Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00679/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00679-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alberto Flores, 

Plaintiff, 

v.

Phillip Verdugo, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-06-679-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Phillip Verdugo and Phoenix Union High School

District’s (“Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 59, Defs.’ Mot. for

Summ. J.). Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff Alberto Flores’s (“Plaintiff”)

case in its entirety, asserting that Plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence to

create any genuine issues of material fact, and judgment should be entered in favor of

Defendants as a matter of law. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff opposes the Motion. (Dkt. 65, Pl.’s

Resp.) This matter being fully briefed and ripe for decision (see Dkt. 67, Defs.’ Reply),

the Court now issues this Memorandum of Decision and Order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a naturalized American citizen born in Mexico. (Dkt. 60, Defs.’

Statement of Facts (“DSOF”) ¶ 1.) Plaintiff has been employed by Defendant Phoenix

Union High School District (“the District”) as an assistant principal at all times relevant

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1

 The performance evaluation form provided four categories of performance—

Inadequate Performance, Not Applicable, Needs Improvement, and Meets

Expectations—with Meets Expectations being the highest category. (DSOF, Ex. 8.)

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to this case. (Id. at ¶ 2.) Plaintiff was hired by the District in July of 2000. (Id. at ¶ 3.) 

From July 2000 to June 2007 Plaintiff was employed as an assistant principal at Maryvale

High School. (Id. at ¶ 4.) In July 2007, the District transferred Plaintiff to an assistant

principal position at Carl Hayden High School, where he currently remains assigned. (Id.

at ¶ 5.)

In 2003, Defendant Phillip Verdugo replaced Barbara Dobbs as principal of 

Maryvale High School. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Conflicts between Verdugo and Plaintiff first arose

in September 2003, when Verdugo directed Plaintiff to stop playing basketball with

students during the lunch hour. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Beginning in November 2004, Plaintiff

drafted several letters to Verdugo and other District administrators stating Plaintiff’s

concerns regarding the circumstances of his employment and relationship with Verdugo

and requesting a transfer. (See DSOF, Ex. 9, Letters dated Nov. 8, 2004, Nov. 10, 2004,

Apr. 2005, June 3, 2005.) None of these letters indicated that Plaintiff’s national origin

caused or contributed to the difficulties between Plaintiff and Verdugo. (See id.) A

performance evaluation completed June 1, 2004 by Verdugo rated Plaintiff as “Meets

Expectations” in all ten performance areas.1

 (DSOF, Ex. 8.) A similar evaluation

completed June 1, 2005 lowered the rating to “Needs Improvement” in five of the ten

areas. (Id.)

On March 9, 2005, Plaintiff was issued a written reprimand for violating the

District’s evaluation procedures. (DSOF ¶ 11.) Plaintiff had evaluated two teachers and

his evaluations of them were identical except for the name of the teachers. (DSOF, Ex.

10.) Plaintiff grieved the reprimand to Nora Gutierrez, Assistant Superintendent of

Human Resources for the District, on the grounds that he felt it was too severe, and that

the District’s guidelines regarding progressive discipline were not followed. (DSOF, Ex.

11.) In July 2005, Plaintiff lodged a complaint of harassment against Verdugo, requested

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a transfer to another school, and requested that the two evaluations by Verdugo and the

written reprimand be removed from Plaintiff’s file. (DSOF, Exs. 13, 14.) Legal counsel

for the District completed an investigation of the complaint filed against Verdugo, and did

not believe that the complaint rose to the level of harassment. (DSOF, Ex. 16.) 

In August 2005, Plaintiff hired an outside company to call Verdugo and Gutierrez

to check his references. (DSOF ¶ 16.) Verdugo rated Flores as satisfactory in all areas,

and his tone of voice “did not lead [the company] to believe there was a problem.” 

(DSOF, Ex. 15.) On September 23, 2005, Plaintiff submitted a letter of complaint to

Assistant Superintendent Arthur Lebowitz entitled “Claim of National Origin

Discrimination and Request for Equitable Remedies.” (DSOF ¶ 18.) Plaintiff mentioned

in that letter a conversation that Verdugo allegedly had with another District employee

where Verdugo allegedly said that Plaintiff “knew nothing about his Hispanic

background, that he has been fed with a silver spoon and he acted like he was white.” 

(DSOF, Ex. 7.) Verdugo has at all times denied having made that comment. (DSOF ¶

20.) 

Plaintiff continued writing letters to District administrators, raising his concerns

with his work environment and relationship with Verdugo. (DSOF Ex. 17.) In

November 2005, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that Verdugo had created a hostile work

environment and had discriminated against Plaintiff based on Plaintiff’s national origin. 

(DSOF ¶ 23.) In March 2006, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this case. (Dkt. 1, Compl.) 

In December 2006, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Retaliation with the EEOC. (DSOF ¶ 25.) 

On January 9, 2007, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Laura Sherman and began treatment

for post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). (Dkt. 66, Pl.’s Statement of Facts (“PSOF”)

¶ 19.) In Dr. Sherman’s opinion, Verdugo’s conduct toward Plaintiff was sufficient to

cause Plaintiff’s PTSD. (PSOF ¶ 26.)

//

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Jesinger v. Nevada Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive

law determines which facts are material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986); see also Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. “Only disputes over facts that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of

summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The dispute must also be genuine, that

is, the evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Id.; see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130.

A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Summary judgment is appropriate

against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of

proof at trial.” Id. at 322; see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th

Cir. 1994). The moving party need not disprove matters on which the opponent has the

burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The party opposing summary

judgment need not produce evidence “in a form that would be admissible at trial in order

to avoid summary judgment.” Id. at 324. However, the nonmovant “may not rest upon

the mere allegations or denials of [the party's] pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986); Brinson v.

Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995).

//

//

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DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges six claims for relief: national origin discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) (Compl. ¶¶ 24-27);

retaliation in violation of Title VII (Compl. ¶¶ 28-31); national origin discrimination in

violation of the Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”) (Compl. ¶¶ 32-35); retaliation in

violation of the ACRA (Compl. ¶¶ 36-39); a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”)

against the District (Compl. ¶¶ 40-42); and a claim under § 1983 against Verdugo

(Compl. ¶¶ 43-46).

Plaintiff characterizes for the first time in his Response to Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment that his discrimination claims under Title VII and the ACRA are

claims for hostile work environment. (See Pl.’s Resp. at 3-7.) The Complaint does not

itself clearly identify the nature of the discrimination claims, as they are captioned

“Race/National Origin” and allege “discrimination and retaliation” and a “discriminatory

and hostile work environment.” (Compl. ¶¶ 25-26, ¶¶ 33-34.) In the parties’ joint

Proposed Case Management Plan, Plaintiff represents these claims as claims for

discrimination, and not hostile work environment. (See Dkt. 12 at 4-7.) Defendants

therefore treated them as claims for national origin discrimination. (Def.’s Mot. for

Summ. J. 8-12.) After Plaintiff’s Response indicated that he was asserting a claim for

hostile work environment, Defendants set forth arguments why a hostile work

environment claim fails. (Dkt. 67, Def.’s Reply 4-7.) The Court will therefore analyze

the discrimination claims as claims for hostile work environment, as Defendants do not

object to the apparent revision of the nature of the claim.

As the ACRA is modeled after federal employment discrimination laws, federal

cases interpreting and applying Title VII are instructive with regard to the ACRA. 

Timmons v. City of Tucson, 830 P.2d 871, 875 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). Plaintiff’s causes

of action under Title VII and the ACRA will therefore be subjected to the same legal

analysis. For reasons set forth below, the Court finds that no genuine issue of material

fact exists as to either of Plaintiff’s discrimination/hostile work environment claims and

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will grant summary judgment as to those claims. This finding also disposes of Plaintiff’s

§ 1983 claims. The Court further finds that Plaintiff fails to provide admissible evidence

regarding his retaliation claims, and summary judgment is therefore appropriate as to

those claims. 

A. Hostile Work Environment

Title VII guarantees employees “the right to work in an environment free from

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477

U.S. 57, 65 (1986). To make out a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show

(1) that he was subjected to verbal or physical conduct based on his race or national

origin; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was “sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work

environment.” Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003). 

To survive summary judgment on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must

show a genuine factual dispute as to: (1) whether a reasonable person would find the

workplace so objectively and subjectively hostile toward him as to create an abusive

working environment; and (2) whether the defendant failed to take adequate remedial and

disciplinary action. See McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir.

2004). The conduct must constitute discrimination because of an impermissible

consideration made illegal by Title VII. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523

U.S. 75, 81 (1998).

A plaintiff must show that the work environment was both subjectively and

objectively hostile. See McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1113. In making the objective

determination, courts look to all of the circumstances, including the frequency, severity,

and nature (i.e., physically threatening or humiliating as opposed to merely verbally

offensive) of the conduct. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642. The required severity of the

conduct varies inversely with its pervasiveness and frequency. McGinest, 360 F.3d at

1113. Finally, the objective hostility of the environment must be considered “from the

perspective of a reasonable person belonging to the racial or ethnic group of the plaintiff.” 

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Id. at 1115. “[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless

extremely serious)” do not constitute a hostile or abusive work environment. Faragher v.

City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). A working environment is abusive if “hostile conduct pollutes the victim's

workplace, making it more difficult for [him] to do [his] job, to take pride in [his] work,

and to desire to stay on in [his] position.” Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d

1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994).

Defendants seek summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s hostile work environment

claims on the grounds that, although Plaintiff’s conflicts with Verdugo may have

contributed to an environment that was contentious and uncomfortable, those conflicts are

not actionable under Title VII. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 8.) Plaintiff contends that

Defendants are “in considerable denial” regarding Verdugo’s conduct, conduct that

Plaintiff asserts met the legal standard for a hostile work environment. (Pl.’s Resp. 4-5.) 

In reply, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff has not established that his national origin had

any impact on how he was treated. (Defs.’ Reply 4-7.)

The only evidence that Verdugo’s treatment of Plaintiff stemmed from Plaintiff’s

national origin is Verdugo’s alleged statement that Plaintiff “knew nothing about his

Hispanic background, that he has been fed with a silver spoon and he acted like he was

white.” (Pl.’s Resp. 5-6; DSOF, Ex. 7.) Although Verdugo has denied making that

statement (DSOF ¶ 20), Plaintiff disputes the denial through the sworn statement of

Patricia Valle (PSOF, Ex. 6.) Ms. Valle’s statement is admissible non-hearsay, as it is

offered against a party and is that party’s own statement. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). 

Verdugo’s statements, in turn, are admissible non-hearsay because they are not offered to

prove the truth of the matter asserted. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); Haddad v. Lockheed Calif.

Corp., 720 F.2d 1454, 1456 (9th Cir. 1983) (complaints by fellow employees about

plaintiff not hearsay because offered to show complaints were received and relevant to

employer’s nondiscriminatory intent, and not to prove the truth of the complaints). 

Therefore a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Verdugo made the

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statement. However, the Court must further determine whether a genuine issue of

material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff’s work environment was objectively and

subjectively hostile.

Plaintiff also contends that more evidence of Verdugo’s “discriminatory animus”

can be found in the fact that he did not address and correct the use of discriminatory

language by a central office staff person, Joann Carrillo. (Pl.’s Resp. 6.) Plaintiff asserts

that Carrillo referred to Mexican parents and students as “mojados,” or “wet-backs.” 

(PSOF, Ex. 3, Decl. of Alberto Flores ¶¶ 14-23.) Plaintiff contends that Carrillo

continued to use discriminatory language even after Plaintiff and others brought Carrillo’s

statements to Verdugo’s attention. (Id.) Like Verdugo’s statements, Carrillo’s statements

are admissible non-hearsay, as they offered to prove the existence of a hostile work

environment, not to prove the truth of the matters asserted. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); Haddad,

720 F.2d at 1456.

National origin hostility must be so severe and pervasive as to affect Plaintiff’s

working conditions. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1112-13. In this case, the alleged statements

by Verdugo and Carrillo do not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Plaintiff’s work environment rose to the requisite level of hostility. Verdugo’s alleged

statement that Plaintiff “knew nothing about his Hispanic background, that he has been

fed with a silver spoon and he acted like he was white” is the only purported statement

made by Verdugo that would constitute discriminatory animus against Plaintiff’s national

origin. Plaintiff asserts in a conclusory fashion that Carrillo “continued to use” offensive

language after it was brought to Verdugo’s attention, but fails to specify the time or

frequency of these statements, or whether and how Plaintiff had personal knowledge of

such continued use. That Verdugo’s alleged statement was made outside of Plaintiff’s

presence is not necessarily fatal to Plaintiff’s claim, as a Title VII plaintiff need not

always be directly and personally subjected to the hostile statements. See Woods v.

Graphic Commc’ns, 925 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1991). However, indirect hostility

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only establishes a violation of Title VII if hostility “pervades [the] workplace.” Id.;

McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1117.

Considering the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the incidents

described are insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. In evaluating the

objective hostility of a work environment, the factors to be considered include the

frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening

or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with

an employee’s work performance. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1113. As to frequency,

Plaintiff’s evidence indicates that Verdugo allegedly made a single statement concerning

Plaintiff’s race and national origin; “[s]imply causing an employee offense based on an

isolated comment is not sufficient to create actionable harassment under Title VII.” Id.

(citing Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). Carrillo made at least one

statement, but Plaintiff asserts she “continued to use” offensive language without

specifying the number of times she made such statements. None of the statements can be

characterized as physically threatening or humiliating, and are mere “offensive

utterances” rather than severe discriminatory conduct. The Court notes in this regard that

Carrillo is not alleged to have held any type of supervisory position in relation to Plaintiff. 

 Finally, Plaintiff does not contend that Verdugo’s or Carrillo’s statements unreasonably

interfered with his work performance. 

Although Plaintiff contends that Flores was subjected to abusive treatment by

Verdugo (e.g., Pl.’s Resp. 5:21-22), he does not provide evidence that such abusive

treatment was on account of Plaintiff’s national origin. Conduct must constitute

discrimination because of an impermissible consideration made illegal by Title VII. 

Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. Similarly, Plaintiff’s allegations that Verdugo made racist and

sexist comments about other employees do not support his claim for national origin

discrimination, and Plaintiff is not bringing claims for race or gender discrimination. 

(Pl.’s Resp. 6:8-12.) Plaintiff therefore fails to show the existence of a genuine factual

dispute as to whether a reasonable Mexican-born Hispanic would find the workplace so

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objectively hostile as to create an abusive working environment, and summary judgment

in favor of Defendants will be granted as to his Title VII and ACRA hostile working

environment claims.

B. Retaliation

Defendants also seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for retaliation

brought under Title VII and the ACRA. The Court will first address what appears to be a

lack jurisdiction over these claims because no right to sue letter appears in the record as to

these claims. As the jurisdictional issue was not raised by the parties and is the subject of

some confusion within the Ninth Circuit, the Court will address the merits of Plaintiff’s

retaliation claims.

1. Jurisdiction

“Nothing is to be more jealously guarded by a court than its jurisdiction. 

Jurisdiction is what its power rests upon. . . . [I]t is imperative that any attempt to impose

upon federal jurisdiction by pleadings without legal justification must be vigorously

discouraged.” In re Mooney, 841 F.2d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled on other

grounds by Partington v. Gedan, 923 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1991). “To permit a federal trial

court to enter a judgment in a case . . . where the federal court could not have original

jurisdiction of the suit even in the posture it had at the time of judgment, would by the act

of the parties work a wrongful extension of federal jurisdiction and give district courts

power the Congress had denied them.” American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6,

17-18 (1951).

As jurisdictional prerequisites to bringing a civil action under Title VII, a plaintiff

must file timely charges of employment discrimination with the EEOC and receive and

act upon the EEOC’s statutory notice of right to sue. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973). Thus, receipt of a right to sue letter is a prerequisite to

maintenance of a private civil suit under Title VII. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,

415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). The precise meaning and significance of this jurisdictional

requirement is not entirely clear, as the Supreme Court held that the failure to file a timely

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EEOC charge is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII claim, but rather a statutory

requirement subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World

Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 383 (1982). Following Zipes, Ninth Circuit cases have held

that the administrative exhaustion requirement in Title VII cases is “not jurisdictional but

merely a condition precedent to suit which a defendant may waive or be estopped from

asserting.” Stache v. Int’l Union of Bricklayers, 852 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Other Ninth Circuit cases, in contrast, hold that presentment of discrimination claims to

an appropriate administrative agency is a jurisdictional requirement. Serpe v. Four-Phase

Systems, Inc., 718 F.2d 935, 936 (9th Cir. 1983) (“In a Title VII action, the subject matter

of the court’s jurisdiction extends only to those claims made before the EEOC.”).

This confusion led another Ninth Circuit panel to opine that the plaintiff’s “failure

to comply with the statutory prerequisites may or may not affect jurisdiction under Title

VII” before concluding that the jurisdictional issue need not be reached. Learned v. City

of Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1988)(emphasis added). A district court has

reconciled these holdings by dividing the exhaustion requirement into two elements: (1)

the jurisdictional non-waivable requirement of presentment of the claim (presentment);

and (2) the waivable requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies (exhaustion). 

Macy v. Dalton, 853 F. Supp. 350, 356 (E.D. Cal. 1994). In the Title VII context, the

jurisdictional presentment requirement is met when the plaintiff presents her claims to the

EEOC, even if the claims are not timely presented. Id. (citing Stache, 852 F.2d at 1232-

33; Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1985)). In cases

where the plaintiff has never presented a discrimination complaint to the appropriate

administrative authority, the district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. 

Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 708-09 (9th Cir. 2001).

The record in this case indicates that, with respect to the retaliation claims under

Title VII and the ACRA, Plaintiff did not satisfy the jurisdictional presentment

requirement prior to commencing this action in district court. The Complaint alleges that

jurisdiction is appropriate because Plaintiff filed claims with the EEOC and the Arizona

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Civil Rights Division (“ACRD”), and received right to sue letters from both. (Compl. ¶¶

10-11.) However, the charges and right to sue letters attached to the Complaint refer only

to Plaintiff’s claim for national origin discrimination, agency claim number 350-2006-

00629. (Id., Exs. 1-3.) As revealed by the parties’ statements of facts, Plaintiff filed the

Complaint on March 3, 2006, and did not file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC

until nine months later, on December 26, 2006. (DSOF ¶ 25; PSOF ¶ 25.) It therefore

appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the retaliation claims, as Plaintiff did not

satisfy the jurisdictional presentment requirement prior to initiating action in district

court. The Court will not decide the jurisdictional issue, however, because this situation

could be considered a timeliness issue that Defendants could waive or be estopped from

asserting, and Defendants have not raised this issue. See Forester v. Chertoff, 500 F.3d

920, 929 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that district court had jurisdiction to grant equitable

relief from plaintiffs’ premature filing under the ADEA). Moreover, Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s retaliation claims because no

genuine issue of material fact exists to suggest that Plaintiff suffered retaliation in

violation of Title VII. See Learned, 860 F.2d at 931 (declining to resolve jurisdictional

argument raised for first time on appeal).

2. Merits

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), Plaintiff

must show (1) involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action

taken against him, and (3) a causal link between the two. Little v. Windermere

Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 969 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff asserts that he suffered

retaliation because he had filed hostile work environment grievances. Specifically,

Plaintiff asserts that his grievances were not processed pursuant to District policy, and he

was denied a transfer to another school. (Pl.’s Resp. 8-9.) Defendant contends that

Plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case for retaliation. (Defs.’ Mot. 12-15; Defs.’

Reply 8-10.) 

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As to the processing of Plaintiff’s grievances, Plaintiff asserts that Gutierrez told

him that “unless he fired his lawyer and dismissed his civil rights lawsuit, he would not

have any resolution of his hostile work environment problems.” (Pl.’s Resp. 8:15-17.) 

By way of evidence, Plaintiff directs the Court’s attention to Plaintiff’s purported

recording of the conversation and subsequent email to Gutierrez. (See PSOF, Ex. 3, Decl.

of Alberto Flores, Exs. B, C.) Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s Declaration, to which the

purported recording is attached, in its entirety on the grounds that it is “replete with

hearsay, rumors, conclusory allegations, and subjective beliefs.” (Defs.’ Reply 2-3.) The

Court finds that the exhibits cited by Plaintiff are inadmissible on authentication and

hearsay grounds. In order to be considered by the trial court on a motion for summary

judgment, documents must be authenticated and attached to an affidavit that meets the

requirements of Rule 56(e). Canada v. Blains Helicopters, Inc., 831 F.2d 920, 925 (9th

Cir. 1987). The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent

to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in

question is what its proponent claims. Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). 

Plaintiff fails to authenticate the purported transcript of the conversation as

contemplated by Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(6), nor is the Court directed to any

other evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter is what Plaintiff claims. (See

Pl.’s Resp. 8:18.) Additionally, any statements made by Plaintiff in the course of the

conversation are inadmissible hearsay without exception. Fed. R. Evid. 801, 802. 

Therefore the Court will not consider the purported recording of the conversation between

Gutierrez and Plaintiff. The Court also notes that Plaintiff does not cite to any evidence

that the District policy regarding investigations of complaints was not followed. 

Plaintiff also contends that, after he complained, he was not transferred while

others who were not foreign born on the team were. Plaintiff fails to cite any evidence

supporting this contention. (See Pl.’s Resp. 9:10-15.) “The district judge is not required

to comb the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment.” 

Forsberg v. Pac. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988). Nor does

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Plaintiff cite any evidence to suggest a causal connection between his protected activity

and the District’s failure to transfer him. “[M]ere allegation and speculation do not

create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment.” Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll.,

83 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996). No genuine issue of material fact existing,

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted as to Plaintiff’s retaliation

claims.

C. Section 1983

Plaintiff’s remaining claims allege violation of § 1983 on the part of the District

and Verdugo. Defendants seek summary judgment on the grounds that neither Defendant

violated Plaintiff’s rights under § 1983, and that § 1983 cannot be used to enforce Title

VII rights. (Defs.’ Mot. 15-16.) Plaintiff concedes that if he cannot show intentional

discrimination by Verdugo he cannot prevail on his § 1983 claims. (Pl.’s Resp. 10:9-12.) 

“A plaintiff who fails to establish intentional discrimination for purposes of Title VII . . .

also fails to establish intentional discrimination for purposes of § 1983.” SischoNownejad v. Merced Cmty. Coll. Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 1991), superceded

on other grounds by statute as stated in Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dept., 424

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Peters v. Lieuallen, 746 F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th

Cir. 1984) (“Since [plaintiff] has failed to demonstrate intentional discrimination on the

part of the defendants, his race discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983

must also fail.”). As Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate national origin discrimination

under Title VII, and as Plaintiff has not indicated that his § 1983 claims allege violation

of any other rights, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983

claims.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff fails to establish that a reasonable Mexican-born Hispanic would have

found the workplace so objectively hostile as to create an abusive working environment,

and summary judgment in favor of Defendants will be granted as to his Title VII and

ACRA hostile working environment claims. This also disposes of Plaintiff’s § 1983

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claims. Summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims is warranted because Plaintiff

fails to provide admissible evidence of an adverse employment action or a causal

connection between his protected activity and the employment actions taken. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Dkt. 59).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment

accordingly and terminate this matter.

DATED this 7th day of August, 2008.

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