Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02268/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02268-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESUS SOLORZANO,

Plaintiff,

v.

KIMBERLY HOLLAND, Warden,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-02268-AJB-KSC

ORDER: 

(1) ADOPTING THE REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION (Doc. No. 25), 

and 

(2) DISMISSING PETITIONER’S 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

(Doc. No. 1)

Before the Court is Petitioner Jesus Solorzano’s petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

(Doc. No. 1.) In the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), the Magistrate Judge 

recommended denying Solorzano’s federal petition for writ of habeas corpus brought under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 25.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court ADOPTS the 

R&R and DENIES Solorzano’s writ of habeas corpus.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 20, 2013, a jury found petitioner guilty of various crimes. (Doc. No. 

1 at 2.) Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term of 114 years in state prison, where 

he is currently incarcerated. (Id.)

Petitioner timely appealed the judgment of conviction to the California Court of 

Appeal arguing the trial court erred in failing to instruct on lesser included offenses

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(“LIO”). (Doc. No. 17-27.) The court affirmed petitioner’s conviction finding, even though

the charged crimes did include the LIOs, the record lacked the substantial evidence that 

would give rise to a sua sponte duty to give instructions on the LIOs and the failure of the 

trial court to give LIO instructions did not prejudice defendant. (Doc. No. 17-30 at 12, 17–

18.) Petitioner filed a Petition for Rehearing with the California Court of Appeal, (Doc. 

No. 17-31), which was denied, (Doc. No. 17-32).

Petitioner further appealed the judgment of conviction to the California Supreme 

Court arguing the trial court’s error in failing to instruct on lesser included offenses was 

prejudicial and the instructional error denied petitioner due process. (Doc. No. 1, at 4; see 

also Doc. No. 17-33.) Petitioner’s Petition for Review was summarily denied without 

discussion. (Doc. No. 17-34.)

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with the California Supreme 

Court. (Doc. No. 17-35.) Petitioner also filed the operative Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his state conviction, (Doc. No. 1), and 

applied for a stay and abeyance of federal court proceedings pending resolution of the state 

habeas petition before the California Supreme Court, (Doc. No. 2). Before Petitioner’s 

application for stay and abeyance could be considered, the California Supreme Court 

denied Petitioner’s state habeas petition. (Doc. No. 12 at 1–2.) Accordingly, Judge Sabraw

denied as moot petitioner’s application for stay and abeyance of the federal habeas petition. 

(Doc. No. 12.) 

Magistrate Judge Crawford submitted the operative R&R directing judgment be 

denied against Solorzano. (Doc. No. 25.) Solorzano objected. (Doc. No. 29.) At all relevant 

times, petitioner was represented by counsel. (See Doc. No. 1 at 14.)

As stated in the R&R, “Petitioner’s operative federal habeas Petition contains one 

unexhausted claim that, ‘[p]etitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 

when his trial attorney misdirected the trial court on the law and his trial was unfair and 

violated Due Process and the 14th Amendment.’[Citation.]” (Doc. No. 25 at 5–6; see also

Doc. No. 1 at 6.)

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The factual background of the underlying conviction, as summarized in the 

unpublished California Court of Appeal opinion in petitioner’s direct appeal of the 

judgment of conviction, is quoted in Magistrate Judge Crawford’s R&R. (Doc. No. 25 at

2–4.) The Court fully incorporates by reference that factual background section of the R&R 

into this Order. 

In addition, to support his state habeas petition, petitioner submitted a declaration 

from his trial counsel, C. Bradley Patton, where Mr. Patton stated he “was unaware the 

non-forcible offenses were lesser included offenses[,]” and not just lesser related offenses, 

and that his “failure to discover the fact that the non-forcible offenses were included 

offenses was merely the product of inadvertence and not by design nor undisclosed 

intention.” (Doc. No. 17-35 at 64, 66.) Petitioner now seeks federal habeas relief on the 

ground that he was denied ineffective assistance of counsel evidenced by the alleged error

by his counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Scope of Review of the Report and Recommendation 

The duties of the district court with respect to a magistrate judge’s R&R are set out 

in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court must 

“make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is 

made” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United 

States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980); United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617–

18 (9th Cir. 1989).

As to portions of the report to which no objection is made, the Court may assume 

the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the 

applicable law. Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson 

v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). Under such circumstances, the 

Ninth Circuit has held that failure to file objections only relieves the trial court of its burden 

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to give de novo review to factual findings; conclusions of law must still be reviewed de 

novo. See Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2007).

B. Standard of Review for Habeas Corpus Relief

A petitioner in state custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court may challenge 

his detention only on the ground that his custody is in violation of the United States 

Constitution or the laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Anti-Terrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, codified as 

amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), applies to § 2254 habeas corpus petitions filed after 1996. 

See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Pursuant to the AEDPA, a § 2254 habeas 

corpus petition must not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by 

a state court, unless the adjudication resulted in a decision that “was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United 

States Supreme Court,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

To determine what constitutes “clearly established federal law” under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(1), courts look to Supreme Court holdings existing at the time of the state court 

decision. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2003). A state court decision is contrary 

to clearly established federal law when the court applies a rule that contradicts the 

governing law set forth in United States Supreme Court cases. Id. at 73 (citing Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)). A state court decision is also contrary to clearly established 

federal law when the court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from 

a United States Supreme Court decision but reaches a result different from that Supreme 

Court decision. Id. Finally, a state court decision involves an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law when it “correctly identifies the governing legal rule but 

applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case.” Penry v. Johnson, 532 

U.S. 782, 792 (2001) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 407–08) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). To be an unreasonable application of federal law the state court decision must be 

more than incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer, 538 U.S. 

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at 75.

When there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks 

through” to the last reasoned state court decision. See Y1st v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

801–06 (1991). 

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner’s substantive objections to the R&R essentially repeat (almost entirely 

verbatim) the same arguments already presented before the Magistrate Judge and 

considered in the R&R: (1) petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to notify 

the trial court of the existence of lesser included offenses, and (2) the evidence was 

insufficient to support Petitioner's conviction on the greater offenses.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Petitioner first argues that his trial counsel’s conduct was “deficient” and “fell below 

the prevailing norms.” (Doc. No. 29 at 10.) The R&R recommends dismissal of this claim, 

finding that because LOI instructions were not required under California Law, petitioner’s 

trial counsel’s conduct did not rise to the level of a Constitutional violation. (Doc. No. 25 

at 10.) Petitioner objects to the R&R on the basis that “there is no dispute” as to the 

deficiency of his trial counsel’s conduct. (Doc. No. 29 at 10.)

1. Standard of Review

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the constitutional right to be 

represented by counsel at all critical stages of the prosecution. Turner v. Calderon, 281 

F.3d 851, 879 (9th Cir. 2002). To prevail on a claim that his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance, a petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) counsel’s performance was 

deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–93 (1984). A petitioner must establish both deficient 

performance and prejudice in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 687; 

United States v. Olson, 925 F.2d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1991). “Because failure to meet either 

prong is fatal to [a defendant’s] claim, there is no requirement that [courts] ‘address both 

components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.’”

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Gonzalez v. Wong, 667 F.3d 965, 987 (9th Cir. 2011).

2. Discussion

The California Court of Appeals held the LIO instructions, although potential 

violations under the charging instrument, were not required. (Doc. No. 17-30 at 12, 17.) 

As such, the R&R concludes the trial counsel’s characterization of the lesser offenses as 

“related” rather than “included” or failure to request the LIO instructions did not rise to the 

level of a Constitutional violation. (Doc. No. 25 at 10.)

First, petitioner objects arguing “there is no dispute that trial counsel’s representation 

fell below [the Strickland] standard.” (Doc. No. 29 at 10.) To show this, Petitioner 

proffered a declaration from his trial counsel, C. Bradley Patton, stating he “informed the 

trial court the requested instructions on non-forcible sex offenses were not lesser included

offenses, but instead were lesser related offenses” and, at the time of the request, he “was 

unaware the non-forcible offenses were actually lesser included offenses.” (Doc. No. 29, 

at pp. 10, 11; Doc. No. 17-35 at 64–67.) (emphasis in original). Petitioner contends his trial 

counsel’s admitted erroneous characterization and lack of awareness as to the lesser 

offenses is definitive evidence his trial counsel’s performance was deficient under prong 

one of the Strickland standard. (Doc. No. 29 at 10.)

Under the performance prong of the Strickland test, the Court does not focus on 

whether counsel’s advice was right or wrong, but whether that advice was within the range 

of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Turner, 281 F.3d at 881 (quoting 

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). “When a convicted defendant 

complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the defendant must show that 

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687–88 (emphasis added). Under the Strickland standard, there is a “strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of professional assistance.” 

Id. at 689. Furthermore, a reviewing court is “not obligated to accept the self-proclaimed 

assertions of trial counsel of inadequate performance.” Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 

1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007).

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The R&R found “because the California Court of Appeal found the LIO instructions 

were not required[,]” “[w]hether petitioner’s [trial] counsel misspoke or failed to 

understand the difference between a lesser related offense versus less included offense 

request made no difference.” (Doc. No. 25 at 10–11.) This Court agrees. 

In his declaration to the California Supreme Court, petitioner’s trial counsel admits 

to misspeaking and being unaware of the LIOs at trial. (Doc. No. 17-35 at 64–67.)

However, the standard is not whether trial counsel believes his own performance was 

inadequate, but whether the representation was objectively reasonable. 

The California Court of Appeal determined that, upon the record before it, the LIO 

instructions were not necessary as a matter of California law. (Doc. No. 25 at 11.) It is 

worth noting that the Court of Appeal was reviewing whether the trial court committed any 

error in failing to sua sponte instruct on the LIOs, where petitioner, here, asks this Court to 

review whether his trial counsel gave ineffective assistance by failing to properly request 

the LIO instructions. As noted in the R&R, regardless of who was responsible for the 

omission of the LIO instructions, the outcome is the same: the LIO instructions were not 

required. (See Doc. No. 25 at 10 fn.6.) Therefore, this Court finds that it cannot be said that 

petitioner’s trial counsel’s conduct or performance was objectively unreasonable when he 

failed to properly request the LIO instructions. 

Second, petitioner objects arguing “the record demonstrates the Court of Appeal 

made an unreasonable determination of the facts and law when it concluded petitioner was 

not prejudiced by the lack of LIO instructions.” (Doc. No. 29 at 13.) Under the prejudice 

prong, a petitioner must “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694.

The R&R found the prejudice standard under People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818 

(1956), was substantially similar to the prejudice standard under Strickland. (Doc. No. 25 

at 11.) Under the Watson standard, the Court of Appeal determined any error attributable 

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to the omission of the LIO instructions was not prejudicial to petitioner. (Id.) After review 

of the record and evidence, the R&R found that “petitioner has not sufficiently shown that 

he had a reasonable probability of obtaining a more favorable result at trial, absent the error 

of his counsel.” (Id. at 12.) This Court agrees.

Petitioner objects arguing the jury could have concluded that Petitioner’s acts were 

“precise[ly] the opposition of ‘benign’ and still be able to conclude that acts were not the 

product of threats to Petitioner’s daughter.” (Doc. No. 29 at 16.) And if the jury were to so 

conclude, and if the LIO instructions were given, petitioner’s sentence would have been 

drastically reduced. (Doc. No. 24 at 10.)

However, the Court of Appeal, after finding the LIO instructions were not required, 

went on to conclude there was also no prejudice: “even if we were to set aside our reticence 

and conclude that lesser included offense instructions should have been given here . . . we 

do not believe it is probable that had lesser included offense instructions been given, the 

jury would have returned a more favorable verdict to Solorzano.” (Doc. No. 17-30 at 17, 

18.) The Court of Appeal, upon review of the trial court record, found “[t]he record shows 

that the jury did not accept some of N.’s testimony, but all of it, in all of its extensive 

detail.” (Doc. No. 17-30 at 18.) This finding was supported by the extensive examination 

of N. by both the prosecutor and the defense counsel as to whether N. had in any way 

consented to the charged sex acts, the trial court’s instructions, and the jury verdicts as to 

N. (Id.) In light of this evidence to support the jury verdict, the Court of Appeals “[did] not 

believe it was probable that had the lesser included offense instructions been given, the 

jury would have returned a more favorable verdict.” (Id.) 

Therefore, this Court agrees the alleged error by petitioner’s trial counsel was not 

prejudicial and petitioner has failed to put forth any evidence tending to show a reasonable 

probability of obtaining a more favorable result, absent the error by his counsel. 

Furthermore, this Court agrees with the R&R that, under the AEDPA, the Court of 

Appeal’s application of Watson was not contrary to clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent, nor an unreasonable determination of the facts from the record. See 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 2254(d). Accordingly, the Court ADPOTS the R&R’s recommendation and DENIES

Petitioner’s relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

B. Insufficiency of Evidence Claim

Petitioner does not raise a separate sufficiency of the evidence claim, however, 

Petitioner argues in his petition, his briefs in support of his petition, and, again, in his 

objections that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, 

petitioner argues “the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law” to convict petitioner of 

forcible sex acts against his daughter. (Doc. No. 29 at 13). Despite the lack of reference to 

a distinct claim for relief, the R&R addressed the claim separately and recommended

dismissal, in conformance with the California Court of Appeal, claiming there issubstantial 

evidence in the record from which the jury could have found the necessary elements under 

the offense charged. (Doc. No. 25 at 16–17.) 

1. Standard of Review 

A habeas petitioner challenging a state criminal conviction based on sufficiency of 

the evidence is entitled to relief “if it is found that upon the evidence adduced at the trial 

no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). The critical inquiry is whether any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable 

doubt when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. at 

318–19. If the record contains facts that support conflicting inferences, the reviewing court 

must presume that the trier of fact resolved any conflicts in favor of the prosecution and 

defer to that determination. Id. at 326. Under the AEDPA, courts apply the Jackson

standard with an additional layer of deference. Shakir v. Lewis, 520 F. App’x 523, 524 (9th 

Cir. 2013). Thus, when the last state court to consider a petitioner’s claim denies it without 

explanation, a petitioner is entitled to relief only if “there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011); see also Juan H. 

v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a federal habeas petitioner’s 

Jackson claim is subject to doubly deferential review under AEDPA). 

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In evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the reviewing federal court must 

look to the applicable state law defining the substantive elements of the crime. Chein v. 

Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (stating the Jackson standard “must 

be applied with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as 

defined by state law.”) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16).

2. Discussion

Petitioner’s objections arguing the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 

support the jury’s finding of duress required to convict petitioner of the charged forcible 

sex crimes because there was no evidence of “express or implied threats.” (Doc. No. 29 at 

14.) The California Court of Appeals held there was sufficient evidence for the jury to 

convict petitioner of the charged forcible sex offenses. (Doc. No. 17-30 at 15.) The R&R, 

upon review of the record, found it was not objectively unreasonable for the Court of 

Appeals to so hold. (Doc. No. 25 at 15.) Absent any specific objections to the R&R’s 

findings of facts as to the sufficiency of evidence claim, this Court may assume the 

correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the 

applicable law as to portions of the report to which no objection is made. See Campbell, 

501 F.2d at 206.

Under California law, the crimes of rape, oral copulation, and penetration with a 

foreign object, when committed with the use of force, duress, or fear of immediate and 

unlawful bodily injury on the victim, allow for additional penalty. See Cal. Pen. Code §§ 

261(a)(2), 288a(c)(2)(A), and 289(a)(1)(A). Duress in the context of these crimes means 

“a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship or retribution sufficient to 

coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to (1) perform an act which 

otherwise would not have been performed or, (2) acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise 

would not have submitted.” People v. Cochran, 103 Cal. App. 4th 8, 13 (2002), 

disapproved on other grounds by People v. Soto, 51 Cal. 4th 229 (2011) (internal 

quotations omitted). Duress involves psychological coercion and can arise from various 

circumstances “including the relationship between the defendant and the victim and their 

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relative ages and sizes.” People v. Senior, 3 Cal. App. 4th 765, 775 (1992) (citations 

omitted). Courts consider the totality of the circumstances when appraising the existence 

of duress. People v. Leal, 33 Cal. 4th 999, 1004–05 (2004); Cochran, 103 Cal. App. 4th at 

13.

Under California Law, duress, in the context of these sexual crimes, may manifest 

in a variety of ways depending on the totality of the circumstances. Here, the Court of 

Appeal found “N.’s testimony, Solorzano’s role as her father, his relative size and strength, 

and the physical control he exerted over her before and during the sex acts provide ample 

evidence of both psychological and physical coercion that is sufficient to establish duress. 

[Citation.]” (Doc. No. 17-30 at 15.) The court further found “there [was] nothing in the 

record which undermines N.’s credibility with respect to the nonconsensual nature of what 

happened to her.” (Id. at 16.)

The R&R found the “Court of Appeal neither deemed the jury’s conclusion one with 

which no rational trier of fact could agree nor applied a standard contrary to Supreme Court 

precedent. [Citation.]” (Doc. No. 25 at 14.) This Court agrees. This Court finds the R&R 

employed the proper standards, accurately recited the facts, and reasonably applied the law 

to those facts. Accordingly, the Court ADPOTS the R&R’s recommendation and DENIES

Petitioner’s relief based on the insufficiency of evidence claim.

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

When a district court enters a final order adverse to the petitioner in a habeas 

proceeding, it must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability, which is required to 

appeal a final order in a habeas proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of 

appealability is appropriate only where the petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). Under 

this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether 

the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 474 (2000). Here, the Court finds that reasonable jurists could 

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not debate whether the petition should have been resolved differently and thus DENIES

issuing a certificate of appealability.

VI. CONCLUSION

Thus, based on the reasoning stated herein, the Court ADOPTS the R&R, (Doc. No. 

21), GRANTS Respondent’s dismissal motion, (Doc. No. 16), and DISMISSES

Solorzano’s federal petition for habeas corpus, (Doc. No. 1). The Court ORDERS the 

Court Clerk to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 16, 2019

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