Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02304/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02304-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD GLASSMAN, MORRIS JACOBS,

MICHAEL HALL, IGNACIA REYES,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

SAN FRANCISCO CITY & COUNTY,

ELSON HAO, JIM WACHOB, ALAN

DeGUZMAN, TOM HIDAYAT,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-02304 WHA

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS AND 

VACATING HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this employment-discrimination action, defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants, the City and

County of San Francisco and four city employees, make this motion on the grounds that

plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations. This order finds that plaintiffs’ claims

accrued more than one year prior to the filing of their complaint, and that plaintiffs have not

alleged sufficient facts to support equitable estoppel of the time bar. Accordingly, defendants’

motion is GRANTED.

Case 3:06-cv-02304-WHA Document 27 Filed 07/31/06 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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STATEMENT

Plaintiffs Richard Glassman, Morris Jacobs, Michael Hall and Ignacia Reyes 

were applicants for positions as electrical transit system mechanics (“7371 positions”) in the

maintenance division of the San Francisco’s Municipal Transportation Agency (“MUNI”). 

Plaintiff Glassman applied for a 7371 position in June 2000 and was disqualified in November

2000, purportedly on grounds that he failed to provide a written verification of his prior work

experience (First Amd. Compl. ¶ 6). Plaintiff Jacobs’ application for a 7371 position was

similarly rejected in October 2000 on grounds that he failed to provide a written verification of

his work history (id. at ¶ 7). Plaintiff Reyes’ application for a 7371 position was also allegedly

rejected in November 2000 for failure to provide a written verification of work experience (id.

¶ 9). Plaintiff Hall applied for a 7371 position in October 2000 and allegedly never received

notification that his application was rejected (id. ¶ 8).

Plaintiffs alleged that defendants discriminated on the basis of race by giving

preferential treatment to Asian and Filipino applicants for the7371 positions. In 2001,

defendants purportedly hired several Asian and Filipino applicants who did not meet the

minimum qualifications for the job. Plaintiffs also contended that defendants modified the

requirments for 7371 positions in late 2000, purportedly to make it easier to hire candidates who

were Asian or Filipino. Plaintiff also alleged that defendants failed to provide sufficient

information about the 7371 positions and the requirements for the positions to non-Asian and

non-Filipino candidates.

This action is related to and contains similar allegations to an earlier-filed action

pending before this Court, Lukovsky, et al. v. City and County of San Francisco, et al., 05-

00389-WHA. On January 17, 2006, this Court issued an order in that action denying class

certification. The claims were thus to proceed individually. The January order, however,

allowed the Lukovsky plaintiffs’ counsel to send letters to other individuals who would

potentially have similar claims against the city and county, so that all such claims could be tried

by the same judge.

Case 3:06-cv-02304-WHA Document 27 Filed 07/31/06 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 This Court issued an order in the Lukovsky action on July 17, 2006, granting partial summary

judgment to defendants with respect to similar legal issues relating to the statute of limitations. That order is

useful as a reference, but does not control the outcome in this separate action.

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The four plaintiffs in this action responded to the letters of counsel, and chose to be

jointly represented by the Lukovsky plaintiffs’ counsel. Plaintiffs identified the letter from

Lukovsky counsel as the event that notified them of the potential for an action.

Plaintiffs in this action filed their complaint on March 31, 2006, alleging the above acts

of discrimination under 42 U.S.C 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986. Plaintiffs subsequently filed an

amended complaint on June 14, 2006. Defendants now move to dismiss this action.1

ANALYSIS

A motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) tests for legal sufficiency of the claims

alleged in the complaint. A complaint should not be dismissed “unless it appears beyond doubt

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). On the other hand, “conclusory

allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim.” Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996).

1. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Defendants move to dismiss all of plaintiffs’ claims on grounds that the claims are timebarred under the relevant statute of limitations.

“Dismissal on statute of limitations grounds can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) ‘only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not

permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.’” TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987,

991 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted).

A. Applicable Limitations Period.

Where, as here, the relevant statutes do not contain their own statutes of limitations,

“courts borrow the most appropriate state statute of limitations.” Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v.

Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004). Section 1981 was amended in 1990 so as to include

a four-year limitations period for certain actions. This limitations period, however, does not

apply to those actions which were cognizable under the pre-1990 version of Section 1981. Id.

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For the Northern District of California

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 To be clear, there is no question that the allegedly discriminatory acts occurred in 2000. This is a

separate issue from when plaintiffs’ claims accrued, which is addressed infra.

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at 974 n. 5 (citing Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004)). Plaintiffs’

Section 1981 claim for failure to hire would have been cognizable under the pre-1990 version. 

See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180–82 (1989).

Accordingly, the appropriate California statute of limitations must be adopted for

plaintiffs’ claims under Sections 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986. Courts have deemed the statute

of limitations for personal-injury claims to be appropriate for these civil-rights statutes. See,

e.g., Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 1993) (“California’s

one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs claims brought pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985”); Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 705 (9th Cir. 2006). 

California amended its statute of limitations for personal injury claims from one to two years in

January 2003. Compare Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340(3) with Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 355.1. The

modified statute, however, applies only to acts occurring after January 2003. See, e.g.,

Guerrero, 442 F.3d at 705 n. 32.2

 Plaintiffs claims, therefore, must satisfy the one-year statute

of limitations provided for in Section 340(3).

B. Accrual.

The remaining issues are whether plaintiffs’ claims accrued more than one year before

they filed their initial complaint, March 31, 2006 and, if so, whether the limitations defense is

nevertheless equitably estopped.

“Although state law determines the length of the limitations period, federal law

determines when a civil rights claim accrues.” Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916,

926 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted). “[A] claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or

has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Ibid. (internal citation

omitted). “[I]nquiry for purposes of determining when the limitations period begins to run must

center on the date when the employee has notice of the unlawful act.” Aronsen v. Crown

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Plaintiffs argue that under Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1991), courts use state

law for the question of when they should have known of the existence of their claims. Under California law,

plaintiffs suggest, accrual is determined by the “discovery rule” — the date on which plaintiffs knew or should

have know of their injury. Under Olsen, supra, it is an inaccurate statement of law that the accrual analysis in

federal court “borrows” from state law. Yet the distinction is academic. Federal law builds in this “discovery

rule,” as was explained clearly by the Seventh Circuit in Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450

(7th Cir. 1990), a case relied upon by both parties.

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Zellerbach, 662 F.2d 584, 593 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Azer v. Connell, 306 F.3d 930, 936

(9th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted).3

 Plaintiffs argue that their claims did not accrue until February 3, 2006, the date they

received a letter from counsel in the Lukovsky action about the nature of that action. This order

finds otherwise.

The claims of plaintiffs Glassman, Jacobs and Reyes all accrued in October or

November 2000. Each of these three plaintiffs was formally notified of the rejection of their

application at that time. Each of these three plaintiffs was told at that time of the basis for their

rejection, failure to provide a written verification of their work history. The notification letters

served as a final statement of Muni’s position with respect to these plaintiffs’ job applications. 

See Olsen, 363 F.3d at 927 (“We hold that Olsen’s claim accrued when she received the

February 4, 1999 letter notifying her of the Board’s proposal to deny her license reinstatement. 

The letter was ‘adequately final and represented the [Board’s] official position’”) (internal

citation omitted).

There is less precision as to the date on which plaintiff Hall’s claim accrued. As stated

above, Hall allegedly never received any notification from MUNI that his 7371 application was

rejected. The lack of a formal notification letter, however, does not yield a meaningfully

different accrual date. It is reasonable to assume that Hall was aware that MUNI selected

another candidate for the 7371 position by 2001, the time by which a successful candidate for

the 7371 position would have begun work. Plaintiff Hall knew or should have known by early

2001 that MUNI had taken the final position of denying his application.

Each of the plaintiffs’ claims, therefore, accrued at least five years prior to the filing of

their complaint — well in excess of the one-year limitations period.

C. Equitable Estoppel.

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Absent equity, plaintiffs’ claims were time barred by late 2001 or early 2002.

“In civil rights suits, this court applies state tolling rules as long as they ‘are not

inconsistent with federal law.’” Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 706 n. 34 (9th Cir. 2006)

(internal citation omitted). “Equitable estoppel, also termed fraudulent concealment, halts the

statute of limitations when there is ‘active conduct by a defendant, above and beyond the

wrongdoing upon which the plaintiff’s claim is filed, to prevent the plaintiff from suing in

time.’” Id. at 706 (internal citation omitted). Under California law, the elements of equitable

estoppel are:

(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) that

party must intend that his or her conduct be acted on, or must so

act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it

was so intended; (3) the party asserting the estoppel must be

ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) the party asserting the

estoppel must reasonably rely on the conduct to his or her injury.

Honig v. San Francisco Planning Dep’t, 127 Cal. App. 4th 520, 529 (2005); see also Lantzy v.

Centex Homes, 31 Cal. 4th 363, 383 (2003).

Plaintiffs have pled insufficient facts in their amended complaint to support the

application of equitable estoppel. Plaintiffs did allege that defendants knew of the

discrimination. Plaintiffs also alleged that they were unaware of the purported discrimination

until they received notice from counsel in the Lukovsky action. They have thus adequately

alleged, at least for purposes of a motion to dismiss, the first and third factors of equitable

estoppel.

Plaintiffs, however, did not adequately allege misrepresentations by defendants upon

which plaintiffs relied, or upon which defendants intended to induce reliance, such that

plaintiffs were inhibited from investigating and bringing the instant lawsuit sooner. Plaintiffs

contend only that defendants induced them not to sue by informing plaintiffs that they had “no

right to appeal” the negative hiring decisions (Opp. 10; First Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 39). This is

not the type of misrepresentation that satisfies the test for estoppel. Defendants

misrepresentations or conduct must have “actually and reasonably induced plaintiffs to forbear

suing.” Lantzy, 31 Cal. 4th at 385 (emphasis in original). Even if plaintiffs could have

appealed the hiring determination, such an administrative appeal would not have “obviated the

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For the Northern District of California

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need for suit” on grounds of racial discrimination. Ibid; see also Vu v. Prudential Property &

Cas. Ins. Co., 26 Cal. 4th 1142, 1152 (2001) (“a denial of coverage, even if phrased as a

‘representation’ that the policy does not cover the insure’s claim, or words to that effect, offers

no grounds for estopping the insurer from raising a statute of limitations defense”).

* * *

As currently iterated, plaintiffs’ claims are time barred. Plaintiffs must allege more to

avoid dismissal of claims that accrued five years before the filing of their complaint. This order

grants plaintiffs a further opportunity to amend the complaint so as to plead sufficient

allegations of equitable estoppel. This will be plaintiffs’ final opportunity to amend. 

Defendants are, of course, entitled to move to dismiss plaintiffs’ amended complaint on

limitations grounds, as well as on the other grounds raised in their current motion to dismiss not

addressed by this order.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Finding no

further argument necessary, the hearing on this motion is hereby VACATED. Plaintiffs must file

their amended complaint within one week of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 31, 2006 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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