Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02132/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02132-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHUOC TRAN,

Petitioner, 

v.

SCOTT KERNAN, Secretary, 

California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation,

Respondent. 

Case No.: 17cv2132-L-MDD

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

RE: PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge M. James Lorenz pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local 

Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of California.

Phuoc Tran (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner, seeks federal habeas relief 

from a felony conviction for 12 counts of committing a lewd act on a child 

under the age of fourteen (Cal. Penal Code § 288(a)) (victims M, D, C, and 

Peter), substantial sexual conduct with the victims (Cal. Penal Code § 

1203.66(a)(8), and committing an offense described in Cal. Penal Code § 

667.61(c) against more than one victim (Cal. Penal Code § 667.61(b)(c)(e); 

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Cal. Penal Code § 1203.066(a)(7)). (ECF No. 7-21 at 109-125).1 After 

reviewing the Petition (ECF No. 1), Respondent’s Answer and Memorandum 

of Points and Authorities in support thereof (“Answer”) (ECF No. 6), 

Petitioner’s Traverse (ECF No. 8), and pertinent state court lodgments, the 

Court RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s federal Petition for Writ of Habeas be 

DENIED.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. State Proceedings

“[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be 

presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner has the “burden 

of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing 

evidence.” Id.; see Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (stating 

that federal courts are required to “give great deference to the state court’s 

factual findings.”)). Accordingly, the following facts are taken from the 

California Court of Appeal’s August 30, 2016, opinion in People v. Tran, 

Appeal No. D067919. (See ECF No. 7-25 at 2-10). 

In 2013, defendant was married and lived with his elderly 

parents (Grandparents). Defendant had six adult siblings, all of 

whom had children. At the time, the extended family was close and 

celebrated birthdays and other milestone events together. The 

children of the siblings (the cousins) often played together. The 

family had immigrated [sic] from Vietnam, and many of the adults 

spoke only Vietnamese.

One of defendant’s brothers has three sons (Michael, age 22; 

Peter, age 17; David, age 16), and one daughter (M, age 11) (ages at 

 

1 All pincite page references refer to the automatically generated ECF page 

number, not the page number in the original document.

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the time of trial). Another one of defendant’s siblings has one child, 

a daughter (C), who was 18 at the time of trial. Another one of 

defendant’s siblings (Tracy) has two children. Tracy’s husband’s 

niece is D, who was 17 at the time of trial.

The jury found defendant committed lewd acts against four of 

these younger relatives: siblings Peter and M, their cousin C, and 

D. The abuse occurred at various times and over many years. None 

of these children immediately reported the misconduct. When they 

later reported, some of the reporting was gradual.

A. Chronology of Disclosures

The disclosures were triggered by a family event that took 

place at the Grandparents’ home during the weekend of May 17 

through May 19, 2013 (the Family Party). The extended family was 

celebrating a birthday and anniversary, and many family members 

stayed overnight at the Grandparents’ house (where defendant 

lived; and Peter and C also lived while going to school).

During the Family Party, Peter saw defendant take Peter’s 

nine-year-old sister M into defendant’s bedroom. When Peter 

attempted to open the door, it was locked. Peter went into an 

adjacent room and listened through a closet, and thought he heard 

moans. Peter was concerned because he and C had recently told 

each other about incidents of sexual abuse by their uncle 

(defendant) when they were much younger.

M later testified that she had been playing with her younger 

cousin, when defendant asked her to go into his room. When she 

did so, he locked the door and told her to take off her clothes. M 

pulled her pants and underwear down to her knees and laid on 

defendant’s bed. At first, she was on her back and defendant 

touched his penis to her vagina. M saw defendant’s penis through 

“a hole on [his] underwear.” After telling M to turn over, defendant 

put his penis into her “butt.” Someone knocked on the door and 

defendant said “wait.” Defendant and M then put their clothes back 

on and M left the bedroom. M was not crying and “acted normally” 

when she left the room. As detailed below, this form of abuse had 

occurred many times since M was five years old.

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After this event occurred, Peter and several of the cousins met 

in a room, and told M to come in the room. Peter then asked if 

defendant had touched her inappropriately. M repeatedly denied 

it, but Peter kept pushing her to tell the truth. After about 20 

minutes, M admitted that defendant had done so. She said 

defendant told her not to tell anyone. The older cousins then had 

lengthy discussions about what to do with the information. Some 

wanted to confront defendant; others wanted to tell the adults; and 

others (Peter) wanted to call the police.

On Monday evening following the Family Party, Peter called 

the police and told them that defendant had been molesting 

younger relatives, including Peter’s younger sister (M) and 16-yearold cousin (C), and that defendant had molested him when he was 

about eight years old. Peter’s father and the Grandparents were 

extremely angry at Peter’s report and instructed him to tell the 

police that he had lied about the abuse. Peter called 911 and told 

the officers he was afraid for his safety, and he spent the night in 

protective custody.

Shortly after Peter’s report, on May 21, C was interviewed by 

a social worker, who came to her high school unannounced. After 

initially denying the abuse, C began crying and told the social 

worked that defendant had touched her “‘down there.’” When asked 

what she meant, she said her “vagina.” She said defendant “tried 

to have sex” with her and tried to “penetrate” her. She said this 

conduct occurred at nighttime on multiple occasions. She said it 

began when she was nine years old and that it stopped when she 

was 12 or 13 years old when she began locking her bedroom door. 

Later that day, when her cousin Michael (Peter’s older brother) 

picked her up from school, C told him that defendant had repeatedly 

touched her “down there” when she was in her bedroom. C said she 

did not tell an adult about the abuse because she feared it would 

ruin the family.

On that same day, Peter and M’s mother heard about Peter’s 

accusations and picked up M from school early. When M’s mother

asked M whether she had gone into a bedroom alone with 

defendant, M responded that she could not say. After M’s mother 

told her she loved her and repeatedly said that M needed to tell the 

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truth, M disclosed some of the conduct to her mother. M’s mother 

testified that M said that defendant “Asked her to come in the room. 

Asked her to lay down on the bed and pull her pants down to her 

knees . . . . [M] [s]aid that uncle [defendant] took his [penis] and 

touch her butterfly [vagina].” When M’s mother asked her if she 

was hurt, M responded that “it was not inserted inside,” but “her 

uncle pull it out” after M said “Ouch. Ouch.” M said that defendant 

told her not to “say this to anybody including the parents.” M 

denied she was in pain or had bled. M’s mother examined M’s 

vaginal area and did not see any visible injury.

Later that day (May 21), a social worker told M’s mother to 

bring M to Children’s Hospital to be interviewed. During the car 

ride, M was told by her father and/or mother not to tell the truth 

and to lie and say that nothing happened. They were worried about 

the health of defendant’s mother if defendant was arrested. When 

M was interviewed by social worker Laurie Fortin later that day, M 

denied that anything had occurred. She said that she had made up 

the story to her brothers and cousins because they were “asking so 

[many] times.”

Two weeks later, on June 4, M’s mother admitted to police 

officers that M had disclosed the abuse and that she had instructed 

M to lie to social workers. The next day, on June 5, M’s mother 

brought her back to Children’s Hospital to be reinterviewed by the 

same social worker. During the second interview, M disclosed that 

defendant began abusing her when she was about five years old. M 

described how defendant would rub his penis on her vaginal area, 

but she denied any penetration. M did not have a medical 

examination on that date, and there was no evidence that police 

officers or the social workers recommended or asked M’s parents to 

permit a doctor to conduct an examination.

Two months later, at the preliminary hearing on August 29, 

M elaborated on her disclosures. At the hearing, M disclosed for 

the first time that defendant also touched his penis to her “butt,” 

and that the touchings had occurred outside and inside her vaginal 

and anal areas. 

About 10 days after M first disclosed the abuse to the social 

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worker, in mid-June 2013, D’s family received a phone call from 

relatives in Vietnam about the accusations against defendant. The 

relative said D had been identified as a possible victim and told D 

not to disclose any abuse. After receiving the phone call, D began 

crying and told her parents she had been sexually abused by 

defendant when she was about eight years old. D had not been at 

the Family Party, and was not in contact with Peter. Several days 

later, D’s parents called police officers, who interviewed D.

Several months later, in about February or March 2014, 

Children’s Hospital (through an investigator) called M’s parents 

requesting that M be brought in for a medical examination. M’s 

parents ignored the phone calls, and declined to bring her in for the 

examination. 

During the first trial that took place in April and May 2014, 

the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on any of the 

charges concerning Peter, C, M, or D. After the trial, the prosecutor 

learned that Peter and M’s brother David was also alleging that he 

was abused by defendant when he was younger.

B. The Second Trial

The second trial took place in February and March 2015. At 

the trial, C retracted her allegations against defendant and testified 

she made up the accusations to get defendant in trouble. There was 

evidence that C was under substantial pressure from her parents 

and other relatives not to testify against her uncle. However, the 

three other alleged victims (M, Peter, and D) testified in detail 

about the sexual abuse committed by defendant.

Eleven-year-old M testified to the incident in the bedroom 

during the Family Party (as summarized above), and also provided 

more detail about the past abuse. In summary, she said that 

defendant touched his penis to her vagina “[a] bunch of times” 

(“more than 10 times”) beginning when she was in kindergarten. 

She said that defendant “push[ed] his penis inside her “middle” 

(vaginal area) and “pushed” his penis inside the “hole” in her butt 

on numerous occasions (more than 10 times). She said these acts 

made her feel uncomfortable, and that she would feel pain “[w]hen 

he did it too hard.” She said that defendant also used his hands to 

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touch her chest. M said she did not tell her parents or her brothers 

because defendant told her not to tell anyone. She described 

various additional details, including the places where the abuse 

occurred (mainly bedrooms and bathrooms in various family 

homes).

Seventeen-year-old Peter testified that when he was eight 

years old defendant came into his bedroom and rubbed Peter’s 

testicles and penis for a lengthy period, telling Peter that it was a 

medical examination. He also described a similar touching in a 

room in a hair salon owned by a family member. Peter also 

described conversations with C in which she disclosed that 

defendant had sexually abused her on multiple occasions when she 

was younger.

Seventeen-year-old D testified that when she was eight or 

nine years old, she had a sleepover with her cousin C. As D was 

falling asleep, defendant came into the bedroom and began 

touching her legs. Defendant then pulled D’s pajama pants down 

and began touching her “private spot” (vagina). Defendant put his 

mouth on her vagina until D stopped it by getting up. Defendant 

then told her to go back to sleep and left the room. D woke up C to 

tell her what happened. D did not tell an adult what had happened 

because she was scared. When D was in eighth or ninth grade, she 

told her best friend (Y) about the molestation. In her testimony, Y 

confirmed this information. D also testified that, during another 

sleepover, C and D stayed up late at night and had a discussion 

about defendant. D and C each told the other about defendant 

molesting them.

The prosecution additionally presented the testimony of 15-

year-old David, the brother of Peter and M. As described in more 

detail below, David testified that defendant repeatedly touched his 

penis and testicles from the time David was about six or eight until 

he was about 13.

The evidence also showed some of the adults in the extended 

family (defendant’s siblings and parents) were pressuring these 

witnesses to recant their accusations.

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(ECF No. 7-25 at 2-9).

On March 17, 2015, a jury convicted Petitioner of 12 separate counts of 

a lewd act upon a child, against victims M, D, C, and Peter. (Pen. Code, § 

288(a)). As to M, the jury found defendant guilty of four lewd act offenses: 

two counts of “Penis to Vagina” and two counts of “Penis to Butt.” As to D, 

the jury found defendant guilty of two lewd act offenses: one count of “Mouth 

to Vagina” and one count of “Hand to Vagina.” As to C, the jury found 

defendant guilty of two counts of “Touching Private Parts” and two counts of 

“Touching Breasts.” As to Peter, the jury found defendant guilty of two lewd 

act counts: one count of “Hand to Penis” and one count of “Hand to Testicles.” 

The jury was unable to reach a verdict on count 13 pertaining to Peter (the 

alleged abuse at the nail salon), and that count was dismissed. (See ECF No. 

7-21 at 109-125). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a total prison term 

of 180 years to life. (ECF No. 7-17 at 16-17).

On November 10, 2015, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. (ECF No. 7-

22). Petitioner argued: (1) the prosecution team committed outrageous 

government conduct; (2) the sexual assault response team (“SART”) violated 

Petitioner’s due process rights by failing to perform a medical examination on 

the complaining witness who claimed to have repeatedly been raped and 

sodomized by Petitioner; (3) the trial court should have instructed the jurors 

to draw an adverse inference from the state’s failure to order medical tests

that, Petitioner argues, would likely have established his guilt or innocence 

as to the charges involving penetration, and alternatively trial counsel was 

ineffective by failing to request this instruction; (4) the trial court erred by 

admitting David’s testimony; and (5) cumulative errors deprived Petitioner of 

his right to a fair trial. (ECF No. 7-22 at 26-71). On August 30, 2016, the 

state appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. (ECF No. 7-25 at 

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28). 

On October 5, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the 

California Supreme Court, raising the same five issues raised in the state 

appellate court. (ECF No. 7-26 at 12-57). On November 22, 2016, the 

California Supreme Court denied the petition. (ECF No. 7-27).

B. Federal Proceedings

On October 17, 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1). Petitioner challenges his 

conviction on all five grounds previously raised in the state appellate court

and the California Supreme Court. 

On December 18, 2017, Respondent answered the Petition. (ECF No. 

6). On January 22, 2018, Petitioner filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 8). 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh, 521 U.S. 320. 

Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides the scope of review for federal habeas 

corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district 

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court only on the grounds that he is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any 

claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that 

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early 

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v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002).

Clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to 

the dicta, of [the United States Supreme] Court’s decisions . . . .” Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A state court’s decision may be “contrary 

to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent “if the state court applies a 

rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Court’s] cases” or “if 

the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable 

from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different 

from [the Court’s] precedent.” Id. at 405-06. A state court decision does not 

have to demonstrate an awareness of clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent, provided neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court 

decision contradict such precedent. Early, 537 U.S. at 8.

A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of 

Supreme Court precedent “if the state court identifies the correct governing 

legal rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of 

the particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. An 

unreasonable application may also be found “if the state court either 

unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a 

new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend 

that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id.; Wiggins v. 

Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th 

Cir. 2003). 

Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is 

available “if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule 

applies to a given set of facts that there could be no ‘fairminded 

disagreement’ on the question.” White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1706-07 

(2014) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86). An unreasonable 

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application of federal law requires the state court decision to be more than 

incorrect or erroneous. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). 

Instead, the state court’s application must be “objectively unreasonable.” Id. 

at 76; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). Even if a petitioner 

can satisfy § 2254(d), the petitioner must still demonstrate a constitutional 

violation. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-22 (2007).

Federal courts review the last reasoned decision from the state courts. 

See Ylst. v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991); Hibbler v. Benedetti, 

693 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2012). In deciding a state prisoner’s habeas 

petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with 

the state court’s determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily 

deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was 

objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 6 (2003); 

Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). The petitioner must 

establish that “the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in 

federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error . . . 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement . . . .” Burt v. Titlow, 

134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (citation omitted). It is not within a federal habeas 

court’s province “to reexamine state court determinations on state-law 

questions . . . .” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Claim 1: Outrageous Government Conduct

1. State Court Opinion

Petitioner presented this claim to the state appellate and California 

Supreme Court on direct review. (ECF Nos. 7-22; 7-26). The appellate court 

denied Petitioner’s claim on the merits and the California Supreme Court 

denied the petition without comment or citation to authority. (ECF Nos. 7-25 

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at 2; 7-27). Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the state appellate 

court’s opinion denying the claim as the basis for authority. Ylst, 501 U.S. 

805-06. That court wrote:

A. Lack of Medical Examination

Defendant raises several appellate contentions arising from 

the fact that no medical examination was conducted on M after she 

initially disclosed the sexual abuse to authorities. We first 

summarize the evidence relevant to the medical examination issue, 

and then address each of the contentions. We find no error.

Relevant Facts

M first disclosed the abuse to authorities on June 5 about 17 

days after the last abuse incident. She disclosed during a forensic 

interview with a social worker at the Chadwick Center at Rady’s 

Children’s Hospital (Chadwick Center). At the time, M reported 

penis to vagina contact, but indicated the touching was on the 

outside of her vaginal area. There was no evidence showing that 

the social workers or law enforcement requested or recommended 

that M undergo a physical examination at that time.

At trial, the prosecution and defense each presented a medical 

expert who testified on the issue of whether a medical examination 

should have been performed and what findings might have been 

expected if an examination had been performed. The prosecution’s 

expert was Dr. Jennifer Davis, the medical director of the Chadwick 

Center. The defense expert was Dr. Lynne Ticson, a pediatrician 

specializing in child sexual abuse who is the chief physician at Los 

Angeles County juvenile hall facilities.

Dr. Davis testified that the Chadwick Center does not 

generally perform a medical examination if a child is denying any 

contact. Dr. Davis said she was not consulted when M first 

disclosed the abuse about three weeks later, and she did not know 

why M was not initially offered a medical examination. Dr. Davis 

testified that generally if a child reports sexual abuse or sexual 

assault within 72 hours of the incident (characterized as the “acute” 

period), an examination should be conducted for forensic purposes, 

but after that time, the purpose of an examination is primarily for 

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healthcare reasons. She explained that well-established scientific 

studies show after the 72-hour period (or at the very most one 

week), physical injuries will be present in less than 5 percent of 

cases, and anal injuries are “extremely rare” and will be present in 

only 1 to 3 percent of cases. She also said that even with sexual 

intercourse on young girls, the vaginal “area heals rapidly and 

heals completely most of the time.” She stated that for a 10-yearold girl, a swab for DNA or sperm cells is generally conducted only 

within 72 hours of the alleged abuse because beyond that time 

period it is unlikely that any such evidence would remain. She also 

said that girls will often have a normal intact hymen even after 

sexual intercourse. She additionally stated that young girls often 

misidentify touching as penetration, explaining that touching to the 

outer vaginal area can feel to a young girl that the finger or penis 

has gone “inside” the vagina.

Dr. Ticson’s opinions were essentially consistent with Dr. 

Davis’s testimony on these issues. Dr. Ticson acknowledged that 

most sexual abuse injuries “heal rapidly” and most sexual abuse 

examinations of children do not result in physical findings, 

particularly after the 72-hour period. She agreed that studies have 

found that “ ‘Even with a history of severe abuse, such as vaginal 

or anal penetration, the rate of abnormal medical findings is only 

5.5 percent.’ ” Dr. Ticson discussed a possible exception to this rule 

if there is blunt force trauma and “full penetration” into a five-or 

six-year-old girl’s vaginal area. She said with such force, there 

could be substantial injury, including disruption of the hymen, 

vaginal tearing, bleeding, and internal damage. Dr. Ticson said 

that absent this form of trauma (which she said frequently does not 

occur with family member sexual abuse), most sexual abuse 

examinations of children do not result in physical findings. She also 

acknowledged that sometimes children do not have bleeding even if 

“sex is forced upon them.” She said that although a forensic medical 

examination of the vaginal area is “gentle,” if the child denies any 

abuse occurred, an examination is not “automatically done” and she 

would not force a child to have an examination. Dr. Ticson agreed 

that the history from the child is the most important diagnostic 

feature in determining whether abuse occurred.

Defendant contends the court had a duty to dismiss all 

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criminal charges because the undisputed evidence shows the state 

acted in an “outrageous” manner by failing to require M to undergo 

a medical examination. Defendant argues that the examination 

“would almost certainly have shown whether [M] had been 

regularly raped and sodomized for four years as she said.”

Defendant forfeited this argument by failing to raise it below. 

The proffered defense requires an analysis of facts, and is not 

purely a legal issue. (See People v. Velasco-Palacios (2015) 235 

Cal.App.4th 439, 445-446 (Velasco-Palacios).)

Even if we were to reach the issue, the contention has no 

merit. M first reported penis-vaginal contact about 17 days after 

the last incident. Both the prosecution expert and the defense 

expert testified that it is unlikely that a medical examination would 

disclose injuries after the 72-hour period. This defeats defendant’s 

contention that the examination “would almost certainly” have 

shown whether he committed the crime. Moreover, on the date of 

the first disclosure, there was no indication that M had been 

“regularly raped and sodomized.” M denied there was any 

penetration, and there was no indication she was in any kind of 

pain or distress. On this record, there is no basis for finding the 

social workers and/or law enforcement officials acted in an 

“outrageous” manner by failing to offer a forensic medical 

examination. Although both experts testified they would have 

preferred to have a medical examination at this first disclosure, 

both indicated this was primarily for healthcare reasons, and not to 

obtain evidence of the abuse.

Moreover, it is unclear whether and under what 

circumstances a wrongful governmental action can serve as valid 

grounds for dismissing criminal charges. But assuming the validity 

of this defense, it precludes a prosecution only “‘in the rarest and 

most outrageous of circumstances’ ” (Miller, The Case for Preserving 

the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense (1996) 91 Nw.U 

L.Rev. 305, 321), where a prosecution would violate “‘fundamental 

fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice,’ mandated by 

the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.” (United States v. 

Russell (1973) 411 U.S. 423, 432.)

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For example, in Velasco-Palacios, the reviewing court upheld 

the dismissal of criminal charges based on the trial court’s finding 

that the prosecutor had deliberately altered an interrogation 

transcript to add a false confession and had provided the transcript 

to defense counsel when the prosecutor knew the counsel was 

attempting to convince the defendant to settle the case. (VelascoPalacios, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 446-452.) Focusing on the 

prosecutor’s “conscience shocking” conduct of adding false 

information to a transcript and finding that this conduct materially 

interfered with the defendant’s right to counsel, the court 

determined the dismissal of the criminal charges was the 

appropriate sanction. (Ibid.)

There is no similar basis to dismiss the criminal charges in 

this case. Unlike a deliberate falsification of a defendant’s pretrial 

interrogation, there was no evidence showing the absence of a 

forensic medical examination on M reflected bad faith or any form 

of fundamental unfairness.

(ECF No. 7-25 at 10-15) (footnotes omitted).

B. Police Interviews Did Not Preclude a Fair Trial

Defendant contends the trial was unfair because the 

investigating officers acted wrongfully by asking “leading and 

improper questions” to minors. Defendant forfeited this argument 

because it was not asserted in the court below. Additionally, the 

argument fails on its merits.

Defendant primarily focuses on an interview of a witness (E) 

who never testified at trial. The trial court excluded E’s testimony 

because it found the questioning was “highly suggestive” and 

“unprofessional.” Because the jury was unaware of this interview 

and there is no indication the verdicts were based on statements 

made by E, there are no grounds for reversing the judgment based 

on the interview. 

With respect to the two other claimed suggestive interviews, 

we have examined the relevant testimony and find there was 

nothing fundamentally unfair about the interviews. First, with 

respect to C, defendant complains that the police officers asked her 

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leading and suggestive questions. However, despite these 

questions, the record reflects that C (who was 16 years old at the 

time) had previously volunteered specific information about the 

abuse to social workers. In recanting her accusations, C did not 

suggest her earlier statements were the result of an unfair police 

interview; instead she said she intentionally made up the false 

accusations to help Peter get her uncle into trouble. C’s statements 

to the police officers were also corroborated by Michael, C’s cousin, 

who had previously been in a close and friendly relationship with 

defendant. Shortly after C first disclosed, Michael picked up C from 

school, and on the way home, C repeated the same accusations 

against defendant. Finally, defense counsel conducted a strong 

cross-examination of the police officers involved in the interview, 

and the jury had full information to decide whether C’s responses 

were the result of an unfair interview or were made independently.

Second, with respect to Y’s interview, defendant complains 

that the prosecutor made improper efforts before trial to “get [Y] to 

say that [D] told her she had been ‘molested’ by appellant.” The 

record does not support this assertion. Defendant cites only to 

defense counsel’s argument to the court, and not to any alleged 

unfair questions. Further, after reviewing Y’s testimony, we are 

satisfied that Y testified from her own recollection and that any 

statements made to her during the pretrial interview did not 

improperly influence her testimony. Y was careful to explain that 

she remembered only generalities about the conversations with D. 

Defense counsel was given substantial latitude to vigorously crossexamine Y regarding her memory of the conversations, and the 

jury, as the trier of fact, had full information to decide whether Y 

was credible.

(ECF No. 7-25 at 18-20) (footnotes omitted).

2. Summary of Arguments

a. Lack of Medical Examination

Petitioner argues the government committed outrageous government

conduct by failing to medically examine the victim. (ECF No. 1-2 at 14). 

Petitioner further argues the state had a duty “to collect physical evidence 

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from a medical exam that would almost certainly have shown whether M[ ] 

had been regularly raped and sodomized for four years . . . .” (Id. at 15). 

Petitioner argues that the appellate court misapplied Supreme Court 

precedent in rejecting this claim. (Id. at 17). Petitioner argues that the 

appellate court should have found the state’s actions were outrageous for due 

process purposes and dismissed the charges. (Id.). 

Respondent first contends that this claim was forfeited by the failure to 

raise it at trial. (ECF No. 6-1 at 22). Respondent argues that “[t]he State 

simply has no duty to gather evidence.” (Id. at 23). Respondent argues that

Petitioner’s argument is meritless and the appellate court’s decision should 

be upheld because it was reasonable. (Id. at 22, 24).

b. Police Interviews

Petitioner argues that the government committed outrageous 

government conduct by allowing police officers to question several of the 

alleged victims with leading and inappropriate questions. (ECF No. 1 at 11). 

Petitioner contends only highly trained social workers should be allowed to 

interview child victims of sexual abuse. (Id. at 16). Petitioner further argues 

that the type of questioning used by the officers resulted in “improper 

coaching or even witness tampering” and maintains that the investigation 

techniques employed by the officers “is shocking to the conscience.” (Id. at 

17).

Respondent argues this claim is also forfeited and defaulted by failure 

to make any objection in the trial court. (ECF No. 6-1 at 25). Respondent 

argues there is no Supreme Court precedent for this claim and who conducts 

victim interviews is not a basis for a constitutional violation. (Id. at 25). 

Respondent further argues that the jury had the ability to decide whether C’s 

responses were the result of an unfair interview and to determine Y’s

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credibility. (Id.). 

3. Legal Standard

The Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that outrageous government 

conduct may give rise to a due process defense. United States v. Russell, 411 

U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973). However, as noted previously, “clearly established 

federal law . . . refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta . . .” of the 

Supreme Court’s decisions at the time of the relevant state-court decision. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Thus, there is no clearly established Supreme 

Court law on an outrageous government conduct claim. 

4. Analysis

The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether a state’s actions 

reflected a form of fundamental unfairness which would constitute a claim of 

outrageous government conduct. Therefore, there is no clearly established 

federal law on the issue of outrageous government conduct for the appellate 

court’s decision to conflict with or be unreasonably applied. 

Furthermore, the appellate court’s decision that M was not required to 

undergo a medical examination was not based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. M first reported the conduct seventeen days after 

the last alleged incident with Petitioner. Medical experts for the prosecution 

and defense indicated it was highly unlikely there would be any physical 

findings of sexual abuse beyond 72 hours after the last incident. 

Additionally, the primary purpose for conducting such an examination is to 

determine the health and well-being of the victim, not to obtain evidence. 

Moreover, Petitioner’s claim that the police interviewing the witnesses

led to “improper coaching” also fails. Petitioner primarily focuses on the 

testimony of a witness, E, whose testimony was never used at trial. As to the 

other two witnesses Petitioner contends were improperly coached, C and Y,

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the defense had ample opportunity to cross-examine them and the jury was 

left to determine the credibility of the two witnesses from the evidence 

presented. Additionally, there is no clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent which requires only trained social workers, rather than police 

officers, to conduct interviews of sexual abuse victims. Thus, the appellate 

court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law.

Petitioner has done nothing to show that government’s conduct was 

grossly shocking here and nothing in his claim establishes that the 

government’s actions violated the universal sense of justice. The Court 

therefore RECOMMENDS habeas relief be DENIED as to Claim 1.

B. Claim 2: SART’s Failure to Perform a Medical Examination and

Preserve Potential Evidence

1. State Court Opinion

Petitioner presented this claim to the state appellate and the California 

Supreme Court on direct review. (ECF Nos. 7-22; 7-26). The appellate court 

denied Petitioner’s claim on the merits and the California Supreme Court 

denied the petition without comment or citation to authority. (ECF Nos. 7-25 

at 2; 7-27). Accordingly, this Court must again “look through” to the state 

appellate court’s opinion denying the claim as the basis for authority. Ylst, 

501 U.S. 805-06. That court wrote:

In a related argument, defendant contends his due process 

rights were violated because the state did not preserve potentially 

exculpatory evidence by conducting a forensic medical examination 

on M. He argues the failure to conduct the examination violated 

his due process rights because it was “likely” to show his “guilt or 

innocence.”

Defendant forfeited this argument by not raising it below. He 

asks this court to nonetheless reach his contention because it is “an 

important constitutional issue” and “the facts here are undisputed.” 

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However, the forfeiture doctrine applies to constitutional issues. 

(See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn.17; People v. 

Navarro (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1347, fn. 9.)

Moreover, the relevant undisputed facts do not support 

defendant’s contention. Under California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 

U.S. 479 (Trombetta), the state has a duty “to preserve ‘evidence 

that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s 

defense.’ ” (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 837, italics 

added.) Defendant is asking this court to extend that principle to 

impose a duty on the state to collect potentially exculpatory 

evidence. Even assuming there is support for such an extension 

(see Montes, at p. 838; Miller v. Vasquez (9th Cir. 1989) 868 F.2d 

1116, 1120), a Trombetta duty arises only where the exculpatory 

value of the evidence is “apparent” (Montes, at p. 837). As discussed 

above, it would not have been apparent to law enforcement officials 

that a medical examination would benefit defendant’s case. The 

testimony from both experts supported that when M first disclosed 

the abuse, it was unlikely there would be any physical findings to 

support a true claim of abuse. Thus, a physical examination would 

have little or no probative value to support a defense to the sexual 

abuse charges.

Further, there is no due process violation on a failure-topreserve claim unless the defendant shows law enforcement acted 

in bad faith with an “animus towards [the defendant] or [a] 

conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.” (Trombetta, 

supra, 467 U.S. at p. 488.) There was no evidence of a conscious 

effort to suppress evidence in this case. 

Defendant contends an “important constitutional issue” is 

“whether there is a due process obligation for the police to gather 

potentially exculpatory evidence . . . through a routine medical 

exam that would likely show the defendant’s guilt or innocence as 

to one of the victims . . . .” (Italics added.) However, this issue is 

not presented here because the factual predicate is missing. There 

is no evidence in the record showing the medical examination would 

“likely show . . . defendant’s guilt or innocence . . . .”

(ECF No. 7-25 at 15-17).

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2. Summary of Arguments

Petitioner argues the state’s failure to order a medical examination and 

gather potential evidence violated due process. (ECF No. 1 at 20). Petitioner 

claims the state acted in bad faith by refusing to test the evidence that may 

have proved his innocence. (Id.). Petitioner further argues that the 

examination was not ordered because either the officer lacked the medical 

knowledge that evidence of penetration will exist after 72 hours, or feared 

that the evidence might not yield the desired results. (Id.). Petitioner 

maintains that the error was “fundamental and compels federal habeas 

corpus relief.” (Id. at 22). 

Respondent argues there is no clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent requiring a child victim of sexual abuse to undergo an examination 

and therefore this Court should defer to the state court’s decision. (ECF No. 

6-1 at 22-24). Respondent maintains this is not a case of destruction of 

evidence because there was no evidence to destroy. (Id. at 22-23). 

Additionally, Respondent argues the government was not acting in bad faith 

when they chose not to pursue a medical examination and that Petitioner 

cannot establish the evidence would have been exculpatory. (Id.). 

3. Legal Standard

Generally, law enforcement officials have a duty to preserve “evidence 

that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.” 

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984). While the Supreme Court 

has not directly addressed the duty to collect potentially exculpatory

evidence, some courts have held that Trombetta imposes a duty to collect 

such evidence. Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(finding the failure to collect potentially exculpatory evidence could be a due 

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process violation). However, this duty applies only to “material evidence, i.e., 

evidence whose exculpatory value was apparent before its destruction and 

this is of such nature that the defendant cannot obtain comparable evidence 

from other sources.” Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(citing Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489). Additionally, failing to preserve 

potentially exculpatory evidence only amounts to a due process violation 

when the petitioner “can show bad faith” on the part of the government. 

Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); Miller, 868 F.2d at 1120 

(“Since, in the absence of bad faith, the police’s failure to preserve evidence 

that is only potentially exculpatory does not violate due process, then a 

fortiori neither does the good faith failure to collect such evidence violate due 

process.”). Bad faith “turns on the government’s knowledge of the apparent 

exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.” 

Martinez v. Barnes, No. 2:12-cv-2975 KJM GGH P, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

153102, 2013 WL 5773108 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2013) (citing Youngblood, 

488 U.S. at 56-57; United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993)).

4. Analysis

The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether the government 

has an affirmative duty to conduct medical examinations on complaining 

sexual assault victims. However, assuming that such a duty does exist the 

appellate court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of or contrary 

to federal law. 

As established, requiring M to undergo a medical examination, by the 

time she reported to the authorities, would not have provided any 

exculpatory or material evidence. M first reported to the authorities 

seventeen days after the last alleged incident with Petitioner. Testimony 

from medical experts in the field of child sexual abuse indicated it was highly 

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unlikely there would be any physical findings of sexual abuse after the 72-

hour period had passed from the last alleged incident. Additionally, both 

experts indicated the primary reason for conducting a medical examination 

after a child is sexually abused is to determine the health and well-being of 

the victim, not to collect evidence. Therefore, the results of the medical 

examination, which Petitioner purports to have shown his guilt or innocence, 

would have had little or no probative value and the state refraining from 

conducting such an examination was not a violation of due process. 

Moreover, Petitioner’s claim the government acted in bad faith is also 

without merit. Petitioner has done nothing to establish the state had 

knowledge a medical examination would produce any evidence or

intentionally refused to conduct an examination in bad faith. Instead 

Petitioner has only alleged that the state lacked the knowledge an 

examination would produce exculpatory evidence or were afraid of an 

examination’s possible results. However, Petitioner’s allegations conflict with 

the testimony of his own expert. Petitioner has no further basis for his

claims other than mere speculation and failed to show that the government 

made a conscious effort to suppress any potential evidence. An examination 

was highly unlikely to yield any type of physical findings that would 

materially prove or disprove the victim was subjected to sexual abuse after 72 

hours. Thus, it would not have been apparent to the state that a medical 

examination was required to produce any material evidence.

Without showing the evidence was apparent or the government acted in 

bad faith, Petitioner’s claim essentially asks this Court to unreasonably 

extend the government’s duty to a new context where it should not apply. 

The Court therefore RECOMMENDS habeas relief be DENIED as to Claim 

2.

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C. Claim 3: Jury Instruction on Adverse Inference From Lack of 

Medical Examination and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. State Court Opinion

Petitioner presented this claim to the state appellate and the California 

Supreme Court on direct review. (ECF Nos. 7-22; 7-26). The appellate court 

denied Petitioner’s claim on the merits and the denied the petition without 

comment or citation to authority. (ECF Nos. 7-25 at 2; 7-27). Accordingly, 

this Court must again “look through” to the state appellate court’s opinion 

denying the claim as the basis for authority. Ylst, 501 U.S. 805-06. That 

court wrote:

Defendant contends the court erred in failing to sua sponte 

instruct the jury that “if [M] had been physically examined, there 

would have been no evidence of an injury, even a healed injury, and 

that fact alone could be found to establish reasonable doubt.” We 

reject this argument because the proposed instruction is not an 

accurate statement of the law or facts.

Defendant relies on People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88 

(Zamora), in which the California Supreme Court reversed the 

defendant’s convictions for resisting arrest and assaulting police 

officers because the officers’ personnel files were wrongfully

destroyed by the city before trial. (Id. at pp. 93-104.) In remanding 

the case for retrial, the high court determined that as a sanction for 

the city’s wrongful destruction of the evidence, the jury should be 

instructed the destroyed files contained evidence the officers had 

used excessive force in the past and that the jury may rely on this 

information to infer the officers were prone to use excessive or 

unnecessary force. (Id. at pp. 99-103.)

Zamora is inapplicable here. There is no showing a public 

entity engaged in wrongful conduct in this case. No evidence was 

destroyed and there was no duty to conduct a medical examination 

under the circumstances. Moreover, defendant’s proposed 

instruction is incorrect and confusing. Even according to his own 

expert, the absence of injuries to a child abuse victim does not 

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constitute reasonable doubt. As stated above, Dr. Ticson testified 

that “most” examinations of children do not result in physical 

findings.

Because the instruction is not legally correct, there was no sua 

sponte duty for the court to give the instruction. (People v. Kelly

(1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 532.) We likewise reject defendant’s 

contention that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request the 

instruction. 

(ECF No. 7-25 at 17-18) (footnotes omitted).

2. Summary of Arguments

Petitioner argues the trial court, sua sponte, should have instructed the 

jurors to draw an adverse inference from the state’s failure to order the 

medical test. (ECF No. 1-2 at 23). Petitioner contends that in “cases where 

the police have failed to preserve exculpatory evidence, the courts have 

emphasized the remedy of instructing the jurors to draw an adverse inference 

from the state’s failure.” (Id.). Petitioner, in the alternative, contends his 

trial counsel was ineffective because counsel “failed to request an instruction 

informing the jurors the failure to conduct the exam could, by itself, 

exonerate petitioner.” (Id.). Petitioner further argues it was “more than 

reasonably probable to assume [he] would have received a better result” if the 

jury did receive such an instruction. (Id. at 25-26). Petitioner argues “[t]he 

failure to properly charge the jury with a curative instruction rendered the 

trial fundamentally unfair.” (Id. at 26).

Respondent argues this claim should be rejected because a challenge to 

jury instructions does not generally state a federal constitutional claim. 

(ECF No. 6-1 at 26). Respondent contends that Petitioner’s instruction is

“misleading, confusing, and incorrectly state[s] the law.” (Id. at 28). 

Respondent further argues Petitioner has failed to show deficient 

performance and prejudice of trial counsel to warrant a showing of ineffective 

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assistance of trial counsel. (Id.). 

3. Legal Standard

In the context of federal habeas petitions, a challenge to jury 

instructions does not generally state a federal constitutional claim. Estelle v. 

Mcguire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-71 (1991) (stating “the fact that the instruction was 

allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis for habeas relief.”); see also

Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 (1983) (“The Due Process Clause 

does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the 

wisdom of state evidentiary rules.”). To establish a federal due process 

violation for failure to give jury instructions, Petitioner must demonstrate 

that the omission “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction 

violates due process” and not whether “the instruction is undesirable, 

erroneous, or even universally condemned.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 

145, 154 (1977) (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). When a 

challenge to jury instructions is based on the refusal or failure, sua sponte,

instruct the jury, the burden on the petitioner is “especially heavy” because 

“[a]n omission, or an incomplete instruction is less likely to be prejudicial 

than a misstatement of the law.” See id. at 155. 

Even if a petitioner meets the heavy burden of proving a trial court’s 

failure to instruct the jury violated due process, habeas relief is not available 

unless the petitioner can also prove such an error had a “substantial and 

injurious effect of influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” and resulted in 

“actual prejudice.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting 

United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)); Kotteakos v. United States, 

328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); see also California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner 

must show two things. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

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First, he must establish counsel’s performance was “deficient” in that it fell 

below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional 

norms. Id. Second, he must demonstrate “the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687-88. To satisfy the first prong, the acts or 

omissions must fall “outside the wide range of professionally competent 

assistance.” Id. at 690. A petitioner must show “that counsel made errors so 

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 

[petitioner] by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. To satisfy the second 

prong, a petitioner must show a “reasonable probability that but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome.” Id. at 694.

Moreover, a habeas court’s review of a claim under the Strickland

standard is “doubly deferential.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 129 

(2009). When AEDPA applies, “the question is not whether counsel’s actions

were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument 

that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). As long as there is a “reasonable 

justification for the state court’s decision,” the state court decision will be 

upheld. Id. at 109. 

4. Analysis

There is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent requiring trial 

courts sua sponte to instruct the jury. Thus, to the extent Petitioner 

challenges the trial court’s application of California law in declining to 

instruct the jury, sua sponte, he has not stated a claim cognizable on federal 

habeas review. 

Petitioner wanted the jury to be instructed that if a medical

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examination had been conducted, there would have been no evidence of any 

injury, even a healed injury, and that fact alone could establish reasonable 

doubt. Petitioner’s argument conflicts with his own expert who stated the 

absence of injuries on a victim of childhood sexual abuse does not constitute 

reasonable doubt. Thus, Petitioner’s jury instruction was not factually or 

legally correct, and its omission was not prejudicial to the defense. 

Additionally, Petitioner’s expert also stated the most important diagnostic 

method to determine if any sexual abuse occurred is the child’s testimony of 

the events and Petitioner’s victims provided ample testimonial evidence 

against him. 

Furthermore, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance also fails 

because his claim has not met the requirements set forth in Strickland. 

Petitioner has not established his trial counsel was objectively unreasonable 

or that the results of the trial would have been different if his trial counsel 

had requested such an instruction, other than mere speculation. Medical 

experts for the prosecution and defense testified to the factual opposite of 

Petitioner’s purported jury instruction. Therefore, Petitioner’s trial counsel 

acted reasonably in not requesting an instruction that was incorrect and 

misleading. Petitioner has also failed to establish that the instruction’s 

omission resulted in “actual prejudice” other than making a conclusory 

argument that it was “more than reasonably probable to assume [he] would 

have received a better result” which does not meet the requirements of 

Strickland. Thus, the actions of counsel were reasonable and did not 

prejudice the defense. 

Petitioner has not met the heavy burden of showing that the omission of 

the instruction so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction 

violated due process or that his counsel was ineffective under Strickland. 

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Thus, the appellate court’s decision is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. The Court therefore 

RECOMMENDS habeas relief be DENIED as to Claim 3. 

D. Claim 4: Admission of David’s Testimony at Trial

1. State Court Opinion

Petitioner presented this claim to the state appellate and the California 

Supreme Court on direct review. (ECF Nos. 7-22; 7-26). The appellate court 

denied Petitioner’s claim on the merits and the California Supreme Court 

denied the petition without comment or citation to authority. (ECF Nos. 7-25 

at 2; 7-27). Accordingly, this Court must again “look through” to the state 

appellate court’s opinion denying the claim as the basis for authority. Ylst, 

501 U.S. 805-06. That court wrote:

A. Factual Background

Before trial, the prosecutor moved to admit the testimony of 

16-year-old David (the brother of Peter and M) under section 1108, 

which permits the admission of uncharged sex offenses as 

propensity evidence. The prosecutor made an offer of proof that 

David would testify that defendant touched David’s penis when he 

was between the ages of eight and 10 years old. The prosecutor said 

he had been previously unaware of David’s allegations because his 

parents had refused to permit an interview with him. The 

prosecutor said that when the parents finally allowed a 

conversation, David disclosed the abuse. 

Defendant opposed the motion on numerous grounds, 

including that the alleged improper touching was remote; David’s 

statement lacked credibility as there is no corroborating evidence; 

David likely had been “pressured by his older brother Peter to join 

him in the allegations”; and the testimony would be confusing as 

defendant was not being charged with the alleged conduct against 

David.

The court decided to conduct a section 402 hearing to consider 

David’s credibility and the potential relevance of the evidence. At 

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the hearing, David testified he “remember[ed] a few occurrences 

where [defendant] has touched my private place,” meaning “my 

testicles and my . . . balls.” He later clarified that he was referring 

to his penis and his testicles. He said his uncle would “grab” his 

penis and “move it around” and would “grab [his testicles] and 

squeeze.” He said this occurred on multiple occasions from the time 

he was six or seven years old until he was 13 years old when he 

“started becoming a teenager.” David said he did not tell anyone 

because he was afraid.

During cross-examination, David said he was told he had been 

asked to testify because “Peter . . . said that [defendant] raped him 

and also me.” He testified that during the Family Party, Peter 

repeatedly attempted to “convince” him that he had been raped by 

his uncle, but that he (David) had denied it. David also said he had 

been “[c]onflicted” about what he should do because Peter had told 

him “what to say,” whereas his father had instructed him to “lie” 

about his uncle (defendant). But David also testified that Peter told 

him he “should always tell the truth and never make stuff up, even 

if you can’t remember and stuff . . . .” David also made a series of 

conflicting statements about whether and when he spoke with his 

mother about defendant’s conduct, and the nature of that 

disclosure.

After considering the testimony and arguments, the court 

ruled David’s testimony was admissible under section 1108. The 

court reasoned that it found David was believable, despite that 

there would be substantial room for cross-examination on bias, 

memory, and credibility issues. The court noted that David 

appeared to be immature, nervous, and not highly articulate, and 

it was uncertain whether “this is all a figment of his imagination or 

if he was really touched.” But the court found it was the jury’s role 

to make this credibility determination.

At trial, David testified that defendant touched his penis and 

testicles many times under and over his clothes. He said defendant 

“would thrust his hand under pan[t]s,” and would squeeze his 

testicles and would “move[ ]” his penis “around.” He said the 

touchings began when he was six or eight years old, and continued 

until he was 13 years old. He said he was “[v]ery certain” that these 

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touchings had occurred. He said that they happened when he was 

alone in a bedroom with his uncle and identified the houses where 

the abuse had taken place. David said he never told his parents 

because he did not know how they would react. He said he did not 

disclose the touchings to anyone until he spoke with the prosecutors 

in September 2014.

Regarding the Family Party, David remembered one “cousins” 

meeting, and said that during the meeting Peter kept telling him 

that he had been “raped” by his uncle and David had repeatedly 

denied it. David also said he spoke with Peter about coming to 

court, and Peter told him to “[a]lways tell the truth.” David said 

his father (defendant’s brother) told him to lie and not disclose any 

abuse and that David would “be dead to him” if David did not “lie.” 

During cross-examination, David agreed he had previously said 

Peter told him to say that he was molested.

B. Legal Principles

Section 1101 prohibits the admission of evidence to show a 

defendant’s propensity to commit a particular crime. Section 1108,

subdivision (a) creates an exception to this rule by permitting the 

admission of a prior sexual offense for any relevant purpose, 

including to show the defendant’s propensity to commit the current 

sexual offense. (People v. Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 60; People v. 

Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911.) “With the enactment of section 

1108, the Legislature ‘declared that the willingness to commit a 

sexual offense is not common to most individuals; thus, evidence of 

any prior sexual offenses is particularly probative and necessary for 

determining the credibility of the witness.’” (People v. Soto (1998) 

64 Cal.App.4th 966, 983.)

Defendant does not challenge that David’s testimony was 

potentially admissible under section 1108 as propensity evidence, 

but contends the court erred in denying his motion to exclude the 

evidence under section 352. 

In considering the admission of section 1108 sexual offense 

evidence, the court should conduct a section 352 balancing analysis 

and exclude the evidence if “its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the probability that its admission will necessitate 

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undue time consumption or create substantial danger of undue 

prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.” (People v. 

Loy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 61-64; accord, People v. Falsetta, supra, 

21 Cal.4th at p. 917.) This determination “‘is entrusted to the sound 

discretion of the trial judge who is in the best position to evaluate 

the evidence.’” (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 917-918.) We 

must uphold the trial court’s ruling unless it “‘falls outside the 

bounds of reason.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 

371; see People v. Avila (2014) 59 Cal.4th 496, 515; People v. Loy, 

supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 61; People v. Miramontes (2010) 189

Cal.App.4th 1085, 1098.)

The court did not abuse its discretion. David’s testimony 

about the abuse reflected actions similar to the charged conduct–

engaging in secretive sexual abuse against his prepubescent nieces 

and nephews within the family homes. Defendant’s actions against 

David (if believed by the jurors) were thus highly probative to show 

defendant had the propensity to commit this type of crime and 

made it more likely he engaged in comparable acts against David’s 

siblings and cousins. Additionally, David’s testimony was brief and 

there was little likelihood the jury would become confused or 

distracted by the evidence. Further, the abuse against David was 

not more inflammatory than the charged crimes. If anything, it was 

relatively less substantial. Unlike the abuse committed against M 

and C, the offenses involved fondling and not attempted 

penetration.

In arguing the court abused its discretion, defendant focuses 

primarily on issues surrounding David’s credibility, particularly 

given David’s late reporting and his admissions that his brother 

Peter had told him what to say. However, as the trial court found, 

the weaknesses in David’s testimony pertained to the weight of the 

evidence, not its admission. The court had the opportunity to 

observe and consider David’s testimony, and found that he was 

fundamentally a believable witness on the basic fact that he had 

been subjected to unwanted sexual touchings by defendant. After 

hearing the testimony and viewing David’s demeanor and body 

language, the court said that “I do not feel he’s lying.” The court 

recognized the weaknesses in David’s testimony and that a jury 

may not agree with its credibility assessment, but found the jury 

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should have the opportunity to consider the evidence and make its 

own determination.

The court did not abuse its discretion in reaching these 

conclusions. The reliability and credibility of a witness are matters 

for the jury to decide, and therefore inconsistencies in the testimony 

or biases or memory problems generally are not grounds for 

precluding the admission of the evidence under section 352. (See 

People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 57; People v. Anderson

(2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 587; People v. Mullens (2004) 119 

Cal.App.4th 648, 660.) Although David suggested at times that he 

was told what to say by Peter, he also said Peter told him to tell the 

truth and that he was conflicted because his father was telling him 

to lie and say there was no improper conduct. The court did not 

abuse its discretion in finding the jury should make the credibility 

determination.

We also reject defendant’s contention the evidence should 

have been excluded because it was remote. According to David’s 

testimony, the sexual touchings continued until he was about 13 

years old. Since David was 16 years old when he testified, the abuse 

evidence was not remote. Further, many of the alleged abusive acts 

against David occurred during the same period as the charged 

offenses.

We likewise reject defendant’s contention the evidence was 

unduly cumulative. There was no other evidence showing David 

had also been a victim of defendant’s sexual abuse, and the fact that 

defendant had also abused Peter’s younger male sibling had 

material probative value. In this regard, it is significant that the 

trial court refused to permit the prosecutor to present the testimony 

of two other claimed victims under section 1108. This ruling shows 

the court carefully weighed the proposed testimony and understood 

the scope of its discretion to disallow section 1108 evidence. Based 

on the court’s detailed explanation for its ruling, we are satisfied 

the court carefully balanced the relevant factors, and acted within 

its discretion in determining the defendant did not meet his burden 

to show the probative value of David’s testimony was substantially 

outweighed by the prejudicial effect.

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Further, even assuming the court abused its discretion in 

admitting the prior sexual offense evidence, the error is not 

reversible unless the defendant shows a reasonable probability he 

would have obtained a more favorable result had the court excluded 

the prior acts evidence. (See People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 

894, 924; People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 924-925; People 

v. Walker (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 782, 808; People v. Mullens, 

supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 658-659.) Defendant has not made 

this showing in this case.

Defense counsel effectively cross-examined David regarding 

his memory, his late disclosure, and the pressure various family 

members placed on him regarding his testimony. Under the 

circumstances, it is highly doubtful the jury would have been 

persuaded that defendant was guilty of the charged offenses based 

solely on David’s testimony. If anything, David’s testimony had the 

potential to help defendant’s case. Portions of David’s testimony 

supported the defense theory that Peter had convinced his cousins 

and siblings to falsely accuse defendant in order to retaliate against 

defendant. David’s statements that during the Family Party, Peter 

repeatedly told him he had been “raped” by defendant and that 

David had denied this assertion was consistent with the defense 

case. On our review of the entire record, we are confident that even 

if the court had not permitted David to testify, the outcome would 

have been the same. On this issue, we find unhelpful defendant’s 

focus on the fact that David did not testify in the first trial. Without 

a full comparison between the trials, it is speculative to conclude 

that this one witness made the difference in the outcome.

(ECF No. 7-25 at 20-27) (footnotes omitted).

2. Summary of Arguments

Petitioner argues the trial court “erred by allowing the testimony of a 

new alleged victim to get to the jury.” (ECF No. 1-2 at 33). Petitioner further 

contends “[t]his is a terrible misuse of section 1108 and one that served to 

render the trial unfair.” (Id.). Petitioner also argues David’s testimony was 

unreliable, which violates the threshold for admission. (Id. at 31). Petitioner 

argues the error was prejudicial because the addition of David’s testimony in 

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the second trial was ultimately the reason for his conviction. (Id. at 35). 

Respondent argues that the Supreme Court has not yet issued a ruling 

on the admissibility of evidence, even allegedly prejudicial evidence, so there 

can be no relief granted in this case. (ECF No. 6-1 at 32). Respondent argues 

that the question of whether David’s testimony lacked credibility was a 

matter for the jury to decide. (Id. at 32). Respondent concludes that because 

the California courts found no error in the admission of the evidence under 

California law, this Court must accept that decision and cannot grant relief. 

(Id. at 34).

3. Legal Standard

Improper admission of evidence under California state law “is not part 

of a federal court’s habeas review of a state conviction.” Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to 

reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Id. Typically, 

“a state court’s evidentiary ruling, even if erroneous, is grounds for federal 

habeas relief only if it renders the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair 

as to violate due process.” Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 977-78 (9th Cir. 

1999). Although the Supreme Court has been clear that a writ should be 

issued when constitutional errors have rendered a trial fundamentally unfair, 

it has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly

prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant 

issuance of a writ. Absent such clearly established federal law, federal courts

cannot conclude that a state court’s ruling was an unreasonable application. 

Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009).

In order to establish that admitting certain evidence violated a criminal 

defendant’s due process rights, the Petitioner must demonstrate that the 

admission of the evidence “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the 

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traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” 

Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977); see also Montana v. Egelhoff, 

518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996). A federal habeas petitioner must show that the 

admission of evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the 

trial fundamentally unfair. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 

1995); see McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that 

even where evidence was erroneously admitted, due process is violated only if 

“the erroneously admitted evidence was of such quality as necessarily 

prevents a fair trial” and that the evidence actually prevented a fair trial).

4. Analysis

There is no established Supreme Court precedent governing a trial 

court’s discretionary decision to admit evidence as a violation of due process. 

Therefore, the appellate court’s decision was not an unreasonable application 

of or contrary to clearly established federal law. 

Admitting David’s testimony about the abuse he suffered was not 

arbitrary and was relevant because it echoed actions similar to the conduct 

charged by the victims. Additionally, the appellate court recognized David’s 

testimony had weaknesses which could establish Peter had convinced the 

other witnesses to falsely accuse Petitioner, which would aid, rather than 

hinder, Petitioner’s argument. Thus, David’s testimony was reasonably 

admitted and was not prejudicial to Petitioner’s case. Under the highly 

deferential standard established by AEDPA, the state court’s decision is not 

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. The Court 

therefore RECOMMENDS habeas relief be DENIED as to Claim 4.

E. Claim 5: Cumulative Errors

1. State Court Opinion

Petitioner presented this claim to the state appellate and the California 

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Supreme Court on direct review. (ECF Nos. 7-22; 7-26). The appellate court 

denied Petitioner’s claim on the merits and the California Supreme Court 

denied the petition without comment or citation to authority. (ECF Nos. 7-25 

at 2; 7-27). Accordingly, this Court must again “look through” to the state 

appellate court’s opinion denying the claim as the basis for authority. Ylst, 

501 U.S. 805-06. That court wrote:

Defendant contends we must reverse his conviction because 

the accumulation of errors deprived him of a fair trial. Because we 

have rejected his contentions of error, we necessarily reject the 

cumulative error claim. (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 294; 

People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 335.) The record 

demonstrates that defendant received a fair trial and the verdicts 

were supported by substantial evidence.

(ECF No. 7-25 at 27).

2. Summary of Arguments

Petitioner argues that the combination of errors raised entitles him to 

habeas relief. (ECF No. 1-2 at 36). Respondent argues the appellate court’s 

decision that there were no errors was reasonable. (ECF No. 6-1 at 35). 

3. Legal Standard

“The Supreme Court has clearly established the combined effect of 

multiple trial court errors violates due process where it renders the resulting 

trial fundamentally unfair.” Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 

2007) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973)). “The 

cumulative effect of multiple errors can violate due process even where no 

single error rises to the level of a constitutional violation or would 

independently warrant reversal.” Id. Where “there are a number of errors at 

trial, ‘a balkanized, issue-by-issue harmless error review’ is far less effective 

than analyzing the overall effect of all the errors in the context of the 

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evidence introduced at trial against the defendant.” United States v. 

Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. 

Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1476 (9th Cir. 1988)). Cumulative error warrants 

habeas relief only when the combined effect of the errors had a “substantial 

and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.” Parle, 505 F.3d at 927 

(quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).

4. Analysis

Although cumulative constitutional errors can make a trial 

fundamentally unfair, Petitioner has failed to establish such a claim. As set 

forth above, Petitioner has not established that any constitutional errors 

occurred at his trial. As such, there can be no cumulative effect to render 

Petitioner’s trial unfair. Therefore, the appellate court’s decision was not

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. The Court 

therefore RECOMMENDS habeas relief be DENIED as to Claim 5. 

V. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED 

that the District Judge issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this 

Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered 

DENYING this Petition.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than August 2, 2018, any 

party to this action may file written objections with this Court and serve a 

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report 

and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be 

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than August 9, 2018. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. 

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See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 5, 2018

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