Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-00964/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-00964-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order Denying Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLIFFORD LOCKLEAR,

Petitioner,

 vs.

TOM L. CAREY, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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No. C 03-00964 JW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the afternoon of June 18, 1994, Petitioner and an accomplice entered a

clothing store in San Francisco. Petitioner pulled a loaded semiautomatic handgun from

a plastic bag and announce that it was a “stick up.” A customer tried to flee out the

front door and became embroiled in a physical struggle with Petitioner who pressed the

gun to his neck and apparently attempted to fire it. A sales person came to his aid and

wrestled with Petitioner on the street outside the store. With the help of another sales

person and several other persons, the group succeeded in disarming Petitioner and

pinning him to the ground. The police soon arrived and arrested Petitioner. On the

sidewalk, they found the handgun, with the safety still on, together with several bullets

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order Denying Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

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and a for the weapon.

While Petitioner struggled with the sales persons, the store manager and other

employees escaped through an exit at the rear of the store. Petitioner’s accomplice

ordered an employee to hand over money from the cash register and fled the scene with

$123.00. One sales person apparently attempted to intercept the accomplice and was

knocked to the ground outside the store.

Petitioner was charged with one count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm

(Pen. Code § 245, subd. (b)), six counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code § 212.5,

former subd. (b)), and one count of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon (Pen. Code §

12021, subd. (a)). The first seven counts carried enhancements alleging use of a firearm

(Pen. Code § 12022.5, subd. (a)). Additional status enhancements under Penal Code §

667(a)(1), (d), and (e), and Penal Code § 667.5(b) were charged, based on five prior

convictions for robbery and three prior prison terms served for nonviolent felonies.

At trial, after presenting its case, the prosecution moved to dismiss the seventh

count of robbery. The jury found Petitioner guilty of all other counts and found the

related enhancement allegations to be true. The court sentenced Petitioner to a term of

213 years in state prison. The sentence included a term of 38 years to life for conviction

of assault with a semiautomatic firearm and 35 years to life for the five convictions of

second degree robbery. The sentence for possession of a firearm by an ex-felon was

stayed pursuant to Penal Code § 654. The trial court subsequently resentenced

Petitioner to a slightly lesser minimum term of 202 years in response to a letter from the

Department of Corrections.

On December 4, 2002, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction

and sentence. A petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court on

February 11, 2003. As of February 2003, Petitioner’s habeas petitions in the state

superior court, appellate court, and supreme court were denied. 

On March 5, 2003, Petitioner filed the instant habeas corpus petition pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner raises the following eight claims for relief: 1) the trial

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order Denying Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

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court committed a sentencing error; 2) there was insufficient evidence to uphold the

conviction; 3) petitioner was incompetent to stand trial; 4) ineffective assistance of

counsel at trial; 5) petitioner did not enter an intelligent and knowing plea to prior

convictions; 6) petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing

stage; 7) there was insufficient evidence to find petitioner had prior convictions that

qualified as strikes; and 8) petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel on

appeal. 

Respondent filed an answer and lodged exhibits. Petitioner did not file a

traverse. The matter is submitted and ready for decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was addressed on the

merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

The court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state

court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time

of the state court decision. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Clark v.

Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order Denying Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

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authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding

on the state courts and only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. Clark, 331

F.3d at 1069.

III. CLAIMS AND ANALYSIS

A. Trial court committed no sentencing error

Petitioner was sentenced to 213 years to life in prison for multiple crimes. 

Petitioner contends that because the offenses occurred at the same time, the sentences

for each count must run concurrently rather than consecutively. Accordingly, Petitioner

moves this Court to remand his case for resentencing or to amend his sentence to reflect

a single 25 years to life sentence.

State sentencing courts must be accorded wide latitude in their decisions as to

punishment. See Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488

U.S. 926 (1988), and cert. denied, 488 U.S. 981 (1988). Additionally, federal courts

must defer to the state courts' interpretation of state sentencing laws. See Bueno v.

Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Under People v. Deloza, 18 Cal. 4th 585 (1998), trial courts retain discretion to

impose either concurrent or consecutive sentences. In Deloza, the defendant entered a

store and robbed four people. A jury convicted him of four counts of second degree

robbery with findings that he was armed with a firearm as to each count and that he had

suffered two prior serious felony convictions under the three strikes law. The defendant

was sentenced to four consecutive life sentences. The trial judge stated that the

sentences imposed “must run consecutive” and that “it would be unlawful . . . to

proceed in any other fashion.” After the Court of Appeal affirmed, the Supreme Court

of California reversed the judgment and directed the court to remand. The Supreme

Court held that there are crimes for which the three strikes law does not mandate

consecutive sentencing and that the trial court has the discretion to impose either

concurrent or consecutive sentences. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order Denying Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

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Accordingly, the trial court in this case had discretion to impose consecutive

sentences upon Petitioner. Petitioner’s claim that the trial court made a sentencing error

is DENIED.

B. There was sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction

Petitioner argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish a conviction for

each of his alleged crimes against the five victims. He claims there was no evidence to

establish that he was in the store when the robbery occurred and that he robbed any of

the five victims. Petitioner contends that he never entered the store. Rather, Petitioner

stood outside the store while the co-defendant robbed the store. Petitioner requests that

this Court reverse his robbery convictions, hold an evidentiary hearing, or remand the

case for resentencing.

A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction does not determine

whether it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 843 (1993). 

The federal court "determines only whether, 'after viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" See id. (quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Only if no rational trier of fact could have found

proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may the writ be granted. See Jackson, 443

U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338; Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.

1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984).

Petitioner’s claim is refuted by the record. During the robbery, there were

several eyewitnesses who testified to seeing Petitioner in the store perpetrating the

robbery. Police arrived on the scene to find Petitioner pinned to the ground by the

witnesses. The handgun used by Petitioner, along with several bullets, was on the

ground next to Petitioner. Clearly, a rational trier of fact could have made a finding

against Petitioner. Consequently, the evidence is sufficient to uphold Petitioner’s

conviction. Petitioner’s claim is DENIED.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order Denying Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

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C. Petitioner was competent to stand trial

Petitioner contends that he did not understand the nature of the proceedings

against him. Petitioner claims he has suffered from schizophrenia and psychosis since

1969. He has been housed in several psychiatric hospitals since the 1995 offense. He

has been treated with medication for many years. Since his incarceration, he has been

housed in a “med-psych unit” and continues psychiatric treatment for his mental

disorder. Petitioner argues that he should have been declared incompetent to stand trial

and placed in a psychiatric hospital. Petitioner moves this Court for an order to remand

the case for a competency hearing, to set aside the judgment, and to place Petitioner in a

state hospital for treatment.

The test for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant "has sufficient

present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding – whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the

proceedings against him." Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960), and Chavez v. United States, 656

F.2d 512, 518 (9th Cir. 1981)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1085 (1986). The standard for

competency to stand trial is lower than the standard for capacity to commit a crime,

such that those with mental deficiencies are not necessarily incompetent to stand trial. 

Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926, 938 (9th Cir. 2006). In finding facts and determining

credibility, a district court is free to assign greater weight to the findings of government

experts than to the opposing opinions of defense experts. United States v. GastelumAlmeida, 298 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Petitioner’s argument ignores the trial court’s finding that he was competent to

stand trial. Petitioner’s counsel expressed a doubt in superior court pursuant to Penal

Code § 1368 regarding Petitioner’s competency. Criminal proceedings were suspended

and a psychiatrist was appointed to examine Petitioner. The court later found Petitioner

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The psychiatrist for the defense, Dr. Schoenfeld, agreed with the appointed psychiatrist that

Petitioner was competent to stand trial.

Order Denying Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Page 7 of 12

competent to stand trial and ordered criminal proceedings reinstated.1 Petitioner has not

demonstrate any error. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is DENIED.

D. There was no ineffective assistance of counsel at trial

Petitioner claims that his counsel failed to adequately present facts to

demonstrate Petitioner’s incompetence to stand trial. Petitioner suggests that his trial

counsel did not present medical and psychiatric records or testimony from psychiatrists

and psychologists. Petitioner contends that this evidence would have shown that he was

“not responsible for his conduct, . . . had an accomplice who got away, [and] the

accomplice told Petitioner to come to a location and just stand there.” These

circumstances allegedly deprived Petitioner of a fair trial.

The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether

counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that

the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). In order to prevail on an ineffectiveness of

counsel claim, petitioner must establish both prongs of the test under Strickland. First,

he must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, specifically, that it fell

below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. 

Id. at 687-88. Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient

performance, that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at

694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome. Id.

Contrary to Petitioner’s claims, counsel did investigate Petitioner’s mental state

and expressed concern about it pursuant to Penal Code § 1368. Moreover, Petitioner’s

competence was addressed by the trial court, so Petitioner experienced no prejudice. 

Petitioner has failed to meet either prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order Denying Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

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under Strickland. For these reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based on

his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Petitioner’s claim is DENIED.

E. Petitioner entered an intelligent and knowing plea to each prior

conviction

Petitioner claims he did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty in 1972 and

1990 to unstated offenses. Petitioner cites his mental disorder and the court’s failure to

explain to him the consequences of pleading guilty as reasons he did not knowingly and

voluntarily plead guilty. 

A defendant who pleads guilty cannot later raise in habeas corpus proceedings

independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred

before the plea of guilty. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1983) (guilty

plea forecloses consideration of pre-plea constitutional deprivations); Tollett v.

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973) (same); see also Hudson v. Moran, 760 F.2d

1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding no constitutional violation where defendant was not

informed that guilty plea would foreclose subsequent habeas relief), cert. denied, 474

U.S. 981 (1985). The only challenges left open in federal habeas corpus after a guilty

plea is the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea and the nature of the advice of

counsel to plead. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985); Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. 

A habeas petitioner bears the burden of establishing that his guilty plea was not

knowing and voluntary. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31-34 (1992).

Regarding Petitioner’s mental disorder, the trial judge for the current offense

previously ruled on Petitioner’s claim of incompetence during his guilty pleas in 1972

and 1990. Ruling on Petitioner’s competence during his 1972 plea of guilty, the trial

judge considered the 1972 transcript where a judge at the time asked Petitioner about

his whereabouts, his narcotics use, and his mental state. The trial judge then ruled that

Petitioner’s responses to the previous judge indicated that he was “clear as a bell.” 

Exhibit 2, vol. 2, pg. 13-14. Ruling on Petitioner’s competence during his 1990

proceedings, the trial judge said Petitioner “responded with clarity to the judge in the

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Order Denying Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

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proceedings of the taking of the plea.” Exhibit 2, vol. 2, pg. 13-14. Moreover, even

though Petitioner offered psychiatric testimony that he suffered from mental illness,

other psychiatrists testified that Petitioner was still capable of understanding the

proceedings he faced. Petitioner has an eleventh grade education and can apparently

read and write. He also signed plea agreements in 1977 and 1980 stating that he

understood the proceedings. Petitioner’s mental disorder did not prevent him from

making a knowing and intelligent plea.

In regards to the court’s alleged failure to explain the circumstances to Petitioner,

Due Process does not require a state court to enumerate all the rights a defendant waives

when he enters a guilty plea as long as the record indicates that the plea was entered

knowingly and voluntarily. See Rodriguez v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir.

1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1057 (1987); Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761, 763 (9th

Cir. 1974). Petitioner does not present any evidence that the record indicated otherwise.

Petitioner did not satisfy the requisite burden of proof. Because Petitioner did

not establish that his pleas were not knowing or voluntary, his claim is DENIED.

F. Petitioner was not denied effective assistance of counsel for prior

convictions

Petitioner contends previous counsel rendered ineffective assistance in allowing

him to plead guilty in past cases. Petitioner claims counsel did not advise him of the

consequences of a guilty plea, did not explain to him the elements of the offense, and

did not present evidence at the plea stage to demonstrate he was suffering from a mental

disorder. Petitioner seems to be challenging the sentence enhancements which he

claims he received because of ineffective assistance of counsel on his prior convictions.

Once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own

right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available,

the conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid. Daniels v. United States, 532

U.S. 374, 382 (2001). If that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the

defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under §

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order Denying Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

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2254 on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained. 

Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403 (2001). This holding is

grounded in considerations relating to the need for finality of convictions and ease of

administration. Id. An exception to the general rule for § 2254 is made for petitions

that challenge an enhanced sentence on the basis that the prior conviction used to

enhance the sentence was obtained where there was a failure to appoint counsel in

violation of the Sixth Amendment. Id. The failure to appoint counsel for an indigent is

a unique constitutional defect rising to the jurisdictional level, which therefore warrants

special treatment among alleged constitutional violations. Id. (citing Custis v. United

States, 511 U.S. 485, 496-497 (1994)).

Petitioner’s claim is unwarranted because implicit in an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim is receiving assistance from an attorney. Therefore it follows that

Petitioner did not experience a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights because he

either retained counsel or the court appointed counsel for him. Consequently, the

enhanced sentence may not be challenged through a habeas petition because it is not

based on a Sixth Amendment violation. Petitioner’s claim is DENIED.

G. There was sufficient evidence to find petitioner had prior convictions

that qualified as strikes

Petitioner contends that the state did not prove his prior convictions beyond a

reasonable doubt. Rather, the state merely presented to the court a photograph and an

abstract of judgment. Petitioner claims that this is insufficient to establish his prior

convictions. Petitioner argues that the prosecutors should have gone beyond the record

to prove his prior convictions. Petitioner moves this Court to vacate the prior

convictions as enhancements or part of the three-strikes sentencing scheme and remand

this case for resentencing. Petitioner also requests an evidentiary hearing on the

convictions which he alleges were not sufficiently proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

As previously discussed, the Court in Daniels explained that once a state

conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the

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United States District Court

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Order Denying Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

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defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available, the conviction may

be regarded as conclusively valid. Daniels, 532 U.S. at 382 (2001). Here, Petitioner

seems to suggest that the prosecution should have been required to present physical

evidence (as opposed to evidence on the record) to establish his guilt even though

Petitioner already pled guilty. If Petitioner wanted to challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence, he should have done so during the proceedings for his previous crimes, not in

a habeas petition after having already been convicted. Petitioner’s claim is DENIED.

H. Petitioner was not denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal

Petitioner’s case was remanded by the court of appeal to the trial court to show

cause regarding the alleged sentencing violation (concurrent v. consecutive sentences). 

The trial court denied relief. Petitioner’s counsel filed a Wende Brief rather than file an

appeal on the sentencing issue which was previously ruled on by the trial court. 

Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel denied Petitioner effective assistance of

counsel on appeal when he filed the Wende Brief instead of contesting the trial court’s

previous sentencing decision.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal

defendant the effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of right. See Evitts v.

Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985). Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel are reviewed according to the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984). Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989); United States

v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1986). A defendant therefore must show that

counsel's advice fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, he would have

prevailed on appeal. Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 & n.9 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,

694; Birtle, 792 F.2d at 849).

Petitioner does not present evidence to show there was a reasonable probability

that he would have prevailed on appeal. Even assuming Petitioner’s counsel fell below

the reasonable standard set for attorneys, Petitioner still has to prove there was a

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reasonable probability of success on the appeal. Petitioner has failed to do so. 

Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is 

DENIED. 

DATED: 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge 

 

August 27, 2007

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