Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02018/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02018-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 20:1681 Title IX Educational Amendments 1992 - Sex Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NICOLE RAMSER,

Plaintiff,

v.

RICKY LAIELLI; UNIVERSITY OF 

SAN DIEGO, a California corporation; 

and DOES 1-20,

Defendants.

Case No.: 15-CV-2018-CAB-DHB

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

[Doc. No. 113]

On August 4, 2017, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant 

University of San Diego (“USD”). Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration of that order. 

Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

Plaintiff cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 59 for the proposition that “[a] 

motion for reconsideration should be granted when there are highly unusual 

circumstances.” [Doc. No. 113 at 27.]1 Rule 59, however, provides only that after entry 

 

1 Plaintiff may have taken this language from Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 

F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993), where, in addition to the three grounds for reconsideration identified 

herein, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[t]here may be other, highly unusual, circumstances warranting 

reconsideration. Plaintiff does not identify any highly unusual circumstances that warrant reconsideration 

here.

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of judgment, a party may file a motion to alter or amend the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). 

“Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered 

evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if 

there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. 

v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).

“Although Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous 

order, the rule offers an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 

finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 

F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A Rule 59(e) 

motion for reconsideration may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the 

first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation. Id. “[A]fter 

thoughts” or “shifting of ground” do not constitute an appropriate basis for reconsideration. 

Ausmus v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 08–CV–2342–L, 2009 WL 2058549, at *2 (S.D.Cal. 

July 15, 2009) (Lorenz, J.). In other words, a Rule 59(e) motion does not give parties a 

“second bite at the apple.” See Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1236–37 (9th Cir. 2001); 

see also Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. State of Mich., 152 F.R.D. 562, 563 

(W.D.Mich.1992) (“[W]here the movant is attempting to obtain a complete reversal of the 

court’s judgment by offering essentially the same arguments presented on the original 

motion, the proper vehicle for relief is an appeal.”); Bermingham v. Sony Corp. of Am., 

Inc., 820 F.Supp. 834, 856 (D.N.J.1992), aff’d 37 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir. 1994) (“A party 

seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court’s decision, 

and recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its 

original decision fails to carry the moving party’s burden.”) (citation omitted). Ultimately, 

“[t]here is no requirement that reasons be stated for the denial of a motion for 

reconsideration under Rule 59(e).” Briddle v. Scott, 63 F.3d 364, 381 (5th Cir. 1995). 

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Here, Plaintiff does not identify any change in controlling authority2 or new 

evidence. Rather, she simply thinks the Court’s order granting summary judgment order 

was wrong. Thus, she utilizes the entirety of her motion making the same arguments she 

made (or could have made) on summary judgment, both in her opposition brief and at the 

hearing, before which the Court had provided the parties with a tentative draft of its 

summary judgment order. Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the Court’s decision is hardly 

surprising, but her inability to convince the Court the first time around does not entitle her

to a second bite at the apple under Rule 59. By merely rearguing her position that USD’s 

summary judgment motion should have been denied, she has not offered any basis for 

reconsideration of the Court’s order granting summary judgment for USD. Cf. Am. 

Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Const. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(holding with respect to motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) that “[b]ecause 

[the movants] simply reargued their case . . . the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying the motion.”).

Ultimately, the Court echoes the following sentiment expressed by another district 

judge that motions for reconsideration should not be used merely as an intermediate 

“appeal” before taking a disputed ruling to the Ninth Circuit:

The Court cannot emphasize strongly enough that the Rules allowing for 

motions for reconsideration are not intended to provide litigants with a second 

bite at the apple. Rather, reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be 

used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial 

resources.” Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th 

Cir. 2000). In an adversarial system such as ours, more often than not one 

party will win and one will lose. Generally, it follows that the losing party 

will be unhappy with the Court’s decision. Rarely does the losing party 

believe that its position lacked merit, or that the Court was correct in ruling 

against it. Rather than either accept the Court’s ruling or appeal it, it seems 

 

2 The only new opinion Plaintiff cites is a decision on a motion for attorney’s fees in an employment 

discrimination case. Fox v. Pittsburg State Univ., No. 14-CV-2606-JAR, 2017 WL 2735475 (D. Kan. 

June 26, 2017). The opinion is entirely irrelevant to USD’s summary judgment motion, and even if it 

were applicable, a decision from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas does not 

constitute an intervening change in controlling law that would warrant reconsideration. 

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to have instead become de rigueur to file a motion for reconsideration. The 

vast majority of these motions represent a simple rehash of the arguments 

already made, although now rewritten as though the Court was the opposing 

party and its Order the brief to be opposed. It is easy for each litigant to 

consider only his or her own motion, and the seemingly manifest injustice that 

has been done to them. But the cumulative effect is one of abuse of the system 

and a drain on judicial resources that could be better used to address matters 

that have not yet been before the Court once, let alone twice.

This is not to say that a motion for reconsideration is never well-taken. A 

litigant should not shy from bringing to the Court’s attention changes in facts 

and circumstances that render a ruling no longer logical, an intervening 

change in controlling authority, or other critical matters that the Rules provide 

should be brought to the Court’s attention in this way. On this basis, motions 

for reconsideration should be few, far between, and narrowly focused. When 

this is the case, the Rules work as they were intended, and the Court can focus 

on the business of justice.

Strobel v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, No. 04CV1069 BEN(BLM), 2007 WL 1053454, 

at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2007). Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration does not meet the 

description in the second paragraph of the above block quote. The Court considered all of 

the arguments and evidence Plaintiff reiterates in her motion for reconsideration when it 

granted USD’s motion for summary judgment and is not persuaded that its order was 

incorrect. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 15, 2017

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