Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-01878/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-01878-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:44 Trademark Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAM CELLARS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE WINE GROUP LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-01878-HSG 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 35, 36, 37, 42

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 36 

(“Mot.”), 38 (“Opp.”), and 43 (“Reply”). The parties also filed administrative motions to seal 

portions of their briefs and exhibits. See Dkt. Nos. 35, 37, 42. 1 For the reasons noted below, the 

Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and the parties’ administrative 

motions to seal. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff JaM Cellars, Inc. (“JaM”) filed suit to prevent The Wine Group LLC’s (“TWG”) 

use of “BUTTERY” to describe its FRANZIA “RICH & BUTTERY” brand. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶20. 

JaM produced its first BUTTER Chardonnay in 2009 and released the wine in 2010. Dkt. No. 37-

6 (“Truchard Decl.”) at ¶2. On July 19, 2011, the United States Patent and Trademark Office 

(“USPTO”) granted registration of the “BUTTER” mark to JaM Cellars as U.S. Trademark 

Registration No. 3,999,253. Dkt. No. 36-3, Ex. 23. JaM now seeks to enforce the following

mark:

1 The Court finds this matter is appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the matter is 

deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 16-5.

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TWG developed a “Flavor First” extension of its FRANZIA Chardonnay and Cabernet 

wine varietals in order to appeal to a new consumer base. Dkt. No. 35-4 (“Cooney Decl.”) at ¶¶11, 

13, 15. To this end, TWG developed a new packaging design that both “fit within the existing 

FRANZIA base portfolio design architecture” and “instantly communicate[d] to consumers that 

the flavor-first Chardonnay was different from the FRANZIA base tier Chardonnay.” Id. at ¶15. 

Pictured below is the packaging that was ultimately selected:

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when a “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” if there is evidence in the 

record sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to decide in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. The 

Court views the inferences reasonably drawn from the materials in the record in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 

574, 587–88 (1986), and “may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations,” 

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Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Shakur v. 

Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2008).

The moving party bears both the ultimate burden of persuasion and the initial burden of

producing those portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that show the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the 

moving party will not bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it “must either produce 

evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the 

nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate 

burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 

(9th Cir. 2000). Where the moving party will bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must 

also show that no reasonable trier of fact could not find in its favor. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 

325. In either case, the movant “may not require the nonmoving party to produce evidence 

supporting its claim or defense simply by saying that the nonmoving party has no such evidence.” 

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 F.3d at 1105. “If a moving party fails to carry its initial 

burden of production, the nonmoving party has no obligation to produce anything, even if the 

nonmoving party would have the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Id. at 1102–03.

“If, however, a moving party carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must 

produce evidence to support its claim or defense.” Id. at 1103. In doing so, the nonmoving party 

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. A nonmoving party must also “identify with 

reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 

F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). If a nonmoving party fails to produce evidence that supports its 

claim or defense, courts enter summary judgment in favor of the movant. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. 

at 323.

III. ANALYSIS 

Defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing first that there is no likelihood of 

consumer confusion, and second that even if there were likelihood of confusion, it is entitled to a

fair use defense. See generally Mot. 

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A. Confusion

“To prevail on a claim of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1114, a party ‘must prove: (1) that it has a protectible ownership interest in the mark; and (2) 

that the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause consumer confusion.’” Network 

Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Dep’t of Parks & Recreation v. Bazaar Del Mundo Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006)). It 

is a “well-established principle that because of the intensely factual nature of trademark disputes, 

summary judgment is generally disfavored in the trademark arena.” Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. 

Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotations and 

alterations omitted). Still, courts have granted summary judgment when “[t]he distribution of the

Sleekcraft factors does not raise a material issue of fact regarding likelihood of confusion.” 

Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 634 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Multi Time 

Mach., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 804 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming grant of summary 

judgment where “the undisputed evidence shows that confusion on the part of the inquiring buyer 

is not at all likely.”).

To determine whether the marks are likely to confuse consumers, the Court is guided by 

the following eight Sleekcraft factors:

(1) [T]he similarity of the marks; (2) the strength of the plaintiff’s 

mark; (3) the proximity or relatedness of the goods or services; (4) the 

defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; (5) evidence of actual 

confusion; (6) the marketing channels used; (7) the likelihood of 

expansion into other markets; and (8) the degree of care likely to be 

exercised by purchasers of the defendant’s product.

Fortune Dynamic, Inc., 618 F.3d at 1030 (citing AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-

49 (9th Cir. 1979) abrogated on other grounds by Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 

F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003)). These factors are “helpful guideposts . . . not a scorecard, a beancounter, or a checklist.” Id. at 1031. 

Here, although the Court accepts that there is no evidence of actual confusion by 

consumers, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, material issues of fact 

exist regarding some of the key factors. Specifically, issues of fact with respect to at least three of 

the Sleekcraft factors weigh against summary judgment: “(1) the strength or arbitrariness of the 

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mark; (2) the relatedness (or proximity) of the parties’ goods; and (3) the similarity of the marks.” 

See Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998) (referring to 

the same factors as “pivotal”); Instant Media, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 07-CV-02639-SBA, 

2007 WL 2318948, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007).

i. Strength of the Mark

“The strength of the mark is a key factor with two components: the mark’s recognition in 

the market (i.e., its commercial strength) and the mark’s inherent distinctiveness (i.e., its 

conceptual strength).” Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 432 (9th 

Cir. 2017). The parties do not dispute the commercial strength of Plaintiff’s “BUTTER” mark. 

Instead, Defendant argues that the mark lacks conceptual strength because it is merely descriptive 

of the flavor of some Chardonnays. Mot. at 14–16. “[M]arks are placed in one of five categories, 

ranging from weakest to strongest: generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful,” to 

determine conceptual strength. Fortune Dynamic, Inc., 618 F.3d at 1033 (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff argues that its mark is at least a suggestive mark since “consumers would need to create 

some association in their minds between butter and wine and conclude that term is in reference to 

the taste of the wine or mouthfeel.” Dkt. No. 37-4; see Fortune Dynamic, Inc., 618 F.3d at 1033 

(noting that “suggestive marks . . . require a consumer to ‘use imagination or any type of 

multistage reasoning to understand the mark’s significance’ and automatically receive protection”) 

(quoting Zobmondo Entm’t, LLC v. Falls Media, LLC, 602 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

While it may appear obvious to a wine enthusiast that “butter” is commonly used to 

describe a trait of Chardonnay wine, nothing in the word inherently has anything to do with wine. 

As Plaintiff notes, the dictionary definition of butter points to (1) “a solid emulsion of fat globules, 

air, and water made by churning milk or cream and used as food;” (2) “a buttery substance,” 

defined further as “any of various fatty oils remaining nearly solid at ordinary temperatures” or “a 

creamy food spread;” and (3) flattery. See “Butter,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, MerriamWebster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/butter; see also Fortune Dynamic, Inc., 

618 F.3d at 1033 (“A suitable starting place for attempting to draw the line between a suggestive 

and a descriptive mark is the dictionary.”) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, a jury could find 

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that the mark is most appropriately categorized as suggestive, since it requires a consumer to 

create an association between BUTTER and wine. A suggestive mark is considered strong, so the 

existence of a triable issue of material fact as to this factor similarly weighs in favor of finding a 

triable issue of fact as to likelihood of confusion at this stage.

2

ii. Relatedness or Proximity of the Goods

“When the goods produced by the alleged infringer compete for sales with those of the 

trademark owner, infringement usually will be found if the marks are sufficiently similar that 

confusion can be expected.” Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348. Defendant argues that the parties’ goods 

here are not related because they are sold at different retail price points and in different packaging. 

Mot. at 18–19 (noting that a 750 ml bottle of BUTTER wine retails for about $13–15, while the 

RICH & BUTTERY brand’s five-liter boxed wine retails at a similar price). While the two 

products may be offered in different packaging types, they are same type of product: Chardonnay 

varietal blends that exhibit a buttery flavor profile. JaM also presents evidence that when TWG 

was developing the RICH & BUTTERY brand, an internal document identified JaM’s BUTTER 

wine as a brand target because it “represented [a] leader[] within the space, and it represented an 

opportunity.” Dkt. No. 35-17, Ex. I at 58:5–14. Where even JaM saw the goods as closely 

related, even if the packaging type and price per milliliter may differ, a material dispute of fact 

exists as to the relatedness of the goods.

iii. Similarity of the Marks

Finally, “[s]imilarity of the marks is tested on three levels: sight, sound, and meaning. 

Each must be considered as they are encountered in the marketplace. Although similarity is 

measured by the marks as entities, similarities weigh more heavily than differences.” Sleekcraft, 

599 F.2d at 351. Defendant argues that “RICH & BUTTERY” is used merely to describe its

2 The Court does agree with Defendant’s argument that the mark’s strength is weakened by the use 

of similar marks bearing the same word. See Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 

114 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]hat the marketplace is replete with products using a particular 

trademarked word indicates not only the difficulty in avoiding its use but also, and directly, the 

likelihood that consumers will not be confused by its use.”). Still, at this stage, where Plaintiff has 

presented evidence that “some consumers . . . make no association between the word ‘butter’ and 

wine,” Opp. at 14 (citing Dkt. No. 37-12, Ex. A at 167:14–168:8), the Court cannot say that no 

material dispute of fact exists. 

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Chardonnay wine, while Plaintiff argues that TWG uses “RICH & BUTTERY” as a name for its

flavor first product just as JaM uses the BUTTER mark. Plaintiff points to the large text size used 

for the mark compared to the varietal name or the FRANZIA logo. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶21. The 

ultimate design does make the font of “RICH & BUTTERY” more prominent than the remaining 

text on the box. Further, Plaintiff points to evidence showing TWG referring to “RICH & 

BUTTERY” arguably in the manner of a brand name. See e.g., Dkt. No. 37-38, Ex. II (sell sheets 

listing “RICH & BUTTERY CHARDONNAY”); 37-13, Ex. G (press interview in which TWG’s 

Chief Marketing Officer Jeff Dubiel was quoted as saying “we’re coming out with a new 

Chardonnay called Rich & Buttery”). Thus, notwithstanding Defendant’s arguments, the Court 

must make all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff and assess whether a reasonable jury

could find that the way Defendant used RICH & BUTTERY made it similar to the BUTTER 

mark.

The typefaces of the two marks are distinct, with the RICH & BUTTERY phrase appearing 

in two straight lines in transparent white font, while the BUTTER mark does not appear in a line, 

but instead in black font with different sized letters in a jumbled format. Compare Dkt No. 1 at 

¶21 with ¶25. Both appear with a yellow background. Id. Additionally, both marks appear 

centrally on their respective packaging. Id. While not identical, the sound and meaning of the 

marks are not so dissimilar as to preclude the existence of a triable issue of fact. RICH & 

BUTTERY noticeably contains the word BUTTER in it, and both marks are used to convey the 

same meaning: the flavor profile of the wine.

* * * *

Considering these factors, the Court cannot find that a jury would have to conclude that no 

reasonable consumer is likely to be confused. Instead, material disputed facts exist so as to 

preclude summary judgment. The Court stresses that it is not making any findings of fact or 

conclusions of law at this stage. Further, the Court has not endeavored to identify every disputed 

issue of material fact: the factual issues discussed above are simply examples of why summary 

judgment is not appropriate here.

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B. Fair Use

To establish a fair use defense, a defendant must show that the use: (1) employs the alleged 

mark for purposes other than as a trademark, (2) deploys the term to describe characteristics of its 

goods, and (3) adopts the term in good faith. 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(4). Defendant argues that it 

does not use “buttery” as a mark, and that it instead uses the term to describe its Chardonnay wine. 

Mot. at 22–24. As noted above, issues of fact exist as to whether Defendant uses RICH & 

BUTTERY to describe the wine or as a name for the product. Although the Court finds some 

persuasive force in Defendant’s argument that the use of “buttery” instead of “butter” (an adjective 

instead of a noun) leans in favor of description, the close relationship between the two words and 

the prominence of the “RICH & BUTTERY” precludes summary judgment on the basis of fair 

use. While the Court has some reason to be concerned based on this and other lawsuits that 

Plaintiff may be effectively attempting to monopolize use of the term “buttery” to describe 

Chardonnay, summary judgment is not warranted. It remains to be seen whether judgment as a 

matter of law may be appropriate at or after trial. 

IV. MOTIONS TO SEAL

The parties further filed administrative motions to file under seal portions of their briefs 

and various other filings in this case. See Dkt. Nos. 35, 37, 42. Courts generally apply a 

“compelling reasons” standard when considering motions to seal documents. Pintos v. Pac. 

Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kamakana v. City & Cty. of 

Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). “This standard derives from the common law 

right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and 

documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). “[A] strong presumption in favor of 

access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quotations omitted). To overcome this 

strong presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record attached to a dispositive motion 

must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the 

general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in 

understanding the judicial process” and “significant public events.” Id. at 1178–79 (quotations 

omitted). “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in 

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disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have become a 

vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public 

scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon v. 

Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). “The mere fact that the production of records 

may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, 

without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id.

The Court must “balance[] the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to 

keep certain judicial records secret. After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal 

certain judicial records, it must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual 

basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Id. Civil Local Rule 79-5 

supplements the compelling reasons standard set forth in Kamakana: the party seeking to file a 

document or portions of it under seal must “establish[] that the document, or portions thereof, are 

privileged, protectable as a trade secret or otherwise entitled to protection under the law . . . The 

request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material.” Civil L.R. 79-5(b).

Having carefully considered the pending administrative motions to file under seal, the 

Court finds a significant defect preclude granting these motions. The parties did not narrowly 

tailor their sealing requests, as many sealing requests seek to redact information otherwise 

unredacted in other portions of the same or other filings. For example, Defendant seeks at one 

point to redact “creating a flavor-first Chardonnay,” see Mot. at 3, but the same reference on the 

next page is unredacted, see id. at 4 (“TWG decided that one of its new flavor-first wines would be 

a buttery Chardonnay.”). Similarly, Plaintiff seeks to seal a press interview transcript with TWG’s 

Chief Marketing Officer Jeff Dubiel, while specifically identifying the same interview and 

statements from that interview in the Complaint, which is publicly available. Compare Dkt. No. 1 

at ¶20 with Dkt. No. 37-13, Ex. G. These examples are not meant to be an exhaustive list of the 

parties’ failures; rather they demonstrate the ways in which the parties have not submitted proper 

sealing requests. 

Additionally, the parties provide limited explanation as to why substantial volumes of 

information need to be redacted in this case. Parties point to their CONFIDENTIAL designation, 

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which is typically insufficient to meet the compelling reasons standard. Further, noting that the 

exhibits refer to product development efforts or market research does not explain the need to

redact substantial portions of, or even entire, exhibits. For instance, the parties seek to seal the 

entirety of Exhibit 4 to the Manes Declaration, a portion of the deposition of John Truchard. See 

Dkt. No. 35-19, Ex. 4. However, in this transcript, Truchard recognizes that the underlying flavor 

profile of a buttery Chardonnay has been well known in California for many years, see id. at 

72:23–73:2, which is public knowledge as recognized in Defendant’s summary judgment motion, 

see Mot. at 5. Simply because a representative of one of the companies involved in this litigation 

states a fact, the fact does not automatically become business or marketing strategy. The parties 

must narrowly tailor their requests to actual references to confidential strategy to meet the 

standard. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons noted above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment. The Court further DENIES the parties’ motions to seal. The Court DIRECTS the 

parties to file, within ten days of the date of this order, public versions of the motions and exhibits 

or an amended motion to seal that narrowly tailors the sealing requests as explained above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

4/17/2020

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