Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00346/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00346-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 08:1446 Immigration: Petition for Naturalization Hearing

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELIZABETH SEGAL, individually, and on 

behalf of herself and all others similarly 

situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

AQUENT LLC, a Massachusetts limited 

liability company, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 18cv346-LAB (JLB)

ORDER GRANTING INDIVIDUAL 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 

FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION [Dkt. 

30];

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART CORPORATE 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 

AND/OR STRIKE [Dkt. 29]

Plaintiff Elizabeth Segal sued Aquent LLC and Scout Exchange, LLC (“Corporate 

Defendants”) as well as several individual officers of those companies (“Individual 

Defendants”). The Individual Defendants now move to dismiss Segal’s complaint for lack 

of personal jurisdiction and the Corporate Defendants move to dismiss and/or strike 

portions of the complaint under FRCP 12(b)(6) and 12(f). For the reasons below, the 

Individual Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED and the Corporate Defendants’ Motion is 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

/ / /

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1. Background

On April 4, 2018, Segal filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) against the 

various Defendants, alleging a variety of wage and hour violations on behalf of herself 

and a putative class consisting of all the Corporate Defendants’ current and former 

employees who worked in California during the last four years. The Corporate 

Defendants’ business model involves hiring individuals like Segal as employees and 

assigning them out to companies looking to hire short-term workers. Dkt. 20 at ¶22. The 

companies needing labor, in turn, pay the Corporate Defendants a fee for the placement. 

Dkt. 20 at 26. While Plaintiff and her fellow employees were paid by Corporate 

Defendants and performed their work remotely, their hours were largely determined by 

the companies they were assigned to. Id. at ¶32. The central allegation of Plaintiff’s

complaint is that Corporate Defendants’ recruiters misrepresented the number of hours 

Plaintiff and her fellow employees would receive from their assigned companies, which 

led to her being unable to take on other paying work. Id. at ¶33-34. Plaintiff further claims

that she was required to “report to work” via daily teleconference, regardless of whether 

there was work or not. Id. at ¶35-41. Plaintiff alleges that these misrepresentations and 

reporting requirements violate various provisions of California law.

In addition to the Corporate Defendants, Plaintiff also sued John Chuang, Doug 

Kaplan, Cheryl King, and Ken Lazarus1, each of whom is a senior officer of either Aquent 

or Scout. Id. at ¶10-13. Segal’s SAC pleads no facts about these Individual Defendants 

other than their corporate titles, but she argues that their positions with the Corporate 

Defendants make them an “other person acting on behalf of an employer,” subjecting 

them to personal liability under Labor Code §§ 558 and 558.1. Id.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

 

1 Lazarus has been voluntarily dismissed. Dkt. 28. 

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2. Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal 

Jurisdiction

Each of the remaining Individual Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC for 

lack of personal jurisdiction, alleging that there are insufficient contacts between the 

Defendants and California to permit this Court to exercise jurisdiction over them. FRCP 

12(b)(2).

When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the burden of 

proving personal jurisdiction rests with the plaintiff. Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 

1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Personal jurisdiction over each defendant must be assessed 

individually. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784 (1984). Courts may not assume the 

truth of allegations in a pleading when those allegations are contradicted by affidavit.

Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 

1977).

In considering personal jurisdiction in cases where no federal statute governing 

personal jurisdiction applies, the Court applies the law of the state in which the district 

court is located. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 

2004). California’s long-arm statute is coextensive with federal due process, so 

jurisdictional analysis for federal due process controls. Id. at 801. Personal jurisdiction 

is only proper where the defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that 

exercise of jurisdiction “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 

Personal jurisdiction can be either general or specific. Goodyear Dunlop Tires 

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). General personal jurisdiction is 

present where a defendant’s ties to a state are so “continuous and systematic” as to 

render the defendant essentially at home in the forum state. International Shoe, 326 U.S. 

at 317. A defendant who is an individual is essentially at home in the state in which the 

defendant is domiciled. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924. Domicile requires a physical 

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presence and an intent to stay in the state indefinitely. Rice v. Thomas, 64 Fed.Appx. 

628, 628-29 (9th Cir. 2003).

Specific personal jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit is analyzed through a three-prong 

test. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. The first prong requires that the defendant have 

purposefully directed his activities at the forum state (in tort cases) or purposefully availed 

himself of the benefits of the forum state (in contract cases). Id. The second prong 

requires that the claim arise out of the defendant’s forum-related activity. Id. The third 

prong requires that the exercise of personal jurisdiction be reasonable. Id. The first prong 

must follow an effects test, under which the defendant must commit an intentional act, the 

act must be expressly aimed at the forum state, and the act must cause harm that the 

defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state. Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 

303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002). The second prong must satisfy a but-for causation 

test. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000).

A defendant’s status as an employee does not shield them from liability for 

intentionally tortious acts. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790. However, mere association with a 

corporation that causes injury is not sufficient to permit personal jurisdiction without a 

further reason for the court to disregard the corporate form. Davis v. Metro Productions, 

Inc., 885 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1989). 

a. John Chuang

John Chuang is the Chairman of Aquent. Dkt. 30-2. He states in an affidavit that 

he is a citizen and resident of Massachusetts. Id. He does not maintain a residence in 

California, does not own any property in California, and does not intend to reside in 

California. Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that general personal jurisdiction is proper over Chuang because 

Aquent LLC does business in California. Even if “doing business” were the standard for 

jurisdiction over corporate entities (it is not), Aquent’s activity does not justify personal 

jurisdiction over its employees. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 

(1984) (“[J]urisdiction over an employee does not automatically follow from jurisdiction 

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over the corporation which employs him . . . .”). Chuang stated in affidavit that he was 

not involved with the decisions leading to the alleged tort, and his relationship to the 

company is not in itself sufficient to permit jurisdiction. Plaintiff offered no evidence to 

contradict Chuang’s affidavit, and the allegations in the complaint cannot be taken as true 

because they are contradicted by Chuang’s affidavit. Data Disc, Inc, 557 F.2d at 1284. 

General personal jurisdiction over Chuang is therefore improper because he is not 

domiciled in California. Aquent’s general business activity does not affect the analysis.

Specific personal jurisdiction over Chuag is also inappropriate. Chuang’s only 

contacts with California are a small number of visits for vacations or work-related 

purposes. Dkt. 30-2. But there is no evidence these visits were a but-for cause of the 

harms Segal alleges. Bancroft & Masters, Inc., 223 F.3d at 1088. This Court therefore 

has no specific personal jurisdiction over Chuang. 

For these reasons, this Court has neither general personal jurisdiction nor specific 

personal jurisdiction over Chuang. 

b. Douglas Kaplan

Douglas Kalpan is the CEO of Aquent. Dkt. 30-3. Kaplan states in an affidavit that 

he is a resident and citizen of Massachusetts. Id. Like Chuang, he states that he does 

not maintain a residence in California, does not own any property in California, and does 

not intend to reside in California. Id. 

Plaintiff’s arguments as to why this Court should exercise jurisdiction over Kaplan 

are identical to her arguments regarding Chuang, and they fail for the same reasons. 

Although Kaplan visited California more often than Chuang, his visits likewise do not 

constitute a but-for cause of Segal’s alleged harms. As stated in his affidavit, he did not 

supervise California employees, oversee California operations, or develop any of the 

policies at issue. Id. Kaplan’s contacts with the state of California thus do not give rise 

to jurisdiction over him. 

/ / /

/ / /

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c. Cheryl King

Cheryl King is the President of Aquent Staffing and Studios, a division of Aquent. 

Dkt. 30-4. King states in affidavit that she is a citizen and resident of the state of 

Washington. Id. Although she owns personal property in California, she has no intent to 

reside there. Id. Plaintiff has made no allegation that King is domiciled in California, nor 

has Plaintiff produced any evidence of such. There is no evidence or even allegation of 

the necessary intent to reside in California permanently.

For the reasons set out with respect to Chuang and Kaplan, this Court finds that 

exercising jurisdiction over King would be improper. 

d. Labor Code § 558.1

Segal argues that even if the Court could not ordinarily exercise personal 

jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants, California Labor Code § 558.1 provides

jurisdiction. That statute provides that “[a]ny . . . other person acting on behalf of an 

employer, who violates, or causes to be violated, [certain provisions of the California 

Labor Code] may be held liable as the employer for such violation.” Cal. Labor Code 

§ 558.1(a) (emphasis added). Segal claims that the Individual Defendants are “other 

persons” acting on behalf of the Corporate Defendants and thus may be personally liable

under California law.

Segal’s argument, however, confuses liability with jurisdiction. It may well be that 

she could hold the Individual Defendants liable under § 558.1. In order to do so, though, 

the Court must first have jurisdiction over them. See Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 

1365 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Liability and jurisdiction are independent. Liability depends on the 

relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants and between the individual 

defendants; jurisdiction depends only upon each defendant's relationship with the 

forum.”). Section 558.1 does not itself create jurisdiction. As the Individual Defendants 

point out, a recent case from this District involved a similar claim of individual liability 

under § 558.1. Overholt v. Airista Flow Inc., 2018 WL 355231, at *10–11 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 

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10, 2018). Rather than assume the statute created jurisdiction, the court there applied 

traditional personal jurisdiction analysis and found that jurisdiction was lacking. 

Plaintiff relies on Jamshid-Negad v. Kessler, 15 Cal.App.4th 1704 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 

1993) to support her argument that § 558.1 provides a jurisdictional hook. In that case, 

the court found that personal jurisdiction could be exercised over Connecticut parents 

who sent their minor son to a public university in California, where he was alleged to have 

committed a tort against the Plaintiffs. Id. However, the court did not rely on the relevant 

liability statute2for jurisdiction; it found that defendants purposefully availed themselves 

of the forum state. Id. at 1709-10. In other words, the court relied on traditional personal 

jurisdiction analysis.

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claim that § 558.1 provides an independent basis for 

personal jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants fails. There being no basis for this 

Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants, their Motion to 

Dismiss is granted.

3. Corporate Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike

The Corporate Defendants move to dismiss or strike various portions of Plaintiff’s 

complaint. Dkt. 29. The Court grants in part and denies in part their motion.

a. Reporting Time Pay Subclass

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s “Reporting Time Pay” subclass as overly 

broad. A Rule 12 motion, however, is not the proper vehicle for this type of challenge. 

Shaw v. Experian Solutions, Inc., 49 F.Supp.3d 702, 709 (S.D. Cal. 2012). Instead, a 

Rule 23 motion should be used to challenge class allegations. Connelly v. Hilton Grant 

Vacations Co., LLC, 2012 WL 2129364, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 2012). Defendants’ motion to 

strike with respect to the subclass is denied.

/ / /

/ / /

 

2 Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.1

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b. Reporting Time Pay Claim

Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims related to “Reporting Time Pay” fail 

as a matter of law and must be dismissed. Reporting time pay is governed by Cal. Code 

Regs., tit. 8, § 11040(5)(A), which provides that an employee is entitled to up to half their 

daily pay when that employee is “required to report for work and does report, but is not 

put to work.” The issue in this case is whether an employee “reports for work” within the 

meaning of the statute when the employee is required to call by telephone to see if there 

is work available. This is a question of first impression for this Court, but it has been 

considered by the Central District of California in Casas v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, LLC, 

2014 WL 12644922, and the Eastern District of California in Bernal v. Zumiez, 2017 WL 

3585230. Both cases contain similar facts to the instant case.

In Casas, the defendant-employer scheduled the plaintiff-employees for two 

separate types of shifts: regular work shifts, where the employees would report to work in 

the traditional fashion, and “call-in” shifts, where the plaintiffs would have to call two hours 

in advance of the shift and then, if asked, report to work. Casas, 2017 WL 358230, at *1.

The defendant instructed plaintiffs to treat call-in shifts the same as regular work shifts 

and to not schedule any personal activities within those times. Id. The Casas court 

considered the plain meaning of the wage order and determined that “report for work” 

required physical presence. Id. at *3 (considering various dictionary definitions which 

impute a physical aspect). The Casas court further considered legislative history and 

reasoned that previous iterations of the wage order, which referred to reporting for work 

in terms of transporting oneself to the location, as well as the consistency in language 

throughout the various iterations of the wage order further support the determination that 

“report for work” requires physical presence. Id. at *4-5.

In Bernal, plaintiff-employees were required to call in an hour before regularly 

scheduled shifts to check if work would be available for them. Bernal, 2017 WL 3585230, 

at *1. These calls usually took five to ten minutes. Id. The Bernal court considered the 

plain language and concluded that reading a physical requirement into “report for work” 

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added an extraneous term to the definition, ultimately refusing to accept that 

interpretation. Turning to legislative history, the court held that an interpretation requiring 

a physical presence would defeat the purpose of protecting workers’ general welfare, 

allowing employers to set up a phone-based system that would evade any reporting time 

liability. Id. at *4. 

In the instant case, Segal alleges that Defendants’ recruiters promised her 40 

hours of work per week. But she was required to call ahead each day and, when she did,

was often told there was no work available for her. She alleges that the Defendants

required her to be available at those times regardless of whether work was available, thus

precluding her from taking on other work. In her view, these calls constituted “report[ing] 

for work” that triggered the mandatory half-day pay under California law. 

The Court is persuaded by the reasoning of the Bernal court: the statutory 

definition of “report for work” does not necessarily require a physical presence. There is 

nothing in the plain language of the statute that requires “reporting” be physical in nature. 

The Court declines to read into the statute an additional requirement not placed there by 

the legislature, especially in light of the general policy that wage and hour statutes should 

be construed liberally to promote worker protection. See Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. 

Superior Court, 53 Cal.4th 1004,1026-27 (2012). As the Bernal court points out: 

“The incentives that led employers to engage in behavior that caused the IWC to 

create the wage orders in the first place still exist: creating a surplus pool of 

contingent workers ready to begin work at a moment’s notice, only to notify some 

number of them that their services would not be required, provides an enormous 

benefit to employers, while forcing workers to prepare a set of contingency plans 

depending on whether they are given a shift to work or not.” 

Bernal, 2017 WL 3585230, at *4. Segal’s allegations, which must be accepted as true at 

this stage, implicate these same concerns. She claims that she was financially harmed 

because the Defendants overrepresented the number of hours she would receive, 

required her to forego any other work on her assigned days, and then failed to give her 

hours once she called in to report for work each day. As pled, the Court finds that Segal 

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“reported for work” within the meaning of the statute. Defendants’ motion to dismiss with 

respect to these claims is denied.3

c. Labor Code §§ 216, 218, 225.5, 1182.12, 1197, and 1197.1

Defendants next move to strike or dismiss the portions of Segal’s First Cause of 

Action predicated on Labor Code §§ 216, 218, 225.5, 1182.12, 1197, and 1197.1. 

Defendants argue that none of these code sections include a private right of action. 

Plaintiff concedes this point, but notes that, even if there is no private right of action, she 

may recover civil penalties for violation of these statutes under her PAGA claim. 

Defendants do not deny that she may assert violations of these statutes as part of her 

PAGA claim, which is her Fifth Cause of Action. Instead, they challenge whether she 

may do so individually and on behalf of the class in her First Cause of Action. The Court 

agrees with the Defendants that these statutes do not provide a private right of action and 

cannot support stand-alone claims. The portions of her First Cause of Action predicated 

on these provisions therefore fail as a matter of law and are dismissed. This does not 

affect whether Segal may assert violations of these statutes as part of her PAGA claim. 

d. Labor Code §§ 201 and 202

Defendants move to strike or dismiss portions of Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action

for lack of standing. Labor Code § 201 concerns terminated employees and § 202 

concerns quitting employees. Plaintiff was terminated from her employment, so 

Defendants argue she may not bring a claim under § 202 on behalf of quitting employees. 

Plaintiff argues that so long as an employee is affected by at least one labor code violation 

(here, § 201), they may pursue penalties on behalf of the state for unrelated violations by 

the same employer (here, § 202) under the PAGA statute. But, again, whether Segal can 

pursue a PAGA claim for violation of a statute is distinct from whether she can pursue an 

individual or class claim under that same statute. While she may be able to allege a 

 

3 The Court is aware that the Ninth Circuit is currently considering an appeal on this very 

issue. Herrera v. Zumiez, Inc., Case No. 18-15135. The parties should keep the Court 

apprised of developments in that case. 

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violation of § 202 as part of her PAGA claim—she does not currently—she has no 

standing to sue under that statute individually or on behalf of the putative class. See In 

re Adobe Sys. Privacy Lit., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1211 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Warth v. 

Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975)) (“In a class action, named plaintiffs representing a class 

‘must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been 

suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they 

purport to represent.’”). Her Second Cause of Action is therefore dismissed to the extent 

it is predicated on § 202. 

e. Labor Code § 226(a)(8)

Defendants move to strike or dismiss portions of Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action 

alleging a failure to provide accurate wage statements. Under Labor Code § 226(a)(8), 

wage statements must include “the name and address of the legal entity that is the 

employer.” Segal’s Complaint attaches a copy of her wage statement, which lists the 

following information:

Aquent LLC

Aquent, Vitamin T, Scout

501 Boylston Street, 3rd Floor

Boston, MA 02116

Dkt. 20 at ¶63, Ex. 1. Segal argues that because Aquent, Vitamin T, and Scout are not 

legal entities, their inclusion on the paycheck violates § 226(a)(8). 

Defendants note that Aquent, Vitamin T, and Scout are Aquent LLC’s trade names 

or “dba’s”, and that courts routinely dismiss claims like Plaintiff’s that are based on the 

inclusion of trade names on wage statements. See, e.g., Delgado v. New Albertson's, 

Inc., 2009 WL 10670628, at *4 (C.D. Cal.) (granting defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment where the wage statement listed the employer’s name as “Albertson’s, a 

SUPERVALU Company” rather than the official legal entity, “American Stores Company, 

LLC.”). Here, Defendants argue, the wage statements are even more consistent with the 

statutory requirements because the wage statements list both the actual entity name and

the trade names. The Court agrees. Aquent LLC was Plaintiff’s employer, and the 

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inclusion of additional trade names on her pay check does not give rise to a cause of 

action under § 226(a)(8). The portion of Segal’s Third Cause of Action based on a 

violation of § 226(a)(8) is therefore dismissed.

f. PAGA Claim

Defendants move to strike portions of Plaintiff’s PAGA claim on various grounds. 

A Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike may be granted to remove language in a pleading that is, as 

relevant here, either “redundant,” “immaterial,” or “impertinent.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. 

Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2010). Language is “redundant” when it 

appears elsewhere in the complaint; is “immaterial” when it has no important relationship 

to the claim for relief; is “impertinent” when it does not pertain, and is not necessary, to 

the issues in question. Id. Motions to strike are generally disfavored. Murphy v. 

Fullbright, 2012 WL 4754730 (S.D. Cal. 2012). However, where the motion may have the 

effect of making the trial of the action less complicated, the motion to strike may be 

granted. State of Cal. ex rel. State Lands Commission v. U.S., 512 F.Supp. 36 (N.D. Cal. 

1981). A motion to strike references to a statute may be granted where no violation of 

the statute is alleged. Conwright v. City of Oakland, 2011 WL 855824 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 

The Court, at its discretion, may also treat a motion to strike as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss. See Kelley v. Corrections Corp. of America, 750 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1146 (E.D. 

Cal. 2010). 

Defendants argue that various statutory references in Plaintiff’s Complaint should 

be stricken because she makes no effort to allege a violation. Specifically, Defendants 

point to Labor Code §§ 246, 246.5, 247, 247.5, 248.5, 512, 1198, 2810.3, and 2810.5. 

Although Plaintiff’s opposition demonstrates that at least some of these statutory 

references are supported by her Complaint, which is all that’s required at this stage of the 

case, the Court strikes: (1) her references to §§ 246, 247, and 2810.5, because notice 

and posting requirements are not bases for a PAGA action4; (2) her references to 

 

4 See Titus v. McLane Foodservice, Inc., 2016 WL 4797497, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2016)

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§§ 246.5, 247.5, and 249.5, because injunctive relief, not PAGA penalties, is the only 

relief available for sick leave claims5; and (3) her reference to § 512, which she admits 

was included by mistake. Defendants’ motion to strike as to the other provisions is 

denied. 

Relatedly, Defendants argue that other statutory references should be stricken 

because Plaintiff’s Complaint has not adequately alleged a violation. Specifically, 

Defendants point to her claims under §§ 204, 204(b), 210, 225.5, 1174, 1174.5, 1198.5, 

and 2804. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has pled some basis for each of these 

claims, which is all that’s required to survive a Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike. Defendants’ 

motion is denied as to these claims. 

Defendants further move to strike references to statutes that “do not create any 

employer obligation”—§§ 218, 218.5—or that are exclusively criminal—§ 216. However,

Defendant fails to show that a statute with criminal penalties like § 216 cannot also be 

basis for a PAGA claim. Nor do Defendants show that Plaintiff’s inclusion of §§ 218 and 

218.5, the latter of which provides for attorneys’ fees in wage claims, is impermissible. 

Defendants’ motion is denied as to these claims.

Defendants final request related to the PAGA claim is to strike references to 

various PAGA penalties under the reasoning that each of these provisions has a specific 

penalty, and § 2699(f) only provides penalties for code sections without a pre-existing 

penalty. However, FRCP 12(f) does not authorize courts to strike damages claims on 

grounds that they are precluded as a matter of law, which is in effect what Defendants 

are asking this Court to do. Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 975. Defendants’ motion is denied 

as to these claims.

/ / /

/ / /

 

5 See Stearne v. Heartland Payment Systems LLC, 2018 WL 746492, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. 

2018)

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g. California Unfair Competition Law Claim

Defendants move to strike in part and dismiss in part Plaintiff’s claim under 

California Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The UCL allows only for restitution and 

injunctive relief, not for penalties. Montecino v. Spherion Corp, 427 F.Supp.2d 965 (C.D. 

Cal. 2006). Unpaid wages qualify as restitution rather than penalties. Id. References to 

recovery that does not meet the requirements of the UCL can be struck from the 

complaint. Id. Former employees lack standing to bring claims for injunctive relief. Walsh 

v. Nevada Dept. of Human Resources, 471 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2006).

Defendants’ argument is, essentially, that Plaintiff’s UCL claims are predicated on 

her other statutory claims. Thus, if the Court determines that a predicate statutory claim 

should be stricken, the Court must also strike the corresponding UCL claims. The Court 

agrees. To the extent the Court has stricken or dismissed a predicate statutory claim, the 

corresponding UCL claim is also stricken or dismissed. 

Defendant is correct in that references to recovery under codes that do not provide 

for restitution or injunctive relief can be stricken, as they were by the Montecino court. 

Plaintiff alleges no penalties under the UCL, asking instead for “restitution,” and thus there 

is no reference to damages to which the motion to strike can apply. Plaintiff lacks standing 

to seek injunctive relief as a former employee. As such, Plaintiff’s UCL claim is dismissed 

with respect to any penalties or injunctive relief.

4. Disposition

For the foregoing reasons: (1) the Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack 

of jurisdiction is GRANTED and those defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

from the case; and (2) the Corporate Defendants’ motion to dismiss and/or strike is 

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as set forth above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 24, 2018

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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