Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01313/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01313-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1985 Consipracy to interfere with civil rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH LEWIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

VETERANS VILLAGE OF SAN DIEGO 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-cv-1313-CAB-WVG

ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION 

FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS AND SUA 

SPONTE DISMISSING COMPLAINT

On July 15, 2019, Plaintiff, a non-prisoner, filed a complaint alleging violations of 

42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), § 1985(3), and 29 U.S.C. § 701. [Doc. No. 1.] The Court reviews 

Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), as required when a plaintiff files a motion 

to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Under this mandatory screening, the Court finds 

that Plaintiff’s complaint does not sufficiently state a claim for relief. Thus, the Court 

GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP motion, [Doc. No. 2], DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s motion for 

leave to appear for pretrial hearings telephonically, [Doc. No. 3], DENIES as moot 

Plaintiff’s motion for court assisted service of summons, [Doc. No. 4], and DISMISSES 

Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend. 

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Plaintiff moves to proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. All parties instituting any 

civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application 

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for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An 

action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff 

is granted leave to proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169

F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). All actions sought to be filed IFP under § 1915 must be 

accompanied by an affidavit, signed by the applicant under penalty of perjury, that includes 

a statement of all assets which shows inability to pay initial fees or give security. Civ LR

3.2.a.

Here, Plaintiff’s application demonstrates that Plaintiff lacks the financial resources 

to pay the filing fees and still afford the necessities of life. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 

F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP motion.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, a complaint filed by any person seeking to proceed 

IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to mandatory and sua sponte review and 

dismissal should the Court determine, inter alia, it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 

254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not 

limited to prisoners.”). Congress enacted this safeguard because “a litigant whose filing 

fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic 

incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. 

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 

(1989)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

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678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). Detailed 

factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Accordingly, the 

Court “may dismiss as frivolous complaints reciting bare legal conclusions with no 

suggestion of supporting facts . . . .” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 

1984) (internal quotation omitted).

II. BACKGROUND

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff Joseph Lewis was a participant in the 

residential treatment program at the Veterans Village of San Diego (“VVSD”) from 

approximately September 1 to October 18, 2018. [Doc. No. 1 at 3.1] Plaintiff alleges there 

were certain participants in the program that exhibited a pattern of harassment and bullying 

of others which he reported to VVSD staff. [Id.] Some of these participants harassed 

Plaintiff and the VVSD staff failed to intervene. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff names as Defendants 

VVSD, VVSD staff counselors Beverly Fisher, Oceana Connolley, and Raul, and San 

Diego county counsel Raquel Young. After going to the emergency room at the VA 

hospital in La Jolla per the request of Defendant Raul and Defendant Beverly, Plaintiff was 

told by a psychologist he was being held on a 5150 court order against his will. [Id. at 5.] 

Shortly after he was detained by the police. [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff alleges that the VVSD staff

counselors lured him to a VA hospital under the false pretense of a tinnitus evaluation with 

plans to make false statements on federal property in attempts to bypass criminal law and 

courts, and have him locked up without the ability to properly defend himself. [Id.] 

Plaintiff further alleges that while he was in the psych ward San Diego county counsel 

Defendant Raquel, coerced a VA psychologist to go into court and testify that he was a 

threat to public safety because of his criminal background, which blocked his release from 

the psych ward. [Id. at 7–8.] Plaintiff alleges that VVSD staff proceeded to discriminate 

 

1 Document numbers and page references are to those assigned by CM/ECF for the docket entry.

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against him because of an ear ringing problem he had and manifested stories and threats he 

never made. [Id. at 8.] According to the complaint, Defendants Beverly, Oceana, and Raul 

blamed another participant’s overdose on Plaintiff, “sold [him] down the river with 

fraudulent statements to have [him] locked in a psych ward, served protective orders, and 

had steady communications with the VA doctors and nurses” detrimental to his release, 

which were illegal HIPAA privacy violations. [Id. at 9.] Further, the complaint alleges 

Plaintiff received ineffective representation from the public defenders regarding his mental 

health hold. [Id.]

III. DISCUSSION

The Complaint purports to assert federal statutory claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985

and 29 U.S.C. § 701. The factual allegations, however, do not support a plausible claim 

under either statute.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and (3) Conspiracy Claims

The second clause of § 1985(2) provides a cause of action if: two or more persons 

conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, 

the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny any citizen the equal 

protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting 

to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws. 

The first clause of § 1985(3) provides a cause of action for a private conspiracy to deny 

equal protection of the laws. The second clause of § 1985(3) provides a cause of action for

a conspiracy: for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any 

State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the 

equal protection of the laws. The third clause of § 1985(3) provides a cause of action for 

a conspiracy to interfere with federal elections.

An allegation of some racial or class-based animus is an essential requirement for a 

claim under the second clause of § 1985(2) and under § 1985(3). See Bretz v. Kelman, 773 

F.2d 1026, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101–

102 (1971). Otherwise, the court explained, § 1985 would become a generalized federal 

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tort law to be invoked for any private tortious conspiracy. Id. at 101–102. To establish 

racial or class-based animus, a plaintiff must show “invidiously discriminatory motivation

. . . behind the conspirators’ action.” Id. at 102. Here, it appears Plaintiff’s only plausible 

reference to an invidious discriminatory motivation on the Defendants’ part is due to the 

fact that he suffers from “a disability named Tenitus [sic], which is ringing of the ears.” 

[Doc. No. 1 at 3.] Plaintiff’s tinnitus is not a medical condition and is often a symptom of 

an underlying condition such as age-related hearing loss.2 The Court is not convinced that 

individuals with tinnitus qualify as a class for private civil rights conspiracy claims under 

§ 1985 and finds no authority to the contrary. Even if individuals with tinnitus would 

qualify as a class, Plaintiff makes no conceivable connection to his tinnitus being behind

the alleged motivations or actions of the Defendants beyond mere conclusory statements. 

Plaintiff also fails to plead any facts linking the Defendants’ actions to a level of conspiracy 

to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state 

a claim under § 1985. 

B. 29 U.S.C. § 701 Rehabilitation Act

The Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a 

disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the 

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 

program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). In order 

to obtain relief under [this section], a plaintiff must show (1) that he is disabled within the 

meaning of the act, (2) that he is “otherwise qualified” for the services sought, (3) that he 

was excluded from the services sought solely by reason of his disability, and (4) that the 

program in question receives federal financial assistance. See Dempsey v. Ladd, 840 F.2d 

638, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Similar to the analysis above for Plaintiff’s § 1985 claims, 

Plaintiff has not convinced the Court he has an actual disability. Furthermore, Plaintiff

 

2

https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/tinnitus/symptoms-causes/syc-20350156

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offers no facts to plausibly infer that he was excluded from the services sought “solely by 

reason of his disability,” which he claims is his tinnitus. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed 

to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act.

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s allegations are unintelligible, mostly conclusory, and fail to state a claim 

that is plausible. In addition, it appears that Plaintiff is to some extent appealing from some 

previous state court orders in relation to his 5150 hold and matters dealing with the San 

Diego county counsel. Plaintiff cannot appeal such orders, if any, using this federal 

lawsuit. For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered that Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed 

IFP is GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice3for failure to 

state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint addressing the deficiencies stated by the 

Court in this Order by August 26, 2019. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete 

in itself without reference to his original pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach 

Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n 

amended pleading supersedes the original.”); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 

1987) (citation omitted) (“All causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are 

not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.”).

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 26, 2019

 

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In light of this ruling, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Appear for Pretrial Hearings Telephonically 

[Doc. No. 3] and Plaintiff’s Motion for Court Assisted Service of Summons and Lawsuit [Doc. No. 4] 

are DENIED as moot.

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