Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04472/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04472-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHILIP J. FEINER, JR.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF AMERICAN CANYON, JAMES

CANNON, ROBERT PONTELLE, MARK

JOSEPH, ROBERT SCHWERIN, and

DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 3:04-cv-04472 WHA

ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION

The Court regrets to say that it made a mistake in connection with its partial

summary-judgment order dated March 8, 2005. Were the record as the Court then understood

it to be, no change would be necessary. But a recent argument on a related motion, heard

during the pendency of the city’s motion for reconsideration, has illuminated the earlier record

more clearly. 

Specifically, the Court was under the impression that the default judgment by the state

court had only authorized the city to “abate” the nuisance and had not indicated that the term

included removing the hedge altogether. Based on that view of the record, the March 8 order

stated in part: 

A default judgment issued on March 4, 2003. Although it

authorized the city to “abate” the nuisance, the order did not state

that the city could cut the hedge down all the way to the ground

(id. at 2). 

* * *

Case 3:04-cv-04472-WHA Document 57 Filed 05/02/05 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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This order holds that the state-court order, while authorizing the

city to “abate” the nuisance, did not authorize abatement measures

beyond those reasonably necessary to bring the hedge into

compliance (ibid.).

* * *

The state-court order could only have authorized the seizure if it

satisfied the requirements for a valid warrant. . . . Even if the

state-court order, as far as it went, satisfied the warrant

requirement, the act of razing the hedges and spraying sealant on

the roots unreasonably exceeded the scope of the order (id. at 5). 

* * *

The evidence presented to the state court concerned only the

zoning ordinance and the 41-inch limit. Nothing was presented in

opposition to the instant motion indicating that the state court

meant the word “abate” to include the draconian action

subsequently taken (id. at 5–6). 

On closer examination, however, the undersigned must frankly acknowledge that he

overlooked language in the state-court default judgment, as follows: 

3. City is authorized to abate any nuisance on

Defendant’s Property, including but not limited to overgrown

hedges which obstruct and/or impair vehicular sight lines, if

Defendant fails to abate any such nuisances within the time

requested by City; and

4. Defendant shall pay all costs incurred by City in

abating Defendant’s nuisances and trimming or removing the

hedge, if City is required to do so as a result of Defendant’s failure

to do so as ordered by the Court . . . .

While it remains true that paragraph 3 only authorized abatement, the italicized language in

paragraph 4 did tend to indicate, contrary to the March 8 order, that the state court used the word

abate to include “removing.” It was wrong, therefore, for the order to grant partial summary

judgment against the city as to the hedge-removal aspect of the action. The state-court order

could have been understood to include the complete razing of the hedge, contrary to the March 8

order. This does not, of course, mean that summary judgment is now granted in favor of the city

on that issue. It only means that the previous order must be vacated as to the hedge-removal part

of the order. Further proceedings will continue as to that issue. 

The March 8 order, however, was correct in stating that herbicide was not authorized by

the state-court order. Nothing in the state-court order hinted that pouring herbicide on the hedge

Case 3:04-cv-04472-WHA Document 57 Filed 05/02/05 Page 2 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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stumps to prevent regrowth was contemplated. That feature of the city’s action was added later

by the city employees after the state-court order issued. For Monell purposes, however, a further

modification of the March 8 order was required, a modification best considered after the

following discussion. 

* * *

The city also seeks reconsideration of the Monell holding, i.e., that the city is liable by

reason of City Attorney Pontelle’s actions. Admittedly, there was a procedural irregularity in the

way the Monell issue developed. Plaintiff did not raise the Monell issue regarding municipal

liability in his initial motion for summary judgment. He should have, but Monell was not even

mentioned. This was largely cured, however, when defendants recognized and addressed the

issue in their opposition brief. In reply, however, plaintiff pointed to the actions of Mr. Pontelle

as the source of Monell liability and surfaced the municipal code for the first time, appending the

municipal code in its reply submission. On the briefing, therefore, defendant American Canyon

did not have a fair opportunity to oppose the reply argument. At the hearing, of course, defense

counsel had every opportunity to address the point but chose not to do so. But the original sin

was by plaintiff in neglecting to lay the Monell issue out in his opening submission. In balancing

the comparative faults for this procedural anomaly, the Court will now reconsider the arguments

that would have been made had both parties done it right. 

The city argues that Mr. Pontelle could not be considered a decision-maker with final

policy-making authority because he was only a deputy city attorney. In its own earlier briefing,

the city itself referred repeatedly to Mr. Pontelle as “the City Attorney.” At no point did the city

claim he was anything less than the City Attorney. The Court can be forgiven for having taken

counsel at his word and for now being disappointed that counsel said nothing at the first hearing. 

The new facts now indicate that Mr. Pontelle was an associate in a law firm hired by

American Canyon as its City Attorney. Counsel now refer to him as a deputy city attorney. 

Mr. Pontelle proposed legal opinions, suggestions and advice to city employees but had no

supervisorial authority. Significantly, no new declarations purport to rebut the basic facts of

what Mr. Pontelle did; the new facts concern only the scope of his authority. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The new facts do not overcome the legal force of American Canyon’s own municipal

code. As noted in the March 8 order, Chapter 2.20 of the American Canyon Municipal Code

specifically stated that “references in this chapter to city attorney or the office of city attorney

will include any applicable law firm and performance of the functions by any of its members or

employed attorneys.” Mun. Code § 20.010 (C) (emphasis added). The Office of the

City Attorney was empowered to “Prosecute on behalf of the people cases for violation of city

ordinances,” and to “perform such other legal duties as may . . . be necessary to complete the

performance of the foregoing functions.” Mun. Code § 2.20.030 (D–E). Under the municipal

code, the title “City Attorney” therefore applied to all attorneys within the law firm, which is

probably why defense counsel referred to Mr. Pontelle as such. The prosecution and

enforcement of city ordinances were specifically enumerated functions of that office. Ibid. 

As an attorney in the law firm which had been contracted by the city to fulfill the duties

of the office of the city attorney, Mr. Pontelle was acting within the stated authority of that office

under the municipal code. Mr. Pontelle’s position as the prosecutor of the zoning case and his

approval of the abatement plan was the type of policy-making position giving rise to municipal

liability under Monell. 

Plaintiff previously identified several decisions holding that the actions of deputy state,

county, and district attorneys can give rise to municipal liability. See Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d

1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2004). The city has

made no attempt to rebut these authorities. In each case, the actions of a deputy or assistant were

held sufficient to establish municipal liability because the officer had the specifically-granted

authority in a particular area or on a particular issue. The fact that a deputy was supervised by a

superior or shared authority did not negate the fact that the officer was a decision-maker who had

final policy-making authority. Here, the authority to prosecute and enforce city ordinances was

specifically granted to the Office of the City Attorney and could be enforced by any attorney in a

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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* Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231 (9th. Cir. 1999), does not aid the city. Christie involved a different

statutory scheme under which Hawaiian law did not delegate final policy-making authority to deputy district

attorneys. Here, the municipal code explicitly defined the Office of the City Attorney as equally inclusive of all

attorneys within a contracted law firm. 

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law firm hired as its City Attorney. Accordingly, Mr. Pontelle was properly considered a

decision-maker with final policy-making authority for the purposes of municipal liability.*

* * *

Even though the March 8 order was correct concerning Mr. Pontelle’s Monell status, now

that the “removal” issue has been withdrawn from summary judgment, the question arises

whether the “herbicide” issue must be withdrawn as well. The Court has reviewed the factual

record again. The problem is that it does not establish that Mr. Pontelle approved or ratified the

herbicide application. The internal city records that discussed the herbicide idea were not sent to

Mr. Pontelle, according to his declaration. Thus, for example, even though the state-court order

did not authorize the application of the herbicide and even though in theory Mr. Pontelle had the

authority to approve its use for Monell purposes, the summary-judgment record fails to establish

that he did so. In his reply brief, plaintiff relied solely on Mr. Pontelle and his role in the

City Attorney’s office to establish Monell liability. No reliance was placed on the potential

policy-making roles of the other city employees involved. Consequently, the partial summary

judgment against the city must be VACATED. We will leave to another day with a more

complete record the issue of whether Mr. Pontelle (or any other policy maker) approved or

ratified the herbicide. Monell liability against the city has not yet, therefore, been established as

to any aspect of its employees’ conduct. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 2, 2005. S/ WILLIAM ALSUP WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:04-cv-04472-WHA Document 57 Filed 05/02/05 Page 5 of 5