Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00471/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00471-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Richard I. Valenzuela, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV 10-0471-TUC-FRZ (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Richard I. Valenzuela’s Amended Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 5) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance 

with the Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge 

for report and recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge 

recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of the record, deny 

the Petition with prejudice. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 By Information filed August 29, 2006, Valenzuela was charged in Cochise 

County Superior Court case number CR2006-00589 with six felony counts of 

attempted murder, robbery, burglary, and aggravated assault. Answer, Ex. B. On 

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May 21, 2007, Valenzuela pled guilty to first-degree burglary, in exchange for which 

the State dismissed the remaining charges. Id., Ex. C (Plea Agreement); Ex. D 

(Sentencing Minute Entry); Ex. L, pp. 2-10 (transcript). On June 18, 2007, the trial 

court sentenced him to a stipulated prison term of 11.5 years and ordered him to pay 

$7,404.49 in restitution. Id., Ex. E (Sentencing Minute Entry). Pursuant to the plea 

agreement, Valenzuela waived his right to direct appeal. Id., Ex. C, p. 3. 

 On June 28, 2007, Valenzuela initiated a state post-conviction relief (PCR) 

proceeding by filing a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. Id., Ex. F. Petitioner then 

filed a PCR petition and an accompanying memorandum in which he alleged that (1) 

the restitution order constituted an illegal sentence that violated his rights to due 

process, and (2) the plea agreement was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 

made and he therefore should have been permitted to withdraw his plea. Id., Ex. G 

(Petition); Ex. H (Memorandum). By Order dated April 23, 2009, the trial court 

rejected Valenzuela’s claims and dismissed the petition. Id., Ex. J. 

 Valenzuela filed a petition for review raising the same two issues he raised 

before the trial court. Id., Ex. K. By Memorandum Decision dated November 13, 

2009, the Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. Id., Ex. A. No petition 

for review by the Arizona Supreme Court was filed and Valenzuela initiated this case 

on August 3, 2010 with the filing of his original petition. 

 . . . 

 . . . 

 . . . 

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II. LEGAL DISCUSSION

 A. The Amended Petition is timely. 

 The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

provides for a one year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations 

period must be dismissed. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that: 

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

 In this case, Valenzuela pled guilty to a non-capital offense and waived his 

right to a direct state appeal. A.R.S. § 13-4033(B). He did, however, have the right 

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to pursue state post-conviction relief proceedings, which when properly filed 

constitute “direct review” for AEDPA limitations purposes. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 

(non-capital pleading defendant has right to pursue post-conviction relief 

proceeding); Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rule 32 “of 

right” proceeding constitutes “direct review” for § 2244(d)(1)(A) purposes). 

 Here, Valenzuela was obligated to raise his claims in a Rule 32 of-right 

proceeding within 90 days after the entry of judgment and sentence. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.4(a). Applied to Valenzuela, this meant that he was required to initiate a Rule 32 

petition of-right proceeding 90 days after his June 18, 2007 sentencing. Valenzuela 

initiated his state PCR proceeding on June 28, 2007, well within the time for doing 

so. Thus, the AEDPA limitation period began to run on November 13, 2009, when 

the Arizona Court of Appeals denied his petition for review. The instant action was 

filed on August 3, 2010, well-within the one year AEDPA limitations period. 

 B. The claims are exhausted. 

 A state prisoner must exhaust the available state remedies before a federal 

court may consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). Exhaustion 

occurs either when a claim has been fairly presented to the highest state court, Picard 

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971), or by establishing that a claim has been 

procedurally defaulted and that no state remedies remain available, Reed v. Ross, 468 

U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

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 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these 

claims. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). A claim has been 

“fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theories 

on which the claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. 

Wood, 44 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). The operative facts must be presented in 

the appropriate context to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. The fair presentation 

requirement is not satisfied, for example, when a claim is presented in state court in a 

procedural context in which its merits will not be considered in the absence of special 

circumstances. Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. An exact correlation of the claims in both 

state and federal court is not required. Rice, 44 F.3d at 1403. The substance of the 

federal claim must have been fairly presented to the state courts. Chacon v. Wood, 

36 F.3d 1459, 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). 

 Here, Valenzuela presented to the Arizona trial and appellate courts the two 

claims he now asserts in his federal habeas petition. See Answer, Exs. I & J. Thus, 

the Court can review the merits of his claims. 

B. The claims are meritless. 

 1. Standard of review 

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect 

to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

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based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2002). 

 2. Grounds One and Two of the Petition are meritless.

 In Ground One, Valenzuela contends that his guilty plea was not knowing and 

voluntary. He claims that he was under the influence of medication and 

misunderstood the terms of the plea agreement. He specifically claims that he was 

unaware of the amount of restitution that could be imposed, and did not understand 

the implications of agreeing to a “stipulated” sentence, and would not have entered 

into the agreement if he had understood the terms. 

 Valenzuela entered his guilty plea on May 21, 2007. At the hearing, upon 

inquiry from the court, Valenzuela indicated that he read, spoke and understood the 

English language and represented that he had not had any drugs, alcohol or 

prescription medication that would affect his ability to understand the proceedings. 

Answer, Ex. L (change of plea hearing transcript), p. 2. The felony burglary charge 

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to which he was pleading was described to him and he indicated that it was his 

intention to plead guilty. Id., pp. 2-3. He said he had met and conferred with his 

lawyer about the agreement and understood all of its terms and conditions. Id., p. 3. 

Valenzuela then indicated that he was satisfied with the advice his lawyer had given 

him. Id., pp. 3-4. 

 The court then turned to the substance of the agreement and asked Valenzuela 

if he understood that the agreement called for a mandatory prison sentence and 

provided that he “shall be sentenced to 11 and-one-half years in the Department of 

Corrections.” Valenzuela responded, “Yeah, I do.” Id., pp. 4-5. Valenzuela also 

affirmatively recognized that the court could impose a fine of up to $150,000.00. Id., 

p. 5. 

 Next, the court reviewed with Valenzuela the rights he was giving up by 

entering into the plea agreement. The court explained to Valenzuela that he had the 

right to go to trial, to be represented by an attorney, to present evidence and examine 

and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify or remain silent. Id., pp. 6-7. 

Valenzuela indicated that he understood his rights and chose to waive them and plead 

guilty. Id., p. 7. Then, after reciting the factual basis of the charge and finding that 

Valenzuela’s plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made, the court 

accepted the plea of guilty to charges of burglary in the first degree. Id., p. 10. 

 About a month later, on June 18, 2007, Valenzuela appeared for sentencing. 

After the court stated for the record that Valenzuela had previously plead guilty and 

that the court had accepted the plea, Valenzuela’s counsel informed the court that 

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despite counsel’s belief that it was a “good plea agreement,” Valenzuela wanted 

another attorney so he could get “a second opinion regarding the plea agreement and 

the motion to withdraw from the plea agreement.” Answer, Ex. M (sentencing 

transcript), p. 3. Valenzuela then spoke directly to the court: 

I really believe that, that I didn’t understand the plea agreement at first. 

That’s why I signed it. I was in a state of confusion. But I think I 

deserve a fair, a fair case to a trial. And I think my counsel was 

uneffective; and we got a conflict of interest. So that’s why I asked 

what I wrote down on paper there, for I could be excused from this plea 

agreement. 

Id., p. 5. Upon hearing this, the court noted that Valenzuela had already plead guilty 

and stated that Valenzuela “knew what was happening” at sentencing and that the 

court found no reason not to proceed with sentencing. Id. 

 The court then asked for the state’s position. The state then raised a request 

contained in the Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) for restitution in the amount of 

$7,404.49, with $2,200.00 going to the victim and $5,204.49 to AHCCS/Mercy Care. 

Id., pp. 6 & 8. No objection was made to the imposition of the restitution order, and 

the court proceeded to impose the stipulated sentence of 11.5 years along with the 

requested order of restitution in the amount of $7,404.49. Id., p. 8. 

 Valenzuela subsequently filed a PCR petition in which he claimed that at the 

time the plea was offered he “was on medications that affected his thinking and 

judgment,” that his attorney pressured him into accepting the agreement, and that he 

was promised that “he would be able to hold his daughter and he would [be] assigned 

to a three yard at prison.” Answer, Ex. H, p. 3. He also asserted that he did not 

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understand the meaning of the term “stipulation,” and believed that the agreement 

provided that he could be sentenced to as few as three years. Id., p. 4. Finally, he 

claimed that he would not have entered into the agreement if he had known that he 

would be ordered to pay $7,404.49 in restitution. Id. 

 In its order dismissing the PCR petition, the trial court noted that it had 

observed Valenzuela’s demeanor during the court hearings and found them 

appropriate. The court further noted that Valenzuela, at both his change of plea and 

sentencing hearings, indicated that he had not taken any drugs or prescription 

medications. Answer, Ex. J, p. 1. The court characterized Valenzuela’s claims that 

he did not understand the word “stipulated” as disingenuous “in light of his prior 

criminal history and contact with the courts and lawyers in the past.” Id., p. 2. The 

court also found disingenuous Valenzuela’s claim that he had been promised certain 

prison placements because “[n]o experienced lawyer would make such a promise 

because any practicing criminal attorney knows that the sentencing court has no 

jurisdiction over the Department of Corrections and where it houses prisoners or how 

it classifies them.” Id., pp. 2-3. Finally, the court rejected Valenzuela’s claim that he 

was unaware of the amount of restitution because he and his counsel were provided 

with a pre-sentence report and restitution documentation prior to sentencing and did 

not request a hearing or object to the order. Id., p. 3. 

 Valenzuela then appealed the trial court’s decision and the Arizona Court of 

Appeals denied relief. Answer, Ex. A. In its Memorandum Decision, the Court of 

Appeals described the trial court’s findings and concluded that the transcript of the 

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change of plea hearing supported the trial court’s determination that Valenzuela had 

knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered into the plea agreement. Id., pp. 3-4. 

In reaching its conclusion, the court specifically noted that Valenzuela had denied 

that he was under the influence of drugs and medications and that he had stated that 

no one had used “force, threats or promises outside the terms of the agreement itself 

to gain his assent to it.” Id., p. 4. The court also rejected Valenzuela’s contention 

that he did not know of the restitution amount and that he would have rejected the 

plea if he had known, finding that he failed to object to the amount of the restitution 

order either before or at the sentencing hearing. Id. 

 Due process requires that a plea of guilty or no contest be voluntary, knowing 

and made with “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 

consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). A plea is 

“involuntary” if it is the product of threats, improper promises, or other forms of 

wrongful coercion. Id. at 754-55. A plea is not intelligent where the defendant is 

without the information necessary to properly assess “the advantages and 

disadvantages of a trial as compared with those attending a plea of guilty.” Id. at 

754. A habeas petitioner bears the burden of establishing that his plea was not 

voluntary and intelligent. Park v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31-34 (1992); Little v. 

Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006) (petitioner must “overcome the 

presumption that he pled voluntarily and intelligently”). 

 Even without relying on the deferential standards of AEDPA, the court finds 

that Valenzuela’s constitutional rights were not violated in this case. In the last 

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reasoned decision on this claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals deferred to the trial 

court’s finding that Valenzuela, who affirmatively stated he was not under the 

influence of drugs, was actually not under the influence. It can hardly be suggested 

that it was unreasonable to reach this conclusion when Valenzuela indicated that he 

was not under the influence and the court did not notice any behavior indicating he 

might be. Also of note is the fact that Valenzuela has not indicated the source or type 

of drug of which he was under the influence. 

 Valenzuela also has not overcome the presumption of the validity of his plea 

by producing evidence that his lawyer promised he would be placed in particular 

custody if he accepted the plea. As the Court of Appeals noted, Valenzuela indicated 

at his change of plea hearing that no one had used force, threats or promises outside 

the terms of the agreement itself to gain his assent to it. Answer, Ex. A, p. 4; Ex. L, 

pp. 8-9 (transcript of change of plea). Additionally, as the trial court stated and the 

Court of Appeals noted, no experienced lawyer would make such a representation. 

Id., Ex. A, p. 3; Ex. J, pp. 2-3. Factual determinations such as this by state courts are 

presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Miller–El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). This presumption applies to findings made by 

both the trial court and the court of appeals. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546–47 

(1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th

Cir. 2001). Moreover, conclusory assertions will not suffice. Id. Under 28 U.S.C. 

2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination will not be 

overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the 

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evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller–El, 537 U.S. at 340. Here, 

Valenzuela has not produced clear and convincing evidence that the Arizona courts’ 

factual determination was unreasonable. 

 With regard to his claim that he did not understand that he was stipulating to a 

sentence of 11.5 and believed he could get a much shorter sentence, Valenzuela’s 

argument is wanting. As the Court of Appeals noted . . . This is clear from the 

change of plea colloquy where Valenzuela affirmatively stated that he understood 

that “[t]he State and the Defendant stipulate that the defendant shall be sentenced to 

11 and-one-half years in the Department of Corrections.” Answer, Ex. L, pp. 4-5. 

Even if he truly did not know the meaning of the word stipulate, Valenzuela was 

certainly informed of the nature of the plea when the trial court explained that the 

agreement provided that he “shall be sentenced to 11 and-one-half years.” 

Valenzuela has not asserted that he did not understand what the words “shall be 

sentenced” mean. 

 In Ground One, Valenzuela also asserts that his plea colloquy was defective 

because he was not informed that he would have to pay $7,404.49 in restitution to his 

victims. In Ground Two, Valenzuela contends that the restitution order rendered 

“illegally imposed.” These arguments are unavailing. As a threshold matter, 

Valenzuela has not identified the clearly established federal law that was allegedly 

misapplied by the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). Accordingly, this Court cannot find that the state court’s 

treatment of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly 

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established Supreme Court law. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (stating 

that “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision 

contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court decision will not be contrary 

to clearly established federal law). 

 Even if there were authority that might support Valenzuela’s claim, he cannot 

overcome that the state courts, as a factual matter, found that he was informed of the 

restitution after his change of plea, but before sentencing, and never objected to its 

imposition or amount. Answer, Ex. J, p. 3. The Court of Appeals determined that his 

failure to do so established that the amount of the restitution was not material to his 

decision to accept the plea. Id., Ex. A, p. 4. Again, Valenzuela has not offered clear 

and convincing evidence that would call this determination into question. 

 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has held that where a defendant who is not 

warned of the potential for restitution is nevertheless ordered to pay such restitution, 

but in an amount less than the total potential criminal fine about which he was 

warned, the arguable error is harmless. United States v. Pomazi, 851 F.2d 244, 248 

(9th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 

(1990); United States v. Crawford, 169 F.3d 590, 592-93 (9th Cir. 1999). In this case, 

the plea agreement warned Valenzuela in bold print that he was subject to a fine of 

up to $150,000 plus an 80% surcharge. Answer, Ex. C, p. 1. Although ordered to 

pay restitution in the amount of $7,404.49, he was not subjected to any fine. Thus, 

his actual financial burden at sentencing was far less than the potential penalty of 

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which he was warned. Even if the court had erred by not informing him of the 

prospect of a restitution order, such error was harmless. 

 Finally, Valenzuela cannot genuinely claim surprise as to the amount of the 

restitution order. The Plea Agreement provided as follows: 

RESTITUTION: The Defendant agrees to pay restitution to all the 

victims named in the original indictment, even if they are not named 

within the specific charge to which the Defendant is pleading guilty. 

The Defendant understands he/she is jointly and severally liable for the 

entire restitution amount(s). The Defendant specifically agrees to make 

restitution to the victim(s) for losses suffered as a result of the course of 

conduct of which the Defendant may only be part. To be determined. 

 

Answer, Ex. C, p. 2. The original charges against Valenzuela consisted of the 

attempted murder, stabbing and robbery of the victim. Answer, Ex. B. The stabbing 

was alleged to have caused “serious physical injury” with “multiple stab wounds.” 

Id. It is too much to ask this Court, and the state courts before it, to believe that 

Valenzuela, who had agreed to pay restitution, would be surprised that robbing 

someone and stabbing them multiple times would result in a restitution order 

substantially lower than the one actually imposed. In short, there is nothing in the 

Petition or the record that would compel this Court to find that the state court’s 

treatment of this claim was objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 

1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Arizona courts’ rejection of 

Valenzuela's claims was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States 

Supreme Court. Thus, habeas relief is not warranted. 

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III. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Valenzuela’s Amended Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 5). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 10-471-TUC-FRZ. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 15th day of April, 2013. 

 

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