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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 16-1835

____________

EDWARD BUTTON; SANDRA BUTTON; 

BUTTON OIL COMPANY, INC.,

 Appellants

v.

ALAN SNELSON; DORRANCE TOWNSHIP

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(M.D. Pa. No. 3-12-cv-01941)

District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani

____________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

December 5, 2016

Before: FISHER, KRAUSE and MELLOY**, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: February 10, 2017)

____________

OPINION***

____________

 

 Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, 

assumed senior status on February 1, 2017.

** Honorable Michael J. Melloy, Senior Judge of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

*** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.

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FISHER, Circuit Judge.

In this land-use dispute, Edward and Sandra Button claim the District Court erred 

in granting summary judgment against them on their Fourteenth Amendment due process 

claims, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We will affirm the District Court’s order and 

final judgment in favor of Alan Snelson and Dorrance Township.

I.

The Buttons are the acting owners and operators of the Blue Ridge Truck Stop in 

Dorrance Township, Pennsylvania. In 1991, they received conditional land development 

approval from the Dorrance Township Board of Supervisors to operate Blue Ridge as “a 

gas station, truck fueling stop and convenience store.”1 This approval was conditioned 

upon the authorization of an “Erosion and Sedimentation Control Plan” and the issuance 

of a Highway Occupancy Permit. The Buttons admit they did not obtain an approved 

Sedimentation Control Plan until 2011 or receive the required Highway Occupancy 

Permit before filing this lawsuit in 2012. The first official recording of an approved land 

development plan did not occur until nearly twenty-three years after the initial 

conditional approval and twenty months after the Buttons filed their complaint in the 

District Court. 

The 1991 approval did not authorize the “storage, distribution or sale of propane.” 

Nevertheless, in 2010, the Buttons applied to Dorrance Township for a zoning permit to 

 

1 App. 4a.

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construct a fence to enclose a “bulk propane storage facility.”2 Believing the Buttons’ 

intended propane usage was “subject to land use regulations that require[d] approval 

beyond what [they] had already obtained,” part-time zoning officer Alan Snelson wrote 

the Buttons a letter styled as a “Cease and Desist Order.”3 The letter outlined “a list of 

items” required for compliance, requested documentation regarding “approvals that have 

been granted for the operations being conducted at the ‘storage building,’” and warned of

potential enforcement remedies (for example, civil action) available to the Township if 

the Buttons failed to comply.

4

 

The Buttons’ attorney responded to Snelson, asserting that the Buttons’ propane 

storage complied with Dorrance Township’s relevant requirements. Snelson replied with 

a “multitude of mail and email letters,” reiterating his stance that “further zoning and land 

approvals [were required] for the operation of a bulk propane storage and distribution 

business on their property.”5 Snelson also “notified” the Buttons that the Township 

intended to take legal action against them for their ongoing violations; told the Buttons’ 

employees at Blue Ridge he could “shut them down”; and said to Sandra Button when 

presented with the original land development plan, “This means nothing. See this new 

book? It draws a line in the sand. You’re starting over.”6

 

2 App. 7a. 

3 App. 7a, 64a.

4 App. 64a-65a. 

5 App. 9a-10a. 

6 App. 12a, 20a, 21a. The book Snelson referenced is unclear.

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Contrary to municipal protocol, Snelson initiated his own lawsuit against the 

Buttons in state court, listing himself (i.e., the “Dorrance Township Zoning Officer”) as 

plaintiff. His complaint alleged that the Buttons “failed to receive all appropriate permits 

and land development approvals” and sought $12,000 in damages.7 After a January 2012 

hearing in state court, Snelson directed an ex parte correspondence to the presiding 

District Judge’s attention to “wrap-up . . . what was said.”8 The judge ultimately entered a 

default judgment for the Buttons, and no appeal was taken. 

Around this time, the Zoning Hearing Board determined that a zoning variance 

was not necessary for the Buttons because their construction of the propane facility at 

Blue Ridge was a valid, non-conforming use. Even so, the land development approval for 

the property remained outstanding until May 2014. 

The Buttons sued Snelson and Dorrance Township in the District Court for the 

Middle District of Pennsylvania in September 2012, alleging violations of their 

procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The 

Buttons sought compensatory damages for lost income and injury to their business 

reputation, as well as punitive damages against Snelson. Both parties moved for summary 

judgment. The District Court denied the Buttons’ motion but granted Snelson and 

Dorrance Township’s motion, entering final judgment in their favor. This timely appeal 

followed. 

 

7 App. 16a. 

8 App. 17a. 

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II.9

We review the District Court’s disposition of a summary judgment motion de 

novo, applying the same standard as the District Court. Summary judgment is appropriate 

if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. We view the record in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.10

III.

On appeal, the Buttons argue that the District Court (A) improperly concluded that 

Snelson’s conduct did not meet the “shock-the-conscience” test for substantive due 

process violations and (B) erroneously found that the Buttons applied for a zoning 

variance. We consider each argument in turn. 

A.

“Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color 

of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 

 

9 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

10 Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014); see Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a).

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by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”11 A substantive due process violation 

occurs if a government official engages in “an abuse of executive power so clearly 

unjustified by any legitimate objective of law enforcement” that it is barred by the 

Fourteenth Amendment.12 To establish a prima facie case under § 1983, the Buttons must 

show that (1) Snelson deprived them of a substantive due process right (2) under color of 

state law.13 The first prong of the analysis requires the Buttons to prove that the 

“particular interest at issue is protected by the substantive due process clause and the 

government’s deprivation of that protected interest shocks the conscience.”14

There is no dispute that the Buttons have a fundamental property interest in their 

business protected under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. However, we 

agree with the District Court that no reasonable jury could find that Snelson’s conduct 

“shocks the conscience.” 

 

11 Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 

2005). The Buttons’ complaint alleged procedural and substantive due process claims. 

However, the Buttons do not argue that Dorrance Township “violated their rights by 

failing to provide them with adequate procedures to remedy any deprivation that Snelson 

might have inflicted.” App. 27a. Rather, they assert that Snelson exercised his official 

power without reasonable justification. We therefore agree with the District Court that 

this matter is one of substantive due process only.

12 Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998) (emphasis added).

13 See Shuman, 422 F.3d at 146. 

14 See Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 219 (3d Cir. 2008). 

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“The ‘shocks the conscience’ standard encompasses ‘only the most egregious 

official conduct’”15 and prevents this Court from “being cast in the role of a ‘zoning 

board of appeals.’”16 Conduct that may shock the conscience varies “depending on the 

factual context.”17 In the land-use context, we look for evidence of corruption, selfdealing, intentional interference with constitutionally protected activity, virtual “takings,” 

or bias against an ethnic group on the part of local officials.18 In Eichenlaub v. Township 

of Indiana, for example, a landowner alleged that township officials violated his due 

process rights by applying subdivision requirements inconsistently, pursuing 

“unannounced and unnecessary inspection and enforcement actions,” delaying permits 

and approvals, increasing tax assessments, and “malign[ing] and muzzl[ing]” him.19 We 

concluded that the alleged misconduct did not “rise sufficiently above that at issue in a 

normal zoning dispute to pass the ‘shocks the conscience test’” and that the allegations 

mirrored ordinary disagreements frequent in planning disputes.20

Guided by Eichenlaub, we see no evidence in this record from which a reasonable

jury could find that racial invidiousness, corruption, or self-dealing motivated Snelson’s 

 

15 United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 400 

(3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846). 

16 Id. at 402 (quoting Creative Env’ts, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st 

Cir. 1982)). 

17 Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting 

United Artists, 316 F.3d at 400). 

18 Id.

19 Id.

20 Id.

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enforcement activities. Rather, the evidence suggests Snelson very consistently, although 

somewhat misguidedly, pursued one goal: the Buttons’ compliance with township-zoning 

and land-development requirements to legitimize their storage of propane at Blue Ridge. 

The Buttons point to evidence that Snelson “rudely” told Sandra Button, “You’re starting 

over.” But given that the Buttons had yet to comply with the original land development 

approval plan when Snelson began his enforcement activities and that they had been 

noncompliant for twenty years, we agree with the District Court that Snelson’s alleged 

statements do not create a triable issue of fact exposing him to constitutional liability. 

Though a reasonable jury may view Snelson’s actions as overzealous or ill-advised—

particularly his state court lawsuit and ex parte communications with the District Judge—

merely negligent or sometimes contentious performance of official duties, like Snelson’s,

does not shock the conscience. 

Attempting to show conscience-shocking conduct, the Buttons argue that no legal 

justification existed for Snelson’s enforcement activities. They assert that their zoning 

district allows propane storage, that Snelson’s attempts to regulate their propane storage 

is preempted by the Pennsylvania Propane and Liquefied Petroleum Gas Act, and that 

Snelson’s enforcement actions were impermissibly motivated by the “inherent danger” of 

propane rather than traditional zoning functions. Untangling these assertions, we agree 

with the District Court that “many of the issues in this case arise out of confusion 

concerning the overlap and the relationships between zoning board approval, land 

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development approval, and the outcomes of the civil action that Snelson filed.”21 The 

Buttons’ arguments fail for the reasons below. 

First, even if the Zoning Hearing Board determined that a zoning variance was not 

needed to approve the Buttons’ propane storage facility, Snelson was still authorized to 

pursue the land development approval outstanding until 2014. Snelson’s enforcement 

actions were permitted, despite the Buttons’ assertions to the contrary, because he acted 

under municipal authority not preempted by the Pennsylvania Propane and Liquefied 

Petroleum Gas Act. That Act provides that “[t]he Commonwealth specifically reserves 

the sole right and ability to regulate any and all matters related to the operation of the 

Liquefied Petroleum Gas Industry.”22 Subsection 15(b)(3) of the Act states that, “[e]xcept 

as provided in this subsection, a municipality may not prohibit or otherwise regulate the 

use or storage of [Liquefied Petroleum Gas], including the location or replacement of 

storage tanks.” However, as the District Court correctly noted, subsection 15(b)(2) 

provides an exception for municipal regulation. Under that subsection, a municipality 

retains the right under local zoning ordinances to require any Liquefied Petroleum Gas 

facility to locate within approved zones and “obtain zoning permits, pay zoning fees and 

undergo inspections.” As such, we agree with the District Court that Snelson’s regulatory

authority was not preempted by state law as the Buttons suggest.

 

21 App. 29a. 

22 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1329.15(a). 

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Further, the record supports the District Court’s conclusion that the Buttons’ 

noncompliance motivated Snelson, not his bare concern over the “inherent danger” of 

petroleum. The Buttons point to just one instance among Snelson’s numerous 

correspondences where he mentions the “dangerous nature of the bulk storage of 

propane.” But for that single instance, however, he consistently asserted that the Buttons 

could remedy their violations with proper Township approval and merely sought the 

enforcement of standard municipal policies excepted from preemption. Given these 

circumstances, we see no error in the District Court’s analysis. Summary judgment was 

proper on the Buttons’ due process claims.

B.

The Buttons’ second argument on appeal is that the District Court erroneously

found that they filed an application for a zoning variance for the activities taking place on 

their property on June 23, 2011. They claim they “never applied for a variance” but

merely appeared before the Dorrance Township Zoning Board “by reason of the actions 

of Snelson in alleging that [the Buttons’] existing business was operating illegally.”23

This argument is meritless. The Buttons admitted that the Zoning Hearing Board issued a 

favorable decision on their application on August 30, 2011. They then used that favorable 

ruling to “attack Snelson’s decision to continue to pursue legal remedies after the Board’s 

 

23 Appellants’ Br. 33. 

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decision was issued.”24 We therefore see no error in the District Court’s finding that the 

Buttons filed a zoning-variance application.

IV.

For the reasons above, we will affirm the District Court’s summary judgment 

order and final judgment. 

 

24 App. 13a n.4.

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