Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-05244/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-05244-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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1 Kauffold filed his opposition on June 14, 2004. Because the Commissioner has failed

to file a reply, the court assumes that the Commissioner considers the matter submitted without

further argument. Cf. Ladarski v. Bowen, 1988 WL 251994 *1 (N.D. Cal. 1998) ("[b]ecause the

Secretary's opposition is long overdue, the court will rule on the pending motions on the basis of the

papers now before it"). 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

C-03-05244-RMW

DOH

E-FILED on 8/8/06

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

KARL N. KAUFFOLD,

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

No. C-03-05244 RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Re Docket No. 9]

The Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") moves to dismiss plaintiff Karl

Kauffold ("Kauffold")'s complaint seeking review of the Commissioner's denial of Kauffold's

application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§

401-433. Kauffold opposes the motion. Although the Commissioner has yet to file a reply, the time

for doing so has lapsed.1

 For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that it has jurisdiction to

hear the motion and make a decision on it. The court finds that dismissal of the case is appropriate.

Case 5:03-cv-05244-RMW Document 13 Filed 08/08/06 Page 1 of 7
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

C-03-05244-RMW

DOH 2

I. BACKGROUND

Kauffold applied for disability benefits on October 20, 2000. The Commissioner denied

Kauffold's application. Gould Decl. Supp. Mot. Dism. ("Gould Decl.") Ex. 1. Kauffold requested

reconsideration on April 16, 2001. Id. at Ex. 6. The Commissioner upheld the initial decision on

June 27, 2001. Id. at Ex. 1. On April 3, 2002, Kauffold claims he called the Gilroy Social Security

Office ("the Gilroy Office") and was told that the Commissioner had denied his reconsideration

request. Id. at Ex. 2. On April 18, 2002, Kauffold's attorney wrote to the Gilroy Office and

requested a copy of the Commissioner's decision. Id. 

On July 2, 2002, Kauffold requested an administrative hearing before an Administrative Law

Judge ("ALJ"). Id. at Ex. 3. Kauffold acknowledged that he had failed to request a hearing within

sixty days of the Commissioner's denial of his reconsideration request as mandated by 20 C.F.R. §

404.933(b). Id. However, Kauffold argued that neither he nor his counsel had received notice that

the Commissioner had denied his reconsideration request. Id. Kauffold asked the ALJ to find that

he had "good cause" for his untimely hearing request. Id. However, the ALJ found that Kauffold

had not shown good cause. Gould Decl. Ex. 5. The ALJ reasoned that "the file shows that a notice

of reconsideration was sent to the claimant and [his] representative" and that "[t]here is no indication

that the notice of reconsideration was returned by the post office." Id.

 On August 8, 2003 Kauffold sought review of the ALJ's dismissal in the Appeals Council. 

Gould Decl. Ex. 6. On September 25, 2004 the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's

dismissal. Gould Decl. Ex. 7. Kauffold now seeks review in this court.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Final Decision Requirement

The Social Security Act allows a claimant to seek review of a "final decision" by the

Commissioner "after a hearing" provided that the claimant does so within sixty days:

Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

made after a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such

decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of

notice of such decision . . . . No findings of fact or decision of the Commissioner

of Social Security shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental

agency except as herein provided.

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

C-03-05244-RMW

DOH 3

42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g). "A claimant's failure to exhaust the procedures set forth in . . . 42 U.S.C. §

405(g) deprives the district court of jurisdiction." Bass v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 872 F.2d 832, 833 (9th

Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Here, Kauffold admits that because he did not challenge the

Commissioner's denial of his reconsideration request within sixty days, he has not received a "final

decision . . . after a hearing" and thus has not exhausted his administrative remedies. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.955(a), 404.968(a)(1). However, Kauffold urges this court to waive the exhaustion

requirement. Courts can do so when a claimant possesses a constitutional claim that is "(1)

collateral to a substantive claim of entitlement, (2) colorable, and (3) 'one whose resolution would

not serve the purposes of exhaustion.'" Anderson v. Babbitt, 230 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quoting Hoye v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 990, 991 (9th Cir. 1992)). This "exception applies to any

colorable constitutional claim of due process violation that implicate[s] a due process right [either]

to a meaningful opportunity to be heard or to seek reconsideration of an adverse benefits

determination." Evans v. Chater, 110 F.3d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation omitted)

(alteration in original). Kauffold argues that he has a procedural due process right to present

evidence to the ALJ in that neither he nor his lawyer received notice that his reconsideration

determination had been denied.

1. Collateral Claim

A constitutional claim arising out of a determination by the Commissioner is "collateral"

when it is sufficiently divorced from the merits of the disability claim. See Boettcher v. Sec. of

Health & Human Servs., 759 F.2d 719, 721 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that plaintiff's claim that the

Secretary violated his due process rights by holding a hearing on all issues rather than the one issue

he was prepared to discuss was "collateral" because it was "procedural, not substantive"). 

Kauffold's due process claim focuses entirely on whether he received proper notice of the

Commissioner's reconsideration determination and therefore is "collateral" to his benefits claim. 

2. Colorable Claim

The "colorable" requirement has two components. First, the plaintiff must show that "refusal

of the relief sought will cause injury which retroactive payments cannot remedy." Cassim v. Bowen,

824 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1987). Kauffold's due process claim meets this requirement. Even if

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

C-03-05244-RMW

DOH 4

Kauffold files a new application and succeeds, the Commissioner has indicated that his benefits will

begin nearly two years after his initial application. Obviously, when the Commissioner has

foreclosed the possibility of Kauffold actually obtaining retroactive payments, retroactive payments

are not available as a remedy.. 

The second prong of the "colorable" test requires that the constitutional claim not be

"insubstantial, immaterial, or frivolous." Boettcher, 759 F.2d at 722. Kauffold's claim has the

requisite modicum of merit. "[A]pplicants for social security disability benefits are entitled to due

process in the determination of their claims." Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1209 (9th Cir.

2001). Courts have routinely held that allegations of defective notice rise to the level of "colorable"

due process violations. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) ("[t]he essence of due

process is the requirement that a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given) notice of the case

against him and opportunity to meet it") (quotation omitted); Giacone v. Schweiker, 656 F.2d 1238,

1244-45 (7th Cir. 1981) (Secretary violated plaintiff's due process rights by not timely informing

him that he could present evidence establishing "good cause" for untimely reconsideration request);

Gipson v. Harris, 633 F.2d 120, 122 (8th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff's claim that Secretary should have

informed his attorney of reconsideration request was "sufficiently colorable to have conferred the

district court with subject matter jurisdiction"); Lodarski v. Bowen, 1988 WL 251994, *4 (N.D. Cal.

1988) ("the courts will exercise jurisdiction over constitutional due process claims only where the

claimant can make a preliminary showing that he or she has not been given adequate notice");

Matlock v. Bowen, 1988 WL 252440, *4 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (opining that plaintiff would have

colorable constitutional claim if he had argued that he did not receive notice in time to appeal

adverse determination). Kauffold asserts that neither he nor his attorney received notice of the

Commisioner's denial of his request for benefits. Although Kauffold has apparently not filed a

sworn statement to that effect, Kauffold's attorney has sworn under penalty of perjury that she did

not receive notice. Gould Decl. Exs. 1, 6. As a result, Kauffold's claim is not "insubstantial,

immaterial, or frivolous" and is "colorable." Boettcher, 759 F.2d at 722. 

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2 The Commissioner denied Kauffold's initial application for disability benefits on

October 20, 2000. Gould Decl. Ex. 1. The Commissioner also denied Kauffold's request for

reconsideration on April 16, 2001. Id. at Ex. 6. 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

C-03-05244-RMW

DOH 5

3. Exhaustion Would Be Futile

The final aspect of the test—that waiver serve the purposes of exhaustion—hinges on

"whether exhaustion would be futile, meaning that nothing could be gained from permitting further

administrative proceedings." Anderson, 230 F.3d at 1164. Agencies may use the exhaustion

requirement to "compile a detailed factual record and apply agency expertise in administering its

own regulations[,] . . . conserve judicial resources . . . [and] . . . correct its own errors through

administrative review." Johnson v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Here, Kauffold has already undergone two administrative hearings on his claim.2

 It thus

does not appear that further compilation of the factual record is necessary. "[C]ourts are empowered

to find futility where the claimant demonstrates that 'there [i]s nothing to be gained from permitting

the compilation of a detailed factual record, or from agency expertise." Briggs, 886 F.2d at 1140

(quotations omitted). Because the facts of Kauffold's claim have been sufficiently developed,

exhaustion would be futile. Accordingly, the court waives the exhaustion requirement and,

therefore, will entertain Kauffold's claim that the sixty-day time limit for filing an action in this court

should not be applied to bar Kauffold's claim for benefits as untimely.

C. Kauffold's Claim Is Properly Dismissed as Untimely

Kauffold did not file his action in this court within sixty days of the Commissioner's denial 

of his reconsideration request. In fact, the denial of Kauffold's reconsideration request was on June

27, 2001 and Kauffold did not request a hearing before an ALJ on that denial until July 2, 2002. On

July 25, 2003 an ALJ dismissed Kauffold's request. After an unsuccessful request of review of the

dismissal, Kauffold filed his claim for benefits in this court on November 20, 2003.

Kauffold asserts that his claim should be considered timely because neither he nor his

counsel received notice of the denial of his request for reconsideration. Counsel asserts she first

received notice of the denial on April 3, 2002 when she called to check on the status of the

reconsideration request that had been filed approximately a year earlier on April 16, 2001.

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3 Notice to claimant alone is sufficient. See Gipson v. Harris, 633 F.2d 120, 122 (8th

Cir. 1980). It is unclear whether claimant himself claims he did not receive notice. He apparently

did not file a declaration or affidavit so stating (at least the court finds no such declaration or

affidavit in its file)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

C-03-05244-RMW

DOH 6

"There is a presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties by government

officials." Red Top Mercury Mines, Inc. v. U.S., 887 F.2d 198, 202-203 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, the

social security claims file reflects that notice of the reconsideration determination was sent to

claimant at his correct address on June 27, 2001 with a copy going to his counsel at her correct

address. Neither notice was returned by the post office. Neither claimant nor his counsel apparently

checked on the status of the claim until April 3, 2002. The claim of claimant's counsel that neither

she nor claimant received notice of the denial is not sufficient cause to overturn the presumption that

notice was sent. Even if claimant and his counsel did not receive notice, no persuasive reason has

been offered to explain their delay in checking on the status of the reconsideration request.3

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss and will enter

judgment in favor of the Commissioner.

DATED: 7/31/06

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

C-03-05244-RMW

DOH 7

Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiff:

Angelina Valle angelina@valle-law.com 

James Hunt Miller jimillaw@rcn.com 

Counsel for Defendant(s):

Sara Winslow sara.winslow2@usdoj.gov 

Leo Montenegro leo.r.montenegro@ssa.gov

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 8/8/06 SPT

 Chambers of Judge Whyte

Case 5:03-cv-05244-RMW Document 13 Filed 08/08/06 Page 7 of 7