Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00096/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00096-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charles Henry Richardson,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Somberg; et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CIV 05-0096-PHX-MHM (GEE)

ORDER

Petitioner Charles Henry Richardson ("Petitioner") filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus

pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254 (Dkt. #1). The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge

Glenda Edmonds for Report and Recommendation. Following Respondents’ Answer,

Magistrate Judge Edmonds filed her Report and Recommendation with this Court. (Dkt.

#16). Petitioner has filed his Objections (Dkt.#17). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must review the legal analysis in the Report and Recommendation de novo.

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court must review the factual analysis in the Report and

Recommendation de novo for those facts to which Objections are filed. "Failure to object

to a magistrate judge's recommendation waives all objections to the judge's findings of fact."

Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d 557, 562 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000).

Case 2:05-cv-00096-MHM Document 21 Filed 08/29/06 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

DISCUSSION

Petitioner plead guilty to aggravated assault and aggravated driving while under the

influence (DUI) pursuant to a plea agreement. (Respondents' Answer, Exhibit A). The court

sentenced him to 7.5 years of imprisonment for the aggravated sexual assault and 4 months

imprisonment as a condition of probation for the aggravated DUI. (Id, Exhibit F). On

November 9, 2001, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief; he filed the petition on

July 24, 2002. (Respondents' Answer, p.3). The trial court denied the petition on September

25, 2002. (Id, Exhibit D). The Petitioner was not mailed a copy of the denial until sometime

the following year. (Petitioner's Reply, Exhibit A). On August 21, 2003, Petitioner filed an

"Addendum" to his petition. The trial court dismissed the petition/addendum on September

4, 2003 pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P 32.2(a). (Respondents' Answer, Exhibit I). Petitioner

appealed the denial of his original petition for post-conviction relief on September 6, 2003;

however the petition was not filed within the 30-day statutory period and it was ultimately

denied by the Arizona Court of Appeals on September 10, 2004. (Id., Exhibits F,G).

Petitioner filed another petition for post-conviction relief on September 9, 2003. (Id. Exhibit

J). The trial court dismissed the petition on September 19, 2003 pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.2(b). Petitioner then sought a petition or review; however it was dismissed by the Arizona

Court of Appeals on September 10, 2004. (Id, Exhibit M). 

On January 10, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

("Petition"). (Dkt.#1). Petitioner asserts the following grounds of relief: (1) his Fourth

Amendment were violated when he was forced to submit to a blood test; (2) his Sixth

Amendment rights were violated because his counsel was ineffective by failing to (a) file for

a bail hearing, (b) file a motion for discovery, (c) challenge the blood test, (d) give Petitioner

the state's discovery related to the blood test, or (e) ask for a mitigated sentence hearing; (3)

his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was held without bail because his

sentence was disparate in comparison to a white person who was similarly situated and (4)

his due process rights were violated during post-conviction proceedings. In reviewing

Case 2:05-cv-00096-MHM Document 21 Filed 08/29/06 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Petitioner's claim for relief, Magistrate Edmonds concludes that Petitioner states no claim for

relief. Petitioner offers objections. 

A. Claim One: Petitioner's Fourth Amendment Claim

Petitioner contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when his blood

was forcibly taken and tested for alcohol content. However, as Magistrate Judge Edmonds

notes, habeas corpus relief is not available for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation

provided the state afforded the petitioner an opportunity to litigate the issue. Stone v. Powell,

428 U.S. 465, 494, 96 S.Ct. 3037 (1976). Petitioner was granted such an opportunity and

did so in his first petition for post-conviction relief. Moreover, Petitioner offers no objection

stating that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to assert his argument addressing the

forcible taking of his blood by authorities. As such, claim one of the Petition is without

merit. 

B. Claim Four: Irregularities in State's Rule 32 Proceeding

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated during post-conviction

proceedings. However, Petitioner fails to recognize that the post-conviction process is not

mandated by the federal constitution. See Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir.

1997), cert denied, 525 U.S. 903 (1998) (holding that errors concerning state post-conviction

process are not cognizable in federal habeas proceeding). Plaintiff offers no relevant

objection to rebut this principle. Thus, claim four of the Petition fails.

C. Claim Three: Violation of Petitioner's Eighth Amendment Rights

Petitioner contends that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was held

without bail and because his sentence was disparate in comparison to a white person who was

similarly situated. Although Petitioner raised this argument in support of his first postconviction petition in front of the trial court, Petitioner did not raise this argument before the

Arizona Court of Appeals. As such, Petitioner failed to exhaust this claim. See Lyons v.

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), as modified by, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001).

Thus, Petitioner's claim is procedurally defaulted and should be dismissed unless he can

make a sufficient showing that the Court should hear the claim. See Edwards v. Carpenter,

Case 2:05-cv-00096-MHM Document 21 Filed 08/29/06 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S.Ct. 1587 (2000) (noting that federal court will not consider a claim

that has been procedurally defaulted unless petitioner shows both "cause" and "prejudice"

or demonstrates that failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of

justice). However, the record does not suggest that such circumstances exist. 

First, Petitioner makes no relevant argument explaining why he could not raise his

Eighth Amendment claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. As such, Plaintiff cannot show

"cause" and "prejudice."

Second, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that denial will result in a "miscarriage of

justice." Petitioner argues at length in his objection to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation that no reasonable juror could have convicted him. See Bousley v. United

States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (stating that to make sufficient showing of "miscarriage of

justice" petitioner must show that "in light of all the evidence, it more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have convicted him"). Petitioner relies on the results of the blood

alcohol examination administered, which he claims are inaccurate and flawed as the results

of the exam may in fact belong to another individual. (Petitioner's Objections, Exhibits D

and D1). However, even if the results of the blood alcohol examination administered to

Petitioner are somehow flawed, there is other evidence supporting the charges and

conviction. For instance, there is evidence that: (1) Petitioner was driving his van on the

wrong side of the road on a one way street at approximately 4:30 a.m. when he collided with

another vehicle injuring the other driver; (2) Petitioner was driving on a suspended driver's

license at the time of the accident and knew that his license had been suspended; and (3)

Petitioner had the odor or alcohol on his breath. (Petitioner's Reply, Exhibit H). Based upon

these circumstances alone, a reasonable juror could conclude that Petitioner was guilty of the

Case 2:05-cv-00096-MHM Document 21 Filed 08/29/06 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The elements of Aggravated Assault include "recklessly causing any physical injury

to another person" while "using a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument." A.R.S. §§ 13-

1203 and 1204. The elements of aggravated DUI includes driving a vehicle "while under the

influence of intoxicating liquor" while "the person's driver's license is suspended..." State

v. Brown, 986 P.2d 239, 241 n.1 (Ariz.App. 1999). 

- 5 -

charges of aggravated assault and aggravated DUI.1

 As such, claim three fails as it is

procedurally defaulted.

D. Claim Two: Violation of Petitioner's Sixth Amendment Rights

Petitioner raises several grounds in support of claim two of his Petition. Specifically,

Petitioner argues his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because his counsel was

ineffective by failing to: (a) file for a bail hearing; (b) file a motion for discovery; (c)

challenge the blood test; (d) give petitioner the state's discovery related to the blood draw;

or (e) ask for a mitigating sentence. As noted by the Magistrate Judge, elements (d) and (e)

of Petitioner's claim are procedurally defaulted as Petitioner did not raise them with the

Arizona Court of Appeals and there is no basis to excuse such failure. See Lyons, 232 F.3d

at 668. 

Further, elements (a) through (c) of Petitioner's claim relate to counsel's conduct prior

to Petitioner's entry of his guilty plea. As such, these elements are not a proper basis for a

federal habeas corpus petition. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (holding

that where defendant admits guilt, he or she loses the right to object to errors which precede

the guilty plea). Specifically, "[w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open

court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter

raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior

to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of

the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was [inadequate]."

United States v. Reyes-Platero, 224 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Tollett, 411 U.S.

at 267). Here, Petitioner does not raise issue with the advice he received from counsel but

rather contests counsel's conduct in failing to raise certain motions prior to Petitioner's plea

Case 2:05-cv-00096-MHM Document 21 Filed 08/29/06 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

agreement. Under such circumstances, Petitioner's claims in support of his Sixth Amendment

claim are not persuasive. 

Moreover, even if Petitioner challenged the advice he received from counsel, his claim

still fails. To attack the advice from counsel, Petitioner must show that the advice was not

within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Lambert v.

Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 979 (9th Cir. 2004). To establish such an ineffective assistance of

claim, Petitioner must show that counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-93, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). To establish the

first prong, Petitioner must show that counsel's performance fell below an "objective standard

of reasonableness." Id. at 687-88. Second, Petitioner must show that he was prejudiced, i.e.,

that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. As discussed above, even if

Petitioner's counsel fell below the applicable standard of care by not invalidating Petitioner's

blood results, assuming they are invalid, there is other evidence supporting Petitioner's guilt

and punishment. This Court cannot say that the result of the proceedings would have been

different. Thus, claim four of the Petition fails.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court hereby adopts the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation as the Order of the Court. (Dkt.#16).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED overruling Petitioner's objections to the Report and

Recommendation. (Dkt.#17). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Petitioner's Motion for Status (Dkt.#18) and

Motion for Ruling (Dkt.#19) to the extent that this Order informs Petitioner of the status of

his Petition and of the Court's ruling. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Dkt.#1). 

/ / / 

Case 2:05-cv-00096-MHM Document 21 Filed 08/29/06 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 25th day of August, 2006.

Case 2:05-cv-00096-MHM Document 21 Filed 08/29/06 Page 7 of 7