Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00540/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00540-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

N.D., )

by and through his Mother and )

Next Friend, Beverly Dorman, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CASE NO. 2:13cv540-MEF-TFM

v. ) [wo]

)

MARK M. GOLDEN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff=s Motion to Quash Subpoenas to 

Stanhope Elmore High School or, in the alternative, for a Protective Order (Doc. 26, 

filed February 12, 2014). 

I. BACKGROUND

On or about March 1, 2013, N.D.1 and his friend J.S. were released from school 

for the day and planned to pick up an unnamed friend from the school bus stop near the 

friend’s house. See Doc. 1 at 3-4. At around 3:00 p.m., N.D. parked along or near 

Gorey Drive in Millbrook, Alabama near a vacant lot to wait for his friend. See Doc. 1 

at 4. A few minutes later, Mark Golden (“Golden”) drove up in his personal vehicle, a 

Ford Mustang, and parked closely behind N.D.’s vehicle. Id. According to the 

plaintiff, Golden got out of his vehicle, wearing an Auburn University sweatshirt, and ran 

 1 N.D. was 17 years old at the time of the incident, thus he was a minor and will be referred to solely by his 

initials.

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up to the driver’s side of N.D.’s vehicle and yelled “what the f*** are you doing on my 

property.” Id. N.D. responded “my bad, if you will move your car I will leave;” 

however, Golden refused to leave and demanded that N.D. show him his hands. Id. 

When N.D. retorted that he did not know Golden, Golden replied that he works for the 

Department of Corrections and is a reserve officer for the city and demanded that N.D. 

exit his vehicle. Id. 

N.D. said that due to Golden’s threatening behavior he was “frightened and 

terrified,” and he refused to exit his vehicle. Id. As a result, Golden reached through 

the open window of N.D.’s door and grabbed N.D. around his shoulders, neck, and head 

in an attempt to forcefully remove N.D. through the vehicle’s window, ripping his shirt 

and scratching N.D.’s chest and neck in the process. See Doc. 1 at 4-5. N.D. broke 

loose of Golden’s hold and fled the vehicle through the passenger’s side door. See Doc. 

1 at 4. Golden attacked N.D. and threw him to the ground, but N.D. broke loose and 

began running away. See Doc. 1 at 5. Golden ran to his car, retrieved his handgun, 

pointed it toward N.D., and repeatedly shouted that if N.D. did not stop running and drop 

to the ground, he would shoot. Id. N.D. slowed down and walked to the street and 

away from the area. Id. 

Golden contacted dispatch and requested assistance. Officer Bo Knight (“Officer 

Knight”) was dispatched to the scene. Id. Officer Knight arrived and spoke to Golden, 

who simply stated “it’s in his back pocket.” Id. Officer Knight found N.D. and 

thoroughly searched him, but discovered nothing illegal on his person. See Doc. 1 at 

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5-6. Regardless of that fact, N.D. was placed in handcuffs, advised that he was under 

arrest, and placed in the back of Officer Knight’s police cruiser. See Doc. 1 at 6. 

Moments later, Corporal Brett Wadsworth (“Corporal Wadsworth”) arrived and directed 

a complete search of N.D.’s vehicle, without consent. All three officers thoroughly 

searched the vehicle, but did not find any contraband. Id. The vehicle was 

subsequently impounded. Id. 

N.D.’s mother arrived at the police station and was told that N.D. had been 

arrested for possession of marijuana; however, the officers released N.D. into her custody 

with no official charges. Id. N.D. later learned that he was charged and/or was being 

threatened with charges of harassment, trespassing, and possession of marijuana. Id. 

N.D. alleges that based upon “information and belief,” the City of Millbrook has a 

“custom, practice and or policy” of:

(1) authorizing and allowing its reserve officers to engage in ordinary 

police functions including, but not limited to, arrests and searches, while 

alone and/or not under direct control and supervision of a certified law 

enforcement officer, and without having met the training requirements of 

the Alabama Peace Officers’ Standards and Training Commission;

(2) failing to adequately and properly control and supervise its reserve 

officers while such officers are engaged in police functions on behalf of the 

City; and

(3) failing to adequately and properly train its reserve officers regarding the 

scope of authority held by a reserve officer.

See Doc. 1 at 6-7. N.D. asserts that the defendants’ conduct proximately caused him to 

suffer “anger, anguish, anxiety, apprehension, embarrassment, emotional distress, fear, 

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[and] physical pain and suffering.” See Doc. 1 at 7.

On or about February 6, 2014, Defendants advised Plaintiff that a subpoena to 

obtain N.D.’s “complete file” was submitted to the Custodian of Records for Stanhope 

Elmore High School. See Doc. 26 at 1-2. The following day, Plaintiff provided 

Defendants with a list of objections to the subpoena. Id. In opposition to the motion to 

quash, Defendants argue that N.D. waived his privacy rights under federal law by filing 

this lawsuit and placing his mental and emotional health directly at issue. See Doc. 28 

at 3.

II. DISCUSSION

The issue before this Court is whether N.D.’s complete high school record is subject 

to discovery by the Defendants. See Docs. 26, 28. N.D. argues that allowing discovery 

of his complete educational record will violate his privacy rights and does not comport 

with Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which requires that the discovery 

“appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” because 

the incident took place after school and was not on school property. See Doc. 26 at 3-6. 

Defendants argue that N.D. failed to assert a privilege, but to the extent he is inferring 

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”) protections, he is not protected 

because privacy rights under FERPA apply to nonparty educational records. Whereas 

here, defendant argues that N.D. “voluntarily pursued litigation,” and has “placed certain 

aspects of his life at issue,” specifically Defendants claim that N.D. has put his mental 

health at issue. See Doc. 28 at 3.

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The Defendants correctly invoke FERPA as the relevant statute governing school 

records. Id. FERPA provides, in relevant part:

No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any 

educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of releasing, 

or providing access to, any personally identifiable information in education 

records other than directory information, or as is permitted under paragraph 

(1) of this subsection, unless—

(A) there is written consent from the student's parents specifying records to 

be released, the reasons for such release, and to whom, and with a copy of the 

records to be released to the student's parents and the student if desired by the 

parents, or

(B) except as provided in paragraph (1)(J), such information is furnished in 

compliance with judicial order, or pursuant to any lawfully issued subpoena, 

upon condition that parents and the students are notified of all such orders or 

subpoenas in advance of the compliance therewith by the educational 

institution or agency.

20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2). In other words, “schools and educational agencies receiving 

federal financial assistance must comply with certain conditions.” Owasso Indep. Sch. 

Dist. No. I-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 428, 122 S. Ct. 934, 937, 151 L. Ed. 2d 896 (2002) 

(citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(3)). One such condition identified in the Act is that “federal 

funds are to be withheld from school districts that have ‘a policy or practice of permitting 

the release of education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein 

...) of students without the written consent of their parents.’” Id. at 428-29, 122 S. Ct. at 937 

(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)). The Act defines “education records” as “‘records, 

files, documents, and other materials’ containing information directly related to a student, 

which ‘are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for 

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such agency or institution.’” Id. at 429, 122 S. Ct. at 937 (quoting 20 U.S.C. §

1232g(a)(4)(A)).

The purpose of FERPA is “‘assure parents of students ... access to their education 

records and to protect such individuals’ right to privacy by limiting the transferability (and 

disclosure) of their records without their consent.’” Alig-Mielcarek v. Jackson, 286 

F.R.D. 521, 525-26 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (quoting Rios v. Read, 73 F.R.D. 589, 597 

(E.D.N.Y.1977)). Courts have noted that “[a]lthough FERPA does not provide a privilege 

preventing disclosure of student records, it seeks to protect the confidentiality of 

educational records by threatening financial sanctions against those schools that adopt 

policies of releasing student records.” Id. at 526 (citing Rios, 73 F.R.D. at 597; see also 

Bigge v. District School Bd. of Citrus Cty., Fla., No. 5:11–cv–210–Oc–10TBS, 2011 WL 

6002927, at *1 (M.D.Fla. Nov. 28, 2011); Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free School District,

549 F.Supp.2d 288, 291–92 (E.D.N.Y.2008).

However, Subsection (B) excuses schools from sanctions for disclosure of 

educational records if they are pursuant to a judicial order. Id. (Ragusa, 549 F.Supp.2d at 

291–92; Rios, 73 F.R.D. at 599); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2)(B). “Nevertheless, the 

‘privacy violations’ that result from any disclosure of education records protected by 

FERPA are ‘no less objectionable simply because release of the records is obtained 

pursuant to judicial approval unless, before approval is given, the party seeking disclosure 

is required to demonstrate a genuine need for the information that outweighs the privacy 

interests of the students.’” Id. (quoting Rios, 73 F.R.D. at 599); see also Ragusa, 549 

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F.Supp.2d at 292. Several courts have released educational records after a determination 

that the records are clearly relevant to the claims at issue. See Ragusa, 549 F.Supp.2d at 

293–94; Nastasia v. New Fairfield Sch. Dist., No. 3:04 CV 925(TPS), 2006 WL 1699599, 

*1–2 (D.Conn. June 19, 2006); and Davids v. Cedar Falls Cmty. Sch., No. C96–2071, 

1998 WL 34112767, *3 (N.D.Iowa Oct. 28, 1998).

Although the Defendants assert that this line of case law relates to nonparty 

educational records, after review of the plain language of FERPA, the balancing test 

established by these courts is clearly consistent with the purpose of the statute. 2

 

Furthermore, a distinction between whether the records are those of a party to the action or 

a nonparty is not relevant in the overall analysis and application of the balancing test. 

However, the party-nonparty distinction becomes important while reviewing the individual 

claims or alleged damages in conjunction with the specific portion of the records sought.

Here, N.D.’s claims involve an incident occurring after school hours and 

off-campus with an off-duty reserve officer. Defendants claim that N.D.’s complete

educational record will help them prepare their defense; however, Defendants completely 

fail to explain why there is a genuine need for N.D.’s academic, attendance, and 

disciplinary records, among others. N.D.’s grades, attendance record, disciplinary 

record, etc. have absolutely no bearing on the claims involved in the instant action. It is 

clear to this Court that Defendants’ request for N.D.’s complete school record in defense

 2 Case law in this Circuit regarding FERPA and discovery of educational records is sparse, especially where the 

records belong to a plaintiff in the case.

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of an after-hour, off-campus incident does not appear “reasonably calculated to lead to the 

discovery of admissible evidence” in this case, and they have failed to establish a “genuine 

need for the information that outweighs the privacy interests of [N.D.].” See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 26(b); Alig-Mielcarek, 286 F.R.D. at 526. Thus, insofar as N.D. requests that this Court 

quash Defendants’ subpoena for his complete educational records from Stanhope Elmore 

High School, the Motion to Quash is GRANTED.

However, Defendants make a specific request related any mental health records 

that might be contained in N.D.’s educational records. N.D. asserts that due to the 

harassment and arrest, he suffers from “anger, anguish, anxiety, apprehension, 

embarrassment, emotional distress, fear, and physical pain and suffering.” See Doc. 1 at 

7. Defendants argue that “these claims of damages [place] N.D.’s mental and emotional 

health directly at issue rendering any information about other problems, stresses, and/or 

complications that he has in his life relevant to Golden’s defenses in this case.” See

Doc. 28 at 3.

Under both federal and Alabama law, psychotherapist/patient privilege is 

absolute.3

 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1931, 135 L. Ed. 2d 

 3 Psychotherapist/patient privilege is absolute in the federal context only in the sense that there is 

no balancing test to weigh the patient=s privacy concerns versus the evidentiary need of the records:

Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's later evaluation of 

the relative importance of the patient's interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for 

disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege. As we explained in 

Upjohn, if the purpose of the privilege is to be served, the participants in the confidential 

conversation Amust be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular 

discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain 

but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at 

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337 (1996); and Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993). 

Defendants’ subpoena seeks protected school mental health records. Thus, the records 

sought by Defendants are privileged and not subject to disclosure absent a waiver by 

N.D. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15, 116 S. Ct. at ,1931, n. 14 (ALike other testimonial 

privileges, the patient may of course waive the protection@). Defendants argue that N.D.

impliedly waived his privilege by placing his mental health at issue in the case at bar. 

See Doc. 28.

The Eleventh Circuit has been silent on the issue of implied waiver of

psychotherapist/patient privilege; however, this Court as well as other federal courts have 

held that the privilege is impliedly waived where the plaintiff puts their mental or 

emotional state at issue. See Kelly, 2:05-CV-1150MHT-TFM, 2007 WL 2580492, *3 

(This Court found that it could not Afathom a more clear example of voluntary waiver of 

the psychotherapist-patient privilege@ than a plaintiff who claimed to have been 

diagnosed with bipolar disorder before the alleged incident, and post-traumatic stress 

disorder after the alleged incident in the jail.); Wilson, 2:09-CV-21-MEF-CSC, 2010 

WL 1729111, *3 (Finding that the plaintiff affirmatively placed his mental health at 

issue, and thus the Court concluded Athat the privilege which protects disclosure of 

psychotherapy records has been waived@ after the plaintiff asserted claims for intentional 

 

all.@

Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17-18, 116 S. Ct. at 1932 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393, 101 

S.Ct. 677, 684, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981)).

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and negligent infliction of emotional distress and mental anguish).4

 As noted in Wilson, 

the Eleventh Circuit has long recognized implied waiver in analogous privileges such as 

the attorney-client privilege. Wilson, 2:09-CV-21-MEF-CSC, 2010 WL 1729111, *3 

(citing Cox v. Administrator United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1417 (11th Cir. 

1994)).5

However, other courts in this Circuit note that the majority of district courts have 

adopted a middle position, holding that a plaintiff does not put his or her mental health at 

issue by simply alleging mental anguish or Agarden variety@ emotional distress. Chase 

v. Nova Se. Univ., Inc., 11-61290-CIV, 2012 WL 1936082, *4 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 2012).6

 

 4 See also Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 2007) (By seeking 

emotional distress damages, the plaintiff had Aput her emotional state at issue in the case@ and therefore 

waived any psychotherapist-patient privilege); Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 718 (7th Cir. 2006) 

(AIf a plaintiff by seeking damages for emotional distress places his or her psychological state in issue, the 

defendant is entitled to discover any records of that state.@); Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 

(8th Cir. 2000) (The plaintiff Aplace[d] . . . her medical condition at issue@ by seeking emotional distress 

damages and therefore waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege.); Fisher v. Southwestern Bell 

Tel.Co., 2010 WL 257305, *3 (10th Cir. 2010) (AMs. Fisher=s request for emotional-distress damages 

placed her psychological state in issue and entitled [the defendant] to discover her therapy records.@).

5 The attorney-client privilege Abelongs solely to the client,@ and the client may waive it, either 

expressly or by implication.@ In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100, 101 (2d Cir. 1987). We have observed 

that the doctrine of waiver by implication reflects the position that the attorney-client provilege A>was 

intended as a shield, not a sword.=@ GAB Business Services, Inc. v. Syndicate 627, 809 F.2d 755, 762 (11th 

Cir. 1987) (applying Florida law) (quoting Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444, 446 (S.D. Fla. 

1980)). In other words, A[a] defendant may not use the privilege to prejudice his opponent=s case or to 

disclose some selected communications for self-serving purposes.@ United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 

1285, 1292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 502 U.S. 813, 112 S.Ct. 63, 116 L.Ed.2d 39 (1991); accord United States 

v. Jones, 696 F.2d 10369, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982) (ASelective disclosure for tactical purposes waives the 

privilege.@)

6 See also OrtizBCarballo v. Ellspermann, No. 5:08BcvB165BOcB10GRJ, 2009 WL 961131, at *2 

(M.D.Fla. Apr.7, 2009) (AThe majority of federal courts that have addressed the issue have held that a 

party does not place his mental condition in controversy merely by requesting damages for mental 

anguish or >garden variety= emotional distress.@); Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 551, 553 

(N.D.Ga.2001) (AThe majority of courts have held that plaintiffs do not place their mental condition in 

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The courts have identified five conditions in which a plaintiff=s mental health is placed 

Ain controversy@:

(1) stating a tort claim for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional 

distress;

(2) alleging a specific mental or psychiatric injury or disorder;

(3) alleging unusually severe emotional distress;

(4) intending to offer expert testimony to support a claim for emotional 

distress damages; and/or

(5) conceding that his or her mental condition is in controversy.

Id. However, it is unnecessary for the Court to grapple with whether the above 

conditions should provide a standard for this Court to follow, because it is clear that N.D.

has placed his mental health at issue in this case.

Here, even considering the above conditions, N.D. has clearly put his mental 

health in issue by contending that he has suffered anger, anguish, anxiety, apprehension, 

embarrassment, emotional distress, and fear. See Doc. 1 at 7. In stating claims for 

anxiety, N.D. is clearly seeking damages for a Aspecific mental or psychiatric injury or 

disorder.@ Id.; see also Tracey P. v. Sarasota Cnty., 8:05-CV-927-T-27EAJ, 2006 WL 

1678908 (M.D. Fla. June 16, 2006) (finding that claims for “tremendous emotional harm” 

and “severe anxiety and fear” “present more than a simple allegation of emotional distress 

and place the individual Plaintiffs' mental condition in controversy for purposes of Rule 

 

controversy merely by claiming damages for mental anguish or >garden variety= emotional distress.@)

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35.”). N.D. has affirmatively placed his mental health at issue; therefore, the Court 

concludes that N.D. waived the privilege which protects disclosure of his psychiatric 

treatment records. Any records related to psychotherapy treatment contained in N.D.’s

Stanhope Elmore High School records are discoverable in this case and insofar as N.D. 

requests this court to quash the subpoena related to psychotherapy treatment records, the 

Motion to Quash is DENIED. However, N.D.=s psychiatric treatment records should 

receive protection from uses that are outside of the scope of Defendants’ defense in this 

case. Consequently, the Plaintiff’s Alternative Motion for Protective Order is 

GRANTED. The parties shall submit a protective order with respect to N.D.=s mental 

health treatment records.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, upon consideration of the motions, for the reasons as stated, and for 

good cause, it is ORDERED as follows:

(1) Insofar as Defendants’ subpoena requests psychotherapy records contained in 

Plaintiff’s Stanhope Elmore High School record, the Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash 

Subpoenas to Stanhope Elmore High School or, in the alternative, for a Protective Order

(Doc. 26), be and is hereby DENIED;

(2) Plaintiff’s Alternative Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 26) be and is hereby

GRANTED. The parties have until on or before May 14, 2014 to submit a joint 

proposed protective order to govern Plaintiff=s psychiatric treatment records; and

(3) Insofar as Defendants’ subpoena requests Plaintiff’s complete Stanhope 

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Elmore High School record, the Plaintiff=s Motion to Quash Subpoenas to Stanhope 

Elmore High School or, in the alternative, for a Protective Order (Doc. 26) be and is 

hereby GRANTED.

DONE this 1st day of May, 2014.

/s/Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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