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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

P. I LED 

Uoitcd Si11tq~ Cou.n of Appeals 'f enth Ckcuit 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 211990 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT .ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

JACK LAUREN MARTIN, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

STEPHEN W. KAISER; ATTORNEY 

GENERAL, State of Oklahoma, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

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No. 89-6358 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. NO. CIV.-89-1024-R) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Jack Lauren Martin, prose. 

Robert H. Henry, Attorney General, Steven Spears Kerr, Assistant 

Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for RespondentsAppellees. 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

Before ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Jack Lauren Martin appeals EE..9. se the denial of his petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus by the federal district court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma.* The following description of the 

* After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 89-6358 Document: 01019871102 Date Filed: 06/21/1990 Page: 1 
procedural background of this appeal is taken from the district 

court's·memorandum opinion: 

"Petitioner was convicted, after jury trial, of six 

counts of solicitation of murder in the District Court 

of Oklahoma County, Case No. CRF-83-3244. These 

convictions were affirmed on direct appeal to the Court 

of Criminal Appeals. Martin v. State, 763 P.2d 711 

(Okla. Crim. App. 1988). Petitioner's convictions were 

obtained at his third trial on the charges, the first 

having ended in a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury, the 

second having resulted in convictions which were 

overturned by the Court of Criminal Appeals for reasons 

unrelated to the instant allegations. Martin v. State, 

714 P.2d 602 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986). Petitioner was 

convicted on each of the six counts after former 

conviction of a felony, and the jury set his punishment 

at 10 years, the minimum under Oklahoma law. Okla. 

Stat. tit. 21, §51 (1981). The trial court, after a 

presentence investigation report and comments from 

counsel, imposed the sentences to run consecutively." 

In his petition below and on appeal, Martin asserted four 

errors in the Oklahoma courts: (1) jurisdictional error in trying 

him under the solicitation statute, (2) trial court error in 

admitting an enhanced tape recording and allowing the jury to view 

a transcript made therefrom, (3) unfair limitation by the trial 

court of petitioner's right of cross-examination, and (4) trial 

court error in sentencing Martin to six consecutive sentences for 

what petitioner alleges was one act of solicitation. These 

errors, he asserts, impinge on his constitutional rights under the 

Fifth and Sixth Amendments as made applicable to the states via 

the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Martin raised the first three issues but not the fourth on 

direct appeal of his conviction, and the Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals rejected his allegations of error. Martin v. 

State, 763 P.2d 711 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). The district court 

denied Martin's petition, concluding that the first three issues 

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• 

were meritless and that the fourth was barred for failure to raise 

it below. We construe Martin's explanation of his failure to 

brief the last issue in his direct appeal in state court as 

essentially an argument that he was denied the effective 

assistance of counsel, an issue he could not assert until after 

failure of counsel and therefore one he could not raise except in 

connection with his habeas corpus petition in federal court. We, 

therefore, reach the issue of ineffective counsel. 

We review the district court's conclusions of law de novo. 

After review of the entire record in the Oklahoma courts, we 

affirm the decision of the federal district court denying Martin's 

petition. 

I 

Oklahoma's statute prohibiting solicitation of first degree 

murder reads as follows: 

"It shall be 

another person 

being by the 

defined by [21 

unlawful for any person ... to solicit 

or persons to cause the death of a human 

act of murder in the first degree as is 

Okla. Stat.§ 701.7) .... " 

21 Okla. Stat. § 701.16 (1981). Martin contends that this 

solicitation statute does not extend to him because (1) any 

murders solicited were to have been performed outside the state of 

Oklahoma, and (2) the statute covers solicitation only of murders 

triable under Oklahoma law, i.e., committ·ed in Oklahoma. 

This issue is easily disposed of. We agree with the district 

court and the Oklahoma appeals court that the statute governs the 

solicitation in Oklahoma of first degree murder, not the location 

of the murder itself. There is no dispute over the fact that the 

solicitations occurred within the state of Oklahoma, nor with the 

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Appellate Case: 89-6358 Document: 01019871102 Date Filed: 06/21/1990 Page: 3 
fact that murder is a crime in the states in which the solicited 

acts were to have been carried out. Cf. State v. Self, 706 P.2d 

975 (Or. App. 1985} ("one may be criminally liable in Oregon for 

soliciting the commission of a crime in another state, so long as 

that other state's offense has a counterpoint under Oregon law.}; 

People v. Burt, 288 P.2d 503, 506 (Cal. 1955) (solicitation of a 

person in California to commit a crime outside the state is an 

offense under the California solicitation statute); Miller v. 

State, 430 So.2d 611 (Fla. App. 1983} (''rationale of the Burt 

decision prohibiting criminal solicitation no matter where the 

actual crime is to be committed [is] consistent with the Florida 

solicitation statute"}. As Burt noted, solicitation itself is 

"inimical to the public welfare and to the safety and morals of 

the inhabitants of [~]· state, regardless of where the solicited 

acts are to be performed •••• " Burt, 288 P.2d at 505-06. Since 

Oklahoma had jurisdiction to try Martin for solicitation, there 

was no constitutional deprivation in doing so. 

II 

Martin next asserts that the trial court committed 

constitutional error in admitting into evidence an enhanced tape 

recording of a conversation between himself and a confidential 

informant. Attempts had been made to reduce the distortions on 

the original tape by reproducing it at variable speeds. The 

Louisiana state policeman who enhanced the recording had listened 

to the original conversation via a hidden mike. He testified that 

he had in no way tampered with the recording except to alter its 

speed. He also testified to the accuracy of the enhanced tape. 

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The jury was permitted to view a transcript made from the 

enhanced recording, although the transcript itself was not 

admitted into evidence. Martin also contends that the trial court 

erred in allowing the jury to see the transcript, which Martin 

described as very prejudicial. 

We note first that any errors in the admissibility of 

evidence are not grounds for habeas corpus relief absent 

fundamental unfairness so as to constitute a denial of due process 

of law. See Chavez v. Kerby, 848 F.2d 1101, 1102 (10th Cir. 

1988); see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). The 

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals construed Oklahoma Rules of 

Evidence, 12 O.S. §§ 3001-3003 (1981), in concluding that the 

enhanced tape was admissible under Oklahoma law1 • It relied on 

Brassfield v. State, 719 P.2d 461 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), in 

concluding that non-evidentiary use of the transcripts by the jury 

was within the discretion of the trial court. 2 See also United 

States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1335-36 (10th Cir.) (limited use 

of transcripts is within sound discretion of trial judge), cert. 

denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979). 

We see no error in the Oklahoma appellate ruling that 

introduction of the enhanced tape and use of the transcript did 

1 The use of enhanced tapes has been upheld as well under 

federal law in situations in which the tapes were objected to. 

See,~ United States v. Carbone, 798 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 

1986) (tape enhanced to improve audibility is admissible if 

properly authenticated). 

2 Limited, non-evidentiary use of transcripts by the jury was 

permitted under carefully controlled conditions in Brassfield. 719 

P.2d 462-63. No limiting instructions were offered in the case 

before us. 

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not constitute an abuse of discretion. While it might have been 

wiser to advise the jury as to the limited applicability of the 

transcript for non-evidentiary purposes, such an instruction had 

been given earlier in the trial with respect to a previous 

transcript; it is likely that the earlier instruction would have 

been seen by jurors as applicable to subsequent introduction of 

other transcripts. In any event, failure to reiterate limiting 

instructions did not constitute constitutional error. 

III 

Martin contends that the trial court sustained numerous 

objections to an entire line of cross-examination that was aimed 

at establishing his defenses of entrapment and duress. Having 

reviewed the entire transcript, we conclude that the trial court 

committed no error of constitutional proportions. As the district 

court noted, defense counsel's technique in attempting to impeach 

witnesses by their previous testimony was deficient, and defense· 

counsel's questioning frequently became highly repetitious. Under 

the circumstances, the court showed considerable latitude to 

defense counsel. Furthermore, we do not think that the court's 

interruption of defense counsel's closing argument raised an error 

of constitutional proportions. Although the court may have 

misconstrued where the defense counsel was heading and needlessly 

shortcircuited a comment questioning the prosecution's ability to 

prove that Martin was lying, the error, if such it was, did not 

rise to a violation of Martin's Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights. 

IV 

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Finally, Martin argues that his six consecutive ten-year 

sentences amounted to double jeopardy and that his trial attorney 

had raised a double jeopardy argument in the petition of error to 

the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Martin contends ~hat his 

double jeopardy argument was not briefed to the same court, as 

required to allow its consideration, because his attorney died 

suddenly and was replaced at the last minute. Because Martin's 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a prose petition, and 

because a constitutional right is at stake, we construe his double 

jeopardy argument in its most favorable light as an argument that 

the substitute attorney rendered ineffective assistance with 

respect to the sentencing phase of his trial. See Maleng v. Cook, 

109 S.Ct. 1923, 1927 (1989) (P!.2_ se petition construed liberally). 

We, therefore, reach this argument on appeal. 

Martin's previous attorney gave a clear indication to the 

sentencing judge and to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 

that he intended to raise a double jeopardy argument based on the 

difference between Martin's sentences at his second trial, which 

consisted of six concurrent life sentences, and his six 

consecutive ten-year sentences at his third trial. He stated 

that, as Mr. Martin was already advanced in years, a sixty-year 

sentence ~as more severe than a life sentence and raised double 

jeopardy concerns. 

Martin, proceeding in federal court~ se, may have failed 

to understand the thrust of his attorney's argument, which was 

based on North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969)(where 

sentence upon retrial is more severe than at previous trial, court 

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must offer reason based ·on defendant's conduct occurring after 

previous trial). In any event Martin converted it into an 

argument that the double jeopardy issue arose out of his multiple 

convictions for what he thought was one act of solicitation. We 

consider each argument in turn, concluding that each is without 

merit. 

There is no question but what imposition of six sentences for 

six separate counts of solicitation by themselves did not 

constitute double jeopardy. Each count was based on solicitation 

of a separate act of first degree murder; the fact that all six 

solicitations took place at one time does not negate the fact that 

Martin's convictions, on which the sentencing was based, were for 

soliciting the murders of six separate persons. To convict on 

each count required proof that a different individual was being 

targeted for murder on each count. See United States v. Peterson, 

867 F.2d 1110, 1115 (8th Cir. 1989) (test for duplicative charges 

is whether each charge requires proof of an element that the other 

does not); see also Stohler v. Oklahoma, 751 P.2d 1087 (Okla. 

Crim. App. 1988) (offenses are separate where each requires proof 

of some fact or element which the other does not require). 

Therefore, failure to brief this argument could not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel because the argument is 

meritless. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-96 

(1984) (no ineffective assistance of counsel absent a showing of 

reasonable probability that outcome would have been different). 

We turn next to a consideration of whether Martin's six 

consecutive ten-year sentences were more severe than the 

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previously imposed concurrent life sentences, thereby requiring an 

explanation that was not given by the trial court. While we are 

sympathetic to the fact that the defendant is a senior citizen and 

that a collective sixty-year sentence may seem superficially to be 

more severe than a life sentence, we reject this argument. 

Nothing on its face except a death sentence can be more severe 

than a life sentence, because what may seem like a sentence that 

exceeds a person's expected life span is in reality a sentence 

that will also terminate upon the death of the prisoner: it cannot 

extend longer than a life sentence. 3 We conclude that Martin's 

double jeopardy argument is meritless, and, therefore, so is any 

argument that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel 

with respect to the appeal of his sentence. 

We have considered all other arguments put forward by the 

petitioner and find them meritless. We affirm the district 

court's denial of Martin's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

AFFIRMED. 

3 Martin's first attorney, in his petition of error to the 

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, raised no argument that 

Oklahoma's parole regulations should be considered in determining 

whether Martin's consecutive ten-year sentences were more severe 

than his concurrent life senten~es, and we express no opinion on 

the need for such a consideration. We note in passing, however, 

that apparently wherever a sentence under Oklahoma law is for 

forty-five years or longer, including life, a prisoner is eligible 

for parole in fifteen years under the Oklahoma prison regulations. 

Fields v. State, 501 P.2d 1390 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972). Although 

the pertinent prison regulations are not in the record, Martin's 

six consecutive ten-year sentences may make him eligible for 

parole at the same time that he would have become eligible under 

his concurrent life sentences. In any event, parole 

considerations are not dispositive here. 

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