Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01663/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01663-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUCHELL MAGEE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

K. CLARK, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:09-CV-01663 OWW GSA HC

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATION IN PART

[Doc. #9]

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO SEND BLANK HABEAS FORM

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

DISQUALIFICATION 

[Doc. #11]

ORDER REFERRING MATTER BACK TO

MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR FURTHER

PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

On November 24, 2009, the Magistrate Judge issued a Findings and Recommendation that

recommended the petition be SUMMARILY DISMISSED. The Magistrate Judge further

recommended that the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment. The Findings and

U.S. District Court

E. D. California cd 1

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Recommendation was served on all parties and contained notice that any objections were to be filed

within thirty (30) days of the date of service of the order. 

On December 11, 2009, Petitioner filed objections to the Findings and Recommendation. In

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court has conducted a de novo

review of the case. The claims presented in the petition are not cognizable and must be dismissed

for the reasons stated by the Magistrate Judge. In Ground One, Petitioner attempts to attack a denial

of parole based on his innocence of the underlying convictions. As stated in the Findings and

Recommendation, any challenge to the underlying conviction must be brought in the jurisdiction of

the sentencing court, which in this case is the Central District of California. Ground Two is not

proper since Petitioner is complaining the California Supreme Court erred by failing to grant him a

hearing pursuant to a state law, and such issues of state law are generally not cognizable in a federal

habeas action. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). Grounds Three and Four attack the

underlying convictions and must also be brought in the Central District of California.

Nevertheless, in his objections Petitioner raises certain other issues which involve the parole

board and a parole denial. In particular, Petitioner appears to complain that the Board continues to

rely on the underlying offense in denying parole. Petitioner also claims that prison officials failed to

provide a sentencing hearing to fix his life sentence as required by statute. Such claims may be

cognizable in a federal habeas action. Therefore, the Court will dismiss the petition but provide

Petitioner an opportunity to file an amended petition, since it appears that a tenable claim may be

pleaded. Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9 Cir.1971). However, Petitioner is advised once again th

that any claim involving his underlying convictions must be made in the Central District of

California. He is also advised that the amended petition must reference the instant case number. He

further advised that with respect to his claims, he must comply with Rule 2(c) of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases by specifying his grounds for relief and stating the facts supporting

each ground. This means that Petitioner must provide details on the parole denial and the prison’s

alleged failure to comply with the sentencing law, not the underlying conviction. Petitioner is

forewarned that failure to comply with this Order will result in dismissal of the petition and

termination of the action.

U.S. District Court

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Motion for Disqualification

On December 21, 2009, Petitioner filed a statement requesting disqualification of the

undersigned. Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, a judge has an affirmative duty to recuse himself “in any

proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” See Liteky v. United States,

510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (citation omitted). The substantive standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 455 is “whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the

judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450,

1453 (9 Cir. 1997); United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir.1986). th

The alleged bias must stem from an “extrajudicial source.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S.

at 554-56; United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1454 (9 Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit has th

held that rulings by a court during the course of a case cannot be extra-judicial conduct. See

Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 830 F. 2d 1513, 1523-24 (9th Cir. 1987); Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn,

Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F. 2d 1538, 1548 (9th Cir. 1988). However, in

Liteky v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized that: 

The fact that an opinion held by a judge derives from a source outside judicial

proceedings is not a necessary condition for “bias or prejudice” recusal, since

predispositions developed during the course of a trial will sometimes (albeit rarely)

suffice.

Liteky, 510 U.S. 540, 554. However, judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for

a bias or partiality motion. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 940 (9 Cir. th

1998); United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1560 (9th Cir.1996). Judicial bias or prejudice formed

during current or prior proceedings is sufficient for recusal only when the judge's actions “display a

deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S.

at 555; United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.1994). Thus, judicial rulings may

support a motion for recusal only “in the rarest of circumstances.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555;

Chischilly, 30 F.3d at 1149.

In this case, Petitioner moves for recusal based on the undersigned’s orders in this case and

other cases involving Petitioner. As such, they are not a proper reason for recusal without a showing

of “deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible.” He fails

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to make such a showing. Petitioner has not demonstrated such a deep-seated favoritism on the part of

the undersigned as to make fair judgment impossible.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Findings and Recommendation issued November 24, 2009, is ADOPTED IN PART; 

2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED;

3. Petitioner is GRANTED leave to file an amended petition within thirty (30) days of the

date of service of this Order;

4. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Petitioner a blank form for filing a habeas

action;

5. Petitioner’s motion for disqualification is DENIED; and

6. The matter is REFERRED BACK to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 23, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

U.S. District Court

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