Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_14-cv-00595/USCOURTS-alnd-4_14-cv-00595-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:2601 Family and Medical Leave Act (1993)

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

SUSAN CASEY, )

)

Plaintiff )

)

vs. ) Case No. 4:14-cv-00595-HGD

)

CITY OF GLENCOE, ALABAMA, )

)

Defendant )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The above-entitled civil action is before the court on the Motion for Summary

Judgment filed by defendant, City of Glencoe, Alabama. (Doc. 27). The parties have

consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 38). Plaintiff has filed a response to the motion for summary

judgment (Doc. 33), and defendant has filed a reply (Doc. 36). The matter is now

ready for disposition. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Susan Casey, filed the complaint in this action on April 1, 2014,

against the City of Glencoe, Alabama, and Charles Gilchrist. (Doc. 1). She asserts

claims of interference with her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)

Page 1 of 17

FILED

 2016 Mar-31 PM 01:23

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:14-cv-00595-HGD Document 39 Filed 03/31/16 Page 1 of 17
and retaliation for assertion of her FMLA rights. She also asserts a separate state law

claim for mental and emotional distress, based on the alleged failure of the City of

Glencoe to “permit[ ] her federally protected right under FMLA” and the fact thatshe

“was informed that she would not be re-appointed to her position the day after she

returned to work after hospitalization and was recuperating from a serious medical

condition.” (Id. at ¶ 42). Defendant Gilchrist filed a Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings (Doc. 16). The undersigned entered a report and recommendation,

recommending that the motion be granted and that Gilchrist be dismissed with

prejudice as a defendant. (Doc. 25). The report and recommendation was adopted

and accepted by the district court, without objection. (Doc. 26). 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

This matter is considered by the court pursuant to the provisions of Rule 56,

Fed.R.Civ.P. Summary judgment “shall [be granted] if the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247,

106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Thus, summary judgment is

appropriate where the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 332, 106

Page 2 of 17

Case 4:14-cv-00595-HGD Document 39 Filed 03/31/16 Page 2 of 17
S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The substantive law governing the action

determines whether an element is essential. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct.

at 2510. A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility

of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, identifying those portions

of the pleading, depositions, answersto interrogatories, and admissions on file, if any,

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; see Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667,

669 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933, 111 S.Ct. 2056, 114 L.Ed.2d 461

(1991).

This circuit clearly holds that summary judgment should be entered when the

moving party has sustained its burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact when all the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1983); see also,

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89

L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the

plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury

could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at

2512. The evidence of the non-movant isto be believed and all justifiable inferences

are to be drawn in his or her favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2514, citing Adickes v. S.

Page 3 of 17

Case 4:14-cv-00595-HGD Document 39 Filed 03/31/16 Page 3 of 17
H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608-09, 26 L.Ed.2d 142

(1970). However, “[a] court need not permit a case to go to a jury when the

inferences that are drawn from the evidence and upon which the non-movant relies

are ‘implausible.’” Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir.

1996) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 593, 106 S.Ct. at 1359. It is,

therefore, under this standard that the court must determine whether the plaintiff can

meet her burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence as to each material

element of her claim sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find in her favor. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The court finds the following undisputed facts. Where any facts are disputed,

they are viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. 

The City of Glencoe is a municipal corporation that had more than 4000 and

less than 6000 inhabitants at all times relevant to this action. (Doc. 28-2: Blackerby

Aff., at ¶¶ 6-7 and Ex. 1). The City of Glencoe is recognized as a separate

governmental organization by the U.S. Census Bureau. (Id. at ¶ 7 and Ex.1). The

City of Glencoe does not have a civil service board. (Id. at ¶ 10). At all relevant

times, the City of Glencoe has had a proper FMLA notice from the U.S. Government

Printing Office (WH Publication 1420, entitled “Your Rights under the Family and

Medical Leave Act of 1993”) prominently posted at city hall, detailing the Act’s

Page 4 of 17

Case 4:14-cv-00595-HGD Document 39 Filed 03/31/16 Page 4 of 17
provisions (including enforcement) and where to obtain additional information. (Id.

at ¶ 8 and Ex. 2). The Personnel Handbook of the City of Glencoe, adopted in 2009,

includes FMLA eligibility, notice, and certification provisions. (Id. at ¶ 9). Plaintiff

was provided with a copy of the Personnel Handbook. The Personnel Handbook

specifically states that “The Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 requires

cities with fifty (50) or more employees to offer up to twelve (12) weeks of unpaid,

job-protected leave to eligible employees for certain family and medical reasons.” 

(Doc. 33-1 at 26). The Personnel Handbook also states that an employee must

provide the mayor with 30 days’ written notice of the need for foreseeable or

predictable need for FMLA leave, or if emergency circumstances prevent 30 days’

written notice, the employee must notify the mayor as soon as possible. (Id. at 28). 

In addition, the Personnel Handbook states that medical certification, by a qualified

health care provider, of the need for FMLA leave for medical reasons must be

provided, within 15 calendar days of the employee’s departure, unless it is not

practicable to do so despite the employee’s good faith efforts. However, if notice is

provided more than 15 days after, the employee must provide a reasonable

explanation for the delay, along with the certification. (Id. at 29).

At all relevant times, Charles Gilchrist served as Mayor of the City of Glencoe,

Alabama. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 8-9; Doc. 6, Gilchrist Answer, at ¶¶ 4, 8; Doc. 7, Glencoe

Page 5 of 17

Case 4:14-cv-00595-HGD Document 39 Filed 03/31/16 Page 5 of 17
Answer, at ¶¶ 4, 8). Plaintiff was initially elected by the Glencoe City Council to

serve as city clerk for a four-year term in 2004. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 9, 25; Doc. 6 at ¶ 4;

Doc. 7 at ¶ 4; Doc. 28-1, Casey Depo., at 64). Plaintiff was elected to a second

four-year term as city clerk in 2008. (Doc. 28-1, Casey Depo., at 64). Plaintiff’s

second term as city clerk expired in November 2012. (Id.). Plaintiff retained her

position as city clerk with full pay and full benefits until the expiration of her second

term, when the Glencoe City Council voted to elect Tashia Blackerby as city clerk.

(Doc. 28-2, Blackerby Aff., at ¶ 3). 

As city clerk, plaintiff worked at Glencoe City Hall. (Doc. 28-1, Casey Depo.,

at 36). During plaintiff’s tenure as city clerk, the City of Glencoe employed between

30 and 40 employees. (Id. at 35). However, at no time relevant to this action did the

City of Glencoe have as many as 50 employees working at Glencoe City Hall or

within 75 miles of Glencoe City Hall. (Doc. 28-2, Blackerby Aff., at ¶ 5).1

 

While serving as city clerk, plaintiff suffered “illness, family bereavement and

repeated hospitalizations.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 23). She was first hospitalized in 2009.

(Doc. 28-1, Casey Depo. at 66-67). She was admitted to UAB Hospital in 2011. (Id.

at 70-71). She underwent three surgical proceduresin July 2012 and was absent from

1 Ms. Blackerby attests to this evidence as city clerk for the City of Glencoe, as custodian of

records for the City of Glencoe, and based upon her review of payroll records for the City of

Glencoe. (Doc. 28-2, Blackerby Aff., at ¶¶ 2, 5).

Page 6 of 17

Case 4:14-cv-00595-HGD Document 39 Filed 03/31/16 Page 6 of 17
work. (Id. at 85-87). Plaintiff testified that she has migraine headaches, depression

and anxiety. (Id. at 108). Her father passed away on September 17, 2012. (Id. at

124). However, plaintiff never submitted either a written notice of the need to be

absent for FMLA purposes or medical certification of the need for FMLA leave. (Id.

at 65). Plaintiff has been aware of the FMLA since at least 2008. (Id. at 100-02). 

However, plaintiff testified that she discussed the need to take some time off for

medicalreasons with Gilchrist after she returned to work and at other timesthereafter. 

(Id. at 79, 82, 85, 88-91, 93, 97, 113, 118-20, 132). 

Plaintiff received a performance evaluation dated February 16, 2009, in which

she received a score of 80 out of 100, indicating she met standards. It was

recommended that plaintiff work on her accuracy, co-worker relations and computer

skills, and she received a raise. (Doc. 33-2 at 5-6). A performance evaluation dated

February 11, 2011, showsthat plaintiff exceeded standards, and she was given a raise. 

However, Gilchrist stated he was concerned about plaintiff’s health but that he had

no complaints about her job performance. (Doc. 33-2 at 7-8). At plaintiff’s next

performance evaluation, dated February 8, 2012, Gilchrist gave her a score of 70 out

of 100, indicating she met standards, and gave her a raise. The evaluation decreased

her scores in quality and quantity of her work as compared to previous evaluations,

and Gilchrist noted plaintiff was “late alots” and “out a good bit” and he sometimes

Page 7 of 17

Case 4:14-cv-00595-HGD Document 39 Filed 03/31/16 Page 7 of 17
wondered if her mind was on doing a good job. He recommended that plaintiff arrive

for work on time, take less time away from the job, let Gilchrist know when she was

going to be off or leave early, and make her job a priority. (Doc. 33-2 at 9-10).

Plaintiff suffered a stroke on or about December 27, 2011. (Doc. 28-1, Casey

Depo., at 74). She was hospitalized two or three days as a result of the stroke. (Id.

at 76). She returned to work the same week. (Id. at 78). Plaintiff never specifically

requested that the hospitalization be treated as FMLA leave. (See Doc. 1 at ¶ 23;

Doc. 28-1, Casey Depo., at 95-96,100-02). When plaintiff returned to work in late

December 2011, she requested two weeks off (from late December 2011 into

mid-January 2012). (Doc. 28-1, Casey Depo., at 89). Specifically, she requested

vacation leave, not FMLA leave. (Id. at 90). She advised Mayor Gilchrist that she

wanted the vacation leave “to recover and try to gather myself.” (Id. at 91). Plaintiff

was advised by Mayor Gilchrist that the City of Glencoe could not handle plaintiff

taking extended leave at that time because the assistant city clerk was already taking

leave during that time frame. (Id.).

In mid-January 2012, plaintiff requested “to take a week off” for “health

related” reasons. (Id. at 93). Plaintiff was advised that she could not take extended

leave due to the assistant city clerk already being out on leave. (Id. at 93-94). 

Plaintiff claims FMLA interference because she was neither granted vacation leave

Page 8 of 17

Case 4:14-cv-00595-HGD Document 39 Filed 03/31/16 Page 8 of 17
nor offered FMLA leave in December 2011 and January 2012. (Id. at 136-37). For

some time following her stroke, plaintiff describes herself as “an emotional wreck.” 

(Id. at 80-81). After a doctor’s appointment at some time in January 2012, plaintiff

was able to resume her normal work duties. (Id. at 81, 83).

On or about January 24, 2012, plaintiff received a negative job performance

notice for failing to pay a city credit card bill in a timely fashion. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 15;

Doc. 29-1, Notice of Corrective Action). The bill was due by December 28, 2011, the

day after plaintiff had a stroke. (Doc. 29-1). Plaintiff contends that the tardy bill

payment was due to her hospitalization in December 2011. “[G]etting written up for

not doing something while you’re in the hospital” is the basis for plaintiff’s FMLA

retaliation claim. (Doc. 28-1, Casey Depo., at 140). She also contends she was not

reappointed to the city clerk position in retaliation for her attempts to take FMLA

leave. (Doc. 33, Plaintiff’s Brief, at 15-17). 

After returning to work after her stroke, plaintiff missed single days of work

from time to time for doctor appointments or when feeling bad. (Doc. 28-1, Casey

Depo., at 71). Plaintiff would take a day off when she “was tired and needed time

off.” (Id. at 81-82). Her doctors did not recommend extended medical treatment of

any kind. (Id. at 71). There was no mention of inpatient care (after being discharged

from the hospital in December 2011 as stated above). (Id. at 72-73). Her doctors

Page 9 of 17

Case 4:14-cv-00595-HGD Document 39 Filed 03/31/16 Page 9 of 17
recommended that she go about her normal activities, including work, “at a slower

pace.” (Id. at 72). Plaintiff recalls no doctor providing her with a work excuse or

prescribing time off from work. (Id. at 73). The assistant city clerk returned from her

extended leave on January 23, 2012. (Doc. 28-2, Blackerby Aff., at ¶ 11). 

After the assistant city clerk returned to work, plaintiff was never again denied

any requested leave. (Doc. 28-1, Casey Depo., at 95). Plaintiff’ssalary was never cut

due to work absences of any kind. Plaintiff received her full salary and benefits

during her entire tenure as city clerk. All of her leave was paid leave. (Id. at 95; Doc.

28-2, Blackerby Aff., at ¶ 3). 

Elections occurred on August 12, 2012, and Gilchrist was up for re-election as

mayor. Gilchrist’s opponent in the election was Chris Hare, who had a family

connection to plaintiff. Plaintiff’s family supported Hare in the election. Plaintiff

testified that Gilchrist “knew I had a family interest in [Hare] being elected as

mayor.” Gilchrist was re-elected as mayor. (Doc. 28-1, Casey Depo., at 149-51). 

However, plaintiff denies she ever campaigned against Gilchrist or was asked about

the election. (Id. at 149-51). She testified that she was told by her brother, David

Gorham, and Tim Langdale that Gilchrist said she had been let go because she

campaigned against Gilchrist. (Id. at 149-53). Mr. Gorham has submitted an

Page 10 of 17

Case 4:14-cv-00595-HGD Document 39 Filed 03/31/16 Page 10 of 17
affidavit in which he atteststhat he was told by Gilchrist that Gilchrist let plaintiff go

because plaintiff and Gorham had campaigned against him, and Gilchrist did what he

considered right for the City of Glencoe. (Doc. 33-2 at 14-15, Gorham Aff.).

On or about October 1, 2012, plaintiff was called to a meeting with Mayor

Gilchrist and Councilman Danny Wagnon. (Doc. 28-1, Casey Depo., at 125-26). In

the meeting, Gilchrist told plaintiff that she “was too emotional,” that Gilchrist “was

recommending that I [plaintiff] take my things and take administrative leave until the

council would reappoint a city clerk or make all their appointments,” and that

Gilchrist “was not going to recommend that I [plaintiff] be reappointed because I

[plaintiff] was too emotional”

2

and because of “the campaigning against me

[Gilchrist].” (Id. at 125). The term “fired” was never used; the term “terminated”

was never used; and plaintiff was advised that she could continue to do her job if she

could do so without being overcome by her emotions. (Id. at 127-28). Following the

conversation on October 1, 2012, plaintiff took her personal belongings, left city hall,

and never returned. (Id. at 142). From October 1, 2012, until the end of her term as

city clerk, plaintiff did not work, but received full pay and benefits. (Id. at 142-43). 

2 Plaintiff’s father had recently passed away, and she was “struggling” with her duties as city

clerk. (Doc. 28-1, Casey Depo., at 128). 

Page 11 of 17

Case 4:14-cv-00595-HGD Document 39 Filed 03/31/16 Page 11 of 17
On November 5, 2012, the Glencoe City Council voted to elect Tashia

Blackerby as city clerk. (Doc. 28-2, Blackerby Aff., at ¶ 3). According to the

affidavits of JohnnyChambers,Brent Lang, Wayne Farley, DannyWagnon andChris

Sims (members of the Glencoe City Council), they voted for Blackerby because they

thought she was the best person for the job, based on her educational background,

work experience and demeanor. (Doc. 28-3; Doc. 28-4; Doc. 28-5; Doc. 28-6; Doc.

28-7). All deny knowing if plaintiff requested or needed FMLA leave, and all deny

their vote for Blackerby was motivated by any request or need for such leave. (Id.). 

Danny Wagnon specifically states that plaintiff’s work performance and office

demeanor had deteriorated throughout 2012, that other employees had complained

about plaintiff, and that he was aware plaintiff’s family had supported Gilchrist’s

opponent while Wagnon had supported Gilchrist. (Doc. 28-6, Wagnon Aff., at ¶ 4).

Plaintiff is now disabled and receiving Social Security Disability benefits. 

(Doc. 28-1, Casey Depo., at 102). In her application for disability benefits, plaintiff

asserted that she can no longer do the work of a city clerk and became disabled

effective November 1, 2012, after she was not reappointed as city clerk. (Id. at 109). 

Plaintiff admits that she has been disabled since November 1, 2012, admits she can

no longer do the job of city clerk, admits she has been unable to do the job since

November 1, 2012, and admits that she is unable to return to work. (Id. at 108-09). 

Page 12 of 17

Case 4:14-cv-00595-HGD Document 39 Filed 03/31/16 Page 12 of 17
However, she was able to perform her city clerk job duties after her doctor’s

appointment in January 2012 until November 1, 2012, despite being tired and needing

some time off. (Id. at 81).

DISCUSSION

I. FMLA Interference and Retaliation

The FMLA makes it illegal “for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or 

deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this

subchapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). A plaintiff claiming interference must

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that she was denied a benefit to

which she was entitled. Pereda v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys., Inc., 666 F.3d

1269, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2012). An “employer” for purposes of the FMLA includes

any “public agency” such as the City of Glencoe. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(iii). 

The protections of the FMLA only apply if the plaintiff is an aggrieved

“eligible employee.” See Pereda, 666 F.3d at 1272; 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (stating

that only an “eligible employee” shall be entitled to FMLA leave); 29 U.S.C. §

2617(a)(1) (providing that an employer who violates § 2615 shall be liable in a civil

action to any “eligible employee”). The FMLA defines the term “eligible employee”

to exclude “any employee of an employer who is employed at a worksite at which

such employer employs less than 50 employees if the total number of employees

Page 13 of 17

Case 4:14-cv-00595-HGD Document 39 Filed 03/31/16 Page 13 of 17
employed by that employer within 75 miles of that worksite is less than 50.” 29

U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii). Thus, in order for the FMLA to apply, the “employer(s) at

issue must have at least 50 employees within a 75 mile radius of the worksite.” 

Morrison v. Magic Carpet Aviation, 383 F.3d 1253, 1254 (11th Cir. 2004). This

“worksite requirement” is both a threshold jurisdictional issue and a required element

of a plaintiff’s claim. See Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 923 (11th Cir.

2003). Whether the worksite requirement is met is determined as of the date the

employee gives notice of the need for leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(e). 

Thus, in order to demonstrate that the FMLA is applicable, plaintiff has the

burden of showing that the City of Glencoe employed at least 50 employees at her

work site or within 75 miles. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(2)(B)(ii) and 2612; 29 C.F.R. §§

825.102, 825.104 and 825.108(d). Plaintiff argues that “defendant offers no

substantive evidence that the City of Glencoe did not meet the statutorily

demonstrated requirement of a public agency that employs 50 or more employeesfor

each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or

preceding calendar year.” (Doc. 33, Plaintiff’s Brief, at 10). However, the burden is

on plaintiff to establish that the City of Glencoe employed at least 50 employees at

her work site or within 75 miles thereof, not on the City of Glencoe to establish it did

not. Further, the deposition testimony of plaintiff and the affidavit testimony of

Page 14 of 17

Case 4:14-cv-00595-HGD Document 39 Filed 03/31/16 Page 14 of 17
Tashia Blackerby establish that the City of Glencoe employed between 30 and 40

employees and that it never employed 50 employees at plaintiff’s work site or within

75 miles of the site during the period relevant to this action. While plaintiff has

described Ms. Blackerby’s affidavit as “hearsay,” the rules of evidence provide

otherwise. See Fed.R.Evid. 602, 803(6); 902(4)(A). Therefore, plaintiff was not

eligible for FMLA leave. 

The Eleventh Circuit has held that an employee must actually qualify for

FMLA leave in order to bring a claim of FMLA interference or retaliation. Hurley

v. Kent of Naples, Inc.,, 746 F.3d 1161, 1166-67 (11th Cir. 2014). Because plaintiff

has not brought forth evidence to create even a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether she was an “eligible employee” entitled to FMLA leave, she cannot establish

that defendant either interfered with her FMLA rights or retaliated against her for

attempting to exercise FMLA rights. 

Mental and Emotional Distress

Plaintiff claimsthat defendant isliable for mental and emotional distress. This

cause of action was recognized by the Alabama Supreme Court in American Road

Serv. v. Inmon, 394 So.2d 361 (Ala. 1980), and described as follows:

one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly

causessevere emotional distressto another issubject to liability for such

emotional distress and for bodily harm resulting from the distress. The

emotional distress thereunder must be so severe that no reasonable

Page 15 of 17

Case 4:14-cv-00595-HGD Document 39 Filed 03/31/16 Page 15 of 17
person could be expected to endure it. Any recovery must be reasonable

and justified under the circumstances, liability ensuing only when the

conduct is extreme. Comment, Restatement, supra, at 78. By extreme

we refer to conduct so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree

as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as

atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. 

Id. at 365. By definition, it is an intentional tort. However, a municipality such as

the City of Glencoe cannot be liable for the tort of intentional infliction of mental or

emotional distress. See Ala. Code § 11-47-190 (“No city or town shall be liable for

damages for injury done to or wrong suffered by any person or corporation, unless

said injury or wrong was done or suffered through the neglect, carelessness or

unskillfulness of some agent, officer or employee of the municipality engaged in

work therefor and while acting in the line of his duty. . . .”). Further, in the report and

recommendation on defendant Gilchrist’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,

which was adopted and accepted by the district court, the undersigned found that

plaintiff failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See

Doc. 25 at 6. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that there are no genuine issues of

materialfact and that defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted

and this action dismissed with prejudice. A separate order in conformity with this

Memorandum Opinion will be entered contemporaneously herewith.

Page 16 of 17

Case 4:14-cv-00595-HGD Document 39 Filed 03/31/16 Page 16 of 17
DONE this 31st day of March, 2016.

 

HARWELL G. DAVIS, III

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Page 17 of 17

Case 4:14-cv-00595-HGD Document 39 Filed 03/31/16 Page 17 of 17