist.” (Am. Compl. 9:4-8.) 

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendants Umphenour, Doe 1, and Doe 2 were deliberately

indifferent to a serious threat to his safety and states a cognizable claim against Defendants

Umphenour, Doe 1, and Doe 2.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Mendoza-Powers and Mancinas ignored Plaintiff’s “verbal

and written pleas.” However, Plaintiff provides scant details about the timing and contents of his

“verbal and written pleas” and the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support

a plausible claim for relief. It is not clear what Plaintiff told Mendoza-Powers and Mancinas. 

Plaintiff does not allege that he informed Mendoza-Powers or Mancinas of any specific threat to

Plaintiff’s safety. Plaintiff must allege facts that demonstrate that Mendoza-Powers and Mancinas

were aware of a substantial threat to Plaintiff’s safety, which theyignored. Although Plaintiff alleges

that he was seriously injured in a stabbing incident, Plaintiff does not claim to have known about the

incident in advance, and has not alleged any facts that suggest Mendoza-Powers or Mancinas knew

about the incident in advance. If Plaintiff’s “verbal and written pleas” did not contain sufficiently

specific information to put Mendoza-Powers and Mancinas on notice of a substantial threat to

Plaintiff’s safety, their inaction does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Plaintiff fails

to state any cognizable Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Mendoza-Powers or

Mancinas.

Similarly, Plaintiff attempts to hold Grannis liable for delaying and denying Plaintiff’s

administrative appeals. Plaintiff alleges that Grannis denied Plaintiff’s grievance after Plaintiff was

transferred to MCSP and long after the stabbing incident. There is no indication from Plaintiff’s

9

Case 1:08-cv-01655-SAB Document 21 Filed 06/28/10 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

complaint that Grannis could have done anything to intervene because by the time Plaintiff filed his

appeal, Plaintiff was transferred to MCSP and presumably away from any threat to his safety. 

Plaintiff fails to identify how Grannis’ action exposed Plaintiff to any danger. Plaintiff fails to state

a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Grannis.2

C. Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff fails to raise a claim that adequately supports a violation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment rights. “[W]here a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of

constitutional protection against a particular sort of governmental behavior, that Amendment, not

the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing a plaintiff’s

claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations, internal quotations, and

brackets omitted). The concept of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment is broad and wideranging. The Eighth Amendment provides a more explicit textual source of constitutional protection

for Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. 

See discussion supra III.B. Plaintiff fails to state a separate claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

IV. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint states cognizable claims against Defendants Umphenour, Doe 1, and

Doe 2 for deliberate indifference to a serious risk to Plaintiff’s safety in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state claims against any other defendants. The Court will

provide Plaintiff with the opportunityto file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified

by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may

not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George

v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints).

In the previous screening order, the Court found that Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Mendoza2

Powers, Mancinas, and Grannis were sufficient to support and Eighth Amendment claim. The previous screening

order was issued before the Supreme Court decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). The Court previously

noted that Plaintiff’s complaint was ambiguous as to the timing of his inmate appeals and whether Defendants had

the opportunity to intervene to protect Plaintiff. The Court also accepted Plaintiff’s unsupported conclusion that

Mendoza-Powers and Mancinas exposed Plaintiff to a substantial risk of serious harm. It is clear after Iqbal that

Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient and Plaintiff must clarify the ambiguities in his complaint against the above

referred Defendants and allege sufficient facts to support a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1949. The Court finds

that Plaintiff’s claims are not cognizable under the standards set forth in Iqbal.

10

Case 1:08-cv-01655-SAB Document 21 Filed 06/28/10 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

If Plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and is agreeable to proceeding only

on the claims identified in this order as cognizable, Plaintiff may so notify the Court in writing, and

the Court will issue a recommendation for dismissal of the other claims and defendants, and will

forward Plaintiff one (1) summonses and one (1) USM-285 forms for completion and return. Upon 3

receipt of the forms, the Court will direct the United States Marshal to initiate service of process.

If Plaintiff opts to amend, his amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

Plaintiff must identify how each individual defendant caused the deprivation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional or other federal rights: “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus

on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged

to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). 

With respect to exhibits, while they are permissible if incorporated by reference, Fed. R. Civ. P.

10(c), they are not necessary in the federal system of notice pleading, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In other

words, it is not necessary at this stage to submit evidence to prove the allegations in Plaintiff’s

complaint because at this stage Plaintiff’s factual allegations will be accepted as true.

Although Plaintiff’s factual allegations will be accepted as true and that “the pleading

standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’” “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint. 

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

(9th Cir. 1987). The amended complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior

or superceded pleading.” Local Rule 220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in

The Court will only provide Plaintiff with service documents for Defendant Umphenour. The Court will

3

provide Plaintiff with service documents for Doe 1 and Doe 2 when Plaintiff is able to identify Doe 1 and Doe 2 and

provide the Court with sufficient information to effect service of process on said Defendants.

11

Case 1:08-cv-01655-SAB Document 21 Filed 06/28/10 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d

at 567 (citing London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth,

114 F.3d at 1474. In other words, even the claims that were properly stated in the original complaint

must be completely stated again in the amended complaint.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in

this order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended

complaint and wishes to proceed only against Defendants Umphenour, Doe

1, and Doe 2 for violation of the Eighth Amendment; and

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 28, 2010 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

12

Case 1:08-cv-01655-SAB Document 21 Filed 06/28/10 Page 12 of 12