Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01130/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01130-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Willie Lee Parker, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-01130-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(“Petition”), (Doc. 1), and Motion for Release Pending Review of Court’s Decision and 

Recommendation (“Motion for Release”), (Doc. 50). On June 8, 2016, the Magistrate 

Judge to whom this case was assigned issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) 

recommending that the Petition and the Motion for Release be denied. (Doc. 52). 

Petitioner subsequently filed a “Motion to Object to Doc (52) to Dismiss Petitioner[’]s 

Petition, and Responsed [sic] with Proffer Authority” (“Motion to Object”) on June 22, 

2016. (Doc. 53).1

 The Court now rules on Petitioner’s Petition and Motion for Release. 

I. Legal Standard 

 The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that 

the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de 

 

1

 Although entitled as a motion, the Court construes this filing as Petitioner’s 

objections to the R&R. 

Case 2:15-cv-01130-JAT Document 54 Filed 08/09/16 Page 1 of 6
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 

1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“Following Reyna-Tapia, this Court concludes that de novo review 

of factual and legal issues is required if objections are made, ‘but not otherwise.’”); 

Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 589 F.3d 1027, 1032 

(9th Cir. 2009) (the district court “must review de novo the portions of the [Magistrate 

Judge’s] recommendations to which the parties object”). District courts are not required 

to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an objection.” 

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“[T]he court 

shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the [report and recommendation] 

to which objection is made.”). Thus, the Court will review de novo the portions of the 

R&R to which Petitioner objected. 

II. Petition 

At page 9, the R&R discusses the statute of limitations applicable to federal 

habeas petitions brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court adopts this statement of 

the governing law. 

The R&R then applies the controlling law and determines that Petitioner’s Petition 

must be dismissed with prejudice because it was filed more than three years after the 

statute of limitations had expired. (Doc. 52 at 9–24). In reaching this conclusion, the 

R&R reviews whether statutory tolling is applicable, (id. at 12); and whether equitable 

tolling applies due to Petitioner’s pro se status, Petitioner’s allegation of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, the state court’s delay in ruling on Petitioner’s motion to extend 

time to file his notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”), and Petitioner’s argument that he 

was required to exhaust his state remedies before filing his habeas petition in federal 

court, (id. at 12–15). The R&R also reviews Petitioner’s claim of actual innocence under 

the standards set forth in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). (Id. at 15–24). The R&R 

concludes that none of these issues prevents the statute of limitations from barring 

Petitioner’s Petition. (Id. at 24). 

Case 2:15-cv-01130-JAT Document 54 Filed 08/09/16 Page 2 of 6
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 In his Motion to Object, Petitioner does not expressly object to any particular 

finding of the R&R. See (Doc. 53). Rather, the only reference to any “objection” in the 

Motion to Object is the comment that “Petitioner object [sic] to the Court’s 

recommendation to dismiss the Petition with prejudice, of petitioners [sic] claims.” (Id. at 

9). Beyond this cursory statement, the Motion to Object simply reasserts that Petitioner is 

innocent and reviews the state court’s delay in ruling on Petitioner’s motion for a time 

extension. (Id. at 1–7). Although Petitioner does not expressly state that he objects to the 

R&R’s findings on these issues, because Petitioner is an incarcerated, pro se litigant, the 

Court will construe his arguments regarding these two issues as objections. Nonetheless, 

because Petitioner does not object to or discuss any other portion of the R&R in his 

Motion to Object, see (id.), the Court accepts and adopts the R&R’s findings regarding 

the commencement of the statute of limitations time period, (Doc. 52 at 9–10); the 

mailbox rule, (id. at 11); statutory tolling, (id. at 12); and equitable tolling as to 

Petitioner’s pro se status, allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, and exhaustion, 

(id. at 12–15). The Court will now review de novo the two issues discussed in Petitioner’s 

Motion to Object: (1) the state court’s delay in ruling on Petitioner’s time extension 

motion and (2) Petitioner’s claim of actual innocence. 

A. Motion for Time Extension 

 Pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4, Petitioner was required to 

file a notice of PCR within ninety days of being sentenced by the Arizona state court. 

Eighty-seven days after Petitioner was sentenced, he filed a “Motion for Extension of 

Time to File Rule 32,” seeking an unspecified extension of time to file a notice of PCR. 

When filing his motion for a time extension, Petitioner claims that he relied on the 

“Arizona Constitution & U.S. Constitutional Amendment, Art 6. Sub. 21, [which] says 

‘every matter submitted to a judge of the superior court for his decision shall be decided 

within (sixty days) from the date of submission thereof.’” (Doc. 53 at 1) (parenthesis in 

original). The state court did not rule on Petitioner’s motion before the ninety day period 

lapsed. One-hundred and fifty-three days after being sentenced, Petitioner filed a notice 

Case 2:15-cv-01130-JAT Document 54 Filed 08/09/16 Page 3 of 6
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

of PCR. According to Petitioner, because the state court did not promptly grant 

Petitioner’s motion for a time extension, that “caus[ed] Petitioner[’]s PCR to be late, as if 

it was done ‘egregiously.’” (Id.) 

 When determining whether the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled, the 

R&R considers the state court’s delay in ruling on Petitioner’s motion for an extension of 

time. (Doc. 52 at 13–14). The R&R explains that there is no substantive or procedural 

guarantee that an eleventh hour time extension motion will be ruled upon before an 

impending deadline and concludes that Petitioner bore the risk of filing such a late 

motion. (Id.) The R&R further finds that there is no evidence that Petitioner was 

prevented from filing his notice on time. (Id.) Consequently, the R&R determines that the 

trial court’s delay in ruling on the motion was not an extraordinary circumstance 

warranting equitable tolling. (Id.) 

 The Court agrees with the R&R that the state court’s delay in ruling on 

Petitioner’s last minute motion for a time extension was not an extraordinary 

circumstance that justifies equitable tolling. There is no evidence indicating that 

Petitioner was prohibited or prevented from filing his PCR notice within ninety days of 

his sentence. Further, as detailed by the R&R, Petitioner did not exhibit diligence by 

filing his notice within the un-extended deadline. In any event, even if Petitioner did in 

fact rely on subsection 21 of article 6 of the Arizona Constitution, he still acted in a 

dilatory manner. Namely, Petitioner waited over 150 days after his sentence to file a 

notice of PCR, more than three years to file a federal habeas petition after the state court 

deemed his notice untimely, and over sixteen months after the Arizona Court of Appeals 

affirmed the trial court’s decision that the notice was untimely. Accordingly, to the extent 

Petitioner objected to this portion of the R&R, his objection is overruled. 

B. Actual Innocence 

Within a span of eight months, Petitioner was detained on three separate instances 

for driving under the influence (“DUI”). Petitioner ultimately pled guilty to one count of 

aggravated DUI for each occurrence. As recounted by the R&R, the counts were 

Case 2:15-cv-01130-JAT Document 54 Filed 08/09/16 Page 4 of 6
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

aggravated because Petitioner “committed each DUI while his driver’s license or 

privilege to drive was suspended, canceled, revoked, or refused, or while a restriction was 

placed on his license as a result of a prior DUI.” (Doc. 52 at 2) (citation omitted). The 

suspended license was issued to one “Maurice Davis.” Fingerprint analysis conducted by 

the Phoenix Police Department confirmed with 100% certainty that Petitioner was issued 

the suspended “Maurice Davis” driver’s license. 

 Petitioner asserts that he possessed a valid driver’s license in his name, Willie Lee 

Parker, at the time of two of the three DUIs. (Doc. 53 at 4–5). Petitioner argues that he 

“NEVER obtained a driver[’]s license in the name Maurice Davis, and stand by a resolute 

to that avouch [sic].” (Id. at 4). According to Petitioner, “fingerprints [sic] analysis is not 

a drivers [sic] license.” (Id. at 6). Petitioner asserts that he is not Maurice Davis because 

his birth date and social security number are different than that of Maurice Davis. (Id. at 

4). Petitioner states that if the Government “could produce that drivers [sic] license of 

Maurice Davis it would destroy Petitioners [sic] [‘factual innocence’] of his claim.” (Id.

at 6) (brackets in original). Petitioner suggests that the Government should “compare 

Maurice Davis driving license (made up) profile to Petitioner’s exibit [sic] 1 and prove 

[sic] a photo link to Petitioner and Maurice Davis driving no. (B12374523).” (Id. at 6). 

Consequently, Petitioner asserts that he is being held unconstitutionally because his “real 

offense” is a misdemeanor, not aggravated DUI. (Id.) 

 Although it appears that a driver’s license issued to “Willie Lee Parker” was valid 

at the time of two of the DUIs, fingerprint analysis conducted by the Phoenix Police 

Department established with a “0% chance of error” that Petitioner was previously issued 

a driver’s license using the alias Maurice Davis. (Docs. 42 at 20; 42-2 at 2). There is also 

evidence that the Maurice Davis driver’s license was suspended in 1992 in connection 

with a DUI and has never been reinstated. (Docs. 36-1 at 2–3; 42-1 at 11). Based on this 

evidence, the Court agrees with the R&R that Petitioner’s self-serving statement that he 

never obtained a driver’s license under the name Maurice Davis is insufficient to satisfy 

the Schlup Gateway which requires “new reliable evidence” proving a petitioner’s actual 

Case 2:15-cv-01130-JAT Document 54 Filed 08/09/16 Page 5 of 6
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

innocence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Petitioner presents no evidence beyond his selfserving statement that he never obtained a driver’s license using the alias Maurice Davis. 

In contrast, there is evidence with a “0% chance of error” that Petitioner’s fingerprints 

match the fingerprints of Maurice Davis. There is no basis to conclude that no reasonable 

juror would have convicted Petitioner in light of his disavowals. Because the evidence 

shows that Petitioner was issued a driver’s license using the alias “Maurice Davis” and 

that the license was suspended at the time of Petitioner’s three DUIs in 2008 and 2009, 

Petitioner’s claim of actual innocence fails. Accordingly, to the extent Petitioner objected 

to this portion of the R&R, his objection is overruled. 

III. Motion for Release 

Because this Order rules on Petitioner’s Petition, his Motion for Release pending 

review of his Petition is denied. 

IV. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, 

 IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation, (Doc. 52), is accepted 

and adopted as stated above; Petitioner’s objections, (Doc. 53), are overruled; and 

Petitioner’s Motion for Release Pending Review of Court’s Decision and 

Recommendation, (Doc. 50), is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims in the Petition are dismissed as 

specified in the Report and Recommendation, (Doc. 52 at 25), and the Clerk of the Court 

shall enter judgment accordingly. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, a 

Certificate of Appealability is denied because, to the extent the Petition was dismissed, 

such dismissal was based on a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find 

this Court’s procedural rulings debatable or wrong. 

 Dated this 8th day of August, 2016. 

Case 2:15-cv-01130-JAT Document 54 Filed 08/09/16 Page 6 of 6