Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04922/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04922-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

LARRY MAYNARD STENSHOEL,

Petitioner, 

 No C-05-4922 VRW

v

 ORDER

SHERIFF LAURIE SMITH, SANTA 

CLARA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, 

Respondent.

_________________________________/

Petitioner Larry Maynard Stenshoel has filed a petition

for writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC § 2241. Doc # 1, filed

November 29, 2005. The gravamen of his petition is that the state

trial court in which he is awaiting trial has set his bail at

$550,000, a sum he asserts he cannot afford. He also asserts that

he has serious medical problems and should therefore not be

incarcerated prior to trial. According to respondent, petitioner

had been in custody since May 26, 2005, Doc # 17 at 2, and his

trial is currently set to begin on January 9, 2005 [sic]. Id at 3.

On December 16, 2005, petitioner filed papers seeking, in

essence, expedited review of his petition. He asserted that

"[n]either an evidentiary hearing nor further briefing is

Case 3:05-cv-04922-VRW Document 21 Filed 12/22/05 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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necessary" in order for the court to determine that the state has

violated petitioner’s constitutional rights. Doc # 3 at 3. The

court ordered expedited briefing and has now considered both

parties’ submissions. Based upon that review, the court now

DISMISSES the petition for the reasons stated herein. 

One defect warranting dismissal appeared on the caption

of the original petition: petitioner failed to name a respondent

as 28 USC § 2242 requires. That section requires the petition “to

allege the facts concerning the applicant’s commitment or

detention, the name of the person who has custody over him and by

virtue of what claim or authority, if known.” The failure to name

the respondent, who “typically is the warden of the facility in

which the petitioner is incarcerated” deprives the federal court of

personal jurisdiction. Smith v Idaho, 383 F3d 934, 937 (9th Cir

2004), citing Stanley v California Supreme Court, 21 F3d 359, 360

(9th Cir 1994). While this jurisdictional defect may be waived,

id, the state raised this issue in its opposition brief (Doc # 17),

thus indicating its unwillingness to waive the defect in this case. 

The state has, however, allowed petitioner to cure the defect by

stipulating to the filing of an amended petition naming Sheriff

Laurie Smith as the respondent. Docs # 18, 19. 

The petition is subject to dismissal on the further

ground that it fails to allege exhaustion of state remedies;

indeed, while petitioner asserts that he has exhausted “sufficient”

state remedies, Ptr’s Memo at 8, his papers make clear that he has

taken no steps to seek relief from the state’s appellate courts. 

Petitioner acknowledges that he has not previously presented his

one federal constitutional claim to any court and has filed no

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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previous petition challenging the bail amount. Petition ¶ VIII at

5. He asserts that “a bias exists against him given the remedies

being sought by the state’s Complaint.” Ptr’s Mem at 8. 

In its opposition, the state cites 28 USC § 2254(b) and

authorities thereunder for the proposition that for reasons of

comity, a state prisoner must first exhaust his constitutional

claims in state court before seeking habeas relief in the federal

courts. Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509, 518-19 (1982). In order to

exhaust a federal claim, the defendant must “fairly present” the

specific factual and legal bases for the claim to the state’s

highest court. Duncan v Henry, 513 US 364, 365 (1995). This

requires state prisoners to “give the state courts one full

opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one

complete round of the State’s established appellate review

process,” including discretionary review to the state supreme court

if that is the state’s practice. O’Sullivan v Boerckel, 526 US

838, 845 (1999). 

Petitioner appears to contend that his efforts at

exhaustion (that is, moving the trial court for a reduction in his

bail amount) should be deemed sufficient because his proceedings

are in the pretrial stage, citing Boston Municipal Court v Jydon,

466 US 294 (1984), and Mannes v Gillespie, 967 F2d 1310 (9th Cir

1992). Ptr’s Mem at 8. Because in both of those cases the

petitioners had exhausted their claims before arriving in federal

court, however, petitioner’s reliance on them is not only

unavailing but incomprehensible. In Jydon, moreover, the Supreme

Court specifically stated the contrary proposition:

\\

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United States District Court

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We are concerned here with a petitioner who has been

convicted in state court and who has apparently

exhausted all available state court opportunities to

have that conviction set aside. Where a state

defendant is released on bail or on his own

recognizance pending trial or pending appeal, he must

still contend with the requirements of the exhaustion

doctrine if he seeks habeas corpus relief in the

federal courts. Nothing in today’s opinion

alters the application of that doctrine to such a

defendant.

Id at 302-03. See also Sistrunk v Lyons, 646 F2d 64, 66 n 4 (3d

Cir 1981) (“A petitioner appealing the imposition of bail by a

state court must exhaust available state remedies before commencing

a habeas proceeding in the federal district court.”).

Petitioner’s unsubstantiated assertion that the state

courts are biased against him similarly provides no basis for

failing to exhaust state remedies. A petitioner “may not bypass

the state courts simply because he thinks they will be

unsympathetic to his claim.” Engle v Isaac, 456 US 102, 130

(1982).

With his reply papers, petitioner attempts a different

tack. He correctly points out that his petition is brought not

under 28 USC § 2254, but under § 2241(c)(3), and that the former

provision is available only to individuals “in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States,” 28 USC § 2254(a), and therefore does not encompass

pretrial detainees. Doc # 20 (Ptr’s Reply) at 2. Describing

respondent’s “‘unexhausted’ state remedies concept” as “misplaced,”

petitioner argues that habeas petitions brought under § 2241(c)(3)

are not subject to “the restrictions or limitations of 28 USC §

2254.” Id at 3. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In Carden v State of Montana, 626 F2d 82, 83 (9th Cir

1980), the Ninth Circuit squarely addressed the exhaustion

requirements for habeas petitions under § 2241: 

The central issue is whether comity precluded the

district court from intervening, prior to trial, in

the State's criminal prosecution of the Cardens.

The State concedes that the district court had

jurisdiction, under 28 USC s 2241, to issue the

pretrial writ of habeas corpus. As an exercise of

judicial restraint, however, federal courts elect

not to entertain habeas corpus challenges to state

court proceedings until habeas petitioners have

exhausted state avenues for raising federal claim.

Pursuant to Carden, the judges of this court, including the

undersigned judge, have consistently required dismissal of

petitions brought by pretrial detainees in state court for failure

to exhaust state remedies. See, e g, In re Johnson, 2003 WL

22094534, In re Cole, 2002 WL 31720577, Jones v Piccinini, 2001 WL

1658285, Merrick v Ornell, 1997 WL 12128, Burnett v Rupf, 1996 WL

700251, Woodruff v Plummer, 1994 WL 412438. This case offers no

ground for deviating from this practice. 

Because the court dismisses the petition on procedural

grounds, it does not reach the merits of the petition. 

The petition is DISMISSED without prejudice. The clerk

is directed to close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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