Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-00622/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-00622-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

WARDEN, SOLANO STATE PRISON, et 

al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-00622 DB P

ORDER

Plaintiff, an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, seeks relief pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious 

medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Presently before the court is

plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) for screening. (ECF No. 21.) For the reasons 

set forth below, the court will give plaintiff the option of proceeding on his cognizable claims or 

being given leave to file an amended complaint.

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SCREENING

I. Legal Standards

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 

that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. Rule 8(a)(2) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what 

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must 

contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain 

factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 

550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 

allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 

738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 

doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

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The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . 

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 

or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 

1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform 

an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 

their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 

holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); 

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

II. Linkage Requirement

Under Section 1983, a plaintiff bringing an individual capacity claim must demonstrate 

that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. See Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There must be an actual connection or link between 

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Ortez v. Washington County, State of Oregon, 88 F.3d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Taylor 

v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Government officials may not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under a 

theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (stating vicarious liability is inapplicable in 

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Section 1983 suits). Since a government official cannot be held liable under a theory of vicarious 

liability in Section 1983 actions, plaintiff must plead sufficient facts showing that the official has 

violated the Constitution through his own individual actions by linking each named defendant 

with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff's federal rights. 

Id. at 676.

III. Allegations in the SAC

Plaintiff states that, at all relevant times, he was a prisoner at California State Prison 

Solano (“SOL”). (ECF No. 21 at 2.) Plaintiff names five defendants in this action: Registered 

Nurse (“RN”) N. Sabati, RN G. Coder, RN Isaac Walatye, Dr. Kemal, and Dr. Boitor. (Id. at 3, 

5.) 

The SAC contains the following allegations: Plaintiff was placed on suicide watch “on or 

about December 6 or 12....” (Id. at 4.) Defendant Kemal or defendant Boitor prescribed plaintiff 

Propanolo, Busbar, Abilify1, and Benadryl “all to be delivered by a Registered Nurse with an 

Officer present.” (Id.) The prescription also instructed that plaintiff was to only receive “only 

one and to make sure the Patien swallow [sic].” (Id.) Defendants Sabati, Coder, and Walatye 

were assigned to deliver medication to prisoners in Ad Seg where plaintiff was located at the 

time. (Id. at 5.) On December 24, 2008, defendant Sabati arrived at plaintiff’s cell with a 

correctional officer to give plaintiff his medication. (Id. at 4.) Defendant Coder was also present 

as the nurse assigned to sit outside plaintiff’s cell. (Id.) Instead of a single pill, defendant Sabati 

gave plaintiff two bags containing thirty pills of Benadryl and sixty pills of Abilify. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was later found in his cell unresponsive and showing signs of overdose. (Id. at 6.) An 

outside hospital treated plaintiff for overdose and aspirated pills from plaintiff. (Id.)

Plaintiff claims that defendants Sabati, Coder, Walatye, Kemal, and Boitor were 

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs as he was given large quantities of 

medication even though they were aware that plaintiff was suicidal. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff seeks 

1 Plaintiff refers to this medication as both “Ability” and “Abilify” throughout the SAC. These 

appear to reference the same medication. For consistency purposes, the court will use the name 

“Abilify” in this order.

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relief in the form of punitive and compensatory damages in the amount of thirty million dollars 

($30,000,000.00). (Id. at 10.)

IV. Does Plaintiff State a Claim under § 1983?

A. Possible Failure Exhaust Administrative Remedies

As noted in the court’s prior screening order (ECF No. 16), plaintiff again indicates that 

he may not have properly exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing the instant action.

(See ECF No. 21 at 4.) (stating that plaintiff filed an appeal but it was “lost [sic] due to [plaintiff 

being] housed in Adseg Suicidal Watch.”) As a demonstration of the exhaustion of 

administrative remedies is not a pleading requirement (see Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 

1112 (9th Cir. 2003)), and inmates are not required to specifically plead or demonstrate 

exhaustion in their complaints (see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007)), the court will 

conduct a substantive screening of this action at this time. However, the plaintiff is again warned 

that should defendants be ordered to respond to this action, any failure to exhaust that can be 

substantiated may be proffered by defendants as an affirmative defense in support of the dismissal 

of this action. See generally Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating failure 

to exhaust is affirmative defense defendants must plead and prove).

B. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

1. Legal Standard

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. 

Const. amend. VIII. The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); 

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). 

Neither accident nor negligence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, as “[i]t is obduracy 

and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited 

by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.

If a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim arises in the context of medical care, the prisoner 

must allege and prove “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference 

to serious medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. An Eighth Amendment medical claim has 

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two elements: “the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s 

response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on 

other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

A medical need is serious “if the failure to treat the prisoner’s condition could result in 

further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 974 

F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Indications of a serious medical need include 

“the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities.” Id.

at 1059-60. By establishing the existence of a serious medical need, a prisoner satisfies the 

objective requirement for proving an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 834 (1994).

If a prisoner establishes the existence of a serious medical need, he must show that prison 

officials responded to the serious medical need with deliberate indifference. See Id. at 834. In 

general, deliberate indifference may be shown when prison officials deny, delay, or intentionally 

interfere with medical treatment, or may be shown by the way in which prison officials provide 

medical care. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1988).

Before it can be said that a prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged with regard to 

medical care, “the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ 

‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter 

Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06); see also

Toguchi v. Soon Hwang Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Mere negligence in 

diagnosing or treating a medical condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth 

Amendment rights.”); McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (same). Deliberate indifference is “a state of 

mind more blameworthy than negligence” and “requires ‘more than ordinary lack of due care for 

the prisoner’s interests or safety.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.

Delays in providing medical care may manifest deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. 

at 104-05. To establish a claim of deliberate indifference arising from delay in providing care, a 

plaintiff must show that the delay was harmful. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 745-46 (9th 

Cir. 2002); Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059; 

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Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990); Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 

200 (9th Cir. 1989); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 

1985). In this regard, “[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial; however, such would 

provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to 

his needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).

Finally, mere differences of opinion between a prisoner and prison medical staff or 

between medical professionals as to the proper course of treatment for a medical condition do not 

give rise to a § 1983 claim. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058; Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 

332 (9th Cir. 1996); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 

F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).

2. Analysis

i. Registered Nurse N. Sabati and Registered Nurse G. Coder

Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against defendants Sabati and Coder 

for deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s medical needs. The allegations in the SAC establish that 

plaintiff purportedly had a serious medical need as plaintiff was facing mental health difficulties 

and was found to be suicidal by his doctors. Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 

2010) (stating that heightened suicide risk is a serious medical need). The SAC also alleges that 

defendant Sabati, in the presence of defendant Coder, provided plaintiff with a large number of 

pills despite the instructions from either defendant Kemal or Boitor that plaintiff was only to be 

given a single pill under observation. (ECF No. 21 at 4.) This is sufficient to establish deliberate 

indifference to those medical needs on screening.

Accordingly, plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment 

medical needs claim against defendants Sabati and Coder.

ii. Registered Nurse Isaac Walatye, Dr. Kemal, and Dr. Boitor

The SAC does not contain sufficient alleged facts to state a claim against defendants 

Walatye, Kemal, and Boitor. Specifically, plaintiff fails to satisfy the linkage requirement which 

provides that there must be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and 

the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Ortez, 88 F.3d at 809; see also

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Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. Under the facts in the SAC, defendant Walatye was one of the RNs 

assigned to deliver medication to plaintiff but was not present when plaintiff was given the large 

quantities of medication. (See ECF No. 21 at 4.) Though plaintiff claims defendant Walatye was 

aware of plaintiff’s serious medical need, he does not include any facts which establish that 

defendant Walatye performed any act or omission which violated or contributed to violating 

plaintiff’s rights. Similarly, though defendants Kemal and Boitor were allegedly aware plaintiff 

was suicidal, plaintiff does not allege any facts that show they were aware that plaintiff was given 

large quantities of medication. (See Id. at 4-8.) In fact, plaintiff alleges that it was one or both of 

these defendants who gave the specific instruction that plaintiff should be given only a single 

dose under the supervision of multiple prison officials. (Id. at 4.)

Given the above, plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a cognizable claim 

against defendants Walatye Kemal, and Boitor as the SAC fails to connect the actions of these 

defendants to the deprivation of plaintiff’s rights. See Ortez, 88 F.3d at 809; see also Taylor, 880 

F.2d at 1045. As such, these claims are not cognizable, plaintiff may not proceed with them. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). As the court has found above that the SAC contains cognizable 

claims, plaintiff will be given the option to either proceed on his cognizable claims or be given 

leave to file an amended complaint.

C. Plaintiff’s Additional Claim

The SAC may suggest that plaintiff may wish to state another claim in addition to his 

Eighth Amendment medical needs claim. (See e.g., ECF No. 21 at 5.) It is unclear the nature of 

plaintiff’s claim or if it is even different from his medical needs claim. On the form used by 

plaintiff to complete his SAC, plaintiff has filed out the section entitled “Claim II” and has 

indicated it is also an Eighth Amendment claim. (Id.) However, plaintiff has also marked three 

boxes indicating the “issue involved” even though the form clearly instructs the plaintiff to only 

mark one. (Id.) Further, one of the boxes marked states that this possible claim regards medical 

care. (Id.) The factual allegations of the complaint do not appear to address a separate claim and 

plaintiff later states at the end of this section that defendants showed “deliberate indifference 

towards a serious medical need....” (Id. at 8.) Given the above, plaintiff has not alleged sufficient 

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facts to state any additional cognizable claims. If plaintiff wishes to state additional claims 

against these or other defendants, he will be given the option to further amend his complaint.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1. The Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 21) states a cognizable Eighth 

Amendment claim against defendants N Sabati and G. Coder for deliberate 

indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs.

2. The Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 21) fails to state any other cognizable 

claims.

3. Plaintiff may choose to proceed on his cognizable claims set out above or he may 

choose to amend his complaint. 

4. Within thirty (30) days of the date of this order plaintiff shall notify the court of how 

he wishes to proceed. Plaintiff may use the form included with this order for this 

purpose. 

5. Plaintiff is warned that his failure to comply with this order will result in a 

recommendation that this action be dismissed.

Dated: December 22, 2022

DB:14

DB/DB Prisoner Inbox/Civil Rights/S/rodr0622.scrn(3).not

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

WARDEN, SOLANO STATE PRISON, et 

al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-00622 DB P

PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE ON HOW TO 

PROCEED 

Check one:

_____ Plaintiff wants to proceed immediately on his Eighth Amendment medical needs claim 

against Registered Nurse N. Sabati and Registered Nurse G. Coder. Plaintiff understands 

that by going forward without amending the complaint he is voluntarily dismissing all 

other claims and defendants.

____ Plaintiff wants to amend the complaint.

DATED:_______________________

Antonio Rodriguez

Plaintiff pro se

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