Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01814/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01814-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Lawrence Christopher Smith (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 24). On August 1, 2013, 

Plaintiff submitted his objections to the Court’s Findings and Recommendations in which he provides 

factual allegations which were not contained in his prior complaints. (Doc. 25).1 Based upon these 

 

1 On July 8, 2013, the Court ordered service of Plaintiff’s cognizable claims and recommended dismissal of his 

remaining claims. (Doc. 25). Plaintiff was granted the opportunity to file his objections to the Findings and 

Recommendations of Dismissal on or before July 25, 2013. Id. The Court adopted the Findings and Recommendation of 

LAWRENCE CHRISTOPHER SMITH,

 Plaintiff,

v.

D. GOSS, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:10-cv-01814 - LJO- JLT (PC)

ORDER VACATING THE ORDER FINDING 

SERVICE OF THE SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT APPROPRIATE AND THE 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

ISSUED JULY 8, 2013

(Doc. 25)

ORDER VACATING THE ORDER DIRECTING 

THE UNITED STATES MARSHAL SERVICE TO 

SERVE THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Doc. 29)

ORDER DISMISSING THE SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

(Doc. 24)

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additional allegations, it appears Plaintiff may be able to state additional claims. Thus, the Court 

VACATES the July 8, 2013 Order and Findings and Recommendations (Doc. 25) and VACATES the 

Order directing the United States Marshal Service to Serve the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 

29). Finally, as is required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court screens the Second Amended Complaint, 

and for the reasons set forth below, DISMISSES the complaint with a FINAL opportunity to amend.2

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 

Because Plaintiff seeks redress from governmental employees in a civil action, the Court is 

required to screen his complaint in order to identify cognizable claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). 

The Court shall “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is 

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). 

II. PLEADING STANDARDS 

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)

“Pro se documents are to be liberally construed” and “‘must be held to ‘less stringent standards 

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). “[They] can only be dismissed for failure to state a 

claim if it appears ‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 

which would entitle him to relief.’” Id. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), “[a] pleading that 

states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plaint statement of the grounds for the court’s 

jurisdiction, . . . ; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Each allegation must be simple, 

 

dismissal in full on July 31, 2013, as Plaintiff failed to object. (Doc. 26). However, Plaintiff filed his Objections to the 

Findings and Recommendations (Doc. 28) on August 1, 2013, which are dated July 23, 2013. (Doc. 28 at 20). The Court 

presumes Plaintiff served his Objections on this date, and thus deems the Objections as timely submitted given that delays 

in the prison’s mail delivery system are not attributable to the Plaintiff. 

2 While the Court finds that Plaintiff states certain cognizable claims, his Objections indicate that he may possess 

further cognizable claims beyond those presented in his second amended complaint. Thus, the entire complaint is 

dismissed to afford Plaintiff a FINAL opportunity to present a pleading that encompasses the ENTIRETY of his 

cognizable claims. Plaintiff is advised that in future, the Court will consider only the factual allegations made in the 

complaint so he is encouraged to state completely his claims in his Third Amended Complaint or his claims will be 

dismissed.

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concise, and direct. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). While a complaint “does not need detailed factual 

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his entitlement to relief requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). 

In analyzing a pleading, the Court sets conclusory factual allegations aside, accepts all nonconclusory factual allegations as true, and determines whether those non-conclusory factual 

allegations accepted as true state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 676-684 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it 

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining plausibility, the Court is permitted “to draw on 

its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In order to sustain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show (i) that he 

suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (ii) that 

the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v. 

Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The causation requirement of § 1983 is satisfied only if a 

plaintiff demonstrates that a defendant did an affirmative act, participated in another's affirmative act, 

or omitted to perform an act which he was legally required to do that caused the deprivation 

complained of. Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 

F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978)).

III. COMPLAINT

Portions of Plaintiff’s cause of action arose while he was incarcerated at the California 

Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison (“CSATF/SP”) located in Corcoran, California, 

and at the Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”) located in Delano, California. (Doc. 24 at 12). Plaintiff 

names the following CSATF/SP personnel as defendants to this matter: (1) Lieutenant (“Lt.”) D. Goss, 

(2) Lt. Gallagher, (3) Officer T. Langler, (4) Physician Assistant (“PA”) Byers, (5) Chief Medical 

Officer Dr. Enemoh, and (6) “O. Beregostva, Medical Doctor” or O. Beregovskaya, M.D. Id. at 1, 9. 

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Plaintiff also names the following KSVP staff as Defendants to this matter: (1) Sergeant (“Sgt.”) A. 

Sotelo and (2) Officer Anderson, the property clerk of the Administrative Segregation (“Ad. Seg.”)

Unit at KVSP. Id. at 1, 16. Finally, Plaintiff names Defendant Doe, the property clerk of California 

State Prison – Corcoran (“CSP-Corcoran”). Id. at 16. Plaintiff seeks monetary recompense and states 

his complaint as follows: 

On an undisclosed date, an unnamed officer at CSATF/SP made unwanted sexual advances 

toward Plaintiff. (Doc. 24 at 3) Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance against the officer. Id. at 3-4. Lt. 

Goss presided over the administrative hearing on this grievance, at which time he suggested that 

Plaintiff may have misinterpreted the officer’s intentions. Id. Lt. Goss next requested that Plaintiff 

withdraw his grievance and, when Plaintiff refused, Lt. Goss destroyed Plaintiff’s administrative 

complaint. Id. Also, he threatened future reprisals. Id.

 In April 2010, Plaintiff and his cellmate engaged in an altercation, resulting in serious injury to 

his cellmate. (Doc. 24 at 5) Plaintiff was charged with attempted murder of an inmate and received a 

Rules Violation Report (“RVR”). Id. On June 14, 2010, Lt. Popper conducted a hearing on the charge

and, as a result, ordered an independent investigation of the incident. Id. 

On June 19, 2010, Lt. Goss conducted a second hearing on the murder charge without the 

completion of the independent investigation. (Doc. 24 at 5) Lt. Gallagher, the CSATF/SP Ad. Seg. 

supervising lieutenant, falsely testified that Plaintiff was unruly at this hearing. Id. at 6. None of the 

witnesses Plaintiff wished to call to testify at the hearing were made available. Id. Lt. Goss falsely

reported that Plaintiff was uncooperative at the hearing and that “Plaintiff acted in concert with an 

accomplice.” Id. Nonetheless, prison personnel subsequently acquitted Plaintiff of this alleged rules 

violation. Id. 

In an unrelated claim, Plaintiff reports that he has deformed lower legs and has been diagnosed 

with a moderate “case of bowlegs (sic)”and has “flat feet” which requires him use orthopedic shoes 

and inserts. (Doc. 24 at 7-8) Following the April 24, 2010, altercation with his cellmate, Officer 

Cribbs confiscated and placed Plaintiff’s orthopedic shoes in an evidence locker because they had

blood stains on them. Id. at 8. Plaintiff had no other shoes and was forced to walk barefoot to Ad. Seg. 

Id. 

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Also on April 24, 2010, Plaintiff sought to access CSATF/SP’s law library, as he had a 

pending writ of habeas corpus that attacked his conviction and was facing attempted murder charges.

(Doc. 24 at 13) CSATF/SP officials granted Plaintiff “general library user” status in late May of 2010. 

Id. at 14. The research materials at the library were over four years old and he was not provided any 

means to Shepardize his legal materials. Id. at 14-15. Officer Langler subsequently offered to 

implement an “inmate paging services.” Id. at 15. Nevertheless, Plaintiff reports he was banned from 

the law library due to his inmate grievance against Lt. Goss. Id. at 15. 

In June 2010, P.A. Byers met with Plaintiff concerning pain in his lower extremities. (Doc. 24

at 8.) Plaintiff “attempted to talk to P.A. Byers reasonably as well as attempted to have him examine 

(sic) Plaintiff’s feet.” Id. at 9. P.A. Byers did not examine Plaintiff’s feet, despite the development of 

“foot ulcers and callouses” from his state-issued shoes and his “severely flat feet” condition. Id. at 8-9. 

Because Byers found only that Plaintiff had been issued regular shoes, he refused to authorize 

replacement orthopedic shoes. Id. at 9.

After an appeal, prison officials determined Plaintiff, indeed, had been issued the inserts but 

they found no record of his having been issued orthopedic shoes. (Doc. 24 at 9) Thus, they permitted

Plaintiff to have his orthopedic arch supports restored to him but did not order return of the orthopedic 

shoes. Id. Instead, medical staff was required to review the shoes and determine whether they were 

medically necessary. Id. 

In April 2010, Lt. Gallagher was in charge of returning the insoles. Id. at 9-10. Gallagher 

refused to return Plaintiff the orthopedic shoes—despite reviewing the shoes and consulting with 

medical staff and despite being aware they were needed for the insoles to work. Id. Thus, he 

determined the shoes were “personal property” which was not permitted in Ad. Seg. Id. at 9. Plaintiff 

attempted to show Gallagher that the shoes were specially made to accommodate the inserts and told 

him they would not fit in regular prison shoes. Id. at 10. Gallagher stated he was aware of this and 

then laughed. Id.

In April 2011, Plaintiff was transferred to KVSP, and by this time he had begun to develop 

foot calluses and bunions. (Doc. 24 at 11) Plaintiff saw a podiatrist who issued a medical chrono 

which enabled Plaintiff to wear orthopedic shoes and arch supports. Id. at 11-12. 

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On March 13, 2013, due to inmate grievances filed against several officers, Sgt. Sotelo and 

Officer Castro confiscated Plaintiff’s orthotics and forced him to walk barefoot to KSVP’s “program 

office holding cell area.” Id. at 12. En route to the program office and while barefoot, Officer Castro 

stomped on Plaintiff’s left foot. Id. Similarly, Sgt. Sotelo stomped on Plaintiff’s right foot and caused 

damage to his right big toe. Id. Shortly thereafter, Sgt. Sotelo unleashed a series of foul statements

concerning Plaintiff’s orthopedic shoes. Id. 

IV. DISCUSSION AND ANAYLSIS

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff has not identified any causes of actions against Defendants in 

his complaint. As a result, Plaintiff has not carried his burden to state claims with specificity. See 

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49; Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007) (a plaintiff 

must set forth more than conclusions and include “the grounds of his entitlement to relief”). 

Nevertheless, based on the factual allegations above, it appears Plaintiff seeks to proceed on claims for 

retaliation, denial of access to the courts, inadequate medical care, violation of due process and a new 

Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment. 

A. Supervisor Liability 

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in 

the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant, through his or her own individual actions, violated 

Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948–49 (2010). 

Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under section 1983 on the theory of 

respondeat superior, as each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Id.; Ewing v. City 

of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009). A supervisor may be held liable only if he or she 

“participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989); accord Starr v. Baca, No. 09–55233, 2011 WL 

477094 *4–5 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir.2009); Preschooler II v. 

Clark County School Board of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir.2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 

F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir.1997).

Here, Plaintiff indicates that Dr. Beregovskaya and Dr. Enemoh did nothing more than review 

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Plaintiff’s inmate grievance against P.A. Byers. (Doc. 24 at 9). Although Plaintiff names Dr. 

Beregovskaya for the first time in his current complaint, his sole complaint against Dr. Beregovskaya 

is based on the handling of Plaintiff’s inmate grievance. To that extent, Plaintiff is advised that he has 

no constitutional right to have his medical grievance reviewed in a particular manner. Ramirez v. 

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). Moreover, for the second time, Plaintiff bases his sole 

complaints against Dr. Enemoh on the theory of respondeat superior without providing any factual 

basis for this claim. (Docs. 18 and 24). Thus, the claim is DISMISSED. 

B. First Amendment Claims

1. Retaliation

Under the First Amendment, prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners for initiating 

litigation or filing administrative grievances. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005). 

A viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state 

actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) the inmate’s protected conduct and 

that the adverse action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights and (5) did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate penological purpose. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 

2009) (quoting Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68). An adverse action is one that “would chill or silence a 

person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 

1228 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Mendocino Envtl. Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 

(9th Cir. 1999)).

Plaintiff alleges he complained about sexual harassment by a male correctional officer. In this 

process, Lt. Goss destroyed a complaint made by Plaintiff and discarded it because Plaintiff refused to 

stop pursuing his sexual harassment complaint. (Doc. 24 at 3-4). Previously, this Court has 

determined a plaintiff stated a cognizable claim when he alleged a correctional officer destroyed an 

inmate appeal. Leinweber v. Day, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35935, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2010). 

Similarly, Plaintiff indicates that Lt. Goss, “blinded by anger,” also retaliated against Plaintiff 

by issuing a false finding of guilt on the charge of attempted murder, despite Lt. Popper’s order for an 

independent investigation. (Doc. 24 at 5-6). In Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth 

Circuit determined that a cognizable claim of retaliation existed where a plaintiff alleged that he was 

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falsely accused of prison gang activity in retaliation for filing an inmate grievance. 351 F.3d at 1288-

1289. Because “[a]n allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a 

prison grievance is sufficient to support a claim under Section 1983,” Plaintiff has stated a cognizable 

claim against Lt. Goss. See Leinweber, 2010 U.S. Dist. at *9 (citing Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288).3

In addition, Plaintiff appears to set forth a claim of retaliation against Officer Langler, when he 

alleges Langler enforced an unofficial ban that kept Plaintiff from the law library. (Doc. 24 at 15). In 

support of this contention, Plaintiff alleges that when he confronted Officer Langler about not getting 

access to the law library, Officer Langler told him that Plaintiff “knew damn well why [he] was 

restricted from the library like [he was] showing up the Lieutenant like that.” Id. It appears that 

Officer Langler prohibited Plaintiff from accessing the law library because Plaintiff filed a grievance

against Lt. Goss. Id. Such an action could reasonably have a chilling effect on a litigant’s exercise of 

their First Amendment rights. White, 227 F.3d at 1228. Thus, taking the complaint in the light most 

favorable to the Plaintiff, Plaintiff states a cognizable claim against Officer Langler.

2. Access to the Courts

Plaintiff asserts a multifaceted First Amendment claim of denial of access to the courts against

Officer Langler, Officer Anderson, and Defendant Doe – the Property Clerk at CSP-Corcoran. (Doc. 

24 at 13-19). Under the First Amendment, prisoners have a right of access to the courts. Lewis v. 

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right is limited to the filing of direct criminal appeals, habeas 

petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from 

the frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access 

claim) or from the loss of a suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. 

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002). 

In addition to demonstrating official acts frustrating the inmate’s litigation, a prisoner asserting 

a backward-looking denial of access claim must show the loss of a “nonfrivolous” or “arguable” 

underlying claim. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-414 (2002). The underlying claim 

must be set forth in the pleading claiming a denial of access to the courts “as if it were being 

 

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Plaintiff also avers that Officer Anderson’s actions were “in concert with established patterns of retaliation by 

prison officials” without providing any factual support for this conclusion. Thus, the claim is DISMISSED. 

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independently pursued.” Id. at 417. Finally, the plaintiff must specifically allege the “remedy that may 

be awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be brought.” Id. at 

415. 

A plaintiff must allege “actual injury” as the threshold requirement to any First Amendment 

claim of denial of access to the Courts. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53. An “actual injury” is “actual 

prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing 

deadline or to present a claim.” Id. The failure to demonstrate an actual injury is jurisdictional. 

Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Failure to show that a “nonfrivolous legal claim 

had been frustrated” is fatal”). As discussed below, Plaintiff fails to state a claim of denial of access to 

the courts. 

a. Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Officer Langler.

Plaintiff alleges he was injured when he was denied priority legal user status, when he had to 

“wrangle” with Officer Langler to get his legal property, and that the law library possessed subpar 

legal resources. (Doc. 24 at 14). 

Notably, inmates do not have a “freestanding right” to access a law library or legal assistance. 

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). The accessibility or adequacy of a law library is of 

constitutional concern only when it thwarts a prisoner from exercising his right to access the courts for 

the purpose of seeking redress for “claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights.” Id. 

(quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977)). Moreover, an inmate must demonstrate that he 

suffered “actual injury” because of deficiencies in law library access or materials, “such as the 

inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim” in a direct appeal, habeas petition, or a § 1983 

action. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348, 355. As the United States Supreme Court has explained:

[A]n inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his 

prison's law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense. 

That would be the precise analog of the healthy inmate claiming constitutional violation 

because of the inadequacy of the prison infirmary.

Id. at 351. 

The age of the law library reference materials and the fact that it offered no method to 

Shepardize cases indicates nothing more than Plaintiff’s assertion that the law library was subpar. 

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Though he complains he submitted a habeas corpus petition to the California court of appeals “without 

any research into any of the rebuttals,” he does not allege any facts that he was prejudiced by doing so. 

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53. Furthermore in his second amended complaint, Plaintiff notes that Officer 

Langler permitted Plaintiff to access the law library only once, he fails to indicate how this restriction 

caused him an actual injury. 

On the other hand, for the first time in his Objections, Plaintiff asserts facts that could support 

a claim against Officer Langler. Specifically, Plaintiff avers that “by failing to schedule the [P]laintiff 

in a timely fashion for the use of [the law library]...cost the [P]laintiff the opportunity to challenge an 

adverse entry of judgment [on a habeas corpus appeal].” (Doc. 28 at 5). Notably, this conclusory 

allegation is insufficient to state a claim against Langler but it raises the possibility Plaintiff may be

able to state a claim. 

The Court does not understand why Plaintiff omitted these determinative facts from his prior 

complaints. Nonetheless, given the facts alleged in his Objections, Plaintiff may be able to state a

First Amendment claim for denial of access to the courts against Officer Langler. Therefore, the Court 

DISMISSES this claim and with leave to amend.

b. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Doe.

Plaintiff alleges he was injured by Defendant Doe, the property clerk of CSP-Corcoran’s SHU 

facility, when Doe denied him access to his legal property. (Doc. 24 at 16). Plaintiff claims he sought 

to access the documents for the purposes of filing a “writ of habeas corpus to overturn his RVR 

hearing, a state bar complaint, and a writ of habeas corpus before the California Supreme Court.” Id. 

While awaiting receipt of this property may have presented an inconvenience to Plaintiff, it does not 

present any cognizable injury under § 1983. In fact, Plaintiff’s admission that he “filed the appropriate 

appeals...within the Superior Court of California,” demonstrates he cannot state a claim. Id. Thus, 

the Court DISMISSES this claim. 

C. Eighth Amendment – Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care

The Eighth Amendment “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized 

standards, humanity, and decency.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. 

Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1976)). The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment requires 

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that prison officials to provide medical care to prisoners. Id. at 104-05. To state a claim arising in the 

context of inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must point to “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to 

evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Id. at 106. Thus, a cognizable claim has 

two elements: “the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of defendant’s response 

to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds 

by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiff alleges he suffers from a congenital defect of his feet in which he has no arch in either 

foot. (Doc. 24 at 7) Plaintiff alleges this condition is “quite painful to say the least” if not treated. Id. 

For many years before entering prison and while in prison, he used orthopedic devices. Id. When he 

entered prison he had the devices in prison and used them faithfully. Id. Eventually, Plaintiff was 

provided a new pair of orthopedic shoes and “custom-made arch supports and insoles for athletic 

shoes as well.” Id. at 7-8. When he was transferred to Kern Valley State Prison in April 2011, he was 

seen by a podiatrist who issued him new orthopedic boots. Id. at 11.

Likewise, he alleges that after his arch supports and orthopedic shoes were removed from him 

and he was forced to wear non-orthopedic shoes, he developed foot ulcers, callouses and bunions and 

was required to see a podiatrist regularly for months. Id. at 8, 11. Thus, at this early stage in the 

proceeding, the Court finds these allegations sufficient to demonstrate Plaintiff suffered from a serious 

medical condition. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1298 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 

With regard to P.A. Byers, Plaintiff asserts Byers failed to examine him and refused to 

prescribe orthopedic shoes. (Doc. 24 at 8-9, 11). Plaintiff explains that he “attempted to talk to PA 

Byers reasonably as well as attempted to have him examine [his] feet.” Id. at 9. PA Byers refused to 

examine Plaintiff and indicated that the state budget did not allow for orthopedic shoes. Id. It was not 

until Plaintiff’s transfer to KVSP that Plaintiff was examined by a podiatrist who prescribed him a pair 

of orthopedic shoes. Given Byers’ cursory response to Plaintiff’s serious medical need, the Court finds 

that Plaintiff states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim of failure to provide adequate medical care 

at this early juncture. 

With regard to Lt. Gallagher, Plaintiff indicates he made Lt. Gallagher aware of his need for 

the orthopedic shoes and the arch supports by demonstrating that the arch supports could not fit into 

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prison-issued shoes. (Doc. 24 at 9-10) Gallagher acknowledged understanding that Plaintiff needed 

the shoes but refused to allow Plaintiff to have them. Id. Notably, Plaintiff alleges the appeal required 

medical staff to review the shoes and determine whether they were for a medical need. Id. However, 

Gallagher looked at the shoes and consulted with medical staff but informed medical staff that the 

shoes were personal property and would not be allowed in Ad Seg. Id. at 9-10. Taken in a light most 

favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff states a cognizable claim against Lt. Gallagher. 

D. Procedural Due process and Disciplinary Hearings.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action that deprives a 

person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 

(1974). A plaintiff alleging a procedural due process violation must first demonstrate that he was 

deprived of a liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause and then demonstrate 

that the procedures attendant upon the deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. Ky. Dep’t of 

Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989). McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 

2002). The Due Process Clause in of itself protects only those interests that are implicit in the word 

“liberty.” See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (liberty interest in avoiding involuntary 

psychiatric treatment and transfer to a mental institution). A state statute or regulation, however, gives 

rise to a protected liberty interest if it imposes conditions of confinement that constitute an “atypical 

and significant hardship [on the prisoner] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin 

v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). This requires a factual comparison between the conditions of 

confinement caused by the challenged action and the basic conditions of prison life. See Wilkinson, 

545 U.S. at 223-24 (placement of prisoners in a highly restrictive “supermax” prison implicated a 

protected liberty interest). 

Here, Plaintiff fails to state a procedural due process claim in his second amended against Lt. 

Goss and Lt. Gallagher because there are no facts alleged that he was deprived of any liberty interest 

as a result of the June 14, 2010, disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff’s acquittal of the RVR report and the 

lack of discipline received as a result of the false report moots Plaintiff’s claim that Lt. Goss created a 

false report and failed to make his witnesses available at the hearing. Similarly, while Plaintiff claims 

that Lt. Gallagher falsely testified against Plaintiff, the Due Process clause does not guarantee freedom 

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from false testimony. See e.g., Kennedy v. Hayes, 1:09-CV-01946-JLT, 2010 WL 5440805 (E.D. Cal. 

Dec. 28, 2010). 

In addition, Plaintiff indicates that Goss denied Plaintiff’s request to present witnesses by not 

making them available at the June 14, 2010, disciplinary hearing. (Doc. 24 at 6). The Ninth Circuit 

has determined that prisoners do not possess an unlimited right to call witnesses at a disciplinary 

hearing. Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003). However, prison officials are 

required to “make the decision whether to allow witnesses on a case-by-case basis, examining the 

potential hazards that may result from calling a particular person.” Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1079. It 

logically follows that a blanket denial of an inmate’s right to call witnesses at a disciplinary hearing 

implicates an inmates’ due process rights. See Id. Examining the claim in the light most favorable to 

the Plaintiff, Lt. Goss seemingly refused to permit Plaintiff to present his witnesses at trial without 

providing any explanation. 

In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that any deprivation of 

Plaintiff’s liberty occurred. Namely, Plaintiff’s RVR that resulted from Lt. Goss’ conduct was 

overturned on appeal. (Doc. 24 at 6-7). However, for the first time in his Objections, Plaintiff states 

that the CDCR-115-RVR “was reheard on September 18[,] 2010 with a finding of guilty for a lesser 

(sic) included offense of [b]attery.” (Doc. 28 at 17). As a result, Plaintiff received a 15 month 

segregated housing unit term and 360-day loss of good credit. Id. at 17. Allegations of a loss of good 

time credit demonstrate a deprivation of a liberty interest. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. Thus, the Court 

DISMISSES the claims with leave to amend. 

E. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a) does not permit “buckshot complaints.”

Despite the prior admonition that Plaintiff may not file a “buckshot complaint,” (Docs. 14), 

Plaintiff has added new, unrelated claims against Sgt. Soltero, Officer Castro and Anderson. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 18(a) permits a plaintiff to join as many claims as he has against a single party. However, 

“[u]nrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits.” Smith v. Anti, Case No. 

2:07-CV-1675-GEBGGHP, 2008 WL 5178911 * 1 (E.D. Cal. 2008)(quoting George v. Smith, et al., 

507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007)). A “buckshot complaint” occurs where a plaintiff files unrelated 

claims against different defendants in the same suit. See Smith, 2008 WL at 1. “Buckshot complaints” 

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violate Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Plaintiff has filed a buckshot complaint against the following 

individuals:

i. Officer Anderson

For the first time in his second amended complaint, Plaintiff claims Officer Anderson denied 

him his legal property which resulted in “adverse rulings in various court proceedings.” (Doc. 24 at 

17). Plaintiff does not allege facts in his second amended complaint that these “various court 

proceedings” were non-frivolous nor does he indicate the bases of his claims. He does not aver that he 

sought to access his legal documents during the pleading stage of either his habeas corpus matters or 

that his petition for writ of mandate related to his underlying conviction or a condition of confinement. 

Finally, and determinative of the Court’s decision, these allegations occurred after the filing of 

the complaint.4 Plaintiff cannot bootstrap his First Amendment claim against Officer Anderson onto 

his current lawsuit. Furthermore, Plaintiff provides no factual support to demonstrate that Officer 

Anderson’s actions are part of a common factual nexus with his other claims.

5

 Thus, his claim against 

Officer Anderson is a buckshot complaint. Therefore, the claim is DISMISSED. 

ii. Sgt. Soltero and Officer Castillo 

While the Court sympathizes with Plaintiff’s situation, Plaintiff’s apparent Eighth Amendment 

claim of cruel and unusual punishment concerning Sgt. Soltero and Officer Castro is wholly unrelated 

to Plaintiff original and first amended complaints. Compare (Docs. 1 and 18) with (Doc. 24). These 

actions allegedly occurred on March 13, 2013. (Doc. 18 at 13). However, Plaintiff provides no factual 

support to demonstrate that these actions, which occurred two years after Plaintiff filed his complaint, 

are related to the actions of prison personnel in 2010. Thus, Plaintiff’s complaint against Sgt. Soltero 

and Officer Castro is a “buckshot complaint” that violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a).

Finally, when the Court previously granted him leave to amend, the Court did not provide 

Plaintiff with carte blanche leave to include every claim against every prison official that he might 

have. Should new claims arise during the course of this litigation, Plaintiff must initiate separate 

 

4

Plaintiff alleges that some of his claim against Officer Anderson arose in September of 2011. 

5

In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Anderson’s actions were “in concert with 

established patters of retaliation by prison officials.” (Doc. 24 at 19). Nowhere does Plaintiff provide factual allegations to 

support this contention. Thus, no factual nexus exists to permit Plaintiff to bring this claim in the present lawsuit. 

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lawsuits. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims against Sgt. Soltero and Officer 

Castro.6

V. FINAL LEAVE TO AMEND

The Court will provide Plaintiff a final opportunity to amend his pleading to cure the 

deficiencies noted in this order. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987) (“A pro 

se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is absolutely clear that the 

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (internal quotations omitted). In his 

first amended complaint, Plaintiff must address the deficiencies noted here. Plaintiff is advised 

that his failure to do so will result in a recommendation of dismissal of this action. 

Plaintiff is explicitly warned to include all facts which are the basis of his claim in his third 

amended complaint. Facts raised in subsequent pleadings to his third amended complaint will 

not be considered by the Court. Further, Plaintiff must state his complaint in a plain and concise 

manner. Plaintiff’s third amended complaint SHALL NOT EXCEED 20 pages. Failure to comply 

with this order will result in an immediate recommendation of dismissal without leave to amend. 

In addition, Plaintiff is cautioned that in his third amended complaint he may not change the 

nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. See George v. Smith, 

507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). Plaintiff is also advised that once he 

files his third amended complaint, his original pleadings are superceded and no longer serve any 

function in the case. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Thus, the third amended 

complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading.” Local 

Rule 220. “All causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not [re-]alleged in an 

amended complaint are waived.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations 

omitted). Plaintiff may not assert any claims unrelated to those asserted in his original and first 

amended complaints.

///

 

6

In filing his third amended complaint, Plaintiff is STRONGLY ADVISED not to re-assert his claims against 

Officer Anderson, Sgt. Solteo or Officer Castro. Rather, the Court STRONGLY ENCOURAGES Plaintiff to file a 

separate lawsuit in regard to these claims if he wishes to pursue these claims. 

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ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that:

1. The second complaint (Doc. 24) is DISMISSED; 

2. Plaintiff is GRANTED 21 days from the date of service of this Order to file a third 

amended complaint that addresses the deficiencies set forth in this order. The third amended complaint 

must bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Third Amended Complaint.” 

The third amended complaint SHALL not exceed 20 pages;

3. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff the form complaint for use in a 

civil rights action; and

4. Plaintiff is firmly cautioned that failure to comply with this order will result in an 

order dismissing this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 6, 2013 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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