Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00094/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00094-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:7604 Clear Air Act (Emission Standards)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1Plaintiffs’ complaint names Michael Leavitt, former EPA

Administrator, as a Defendant. His successor, Acting

Administrator Johnson, is automatically substituted as a party

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d)(1). See

Answer at 1 n.1. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OUR CHILDREN’S EARTH FOUNDATION,

and SIERRA CLUB,

Plaintiffs,

v.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY, et al.,

Defendants,

and

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE and

NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL & REFINERS

ASSOCIATION,

Proposed Intervenors.

 /

No. C 05-00094 CW

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING

IN PART MOTION

FOR LEAVE TO

INTERVENE AS

DEFENDANTS

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, Applicants

American Petroleum Institute (API) and National Petrochemical &

Refiners Association (NPRA) (collectively, Applicants) move to

intervene as defendants in this action. The motion is opposed

by Plaintiffs Our Children’s Earth Foundation (OCEF) and Sierra

Club (collectively, Plaintiffs). Defendants United States

Environmental Protection Agency and Stephen Johnson, sued by

Plaintiffs in his capacity as Acting Administrator1

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(collectively, the EPA), have not taken a position in support of

or in opposition to the motion. Having considered all of the

papers filed by the parties, the Court grants in part and denies

in part Applicants’ motion for leave to intervene. 

BACKGROUND

I. Underlying Action

The Clean Air Act (CAA) requires that the Administrator of

the EPA promulgate federal standards of performance for sources

of air pollutants. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B). The CAA further

directs that the EPA “shall, at least every 8 years, review and,

if appropriate, revise such standards,” although it “need not

review any such standard if the Administrator determines that

such review is not appropriate in light of readily available

information on the efficacy of such standard.” Id.

Plaintiffs’ claims in this action arise from the EPA’s

failure to review and revise its standards of performance

relating to petroleum refineries, 40 C.F.R. Subparts J, VV and

GGG, or to determine that review of the standards relating to

those Subparts is not appropriate. See respectively 40 C.F.R.

§§ 60.100 et seq. (standards of performance for petroleum

refineries), §§ 60.480 et seq. (standards of performance for

equipment leaks of volatile organic compounds (VOC) in the

synthetic organic chemicals manufacturing industry) and §§

60.590 et seq. (standards of performance for equipment leaks of

VOC in petroleum refineries) (hereinafter the Subparts). 

Plaintiffs allege that, upon conducting the required review, the

EPA should inter alia introduce emission limitations for

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nitrogen dioxides (NOx). Complaint ¶ 29. In their complaint,

Plaintiffs allege three violations of the CAA based on failure

to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B). 

Plaintiffs request declaratory and injunctive relief,

including (1) a declaration that the EPA violated its duty

either to review and if appropriate revise Subparts J, VV and

GGG, or to determine that review of those Subparts is not

appropriate in light of readily available information about

their efficacy; and (2) an order requiring the EPA to fulfill

these duties by issuing proposed revisions of these rules within

six months and final rules within six months. See Complaint ¶¶

A-B. 

On March 15, 2005, the EPA filed an answer. The EPA admits

that it has failed, within eight years of issuance, either to

review and if appropriate revise the relevant Subparts or to

determine that such review is not appropriate. The EPA denies

that Plaintiffs are suffering and will suffer irreparable harm,

and denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief requested. 

II. Applicants for Intervention

By motion filed with the Court on March 25, 2005, API and

NPRA seek to intervene as defendants in this action. Applicants

seek to intervene as of right, under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 24(a)(2), or, in the alternative, permissively, under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(2). 

API is the primary trade association of the oil and natural

gas industry. NPRA is the primary trade association of United

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States petroleum refiners and the petrochemical industry. 

Members of API and NPRA are regulated under the CAA regulations

at issue in this case. API and NPRA members would be

financially impacted if revisions proposed by Plaintiffs, such

as emission limitations on NOx, were adopted by the EPA. API,

NPRA and their members have participated in regulatory and

judicial processes relating to air quality. 

LEGAL STANDARD

To intervene as a matter of right under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), an applicant must claim an interest

the protection of which may, as a practical matter, be impaired

or impeded if the lawsuit proceeds without the applicant. 

Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66

F.3d 1489, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit applies a

four-part test to motions under Rule 24(a):

(1) the motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must

claim a “significantly protectable” interest relating to

the property or transaction which is the subject of the

action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the

disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair

or impede its ability to protect that interest; and (4)

the applicant’s interest must be inadequately protected by

the parties to the action.

Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir.

1993) (citation omitted)). 

The Ninth Circuit interprets Rule 24(a) broadly in favor of

intervention. Id. In evaluating a motion to intervene under

Rule 24(a), a district court is required “to take all wellpleaded, nonconclusory allegations in the motion . . . as true

absent sham, frivolity or other objections.” Southwest Ctr. for

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Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 820 (9th Cir. 2001). 

A court may also at its discretion permit intervention

“when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a

question of law or fact in common.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2). 

In exercising its discretion, a court is to “consider whether

the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication

of the rights of the original parties.” Id. 

DISCUSSION

I. Intervention as of Right Under Rule 24(a)(2)

A. Timeliness

The most important consideration in evaluating the

timeliness of a motion to intervene is whether any delay in

moving for intervention may prejudice existing parties; as long

as prejudice is not likely to result from the timing of the

motion, courts interpret the timeliness requirement liberally. 

See, e.g., Cummings v. United States, 704 F.2d 437, 439 (9th

Cir. 1983) (motion to intervene timely even though made after

interrogatories and two weeks before date set for close of

discovery). 

In the present case, although EPA has filed an answer to

the complaint, no dispositive motions have been filed. 

Plaintiffs do not contest the timeliness of Applicants’ motion. 

Therefore, the Court concludes that Applicants’ motion to

intervene is timely. 

B. Protectable Interests and Impairment of Ability to

Protect Interests

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As noted above, under Rule 24(a)(2), an applicant may

intervene as of right when the applicant “claims an interest

relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of

the action.” The interest asserted need not be a “specific

legal or equitable interest,” but it must be “significantly

protectable.” Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302,

309 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 911 (1989)

(citations omitted). Applicants must also be situated such that

“disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or

impede the applicant’s ability to protect” its asserted

interests. Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at 1493. 

Interests the Ninth Circuit has held sufficient to support

intervention as of right include a city’s interest in preventing

modification of water permits held under the Clean Water Act,

Sierra Club, 995 F.2d at 1482; a State’s interest in preventing

action on federal lands that could impair the State’s legal duty

to manage its own adjacent lands, Forest Conservation Council,

66 F.3d at 1497; a power company’s interest in preventing

federal action that could hinder construction of a power plant

and the company’s duty to ensure a water supply, Churchill

County v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, 1084 (9th Cir. 1998), as

amended by 158 F.3d 491 (9th Cir. 1998); and a city’s interests

in taxing and regulating contested land, Scotts Valley Band of

Pomo Indians of Sugar Bowl Rancheria v. United States, 921 F.2d

924, 927-28 (9th Cir. 1990). In contrast, the Ninth Circuit

held that timber companies’ economic interest in ensuring an

ongoing supply of timber was not a “protectable” interest

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sufficient for intervention as of right when those companies did

not assert existing contracts for the timber in question. 

Portland Audubon, 866 F.2d at 309; see also Sierra Club, 995

F.2d at 1482.

Applicants assert several interests relating to Plaintiffs’

complaint. First, Applicants contend that they have an interest

as past and future participants in the rule-making process. 

They claim that Plaintiffs seek to “short-circuit” the process

established by CAA Section 307(d)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(d)(1)(C), which sets forth rules for inter alia

publication, public comment and judicial review of EPA rulemaking. Applicants also assert a more general economic interest

in preventing the changes sought by Plaintiffs in the EPA’s

regulation of petroleum refineries. Applicants note that if EPA

removed certain startup, shutdown and malfunction exemptions to

emissions requirements, or imposed new limits on NOx emission

rates, API and NPRA members would face increased operating costs

and potential legal liability. Slaughter Decl. ¶¶ 6-7; Ng Decl.

¶¶ 5-6. Finally, Applicants assert an interest in preventing

Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief, which would require

that the EPA fulfill its review obligations by issuing proposed

revisions of the Subparts within six months and final versions

within six months. 

As a prima facie matter, Applicants’ affidavits show that

they have significant economic interests in the current system

of regulations governing petroleum refineries, and a significant

procedural interest in participation in any changes to that

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system. In order to determine whether these interests meet the

second element of the Ninth Circuit’s test, however, Applicants

must show that these interests are “protectable,” Sierra Club,

995 F.2d at 1481-82 (citing Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S.

517 (1970)). Applicants must also meet the third, related

requirement to show that disposition of this case could result

in impairment of Applicants’ ability to protect these interests. 

Applicants demonstrate that their interest as participants

in the procedures established by 42 U.S.C. § 7607 is protected

and may be threatened by Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive

relief, at least insofar as injunctive relief would abridge the

normal § 7607 process. If, for instance, the Court were to

issue an injunction that restricted or shortened opportunities

for Applicants and their members to comment on proposed rules,

their rights may be impeded. 

However, Applicants have not shown that their ability to

protect their other interests could be impaired by disposition

of this action. In attempting to characterize the potential

imposition on their interests broadly, Applicants confuse

Plaintiffs’ factual allegations with the complaint’s actual

claims and requests for relief. The “factual background”

section of Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that technology exists

to reduce the emission rates for NOx from fluidized catalyst

cracking units (FCCU) and that current standards of performance

should be revised accordingly, and that current startup,

shutdown and malfunction exemptions lack technological

justification and should be removed. See Complaint ¶¶ 27-29. 

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Applicants have demonstrated protected economic and procedural

interests in such regulatory changes. However, this interest is

not endangered by Applicants’ claims and request for declaratory

relief per se, because they are narrowly based on the EPA’s

obligation to review and revise its standards of performance

relating to petroleum refineries, or to determine that such

review is not appropriate. Applicants’ interests will be at

stake only once the EPA begins its review or determines not to

review. Even if the Court were to order the EPA to engage in

that process, changes to the existing system of regulations

would not automatically occur. 

Applicants rely heavily on Sierra Club, in which the Ninth

Circuit held that a city had a right to intervene in a case

where the Sierra Club sued the EPA pursuant to the Clean Water

Act. In arguing that the Sierra Club there “challenged EPA for

allegedly failing to list impaired waterways,” Reply at 4,

Applicants omit important facts regarding the posture of Sierra

Club. There, the plaintiff sought not only an order compelling

the EPA to list impaired waters, but also to list and implement 

control strategies . . . by promulgating final National

Pollution Discharge Elimination System permits containing

pollutant-specific, numerical, water quality-based effluent

limitations that reduce toxins being discharged from each

of the Arizona point sources.

995 F.2d at 1480. In practical terms, the court was asked to

order the EPA to change the terms of the city’s permits for its

wastewater treatment plants. 995 F.2d at 1481. Unlike the

city-intervenor in Sierra Club, Applicants have no economic

interests that would be immediately and directly affected by the

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more narrow injunctive relief sought here. The fact that this

case, like Sierra Club, does not involve NEPA is not

dispositive. Applicants have not shown, as a threshold matter,

that resolution of the merits of the action might impair their

protected interests, other than their right to participate in

the review process in the event injunctive relief is granted. 

C. Adequacy of Representation

The burden of showing that an applicant's interests may not

be adequately represented by the existing parties to an action

is minimal. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, 404

U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972); Scotts Valley, 921 F.2d at 926-27. 

Here, it is not clear that the interests of Applicants and the

interest of the EPA are perfectly aligned. While the government

must represent the broad public interest, Applicants are

concerned with their own financial welfare. The Court therefore

finds that Applicants have met this requirement. 

D. Conclusion

Because Applicants have not shown that they have protected

interests that may be impaired by resolution of Plaintiffs’

claims, the Court concludes that Applicants may not intervene as

of right on the merits phase of this action, i.e. adjudication

of Plaintiffs' three claims of violation of the CAA and request

for declaratory relief. However, Applicants may intervene in

this case as to the question of what injunctive relief, if any,

should be ordered with respect to Plaintiffs' claims. 

II. Permissive Intervention Under Rule 24(b)(2)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(2), the Court

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may permit intervention if the applicant presents a claim or

defense that has a question of law or fact in common with the

main action. An applicant seeking “permissive intervention must

prove that it meets three threshold requirements: (1) it shares

a common question of law or fact with the main action; (2) its

motion is timely; and (3) the court has an independent basis for

jurisdiction over the applicant's claims.” Donnelly v.

Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Northwest

Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 839 (9th Cir.

1996)). However, satisfaction of this requirement “does not

automatically entitle an applicant to intervene.” Venegas v.

Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1989). A court must also

“consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or

prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original

parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2). In addressing this

question, a court may consider (1) whether undue delay or

prejudice to existing parties will result from the intervention,

(2) whether the applicants’ interests are adequately represented

by existing parties and (3) the interests of judicial economy. 

Venegas, 867 F.2d at 530-31. 

Applicants argue that intervention is permissible under

Rule 24(b)(2) based on (1) their proposed defense of a right

under 42 U.S.C. § 7607 to participate meaningfully in the rulemaking process; (2) their proposed factual defense that “federal

law requires exceptions based on startup, shutdown and

malfunction exemptions”; and (3) their contention that

Plaintiffs’ claimed basis of jurisdiction is invalid. Mem. P. &

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A. in Supp. of Mot. to Intervene at 8-9. 

Plaintiffs argue that Applicants cannot meet the threshold

requirements for permissive intervention, because there is no

independent basis for jurisdiction over Applicants’ defenses,

because Applicants cannot be held liable for the claims

asserted. See League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 184

F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1060-61 (D. Or. 2002) (finding no jurisdiction

over proposed defendant-intervenor regarding liability aspects

of NEPA action against Forest Service). Applicants have not met

their burden to establish that the Court has a basis for

jurisdiction over their defenses, as least insofar as the

liability phase of this action is concerned. Unlike the EPA,

Applicants face no liability under the Clean Air Act for failure

to review standards of performance for sources of air

pollutants. For this reason, the Court declines to permit

Applicants’ intervention into the liability phase of this

action. 

Even had Applicants proven that they met the threshold

requirements for permissive intervention, their claim that

intervention would not cause undue delay or prejudice is

unpersuasive. Their first proposed defense, their right to

participate in the rule-making process, will only become

relevant in the event the Court orders injunctive relief. Their

proposed “factual defense” that federal law requires startup,

shutdown and malfunction exemptions is relevant to the EPA’s

administrative process, but not to this lawsuit. Finally, their

purported jurisdictional argument relates to an interest that is

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already adequately represented by the EPA. Applicants’ argument

that the EPA has already complied with its review requirements,

despite the EPA’s own admissions, is based on what the EPA

described as “miscellaneous editorial changes and technical

corrections,” 65 Fed. Reg. 61,744 (Oct. 17, 2000). The EPA is

in a much better position than Applicants to raise

jurisdictional arguments regarding its own compliance with

§ 7411(b)(1)(B). Nor would the interests of judicial economy

would be served by allowing Applicants to bring such a motion. 

CONCLUSION

As described above, the Court concludes that Applicants may

not intervene as of right on the merits phase of this action. 

The Court, however, grants Applicants permission to file an

amicus curiae brief with regard to the merits of Plaintiffs' CAA

claims. 

Applicants may intervene in this case as to the question of

what injunctive relief, if any, should be ordered with respect

to any of Plaintiffs' claims. Regarding injunctive relief,

Applicants will be allowed "to present evidence to the court

that 'unusual circumstances' weigh against the injunction

sought, and to present evidence to assist the court in

fashioning the appropriate scope of whatever injunctive relief

is granted." Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at 1496

(quoting Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081,

1087-95 (W.D. Wash.), aff'd, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

For the foregoing reasons Applicants’ motion is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part (Docket No. 11). 

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Dated: 5/4/05 /s/ CLAUDIA WILKEN 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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Copies mailed to:

Robert Brager

Beveridge & Diamond

201 North Charles Street, Suite 2210

Baltimore, MD 21201-4150

Laura M. Duncan

Beveridge & Diamond

456 Montgomery Street, Suite 1800

San Francisco, CA 94104-1251

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