Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00357/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00357-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Anti-trust

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1 At the close of briefing, plaintiff filed a second, largely redundant motion, styled

“Plaintiff’s Motion for Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction” (doc. 32). Given the identity of

legal standards for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, such requests are

almost always combined in a single motion. For reasons that are unclear, plaintiff elected to file

them separated by several days, resulting in complications to the briefing process, as discussed

herein. In any event, that Motion is also ripe for disposition.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MOBILE COUNTY WATER, SEWER )

AND FIRE PROTECTION AUTHORITY, )

INC., )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 07-0357-WS-M

 )

MOBILE AREA WATER AND SEWER )

SYSTEM, INC., )

 )

Defendant. )

 

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Restraining

Order (doc. 25), which was filed on October 18, 2007. Following an expedited briefing

schedule, that Application is ripe for disposition at this time.1

I. Background.

This action is part of a longstanding war on multiple fronts being waged between

plaintiff, Mobile County Water, Sewer and Fire Protection Authority (“MCWSFPA”), and

defendant, Mobile Area Water and Sewer System (“MAWSS”). The dispute originates from the

fact that these Alabama public corporations have developed partially overlapping service

territories, inasmuch as both MAWSS and MCWSFPA provide water and sewer services to

certain rural customers outside the City of Mobile but within Mobile County. The problem, as

plaintiff postures it, is that MAWSS provides the only source of “centralized” sewer services for

customers in MCWSFPA’s service area. MCWSFPA, for practical and economic reasons,

Case 1:07-cv-00357-WS-M Document 36 Filed 10/29/07 Page 1 of 14
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cannot develop its own competing centralized sewer system. According to plaintiff, MAWSS

has parlayed its centralized sewer services into a formidable competitive advantage in the

parties’ shared service area by instituting an “all-or-nothing” policy pursuant to which residential

or commercial customers who wish to avail themselves of MAWSS centralized sewer services

must also purchase its water services, thereby depriving the customer of the chance to purchase

competing water services from MCWSFPA while purchasing sewer services from MAWSS. 

The effect, according to plaintiff, is that MCWSFPA is being squeezed out of its own service

territory because customers are being coerced to purchase water services from MAWSS when

they otherwise might have purchased water from MCWSFPA. Notably, this practice is not new;

to the contrary, MCWSFPA repeatedly makes statements in its filings to the effect that “for a

number of years, MAWSS has adhered to an all-or-nothing utility policy.” (Amended Complaint

(doc. 6), ¶ 15; Plaintiff’s Brief (doc. 28), ¶ 39.)

Court documents reflect that the disagreements between these two public utility providers

concerning how they may compete in their common service territory date back more than two

decades, as the parties first engaged in litigation in state court concerning the manner and scope

of their competition back in 1986. After an apparent period of armistice, in August 2005,

MCWSFPA filed suit against MAWSS in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama,

contending that MAWSS is unlawfully encroaching upon MCWSFPA’s exclusive service area

by extending its services within that area. MCWSFPA seeks monetary, declaratory and

injunctive relief in that action under a variety of state-law statutory and common-law theories. 

The state court action remains pending today.

Nearly two years later, on May 18, 2007, MCWSFPA initiated another lawsuit against

MAWSS by filing a Complaint (doc. 1) in this District Court. This action unquestionably bears

factual similarities to, and arises from similar events as, its state court counterpart. Here,

MCWSFPA’s causes of action are confined to antitrust claims, as MCWSFPA alleges that

MAWSS is in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2, as well as a

claim under a state statute that creates a right of action for one “injured or damaged by an

unlawful trust, combine or monopoly, or its effect, direct or indirect.” Ala. Code § 6-5-60(a). 

The gist of the alleged unlawful conduct on which this action is predicated is MAWSS’s practice

of “tying” the purchase of water service to the purchase of sewer service. The alleged tying

Case 1:07-cv-00357-WS-M Document 36 Filed 10/29/07 Page 2 of 14
2 In its Opposition Brief, MAWSS asserted that the requested preliminary

injunction relief was broader in scope than that requested by the Application for TRO. This is

not correct. Side-by-side comparison of the relief sought by the Application for TRO and that

sought by the Motion for Preliminary Injunction reveals that they are co-extensive, except that of

course the TRO would be temporary while the Preliminary Injunction would remain in place

until a final ruling on the merits. Compare doc. 28, ¶ 66 with doc. 32, ¶¶ 2-4.

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conduct consists of the all-or-nothing policy described above, thereby leveraging MAWSS’s

dominance in the sewer service market to oblige its sewer customers also to purchase water

service from it, rather than from competitors such as MCWSFPA. Thus, plaintiff contends that

MAWSS is engaged in an illegal tying scheme, in violation of federal antitrust laws, and is

abusing its market power in the area of sewer service to gain an unfair competitive advantage in

the sale of water service, all to MCWSFPA’s detriment. In this action, MCWSFPA does not

seek monetary damages; rather, the ad damnum clause of the Amended Complaint is confined to

requests for permanent injunctive relief, plus costs and attorney’s fees.

In the five months since its filing, this action has proceeded along a routine litigation

trajectory. Magistrate Judge Milling entered a Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order (doc. 19) on

September 6, 2007, setting guidelines and deadlines for discovery, pretrial conference and trial,

among others. The case proceeded smoothly until October 18, 2007, when without warning

plaintiff abruptly filed an Application for Temporary Restraining Order, with a supporting

affidavit and exhibits. The catalyst for that filing, and MCWSFPA’s reasons for waiting until

then to file it, are not apparent. The following day, plaintiff submitted a 26-page Memorandum

of Law in support of its request for TRO. In response to an inquiry by counsel and consistent

with the emergency nature of the relief requested by plaintiff, the Court entered an accelerated

briefing schedule resulting in MAWSS filing an Opposition Brief (doc. 30) on October 22, 2007,

with MCWSFPA filing a Reply (doc. 31) on October 23, 2007. Contemporaneously with its

reply, MCWSFPA filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (doc. 32) that merely piggybacked

on the Application for TRO. MAWSS filed an Opposition Brief (doc. 33) to that Motion on

October 24, 2007.2

 Plaintiff filed a Reply (doc. 34) on October 25, 2007. Briefing having now

been concluded, the Court will now consider the Application for TRO and corresponding Motion

Case 1:07-cv-00357-WS-M Document 36 Filed 10/29/07 Page 3 of 14
3 The Court takes these matters under submission without an evidentiary hearing. 

The law is clear that a hearing is required on motions for TRO or preliminary injunction only if

there are contested issues of fact that require credibility determinations. See Four Seasons

Hotels and Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320 F.3d 1205, 1211 (11th Cir. 2003)

(observing that an “evidentiary hearing is not always required before the issuance of a

preliminary injunction” unless “facts are bitterly contested and credibility determinations must

be made to decide whether injunctive relief should issue”) (citations omitted); Cumulus Media,

Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 304 F.3d 1167, 1178 (11th Cir. 2002) (opining that

where little dispute exists as to raw facts, and dispute revolves around inferences to be drawn

from such facts, it is left to district court’s sound discretion to determine whether an evidentiary

hearing is necessary by balancing the interests of speed and practicality against those of accuracy

and fairness). Review of the parties’ submissions reveals no material disputes as to raw facts

and no bitter contest of facts that must be resolved antecedent to a ruling on the Rule 65 motions;

rather, it appears that plaintiff’s motions turn on purely legal questions relating to the sufficiency

of its evidentiary submission. Accordingly, the Court finds, after balancing the interests of speed

and practicality against those of accuracy and fairness, that no hearing is needed here.

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for Preliminary Injunction.3

II. Legal Standard for TRO / Preliminary Injunction.

To be eligible for temporary restraining or preliminary injunctive relief under Rule 65, a

movant must establish each of the following elements: (1) that there is a substantial likelihood

of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3)

that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4)

that entry of the relief would serve the public interest. See KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of

Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d

1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005). The law is clear, moreover, that “[a] preliminary injunction is an

extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the

burden of persuasion as to each of the four prerequisites.” Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163,

1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Preliminary injunction

decisions, about the viability of a plaintiff’s claims and the balancing of equities and the public

interest, are the district court’s to make, and [the Eleventh Circuit] will not set them aside unless

the district court has abused its discretion in making them.” Charles H. Wesley Educ.

Foundation, Inc. v. Cox, 408 F.3d 1349, 1354 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted); see also Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1175 (recognizing that appellate court could reverse

denial of preliminary injunction “only if there was a clear abuse of discretion”).

Case 1:07-cv-00357-WS-M Document 36 Filed 10/29/07 Page 4 of 14
4 Those four basic elements are as follows: “1) that there are two separate products,

a ‘tying’ product and a ‘tied’ product; 2) that those products are in fact ‘tied’ together - that is,

the buyer was forced to buy the tied product to get the tying product; 3) that the seller possesses

sufficient economic power in the tying product market to coerce buyer acceptance of the tied

product; and 4) involvement of a ‘not insubstantial’ amount of interstate commerce in the market

of the tied product.” Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1574 (11th Cir.

1991) (citation omitted).

5 That said, MCWSFPA’s showing on the coercion prong of the per se tying claim

appears inadequate to carry its burden. The Eleventh Circuit has specifically looked to and

required evidence of actual coercion of customers being actually forced to change their

purchasing patterns to select the tied product (i.e., evidence concerning whether the customers

would have purchased the tied product anyway). See Thompson, 934 F.2d at 1577-78 (denying

summary judgment to defendant on antitrust claims where plaintiff proffered substantial

evidence that individuals had quit or refused to join plaintiff’s professional association because

of tying behavior from defendant). MCWSFPA has submitted no evidence of actual coercion of

customers (i.e., that any specific customer who would have bought water from MCWSFPA was

compelled to buy it from MAWSS instead because of the latter’s hardball tying tactics). Instead,

plaintiff simply argues that Thompson (which plaintiff does not mention by name in this section

of its brief, but which is presumably the case to which plaintiff is referring) was wrongly decided

in this regard, given the statements in a leading treatise on antitrust law that a party’s mere

announcement of a tying condition to a buyer is sufficient to establish coercion. See X Phillip E.

Areeda et al., X Antitrust Law, § 1754e (2nd ed. 2003). Of course, the Court does not have the

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III. Analysis.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits.

In both the TRO and the preliminary injunction contexts, a movant must show a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits. See Cable Holdings of Battlefield, Inc. v. Cooke,

764 F.2d 1466, 1474 (11th Cir. 1985). After careful review of the parties’ written submissions,

the undersigned finds that MCWSFPA has failed to meet its burden of persuasion on this

prerequisite to the issuance of temporary or preliminary injunctive relief. To be sure, plaintiff

has argued that all four elements of an illegal per se tying claim are satisfied.4 In response,

defendant has failed effectively to challenge plaintiff’s proof or arguments on any of those

elements, but has simply offered a blanket rebuttal that the cases cited by plaintiff are all

factually or procedurally distinguishable. Such a vague argument neither defeats nor seriously

calls into question plaintiff’s arguments that each of those four elements of proof of a tying

scheme are substantially likely to be satisfied here.5

Case 1:07-cv-00357-WS-M Document 36 Filed 10/29/07 Page 5 of 14
luxury of discarding binding precedent in favor of treatises; therefore, plaintiff must satisfy the

Thompson coercion standard because that decision remains good law in this Circuit. Plaintiff’s

failure to proffer evidence of actual coercion as required by Thompson amounts to a failure to

show substantial likelihood of success as to its tying claim.

6 The focus of that inquiry is whether “the nexus between the State and [MAWSS]

is sufficiently strong that, when combined with a clearly articulated policy in favor of the

challenged anticompetitive conduct, there is little danger that it is involved in a private price

fixing arrangement.” Crosby, 93 F.3d at 1525; see also Bankers, 137 F.3d at 1297 (“The more

public the entity looks, the less we worry that it represents purely private competitive interests,

and the less need there is for active state supervision to ensure that the entity’s anticompetitive

actions are indeed state actions and not those of an alliance of interests that properly should be

competing.”). It is apparently undisputed that MAWSS is a Board of Water and Sewer

Commissioners organized pursuant to Ala. Code §§ 11-50-340, et seq. Those statutes provide, in

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In lieu of any argument that the elements of a per se tying claim cannot be met in this

case, MAWSS principally relies on an affirmative defense to federal antitrust liability known as

the “state action immunity” doctrine. “Under the state action immunity doctrine, also known as

the Parker doctrine, states are immune from federal antitrust law for their actions as sovereign.” 

Crosby v. Hospital Authority of Valdosta and Lowndes County, 93 F.3d 1515, 1521 (11th Cir.

1996). A political subdivision “is entitled to state action immunity if it acted pursuant to clearly

articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.” Id. at 1521-22 (citing Town of Hallie v.

City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46-47, 105 S.Ct. 1713, 85 L.Ed.2d 24 (1985)); see also Bankers

Ins. Co. v. Florida Residential Property and Cas. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 137 F.3d 1293,

1296 (11th Cir. 1998) (“political subdivisions such as municipalities are immune from antitrust

liability if their anti-competitive acts follow a ‘clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed

state policy’”) (citation omitted); TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d

1560, 1567 (11th Cir. 1996) (“federal antitrust laws were not intended to reach state-regulated

anticompetitive activities”). 

There appears to be no challenge by MCWSFPA (or at least, none raised in the briefing)

that MAWSS qualifies as an instrumentality, agency or political subdivision of Alabama that is

eligible for state action immunity; therefore, the Court will refrain from embarking on the factintensive analysis required by Crosby and other authorities to make that determination, but will

instead accept that MAWSS is substantially likely to prevail on that aspect of the defense.6

Case 1:07-cv-00357-WS-M Document 36 Filed 10/29/07 Page 6 of 14
part, that such a Board “shall be deemed to be a public agency or instrumentality exercising

public and governmental functions to provide for the public health and welfare.” Ala. Code §

11-50-343(a). Although there are numerous factors involved in the “political subdivision”

inquiry, MAWSS has at least made a preliminary showing that it satisfies the legal criteria for

that designation. There is certainly no indication in the record before the undersigned (and,

again, MCWSFPA has not argued) that MAWSS would not properly be classified as a political

subdivision of Alabama for state action immunity purposes.

7 More generally, the Alabama legislature authorized such Boards “[t]o exercise

jurisdiction, control and supervision over any water system or sewer system owned, operated or

maintained by the board and to make and enforce such rules and regulations for the maintenance

and operation of any such system as may, in the judgment of the board, be necessary or desirable

for the efficient operation of such system and for accomplishing the purposes of this article.” 

Ala. Code § 11-50-343(a)(9). This section strongly suggests that the Alabama legislature

intended to confer broad discretion on Boards of Water and Sewer Commissioners in operating

water and sewer systems, which would encompass the discretion to implement an all-or-nothing

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Rather, the central battleground exposed in the TRO briefing concerns whether MAWSS can

satisfy the “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy” requirement. At this

very preliminary stage, and without the benefit of either comprehensive briefing by the parties or

the luxury of time to conduct thorough independent research given the “urgent” nature of the

posture in which MCWSFPA has thrust these issues upon the Court, the undersigned deems it

substantially likely that MAWSS can make the requisite showing of a clearly articulated policy.

“A state anticompetitive action is pursuant to a clearly articulated policy when the action

is both authorized by statute and its anticompetitive effect is an intended (meaning foreseeable)

result of this authorization.” Bankers, 137 F.3d at 1298; see also Crosby, 93 F.3d at 1532

(political subdivision is eligible for state action immunity if it shows “that, through statutes, the

state generally authorizes [it] to perform the challenged action; and ... that, through statutes, the

state has clearly articulated a state policy authorizing anticompetitive conduct”). MAWSS

argues that it can satisfy the “clearly articulated policy” requirements by reference to an

Alabama statute that specifically authorizes and empowers Boards of Water and Sewer

Commissioners “[t]o combine the water system and the sewer system as a single system for the

purpose of operation and financing.” Ala. Code § 11-50-343(a)(7). On its face, this language,

which is to be liberally construed in accordance with § 11-50-357, certainly appears to reflect

that the Alabama law legislature has authorized MAWSS to perform the challenged action.7

 As

Case 1:07-cv-00357-WS-M Document 36 Filed 10/29/07 Page 7 of 14
policy for water and sewer systems.

8 See also Reply, at 9 (“Again, Defendant offers no evidence of an Alabama

authorization of its undisputed antitrust practices.”) and 9-10 (“[I]t is MAWSS’s burden to show

this Court a ‘clearly articulated’ Alabama Statutory scheme that exempts MAWSS from federal

Antitrust Law. MAWSS has failed to do so.”).

9 That is not to say with any finality that no valid counterarguments exist that might

refute defendant’s position. In fairness to MCWSFPA, the Court recognizes that plaintiff had

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to whether § 11-50-343(a)(7) intends anticompetitive effects, there is no requirement that the

legislature “state explicitly that it anticipates anticompetitive effects. ... Rather, it simply requires

that the anticompetitive conduct be a foreseeable result of the powers granted to the political

subdivision.” Crosby, 93 F.3d at 1532 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The

foreseeability requirement has been construed liberally. See Bankers, 137 F.3d at 1298 (statute

providing that political subdivision may provide claims services confers unfettered discretion on

that entity, such that it is foreseeable that entity might engage in potentially anticompetitive

adjustment and revision of standards and selection criteria); Crosby, 93 F.3d at 1532 (this Circuit

requires only that anticompetitive conduct be reasonably anticipated, not the inevitable, ordinary,

or routine outcome of the statute); Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 828 F.2d 514,

519-20 (9th Cir. 1987) (where political subdivision was granted authority to buy and sell water

rights, it was foreseeable that city would attach a no-resale-allowed condition to water sales).

Based on the foregoing authorities, the Court perceives no persuasive reason why it is not

foreseeable from the express grant of authority to combine water and sewer systems as a single

system for purposes of operation and financing that MAWSS would implement a “tying”

restriction under which it declined to sell sewer services to customers who did not also purchase

its water services. Rather than formulating an argument to the contrary, MCWSFPA simply

states in its Reply (doc. 31) in the most conclusory of terms that “MAWSS has the duty (and has

failed) to demonstrate the clearly articulated statutory scheme authorizing the illegal tying.” 

(Reply, at 5-6.)8

 But MAWSS expressly cited to § 11-50-343(a)(7) as the statutory source of the

requisite authorization. In briefing the Application for TRO, plaintiff offers no inkling of why it

believes this statute not to satisfy the foreseeability / reasonable anticipation test, and no such

shortcoming in the statute is obvious to the Court.9

Case 1:07-cv-00357-WS-M Document 36 Filed 10/29/07 Page 8 of 14
just 24 hours to prepare its reply brief, so the circumstances were hardly conducive to expansive

treatment of the issues. However, this is a dilemma of plaintiff’s own creation because it is

plaintiff who elected to present this issue to the Court for preliminary resolution in the pressurepacked, time-sensitive, unforgiving crucible of an Application for TRO, rather than limiting

itself to a request for preliminary injunction or awaiting an opportunity for more reasoned

reflection, research and analysis on summary judgment.

10 The cavalcade of unauthorized sur-replies began with MAWSS’s “Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Motion for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction” (doc. 33) filed on October 24, 2007,

which proceeded for two paragraphs to discuss the Motion for Preliminary Injunction before

stating, “MAWSS would also like to take this opportunity to respond to some of the argument

asserted in MCWSFPA’s reply in support of its TRO application, (Doc. 31), since it has now

been given the opportunity to do so.” (Doc. 33, ¶ 3.) It is unclear what this “opportunity” is. 

Certainly this Court did not afford defendant any such opportunity. Sur-replies can only be filed

with leave of court and are ordinarily stricken if no such leave is requested or received. Neither

side adhered to this requirement before submitting their additional memoranda. The result is

particularly burdensome in this case, where the Court is attempting to resolve expeditiously

matters that have been characterized as “urgent” by the movant, even as the parties have

submitted ever-shifting briefs altering the landscape and analysis on the fly. Nonetheless, the

Court in its discretion will consider these improperly filed memoranda.

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Regrettably, the parties elected to continue filing de facto unauthorized briefs on the TRO

issue well past the clearly defined terminus point of the Court-ordered briefing schedule. The

most recent of those memoranda, filed just before the close of business on October 25, 2007, is

styled by plaintiff as “Reply of Mobile County Water Authority to MAWSS’ Opposition to

Motion for Preliminary Injunction” (doc. 34). Despite its title, this filing is effectively an

unauthorized reply to MAWSS’ unauthorized sur-reply on the Application for TRO (and thus the

fifth ping-ponged brief the parties have collectively filed in the last five business days).10 

Setting aside this filing’s problematic procedural pedigree, and overlooking the general

proscription against a movant raising new arguments in a reply brief (much less a sur-sur-reply

brief), in this most recent brief plaintiff identifies for the first time an explanation for why it

believes that § 11-50-343(a)(7) does not support state action immunity here. As the Court

understands MCWSFPA’s position, that section is inadequate because it fails to “clearly

articulat[e] the anticompetitive activity of illegal tying arrangements.” (Doc. 34, ¶ 14.) 

Apparently, plaintiff would confine the analysis to the literal language of the statute, arguing that

the cited Alabama Code section cannot be a “clearly articulated policy” unless it expressly states

Case 1:07-cv-00357-WS-M Document 36 Filed 10/29/07 Page 9 of 14
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that Boards may engage in anticompetitive, otherwise illegal tying arrangements. Plaintiff

misapprehends the applicable legal standard. As discussed supra, the Eleventh Circuit has

unequivocally explained that nothing more is required than that “anticompetitive conduct be a

foreseeable result of the powers granted to the political subdivision.” Crosby, 93 F.3d at 1532. 

For the reasons stated above, the undersigned is of the opinion, based on the limited evidence

and argument presented to date, that it is substantially likely that MCWSFPA will be able to

establish that it is foreseeable and could be reasonably anticipated that a water and sewer board

granted statutory authority to combine its water and sewer systems for operation and financial

purposes, and further given broad authority to make any operational rules that it sees fit, might

exercise that authority to require its customers to subscribe to both systems in the “all-ornothing” approach that MCWSFPA contends is anticompetitive here. 

Based on the foregoing, it appears substantially likely that MAWSS will be able to

establish on the merits the affirmative defense of state action immunity, insulating it from all

liability under the federal antitrust statutes which animate plaintiff’s claims for preliminary

relief. For that reason, the Court finds that plaintiff has not met its burden of demonstrating a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits.

B. Irreparable Harm.

Because all four prongs of the Rule 65 inquiry must be satisfied by a movant for a TRO

or preliminary injunction, plaintiff’s failure to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the

merits is itself fatal to its request for immediate injunctive relief. Nonetheless, the Court also

perceives significant defects in plaintiff’s showing of immediate and irreparable harm which

would provide independently sufficient grounds for denying the motion.

The Eleventh Circuit has emphasized that “[a] showing of irreparable injury is the sine

qua non of injunctive relief” and that “the absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable

injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper.” Siegel, 234 F.3d at

1176 (citations omitted). Indeed, it has been observed that the very “purpose of a preliminary

injunction is to prevent irreparable injury so as to preserve the court’s ability to render a

meaningful decision on the merits.” United States v. State of Alabama, 791 F.2d 1450, 1459

(11th Cir. 1986). 

The court file reflects that MCWSFPA and MAWSS have been engaged in legal

Case 1:07-cv-00357-WS-M Document 36 Filed 10/29/07 Page 10 of 14
11 See generally Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir.

1975) (affirming denial of temporary injunctive relief where movant, among other things,

delayed three months in making its request); Tough Traveler, Ltd. v. Outbound Prod., 60 F.3d

964, 968 (2d Cir. 1995) (vacating preliminary injunction where movant waited four months to

seek a preliminary injunction after filing suit); Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 276 (2d

Cir. 1985) (ten week delay in seeking injunction undercut claim of irreparable harm); Pharmacia

Corp. v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc., 201 F. Supp.2d 335, 383 (D.N.J. 2002) (delay of one full year

before seeking preliminary relief “knocks the bottom out of any claim of immediate and

irreparable harm”).

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skirmishes for more than two decades concerning MAWSS’s alleged transgressions in their

overlapping service areas. The instant batch of lawsuits, including the one filed in state court in

2005 and the one filed here in May 2007, is not of recent vintage. By all indications, plaintiff

has been aware for quite some time of MAWSS’s alleged illegal tying practices that are now

sought to be enjoined via TRO. Indeed, the Complaint (doc. 1) filed on May 18, 2007 alleged

that “for a number of years, MAWSS has adhered to an all-or-nothing utility policy,” (doc. 1, ¶

15). This is precisely the same policy that MCWSFPA claims is causing it irreparable harm. If

MCWSFPA was aware of and perceived the effects of the all-or-nothing policy of which it now

complains, then it is extraordinarily difficult to understand why it waited for years before filing

this action and, beyond that, waited for five months after filing the instant lawsuit before seeking

emergency relief to halt that irreparable harm. Simply put, plaintiff’s long history of inaction in

the face of actual knowledge of defendant’s all-or-nothing policy appears fundamentally

incompatible with its present cries of irreparable harm arising from that policy. See, e.g.,

Gonannies, Inc. v. Goupair.Com, Inc., 464 F. Supp.2d 603, 609 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (“Absent a

good explanation, a substantial period of delay militates against the issuance of a preliminary

injunction by demonstrating that there is no apparent urgency to the request for injunctive

relief.”) (citation omitted).11 Such unexplained delay may “standing alone, ... preclude the

granting of preliminary injunctive relief ... because the failure to act sooner undercuts the sense

of urgency that ordinarily accompanies a motion for preliminary relief and suggests that there is,

in fact, no irreparable injury.” Tough Traveler, Ltd. v. Outbound Products, 60 F.3d 964, 968 (2d

Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 227

F.3d 891, 903 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Delay in pursuing a preliminary injunction may raise questions

Case 1:07-cv-00357-WS-M Document 36 Filed 10/29/07 Page 11 of 14
12 The reference to Home Depot in the TRO Application is apparently a

typographical error, as plaintiff’s other submissions refer extensively to an Office Depot

development, not a Home Depot.

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regarding the plaintiff’s claim that he or she will face irreparable harm if a preliminary

injunction is not entered.”).

In a weak attempt to justify the unusual timing of its Application for TRO, plaintiff

explains that “[t]he specific circumstances giving rise to the immediacy of the Application for a

[TRO] are the construction projects for The Home Depot, the Mobile Infirmary Clinic and Bank

Trust” in the Tillman’s Corner area of Mobile County. (Application for TRO, ¶ 5.)12 Yet

MCWSFPA has made no showing that MAWSS’s application of its “all-or-nothing” policy with

respect to these three developments is any different in kind or degree from what it has been

doing all along. MCSWSFPA refers to these developments as an “unusually large transaction”

(doc. 28, at 24), but offers no evidence that this bank branch, office supply store and medical

clinic are appreciably larger in scope or contemplated water usage than any of the other

numerous commercial and residential developments springing up in the service area at issue over

the last few years. Nor, apparently, are these construction projects themselves of recent origin.

Even setting aside the curiously belated filing of the Application for TRO well into the

course of this litigation to enjoin activity that plaintiff has apparently known about for years, it is

very difficult to perceive anything approaching irreparable harm here. Plaintiff’s brief argues

that without an injunction, it will “continue to lose customers for its product,” that it will “lose

this opportunity” (presumably referring to the Tillman’s Corner three-store development), and

that it will “be unable to benefit from both the pecuniary gains and the good will it will provide.” 

(Doc. 28, at 23-24.) Yet conspicuously absent from plaintiff’s filings is any evidence that Office

Depot, Mobile Infirmary, or Bank Trust would have signed up for water service from plaintiff in

the absence of MAWSS’s all-or-nothing policy. There is no affidavit from representatives of

any of those three customers to that effect, nor is there allegation of such in plaintiff’s filings. 

Instead, at most, plaintiff submits the Affidavit of Robert G. Brown, the General Manager of

MCWSFPA, who avers that his “understanding is that Office Depot and Bank Trust designed

their buildings to hook up to the water service of Mobile County Water Service, and not to a yetCase 1:07-cv-00357-WS-M Document 36 Filed 10/29/07 Page 12 of 14
13 To the extent that plaintiff is complaining about MAWSS’s decision to build

water access to those construction sites, those arguments appear far better suited to the claims

pending in the state law action than to the antitrust issues being litigated here.

-13-

to-be available water service of MAWSS.” (Doc. 26, ¶ 30.) But this averment does not come

close to showing irreparable harm. Indeed, assuming Brown’s murky (and almost certainly

hearsay) “understanding” is admissible, it shows nothing more than the unremarkable fact that

two customers intended to purchase water from MCWSFPA when they thought that MCWSFPA

was the only available option for water service at their location because, as Brown avers,

“MAWSS does not have water service available to the three construction sites.” (Id., ¶ 17.) 

Now that MAWSS is voluntarily undergoing the effort and expense of an “elaborate boring

project [to] install[] water pipes in order to provide water service at the three construction sites”

(id., ¶ 21), the three customers may all prefer MAWSS water service, without regard to

defendant’s all-or-nothing policy. In other words, these customers may be selecting MAWSS’s

water not because of any antitrust tying by MAWSS, but because they would prefer that entity’s

service now that it is being made available in their area.13 Simply put, of the three Tillman’s

Corner developments that are ostensibly animating its motions for emergency injunctive relief,

plaintiff has not shown that it will lose a single one as a customer because of any illegal tying

activities of MAWSS.

Finally, the Court considers Brown’s statement in his affidavit that “[u]nchecked,

MAWSS’ ‘all-or-none’ policy will result in the eventual financial and actual demise of

[plaintiff].” (Brown Aff., ¶ 49 (emphasis added).) To be sufficient for a TRO or preliminary

injunction, “the asserted irreparable injury must be neither remote nor speculative, but actual and

imminent.” Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1176 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Church v.

City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1994) (party is entitled to injunctive relief only

if proves “a real and immediate - as opposed to a merely conjectural or hypothetical - threat of

future injury”); Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (“a showing

of irreparable harm is insufficient if the harm will occur only in the indefinite future”). The kind

of speculative, “someday” harm described by the Brown Affidavit is wholly inadequate in that

regard.

Case 1:07-cv-00357-WS-M Document 36 Filed 10/29/07 Page 13 of 14
14 Plaintiff having failed to satisfy two of the four mandatory prerequisites for

temporary or preliminary injunctive relief, no constructive purpose would be served by

examining the remaining two elements (the balance of harms and the public interest).

-14-

In light of this analysis, it is the opinion of the undersigned that plaintiff has failed to

make the requisite showing of irreparable harm to warrant the extraordinary remedy of issuance

of a TRO or preliminary injunction.14

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Restraining Order

(doc. 25) and Motion for Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction (doc. 32) are denied.

DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of October, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00357-WS-M Document 36 Filed 10/29/07 Page 14 of 14