Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-05931/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-05931-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUAN LORENZO SOTO,

Petitioner,

v.

R.T.C. GROUNDS, Warden,

Respondent.

___________________________________/

No. C-13-5931 EMC (pr)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Juan Lorenzo Soto filed this pro se action seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2254. In his petition, Mr. Soto contends that his federal constitutional rights were violated by the

trial court’s admission of evidence about statements his co-perpetrator had made to a girlfriend. The

petition will be DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Crimes

The California Court of Appeal described the events that led to Mr. Soto’s conviction for

murder and other crimes. 

On the morning of July 25, 2004, defendants Juan Lorenzo Soto and

Francisco Javier Valenciano, Jr., along with Anthony Gonzales, drove

from Watsonville to Santa Cruz to commit a robbery. They were

armed with a shotgun and a pistol. The liquor store they intended to

rob was too busy, so the three men decided to rob a group of men they

had seen playing cards in a nearby driveway, with a pile of money on

the ground. When Gonzales, armed with the shotgun, and Soto, armed

with the pistol, approached the card players and directed them to hand

over their money, all but one of them, Rodolfo Escobar, complied. 

Escobar instead insulted Gonzales, and picked up the money off the

ground. As one of his friends implored him to cooperate with the

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 1 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Jose Saul Ayala Baires was shown two photo lineups by police on July 28, 2004. “In one

lineup, he identified a photo of Soto, writing on the card ‘It seems to be him but I would have to see

his body.’ He was unable to identify anyone during a subsequent live lineup.” Soto, at *4. 

“Francisco [Ayala] was shown several photo lineups, and in one of them, he identified a picture of

Gonzales as ‘someone who looked like the person with the shotgun.’ At a live lineup, he identified

Gonzales and another man as being similar to the man with the shotgun.” Id. Another witness,

G.G., who had seen the incident from her bedroom after hearing what sounded “‘like a big bang,’”

viewed two photo lineups on July 27, 2004, and picked out Gonzales from the first photo lineup, but

then declined to participate in an in-person lineup the following week. Id. at *5-*6. 

2

gunmen, Escobar said he had to work hard for his money to support

his family, and that if Gonzales wanted his money, he should ask [his]

mama for [it]. Gonzales pressed the shotgun against Escobars

forehead and pulled the trigger, blowing off the top of his head. 

Gonzales and Soto collected the money off the ground, went back to

the car, where Valenciano had been acting as a lookout, and drove off.

People v. Soto, 2012 WL 2393081, *1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 26, 2012) (alterations in original). 

The police officers who responded to the scene spoke to several men present who described

the events of the robbery and shooting. Some of the men gave general descriptions of the men who

had robbed them. While the police were talking to the victims, another man approached one of the

officers and “described seeing a green Honda, containing four males, leave the scene just after the

shooting. The man had written down the Honda’s license plate number, so [officer] Vasquez

broadcast the description of the car and the license plate number.” Id. at *2. Several of the

percipient witnesses to the shooting and robbery were unable to identify the perpetrators, but some

later were able to do so at least tentatively.1

 

The California Court of Appeal also summarized evidence developed after the investigation

at the scene of the crime, including the testimony of Vanessa Martinez. 

7. Vanessa Martinez

Martinez met Gonzales when she was 18, at the house of Francisco

“Frankie” Valenciano. After Gonzales was incarcerated for violating

his parole, Martinez developed a relationship with him through letters,

phone calls and prison visits. When he was released in March 2002,

they lived together at his grandparents’ house and in January 2003, she

gave birth to Gonzales’ child. In mid-July 2004, Martinez bought her

own home in Watsonville and Gonzales moved in with her. 

During this time, Martinez learned that Gonzales was a gang member. 

She saw his tattoos, including “VGV” (for Varrio Green Valley) on his

stomach and “Norteno” across his lower back, and asked him about

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 2 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

them. Gonzales also cut his hair in a fade hairstyle called a

Mongolian. He also owned a lot of Oakland Raiders clothing.

From April to December 2003, Gonzales was incarcerated at the Santa

Cruz county jail for possession of marijuana for sale. Valenciano gave

Martinez $25 a month to put on Gonzales’ book to buy items at the

commissary, money to give to Andrea Gonzalez, who had a son with a

VGV gang member; and $1,500 to give to Gonzales’ mother for an

attorney. He also gave Martinez Christmas cards containing money to

mail. While in county jail, Gonzales obtained more tattoos, including

“14,” which stands for the Northern gang, on his chest, and stars on

his left shoulder.

As a gang member, Gonzales was obligated to pay monthly “taxes” or

dues to the gang. Oscar Cabrera, a member of a Norteno gang and the

Nuestra Familia prison gang, would beat up members who failed to

pay their taxes. Martinez witnessed Cabrera beating up a VGV gang

member, Armando Cardenas, for such a failure.

Martinez had known Valenciano for about two years, and first met

Soto about a week or two before July 25, 2004. She believed both

men were also gang members.

The week before the shooting, Martinez twice heard Valenciano tell

Gonzales he needed money. Valenciano said that if Maria Zamora did

not lend him money, he was going to rob somebody. Valenciano

needed the money because his car was impounded and he had to pay

$200 in tax to Cabrera, which he and Gonzales paid monthly. 

Gonzales also needed money. She knew that if Valenciano and

Gonzales did not pay, they would be beaten up.

On July 24, 2004, at around 6:00 or 7:00 p.m., Charal Hernandez came

to Martinez’s house to have her hair and make-up done for a party. 

Valenciano, Soto and Julio Cabrera, Oscar Cabrera’s brother, were

there, too. Gonzales asked Martinez to leave them and go upstairs. 

Soto, who was dating Hernandez, asked to borrow her car, a 1999

green Honda Accord EX. Hernandez agreed, and Soto drove her to

the party down the street. At 9:00 p.m., Soto, Valenciano and

Gonzales left in Hernandez’s car, while Julio walked down the street

to the party.

Soto, Valenciano and Gonzales returned sometime after midnight. 

Valenciano left, but Soto stayed overnight, as did Hernandez.

The next morning, Sunday, July 25, Soto asked Hernandez if he could

borrow her car again. Hernandez refused at first, and asked why. She

offered to drive him where he wanted to go, but he took the keys from

her and knocked on the door to Gonzales’ bedroom.

It was about 7:00 or 8:00 a.m. when Soto knocked on the door, but

Gonzales did not answer. Soto knocked again, and Gonzales kissed

Martinez and told her he would be right back.

Some time later, Martinez was driving with her son, her younger sister

and Hernandez to get breakfast. Gonzales called her cell phone, and

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 3 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

said that Soto needed to talk to Hernandez. Martinez gave the phone

to Hernandez, and Soto told her she needed to report that her car had

been stolen. She asked what happened, but Soto did not explain. He

was upset and said to just report that it was “fuckin’ stolen.”

Hernandez was crying, as the car was registered to her grandparents

and she did not know how to explain to them about their car. She

refused to call 911.

Martinez warned Hernandez they would be in trouble if they did not

do as they were told. She was worried that the call might have

something to do with the robbery that Gonzales and Valenciano

discussed a few days prior, and was also worried that any blame would

fall on Gonzales because he was on parole and was not supposed to be

around other gang members, such as Soto and Valenciano. Hernandez

agreed to call the police and report the car stolen, so she and Martinez

fabricated a story about how the car was stolen from in front of

Martinez’s house the night before.

Martinez then noticed she had missed a call from Gonzales and called

him back, telling him she and Hernandez had filed a police report. 

While talking to her, Gonzales seemed distracted, and yelled at Soto,

“[W]here’s [Valenciano]?” She could hear people talking in the

background and Gonzales said, “Excuse, excuse me, where’s

[Valenciano]? Where the fuck is [Valenciano]?” Martinez heard either

Gonzales or Soto say, “There he is at the payphone.” Gonzales said

that they were in Santa Cruz and asked her to pick him up. Martinez

initially said no, but called back 20 minutes later to ask if he still

needed a ride. Gonzales said he did not.

Julio called Martinez later in the afternoon and told her to come by his

house with her son. When she arrived she saw Soto, Valenciano,

Gonzales, Julio and Oscar sitting in a truck outside. Gonzales told

Martinez he was going to Mexico. He was emotional and told her he

was sorry. Soto told Martinez to tell Hernandez he was sorry.

The next day, however, Martinez saw Gonzales at his grandmother’s

house. He had a bad case of poison oak. She asked him what had

happened but he could not really speak. She drove him back to their

home, and about a week later, he was arrested. During that week,

Gonzales told Martinez what had happened on July 25, 2004.

Gonzales told Martinez he and Soto went to rob a liquor store in Santa

Cruz, with Valenciano driving. Because the store they had selected

was crowded, they drove around the block. As they did, they saw

some men playing poker in a driveway, with money lying on the

ground. They pulled over and robbed the guys, with Valenciano

staying by the car as he and Soto confronted the men. Gonzales said

one of the men was killed after trying to take back his money and

talking back to the shooter. Gonzales denied killing the man even

though Martinez asked him many times. When describing how the

man was shot, Gonzales said Soto “ate brains.”

They fled after the shooting, and Gonzales might have been driving at

that point. They had a police scanner and heard that the police were

looking for the Honda so they left the car by a creek or river and threw

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 4 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

the weapons in the bushes. Gonzales said they were in Santa Cruz

when Soto called Hernandez and told her to report the car had been

stolen.

Also during the week before his arrest, Martinez saw Gonzales

dividing up about $150 in cash. As he did so, Gonzales said to

himself, “One for Soto,” “one for Valenciano,” and “one for me.”

Gonzales seemed angry with Valenciano and felt the “whole thing”

was his fault. Gonzales said the money was going to Julio and Oscar

Cabrera.

Before his arrest, Gonzales told Martinez and Hernandez not to talk to

the police. After Gonzales and Soto were arrested, Valenciano waved

Martinez over as she was driving one day. He told her not to talk to

the police and that there was no evidence. He said if she needed to

talk to him, she should do so in person, so there would be no phone

records.

When Martinez was interviewed by Detective Christine Bentley, she

did not tell the truth because she was afraid of Oscar Cabrera, who had

threatened both her and Hernandez. Martinez believed Oscar would

kill her if she cooperated with the police. On July 31, 2004, Oscar had

gone to her parents’ house looking for her, but she was not there. She

arranged to meet Oscar at Valenciano’s parents’ house later that day. 

When she arrived, she saw Valenciano’s father was bleeding from a

wound on his head. Oscar had asked Valenciano’s father for money to

post bail, and when he refused, Oscar slashed his head open. Martinez

met with Oscar later and he reminded her that people who talk to the

police end up dead.

Martinez lied about a number of things over the course of several

interviews with Bentley, including that Gonzales was working on his

car at his grandmother’s house on the morning of the murder. After

being arrested and threatened with prosecution, Martinez told Bentley

essentially the same story that she testified to at the trial. She did not

recall, however, asking Bentley to fabricate evidence against Soto. 

After the first time she testified in the case, she moved out of the area

and changed her name.

8. Alberto Anguiano and Maria Zamora

Alberto Anguiano worked with Valenciano and Gonzales in

Watsonville for a couple of months at Sambrailo Packaging. They

became friends and Anguiano cut their hair weekly. He knew that

Valenciano was a gang member because he had a tattoo that read

“Norteno” on the back of his head. Anguiano knew that Gonzales was

also a gang member because he had a tattoo of the “Northern star” on

his left arm, and had a fade haircut with a “Mongolian” ponytail.

On July 25, 2004, at 10:20 a.m., Anguiano called Gonzales, who

answered, but seemed hurried. Gonzales passed the phone to

Valenciano who asked Anguiano for Maria Zamora’s phone number. 

Valenciano was interested in Zamora, who also worked at

Sambrailo’s. Before hanging up, he told Anguiano to call him later. 

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 5 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Later that afternoon, Anguiano called Valenciano at his house, but

could not reach him and did not leave a message.

Zamora confirmed she worked with Valenciano and Gonzales at

Sambrailo’s Packaging for a few months. At about 11:18 a.m. on July

25, 2004, Valenciano called Zamora on her cell phone. She told

Valenciano she was on her half-hour lunch break at work. He did not

ask her for a ride and never said he was in trouble.

9. Further investigation, autopsy and forensic evidence

Meredith Baker used to date Soto in high school. After graduating,

she went to college and Soto went to “jail” so she did not see him for

approximately three years. At 10:31 a.m. on July 25, 2004, she got a

call from Soto. Soto hurriedly said, “Meredith, I really need you to

come get me. Can you please come get me.” Meredith refused saying

she needed to get ready for work, but Soto pleaded with her, “Please, I

need you to do me a favor. Please come get me.” She was upset and

struggled with her feelings for Soto, answering “I can’t go through this

again.” She asked where he was and Soto said he was off Frederick

Street. At a later date, Soto’s sister Doreen came into Meredith’s

workplace and told her she did not need to testify. If Meredith did

testify, Doreen said, it would be her fault if Soto went to jail. 

Meredith believed that Soto was affiliated with the Nortenos. She did

not hear from him again.

Meredith’s mother, Linda Baker, saw her daughter was upset because

she wanted to help Soto but could not. She later checked the caller ID

on Meredith’s phone which showed the 10:31 a.m. phone call came

from Gonzales’s phone number. Linda contacted the police and

Detective Bentley came to their house.

At 1:30 p.m. on the day of the shooting, Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s

Deputy Daniel Brierley was assigned to find the suspect vehicle, a

1999 green Honda Accord with license plate number 4BFR732. He

went to every known Norteno gang house in Santa Cruz and started a

grid search. At the 400 block on Owen Street, with Clinton as the

nearest cross street, Brierley found the vehicle unoccupied next to a

bamboo hedge. Other officers arrived to secure the scene and assist in

collecting evidence. In the thick bamboo hedge, the officers found an

expended red 16–gauge shotgun shell, a sawed-off double-barrel

16–gauge shotgun, and a revolver loaded with three .38–caliber

bullets. When the vehicle was subsequently searched, officers found a

glove and collected samples of what appeared to be blood and tissue

from its interior.

On July 25, 2004, Lore James lived at the corner of Clinton and Owen

Street in Santa Cruz. Between 9:30 and 10:30 a.m., she left the house

and saw a green car across the street on Owen. She heard loud

rustling noises in the bushes across the street. As she walked out to

the sidewalk, she heard a car door close, and saw three young

Hispanic men, between 18 to 25 years old, walk from the green car

across the street toward her. They talked softly to each other, and one

man turned and looked directly at James as he passed. She drove

away, picked up her son and returned to find police securing the area. 

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 6 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

James told Officer Northrup she had seen three Hispanic men in their

early 20s, five feet 10 inches to six feet tall. One had a medium build,

dark complexion and wore a red bandana and baggie jeans. Another

had a medium build, wore a white tank or v-neck shirt, baggie jeans, a

baseball cap and carried a white bag.

At approximately 7:52 p.m. on July 25, 2004, Katy O’Doyle, whose

front door faces Clinton Street, found a black Raiders sweatshirt in her

backyard. She turned the sweatshirt over to the police. A couple of

days later, Timothy Filed, who lived at Darwin and Clinton Streets,

found a red sweatshirt, a baseball cap, and a pair of gloves inside the

green waste trash can on the side of his home.

A DNA analysis on the red sweatshirt revealed three contributors from

a stain on the back of the neck area, near the tag. Escobar’s DNA was

definitely present, and Soto and Valenciano could not be excluded as

contributors to the mixture. Gonzales was excluded as a contributor of

the DNA found on the sweatshirt.

Several different samples from the baseball cap were taken for DNA

analysis. The bill and outside of the cap contained only Escobar’s

DNA. The tag included a mixture of DNA, with Valenciano

representing the major contributor with at least two minor

contributors. Soto could not be excluded as a possible minor

contributor to the DNA on the tag.

One of the two gloves from the trash can contained a mixture of DNA

consistent with two donors, Escobar and Soto. Soto could not be

excluded as a possible major contributor and Escobar was a possible

minor contributor. The other glove contained only Escobar’s DNA. 

The glove found in the Honda contained DNA from Escobar and

Gonzales. Soto and Valenciano were excluded as possible

contributors of DNA on the glove.

Samples from the black Raiders sweatshirt included DNA from

Escobar and Gonzales, and Escobar’s blood was also found on the

sweatshirt. Soto and Valenciano were excluded as contributors to the

DNA found on that garment.

Santa Cruz Police Detective Warren Barry, along with other officers,

searched the neighborhood where the Honda and weapons were found,

looking for witnesses or businesses which may have videotapes. He

reviewed a security videotape from a gas station mini-mart at

Frederick and Soquel, but did not see any unusual activity and

returned it. A few days later, he saw a picture of Soto at a police

briefing and recalled seeing a man on the videotape with the same

tattoo on the back of his neck and short black hair. He mentioned this

to Northrup, who went to the mini-mart and obtained the video. The

video showed Soto purchasing a soda at the store on July 25, 2004, at

about 11:18 a.m. Barry obtained phone records for the payphone

outside the mini-mart, and those records showed three calls were made

at about the time of the murder: one at 11:03 a.m. to Valenciano’s

mother; one to Jose Carranco, who lived with Valenciano’s sister, at

11:13 a.m. and one to Zamora at 11:14 a.m.

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 7 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

On July 30, 2004, Bentley went to Hernandez’s workplace and showed

her a still photo from the videotape to see if she could identify the

person as Soto. When she looked at the photo, she cried and became

hysterical, yet claimed she could not recognize the person in it since it

was too blurry.

According to Dr. Richard Mason, forensic pathologist for the Santa

Cruz County Coroner, Escobar was killed by a contact FN5 shotgun

wound to the head.

FN5. The barrel of the shotgun was in contact with

Escobar’s head when it was fired.

10. Jailhouse informant’s testimony

Nonu Randy Aluni was in the Santa Cruz jail, awaiting sentencing for

a bank robbery, when he met Soto, Gonzales and Valenciano. Aluni,

who was facing a sentence of 25 or 30 years for his role in the bank

robbery, agreed to testify in this case in exchange for a sentence of

between 10 and 13 years.

At separate times, Aluni was housed with Valenciano and Soto. Soto

told Aluni he was a member of VGV and he discussed the shooting. 

Soto said the night before the shooting he and Gonzales planned to rob

a liquor store in Santa Cruz, and he and Gonzales drove to Santa Cruz

that morning in Hernandez’s car. They first went to Valenciano’s

house and picked up the guns. When they got to the liquor store, there

were too many people there, so they drove around the block and saw

some guys playing poker. They drove around the block again and

pulled over by the poker players. Valenciano stayed back at the car to

listen to the police scanner. Gonzales and Soto walked up to the men

and said, “Give me your money.” One guy disrespected Gonzales so

he shot him. As they were walking away, Soto yelled out another

gang name, “Northside,” to throw them off.

They got back in the car, drove down the block, hid the guns, threw

the clothes away and started running towards the creek. Valenciano

threw the police scanner, its batteries and the car keys in different

directions. Soto went with Gonzales to call Hernandez, and he told

her to report the car stolen. They caught up with Valenciano who was

calling for a ride from a payphone at a church. The three got a ride to

Hollister.

Soto showed Aluni a picture of himself taken by a gas station

surveillance camera and asked if he could see blood on Soto’s shirt. 

Soto claimed they committed the robbery because they needed the

money. He also said his father owned a mechanics shop and someone

there could provide him with an alibi.

At some point, Soto found out that Aluni was talking to the district

attorney, and he threatened to kill Aluni’s family if he testified. Soto

had Aluni write a letter saying he made the whole thing up, and that he

had obtained information about the case by reading Soto’s paperwork

when Soto was not in the cell. Aluni wrote a letter to his own

attorney, Charlie Stevens, and another to Soto’s attorney. In his letter

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 8 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

to Stevens, Aluni lightly wrote in pencil that he was being threatened. 

Aluni also told Stevens he had been threatened by Soto.

About a month before he was housed with Soto, Aluni was housed

with Valenciano who also told him about the shooting several times. 

Valenciano’s version was consistent with Soto’s, but he added the

detail that the guns used belonged to their gang, VGV. Soto had the

revolver and Gonzales had the shotgun, which they hid in some bushes

after the robbery/shooting. They also hid some of their clothing in a

garbage bin, before running to a lake or creek where they discarded

the police scanner and car keys.

Aluni met Gonzales once, for 10 or 15 minutes, while in a holding cell

going into court. He told Gonzales he already knew why Gonzales

was in jail, and Gonzales described the robbery and shooting in much

the same way as Soto and Valenciano. Gonzales also admitted killing

Escobar.

Soto, at *6-*11. Evidence of gang activities and the defendants’ gang membership also was

presented at trial. Id. at *11-*14. 

Soto testified at trial. He admitted to being a Northern Hispanic and being a member of the

VGV gang in Watsonville, but denied paying gang taxes, denied having obligations toward fellow

gang members and denied having enemies among rival Sureno gangs. Id. at *14. He admitted to

being in Santa Cruz on the morning of the shooting but said he was there to look for a girl at the

Santa Cruz Bible Church, but didn’t find her. 

The night before, he stayed at Martinez’s house with his friend,

Hernandez. Hernandez often gave him rides in her green Honda. 

Gonzales asked him if he could borrow Hernandez’s car the next day,

but did not say why he needed it.

The morning of July 25, Soto asked Hernandez for the keys to her car,

saying he wanted to go to church. She offered to give him a ride, but

he did not want her to know he was going to try to find a girl, so he

declined her offer. Eventually, she gave him the keys without much of

an argument.

He woke up Gonzales and they drove off. Gonzales drove and the

plan was to drop Soto off at the church, while Gonzales used the car. 

They stopped at Valenciano’s house to pick up Soto’s cell phone and

Valenciano agreed to give Soto a ride back from Santa Cruz about

11:00 a.m. Gonzales and Soto drove to Santa Cruz and Soto got out by

the church. Gonzales drove away.

He wandered around the church area for about 20 minutes, but could

not find the girl. A stranger approached him and they had a brief

conversation, but Soto could not recall what they talked about or what

the man looked like.

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 9 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Gonzales suddenly came up to Soto on foot and asked if he could give

him a ride “like right now.” Soto had not told Gonzales where he

would be in the church complex and the bench on which he was sitting

was not visible from the street, but somehow Gonzales found him. 

Soto called an ex-girlfriend, Baker, whom he had not seen in four

years, but she could not pick them up.

Gonzales gave Soto his phone, telling him to call Hernandez and tell

her to report her car was stolen. At about that time, Soto saw a green

Honda driving down the street with people in the front and back, and

Soto realized that Gonzales needed to get rid of the car. He did not

ask questions because he did not want to be involved. Soto called

Hernandez and told her to report the car had been stolen. She did not

want to do so, but he repeated she should “fucking report it.”

He and Gonzales walked up the street to the gas station where

Valenciano was supposed to pick him up. He stopped in the station’s

store to buy a drink, and heard a man say in broken English that he had

just seen his friend shot.

Valenciano picked them up, dropped Gonzales off and took Soto back

to his (Valenciano’s) house. Soto watched some television, then

walked to the Green Valley Apartments. The numerous calls he made

during this period to Julio Cabrera, Oscar Cabrera, Gonzales,

Valenciano and Hernandez were simply him trying to find a ride. He

eventually met up with Oscar and spent the night at the Cabrera

residence. He did not see Martinez at the Cabrera house.

From that day to the date of his arrest, he never asked Gonzales about

the car or what Gonzales was doing that morning, even after

Hernandez told him about the shooting. He did not want to be

involved or go back to prison. He repeatedly said he never asked

Hernandez whether she gave his name to police, though on

cross-examination he admitted he might have told her not to mention

his name.

While incarcerated, Soto often talked to Aluni about his case,

discussing how Martinez’s statements were inconsistent, among other

things. Soto also had “stacks of discovery” papers in his cell and

Aluni was sometimes alone in Soto’s cell FN10 when Soto would get

a visit from his lawyer or family.

FN10. Soto admitted Aluni was not one of his

cellmates.

Aluni gave Soto a letter at some point, saying “Give this to your

attorney” and Soto did so, without looking at the letter. After that,

Soto’s attorney told Soto to be careful around Aluni. When asked how

he knew the contents of that letter, since it was not part of the

discovery, Soto said a different letter from Aluni to a deputy district

attorney, which was part of the discovery, mentioned that Aluni had

written a similar letter to Soto’s attorney. Soto never threatened Aluni

at any time, but Aluni was lying in exchange for a reduced sentence.

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 10 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Messrs. Soto, Valenciano and Gonzales were originally charged together. In November

2005, the trial court granted the motion to sever the trial of Messrs. Soto and Valenciano from that

of Mr. Gonzales. Soto, at *1 & n.1. 

11

Soto, at *14-*15. 

B. Procedural History

A jury trial was held for Mr. Soto and Mr. Valenciano in Santa Cruz County Superior Court

in 2009.2

 Following the jury trial, Mr. Soto was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery, first

degree murder, five counts of robbery, and two counts of attempted second degree robbery. 

Sentence enhancement allegations that the crimes were for the benefit of a criminal street gang and

for personal use and discharge of a firearm were found true. Mr. Soto was sentenced to a total of 84

years to life in prison. 

Mr. Soto appealed. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction. 

See Resp. Exs. 3 and 4. The California Supreme Court denied Mr. Soto’s petition for review. 

See Resp. Ex. 6. 

Mr. Soto then filed this action. His petition contends that the admission of an out-of-court

hearsay statement violated his federal constitutional rights to confrontation and due process. 

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the petition concerns the

conviction and sentence of a person convicted in Santa Cruz County, California, which is within this

judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 to

impose new restrictions on federal habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 11 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the

state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. “A federal habeas

court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application

of clearly established federal law was ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Id. at 409.

V. DISCUSSION

A. Confrontation Clause Claim

A little more than a decade ago, the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington,

541 U.S. 36 (2004), dramatically changed Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, and abandoned the

analytic framework from Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), that had been used for many years. 

Mr. Soto’s habeas petition contends that Crawford left the Roberts test intact for a subset of cases in

which the evidence at issue was nontestimonial hearsay and that, applying the Roberts test, a

Confrontation Clause violation occurred when certain nontestimonial hearsay was admitted at his

trial. His argument fails because the Supreme Court and lower courts have determined that

Crawford did not leave the Roberts test intact; instead, the rule now is that the Confrontation Clause

simply does not apply to nontestimonial evidence. The California Court of Appeal erred in its

analysis by applying the outdated Roberts test to deny Mr. Soto’s claim. Nonetheless, because no

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 12 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 When there is a reasoned decision by the intermediate court, followed by a summary denial

of the petition for review by the California Supreme Court, this Court will look through summary

denials to the last reasoned decision and apply § 2254(d) to that decision. See Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir.), amended, 733 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2013). Here, the California Court

of Appeal’s rejection of the Confrontation Clause claim was a reasoned decision, and was followed

by a summary denial of the petition for review in the California Supreme Court. Thus, the

California Court of Appeal’s reasoned decision is the one to which § 2254(d) is applied for the

Confrontation Clause claim. 

4

 This Court has added the bracketed numbers at the beginning of each of the paragraphs of

the California Court of Appeal’s analysis because this Court’s analysis will refer to the particular

paragraphs in that court’s discussion. 

13

Confrontation Clause violation occurred, Mr. Soto is not entitled to federal habeas relief. The

analysis is explained in more detail below.

1. California Court of Appeal Decision3

The California Court of Appeal rejected Mr. Soto’s Confrontation Clause claim in an

analysis that was somewhat confusing and ultimately applied the wrong legal standard to the federal

constitutional claim.

[1]4 Valenciano and Soto argue the trial court should have sustained

their hearsay objections to the statements Gonzales made to Martinez,

his girlfriend and mother of his child. The court found the statements

were nontestimonial and admissible under the declaration against

interest rule. The one false part of Gonzales’ statement, i.e., where he

denied being the shooter, did not make the remaining statements

unreliable, but instead was Gonzales’ attempt to tell Martinez what

happened without admitting that he was, in fact, a murderer. Soto and

Valenciano concede that the statements were nontestimonial and limit

their challenge to their admission under the declaration against interest

exception.

[2] A criminal defendant has the right under both the federal and state

Constitutions to confront the witnesses against him. (U.S. Const., 6th

Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) In Crawford v. Washington (2004)

541 U.S. 36 (Crawford), the United States Supreme Court held that,

under the confrontation clause, “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses

absent from trial” are admissible “only where the declarant is

unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity

to cross-examine [the witness].” (Id. at p. 59, fn. omitted.) “Under

Crawford, . . . the Confrontation Clause has no application to

[out-of-court, nontestimonial statements not subject to prior

cross-examination] and therefore permits their admission even if they

lack indicia of reliability.” (Whorton v. Bockting (2007) 549 U.S. 406,

420; see also Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 821.) “Where

nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the

Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of

hearsay law . . . .” (Crawford, supra, at p. 68.)

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 13 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

[3] The veracity of nontestimonial hearsay statements is sufficiently

dependable to allow the untested admission of such statements against

a defendant when (1) the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay

exception or (2) the evidence contains “particularized guarantees of

trustworthiness” such that adversarial testing would be expected to add

little, if anything, to the statements’ reliability. (Ohio v.

Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66; Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 68.) 

In Lilly v. Virginia (1999) 527 U.S. 116 (Lilly), a plurality of the court

held that “accomplices’ confessions that inculpate a criminal

defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule

as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause

jurisprudence.” (Id. at p. 134, fn. omitted.) “This, of course, does not

mean, . . . that the Confrontation Clause imposes a “blanket ban on the

government’s use of [nontestifying] accomplice statements that

incriminate a defendant.” Rather it simply means that the government

must satisfy the second prong of the Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56

(1980) test[, that the statements bear a particularized guarantee of

trustworthiness,] in order to introduce such statements.” (Id. at p. 134,

fn. 5.) On appeal, we conduct a de novo review to determine whether

that trustworthiness test has been satisfied. (Id. at ¶. 136-137.)

[4] “In California, ‘[e]vidence of a statement by a declarant having

sufficient knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the

hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the

statement, when made, ... so far subjected him to the risk of ... criminal

liability ... that a reasonable man in his position would not have made

the statement unless he believed it to be true.’ ( [Evid.Code,] § 1230.)

The proponent of such evidence must show that the declarant is

unavailable, that the declaration was against the declarant’s penal

interest when made and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to

warrant admission despite its hearsay character.” (People v. Duarte

(2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 610–611.) “‘To determine whether [a

particular] declaration [against penal interest] passes [Evidence Code]

[section 1230’s] required threshold of trustworthiness, a trial court

“may take into account not just the words but the circumstances under

which they were uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant, and

the declarant’s relationship to the defendant.”’ [Citation.] We have

recognized that, in this context, assessing trustworthiness ‘”requires

the court to apply to the peculiar facts of the individual case a broad

and deep acquaintance with the ways human beings actually conduct

themselves in the circumstances material under the exception.”’” 

(Id. at p. 614.)

[5] “There is no litmus test for the determination of whether a

statement is trustworthy and falls within the declaration against [penal]

interest exception. The trial court must look to the totality of the

circumstances in which the statement was made, whether the declarant

spoke from personal knowledge, the possible motivation of the

declarant, what was actually said by the declarant and anything else

relevant to the inquiry.” (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58

Cal.App.4th 298, 334 (Greenberger).) “When examining what was

actually said by the declarant special attention must be paid to any

statements that tend to inculpate the nondeclarant. This is so because

a statement’s content is most reliable in that portion which inculpates

the declarant. It is least reliable in that portion which shifts

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 14 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

responsibility. Controversy necessarily arises when the declarant

makes statements which are self-inculpatory as well as inculpatory of

another. This is why Evidence Code section 1230 only permits an

exception to the hearsay rule for statements that are specially

disserving of the declarant’s penal interest. [Citation.] This is not to

say that a statement that incriminates the declarant and also inculpates

the nondeclarant cannot be specifically disserving of the declarant’s

penal interest. Such a determination necessarily depends upon a

careful analysis of what was said and the totality of the

circumstances.” (Id. at p. 335.)

[6] The Court of Appeal in Greenberger considered out-of-court

statements made by some defendants implicating other defendants. 

The court held that “a defendant’s declarations against [penal] interest

may be received in a joint trial without denying the codefendant the

right of confrontation guaranteed by the United States Constitution.”

(Greenberger, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 314.) “Since declarations

against [penal] interest may be admitted in evidence without doing

violence to the confrontation clause, we see no reason why such

declarations, when made by a codefendant, should not also be

admissible.” (Id. at p. 332.)

[7] In People v. Cervantes (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162 (Cervantes),

a nontestifying codefendant, Morales, inculpated himself and his two

codefendants, Cervantes and Martinez, in a murder and an attempted

murder while speaking to a friend of all three defendants, Ojeda. (Id. at ¶. 166–167.) On appeal the two codefendants contended that

Morales’ statement to the friend should have been excluded. (Id. at p.

169.) The appellate court found that the trial court did not err in

admitting evidence of the statement at the defendants’ joint trial. 

Following Greenberger, the court found that the statement qualified as

a declaration against penal interest and satisfied the constitutional

standard of trustworthiness. (Id. at p. 177.) “The evidence here

showed Morales made the statement within 24 hours of the shooting to

a lifelong friend from whom he sought medical treatment for injuries

sustained in the commission of the offenses.... Regarding the content

of the statement, Morales did not attribute blame to Cervantes and

Martinez but accepted for himself an active role in the crimes and

described how he had directed the activities of Martinez.” (Id. at p.

175.) “Ojeda consistently reported that Morales admitted shooting at

the second male with Cervantes. The statement Cervantes shot the first

male, as well as the statement Morales shot at the second male, both

incriminated Morales because Morales was acting in concert with

Cervantes at all relevant times. Thus, the discrepancies in the

statement as repeated by Ojeda does not preclude a finding the

statement was trustworthy.” (Id. at p. 176.) “Regarding the claim the

statement should have been redacted to exclude reference to the

nondeclarants, Greenberger specifically held this is not required

where the statement admitted into evidence is disserving to the

interests of the declarant. We agree with Greenberger ‘s analysis on

this point.” (Ibid.)

[8] Here, the statements by Gonzales implicated him, as well as Soto

and Valenciano, in the robbery and murder. Gonzales described to

Martinez how the robbery and murder were committed, who was

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 15 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

involved in it, and in what manner, and thereby admitted that he was

acting in concert with Soto and Valenciano at all relevant times. The

statements were not made to the police during questioning and

Gonzales’ only effort to mitigate his own conduct or shift the blame

was to consistently deny pulling the trigger. At the time Gonzales

made the statements, his only motive to lie was to keep Martinez, the

mother of his child, from knowing he had blown someone’s head open

with a shotgun. “[T]he most reliable circumstance is one in which the

conversation occurs between friends in a noncoercive setting that

fosters uninhibited disclosures.” (Greenberger, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th

at p. 335; Cervantes, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 175.) After

independently reviewing the record, we find that the statements

Gonzales made to Martinez bore a particularized guarantee of

trustworthiness. Accordingly, admission of the statements did not

violate the federal or state Constitutions or state law. (Lilly, supra, 527

U.S. at ¶. 136-137; Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 66;

Cervantes, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 177.)

Soto, at *16-*18.

2. The Confrontation Clause - Crawford Works A Major Change

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that in criminal cases the

accused has the right to “be confronted with witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The

ultimate goal of the Confrontation Clause “is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural

rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability

be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.” Crawford, 541

U.S. at 61.

The Confrontation Clause applies to all “testimonial” statements. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at

50-51. “Testimony . . . is typically a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of

establishing or proving some fact.” Id. at 51 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see

id. at 51 (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a

sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”); id. at 68 (“[w]hatever

else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a

grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations”). In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813

(2006), the Supreme Court distinguished testimonial and nontestimonial statements to police. 

“Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances

objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to

meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 16 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish

or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Id. at 822; see, e.g., id. at

826-28 (victim’s frantic statements to a 911 operator naming her assailant who had just hurt her

were not testimonial); id. at 829-30 (victim’s statements to officer telling him what had happened

were testimonial, as there was no emergency in progress and were made after police officer had

separated victim and assailant); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 39-40, 68 (statements were testimonial where

made by witness at police station to a series of questions posed by an officer who had given

Miranda warnings to witness and was taping and making notes of the answers). 

Before Crawford was decided, the Confrontation Clause analysis had been governed by the

“indicia of reliability” test set out in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980). Under the

Roberts test, hearsay statements could be introduced only if the witness was unavailable at trial and

the statements had “adequate indicia of reliability,” i.e., the statements fell within a “firmly rooted

hearsay exception” or bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 

Roberts was overruled in Crawford, although some readers of the Crawford opinion believed that

Roberts was not overruled as to nontestimonial statements. Two years later, the Supreme Court

clarified in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006), that the Roberts test had no continuing

validity. Nontestimonial hearsay, “while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is

not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 821. The Supreme Court made the

same point again the following term, when it referred to “Crawford’s elimination of Confrontation

Clause protection against the admission of unreliable out-of-court nontestimonial statements.”

Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007). 

In an en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the Roberts test no longer

survives, and that nontestimonial statements are now outside the scope of the protection of the

Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094, 1099 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (en

banc). The court explained that earlier it was unresolved whether the Roberts test “to determine the

admissibility of out-of-court nontestimonial statements survived Crawford,” but the Supreme Court

then clarified in Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, “that Crawford ‘eliminat[es] Confrontation Clause

protection against the admission of unreliable out-of-court non-testimonial statements’ and that ‘the

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 17 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

Confrontation Clause has no application to such statements and therefore permits their admission

even if they lack indicia of reliability.’” Larson, 495 F.3d at 1099 n.4; see also Delgadillo v.

Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Crawford rejected [the Roberts] framework for

analyzing Confrontation Clause violations,” and nontestimonial statements no longer raise

Confrontation Clause concerns). 

Other circuits also have concluded that the Confrontation Clause no longer applies to

nontestimonial hearsay statements, although they have not all agreed on whether it was Crawford,

Davis or Bockting that sounded the death knell. See United States v. Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d 53, 64

n.14 (1st Cir. 2010) (“until Davis, Roberts remained the controlling precedent for judging whether

non-testimonial hearsay violated the Confrontation Clause. After Davis, however, non-testimonial

hearsay no longer implicates the Confrontation Clause at all”); United States v. Smalls, 605 F.3d

765, 774 (10th Cir. 2010) (Davis “squarely confronted the issue of whether the Confrontation Clause

had any application to nontestimonial hearsay statements, or, in other words, whether any portion of

Roberts remained good law. In Davis, the Court placed the question of the admissibility of

nontestimonial hearsay statements entirely outside the confines of the Confrontation Clause and

rendered Roberts academic”); United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 2009) (although

it had been an open question whether nontestimonial statements continued to be governed by the

Roberts test after Crawford, the Supreme Court’s later decisions in Davis and Bockting answered the

question in the negative). 

3. Analysis of Federal Habeas Claim

The California Court of Appeal’s analysis of Mr. Soto’s Confrontation Clause claim

confusingly articulated the correct legal standard in one paragraph, but then applied the incorrect

legal standard in later paragraphs. The first paragraph of the analysis framed the issue. The state

appellate court first noted that the trial court had found that the statements were nontestimonial and

admissible under the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule. The state appellate

court then noted that the defendants had conceded that the statements were nontestimonial and had

limited their challenge to the trial court’s ruling that the statements were admissible under the

hearsay exception for declarations against interest. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1230. In the second

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 18 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 Lilly applied the Roberts test to a nontestifying accomplice’s confession made to the police

during a custodial interrogation by the police, i.e., testimonial hearsay. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 120-

21. 

19

paragraph, the state appellate court identified the correct legal rule, i.e., that the Confrontation

Clause has no application to nontestimonial hearsay following Crawford, Davis and Bockting. The

problem arises in the third paragraph of the discussion because there the California Appellate Court

cited and revived the Roberts test, indicating that the Roberts test was the test for determining

whether the admission of the nontestimonial hearsay statements could be admitted without offending

the Confrontation Clause. The next five paragraphs of the analysis considered California law on

hearsay to determine whether the hearsay statements “bore a particularized guarantee of

trustworthiness.” Soto, at *18. The final two sentences and citations in the eighth paragraph show

that the California Court of Appeal applied Roberts to determine that no Confrontation Clause

violation had occurred. First, the California Court of Appeal stated that it had “independently

review[ed] the record,” – a requirement from the outdated analysis in Lilly5

 that had been mentioned

in the troublesome third paragraph of the California Court of Appeal’s decision. Second, the

California Court of Appeal found “that the statements Gonzales made to Martinez bore a

particularized guarantee of trustworthiness” – a phrase that is part of the Roberts test. And third, the

California Court of Appeal cited Lilly and Roberts, but not Crawford, Davis or Bockting, as support

for its conclusion that the “admission of the statements did not violate the federal or state

Constitutions or state law.” Soto, at *18. 

A state court’s “mistakes in reasoning or in predicate decisions” such as using the wrong

legal rule or framework “constitute error under the ‘contrary to’ prong of § 2254(d)(1).” Frantz v.

Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 734 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (state court’s review of claim for interference

with right to self-representation for harmlessness was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court

precedent holding that it was structural error). In such a case, habeas relief is not automatically

granted; rather, the federal court must do a de novo review of the constitutional issue raised. Id. at

735 (citing Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007)). In deciding whether there is a §

2254(d)(1) error, the federal court’s analysis is confined to the state court’s actual decisions and

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 19 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

analysis, but in doing the de novo review once such an error is found, the federal court is not limited

to the reasoning of the state court. Id. at 737-39; see, e.g., Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1193 (9th

Cir. 2013) (after finding state court decision “contrary to” federal law because it failed to apply the

correct federal rule for sentencing of juvenile offenders, Ninth Circuit conducted de novo review of

issue and found error). 

Here, by applying the Roberts test, the California Court of Appeal used the wrong legal

framework to evaluate Mr. Soto’s Confrontation Clause claim. The Supreme Court’s Crawford,

Davis and Bockting decisions had clearly established that the Roberts test no longer applied and that

nontestimonial hearsay evidence was not covered by the Confrontation Clause. The California

Court of Appeal’s use of the wrong rule (i.e., the Roberts test) “constitute[d] error under the

‘contrary to’ prong of § 2254(d)(1).” Frantz, 533 F.3d at 734. That does not mean that Mr. Soto

obtains habeas relief as a bonus for the state court’s error; instead, it means that this Court must do a

de novo review of the Confrontation Clause claim. See id. 

A de novo review is a simple matter here because there is a bright line rule: the

Confrontation Clause does not apply to nontestimonial hearsay. See Bockting, 549 U.S. at 420;

Davis, 547 U.S. at 821; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51; Larson, 495 F.3d at 1099 n.4; Delgadillo, 527

F.3d at 924. Mr. Soto conceded in state court that the statements were nontestimonial, as he

identified them as “nontestimonial statements,” and the thrust of his argument in his petition for

review was that Crawford did not apply because the Roberts test remained intact for nontestimonial

statements such as Mr. Gonzales’ statements to Ms. Martinez. Resp. Ex. 5 (Petition for Review, p.

5; see also id. at 10 (“Gonzalez’s statements to Vanessa [Martinez] do not appear to be testimonial

within the meaning of Crawford or Davis”). Mr. Soto does not contend that the statements of Mr.

Gonzales to Ms. Martinez were testimonial, nor would such an argument be well-founded because

their boyfriend-to-girlfriend communications were just the sort of communications that courts have

repeatedly held to be nontestimonial and therefore outside the protection of the Confrontation

Clause. See, e.g., Desai v. Booker, 732 F.3d 628, 630 (6th Cir. 2013) (“the Confrontation Clause no

longer applied to nontestimonial hearsay such as the friend-to-friend confession”); United States v.

DeLeon, 678 F.3d 317, 321-24 (4th Cir. 2012), judgment vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2850

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 20 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

(2013) (admission of evidence of stepson’s statements describing his defendant-stepfather’s

disciplinary methods to social worker made several months before the stepson died did not implicate

the Confrontation Clause because they were made for purposes of formulating a family treatment

plan and were not testimonial); United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2012)

(admission of evidence of surreptitiously recorded jailhouse conversations between codefendants did

not violate the Confrontation Clause because they were not testimonial). 

Mr. Soto argues that the Roberts test applies to his case, notwithstanding the decision in

Crawford. He argues that “it is [an] open question as to whether the admission of non-testimonial

statements violate the Confrontation Clause under the traditional test of reliability announced in”

Roberts. Resp. Ex. 5, Petition for Review, p. 10. This argument fails because, as explained in

Section “2” above, the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have firmly said that the Roberts test no

longer applies and that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to nontestimonial hearsay. 

Mr. Soto also argues that the fact that Crawford did not overrule Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S.

116 (1999), supports his argument that the Roberts test survives because Lilly had applied the

Roberts test for reliability and trustworthiness. See Resp. Ex. 5, Petition for Review, p. 11; see

also Docket # 1 at 26-30 (legal argument in his federal habeas petition consists almost entirely of a

lengthy quote from Lilly). Mr. Soto’s reliance on Lilly does not help him because the evidence at

issue in Lilly was a confession made during police interrogation, see Lilly, 527 U.S. at 120-21, and

therefore was testimonial hearsay of just the sort that Crawford determined was covered by the

Confrontation Clause. Crawford recognized that very point in its reference to Lilly, as Crawford

noted that even where its recent cases (including Lilly) had followed the reasoning of Roberts, those

cases made a distinction for testimonial hearsay, and testimonial hearsay required unavailability and

prior cross-examination. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 (Lilly “excluded testimonial statements that

the defendant had had no opportunity to test by cross-examination”); see also Davis, 547 U.S. at

825. Thus, the fact that the Supreme Court did not overrule Lilly (which concerned testimonial

hearsay) does not provide any support for the argument that the Roberts test survives or that the

Confrontation Clause continues to apply to nontestimonial hearsay. Mr. Soto sees his case and

Lilly as similar because both involved confessions by accomplices, but the critical difference in this

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 21 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

post-Crawford time is that the confession in Mr. Soto’s case was to a girlfriend (and nontestimonial)

whereas the Lilly confession was during police interrogation (and, therefore, testimonial). See

generally United States v. Smalls, 605 F.3d 765, 773 (10th Cir. 2010) (district court erred in

applying Roberts test to accomplice’s statement to confidential informant because it was

nontestimonial; “Roberts was no longer good law when the district court made its decision in this

case, rendering Lilly a dead letter and eviscerating not only the presumption of unreliability, but the

entire foundation upon which the district court’s order rested”). 

The admission of the nontestimonial hearsay statements from Mr. Gonzales to Ms. Martinez

did not implicate, let alone violate, Mr. Soto’s Confrontation Clause rights. He is not entitled to

habeas relief on this claim.

 B. Due Process Claim

Mr. Soto also argues that the admission of Mr. Gonzales’ statements to Ms. Martinez

violated his right to due process because the evidence was unreliable hearsay. See Docket # 1 at 8. 

Neither the California Court of Appeal nor the California Supreme Court discussed Mr.

Soto’s due process claim. “When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state

court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in

the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011) (one-sentence order denying habeas petition analyzed under

§2254(d)); see also Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013) (order discussing state law

claim but not federal claim rebuttably presumed to be rejection on the merits and therefore subject to

§ 2254(d)). Mr. Soto does not dispute that the state supreme court decided his claim on the merits.

The summary rejection of the due process claim by the California Supreme Court was neither

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court

authority. In addition, the state court’s decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts. 

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that federal habeas writ is unavailable for violations

of state law or for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. See Swarthout v.

Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011). Thus, to the extent Mr. Soto is urging that the California

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 22 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

Evidence Code’s hearsay rule was misapplied in state court, it would be a claim for a state law error

for which federal habeas relief is not available. 

A state court’s evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas review unless the ruling

violates federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or statutory provision

or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Pulley

v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). The Supreme Court “has not yet made a clear ruling that

admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient

to warrant issuance of the writ.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009)

(finding that trial court’s admission of irrelevant pornographic materials was “fundamentally unfair”

under Ninth Circuit precedent but not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law under § 2254(d)). Absent violation of a specific constitutional or statutory

provision, the due process inquiry in federal habeas review is whether the admission of evidence

was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Walters v. Maass, 45

F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, the admission of Mr. Gonzales’ statement to Ms. Martinez

which implicated himself along with Mr. Soto did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. Mr.

Soto fails to demonstrate that admission of the statement violated state evidentiary rules; as the

Court of Appeal noted, statement was admissible hearsay under Evid. Code § 1230 as a declaration

against the declarant’s personal interest which was imbued with reliability and trustworthiness. 

Given the state court’s finding that the statement was sufficiently trustworthy so as to satisfy state

evidentiary rules, admission of Gonzales’ statement was not so arbitrary or prejudicial as to render

the Mr. Soto’s trial fundamentally unfair. Furthermore, even if admission of the statement violated

state evidence rules and was so arbitrary as to violate due process, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas

relief unless the evidence had a “‘substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.’” Dillard v. Roe,

244 F.3d 758, 767 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)). 

Given the strength of the evidence against Mr. Soto, no such effect can be found in the instant case. 

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held (albeit in a different context) that, where a habeas

petitioner challenges his conviction based on the allegedly erroneous admission of evidence, as long

as there is some permissible inference that may be drawn, the introduction of such evidence does not

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 23 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

violate due process. Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991). “Evidence

introduced by the prosecution will often raise more than one inference, some permissible, some not;

we must rely on the jury to sort them out in light of the court’s instructions. Only if there are

no permissible inference they jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due

process. Even then, the evidence must ‘be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.’

[Citation] Only under such circumstances can it be inferred that the jury must have used the

evidence for an improper purpose.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920 (footnote omitted). Here, there was a

permissible inference that could be drawn from Gonzales’ statement – that Soto was involved in the

crime.

Accordingly, Mr. Soto is not entitled to relief on his due process claim. 

C. A Certificate Of Appealability Will Not Issue

Mr. Soto has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and this is not a case in which “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000). Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is DENIED. 

VI. CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED on the merits. The Clerk shall close the

file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 25, 2015

_________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

Case 3:13-cv-05931-EMC Document 10 Filed 03/25/15 Page 24 of 24