Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06176/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06176-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

·united States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 

C-404 United States Courthouse 

1929 Stout Street 

Denver Colorado 80294 

January 29, 1992 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 91-6176, Herrera v. Harkins 

Filed November 26, 1991 by Judge Ebel 

Please be advised that the following corrections have 

been made to the cover page of the captioned opinion: 

The line Susan B. _Loving, Attorney General, State of 

Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees., has 

been deleted. 

Attachment 

The first sentence of the footnote has been deleted. 

A corrected page is attached. 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

By: ~~a_.{!!_~ 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 91-6176 Document: 010110096991 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 1 
( 

FILED 11/26/91 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JORGE MARIO HERRERA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

NOV 2 G 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 91-6176 

) 

CLARENCE HARKINS, JR., ) 

Chairman; FARREL HATCH, ) 

Vice Chairman; CARL B. ) 

HAMM, Member; AGUSTA E. MANN, ) 

Member; MARZEE DOUGLASS, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D,C. Civil Action No. 90-1909-W) 

Submitted on Plaintiff-Appellant's brief and the record.* 

Jorge Mario Herrera, prose. 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, and SEYMOUR and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

* After examining Plaintiff-Appellant's brief and the appellate 

record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case 

is ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 91-6176 Document: 010110096991 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 2 
PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 2 6 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

JORGE MARIO HERRERA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

CLARENCE HARKINS, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 91-6176 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 90-1909-W) 

Submitted on Plaintiff-Appellant's brief and the record.* 

Jorge Mario Herrera, prose. 

Susan B. Loving, Attorney General, State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, and SEYMOUR and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

* Defendants-Appellees elected not to submit a response brief. 

After examining Plaintiff-Appellant's brief and the appellate 

record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case 

is ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 91-6176 Document: 010110096991 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 3 
Appellant Herrera appeals the district court's dismissal of 

his complaint filed pursuant to 42 u.s.c. § 1983. The district 

court ruled that because the appellant primarily challenged the 

fact or duration of his imprisonment, his only remedy was to seek 

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2254. As 

explained below, we construe the appellant's complaint to be 

partially an attack on parole procedures and therefore cognizable 

under section 1983. 

The Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board denied the appellant 

parole in June 1990. The appellant contends that the Board based 

its finding in part on erroneous information provided by a parole 

investigator. In June 1990, the appellant filed a complaint 

pursuant to 42 u.s.c. § 1983 in the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma. In this complaint, he 

requested the following relief: (1) "Declaratory and Injunctive 

Relief ordering the defendants to stop denying Plaintiff Parole 

Recommendations based on" the erroneous information, and (2) "a 

new Parole Board Hearing" in which the Board did not use the 

erroneous information. Complaint, Record, tab 2, at 5. 

The district court ruled that "the Plaintiff is primarily 

challenging the fact or duration of his imprisonment." Order of 

Dismissal, Record, tab 3, at 1. Relying on Praiser v. Rodriguez, 

411 U.S. 475 (1973), and its progeny, the court ruled that habeas 

corpus relief provided the exclusive remedy and dismissed the 

complaint on that basis. On appeal, the appellant challenges the 

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Appellate Case: 91-6176 Document: 010110096991 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 4 
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I 

district court's conclusion that section 1983 relief is 

unavailable. Relying on a Fifth Circuit case, Johnson v. 

Pfeiffer, 821 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1987), the appellant contends 

that he may use section 1983 to attack parole procedures. "At 

most," the appellant argues, "the consequences of [t]his suit 

would be a requirement that the Parole Board refrain from using 

unconstitutional information, etc. when making parole decisions." 

Appellant's Opening Brief at 3-4. 

At the outset, we note that prose complaints are held "to 

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Moreover, 

the district court may dismiss the complaint only if "the 

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 

would entitle him to relief." Id. at 521 (quoting Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Thus, "if the [district] 

court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on 

which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the 

plaintiff's failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion 

of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence 

construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements." 

Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 

A prisoner may use section 1983 to attack parole procedures. 

See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional 

Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (reaching the merits of prisoners' 

class action section 1983 suits challenging state parole 

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Appellate Case: 91-6176 Document: 010110096991 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 5 
procedures); Pope v. United States Parole Comm'n, 647 F.2d 125, 

126 (10th Cir. 1981) (claim requesting declaratory judgment that 

parole procedures violated due process "is cognizable under" 

section 1983); Candelaria v. Griffin, 641 F.2d 868, 869 (10th Cir. 

1981) ("§ 1983 is a proper statutory basis" for "a challenge to 

the fairness of parole procedures"). However, a prisoner must 

challenge present confinement by means of a habeas petition. 

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500; Richards v. Bellmen, 941 F.2d 1015, 

1018 (10th Cir. 1991) ("a challenge to the fact of conviction or 

confinement, or the duration of confinement, is cognizable only 

under the habeas statute with its requirement of exhaustion of 

state remedies"). 

The availability of section 1983 to remedy constitutional 

violations in the context of parole proceedings depends on the 

constitutional violation alleged and on the relief sought. To 

challenge a constitutional defect in an individual parole hearing, 

where the remedy lies in providing a new parole hearing, a 

prisoner must file a habeas petition. When seeking injunctive or 

declaratory relief to correct constitutionally defective parole 

procedures, section 1983 remains available despite the prisoner's 

failure to exhaust state remedies. In this latter case, the court 

does not grant a new parole hearing; rather, in any future parole 

hearings, the prisoner benefits from the new constitutionally 

acceptable procedures. Pope, 647 F.2d at 126 ("declaratory 

judgment that the Commission's parole procedures denied him due 

process •.. is cognizable under 42 u.s.c. § 1983" while 

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Appellate Case: 91-6176 Document: 010110096991 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 6 
"mandatory injunction ordering the Commission to parole him .•. 

is properly heard pursuant to ... habeas corpus jurisdiction"); 

Candelaria, 641 F.2d at 869 ("We construe plaintiff's petition as 

a challenge to the fairness of parole procedures and not a demand 

for immediate release pursuant to parole. As such,§ 1983 is a 

proper statutory basis for this action.") (citations omitted); 

Schuemann v. Colorado State Board of Adult Parole, 624 F.2d 172, 

173 n.1 (10th Cir. 1980) ("[H]abeas corpus, and not [section 

1983], 'is the appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking 

the validity of the fact or length of their confinement.' On the 

other hand, a civil rights action under [section] 1983 may be 

appropriate if the inmate is seeking •.. to require a 

readjustment of parole procedures.") (citations omitted); accord 

Johnson, 821 F.2d at 1123 (in Fifth Circuit, habeas is exclusive 

remedy for attack on "a single allegedly defective hearing 

affecting eligibility for" parole, but section 1983 is available 

to enjoin parole board "from using unconstitutional customs, 

rules, and procedures when making parole decisions"); see 

Richards, 941 F.2d at 1018 ("§ 1983 ... is available when a 

prisoner seeks .•. a declaratory judgment as a predicate to 

. prospective injunctive relief"). 

Based on the foregoing, the appellant can challenge in 

federal court the result of his parole hearing only by filing a 

habeas petition after exhausting state remedies. The appellant 

therefore may not obtain the "new Parole Board Hearing" he 

requested from the district court. The appellant may, however, 

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Appellate Case: 91-6176 Document: 010110096991 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 7 
obtain declaratory or injunctive relief regarding parole 

procedures. We construe the appellant's request for "Declaratory 

and Injunctive relief ordering the defendants to stop denying 

Plaintiff Parole Recommendations based on" the erroneous 

information as a specific attack on parole procedures. Because 

the appellant might obtain some relief, albeit not all the relief 

sought, the district court should not have dismissed the petition. 

See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21. 

We express no opinion on the merits of the complaint or on 

what relief, if any, would be appropriate. 

Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court's dismissal of the 

complaint insofar as the complaint challenged parole procedures 

and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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