Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01262/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01262-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

BERTA ALICIA LUJANO GONZALEZ,

JOSE LUIS SALAZAR JARAMILLO

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES 

CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 

SERVICES, CHAD F. WOLF, Acting 

Secretary of United States 

Department of Homeland Security, 

and KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, 

Senior Official Performing the 

Duties of the Director, USCIS,

Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-1262 WBS JDP

ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Berta Alicia Lujano Gonzalez and Jose Luis 

Salazar Jaramillo brought this action against the United States 

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), the United States 

Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”), Chad Wolf, Acting 

DHS Secretary, and Kenneth Cuccinelli, Senior Official Performing 

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the Duties of the Director, USCIS, (collectively “defendants”) 

alleging unlawful delays in the processing of their requests for 

nonimmigrant classification and work authorization. Defendants

have moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (See Defs.’ Mot. to 

Dismiss (Docket No. 14).)

I. Legal Standard

A. Failure to State a Claim

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for 

dismissal when the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The 

inquiry before the court is whether, accepting the allegations in 

the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in 

the plaintiff’s favor, the complaint has stated “a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The plausibility standard is 

not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more 

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

B. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction is appropriate if the complaint, considered 

in its entirety, fails to allege facts on its face that are 

sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. In re 

Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 

981, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2008). A defendant can challenge subject 

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matter jurisdiction in one of two ways--through a facial attack 

or a factual attack. A facial attack “accepts the truth of the 

plaintiff's allegations but asserts that they are ‘insufficient 

on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.’” Leite v. Crane 

Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). A factual attack 

“contests the truth of the plaintiff's factual allegations, 

usually by introducing evidence outside the pleadings.” Id. 

“The plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of 

the evidence that each of the requirements for subject-matter 

jurisdiction has been met.” Id.

II. Factual Background and Relevant Allegations

This case arises out of defendants’ delay in 

responding to plaintiffs’ applications for “U Nonimmigrant 

Status” and employment authorization in October 2016. (See

generally First Amended Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket No. 9).) Federal 

question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is predicated upon 

the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.

A. The “U Visa” Program

In October 2000, as part of the Victims of Trafficking 

and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (“VTVPA”), Pub. L. 106-386, 

114 Stat. 1464, Congress created the U nonimmigrant 

classification (the “U visa”). See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U). 

An individual is eligible for a U visa if USCIS determines that 

the individual (1) is a victim of a qualifying crime committed in 

the United States; (2) has suffered physical or mental abuse as a 

result; (3) has credible or reliable information about the crime;

(4) has been, is being, or is likely to be helpful to law 

enforcement in investigating or prosecuting the crime; and (5) is 

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admissible to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 

214.14(b), 214.14(c), 214.1(a)(3)(i). 

An individual may apply for a U visa using a “Form I918” petition. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U). Upon approval by 

USCIS, the petitioner receives lawful U-1 nonimmigration status 

and employment authorization for four years. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1184(p)(6). He or she may also petition for certain qualifying 

relatives. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii). 

B. The Regulatory Waitlist

The number of aliens who may be issued a U visa in the 

United States is limited by statute to 10,000 per year. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1184(p)(2)(A). USCIS has enacted rules establishing a 

regulatory waitlist process for petitions that would be 

approvable but for the fact that the annual statutory cap had 

already been met. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(2). Submission of a 

petition does not automatically place a petitioner on the 

regulatory waitlist; USCIS must first determine that the petition 

submitted would be approvable in all respects. See id. Part of 

this process involves verifying that the petitioner has submitted 

a required certification from a “Federal, State, or local law 

enforcement official, prosecutor, judge, or other Federal, State, 

or local authority investigating criminal activity” stating that 

the petitioner “has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely 

to be helpful” to the authority in investigating a qualifying 

crime. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(III)-(IV); 8 U.S.C. § 

1184(p)(1). 

Once USCIS determines that a petition is grantable in 

all respects, the petitioner “must be placed on [the] waiting 

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list and receive written notice of such placement.” 8 C.F.R. § 

214.14(d)(2). However, no statute or regulation requires USCIS

to determine whether a petition is eligible for placement on the 

regulatory waitlist within a specified period of time or in any 

particular order. USCIS regulations merely require that 

“[p]riority on the waiting list . . . be determined by the date 

the petition was filed with the oldest petitions receiving the 

highest priority.” Id. 

When USCIS places a petition on the regulatory 

waitlist, the petitioner and his or her qualifying family members 

receive “deferred action” (a discretionary determination by the 

federal government to defer a removal action of the petitioner 

and qualifying family members), provided they are in the United 

States. Id. 

C. U-Related Employment Authorization

Non-citizens are only lawfully permitted to work in the 

United States if they are lawfully admitted for permanent 

residence or otherwise authorized to be employed. 8 U.S.C. § 

1324a; 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12. USCIS is required by statute to grant 

work authorization in the form of “employment authorization 

documents” to petitioners who receive a U visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 

1184(p)(3)(B). Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security 

“may grant work authorization to any alien who has a pending, 

bona fide application for [a U visa].” 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6). 

Petitioners may receive employment authorization documents once 

they have been placed on the waitlist, but USCIS regulations 

leave this decision to the agency’s discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 

214.14(d)(2) (“USCIS, in its discretion, may authorize employment

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for such petitioners [who are placed on the waitlist] and 

qualifying family members.”). 

Under the USCIS regulations, petitioners for a U visa

do not need to submit a separate request or fill out separate 

paperwork to obtain work authorization, because the Form I-918 

petition contains a box petitioners can check to indicate they 

are also seeking work authorization and thus “serves the dual 

purpose of requesting U nonimmigrant status and . . . employment 

authorization.” New Classification for Victims of Criminal 

Activity; Eligibility for “U” Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 

53,014, 53,029 (Sep. 17, 2007). U visa petitioners placed on the 

waitlist are also eligible for employment authorization based on 

the fact that they have been granted deferred action, but they 

must apply separately to receive employment authorization 

documents. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14); 8 C.F.R. § 1.2; 8 C.F.R. § 

103.2(a)(1).

D. The 90-Day Adjudication Timeframe and Interim 

Employment Authorizations

Former 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) required USCIS to 

adjudicate applications for work authorization within 90 days. 

See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) (2016). If the application for work 

authorization was not adjudicated within 90 days of USCIS’ 

receipt, the regulation called for USCIS to grant interim 

employment authorization documents that expire after a period of 

no greater than 240 days. See id. 

Effective January 17, 2017, however, the 90-day 

processing deadline and authorization to issue interim employment 

authorization documents were eliminated via rulemaking. See 81 

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Fed. Reg. 82398 (Nov. 18, 2016) (“Final Rule”). As a result of 

the Final Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) no longer requires that 

USCIS adjudicate work authorization applications within 90 days,

and no longer authorizes the agency to issue interim employment 

authorization documents. 

E. Plaintiffs’ Claims

Plaintiffs submitted I-918 petitions to obtain U visas

and work authorization in October 2016, along with required 

certifications verifying that they had in fact been victims of a 

qualifying crime and had or were likely to be helpful to law 

enforcement authorities in investigating the crime. (FAC ¶¶ 48-

54.) Plaintiffs submitted their petitions before the amendments 

to 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d), which removed USCIS’ 90-day processing 

deadline, went into effect in January 2017. (See id.) To date, 

USCIS has not issued a decision as to whether to place plaintiffs 

on the regulatory waitlist, grant deferred action, or issue 

employment authorization documents. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs allege that USCIS has unreasonably delayed 

in processing their I-918 petitions, “as Plaintiff believes (and 

Defendants can confirm) other applicants who have filed their I918 applications after theirs were filed have already been placed 

on the waitlist or have been issued employment authorization 

documents and/or granted deferred action status by USCIS.” (See

FAC ¶¶ 55-56.) Plaintiffs further allege that USCIS has issued 

fewer waitlist determinations each year since 2018, despite an 

increase in U visa applications being filed. (See FAC ¶ 57.)

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in June 2020, 

approximately 44 months after submitting their I-918 petitions. 

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(See Docket No. 1.) Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint sets 

forth five claims for relief, styled as “Causes of Action.” (See

FAC ¶¶ 61-170.) In the First Cause of Action, plaintiffs claim 

that defendants violated APA § 706(1) by unreasonably delaying or 

unlawfully withholding a decision on plaintiffs’ requests for 

work authorization under 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6) and 8 C.F.R. § 

274a.12(c)(14). (See FAC ¶¶ 61-85.) In the Second Cause of 

Action, plaintiffs claim that defendants violated APA § 706(1) by 

unreasonably delaying or unlawfully withholding a decision on 

plaintiffs’ requests for work authorization under the version of 

8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) in effect when plaintiffs submitted their 

petitions by failing to adjudicate their requests for work 

authorization within 90 days and by failing to issue interim 

employment authorization documents. (See FAC ¶¶ 86-102.) In the 

Third Cause of Action, plaintiffs claim that defendants violated 

the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), § 706(1) by unreasonably delaying or 

unlawfully withholding a determination as to whether plaintiffs 

belong on the regulatory waitlist for a U visa. (See FAC ¶¶ 103-

55.) In the Fourth Cause of Action, plaintiffs claim that 

defendants violated the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 

U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i), by withholding documents requested by 

plaintiffs that make up their alien registration files. (See FAC 

¶¶ 156-64.) In the Fifth Cause of Action, plaintiffs claim they 

are entitled to attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice 

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504; 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (See FAC ¶¶ 164-70.) 

III. Discussion

A. First Cause of Action

Section 1184(p)(6) states that “[t]he Secretary may 

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grant work authorization to any alien who has a pending, bona 

fide application for nonimmigrant status under section 

1101(a)(15)(U) of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6). 

Defendants contend that the APA and the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (“INA”) deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear 

plaintiff’s claim that they have unlawfully withheld or 

unreasonably delayed issuing a decision under the statute because 

their decision whether to issue employment authorization 

documents under the statute is purely discretionary. (See Defs.’ 

Mot. to Dismiss at 15-17.) The court agrees.

Although section 706(1) of the APA states that a 

“reviewing court shall compel agency action unlawfully withheld 

or unreasonably delayed,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), section 701 limits 

judicial review of agency action when “(1) statutes preclude 

judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency 

discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). “[A] claim under 

§ 706(1) can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an 

agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is 

required to take.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 

U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (emphasis in original). 

Similarly, the INA states that “no court shall have 

jurisdiction to review any other decision or action of . . . the 

Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is 

specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the 

Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security . . . .” 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). 

Section 1184(p)(6) clearly grants defendants discretion 

to adjudicate requests for work authorization. See Gonzalez v. 

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Cissna, 364 F. Supp. 579, 584 (E.D.N.C. 2019); Uranga, 2020 WL 

5763633, at *7-*10; Ramires, 2020 WL 6146393, at *4. The statute 

states that “[t]he Secretary may grant work authorization” to a 

petitioner with a pending, bona fide application, but nothing in 

the statute indicates that the Secretary is required to evaluate 

whether a petitioner’s application is bona fide or whether work 

authorization is warranted prior to the petitioner being placed 

on the waitlist. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6) (emphasis added). 

The use of the word “may” is a clear grant of discretion to 

USCIS. See Uranga, 2020 WL 5763633, at *8; Maine Cmty. Health 

Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1320 (2020) (“Unlike 

the word ‘may,’ which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’ 

usually connotes a requirement.”); Rastelli v. Warden Metro. 

Corr. Ctr., 782 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The use of . . . 

‘may review’ instead of ‘shall review’ suggests a discretionary 

rather than mandatory process.”). The statute does not mandate 

that USCIS grant work authorization to pending, bona fide 

applicants, or even direct USCIS to promulgate regulations 

interpreting what makes an application “bona fide” or otherwise 

implementing the statute. See Ramires, 2020 WL 6146393 at *4. 

By contrast, section 1184(p) does place a clear duty on 

USCIS to grant employment authorization to petitioners who 

receive a U visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(3)(B) (“the Attorney 

General shall, during the period those aliens are in lawful 

temporary resident status under that subsection, provide the 

aliens with employment authorization.” (emphasis added)). 

Additionally, section 1184(p)(6) itself utilizes mandatory 

language multiple times when addressing certain extensions of U 

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visas:

The authorized period of status of an alien 

as a nonimmigrant under section 

1101(a)(15)(U) of this title shall be for a 

period of not more than 4 years, but shall

be extended upon certification from a . . . 

law enforcement official, prosecutor, judge, 

or other . . . authority investigating or 

prosecuting criminal activity described in 

section 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii) of this title 

that the alien's presence in the United 

States is required to assist in the 

investigation or prosecution of such 

criminal activity . . . . Such alien's 

nonimmigrant status shall be extended beyond 

the 4-year period authorized under this 

section if the alien is eligible for relief 

under section 1255(m) of this title and is 

unable to obtain such relief because 

regulations have not been issued to 

implement such section and shall be extended 

during the pendency of an application for 

adjustment of status under section 1255(m) 

of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6) (emphasis added). 

Only in the last sentence of section 1184(p)(6) did 

Congress state that the “Secretary may grant work authorization 

to any alien who has a pending, bona fide application . . . .” 

Id. In other words, Congress knew the words to choose if had 

intended to require the Secretary to adjudicate every U visa 

application to determine if it was bona fide and, thus, whether 

work authorization should issue. See Lindley v. FDIC, 733 F.3d 

1043, 1056 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[W]here Congress knows how to say 

something but chooses not to, its silence is controlling.”). 

Accordingly, the court concludes that section 

1184(p)(6) places the decision whether to award work 

authorization to petitioners who have not yet been placed on the 

regulatory waitlist within USCIS’ discretion. Because the APA 

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and the INA preclude judicial review of discretionary decisions 

by USCIS, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 

plaintiffs’ claim. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a); 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The First Cause of Action of plaintiffs’ 

FAC (FAC ¶¶ 61-85) will therefore be dismissed. 

B. Second Cause of Action

The version of 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) that was in effect 

at the time plaintiffs filed their petitions for a U visa stated 

“USCIS will adjudicate the application within 90 days from the 

date of receipt of the application” and “[f]ailure to complete 

the adjudication within 90 days will result in the grant of an 

employment authorization document for a period not to exceed 240 

days.” 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) (2016). In other words, USCIS was 

required to adjudicate a request for employment authorization 

within 90 days of receiving a petitioner’s application, and if it 

failed to do so, it was required to issue the petitioner interim 

employment authorization documents for a period no greater than 

240 days. See id. 

Under the current version of the regulation, however, 

USCIS is no longer required to adjudicate applications for work 

authorization within 90 days and is not authorized to issue 

interim employment authorization documents. See 8 C.F.R. § 

274a.13(d). Defendants contend that the court should apply the 

current version of the regulation, and that under this version, 

the court does not have jurisdiction to review plaintiff’s claim 

because USCIS is under no legal obligation to act. See Norton, 

542 U.S. at 64 (“[A] claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where 

a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete 

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agency action that it is required to take.”). 

To determine whether subject matter jurisdiction over 

this claim exists, then, the court must first determine which 

version of 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) to apply. Because the 2016 

version of the regulation was in effect when plaintiffs filed 

their petitions, and was still in effect when the 90-day period 

expired and the issuance of interim employment authorization 

documents was mandatory, the court concludes that it applies, for

the reasons discussed below. 

“The principle that the legal effect of conduct should 

ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the 

conduct took place has timeless and universal human appeal.” 

Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 

(1990). “Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that 

individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is 

and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations 

should not be lightly disrupted.” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 

511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994). “Retroactivity is not favored in the 

law.” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). 

“Congressional enactments and administrative rules will 

[therefore] not be construed to have retroactive effect unless 

their language requires this result.” Id. “By the same 

principle, a statutory grant of legislative rulemaking authority 

will not, as a general matter, be understood to encompass the 

power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is 

conveyed by Congress in express terms.” Id. 

To determine whether a statute or regulation may be 

retroactively applied, courts generally employ a two-step 

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framework. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265. First, the court looks to 

whether Congress expressly provided that the statute be applied 

retroactively. Id. at 270. If “the statute contains no such 

express command,” a court moves on to the second step, which 

examines whether the law has a “retroactive effect.” Id. at 280. 

This analysis requires an assessment of “the nature and extent of 

the change in the law and the degree of connection between the 

operation of the new rule and a relevant past event,” as well as 

“whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to 

events completed before its enactment.” Id. at 270. A statute 

is impermissibly retroactive if it “takes away or impairs vested 

rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, 

imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to 

transactions or considerations already past.” Id. at 269 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

To determine whether rights have “vested,” the court 

looks to whether the person has “availed himself of them or 

[taken] action that enhanced their significance to him in 

particular.” Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 44 n.10 

(2006). Any action taken must “elevate [the expectation] above 

the level of hope,” and therefore actions that do little to 

substantially further the individual's expectation of relief are 

insufficient to create a vested right. Id.

Here, there is no provision in the immigration statutes 

that explicitly authorizes USCIS to promulgate retroactive rules, 

and defendants do not contend otherwise. (See Defs.’ Mot. to 

Dismiss at 19-20.) The court will therefore move on to the 

second step of the Landgraf analysis and ask whether applying the 

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amended regulation would take away “vested rights [that were] 

acquired under existing laws.” Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 

266 (2012).

Plaintiffs applied for work authorization on October 3, 

2016, when they submitted their Form I-918 petition for a U visa. 

See 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014, 53,029 (Sep. 17, 2007) (indicating that 

the Form I-918 petition “serves the dual purpose of requesting U 

nonimmigrant status and . . . employment authorization”). At the 

time, they had the right to have the request adjudicated within 

90 days, or USCIS was required to issue interim employment 

authorization documents. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) (2016). 

Plaintiffs availed themselves of this right by submitting their 

petition for a U visa and work authorization. See FernandezVargas, 548 U.S. at 44 n.10; Uranga, 2020 WL 5763633, at *15 

(holding that applying amended version of 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) 

would interfere with right of plaintiff that vested when he 

applied for work authorization); Rodriguez v. Nielson, No. 16-CV7092 (MKB), 2018 WL 4783977, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2018) 

(same). 

Contrary to defendants’ assertions (see Defs.’ Reply at 

6-8 (Docket No. 19)), plaintiffs took action in reliance on the 

prior version of the regulation that elevated their expectation 

of having their work authorization requests adjudicated “above 

the level of hope.” See Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 44 n.10. 

Specifically, plaintiffs volunteered their identities--along with 

their status as undocumented aliens--to local and federal law 

enforcement agencies and agreed to cooperate in ongoing law 

enforcement investigations with the expectation that they would 

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be placed on the waitlist for a U visa and receive a 

determination as to their requests for work authorization within 

90 days, as provided by the regulation in force at the time. 

(See FAC ¶¶ 44, 48-49, 87.) 

While plaintiffs could have applied for work 

authorization through other channels, the regulation in place at 

the time provided that if they applied in conjunction with their 

application for a U visa, they would have their requests

adjudicated within 90 days or, if USCIS did not make a 

determination within that time period, they would receive interim 

employment authorization documents for up to 240 days. See 8 

C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) (2016). Because the regulation’s language 

was that of a guarantee (i.e., USCIS “will adjudicate the 

application within 90 days,” and “failure to complete the 

adjudication within 90 days will result” in the issuance of 

interim employment documents), filing a request for a work 

authorization along with a U visa elevated plaintiff’s 

expectations “above the level of hope.” See id.

Defendants cite to Durable Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Labor, 578 F.3d 497, 503 (7th Cir. 2009), and Labojewski v. 

Gonzales, 407 F.3d 814, 822 (7th Cir. 2005), to argue that the 

filing of an application for an administrative benefit, including 

a visa petition, does not create a vested right in that benefit. 

The court finds those cases distinguishable, however. In 

Durable, the Seventh Circuit held that a revised regulation did 

not have an impermissibly retroactive effect with regard to two 

applications for labor certifications that were approved after 

the new regulation took effect. See Durable, 578 F.3d 497, 503-

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504. The court reasoned that merely filing an application for a 

labor certification did not give the applicants a vested right to 

a labor certification because the agency would still have to make 

a final determination as to the applicant’s qualification for the 

certification. See id. “[No] new legal consequences would 

affect the application as a result of the amended” regulation 

because the agency would still had to evaluate the merits of the 

application. See id. 

The court in Durable also held that the new regulation 

did not have an impermissibly retroactive effect as to thirteen 

labor certification applications that had been approved before

the new regulation went into effect, because the prior regulation 

had only given applicants the right to an “indefinite” labor 

certification, meaning their duration was not fixed and the 

agency could revoke or extinguish the validity of their 

certifications at any time. See id. The applicants could not 

expect their certifications to be permanent and therefore did not 

have a vested right in them. Id.

The right guaranteed by 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) (2016) 

differs from the one at issue in Durable because it specifically 

guaranteed plaintiffs the right to have their application for 

work authorization adjudicated within 90 days. The regulation 

stated that “USCIS will adjudicate the application within 90 days 

from the date of receipt of the application.” 8 C.F.R. § 

274a.13(d) (2016). This 90-day period had completely elapsed 

prior to enactment of the revised regulation, so unlike the 

applicants in Durable, no “final determination” remained to be 

made before adjudication of their applications. See Durable, 578 

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F.3d 497, 503-504. Because the prior regulation also guaranteed 

that “[f]ailure to complete the adjudication within 90 days will 

result in the grant of an employment authorization document for a 

period not to exceed 240 days,” 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) (2016), 

plaintiffs had a more legitimate expectation in receiving interim 

employment authorization documents than the applicants in 

Durable. See Durable, 578 F.3d 497, 503-504.

Similarly, Labojewski is distinguishable because it 

dealt with a situation in which the applicant had not yet applied 

for the benefit at issue prior to the change in law. See

Labojewski, 407 F.3d at 822. There, the Seventh Circuit held 

that a change in law did not have an impermissibly retroactive 

effect merely because the applicants had satisfied a prerequisite 

for obtaining a change in immigration status (re-entering the 

country) prior to the change in law. See id. Because the 

applicants had failed to actually apply for the change in status 

before the law changed, they did not have a “reasonable reliance” 

on being eligible under the old criteria. Id. Labojewski thus 

does not apply here because plaintiffs had already successfully 

applied for work authorization and had their 90-day period vest 

under the regulation prior to its revision. See 8 C.F.R. § 

274a.13(d) (2016).

Defendants’ reliance on INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 

321 (2001), and Mejia v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 

2007), is also misplaced. Defendants argue that these cases 

stand for the proposition that a regulation is impermissibly 

retroactive only if it “completely vitiates” a plaintiff’s 

rights, as opposed to merely “adversely affecting” those rights, 

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such as by delaying the plaintiff’s ability to obtain what he is 

owed. (See Defs.’ Reply at 18-19.) Defendants argue that the 

amended version of 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) did not interfere with a 

vested right because it did not completely vitiate plaintiffs’ 

right to obtain work authorization, it only deferred the issuance 

of work authorization to the time at which their U visa 

application was adjudicated. (See id.) However, this argument 

mischaracterizes the nature of the right plaintiffs had under 8 

C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) as it existed when they petitioned for work 

authorization. As discussed above, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) (2016) 

guaranteed plaintiffs the right to have their application for 

work authorization adjudicated within 90 days, not the right to 

work authorization itself. If USCIS could not adjudicate the 

plaintiffs’ requests within 90 days, the regulation guaranteed 

plaintiffs the right to interim employment authorization 

documents. Id. Thus, the 2017 revisions did “completely 

vitiate” plaintiffs’ rights--under current regulations, 

plaintiffs no longer have the right to have their applications 

for work authorization adjudicated within 90 days, and they no 

longer have a right to interim employment authorization 

documents. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d). 

Thus, when plaintiffs applied for work authorization, 

they had a vested right to adjudication of their requests within 

90 days, and by January 1, 2017, 90 days after USCIS received 

plaintiffs’ petitions, they had a vested right to interim work 

authorization documents. See Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 44 

n.10. Because application of the revised rule--effective January 

17, 2017--would strip plaintiffs of their vested rights, the 

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court finds that application of the revised version of the 

regulation would “have a retroactive effect” that Congress did 

not authorize. See Uranga, 2020 WL 5763633, at *15; Rodriguez, 

2018 WL 4783977, at *18. The version of 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) in 

effect when plaintiffs filed their petitions for U visas musst 

therefore be applied. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265. 

In their reply, defendants argue for the first time 

that, even under the prior version of 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d), the 

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claim 

because those regulations do not trigger a mandatory duty to act 

until defendants make a threshold determination as to whether a 

petitioner is eligible for work authorization. (See Defs.’ Reply 

at 5.) Not only is this argument waived because it was raised 

for the first time in defendants’ reply brief, see Bazuaye v. 

INS, 79 F.3d 118, 120 (9th Cir. 1996), the court finds the 

argument unpersuasive. 

Defendants’ argument runs counter to the plain language 

of 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) (2016), which unequivocally states: 

“USCIS will adjudicate the application within 90 days from the 

date of receipt of the application,” not within 90 days of USCIS 

performing a threshold determination of a petitioner’s 

eligibility for the underlying benefit. Indeed, in the Final 

Rule repealing the prior version of 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d), DHS 

stated that it was eliminating the 90-day deadline and interim 

employment authorization document provisions because “it believed 

that the 90-day time frame was ‘outdated and no longer 

reflect[ed] the operational realities of the Department’ and it 

‘constrain[ed] DHS’ ability to maintain necessary levels of 

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security when application receipt volumes suddenly increase.’” 

Uranga, 2020 WL 5763633, at *16 (quoting 80 Fed. Reg. 81,900, 

81,929). Such statements would not have been necessary if the 

90-day clock only began running once defendants had evaluated the 

merits of a petitioner’s claim. 

Thus, USCIS was required to adjudicate plaintiffs’ 

requests for work authorization within 90 days of receiving their 

Form I-918 petition or, if it could not do so, issue interim 

employment authorization documents for up to 240 days. See 8 

C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) (2016). Because this decision was legally 

required, and not left up USCIS’ discretion, the court has 

subject matter jurisdiction to review plaintiffs’ claim under the 

APA. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim presented in 

plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action will therefore be denied. See

5 U.S.C. § 706(1), § 701(a)(2); Norton, 542 U.S. at 64.

C. Third Cause of Action

Plaintiffs’ claim of unreasonable delay in issuing a 

waitlist determination for their U visa petitions rests on USCIS 

regulations, which state: “[a]ll eligible petitioners who, due 

solely to the cap, are not granted U–1 nonimmigrant status must 

be placed on a waiting list and receive written notice of such 

placement.” 8 U.S.C. § 214.14(d)(2). Although USCIS regulations 

do not establish a deadline or timeframe by which the agency must 

make a determination regarding waitlist placement, the APA 

provides that, “within a reasonable time, each agency shall 

proceed to conclude a matter presented to it.” 5 U.S.C. § 

555(b). Plaintiffs also argue that reviewing courts are required 

to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 

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delayed” under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 

Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claim must fail 

because “the mere passage of time is insufficient to sustain a 

claim of unreasonable delay.” (See id. (citing Mashpee Wampanoag 

Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 

2003).) In other words, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ FAC 

does not “plausibly suggest[]” an entitlement to relief under the 

APA because it merely alleges that plaintiffs’ U visa 

applications had been pending for 47 months at the time they 

filed the FAC. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. 

To determine whether an agency’s delay is reasonable 

under the APA, the court will have to balance six so-called 

“TRAC” factors, established in Telecommunications Research and 

Action Center v. Federal Communications Commission, 750 F.2d 70 

(D.C. Cir. 1984) (“TRAC”): 

(1) the time agencies take to make decisions 

must be governed by a “rule of reason”; 

(2) where Congress has provided a timetable 

or other indication of the speed with which 

it expects the agency to proceed in the 

enabling statute, that statutory scheme may 

supply the content for this rule of reason; 

(3) delays that might be reasonable in the 

sphere of economic regulation are less 

tolerable when human health and welfare are 

at stake; 

(4) the court should consider the effect of 

expediting delayed action on agency 

activities of a higher or competing 

priority;

(5) the court should also take into account 

the nature and extent of the interests 

prejudiced by delay; and 

(6) the court need not “find any impropriety 

lurking behind agency lassitude in order to 

hold that agency action is ‘unreasonably 

delayed.’” 

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Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 

TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80).

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges facts that, if true, 

would tend to show defendant’s delay was unreasonable under each 

of the TRAC factors. See id. For instance, the FAC alleges that

USCIS’ waitlist decisions are not governed by a “rule of reason,”

TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80, because USCIS “systematically prioritizes 

later filed petitions over earlier filed petitions,” contrary to 

the agency’s assertions that that it makes waitlist decisions on 

a “first in, first out” basis. (See FAC ¶¶ 108-109.) Plaintiffs 

further allege that, even if USCIS’ waitlist decisions are 

governed by a rule of reason, USCIS has ignored that rule in this 

case by processing U visa waitlist decisions for applicants that 

filed their applications after plaintiffs. (See FAC ¶¶ 115-116.)

The FAC also addresses the “nature and extent of the 

interests prejudiced by the delay.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80.

Plaintiffs allege that they are unable to acquire deferred 

action, work authorization, a social security number, or 

government-approved identification (i.e., a “Real ID”), and that 

they are in jeopardy of being physically removed from the United 

States. See FAC ¶¶ 122-26. Because the court will have to 

employ the TRAC framework when it evaluates the merits of 

plaintiffs’ claim that defendant’s delay was unreasonable, 

plaintiffs’ allegations go beyond merely asserting that they have 

been waiting too long and are sufficient to state “a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

557. 

Defendants argue that the court should find under the 

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TRAC factors that their delay in processing plaintiffs’ petitions 

was reasonable as a matter of law. (See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 

at 10-15.) They contend that USCIS’ practice of processing U 

visa petitions in the order they are received, with some 

petitions being expedited subject to criteria set forth by the 

agency, constitutes a “rule of reason” under TRAC that is 

reasonable under the six-factor test. (See id. (citing TRAC, 750 

F.2d at 80).) Without asking the court to take judicial notice 

of any information outside the scope of plaintiffs’ FAC, 

defendants cite to a number of reports, USCIS statements, and 

USCIS webpages to argue that delays in the processing of U visa 

petitions for waitlist eligibility result primarily from the 

overall number of petitions filed, which have increased almost 

every year since 2009, not wrongful conduct on the part of the 

agency. (See id. at 7, 11.) 

The court is unable to find that defendant’s delay was 

reasonable at the motion to dismiss stage. “Resolution of a 

claim of unreasonable delay is ordinarily a complicated and 

nuanced task requiring consideration of the particular facts and 

circumstances before the court.” Mashpee, 336 F.3d at 1100; see

also Yu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp. 2d 922, 935 (D.N.M. 1999) (“What 

constitutes an unreasonable delay in the context of immigration 

applications depends to a great extent on the facts of the 

particular case.”). Adopting defendant’s argument would require 

the court to look beyond the face of plaintiffs’ complaint and, 

without the benefit of the administrative record, evaluate facts 

concerning USCIS’ general practices, whether those practices were 

followed in this case, and the number of U visa petitions filed 

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over the past several years. See Sprewell v. Golden State 

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Review [of a motion 

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)] is limited to the contents of the 

complaint.”). 

While some district courts have found that evaluating 

the reasonableness of USCIS’ delay in issuing U visa waitlist 

determinations under TRAC is appropriate at the motion to dismiss 

stage, see, e.g., Uranga v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 

Services, No. 20-0521 ABJ, 2020 WL 5763633, at *11-14 (D.D.C. 

Sep. 28, 2020), this court agrees with other district courts that 

have found that it would be “‘premature’ at the motion to dismiss 

stage ‘to consider the exact sources of the delay to determine 

whether the delay was actually unreasonable under the 

circumstances.’” See Gelfer v. Chertoff, No. C06-06724 WHA, 2007 

WL 902382, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2007) (finding it 

“premature” at the motion to dismiss stage “to consider the exact 

sources of the delay to determine whether the delay was actually 

unreasonable under the circumstances”); Ramires v. Wolf, No. 

1:20-cv-203 KWR SMV, 2020 WL 6146393, at *3 (D.N.M. Oct. 20, 

2020) (quoting Gelfer, 2007 WL 902382, at *2); Patel v. Cissna, 

400 F. Supp. 3d 1373, 1383 (M.D. Ga. 2019) (““[T]he Court is not 

prepared to hold on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim that the three-year delay in reviewing [plaintiff's] U visa 

petitions for placement on the waiting list is reasonable as a 

matter of law.”); M.J.L. v. McAleenan, 420 F. Supp. 3d 588, 598 

(W.D. Tex. 2019) (“the Court finds that it is premature to 

address these factors at the motion to dismiss stage and before 

discovery has been completed.”) 

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Defendants finally argue that the FAC fails to state a 

claim under the APA because the APA reserves matters of agency 

management priorities to the agency’s discretion, thereby 

precluding judicial review. (See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 12 

(citing 5 U.S.C. § 701; Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 

(1985)). According to defendants, USCIS’ determination as to the 

order in which it will evaluate outstanding U visa petitions 

“reflect[s] the agency’s determination as to the best allocation 

of its resources and calls upon its particular expertise and, 

therefore, is a matter committed to its discretion.” (See id.) 

Defendants argue that granting plaintiffs’ requested relief would

interfere with the agency’s management priorities by “putting the 

petitioner at the head of the queue . . . simply mov[ing] all 

others back one space and produce no net gain.” (See id. at 14 

(quoting Xiaobin Xu v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-2048 (BMC), 2018 WL 

2451202, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2018) (quoting Mashpee, 336 F.3d 

at 1100)).) This, defendants argue, would result in “unwarranted 

line-skipping” for plaintiffs with the means to hire counsel and 

would delay adjudication of other U visa petitions filed earlier 

in time. (See id.) 

It is true that courts should generally defer to 

agencies’ assessments of where their resources should be devoted, 

absent constitutional or legal restraints. See Heckler, 470 U.S. 

at 831-32 (the “agency is far better equipped than the courts to 

deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of 

priorities”). However, the APA commands courts to “compel agency 

action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” when the 

agency is under a mandatory legal duty to act. See 5 U.S.C. 

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§ 706(1), § 701(a). Here, USCIS was required by regulation to 

place “[a]ll eligible petitioners who, due solely to the cap, are 

not granted U–1 nonimmigrant status . . . on a waiting list.” 8 

U.S.C. § 214.14(d)(2). Because plaintiffs claim that USCIS has 

unreasonably delayed in complying with this mandate, the APA 

provides for judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), § 701(a). 

Concerns that other petitioners for U visas may be prejudiced by 

granting plaintiffs’ requested relief because of “line skipping” 

do not preclude judicial review of plaintiffs’ claims. The court 

must evaluate plaintiffs’ claim based on the facts of the case 

before it. 

To the extent that defendants argue “line skipping” or 

agency resource concerns are relevant to the reasonableness of 

the agency’s delay as to plaintiffs under the fourth TRAC factor, 

which requires the court to consider “the effect of expediting 

delayed action of agency activities of a higher or competing 

priority,” the court can take these concerns into account in its 

ultimate evaluation of all the TRAC factors. See TRAC, 750 F.2d 

at 80. Dismissal at the motion to dismiss stage is therefore not 

warranted based solely on that consideration. 

In sum, the Third Cause of Action of plaintiff’s FAC 

adequately states a claim of unreasonable delay. See Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 557. Defendants’ motion to dismiss that claim 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) must accordingly be denied. 

D. Fourth Cause of Action

Finally, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ FOIA claims-

-contained in their Fourth Cause of Action--are moot because 

defendants have fully responded to plaintiffs’ FOIA requests. 

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(See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 21.) “As with other types of 

civil cases, a suit under the FOIA can be rendered moot by events 

subsequent to its filing.” Yonemoto v. Dep’t of Veterans 

Affairs, 686 F.3d 681, 689 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled on other 

grounds by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 836 

F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2016). “The production of all nonexempt 

material, ‘however belatedly,’ moots FOIA claims.” Papa v. 

United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Perry 

v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).

Plaintiff Lujano Gonzales concedes that her FOIA claim 

is moot because defendant produced all nonexempt material in its 

possession prior to litigation. (See Pls.’ Opp’n at 3.) The 

court will therefore dismiss plaintiff Lujano Gonzales’ FOIA 

claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(1).

Plaintiff Salazar Jaramillo concedes that defendant has 

adequately responded to his FOIA request since the filing of the 

FAC. (See Pls.’ Opp’n at 3.) However, plaintiff argues that his 

claim is not moot because he is still entitled to costs and 

attorney fees under FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i). 

“Claims for attorneys’ fees ancillary to the case 

survive independently under the court’s equitable jurisdiction, 

and may be heard even though the underlying case has become 

moot.” Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(quoting Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

“The existence of an attorneys’ fees claim thus does not 

resuscitate an otherwise moot controversy.” Id. (citing Diamond 

v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 70-71 (1985)). 

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Since plaintiff does not contest defendants’ 

representation that they have produced all nonexempt material in 

their possession in response to plaintiff’s FOIA request, and 

plaintiff Salazar Jaramillo’s claim for attorney’s fees cannot 

resuscitate his underlying FOIA claim, see Cammermeyer, 97 F.3d 

at 1238, plaintiff’s FOIA claim is moot and will be dismissed for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Papa v. United States, 

281 F.3d at 1013; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss the Fourth Cause of Action of plaintiffs’ FAC will 

therefore be granted. (FAC ¶¶ 156-64.)

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion to 

dismiss be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED as to the First and 

Fourth Causes of Action and DENIED as to Second and Third Causes 

of Action of the FAC. The First Cause of Action and the Fourth 

Cause of Action of the First Amended Complaint are hereby 

DISMISSED.1

Dated: November 10, 2020

1 The court expresses no opinion at this time as to 

whether plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees based on their 

FOIA claims. 

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