Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02211/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02211-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Plaintiff’s complaint also contains state tort claims under the court’s supplemental 1

jurisdiction. Plaintiff describes his state law claims as “torts of assault and battery and

negligence.” (Compl. at 4.) None of those claims are alleged against moving defendant Jackson.

 Defendants Shepard, Petteway and Allen are represented by counsel Jerome Varanini of 2

Trimble, Sherinian & Varanini. The remaining sixteen defendants, including defendant Jackson,

are represented by Kathleen Williams and Matthew Wilson of Williams and Associates, who

have filed the pending motion.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONY RICHARD LOW,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-2211 MCE DAD P

vs.

GARY R. STANTON, et al., ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint, plaintiff has named nineteen defendants, all of 1

whom are represented by private counsel. The pending motion for summary judgment is

2

brought solely on behalf of defendant Jackson. Plaintiff has filed a timely opposition and

defendant has filed a reply.

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 The court notes that there are several proper spellings for “Koran,” including “Quran” 3

and “Qur’an.” The court will adopt the spelling that was used by plaintiff throughout his

complaint and his opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 

 Defendant Stanton has not joined with defendant Jackson in the pending motion but 4

previously moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims against him concerning the jail law library and the

inmate appeal system. On September 20, 2007, the court granted that motion and dismissed all

claims against defendant Stanton regarding inmate grievances, the inmate appeal system, and the

adequacy of law library services.

2

In his complaint plaintiff claims that in 2005, while he was a pretrial detainee at

the Solano County Jail, defendant Chaplain Jackson unlawfully promoted the Christian faith and

denied plaintiff an Arabic Quran in violation of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection 3

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA). 

Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants Jackson and Sheriff Stanton4

authorize[d] and use[d] Solano County Jail funds to purchase

Christian bibles [sic] to the exclusion of books of other faiths such

as Qurans or book of Mormons thus denying plaintiff and other

pretrial detainees who are not Christians the oppertunity [sic] to

access religious materials of their specific faith.

(Compl. ¶ 128, at 25.) Plaintiff also alleges that both defendants violated his rights under the

Equal Protection Clause and RFRA. (Id. ¶ 184, at 39.) Plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring

Defendant[s] Stanton and Jackson’s action of restricting plaintiff

and all other non-Christians from obtaining religious books and

literature from Solano County sources violates the plaintiffs rights

under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

(Compl. at 43.)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS UNDER RULE 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears

the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis

for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

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together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

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In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

On December 8, 2006, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing

a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts and Evidence

Relying on his own declaration, three attached exhibits, and plaintiff’s response to

a request for admission, defendant Jackson contends that the following facts are undisputed. 

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Defendant Alvin Jackson is the custody chaplain at the Solano County Jail. (Mot. for Summ. J.

(MSJ), Def.’s Decl. dated July 26, 2007, ¶ 1, at 1.) His duties are to coordinate the religious

activities within the Custody Division, to ensure that the various religious needs of the inmates

are met, and to make religious services available to inmates on a voluntary basis. (Id.) 

The Solano County Jail orders a variety of religious texts to accommodate the

religious beliefs of its inmates. (Id. ¶ 3, at 1.) In this regard, defendant has submitted copies of

two invoices showing the receipt of 30 Qurans delivered to the Solano County Sheriff’s Office

on or about February 14, 2005, and another shipment of 50 Qurans delivered on or about June

21, 2005. (Id. ¶ 4, at 2 & Exs. A & B.) The Solano County Jail maintains a stock of Qurans

translated into English. (Id. ¶4, at 2.) Because it is “extremely rare” for an inmate to be fluent in

Arabic and the Arabic Quran is more expensive, the Jail stocks only two or three copies of the

Quran in Arabic. (Id. ¶ 5, at 2.) If an inmate requests an Arabic Quran, defendant Jackson

inquires whether the inmate speaks Arabic. (Id. ¶ 6, at 2.) Only inmates who speak Arabic are

provided with the Quran in Arabic. (Id.) Defendant Jackson also states that,

[a]s the Custody Chaplain, it has been necessary for me to become

familiar with the dictates of the many different religions of the

inmates who are housed at the Solano County Jail. Within the

Islamic religion, it is not mandated that a follower read the Quran

in Arabic.

(Id. ¶ 7, at 2.)

If an inmate desires a religious text, he must submit an inmate request form. (Id. ¶

8, at 2.) In 2005, the form would have been routed to defendant Jackson. (Id.) In the summer of

2005, defendant received plaintiff’s request for a Quran and gave custody staff a copy of the

English translation of the Quran for plaintiff’s use. (Id. ¶ 9, at 2.) Plaintiff refused to accept the

copy of the Quran, stating that he wanted an Arabic version of the Quran. (Id. ¶ 10 at 3.) 

Defendant informed plaintiff of the substantial cost of a Quran in Arabic and asked plaintiff if he

spoke Arabic. (Id.). Plaintiff stated that he did not speak Arabic. (Id.) In an effort to

accommodate plaintiff’s wishes, defendant went to the jail’s library, located an edition of the

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Quran translated into English but which included “a good deal of Arabic writing as well,” and

provided plaintiff with that edition. (Id. ¶ 11, at 3.)

II. Plaintiff’s Declaration

Plaintiff offers a declaration dated August 13, 2007. Plaintiff states that he

arrived at the Solano County Fairfield Detention Facility on June 29, 2005 and soon began

sending request forms to defendant Jackson for Islamic prayer books and a Quran in Arabic. 

(Pl.’s Decl. filed Aug. 17, 2007, ¶¶ 2-3, at 1.) From June to mid-August of 2005, plaintiff

observed that Christian literature and many different versions of the Old and New Testament

Bible were “freely distributed to any inmate who requested them.” (Id. ¶ 5, at 2.) Defendant

Jackson posted a memorandum offering four different kinds of Bibles but no Qurans. (Id. ¶ 6, at

2.) From June 2005 to January 2006, plaintiff was not provided Islamic prayer books or a Quran

in Arabic. (Id. ¶ 9, at 7.)

Plaintiff states that having a Quran in Arabic is critical to the exercise of his

religion because “[t]he Islamic religious text known as the Holy Quran is the revelation of God

and it was revealled [sic] in Arabic.” (Id. ¶ 16 at 4.)

. . . . People such as myself turned to the Arabic language and are

learning it out of our desire to understand the Book of Allah. This

is why learning Arabic is a must; in fact it is a necessity in order

for a Muslim to really get to the foundation of his faith.

Chaplain Jackson denied me a Quran in Arabic and in so doing

denied me the oppertunity [sic] to pray according to my religious

beliefs, denied me an oppertunity [sic] to study the Quran, and

denied me the joy of my Islamic religious experience.

English translations of the Quran are not Holy Qurans. They are

very simply a vehicle in which to facilitate an English speaking and

reading person to get a first look in the maricles [sic] of the Holy

Quran.

In respect to the holy text of the Quran revealed in Arabic, no

translation in any other language can substitute for the actual

Arabic text.

(Id. ¶¶ 20-23 at 5.)

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Plaintiff states, “I can speak Arabic, in that I can vocalize Quranic Arabic during

my prayers [and] can read Quranic Arabic at a rudimentary level.” (Id. ¶ 19, at 4.) Plaintiff does

not recall whether defendant asked him if he spoke Arabic but states that, if defendant had asked,

he would have answered yes with an explanation. (Id. ¶ 26, at 6.) Plaintiff states that defendant

Jackson was responding to plaintiff’s grievance, not trying to accommodate plaintiff, when he

located another English translation of the Quran with editorial Arabic within it. (Id. ¶ 30, at 6.)

III. Judicial Notice

In support of his summary judgment motion, defendant has lodged a copy of the

decision in Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1970), and requests that the court take

judicial notice of the decision. Defendant offers no legal basis for taking judicial notice of a

reported decision in an unrelated case. It appears that defendant intends to cite the case as

authority supporting his motion for summary judgment. The improper request for judicial notice

will be denied.

In reply to plaintiff’s opposition, defendant requests that judicial notice be taken

of the facts that the Arabic language employs the Arabic alphabet and the English language

employs the Latin or Roman alphabet. There is no showing that the nature of the Arabic

language or its alphabet is at issue in the pending motion. Accordingly, this request for judicial

notice will be denied as well.

ANALYSIS

It is undisputed that in the summer of 2005, while plaintiff was a pretrial detainee

at the Solano County Jail, defendant provided plaintiff with a copy of an English translation of

the Quran and, after plaintiff refused that copy of the Quran because it was not in Arabic,

defendant provided plaintiff with a copy of the Quran translated into English but containing some

Arabic writing.

Plaintiff’s Arabic language skills are disputed. Defendant states that he asked

plaintiff if he spoke Arabic and plaintiff indicated that he did not. (Def.’s Decl. ¶ 10, at 3.) 

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Plaintiff states that he can “vocalize Quranic Arabic during my prayers” and “can read Quranic

Arabic at a rudimentary level.” (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 19 at 4.)

I. First Amendment Claim Against Defendant Jackson

The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress shall make

no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The first

clause is called the Establishment Clause and commands a separation of church and state. 

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). The second clause is called the Free Exercise

Clause and “requires government respect for, and noninterference with, the religious beliefs and

practices of our Nation’s people.” Id. 

Although prisoners retain their First Amendment rights, incarceration brings about

the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights. O’Lone v. Estate of

Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). Therefore, “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’

constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).

A. Free Exercise Clause

Before proceeding with a Turner analysis, the court considers the parties’

contentions about whether plaintiff’s free exercise of his religion was substantially burdened

when he was not provided a Quran in Arabic. Defendant argues that plaintiff’s exercise of his

religious beliefs was not substantially burdened because defendant provided plaintiff with a copy

of the Quran translated into English and a copy of another English version of the Quran that

contained some Arabic text. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the “most basic necessities

of his faith” are the Quran in Arabic and prayer literature. (Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. (Pl.’s P&A) at

7.) Plaintiff asserts that the Islamic religion requires prayer five times a day in Arabic and that he

was unable to recite prayers in Arabic due to defendant Jackson’s refusal to provide a Quran in

Arabic. (Id. at 7-8.) In reply, defendant denies that the Islamic religion mandates that a follower

read the Quran in Arabic. (Def.’s Reply at 2-3.) Defendant asserts that plaintiff indicated he did

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not speak Arabic and therefore defendant reasonably provided a Quran in a language plaintiff

does speak. (Id. at 3.)

Based on a Ninth Circuit decision issued after defendant Jackson’s motion was

briefed, Shakur v. Schriro, F.3d , , No. 05-16705, 2008 WL 185496 (9th Cir. Jan. 23,

2008), the court finds it unnecessary to scrutinize plaintiff’s religion and religious beliefs. In

Shakur, “the parties dispute[d] whether a prisoner must objectively show that a central tenet of

his faith is burdened by a prison regulation to raise a viable claim under the Free Exercise

Clause.” Id. at *3. The Court of Appeals heeded the admonitions of the Supreme Court and

concluded that “‘[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs

or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds’” Id.

*3 (quoting Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)). The appellate court concluded that

a subjective test, or a “sincerity test,” applies. Id. Under this test, if the prisoner has a sincerely

held belief that is consistent with his faith, the Free Exercise Clause is implicated. Id. at *3-4.

In light of the decision in Shakur, this court does not ask whether plaintiff’s

practice of his religion was substantially burdened when he was provided an English translation

of the Quran rather than a Quran in Arabic. Instead, the court considers whether plaintiff has a

sincere belief that having a Quran in Arabic is necessary for the free exercise of his religion. 

Plaintiff declares that translated Qurans are not Holy Qurans and that “Chaplain Jackson denied

me a Quran in Arabic and in so doing denied me the oppertunity [sic] to pray according to my

religious beliefs, denied me an oppertunity [sic] to study the Quran, and denied me the joy of my

Islamic religious experience.” (Pl.’s Decl ¶¶ 21 & 24, at 5.) The court finds that plaintiff’s

assertions satisfy the sincerity test. 

Turning to the Turner analysis, the court finds that defendant Jackson has not

argued that denying plaintiff a Quran in Arabic, or failing to provide plaintiff with such a Quran,

is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest. Defendant has not met his initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on this point. Defendant’s

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motion for summary judgment should be denied with respect to plaintiff’s claim under the Free

Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

B. Establishment Clause

The Establishment Clause “‘mandates governmental neutrality between religion

and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’” McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S.

844, 860 (2005) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)). Thus, the Clause bars

official approval or disapproval of any particular religion or religious belief or religion in general. 

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993); American

Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2002).

Defendant Jackson argues that there was no Establishment Clause violation in this

case because the Solano County Jail accommodates the religious beliefs of its inmates by

providing a variety of religious texts. As evidence of the availability of Qurans for Muslim

inmates, defendant submits invoices showing that the Solano County Sheriff’s Office, which

operates the Solano County Jail, purchased eighty copies of the modern English version of the

Quran around the time of plaintiff’s incarceration at the jail. Plaintiff argues that defendant’s

purchase of “large vollumes [sic] of Bibles and Christian literature” promotes the Christian

religion, as does freely providing religious materials to Christians while requiring Muslim

inmates to be proficient in Arabic in order to obtain an Arabic Quran.

The basic test for determining whether there is an Establishment Clause violation

was articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705,

713 n.7 (9th Cir. 2007). In Lemon, the Supreme Court adopted a three-part test: (1) whether the

government has acted with a religious purpose; (2) whether the primary effect of the

government’s action is to advance or inhibit religion; and (3) whether the conduct fosters “an

excessive government entanglement with religion.” 403 U.S. at 612-13.

Under the first prong of the test, “[w]hen the government acts with the ostensible

and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause

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value of official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government’s ostensible

object is to take sides.” McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 860 (affirming decision that posting the

Ten Commandments at courthouses violates the Establishment Clause). When applying this

prong of the test, the court’s analysis “focuses purely on purpose” and “do[es] not question the

propriety of the means to achieve that purpose or whether the defendants were correct or even

reasonable in the assumptions underlying their actions.” American Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City

and County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002).

As custody chaplain at the Solano County Jail, defendant Jackson coordinates

religious activities for inmates, ensures that the religious needs of inmates are met, and makes

religious services available to inmates on a voluntary basis. Defendant Jackson declares that he

has attempted to become familiar with many different religions in order to make a variety of

activities, materials, and services available to inmates who wish to practice their religions while

confined. A variety of religious texts, including dozens of Qurans translated into English, are

purchased by the Solano County Jail. There is no evidence that defendant Jackson carries out his

duties with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing a single religion or that he

violated the Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality. The court finds that

defendant Jackson’s provision of religious texts and materials was for the secular purpose of

enabling inmates to exercise their First Amendment right to free exercise of their religion. In

applying the first prong of the Lemon test, the court does not question the propriety of the

defendant’s means of achieving the secular purpose and does not consider whether the defendant

acted reasonably in the assumptions underlying his actions.

Under the second prong of the test, “[a] government practice has the effect of

impermissibly advancing or disapproving of religion if it is ‘sufficiently likely to be perceived by

adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by nonadherents as a

disapproval, of their individual religious choices.’” Stoner v. Stogner, No. 3:06-cv-00324-LRH

(VPC), 2007 WL 4510202, at *11 (D. Nev. Dec. 17, 2007) (quoting County of Allegheny v.

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ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 596 (1989) (internal citations omitted)). Here, it is not likely that

adherents of the Christian faith would perceive defendant’s practice of providing Muslim inmates

with Qurans translated into English as an endorsement of Christianity, or that Muslim inmates

would perceive the provision of Qurans translated into English as a disapproval of their religious

choice. Therefore, plaintiff’s Establishment Clause claim also fails under the second prong of

the Lemon test.

Plaintiff has not alleged or made any showing that defendant Jackson’s provision

of religious materials to inmates fosters “an excessive government entanglement with religion.” 

Thus, plaintiff’s claim also fails the third prong of the Lemon test.

Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted in favor of defendant Jackson

with respect to plaintiff’s Establishment Clause claim.

II. Equal Protection Claim

Defendant Jackson argues that he did not discriminate against Muslim inmates

and that plaintiff was provided a reasonable opportunity to pursue his religious faith. In addition,

defendant contends that the Jail orders a variety of religious texts to accommodate the religious

beliefs of its inmates. Defendant offers evidence that the Jail has ordered and received copies of

the Quran which are made available to inmates who request a copy of the Quran. Plaintiff

disagrees with defendant’s assertion that both Bibles and Qurans are freely distributed to any

inmate who requests them. Plaintiff argues that his right to equal protection was violated

because defendant Jackson uses a language-test to restrict the number of inmates who may obtain

a Quran in Arabic. 

The Equal Protection Clause

requires the State to treat all similarly situated people equally. 

Moreover, the Equal Protection Clause entitles each prisoner to “a

reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the

opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional

religious precepts.”

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Shakur, F.3d , , 2008 WL 185496, at *9 (internal citations omitted). A plaintiff

asserting a violation of the Equal Protection Clause must show that the defendant acted with a

discriminatory intent or purpose that was based upon the plaintiff’s membership in a protected

class. Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003). The court must then apply the

Turner test to determine whether any difference between the treatment of the plaintiff and the

treatment of other inmates is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Shakur, 2008

WL 185496, at *10.

Defendant Jackson has carried his initial burden with regard to intent by

submitting a declaration in which he states that Bibles and Qurans are freely distributed to any

inmate who requests them. (Def.’s Decl. ¶ 3, at 1.) In support of his contention that religious

materials are purchased to accommodate the religious practices of Muslim inmates, defendant

Jackson has provided evidence that between February and June of 2005 eighty Qurans were

purchased for inmates. (Id. ¶ 4, at 2 & Exs. A & B.) Defendant Jackson further declares that it is

extremely rare for the Jail to receive an inmate fluent in Arabic and that therefore the Jail keeps

in stock only two or three copies of the Quran in Arabic for provision to inmates who speak

Arabic. (Id. ¶ 5, at 2.) When defendant Jackson receives an inmate’s request for a copy of the

Quran in Arabic, his practice is to inquire whether the inmate speaks Arabic and to provide a

copy of the Quran in the language the inmate speaks. (Id. ¶ 6, at 2.)

To defeat defendant Jackson’s motion for summary judgment on the equal

protection claim, plaintiff “‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue’ as

to whether he was afforded a reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith as compared to prisoners

of other faiths” and that “officials intentionally acted in a discriminatory manner.” Freeman v.

Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Shakur, F.3d , 

 , 2008 WL 185496, at *3. Plaintiff has failed to set forth specific facts showing that defendant

Jackson provided inmates of other faiths with copies of religious texts in languages not spoken

by those inmates. The court finds that plaintiff was provided a reasonable opportunity to pursue

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his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded inmates who adhere to other faiths. On the

present record, there is no evidence that defendant Jackson acted in an intentionally

discriminatory manner. Therefore, defendant Jackson’s motion for summary judgment on

plaintiff’s equal protection claim should be granted.

The court notes that plaintiff’s argument with respect to “religious disparity”

concludes as follows:

On the issue of religious disparity the plaintiff has not yet

completed discovery and the documentary statistics are in the sole

possession of the moving party based upon Rule 56(f) FRCP and

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 412-413 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The motion for summary judgment should be denied, or at least

stay it.

(Pl.’s P&A at 6.)

Rule 56(f) provides:

If a party opposing the motion [for summary judgment] shows by

affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential

to justify its opposition, the court may:

(1) deny the motion; 

(2) order a continuance to enable affidavits to be

obtained, depositions to be taken, or other discovery

to be undertaken; or 

(3) issue any other just order.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (eff. Dec. 1, 2007). A party seeking denial or continuance of a summary

judgment motion is required to file a motion requesting discovery under Rule 56(f). Brae

Transp., Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986). The party must

demonstrate that there are specific facts he hopes to discover that will raise an issue of material

fact. Harris v. Duty Free Shoppers Ltd. Partnership, 940 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1991);

Carpenter v. Universal Star Shipping, S.A., 924 F.2d 1539, 1547 (9th Cir. 1991). “The burden is

on the party seeking to conduct additional discovery to put forth sufficient facts to show that the

evidence sought exists.” Volk v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1416 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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See also Hancock v. Montgomery Ward Long Term Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302, 1306 n.1

(9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the party opposing summary judgment “has the burden under Rule

56(f) to show what facts [he] hopes to discover to raise an issue of material fact”). “Denial of a

Rule 56(f) application is proper where it is clear that the evidence sought is almost certainly

nonexistent or is the object of pure speculation.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th

Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff has offered no affidavit in support of his conclusory request to deny or

stay defendant Jackson’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of religious disparity. 

Although plaintiff has not specified any essential fact that would be established by “documentary

statistics” not in his possession, his arguments and citations suggest that he hopes to establish

that defendant Jackson stocks a large supply of Bibles and only a few Qurans in Arabic. These

facts are not disputed, and further evidence as to the precise number of Bibles in stock at the

Solano County Jail is not relevant to the dispositive issue of defendant’s intent. Plaintiff has not

alleged that defendant Jackson freely provides non-English versions of religious texts to inmates

not fluent in a language other than English. There is no indication that plaintiff’s discovery of

unspecified statistics would permit him to establish a genuine issue of material fact on the issue

of whether defendant Jackson acted with discriminatory intent. In addition, this action was filed

in 2005, and plaintiff has had sufficient time to conduct discovery to obtain evidence needed to

support his equal protection claim and to oppose summary judgment. For these reasons,

plaintiff’s request to deny or stay defendant Jackson’s motion for summary judgment will be

denied. 

III. Federal Statutory Claim

Although plaintiff sought relief based on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

(RFRA), plaintiff now requests that the court apply the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), which was in effect at the time plaintiff filed his complaint. The

court is required to liberally construe the inartful pleading of pro se litigants. McGuckin v.

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Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the court will construe plaintiff’s federal

statutory claim as a RLUIPA claim, rather than a RFRA claim.

In opposition to defendant Jackson’s motion, plaintiff argues that the defendant

placed a burden on plaintiff’s exercise of his religion by requiring, without a compelling

governmental interest, that plaintiff speak Arabic in order to receive an Arabic Quran. In reply,

defendant Jackson argues that no burden was placed on plaintiff’s religious exercise and that

defendant facilitated plaintiff’s religious exercise by providing plaintiff with two Qurans.

RLUIPA provides that

“[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the

religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an

institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general

applicability,” unless the government establishes that the burden is

“in furtherance of a compelling government interest” and is “the

least restrictive means of furthering that . . . interest.”

Shakur, F.3d , , 2008 WL 185496, at *6 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)). The first

step in analyzing a RLUIPA claim is to identify the “religious exercise” allegedly impinged, and

the second step is to ask whether the defendant’s action “substantially burdens” that religious

exercise. Greene v. Solano County Jail, F.3d , , No. 06-16957, 2008 WL 170313, at

*3 (9th Cir. Jan. 22, 2008). “Religious exercise” is defined by RLUIPA as “‘any exercise of

religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.’” Id. (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)) (emphasis added in Greene).

Here, the religious exercise is having access to an Arabic Quran. As to whether

there was a substantial burden on that religious exercise, plaintiff declares under penalty of

perjury that only an Arabic Quran is a Holy Quran and that when he was denied a Quran in

Arabic he was denied the opportunity to pray according to his religious beliefs and to study and

learn the Arabic language. (Pl.’s Decl. ¶¶ 20-22, at 4-5.)

For summary judgment, the evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. 

Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff’s religious exercise was substantially burdened when he

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was not provided an Arabic Quran, and since defendant Jackson has neither argued nor shown

that a compelling governmental interest was furthered by his denial of an Arabic Quran, the

defendant’s motion should be denied as to plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim.

IV. Qualified Immunity

Finally, defendant Jackson seeks summary judgment in his favor, arguing that

even if it were to be found that plaintiff’s rights were violated, no jail chaplain would have

reasonably believed that providing an English translation of the Quran to plaintiff under these

circumstances violated any clearly established right of plaintiff’s. However, because plaintiff

has not requested monetary damages from defendant Jackson and seeks only declaratory

judgment against him, defendant Jackson is not entitled to qualified immunity. See Hydrick v.

Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[Q]ualified immunity is only an immunity from a

suit for damages, and does not provide immunity from suit for declaratory or injunctive relief.”);

Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. U.S., 870 F.2d 518, 527 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Qualified immunity is

an affirmative defense to damage liability; it does not bar actions for declaratory or injunctive

relief.”). Therefore, defendant Jackson is not entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s

claims against him.

V. Briefing Requirement

In his reply to plaintiff’s opposition, defendant Jackson notes that plaintiff failed

to comply with Local Rule 56-260(b), which requires a party opposing a summary judgment

motion to itemize the facts in the moving party’s Statement of Undisputed Facts, admit each fact

that is undisputed, and deny each fact that is disputed, including with each denial a citation to

evidence that supports the existence of a dispute. Although plaintiff provided a separate

statement of disputed facts, as permitted by the rule, he did not comply with the rule regarding

the moving party’s Statement of Undisputed Facts. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must comply

with Local Rule 56-260(b) in his opposition to subsequent summary judgment motions.

/////

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant Jackson’s July 26, 2007 request for judicial notice is denied.

2. Defendant Jackson’s August 23, 2007 request for judicial notice is denied; and

3. Plaintiff’s August 17, 2007 request to deny or stay defendant Jackson’s

summary judgment motion is denied.

Also, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendant Jackson’s July 26, 2007

motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part, as follows:

1. Summary judgment be granted on plaintiff’s claims against defendant Jackson

under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment and those claims be dismissed against defendant Jackson; and

2. Summary judgment be denied on plaintiff’s claims against defendant Jackson

under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fifteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within five days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: February 25, 2008.

DAD:4

low2211.57relig.rev

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