Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01999/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01999-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Henry Enrique Montoya, Jr., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 08-1999-PHX-DGC (ECV)

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Schriro’s Motion for Screening Order

(Doc. #26). Defendant filed the motion after Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint

(Doc. #25). On July 27, 2009, this Court screened Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint

(Doc. #1) and dismissed it with leave to amend. See Doc. #23. The Court will grant the

motion and screen the Second Amended Complaint.

1. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if Plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

2. Second Amended Complaint.

An amended complaint supersedes its original complaint. Hal Roach Studios v.

Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

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1

 As noted above, the First Amended Complaint was dismissed.

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567 (9th Cir. 1987). Causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged

in an amended complaint are waived. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d at 567. Thus, Plaintiff’s

Second Amended Complaint supersedes the Original Complaint he filed back in October

2008.1

 

Plaintiff alleges seven causes of action in his Second Amended Complaint. The first

six are similar to claims raised in his Original Complaint and the First Amended Complaint.

The seventh, however, is a new claim that names four new defendants. Plaintiff identifies

a total of twelve defendants in this action.

a. Counts One through Five

In counts one through five, Plaintiff alleges that the prison official who presided over

his disciplinary violation hearings violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Plaintiff contends that for each of five violation hearings, Defendant Captain

Sigona denied him an opportunity to call witnesses, read witness statements, and present a

defense, among other things. Plaintiff further alleges that Sigona found him guilty of the

infractions based solely on officers’ written reports, and failed to satisfy the evidentiary

standard for guilt. Plaintiff also alleges that in one instance he was denied the right to appear

at a hearing.

Plaintiff claims that as a result of these unconstitutional hearings, he was required to

forfeit earned release credits, among other penalties. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and

punitive damages, declaratory relief, payment of costs and the restoration of his earned

release credits.

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a

state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable in a civil rights action if “a judgment in

favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,”

unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the conviction or sentence has previously been reversed,

expunged, or otherwise invalidated. Applying Heck, the Court in Edwards v. Balisok, 520

U.S. 641, 648 (1997), held that a prisoner's claim for declaratory relief and damages based

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on constitutional violations in a prison disciplinary proceeding that necessarily imply the

invalidity of the punishment imposed is not cognizable under § 1983. Such a claim is barred

unless the plaintiff can show that the disciplinary conviction has been overturned. See

Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648, (1997). Moreover, where a prisoner seeks

restoration of good-time credits, the sole method in federal court for obtaining such relief is

a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

Here, Plaintiff's claims for damages and declaratory relief in counts one through five

are barred by Balisok. Plaintiff's alleged constitutional violations would necessarily imply

the invalidity of the disciplinary convictions and the corresponding forfeiture of earned

release credits. Because Plaintiff has not shown that the disciplinary convictions were

overturned, he cannot proceed with these claims in a § 1983 action. In addition, the claims

must be dismissed because Plaintiff seeks restoration of his earned release credits as a

remedy. Such relief may only be obtained through a petition for writ of habeas corpus, not

a civil rights action. Accordingly, counts one through five will be dismissed for failure to

state a cognizable claim. 

b. Count Six

Plaintiff alleges in count six that Defendants Schriro, Ryan and Goldsmith

implemented and administered the unconstitutional disciplinary process described in counts

one through five. He contends that they administered a disciplinary process that prohibited

him from confronting adverse witnesses and calling his own witnesses, that failed to adhere

to the proper evidentiary standard, and that failed to require written findings by the factfinders.

Plaintiff’s claim in count six will be dismissed for the same reasons as the claims in

counts one through five. Plaintiff ties the actions of the three defendants in this claim to the

disciplinary violations referenced in the previous counts. The constitutional violations

alleged would necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s disciplinary violations. Having

failed to show that the disciplinary convictions have been overturned, Plaintiff’s claim is

barred by Balisok. Moreover, as with the previous counts, Plaintiff may not obtain

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restoration of forfeited earned release credits in a civil rights action. Counts six will

therefore be dismissed.

c. Count Seven 

Plaintiff alleges in count seven that correctional officers used excessive force against

him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that on September 1, 2007, after

being strip-searched, Defendants Montgomery and Allen sprayed him with dangerous

chemical agents while he was naked. Plaintiff contends that he posed no threat to the officers

when they sprayed him. He alleges that, while still naked, he was handcuffed and placed on

a gurney to receive medical attention. Plaintiff claims he was in excruciating pain from the

chemicals and felt like he was on fire. Plaintiff alleges that after being forced to lie on the

gurney for 30 minutes, Defendant Austin ordered Montgomery and Allen to “decontaminate”

Plaintiff by placing him under extremely hot water. Plaintiff claims he was screaming that

he was on fire during the 10 or 15 minutes he was forced to remain under the hot water. He

alleges that he was then placed back on the vinyl gurney, face-down, for approximately three

hours. He claims that during this period, he repeatedly told Defendants Montgomery, Allen,

Austin and Cofield that he felt burning pains. He states that Cofield and Austin would order

Montgomery and Allen to push him back down on the gurney whenever Plaintiff would

move to alleviate the pain. Plaintiff further alleges that an unknown nurse administered an

anti-psychotic injection because he was violently crying, screaming and yelling because of

the pain. He claims the nurse also threatened him with mace and later gave him a second

injection. For this claim, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain

against prison inmates. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (citing Whitley v. Albers,

475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). In analyzing an excessive force claim, the question of whether

the conduct involved an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain depends on “whether

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (citing Whitley).

Relevant to that determination are factors such as the need for the application of force, the

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relationship between the need for force and the amount used, and the extent of any resulting

injury. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321. Although the harm to a plaintiff need not rise to the level

of a significant injury to establish an excessive force claim, the level of physical force used

must be more than de minimis. See McMillian, 503 U.S. at 9.

Plaintiff’s allegations state a claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth

Amendment against Defendants Montgomery, Allen, Austin and Cofield. The Court will

require those defendants to answer the claim. The allegations fail to state a claim against the

nurse Plaintiff identifies as Jane Doe.

3. Dismissal of Defendants

Because no claims remain against them, eight of the twelve named defendants will be

dismissed from this action: Defendants Dora Schrio, Charles Ryan, Charles Goldsmith,

Captain Sigona, John Doe/Deputy Warden, Jane Doe/Medical Staff Nurse, John

Doe/Correctional Officer and Jane Doe/Correctional Officer.

4. Warning of Possible Dismissal.

Plaintiff should take note that if he fails to timely comply with every provision of this

Order, this action may be dismissed without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d

1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (district court may dismiss action for failure to comply with

any order of the Court).

5. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

6. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if appearance has been entered, a copy of

every document he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must included a certificate stating

that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit an

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additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv. 5.4. Failure to comply may

result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

7. No Further Amendments.

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to amend his

pleading "once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served...."

Because Plaintiff has now filed two amended complaints, he may not file another amended

complaint without first seeking leave from the Court. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) That Defendant Schriro’s Motion for Screening Order (Doc. #26) is granted;

(2) That Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Second Amended Complaint are dismissed

for failure to state a claim;

(3) That Defendants Dora Schrio, Charles Ryan, Charles Goldsmith, Captain Sigona,

John Doe/Deputy Warden, Jane Doe/Medical Staff Nurse, John Doe/Correctional Officer and

Jane Doe/Correctional Officer are dismissed from this action;

(4) That Defendants Montgomery, Allen, Austin and Cofield must answer Plaintiff’s

claim in count 7 of the Second Amended Complaint.

(5) That the Clerk of Court shall send Plaintiff a service packet including the Second

Amended Complaint, this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for

Defendants Montgomery, Allen, Austin and Cofield;

(6) That Plaintiff shall complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court

within 20 days of the date this order is filed. The United State Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order;

(7) That if Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or

complete service of the summons and Second Amended Complaint on Defendants

Montgomery, Allen, Austin and Cofield within 120 days of the filing of the Second

Amended Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the

action may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i);

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(8) That the United States Marshal shall retain the summons, a copy of the Second

Amended Complaint and a copy of this Order for future use;

(9) That the United States Marshal shall notify Defendants Montgomery, Allen,

Austin and Cofield of the commencement of this action and request waiver of service of the

summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to

Defendants shall include a copy of this Order. The Marshall shall file waivers of service of

the summons or requests for waivers that were returned as undeliverable as soon as they are

received. If a waiver of service of summons is not returned by Defendant within 30 days

from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the Marshal shall:

(a) Personally serve copies of the summons, Second Amended Complaint and

this Order upon Defendants Montgomery, Allen, Austin and Cofield pursuant to Rule

4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

(b) Within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the

summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon Defendants.

The costs of service shall be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and

shall include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of

the summons, Second Amended Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new

process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be

taxed against the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court;

(7) That a Defendant who agrees to waive service of the summons and Second

Amended Complaint shall return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal,

not the Plaintiff;

(8) That Defendants Montgomery, Allen, Austin and Cofield shall answer the Second

Amended Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time provided

by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

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(9) That any answer or responsive pleading shall state the specific Defendant(s) by

name on whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike an answer or responsive pleading that

does not identify the specific Defendant(s) by name on whose behalf it is filed;

(10) That this matter is again referred to Magistrate Judge Edward C. Voss pursuant

to Local Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for further proceedings.

DATED this 2nd day of February, 2010.

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