Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00653/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00653-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 The court deems the filing date for each of petitioner’s habeas petitions to be the date

reflected on the certificate of service for the respective petitions. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S.

266, 276 (1988) (prisoner’s notice of appeal deemed timely filed on the date it was delivered to

prison staff for delivery to the court); Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2002)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN L. SMITH,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-08-0653 GEB EFB P 

vs.

D.K. SISTO, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a 2005 denial of parole. Respondent moves to dismiss the

petition on the ground that it is untimely. For the reasons explained below, the court finds that

the petition is timely and recommends that the motion be denied.

I. Procedural History

On November 1, 2005, the Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”) found petitioner

unsuitable for parole. Pet., Ex. 1. On July 16, 2006 petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Los

Angeles County Superior Court, challenging the Board’s decision.1

 Resp.’s Mot. to Dism.

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26 (applying mailbox rule to petitions filed in state court).

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(“Mot.”), Ex. A at 5 (copy of petition). On April 5, 2007, the superior court found that the

petition had not been served on the respondent and ordered petitioner to lodge a complete copy

of the petition, along with all exhibits, so that respondent could be served. Mot., Ex. B at 1. The

petitioner complied with that order on May 6, 2007, and on August 20, 2007, the superior court

denied the petition on its merits. Mot., Exs. A, C. Thereafter, petitioner filed a habeas petition

in the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, which was denied on November 2,

2007. Mot., Ex. D. Petitioner then filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court,

which was denied on January 3, 2008. Mot., Ex. E. Petitioner filed the instant petition on March

21, 2008.

II. Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions is set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1):

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

The statute of limitations for habeas petitions challenging parole suitability hearings is based on

§ 2244(d)(1)(D), i.e., the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims could have

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077 (9th

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Cir. 2003). Courts ordinarily deem the factual predicate to have been discovered the day the

decision becomes final, i.e., 120 days after the Board finds a petitioner not suitable for parole. 

See Gray v. Cramer, No. S-07-1928, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25293, at *6-7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27,

2009); Woods v. Salazar, No. CV 07-7197, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64573, at *16-17 (C.D. Cal.

Mar. 23, 2009), adopted by 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64575; Nelson v. Clark, No. 1:08-cv-0114,

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48682, at *7-9 (E.D. Cal. June 23, 2008), adopted in full by 2008 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 71061. 

A. Statutory Tolling

When a petitioner properly files a state post-conviction application, the limitations period

is tolled and remains tolled for the entire time that application is “pending.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(2). “[A]n application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in

compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8

(2000). In California, a properly filed post-conviction application is “pending” during the

intervals between a lower court decision and filing a new petition in a higher court. Carey v.

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). A federal habeas application does not provide a basis for

statutory tolling. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001).

B. Equitable Tolling 

The limitations period may also be equitably tolled where a habeas petitioner establishes

two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). In light of this

pronouncement, the Ninth Circuit has reiterated that the threshold necessary to trigger equitable

tolling is very high, and clarified that equitable tolling only applies where a petitioner shows that

despite diligently pursuing his rights, some external force caused the untimeliness. WaldronRamsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009).

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Petitioner has the burden of showing facts entitling him to statutory and equitable tolling.

Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2002); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065

(9th Cir. 2002).

III. Analysis

Respondent submits that the statute of limitations period began to run on November 1,

2005, the date of petitioner’s parole hearing, when the Board decided that petitioner was

unsuitable for parole. Mot. at 3. As petitioner points out, however, the Board’s decision was

only a proposed decision that did not become final until 120 days after the hearing. Pet’r’s

Opp’n at 2; see also Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). Because there was no final decision until 120

days after the hearing, the factual predicate of petitioner’s claim and the claim itself were not

ripe for review before that date. Accordingly, the limitations period accrued on March 1, 2006,

the day the Board’s decision became final, and petitioner had one year thereafter to file a timely

petition, i.e., until March 1, 2007. Absent tolling, the instant petition is over one year late.

As previously noted, petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Los Angeles County

Superior Court on July 16, 2006. Mot., Ex. A at 5 (copy of petition). On April 5, 2007, the

court directed petitioner to lodge a complete copy of the petition for service on the respondent

and stated that failure to do so would result in dismissal. Mot., Ex. B at 1 (copy of order). On

August 20, 2007, after petitioner lodged a complete copy of the petition, the court denied the

petition in a reasoned decision. Mot., Ex. A at 1-3 (copy of order).

Respondent contends that the habeas petition filed in the Los Angeles County Superior

court was not properly filed until May 6, 2007, the date on which petitioner complied with the

court’s April 5, 2007 order. Mot. at 3. Respondent concludes that by then, the limitations period

had expired and therefore, the instant petition is untimely. Id. at 4. The court disagrees. 

The United States Supreme Court has explained the difference between an application

that is merely “filed” and one that is “properly filed” for purposes of section 2244(d)(2).

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An application is “filed,” as that term is commonly understood, when it is

delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the

official record. And an application is “properly filed” when its delivery and

acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings. 

These usually prescribe, for example, the form of the document, the time limits

upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and the

requisite filing fee.

Artuz, 531 U.S. at 8. Thus, to determine when a state habeas petition was “properly filed” for

purposes of statutory tolling, the court must determine when the state habeas petition “complied

with all filing conditions imposed by California law.” Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1017

(9th Cir. 2009) (unverified petition not properly filed because verification is a condition to filing

under California law).

Here, the court must decide whether service of the petition on the respondent is a

condition to filing under California law. Respondent argues that it is, Mot. at 3; Resp.’s Reply to

Opp’n at 2-3, but submits no authority for this position. Respondent cites to two cases, both of

which fall squarely within the examples listed in Artuz, but do not contemplate the circumstances

presented in this case. As such, they are of little value in resolving the instant issue. In one case,

the court found that the state habeas petition was not properly filed when it was submitted on the

wrong form. In the other case, the court found that the state habeas petition was not properly

filed when the petitioner lodged it in the wrong court. Mot. at 3 (citing Chavis v. Lemarque 382

F.3d 921, 927 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 and Hood

v. Galaza, 47 F. Supp.2d 1144, 1147 (S.D. Cal. 1999)). While these cases are consistent with the

holding in Artuz, they do not further the argument that proper service, like proper form and

lodging in the proper court, are conditions to filing. In essence, respondent argues that the

failure to complete service after the filing of the petition not only warranted either a dismissal or

a denial of the petition, but that the petition be treated as though it was never filed in the first

instance.

In this case, the superior court could not proceed with petitioner’s habeas petition until it

had been served on the respondent. In ordering petitioner to lodge a complete copy of the

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 Petitioner does not argue, and the court need not decide, whether petitioner is also

entitled to statutory tolling for the period during which his two subsequent state post-conviction

applications were pending. 

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petition, the court cited to California Penal Code § 1475, which requires that an application for a

writ of habeas corpus be served on the responding party “and no application for the writ can be

heard without proof of service.” Mot., Ex. B. at 1; see also In re Application of Moffett, 13

Cal.App.2d 741, 742 (1936) (“proof of due service is a necessary prerequisite to a consideration

of the [habeas] petition on its merits, and in the absence of such proof the court is without power

to proceed.”). Clearly, California law requires that a habeas petition be properly served before a

court can consider the petition on its merits. However, there is no indication that proper service

is a filing condition imposed by California law, such that defective service would render a

petition improperly filed for purposes of section 2244(d)(2). See Matthews v. Fisher, No. 1:08-

cv-1691, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10968, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2009) (where superior court

ordered petitioner to serve copy of petition on respondent, and to submit a complete copy of

parole hearing transcript, application was not improperly filed), adopted in full by, 2009 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 10968 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2009); see also Artuz, 531 U.S. at 11 (holding that state

procedural bars, while conditions for obtaining relief, are not conditions to filing, and therefore,

do not render a state petition “improperly filed” for purposes of section 2244(d)(2)). 

The court finds that petitioner properly filed his state habeas petition on July 16, 2006,

notwithstanding the fact that petitioner failed to lodge a complete copy of the petition for service

on the respondent. Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling from July 16, 2006, the

date the petition was properly filed in the superior court, to August 20, 2007, the date the petition

was denied. See Mot., Ex. A. As of July 16, 2006, 137 days of the one year limitations period

had expired. With tolling for the 400 days that the superior court petition was pending, the

limitations period was extended from March 1, 2007 to April 4, 2008.2

 The instant petition, filed

March 21, 2008, is therefore timely. 

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IV. Conclusion 

Petitioner has shown he is entitled to statutory tolling and that the instant petition is

therefore timely.

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s July 15, 2009 motion to dismiss be denied;

2. Respondent be directed to file and serve an answer and not a motion in response to

petitioner’s application within 60 days from the date of any order adopting these

recommendations, see Rule 4, Fed. R. Governing § 2254 Cases, and further be directed that the

response shall be accompanied by any and all transcripts or other documents relevant to the

determination of the issues presented in the application, see Rules 4, 5, Rules Governing Section

2254 Cases; and 

3. Petitioner be directed that his traverse, if any, shall be filed and served within 30 days

of service of an answer.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 9, 2010.

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