Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02189/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02189-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IDA BLEICH,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08-CV-2189-H (WVG)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT EHLERS’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[Doc. No. 26.]

vs.

EL CAJON POLICE OFFICER D.

EHLERS, BASIL ABDULAHAD and

DOES 1-20,

Defendant.

On March 5, 2010, Defendant D. Ehlers filed a motion for summary judgment in this

case. (Doc. No. 26.) On April 5, 2010, Plaintiff Ida Bleich filed her response in opposition

to the motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 30.) On April 12, 2010, Defendant Ehlers

filed his reply in support of the motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 33.) The Court held

a hearing on the matter on April 19, 2010. Keith Rutman appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff.

Steven Boehmer and Carrie Mitchell appeared on behalf of the Defendant. For the following

reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant Ehlers’s motion for summary judgment. 

Background

On June 9, 2008, Plaintiff Ida Bleich (“Plaintiff”), a 59-year-old pharmacist, was

arrested by Defendant Darren Ehlers without a warrant on charges of violating California Penal

Code § 442 (criminal threats) and § 646.9 (stalking). (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10.) At all relevant times,

Case 3:08-cv-02189-H-WVG Document 35 Filed 04/20/10 Page 1 of 7
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1

 Parties appear to dispute what was actually said by Defendant Ehlers and Plaintiff

during that meeting. (See Doc. No. 30-1 at 11-12.) 

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Defendant Ehlers was a law enforcement officer with the El Cajon Police Department. (Id. ¶

4.) Prior to June 9, 2008, Defendant Basil Abdulahad and Plaintiff worked together at the CVS

pharmacy in El Cajon, California. (Id. ¶ 8.) On June 9, 2008, Defendant Abdulahad reported

to Defendant Ehlers that on June 7, 2008, Plaintiff left a message on Abdulahad’s cell phone

threatening Abdulahad with death. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) Abdulahad told Ehlers that Plaintiff knew

where he lived and was acting strangely towards him at work. (Doc. No. 26-4, Ehlers Decl.

¶ 10.) Abdulahad appeared visibly shaken and expressed to Defendant Ehlers that he was very

afraid. (Id. ¶ 4.) Defendant Ehlers listened to the message, made an audiotape recording of

the message, and prepared a typewritten document of its contents. (Id. ¶ 8.) The message

made specific threats against Abdulahad and stated that the caller knew where Abdulahad

lived, threatened to slit his throat and put him in a body bag, and purported to describe

Abdulahad’s movements on a recent night. (Id.) Defendant Ehlers believed the caller sounded

like a female with slow mumbling, rambling voice who was either drunk or high on

prescription drugs. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6.) Defendant Abdulahad told Defendant Ehlers that Plaintiff was

Abdulahda’s supervisor at the pharmacy and had access to prescription drugs. (Id. 6.)

Defendant Ehlers then went to the CVS pharmacy where Plaintiff worked to continue

the investigation. (Id. ¶ 12.) Defendant met with the store manager, Josephine Elaine Cavada,

and had her listen to the voice message. (Id. ¶ 13.) According to Defendant Ehlers, Cavada’s

“eyes went big and round and she stated, ‘That’s Ida. These are some serious threats. That

definitely sounds like Ida to me.’” (Id.) According to Defendant Ehlers, Cavada then

informed him that she had received customer complaints about Plaintiff stealing their pills and

manipulating prescriptions, and that customers complained of Plaintiff’s erratic behavior

involving yelling and cursing at people. (Id.) According to Defendant Ehlers, Cavada also

informed him about the fact that Plaintiff was noted for acting strangely toward Abdulahad.

(Id.) Defendant Ehlers then met with Plaintiff, who appeared agitated and defensive.1

 (Id. ¶

13.) Defendant Ehlers noticed that Plaintiff’s voice resembled that of the caller on the

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message. (Id. ¶ 15.) Defendant Ehlers also noticed that Plaintiff appeared to be “disoriented

and ‘not all there,’” and her behavior was erratic. (Id. ¶ 18.) After conferring with a senior

officer who was present during the interview, Defendant Ehlers concluded that probable cause

existed to arrest Plaintiff for making a criminal threat and stalking. (Id.¶ 15.) 

On June 20, 2008, a felony complaint was filed charging Ida Bleich with Penal Code

sections 422 (making a criminal threat) and 646.9 (stalking). (Doc. No. 26-3, Ex. A, Felony

Compl.) At the preliminary hearing, the Superior Court Judge found there was insufficient

evidence to bind over for trial and dismissed the case. (Doc. No. 30-10, Prelim. Hearing

Transcript.) The Judge then denied an oral motion for a factual finding of innocence pursuant

to California Penal Code section 851.8. (Id. at 39-40.) The court explained there was some

evidence that Bleich made the call to Abdulahad but the evidence was not strong enough to

bind her over for trial. (Id.) The court later denied Bleich’s written petition seeking a finding

of factual innocence, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. See People v. Bleich, 100

Cal. Rptr.3d 288 (Ct. App. 2009), review denied (Jan. 13, 2010). 

On November 25, 2008, Plaintiff filed her complaint against Defendants Ehlers and

Abdulahad. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff’s complaint alleges Defendant Ehlers violated Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures by unlawfully arresting her,

and seeks damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶¶ 27-31.) Plaintiff alleges that a

reasonably prudent officer would have known that Plaintiff was not subject to detention or

arrest, and that Plaintiff sustained great emotional distress and shock and injury to her person

and nervous system as a result of Defendant’s actions. (Id. ¶¶ 28-30.) 

On March 5, 2010, Defendant Ehlers filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that

Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of probable cause. (Doc. No. 26-1

at 12.) Defendant’s motion also argues that probable cause existed as a matter of law, and that

Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 16-20.)

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I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure if the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact

and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the

outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Freeman

v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir.1997). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving

party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an

essential element of the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the

nonmoving party failed to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's case on

which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving at trial. Id. at 322-23. “Disputes

over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W.

Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Once the moving party establishes the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the

burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth facts showing that a genuine issue of

disputed fact remains. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. The nonmoving party cannot oppose a

properly supported summary judgment motion by “rest[ing] on mere allegations or denials

of his pleadings.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must view all inferences

drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court

does not make credibility determinations with respect to evidence offered. See T.W. Elec.,

809 F.2d at 630-31 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587). Summary judgment is therefore

not appropriate “where contradictory inferences may reasonably be drawn from undisputed

evidentiary facts....” Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324,

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1335 (9th Cir. 1980).

II. Discussion

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Ehlers violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free

from unreasonable seizures by unlawfully arresting her. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action “against any person acting under color

of law who deprives another ‘of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336

F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To establish liability under 1983,

a plaintiff must show (1) that she has been deprived of a right secured by the United States

Constitution or a federal law, and (2) that the deprivation was effected “under color of state

law.” Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir.2003).

An arrest without probable cause is an actionable unlawful arrest. Atwater v. City

of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). Probable cause exists when the facts are such

that a reasonably prudent person would believe that a crime had been committed. Gerstein

v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975). Probable cause is based o what the officer knew at the

time of the arrest. Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (“Whether that arrest was

constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the

officers had probable cause to make it-whether at that moment the facts and circumstances

within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were

sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was

committing an offense.”) 

Plaintiff was arrested for making a criminal threat pursuant to California Penal Code

section 422 and for stalking under section 646.9, subdivision (a). The crime of stalking is

established if a person repeatedly follows or harasses another person and makes a credible

threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury.

People v. Ewing, 76 Cal. App.4th 199, 210 (1999). The offense of making a criminal threat

is established where the following five elements are present: (1) the defendant willfully

threatened to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another;

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2

Because the Court concludes that probable cause to arrest existed, the Court does not

reach the question of whether collateral estoppel or qualified immunity apply to Plaintiff’s

claim. 

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(2) the defendant made the threat with the specific intent the statement would be taken as a

threat; (3) the threat was on its face and under the circumstances so unequivocal,

unconditional, immediate and specific as to convey to the person threatened a gravity of

purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat; (4) the threat caused the

person threatened to be in sustained fear for his or his immediate family's safety; and

finally, (5) the threatened person's fear was reasonable under the circumstances. In re

Sylvester C., 40 Cal. Rptr.3d 461, 463-64 (Ct. App. 2006); People v. Maciel, 6 Cal. Rptr.3d

628, 632 (Ct. App. 2003). 

Here, there is no disputed issue of material fact as to what was known to the officers

at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest. Parties do not dispute that Abdulahad was threatened and

stalked. Abdulahad appeared visibly shaken and expressed to Defendant Ehlers that he was

very afraid. Defendant Ehlers listened to the message and believed that the voice sounded

like a female with a slow mumbling, rambling voice who was either drunk or high on

prescription drugs. Defendant Ehlers was then informed that Plaintiff was a female who

had access to prescription drugs. At the time of Plaintiff’s arrest for making a criminal

threat and stalking, Defendant Ehlers knew that at least two persons believed the voice on

the cell phone message belonged to Plaintiff. Both Defendant Abdulahad and store

manager Cavada told Ehlers that the voice sounded like Plaintiff. Defendant Ehlers was

also told that Plaintiff had been acting strangely towards Abdulahad. During his contact

with Plaintiff, Defendant observed that her behavior was erratic, and her voice resembled

the caller’s voice on the message. The Court concludes that Defendant Ehlers had probable

cause to arrest Plaintiff. Under the totality of the circumstances, a prudent person would

have concluded that there was a fair probability Plaintiff had committed a crime.2

 

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Conclusion

For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Defendant Ehlers’s motion for summary

judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 20, 2010

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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