Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02181/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02181-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 450
Nature of Suit: Interstate Commerce
Cause of Action: 28:1337 Sherman-Clayton Act

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

------------------------------------X 

FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, and 

STARK CARPET CORP. INC., 

 

 Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

 -against- Civil Action No. 

 09-CV-2739 (DGT) 

BAX GLOBAL INC. and MAINFREIGHT, INC., 

 Defendants. 

------------------------------------X 

MAINFREIGHT, INC., 

 Third-Party Plaintiff, 

 -againstBETTY SCRIPPS and NOW EXPRESS 

CARTAGE, INC., 

 Third-Party Defendants. 

-------------------------------------X 

Trager, J.: 

 This action arises from a shipment of twenty-four rolls of 

carpet, which were damaged while en route from Rancho Santa Fe, 

California to Calhoun, Georgia. Federal Insurance Company 

("F.I.C.") and Stark Carpet Corp. Inc. ("Stark Carpet") 

(collectively "plaintiffs") bring this action against cargo 

transporters Mainfreight, Inc. ("Mainfreight") and Bax Global, 

Inc. ("Bax") (collectively "defendants"), alleging a violation 

of the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 1 of 23
2

U.S.C. § 14706, as well as various common law claims.1 

Plaintiffs seek $80,606.31 in damages. Pls.' Compl. ¶ 6. 

Defendants move to transfer venue to the Southern District 

of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). For the reasons 

stated below, defendants' motion to transfer is granted. 

Background 

(1) 

The Carpet Shipment 

Betty Scripps ("Scripps"),2

 who resides in Rancho Santa Fe, 

California, bought twenty-four rolls of carpet from plaintiff 

Stark Carpet, a Manhattan-based carpet dealer.3

 Pls.' Decl. in 

Opp'n to Defs. Mot. to Transfer ("Pls.' Decl. in Opp'n") at 

¶¶ 8, 22. These carpets were custom-made for Scripps' home by 

                                                      

1

 These claims include, inter alia, negligence, deviation, tort, 

tortious interference with contract, breach of warranty and 

contract, and conversion. Pls.' Compl. ¶ 4. 

2

 On September 3, 2009, Mainfreight filed a third-party complaint 

against Scripps and Now Express Cartage, Inc. See Am. Third 

Party Compl. Against Betty Scripps and Now Express Cartage, Inc. 

("Third Party Compl."). Scripps and Now Express have not filed 

any papers on the instant venue motion, nor have they answered 

the complaint. 

 

3

 Stark Carpet is incorporated in New York State and has a 

Manhattan, New York service address. Pls. Ex. 5. Plaintiff 

F.I.C. insured the carpet shipment at issue here and brings this 

action as subrogee of Stark Carpet. See Compl. ¶ 2. According 

to the record, plaintiff F.I.C. "is located" in Manhattan, New 

York as well. Pls. Decl. in Opp'n at ¶ 8. 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 2 of 23
3

non-party Glen Eden Wool Carpets ("Glen Eden"), a carpet 

manufacturer based in Calhoun, Georgia. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 22. On or 

about June 25, 2008, Scripps notified Stark Carpet that she 

wanted to return the carpets because of a "manufacturing 

deficiency." Pls.' Exs. 6, 14. However, the precise nature of 

this "deficiency" remains unclear. 

On or about June 30, 2008, Stark Carpet arranged to ship 

the carpets from Scripps to Glen Eden through non-party ICC 

Logistics Services ("ICC"), a transportation and logistics 

consulting firm based in Hicksville, New York. Pls.' Decl. in 

Opp'n ¶ 9. ICC Chief Executive Officer Anthony Nuzio ("Nuzio") 

and his assistant Pat Kober ("Kober") booked Scripps' return 

shipment with defendant Mainfreight, an international 

transportation and logistics company. Id. at ¶ 2; Pls.' Ex. 6. 

At some point soon thereafter, the carpets were picked up 

at Scripps' residence and loaded onto a truck by Scripps' 

contact person, Bob Clapp ("Clapp"), Scripps' forklift driver 

and an employee from Now Express Cartage, Inc. ("Now Express"), 

a local hauling company.4

 Mainfreight Mem. of Points and 

Authorities in Supp. Mot. to Transfer Case Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

                                                      

4

 Although it is unclear from the record, it appears that 

Mainfreight hired Now Express to transport the carpets from 

Scripps' home to Mainfreight's warehouse in San Diego, 

California. See Decl. of William Rose in Supp. Mot. to Transfer 

Case Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) ("Rose Decl.") at 2. 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 3 of 23
4

1404(a) ("Mainfreight Mem. in Supp.") at 2; Decl. Matthew T. 

Loesberg in Supp. Mot. Transfer ("Loesberg Decl.") at ¶ 2. Now 

Express then transported the carpets from Scripps' home in 

Rancho Santa Fe to Mainfreight's warehouse in San Diego, 

California. Rose Decl. at 1. The carpets arrived on or about 

July 3, 2008, and Mainfreight issued a clean bill of lading5 for 

the shipment.6

 Pls.' Decl. in Opp'n at ¶ 11; Def. Bax's Ex. 2. 

Now Express then transported the carpets from Mainfreight's 

San Diego warehouse to the San Diego facilities of defendant 

Bax, an international transportation and logistics company 

subcontracted by Mainfreight for the shipment. Pls.' Decl. in 

Opp'n at ¶ 25; Bax Reply in Opp'n to Pls.' Letter Mot. to Compel 

or Sanction Defs. at 1-2, Dec. 23, 2009, ECF No.32 ("Bax Reply 

in Opp'n to Mot. to Compel"). After receiving the carpets in 

its warehouse, Bax transported them from San Diego to Atlanta, 

Georgia. Bax Reply in Opp'n to Mot. to Compel at 1-2. Once in 

Atlanta, Georgia, a local hauler transported the carpets to Glen 

Eden in Calhoun, Georgia. Id. 

                                                      

5

 "A bill of lading records that a carrier has received goods 

from the party that wishes to ship them, states the terms of 

carriage, and serves as evidence of the contract for carriage." 

Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 18-19 (2004). 

6

 It is unclear if the carpets were received by Mainfreight on 

the same day that the bill of lading was issued. It is also 

unclear which Mainfreight employee filled out the bill of 

lading. 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 4 of 23
5

When the carpets were received by Glen Eden on July 11, 

2008, they were severely damaged. Pls.' Decl. in Opp'n at ¶ 11. 

According to a handwritten note on the bill of lading, dated 

July 11, 2008, the carpets were: "Dirty, some w/ holes[.] 

Pictures have been taken/has original packaging, never been 

open."7 Def. Bax's Ex. 2; see also Pls. Ex. 14 (photographs of 

the damaged carpets). 

Glen Eden immediately notified Don Benis ("Benis"), a Stark 

Carpet employee, that the carpets were damaged. Pls' Decl. in 

Opp'n at ¶ 12. Benis then contacted Nuzio and Kober at ICC, the 

New York-based company that had originally booked the shipment 

with Mainfreight, to inform them of the damage. Id. At Stark 

Carpet's request, Kober began an investigation on July 14, 2008 

to determine exactly when, where and how the damage occurred. 

Id. at ¶¶ 12-13. 

It is unclear from the record exactly what this 

investigation entailed. However, at the very least, this 

investigation included a series of inconclusive e-mails, faxes 

and letters, dated from July 2008 to November 2008, between the 

following people: Kober and Nuzio, both based in Hicksville, New 

York; Mainfreight employee Bob Andrews ("Andrews"), based in 

Greensboro, North Carolina; Mainfreight employee Ed Nowicki 

                                                      

7

 This note was written by "C. Wells" but there is no indication 

in the record as to who this is. It is assumed that he or she 

was a Glen Eden employee. 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 5 of 23
6

("Nowicki"), based in Carolina Shores, North Carolina; 

Mainfreight employee Joanne Charles ("Charles"), based in 

Carson, California; Stark Carpet employee Rob Meistrich 

("Meistrich"), based in New York, New York; and Stark Carpet 

employee Benis, based in Dania Beach, Florida. Pls. Exs. 7-15. 

It seems that as part of this investigation, Kober 

repeatedly attempted to get information from Mainfreight on the 

shipment, specifically the documentation on each transfer point 

from Rancho Santa Fe to Calhoun. Pls.' Decl. in Opp'n at 15-18; 

Pls' Exs. 10, 15. On November 4, 2008, Mainfreight employee 

Charles e-mailed Kober that she could not provide her with this 

information but directed Kober to contact Mainfreight employees 

Andrews and Nowicki, stating that "they may be in a better 

position to provide this information." Pls.' Ex. 13. On 

November 24, 2008, Andrews wrote to Kober that: "We are not able 

to determine exactly where or when the damage occurred. The 

damage happened while the cargo was in the care of our carrier. 

Please file the claim with our claim department and they will 

take it from there."8 Pls.' Ex. 15. 

                                                      

8

 Although Andrews instructed Kober to file a claim in his 

November 24, 2008 e-mail, it appears from the record that she 

had already done so about a month earlier. Notably, on October 

24, 2008, Kober filed a claim with Mainfreight, which stated 

that Mainfreight was responsible for $78,362 worth of damage to 

the carpets. Pls. Ex. 12. However, on November 5, 2008, 

Mainfreight rejected the claim, noting that "claims for lost or 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 6 of 23
7

In addition to the investigation performed by ICC, 

plaintiffs FIC and Stark Carpet hired Charles Williams, a 

Georgia-based surveyor, to assess the carpet damage at the Glen 

Eden factory in Calhoun, Georgia. Pls' Decl. in Opp'n at ¶ 20. 

In a report dated November 25, 2008, Williams noted that the 

carpets could not be repaired because they were stained with 

grease and dock dirt and contained many cuts. Pls.' Ex. 14. 

Williams also noted that the damage "was the result of careless 

and/or rough handling at sometime during the possession of 

Mainfreight, Inc." Id. 

(2) 

Procedural History 

Plaintiffs filed the instant action in the Southern 

District of New York on March 18, 2009, asserting a federal 

cause of action against plaintiffs under the Carmack Amendment, 

49 U.S.C. § 14706. On June 15, 2009, Judge Deborah A. Batts sua

sponte transferred the case to the Eastern District of New York 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), finding that "the only 

connections between Plaintiffs' suit and the Southern District 

of New York [were] Plaintiffs' places of business." Order by 

                                                                                                                                                                              

damaged freight must be received by Mainfreight within 90 days 

from the date of shipment." Id. 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 7 of 23
8

Judge Deborah A. Batts Transferring Venue, June 15, 2009, ECF 

No. 8. In further support of the sua sponte transfer, Judge 

Batts noted that 1) both defendants were located outside of the 

Southern District of New York; and 2) there was no reference in 

the complaint to any events occurring in the Southern District 

of New York. Id. According to Judge Batts, venue was proper in 

the Eastern District of New York because Bax "may be found in 

Jamaica, New York."9

 Id.

This case was opened in the Eastern District on June 26, 

2009. On January 8, 2010, defendants filed a § 1404(a) motion 

to transfer the case to the Southern District of California in 

the interest of judicial efficiency and for the convenience of 

parties and witnesses.10 

Discussion 

(1) 

Motion to Transfer Venue 

Section 1404(a) provides that "for the convenience of 

parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district 

                                                      

9

 Judge Batts was likely referencing the fact that the service 

address listed for Bax was in Jamaica, New York. See Pls.' 

Decl. in Opp'n at ¶ 5. 

10 The Southern District of California includes Imperial and San 

Diego counties. 28 U.S.C. § 84(d). 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 8 of 23
9

court may transfer any civil action to any other district or 

division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1404(a).11 "The determination whether to grant a change of 

venue requires a balancing of conveniences, which is left to the 

sound discretion of the district court." Filmline (Cross 

Country) Prods., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 865 F.2d 513, 520 

(2d Cir. 1989). 

Courts in the Eastern District of New York have adopted a 

two-pronged inquiry for deciding whether to grant a § 1404(a) 

motion to transfer. Launer v. Buena Vista Winery, Inc., 916 F. 

Supp. 204, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). "The first inquiry is whether 

the action sought to be transferred is one that might have been 

brought in the district court in which the moving party seeks to 

have the case litigated." Id. at 212-13. The second inquiry 

                                                      

11 Although defendants have moved pursuant to § 1404(a), which 

allows a court to transfer an action in the interests of 

convenience and justice, they repeatedly claim throughout their 

papers that New York is the improper venue for the instant 

action, rather than merely an inconvenient venue. See, e.g., 

Mainfreight Mem. in Supp. at 2, 3; Reply Brief of Bax Global 

Inc. in Further Supp. of Mot. to Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1404(a) ("Bax Reply Brief") at 1. This is more 

consistent with a 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) motion, which allows a 

court to dismiss or transfer an action brought in an improper 

venue. Section 1404(a) differs from § 1406(a) in that venue 

does not need to be improper for § 1404(a) to apply. However, 

because resolution of the transfer issue under § 1404(a) is 

dispositive in this case, it is unnecessary to determine whether 

transfer is also appropriate under § 1406(a). 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 9 of 23
10

asks "whether the 'convenience of the parties and witnesses' and 

the 'interest of justice' favor transfer." Id. at 213. Factors 

that may be considered in deciding this second prong include: 

(1) convenience of the parties; (2) convenience of 

witnesses; (3) relative means of the parties; (4) locus of 

operative facts and relative ease of access to sources of 

proof; (5) attendance of witnesses; (6) the weight accorded 

the plaintiff's choice of forum; (7) calendar congestion; 

(8) the desirability of having the case tried by the forum 

familiar with the substantive law to be applied; (9) 

practical difficulties; and finally, (10) the Court should 

also consider how best to serve the interest of justice, 

based on an assessment of the totality of material 

circumstances. 

Photoactive Prods., Inc. v. AL-OR Int'l Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 2d 

281, 291-92 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). However, "[t]here is no rigid 

formula for balancing these factors and no single one of them is 

determinative." Citigroup, Inc. v. City Holding Co., 97 F. 

Supp. 2d 549, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The moving party bears the 

burden to make a clear and convincing showing that a transfer is 

appropriate. N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., 

599 F.3d 102, 114 (2d Cir. 2010). 

a. This Action Could Have Been Brought in the Southern 

District of California

Applying the first prong of the § 1404(a) inquiry, this 

action could have been brought in the Southern District of 

California. Specifically, under the Carmack Amendment's special 

venue provision, venue is proper in California. 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 10 of 23
11

Before addressing the venue issue, however, some background 

on the Carmack Amendment is necessary. The Carmack Amendment 

imposes liability on common carriers for damages and losses to 

goods caused by the carrier in interstate shipment. 49 U.S.C. 

§ 14706(a)(1). "The purpose of the Carmack Amendment was to 

relieve shippers of the burden of searching out a particular 

negligent carrier from among the often numerous carriers 

handling an interstate shipment of goods." Reider v. Thompson, 

339 U.S. 113, 119 (1950). Under the Carmack Amendment, the 

shipper, or "the person entitled to recovery under the bill of 

lading," can bring suit "for the actual loss or injury to the 

property caused by . . . the delivering carrier . . . ." 49 

U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1).12 The statute defines the "delivering 

carrier" as "the carrier performing the line-haul transportation 

nearest the destination but does not include a carrier providing 

only a switching service at the destination." Id.

The Carmack Amendment has a special venue provision, 

§ 14706(d)(1), that expressly governs any action brought under 

the Carmack Amendment. Sompo Japan Ins. Co. of Am. v. Yang Ming 

                                                      

12 It is assumed that the shipment at issue here was performed 

via motor carrier, given that the parties repeatedly cite to 

§ 14706(a)(1), the motor carrier liability provision of the 

Carmack Amendment. Indeed, in a letter filed by Mainfreight on 

November 17, 2009, Mainfreight conceded "that there was no air 

carriage involved in respect to the subject shipment." 

Mainfreight Letter in Reply to Pls.' Mot. for Pre-Mot. 

Conference, Nov. 17, 2009, ECF 28. 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 11 of 23
12

Marine Transp. Corp., 578 F. Supp. 2d 584, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), 

overruled on other grounds by Rexroth Hydraudyne B.V. v. Ocean 

World Lines, Inc., 547 F.3d 351, 361 (2d Cir. 2008); see also

Meserole St. Recycling, Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 06-CV4652, 2007 WL 2891424 at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2007) ("Special 

venue provisions are typically attached to statutes providing 

substantive rights and are intended to control all claims 

brought under such statutes."). Subsection 14706(d)(1) states 

that "[a] civil action . . . may be brought against a delivering 

carrier in a district court of the United States . . . [if it] 

is in a State through which the defendant carrier operates." 

Thus, to establish venue pursuant to § 14706(d)(1), it must be 

determined who was the delivering carrier and where that 

delivering carrier "operates." 

Here, the parties dispute whether Mainfreight or Bax was 

the delivering carrier. Plaintiffs and Mainfreight argue that 

both Mainfreight and Bax were the delivering carriers, but Bax 

claims that only Mainfreight can be characterized as such.13 See

Pls.' Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Defs. Mot to Transfer Pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) ("Pls.' Mem. in Opp'n") at 6; Def. 

Mainfreight's Reply to Pls.' Opp'n ("Mainfreight's Reply") at 2; 

                                                      

13 According to the definition provided in § 14706(a)(1), it 

certainly seems that Bax was the "delivering carrier." However, 

because there is some dispute on this point among the parties, 

this opinion will address the issue as if it is unclear. 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 12 of 23
13

Bax Reply Brief at 2. However, regardless of whether 

Mainfreight or Bax was the delivering carrier, the § 14706(d)(1) 

venue analysis would be the same. Assuming that Mainfreight was 

the delivering carrier, venue would be proper in the Southern 

District of California because Mainfreight clearly "operates" 

there, as evidenced by the fact that it maintains a warehouse in 

San Diego. Similarly, assuming that Bax, and not Mainfreight, 

was the delivering carrier, venue would still be proper in the 

Southern District of California because Bax "operates" there, as 

is evident from the fact that it also maintains a warehouse in 

San Diego.14 Thus, either way, venue would be proper in the 

Southern District of California under § 14706(d)(1), and this 

action could have been brought there originally.15 Defendants, 

therefore, meet the first prong of the § 1404(a) inquiry. 

                                                      

14 Plaintiffs argue that because Bax "operates" in Jamaica, New 

York, venue is proper in the Eastern District of New York under 

§ 14706(d)(1). This may indeed be the case. However, because 

this is a § 1404(a) motion, it is only necessary to decide if 

venue would be proper in the Southern District of California, 

not whether venue is improper in the Eastern District of New 

York. See supra n.11. 

15 The parties also invoke § 14706(d)(2) of the Carmack Amendment 

as a basis for determining venue in this case. Under 

§ 14706(d)(2), venue is proper "against the carrier alleged to 

have caused the loss or damage, in the judicial district in 

which such loss or damage is alleged to have occurred." 

However, because it is clear that venue is proper in the 

Southern District of California under § 14706(d)(1), it is 

unnecessary to address the application of § 14706(d)(2). 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 13 of 23
14

b. Convenience Factors Under a § 1404(a) Motion to Transfer 

 The second step of the § 1404(a) inquiry includes a 

balancing of the ten convenience factors listed above. The 

factors relevant to the instant motion will be addressed in 

turn. 

i. Plaintiffs' Choice of Forum

"Generally speaking, [a] plaintiff's choice of forum is 

entitled to substantial weight and will not be disturbed 

lightly." Myers v. Lennar Corp., No. 08-CV-2799, 2010 WL 

1992200, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 17, 2010) (internal citations 

omitted). However, a plaintiff's choice is accorded less 

deference "where the plaintiff does not reside in the chosen 

forum or where there is little connection between that forum and 

the circumstances at issue in the litigation." Quan v. Computer 

Sci. Corp., Nos. 06-CV-3927, 06-CV-5100, 2008 WL 89679, at *3 

(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2008). 

Here, the Eastern District of New York does not reflect 

plaintiffs' choice of forum, as plaintiffs originally filed this 

action in the Southern District of New York. Additionally, 

plaintiffs do not reside in this district. Of course, while the 

Eastern District of New York was not plaintiffs' initial choice, 

it is certainly geographically closer to Manhattan than the 

Southern District of California. See Habrout v. City of New 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 14 of 23
15

York, 143 F. Supp. 2d 399, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("New York's 

Southern District Courthouse . . .lies just across the East 

River and just over the Brooklyn Bridge from the Eastern 

District . . . ."). But even assuming that the Eastern District 

of New York somehow reflects plaintiffs' choice of forum given 

its proximity to the Southern District of New York, there is 

still little connection between this district and the 

circumstances at issue in this case. In particular, the carpets 

travelled from Rancho Santa Fe, California to Calhoun, Georgia, 

but never passed through New York. 

In an effort to demonstrate that there is a connection 

between this district and the instant action, plaintiffs point 

to the fact that Scripps originally ordered the carpets from 

Stark Carpet's New York office. However, this action concerns 

the later damage to the carpets, not Scripps' original carpet 

order. Therefore, plaintiffs' choice of forum is not accorded 

significant weight. 

ii. Convenience and Attendance of the Witnesses 

"The convenience of the witnesses is probably the single 

most important factor in the transfer analysis." Neil Bros. 

Ltd. v. World Wide Lines, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 325, 329 

(E.D.N.Y. 2006). "When assessing the convenience of witnesses, 

a court does not merely tally the number of witnesses who reside 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 15 of 23
16

in the current forum in comparison to the number located in the 

proposed transferee forum. Instead, the court must 

qualitatively evaluate the materiality of the testimony that the 

witnesses may provide." Herbert Ltd. P'ship v. Elec. Arts Inc., 

325 F. Supp. 2d 282, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (emphasis added). 

Thus, to assess this factor here, it is necessary to first 

determine which witnesses might offer material testimony. 

The central issue of this litigation concerns when and 

where the carpets were damaged — more specifically, whether the 

damage occurred prior to or during the pick-up at Scripps' home 

or subsequently as the carpets were transported across 

California and then to Georgia. The witnesses who can possibly 

answer this material question are located in California and 

include: (1) Scripps, who can shed light on the condition of the 

carpets at the time she received and returned them; (2) Scripps' 

assistant Clapp and her forklift driver, who can testify on the 

procedures they used to load the carpets on to the truck at 

Scripps' home; (3) the Now Express driver, who picked up the 

carpets from Scripps' home and drove them to Mainfreight's San 

Diego warehouse, and can testify on the loading procedures at 

Scripps' home and the receiving procedures at Mainfreight's 

warehouse; and (4) the Bax employees, who received the carpets 

in their San Diego warehouse prior to transporting them to 

Atlanta. 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 16 of 23
17

Additionally, Rose, the Night Manager at Mainfreight's San 

Diego warehouse, may serve as an important witness. At the very 

least, as the manager, Rose has knowledge of the general 

receiving and inspection procedures that were likely conducted 

upon the arrival of the carpets at the Mainfreight warehouse. 

Furthermore, he has stated that he is "personally familiar" with 

this particular shipment and may therefore provide more specific 

information in his testimony.16 Rose Decl. at 1. 

 Plaintiffs argue that these California-based witnesses are 

not actually material because the damage occurred after these 

witnesses were involved with the shipment. More specifically, 

plaintiffs point to the clean bill of lading issued by 

Mainfreight upon its receipt of the carpets as evidence that the 

damage had not yet occurred when the shipment arrived at 

Mainfreight's San Diego warehouse. Pls.' Decl. Opp'n ¶¶ 23, 25, 

29. However, this argument fails because a bill of lading often 

only notes the condition of the exterior packing. Caemint Food, 

Inc. v. Brasileiro, 647 F.2d 347, 352 (2d Cir. 1981). "Although 

a clean bill of lading normally constitutes prima facie evidence 

that cargo was in good condition at the time of shipment, courts 

                                                      

16 In his declaration, Rose also identifies three other 

California-based Mainfreight witnesses, who are "familiar with 

this incident": Sarah Pfeffer, Customer Service Representative 

in San Diego; Joanne Charles, Claims Supervisor in Los Angeles; 

and Susannah Beattic, Vice President Operations in Los Angeles. 

Rose Decl. at 1. 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 17 of 23
18

have long recognized that it does not have this probative force 

where . . . the shipper seeks to recover for damage to goods 

shipped in packages that would have prevented the carrier from 

observing the damaged condition had it existed when the goods 

were loaded." Id.; see also The Niel Maersk, 91 F.2d 932, 933 

(2d Cir. 1937) (holding that a clean bill of lading on a 

shipment of sardines was only prima facie evidence that the 

external packaging was in good condition and did not necessarily 

demonstrate that the sardines contained inside were not 

spoiled). It is certainly possible that the packaging of the 

carpets prevented Mainfreight personnel from observing the 

interior damage. Indeed, when Glen Eden received the carpets 

about a week after Mainfreight issued the clean bill of lading, 

an employee wrote on the bill of lading that the carpets were in 

their "original packaging" and had "never been open." See Pls. 

Ex. 9. Thus, Mainfreight's issuance of a clean bill of lading 

hardly indicates that the damage occurred after the involvement 

of the California-based witnesses.17 

                                                      

17 Plaintiffs also argue that these California-based witnesses 

are not material because Mainfreight has conceded that the 

damage occurred while the carpets were already in its custody. 

Plaintiffs point to the November 24, 2008 e-mail from 

Mainfreight employee Andrews to ICC employee Kober, which as 

described above, stated: "We are not able to determine exactly 

where or when the damage occurred. The damage happened while 

the cargo was in the care of our carrier." Pls.' Ex. 15. 

However, Andrews' statement is inherently contradictory, and as 

such, it is stretch to say that Mainfreight has conceded 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 18 of 23
19

 Plaintiffs also claim that the material witnesses are 

located not in California but rather in New York. Specifically, 

plaintiffs point to ICC employees Kober and Nuzio and Stark 

Carpet employees Benis and Meistrich. However, these 

individuals have limited to no knowledge as to when and where 

the damage occurred, as evidenced by their inconclusive 

investigation. See Pls. Exs. 7-11, 13. Although these 

individuals may certainly have some relevant information, the 

issue of where and when the damage occurred can more likely be 

answered by the California-based witnesses described above. 

Similarly, plaintiffs argue that New York-based F.I.C. employees 

J. Scott Scherban and Rose DePino are material witnesses because 

they "may have to offer testimony about the insurance coverage, 

claim adjustment . . . and payment of the claim." Pls.' Mem. 

Opp'n at 11. However, there is no evidence in the record that 

these individuals have any personal knowledge as to when and 

where the carpet damage occurred. 

Finally, plaintiffs contend that Mainfreight employees 

Nowicki and Andrews are material witnesses. While they may 

indeed be material, Nowicki and Andrews are in North Carolina, 

                                                                                                                                                                              

liability. Additionally, as is evident from the record, the 

investigation into the damage was inconclusive, and Andrews may 

have had no basis for his statement. Moreover, Andrews' 

statement is possibly inadmissible hearsay; it is unclear 

whether it qualifies an admission by a party-opponent under the 

Federal Rules of Evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(c). 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 19 of 23
20

not New York. Thus, because the majority of the material 

witnesses are located in California, the convenience and 

attendance of the witnesses strongly weighs in favor of transfer 

to the Southern District of California. 

iii. Convenience of the Parties 

Plaintiffs concede that this factor is neutral because 

"plaintiffs are in New York and defendants are in California."18

 Pls.' Mem. in Opp'n at 14. Plaintiffs are correct that "[t]he 

convenience of the parties becomes a neutral factor in the 

transfer analysis if transferring venue would merely shift the 

inconvenience to the other party." IDT Domestic Telecom, Inc. 

v. Estrella Telecom, Inc., No. 09-CV-10436, 2010 WL 1047648, at 

*3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010). However, the third-party 

defendants in this action, Scripps and Now Express, are both 

located in California, which adds some weight to this factor in 

favor of transfer.19

                                                      

18 Despite plaintiffs' statement that "defendants are in 

California," plaintiffs also state that Bax is located in 

Jamaica, Queens and that Mainfreight is incorporated in New 

York. See Pls. Decl. in Opp'n at ¶¶ 5 and 7. Thus, it must be 

that their statement, "defendants are in California," refers to 

the fact that Mainfreight and Bax also have offices and 

warehouses in California and that these were the offices and 

warehouses involved in the shipment at issue.

19 It is unclear whether this district has personal jurisdiction 

over Scripps or Now Express, both of whom Mainfreight has 

impleaded but have not yet appeared. On the other hand, the 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 20 of 23
21

iv. The Locus of Operative Facts 

Turning next to the location of events giving rise to the 

action, it is clear that the damage to the carpets occurred 

either in California, Georgia or somewhere in between. In any 

event, it is undisputed that the damage did not occur in this 

district. Although it is not clear that the damage occurred in 

the Southern District of California, it is also undisputed that 

the shipment originated there. Thus, it is, at the very least, 

possible that the damage at issue in this case occurred there. 

As such, this factor weighs in favor of a transfer to 

California. See, e.g., Centennial Ins. Co. v. Burlington Air 

Exp. Inc., No. 97-CV-8512, 1998 WL 323486, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 

17, 1998) (granting a motion to transfer venue from the Southern 

District of New York to the Western District of Tennessee when 

                                                                                                                                                                              

Southern District of California would certainly have personal 

jurisdiction over all of the parties here, including Scripps and 

Now Express. This issue of personal jurisdiction is reason 

enough to grant defendants' motion to transfer venue. See

Myers, 2010 WL 1992200, at *7 ("The ability to implead a third 

party is a significant consideration on a motion to transfer."); 

Posven, C.A. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 303 F. Supp. 2d 391, 406 

(S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("[I]t is well established that the ability to 

implead a third-party in the proposed transferee forum and 

thereby resolve related claims in a single action weighs heavily 

in favor of transfer."); see also Winona Foods, Inc. v. Timothy 

J. Kennedy, Inc., No. 07-CV-1003, 2008 WL 2570600, at *2 (E.D. 

Wis. June 26, 2008) (granting transfer of venue where there was 

no personal jurisdiction over defendants even though venue was 

technically proper under the Carmack Amendment and noting that 

the Carmack Amendment's "specific venue provisions are not a 

substitute for personal jurisdiction — the court must still 

ensure at the outset that it has the power to compel the 

defendant to appear in its court").

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 21 of 23
22

the damaged shipment at issue never passed through New York but 

originated in Memphis). 

 

v. Forum Familiar with Substantive Law 

"Where an action does not involve complex questions of 

another state's laws, courts in this district accord little 

weight to this factor on a motion to transfer." Merkur v. 

Wyndham Int'l, Inc., No. 00-CV-5843, 2001 WL 477268, at *5 

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2001). Here, because plaintiffs bring this 

action as a violation of federal interstate commerce law, there 

are no "complex questions of another state's laws." 

Accordingly, this factor does not weigh heavily in either 

direction. 

Although no single factor in the § 1404(a) analysis is 

dispositive, defendants have met their burden to demonstrate 

that transfer is indicated for convenience and in the interests 

of justice. In particular, the convenience and attendance of 

the witnesses strongly weighs in favor of defendants' transfer 

of venue motion. 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 22 of 23
23

Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to transfer 

venue to the Southern District of California pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1404(a) is granted. 

Dated: Brooklyn, New York 

 September 20, 2010 

 

 

 

SO ORDERED: 

 /s/ 

David G. Trager 

United States District Judge 

Case 3:10-cv-02181-W-NLS Document 44 Filed 09/20/10 Page 23 of 23