Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-01008/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-01008-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

LISA WILSON, GINA FULTON, )

RHONDA SIMPSON, and )

SONDRA KEATON, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. CV-13-S-1008-NE

)

BIG LOTS, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action was commenced on May 28, 2013, on behalf of four plaintiffs: i.e.,

Lisa Wilson, Gina Fulton, Rhonda Simpson, and Sondra Keaton. The complaint

asserts claims against Big Lots, Inc., the employer or former employer of each 1

plaintiff, for sex-based harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation, based

upon Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

2

Plaintiffs Simpson and Keaton also assert claims for wrongful termination pursuant

to Title VII. The case currently is before the court on defendant’s motion to dismiss 3

the claims of plaintiff Sondra Keaton, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

 Defendant asserts that it has been incorrectly identified as Big Lots, Inc., but that its true 1

corporate name is “Big Lots Stores, Inc.” See doc. no. 8 (Motion to Dismiss Claims of Sondra

Keaton), at 1. 

See doc. no. 1 (Complaint). 2

Id. at 14-15. 3

FILED

 2013 Oct-07 PM 03:13

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 13 Filed 10/07/13 Page 1 of 6
12(b)(6), for failure to satisfy the administrative prerequisites to filing suit under Title

VII. 

4

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) permits a party to move to dismiss a

complaint for, among other reasons, “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). That rule must be read together with Rule 8(a),

which requires that a pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While those

combined pleading standards do not require “detailed factual allegations,” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007), they do demand “more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:

A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly, 550 U.S.,

at 555]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]”

devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id., at 557. 

To survive a motion to dismiss founded upon Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), [for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Id., at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556. The

 Doc. no. 8. 4

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Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 13 Filed 10/07/13 Page 2 of 6
plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely

consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id., at 557

(brackets omitted). 

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,

the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555 (Although for the purposes of a

motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the

complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical,

code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. 

Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556. Determining whether a complaint states

a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense. 490 F.3d, at 157-158. But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than

the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it

has not “show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule

Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). 

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they

are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 

While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (emphasis added).

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Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 13 Filed 10/07/13 Page 3 of 6
II. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that Keaton’s claims should be dismissed because she has not

yet received notice of her right-to-sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”). 

Before instituting a Title VII action in federal district court, a private

plaintiff must file an EEOC complaint against the discriminating party

and receive statutory notice from the EEOC of his or her right to sue the

respondent named in the charge. Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d

1211, 1215 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S. Ct.

729, 74 L. Ed. 2d 954 (1983) (citing, inter alia, 42 U.S.C.A. §

2000e-5(f)(1)). Further, if, after the expiration of 180 days, the charge

has not been dismissed and no other action has been taken by the EEOC,

the EEOC is required to notify the claimant and that claimant may bring

suit in district court within 90 days thereafter. 42 U.S.C.A. §

2000e-5(f)(1).

Forehand v. Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee, 89 F.3d 1562, 1567 (11th Cir.

1996) (footnotes omitted).5

 The statute cited by the Eleventh Circuit provides, in pertinent part: 5

If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this

section is dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days

from the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference under

subsection (c) or (d) of this section, whichever is later, the Commission has not filed

a civil action under this section or the Attorney General has not filed a civil action

in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, or

the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person

aggrieved is a party, the Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a

government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, shall so notify the person

aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may

be brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming

to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by

any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful

employment practice. 

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Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 13 Filed 10/07/13 Page 4 of 6
Keaton acknowledges that she has not yet received a right-to-sue letter from the

EEOC. She states that she filed her EEOC charge in November of 2012, and

subsequently was informed “that a ‘cause of finding’ was being issued on Keaton’s

Charge and a Right-to-Sue would be forthcoming.” Keaton also states that her 6

attorney requested the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue letter “since the 180 days had

expired for the EEOC to conduct their investigation.” However, she has not received 7

the right-to-sue letter, and she also apparently has not been notified by the EEOC that

no action has been taken on her claim and she has 90 days to sue. 

“[T]he receipt of a right-to-sue letter is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit

in district court, but rather, is a condition precedent subject to equitable modification.” 

Forehand, 89 F.3d at 1567-68 (citing Pinkard, 678 F.2d at 1216; Fouche v. Jekyll

Island-State Park Authority, 713 F.2d 1518, 1525 (11th Cir.1983)) (alteration

supplied). It would not be equitable to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies when her failure to exhaust administrative remedies actually

is attributable to the EEOC’s failure to either issue notice of plaintiff’s right-to-sue, or

to inform plaintiff of her right to file suit due to the passage of 180 days since the filing

of her charge. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. Keaton will

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 

 Doc. no. 10 ¶ 3. 6

Id. 7

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Case 5:13-cv-01008-CLS Document 13 Filed 10/07/13 Page 5 of 6
be allowed an additional ninety (90) days to supplement her complaint by filing a rightto-sue letter from the EEOC. If Keaton still has not received a right-to-sue letter once

the 90-day deadline has passed, her claims will be dismissed, but without prejudice to

her right to re-file them, in a separate case, after receiving a right-to-sue letter. 

DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of October, 2013. 

______________________________

United States District Judge

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