Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01279/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01279-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 “Doc.#” refers to the docket number of filings in this case.

TERMPSREF

WO SC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Karl Louis Guillen, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Gerald Thompson, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 08-1279-PHX-MHM (LOA)

ORDER

Plaintiff Karl Louis Guillen, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison ComplexLewis, Rast Unit, in Buckeye, Arizona, filed a pro se motion for leave to exceed the page

limit for his civil rights complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc.# 3.)1

 On

August 7, 2008, the Court denied the motion, but granted Plaintiff thirty days within which

to file a complaint on the court-approved form and in compliance with the instructions for

completing the form. (Doc.# 9.) On September 2, 2008, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting

a 20-day extension of time to comply with that Order. (Doc.# 10.) On September 8, 2008,

he filed a First Amended Complaint. (Doc.# 11.) Plaintiff later filed a motion inquiring

about the status of the case. (Doc.# 12.) The Court will grant Plaintiff’s request for an

extension of time to the extent that his First Amended Complaint will be deemed timely filed

and will grant his request for status to the extent set forth herein. (Doc.# 10, 12.) The Court

will order Defendants Schriro and Macabuhay to answer Count I of the First Amended

Case 2:08-cv-01279-MHM Document 13 Filed 12/22/08 Page 1 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 2 -

Complaint and will dismiss the remaining claims and Defendants without prejudice. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

II. First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff alleges ten counts. He sues the following individuals, who are all employed

by the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC): Director Dora Schriro; Lewis Complex

Warden John Palosaari; Deputy Wardens Gerald Thompson and Robert Curran; ADC Legal

Access Monitor Darrell Johnson; Rast Unit Lieutenant Paula Berger; Lewis Complex

physician Ronolfo Macabuhay; ADC Head of Chaplaincy Mike Linderman; Lewis Complex

Head of Chaplaincy Kingsland; Rast Unit Chaplain Herman; Rast Unit Sergeants Webb,

Smith, Parsons, and Zavala; Rast Unit Correctional Officers Breummer, Mendoza, Hatfield,

Cooper, Rios, Butryn, Kocho, and Coleman; Lewis Complex Mail and Property Correctional

Officers Sikes and Johnson; and several John and Jane Does.

III. Failure to State a Claim

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the

conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v.

Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he

suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must

allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

A. Doe Defendants

Plaintiff sues several John and Jane Doe Defendants. Generally, the use of

Case 2:08-cv-01279-MHM Document 13 Filed 12/22/08 Page 2 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 3 -

anonymous type appellations to identify defendants is not favored. Rule 10(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure requires the plaintiff to include the names of the parties in the

action. As a practical matter, it is impossible in most instances for the United States Marshal

or his designee to serve a summons and complaint or amended complaint upon an

anonymous defendant. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that where identity is unknown prior to the filing of a

complaint, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the

unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that

the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds. Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d

1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)).

Plaintiff may use the discovery process to obtain the names of the persons whom he believes

violated his constitutional rights. If Plaintiff discovers the identities of the fictitiously-named

defendants through the discovery process, or otherwise, he may seek leave of Court to amend

his First Amended Complaint to name these individuals.

B. Count II

In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Schriro’s current Inmate Legal Access Policy has

“frustrated Plaintiff’s ability to raise a new claim” under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.

466, 488-90 (2000), thereby violating his constitutional right of access to the courts. Plaintiff

bases Count II on the following facts: In April 2008, Defendants Thompson, Bruemmer, and

Yielding restricted Plaintiff’s access to the law library to three hours per week “despite a

pending court deadline under the AEDPA.” (Doc.# 11 at 4.) In August 2008, Defendant

Darrell Johnson directed Rast Unit officials only to allow Plaintiff access to the law library

for one period a week, although Plaintiff had two court deadlines. 

The right of meaningful access to the courts prohibits state officials from actively

interfering with an inmate’s attempt to prepare or file legal documents. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 350 (1996). That right, however, only encompasses the ability to bring petitions

or complaints to federal court and not to discover or even effectively litigate such claims

once filed with a court. Id. at 354; see also Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir.

Case 2:08-cv-01279-MHM Document 13 Filed 12/22/08 Page 3 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 4 -

1995) (“The right of access is designed to ensure that a habeas petition or civil rights

complaint of a person in state custody will reach a court for consideration.”) The right

“guarantees no particular methodology but rather, the conferral of a capability--the capability

of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the

courts.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356. Further, the denial of access to a paralegal or use of a law

library is not actionable if there is no claim of prejudice to an existing or future legal action.

Id. at 351-53. That is, an inmate must establish that he suffered an “actual injury” when he

alleges that he was denied access to a paralegal or a law library. See Vandelft v. Moses, 31

F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 1994). An “actual injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to

contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present

a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348. In other words, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that

a defendant’s conduct prevented him from bringing to court a non-frivolous claim that he

wished to present. Id. at 351-53. 

Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that any Defendant denied him the ability to

file any contemplated challenge in state or federal court. Plaintiff merely alleges that his law

library access was limited; he does not allege that he was prevented from filing an initial

pleading. Plaintiff also fails to identify any court-ordered deadlines with which he was

unable to comply as a result of limited law library time. In addition, Plaintiff fails to allege

facts to support that he suffered an actual injury, i.e., actual prejudice to contemplated or

existing litigation. For these reasons, he fails to state a claim for denial of access to the

courts in Count II. 

C. Count III

In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Schriro, Palosaari, Thompson,

Yielding, Kingsland, Herman, and Linderman violated his right to exercise his religion by:

(1) blocking access to catalogs from which he “is required to purchase religious supplies”;

(2) denying him the ability to purchase non-flammable, naturally scented holy/anointing oils;

(3) denying space for worship comparable to those afforded other faiths; (4) denying time

to conduct ceremonies; (5) limiting “ceremonial” access to an hour every other week

Case 2:08-cv-01279-MHM Document 13 Filed 12/22/08 Page 4 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Plaintiff does not allege when, how, or by whom he was denied supplies nor does

he identify the supplies at issue. 

3

 Regulations that impinge on the First Amendment right to free exercise may be

upheld only if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). This determination requires analysis of four prongs: (1) there

must be a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate governmental

interest; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to

inmates; (3) the impact accommodation of the right will have on guards and other inmates,

and on the allocation of prison resources; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives. Turner,

482 U.S. at 90.

TERMPSREF - 5 -

depending upon security and chaplain availability; (6) denying him turnout if he is the only

Wiccan inmate who wishes to attend, after having previously divided Wiccan inmates into

two small groups; (7) denying access to supplies permitted under ADC policies through delay

and inconsistent application of procedures; and (8) disrupting ceremonies by hazing and

handling ceremonial items. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants’ denial of supplies has

prevented him from being able to exercise basic tenets of his faith, ritual, and daily

purification in or out of his cell.2

Prisoners retain the First Amendment right directing that no law shall prohibit the free

exercise of religion. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); Henderson v.

Terhune, 379 F. 3d 709 (9th Cir.2004). To state a First Amendment, free-exercise-ofreligion claim, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant burdened the practice of plaintiff’s

religion by preventing him from engaging in a sincerely held religious belief and that the

defendant did so without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008).3

 To merit protection under the

free exercise clause of the First Amendment, a religious belief must be sincerely held and not

rooted in purely secular philosophical concerns. Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir.

1994), supplemented, 65 F.3d 148 (9th Cir. 1995). Although the validity of religious beliefs

cannot be questioned, the sincerity of the person claiming to hold such beliefs can be

examined. United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 846 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing United States

v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965)). The question is whether the belief is sincere and held

Case 2:08-cv-01279-MHM Document 13 Filed 12/22/08 Page 5 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 6 -

with the strength of traditional religious convictions. United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015,

1018 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000cc-2000cc-5, prohibits the government from imposing a substantial burden on the

religious exercise of a confined person, unless the government establishes that the burden

furthers a “compelling governmental interest” and does so by “the least restrictive means.”

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). “[A] ‘substantial burden’ on ‘religious exercise’ must

impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise.” Warsoldier v.

Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). An inmate’s religious

exercise is substantially burdened “‘where the state . . . denies [an important benefit] because

of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent

to modify his behavior and to violate his belief.’” Id.

Plaintiff makes only conclusory and vague assertions that various Defendants

interfered with his religious rights. He fails to allege the circumstances, including when,

where, how, and by whom, his religious rights were violated. For that reason, he fails to state

a claim.

 D. Count IV

In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges retaliation. To state a viable constitutional claim for

retaliation, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant acting under color of law took adverse

action against him because he engaged in protected conduct, that the adverse action was not

narrowly tailored to advance legitimate correctional goals, and that the adverse action chilled

the plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights or caused him to suffer more than

minimal harm. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-58 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Hines

v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997) (retaliation claims requires an inmate to show

that (1) a prison official acted in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally-protected

right, and (2) the official’s act “advanced no legitimate penological interest”). An inmate

may also state a constitutional violation where he alleges that a grievance was denied in

retaliation for exercising a constitutionally-protected right, see Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276,

Case 2:08-cv-01279-MHM Document 13 Filed 12/22/08 Page 6 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 7 -

1279 (9th Cir. 1995), or in retaliation for filing a grievance, Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866

F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989). An inmate does not, however, have a protected liberty

interest in prison grievance procedures because there is no free-standing constitutional right

to a grievance process. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams

v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 493 (8th Cir. 1993)

(per curiam); Mann v. Adams , 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988).

Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation is based upon the following facts: In March 2008,

Plaintiff filed informal grievances and informed Bob Williams, an investigator in the Lewis

Complex Criminal Investigations Unit, about “photographic evidence concerning a[nother

inmate’s] rape that took place” in Rast Unit in 2007, which was stored on a computer used

for the Rast Unit newsletter. (Doc.# 11 at 5B.) On April 1, 2008, Plaintiff was moved into

a segregated building for former gang members. On April 3-4, 2008, Berger deleted the

photographic rape evidence from the computer used for the Unit’s newsletter. Plaintiff

informed Thompson, Yielding, Berger, Hatfield, Webb, and Schriro about the “attempted

cover-up.” (Id.) He also informed Bob Williams.

On April 5, 2008, Thompson, Yielding, and Berger “attempted” to move an

unidentified assaultive inmate into Plaintiff’s new cell, knowing that the inmate would

endanger Plaintiff’s life. (Id.) The same day, Yielding and Berger threatened Plaintiff with

“all day in the sun (“cages”) unless he moved into a cell with another [unidentified] inmate

who represented a dangerous threat to Plaintiff.” (Id.) On April 6, Thompson, Yielding,

Berger, and Hatfield terminated Plaintiff’s job as the Rast Unit editor, despite the lack of

disciplinary charges or bad performance. Between April 1-15, 2008, Plaintiff filed formal

grievances regarding unspecified issues raised in this First Amended Complaint. 

On April 24, 2008, unknown staff acting under the supervision of Thompson,

Yielding, and Berger searched Plaintiff’s cell “in a harassing and unauthorized nonsanctioned manner.” (Id.) The same day, Plaintiff was placed on report by Officer Webb

for using his toilet. 

At midnight on May 9, Defendant Cooper seized Plaintiff’s legal and personal

Case 2:08-cv-01279-MHM Document 13 Filed 12/22/08 Page 7 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 8 -

property, which was held until May 12, as part of a property inventory conducted on behalf

of Thompson, Yielding, and Berger. The next day, Cooper and Defendant Butryn placed

Plaintiff on report for unknown disciplinary charges and Cooper told Plaintiff that he was

under investigation. The unknown charges were eventually dismissed. On May 14,

Thompson, Berger, and Yielding sent Defendants Rios, Kocho, and Parsons to search

Plaintiff’s cell and, allegedly, to break his typewriter, which he was permitted to have as an

ADA accommodation. On May 21, 2008, Thompson, Yielding, Smith, and Hatfield moved

an unidentified inmate, who was a documented threat to Plaintiff’s safety, from SMU I into

Plaintiff’s living area. 

In June 2008, Thompson and Palosaari denied in part Plaintiff’s visitation request for

a visitor from Italy, although such permission had been granted in previous years. On June

20, 2008, Grievance Co-ordinator Breummer told Plaintiff when he turned in a grievance

appeal that, “I thought we broke your typewriter? Someone needs to break it.” (Id. at 5C.)

In July 2008, Thompson, Hatfield, Smith, Berger, and Yielding moved an unidentified

inmate into the cell next to Plaintiff’s, knowing the inmate was a threat to Plaintiff. From

April to August 2008, Mendoza, Breummer, Thompson, Yielding, Palosaari, and Schriro

“subverted” the grievance process by failing to respond to Plaintiff’s non-frivolous

complaints. (Id.) 

Plaintiff appears in part to contend that various Defendants retaliated against him for

reporting the location of evidence allegedly relevant to the rape of another inmate. The right

to report the location of evidence of a crime is not constitutionally protected. Plaintiff

otherwise appears to allege that Defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances.

Plaintiff fails, however, to allege facts to support that any of the allegedly retaliatory actions

were motivated by the filing of grievances. Rather, Plaintiff merely asserts that various acts

of various Defendants were retaliatory. He fails to allege facts to support any connection

between the filing of grievances and the allegedly retaliatory actions. For these reasons,

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for retaliation in Count IV. 

///

Case 2:08-cv-01279-MHM Document 13 Filed 12/22/08 Page 8 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 9 -

E. Counts V and VI

In Count V, Plaintiff alleges that he has been subjected to cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment based on the facts described in Count IV.

In Count VI, he alleges that Thompson, Hatfield, Smith, Schriro, Yielding, and Berger failed

to protect him based on the facts alleged in Count IV. 

Under the Eighth Amendment, punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it

contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,

346 (1981). Only deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,

however, are sufficiently grave to violate the Eighth Amendment. Johnson v. Lewis, 217

F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). These are “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or

sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at

348. Prison officials must also take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates

and officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th

Cir. 1998). To state a claim for unconstitutional conditions or failure to protect, an inmate

must allege facts to support that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial

risk of harm and that prison officials were “deliberately indifferent” to those risks. Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128; Redman v. County of Los Angeles, 942 F.2d 1435,

1443 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). To adequately allege deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must

allege facts to support that a defendant knew of, but disregarded, an excessive risk to inmate

safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. That is, “the official must both [have been] aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and

he must also [have] draw[n] the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Frost, 152 F.3d at

1128; Redman, 942 F.2d at 1442. 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants damaged his property, searched his cell, denied him

special visitation privileges, brought false disciplinary charges that were ultimately

dismissed, mishandled his grievances, and terminated his prison job. These actions neither

rise to the level of constitutional violation, nor rendered Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement

Case 2:08-cv-01279-MHM Document 13 Filed 12/22/08 Page 9 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 10 -

unconstitutional. Inmates do not have a constitutional right to unfettered visitation. See

Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d

1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996). Inmates also have no constitutional right to enjoy a particular

security classification or housing. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976) (no

liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause is implicated in a prison’s

reclassification and transfer decisions); see also Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th

Cir. 2007). Further, the Supreme Court has held that “while persons imprisoned for crime

enjoy many protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that imprisonment carries with it

the circumscription or loss of many significant rights,” including the Fourth Amendment

protection against random searches of individual prison cells. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.

517, 524 (1984) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)). In addition, there is no

constitutional right to prison employment. Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1997);

Baumann v. Arizona Dep’t of Corr., 754 F.2d 841,846 (9th Cir. 1985). An inmate also does

not have a protected liberty interest in prison grievance procedures because there is no freestanding constitutional right to a grievance process. Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1430; Adams, 40

F.3d at 75; Buckley, 997 F.2d at 493; Mann, 855 F.2d at 640. With respect to the damage

to Plaintiff’s property, where the state makes a meaningful post-deprivation remedy

available, neither a negligent, nor an intentional, deprivation of an inmate’s property by a

state employee violates the inmate’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Parratt v.

Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981) (negligent); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)

(intentional). The availability of a common-law tort suit against a state employee constitutes

an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534-35.

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants celled him with or near known assaultive

inmates. He fails to allege facts to support that any of the allegedly assaultive inmates posed

a substantial risk of serious physical harm to Plaintiff, nor does he allege facts to support that

he was actually injured or that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial

risk of serious physical harm posed to Plaintiff by allegedly assaultive inmates. For the

reasons discussed, Plaintiff fails to state a claim in Counts V or VI.

Case 2:08-cv-01279-MHM Document 13 Filed 12/22/08 Page 10 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 11 -

F. Count VII

In Count VII, Plaintiff alleges a violation of “equal privileges,” which the Court

construes as an equal protection claim, based upon the facts described in Count IV. The

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not “deny

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” which is essentially a

direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. U.S. Const., amend. XIV;

see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). A state

practice that interferes with a fundamental right or that discriminates against a suspect class

of individuals is subject to strict scrutiny. Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S.

307, 312 (1976); Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 700 (9th Cir. 2006). Absent allegations

that he is a member of a suspect class, or that a fundamental right has been violated, a

plaintiff must allege facts to support that he has been intentionally treated differently from

others who are similarly situated without a reasonable basis therefor. See Village of

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Conclusory allegations do not suffice.

See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265

(1977). 

Plaintiff has neither alleged facts to support interference with a fundamental right, nor

membership in a suspect class. See Hydrick, 466 F.3d at 700 (convicted sex offenders do

not constitute a suspect class); see also Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir.

1999) (indigent inmates are not a suspect class). Plaintiff also fails to allege facts to support

that he has been treated differently than similarly-situated individuals. That is, Plaintiff does

not allege facts to support that he has been singled out, based on his membership in a suspect

class, in any manner. For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of his

Equal Protection rights.

G. Count VIII

In Count VIII, Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated based on the

facts contained in paragraph 22-23 of Count IV. In paragraph 22, Plaintiff states that in

August 2008 he received a second replacement typewriter, which began to malfunction in

Case 2:08-cv-01279-MHM Document 13 Filed 12/22/08 Page 11 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 12 -

the same way as the typewriter allegedly broken by Kocho and Rios on May 14, 2008. He

alleges that Sikes and Johnson “processed the typewriter and gave it to Defendant Cooper

for delivery.” (Doc.# 11 at 5C.) In paragraph 23, Plaintiff alleges that on August 20, 2008,

Sikes and Johnson “contrabanded” a book regarding hypnotherapy that Plaintiff purchased

through Amazon, despite Plaintiff’s compliance with procedures to purchase the book. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges they contrabanded the purchase without any legitimate penological reason.

As stated above, where the state makes a meaningful post-deprivation remedy

available, neither a negligent, nor an intentional, deprivation of an inmate’s property by a

state employee violates the inmate’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Parratt,

451 U.S. at 541; Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. Because Plaintiff has an available common-law

tort remedy against prison employees who deprived him of property, he may not sue under

§ 1983 for violation of his due process rights for damage to the typewriter or contrabanding

of the book. 

H. Count IX

In Count IX, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Schriro, Palosaari, Thompson, Yielding,

and Curran have denied him “equal privileges,” which the Court construes as a claim for

violation of his equal protection rights. Plaintiff alleges the following facts in support of this

count: he is a former gang member, who was debriefed regarding his former gang affiliation.

In March 2008, Defendants created a segregated building in the Rast Unit to hold former

gang members who had been debriefed. Defendants also placed more recently debriefed

former gang members, who might be “sleeper assassins,” into the segregated building. In

addition, Defendants threatened inmates in the building with placement in a Special

Management Unit (SMU) if they refused to remove other prisoners from their Do Not House

With (DNHW) lists. Further, Defendants restricted debriefed inmates from being housed so

as to ensure their safety and decrease the likelihood of violence or death under Director’s

Instruction (DI) 254 and 67. Defendants also continually overrode Plaintiff’s classification

scores and custody level and thereby limited his ability to participate in programs, services,

and activities offered to similarly-situated inmates. 

Case 2:08-cv-01279-MHM Document 13 Filed 12/22/08 Page 12 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 13 -

As explained above, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

provides that a state may not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection

of the laws.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV; see City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439. A state

practice that interferes with a fundamental right or that discriminates against a suspect class

of individuals is subject to strict scrutiny. Massachusetts Bd. of Ret., 427 U.S. at 312;

Hydrick, 466 F.3d at 700. Although Plaintiff conclusorily asserts that debriefed former gang

members constitute a “suspect class,” he is mistaken. See Nesbit v. Dep’t of Public Safety,

283 Fed. Appx. 531, 533-34 (9th Cir. 2008) (inmates unaffiliated with a gang but housed

with gang members are not a suspect class); see also Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224-25;

Hydrick, 466 F.3d at 700 (convicted sex offenders do not constitute a suspect class);

Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1179 (indigent inmates are not a suspect class).

A plaintiff who fails to allege that he is a member of a suspect class or that a

fundamental right has been violated may otherwise state a claim if he alleges facts to support

that he has been intentionally treated differently from others who are similarly-situated

without a reasonable basis therefor. See Olech, 528 U.S. at 564; Nesbit, 283 Fed. Appx. at

533-34. Conclusory allegations do not suffice. See Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S.

at 265. As noted above, a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to a particular security

classification. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224-25; Hydrick, 466 F.3d at 700; see also

Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1179; Nesbit, 283 Fed. Appx. at 533-34. 

 Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that he has been treated differently than other

similarly-situated inmates. Plaintiff makes only conclusory assertions that he has been

excluded from being housed pursuant to DI 254 and 67 or that his safety has in been

threatened. Similarly, Plaintiff makes only conclusory assertions that Defendants lack a

rational basis for their actions. For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state an equal protection

violation. 

I. Count X

In Count X, Plaintiff alleges a failure to protect or threats to his safety. Plaintiff

asserts that Defendants “have created an environment in which the risk of sleeper

Case 2:08-cv-01279-MHM Document 13 Filed 12/22/08 Page 13 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 14 -

assassination attempts will take place, by removing the buffer zone from newly debriefed

STG members,” based on the facts alleged in Count IX. (Doc.# 11 at 5G.) As explained

above, to state a claim for failure to protect, an inmate must allege facts to support that he is

incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of harm and that prison officials were

“deliberately indifferent” to those risks. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128;

Redman, 942 F.2d at 1443. Plaintiff makes only conclusory and speculative assertions that

his safety is threatened. He fails to set forth facts to support that he is incarcerated in

conditions that pose a substantial risk of harm to him or that Defendants have acted with

deliberate indifference to such risk. Accordingly, Count X fails to state a claim. 

IV. Claim for Which an Answer Will be Required

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges the following facts: On May 10, 2008, Plaintiff submitted

an emergency health needs request (HNR) to Rast Unit medical staff for treatment of postherpetic neuralgia. Plaintiff began to feel pain, allodynia, and hyperalgesia on April 10,

2008. On May 18, 2008, Dr. Macabuhay told Plaintiff that he could not treat him for more

than seven days. Dr. Macabuhay gave Plaintiff an injection for pain that lasted only eight

hours and prescribed seven days of tylenol. The same day, Dr. Macabuhay submitted a

request for lidocaine patches and referral to a pain clinic for Plaintiff to currently unknown

prison personnel. 

In July 2007 and 2008, Schriro reduced the medical care contract and eliminated 8 of

10 pharmacies so that “Plaintiff cannot receive appropriate medications as indicated by his

ADC medical file from 2004-05.” (Doc.# 11 at 3A.) Between May 10 and August 10, 2008,

Plaintiff submitted 14 HNRs for treatment of his extreme pain from his post-herpetic

neuralgia, which was interfering with his ability to sleep, eat, exercise, and function.

“Defendants” were aware that Plaintiff was experiencing tachycardia, elevation of his blood

pressure, and had lost 25 lb. as a result of the pain. (Id.) Plaintiff had also been issued “layin trays for 10 days” and seven days of pain shots. Further, “Defendants” were aware that

in 2005, he was taken to the University of Arizona Pain Clinic to receive an epidural spinal

injection to alleviate pain he was then experiencing from a prior flare-up. (Id.) Despite

Case 2:08-cv-01279-MHM Document 13 Filed 12/22/08 Page 14 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 15 -

knowledge of Plaintiff’s medical condition and his severe pain from that condition, Schriro

restricted Macabuhay’s ability to effectively treat Plaintiff’s condition for longer than a

seven-day increment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Macabuhay and Schriro have acted

with deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition. Plaintiff adequately alleges

a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Defendants Macabuhay and

Schriro will be required to respond to Count I. 

V. Warnings

A. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

B. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy

of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate

stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit

an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply

may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

C. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time is granted to the extent that his First

Amended Complaint is deemed timely filed. (Doc.# 10.)

(2) Plaintiff’s motion for status of case is granted to the extent set forth herein.

(Doc.# 12.)

Case 2:08-cv-01279-MHM Document 13 Filed 12/22/08 Page 15 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 16 -

(3) Counts II-X and Defendants Thompson, Berger, Palosaari, Doe, Breummer,

Johnson, Kingsland, Herman, Linderman, Hatfield, Webb, Cooper, Butryn, Smith, Rios,

Kocho, Parsons, Mendoza, Sikes, Curran, Zavala, and Coleman are dismissed without

prejudice.

(4) Defendants Macubuhay and Schriro must answer Count I. (Doc.# 11.)

(5) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the First

Amended Complaint (Doc. #11), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms

for Defendants Schriro and Macubuhay.

(6) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court

within 20 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(7) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or

complete service of the Summons and First Amended Complaint on a Defendant within 120

days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever

is later, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m);

LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(I).

(8) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the First

Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use.

(9) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement of

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this Order. The

Marshal must immediately file requests for waivers that were returned as undeliverable and

waivers of service of the summons. If a waiver of service of summons is not returned by a

Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the

Marshal must:

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, and

this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure; and

Case 2:08-cv-01279-MHM Document 13 Filed 12/22/08 Page 16 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TERMPSREF - 17 -

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the

summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon Defendant.

The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and

must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of

the Summons, First Amended Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process

receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed

against the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(10) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and First

Amended Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal,

not the Plaintiff.

(11) Defendants must answer the First Amended Complaint or otherwise respond

by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(12) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose

behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that

does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed.

(13) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. Anderson pursuant to

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for further proceedings.

DATED this 19th day of December, 2008.

Case 2:08-cv-01279-MHM Document 13 Filed 12/22/08 Page 17 of 17