Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-md-01486/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-md-01486-128/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re DYNAMIC RANDOM ACCESS

MEMORY (DRAM) ANTITRUST 

LITIGATION No. M 02-1486 PJH

_______________________________/

ORDER DENYING MOTION 

This Document Relates to: FOR RECONSIDERATION

State of New York v. Micron et al. 

(C 06-6436 PJH)

_______________________________/

Before the court is defendant’s motion to reconsider a portion of this court’s August

31, 2007 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,

specifically, that portion which denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim under

New York Executive Law § 63(12) as untimely. Having read the parties’ supporting papers

and carefully considered the relevant legal authority, the court hereby DENIES defendant’s

motion for reconsideration. 

The court’s August 31, 2007 order applied the 6 year statute of limitations period set

forth in N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1) to plaintiffs’ claims under New York Executive Law § 63(12),

after holding that the 3 year statute of limitations contained in N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) was

inapplicable to plaintiffs’ price-fixing allegations. Defendants now note, however, that after

the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the New York Supreme Court’s Appellate Division

issued a new opinion – New York v. Daicel Chemicals, 42 A.D.3d 301 (N.Y. App. Div.

2007) – in which it found that allegations of price fixing under Executive Law § 63(12) are

subject to the 3 year statute of limitations. Defendants contend that Daicel rejected the

arguments that this court relied on in its prior order, and that the court should therefore

reconsider its prior holding. 

Case 4:02-md-01486-PJH Document 1751 Filed 10/16/07 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The court is unpersuaded. Defendants are correct, to be sure, that Daicel dealt with

allegations of antitrust price-fixing that are similar to those before the court here. However,

the Daicel court’s actual decision regarding the statute of limitations applicable to Executive

Law § 63(12) was less than clear. The Daicel court merely stated in conclusory fashion

that plaintiff’s second and third causes of action “under Executive Law § 63(12) and

General Business Law § 349, were properly found to be time-barred by the three-year

statute of limitations (CPLR 214[2]).” See Daicel, 42 A.D.3d at 303. The court then went

on to state, “these claims rely on allegations of conduct made illegal by statute, and do not

even allege all the elements of common-law fraud, and as such are they covered by CPLR

214[2].” Id. Nothing else is provided – no explanation for the court’s reasoning, and no

mention whatsoever of State v. Cortelle Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 83, 87 (N.Y. 1975), the controlling

state authority that this court relied on in its August 31 order. Additionally, it appears that

the Daicel decision focused on the fraud aspect of plaintiff’s claims, as opposed to the

antitrust aspect of plaintiff’s claims. Finally, neither Daicel nor any other new authority cited

by defendants here actually calls into question the court’s earlier conclusion that the

antitrust violations alleged by plaintiff did, in fact, preexist the antitrust statute upon which

plaintiff’s Executive Law § 63(12) claim is premised. 

As such, the court continues to find that application of the 6 year statute of

limitations period set forth in N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1) is proper with respect to plaintiff’s

section 63(12) claim. Defendants’ motion is therefore DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 16, 2007 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:02-md-01486-PJH Document 1751 Filed 10/16/07 Page 2 of 2