Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00058/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00058-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1Local Rule 72.2(c)(1) provides for the automatic referral

of non-dispositive pretrial matters to the Magistrate Judges.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PATRICK N. ANDERSON, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 04-0058-CG-M

CITY OF PRICHARD :

(THE BLACK COMMUNITY)

:

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This action has been referred to the undersigned pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(1) due to

lack of service of process on Defendant.1 After review of the

complaint and its attachment, and when considered with

Plaintiff’s other actions dismissed by this Court for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, it is recommended this action be

dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

I. Nature of Proceedings.

Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, commenced this

action by filing a self-styled complaint and paying the

$150.00 filing fee after he was denied leave to proceed in

Case 1:04-cv-00058-CG-M Document 11 Filed 06/16/05 Page 1 of 14
2

forma pauperis (Docs. 3, 6). Plaintiff has attempted to serve

the sole Defendant, City of Prichard (The Black Community), by

regular mail instead of by certified mail, return receipt

requested. FED.R.CIV.P. 4(j)(2); ALA.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(8) & (i). 

There is no indication this Defendant has been served with

process as there is no return receipt in the Court’s file,

much less a return receipt signed by an appropriate official. 

Furthermore, this Defendant has not appeared in this action.

Because Defendant was not served within 120 days of the

complaint’s filing on January 30, 2004 (Doc. 1), Plaintiff’s

action is subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

If service of the summons and

complaint is not made upon a defendant

within 120 days after the filing of the

complaint, the court, upon motion or on its

own initiative after notice to the

plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without

prejudice as to that defendant or direct

that service be effected within a specified

time; provided that if the plaintiff shows

good cause for the failure, the court shall

extend the time for service for an

appropriate period. This subdivision does

not apply to service in a foreign country

pursuant to subdivision (f) or (j)(1).

This Report and Recommendation is serving as Plaintiff’s

notice if he elects to show good cause. 

The undersigned notes, however, if Plaintiff had made

Case 1:04-cv-00058-CG-M Document 11 Filed 06/16/05 Page 2 of 14
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further attempts to accomplish service of process, he

undoubtedly would not have been successful. The Court is not

aware of a Defendant by the name “City of Prichard (the Black

Community)” that has the capacity to be sued. The City of

Prichard itself is a suable entity, but a group of the city’s

citizens identified by race is not a legal entity that is

known to the Court. Cf. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214-

15 (11th Cir. 1992) (Alabama county’s sheriff’s department is

not a legal entity subject to suit, whereas the sheriff is

subject to suit under Alabama law). For this reason,

Plaintiff’s action is also due to be dismissed unless he can

show otherwise in an objection to the Report and

Recommendation.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the undersigned finds in

the present action that Plaintiff filed a complaint (Doc. 1)

which is identical to the complaint in Anderson v. District

One (The Black Community), CV 04-0061-CG-M (S.D. Ala. Apr. 11,

2005), which was dismissed by Chief Judge Granade for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. The only differences between the

two complaints are the Defendants and the amount of damages. 

Because a court’s subject matter jurisdiction can be

examined at any time, and in light of the dismissal of

Anderson v. District One (The Black Community), CV-04-0061-CGCase 1:04-cv-00058-CG-M Document 11 Filed 06/16/05 Page 3 of 14
 

2The Eleventh Circuit in Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661

F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopted as binding

precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered

prior to October 1, 1981.

4

M, and the failure to perfect service of process in the

present action on Defendant, the undersigned has examined the

present complaint to determine if subject matter jurisdiction

exists. 

II. Discussion.

 A federal court is a court of limited jurisdiction. 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct.

1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). A plaintiff invoking a

federal court’s jurisdiction must establish this jurisdiction

in the complaint. Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367

(11th Cir. 1994) (requiring not only must the jurisdictional

provision be stated in the complaint, but facts “demonstrating

the existence of jurisdiction” must be stated); Kirkland

Masonry, Inc. v. Comm’r, 614 F.2d 532, 533 (5th Cir. 1980)

(same).2 Because a court is powerless to act beyond its grant

of subject matter jurisdiction, a court is obligated to raise

whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at any time during

the litigation. Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th

Cir. 2001). When a court discovers that it lacks jurisdiction

over a case, “the court’s sole remaining act is to dismiss the

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case for lack of jurisdiction.” Morrison v. Allstate Indem.

Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing University

of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409-10

(11th Cir. 1999)); Barnett v. Bailey, 956 F.2d 1036, 1039

(11th Cir. 1992). 

In order to avoid reiterating Plaintiff’s factual

allegations, the undersigned adopts Chief Judge Granade’s

opinion in Anderson v. District One (The Black Community), CV04-0061-CG-M, which is attached hereto, for its findings of

fact as well as for its conclusions of law. Accordingly, the

undersigned finds Plaintiff’s federal claims in the present

action to be “wholly insubstantial and frivolous” as they are

only state law claims. Southpark Square Ltd. v. City of

Jackson, Miss., 565 F.2d 338, 342 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

436 U.S. 946, 98 S.Ct. 2849, 56 L.Ed.2d 787 (1978) (finding

wholly insubstantial and frivolous claims are insufficient to

establish federal question jurisdiction). Thus, for the same

reason stated in Chief Judge Granade’s opinion, this Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

III. Conclusion.

Based upon the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that

this action be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. 

Case 1:04-cv-00058-CG-M Document 11 Filed 06/16/05 Page 5 of 14
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APPENDIX

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PATRICK N. ANDERSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 04-0061-CGM

)

DISTRICT ONE )

(THE BLACK COMMUNITY), )

)

Defendant.

ORDER

This matter is before the court on the motion of Mr.

Frederick D. Richardson, Jr., for limited appearance for

purpose of contesting service and to dismiss and brief in

support (Docs. 11, 12), plaintiff’s opposition thereto and

brief in support (Docs. 14, 15) and Mr. Richardson’s reply

(Doc. 16). The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint

presents no real or substantial dispute of federal law and

that plaintiff’s claims are wholly insubstantial and

frivolous. Therefore, the motion to dismiss is due to be

granted. The court further finds plaintiff’s use of

inflammatory language in his pleadings intolerable and advises

plaintiff that any future filings with this court which

contain such language will be stricken. 

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action pro se by submitting two

documents which were docketed together as the complaint. (Doc.

1). Plaintiff’s complaint includes the following factual

allegations:

Over the course of 45 months July of 2000 to present

day District One of Mobile (The Black Community)

continue to harass the plaintiff with words like he

a homosexual, the plaintiff got fuck in the ass, he

have aids, the plaintiff is dying, he is stupid

etc., etc. The plaintiff is asking for damaging

under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, Section 1985, Civil

Rights Act of 1871, Title Two of the America with

Disability Act, and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ...

(Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges that under the above-described

federal statutes, the “black community” has damaged plaintiff

in the following ways: (1) “Chronic Malicious Harassment,” (2)

“Chronic Malicious Discriminatory Harassment,” (3) “Chronic

Malicious Hostile Environment Harassment,” (4) “Chronic

Malicious Same Sex Race Discrimination,” (5) “Chronic

Malicious Sex Discrimination,” (6) “Chronic Malicious Sex

Orientation,” (7) “Chronic Malicious Invasion of Privacy,” (8)

“Chronic Malicious Conspiracy,” (9) “Chronic Malicious

Violations of the 14th Equal Protection of the Law Clause,”

(10) “Chronic Malicious Violations of Title Two of the America

with Disability Act (ADA),” and (11) “Chronic Malicious

Violations of 504 Rehabilitation Act of 1973.” (Doc. 1). 

Case 1:04-cv-00058-CG-M Document 11 Filed 06/16/05 Page 7 of 14
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This action is one of nine actions filed by plaintiff in

this court from July 2003 through January 2004 alleging

similar claims against various Alabama communities, officials,

and related institutions. See Anderson v. City of Mobile, CV03-464-CG-M; Anderson v. County of Mobile, CV-03-0467-CG-M;

Anderson v. Mobile County Health Dept., CV-03-0593-CG-B;

Anderson v. Bishop State Comm. College, CV-03-0595-CG-L;

Anderson v. Dow, CV-03-0713-CB-B; Anderson v. Bishop State

Comm. College, CV-03-0595-CB-B; Anderson v.City of Prichard,

CV-04-0050-CG-M; Anderson v. District Two, CV-04-0060-CG-M.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Richardson, appearing specially to contest

jurisdiction, moves for dismissal based on the following

grounds: lack of jurisdiction, insufficiency of process,

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; the

action is wholly insubstantial and frivolous, and because the

putative defendant is not an entity subject to being sued. 

Mr. Richardson is the Mobile City Councilman elected from

Mobile City Council District One. 

 Judge Butler of this court recently considered a similar

motion in plaintiff’s action against Michael Dow, the Mayor of

Mobile. Anderson v. Michael Dow, CV-03-0713-CB-B. The

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allegations in the Dow case are very similar to the

allegations in the instant case. Plaintiff alleged the

following in the Dow case:

“from June 24, 2003 until the date the complaint was

filed, October 23, 2003, Michael Dow, who is the

mayor of Mobile, Alabama, continually defamed the

plaintiff by referring to plaintiff as a

“homosexual[,] a quoted-unquoted [ ] queer and/or

fag.” In addition, plaintiff alleges that Dow

“brainwash[ed] the Mobile County citizens [by

telling them] that the plaintiff lost his Social

Security Disability case which is [still] pending. .

. [and by telling them] that [the plaintiff] know[s]

this very stupid idiot aka (Gloria brother [sic])

and [that] this idiot is [plaintiff’s] best friend .

. . without substantial evidence.” 

Along with these factual allegations, the

complaint makes references to various legal

citations and propositions. For instance, after

setting forth the factual basis for the complaint,

the complaint states that “[s]uch obscene speech and

fighting words long have no protection under the

first amendment;” “[t]he 1st Amendment. . . do [sic]

not require a private figure plaintiff to prove

actual malice to recover damages for actual injury

caused by publication of a defamatory falsehood;”

“Michael Dow deprived the plaintiff [sic] 5th

Amendment rights in reputation, the security of his

reputation or good name from the arts of detraction

and slander;” and “deprived the plaintiff [sic] 4th

Amendment right to privacy.”

Plaintiff concludes his complaint with a summary

of the constitutional and statutory grounds for his

claim and with a demand for damages. Plaintiff

asserts that Dow has violated his rights secured by

the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments of the

United States Constitution and that he is entitled

to damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks

“non-economic compensatory damages” in the amount of

$5 million dollars and punitive damages $10 million

dollars [sic] for a very actionable prima facie

Case 1:04-cv-00058-CG-M Document 11 Filed 06/16/05 Page 9 of 14
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slanderous defamation per se.”

Anderson v. Dow, CV-03-0713-CB-B, Doc. 14, February 26, 2005. 

This court found that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking

in the Dow case. Id. The court reasoned as follows:

When a complaint seeks recovery under a federal

statute, it cannot be dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction unless it is (1) “clearly

immaterial and made solely for the purpose of

obtaining jurisdiction” or (2) “wholly insubstantial

and frivolous.” Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83

(1946). Whether a claim falls under the former

exception “turns on whether the complaint ‘really

and substantially’ invokes a dispute over federal

law.” Creel v. City of Atlanta, 399 F.2d 777, 778

(5th Cir. 1968). A claim is “wholly insubstantial

and frivolous” if it is obviously without merit or

if it is foreclosed by prior Supreme Court

decisions. South Park Square, Ltd. v. City of

Jackson, 565 F.2d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 1977).

Subject matter jurisdiction is lacking in this

case under either of these exceptions. First, there

is no real and substantial dispute of federal law. 

Plaintiff’s complaint can be read to assert two

state law claims–defamation and invasion of privacy.

Plaintiff has attempted to transform these state law

claims into federal causes of action simply by

adding references to the federal constitution and

federal law to his complaint. See Johnston v. Byrd,

354 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1965) (federal question

merely incidental even though complaint alleged

constitutional violations against sheriff). Second,

plaintiff’s constitutional defamation and invasion

of privacy claims are foreclosed by the Supreme

Court’s decision in Paul v. Davis, 425 U.S. 985

(1976), which 

held that a person's interest in reputation

alone, apart from some more tangible

interests such as employment,” is not a

protected liberty interest within the

meaning of the due process clause. To

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establish a liberty interest sufficient to

implicate the fourteenth amendment

safeguards, the individual must be not only

stigmatized but also stigmatized in

connection with a denial of a right or

status previously recognized under state

law.

Smith v. Siegelman, 322 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir.

2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

[Footnote: While plaintiff has alleged invasion of

privacy claims under the First, Fourth and Fifth

Amendments, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, he

has asserted no facts to demonstrate that he has

been deprived of a right protected by any of those

Amendments.] Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that his

reputation has been injured as the result of the

statements allegedly made by defendant Dow. Such a

claim, standing alone, is not cognizable under

federal law. [Footnote: It should be noted that of

the three federal statutes invoked--§ 1981, § 1983

and § 1985–the only one that even arguably might

apply is § 1983, which provides redress for the

violation, committed under color of state law, of a

constitutional right. As discussed above, the

complaint does not state a constitutional violation

and, therefore, is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1981 prohibits discrimination in the making

of contracts which affect interstate commerce, while

section 1985 prohibits, inter alia, conspiracy to

deprive a person of civil rights. The facts alleged

do not involve the making or enforcement of any

contract, nor do they give rise to any inference of

a conspiracy.]

Anderson v. Dow, CV-03-0713-CB-B, Doc. 14, February 26, 2005. 

The court finds that this court lacks jurisdiction over

the instant case for the same reason jurisdiction was lacking

in plaintiff’s suit against Michael Dow. Plaintiff’s

complaint asserts only state law claims against defendant. 

Case 1:04-cv-00058-CG-M Document 11 Filed 06/16/05 Page 11 of 14
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There is no real and substantial dispute of federal law and 

plaintiff’s claims are wholly insubstantial and frivolous. In

addition, it does not appear to the court that the defendant,

named as “District One (the black community of Mobile)” is a

person or entity capable of being sued. It is merely a

designated electoral district, and not a governmental entity

capable of being sued. For all of these reasons, individually

and cumulatively, this action is due to be dismissed.

The court notes that many, if not all, of plaintiff’s

pleadings in this and plaintiff’s other cases in this court

contain inflammatory remarks about the defendants and/or

defendants’ counsel. For instance, in the complaint in the

instant case, plaintiff thanks “The Black Community” for

providing him with “this great opportunity to commence a civil

lawsuits” and calls The Black Community “incredibly dumb and

the very stupid idiots.” (Doc. 1). In his opposition to the

motion to dismiss, plaintiff asserts that “not only do [Mr.

Richardson and his counsel] need to be sanction[ed] they need

to be sent to hell, where Satan the devil rule.” (Doc. 15). 

The court finds the inclusion of such inflammatory statements

in court pleadings to be totally unacceptable, and if

plaintiff files any more papers in this court including like

language, they will be stricken. 

Case 1:04-cv-00058-CG-M Document 11 Filed 06/16/05 Page 12 of 14
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, motion of Mr. Frederick D.

Richardson, Jr., to dismiss (Doc. 11) is GRANTED and this case

is hereby DISMISSED.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that Patrick N. Anderson shall

cease and desist from filing pleadings in any action in this

court which contain unnecessarily abusive, derisive, or

invective language.

DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of April, 2005. 

 /s/ Callie V. S. Granade

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation

or anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service

of this document, file specific written objections with the

clerk of court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo

determination by the district judge of anything in the

recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the

factual findings of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir.

1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B,

1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging the findings

and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more

detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by

filing a “Statement of Objection to Magistrate

Case 1:04-cv-00058-CG-M Document 11 Filed 06/16/05 Page 13 of 14
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Judge’s Recommendation” within ten days after being

served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a

different time is established by order. The

statement of objection shall specify those portions

of the recommendation to which objection is made and

the basis for the objection. The objecting party

shall submit to the district judge, at the time of

filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s

recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a

different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted

to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the

original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the

objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of

the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to

a Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or

judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay

the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required

before the United States will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 16th day of June, 2005.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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