Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-md-01648/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-md-01648-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE RUBBER CHEMICALS ANTITRUST

LITIGATION

 /

No. C 04-1648 MJJ

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Rule 23 motion for class certification in this multi-district

litigation arising from an alleged conspiracy by Defendants to fix the prices of the chemicals used in

the manufacture of tires and other rubber products. Plaintiffs seek certification of the following

class:

All persons (excluding government entities, defendants, and the present or

former parents, predecessors, subsidiaries and affiliates of the foregoing)

which purchased rubber chemicals in the United States directly from any of

the defendants, or any present or former parent, subsidiary or affiliate thereof,

at any time during the period May 1, 1995 through December 31, 2001.

Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint Gold Bennett Cera & Sidener LLP (“Gold Bennett”) and

Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C. (“Cohen Milstein”) as class counsel. Having read and

considered the parties’ briefs and the arguments proffered at the hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion, the

Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for the following reasons.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In its natural state, raw rubber has little commercial application. The products involved in 

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this litigation – primary, secondary, or ultra accelerators; activators; vulcanizing agents;

antioxidants; and antiozonants (hereinafter, collectively referred to as “Rubber Chemicals”) –

facilitate the conversion of raw rubber into finished rubber. The transformation from raw to finished

rubber is achieved through vulcanization, which is the process of combining raw rubber with Rubber

Chemicals at a high temperature. Rubber Chemicals facilitate the vulcanization process and protect

the finished rubber against degradation caused by oxygen and ozone. Much of the U.S. market for

Rubber Chemicals is supplied by three large producers and their affiliates: Flexsys America L.P.,

Bayer A.G., and Crompton Corporation. These entities are three of the defendants (alleged coconspirators) in this multi-district litigation. These three producers are believed to account for up to

75% of Rubber Chemicals sales. 

Direct purchasers of Rubber Chemicals, including tire companies and industrial

manufacturers, brought this lawsuit alleging that Defendants conspired to fix the prices of Rubber

Chemicals sold in the United States in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Plaintiffs further

allege that as a result of the conspiracy, they paid more for Rubber Chemicals than they otherwise

would have and, thus, were injured. Plaintiffs seek, among other things, injunctive relief and treble

damages pursuant to sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26. 

The first complaint in this multi-district litigation was filed on April 8, 2003. That case and

several subsequently-filed cases were consolidated and a Consolidated Amended Complaint was

filed on November 3, 2003 (the “Complaint”). Plaintiffs recently settled their claims with one

subset of Defendants – Flexsys N.V., Flexsys America L.P., Akzo Nobel Chemicals International

B.V., and Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Inc. (collectively, the “Flexsys Defendants”) – and are in the

process of settling with another subset – Crompton Corporation and Uniroyal Chemical Company,

Inc. (collectively, the “Crompton Defendants”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for class

certification is opposed only by the remaining Defendants – Bayer Corporation, Bayer AG, and

Rhein Chemie Corporation (collectively, the “Bayer Defendants”).

In 2004, Defendant Bayer AG pled guilty in a parallel criminal case to one count of a felony

charge for violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act. That count of the indictment alleged that Bayer

AG conspired with unnamed rubber chemical producers to suppress and eliminate competition for

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certain rubber chemicals sold in the United States and elsewhere from mid-1995 to 2001. As part of

the plea, Bayer AG agreed to pay a $66 million criminal fine.

LEGAL STANDARD

To maintain a class action under Rule 23, the proponents of the class must first satisfy the

four prerequisites of Rule 23(a). According to Rule 23(a), a class may be certified only if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or

defenses of the class; and

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). If these requirements are met, the class proponents must also show that they

have met one of the four disjunctive prerequisites of Rule 23(b). Under this subsection, the Court

must find either: (1) that the prosecution of individual actions would create a risk of inconsistent

verdicts that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for defendant or would be

dispositive of the claims of non-party class members or substantially impede the ability of non-party

class members to pursue their own claims; (2) that the defendant acted or refused to act on grounds

generally applicable to the class, so that declaratory or injunctive relief is appropriate with respect to

the entire class; or (3) that common questions of law or fact predominate and that a class action is

superior to other available methods of adjudication. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)-(3). Here, Plaintiffs

seek class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). According to that subsection, the matters pertinent to

the findings include:

(A) the interests of members of the class in individually controlling the

prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any

litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members

of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of

the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered

in the management of a class action.

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).

The proponents of the class bear the burden of demonstrating that all the prerequisites for

class designation are met. See In re Northern District of California Dalcon Shield IUD Products

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28 1 Instead, Defendants focus their opposition on whether the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are

met here. This argument will be addressed in section B, infra.

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Liability Litigation, 693 F.2d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 1982). In analyzing whether the putative class

meets the requirements of Rule 23, a court is to take the substantive allegations of the complaint as

true, and may also consider extrinsic evidence submitted by the parties. Blackie v. Barrack, 524

F.2d 891, 901 (9th Cir. 1975).

“Class actions play an important role in the private enforcement of antitrust actions.” In re

Citric Acid Antitrust Litig., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16409, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 1996). “For this

reason, courts resolve doubts in these actions in favor of certifying the class.” Id. (citing In re

Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 688–89 (D. Minn. 1995)). Courts have stressed that pricefixing cases are appropriate for class certification because “a class-action lawsuit is the most fair and

efficient means of enforcing the law where antitrust violations have been continuous, widespread,

and detrimental to as yet unidentified consumers.” Coleman v. Cannon Oil Co., 141 F.R.D. 516,

520 (M.D. Ala. 1992). 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 23(g), a court that certifies a class must appoint class

counsel and that counsel must “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” 

ANALYSIS

A. Rule 23(a)

Plaintiffs contend that the purported class meets all four of the requirements of Rule 23(a). 

The Bayer Defendants do not contest that these requirements are met. (Opposition at 5:12–14.)1

Despite Defendants’ concession, the Court briefly addresses the numerosity, commonality,

typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a).

1. Numerosity

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class be so numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable. Plaintiffs do not need to state the exact number of potential class members, nor is a

specific number of class members required for numerosity. Bates v. United Parcel Service, 204

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2 But it has been suggested that a class exceeding one hundred members would satisfy the

numerosity requirement. See Berlowitz v. Nob Hill Masonic Management, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

22599 at *7 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

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F.R.D. 440, 444 (N.D. Cal. 2001).2

 A court may make common sense assumptions to support a

finding that joinder would be impracticable. 1 Robert Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, § 3:3

(4th Ed. 2002) (“Where the exact size of the class is unknown but general knowledge and common

sense indicate that it is large, the numerosity requirement is satisfied.”). In addition, the fact that a

class is geographically dispersed, and that class members are difficult to identify, supports class

certification. Id. at § 3:6; Haley v. Medtronic, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 643, 648 (C.D. Cal. 1996).

In this case, the evidence indicates that the purported class is made up of more than 1,000

individuals or business entities dispersed throughout the United States. As a matter of common

sense, the purported class is large and geographically diverse. For these reasons, the Court finds that

joinder of all class members is impracticable and that the putative class satisfies Rule 23(a)(1)’s

numerosity requirement.

2. Commonality

Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be questions of law or fact that are common to the class. 

“Courts consistently have held that the very nature of a conspiracy antitrust action compels a finding

that common questions of law and fact exist.” In re Sugar Industry, 1976 WL 1374, at *13 (N.D

Cal. May 21, 1976). In this case, the claims asserted involve the same core questions. Specifically

at issue is whether: (1) Defendants acted in concert to fix, maintain or stabilize prices, and to

allocate markets for rubber chemicals; (2) Defendants concealed the alleged conspiracy; (3) whether

Defendants’ conduct artificially-inflated the prices of rubber chemicals; and (4) whether putative

class members were injured as a result of Defendants’ conduct and, if so, what the appropriate classwide measure of damages would be. Accordingly, the Court finds that Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality

requirement is satisfied here. 

3. Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the claims of the named plaintiffs be typical of those of the class. 

“In the antitrust context, typicality ‘will be established by plaintiffs and all class members alleging

the same antitrust violations by defendants.’” Thomas & Thomas Rodmakers, Inc., et al. v. Newport

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Adhesives and Composites, Inc., et al., 209 F.R.D. 159 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (quoting In re Playmobil

Antitrust Litig., 35 F. Supp. 2d 231 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)). In the instant case, the named plaintiffs’

claims are typical of the claims of the putative class. Plaintiffs allege a conspiracy to fix, raise,

maintain, and stabilize the price of Rubber Chemicals. As a result of the alleged conspiracy, the

named plaintiffs, like the members of the putative class, purchased Rubber Chemicals, at artificiallyinflated prices, from Defendants between May 1995 and December 2001. Accordingly, the Court

finds that the claims of the putative class satisfy the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3).

4. Adequacy of Representation

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the class. The adequacy requirement consists of two separate inquiries. First, the

representative plaintiffs must not possess interests that are antagonistic to the interests of the

purported class. Second, the plaintiffs must be represented by counsel of sufficient diligence and

competence to fully litigate the claims. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund

v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, both requirements are met.

First, the named plaintiffs, like each member of the purported class, were allegedly

overcharged, due to Defendants’ alleged price-fixing conspiracy, for Rubber Chemicals purchased

from Defendants between May 1995 and December 2001. Additionally, the named plaintiffs and the

putative class members were allegedly injured in the same manner and seek the same relief. Thus,

there are no conflicts of interest between the named plaintiffs and members of the putative class. 

Second, Plaintiffs have retained highly skilled and experienced counsel to represent them in their

actions against Defendants and there is no indication that Plaintiffs’ counsel is incapable of litigating

vigorously on behalf of the putative class. Accordingly, the Court finds that the proposed class

satisfies the adequate representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4).

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The purported class satisfies all four of the requirements of Rule 23(a). 

B. Rule 23(b)

The Court must now determine whether this case fits within one of the three subsections of

Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs urge the Court to find that the lawsuit satisfies both the predominance and

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superiority requirements set forth in Rule 23(b)(3). Defendants argue that those requirements are

not met here. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs.

1. Common Questions Predominate Over Individual Questions.

In Sherman Act antitrust price-fixing actions such as this one, plaintiffs must establish: (1)

that there was a conspiracy to fix prices, and prices were fixed, in violation of the antitrust laws; (2)

that the plaintiffs were injured because they purchased products at prices that, as a result of the

conspiracy, were higher than they should have been; and (3) damages. See Citric Acid, 1996 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 16409, at *17. On a motion for class certification, the plaintiffs’ burden is to “establish

that common or generalized proof will predominate at trial with respect to these three essential

elements of their antitrust claim.” Id. (citations omitted). “In deciding . . . whether common

questions of law or fact in the case predominate over questions affecting only individual members, 

. . . the Court must focus on liability issues.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, Defendants do not dispute that the existence of the conspiracy and the alleged pricefixing are common to the litigation. Instead, Defendants contend that individualized issues

regarding impact and damages will overwhelm the common issues such that the Court should not

find that common issues predominate. 

a. Common Issues Regarding Impact Predominate Over Individual Issues.

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have failed to meet the predominance requirement here

because they cannot demonstrate impact through common proof on a class-wide basis. Defendants’

argument is not persuasive.

First, the Court notes that “the great weight of authority suggests that the dominant issues in

cases like this are whether the charged conspiracy existed and whether price-fixing occurred.” 

Citric Acid, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16409, at *21. “[B]ecause the gravamen of a price-fixing claim

is that the price in a given market is artificially high, there is a presumption that an illegal

price-fixing scheme impacts upon all purchasers of a price-fixed product in a conspiratorially

affected market.’” Potash, 159 F.R.D. at 695 (citing In re Alcoholic Beverages Antitrust Litig., 95

F.R.D. 321, 327 (E.D. N.Y. 1982)); see also 4 Newberg on Class Actions, §§ 18.28 at 18-98 (1992)

(“As a rule, the allegation of price-fixing conspiracy is sufficient to establish predominance of

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common questions.”) 

In Citric Acid, the court certified a class of purchasers in a horizontal price-fixing case

similar to this one. The defendants there, like Defendants here, argued that the plaintiffs’ motion for

class certification should be denied because, they argued, the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate

common proof of class-wide impact such that the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) was

not met. The defendants argued that because citric acid, the product at issue, comes in many forms

and is used for many purposes, the pricing varies between products, making common proof of

impact impossible. The court rejected the defendants’ argument and found that common issues

predominated even in the absence of proof of class-wide impact. “Diversity of products and pricing

does not necessarily mean that plaintiffs cannot show class-wide impact . . . .” Indeed,

“[c]ontentions of infinite diversity of product, marketing practices, and pricing have been made in

numerous cases and rejected.” Citric Acid, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16409, at *18 (quoting In re

Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 75 F.R.D. 727, 734 (N.D. Ill. 1977)). “[C]onspiracy [is] the

overriding predominant question.” Id. 

Second, class-wide impact is usually found to exist where the defendants are shown to have

used collusively-set list prices for the product at issue. “[H]igh list prices prove[] the fact of impact,

even if the degree of impact differed between products and purchasers.” Citric Acid, 1996 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 16409, at *19–20; see also In re Industrial Diamonds Antitrust Litig., 167 F.R.D. 374, 383

(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (common impact shown where conspiracy resulted in inflated list prices). In the

instant case, Plaintiffs have alleged, and pointed to, national price lists used by Defendants that

reflect collusively-set prices for Rubber Chemicals. This alone suggests the fact of common impact,

“even if the degree of impact differed.” That some members of the proposed class may have

received discounts on the chemicals they purchased such that they did not pay the prices set does not

counsel against class certification. As the court explained in Industrial Diamonds:

In a number of price-fixing cases concerning industries where discounts and

individually negotiated prices are common, courts have certified classes where

the plaintiffs have alleged that the defendants conspired to set an artificially

inflated base price from which negotiations for discounts began. The theory that

underlies these decisions is, of course, that the negotiated transaction prices

would have been lower if the starting point for negotiations had been list prices

set in a competitive market. Hence, if a plaintiff proves that the alleged

conspiracy resulted in artificially inflated list prices, a jury could reasonably

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conclude that each purchaser who negotiated an individual price suffered some

injury.

167 F.R.D. at 383. 

Third, for purposes of class certification, it is not necessary for Plaintiffs to show that every

single class member was injured by the alleged price-fixing conspiracy. See, e.g., In re Warfarin

Sodium Antitrust Litig., 212 F.R.D. 231, 252 (D. De. 2002); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200

F.R.D. 197, 321 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“courts have routinely observed that the inability to show injury

as to a few does not defeat class certification where the plaintiffs can show widespread injury to the

class”).

Fourth, even if conspiracy were not the overriding question and Plaintiffs were required to

show common proof of class-wide impact under Rule 23(b)(3), the Court finds that Plaintiffs have

done so here. Defendants are right that some courts, albeit “a smaller number,” “carefully examine

the facts of each case in order to determine whether common proof of impact is possible.” Citric

Acid, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16409, at *17 (citing Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59

(4th Cir. 1977)). However, even in those cases, courts “only require that plaintiffs ‘come forward

with seemingly realistic methodologies.” Id. (citing In re Brand Name Prescription Drug Antitrust

Litig., 1996 WL 478547, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 1994). “[I]n considering a class certification motion, a

court must consider only whether plaintiffs have made a threshold showing that ‘what proof they

will offer will be sufficiently generalized in nature that . . . the class action will provide a

tremendous savings of time and effort.’” Potash, 159 F.R.D. at 697 (citation omitted). Here,

Plaintiffs have made that threshold showing.

Dr. Douglas F. Greer, Plaintiffs’ economics expert, proposes a correlation analysis as a

method for demonstrating common impact that has been upheld by numerous courts. See, e.g., In re

Catfish Antitrust Litig, 826 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Miss. 1993). Based on his review of numerous

documents produced by Defendants, Dr. Greer found high price correlations between buyers and

across products. (Declaration of Douglas Greer (“Greer Decl.”) at ¶¶ 76–82.) Defendants’ expert,

Dr. William C. Myslinski, disagrees with Dr. Greer’s approach. However, “[t]he certification stage

of this litigation is not . . . the proper forum in which to resolve this battle [of the experts].” Potash,

159 F.R.D. at 697. “[W]hether or not plaintiffs’ expert is correct in his assessment of common

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3 Defendants liken this case to the Sample v. Monsanto, 218 F.R.D. 644 (E.D. Mo. 2003), case.

There, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification on the ground that the

plaintiffs could not show, pursuant to the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), that impact could be proven

on a systematic, class-wide basis with common proof. But there, the products at issue were not

commodity products. The market for seeds was deemed “highly individualized depending upon

geographic location, growing conditions, [and] consumer preference.” Id. at 650–51. Here, to the

contrary, the Rubber Chemicals are highly fungible. Thus, Defendants’ reliance on Monsanto is

misplaced.

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impact/injury is for the trier of fact to decide, at the proper time.” Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiffs

need only show that their proposed method is realistic. They have done so here. 

As the court held in Citric Acid, even though Plaintiffs need not have shown common proof

of class-wide impact to satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), particularly since

they pointed to high list prices set by Defendants, they have satisfactorily done so by presenting a

realistic method, as described by their expert, for proving common impact.3 The Court finds that

individualized issues regarding impact do not predominate over common issues here.

b. Common Issues Regarding Damages Predominate Over Individual

Issues.

Defendants argue that the methodologies proposed by Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Greer, fail to

establish that the amount of damages allegedly sustained by each putative class member can be

demonstrated through the use of common proof. The Court disagrees.

“Antitrust plaintiffs have a limited burden with respect to showing that individual damages

issues do not predominate. Plaintiffs do not need to supply a precise damage formula at the

certification stage of an antitrust action. Instead, assessing whether to certify a class, the court’s

inquiry is limited to whether or not the proposed methods are so insubstantial as to amount to not

method at all.” Potash, 159 F.R.D. at 697 (citation omitted). “Moreover, the fact that the damages

calculation may involve individualized analysis is not by itself sufficient to preclude certification

when liability can be determined on a class-wide basis.” Id; see also In re Workers’ Compensation,

130 F.R.D. 99, 110 (D. Minn. 1990) (“individual questions of damages are often a problem

encountered in an antitrust action and are rarely a barrier to certification.”) 

Plaintiffs’ expert has proffered two reasonable and commonly-used formulaic approaches to 

calculating damages. Dr. Greer opines that damages suffered by the putative class members may be

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determined, with a substantial degree of precision, through the use of a “benchmark” approach,

whereby the prices that class members paid during the Class Period are compared to the prices they

would have paid absent the conspiracy. In the alternative, Dr. Greer proposes a “yardstick”

approach, by which the prices of Rubber Chemicals in the United States during the Class Period are

compared to those in Europe where the market was more competitive. Defendants attack the

specifics of Dr. Greer’s proposed methodologies but their expert, Dr. Myslinski acknowledged that

both approaches are “useful.” Defendants have not established that Plaintiffs’ expert’s proposed

methodologies would foreclose a class-wide common method of proof on damages. The Court need

only determine that Plaintiffs have proffered a method that is not so insubstantial or unreasonable as

to amount to no method at all. They have met their low burden here. 

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The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated that common issues

predominate over potential individual impact or damage issues such that the predominance

requirement of Rule 23(b)(2) is met.

2. A Class Action is Superior to Other Available Methods For the Fair and

Efficient Adjudication of This Case

Defendants argue that proceeding as a class action here is not superior to other available

methods because individual questions of law and fact regarding impact and damages will

predominate over the questions common to the proposed class. Having already determined that

common issues predominate here, the Court finds Defendants’ argument against superiority

unpersuasive. The Court is satisfied that proceeding as a class action is the best method for the fair

and efficient adjudication of this case.

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Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirements.

C. Rule 23(g) – Appointing Class Counsel

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g)(1) provides that “a court that certifies a class must

appoint class counsel” and that “[a]n attorney appointed to serve as class counsel must fairly and

adequately represent the interests of the class.” In appointing class counsel, courts must consider: 

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(1) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; (2)

counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and claims of the type

asserted in the action; (3) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and (4) the resources counsel

will commit to representing the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(I). Courts may also consider “any

other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the

class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(ii). 

In the instant lawsuit, it is undisputed that the counsel selected by the named plaintiffs –

Gold Bennett and Cohen Milstein – have extensive experience and expertise in antitrust and other

class actions, as well as other complex litigation, and have successfully prosecuted such cases in

courts across the country. Gold Bennett and Cohen Milstein, Co-Chairs of the Plaintiffs’ Executive

Committee, have worked together to identify, investigate, and prosecute the claims alleged here. 

They have reviewed documents produced in discovery, worked with economists to analyze impact

and damage methodologies, analyzed comprehensive transactional data, briefed legal issues, and

engaged in negotiations with opposing counsel. Gold Bennett and Cohen Milstein have also devoted

considerable attorney resources to this case and have associated with other counsel, experienced in

class actions, who have assisted in the matter as members of the Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee. 

There is every indication that Gold Bennett and Cohen Milstein are well equipped to fairly and

adequately represent the interests of the Class.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. 

The following class is certified:

All persons (excluding government entities, defendants, and the present or former

parents, predecessors, subsidiaries and affiliates of the foregoing) which

purchased rubber chemicals in the United States directly from any of the

defendants, or any present or former parent, subsidiary or affiliate thereof, at any

time during the period May 1, 1995 through December 31, 2001.

The Court also hereby appoints Gold Bennett and Cohen Milstein as Class Counsel.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September_23_, 2005 _______________________________

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:04-md-01648-MMC Document 218 Filed 10/06/05 Page 12 of 12