Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08114/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08114-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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The Court dismissed the ADA Title I claims against all Defendants with prejudice.

(Doc. 38 at 21.)

WO SVK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

William W. Castle, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Eurofresh, Inc., et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 09-8114-PCT-MHM (DKD)

ORDER

On June 30, 2009, Plaintiff, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison ComplexMeadows in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint; he paid the filing fee

on August 3, 2009. (Doc. 1, 6.) Plaintiff’s Complaint raised multiple claims, including

claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA)

against Eurofresh Farms, Inc. (Eurofresh) and various State Defendants—the State of

Arizona, the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC), Dora Schriro, former Director of

ADC, and Charles Ryan, current Director of ADC (State Defendants). (Doc. 1.) Eurofresh

and State Defendants separately moved to dismiss. (Docs. 20, 27.) The Court granted the

motions and dismissed the Complaint with leave to file an amended complaint that cured the

deficiencies identified in the Order.1

 (Doc. 38.)

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On April 28, 2010, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 51.) The

Court dismissed the it for failure to state a claim and gave Plaintiff one final opportunity to

file an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies. (Doc. 52.)

Plaintiff has filed a Second Amended Complaint, with almost 100 pages of

attachments. (Doc. 58.) The Court will direct State Defendants to answer Counts II and III

and dismiss the remaining Counts and Defendant. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does

not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951.

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Plaintiff sues Schriro and Ryan in their individual and official capacities. (Doc. 58

at 12.)

3

28 U.S.C. § 1337 gives district courts original jurisdiction of a civil action arising

under an Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against

restraints and monopolies. 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a). 28 U.S.C. § 451 contains definitions for Title

28 and is not a jurisdictional statute. 

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II. Second Amended Complaint

In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues the following Defendants:

Eurofresh, Inc., the ADC, Dora Schriro, Charles Ryan, and the State of Arizona.2

 Plaintiff

asserts generally that he is a disabled veteran, who is unable to walk for extended periods of

time. (Doc. 58 at 3 and ¶14.) On July 27, 2008, State Defendants contracted out his labor

to Eurofresh, which Plaintiff describes as a private, for-profit corporation. (Id. at 3, and ¶¶

1, 5.) This was done through the Arizona Correctional Industries (ACI) Program, which is

a program pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1622(B). (Id. at 3, and ¶ 1.) He alleges that

Defendants were his employers within the meaning and scope of Title I of the ADA and were

federally funded public entities under Title II of the ADA and the RA. (Id. ¶ 1.) On or about

October 15, 2008 and November 10, 2008, Plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation

for his disability, stating that he could not walk for extended periods of time. The requests

were denied and Plaintiff was constructively discharged. (Id. at 3.) 

The Second Amended Complaint raises five Counts as follows: 

Count I: All Defendants violated Title I of the ADA when they denied Plaintiff

reasonable accommodation for his disability;

Count II: All Defendants violated Title II of the ADA when they denied Plaintiff

access to the ACI Program;

Count III: All Defendants violated § 504 of the RA of 1973;

Count IV: Eurofresh’s actions violated the Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA); and 

Count V: Eurofresh violated its contract with State Defendants by failing to comply

with the ADA and federal and state employment laws.

Plaintiff claims federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1332, and 1337.3

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He seeks $30,000 in lost wages, $100,000 in nominal and compensatory damages, and

$300,000 in punitive damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id. at 8.)

III. Analysis

A. Count I—ADA Title I

In Count I, Plaintiff asserts that Eurofresh and the State Defendants were covered

entities under the ADA and that Eurofresh “was by virtue of contract, part of the ACI

program.” (Doc. 58 ¶ 18.) Plaintiff asserts that at all relevant times he was an employee

within the meaning of Title I and exempt from Arizona’s “hard labor” requirement because

of his disability. (Id. ¶ 19.) 

Plaintiff performed tomato picking at Eurofresh; he asserts that he was a qualified

individual with a disability, walking was not an essential function of his job, and that he was

able to pick tomatoes with or without accommodations. (Id. ¶ 22.) He asserts that he

requested a reasonable accommodation for his disability; specifically, he requested “use of

an electronic trolley, be allowed additional periodic rest breaks, and/or transfer to a position

that does not require walking for long periods of time.” (Id. ¶ 23.) 

Title I of the ADA prohibits the States and other employers from “discriminat[ing]

against a qualified individual with a disability because of th[at] disability . . . in regard to . . .

terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The Court has

previously held that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff was not an employee for purposes of

protection under Title I of the ADA. (Doc. 38 at 8, 11.) In addition, the Court notes that

State Defendants have Eleventh Amendment immunity as to the Title I claims. (Id. at 16, see

Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama, et al. v. Garrett, et al., 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).)

 These claims are, again, dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants. 

B. Count II —ADA Title II 

To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is a “qualified

individual with a disability”; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the

benefits of a public entity’s services, programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated

against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was

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by reason of his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A disability within the meaning of the statute

is a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life

activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102. And “[t]o recover monetary damages

under Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove intentional

discrimination on the part of the defendant.” Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124,

1138 (9th Cir. 2001). To establish intentional discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff

must show defendants acted with “deliberate indifference.” Id. (emphasis added).

“Deliberate indifference requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right

is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood.” Id. at 1139.

In Count II, Plaintiff asserts that the ACI program offers particular benefits to state

prisoners such as six times the wages paid for prison jobs outside the program, bonuses, and

job skills not otherwise available. (Doc. 58 ¶ 35.) He asserts that because of his disability,

he was denied access to the ACI program and the ability to obtain the benefits, in violation

of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 41.) He alleges

that Defendants intentionally discriminated against him by denying and ignoring his requests

for accommodations. (Id. ¶ 42.)

 Plaintiff also alleges that by virtue of the contract, Eurofresh and its Snowflake

facility were “integral parts of the ACI program. Eurofresh is part of the ACI Program in

accordance with the entity theory of partnership. . . . Eurofresh was an instrumentality of the

State of Arizona.” (Id. ¶ 33, ref. Ex. 5, Inmate Work Contract.) 

Plaintiff has stated a claim against State Defendants for violation of Title II of the

ADA. The Court notes that claims against State Defendants may be barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006). In addition, it is not

clear that a Defendant can be liable in his or her individual capacity because it is not clear

that the language of Title II, which as noted below refers specifically to “public entities,”

applies to individuals. 

The Court holds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Eurofresh under Title II of

the ADA. ADA Title II applies to public entities, which are defined as 

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(A) any State or local government; 

(B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a 

 State or States or local government; and 

(C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority

 (as defined in section 24102(4) of Title 49). 

42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). 

Plaintiff alleges that Eurofresh is an instrumentality of the state, but he also asserts

that Eurofresh is a private, not-for-profit corporation.

First, the allegation that Eurofresh is an instrumentality of the state is nothing but a

vague and implausible legal conclusion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

In addition, courts that have considered the issue have consistently found that contractual

relationships between private and government entities are not sufficient to render the private

entities instrumentalities liable under Title II. In Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65,

79 (2nd Cir. 2006), the Second Circuit held that a private hospital was not an

“instrumentality” of a local government and that “instrumentality” as used in Title II of the

ADA meant that the entity “must somehow belong to the government or have been created

by it.” Specifically, the court found that a private hospital performing services under a

contract with a municipality, even if it did so according to the municipality’s rules and under

its direction, was not “a creature of any governmental entity. Instead it is a parallel private

entity.” Id. More recently, the Eleventh Circuit held that a private prison management

corporation that contracted to provide prison management services to Florida was not a

public entity within the meaning of Title II and that “‘instrumentality of a State’ refers to

governmental units or units created by them.” Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307, 1310

(11th Cir. 2010); see Falchenberg v. New York State Dept. of Educ., 642 F. Supp. 2d 156,

165 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that the private testing company contracted by state defendants

to administer accreditation tests was not subject to suit under Title II of the ADA); Schiavo

ex rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1165 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (hospice was not

a public entity even though it received federal funding). 

The Court finds that Eurofresh is not a public entity and, therefore, it is not subject to

Title II. The Court also notes that the contract specifically provides “that this Contract does

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not create a partnership between the parties and that each party shall remain a distinct legal

entity.” (Doc. 58, Ex. 5 §3.21.) 

Eurofresh is dismissed from Count II.

C. Count III—Rehabilitation Act

“The Rehabilitation Act is materially identical to and the model for the ADA, except

that it is limited to programs that receive federal financial assistance. . . .” Armstrong v.

Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 862 n. 17 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). Title II of the

ADA was expressly modeled after § 504 of the RA. Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,

166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n. 11 (9th Cir. 1999) (“there is no significant difference in analysis of

the rights and obligations created by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act”). To state a claim

under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must allege “(1) he is an individual with a disability;

(2) he is otherwise qualified to receive the benefit; (3) he was denied the benefits of the

program solely by reason of his disability; and (4) the program receives federal financial

assistance.” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1135.

 Plaintiff asserts that State Defendants receive direct federal financial assistance and

that Eurofresh as a contract partner of the ACI Program received indirect federal assistance.

(Doc. 58 ¶¶ 44, 45.) He alleges that because of the contractual partnership with ADC,

Eurofresh obtained “a competitive advantage with respect to other produce and agricultural

companies because Plaintiff was paid $2.25 per hour in contrast to the prevailing wage of

$10.00 per hour or more to union non-prisoner workers.” (Id. ¶ 45.) He also asserts that

Eurofresh does not have to pay Social Security or Medicare taxes in the ACI Program. (Id.)

Because Plaintiff asserts that State Defendants receive federal financial assistance and

Plaintiff has stated a claim under ADA Title II, he states a claim against State Defendants

under the RA. But the RA claim against Eurofresh is dependent on the allegation that it

receives an indirect financial benefit from paying lower wages that results in a competitive

advantage. This is too vague and conclusory, as well as implausible, to pass muster under

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949, 1951. The Court has already held that because ACI must pay

Social Security and medicare taxes there is no indirect financial assistance to Eurofresh in

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this regard. (Doc. 38 at 9.) Count III will be dismissed as to Eurofresh.

D. Count IV—Arizona Civil Rights Act

The Court holds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Eurofresh for violations of

the ACRA. 

The allegations in Count IV are very confusing. Plaintiff asserts that the Eurofresh

facility is a public place in that “it is open indiscriminately to other members of the general

public, is a retail and wholesale enterprise, and provides tours to the general public.” (Doc.

58 ¶ 50.) He contends that “Eurofresh and the Snowflake facility were integral parts of the

ACI Program, a federally funded public program, thereby, in relationship with the State

Defendants, is a public accommodation and/or public place.” (Id. ¶ 51.) He also asserts that

Eurofresh discriminated against him on the basis of disability “in the full and equal

enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of

facility in Snowflake, Arizona, by virtue of contract and otherwise a public accommodation

and denying Plaintiff the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the ACI Program and/

or goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” (Id. ¶ 52.) 

The ACRA prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and equal

enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of any

place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases, leases to others or operates

a place of public accommodation.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1492.02(A). The law further

provides that: 

B. It is discriminatory to subject an individual or class of individuals on the

basis of a disability or disabilities of that individual or class, directly or

through contractual, licensing or other arrangements:

1. To a denial of the opportunity of the individual or class to participate in or

benefit from the goods, services, facilities, advantages, privileges or

accommodations of an entity.

2. To the loss of an opportunity to participate in or benefit from goods,

services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations that are not

equal to that afforded to other individuals.

3. To a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation that is

different or separate from that provided to other individuals, unless the action

is necessary to provide the individual or class of individuals with a good,

service, facility, privilege, advantage, accommodation or other opportunity that

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is as effective as that provided to others. For purposes of this subsection,

“individual” or “individuals” refers to the clients or customers of the covered

public accommodation that enters into the contractual, licensing or other

arrangement.

Id. at § 41-1492.02(B). 

A public accommodation is defined to include, among other things, places of lodging,

restaurants and bars, theaters, stadiums, concert and lecture halls, auditoriums, convention

centers, museums, libraries, public transportation stations, retail establishments, service

establishments, social service establishments, places of recreation and schools. Nolan v.

Starlight Pines Homeowners Ass’n, 167 P.3d 1277, 1280 (Ariz. 2007) ( citing Ariz. Rev.

Stat. § 41- 1492(9)(a)-(l)). A disability within the meaning of the statute is a “physical or

mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such

individual.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1492(5).

The ACRA is intended to be consistent with the ADA. Laws 1992, Ch. 224, § 1C.

Title III of the ADA provides as follows:

No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the

full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,

advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any

person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public

accommodation.

42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Neither the ACRA nor Title III of the ADA defines “goods, services,

facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.”

For purposes of screening the Second Amended Complaint, the Court must accept as

true Plaintiff’s factual assertions regarding Snowflake as a public accommodation.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that it is a retail establishment. But Plaintiff’s allegation that

Eurofresh is an “integral part of the ACI Program” is vague and conclusory. 

Moreover, it is beyond dispute that ADC and its prison facilities and programs are not

places of public accommodation. That ADC receives federal funds does not mean that the

ACI program is a public accommodation. The legislative history of the ACI Program states

that

The purposes of correctional industries established pursuant to § 41-1622,

Arizona Revised Statutes, are to:

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1. Make available within the state correctional institutions opportunities for

employment of inmates in jobs which combat idleness or develop good

working habits. . . .

Laws 1978, Ch. 164, § 29, effective October 1, 1978. Plainly, ACI is restricted to inmate

labor, is not open to the public, and is not a public accommodation. The Court finds that

Eurofresh is not a place of public accommodation by virtue of any relationship with ACI,

and, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that he was denied the “goods, services, facilities,

privileges, advantages and accommodations” of ACI, Plaintiff does not state a claim under

the ACRA.

But it also appears that Plaintiff may be alleging that he was denied the “goods,

services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations” of the Eurofresh Snowflake

facility. First, Plaintiff does not specify what “goods, services, facilities, privileges,

advantages and accommodations” of Eurofresh he was denied; he merely recites the language

of the statute. But more important, the Court finds that, even if Eurofresh is a place of public

accommodation, Plaintiff does not state a claim against Eurofresh because Plaintiff was not

denied any “goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations” offered

by Eurofresh to the public. 

In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 679 (2001), the Supreme Court left open

the question whether Title III of the ADA applies only to clients and customers of a public

accommodation. The Court did not need to reach the issue because it held that Martin was

a client or customer because he had paid a $3000 fee to compete in qualifying events and,

if successful, in subsequent tour events. The Court reasoned that the defendant’s

tournaments simultaneously offered at least two privileges to the public—the privilege of

watching and the privilege of competing in the golf competition. Id. at 680. Justices Scalia

and Thomas dissented on the ground that the judgment “distorts the text of Title III, the

structure of the ADA, and common sense.” Id. at 691 (Scalia J., dissenting). They

concluded, inter alia, that Title III covers only clients and customers of public

accommodations. Id. 693. 

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Since PGA Tour, at least one court has held that Title III protections are not limited

to the clients or customers of a public accommodation. Hetz v. Aurora Medical Ctr. of

Manitoc County, 2007 WL 1753428 (E.D. Wis.). In Hetz, the district court held that a doctor

seeking staff privileges at the defendant hospital was covered by Title III, “irregardless of

whether such individual could be considered a client or a customer of the place of public

accommodation.” Id. at 11. The court also held that the plaintiff could be properly

considered a “client or customer.” Id. The court found that the hospital’s offer of staff

privileges fit within the coverage of Title III, citing Martin, 532 U.S. at 677 (“It seems

apparent, from both the general rule and the comprehensive definition of ‘public

accommodation,’ that petitioner’s golf tours and their qualifying rounds fit comfortably

within the coverage of Title III, and Martin within its protection.”) Hetz, 2007 WL 1753428,

at 11. But the court also noted that its holding did not mean that all independent contractors

are necessarily also covered under Title III. Id. at 12. “Unlike in other independent

contractor relationships, the hospital is in essence simply offering its facility as a place of

practice for an independent doctor. The hospital does not pay the physician, who bills his

own patients and collects fees from them directly. . . . In contrast, an individual who is hired

and paid to perform services primarily for the benefit of the place of public accommodation

may very well not fall under the protections of Title III.” Id. 

Without deciding whether Title III, and therefore the ACRA, protects only customers

or clients of a public accommodation, the Court finds that Plaintiff, nevertheless, does not

state a claim. The Supreme Court found in Martin that the defendant offered at least two

privileges to the public, including the privilege of competing in the golf tournament, which

is what that plaintiff was prevented from doing. In contrast, Plaintiff here alleges that he lost

his inmate job picking tomatoes. But picking tomatoes is not among the “goods, services,

facilities, advantages, privileges or accommodations” offered by Eurofresh to the public. In

other words, not only is Plaintiff not a client or customer of Eurofresh or its Snowflake

facility, but the privilege he allegedly lost is not covered under the statute. Therefore,

Plaintiff does not and cannot allege on these facts that he was denied the opportunity “to

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participate in or benefit from the “goods, services, facilities, advantages, privileges or

accommodations” of Eurofresh within the meaning of the ACRA.

 The Court will dismiss Count IV.

E. Count V—Breach of Contract

Plaintiff asserts that Eurofresh and State Defendants entered into a contract for prison

labor and, under the terms of the contract, Defendants promised to comply with the ADA and

federal and state employment laws. (Doc. 58 ¶¶ 54, 56.) He alleges that on November 28,

2008, Eurofresh violated the contract by discriminating against Plaintiff on the basis of his

disability and that he suffered damages in the form of lost wages and future pay. (Id. ¶ 57.)

 Because the Court will dismiss the federal and state claims against Eurofresh, the

breach of contract claim will also be dismissed. In addition, Plaintiff fails to allege the

elements necessary to recover as a third party beneficiary. See Norton v. First Fed. Sav.,

624 P.2d 854, 856 (Ariz. 1981) ((1) the contract must indicate an intention to benefit the third

party beneficiary, (2) the contemplated benefit must be both intentional and direct, and (3)

it must be clear that the parties intended to recognize the third party as the primary party in

interest). 

IV. Conclusion

Count I will be dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants. All claims against

Eurofresh will be dismissed. State Defendants are directed to answer Counts II and III.

Defendants have already been served. (Doc. 15-18.)

V. Warnings

A. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

B. Copies

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Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See

LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice

to Plaintiff.

C. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61(9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint (Doc. 58).

(2) Count I of the Second Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice; Counts

IV and V are dismissed; and Eurofresh is dismissed as a Defendant. 

(3) State Defendants must answer Counts II and III.

(4) Defendants must answer the Second Amended Complaint or otherwise respond

by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(5) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose

behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that

does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed.

DATED this 10th day of August, 2010.

Case 3:09-cv-08114-JWS Document 61 Filed 08/16/10 Page 13 of 13