Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03569/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03569-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HERBERT FLORES-TORRES,

Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official capacity as

United States Attorney General,

Respondent. /

No. C 08-01037 WHA

No. C 09-03569 WHA

ORDER GRANTING

ENTITLEMENT TO COSTS

AND DENYING ATTORNEY’S

FEES

INTRODUCTION

After a bench trial, an order on December 23, 2009, declared petitioner to be a United

States citizen and judgment was entered in petitioner’s favor. Petitioner now moves for an

award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the fees provision of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28

U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A). Petitioner also moves pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1) for review of the clerk’s

taxation of costs. For the reasons stated below, petitioner’s entitlement to taxation of costs

sought on review is GRANTED IN PART, but his entitlement to attorney’s fees is DENIED.

STATEMENT

Petitioner was a native and citizen of El Salvador who moved to the United States to live

with his mother while still a child. In 2005, petitioner was convicted of being a felon in

possession of a firearm in violation of California Penal Code § 12021(a)(1). In October 2006,

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while petitioner was incarcerated for this offense, ICE filed an immigration detainer and placed

him in removal proceedings, charging him with being an alien convicted of an aggravated

felony. 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The immigration judge ruled that petitioner was not a

United States citizen and ordered his removal to El Salvador. The Board of Immigration

Appeals affirmed the immigration court’s decision. Petitioner then appealed the order of

removal to the court of appeals.

The Ninth Circuit determined that there were material issues of fact pertaining to

whether petitioner was a United States citizen. It stayed its consideration of petitioner’s appeal

and transferred the issue of petitioner’s citizenship to the undersigned pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

1252(b)(5)(B) for a hearing and decision on petitioner’s nationality claim. The declaratory

proceeding on petitioner’s citizenship claim then proceeded to trial, after which a December 23

order determined that petitioner became and remains a United States citizen pursuant to

Immigration and Nationality Act Section 321(a), former 8 U.S.C. 1432(a), upon the

naturalization of his mother on September 15, 1995.

Section 321(a) stated in its entirety:

(a) A child born outside of the United States of alien parents,

or of an alien parent and a citizen parent who has subsequently

lost citizenship of the United States, becomes a citizen of the

United States upon fulfillment of the following conditions:

(1) The naturalization of both parents; or

(2) The naturalization of the surviving parent if

one of the parents is deceased; or

(3) The naturalization of the parent having

legal custody of the child when there has

been a legal separation of the parents or the

naturalization of the mother if the child was

born out of wedlock and the paternity of the

child has not been established by

legitimation; and if

(4) Such naturalization takes place while such

child is under the age of eighteen years;

and

(5) Such child is residing in the United States

pursuant to a lawful admission for

permanent residence at the time of the

naturalization of the parent last naturalized

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under clause (1) of this subsection, or the

parent naturalized under clause (2) or (3) of

this subsection, or thereafter begins to

reside permanently in the United States

while under the age of eighteen years.

Section 321 was repealed in 2000, but it was undisputed that its later repeal had no

bearing on the issue of whether petitioner automatically derived citizenship pursuant to its

requirements on September 15, 1995, when it was still in effect. It was also undisputed that on

September 15, 1995, petitioner met most of the requirements for derivative citizenship as a

child born out of wedlock under Section 321(a)(3). The only dispute was whether petitioner’s

“paternity had been established by legitimation” at the time of his mother’s naturalization. In

particular, the parties disputed what it meant to “establish paternity by legitimation” for

purposes of the INA. 

Because this phrase was not explicitly defined by the statute, the December 23 order

looked to the plain meaning of the phrase, the legislative history and Ninth Circuit precedent. 

In Matter of Rowe, 23 I&N Dec. 962, 965–66 (2006), a native of Guyana sought derivative

citizenship under Section 321(a) and argued that his paternity had not been established by

legitimation. The Board of Immigration Appeals held in Rowe that because all children had

been legitimated by Guyanese statute, a child was deemed legitimated for all purposes,

including Section 321(a). The immigration court and BIA relied on Rowe in denying

petitioner’s claim in the present matter.

The December 23 order disagreed with Rowe on the grounds that the BIA did not

consider the distinction between whether a child was legitimated in general and whether a

child’s paternity was established by legitimation as required by Section 321(a). It determined

that because a statute must be interpreted to give each word some operative effect, the word

“by” indicated that legitimation must be the means through which paternity was established. 

Paternity established in some other way was insufficient to defeat citizenship. Based on a

review of the legislative history, the December 23 order determined that in employing the

phrase “paternity of the child is established by legitimation,” Congress intended that paternity

of the born-out-of-wedlock child be established by legitimation, which required the marriage of

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the parents subsequent to the child’s birth. The final record was clear that petitioner’s father

never married his mother, which alone was sufficient to dispositively determine that petitioner

qualified for derivative citizenship pursuant to Section 321(a).

ANALYSIS

1. COSTS.

Petitioner filed a bill of costs in this matter seeking $16,481.14 in costs. The clerk

subsequently taxed costs in the amount of $2,404.35. The clerk disallowed all interpreter and

translation costs sought by petitioner, totaling $12,083.14. The clerk also disallowed $416.40 in

transcript fees, and $1497.15 in witness fees. Petitioner seeks review of the taxation of costs as

provided by Rule 54(d)(1).

Courts cannot authorize costs that are not authorized under 28 U.S.C. 1920, although

they are permitted to interpret the meaning of the phrases used in Section 1920. Alfex Corp. v.

Underwriters Labs., Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 178 (9th Cir. 1990). Respondent incorrectly asserts

that Section 1920(6) only allows compensation of “special interpretation services under section

1828 of this title” (Respondent’s Br. at 2). Section 1920(6) also explicitly allows compensation

of “court appointed experts” and “compensation of interpreters.” Although the Ninth Circuit has

not addressed this issue, other courts have held that “compensation of interpreters” includes

costs related to translation of documents so long as they were necessarily incurred. BDT

Products, Inc. v. Lexmark, 405 F.3d 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2005); Quy v. Air America, Inc. 667 F.2d

1059, 1065 (D.C.Cir. 1981); Competitive Technologies v. Fujitsu Ltd., 2006 WL 6338914

(N.D.Cal. 2006). This order agrees that this is the most reasonable interpretation of Section

1920(6).

This order finds that the translation costs sought by petitioner were necessary. One of

the issues at trial was whether petitioner had been legitimated under Salvadoran law. This

required translations of numerous foreign law documents which were of material aid to the

Court in resolving this case. Petitioner is therefore entitled to taxation of costs for translations.

Respondent further objects to petitioner’s sought “rush” rates for certain translations. 

Because of the undersigned’s busy trial calendar, this case was tried in five court days over

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three and a half weeks. Petitioner obtained the “rushed” translations in question because he

sought to depose his own expert to preserve his testimony due to his expert’s unavailability on

the scheduled trial dates. At a discovery dispute hearing two days before the scheduled

deposition, the trial dates were re-arranged so as to allow petitioner’s expert to testify live. By

then, petitioner had already incurred the “rushed” costs. Because these “rushed” transcripts

were ordered to accommodate the discontinuous trial schedule necessitated by the

undersigned’s calendar, their cost should also be taxed.

Respondent next objects that the interpretation costs sought by petitioner are excessive

because they include $34.80 in mileage costs and because the interpreter was present in court

both on November 16 and November 18 but was only used on November 18. Petitioner is

correct that it was necessary for the interpreter to be present on both days because the schedule

may have proceeded such that the interpreter would have been necessary beginning November

16. Additionally, this order holds that “compensation of interpreters” under Section 1920(6)

may reasonably include mileage costs. Petitioner is therefore entitled to have these costs taxed.

Respondent also objects to the taxation of transcript fees. By statute, fees of the court

reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case

are recoverable. 28 U.S.C.1920(2). The local rules expressly permit recovery of costs of

transcripts “necessarily obtained for an appeal” or if a statement by a judge from the bench is to

be reduced to a formal order; otherwise, without prior court approval or stipulation by the

parties, “[t]he cost of other transcripts is not normally allowable.” Civ. L.R. 54-3(b). While not

normally allowable, this order holds that petitioner is entitled to the cost of all hearing

transcripts in this matter because they were “necessarily obtained.” 28 U.S.C.1920(2). The

parties were required to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and a November

25 order explicitly required specific citation to the reporter’s transcript (November 25 order at

1). The transcripts were necessarily obtained for this purpose, and petitioner is entitled to

recover these costs.

Respondent also objects to the travel and lodging expenses of plaintiff’s expert witness

Jose Tercero. Reasonable travel and lodging expenses may be reimbursed in a cost award

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pursuant to Section 1920(3). Respondent argues that it is probable that the witness’s air fare

was not the lowest available. Petitioner’s counsel, however, has submitted a sworn declaration

that no lower fare was available (White Decl. at 2). Respondent does no more than speculate

that this was incorrect.

Respondent also argues that Witness Tercero’s stay was extended beyond what was

necessary for trial. Witness Tercero arrived two days prior to his scheduled testimony and two

days after. Petitioner’s counsel has declared under oath that this was necessary to allow

petitioner’s counsel to meet with Witness Tercero before trial, as well as for Witness Tercero to

help petitioner’ counsel prepare to cross-examine respondent’s expert witness. On that basis,

petitioner should be awarded all the travel and lodging costs submitted for Witness Tercero.

Finally, respondent objects that two items for which petitioner seeks award of costs are

described with insufficient particularity. First, respondent objects to the first item on the bill

titled “Translation,” which seeks $863.50 for “Written translation (3,925 words)” on the

grounds that it was unclear what documents were translated with regards to this item. Second,

with regards to the bill dated October 27, 2009, respondent objects to the unspecified “project

management fee” in the amount of $320, on the grounds that insufficient information was

provided to determine whether it was necessary to the case. This order agrees. No later than

NOON ON MAY 18, 2010, petitioner may submit an elaborated explanation of these two items. 

The other $15,297.64 in costs sought by petitioner are GRANTED.

2. ATTORNEY’S FEES.

EAJA provides that a party in a civil action against the United States is entitled to

reasonable attorney’s fees if: (i) the claimant is a “prevailing party,” (ii) the government’s

position was not “substantially justified,” (iii) no “special circumstances makes an award

unjust,” and, (iv) the fee application is timely submitted to the court within thirty days of final

judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(A)–(B); see INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 158 (1990). 

Respondent contends that petitioner is not entitled to attorney’s fees because the government’s

position was substantially justified. The government’s position is “substantially justified” in

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this context where it “has a reasonable basis in law and fact.” Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428

F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 2005).

The Ninth Circuit has held that in evaluating whether the government’s position is

reasonable, the government’s position encompasses not only the litigation position of the

litigating agency, but also the administrative decisions upon which the present action is based. 

Thangaraja, 428 F.3d at 873–74. The government’s position in this matter therefore includes

its litigation position as well as the BIA and IJ decisions ordering petitioner’s removal.

The “substantially justified” standard is met when “reasonable people could differ as to

the appropriateness of the contested action.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). 

The government need not be “justified to a high degree.” Ibid. Although it did not prevail, this

order holds that the government’s position in this matter nevertheless was substantially

justified. The government’s position in this matter relied on the BIA’s decision in Rowe, which

as noted above, also interpreted the meaning of legitimation in Section 321(a). Although the

December 23 order disagreed with Rowe, the government was reasonable in relying upon it,

especially in this largely unsettled area of the law which had not previously been addressed in

this context by a district court.

In this circumstance, petitioner is not entitled to attorney’s fees under EAJA. 

Petitioner’s motion for attorney’s fees is therefore DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, petitioner’s entitlement to taxation of costs sought on

review is GRANTED in the amount of $15,297.64. No later than NOON ON MAY 18, 2010,

petitioner may submit an elaborated explanation for the additional $1,183.50 that he seeks. His

entitlement to attorney’s fees is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 11, 2010. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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