Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00758/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00758-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TONY NGUYEN, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

LVNV FUNDING, LLC; MICHAEL S. 

HUNT; JANALIE A. HENRIQUES, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 15cv758-LAB (RBB) 

ORDER AWARDING $4,525.00 

IN ATTORNEY’S FEES 

FOLLOWING THE ORDER 

GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO 

COMPEL TESTIMONY AT 

DEPOSITION AND FOR 

SANCTIONS [ECF NO. 57] 

 After granting in part Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Testimony and for Sanctions 

[ECF No. 57], counsel for Nguyen was directed to submit a declaration outlining fees and 

expenses, and Defendant was permitted to file a responsive brief. (Order Granting Part & 

Den. Part Mot. Compel Test. Dep. & Sanctions 27-28, ECF No. 66.) On March 17, 2017, 

Plaintiff Tony Nguyen filed a “Declaration of Stephen G. Recordon Regarding Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Sanctions and Hours Incurred” (the “Declaration”) with an exhibit [ECF No. 

69]. Plaintiff seeks to recover $13,100.00 from Defendants. (Decl. 3, ECF No. 69.) 

Defendants Michael S. Hunt and Janalie A. Henriques filed a document entitled, 

“Defendants’ Response to Declaration of Stephen G. Recordon Regarding Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Sanctions and Hours Incurred” (the “Response”) on March 24, 2017, with a 

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declaration of Liana Mayilyan and an exhibit [ECF No. 79]. Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff should recover no more than $1,940.00 in attorney’s fees. (Resp. 3, ECF No. 

79.) For the reasons discussed below, Nguyen is awarded $4,525.00 in attorney’s fees. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff filed his lawsuit against Defendants LVNV Funding, LLC; Michael S. 

Hunt; and Janalie A. Henriques on April 7, 2015. (Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.)1

 In his First 

Amended Complaint, Nguyen asserts claims against the three Defendants for violations 

of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and the Rosenthal Act. (First Am. 

Compl. 5-6, ECF No. 39.) He contends that on April 17, 2014, Hunt and Henriques filed 

a complaint against him in San Diego Superior Court on behalf of LVNV. (Id. at 3.) In 

the state court action, Defendants Hunt and Henriques alleged that LVNV was the 

assignee of a debt owed by Nguyen and had enforceable claims against him. (Id. at 4.) 

Plaintiff maintains that the claims were time-barred and unenforceable. (Id.) He seeks 

actual damages, statutory damages, litigation costs, and attorney’s fees. (Id. at 6-7.) 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Nguyen filed his First Amended Complaint on April 7, 2016 [ECF No. 39]. United 

States District Court Judge Larry Alan Burns consolidated this case with a related case 

involving the same parties on April 20, 2016 [ECF No. 43], and the Defendants answered 

shortly thereafter [ECF Nos. 44, 45, 46]. Defendants Hunt and Henriques were deposed 

on September 28, 2016. (Mot. Compel 2, ECF No. 56.) Several times during the 

depositions, defense counsel objected to questions by Plaintiff’s counsel and instructed 

his clients not to answer. (Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7-14.) Subsequent 

communications between counsel were unsuccessful in resolving these issues, (id. at 14-

15), and a “Motion to Compel Testimony at Deposition and for Sanctions” (the “Motion 

to Compel”) was filed on October 27, 2016 [ECF No. 56]. 

                                               

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 The Court will cite to documents as paginated on the electronic case filing system.

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 On March 10, 2017, the Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part 

the Motion to Compel [ECF No. 66]. The Motion to Compel was granted as to questions 

asked of Defendant Hunt regarding jurisdictional allegations under section 395 of the 

California Code of Civil Procedure and the number of debt-collection attorneys employed 

at Defendants’ law firm at the time the underlying state action was filed against Nguyen. 

(Order Granting Part & Den. Part Mot. Compel Test. Dep. & Sanctions 27, ECF No. 66.) 

The Court ordered a supplemental one-hour telephonic deposition of Defendant Hunt 

limited to these topics. (Id.) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel was denied as to questions to 

Defendants Michael Hunt and Janalie Henriques about compliance with and training 

regarding the California Fair Debt Buying Practices Act, (id. at 18, 20, 23), and as to all 

other requests, (id. at 27). The Court additionally granted in part and denied in part 

Nguyen’s request for sanctions and ordered the following: 

Counsel for Defendants shall reimburse Plaintiff for his reasonable 

expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in bringing the portion of the 

Motion to Compel relating to Hunt’s one hour telephonic deposition about 

jurisdictional allegations under section 395 of the California Code of Civil 

Procedure and the number of debt-collection attorneys employed at 

Defendants’ law firm at the time the underlying state actions were filed 

against Nguyen. 

(Id.) The Court requested briefing from the parties regarding attorney’s fees, (id. at 65-

66), which followed [ECF Nos. 69, 79]. 

III. DISCUSSION 

“District courts must calculate awards for attorneys’ fees using the ‘lodestar’ 

method.” Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(citing Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co., 224 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000); Morales v. 

City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996)). “[T]he amount of that fee must be 

determined on the facts of each case[.]” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 

978 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983)). “‘The 

‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party 

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reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Id. (quoting Ferland, 

244 F.3d at 1149 n.4). 

“Although in most cases, the lodestar figure is presumptively a reasonable fee 

award, the district court may, if circumstances warrant, adjust the lodestar to account for 

other factors which are not subsumed within it.” Ferland, 244 F.3d at 1149 n.4 (citing

Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2000); Kerr v. 

Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975)). The factors include the 

following: 

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the 

questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service 

properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to 

acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or 

contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, 

(8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, 

reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, 

(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, 

and (12) awards in similar cases. 

Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 

Nevertheless, “only in rare circumstances should a court adjust the lodestar figure, as this 

figure is the presumptively accurate measure of reasonable fees.” Id. (citing Cabrales v. 

Cty. of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th Cir. 1988); Cunningham v. Cty of Los 

Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

A. Reasonable Hourly Rate 

Stephen Recordon, counsel for Plaintiff states, “The reasonable rate for my 

professional services is $425.00 per hour and I have been court approved at that rate 

multiple times.” (Decl. 3, ECF No. 69.) He cites several San Diego Superior Court cases 

where he was awarded attorney’s fees, but he does not identify the rates approved for the 

various cases. (See id. at 2 (citations omitted).) The implication is that in some of the 

listed cases, Recordon was awarded fees at the rate of $425.00 an hour. The parties 

identified in these cases have appeared before the Court in similar matters. But he does 

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not provide any additional support for his argument that $425.00 per hour is a reasonable 

rate for his services. (See id. at 2-3.) 

Defendants Hunt and Henriques respond that $425.00 per hour is not reasonable. 

(Resp. 3, ECF No. 79.) “Despite the Court’s directive to Nguyen’s counsel to provide 

information regarding the hourly rates for similarly situated attorneys in the community, 

Nguyen has failed to do so.” (Id.) Hunt and Henriques contend that the Declaration does 

not support the rate requested by Recordon, and that the rate should be $300.00 per hour 

at most. (Id.) They note that Recordon did not specify any court that awarded him 

$425.00 per hour. (Id. at 9.) “Nor does he explain what types of claims were at issue in 

those matters where he purportedly was awarded this amount.” (Id.) Defendants assert 

that Plaintiff’s counsel has not introduced any evidence regarding the prevailing rate for 

attorneys in this district who represent plaintiffs in FDCPA cases. (Id. at 9-10.) They 

conclude that he has not met his burden of showing the reasonableness of the requested 

rate. (Id. at 10.) 

“In determining a reasonable hourly rate, the district court should be guided by the 

rate prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable 

skill, experience, and reputation.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 

1210-11 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)), opinion 

amended on denial of reh’g, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987). The relevant community is 

the district in which the court sits. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979 (citing Barjon v. Dalton, 

132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997)). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing “that the 

requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by 

lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Id. (quoting Blum, 

465 U.S. at 895 n.11). “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys 

regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, 

particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the 

prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 

403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990). 

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When looking to rate determinations made in other cases, the Court may only 

consider cases setting rates during the time period in which the fees in the present case 

were incurred. See Camacho, 523 F.3d at 981 (stating that the court abuses its discretion 

in looking to cases decided several years before the litigation to determine market rates 

(citing Bell v. Clackamas Cty., 341 F.3d 858, 869 (9th Cir. 2003))). “[R]ates outside the 

forum may be used ‘if local counsel was unavailable, either because they were unwilling 

or unable to perform because they lack the degree of experience, expertise, or 

specialization required to handle properly the case.’” Barjon, 132 F.3d at 500 (quoting 

Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

To determine the appropriate hourly rate, this Court will only look to cases in this 

district within two years prior to the work completed by Plaintiff’s counsel. See Bell, 

341 F.3d at 869 (“[I]t was an abuse of discretion in this case to apply market rates in 

effect more than two years before the work was performed.”). In Arana v. Monterey 

Financial Services Inc., Judge Burns awarded a $250.00 hourly rate for a first-year 

attorney in an FDCPA and Rosenthal Act case. CASE NO. 15cv2262-LAB (BGS), 2016 

WL 1324269, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2016). By contrast, in Jewell-Cohen v. Law Office 

of Patenaude & Felix, A.P.C., another case brought under the Rosenthal Act and the 

FDCPA, Judge Whelan approved a rate of $375.00 per hour for an attorney who had 

litigated over 100 FDCPA cases and had been practicing law for six years. Case No.: 15-

CV-2124 W (BGS), 2016 WL 1355767, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2016) (citation omitted). 

Similarly, in Nguyen v. HOVG, LLC, also a Rosenthal Act and FDCPA case, Judge 

Moskowitz approved hourly rates of $325.00 and $350.00 for two lawyers who both had 

around five years of experience. No. 14cv837 BTM (RBB), 2015 WL 5476254, at *2 

(S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2015). He additionally found that $325.00 per hour was appropriate 

for a lawyer who had been practicing less than five years. Id. at *3. In the same case, 

however, Judge Moskowitz held that an hourly rate of $450.00 was reasonable for the 

founding partner of the firm with twenty years of experience. Id. 

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Following the above cases from this district, the Court finds that a rate of $425.00 

per hour is reasonable for Plaintiff’s counsel. Recordon has been practicing law for over 

thirty-six years. (Decl. 2, ECF No. 69.) He has litigated many FDCPA and Rosenthal 

Act cases. (Id.) Given how long he has been practicing law and his experience in this 

type of litigation, a $425.00 hourly rate is appropriate. See Nguyen, 2015 WL 5476254, 

at *3. 

B. Number of Hours Reasonably Expended

Attached to the Declaration is a time log of hours totaling $13,100.00 in attorney’s 

fees and costs. (Decl. Ex. A, at 5-7, ECF No. 69.) In the Declaration, Recordon states as 

follows: 

The activities and time recorded in the time and billing records were 

reasonably incurred to prepare the portions of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel 

and Reply addressing all of the issues in the motion except the Fair Debt 

Buyer Practices Act, and also the anticipated hours and costs to finish the 

deposition of Mr. Hunt . . . . 

(Decl. 3.) 

 Hunt and Henriques respond that “[t]he amounts Nguyen seeks are excessive, 

impermissibly punitive and should be substantially reduced.” (Resp. 2, ECF No. 79.) 

The Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to $1,940.00 in attorney’s fees at 

most. (Id. at 3.) They contend that Nguyen “failed to make a good faith effort to resolve 

the issues involved in his Motion For Sanctions and avoid the expense of bringing the 

motion.” (Id. at 2.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff could have avoided all or most of the 

expenses he seeks if Nguyen’s counsel had cooperated with defense counsel. (Id.) They 

additionally assert that “Nguyen did not obtain the bulk of the relief he sought by the 

motion.” (Id.) Defendants contend that the Declaration does explain how it takes 

Plaintiff’s limited success into account. (Id. at 5 (citation omitted).) Hunt and Henriques 

further indicate that because one of the areas of further testimony ordered by the Court 

was already covered by a prior deposition of Henriques, the size of Nguyen’s requested 

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attorney’s fees is unwarranted. (Id. at 5-6 (citations omitted).) They argue that the hours 

claimed by Recordon should be reduced by at least 75%. (Id. at 2, 6.) 

 Defendants moreover state that certain items contained in the Declaration are not 

compensable. (Id. at 2-3, 6-9.) First, they contend that Plaintiff’s attorney should not be 

compensated for the time he spent reviewing and summarizing the deposition transcripts. 

(Id. at 2, 6.) With regard to the time spent reviewing the transcript of Henriques’s 

deposition, “[t]his request is patently unreasonable given that the Court only ordered a 

further deposition of Hunt, not Henriques.” (Id. at 6.) Addressing the time spent 

reviewing the transcript of Hunt’s deposition, the Defendants assert that Nguyen has not 

explained why he should be compensated for this task. (Id.) “The basis of the motion to 

compel solely related to the instructions not to answer certain questions. There is no 

reason to order counsel for Defendants to compensate counsel for Nguyen for the time he 

spent reviewing the entire transcript.” (Id.) 

 Hunt and Henriques further argue that the vague entries in the Declaration should 

be excluded. (Id. at 7.) “Nguyen should not be compensated for vague time entries or for 

time his attorney spent drafting declarations regarding the ‘hours’ and ‘fees’ since this 

Court concluded that the declarations were insufficient.” (Id. at 2.) They state that the 

time log submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel has many deficient time entries. (Id. at 7.) “For 

example, Nguyen seeks .3 hours Mr. Recordon spent on reviewing ‘emails after 

deposition.’ He also seeks .7 hours his attorney spent on drafting ‘portion of declaration 

regarding events prior to September 28, 2016.’” (Id. (citations omitted).) Hunt and 

Henriques assert that under the applicable legal standards, the Court cannot make an 

evaluation of these entries and they should be stricken. (Id. (citations omitted).) 

 The Defendants moreover argue that the time attorney Recorden spent drafting his 

declaration regarding hours and fees should be excluded. (Id. at 8.) They note that the 

declaration is only three paragraphs and that the Court already held that the prior 

declarations submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel “were insufficient because they failed to 

provide information regarding the reasonableness of the hours expended and their hourly 

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rates.” (Id. (citations omitted).) Consequently, Nguyen’s attorney should not be 

compensated for this time. (Id.) Hunt and Henriques further state that the anticipated 

deposition time and costs should be excluded because they are speculative and excessive. 

(Id. at 2, 8-9.) 

 Defendants conclude that Plaintiff is only entitled to recover fees for 5.15 hours of 

work. (Id. at 10.) They arrive at this conclusion through the following analysis: 

Defendants request the Court exclude the 3.60 hours Nguyen’s attorney 

billed for reviewing Defendants’ deposition transcripts; the hour Nguyen’s 

attorney billed for vague entries; and the .8 hour Nguyen’s attorney billed 

for drafting declarations regarding “hours” and [“]fees.” All told, this would 

result in a reduction of 5.40 hours of Nguyen’s attorney’s time, from 26 

hours to 20.60 hours. Further, Defendant’s requests that the Court reduce 

the number of hours allegedly spent by Nguyen’s counsel in preparing the 

Motion to Compel and the reply by at least 75 percent (75%), from 20.60 

hours to 5.15 hours. In addition, Nguyen should only be compensated for 

.40 hours for the supplemental telephonic deposition of Hunt and should 

only be awarded $275 for the copy of the transcript. 

(Id.)

“In determining the lodestar, the district court should exclude hours that were not 

‘reasonably expended.’” Nguyen, 2015 WL 5476254, at *3 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. 

at 434). This includes “hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” 

Durham v. Cont’l Cent. Credit, No. 07cv1763 BTM(WMc), 2011 WL 6783193, at *3 

(S.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2011) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). Additionally, “[t]he district 

court may reduce the attorneys’ fee by examining the fee request and excluding noncompensable hours via a percentage cut.” Haas v. PMCW, CASE NO. 12-CV-570-H 

(WVG), 2013 WL 12116598, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013) (citing Gonzalez v. City of 

Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2013)). The opposing party “bears the burden 

of providing specific evidence to challenge the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours 

charged.” McGrath v. Cty. of Nevada, 67 F.3d 248, 255 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Gates v. 

Gomez, 60 F.3d 525, 534-35 (9th Cir. 1995); Blum, 465 U.S. at 892 n.5). 

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The Court makes two observations at the outset. First, Defendants’ assertion that 

“Nguyen did not obtain the bulk of the relief he sought by the motion[,]” (Resp. 2, ECF 

No. 79), is an overstatement. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel was granted as to two of the 

three categories of testimony from Defendant Hunt. (See Order Granting Part & Den. 

Part Mot. Compel Test. Dep. & Sanctions 5-23, ECF No. 66.) Plaintiff’s motion was 

denied as to the third category: questions to Defendants Michael Hunt and Janalie 

Henriques about compliance with and training regarding the California Fair Debt Buying 

Practices Act. (Id. at 18, 20, 23.) 

Second, in the Court’s order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s Motion 

to Compel, the Court granted Nguyen’s sanctions request only “for his reasonable 

expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in bringing the portion of the motion 

relating to Hunt’s testimony regarding the two areas of questioning for which the Motion 

to Compel is granted.” (Id. at 27.) The Court did not grant the Motion to Compel as to 

Plaintiff’s request for reimbursement of attorney’s fees and expenses in connection with 

any subsequent deposition. (See id. at 24-27.) Nor did the Court permit Nguyen to be 

reimbursed for his time spent preparing the Declaration and associated time records. As 

a result, the $1,625.00 in “Anticipated Deposition Time” and the $425.00 for 

“Preparation of Declaration and Time Records,” (Decl. Ex. A, at 7, ECF No. 69), are not 

included in the award below. 

The Court finds that the remaining hours claimed by Plaintiff’s counsel are 

excessive. Recordon seeks 17.6 hours for preparing the Motion to Compel and 8.4 hours 

for preparing the reply in support of that motion, totaling 26 hours. (See id. at 5-6.) He 

asserts that “[t]he activities and time recorded in the time and billing records were 

reasonably incurred to prepare the portions of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and Reply 

addressing all of the issues in the motion except the Fair Debt Buyer Practices Act . . . .” 

(Decl. 3.) Although he states that he limited his hours to those portions of the Motion to 

Compel he succeeded on, many of the hours claimed by Recordon are non-compensable. 

For example, the Court only granted the Motion to Compel as to testimony sought from 

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Defendant Hunt. (See Order Granting Part & Den. Part Mot. Compel Test. Dep. & 

Sanctions 27, ECF No. 66.) As a result, the 1.9 hours Recordon claims for reviewing and 

summarizing the deposition of Defendant Henriques, (Decl. Ex. A, at 5, ECF No. 69), are 

not compensable. Further, many of the claimed hours relate to the entirety of the Motion 

to Compel and not just the successful portions. To cite a few examples, “[r]eview of 

Declaration of Clinton Rooney,” “[d]raft introduction,” and “[r]eview and summarize 

defendant’s [sic] Opposition,” (id. at 5, 6), are tasks that relate to the Motion to Compel 

and reply brief as a whole. Their application extends beyond those portions of the 

Motion to Compel that Nguyen succeeded on. 

Given the significant presence of non-compensable hours in the Declaration and 

the difficulty in separating those hours from the compensable hours, a percentage 

reduction is appropriate. See Caplan v. CNA Fin. Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1251 

(N.D. Cal. 2008) (imposing a percentage reduction of attorney’s fees where it was not 

possible to exclude hours spent on an unsuccessful claim). “[W]hen a district court 

decides that a percentage cut (to either the lodestar or the number of hours) is warranted, 

it must ‘set forth a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for choosing a given 

percentage reduction.’” Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1203 (quoting Gates, 987 F.2d at 1400). 

“The explanation need not be elaborate, but it must be comprehensible.” Moreno v. City 

of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008). “Nevertheless, the district court can 

impose a small reduction, no greater than 10 percent—a ‘haircut’—based on its exercise 

of discretion and without a more specific explanation.” Id. at 1112. 

 Here, the Court permitted Plaintiff to depose Defendant Hunt on two of the three 

topics identified in the Motion to Compel; the deposition, however, was not to exceed 

one hour. (See Order Granting Part & Den. Part Mot. Compel Test. Dep. & Sanctions 5-

23, ECF No. 66.) Nevertheless, the Court denied Plaintiff’s request to question 

Defendants Hunt and Henriques concerning the California Fair Debt Buying Practices 

Act. (Id. at 18, 20, 23.) The Court finds it appropriate to reduce the hours sought by 

Nguyen by one-half, representing the portion of the Motion to Compel that was denied. 

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A one-half reduction of the 26 hours spent drafting the Motion to Compel and reply brief 

brings the total number of compensable hours to 13. That number multiplied by $425.00, 

the reasonable hourly rate for Plaintiff’s counsel, amounts to a total fee award of 

$5,525.00. In light of Nguyen’s partial success with the Motion to Compel and the noncompensable hours included in the Declaration, this is an appropriate award. See 

Mockler v. Skipper, 942 F. Supp. 1364, 1368 (D. Or. 1996) (“[T]he court will reduce the 

lodestar amount by fifteen percent. This reduction reflects the fact that there were some 

issues which related only to Mockler’s unsuccessful claims against defendant Multnomah 

County Sheriff’s Association, and that Mockler was very successful in her claims against 

the Multnomah County defendants.”); see also Caplan, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 1251 (“The 

amount of the fees charged by counsel would no doubt be lower if Plaintiff had not 

pursued his unsuccessful claim for breach of fiduciary duty. . . . [A] reduction of eight 

percent is appropriate.”). 

C. Additional Factors 

As discussed above, “the district court may, if circumstances warrant, adjust the 

lodestar to account for other factors which are not subsumed within it.” Ferland, 244 

F.3d at 1149 n.4 (citing Van Gerwen, 214 F.3d at 1046; Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70). Still, the 

lodestar “is the presumptively accurate measure of reasonable fees.” Ballen, 466 F.3d at 

746 (citing Cabrales, 864 F.2d at 1464; Cunningham, 879 F.2d at 484). But in this case, 

Plaintiff had limited success. Although he prevailed in part on the Motion to Compel, 

Nguyen was limited to deposing Defendant Hunt on two topics by telephone, and the 

deposition was not to exceed one hour. In light of Plaintiff’s limited success, the fees 

awarded are reduced by an additional $1,000.00. The Court finds that this is a rare case 

that justifies adjusting the total fee award calculated above. See id. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons discussed, Nguyen is awarded $4,525.00 in attorney’s fees as a 

monetary sanction under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Frank 

Brunkhorst Co. v. Ihm, CASE NO. 11cv1883-CAB (KSC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

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192270, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2013) (stating that monetary sanctions under Rule 37 

are not disposition of a claim or defense). Payment shall occur no later than thirty days 

from the filing of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: May 11, 2017 ___________________________________ 

 Hon. Ruben B. Brooks 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

cc: Judge Burns 

 All Parties of Record 

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