Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01812/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01812-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order of Dismissal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AVON DAVIES,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

KANE, et al., 

Defendant.

 

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No. C 05-01812 JW (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

On May 2, 2005, plaintiff, a California prisoner incarcerated at the Soledad

State Prison (“SSP”), filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging claims of constitutional violations by SSP prison officials. On August 21,

2006, the Court granted plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court

now reviews the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismisses the

complaint for failing to state a claim. 

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Case 5:05-cv-01812-JW Document 17 Filed 06/13/07 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order of Dismissal

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DISCUSSION

A. Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A 

Section 1915A requires a federal court to engage in a preliminary screening

of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer, or

employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Federal courts must

dismiss a case filed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 if the court, at any

time, determines the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally

construed, however. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States

was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting

under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Legal Claims

1. Involuntary Transfers

Plaintiff complains that since being moved to SSP in April 2003, in

order to be placed in a medium (level II) security environment in accordance with

his classification score, he has been repeatedly transferred from one wing to another,

once to a higher security level facility, without the state mandated classification

process. Plaintiff argues that the prison’s failure to provide him with a proper

placement consistent with his classification score without a classification hearing

violates his due process rights. Plaintiff’s claim is without merit. 

Interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources--

the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427

Case 5:05-cv-01812-JW Document 17 Filed 06/13/07 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order of Dismissal

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U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence

imposed in an unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether

or not they are authorized by state law. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484

(1995). Deprivations authorized by state law that are less severe or more closely

related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a

procedurally protected liberty interest, provided that (1) state statutes or regulations

narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation, i.e., give

the inmate a kind of right to avoid it, and (2) the liberty in question is one of “real

substance.” See id. at 477-87.

An inmate’s classification score determines inmate placement unless a

specific administrative determinant, e.g., conviction for arson or sex crimes or

disciplinary problems, is affixed, see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3375.1(a), 3375.2,

or the inmate is transferred to a sub-facility, see id. § 3375.1(b). The regulations

contain no substantive predicates or mandatory language with respect to

administrative determinants: they “may be imposed by departmental officials.” Id. §

3375.2(b) (emphasis added). It cannot be said, therefore, that an inmate, such as

plaintiff, with a specific classification score “can reasonably form an objective

expectation” that he will be placed in a facility which corresponds with his

classification score. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S.

454, 464-65 (1989) (finding no protected liberty interest in Kentucky regulations);

Myron v. Terhune, 457 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that although

California regulations pertaining to security classification contained some

mandatory language, they did not eliminate all discretion of prison officials,

mandate a particular outcome, or impose an atypical and significant hardship on the

inmate population and therefore the regulations do not give rise to a Fourteenth

Amendment liberty interest); Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir.

Case 5:05-cv-01812-JW Document 17 Filed 06/13/07 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1995) (Hawaii classification regulations that generally require particular result but

reserve for prison administrators broad discretion about placement and transfer

decisions do not create protected liberty interest). Because the statutory language

does not meet the first prong of the Sandin test, no protected liberty interest

requiring constitutional protection is created. 

Plaintiff claims that prison officials violated due process when they

transferred him without a classification hearing to a level III security housing facility

although his classification score was for a level II security facility. Plaintiff’s claim

is without merit. First of all, there is no federal right to due process prior to

placement in less amenable and more restrictive quarters, e.g. reclassification to a

higher level of security, for non-punitive, administrative reasons. See Hewitt v.

Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091-92

(9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987). In the alternative, plaintiff has

failed to establish the existence of a state created liberty interest for an inmate to be

housed in accordance with his classification score. Plaintiff’s claim does not even

meet the first prong under Sandin, for California state statutes and regulations do not

narrowly restrict the power of prison officials with regard to housing and transfers to

give rise to a protected liberty interest. See Myron, 457 F.3d at 1000. In sum,

plaintiff has no liberty interest in being housed consistently with his classification

score. Id. Having failed the first prong, it is not necessary for this Court to review

the claim under Sandin’s second prong. See id. at 477-87. Accordingly, this claim is

DISMISSED for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

 2. Unjust Punishment

Plaintiff alleges that when he protested the unlawful transfers, he was

“punished with a disciplinary writeup, a portion of [his] good-time credits toward

paroled revoked, [and] required to do extra-duty work.” Plaintiff refused to move on

Case 5:05-cv-01812-JW Document 17 Filed 06/13/07 Page 4 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order of Dismissal

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two occasions and was subject to similar punishment each time. Plaintiff claims that

these punishments were unjustified because he was protesting the involuntary and

unconstitutional transfers discussed above. Nonetheless, because plaintiff has failed

to show that a liberty interest is involved with respect to the transfers, the only other

constitutional rights implicated by the imposition of the allegedly unjust

punishments are rights to procedural protections mandated by Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539 (1974). 

Wolff established five procedural requirements. First, “written notice of the

charges must be given to the disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of

the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense.” Wolff,

418 U.S. at 564. Second, “at least a brief period of time after the notice, no less than

24 hours, should be allowed to the inmate to prepare for the appearance before the

[disciplinary committee].” Id. Third, “there must be a ‘written statement by the

factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons’ for the disciplinary action.” Id.

(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)). Fourth, “the inmate

facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be

unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Id. at 566; see also

Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1982) (right to call

witnesses is basic to fair hearing and decisions to preclude should be on case by case

analysis of potential hazards of calling particular person). Fifth, “[w]here an

illiterate inmate is involved . . . or where the complexity of the issues makes it

unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence necessary for

an adequate comprehension of the case, he should be free to seek the aid of a fellow

inmate, or . . . to have adequate substitute aid . . . from the staff or from a[n] . . .

inmate designated by the staff.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570. The Court specifically held

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order of Dismissal

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that the Due Process Clause does not require that prisons allow inmates to crossexamine their accusers, see id. at 567-68, and does not give rise to a right to counsel

in the proceedings, see id. at 569-70. 

Accordingly, this claim is DISMISSED, with leave to amend to attempt to

make allegations of procedural due process deficiencies under Wolff. 

3. Defendants

Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a claim with respect to the eight 

individual defendants named in the complaint, however. Liability may be imposed

on an individual defendant under § 1983 only if the plaintiff can show the defendant

proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. See Leer v.

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). In that regard, the plaintiff must “set

forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s” deprivation of the plaintiff’s

protected rights. Id.; see also Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1996)

(holding defendant cannot be held liable based on membership in group; requiring

showing of defendant’s individual participation in unlawful conduct). Here, all of

plaintiff’s allegations are against the “defendants” collectively; plaintiff fails to

allege what any individual defendant actually did. In order to state a cognizable

claim against any of the defendants herein, plaintiff must allege how each such

defendant personally was involved in the events plaintiff describes and, equally

important, what each such defendant personally did, or failed to do, that caused

plaintiff’s alleged injuries. Accordingly, plaintiff is directed to name proper

defendants in accordance with the above as part of plaintiff’s amendment with

respect to his claim of unjust punishment. Until they are named in plaintiff’s

amended complaint, all defendants are hereby DISMISSED from this action. 

4. “All Similarly Situated Inmates”

Plaintiff’s claims include a prayer for relief for “all other similarly

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order of Dismissal

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situation inmates” and to “prevent further... irreparable injury to their persons and

protected liberty interests.” Plaintiff's action with respect to these other inmates

must be dismissed for lack of standing. Prudential limitations of standing require

that plaintiff (1) assert his own rights, rather than rely on the rights or interests of

third parties; ( 2) allege an injury that is more than a generalized grievance; and (3)

allege an interest that is arguably within the zone of interests protected or regulated

by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. Estate of McKinney v. United

States, 71 F.3d 779, 782 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1995) . Failure to satisfy any of these

prudential requirements defeats standing. Id. The first prudential principle means

that a plaintiff does not have standing to complain about the deprivations of the

constitutional rights of others. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991);

Estate of McKinney, 71 F.3d at 782 n.4. Put simply here, plaintiff does not have

standing to complain about a threat of future harm to the other inmates. There is no

indication that there is some hindrance to these other inmates’ ability to protect their

own interests. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 411. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims with

respect to the rights of these other inmates are DISMISSED. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above: 

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

Within thirty (30) days of the date this order is filed, plaintiff may file an

AMENDED COMPLAINT correcting the deficiencies outlined above. Plaintiff

shall include in the caption both the case number of this action (No. C 05-01812 JW

(PR)), and the phrase “FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT.”

2. The amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint and may not

incorporate by reference any parts of the original complaint; plaintiff must include in

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order of Dismissal

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the amended complaint all the allegations and claims he wishes to present. If plaintiff fails

to timely file an amended complaint in conformity with this order, this case will be

dismissed.

3. It is plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a

timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), for failure to prosecute.

DATED: June 13 2007 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge 

Case 5:05-cv-01812-JW Document 17 Filed 06/13/07 Page 8 of 8