Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00323/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00323-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Melissa Duran, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of the Social Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-0323-PHX-GMS

 

ORDER 

 

 Pending before the Court is the appeal of Plaintiff Melissa Duran, which 

challenges the Social Security Administration’s decision to deny benefits. (Doc. 14.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms that decision. 

BACKGROUND

 Duran applied for disability insurance benefits on April 29, 2009, (R. at 146–51), 

and for supplemental security income on May 18, 2009, (Id. at 152–58). In both 

applications, Duran alleged a disability onset date of November 16, 2007. (Id.) Duran met 

the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2011. 

(Id. at 26.) Her claims were denied both initially and upon reconsideration. (Id. at 83–90, 

93–99.) She then appealed to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 106–07.) The 

ALJ conducted a hearing on the matter on April 4, 2011. (Id. at 37–78.) 

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 In evaluating whether Duran was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step 

sequential evaluation for determining disability.1

 (Id. at 25–26.) At step one, the ALJ 

determined that Duran had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged 

onset date. (Id. at 26.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Duran suffered from the 

severe impairments of obesity, post lumbar surgery, and post kidney removal due to 

cancer. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ determined that none of these impairments, either 

alone or in combination, met or equaled any of the Social Security Administration’s listed 

impairments. (Id. at 26–27.) 

At that point, the ALJ made a determination of Duran=s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”),2

 concluding that she could perform sedentary work. (Id. at 27–30.) The 

ALJ thus determined at step four that Duran retained the RFC to perform her past 1

 The five-step sequential evaluation of disability is set out in 20 C.F.R. '

404.1520 (governing disability insurance benefits) and 20 C.F.R. ' 416.920 (governing 

supplemental security income). Under the test: 

A claimant must be found disabled if she proves: (1) that she 

is not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2) 

that her disability is severe, and (3) that her impairment meets 

or equals one of the specific impairments described in the 

regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of 

the specific impairments described in the regulations, the 

claimant can still establish a prima facie case of disability by 

proving at step four that in addition to the first two 

requirements, she is not able to perform any work that she has 

done in the past. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie 

case, the burden of proof shifts to the agency at step five to 

demonstrate that the claimant can perform a significant 

number of other jobs in the national economy. This step-five 

determination is made on the basis of four factors: the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, work experience 

and education. 

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 

2

 RFC is the most a claimant can do despite the limitations caused by his 

impairments. See S.S.R. 96-8p (July 2, 1996). 

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relevant work as a collections supervisor and a collections agent. (Id. at 30.) The ALJ did 

not reach step five. Given this analysis, the ALJ concluded that Duran was not disabled. 

(Id.) 

The Appeals Council declined to review the decision. (Id. at 1–6.) 

Plaintiff filed the complaint underlying this action on June 18, 2013, seeking this 

Court’s review of the ALJ’s denial of benefits.3

 (Doc. 14.) The matter is now fully 

briefed before this Court. (Docs. 14, 19, 26.) 

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 A reviewing federal court will only address the issues raised by the claimant in the 

appeal from the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 

2001). A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if that denial is 

either unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Thomas v. Barnhart, 

278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less 

than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 

which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

 However, the ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining 

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 1995). “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational 

interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). This is so because “[t]he [ALJ] and not the 

reviewing court must resolve conflicts in evidence, and if the evidence can support either 

outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. 

 3

 Plaintiff was authorized to file this action by 42 U.S.C. ' 405(g) (“Any 

individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a 

hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil 

action . . . .”). 

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Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 

II. ANALYSIS

Duran argues that the ALJ erred by: (A) giving little weight to the assessment of 

her treating physician, Dr. Rakkar, (Doc. 14 at 14–20), (B) rejecting Duran’s symptom 

testimony, (id. at 21–28), and (C) determining Duran’s work capacities without support 

in substantial evidence in the record, (id. at 28–30). The Court will address each 

argument in turn. 

A. Assessment by Treating Physician 

 Duran first argues that the ALJ improperly discounted the assessment by her 

treating physician Dr. Rakkar. The regulations impose a hierarchy for medical opinions 

offered by licensed physicians. The opinion of a treating physician is given more weight 

than non-treating and non-examining medical sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; Orn v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 

1995). When the treating doctor’s opinion is uncontradicted, the ALJ can reject those 

conclusions only for “‘clear and convincing’ reasons.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (quoting 

Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991)). Even when another doctor 

disagrees with the treating doctor’s opinion, as is the case here with Dr. Tom, (R. at 341–

48), the ALJ can reject the treating doctor’s conclusions only when he provides “‘specific 

and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record for so doing.” Id.

(quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)).

 The ALJ was “unable to assign great weight” to Dr. Rakkar’s opinions. (R. at 30.) 

He first asserted that Dr. Rakkar’s August 2010 finding that Duran can sit for only a half 

hour a day was unsupported by the objective medical evidence in the record and that Dr. 

Rakkar’s assessments regarding Duran’s fatigue conflicted with the medical evidence and 

with Duran’s function report. (Id.) The ALJ further noted that Dr. Rakkar assessed 

different sitting limitations in her August 2010 and July 2011 opinions. (Id.) The ALJ 

cited to numerous portions of Duran’s medical records demonstrating that her condition 

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improved following her July 2009 surgery. The medical records following her surgery 

state that her symptoms improved 60%, that she was walking better, and that imaging 

demonstrated normal disc spaces with no evidence of spondylolisthesis or compression 

factors. (Id. at 28.) Duran’s medical records following her surgery do note that she 

continued to report back pain, but that imaging and medical examinations neither 

explained why her pain persisted following recovery from the surgery nor suggested 

severe fatigue. (Id.; see also id. at 434–37, 470, 529.) Further, Dr. Rakkar’s opinions do 

not cite to any objective medical evidence or otherwise provide justification for the 

assessed limitations that would controvert the medical records. As such, the medical 

records conflict with both Dr. Rakkar’s findings about Duran’s ability to sit and with her 

findings about Duran’s fatigue. 

 The ALJ further noted that Dr. Rakkar stated that Duran could maintain only 

frequent use of her hands, but that the medical records do not support this limitation. (Id.

at 29.) Again, Dr. Rakkar did not offer explanation to suggest otherwise. 

 Finally, the ALJ stated that Dr. Rakkar’s finding of Duran’s need for a hand-held 

device for ambulation was contradicted by records of her walking well without the use of 

any such device and the lack of a prescription for a cane or other device. (Id. at 29–30.) 

However, the record does indicate that Duran did use a hand-held device for ambulation 

at various points (R. at 211, 219), and that the existence of a prescription for such a 

device is irrelevant as such devices are available without a prescription. Accordingly, this 

particular argument is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

 Without considering the ALJ’s argument regarding the use of a hand-held device 

for ambulation, the ALJ nonetheless provided specific and legitimate reasons for 

discounting Dr. Rakkar’s opinions, supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

Murray, 722 F.2d at 502. Thus, the ALJ will not be reversed on this ground. 

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B. Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony 

 Duran next contends that the ALJ erred in finding that her testimony was not fully 

credible as to the severity and extent of her limitations. The ALJ must engage in a twostep analysis in determining whether a claimant’s testimony is credible. Lingenfelter v. 

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007). The ALJ must first “determine whether 

the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 

which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id.

at 1036. If she has, and the ALJ has found no evidence of malingering, then the ALJ may 

reject the claimant’s testimony “only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons 

for doing so.” Id. If an ALJ finds that a claimant’s testimony relating to the intensity of 

his pain and other limitations is unreliable, the ALJ must make a credibility determination 

citing the reasons why the testimony is unpersuasive. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 

341 (9th Cir. 1991). The ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and 

what testimony undermines the claimant’s complaints. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). These findings, properly supported by the 

record, must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the 

adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and did not 

arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding pain. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345–46 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 Here, at the first step, the ALJ concluded that Duran’s medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to produce her alleged symptoms. (R. at 27.) 

However, at the second step, the ALJ found that Duran’s statements regarding the 

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not credible to the 

extent that they conflicted with the ALJ’s RFC assessment. (Id. at 27–28.) The ALJ did 

not state that he found any evidence of malingering; thus, his reasons for rejecting 

Duran’s symptom testimony must be clear and convincing. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 

1036. The ALJ’s general statement that Duran’s symptom testimony conflicts with the 

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RFC does not itself constitute “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for discounting 

her testimony. Indeed, the ALJ is required to consider Duran’s symptom testimony in 

making the RFC assessment. 20 CFR § 416.945(a) (3). “Dismissing a claimant's 

credibility because it is inconsistent with a conclusion that must itself address the 

claimant’s credibility is circular reasoning” that cannot be sustained by this Court. 

Leitheiser v. Astrue, No. CV 10–6243–SI, 2012 WL 967647 at *9 (D. Or. Mar. 16, 2012). 

 However, beyond this general statement, the ALJ did provide clear and convincing 

reasons for his finding that Duran’s symptom testimony was only somewhat credible. 

First, the ALJ cited to objective medical evidence in the record that does not support her 

testimony. (R. at 28–29.) This included numerous portions of Duran’s medical records 

noting symptom improvement and normal gait. (Id.) As noted previously, the medical 

records demonstrate that Duran continued to report pain, but that this was not supported 

in repeated examinations and imaging in the record. Additionally, the ALJ found that 

Duran’s testimony was inconsistent with some of her own statements about her daily 

activities. (Id.) The ALJ noted that portions of Duran’s testimony conflicted with prior 

statements she had made about her ability to sit and with her reported activities of daily 

living. (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in finding Duran’s symptom testimony only 

somewhat credible. 

C. Determination of Plaintiff’s Work Capacities 

Finally, Duran argues that the ALJ erred in his determination of her work 

capacities. The ALJ determined that Duran was capable of a limited range of sedentary 

work. (R. at 27.) Duran asserts that the ALJ based his determination solely on his own 

opinion, untied to supporting evidence in the record. Duran argues that this is the case 

because the ALJ gave only little weight to Dr. Rakkar’s opinion, gave only “some 

weight” to state agency ratings, and instead assigned Duran a more limited RFC than 

recommended by the agency doctors. 

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The RFC is an administrative finding “based on all of the relevant medical and 

other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). Here, the ALJ’s ultimate RFC assessment 

largely tracked the state agency ratings, but also took into account the other evidence in 

the record. While the ALJ gave “some weight,” to the agency ratings, he decided to give 

Duran the reasonable benefit of the doubt and assigned her a sedentary RFC, as opposed 

to the reduced range of light work recommended by the state agency. (R. at 29.) In 

determining Duran’s RFC, the ALJ looked to the relevant medical and other evidence in 

the record, coming to a conclusion supported by substantial evidence in that record. Thus, 

the ALJ did not err in his RFC determination. 

CONCLUSION

 The ALJ made no error of law and there is substantial evidence to support the 

ALJ’s denial of benefits. Therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to 

TERMINATE this action. 

Dated this 21st day of October, 2013. 

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