Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LIONEL HARPER and DANIEL 

SINCLAIR, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly 

situated and all aggrieved 

employees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

Defendant.

No. 2:19-cv-00902 WBS DMC

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO STRIKE AND/OR DISMISS 

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Lionel Harper (“Harper”) and Daniel Sinclair

(“Sinclair”) brought this putative class action against defendant 

Charter Communications, LLC (“Charter”) alleging various 

violations of the California Labor and Business and Professions 

Code. (See First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket No. 45).) Before 

the court is Charter’s motion to strike and/or dismiss portions 

of plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 48.)

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 56 Filed 02/26/20 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Plaintiffs were employed by Charter as salespeople in 

California. (FAC ¶ 9.) Harper worked for Charter from September 

2017 to March 2018, and Sinclair worked for Charter from January 

2015 to December 2016. (Id.) During and after training weeks, 

plaintiffs allege they were erroneously treated as exempt 

employees because Charter mistakenly categorized them as “outside 

salespersons.” (Id.) Plaintiffs claim they were denied, inter 

alia, commission wages as a result of this misclassification. 

(Id. ¶ 10.) Harper initially brought this suit in California 

state court on behalf of himself and all similarly situated 

individuals, and Charter removed the action to this court. 

(Docket No. 1.) The court denied Harper’s motion to remand in 

July 2019 (Docket No. 23), and thereafter the parties stipulated 

to Harper filing a First Amended Complaint. (Docket Nos. 40, 

42.) Sinclair was added as a named plaintiff at that time. 

(Docket No. 45.) 

Collectively, plaintiffs allege ten causes of action: 

(1) failure to pay minimum wages for all hours worked in 

violation of California Labor Code §§ 1182.12, 1194, 1197, and 

1194.4; (2) failure to pay overtime wages for all overtime hours 

worked in violation of California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1197; (3) 

failure to provide meal periods or pay premium wages in lieu 

thereof in violation of California Labor Code §§ 512 and 226.7; 

(4) failure to provide rest breaks or pay premium wages in lieu 

thereof in violation of California Labor Code § 226.7; (5) 

unlawful calculation, deduction, and payment of commission wages 

under California Labor Code §§ 204, 221, 223, 224, and 2751; (6) 

failure to provide accurate wage statements in violation of 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 56 Filed 02/26/20 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

California Labor Code § 226; (7) failure to pay all wages owed 

upon termination in violation of California Labor Code § 203; (8) 

failure to provide timely and complete copies of employment 

records in violation of California Labor Code §§ 226, 432, and 

1198.5; (9) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law 

(“UCL”) under California Business and Professions Code § 17200; 

and (10) civil penalties under the Private Attorney General Act

(“PAGA”), Cal. Lab. Code § 2698, et seq. Charter now seeks to 

dismiss plaintiffs’ third, fourth, sixth, and ninth causes of 

action in full or in part for failure to state a claim pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and strike portions 

of the operative complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(f). (Mot. to Strike and Dismiss (“Mot.”) (Docket 

No. 48).) 

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss, the inquiry before the court is 

whether, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and 

drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor, the 

plaintiffs have stated a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim 

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff[s] plead factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A 

complaint that offers mere “labels and conclusions” will not 

survive a motion to dismiss. Id. (citations and quotations 

omitted).

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 56 Filed 02/26/20 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

1. Claims Three & Four: Failure to Provide Meal & 

Rest Periods

Under California Labor Code § 226.7, “[a]n employer 

shall not require an employee to work during a meal or rest.” 

Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7(b). These protections only extend to nonexempt employees. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7(e), 512. “[A]n 

employer has an obligation to relieve its employee of all duty, 

permit the employee to take an uninterrupted 30-minute break, and 

to not impede or discourage the employee from doing so.” Bradley 

v. Networkers Int’l, LLC, 211 Cal. App. 4th 1129, 1151 (4th Dist. 

2012) (citing Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 

1004, 1040 (2012)). Importantly, “an employer has an obligation 

to provide a rest break, and if the employer fails to do so, the 

employer cannot claim the employee waived the break.” Id. If 

the employer forces employees to miss required rest breaks, or 

does not provide employees with required rest breaks, then the 

employee is entitled to premium wages of “one additional hour of 

pay at the employee’s regular rate of compensation for each 

workday that the meal or rest . . . is not provided.” Cal. Lab. 

Code § 226.7(c). 

Defendant argues plaintiffs’ claim for failure to 

provide meal and rest periods under Labor Code § 226.7 should be 

dismissed because they were not entitled to meal breaks or rest 

periods as exempt employees, and even if they were, plaintiffs 

cannot plausibly allege that they were “actually forced to forgo

their [] breaks, if they were misclassified.” (Mot. at 16-17.

(emphasis original).) However, § 226.7 makes no mention of 

force; instead, “fail[ing] to provide an employee a meal or rest 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 56 Filed 02/26/20 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

or recovery period in accordance with a state law” is a violation 

of the statute. Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7(c). 

Under § 512(a), an employer “shall not employ an 

employee for a work period of more than five hours per day 

without providing the employee with a meal period of not less 

than 30 minutes.” Cal. Lab. Code § 512(a). Plaintiffs allege 

that during training weeks, employees were required “to work more 

than 8 hours in a day and 40 hours in a week.” (FAC ¶ 22.) 

Charter allegedly had no policy that designated meal periods and 

rest breaks for outside salespersons during training weeks. (Id.

¶¶ 34, 39.) Furthermore, Charter allegedly “did not require or 

allow Plaintiffs and Outside Salesperson Class members to clockout and clock-in for each meal period and to accurately record 

the existence and length of each meal period taken.” (Id. ¶ 34.) 

While Charter need not “police [] breaks and ensure no work 

thereafter is performed,” Brinker, 53 Cal. 4th at 1040, 

plaintiffs’ assertions plausibly allege that Charter did not 

provide breaks and its employees’ demanding schedules discouraged 

them from taking breaks. Accordingly, the court will deny 

defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ third and fourth causes

of action. Additionally, the court will deny defendant’s motion 

to strike references to meal and rest breaks throughout the 

complaint. 

2. Claim Six: Failure to Provide Wage Statements 

California Labor Code § 226 provides nine itemized 

requirements that must be included on employee wage statements. 

See Cal. Lab. Code § 226(a). Under the 2013 amendment to Labor 

Code § 226:

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 56 Filed 02/26/20 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

An employee is deemed to suffer injury . . . 

if the employer fails to provide accurate 

and complete information as required by one 

or more of [the section (a) requirements]

and if the employee cannot promptly and 

easily determine from the wage statement 

alone . . . . (i) [t]he amount of the gross 

wages or net wages paid to the employee 

during the pay period or any of the other 

information required to be provided on the 

itemized wage statement. 

Cal. Lab. Code § 226(2)(B) (emphasis added). 

Here, plaintiffs allege Charter failed to keep accurate 

records reflecting plaintiffs’ hours worked, deductions taken, 

and all gross and net wages earned, including minimum, overtime, 

and commission wages in violation of Labor Code § 226(a). (FAC 

¶¶ 51-52.) Under the 2013 amendment, plaintiffs are “deemed to 

suffer injury” upon a violation and allege as much. (See id. ¶ 

54 (“Plaintiffs . . . suffered injury as a result of Charter’s 

violations”).) Additionally, plaintiffs explicitly allege 

Charter’s violations were or are “knowing and intentional.” (Id.

¶ 53.) “Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a 

person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Reinhardt v. Gemini 

Motor Transp., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1142 (E.D. Cal. 2012)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 9(b)) (Ishii, J.). Accordingly,

plaintiffs have plausibly alleged their claim for failure to 

provide accurate wage statements, and the court will deny 

Charter’s motion to dismiss Claim Six. 

3. Claim Nine: Violation of California’s UCL 

Defendant moves to dismiss or strike plaintiffs’ ninth 

cause of action to the extent that it seeks restitution under the 

UCL for Charter’s alleged failure to provide compliant meal 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 56 Filed 02/26/20 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

periods and rest breaks under Labor Code § 226.7, complete and 

accurate wage statements under Labor Code § 226, and timely 

copies of employment records under Labor Code §§ 226(e)(1) and 

1198.5(k). (Mot. at 19.) In response to defendant’s motion to 

dismiss, plaintiffs withdrew their request for restitution under 

Labor Code §§ 226 and 1198.5(k). (Opp. to Mot. at 24 (Docket No. 

51).) However, plaintiffs maintain their claim to recover

restitution under the UCL for unpaid premium wages under Labor 

Code § 226.7. (Reply to Opp. at 12-13 (Docket No. 53).) 

California’s UCL prohibits “unlawful, unfair, or 

fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s].” Cal. Bus. & Prof. § 

17200. “Unlawful” business acts or practices are defined by

“other laws”, and the UCL then “treats them as unlawful practices 

that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” 

Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Cle-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 

163, 180 (1999)). Under the UCL, remedies are “generally limited

to injunctive relief and restitution.” Clark v. Superior Ct., 50 

Cal. 4th 605, 610 (2010). Damages are not recoverable. Id. 

Restitution concerns the power “to order the defendant to restore 

to any person in interest any money . . . which may have been 

acquired by means of any unlawful practice.” Cortez v. Purolator 

Air Filtration Prods. Co., 23 Cal. 4th 163, 177 (2000) (internal 

citations and modifications omitted). Defendant argues 

plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law because payments for 

meal and rest break violations are penalties, rather than wages 

subject to restitution. (Mot. at 20.) 

The Labor Code defines “wages” expansively, as “all 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 56 Filed 02/26/20 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

amounts for labor performed by employees of every description.” 

Cal. Lab. Code § 200(a). Regardless, the California Supreme 

Court has offered conflicting interpretations about whether 

premium wages recoverable under Labor Code § 226.7 are “wages” 

under other provisions of the Labor Code. In Murphy v. Kenneth 

Cole Products Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 1094, 1109 (2007), the court 

analogized premium payments to overtime pay, describing premium 

payments as both a penalty and a wage. Premium payments were

subject to the statute of limitations for wages because their 

primary purpose was to “compensate employees for their injuries.” 

Id. at 1110-11. In contrast, in Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, 

Inc., 53 Cal. 4th 1244, 1254 (2012), the court held “Section 

226.7 is not aimed at protecting or providing employees’ wages” 

because it is instead concerned with “ensuring the health and 

welfare of employees.” Consequently, “section 226.7 [] is not an 

action brought for nonpayment of wages; it is an action brought 

for non-provision of meal or rest breaks.” Id. at 1257. 

Following these cases, district courts have diverged on 

whether premium wages paid for meal and rest periods are “wages” 

under other provisions of the Labor Code, and furthermore, 

whether they are wages recoverable as restitution for purposes of 

the UCL. Compare Horton v. NeoStrata Co., No. 3:16-cv-02189-AJBJLB, 2017 WL 2721977, at *9 (S.D. Cal. June 22, 2017) (holding 

that meal premiums are wages and are recoverable under the UCL) 

with Francisco v. Emeritus Corp., No. CV17-02871-BRO (SSx), 2017 

WL 7790038, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2017) (holding meal 

period premiums are wages but are not subject to restitution 

under the UCL) and Guerrero v. Halliburton Energy Serv., Inc., 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 56 Filed 02/26/20 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

231 F. Supp. 3d 797, 808 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (holding meal period 

premiums do not constitute restitution recoverable under the UCL

without deciding whether they are wages).

The court need not resolve this dispute, however. See

Guerrero, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 808. Regardless of whether premium 

wages are “wages” under other provisions of the Labor Code,1

restitution under the UCL is intended to “restore the status quo 

by returning to the plaintiff funds in which he or she has an 

ownership interest.” Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 

29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1149 (2003). Consequently, restitution under 

the UCL is not available for all violations of the Labor Code. 

See Pineda v. Bank of Am., N.A., 50 Cal. 4th 1389, 1401-02 

(2010). In Pineda, the California Supreme Court held Labor Code 

§ 203 is “not designed to compensate employees for work performed

[but] it is intended to encourage employers to pay final wages on 

time, and to punish employers who fail to do so.” Id. Like 

 

1 The court notes that the California Supreme Court 

recently granted review of a case in which the lower court held 

premium wages paid for lost meal and rest periods were not 

“wages” for the purpose of accurate pay statements and did not 

entitle employees to pursue penalties under Section 226. See

Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc., 40 Cal. App. 5th 444, 270-

271 (2d Dist. 2019), review granted, 2020 WL 35452. While the 

grant itself is not suggestive of the merits, the court assumes,

without deciding, that premium wages are “wages” under other 

provisions of the Labor Code because of the Labor Code’s 

expansive definition of “wages.” See Cal. Lab. Code § 200(a); 

Murphy, 40 Cal. 4th at 1103 (defining wages to include “benefits 

to which an employee is entitled as part of his or her 

compensation, including money, room, board, clothing, vacation 

pay, and sick pay”) (collecting cases); see also Suarez v. Bank 

of Am. Corp., No. 19-cv-01202-MEJ, 2018 WL 3659302, at *12 (N.D. 

Cal. Aug. 2, 2018) (finding the majority of courts have held “the 

‘additional hour of pay’ premium owned for meal and rest 

violations is a ‘wage’”) (collecting cases). 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 56 Filed 02/26/20 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Section 203, Section 226.7 is “not an action brought for 

nonpayment of wages,” but is instead meant to incentivize 

employers to ensure the health and welfare of its employees. See 

Kirby, 53 Cal. 4th at 1256-57. Therefore, employees have no 

ownership interest in premium wages awarded for a § 226.7 

violation, and restitution would not serve to “restore the status 

quo” by returning plaintiffs’ funds to them. See Francisco, 2017 

WL 7790038, at *6; accord Guerrero, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 808. 

Accordingly, the court will grant defendant’s motion to 

dismiss or strike plaintiffs’ claim for restitution under the UCL 

to the extent it is predicated on § 226.7. Plaintiffs’ UCL 

claims founded on failures to timely and properly pay all 

minimum, overtime, and commission wages; taking of unlawful 

commission wage reductions and deductions; and misclassification 

are unchallenged and will remain operative. 

B. Motion to Strike

Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

allows the court to “strike from a pleading an insufficient 

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous 

matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Whether to grant a motion to 

strike is made at the Court’s discretion. See Fantasy, Inc. v. 

Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other 

grounds by Fogerty v. Fantastic, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994)). 

“Motions to strike should not be granted unless the matter to be 

stricken clearly could have no possible bearing on the subject of 

the litigation or unless prejudice would result to the moving 

party from denial of the motion.” Delgado v. Marketsource, Inc., 

No. 17-CV-07370-LHK, 2019 WL 1904216, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 56 Filed 02/26/20 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

2019) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The court 

must view the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Terpin v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 399 F. Supp. 3d 

1035, 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (citations omitted). 

1. Class and Subclass Claims

“An order striking class allegations is ‘functionally 

equivalent’ to an order denying class certification.” Microsoft 

Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1711 n.7 (2017). Although some 

courts have granted motions to strike class allegations under 

Rule 12(f), “it is in fact rare to do so in advance of a motion 

for class certification.” Rennick v. NPAS Sols., LLC, No. 19-cv02495-ODW(KSx), 2020 WL 244170, at *2 (quoting Cholakyan v. 

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1245 (C.D. Cal. 

2011) (collecting cases)). Indeed, while the Supreme Court has 

noted there are times in which “the issues are plain enough from 

the pleadings to determine whether the interests of the absent 

parties are fairly encompassed within the named plaintiff’s 

claim,” it did so in the face of a motion for class 

certification. See Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 

160 (1982). Consequently, other judges in this district have

recognized that “motions to strike class allegations are 

disfavored because a motion for class certification is a more 

appropriate vehicle for arguments pertaining to class 

allegations.” Olney v. Job.com, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-01724-LJO-SKO, 

2013 WL 5476813, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2013) (internal 

citations omitted).

As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, “[o]ur cases stand 

for the unremarkable proposition that often the pleadings alone 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 56 Filed 02/26/20 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

will not resolve the question of class certification and that 

some discovery will be warranted.” Vinole v. Countrywide Home 

Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009). The court is 

reluctant to strike plaintiffs’ class allegations before the 

parties have had an opportunity to proceed through discovery and 

the class certification process. Plaintiffs filed a motion to 

compel discovery on January 8, 2020, two days before the motion 

to strike was filed. (See Docket Nos. 47, 48.) Plaintiffs 

agreed to withdraw their discovery motion without prejudice after 

the parties stipulated to extending the dates and deadlines for 

plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. (Docket No. 49.) 

Accordingly, the court will deny defendant’s motion to strike the 

class allegations to allow discovery to proceed.

2. Claim Ten: PAGA Representative Allegations

District courts appear largely divided as to whether 

plaintiffs may bring representative PAGA claims without 

satisfying the requirement of manageability. See Silva v. 

Domino’s Pizza, No. SACV 18-2145 JVS (JDEx), 2019 WL 4187388, at 

*5 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2019) (collecting cases). Regardless of 

whether the manageability requirement applies in PAGA cases, the 

court finds defendant’s motion to strike premature. As previous 

courts have found, manageability issues are better addressed 

after discovery has concluded and class certification is 

determined. See, e.g., Litty v. Merril Lynch, No. CV14-0425 PA 

(PJWx), 2014 WL 5904904, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (striking PAGA 

claims after denial of class certification). Accordingly, the 

court will deny defendant’s motion to strike plaintiffs’ PAGA 

representative action.

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 56 Filed 02/26/20 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

3. Claim Ten: PAGA Claims for Labor Code Violations 

Defendant also moves to strike plaintiffs’ PAGA claims 

to the extent they are based on failure to timely provide 

personnel records under California Labor Code § 1198.5(k), wage 

statement violations under California Labor Code § 226, and

unpaid wages under California Labor Code § 558. (Mot. at 23-25.) 

When a section of the Labor Code does not provide for 

civil penalties, PAGA supplies default civil penalties. See Cal. 

Lab. Code § 2699(f). California Labor Code § 1198.5(k) allows 

employees to recover against their employers for failing “to 

permit a current or former employee, or his or her 

representative, to inspect or copy personnel records” within a 

set amount of time. Cal. Lab. Code § 1198.5. Similarly, Labor 

Code § 226 permits employees to recover for inaccurate wage 

statements. See Cal. Lab. Code § 226. However, the availability 

of statutory penalties payable directly to plaintiffs does not 

preclude recovery of civil penalties under PAGA for the same 

violation. See Tenorio v. Gallardo, No. 1:16-cv-00283 DAD JLT, 

2019 WL 338220, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2019) (holding the 

“weight of authority holds that plaintiffs are entitled to both 

statutory and civil penalties for the same violation of the 

California Labor Code”) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the 

court will deny defendant’s motion to strike California Labor 

Code §§ 1198.5(k) and 226 from plaintiffs’ PAGA action. 

California Labor Code § 558 permits plaintiffs to sue 

for underpayment. Cal. Lab. Code § 558(a). Plaintiffs and 

defendant agree that the California Supreme Court has expressly 

held PAGA “does not authorize employees to collect section 558’s 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 56 Filed 02/26/20 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

unpaid wages through a PAGA action.” See Mot. at 24-25, Opp. to 

Mot. at 29, citing ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 5th 175, 

188 (2019) (emphasis added). Consequently, plaintiffs have 

clarified that they only request civil penalties in conformity 

with ZB, N.A. Accordingly, the court will deny defendant’s 

motion to strike plaintiffs’ PAGA claim under Section 558. 

4. Request for Attorney’s Fees

The parties agree that attorneys’ fees are not 

recoverable under Labor Code §§ 218.5 or 1194 for violations of 

Section 226.7. (See Mot. at 23; Opp. at 26.) However, 

plaintiffs argue that attorneys’ fees can be recovered under 

California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5 if plaintiffs’ meal 

and rest break claims “result[] in the enforcement of an 

important right affecting the public interest.” Cal. Code Civ. 

P. § 1021.5. 

“Three basic criteria are required to support an award 

of attorneys' fees under [§ 1021.5]: (1) the action resulted in 

the enforcement of an important right affecting the public 

interest; (2) a significant benefit was conferred on the general 

public or a large class of persons; and (3) the necessity and 

financial burden of private enforcement were such as to make the 

award appropriate.” Abouab v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 141 

Cal. App. 4th 643, 663 (1st Dist. 2006). Plaintiffs assert their 

action “is designed to ensure the enforcement of important rights 

affecting the public interest generally and the interests of 

large number of employees” and “[t]he necessity and financial 

burden of private enforcement is great.” (FAC ¶ 73.) On their 

face, these assertions are sufficient to overcome defendant’s 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 56 Filed 02/26/20 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

motion to strike. See Guerrero, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 807.

However, plaintiffs only seek attorneys’ fees under § 1021.5 in 

conjunction with their claim for restitution under the UCL, which 

was dismissed in part. See Part II(A)(3), supra. To the extent 

that plaintiffs can recover attorneys’ fees under their operative 

UCL claims for failure to timely and properly pay all minimum, 

overtime, and commission wages, unlawful taking of commission 

wage reductions and deductions, and misclassification, the court 

will deny defendant’s motion to strike. 

5. Request for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief

Charter moves to strike plaintiffs’ claims for 

injunctive relief because plaintiffs are no longer employed by 

Charter and therefore lack standing. (Mot. at 23.) 

In this suit, Harper seeks “individual, representative, 

and public injunctive and declaratory relief that compels Charter 

to stop its unlawful and unfair practices and fix its broken 

timekeeping, recordkeeping, and wage payment systems and 

practices, its misclassification of Outside Salespersons Class 

members both during training and after training, and its improper 

use of commission agreements with Commissions Class members” in 

conjunction with his UCL claim. (FAC ¶ 72.) “A former employee 

currently seeking to be reinstated or rehired may have standing 

to seek injunctive relief against a former employer.” Bayer v. 

Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 861 F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(citing Walsh v. Nev. Dep’t. of Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033, 1036 

(9th Cir. 2006)). However, Harper only seeks to be reinstated as 

an employee with Charter in another lawsuit. See Harper v. 

Charter Commc’ns, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-01749 WBS DMC. The 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 56 Filed 02/26/20 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

consequence of a distinct (albeit related) case will not be 

brought to bear on this action. Accordingly, the court will 

grant defendant’s motion to strike plaintiffs’ request for 

injunctive and declaratory relief. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion to 

strike plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive and declaratory relief 

be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in all other respects 

defendant’s motion to dismiss or strike be, and the same hereby 

is, DENIED.

Dated: February 25, 2020

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 56 Filed 02/26/20 Page 16 of 16