Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00630/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00630-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Anthony Jackson II, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-630-PHX-RCB (LOA) 

 O R D E R 

On March 28, 2013, Plaintiff Anthony Jackson, who is confined in the Arizona 

State Prison Complex-Lewis (ASPC-Lewis) in Buckeye, Arizona, filed a “Notice of 

Intention to File Tort Claim.” On June 24, 2013, he filed a “Notice to Court,” in which 

he states that he made a mistake and “will be filing a 42 USC 1983 Civil Rights 

Complaint.” 

In a July 17, 2013 Order, the Court noted that Plaintiff had not paid the $350.00 

filing fee or filed an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. The Court gave Plaintiff 

30 days to either pay the filing fee or file a complete Application to Proceed. In addition, 

the Court construed the “Notice of Intention to File Tort Claim” as a “Complaint” and 

dismissed it because it was not filed on a court-approved form, as required by Local Rule 

of Civil Procedure 3.4. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint on 

a court-approved form. 

On July 31, 2013, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, and an Application to Proceed In 

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Forma Pauperis. In an October 28, 2013 Order, the Court granted the Application to 

Proceed, dismissed the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, and denied 

without prejudice the Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court gave 

Plaintiff 30 days to file a second amended complaint that cured the deficiencies identified 

in the Order. 

 On December 2, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 12). 

The Court will dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and this action. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

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assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

II. Second Amended Complaint 

 In his one-count Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues the following 

Defendants, who are employed in the Barchey Unit at ASPC-Lewis: Deputy Warden 

Kimberly Currier, “S.S.U.” Sergeants Kindall and King, Correctional Officer IV Baca, 

and Sergeants Grant and Hilbun. 

 Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated. Plaintiff asserts 

that in August 2012, inmates attempted to extort him and another inmate and threatened 

them with bodily harm and death if they did not agree to help facilitate bringing 

contraband into the prison. Plaintiff claims that “[a]n attempt was made [by someone] to 

provide notice to Defendants [Kindall and King] through the inmate letter system” and to 

a nonparty by electronic mail, but “[n]o response was ever received from either of them” 

and they did not “call Plaintiff in.” Plaintiff states that the inmates’ threats escalated and 

he and the other inmate “came up with the idea[] to give the information to the visitation 

officer via letter to family.” Plaintiff states that he was told by someone that 

“disciplinary action would be written and forward[ed] with documents to insure that the 

issue would be brought to the attention of appropriate staff,” but staff was also warned by 

someone that Plaintiff’s life would be in danger if he remained on the unit. Plaintiff 

states that Defendant Currier failed to transfer Plaintiff to a different unit after she was 

“notified of such action.” 

 Plaintiff also claims that he told prison staff that his life was in danger, they told 

him to return to a unit, and he informed them that he could not because he had “[do not 

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house] issues” in that unit. Plaintiff contends that at that point, Defendants Baca, Grant, 

and Hilbun placed Plaintiff on report for refusing to house. Plaintiff also states that after 

he filed a lawsuit in January 2012, Defendant Baca again asked Plaintiff to return to the 

unit, Plaintiff stated that his life was in danger in that unit, and Defendant Baca again 

placed Plaintiff on report for refusing to house. Plaintiff states that he believes this was 

“out of retaliation.” Plaintiff asserts that a disciplinary sergeant found Plaintiff guilty, 

without allowing Plaintiff to call witnesses or submit a witness statement. 

 Plaintiff alleges that he suffered mental anguish. In his Request for Relief, 

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, monetary damages, and his costs of suit. 

III. Failure to State a Claim

 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 

v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a 

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the 

claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

 An Eighth Amendment claim requires a sufficiently culpable state of mind by the 

Defendants, known as “deliberate indifference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 

(1994). Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Id. at 835. To state a claim of deliberate indifference, 

plaintiffs must meet a two-part test. First, the alleged constitutional deprivation must be, 

objectively, “sufficiently serious”; the official’s act or omission must result in the denial 

of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. at 834. Second, the prison 

official must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., he must act with deliberate 

indifference to inmate health or safety. Id. In defining “deliberate indifference” in this 

context, the Supreme Court has imposed a subjective test: “the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837 (emphasis added). 

 Plaintiff’s allegations are too vague and conclusory to state a deliberate 

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indifference claim. Plaintiff does not allege whether an inmate letter was actually 

submitted to Defendants Kindall and King, and, if it was, who submitted it or what it 

stated. Plaintiff does not claim that Defendants Kindall and King were deliberately 

indifferent to a substantial risk to Plaintiff’s safety. Specifically, Plaintiff does not 

indicate whether Defendants Kindall and King actually received the letter, whether they 

completely disregarded the letter, whether they took no action at all as a result of the 

letter, whether their failure to respond or “call Plaintiff in” was more than mere 

negligence, or whether they investigated the issue and did not respond because they 

determined that no substantial risk to Plaintiff’s safety existed. 

 Similarly, Plaintiff does not identify the actions about which Defendant Currier 

was notified and does not allege that Defendant Currier was deliberately indifferent. He 

does not claim that she failed to act; he simply alleges that she did not transfer him. Nor 

does he indicate whether she completely disregarded the information, whether her failure 

to transfer him was more than mere negligence, or whether she investigated the issue and 

did not transfer Plaintiff because she determined that no substantial risk to his safety 

existed. The Court also notes that Plaintiff is not currently confined in the unit in which 

he was threatened and that Plaintiff does not allege that he was injured at all by the 

inmates. 

 As to Plaintiff’s claims regarding being placed on disciplinary report by 

Defendants Baca, Grant, and Hilbun, Plaintiff does not allege that these Defendants acted 

with deliberate indifference to a serious risk of harm. Thus, he has failed to state an 

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. 

 Moreover, the Court notes that in his Request for Relief, Plaintiff seeks, among 

other things, for his disciplinary proceedings or sanctions to be vacated and for his good 

time credits and parole class three to be reinstated. “[A] state prisoner seeking injunctive 

relief against the denial or revocation of good-time credits must proceed in habeas 

corpus, and not under § 1983.” Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2002). In 

addition, if a judgment for Plaintiff regarding the denial of due process in a prison 

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disciplinary proceeding would invalidate or imply the invalidity of the deprivation of 

good-time credits, the claim is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), 

unless Plaintiff can show that the disciplinary conviction has been previously invalidated. 

See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48 (1997); Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; 

Nonnette, 316 F.3d at 875. See also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) 

(“[A] state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)–no matter the 

relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit 

(state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)–if success in that 

action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”). 

Here, Plaintiff’s claim regarding the disciplinary reports, if decided in his favor, would 

either invalidate or imply the invalidity of the loss of his good time credits. Because 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his prison disciplinary proceedings have been 

reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance 

of a writ of habeas corpus, his claim is barred by Heck. 

 Finally, Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegation that Defendant Baca acted 

“out of retaliation” is insufficient to state a retaliation claim. A viable claim of First 

Amendment retaliation contains five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor 

took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected 

conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment 

rights (or that the inmate suffered more than minimal harm) and (5) did not reasonably 

advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th 

Cir. 2005); see also Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997) (retaliation claims 

requires an inmate to show (1) that the prison official acted in retaliation for the exercise 

of a constitutionally protected right, and (2) that the action “advanced no legitimate 

penological interest”). The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that his exercise of 

his First Amendment rights was a substantial or motivating factor behind the defendants’ 

conduct. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); 

Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff does 

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not allege that his filing of the other lawsuit was a substantial or motivating factor behind 

Defendant Baca’s conduct, that Plaintiff suffered more than minimal harm or his First 

Amendment rights were chilled, or that Defendant Baca’s conduct did not advance a 

legitimate penological goal. 

 Thus, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. 

IV. Dismissal without Leave to Amend

 Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in his Second Amended Complaint, the 

Court will dismiss his Second Amended Complaint. “Leave to amend need not be given 

if a complaint, as amended, is subject to dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 

Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is 

particularly broad where Plaintiff has previously been permitted to amend his complaint. 

Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Repeated failure to cure deficiencies is one of the factors to be considered in deciding 

whether justice requires granting leave to amend. Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. 

 Plaintiff has made multiple efforts at crafting a viable complaint and appears 

unable to do so despite specific instructions from the Court. The Court finds that further 

opportunities to amend would be futile. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, will 

dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 12) and this action are 

dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 (2) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the 

dismissal for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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 (3) The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of 

this decision would not be taken in good faith. 

 DATED this 28th day of April, 2014. 

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