Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00750/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00750-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

BARBARA A. BRACKIN, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:12-CV-750-WKW

 ) [WO]

KEVIN J. ANSON, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Defendants Kevin J. Anson and Christopher Denson’s

motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 20), which has been fully briefed. (Docs. 

# 21–29 (Brief and Evidence); 34–35 (Responsive Brief and Evidence); and 36 

(Reply).)1 After careful consideration of the parties’ arguments and the relevant 

law, the court concludes that Defendants’ motion is due to be granted.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To succeed on summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate “that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [he] is entitled to judgment as a 

 

1 All citations to the record in this case are to page numbers created by CM/ECF.

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matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the evidence and the 

inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. JeanBaptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2010).

The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This responsibility includes 

identifying the portions of the record illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute 

of material fact. Id. A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving 

party produces evidence allowing a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its 

favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 

2001). If the movant meets its evidentiary burden, the burden shifts to the 

nonmoving party to establish – with evidence beyond the pleadings – that a 

genuine dispute material to each of its claims for relief exists. Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 324.

III. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Barbara A. Brackin, Steven A. Buchanan, and Nyle H. Trimble are 

all former biologist aides who worked for the Marine Resources Division (“MRD”) 

of the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (“DCNR”) in 

Baldwin County, Alabama. Defendant Anson is Chief Biologist for the MRD; 

Defendant Denson is the Assistant Chief Biologist. Defendants were some of 

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Plaintiffs’ supervisors who investigated Plaintiffs, determined that Plaintiffs had 

falsified their time records and been derelict in their work duties, and 

recommended that the DCNR Commissioner terminate their employment.

While employed for the DCNR, Plaintiffs performed data collection 

activities that involved surveying recreational fishing activities. The MRD gathers 

information through surveying and other methods in order to manage species by 

setting creel limits, size limits, and seasons to harvest. Typically, biologist aides 

worked together in teams of two. Ms. Brackin and Mr. Buchanan often worked 

together; sometimes Ms. Brackin worked with Mr. Trimble; and sometimes Mr. 

Trimble worked with other employees, including Jay Gunn, who is not a plaintiff

in this suit. Biologist aides documented their work on daily activity reports. 

Plaintiffs represent that they and other employees commonly recorded their 

activities after the fact. 

For various reasons, Defendants aver that they came to suspect that several

MRD employees – not just Plaintiffs – were failing to perform their assigned duties 

and that the dereliction of duties was compromising the MRD’s efforts to conduct 

two recreational fishing survey programs. Defendants decided to acquire and use 

two GPS tracking devices called “track sticks” to monitor the movement of Stateowned vehicles and boats used by Plaintiffs and other employees in the course of 

their work hours. While Defendants represent that the track sticks were useful for 

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validating employees’ locations and records, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants 

acquired and used the track sticks solely for the purpose of developing a case in 

support of their terminations. Plaintiffs were unaware of Defendants’ suspicions 

and claim they were not confronted until after Defendants acquired the allegedly 

faulty evidence Defendants wanted.

Plaintiffs aver that Defendants never used the track sticks before using them 

on Plaintiffs’ boats and vehicles, never tested or verified the devices, and never 

consulted persons with knowledge about the proper use of the track sticks. 

Plaintiffs claim that Defendants installed the track sticks underneath boat radio 

transmitters and in other concealed locations which adversely affected the track

sticks’ ability to provide accurate data. Defendants used the track sticks from 

February to April of 2010, during which time Defendants contemporaneously 

monitored Plaintiffs’ time and activity logs for discrepancies. To summarize 

briefly a large volume of evidence, the track stick data confirmed Defendants’ 

suspicions. By assessing the track stick GPS information, Defendants determined 

that Plaintiffs did not work as many hours as they claimed and falsely reported 

working before 8:00 a.m. in order to acquire compensatory time off.

In late April and early May of 2010, Defendants confronted and interrogated 

Plaintiffs individually about the disparities between the track stick data and 

Plaintiffs’ activities as logged in their activity reports. Because the interrogations 

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involved events that occurred 45–60 days earlier, Plaintiffs say they could not 

recall accurately their reported work or explain discrepancies between their reports 

and the track stick reports.

2

 Defendants recommended to then-Director of the 

MRD, Vernon Minton, that Plaintiffs be terminated, and the same 

recommendations were forwarded to DCNR Commissioner Barnett Lawley. 

Commissioner Lawley notified Plaintiffs of their pre-termination conference and 

that they were charged with falsification of records, insubordination, dereliction of 

duties, and improper claims of compensatory time.

Defendants also confronted other employees, too, including Jay Gunn, who 

received a pre-termination notice like Plaintiffs did. Gunn immediately challenged 

the track stick information as unreliable. He produced photographic evidence, a 

signed letter from a field interview witness, and other eyewitness testimonies that 

corroborated Gunn’s presence in places not recorded by the track sticks. When 

Defendants were not persuaded, Gunn met with other higher-ups in the MRD –

Vernon Minton and Chris Blankenship – to challenge Defendants’ 

recommendation of dismissal. Minton recommended that Gunn be suspended and 

demoted rather than terminated. Plaintiffs claim that Gunn successfully 

 

2

Plaintiffs’ immediate supervisor, Karen Aplin, who is not a defendant, was responsible 

for reviewing Plaintiffs’ records. Plaintiffs complain that Ms. Aplin never questioned or 

counseled Plaintiffs prior to Defendants’ meetings with Plaintiffs.

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undermined the reliability of the track stick data, but Defendants continued to 

endorse the recommendation that Plaintiffs be dismissed from their jobs.

The Commissioner of the DCNR held Plaintiffs’ pre-dismissal conference in 

Montgomery, Alabama, at DCNR headquarters on July 29, 2010. He heard the 

Defendants’ evidence against Plaintiffs and accepted Defendants’ recommendation 

to terminate employment effective August 6, 2010. Plaintiffs appealed to the State 

Personnel Board where the Board conducted a de novo review, and Plaintiffs had 

the opportunity to cross examine Defendants about the track sticks’ margin for 

error and Defendants disregard for Plaintiffs’ exemplary records as employees 

prior to the records falsification charges.3 In March 2011, the administrative law 

judge (“ALJ”) recommended that the Personnel Board uphold Plaintiffs’ 

terminations. It did.

In July 2012, Plaintiffs brought this suit in state court against Defendants, 

suing them in their official and individual capacities. Defendants removed the case 

to this court. Plaintiffs’ complaint sets forth five counts against Defendants: (1) 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 equal protection violation; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due process 

violation; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy; (4) defamation; and (5) civil 

 

3

Plaintiffs had clean records before Defendants accused them of misconduct. Ms. 

Brackin began working for DCNR in 2002. Throughout her tenure, she received “exceeds 

standards” performance appraisals and received no disciplinary actions. Mr. Buchanan began 

working for the DCNR in 1993. Throughout his tenure, he was given “exceeds standards” or 

“consistently exceeds standards” scores for his annual performance appraisals, and like Ms. 

Brackin, he had no history of disciplinary action. Mr. Trimble began working for the DCNR in 

2004. He always received “exceeds standards” evaluations and had no disciplinary record.

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conspiracy. Plaintiffs request unspecified equitable and declaratory relief, as well 

as compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants request summary judgment on 

all claims against them in both their official and individual capacities.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Federal-Law Claims

1. Official-Capacity Claims and Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants argue that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Plaintiffs’ 

§ 1983 and § 1985 claims against them in the official capacities. The Eleventh 

Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be 

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 

one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 

any Foreign State.” “[B]y its terms the Amendment applies only to suits against a 

State by citizens of another State,” but the Supreme Court “ha[s] extended the 

Amendment’s applicability to suits by citizens against their own States.” Bd. of 

Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). Moreover, 

“[l]awsuits against a state official in his or her official capacity are suits against the 

state when ‘the state is the real, substantial party in interest.’” Carr v. City of 

Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Pennhurst State 

School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984)). This is because the state 

would be responsible for paying any award of damages to the plaintiff. Id.

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There are two exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity: where 

Congress abrogates state immunity pursuant to its power to enforce Section 5 of 

the Fourteenth Amendment, or where a state expressly waives its immunity 

through legislative action. Id. at 1524–25. Neither exception applies in this case. 

Additionally, in accord with Eleventh Amendment immunity jurisprudence, 

states are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983, and a suit under § 1983 

against a state official “is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. 

Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). For these reasons, Defendants 

contend that they are immune from suit in their official capacities.

Plaintiffs counter that they seek not only monetary relief but also 

“declaratory and injunctive relief,” (Doc. # 34, at 18), and “a state official in his or 

her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, [is] a person under § 1983 

because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions 

against the State.’” Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 

U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985)).

Defendants reply that Plaintiffs, by their silence, concede that any officialcapacity suit for monetary relief must fail. Defendants further contend that 

Plaintiffs lack standing to sue for declaratory or injunctive relief because Plaintiffs

are no longer DCNR employees who will suffer future harms at the hands of 

Defendants. Although Defendants raise this lack of standing argument in the reply 

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brief, thereby denying Plaintiffs the opportunity to respond, the court must

consider the argument because the issue challenges this court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction. Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 

1999) (“[A] federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction . . .

whenever it may be lacking.”).

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs request unspecified “equitable” and 

“declaratory” relief, and for purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed that the 

requested relief encompasses injunctive relief. “A plaintiff has standing to seek 

declaratory or injunctive relief only when he alleges facts from which it appears 

there is a substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future.” Bowen v. 

First Family Fin. Servs., Inc., 233 F.3d 1331, 1340 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal 

quotation marks and alteration omitted). Former employee-plaintiffs face no threat 

of future injury from their former supervisor or employer-defendants. See Jackson 

v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that 

former employee-plaintiffs lacked standing to sue employer for injunctive relief);

see also Drayton v. W. Auto Supply Co., No. 01-10415, 2002 WL 32508918, at *4

(11th Cir. Mar. 11, 2002) (acknowledging and applying the holding in Jackson). 

Plaintiffs’ employment with the DCNR ended in 2010. There is no threat, let alone 

an allegation of a threat, of continuing harm. The court must agree with 

Defendants that Plaintiffs lack standing to sue for prospective injunctive relief, and 

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thus, Plaintiffs’ argument to avoid summary judgment on Eleventh Amendment 

official-capacity immunity is without merit.

The Eleventh Amendment bars any claim against Defendants in their official 

capacities for monetary relief, and thus, Defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment on Plaintiffs’ official-capacity federal-law claims.

2. Individual-Capacity Claims and Qualified Immunity

Defendants further assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity on 

Plaintiffs’ federal-law claims against them in their individual capacities. 

“Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified 

immunity ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Lancaster 

v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1424 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Defendants assert that their actions in this 

case – namely, investigating Plaintiffs’ work performance and recommending 

Plaintiffs’ dismissal – are discretionary functions “undertaken pursuant to the 

performance of [their] duties” and “within the scope of [their] authority.” Jordan 

v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994).

4

 Defendants further argue that

Plaintiffs cannot establish a constitutional violation or identify the existence of any

 

4

Plaintiffs do not contest that Defendants acted within their discretionary authority when 

they conducted their investigation and made their recommendations.

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Eleventh Circuit or Supreme Court authority that would place Defendants on 

notice that their actions gave rise to a constitutional violation.

a. Equal Protection, Substantive Due Process, and § 1985 

Conspiracy

Defendants analyze each of Plaintiffs’ three federal-law claims, but in the 

responsive briefing, Plaintiffs discuss only the § 1983 procedural due process 

claim. Plaintiffs’ failure to respond to Defendants’ arguments concerning equal 

protection, substantive due process, or § 1985 conspiracy amounts to abandonment 

of those claims. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th 

Cir. 1995) (“[G]rounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary 

judgment are deemed abandoned.”). Defendants are entitled to summary judgment 

on the equal protection, substantive due process, and § 1985 conspiracy claims. 

The court will discuss only the procedural due process claim.

b. Procedural Due Process

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack evidence that the DCNR denied them

the procedural due process to which they are entitled. The Fourteenth Amendment 

protects against state deprivations of “life, liberty, or property without due process 

of law.” U.S. Const. amend XIV § 1. “To establish a deprivation of procedural 

due process, a plaintiff must establish that he holds a constitutionally protected 

interest in . . . property, that there has been a governmental deprivation of that 

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interest, and that the procedures accompanying the deprivation were 

constitutionally inadequate.” Black v. City of Auburn, Ala., 857 F. Supp. 1540, 

1546 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (De Ment, J.). Permanent employment, terminable only for 

cause, is a property interest entitling a plaintiff to the protection of procedural due 

process. Green v. City of Hamilton, Hous. Auth., 937 F.2d 1561, 1564 (11th Cir. 

1991). “[T]enured employee[s] [are] entitled to oral or written notice of the 

charges against [them], an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an 

opportunity to present [their] side of the story before a state or state agency may 

terminate [them].” Black, 857 F. Supp. at 1546 (quoting McKinney v. Pate, 20 

F.3d 1550, 1561 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In a federal procedural due process challenge, “the pivotal question is 

whether [the state] provided a post-deprivation process by which [the] plaintiff 

could seek review of [the] defendants’ alleged procedural violation.” Hicks v. 

Jackson Cnty. Comm’n, 374 F Supp. 2d 1084, 1090 (N.D. Ala. 2005). “[O]nly 

when the state refuses to provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural 

deprivation does a constitutional violation . . . arise.” McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1557. 

The Eleventh Circuit has held that “state-court review of employment termination 

decisions qualifies as an adequate post-deprivation remedy.” Autery v. Davis, 355 

F. App’x 253, 255 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1563). On the 

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basis of these authorities, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have received the due 

process to which they were entitled.

Plaintiffs respond to Defendants’ motion by rehashing an issue that 

Defendants do not appear to dispute – i.e., that Plaintiffs’ permanent employment 

is a protectable property interest. (See Doc. # 34, at 20–21.) Plaintiffs hinge their 

argument on what they say is “[a] material question of fact” – i.e., “whether 

[D]efendants knowingly utilized improper, unreliable[,] and flawed data to support 

their recommendations” that Plaintiffs’ employment be terminated. (Doc. # 34, 

at 22.) This is certainly a fact that the parties dispute, but it is not a relevant factual 

dispute for purposes of the procedural due process claim pending before this court. 

There is no genuine dispute that Plaintiffs were afforded notice, an explanation of 

the grounds for their dismissal, and an opportunity to share their side of the story

including the issues that Plaintiffs have underscored in this case (e.g., Defendants’ 

alleged overzealousness to accuse them of wrongdoing, the allegedly compromised 

and unreliable nature of the GPS-based track stick data, and Plaintiffs’ previously 

untarnished employment records with their agency). As Defendants explain, due 

process was provided in the form of a pre-termination conference, an appeal, and a 

full post-termination hearing before an ALJ. Plaintiffs also could have appealed 

the ALJ’s recommendation, but they declined to do so.

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Because Plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that 

Defendants’ actions caused them to suffer a denial of procedural due process or 

any other unconstitutional harm, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on 

Plaintiffs’ federal-law individual-capacity claims.

5

 Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment on the federal-law individual-capacity claims is due to be 

granted.

B. State-Law Claims6

1. Official-Capacity Claims and Absolute Immunity

Defendants contend that the DCNR is a state agency that is immune from 

suit pursuant to Article I, Section 14, of the Alabama Constitution. See Ala. Const. 

art. I, § 14 (“[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court 

of law or equity.”). “Under this provision, the State and its agencies have absolute 

immunity from suit in any court,” and “[s]tate officers and employees, in their 

official capacities[,] . . . also are absolutely immune from suit when the action is, in 

effect, one against the State.” Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala. 1989). 

There are limited exceptions to absolute immunity, see Raley v. Main, 987 So. 2d 

569, 576 (Ala. 2007), but according to Defendants, no exception applies in this 

 

5 Because Defendants violated no constitutional right, it is unnecessary to address 

whether any constitutional right was clearly established.

6

Even though Plaintiffs’ underlying federal-law claims are due to be dismissed, the court 

retains authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over 

Plaintiffs’ state-law claims that arise from the same facts. See Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of 

Randolph Cnty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1567 (11th Cir. 1994).

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case, and thus, they are entitled to absolute immunity on Plaintiffs’ officialcapacity claims. Plaintiffs make no argument to the contrary. 

The court agrees that Defendants are entitled to the benefit of absolute 

immunity on Plaintiffs’ state-law claims against them in their official capacities. 

2. Individual-Capacity Claims and State-Agent Immunity

Defendants argue further that the doctrine of state-agent immunity precludes 

Plaintiffs from bringing their state-law claims against Defendants in their 

individual capacities. In Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), holding 

modified on other grounds by Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300 (Ala. 

2006), the Alabama Supreme Court set forth a thorough restatement of the stateagent immunity doctrine:

A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her 

personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim 

against the agent is based upon the agent’s . . . (2) exercising his or 

her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of 

government, including, but not limited to, examples such as: (a) 

making administrative adjudications; (b) allocating resources; (c) 

negotiating contracts; (d) hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or 

supervising personnel . . . .

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the foregoing statement 

of the rule, a State agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his 

or her personal capacity . . . (2) when the State agent acts willfully, 

maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or 

under a mistaken interpretation of the law.

Id. at 405. Defendants maintain that they “exercised their judgment in the 

administration of the MRD when they investigated Plaintiffs and recommended 

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that they be dismissed from State employment. Defendants assert that in addition 

to the protection afforded by state-agent immunity, they are entitled to summary 

judgment because Plaintiffs cannot sustain their state-law claims for either 

defamation or civil conspiracy.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that it is their burden to establish that Defendants 

“acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond their authority.” 

Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003). Yet Plaintiffs claim 

that they successfully rebut the state-agent immunity defense because they have 

evidence that Defendants “act[ed] beyond [their] authority” when they “fail[ed] to 

discharge [their] duties pursuant to [. . .] rules or regulations.” Giambrone, 874 

So. 2d at 1052 (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000)). 

Plaintiffs cite Alabama State Personnel Board Rule 670-X-18-.02(5) (“the 

Personnel Board Rule”), which requires that “[i]n all cases, before dismissing a 

permanent employee, the appointing authority shall consider the previous 

disciplinary and performance history of the employee and any progressive 

discipline received.” (emphasis added). Plaintiffs then highlight Defendant 

Anson’s admission that he and Defendant Denson “did not consider [P]laintiffs’ 

disciplinary and performance history before recommending [P]laintiffs’ 

termination.” (Doc. # 34, at 23.) Hence, Plaintiffs contend that there is an issue of 

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material fact as to whether Defendants acted beyond their authority by failing to 

follow the Personnel Board Rule.

Defendants reply that Plaintiffs ignore that the Personnel Board Rule is 

directed to “the appointing authority.” Defendants argue that former 

Commissioner Lawley is the appointing authority. (See Doc. # 36, at 3.) 

Defendants further assert that even if they personally failed to consider Plaintiffs’ 

disciplinary and performance history in reaching their recommendation to 

terminate Plaintiffs’ employment, the State Personnel Board’s Administrative Law 

Judge who heard Plaintiffs’ appeal properly considered each Plaintiff’s work 

history and his or her lack of a disciplinary record. (See Docs. # 29-2, at 36 n.42; 

29-3, at 30 n.34; 29-4, at 38 n.40 (Recommended Orders of the ALJ to the State 

Personnel Board).)

Upon consideration of Plaintiffs’ contentions, the court concludes that 

Plaintiffs again stake their argument upon a fact that is not material. Defendants’ 

admission that they failed to consider Plaintiffs’ previously untarnished 

employment records does not mean that Defendants acted “beyond their authority”

when recommending that Plaintiffs be fired. Defendants are not “the appointing 

authority” described in the Personnel Board Rule. They are mid-level supervisors 

within the MRD. Furthermore, what Defendants chose to do in fulfillment of their 

supervisory duties is the very sort of discretionary action that state-agent immunity 

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doctrine exists to protect. See Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405. Defendants 

are thus entitled to state-agent immunity from Plaintiffs’ state-law claims against 

them in their individual capacities.

3. Additional Reasons to Grant Summary Judgment

Additionally, even if absolute or state-agent immunity is unavailable as a 

defense, Defendants are nevertheless entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 

state-law claims for defamation and conspiracy.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege when and to whom any 

defamatory statements were published. They assert as an absolute defense that any 

allegedly defamatory statements they made about Plaintiffs are true. And further, 

to the extent that any defamatory publications were made in the course of 

Plaintiffs’ administrative appeal, any publications are protected by an absolute 

privilege that applies to defamatory publications made in the course of a judicial 

proceeding. (See Doc. # 21, at 40–41.) Plaintiffs make no response to these 

defenses to the defamation claim. The court therefore deems Plaintiffs’ 

defamation claim abandoned. See Resolution Trust Corp., 43 F.3d at 599.

As for the civil conspiracy claim, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to 

allege that Defendants acted in a concerted manner to achieve an unlawful purpose 

and that Plaintiffs lack an underlying tort to support their claim. (See Doc. # 21, 

at 41–42 (citing Ex parte Alamo Title Co., ___ So. 3d. ____, 2013 WL 1032857, 

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at *11 (Ala. Mar. 15, 2013) reh’g denied May 17, 2013; Goolesby v. Koch Farms, 

LLC, 955 So. 2d 422, 430 (Ala. 2006)).

Plaintiffs counter that Defendants worked together to covertly monitor 

Plaintiffs’ vehicles and boats for the purpose of assembling an evidentiary case in 

support of a recommendation to terminate Plaintiffs’ permanent employment. 

Plaintiffs point out Defendant Anson’s admission that he and Defendant Denson 

collaborated to track MRD employees’ whereabouts, and that without the track 

stick data, there would have been no case to support Plaintiffs’ termination. 

Plaintiffs aver that this amounts to “a concerted action by two or more persons to 

achieve an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means.” See Ex 

Parte Alamo Title Co., ___ So. 3d at ____, 2013 WL 1032857, at *11.

Defendants reply that Plaintiffs fail to identify the requisite unlawful 

purpose or lawful purpose achieved by unlawful means. They further assert that a 

claim for civil conspiracy necessarily fails in the absence of an underlying tort like, 

for instance, defamation.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, it could be said 

that Defendants “conspired,” in the ordinary sense of the word, to build a case to 

support Plaintiffs’ termination. But Plaintiffs have not shown how Defendants’ 

activities – their clandestine use of track sticks on DCNR property, their 

compilation of track stick data, or their recommending Plaintiffs’ terminations for 

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cause – amount to legally cognizable wrongs. “Where civil liability for a 

conspiracy is sought to be enforced, the conspiracy itself furnishes no cause of 

action. The gist of the action is not the conspiracy alleged but the wrong 

committed.” McLemore v. Ford Motor Co., 628 So. 2d 548, 550 (Ala. 1993). In 

other words, as Defendants have argued, the absence of an underlying tort renders 

Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim unsustainable.

Hence, even if Defendants’ absolute and state-agent immunity defenses are 

not viable, Plaintiffs’ state-law claims against Defendants still fail to survive 

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

V. CONCLUSION

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 20) is GRANTED as to all of Plaintiffs’ 

claims.

A separate final judgment will be entered.

DONE this 12th day of February, 2014.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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