Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_16-cv-00232/USCOURTS-alsd-2_16-cv-00232-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

DOROTHY JOHNSON, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 16-0232-M

 :

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, :

Commission of Social Security, :

 :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the undersigned is Plaintiff’s Attorney’s 

Application for Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice 

Act (hereinafter EAJA), with supporting documentation (Doc. 25),

and Defendant’s Response (Doc. 26). After considering the 

pertinent pleadings, it is ORDERED that the Motion be GRANTED

and that Plaintiff be AWARDED an EAJA attorney’s fee in the 

amount of $1,934.76. 

Plaintiff filed this action on May 23, 2016 (Doc. 1). On 

November 18, 2016, the undersigned Judge entered a Memorandum 

Opinion and Order, reversing the decision of the Commissioner

and remanding this action for further proceedings (Doc. 23). 

Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant 

(Doc. 24).

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On December 16, 2016, William T. Coplin, Jr., Plaintiff’s 

Attorney, filed an EAJA Fee Application requesting a fee of 

$1,934.76, computed at an hourly rate of $191.56 for 10.10 hours 

spent in this Court (Doc. 25). Defendant, in her Response filed 

on December 20, 2016, stated that she had no objection to the 

requested fee (Doc. 26).

The EAJA requires a court to

award to a prevailing party . . . fees and 

other expenses . . . incurred by that party 

in any civil action . . . including 

proceedings for judicial review of Agency 

action, brought by or against the United 

States . . . unless the court finds that the 

position of the United States was 

substantially justified or that special 

circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). EAJA requires a prevailing party to 

file an application for attorney’s fees within thirty days of 

final judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The 

court’s judgment becomes final sixty days—the time an appeal may 

be taken pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. Rule 4(a)—after it is entered. 

See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993).

 Three statutory conditions must be satisfied before EAJA 

fees may be awarded. See Myers v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 659, 666 

(11th Cir. 1990). First, the claimant must file a fee

application within the thirty-day period following the entry of 

Case 2:16-cv-00232-M Document 27 Filed 12/21/16 Page 2 of 8
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final judgment. Second, the claimant must be a prevailing 

party. Third, the Government’s position must not be 

substantially justified. With no objection from Defendant, the 

Court finds that those requirements have been met.

 Having found the prerequisites satisfied, the Court will 

discuss the fee to be awarded. EAJA is a fee-shifting statute. 

The Supreme Court has indicated that “‘the most useful starting 

point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the 

number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied 

by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 

1562, 1586 (11th Cir. 1985 (EAJA) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhartt, 

461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (§ 1988)). In describing this lodestar 

method of calculation, the United States Supreme Court stated:

This calculation provides an objective basis 

on which to make an initial estimate of the 

value of a lawyer’s services. The party 

seeking an award of fees should submit 

evidence supporting the hours worked and the 

rates claimed. Where the documentation of 

hours is inadequate, the district court may 

reduce the award accordingly. The district 

court also should exclude from this initial 

fee calculation hours that were not 

“reasonably expended.” . . . Cases may be 

overstaffed, and the skill and experience of 

lawyers vary widely. Counsel for the 

prevailing party should make a good-faith 

effort to exclude from a fee request hours 

that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise 

unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private 

practice ethically is obligated to exclude 

Case 2:16-cv-00232-M Document 27 Filed 12/21/16 Page 3 of 8
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such hours from his fee submission. In the 

private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is an 

important component in fee setting. It is 

no less important here. Hours that are not 

properly billed to one’s client also are not 

properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant 

to statutory authority.

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted). Counsel must use 

professional judgment in billing under EAJA. A lawyer should 

only be compensated for hours spent on activities for which he 

would bill a client of means who was seriously intent on 

vindicating similar rights. Norman v. Housing Authority, 836 

F.2d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988).

 After examining Plaintiff’s Attorneys’ Application and 

supporting documentation (Doc. 25, Exhibit 2), the Court finds 

that the 10.10 hours expended in prosecuting this action is 

reasonable.

 In determining the hourly rate to apply in a given EAJA 

case, express statutory language provides as follows:

The amount of fees awarded under this 

subsection shall be based upon prevailing 

market rates for the kind and quality of the 

services furnished, except that . . . 

attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess 

of $125 per hour unless the court determines 

that an increase in the cost of living or a 

special factor, such as the limited 

availability of qualified attorneys for the 

proceedings involved, justified a higher 

fee.

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28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1997).

 In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1992), the 

Eleventh Circuit determined that the EAJA established a two-step 

analysis for determining the appropriate hourly rate to be 

applied in calculating attorney’s fees under the Act:

The first step in the analysis, . . . is to 

determine the market rate for “similar 

services [provided] by lawyers of reasonably 

comparable skills, experience, and 

reputation.” . . . The second step, which is 

needed only if the market rate is greater 

than $75 per hour, is to determine whether 

the court should adjust the hourly fee 

upward . . . to take into account an 

increase in the cost of living, or a special 

factor.

Meyer, 958 F.2d at 1033-34 (citations and footnote omitted).1 

The applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory 

evidence that the requested rate is in line with prevailing 

market rates. NAACP V. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1338 

(11th Cir. 1987). Satisfactory evidence at a minimum is more 

than the affidavit of the attorney performing the work. Blum v. 

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). Where the fees or time 

claimed seem expanded or there is lack of documentation or 

 1

Subsequent to Meyer, the cap was raised from $75.00 per hour to 

$125.00 per hour, as set out above in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 

Case 2:16-cv-00232-M Document 27 Filed 12/21/16 Page 5 of 8
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testimony in support thereof, the court may make an award on its 

own experience. Norman v. City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 

1303 (11th Cir. 1988). Where the documentation is inadequate, 

the court is not relieved of its obligation to award a 

reasonable fee; traditionally, it has had the power to make an 

award with no need of further pleadings or an evidentiary 

hearing. Id.

 Beginning in 2001, the prevailing market rate in the 

Southern District of Alabama was $125.00 per hour. See, e.g., 

Smith v. Massanari, Civil Action 00-0812-P-M (S.D. Ala. October 

25, 2001); and Square v. Halter, Civil Action 00-0516-BH-L (S.D. 

Ala. April 12, 2001). However, in 2007, United States

Magistrate Judge Cassady fashioned a formula to adjust the 

prevailing market hourly rate to account for the ever-increasing 

cost-of-living. Lucy v. Barnhart, Civil Action 06-0147-C (S.D. 

Ala. July 5, 2007 (Doc. 32)). As set out in Lucy, the formula 

for calculating all future awards of attorney’s fees under the 

EAJA is as follows: “‘($125/hour) x (CPI-U Annual Average “All 

Items Index,” South Urban, for month and year of temporal 

midpoint2)/152.4, where 152.4 equals the CPI-U of March 1996, the 

 2

“The appropriate endpoint for computing the cost of living 

adjustment is the temporal midpoint of the period during which the 

compensable services were rendered[;] . . . [t]he temporal midpoint is 

calculated by computing the number of days from the date the claim 

was prepared until the date of the Magistrate or District Judge’s 

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month and year in which the $125 cap was enacted.’” (Lucy, Doc. 

32, at p. 11) (quoting Lucy, Doc. 31, at p. 2). The undersigned 

also adopts this formula in EAJA fee petition actions for use in 

arriving at the appropriate hourly rate.

 The complaint was filed on May 23, 2016 (Doc. 1) and the 

Court entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order and Judgment on 

November 18, 2016 (Docs. 23-24), so the temporal midpoint in 

this action was August 21, 2016. The CPI-U for August 2016 was 

233.561. Plugging the relevant numbers into the foregoing 

formula renders the following equation: $125.00 x 

233.561/152.4, the computation of which renders an hourly rate 

of $191.56. This hourly rate for 10.10 hours equals $1,934.76.

 As noted earlier, EAJA allows a Court to make an “award to 

a prevailing party.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). In Panola Land 

Buying Ass’n v. Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1988), the 

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that “[i]t is readily 

apparent that the party eligible to recover attorneys’ fees 

under the EAJA as part of its litigation expenses is the 

prevailing party.” See also Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 738 

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1072 (2008) (“We conclude the 

EAJA means what it says: attorney’s fees are awarded to the 

 

Order and Judgment.” Lucy v. Barnhart. Civil Action 06-0147-C (S.D. 

Ala. Doc. 31, at p. 3). 

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‘prevailing party,’ not to the prevailing party’s attorney”). 

The United States Supreme Court, in the unanimous decision of 

Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 589 (2010), held “that a § 

2412(d) fees award is payable to the litigant and is therefore 

subject to a Government offset to satisfy a pre-existing debt 

that the litigant owes the United States,” removing any doubt as 

to whom the award should be paid. Under the reasoning of Reeves

and Ratliff, the Court finds that the award should be paid to 

Plaintiff Dorothy Johnson and not to Coplin.

 In conclusion, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application 

(Doc. 25) be GRANTED as set out above and that Plaintiff be 

AWARDED an EAJA Attorney’s fee in the amount of $1,934.76.

DONE this 21st day of December, 2016.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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