Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00635/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00635-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STACIA LANGLEY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GUIDING HANDS SCHOOL, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-00635-TLN-KJN

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Motions to Dismiss brought by the following 

Defendants: Pollock Pines Elementary School District (“PPESD”), Pat Atkins (“Atkins”), and 

Licia McDonald (“McDonald”) (collectively, “Pollock Pines Defendants”) (ECF No. 30); 

Amador County Office of Education SELPA (“Amador SELPA”) (ECF No. 33); Placerville 

Union School District (“PUSD”) and Eric Bonniksen (“Bonniksen”) (collectively, “Placerville 

Defendants”) (ECF No. 34); Davis Joint Unified School District (“DJSUD”), Jennifer Galas

(“Galas”), Patrick McGrew (“McGrew”), and Riley Chessman (“Chessman”) (collectively, 

“Davis Defendants”) (ECF No. 35); Elk Grove Unified School District (“EGUSD”), Elk Grove 

Unified SELPA (“Elk Grove SELPA”), Marilyn Delgado (“Delgado”), and Doug Phillips

(“Phillips”) (collectively, “Elk Grove Defendants”) (ECF No. 36); Kimberly Wohlwend 

(“Wohlwend”) (ECF No. 37); Folsom Cordova Unified School District (“FCUSD”), Folsom 

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Cordova SELPA (“FCSELPA”), Kim Triguero (“Triguero”), Meghan Magee (“Magee”), and 

Betty Jo Wessinger (“Wessinger”) (collectively, “Folsom Defendants”) (ECF No. 38); Handle 

with Care Behavior Management System, Inc. (“HWC”) (ECF No. 40); Guiding Hands School, 

Inc. (“GHS”), Staranne S. Meyers (“Meyers”), Cindy Keller (“Keller”), Jennifer Christensen 

(“Christensen”), Betty Morgan (“Morgan”), Jill Watson (“Watson”), Linda Stearn (“Stearn”), 

Michael Smith (“Smith”), Le’mon Thomas (“Thomas”), and David Chambers (“Chambers”) 

(collectively, “GHS Defendants”) (ECF Nos. 42, 45); California Department of Education

(“CDE”) and State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Thurmond (“Thurmond”) 

(collectively, “CDE Defendants”) (ECF No. 43); and Yolo County Office of Education, 

Carolynne Beno, and Sharon Holstege (collectively, “Yolo Defendants”) (ECF No. 44)

(collectively, “Defendants”). Also before the Court is HWC’s separately-filed Motion to Strike. 

(ECF No. 41.)

Plaintiffs Stacia Langley (“Langley”), David Benson (“Benson”), Michael Turelli 

(personal representative of M.B.), Laura Kinser (“Kinser”) (individually and as guardian ad litem

for D.Z.), Melanie Stark (“Stark”) (individually and as guardian ad litem for M.S.), Cherilyn 

Caler (“Caler”) (individually and as guardian ad litem for J.P.), Timothy Peterson (“Peterson”)

(individually and as guardian ad litem for A.P.), Suzanne Brent-Petersen (“Brent-Petersen”)

(individually and as guardian ad litem for A.P.), Robert Darrough (“Darrough”) (individually and 

as guardian ad litem for E.D.), Kristen Coughlin (“Coughlin”) (individually and as guardian ad 

litem for E.D.), Susan Muller (“Muller”) (individually and as guardian ad litem for H.K.), 

Christian Davis (“Davis”) (individually and as guardian ad litem for S.D.), Deborah Marques

(individually and as guardian ad litem for L.M.), and Louis Marques (individually and as 

guardian ad litem for L.M.) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed oppositions or non-oppositions to 

each motion. (ECF Nos. 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 75, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 96.) 

Defendants filed replies. (ECF Nos. 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 

116, 117.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 

Defendants’ motions. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

This case involves the use of restraints on students with disability-related behavioral 

issues, which resulted in the death of a child. Plaintiffs include nine children with disabilities, 

including developmental, social, and emotional disabilities. (ECF No. 12 at ¶¶ 18–32.) Also 

named as Plaintiffs are the students’ parents. (Id. at ¶¶ 33–34.) Plaintiffs’ local education 

agencies (“LEAs”) placed the students at GHS. (Id. at ¶ 2.) GHS was a nonpublic school 

certified by the CDE to provide education and specialized services to public school children with 

disabilities. (Id. at ¶¶ 75–78.) GHS contracted with LEAs to provide special education services 

on behalf of those entities. (Id. at ¶ 45.) 

At issue is a restraint system developed by Bruce Chapman and marketed by HWC.

1

 (Id.

at ¶¶ 70–71.) On November 28, 2018, a member of GHS staff placed M.B., a 13-year-old student 

with autism and other disabilities, in a prone, face-down restraint for approximately one hour and 

forty-five minutes. (Id. at ¶¶ 239–276.) During the restraint, M.B. showed increasing and 

obvious signs of distress, including kicking the wall with his feet, urinating on himself, biting his 

lip until it bled, and vomiting. (Id. at ¶¶ 246, 248–251, 258, 260–263, 265–272, 274.) M.B. 

finally went into cardiac arrest and passed out. (Id. at ¶¶ 263, 266–272.) He was transported to a 

medical center and died on November 30, 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 323–325.) The CDE subsequently 

revoked GHS’s nonpublic school credential. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Two administrators and one staff 

member have been charged with manslaughter in connection with M.B.’s death. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs allege M.B. was not the only student subjected to this type of abuse — GHS

engaged in a policy and practice of using restraints as a substitute for positive interventions in 

response to predictable behavior that did not pose a clear and present danger of serious physical 

harm to the student or others. (Id. at ¶¶ 48–57, 98–101, 336–337, 346–347, 358–359, 363–364, 

389–391, 369–397, 401–409, 415–416, 419, 425–426.) Plaintiffs allege GHS used restraints 

against its students frequently, for periods of time that were longer than necessary, and with 

excessive force. (Id. at ¶¶ 98–103, 224, 235–237, 306, 422.)

1 On March 16, 2021, the Court dismissed Bruce Chapman from this action based on a lack 

of personal jurisdiction. (ECF No. 121.) 

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On November 7, 2019, Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendants in El Dorado 

County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Defendant removed the case to this Court on March 

23, 2020. (Id. at 1.) On May 3, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended Complaint 

(“SAC”) pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, alleging various state and federal claims against 

Defendants. (See ECF No. 12.) Defendants subsequently brought 12 separate motions to dismiss 

and HWC also brought a motion to strike. (ECF Nos. 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 

44, 45.) The Court will address all Defendants’ pending motions herein. 

II. STANDARD OF LAW 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give 

the defendant fair notice of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell

Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). “This simplified 

notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to 

define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema

N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).

On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as 

true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every 

reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail

Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 

“‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 

relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). 

Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 

factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir.

1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 

unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 

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pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the plaintiff “can prove 

facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not 

been alleged[.]” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,

459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge[ ] [his or her] claims . . . across 

the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680. While 

the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than “a 

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is “a 

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. at 679.

If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 

amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,

1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 484, 497 (9th Cir. 

1995)); see also Gardner v. Marino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of 

discretion in denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court 

should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), “the court’s 

discretion to deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended 

its complaint.” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir.

2013) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)).

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III. ANALYSIS 

A. Davis Defendants, Elk Grove Defendants, Folsom Defendants, Placerville 

Defendants, Pollock Pines Defendants, and Amador SELPA’s Motions to 

Dismiss 

Davis Defendants, Elk Grove Defendants, Folsom Defendants, Placerville Defendants, 

and Pollock Pines Defendants are represented by the same counsel and make the same threshold 

argument that the SAC should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 8 as “an impermissible shotgun 

pleading.” (See ECF No. 30-1 at 9; ECF No. 34-1 at 11; ECF No. 36-1 at 13; ECF No. 35-1 at 

12; ECF No. 38-1 at 11.) 

Rule 8 requires “each averment of a pleading to be ‘simple, concise, and direct.’” See 

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of complaint that 

was “argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant”). To comply with 

Rule 8, a complaint should clearly and fully set forth “who is being sued, for what relief, and on 

what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery.” Id. at 1178. Even if the factual elements of 

a cause of action are present but are scattered throughout the complaint and not organized into a 

“short and plain statement of the claim,” dismissal for failure to satisfy Rule 8 is proper. Id. 

Further, “[t]he propriety of dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 8 does not depend on 

whether the complaint is wholly without merit.” Id. at 1179. Indeed, Rule 8(d)’s requirement 

that each averment of a pleading be “‘simple, concise, and direct,’ applies to good claims as well 

as bad, and is a basis for dismissal independent of Rule 12(b)(6).” Id.

The SAC is anything but simple, concise, and direct. The SAC is 169 pages long, with 

over 700 paragraphs. (See generally ECF No. 12.) The SAC includes 40 pages of factual 

allegations that are later incorporated by reference within causes of action that essentially list the 

bare elements of each claim. (Id.) Throughout the SAC, Plaintiffs fail to clearly set forth the 

factual allegations giving rise to each particular Plaintiff’s claims. See Bautista v. Los Angeles 

Cnty., 216 F.3d 837, 840–841 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal of a complaint with prejudice 

where the complaint failed to include short and plain statement of claim of each of the 51 

plaintiffs and failed to state each plaintiff’s claim in separate count). 

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Plaintiffs’ own responses to Defendants’ motions illustrate the confusion. Despite naming 

Amador SELPA and Placerville Defendants as parties, Plaintiffs filed non-oppositions admitting 

there are no claims alleged against those Defendants.2 (ECF Nos. 67, 96.) In opposition to Davis 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs agree to strike the name of Michael Turelli from the 

portion of the prayer seeking relief for wrongful death. (ECF No. 71 at 10.) Plaintiffs also agree 

to dismiss their claims against Galas, McGrew, and Chessman, with the exception of Plaintiffs’ §

1983 claims against those Defendants. (Id.) In opposition to Elk Grove Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss, Plaintiffs agree to dismiss their claims against Delgado and Phillips, with the exception

of their § 1983 claims against those Defendants in their personal capacities. (ECF No. 82 at 9.) 

Plaintiffs also clarify they did not bring § 1983 claims against EGUSD or Elk Grove SELPA. 

(Id.) In opposition to Folsom Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs clarify that Kinser does 

not allege any claims against Folsom Defendants and agrees to dismiss the Unruh Act Claim 

against Folsom SELPA. (ECF No. 80 at 6.) In opposition to Pollock Pines Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss, Plaintiffs clarify the only individual with claims against Pollock Pines Defendants is 

S.D. (ECF No. 83 at 6.) Plaintiffs also admit there are no claims currently alleged against 

PPESD. (Id.) Lastly, Plaintiffs agree to dismiss S.D.’s common law tort claims against Atkins 

and McDonald in their official capacities. (Id.) Plaintiffs continue this pattern of clarification as 

to the other Defendants’ motions, which indicates that the SAC does not clearly allege “who is 

being sued, for what relief, and on what theory.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Davis Defendants, Elk Grove Defendants, Folsom 

Defendants, and Pollock Pines Defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 8 and 

DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ claims against those Defendants with leave to amend. 

As mentioned, Plaintiffs filed non-oppositions to Placerville Defendants’ and Amador 

SELPA’s motions to dismiss. In their non-oppositions, Plaintiffs do not ask for leave to amend 

any existing claims against Placerville Defendants or Amador SELPA. Instead, Plaintiffs state

2 Amador County Unified School District (“ACUSD”) is also named as a Defendant 

separate from Amador SELPA. However, ACUSD is not a party to Amador SELPA’s motion, 

and the Court therefore does not address whether Plaintiffs have viable claims against ACUSD.

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they will be filing a motion to amend to add new claims against those Defendants. (ECF No. 67 

at 2; ECF No. 96 at 2.) As of the date of this Order, however, Plaintiffs have not filed a motion to 

amend. Absent any argument as to why the Court should allow them to add new claims against 

Amador SELPA or Placerville Defendants, the Court GRANTS those Defendants’ motions 

without leave to amend and DISMISSES Amador SELPA, PUSD, and Bonniksen without

prejudice. If Plaintiffs wish to bring new claims against these Defendants, they may file a motion 

to do so pursuant to Rule 15. 

Because the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims against the aforementioned Defendants 

pursuant to Rule 8, the Court need not and does not reach those Defendants’ remaining 

arguments. Although arguably the entire SAC is subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 8, the 

remaining Defendants did not raise this threshold argument in their motions to dismiss. 

Therefore, the Court will address the merits of the remaining motions in turn. 

B. CDE Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

CDE Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 

(ECF No. 43-1 at 13.) In opposition, Plaintiffs agree to dismiss all claims against Thurmond. 

(ECF No. 72 at 6.) Plaintiffs also agree to dismiss all claims against CDE except as follows: (1) 

violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (2) violation of § 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (“§ 504”); (3) violation of Cal. Educ. Code § 220; (4) 

negligence; (5) negligent supervision; (6) negligence per se; and (7) wrongful death. (ECF No. 

72 at 6.) Plaintiffs also clarify that the only students with claims against CDE are M.S. and M.B. 

(Id. at 9.) The Court will address CDE’s arguments as to the remaining claims. 

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i. Federal Claims (ADA and § 504) 

a. Exhaustion 

CDE argues M.S. failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Individuals 

with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) for the § 504 and ADA claims.

3

 (ECF No. 43-1 at 17.) 

The IDEA is a federal statute enacted “to ensure that all children with disabilities have 

available to them a free appropriate public education [FAPE].” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). A 

FAPE encompasses “both ‘instruction’ tailored to meet a child’s ‘unique needs’ and sufficient 

‘supportive services’ to permit the child to benefit from that instruction.” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. 

Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 748–49 (2017).

To comply with the IDEA, school districts must create an Individualized Education 

Program (“IEP”) for each child with a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). Additionally:

The IDEA requires educational agencies to implement procedures which provide 

“[a]n opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the 

identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of 

a [FAPE] to such child[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). The parent or educational 

agency begins the process by filing a due process complaint. 20 U.S.C. § 

1415(b)(6), (b)(7). The matter proceeds to a “due process hearing” before an 

impartial hearing officer. § 1415(f)(1)(A).

S.B. by & through Kristina B., 327 F. Supp. 3d at 1243–44. Notably, the IDEA requires the 

exhaustion of all administrative remedies on all claims prior to filing a civil action. 20 U.S.C. § 

1415(l); see J.H. ex rel Sarah H. v. Nevada City Sch. Dist., No. 2:14-CV-00796-TLN, 2015 WL 

1021424, at *3 n.4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2015) (citation omitted). 

In Fry, the Supreme Court explained the IDEA “requires that a plaintiff exhaust the 

IDEA’s procedures before filing an action under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or similar laws 

when (but only when) her suit ‘seek[s] relief that is also available’ under the IDEA.” 137 S. Ct. 

at 752. Such an action “must seek relief for the denial of a FAPE, because that is the only ‘relief’ 

the IDEA makes ‘available.’” Id. When determining whether an action brought under a statute 

other than the IDEA seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE, courts must look “to the ‘substance’ of, 

3 CDE does not assert failure to exhaust as to M.B. (ECF No. 43-1 at 17.) 

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rather than the labels used in, the plaintiff’s complaint . . . or, in legal-speak, the gravamen — of 

the plaintiff’s complaint.” Id. at 755.

Plaintiffs argue exhaustion is not required because they “seek monetary damages for 

physical and emotional abuse,” which are “not available under the IDEA.” (ECF No. 72 at 15–

16.) The Court in Fry explicitly declined to rule on whether a plaintiff seeking monetary 

damages must exhaust administrative remedies. 137 S. Ct. at 754 n.8. (“[W]e do not address here

. . . a case in which a plaintiff, although charging the denial of a FAPE, seeks a form of remedy 

that an IDEA officer cannot give — for example, . . . money damages for resulting emotional 

injury.”). In the Ninth Circuit, exhaustion is required when monetary damages relate to harms 

resulting from the denial of a FAPE. See D. D. by & through Ingram v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. 

Dist., 984 F.3d 773, 791 n.15 (9th Cir. 2020). However, “to the extent that a plaintiff has laid out 

a plausible claim for damages unrelated to the deprivation of a FAPE, the IDEA does not require 

her to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking them in court.” Payne v. Peninsula Sch. 

Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 877 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Albino v. Baca, 

747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014).

The monetary damages Plaintiffs seek include general damages, medical expenses, past 

and future lost earnings, general damages for emotional distress, and damages for pain and 

suffering. (ECF No. 12 at 153–154.) These damages apparently relate to Plaintiffs’ alleged 

physical and emotional injuries caused by the use of restraints. Although CDE argues these 

monetary damages somehow flow from the denial of a FAPE, the Court declines to make such an

assumption at this stage. See Payne, 653 F.3d at 877 (“[W]e do not think, especially in the 

context of motions to dismiss or summary judgment motions, that it is proper for courts to assume 

that money damages will be directed toward forms of relief that would be available under the 

IDEA.”). Future discovery may clarify whether the “gravamen” of Plaintiffs’ claims relate to the 

denial of a FAPE, and CDE may raise its exhaustion argument again if further evidence arises. 

As it is, Plaintiffs have “laid out a plausible claim for damages unrelated to the deprivation of a 

FAPE.” See id. at 877, 880. Therefore, the Court DENIES CDE’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

claims based on failure to exhaust under the IDEA.

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b. Failure to State a Claim 

Alternatively, CDE moves to dismiss the federal claims because “[t]he SAC does not 

plausibly allege that the CDE discriminated against Plaintiffs based on disability.” (ECF No. 43-

1 at 35.) 

To plead a prima facie ADA claim, a plaintiff must allege as follows: “(1) she is an 

individual with a disability; (2) she is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of 

a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) she is either excluded from participation in 

or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or activities or was otherwise 

discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or 

discrimination was solely by reason of her disability.” Sheehan v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 743 F.3d 

1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014). Additionally, with respect to a § 504 claim, a plaintiff must plead 

that the program at issue receives federal assistance. Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 

1135 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs allege, and CDE does not dispute, that CDE receives federal 

assistance. (ECF No. 12 at ¶ 46.)

Plaintiffs’ claims against CDE center on CDE’s alleged “failure to make reasonable 

modifications to its policies and practices regarding certification, monitoring, supervision, and 

investigation of nonpublic schools” despite “repeated notifications . . . regarding the 

disproportionate use of restraints on children with disabilities and their tragic outcomes.” (ECF 

No. 72 at 24.) Plaintiffs allege students M.B. and M.S. suffered from several disabilities, such as 

autism, and were placed at GHS by their LEAs. (ECF No. 12 at ¶¶ 2, 18, 27.) Plaintiffs also 

allege CDE knew or should have known about the danger of the restraints used on disabled 

students at GHS. (Id. at ¶¶ 83–96, 99–103.) For example, Plaintiffs allege CDE received 

behavioral emergency reports, which at the very least leads to a reasonable inference that CDE 

was on notice that restraints were being imposed on disabled children frequently and excessively. 

(ECF No. 12 at ¶ 98). Plaintiffs allege despite this knowledge, CDE failed to fulfill its statutory 

duties to certify, monitor, supervise, and investigate nonpublic schools such as GHS, which 

resulted in discrimination to Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶¶ 77, 114–121.) Therefore, Plaintiffs plausibly 

allege (1) M.B. and M.S. were disabled individuals, (2) they were qualified to receive special 

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education services, (3) they were denied the benefit of special education services, and (4) the 

denial was a result of their disabilities. See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232; Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1135. 

As such, the Court DENIES CDE’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ ADA and § 504 claims

for failure to state a claim.

ii. State Law Claims 

a. California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”)

CDE next argues Plaintiffs failed to comply with the CTCA. (ECF No. 43-1 at 21.) The 

CTCA applies to actions for damages against local public entities or public employees acting 

within the scope of that employee’s public employment. Cal. Gov’t Code § 950.2. “The [CTCA] 

requires, as a condition precedent to suit against a public entity, the timely presentation of a 

written claim and the rejection of the claim in whole or in part.” Mangold v. California Pub. 

Utilities Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). “[A] plaintiff must allege facts

demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement.” State of 

California v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1243 (2004). “The timely presentation of a claim 

under the Tort Claims Act is not merely a procedural requirement but is an actual ‘element of the 

plaintiff’s cause of action.’” Creighton v. City of Livingston, 628 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1225 (E.D. 

Cal. 2009) (quoting Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal. 4th 201, 209 (2007)). “[T]he

requirement that a plaintiff must affirmatively allege compliance with the CTCA applies in 

federal court.” Butler v. Los Angeles Cty., 617 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2008).

The SAC summarily alleges “M.S. has complied with the Tort Claims filing against Elk 

Grove Unified School District, Elk Grove Unified School District SELPA, Sacramento Office of 

Education and the State of California.” (See ECF No. 12 at ¶¶ 28.) As to M.B., the SAC alleges 

his estate “has complied with the Tort Claims filing requirements for claims against the State of 

California, Yolo County SELPA and DJUSD.” (Id. at ¶ 19.) These allegations are mere legal 

conclusions. Plaintiffs have not provided the tort claims as attachments to the SAC, nor have 

they alleged what specific facts and causes of action were referenced in the tort claims. Without 

such information, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded facts demonstrating they complied with 

the CTCA in bringing state tort claims against CDE. 

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Therefore, the Court GRANTS CDE’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state tort claims with 

leave to amend. 

b. Cal. Educ. Code § 220 (“§ 220”)

CDE argues Plaintiffs’ § 220 claim “is brought against [Thurmond] only.” (ECF No. 43-1 

at 35.) In opposition, Plaintiffs assert they intended to bring the claim against CDE. (ECF No. 72 

at 28.) The CDE is correct that the SAC does not list CDE as a Defendant under the § 220 claim

and there are no factual allegations specific to CDE within the § 220 claim. (See ECF No. 12 at 

99–102.) To the extent this exclusion was an oversight, Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend 

their § 220 claim to include CDE. Plaintiffs should also include factual allegations to support 

such a claim against CDE. 

c. Tort Claims 

CDE argues Plaintiffs fail to plead valid tort claims because “a state agency is not liable 

for any injury except as may otherwise be provided by a statute” and “the SAC does not plausibly 

allege an applicable mandatory duty on the part of the CDE.” (ECF No. 43-1 at 22 (citing Cal. 

Gov’t. Code §§ 815(a), 815.6).) In opposition, Plaintiffs argue CDE “failed to discharge multiple 

interlocking duties,” as set forth in various sections of the California Education Code. (ECF No. 

72 at 29.) However, Plaintiffs concede they did not allege the specific statutes and seek leave to 

do so. (Id. at n.4) Based on the liberal standard in favor of granting leave to amend, the Court 

GRANTS CDE’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ tort claims with leave to amend. 

C. Yolo Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Yolo Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 

(ECF No. 44-1 at 8.) In opposition, Plaintiffs clarify that the only parties bringing claims against 

Yolo Defendants are M.B., Langley, and Benson. (ECF No. 81 at 5.) With the exception of their

§ 1983 claims, Plaintiffs also agree to dismiss their claims against Beno and Holstege. (Id.) 

Yolo Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ remaining claims against them should be dismissed 

because there are no facts alleged in the SAC that Yolo Defendants were involved in M.B.’s 

death. (ECF No. 44-1 at 12.) Plaintiffs’ opposition lacks clarity, and Plaintiffs consistently fail to 

point the Court to factual allegations about Yolo Defendants that support their arguments. For 

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example, Plaintiffs argue — without citing to specific portions of the SAC — that Yolo 

Defendants are liable because “[w]hen the SELPA decided not to renew the contract [with GHS] 

for the 2018-2019 school year, it did nothing to remove [M.B.] from GHS or inform his parents. 

Nor did it monitor the existing NPS placement of students in its area to ensure that students in the 

Plan area were receiving services in approved, monitored, safe programs.” (ECF No. 81 at 16.) 

Plaintiffs also indicate they can amend the SAC to include additional facts to support their claims 

against Yolo Defendants. (Id.) 

As it is, the Court cannot discern a viable basis for Plaintiffs’ claims against Yolo 

Defendants. It is not the Court’s job to sift through voluminous allegations to attempt to 

determine whether there may be a possible hidden cause of action. Walker v. Bowler, No. 5:17-

cv-01687-AG-JC, 2018 WL 2392152, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2018) (collecting cases) (“It is not 

the Court’s responsibility to hunt through plaintiff’s prolix and rambling allegations in an attempt 

to determine whether plaintiff might have some adequate basis for bringing an action in federal 

court.”); Cf. United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, 

hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”). 

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ claims against Yolo Defendants with leave 

to amend. 

D. Wohlwend’s Motion to Dismiss

Wohlwend is one of the GHS staff members who allegedly put M.B. in the prone restraint 

prior to his death. (ECF No. 12 at ¶ 244.) Wohlwend moves to dismiss all claims against her 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 37 at 8–9.) In opposition, Plaintiffs agree to dismiss their 

Cal. Educ. Code § 220 and Cal. Civ. Code § 51 claims against Wohlwend. (ECF No. 79 at 4.) 

Plaintiffs also clarify that only M.B., Langley, Benson, and S.D. are bringing claims against 

Wohlwend. (Id.) The Court will address Wohlwend’s arguments in turn. 

///

///

///

///

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i. § 1983 Claim 

Wohlwend argues Plaintiffs cannot bring a § 1983 claim against her because she was 

acting as an employee of a private school. (ECF No. 37 at 15.) 

“Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States. To state a 

claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was 

committed by a person acting under the color of State law.” Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 

F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has indicated that “a private entity can 

qualify as a state actor in a few limited circumstances — including, for example, (i) when the 

private entity performs a traditional, exclusive public function; (ii) when the government compels 

the private entity to take a particular action; or (iii) when the government acts jointly with the 

private entity.” Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019) (internal 

citations omitted).

Plaintiffs repeatedly allege “GHS employees acted under the color of state law because 

GHS performed a function traditionally reserved to the state.” (See e.g., ECF No. 12 at ¶¶ 462, 

472, 483, 493.) Plaintiffs’ allegations are conclusory, and Plaintiffs fail to present a coherent 

argument in opposition to persuade the Court they allege sufficient facts to demonstrate state 

action on the part of Wohlwend. 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Wohlwend’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims 

with leave to amend.

ii. Punitive Damages 

Wohlwend next moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages in M.B.’s 

wrongful death claim. (ECF No. 37 at 19–20.) Wohlwend argues punitive damages may not be 

recovered in a wrongful death case for a homicide unless the defendant has been convicted of a 

felony as set forth in Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(d) (“§ 3294(d)”). (Id.) Wohlwend asserts she has 

been charged but has not yet been convicted of a felony related to M.B.’s death. (Id.) In 

opposition, Plaintiffs admit “punitive damages are not generally available on a wrongful death 

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cause of action,” subject to the exception in § 3294(d). (ECF No. 79 at 18–19.) However, 

Plaintiffs argue the Court need not decide the issue now because Wohlwend may be convicted of

felony manslaughter in connection with M.B.’s death in the future. (Id.) 

The parties seem to agree that Plaintiffs can only recover punitive damages for the 

wrongful death claim pursuant to § 3294(d), which allows a plaintiff to recover punitive damages 

in a wrongful death claim “based upon a death which resulted from a homicide for which the 

defendant has been convicted of a felony.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(d). Plaintiffs also apparently 

concede that Wohlwend has not yet been convicted of a felony. As such, Plaintiffs cannot 

recover punitive damages according to the plain language of § 3294(d). Plaintiffs do not provide 

any other basis for punitive damages. 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Wohlwend’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ request for 

punitive damages as to M.B.’s wrongful death claim with leave to amend.

iii. Negligence per se 

Wohlwend argues Plaintiffs’ negligence per se claim is based on various causes of action 

throughout the SAC and should be dismissed if those underlying claims are dismissed. (ECF No. 

37 at 20.) In opposition, Plaintiffs argue “Wohlwend violated the California Education Code 

statutes prohibiting corporal punishment and placing restrictions on the use of behavioral 

interventions.” (ECF No. 79 at 19 (citing Cal. Educ. Code §§ 49001, 56520, 56521, 56521.1, 

56521.2).) Even assuming these statutes could provide a viable basis for Plaintiffs’ negligence 

per se claims, Plaintiffs do not bring claims under these statutes. Indeed, the SAC does not even 

mention Cal. Educ. Code § 49002 or § 56520. The Court agrees with Wohlwend that the basis 

for Plaintiffs’ negligence per se claim is unclear and dismissal is warranted. 

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the negligence per se claim with leave to amend. 

iv. Fraud 

Lastly, Wohlwend moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fraud claim pursuant to Rule 9(b). (ECF 

No. 37 at 20.) “Under California law, the indispensable elements of a fraud claim include a false 

representation, knowledge of its falsity, intent to defraud, justifiable reliance, and damages.” 

Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal 

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quotation marks omitted). A claim grounded in fraud “must state with particularity the 

circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). A court may dismiss a claim for failing 

to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements. See Vess, 317 F.3d at 1107. Under this 

heightened pleading standard, a party must “identify the who, what, when, where, and how of the 

misconduct charged, as well as what is false or misleading about the purportedly fraudulent 

statement, and why it is false.” Moore v. Mars Petcare US, Inc., 966 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 

2020) (quoting Davidson v. Kimberly–Clark, 889 F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2018)). The complaint 

must contain enough detail to put a defendant on notice of the alleged misconduct so they may 

“defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Vess, 317 

F.3d at 1106 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiffs allege that on or about the date of enrolling M.B. at GHS, Wohlwend falsely 

represented to Langley that two aides would be in M.B.’s classroom and he would be seated near 

one of the aides to keep him calm. (ECF No. 12 at ¶ 661.) The SAC does not allege precisely 

where or when this alleged misrepresentation took place, nor does it specify why the statement 

was false. See Moore, 966 F.3d at 1019. Further, the SAC does not allege any specific false 

representations that were made to M.B., S.D., or Benson. While the SAC contains vague 

allegations about representations made to “the Plaintiff students’ parents” at some point in time

(ECF No. 12 at ¶ 660), Plaintiffs fail to allege how these representations were false, or where and 

when the representations were made to each individual Plaintiff. See Moore, 966 F.3d at 1019.

For all these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ fraud allegations against Wohlwend do not satisfy 

Rule 9(b). 

As such, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ fraud claims against Wohlwend with leave to 

amend.

E. GHS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

As a preliminary matter, GHS Defendants filed two motions to dismiss on the same day. 

(See ECF Nos. 42, 45.) The Court has reviewed both motions and concludes they are essentially 

identical. Indeed, Plaintiffs filed a single opposition in response to both motions (ECF No. 75),

and GHS Defendants filed a single reply (ECF No. 117). It is unclear why GHS Defendants filed 

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duplicate motions. In the interest of judicial economy, the Court will cite GHS Defendants’ 

arguments only as set forth in the later-filed motion. 

GHS Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them. (ECF No. 45-1 at 6.) In 

opposition, Plaintiffs clarify that they did not intend to include Debbie Marques and Luis

Marques as Plaintiffs and admit there are no claims alleged by them in the SAC. (ECF No. 75 at 

6.) Plaintiffs agree to dismiss L.M.’s common law tort claims against Defendants. (Id.) 

However, Plaintiffs indicate they will “shortly be filing a motion for leave to amend their 

complaint . . . to assert [L.M.’s] claims under Cal. Civ. Code § 51, Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7, and 

Cal. Ed. Code §§ 200” against GHS Defendants. (Id.) Plaintiffs also agree to remove DOE 

Defendants from the SAC without prejudice to future amendment. (Id.) The Court will address 

GHS Defendants’ remaining arguments in turn. 

i. § 504 Claim

GHS Defendants argue GHS is not subject to § 504 because it is not federally funded. 

(ECF No. 45-1 at 12.) In opposition, Plaintiffs point to an allegation in the SAC that states “all of 

the above-named” Defendants — presumably including GHS — “received federal financial 

assistance.” (ECF No. 75 at 17 (citing ECF No. 12 at ¶ 450).) Plaintiffs also allege GHS 

contracted with LEAs to provide educational services to students on behalf of those agencies, and 

the LEAs received federal financial assistance. (Id. at 17 (citing ECF No. 12 at ¶¶ 45, 46).) 

Section 504 provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, 

solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the 

benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 

financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). “Federal financial assistance can be direct or indirect.” 

Herman v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 971, 60 F.3d 1375, 

1381 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202, 1211 (9th Cir. 

1984)). “[P]ayments that include a subsidy constitute ‘Federal financial assistance’ within the 

meaning of the Rehabilitation Act,” however purely compensatory payments do not. Jacobson, 

742 F.2d at 1209. 

///

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Neither party provides binding authority directly on point. At least one district court in 

the Ninth Circuit has denied a motion to dismiss under similar circumstances. See Smith v. 

Tobinworld, No. 16-CV-01676-RS, 2016 WL 3519244, at *4–6 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2016) 

(“[W]hen a disabled child, like [the plaintiff], gets placed in private school on the public dime, 

that private school . . . is the intended recipient of the federal financial assistance disbursed via 

the IDEA.”). However, “the question of which programs are subject to the [Rehabilitation Act] is 

a question of law, to be answered in most cases by reference to the statutory authority for the 

particular disbursements at issue or, if the authority to provide assistance has been delegated, to 

the relevant administrative documents.” Jacobsen, 742 F.2d at 1210. At this early stage,

Plaintiffs’ allegations must be taken as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in their 

favor. Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322; Retail Clerks, 373 U.S. at 753 n.6. At the very least, Plaintiffs’ 

allegations lead to a reasonable inference that GHS was the intended recipient of federal funds for 

providing educational services to students on behalf of school districts. Accordingly, the Court 

DENIES GHS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 504 claim. 

ii. Negligent Supervision Claim

GHS Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ negligent supervision claim should be dismissed 

because it is duplicative of their negligence claim. (ECF No. 45-1 at 13–14.) 

California law imposes a duty on school districts and their employees “to supervise at all 

times the conduct of the children on the school grounds and to enforce those rules and regulations 

necessary to their protection.” Hoff v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., 19 Cal. 4th 925, 934 (1998). 

The standard of care imposed upon school employees in carrying out this duty is the degree of 

care “which a person of ordinary prudence, charged with [comparable] duties, would exercise 

under the same circumstances.” Id. 

It is unclear why Plaintiffs brought this claim as a standalone negligent supervision claim 

rather than as part of their negligence claim. Plaintiffs’ negligent supervision claim alleges 

Defendants “had a legal duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising special needs students in 

its respective charge pursuant to California Education Code [§] 44807 and may be held liable for 

injuries proximately caused by the failure to exercise such care.” (ECF No. 12 at ¶ 634.) 

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Plaintiffs further allege Defendants “failed to exercise reasonable care” in supervising the 

Plaintiff students. (Id. at ¶ 635.) Plaintiffs’ negligent supervision claim is conclusory and devoid 

of factual allegations. Moreover, Plaintiffs cite Cal. Educ. Code § 44807, which states in relevant 

part, “Every teacher in the public schools shall hold pupils to a strict account for their conduct on 

the way to and from school, on the playgrounds, or during recess.” (Id. at 634.) Yet Plaintiffs 

fail to explain how § 44807 imparts liability in this case. For these reasons, the Court 

DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ negligent supervision claim with leave to amend. 

iii. Tortious Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Claim

Under California law, “it is well established that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing 

is implicit in every contract.” Cates Constr., Inc. v. Talbot Partners, 21 Cal. 4th 28, 43 (1999). 

“[This] covenant is implied as a supplement to the express contractual covenants, to prevent a 

contracting party from engaging in conduct that frustrates the other party’s rights to the benefits 

of the agreement.” Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 11 Cal. 4th 1, 36 (1995). 

GHS Defendants move to dismiss this claim because there are no factual allegations to 

indicate there were any contracts between Plaintiffs and GHS Defendants. (ECF No. 45-1 at 14.) 

The Court agrees. Plaintiffs’ claim is difficult to follow. The SAC alleges Plaintiffs “entered into 

a written contract” with GHS Defendants “for the education of their child.” (ECF No. 12 at ¶ 

642.) However, there are no factual allegations about the terms of any such contracts. Plaintiffs 

allege “[a]s part of said contract,” GHS Defendants provided the parents with a parent/teacher 

handbook that made certain representations about behavior intervention techniques that would be 

used at the school. (Id. at ¶¶ 644–648.) It is unclear whether Plaintiffs are alleging the handbook 

itself was the contract. It is also unclear what, if any, consideration Plaintiffs provided as part of 

the contract — the SAC vaguely alleges Plaintiffs “did all of the significant things that the 

contract required them to do.” (Id. at ¶ 649.) 

Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ tortious breach of the covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing claim with leave to amend.

///

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iv. Fraud

GHS Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fraud claim under Rule 9(b). (ECF No. 45-1 

at 15.) The Court has already concluded Plaintiffs’ fraud allegations as to Wohlwend fail to 

satisfy Rule 9(b). The same reasoning applies to Plaintiffs’ fraud claim against GHS Defendants. 

In short, Plaintiffs fraud allegations are too general. Plaintiffs fail to allege which false 

representations were made to which students and/or parents, where and when those allegations 

were made, or why the representations were false. See Moore, 966 F.3d at 1019. Therefore, the 

Court GRANTS GHS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fraud claim with leave to amend. 

v. Severance 

Lastly, GHS Defendants briefly argue the SAC is “a misjoinder of parties and claims.” 

(ECF No. 45-1 at 21.) Notably, GHS Defendants do not expound on which parties and claims 

should be severed. GHS Defendants simply argue “[t]he only commonality of the Plaintiffs in 

this case is they attended GHS as students at some point . . . each student was at GHS at a 

different time, provided different personal medical information to GHS, had different teachers 

and aids, has different disabilities/requirements, are of a different age and grade, and received 

different services from GHS.” (Id.) 

Rule 21 permits a court to “sever any claim against a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. “There is 

no established test in the Ninth Circuit for when a district court should exercise its broad 

discretion to sever a claim under Rule 21.” Arcure v. Cal. Dep’t of Developmental Servs., No. 

1:13-cv-00541-LJO-BAM, 2014 WL 346612, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2014). “Claims may be 

severable under Rule 21 if they arise from different factual situations or pose different legal 

questions.” Khanna v. State Bar of Cal., No. C-07-2587 EMC, 2007 WL 2288116, at *2 (N.D. 

Cal. Aug. 7, 2007). Claims may also be severed “if it will serve the ends of justice and further the 

prompt and efficient disposition of litigation.” Id. (citation omitted). “Fairness is a critical 

consideration in determining whether severance is appropriate,” and therefore it must be 

determined whether any party would suffer prejudice. Pena v. McArthur, 889 F. Supp. 403, 407 

(E.D. Cal. 1994). 

///

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GHS Defendants fail to persuade the Court that any claims or parties should be severed at 

this time. Rule 20(a) permits joinder if: (1) the claims against each defendant arise “out of the 

same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences,” and (2) “there are common 

questions of law or fact.” Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997). It appears 

Plaintiffs’ claims against GHS Defendants involve similar questions of law and fact because the 

students each allegedly suffered injuries due to GHS Defendants’ use of the restraint system

marketed by HWC. (ECF No. 12 at ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs are challenging GHS Defendants’ policies —

or lack thereof — related to executing the restraint system safely. In that sense, Plaintiffs’ claims 

seem to arise from the same series of transactions or occurrences because “each discrete claim is 

part of the larger systematic behavior.” Almont Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., LLC v. UnitedHealth 

Grp., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1188 (C.D. Cal. 2015). Further, it is unclear whether severance 

would serve the interests of fairness and judicial economy Rule 20 is designed to promote. 

As mentioned throughout this Order, the SAC lacks clarity in many respects. The Court 

encourages Plaintiffs to amend the SAC in such a way to give more clarity on the issue of joinder

moving forward. However, the Court cannot say that joinder in this case is so defective as to 

warrant severance at this time. Therefore, the Court DENIES GHS Defendants’ request to sever 

without prejudice. 

F. HWC’s Motion to Dismiss

HWC moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for strict product liability and negligent product 

liability, arguing the restraint techniques and training at issue were services, not products. (ECF 

No. 40 at 3.) In addition, HWC moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages. (Id. at 

11.) HWC also filed a separate motion to strike Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages, which 

includes nearly identical arguments as set forth in HWC’s motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 41.) 

“[P]ersons providing only services are not subject to strict products liability.” Jimenez v. 

Superior Ct., 29 Cal. 4th 473, 479 (2002); see also Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. 40 Cal. 3d 

672, 677 (1985) (stating that strict products liability law does not apply to services); Rest. 3d 

Torts, Products Liability, § 19, subd. (b) (“Services, even when provided commercially, are not 

products.”). 

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The SAC alleges HWC trained GHS staff to “restrain special needs children in prone and 

other types of restraints.” (ECF No. 12 at ¶¶ 70, 674.) Plaintiffs argue the restraint system was a 

“product” for the purposes of its product liability claims because in addition to training teachers 

on restraint methods, HWC holds patents for products such as cuffs, collars with bite and spit 

shields, and other mechanical restraints.

4

 (ECF No. 77 at ¶¶ 6–7, 16.) However, as HWC 

correctly points out, the SAC does not mention any of these products. The SAC alleges GHS 

staff put disabled students in various restraint positions, but there are no allegations that GHS 

used any tangible products while restraining Plaintiffs. (See, e.g., ECF No. 12 at 239, 388.) 

Plaintiffs fail to persuade the Court that HWC’s service in training GHS staff on restraint 

techniques is a “product” for the purposes of their product liability claims. Therefore, the Court 

DISMISSES those claims with leave to amend. To the extent Plaintiffs intended to bring a 

general negligence claim as opposed to a negligent product liability claim, Plaintiffs should 

clarify as such in their amended complaint. Moreover, because the Court has dismissed 

Plaintiffs’ underlying claims against HWC, HWC’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ request for 

punitive damages is DENIED as moot. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:

1. The Court GRANTS Pollock Pines Defendants (ECF No. 30), Davis Defendants 

(ECF No. 35), Elk Grove Defendants (ECF No. 36), and Folsom Defendants’ 

(ECF No. 38) Motions to Dismiss with leave to amend; 

2. The Court GRANTS Placerville Defendants (ECF No. 34) and Amador SELPA’s 

(ECF No. 33) Motions to Dismiss without leave to amend. Amador County Office 

of Education SELPA, Placerville Union School District, and Eric Bonniksen are 

DISMISSED from the action without prejudice; 

3. The Court DENIES CDE’s Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ federal claims and 

4 Plaintiffs request the Court take judicial notice of the patents for these products. (ECF 

No. 77 at 7.) However, because the Court finds there are no allegations that GHS staff actually 

used any of the patented products, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ request without prejudice. 

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GRANTS the motion as to Plaintiffs’ state law claims with leave to amend (ECF 

No. 43); 

4. The Court GRANTS Yolo Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 44) with 

leave to amend; 

5. The Court GRANTS Wohlwend’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 37) with leave to 

amend;

6. The Court DENIES GHS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ § 504 

claim and GRANTS the motion as to Plaintiffs’ negligent supervision, tortious 

breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud claims with leave 

to amend. The Court also DENIES GHS Defendants’ request to sever without 

prejudice (ECF Nos. 42, 45); and 

7. The Court GRANTS HWC’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 40) with leave to 

amend and DENIES HWC’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 41) without prejudice. 

Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint not later than thirty (30) days from the date of 

electronic filing of this Order. Defendants’ responsive pleading is due twenty-one (21) days after 

Plaintiffs file an amended complaint. The Court understands that this action involves many 

parties and claims. However, the Court urges to parties to ensure future filings are clear and 

concise so the Court can accurately assess the parties’ arguments.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 30, 2021

Troy L. Nunley

United States District Judge

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