Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00532/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00532-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332fr Diversity-Fraud

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHERRY HUNTER, on behalf of

herself, all others similarly situated,

and the general public; MALIA

LEVIN, on behalf of herself, all others

similarly situated, and the general

public,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 16cv532-WQH-BLM

ORDER

v.

NATURE’S WAY PRODUCTS, LLC;

SCHWABE NORTH AMERICA,

INC.,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are (1) the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (ECF

No. 12) filed by Defendants Nature’s Way Products, LLC (“Nature’s Way”) and

Schwabe North America, Inc. (“Schwabe”); and (2) the Motion to Strike Allegations

of the Complaint (ECF No. 13) filed by Defendants.

I. Background

On January 28, 2016, Plaintiffs Sherry Hunter and Malia Levin initiated this

action by filing a Complaint in the Superior Court of the State of California County of

San Diego, Case No. 37-2016-00002933-CU-NP-CTL. On March 2, 2016, Defendants

removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and 28 U.S.C. §

1332(d)(2)(A), asserting that federal jurisdiction exists pursuant to the Class Action

Fairness Act. 

- 1 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On March 14, 2016, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint (ECF

No. 12) and a motion to strike allegations of the Complaint (ECF No. 13). On April 4,

2016, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 18) and an

opposition to the motion to strike (ECF No. 17). On April 11, 2016, Defendants filed

a reply to the opposition to the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 19) and a reply to the

opposition to the motion to strike (ECF No. 20). On June 9, 2016, Plaintiffs filed two

Notices of Lodgment of Supplemental Authority (ECF Nos. 25, 26). On June 17, 2016,

Defendants filed a response to the Notices of Lodgment. (ECF No. 27).

II. Allegations of the Complaint

Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants have manufactured, distributed, marketed, and

sold various Nature’s Way brand coconut oil products on a nationwide, and indeed

international basis for at least the past several years.” (ECF No. 1-5 ¶ 49). “Nature’s

Way brand coconut oil products challenged in this lawsuit include at least the following

. . . : (a) Extra Virgin Coconut Oil, and (b) Liquid Coconut Oil . . . .” Id. ¶ 52. “Each

1 tablespoon (or 15mL) of Nature’s Way coconut oil . . . contains 130 calories, all of

which come from fat: in each 14-gram serving there are 14 grams of fat. Further, each

14-gram serving contains 13 grams of saturated fat.” Id. ¶ 54. Plaintiffs allege that

various studies have shown that because of its high saturated fat content, the

consumption of coconut oil increases the risk of cardiovascular heart diseases and other

morbidity. Id. ¶¶ 45-48.

“Through statements placed directly on the labels of the Nature’s Way coconut

oil products, defendants market and advertise the products as both inherently healthy,

and healthy alternatives to butter, margarine, and other oils, even though the products’

total and saturated fat content render them both inherently unhealthy, and less healthy

alternatives.” Id. ¶ 57. 

Directly on the Nature’s Way Extra Virgin Coconut Oil label, defendants claim the product has a “Variety of Healthy Uses.” Defendants encourage consumers to “Enjoy straight from the jar or supplement your diet by

mixing into smoothies, spreading on bagels and toast, or adding to homemade energy bars. Be creative! The possibilities are endless.” These claims taken individually and in context of the label as a whole, are false

- 2 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and misleading because Nature’s Way Extra Virgin Coconut Oil is

actually unhealthy due to its high saturated fat content.

Id. ¶ 60. “[D]efendants claim that the product[s are] ‘ideal for exercise & weight loss

programs.’” Id. ¶¶ 61, 71. “To reinforce this misleading health message, defendants

label the Extra Virgin Coconut Oil [and Liquid Coconut Oil] as ‘Premium Quality,’

‘non-hydrogenated,’ and containing ‘no trans fat.’” Id. ¶¶ 62, 72. “[D]efendants claim

that their Nature’s Way Extra Virgin Coconut Oil provides ‘Natural Energy’ and

contains ‘62% (8,694 mg) medium chain fatty acids (MCTs) per serving for energy.’ 

Defendants even recommend consumers ‘Take 1 tablespoon (14g) up to 4 times daily.’”

Id. ¶ 63. “[D]efendants claim that Nature’s Way Liquid Coconut Oil provides ‘Natural

Energy’ and contains ‘13 g of medium chain triglycerides’ or ‘93% MCTs.’” Id. ¶ 72. 

“[D]efendants suggest that their Nature’s Way Extra Virgin Coconut Oil ‘be used in

place of butter, margarine, shortening or other cooking oils.’” Id. ¶ 64. 

[D]efendants suggest that the Nature’s Way Liquid Coconut Oil be used ‘as an alternative to butter, margarine or vegetable oil.’ This misleadingly suggests that replacing butter, margarine or vegetable oil with Nature’s Way Liquid Coconut Oil is a healthy choice despite that doing so would increase consumption of saturated fat and decrease consumption of

unsaturated fat . . . .” 

Id. ¶ 73. Plaintiffs allege that the totality of Nature’s Way coconut oil “label[s] and

packaging conveys the concrete message to a reasonable consumer that the product is

healthy, and a more healthful alternative to butter, margarine, shortening, or other

cooking oils.” Id. ¶¶ 66, 75. The Complaint provides exemplars of the labels that are

allegedly attached to Nature’s Way coconut oil containers.

“The labels of the Nature’s Way coconut oil products direct consumers to the

Nature’s Way website . . . .” Id. ¶ 76. “Through statements on Nature’s Way’s website,

defendants portray Nature’s Way as a company devoted ‘To help[ing] [consumers]

enhance their health,’ . . . .” Id. ¶ 77. “Nature’s Way further claims that ‘The health

properties of coconut oil have been known for thousands of years. Coconut oil

naturally contains ‘good fats’ called medium chain triglycerides (MCTs), which your

body uses to produce energy. [] Adding coconut oil to your diet can help increase

- 3 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

metabolism, and help fuel any healthy lifestyle.’” Id. ¶ 78.

“Plaintiff Sherry Hunter purchased Nature’s Way Extra Virgin Coconut Oil. As

best she can remember, she purchased the 16-ounce variety of Nature’s Way Extra

Virgin Coconut Oil in or around July 2015 from a Sprout’s Farmers Market located at

690 3rd Ave., Chula Vista, CA 91910, for approximately $10.” Id. ¶ 107. 

As best she recalls, [Plaintiff Malia] Levin began purchasing Nature’s Way Extra Virgin Coconut Oil approximately five years ago. Since that time, until recently, she has purchased the product approximately once per month. [Plaintiff] Levin believes she most recently purchased a 32-ounce container of Nature’s Way Extra Virgin Coconut Oil in or around September or October of 2015 from Accent on Health, located on 18559

Devonshire Street, Northridge, California 91324, for approximately $24.

Id. ¶ 108. Plaintiffs allege that, “[w]hen deciding to purchase Nature’s Way Extra

Virgin Coconut Oil, plaintiffs read and relied on the . . . claims . . . on the product’s

label.” Id. ¶ 109. 

Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants’ deceptive statements . . . violate Cal. Health

& Safety Code § 109875, and 21 U.S.C. § 343(a), which deem a food misbranded if its

labeling is ‘false or misleading in any particular.’” Id. ¶ 83. Plaintiffs allege that labels

on Defendants’ coconut oil containing the phrases “non-hydrogenated,” “no trans fat,” 

“62% MCTs,” “62% (8,694 mg) medium chain fatty acids (MCTs) per serving,” “93%

MCTs,” and “13 g of medium chain triglycerides,” “meet the definition of nutrient

content claims because they characterize the level of trans fat, and fatty acids, in the

coconut oil products, which are the type required to be in nutrition labeling. See 21

C.F.R. § 101.13(b)(1).” Id. ¶¶ 88-89. “Under 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(h), a food that bears

an express or implied nutrient content claim, and that contains more than 13 grams of

total fat or 4 grams of saturated fat per serving, must also bear a disclosure statement

on the label, immediately adjacent to the claim, referring the consumer to nutrition

information for that nutrient, e.g., ‘See nutrition information for total fat and saturated

fat content.’” Id. ¶ 90. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ “labels fail to bear these

mandatory disclosure statements . . . . Therefore, Nature’s Way Extra Virgin Coconut

Oil and Nature’s Way Liquid Coconut Oil are misbranded.” Id. ¶ 91. Plaintiffs allege

- 4 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that Defendants’ coconut oil products are “misbranded because ‘no trans fat’ is an

unauthorized nutrient content claim that may not be used in the labeling of any foods.” 

Id. ¶ 92. “Plaintiffs and members of the Class would not have purchased the Nature’s

Way coconut oil products if they knew the products were and are misbranded . . . and

omit material information and disclosures.” Id. ¶ 93.

Plaintiffs allege that “the labels of the Nature’s Way coconut oil products are

misleading and misbranded because they claim that the oils are healthy, but the products

do not meet the requirements for making such claims.” Id. ¶ 94. “The Nature’s Way

coconut oil products both contain 14 grams of total fat per RACC or labeled serving,

and 50 grams of total fat per 50 grams. Thus the Nature’s Way coconut oil products do

not meet the total fat requirement in section 101.65(d)(2)(i)(F), and as a result, their use

of a ‘healthy’ term renders the products misbranded.” Id. ¶ 100. Plaintiffs further

allege that Defendants’ products are misbranded because they do not meet the saturated

fat requirements of section 101.65(d)(2)(i)(F) and “do not contain ‘at least 10 percent

of the RDI or the DRV per RACC of one or more of vitamin A, vitamin C, calcium,

iron, protein or fiber . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 102-103. “Defendants’ use of the term healthy (and

variations) to describe Nature’s Way coconut oil products not only violate 21 C.F.R. §

101.65 and renders the products misbranded, but also misleads consumers regarding the

nature of the oils, in the specific manner the regulations are intended to prevent.” Id.

¶ 106.

Plaintiffs allege that based on these representations, they “believed the Nature’s

Way Extra Virgin Coconut Oil was healthy, healthier than butter, margarine, shortening

and other cooking oils, and would not raise or otherwise detriment their blood

cholesterol levels.” Id. ¶ 110. “Plaintiffs paid more for the Nature’s Way Extra Virgin

Coconut Oil, and would only have been willing to pay less, or unwilling to purchase it

at all, absent the false and misleading labeling statements complained of . . . .” Id. ¶

116. Plaintiffs allege that “[i]nstead of receiving products that had actual healthful

qualities, the products that plaintiffs and the Class received were ones that are not

- 5 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

healthy, but rather their consumption causes increased risk of CHD, stroke, and other

morbidity.” Id. ¶ 118. Plaintiffs allege that they “would not have purchased Nature’s

Way Extra Virgin Coconut Oil if they knew that it was misbranded pursuant to

California and FDA regulations, or that its labeling claims were false and misleading.” 

Id. ¶ 119.

Plaintiffs allege that “Plaintiff Malia Levin did not discover that defendants’

labeling of the Nature’s Way Extra Virgin Coconut Oil was false, deceptive, or

misleading until approximately December 2015 when she spoke with her counsel in this

matter.” Id. ¶ 123. “[Plaintiff] Levin, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not

have discovered defendants’ deceptive practices earlier because, like nearly all

consumers, she does not have access to scholarly publications where scientific evidence

of negative health effects of coconut oils on human health has been published.” Id. ¶

125.

Plaintiffs “bring this suit as a class action pursuant to California Code of Civil

Procedure section 382 on behalf of themselves and a Class of all persons in California

who purchased, for personal or household use, and not for resale or distribution,

Nature’s Way Extra Virgin Coconut Oil, or Nature’s Way Liquid Coconut Oil . . . .” 

Id. ¶ 127.

Plaintiffs bring the following causes of action: (1) violations of the Unfair

Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. based on

allegations that Defendants’ claims relating to the Nature’s Way coconut oil products

are fraudulent, unlawful, and unfair; (2) violations of the False Advertising Law

(“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500 et seq. based on allegations that Defendants’

advertisements and labeling misled reasonable consumers; (3) violations of the

Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq. based on

allegations that Defendants falsely and deceptively advertised Nature’s Way coconut

oil products; (4) Breach of Express Warranties, Cal. Com. Code § 2313(1); and (5)

Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability, Cal. Com. Code § 2314. 

- 6 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiffs seek class certification and an Order compelling Defendants to bear the

cost of class notice. Plaintiffs seek an Order compelling Defendants to conduct a

corrective advertising campaign, to destroy all misleading and deceptive advertising

materials and product labels, and to recall all offending products. Plaintiffs seek

disgorgement, restitution, punitive damages, and an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.

III. Motion to Dismiss

A. Request for Judicial Notice

“As a general rule, a district court may not consider any material beyond the

pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d

668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). However, there are “two exceptions to the requirement that

consideration of extrinsic evidence converts a 12(b)(6) motion to a summary judgment

motion.” Id. First, Federal Rule of Evidence 201 provides that “[t]he court may

judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . is

generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or . . . can be accurately

and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 

 Fed R. Evid. 201(b). [U]nder Fed. R. Evid. 201, a court may take judicial notice of

‘matters of public record.’” Lee, 250 F.3d at 689 (quoting Mack v. South Bay Beer

Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.1986)). Second, under the doctrine of

incorporation by reference, “[a] district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may

consider documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity

no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the plaintiff’s pleadings.” 

Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

“[W]hen a court takes judicial notice of another court’s opinion, it may do so not

for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the opinion, which is

not subject to reasonable dispute over its authenticity.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250

F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001). Courts may take judicial notice of “proceedings in other

courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have

- 7 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a direct relation to matters at issue.” U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council

v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotations

omitted).

Plaintiffs request the Court to take judicial notice of a warning letter sent from

the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to Carrington Farms regarding labeling on

coconut oil. (ECF No. 18-2). Plaintiffs filed two notices of supplemental authority

containing orders filed in two United States District Court cases. The Court takes

judicial notice of these documents which are not subject to reasonable dispute over their

authenticity. See Fed R. Evid. 201(b); Lee, 250 F.3d at 690.

B. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8(a) provides: “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain .

. . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable

legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all

“well-pleaded factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

However, a court is not “required to accept as true allegations that are merely

conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v.

Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). “In sum, for a complaint to

survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable

inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the

plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quotations omitted).

Claims sounding in fraud or mistake must additionally comply with the

heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which

- 8 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

requires that a complaint “must state with particularity the circumstances constituting

fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) “requires ... an account of the time,

place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the

parties to the misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir.

2007) (quotation omitted); see also Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097,

1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (averments of fraud must be accompanied by “the who, what,

when, where, and how of the misconduct charged”) (quotation omitted). “To comply

with Rule 9(b), allegations of fraud must be specific enough to give defendants notice

of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they

can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” 

Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal

quotations omitted).

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move

for dismissal on grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the court has subject

matter jurisdiction over an action. Assoc. of Medical Colleges v. United States, 217

F.3d 770, 778-79 (9th Cir. 2000). In resolving an attack on a court’s jurisdiction, “the

district court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion

to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Safe Air For Everyone v. Doyle, 373

F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Issues regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be

raised at any time, even on appeal, by motion or sua sponte by the court. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(h)(3); Snell v. Cleveland, 316 F.3d 822, 826-27 (9th Cir. 2002). 

C. Discussion

1. Misrepresentation-Based Claims

Defendants contend that all of Plaintiffs’ claims fail for lack of specific facts

plausibly alleging their misrepresentation-based claims. Defendants assert that Plaintiffs

do not allege that the product labeling states that Defendants’ coconut oil products are

“inherently healthy” or “a healthier alternative” to other oils. Defendants contend that

- 9 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiffs do not allege facts to support an inference that the labeling would mislead

reasonable consumers. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ allegations of reasonable

reliance are insufficient because they do not allege that the exemplar labels are the

labels they relied on when they purchased the product, do not allege that the labels

provided an assurance that the product would not increase their risk of CDH, stroke, or

other morbidity, and do not allege that they were unaware that coconut oil was saturated

fat or that studies had linked over-consumption of saturated fats with an increased risk

of heart disease.

Plaintiffs contend that a reasonable inference from the claims “Variety of Healthy

Uses: Enjoy straight from the jar . . .” is that the oil is inherently healthy since

consuming it “straight from the jar” is a healthy use. Plaintiffs contend that the

“Recommendation: Take 1 tablespoon (14g) up to 4 times daily” followed by “use[] in

place of butter, margarine, shortening or other cooking oils” could reasonably be

understood to mean that the product is healthier than those substitutes. Plaintiffs

contend that the Complaint alleges that coconut oil is inherently unhealthy because it

alleges that there is no safe level of saturated fat intake. Plaintiffs contend that they

have sufficiently alleged reliance and that reasonable consumers are misled by

statements on Defendants’ coconut oil labels. Plaintiff contends that Plaintiffs’ claims

should not be dismissed at this stage of the proceedings because health and wellness

claims may plausibly mislead reasonable consumers when other harmful ingredients are

present.

“To have standing to bring a UCL, FAL, or CLRA claim, Plaintiffs must plead

that they relied on the misleading materials.” Bronson v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., No.

C 12-04184 CRB, 2013 WL 1629191, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013). A plaintiff may

prove reliance “‘by showing the defendant’s misrepresentation or nondisclosure was an

immediate cause of the plaintiff’s injury-producing conduct.’” Hodsdon v. Mars, Case

No. 15-cv-04450-RS, 2016 WL 627383, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2016) (quoting In re

Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298, 326 (2009)). The Ninth Circuit in Hinojos found that

- 10 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“[p]leading that one would not have otherwise purchased the product but for the

misleading advertising also satisfies the consumer’s obligation to plead a causal link

between the advertising and the alleged economic injury.” Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718

F.3d 1098, 1107 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Branca v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 14cv2062-

MMA (JMA), 2015 WL 1841231, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2015).

California’s UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or

practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Code. § 17200. California’s FAL prohibits any “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading

advertising.” Id. § 17500. California’s CLRA prohibits “unfair methods of competition

and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770. Under these

California statutes, conduct is deceptive or misleading if it is likely to deceive an

ordinary consumer. Williams v. Gerber Products Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir.

2008). “California courts have recognized that whether a business practice is deceptive

will usually be a question of fact not appropriate for decision on demurrer.” Id. at 939;

accord Linear Tech. Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 115, 134-35

(2007). “[I]t is a ‘rare situation’ where granting a motion to dismiss claims under the

UCL is appropriate.” In re Ferrero Litigation, 794 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1115 (S.D. Cal.

2011) (quoting Williams, 552 F.3d at 939).

In this case, Plaintiffs allege that they relied on the label of the coconut oil prior

to purchasing it. See Compl. ¶ 109. Plaintiffs allege that the claims Defendants made

on the Nature’s Way coconut oil products, “taken individually, and in context of the

label as a whole, misleadingly imply, by affirmative representations and material

omissions, that Nature’s Way Extra Virgin Coconut Oil is healthy, when it is not, and

that the product is healthier or more nutritious than butter, margarine, shortening or

other cooking oils, which it is not.” Id. ¶ 65. Plaintiffs allege that “defendants’ labeling

claims are designed to conceal or distract consumers from noticing that their Nature’s

Way coconut oils are pure fat.” (Comp. ¶ 57). Plaintiffs have alleged that the

likelihood of misleading consumers is the reason why the FDA prohibits labeling foods

- 11 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

as “healthy” unless they contain less than 3 grams of total fact and 1 gram of saturated

fat. Id. ¶¶ 94-106 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 101.65(d)(2)).

The Court concludes that the facts alleged are sufficient to support the

misrepresentation claims; this is not one of the “rare situations” where granting a

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims regarding deceptive advertising is appropriate. 

Representations made on the label of the coconut oil products may be misleading and

deceptive even though the representations do not directly contradict the ingredients

listed on the label. See Williams, 552 F.3d at 939 (“We disagree with the district court

that reasonable consumers should be expected to look beyond misleading

representations on the front of the box to discover the truth from the ingredient list in

small print on the side of the box.”). The representations on the coconut oil labels “may

be deceptive and actionable under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA even though [they are]

truthful.” In re Ferrero Litigation, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1115; see also Leoni v. State Bar,

39 Cal.3d 609, 626 (1985) (The UCL and FAL “have been interpreted broadly to

embrace not only advertising which is false, but also advertising which although true,

is either actually misleading or which has the capacity, likelihood or tendency to

deceive or confuse the public.”); Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152,

1162 (9th Cir. 2012) (Under the FAL, “even a perfectly true statement couched in such

a manner that is likely to mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to disclose

relevant information, is actionable . . . .”). Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to

support an inference that they relied on the representations made by Defendants on the

coconut oil products that they purchased. Plaintiffs have also alleged sufficient facts

to support an inference that a reasonable consumer would be deceived by the labels of

Nature’s Way coconut oil products. Based on the allegations in the Complaint, “at the

very least, there appears to be a question of fact regarding whether a reasonable

consumer would be likely to be misled . . . .” See Bruton v. Gerber Prods. Co., 961 F.

Supp. 2d 1062, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2013). At this stage in the proceedings, the Court

cannot conclude that as a matter of law the claims made on Nature’s Way coconut oil

- 12 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

products are not deceptive.

2. Violation of State or Federal Food Labeling Regulations

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs do not allege the manner in which any

statement on the coconut oil packaging constitutes a “health claim” under the FDA’s

definition. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs do not allege a violation of FDA

regulations regarding the use of the word “healthy” because they do not allege use of

the word “healthy” in connection with a nutrient claim. Defendants contend that

Plaintiffs do not allege plausible facts of reliance and causation in connection with an

alleged misbranding violation.

Plaintiffs contend that the coconut oil product labels violate general provisions

prohibiting misleading claims and also specific regulations by using nutrient claims

“non-hydrogenated” and “no trans fat,” and claims about the products’ medium

triglycerides/fatty acid content along with the claim “Variety of Healthy Uses.” 

Plaintiffs contend that the term “healthy” is used in connection with nutrient content

claims. Plaintiffs contend that they need not plead reliance to assert their UCL

“unlawful” claim but have alleged that they relied on the exact statements that violate

federal labeling regulations.

Section 101.65(d) of 21 C.F.R. governs “labeling claims that are implied nutrient

content claims because they: (i) Suggest that a food because of its nutrient content may

help consumers maintain healthy dietary practices; and (ii) Are made in connection with

an explicit or implicit claim or statement about a nutrient (e.g., ‘healthy, contains 3

grams of fat’).” Section 101.65(d) permits use of the term “healthy” or related terms

as an implied nutrient content claim on the label if the food is “Low fat as defined in §

101.62(b)(2),” “Low saturated fat as defined in § 101.62(c)(2),” “The disclosure level

for cholesterol specified in § 101.13(h) or less,” and “At least 10 percent of the RDI or

the DRV per RA of one or more of vitamin A, vitamin C, calcium, iron, protein or

fiber.” 21 C.F.R. § 101.65(d). 

 In this case, the parties dispute whether Defendant’s representation “Variety of

- 13 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Healthy Uses” was made in connection with a nutrient content claim. The Complaint

alleges that Defendants’ coconut oil products contain 14 grams of fat. Plaintiffs allege

that Defendants’ representation “Variety of Healthy Uses” is used in close proximity

on the products’ label to representations about “Non-hydrogenated; No trans fat” and

claims regarding medium chain triglyceride content. These allegations are plausibly

suggestive of a claim that Defendants use the term “healthy” in connection with a

nutrient content claim. Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to support an inference

that they relied on the representations that are the basis of the alleged labeling violations

and that the alleged labeling violations caused Plaintiffs’ economic injuries.

3. Breach of Warranty Claims

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ claims do not meet the standards to state a

claim for express breach of warranty because Plaintiffs do not allege any express

“affirmation of fact” made by Defendants that their coconut oil products are “inherently

healthy” or a “healthier alternative” to other oils and fats. Defendants contend that

Plaintiffs do not state a breach of implied warranty claim because Plaintiffs do not

allege that the coconut oil was unfit for its “ordinary purpose” or was below a

“minimum level of quality.” Defendants contend that Plaintiffs implied warranty

claims should be dismissed because Plaintiffs do not stand in direct contractual privity

with Defendants because they purchased the products from third parties.

Plaintiffs contend that they properly alleged that Defendants expressly warranted

Nature’s Way Extra Virgin Coconut Oil as “premium quality,” “healthy,” and “Ideal

for exercise and weight loss programs.” Plaintiffs contend that their implied warranty

claim stems from the products failure to conform to promises and affirmations made on

the container label, not a “minimum level of quality.” Plaintiff contends that where the

implied warranty claim is based on reliance on statements on a product’s packaging, the

plaintiff does not need to allege privity.

Under the California Commercial Code § 2313, “[t]o prevail on a breach of

express warranty claim, a plaintiff must prove that the seller (1) made an affirmation of

- 14 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

fact or promise or provided a description of its goods; (2) the promise or description

formed part of the basis of the bargain; (3) the express warranty was breached; and (4)

the breach caused injury to the plaintiff.” Viggiano v. Hansen Natural Corp., 944 F.

Supp. 2d 877, 893 (C.D. Cal. 2013). See also Long v. Graco Children’s Products Inc.,

Case No. 13-cv-1257-WHO, 2013 WL 4655763, at * 12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2013); In

re Ferrero Litigation, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 117. The Ninth Circuit has held that

“generalized, vague and unspecific assertions constitut[e] mere ‘puffery’ upon which

a reasonable consumer [cannot] rely.” Glen Holy Entertainment, Inc. v. Tektronix Inc,

343 F.3d 1000, 1015 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Viggiano, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 894 (“The

term ‘premium,’ however, is mere puffery; it has no concrete, discernable meaning . .

. and thus cannot give rise to a breach of warranty claim.”). 

Plaintiffs allege that defendants expressly warranted Extra Virgin Coconut Oil

as “premium quality,” “healthy,” and “Ideal for exercise and weight loss programs.” 

(Compl. ¶¶ 109, 167). Plaintiffs allege that they relied on these representations when

purchasing the product and that “Defendants breached their express warranties by

selling products that are not healthy” and increase the risk of serious diseases. Id. ¶

169. The Court concludes that Defendants’ use of the term “premium” is mere puffery 

because it has no concrete meaning in the context of coconut oil products and is not

actionable under a breach of warranty claim. See Viggiano, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 894. 

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Defendants’ use of the term

“healthy” and claim that the coconut oil product is “Ideal for exercise and weight loss

programs” are sufficient to show that Defendants made “affirmation[s] of fact or

promise[s] or provided a description of its goods.” See id. at 893. Plaintiffs have

alleged sufficient facts to infer that Plaintiffs relied on Defendants’ warranties and

Defendants’ breach of those warranties caused Plaintiffs injury. The Court concludes

that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for breach of express

warranty under the California Commercial Code § 2313.

Under California Commercial Code § 2314, “a warranty that the goods shall be

- 15 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with

respect to goods of that kind. . . . Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as .

. . are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and . . . conform to

the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.” Although

Defendants contend that Nature’s Way coconut oil products are fit for their ordinary

purpose of consumption, Plaintiffs bring their claim under the definition of

merchantability that requires a product to conform to “the promises or affirmations of

fact made on the container or label.” Cal. Com. Code § 2314(2)(f). The Court

concludes that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to support a claim for breach of

implied warranty of merchantability under § 2314(2)(f). See In re Ferrero Litigation,

794 F. Supp. 2d at 1118. 

Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for breach of implied

warranty of merchantability because Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support an inference

that Plaintiffs stand in direct contractual privity with Defendants because they

purchased the products from a third party retailer. “As the Ninth Circuit has explained,

however, although the general rule is that a plaintiff alleging a breach of implied

warranty ‘must stand in vertical privity with the defendant,’ an exception exists ‘when

the plaintiff relies on written labels or advertisements of a manufacturer.’” Johnson v.

Triple Leaf Tea Inc., (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2014) (finding that “plaintiff need not allege

privity” because “plaintiff’s implied warranty claim is based on her reliance on

statements on the packaging for Dieter’s Green”) (citing Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler

Corp., 534 F. 3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying California law). In this case,

Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims are based on their reliance on statements on the

labels of Nature’s Way coconut oil products. Plaintiffs need not allege privity. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ breach of warranty claims is denied.

4. UCL Claims

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim based on the “fraudulent”

and “unlawful” prongs of the UCL because they fail to state claims under the CLRA,

- 16 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

FAL, or for a breach of warranty. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim

under the “unfair” prong because the Complaint does not allege facts explaining why

the conduct is unfair or how it is immoral and instead pleads only labels and

conclusions.

Plaintiffs contend that the allegations alleged in the Complaint are sufficient to

state claims under all three independent prongs of the UCL. Plaintiffs contend that they

state a claim under the “unfair” prong because Plaintiffs may be able to prove facts

showing that the harm to the consumer from Defendants’ misrepresentation outweighed

the utility of Defendants’ practice.

To violate the UCL, a business practice must meet one of three criteria: unlawful,

unfair, or fraudulent. McKell v. Wash. Mut. Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1457, 1471 (2006). 

The UCL prohibits similarly “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal.

Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “Advertising is broadly defined to include virtually any

statements made in connection with the sale of goods or services, including statements

and pictures of labels.” Algarin v. Maybelline, LLC, 300 F.R.D. 444, 452 (S.D. Cal.

2014) (citing Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2008)). 

“The standard under . . . the ‘fraudulent’ prong of the UCL is the ‘reasonable

consumer’ test, which requires a plaintiff to show that members of the public are likely

to be deceived by the business practice or advertising at issue. Dorfman v. Nutramax

Laboratiries, Inc., No. 13cv0873 WQH (RBB), 2013 WL 5353043, at *10 (S.D. Cal.

Sept. 23, 2013) (citing Williams, 552 F.3d at 938). A UCL fraud claim must satisfy

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. Kearns v. Ford

Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009). “Rule 9(b) requires a party to state

with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake, including the who,

what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged.” Ebeid ex rel United States

v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). 

The Court has concluded that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to meet the

“reasonable consumer” test. Plaintiffs have alleged the locations and approximate dates

- 17 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

at which they purchased the Nature’s Way Extra Virgin Olive Oil. Plaintiffs identify

the allegedly false and misleading representations made by Defendants. Plaintiffs cite

scientific studies that allegedly undermine Defendants’ representations. The Court

finds that these allegations are “sufficient[ly] detail[ed] . . . to give us some assurance

that [Plaintiffs’] theory has a basis in fact.” Dorfman, 2013 WL 5353043, at *12

(quoting Berson v. Applied Signal Tech, Inc., 527 F.3d 982, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Plaintiffs allegations provide Defendants with sufficient notice to defend the claims

against them. See id. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts

to meet the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) and to state a claim under the

“fraudulent” prong of the UCL. The motion to dismiss the UCL “fraudulent” prong

claim is denied.

“Under the UCL, an ‘unlawful’ business practice is an act or practice, committed

pursuant to business activity, that is at the same time forbidden by law.” Id. (quotation

omitted). “The UCL borrows violations from virtually any state, federal, or local law

and makes them independently actionable.” Id. (quotation omitted). Having concluded

that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged claims against Defendant for express and implied

breaches of warranty, violations of FDA regulations, and violations of the FAL and

CLRA, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a claim against

Defendants for “unlawful” conduct in violation of the UCL.

“Under the unfair prong, a plaintiff must allege facts to establish ‘the practice is

immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers’

or tether the UCL ‘to some specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions.” 

Bautista v. Valero Marketing and Supply Co., (quoting Hodson v. Mars, Case No. 15-

cv-04450-RS, 2016 WL 627383, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2016)). When a plaintiff’s

claims sound in fraud, courts in this circuit have applied Rule 9(b)’s heightened

pleading standard to not just the “fraudulent” prong of the UCL, but the “unlawful” and

“unfair” prongs as well. See Bautista, at *2; Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120,

1125 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants’ conduct with respect to the

- 18 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

labeling, advertising, and sale of the Nature’s Way coconut oil products was unfair

because defendants’ conduct was immoral, unethical, unscrupulous, or substantially

injurious to consumers, and the utility of their conduct, if any, does not outweigh the

gravity of harm to their victims.” (Compl. ¶ 142). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’

conduct was also unfair “because it violates public policy as declared by specific

constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions, including but not limited to the False

Advertising Law, portions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and portions

of the California Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law.” Id. ¶ 143. Plaintiffs allege

that “Defendants profited from the sale of the falsely, deceptively, and unlawfully

advertised Nature’s Way coconut oil products to unwary consumers.” Id. ¶ 145. The

Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations regarding Defendants’ “unfair”

business practices are not pleaded with sufficient specificity to state a claim under the

“unfair” prong of the UCL. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under the UCL is granted as to

Plaintiffs’ claim under the “unfair” prong of the UCL and denied as to Plaintiffs’ claims

under the “fraudulent” and “unlawful” prongs of the UCL.

5. Statute of Limitations

Defendants contend that Plaintiff Levin has not alleged sufficient facts to show

that she was not negligent in failing to make the discovery regarding the alleged

misbranding sooner and she had no actual or presumptive knowledge of facts sufficient

to put her on notice. Defendants contend that the Complaint does not allege facts to

show that Plaintiff Levin was unable to learn of the alleged misrepresentations by using

reasonable diligence.

Plaintiffs contend that Plaintiff Levin adequately pleads delayed discovery. 

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ assertion that all of Plaintiff Levin’s claims are timebarred ignores the continuing violation doctrine, under which all of Plaintiff Levin’s

claims accrued within the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs contend that the only

question is whether the delayed discovery doctrine allows Plaintiff to also seek damages

- 19 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

for injuries incurred before the statute of limitations period.

The statute of limitations for actions under the FAL or CLRA is three years. Cal.

Code Civ. Proc. § 338(a); Cal. Civ. Code § 1783. The statute of limitations for UCL

or breach of warranty claims is four years. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208. “The

limitations period, the period in which a plaintiff must bring suit or be barred, runs from

the moment a claim accrues . . . . [O]rdinarily, the statute of limitations runs from the

occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action.” Aryeh v. Canon

Business Solutions, Inc., 292 P.3d 871, 875 (Cal. 2013) (quotations omitted). “To align

the actual application of the limitations defense more closely with the policy goals

animating it, the courts and the Legislature have over time developed a handful of

equitable exceptions to and modifications of the usual rules governing limitations

periods.” Id. “The most important of these doctrines, the [delayed] discovery rule,

where applicable, postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or

has reason to discover, the cause of action.” Id. (quotations omitted). Under another

exception, “the theory of continuous accrual, a series of wrongs or injuries may be

viewed as each triggering its own limitations period, such that a suit for relief may be

partially time-barred as to older events but timely as to those within the applicable

limitations period.” Id. The continuing violation doctrine is meant to serve equitable

purposes when “injuries are the product of a series of small harms, any one of which

may not be actionable on its own,” or when the plaintiff has alleged “a pattern of

reasonably frequent and similar acts . . . justifying treating the acts as an indivisible

course of conduct actionable in its entirety, notwithstanding that the conduct occurred

partially outside and partially inside the limitations period.” Id. at 879. 

The theory is a response to the inequities that would arise if the expiration of the limitations period following a first breach of duty or instance of

misconduct were treated as sufficient to bar suit for any subsequent breach or misconduct; parties engaged in long-standing misfeasance would thereby obtain immunity in perpetuity from suit even for recent and ongoing misfeasance. In addition, where the misfeasance is ongoing, a

defendant’s claim to repose, the principal justification underlying the limitations defense, is vitiated.

Id. at 880. The burden is on the plaintiff to allege that his or her claims fall within the

- 20 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 20 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

applicable statute of limitations or survive based on an exception to limitations period. 

See id. at 879.

In this case, Plaintiff Levin alleges that she purchased Defendants’ product

“approximately five years ago” and “[s]ince that time, until recently, she has purchased

the product approximately once per month.” (Compl. ¶ 108). Plaintiff Levin alleges

that when she bought Nature’s Way Extra Virgin Coconut Oil, she relied on the alleged

misrepresentations on the label. Id. ¶ 109. Plaintiff Levin adequately alleges that she

relied on misrepresentations Defendants made on their Extra Virgin Coconut Oil and

that the misrepresentations constituted a continuing violation over the course of the

approximately five years that Plaintiff Levin continued to purchase the Extra Virgin

Coconut Oil. The Court finds that Plaintiff Levin has sufficiently alleged facts to infer

that the continuing violation doctrine provides an exception to the statutes of limitations

for the FAL, UCL, CLRA, and breach of warranty claims in this case. The Court

concludes that Plaintiff Levin has plausibly alleged UCL and breach of warranty claims

for the four-year statute of limitations and FAL and CLRA claims for the three-year

statute of limitations preceding the filing of the Complaint.

The remaining issue regarding the statute of limitations is whether Plaintiff Levin

has sufficiently alleged that the delayed discovery doctrine applies, thus allowing her

to bring claims that accrued outside of the respective statute of limitations periods. “In

California, the delayed discovery rule postpones accrual of a claim until ‘the plaintiff

discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.’” Plumlee v. Pfizer, Inc., No.

13-cv-00414, 2014 WL 695024, at * 8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014) (quoting Clemens v.

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be

barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence. The burden is on the plaintiff to show diligence, and conclusory allegations will not withstand a motion to dismiss.

Id.

Plaintiff Levin alleges that she “did not discover that defendants’ labeling of the

- 21 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 21 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Nature’s Way Extra Virgin Coconut Oil was false, deceptive, or misleading until

approximately December 2015 when she spoke with her counsel in this matter.” Id. ¶

123. The Complaint alleges that “Ms. Levin, in the exercise of reasonable diligence,

could not have discovered defendants’ deceptive practices earlier because, like nearly

all consumers, she does not have access to scholarly publications where the scientific

evidence of negative health effects of coconut oils on human health has been

published.” Id. ¶ 124. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff Levin “is a lay consumer

who did not possess the specialized knowledge defendants possessed regarding the

negative health effects of coconut oil.” Id. ¶ 125.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff Levin has not met her burden of pleading facts

that show her diligence. The Complaint does not provide an adequate basis for the

Court to conclude Plaintiff Levin was unable to discover the facts to support her claims

earlier despite reasonable diligence. Plaintiff Levin pleads no facts that would support

a finding that she was “not negligent in failing to make the discovery sooner and that

[s]he had no actual or presumptive knowledge of facts sufficient to put [her] on

inquiry.” Plumlee, 2014 WL 695024, at * 9 (quoting Clemens, 534 F.3d at 1024). 

While Plaintiff alleges that she did not have access to publications where scientific

evidence about coconut oil and human health have been published, Defendants note that

the Complaint lists sources on the internet for the studies cited in the Complaint.

Plaintiff does not allege that she took any steps towards discovery. Because Plaintiff

Levin has failed to meet her burden to adequately plead the inability to have made an

earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence, Plaintiff Levin’s claims for alleged

violations that occurred outside of the respective statute of limitations for the CLRA,

UCL, FAL, and breach of warranty claims are time-barred. Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Plaintiff Levin’s claims based on the delayed discovery rule is granted, however

Plaintiff Levin’s claims remain pending insofar as they fall within the statutes of

limitations allowed by the continuing violation doctrine. 

6. Standing to Pursue Injunctive Relief

- 22 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 22 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue injunctive relief

because Plaintiffs do not allege that they will buy the coconut oil product again. 

Plaintiffs contend that there is a spit in the Ninth Circuit regarding whether a

plaintiff may seek injunctive relief when he or she is aware that the challenged

advertising is deceptive. Plaintiffs contend that consumers have a broad right to be free

from deception in the marketplace regardless of whether the Plaintiff is now aware of

the deception or intends to purchase the products in the future. Plaintiffs contend that

as class representatives, they have standing to seek injunctive relief on behalf of absent

class members that are unaware of the deception. 

To have standing to pursue prospective injunctive relief, Article III of the United

States Constitution requires a plaintiff to “demonstrate a real and immediate threat of

repeated injury in the future.” Chapman v. Pier I Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946

(9th Cir. 2011). “To establish standing to prospective injunctive relief, Plaintiff must

demonstrate that ‘he has suffered or is threatened with a ‘concrete and particularized’

legal harm . . . coupled with ‘a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a

similar way.’ Plaintiff must establish a ‘real and immediate threat of repeated injury.’”

Mason v. Nature’s Innovation, Inc., No. 12cv3019 BTM-DHB, 2013 WL 1969957

(S.D. Cal. May 13, 2013) (quoting Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985

(9th Cir. 2007). This Court has recognized that “courts in this circuit ‘are split over the

issue of whether a plaintiff, who is seeking to enjoin a seller or manufacturer from

making false or misleading misrepresentations about an item the plaintiff previously

purchased, must be able to establish that he would likely purchase the item again to

establish standing.” Dorfman v. Nutramax Laboratiries, Inc., No. 13cv0873 WQH

(RBB), 2013 WL 5353043, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2013) (quoting Mason, 2013 WL

1969957, at *2-3). The court in Mason explained: 

[As important as consumer protection is, it is not within the Court’s

authority to carve out an exception to Article III’s standing requirements

to further the purpose of California consumer protection laws . . . . 

Moreover, plaintiffs who have no intention of again purchasing a product that is the focus of false advertising claims are not precluded from seeking

- 23 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 23 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

an injunctive remedy because they can sue in state court. In assessing standing, California courts are not bound by the ‘case or controversy

requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution, but instead are

guided by prudential considerations. 

Mason, 2013 WL 1969957, at *4-5 (quotations omitted). In Mason and Dorfman, the

Court found that, based on the plaintiffs’ allegations that the products at issue were

ineffective, the plaintiffs did not intend to purchase the products again and concluded

that the plaintiffs “had failed to adequately allege that [they faced] a ‘real and

immediate threat of repeated injury.’” Dorfman, 2013 WL 5353043, at *9 (quoting

Bates, 511 F.3d at 985).

In this case, Plaintiffs have alleged similar facts and causes of action as the

plaintiffs in Mason and Dorfman, which were also class action suits related to deceptive

advertising of consumer products. Plaintiffs do not allege that they will purchase

Defendants’ coconut oil products in the future. Plaintiffs allege that they would not

have purchased the products if they knew that it was misbranded or that the labeling

claims were false or misleading. These allegations support an inference that now that

Plaintiffs are aware of the alleged misrepresentations on the coconut oil labels,

Plaintiffs will not purchase the products in the future. Accordingly, the Court finds that

Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they face a “real and immediate threat of repeated

injury.” Bates, 511 F.3d at 985. Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to seek injunctive

relief. See id. The motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief is granted.

7. Standing for Claims Regarding Liquid Coconut Oil

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts to support standing as

to the Nature’s Way Liquid Coconut Oil because neither Plaintiff alleges that they

bought the liquid product or that the Extra Virgin Coconut Oil and the Liquid Coconut

Oil products are substantially similar. Plaintiffs contend that they may assert claims on

behalf of the class concerning substantially similar products that they did not purchase,

but that this determination is made at the class certification stage of the proceedings.

“In the Ninth Circuit, there is ‘no controlling authority’ on whether a plaintiff in

a class action has standing to assert claims based on products he did not purchase.” 

- 24 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 24 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Morales v. Unilever U.S., Inc., Civ. No. 2:13-2213 WBS EFB, 2014 WL 1389613, at

*4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014) (quoting Miller v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Co., 912 F. Supp.

2d 861, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2012). “However, “[t]he majority of the courts that have

carefully analyzed the question hold that a plaintiff may have standing to assert claims

for unnamed class members based on products he or she did not purchase as long as the

products and alleged misrepresentations are substantially similar.” Id. “Factors that .

. . courts have considered include whether the challenged products are the same kind,

whether they are comprised of largely the same ingredients, and whether each of the

challenged products bears the same alleged mislabeling.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. FritoLay N. Am., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140-41 (N.D. Cal. 2013)).

This case is distinguishable from the case Defendant’s rely on, Wilson v. FritoLay North America, in which the Court held that plaintiffs lacked standing as to

products they did not purchase because “Plaintiffs simply provide[d] a list of NonPurchased Products, attach[ed] barely-legible labels . . . and assert that these labels are

lawful or misleading.” 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1141. The court in Wilson held that

plaintiffs’ allegations were “not enough–the Court cannot just assume that every one

of the Non-Purchased Products’ labels is actionable in the same way as the more fully

described Purchased Products labels are.” Id. In this case, although the Plaintiffs do

not allege that they have purchased the liquid coconut oil product, they allege that both

types of coconut oil have the same composition: “in each 14-gram serving there are 14

grams of fat. Further, each 14-gram serving contains 13 grams of saturated fat.” 

(Compl. ¶ 54). Plaintiffs allege that the claims made on the labels of both types of

coconut oil products are nearly identical, both products containing the claims: “variety

of healthy uses,” “premium,” “non-hydrogenated,” “no trans fat,” and Natural Energy.” 

Id. ¶¶ 60-62, 70-73. Plaintiffs also allege that both coconut oil products contain

assertions that the product can be used in place of “butter, margarine” and other

vegetable or cooking oils. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient

facts to show that Nature’s Way Liquid Coconut Oil is substantially similar to Nature’s

- 25 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 25 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Way Extra Virgin Coconut Oil. Plaintiffs have standing to bring claims on behalf of

putative class members alleging that Nature’s Way Liquid Coconut Oil was mislabeled.

IV. Motion to Strike

Defendants contend that the Complaint contains immaterial and impertinent

allegations, specifically references to websites that Plaintiffs do not allege they viewed,

allegations about a product they do not allege they bought, and defective class

allegations, that should be stricken to avoid the expenditure of time and money required

to litigate the allegations. Plaintiffs contend that allegations related to websites and

products Plaintiffs did not purchase are relevant to the class action. Plaintiffs contend

that Defendants’ contentions that Plaintiffs’ class allegations should be struck are

premature at this stage in the proceedings.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a court “may strike from a

pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter.” Motions to strike are generally disfavored and “should not be

granted unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing

on the subject matter of the litigation.” Neveau v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1159,

1170 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335,

1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991)). “[C]ourts often require a showing of prejudice by the moving

party before granting” a motion to strike, and “[u]ltimately, whether to grant a motion

to strike lies within the sound discretion of the district court.” Cal. Dept. of Toxic

Substances Control v. Alco Pacific, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2002)

(citing Fantasy, Inc., v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993)). In exercising

its discretion, the court views the pleadings in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party, and “resolves any doubt as to the relevance of the challenged

allegations or sufficiency of a defense in the defendant’s favor.” Cal. Dept. of Toxic

Substances Control, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1033. “Even when the defense under attack

presents a purely legal question, courts are reluctant to determine disputed or substantial

questions of law on a motion to strike.” S.E.C. v. Sands, 902 F. Supp. 1149, 1166 (C.D.

- 26 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 26 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cal. 1995). 

With regard to Defendants’ motion to strike allegations regarding statements on

Defendants’ website and allegations regarding the coconut oil product not purchased

by Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that issues regarding whether these allegations are

material to the litigation will be better resolved at the class certification stage of the

proceedings. See Musgrave v. ICC/Marie Callender’s Gourmet Prods. Div., Case No.

14-cv-02006-JST, 2015 WL 510919, at *34-35 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2015) (“The Court

disagrees with Defendant that these allegations are ‘immaterial’ to the case. . . . [E]ven

though Plaintiff has not alleged that he personally relied on Defendant’s website and

advertising materials, these materials may be relevant to class certification and absent

class members’ reliance on Defendants’ promotional materials.”). 

The Court has determined that allegations regarding the Nature’s Way Coconut

Oil products that Plaintiffs did not purchase are sufficient to state a claim at this stage

in the proceedings. Whether the coconut oil products are substantially similar is an

issue that will be addressed at the class certification stage of the proceedings. See Kosta

v. Del Monte Corp., No. 12-cv-01722, 2013 WL 2147413, at *51 (N.D. Cal. May 15,

2013) (denying a motion to strike allegations regarding products not purchased because

“these products and representations are sufficiently similar to those purchased and seen

by Plaintiffs, and any concerns regarding the differences among products at issue are

better resolved at the class certification stage.”).

With regard to Defendants’ motion to strike class allegations of the Complaint,

the Court concludes that the class issues are more appropriately considered at the class

certifications stage of the proceedings. See In re Jamster Mktg. Litig., No. 05cv0819

JM (CAB), 2009 WL 1456632, at * 7 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2009) (“Even though the

arguments of [defendant] may ultimately prove persuasive, the court declines to address

issues of class certification at the present time. Piece-meal resolution of issues related

to the prerequisites for maintaining a class action do not serve the best interests of the

court or parties.”); In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage and Hour Litigation, 505 F. Supp.

- 27 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 27 of

28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2d 609, 615-16 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“In the absence of any discovery or specific

arguments related to class certification, the Court is not prepared to rule on the propriety

of the class allegations and explicitly reserves such a ruling. . . . [P]laintiffs should at

least be given the opportunity to make the case for certification based on appropriate

discovery . . . .”). Defendants’ motion to strike allegations of the Complaint is denied.

V. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 12) filed by

Defendants is granted in part and denied in part. The motion to dismiss is granted as

to Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief and Plaintiffs claims under the “unfair” prong

of the UCL. Defendants motion is denied as to all other claims

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to strike allegations of the

Complaint (ECF No. 13) filed by Defendants is denied.

DATED: August 12, 2016

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

- 28 - 16cv532-WQH-BLM

Case 3:16-cv-00532-WQH-AGS Document 28 Filed 08/12/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 28 of

28