Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00123/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00123-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

This case was removed from the Kern County Superior Court and arises from a contractual 

dispute between Plaintiff Critters of the Cinema (“Critters”) and Defendant Nestle Purina Petcare 

Co. (“Nestle”). Critters alleges claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and 

declaratory relief. Nestle now moves to transfer this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the 

Eastern District of Missouri, and also moves to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Per the Court’s request under Costlow v. Weeks, 

790 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1986), the parties have submitted briefing regarding a § 1404(a) transfer 

to the Central District of California. For the reasons that follow, the Court will transfer this matter 

to the Central District of California.

CRITTERS OF THE CINEMA, INC., a 

California Corporation,

Plaintiff

v.

NESTLE PURINA PETCARE CO., a 

Missouri corporation, and DOES 1 

through 20, inclusive,

Defendants

CASE NO. 1:16-CV-0123 AWI JLT 

ORDER ON MOTION TO CHANGE 

VENUE AND ORDER TRANSFERRING 

MATTER TO THE WESTERN 

DIVISION OF THE CENTRAL 

DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

(Doc. Nos. 9, 12)

Case 1:16-cv-00123-AWI-JLT Document 29 Filed 05/24/16 Page 1 of 18
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2

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

From the Complaint, in 1995, Critters began working with Nestle under various written 

agreements. Critters was to inter alia train, maintain, make available, and provide cats to Nestle 

for use in advertising “Fancy Feast” brand cat food. In exchange for these services, Nestle agreed 

to pay Critters certain fees and expenses.

In March 2010, Critters and Nestle entered into a new service contract (“the Contract”), 

whereby Critters agreed to make available and provide a minimum of two particular breeds of cats 

for use by Nestle in its advertising (on camera or personal appearance use) through March 2020. 

The Contract contains allegedly “one-sided” clauses in favor of Nestle: a “dissatisfaction” and a 

“cure ‘satisfaction’” clause. The two clauses provide that, in the event Nestle is dissatisfied with 

Critters’s services, Nestle is to provide Critters with written notice detailing the areas of 

deficiency. Critters would then have 30 days to cure the deficiency. The clauses provide that, 

after 30 days, if Nestle determines “in its sole discretion” that Critters has failed to make 

satisfactory improvement, Nestle can terminate the Contract. The Contract also contains a clause 

that required Critters to be the owner of the cats. The clause provides that Critters warrants and 

represents that it is the owner of the cats and has full authority to enter into the Contract and 

perform all obligations under the Contract.

On December 30, 2013, Critters and Nestle were both named as defendants in a lawsuit 

filed in the San Francisco Superior Court. This lawsuit was allegedly a sham. The lawsuit falsely 

alleged that Critters was not the sole owner of the cat Aladdin (a cat Critters provided to Nestle 

under the Contract), and further falsely alleged that Critters mistreated Aladdin. 

On July 31, 2014, Nestle sent Critters a letter in which Nestle provided notice of its intent 

to terminate the Contract based on Nestle’s “dissatisfaction.” The letter explained that Nestle was 

dissatisfied because of the sham lawsuit. Nestle did not want to be associated with Critters when 

Critters was accused of failing to support standards and values cultivated by Nestle, or utilizing 

methods which violate the humane ideals that are the criteria by which Nestle operates. Nestle 

also was dissatisfied with the allegation that Critters did not own Aladdin. Although Nestle gave 

Critters 30 days to cure the dissatisfaction, Nestle allegedly had no intent to act in good faith 

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because it had already decided to terminate the Contract. The July 31 letter stated that Nestle 

believed that the deficiencies were incapable of correction. Given this position, Nestle made it 

contractually impossible to cure under the Contract. 

On August 25, 2014, Critters responded in good faith to Nestle. Critters adamantly denied 

the allegations in the sham lawsuit. Critters denied that it or its employees mistreated any cats or 

behaved in a manner that compromised Nestle’s standards or values. In support of this assertion, 

Critters provided notarized attestations from several individuals, including a veterinarian. Critters 

also provided Nestle with evidence that it owned Aladdin.

Despite the allegations of the sham lawsuit, Nestle still hired Critters to perform the exact 

services it was to perform under the Contract on April 29, 2014, on May 5, 2014, and June 5, 

2014.1 Critters performed without incident and to Nestle’s satisfaction.

On September 12, 2014, Nestle sent Critters a letter terminating the Contract. Nestle 

acknowledged that Critters had cured the alleged deficiencies, but still terminated the Contract

based on a “perception,” and not based on deficiencies in Critters’s services. The decision to 

terminate was allegedly arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, in light of the information 

provided by Critters and Critters’ history and years of unblemished service to Nestle. Nestle 

completely failed to substantiate, investigate, or use the discovery process with respect to the 

allegations of the sham lawsuit.

On September 18, 2014, the state court dismissed the sham lawsuit. As of January 1, 2016, 

no appeal of the dismissal had been taken, and the plaintiff in the sham lawsuit has not attempted 

to re-file her case. 

Critters alleges that the termination by Nestle breached the Contract, and that Nestle’s 

conduct breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Critters also alleges that 

 

1 The Complaint is somewhat ambiguous. Critters lists these dates as dates on which “Defendant hired Plaintiff to 

perform the exact services Plaintiff was to perform under the [Contract].” The nature of the allegation suggests that, 

after Nestle terminated the Contract, it nevertheless hired Critters on three more occasions. However, April 29, 2014, 

May 5, 2014, and June 5, 2014, are all days that pre-date the termination, and thus, would have been days in which 

Critters performed pursuant to the Contract. That is, Nestle would not have “hired” Critters on those days, rather 

Nestle would have simply requested Critters perform its obligation under the Contract on those days. It is possible 

that Critters meant to allege dates that occurred in 2015. It is also possible that Critters is focusing on dates that postdate the sham lawsuit but pre-date the termination. For now, the Court merely notes the ambiguity. 

Case 1:16-cv-00123-AWI-JLT Document 29 Filed 05/24/16 Page 3 of 18
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Nestle knew of Critters’s business relationship and prospects in the animal training industry. 

However, Nestle’s termination of the Contract, along with Nestle’s subsequent conduct and 

contact with third parties, has effectively blackballed and destroyed Critters’s business and 

reputation. Nestle’s conduct has interfered with Critters’s business relationships and prospective 

business relationships. 

I. MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE

Defendant’s Argument

Nestle argues that the relevant considerations show that this case should be transferred to 

the Eastern District of Missouri (“EDMO”). First, the contract at issue has a broad choice of law 

clause that sets Missouri law as the governing law. The EDMO will be more familiar with the 

governing law than the Eastern District of California (“EDCA”). 

Second, the EDMO has a strong relationship to the dispute. Nestle, 11 current and retired 

employees, and at least 3 third party witnesses are all located in the St. Louis area.

Third, the EDMO is less congested than the EDCA. The EDMO has about half the case 

load as the EDCA, and also has three more judges than the EDCA.

Fourth, there are numerous witnesses for whom the EDMO is a more convenient forum. 

There are a number of Nestle employees who worked on the television and advertising team 

involving Critters, and those employees all reside in the Saint Louis, Missouri area. There are

third party entities who worked with Critters directly as part of advertising and public relations 

activities. Avrett, Free, & Ginsberg, LLC is based in New York, and was involved in television 

advertising and briefing Critters on what the cats would do for photoshoots. MRA 

Advertising/Production Support Services, Inc. (“MRA”) was involved in television advertising 

costs and budgeting, including the expenses for Critters. MRA is based in Ohio, but the employee 

who worked with Nestle and Critters resides in Michigan. Thompson Design Group (“TDG”) is 

based in California, and worked with Critters concerning what the cats should do for photoshoots. 

MSL Group Americas is a New York based public relations firm that communicated with Critters 

regarding public relations events. Check Mark PR (“CMPR”) is a subsidiary of Nestle that 

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communicated with Critters regarding public relations events. CMPR and its 3 employees who 

worked with Critters are located in the St. Louis area. The nature and quality of these witnesses’ 

testimony is central to the million dollar tortious interference claim. The current and former 

Nestle employees can all address whether they engaged in the alleged tortious conduct or knew of

Nestle employees who did. The third party witnesses can attest to whether they heard anything 

from their Nestle counterparts that would support Critters’s claims. All of the witnesses could be 

expected to affirm the value of the Fancy Feast brand and the reasons supporting Nestle’s cure 

notice and termination. Given the location of these witnesses, the EDMO is more convenient.

In supplemental briefing, Nestle argues that the Central District of California (“CDCA”) is 

a more appropriate forum than the EDCA. Nevertheless, for the same reasons that the EDMO is a 

more convenient and appropriate forum than the EDCA, it is also more convenient than the 

CDCA. There are numerous witnesses in the EDMO, and the EDMO is more familiar with the 

governing law. 

Plaintiff’s Opposition

Critters argues that a transfer of venue is unwarranted. California is an obvious forum 

choice. Critters resides in California, and Nestle maintains a facility in Maricopa, California. The 

contract at issue was entered into in California, all of the Fancy Feast cats reside in California, all 

of the cat training occurred in California, and all of the Fancy Feast advertising/filming occurred 

in California. That is, everything relevant to the complaint occurred in California. California has 

a strong connection to this case, and the choice to bring this suit in California is entitled to 

deference. 

With respect to Court congestion, this is a relatively disfavored consideration. The EDCA 

is not so congested that it cannot hear this case. 

With respect to witnesses, primary consideration is given to third parties, as opposed to the 

employees of a party. Those third parties will be inconvenienced by having to travel to another 

state, be it California or Missouri, and there is no assertion that any third party witnesses are 

unable to travel to California. There is also no assertion that any particular witness will be 

unwilling to testify in the absence of compulsory process. Further, Defendants have given only 

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general assertions and explanations of what non-party witnesses might say. There is no 

description of specific testimony or specific relevance. Defendants have not shown 

inconvenience, rather there is merely a list of names with generalized descriptions. 

Finally, Nestle’s resources vastly exceed Critters’s resources. Critters is a family owned 

business that is run by one person. Nestle is the second largest pet food company globally and the 

largest in the United States.

In supplemental briefing, Critters states it does not oppose a transfer to the CDCA. Critters 

is “semi-located” in the CDCA, and travel to the CDCA is easier than travel to the EDMO.

Legal Standard

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides in relevant part: “For the convenience of parties and 

witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other 

district or division where it might have been brought . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). This statute 

partially displaces the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. See Decker Coal Co. v. 

Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). The purpose of § 1404(a) is “to 

prevent the waste of time, energy, and money and to protect litigants, witnesses and the public 

against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 

(1964). “Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions 

for transfer according to an ‘individualized, cases by case consideration of convenience and 

fairness.’” Stewart Organization, Inc. v. RICOH Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988).

The “defendant must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant upsetting the 

plaintiff's choice of forum.” Decker, 805 F.2d at 843. In deciding whether to transfer under 

§ 1404(a), courts consider inter alia: (1) the location where the relevant agreements were 

negotiated and executed; (2) the state that is most familiar with the governing law; (3) the 

plaintiff’s choice of forum; (4) the respective parties’ contacts with the forum; (5) the forum’s 

contacts with the plaintiff’s cause of action; (6) the differences in the costs of litigation in the two 

forums; (7) the availability of compulsory process to compel attendance of unwilling non-party 

witnesses; (8) the ease of access to sources of proof; (9) the presence of a forum selection clause

(which is a “significant factor”); (10) the relevant public policy of the forum state, if any; (11) 

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convenience of the parties; (12) convenience of the witnesses; (13) local interest in the 

controversy; (14) court congestion of the two forums; and (15) feasibility of consolidating other 

claims. See Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498-99 (9th Cir. 2000); Hawkins v. 

Gerber Prods. Co., 924 F.Supp.2d 1208, 1213 (S.D. Cal. 2013); Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI 

Corp., 823 F.Supp.2d 980, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Metz v. United States Life Ins. Co., 674 

F.Supp.2d 1141, 1145-46 (C.D. Cal. 2009).

Discussion

The parties do not dispute that this case could have been filed in either the EDMO or the 

CDCA. With respect to the EDMO, because Nestle is a Missouri corporation headquartered in St. 

Louis, Nestle is subject to personal jurisdiction in the EDMO. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1), 

(c)(2); Lightfoot v. Cendant Mort. Corp., 769 F.3d 681, 689 (9th Cir. 2014). With respect to the 

CDCA, Critters is located in the CDCA, all cats (including Aladdin) would have been kept, cared 

for, and trained by Critters in the CDCA, the notice of dissatisfaction and termination were 

received in the CDCA, and Critters’s attempts to cure Nestle’s dissatisfaction occurred in the 

CDCA. Cf. Decker Coal, 805 F.2d at 842 (holding that breach of contract claims arise at the place 

of intended performance). Further, because Critters is based in the CDCA, the harm from the 

tortious interference claim would have been felt in the CDCA. See Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 

238 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001); United Tactical Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 108 

F.Supp.3d 733, 755 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Therefore, “substantial parts” of Critters’s claims occurred 

in the CDCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2); Myers, 238 F.3d at 1076; Decker Coal, 805 F.2d at 

842; United Tactical, 108 F.Supp.3d at 755. Since this matter could have been filed in the EDMO

or the CDCA, the Court will examine whether a transfer to either of these districts is appropriate.

1. Location Where The Contract Was Negotiated and Executed

It is not clear where the Contract was executed or negotiated. There is no evidence 

regarding negotiations in general, much less where the negotiations actually occurred or through 

what medium (face to face, telephone, fax, e-mail, etc.). There is also little evidence regarding 

where the Contract was executed. A copy of the Contract indicates that it was sent to the CDCA. 

See Leas Dec. Ex. A. This suggests that Critters executed the Contract in the CDCA, but that 

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Nestle executed the Contract in the EDMO. No evidence suggests that any negotiations or 

execution occurred in the EDCA. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of transfer out of the 

EDCA, and equally supports transfer to either the EDMO or the CDCA. 

2. State Most Familiar With The Governing Law

The Contract has a broad choice of law clause. “This [Contract] and all matters and issues 

collateral thereto shall be governed by and determined according to the laws of the State of 

Missouri, without regard to conflict of law principles.” See Leas Dec. Ex. A at ¶ 6(i). Critters 

does not dispute that Missouri law governs each of its claims. The EDMO sits in Missouri and is 

more familiar with the governing law than the EDCA or the CDCA. Therefore, this factor weighs 

in favor of a transfer to the EDMO.

3. Plaintiff’s Choice Of Forum

Generally, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is given substantial weight. See Lou v. Belzberg, 

834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987); Park v. Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc., 964 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1094 

(N.D. Cal. 2013). However, other considerations will lessen the weight to be given a plaintiff’s 

choice of forum. See Park, 964 F.Supp.2d at 1094. A plaintiff’s choice of forum will be given 

less weight if the plaintiff does not reside in the forum, or if the conduct giving rise to the 

plaintiff’s claims occurred in another forum. See Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bartile Roofs, Inc., 

618 F.3d 1153, 1168 (10th Cir. 2010); Park, 964 F.Supp.2d at 1094; Williams v. Bowman, 157 

F.Supp.2d 1103, 1107 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

Here, Critters clearly chose the EDCA when it filed suit in Kern County. However, 

Critters’s principal place of business is Lake Hughes, California. See Complaint ¶ 1. Lake 

Hughes California is located within the CDCA. For purposes of venue, a corporate plaintiff 

resides “only in the judicial district in which it maintains its principal place of business.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Therefore, Critters resides in the CDCA, not in the EDCA. Furthermore, it 

does not appear that any of the conduct that forms the bases of Critters’s claims occurred in the 

EDCA. With respect to the contract claims, Critters’s opposition states that the cats are located in 

California, and that the filming and training of the cats occurred in California. However, because 

Critters is located in the CDCA, it is reasonable to conclude that such conduct actually occurred in 

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the CDCA. There is nothing to suggest that the identified conduct occurred in the EDCA. With 

respect to the tort claim, there is no information regarding what potential contractual relationships 

were interfered with, where the interference occurred, or where Critters’s services would have 

been rendered to its potential business partners/clients. Because Critters is located in the CDCA, 

nothing suggests that any tortious interference by Nestle occurred within the EDCA. 

Critters argues that Nestle maintains “its business” in Maricopa, California, which is in 

Kern County and the EDCA. However, according to Nestle’s website,2 Nestle has a 

manufacturing facility in Maricopa where it manufactures “Tidy Cats” brand cat litter. While 

Nestle clearly has a tangible presence in the EDCA, the services at issue in this case relate to 

“Fancy Feast” brand cat food, not “Tidy Cats” brand cat litter. There is no evidence that the 

Nestle facility in Maricopa is related in any way to Critters’ claims. 

Therefore, because Critters does not reside in the EDCA, and there is no indication that 

relevant conduct occurred within the EDCA, this factor weighs against a transfer, but in a 

substantially diminished capacity. See Park, 964 F.Supp.2d at 1094.

Nevertheless, Critters has stated that the CDCA is a convenient and acceptable forum. 

Also, as discussed above, Critters resides in the CDCA and relevant conduct occurred in the 

CDCA. Therefore, this factor will also weigh in favor of a transfer to the CDCA. But, because

the CDCA was not Critters’s first choice, it weighs in favor of a transfer to the CDCA in a 

somewhat reduced capacity. Cf. id. (noting that a forum that is a plaintiff’s second choice is given 

less weight than the plaintiff’s first choice). 

4. Parties’ Contacts With The Forum

Critters has not shown that it has any contacts with the EDCA. Nestle maintains its “Tidy 

Cats” manufacturing facility in the EDCA. Nestle’s contact with the EDCA is diminished in that 

the manufacturing facility involves cat litter, not cat food. On balance, this factor weighs against a 

transfer in a reduced a capacity. 

5. Forum’s Contacts With The Plaintiff’s Cause Of Action

As discussed above under the third factor, no material connection to the EDCA is apparent. 

 

2

https://www.nestlepurinacareers.com/blog/locations/living-and-working-in-maricopa-california.

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Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of transfer out of the EDCA. 

With respect to the CDCA, there are substantial contacts with Critters’s claims. As to 

Critters’s contract claims, the Contract would have been largely performed by Critters in the 

CDCA, as this is where Critters would have kept, cared for, trained, and made available the cats. 

As discussed above, the CDCA is where the breach of contract claim arises. See Decker Coal, 805

F.2d at 842. As to Critters’s tort claim, as stated above, it is unknown where the potential business 

partners/clients were located or where the services would have been rendered. However, the harm 

from the tortious interference claim would have been felt by Critters in the CDCA, and the

location where the injury/harm is felt is relevant to determining venue. See Myers, 238 F.3d at

1076; United Tactical, 108 F.Supp.3d at 735. 

With respect to the EDMO, the Court can say that the decision to terminate the Contract 

was made by Nestle in the EDMO. See Leas Dec. ¶¶ 6, 8, 9. It is also possible that some of the 

contractual negotiations may have occurred within that EDMO. However, that is the most that can 

be said at this time.

On balance, this factor weighs in favor of a transfer to the CDCA. 

6. Differences In Litigation Costs Between The Two Forums

The parties have not submitted evidence regarding the litigation costs in the EDCA, the 

CDCA, or the EDMO. Therefore, this is a neutral factor. 

7. Compulsory Process For Unwilling Non-Party Witnesses

The parties have not identified any witnesses who are unwilling to testify. Of the 

witnesses that have been identified, the EDCA and the CDCA could only compel the California 

witnesses of San Francisco based TDG to testify. The EDMO could only compel the 14 witnesses 

who live in Missouri to testify. However, these witnesses include 10 current Nestle employees 

and 3 employees of a Nestle subsidiary. Since Nestle can compel these witnesses to attend any 

court, Lax v. Toyota Motor Corp., 65 F.Supp.3d 772, 779 (N.D. Cal. 2014); In re Yahoo!, Inc., 

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20605, *11-*12 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2010), the California districts’ inability 

to compel their testimony is irrelevant. As for the third party witnesses in Michigan and New 

York, none of the three districts can compel their testimony. On balance, this is a neutral factor. 

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8. Ease Of Access To Sources Of Proof

The parties have not submitted evidence on this point. Nestle is the only party to have 

produced documents, and those documents are not extensive. Furthermore, to the extent that emails or electronically stored documents may be involved, such evidence can likely be 

“transported” and printed without great difficulty. See Body Sci. LLC v. Boston Sci. Corp., 846 

F.Supp.2d 980, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2012). Without more from the parties, this is a neutral factor. 

9. Presence Of A Forum Selection Clause

The parties have not identified a forum selection clause. Therefore, this is a neutral factor.

10. Relevant Public Policy Of The Forum State

The parties have not discussed or identified any California public policy that may be 

implicated by this case. Therefore, this is a neutral factor. 

11. Convenience Of The Parties

Nestle is a large corporation that has a manufacturing facility within the EDCA. 

Furthermore, Nestle’s supplemental opposition states that the CDCA is a more convenient forum 

than the EDCA. There is nothing to indicate that Nestle is unable to litigate in the EDCA or the 

CDCA, or that litigating in the EDCA or CDCA would constitute an unreasonable burden on 

Nestle. 

In contrast, Critters’s opposition states that Critters is a family owned business that is run 

by one person. Because Critters is located in the CDCA, little inconvenience would be involved

in the CDCA. Further, although Critters does not appear to have a presence in the EDCA, the 

EDCA is much closer to Lake Hughes than the EDMO. Critters’s Complaint alleges that, because 

of Nestle’s conduct, Critters has been blackballed and had its business and reputation destroyed. 

These allegations indicate that Critters has diminished resources. Compared to the burden on 

Nestle of litigating in the EDCA or the CDCA, there would be a greater burden on Critters in 

litigating in the EDMO.

Because it appears that there would be a greater burden on Critters in litigating in the 

EDMO, this factor weighs against a transfer to the EDMO. Instead, because Critters is actually 

located in the CDCA, this factor weighs in favor of a transfer to the CDCA.

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12. Convenience Of The Witnesses

The convenience of witnesses is often considered the most important consideration in 

determining whether to transfer a case under § 1404. See Hawkins, 924 F.Supp.2d at 1215; Metz, 

674 F.Supp.2d at 1147. In order to properly assess the convenience of witnesses, the parties 

should identify the witnesses, the location of the witnesses, and the content and relevance of the 

witnesses’ testimony. See Lax, 65 F.Supp.2d at 779; Florens Container v. Cho Yang Shipping, 

245 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1092-93 (N.D. Cal. 2002). Courts are not to simply consider the number of 

witnesses listed by a party, rather courts are to consider the nature and quality of each witness’s 

testimony. See Vesta Corp. v. Amdocs Mgmt., 129 F.Supp.3d 1012, 1036 (D. Or. 2015); Metz, 

674 F.Supp.2d at 1147. Thus, the convenience of “key witnesses” is accorded greater weight than 

“non-key witnesses.” Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Petroleum Solutions, Inc., 629 F.Supp.2d 759, 

763 (S.D. Tex. 2009); see Amazon.com v. Cendant Corp., 404 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1260-61 (W.D. 

Was. 2005). Additionally, because employers can compel the testimony of their employees,

considerably less weight is given to the convenience of a party’s employee-witness, as opposed to 

a true third-party witness. See Vesta Corp., 129 F. Supp. 3d at 1036; Lax, 65 F.Supp.3d at 779; 

Hawkins, 924 Supp.2d at 1215; Metz, 674 F.Supp.2d at 1147. Similarly, unless evidence is 

presented that suggests otherwise, because former employees are likely to voluntarily testify on 

behalf of their former employers, former employees are viewed in the same light as current 

employees. See Vesta Corp., 129 F.Supp.3d at 1036-37. 

Critters has not identified any witnesses, but Nestle has identified 17 witnesses. Of the 17 

witnesses, 14 reside near or in St. Louis, Missouri, 2 reside in New York, and 1 resides in 

Michigan. See Leas Dec. ¶¶ 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18. 

With respect to the Missouri witnesses, 10 witnesses are current employees of Nestle, 1 

witness is a retired Nestle employee, and 3 witnesses are currently employed by CMPR (a

subsidiary of Nestle). For purposes of this motion, the Court views the 3 witnesses employed by 

CMPR as employees of Nestle, because these witnesses would be under Nestle’s control. See

Audatex N. Am., Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90847, *15-*16 (D. Del. June 

28, 2013) (treating a party’s employees and the employees of the party’s subsidiary the same for 

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purposes of § 1404(a)); In re Yahoo!,, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20605 at *11-*12 (same). 

Therefore, each of the 14 total Missouri witnesses will be viewed as Nestle “employees,” and their 

convenience is afforded substantially reduced weight. See Vesta Corp., 129 F.Supp.3d at 1036-

37; Lax, 65 F.Supp.3d at 779; Audatex, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90847 at *15-*16; Metz, 674 

F.Supp.2d at 1147. 

Additionally, the Court finds that, as described, the testimony of a number of the Missouri

witnesses would be of limited relevance. See Vesta Corp., 129 F.Supp.3d at 1036 (courts are to 

consider the nature and quality of the testimony). Nestle has indicated that the one retired witness 

(Tim Hanneke) signed the Contract in March 2010 on behalf of Nestle. See id. at ¶¶ 5, 6. 

However, there is no dispute that the Contract exists, so testimony about signing the document has 

little relevance. Nestle has indicated that the three witnesses employed by CMPR (Emily 

Goldkamp, Gordon Wade, and Julie Catron) worked with Critters while the Contract was in effect. 

However, simply working with Critters for some unknown period of time on an unknown number 

of projects is alone not particularly relevant. There is nothing to indicate that these individuals 

expressed dissatisfaction to “Fancy Feast” brand managers about Critters, provided input on the 

decision to terminate the Contract, or had contact with or interfered in possible relationships with 

potential or existing Critters clients. Further, to the extent that they could support Nestle’s 

rationale for terminating the Contract, the testimony of all three witnesses would be redundant. As 

to five of the current employees (Gina Garren, Katie Fiamingo, Courtney Louch, Lisa Luedde, and 

Carey Mullen), Nestle indicates that they “have knowledge concerning the performance of the 

Agreement by [Nestle] and [Critters].” Leas Dec. ¶ 11. However, as the Court understands the 

allegations in the Complaint, Nestle’s notice of dissatisfaction (Ex. C to Leas Declaration), and the 

written termination notice (Ex. E to Leas Declaration), the purported reason for the termination of 

the Contract was the allegations in the lawsuit, specifically the true ownership of Aladdin and how 

Aladdin (and possibly other cats) were treated by Critters. There is no indication that Nestle was 

dissatisfied with Critters’s performance prior to the lawsuit. Knowledge of Critters’s performance 

in general has some relevance, but evidence regarding the specific aspects of Critters’s 

performance that Nestle found dissatisfactory is highly relevant. There is no indication that these 

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five witnesses have such knowledge. Finally, Nestle has indicated that one other current employee 

(Amanda Culbertson-Kraemer) was a Brand Manager of Fancy Feast and the predecessor of a 

manager who was involved in the termination decision (Andrea Leas). However, there is no 

indication that this witness was involved in the decision to terminate or had knowledge of any 

dissatisfaction by Nestle with Critters’s performance. At this time, it appears that any evidence 

that Culbertson-Kraemer could offer would have minimal relevance. Therefore, in sum, the 

testimony of these Missouri witnesses appears to be of limited relevance and possibly redundant,

and none of these witnesses appear to be “key witnesses.” See Vesta Corp., 129 F.Supp.3d at 

1036; Mid-Continent, 629 F.Supp.2d at 763. 

In contrast, the remaining four Missouri witnesses appear to be “key witnesses” who have 

highly relevant testimony. See id. Andrea Leas, Tad Stricker, Stacy Bacilek, and Heather Scott 

all appear to have been involved in the decision to terminate the Contract. See Leas Dec. Exs. C, 

E. These witnesses either wrote the relevant correspondences to Critters, or were copied on the 

correspondences. See id. It is reasonable to assume that these witnesses either collectively made 

the decision to terminate the Contract, or provided input to the ultimate decision-maker. However, 

because these are current employees that Nestle can compel to attend any court, their 

inconvenience is given substantially reduced weight. See Vesta Corp., 129 F.Supp.3d at 1036-37; 

Lax, 65 F.Supp.3d at 779; Metz, 674 F.Supp.2d at 1147. 

With respect to the two New York witnesses (Lynne Kruger and Molly Kelly) and one 

Michigan witness (Larry Haggart), these witnesses appear to be employees of third party public 

relations/advertising firms who worked on projects with Critters for the Fancy Feast brand. See

Leas Dec. ¶¶ 12, 13, 14, 17. These firms do not appear to be subsidiaries of Nestle, and there is 

nothing to indicate that Nestle can compel attendance of these individuals to the EDMO, the 

EDCA, or the CDCA. Although the CDCA is easily reached through Los Angeles’s airport, both 

the CDCA and the EDCA are significantly farther from New York and Michigan than the EDMO. 

Therefore, the convenience of these witnesses weighs in favor of a transfer to the EDMO. 

However, the relevance of any testimony from these witnesses appears to be limited. Like other 

witnesses, there is no indication that these individuals expressed dissatisfaction to “Fancy Feast” 

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brand managers about Critters, witnessed abusive conduct by Critters, provided input on the 

decision to terminate the Contract, or had contact with or interfered in possible relationships with 

potential or existing Critters clients. All that can be said is that these witnesses participated in an

unknown number of projects at unknown times with Critters.3 There is nothing to indicate that 

these witnesses actually have relevant information about the tortious interference claim or contract 

claims, and Nestle does not need a parade of public relations experts to justify its decision to 

terminate the Contract. Therefore, the testimony of these witnesses appears to be of limited 

relevance and possibly redundant, and none of these witnesses appear to be “key witnesses.” See

Vesta Corp., 129 F.Supp.3d at 1036; Mid-Continent, 629 F.Supp.2d at 763.

On balance, Nestle has demonstrated that the EDMO is a more convenient location for the 

witnesses it has identified. Therefore, this factor favors a transfer to the EDMO. However, the 

weight that will be given to this factor is substantially reduced either because the witnesses’ 

testimony appears to be of limited relevance, or because the witnesses are “employees” of Nestle. 

See Vesta Corp., 129 F.Supp.3d at 1036-37; Lax, 65 F.Supp.3d at 779; Metz, 674 F.Supp.2d at 

1147; Mid-Continent, 629 F.Supp.2d at 763.

13. Local Interest In The Controversy

With respect to the EDCA, there is very little, if any, local interest in this case. Although 

there is a significant dispute with Nestle, and Nestle has a manufacturing facility within the 

EDCA, that facility manufactures “Tidy Cats” brand cat litter, it does not manufacture “Fancy 

Feast” brand cat food. 

With respect to the EDMO, Nestle’s headquarters are in St. Louis, and it appears that the 

“Fancy Feast” brand is managed from St. Louis. See Leas Dec. ¶ 2. Based on these 

considerations, the EDMO has a significant local interest in this case. 

With respect to the CDCA, Critters is located in Lake Hughes. Critters appears to be a 

small business that has had a contractual relationship with Nestle for about 20 years. Because of 

 

3 As indicated above, the public relations firm TDG of San Francisco, California is also identified by Nestle, but no 

contact person is listed. Without a contact person identified, the Court cannot make a clear determination about 

inconvenience. If the Court were to assume that a contact person is in California, then the EDCA and the CDCA 

would be more convenient to that witness than the EDMO. However, for the same reasons as the New York and 

Michigan witnesses, the TDG witness’s testimony would appear to have limited relevance. 

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Nestle’s actions, it is alleged that Critters’s business and reputation has been all but destroyed. 

Given the allegations of the damage done to a local business, the CDCA has a significant local 

interest in this case. 

On balance, this factor weighs in favor of a transfer out of the EDCA, and equally supports 

transfer to either the EDMO or the CDCA. 

14. Court Congestion Of The Forums

As of December 31, 2015, the EDCA had 7,630 cases pending, the EDMO had 4,422 cases 

pending, and the CDCA 12,474 cases pending. See Table – U.S. District Courts – Combined Civil 

and Criminal Federal Court Management Statistics (December 31, 2015).4The median time to 

trial from the date of filing in civil cases in the EDMO is 29.9 months, the median time in the 

EDCA is 36.5 months, and the median time in the CDCA is 21.1 months. See id. The EDMO has 

a total of 12 full time and senior district judges, the EDCA has a total of 9 full time and senior

district judges, and the CDCA has a total of 33 full time and senior district judges.

5

 These 

statistics show that the EDCA is the most congested of the three districts – it has less judges and a 

greater median time to trial than either the EDMO or the CDCA. Although the CDCA has a 

significantly higher number of pending cases than either the EDMO or the EDCA, the CDCA has 

enough judges that the median time to trial is lower than the EDMO by approximately 9 months. 

The CDCA is “less congested” than the EDCA and the EDMO. Therefore, this factor weighs in 

favor of transfer to the CDCA.

15. Feasibility Of Consolidating Other Claims

The parties have not identified any claims that may be related to or could be consolidated 

with this case. Therefore, this is a neutral factor.

Conclusion

Factors 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 15 are neutral. Factors 3 and 4 weigh against a transfer, but 

Factor 3 does so on a significantly reduced basis because Critters does not reside in the EDCA, 

 

4 This Table can be found at: http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/na/federal-court-managementstatistics/2015/12/31-3.

5 The number of full time and senior judges in each district can be found at each district’s website: 

http://www.caed.uscourts.gov, http://www.moed.uscourts.gov, and http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov.

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and it does not appear that the events that form the basis of the Complaint occurred in the EDCA. 

See Park, 964 F.Supp.2d at 1094. Further, Factor 4 only weighs slightly against a transfer. 

Factors 1, 2, 12, and 13 weigh in favor of a transfer to the EDMO. However, because of 

ambiguity, Factor 1 is given a reduced weight. Further, Factor 12 is given significantly reduced 

weight because most of the witnesses are considered employees, or otherwise under the control, of 

Nestle, or the testimony many of the witnesses does not appear particularly relevant. see Vesta 

Corp., 129 F.Supp.3d at 1036-37; Lax, 65 F.Supp.3d at 779; Metz, 674 F.Supp.2d at 1147; MidContinent, 629 F.Supp.2d at 763; In re Yahoo!, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20605 at *11-*12. Finally, 

Factors 1, 3, 5, 11, 13, and 14 weigh in favor of a transfer to the CDCA. However, as is the case 

with respect to the EDMO, Factor 1 is given reduced weight because of ambiguity. Further, 

Factor 3 is given reduced weight because the CDCA was not Critters’s first choice of forum. 

The factors that are not neutral show that the EDCA is the least convenient forum of the 

districts at issue. Only two reduced or “light weight” factors support keeping the matter in the 

EDCA. The EDMO and the CDCA each have more factors that favor them than the EDCA. As 

between the EDMO and the CDCA, both districts share Factors 1 and 13 equally. Those factors 

essentially cancel each other out. Factors 3 and 12 are different, but are generally highly

important factors to plaintiffs and defendants, respectively. However, Factors 3 and 12 are given 

reduced weight, as discussed above. This leaves only Factor 2 fully in favor of the EDMO, but 

leaves Factors 4, 11, and 14 fully in favor of the CDCA. The Court finds that the totality of the 

factors shows that the CDCA sufficiently outweighs the EDCA and the EDMO so as to warrant a 

§ 1404(a) transfer to that district. Therefore, this case will be transferred to the CDCA.6

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

On the same day that Nestle filed its § 1404(a) motion to transfer, it also filed a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Because the Court has determined that a transfer to the CDCA is 

proper, it is appropriate for the CDCA to resolve Nestle’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The Court 

expresses no opinions on Nestle’s Rule 12(b)(6) arguments.

 

6 Because Critters resides in Los Angeles County, the Court will transfer this case to the CDCA’s Western Division.

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ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s motion to transfer to the Eastern District of Missouri (Doc. No. 12) is 

DENIED; and

2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1986), this 

matter is TRANSFERRED forthwith to the Western Division of the Central District of 

California.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 24, 2016 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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