Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01649/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01649-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SORIYAA EK,

Petitioner,

v.

F. FOULK,

Respondent.

No. 2: 13-cv-1649 KJN P

ORDER

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the 

undersigned.

Petitioner challenges his 2008 conviction for arson (Cal. Penal Code § 451(b)), street 

terrorism (Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(a)), two counts of dissuading a witness by force or threat 

(Cal. Penal Code § 136.1(c)(1)), participating in a criminal street gang (Cal. Penal Code 

§ 186.22(a)), and two counts of criminal threats (Cal. Penal Code § 422). 1Petitioner is serving a 

sentence of fourteen years to life plus nine years and four months. 

The petition raises the following claims: 1) insufficient evidence to support convictions

 

1

 Petitioner was also charged with attempted murder, to which the jury rendered a verdict of not 

guilty. 

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for violating California Penal Code 136.1 (2 claims); 2) jury instruction error; and 3) his sentence 

violates double jeopardy and state law.

After carefully considering the record, the undersigned denies the petition for the reasons

stated herein. 

II. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 

202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000).

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state 

court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established United 

States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in 

Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a 

decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different result. Early v. Packer, 537 

U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court 

may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the 

Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s 

case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because 

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied 

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

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unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (it is “not enough 

that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm 

conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) (internal citations omitted). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded 

jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 

131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). If there is no reasoned decision, 

“and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the 

claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the 

contrary.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. That presumption may be overcome by a showing 

that “there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely.” 

Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). 

“When a state court rejects a federal claim without expressly addressing that claim, a 

federal habeas court must presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits – but that 

presumption can in some limited circumstances be rebutted.” Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 

1088, 1096 (Feb. 20, 2013). “When the evidence leads very clearly to the conclusion that a 

federal claim was inadvertently overlooked in state court, § 2254(d) entitles the prisoner to” de 

novo review of the claim. Id., at 1097.

Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, the federal court conducts an independent review of the record. 

“Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the 

only method by which we can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively 

unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). Where no reasoned 

decision is available, the habeas petitioner has the burden of “showing there was no reasonable 

basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784. “[A] habeas court must 

determine what arguments or theories supported or, . . . could have supported, the state court’s 

decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those 

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arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.” Id. at 

786.

III. Factual Background

The opinion of the California Court of Appeal contains a factual summary. After 

independently reviewing the record, the undersigned finds this summary to be accurate and 

adopts it herein. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 6, 2007, Christina McDonald was living at 4404 

Manchester Avenue, apartment number 28 in Stockton, California. 

She lived with her fiancé Eric Lamarra, her infant daughter, and 

Eric’s parents Rocky Lamarra and Rebecca Nagy. Around 11:40 

p.m. McDonald was watching television in the living room with her 

daughter. Her daughter was in a crib between the couch and the 

window. Eric was at another apartment, and his parents were asleep 

upstairs.

McDonald heard voices outside the apartment. She went to the door 

and opened it. She saw two individuals. She recognized them, but 

did not know their names. She had seen them hanging around with 

the usual bunch of troublemakers. One of them had “very 

noticeable gold teeth” and was wearing a bright orange sweatshirt. 

The other one, who was thinner, was wearing a black sweatshirt. He 

was later identified as Louie. Both men glared at her. The man in 

the orange sweatshirt, later identified as Ek, approached her and 

said, “Fuck you. You’re a cop caller. Go inside, bitch. You're going 

to get yours[.]”

McDonald closed the door. She debated whether or not to call the 

police, and finally decided just to sit down and forget about it. She 

then heard breaking glass and saw her curtains go up in flames. She 

ran to her daughter’s crib and picked her daughter up, burning her 

hand on the metal crib because it was so hot. She managed to wake 

up everyone and get them out of the apartment through the back 

door. A neighbor had to cut the back fence so they could escape.

Emily Un, McDonald’s apartment manager, was driving toward the 

complex around midnight. She saw defendants running out of the 

entrance to the complex. She recognized them because they were 

always disturbing her tenants, pulling out the no trespassing signs, 

and writing on the walls. Ek was wearing an orange sweatshirt, 

orange cap, and khaki pants. He was carrying a yellow bucket. 

Louie was wearing a black sweatshirt, black jeans, and a black hat. 

As Un walked to her apartment, she saw defendants behind one of 

the vacant apartments. She told them to get out and asked what they 

were doing there.

Un started walking toward defendants. They both took off their 

sweatshirts, dropped them, and kept running. Un smelled gasoline 

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on the shirts. Defendants took the yellow bucket with them. Un 

turned around and saw smoke coming from the apartments and 

heard the sirens.

The discarded sweatshirts tested positive for the presence of 

gasoline, as did burnt debris from the apartment fire. The 

sweatshirts were also tested for DNA evidence. The orange 

sweatshirt contained one major and two minor DNA contributors. 

The profile of the major contributor matched Ek’s profile. The 

black sweatshirt also contained a mixture of DNA, but it was not 

possible to determine a major and minor contributor. Louie was 

determined to be a possible contributor to the DNA on the black 

sweatshirt, although statistically the match was not as strong as for 

Ek.

An arson investigator determined that the fire originated near the 

front doorway of McDonald’s apartment. The fire traveled in from 

the outside. The fire was caused when an open flame, spark, or hot 

surface was used to ignite a liquid to start the fire.

McDonald testified that her neighborhood was gang infested, the 

predominant gang being the Tiny Raskal Gang (TRG), an Asian 

gang. She had seen Louie and Ek with other TRG members. She 

had a run-in with TRG about two months prior to the fire. She was 

sitting in her back yard when two gang members, who were running 

from the police, jumped her back fence and tried to come into the 

yard. She told them they were not allowed in the yard and had to 

leave. They got mad, and when her fiancé came out to support her, 

they threw a large potted plant at his head. They said they were 

going to get a gun and come back.

She called the police and filed a report. The individuals were 

Joseph Danh and Rachana Pheng. Right after that incident, 

someone came to their door and told them not to testify, and that 

things would be better for them if they did not. TRG members 

would often threaten them with sticks. They often had guns. They 

sold drugs and harassed the neighbors. They called her honky, cop 

caller, and dumb white bitch. McDonald said things got so bad that 

she and her family just stayed inside.

Just prior to the incident where defendants set fire to the apartment, 

McDonald had called the police because gang members were 

yelling and shooting guns. She could not relax in her own 

apartment because she was afraid a bullet would come through the 

window.

Two or three weeks after the fire, around January 15, 2007, 

McDonald called police to make an anonymous tip when she 

spotted Ek at the volleyball field. That day, Ek came to her back 

gate, pointed a gun at her, called her a cop calling bitch, and said 

she was going to get hers, just like the night of the fire.

Ek was arrested on February 14, 2007, and Louie was arrested on 

March 31, 2007. Louie admitted association with the TRG. Ek 

admitted association with MLS, the Moonlight Strangers. He had 

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MLS tattooed on his left forearm.

Detective Richard Slater testified as an expert on Asian street 

gangs. Although both TRG and MLS are considered Asian street 

gangs, not all of their members are Asian. It is common for TRG 

members and MLS members to hang out together. They do crimes 

together and back up each other. In Stockton, both TRG and MLS 

are Blood gang subsets. Detective Slater opined that the arson of 

the apartment and subsequent threats were for the benefit of the 

TRG gang, specifically to punish McDonald and Eric Lamarra for 

calling the police on TRG gang members and to intimidate the 

entire neighborhood.

(ECF No. 14 at 34-38.)

IV. Insufficient Evidence

A. Legal Standard

When a challenge is brought alleging insufficient evidence, federal habeas corpus relief is 

available if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found “the essential elements of 

the crime” proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 

Jackson established a two-step inquiry for considering a challenge to a conviction based on 

sufficiency of the evidence. U.S. v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). First, 

the court considers the evidence at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id., citing 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. “'[W]hen faced with a record of historical facts that supports 

conflicting inferences,' a reviewing court 'must presume-even if it does not affirmatively appear in 

the record-that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must 

defer to that resolution.”' Id., quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326.

“Second, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a 

reviewing court must determine whether this evidence, so viewed is adequate to allow 'any 

rational trier of fact [to find] the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id., 

quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. “At this second step, we must reverse the verdict if the 

evidence of innocence, or lack of evidence of guilt, is such that all rational fact finders would 

have to conclude that the evidence of guilt fails to establish every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Id.

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Put another way, “a reviewing court may set aside the jury's verdict on the ground of 

insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.” Cavazos v. 

Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011). Sufficiency of the evidence claims in federal habeas proceedings 

must be measured with reference to substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by 

state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16.

“Jackson leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw from the 

evidence presented at trial,” and it requires only that they draw “'reasonable inferences from basic 

facts to ultimate facts.’” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) (per curiam) (citation 

omitted). “'Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from it may be sufficient to sustain a 

conviction.”' Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

Superimposed on these already stringent insufficiency standards is the AEDPA 

requirement that even if a federal court were to initially find on its own that no reasonable jury 

should have arrived at its conclusion, the federal court must also determine that the state appellate 

court not have affirmed the verdict under the Jackson standard in the absence of an unreasonable 

determination. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2005). Because this claim is governed 

by the AEDPA, this court owes a “double dose of deference” to the decision of the state court. 

Long v. Johnson, 736 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957,

960 (9th Cir. 2011)).

B. Insufficient Evidence of Dissuading a Witness - Count 3

Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence that he had the intent to dissuade 

victim McDonald from either making a report of a crime or of causing someone to be arrested for 

a crime she had witnessed of which she had been the victim. This claim is based on count 3, 

which charged petitioner with dissuading victim McDonald on January 6, 2007. (See Court

Transcript (“CT”) at 417 (fourth amended information).) Petitioner argues that the evidence 

instead demonstrated that he intended to retaliate against victim McDonald for reporting crimes 

committed by his gang. 

The California Court of Appeal was the last state court to issue a reasoned opinion 

addressing this claim. Accordingly, the undersigned considers whether the denial of this claim by 

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the California Court of Appeal was objectively unreasonable. The California Court of Appeal 

denied this claim for the reasons stated herein: 

A. January 6, 2007 Incident

The information alleged in count 3 that both defendants committed 

the crime of dissuading a witness by force or threat “in violation of 

Section 136.1(c)(1)[.]” It was alleged that the act occurred on or 

about January 6, 2007. It was specifically alleged that defendants 

dissuaded McDonald from “MAKING A REPORT OF 

VICTIMIZATION OR ASSISTING IN THE PROSECUTION OF 

DEFENDANT.” 

Section 136.1, subdivision (c) makes it a felony to knowingly and 

maliciously prevent or dissuade, or attempt to prevent or dissuade a 

witness or victim: (1) from attending or giving testimony at a trial 

or other proceeding; (2) from making a report or that victimization; 

(3) from causing, inter alia, a complaint, indictment, or information 

to be sought and prosecuted and assisting in the prosecution 

thereof; or (4) from causing or seeking the arrest of any person in 

connection with that victimization. [Footnote 2]

[Footnote 2: The full text of section 136.1, subdivision (a) 

through (c) states:

“(a) Except as provided in subdivision (c), any person who 

does any of the following is guilty of a public offense and 

shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not 

more than one year or in the state prison:

Knowingly and maliciously prevents or dissuades any 

witness or victim from attending or giving testimony at any 

trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law.

Knowingly and maliciously attempts to prevent or dissuade 

any witness or victim from attending or giving testimony at 

any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law.

For purposes of this section, evidence that the defendant 

was a family member who interceded in an effort to protect 

the witness or victim shall create a presumption that the act 

was without malice.

(b) Except as provided in subdivision (c), every person who 

attempts to prevent or dissuade another person who has been 

the victim of a crime or who is witness to a crime from 

doing any of the following is guilty of a public offense and 

shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not 

more than one year or in the state prison:

(1) Making any report of that victimization to any peace 

officer or state or local law enforcement officer or probation 

or parole or correctional officer or prosecuting agency or to 

any judge.

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(2) Causing a complaint, indictment, information, probation 

or parole violation to be sought and prosecuted, and 

assisting in the prosecution thereof.

(3) Arresting or causing the arrest of any person in 

connection with that victimization.

(c) Every person doing any of the acts described in 

subdivision (a) or (b) knowingly and maliciously under any 

one or more the following circumstances, is guilty of a 

felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 

two, three or four years under any of the following 

circumstances:

(1) Where the act is accompanied by force or by an express 

or implied threat of force or violence, upon a witness or 

victim or any third person or the property of any victim, 

witness, or any third person.

(2) Where the act is in furtherance of a conspiracy.

(3) Where the act is committed by any person who has been 

convicted of any violation of this section, any predecessor 

law hereto or any federal statute or statute of any other state 

which, if the act prosecuted was committed in this state, 

would be a violation of this section.

(4) Where the act is committed by any person for pecuniary 

gain or for any other consideration acting upon the request 

of any other person. All parties to such a transaction are 

guilty of a felony.” 

Thus, the information alleged that defendants violated (2) and (3) 

above, which correspond to subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) of the 

statute.

The jury was instructed with a modified version of CALCRIM No. 

2622. The instruction stated that the prohibited acts were: (1) 

preventing or discouraging McDonald from reporting a 

victimization, or (2) causing the arrest of anyone in connection with 

a crime. Thus, unlike the information which charged a violation 

under subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2), the instruction corresponded 

with subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(3) of section 136.1.

Defendants assume for purposes of appeal that the convictions were 

as instructed, under subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(3). They argue that 

there is insufficient evidence in the record that they had the specific 

intent to dissuade McDonald from either making a report of a crime 

or of causing someone to be arrested for a crime she had witnessed

or of which she had been a victim. [Footnote 3.]

[Footnote 3: Defendant Louie joins in all issues that affect 

him and are raised in Ek’s opening brief.]

They claim the only reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that 

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they intended only to retaliate against McDonald for reports she had 

already made.

Defendants argue the threat could not have been to dissuade 

McDonald from reporting or seeking arrests for the incident 

involving Danh and Pheng because she had already reported that 

incident, and Danh and Pheng had been arrested and prosecuted for 

it. They argue that other criminal acts McDonald had witnessed 

being committed by TRG members could not have been the basis 

for the threats because there was no evidence defendants were 

involved in any of those incidents or that defendants knew 

McDonald had witnessed any of those crimes.

However, the evidence supports the jury’s finding that defendants’ 

purpose in targeting McDonald was to prevent her from reporting 

both general criminal activities committed by TRG in the 

neighborhood, and specifically the arson incident.

The reason McDonald was targeted was made clear by Ek’s own 

words when he called McDonald a “cop calling bitch.” Defendants 

thus knew that McDonald had called authorities about criminal 

activities in the past. McDonald testified she regularly called the 

police about the gang activities in the neighborhood, although she 

did not always give her name. The prosecution’s gang expert 

testified to his opinion that one purpose of the threat and the arson 

was to demonstrate to the neighborhood (and presumably 

McDonald as well) that the consequences of reporting gang activity 

to the police are dire. He opined that one purpose of the arson was 

to send a message to the neighborhood not to “mess with” the gang. 

Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding 

that the threat and the arson were for the specific purpose of 

preventing McDonald from calling the police to report gang activity 

she either witnessed or experienced as a victim.

A defendant may violate section 136.1 where the threat is made at 

the time of the crime itself. Thus, in People v. Hallock (1989) 208 

Cal.App.3d 595, 607, the court found that where the defendant, 

before escaping, told the attempted rape victim, “’if you tell 

anybody anything that happened tonight here, ... I’ll blow your 

house up [,]’” the threat could reasonably have been believed to 

have been directed at reporting the crime to the police. Likewise, 

here defendants called McDonald a cop caller and told her she 

would get hers shortly before they set her apartment on fire. This is 

sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that defendants’ words 

combined with their actions were specifically intended to dissuade 

her from contacting the police about the fire. 

(ECF No. 14 at 41-45.)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the undersigned finds that 

there was sufficient evidence, as discussed above by the California Court of Appeal, from which a 

rational trier of fact could have found that petitioner possessed the specific intent to prevent 

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victim McDonald from reporting general criminal activities committed by TRG and also the arson 

incident. The rejection of this claim by the California Court of Appeal was not objectively 

unreasonable under Cavazos, 132 S. Ct. at 4. Accordingly, this claim is denied.2 

B. Insufficient Evidence of Dissuading a Witness - Count 7

In this claim, petitioner challenges the sufficiency of evidence of his conviction for 

violating California Penal Code § 136.1 on the grounds that this section does not apply to 

attempts to prevent the victim from reporting crimes not yet committed. This claim is based on 

count 7, which charged petitioner with dissuading victim McDonald on January 15, 2007. (See

CT at 421.) 

The California Court of Appeal was the last state court to issue a reasoned opinion 

addressing this claim. Accordingly, the undersigned considers whether the denial of this claim by 

the California Court of Appeal was objectively unreasonable. The California Court of Appeal 

denied this claim for the reasons stated herein:

In count 7, Ek was charged with violating section 136.1, 

subdivision (c) by attempting to prevent McDonald “from attending 

and giving testimony at any trial proceeding and inquiry authorized 

by law and assisting in the prosecution of a complaint, indictment, 

[or] information, ...” The instruction for this count was the same 

one used for count 3. Thus, the jury was instructed that Ek could be 

guilty of the crime if he tried to prevent McDonald from reporting 

or causing the arrest of anyone in connection with a crime. Ek 

concedes that as there was no objection to the instruction the 

instruction may be deemed to have amended the information.

Ek argues he could not have been guilty of preventing McDonald 

from reporting the arson, since she had already reported it. He 

argues that while it is possible he was attempting to prevent her 

from causing his arrest for the arson and prior threat, there is 

insufficient evidence this was his specific intent. He argues there 

was no reason for him to think McDonald could do nothing more to 

bring about his arrest. We disagree.

“’When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light 

most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains 

 

2

 Petitioner’s co-defendant, Michael Louie, raised this same claim in his federal habeas petition. 

The Honorable James K. Singleton also found that petitioner Louie was not entitled to habeas 

relief as to this claim on grounds that the denial of this claim by the California Court of Appeal 

was not objectively unreasonable. See Louie v. Frauenheim, 2015 WL 403822 at *11-12 (E.D. 

Cal. 2015). 

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substantial evidence – that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, 

and of solid value – from which a reasonable trier of fact could find 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] ... We 

presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the 

trier of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence. [Citation.] If 

the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, 

reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the 

circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary 

finding. [Citation.] A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence 

nor reevaluates a witness’s credibility. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” 

(People v. D’Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 293.)

As long as Ek had not yet been arrested, McDonald could assist in 

his arrest by identifying him as the perpetrator. His actions toward 

her, accompanied by his threat and calling her a cop caller, were 

clearly meant to intimidate her and prevent her from continuing her 

cooperation with police regarding his crime and the crimes of his 

associates. His actions and words were sufficient to show his 

specific intent.

(ECF No. 14 at 46-47.)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the undersigned finds that 

there was sufficient evidence, as discussed above by the California Court of Appeal, from which a 

rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that, on January 15, 2007, 

petitioner intended to intimidate victim McDonald and prevent her from continuing her 

cooperation with the police regarding the arson and the crimes of petitioner’s associates. The 

denial of this claim by the California Court of Appeal was not objectively unreasonable. 

Cavasos, 132 S. Ct. at 4. Accordingly, this claim is denied. 

V. Jury Instruction Error

A. Legal Standard

Generally, claims of instructional error are questions of state law and are not cognizable 

on federal habeas review. “It is not the province of a federal court to reexamine state court 

determinations of state law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). “The fact 

that a jury instruction violates state law is not, by itself, a basis for federal habeas corpus relief.” 

Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006).

To prevail in a collateral attack on state court jury instructions, a petitioner must do more 

that prove that the instruction was erroneous. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). 

Instead, the petitioner must prove that the improper instruction “by itself so infected the entire 

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trial that the resulting conviction violated due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Even if there 

were constitutional error, habeas relief cannot be granted absent a “substantial and injurious 

effect” on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). If the court is 

convinced that the error did not influence the jury, or had little effect, the judgment should stand. 

O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437 (1995).

A federal court’s review of a claim of instructional error is highly deferential. Masoner v. 

Thurman, 996 F.2d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1993). A reviewing court may not judge the instruction 

in isolation, but must consider the context of the entire record and of the instructions as a whole. 

Id. The mere possibility of a different verdict is too speculative to justify a finding of 

constitutional error. Henderson, 431 U.S. at 157.

Where a petitioner claims that an instruction was erroneously omitted, the petitioner bears 

an “especially heavy burden” because an omitted or incomplete instruction is less likely to be 

prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 

1997).

B. Analysis

Petitioner challenges the witness intimidation instruction on grounds that it allowed the 

jury to convict him of dissuading a witness from reporting a crime that was not the same crime 

the victim either witnessed or suffered. 

The California Court of Appeal was the last state court to issue a reasoned opinion 

addressing this claim. Accordingly, the undersigned considers whether the denial of this claim by 

the California Court of Appeal was objectively unreasonable. The California Court of Appeal 

denied this claim for the reasons stated herein:

Defendants argue the witness intimidation instruction was faulty 

because it allowed them to be convicted of dissuading a witness 

from reporting a crime that was not the same crime the victim either 

witnessed or suffered. Ek raises this argument as both count 3 

(occurring on January 6, 2007) and count 7 (occurring on January 

15, 2007).

Defendants argue that section 136.1 subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(3) 

require an identify between the crime the victim suffered of 

witnessed, and the crime the victim is being dissuaded from 

reporting or from which the victim is facilitation an arrest. 

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[Footnote 4.]

[Footnote 4: Defendant interprets the statute this way because 

subdivisions (b)(1) and (3) make it a crime to prevent a person from 

making a report of “that victimization” and from causing an arrest 

in connection with “that victimization.”]

If a person is being dissuaded from reporting a crime or assisting in 

the arrest of a suspect, it follows that the person was either a victim 

or a witness to the crime. This case involves the added 

circumstances that defendants also could have been intimidating the 

victim to prevent her from reporting future crimes committed by the 

gang.

The jury was instructed in pertinent part that it must find that: (1) 

“defendant maliciously tried to prevent or discourage ... McDonald 

from reporting a victimization or causing the arrest of anyone in 

connection with a crime;” (2) “McDonald was a witness or crime 

victim;” and (3) “defendant knew he was trying to prevent or 

discourage Christina McDonald from reporting a victimization or 

causing the arrest of anyone in connection with a crime and 

intended to do so.” To the extent the instruction indicated to the 

jury that defendants were guilty of the crime even if the jury found 

their intent was to dissuade McDonald from reporting some crime 

that she had not yet witnessed or suffered, the error was harmless. 

“A defendant challenging an instruction as being subject to 

erroneous interpretation by the jury must demonstrate a reasonable 

likelihood that the jury understood the instruction in the way 

asserted by the defendant. [Citations.]” (People v. Cross (2008) 45 

Cal.4th 58, 67-68.) “’[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be 

determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a 

consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular 

instruction.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 

145, 192.)

There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have believed 

that it was defendants’ intent to prevent McDonald from reporting 

or facilitating defendants’ arrest as to future uncommitted crimes, 

but not the very crime that was meant to intimidate her. The jury 

could not have believed that it was okay for defendants to dissuade 

McDonald from reporting or having them arrested for burning her 

apartment, but not okay for them to dissuade her from reporting 

future, as yet uncommitted crimes. We will not reverse unless there 

is a reasonable likelihood the jury misconstrued or misapplied the 

jury instruction in a way that denied fundamental fairness. (People 

v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663.) There was no such reasonable 

likelihood here, thus any error was harmless. 

(ECF No. 14 at 48-50.)

The undersigned agrees with the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal that any 

instructional error was harmless because there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would 

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have believed that it was petitioner’s intent to prevent victim McDonald from reporting or 

facilitating petitioner’s arrest as to future, uncommitted crimes, but not the arson, i.e., the crime 

that was meant to intimidate her. Thus, even assuming the instruction was erroneous, it did not 

have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” Brecht, 

507 U.S. at 638, and the undersigned is without “grave doubt as to the harmlessness of [the] 

error.” Merolillo v. Yates, 663 F.3d 444, 454 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 

U.S. 432, 437 (1997). Accordingly, this claim is denied.3 

VI Sentencing Error/Double Jeopardy

Petitioner argues that his conviction for arson violates double jeopardy because arson, 

criminal threat and witness intimidation, based on the events of January 6, 2007, formed an 

indivisible course of conduct. Petitioner alleges that his conviction and sentence for arson 

violates the double jeopardy clause and California Penal Code § 654.

The California Court of Appeal issued a reasoned opinion addressing petitioner’s state law 

claim. The California Court of Appeal did not specifically address petitioner’s double jeopardy 

claim, although petitioner raised it on appeal. (See petitioner’s opening brief, respondent’s 

lodged document 16.) Petitioner raised his double jeopardy claim in his petition for review, 

which the California Supreme Court denied without comment or citation. (See Respondent’s 

lodged documents 20, 21.) Because there is no reasoned state court decision addressing the 

double jeopardy claim, the undersigned conducts an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the denial of this claim was objectively unreasonable. Harrington, 131 S. C. at 

784.

The undersigned herein sets forth the section of opinion of the California Court of Appeal 

denying petitioner’s related state law claim as it is helpful in reviewing the related double 

jeopardy claim:

//// 

 

3

 Petitioner’s co-defendant Michael Louie raised the same claim challenging the witness 

intimidation instruction in his federal habeas petition. Judge Singleton also found that any error 

in the instruction was harmless. See 2015 WL 403822 at *8.

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C. Section 654: Arson, Dissuading a Witness

Ek argues that the arson, witness intimidation, and criminal threat 

that the jury found occurred on January 6, 2007, comprised a course 

of conduct with the single objective of punishing McDonald for 

being a “cop caller.” As such, he argues the punishment for arson 

should have been stayed pursuant to section 654. We disagree.

There was sufficient evidence to support a finding by the trial court 

that defendants harbored multiple independent objectives when they 

threatened McDonald, then set her apartment on fire. (See People v. 

Herrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1466 [“The question of 

whether the defendant held multiple criminal objectives is one of 

fact for the trial court, and, if supported by any substantial 

evidence, its finding will be upheld on appeal.”].)

Detective Slater testified that one of defendants’ criminal objectives 

was to make sure the entire neighborhood knew what would happen 

to anyone who reported the criminal activities of the gang. The jury 

was instructed that to find defendants guilty of arson, it must find 

that defendants acted on purpose to burn the apartment. The fact 

that the jury convicted defendants of arson indicates it found 

beyond a reasonable doubt that one of defendants' purposes was to 

burn the apartment. There was also sufficient evidence based on the 

verbal threat given to McDonald, that one of the criminal objectives 

was to prevent McDonald from reporting the crime to the 

authorities. Defendants themselves argue their purpose was to 

punish McDonald for reporting past crimes.

Moreover, where a course of conduct is divisible in time it may 

give rise to multiple punishment even if the acts are directive to one 

objective. (People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639, fn.11.) If 

the separation in time afforded defendants an opportunity to reflect 

and to renew their intent before committing the next crime, a new 

and separate crime is committed. (In re William S. (1989) 208 

Cal.App.3d 313.) The evidence indicated that there was a pause of 

about 15 minutes between the verbal threat to McDonald and the 

fire. McDonald did not mention seeing a bucket or smelling 

gasoline, thus, as Ek recognizes, the “only reasonable conclusion is 

that, after McDonald closed her door, [Ek] set about provisioning 

himself with a bucket filled with gasoline and then returned to 

McDonald's apartment to pour the gasoline on the door and window 

and ignite it.” This gave defendants the time to reconsider and 

reflect upon their actions, and to renew their intent before burning 

McDonald's apartment.

Because defendants' course of conduct consisting of two criminal 

acts was incident to several objectives and was separated in time by 

an interval sufficient to allow them to reflect and renew their intent, 

the court properly sentenced defendants for the crimes of arson and 

dissuading a witness.

(ECF No. 14 at 56-58.) 

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Petitioner’s claim alleging that the failure to stay his sentence for the arson conviction 

violated state law is not cognizable on federal habeas review. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 

780 (1990) (generally, a challenge to a state court’s application of state sentencing laws does not 

create a federal question cognizable on federal habeas review.) 

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject 

for the same offen[s]e to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The 

clause is enforced against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 

395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969). The Supreme Court has previously held that this clause protects 

against successive prosecutions for the same offense after acquittal or conviction and multiple 

criminal punishments for the same offense. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1998) 

(citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).)

“[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory 

provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is 

whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not...” Brown v. Ohio, 432 

U.S. 161, 166 (1997) (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).) “If each 

requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the Blockburger test is satisfied, notwithstanding a 

substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes.” Id. at 166 (quoting Iannelli v. 

United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975).)

The undersigned begins the double jeopardy analysis by setting forth the elements of each 

of the three at-issue offenses. California Penal Code § 451(b) defines arson as follows:

A person is guilty of arson when he or she willfully and maliciously 

sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels, or 

procedures the burning of, any structure, forest land, or property.

(b) Arson that causes an inhabited structure or inhabited property to 

burn is a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 

three, five, or eight years. 

Cal. Penal Code § 451(b).

Petitioner was found guilty of violating California Penal Code § 136.1, subsections (b)(1), 

(b)(3), and (c)(1). Subsection (c)(1) provides,

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Every person doing any of the acts described in subdivision (a) or 

(b) knowingly and maliciously under any one or more of the 

following circumstances, is guilty of a felony punishable by 

imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years under 

any of the following circumstances:

(1) Where the act is accompanied by force or by an express or 

implied threat of force or violence, upon a witness or victim or any 

third person or the property of any victim, witness, or any third 

person.

(Cal. Penal Code § 136.1(c)(1).)

As discussed by the California Court of Appeal, the jury was instructed with subsections 

(b)(1) and (b)(3) of California Penal Code § 136.1. (See CT at 774.) These subsections provide 

as follows:

Except as provided in subdivision (c), every person who attempts to 

prevent or dissuade another person who has been the victim of a 

crime or who is witness to a crime from doing any of the following 

is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by imprisonment 

in a county jail for not more than one year or in state prison:

(1) Making any report of that victimization to any peace officer or 

state or local law enforcement officer or probation or parole or 

correctional officer or prosecuting agency or to any judge.

***

(3) Arresting or causing or seeking the arrest of any person in 

connection with that victimization.

(Cal. Penal Code § 136.1(b).)

California Penal Code § 422(a) defines making criminal threats as follows:

Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will 

result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the 

specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by 

means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a 

threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, 

on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so 

unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to 

the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate 

prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person 

reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for 

his or her immediate family's safety, shall be punished by 

imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by 

imprisonment in the state prison.

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(Cal. Penal Code § 422(a).)

The California Court of Appeal found that petitioner’s convictions for arson, threatening a 

witness and making criminal threats involved different transactions, i.e., they were not 

continuous, based on the 15 minute interval between the time petitioner threatened the victim and 

when he committed the arson. 

The undersigned does not reach the issue of whether petitioner’s convictions regarding the 

events of January 6, 2007, involved the same act or transaction, i.e., the grounds on which the 

California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s related state law claim. Instead, the undersigned 

finds that petitioner’s convictions did not violate double jeopardy because, even assuming they 

were continuous and involved the same transaction, each offense required proof of a fact which 

the others did not. Arson clearly requires proof of facts that are not required by California Penal 

Code sections 136.1 (dissuading a witness) and 422 (criminal threats). Making criminal threats 

and dissuading a witness have different elements: 

A criminal threat requires proof that, among other elements, the 

defendant intended the subject statement to be taken as a threat and 

the statement caused the victim reasonably to be in sustained fear 

for her own safety or the safety of her immediate family. (§ 422; 

People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227–28.) Felony 

dissuading a witness has different elements and requires a different 

intent. “Section 136.1 criminalizes trying to dissuade a victim from 

reporting a crime.” (People v. Upsher (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 

1311, 1320.) Conviction of that felony offense requires the jury to 

find the defendant knowingly and maliciously tried to prevent or 

discourage a crime victim from making a report of that 

victimization to law enforcement. (§ 136.1; see People v. Upsher, 

supra, at pp. 1318–319.)

People v. Newman, 2013 WL 1836109 at *3 (2013). 

Because petitioner’s convictions for arson, dissuading a witness and criminal threats all 

required proof of different facts, no double jeopardy violation occurred. After independently 

reviewing the record, the undersigned finds that the denial of this claim by the state courts was 

not objectively reasonable. Accordingly, petitioner’s double jeopardy claim is denied. 

////

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Accordingly, for all of the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus is denied; and

2. A certificate of appealability is not issued. 

Dated: May 11, 2016

ek1649.157

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