Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-03861/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-03861-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL L. ROBERTS,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

JOE MCGRATH, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. C 04-3861 JF (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Docket No. 66) 

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the instant civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”), and PBSP employees. The Court

ordered service of the complaint on Defendants California Department of Corrections; Officer T.

Travis; Officer D. Luna; Officer B. Chaucer and Warden Joe McGrath. The Court dismissed the

complaint as to Defendant State Of California and dismissed with leave to amend Plaintiff’s

claims against Defendant “Does” 1-25, employees of the California Department of Corrections. 

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming eight additional Defendants and alleging one

additional claim. On February 13, 2006, the Court ordered service of the amended complaint on

the additional Defendants and referred this action to the Pro Se Prisoner Mediation Program. 

Case 5:04-cv-03861-JF Document 72 Filed 03/25/08 Page 1 of 8
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Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

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On June 19, 2006, Defendants California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(“CDCR”) and Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) filed a motion to dismiss. On July 5, 2006,

Magistrate Judge Vadas filed a mediation report stating that the parties were unable to reach an

agreement at the June 16, 2006 mediation. On March 27, 2007, the Court granted Defendants’

CDCR and PBSP’s motion to dismiss and issued a further scheduling order. 

Defendants Travis, Luna, McGrath, Chaucer, Mullen, Dahlberg, Uptergrove, Terry,

Thomas, Beers and Deters (“Defendants”) then moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. Plaintiff has filed opposition, and Defendants have filed a reply. Based

upon the papers submitted, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motion and DISMISS the

complaint without prejudice. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Exhaustion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to

provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. §

1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

Although once within the discretion of the district court, exhaustion in prisoner cases covered by

§ 1997e(a) is now mandatory. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). All available

remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies “need not meet federal standards, nor must

they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.’” Id. (citation omitted). Even when the prisoner seeks

relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a

prerequisite to suit. Id.; Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). Similarly, exhaustion is a

prerequisite to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or

particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong. Porter, 534

U.S. at 532. 

The PLRA exhaustion requirement requires “proper exhaustion” of available

administrative remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). The PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied “by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally

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Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

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defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2382. “The text of 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a) strongly suggests that the PLRA uses the term ‘exhausted’ to mean what the

term means in administrative law, where exhaustion means proper exhaustion.” Id. at 2387. 

Therefore, the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion. Id. “Proper

exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules

because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure

on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 2386 (footnote omitted). 

The State of California provides its prisoners the right to appeal administratively “any

departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those individuals as adversely

affecting their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). It also provides them the right to

file appeals alleging misconduct by correctional staff. Id. § 3084.1(e). In order to exhaust

available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed through several

levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal

form, (3) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (4) third level appeal to the

director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F.

Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit 15, § 3084.5). A final decision

from the director’s level of review satisfies the exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a). Id. at

1237-38. 

Nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct.

910, 922-23 (2007); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir 2003). It should be treated

as a matter of abatement and brought in an “unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion rather than [in] a

motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citations omitted). In deciding a motion to dismiss for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies under § 1997e(a), the court may look beyond the

pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. If the court concludes that the

prisoner has not exhausted California’s prison administrative process, the proper remedy is

dismissal without prejudice. Id. Defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence

of exhaustion, and inmates are not required to plead or demonstrate exhaustion specifically in

their complaints. Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 921-22. 

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Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

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As there can be no absence of exhaustion unless some relief remains available, a movant

claiming lack of exhaustion must demonstrate that pertinent relief remained available, whether at

unexhausted levels or through awaiting the results of the relief already granted as a result of that

process. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Here, Defendants correctly raise nonexhaustion in an unenumerated motion to dismiss. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff did not timely

exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. Defendants note that Plaintiff was

required to file an appeal within fifteen working days of the actions that he alleges occurred on

August 12, 2003. Cal. Code of Regs. Tit. 15 § 3084.6(c). 

Defendants note that Plaintiff states that his initial administrative appeal “disappeared or

was caused to be ‘lost.’” Amended Complaint at 2. Plaintiff contends that his second

administrative appeal was subsequently “lost” without a log number assigned. Id. Plaintiff

states that he does not have the original appeal forms, but did attach exhibits to show that the

appeals process is in disarray. Defendants point out that Plaintiff’s attachments concerning his

appeals are not related to any of the claims in the amended complaint. Attachment 1A is an

Inmate Appeal Assignment Notice for appeal log number PBSP-S-04-01275, dated May 25,

2004, informing Plaintiff that his appeal has been sent to staff for a first level response. Amend.

Compl., Ex. 1A. This appeal concerns the issue of case information and records. Id. Plaintiff

also includes an August 25, 2004 memorandum informing Plaintiff that his appeal for log

number PBSP-S-04-01275 was lost. Id. at 2. Plaintiff’s Attachment 1B is an Inmate Appeal

Assignment Notice for appeal log number PBSP-S-04-01069, dated June 28, 2004, concerning

the issue of living conditions, and informing Plaintiff that his appeal has been sent to staff for a

first level response. Amend. Compl., Ex. 1B at 1. Plaintiff includes a memorandum dated

August 25, 2004, that his appeal for log number PBSP-S-04-01069 was lost. Id. at 2; Defs.’

Mot. at 4.

Plaintiff also has submitted an affidavit dated September 1, 2005, which was filed with

the Court on September 6, 2005. This affidavit includes two attachments regarding Plaintiff’s

appeal in 2005. Plaintiff alleges that his appeals for relief are being lost to keep - “certain

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Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

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matters from coming to light.” Pl.’s Affidavit at 1-2. Plaintiff states that he could re-appeal, but

that the attachments and exhibits would have been placed on the “original 602” appeal -that is

“lost.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff contends that he cannot replace lost documents. Plaintiff states “[a]nd

To Re-appeal Would Be “Fruitless” Without Them. Note: Same Reviewer.” Id. The

attachments include an Inmate Appeal Assignment Notice for appeal log number PBSP-S-05-

01628, dated July 5, 2005, concerning property issues. The second attachment is a memorandum

from D.W. Bradbury, Appeals Coordinator, noting that Appeal log number PBSP-S-05-01628

had been lost or misplaced. This memo notifies Plaintiff that he has the right to re-file the appeal

by submitting another CDC-602 form, using the same appeal log number. This 2005 appeal

concerns Plaintiff’s request to order earplugs. Decl. Of C. Wilbur In Support of Defs.’ Mot. at 3, 

¶ 10. 

Defendants also recognize that Plaintiff filed several appeals between August 12, 2003,

and September 17, 2003, but that none of these appeals made it past the screening process. Id.

At 2, ¶ 7. Plaintiff filed an appeal on November 17, 2003, which was classified as a staff

compliant about Defendants Travis, Chaucer and Luna. This appeal was screened out because

Plaintiff did not meet the time constraints for filing an appeal. Plaintiff did not resubmit this

appeal. Decl. of Wilbur at 2, ¶ 8. Defendants assert that this appeal does not satisfy the

exhaustion requirement because it was untimely. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2382. Additionally,

none of Plaintiff’s remaining 2003 appeals appear to be related to the claims in the Amended

Complaint, except for an appeal regarding property that was returned to Plaintiff because it was

missing documentation and it was never resubmitted. Decl. of Wilbur at 2, ¶ 7. Defendants

therefore maintain that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed because Plaintiff’s administrative

appeals record, documented by the PBSP Appeal Coordinator and exhibits to Plaintiff’s amended

complaint, demonstrates that Plaintiff has not fully exhausted his administrative remedies

through the director’s level of review. 

In his opposition, Plaintiff notes that Defendants Lethal Polk and D. Freeman were

included in this action and have not been served with the amended complaint. Plaintiff contends

that the Attorney General has failed to serve these Defendants and is in default. 

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Pl.’s Opp. at 1-2. However, it appears that these Defendants never returned an executed

summons. Counsel for the remaining defendants’ is not required to serve or notify any

additional defendants. Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the United States

Marshals were directed to serve the amended complaint on the named Defendants based on the

identifying information provided by Plaintiff. Defendants are not in default. Moreover, the

issue of service on these two Defendants appears moot at this point, in light of Plaintiff’s failure

to exhaust administrative remedies. 

As to the issue of exhaustion, Plaintiff maintains that he was on strip status for twelve

days after the August 2003 incident and thus he could not file an administrative appeal during

that time. When he finally did receive the appeals form, he claims the appeals were

“subsequently ‘lost’ by floor staff/officers.” Pl.’s Opp. at 2. Plaintiff states that this is why the

appeals coordinator did not have any record of them and no log number was assigned to them. 

Id. at 3. Plaintiff asserts that he was subjected to a grievance system that was defective because

all staff were apprised of the incident that gave rise to the suit at issue here. Id. Plaintiff

maintains that he tried every legal means available to him and sought relief that was unavailable. 

Plaintiff alleges that the appeals system is in disarray and analogizes the prison appeals process

to the current status of adequate medical care and treatment at the state prison facilities. Id. at 5. 

Plaintiff cites to White v. California, 195 Cal. App. 3d 452, 464 (1987), for the

proposition that “[e]xhaustion is not required if the administrative remedies are unavailable or

inadequate.” Id. at 3. However, as Defendants point out, the claims in White were brought

under the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA). The Court in White found that the plaintiff

did not need to exhaust any administrative procedures because the EHA did not contain an

administrative procedure for the plaintiff to bring his claim that his class was excluded from

receiving EHA entitlements. Id. at 464. Here, the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation provides an administrative appeal process that requires Plaintiff to present his

claims in order to obtain relief prior to filing suit. White is not controlling authority, nor is it

relevant to Plaintiff’s claims in the instant complaint. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that the

complaint “should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt he

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can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief” citing to 

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). Pl.’s Opp. at 3. Plaintiff contends that the Court should

apply liberal standards of review as he is proceeding pro se. Id. at 4. However, the Court notes

that Plaintiff’s allegations relating to his substantive claims are not at issue in the pending

motion to dismiss, and that the only issue presently before the Court is whether Plaintiff timely

exhausted his administrative remedies before filing this suit. Plaintiff also states that he may file

for joinder to include additional facts after the original pleading to show a continued violation. 

Id. at 6. However, Plaintiff does not allege, or demonstrate, that these new facts or claims have

been exhausted through the administrative appeals process available to him. 

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish that he exhausted his

administrative remedies regarding his claims in the amended complaint prior to filing this suit. 

Even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations about the appeals process in general as true, Plaintiff ’s

supporting documentation does not demonstrate that his appeal concerning the instant claims

was lost or misplaced. Plaintiff’s contention regarding the general processing of inmate appeals,

that some are lost or misplaced, does not excuse exhaustion here. Even assuming that Plaintiff’s

“lost” appeal could in some way satisfy the exhaustion requirement at the informal and/or first

levels of review, Plaintiff does not allege, or establish, that he exhausted all of his available

remedies through the director’s level of review to completely exhaust the present claims. Nor

can Plaintiff avoid the exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a) by alleging that any further

attempts to appeal would be futile. The Court notes that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement

cannot be satisfied “by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative

grievance or appeal.” Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. at 2382. “Proper exhaustion demands

compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no

adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the

course of its proceedings.” Id. at 2386 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to

dismiss will be GRANTED. 

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Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

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B. Supplemental Jurisdiction

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges state law claims of assault, battery, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Amend. Compl. at

16-17. Defendants move for dismissal of Plaintiff’s state tort claims because he did not exhaust

his administrative remedies before filing a claim with the Victim Compensation and Government

Claims Board. Defs. Mot. at 6. The Court’s jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law tort claims is

supplemental in nature. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A district court may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction where “ the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Here, Plaintiff’s federal claims have been

dismissed. Pursuant to § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s state law claims. See Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (court

may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims under

§1367(c)(3) once it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction); see also

Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (although discretionary,

claims under state law should be dismissed when associated federal claims are dismissed before

trial). The dismissal is without prejudice; Plaintiff may proceed with his state law claims in state

court. 

CONCLUSION 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust

administrative remedies (docket no. 66) is GRANTED. Pursuant to § 1367(c)(3), the Court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. The amended

complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: JEREMY FOGEL 

United States District Judge

3/25/08

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