Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02481/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02481-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

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 Plaintiff’s complaint also named Fox Interactive Media, Inc., Fox Broadcasting Company, Fox Entertainment Group, Inc., and News Corporation as defendants, but

they were voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff on November 30, 2006. (Doc. No. 15.) 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GAMECASTER, INC., a California

Corporation,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06-CV-02481-H

(WMC)

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION

FOR A TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER AND

DENYING WITHOUT

PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S

APPLICATION FOR A

PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION

vs.

DIRECTV, INC., a California

Corporation; IGN

ENTERTAINMENT, INC., a

Delaware Corporation; JETBLUE

AIRWAYS CORPORATION, a

Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1-

10, inclusive,

Defendants.

On November 14, 2006, plaintiff GameCaster, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint

against defendants DirecTV, Inc. (“DirecTV”), IGN Entertainment, Inc. (“IGN”), and

JetBlue Airways Corporation (“JetBlue;” collectively “Defendants”) alleging several

claims related to trademark infringement and dilution.1

 (Doc. No. 1.) On December 15,

2006, Plaintiff submitted to the Court an ex parte application for a temporary restraining

order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction (“the application”). On December 19, 2006,

Case 3:06-cv-02481-H-WMC Document 31 Filed 12/20/06 Page 1 of 16
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Defendants filed an opposition. The Court held a telephonic hearing on the application

on December 19, 2006. Richard Wirtz appeared on behalf of Plaintiff, and Diana

Torres and David Ono appeared on behalf of Defendants. For the reasons stated below,

the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s application for a TRO and DENIES WITHOUT

PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s application for a preliminary injunction.

Background

Plaintiff is a California corporation that develops, produces, and markets video

game competitions and related programs for broadcast worldwide in all forms of media.

(Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. TRO and Prelim. Inj. 1 (“Pl.’s Mem. P. & A.”).)

Plaintiff sells corporate sponsorships for such competitions and programs, licenses and

sells Gamecaster-branded merchandise, and licenses and sells the Gamecaster

Cybercam S2 technology, which films live video game tournaments from “within” the

game. (Id.) 

Plaintiff owns U.S. Service Mark Registration No. 2,931,561 for the service mark

“GAMECASTER” in International Class 041, which encompasses “entertainment

services, namely, staging, organizing and conducting computer and video game

tournaments and events.” (Notice Lodgment Supp. Pl.’s Mot. TRO and Prelim Inj., Ex.

1, at 3 (“Notice Lodgement”).) The Certificate of Registration indicates that Plaintiff

filed for the trademark on May 15, 2002, first used the trademark in commerce on

August 24, 2004, and that the trademark was federally registered on March 8, 2005.

Plaintiff also owns registered trademarks for a “GAMECASTER” mark in Europe,

Australia, and Hong Kong. (Id., Ex. 2.) Plaintiff has applied for a United States

trademark for the service mark “GAMECASTER” in International Classes 006, 009,

014, 016, 018, 020, 021, 025, 028, 035, and 038. (Id.) Plaintiff is also the owner of the

World Wide Web URL address http://www.gamecaster.com, through which it sells

merchandise with the service mark “GAMECASTER.” (David MacIntosh’s Decl.

Supp. Pl.’s Mot. TRO and Prelim. Inj. ¶ 7 (“MacIntosh Decl.”); Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. 2.)

 

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David MacIntosh, president and chief executive officer of Plaintiff, stated in his

declaration that Plaintiff has licensed its “GAMECASTER” mark, and the worldwide

broadcast rights to its second Gamecaster branded video game competition, to the

television station channel GamePlay HD, available nationally on Dish Network.

(MacIntosh Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff has concluded taping its second video game

competition, titled “Gamecaster’s Battlefield 2142 Invitational Presented by GamePlay

HD.” (Id. ¶ 5.) The eight episode series is scheduled to air on GamePlay HD in the

first quarter of 2007. (Id.) MacIntosh also stated that Plaintiff has entered into a

licensing representation agreement with Lisa Mark & Associates regarding Plaintiff’s

“GAMECASTER” mark, and that Plaintiff sells merchandise bearing the mark on its

online retail store. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) 

MacIntosh stated in his declaration that on May 18, 2005, Plaintiff’s

representatives met with executives from DirecTV to discuss a relationship between

Plaintiff and DirecTV to organize, conduct, tape, and broadcast “GAMECASTER”

branded video game competitions. (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff presented its 2004

“GAMECASTER” branded television pilot and patent pending Gamecaster video game

camera-controller technology during the meeting. (Id.) Plaintiff did not receive a

response to their proposal, and on January 3, 2006, DirecTV issued a press release

stating that it intended to launch a video game competition league similar to the one

proposed by Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.) 

In May 2006, DirecTV and IGN formed the Championship Gaming Series, a

video game competition league planned to be launched in 2007. (Notice Lodgement,

Ex. 5, at 1.) On July 21 through 22, 2006, DirecTV and IGN held a video game

competition called the Championship Gaming Invitational (“July 2006 CGI”) in San

Francisco, California. (Id., Ex. 6, at 1.) Greg Munson, an executive producer and an

advisory board member of Plaintiff, stated in his declaration that he was an audience

member of the July 2006 CGI on July 22, 2006, and heard the hosts of the event use the

term “gamecaster” on at least two occasions. (Greg Munson’s Decl. Supp. Pl.’s Mot.

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TRO and Prelim. Inj. ¶ 5.) 

On July 25, 2006, Plaintiff’s attorney Thomas Foster sent DirecTV’s attorney

John Crook a letter stating that DirecTV’s use of the term “GAMECASTER” in any

manner for closely related goods and services constituted an infringement of Plaintiff’s

rights. (Notice Lodgement, Ex. 8, at 1.) On August 2, 2006, Foster e-mailed Ted

Suzuki, Vice-President of Business and Legal Affairs for DirecTV, raising the same

concern, indicating that Plaintiff believed that DirecTV would soon air footage of the

July 2006 CGI, and requesting DirecTV take corrective action. (Id., Ex. 9, at 3.) In

response, Suzuki e-mailed Foster on August 7, 2006, stating that although he did not

believe the use of the term “gamecaster” to refer to the hosts/announcers at the July

2006 CGI constituted use as a trademark, the final footage of the broadcast of the July

2006 CGI would not contain the word “gamecaster.” (Id. at 2.) Cort Carpenter, a

member of Plainitiff’s board of directors, stated in his declaration that he viewed a

broadcast of the July 2006 CGI in October 2006 on DirecTV while on a JetBlue flight

from San Diego to New York City, during which the term “gamecaster” was used.

(Greg Munson’s Decl. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. TRO and Prelim. Inj. ¶ 4, see also Notice

Lodgement, Exh. 7, at 4, 7, 27 (transcript of broadcast provided by Plaintiff which

describes the use of the term “gamecaster” to refer to announcers on the broadcast at

least four times).) 

On November 14, 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging

trademark infringement, false designation, and dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1501, et seq.

(the “Lanham Act”), common law trademark infringement under California law,

dilution under section 14330 of California’s Business and Professions Code, unfair

competition under section 17200 of California’s Business and Professions Code, and

common law conversion under California law. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-81.) Plaintiff’s prayer

for relief for its trademark infringement, false designation, and dilution claims under

the Lanham Act, and its trademark infringement and dilution claims under California

law included a request for temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctions enjoining

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 The specific language of the joint stipulation to be filed by the parties is left up to the parties.

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Defendants from using Plaintiff’s “GAMECASTER” trademark, or any similar terms,

to promote its products or services, and from falsely designating or diluting the

“GAMECASTER” mark. (Id. at p. 12.) Plaintiff’s prayer for relief for its unfair

competition claim included a request for temporary, preliminary, and permanent

injunctions enjoining Defendants from competing unfairly against Plaintiff. (Id.)

On December 15, 2006, Plaintiff submitted to the Court the application

requesting an order requiring Defendants to immediately cease from distributing or

broadcasting the July 2006 CGI recording in its current form containing the mark

“GAMECASTER,” edit the use of the mark “GAMECASTER” from the production

of the July 2006 CGI, and cease all use of the term “GAMECASTER” in current or

future activities, recordings, or productions. (Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. 6.) The Court

declined the ex parte application, and scheduled a telephonic hearing involving all of

the parties for December 19, 2006. During the hearing, the parties agreed to file a joint

stipulation by December 22, 2006, indicating that Defendants will not rebroadcast any

portion of the July 2006 CGI using the term “gamecaster,” or use the term

“gamecaster” during the broadcast of its second Championship Gaming Invitational

special, at least until the issues in this suit are resolved or this Court orders otherwise.2

Discussion

1. Legal Standard for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary

Injunction

A TRO is a form of preliminary injunctive relief whose sole purpose is to

preserve the status quo pending a hearing on the moving party’s application for a

preliminary injunction. See Schwarzer, et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Federal Civil

Procedure Before Trial, ¶ 13:7, p. 13-4 (The Rutter Group 2006) (citing Granny Goose

Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439

(1974)). A preliminary injunction is a device for preserving the status quo and

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preventing the irreparable loss of rights before a judgment in the suit. See Textile

Unlimited, Inc. v. A..BMH and Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 2001). The same

standard governs the issuance of both TROs and preliminary injunctions. See, e.g.,

Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1111,

1126 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (“The standard for issuing a preliminary injunction is the same

as the standard for issuing a temporary restraining order .”). 

A plaintiff can demonstrate it is entitled to a temporary restraining order or

preliminary injunction in one of two ways. First, using the “traditional criteria,” a

plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the

possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a

balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and (4) advancement of the public interest

(in certain cases). See Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1158 (9th

Cir. 2006). Alternatively, a plaintiff may show “either a combination of probable

success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm or that serious questions

are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor.” Id. (emphasis in

original). “This analysis creates a continuum: the less certain the district court is of the

likelihood of success on the merits, the more plaintiffs must convince the district court

that the public interest and balance of hardships tip in their favor.” Southwest Voter

Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003). Even if the

balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the moving party, however, it must be

shown as an irreducible minimum that there is a fair chance of success on the merits.

See Johnson v. California State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir.

1995). 

In a trademark infringement claim, “irreparable injury may be presumed from

a showing of likelihood of success on the merits.” See Brookfield Communications,

Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir.1999) (citing

Metro Pub., Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, 987 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir.1993)). This

presumption effectively conflates the dual inquiries of the ‘probable success on the

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merits and the possibility of irreparable harm’ test into the single question of whether

the plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits. See GoTo.com, Inc. v.

Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000). 

2. Likelihood of Success on the Merits as to Trademark Infringement

Plaintiff first argues that it is likely to succeed on its trademark infringement

claims. A trademark is a “word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination

thereof,” either used by a person, or which a person has a bona fide intention to use in

commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by sections 1051

to 1072 of title 15 of the United States Code, “to identify and distinguish his or her

goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to

indicate the source of the goods . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. A federal court may grant

an injunction to prevent the violation of the rights of a registrant of a registered mark

or to prevent a violation under section 1125(a) of title 15 of the United States Code,

relating to false designation of origin or false description or representation. See id. §§

1114, 1125. 

A. Likelihood That Plaintiff Has a Valid Protectable Interest in the

“GAMECASTER” Mark

In order to determine if Plaintiff has a likelihood of proving Defendants liable

for trademark infringement, the Court must first determine if it is likely that Plaintiff

owns a valid, protectable interest in the “GAMECASTER” mark. In order to be

protected, a mark must be distinctive such that it is capable of distinguishing the

applicant’s goods or services from the goods and services of others. See

Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir.

1998). Marks are classified in one of five categories of increasing distinctiveness:

(1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, or (5) fanciful. See id. “The

latter three categories of marks, because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a

particular source of a product, are deemed inherently distinctive.” Id. (quoting Two

Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)). At the other end of the

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spectrum are generic marks, which give the general name of the product or embrace

an entire class of products, and which can never meet the distinctiveness element. See

id. “Marks that are descriptive fall in the middle of these two extremes.” Id.

“Descriptive marks” define qualities or characteristics of a product or service in a

straightforward way that requires no exercise of the imagination to be understood. See

id. at 1047 n.8. Plaintiff’s “GAMECASTER” mark describes a video game

broadcaster in a straightforward way, combining the English words game and caster.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s “GAMECASTER” mark is

descriptive.

 Descriptive marks are not inherently distinctive and therefore do not initially

satisfy the distinctiveness element of a trademark infringement claim. See id. “But

descriptive marks can acquire distinctiveness if the public comes to associate the mark

with a specific source.” Id. Such acquired distinctiveness, which is referred to as

“secondary meaning,” allows a suit to be brought for infringement of a descriptive

mark that otherwise could not qualify for protection as a trademark. See id.

Plaintiff argues that its “GAMECASTER” mark is not generic, and is not

commonly used to refer to broadcasting announcers in a video game competition.

(Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. 11; MacIntosh Decl. ¶¶ 17-18.) Plaintiff also claims that its mark

is famous. (Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. 12.) Whether Plaintiff could succeed in showing

secondary meaning is disputed. Defendants contend that their use of the word

“gamecaster” was not in a trademark sense, and therefore did not denote a specific

source. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301 (9th Cir.

1979) (abrogated by statute on other grounds, as recognized in Christian Science Bd.

of Directors of First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Evans, 105 N.J. 297, 310-12 (1987)).

Similarly, if the use of the word “gamecaster” was not used in a trade mark sense, there

is no liability for dilution. See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 880

(9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, at this stage of the proceeding, the Court is unable to

determine whether Plaintiff would likely prevail on the merits of its claim for

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trademark infringement. 

B. Likelihood of Confusion

“The test for a trademark infringement claim under federal, state, and common

law is whether there will be a likelihood of confusion.” M2Software, Inc. v Madacy

Entertainment, 421 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Cleary v. News Corp.,

30 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that claims under the Lanham Act and

California Business and Professions Code section 17200 are “substantially

congruent”). In AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979)

(abrogated on other grounds in Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792

(2003)), the Ninth Circuit articulated an eight factor test for determining the likelihood

of confusion in a trademark action. Applied to this case, they are (1) the similarity of

the marks; (2) the relatedness of the two companies’ good or services; (3) the

marketing channel used; (4) the strength of Plaintiff’s mark; (5) DirecTV and IGN’s

intent in selecting its mark; (6) evidence of actual confusion; (7) the likelihood of

expansion into other markets; and (8) the degree of care likely to be exercised by

purchasers. See GoTo.com, Inc., 202 F.3d at 1205 (citing Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348-

49). “Some Sleekcraft factors are much more important than others, and the relative

importance of each individual factor will be case specific.” M2 Software, Inc., 421

F.3d at 1080 (citing Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054). The determination of which factors

are most important turns on whether a reasonably prudent consumer in the marketplace

is likely to be confused as to the origin of the good or service bearing one of the marks.

See id. (citing Dreamwerks Prod. Group, Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th

Cir. 1998); see also Eclipse Associates Ltd. v. Data General Corp., 894 F.2d 1114,

1118 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The district court’s primary task, in determining infringement

of registered trademarks, is to make the factual determination whether the public is

likely to be deceived or confused by the similarity of the marks as to source,

relationship or sponsorship.”)). In the application, Plaintiff addresses the similarity of

the marks, proximity of the goods, and marketing channels factors, citing GoTo.com.

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See GoTo.com, 202 F.3d at 1205 (“In the context of the Web in particular, the three

most important Sleekcraft factors are (1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the relatedness

of the goods or services, and (3) the simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing

channel. . . . Together with the relatedness of the services and the use of a common

marketing channel, [the similarity of the marks factor] constitutes part of the

controlling troika in the Sleekcraft analysis.”).

 The similarity of the marks is always an important factor in the Sleekcraft

analysis. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054. “[T]he more similar the marks in terms of

appearance, sound, and meaning, the greater the likelihood of confusion. See id. In

analyzing this factor, the marks must be considered in their entirety as they appear in

the marketplace, with similarities weighed more heavily than differences. See id.

Plaintiff argues that DirecTV and IGN’s identification of their announcers as

“gamecasters” during the broadcast of the July 2006 CGI constitutes the use of an

identical mark in sound, sight and meaning to their “GAMECASTER” trademark.

Defendants argue that they did not use the term “gamecaster” in a source-denoting,

trademark sense at all, and therefore they did not use a similar mark. See AntiMonopoly, 611 F.2d at 301. 

Plaintiff also argues that DirecTV and IGN’s use of the term “gamecaster” is in

the context of the identical goods and service to those provided by Plaintiff, the

broadcast of video game tournaments and related merchandise. Additionally, Plaintiff

argues that the marketing channels used by DirecTV/IGN and Plainiff are the same

because they all sell and advertise their goods and services on the internet, and because

Plaintiff’s video game competitions and DirectTV/IGN’s competitions are broadcast

on satellite networks. 

Given the uncertainty as to whether the use of the term “gamecaster” at the July

2006 CGI denoted a use in a trademark sense, and the importance of the ‘similarity of

the marks’ factor, the Court is again unable to determine at this early stage whether

Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of its trademark infringement claim.

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3. Dilution Claims

A. Likelihood of Success on Merits as to Dilution Claim

The Ninth Circuit has stated that a dilution claim is subject to the same analysis

whether it is brought under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (section 43(c) of the

Lanham Act) or under section 14330 of California’s Business and Professions code.

See Panavision Intern., L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998). In either

claim, the Panvision Intern. court stated, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the mark is

famous; (2) the defendant is making a commercial use of the mark in commerce;

(3) the defendant’s use began after the mark became famous; and (4) the defendant’s

use of the mark dilutes the quality of the mark by diminishing the capacity of the mark

to identify and distinguish goods and services.” Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)).

Section 1125(c) of title 15 of the United States Code was amended, however, on

October 6, 2006. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312,

§ 2, 120 Stat. 1730, 1730-32 (2006). Section 1125(c)(1) currently reads that: 

Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is

distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be

entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time after the

owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade

name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution

by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence

of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic

injury. 

The Court concludes that the amended statute only affects the fourth prong of the

dilution test, allowing a plaintiff to bring a successful dilution claim without proof that

defendant’s use of the mark is diluting the quality of the mark by diminishing the

capacity of the mark to identify and distinguish goods and services, as long as the

plaintiff proves that defendant’s use is likely to cause dilution by blurring or

tarnishment. 

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1. Defendant’s Commercial Use of the Mark in Commerce

The second prong of the dilution test requires a plaintiff to prove that the

defendant is making a commercial use of the mark in commerce. “Commercial use

under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act requires the defendant to be using the

trademark as a trademark, capitalizing on its trademark status.” Avery Dennison

Corp., 189 F.3d at 880 (citing Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1325). A defendant who uses

words that happen to be trademarks for their non-trademark value does not use the

mark in commerce for purposes of establishing a dilution cause of action. See id. As

previously discussed, Defendants argue that the use of the term “gamecaster” during

the July 2006 CGI did not denote the use of that term in a trademark sense.

Accordingly, the Court is unable to determine at this early stage whether Plaintiff is

likely to succeed on the merits of its dilution claim. 

2. Fame of Plaintiff’s “GAMECASTER” Mark, Whether

Defendant’s Use Began after Plaintiff’s Mark Became Famous,

and Whether Defendant’s Use of the Mark Is Likely to Cause

Dilution by Blurring or Tarnishment

Section 1125(c)(2) of title 15 of the United States Code states that for purposes

of a dilution claim, “a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general

consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or

services of the mark’s owner.” The statute lists four non-exclusive considerations for

the famousness inquiry: (1) the duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising

and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third

parties; (2) the amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services

offered under the mark; (3) the extent of actual recognition of the mark; and

(4) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of

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3

 Plaintiff cites to the previous list of non-exclusive factors listed in the since

amended section 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H): (1) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (2) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection

with the goods or services with which the mark is used; (3) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (4) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (5) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; (6) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the mark’s owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (7) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (8) whether the mark was registered on the principal register. 

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February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.3 Section 1125(c)(1) requires a plaintiff

to prove that a defendant used the mark in commerce after it became famous.

“Dilution by blurring” is association arising from the similarity between a mark

or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). In determining whether a mark or trade name is likely to

cause dilution by blurring, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the

following: (1) the degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous

mark; (2) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark; (3) the

extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive

use of the mark; (4) the degree of recognition of the famous mark; (5) whether the user

of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with the famous mark; and

(6) any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous mark. Id.

“Dilution by tarnishment” is association arising from the similarity between a mark or

trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark. See id.

at § 1125(b)(2)(C).

Plaintiff’s trademark application indicates that the “GAMECASTER” service

mark was first used in commerce in August 2004. Plainitiff argues that the

approximately two years that have passed since August 2004 is a lengthy period of

time for a young industry. Plaintiff also argues that because Plaintiff promotes its

goods and services on the internet, there is no geographic limit to the reach of its

advertising. Additionally, Plaintiff seems to argue that Defendants’ use of the term

“gamecaster” caused dilution by blurring. Given the uncertainty regarding the

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threshold question of whether Defendants ever used Plaintiff’s “GAMECASTER”

mark in commerce, however, the Court does not need to reach the issues of whether

Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits regarding the other requirements of a

dilution claim. 

B. Possibility of Irreparable Harm Based on Plaintiff’s Dilution Claim

Plaintiff argues that similar to the way that proving a strong likelihood of

confusion creates the presumption of irreparable harm, proving a likelihood of dilution

creates the presumption of irreparable harm. Again, since Plaintiff has failed to show

that it is likely to succeed on the merits regarding whether Defendants used Plaintiff’s

“GAMECASTER” mark in commerce, the Court does not need to reach this issue.

4. Balance Of Harms

Even if Plaintiff fails to prove a probability of success on the merits of its claim,

it may still be entitled to preliminary injunctive relief upon a showing that serious

questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor. See Earth

Island Inst., 442 F.3d at 1158. Serious questions, for purpose of the alternative

preliminary injunction test, means questions that involve a fair chance of success on

the merits that cannot be resolved one way or the other at the hearing on the injunction,

and as to which the court perceives a need to preserve the status. See Republic of

Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F2d 1355, 1362 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff argues that the Court should conclude that the balance between the

harm Plaintiff would suffer if the Court was to deny the TRO request against the harm

that Defendants would suffer if the request was granted tips sharply in favor of

Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that without the requested relief, Plaintiff will suffer harm

to the goodwill it has established. See Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Canyon Television and

Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (holding that damage to goodwill qualifies

as irreparable harm in a preliminary injunction analysis). Defendants argue that they

will suffer harm in the form of a prior restraint of their first amendment rights of free

speech if a TRO or injunction is granted preventing them from using the term

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“gamecaster.” Defendants have failed to address the relativeness of the fact that an

injunction in this case would likely be in the realm of commercial speech, significantly

weakening their prior restraint argument. Regardless, under the totality of the

circumstances, including the fact that the parties have agreed to file a joint stipulation

by December 22, 2006, indicating that DirecTV will not rebroadcast any portion of the

July 2006 CGI using the term “gamecaster,” or use the term “gamecaster” during the

broadcast of its second Championship Gaming Invitational special, the Court

concludes that Plaintiff has failed to show that the balance of hardships tips sharply in

its favor. Accordingly, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff’s request for a TRO or a

preliminary injunction based on the ‘serious questions are raised and the balance of

hardships tips sharply in plaintiff’s favor’ test.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s application for a TRO,

and DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary

injunction. If, after appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes it meets the requirements

for a preliminary injunction, it should contact the Court so that the application can be

calendared for a noticed hearing pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1. The Court

ORDERS the parties to file their joint stipulation regarding Defendants’ use of the

term “gamecaster” on or before Friday, December 22, 2006 at 2:00 p.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 20, 2006

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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COPIES TO:

Richard Michael Wirtz 

Wirtz Hellenkamp 

12760 High Bluff Drive 

Suite 300 

San Diego, CA 92130 

Diana M Torres 

O’Melveny & Myers 

400 South Hope Street 

Suite 1050 

Los Angeles, CA 90071-2899 

Jonathan Gottlieb

Fox Legal Group

PO Box 900

Beverly Hills, CA 90213

Joanna Geraghty

JetBlue Airways Corporation

118-29 Queens Blvd.

Forest Hills, NY 11375

Case 3:06-cv-02481-H-WMC Document 31 Filed 12/20/06 Page 16 of 16