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Nature of Suit Code: 344
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

WALTER N. STRAND, III,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________

2019-1016

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:15-cv-00601-TCW, Judge Thomas C. Wheeler.

______________________

Decided: March 3, 2020

______________________

LUCAS TAYLOR HANBACK, Rogers Joseph O'Donnell, 

Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented by JEFFERY M. CHIOW; NEIL H. O'DONNELL, San 

Francisco, CA. 

 DANIEL KENNETH GREENE, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant. 

Also represented by JOSEPH H. HUNT, ROBERT EDWARD 

KIRSCHMAN, JR., DOUGLAS K. MICKLE; STEPHEN ROBERT 

STEWART, Office of the Judge Advocate General, General 

Litigation Division, United States Department of the Navy, 

Washington, DC. 

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2 STRAND v. UNITED STATES

 ______________________

Before REYNA, HUGHES, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HUGHES.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge REYNA.

HUGHES, Circuit Judge.

The government appeals a decision of the United 

States Court of Federal Claims setting aside the Secretary 

of the Navy’s denial of Walter Strand’s request to correct 

his military service records. Against the recommendation 

of a records correction board, the Secretary denied Mr. 

Strand’s request for a six-month service credit to become 

eligible for military retirement benefits. Because the Secretary did not exceed his authority in rejecting the board’s 

recommendation and substantial evidence supports his decision, we reverse and thereby reinstate the Secretary’s decision to deny the correction.

I

Mr. Strand served in the Navy for roughly nineteen 

and a half years until June 2009 when he was discharged

under other than honorable conditions for firing a gun at 

his estranged wife and her companion. Mr. Strand was 

convicted in state court of three felonies: attempted malicious wounding, attempted unlawful wounding, and use of 

a firearm in the commission of a felony. He was sentenced

to six years in prison, with three years suspended for good 

behavior. Since his release, Mr. Strand has sought various 

“corrections” to his naval service records, including a sixCase: 19-1016 Document: 37 Page: 2 Filed: 03/03/2020
STRAND v. UNITED STATES 3

month credit so that he would have 20 years of service and 

be eligible for military retirement benefits.1

A

In 2014, the Board for Correction of Naval Records 

(BCNR or Board) recommended granting Mr. Strand’s requested correction. The Board weighed “the seriousness of 

[Mr. Strand’s] disciplinary infractions” against his “overall 

record of more than 19 years and six months of satisfactory 

service [including receiving numerous medals,] . . . . his 

good post service conduct[,] and his early release from civil 

confinement due to good behavior.” J.A. 32. Finding that 

he had “suffered long enough for his indiscretion,” the 

Board recommended correcting Mr. Strand’s record to reflect 20 years of service. J.A. 32–33. That recommendation 

has now been twice considered—and twice rejected—by the 

Secretary of the Navy.2

First, in February 2015, the Secretary rejected the 

Board’s recommendation in a short, two-paragraph decision. The Secretary’s decision generally referenced the seriousness of Mr. Strand’s felony convictions, the Navy’s 

core values, its practice in similar cases, and Mr. Strand’s 

supposed “long-standing history of FAP [Family Advocacy 

Program] involvement and domestic violence issues.” 

1 As discussed below, 10 U.S.C. § 1552 authorizes 

corrections of military records when “necessary to correct 

an error or remove an injustice.”

2 The Secretary has delegated authority to act on 

BCNR recommendations to the Assistant Secretary, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, SECNAVINST 5420.193 at 1–

2 ¶ 3(b), who in turn delegated that authority to the Assistant General Counsel for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 

Appellant’s Br. 4 n.1. Here, different Assistant General 

Counsels issued the two rejection decisions, but for clarity 

we refer to both as decisions of the Secretary.

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4 STRAND v. UNITED STATES

J.A. 25. Mr. Strand challenged this decision in the Court 

of Federal Claims, which reversed the Secretary’s 2015 decision as arbitrary and capricious and instructed the Navy 

to retire Mr. Strand. Strand v. United States (Strand I), 

127 Fed. Cl. 44, 51 (2016).

On appeal, we agreed that the Secretary’s 2015 decision was not supported by substantial evidence, but we reversed and remanded to allow the Secretary an opportunity 

for further review. Strand v. United States (Strand II), 

706 F. App’x 996, 998, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential). In Strand II, we found a lack of substantial evidence 

specifically because the Secretary’s statement that Mr. 

Strand had a history of FAP involvement and domestic violence issues lacked record support. Id. at 1000. Recognizing that the Secretary relied on “a combination of 

intertwined reasons,” at least one of which Mr. Strand had 

shown was not supported by substantial evidence, we remanded because the Secretary had not yet considered 

whether the Board’s decision “should be upheld in the absence of any evidence of a ‘long-standing history’ of FAP 

involvement.” Id.

On remand following Strand II, the Secretary considered the Board’s 2014 recommendation anew and in January 2018—after inviting and receiving supplemental 

information from Mr. Strand—again rejected the recommendation. The Secretary this time issued a seven-page 

memorandum explaining the decision to deny the requested correction. The Secretary found that Mr. Strand’s 

overall periods of service and post-service conduct did not 

“overcome the seriousness of the misconduct that resulted 

in his civilian conviction,” and that the “passage of time . . . 

does not warrant overlooking the seriousness of the conviction that led to his discharge” and his resultant ineligibility 

for retirement. J.A. 283.

The Secretary also noted that two early “counseling/warning” entries added to Mr. Strand’s record in 

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STRAND v. UNITED STATES 5

February 1992 and September 1993 gave him “clear and 

repeated notice” that he could be separated from service for 

disobeying military regulations and civilian laws.3 

J.A. 118, 121, 283.

The Secretary then described how Mr. Strand’s “history of performance and conduct” did not align with each of 

the Navy’s core values—Honor, Courage, and Commitment. J.A. 283–85. Finally, the Secretary noted that Mr. 

Strand’s offenses were equivalent to a violation of Uniform 

Code of Military Justice Article 128 (Assault), which authorizes a maximum penalty of dishonorable discharge and 

confinement for eight years. Citing several military justice 

cases, the Secretary further noted that it was “very likely” 

Mr. Strand would have received a punitive discharge had 

he been prosecuted by the Navy, rather than civilian authorities. J.A. 285. The Secretary concluded:

In sum, I commend Petitioner’s efforts to engage in 

rehabilitation following his conviction and incarceration, as well as his efforts to rebuild his life. 

However, I do not find that relief is warranted and 

that Petitioner should be granted credited time 

served for retirement when, in fact, the basis for his 

inability to retire was not an error or an injustice, 

but his own deliberate misconduct despite being on 

clear notice of the consequences of his actions. To 

3 It is unclear from the record whether the 1992 and 

1993 entries addressed the same underlying act(s) of misconduct. The parties take opposing stances, with Mr. 

Strand urging that the 1993 entry was merely a follow-up 

for the same misconduct that prompted the 1992 entry. 

Even assuming the Secretary erred in stating that Mr. 

Strand “again engaged in misconduct in 1993,” J.A. 283, we 

would find this error harmless. No matter the number of

early instances of misconduct, the Secretary’s rejection decision is supported by substantial evidence.

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6 STRAND v. UNITED STATES

grant relief under the circumstances of this matter 

wholly ignores the high standards that the Navy 

expects our military members to demonstrate.

J.A. 285–86. The Secretary also added that Mr. Strand had 

already received “appropriate relief” from another records 

review board that upgraded his service characterization 

from “Under Other Than Honorable Conditions” to “General Under Honorable Conditions.” J.A. 52, 286. The Secretary found this partial relief—reflecting Mr. Strand’s 

“satisfactory service and post-incarceration efforts to rebuild his life”—further reason to deny additional relief. 

J.A. 286.

B

Mr. Strand filed a supplemental complaint in the Court 

of Federal Claims contesting the Secretary’s 2018 decision. 

On cross-motions for judgment upon the administrative 

record, the Court of Federal Claims again found the Secretary’s decision arbitrary and capricious. Strand v. United 

States (Strand III), 138 Fed. Cl. 633, 643 (2018). Specifically, the trial court found it arbitrary and capricious for 

the Secretary to view Mr. Strand’s early counseling entries 

as providing notice of his obligation to comply with Navy 

core values that did not exist at the time of the 1992 entry;4

and for the Secretary to engage in “hypothetical forecasting” by “comparing Mr. Strand’s civil case to military cases 

that do not apply the same analysis.” Id. at 641. As to 

consideration of Mr. Strand’s 2009 convictions, the trial 

court determined that this Court, in Strand II, already 

“found that Mr. Strand’s conduct did not constitute substantial evidence to support the Secretary’s decision.” Id.

4 The government concedes that the Navy adopted 

its core values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment in late 

1992, after Mr. Strand received his 1992 counseling entry. 

Appellant’s Br. 9, 26. 

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STRAND v. UNITED STATES 7

at 642 (citing Strand II, 706 F. App’x at 1000). Finally, the 

trial court faulted the Secretary for “fail[ing] to give any 

real consideration to Mr. Strand’s post-service conduct.” 

Id. at 643. The court concluded that, given these deficiencies and the Board’s “thorough consideration of the evidence of record,” it could not uphold the Secretary’s 

“decision to overrule the Board.” Id. The trial court therefore again directed the Navy to retire Mr. Strand with all 

appropriate back pay, benefits, and allowances. Id. at 643–

44.

The government now appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

II

We review de novo the Court of Federal Claims’ decision to grant or deny judgment on the administrative record. Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 

2004). In reviewing an adverse decision of a records correction board, we apply the same standard of review that 

the Court of Federal Claims applied, without deference. 

See id. Here we are called to review not the action of a

correction board, but action by the Secretary of the Navy to 

overrule that correction board. While the parties dispute 

the circumstances in which a service secretary may reject 

a board’s recommendation, they agree that the substantialevidence standard generally applies here. That is, we must 

“determine whether the Secretary’s rejection of the Board 

recommendation was arbitrary or capricious, unsupported 

by substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary to the law.” 

Strickland v. United States, 423 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 

2005). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as 

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 

197, 229 (1938). 

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8 STRAND v. UNITED STATES

A

The statute establishing civilian military-records correction boards, such as the BCNR, provides: “The Secretary of a military department may correct any military 

record of the Secretary’s department when the Secretary 

considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice.” 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1). Except in circumstances 

not present here, “such corrections shall be made by the 

Secretary acting through boards of civilians of the executive part of that military department.” Id. (emphasis 

added).

Records correction boards were first authorized in 1946 

to “relieve Congress of the burden of considering private 

bills to correct alleged errors and injustices in the military 

system . . . .” Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 

1306–07 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc). Concerned that service 

members returning to civilian life after World War II might 

be “handicapped by bad military records created without 

due process in the hurly-burly of the war,” and that career 

military officials “would not be much interested in effecting 

corrections,” Congress required the service secretaries to 

act “through boards of civilians.” Boyd v. United States, 

207 Ct. Cl. 1, 14 (1975) (Nichols, J., concurring).

Under Naval Service regulations, the BCNR can take 

corrective action on behalf of the Secretary in many situations. See 32 C.F.R. § 723.6(e)(1). But any petition that 

the Secretary or the BCNR Executive Director determines 

warrants Secretarial review is “reserved for decision” by 

the Secretary. Id. § 723.6(e)(2)(iii). In Mr. Strand’s case, 

BCNR Executive Director Robert O’Neill—a retired Navy

JAG Corpsman—requested that the Secretary review the 

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STRAND v. UNITED STATES 9

Board’s 2014 recommendation.5 In cases designated for 

Secretarial review, the record of proceedings “will be forwarded to the Secretary who will direct such action as he 

or she determines to be appropriate . . . .” 32 C.F.R. 

§ 723.7(a). “If the Secretary’s decision is to deny relief, 

such decision shall be in writing and, unless he or she expressly adopts in whole or in part the findings, conclusions 

and recommendations of the Board, or a minority report, 

shall include a brief statement of the grounds for denial” 

satisfying 32 C.F.R. § 723.3(e)(4).6 Id.

B

This appeal raises the question of how much constraint 

a substantiated Board recommendation places on a Secretary’s discretion to deny record correction requests. Relying on language in Strickland v. United States, 423 F.3d 

1335, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the government asserts 

5 Mr. O’Neill’s handwritten memo reads in full:

Please prepare this decision for [Manpower and Reserve Affairs] review. It is my opinion, based on 

the seriousness of the offense and the significant 

grant of relief, that [the Secretary] should review 

this case for decision.

J.A. 35.

6 Section 723.3(e)(4), in turn, requires that the “brief 

statement of the grounds for denial” include

the reasons for the determination that relief should 

not be granted, including the applicant’s claims of 

constitutional, statutory and/or regulatory violations that were rejected, together with all the essential facts upon which the denial is based, 

including, if applicable, factors required by regulation to be considered for determination of the character of and reason for discharge.

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10 STRAND v. UNITED STATES

that the Secretary may reject a Board recommendation “on 

the basis of either explicitly stated policy reasons or evidence in the record.” Appellant’s Br. 19 (quoting Strickland). In Strickland, we held that Board recommendations 

are not binding on the Secretary since “Congress clearly 

has delegated the final authority regarding any correction 

of military records to the Secretary, not the correction 

board.” 423 F.3d at 1340; see id. at 1337 (concluding that 

the “the trial court erred in interpreting § 1552(a) to mandate that the . . . Secretary cannot reject a Board recommendation”). We did not address the merits of whether the 

Secretary’s rejection was permissible in that instance, instead remanding for the trial court to “determine whether 

the Secretary’s rejection of the Board recommendation was 

arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary to the law.” Id. at 1343. Thus, 

our observation that “[o]ther circuits too have held that the 

Secretary is authorized to reject a Board recommendation 

so long as he acts on the basis of either explicitly stated 

policy reasons or evidence in the record,” id. at 1341, did 

not adopt such a standard for future cases.

For his part, Mr. Strand argues that, under precedent 

from our predecessor court, the Secretary may not alter a 

correction board’s recommendation unless the board’s findings are unsupported by the administrative record. Appellee’s Br. 14–17. In his view, rejecting a substantiated

board recommendation amounts to ignoring the board, rather than “acting through” it, as § 1552(a) requires. We 

acknowledge that strong language in some of our adopted 

precedent would seem to support Mr. Strand’s position. 

See, e.g., Proper v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 317, 326 (Ct. 

Cl. 1957) (rejecting the proposition that a secretary is “free 

to accept and act favorably on the [board’s] findings and 

recommendations, or to ignore them, as he [sees] fit” because such an interpretation of § 1552 “makes the words 

‘acting through boards of civilian officers or employees’ 

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STRAND v. UNITED STATES 11

superfluous” (quoting the predecessor to § 1552)); Weiss v. 

United States, 408 F.2d 416, 421 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (“The thrust 

of the Proper opinion is that a Secretary of a military department cannot overrule the recommendations of a civilian correction board on the advice of a military officer 

unless the findings of the board are not justified by the record before it.” (emphasis added)).

However, as the above-quoted language in Weiss suggests, the decisions on which Mr. Strand relies were rendered in the context of service secretaries being influenced 

by—or outright adopting—the opinions of military officers 

in rejecting otherwise substantiated board recommendations. See Weiss, 408 F.2d at 420–21 (Navy Secretary rejecting a BCNR recommendation in an opinion that JAG 

likely prepared for the Secretary’s signature); Hertzog v. 

United States, 167 Ct. Cl. 377, 385 (1964) (Army Secretary’s rejection decision was “induced and influenced” by 

general’s memorandum stating “I think the approval of 

this recommendation would be a very bad precedent”); 

Proper, 154 F. Supp. at 324–25 (Army Secretary merely 

signed an order attached to the oppositional memorandum 

of a retired general who was not a civilian employee of the 

Army).

We have since held that Proper and Weiss “have no application” without military officer involvement. See Strickland, 423 F.3d at 1341–42 (noting that in those cases—

which “had as a precondition the involvement of a uniformed military officer”—the Secretary “effectively deferred to a professional military officer over the reasonable 

decision of the Board”). We therefore find these cases inapplicable here. Although BCNR Executive Director 

O’Neill is a retired military officer, his memo requesting 

Secretarial review does not constitute undue officer influence. Mr. O’Neill was a civilian employee of the Navy when 

he wrote the memo, cf. Proper, 154 F. Supp. at 325 (finding 

it “important” that the memo in question was “rendered by 

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12 STRAND v. UNITED STATES

a military officer . . . , and not by a civilian employee” of the 

Army); and his memo merely states that the Secretary 

“should review this case for decision,” J.A. 35, without advocating a particular outcome of that review.

Indeed, in cases without military officer involvement, 

our predecessor court “ha[s] held that the Secretaries are 

free to . . . differ with the recommendations of [correction] 

boards where the evidence is susceptible to varying interpretations.” Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 812 

(Ct. Cl. 1979) (citing Boyd v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 1, 

11 (1975)). In Boyd, the court upheld the Air Force Secretary’s rejection of a board recommendation, finding the 

board’s conclusion “d[id] not withstand the contrary analysis and conclusion made in good faith, within the law, and 

without arbitrariness or caprice by the Assistant Secretary.” 207 Ct. Cl. at 12–13. In so holding, the Boyd court 

applied the standard that courts “may reject the decision of 

a Secretary only if he has exercised his discretion arbitrarily, capriciously, in bad faith, contrary to substantial evidence, or where he has gone outside the board record, or 

fails to explain his actions, or violates applicable law or regulations.” Id. at 8–9. We reaffirm that standard today.

We hold that, where a military officer has not unduly 

influenced the secretary’s decision, a service secretary may 

reject the recommendation of a records correction board—

even a recommendation supported by the administrative 

record—so long as the secretary’s rejection decision is not 

arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary to the law. See Strickland, 

423 F.3d at 1343; Boyd, 207 Ct. Cl. at 8–9.

C

The Secretary’s 2018 decision satisfies this standard. 

It must therefore be reinstated.

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STRAND v. UNITED STATES 13

The Secretary’s thorough consideration of the seriousness of Mr. Strand’s criminal misconduct, alone, justifies

his decision to deny the requested relief. The Secretary undertook a broad review of Mr. Strand’s record, but in our 

view the heavy weight he ascribed to Mr. Strand’s “cho[ice]

to take a gun and attempt[] to cause his former wife and 

another individual substantial harm by discharging the 

weapon,” J.A. 284, fully supports denying him credit for six 

months of service he did not perform.

The trial court misread our decision in Strand II when 

it stated that we “found that Mr. Strand’s conduct did not 

constitute substantial evidence” and that we had “rejected” 

his prior conviction as a justification for overruling the 

Board’s recommendation. See Strand III, 138 Fed. Cl. at 

642–43. We took no such position. In Strand II, we considered an extremely brief Secretarial decision which generally relied on four “intertwined reasons” to reject the 

Board’s recommendation. 706 F. App’x at 999–1000. Because we found no record support for one of those reasons—

the alleged FAP involvement and domestic violence issues—we remanded for the Secretary to consider whether 

the Board’s recommendation “should be upheld in the absence of any evidence of a ‘long-standing history’ of FAP 

involvement and domestic violence issues.” Id. at 1000. 

We expressed no view on the hypothetical sufficiency of the 

other three reasons the Secretary mentioned in the 2015 

rejection—(1) the seriousness of Mr. Strand’s convictions; 

and (2) that granting relief would be inconsistent with the 

Navy’s core values and (3) its practice in similar cases—in 

the absence of the unsupported domestic violence reason. 

Id. The Secretary’s 2018 decision makes it abundantly 

clear that his decision remains the same even without evidence of FAP involvement or domestic violence issues. The 

trial court’s misinterpretation of Strand II

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14 STRAND v. UNITED STATES

notwithstanding, the Secretary remained free to rest his 

decision on the seriousness of Mr. Strand’s offenses.7

Mr. Strand objects that Naval Service regulations prohibit denying relief solely because the original discharge 

decision was correctly made, citing 32 C.F.R. § 723.3(e)(2).8 

Even assuming § 723.3(e)(2) applies to decisions of the Secretary (and not only to Board consideration of initial applications), and assuming Mr. Strand’s interpretation is 

correct, that regulation does not undermine the Secretary’s 

2018 decision. The Secretary did not reject the Board’s recommendation simply because he thought the Navy’s 2009 

discharge decision was correct. Nowhere in the 2018 

7 In Strand II, the Secretary’s brief reference to Mr. 

Strand’s “serious felonies” was not enough for us to uphold 

his 2015 decision, given its simultaneous reference to unsupported domestic violence issues. J.A. 25.

8 Section 723.3(e)(2) provides, in relevant part: 

The Board may deny an application in executive 

session if it determines that the evidence of record 

fails to demonstrate the existence of probable material error or injustice. The Board relies on a presumption of regularity to support the official 

actions of public officers and, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, will presume that 

they have properly discharged their official duties. 

Applicants have the burden of overcoming this presumption but the Board will not deny an application solely because the record was made by or at the 

direction of the President or the Secretary in connection with proceedings other than proceedings of a 

board for the correction of military or naval records.

32 C.F.R. § 723.3(e)(2) (emphasis added).

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STRAND v. UNITED STATES 15

rejection decision do we find discussion of the propriety of 

the original discharge. Rather, we find a full analysis of

the seriousness of Mr. Strand’s conduct underlying the discharge.9

D 

Beyond considering the seriousness of Mr. Strand’s 

conviction-related conduct, the Secretary’s seven-page 

memorandum also discussed several other reasons for 

denying the service-credit correction—more than satisfying the requirement to provide a “brief statement of the 

grounds for denial.” See 32 C.F.R. §§ 723.3(e)(4), 723.7(a). 

Mr. Strand and the trial court take issue with various aspects of the Secretary’s additional reasoning. But none of 

the identified issues brings the Secretary’s 2018 decision 

into the realm of arbitrary or unlawful agency action.10

9 At oral argument, Mr. Strand’s counsel seemed to 

suggest that § 723.3(e)(2) also prohibits relying solely on 

the seriousness of the conduct underlying the discharge. 

See Oral Argument at 19:40–20:00 (Q: “Are you saying that 

because he was administratively discharged from the . . . 

Navy because of this felony conviction and jail time, that 

they can’t further use that as a basis . . . for not giving him 

relief under the corrections board decision? A: I’m saying it can’t be the sole basis, Your Honor.”) and 31:01–10 

(stating that under § 723.3(e)(2) the Secretary cannot rely 

on “the initial incident” as “the sole basis”), http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2019-1016.mp3. 

We find nothing in the text of § 723.3(e)(2) prohibiting consideration of the seriousness of prior misconduct.

10 Mr. Strand has moved to strike the government’s 

reply brief, arguing that it raises new issues not presented 

in the government’s opening brief, though addressed by the 

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16 STRAND v. UNITED STATES

First, both the trial court and Mr. Strand, on appeal, 

ascribe error to the Secretary’s use of the Navy’s core values to assess Mr. Strand’s request for relief. Mr. Strand 

objects both to the retroactive application of the core values 

to his 1992 conduct predating their establishment, and to 

the Secretary’s invocation of the core values in general to 

overrule the Board’s recommendation. Although the Navy 

admittedly had not adopted its core values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment when Mr. Strand received his 1992 

counseling entry, we see nothing arbitrary about analyzing 

his overall history of performance and conduct under the 

values existing at the time of the 2018 decision. While we 

agree that the 1992 counseling entry could not have provided Mr. Strand notice to comply with not-yet existing 

standards, it still could—and did—warn him of the consequences of future misconduct. J.A. 121 (stating that failure 

to adhere to cited guidelines in the future “will make you

eligible for administrative separation action”). Even leaving aside Mr. Strand’s early counseling entries, one does 

not need any degree of “notice” to know not to shoot at unarmed civilians. 

As we read the 2018 decision, the Secretary merely 

used the core values as a general framework to assess Mr. 

Strand’s request. Although Mr. Strand portends that allowing this core-values framework will provide the Secretary unlimited discretion to overrule Board 

recommendations, we are unwilling to mandate that the 

Secretary take—or avoid—any particular analytical approach in his review of Board recommendations. The 

trial court. We agree that the government forfeited the justiciability and waiver arguments asserted in its reply brief, 

and we have not considered those arguments in resolving 

this appeal. Given that the government has prevailed on 

its other arguments, however, we deny Mr. Strand’s motion 

as moot.

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STRAND v. UNITED STATES 17

requirement that the Secretary’s rejection decision not be 

arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to the law will continue to provide adequate accountability.

Likewise, the trial court and Mr. Strand read too much 

into the Secretary’s citation to military justice cases and 

observation that Mr. Strand likely would have received 

harsher punishment had he been prosecuted by military, 

rather than civil, authorities for the shooting. We disagree 

with the trial court that the Secretary “relie[d] upon” the 

cited cases or “use[d] these cases to justify” his decision. 

Strand III, 138 Fed. Cl. at 642. Rather, after a full analysis 

of how Mr. Strand’s illegal behavior did not align with the 

Navy’s core values, the Secretary briefly delved into military justice standards to emphasize that “the nature of 

[Mr. Strand’s] conduct leading to his civilian conviction 

cannot be overlooked.” J.A. 285. Far from denying Mr. 

Strand’s request just because he might have been punished

more harshly in military court, the Secretary cited military 

sources simply to provide further points of comparison for 

assessing the nature and severity of Mr. Strand’s conduct.

Finally, we reject the notion that the Secretary’s decision should be reversed for insufficient consideration of Mr. 

Strand’s positive service record and post-service conduct. 

True, the Secretary’s 2018 decision makes little mention of

the many medals, high performance marks, and promotions Mr. Strand received over the course of his career. But 

there is no requirement that the Secretary’s “brief statement” address every aspect of a petitioner’s record. See 32 

C.F.R. §§ 723.3(e)(4), 723.7(a).11

11 We note that the 2018 decision did acknowledge

several positive aspects of Mr. Strand’s record. The 

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The Secretary reviewed the same administrative record as the Board and drew a different, but still supported, 

conclusion from it. That the Secretary weighed certain aspects of the record differently than did the Board does not 

mean that the Secretary’s conclusions were arbitrary or 

unsubstantiated. While the Board’s contrary conclusion 

may also be supported by substantial evidence, that conclusion is not under review here. See Strickland, 423 F.3d 

at 1339 (“If . . . the Secretary disagrees with the Board and 

rejects its recommendation, . . . . the court reviews the decision on the basis of the Secretary’s written statement.”). 

“[W]hereas the Secretary in correcting a military record is 

to act through a board of civilians, as required by [§ 1552], 

he has . . . retained the authority to take such final action 

on board recommendations as he determines to be appropriate.” Boyd, 207 Ct. Cl. at 8 (discussing an Air Force regulation containing the same operative language as Navy 

regulation 32 C.F.R. § 723.7(a)). As we noted in Strickland, 

Secretary (1) noted Mr. Strand’s “satisfactory service, including various medals and personal awards” and his 

“‘good post service conduct and his early release from civil 

confinement due to good behavior,’” J.A. 281 (emphases in 

original) (quoting J.A. 32); (2) acknowledged the personal 

character references and personal statements showing Mr. 

Strand’s commitment to supporting his children and reconciliation with his ex-wife (while noting that no statement 

from Mr. Strand’s ex-wife appears among the many statements of support), J.A. 282; (3) “commend[ed]” Mr. 

Strand’s efforts toward post-conviction rehabilitation, 

J.A. 285; and (4) recognized that Mr. Strand had obtained

an equitable upgrade of his service characterization, recognizing his “19.5 years of satisfactory service and post-incarceration efforts to rebuild his life”, J.A. 286.

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STRAND v. UNITED STATES 19

“‘[i]t is clear from the statute that the Secretary’s decision 

is a discretionary one.’” 423 F.3d at 1338 (alteration and 

emphasis in original) (quoting Boyd, 207 Ct. Cl. at 7). The 

Secretary properly exercised the discretion given to him by 

§ 1552(a) in considering the Board’s reasoning and disagreeing with its recommendation to grant additional relief

to Mr. Strand.

III

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. The Secretary acted within 

his discretion in rejecting the recommendation of the 

Board. His 2018 rejection decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the law. We therefore reverse the judgment of the 

Court of Federal Claims.

REVERSED

No costs.

Case: 19-1016 Document: 37 Page: 19 Filed: 03/03/2020
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

WALTER N. STRAND, III,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________

2019-1016

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:15-cv-00601-TCW, Judge Thomas C. Wheeler.

______________________

REYNA, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

The majority upholds an agency decision that relies on

an unsupported factual finding: that Mr. Strand “engaged 

in misconduct in 1993.” J.A. 283. Because that finding was 

an integral part of the Secretary’s decision, our law requires that we remand to the Secretary for further review. 

I respectfully dissent. 

The Secretary’s decision is based, at least in part, on 

two distinct events of misconduct: one in 1992, one in 1993. 

The Secretary found that “in 1992, [Mr. Strand] was counseled for abuse of alcohol, which resulted in disorderly conduct, and he was issued non-judicial punishment for 

assault and disorderly conduct.” J.A. 283. The Secretary 

also found that Mr. Strand “again engaged in misconduct 

in 1993.” Id. 

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2 STRAND v. UNITED STATES

The record supports the Secretary’s finding of misconduct in 1992. Two documents—a two-page “Court Memorandum” and one-page of “Administrative Remarks”—

show that Strand was involved in an alcohol-related incident on February 27, 1992, and that Strand received nonjudicial punishment for violating UCMJ Article 128 (assault) and Article 134 (disorderly conduct). J.A. 119–121. 

The administrative remarks identify the “deficiencies in 

[Strand’s] performance and/or conduct” as “abuse of alcohol 

which results [sic] in disorderly conduct.” J.A. 121. 

There is no similar evidence that would support the 

Secretary’s finding that Strand “again engaged in misconduct in 1993.” The Secretary cites one document in support: a single page of “Administrative Remarks,” dated 

September 29, 1993. But the 1993 administrative remarks

do not identify an act of misconduct that occurred in 1993. 

J.A. 118. Instead, the document identifies the “deficiencies 

in [Strand’s] performance and/or conduct” as: 

Violation of UCMJ Articles 128 (Assault) and 134 

(Disorderly conduct) as evidenced by CO’s NJP of 

27 February 1992 and documented in your service 

record on NAVPERS 1070/607 and NAVPERS 

1070/609.

J.A. 118 (emphasis added). The 1993 administrative remarks do not reference any other dates, incidents, or misconduct. Nor does the record contain any other evidence 

showing a 1993 act of misconduct or related punishment. 

The government admits that the record lacks support 

for the Secretary’s finding that Strand “again engaged in 

misconduct in 1993.” At oral argument, counsel for the 

government agreed that the Secretary had found two separate acts of misconduct stemming from two separate 

events: “[t]he Secretary’s decision makes clear that the 

1992 nonjudicial punishment was one event and . . . whatever the event was that resulted in the counseling entry in 

1993 was a separate event.” Oral Arg. at 1:45–2:13. 

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STRAND v. UNITED STATES 3

Counsel for the government also recognized that the record 

contained no support for that finding. 

Q: The 1993 counseling is not the result of the 1992 

event? 

A: Correct.

. . . 

Q: What was the 1993 event? 

A: It’s unclear your Honor . . . the record does not 

describe the event.

Id. at 2:55–3:05; 3:39–3:46. When pressed, counsel for the 

government simply said, “I would defer to the Secretary . . . I don’t have any reason to doubt the Secretary’s 

characterization of these being two separate incidents.” Id. 

at 7:34–8:05. 

The Secretary expressly relied on the illusory “misconduct in 1993” when it ruled against Mr. Strand. J.A. 283–

285. For example, the Secretary concluded that Mr. Strand 

failed to “rehabilitate himself while in the Naval service”

because “Strand again engaged in misconduct in 1993.” 

J.A. 283. The Secretary also found that Mr. Strand’s “conviction for felony offenses, as well as his history of performance and conduct, does not align with the Navy [C]ore 

[V]alues.” Id. (emphasis added). Because the Secretary refers generally to Mr. Strand’s “misconduct” throughout its 

decision, it is impossible for this court to determine the extent to which the Secretary’s error compromised the Secretary’s decision. See J.A. 284 (“This was not [Mr. Strand’s] 

first instance of misconduct leading to harm of others.”); 

J.A. 286 (“Petitioner’s misconduct is inconsistent with the 

Navy’s [C]ore [V]alues of honor, courage, and commitment 

and runs counter to granting relief.”). 

In a footnote, the majority sidesteps the Secretary’s unsupported finding of 1993 misconduct by characterizing the 

error as “harmless.” Slip op. at 5 n.3. The majority opines 

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4 STRAND v. UNITED STATES

that “[n]o matter the number of early instances of misconduct, the Secretary’s rejection decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. I disagree. We soundly rejected this 

reasoning in Strand II. 

In Strand II, we explained that the Secretary’s decision 

was based on “the sum of two facts in the record and two 

policy reasons”: (1) Mr. Strand’s history of domestic violence issues; (2) the seriousness of Mr. Strand’s 2008 actions; (3) the Navy’s Core Values; and (4) the Navy’s 

practice in similar cases. Strand v. United States, 706 F. 

App’x 996, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Strand II”). We concluded, however, that the Secretary’s finding that Mr. 

Strand had a history of domestic violence issues was not 

supported by substantial evidence. Id. In response, the 

government encouraged us to “uphold the Secretary’s decision because it sets forth other policy rationales and evidence.” Id. But we rejected that argument, explaining: 

[B]ecause the Secretary relied on a combination of 

intertwined reasons, and Mr. Strand has shown 

that at least one of those reasons is not supported 

by substantial evidence, the record is not clear as 

to whether the Secretary would still reach the same 

conclusion. 

. . . 

It is an established principle of administrative law 

that courts should not intrude upon the domain 

which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency, and that a judicial judgment 

cannot be made to do service for an administrative 

judgment. Thus, the proper course, except in rare 

circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation. Here, the Secretary has not yet considered whether the [Board’s] 

decision to grant Mr. Strand partial relief should 

be upheld in the absence of any evidence of a longstanding history of FAP involvement and domestic 

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STRAND v. UNITED STATES 5

violence issues. We find no special circumstances 

that would support determining this question in 

the first instance. Therefore, this case must be remanded back to the Secretary for further review of 

the [Board’s] decision.

Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Gonzales v. 

Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006); INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 

12, 16 (2002); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 

(1943)).

The majority theorizes that “the Secretary’s thorough 

consideration of the seriousness of Mr. Strand’s criminal 

misconduct, alone, justifies his decision to deny the requested relief.” Slip op. at 12–13 (explaining that the 

“heavy weight” the Secretary ascribed to Mr. Strand’s actions in 2008 “fully supports denying him credit for six 

months of service he did not perform”). But the Secretary 

did not determine that Mr. Strand’s 2008 actions were 

alone sufficient to warrant rejecting the Board’s decision. 

To the contrary, the Secretary expressly stated that Mr. 

Strand’s “conviction for felony offenses, as well as his history of performance and conduct,” does not align with the 

Navy Core Values. J.A. 283 (emphasis added). 

As in Strand II, the Secretary’s decision is based on an

unsupported fact finding. The Secretary has not yet considered whether it would uphold the Board’s decision in the 

absence of that finding. Nor has the majority identified 

any special circumstances that would permit this court to 

determine this question in the first instance. This case, 

therefore, must be returned to the Secretary for further review. Because the majority upholds the Secretary’s flawed 

decision, I dissent. 

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