Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00070/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00070-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Westley Nat Lewis, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan; et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 11-70-TUC-JGZ (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s pro se Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 (Doc. 5). Respondents have filed an Answer (Doc.

10). Petitioner did not file a Reply.

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to the

undersigned Magistrate Judge for Report and Recommendation. For the following reasons

the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court dismiss and deny the Amended

Petition.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Petitioner’s Conviction

In 2005, a grand jury sitting in Pima County Superior Court, Tucson, Arizona,

indicted Petitioner on charges of second-degree burglary and theft by control. (Answer,

Exh. A, p.1; Answer Exh. B, p.1). The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts as

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follows:

As [Petitioner] states in his opening brief, “Forensic evidence–three

partial fingerprints and a DNA match indicated...that [Petitioner] had been in

contact with objects inside a Tucson apartment in March 2005 while the

occupants were away.” But, in addition, the victim testified that her bedroom

had been ransacked by someone who had obviously been “going through [her]

stuff” after having gained entry by breaking the bedroom window with a rock.

Among the items the burglar had disturbed was a piggy bank that the

victim kept on her desk. After the burglary, the piggy bank was found lying

on the floor of the victim’s bedroom, missing the thirty to fifty dollars it had

previously contained. Three fingerprints found on the piggy bank proved to

be [Petitioner’s]. 

(Answer, Exh. A, p.5 (footnote omitted)).

A jury found Petitioner guilty of the burglary charge but acquitted him of theft. (Id.

at p.1). After the trial court found Petitioner had three historical prior felony convictions and

had committed the burglary offense while on probation, Petitioner was sentenced to an

enhanced, presumptive prison term of 11.25 years. (Id. at p.2). 

B. Direct Appeal

Petitioner filed a direct appeal wherein he argued that the trial court erred in refusing

his proffered jury instruction on first-degree criminal trespass, which he claimed was a

lesser-included offense of second-degree burglary. (Answer, Exh. B). In affirming

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence, the appellate court relied on Arizona precedent that

“‘[c]riminal trespass is not necessarily a lesser included offense of burglary....’” Answer,

Exh. A, p. 4 (quoting State v. Malloy, 131 Ariz. 125, 131, 639 P.2d 315, 321 (1981)). The

court also found that the proffered instruction was not supported by the evidence because “all

the elements of the charged offense were established by the evidence presented.” (Id. at ¶11).

 Thereafter, Petitioner raised the same claim in his Petition for Review to the Arizona

Supreme Court. (Answer, Exh. C). The court denied review on March 18, 2008. (Answer,

Exh. D).

C. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On April 7, 2008, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Answer, Exh.

I). Thereafter, through counsel, Petitioner filed a Post-Conviction Relief (hereinafter “PCR”)

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Petition pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Answer, Exh. E).

Petitioner, citing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, argued that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to file a post-trial motion for dismissal on the ground that the evidence

was insufficient to support conviction. (Id.). The trial court denied relief without a hearing.

(Answer, Exh. F). Petitioner filed a petition for appellate court review raising the same issue.

(Answer, Exh. G). The appellate court granted review, but denied relief. (Answer, Exh. H).

Although Petitioner received an extension of time to file a petition for review with the

Arizona Supreme Court, he did not seek such review. (Answer, Exh. J, K; Petition, p.5). On

January 20, 2010, the mandate issued. (Answer, Exh. K).

D. Amended Federal Habeas Petition

On January 26, 2011, the Clerk of Court file-stamped Petitioner’s Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. (Doc. 1). The Petition was signed by

Petitioner and placed in the prison mailing system on January 20, 2011. (Id.). A federal

habeas petition is deemed filed when handed by the inmate to a prison official for mailing.

See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-271 (1988); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1245 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Under the prison mailbox rule...a pro se petitioner's petition is

deemed constructively filed at the moment it is delivered to prison officials to be forwarded

to the court clerk."). On February 9, 2011, the Court dismissed Petitioner’s Petition for

failure to name his custodian as a respondent and for failure to allege in each count the

federal constitutional right that he claims was violated. (Doc. 4). The Court granted

Petitioner leave to file an Amended Petition. (Id.). On March 3, 2011, the Court file-stamped

Petitioner’s Amended Petition, which he signed and placed in the prison mailing system on

March 1, 2011. (Doc. 5). 

In his Amended Petition, Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief:

1. The trial court violated Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right to due process

when it denied his request for a jury instruction on criminal trespass as a

lesser-included offense (Ground I);

2. Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right was violated because trial counsel was

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ineffective for failing to file a post-trial motion for dismissal based on lack of

evidence (Ground II); and

3. Petitioner was denied his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth and Sixth

Amendments with regard to his right to a fair trial, the presumption of

innocence, and to be represented effectively.

(Petition, pp. 6-7).

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s Amended Petition is untimely filed. (Answer,

pp. 4-7). Alternatively, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s Grounds I and III are

procedurally defaulted and Ground II lacks merit. (Id. at pp. 7-19).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”)

applies to federal habeas petitions, like Petitioner’s, that are filed after April 24, 1996. See

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). The AEDPA "imposes a one-year statute of

limitations on habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in federal court." Patterson,

251 F.3d at 1245 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)). Pursuant to section 2244, the limitations

period:

shall run from the latest of– 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

Additionally, the AEDPA limitations period is statutorily tolled when a "properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

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judgment or claim is pending...." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Moreover, the AEDPA limitations

period may also be subject to equitable tolling. Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008,

1011 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Respondents concede that Petitioner’s “Amended Petition relates back to the original

filing date of January 20, 2011, for time calculation purposes.” (Answer, p. 4 (citing

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2)). Respondents recognize that Petitioner filed the instant action “on the

one-year anniversary of the entry of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ mandate in his

[PCR]...proceedings....” (Answer, p. 6). Respondents argue that “Petitioner’s conviction

became final on October 8, 2009, the date of the state appellate court decision denying

collateral review”, and not the latter date of January 20, 2010 when the mandate issued in

that proceeding. (Id. at p.5).

Under the AEDPA, in pertinent part, the limitations period commences, on “[t]he date

on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review[.]” 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A). The period for direct review

includes the 90-day period during which a petitioner can file a petition for writ of certiorari

to the United States Supreme Court. Bowen v. Row, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999).

Respondents acknowledge that “[b]efore the 90-day period for seeking certiorari expired,

Petitioner initiated [PCR]...proceedings by filing his notice of post-conviction [relief] on

April 7, 2008.” (Answer, p. 5). Thus, at the end of the 90-day period for seeking certiorari,

Petitioner’s conviction became final. See Bowen, 188 F.3d at 1159. However, because

Petitioner had filed his PCR Petition by that time, the limitations period was immediately

tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Respondents correctly point out that the 90-day period for filing a petition for writ of

certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is not added to the time collateral review

proceedings are pending in state court. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 332 (2007).

Respondents argue that “Petitioner’s filing his federal petition on the one-year anniversary

of the entry of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ mandate in his [PCR]...proceedings does not

comport with the AEDPA’s statute of limitations.” (Answer, p.6). According to

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Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.23(a), 

[i]f there has been no motion for reconsideration and no petition for review

filed, the clerk of the Court of Appeals shall issue the mandate at the

expiration of time for the filing of such motion or petition.” 

(emphasis added). 

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Respondents, the statute of limitations expired in either: October 2010, one year after the

Arizona Court of Appeals issued its decision denying PCR relief; or in December 2010, one

year from the date Petitioner’s petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court in was due

in the post-conviction relief proceeding. (Id., at p.5). Respondents contend that in either

event, Petitioner’s “January 20, 2011 petition is still untimely.” (Id.).

Until an application for state post-conviction relief has achieved final resolution

through the State’s post-conviction procedure, it remains “pending” for purposes of the

tolling provision at section 2244(d)(2). Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-220 (2002);

Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007). The United States Supreme Court

has stated:

Read naturally, the text of the statute must mean that the statute of limitations

is tolled only while state courts review the application. As we stated in Carey

v. Saffold, 536 U.S. [at] 220,... (internal quotation marks omitted), a state

postconviction application “remains pending” “until the application has

achieved final resolution through the State's postconviction procedures.”

...State review ends when the state courts have finally resolved an application

for state postconviction relief. After the State's highest court has issued its

mandate or denied review, no other state avenues for relief remain open. And

an application for state postconviction review no longer exists. 

Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 332 (emphasis added). “In Arizona, when the court of appeals grants

review of a petition, but denies the petition, [as in the instant case,] direct review is not final

until the mandate has issued.” Ramon v. Ryan, 2010 WL 3564819, *6 (D. Ariz. July 23,

2010) (citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.23(a)1

). See also Celaya v. Stewart, 691 F.Supp.2d 1046,

1055, 1074-1075, (D.Ariz. 2010). Respondents’ argument to the contrary, which relies

primarily on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hemmerle, is misplaced given that Hemmerle did

not involve a situation where the appellate court granted review but denied relief in the postconviction proceeding. Moreover, Hemmerle, in pertinent part, addressed whether a letter

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issued from the clerk of the court of appeals facilitating the performance of the ministerial

function of returning the record to the trial court after the Arizona Supreme Court’s denial

of review factored into the tolling period under section 2244(d)(2). Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at

1077. In deciding that the post-conviction proceeding was not pending for purposes of

AEDPA’s tolling provision when the letter issued, the Hemmerle court pointed out that the

letter was not a mandate, nor was it the equivalent to the issuance of a mandate. Id. Herein,

unlike Hemmerle, review was granted by the appellate court and a mandate in fact issued.

On the instant facts, the AEDPA statute of limitations was tolled until January 20, 2010 when

the mandate issued in the post-conviction relief proceedings. See Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 332;

Ramon, 2010 WL 3564819, at *6; Celaya, 691 F.Supp.2d at 1055, 1074-1075. Petitioner had

one year from that date to file his federal habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244. As

Respondents acknowledge, Petitioner’s Amended Petition relates back to January 20, 2011,

the date he filed his original petition. Petitioner’s Amended Petition is timely filed under the

AEDPA. 

B. Whether Grounds I and III are Procedurally Defaulted

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s Ground I and III are procedurally defaulted and,

thus, precluded from federal habeas review.

1. Standard

a. Exhaustion

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner

has exhausted the state court remedies available to him 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27(2004); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989). The exhaustion inquiry

focuses on the availability of state court remedies at the time the petition for writ of habeas

corpus is filed in federal court. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). Exhaustion

generally requires that a prisoner provide the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims

before he presents those claims to a federal court. Id. A petitioner has not exhausted a claim

for relief so long as the petitioner has a right under state law to raise the claim by available

procedure. See Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 

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To meet the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have “‘fairly present[ed]’ his

claim in each appropriate state court...thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the

claim.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995).

A petitioner fairly presents a claim to the state court by describing the factual or legal bases

for that claim and by alerting the state court "to the fact that the...[petitioner is] asserting

claims under the United States Constitution." Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. See also Tamalini

v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). Mere similarity between a claim raised

in state court and a claim in a federal habeas petition is insufficient. Duncan, 513 U.S. at

365-66.

Furthermore, to fairly present a claim, the petitioner "must give the state courts one

full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the

State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. Once a federal

claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.

See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). In habeas petitions, other than those

concerning life sentences or capital cases, the claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted

if they have been fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on appeal of the

conviction or through a collateral proceeding pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied

529 U.S. 1124 (2000). Thus, “[a] petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court

for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the

proper forum..., (2) through the proper vehicle..., and (3) by providing the proper factual and

legal basis for the claim....” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citations omitted).

b. Procedural Default

In some instances, a claim can be technically exhausted even though the state court

did not address the merits. This situation is referred to as "procedural bar" or "procedural

default." See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has

defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion;

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The Ninth Circuit has suggested that, under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, there are exceptions

to the rule that a district court can decide whether state remedies remain available for claims

that require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. See Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d

614 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1172 (2006). The issue of waiver must be

affirmatively raised by the petitioner. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 & n.5 (9th Cir.

2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1053 (2003).

3

Such claims include: (1) that the petitioner is being held in custody after his sentence

has expired; (2) certain circumstances where newly discovered material facts probably exist

and such facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence; (3) the petitioner's

failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief was without fault on his part; (4) there

has been a significant change in the law that would probably overturn petitioner's conviction

if applied to his case; and (5) the petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence

that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable factfinder would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)

(citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h)). 

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there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”). A claim is procedurally

defaulted if the state court declined to address the issue on the merits for procedural reasons

such as waiver or preclusion. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Franklin

v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002). A higher court’s subsequent summary denial

reaffirms the lower court’s application of a procedural bar. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803.

Additionally, procedural default also occurs if the claim was not presented to the state

court and it is clear the state court would now refuse to address the merits of the claim for

procedural reasons. Id. Thus, if a claim has never been presented to the state court, a federal

habeas court may determine whether state remedies remain available.2

 See Harris v. Reed,

489 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1989); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. In Arizona, such a determination

often involves consideration of Rule 32 et seq. of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

governing post-conviction relief proceedings. For example, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 specifies

when a petitioner may seek relief in post-conviction proceedings based on federal

constitutional challenges to convictions or sentences. Under Rule 32.2, relief is barred, inter

alia, on any claim which could have been raised on direct appeal or could have been raised

in a prior Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief, with the exception of certain claims3

which were justifiably omitted from a prior petition. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2. Moreover, a state

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post-conviction action is futile when it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v.

Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from

preclusion under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)).

Both of these instances of procedural default provide an independent and adequate

state-law ground for the conviction and sentence and thus prevents federal habeas corpus

review. Accordingly, the procedural default doctrine prevents state prisoners from obtaining

federal review by allowing the time to run on available state remedies and then rushing to

federal court seeking review. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-732.

A federal court may not consider a claim that is procedurally defaulted unless the

petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice to excuse the default, or demonstrates a

fundamental miscarriage of justice would result. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-162

(1996); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-495 (1986); Coleman, 501 U.S. at

750; Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.

298, 321 (1995); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. Generally, “cause” sufficient “to excuse a

default exists if the petitioner ‘can show that some objective factor external to the defense

impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.’” Cook, 538 F.3d at

1027 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). Prejudice is defined as actual harm resulting from

the constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir.

1984). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate that the alleged constitutional

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)

(emphasis in original). If the petitioner fails to establish cause sufficient to excuse a

procedural default, the court “need not consider whether he suffered actual prejudice.” Cook,

538 F.3d at 1028 n.13. 

To fall within the narrow class of cases that implicates a fundamental miscarriage of

justice, a petitioner “must come forward with sufficient proof of his actual innocence” which

“can be shown when a petitioner presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot

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have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was

free of nonharmless constitutional error.” Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 672-73 (9th

Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316.

The Supreme Court has stated that “actual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal

insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). “‘To be credible,...a

claim [of actual innocence] requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional

error with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy

eye-witness accounts, or critical physical evidence–that was not presented at trial.’” Cook,

538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324).

 c. Conclusion

In summary, failure to exhaust and procedural default/bar are different concepts.

Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1230-1231. Under both doctrines, the federal court may be required

to refuse to hear a habeas claim. Id. The difference between the two is that when a petitioner

fails to exhaust, he may still be able to return to state court to present his claims there. Id.

In contrast, "[w]hen a petitioner's claims are procedurally barred and a petitioner cannot show

cause and prejudice for the default [or a fundamental miscarriage of justice]...the district

court dismisses the petition because the petitioner has no further recourse in state court." Id.

at 1231.

2. Ground I

In Ground I of the Amended Petition, Petitioner claims that he was deprived of his

Fifth Amendment right to due process when the trial court denied his request for a jury

instruction on criminal trespass, which Petitioner argues is a lesser-included offense of

second degree burglary, the charged offense. (Amended Petition, p. 6). Respondents

contend that Petitioner did not cite a federal basis when he raised the issue of the jury

instruction on direct appeal. (Answer, p. 11). Respondents also contend that defining

criminal conduct is a matter of state law and is not a matter appropriate for federal habeas

review. (Id.).

It is the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifth Amendment that protects a person

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against deprivations of due process by a state. See U.S. Const. amend XIV, §1 (“nor shall

any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”);

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1002 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The Fifth Amendment

prohibits the federal government from depriving persons of due process, while the Fourteenth

Amendment explicitly prohibits deprivations without due process by the several States.”).

Because the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause does not provide a cognizable ground for

relief regarding Petitioner’s state court conviction, his allegations under the Fifth

Amendment Due Process Clause should be dismissed.

Moreover, even had Petitioner alleged a Fourteenth Amendment due process

violation, Respondents are correct that he failed to fairly present such a claim to the state

court.

To exhaust a federal claim, a petitioner must fairly present the claim in state court.

Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2005). A petitioner fairly presents his

claims to the state court “only if he alerted the state court that his claim[] rested on the

federal Constitution....In order to alert the state court, a petitioner must make reference to

provisions of the federal Constitution or must cite either federal or state case law that engages

in a federal constitutional analysis.” Id. at 1020-1021 (citations omitted); see also Castillo,

399 at 999 (“In short, the petitioner must have either referenced specific provisions of the

federal constitution or cited to federal or state cases involving the legal standard for a federal

constitutional violation.”). Further, it is not “enough to raise a state claim that is analogous

or closely similar to a federal claim.” Castillo, 399 F.3d at 999. Thus, where a petitioner

raises an issue of exclusively state law to the state court and fails to apprise the state court

that he is also raising a federal claim, he has failed to fairly present his federal claim. See Id.

at 1002. Moreover, “[w]hen a petitioner does not label his claim as federal, the mere citation

to a state court case that engages in both state and federal constitutional analysis does not

suffice to exhaust the federal claim.” Fields, 401 F.3d at 1022 (citing Casey v. Moore, 386

F.3d 896, 912 n.13 (9th Cir. 2004)).

Petitioner argued on direct appeal that the trial court erred as a matter of law by

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4

“Beck held unconstitutional an Alabama statute that prohibited a trial court from

instructing the jury on any lesser included offense in a capital murder prosecution. The

Supreme Court found that such a restriction might lead a jury to convict a defendant of

capital murder, despite jurors' reasonable doubts, merely because the jurors thought the

defendant was guilty of some crime and should therefore be punished. [Beck, 447 U.S.]...at

642–43....” Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 343, ¶63, 111 P.3d at 386.

5

Hughes includes the following citation: “See State v. Engram, 171 Ariz. 363, 831

P.2d 362, 363-365 (Ct.App.1991) (affirming trial court's entry of judgment of conviction on

the greater charge (second-degree burglary) when jury returned ‘guilty’ verdicts on both the

greater charge and its lesser-included offense (criminal trespass)) (collecting cases)

(suggesting that error should have been pointed out to jury, which should have then been

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refusing his request for a jury instruction on criminal trespass. (Answer, Exh. B, pp. 9-15).

Petitioner’s argument on direct appeal addressed whether, under Arizona law, criminal

trespass is a lesser-included offense of second-degree burglary. (Id.). Review of the cases

cited by Petitioner on direct appeal reflect that Petitioner cited no federal cases and he made

no mention of the federal constitution or the issue of a federal due process violation. Of the

cases Petitioner cited, only two, State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, 111 P.3d 369 (2005), and

State v. Hughes, 635 N.W.2d 661 (Wis.App. 2001), mentioned a due process violation

associated with denial of a lesser-included instruction. In Anderson, the Arizona court

addressed and rejected the argument that the trial court’s denial of an aggravated assault

instruction in a capital case violated the defendant’s due process rights under Beck v.

Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).4 Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 344, ¶¶63-65, 111 P.3d at 386.

Petitioner cited Anderson in the portion of his brief labeled “Standard of Review” and he

relied on the case solely for the premise that “[a] trial court’s denial of a requested jury

instruction either is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327,

343, ¶ 60, 111 P.3d 369, 385 (2005), or for fundamental error, State v. Miranda, 200 Ariz.

67, 68, ¶2, 22 P.3d 506, 507 (2001).” (Answer, Exh. B, p. 9). Petitioner cited Hughes to

support his argument that the charge of criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of

second-degree burglary. (Id. at p. 14 (citing Hughes, 635 N.W.2d at 666)).5

 Elsewhere in

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permitted to deliberate further)....” Hughes, 635 N.W.2d at 666.

6

With specific regard to jury instructions, Moody argued that: (1) the court improperly

instructed the jury on the effect of intoxication which he claimed resulted in a violation of

the federal ex post facto clause; and (2) the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the

consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity violated his right to federal due

process. Moody also raised federal constitutional issues regarding the right to counsel,

double jeopardy, violation of due process with regard to the presentation of false evidence,

failure to properly voir dire the jury, and a range of sentencing issues. 

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the Hughes decision, the court mentioned the defendant’s claim that the trial court

disregarded the jury’s verdict in violation of his constitutional rights. Hughes, 635 N.W.2d

at 664. The court rejected the claim without engaging in a federal constitutional analysis

because the defendant failed to explain how the jury’s verdict violated any of his

constitutional rights. Id.

Likewise, review of Petitioner’s Petition of Review to the Arizona Supreme Court in

the direct appeal proceeding reflects that Petitioner cited no federal cases and he made no

mention of a federal due process violation. (Answer, Exh. C). Of the state cases cited in his

Petition for Review, only two mention the federal constitution. Petitioner cited State v. Rood,

11 Ariz. App. 102, 104-105, 462 P.2d 399, 401-402 (App. 1969) in a footnote regarding the

intent element of burglary. (Id. at p. 4 n. 3). Rood mentions, without discussion, that the

defendant, in addition to other claims, also raised federal equal protection and due process

claims regarding the failure to provide counsel at a preliminary hearing. Rood, 11 Ariz. App.

at 103, 462 P.2d at 400. Petitioner quoted State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 466, ¶189, 94 P.3d

1119, 1161 (2004) in his “Standards of Review” section as follows: “‘[W]e review de novo

a claim that a jury instruction misstates the law.’” (Answer, Exh. C, p. 5). Moody, a capital

case, involved a plethora of federal constitutional claims including due process claims.

However, none of those claims involved the issue of lesser-included offenses or are

otherwise remotely relevant to Petitioner’s argument on direct appeal.6

 

“For a federal issue to be presented by the citation of a state decision dealing with

both state and federal issues relevant to the claim, the citation must be accompanied by some

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clear indication that the case involves federal issues. Where...the citation to the state case

has no signal in the text of the brief that the petitioner raises federal claims or relies on state

law cases that resolve federal issues, the federal claim is not fairly presented.” Casey, 386

F.3d at 912 n.13 (holding that in such situation, the petitioner failed to fairly present federal

claim). To any extent that the Anderson court’s due process discussion in context of the Beck

decision may be relevant to Petitioner’s appeal, the record is clear that Petitioner did not cite

Anderson for that premise. (See Answer, Exh. B, p. 9 (citing Anderson for purpose of

standard or review)). Further, Hughes did not engage in a constitutional analysis, and

Petitioner cited to Hughes not on constitutional law issues, but to support his theory that

under state law, criminal trespass constituted a lesser-included offense of second-degree

burglary. Here, Petitioner gave no signal that he relied on Anderson or Hughes to either raise

or resolve a federal issue. Finally, neither Rood nor Moody engaged a constitutional analysis

relevant to Petitioner’s claim and he did not rely on those cases to support any federal

constitutional argument. Under the instant circumstances, Petitioner failed to fairly present

a federal due process claim to the state court. See Casey, 386 F.3d at 912 n.13.

3. Ground III

In Ground III, Petitioner claims that his rights under the Fourteenth and Sixth

Amendments were violated. (Petition, p. 8). Petitioner asserts that the he “had a right to a

fair trial and presumed [sic] innocent in every phase of the case...I should have had [sic]

opportunity of the lesser crime and the right to be represented correctly.” (Id.). Respondents

argue that Ground III was not exhausted. (Answer, p.12).

Respondents are correct, as discussed, supra, at II.B.2., Petitioner never raised a

federal due process issue with regard to the trial court’s rejection of the lesser-included

offense instruction. Nor did he argue that the trial court proceedings violated his federal

constitutional right to be presumed innocent. Petitioner has exhausted his Ground II claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to counsel’s failure to file a post-trial motion

arguing lack of sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner of second-degree burglary. In

Ground III, Petitioner states that he “had the right to be represented correctly.” (Petition, p.

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7

Because this claim is procedurally defaulted pursuant to Rule 32.4(a),

Ariz.R.Crim.P., this Court need not determine whether the claims are of “sufficient

constitutional magnitude” to require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver such that

the claims are precluded pursuant to Cassett. Moreover, the procedural timeliness bar of Rule

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8). In Ground III, Petitioner provides no factual basis to support an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim. It is well settled that “[c]onclusory allegations [of ineffective assistance of

counsel] which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas

relief.” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (a petitioner “making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the

acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable

professional judgment.”). Further, Petitioner’s exhaustion of the ineffective assistance of

council claim raised in Ground II does not exhaust other, unrelated claims of ineffective

assistant of counsel. See Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2005) (new

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel not previously raised before the state court

cannot be addressed on habeas review); Date v. Schriro, 619 F.Supp.2d 736, 788 (D.Ariz.

2008) (same).

4. Petitioner’s Ground I and Ground III are Procedurally Defaulted

Petitioner’s return to state court to raise Grounds I and III would be futile given that

the claims are precluded as waived under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) because they were not

presented on direct appeal or in Petitioner’s PCR Petition. Further, presentation of such

claims in a second post-conviction relief proceeding would be untimely under Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.4. See Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (a state post-conviction action is futile when it is timebarred). Nor do the claims qualify for any of the timeliness exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.1(d)-(h). Thus, any additional petition would be subject to summary dismissal. See State

v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266, 987 P.2d 226, 228 (App. 1999); State v. Jones, 182 Ariz. 432,

897 P.2d 734 (App. 1995); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 135, 962 P.2d 205, 209

(1998) (timeliness is a separate inquiry from preclusion). Under such circumstances, the

claims raised in Grounds I and III are procedurally defaulted.7 Park v. California, 202 F.3d

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32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P., is clear, consistently applied, and well established. Powell v.

Lambert, 357 F.3d 871 (9th Cir.2004); see e.g., Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 987 P.2d 226 (where

petitioner did not raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d) through (g), the petition could be

summarily dismissed if untimely); Moreno, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (timeliness

provision of Rule 32.4(a) became effective September 20, 1992); Jones, 182 Ariz. at 434,

897 P.2d at 736 (Rule 32.4(a) was amended “to address potential abuse by defendants caused

by the old rule's unlimited filing periods”); see also Wagner v. Stewart, 2008 WL 169639,

*9 (D.Ariz. Jan. 16, 2008).

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1146, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2000) (federal habeas review is precluded where petitioner has not

raised his claim in the state courts and the time for doing so has expired). Petitioner has not

demonstrated cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default. Nor has Petitioner

presented any evidence that would sustain application of the “fundamental miscarriage of

justice exception” to the procedural default rule on this issue.

C. Review of the Merits of Ground II

Petitioner claims that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel

was violated when his trial counsel failed to file a post-trial motion based on lack of

sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner of second-degree burglary in light of the jury’s

acquittal on the theft charge. (Petition, p. 7). 

1. Standard

Pursuant to the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”), the Court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state

court proceeding:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. §2254(d). Section 2254(d)(1) applies to challenges to purely legal questions

resolved by the state court and section 2254(d)(2) applies to purely factual questions resolved

by the state court. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the

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8

“[T]he only definitive source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA is the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412...While circuit law may be ‘persuasive authority’ for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law, Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999), only the

Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

reasonably applied.” Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069 (emphasis in original).

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question whether a state court erred in applying the law is a different question from whether

it erred in determining the facts. Rice v. Collins 546 U.S. 333 (2006). 

Section 2254(d)(1) consists of two alternative tests, i.e., the “contrary to” test and the

“unreasonable application” test. See Cordova v. Baca, 346 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2003).

Under the first test, the state court’s “decision is contrary to clearly established federal law

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling authority

to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result.” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir.

2003)(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413-14 (2000)). Additionally, a state court’s

decision is “‘contrary to’ Supreme Court case law if the state court ‘applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in’ Supreme Court cases.”8 Van Lynn v. Farmon, 347

F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). “Whether a

state court’s interpretation of federal law is contrary to Supreme Court authority...is a

question of federal law as to which [the federal courts]...owe no deference to the state

courts.” Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929 (emphasis in original)(distinguishing deference owed

under the “contrary to” test of section (d)(1) with that owed under the “unreasonable

application” test). 

Under the second test, “‘[a] state court’s decision involves an unreasonable

application of federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle...but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.’” Van

Lynn, 347 F.3d at 738 (quoting Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067). Under the “unreasonable

application clause...a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

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9

Section 2254(d) applies even where there has been a summary denial. Cullen v.

Pinholster, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1402 (2011). In such circumstances, the petitioner

can satisfy the “unreasonable application” prong of section 2254(d)(1) “only by showing that

‘there was no reasonable basis’ for the...” state court’s decision. Id. (quoting Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784 (2011)).

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concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly....Rather that application must be

objectively unreasonable.’” Clark, 331 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Lockyear v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63 (2003)). When evaluating whether the state decision amounts to an unreasonable

application of federal law, “[f]ederal courts owe substantial deference to state court

interpretations of federal law....” Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929.9

 

Further, a federal habeas court can only look to the record before the state court in

reviewing a state court decision under section 2254(d)(1). Cullen, __ U.S. at __, 131 S.Ct.

at 1400 (“If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas

petitioner must overcome the limitation of §2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that

state court.”)(footnote omitted); Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652 (2004)(“[W]e have

made clear that whether a state court’s decision was unreasonable must be assessed in light

of the record the court had before it.”)(citations omitted).

Under section 2254(d)(2), which involves purely factual questions resolved by the

state court, “the question on review is whether an appellate panel, applying the normal

standards of appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the

record.” Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978: see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied 543 U.S. 1038 (2004)(“a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s factfinding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court

was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.”). Section (d)(2) “applies most readily to

situations where petitioner challenges the state court’s findings based entirely on the state

record. Such a challenge may be based on the claim that the finding is unsupported by

sufficient evidence,...that the process employed by the state court is defective...or that no

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10Under the AEDPA “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall

be presumed to be correct” and the presumption of correctness may be overcome only by

clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1). The “AEDPA spells out what this

presumption means: State-court fact-finding may be overturned based on new evidence

presented for the first time in federal court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and

convincing proof that the state-court finding is in error....Significantly, the presumption of

correctness and the clear-and-convincing standard of proof only come into play once...” it

is found that the state court reasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the state proceeding. Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. 

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finding was made by the state court at all.” Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999 (citation omitted). In

examining the record under section 2254(d)(2), the federal court “must be particularly

deferential to our state court colleagues...[M]ere doubt as to the adequacy of the state court’s

findings of fact is insufficient; ‘we must be satisfied that any appellate court to whom the

defect [in the state court’s fact-finding process] is pointed out would be unreasonable in

holding that the state court’s fact-finding process was adequate.’” Lambert. 393 F.3d at 972

(quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000)(emphasis in original). 

Once the federal court is satisfied that the state court’s fact-finding process was

reasonable, or where the petitioner does not challenge such findings, “the state court’s

findings are dressed in a presumption of correctness, which then helps steel them against any

challenge based on extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence presented for the first time in federal

court.”10 Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000: see also 28 U.S.C. §2254(c). Factual and credibility

determinations by either state trial or appellate courts are imbued with a presumption of

correctness. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1); Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002);

Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1078 (9th Cir. 2001), amended 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.

2001). Furthermore, factual assertions made in support of properly exhausted claims in state

court cannot be altered or expanded upon without permission of the federal habeas court. See

Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999).

Both section 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) may apply where the petitioner raises issues of

mixed questions of law and fact. Such questions “receive similarly mixed review; the state

court’s ultimate conclusion is reviewed under section 2254(d)(1), but its underlying factual

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findings supporting that conclusion are clothed with all of the deferential protection

ordinarily afforded factual findings under §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1).” Lambert, 393 F.3d at

978.

2. The State Court Proceedings

Petitioner raised his Ground III claim in his PCR Petition. (Answer, Exh. E). In

ruling on Petitioner’s PCR Petition, the trial court cited Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1994), in addition to state cases, for the standard of review for resolving claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Answer, Exh. F, pp. 2-3). The trial court denied

Petitioner’s claim because Petitioner “failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the

[post-trial] motion would have succeeded.” (Id. at p.3). 

On review, the appellate court, citing Strickland in addition to state cases for the

standard of review for resolving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, denied relief.

(Answer, Exh. H). The appellate court recognized that “[w]e essentially resolved the

predicate for [Petitioner’s] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when we determined

on appeal that the evidence at trial had established all the elements of the charged offense of

second-degree burglary.” (Id. at p. 4). The court also acknowledged Petitioner’s contention

that the verdicts in his case were inconsistent and, thus, there was insufficient evidence to

support his conviction for burglary: “if the jury determined he had not stolen the victim’s

property, he claims, then there was no basis on which it could have found he had broken into

the apartment intending to commit a theft....He contends trial counsel therefore performed

deficiently...” by not filing a post-trial motion arguing that the evidence was insufficient to

support the conviction. (Id.). The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s analysis, which

the appellate court quoted as follows:

“Here, the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the

motion [for new trial] would have succeeded. To set aside a jury verdict for

insufficient evidence, it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever

is there sufficient evidence to support the conclusion reached by the jury. In

burglary cases like the case at hand, achieving success while attempting a theft

is not required under A.R.S. §13-1507(A). The statute defines burglary in the

second degree as ‘entering or remaining unlawfully in or on a residential

structure with the intent to commit any theft or felony therein.’ The crime of

burglary is complete when entrance to the structures is made with the requisite

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criminal intent. Burglary does not require the successful completion of the

theft or underlying felony. Acquittal of that underlying charge does not

necessitate an acquittal on the separate and distinct charge of

burglary....Therefore, a motion for a new trial based on lack of sufficient

evidence would likely have been unsuccessful had it been filed by the

Petitioner’s trial counsel. Accordingly, no prejudice has been shown and the

Petitioner’s trial counsel cannot be held to have been ineffective in failing to

file a motion for a new trial based upon that argument.”

(Id. at pp. 5-6 (quoting trial court’s opinion attached to the Answer at Exh. F, p. 3) (citations

omitted)). The appellate court’s decision is the last-reasoned state decision on this issue.

3. Analysis

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984), the Supreme Court established

a two-part test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. To establish that his

trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland, a petitioner must show: (1) that his trial

counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that trial counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced petitioner’s defense. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694).

 To establish deficient performance, Petitioner must show that “counsel made errors

so serious...that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”

under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688. The relevant inquiry

is not what defense counsel could have done, but rather whether the decisions made by

defense counsel were reasonable. Babbit v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998).

In considering this factor, counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance

and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The Ninth Circuit “h[as] explained that ‘[r]eview of counsel’s

performance is highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct

fell within the wide range of reasonable representation.’” Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 932 (quoting

Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 184 (9th Cir. 1995)). “The reasonableness of counsel’s

performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and

in light of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential.”

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). Additionally, “[a] fair assessment of

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attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct , and to evaluate

the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Even where trial counsel’s performance is deficient, Petitioner must also establish

prejudice in order to prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. To establish

prejudice, Petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.

Under the prejudice factor, “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does

not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on

the judgment.” Id. at 691. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just

conceivable.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at __, 131 S.Ct. at 792. Further, because failure to

make the required showing of either deficient performance or prejudice defeats the claim, the

court need not address both factors where one is lacking. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697-700.

It is well-established that a defendant has the ultimate authority to make fundamental

decisions regarding whether to plead guilty, waive a jury trial, testify in his or her own

behalf, or take an appeal. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n. 1 (1977)(Burger, C.J.

concurring). However: 

[no decision of the Supreme Court] suggests,...that the indigent defendant has

a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points

requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment,

decides not to present those points.

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). To require otherwise would “seriously

undermine[] the ability of counsel to present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s

professional evaluation.” Id. The professional judgment and evaluation every defendant is

entitled to is an examination of the record, research of the law, and the marshaling of

arguments on behalf of the defendant. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).

Additionally, under the AEDPA, the federal court’s review of the state court’s

decision is subject to another level of deference. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 689-699 (2002).

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In order to merit habeas relief, therefore, Petitioner must make the additional showing that

the state court’s ruling rejecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim constituted an

unreasonable application of Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1); see also Cullen, 563

U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. at 1403 (federal habeas court’s review of state court’s decision on

ineffective assistance of counsel claim is “doubly deferential.”); Harrington, 562 U.S. at __,

131 S.Ct. at 788 (“Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating

unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d)

applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is

whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential

standard.”); West v. Schriro, 2007 WL 4240859, *7 (D.Ariz. Nov. 29, 2007).

Here, the state court, in applying Strickland, applied the correct law to the issue. See

Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 484-85 (9th Cir. 2000) (Strickland “is considered in this circuit

to be ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States’ for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) review.”). 

On the instant record, the state court’s factual findings are presumed correct. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Here, the evidence was that three partial fingerprints and a DNA match

indicated that Petitioner had touched objects inside the victims’ apartment in March 2005,

while the victims were away and without permission from the victims to be in the apartment.

(Answer, Exh. A, at p. 5; see also Answer, Exh. N, pp. 64, 80, 113-114; Answer, Exh. O, p.

20). One of the victims testified that her bedroom had been ransacked by someone who had

obviously gone through her belongings after having gained entry by breaking the bedroom

window with a rock. (Answer, Exh. A, p. 5; Answer, Exh. N, pp. 46-50; see also Answer,

Exh. N, pp. 22, 39-40). Among the items the burglar had disturbed was the victim’s piggy

bank that she kept on her desk. (Answer, Exh. A, p. 5; Answer, Exh. N, pp. 53-54). The

victim testified that approximately $30.00 to $50.00 was missing from the piggy bank. 

(Answer, Exh. A, p. 5; Answer, Exh. N, pp. 53-54). Three fingerprints found on the piggy

bank proved to be Petitioner’s. (Answer, Exh. A, p. 5; Answer, Exh. N, pp. 113-114).

Under Arizona law, “the crime of burglary is complete when entrance to the structure

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is made with the requisite criminal intent. Burglary does not require the successful

completion of the underlying felony.” State v. Bottoni, 131 Ariz. 574, 575, 645 P.2d 19, 20

(App. 1982) (citations omitted). The “intent to commit theft or any felony can be shown by

circumstantial evidence. An inference of the intent necessary for conviction of burglary may

be drawn when unauthorized entry into the premises is gained by force.” State v. Taylor, 25

Ariz. App. 497, 499, 544 P.2d 714, 716 (App. 1976) (citations omitted) (holding there was

“ample evidence that the defendant entered the residence with intent to commit a theft or

some felony therein” where defendant gained unauthorized entry into private home by

throwing a rock through a glass acardia door and was found hiding in a closet). 

On direct appeal, the state court found that “all the elements of the charged offense

[i.e., second-degree burglary] were established by the evidence presented....” (Answer, Exh.

A, p. 5). As the state appellate court pointed out during the PCR proceeding, such a finding

necessarily “resolved the predicate for [Petitioner’s] claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel....” (Answer, Exh. H, p.4). Moreover, given the evidence presented at trial that

Petitioner made an unauthorized entry into the apartment by throwing a rock through a

window, rifled through one of the victim’s belongings, and his fingerprints were found on

the piggy bank which had been moved and from which money was missing, it was not

unreasonable for the state court to find that Petitioner failed to establish prejudice for

counsel’s alleged failure to file a post-trial motion arguing insufficient evidence to support

the verdict. An attorney’s failure to make a meritless objection or motion does not constitute

ineffective assistance of Counsel. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 751; Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d

1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Failure to raise a meritless argument does not constitute

ineffective assistance.”). Consequently, the state court’s decision did not constitute an

unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Nor did the

state court’s proceeding result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Petitioner’s Ground III fails on the merits.

III. CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s Amended Petition is timely filed. However, Petitioner’s Grounds I and

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III are precluded from federal review as procedurally defaulted. Additionally, Petitioner’s

Ground II lacks merit. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

dismiss and deny Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 5) as

follows:

(1) Grounds I and III should be dismissed as procedurally defaulted; and

(2) Ground II should be denied on the merits.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and LRCiv 7.2(e), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of

Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being

served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to another

party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P.

72(b)(2). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 11-70-

TUC-JGZ. 

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003).

DATED this 25th day of April, 2012.

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