Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_02-cv-01642/USCOURTS-casd-3_02-cv-01642-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 355
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Product Liability

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 02cv1642

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAROLD J. PHILLIPS and GEORG-ANNE

PHILLIPS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER

COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No.02cv1642-B (NLS)

ORDER DENYING AS MOOT

INTERVENORS’ MOTION TO

MODIFY THE COURT’S

PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED

JUNE 13, 2003

[Doc. No. 27]

Having been granted permission by the District Court to intervene in the above-captioned action,

Leroy Haeger, Kori D. Haley, Margaret Rose Bogaert, Billy Wayne Woods, and John H. Schalmo

(collectively “Intervenors”) move this Court to modify its June 13, 2003 Protective Order in the interests

of justice and for public policy reasons. Defendant Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (“Goodyear”)

opposes the motion. Having considered the parties’ briefs and accompanying submissions, as well as

the oral argument of counsel, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Intervenors’ motion [Doc. No. 27]. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case originated as a product liability action, filed on June 19, 2002 in San Diego County

Superior Court by Plaintiffs Harold and Georg-Anne Phillips against Goodyear. Plaintiffs alleged that

Goodyear’s G159 275/70R/22.5 tire (the “G159 tire”) was defective in design and/or manufacturing and

unsafe when used for its intended purpose after a tire on their motor home experienced tread/belt

separation, causing them to lose control of their vehicle, collide with an adjacent embankment and

Case 3:02-cv-01642-B-NLS Document 65 Filed 01/28/08 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 In his October 31, 2007 order, Judge Brewster adopted the undersigned magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation and granted Intervenors’ motion to intervene, which was filed contemporaneously with Intervenors’ motion

to modify the Court’s June 13, 2003 Protective Order. Upon granting the intervention, Judge Brewster requested that the

undersigned prepare a further report and recommendation on the motion to modify, as well as Defendant’s request for a

contempt finding against Plaintiffs’ counsel. (See October 31, 2007 Order Adopting Report and Recommendation, Doc. No.

39, 3-4.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(e), the undersigned shall prepare a separate report and recommendation for the District

Judge regarding Defendant’s contempt motion. Pursuant to Paragraphs 13 and 15 of the Protective Order [Doc. No. 22], the

undersigned retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the order, and may “modify this stipulated protective order in the

interests of justice or for public policy reasons.” Accordingly, Intervenors’ motion to modify may be ruled upon directly by

the undersigned, and the preparation of a report and recommendation is not necessary.

2 In June 2000 Plaintiffs purchased a Windsor motor home, equipped with G159 tires, at a motor home retailer in

San Diego. (Complaint ¶ 6.) In August 2000, Plaintiffs made an initial claim to Goodyear after two of the tires on the left

rear side of the motor home failed, damaging the rear of the vehicle. (Id., Ex. “1,” at 3.) After inspection of the failed tires,

Goodyear reimbursed Plaintiffs for the cost of both replacement tires and for the repair of the transmissions lines and power

steering lines. (Id.) In February 2002, Plaintiffs once again experienced trouble with the tires on their motor home. While

2 02cv1642

sustain serious bodily injury and property damage. (Complaint ¶¶ 10-15.) On August 15, 2002,

Goodyear removed the case to this Court [Doc. No. 1]. Subsequent to the commencement of discovery

and the entry by this Court of a Protective Order stipulated to and requested by the parties [Doc. No.

22], the case settled. A stipulation for dismissal of the action with prejudice was entered on October 7,

2003, and the case was closed [Doc. No. 24]. 

On June 28, 2007, Intervenors filed a motion seeking to intervene in this action for the limited

purpose of petitioning the Court to modify its Protective Order and allow Intervenors access to

deposition testimony of a Goodyear employee taken pre-settlement in this case for purposes of

discovery in ongoing collateral litigation involving the G159 tire in federal and state courts throughout

the country [Doc. No. 27]. Over Goodyear’s opposition, this Court recommended that presiding District

Judge Rudi M. Brewster grant the motion to intervene so that the Court could determine whether its

Protective Order should be modified [Doc. No. 35]. On October 31, 2007, Judge Brewster adopted the

recommendation and allowed the intervention [Doc. No. 39].1

 Intervenors now request that the Court

modify the June 13, 2003 Protective Order to allow them the opportunity to discover the June 20, 2003

deposition testimony of former Goodyear employee Kim Cox. (Intervenors’ Motion, 14.) 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In June 2003, Plaintiffs’ counsel Guy Ricciardulli noticed the deposition of the Goodyear

employee most knowledgeable with respect to the processing of property damage claims, particularly

the Phillips’ prior claims.2

 (See Declaration of Guy Ricciardulli in Support of His Response in

Case 3:02-cv-01642-B-NLS Document 65 Filed 01/28/08 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

traveling on Interstate 10 in Arizona, the tread separated from the motor home’s left front tire, causing Plaintiffs to lose

control of the vehicle and crash into a roadside embankment. (Complaint ¶ 10.) Approximately one month later, in March

2002, Plaintiffs initiated the claims process by contacting Goodyear’s Liability Claims Team regarding the incident, alleging

breach of the tire’s warranty. (Id. ¶ 19.) 

3 02cv1642

Opposition to Goodyear’s Application for Order to Show Cause (“Ricciardulli Declaration”) ¶ 4.) On

or about June 19, 2003, counsel for the parties traveled to Akron, Ohio, where Goodyear tendered

claims administrator Kim Cox for deposition. (Id.) Ricciardulli recalls that in response to his

questioning, Cox stated that Goodyear “was aware of the fact” that the G159 tire “did not perform

properly” when used on Class A motor homes. (Id. ¶ 5.) Ricciardulli also recalls having interpreted this

statement as an admission of liability by Goodyear, which resulted in Goodyear’s counsel present at the

deposition, John McCormick, requesting a recess in the deposition. (Id. ¶ 6.) Subsequent to the break,

McCormick approached Ricciardulli regarding termination of the deposition and potential mediation. 

(Id. ¶ 7.) The case settled shortly thereafter. 

In their role as plaintiffs involved in discovery in collateral litigation around the country,

Intervenors have alleged that the G159 tire is defective when used on Class A motor homes and that they

have suffered property damage and, in some cases, extensive personal injury and death of family

members, as a result of accidents caused by the tires. (See Intervenors’ Motion, Exhibits 2-7.) During

the course of gathering information and evidence for potential use in one of these collateral cases,

Intervenors’ counsel Tim Casey contacted Guy Ricciardulli. (Intervenors’ Motion, Ex “8,” Affidavit of

Timothy J. Casey, Esq. (“Casey Affidavit”) ¶¶ 3-5.) On May 24, 2007 and several dates soon thereafter,

Casey and Ricciardulli spoke telephonically regarding the 2003 deposition of Kim Cox. (Id. ¶ 5.) 

According to Casey, Ricciardulli informed him that the Phillips’ case involved the same tire and alleged

defect at issue in his clients’ litigation. (Id. ¶ 6(a).) Ricciardulli recalled that on June 20, 2003 in Akron,

Ohio, he was present at the deposition of a Goodyear employee from the in-house liability claims team,

who admitted under oath that “there was a defect in the G159 when used on a motor home,” and “that

they [i.e., Goodyear] had a problem and paid the claim.” (Id. ¶¶ 6(c)-(f).) Ricciardulli also recalled that

as part of the settlement of the case which occurred subsequent to the termination of the deposition, he

stipulated to having the court reporters’ notes/recordings of the deposition returned to Goodyear’s

Case 3:02-cv-01642-B-NLS Document 65 Filed 01/28/08 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 02cv1642

counsel. (Id. ¶ 6(h).) Casey then confirmed with the court reporting service in Ohio that Cox was

deposed on June 20, 2003, that the deposition was never transcribed, that all other noticed depositions in

the case had been cancelled, and that the notes of the Cox deposition had been forwarded to Goodyear’s

counsel on October 1, 2003 for “destruction.” (Id. ¶¶ 7-9.) 

According to Intervenors, Goodyear denies the G159 tire is defective, including when used on a

Class A motor home. (Intervenors’ Motion, 3; Casey Affidavit ¶ 10.) Because the testimony of

Goodyear employee Kim Cox appears to directly contradict Goodyear’s denial of a tire defect,

Intervenors seek to discover the information revealed during the course of Cox’s deposition in their

collateral lawsuits. (Id.) After being informed by the court reporting service in Ohio that no transcript or

notes presently exist documenting the deposition testimony, Intervenors issued deposition notices and

subpoenas in the pending litigation for the deposition of Goodyear’s counsel who defended the Cox

deposition, John McCormick, the court reporters who handled the Cox deposition, and Goodyear

employee, Mr. Cox. (Intervenors’ Motion, 12-14.) In at least one of these collateral cases, currently

pending in the District of Arizona, Goodyear moved to quash the deposition notices and subpoenas,

arguing that Cox’s deposition testimony is confidential, protected by this Court’s June 13, 2003

Protective Order, and therefore not discoverable in the collateral cases. The presiding District Judge in

the Arizona case ruled that the depositions may go forward, but also found that this Court’s June 13,

2003 Protective Order currently limits what can be discussed during these depositions. Specifically, the

Arizona District Judge ordered that 

“[n]o individuals may be asked questions or testify regarding what was said in the

Phillips depositions. . .if Plaintiffs wish to refresh the individuals’ recollection or

impeach them with prior deposition testimony, they will need to seek relief from the

Protective Order in the United States Court for the Southern District of California.” 

(See July 2, 2007 Order of the District Court of Arizona, Hon. Roslyn O. Silver presiding, Doc.

No. 266, Civil No. 05-2046-PHX-ROS.) 

Intervenors argue that Goodyear is using this Court’s Protective Order to prevent the truth about

Cox’s June 20, 2003 deposition testimony from being revealed and potentially relied upon as evidence in

their collateral litigation. For public policy reasons and in the interest of avoiding duplicative discovery,

Intervenors seek modification of the Court’s Protective Order so that any remaining discovery materials

Case 3:02-cv-01642-B-NLS Document 65 Filed 01/28/08 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Blanket protective orders such as the one in effect in this case are generally entered upon an “some threshold

showing of good cause to believe that discovery will involve confidential or protected information. This may be done on a

generalized as opposed to a document-by-document basis.” Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House

Group, 121 F.R.D. 264, 268 (M.D.N.C. 1988). However, “blanket orders are inherently subject to challenge and

modification, as the party resisting disclosure generally has not made a particularized showing of good cause with respect to

any individual document” or thing. San Jose Mercury News v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Essentially, a blanket protective order defers litigation of the need for protection on a document-by-document basis, and

postpones the need for a party to make a particularized showing of “good cause” until a challenge is made to the designation

of a particular document or thing as confidential.

5 02cv1642

from the 2003 Cox deposition can be accessed in their collateral litigation, and so that percipient

witnesses to the 2003 Cox deposition can be deposed on the substance of Cox’s testimony. Goodyear

opposes the modification, arguing that the potential prejudice to Goodyear’s substantive rights balanced

against public interest and judicial economy weighs against the modification. 

DISCUSSION

The public is permitted “access to litigation documents and information produced during

discovery unless the party opposing disclosure shows ‘good cause’ why a Protective Order is necessary.” 

Phillips v. General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It is well-established that the

fruits of pre-trial discovery are, in the absence of a court order to the contrary, presumptively public. 

Rule 26(c) authorizes a district court to override this presumption where ‘good cause’ is shown.”

(quoting San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir.1999))). 

“A party who has never made a ‘good cause’ showing under Rule 26(c) justifying initial protection of

disputed documents may not rely solely on the Protective Order to justify refusal when there is a

reasonable request for disclosure.” Contratto v. Ethicon, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 304, 308 (N.D.Cal. 2005)

(quoting Verizon California, Inc. v. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, L.P., 214 F.R.D. 583, 586 (C.D.Cal.

2003) (citations omitted)).3 Courts have broad discretion in determining what constitutes good cause,

whether good cause exists, and, if it does exist, what protection is appropriate. Seattle Times v.

Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) ( “broad discretion [is conferred] on the trial court to decide when a

Protective Order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required” ); Flatow v. Islamic Republic

of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting court has “extensive control” over discovery

process); Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211. As the party opposing modification of the Protective Order,

Case 3:02-cv-01642-B-NLS Document 65 Filed 01/28/08 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 02cv1642

Goodyear bears the burden of showing “good cause” for protecting the Cox deposition testimony from

discovery in Intervenors’ collateral litigation. Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211, n. 1 (citing Beckman Industries

Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 475 (9th Cir. 1992)).

The Ninth Circuit has determined that, where access to unfiled discovery documents is at issue,

the “party asserting good cause bears the burden, for each particular document it seeks to protect, of

showing that specific prejudice or harm will result if no Protective Order is granted. Phillips, 307 F.3d at

1210-11 (citing San Jose Mercury News, 187 F.3d at 1102); see also Beckman, 966 F.2d at 476 (“[B]road

allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule

26(c) test.”) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986) (internal

quotation marks omitted)); Deford v. Schmid Prods. Co., 120 F.R.D. 648, 653 (D.Md. 1987) (requiring

party requesting a Protective Order to provide “specific demonstrations of fact, supported where possible

by affidavits and concrete examples, rather than broad, conclusory allegations of potential harm”).” 

Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2003). The mere fact that the

production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further

litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records. Id. at 1136.

Intervenors maintain that the Court’s Protective Order should be modified so that it does not bar

the discovery of Cox’s deposition testimony in their collateral cases. In Foltz, supra, the Ninth Circuit

considered third-party collateral litigants’ motion to modify a Protective Order to gain access to

discovery materials that had been protected as confidential. The collateral litigation in state court

involved issues similar to the federal action which had been settled and in which certain documents were

obtained in discovery under a Protective Order keeping them confidential. The third-party litigants

sought access to these documents and other sealed court records. In order to obtain the confidential

discovery documents for the state court collateral litigation, the Protective Order first had to be modified

by the issuing federal court. The Foltz court recognized the policy of strongly favoring “access to

discovery materials to meet the needs of parties engaged in collateral litigation,” and held that in

determining whether to modify a Protective Order so that it does not stand in the way of a collateral

court’s control of discovery, the issuing court must evaluate the request to modify on a case by case

basis, examining, for instance, the complaints in both actions to make a rough determination of

Case 3:02-cv-01642-B-NLS Document 65 Filed 01/28/08 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 The Court previously determined that Intervenors have satisfied the relevancy requirement, holding that “the

underlying commonality between Applicants’ claims and the claims in this case lies with the allegation that Goodyear’s G159

275/70R/22.5 tire is defective when used on Class A motor homes.” (See Court’s July 13, 2007 Report and

Recommendation, Doc. No. 35, 5.)

7 02cv1642

relevancy,4 and the intensity of the reliance interest of the party opposing the modification. Id. at

1132-33. 

Foltz also held that the issuing court must in the first instance determine whether a Protective

Order should apply to specific documents or information under Rule 26(c). Id. at 1133. If a court

determines that its order does not protect the sought-after information, the court need not engage in the

Foltz analysis, as modification of its Protective Order is simply not necessary. The Court notes that both

Goodyear and Intervenors tacitly assume that Cox’s deposition testimony is presently protected as

“confidential information” under the June 13, 2003 Protective Order. Accordingly, Intervenors have not 

challenged whether Goodyear actually designated the Cox deposition testimony as confidential. 

Intervenors only challenge whether the deposition testimony is entitled to remain confidential. However,

under Foltz, the Court must decide as a threshold question whether its Protective Order in fact protects

the Cox deposition testimony. In order to resolve this question, the Court first looks to the applicable

terms of its Protective Order. Section One, Paragraph A of the Protective Order defines the term

“confidential,” and states: 

The words “confidential,” “confidential information,” and “confidential material”

describe information which is or contains trade secrets, research, development

and other proprietary matters including, but not limited to, methodology,

technique, process, control, and evaluation which any party believes in good faith

pertains to its trade or business and has independent value from not being

generally known and not being readily ascertainable by other persons who may

obtain economic value from its disclosure or use. In addition, such information is

not normally revealed to others except in confidence and is not revealed to others

in the party’s trade or business and is of a type that the party has made efforts to

maintain as secret.

(See June 13, 2003 Protective Order, Doc. No. 22, 2.) Paragraph B contemplates the consequence of a

confidential designation, and states: 

Information designated as “confidential” or “confidential information” or

“confidential material” shall be considered trade secret and fully protected by this

order. All portions of transcripts, depositions, exhibits, or other pleadings or

filings in this action which contain or otherwise set forth documents, information,

or other materials, or contents thereof, which have been previously designated as

confidential, shall likewise be subject to the terms of this protective order.

Case 3:02-cv-01642-B-NLS Document 65 Filed 01/28/08 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 02cv1642

(Id.) Section Two, Paragraph Three, specifically refers to the treatment of deposition testimony relating

to or discussing information designated as confidential, and states that:

Deposition testimony relating to or discussing Goodyear’s confidential

information shall be protected under this ORDER and the transcript of such

testimony shall be marked with the Confidential legend of Paragraph 1. The

transcripts of such deposition testimony shall be treated the same under this

ORDER as other documents Goodyear marks as confidential. The parties

stipulate that the court reporter or videographer for any such deposition will be

given a copy of this Protective Order, will execute an acknowledgment thereof

and shall not disclose to anyone other than those specified in Paragraph 2 any

deposition testimony or exhibit in this case. 

(Id. at 4.) Pursuant to these terms, in order for any portion of Cox’s deposition testimony to be subject

to protection, that testimony must have been designated by Goodyear as “confidential information.” 

This constitutes a threshold matter, because if Goodyear did not designate the deposition testimony as

relating to or discussing confidential information, the testimony is not protected and the motion

requesting modification of the Protective Order is moot. 

Goodyear asserts that it designated the entire deposition testimony of Cox as confidential and

protected under the terms of the Court’s Protective Order. Goodyear has not produced any document

that demonstrates the deposition was so designated. Rather, Goodyear relies on the hearsay declaration

of counsel John McCormick, who attended the Cox deposition, submitted in support of Goodyear’s

opposition to Intervenors’ motion. In his declaration, McCormick states:

Because Mr. Cox was being deposed regarding Goodyear’s confidential

information relating to its handling and evaluation of a property damage claim,

the deposition was declared to fall within the protections of the protective order,

and Plaintiffs’ counsel, Mr. Ricciardulli, agreed to this designation and did not

challenge it.

 (McCormick Declaration ¶ 4.) In direct contradiction to this statement, Ricciardulli submitted his own

hearsay declaration, in which he explains his understanding of the applicability of the stipulated

Protective Order to deposition testimony:

When I reviewed and signed the proposed Protective Order in the instant matter in

2003, it was my understanding that the Protective Order would treat as

confidential, only ‘trade secrets, research, development and other proprietary

matters . . . ‘ - as the language of the Protective Order itself provides. I understood

however, that deposition testimony of Goodyear employees could be entitled to

confidentiality, if that testimony related to such ‘trade secrets, research,

development or other proprietary matters.’ I did not believe, nor consider, that an

admission of liability . . . by a Goodyear representative (designated by Goodyear

Case 3:02-cv-01642-B-NLS Document 65 Filed 01/28/08 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 02cv1642

as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness) could be properly treated as a proprietary or

confidential business secret, such that it was entitled to protection from disclosure

under the Protective Order. 

(Ricciardulli Declaration ¶ 3.) Ricciardulli goes on to state:

I don’t recall ever having any discussion with Mr. McCormick regarding the

applicability of the provisions of the Protective Order to the transcript of the Cox

deposition. I have reviewed Mr. McCormick’s declaration wherein he states

and/or implies that I stipulated that the transcript, in its entirety, would be treated

as confidential. I have to believe that if I had entered into such an extraordinary

stipulation, I would remember having done so. I can state unequivocally that it

was never my intent to so stipulate, and treat as confidential, the above-referenced

testimony by Mr. Cox. I did not then believe, nor do I now believe, that such an

admission falls within the category of ‘trade secret or other proprietary

information’ entitled to confidentiality under the Protective Order.

(Id. ¶ 9.) 

Goodyear also brings to the Court’s attention several letters exchanged in May 2003 between

McCormick and Ricciardulli, and letters exchanged in August and October 2003 between McCormick

and the court reporting service in Ohio hired to transcribe the Cox deposition. A May 7, 2003 letter from

McCormick’s law firm to Ricciardulli discusses Plaintiffs’ demand for production of documents at

upcoming Rule 30(b)(6) depositions. In pertinent part, the letter states:

We are waiting on your and Mr. Regan’s signatures on the protective order. If we

receive those signatures soon, you should have the documents prior to the

depositions. Having a protective order in place will also expedite the production at

deposition of any additional documents which Goodyear considers trade secret,

proprietary, or otherwise confidential.

(McCormick Declaration, Ex. “B.”) A May 27, 2003 letter from McCormick to Ricciardulli once again

refers to pre-deposition document production requests, and the fact that Goodyear would not produce

documents until the Court had approved and entered the proposed Protective Order. (Id., Ex. “C.”) 

Additionally, that letter states:

In connection with the documents to be produced at deposition, to the extent they

are not included in the previously requested documents, they will be, subject to

appropriate objection and the protective order, produced at deposition.

(Id.) An August 19, 2003 letter written by McCormick, co-signed by Ricciardulli, to the court reporting

service in Ohio instructed the court reporter who transcribed the Cox deposition to return “the original

and all copies of your notes and the transcription of that deposition” for “destruction.” (Casey Affidavit,

Ex. “A.”) Finally, an October 1, 2003 letter from the court reporting service to McCormick confirmed

Case 3:02-cv-01642-B-NLS Document 65 Filed 01/28/08 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 This destruction was particularly risky given the fact that at the time there were other pending lawsuits alleging a

defect in the G159 tire. Intervenors bring to the Court’s attention six lawsuits filed in other jurisdictions prior to the Phillips’

suit, including England v. Goodyear in the District of South Carolina (Case No. 5:01cv05026-AWB); Wright v. Goodyear in

the 249th Judicial District of Texas (Case No. C 2000 0090); Cooner v. Goodyear in Alabama state court (Case No. CV-01-

667); Dutilly v. Goodyear in Arizona state court (Case No. C20030834); Price v. Goodyear in Alabama state court (Case No.

CV-02-2782-GWN); and Cluff v. Goodyear in the Southern District of Mississippi (Case No. 1:04cv51GURO). 

(Intervenors’ Motion, 7-8.) 

10 02cv1642

that the notes and exhibits from the deposition had been returned to Goodyear, and that the deposition

was never transcribed. (Id., Ex. “B.”) 

Goodyear argues that these letters when considered in tandem with John McCormick’s

declaration conclusively establish that the entire Cox deposition was designated confidential and subject

to the Court’s Protective Order. The Court disagrees. At most this evidence indicates that Goodyear

contemplated there would be documents used at the deposition that it considered confidential pursuant to

the terms of the Protective Order. This evidence does not, however, support Goodyear’s assertion that

the entire Cox deposition was designated confidential. To begin with, the terms of the Protective Order

drafted by Goodyear make no provision for pre-designating or post-designating an entire deposition as

confidential. Section 2, paragraph 3 of the Protective Order clearly states that portions of depositions

which refer to documents or information “previously designated” as confidential would likewise be

protected under the order. (See June 13, 2003 Protective Order, Doc. No. 22, 4.) (emphasis added) 

Moreover, in his declaration, Ricciardulli says he does not recall making any agreement with McCormick

to treat the entire Cox deposition as confidential, and if he had entered into such “an extraordinary

stipulation,” he would remember it. (Ricciardulli Declaration ¶ 10.) 

Goodyear was the last party to have custody and control of the returned deposition exhibits, as

well as the court reporter’s notes. Because Goodyear destroyed these documents, they also destroyed any

evidence that confidential documents were in fact used or relied upon by Cox while testifying, as well as

any evidence that the entire deposition was designated confidential before or after the deposition was

terminated. This destruction of the exhibits and notes, although purportedly done in light of the

Protective Order’s terms and pursuant to the parties’ settlement of the case, was done at Goodyear’s own

peril, as Goodyear now stands before this Court unable to prove that Cox’s deposition testimony was

designated confidential and subject to the protection of the Court’s June 13, 2003 Protective Order.5

Case 3:02-cv-01642-B-NLS Document 65 Filed 01/28/08 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

 The Protective Order defines “confidential” information as information which “is or contains trade secrets,

research, development, and other proprietary matters regarding methodology, technique, process, control, and evaluation.” 

(See June 13, 2003 Protective Order, Doc. No. 22, 2.) 

7 Based on counsels’ own recollections of events, the Cox deposition specifically involved resolution of Phillips’

prior property damage claim with Goodyear, and it is questionable whether testimony on that topic would be considered 

proprietary or trade secret material. Ricciardulli asserts that he “never considered that the subject testimony by Mr. Cox fell

within the category of ‘trade secret or proprietary information.’ In fact, in the course of resolving his prior claim with

Goodyear, that similar information about the G159 tire had been communicated directly to my client [the Phillips]” and was

not treated in a confidential manner by Goodyear. (Ricciardulli Declaration ¶ 8.) 

11 02cv1642

Goodyear asserted during oral argument that because it presented Cox for deposition as the

employee most knowledgeable on claims procedures, and because Goodyear has always considered its

in-house claims procedure to involve proprietary matters and information otherwise held confidential by

the corporation, his testimony was impliedly protected by the terms of the Protective Order.6 Goodyear

argued that any statements made by Cox during his deposition concerning the G159 tire’s performance

would have included proprietary information because of his high level position within the company and

his base of knowledge concerning Goodyear’s products. However, Goodyear presents no documentary

evidence to support this assertion. As noted above, Goodyear destroyed the allegedly confidential

documents upon which Cox relied during the deposition, as well as the court reporter’s notes of his

testimony. Therefore, Goodyear cannot establish that Cox relied upon proprietary matters or trade secret

information when testifying, nor that Cox actually testified regarding proprietary matters or trade secret

information. In fact, in its written submissions to the Court, Goodyear contradicts the assertion that Cox

testified to, or was expected to testify to, confidential information, as the Protective Order defined that

term, by stating that it tendered Cox as a fact witness - not a Rule 30(b)(6) witness, a designation to

which Goodyear specifically objected.7

 According to McCormick:

In the course of discovery, Plaintiffs’ counsel requested depositions of Goodyear

designees on several topics pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6). Although I timely objected

to his designation as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness, I agreed to arrange for the June 19,

2003 deposition of Mr. Kim Cox, a Goodyear employee, to testify regarding the

resolution of a property damage claim that the Plaintiffs had submitted to

Goodyear prior to the accident involved in this litigation.

(McCormick Declaration ¶ 3.) Thus, Goodyear presents the Court with contradictory statements

regarding Cox’s witness designation, which significantly undermines the Court’s ability to make any

inference as to the applicability of the Protective Order to his testimony. 

In the Ninth Circuit, in the absence of a court order to the contrary, fruits of pre-trial discovery

Case 3:02-cv-01642-B-NLS Document 65 Filed 01/28/08 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 02cv1642

are presumptively public. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1103

(9th Cir. 1999). The plain language of the Protective Order in this case created an affirmative obligation

of the parties to designate information, documents, and deposition testimony as “confidential.” Without

evidence of such a designation, where the definition of “confidential” was aimed at protecting trade

secrets and proprietary matters from Goodyear’s potential competitors, and considering the unreliable

and contradictory memories of counsel, the Court cannot conclude that Cox’s deposition testimony is

subject to the terms of its Protective Order. Accordingly, the Court finds that Cox’s June 20, 2003

deposition testimony is not confidential, and modification of the Court’s Protective Order is not

necessary in order for this information to be potentially discoverable in Intervenors’ collateral litigation. 

Based on the Court’s findings above, further analysis under Foltz is not necessary. Foltz v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003). However, even if Goodyear had

established the confidentiality of Cox’s deposition testimony, Goodyear fails to demonstrate good cause

for continued protection of the testimony. Id. at 1131 (citing Beckman, 966 F.2d at 476). As the party

opposing modification, Goodyear must establish that specific harm or prejudice will result from

disclosure of the information. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). A

“particularized showing,” Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1138, under the “good cause” standard of Rule 26(c) will

“suffice[ ] to warrant preserving the secrecy of sealed discovery material attached to non-dispositive

motions.” Id. at 1135. The court that issued the protective order must weigh the “countervailing reliance

interest of the party opposing modification against the policy of avoiding duplicative discovery.” Id. at

1133. 

Goodyear first argues that modification of the Protective Order will harm the interests of judicial

economy. (Defendant’s Opposition, 9.) In support, Goodyear highlights the fact that because it

destroyed the Cox deposition notes and exhibits, modification of the Protective Order will result in the

“creation of new discovery” in the form of multiple depositions being taken in order to try and recreate a

record of Cox’s 2003 testimony. Goodyear asserts that the potential proliferation of discovery directly

implicates the Ninth Circuit’s admonition against wasteful and duplicative discovery. (Id., citing Foltz at

1132.) Intervenors note in reply that “the fatal problem with this argument is that it rewards Goodyear

for destroying evidence.” (Intervenors’ Reply, 4.) The Court agrees that Goodyear should not be able to

Case 3:02-cv-01642-B-NLS Document 65 Filed 01/28/08 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 As Goodyear points out, Cox has been and will continue to be deposed in product liability cases involving the

G159 tire. Therefore, the court’s ruling on the present motion affects the question of whether he can be asked if he admitted a

tire defect when deposed in this case.

9 Intervenors cite to applicable federal laws that place an affirmative obligation on companies like Goodyear to

report to the government, public, and consumers when a tire’s use on a particular type of vehicle renders it a defective

product, and to maintain a record of product malfunctions. See Intervenors’ Motion, 17, citing 49 U.S.C. § 3118(c)(1) and 

49 C.F.R. § 576.6, “Regulations Relating to Transportation: Record Retention,” which states in pertinent part: 

Records to be maintained by manufacturers under this part include all documentary materials, films, tapes,

and other information-storing media that contain information concerning malfunctions that may be related

to motor vehicle safety. Such records include, but are not limited to, reports and other documents, including

material generated or communicated by computer, telefax or other electronic means, that are related to work

performed under warranties; and any lists, compilations, analyses, or discussions of such malfunctions

13 02cv1642

turn its handling of the evidence in this case in 2003 into good cause five years later for barring access to

the information. The Court disagrees with Goodyear’s suggestion that modification of the Protective

Order will result in wasteful or duplicative discovery. Allowing collateral litigants to access Cox’s

deposition testimony will at most result in the depositions of a handful of people who were present at the

Cox deposition on June 20, 2003 in an effort to determine whether he admitted a defect in the G159 tire.8

 Goodyear also argues that its reliance interest on the Protective Order weighs heavily against

modification. (Id. at 10.) Goodyear contends that it relied on the Protective Order as well as its

settlement with the Phillips family, to protect Cox’s testimony. (Defendant’s Opposition, 10.) Goodyear

states that modification of the Protective Order will undermine Goodyear’s own proper compliance with

the order, as well as its handling of the deposition notes and exhibits. (Id.) However, as the Foltz court

noted, “[r]eliance will be less with a blanket [protective] order, because it is by nature over-inclusive.” 

Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1138 (citing Beckman, 966 F.2d at 476). Because Goodyear drafted and then obtained

the blanket protective order without making a particularized showing of good cause with respect to any

particular documents or any specifically anticipated depositions or portions of testimony, and because

this case settled so quickly into the discovery process, Goodyear’s reliance on the Protective Order was

minimal. See id. (citations omitted). Thus, even if Cox’s testimony was confidential and subject to

protection, Goodyear fails to establish good cause for why the testimony should continue to be protected.

Finally, Intervenors argue that Goodyear’s attempt to withhold access to Cox’s 2003 testimony

violates a strong public policy compelling the disclosure of information related to the health and safety of

motorists.9

 (Intervenors’ Motion, 17.) Paragraph 15 of the Protective Order states in pertinent part that

Case 3:02-cv-01642-B-NLS Document 65 Filed 01/28/08 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

contained in internal or external correspondence of the manufacturer, including communications transmitted

electronically.

See also U. S. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 455 F.Supp. 1072, 1082 (D.D.C.,1978)(holding that “15 U.S.C. § 1397[a]

empowers the Secretary of Transportation, and by delegation NHTSA, to prohibit the manufacture and sale in interstate

commerce any substandard motor vehicle or piece of motor vehicle equipment. 15 U.S.C. § 1401(c) allows for the

Secretary, and by delegation NHTSA, to conduct investigations and issue special orders such as the one at issue here, for

the accomplishment of any of the purposes outlined in the Act. It is clear that automobile tires are motor vehicle

equipment.”) 

14 02cv1642

“[t]he Court may modify this stipulated protective order in the interests of justice or for public policy

reasons.” The important public interest in safety implicated by this case and Intervenors’ collateral

litigation demands the disclosure of information related to a potential product defect in the G159 tire. 

Therefore, even if Cox’s testimony were protected under the terms of the Protective Order, the Court

would modify its order to allow Intervenors to discover what he stated during that deposition. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Intervenors’ Motion to Modify

the Court’s Protective Order Entered June 13, 2003 [Doc. No. 27]. The Court further ORDERS that the

Clerk of this Court UNSEAL Document Numbers 27, 37, 45, 48, 51, and 53 in light of the Court’s

ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 28, 2008

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:02-cv-01642-B-NLS Document 65 Filed 01/28/08 Page 14 of 14