Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-2_19-cv-00133/USCOURTS-ared-2_19-cv-00133-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

DELTA DIVISION 

HERBERT LEE COLEMAN PETITIONER 

v. NO. 2:19-cv-00133-JM/PSH 

DEWAYNE HENDRIX RESPONDENT 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

INSTRUCTIONS 

 The following proposed Recommendation has been sent to United 

States District Judge James M. Moody Jr. You may file written objections 

to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: 

(1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection, 

and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of 

this Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal 

questions of fact. 

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DISPOSITION 

 The record reflects that petitioner Herbert Lee Coleman (“Coleman”) 

pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District 

of Iowa (“trial court”) to two drug offenses and was sentenced to the 

custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). See United States v. 

Coleman, 3:08-cr-00115-2 (S.D.Iowa). His sentence was affirmed on 

appeal. See United States v. Coleman, 635 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2011). 

 The trial court subsequently reviewed Coleman’s sentence to 

determine his eligibility for a reduction in his sentence as a result of 

retroactively applicable crack cocaine amendments to the Sentencing 

Guidelines. The court concluded that Coleman was not eligible because his 

sentence was determined “after applying the career offender sentencing 

guideline, not a crack cocaine driven guideline.” See 3:08-cr-00115-2, 

Docket Entry 114. 

The trial court next reviewed Coleman’s sentence to determine his 

eligibility for a reduction in his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). 

The court concluded that he was not eligible because his sentence was 

determined “by referring to the career offender guidelines, not [the] crack 

cocaine guidelines.” See 3:08-cr-00115-2, Docket Entry 118. 

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 On March 22, 2019, Coleman filed a document that the trial court 

construed as a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to the First Step 

Act.1 The motion is currently pending before the trial court. 

On October 21, 2019, Coleman began the case at bar by filing a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241. In the 

petition, he maintained that the BOP has failed to award him the good 

conduct credit he is entitled to under the First Step Act. He asked that he 

be awarded the credits. 

 Respondent Dewayne Hendrix (“Hendrix”) thereafter filed a 

combined response and motion to dismiss. See Docket Entry 7. In the 

submission, Hendrix asked that the petition be dismissed for the following 

reasons: first, Coleman failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; and 

second, the good conduct credit he is entitled to under the First Step Act 

has been applied to his sentence, and his challenge is moot. 

                                                            

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   The document contained, in part, the following representations: 

I am reaching out to your offices in the express hope of gaining some 

additional information from you to provide me with clarity on the steps 

the District will be following to make the determinations for those who 

qualify and will benefit from reductions in their sentence due to this Act. 

As well please explain the necessary steps I will need to take to insure 

that I do not foreclose myself from being a beneficiary of the future 

possible reductions. 

See 3:08-cr-00115-2, Docket Entry 123. 

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 Coleman was given up to, and including, February 7, 2020, to file a 

reply to Hendrix’s assertions. When Coleman failed to do so, the 

undersigned began reviewing the record. As a part of doing so, the 

undersigned reviewed the exhibits submitted by Hendrix, which included 

an affidavit from a BOP supervisory attorney. It appeared that the exhibits 

and affidavit did not address Hendrix’s first reason for seeking the dismissal 

of this case, i.e., Coleman failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

Because an affidavit by a BOP supervisory attorney addressing the steps 

Coleman took, or failed to take, to exhaust his administrative remedies 

would be beneficial, Hendrix was asked to submit such an affidavit. 

Hendrix has now filed an affidavit from a BOP supervisory attorney. 

In the affidavit, the attorney represents, in part, the following: 

As part of my official duties, I have access to records 

maintained in the ordinary course of business by the [BOP], 

including inmate central files. 

According to records maintained in the SENTRY database 

system, ... Coleman ... has filed only one administrative 

remedy request during his incarceration. It involved an 

allegation of staff misconduct in January of 2017, and was 

rejected. [Coleman] has not filed any other administrative 

remedies, to include requests dealing with his [good conduct 

time] and the [First Step Act]. 

See Docket Entry 10, Exhibit D at CM/ECF 1-2. 

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 The undersigned has thoroughly reviewed the parties’ pleadings and 

exhibits. On the basis of that review, the undersigned finds that Coleman’s 

petition should be dismissed without prejudice because he failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies. 

The exhaustion question focuses on the procedure the petitioner used 

prior to arriving in federal court. See State of Missouri v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 

864 (8th Cir. 1987). Before filing his petition, he is required to have 

completely exhausted his administrative remedies. See United States v. 

Chappel, 208 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir. 2000).2 That requirement is clearly 

illustrated in Chapman v. United States Justice Department, 2019 WL 

2030550 (E.D.Ark. 2019) (Ray, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, 

2019 WL 2030114 (E.D.Ark. 2019) (Moody, J.). In that case, Chapman filed 

                                                            

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 In adopting the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge 

Beth Deere, United States District Judge Kristine G. Baker found the following with 

respect to the administrative remedies afforded a petitioner by the BOP: 

Under 28 C.F.R. 542.13(a), an inmate aggrieved by an action of the 

BOP must first present the issue informally to staff. ... If the inmate is 

dissatisfied with the result of the informal process, he may then pursue a 

three-step formal grievance process. In the formal process, the prisoner 

appeals to the Warden; then to the Regional Director; and last, to the 

Office of General Counsel. ... “A prisoner’s administrative remedies are 

not considered exhausted until his grievance has been filed and denied at 

each step.” Bullock v. Beasley, No. 2:18-CV-84-BSM-BD, slip op. at 2 (E.D. 

Ark. 2018); 2019 WL 4997676, at 2. 

See Adams v. Hendrix, 2019 WL 7631401, 1 (E.D. Ark. 2019), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 365417 (E.D. Ark. 2020). 

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a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241 and raised the identical claim 

Coleman raises here, i.e., the BOP failed to award good conduct credit 

under the First Step Act. Chapman’s petition was dismissed, in part, 

because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his 

petition and requiring him to do so would not be futile. With respect to the 

exhaustion requirement and Chapman’s failure to satisfy the requirement, 

United States District Judge James M. Moody, Jr., found the following: 

Under the federal statute authorizing good time credit, 

18 U.S.C. 3624, the BOP, not the district court, determines 

whether a prisoner should receive good time credit. See 

Gonzalez v. United States, 959 F.2d 211, 212 (11th Cir. 1992) 

(“Courts have original jurisdiction over imposition of a 

sentence. The Bureau of Prisons is, however, responsible for 

computing that sentence and applying appropriate good time 

credit.”). If a prisoner believes that the BOP erred in computing 

his sentence, his initial remedy is to pursue administrative 

review of the BOP's computation. See United States v. Wilson, 

503 U.S. 329, 331-35, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992) 

(citing 28 C.F.R. 542.19-542.16). For that purpose, the BOP 

provides prisoners with access to an administrative review 

program. [Footnote omitted]. 

“A prisoner may bring a habeas action challenging the 

BOP's execution of his sentence only if he first presents his 

claim to the BOP.” Mathena v. United States, 577 F.3d 943 (8th 

Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Chappel, 208 F.3d 1069, 1069 

(8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)). Administrative exhaustion 

“means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so 

properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the 

merits).” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (internal 

citations omitted). [Footnote omitted]. 

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Chapman fails to allege or to provide any documentation 

indicating that he has exhausted his administrative remedies 

with the BOP. In fact, there is no indication in the record that 

Chapman made any effort to resolve the current dispute with 

the BOP, either informally or formally, before filing a 2241 

habeas Petition. 

See Chapman v. United States Justice Department, 2019 WL 2030550, 2–3, 

report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 2030114. 

 Here, Coleman failed to allege or provide any documentation 

indicating that he exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing his 

petition. In fact, he left that portion of his petition blank. Coleman likely 

did so because, as the BOP supervisory attorney’s affidavit conclusively 

establishes, Coleman made no effort to exhaust his administrative 

remedies. In short, there is no evidence he presented the issue at bar 

informally to BOP staff or pursued the three-step formal grievance process. 

 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the exhaustion requirement may be 

disregarded if the petitioner can show that attempting to exhaust would 

be futile. See Lueth v. Beach, 498 F.3d 795, 797 n. 3 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. 

denied, 552 U.S. 1121 (2008). Coleman has failed to make that showing. 

Specifically, he has failed to show that requiring him to exhaust his 

administrative remedies would be futile. 

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In conclusion, the undersigned finds that Coleman did not exhaust his 

administrative remedies before filing the petition at bar and has not shown 

that requiring him to do so would be futile. It is therefore recommended 

that his petition be dismissed without prejudice, all requested relief be 

denied, and judgment be entered for Hendrix. 

DATED this 9th day of March, 2020. 

 __________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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