Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00980/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00980-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

HEATHER R. POWELL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12cv980-CSC

) (WO)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

The plaintiff applied for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of

the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq., alleging that she was unable to work

because of a disability. Her application was denied at the initial administrative level. The

plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ also denied the claim. The Appeals Council

rejected a subsequent request for review. The ALJ’s decision consequently became the

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner). See Chester v.

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Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the court for review

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). The parties have consented to the United

Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 1

103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to Social

Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.

Case 2:12-cv-00980-CSC Document 18 Filed 10/15/13 Page 1 of 21
States Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings in this case and ordering the entry of

final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and M.D. Ala. LR 73.1. Based on the

court’s review of the record in this case and the briefs of the parties, the court concludes

that the decision of the Commissioner should be affirmed.

II. Standard of Review

Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when the

person is unable to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result

in death or which haslasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of not less than 12 months . . .

To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential

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evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

(1) Is the person presently unemployed?

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1?

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative

answer to any question, other than step three, leadsto a determination of “not

disabled.”

A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 2

abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.

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McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).

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The standard of review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court

must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive ifit issupported bysubstantial evidence. 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Substantial

evidence is “more than a scintilla,” but less than a preponderance; it “is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation

marks omitted). The court “may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or

substitute . . . [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357

F.3d 1232, 1240 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted).

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings . . . No similar

presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal

conclusions, including determination of the properstandardsto be applied in

evaluating claims.

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

III. The Issues

A. Introduction. The plaintiff was 26 years old on the date of onset of disability.

(R. 123, 132). She has completed the eleventh grade. (R. 142). Her past work experience

includes work as a fast food worker. (R. 32). Following the hearing, the ALJ concluded

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986) is a supplemental security income case (SSI). 3

The same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II are appropriately cited

as authority in Title XVI cases. See e.g. Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A).

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that the plaintiff has severe impairments of “post concussion headaches and major

depressive disorder.” (R. 25). The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was able to return to

her past relevant work as a fast food worker, and thus, she was not disabled. (R. 31-33).

 B. Plaintiff’s Claims. As stated by the plaintiff, she presents the following three

issues for the Court’s review.

1. The Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because the ALJ failed to

give great weight to the opinion of Ms. Powell’s treating physician, Dr.

Steven Davis.

2. The Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because the ALJ’s finding

that Ms. Powell is capable of performing a full range of work at all exertional

levels is not supported by substantial evidence.

3. The Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because the ALJ failed to

properly consider Ms. Powell’s credibility.

(Doc. # 13, Pl’s Br. at 5).

IV. Discussion

A disability claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating an inability to return

to her past work. Lucas v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1990). In determining

whether the claimant hassatisfied this burden, the Commissioner is guided by four factors:

(1) objective medical facts or clinical findings, (2) diagnoses of examining physicians, (3)

subjective evidence of pain and disability, e.g., the testimony of the claimant and her family

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orfriends, and (4)the claimant’s age, education, and work history. Tieniber v. Heckler, 720

F.2d 1251 (11th Cir. 1983). The ALJ must conscientiously probe into, inquire of and

explore all relevant facts to elicit both favorable and unfavorable facts for review. Cowart

v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735-36 (11th Cir. 1981). The ALJ must also state, with

sufficient specificity, the reasons for her decision referencing the plaintiff’s impairments.

Any such decision by the Commissioner of Social Security which involves a

determination of disability and which is in whole or in part unfavorable to

such individual shall contain a statement of the case, in understandable

language, setting forth a discussion of the evidence, and stating the

Commissioner’s determination and the reason or reasons upon which it is

based.

42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (emphases added). Within this analytical framework, the court will

address the plaintiff’s claims.

A. Treating Physician. Powell argues that the ALJ improperly rejected her

treating physician’s opinion without providing sufficientreasons. (Doc. # 13, Pl’sBr. at 6).

According to the plaintiff, because the ALJfailed to identify any contradictory evidence to

Dr. Davis’ opinion, she has failed to identify “good cause” to reject his opinion. (Id.). Of

course, this is not the standard for evaluating the treating physician’s opinion.

The law in this circuit is well-settled that the ALJ must accord “substantial weight”

or “considerable weight” to the opinion, diagnosis, and medical evidence of the claimant’s

treating physician unless good cause exists for not doing so. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d

1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986); Broughton v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 961 (11th Cir. 1985).

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The Commissioner, as reflected in his regulations, also demonstrates a similar preference

for the opinion of treating physicians.

Generally, we give more weight to opinionsfromyour treating sources,since

these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide

a detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical impairment(s) and may bring

a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained fromthe

objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations,

such as consultive examinations or brief hospitalizations.

Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing 20 CFR § 404.1527

(d)(2)). The ALJ’s failure to give considerable weight to the treating physician’s opinion

is reversible error. Broughton, 776 F.2d at 961-62.

There are, however, limited circumstances when the ALJ can disregard the treating

physician’s opinion. The requisite “good cause” for discounting a treating physician’s

opinion may exist where the opinion is not supported by the evidence, or where the

evidence supports a contrary finding. See Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir.

1987). Good cause may also exist where a doctor’s opinions are merely conclusory,

inconsistent with the doctor’s medical records, or unsupported by objective medical

evidence. See Jones v. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 941 F.2d 1529, 1532-33 (11th

Cir. 1991); Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584-85 (11th Cir. 1991); Johns v. Bowen,

821 F.2d 551, 555 (11th Cir. 1987). The weight afforded to a physician’s conclusory

statements depends upon the extent to which they are supported by clinical or laboratory

findings and are consistent with other evidence of the claimant’s impairment. Wheeler v.

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Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1986). The ALJ “may reject the opinion of any

physician when the evidence supports a contraryconclusion.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703

F.2d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 1983). The ALJ must articulate the weight given to a treating

physician’s opinion and must articulate any reasons for discounting the opinion. Schnorr,

816 F.2d at 581.

On December 29, 2010, Dr. Steven Davis completed a clinical assessment of pain

and a physical capacityevaluation assessing Powell’simpairments. (R. 315-16). According

to Dr. Davis, Powell’s pain was severe enough to distract her from work, physical activity

would increase her pain, and side effectsfrom her medication would be considered severe.

(R. 315). He also opined that she could only lift 5 pounds occasionally, sit for one hour in

a work day,stand or walk for two hours and she would be absent from work more than four

days per month. (R. 316). A treatment note on that day also reflects Dr. Davis’ opinion.

Comes in today for a disability form to be filled out. She continues to have

headaches. She continues to really kind of hurt all over from time to time.

This woman was involved in a terrible MVA. I think she is very lucky that

she did not kill herself. She had a terrible concussion and has never been the

same since. I really think that she has some profound brain damage, which

of course is not easy to measure. She is just not the same person that she

used to be. Hopefully this will be taken into consideration on her disability

application. Sometimes things are very difficult to put into words about a

person. We can use all sorts of fancy words, but it doesn’t get down to the

basic issues of a patient and all I can say is this person following the MVA,

she is different, her cognitive functions are different, her whole personality

seems to be different.

(R. 317).

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After reviewing the medical evidence, the ALJ gave Dr. Davis’ opinion “little

weight” because

it isinconsistent with Dr. Davis(sic) own treatment records, it isinconsistent

with the longitudinal medical evidence, and it isinconsistent with the amount

oftreatment the claimant hasreceived. Forinstance, Dr. Davis neverreferred

the claimant to pain management, he did not prescribe her narcotic pain

medications, and he did notsee her for almost one year prior to filling out this

form, which would suggest the claimant had not experienced any pain worthy

of seeking medical attention in almost twelve months (All Exhibits). This

opinion is also inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, which was

all normal. It is inconsistent with the claimant’s own reported activities of

daily living, which include caring for her two children. Dr. Davis also opined

that the claimant can occasionally lift and carry up to five pounds,she can sit

for one hour out of eight and stand or walk for two hours out of eight (Exhibit

11F, page 3). He opined that the claimant can never climb stairs or ladders

or work around hazardous machinery, and he stated thatshe would miss more

than four days per month from work as a result of her impairments (Exhibit

11F, page 3). This opinion was also given little weight because it is

inconsistent with Dr. Davis’ treatment records and the objective medical

evidence. The claimant did not visit Dr. Davis for almost one year, and then

she showed up and asked him to fill out forms based on his treatment notes

taken shortly after she had a motor vehicle accident. Even in those notes, Dr.

Davis did not state the claimant had any restrictions related to her reported

headaches (Exhibits 6F, 10F, and 12F). The objective medical evidence is

all normal. The claimant did report post accident headachesto Dr. Davis, but

she had a normal CT scan, and Dr. Davis did not refer her to any specialists

to manage her condition. He also did notrefer herto pain managementfor her

condition.

(R. 28-29).

The ALJ acknowledged that Powell suffers from headaches, but after a thorough

review of her treatment records, discounted Dr. Davis’ assessment. The ALJ’s decision to

discount Dr. Davis’ assessment is supported by substantial evidence. Although Powell

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testified that her most disabling impairment is pain caused by headachesfrom a concussion

suffered in the motor vehicle accident, Dr. Davis’ treatment records do not support his

assessment of the severity of this impairment. Powell was in a single car accident on June

17, 2009. (R. 202). She sustained facial injuries including a bilateral fracture of her nasal

bone, fractures of the right and left mandibulars, and facial lacerations. (R. 203). She also

sustained a cerebral concussion. (Id.). At the scene of the accident, Powell complained

about her foot which had been caught between the dashboard and gas pedal. (R. 332). She

denied any other pain and repeatedly stated she was “fine.” (Id.) However, “[w]hen she

arrived at the emergency room she was inebriated, but oriented to time, place, and person;

at that time was not really having any particular complaints.” (R. 202).

X-rays of the thoracic spine, lumbar spine, and cervicalspine were all negative. (R.

205). A CT scan of her brain revealed no intracerebral bleeding, and no skull fracture. (R.

207). She was “awake and alert, well oriented to time, place, and person, anxious to go

home.” (R. 204). Dr. Davis specifically noted that she was “exhibiting no neurological

deficits.” (Id.) Treatment notes after surgery to repair the facial fractures reflect that

Powell was “cleared by [the Mizell Hospital] physician neurologically.” (R. 219).

On June 29, 2009, Powell complained to Dr. Davis of having headaches. Dr. Davis

noted that the headaches were “probably from her concussion” although he thought they

might also be caused by her neck. (R. 253) He prescribed Flexeril. On August 25, 2009,

Powell complained to Dr. Davis of headaches and black out spells. (R. 252). At that time,

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Dr. Davis attributed Powell’s symptoms to hypoglycemia. (Id.) He prescribed ibuprofen.

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(Id.)

On September 4, 2009, Powell underwent another CT scan of her brain to ascertain

whether her headaches were caused by her concussion. (R. 288). The scan was negative.

(R. 290). Dr. Davis diagnosed Powell with reactive hypoglycemia. (R. 298). On

September 17, 2009, Powell again complained of “really bad headaches” but Dr. Davis

noted that he was “not sure what [was] going on.” (R. 299). In a November 12, 2009

treatment note, Dr. Davis opined that Powell’s headaches might be migraine in nature “even

though it is odd that they started after her MVA.” (R. 300).

Dr. Davis next saw Powell on January 6, 2010, when she complained of headaches

and neck pain. (R. 296). Topamax medication did not help. (Id.)

Powell did not see Dr. Davis again until November 23, 2010 when she complained

of being tired all the time. (R. 296, 317). She also complained of difficulty remembering

things. (R. 317). At that time, Dr. Davis noted that Powell “had a terrible head injury . .

. and probably had a terrible concussion and might well have some type of chronic problems

related to that.” (Id.) He diagnosed her with tension headaches and prescribed Cymbalta

medication. (Id.)

Powell returned to Dr. Davis on December 29, 2010, and asked that he complete the

On August 26, 2008, Powell complained of experiencing a “near syncopal episode” which was 4

attributed to hypoglycemia. (R. 292).

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disability forms. (Id.) It was at this appointment that Dr. Davis opined that Powell was

suffering from “some profound brain damage.” (Id.) There is no notation in any of Dr.

Davis’ treatment records nor is there any objective medical evidence to substantiate this

statement.

Dr. Davis’ assessment of Powell was based on six office visits from the previous

year. During 2010, Dr. Davis had seen Powell only once in January and once in November

before he completed the disability assessment in December. He attributed “profound brain

damage” to Powell even though two CT scans were negative. Consequently, Dr. Davis’

treatment notes do not support the level of disability he attributes to Powell.

In addition, the other medical evidence of record supports the ALJ’s decision to

discount Dr. Davis’ opinion. Dr. WilliamWatson performed a neurological examination of

Powell on February 7, 2011. (R. 359-60). At that time, she was acceptably alert, and

oriented to place, time and person. (Id.) Her speech was clear. (Id.) Dr. Watson opined

that her headaches may be “rebound headaches” caused by chronic use of daily pain

medication. (Id.) Dr. Watson did not opine that Powell was suffering from brain damage

and he did not suggest that she was disabled or unable to work. (Id.)

The ALJ may disregard the opinion of a physician, provided that she states with

particularity reasons therefor. Sharfarz, supra. The ALJ examined and evaluated the

treatment records for evidence supporting Dr. Davis’ assessment of Powell’s ability to

work, and she considered Powell’s own testimony. Only then did the ALJ discount Dr.

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Davis’ assessment of Powell’s abilities. The evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s

findings regarding Dr. Davis’ assessment of Powell. “Even though Social Security courts

are inquisitorial, not adversarial, in nature, claimants must establish that they are eligible

for benefits.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1269 (citing Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1281

(11th Cir. 2001)). See also Holladay v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1988).

This the plaintiff has failed to do. Based upon its review of the ALJ’s decision and the

objective medical evidence of record, the court concludes that the ALJ properly rejected

Dr. Davis’ opinion regarding the limitations caused by Powell’s headaches.

B. Residual Functional Capacity. Powell next complains that the ALJ’s

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment is not supported by substantial evidence

because “the record does not contain anyRFC assessmentsfrom any treating or examining

physicians which support the ALJ’s RFC assessment.” (Doc. # 13 at 8). The ALJ

concluded that the plaintiff had the residual functional capacity

to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following

nonexertional limitations: the claimant can performsimple,routine, repetitive

tasks. She can concentrate for up to two hours. She can have minimal

changes in a work setting. She can have no concentrated exposure to fumes,

odors, gases, temperature extremes. She cannot work at unprotected heights

or around dangerous machinery. She cannot operate automotive equipment.

(R. 28).

An ALJisrequired to independently assess a claimant’sresidualfunctional capacity

“based upon all of the relevant evidence.” 20 CFR § 404.1545(a)(3) (“We will assess your

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residual functional capacity based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence.”); 20

C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) (“Responsibility for assessing residual functional capacity at the

administrative law judge hearing . . . level. If your case is at the administrative law judge

hearing level . . ., the administrative law judge . . . isresponsible for assessing your residual

functional capacity.”) See also Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440 (“The residual functional capacity

is an assessment, based upon all of the relevant evidence, of a claimant’s remaining ability

to do work despite [her] impairments.”). “Residual functional capacity, or RFC, is a

medical assessment of what the claimant can do in a work setting despite any mental,

physical or environmental limitations caused by the claimant’s impairments and related

symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a).” Peeler v. Astrue, 400 Fed. Appx. 492, 494 n.2 (11th

Cir. 2010).

The plaintiff argues that “the ALJ is required to have evidence from a physician

which supports her RFC assessment given that it is by definition “a medical assessment.””

(Doc. # 13 at 9). In essence, the plaintiff contends that the record must contain a residual

functional capacity determination by an examining or treating physician. However, the

plaintiff’s argument conflates the nature of residual functional capacity with the

responsibility for making the residual functional capacity determination. The

Commissioner’s regulations clearly show who is responsible for making the residual

functional capacity determination when a case has reached the administrative law judge

hearing.

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If your case is at the administrative law judge hearing level or at the Appeals

Council review level, the administrative law judge or the administrative

appeals judge at the Appeals Council (when the Appeals Council makes a

decision) is responsible for assessing your residual functional capacity.

20 CFR § 404.1546.

But that observation does not end the enquiry. The essential question raised by the

plaintiff is whether it is necessary to have a residual functional capacity assessment by a

medical provider as part of the evidence which an ALJ must consider in reaching a

determination. In this case, the answer is no. The ALJ stated that she

considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can

reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and

other evidence, based on the requirements of 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929 and SSRs

96-4p and 96-7p. The undersigned has also considered opinion evidence in

5 6

accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 416.927 and SSRs 96-2p,

96-5p, 96-6p, and 06-3p.

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(R. at 28) (footnotes added).

Although Powell also complains that the ALJ’s RFC is contrary to the RFC offered

by her treating physician, the ALJ was not required to accept her treating physician’s RFC.

The ALJ reviewed and considered all the medical evidence in the record in determining

Powell’s RFC. The court hasindependently considered the record as a whole and findsthat

This Ruling clarifies the policy of the Social SecurityAdministration on the evaluation ofsymptoms

5

in the adjudication of claims for disability benefits under title II and title XVI of the Social Security Act.

This Ruling clarifies when the evaluation ofsymptoms, including pain, requires a finding about the

6

credibilityof an individual and explainsthe factorsto be considered in assessingthe credibilityofthe individual's

statements about symptoms.

Generally, these Rulings describe howthe Commissioner evaluates and usesmedicalsourceopinions. 7

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the record providessubstantialsupport for the ALJ’s conclusions. Consequently, the court

concludes there was sufficient medical evidence before the ALJ from which she properly

could made a residual functional capacity assessment.

Powell accuses the ALJ of speculating on her physical abilities, and contends that

the ALJ should have secured a consultative evaluation. (Doc. # 13 at 11). The ALJ did

order a neurological consultative evaluation, (R. 359-67), and considered that assessment

in determining Powell’s RFC.

Finally, Powell attempts to improperly shift to the Commissioner the burden of

establishing the evidentiary basis from which her residual functional capacity may be

determined. In the fourth step of the sequential analysis, the ALJ determinesthe claimant’s

RFC and her ability to return to her past relevant work. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238. While

the ALJ hasthe responsibility to make a determination of plaintiff’s RFC, it is plaintiff who

bears the burden of proving her RFC, i.e., she must establish through evidence that her

impairments result in functional limitations and that she is “disabled” under the Social

Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512 (instructing claimant that the ALJ will consider

“only impairment(s) you say you have or about which we receive evidence” and “[y]ou

must provide medical evidence showing that you have an impairment(s) and how severe it

is during the time you say that you are disabled”). See also Pearsall v. Massanari, 274

F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001) (it is claimant’s burden to prove RFC, and ALJ’s

responsibility to determine RFC based on medical records, observations of treating

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physicians and others, and claimant’s description of limitations).

In support of her position regarding her RFC, Powell relies on a case from another

districtforthe proposition that theCommissioner’sresidualfunctional capacityassessment

must be supported by a residual functional capacity assessment of a physician. See Doc.

# 13 at 9 (“the ALJ’s finding must be supported by an RFC assessment of a treating

physician or examining physician.” citingColeman v. Barnhart, 264 F.Supp.2d 1007, 1010

(S.D. Ala. 2003)). But Coleman is most assuredly not the last word on this issue. In

Packer v. Astrue, ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 593497 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 14, 2013), Chief Judge

Granade rejected the absolutismofColeman, noting that “numerous court had upheld ALJ’s

RFC determinations notwithstanding the absence of an assessment performed by an

examining or treating physician.” Id. at *3. Like those other courts, this court rejects

Coleman’s seemingly mandatory requirement that the Commissioner’s fifth-step burden

must be supported by an RFC assessment of a physician. The ALJ had before her

8

sufficient medical evidence from which she could make a reasoned determination of

Powell’s residual functional capacity. Thus,she was not required to secure from a medical

source a residual functional capacity assessment.

C. Credibility Analysis. Finally, the plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to

properly consider [her] credibility by impermissibly finding that (1) Ms. Powell’s

The court notes with dismay that the plaintiff failed to cite for the court the many cases which 8

disagree with Coleman v. Barnhart, 264 F.Supp.2d 1007, 1010 (S.D. Ala. 2003). Counsel is reminded of his

obligation of candor to the court.

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participation in her activities of daily living disqualifies her from disability and (2) Ms.

Powell’s alleged lack of treatment disqualifies her from disability.” (Doc. # 13 at 12).

“Subjective pain testimony supported by objective medical evidence of a condition that can

reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms of which the plaintiff complains is itself

sufficient to sustain a finding of disability.” Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007 (11th Cir.

1987). The Eleventh Circuit has established a three-part test that applies when a claimant

attempts to establish disability through her own testimony of pain or other subjective

symptoms. Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Holt v.

Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). This standard requires evidence of an

underlying medical condition and either (1) objective medical evidence that confirms the

severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (2) an objectively determined

medical condition of such severity that it can reasonably be expected to give rise to the

alleged pain. Landry, 782 F. 2d at 1553. In this circuit, the law is clear. The

Commissioner must consider a claimant’ssubjective testimonyof pain ifshe finds evidence

of an underlying medical condition and the objectively determined medical condition is of

a severity that can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged pain. Mason v.

Bowen, 791 F.2d 1460, 1462 (11th Cir. 1986); Landry, 782 F.2d at 1553. Thus, if the

Commissioner fails to articulate reasons for refusing to credit a claimant’s subjective pain

testimony, the Commissioner has accepted the testimony as true as a matter of law. This

standard requires that the articulated reasons must be supported by substantial reasons. If

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there is no such support, then the testimony must be accepted as true. Hale, 831 F.2d at

1012.

According to Powell, the fact that she cares for her children does not demonstrate

that she is not disabled. (Doc. # 13 at 12). At the administrative hearing, the plaintiff

testified that she has two children, ages nine and seven. (R. 46) She further testified that

she has “back pain and headaches and my body hurts.” (R. 44). She also testified she

sometimes cooks, but thatshe and her mother do the laundry. (R. 45-46). She testified that

her pain was a six or seven on a scale of one to ten, and that she “can’t remember as good”

as she did before the accident. (R. 47-48). Finally, she testified that while she does not

black out, when she sits up she “get[s] very blurry and stuff for like 10 to 15 minutes.”

(Id.) As explained more fully below, the ALJ did not fully credit this testimony.

The ALJ discredited the plaintiff’s testimony of disabling pain and functional

restrictions.

Moreover, the claimant has described daily activities, which are not limited

to the extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms

and limitations. The claimant is the only adult in the household with her two

children ages nine and seven, and she provides their only source of care

(Hearing Testimony). The claimant stated that her daily activities include

sitting and playing with her children, cooking, lying around, and watching

television (Exhibit 3E, page 1). She stated that she cleans the house and

performs chores such as sweeping and vacuuming (Exhibit 3E, page 3).

After considering the evidence of the record, the undersigned finds that the

claimant’s medicallydeterminable impairments could reasonablybe expected

to cause some symptoms; however, the claimant’sstatements concerning the

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible

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to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity

assessment.

(R. 31).

If this were the extent of the ALJ’s credibility, the plaintiff might be correct.

However, the ALJ also included the following in her analysis.

In making this [RFC] determination, the undersigned considered all the

evidence of record as well asthe claimant’s allegations and activities of daily

living.

In short, the claimant’s allegations were not credible because they were

inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, which showed that the

claimant had a normal spine, a normal CT scan of her head, and a normal

neurological evaluation. The claimant has not had any finding of any

abnormalities involving her cranial nerves or cerebullar functioning. The

objective evidence also showed that the claimant’s depression hasresponded

well to treatment with Cymbalta. The claimant has not been referred to pain

management, physical therapy, or any specialiststo treat her conditions. She

has rarely sought medical treatment with the exception of the period of time

directly after her automobile accident. The clinical findings do not support

the claimant’s allegations of severe, debilitating headaches. Dr. Grant

9

mentioned the possibility that the claimant could be experiencing rebound

headaches from taking too much over the counter medication, but even he

stated that her alleged headaches were from an unknown etiology. After

January 2010, the claimant did not seek medical treatment again until

November 2010 when she asked Dr. Davis to fill out disability forms for her

(All Exhibits). Such infrequent treatment is inconsistent with uncontrolled,

debilitating daily pain of any kind.

Also, the claimant’s allegationsthatshe needsto constantly change positions

throughout the day due to back pain are not credible. The x-rays of the

claimant’sspine were normal, and Dr. Watson found that the claimant’s back

Dr. William G. Watson completed the neurological evaluation and suggested that Powell might be 9

suffering from rebound headaches. It appears that the reference to Dr. Grant is merely a scrivener’s error as

Dr. Watson completed the evaluation.

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pain appeared to be related to her paraspinal muscles and corresponding bone

with no suggestion of radiculopathy (Exhibit 14F). None of the claimant’s

treating physicians referred her to physical therapy or pain management.

(Id.) (footnote added).

The ALJ has discretion to discredit a plaintiff’ssubjective complaints aslong asshe

provides “explicit and adequate reasons for [her] decision.” Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223. The

ALJ compared the objective medical evidence to Powell’s complaints and determined that

Powell’s allegations of disabling pain were not supported by the medical evidence. The

ALJ did not simply discredit Powell based upon her daily activities or lack of treatment.

Furthermore, when an ALJ decides not to credit a claimant’stestimony, the ALJ must

articulate specific and adequate reasons for doing so, or the record must be obvious as to

the credibility finding. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1995) (emphasis

added); Jones, 941 F.2d at 1532 (articulated reasons must be based on substantial

evidence). The objective, medical records, coupled with Powell’s own testimony,

demonstrate that her allegations regarding the extent of her pain were not credible to the

extent alleged. After a careful review of the record, the court concludes that the ALJ

properly discounted the plaintiff’s testimony and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

credibility determination. It is undisputed that the plaintiff suffers from pain. The ALJ

considered that the plaintiff's underlying condition is capable of giving rise to some pain and

other limitations, but she concluded that the plaintiff’s underlying impairments are not so

severe as to give rise to the disabling intractable pain as alleged by the plaintiff.

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To the extent that the plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have accepted her

testimony about her pain, as the court has explained, the ALJ had good cause to discount

her testimony. This court must accept the factual findings of the Commissioner if they are

supported by substantial evidence and based upon the proper legal standards. Bridges v.

Bowen, 815 F.2d 622 (11th Cir. 1987).

V. Conclusion

The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record, and concludes that

the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence.

A separate order will be entered affirming the Commissioner’s decision.

Done this 15th day of October, 2013.

/s/Charles S. Coody

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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