Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-04015/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-04015-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LINDA PERRYMENT,

Plaintiff,

v.

SKY CHEFS, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-04015-KAW 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO PARTIALLY DISMISS 

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 14

On August 12, 2016, Defendant Sky Chefs, Inc. filed a motion to partially dismiss Plaintiff

Linda Perryment’s first amended complaint. Specifically, Defendant seeks to dismiss the sixth 

cause of action for penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) on the grounds 

that it is barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

Upon review of the moving papers, the Court finds this matter suitable for resolution 

without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), and, for the reasons set forth below,

DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss the sixth cause of action. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Linda Perryment was employed by Defendant Sky Chefs, Inc. (a/k/a “LSG Sky 

Chefs”) for 13 years, from 1999 to 2004, and 2007 until the June 5, 2015 termination date 

contained in a letter received days after she submitted an application for medical leave. (First Am. 

Compl., “FAC,” Dkt. No. 11 ¶¶ 8, 11.) Plaintiff worked as a clerk between 1999 and served as a 

Human Resources Coordinator from 2007 until her termination. (FAC ¶ 11.) Plaintiff was a nonexempt, hourly employee, and was paid on a biweekly basis. Id. On or about May 29, 2015, 

Plaintiff applied for medical leave due to a serious health condition that allegedly rendered her 

unable to perform her duties. Id. On June 4, 2015, Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant 

informing her that the company terminated her employment effective June 5, 2015. Id. Plaintiff 

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contends that she was effectively discharged on May 28, 2015, but was not officially terminated 

until June 5, 2015, because Defendant could not issue a paycheck until June 4, 2015. (FAC ¶¶ 11-

12.) 

On May 27, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint in San Mateo Superior Court containing 

thirteen causes of action, including wrongful termination and violations of wage and hour laws.

(Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 13.) The initial complaint contained a sixth cause of action seeking 

penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code § 2698. (Compl. ¶¶ 44-

47.) On July 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, in which she amended the sixth 

cause of action to allege compliance with the statute’s notice and exhaustion requirements. (FAC, 

Dkt. No. 11 ¶ 46.)

On August 12, 2016, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the PAGA cause of action. 

(Def.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 14.) On August 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed an opposition. (Pl.’s Opp’n, Dkt. 

No. 15.) On September 2, 2016, Defendant filed a reply. (Def.’s Reply, Dkt. No. 16.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss based 

on the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 

F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In considering such a motion, a court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations 

contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citation 

omitted), and may dismiss the case or a claim “only where there is no cognizable legal theory” or 

there is an absence of “sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief.” 

Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

A claim is plausible on its face when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate 

“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action” and “conclusory statements” are 

inadequate. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (“[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat 

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully . . . When a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's 

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal citations omitted).

Generally, if the court grants a motion to dismiss, it should grant leave to amend even if no 

request to amend is made “unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by

the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations 

omitted).

B. Request for Judicial Notice

As a general rule, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in 

ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 

F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). A district court may take notice of facts not subject to reasonable 

dispute that are “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 

cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal–Obeso, 989 F.2d 

331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993). “[A] court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record,’” Lee, 

250 F.3d at 689 (citing Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)), and 

may also consider “documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity 

no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading” without converting a 

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) into a motion for summary judgment. Branch v. Tunnell, 

14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 

307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). The court need not accept as true allegations that contradict facts 

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which may be judicially noticed. See Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 

(9th Cir. 1987). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Request for Judicial Notice

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff asks that the Court take judicial notice of California State 

Assembly Bill No. 1506, which sets forth the October 2, 2015 amendments to sections 2699, 

2699.4, and 2699.5 of the California Labor Code, in support of its opposition to the motion to 

dismiss. (Pl.’s Req. for Judicial Not., “RJN,” Ex. 1 Dkt. No. 15-1.) Exhibit 1 is a true and correct 

copy of official public records, whose authenticity is capable of accurate and ready determination 

by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice.

B. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s PAGA cause of action is time-barred for failure to 

“properly commence her lawsuit” before July 8, 2016. (Def.’s Mot. at 14.)

To claim PAGA penalties, a plaintiff must exhaust the administrative procedures set forth

in California Labor Code § 2699.3. Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court, 134 Cal.App.4th 

365, 375-76 (2005). This includes giving written notice to the California Labor and Workforce 

Development Agency (“LWDA”) and the defendants via certified mail. Cal. Lab. Code § 

2699(a)(1). After the LWDA responds that it will not prosecute the action, or after 33 days 

without notice from the LWDA, the plaintiff may file suit. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(a)(2)(A). To 

properly introduce a PAGA cause of action, a party must plead compliance with the pre-filing 

notice and exhaustion requirements. See Thomas v. Home Depot USA Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1003 

(N.D. Cal. 2007); see also Slay v. CVS Caremark Corp., 2015 WL 2081642, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 

4, 2015). 

PAGA claims have a one-year statute of limitations. See Cal.Code Civ. Proc. § 340(a); 

Thomas, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 1007. Additionally, “PAGA allows for a tolling of the limitations 

period during the (at most) 33-day period during which the LWDA is assessing, or the employer 

may be curing, the alleged violations.” Martinez v. Antique & Salvage Liquidators, Inc., 2011 WL 

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500029, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2011), modified in part, 2011 WL 766683 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 

2011) (citing Cal. Labor Code § 2699.3(d); Singer v. Becton, Dickinson And Company, 2008 WL 

2899825, at *6 (S.D. Cal. July 25, 2008); Moreno v. Autozone, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

43873, at *5.) PAGA also contains a provision that permits a plaintiff to amend an existing 

complaint to add a PAGA cause of action within 60 days of the tolling period. See Cal. Lab.Code 

§ 2699.3(a)(2)(C). A plaintiff has this ability “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” such 

that a plaintiff can make such an amendment even if it occurs outside of the one-year limitations 

period. Id.

On May 25, 2016, Plaintiff provided notice to the LWDA pursuant to California Labor 

Code § 2699.3(a)(1) of the violations allegedly committed by Defendant against her and other 

current and former employees. (FAC ¶ 45.) On May 27, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant action in 

state court. It is undisputed that Plaintiff filed the initial complaint after timely filing the notice 

with the LWDA, but prior to expiration of the 33 day period. On July 26, 2016, Plaintiff amended 

the PAGA cause of action to allege compliance with the pre-filing notice and exhaustion 

requirements. (FAC ¶ 46.)

Defendant contends that, based on a termination date of June 5, 2015, the last day for 

Plaintiff to “properly” plead a PAGA claim was July 8, 2016,1 which was one year and 33 days 

from her termination date. (Def.’s Mot. at 5.) Thus, her failure to file a first amended complaint 

by that date bars the PAGA cause of action. Id.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends the “FAC [d]id not add a new PAGA claim, but merely

amended a PAGA claim that was already alleged in the lawsuit,” so the claim does not implicate 

the statute of limitations. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.) Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that under California 

law, Plaintiff could amend her complaint to allege a PAGA cause of action within 60 days of the 

limitations period, and the claim is, therefore, timely. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 3-4 (citing Former Cal. Lab. 

 

1

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s “effective” termination date of May 28, 2015 affects the viability 

of her other causes of action. Accordingly, any use of the June 5, 2015 date is not dispositive as to 

those other causes of action. Indeed, use of the “effective” termination date would result in a last 

day of filing of June 30, 2016, which does not affect the disposition of the instant motion. See 

discussion infra note 2.

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Code 2699.3(a)(2)(C).) The Court agrees. 

Indeed, “California courts have held, under analogous circumstances, that an exhausted 

claim, although alleged in an amended complaint filed after expiration of the statute of limitations, 

relates back to a prior timely-filed complaint based on the ‘same set of facts.’” Waisbein v. UBS 

Fin. Servs. Inc., 2008 WL 753896, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2008); see also Martinez, 2011 WL 

500029, at *9 (PAGA claim in first amended complaint filed after the one-year and 33 days 

limitations period, but within 60-day window in which the plaintiffs could amend their existing 

complaint as a matter of right under California Labor Code § 2699.3(a)(2)(C), was not timebarred). It would be unfair to preclude amendment to an existing PAGA claim when a statute 

expressly permits amendment to add new PAGA claims within 60 days of the limitations period. 

See Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3(a)(2)(C). Thus, assuming a termination date of June 5, 2015, 

Plaintiff’s last day to sufficiently allege a PAGA claim would be 60 days after July 8, 2016 or 

September 6, 2016.2Plaintiff filed the first amended complaint on July 26, 2016, which falls 

within the 60 day window.

Moreover, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that it “will suffer substantial prejudice 

if Plaintiff is able to circumvent the statute of limitations with this amended complaint.” (Def.’s 

Mot. at 2.) To the contrary, Defendant will suffer no unfair prejudice or surprise by confronting a 

PAGA claim contained in the original complaint, which— while defective for failure to exhaust 

her administrative remedies prior to filing— alleged the relevant facts underlying the PAGA cause 

of action. See Ramirez v. Ghilotti Bros. Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1210 (N.D. Cal. 

2013)(permitted relation back of PAGA claims not contained in the original complaint). In fact, 

the only amendment to the sixth cause of action was to plead that the notice and exhaustion 

requirements were satisfied instead of presumed satisfied. (See FAC ¶ 46; cf. Compl. ¶ 46.)

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s PAGA claim is not time-barred.

///

///

 

2 Using Plaintiff’s effective termination date, she would have 60 days after June 30, 2016.

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IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice and 

DENIES Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss. Defendant shall file an answer to the complaint 

within 14 days of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 30, 2016

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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