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Nature of Suit Code: 330
Nature of Suit: Federal Employers' Liability
Cause of Action: 

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TOMMY L. 

v. 

SOUTHERN 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Uoird Srates Courr of Appeals 

TemhG::mit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

HARVEY, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

) 

) 

PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION co., ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

FEB 111991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-2088 

(D.C. No. 89-329-M) 

(D.N.M.) 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

The issue in this appeal is whether summary judgment in favor 

of a railroad-employer was properly entered in an action brought 

under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 u.s.c. S 51-60 

(1988)("FELA"). We affirm. 1 

Plaintiff-appellant Harvey was working on a temporary 

seven-day assignment as a brakeman in Deming, New Mexico, for his 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. lOth Cir. R. 

36.3. 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-2088 Document: 01019726097 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 1 
employer, Southern Pacific Transportation Co. ("Southern 

Pacific"). He was lodged at a motel less than one mile from the 

Deming train station. 2 If the motel at which he had stayed had 

been more than a mile from the "tie-up point," usually the train 

station or yards, Southern Pacific would have been required to 

provide transportation to and from the tie-up point under the 

applicable collective bargaining agreement. 3 Because no company 

transportation was provided in Deming, Mr. Harvey got a ride to 

and from work with a conductor on his crew, arranged informally 

between the men. One night after work, at the request of 

Mr. Harvey, the conductor drove past Mr. Harvey's motel and took 

him to a nearby restaurant, from which Mr. Harvey had to walk the 

three blocks back to his motel. As he was walking to the motel, 

2 In Deming, Southern Pacific usually housed out-of-town 

employees at a motel located more than one mile from the train 

station. However, that motel was full when Mr. Harvey arrived in 

Deming, and, after being instructed by Southern Pacific to stay 

wherever he could find a room, Mr. Harvey checked int o the closer, 

alternate lodging. 

3 The pertinent contract provision, entitled 

Agreement" provided in pertinent part: 

"Resume: Lodging 

Where lodging provided by Carrier is located more 

than one mil e from the on-and-off duty poi nt, the 

Carrier will provide suitable transportation, which 

includes carrier-owned or provided passenger carrying 

motor vehicles or taxicabs, but excludes other forms of 

public transportation. 

Although Mr. Harvey also raises on appeal the alternate 

argument that Southern Pacific voluntarily assumed the duty of 

transporting Mr. Harvey to his motel through its employee, Mr. 

Harvey's coworker, this argument was not raised in Mr. Harvey's 

complaint, R. tab 1, or his brief in opposition to Southe rn 

Pacific's motion for sumrr1ary judgment. R. tab 65. This court 

will not entertain theories not raised below. See, e . g., Farmers 

Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 869 F.2d 565, 570 (lOth Cir. 1989); United 

States v. McNeal, 865 F.2d 1173, 1174 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-2088 Document: 01019726097 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 2 
he crossed a busy, four-lane street and was struck and injured by 

a vehicle driven by a third party unrelated to Southern Pacific. 

Mr. Harvey brought this action against Southern Pacific for 

liability under the FELA. 4 ·He claimed that Southern Pacific 

failed to provide a safe workplace, failed to provide safe tools 

and equipment, and failed to enforce and promulgate reasonable 

safety rules and procedures to protect employees from foreseeable 

risk of harm while stationed at "outside locations." The trial 

court granted Southern Pacific's motion for summary judgment, 

ruling that: 

Defendant Southern Pacific did not breach the 

lodging agreement between Southern Pacific and its 

employees as the lodging facility provided was located 

less than one mile from the on and off duty point. 

Therefore, the railroad was not required to furnish 

t r ansportation to plaintiff's lodgi ng. Furthermore, 'the 

Federal Employers' Liability Act 45 u.s.c. S 51 et seq. 

protects employees only if they are injured within the 

scope of their employment. ~ Atchison, T.& S.F.R. 

Co. v. Wottle, 193 F.2d 628 (lOth Cir. 1952). Under the 

agreed to facts, I find that plaintiff was not acting in 

furtherance of, or affecting, interstate commer ce at the 

t i me of his injury. 

Harvey v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., No. CIV-89-329-M, slip op. at 

1-2 (D.N.M. April 9 1 1990). 

On appeal, this court reviews 

summary judgment orders de novo, applying the same legal 

standard used by the district court under Rule 56(c) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgment 

should be granted only if "there is no genuine issue as 

to any material fact and . . . the moving party is 

entitled to j udgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(c). When applying this standard, we are to 

examine the factual record and reasonable inferences 

4 He also brought claims against the vehicle's driver and i ts 

owner. Those claims were dismissed from the action a f ter 

settlement with their respecti ve defendants. Only the cla im 

against Southern Paci fic remai ns. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-2088 Document: 01019726097 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 3 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the party 

opposing summary judgment. However, the nonmoving party 

may not rest on his pleadings; the party must set forth 

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 

trial. 

Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1230 (lOth Cir. 

1990)(citations omitted). 11 [T]he mere existence of some alleged 

factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise 

properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is 

that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 u.s. 242, 247-48 (1986); ~ generally 

lOA C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and 

Procedure§ 2725 (1983). Thus, "[o]nly disputes over facts that 

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will 

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 

477 u.s. at 248 (quoted by Clifton v. Craig, No. 90-3216, slip op. 

at 3 {lOth Cir. Jan. 23, 1991)). In this case, the facts that 

Harvey disputes do not determine the outcome and, thus, are not 

material . 5 

Apparently Mr. Harvey misapprehends his burden in response to 

the motion for summary judgment. As outlined by the Supreme Court 

in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 u.s. 317 (1986), 

Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the 

pleadi ngs, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

5 ~' whether the transportation provided by Mr. Harvey's 

coworker is effective to satisfy Southern Pacific's contractual 

obligations; whether Mr. Harvey volunteered to walk back to the 

motel as opposed to being asked to walk back there by his 

coworker; whether the railro ad would have provi ded transportation 

for Mr. Harvey from the rest aurant to the mote l if asked to do so; 

whether Southern Pacific was negligent in failing to warn Mr. 

Harvey of the dangers of young people "cruising" Deming's main 

street; whether Southern Pacific established a safe workplace for 

Mr. Harvey . 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-2088 Document: 01019726097 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 4 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law. " In our view, the plain 

language of Rul e 56 (c) mandates the entry of swnmary 

judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon 

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party's case, and on which that party 

will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a 

situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any 

material fact,'' since a complete failure o f proof 

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's 

case necessar ily renders all other facts immaterial. 

The moving party is "entitled to a judgment as a matter 

of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a 

sufficient showing on an essential element of her case 

with respect to which she has the burden of proof. 

Id. at 322. 

Applying Celotex to this case, in response to Southern 

Pacific's motion for summary judgment Mr. Harvey bears the burden 

of showing, by affidavit or other competent evidence, the 

existence of a question of fact material to every element of the 

FELA claim which he made against Southern Pacific. 

To recover under FELA, a plaintiff must prove: 

(1) that defendants are common car riers by railroad 

engaged in interstate commerce; (2) that the injured was 

employed by the defendant with duties furtheri ng such 

commerce; (3) that the injuries were sustained while 

claimant was so employed; and (4) that the injuries were 

the result of negligence of defendant company. 45 

u.s.c. § 51. 

Fowler v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 638 F.2d 17, 19 (5th Cir. 

1981). The parties agree that only elements (3) and (4) are 

pivotal to this case. Mr. Harvey must show that he was injured 

while he was in the scope of hi s employment and that hi s injuries 

were the result of Southern Pacific's negligence. 

In the Tenth Circuit, the FELA plaintiff must show that his 

activities at the time of injury were "incident to or an integral 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-2088 Document: 01019726097 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 5 
part of employment in interstate commerce," Atchison. Topeka & 

Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Wattle, 193 F.2d 628, 630 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

dismissed, 344 u.s. 850 (1952), not merely "activities undertaken 

by an employee for a private purpose and having no causal 

relationship with his employment. " Id. Absent additional 

material evidence to the contrary, an employee who has finished 

work and has timely and properly signed out, who no longer 

occupies property belonging to or controlled by the railroad, who 

is pursuing his own interests, and who is injured at the hand of a 

party unassociated in any way with the railroad is not acting 

within the scope of his employment, and thus is not entitled by 

the FELA to claim railroad liability for his injuries. 

After thorough review of the record on appeal, we conclude 

that Mr. Harvey did not rebut Southern Pacific's motion for 

summary judgment with evidence of material factual disputes 

concerning these pivotal issues. None of the factual disputes to 

which Mr. Harvey calls our attention is material to proof of the 

threshold questions of whether he was within the scope of 

employment or whether the Southern Pacific was negligent. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT - Judge Monroe G. McKay 

6 

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