Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_08-cv-08028/USCOURTS-azd-3_08-cv-08028-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgment

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Salt River Project Agricultural

Improvement and Power District, a

municipal corporation and political

subdivision of the State of Arizona;

Headwaters Resources, Inc., a Utah

corporation, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Reynold R. Lee; Casey Watchman;

Woody Lee; Peterson Yazzie; Evelyn

Meadows; Honorable Herb Yazzie;

Honorable Lorene B. Ferguson; Honorable

Lorene B. Begay; Leonard Thinn; Sarah

Gonnie, 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 08-8028-PCT-JAT

ORDER

Currently pending before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss by Defendants (Docs.

108 & 125), Cross Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 119 & 127), and SRP’s Motion

for Leave to file Sur-Reply (Doc. 115). The Court now rules on the Motions.

I. BACKGROUND

This case originated with two separate employee complaints filed by Defendants

Leonard Thinn and Sarah Gonnie, both members of the Navajo Nation, who worked at the

Navajo Generating Station (“NGS”) located near Page, Arizona. Plaintiff Salt River Project

Agricultural Improvement and Power District (“SRP”) operates NGS, a large electrical plant

Case 3:08-cv-08028-JAT Document 150 Filed 12/02/10 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 2 -

that is located on the Navajo Reservation. SRP contracts with Plaintiff Headwaters

Resources (“Headwaters”) at NGS.

SRP and other energy utilities entered into a lease (the “1969 Lease”) with the Navajo

Nation in 1969 to allow SRP to operate the NGS on Navajo Nation land. At the same time

SRP entered into the 1969 Lease, the United States Secretary of the Interior (the “Secretary”)

granted SRP and the other utilities certain easements and rights of way (the “§323 Grant”).

The Secretary entered into the §323 Grant to induce SRP and the others to proceed with the

development of the NGS.

On December 2, 2004, Mr. Thinn, a former employee of SRP, filed a charge with the

Office of Navajo Labor Relations (“ONLR”), an office created by the Navajo Tribal Council,

alleging that he had been terminated without just cause in violation of the Navajo Preference

in Employment Act (“NPEA”). The ONLR determined there was probable cause to believe

SRP had violated the NPEA and issued a Notice of Right to Sue. Mr Thinn filed a complaint

against SRP with the Navajo Nation Labor Commission (“NNLC”) on November 15, 2005.

The NNLC granted SRP’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Mr.

Thinn filed a notice of appeal on May 12, 2006.

Ms. Gonnie, a former employee of Headwaters, also filed a charge with the ONLR

alleging that she had been terminated without cause in violation of the NPEA. On September

16, 2005, the ONLR issued Ms. Gonnie a Right to Sue letter. On September 22, 2005, Ms.

Gonnie filed a complaint with the NNLC. On April 28, 2006, the NNLC granted

Headwater’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Ms. Gonnie appealed on May 12,

2006. 

The Navajo Nation Supreme Court (“NNSC”) consolidated the Thinn and Gonnie

appeals and reversed the judgments of the NNLC. The NNSC ruled that the NPEA applies

to SRP and Headwaters at the NGS and that the NNLC has jurisdiction to enforce the NPEA

against them. The NNSC remanded to the NNLC for further proceedings on the merits of

the Thinn and Gonnie claims. 

Case 3:08-cv-08028-JAT Document 150 Filed 12/02/10 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 3 -

The NNLC set the two cases for hearings in April of 2008. Based on SRP’s request

to have the Secretary address the jurisdictional issue, SRP and Headwaters filed motions to

stay the Thinn and Gonnie hearings. On February 27, 2008, the NNLC initially denied the

motions to stay, but later agreed to stay the Thinn and Gonnie cases.

Plaintiffs filed this action on February 29, 2008 against the Director of the ONLR in

his official capacity, members of the NNLC in their official capacities, justices of the NNSC

in their official capacities (collectively the “Navajo Defendants”), and Ms. Gonnie and Mr.

Thinn (collectively the “Employee Defendants”). Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the

Navajo Defendants may not lawfully apply the NPEA against SRP, the other participants,

and their contractors at the NGS and that the Navajo Defendants may not otherwise regulate

employment matters at the NGS. Plaintiffs also seek permanent injunctive relief. 

The Navajo Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on March 31, 2008. They argued

that Plaintiffs had to submit the jurisdictional dispute to the Secretary pursuant to the 1969

Lease and could not file the case with this Court as a first resort. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment on August 8, 2008. They argued that the NPEA does not apply to the

operation of NGS because the Navajo Nation waived its right to regulate employment

relations there pursuant to the 1969 Lease. 

In addition to filing this case, Plaintiffs pursued dispute resolution before the

Secretary. On February 4, 2008, Plaintiffs sent a letter to the Secretary requesting a ruling

that the NPEA does not apply to SRP or Headwaters at NGS. The Secretary initially

responded in a letter dated May 10, 2008, by finding that the Navajo Nation had not clearly

waived in the 1969 Lease the Nation’s right to regulate employment relationships at NGS.

Following that response, SRP sent correspondence dated June 24, 2008 to the

Secretary requesting reconsideration of this decision. In a letter dated August 1, 2008, a

different Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary indicated that the Secretary would entertain the

request for reconsideration. Then, in a letter dated October 2, 2008, the Secretary declined

to decide the jurisdictional dispute and instead deferred to the Court’s determination of this

Case 3:08-cv-08028-JAT Document 150 Filed 12/02/10 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 4 -

litigation. 

In an Order filed on January 14, 2009, the Court granted the Navajo Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss. The Court found that rather than the Secretary deferring to the Court’s

determination of the applicability of the NPEA at the NGS, the Secretary should be the party

to decide the issue per the terms of the 1969 Lease. 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision in an unpublished opinion

dated March 19, 2010. The Ninth Circuit remanded to this Court for further proceedings

with the instruction that Plaintiffs’ claims “are thus properly before the district court.” (Doc.

109-1 p.3.)

On April 16, 2010, the Navajo Defendants filed one of the pending motions to

dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs need to file an administrative appeal type of complaint. (Doc.

108.) Plaintiff SRP filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 7, 2010 (Doc. 119), in

which Plaintiff Head Waters joined (Doc. 121). The Navajo Defendants filed a CrossMotion for Summary Judgment on July 12, 2010. (Doc. 127.) On that same day, the Navajo

Defendants also filed another motion to dismiss, that one pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 19. (Doc. 125.) 

II. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

A. Navajo Defendants’ First Motion to Dismiss

In their first motion to dismiss, the Navajo Defendants argue that this case must be

dismissed because it is not an administrative appeal under the Administrative Procedure Act

(the “APA”). They assert that this case should be dismissed in favor of an administrative

appeal, which can come in the form of a declarative action, against the Secretary. Moreover,

they argue, the APA’s standard of review should control any appeal from the Secretary’s

decision. 

The Navajo Defendants interpret the Ninth Circuit’s opinion as holding that the

Secretary has reached a final decision on the merits regarding whether the Nation waived its

right to regulate employment matters at the NGS. According to the Navajo Defendants, the

Case 3:08-cv-08028-JAT Document 150 Filed 12/02/10 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The Court did not review SRP’s proposed Sur-reply when reaching its decision on

the first Motion to Dismiss. The Court therefore denies SRP’s Motion for Leave to File a

Sur-Reply (Doc. 115) as moot. 

- 5 -

Court therefore must review that final decision only in the form of an administrative appeal.

Obviously, given the Court’s earlier ruling on the motion to dismiss, the undersigned

believed that the Secretary had not reached a final decision on the merits and instead was

deferring to this Court to finally decide the issues. The Ninth Circuit did not definitively

state whether it concluded that the Secretary had reached a final decision on the merits. The

Ninth Circuit did note that the Secretary had declined to reconsider its initial decision and

found that Plaintiffs had no further obligation to submit their dispute to the Secretary.

Most importantly, the Ninth Circuit held that the Plaintiffs’ claims “are . . . properly

before the district court.” The Ninth Circuit did not hold that the claims would be properly

before the Court if couched as an administrative appeal. The Court finds that in order to

follow the Ninth Circuit’s mandate, the Court must decide the issues as currently framed by

Plaintiffs. The Court therefore will deny the Navajo Defendants’ first Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. 108).1

B. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19

In their second Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 125), the Navajo Defendants contend that

the Court must dismiss this case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. They argue

that Plaintiffs cannot join the United States and the Navajo Nation as parties because of

sovereign immunity and that the case cannot proceed in “equity and good conscience”

without those two parties. In its recently amended form, Rule 19 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible.

(1) Required Party. A person who is subject to service

of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of

subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if:

(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord

complete relief among existing parties; or

Case 3:08-cv-08028-JAT Document 150 Filed 12/02/10 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 6 -

(B) that person claims an interest relating to the

subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the

action in the person’s absence may:

(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the

persons’s ability to protect the interest; or

(ii) leave an existing party subject to a

substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise

inconsistent obligations because of the interest. 

. . .

(b) When Joinder is Not Feasible. If a person who is required

to be joined if feasible cannot be joined, the court must

determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action

should proceed among the existing parties or should be

dismissed. The factors for the court to consider include:

(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the

person’s absence might prejudice that person or the existing

parties;

(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened

or avoided by:

(A) protective provisions in the judgment;

(B) shaping the relief; or

(C) other measures;

(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence

would be inadequate; and

(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy

if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.

. . . 

F.R.Civ.P.19(a)&(b). 

Although the wording of Rule 19 has changed somewhat, by doing away with the

potentially confusing terms “necessary” and “indispensable” parties, the Court follows the

same analysis. The Court must engage in a three-party inquiry. Equal Emp’t Opportunity

Comm’n v. Peabody Western Coal Co., 610 F.3d. 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2010). First, the

Court determines whether a nonparty should be joined under Rule 19(a). If so, that nonparty

becomes a person required to be joined if feasible. Id. Next, the Court analyzes whether it

Case 3:08-cv-08028-JAT Document 150 Filed 12/02/10 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 7 -

is feasible to order the nonparty to be joined. Id. Finally, if joinder of the nonparty is not

feasible, the Court must determine whether the case can proceed without the nonparty or if

the case must be dismissed. Id.

“There is no precise formula for determining whether a particular nonparty should be

joined under Rule 19(a) . . . The determination is heavily influenced by the facts and

circumstances of each case. Id. at 1081 (internal citations omitted). And when determining

whether an action should proceed in a nonparty’s absence, the factors set out in Rule 19(b)

for are nonexclusive. Republic of the Phillippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 862 (2008).

“The general direction is whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed

among the existing parties or should be dismissed.” Id. The Rule indicates that a

determination of whether an action should proceed will turn upon factors that are case

specific, “which is consistent with a Rule based on equitable considerations.” Id. at 862-63.

Some factors will be “substantive, some procedural, some compelling by themselves, and

some subject to balancing against opposing interests.” Id. at 863 (internal citations omitted).

1. Joinder of the United States

The Navajo Defendants argue that the United States is a party required to be joined

if feasible under Rule 19(a). They assert that the United States has an interest in the subject

of this action because the tribal land at issue in the 1969 Lease and the §323 Grant is held in

trust by the United States and because this case implicates the Secretary’s responsibilities

under the 1969 Lease and the §323 Grant. 

The Court does not agree with the Navajo Defendants that the United States has an

interest sufficient to make it a party required to be joined if feasible. The Court can accord

complete relief without the presence of the United States. This case does not concern

interests in the land subject to §323 Grant; it deals with the extent of the Navajo Nation’s

authority to enforce the NPEA at the NGS. The United States does not have an interest to

protect. The Court therefore finds that the United States is not a party required to be joined

if feasible under Rule 19(a).

Case 3:08-cv-08028-JAT Document 150 Filed 12/02/10 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs also argue that the Navajo Nation does not have

inherent authority to regulate non-members of the Nation, such as SRP, even absent the

operation waiver. 

- 8 -

2. Joinder of the Navajo Nation

Determining the joinder issue with regard to the Navajo Nation presents a more

complex problem. Plaintiffs claim that the Navajo Nation waived its right to regulate

employment matters at the NGS in the 1969 Lease. They argue that because the Navajo

Nation cannot interfere in employment matters at the NGS, the Navajo Defendants have

exceeded their jurisdiction in attempting to enforce the NPEA at the NGS. 

The basis for Plaintiffs’ suit against the Defendants therefore is in large part the 1969

Lease and its alleged operational waiver.2

 As a party to that Lease, the Navajo Nation has

an interest in its contract rights with SRP. See Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric.

Improvement & Power Dist, 276 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002). The Nation also has an

economic interest in this action – the job security of the Nation’s members. Id. at 1157

(holding that because the plaintiff “challenges the Nation’s ability to secure employment

opportunities and income for the reservation – its fundamental consideration for the lease

with SRP – the Nation . . . claims a cognizable economic interest in the subject of this

litigation which may be grievously impaired by a decision rendered in its absence.”). 

Adjudicating this action without the Navajo Nation will, as a practical matter, impair

the Nation’s ability to protect its contractual and economic interests, along with its general

interest in governing the Navajo reservation. The Court therefore finds that the Navajo

Nation is a party required to be joined if feasible under Rule 19(a). See e.g., Equal Emp’t

Opportunity Comm’n v. Peabody Western Coal Co., 400 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2005)(in

suit against coal company alleging discrimination based on preferential hiring of Navajos,

Navajo Nation was a necessary party because it was a party to the lease with the coal

company that required the preferential hiring); Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d 1150 at 1155-57

(Navajo Nation was necessary party under Rule 19(a) because it was a party to the lease at

Case 3:08-cv-08028-JAT Document 150 Filed 12/02/10 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 9 -

issue and because of its sovereign and economic interests); Pit River Home v. United States,

30 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 1994)(Pit Rive Tribal Council was a necessary party in a suit

that might have the result of directly undermining the tribe’s authority). 

The Court next addresses the feasability of joining the Navajo Nation as a defendant.

The Court holds that the Nation cannot be joined as a party because of the Nation’s sovereign

immunity. Federally recognized Indian tribes have sovereign immunity from suit and cannot

be sued absent an express and unequivocal waiver of immunity by the tribe or abrogation of

tribal immunity by Congress, unless the party suing is the federal government.

Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1159; Peabody, 400 F.3d at 781. Plaintiffs do not argue that the

Nation has waived its sovereign immunity or that Congress has abrogated that immunity.

Because the Court has found that the Nation should be joined if feasible under Rule

19(a) and that joinder is not feasible, the Court must proceed to Rule 19's final inquiry –

whether “in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing

parties or should be dismissed.” F.R.Civ.P. 19(b). Rule 19(b) provides four non-exclusive

factors for the Court to consider, but the general inquiry is whether the action equitably can

proceed. Pimentel, 553 U.S. at 862. The Rule 19(b) determination is “a practical one and

fact specific . . . and is designed to avoid the harsh results of rigid application.” Peabody,

610 F.3d at 1083 (internal citation omitted).

When a party that should be joined under Rule 19(a) has immunity from suit, “there

may be very little need for balancing Rule 19(b) factors because immunity itself may be

viewed as the compelling factor.” Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1460 (9th

Cir. 1994). Nonetheless, courts in this Circuit have discussed the four factors even when a

party enjoys immunity from suit. Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1162.

Prejudice

A judgment for Plaintiffs in this case would prejudice the Nation’s economic interest

in the 1969 Lease with SRP, namely its ability to provide employment protections and

security for its members. See id. A Plaintiffs’ victory would also prejudice the Nation’s

Case 3:08-cv-08028-JAT Document 150 Filed 12/02/10 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

The Court does not agree with Plaintiffs that the presence of the Navajo officials as

Defendants prevents this prejudice. 

- 10 -

sovereign interests in negotiating contractual obligations and governing the reservation.3

 See

id.

The absence of the Nation would seem to prejudice Plaintiffs as well. In their prayer

for relief, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Defendants: “(1) may not lawfully apply NPEA

to, or enforce it against, SRP . . . at NGS; and (2) may not regulate, through tribal

proceedings or otherwise, except as provided in the 1969 Lease, the operation of NGS by

SRP . . . , related to employment relations.” (Doc. 1, p.12.) Plaintiffs further seek

permanent injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants, during the term of the 1969 Lease and

except as provided in the 1969 Lease, from: 

(1) commencing, prosecuting, maintaining or considering any tribal

proceedings against SRP . . ., seeking to regulate the operation of

NGS related to employment relations; (2) applying the NPEA

against SRP . . . with respect to the operation of NGS; (3) regulating

or attempting to regulate, directly or indirectly, the operation of

NGS by SRP . . . related to employment relations at NGS.

(Doc. 1, pp. 14-15.)

The Court does not agree with Plaintiffs that the fact that the Nation would not

“technically” be bound by the judgment does not lessen the value of the judgment for

Plaintiffs. (Doc. 132, p.15.) An injunction against the current Navajo Defendants, even in

their official capacities, would not prevent some future or other tribal authority from

attempting to “regulate” employment at the NGS. If what Plaintiffs want is for the Nation

never again to interfere with employment matters at the NGS, this lawsuit would not

necessarily accomplish that goal. Because a judgment rendered in the absence of the Nation

would prejudice the interests of both the Nation and the Plaintiffs, the first factor weighs in

favor of dismissing. 

Case 3:08-cv-08028-JAT Document 150 Filed 12/02/10 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 11 -

Shaping Relief

Plaintiffs do not believe that the absence of the Nation causes prejudice to the Nation

or any of the current parties, so they do not offer any methods for alleviating the prejudice

caused by the Nation’s absence. The Court on its own has not discovered any relief that

would mitigate the prejudice outlined above. This factor therefore also weighs in favor of

dismissal. 

Adequate Relief

As the Court noted above, injunctive relief in the form requested by the Plaintiffs

would not award them complete relief. The Nation could still, through some other body or

future bodies or officials, attempt to regulate employment matters at the NGS. Accordingly,

this factor weighs in favor of dismissal as well. 

Alternative Forum

Plaintiffs have an alternative forum in this case. Plaintiffs brought an action in front

of the Secretary pursuant to the terms of the 1969 Lease. The Secretary initially found

against Plaintiffs, then later said he would reconsider that decision, then still later said that

he would defer to the Court’s determination of the issue rather than reconsider his decision.

The Court cannot say that after this Order the Secretary would not reconsider his earlier

decision. Nevertheless, even if no alternative forum exists, the Court need not automatically

deny the motion to dismiss. Quileute Indian Tribe, 18 F.3d at 1460. Plaintiffs’ interest in

litigating “may be outweighed by a tribe’s interest in maintaining its sovereign immunity .

. . [S]ociety has consciously opted to shield Indian tribes from suit without congressional or

tribal consent” Id. at 1460-61. 

Balancing these four factors, we find that this case cannot proceed in equity and good

conscience in the absence of the Navajo Nation.

Ex Parte Young

In addition to arguing that the Rule 19 factors themselves do not require dismissal,

Plaintiffs argue that even if Rule 19 normally would mandate dismissal, to do so in this case

Case 3:08-cv-08028-JAT Document 150 Filed 12/02/10 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 12 -

effectively would abrogate the Ex Parte Young doctrine. Under the doctrine of Ex Parte

Young, sovereign immunity does not extend to officials allegedly violating federal law in

suits for purely prospective relief. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 509 F.3d 1085, 1092

(9th Cir. 2007)(citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908)(holding that Eleventh

Amendment immunity did not bar suit against the state’s Attorney General to enjoin him

from enforcing a law that the plaintiffs alleged violated the Constitution)). 

The courts have extended the Ex Parte Young doctrine to tribal officials sued in their

official capacity for allegedly acting in violation of federal law. Id. (citing Burlington N.

R.R. Co v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 1991)). The Ex Parte Young

doctrine therefore permits lawsuits like the one here, where the Nation’s officials allegedly

have violated federal law and the Plaintiffs seek only prospective relief, no damages. In such

situations, the Nation’s officials themselves do not enjoy immunity from suit. But the

officials’ immunity is not in question here. Rather, the Court must determine how to resolve

the interplay between the Ex Parte Young doctrine and the strictures of Rule 19. 

The Court appreciates Plaintiffs’ concerns. In much the same way parties should not

be allowed to attempt “an end run around tribal sovereign immunity . . . by merely

substituting tribal officials in lieu of the Indian Tribe,” Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1160,

parties should not attempt an end run around the Ex Parte Young doctrine by claiming the

absence of the governmental entity necessitates dismissal. But the Court does not agree that

dismissing pursuant to Rule 19 in this particular case would effectively abrogate all Ex Parte

Young cases against officials. 

While Plaintiffs do argue that Defendants have violated federal law by exceeding their

authority in attempting to regulate the affairs of non-Navajos, they also argue that the Navajo

Nation waived any inherent right to regulate employment matters at the NGS by signing the

1969 Lease. Indeed, the contractual waiver issue was the Plaintiffs’ main argument to the

Secretary. 

It is the contractual waiver argument that sets this case apart from the traditional Ex

Case 3:08-cv-08028-JAT Document 150 Filed 12/02/10 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

The Court recognizes that the plaintiffs in Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Aspaas, 77

F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1996) were allowed to maintain an action very similar to this one that

included a contractual waiver argument. But nothing in the Aspaas record indicates that the

defendants there made a Rule 19 dismissal argument. 

- 13 -

Parte Young case where government officials solely are acting pursuant to an allegedly

unconstitutional statute, etc.4

 Plaintiffs are asking the Court, at least in the alternative, to

bind the Navajo Nation to a lease provision that Plaintiffs believe waives the Nation’s right

to regulate the employment of Navajos at the NGS. The attempt to interpret and enforce the

1969 Lease without the signatory, the Navajo Nation, as a party interferes with the Nation’s

sovereign rights, contractual rights, and economic rights. 

Like the Ninth Circuit in Dawavendewa, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs’ real

claim is against the Nation itself. 276 F.3d at 1161 (“At bottom, the lease at issue is between

SRP and the Nation, and the relief Dawavendewa seeks would operate against the Nation as

signatory to the lease.”). So, while the Court has considered carefully the Ex Parte Young

issue, the Court finds that in this particular case, equity favors honoring the Navajo Nation’s

sovereignty and dismissing pursuant to Rule 19. The Court’s ruling in this case should not

be construed as precluding the survival of an Ex Parte Young action against Nation officials

in the face of a Rule 19 challenge under different circumstances.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED DENYING the Navajo Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc.

108).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING as moot SRP’s Motion for Leave to File

Sur-Reply (Doc. 115).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING the Navajo Defendants’ Rule 19(b)

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 125). This case is dismissed in its entirety.

///

///

Case 3:08-cv-08028-JAT Document 150 Filed 12/02/10 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 14 -

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING as moot Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 119) and the Navajo Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. 127).

DATED this 2nd day of December, 2010.

Case 3:08-cv-08028-JAT Document 150 Filed 12/02/10 Page 14 of 14