Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02221/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02221-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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09cv2221

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT SHELEY,

Petitioner,

v.

DOMINGO URIBE, JR., Warden, et al.

Respondents.

 

 

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Case No. 09-CV-2221-WQH (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 4] 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner Robert Sheley (“Petitioner”) be DISMISSED with

prejudice. 

I. Introduction

On March 21, 1973, Petitioner was sentenced by the Circuit Court of the

Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County, to an indeterminate life term

for robbery and a concurrent five (5) year sentence for possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon. (Resp’t. Lodgment No. 1.) On June 25, 1974, Petitioner was

sentenced by the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Osceola

County, to a prison term of fifteen (15) years for two counts of assault with intent to

commit murder and for shooting into an occupied vehicle, a consecutive fifteen (15)

year sentence for three additional counts of assault with intent to commit murder and for

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1

 The Court takes judicial notice of Sheley v. Florida Parole Commission, 720 So.2d

216 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1998), which provides the following explanatory information: 

The Parole Commission entered an order on July 16, 1996, suspending inmate

Sheley’s presumptive parole release date and declining to authorize an effective

parole release date. In support of the order, the Commission cited the inmate’s

lengthy criminal history and the facts of some of his prior offenses. These

offenses included escapes and escape attempts as well as armed attacks on law

enforcement and corrections personnel. The Commission also expressed

serious concerns about the inmate’s mental health evaluation. Based on this

evidence, the Commission concluded that the inmate’s “release on parole would

not be compatible with his welfare or the welfare of society.” Sheley, 720 So.2d 

at 217. 

2 09cv2221

shooting into an occupied vehicle, a consecutive five (5) year sentence for aggravated

assault and petit larceny, a consecutive one (1) year and one (1) day sentence for

possession of a counterfeit license, and a consecutive one (1) year and one (1) day

sentence for possession of burglary tools. (Resp’t. Lodgment No. 2.) On January 20,

1975, Petitioner was sentenced by the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit of

Florida, in and for Union County, to a prison term of ten (10) years, to run consecutively

with any sentence being served, for escape. (Resp’t. Lodgment No. 3.) In or around

1993, Petitioner was transferred to the custody of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) pursuant to an Interstate Corrections Compact

Agreement. (Resp’t. Lodgment No. 4.) In or around 1996, Petitioner’s Presumptive

Parole Release Date (“PPRD”) of May 6, 1996 was suspended by Special Commission

Action by the Florida Parole Commission. (Resp’t. Lodgment No. 5.)1

On October 6, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). (Doc. 1.) On December 17, 2009,

Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the grounds that Petitioner’s

claims are not cognizable on federal habeas review. (Doc. 4.) Petitioner filed an

Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (styled as a “Response” to the Motion to Dismiss)

on January 4, 2010. (Doc. 5.) 

//

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II. Procedural Background

On December 20, 2006, Petitioner was issued a CDC-115 Rules Violation Report

(“RVR”) charging him with possession of dangerous contraband in violation of Cal.

Code. Regs., tit. 15, § 3006(c). (Pet., Ex. E; Resp’t. Lodgment No. 6.) On January 24,

2007, a hearing was held in which Petitioner was found guilty. (Id.) Petitioner was not

assessed any days of forfeiture due to staff error. (Id.) After exhausting his

administrative appeals, in which he contended he did not receive a fair hearing (see

Pet., Ex. A), Petitioner filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court

of California, County of Imperial (Case Nos. EHC 00934 and EHC 01020). (Pet., Exs.

B, C.) The court denied the petitions on March 10, 2008 and July 29, 2008,

respectively. (Id.) Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal (Case No. D053572). (Pet., Ex. D.) On January 27, 2009,

the appellate court denied the petition. (Id.) Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for writ

of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court (Case No. S172299). (Pet., Ex. E.) 

On August 12, 2009, the California Supreme Court denied the petition. (Id.) 

Petitioner contends in his federal Petition that his rights to due process and a fair

hearing were violated for three reasons: (1) The finding of guilt on his disciplinary

violation was based on insufficient evidence; (2) Prison officials did not permit him to

call witnesses at the disciplinary hearing; and (3) Prison officials failed to record the

disposition of the contraband at issue in the disciplinary proceeding. Pet. at i, 6-8. 

III. Discussion

A. The Petition Does Not State a Cognizable Claim for Federal Habeas

Relief 

Respondents move to dismiss on the grounds that Petitioner has failed to state a

cognizable claim for federal habeas relief because the disciplinary adjudication of which

Petitioner complains did not affect the fact or duration of Petitioner’s confinement. 

//

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4 09cv2221

1. Legal Standards

“‘Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to

imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under

the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are

the province of habeas corpus.’” Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006) (quoting

Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004)). “An inmate’s challenge to the

circumstances of his confinement, however, may be brought under § 1983.” Id. 

“The Supreme Court first addressed the intersection between § 1983 and writs of

habeas corpus in Preiser v. Rodriguez, holding that ‘when a state prisoner is

challenging the very fact or duration of his physical confinement,’ and where ‘the relief

he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier

release from that imprisonment,’ the prisoner’s ‘sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas

corpus.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 855 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)). “Conversely, Preiser concluded that ‘a § 1983

action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge

to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody.” Id.

(quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499). “Conditions of prison life” encompass “any

deprivation that does not affect the fact or duration of a prisoner’s sentence.” Id. at 857

(quoting Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 1999)). 

The Ninth Circuit has determined that “habeas jurisdiction is proper where a

challenge to prison conditions would, if successful, necessarily accelerate the prisoner’s

release.” Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 859. “[H]abeas jurisdiction is absent, and a § 1983

action proper, where a successful challenge to a prison condition will not necessarily

shorten the prisoner’s sentence.” Id. In Ramirez, the plaintiff appealed the district

court’s dismissal of his § 1983 complaint challenging prison disciplinary procedures as

barred by the “favorable termination rule” established in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

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5 09cv2221

477 (1994). Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 852. The complaint sought to expunge all references

to the disciplinary charge and to prohibit the State from considering any reference to the

charge when evaluating the plaintiff for parole. Id. at 859 n.6. The appellate court

reversed, finding that “the applicability of the favorable termination rule turns solely on

whether a successful § 1983 action would necessarily render invalid a conviction,

sentence, or administrative sanction that affected the length of the prisoner’s

confinement.” Id. at 856. Because Ramirez’s action, if successful, would not shorten

the length of his confinement, the appellate court determined that his challenge to the

prison disciplinary procedures did not “intrude upon the ‘heart’ of habeas jurisdiction”

and was properly brought under § 1983. Id. at 858, 859. 

In Docken v. Chase, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a prisoner’s claim of a

right to annual review of his suitability for parole was cognizable under § 2254 or

whether it needed to be brought as a § 1983 claim. Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024,

1026 (9th Cir. 2004). The district court had concluded that Docken’s claims could only

be brought under § 1983. The Ninth Circuit, finding that habeas and § 1983 relief are

not mutually exclusive, reversed, and held that “when prison inmates seek only

equitable relief in challenging aspects of their parole review that, so long as they prevail,

could potentially affect the duration of their confinement, such relief is available under

the federal habeas statute.” Id. at 1031 (emphasis in original). The court, quoting from

its decision in Bostic v. Carlson, explained that claims that are “likely to accelerate the

prisoner’s eligibility for parole” bear a sufficient nexus to the length of imprisonment so

as to serve as the subject of a habeas petition. Id. at 1031 (citing Bostic v. Carlson, 884

F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original)). The court did not determine

whether the relief sought by Docken was also available under § 1983. Docken, 393

F.3d at 1031. 

2. Discussion

Here, Petitioner’s claims are more akin to those raised in Ramirez than to the

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claims raised in Docken. As in Ramirez, Petitioner challenges prison disciplinary

proceedings, not the fact or duration of his confinement. Like Ramirez, if Petitioner

were to succeed on his claims, he would not shorten the length of his confinement.

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 859. Petitioner was not assessed any loss of good-time credits

and thus the length of his imprisonment was not affected by the disciplinary finding. As

with Ramirez, Petitioner essentially seeks a finding of “not guilty” on the disciplinary

charge and/or an expungement of the guilty finding from his record. Petitioner is not,

like the plaintiff in Docken, “seek[ing] only equitable relief in challenging aspects of [his]

parole review” (see Docken, 393 F.3d at 1031), and thus Docken is distinguishable. 

See, e.g., Thomas v. Wong, 2010 WL 1233909, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (distinguishing

Docken on same basis); Santibanez v. Marshall, 2009 WL 1873044, at *7 (C.D. Cal.

2009) (same). 

While Petitioner contends that his parole eligibility could be affected by the

disciplinary charge (see Pet’r.’s Opp’n at 1), this is merely speculative. Petitioner has

made no showing that expungement of the disciplinary finding from his record would be

“likely to accelerate” his eligibility for parole. Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269

(9th Cir. 1989). “The decision to release a prisoner rests on a myriad of

considerations.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995). Like Ramirez, even if

Petitioner successfully challenged the disciplinary proceeding, “the parole board will still

have the authority to deny his request for parole on the basis of any of the grounds

presently available to it in evaluating such a request.” Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 859

(citation and internal modifications omitted). The “speculative impact” of the disciplinary

proceedings on any future parole considerations is inadequate to serve as the basis for

a habeas corpus petition. See Santibanez, 2009 WL 1873044, at *7 (finding same). 

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable on federal

habeas review and instead must be raised, if at all, under § 1983. The Court

accordingly recommends that the Petition be dismissed with prejudice.

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IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the undersigned magistrate

judge finds that Petitioner has not stated a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief.

The Court hereby recommends that Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss the Petition be

GRANTED, the Petition be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and that judgment be

entered accordingly.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable William Q.

Hayes, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that not later than July 22, 2010, any party may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be served and filed not later than

August 6, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s

order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 21, 2010

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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