Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-03106/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-03106-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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Case No.: 5:18-cv-03106-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ALBERT C. ALVAREZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

TRANSITAMERICA SERVICES, INC., et 

al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Case No. 5:18-cv-03106-EJD 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING INPART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 20

Plaintiff Albert C. Alvarez brings this putative class action suit against Defendants 

Transitamerica Services, Inc. and Herzog Transit Services, Inc. (“Defendants”) alleging violations 

of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., and wage and hour violations under 

California law. Defendants removed the action asserting federal question jurisdiction. Pursuant to 

Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants now move to 

dismiss causes of action 5 through 9, 11, and the portion of 10 that is based on Counts 5 through 9 

of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims 

are preempted by the federal Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (the “RLA”).

The Court finds it appropriate to take the motion under submission for decision without 

oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ 

motion is granted in part and denied in part.

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

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II. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a non-exempt, hourly employee from approximately 

April 13, 2015, until he was terminated on or about May 28, 2017. Plaintiff was not provided with 

meal periods and rest periods that complied with California law when Plaintiff was “required to 

work double shifts and/or to fill in for other employees.” First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 27, 30. “In 

other words, when Plaintiff and the putative class were dispatched to work another shift, there was 

no time for them to take their meal periods [and rest periods] and they would have to continue 

working.” Id. Plaintiff was also not provided with meal periods and rest periods because of “(1) 

Defendants’ policy of not scheduling each meal period [and rest period] as part of each work shift; 

(2) chronically understaffing each work shift with not enough workers; (3) imposing so much 

work on each employee such that it made it unlikely that an employee would be able to take their 

breaks if they wanted to finish their work on time; and (4) no formal written meal and rest period 

policy that encouraged employees to take their meal and rest periods.” Id. ¶¶ 28, 31. Plaintiff was 

also not provided with wage statements that accurately reflected (1) all hours worked, including 

overtime and (2) any and all meal and rest period premium wages. Id. ¶¶ 34-36. 

The Complaint includes several claims for violations of California state and hour laws, as 

well as derivative claims for waiting time penalties, violation of the California Private Attorneys 

General Act, Labor Code §§ 2698 et seq. (“PAGA”), and unfair competition. More specifically, 

causes of action 5 through 11 state claims under California law for: Failure to Provide Meal 

Periods (Lab. Code §§ 204, 223, 226.7, 512 and 1198); Failure to Provide Rest Periods (Lab. Code 

§§ 204, 223, 226.7 and 1198); Failure to Pay Hourly Wages (Lab. Code §§ 223, 510, 1194, 

1194.2, 1197, 1997.1 and 1198); Failure to Provide Accurate Written Wage Statements (Lab. 

Code §§ 226(a)); Failure to Timely Pay All Final Wages (Lab. Code §§ 201, 202 and 203); Unfair 

Competition (Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.); and Civil Penalties (Labor Code §§2698 et 

 

1 The Background is a summary of the allegations in the First Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 15) 

that are relevant to Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

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seq.). 

III. STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient 

specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which 

it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). The 

factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level” such that the claim “is plausible on its face.” Id. at 556-57. A complaint that falls short of 

the Rule 8(a) standard may be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the 

complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 

Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).

When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court must generally accept as 

true all “well-pleaded factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). The court 

must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Retail Prop. 

Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014) (providing 

the court must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party” for a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion). However, “courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as 

a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Also, the court usually does not consider any material beyond the pleadings for a Rule 

12(b)(6) analysis. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 

(9th Cir. 1990). Exceptions to this rule include material submitted as part of the complaint or 

relied upon in the complaint, and material subject to judicial notice. See Lee v. City of Los 

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-69 (9th Cir. 2001).

IV. DISCUSSION

Congress enacted the RLA “to promote stability in the railroad industry and to provide for 

prompt and efficient resolution of labor-management disputes arising out of railroad collective 

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bargaining agreements.” Lewy v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 799 F.2d 1281, 1289 (9th Cir. 

1986). In enacting the RLA, Congress intended to keep certain types of railroad labor disputes out 

of the courts and instead require use of grievance procedures and arbitration. Id. at 1289. To that 

end, the RLA2provides “a mandatory arbitral mechanism to handle disputes ‘growing out of 

grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, 

or working conditions ....’” Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 248 (1994) (quoting

45 U.S.C. § 153).3 

There are two classes of disputes subject to arbitration under the RLA, “major” disputes 

and “minor” disputes. Id. at 252; see also 45 U.S.C. § 151a. Major disputes relate to the 

formation of collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) or efforts to secure them. Id. at 252

(quoting Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 491 U.S. 

299, 302 (1989)). In contrast, minor disputes “gro[w] out of grievances or out of the interpretation

or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.” Id. (quoting 15 

U.S.C. § 151a). Minor disputes involve the interpretation or application of CBAs in a particular 

instance. See id. at 252-253. Thus, major disputes seek to create contractual rights, whereas 

minor disputes seek to enforce the contractual rights. Id. at 253. Stated differently, “[t]he 

distinguishing feature of [a minor dispute] in that the dispute may be conclusively resolved by 

interpreting the existing [CBA].” Id. at 256 (quoting Conrail, 491 U.S. at 305).

Whether RLA preemption applies depends upon the source of the right asserted by the 

plaintiff. See Angeles v. U.S. Airways, Inc., No. 12-5860 CRB, 2013 WL 622032, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

Feb. 19, 2013) (citing Espinal v. Northwest Airlines, 90 F.3d 1452, 1456 (9th Cir. 1996)). “[T]he 

RLA’s mechanism for resolving minor disputes does not pre-empt causes of action to enforce 

 

2 The RLA “is similar to the National Labor Relations Act (‘NLRA’) in that it regulates the 

process of negotiations for the creation and modification of” CBAs. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. 

City & County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 1064, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2001). “The RLA is also 

similar to the Labor Management Relations Act (‘LMRA’) in that it creates a system for dispute 

resolution for grievances arising from CBAs.” Id. 

3 The RLA applies to the airline industry. 42 U.S.C. § 181. 

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rights that are independent of the CBA.” Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 256. 

In Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louis v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 

(1943), a union complained to the Illinois Commerce Commission of its employer’s failure to 

provide caboose cars. A Commission order required cabooses on all designated runs within 

Illinois, whereas the operative CBA required cabooses only on some of the trains. The Supreme 

Court held that the RLA did not preempt the Commission’s order. Id. at 6. The Court stated that 

the RLA, “like the National Labor Relations Act, does not undertake governmental regulation of 

wages, hours, or working conditions. Instead it seeks to provide a means by which agreement may 

be reached with respect to them.” Id. In other words, the RLA “does not fix and does not 

authorize anyone to fix generally applicable standards for working conditions.” Id. The federal 

interest that is fostered by the RLA “is to see that disagreement about conditions does not reach 

the point of interfering with interstate commerce.” Id. “The Mediation Board and Adjustment 

Board act to compose differences that threaten continuity of work, not to remove conditions that 

threaten the health or safety of workers.” Id. The Court described the relationship between the 

RLA and state laws as follows:

State laws have long regulated a great variety of conditions in 

transportation and industry, such as sanitary facilities and 

conditions, safety devices and protections, purity of water supply, 

fire protection, and innumerable others. Any of these matters might, 

we suppose, be the subject of a demand by workmen for better 

protection and upon refusal might be the subject of a labor dispute 

which would have such effect on interstate commerce that federal 

agencies might be invoked to deal with some phase of it. But we 

would hardly be expected to hold that the price of the federal effort 

to protect the peace and continuity of commerce has been to strike 

down state sanitary codes, health regulations, factory inspections, 

and safety provisions for industry and transportation. We suppose 

employees might consider that state or municipal requirements of 

fire escapes, fire doors, and fire protection were inadequate and 

make them the subject of a dispute, at least some phases of which 

would be of federal concern. But it cannot be that the minimum 

requirements laid down by state authority are all set aside. We hold 

that the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a 

pre-emption of the field of regulating working conditions 

themselves . . .

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Id. at 6-7; see also Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 920 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Congress 

did not intend to preempt state law claims simply because they in some respect implicate CBA 

provisions.”). Thus, “substantive protections provided by state law, independent of whatever 

labor agreement might govern, are not pre-empted under the RLA.” Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. 

at 257 (citing Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931)); see also Air Transp. 

Ass’n of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 1064, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(ordinance prohibiting city from contracting with companies whose provisions of employee 

benefits discriminated between employees with spouses and employees with domestic partners not 

preempted by RLA); Espinal v. Northwest Airlines, 90 F.3d 1452 (9th Cir. 1996) (employee’s 

state law discrimination claims not preempted by RLA, but breach of contract claims were); 

In the context of wrongful discharge claims, the Court has held that a plaintiff’s claim was 

preempted because the “only source” of the plaintiff’s right to not be discharged was the CBA. 

See Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 406 U.S. 320 (1972). In comparison, the Court has 

held that a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy or in retaliation for whistleblowing, was not preempted because the CBA was not the “only source” of plaintiff’s right. 

Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 258. 

Consistent with the Supreme Court cases, the Ninth Circuit has instructed that a state law 

claim is preempted if it necessarily requires the court to interpret an existing provision of a CBA 

that “can reasonably be said to be relevant to the resolution of the dispute.” Cramer v. 

Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 693 (9th Cir. 2001) (LMRA did not preempt claims 

for invasion of privacy and emotional distress based on use of two-way mirrors in terminal 

restrooms, ostensibly to detect and prevent drug use, because CBA provisions permitting 

surveillance clearly applied only to circumstances involving charges of theft or dishonesty). In 

contrast, “[a] claim that requires only reference to a CBA, but no interpretation, is not preempted.” 

Id.; State law claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with the interpretation of a CBA, 

however, are preempted. Edelman v. Western Airlines, Inc., 892 F.2d 839, 845 (9th Cir. 1989)

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(state law claims for wrongful infliction of emotional distress and defamation preempted by RLA 

because resolution of claims required analysis of CBA to decide whether discharge was justified).

In the present case, Defendants contend that resolution of Plaintiff’s claims would require 

both application and interpretation of the two CBAs governing Plaintiff’s employment.4

Defendants reason that the two CBAs control Plaintiff’s hours of work, rates of pay, overtime 

rates, breaks owed, deductions allowed, wage statements, the manner and means of payment, and 

all of the other significant terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment. As such, Defendants 

contend that the court would need to consult and interpret the CBAs to determine Defendants’ 

liability, if any, and calculated damages. Plaintiff responds that his claims are not preempted 

because they do not require any analysis of a CBA. Plaintiff’s Opposition, p. 4.5 

The court discusses each claim separately below to determine whether resolution of the 

claim requires interpretation or application of, and not merely reference to, the CBAs.

A. Meal Period Claim 

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is based upon allegations that he “was not subject to a valid 

on-duty meal period agreement” and that Defendants “maintained a policy or practice of not 

providing” Plaintiff with uninterrupted, duty-free meal periods for at least thirty minutes for every 

five (5) hour work period. Complaint ¶¶ 107-108. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants 

maintained a policy or practice of failing to pay premium wages when he worked five (5) hours 

without clocking out for any meal period. Id. ¶ 109. Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 

maintained “a policy or practice of not providing” Plaintiff with a second meal period when he

worked shifts of ten or more hours and failed to pay him premium wages. Id. ¶ 110. Plaintiff 

alleges that “Defendants[’] written policies do not provide that employees must take their first 

meal period before the end of the fifth hour of work, that they are entitled to a second meal period 

 

4 The CBAs are attached as Exhibits A and B to the Declaration of Bret George. 

5 Plaintiff also contends that he is not “covered by any CBA implicating” the RLA. Id. However, 

Plaintiff never actually denies that his employment was governed by the CBAs relied upon by 

Defendants. Nor does Plaintiff offer any facts or legal argument to support his assertion. 

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if they work a shift of over ten hours, or that the second meal period must commence before the 

end of the tenth hour of work, unless waived.” Id. 

To the extent the fifth cause of action challenges the validity of Plaintiff’s “agreement” and 

“written policies” with Defendants regarding meal periods, the claim requires interpretation of the 

CBAs. The only plausible sources of any meal agreement or policies between the parties are the 

CBAs referenced by Defendants. The validity of the meal agreement and policies cannot be 

determined without interpretation of the CBAs. See e.g., Pa. Fed’n. of Broth. of Maintenance of 

Way Employees v. Nat’l. R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 989 F.2d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 1993)

(plaintiff’s claim for state law minimum wages for travel time preempted by the RLA because 

resolution of claim required interpretation of the CBA to determine the duties of an employee, 

what constituted normal working hours, and when an employee was required to be on the 

premises, to be on duty, or to be at a prescribed work place). Therefore, the fifth cause of action is 

preempted and subject to dismissal insofar as it challenges the validity of Plaintiff’s agreement 

and “written policies” with Defendants regarding meal periods.

Plaintiff’s Complaint and opposition to Defendants’ motion raise another basis for the 

meal period claim, namely that Defendants required employees to work double shifts and/or to fill 

in for other employees without providing meal breaks. See Complaint ¶ 27; Plaintiff’s Opposition 

at 2. To the extent Plaintiff intends to pursue a meal period claim based on this alternative theory, 

Defendants have not established that the claim would be preempted. Defendants have not pointed 

to any particular term or provision in the CBAs that must be interpreted or applied in order to 

determine Defendants’ meal period obligations when an employee is working a double shift or 

filling in for another employee. That the CBAs’ provisions regarding meal periods may need to be 

consulted for information will not result in preemption. See Firestone v. Southern California Gas 

Co., 219 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999) (“When the meaning of particular contract terms is not 

disputed, the fact that a collective bargaining agreement must be consulted for information will not 

result in § 301 preemption.”).

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Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is dismissed with leave to amend. 

B. Rest Periods Claim

In the sixth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “maintained a policy or 

practice of not providing” Plaintiff with a rest period of at least ten minutes for each four hour 

work period, or major fraction thereof. Complaint ¶ 121. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that 

“Defendants[’] written policies do not provide that employees may take a rest period for each four 

hours worked, or major fraction thereof, and that rest periods should be taken in the middle of 

each work period insofar as practicable.” Id. ¶ 123. 

To the extent the sixth cause of action challenges the validity of “written policies,” the 

claim requires interpretation of Defendants’ written policies, namely the CBAs. Accordingly, the 

sixth cause of action is preempted insofar as it challenges “written policies.” See e.g., Pa. Fed’n. 

of BMWE v. Nat’l. R.R. Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK), 989 F.2d at 115.

Plaintiff’s rest period claim is also based upon Defendants’ “policy and practice of 

requiring Plaintiff and class members to work double shifts that did not permit them to take their 

rest period.” Complaint ¶ 30; Plaintiff’s Opposition at p. 3. To the extent Plaintiff intends to 

pursue a rest period claim based on this alternative theory, Defendants have not established that 

the claim would be preempted. Defendants have not pointed to any term or provision in the CBAs 

that must be interpreted or applied in order to determine Defendants’ rest period obligations when 

an employee is working a double shift or filling in for another employee. That the CBAs’ 

provisions regarding rest periods may need to be consulted for information will not result in 

preemption. See Firestone v. Southern California Gas Co., 219 F.3d at 1065.

The sixth cause of action is dismissed with leave to amend.

C. Failure to Pay Hourly and Overtime Wages

In the seventh cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “have applied centrally 

devised policies and practices” with respect to working conditions and compensation 

arrangements. Complaint ¶ 139. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to pay all earned wages 

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“because Defendants directed, permitted or otherwise encouraged Plaintiff . . . to perform off-theclock work.” Id. ¶¶ 140-141.

Defendants contend that the seventh cause of action is preempted because “the CBAs 

specifically define the hours of work, compensation to be paid, when overtime is triggered, and at 

what rate overtime should be paid.” Reply, p. 10. Further, Defendants contend that the CBAs 

contain multiple, complex provisions relating to when overtime can be worked and at what rates 

overtime will be paid. Id.

At the pleading stage, Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive because Defendants have not 

identified any particular term within the CBAs that will require application or interpretation to 

decide whether Plaintiff was required to work off-the-clock. Instead, Defendants cite to 

provisions in the CBAs that may affect calculation of damages in the event Plaintiff prevails on 

the merits of the off-the-clock claim. The potential need to consult the CBAs for damages 

computation, however, does not mean the claim is preempted. Angeles, 2013 WL 622032 at *6

(citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994)); cf Fitz-Gerald v. SkyWest, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 

4th 411, 421 (2007) (claims preempted because damages could not be calculated without reference 

to and application of the CBA’s definition of “flight pay” and “block time pay”); and Adames v. 

Executive Airlines, Inc., 258 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2001) (claims under Puerto Rico laws dealing with 

wages, overtime pay, maternity benefits, meal periods, days off, vacation and other matters were 

preempted because resolution required interpretation of several CBA terms, including but not 

limited to “guarantee,” “flight time,” “on-duty” time, base and overtime pay, “reserve time,” 

“Company policy” and “applicable law,” as well as consideration of industry practices). 

D. Derivative Claims Written

 Plaintiff asserts several claims that are derivative of his substantive claims. The 

preemption analysis set forth above for the fifth through seventh causes of action applies to the 

derivative claims. See e.g. Fitz-Gerald, 155 Cal. App. 4th at 422; Blackwell v. SkyWest Airlines, 

Inc., No. 06-307 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5103195 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008).

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED with leave to 

amend as to the fifth and sixth causes of action, and the portions of the eighth, ninth, tenth and 

eleventh causes of action that are based on the fifth and sixth causes of action, and DENIED as to 

the seventh cause of action and the portions of the eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh causes of 

action that are based on the seventh cause of action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 9, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

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