Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00367/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00367-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, )

)

Plaintiff/Respondent, )

) CR 07-00871 PHX ROS

v. ) CV 12-00367 PHX ROS MEA

) 

Hanoi Barbaro Acosta, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Defendant/Movant. )

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER:

On February 21, 2012, Mr. Hanoi Acosta (“Movant”),

filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On July 12, 2012, Respondent

filed a Response to Defendant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or

Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Response”) (Doc.

9). Movant filed a reply to the response to his motion on

August 15, 2012. See Doc. 12. 

I Procedural History

A grand jury indictment returned July 25, 2007, charged

Movant with one count of child sex trafficking, a violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), and one count of interstate transportation

of a minor for prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)

and (e). See Criminal Doc. 9.

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After a seven-day trial and less than a day of

deliberations, on May 23, 2008, a jury found Movant guilty on

the charge of interstate transportation of a minor for

prostitution, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the

charge of child sex trafficking. See Criminal Doc. 222. On

July 18, 2008, the government moved to dismiss the child sex

trafficking charge. See Criminal Doc. 282. The motion was

granted July 23, 2008. See Criminal Doc. 298. 

The United States Probation Office prepared a

presentence investigation report and computed Movant’s offense

level under the Sentencing Guidelines at 38 with a Criminal

History Category of II. See Criminal Doc. 314 at 5, 9. The

Probation Office reached an offense level of 38 by beginning

with a base offense level of 28 and adding: (1) two levels

because Movant used force and his age disparity to influence a

minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct; (2) two levels

because Movant used a computer to entice, encourage, offer, or

solicit a person to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with a

minor; (3) two levels because Movant’s offense involved a

commercial sex act; (4) two levels because Movant organized,

led, managed or supervised the criminal activity; and (5) two

levels because Movant obstructed justice by making several

telephone calls to witnesses prior to his trial to persuade them

to flee the United States or to influence their testimony. See

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1

The United States supported the obstruction of

justice enhancement with a recording of a

telephone call from Defendant to [a minor whom

Movant was accused of transporting across state

lines for prostitution], in which he told [her]

to turn off her telephone “and never turn it on

again” so the F.B.I. agents looking for her could

not find her. (CR 314.) The Probation Office

recommended that the District Court impose a

sentence in the middle of the Guidelines range,

295 months’ imprisonment.

-3-

Criminal Doc. 314 at 5.1

Movant’s defense counsel filed a sentencing memorandum

urging the District Court to find that the statutory minimum

sentence was excessive and asking the Court to impose a shorter

sentence. See Criminal Doc. 320. Movant also argued that the

punishment for his crime under federal law was unfairly harsh

compared to the punishment for the same crime in other

jurisdictions. See Criminal Doc. 320.

On October 15, 2008, the Court sentenced Movant to a

term of 262 months imprisonment pursuant to his conviction on

the charge of interstate transportation of a minor for

prostitution, the minimum term available under the Sentencing

Guidelines. See Criminal Doc. 322. 

At his request, Movant was appointed different counsel

to represent him in his direct appeal. See Criminal Doc. 339.

In his appeal Movant argued the District Court erred in failing

to find certain enhancements by clear and convincing evidence

and that the District Court erred in sentencing him to a term of

262 months imprisonment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

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affirmed Movant’s conviction and sentence, finding that the

District Court did not plainly err in applying the enhancements

and concluding that the District Court had sentenced Movant “in

a procedurally sound manner.” United States v. Acosta, 388 Fed.

App. 620, 622 (9th Cir. 2010).

On October 15, 2010, Movant sought review of the Ninth

Circuit’s decision by the United States Supreme Court, which

denied certiorari on November 15, 2010. 

On December 14, 2011, Defendant filed a motion asking

the Court for additional time to file a section 2255 action.

The matter was docketed as case number 11 CV 2473 PHX ROS and

classified as a section 2255 action. At that time Movant was

incarcerated in Florida. Movant asked the Court for more time

to file his substantive section 2255 petition, averring that in

October of 2011, one month before his habeas petition was due,

he was transferred and his “legal papers” did not travel with

him. In a decision entered January 9, 2012, the District Court

denied the motion, concluding:

Movant’s Motion Seeking Permission is not

accompanied by a § 2255 motion. The Court is

not able to construe the Motion Seeking

Permission as a § 2255 motion because it is

not filed on the court-approved form for

filing a § 2255 motion, does not specify any

grounds for habeas corpus relief, does not

set forth any facts supporting any grounds,

and does not specify the habeas relief

requested. See Rule 2(a) of the Rules

Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the

United States District Courts.

***

Because this matter is being dismissed

without prejudice, Movant is in no way

prevented by this Order from filing a § 2255

motion in the future. Any § 2255 motion must

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be filed on the court-approved form. See

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 3.5(a)

(prisoners must use the court-approved form

when filing a pro se motion pursuant to §

2255). In the event that the government

raises the 1-year period of limitation in 28

U.S.C. § 2255(f) as an affirmative defense in

any future § 2255 action instituted by

Movant, Movant will be free to argue that his

§ 2255 motion is subject to equitable

tolling. See United States v. Battles, 362

F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The statute

of limitations contained in § 2255 is subject

to equitable tolling.”).

On February 21, 2012, Movant filed the instant Motion

to Vacate, Set Aside, and Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255. Movant contends the District Court denied him his right

to a speedy trial when it granted his trial counsel’s motions to

continue his trial date, “constituting ineffective assistance of

counsel.” Movant also argues that the Court improperly found

Movant was a leader or organizer of the crimes of conviction

resulting in an enhanced sentence, and that his counsel failed

to “argue [the application of the sentencing enhancements] in a

constitutional manner. Constituting ineffective assistance of

counsel.” Movant also asserts his trial counsel gave him

“erroneous” advice concerning a plea agreement. 

Respondent contends the section 2255 motion is untimely

and that some claims are precluded: “The motion was due on

November 15, 2011. Two of the three arguments contained in the

motion were not addressed on direct appeal.”

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2

 Section 2255 provides, inter alia:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a

motion under this section. The limitation period

shall run from...the date on which the judgment

of conviction becomes final.... [or] the date on

which the right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if that right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review...

-6-

II Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

A one-year statute of limitations on a section 2255

action applies to criminal convictions entered by the District

Court.2 The statute of limitations begins to run when a

conviction becomes final. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia,

210 F.3d 1058, 1060 (9th Cir. 2000). “The Supreme Court has

held that a conviction is final in the context of habeas review

when ‘a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the

availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition

for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally

denied.’” United States v. Schwartz, 274 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th

Cir. 2001), quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6,

107 S. Ct. 708, 712 n.6 (1987). See also United States v.

Buckles, 647 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.

436 (2011). 

Movant’s conviction became final on November 15, 2010,

when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in

Movant’s direct appeal. Accordingly, his section 2255 motion

was required to be filed by November 15, 2011. The section 2255

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motion was not filed until February 21, 2012. The motion filed

by Movant in November of 2011, seeking additional time to file

a substantive section 2255 petition, was denied and dismissed

and did not toll the statute of limitations. 

Movant would be entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations if he established that he has diligently

been pursuing his rights and that “some extraordinary

circumstance prevented timely filing of his section 2255 motion.

See, e.g., Buckles, 647 F.3d at 889-91 (holding that the movant

was not entitled to equitable tolling notwithstanding his

counsel’s alleged misconduct because it had “no effect” on the

timeliness of his motion). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

has held that movants who relied to their detriment on incorrect

statements of law by the Ninth Circuit, or those who are

“affirmatively misled” by a court’s erroneous instructions may

be entitled to tolling. Id. at 891.

With regard to the timeliness of his section 2255

action, Movant reasserts the claims made in his previous section

2255 action (11 cv 2473) and notes that matter was dismissed

without prejudice. Movant contends “genuine circumstances

outside his control” prevented the timely filing of his section

2255 action, i.e., that Movant’s transfer of custody in October

of 2011 and his lack of access to his legal papers until

February of 2012 prevented his timely filing of his habeas

action.

Movant has not alleged a basis for equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations with regard to his section 2255

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action. Movant does not explain why his habeas petition was not

filed prior to October of 2011 when Movant was transferred, one

month before the habeas petition was due. Accordingly, the

Court should not consider the merits of his claims for relief.

Nor does Movant assert his actual innocence of the crime of

conviction; the bulk of Movant’s arguments in his motion are

regarding the sentence imposed rather than the jury’s finding of

guilt.

 However, assuming the Court concludes Movant is

entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, the

Magistrate Judge will discuss Movant’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claims.

B. Defaulted claims

Because “[h]abeas review is an extraordinary remedy and

will not be allowed to do service for an appeal,” Bousley v.

United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1610 (1998),

absent a showing of cause and prejudice, a section 2255 movant

procedurally defaults all claims which were not raised in his

direct appeal, other than claims asserting that the movant was

deprived of the right to the effective assistance of counsel.

See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68, 102 S. Ct.

1584, 1594 (1982); United States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 964

(9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945

(9th Cir. 1993). 

“[T]o obtain collateral relief based on trial errors to

which no contemporaneous objection was made, a convicted

defendant must show both (1) ‘cause’ excusing his double

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procedural default, and (2) ‘actual prejudice’ resulting from

the errors of which he complains.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68,

102 S. Ct. at 1594. See also Ratigan, 351 F.3d at 964. A

petitioner who fails to show cause and prejudice can still

obtain review of a claim on collateral attack by demonstrating

the likelihood of his “actual,” i.e., factual, innocence. See

Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, 118 S. Ct. at 1611-12; United States

v. Braswell, 501 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2007). To establish

actual innocence the movant must demonstrate that, in light of

all the evidence, including new evidence that might be

introduced by both sides, it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have convicted him. See Ratigan, 351

F.3d at 964, quoting Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, 118 S. Ct. at

1611.

Additionally, as a general rule, “[i]ssues disposed of

on a previous direct appeal are not reviewable in a subsequent

§ 2255 proceeding.” United States v. Currie, 589 F.2d 993, 995

(9th Cir. 1979). A section 2255 petitioner may, in limited

circumstances, raise claims of trial court error that were

previously raised and decided on direct appeal. See Feldman v.

Henman, 815 F.2d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added),

citing Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 n.8, 89 S.

Ct. 1068, 1074 n.8 (1969).

The scope of this exception has been

clarified by Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit

case law. The guiding principles may be

summarized as follows: When a district court

is confronted by a repetitive claim in a §

2255 Motion, the court may refuse to consider

the claim and may give controlling weight to

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the court of appeals’ determination if (1)

the “same ground” presented in the § 2255

Motion was previously determined adversely to

the petitioner; (2) the prior determination

was “on the merits;” and (3) the “ends of

justice” would not be served by reaching the

merits of the claim in the subsequent § 2255

Motion. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1,

15, 83 S. Ct. 1068, 1077, [] (1963); Molina

v. Rison, 886 F.2d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir.

1989); Polizzi v. United States, 550 F.2d

1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1976).

United States v. Olmos-Esparza, 974 F. Supp. 1311, 1317 (S.D.

Cal. 1997). Accordingly, absent a showing of cause and

prejudice, any claim other than an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim which Movant did not assert in his direct appeal

has been procedurally defaulted. 

In response to the answer to his section 2255 motion,

Movant re-asserts the merits of his claims, including many

allegations of trial error which were required to be raised in

his direct appeal and arguing that his trial counsel’s failure

to raise or pursue these claims constituted ineffective

assistance of counsel. Movant also contends that his appellate

counsel was ineffective because appellate counsel did not raise

Movant’s assertions of trial error and error on the part of his

trial counsel in his direct appeal.

Movant has not established cause for nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of any habeas claims other

than ineffective assistance of counsel. Movant does not assert

his actual innocence of the crimes of conviction. Accordingly,

the Court should not consider the merits of any claims other

than ineffective assistance of counsel.

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C. Movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal

defendants the right to effective assistance

of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984).... To prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner

must show 1) his attorney’s performance was

unreasonable under prevailing professional

standards; and 2) there is a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the results would have

been different. United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064). “Strickland defines a reasonable

probability as ‘a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id.

United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1996).

See also United States v. Thomas, 417 F. 3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir.

2005).

Counsel’s performance is deficient when it is

unreasonable, or not “within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104

S. Ct. at 2054. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must

be “highly deferential.” Id., 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at

2065. There is a “strong presumption” that trial counsel’s

conduct and strategy falls “within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.” Id. To establish that his counsel’s

conduct was unconstitutionally substandard, a section 2255

petitioner must establish that no competent counsel would have

acted as his counsel acted, i.e., that his counsel’s acts were

unreasonable. United States v. Fredman, 390 F.3d 1153, 1156

(9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ferreira-Alameda, 815 F.2d

1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[r]eview of counsel’s performance

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is highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable

representation.”); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176-77

(11th Cir. 2001). It is Movant’s burden to provide the Court

with sufficient evidence from which the Court can conclude his

counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally ineffective. See

Withers, 638 F.3d at 1066-67. 

 With regard to the prejudice prong of the Strickland

analysis, the probability of prejudice may not be based merely

upon conjecture or speculation. See Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S.

Ct. 1237, 1246 (2002) (Kennedy, J. concurrence) (regarding

speculation as having no place in a Strickland analysis).

Movant must establish that, but for counsel’s error, the result

of his trial would have been different. See Hasan, 254 F.3d at

1154. 

In response to Movant’s claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel, Respondent asserts:

Counsel for [Movant] was apprised of this

2255 Motion and wrote an Affidavit for the

court’s consideration in this matter.

(Exhibit 2.) Although the government

disagrees with the allegations contained in

the Affidavit that the government “provided

extensive late disclosures” (Id. at 2-3);

that the victim “set up” Defendant (Id. at

2); that the juvenile victim “is a prostitute

who lied about her age and who does not care

what happens in this trial, and who, in fact,

returned to prostitution ...” (Id. at 3-4),

those matters are far outside the focus of

Defendant’s 2255 Motion alleging ineffective

assistance of counsel. Further, as to the

suggestion that the prosecution provided late

discovery, and this somehow prejudiced

Defendant, the District Court considered this

issue and made a finding that “in every

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respect, your client has been accorded the

fairness that he is entitled to . . . [and]

there was no prejudice to your client.”

Doc. 9 at 14.

Respondent also avers:

Defendant also claims that trial counsel

failed to move the court for a dismissal of

the case. This is untrue. Trial counsel filed

two written motions to dismiss (CR 73 and CR

23616), and in trial, made an oral Motion for

Directed Verdict after the government rested

its case. (RT 5/21/08 969-74.)

Doc. 9 at 20. 

Respondent also states:

Defendant claims that the prosecution’s

“manipulation of the proceedings” prevented

him from taking the plea agreement. (CR 1 at

9.)18 This argument does not implicate an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In

accordance with Dunham, Defendant should have

made a prosecutorial misconduct claim in his

direct appeal, and his failure to do so means

this Court should summarily dismiss this

argument. See Dunham, 767 F.2d at 1396. In

order to prevail on a claim of ineffective

assistance, Strickland requires Defendant

establish “constitutionally deficient

performance.” 466 U.S. at 687. In his motion,

Defendant fails to allege any deficient

performance on the part of his trial counsel

concerning the plea agreement. Instead, he

lashes out at the prosecution’s supposed

misdeeds, but never points to ineffective

assistance from his own attorney. 

***

Trial counsel explained every plea agreement

to Defendant. (Exhibit 2 at 1-2.) She

reviewed with him the minimum and mandatory

penalties. (Id.) Counsel for Defendant

relayed to the government that Defendant

wanted to accept the plea agreement to one

year and one day, but the government withdrew

that plea offer. (Id. at 1-2.) The government

made a second plea agreement to 10 years,

counsel explained that plea offer to him, and

Defendant rejected it. (Id. at 2.) The record

is consistent with trial counsel’s affidavit;

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the prosecutor sets forth the details of the

plea agreement exchange and informs the court

that “Mr. Logan reopened that plea agreement

last week which was rejected by the defendant

but I was willing to proceed with that plea

[stipulating to the mandatory minimum of 10

years] because I felt that I could stand

behind that plea...”

Doc. 9 at 23-24.

For the reasons propounded by Respondents, the

Magistrate Judge concludes Movant has not met his burden of

showing any deficient performance by his counsel or that any

alleged deficiency was prejudicial. Accordingly, Movant’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be denied on the

merits notwithstanding any issue regarding the timeliness of his

section 2255 action.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Acosta’s motion

for relief from his convictions and sentences pursuant to

section 2255 be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

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the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. 

Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil Procedure

for the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to de novo appellate consideration of the issues. See United

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 5th day of September, 2012.

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