Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-02094/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-02094-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID L. HOLLAND,

Petitioner,

v.

HEIDI LACKNER,

Respondent.

Case No. 13-cv-02094-JD 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The Court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. Respondent 

filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and lodged exhibits

with the Court. Petitioner filed a traverse. The petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

A jury found petitioner guilty of oral copulation by force committed during a burglary. 

People v. Holland, No. H034963, 2011 WL 4062376, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2011). It was 

also found that the victim was 65 years of age or older, and that petitioner had a prior strike 

conviction and a prior serious felony conviction. Id. Petitioner was sentenced to 25 years to life 

in prison. Id. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal in a reasoned 

opinion. Id. The California Supreme Court denied a petition for review. Resp. Exs. H, I. 

In 2007, petitioner voluntarily provided a DNA sample to help with the investigation of his 

brother who was a suspect in an unrelated rape and murder. Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 6-11. 

When petitioner provided the DNA sample, police were unaware that petitioner might have been 

involved in a 2001 rape and were not investigating petitioner for any crime. RT at 9-10, 33, 48. 

There was a match between petitioner’s DNA and a sample from the 2001 unsolved sexual assault 

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of Gweneth Doe. RT at 544-45.

In October 2001, Gweneth Doe was 81 years old and lived independently in San Jose. RT 

at 392, 395, 417. In the spring of 2001, Gweneth had fence work done at her house. RT at 411. 

Her daughter, Lauren, visited her frequently. Lauren described Gweneth as normally a “talkative, 

cheerful kind of person.” RT at 396. On October 11, 2001, Lauren received a voicemail from 

Gweneth who stated she was calling from a neighbor’s house because her phones had been stolen. 

RT at 394. On October 12, 2001, Lauren went to her mother’s house. RT at 395. Lauren detected 

a sense of nervousness in her mother’s demeanor and thought she was in a stressful state and 

having a difficult time coping with something. RT at 397-99, 437.

When queried, Gweneth stated that her phones had been stolen. RT at 401. When Lauren 

asked if Gweneth was there when the phones were stolen, Gweneth replied, “Well, it was kind of a 

rape situation.” RT at 402. Gweneth stated that she had woken up in her bedroom in the middle 

of the night with a man on top of her. Id. She stated she was threatened with being killed, but had 

not been beaten. RT at 402-03. She had been wearing a nightgown and that “the man had told her 

to have oral sex with him and . . . she had to do that.” RT at 403. The man then told her to take a 

shower with her nightgown on. Id. When she was showering, the man had made some phone 

calls from the front room and told her not to come into the room. RT at 405. The incident 

occurred on October 10, 2001, between 4:30 and 6:30 in the morning. RT at 406. Gweneth could 

not identify the man. Id. Gweneth had not called the police. RT at 402. Lauren called 9-1-1 and 

reported what had happened. Id. Lauren’s conversation with Gweneth occurred before the police 

arrived. RT at 404, 450-51. Before police arrived, Gweneth did not talk to Lauren about the 

vaginal sex. RT at 462. In 2004, Gweneth died. RT at 440. In 2007, police contacted Lauren and 

told her there was a suspect. RT at 440-41.

On November 16, 2007, petitioner was interviewed by police in a recorded interview. RT 

at 679; Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 410. In 2001, he was 39 years of age. CT at 412. At first 

petitioner said he had no idea how his DNA ended up on the victim’s underwear. CT at 422-23. 

He then stated that there was no rape, rather it was consensual. CT at 423. He stated there were 

problems with his relationship with his wife and Gweneth was comforting him. CT 423-24. He 

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met her while installing a fence for her. CT at 424. He stated that they were good friends and that 

night had been weird, that Gweneth did not want him to go, that she was clingy and there was “no 

actual sex.” CT at 426. He stated he was drunk and she never said no and that she tried to 

perform oral sex, but it didn’t happen. CT at 428-29. He stated they were both embarrassed about 

the whole situation and that she told him she felt dirty, and then she took a shower fully dressed. 

CT at 423, 426. He stated she did not want him to leave, but he left anyway. CT at 426, 429. He 

stated he saw her a few times shortly after that night and that she had nodded and waved to him a 

few times. CT at 430-31.

A prison inmate, who had several convictions for fraud and other offenses, testified about 

statements petitioner made while they shared a cell in November 2007. RT at 464-66, 475. The 

inmate said that petitioner admitted that he had known the victim kept a key under her mat and 

that he entered her house one morning when he was high on drugs. RT at 471, 473. He had 

thought she was out of town but he found her there, got into bed with her and made her perform 

oral sex on him. RT at 471. He threatened to kill her if she said anything and also stole some 

phones. RT at 474, 493. The prison inmate also recounted that petitioner stated he called a phone 

sex line and masturbated in a basket of laundry and wiped himself off with some underwear. RT 

at 472. A local newspaper article written in November 2007 stated that petitioner was charged 

with rape and forced oral copulation and mentioned phone sex, but it did not describe the 

masturbation or the victim’s underwear. RT at 700-01. The inmate did not receive any benefit for 

his testimony, though he did think there would be some benefit when he contacted law 

enforcement. RT at 466-69, 474.

Petitioner’s trial counsel and the prosecution agreed to the following stipulations to be read 

to the jury:

. . . . on October 12, 2001, Gweneth Doe was five feet, three inches 

tall and weighed 125 pounds. . . . .

. . . . defendant has a date of birth of December 19, 1961. He is six 

feet, two inches tall, weighed approximately 220 pounds in the fall 

of 2001. . . . . . . 

. . . . on October 12, 2001, a blood sample was taken from Gweneth 

Doe at Valley Medical Center in San Jose. That blood sample is the 

one on which the Santa Clara County Crime Laboratory conducted 

forensic DNA analysis . . . .

. . . . Gweneth Doe was examined on October 12, 2001, by a 

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qualified nurse who observed no visible injuries to her mouth, 

vagina or any other parts of her body. 

If called to testify that nurse would state that the absence of a sexual 

injury alone does not necessarily mean that a person was not raped 

or compelled to orally copulate another. Findings may vary from 

patient to patient. Lack of sexual injuries includes a lack of 

bruising, cuts, bleeding, swelling, abrasions, lacerations or redness.

RT at 544-45.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication 

of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first 

prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual 

determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the first 

clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by 

[the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the 

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under 

the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the 

Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s 

case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be 

“objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination will 

not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

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presented in the state-court proceeding.” See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres v. 

Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, in conducting its analysis, the federal 

court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings, and the petitioner bears the 

burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The state court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the 

state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 

1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to 

consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Nunnemaker at 

801-06; Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner asserts that: (1) the trial court erroneously 

admitted hearsay statements of the deceased victim in violation of the Confrontation Clause and 

his right to due process; and (2) the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay statements by forensic 

analysts in violation of the Confrontation Clause and his right to due process.1

I. VICTIM’S STATEMENT

Petitioner argues that his right to confrontation was violated when the trial court 

erroneously permitted the victim’s daughter to testify regarding the victim’s statements concerning

the incident. He also argues that his due process rights were violated by the admission of this

evidence.

Confrontation Clause

Legal Standard

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that in criminal cases the 

accused has the right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. Amend. VI. 

The ultimate goal of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a 

procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 

 

1 A Fourth Amendment claim regarding his DNA sample was previously dismissed pursuant to 

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82, 494 (1976), which bars federal habeas review of Fourth 

Amendment claims unless the state did not provide an opportunity for full and fair litigation of 

those claims. 

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The Confrontation Clause applies to all “testimonial” statements. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 

at 50-51. “Testimony . . . is typically [a ]solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose 

of establishing or proving some fact.” Id. at 51 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see id. (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears 

testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”). The 

Confrontation Clause applies not only to in-court testimony but also to out-of-court statements 

introduced at trial, regardless of the admissibility of the statements under state laws of evidence. 

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51.

When the primary purpose of taking an out-of-court statement is to create an out-of-court 

substitute for trial testimony, the statement is testimonial hearsay and Crawford applies. Michigan 

v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 

2712-14 (2011) (concluding that forensic lab report, prepared in connection with a criminal 

investigation, certifying that petitioner’s blood alcohol level was above limit for aggravated DWI 

was testimonial). When that was not the primary purpose, “the admissibility of a statement is the 

concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.” Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 

1155. In determining the primary purpose of the statement, “standard rules of hearsay” will be 

relevant. Id. And the formality of the interrogation, or the lack of it, may inform the court’s 

inquiry as to its “primary purpose.” Id. at 1160. The primary purpose of a statement is 

determined objectively. United States v. Rojas-Pedroza, 716 F.3d 1253, 1267 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Thus, “‘the relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual purpose of the individuals involved in a 

particular encounter, but rather the purpose that reasonable participants would have had, as 

ascertained from the individuals’ statements and actions and the circumstances in which the 

encounter occurred.’” Id. (quoting Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156). 

Discussion

The California Court of Appeal discussed the relevant federal authority and denied this 

claim:

Obviously, the initial statements of Gweneth to her daughter Lauren 

were not products of an interrogation by a police officer or a 911 

operator and there was no evidence that Lauren was acting as an 

agent for law enforcement. Even assuming without deciding that a 

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victim’s statements made in response to a family member’s 

questions or volunteered to a family member might be testimonial 

under certain circumstances, FN8 the record does not show that the 

“primary purpose” of Gweneth’s disclosures was to create a record 

for prosecution or a substitute for testimony. It is evident that the 

“primary purpose” of Lauren’s inquiries was to uncover what had 

happened to her mother and to help her. There was no evidence that 

Gweneth confided in her daughter for the “primary purpose” of 

making “‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose 

of establishing or proving some fact [ ]’ . . .” (Crawford, supra, 541 

U.S. at p. 51) or for the “primary purpose” of providing “an out-ofcourt substitute for trial testimony.” (Michigan v. Bryant, supra, 

131 S.Ct. at p. 1155; cf. People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 

580, fn. 19 [accusatory statement by victim to friend at school was 

not testimonial for purposes of right to confrontation].)

FN8. For example, we can conceive of a situation where a 

family member is merely acting as an intermediary and is 

asking questions on behalf of law enforcement and relating 

information directly from a victim to law enforcement or a 

situation where a victim is having a family member record 

her statements for purposes of creating a record for later use 

at trial.

The circumstances of Gweneth’s initial statements to Lauren, 

viewed objectively, lead us to conclude that they were not 

testimonial. Accordingly, their admission was not violative of the 

Sixth Amendment’s right to confrontation as interpreted by 

Crawford and its progeny.

Holland, 2011 WL 4062376, at *8.

Petitioner has failed to show that the state court decision was an unreasonable application 

of Supreme Court authority. There is no Supreme Court authority that establishes when 

statements made to someone other than law enforcement personnel are testimonial. In Davis v. 

Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), the Supreme Court specifically declined to consider this issue. 

Id. at 823 fn. 2. The Court similarly declined to address the issue of statements to non-law 

enforcement personnel in Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155, n.3. In Giles v. California, 554 

U.S. 353 (2008), the Court stated in dicta that, “[s]tatements to friends and neighbors about abuse 

and intimidation and statements to physicians in the course of receiving treatment would be 

excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules . . . .” Id. at 376. Many circuit courts have also found 

that statements to friends and family members are non-testimonial pursuant to Crawford. See 

United States v. Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222, 1238 (11th Cir. 2011) (“bragging to a friend” is not 

testimonial); United States v. Boyd, 640 F.3d 657, 665 (6th Cir. 2011) (“statements made to 

friends and acquaintances are non-testimonial”); United States v. Smalls, 605 F.3d 765, 780 (10th 

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Cir. 2010) (statement to “apparent friend” was “undoubtedly nontestimonial under any legitimate 

view of the law”); United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 838 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Mr. Rush’s 

comments were made to loved ones or acquaintances and are not the kind of memorialized, 

judicial-process-created evidence of which Crawford speaks”).

Assuming that statements to non-law enforcement individuals could be testimonial under 

certain circumstances, the discussion between the victim and her daughter in this case about the 

sexual assault was non-testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. The victim’s 

statements to her daughter were not for the purpose to create a record for prosecution or to act as a 

substitute for testimony nor were they a declaration made for the purpose to establish or prove a 

fact. It is clear from the record that the victim’s statements were to answer the questions from her 

daughter about why she was behaving uncharacteristically and appeared in distress and why her 

phones were missing.2 The state court found that looking to the circumstances of the individuals 

during the discussion, the statements were non-testimonial. In reaching this conclusion, the state 

court decision did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court authority.

Due Process

Petitioner also argues that the trial court erred by admitting the statements under state 

hearsay rules which violated due process and denied him a fair trial.

Legal Standard

A state court’s evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas review unless the ruling 

violates federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or statutory 

provision or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. 

See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th 

Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court “has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or 

overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of 

the writ.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that trial court’s 

admission of irrelevant pornographic materials was “fundamentally unfair” under Ninth Circuit 

 

2

The trial court excluded the victim’s statements to a police officer and a sexual assault response 

nurse, finding that these statements were testimonial. Holland, 2011 WL 4062376, at *5.

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precedent but not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law 

under § 2254(d)). 

To obtain federal habeas relief based upon a state court’s admission of evidence, a 

petitioner must show that the admission of the evidence was so prejudicial that it rendered the trial 

fundamentally unfair in violation of due process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 70 (1991); 

Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919. “A habeas petitioner bears a heavy burden in showing a due process 

violation based on an evidentiary decision.” Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1172 (9th Cir.

2005). The Supreme Court has “defined the category of infractions that violate ‘fundamental 

fairness’ very narrowly.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990). The Ninth Circuit 

has noted that the admission of evidence violates due process only if “there are no permissible 

inferences the jury may draw from the evidence.” Jammal, at 920.

Discussion

The trial court admitted the statements as spontaneous utterances under California 

Evidence Code section 1240. The California Court of Appeal found that the trial court abused its 

discretion in admitting the statements as spontaneous utterances but evaluated the error under the 

harmless error standard of People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836 (1956), and found no error as the 

evidence was properly admissible for nonhearsay purposes as a “fresh complaint.” The state court 

held:

We observe that the evidence of Gweneth’s complaint was relevant 

and admissible for nonhearsay purposes. “[U]nder principles 

generally applicable to the determination of evidentiary relevance 

and admissibility, proof of an extrajudicial complaint, made by the 

victim of a sexual offense, disclosing the alleged assault, may be 

admissible for a limited, nonhearsay purpose-namely, to establish 

the fact of, and the circumstances surrounding, the victim’s 

disclosure of the assault to others-whenever the fact that the 

disclosure was made and the circumstances under which it was 

made are relevant to the trier of fact’s determination as to whether 

the offense occurred.” (People v. Brown (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 746, 749-

750, italics omitted; see also Evid. Code, §§ 210, 351.) “Of course, 

only the fact that a complaint was made, and the circumstances 

surrounding its making, ordinarily are admissible; admission of 

evidence concerning details of the statements themselves, to prove 

the truth of the matter asserted, would violate the hearsay rule. (4 

Wigmore, op. cit. supra, § 1142, p. 318.)” (Id. at p. 760.)

“In sexual as well as nonsexual offense cases, evidence of the fact 

and circumstances of a victim’s complaint may be relevant for a 

variety of nonhearsay purposes, regardless whether the complaint is 

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prompt or delayed. To begin with, if such a victim did, in fact, 

make a complaint promptly after the alleged incident, the 

circumstances under which the complaint was made may aid the 

jury in determining whether the alleged offense occurred. 

Furthermore, admission of evidence that such a prompt complaint 

was made also will eliminate the risk that the jury, if not apprised of 

that fact, erroneously will infer that no such prompt complaint was 

made.” (Id. at p. 761.)

Defendant is not disputing that evidence of the fact of and the 

circumstances surrounding Gweneth’s complaint of forcible oral 

copulation was admissible for nonhearsay purposes. FN9 That 

evidence considered for nonhearsay purposes together with other 

incriminating evidence, stipulated facts, and reasonable inferences 

satisfy us that the erroneous admission of the victim’s statements for 

their truth was harmless. It was stipulated that Gweneth was five 

feet, three inches tall and weighed 125 pounds on October 12, 2001. 

It was also stipulated that defendant was six foot, two inches tall and 

weighed 220 pounds in the fall of 2001 and he was born on 

December 19, 1961, which made him 39 years old in October 2001. 

As indicated, Gweneth was 81 years old at that time.

FN9. “[T]he admissibility of such evidence does not turn 

invariably upon whether the victim’s complaint was made 

immediately following the alleged assault or was preceded 

by some delay, nor upon whether the complaint was 

volunteered spontaneously by the victim or instead was 

prompted by some inquiry or questioning from another 

person. Rather, these factors simply are to be considered 

among the circumstances of the victim’s report or disclosure 

that are relevant in assisting the trier of fact in assessing the 

significance of the victim’s statements in conjunction with 

all of the other evidence presented.” (People v. Brown, 

supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 763.)

The evidence showed that Sergeant Paula McAllister with the Santa 

Clara County Sheriff's Office interviewed defendant in November 

2007. When defendant was first confronted with information that 

his DNA had been found in the underwear of a much older woman 

named Gweneth, defendant at first could not recall her but, later in 

the same interview, he admitted that she tried to give him a “blow 

job” but it “wasn’t happening” and claimed it was entirely 

consensual. FN10 He recalled that she walked into the shower fully 

dressed because she felt dirty. Defendant also confirmed that he 

worked for a week putting up a new fence for Gweneth. He recalled 

that she brought him lemonade. There was no evidence to suggest 

that defendant’s incriminating admissions to the sergeant should not 

be believed.

FN10. “Oral copulation is any contact, no matter how slight, 

between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or 

anus of another person.” (CALCRIM No. 1015 (2010 ed.) p. 

819; see § 288a, subd. (a) [“Oral copulation” within the 

meaning of section 288a is “the act of copulating the mouth 

of one person with the sexual organ or anus of another 

person”].)

A cellmate with whom defendant had been briefly housed in jail 

recalled defendant saying that he had done fencing work for 

someone named Gweneth or Gwen and he had known there was a 

house key under the mat. Defendant had admitted that he had 

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entered her home but he had not expected her to be there. 

According to the cellmate, defendant said that when he discovered 

her in the bedroom, he crawled into her bed and made Gweneth give 

him a “blow job.” This statement was consistent with defendant’s 

previous statement to the sergeant indicating there had been an act 

of oral copulation. Defendant disclosed to the cellmate that he had 

threatened to kill her if she said anything but reported that he had 

told Sergeant McAllister that the encounter was consensual. 

Defendant’s statements to the cellmate supported an inference that 

his repeated assertions to the sergeant that the “blow job” was 

consensual were untruthful. In addition, defendant told the cellmate 

that he had used a telephone in her living room to have phone sex. 

Defendant said that he had masturbated, ejaculated, and wiped 

himself on panties that he grabbed from a basket of laundry.

The fact that, during the sergeant’s interrogation, defendant could 

not at first remember the decades-older Gweneth, for whom he had 

done fence work over the course of a week and who he admitted 

later in the interview had tried to give him a “blow job,” casts doubt 

upon defendant’s claim that the act of oral copulation was 

consensual. Defendant’s admissions to his cellmate regarding 

forcible oral copulation and his use of Gweneth’s phone during the 

incident and Lauren’s testimony that she could not find any of her 

mother’s telephones after the incident also undermine any assertions 

that sexual contact was consensual. Although Gweneth’s statements 

were not admissible for their truth, the fact and circumstances of her 

complaint to her daughter that there had been “sort of a rape 

situation” involving oral sex not long after the alleged incident 

strengthened the evidence that a crime had occurred.

We conclude that the error in admitting the victim’s hearsay 

description of the incident under the spontaneous-statement 

exception to the hearsay rule was harmless because it is not 

“reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [defendant] 

would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. 

Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)

Holland, 2011 WL 4062376, at *11-13.

Petitioner has failed to meet his heavy burden in demonstrating that the admission of the 

evidence was so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. In his petition, 

petitioner only argues that the evidence was improperly admitted under state law and the “fresh 

complaint” exception. Whether or not the statements were improperly admitted is solely an issue 

of state law. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67 (an inquiry into whether evidence was correctly admitted 

under California law “is no part of a federal court's habeas review of a state conviction”). 

Petitioner does not present arguments to support his claim that the admission of the evidence 

deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial.

On direct appeal petitioner conceded that the day, time, place, and circumstances when 

Gweneth first told her daughter about the incident were admissible under the “fresh complaint” 

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principle. Resp. Ex. C at 42-43. Petitioner argued that the testimony regarding the details of the 

offense were not admissible. Thus, it was proper for statements to be admitted that set forth that 

the victim stated she was sexually assaulted, just not the details.

The evidence that was improperly admitted was relative and probative of the issue of 

consent because Gweneth’s report of the sexual assault was contrary to petitioner’s statement that 

the encounter was consensual. Only if there are no permissible inferences that the jury may draw 

from the evidence can its admission violate due process. See Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. Because 

there were permissible references to be drawn from the evidence, the admission of the statements 

did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. See e.g., Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 886-88

(9th Cir. 2003) (admission of knives found in defendant’s residence was prejudicial constitutional 

error where the jury could draw no permissible probative inference from evidence, because alleged 

murder weapon was a knife made by same manufacturer but was commonly available, had a 

different design, was sold separately and was not owned by defendant). While the details of the 

incident were not properly admitted under state law, the vital evidence that the victim reported a 

sexual assault was admissible under the “fresh complaint” doctrine. While it is clear this 

erroneously admitted evidence was detrimental to petitioner, the Court does not find that he has 

met his heavy burden in demonstrating that it was so prejudicial that it rendered the trial 

fundamentally unfair.

Moreover, as noted by the state court, there was additional evidence that pointed to 

petitioner’s guilt and that the encounter was not consensual. The other inmate testified that 

petitioner admitted his guilt and the inmate was aware of details that were not publicly known. 

Aspects of petitioner’s statement to police also cast doubt on his claim that the incident was 

consensual. Because petitioner has not met the heavy burden in demonstrating that the admission 

of the evidence was so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, this claim is 

denied.

II. FORENSIC ANALYSTS

Petitioner next contends that his right to confrontation was violated when lab supervisors

testified regarding certain DNA tests performed by other analysts and that this also violated his 

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due process rights.

Background

Prior to the DNA evidence being presented, petitioner’s trial counsel objected to the 

testimony of analysts Jones and Skinner, who did not perform all the laboratory analysis in 

question, but were to testify regarding certain analyses performed by other technicians. Holland, 

2011 WL 4062376, at *13. The prosecutor indicated he was planning on laying the foundation for 

admission of the laboratory analyses as business records. Id. The trial court overruled trial 

counsel’s objection because at that time the California Supreme Court case of People v. Geier, 41 

Cal. 4th 555 (2007), was controlling and allowed for such evidence to be admitted. Id.

The following testimony was heard at trial:

After the trial court overruled defense counsel’s objections in this 

case, the prosecution called Jocelyn Jones, a supervising criminalist 

at the Santa Clara County Crime Laboratory, and Elizabeth Skinner, 

who worked as a criminologist in that laboratory and conducted 

forensic DNA analysis. The court recognized both witnesses as 

experts in the field of forensic DNA analysis.

Supervising criminalist Jones testified about the defendant’s DNA 

profile developed by analyst Hall, who was no longer working for 

the laboratory at the time of trial. Jones was familiar with Hall’s 

report. Hall’s report and accompanying notes were not admitted 

into evidence. Exhibit 15, a DNA chart comparing defendant’s 

DNA profile generated from his DNA sample with the DNA profiles 

developed from two cuttings from the victim’s underwear, was 

admitted into evidence.

Jones testified that the results of the DNA testing of defendant’s 

sample and the underwear cuttings showed a match at all loci tested. 

She explained the significance of the match in terms of the 

probability in a particular population. She stated that the random 

match probability in the Caucasian population was one in 160 

quadrillion, in the Hispanic population it was one in “one 

quintillion, 400 quadrillion,” and in the African–American 

population it was one in 45 quadrillion. The database match 

probability for the Caucasian population was “one in 26 Trillion.” 

In reaching her opinions, Jones relied on Hall’s and Skinner’s 

reports and accompanying notes.

Skinner testified that in 2002 she did forensic DNA analysis on two 

cuttings from a pair of underwear, which had been found by an 

officer found under the alleged victim’s bed. Skinner confirmed that 

the report and notes contained in exhibit 16, which was identified at 

trial but not admitted into evidence, were her work. Skinner 

confirmed that exhibit 15, the DNA chart, reflected the forensic 

DNA analysis that she had done on the two underwear cuttings. 

Skinner also developed the DNA profile for Gweneth Doe’s 

reference blood sample and the DNA chart, exhibit 17, which was 

admitted into evidence, reflected that DNA profile.

The two experts’ testimony also indicated that a nontestifying 

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analyst named Jennifer Zawacki conducted serological work and 

identified a sperm cell on the underpants near the cuttings analyzed 

by Skinner. Zawacki’s report and accompanying notes were 

identified as exhibit 19 but the exhibit was not admitted into 

evidence before the jury. There was testimony that Zawacki’s notes 

indicated that Zawacki observed a sperm cell but her notes did not 

say whether it was human or animal.

Holland, 2011 WL 4062376, at *14-15 (footnotes omitted).

Discussion

The jury found petitioner guilty on May 27, 2009. On June 25, 2009, the Supreme Court 

issued Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). The Supreme Court found that 

affidavits reporting results of forensic analysis were testimonial under Crawford because they 

were made under circumstances where an objective witness would reasonably believe they would 

be used at trial. Id. at 310-11. In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011), the Supreme 

Court held that “[t]he accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the 

certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, 

to cross-examine that particular scientist.” Id. at 2710. 

Based on these and other cases, the California Court of Appeal found that petitioner’s right 

to confrontation was violated when the expert witnesses testified about forensic testing done by 

two analysts who did not testify. Holland, 2011 WL 4062376, at *18-19. While petitioner’s 

rights were violated, the state court found that the error was harmless:

A violation of the right to confrontation is subject to harmless-error 

analysis under Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24 [87 

S.Ct. 824]. FN19 (Coy v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 [denial 

of face to face confrontation]; Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 

U.S. 673, 682 [“denial of the opportunity to cross-examine an 

adverse witness does not fit within the limited category of 

constitutional errors that are deemed prejudicial in every case”], 684 

[holding that “the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant's 

opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation 

Clause errors, is subject to Chapman harmless-error analysis”].) 

“An assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of 

whether the witness' testimony would have been unchanged, or the 

jury's assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such an 

inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and harmlessness 

must therefore be determined on the basis of the remaining 

evidence.” (Coy v. Iowa, supra, 487 U.S. at pp. 1021–1022.) “The 

correct inquiry [for purposes of harmless-error analysis] is whether, 

assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were 

fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error 

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether such an error is 

harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors . . . 

includ[ing] the importance of the witness’ testimony in the 

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prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the 

presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the 

testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of crossexamination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength 

of the prosecution’s case. Cf. Harrington, 395 U.S., at 254, 89 

S.Ct., at 1728; Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S., at 432, 92 S.Ct., at 

1059.” (Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684.)

FN19. Bullcoming, Melendez–Diaz, and Crawford do not 

demonstrate that the denial of the constitutional right of 

confrontation is a structural error that is reversible per se. 

(See Bullcoming, supra, 131 S.Ct. at p. 2719, fn. 11 [court 

stated that it expressed no view on whether the confrontation 

clause error in that case was harmless]; Melendez–Diaz, 

supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 2542, fn. 14 [same ]; Crawford, supra, 

541 U.S. at p. 42, fn. 1 [same].) Rather, in each case, the 

court remanded the case for further proceedings not 

inconsistent with its opinion. (Bullcoming, supra, 131 S.Ct. 

at p. 2719; Melendez–Diaz, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 2542; 

Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 69.) Unlike the structural 

error of erroneously depriving a defendant of the right to 

counsel of choice under the Sixth Amendment, the 

consequences of which are necessarily unquantifiable and 

indeterminate and which is not subject to harmless-error 

analysis (U.S. v. Gonzalez–Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140, 150–

152 [126 S.Ct. 2557] ), the deprivation of the right of 

confrontation with respect to hearsay evidence is a trial error 

that occurs “during presentation of the case to the jury” and 

the effect of such error may “be quantitatively assessed in 

the context of other evidence presented in order to determine 

whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 308 

[111 S.Ct. 1246]; cf. Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 

686, 691 [106 S.Ct. 2142] [erroneous exclusion of testimony 

about the circumstances of the defendant’s confession 

intended to “cas[t] doubt on its validity and its credibility” 

was subject to harmless error analysis].) This is not a case 

where the defendant was entirely deprived of the right to 

confront or cross-examine the witnesses against him, which 

presumably would be a structural error. (Cf. U.S. v. Cronic

(1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 [104 S.Ct. 2039] [“if counsel 

entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful 

adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth 

Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself 

presumptively unreliable”].) “In those limited instances in 

which [the U.S. Supreme] Court has found an error 

‘structural,’ [it has] done so because the error defies analysis 

by harmless-error standards. [Citations.]” (Hedgpeth v. 

Pulido (2008) 555 U.S. 57, 67 [129 S.Ct. 530].)

Any confrontation error with respect to forensic evidence generated 

by nontestifying analysts was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in 

the specific circumstances of this case because the identity of the 

perpetrator was not an issue at trial and defendant admitted to being 

in Gweneth’s home and engaging in sexual activity. The defense 

was never that defendant had been misidentified as the assailant. At 

trial, the closing argument was that there was no forcible oral 

copulation and the rape-like situation referred to by the alleged 

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victim involved defendant’s act of masturbation: “Gweneth Doe saw 

something very upsetting. I think she saw my client masturbating in 

the living room. That’s very upsetting. That’s the rape-like 

situation that she saw.” Thus, any violation of the right to confront 

Hall and Zawacki regarding their forensic testing was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. FN20

FN20. By virtue of the same reasoning, any violation of the 

hearsay rule would be harmless under the Watson standard of 

review. (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) 

Consequently, we need not consider whether the evidence of 

forensic testing performed by and determinations made by 

the nontestifying analysts was admissible for its truth under 

the business record exception to the hearsay rule. (See Evid.

Code, §§ 1200, 1271.) Further, under the facts of this case, it 

is unnecessary to decide whether a testifying expert’s 

reliance on the truth of extrajudicial testimonial statements in 

reaching an opinion and the expert’s testimony regarding 

those statements for purposes of evaluating the opinion 

testimony implicates the confrontation clause.

Holland, 2011 WL 4062376, at *19-20.

Respondent first argues that there was no violation of petitioner’s right to confrontation. A 

year after the California Court of Appeal issued its decision in this case, the Supreme Court 

decided Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). In Williams, the Supreme Court held that 

expert testimony regarding a laboratory report by non-testifying analysts did not violate the 

Confrontation Clause because the lab report, which was not introduced into evidence, was not 

testimonial because it (1) had not been “prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted 

individual . . . or to create evidence for use at trial,” and (2) lacked, unlike the lab reports at issue 

in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, an affidavit or declaration attesting to the truth of the matters 

contained in the report. Id. at 2243, 2260. 

Respondent argues that the facts of this case are similar to Williams, thus there was no 

violation of the right to confrontation. The Court need not address if there was a violation of the 

Confrontation Clause because even assuming there was a violation, the error was harmless in this 

case. A Confrontation Clause claim is subject to harmless error analysis. See Winzer v. Hall, 494 

F.3d 1192, 1201 (9th Cir. 2007) (violation of Confrontation Clause is trial error subject to 

harmless error analysis in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993)). “Under this standard, 

habeas petitioners . . . are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish 

that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Actual prejudice, in turn, is 

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demonstrated by the petitioner “if the error in question had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Winzer, 494 F.3d at 1201 (quoting Brecht).

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the admission of the DNA evidence had a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. As noted by the 

California Court of Appeal, it was undisputed that petitioner had been in the victim’s house and

that there had been some type of sexual encounter because he admitted these facts to police well 

before trial. The testimony of petitioner’s cellmate also corroborated this fact. The vital issue at 

trial was consent, not identity. 

In closing argument, petitioner’s trial counsel emphasized the DNA evidence by noting

that the underwear had mostly petitioner’s DNA and only minor amounts from the victim, which 

suggested that the victim had not been wearing the underwear when petitioner’s DNA was 

deposited onto it. RT at 1018-19. Trial counsel argued that this supported petitioner’s cellmate’s 

testimony that petitioner masturbated and then ejaculated on the underwear. Id. Trial counsel 

argued that petitioner was in the house, had called a sex line on the phone, and was masturbating 

with the victim’s clothing when the victim came out of her room and saw him. RT at 1019. She 

was understandably shocked, and this is what she referred to as a “rape-like situation.” RT at 

1020. Thus, the DNA evidence was of minor importance in petitioner’s trial and, assuming it was 

erroneously admitted in violation of petitioner’s right to confrontation, any error was harmless 

because the admission of the evidence did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict. This claim is denied.3

III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a).

A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the 

 

3

For these same reasons, any due process claim is denied. Petitioner cannot show that the 

admission of the DNA evidence was so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.

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certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. Id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) 

is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

Here, petitioner has made no showing warranting a certificate and so none is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. A Certificate 

of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 13, 2015

______________________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID L. HOLLAND,

Plaintiff,

v.

HEIDI LACKNER,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-02094-JD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on October 13, 2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

David L. Holland ID: AB3615

Sierra Conservation Center

5150 O'Byrnes Ferry Road

Jamestown, CA 95327 

Dated: October 13, 2015

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JAMES DONATO

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