Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00617/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00617-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSUE ORTIZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND 

REHABILITATION (“CDCR”), et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-0617 KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing 

fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will 

direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account 

and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly 

Case 2:13-cv-00617-WBS-KJN Document 7 Filed 09/04/13 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. 

These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 

the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 

2000) (“a judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 

1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. 

However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. 

Case 2:13-cv-00617-WBS-KJN Document 7 Filed 09/04/13 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal 

quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as 

true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the 

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 

(1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

Plaintiff alleges that following spinal surgery on October 13, 2011, plaintiff returned to 

prison on October 15, 2011, and defendant Martinez subjected plaintiff to a strip search causing 

pain and injury to plaintiff’s already existing back injury, and required plaintiff to be attended to 

by Dr. Senegor. (ECF No. 1 at 11, 16.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Dr. Senegor’s conduct 

violated plaintiff’s rights, but does not explain how. Plaintiff alleges that prison guard Miller (not 

named as a defendant), searched plaintiff in 3 Block and found him in possession of Morphine 

Sulfate. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Dr. Smith took plaintiff’s medication with the knowledge 

that plaintiff was in severe pain and needed his medication to function, and despite having 

prescribed Morphine Sulfate to plaintiff on numerous occasions. (ECF No. 1 at 10-11.) Plaintiff 

claims that Dr. Smith did not substitute plaintiff’s pain medication or administer a withdrawal 

regimen after discontinuing the Morphine Sulfate prescription. (ECF No. 1 at 17.) Plaintiff also 

alleges that defendants Dr. Smith and Dr. Forester required plaintiff to sign a medication contract 

before plaintiff could receive any medication. Plaintiff alleges defendants Dr. Bangi and Dr. 

Allen prescribed Morphine Sulfate for plaintiff, and claims this conduct violated plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights, but does not explain how. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Dr. Thomatoes 

stopped plaintiff’s prescription for Morphine Sulfate, but did not1provide a replacement or 

alternative medication, despite the doctor’s numerous prescriptions for this drug in the past. 

(ECF No. 1 at 10.) 

Plaintiff alleges defendant LVN Jared “induce[d] plaintiff to perform aggressive exercise 

forcing plaintiff to walk, although plaintiff persistently stated that [he] was in severe pain, and 

 

1

Later plaintiff states that defendant Dr. Smith “did administer a withdrawal regimen” (ECF No. 

1 at 17), but this may be a typographical error.

Case 2:13-cv-00617-WBS-KJN Document 7 Filed 09/04/13 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

upon stopping, plaintiff discovered blood coming from [his] surgical incision. (ECF No. 1 at 14.) 

Plaintiff claims defendant Jared’s conduct caused plaintiff’s condition to worsen, and contributed 

to the need for plaintiff to return to San Joaquin General Hospital. (ECF No. 1 at 14.)

Plaintiff also alleges that on September 7, 2010, defendant Miles, a registered nurse 

(“RN”), claimed she witnessed plaintiff cheeking medication, and allegedly caused a false 

document to be entered into a state record. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Plaintiff also alleges defendant 

Miles threatened to issue plaintiff a prison disciplinary in violation of plaintiff’s due process 

rights. While not entirely clear, it appears plaintiff contends that defendant Miles intentionally 

interfered with plaintiff’s medication. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant 

Maldonaldo, a Licensed Vocational Nurse (“LVN”), falsely stated that LVN Maldonaldo caught 

plaintiff with a pill in his cup, and such statement was filed in plaintiff’s state records. Plaintiff 

does not state on what date defendant Maldonaldo made this statement, and plaintiff did not 

provide copies of the documents allegedly authored by defendants Miles or Maldonaldo. 

Plaintiff contends that defendant Dr. St. Clair, Chief Medical Officer, failed to perform his 

duties in handling plaintiff’s grievances in which plaintiff stated he was receiving inadequate and 

harmful medical treatment, and had knowledge that plaintiff was required to sign a medication 

contract or plaintiff would not be provided medication. (ECF No. 1 at 8-9.) Plaintiff asked 

defendant Dr. St. Clair to remove documents that plaintiff alleged were false from plaintiff’s 

medical file. (ECF No. 1 at 9.) 

Finally, plaintiff alleges that Jeffery Beard, Secretary of the CDCR, is named as a 

defendant because Beard has control of all records for the CDCR and could enforce the court’s 

order to remove false documents from plaintiff’s medical file. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff also 

names the CDCR as a defendant, claiming the CDCR refused to correct allegedly false records, 

and allegedly made false statements concerning the CDCR’s duty to correct records. (ECF No. 1 

at 17.)

Eighth Amendment Claims

The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. “The Constitution does 

not mandate comfortable prisons.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotation and 

Case 2:13-cv-00617-WBS-KJN Document 7 Filed 09/04/13 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

citation omitted). A prisoner's claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an 

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal 

civilized measure of life's necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate 

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 

Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). The deliberate 

indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation 

must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious. . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. 

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must “know [ ] of and disregard[ ] 

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. . . .” Id. at 837.

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. “Under 

this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference 

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the 

inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have 

been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no 

matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 

1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). Medical malpractice is insufficient to state a claim for relief. Estelle v. 

Gamble, 329 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in 

diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment 

under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation 

merely because the victim is a prisoner.”). Similarly, a prisoner’s disagreement with the course 

of medical treatment is insufficient to demonstrate deliberate indifference.

The allegations concerning plaintiff’s medical treatment are too vague and conclusory for 

the court to determine whether plaintiff can state a cognizable civil rights claim. Plaintiff failed 

to allege facts demonstrating each defendant acted with a culpable state of mind. Plaintiff did not 

indicate what periods of time he went without his medication, and did not provide time frames as 

to each particular defendant’s involvement with plaintiff’s medication or its alleged deprivation. 

Moreover, in a prison setting, the decision to discontinue a pain medication because of concerns 

of abuse of such medication does not amount to deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. 

Case 2:13-cv-00617-WBS-KJN Document 7 Filed 09/04/13 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

See Atakpu v. Lawson, 2008 WL 5233467, *11 (S.D. Ohio, Dec.11, 2008) (“evidence submitted 

by plaintiff shows that the LeCI doctor ordered that the Ultram be discontinued on April 14, 2005 

because of ‘cheeking’”); Johnson v. Herman, 2006 WL 1408389, *3 (N.D. Ind., May 18, 2006) 

(“An inmate who will not take his medication when it is dispensed does not appear to need the 

medication. This is particularly true for pain medication. Even if he is in pain as a result, he 

appears willing to suffer that pain in exchange for whatever benefit he receives by not 

immediately taking the medication.”); Shea v. Wheeler, 2001 WL 34376846, *6 (W.D. Wis., June 

19, 2001) (holding that prison doctor's decision to discontinue inmate's prescription for misuse, 

even after inmate was found not guilty at a subsequent disciplinary hearing, did not constitute 

deliberate indifference); Jones v. Ehlert, 704 F. Supp. 885, 888-90 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (no 

deliberate indifference found where prisoner's Valium was discontinued after sergeant at 

correctional institution accused prisoner of palming off medication). Finally, it is unclear how 

requiring an inmate to sign a medication contract, presumably in an effort to get the inmate to 

comply with his medication regimen, could state a viable Eighth Amendment claim. 

Because of the lack of factual allegations supporting plaintiff’s medical claims, the court 

cannot determine whether plaintiff can amend the complaint to state a cognizable Eighth 

Amendment violation. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint, but is cautioned 

that he must set forth plausible allegations that the particular defendant was acting out of 

deliberate indifference rather than conformity with prison rules.

Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim upon which relief can be granted. 

While plaintiff claims defendants Miles and Maldonado violated due process by issuing 

“false statements,” plaintiff must allege more in order to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim. 

See Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986) (prisoners have “no constitutionally 

guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the 

deprivation of a protected liberty interest,” so long as they are “not . . . deprived of a protected 

liberty interest without due process of law.”). Here, plaintiff claims defendant Miles 

Case 2:13-cv-00617-WBS-KJN Document 7 Filed 09/04/13 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

“threatened”2to issue a prison disciplinary, but does not state RN Miles issued one. If plaintiff 

did not receive a rules violation, no right to a hearing was triggered. Moreover, plaintiff fails to 

connect these allegedly false statements to the incidents that occurred in 2011 following his spinal 

surgery. Because plaintiff’s allegations concerning false statements fail to state a cognizable due 

process claim, plaintiff’s claims against defendant Beard also fail.

In addition, plaintiff claims that defendant St. Clair is liable based on his role in the 

inmate grievance process. However, prisoners have no stand alone due process rights related to 

the administrative grievance process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see 

also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no liberty interest 

entitling inmates to a specific grievance process). Put another way, prison officials are not 

required under federal law to process inmate grievances in a specific way or to respond to them in 

a favorable manner. Because there is no right to any particular grievance process, plaintiff cannot 

state a cognizable civil rights claim for a violation of his due process rights based on allegations 

that prison officials ignored or failed to properly process grievances. See, e.g., Wright v. 

Shannon, 2010 WL 445203 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb.2, 2010) (plaintiff's allegations that prison 

officials denied or ignored his inmate appeals failed to state a cognizable claim under the First 

Amendment); Towner v. Knowles, 2009 WL 4281999 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2009) (plaintiff's 

allegations that prison officials screened out his inmate appeals without any basis failed to 

indicate a deprivation of federal rights); Williams v. Cate, 2009 WL 3789597 at *6 (E.D. Cal. 

Nov. 10, 2009) (A plaintiff has no protected liberty interest in the vindication of his 

administrative claims.). Thus, plaintiff’s due process claim against defendant Dr. St. Clair is 

unavailing. In addition, defendant Dr. St. Clair may not be held liable based solely on his 

position as Chief Medical Officer. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009).

////

 

2 Verbal abuse and threats, without more, are not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation 

under § 1983. Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1987) (allegations that correctional 

counselor told plaintiff that he would transfer him to a higher custody status unit if he tried to go 

to the law library and that he would be sorry if he filed a class action suit were not actionable 

under § 1983); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1997) (abusive language directed at 

prisoner's religious and ethnic background not actionable).

Case 2:13-cv-00617-WBS-KJN Document 7 Filed 09/04/13 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

In light of the above, plaintiff should not renew his due process claims in any amended 

complaint.

Eleventh Amendment

First, plaintiff names the CDCR as a defendant. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits 

brought by private parties against a state or state agency unless the state or the agency consents to 

such suit. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per 

curiam); Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1982). Although the Eleventh 

Amendment is not jurisdictional, the court may raise the defect on its own. Wisconsin 

Department of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 

651, 677-78 (1974). In the instant case, the State of California has not consented to suit. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against the CDCR are legally frivolous and should be omitted 

from any amended complaint.

Second, plaintiff names each defendant, with the exception of defendants CDCR and 

Beard, in their individual and official capacities. However, the Eleventh Amendment bars 

plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities. In Will v. Michigan 

Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-66 (1989), the Supreme Court held that states, state 

agencies, and state officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to civil rights 

suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court reasoned that a suit against a state official in 

his or her official capacity is a suit against the official's office, and as such is no different from a 

suit against the State itself, which is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See id.; see also

Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 816 (1999); Stivers v. 

Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 749 (9th Cir. 1995). In addition, “the Eleventh Amendment bars actions 

against state officers sued in their official capacities for past alleged misconduct involving a 

complainant's federally protected rights, where the nature of the relief sought is retroactive, i.e., 

money damages.” Bair v. Krug, 853 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Because defendants are prison employees connected with the CDCR, plaintiff's claims for 

monetary damages against these individual defendants named in their official capacities are

barred. Thus, in any amended complaint, plaintiff should name individual defendants solely in 

Case 2:13-cv-00617-WBS-KJN Document 7 Filed 09/04/13 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

their individual capacities.

Amended Complaint

The court finds the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint so vague and conclusory that it is 

unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. The 

court has determined that the complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required 

by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a 

complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones 

v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least 

some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff’s claim. 

Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the 

complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended complaint.

Plaintiff is advised that in an amended complaint he must clearly identify each defendant 

and the action that defendant took that violated his constitutional rights. The charging allegations 

must be set forth in the amended complaint so defendants have fair notice of the claims plaintiff is 

presenting.

Any amended complaint must show the federal court has jurisdiction, the action is brought 

in the right place, and plaintiff is entitled to relief if plaintiff’s allegations are true. It must 

contain a request for particular relief. Plaintiff must identify as a defendant only persons who 

personally participated in a substantial way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional right. 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation 

of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act 

he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). 

In an amended complaint, the allegations must be set forth in numbered paragraphs. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 10(b). Plaintiff may join multiple claims if they are all against a single defendant. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 18(a). If plaintiff has more than one claim based upon separate transactions or 

occurrences, the claims must be set forth in separate paragraphs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

The federal rules contemplate brevity. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 

1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “nearly all of the circuits have now disapproved any 

Case 2:13-cv-00617-WBS-KJN Document 7 Filed 09/04/13 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

heightened pleading standard in cases other than those governed by Rule 9(b)”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

84; cf. Rule 9(b) (setting forth rare exceptions to simplified pleading). Plaintiff’s claims must be 

set forth in short and plain terms, simply, concisely and directly. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 

N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, 

which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Plaintiff must 

not include any preambles, introductions, argument, speeches, explanations, stories, griping, 

vouching, evidence, attempts to negate possible defenses, summaries, and the like. McHenry v. 

Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 complaint for 

violation of Rule 8 after warning); see Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597 (1998) 

(reiterating that “firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is fully warranted” in 

prisoner cases). The court (and defendant) should be able to read and understand plaintiff’s 

pleading within minutes. McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179-80. A long, rambling pleading including 

many defendants with unexplained, tenuous or implausible connection to the alleged 

constitutional injury, or joining a series of unrelated claims against many defendants, very likely 

will result in delaying the review required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and an order dismissing plaintiff’s 

action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 for violation of these instructions. 

A district court must construe a pro se pleading “liberally” to determine if it states a claim 

and, prior to dismissal, tell a plaintiff of deficiencies in his complaint and give plaintiff an 

opportunity to cure them. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000). While 

detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth 

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 570).

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 

Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a 

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility 

Case 2:13-cv-00617-WBS-KJN Document 7 Filed 09/04/13 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

and plausibility of entitlement to relief.

Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Although legal conclusions 

can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations, and are 

not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 1950. 

An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. 

Local Rule 15-220; see Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an 

amended complaint, the original pleading is superseded.

By signing an amended complaint, plaintiff certifies he has made reasonable inquiry and 

has evidentiary support for his allegations, and for violation of this rule the court may impose 

sanctions sufficient to deter repetition by plaintiff or others. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 

A prisoner may bring no § 1983 action until he has exhausted such administrative 

remedies as are available to him. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The requirement is mandatory. Booth v. 

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). The Supreme Court has also cautioned against reading 

futility or other exceptions into the statutory exhaustion requirement. See id. at 741 n.6. 

California prisoners or parolees may appeal “any departmental decision, action, condition, or 

policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1, et seq. An appeal must be presented on a CDC form 602 that asks 

simply that the prisoner “describe the problem” and “action requested.” Therefore, this court 

ordinarily will review only claims against prison officials within the scope of the problem 

reported in a CDC form 602 or an interview or claims that were or should have been uncovered in 

the review promised by the department. Plaintiff is further admonished that by signing an 

amended complaint he certifies his claims are warranted by existing law, including the law that he 

exhaust administrative remedies, and that for violation of this rule plaintiff risks dismissal of his 

entire action.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

Case 2:13-cv-00617-WBS-KJN Document 7 Filed 09/04/13 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently 

herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached 

Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

b. An original and one copy of the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must 

also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” 

Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the dismissal of 

this action.

Dated: September 4, 2013

/orti0617.14

Case 2:13-cv-00617-WBS-KJN Document 7 Filed 09/04/13 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSUE ORTIZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

CDCR, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-0617 KJN P

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court's order 

filed______________.

_____________ Amended Complaint

DATED: 

_____________________________________

Plaintiff

Case 2:13-cv-00617-WBS-KJN Document 7 Filed 09/04/13 Page 13 of 13