Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-07183/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-07183-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN WHITAKER,

Plaintiff,

v.

KRIKOR ARAM OHANESSIAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-07183-SK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND DENYING MOTION TO 

DECLINE SUPPLEMENTAL

JURISDICTION

Regarding Docket No. 11

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of the motion to dismiss filed by 

Defendants Krikor Aram Ohanessian, Jennifer Anne Monahan Ohanessian, and C&F Restaurant 

(collectively referred to as “Defendants”). Having carefully considered the parties’ papers, 

relevant legal authority, and the record in the case, and having had the benefit of oral argument, 

the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion for the 

reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Brian Whitaker (“Plaintiff”) alleges that in September 2019, he went to the 

restaurant China Fun Express located at 211 Kearny Street in San Francisco, California, which is 

owned by Defendants. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 2-7, 12.) Plaintiff further alleges that he suffers from a C-4 

spinal cord injury, is a quadriplegic, and uses a wheelchair for mobility. (Id., ¶ 1.) He states that 

on the date of his visit, Defendants “failed to provide accessible dining surfaces.” (Id., ¶ 14.) 

Plaintiff does not allege facts to explain how the dining surfaces were inaccessible. Plaintiff 

brings a claim for injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and a 

claim for damages under the California Unruh Act, California Civil Code Section 51, et seq.

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ANALYSIS

A. Applicable Legal Standard on Motion to Dismiss.

A motion to dismiss is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where the 

pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On a motion to dismiss under 

Rule 12(b)(6), the Court construes the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to 

the non-moving party and takes as true all material allegations in the complaint. Sanders v. 

Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1986). Even under the liberal pleading standard of Rule 

8(a)(2), “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires 

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain,

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Rather, a plaintiff must instead allege “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than 

a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. . . . When a complaint pleads facts that 

are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the allegations are insufficient to 

state a claim, a court should grant leave to amend, unless amendment would be futile. See, e.g. 

Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990); Cook, Perkiss & Lieche, Inc. v. N. 

Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). 

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on the ground that Plaintiff fails to allege 

facts sufficient to state a claim under the ADA or the Unruh Act. Namely, Plaintiff alleges the 

legal conclusion that Defendants failed to provide accessible dining surfaces but fails to allege any 

facts which, if true, would demonstrate this legal conclusion. The Court agrees. Plaintiff fails to 

allege where the purported barrier is located, in what manner the surface is inaccessible, and how 

Plaintiff was denied full and complete access to the restaurant’s services. Cf. Whitaker v. Reeder, 

2019 WL 6331386 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2019) (finding allegation that defendant failed to provide 

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United States District Court

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accessible dining tables was insufficient to establish standing because he did not “allege[] what the 

barrier was (i.e., what was wrong with the table) and how Plaintiff’s disability was affected by the 

barrier (i.e., how Plaintiff personally suffered).”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss with leave to amend.

C. Defendants’ Alternative Motion to Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction over Unruh Act 

Claim.

Alternatively, Defendants move the Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1367 over Plaintiff’s state-law claim under the Unruh Act. Although the Court is 

granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court will address this alternative argument to 

provide guidance if Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint. 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides that:

in any civil action of which the district courts have original 

jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction 

over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within 

such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 

controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.

State-law claims form part of the same case or controversy as federal claims “when they derive 

from a common nucleus of operative fact and are such that a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected 

to try them in one judicial proceeding.” Kuba v. 1-A Agr. Ass’n, 387 F.3d 850, 855-56 (9th Cir. 

2004) (quoting Trs. of the Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare v. Desert Valley 

Landscape & Maint., Inc., 333 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir.2003)). Here, Plaintiff’s claims under the 

ADA and the Unruh Act derive from the same common nucleus of operative facts – Plaintiff’s 

visit to the restaurant and the allegation that the dining surfaces were inaccessible. Therefore, the 

Court shall exercise supplemental jurisdiction unless there is an applicable exception under 

Section 1367(c). See Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1028 (S.D. Cal. 2017)

(“Supplemental jurisdiction is mandatory unless prohibited by § 1367(b), or unless one of the 

exceptions in § 1367(c) applies.”).

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims

pursuant to Section 1367(c) where: (1) a novel or complex issue of state law is raised; (2) the 

claim substantially predominates over the federal claim; (3) the district court dismisses the federal 

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claims; or (4) under exceptional circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In order to make this 

determination, courts should consider factors such as “economy, convenience, fairness, and 

comity.” Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). 

Defendants argue that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 

Section 1367(c)(2) because Plaintiff’s claims under the Unruh Act predominate and under Section 

1367(c)(4) because Plaintiff’s avoidance of California’s High Frequent Litigant Statute provides 

exceptional circumstances. The Court, however, finds that neither exception warrants the 

declination of supplemental jurisdiction.

1. State-Law Predominance.

State issue predominate if they predominate “in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues 

raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought[.]” United Mine Workers of Am. v. 

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966). Defendants argue that, because Plaintiff may obtain an 

award of damages under the California Unruh Act but can only recover injunctive relief under the 

ADA and because Plaintiff must demonstrate that he personally encountered the alleged barrier 

under the Unruh Act, state law issues predominate. Although some courts have held that Unruh 

Act claims predominate over claims under the ADA, this Court finds that those cases finding to 

the contrary are more persuasive. Compare Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 1030 (holding that 

monetary damages of $36,000 sought by a plaintiff under the Unruh Act substantially 

predominated over federal injunctive relief sought under the ADA) and Vogel v. Winchell’s Donut, 

252 F. Supp. 3d 977, 986 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (holding that a plaintiff’s state-law claims substantially 

predominated over an ADA claim because the remedies available under state law were more 

expansive and the ADA claim added no unique remedy to the suit), with Schoors v. Seaport Vill. 

Operating Co., LLC, 2017 WL 1807954 (S.D. Cal. May 5, 2017) (holding that although a 

plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim offered more comprehensive remedies than their ADA claim, the 

Unruh Act claim did not substantially predominate over the ADA claim because it involved 

identical facts, witnesses, and evidence) and Castillo-Antonio v. Hernandez, 2019 WL 2716289 

(N.D. Cal. June 28, 2019) (same).

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As the court in Castillo-Antonio reasoned:

Though the remedies Plaintiff seeks pursuant to his state-law claims 

exceed those available under the ADA, the federal and state claims 

involve nearly identical facts, witnesses, and evidence because 

Plaintiff’s Unruh Act . . . claims are premised on proving a violation 

of the ADA. . . . To prove his Unruh Act and CDPA claims, Plaintiff 

need only make an additional showing of the particular occasions on 

which he encountered the barrier or was deterred from visiting the 

market to establish statutory damages. . . .Thus, even though the statelaw claims provide for more comprehensive remedies, they do not 

substantially predominate over the ADA claim because the proof 

required for both the state and federal claims is nearly identical.

Castillo-Antonio, 2019 WL 2716289, at *7 (citations omitted). Similarly, here, the proof required 

for Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and ADA claims is nearly identical. Therefore, the Court finds that the 

Unruh Act claim does not predominate over the ADA claim.

2. Exceptional Circumstances.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s efforts to avoid the heightened procedural 

requirements of California’s High Frequent Litigant Statute provides exceptional circumstances to 

decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. The High Frequent Litigant Statute, California 

Code of Civil Procedure § 425.50, imposes the following pleading requirements: 

(1) complaint must allege whether it is filed by or on behalf of a highfrequency litigator; (2) the number of complaints alleging a 

construction related accessibility claim that were filed by the high 

frequency litigator in the past twelve months; (3) the reason the high 

frequency litigator was in the region of the defendant’s business; and 

(4) the specific reason that the high frequency litigator desired access 

to the defendant’s business. Cal. Code Civ. P. § 425.50(a)(4). 

Additionally, a high frequency litigator must verify his complaint and 

pay an additional filing fee. See Cal. Code Civ. P. § 425.50(b); Cal. 

Gov. Code § 70616.5.

Johnson v. Morning Star Merced, LLC, 2018 WL 4444961, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2018). 

Federal Courts have not applied these pleading requirements but instead apply the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure. Castillo-Antonio, 2019 WL 2716289, at *9.

There is a split of authority among district courts within the Ninth Circuit on whether the 

avoidance of California’s High Frequent Litigant Statute provides exceptional circumstances. 

This Court finds persuasive the cases in the Northern District of California which have examined 

this issue and found that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting declination of 

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supplemental jurisdiction. See Castillo-Antonio v. Hernandez, 2019 WL 2716289, at * 9 (finding 

that although comity concerns weigh in favor of declining supplemental jurisdiction, 

considerations of fairness and efficiency outweigh those concerns); Johnson v. Mariani, 2017 WL 

2929453 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2017) (same). “[H]aving two proceedings, one in state court and one 

in federal court, to litigate nearly identical cases would be unduly inconvenient and unfair. An 

exercise of supplemental jurisdiction would also serve the purpose of judicial economy to avoid 

the wasteful duplication in parallel proceedings.” Johnson, 2017 WL 2929453, at *4. Therefore, 

the Court DENIES Defendants’ alternative motion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the

Unruh Act claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss and 

DENIES their alternative motion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Plaintiff shall 

file his amended complaint, if any, by no later than January 29, 2020.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 8, 2020

______________________________________

SALLIE KIM

United States Magistrate Judge

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