Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02709/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02709-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT G. RUSSELL, AK4805,

Petitioner,

 vs.

ROBERT W. FOX, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 15-2709 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND A CERTIFICATE

OF APPEALABILITY

(ECF No. 23)

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Santa Cruz County Superior Court of 

various offenses arising from a traffic accident in which, while driving drunk, he

struck a pedestrian who was walking in the road with his wife. The jury

specifically found petitioner guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and

causing injury, driving with a proscribed blood-alcohol content and causing

injury, leaving the scene of an accident, misdemeanor driving under the influence

of alcohol, misdemeanor driving with a proscribed blood-alcohol content, and

failure to appear in court. Following a bench trial, the court found that petitioner

had six prior strike convictions and six prior serious felony convictions and, on

December 2, 2011, sentenced him to fifty years to life in state prison pursuant to

California’s Three Strikes Law. 

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Petitioner appealed, but the California Court of Appeal affirmed the

judgment of conviction and the Supreme Court of California denied review. 

Petitioner then sought collateral relief by way of habeas corpus petitions in the

state courts. The Santa Cruz County Superior Court denied his habeas petition on

December 8, 2014, as did the California Court of Appeal on February 6, 2015

and Supreme Court of California on May 20, 2015. 

Petitioner then filed the instant federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Per order filed on July 10, 2015, the court found that the

petition appeared to state cognizable claims under § 2254, when liberally

construed, and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus

should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer to the order to show cause

and petitioner has filed a traverse. 

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the case as

follows:

On September 25, 2009, someone driving a red Ford Mustang

struck and injured Om Anand, who was walking with his wife in a

bicycle lane. The person driving the Mustang drove away after the

accident. 

After the vehicle had struck Anand, a witness saw the car roll onto

a traffic island and come to a stop. At that time another witness

noticed the car, which was sitting atop the island. This second

witness was not aware the car had struck someone, but he did

notice that the windshield was damaged on the passenger side. The

second witness glanced inside the car and later told police he

discerned that the driver was a dark-complexioned white or Latino

man, 30 to 35 years old, with long, dark, wavy or curly hair. He

also told police the driver’s hair was down to his ears and neck and

that he may have had a mustache. His view of the driver was

obscured because it was dark and the driver was talking on a cell

phone, which partly blocked his view of the driver’s face, but he

was able to clearly discern that the driver was the car’s only

occupant.

At trial, the second witness testified he could not discern the

driver’s race or age as he glimpsed inside the car in the aftermath of

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Defendant is African-American. He was 53 years old at the time of the

accident and had short hair.

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the accident, notwithstanding he had previously told a defense

investigator the driver was African-American.1

After sitting atop the traffic island for a short period of time, the

driver drove the car to a fire station two blocks away, and parked in

such a way as to block the path of an emergency response vehicle

that was responding to the accident scene. Firefighters, including a

fire captain who testified at trial, noticed that the driver of the car

was an African-American man; the captain testified that the driver

appeared to be looking at a cell phone or other handheld electronic

device. The captain also discerned that the man was lightcomplexioned with short hair and a thin black mustache, but he

could not identify defendant in a photographic lineup. 

About an hour after the accident, a Santa Cruz police officer saw

the accident-involved vehicle. It was parked. As the officer pulled

over, the driver initially drove away, but stopped at the officer’s

command. The driver was defendant; he was the car’s only

occupant. His speech was slurred and his eyes were “sleepy

looking.” He staggered out of the car, and, unable to maintain his

balance, fell over. He twice claimed the cause of the accident was

that someone had collided with him; he used an expletive to

characterize the purported offending driver.

Field sobriety tests showed defendant had a “high level of

impairment,” and a later breath test at the police station showed a

blood-alcohol concentration of 0.20 grams per deciliter, more than

double the legal limit (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (b), 23153,

subd. (b)). An expert witness qualified to give testimony on breathbased blood-alcohol testing testified that at the time of the accident

defendant’s blood-alcohol concentration would have been 0.23 or

0.24 grams per deciliter, which the jury would later be instructed

was about triple the legal limit. 

When defendant later went to retrieve personal belongings from his

impounded car, he told the officer who helped with that process

that he had been driving while intoxicated at the time of the

accident and thought he had struck someone during the incident,

but his memory of the accident was clouded by the degree of his

intoxication. At a Department of Motor Vehicles hearing at which

defendant sought to have his driver license restored, he told the

hearing officer that he had consumed three beers and three shots of

a liqueur before the collision, but that he had no recollection of the

accident itself. 

On the failure-to-appear charge, a court supervisor testified that

defendant disobeyed a court order by failing to appear in court on

July 7, 2010. 

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The defense did not dispute that the car belonged to defendant, that

it (the car) was involved in the hit-and-run accident, or that

defendant was drunk at the time of the accident. The defense did,

however, dispute that defendant was the person driving the car, a

necessary element for conviction on the intoxication-based and

evasion offenses alleged in counts one through five. With regard to

the failure-to-appear charge, the defense did not dispute that

defendant failed to appear in court as ordered, but disputed that his

failure was willful, a necessary element of that offense. 

People v. Russell, No. H037744, 2014 WL 1348813, at **2–3 (Cal. Ct. App. 6th

Dist. Apr. 7, 2014) (ECF No. 20-37) (footnote renumbered).

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘reasonable

application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

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identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court

making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme

Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive

authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s

holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

“reasonably” applied. Id.

B. Claims & Analysis

Petitioner raises four cognizable claims for relief under § 2254: (1) the

trial court’s failure to hold a hearing on his written request to substitute counsel

amounted to a denial of his right to counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment;

(2) the trial court’s abuse of its discretion in refusing to dismiss petitioner’s prior

strike convictions amounted to a violation of due process and resulted in a cruel

and unusual sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (3) defense

counsel’s failure to argue, present evidence, and allow petitioner to testify that he

did not receive seven prior strike convictions amounted to ineffective assistance

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Marsden requires the trial court to permit a criminal defendant requesting

substitution of counsel to specify the reasons for his request and generally to hold a

hearing. This California rule substantially parallels the one prescribed by the Ninth

Circuit. See Chavez v. Pulley, 623 F. Supp. 672, 687 n.8 (E.D. Cal. 1985).

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of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment; and (4) petitioner’s sentence is

unauthorized under the Supreme Court of California’s decision in People v.

Vargas, 59 Cal. 4th 635 (2014).

1. Denial of Right to Counsel

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing on his

written request to substitute counsel amounted to a denial of his right to counsel

under the Sixth Amendment. Pet. (ECF No. 1) at 6. The claim is without merit.

The record shows that petitioner made several motions/requests to

substitute counsel under People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970),2

 and that the

trial court conducted more than one hearing. The California Court of Appeal

summarized the relevant procedural background as follows:

On July 6, 2010, defendant made his first Marsden motion

during motions in limine. The court conducted a Marsden

hearing. Defendant told the court his defense counsel was “a

wonderful man” but he wanted a different lawyer who would

undertake further investigation of his case. He asserted that

any automobile incident in which he might be involved had

been preceded by “racial overtones” in the form of poor

service afforded to him and his wife at a bar earlier that day. 

He suspected someone had doctored his drink at the bar,

making his intoxicated state not entirely voluntary. He

wanted his attorney to research the history of any racial

incidents at the bar. He also complained that his bloodalcohol concentration test had not been signed by the police

officer who administered it.

Counsel replied to the trial court that his investigator had been

to the bar and contacted the employees who were working on

the night of the accident. None of them remembered

defendant, and counsel knew of no past race-based incidents

at the bar. He also told the court that defendant wanted to

move for a change of venue and a continuance, but he had

explained to defendant that he saw no reason to bring these

motions. Counsel further told the court that defendant was

concerned to reach a plea agreement, and that counsel had

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been trying to negotiate one, but so far the parties had not

been able to reach agreement. 

The trial court found defendant had not shown grounds to

substitute counsel and denied the motion. 

On January 5, 2011, defendant made a second Marsden

motion. That same day, the trial court conducted a Marsden

hearing on the second motion, at which it considered a list of

complaints defendant had about his counsel. The court began

by reciting the list: 

“THE COURT: [¶] . . . I’m going to read it out loud. 

“‘Counsel did not diligently and actively participate in the full

and effective preparation of my case or investigate carefully

all defenses of fact or law that may have been available.

“‘Counsel did not confer with me without due delay and as

necessary to elicit matters of defense.

“‘He did not promptly advise me of my rights and take all

actions necessary to preserve them.

“‘He did not make appropriate motions to suppress evidence. 

“‘I was denied the effective assistance of counsel by reason of

counsel’s failure to perform according to the standards

imposed,’ parentheses, ‘as by inadequate pretrial preparation.

“‘Counsel failed to advise me of my status, which deprived

me of my right to meaningfully participate in my defense by

moving to have counsel replaced or by representing myself. 

“‘No defense strategy has been formulated’—I’m not sure this

is the right word: ‘. . . are discussed at this late stage. 

“‘Counsel failed to object or move to strike hearsay testimony

introduced by the prosecution. 

“‘Counsel did not file any pretrial motions. 

“‘Counsel did not file any preliminary hearing motions,

discovery motions, informal and formal points and authorities. 

“‘Counsel did not investigate carefully all defenses of fact and

law, and by not doing that, it resulted in withdrawing a crucial

defense from the case. 

“‘I requested maintenance and accuracy records for

Breathalyzer machines and had they been properly serviced or

calibrated. Officer also did not sign off on the Breathalyzer

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testing. I was told . . . it was nothing. I’ve learned that the

Breathalyzer test could be inadmissible evidence. 

“‘Counsel never questioned hearsay statements by an officer

who had only two years on the force. It was never established

if he had completed a training course certified by the

Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training. . . . 

The average officer needs at least five years law enforcement

experience, plus the POST training, and the officer must be

more than just a reader and have sufficient knowledge of the

crime or circumstances under which out-of-court statements

were made so as to meaningfully assist the magistrate in

assessing the reliability of his statements. This was not

challenged. 

“‘Counsel was advised I was asleep in the car when arrested,

not driving. Counsel told me no one would believe me

because I was drunk and a police officer said I was. 

“‘Counsel could have filed formal discovery points and

authorities in support of a motion for discovery. I would have

had access to radio transmissions and other evidence.

“‘I brought up moral turpitude involving police officers under

Brady versus Maryland [(1963) 373 U.S. 83], and he acted

like he was not aware of this case. 

“‘I was charged with two crimes. Now I have ten, and I have

no idea how I got them. 

“‘Counsel advised me there was no difference between

actually driving a car drunk or being asleep in the car. There

is a difference. 

“‘I was told by counsel there was no motion I could file to

stop what was happening in court.

 “‘On December 9th, at a bail hearing, the DA said

eyewitnesses said the driver of the car was black. At the

preliminary hearing, the first on-scene officer also lied about

eyewitness testimony, until the transcript was read back to

him, and he then stated eyewitnesses said the driver of the car

on September 25th, ‘09 was white, and that was what other

witnesses had said, and that information was reported to

dispatch for APB [all-points bulletin]. 

“‘This is a point where Counsel has failed to declare prejudice

against me. One of these men [is] lying about the eyewitness

testimony. 

“‘Counsel did fail to subpoena witnesses favorable to my

defense. He deprived me of testimony critical to my defense. 

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“‘Counsel has failed to impeach witnesses. He has not

presented any evidence at a motion or a writ hearing critical

to my defense. 

“‘Counsel has failed to declare prejudice against me at any

time and, due to said failure, has taken on the role of a

surrogate prosecutor against my interests. 

“‘The record should clearly show that Counsel failed to

research applicable law, and it has deprived me of a resolution

of critical factual issues supporting my primary defense, and

nothing he has done has been based on a tactical decision or

judgment. 

“‘I’m entitled to relief. I have shown Counsel has not

provided adequate representation. Therefore, I feel I am

entitled to the relief prayed for.’ 

“Did I read that correctly, Mr. Russell? 

“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 

“THE COURT: All right. Now, let’s go through this.” 

After a lunch break, defendant withdrew his Marsden motion,

stating he had “overreacted” in presenting these complaints. 

He “apologize[d] for wasting the Court’s time.” 

Between February 4, 2011, and the start of trial on April 19,

2011, defendant wrote a number of handwritten letters to the

trial court that are included in the clerk’s transcript. Three of

the letters included a request for new counsel and/or

complaints about counsel. These letters were dated February

21, March 14, and March 30, 2011.

In his February 21, 2011 letter, defendant, citing Marsden, asked the trial court to replace his counsel. He asserted

counsel had failed to confer with him on defense strategy and

had not moved for dismissal of his case based on purportedly

perjured testimony given at two hearings even though he

(defendant) knew the prosecutor had presented some of that

testimony knowing it to be perjurious. We note that these

assertions had been included in the second Marsden motion

the trial court had begun to consider before defendant

withdrew the motion. 

On March 14, 2011, defendant wrote another letter to the

court, which began: “I have yet again asked for separation

from my lawyer. This is not a ploy to hinder [or] distract

from the case at hand, but my life as well my family[’]s lives

are at stake and I have not received a rational understanding

of my lawyer[’]s actions.” Defendant essentially repeated his

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written allegations from February 21 and raised an additional

allegation that the court had also recited in the hearing on his

second Marsden motion—that the prosecution had

deliberately failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to the

defense. 

On March 30, 2011, defendant again wrote to the court,

asserting, as he had during the hearing on his second Marsden

motion, that defense counsel, in failing to “declare prejudice

and/or conflict,” had “taken on the role of a surrogate

prosecutor.” He also asserted that his counsel had failed to

challenge a 1990 strike prior on the ground that his guilty plea

in that case was defective. He asked the court to dismiss the

case entirely. 

On April 7, 2011, defendant was present in court. The trial

court proceeded by stating that defendant had sent it more

letters. It provided copies of some of these letters to counsel,

although the record is not clear which ones were provided. 

The trial court told defendant it was not in a position to reply

to either correspondence or questions. Defendant stated he

‘just wanted to bring it to the court’s attention.” The court

noted that defense counsel had filed a motion to set aside the

information and stated, “that takes care of the issues that

[defendant] wrote me about giving his concerns. We’re going

to have a hearing on the matter. We’re going to have

argument on the law and the Court has the transcript which

has been provided.” 

Defendant did not interpose an objection to the trial court’s

statement that the issues he had raised in his various items of

correspondence had been resolved. A fortiori, he did not

mention Marsden after the court spoke. 

Eight days later, the trial court conducted a hearing on the

motion to set aside the information and denied it.

In August through October of 2011, after defendant had been

convicted and was awaiting sentencing, he wrote more letters,

both to the trial court and to his counsel. One letter to the

court, dated August 4, 2011, states, “I have asked for new

counsel[; I’ve outlined] my reasons in prior letters.” The

letter stated that defendant had been “sadly deceived by

counsel” and that he cannot “trust counsel’s tactics” or his

“integrity.” In another letter, file-stamped August 22, 2011,

defendant complained further about counsel and moved for a

post-conviction Marsden hearing. He maintained defense

counsel had failed to adduce exculpatory evidence at trial and

to ask for a favorable jury instruction. He concluded that

because of counsel’s “past ineffective assistance we have

become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that

ineffective representation will continue.” Defendant renewed

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Defendant does not raise a claim about the post-conviction Marsden

proceedings. We describe them here to provide context. 

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his complaints about counsel in letters dated August 29 and

September 30, 2011, citing Marsden in the August 29 letter.

On October 28, 2011, the trial court conducted a third

Marsden hearing—this time to address defendant’s postconviction complaints.3

 Defendant asserted that defense

counsel had presented no evidence despite his of risk of

receiving a life sentence. He asserted that his wife could have

supplied exculpatory evidence. He also asserted that counsel

did not tell him about the defense strategy. Finally, he

complained, in essence, that counsel failed to summon a

potential witness who would have offered exculpatory

evidence relating to the failure-to-appear charge.

The trial court denied defendant’s motion. It found that

“there was clearly effective representation at the trial.” It

explained its reasoning: “Tactical decisions are for the

attorney to present. You may consider the evidence onesided, Mr. Russell. That’s probably because it was

overwhelming[ly] against you, and the fact that you’re

disappointed and you would want a different outcome does

not mean in any way that [counsel] was not an effective

advocate on your behalf. He was . . . . unrelenting . . . but the

truth is the evidence against you was overwhelming, and

although you consider drunk driving to be an accident, the

law does not consider it to be an accident, and although you

were very focused on what you hoped would be a civil

settlement with the victim such that you wouldn’t have

criminal charges, that doesn’t mean that that’s admissible

evidence or that the charges against you could have been

dismissed or that [counsel] did not pursue actively on your

behalf every opening that he saw with respect to creating

doubt on behalf of the different eyewitnesses and these kinds

of things.

“With respect to the failure to appear and return to court, I

think those circumstantial inferences were overwhelming as

well. You failed to appear in the middle of your last jury trial,

as the Court recalls. [¶] I do recall [counsel] presenting some

evidence to the jury on this. There were some stipulations, if

I recall, to some of the minutes, I believe.”

 

Following counsel’s agreement with the trial court that he had

presented evidence on the failure-to-appear charge, the court

summarized its findings: “So to the extent that he was able to

produce something on your behalf, he certainly did, and I’m

not going to find that there’s been any suggestion that he did

not vigorously and more than adequately represent you at

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your jury trial.” It then denied defendant’s post-conviction

Marsden motion. 

Russell, 2014 WL 1348813, at **3–7 (footnote renumbered).

The denial of a motion to substitute counsel may implicate a defendant’s

Sixth Amendment right to counsel and be properly considered on federal habeas

review. Bland v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 20 F.3d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994),

overruled on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc). When a defendant moves to substitute counsel, the trial court should

make an appropriate inquiry into the grounds for such a motion and rule on the

merits of the motion before the case goes forward. See Schell, 218 F.3d at 1025;

Bland, 20 F.3d at 1475–76. But regardless of whether the trial court ruled on the

motion or failed to do so, the inquiry for a federal habeas court is whether the

trial court’s error “actually violated [the defendant’s] constitutional rights in that

the conflict between [the defendant] and his attorney had become so great that it

resulted in a total lack of communication or other significant impediment that

resulted in turn in an attorney-client relationship that fell short of that required by

the Sixth Amendment.” Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026.

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claim that the trial

court’s failure to hold a hearing on his written request to substitute counsel

amounted to a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel:

We find no Marsden error. As described, defendant gave the trial

court a long list of complaints—the court recited 26 itemized

complaints—and it held a hearing on them, with defendant

ultimately withdrawing them and apologizing for undue

consumption of court time. Defendant’s subsequent written

complaints renewed those he had already withdrawn, and when the

court said, on April 7, 2011, that it had taken note of his

correspondence and believed a pending hearing would resolve his

concerns, he remained silent, thereby acquiescing to that ruling. 

“A trial court errs under Marsden by not affording a criminal

defendant the opportunity to state all his reasons for dissatisfaction

with his appointed attorney. [Citations.] On the other hand, a

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Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (criminal defendants generally

entitled to represent themselves at trial).

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defendant is not entitled to keep repeating and renewing complaints

that the court has already heard.” (People v. Vera (2004) 122 Cal.

App. 4th 970, 980.) “Defendant had been allowed to air his

complaints [about counsel] . . . . His renewal, one week later, of a

similar accusation did not compel the court to conduct an

additional hearing under Marsden” (People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.

4th 41, 104); “the trial court was not required to afford a hearing

each time defendant made the same accusations” (ibid.). 

To hold differently would be to risk allowing creative defendants

to engage in gamesmanship by means of “‘proclivity to substitute

counsel’” (People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal. 4th 165, 194)—i.e.,

by making repeated and repetitious Marsden motions. (See People

v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal. App. 3d 744, 762, fn. 9 [“This court is not

oblivious to the ‘game’ quality of many Marsden/Faretta

proceedings.”].) Similar problems have arisen before, not just in

People v. Vera, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th 970 and People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th 41. (See People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693,

719–721, disapproved on other grounds in People v. McKinnon

(2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 637–638, 643; People v. Barnett (1998) 17

Cal.4th 1044, 1082, 1090, 1103; People v. Gallego (1990) 52

Cal.3d 115, 158.) The situation in Clark points to the abuse

inherent in repetitive Marsden claims: “Defendant’s [interrelated

Marsden, Faretta,

2

 and ineffective assistance of counsel] claims

that counsel was ‘unprepared’ were never substantiated. 

Defendant’s own writings suggest that the claims of

unpreparedness were an attempt to inject error into the record. 

Moreover, although defendant claimed that counsel neglected to

interview ‘hundreds’ of witnesses, he failed to identify any such

witness or to demonstrate any relevant testimony these unidentified

witnesses might offer. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that

defendant would have been satisfied with the services of any

attorney appointed to represent him. [¶] In this case, any conflict

between defendant and his attorney was manufactured by

defendant himself. He refused to accept that there were any matters

within the province of counsel to decide. He desired to control all

trial decisions and to make his attorneys subservient to his whims. 

He has not shown the impairment of the right to effective

assistance of counsel or that any lack of communication was the

fault of anyone but himself.” (Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 118.) 

A trial court should acknowledge receipt of a Marsden motion or

other communication raising complaints about counsel in a way

that implicates Marsden, if only to state that the motion or

communication is repetitive, vexatious, or otherwise barred for

procedural reasons. Doing so preserves for the record that the

court was aware of the issue. The court here expressly

acknowledged receipt of defendant’s letters. 

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There is a significant question whether the correspondence

received by the court in this case properly invoked defendant’s

Marsden rights. But even if defendant was raising another

Marsden motion on April 7, 2011—something that is not clear,

inasmuch as he never mentioned Marsden on that day—the court

engaged in a direct colloquy with defendant about the concerns

raised in his letters. As noted, defendant stated he “just wanted to

bring it to the court’s attention.” The court responded to defendant,

commenting that defense counsel had filed a motion to set aside the

information. It stated, “that takes care of the issues that

[defendant] wrote me about giving his concerns. We’re going to

have a hearing on the matter. We’re going to have argument on the

law and the Court has the transcript which has been provided.” 

This colloquy indicates that either defendant abandoned any

motion he may have made, as he had done with his second

Marsden motion, or he accepted the court’s disposition of any such

motion, since his underlying concerns had been addressed. It is not

as if defendant was unaware of his Marsden rights on April 7,

2011. He had already made two Marsden motions and he would

make another one months later, following his conviction. And it is

not as if the court was inattentive to defendant’s concerns about

trial counsel. It repeatedly addressed his Marsden motions, before

and after his conviction. We find no error. 

As for defendant’s constitutional claim, “‘[R]ejection on the merits

of a claim that the trial court erred ... necessarily leads to rejection

of the newly applied constitutional “‘gloss’” as well. No separate

constitutional discussion is required in such cases, and we therefore

provide none.’” (People v. Rivas (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1410,

1435.)

People v. Russell, 2014 WL 1348813, at **14–16 (footnote renumbered).

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s claim that the

trial court’s failure to hold a hearing on his written request to substitute counsel

amounted to a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The record amply supports the state appellate court’s

determination that the trial court’s inquiry into petitioner’s complaints about

counsel was adequate—the trial court considered petitioner’s various complaints

in a July 6, 2010 Marsden hearing during motions in limine, an April 7, 2011

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Marsden hearing in conjunction with a motion to set aside the information and an

October 28, 2011 Marsden hearing after petitioner had been convicted by the

jury, and denied them for lack of merit. Cf. Schell, 218 F.3d at 1025 (Sixth

Amendment requires no more than an “appropriate inquiry” and a ruling “on the

merits”). The record also supports the state appellate court’s ultimate rejection

of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim because there is no evidence that “the

conflict between [petitioner] and his attorney had become so great that it resulted

in a total lack of communication or other significant impediment that resulted in

turn in an attorney-client relationship that fell short of that required by the Sixth

Amendment.” Id. at 1026. Instead, as the trial court found after its third

Marsden hearing, petitioner’s complaints about counsel merely focused on

petitioner’s disagreements with counsel’s tactical decisions and did not indicate a

significant breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. This is not enough to

establish an irreconcilable conflict resulting in the constructive denial of 

assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 886–87 (9th

Cir. 2007) (no irreconcilable conflict where defense counsel refused to pursue

defendant’s suggested trial strategy that counsel did not believe would succeed,

and defendant and second-chair attorney were communicating with each other). 

Nor is petitioner’s mere speculation that his preferred tactical decisions would

have fared better than counsel’s enough to establish that he was prejudiced by his

conflict with counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984)

(ineffectiveness claims require that petitioner affirmatively prove prejudice). 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim that the effective

denial of his written request to substitute counsel amounted to a denial of his

right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

2. Abuse of Discretion

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4

In Romero, the Supreme Court of California held that a trial court retains its

power under California Penal Code section 1385 to strike a prior conviction for

purposes of the Three Strikes Law. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 518-31. 

16

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s abuse of discretion in refusing to

dismiss his prior strike offenses under People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13

Cal. 4th 497 (1996),4

 amounted to a violation of due process and resulted in a

cruel and unusual sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Pet. at 8. 

a. Due Process

Although the constitutional guarantee of due process applies at

sentencing, see Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977), it is well

established that a state court’s errors in the interpretation or application of state

sentencing laws generally are not cognizable on federal habeas review, see

McGuire v. Estelle, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). “Absent a showing of

fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its own sentencing laws

does not justify federal habeas relief.” Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th

Cir. 1994). 

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his right to due process when

it failed to exercise its discretion to dismiss the prior strikes associated with his

1990 conviction because that conviction was dismissed under California Penal

Code section 1385. Pet. at 8. But the record makes clear that petitioner’s 1990

conviction was not dismissed; rather, after petitioner pleaded guilty to assault

with intent to commit rape, first degree burglary, attempted murder, aggravated

assault, and false imprisonment, he was sentenced to four years incarceration for

assault with intent to commit rape and the sentence for the other four counts for

which he was convicted was stayed under California Penal Code section 654. 

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5

Petitioner suggests that the October 23, 1990 abstract of judgment lodged into

the record by respondent (ECF No. 20-7 at 48–49) must be fabricated because a tenpage report ran by the San Francisco public defender’s office on August 6, 2014, that

petitioner filed as addendum number two to his traverse (ECF No. 24-2 at 1–9), shows

that his 1990 plea provided for the dismissal of all charges after completion of his

sentence. But petitioner filed in support of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus the

exact same October 23, 1990 abstract of judgment he now claims is false (see ECF No.

1 at 109–110) and the August 6, 2014 report does not support his contention that all

charges associated with his 1990 conviction were dismissed. The report instead

supports the conclusion above that, as part of a plea agreement, petitioner pleaded

guilty to assault with intent to commit rape, first degree burglary, attempted murder,

aggravated assault and false imprisonment in exchange for a partially stayed sentence

and the dismissal of other charges and allegations in the criminal complaint. 

Petitioner’s purported claim of fabrication of evidence/presentation of false evidence is

wholly without merit.

6

Nor can it be said that the state court’s refusal to exercise its discretion to

dismiss any of the prior strikes associated with petitioner’s other prior convictions

amounted to a misapplication of state sentencing law and fundamental unfairness. After

all, the California Court of Appeal’s determination that the trial court properly refused

to dismiss any of the prior strikes under state sentencing law is binding on this court,

see Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005), and the seriousness of all of the prior

strikes more than justifies the trial court’s decision not to dismiss any of them. 

17

See Oct. 23, 1990 Abstract of Judgment (ECF No. 20-7 at 48-49) at 1–2.5

 Under

the circumstances, it simply cannot be said that the trial court’s refusal to

exercise its discretion to dismiss the prior strikes associated with petitioner’s

1990 conviction for assault with intent to commit rape, first degree burglary,

attempted murder, aggravated assault and false imprisonment amounted to a

misapplication of state sentencing law, and much less to fundamental unfairness

in violation of due process.6

 Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on

his abuse of sentencing discretion/due process claim. Accord Miller v. Vasquez,

868 F.2d 1116, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 1989) (whether assault with deadly weapon

qualifies as “serious felony” under California’s sentence enhancement provisions

is question of state sentencing law and does not present constitutional claim);

Moore v. Chrones, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1040 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (claim that trial

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court abused its discretion in declining to dismiss prior strike conviction is

challenge to state court’s application of state sentencing laws and “does not

create a federal question cognizable in federal habeas review”).

b. Eighth Amendment

Petitioner claims that his sentence of fifty years to life

imprisonment, pursuant to California’s Three Strikes Law, constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment because the sentence

is disproportionate to his crimes and shocks the conscience. Pet. at 8. 

Petitioner’s claim is without merit.

“The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between

crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly

disproportionate’ to the crime.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003). A

sentence will be found grossly disproportionate only in “exceedingly rare” and

“extreme” cases. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003).

In determining whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate under a

recidivist sentencing statute, such as California’s Three Strikes Law, the court

looks to whether such an “extreme sentence is justified by the gravity of [an

individual’s] most recent offense and criminal history.” Ramirez v. Castro, 365

F.3d 755, 768 (9th Cir. 2004). In Ramirez, the Ninth Circuit held that a sentence

of twenty-five years to life upon conviction of petty theft with prior convictions

was grossly disproportionate to the current crime where the previous two strikes

did not involve violence and where both strikes were the result of one negotiated

plea resulting in a one-year county jail sentence. 365 F.3d at 767–770. The

court noted that this was the “extremely rare case that gives rise to an inference

of gross disproportionality.” Id. at 770. 

By contrast, in Rios v. Garcia, the Ninth Circuit held that a sentence of

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twenty-five years to life upon conviction of petty theft with prior convictions was

not grossly disproportionate. Rios v. Garcia, 390 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.

2004). The Ninth Circuit distinguished Ramirez because the defendant in Rios

struggled with a guard to prevent apprehension, his prior convictions of robbery

“involved the threat of violence, because his cohort used a knife,” and because

the defendant had a lengthy criminal history. Id.; accord Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76

(upholding sentence of two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life for

recidivist convicted of two counts of petty theft with a prior theft conviction and

who had four prior strike convictions for burglary).

In the instant case, petitioner was sentenced pursuant to California’s Three

Strikes Law, which is triggered when a defendant is convicted of a felony, and he

has suffered one or more prior “serious” or “violent” felony convictions. See Cal.

Penal Code § 667(e)(2)(A). Under California’s Three Strikes Law at the time of

petitioner’s sentencing, any felony conviction could constitute the third strike and

subject a defendant to a term of twenty-five years to life in prison. See Andrade,

538 U.S. at 67.

Petitioner’s triggering offenses were driving under the influence of alcohol

and causing injury, leaving the scene of the accident, and failure to appear in

court, all properly charged as felonies under California law. See Cal. Veh. Code

§ 23153(a) & (b); Cal. Veh. Code § 20001(a); Cal. Pen. Code § 1320.5. After a

bench trial, the trial court found that petitioner had suffered six prior convictions

that qualified as strikes under the Three Strikes Law. See Dec. 8, 2011 Minute

Order (ECF No. 20-7 at 13–14) at 2. He was sentenced to two consecutive

twenty- five years to life terms—or a fifty years to life term—because the failure

to appear charge involved different facts and occurred on a separate occasion. 

See Cal. Penal Code § 667(c)(6). 

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The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s Eighth Amendment

claim on the merits. See People v. Russell, 2014 WL 1348813, at **13–14. The

court noted that the six prior convictions the trial court found qualified as strikes

stem from petitioner’s “appalling and depraved victimizations of a six-year-old

girl and an 85-year-old woman.” Id. at *13. The 85-year-old woman “was lucky

to survive [petitioner’s] sexual assault and strangulation of her,” which he

committed only “three days after completing parole for molesting a six-year-old

neighbor in 1977.” Id. at *10. The court added that the probation report lists “15

felony offenses and six misdemeanors that [petitioner] has accrued over decades

of inability to conform to the law.” Id. at *13. But even after all that, “he created

new victims in the persons of Om Anand and his wife.” Id. Because petitioner

“has spent a lifetime proving himself to be a danger to others,” the court

concluded that his sentence—“which as a practical matter amounts to

imprisonment with very little possibility of parole during his lifetime—is not

disproportionate under the state-law test . . . or the federal constitutional tests.” 

Id. 

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s Eighth

Amendment claim was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Based on the

gravity of petitioner’s triggering offenses and his history of criminal recidivism,

which includes multiple crimes of violence, his sentence cannot be said to be

grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Rios, 390

F.3d at 1086; see also Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76 (upholding sentence of two

consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life for recidivist convicted of two

counts of petty theft with a prior theft conviction and who had four prior strike

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7

The record shows that the trial court found true only six of seven alleged prior

felony strike convictions. Dec. 8, 2011 Minute Order (ECF No. 20-7 at 12–13) at 2. 

21

convictions for burglary); Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 508 (9th Cir.

1994) (sentence of ineligibility for parole for forty years not grossly

disproportionate when compared with gravity of sexual molestation offenses). 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his Eighth Amendment claim.

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims that defense counsel’s failure to argue, present evidence,

and allow petitioner to testify that he did not suffer seven prior strike convictions7

resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 

The claim is without merit.

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim,

a petitioner must establish (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that

it fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing

professional norms, and (2) that petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

at 694.

In the instant case, petitioner specifically claims that defense counsel was

ineffective in failing to move (and present supporting evidence to) the trial court

to: (1) set aside petitioner’s 1990 plea on the grounds that the trial court in the

1990 case violated California Penal Code sections 1192.7 and 1385 in accepting

petitioner’s plea, and (2) dismiss the prior strikes associated with the 1990 plea on

the ground that the trial court in the 1990 case “dismissed all remaining

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allegations in the interest of Justice.” Pet. at 9. 

Under California law, a defendant may not move in the trial court to

dismiss a prior felony conviction based on a guilty plea unless the prior

conviction was based on a guilty plea obtained in violation of the defendants’

constitutional rights. See People v. Sumstine, 36 Cal.3d 909, 922 (1984). But

petitioner asserts only that violations of a state statutory law, i.e., California Penal

Code sections 1192.7 and 1385, rendered his 1990 plea agreement invalid. 

Consequently, any attempt by defense counsel to challenge the validity of

petitioner’s 1990 plea on the assertion that the plea violated state statutory law

limiting the use of plea bargains would have been futile. Defense counsel “cannot

have been ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection” or motion. Juan H.

v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Nor could defense counsel have been ineffective for failing to move to

dismiss the prior strikes associated with the 1990 plea on the ground that the trial

court in the 1990 case dismissed all the priors. As noted earlier, the record makes

clear that none of the five prior strikes associated with petitioner’s 1990

conviction were dismissed; rather, after petitioner, as part of a plea agreement, 

pleaded guilty to assault with intent to commit rape, first degree burglary,

attempted murder, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment, he was sentenced

to four years incarceration for assault with intent to commit rape, the sentence for

the other four counts for which he was convicted was stayed, and all other charges

and allegations in the criminal complaint were dismissed. See Oct. 23, 1990

Abstract of Judgment (ECF No. 20-7 at 48–49) at 1–2. Defense counsel was not

ineffective for failing to raise a motion that would have been denied as meritless. 

See Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1273; see also Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th

Cir. 1996) (“failure to take a futile action can never be deficient performance”).

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8

Petitioner also claims that his life sentence is “unauthorized” because it

amounts to cruel and unusual punishment and was the result of ineffective assistance of

counsel. Because the Court addressed these claims earlier, it need not address them

again. 

23

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his ineffective

assistance of counsel claims because he has established neither deficient

performance nor prejudice under Strickland. It simply cannot be said that, had

defense counsel moved the trial court as petitioner claims he should have, it is

reasonable that the trial court would have granted the motion as meritorious and 

that there would have been a sentencing outcome more favorable to petitioner. 

See Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 4. Unauthorized Life Sentence 

Petitioner claims that his life sentence is unauthorized because it does not

conform with the Supreme Court of California’s decision in People v. Vargas, 59

Cal. 4th 635 (2014). Pet. at 9.8

 The claim is without merit. 

It is well established that “it is only noncompliance with federal law that

renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal

courts.” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (emphasis in original). Federal

habeas relief is not available for violations of state law or for error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216,

219 (2011); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).

In Vargas, the Supreme Court of California held that two prior convictions

arising out of a single act against a single victim cannot constitute two strikes

under California’s Three Strikes Law. Vargas, 59 Cal. 4th at 637. Petitioner’s

claim that his life sentence under the Three Strikes Law does not conform with

Vargas presents a purely state sentencing law claim not cognizable in federal

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Petitioner’s state law claim appears to be without merit because, as the

California Court of Appeal noted on direct appeal, petitioner’s qualifying strikes arise

out of his “appalling and depraved victimizations of a six-year-old girl and an 85-yearold woman,” People v. Russell, 2014 WL 1348813, at *13 (emphasis added), rather

than out of a single act against a single victim, see Vargas, 59 Cal. 4th at 637. 

24

habeas. See Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 219; Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68.9

 

CONCLUSION 

After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the Court is satisfied

that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be DENIED.

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, a

certificate of appealability (COA) under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) is DENIED because

petitioner has not demonstrated that “reasonable jurists would find the district

court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent, terminate all

pending miscellaneous motions (see, e.g., ECF No. 23) as moot and close the file.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 18, 2016 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge 

G:\PRO-SE\CRB\HC.15\Russell, R.15-2709.denial.final.wpd

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