Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-16147/USCOURTS-ca9-14-16147-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRANK O. LOHER,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

TODD THOMAS,

Respondent-Appellant.

No. 14-16147

D.C. No.

1:11-cv-00731-LEK-KSC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 13, 2015

Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed June 17, 2016

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Richard C. Tallman,

and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Tallman;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge

Milan D. Smith, Jr.

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2 LOHER V. THOMAS

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district

court’s judgment granting Frank Loher’s habeas corpus

petition challenging his Hawaii state conviction and sentence

for attempted sexual assault, and remanded with instructions.

The district court granted the writ on all three of Loher’s

claims: (1) that the trial court violated Loher’s constitutional

rights by forcing him to testify; (2) that Loher’s appellate

counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to raise the

forced testimony issue; and (3) that the enhancement of his

sentence based on judge-found facts violated Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

The panel held that the Hawaii Intermediate Court of

Appeals’ (Hawaii ICA’s) rejection of Loher’s claim under

Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), that he was forced

to testify in violation of his rights to remain silent and to due

process, was not objectively unreasonable.

The panel held that the trial court’s creation, on remand

from the Hawaii ICA, of a post-conviction record on Loher’s

ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel (IAAC) claims,

and the Hawaii ICA’s reliance on the post-conviction record,

were not objectively unreasonable under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1) and 2254(d)(2).

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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LOHER V. THOMAS 3

The panel held that Hawaii waived its challenge to the

district court’s grant of relief for ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel, and waived its challenge to Loher’s

Apprendi claim. 

The panel remanded to the district court with instructions

to modify its conditional writ to require Hawaii to release

Loher or to provide him with resentencing within a

reasonable period of time. The panel wrote that the district

court should consider what additional condition is required to

remedy the ineffective assistance of Loher’s appellate

counsel.

Judge Tallman concurred in part and dissented in part. 

He dissented from the part of Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion

which declares that Hawaii has waived its challenge to the

grant of habeas relief on Loher’s IAAC claim and suggesting

that the district court order a new direct appeal to reconsider

the Brooks and IAAC claims already decided against Loher

by the Hawaiian appellate courts. He disagreed with Judge

M. Smith’s conclusion that the state court’s construction of

Brooks was objectively unreasonable under § 2254(d). 

Judge M. Smith concurred in part and dissented in part. 

He concurred in the majority’s holding that the government

has waived its challenges to Loher’s IAAC and Apprendi

claims, as well as in the majority’s proposed remedy for those

violations. He disagreed with the majority’s rejection of

Loher’s Brooks claims, and would hold instead that the state

court’s denial of relief was “contrary to, or an unreasonable

application” of the Supreme Court’s holding in Brooks.

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4 LOHER V. THOMAS

COUNSEL

Brian R. Vincent, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Honolulu,

Hawaii, for Respondent-Appellant.

Peter C. Wolff, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Honolulu,

Hawaii, Petitioner-Appellee.

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether a state appellate court

unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in upholding

a conviction and resulting sentence against a claim that the

petitioner was forced to testify in violation of his rights to

remain silent and to due process.

I

Petitioner Frank O. Loher was convicted in Hawaii state

court of attempted sexual assault and given an extended-term

sentence, all of which was affirmed on appeal.1 He

subsequently filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in

federal district court. Because his claims relate to matters of

1 The facts are from the record and various court opinions, including:

State v. Loher, No. 24489, 2003 WL 1950475 (Haw. Ct. App. Apr. 21,

2003) (Loher I); State v. Loher, No. 26000, 2005 WL 335234, at *3 (Haw.

Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2005) (Loher II); Loher v. State, 193 P.3d 438, 455

(Haw. Ct. App. 2008) (Loher III); Loher v. State, No. 29818, 2011 WL

2132828 (Haw. Ct. App. May 31, 2011) (Loher IV); Loher v. Thomas,

Civ. No. 11-00731, 2013 WL 8561780 (D. Haw. Oct. 2, 2013) (Loher V);

Loher v. Thomas, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1182 (D. Haw. 2014) (Loher VI).

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LOHER V. THOMAS 5

trial procedure, the trial proceedings must be set out in great

detail.

A

On November 14, 2000, Loher’s trial in Hawaii circuit

court began at 9:06 a.m., and the State’s first witness took the

stand at approximately 9:30 a.m. The prosecution presented

four witnesses and then rested at around 2:15 p.m. The court

recessed until about 2:30 p.m. At that point, Loher’s trial

counsel, Neal Kugiya, requested a continuance to November

16, the following trial day, because none of Loher’s witnesses

was present in court. Kugiya argued that he had not

anticipated that the prosecution’s case would “finish this

early . . . because they have quite a number of people on the

witness list,” and that he had attempted during the break to

get witnesses to come to court, unsuccessfully. The trial

court denied the request and the following exchange occurred

between the court, Kugiya, and the prosecutor, Thalia

Murphy:

THE COURT: Under Rule 611 the Court has

discretion to exercise control over the mode

and order of interrogation. What the Court is

going to do because there’s more than enough

time left in the day,[2] we’re going to continue

with the trial. I’m going to allow the defense

to call [Loher] to testify, then after he

completes testifying, he can call whatever

witnesses that’s on call that may arrive today. 

We can continue with that, and then we can

 

2

 Trial days appear to last until 4:30 p.m.

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6 LOHER V. THOMAS

call the remaining witnesses on Thursday

morning.

KUGIYA: Okay. Well, I need to note my

objection to that, Your Honor, because

[Loher] does have a right not to testify, and

based on testimony of other witnesses, there

may not be a need for him to testify if we can

get everything we need across from the other

people.

So in this vein the Court is actually forcing

him to take the stand because now we have

nobody to call, and you’re saying, Well, we

can call [Loher], but as a strategic manner in

planning for our case, he was going to be the

last witness I call, and depending how it went

with the other witnesses, we may not need to

call him because we can get everything that

we need through the other witnesses.

So, in fact, now that we’re being forced to call

him as first witness in a sense is prejudicial to

[Loher] because he’s being forced to testify

when he, in essence, we had not decided fully

whether or not he would testify for sure.

THE COURT: The Court does not find the

argument persuasive. The Court believes that

it was the responsibility or is the

responsibility of counsel to determine when

witnesses would be available.

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LOHER V. THOMAS 7

Defense counsel was free to discuss with the

State the witnesses called and when they

would anticipate finishing their case.

Defense counsel has hopefully prepared for

this case, so should be aware at the present

time what the witnesses that he intends to call

will testify. And having prepared and having

a knowledge as to what they will say, since

they are the defense witnesses, then they

should be in the position to know whether the

defendant should testify.

So the Court believes it is not persuasive that

defense counsel should now argue to this

Court, after the Court had denied his request

to delay the trial till Thursday by saying that

he does not know what his own witnesses will

say and depending what they say, he will then

make the decision whether his client’s going

to testify.

The Court would also note that during the

pretrial conferences, as well as in the opening

statement, the defendant has asserted an alibi

that he was not present at the time, and that

where the—his location would be during

certain times defense counsel has also

represented to the Court that his client is

going to testify.

The Court is not persuaded by his argument

and is concerned that this may be

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8 LOHER V. THOMAS

manipulative in order to obtain the relief that

the Court had not granted.

. . .

KUGIYA: Well, if I can respond.

THE COURT: Excuse me, and the Court is

unpersuaded by your argument. So we’re

going to proceed. You may call your client to

testify, or if you wish, not to testify or engage

in Tachibana[

3

] at this time, and he may

waive his testimony. That is between you and

your client.

So I’m going to take a recess, and before we

do that, is your client going to testify or is he

going to waive his right to testify?

KUGIYA: I’d like to discuss that matter with

him.

MURPHY: I can leave the courtroom so that

they can remain here.

KUGIYA: Your Honor, if I can just say we’re

not trying to delay this trial in any way. It’s

just that it was my understanding from

3

In Tachibana v. State, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that, in every

criminal case where the defendant does not testify, the trial court must

engage in a colloquy with the defendant, advising himof his constitutional

right to testify, and obtaining an on-the-record waiver of that right. See

900 P.2d 1293, 1303 (Haw. 1995).

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LOHER V. THOMAS 9

conversations that the State would probably,

you know, run the whole day. And so, you

know, try not to inconvenience witnesses. I

don’t want them coming around today on

Tuesday, knowing that we wouldn’t get to

them.

It was my understanding that we would not

start our case until Thursday, and that’s why

I indicated to them that we would probably

start Thursday morning.

THE COURT: I understand what you’re

saying.

KUGIYA: It’s not for any purpose of

delay. . . .

THE COURT: Court will stand in recess.

After the recess, Loher testified beginning at 2:45 p.m. 

During cross-examination, prosecutor Murphy elicited

damaging testimony from Loher.

After the trial concluded on November 16, the jury found

Loher guilty of attempted sexual assault but acquitted him of

attempted kidnapping. After trial, Kugiya moved to withdraw

as counsel because Loher had filed a complaint against him

with the Hawaii Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Randal I.

Shintani was appointed as Loher’s counsel and represented

Loher in his sentencing hearing. Following such hearing, the

circuit court granted the prosecutor’s motion for an extended

term of imprisonment, finding that Loher was a persistent

offender under Hawaii Revised Statutes § 706–662(1).

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10 LOHER V. THOMAS

B

With Shintani’s assistance, Loher appealed to the Hawaii

Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”), claiming there was

insufficient evidence to convict him, ineffective assistance of

trial counsel, instructional error, and sentencing error. The

Hawaii ICA affirmed Loher’s conviction and sentence in

Loher I.

C

Loher then filed a pro se post-conviction motion in

Hawaii circuit court pursuant to Hawaii Rule of Penal

Procedure 35 (2002) (“Rule 35 Motion”), arguing in part that

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny

required that a jury—rather than the court—find the facts

necessary to impose his extended sentence. After the circuit

court denied the motion, Loher appealed, and the Hawaii ICA

affirmed in Loher II.

D

Next, Loher filed a pro se post-conviction petition, also in

Hawaii circuit court, under Hawaii Rule of Penal Procedure

40 (“Rule 40 Petition”) in which he raised dozens of claims. 

After the trial judge rejected Loher’s claims without a

hearing, Loher appealed, again pro se. Although Loher’s

briefing did not clearly set forth his claims, the Hawaii ICA

addressed his arguments to the extent it understood them. In

Loher III, it construed Loher’s petition as claiming that the

trial court violated his constitutional rights by forcing him to

testify and that Loher’s appellate counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to raise the “forced testimony” issue in

Loher’s direct appeal. The court remanded for a hearing on

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LOHER V. THOMAS 11

Loher’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (“IAAC”)

claim.

On remand, the circuit court reviewing the Rule 40

petition (“Rule 40 court”) heard testimony from appellate

counsel Shintani, Loher, and trial counsel Kugiya. The Rule

40 court received into evidence the trial transcript and

Shintani’s opening brief on appeal. After considering both

the trial record and the record developed on remand, the Rule

40 court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. It

concluded that the trial court did not violate Loher’s

constitutional rights and that, therefore, Shintani’s failure to

raise the forced testimony issue did not constitute ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel.

On appeal, the Hawaii ICA affirmed the Rule 40 court’s

decision in a reasoned opinion in Loher IV.

E

In due course, Loher filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the federal district court. Upon review of a

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations in Loher V,

the district court in Loher VI granted the writ on all three of

Loher’s claims: (1) that the trial court violated Loher’s

constitutional rights by forcing him to testify; (2) that Loher’s

appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing

to raise the forced testimony issue; and (3) that the

enhancement of his sentence based on judge-found facts

violated Apprendi. Loher VI, 23 F. Supp. 3d at 1186, 1200. 

Having granted relief on all three grounds, the district court

ordered Hawaii to release or to retry Loher. Id. at 1200–01. 

It then stayed that order pending this appeal, which was

timely filed.

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12 LOHER V. THOMAS

II

A

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and

2253(a) and “review de novo the district court’s grant of a

§ 2254 habeas petition.” Wilkinson v. Gingrich, 806 F.3d

511, 515–16 (9th Cir. 2015) (as amended) (citing Doody v.

Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 1001 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). We

review the district court’s determination of the appropriate

remedy for a constitutional violation on a habeas petition for

abuse of discretion. Chioino v. Kernan, 581 F.3d 1182, 1184

(9th Cir. 2009).

B

A state prisoner’s habeas petition “shall not be granted

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “This is a ‘difficult to meet’ and ‘highly

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which

demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the

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LOHER V. THOMAS 13

doubt.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011)

(quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011);

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).

1

The “‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable application of’

clauses in § 2254(d)(1) are distinct and have separate

meanings.” Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir.

2009) (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73–75

(2003)). Under the “contrary to” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a

federal court may grant relief only when “the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the

Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000).

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of

§ 2254(d)(1), “a state-court decision involves an unreasonable

application of [the Supreme Court’s] precedent if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal rule . . . but

unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state

prisoner’s case.” White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1705

(2014) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 407–08). “And an

‘unreasonable application of’ [the Supreme Court’s] holdings

must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even

clear error will not suffice.” Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct.

1372, 1376 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Woodall, 134 S. Ct.

at 1702). “To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is

required to ‘show that the state court’s ruling on the claim

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification

that there was an error well understood and comprehended in

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14 LOHER V. THOMAS

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement.’” Id. (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 103).

Importantly, a state court does not unreasonably apply the

Supreme Court’s holdings by refusing to extend a legal

principle to a new context. See Woodall, 134 S. Ct. at 1706. 

While the “difference between applying a rule and extending

it is not always clear, . . . [t]he critical point is that relief is

available under § 2254(d)(1)’s unreasonable-application

clause if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established

rule applies to a given set of facts that there could be no

‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” Id. at 1706–07

(citations omitted).

2

Under § 2254(d)(2), fact-based challenges “fall into two

main categories.” Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1146

(9th Cir. 2012). “First, a petitioner may challenge the

substance of the state court’s findings and attempt to show

that those findings were not supported bysubstantial evidence

in the state court record.” Id. (citing Taylor v. Maddox,

366 F.3d 992, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). “Second, a

petitioner may challenge the fact-finding process itself on the

ground that it was deficient in some material way.” Id.

(citing Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999, 1001).

A state-court decision “will not be overturned on factual

grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El

v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (emphasis added). 

“While ‘not impossible to meet,’ that is a ‘daunting

standard—one that will be satisfied in relatively few cases,’

especially because we must be ‘particularly deferential to our

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LOHER V. THOMAS 15

state-court colleagues.’” Hernandez v. Holland, 750 F.3d

843, 857 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000). 

Thus, a “state-court factual determination is not unreasonable

merely because the federal habeas court would have reached

a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen,

558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). And we “may not second-guess a

state court’s fact-finding process unless, after review of the

state-court record,” we determine “that the state court was not

merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.” Taylor, 366 F.3d

at 999.

Thus, when “a petitioner challenges the substance of the

state court’s [factual] findings, ‘it is not enough that we

would reverse in similar circumstances if this were an appeal

from a district court decision. Rather, we must be convinced

that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of

appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the

finding is supported by the record.’” Hibbler, 693 F.3d at

1146 (quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000). And when a

petitioner challenges “the state court’s procedure, mere doubt

as to the adequacy of the state court’s findings of fact is

insufficient; we must be satisfied that any appellate court to

whom the defect in the state court’s fact-finding process is

pointed out would be unreasonable in holding that the state

court’s fact-finding process was adequate.” Id. at 1146–47

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

C

When reviewing a habeas petition, “we look to ‘the last

reasoned state-court decision.’” Miller v. Blacketter,

525 F.3d 890, 894 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Van Lynn v.

Farmon, 347 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2003)). Here, the last

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16 LOHER V. THOMAS

reasoned state court decision is the unpublished, post-remand

decision of the Hawaii ICA, Loher IV.

III

A

Loher first argues that the Hawaii ICA’s rejection of his

“forced testimony” claim involved an unreasonable

application of Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972).

1

In Brooks, the Supreme Court held that a Tennessee

statute, which required a criminal defendant to testify before

any of his witnesses, violated the defendant’s rights to remain

silent and to due process. See 406 U.S. at 610–13. It

reasoned that the “defendant’s choice to take the stand carries

with it serious risks of impeachment and cross-examination;

it ‘may open the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence

which is damaging to his case.’” Id. at 609 (quoting

McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971)). Since a

defendant cannot be certain of what his witnesses will say, he

“may not know at the close of the State’s case whether his

own testimony will be necessary or even helpful to his

cause.” Id. at 610. “Rather than risk the dangers of taking

the stand, he might prefer to remain silent at that point,

putting off his testimony until its value can be realistically

assessed.” Id. Keeping the defendant “off the stand entirely

unless he chooses to testify first . . . casts a heavy burden on

a defendant’s otherwise unconditional right not to take the

stand.” Id. at 610–11 (footnote omitted). The Court held that

the Tennessee statute violated “an accused’s constitutional

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LOHER V. THOMAS 17

right to remain silent insofar as it require[d] him to testify

first for the defense or not at all.” Id. at 612.

The Brooks Court also concluded that the statute violated

the defendant’s right to due process. It explained,

Whether the defendant is to testify is an

important tactical decision as well as a matter

of constitutional right. By requiring the

accused and his lawyer to make that choice

without an opportunity to evaluate the actual

worth of their evidence, the statute restricts

the defense—particularly counsel—in the

planning of its case. Furthermore, the penalty

for not testifying first is to keep the defendant

off the stand entirely, even though as a matter

of professional judgment his lawyer might

want to call him later in the trial. The accused

is thereby deprived of the ‘guiding hand of

counsel’ in the timing of this critical element

of his defense. While nothing we say here

otherwise curtails in any way the ordinary

power of a trial judge to set the order of proof,

the accused and his counsel may not be

restricted in deciding whether, and when in

the course of presenting his defense, the

accused should take the stand.

Id. at 612–13.

2

In Loher IV, the Hawaii ICA reviewed two of its prior

decisions applying Brooks to a trial court’s ruling that a

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18 LOHER V. THOMAS

defendant testify first or not at all: State v. Kido, 76 P.3d 612

(Haw. Ct. App. 2003), and State v. Sale, 133 P.3d 815 (Haw.

Ct. App. 2006). Loher IV, 2011 WL 2132828, at *4, *6–8.

In Kido, the defendant wanted to call a witness who was

in the same courthouse, but was occupied in a different

hearing. See 76 P.3d at 614–15. When the witness was not

immediately available, the trial court required the defense to

call the only witness present, the defendant. Id. at 615. On

appeal, the Hawaii ICA identified several situations in which

courts had held that no Brooks violation occurred, including

“where the defendant’s decision whether to testify congealed

before the trial court’s action[] and/or . . . where the

defendant himself created the exigency for taking his

testimony first.” Id. at 619 (citations omitted).4

In Loher IV, the Hawaii ICA noted such “generallyrecognized exceptions” to Brooks and then upheld the Rule

40 court’s factual findings and legal conclusion that both of

the exceptions applied in Loher’s case. Loher IV, 2011 WL

2132828, at *7–10 (quoting Loher III, 193 P.3d at 449 n.6

(citing Kido, 76 P.3d at 619)). Specifically, it affirmed the

findings that Loher had decided “to take the stand no matter

what” before the trial court required him to testify

immediately or not at all; that delay from a continuance

would not have been “trifling”; and that defense witnesses

were not present the first day of trial because Loher’s counsel

failed to confer with the prosecution about the length of its

4 However, the Hawaii ICA concluded that those “exceptions” to Brooks

did not apply in Kido’s case. Id. at 619–20. The court reversed and

remanded for a new trial. Id. at 622–23. In Sale, the Hawaii ICA

distinguished Kido and held that the trial court did not violate Brooks. 

Sale, 133 P.3d at 826–27.

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LOHER V. THOMAS 19

case and erred in estimating the same. Id. at *9–10. Given

these findings, the Hawaii ICA concluded that the trial court

had not violated Brooks. Id. at *10.

3

A “state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit

precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists

could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s

decision.” Woods v. Etherton, 136 S. Ct. 1149, 1151 (2016)

(per curiam) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 101). Such

disagreement is possible here for at least three reasons.

First, Brooks itself addressed a blanket statutory

requirement that a defendant testify before his other

witnesses, regardless of whether such witnesses were

available. It did not address a trial court’s extemporaneous

denial of a continuance, sought in order to procure defense

witnesses, where the defendant was responsible for the

absence of such witnesses. Thus, the Hawaii ICA had to

consider how the principles announced in Brooks applied to

different facts. Extending Brooks to this new context

involves interpretation and reasoning over which fairminded

jurists could disagree. See Woodall, 134 S. Ct. at 1706–07.

Second, in the context of Loher’s request for a

continuance, fairminded jurists could disagree over how to

balance the rights recognized in Brooks with the competing

concern for a trial court’s ability to manage trials recognized

in other Supreme Court opinions. With regard to

continuances in state trials, the Court has remarked:

Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of

latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least of

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their problems is that of assembling the

witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same

place at the same time, and this burden

counsels against continuances except for

compelling reasons. Consequently, broad

discretion must be granted trial courts on

matters of continuances . . . .

Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983). Similarly, when

discussing federal trials, the Court has stated:

Our cases have consistently recognized the

important role the trial judge plays in the

federal system of criminal justice. The judge

is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of

the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper

conduct and of determining questions of law. 

A criminal trial does not unfold like a play

with actors following a script; there is no

scenario and can be none. The trial judge

must meet situations as they arise and to do

this must have broad power to cope with the

complexities and contingencies inherent in the

adversary process. To this end, he may

determine generally the order in which parties

will adduce proof; his determination will be

reviewed only for abuse of discretion.

Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86 (1976) (alterations

and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, at a certain

point, the trial court must have discretion to manage the trial. 

Fairminded jurists could disagree over where to draw the line

between the trial court’s authority and the constitutional

rights recognized in Brooks.

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LOHER V. THOMAS 21

Third, Brooks itself showed solicitude for the trial court’s

ability to manage trials. It cautioned that “nothing we say

here otherwise curtails in any way the ordinary power of a

trial judge to set the order of proof.” 406 U.S. at 613. A

fairminded jurist could interpret Brooks narrowly and

emphasize the trial court’s discretion to set the order of proof.

Thus, a fairminded jurist could conclude that the Hawaii

ICA’s decision was correct based on: (1) the fact that Brooks

addressed significantly different circumstances; (2) the

Supreme Court’s recognition elsewhere that trial courts must

have broad power to manage trials and to deny continuances;

and (3) the Supreme Court’s solicitude in Brooks for the trial

court’s ability to set the order of proof.5 Specifically, such 

5 While our focus above is properly on “whether the applicable Supreme

Court law leaves the issue raised by the petitioner open or resolves it,”

Crace v. Herzog, 798 F.3d 840, 848 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015), we note that

many state and federal courts have reached conclusions that support the

Hawaii ICA’s decision. As the Hawaii ICA recognized, numerous courts,

including our own, “have adopted a narrow interpretation of Brooks and

a corresponding emphasis on the discretion of trial courts to set the order

of proof.” Loher IV, 2011 WL 2132828, at *7 n.5 (citing Menendez v.

Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1031 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Apart from its limited

holding, Brooks did not ‘curtail in any way the ordinary power of a trial

judge to set the order of proof.’” (quoting Brooks, 406 U.S. at 613)

(alteration omitted)); United States v. Singh, 811 F.2d 758, 762–63 (2d

Cir. 1987); Harris v. Barkley, 202 F.3d 169, 173–74 (2d Cir. 2000) (per

curiam); Juniel v. Felkner, No. C 07-4542 RMW (PR), 2010 WL

1912031, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2010); People v. Lancaster, 158 P.3d

157, 194 (Cal. 2007); People v. Walden, 224 P.3d 369, 376 (Colo. Ct.

App. 2009); Book v. State, 880 N.E.2d 1240, 1248–50 (Ind. Ct. App.

2008); People v. Smith, 690 N.Y.S.2d 6, 7 (App. Div. 1999); see also

Loher IV, 2011 WL 2132828, at *8 n.6 (citing, among others, United

States v. Leon, 679 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1982); Johnson v. Evans, No.

CIV S-05-1223, 2009 WL 5030661, at *14–15 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2009);

State v. Turner, 751 A.2d 372, 384 (Conn. 2000)).

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a jurist could readily conclude that a trial court may require

a defendant to testify, if at all, while awaiting the arrival of

other defense witnesses where the defendant is responsible

for the absence of such witnesses.6“No precedent of [the

In Harris, a federal habeas case, the Second Circuit concluded that,

“[n]otwithstanding . . . some of the broad language the Court employed in

Brooks, . . . Brooks does not constitute a general prohibition against a trial

judge’s regulation of the order of trial in a way that may affect the timing

of a defendant’s testimony.” Harris, 202 F.3d at 173. The Second Circuit

thus expressly rejected the contention in Judge Smith’s partial dissent that

Brooks announced a “general principle of constitutional law” “that a

criminal defendant’s rights are violated when a trial judge restricts

‘whether, and when in the course of presenting his defense, the accused

should take the stand.’” Smith Op. at 45–46 (quoting Brooks, 406 U.S. at

613). Next, the Second Circuit distinguished the categorical, statutoryrule

in Brooks from an exercise of the “trial court’s ‘broad power to cope with

the complexities and contingencies’ of trial.” Id. at 174 (quoting Singh,

811 F.2d at 762–63).

6 As the Hawaii ICA observed, many courts have “held that a trial court

may require the defendant to testify, if at all, while awaiting the arrival of

other defense witnesses.” See Loher IV, 2011 WL 2132828, at *7 n.5

(citing Walden, 224 P.3d at 375–76 (recognizing this as a separate

category of cases finding no Brooks violation and citing three such statecourt decisions); Juniel, 2010 WL 1912031, at *5–7; Lancaster, 158 P.3d

at 194; Soto v. State, 751 So.2d 633, 639 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999); Book,

88 N.E.2d at 1243–50; State v. Amos, 262 N.W.2d 435, 437 (Minn. 1978);

Smith, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 7).

In Harris, defense counsel could not procure the presence of a police

officer until the following day, and the trial court ordered the defendant to

take the stand immediately. See 202 F.3d at 171–72. The Second Circuit

recognized that a defendant’s responsibility for the lack of other defense

witnesses distinguished his circumstances from those in Brooks: “Harris,

unlike Brooks, bears primary responsibility for the situation that

engendered the ruling of which he now complains.” Id. at 174; see also

Turner, 751 A.3d at 382–84 (“Brooks does not apply here because the

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LOHER V. THOMAS 23

Supreme Court] clearly forecloses that view.” Etherton,

136 S. Ct. at 1152. Brooks simply did not address such a

situation. Moreover, it is not “so obvious” that the rules set

forth in Brooks apply here “that there could be no ‘fairminded

disagreement’ on the question.” See Woodall, 134 S. Ct. at

1706–07.

Similarly, a fairminded jurist could conclude that a trial

court may require a defendant to testify, if at all, to avoid

wasting two hours of trial time.7 That view is likewise not

“clearly foreclose[d]” by Supreme Court precedent. 

Etherton, 136 S. Ct. at 1152. Brooks did not address the

order of witnesses resulted solely from Corey Turner’s late disclosure of

his alibi and his own statements to the court.”).

7 Again, several courts have reached such a conclusion. For example,

in Walden, the “prosecution completed its case at about 4 p.m. on the first

day of trial.” 224 P.3d at 372. The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded

that the trial court had not violated Brooks when it ordered Walden to

testify that afternoon because his expert was not available. See id. at

377–78. It noted that the trial “court’s decision was influenced by its

concern that the jury’s time not be wasted. This was a legitimate reason

supporting the court’s exercise of discretion over the order of witnesses

because the court would have been required to adjourn for the day if

defendant were to testify after his expert.” Id. at 377. Whatever portion

of Walden’s trial day remained after 4 p.m., it was likely less than the two

hours left in Loher’s first trial day. See also Leon, 679 F.2d at 538

(“Brooks does not control here. The judge was merely trying to keep the

trial from stalling in mid-afternoon.”); Smith, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 7 (“The

court exercised its power to control the flow of the proceedings in the

interest of preventing the morning session of the trial from being wasted,

and defendant’s decision to testify was made with the assistance of

counsel.”); Soto, 751 So.2d at 638–39 (Brooks was “inapplicable” where,

having granted a 30-minute continuance, the trial judge “simply told the

defense, when it could produce no other witnesses, that if the defendant

was going to testify, he would have to take the stand. Otherwise, there

were no other witnesses available.”).

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waste of trial time as a justification for requiring a defendant

to testify first. Instead, it addressed a different justification:

preventing the defendant’s testimony from being influenced

by the testimony of other defense witnesses. See Brooks,

406 U.S. at 607. Although Judge Smith’s partial dissent

argues that the justification in Brooks was “far more

compelling” and that the “trade-off was grossly

disproportionate,” Smith Op. at 45–46, no Supreme Court

holding clearly establishes such propositions. To the

contrary, as discussed above, several Supreme Court opinions

indicate that the trial court’s ability to manage the trial is a

compelling interest warranting the trial court’s broad

discretion to deny continuances and to set the order of proof.

See Morris, 461 U.S. at 11; Geders, 425 U.S. at 86.

In sum, extending Brooks to a trial court’s

extemporaneous ruling involves an inherent amount of

extrapolation and requires balancing the rights recognized in

Brooks with the competing concern for a trial court’s ability

to manage trials effectively. A fairminded jurist could readily

conclude that Brooks does not require a court to waste two

hours of trial time waiting for a defendant’s other witnesses

to arrive when the defendant is primarily responsible for the

absence of such witnesses. Thus, the Hawaii ICA’s

conclusion that no Brooks violation occurred was not “so

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood

and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” Etherton, 136 S. Ct. at 1151

(quoting Woodall, 134 S. Ct. at 1702).

We therefore conclude that the Hawaii ICA’s rejection of

Loher’s Brooks claim was not objectively unreasonable.

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LOHER V. THOMAS 25

B

Loher also argues that the creation of the post-conviction

record and the Hawaii ICA’s reliance on it in Loher IV were

objectively unreasonable under both § 2254(d)(1) and

§ 2254(d)(2).

1

The post-conviction record was created as a result of the

Hawaii ICA’s remand in Loher III. There, the court

construed Loher’s petition as raising both a Brooks claim and

an IAAC claim for Shintani’s failure to raise Brooks in

Loher’s direct appeal. Loher III, 193 P.3d at 448.

It observed that, when Hawaii courts evaluate IAAC

claims, “[c]ounsel’s scope of review and knowledge of the

law are assessed.” Id. at 449 (quoting Briones v. State

(Briones II), 848 P.2d 966, 978 (Haw. 1993)). In Briones II,

the Hawaii Supreme Court explained that the “counsel whose

performance is being evaluated is given an opportunity at the

trial court level to explain his or her understanding of the

issues presented for review.” Briones II, 848 P.2d at 978 n.17

(citing Haw. R. Penal P. 40(f)). It further instructed that,

“[i]n the absence of sufficient evidence in the record on

appeal, an appellate court should remand for the development

of such a record.” Id.

In Loher III, the Hawaii ICA remanded to develop the

record on Loher’s IAAC claims. Because “Loher’s appellate

counsel ha[d] not been given an opportunity to explain his

understanding of the ‘forced testimony’ issue, and the issue

ha[d] not been fully briefed and argued at a hearing on the

Rule 40 Petition,” the Hawaii ICA was “unable to determine

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why the [Brooks] issue was not raised.” Loher III, 193 P.3d

at 449. In “the absence of a sufficient record on this appeal,

including an opportunityfor Loher’s former appellate counsel

to be heard,” the Hawaii ICA concluded that it “must remand

for the development of such a record on the issue of whether

Loher had ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” Id. at

450. The court noted that a remand would assist in

determining not only why Shintani did not brief the Brooks

issue but also whether a Brooks claim was “potentially

meritorious.” Id. at 449.

2

“AEDPA does not provide any specific guidance on what

sort of procedural deficiencies will render a state court’s factfinding unreasonable” under § 2254(d)(2). Hibbler, 693 F.3d

at 1147. When determining whether a state’s fact-finding

procedures were reasonable, we must engage in a “fact-bound

and case-specific inquiry.” Id.

Here, to assist in evaluating the IAAC claim, the Hawaii

ICA remanded for the entirely reasonable purpose of

providingLoher’s appellate counsel an opportunity to explain

why he did not brief the Brooks issue. Loher III, 193 P.3d at

449. While Loher argues that the remand was unnecessary

because the existing trial record supported a Brooks claim, he

does not explain why the state courts were required to

consider the Brooks claim first without collecting further

evidence on the IAAC claim. Consequently, he has failed to

establish that the remand was objectively unreasonable under

§ 2254(d)(2).

Moreover, Loher cites no Supreme Court authority

suggesting that an appellate court should not remand for the

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LOHER V. THOMAS 27

collection of evidence relevant to an IAAC claim.8 Thus,

ordering the remand was not an objectively unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent under § 2254(d)(1).

3

Loher also argues that it was objectively unreasonable “to

adduce testimony from either trial counsel or the petitioner on

remand in the post-conviction proceeding, when the issue to

be litigated was simply whether appellate counsel had been

ineffective for missing the Brooks issue.” But the Rule 40

court did not request testimony from Loher and Kugiya. 

Instead, Loher’s counsel called Loher to the stand, where he

asserted that he had not intended to testify at trial and that he

had expressed such intent to Kugiya. This caused the State to

call Kugiya to the stand to rebut Loher’s testimony.

Loher may not complain to us that the Rule 40 court

considered testimony relevant to the Brooks claim when his

counsel either introduced or opened the door to such

testimony. See United States v. Myers, 804 F.3d 1246, 1254

(9th Cir. 2015) (as amended) (citation omitted) (“The

doctrine of invited error prevents a [party] from complaining

of an error that was his own fault.”). Moreover, Loher has

8

Indeed, remanding for counsel to explain his conduct comports with

the federal test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims set forth in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–95 (1984); see also Smith v.

Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285–88 (2000) (confirming that Strickland is the

proper standard for IAAC claims). There, the Court explained that “every

effort [must] be made . . . to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

challenged conduct[] and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Obtaining counsel’s

explanation of his own conduct and perspective is certainly a reasonable

part of such an evaluation.

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cited no Supreme Court authority establishing that a court

must restrict its consideration of a Brooks claim to the trial

record. Therefore, the Rule 40 court’s hearing testimony

from Loher and Kugiya was not objectively unreasonable

under § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2).

4

Finally, Loher challenges the Hawaii ICA’s reliance on

the facts found by the Rule 40 court.

The Hawaii ICA concluded that such findings were

supported by substantial evidence. Loher IV, 2011 WL

2132828, at *9. First, it reasonably upheld the finding that

Loher’s decision to testify“congealed” before the trial court’s

ruling. Id. It pointed to numerous assertions by Kugiya in

the post-conviction record and the trial court’s

contemporaneous statement that Kugiya had represented to

the court that Loher was going to testify. Id. To the extent

that those statements conflicted with Loher’s post-conviction

testimony and Kugiya’s contemporaneous statements, the

appellate court reasonably deferred to the Rule 40 court,

which was in the best position to judge the credibility of the

witnesses. Id.

Second, the Hawaii ICA reasonably upheld the finding

that Loher was responsible for the situation that required him

to testify because his witnesses were not present. Id. at

*9–10. On appeal, Loher did not challenge the Rule 40

court’s “findings that (1) Kugiya made a mistake as to the

timing of the State’s case, and (2) there was no evidence that

Kugiya ever consulted with the prosecutor as to the length of

the State’s case or the number of witnesses the State would

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LOHER V. THOMAS 29

actually call.” Id. at *10. With these facts uncontested, the

Hawaii ICA’s reliance on them was certainly reasonable.

Loher argues that, nevertheless, Kugiya was not

responsible for the situation because the prosecution

unexpectedly called only four of the fourteen witnesses on its

witness list. However, Loher conceded at oral argument that

“both sides typically over-designate the number of witnesses

that they are going to call” and that “it is incumbent upon trial

counsel to talk to one another as the trial begins” to ascertain

which witnesses would realistically be called and how long

such testimonywould take.9 Because Kugiya was responsible

for taking such steps to determine when the defense should be

ready to begin its case and did not do so, the Hawaii ICA

reasonably upheld the determination that Kugiya was

responsible for the absence of other defense witnesses.

Thus, we reject Loher’s challenges to the creation of the

post-conviction record and to the Hawaii ICA’s reliance on

the facts found on remand.

9 The trial court made the latter point when ruling: “The Court believes

that it was the responsibility . . . of counsel to determine when witnesses

would be available. Defense counsel was free to discuss with the State the

witnesses called and when they would anticipate finishing their case.” See

also Tallman Op. at 39–40; see generally 2 John Toothman & Douglas

Danner, Trial Practice Checklists § 9:51, ¶ 6, Westlaw (database updated

March 2016) (“Another complication in defendant’s case is that counsel

generally does not know when plaintiff will rest and defendant’s case will

begin: a. plaintiff may make an estimate of when its case will be

completed, but these estimates may not be accurate, b. different judges

also have different habits regarding the length of a trial day, c. some

judges will be lenient in postponing the beginning of defendant’s case if

plaintiff finishes early, but others will not, d. defense counsel should have

witnesses available at the earliest possible time the plaintiff may rest, even

if this means that the witnesses may be waiting for some time . . . .”).

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IV

A

Loher persuasively argues that Hawaii has waived any

challenge to the district court’s grant of relief for ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel.

“We address ‘only issues which are argued specifically

and distinctly in a party’s opening brief.’” Chadd v. United

States, 794 F.3d 1104, 1110 n.4 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting

Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994)). “We

adhere to this approach for sound prudential reasons.” 

Ground Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of

Navy, 383 F.3d 1082, 1091 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004). “The premise

of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as

self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but

essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued

by the parties before them.” NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134,

148 n.10 (2011) (quoting Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171,

177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.)); see also Indep. Towers of

Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“Our adversarial system relies on the advocates to inform the

discussion and raise the issues to the court.”); Abovian v. INS,

219 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000) (Wallace, J., dissenting)

(“There is a risk that the court, lacking the analysis ordinarily

provided by adversarial parties, will reach the wrong

conclusion on the merits and create poor precedent . . . .”).10

10 Judge Tallman’s partial dissent argues that we have discretion to

consider issues not argued specifically and distinctly in an opening brief. 

Tallman Op. at 40. But such discretion relates to a different type of

waiver—our “‘general rule’ against entertaining arguments on appeal that

were not presented or developed before the district court.” In re Mercury

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LOHER V. THOMAS 31

Here, in its opening brief, the State did not argue at all

that the district court’s grant of relief for IAAC should be

reversed. After Loher argued in his response brief that

Hawaii had waived this issue, the State did not even address

the issue in its reply brief.

The district court granted Loher relief on three separate

grounds: (1) the Brooks violation (“Ground I”); (2) IAAC for

failure to raise the Brooks claim (“Ground II”); and (3) the

Apprendi violation (“Ground III”). Loher VI, 23 F. Supp. 3d

at 1186, 1200. Because Hawaii did not object to the

magistrate judge’s recommendation that the court grant relief

on Ground III, the court adopted that recommendation

without analysis. The district court then analyzed Ground I

and Ground II in separate sections of its opinion. See id. at

1193–1200 (Section I); id. at 1200 (Section II).11

These two grounds, although both related to the merits of

the underlying Brooks claim, are independent from each

other. For the Brooks claim, the question is whether Loher IV

involved an unreasonable application of Brooks, and we have

concluded it was not. See supra Section III.A. For the IAAC

Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig., 618 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation

omitted); see United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 957 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1995) (addressing waiver of issue “raised for the first time on

appeal”).

11Because the district court granted relief on Ground II, Judge Tallman’s

partial dissent errs when it suggests that Loher’s entitlement to habeas

relief on his IAAC claim depends on whether the Hawaii ICA’s decision

in Loher IV was “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

Strickland.” Tallman Op. at 40. At this stage, Loher is entitled to relief

on his IAAC claim unless Hawaii argues successfully that the district

court erred in granting such relief. Hawaii has not raised any argument on

this issue.

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claim, the question would be whether Loher IV was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, Strickland. 

See Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 785 (9th Cir. 2014); see

also Smith, 528 U.S. at 285–88 (confirming that Strickland is

the proper standard for IAAC claims).

Judge Tallman’s partial dissent suggests that our

conclusion in Section III.A—that Loher IV did not involve an

objectivelyunreasonable application of Brooks—compelsthe

conclusion that Loher IV was neither contrary to, nor an

objectively unreasonable application of, Strickland. Tallman

Op. at 41–42. It does not. Under Strickland, the question is

whether “appellate counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness” and, “but for counsel’s

errors, a reasonable probability exists that he would have

prevailed on appeal.” Hurles, 752 F.3d at 785 (citation

omitted). We have concluded that the Hawaii ICA’s rejection

of the Brooks claim in a post-conviction appeal, based on a

post-conviction record, did not involve an objectively

unreasonable application of Brooks. See Section III.A. 

However, such conclusion simply does not answer whether a

“reasonable probability exists” that Loher would have

prevailed in his direct appeal, based on the trial record, if his

counsel had raised a Brooks claim.12

12 The approach suggested in Judge Tallman’s partial dissent,

considering the merits of the IAAC claim, raises numerous questions for

which the State has supplied no arguments. For example, did the Hawaii

ICA even determine whether a reasonable probability exists that Loher

would have prevailed in his direct appeal? One could argue that Loher IV

applied a more burdensome standard by rejecting the IAAC claim on the

ground that the Brooks claim was not actually meritorious in the postconviction appeal on the basis of evidence that was not in the trial record. 

Loher IV, 2011 WL 2132828, at *10. If the Hawaii ICA applied the

wrong standard, what would we conclude on de novo review? Did

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LOHER V. THOMAS 33

Because Hawaii has failed to argue this independent

IAAC issue specifically and distinctly, it has waived its

challenge to the district court’s grant of relief on Ground II.

B

Loher also persuasively argues that the State waived its

challenge to Loher’s Apprendi claim.

“‘As a general matter, a litigant must raise all issues and

objections’ before the trial court. Thus, in the ordinary

course, a party who does not complain of an issue in the

district court forfeits his right to review of that issue on

appeal.” Bastidas v. Chappell, 791 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir.

2015) (alteration omitted) (quoting Freytag v. C.I.R.,

501 U.S. 868, 879 (1991)). “While ‘failure to object to a

magistrate judge’s factual findings waives the right to

challenge those findings, it is well settled law in this circuit

that failure to file objections . . . does not automatically waive

the right to appeal the district court’s conclusions of law,’ but

is rather ‘a factor to be weighed in considering the propriety

of finding waiver of an issue on appeal.’” Id. (alterations

omitted) (citing Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 848

(9th Cir. 2012)).

counsel’s performance fall belowan objective standard ofreasonableness?

If the Hawaii ICA had considered solely the trial record, is there a

reasonable probability that it would have ruled in favor of Loher on his

direct appeal, as it did for Kido? With respect to these questions, Loher

raises non-trivial arguments, which the State makes no attempt to rebut. 

Ultimately, we need not consider such contentions or answer any of these

questions because the State has waived the issue by failing to raise it its

opening brief.

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34 LOHER V. THOMAS

Here, the district court adopted the magistrate’s

recommendation to grant relief on Loher’s Apprendi claim

because Hawaii did not object to that recommendation. 

Loher VI, 23 F. Supp. 3d at 1186. But Hawaii did more than

fail to object to the magistrate’s legal conclusion. The State

affirmatively requested that the district court “adopt the

Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations,” without

any qualification or reservation. Cf. Myers, 804 F.3d at 1254

(addressing invited error). Hawaii’s failure to object and its

affirmative request invited the district court to adopt the

magistrate’s conclusion on the Apprendi claim and deprived

this court of the considered views of the district court on this

issue. The State’s failure to object and its affirmative

invitation to adopt the magistrate’s recommendation

constitute waiver of its challenge to Loher’s Apprendi claim.

V

Because Loher prevails on his IAAC and Apprendi

claims, but not on his Brooks claim, we must remand for

further proceedings. We provide the following guidance for

the district court to consider in fashioning the remedy.

A

A “court has broad discretion in conditioning a judgment

granting habeas relief. Federal courts are authorized, under

28 U.S.C. § 2243, to dispose of habeas corpus matters ‘as law

and justice require.’” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775

(1987). “More specifically, a court may issue a conditional

writ that requires the state to release a petitioner unless it

takes some other remedial action, such as retrial of the

petitioner.” Lujan v. Garcia, 734 F.3d 917, 933 (9th Cir.

2013).

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LOHER V. THOMAS 35

“The court’s discretion, however, is still bound by the

Constitution . . . .” Johnson v. Uribe, 700 F.3d 413, 425 (9th

Cir. 2012). In the Sixth Amendment context, the Supreme

Court has instructed that “remedies should be ‘tailored to the

injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should

not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.’” Lafler v.

Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388–89 (2012) (quoting United

States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981)). “Thus, a

remedy must ‘neutralize the taint’ of a constitutional

violation, while at the same time not grant a windfall to the

defendant or needlessly squander the considerable resources

the State properly invested in the criminal prosecution.” Id.

(quoting Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365). “The court’s remedy

‘should put the defendant back in the position he would have

been in if the Sixth Amendment violation never occurred.’” 

Johnson, 700 F.3d at 425 (quoting Chioino, 581 F.3d at

1184).

B

Here, having granted relief on all three grounds, the

district court ordered Hawaii to release or to retry Loher. 

Loher VI, 23 F. Supp. 3d at 1200–01. Such remedy was

“tailored to the injury suffered from” a Brooks violation,

which results in a presumptively unfair trial. See Bell v.

Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695–96 & n.3 (2002) (citing United

States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25 (1984) (listing

Brooks as a case in which a presumptively unfair trial

resulted)). Because the writ will now be granted solely with

respect to the Apprendi and IAAC claims, a new trial would

no longer be tailored to such constitutional violations and

would improperly grant Loher a windfall. As a result, on

remand, the district court’s conditional writ should not

require the state to release or retry Loher.

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36 LOHER V. THOMAS

C

We conclude that the appropriate remedy for a sentencing

error such as an Apprendi violation is resentencing “utilizing

a constitutionally sound procedure.” See Chioino, 581 F.3d

at 1186 (concluding that resentencing by the state trial court

is the appropriate remedy for a violation of Apprendi’s

progeny, Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007)).

D

The appropriate remedy is not as clear for ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel.13 The district court should

consider the appropriate remedy in light of supplemental

briefing. On remand, we suggest that the district court

consider Robbins v. Smith, 152 F.3d 1062, 1068–69 (9th Cir.

1997), rev’d on other grounds, 528 U.S. 259 (2000); Lynch

v. Dolce, 789 F.3d 303, 320 (2d Cir. 2015) (“In general, the

appropriate remedy for ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel is to grant a new appeal.”); and, obviously, any other

authorities that the parties bring to its attention.

13 We leave it to the district court to decide whether the principles

delineated in the Sixth Amendment cases in Section V.A should apply to

the remedy for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, which

constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2001)

(discussing Martinez v. Ct. App. of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000) (“[T]he

Sixth Amendment does not apply to appellate proceedings . . . .”));

Moormann v. Ryan, 628 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2010). We note that

we have previously determined that it is “sensible” to apply such

principles to the remedy for a violation of the Fifth Amendment. See

Lujan, 734 F.3d at 934–36.

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LOHER V. THOMAS 37

In conclusion, we remand to the district court with

instructions to modify its conditional writ to require Hawaii

to release Loher or to provide him with resentencing within

a reasonable period of time. In addition, the district court

should consider what additional condition is required to

remedy the ineffective assistance of Loher’s appellate

counsel.14

VI

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and this

case is REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Each party

shall bear its own costs on appeal.

14 Contrary to the suggestion in Judge Tallman’s partial dissent, Tallman

Op. at 42–43, the Hawaii ICA has not considered, and Loher has not yet

litigated, whether Loher’s trial record makes out a meritorious Brooks

claim. Loher IV decided that Loher’s Brooks claim was not meritorious

on the basis of the post-conviction record, and Section III of this opinion

merely concludes that such decision was not objectively unreasonable. 

That is a low bar to clear. Moreover, Section III says nothing about Loher

IV’s conclusion that Loher would not have prevailed in his original direct

appeal, based on the trial record, if his counsel had raised a Brooks claim

or Loher IV’s consideration of evidence outside the trial record for such

prejudice analysis. To the extent that the district court’s remedy requires

the State and the state courts to expend resources to address Loher’s

Brooks claim, the blame will lie squarely with the State for failing to argue

for reversal of the district court’s grant of the writ with respect to Loher’s

IAAC claim.

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38 LOHER V. THOMAS

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting

in part:

With the utmost respect for the views of my two

colleagues, I find myself at odds with portions of both

opinions. I concur in all but Sections IV.A and V.D of Judge

O’Scannlain’s opinion and would remand solely for

resentencing as explained in Section VI. I respectfully

dissent from that part of his opinion which declares that

Hawaii has waived its challenge to the district court’s grant

of habeas relief on Loher’s ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel (IAAC) claim and suggesting that the district court

order a new direct appeal to reconsider the Brooks and IAAC

claims already decided against Loher by the Hawaiian

appellate courts. I also disagree with Judge Smith’s

conclusion that the state court’s construction of Brooks v.

Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), was objectively

unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

I

Judge Smith’s opinion does not afford sufficient AEDPA

deference to the factual findings of the Hawaii courts

following an evidentiary hearing on state collateral review. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Those courts expressly found that

Loher’s trial counsel created the mid-trial hiatus by failing to

confer with opposing counsel as to how many witnesses the

State intended to actually call. That factual finding is entitled

to a presumption of correctness, which Loher has not rebutted

by “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

The findings included that when the State rested early on the

first day, the defense was unprepared to call any of its

witnesses except for the defendant, who had intended to

testify all along. Simply because Judge Smith would have

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LOHER V. THOMAS 39

found otherwise is not good enough. See Wood v. Allen,

558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010) (“[A] state-court factual

determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal

habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the

first instance.”); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473

(2007) (“The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal

court believes the state court’s determination was incorrect

but whether that determination was unreasonable—a

substantially higher threshold.”).

In my trial experience, it is not unusual to list far more

witnesses than counsel will actually need to put on during the

case in chief. That avoids a ruling barring them from

testifying because they were not listed in advance. It is the

responsibility of counsel to confer on timing issues and to be

ready to fill gaps in the trial day to avoid exactly what

happened here—inexcusably running out of witnesses. The

language of the Supreme Court opinions, and Federal Rule of

Evidence 611,1recognize the key role and responsibility of

the trial judge to keep the trial moving. See Morris v. Slappy,

461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983) (“Trial judges necessarily require a

great deal of latitude in scheduling trials.”); Geders v. United

States, 425 U.S. 80, 86 (1976) (“The judge is not a mere

moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of

assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions of

law.”) (citations omitted). This is especially important in

congested urban trial courts, like those in Honolulu, that must

1 Federal Rule of Evidence 611 instructs courts to: “exercise reasonable

control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting

evidence” in order to “avoid wasting time.” The trial judge cited to the

Hawaiian equivalent of the federal rule in refusing to adjourn two hours

early. Jurors do not like to come in for half a day and then be told to go

home. It is inconsiderate of their valuable time and a waste of precious

courtroom space and limited judicial officer time as well.

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40 LOHER V. THOMAS

daily address heavy trial caseloads so that all defendants can

be heard. On this record, the Hawaiian courts were not

objectively unreasonable in ruling that there was no Brooks

error.

II

I disagree with Section IV.A of Judge O’Scannlain’s

opinion because I believe we should exercise our discretion

to consider whether Loher is entitled to habeas relief on his

IAAC claim. Hawaii’s failure to address this issue separately

and distinctly on appeal has unnecessarily complicated this

case. While we ordinarily address “only issues which are

argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief,”

Chadd v. United States, 794 F.3d 1104, 1109 n.4 (9th Cir.

2015) (quoting Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir.

1994)), this is not always the case. We have held that “the

waiver rule is not one of jurisdiction, but discretion.” United

States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 957 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995)

(citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976)).

I would exercise that discretion here, considering the

“record relevant to the matter is fully developed” and the

district court considered the IAAC claim below. See id. We

should find that Loher is not entitled to habeas relief on his

IAAC claim, which is intertwined with the merits of his

invalid Brooks claim.

As Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion acknowledges, the

inquiry as to whether Loher is entitled to habeas relief on his

IAAC claim depends on whether the Hawaii state court’s

decision in Loher IV was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984). DFO Op. at 31–33; see Smith v.

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LOHER V. THOMAS 41

Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). Under Strickland’s twopart test, Loher had to show both that his appellate counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness for failing to raise the Brooks issue and that

there is “a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s

unreasonable failure to file a merits brief, he would have

prevailed on his appeal.” Smith, 528 U.S. at 285 (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “The likelihood of a different

result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington

v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). We may consider either

Strickland prong, and need not address both if Loher fails

one. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

Here, Loher cannot meet the prejudice prong—as

Hawaii’s Intermediate Court of Appeal reasonably

recognized. In rejecting Loher’s IAAC claim, the state court

held:

[Appellate counsel’s] omission of the

[Brooks] issue did not result in the

“withdrawal or impairment of a potentially

meritorious defense.” The Circuit Court did

not err in concluding that [appellate

counsel’s] omission of the “forced testimony”

issue did not amount to ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel.

Loher v. State, No. 29181, 2011 WL 2132828, at *10 (Haw.

Ct. App. May 31, 2011) (citation omitted).

We have ruled that under AEDPA, it was not objectively

unreasonable to find Loher’s Brooks claim meritless. DFO

Op. at 16–29. How then can it be ineffective of Loher’s

appellate lawyer to have failed to raise this claim? It cannot. 

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42 LOHER V. THOMAS

Accordingly, the Hawaii ICA reasonably found, in Loher IV,

that Loher had not shown he was prejudiced by appellate

counsel’s omission of the Brooks claim (the second prong of

the two-part Strickland test). See Loher IV, 2011 WL

2132828, at *10 (appellate counsel’s omission of the Brooks

issue “did not result in the withdrawal or impairment of a

potentially meritorious defense”).

Because this finding was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, Strickland, Loher is not entitled

to habeas relief on his IAAC claim.

III

Asking the state court to revisit an issue it already decided

is senseless. Accordingly, I dissent from Section V.D of

JudgeO’Scannlain’s opinion that remands to the district court

by citing to cases suggesting a new direct appeal be ordered

as an additional condition required to remedy the ineffective

assistance of Loher’s appellate counsel. DFO Op. at 36–37. 

Federal habeas law does not require a “do over” when we

already know the result will be the same as previously

pronounced by the state courts. See Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (federal habeas petitioners are not

entitled to habeas relief unless the alleged violation had a

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict”).

While the district court, on remand, has discretion to

consider the appropriate remedy, Istrongly disagree with any

suggestion that Loher might be entitled to a new direct appeal

on an issue that the state courts have already decided. The

Hawaii state courts have previously expended substantial

judicial resources, that included an evidentiary hearing,

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LOHER V. THOMAS 43

deciding adverse to Loher the merits of the Brooks and IAAC

issues. Granting Loher a new direct appeal—on an issue that

lacks merit—would be a windfall.

A new direct appeal under Judge O’Scannlain’s view

would also apparently require the Hawaii state courts to

disregard all of the important evidence that was adduced in

the state evidentiary hearing on the Brooks issue. See DFO

Op. at 37 n.14. We should not, under the guise of doing what

is “equitable,” turn back the hands of time and deprive the

state court of important evidence obtained from the

evidentiary hearing that was conducted for the exact purpose

of determining whether the Brooks claim was “potentially

meritorious.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (every effort

must be made to “reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

challenged conduct”). That hearing conclusively showed it

was not.

This is not a game. Habeas corpus exists to remedy

“extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102 (citation omitted). The full

record in this case certainly does not present one.

In my view, the appropriate remedy is to leave the

conviction intact and simply remand for re-sentencing on the

Apprendi claim—which I agree has been waived for all of the

reasons stated in Section IV.B of Judge O’Scannlain’s

opinion. On remand, I would urge the district court to avoid

imposing any remedy that would “squander the considerable

resources the State properlyinvested” in determining whether

the Brooks and IAAC claims were meritorious. Lafler v.

Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388–89 (2012). Loher, a recidivist

sex-offender, should not get a second-bite to challenge his

conviction.

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44 LOHER V. THOMAS

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting

in part:

I concur in the majority’s holding that the government has

waived its challenges to Loher’s ineffective assistance of

counsel (IAC) and Apprendi claims, as well as in the

majority’s proposed remedyfor those violations, as discussed

in Section V of the opinion. I respectfully disagree, however,

with the majority’s rejection of Loher’s claims under Brooks

v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972). I would hold instead that

the state court’s denial of relief was “contrary to, or an

unreasonable application” of the Supreme Court’s holding in

Brooks, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).1

I. Brooks controls the outcome of Loher’s case.

Brooks struck down a state rule that criminal defendants

must testify first—before all other defense witnesses—or

forfeit the right to testify at all. 406 U.S. at 605. Brooks’s

holding rested on two bases: first, that this procedural rule

unlawfully curtailed a defendant’s right to remain silent, and

second, that it deprived a defendant of counsel’s guidance in

deciding “whether and when” to testify, in violation of due

process. Id. at 612–13. As the Court highlighted, this

Hobson’s choice “casts a heavy burden on a defendant’s

otherwise unconditional right not to take the stand.” Id. at

1 Despite some difficulty accepting the bona fides of factfinding

conducted a decade after the relevant events, I will assume that the facts

found by the state court are true. Therefore, my view does not rely on a

conclusion that its assessment of the evidence was “unreasonable” under

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Rather, I find legal error in the manner in which

the state court construed the holding of Brooks, such that its construction

was contrary to, or an objectively unreasonable application of, established

law.

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LOHER V. THOMAS 45

610–11 (emphasis added). The Court further explained that

this rule unlawfully deprived the defendant of the strategic

hand of counsel in the timing of his testimony, a “critical

element of his defense.” Id. at 612–13.

Brooks set forth a robust rule of constitutional law. In

reaching its conclusion, the Brooks Court considered

Tennessee’s countervailing interest in “preventing testimonial

influence,” but held that this state concern did not override a

defendant’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at

611–12. Rather, Brooks held that a criminal defendant’s

rights are violated when a trial judge restricts “whether, and

when in the course of presenting his defense, the accused

should take the stand.” Id. at 613. Such was the choice that

the trial judge presented to Loher’s counsel. (“Is your client

going to testify or is he going to waive his right to testify?”).

These facts fall squarely within the scope of Brooks.

In support of its conclusion that Brooks does not control,

the majority relies on cases where other courts have cited a

trial judge’s authority over the “order of proof” to justify

occasions when a defendant was compelled to testify.

406 U.S. at 613. Indeed, the Brooks Court agreed that its

holding did not “otherwise” disturb a trial judge’s “ordinary

power” over the order of proof. Id. Yet the core of the

constitutional disturbance remains when, as here, a trial judge

unjustifiably compels a defendant to testify first or not at all.

Nothing in the reasoning of Brooks turns on whether the trial

judge’s ultimatum was “extemporaneous,” or occurred in the

middle of trial. Indeed, Brooksinvolved far more compelling,

and admittedly legitimate, state concerns in preventing

testimonial influence, which failed to outweigh a defendant’s

rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at

611–12. In contrast, the trial judge summarily concluded that

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46 LOHER V. THOMAS

an efficiency interest in the remaining two hours’ worth of

time trumped Loher’s constitutional rights. This trade-off was

grossly disproportionate. To conclude otherwise would be to

eviscerate one of the central concerns of Brooks—to preserve

a defendant’s “unconditional right not to take the stand.” Id.

at 610.

The majority ultimately relies on whether fairminded

jurists could disagree over “where to draw the line between

the trial court’s authority and the constitutional rights

recognized in Brooks.” Such an approach has some appeal.

Yet the fact that the Brooks Court framed its holding as a

general principle of constitutional law does not indirectly

weaken its force by suggesting that its application to Loher’s

particular circumstances was objectively reasonable. As the

Court has clarified, “AEDPA does not require state and

federal courts to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern

before a legal rule must be applied. . . . The statute

recognizes, to the contrary, that even a general standard may

be applied in an unreasonable manner.” Panetti v.

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Nor does the “fairminded jurist”

inquiry boil down to a matter of nose-counting the decisions

of other courts in other cases. See Crace v. Herzog, 798 F.3d

840, 848 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015).

Even so, the cases cited by the majority are materially

distinguishable from Brooks and the case at hand. They

illustrate only the general proposition that the outer bounds of

a trial judge’s discretion may vary from case to case—not

that the line was unclear in the case before us, where the trial

court abrogated Loher’s constitutional rights to preserve a

mere two hours of trial time.

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LOHER V. THOMAS 47

For example, the majority relies on the Second Circuit’s

decision in Harris v. Barkley, 202 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2000),

where the trial court compelled a criminal defendant to testify

before his last witness. Unlike the facts in the case at hand,

the defendant in Harris flouted the trial court’s instructions

by failing to subpoena a witness to appear on the specific date

that the trial court had pre-determined. Id. at 174.2

Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1031 (9th Cir.

2005), is likewise inappropos because that case decided the

limited issue of whether a trial court could enforce the rules

of evidence by requiring a defendant to first lay the

foundation for the testimony of other witnesses, when the

defendant was the sole witness who could do so. In no way

did the state court in Menendez mandate that the defendant

testify first or forfeit the right to testify at all—it simply

mandated that the defendant testify first if he desired to

introduce testimony from those witnesses in order to comply

with longstanding evidentiary rules. See id.

Therefore, the facts of these cases are far afield of Brooks,

and of the instant case. They might permit reasonable jurists

2 Similarly, in United States v. Leon, 679 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1982),

the Fifth Circuit addressed a situation where defense counsel was unable

to secure the appearance at trial of a voluntary witness. Leon’s analysis of

this issue is scant, but it appears to rest its holding on the assumption that

the defendant had already decided to testify and that the witness was

merely a voluntary one. In addition, Leon’s reasoning commits the same

legal error discussed below, infra Section II.A. That is, a determination

that the trial court’s ruling is harmless cannot factor into whether the

ruling itself violated Brooks. In parsing claims of trial error, we look to

whether an error of constitutional magnitude occurred. Then, we examine

whether such error is susceptible to harmless-error analysis. See Arizona

v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308 (1991).

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48 LOHER V. THOMAS

to disagree about facts that lie at the periphery of the Brooks

rule. But this case lies at its core. The state court’s reasoning

was thus contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

Brooks.

II. The state court’s analysis of the Kido exceptions to

Brooks was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, Brooks.

The state court in this case rested its analysis on certain

putative exceptions to Brooks that were enunciated by the

Hawaii Court of Appeals in State v. Kido, 76 P.3d 612, 619

(Haw. Ct. App. 2003). The state court found that the Kido

exceptions applied because (1) Loher’s decision to testify

“congealed” prior to the trial court’s actions and (2) Loher

created the “exigency” that compelled him to testify first.

Loher v. Hawaii, No. 29-818, 2011 WL 2132828 (Haw. Ct.

App. 2011) (“Loher IV”), *8–*9. In adopting the Kido

exceptions, the state court unreasonably strayed from

Brooks’s holding.

A. Whether Loher’s intent to testify had “congealed”

The first Kido exception involves a factual inquiry into

whether a defendant’s decision to testify had “congealed”

prior to the trial court’s action. 76 P.3d at 619. Yet Brooks

emphasized that a defendant “cannot be absolutely certain

that his witnesses will testify as expected or that they will be

effective on the stand.” 406 U.S. at 609. Rather, a defendant

is constitutionally entitled to wait “until [his testimony’s]

value can be realistically assessed.” Id. at 610. Prior to the

trial court’s ruling, Loher made no definitive statement that

he would waive his right to remain silent by taking the stand

and exposing himself to cross-examination. Loher v. Thomas,

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LOHER V. THOMAS 49

23 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1198 (D. Haw. 2014).3 The district court

quoted then-Circuit Judge Anthony Kennedy as follows:

At the outset of a trial, a defendant in good

faith may intend to testify, but it may be quite

reasonable for him to change his mind after

considering the course taken by the

evidence. . . . Thus, a defendant cannot be

bound by any pretrial statement of election; in

fact, it would appear to be unconstitutional to

do so. See Brooks v. Tennessee, supra. There

is absolutely nothing to guarantee the

sincerity of such pretrial assurances, and even

when statements of election are given in good

faith, they may be based on fictional

assumptions.

Id. at 1199 (quoting United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175,

1189 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part and

concurring in part)). For these reasons, Brooks discouraged

close probing of whether a defendant intended to

testify—instead, it allowed a defendant the right to decide, or

change his mind, after viewing the strength of his case. See

406 U.S. at 609–10.

Equally improper is the fact that the exception fails to

consider the entirety of the Court’s opinion in Brooks. Brooks

did not limit itself to the question of whether a defendant was

3 Even if the state court’s post-hoc inquiry into whether Loher had

intended to testify all along was in accordance with Brooks, Loher was not

required to take the stand to establish an alibi defense under Hawaiian law.

See Loher, 23 F.Supp.3d at 1198 (citing State v. Cordeira, 707 P.2d 373,

376 (1985)).

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50 LOHER V. THOMAS

compelled to testify, in violation of his Fifth Amendment

rights. It also rested its holding on a defendant’s choice of

when to testify, based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s

guarantee of due process. Id. at 612–13. Brooks therefore

concerned two distinct constitutional rights.Yet the exception

enunciated in Kido places a myopic focus on one half of the

Court’s holding by providing that whenever a defendant has

already decided to testify, both his Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights are forfeited.

Here, Loher was harmed not only by being compelled to

testify, but being compelled to do so first. See id. Brooks

held that compelling a defendant to testify first interferes with

his right to counsel in the planning of his defense—at a time

when a defendant and his counsel are “without an opportunity

to evaluate the actual worth of their evidence,” and when “as

a matter of professional judgment his lawyer may want to call

him later in the trial.” Id. at 612. By casting aside this part of

the Court’s constitutional holding, the exception is

objectively unreasonable and, indeed, contrary to Brooks

itself.

Finally, this exception sidesteps the appellate-review

process set forth in cases such as Chapman v. California,

386 U.S. 18 (1967), and Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279

(1991), for evaluating whether claims of trial error are

harmful. The Hawaii courts’ post-hoc factual inquiry into

when a defendant’s decision to testify had “congealed” is

independent of whether a Brooks violation existed in the first

place. Rather, the exception asks whether the trial court’s

decision materially changed the outcome—that is, assuming

there was constitutional error, whether such error was

harmless. The Hawaii courts’ inquiry therefore places the cart

before the horse by conflating harmlessness with underlying

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LOHER V. THOMAS 51

constitutional error. In effect, it assumes that when a trial

error is deemed “harmless,” there can be no violation of the

constitutional scheme envisioned by Brooks. Worse yet, it

does so by omitting a significant threshold question: whether

a harmless-error or a structural-error analysis is more

appropriate.

Under structural-error analysis, legal error is per se

harmful. See United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d

664, 670 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Arizona, 499 U.S. at 309–10).

As the district court concluded, a Brooks error is likely

structural and not amenable to harmlessness analysis. Loher

v. Thomas, 23 F.Supp.3d at 1196–97; see Bell v. Cone,

535 U.S. 685, 695–96 & n.3 (2002) (citing Brooks).

Therefore, the choice between structural error and harmless

error is a non-trivial one. By shortcircuiting the constitutional

analysis under Chapman and its progency, the Hawaii court’s

exception serves to erode the standard of review in a way that

materially, and invidiously, alters a reviewing court’s

conclusions.

B. Creation of the exigency

The state court also based its holding on a second Kido

exception: whether a defendant is to blame for causing the

“exigency” that compelled the premature testimony. Loher IV

at *7. This exception, too, does not square with established

precedent that a criminal defendant’s waiver of fundamental

constitutional rights must generally be knowing and

intelligent. See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80 (2004). Rather,

the exception unreasonably compels a defendant to forfeit his

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under Brooks, even

where that situation arose as a mere mishap or “mistake,” id.

at *10.

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52 LOHER V. THOMAS

The majority relies on the assumption that Loher was

“primarilyresponsible” for the absence of his witnesses. Even

assuming the trial court was not unreasonable in imposing an

affirmative duty on defense counsel in this situation,

counsel’s failure to exercise this duty, standing alone, does

not compel the waiver of the defendant’s constitutional rights

under Brooks. Such a conclusion, even in pursuit of a valid

interest in efficiency, would be dissonant with the very

balancing conducted by the Brooks Court, where even a

state’s substantive interest in preventing testimonial

gamesmanship did not outweigh a defendant’s Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. 406 U.S. at 611–12.

Moreover, the Supreme Court has long maintained that a

criminal defendant waives his constitutional rights only in the

case of “intentional relinquishment or abandonment.” United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson

v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)). “Waiver of the right to

counsel, as of constitutional rights in the criminal process

generally, must be a “knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with

sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances.” Iowa,

541 U.S. at 80 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,

748 (1970)); see also Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 (holding that

courts should not “presume acquiescence in the loss of

fundamental rights”). The majority cites cases from other

circuits in which defendants apparently waived their rights

under Brooks through affirmative misconduct or failure to

fulfill a court-imposed duty—for example, to secure the

presence of witnesses on a date set by the court. See, e.g.,

Harris, 202 F.3d at 174. Loher’s case presents a far cry from

such circumstances. Rather, the state court found that the

Loher had waived the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

announced in Brooks by no more than pure inadvertence.

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LOHER V. THOMAS 53

III. Legal error under § 2554(d)(1)

The Hawaii courts, as a matter of law, misconstrued the

scope of Brooks and improperly curtailed its holding through

the creation of several freewheeling exceptions set forth in

Kido. The Kido exceptions embody flawed constitutional

standards. Most dangerously, they operate to withhold cases

from Brooks scrutiny entirely once it is determined that an

over-expansive exception is triggered. Because the state court

applied the wrong legal standard to Loher’s constitutional

claims, AEDPA deference to its conclusions is unwarranted.

See Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir.

2001); Wade v. Terhune, 202 F.3d 1190, 1095 (9th Cir.

2000). Accordingly, I would hold that the state court’s

construction of Brooks is objectively unreasonable under

28 U.S.C. § 2554(d)(1), and must be reversed.

I respectfully dissent.

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