Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01450/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01450-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Miguel Garfias-Ortega, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-13-01450-PHX-NVW (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Miguel Garfias-Ortega (Petitioner) has filed a timely Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Respondents have filed an Answer 

asserting that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred or lack merit (Doc. 11), and 

Petitioner has filed a Reply in support of his Petition. (Doc. 14.) For the reasons below, 

the Petition should be denied. 

I. Procedural Background 

 A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing 

 Petitioner was indicted in the Maricopa County Superior Court (trial court) on two 

counts of armed robbery and one count of attempted armed robbery. (Doc. 11, Ex. A.) 

The indictment alleged that in June 2004 Petitioner and another person approached three 

men who were changing a tire on the side of the highway, and robbed them at gunpoint. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. Z at 2.) In August 2006, a jury found Petitioner guilty of both counts of 

armed robbery, violations of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1904 and class two felonies, and not 

guilty of attempted armed robbery. (Doc. 11, Exs. B, Z at 2.) The jury also found that 

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both counts of armed robbery were dangerous offenses. (Doc. 11, Ex. B.) Although the 

State had alleged several aggravating factors, the court did not submit aggravating factors 

to the jury. (Doc. 11, Ex. Z at 2.) 

 At the June 6, 2008 sentencing hearing, the trial court found as aggravating factors 

the “presence of an accomplice, multiple victims, emotional harm to the victims, the fact 

that [Petitioner’s] vehicle was used to facilitate the commission of the offense,” and 

Petitioner’s lack of remorse. (Doc. 11, Exs. V, Z at 3.) The court imposed concurrent, 

aggravated sentences of fifteen years’ imprisonment on each count of conviction. 

(Doc. 11, Exs. V, Z at 3.) 

B. Direct Appeal 

 Petitioner appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals (court of appeals or appellate 

court), arguing that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination by considering his lack of remorse an aggravating factor. (Doc. 11, Ex. X 

at 24-30.) The State argued that even if the trial court improperly considered Petitioner’s 

lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, Petitioner was not prejudiced because the 

court’s consideration of that factor did not affect Petitioner’s sentence. (Doc. Y at 9-10.) 

Thus, the State argued that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence, even if 

it did not consider Petitioner’s lack of remorse. (Id.) Additionally, although Petitioner 

had not raised the issue, the State conceded that the trial court erred by imposing 

aggravated sentences in the absence of a prior conviction, or Petitioner’s admission, or a 

jury finding of at least one aggravating factor.1

 (Id. at 6-9.) However, the State argued 

that Petitioner was not prejudiced because “no reasonable jury” could have failed to find 

the presence of an accomplice, pecuniary gain, and emotional or financial harm to the 

victims as aggravating factors. (Doc. 11, Ex. Y at 8.) 

 

1

 In a subsequent petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, appellate counsel explained that she did not raise that sentencing issue because any rational jury that convicted Petitioner would also have found the trial court’s three statutory aggravating factors: presence of an accomplice, multiple victims, and emotional or financial harm to the victims. (Doc. 11, Ex. AA at 2.) 

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 The court of appeals first addressed the State’s concession that the trial court had 

violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 

U.S. 296 (2004), by imposing aggravated sentences in the absence of jury findings, or 

Petitioner’s admission, of at least one aggravating factor. (Doc. 11, Ex. Z at 4-5.) The 

court of appeals found that the trial court had erred, but concluded that Petitioner was not 

prejudiced because under Arizona law the existence of a single aggravating factor 

exposes a defendant to an aggravated sentence, and considering the record, “no 

reasonable jury could both convict [Petitioner] and simultaneously find that an 

accomplice was not present.” (Id. at 8.) 

 The appellate court next found that the trial court violated Petitioner’s Fifth 

Amendment right against self-incrimination by considering his lack of remorse as an 

aggravating factor. (Id. at 9.) Additionally, although Petitioner had not explicitly raised 

the issue, the appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in considering the use of 

Petitioner’s vehicle to facilitate the offenses as an aggravating factor under 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-701(D). (Id. at 9-10.) However, the appellate court found that 

Petitioner could not establish prejudice, and denied relief, because it was “clear that the 

court would have imposed an aggravated sentence without reference to Defendant’s use 

of his vehicle or refusal to admit guilt.” (Id. at 8-11.) 

 On May 4, 2010, the court of appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and 

sentences. (Doc. 11, Ex. Z.) Petitioner filed a timely petition for review (Doc. 11, 

Ex. AA at 5), which the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied on November 30, 

2010. (Doc. 11, Exs. CC, DD.) 

C. Post-Conviction Proceedings 

On June 18, 2010, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the trial 

court, pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 11, Ex. II.) 

The trial court dismissed the notice without prejudice because Petitioner’s direct appeal 

was still pending. (Doc. 11, Ex. JJ.) After the conclusion of his direct appeal, on 

December 15, 2010, Petitioner filed another notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 11, 

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Ex. KK.) On February 11, 2011, Petitioner’s appointed post-conviction counsel filed a 

notice stating that, after review of the record, she found no colorable claims to raise on 

post-conviction review. (Doc. Ex. LL.) She requested an extension of time for Petitioner 

to file a pro per petition. (Id.) 

 On October 31, 2011, proceeding pro per, Petitioner filed a fifty-four page petition 

raising numerous claims. (Doc. 11, Ex. MM.) The State moved to strike the petition 

because it violated Rule 32.5, which imposes a mandatory twenty-five page limit. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. NN.) On January 5, 2012, the trial court granted the State’s motion. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. OO.) The court directed the clerk to “immediately” return the over-length 

petition to Petitioner and to send “a form petition for [his] use.” (Id.) The trial court 

advised Petitioner that he could “revise his petition to comply with the page limits 

imposed by Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5,” and file the revised petition within thirty days of the 

court’s order. (Id.) The court warned Petitioner that “[f]ailure to file a revised petition 

[would] result in dismissal of this Rule 32 proceeding with no further extensions without 

a showing of extraordinary circumstances.” (Id.) Petitioner filed a motion for 

reconsideration of the trial court’s order striking his petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. PP.) The trial 

court denied Petitioner’s motion, but granted him an extension until April 6, 2012 to file 

a rule-compliant petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. QQ.) The trial court stated that “[n]o further 

extensions of time shall be granted.” (Id.) 

 Nonetheless, Petitioner requested an additional extension of time to file his 

petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. RR.) The trial court granted this request and extended the 

deadline for Petitioner to file his petition until June 29, 2012. (Doc. 11, Ex. SS.) The 

court again stated that “[n]o further extensions will be granted without a showing of 

extraordinary circumstances.” (Id.) On July 9, 2012, Petitioner filed another request for 

an extension. (Doc. 11, Ex. TT.) Although the trial court did not find extraordinary 

circumstances, it granted Petitioner an additional extension, until August 16, 2012, to file 

a petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. UU.) The trial court stated that if Petitioner did not file a timely 

petition, he would be required to show cause for failing to do so. (Id.) On October 8, 

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2012, the trial court dismissed the Rule 32 proceeding because Petitioner did not file a 

petition by the August 16, 2012 deadline. (Doc. 11, Ex. VV.) 

 Four days later, the trial court received Petitioner’s motion to reconsider the 

August 16, 2012 deadline, which Petitioner had apparently mailed on July 29, 2012. 

(Doc. 11, Exs. WW, XX.) The trial court denied the motion as moot. (Doc. 11, Ex. XX.) 

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order dismissing the 

Rule 32 proceeding. (Doc. 11, Ex. YY.) The trial court denied the motion, stating it did 

not find “good cause” to reconsider its order, and noting that it had granted Petitioner 

three extensions of time, plus an additional twenty days, to file his petition and that 

Petitioner had failed to file a timely petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. ZZ.) Petitioner did not seek 

review of the dismissal of his Rule 32 proceeding in the court of appeals. 

D. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On July 16, 2013, Petitioner filed the pending Petition raising the following 

grounds for relief: (1) the trial court imposed an aggravated sentence based on 

aggravating factors not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of the 

Fifth and Sixth Amendments (Doc. 1 at 3); (2) there is “newly discovered” evidence that 

the “lead detective” committed perjury during the grand jury proceedings (Id. at 4); 

(3) the prosecutor committed misconduct in violation of Petitioner’s due process and 

Sixth Amendment rights by “compelling [a] witness to testify by the use of threat[s],” 

and by misstating testimony and referring to inadmissible evidence during closing 

argument (Id. at 5); (4) the trial court denied Petitioner’s right to a fair trial in violation of 

his due process and Sixth Amendment rights because (i) he was mentally incompetent, 

(ii) the trial court forced him to appear before the jury wearing “identifiable jail 

clothing,” (iii) the court erred by denying his motion “for dismissal” based on insufficient 

evidence and unreliable testimony, and failed to rule on a motion for a new trial filed 

before sentencing, and (iv) the trial court erred in imposing an aggravated sentence based 

on factors that were not found by the jury (Id. at 6); (5) the trial court violated Petitioner’s 

due process and Sixth Amendment rights by disregarding the use of perjured testimony 

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during grand jury proceedings (Id. at 7);2 (6) the trial judge was biased against Petitioner 

in violation of the Due Process Clause as evidenced by his denial of several motions filed 

by defense counsel, insistence that Petitioner appear before the jury in jail clothing, and 

imposition of a sentence based on “non-enumerated factors in the Arizona statutes” and 

aggravating factors not found by the jury (Id. at 8); (7) his convictions violate the Due 

Process Clause because there was insufficient evidence (Id. at 9); (8) Petitioner was 

denied the effective assistance of trial counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment (Id. at 

10); (9) Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel in violation of 

the Sixth Amendment (Doc. 1 at 11); (10) Petitioner was denied the effective assistance 

of post-conviction counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment (Id. at 12); and 

(11) several “structural errors” violated his due process and Sixth Amendment rights. 

(Id. at 13.) 

 Respondents assert that habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s claims is 

procedurally barred, except for Petitioner’s claims in Ground One that the trial court 

violated the Fifth Amendment by considering Petitioner’s lack of remorse an aggravating 

factor, and that the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment by imposing aggravated 

sentences based on factors not admitted by Petitioner or found by a jury. (Doc. 11.) 

Respondents further argue that the claims that are properly before this Court lack merit. 

For the reasons below, the Petition should be denied. 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

A. Federal Court Review 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

 

2

 Ground Five raises several additional claims that duplicate the claims asserted in 

Ground Four. (Compare Ground Four with Ground Five, Doc. 1 at 6-7.) The Court does 

not reiterate the duplicate claims. 

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(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). “A 

claim has been ‘fairly presented’ if the petitioner has described both the operative facts 

and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 33. A 

“state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must read 

beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in 

order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 31-

32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of 

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper 

forum, . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and 

legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

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 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar 

does not depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart

v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state 

court’s application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly 

followed.” See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court 

occasionally excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its 

procedural bar inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). 

“The independent and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in 

correcting their own mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 732. Although a procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of 

comity, the federal court will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-

32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

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claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 

§ 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

B. Ground One was Properly Exhausted, in Part 

 In Ground One, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated the Fifth and Sixth 

Amendments by imposing sentences based on aggravating factors that Petitioner had not 

admitted, or that a jury had not found beyond a reasonable doubt (Ground One (a)). 

(Doc. 1 at 3.) Petitioner also asserts that the trial court erred in considering Petitioner’s 

lack of remorse as an aggravating factor (Ground One (b)). (Id.) Finally, Petitioner 

asserts that the trial court erred when it considered, as an aggravating factor, the use of 

Petitioner’s vehicle in the commission of the offense (Ground One (c)). (Id.) 

 1. Grounds One (a) and (b) 

 Petitioner’s claim in Ground One (a) was properly exhausted on direct appeal 

when the court of appeals considered the State’s concession that the trial court violated 

the Sixth Amendment by imposing aggravated sentences in the absence of Petitioner’s 

admission or a jury finding of at least one aggravating factor. (Doc. 11, Ex. Z at 5.) 

Although Petitioner did not raise this claim, the appellate court’s consideration of that 

claim was sufficient to satisfy § 2254’s exhaustion requirement. See Casey v. Moore, 

386 F.3d 896, 916 n.18 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “a claim is exhausted if the State’s 

highest court expressly addresses the claim, whether or not it was fairly presented.”). 

 Petitioner’s claim in Ground One (b) was exhausted when he asserted on direct 

appeal that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 

by considering his lack of remorse as an aggravating factor at sentencing. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. X, at 30.) See Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(explaining that in non-capital cases, an Arizona state prisoner exhausts his claims by 

presenting them to the court of appeals). Accordingly, the Court considers the merits of 

Grounds One (a) and (b) in Section V, below. 

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 2. Ground One (c) 

 Petitioner did not properly exhaust Ground One (c) because he did not assert in the 

court of appeals a federal claim that the trial court erred by considering the use of his 

vehicle as an aggravating factor in sentencing. Therefore, the court of appeals resolved 

this issue solely on the basis of state law. (Doc. 11, Exs. X at 25, Z at 6-7); see 

Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 668 (stating that a petitioner “must make the federal basis of 

the claim explicit either by specifying particular provisions of the federal Constitution or 

statutes, or by citing to federal case law.”). 

 In his petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court, Petitioner again failed to 

assert a federal basis for his claim that the trial court erred by considering the use of his 

vehicle as an aggravating factor in sentencing. (Doc. 11, Ex. AA.) Even if he had 

asserted this claim in his petition for review, it would not be exhausted because a habeas 

petitioner does not satisfy the fair presentation requirement by raising a federal claim for 

the first time in a petition for discretionary review. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 351 (a claim 

is not fairly presented “where the claim has been presented for the first and only time in a 

procedural context in which its merits will not be considered unless there are ‘special and 

important reasons therefor . . . .’”) (internal citations omitted); Arizona v. Shattuck, 684 

P.2d 154, 156 (Ariz. 1984) (explaining that review by the Arizona Supreme Court is 

discretionary in cases not involving a life sentence or death penalty). 

 Accordingly, Petitioner did not fairly present Ground One (c) to the state courts. 

As discussed below in Section II(D), this claim is procedurally defaulted and barred from 

federal habeas corpus review. 

C. Petitioner did not Properly Exhaust his Remaining Claims 

 Petitioner did not present his remaining claims asserted in Grounds Two through 

Eleven to the state courts, either on direct appeal or in post-conviction proceedings. 

Accordingly, aside from Grounds One (a) and (b), Petitioner did not fairly present any of 

his claims asserted in the pending Petition to the state courts. Therefore, as discussed in 

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Section II(D), Ground One (c) and Grounds Two through Eleven are procedurally 

defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus review. 

D. Procedural Bar to Review of Grounds One (c) and Two through Eleven 

 Petitioner did not exhaust available state remedies with respect to his claims in 

Ground One (c) and Grounds Two through Eleven and, as discussed below, a return to 

state court to present those claims would be futile because Arizona’s procedural rules 

would bar presentation of these claims. Accordingly, these claims are technically 

exhausted and procedurally defaulted. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

First, Rule 32.4(a) requires a defendant to file a notice of post-conviction relief 

“within ninety days of the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the 

issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later.” Here, the 

court of appeals issued its final order and mandate in the direct appeal on January 12, 

2011. (Doc. 11, Ex. DD.) Thus, the ninety-day deadline for filing a notice of postconviction relief expired in April 2011, over two years ago. Accordingly, Rule 32.4(a) 

would bar Petitioner from returning to the state court to assert his claims in a postconviction proceeding. 

 Second, Rule 32.2(a)(3) precludes post-conviction relief upon any ground “that 

has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding.” Petitioner 

waived the claims asserted in Ground One (c) and Grounds Two through Eleven by 

failing to raise them either on direct appeal or in a rule-compliant petition for postconviction relief. See State v. Shrum, 203 P.3d 1175, 1178 (Ariz. 2009) (stating that 

“[r]ule 32.2(a) precludes collateral relief on a ground that either was or could have been 

raised on direct appeal or in a previous PCR proceeding.”). 

 Third, under Rule 31.3, the time for filing a direct appeal expires twenty days after 

entry of the judgment and sentence, and the Arizona rules do not provide for successive 

direct appeals. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer 

available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims. 

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 The application of these rules does not depend on an interpretation of federal law; 

these rules are regularly and consistently followed and, therefore, would bar any future 

attempt to exhaust Petitioner’s claims asserted in Ground One (c) and Grounds Two 

through Eleven in state court. See Stewart, 536 U.S. at 861 (holding that Arizona Rules 

of Criminal Procedure concerning preclusion are an adequate and independent procedural 

bar preventing federal habeas relief); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577-78 (9th Cir. 

1999) (Arizona’s procedural rules are “consistently and regularly followed and are 

adequate to bar federal review.”); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998 

(concluding that Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2 was an adequate and independent procedural bar). 

 Because Petitioner cannot return to state court to exhaust the claims asserted in 

Ground One (c) and Grounds Two through Eleven, those claims are technically 

exhausted and barred from federal habeas corpus review. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 297-99 

(claim was procedurally defaulted where it was “clear that collateral relief would be 

unavailable to [the] petitioner” if he returned to the state courts); McKinney v. Ryan, 730 

F.3d 903, 914 (9th Cir. 2013) (Arizona prisoner’s unexhausted claim was procedurally 

barred because he would be barred from raising it in state court pursuant to Rules 32.2(a) 

and 32.4); Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (“If [petitioner] has any unexhausted claims, he has 

procedurally defaulted them, because he is now time-barred under Arizona law from 

going back to state court.”). Because these claims are procedurally defaulted, they are 

not subject to federal habeas corpus review unless Petitioner establishes a “fundamental 

miscarriage of justice” or “cause and prejudice” to overcome the procedural bar. See 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50; Teague, 489 U.S. at 297-98. As discussed in Sections III 

and IV, Petitioner has not established either basis to excuse the procedural default of 

these claims and allow federal habeas corpus review. 

III. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of that claim will result in a 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A 

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“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when “‘a constitutional violation has 

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Id. (citing Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). 

 To establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must present “new 

reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that “it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 327. Petitioner does not argue that failure to consider his defaulted claims will result 

in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. (Docs. 1, 2, 14). Accordingly, this exception 

does not excuse the procedural bar. 

IV. Cause and Prejudice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if a 

petitioner establishes “cause” and “prejudice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To establish 

“cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense 

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Teague, 489 U.S. at 298. 

A showing of “interference by officials,” constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel, or “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available” may 

constitute cause. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. 

 “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

habeas petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional 

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial 

with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 

(1982) (emphasis in original); see Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). 

If petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, then the court need not 

consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

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A. The Complexity of Arizona’s Procedural Rules, and Petitioner’s Lack 

 of Legal Knowledge and Pro se Status do not Constitute Cause 

 To establish cause, Petitioner argues that Arizona’s Rules of Criminal Procedure 

are “so cumbersome, complex, and confusing that they frustrated [his] good faith 

attempts to comply with them.” (Doc. 3 at 2.) In support of that assertion, Petitioner 

explains that he filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court, but the 

trial court struck it for failure to comply with the page limits of Rule 32.5. (Doc. 3 at 2-

3.) Thus, it appears that Petitioner is arguing that because he was proceeding pro se and 

lacked legal knowledge, including knowledge of the page limits in Rule 32.5, he should 

be excused from complying with Arizona’s procedural requirements. He also argues that 

he was unaware that he could seek appellate review of the trial court’s dismissal of his 

petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 14 at 5.) 

 To the extent that Petitioner argues “cause” based on his pro se status and lack of 

legal knowledge, including his lack of knowledge of the Arizona Rules of Criminal and 

Appellate Procedure, his arguments are unavailing. A petitioner’s lack of legal 

knowledge, status as an inmate, and limited legal resources do not constitute cause to 

excuse the procedural bar. See Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(petitioner’s arguments concerning his mental health and reliance upon jailhouse lawyers 

did not constitute cause); Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrs., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (an illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance was not cause to excuse 

a procedural default). 

 Additionally, Petitioner does not explain why, after the trial court struck his overlength petition and directed him to file a rule-compliant petition, he was unable to do so, 

despite the trial court granting him several extensions of time. The Court finds that the 

alleged complexity of the Arizona Rules of Criminal and Appellate procedure, 

Petitioner’s lack of legal knowledge, and Petitioner’s pro se status do not constitute cause 

to overcome the procedural bar to his claims. 

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B. Interference by Prison Officials does not Constitute Cause 

 Petitioner further argues “cause” based on his assertion that on July 30, 2012, after 

the trial court extended the deadline for him to file a rule-complaint petition to August 16, 

2012, he “gave prison officials his state court petition to mail and it was never received 

by the state court.” (Doc. 3 at 4; Doc. 14 at 5, Exs. 2, 3) He asserts that because the trial 

court never received that petition, it dismissed the post-conviction proceeding on October 

8, 2012. (Doc. 14 at 5.) 

 A petitioner may establish cause for a procedural default when prison officials 

delay the mailing of state court pleadings. See Maples v. Stegall, 340 F.3d 433, 439 (6th 

Cir. 2003) (stating that “[w]here a pro se prisoner attempts to deliver his petition [to 

prison officials] for mailing in sufficient time for it to arrive timely in the normal course 

of events, the [prison mailbox] rule [established in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988)] 

is sufficient to excuse a procedural default based upon a late filing.”). However, because 

the record does not support Petitioner’s assertion that he submitted a petition for postconviction relief to prison officials for mailing on July 30, 2012, the interference of 

prison officials does not constitute cause for his procedural default. 

 Instead, the record reflects that on January 5, 2012, the trial court struck 

Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief because it exceeded the page limits of Rule 

32.5, but the court granted Petitioner an extension of time until February 6, 2012 to file a 

revised, rule-compliant petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. OO.) Petitioner filed a motion for 

reconsideration of the order striking his over-length petition and, on March 7, 2012, the 

trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to reconsider, but extended the deadline for 

Petitioner to file a petition for post-conviction relief until April 6, 2012. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. QQ.) On May 3, 2012 granted Petitioner an additional forty-five day extension of 

time, until June 29, 2012, to file a rule-compliant petition. (Doc. 11, Exs. RR, SS.) On 

July 9, 2012, Petitioner requested another forty-five day extension of time to file a 

petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. TT.) The court denied Petitioner’s extension request, but granted 

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him another extension of time, until August 16, 2012, to file a rule-compliant petition. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. UU.) 

 On October 8, 2012, the trial court dismissed the post-conviction proceeding 

because Petitioner had not filed a rule-compliant petition and the deadline to do so had 

passed. (Doc. 11, Ex. VV.) Several days later, the trial court received Petitioner’s 

motion to reconsider its denial of his July 9, 2012 request for an extension of time. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. WW.) Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was dated July 29, 2012. 

(Id.) The trial court denied the motion to reconsider as moot. (Doc. 11, Ex. XX.) 

 On November 15, 2012, the trial court received Petitioner’s motion to reconsider 

its October 8, 2012 dismissal of the post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 11, Ex. YY.) In 

that motion, Petitioner argued that the trial court had dismissed the post-conviction 

proceeding before it had received or considered his July 29, 2012 motion for 

reconsideration of the order denying the July 9, 2012 extension request. (Id.) Petitioner 

stated that “official prison records” showed that his motion for reconsideration was “sent 

out on July 30, 2012.” (Id. at 2.) Petitioner did not argue that he had filed or attempted 

to file a petition for post-conviction relief by submitting it to prison officials for mailing. 

On December 10, 2012, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. ZZ.) 

 The record does not support Petitioner’s assertion that he either submitted, or 

attempted to submit, a rule-compliant petition before the August 16, 2012 deadline. 

Petitioner refers to a “petition” that he submitted to prison officials for mailing on July 

30, 2012, but that was not received by the trial court until after it dismissed the postconviction proceedings. (Doc. 3 at 4; Doc. 14 at 5; Doc. 14-1 at 12.) It appears, 

however, that Petitioner is referring to his July 29, 2012 motion for reconsideration of the 

denial of his July 9, 2012 extension request, which the trial court received four days after 

it dismissed the post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 11, Exs. WW, XX, YY at 2.) 

Petitioner’s argument that he did not receive a ruling on his July 29, 2012 motion for 

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reconsideration before the August 16, 2012 deadline for filing of a rule-compliant 

petition, does not constitute cause for failing to file his petition by the deadline. 

 Although it appears that Petitioner submitted the motion for reconsideration to 

prison officials for mailing on July 30, 2012 (Doc. 11, Ex. YY at 2; Doc. 14-1 at 12), 

Petitioner does not allege that he inquired into the status of that motion at any time before 

or after the August 16, 2012 deadline for filing his rule-compliant petition. The trial 

court did not dismiss the post-conviction proceeding until October 8, 2012. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. VV.) Thus, Petitioner had ample time to inquire into the status of his motion for 

reconsideration and has not shown that his failure to receive a ruling on that motion until 

after the August 16, 2012 deadline, or that that prison officials’ alleged interference with 

the mailing of his “petition,” constitutes cause to excuse the procedural bar to his claims 

asserted in Ground One (c) and Ground Two through Eleven. 

C. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel does not Constitute Cause 

 Petitioner also argues that appellate counsel’s ineffective assistance “resulted in a 

default in a proceeding . . . .” (Doc. 3 at 1.) To the extent Petitioner contends that the 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel constitutes cause to overcome the procedural 

bar, his claim fails. Although in some circumstances the ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel may establish cause for a procedural default, “a claim of ineffective 

assistance must be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be 

used to establish cause for a procedural default.” Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488-89; see also 

Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451-53 (2000) (“ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

claim asserted as cause for the procedural default of another claim can itself be 

procedurally defaulted”); Tacho, 862 F.2d at 1381 (same). Petitioner did not present any 

claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to the state courts. Accordingly, the 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel does not establish cause to overcome the 

procedural bar to habeas corpus review of Ground One (c) and Grounds Two through 

Eleven. 

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D. Ineffective Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel does not Constitute 

 Cause 

 To establish “cause” to overcome the procedural bar of his claims, Petitioner also 

argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on post-conviction review. 

(Doc. 3 at 1-2; Doc. 14.) Generally, any errors of counsel during the post-conviction 

proceedings cannot serve as a basis for cause to excuse a petitioner’s procedural default 

of other claims. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752. However, in Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S. 

___, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), the Supreme Court established a limited exception to 

this general rule. The Court held that the ineffective assistance of post-conviction 

counsel “at initial-review collateral review proceedings” — while not stating a 

constitutional claim itself — may establish cause to excuse procedural default of claims 

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel when a post-conviction proceeding represents 

the first opportunity under state law for a petitioner to litigate such claims. Id. at 1315. 

“Cause” is established under Martinez when: 

(1) the claim of “ineffective assistance of trial counsel” was a 

“substantial” claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of there being 

“no counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the state collateral review proceeding; (3) the state collateral review 

proceeding was the “initial” review proceeding in respect to the “ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim”; and 

(4) state law requires that an “ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel [claim] . . . be raised in an initial-review collateral 

review proceeding. 

Trevino v. Thaler, __ U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) (citing Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 

1318-19, 1320-21). In Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1296 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth 

Circuit held that “the Martinez standard for cause applies to all Sixth Amendment 

ineffective-assistance claims, both to trial and appellate, that have been procedurally 

defaulted by ineffective counsel in the initial-review state-court collateral proceeding.” 

 The Martinez exception applies only to the ineffectiveness of post-conviction 

counsel in the initial post-conviction review proceeding. It “does not extend to attorney 

errors in any proceeding beyond the first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a 

claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Id. at 1320. Rather, Martinez is concerned that, 

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if ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not brought in the collateral proceeding 

that provided the first occasion to raise such claims, then the claims could not be brought 

at all. Id. at 1316. Therefore, a petitioner may not assert “cause” to overcome the 

procedural bar based on attorney error that occurred in “appeals from initial-review 

collateral proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings, and petitions for 

discretionary review in a State’s appellate courts.” Id. at 1320. 

 Because the Martinez cause standard applies only to defaulted ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims, the only claims to which it might apply in this case are 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel asserted in 

Grounds Eight and Nine.3

 Petitioner argues that the procedural default of his claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel should be excused because postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to raise those claims. Thus, the Court must 

first address whether Petitioner has shown a “substantial” claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel.4

 

 A “substantial” claim “has some merit.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. Like the 

standard for issuing a certificate of appealability, to establish a “substantial” claim, a 

petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition 

should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were 

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 

1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, a claim is 

 

3

 Respondents argue that under Martinez, the ineffective assistance of post- conviction counsel may establish cause “only for the procedural default of a claim asserting ineffective assistance of counsel at trial,” and thus only applies to Ground Eight, which alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Doc. 11 at 20.) After Respondents filed their Answer, the Ninth Circuit clarified that “the Martinez standard for cause” 

applies to claims of trial and appellate counsel. See Nguyen, 736 F.3d at 1296. The 

Court, however, does not require additional briefing to resolve whether ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel constitutes cause for the procedural default of Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

4

 The third and fourth prongs of the Martinez test are not at issue because an 

Arizona petitioner cannot bring a claim of ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel until the “initial-review state court collateral proceeding . . . .” See Nguyen, 736 

F.3d at 1294-95. 

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“‘insubstantial’ if it does not have any merit or is wholly without factual support.” Id. 

Determining whether an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is substantial requires a 

district court to examine the claim under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668 (1984). 

 1. Establishing an Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 

 To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a petitioner must 

demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient under prevailing professional 

standards, and that he suffered prejudice as a result of that deficient performance. Id. at 

687-88. To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must show “that counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 699. A 

petitioner’s allegations and supporting evidence must withstand the court’s “highly 

deferential” scrutiny of counsel’s performance, and overcome the “strong presumption” 

that counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 

exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 689-90. A petitioner bears the 

burden of showing that counsel’s assistance was “neither reasonable nor the result of 

sound trial strategy,” Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 939 (9th Cir. 2001), and 

actions by counsel that “‘might be considered sound trial strategy’” do not constitute 

ineffective assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 

U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 

 To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show a “reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is one “sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Courts should not presume prejudice. 

Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000). Rather, a petitioner must 

affirmatively prove actual prejudice, and the possibility that a petitioner suffered 

prejudice is insufficient to establish Strickland’s prejudice prong. See Cooper v.

Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A petitioner] must ‘affirmatively prove 

prejudice.’ . . . This requires showing more than the possibility that he was prejudiced by 

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counsel’s errors; he must demonstrate that the errors actually prejudiced him.”) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693) (emphasis in original). However, the court need not 

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient if the court can reject the claim 

of ineffectiveness based on the lack of prejudice. See Jackson, 211 F.3d at 1155 n.3 (the 

court may proceed directly to the prejudice prong). 

 2. Ground Eight — Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 

 In Ground Eight, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective by: (a) failing 

to move to remand to the grand jury based on a police detective’s perjured testimony; 

(b) failing to request a competency hearing before or during trial; (c) failing to consult 

with Petitioner more than a “couple of times,” which foreclosed the opportunity for 

Petitioner to advise counsel he did want to testify, failing to investigate the ownership of 

the “subject vehicle alleged to be [Petitioner’s],” failing to obtain information from “the 

airlines” to prove that Petitioner was not in Arizona at the time of the offenses, and 

failing to investigate witnesses to obtain impeachment evidence; (d) failing to provide 

Petitioner with suitable clothing for trial; (e) failing to move for a continuance or a 

mistrial when the trial court compelled Petitioner to appear before the jury wearing 

“identifiable jail attire”; (f) failing to object when the prosecutor “deliberately misstated 

testimony” regarding a gun during closing argument; (g) failing to argue in closing that 

Petitioner was mistakenly identified; (i) failing to object to Petitioner’s unlawfully 

aggravated sentence; and (j) failing to act as an adversary. (Doc. 1 at 10.) 

 As discussed below in Section IV(D)(2)(a)-(h), Petitioner has not asserted 

“substantial” claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Therefore, he cannot 

establish “cause” under Martinez, based on the ineffective assistance of post-conviction 

counsel in failing to raise these claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, to 

overcome the procedural bar to federal habeas review of these claims. In addition, even 

if these claims were properly before this Court, they would fail on the merits. 

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 a. Ground Eight (a) – Failure to Move to Remand to Grand 

 Jury

 Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a remand 

to the grand jury under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 12.9 because police detective Pablo Garcia 

(Detective Garcia) allegedly falsely testified before the grand jury that Petitioner’s 

vehicle was used in the offense and that the victims could identify him. (Doc. 1 at 4, 10; 

Doc. 14 at 7-8.) Respondents argue that, even assuming that Detective Garcia offered 

this testimony to the grand jury, Petitioner has not established that this testimony was 

false.5

 (Doc. 11 at 21.) 

 The portion of the grand jury transcript that includes Detective Garcia’s testimony 

regarding the use of Petitioner’s car in the commission of the robbery is not in the record 

before the Court. Accordingly, for the purpose of analyzing Petitioner’s claim, the Court 

assumes that Detective Garcia testified before the grand jury as Petitioner asserts. During 

trial, Detective Garcia and two other witnesses testified that Petitioner’s vehicle was used 

in the robbery. (Doc. 11, Ex. EE at 81, 87-88 (Jesus Fernandez), 99-102 (Carlos 

Carbajal), 130 (Detective Garcia).) Thus, it appears that Detective Garcia’s grand jury 

testimony was consistent with his trial testimony and there is no indication that his grand 

jury testimony regarding the use of Petitioner’s vehicle was false. 

 Although the record before the Court does not include the entire grand jury 

transcript, Respondents’ exhibit MM is a copy of one of Petitioner’s state court filings 

and it includes portions of a transcript that Petitioner identified as “Detective Garcia’s 

testimony relating to photo-line-up” during the November 3, 2004 grand jury proceeding. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. MM, Doc. 11-4 at 61-63.) That transcript includes Detective Garcia’s 

testimony that he showed “photographic lineups” that included a photograph of GarfiasOrtega to “the three alleged victims,” and that two of the three victims “identif[ied] 

 

5

 In Ground Two, Petitioner characterizes Detective Garcia’s alleged false grand jury testimony as “new evidence.” (Doc. 1 at 4.) Because the veracity of Detective Garcia’s testimony could have been ascertained at the time of the grand jury proceeding and at trial, it is not “new” evidence. 

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Mr. Garfias-Ortega as an individual involved in this situation.”6 (Doc. 11-4 at 62-63.) 

During trial, however, Detective Garcia testified that those same two victims had not 

identified Petitioner from a photographic lineup. (Doc. 11, Ex. FF at 8-10.) 

 Based on the portion of the transcript in the record, Detective Garcia’s grand jury 

testimony regarding the victims’ identification of Petitioner from photographic lineups 

appears to conflict with his trial testimony. Under Arizona law, a grand jury’s finding of 

probable cause may be challenged “by a motion alleging that the defendant was denied a 

substantial procedural right” and seeking remand to the grand jury. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

12.9. Arizona courts have found that a petitioner was “denied substantial due process” 

when false evidence was either intentionally or unintentionally presented to the grand 

jury and was used as a basis for a finding of probable cause. Nelson v. Roylston, 699 

P.2d 1349, 1354 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). 

 Although it appears that Detective Garcia may have given inaccurate testimony 

before the grand jury, without the complete grand jury transcript, the Court cannot 

determine whether counsel was deficient for failing to file a motion to remand or whether 

counsel could have reasonably believed that the trial court would have denied a motion to 

remand, making such a motion futile. See Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1162 

(9th Cir. 1989) (“The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel”) (quotation omitted). However, because Petitioner 

must establish both Strickland requirements, the Court will first consider whether 

Petitioner has established prejudice and, if not, the Court need not consider whether 

counsel’s performance was deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (explaining that 

“[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 

prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.”); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (stating that “[f]ailure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the 

need to consider the other.”). 

 

6

 Detective Garcia clarified that, although there were three victims to the robbery, the police were unable to locate the third victim. (Doc. 11, Ex. FF at 7-8, 13-14.) 

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 Here, Petitioner cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to file a 

motion to remand because a jury later found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of two 

counts of armed robbery as charged. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 

(1986) (holding that any error with respect to the charging decision by the grand jury is 

rendered harmless by subsequent conviction by the petit jury); United States v. Anderson, 

61 F.3d 1290, 1297 n.5 (7th Cir. 1995) (petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel based on failure to challenge the indictment for lack of probable cause failed 

because “his subsequent conviction establishes that there was ‘no reasonable probability’ 

that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for his trial counsel’s 

alleged error.”); Jones v. Ryan, 2010 WL 383510, at *31 (D. Ariz. Jan. 29, 2010) (citing 

Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70) (concluding that even if counsel was deficient for failing to 

challenge witness’s grand jury testimony as false, any error was harmless); Murray v.

Schriro, 2006 WL 988133, at *7 (D. Ariz. Apr. 13, 2006) (concluding that “[b]ecause a 

jury found [p]etitioner guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, the 

alleged absence of probable cause before the grand jury, even if true, would be harmless 

error.”). Thus, even assuming counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to file a 

motion to remand to the grand jury on the basis that Detective Garcia’s grand jury 

testimony was false, Petitioner has not established prejudice. 

 Accordingly, Petitioner has not presented a “substantial” claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel to establish “cause” under Martinez to overcome the procedural 

bar to federal habeas corpus review of Ground Eight (a). In addition, even if Petitioner’s 

claim asserted in Ground Eight (a) were properly before the Court, it would fail on the 

merits. 

 b. Ground Eight (b) - Failure to Request a Competency Hearing 

 In Ground Eight (b), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to request a competency hearing before or during trial because “during the 

commencement of court proceedings, [he] conveyed his concerns to his trial lawyer 

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regarding [his] mental illness and [informed counsel that he] required psychiatric 

medication.” (Doc. 1 at 10, Doc. 14 at 8-10.) Respondents agree that trial counsel did 

not request a competency hearing pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11 before trial. (Doc. 11 

at 21-22.) Rather, they argue that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient because 

he filed numerous motions regarding Petitioner’s competency between trial and 

sentencing, and Petitioner cannot establish prejudice because he received competency 

proceedings. (Id.) 

 Under the Due Process Clause, a state may not try a person who is mentally 

incompetent. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). To be competent to 

stand trial, a defendant must demonstrate “a sufficient present ability to consult with his 

lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and “a rational as well as 

factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 

402, 402 (1960); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11. 1 (“A person shall not be tried, convicted, 

sentenced or punished for a public offense, except for proceedings pursuant to [Ariz. Rev. 

Stat.] § 36-3707(D), while, as a result of a mental illness, defect, or disability, the person 

is unable to understand the proceedings against him or her or to assist in his or her own 

defense.”). 

 Counsel is not required to request a competency hearing in every instance in 

which a defendant has exhibited signs of mental illness. See Drope, 420 U.S. 162 at 180. 

(“There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for 

further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in 

which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.”) However, 

“[c]ounsel’s failure to move for a competency hearing violates the defendant’s right to 

effective assistance of counsel when ‘there are sufficient indicia of incompetence to give 

objectively reasonable counsel reason to doubt the defendant’s competency, and there is a 

reasonable probability that the defendant would have been found incompetent to stand 

trial had the issue been raised and fully considered.’” Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 

862 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 283 (3d Cir. 2001)). 

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 Petitioner asserts that before trial he informed counsel of his “apparent case of 

schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorder, and about his required psychiatric 

medication.” (Doc. 14 at 9.) In support of his assertion, Petitioner cites a portion of an 

“External Grievance” and “External Response” (the Grievance and Response) regarding a 

grievance that he apparently filed on November 10, 2006, when he was housed in Towers 

Jail. (Doc. 14, Ex. 4; Doc. 14-1 at 13.) The grievance related to Petitioner’s June 19, 

2006 request to be seen by “psych” while housed at the Lower Buckeye Jail. (Doc. 14-1 

at 13.) 

 Petitioner was tried in state court in August 2006. (Doc. 11, Exs. EE-GG.) Thus, 

even assuming that trial counsel was aware of Petitioner’s November 2006 Grievance and 

Response, because it was filed after the trial date, it could not have put counsel on notice 

before trial that Petitioner had any sort of mental illness that affected his competency to 

stand trial. Additionally, even if trial counsel knew that Petitioner had requested to been 

seen by a psychiatric professional in June 2006, several months before his trial 

commenced, the information in the Grievance and Response does not include “sufficient 

indicia of incompetence to give objectively reasonable counsel reason to doubt the 

defendant’s competency.”7

 See Stanley, 633 F.3d at 862. Instead, the Grievance and 

Response indicates that Petitioner was experiencing “anxiety and depression” that was 

“non-urgent,” and that Petitioner was not prescribed psychiatric medication until October 

26, 2006, after his trial had concluded. (Doc. 14-1 at 13 (noting that, on June 19, 2006, 

Petitioner indicated that “he had never been treated for any mental health problems but 

was now suffering anxiety and depression” and that on June 22, 2006 a “mental health 

professional” “determined this was a non-urgent issue”).) (Id.) The information 

contained in the Grievance and Response does not support Petitioner’s assertion that trial 

counsel had notice before or during trial that Petitioner had a mental health issue that 

 

7

 On February 8, 2008, trial counsel filed a motion for a new trial and stated that 

he “was unaware of Defendant’s request to see a psych before trial.” (Doc. 11, Ex. S at 2.) 

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would have “given objectively reasonable counsel reason to doubt [Petitioner’s] 

competency.” See Stanley, 663 F.3d at 862. 

 In further support of Ground Eight (b), Petitioner cites a page from a December 4, 

2006 report that the public defender’s mitigation specialist Linda Shaw prepared for 

sentencing. (Doc. 14, Ex. 6; Doc. 14-1 at 35; Doc. 11, Ex. HH at 3, 6.) Ms. Shaw’s 

report lists “schizoaffective disorder” and “post-traumatic stress disorder” among her 

“diagnostic impressions.” (Doc. 14-1 at 35.) However, because this report was not 

prepared until December 4, 2006, several months after the conclusion of Petitioner’s trial, 

it could not have put trial counsel on notice before or during trial of any mental health 

issues that might have affected Petitioner’s competency to stand trial. 

 Thus, the evidence Petitioner cites in support of Ground Eight (b) does not support 

his contention that trial counsel had reason to doubt his competency before or during 

trial.8

 See Stanley, 633 F.3d at 862; Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 646-47 (9th Cir. 

2004) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim when record did not demonstrate 

“substantial evidence” of incompetence); Williams v. Woodford, 306 F.3d 665, 702 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (explaining that, “[a]lthough no particular facts signal a defendant’s 

incompetence, suggestive evidence includes the defendant’s demeanor before the trial 

judge, irrational behavior of the defendant, and available medical evaluations of the 

defendant’s competence to stand trial.”). 

 Furthermore, even assuming that trial counsel was deficient for failing to request a 

competency hearing before or during trial, Petitioner has not established prejudice. 

Between trial and sentencing, after trial counsel received a report from Dr. Richard 

Rosengard concluding that Petitioner was incompetent, counsel twice moved for a 

competency evaluation. (Doc. 11, Exs. E, K.) The trial court appointed an expert under 

 8

 The trial court could have sua sponte ordered a competency examination if it observed behavior warranting one. See State v. Amaya–Ruiz, 800 P.2d 1260, 1270 (Ariz. 

1990) (stating that “[a] trial judge is under a continuing duty to inquire into a defendant’s competency, and to order a rule 11 examination sua sponte if reasonable grounds exist.”). The fact that the court did not order a competency examination suggests that it did not observe behavior that raised a concern about Petitioner’s mental competency. 

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Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.5, which governs presentence mental health examinations, to assess 

Petitioner’s mental status. (Doc. 11, Exs. I, J.) After the court-appointed expert found 

Petitioner incompetent, the trial court ordered that Petitioner receive treatment for 

restoration to competency. (Doc. 11, Ex. N.) The trial court subsequently ruled that the 

Rule 26.5 evaluation was inadequate to initiate restoration proceedings, granted trial 

counsel’s motion for a competency evaluation under Rule 11, and appointed two experts 

to evaluate Petitioner’s competency. (Doc. 11, Exs. O, P.) Based on the reports of the 

court-appointed experts, the trial court found that Petitioner understood the proceedings, 

was able to assist counsel, and was competent to proceed. (Doc. 11, Ex. R.) 

 Trial counsel then moved for a new trial asserting, among other grounds, that 

Petitioner was mentally incompetent during trial. (Doc. 11, Ex. S.) The trial court 

deferred ruling on the competency issue until after the State responded, and denied the 

motion on the other grounds asserted. (Doc. 11, Ex. T.) The State argued that doctors 

had found Petitioner competent and there were “no indications that the defendant was 

incompetent or mentally ill at the time of trial.” (Doc. 11, Ex. U.) Although the trial 

court never explicitly ruled on the request for a new trial based on Petitioner’s alleged 

incompetency, it implicitly denied that request by proceeding to sentencing. See United 

States v. Stolarz, 547 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir. 1976) (“[T]he entry of judgment amounts to 

an implicit denial of [a] motion for new trial.”). 

 Therefore, Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of either deficient 

performance or prejudice. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. The record reflects that trial 

counsel’s performance was not deficient because he filed several motions for an 

evaluation of Petitioner’s competency, and requested a new trial, after he became aware 

of Petitioner’s potential mental incompetency. (Doc. 11, Exs. C, E, K, S.) Additionally, 

Petitioner has not established prejudice because he received a Rule 11 competency 

evaluation between trial and sentencing, and two experts and the trial court found him 

competent to proceed. See Puhrmann v. Schriro, 2007 WL 1830600, at *9-11. (D. Ariz. 

Mar. 26, 2007) (finding that the petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to 

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request a Rule 11 competency hearing when medical records obtained before sentencing 

did not mention psychological or cognitive deficiencies). Additionally, he has not shown 

that the results of a competency evaluation before or during trial would have differed 

from his presentence competency evaluation. See Cooper, 255 F.3d at 1109 (petitioner 

must “affirmatively prove prejudice”). 

 Thus, Petitioner has not presented a “substantial” claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to request a competency hearing before or during 

trial, and has not established “cause” under Martinez to overcome the procedural bar and 

to allow federal habeas corpus review of his claim in Ground Eight (b). Furthermore, 

even if that claim were properly before the Court, it would fail on the merits. 

 c. Ground Eight (c) - Failure to Investigate and Confer 

In Ground Eight (c), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to consult with him more than a few times, which deprived him of the opportunity to tell 

counsel he did not want to testify. (Doc. 1 at 10.) Petitioner also asserts that counsel was 

ineffective for failing to investigate the “actual” owner of the vehicle used in the 

commission of the robberies, failing to investigate “the airlines” to establish that 

Petitioner was not in Arizona at the time of the robberies, and failing to investigate 

“witnesses’ backgrounds” to obtain impeachment evidence. (Id.) 

 Petitioner has not provided citations to the law or the record to support these 

allegations. (Id.) His unsupported, conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a 

claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (stating that conclusory allegations with no reference to the record or other 

evidence do not warrant habeas relief). Moreover, the record does not support 

Petitioner’s allegations. 

 First, the record suggests that trial counsel consulted with Petitioner regarding 

witnesses who could help the defense because he called Petitioner’s fiancée, brother, and 

sister-in-law as witnesses on Petitioner’s behalf. (Doc. 11, Ex. FF at 81-85, 90-92, 101-

03.) Additionally, Petitioner testified in his own defense, which suggests that counsel 

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consulted with him to develop questions to ask him at trial. (Doc. 11, Ex. FF at 32-78.) 

The record before the Court, including the trial transcripts, does not suggest that 

Petitioner did not want to testify at trial. Petitioner could have raised that issue at trial, 

yet there is no indication in the record that Petitioner expressed a desire to invoke his 

Fifth Amendment right not to testify or that he otherwise expressed a desire not to testify. 

 Second, Petitioner does not describe the evidence counsel would have uncovered 

had he further investigated the ownership of the vehicle used in the robberies. See 

Beaver v. Thompson, 93 F.3d 1186, 1195 (4th Cir. 1996) (“an allegation of inadequate 

investigation does not warrant habeas relief absent a proffer of what favorable evidence 

or testimony would have been produced.”). Additionally, trial counsel cross-examined 

Carlos Carbajal and challenged his testimony that Petitioner owned the vehicle used in 

the robberies, but that Carbajal registered the vehicle in his name as a favor to Petitioner. 

(Doc. EE, at 99-102, 111-12.) 

 Third, Petitioner also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

investigate “the airlines” to discover evidence confirming that Petitioner was not in 

Arizona at the time of the robberies, but he again fails to identify the evidence counsel 

would have uncovered through such an investigation. (Doc. 1 at 10.) Moreover, it is 

unlikely that an investigation into “the airlines” would have uncovered any favorable 

evidence because Petitioner admitted during trial that he was in Arizona in June 2004 

when the robberies were committed, and he also testified that he had unsuccessfully tried 

to obtain airlines records regarding his flight from the east coast to Arizona in March 

2004, and his return flight to the east coast in July or August 2004. (Doc. 11, Ex. FF at 

44, 53.) 

 Finally, Petitioner’s assertion that trial counsel did not investigate the witnesses’ 

backgrounds for impeachment purposes is not supported by the record, which indicates 

that on cross-examination trial counsel questioned the victim-witnesses regarding their 

testimony, especially regarding their identifications of Petitioner. (Doc. 11, Ex. EE, at 

30-35, 57-59.) Trial counsel similarly attacked Petitioner’s accomplice Jesus Fernandez 

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on cross-examination, and elicited testimony that he inculpated Petitioner to protect 

himself and to secure a conviction on lesser charges. (Id. at 90-91.) 

 Even assuming that trial counsel was deficient, as Petitioner alleges in Ground 

Eight (c), Petitioner has not established prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 

(explaining that “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of 

lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.”); Rios, 299 F.3d at 805. 

Petitioner has not described the information counsel could have learned upon additional 

consultation with him, or the information he could have obtained if he had further 

investigated the ownership of the vehicle, the airlines, or the witnesses’ backgrounds. 

Petitioner’s unsupported allegations are not sufficient to establish a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. See Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2003) (to 

succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on failure to investigate or 

call witnesses, a petitioner must identify witnesses in question, state with specificity what 

testimony witnesses would have provided, and explain how that testimony would have 

altered the outcome of his trial). Additionally Petitioner has not described how his own 

testimony prejudiced the outcome of his trial. See Cooper, 255 F.3d at 1109 (petitioner 

must affirmatively establish prejudice). Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel in Ground Eight (c) are not “substantial” and do not establish 

“cause” under Martinez, and also fail on the merits. 

 d. Grounds Eight (d) and (e) – Lack of Suitable Clothing 

In Grounds Eight (d) and (e), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to provide him with suitable clothing for trial, and for failing to move for a 

continuance when the trial court compelled him to appear before the jury in identifiable 

jail attire. Although Petitioner provides varied descriptions of his attire at trial, it appears 

that he appeared before the jury in civilian clothing with pink jail socks and slippers.9

 

(Doc. 1 at 10.) 

 

9

 In his Petition, Petitioner asserts that he appeared before the jury in pink jail slippers and socks. (Doc. 1 at 10.) In his Reply, Petitioner asserts that his “new clothes, shoes, and socks” were missing on the first day of trial, and that he “appeared before the 

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 The trial transcript also creates some confusion on the issue of Petitioner’s 

courtroom attire. On the first day of testimony, the trial court noted that Petitioner was 

not present in the courtroom because he was “refusing to be dressed out in 

clothing . . . which he had from last week.” (Doc. 11, Ex. EE at 2.) Trial counsel said he 

would talk with Petitioner, and the court explained “he does have clothing here that is 

available for him to put on. If he refuses to put on that clothing, then I will take that as an 

indication from him that he is voluntarily refusing to appear for trial or he can appear if 

he chooses in his jail garb, but I think the better way to proceed is to just take it as 

voluntary refusal to appear.” (Id. at 2-3.) 

 When Petitioner subsequently appeared in the courtroom, the trial court noted that 

his refusal to change clothes had delayed the start of trial that day. Petitioner stated that, 

“I just didn’t have any shoes, Your Honor. I lost my shoes.” (Id. at 3.) The trial court 

advised Petitioner that his family could bring him clothing to wear but that she would not 

delay the trial if he refused to wear available clothing. (Id. at 3-4.) 

 After the jury returned its verdict against Petitioner, trial counsel moved for a new 

trial on the ground that Petitioner “was required to appear and testify before the jury 

wearing jail slippers because his shoes were lost by the sheriff between days of trial. 

This allowed the jury to know that he was in custody.” (Doc. 11, Ex. S.) The trial court 

denied the motion as untimely filed. (Doc. 11, Ex. T.) 

 A defendant “may not be compelled to be tried before a jury in identifiable prison 

clothes.” United States v. Rogers, 769 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Estelle v.

Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (holding that a defendant may not be compelled to wear 

jail clothes before the jury, because no “essential state policy” is served by compelling a 

defendant to dress in this manner.”)). The court must determine whether a defendant was 

 jury wearing the same clothes he had already worn with identifiable pink jail slippers and socks on day one and two of trial.” (Doc. 14 at 11) In a motion for new trial, Petitioner’s 

trial counsel indicated that Petitioner appeared before the jury wearing “jail slippers.” (Doc. 11, Ex. S.) Although Petitioner’s Reply states that his “new clothes,” were missing, it appears from the record and the Petition that Petitioner appeared before the jury in civilian clothing with pink jail socks and slippers. 

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compelled to appear in prison clothes because “instances frequently arise where a 

defendant prefers to stand trial before his peers in prison garments . . . in the hope of 

eliciting sympathy from the jury,” Williams, 425 U.S. at 508 (citing Andern v. Watt, 475 

F.2d 881, 882 (10th Cir. 1973)). 

 Even assuming that trial counsel was deficient for failing to provide Petitioner 

with suitable attire (foot wear and socks), and failing to object to the trial court requiring 

Petitioner to appear before the jury wearing pink jail socks and slippers, he has not shown 

a reasonable probability that counsel’s failure to provide him will a full set of civilian 

clothing affected the outcome of his trial. The jury acquitted him of one of the three 

charges, which suggests that his pink jail socks and slippers were not outcome 

determinative. See United States v. de Cruz, 82 F.3d 856, 861 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that 

a verdict acquitting a defendant of some charges was “indicative a lack of prejudice 

toward defendant.”); Whitman v. Bartow, 434 F.3d 968, 972 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Because 

[the petitioner’s] appearance before the jury in his prison clothing did not prejudice the 

outcome of his trial, [the petitioner’s] ineffective assistance of counsel claim also 

fails . . . . The evidence of [the petitioner’s] guilt was overwhelming, and his attire was 

not an outcome determinative factor in the jury’s decision.”); Balas v. Ryan, 2011 WL 

3320652, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 2, 2011) (petitioner failed to establish that counsel’s failure 

to object to his appearance in prison clothing and restraints was prejudicial considering 

evidence of Petitioner’s guilt). 

 Thus, Petitioner has not presented a “substantial” claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel in Grounds Eight (d) and (e) and has not established “cause” under Martinez to 

overcome the procedural bar and to allow federal habeas corpus review of these claims. 

Even if these claims were properly before the Court, they would fail on the merits. 

 e. Ground Eight (f) - Failure to Object to Closing Argument 

 During closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged that the police never found 

the gun that the victims described, and he referred to witness Carbajal’s testimony that he 

lent Petitioner a gun “the night before this armed robbery.” (Doc. 11, Ex. GG at 10-11.) 

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The prosecutor also suggested that, even though the gun that was used in the robberies 

was never found, Petitioner had plenty of time between the robberies in 2004 and his trial 

in 2006 to dispose of the gun. (Id. (“From 2004 until the time he’s picked up there 

wouldn’t have been any opportunity, ladies and gentlemen, for him to not have it 

anymore? No, that’s not reasonable. Of course it’s gone.”).) The prosecutor argued that 

the “link” between Petitioner and the gun was Carbajal “put[ing] it in his hand.” (Id. at 

11.) In Ground Eight (f), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object during closing argument when the prosecutor “deliberately misstated testimony 

linking [Petitioner] to a gun that was not presented at trial.” (Doc. 1 at 10.) 

 Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the prosecutor did not misstate Carbajal’s 

testimony. On direct examination, Carbajal testified that Petitioner had borrowed a 

handgun from him and had not returned it. (Doc. 11, Ex. EE at 106-07.) He further 

testified that he lent the gun to Petitioner on June 15, 2004, the day before the armed 

robberies were committed. (Id. at 107.) On cross examination, Carbajal again stated that 

he had loaned Petitioner a “pistol.” (Id. at 112.) On redirect examination, Carbajal stated 

that he was not present when Petitioner picked up the gun from the house where Carbajal 

was staying. (Id. at 113.) 

 In contrast to Carbajal’s testimony about the gun, co-defendant Fernandez testified 

on direct examination that he had carried the gun during the robberies. However, he was 

impeached on cross-examination with an audiotape recording of his interview with police 

in which he told Detective Garcia that Petitioner “carries a gun and was carrying a gun” 

during the robberies. (Doc. 11, Ex. EE at 70-72, 82-83.) Detective Garcia also testified 

that, when interviewed, Fernandez told him that Petitioner had a gun and “held the gun 

on” the victims during the robberies. (Doc. 11, Ex. FF at 13.) 

 On review of the trial court record, it appears that the prosecutor’s statement that 

Carbajal “put the gun in Petitioner’s hand” was hyperbole to emphasize Carbajal’s 

testimony that he had loaned Petitioner a gun, rather than a misstatement of evidence. 

See Jackson v. Hall, 2008 WL 647548, at *31 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2008) (prosecutor’s use 

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of hyperbole during closing argument was a proper “invited response” to defense 

counsel’s argument that defendant was not the sort of person who could have pulled off a 

bank robbery). Because the prosecutor did not misstate testimony linking Petitioner to 

the gun used during the robberies, he has not shown that defense counsel’s performance 

was deficient for failing to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument about the gun. See 

Shah, 878 F.2d at 1162. Because Petitioner has not shown that counsel’s performance 

was deficient, his claim of ineffective assistance fails. See Rios, 299 F.3d at 805 (stating 

that “[f]ailure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the need to consider 

the other.”). Thus, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel asserted in 

Ground Eight (f) is not substantial, and also fails on the merits. 

 f. Ground Eight (g) - Failure to Challenge Identifications 

 In Ground Eight (g), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective during 

closing argument for failing “to emphasize that [Petitioner] was mistaken for someone 

else,” and for failing to “rectify the misstating of testimony.” (Doc. 1 at 10.) Other than 

the prosecutor’s closing argument regarding the gun, which Petitioner challenged in 

Ground 8(f), Petitioner does not identify any alleged misstatements of testimony. 

Accordingly, the Court assumes Petitioner is referring to the prosecutor’s closing 

argument about the gun. Because the Court determined in its discussion of Ground 8(f) 

that the prosecutor did not misstate that evidence, counsel was not ineffective for failing 

to “rectify the misstating of testimony.” 

 Additionally, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the record reflects that trial counsel 

spent a significant portion of his closing argument arguing that Petitioner was 

misidentified as one of the perpetrators of the robberies. (Doc. 11, Ex. GG at 24-25.) 

Trial counsel highlighted differences between Petitioner’s appearance and the manner in 

which one of the victims had described a perpetrator. (Id.) He also argued that the 

victims’ identifications of Petitioner in the courtroom were suggestive and that “people 

make mistakes.” (Id.) Thus, Petitioner’s assertion that trial counsel did not argue that he 

was mistakenly identified is not supported by the record. Accordingly, Petitioner has not 

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asserted a “substantial” claim that counsel was ineffective during closing argument, and 

that claim also fails on the merits. 

 g. Ground Eight (h) - Failure to Object to Aggravated Sentence 

 In Ground Eight (h), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to object to his unlawfully aggravated sentence. (Doc. 1 at 10.) Even assuming that trial 

counsel was deficient for failing to object to Petitioner’s aggravated sentence, he has not 

shown prejudice. On direct appeal, the appellate court found that Petitioner was not 

entitled to relief based on his claim that the trial court unlawfully considered aggravating 

factors in the absence of a jury finding of at least one aggravating factor. (Doc. 11, Ex. Z 

at 5-8.) The appellate court found that the trial court had erred, but concluded that the 

error was harmless. (Id. at 7-8.) 

 As discussed in Section V, any error in imposing an aggravated sentence was 

harmless. Accordingly, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the 

aggravated sentences. See Nardi v. Schriro, 2008 WL 4446963, at *41 (D. Ariz. Sept. 

30, 2008) (stating that “because the underlying challenge to the jury instructions lacks 

merit, the corresponding ineffective assistance of counsel claim has no merit for lack of 

showing prejudice to Petitioner's defense.”). Accordingly, Ground 8(h) is not substantial 

and lacks merit. 

 h. Ground Eight (i) - Failure to Act as an Adversary 

 Finally, in Ground Eight (i), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

“fail[ing] to act as an adversary.” (Doc. 1 at 10.) Petitioner does not provide any legal or 

factual support for his claim and his unsupported, conclusory allegations are not 

sufficient to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See United States v. 

McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1996). To the extent that Petitioner raises a 

claim of cumulative prejudice based on the numerous ineffective assistance claims he has 

asserted in Ground Eight, this claim fails because Petitioner’s individual claims of 

ineffective assistance lack merit. See Wroe v. Mueller, 40 F. App’x 449, 451 (9th Cir. 

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2002) (finding that because trial counsel was not deficient, petitioner could not establish 

cumulative prejudice) (citing Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 834 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

 Petitioner has not established any “substantial” claim of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel under Martinez. Accordingly, post-conviction counsel was not ineffective 

for failing to raise the asserted claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on postconviction review and post-conviction counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance does not 

establish cause for Petitioner’s failure to properly exhaust his claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. Moreover, even if Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel asserted in Ground Eight were properly before the Court, they lack merit 

for the reasons discussed above. 

 3. Ground Nine — Ineffective Assistance of Post-Conviction 

 Counsel 

 In his Reply, Petitioner also appears to argue that the ineffective assistance of 

post-conviction counsel provides cause for his failure to properly exhaust his claims of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Doc. 14 at 3.) As previously stated, under 

Martinez and Nguyen, the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel during an 

initial review collateral proceeding can constitute cause to excuse a procedurally 

defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 

1315; Nguyen, 736 F.3d at 1296. To establish cause under Martinez, Petitioner must 

establish a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Trevino, 

133 S. Ct. at 1918. 

 In Ground Nine, Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 

to raise “dead bang” winning arguments on direct appeal and for overlooking stronger 

arguments and raising only one issue on direct appeal. (Doc. 1 at 11.) The Strickland

test applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Miller v. Keeney, 

882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 

1986). Petitioner must show that his appellate counsel’s performance was objectively 

unreasonable in failing to identify and bring the claims on appeal. See Smith v. Robbins, 

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528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). “However, appellate counsel need not advance every possible 

argument, even those that are non-frivolous, and should instead concentrate his advocacy 

on winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if 

possible, or at most on a few key issues.” Davis v. Singletary, 853 F. Supp. 1492, 1549 

(M.D. Fla. 1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

 To succeed on a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a 

particular argument on appeal, the petitioner must establish that the omitted argument 

was likely to be successful and therefore that he was prejudiced by its omission. See 

Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir. 2007); Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 

F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). The inquiry is not whether raising a particular issue on 

appeal would have been frivolous, but whether there is a reasonable probability that 

raising the issue would have led to the reversal of the petitioner’s conviction. See Miller, 

882 F.2d at 1434. If the petitioner had only a remote chance of obtaining reversal based 

upon a specific issue, neither element of Strickland is satisfied. Id.

 Here, appellate counsel winnowed out weaker arguments and focused on one 

central issue. Specifically, appellate counsel argued that the trial court erred in 

considering Petitioner’s lack of remorse an aggravating factor at sentencing. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. X.) In a subsequent petition for review filed in the Arizona Supreme Court, appellate 

counsel explained that she did not challenge the trial court’s finding of several other 

aggravating factors at sentencing because any rational jury that convicted Petitioner 

would have also found those other aggravating factors (presence of an accomplice, 

multiple victims, and emotional or financial harm to the victims). (Doc. 11, Ex. AA at 2.) 

Thus, appellate counsel considered other issues that could have been raised on appeal, but 

rejected them in favor of focusing on what she considered a stronger argument. (See id.) 

The process of “‘winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on’ those 

more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of 

effective appellate advocacy.” Smith, 477 U.S. at 536 (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 

745, 751-752 (1983)). Here, appellate counsel’s decision to raise a single issue on direct 

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appeal was not deficient performance, and Petitioner has not shown that there is a 

reasonable probability that raising other issues on direct appeal would have led to a 

reversal of his convictions. Accordingly, Petitioner has not raised a substantial claim of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

 Petitioner also argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to provide 

him with court records and transcripts to permit him to file a supplemental brief on 

appeal. (Doc. 1 at 11.) Even assuming that appellate counsel’s performance was 

deficient for failing to provide Petitioner with court records and transcripts, Petitioner has 

not established prejudice. He has not identified the arguments he would have raised on 

appeal or shown that, but appellate counsel’s failure to provide him with the court records 

and transcripts, the results of his direct appeal would have been different. See Smith, 528 

U.S. at 285. 

 Thus, Petitioner has not established a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel and has not overcome the procedural bar to his claims of ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel asserted in Ground Nine. Moreover, Petitioner’s claims of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel lack merit for the reasons set forth above. 

V. Merits Review of Grounds One (a) and (b) 

 A. Standard of Review 

 If a habeas petition includes a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits in State 

court proceedings,” federal court review is limited by § 2254(d). Under § 2254(d)(1), a 

federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) that the state 

court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the 

United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision, Greene v. Fisher, __ 

U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011); or (2) that it “involved an unreasonable application of” 

such law, § 2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts” in light of the record before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). This standard is “difficult to meet.” 

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786. It is also a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state 

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court rulings, which demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” 

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the 

Supreme Court that existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 

44. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). 

 A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court 

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a 

particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

“[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s 

specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes 

in case-by-case determination.” Id. 

When a state court decision is deemed to be “contrary to” or an “unreasonable 

application of” clearly established federal law, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus 

relief unless the erroneous state court ruling also resulted in actual prejudice as defined in 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). “Actual prejudice” means that the constitutional error at issue 

had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631. “The Brecht harmless error analysis also applies to habeas 

review of an error with respect to sentencing, in other words the test is whether such error 

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had a ‘substantial and injurious effect’ on the sentence.” Hernandez v. LaMarque, 2006 

WL 2411441, at *3 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 18, 2006) (citing Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 

141, 145-57 (1998) (finding sentencing error harmless because even if the evidence of 

three prior convictions was insufficient, petitioner was not prejudiced by the court’s 

consideration of those convictions because it found four other prior convictions that 

would have supported the petitioner’s sentence)). 

 B. Ground One (a) 

 In Ground One (a), Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his Sixth 

Amendment rights articulated in Apprendi and Blakely by finding aggravating sentencing 

factors by a preponderance of the evidence. (Doc. 1 at 3.) Petitioner exhausted this 

federal claim on direct appeal. However, because Petitioner did not object at sentencing, 

the court of appeals reviewed for fundamental error. (Doc. 11, Ex. Z at 4.) The appellate 

court found that the trial court committed fundamental error by considering aggravating 

factors at sentencing because Petitioner had no prior convictions, he did not admit to any 

aggravating factors, and the jury did not find any aggravating factors. (Id. at 6.) 

However, the appellate court found that Petitioner was not entitled to relief because the 

error was not prejudicial. (Id. at 6-8.) The appellate court explained that, considering the 

record, no reasonable jury could have convicted Petitioner without also finding that an 

accomplice was present. (Id.) Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that the trial 

court did not prejudice Petitioner by considering the presence of an accomplice as an 

aggravating factor. (Id. at 8.) As discussed below, this Court agrees that Petitioner was 

not prejudiced by the trial court’s error in considering aggravating factors at sentencing. 

 The Sixth Amendment proscribes the imposition of a sentence above the statutory 

maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, that is not found by a jury or 

admitted by the defendant. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Blakely. 542 U.S. at 301. In 

Blakely, the Supreme Court clarified that the “‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi

purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts 

reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant . . . . In other words, the 

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relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after 

finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional 

findings.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04. Thus, before a trial court can impose a sentence 

above the statutory maximum, a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt, or the 

defendant must admit, all facts “legally essential to the punishment.” Blakely, 542 U.S. 

at 313. 

 Under Arizona’s sentencing scheme, “the existence of a single aggravating factor 

exposes a defendant to an aggravated sentence.” State v. Martinez, 115 P.3d 618, 625 

(Ariz. 2005) (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702). “Therefore, once a jury finds or a 

defendant admits a single aggravating factor, the Sixth Amendment permits the 

sentencing judge to find and consider additional factors relevant to the imposition of a 

sentence up to the maximum prescribed in that statute.” Id. This procedure — permitting 

the sentencing judge to consider additional aggravating factors and impose an aggravated 

sentence if the jury finds, or the defendant admits, at least one statutory aggravator — is 

consistent with the Apprendi and Blakely line of cases because the Supreme Court has 

stated that trial courts may consider any relevant evidence in determining what sentence 

is appropriate within the authorized range. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 (stating that 

“nothing . . . suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion — taking 

into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender — in imposing a 

judgment within the range prescribed by statute.”). Thus, courts within the Ninth Circuit 

have held that the existence of one Blakely-complaint factor supports the imposition of a 

sentence anywhere within the maximum statutory range. See Jones v. Schriro, 2006 WL 

1794765, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jun. 27, 2006) (based on the petitioner’s admission of at least 

one aggravating factor, the trial court was authorized to impose a sentence anywhere 

within the statutory range.)

 Because Petitioner did not object at sentencing, the appellate court properly 

reviewed the Blakely violation for fundamental error.10 See Mullins v. Schriro, 2007 WL 

 10 Fundamental error is “error going to the foundation of the case, error that takes 

from the defendant a right essential to his defense, and error of such magnitude that the 

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4468718 *22 (D. Ariz. Dec. 17, 2007) (stating that “because Petitioner did not object at 

trial to the failure to have a jury determine the aggravated factors, any Blakely violation 

was properly reviewed [by the Arizona court] for fundamental error . . . .”) (footnote 

omitted). The appellate court found that the trial court committed a fundamental error in 

considering aggravating factors that were not admitted by Petitioner or found by a jury. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. Z at 5-8.) However, the appellate court found that Petitioner was not 

prejudiced by the error. (Id.) As set forth below, the trial court’s error was not 

prejudicial under the standard applicable on habeas corpus review. 

 There is no dispute that the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment by imposing 

an aggravated sentence based on aggravating factors that were neither admitted by 

Petitioner nor found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. Having found a constitutional 

error, the Court must determine whether the error was harmless under Brecht. See 

Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2006) (holding that harmless error 

analysis applies to a claim of Sixth Amendment Blakely error based on the failure to 

submit a sentencing factor to a jury). On federal habeas corpus review, the applicable 

harmless error standard is whether the error had a “substantial and injurious effect” upon 

the sentence. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. Under that standard, the court must grant relief if 

it has “grave doubt” as to whether a jury would have found the relevant aggravating 

factors beyond a reasonable doubt. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995). 

Grave doubt exists when, “in the judge’s mind, the matter is so evenly balanced that he 

feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error.” Id. at 435. 

Because under Arizona law “only one aggravating factor is necessary to set the upper 

term as the maximum term[,] . . .[a]ny Apprendi[/Blakely] error [is] harmless if it is not 

 defendant could not have possibly received a fair trial.” State v. Henderson, 115 P.3d 

601, 608 (Ariz. 2005) (citation omitted). Under the analogous federal plain-error standard, an appellate court cannot reverse, based upon an objection not timely raised in the lower court unless: (1) there was error, (2) the error was “plain,” (3) the error “affects 

substantial rights;” and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632 (2002) 

(citations omitted). 

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prejudicial as to just one of the aggravating factors at issue.” Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 

624, 648 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 Here, no reasonable juror could have failed to find beyond a reasonable doubt at 

least one of the aggravating factors that the trial court considered in imposing the 

aggravated sentence — the presence of an accomplice. At trial, both victims testified that 

two men, one of whom was armed, approached them and demanded money. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. EE at 21-23, 44-53.) Petitioner’s accomplice Fernandez testified that Petitioner did 

not participate in the robberies. (Doc. 11, Ex. EE at 70-71.) However, Fernandez was 

impeached with an audiotape recording of his interview with police in which he stated 

that he and Petitioner acted together to rob the victims. (Id. at 79-89.) Furthermore, as 

the appellate court noted, Petitioner’s theory of defense — that Fernandez and someone 

other than Petitioner committed the offense — conceded that two culprits participated in 

the robbery. (Doc. 11, Ex. GG at 24.) Therefore, the trial court’s consideration of the 

presence of an accomplice as an aggravating factor did not have a “substantial and 

injurious effect” upon the sentence. See Mullins v. Schriro, 2007 WL 4468718, at *26 

(D. Ariz. Dec. 17, 2007) (because no reasonable jury would have failed to find the 

aggravating factor that the petitioner had laid in wait and engaged in extensive 

preplanning, any Blakely error was harmless). Because the trial court’s consideration of 

the presence of an accomplice as an aggravating factor was harmless, its consideration of 

additional aggravating factors was likewise harmless because the existence of one 

aggravating factor permitted the trial court to consider “additional factors relevant to the 

imposition of a sentence up to the maximum prescribed in that statute.”11 Martinez, 115 

P.3d at 625; see Nino v. Flannigan, 2007 WL 1412493, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 14, 2007) 

(finding that because one Blakely-compliant or Blakely-exempt aggravating factor 

 11 As the appellate court noted, Petitioner’s fifteen-year sentences for the two counts of armed robbery were within the applicable sentencing range. See Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 13-704(A) (presumptive sentence of ten-and-one-half years and a maximum sentence of twenty-one years for a dangerous offense that is class two felony); see Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. §13-1904(B) (armed robbery is a class two felony). 

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supports an aggravated sentence, the court’s consideration of other factors does not 

violate the Sixth Amendment). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus 

relief on Ground One (a). 

B. Ground One (b) 

 In Ground One (b), Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his Fifth 

Amendment right against self-incrimination by considering his lack of remorse as an 

aggravating factor. (Doc. 1 at 3.) He raised this claim on direct appeal and the appellate 

court found that under Arizona law the trial court was not “entitled to consider 

[Petitioner’s] lack of remorse as an aggravating factor,” but the error was not prejudicial 

because “it was clear that the court would have imposed an aggravated sentence without 

reference to [Petitioner’s] . . . refusal to admit guilt.” (Doc. 11, Ex. Z at 9-11.) 

 On review of this claim, the Court must determine the controlling Supreme Court 

precedent applicable to Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claim. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362, 390 (2000) (explaining that the “threshold question under AEDPA is whether 

[the petitioner] seeks to apply a rule of law that was clearly established at the time his 

state-court conviction became final”). The Supreme Court has never “clearly 

established” that a sentencing court may not make an adverse inference from a 

defendant’s lack of remorse at sentencing.12 In Mitchell v. United States, the Supreme 

Court held that the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent survives a guilty plea and 

applies at sentencing. 526 U.S. 314, 317 (1999). However, in Mitchell, the Court 

“express[ed] no view” on “[w]hether silence bears upon the determination of a lack of 

remorse, or upon acceptance of responsibility . . . .” Id. at 330. 

 The federal courts of appeal are divided over the scope and application of 

Mitchell. See United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 629 (4th Cir. 2010) (collecting 

conflicting cases regarding Mitchell’s applicability to the non-statutory sentencing factor 

of remorse); see also Burr v. Pollard, 546 F.3d 828, 832 (7th Cir. 2008) (Mitchell does 

 

12 Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009) (stating that to constitute clearly established federal law, a rule must be “squarely established” by the Supreme Court). 

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not prohibit the sentencing judge’s consideration of the defendant’s lack of remorse, even 

if based on the defendant’s silence). Furthermore, other courts have distinguished 

between a defendant’s silence at sentencing, and a voluntary allocution, which may 

constitute a limited Fifth Amendment waiver. See United States v. Whitten, 610 F.3d 

168, 199 (2d Cir. 2010). Because there is no “clearly established federal law” on point, 

Petitioner cannot establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief under § 2254(d)(1). 

See Williams, 529 U.S. at 381. 

 Additionally, the appellate court’s application of fundamental error review to a 

sentencing error, to which Petitioner made no objection, is not contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Supreme Court has not 

held that a consideration of a defendant’s lack of remorse as an aggravating factor at 

sentencing constitutes a structural error requiring automatic reversal. Rather, the 

Supreme Court has acknowledged that Fifth Amendment violations constitute “trial 

error,” subject to review for harmlessness. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629-30 (improper 

comment on defendant’s post-Miranda silence was reviewed for harmlessness). 

 Federal courts apply plain error review — the functional equivalent of Arizona’s 

fundamental error review — to Fifth Amendment claims when a defendant did not object 

at trial. See United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 441 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Accordingly, the appellate court’s fundamental error review of Petitioner’s Fifth 

Amendment challenge to the trial court’s consideration of lack of remorse as an 

aggravating factor was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. 

 Furthermore, to the extent that the trial court erred in considering Petitioner’s lack 

of remorse as an aggravating factor, that error was harmless. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. At 

the sentencing hearing, the trial court explained why it imposed aggravated sentences: 

 As to Counts One and Two, the court finds that 

probation is not appropriate or available under the law. The 

court has considered these mitigating circumstances, the defendant’s lack of prior criminal record. I do not consider his 

age to be a mitigating circumstance, not his age now or his 

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age then. I will consider mental health issues as a mitigating factor. 

 I’ve also considered these aggravating circumstances, presence of an accomplice, multiple victims, emotional harm 

to the victims, the fact that the defendant’s vehicle was used 

to facilitate the commission of the offense. 

 And based on his statements here today, as well as his statements in the pre-sentence report, there is certainly a lack of remorse as it relates to this offense. 

 The court finds the aggravating circumstances are 

sufficiently substantial to warrant an aggravating [sic] sentence. Accordingly, as to both counts the court finds an 

aggravated sentence is appropriate and, thereafter, community supervision equal to one day for every seven days of this 

sentence. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. HH at 13-14.) 

 Thus, the record establishes that lack of remorse was only one of several factors 

that the court considered when sentencing Petitioner. The trial court’s pronouncement of 

the sentences indicates that the court would have imposed aggravated sentences, even if it 

had not considered Petitioner’s “lack of remorse.” 

 Petitioner’s citation to State v. Trujillo, 257 P.3d 1194 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011), does 

not require a different result. (Doc. 1 at 3.) There, the court concluded that the defendant 

established prejudice resulting from the trial court’s improper consideration of the 

defendant’s failure to admit responsibility for sentencing purposes. Trujillo, 257 P.3d at 

1198-99. However, unlike this case, in Trujillo the court “made it quite obvious it was 

very concerned” about the defendant’s lack of remorse, “stating no less than five times” 

that petitioner lacked remorse or had denied responsibility for his crimes. Id. at 1199. 

Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that the trial court’s consideration of his lack of 

remorse had a “substantial and injurious effect” on his sentence and he is not entitled to 

habeas corpus relief on Ground One (b). See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 

VI. Conclusion 

 The Petition should be denied because Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally 

defaulted and barred from review, or lack merit. 

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 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be 

DENIED AND DISMISSED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable or because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 22nd day of April, 2014. 

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