Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00272/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00272-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHELE M.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security,1

Defendant.

Case No.: 19-cv-00272-JLB

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF Nos. 14; 18]

On February 6, 2019, Plaintiff Michele M. filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of 

Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying her applications for a period of disability 

and disability insurance benefits and for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). (ECF No. 

1.) Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and the 

Commissioner’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 14; 18.) For the 

reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

DENIES the Commissioner’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, reverses the decision 

1 Andrew Saul is hereby substituted as the defendant in this case pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

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of the Commissioner, and remands this matter for further administrative proceedings

consistent with this decision. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 28 and May 6, 2016, Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability 

and disability insurance benefits and SSI under Titles II and XVI, respectively, of the 

Social Security Act, alleging disability commencing January 24, 2016. (ECF No. 12-5 at 

2–7.)2

 After her applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration, Plaintiff 

requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) on August 4, 2017. (ECF 

No. 12-4 at 20.) On July 3, 2018, Plaintiff, her attorney, and vocational expert Shirley 

Ripp (“the VE”) appeared before ALJ MaryAnn Lunderman (“the ALJ”). (ECF No. 12-2 

at 34.) In a decision dated August 28, 2018, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled

as defined by the Social Security Act. (Id. at 12–32.) The ALJ’s decision became the final 

decision of the Commissioner on December 18, 2018, when the Appeals Council denied 

Plaintiff’s request for review. (Id. at 1–6.) Plaintiff then commenced this action for judicial 

review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). (ECF No. 1.) 

II. SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In rendering her decision, the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five-step sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At Step One, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 24, 2016, her alleged

disability onset date. (ECF No. 12-2 at 18.)

At Step Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

connective tissue disease; neuropathy in the right hand; carpel tunnel syndrome in the left 

hand; left ankle pain;

3 and morbid obesity. (Id.) 

2 All page numbers in this Order refer to the page numbers provided by the CM/ECF 

system. 

3 In a seeming inconsistency, the ALJ also found “ankle pain” to be a non-severe 

impairment. (ECF No. 12-2 at 19.)

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At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the impairments listed 

in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (Id. at 22.)

Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), with certain 

exceptions. (Id. at 23.) Specifically, the ALJ determined that: 

the climbing of ramps and stairs must be limited to frequently, while the 

climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds must be precluded entirely from the 

work duties as assigned. Balancing, stooping (bending at the waist), kneeling, 

crouching (bending at the knees), crawling, handling (gross manipulation) and 

fingering (fine manipulation) with the bilateral upper extremities must be 

limited to frequently. Within the assigned work area, there must be no 

exposure to unprotected heights and fast[-]moving machinery.

(Id.) 

At Step Four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “was capable of performing past 

relevant work as a social worker aide” because such “work does not require the 

performance of work-related activities precluded by [Plaintiff’s] [RFC].” (Id. at 26.) The 

ALJ accepted the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff’s “[RFC] does not preclude [Plaintiff] from 

performing her past work as a social-service aid as it is generally performed in the national 

economy.” (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the 

Social Security Act and did not proceed to Step Five of the sequential evaluation process—

whether Plaintiff was able to perform any other work. (Id. at 28.) 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Social Security Act allows for unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review 

of the Commissioner’s final agency decision. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The 

scope of judicial review, however, is limited. The Commissioner’s final decision should 

not be disturbed unless: (1) the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error; or (2) the ALJ’s 

determinations are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See 

Schneider v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000). Substantial 

evidence is “more than a mere scintilla, but may be less than a preponderance.” Lewis v. 

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Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence that, 

considering the entire record, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Id.; accord Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 

2003).

In making this determination, the Court must consider the record as a whole, 

weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001); Desrosiers v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). Where the evidence 

can reasonably be construed to support more than one rational interpretation, the Court 

must uphold the ALJ’s decision. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 

1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). This includes deferring to the ALJ’s credibility determinations 

and resolutions of evidentiary conflicts. See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 509. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS OF ERROR

Plaintiff raises the following claims of error in her Motion for Summary Judgment: 

1. Can the ALJ’s decision be supported by substantial evidence where the RFC

determination failed to consider the impact of Plaintiff’s mental impairments?

2. Can the ALJ’s decision be supported by substantial evidence where the ALJ’s 

rejection of Plaintiff’s testimony is contradicted by the record and the ALJ’s reasoning 

failed to consider the entire record?

3. Can the ALJ’s decision be supported by substantial evidence where the ALJ 

cherry-picked portions of the record to support her ultimate conclusion of non-disability 

while ignoring significant portions of the record that support Plaintiff’s claim of disability?

(ECF No. 14-1 at 7.)

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V. DISCUSSION

A. Whether the ALJ Erred by Failing to Consider Plaintiff’s Non-Severe Mental 

Impairments When Determining Her RFC

1. Parties’ Arguments

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s RFC determination and argues that it was not 

supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff’s non-severe 

mental impairments. (Id. at 15–17.) Plaintiff provides that “[i]n assessing the RFC, the 

adjudicator must consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an individual’s 

impairments, even those that are not ‘severe.’” (Id. at 15 (quoting Buck v. Berryhill, 869 

F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2008)).) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ found that Plaintiff had 

non-severe but medically determinable mental impairments, yet “failed to even mention 

[Plaintiff’s mental] limitations in the [RFC] assessment.” (Id.) 

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff’s mental 

impairments were not severe, but he is silent as to whether the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s 

non-severe mental impairments when determining the RFC. (ECF No. 18-1 at 3.) In reply, 

Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner failed to address Plaintiff’s claim and clarifies that 

her argument is not that the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff’s mental impairments as not 

severe but that the ALJ did not consider her non-severe mental impairments when 

determining her RFC. (ECF No. 20 at 3.) Plaintiff again contends that an ALJ “must 

consider the combination of impairments—both severe and non-severe—when 

determining the RFC.” (Id. (citing Buck, 869 F.3d at 1049).) 

2. Relevant Background Relating to Plaintiff’s Mental Impairments 

Plaintiff is a 60-year-old female who suffers from anxiety, depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). She grew up in an abusive household and was beaten 

by her father beginning at age four. (ECF No. 12-6 at 79.) She was also sexually abused 

beginning at age four. (Id.; ECF Nos. 12-8 at 53; 12-15 at 21.) She was forced into 

prostitution when she was sixteen years old and was abused by her “pimp,” her thenboyfriend and current ex-husband. (ECF Nos. 12-6 at 79; 12-7 at 108, 129; 12-8 at 52, 54; 

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12-15 at 3, 22.) She spent three-and-a-half or four-and-a-half years in federal prison. (ECF 

Nos. 12-6 at 79; 12-8 at 52.) She has a history of methamphetamine and cocaine use but 

has been clean for over twenty years. (See ECF No. 12-8 at 50, 52.) She does not sleep 

well, experiences night terrors, and sometimes “wakes up in a panic.” (Id. at 52; ECF No. 

12-15 at 22.) 

In June 2016, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Thomas A. Schweller for a neurological 

consultation. (ECF No. 12-7 at 129.) Dr. Schweller described Plaintiff’s mental status as 

follows: “She was able to remember one of three objects after five minutes, confabulating 

a pear and a banana. She remembered the street address 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue and 

knew it was the home of the President. Her affect was depressed. Her communication 

skills were intact.” (Id. at 130.) Under “impressions,” Dr. Schweller found that Plaintiff 

suffered from “anxiety, depression, and [PTSD].” (Id. at 131.) Under “functional 

capacity,” Dr. Schweller noted that Plaintiff appeared to suffer from “a significant 

depressive disorder and [PTSD] that may best be addressed by a psychiatrist.” (Id.)

In August 2016, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Jaga Nath Glassman for a psychiatric 

disability evaluation. (ECF No. 12-8 at 50.) Dr. Glassman evaluated Plaintiff’s mental 

status and noted the following: 

The claimant arrived about ten minutes early for the appointment. She 

was a well-developed, well[-]nourished-appearing, obese Caucasian female, 

appearing her stated age. She was clean, neat, well-groomed, and attractive 

in her physical presentation. She was wearing decent blue jeans, an attractive 

blue blouse, and nice flip-flops. Her blond hair appeared slightly-dirty 

appearing and not well-groomed. She was wearing some nice makeup and 

lipstick, and nice jewelry. She had lovely pink toenail polish. She carried a 

nice purse with her. 

She was well-engaged with the examiner, making and maintaining 

good eye contact. She was calm, cooperative, polite, and respectful in her 

attitude and demeanor. Her mood did not appear elevated, but she spoke 

rapidly, with pressured speech, and some tangentiality. This seemed to be 

related to anxiety. She calmed with some support. She was not pervasively 

sad or down or dysphoric. She did show marked affective lability. She was 

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tearful at times. At other times, she smiled nicely, and demonstrated a 

responsive mood. There was a coarse, brusque quality. 

Her thought processes were coherent, relevant, and goal-directed, and 

there was no evidence of a Schizophrenic Thought Disorder, or of any 

psychotic symptoms. She has some difficulty following instructions, 

rambling and going off track in a circumstantial, anxious manner. There was 

no grossly odd or bizarre behavior. 

Cognitively, she presented as of average intellectual functioning. She 

was alert and oriented x 3. She repeated three of three words immediately, 

remembered two of three words at five minutes, three of three with a hint. She 

did Serial 3’s fairly well. She used her fingers to do a money-changing 

problem, and eventually gave the correct answer. She interpreted a proverb 

appropriately. She knew the current president and the recent past presidents. 

She knew the sun rises from the east. She correctly named the capital of New 

Jersey, where she grew up. 

(Id. at 53.) 

Dr. Glassman diagnosed Plaintiff, in relevant part, with dysthymic disorder, 

generalized anxiety disorder, methamphetamine and cocaine abuse in long-term remission,

and mixed personality disorder with borderline and antisocial features. (Id. at 54.) Dr. 

Glassman gave Plaintiff a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 554 and 

noted that she was “not taking care of her grooming that well.” (Id.) Dr. Glassman further

found that Plaintiff “has moderate impairment in her capacity to get along adequately with 

others and to behave in a socially-appropriate manner, due to her anxiety, depression, [and] 

dysfunctional personality features,” “mild impairment in her capacity to understand and 

follow even simple instructions consistently,” and “moderate impairment in her capacity 

to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace, and to adapt to changes and stresses in a 

4 “A GAF score is a rough estimate of an individual’s psychological, social, and 

occupational functioning used to reflect the individual’s need for treatment.” Vargas v. 

Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1164 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 

of Mental Disorders 20 (3d ed., rev. 1987)). “A GAF score of 55 indicates at least moderate 

symptoms or moderate difficulty” in social or occupational functioning. (Id.) 

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workplace setting.” (Id. at 54–55.) Dr. Glassman opined that “[c]onsistent, ongoing 

treatment could help decrease her symptoms and improve her functioning.” (Id. at 55.) 

In May 2016, Plaintiff’s son, Marquise M., completed a Third-Party Function 

Report. (ECF No. 12-6 at 14.) Marquise’s report contained the following observations 

and opinions about Plaintiff’s mental health: Plaintiff is homeless, and Marquise is “pretty 

sure” she is bipolar because he “never know[s] how she is going to be.” (Id.) She suffers 

from PTSD and “from being on the streets and in prison,” and “she doesn’t do anything 

but stay by a bathroom and . . . is so depressed she sleeps a lot.” (Id. at 14–15.) She “has 

night terrors every night” and “nightmares of being abused.” (Id. at 15.) She “doesn’t 

care” how she dresses and sometimes Marquise has to “remind her to bathe or wash [her] 

hair.” (Id. at 16.) She “doesn’t have hobbies anymore,” “gets confused and frustrated,” 

and is “very irr[it]able.” (Id. at 18.) She “has a hard time doing anything” and “doesn’t 

like being around [people].” (Id.) She “is very difficult to get along with.” (Id. at 19.) 

She “doesn’t focus too well at all,” and it is “hard for her to con[ce]ntrate.” (Id.) 

The record includes a letter dated June 2018 from Claire Marton, Plaintiff’s case 

manager at Mental Health Systems (“MHS”). (Id. at 78.) In the letter, Ms. Marton

provided that Plaintiff “has a good relationship with her son and grandkids who live outof-state” but “is in long-term recovery from drug and alcohol abuse and is a survivor of 

trauma in early childhood and adulthood.” (Id.) Ms. Marton further provided that Plaintiff 

“participates in medication management, psychiatry[,] and therapy at MHS Kinesis to 

address her [bipolar] disorder and chronic anxiety.” (Id.) From Ms. Marton’s “perspective, 

[Plaintiff] is doing all she can to take care of herself.” (Id.) 

During the administrative hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel asked Plaintiff about how she

interacts with people, and she responded: 

I’ve had a rough life and, you know, I used to be kind of happy go lucky, and 

stuff, you know, but I’m just broke now, and I’m burned out, I’m sad, and it’s 

hard for me to get along with people [anymore] because I just, it’s rough for 

me. It’s just really hard for me. 

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(ECF No. 12-2 at 50.) When asked if she engaged in any social activities, Plaintiff 

answered, “No. I don’t do anything. I can’t now. I’m homeless, and I just really kind of 

don’t want to do anything, you know.” (Id.) When asked about the abuse she suffered in 

the past from her ex-husband, Plaintiff explained how it was something that still bothered 

her every day: 

I have trouble sleeping, you know. I mean I have nightmares about it. Every 

night I wake up in the middle of the night crying. I have a friend that I brought 

with me here today that, that said she would be willing to testify that . . . when 

I spend the night and on her couch, several nights I’ve woken her up, and even 

her ten-year-old daughter said that I’ve woken her up in the middle of the 

night crying. They’ve heard me crying in the middle of the night and stuff 

while I’m sleeping. I’ll be whimpering, and things, you know, yeah. It’s 

really bad. And not only when it’s that, in the daytime it’s hard for me. You 

know, I try not to cry just thinking about my body, you know, how badly my 

body is, and the aches and pains that I have, you know. I cannot think about 

him. It was a way of life. It wasn’t just something that I can get over. It was 

. . . horrible. It was torture living with him, what he did to me . . . .

(Id. at 50–51.) 

3. The ALJ’s Decision 

At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had medically determinable mental 

impairments of depression, PTSD, and anxiety, but the impairments were not severe. (Id.

at 20.) In making this finding, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s mental impairments pursuant 

to the four broad functional areas as required by the regulations, or the “Paragraph B” 

criteria. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a, 416.920a. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had: (1) 

mild limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) mild 

limitations in interacting with others; (3) mild limitations in her ability to concentrate, 

persist, or maintain pace; and (4) mild limitations in her ability to adapt or manage herself. 

(ECF No. 12-2 at 20–21.) 

In reaching these conclusions, the ALJ first considered and gave great weight to the 

opinion of non-examining state agency psychological evaluators Drs. George Grubbs and 

Preston Davis. (Id. at 21.) The ALJ noted that Drs. Grubbs and Davis found that, in 

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September 2016 and June 2017, respectively, Plaintiff “had mild limitations in mental 

functioning.” (Id.) The ALJ then asserted that Plaintiff had “received significant treatment 

and is on medications that [have] proven affective at controlling her symptoms.” (Id. at 

22.) 

The ALJ next considered the opinion of Dr. Glassman, stating: 

I have given some weight to the statements of the psychological consultative 

examiner. Jaga Glassman, MD, reported the claimant was not receiving any 

kind of psychiatric or mental health treatment. 10F/4. She complained of 

depression and anxiety. She insisted she was unable to get along with others. 

10F/3. A mental status examination was near normal. The claimant appeared 

clean, neat, and well-groomed. She was wearing makeup, lipstick, nice 

jewelry[,] and lovely pink toenail polish and nice purse. She was calm, 

cooperative[,] and polite. Her mood was elevated but she had pressured 

speech. Her thought process was coherent, relevant[,] and goal-directed. She 

had some difficulties in following instructions. She was of average 

intelligence. She had minimal difficulty on testing of her memory and 

concentration. 10F/5. Dr. Glassman found moderate limitations in interacting 

with others and in concentration, persistence[,] and pace. Dr. Glassman 

suggest[ed] that with consistent and ongoing treatment[,] the claimant’s 

symptoms would decrease [and] functioning would improve. 10F/7. This 

appears to be the case. The medical evidence indicates the claimant has since 

received consistent treatment for her mental health issues. 12E/1, 25.5

 As 

previously discussed, the treatment records indicate she is doing quite well on 

medication with no adverse reactions. 25F/8, 12, 14. With that said, her 

mental status examinations have also been generally unremarkable. Notably, 

her speech is of normal rate, tone, and volume. 25F/2. Therefore, I have 

assigned great weight to the opinion of Dr. Glassman. 

(Id. (footnote added).) 

Lastly, the ALJ considered and assigned some weight to the statements of Ms. 

Marton, Plaintiff’s case manager at MHS. (Id.) The ALJ noted that Ms. Marton’s 

statements “suggested” that Plaintiff “is capable of managing her psychiatric care,” and 

5 The ALJ cites to “12E/25,” but no such page exists in the Administrative Record. 

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Ms. Marton’s “letter [did] not appear to indicate any significant difficulties with mental 

functioning.” (Id.) 

Within her Step 2 analysis, the ALJ specifically acknowledged:

The limitations identified in the “paragraph B” criteria are not a residual 

functional capacity assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental 

impairments at steps 2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation process. The mental 

residual functional capacity assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential 

evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment by itemizing the 

various functions contained in the broad categories found in paragraph B of 

the adult mental disorders listings in 12.00 of the Listing of Impairments (SSR 

96-8p). Therefore, the following residual functional capacity assessment 

reflects the degree of limitation I have found in the “paragraph B” mental 

function analysis.

(Id. at 21.) Despite this acknowledgement, and despite her recognition that in determining 

an individual’s RFC, an ALJ must “consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including 

impairments that are not severe” (id. at 17), the ALJ did not address Plaintiff’s medically 

determinable mental impairments at Step 3, where she analyzed whether any impairments, 

alone or in combination, were of a severity to meet or medically equal the criteria of an 

impairment listed in 20 CFR Part 404. Thereafter, the ALJ assigned Plaintiff an RFC

without including any mental restrictions. 

4. Applicable Law

“RFC is an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related 

physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis.” SSR 

96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (July 2, 1996). “RFC is not the least an individual can do

despite his or her limitations or restrictions, but the most.” Id. In determining a claimant’s 

RFC, the ALJ must consider “all of the relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3). If a claimant has more than one impairment, the ALJ 

must consider all medically determinable impairments, including “medically determinable 

impairments that are not ‘severe.’” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2); accord

Buck, 869 F.3d at 1048–49 (quoting 1996 WL 374184, at *5). 

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In assessing mental abilities specifically, the ALJ must consider the nature and 

extent of the claimant’s mental limitations and restrictions to determine the claimant’s RFC 

“for work activity on a regular and continuing basis.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(c), 

416.945(c). A claimant’s “limited ability to carry out certain mental activities, such as 

limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out instructions, and in 

responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and work pressures in a work setting, 

may reduce [his or her] ability to do past work and other work.” Id. 

5. Discussion

a. The ALJ Erred by Not Considering—or Not Clarifying Whether She 

Considered—Plaintiff’s Non-Severe Mental Impairments When Determining 

the RFC

As argued by Plaintiff, the ALJ was required to consider all of Plaintiff’s medically 

determinable impairments, including her non-severe mental impairments, when 

determining the RFC. (ECF No. 14-1 at 15–17.) Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred 

because the ALJ did not consider her non-severe mental impairments when determining 

the RFC. (Id.) The Court recognizes that “consideration of ‘the limiting effects of all 

impairments’ does not necessarily require the inclusion of every impairment into the final 

RFC if the record indicates the non-severe impairment does not cause a significant 

limitation in the plaintiff’s ability to work.” Medlock v. Colvin, No. CV 15-9609-KK, 2016 

WL 6137399, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2016). But because the Court cannot discern 

definitively from the hearing decision whether the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s non-severe 

mental impairments and any corresponding limitations before assigning Plaintiff an RFC 

without any mental restrictions, the Court finds error. 

As detailed above, at Step 2, the ALJ conducted a Paragraph B analysis and found

that Plaintiff had: (1) mild limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying 

information; (2) mild limitations in interacting with others; (3) mild limitations in her 

ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and (4) mild limitations in her ability to 

adapt or manage herself. (ECF No. 12-2 at 20–21.) After the ALJ conducted her Paragraph

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B analysis, the ALJ addressed some6 of the medical providers who opined on Plaintiff’s 

mental limitations and the weight she gave to each of their opinions.7

 

In the ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s non-severe mental impairments, the ALJ 

indicated she relied heavily on the opinion of Dr. Glassman. The ALJ first assigned “some 

weight” to Dr. Glassman’s opinion, highlighting that Dr. Glassman found that Plaintiff had 

“moderate limitations in interacting with others and in concentration, persistence[,] and 

pace” and suggested that treatment would8 improve Plaintiff’s symptoms. (Id. at 22.) The 

ALJ then continued on to find that Plaintiff “has since received consistent treatment for her 

mental health issues” and “treatment records indicate she is doing quite well on medication 

with no adverse reactions.” (Id.) The ALJ then simply stated that she assigned “great 

weight” to Dr. Glassman’s opinion without further explanation or conclusion. 

The Court finds no explanation from the ALJ as to why, while crediting Dr. 

Glassman’s opinion—which, as detailed above, stated that Plaintiff’s mental limitations 

6 The ALJ did not discuss Dr. Schweller’s opinion, which provided that Plaintiff 

appeared to suffer from “a significant depressive disorder and [PTSD].” (ECF No. 12-7 at 

131.) Further, although not a medical record, the ALJ did not discuss Plaintiff’s son’s 

Third-Party Function Report. See Lahti v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-CV-00080-REB, 2018 WL 

4643055, at *5 (D. Idaho Sept. 27, 2018) (“The law is clear that friends and family 

members—who, by definition, will seldom be disinterested—are nonetheless competent to

testify.”); Flores v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:16-CV-00878-SAB, 2017 WL 2797861, at 

*9 n.5 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2017) (“The Ninth Circuit has found that ‘friends and family 

members in a position to observe a [plaintiff’s] symptoms and daily activities are 

competent to testify as to [his or] her condition.’” (quoting Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009))). 7 It is not clear whether this was part of the ALJ’s Step 2 analysis, Step 3 analysis, or 

an out-of-order RFC analysis limited to Plaintiff’s mental health impairments. The ALJ 

notes that “the following residual functional capacity assessment reflects the degree of 

limitation I have found in the ‘paragraph B’ mental function analysis” (ECF No. 12-2 at 

21), but it is unclear whether “the following” refers to the next several paragraphs or the 

next section of the hearing decision. 

8 Dr. Glassman actually opined that “ongoing treatment could decrease” Plaintiff’s 

symptoms and improve her functioning. (ECF No. 12-8 at 55 (emphasis added).) 

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imposed both mild and moderate impairments—she nonetheless rejected the opinion by 

concluding that Plaintiff was “doing well” on unspecified medication. Moreover, and more 

importantly, the ALJ did not explain how, if at all, her assessment of Plaintiff’s non-severe 

mental impairments factored into her RFC determination. The ALJ’s discussion of 

Plaintiff’s RFC contains no reference to Plaintiff’s mental impairments or reference to the 

ALJ’s own findings of mental limitations at Step 2. The ALJ does not explain why, after 

finding Plaintiff had mental limitations, she omitted these limitations from the RFC. See 

Hutton v. Astrue, 491 F. App’x 850, 851 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Further, while the ALJ was free 

to reject [the claimant’s] testimony as not credible, there was no reason for the ALJ to 

disregard his own finding that [the claimant’s] non[-]severe PTSD caused some ‘mild’

limitations in the areas of concentration, persistence, or pace.”); Palafox v. Saul, No. CV 

19-1517 SS, 2020 WL 752153, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2020) (“Here, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff had mild limitations in ‘understanding, remembering, or applying information,’ 

and in ‘concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace.’ However, the ALJ gave no 

indication that he considered these limitations in determining Plaintiff’s RFC.”). 

The hearing decision does not conclusively indicate that the ALJ considered 

Plaintiff’s non-severe mental impairments when determining the RFC or that the ALJ’s 

omission of any mental restrictions in the RFC was intentional. The closest she comes to 

doing so is the one vague and conclusory assertion that “the following residual functional 

capacity assessment reflects the degree of limitation I have found in the ‘paragraph B’

mental functioning analysis.” (ECF No. 12-2 at 21.) It may be that the ALJ did consider 

Plaintiff’s non-severe mental impairments when determining the RFC and that the ALJ’s

general findings concerning Plaintiff’s symptoms being “controlled” by medication were

the reason the ALJ did not include any mental limitations in the RFC. However, this is 

speculative, as the ALJ does not provide this explanation herself. See Treichler v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A court] cannot substitute [its] 

conclusions for the ALJ’s, or speculate as to the grounds for the ALJ’s conclusions. 

Although the ALJ’s analysis need not be extensive, the ALJ must provide some reasoning 

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in order for [the court] to meaningfully determine whether the ALJ’s conclusions were 

supported by substantial evidence.” (citation omitted)). 

The Court finds the decision in Soloman v. Commissioner of Social Security to be 

analogous and persuasive. 376 F. Supp. 3d 1012 (D. Ariz. 2019). In Soloman, the ALJ 

found that the plaintiff had non-severe mental impairments and in applying the Paragraph 

B criteria, found that the plaintiff “had (1) no limitation in activities of daily living; (2) 

mild limitation in social functioning; (3) mild limitation in concentration, persistence, and 

pace; and (4) no episodes of decompensation.” Id. at 1020. The district court stated that,

despite the ALJ’s findings, “the RFC didn’t incorporate any of the non-severe mental 

limitations that had been identified at Step 2” and that the ALJ did not “discuss with any 

particularity [the plaintiff’s] mental limitations, only briefly noting two medical opinions 

regarding mental health and giving them ‘substantial weight.’” Id. The court ultimately 

found that the ALJ erred because he or she “determined [the plaintiff] had mental 

limitations that caused mild limitation in social functioning and concentration, persistence, 

and pace” but the hearing decision “provide[d] no indication that the ALJ considered those 

limitations when calculating [the plaintiff’s] RFC at Step 4.” Id. at 1021. The court further 

found that the omissions were not harmless error “because the ALJ ultimately determined 

that [the plaintiff] could perform” past work as a project estimator, and it was possible that 

the plaintiff’s “limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace could prevent him from 

performing” this skilled work. Id. 

As in Soloman, the ALJ here did not make it clear that she considered Plaintiff’s 

non-severe mental limitations and consciously concluded that no mental limitations were 

required in the RFC. Nor did the ALJ explain the significance of her assessment of Dr. 

Glassman’s, Drs. Grubb’s and Davis’s, or Ms. Marton’s opinions before proceeding to her 

RFC analysis. The Court finds that this constitutes error. 

///

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b. The ALJ’s Determination that Plaintiff Was “Doing Quite Well” on 

Medication Is Not Supported by Substantial Evidence 

Even assuming that the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s mental limitations and 

consciously excluded them from the RFC based upon a determination that the limitations 

were no longer present, the Court would still find error. The medical records the ALJ cited 

to in her assessment following her Paragraph B analysis are not adequate to support a 

conclusion that the mental limitations identified by the ALJ herself (ECF No. 12-2 at 21) 

were no longer present. 

As support for the finding that Plaintiff had received “consistent treatment for her 

mental health issues,” the ALJ cited only to Ms. Marton’s letter. (Id. at 12-2 at 22; ECF 

No. 12-6 at 78.) However, Ms. Marton stated only that Plaintiff “participates in medication 

management, psychiatry[,] and therapy at MHS Kinesis to address her [bipolar] disorder 

and chronic anxiety,” and “from [Ms. Marton’s] perspective, [Plaintiff] is doing all she can 

to take care of herself.” (Id.) Nothing in Ms. Marton’s letter fairly supports the conclusion 

that Plaintiff was receiving consistent treatment for all of the non-severe mental 

impairments identified by the ALJ: depression, anxiety, and PTSD. (ECF No. 12-2 at 20.)

Further, as support for the findings that Plaintiff was “doing quite well on 

medication” and that medication had “proven affective at controlling her symptoms,” the 

ALJ cited to three pages of progress notes from the North Inland Mental Health Center. 

(Id. at 22.) The records cited to by the ALJ provide that on January 11, 2018, Plaintiff 

reported that she “was still doing well on her current med[ications] but ha[d] additional 

anxiety in the context of various situational stressors.” (ECF No. 12-15 at 13.) Dr. Douglas 

Conte, psychiatrist, noted that she had a “good response” to her medication and increased 

her Vistaril dose to 25mg. (Id. at 14.) On February 15, 2018, Plaintiff reported that 

“Vistaril [was] slightly helpful” for anxiety and her response to medication was 

“fair/good.” (Id. 11–12.) However, she also reported experiencing an increase in 

depression and was especially anxious due to situational stressors. (Id. at 11.) On June 1, 

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2018, Plaintiff reported that “[B]uspirone helps with anxiety,” but she was experiencing 

“intrusive thoughts/flashbacks.” (Id. at 8.) 

Although these three records indicate that medication may have helped Plaintiff’s 

anxiety from January to June 2018, Plaintiff still reported anxious symptoms in the form 

of situational stressors, as well as symptoms from depression and PTSD. In fact, the

records reveal little to nothing about any improvement or treatment for Plaintiff’s 

depression and PTSD. It appears the ALJ focused only on the fact that Plaintiff’s general 

response to her medication was “good” or “fair” during these few months, while ignoring 

the fact that Plaintiff continued to report symptoms of depression, anxiety, and PTSD. See 

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1018 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Reports of ‘improvement’ in the 

context of mental health issues must be interpreted with an understanding of the patient’s 

overall well-being and the nature of her symptoms.”). For example, on June 29, 2018, in 

a progress note not cited to by the ALJ, Plaintiff complained that her nightmares were back 

and she was screaming in her sleep. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff further reported that she “ha[d] not 

seen significant improvement of mood” in response to the medication, “Buspirone help[ed]

with anxiety,” and she was still having “intrusive thoughts/flashbacks.” (Id. at 3–4.) 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the records cited to by the ALJ do not reasonably support 

a conclusion that the limitations the ALJ herself found were no longer present. See also

Hutsell v. Massanari, 259 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We also believe that the 

Commissioner erroneously relied too heavily on indications in the medical record that [the 

plaintiff] was ‘doing well,’ because doing well for purposes of the treatment program has 

no necessary relation to a claimant’s ability to work or her work-related functional 

capacity.”); Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A physician’s] 

statements must be read in the context of the overall diagnostic picture he draws. That a 

person who suffers from severe panic attacks, anxiety, and depression makes some 

improvement does not mean that the person’s impairments no longer seriously affect her 

ability to function in a workplace.”). 

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c. The ALJ’s Error Is Not Harmless

The Court finds that the ALJ’s failure to consider Plaintiff’s non-severe mental 

impairments when determining the RFC is not harmless error. Harmless error is defined 

as error that is “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Stout v. 

Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006). The ALJ’s conclusions must be supported 

by substantial evidence, and the error must not negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate 

conclusion. Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citing Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

As stated above, at Step 4, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could return to her past 

work as a social worker aide, specifically noting that “[t]his work does not require the 

performance of work-related activities preclude by the” RFC. (ECF No. 12-2 at 26.) 

According to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), work as a social worker aide, 

or “social-services aide,” has a specific vocational preparation (“SVP”) level of 6 and is 

therefore “skilled work.”9

 Social-Services Aide, DOT 195.367-0.4, 1991 WL 671601 (Jan. 

1, 2016); SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704, at *3 (Dec. 4, 2000) (“[S]killed work corresponds 

to an SVP of 5-9 in the DOT.”). The DOT describes the requirements of a social-services 

aide as follows: 

Assists professional staff of public social service agency, performing any 

combination of the following tasks: Interviews individuals and family 

members to compile information on social, educational, criminal, 

institutional, or drug history. Visits individuals in homes or attends group 

meetings to provide information on agency services, requirements, and 

procedures. Provides rudimentary counseling to agency clients. Oversees 

9 “Skilled work requires qualifications in which a person uses judgment to determine 

the machine and manual operations to be performed in order to obtain the proper form, 

quality, or quantity of material to be produced. Skilled work may require laying out work, 

estimating quality, determining the suitability and needed quantities of materials, making 

precise measurements, reading blueprints or other specifications, or making necessary

computations or mechanical adjustments to control or regulate the work. Other skilled jobs 

may require dealing with people, facts, or figures or abstract ideas at a high level of 

complexity.” 20 CFR §§ 404.1568(c), 416.968(c). 

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day-to-day group activities of residents in institution. Meets with youth 

groups to acquaint them with consequences of delinquent acts. Refers 

individuals to various public or private agencies for assistance. May care for 

children in client’s home during client’s appointments. May accompany 

handicapped individuals to appointments.

1991 WL 671601. Given that the ALJ found that Plaintiff had “mild limitations in 

interacting with others” (ECF No. 12-2 at 21), it is possible that limitations in social 

interactions—which appears to be a significant portion of a social-services aide’s duties—

could prevent Plaintiff from returning to her past work. Also, the VE testified that if 

Plaintiff was limited to work with “occasional public contact interaction” it would “affect” 

her work as a social-services aide. (Id. at 55.) Additionally, the work of a social-services

aide has a Reasoning Level of 4, which expects someone to be able to “[i]nterpret a variety 

of instructions furnished in written, oral, diagrammatic, or schedule form.” 1991 WL 

671601. Given that the ALJ also found that Plaintiff had “mild limitations” in 

“understanding, remembering, or applying information,” it is also possible that these 

limitations could prevent Plaintiff from returning to her past work. 

Therefore, had the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s non-severe mental impairments when 

determining the RFC, the ALJ may have concluded that Plaintiff did not have an RFC to 

perform the requirements of her past work. The ALJ’s error prevented her from proceeding 

to Step 5—whether Plaintiff is able to do any other work considering her RFC, age, 

education, and work experience. Thus, the ALJ’s error is not harmless. 

6. Conclusion

As stated above, because the hearing decision does not make clear whether the ALJ

affirmatively considered Plaintiff’s non-severe mental impairments and their 

corresponding limitations when determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the Court finds that the ALJ 

erred. Further, because it is possible that the ALJ would have concluded that Plaintiff could 

not return to her past work as a social worker aide had the ALJ properly considered 

Plaintiff’s non-severe mental impairments, and the ALJ stopped at Step 4, the ALJ 

committed error that is not harmless. This error alone is grounds for remand. As a result 

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of the Court’s inability to affirm the ALJ’s RFC determination, the Court need not reach 

the other disputed issues raised by Plaintiff. 

B. Scope of Remand 

1. Applicable Law

“When the ALJ denies benefits and the court finds error, the court ordinarily must 

remand to the agency for further proceedings before directing an award of benefits.” Leon 

v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017). This applies particularly “[i]f additional 

proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative proceeding.” Garrison, 759 

F.3d at 1019. But there is an exception to this rule, known as the “credit-as-true” rule, 

under which the court may remand with instructions to calculate and award benefits. For 

this rule to apply, a three-part test must be satisfied:

(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings 

would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally 

sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or 

medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited 

as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

Id. at 1020. 

2. Parties’ Arguments

Plaintiff argues that the Court should apply the credit-as-true rule and remand the 

case to the ALJ for a calculation and award of benefits. (ECF No. 14-1 at 24–27.) Plaintiff 

first argues that if Dr. Glassman’s opinion concerning Plaintiff’s mental limitations was 

properly considered, the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled. (Id. at 25–26.) 

As support for this proposition, Plaintiff cites to the VE’s testimony, which states that if 

Plaintiff was limited to work with “occasional public contact interaction,” it would “affect” 

her past relevant work as a social worker aide. (Id. at 26.) Plaintiff then concludes that 

because the VE opined that Plaintiff did not have any transferrable skills, on remand, the 

ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled. (Id.) Plaintiff next argues that if her 

complaints concerning her physical impairments were properly considered, the ALJ would 

be required find her disabled. (Id. at 26–27.) The Commissioner argues that, should the 

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Court find the ALJ committed non-harmless error, the proper remedy is a remand for 

further proceedings, and not an award of benefits, as the record “casts serious doubt” that 

Plaintiff is disabled. (ECF No. 18-1 at 16.) 

3. Discussion

The Court is mindful of Ninth Circuit authority for the proposition that, where an 

ALJ failed to properly consider either subjective symptom testimony or medical opinion 

evidence, it is sometimes appropriate to credit this evidence as true and remand the case 

for a calculation and award of benefits. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. However, in 

Ghanim v. Colvin, a case decided after Garrison, another Ninth Circuit panel simply 

remanded the case for further administrative proceedings without even addressing the 

credit-as-true rule, even though the panel determined that substantial evidence did not 

support the ALJ’s rejection of treating medical opinions or his adverse credibility 

determination. 763 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2014). And, in Marsh v. Colvin, the panel did not 

apply or even acknowledge the credit-as-true rule where the ALJ had failed to even mention 

a treating source’s opinion that the claimant was “pretty much nonfunctional”; instead, the 

panel simply remanded the case to afford the ALJ the opportunity to comment on the 

doctor’s opinions. 792 F.2d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Here, Plaintiff has not made a persuasive argument that the credit-as-true rule should 

apply. Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff has even satisfied parts one and two of the rule, 

Plaintiff’s argument fails at part 3. Although the VE testified that she did not “believe” 

that Plaintiff acquired any transferable skills from her past work (ECF No. 12-2 at 54), 

“[w]hen it comes to the transferability of skills, an ALJ is required to make particular 

findings of fact in the written decision, supported with appropriate documentation, 

regarding what transferable skills a claimant has obtained, and to what jobs those skills are 

transferable.” Salazar v. Astrue, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1222 (D. Ore. 2012). The ALJ 

made no findings in the hearing decision as to whether Plaintiff acquired any transferable 

skills from her past work. Further, “transferability of skills ‘is precisely the sort of finding 

. . . that SSR 82-41 requires the ALJ, and not the court, to make.” Id. (quoting Bray v. 

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Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also SSR 82-41, 1982 

WL 31389, at *4 (Jan. 1, 1982) (“Skills, levels of skills and potential occupations to which 

skills from [past relevant work] may be transferred are for the adjudicator or ALJ to 

determine (with the assistance, when required, of a [vocational specialist] or occupational 

reference sources).”). Therefore, the Court cannot make any findings as to whether 

Plaintiff acquired transferable skills from her past work as a social worker aide, and 

ultimately, whether a lack of transferable skills would necessitate a finding of disabled. 

Additionally, Plaintiff argues that crediting Plaintiff’s complaints concerning her 

physical ailments would require a finding of disabled, but Plaintiff does not explain why. 

Plaintiff merely reiterates her argument that the ALJ erred in rejecting her complaints 

without further analysis as to why Plaintiff would necessarily be found as disabled if her 

complaints were credited-as-true. Accordingly, the Court declines Plaintiff’s request to 

apply the credit-as-true rule and finds that the appropriate remedy in this case is a remand 

to the ALJ for further proceedings. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment and DENIES the Commissioner’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF 

Nos. 14; 18.) Judgment shall be entered reversing the decision of the Commissioner and 

remanding this matter for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 25, 2020

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