Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01474/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01474-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Ronald Foster is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

On October 24, 2019, the Magistrate Judge issued Findings and Recommendations 

recommending that the action be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. (ECF No. 

8.) The Findings and Recommendations were served on Plaintiff and contained notice that objections 

were due within thirty days. (Id.) After receiving two extensions of time, Plaintiff filed objections on 

January 23, 2020.

Plaintiff filed objections on January 23, 2020. In his objections, Plaintiff indicates that he has 

completed his criminal sentence and he is no longer in custody.1 However, contrary to Plaintiff’s 

 

1 On this same date, Plaintiff also filed a notice of change of address. (ECF No. 14.) 

RONALD FOSTER,

 Plaintiff,

v.

L. CARROL, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:19-cv-01474-LJO-SAB (PC)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO 

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION TO 

OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS FILED

[ECF No. 13]

Case 1:19-cv-01474-DAD-SAB Document 15 Filed 01/24/20 Page 1 of 4
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contention, the mere release from physical custody does not necessarily mean he may proceed by way 

of section 1983 complaint. 

“Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under ... 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 

Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam). “Challenges to the validity of any 

confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus; requests for 

relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 action.” Id. (internal 

citation omitted). A prisoner’s claims are within the core of habeas corpus if they challenge the fact or 

duration of his conviction or sentence. Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 934 (9th Cir. 2016) (en 

banc), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 645 (2017). 

Often referred to as the favorable termination rule or the Heck bar, this exception to section 

1983’s otherwise broad scope applies whenever state prisoners “seek to invalidate the duration of their 

confinement-either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a 

judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State’s custody.” Wilkinson v. 

Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 482, 486-487 (1994); Edwards v. 

Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644 (1997). Thus, “a state prisoner’s [section] 1983 action is barred (absent 

prior invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the 

prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)-if success in that 

action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson, 544 

U.S. at 81-82.

A “narrow exception” to the favorable termination rule exists where a § 1983 plaintiff 

challenging a prison disciplinary determination, who no longer meets the “in custody” requirement for 

filing a habeas petition, has diligently pursued relief. See Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 704-05 

(9th Cir. 2006); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2002). That exception only applies 

when the former prisoner plaintiff “challenges loss of good-time credits, revocation of parole or 

similar matters,” it does not apply to challenging underlying convictions. Lyall v. City of Los 

Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178, 1192 (9th Cir. 2015). 

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California and federal habeas jurisprudence require a petitioner to be “in custody” at the time 

that a habeas petition is filed. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989); 

Bailey v. Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Douglas, 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 246-47 (Cal. 

Ct. App. 2011). The “in custody” requirement is met if, at the time of filing the petition, the habeas 

petitioner is in physical custody, Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238-40 (1968); In re Douglas, 200 

Cal.App.4th at 246-47, is on parole from an unexpired sentence, Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491 (citing Jones 

v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963) (emphasizing that the petitioner was “confined by the 

parole order to a particular community, house, and job at the sufferance of his parole officer”); In re 

Jones, 57 Cal.2d 860, 861 (1962), or is on probation, In re Ossio, 51 Cal.2d 371, 376 (1958). In each 

of those situations, the petitioner is subject to the control of the state, limited in liberty, and at risk of 

resumption of (or actually in) physical custody as a result of the criminal conviction. The same is not 

true of a former prisoner who seeks to challenge the outcome of a rules violation report. After release 

from custody, a former prisoner faces no limitation on liberty as a result of an erroneous disciplinary 

violation, even with an attendance loss of time credits. Accordingly, a habeas corpus cannot be used 

to challenge a disciplinary violation after release from custody because the former prisoner is no 

longer “in custody.” 

Here, the complaint does not contain sufficient facts to determine whether or not Plaintiff’s

claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477. Although Plaintiff is out of custody, he does not 

indicate whether he is subject to parole and/or probation. Therefore, the Court cannot determine 

whether Plaintiff can proceed with any potential claims in this action. Nor does Plaintiff indicate 

whether he has sought relief by way of habeas corpus which may impact his ability to proceed in this 

action. Thus, Plaintiff will be granted the opportunity to supplement his objections, and in any 

supplement Plaintiff must identify whether he is subject to parole and/or probation, and whether he 

filed any habeas corpus petition raising the challenge presented here. 

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff is granted twenty (20) days from the date of service of this order to supplement

his objections; and 

2. If Plaintiff fails to supplement his objections, the Court will proceed with the objections

on file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 24, 2020 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:19-cv-01474-DAD-SAB Document 15 Filed 01/24/20 Page 4 of 4