Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01742/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01742-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUZANNE A. MERTES,

NO. CIV.S-06-1742 LKK/GGH

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL W. WYNNE, Secretary,

United States Department of

the Air Force,

Defendant.

 /

This is a gender discrimination case brought by plaintiff

Suzanne Mertes, a federal wage grade employee at Beale Air Force

Base, California. Plaintiff seeks damages from the Secretary of

the Air Force for alleged gender discrimination, sexual harassment,

and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e). Pending

before the court is defendant’s motion to dismiss and motion for

summary judgment. The court resolves the motions upon the parties’

papers, supplemental briefing, and after oral argument. For the

reasons explained below, the motions are granted in part and denied

in part.

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 The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

2

I. Facts1

Plaintiff is a female civilian employed at Beale Air Force

Base, California, as a Locomotive Engineer. Def.’s Statement of

Undisputed Facts (“DSUF”) ¶ 1. She has worked at Beale for over

26 years. Decl. of Suzanne Mertes ¶ 2. She has been the

Locomotive Engineer at Beale since 1990 and operated a tractortrailer for the ten year period prior to that. Id. Plaintiff

first commenced her employment with Beale as a secretary. Id.

The events giving rise to the complaint occurred shortly after

February 1, 2004, when an organizational structure known as the

Most Efficient Organization (“MEO”) came into existence. DSUF ¶

3. As described in detail below, the facts revolve around three

central claims. First, plaintiff maintains that she was

discriminated against when passed up for a promotion to temporary

supervisor and discriminated against again when that position

became permanent. All the while, according to plaintiff, she was

in fact performing supervisory duties but defendants refused to

compensate her accordingly. Second, plaintiff claims that she was

subjected to a hostile work environment. Third, plaintiff alleges

that defendants retaliated against her when she complained of the

discrimination.

Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint of discrimination

on July 25, 2005 by contacting an Equal Employment Opportunity

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 Federal employees must “contact with a Counselor within 45

days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in

the case of personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date

of the action.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1).

3 A detail is the temporary assignment of an employee to a

position without an actual upgrade in pay or job status.

3

(EEO) counselor.2 The resulting administrative investigation

conducted by the agency concluded that the MEO is a hostile work

environment for female employees. The agency’s investigator

summarized her findings: “Looking at the record in totality, i.e.,

the lack of consideration received by the [plaintiff] for either

details or temporary promotions, management’s less than credible

explanation as to why the [plaintiff] was not considered, the

hostile manner in which the draft core document was handed . . .

and each event the [plaintiff] brings forward as harassing in

nature, [the situation] would be intolerable for the average

employee.” Ex. A to Mot., at 25.

A. Failure to Promote and Failure to Compensate

In January 2005, the Material Movement Supervisor, a temporary

position not to exceed one year, was announced for competition.

DSUF ¶ 4. Daniel Williams, plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, was

the selecting official. DSUF ¶ 5. Plaintiff self-nominated for

the position, DSUF ¶ 6, but Williams chose another employee, Jay

Turner, who had previously been “detailed” to the position in 2004,

to fill the temporary position.3 DSUF ¶ 7. Turner subsequently

became plaintiff’s immediate supervisor. 

Plaintiff maintains that by any objective measure, she was the

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more qualified candidate. At the time the position was posted,

plaintiff occupied a “journey” level position at a WG-09 grade,

whereas Turner was only a WG-05 entry level warehouse worker.

Def.’s Mot., Ex. A. Furthermore, of the 22 positions that were

under the supervision of the Material Movement Supervisor, 18

related to the transportation field, and plaintiff’s most recent

21 years of employment at Beale were in the transportation field.

Mertes Decl. ¶ 23. Plaintiff believes that Turner had no

experience in the transportation field. Id.

According to Williams, “supervisory experience was a key

factor in [his] decision” and he selected Turner because of his

knowledge that Turner had prior supervisory experience. Williams

Decl. ¶¶ 8, 9. It is unclear what supervisory experience Turner

possessed or how Williams came to know this information. In any

event, plaintiff also maintains that she had supervisory

experience, as reflected in her Air Force career brief. Mertes

Decl. ¶ 17. This supervisory experience, however, was obtained 24

years ago. Supp. Decl. of Patti Yandell, Ex. D at 8.

Williams “name selected” Turner for the position. Pl.’s

Statement of Undisputed Fact (“PSUF”) ¶ 6, 7. Name selection is

a procedure where the selecting official may, prior to publication

of a list of eligible employees, indicate by name the employee she

or he wishes to select. Decl. of Linda McCory ¶ 23. Name

selection also occurs prior to a comparison of the applicants or

career briefs. Accordingly, plaintiff maintains that it is

unlikely that Williams name selected Turner based on the extent of

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his prior supervisory experience, even if subsequent information

obtained from the career briefs fortuitously supported his initial

choice. Furthermore, plaintiff notes that the position was an

entry level supervisory position, and that the announcement for the

position neither required nor recommended prior supervisory

experience. PSUF ¶ 21.

In 2006, the Material Movement Supervisor position was

announced as a permanent position. DSUF ¶ 16. Again, plaintiff

submitted her name for consideration. Mertes Depo. 147:22-148:12.

Upon receipt of the candidate referral list, Williams decided not

the fill the position at all. DSUF ¶ 16. Instead, he decided to

have the position filled on a temporary basis by seven individuals

referred on the list, one of whom was plaintiff, for temporary

terms of approximately 56 days each. Id.

From plaintiff’s perspective, the irony of defendant’s

decision not to promote her to a supervisory position is that she

was already performing supervisory work, but without the

appropriate compensation. For example, after the MEO came into

existence in February 2004, Williams put plaintiff in charge of the

Outbound Freight Area and allegedly promised her that she would

receive supervisory credit for everything she was responsible for

handling. Mertes Decl. ¶ 3. In this capacity, she was responsible

for training all new employees, preparing the work area for

inspections, and operating Power Track, a web-based program that

enables the government to pay its bill through the U.S. Bank. Id.

Plaintiff was sent to specialized training in New York to learn

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Power Track operation after the MEO commenced operations. Id.

Previously, Power Track had been the responsibility of plaintiff’s

supervisor. Mertes Decl. ¶ 4.

When plaintiff assumed these new responsibilities, she did not

ask for an upgrade in pay or position because she had been told

that upgrades and promotions would not be allowed in the MEO.

Mertes Decl. ¶ 3. She then observed certain male employees being

detailed to higher classifications or temporarily promoted. Mertes

Decl. ¶ 6. In addition to Turner’s promotion to the temporary

Material Movement Supervisor position, plaintiff observed that

another male employee, originally hired as a Material Handler (WG05) after the MEO commenced operations in 2004, was name selected

for a new position, the Aircraft Flight Leader. Mertes Decl. ¶ 10.

Accordingly, plaintiff asked Williams if she could be

considered for an upgrade or promotion based on the duties she was

performing. Mertes Decl. ¶ 11; DSUF ¶ 9. Williams then told her

that there could be no more promotions in the MEO but that she

could seek reclassification at the Civilian Personnel Office and

therefore encouraged her to draft a core document that described

her duties. Mertes Decl. ¶ 12; DSUF ¶ 10. Ultimately, however,

Williams told plaintiff that Harl Sanderson, a member of the MEO

management team, told him to tell her that any hope of an upgrade

was a “dead issue.” Mertes Decl. ¶ 12.

In fact, when plaintiff approached Sanderson and Wardell

Montgomery, another member of the MEO management team, for help in

re-drafting her core documents to describe her then extant duties,

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plaintiff was stripped of responsibility for Power Track.

Initially, Sanderson told plaintiff to continue performing all her

duties, including Power Track. Mertes Decl. ¶ 14. After being

informed that Power Track duties were fiduciary in nature and thus

should be performed by a person with a higher grade, Sanderson

reassigned plaintiff to train Turner, then her supervisor, in the

operation of Power Track. Mertes Decl. ¶ 15. Turner only showed

up once for training, and Sanderson then created a new, temporary

position to assist in performing Power Track duties. Id. Although

plaintiff had been sent to training in New York to learn the

operation, the new assistant was sent to Florida and Travis AFB for

Power Track training. Id. 

B. Hostile Work Environment

Plaintiff also maintains that she was subjected to gender

discrimination by exposure to a hostile work environment. Various

members of the management team of the MEO referred to plaintiff as

“rough around the edges,” “not management material,” a “whiner,”

“complainer,” “troublemaker,” and a “blue collar type.” McCory

Decl. ¶ 11. One said that he would never select plaintiff for any

kind of supervisory position, and that if plaintiff did not operate

the locomotive, she would be nothing more than a WG-06 employee.

McCory Decl. ¶¶ 11, 19, 36. That same supervisor described another

female worker as “just an angry black woman.” Id. ¶ 11. Another

supervisor complained that all plaintiff did was bitch and moan.

Id. ¶ 36. 

A male co-worker called plaintiff a bitch and psycho to her

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face and in the presence of co-workers. Mertes Decl. ¶ 28. When

plaintiff said that she intended to report his behavior, he told

her to go ahead because no one was going to do anything about it

and that no one liked her. Id. Furthermore, when plaintiff

reported this co-worker’s behavior, Williams told plaintiff that

she needed to be patient with the co-worker because he was young

and the MEO management team needed to train him. Id. The coworker was reassigned away from plaintiff’s area for a short time

and then was later reassigned to work near plaintiff. Id. ¶ 29.

It does not appear that he was ever disciplined for his conduct.

Plaintiff also states that Turner began treating her

differently after plaintiff submitted her request for an upgrade

in her position. For example, during a meeting, Turner told

plaintiff to “shut up” in front of others, and on another occasion,

told her to “get out of my office.” Mertes Decl. ¶ 30. He also

allegedly told a male sergeant to stop by and tell her happy

birthday because she had turned 50 and seemed to be menopausal.

Id. 

C. Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges fourteen acts of retaliation and reprisal

in response to her complaint of gender discrimination. The first

and second acts concern allegedly false statements made to the

Civilian Personnel Officer that plaintiff was not performing

supervisory duties and the refusal to acknowledge plaintiff’s

request to be reclassified. Mertes Decl. ¶ 12. The third act

concerns the allegedly false statement that promotions were not

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permitted under the MEO. Id. ¶¶ 3, 6, 7, 10, 12. The fourth and

fifth acts both concern Turner’s conduct toward plaintiff (e.g.,

yelling at her to “shut up” in the presence of others and refusing

to speak to plaintiff on matters for which she was responsible).

Id. ¶¶ 30, 31.

The sixth and seventh acts concern plaintiff’s Power Track

duties and, specifically, the fact that plaintiff was forced to

train Turner on Power Track and that her Power Track duties were

assigned away to other employees. Mertes Decl. ¶ 15. In the

eighth and ninth acts, plaintiff claims that her supervisors told

her she was spending too much time at the Civilian Personnel Office

and counseled her against doing so. Id. ¶ 34. The tenth act of

retaliation involves a somewhat incredible demand. Plaintiff was

apparently told to email Turner, her supervisor, every single time

she left the facility, even though her duties required her to

frequently leave the facility. Id. ¶ 33. 

In the eleventh act, plaintiff alleges that she was downgraded

on her performance evaluation. Mertes Decl. ¶ 31. Plaintiff

alleges in her twelfth act that management falsely claimed that she

did not get along with men. In the thirteenth act, plaintiff

alleges that management threatened to remove the operation of the

locomotive from plaintiff’s duties. McCory Decl. ¶ 11. Finally,

plaintiff claims in the fourteenth act that defendant chose not to

fill the permanent Material Movement Supervisor position to

retaliate against her. DSUF ¶ 16. 

////

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II. Standards

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

It is well established that the party seeking to invoke the

jurisdiction of the federal court has the burden of establishing

that jurisdiction exists. KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S.

269, 278 (1936); Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir.

1986). On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1), the standards that must be applied vary

according to the nature of the jurisdictional challenge.

If the challenge to jurisdiction is a facial attack, i.e., the

defendant contends that the allegations of jurisdiction contained

in the complaint are insufficient on their face to demonstrate the

existence of jurisdiction, the plaintiff is entitled to safeguards

similar to those applicable when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is made.

The factual allegations of the complaint are presumed to be true,

and the motion is granted only if the plaintiff fails to allege an

element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. See 2A J.

Moore, J. Lucas & G. Grotheer, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 12.07 (2d

ed. 1987); see also Eaton v. Dorchester Development, Inc., 692 F.2d

727, 731 (11th Cir. 1982); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412

(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Mortensen v.

First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).

A complaint will be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction (1) if the case does not "arise under" any federal law

or the United States Constitution, (2) if there is no case or

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controversy within the meaning of that constitutional term, or (3)

if the cause is not one described by any jurisdictional statute.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).

If the challenge to jurisdiction is made as a "speaking

motion" attacking the truth of the jurisdictional facts alleged by

the plaintiff, a different set of standards must be applied.

Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d

730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Where the jurisdictional issue is

separable from the merits of the case, the district court is free

to hear evidence regarding jurisdiction and to rule on that issue

prior to trial, resolving factual disputes where necessary.

Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983);

Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. "In such circumstances '[n]o

presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and

the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the

trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional

claims.'" Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1077 (quoting Thornhill, 594 F.2d

at 733).

However, where the jurisdictional issue and substantive

issues are so intertwined that the question of

jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual

issues going to the merits, the jurisdictional

determination should await a determination of the

relevant facts on either a motion going to the merits

or at trial.

Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1077 (citing Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733-35;

5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1350, at

558 (1969 & Supp. 1987)). On a motion going to the merits, the

court must, of course, employ the standard applicable to a motion

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for summary judgment. Farr v. United States, 990 F.2d 451, 454 n.

1 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1023 (1993).

B. Summary Judgment Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970); Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

1995).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. See id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance,

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summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before

the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of

summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id.

at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co.,

391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Secor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853. 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in

the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in

support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; see also First Nat'l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir.

1998). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Ass’n of

Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992)

(quoting T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n,

809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)), and that the dispute is

genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-

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49; see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200

F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of

fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; see also T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631.

Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings

and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine

need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments); see

also Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No.

20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); see also In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th

Cir. 1999). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed,

see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that

may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn

in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587

(citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)

(per curiam)); see also Headwaters Forest Def. v. County of

Humboldt, 211 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless,

inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

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party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602

F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902

(9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'"

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

III. Analysis

A. Failure to Promote and Failure to Compensate

1. Temporary Supervisor Position

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it an unlawful

employment practice to fail to hire or otherwise discriminate

against any individual because of such individual’s sex. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a). Plaintiffs may meet the burden of proving a prima

face case of discrimination in one of two ways. McDonnell Douglas

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973); Texas Dep’t of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 251 (1981). First, plaintiffs

may show direct evidence of discrimination. Washington v. Garrett,

10 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1994). Second, plaintiffs may produce

evidence that raises an inference that discrimination was a

motivating factor for the challenged employment decision.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801.

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a. Prima Facie Case

Here, defendant concedes that plaintiff can establish a prima

facie case. To make out a prima facie case of gender

discrimination, plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a

protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position sought, (3)

she was denied the position, and (4) the employer hired a man for

the position. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07

(1993). It is undisputed that Ms. Mertes is female, was at least

minimally qualified for the temporary Material Movement Supervisor

position, was denied the position, and that Jay Turner, a male,

ultimately filled the job. 

b. Legitimate, Non-discriminatory Reason

Once plaintiff has established the prima facie case, the

burden then shifts to defendant to demonstrate that the adverse

employment action occurred for a legitimate non-discriminatory

reason. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252. The defendant’s burden with

respect to this stage of the analysis is merely one of production,

and “defendant need not persuade the Court that it was actually

motivated by the proffered reasons.” Id. at 254.

Here, defendant maintains that the main reason that Williams

selected Turner was based on Turner’s supervisory experience. As

noted above, Williams has stated that he was aware of this

experience. Williams Decl. ¶ 9. This satisfies defendant’s burden

of production in coming forward with a facially plausible nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision.

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c. Pretext

Finally, once defendant establishes the existence of a

legitimate non-discriminatory reason, the McDonnell Douglas

presumption drops out of the picture, and plaintiff must

demonstrate this proffered reason was not the true reason for the

employment decision. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. She may do this

“either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory

reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing

that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”

Id. at 256.

Here, plaintiff argues that first, at the time Williams name

selected Turner, he did not have access to Turner’s career brief,

and therefore could not have relied on the extent of Turner’s prior

supervisory experience. Even if Turner’s career brief ultimately

confirmed Williams’ initial choice post hoc, this would not erase

the original discrimination. Second, plaintiff maintains that her

undisputedly greater experience in the transportation field

(spanning two decades) far outweighed any advantage that Turner

might have had with regard to supervisory experience, although she

also contends that she did have some, albeit not much, supervisory

experience.

Third, plaintiff notes that “subjective practices are

particularly susceptible to discriminatory abuse and should be

closely scrutinized.” Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 443

(9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because

supervisory experience was not required or recommended in the job

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announcement, Williams’ explanation of emphasizing supervisory

experience -- particularly for an entry level supervisory position

-- does appear subjective, although, arguably, it would not be

unreasonable to place weight on such experience. 

Taken together, a reasonable jury could find that defendant’s

proffered explanation was merely pretext for discrimination.

Accordingly, summary judgment with respect to the temporary

supervisor position must be denied.

2. Permanent Supervisor Position

With regard to the discrimination claim pertaining to the

permanent supervisor position announced in 2006, defendant argues

that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.

Federal employees cannot bring claims of employment discrimination

unless they have exhausted their administrative remedies.

Vinieratos v. United States Department of Air Force, 939 F.2d 762,

769 (9th Cir. 1991). The failure to exhaust administrative

remedies bars subject matter jurisdiction. B.K.B. v. Maui Police

Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, plaintiff initiated her complaint of discrimination on

July 25, 2005 and the agency’s Notice of Final Interview was issued

on October 17, 2005. In the Notice, plaintiff’s complaint was

described as follows: “When other employees (all males) were being

promoted, you asked to be considered for a promotion.” Ex. A to

Mot. at 4. In the formal EEO complaint filed on October 19, 2005,

plaintiff requested relief in the form of “promotion to WS position

over locomotive operations and cargo movement area.” Ex. A. to

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Mot. at 8. The Report of Investigation stated plaintiff’s claim

as discrimination “on the basis of sex (female) when she was not

considered for promotions within her flight and all promotions have

been given to males.” Ex. A. to Mot. at 196.

Plaintiff’s EEO complaint and the subsequent EEO investigation

indicate that plaintiff was complaining generally of a failure to

promote, not simply a failure to promote to the temporary

supervisor position. Moreover, the court’s jurisdiction is not

tethered to the actual EEO investigation “but can include the scope

of an [] investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out

of a charge of discrimination.” E.E.O.C. v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31

F.3d 891, 899 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks

omitted; emphasis in original). Incidents of discrimination “like

or reasonably related to” the EEO charge of discrimination are

within the court’s jurisdiction. Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451,

1456 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Here, a failure to promote plaintiff to the temporary Material

Movement Supervisor position in 2005 is certainly “reasonably

related to” the failure to promote her to the same permanent

position a year later. See Chung v. Pomona Valley Community Hosp.,

667 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1982) (whether denial of subsequent

promotion was “like or reasonably related to” denial of earlier

promotion was at least a triable issue of fact).

Defendant argues that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in

Ledbetter changes the law, because a new EEOC charging period is

triggered upon each “discrete act” of discrimination. Ledbetter

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4

 Defendant cites to Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1210-

11 (10th Cir. 2003), which stated that there is a separate charging

period for each discrete act of discrimination, even for “discrete

. . . incidents occurring after the filing of Plaintiff’s

complaint.” See also Turner v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 2007 WL

2422151 at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 22, 2007). The Ninth Circuit,

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v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., -- U.S. --, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).

In Ledbetter, the plaintiff argued that she received lower pay than

her male colleagues over a lengthy period of time, but the Court

held that she could only recover for discriminatory acts that

occurred during the 180 day EEOC charging period. Id. at 2169

(“[I]f an employer engages in a series of discriminatory acts each

of which is intentionally discriminatory, then a fresh violation

takes place when each act is committed.”).

In other words, the plaintiff in Ledbetter complained of pay

discrimination too late. Here, however, defendant seems to argue

that plaintiff did not complain about discrimination enough,

because although she had already once complained about a failure

to promote, she did not complain again about the repeated failure

to promote her for essentially the same job. 

There was no need for plaintiff to do so. See Anderson v.

Reno, 190 F.3d 930, 938 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that “forcing an

employee to begin the administrative process anew after additional

occurrences of discrimination in order to have them considered by

the agency and the courts would erect a needless procedural

barrier”) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other

grounds by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101

(2002).4 Her complaint about the permanent position was “like or

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reasonably related to” her original charge. See Oubichon v. N. Am.

Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1973) (“[T]he judicial

complaint nevertheless may encompass any discrimination like or

reasonably related to the allegations of the EEOC charge, including

new acts occurring during the pendency of the charge before the

EEOC.”); see also Sosa, 920 F.2d at 1456-57. 

Ledbetter has not overruled this rule, at least with respect

to incidents of discrimination occurring after the initial charge.

In Lyons v. England, 207 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth

Circuit addressed the Supreme Court’s holding in Morgan, 536 U.S.

101, subsequently reaffirmed in Ledbetter, that “discrete

discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when

they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” 207

F.3d at 1105. Nevertheless, Lyons continued to rely upon the rule

that “like or reasonably related” incidents of discrimination may

be considered part of the EEOC charge. Id. at 1103-04. Moreover,

Ledbetter’s concerns about the underlying purposes of statutes of

limitation (e.g., notice to defendant, stale evidence) are absent

where the plaintiff complains of discrimination and the

discrimination happens again, at a later date.

Plaintiff also claims that she was discriminated against when

Turner was first detailed to the Material Movement Supervisor

position in 2004, which occurred prior to his actual appointment

to the temporary Material Movement Supervisor position in 2005.

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With respect to this “failure to detail” claim, the court finds

that plaintiff did not timely contact an EEO counselor within 45

days (given that plaintiff’s complaint was not initiated until July

25, 2005). Because this alleged instance of discrimination

occurred prior to plaintiff’s 2005 complaint, the policy concerns

that animate statutes of limitation apply here. Accordingly, the

court finds that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies over the failure to detail claim.

3. Failure to Compensate for Duties Performed

Plaintiff also alleges that defendant’s refusal to upgrade her

pay based on the duties she was performing was motivated by gender

discrimination. In order to establish a prima facie case with

regard to this claim, plaintiff must prove that (1) she is a member

of a protected class, (2) she was the subject of an adverse

employment decision, and (3) she was adversely treated because of

her status in a protected group. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at

801. Here, plaintiff is a female and she was not upgraded or

reclassified at a higher pay. Defendant argues, however, that she

was not adversely treated because of her status.

As noted above, plaintiff has provided evidence that several

males were detailed and/or promoted, even though plaintiff had been

told that promotions were not allowed in the MEO. McCory Decl. ¶¶

20-26. Moreover, core documents of other employees were re-written

for the purpose of allowing them to qualify for a promotion. Id.

This is enough to make at least a prima facie showing that

similarly situated employees were treated differently and that

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5

 Plaintiff’s core personnel document was partially revised

on February 16, 2006 to include wood working and motor vehicle

operator, DSUF ¶ 14, but not to include what plaintiff maintains

were supervisory responsibilities.

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plaintiff was therefore adversely treated because of her gender.

Indeed, this evidence is enough for a reasonable jury to find

that defendant’s proffered reasons for their employment decisions

were either false, because they shifted over time, or that they

were pretext for discrimination. Defendant maintains that its

reason for not reclassifying plaintiff or paying her at a higher

grade is that she was not performing duties for such action under

the Office of Personnel Management Federal Wage System Job Grading

Standard for Supervisors. According to that standard, employees

must exercise technical and administrative supervision over

subordinate workers. Yandell Decl. ¶ 9. 

Defendant relies on plaintiff’s core personnel document in

determining whether her job duties met that standard; as plaintiff

complains, however, defendant refused to adjust plaintiff’s

document to reflect all the duties that she was performing.5

McCory Decl. ¶ 37. Furthermore, Linda McCory, then Beale’s

Civilian Personnel Director, believed that “some of [plaintiff’s]

work would very likely be considered higher level work and possibly

supervisory in nature.” Id. Plaintiff also maintains that she

was held accountable by her supervisor for other employees in her

area, that she was responsible for training employees in various

assignments, and that she was, at least early on, responsible for

Power Track, which invested her with fiduciary responsibilities.

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Taken together, this is enough to create a triable issue of fact

that plaintiff deserved a supervisory classification and/or more

pay.

B. Hostile Work Environment

1. Prima Facie Case

To show a prima facie hostile work environment claim,

plaintiff must show that (1) she was subject to unwelcome conduct

or comments, (2) the harassment complained of was based on gender,

and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter

the terms and conditions of plaintiff’s employment. Meritor

Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 57 (1986). Factors to

be considered in this analysis include the frequency of the

conduct, its severity, whether it was physically threatening or

humiliating, and whether it unreasonably interfered with the

plaintiff’s work performance. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,

510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).

First, defendant argues that the alleged harassment was not

“because of” sex. In Galloway, the Seventh Circuit found that the

phrase “sick bitch” was simply a pejorative term, because “it does

not necessarily connote some specific female characteristic,

whether true, false, or stereotypical; it does not draw attention

to the woman's sexual or maternal characteristics or to other

respects in which women might be thought to be inferior to men in

the workplace, or unworthy of equal dignity and respect.” Galloway

v. General Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1168 (7th

Cir. 1996). 

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Under Ninth Circuit law, however, “there is no legal

requirement that hostile acts be overtly sex- or gender-specific

in content, whether marked by language, by sex or gender

stereotypes, or by sexual overtures”; the relevant question is

whether “members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms

or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are

not exposed.” Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Nat’l Educ.

Ass’n, 422 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Accordingly, while it seems fairly obvious that “bitch”

is, on its face, a term that is used “because of sex,” even if it

were not, plaintiff could still show that it was indirectly used

(as a generically derogatory term) because of her sex.

Second, defendant argues that the conduct faced by plaintiff

was not severe or pervasive enough as a matter of law to support

a finding of a hostile work environment. In Kortan, the Ninth

Circuit found no hostile work environment where a supervisor called

female employees “castrating bitches” and “Madonnas.” Kortan v.

Cal. Youth Authority, 217 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Here, however, the conduct faced by plaintiff was not limited

to being called a “bitch” and “psycho” by a co-worker. That same

co-worker also told plaintiff that she could try to complain to

management but that her complaint would, in effect, fall on deaf

ears, because she was out of favor with management. As noted

above, Turner, plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, also told her to

shut up and get out of his office in the presence of others. There

is a genuine dispute as to whether a reasonable woman would find

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this sufficiently severe and pervasive so as to alter the terms of

her employment. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir.

1991) (standard is reasonable victim, which takes into account

victim’s sex).

Finally, defendant argues that it took appropriate corrective

action by reassigning the worker to a different area of the

warehouse. See Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.

2001). Nevertheless, based on the record, it appears that

defendant did not discipline the co-worker for his disparaging

comments, a critical factor in determining whether the employer’s

corrective action was appropriate and reasonably calculated to end

harassment. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882 ("Employers send the wrong

message to potential harassers when they do not discipline

employees for sexual harassment.”). Accordingly, the court denies

summary judgment as to the hostile work environment claim.

C. Retaliation

To make a prima face case of retaliation, plaintiff must show

that (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) she was subject to

an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link exists between

the protected activity and the adverse action. Ray v. Henderson,

217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). The adverse employment action

must be materially adverse, in that it would dissuade a reasonable

employee from engaging in the protected activity. Burlington N.

& Santa Fe. Ry. Co. v. White, -- U.S. --, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415

(2006).

Here, the parties dispute when plaintiff first engaged in

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protected activity. Defendant places that event on July 25, 2005,

when plaintiff filed her informal EEO complaint of discrimination.

Plaintiff, however, places that event earlier, when, in 2004, she

went to her supervisor and told him that she, like others, deserved

to be compensated for the duties that she was actually performing.

The others to whom she compared herself were males. Mertes Decl.

¶ 11. 

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate

against any individual because he or she has “opposed any practice

made an unlawful employment practice” (the so-called opposition

clause) or “participated in any manner in an investigation or

proceeding” (the so-called participation clause) 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-3. The classic example of protected activity is the act of

filing a discrimination complaint. But “informal protests of

discriminatory employment practices, including making complaints

to management, . . . protesting against discrimination by industry

. . . , and expressing support for co-workers who have filed formal

charges” also constitute protected activity. See, e.g., CurayCramer v. Ursuline Academy of Wilmington, Delaware, Inc., 450 F.3d

130, 135 (3d Cir. 2006).

Here, plaintiff alleges that she was compensated less than

similarly situated males because of defendant’s discrimination.

Accordingly, when she complained of the pay disparity, she was

“oppos[ing] a[] practice made an unlawful employment practice”

within the meaning of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. There is

no requirement that plaintiffs utter a magic word, such as

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6 The court therefore rejects defendant’s argument that the

retaliatory conduct alleged with regard to acts 1 and 2 (falsely

telling CPO that plaintiff was not performing supervisory duties

and refusing reclassification), 3 (falsely stating that promotions

were not allowed), 10 (directing plaintiff to email her supervisor

every time she left her work area), 11 (downgrading plaintiff’s

performance evaluation), and 13 (threatening to remove plaintiff’s

locomotive duties) temporally preceded the date of plaintiff’s

protected activity.

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“discrimination,” in order to oppose a discriminatory practice.

Accordingly, the court finds that the first date of plaintiff’s

protected activity was when she requested a pay raise in 2004.6

1. Acts 1 and 2 (falsely telling CPO that plaintiff was not

performing supervisory duties and refusing reclassification)

With regard to these acts, defendant argues that it had a

legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision.

Nevertheless, as addressed above, the issue of whether plaintiff

was actually performing supervisory duties is a question for the

jury.

2. Acts 4 and 5 (Turner’s treatment toward plaintiff)

Defendant argues that Turner’s treatment of plaintiff --

telling her to shut up and then refusing to speak with her -- is

the type of personality conflict that is not materially adverse.

See Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415. Nevertheless, this was not a

“petty slight[] or minor annoyance[],” id.; rather, a jury could

conclude that this is the type of conduct that “could well dissuade

a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination.” Id. at 2409.

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3. Acts 6 and 7 (redelegation of Power Track duties)

With regard to these acts, defendant merely asserts that they

were not materially adverse. Again, however, a reasonable jury

could find that stripping an employee of certain duties would deter

him or her from engaging in protected activity.

4. Acts 8 and 9 (counseling plaintiff for spending too much

time at CPO)

Similarly, defendant argues that counseling an employee for

spending too much time at a personnel office is not a materially

adverse action. This too, however, is a question for the jury to

resolve.

5. Act 12 (claiming that plaintiff did not get along with men)

Defendant argues that any claim that management said that

plaintiff did not get along well with men is inadmissible as

hearsay, because no one directly told plaintiff that she did not

get along well with men. Because plaintiff has failed to respond

to this, the court grants summary judgment on this issue.

6. Act 14 (failure to fill permanent supervisor position)

With regard to this claim, defendant merely renews its

objections regarding plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. As noted above, the court finds that this instance of

discrimination was reasonably related to the earlier incidents of

discrimination previously alleged.

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IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, the motion to dismiss and

motion for summary judgment are granted in part and denied in part.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 26, 2007.

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