Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00256/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00256-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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1

 Defendant NDEx West LLC filed a Notice of Joinder in Defendant Wells Fargo’s motion

on July 22, 2010, nearly one week after the reply briefs were filed. Because Plaintiffs did not have

an opportunity to respond to arguments as they relate to Defendant NDEx West, the Court finds the

Notice of Joinder was untimely filed, and declines to address the motion as to Defendant NDEx West.

- 1 - 09cv0256

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERT TOBIN, an individual; JULIET

TOBIN, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 09cv0256 DMS (CAB)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANT DEUTSCHE BANK

NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, (2) GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANT WELLS FARGO

BANK, N.A.’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND (3)

DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT 

[Docket Nos. 142, 143, 144]

vs.

BC BANCORP, a California Corporation, et

al.,

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Deutsche Bank National Trust Company

and Wells Fargo Bank N.A.’s motions for summary judgment and Plaintiffs’ motion for partial

summary judgment.1

 The motions are fully briefed and ready for disposition. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motions, and denies

Plaintiffs’ motion.

Case 3:09-cv-00256-DMS-WVG Document 183 Filed 08/24/10 Page 1 of 12
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2

 Defendants object to most of Mr. Tobin’s declaration on grounds of hearsay and lack of

foundation. The Court overrules those objections. 

3

 Plaintiffs submitted only a small portion of the PSA with their opposition brief. After the

motion was submitted, and at the Court’s request, Plaintiffs submitted a copy of the entire PSA. 

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I.

BACKGROUND

In June 2006, Plaintiffs Albert Tobin, age 79, and Juliet Tobin, age 91, were solicited to

refinance their primary residence located at 1585 Powell Road in Oceanside, CA. (Decl. of Albert

Tobin in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“Tobin Decl.”) ¶ 3.)2 Plaintiffs completed the

refinance on or about June 26, 2006. 

On May 1, 2007, Defendants Alliance Bancorp (“Alliance”), Wells Fargo Bank (“WFB”) and

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“Deutsche”) entered into a Pooling and Servicing

Agreement (“PSA”) with Alliance Securities Corp. and GMAC Mortgage, LLC. (“GMAC”). (See

Decl. of Deborah Raymond in Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. G.)3 Pursuant to the terms of the PSA,

Depositor Alliance Securities Corp. transferred title to certain mortgage loans to Defendant Deutsche

as Trustee. (PSA § 2.01.) Defendant WFB was appointed Master Servicer of the loans included in

the trust, Defendant Alliance was appointed Servicer of the loans, and GMAC was appointed Back-Up

Servicer. Subsequently, Defendant Alliance transferred its rights and obligations as Servicer to

IndyMac Bank, FSB, which transferred its rights to Defendant IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB

(“IndyMac”), which transferred its rights to One West Bank, FSB. 

On May 30, 2007, Plaintiffs’ loan was transferred to Defendant Deutsche for inclusion in the

pool of loans governed by the PSA. (Pls.’ Statement of Disputed and Undisputed Facts in Opp’n to

Mot. for Summ. J., Pls.’ Fact No. 17.)

In February 2008, Plaintiffs defaulted on their loan. (Id., Def.’s Fact No. 14.) 

On September 18, 2008, Plaintiff mailed a Notice of Rescission of their loan to Defendants BC

Bancorp, FDIC as Receiver of IndyMac, WFB and NDEx West, L.L.C. (Tobin Decl., Ex. F.) In

response to that Notice, Defendant IndyMac agreed to enter a Rescission Agreement with Plaintiffs.

(See Pls.’ Notice of Lodgment in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 2.) On October 3, 2008, Elke Poerschke,

/ / /

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4

 The e-mail exchange has been edited to appear in chronological order.

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who was then employed as Vice President - Corporate Compliance for Defendant IndyMac, prepared

a letter and Rescission Agreement for Plaintiffs’ review and approval. (Id.) 

The following month, Plaintiffs’ counsel engaged in a series of e-mails with Poerschke

concerning Plaintiffs’ loan. The e-mail exchange is attached to the Corrected Second Amended

Complaint (“CSAC”) as Exhibit H, and provides as follows:4

From: Deborah L. Raymond [mailto:draymond@lawinfo.com]

Sent: Friday, November 07, 2008 11:38AM

To: Poerschke, Elke

Subject: RE: Albert W. Tobin and Juliet E. Tobin / IMFB Loan No. 3002883258

Dear Ms. Poerschke:

This email is regards to my above referenced clients. As we discussed, my clients are

elderly and the pending Trustee's Sale on their home is causing them severe emotional

distress.

Pursuant to the last message that you left on my voice mail, it was my understanding

that you were going to review the loan modification Information provided by my

clients and have the Trustee's Sale postponed.

I have just looked online and the Trustee's Sale is still pending for 11/20/2008. Please

inform me of your intentions and provide me with written confirmation that the

Trustee's Sale has been postponed and to what date. Thank you.

_____________________________________________________________________

From: Poerschke, Elke [mailto:Elke.Poerschke@imb.com]

Sent: Friday, November 07, 2008 1:19 PM

To: draymond@lawinfo.com

Subject: RE: Albert W. Tobin and Juliet E. Tobin / IMFB Loan No. 3002883258

Dear Ms. Raymond,

I have confirmed that the foreclosure was placed on hold and your clients' file has been

forwarded to a loss mitigation specialist. I've asked for them to provide me with an

update. I will be back in touch with you as soon as I hear from them. 

Thank you.

Elke Poerschke

____________________________________________________________________

From: Deborah L. Raymond [mailto:draymond@lawinfo.com]

Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2008 7:50 PM

To: Poerschke, Elke

Subject: RE: Albert W. Tobin and Juliet E. Tobin / IMFB Loan No. 3002883258

Dear Ms. Poerschke:

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Based on your email below, it is my understanding that the Trustee's Sale has been

postponed and yet, as of this writing, the foreclosure posting company states that it is

still scheduled for November 20, 2008 (see attached). Please explain.

Pursuant to your prior email, I informed my elderly clients (one of whom has just

returned from being hospitalized) that you have placed the foreclosure on hold. Ms.

Poerschke, we have relied on your representation. If the Tobin's home is unlawfully

foreclosed upon, it will cause them serious and irreparable harm. Please provide me

with verifiable confirmation that the Trustee's Sale has been postponed and to what

date. Thank you.

Deborah L. Raymond

____________________________________________________________________

From: Poerschke, Elke [mailto:Elke.Poerschke@imb.com]

Sent: Friday, November 14, 2008 6:48 AM

To: draymond@lawinfo.com

Subject: RE: Albert W. Tobin and Juliet E. Tobin / IMFB Loan No. 3002883258

Dear Ms. Raymond,

I have confirmed with our servicing department that the sale is still on hold

(indefinitely). Should you wish to speak with our foreclosure attorney to verify this,

you may contact them at 866-795-1852.

Elke Poerschke

(CSAC, Ex. H.) 

Despite Poerschke’s representation that the foreclosure sale was on hold “indefinitely,” there

is evidence in the record that the foreclosure sale was only on hold for sixty days, and that Poerschke

was made aware of that fact. (See Poerschke’s Notice of Lodgment in Supp. of Mot., Ex. C at 157-

58.) 

On February 6, 2009, Plaintiffs’ home was sold at a Trustee’s sale to Defendant IndyMac.

Plaintiffs first learned of the sale on February 11, 2009. 

That same day, Plaintiffs filed the present case. The Corrected Second Amended Complaint

(“CSAC”) alleges the following claims for relief against the following Defendants: (1) violation of

the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) against Defendants WFB, US Bank, N.A., Deutsche, BC Bancorp

and Alliance, (2) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 (“UCL”) against all

Defendants, (3) quiet title against Defendants WFB, US Bank, N.A., Deutsche, BC Bancorp and

Alliance, (4) violation of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act against Defendants J&J Lending

(“J&J”), Robert S. Garner (“Garner”) and Loni Hall (“Hall”), (5) violation of California’s Elder Abuse

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Act by Defendants BC Bancorp, J&J, Garner and Hall, (6) breach of fiduciary duty by Defendants

J&J, Garner and Hall, (7) fraud by Defendants J&J, Garner and Hall, (8) intentional misrepresentation

by Defendants WFB, US Bank, N.A., Deutsche, IndyMac, Poerschke and NDEx West, L.L.C., (9)

negligent misrepresentation by Defendants WFB, US Bank, N.A., Deutsche, IndyMac, Poerschke and

NDEx West, L.L.C., (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress by Defendants WFB, US Bank,

N.A., Deutsche, IndyMac, Poerschke and NDEx West, L.L.C., (11) negligent infliction of emotional

distress by Defendants WFB, US Bank, N.A., Deutsche, IndyMac, Poerschke and NDEx West, L.L.C.,

and (12) breach of contract by Defendants WFB, US Bank, N.A., Deutsche, IndyMac, Poerschke and

NDEx West, L.L.C.. The Clerk of Court entered defaults against Defendants BC Bancorp, Alliance,

Garner and Hall, and the Court dismissed Defendants IndyMac, Poerschke and US Bank from the

case. It appears Plaintiffs have settled their claims against Defendant J&J, but that Defendant has not

yet been dismissed from the case. The only other remaining Defendants are WFB, Deutsche and

NDEx West, L.L.C. 

II.

DISCUSSION

Defendants Deutsche and WFB move for summary judgment on each claim against them: (1)

violation of TILA, (2) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, (3) quiet title,

(4) intentional misrepresentation, (5) negligent misrepresentation, (6) intentional infliction of

emotional distress, (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress, and (8) breach of contract. Plaintiffs

move for summary judgment on their TILA claim only. 

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party has

the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is proper. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,

398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The moving party must identify the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, or

other evidence that it “believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome

/ / /

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5

 Although the general rule is that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are

waived, “a district court has the discretion to consider an argument first raised in a reply brief.” Lane

v. Dep’t of Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008). Because this argument goes to the viability

of the claim, the Court will address it here.

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of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth.” S.E.C. v.

Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1982). 

The burden then shifts to the opposing party to show that summary judgment is not

appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The opposing party’s evidence is to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986). However, to avoid summary judgment, the opposing party cannot rest solely on conclusory

allegations. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Instead, it must designate specific

facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. See also Butler v. San Diego District Attorney’s

Office, 370 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating if defendant produces enough evidence to require

plaintiff to go beyond pleadings, plaintiff must counter by producing evidence of his own). More than

a “metaphysical doubt” is required to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

B. TILA Claims

In their first claim for relief, Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated TILA. As a result of the

violations, Plaintiffs seeks rescission, recoupment and damages. 

1. Rescission

Defendants’ primary argument in support of their motion for summary judgment on this claim

concerns Plaintiffs’ ability to tender. In its reply brief, however, Defendant Deutsche raises another

argument that is dispositive of this claim, namely that the foreclosure sale terminated Plaintiffs’ right

to rescind.5

 

Title 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) provides: 

An obligor’s right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation

of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first,

notwithstanding the fact that the information and forms required under this section or

any other disclosures required under this part have not been delivered to the obligor

.... 

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15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). Here, there is no dispute that the property was sold on February 6, 2009. (Pls.’

Statement of Disputed and Undisputed Facts in Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J., Def.’s Fact No. 30.) That

sale extinguished Plaintiffs’ right to rescind, and thus Defendants are entitled to summary judgment

on this claim. 

2. Recoupment

Next, Plaintiffs allege a claim for recoupment under TILA. Defendants assert this claim

applies only as a defense, and since Plaintiffs are not defending against any claims in this case,

recoupment does not apply. Plaintiffs do not address this argument. 

In support of their claim for recoupment, Plaintiffs cited 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) in the CSAC.

That statute:

does not bar a person from asserting a violation of this subchapter in an action to

collect the debt which was brought more than one year from the date of the occurrence

of the violation as a matter of defense by recoupment or set-off in such action, except

as otherwise provided by State law. 

15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). Here, Plaintiffs are not defending against any action, therefore they are not

entitled to assert a claim for recoupment. See In re Smith, 737 F.2d 1549, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984)

(stating plaintiff cannot assert a claim for recoupment “because her demand is not in the nature of a

defense ....”) Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

3. Damages

Next, Plaintiffs allege a claim for damages under TILA. Defendants assert this claim is

untimely. Plaintiffs respond that Defendants’ TILA violations were ongoing, and continued through

the date of the foreclosure sale on February 6, 2009. Applying the date of the foreclosure sale,

Plaintiffs argue their claim was timely filed. 

TILA provides a one-year statute of limitations that begins to run from “the occurrence of the

violation.” 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). Generally, the violation occurs “at the time the loan documents were

signed.” Meyer v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 342 F.3d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 2003). Although one circuit

court has applied the continuing violation theory to TILA claims, Postow v. OBA Federal Savings and

Loan Ass’n, 627 F.2d 1370, 1379-80 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit has rejected that approach.

King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 1986). Absent that doctrine, Plaintiffs’ claim for

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6

 Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ UCL claim to the extent it

relies on a TILA violation. See Rosal v. First Federal Bank of Cal., 671 F.Supp. 2d 1111, 1126 (N.D.

Cal. 2009) (“To the extent that plaintiff’s § 17200 claim is predicated on FFB’s purported violations

of TILA and its regulations, it fails as a matter of law.”)

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damages under TILA is untimely. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this

claim is granted, and Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on this claim is denied.6

 

C. Misrepresentation and Emotional Distress Claims

The next claims at issue are Plaintiffs’ claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation

and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. These claims are based on the conduct

of Elke Poerschke. Before being dismissed from this case, Poerschke filed a motion for summary

judgment on these claims. Defendants incorporate Poerschke’s arguments into the present motions.

Defendants also argue they are not liable for these claims under an agency or conspiracy theory.

Plaintiffs dispute Poerschke’s arguments and Defendants’ arguments about agency. Plaintiffs do not

dispute the conspiracy theory, therefore the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

as to that theory. The other arguments are addressed below.

1. Misrepresentation

The elements of an intentional misrepresentation claim are: “(1) a misrepresentation, (2) with

knowledge of its falsity, (3) with the intent to induce another’s reliance on the misrepresentation, (4)

justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage.” Conroy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 45 Cal. 4th 1244,

1255 (2009) (citing Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 30 Cal. 4th 167, 173 (2003)). Negligent

misrepresentation requires a showing of the same elements with one exception: Negligent

misrepresentation “does not require intent to defraud but only the assertion, as a fact, of that which

is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true.” Id. (citing Small, 30 Cal.

4th at 173-74). Defendants assert there are no genuine issues of material fact on any of these elements,

and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

a. Misrepresentation

There is no dispute about the representations at issue in this case. In the e-mail exchange with

Plaintiffs’ counsel, Poerschke represented, first, that the foreclosure sale was on hold, and, second,

/ / /

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 This evidence also raises a genuine issue of material fact on the scienter elements of

Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims and Plaintiffs’ emotional distress claims. 

8

 To the extent Plaintiffs’ negligence may be raised as an affirmative defense to the negligent

misrepresentation claim, Defendants have not satisfied their burden of proof that they are entitled to

summary judgment on that defense. 

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that the foreclosure sale was on hold “indefinitely.” Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute that the first

representation was true. However, they do dispute the accuracy of the second representation. 

After reviewing the evidence, the Court finds there is a genuine issue of material fact about

whether this representation was true. Although Poerschke represented to Plaintiffs’ counsel that the

foreclosure sale was on hold “indefinitely,” Plaintiffs cite evidence that the foreclosure sale would

only be on hold for sixty days. (See Poerschke’s Notice of Lodgment in Supp. of Mot., Ex. C at 157-

58.) Plaintiffs also present evidence that Poerschke was made aware of that fact on or around

November 3, 2008, which predates both of her representations to Plaintiffs’ counsel. (Id.) In light

of this evidence, there is a genuine issue of material fact about whether Poerschke’s statements to

Plaintiffs’ counsel were true.7 

b. Justifiable Reliance

Next, Defendants assert there is no evidence to support the element of justifiable reliance.

Defendants’ argument is two-fold. First, they argue Plaintiffs did not change their position based on

Poerschke’s representations. Second, Defendants assert Plaintiffs’ counsel had access to information

about the foreclosure sale, and Plaintiffs were properly notified thereof.

Neither of these arguments demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or that

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, the

element of justifiable reliance does not require affirmative action. Plaintiffs’ failure to act may be

sufficient as long as it was caused by Poerschke’s representations. Furthermore, “[i]t is well

established in California that in an action for fraud or deceit, negligence on the part of the plaintiff in

failing to discover the falsity of the defendant’s statement is no defense when the misrepresentation

was intentional.” Manderville v. PCG & S Group, Inc., 146 Cal. App. 4th 1486, 1502 (2007) (citations

omitted).8

 The Court is also mindful that “the reasonableness of the reliance is ordinarily a question

of fact.” Guido v. Koopman, 1 Cal. App. 4th 837, 843 (1991) (citations omitted). This case is no

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exception to that general rule. Accordingly, Defendants’ argument on the element of justifiable

reliance does not warrant summary judgment. 

c. Damage

Next, Defendants argue Plaintiffs did not suffer any damage as a result of Poerschke’s

representations. Defendants appear to concede that Plaintiffs may have been damaged by the

foreclosure sale of their home, but assert that harm “was not related to Poerschke’s true

representations about the hold.” (Poerschke’s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. at 16.) This

argument sounds in causation, which is addressed by the justifiable reliance element of a

misrepresentation claim. See Hall v. Time Inc., 158 Cal. App. 4th 847, 855 n.2 (2008) (stating

justifiable reliance is same as causation in fraud case). For the reasons discussed above, the Court

rejects this argument. 

d. Duty

Finally, Defendants argue Poerschke did not owe Plaintiffs a fiduciary duty, therefore they are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The absence of a fiduciary duty, however, does not defeat

Plaintiffs’ claim. See Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 49 Cal. 4th 739, ___,

112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230, 238 n.5 (2010) (stating tort law recognizes the existence of a duty “even in the

absence of a fiduciary relationship.”) Therefore, this argument does not warrant entry of summary

judgment. 

2. Agency

Turning to Defendants’ next argument, the parties appear to agree that the two primary

elements of an agency relationship are authority and control. (Deutsche’s Mem. of P & A. in Supp.

of Mot. at 14; Opp’n to Deutsche’s Mot. at 11.) Defendants assert there is no evidence of either

element, but Plaintiffs disagree. They cite the testimony of Ronaldo Reyes, Defendant’s 30(b)(6)

designee, and the PSA as evidence of both elements.

This evidence establishes that Defendants entered into a contractual relationship with

Defendant Alliance, which later transferred its rights and obligations under the contract to Poerschke’s

undisputed employer, IndyMac. Pursuant to the PSA, IndyMac was responsible for communicating

with borrowers about their loans, handling notices of rescission from borrowers and initiating

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 The Court also denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ UCL claim

to the extent it relies this theory. 

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foreclosure proceedings, all on behalf of Defendants. (Def.’s Notice of Lodgment in Supp. of Mot.,

Ex. A at 17, 18, 28, 29.) Defendants argue this evidence does not establish an agency relationship

between themselves and IndyMac or its employee, Poerschke. However, Plaintiffs need not establish

an agency relationship to defeat Defendants’ motions. They need only raise a genuine issue of

material fact, and the evidence cited fulfills that purpose. In light of that evidence, and the general

rule that the existence of an agency relationship is a question of fact, Stilson v. Moulton-Niguel Water

Dist., 21 Cal. App. 3d 928, 936 (1971); Housewright v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 229 Cal. App. 2d

259, 265 (1964) (citing Thayer v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 55 Cal. 2d 430, 438 (1961)), the Court denies

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation and emotional distress

claims to the extent those claims rely on an agency theory.9 

D. Quiet Title

Plaintiffs’ next claim is for quiet title. Defendants argue they are entitled to judgment on this

claim because Plaintiffs cannot tender their unpaid debt. However, Defendants have failed to show

that Plaintiffs’ present inability to tender entitles Defendants to summary judgment on this claim. The

only case cited by Defendants involves mortgagors and their obligation to tender before recovering

on a quiet title claim. (See Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. at 18.) However, the foreclosure sale

extinguished the mortgage, and under those circumstances, it is not clear that Plaintiffs are required

to tender. See Fontana Land Co. v. Laughlin, 199 Cal. 625, 639 (1926) (citing Faxon v. All Persons,

166 Cal. 707(stating tender requirement did not apply when “the mortgage had become

extinguished.”) Thus, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

E. Breach of Contract

The final claim at issue is Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim. Defendants assert they are

entitled to judgment on this claim because they did not have a contract with Plaintiffs. Rather,

Defendants state Plaintiffs had a contract with Poerschke. However, as discussed above, Plaintiffs

have alleged there was an agency relationship between Poerschke and Defendants. Under that theory,

Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

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III.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motions for summary

judgment. Specifically, the Court grants the motion as to Plaintiffs’ TILA claim, Plaintiffs’ UCL

claim to the extent it relies on the alleged TILA violation, and Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation and

emotional distress claims to the extent they rely on a conspiracy theory. In all other respects,

Defendants’ motions are denied. Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is also denied for

the reasons set out above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 24, 2010

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

Case 3:09-cv-00256-DMS-WVG Document 183 Filed 08/24/10 Page 12 of 12