Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01946/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01946-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALKER & ZANGER, INC,

Plaintiff,

v

PARAGON INDUSTRIES, INC,

Defendant. /

No C-04-1946 VRW

ORDER

Walker & Zanger, Inc filed this action May 18, 2004,

against Paragon Industries, Inc, alleging a variety of claims under

the Lanham Act, the Copyright Act, state unfair competition law and

state false advertising law. Compl (Doc #1). 

Defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s

claims and moves to strike surveys performed by plaintiff’s expert

Dr Henry Ostberg. Doc ##82, 87. Plaintiff moves to exclude

testimony of defendant’s expert Travis Culwell. Doc #107. For

reasons discussed below, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN

PART defendant’s motion for summary judgment, DENIES defendant’s

motion to strike and DENIES plaintiff’s motion to exclude

testimony. 

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I

Plaintiff is a producer of high quality stone and ceramic

decorative tiles and tile collections for use in a variety of

settings. Doc #111, Ex B at 12:16-25, 13:1-15 (Overend decl). 

Plaintiff’s tiles are nationally marketed in several series, or

lines, each of which is devoted to a particular artistic concept,

such as a line exemplifying a French provençal theme. Overend

decl, Ex G. The tile lines at issue in this case are the Avignon

and Newport lines, which were first promoted in approximately

August 1999. Overend decl, Ex B. 

According to plaintiff, the trade dress for the tiles is

consistent with the design theme, and, taken as a whole, the design

elements of the tiles and their trade dress “create an inherently

distinctive and non-functional trade dress which readily identifies

[plaintiff’s] products as being associated with [plaintiff].” Id. 

The distinctive features of plaintiff’s tiles are said to include

classical design, colors and glazes that evoke the look of “Old

World handiwork.” Id at Ex D; Id at Ex H, at 29:18-25, 47:19-

49:25, 55:14-56:2. Other distinguishing characteristics include

the depth and dimensions of design relief and the level of

intricate detailings. Id at Ex E, no 15; Id at Ex G, at 76:21-

77:2, 79:3-80:2. Plaintiff’s Avignon line, its best selling tile

collection, uses a combination of designs, glazes, textures and

colors to create a French provençal theme. Id, Ex G at 18:7-25,

19:12-19, 21:2-23:8. The collection is intended to capture a

variety of French-inspired designs, specifically invoking the “look

and feel” of French architecture and art “over a large span of

time. Id, Ex G at 18:7-18. 

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Plaintiff asserts it has put effort and expense into

promoting its tiles using the chosen trade dress. Id, Ex E at no

16; Ex H at 108:5-18, 108:22-113:13. This includes advertisements

in magazines, newspapers and trade publications and appearances at

trade shows. Id. From January 2000 to the filing of the

complaint, plaintiff invested over $8 million in this activity. Id

at Ex A. Plaintiff applied for copyright registration on several

of its designs, and on February 11, 2004, it received copyright

registration for its “Avignon Romanesque Molding” and “Avignon

Triellage Molding” designs. Id ¶13 & Ex B (copyright

registrations). 

Plaintiff believes that defendant has been producing,

promoting and selling tiles with designs and displays that are

confusingly similar to plaintiff’s. Doc #1 at ¶16. Plaintiff

further believes that defendant is in the practice of copying the

tile designs of its competitors and offering them as its own,

assertedly an unfair method of competition. Id ¶17. In this case,

the designs allegedly appropriated by defendant include the “Fleur

De Lis Border,” “Perle Molding,” “Triellage Molding” and

“Romanesque Molding” tiles from the Avignon line, and the “Westport

Molding” tile from the Newport line. Id ¶18. Plaintiff believes

not only that defendant has copied these tiles, but also that

defendant has displayed the copies using trade dress similar to

that used by plaintiff in promoting its corresponding tiles. Id

¶19.

Along with this, plaintiff believes that defendant has

made confusing or misleading statements about the relationship

between plaintiff’s and defendant’s tiles. Id ¶20. For example,

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plaintiff alleges that defendant’s representatives have stated that

“[defendant’s] tiles are the same as [plaintiff’s] tiles, but at a

much less expensive price.” Id. Plaintiff also believes that

defendant’s representatives have claimed that both plaintiff’s and

defendant’s tiles are made in China, when in fact plaintiff’s tiles

are not. Id. 

After the court dismissed plaintiff’s defamation claim

pursuant to defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Doc #26, six claims

for relief remain. Plaintiff alleges that: (1) defendant has

violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act through unfair competition

and false advertising by misappropriating plaintiff’s trade dress

and making false claims about plaintiff’s products; (2) defendant

has violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act by infringing

plaintiff’s trade dress and thereby confusing consumers as to the

origin of defendant’s goods; (3) defendant has violated section

43(a) of the Lanham Act by falsely claiming that plaintiff’s and

defendant’s goods have the same origin; (4) defendant has infringed

plaintiff’s copyrights in its tiles; (5) defendant’s conduct

violates the California unfair competition law, Cal Bus & Prof Code

§ 17200; and (6) defendant has engaged in false advertising under

California statutory and common law. Defendant seeks summary

judgment on all counts.

II

In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court must

determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, resolving

any doubt in favor of the party opposing the motion. “[S]ummary

judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is

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‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v

Liberty Lobby, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes over facts

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. And

the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact lies with the moving party. Celotex Corp v Catrett,

477 US 317, 322-23 (1986). When the moving party has the burden of

proof on an issue, the party’s showing must be sufficient for the

court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other

than for the moving party. Calderone v United States, 799 F2d 254,

258-59 (6th Cir 1986). Summary judgment is granted only if the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCP

56(c).

The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings,

however, but must produce significant probative evidence supporting

its claim that a genuine issue of material fact exists. TW Elec

Serv v Pacific Elec Contractors Ass’n, 809 F2d 626, 630 (9th Cir

1987). The evidence presented by the nonmoving party “is to be

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his

favor.” Anderson, 477 US at 255. “[T]he judge’s function is not

himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter

but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id

at 249.

//

//

//

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III

A

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act gives a producer a cause

of action for the use by any person of “any word, term, name,

symbol, or device, or any combination thereof * * * which * * * is

likely to cause confusion * * * as to origin, sponsorship, or

approval of his or her goods.” 15 USC § 1125(a). This cause of

action has been extended to cover a product’s “trade dress” — a

category that traditionally consisted of packaging, but in modern

parlance includes the design and shape of the product itself. See

Vision Sports, Inc v Melville Corp, 888 F2d 609, 613 (9th Cir 1989)

(noting that trade dress includes “features such as size, shape,

color, color combinations, texture or graphics.”). A claim for

infringement of trade dress requires a plaintiff to prove three

elements: (1) distinctiveness, (2) non-functionality and (3)

likelihood of confusion. Kendall-Jackson Winery Ltd v E & J Gallo

Winery, 150 F3d 1042, 1046-47 (9th Cir 1998). 

Courts exercise “particular caution” when extending

protection to product designs because such claims present an acute

risk of stifling competition. Landscape Forms, Inc v Columbia

Cascade Co, 113 F3d 373, 380 (2d Cir 1997). “While most trademarks

only create a monopoly in a word, a phrase or a symbol, granting

trade dress protection to an ordinary product design * * *

create[s] a monopoly in the goods themselves.” Yurman Design, Inc

v PAJ, Inc, 262 F3d 101, 115 (2d Cir 2001). 

As a preliminary matter, defendant challenges plaintiff’s

claim for trade dress on the ground that plaintiff fails to

identify the claimed trade dress with particularity. The leading

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case cited by defendant on the need to articulate trade dress with

particularity is Yurman Design, Inc v PAJ, Inc, 262 F3d 101 (2d Cir

2001). At issue in that case was plaintiff’s line of jewelry,

about which the Second Circuit noted: “The overall impression

conveyed by the Yurman designs that are alleged to embody Yurman’s

trade dress is a structural, almost industrial motif of twisted

multi-strand cable, executed with a polished and elegant finish,

and set off by gemstones.” Id at 114. The Second Circuit rejected

this “overall impression” theory of trade dress, concluding that

Yurman “never identified the elements that make up its trade dress,

* * * [and] this failure to articulate the dress required dismissal

of the Lanham Act claim as a matter of law.” Id.

The basis for Yurman’s holding is the rule that generic

product designs are unprotectible even upon a showing of secondary

meaning. See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc v American Eagle

Outfitters, Inc, 280 F3d 619 (6th Cir 2002) (recognizing that

“generic product configurations,” or “designs regarded by the

public as the basic form of a particular item,” should not be

protectible even upon a showing of secondary meaning). This court

recognizes the difficulty of applying traditional definitions of

“genericness” to product design features. See, e g, AM General

Corp v Daimler Chrysler Corp, 311 F3d 796, 828 (7th Cir 2002) (“The

traditional method of measuring a mark’s strength with a yardstick

that runs from generic at one end to arbitrary and fanciful at the

other is a clumsy method when measuring the strength of trade dress

or product design”). But the rule against enforcing generic

product features guards against the acquisition of broad trademark

exclusivities that bear little relation to consumer confusion. 

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Cases addressing product design suggest that the term

“genericness” covers three situations: (1) if the definition of a

product design is overbroad or too generalized; (2) if a product

design is the basic form of a type of product; or (3) if the

product design is so common in the industry that it cannot be said

to identify a particular source. Jeffrey Milstein, Inc v Greger,

Lawlor, Roth, Inc, 58 F3d 27, 32 (2d Cir 1995); Yurman, 262 F3d at

115 (concluding that a “generic” product design may also be defined

as one that “refer[s] to the genus of which the particular product

is a species”); Mana Prods, Inc v Columbia Cosmetics Mfg, Inc, 65

F3d 1063 (2d Cir 1995). See also Big Island Candies, Inc v The

Cookie Corner, 269 F Supp 2d 1236 (D Haw 2003).

In Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd v E & J Gallo Winery, 150

F3d 1042 (9th Cir 1998), the Ninth Circuit’s approach to

genericness in the context of a trademark dispute applies also to a

trade dress claim. In Kendall-Jackson, the court held that grapeleaf designs had become generic emblems for wine because grape

leaves are commonly used to decorate labels on wine bottles and

because the grape leaf alone “has lost the power to differentiate

brands.” Id at 1049. Hence, the court defined genericness in

terms of both commonness and generality. 

Turning to the trade dress at issue here, the court notes

that plaintiff’s complaint alleges three categories of trade dress,

covering the individual tiles, the Avignon tile line and the tile

displays. The elements said to constitute plaintiff’s protectible

trade dress for its individual tiles are as follows: 

//

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[Plaintiff’s] tiles are distinguished by their classical

designs and careful craftsmanship, which give the tiles

the look of Old World handiwork. The tiles are further

distinguished by the depth and dimensions of their

design relief, i e, the range between the highest and

lowest points of relief, as well as by the level of

intricate detailing at all levels of the relief. The

tiles are further distinguished by [the] use of colors

and glazes that enhance the appearance of Old World

craftsmanship. Plaintiff further invokes Old World

craftsmanship through its unique approach to designing

and marketing tiles, through which [plaintiff] creates

collections of tiles designed with a particular theme in

mind.

Doc #84 (Degenshein decl), Ex D, no 15. 

Although not articulated in its complaint, plaintiff now

sets forth elements for its Avignon line as well. The Avignon line

is said to combine elements of both geometric and botanical art

with other design elements in order to convey a French provençal

look and feel. More specifically, the trade dress of the Avignon

line includes the following: 

(1) the rustic look of hand-shaped tiles; 

(2) the specific designs, and combinations of designs,

selected by plaintiff to evoke certain styles of

French architecture or art; 

(3) the use of certain glazing techniques to create

color tones to reflect their three-dimensional,

sculpted appearance; 

(4) complex three-dimensional relief to give the tiles

an architectural character; 

(5) a textured appearance that evokes the weathered

look of stone carving; and 

(6) a palette of colors reminiscent of Provence. 

Overend decl, Ex G (Becker), 18:7-25, 21:2-23:8, 62:13-14, 64:16-

65:3, 108:12-109:3, 171:1-6. 

Finally, plaintiff asserts trade dress protection over

its tile displays. It defines the trade dress for its displays as

follows:

//

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[Plaintiff] pioneered the use of three types of tile

displays * * *. In its built-in vignettes, [plaintiff]

builds a full-size model of a portion of a home – a

corner of a bathroom * * * or a wall of a kitchen,

complete with fixtures — and uses that model to

demonstrate how its tiles may be used in a real life

setting. [Plaintiff’s] concept boards are a smallerscale, portable version of the same idea * * *. 

[Plaintiff’s] library boards [demonstrate] the conceptoriented product lines that are unique to it [including]

samples of the tiles that make up a particular product

line. [It] is decorated with complementary colors and

designs, and includes a narrative describing the design

concept of the particular line.

As set forth above, to determine whether plaintiff’s

product design is generic, the court assesses whether (1) the

design’s definition is overbroad or too generalized; (2) the design

is the basic form of a type of product; or (3) the design is so

common in the industry that it cannot be said to identify a

particular source. Again, the motivation for requiring strict

definition is that “trade dress claims raise a potent risk that

relief will impermissibly afford a level of ‘protection that would

hamper efforts to market competitive goods.’” Yurman, 262 F3d at

114 (quoting Landscape Forms, 113 F3d at 380). See also Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc v Samara Bros, 529 US 205, 213 n12 (2000) (“Consumers

should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard

to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design

ordinarily serves.”)

The court first finds that some of the elements of

plaintiff’s proposed trade dress are overbroad. The court

acknowledges that trade dress of “decorative or artistic” works may

be harder to capture in words, and “may need descriptions more

broadly framed.” Yurman, 262 F3d at 115. But for some of the

trade dress elements, plaintiff resorts to empty generalities in

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the face of more precise alternatives. For instance, to describe

the colors of the trade dress, plaintiff should list the actual

colors rather than claim a “palette of colors reminiscent of

Provence.” Or instead of defining the three-dimensional relief as

“complex,” plaintiff should provide the magnitude and angle of

relief that render plaintiff’s tiles distinctive. Finally, some

terms leave the boundary of plaintiff’s trade dress rights unclear,

such as the terms “rustic look,” “weathered look,” “architectural

character” or even “Old World handiwork.” These terms fail to

provide adequate notice to competitors in the decorative tile

business regarding the breadth of plaintiff’s exclusivity rights. 

The court also notes that portions of plaintiff’s trade

dress definition constitute the basic form of tile design. For

examples, a three-dimensional tile design necessarily uses “design

relief,” stone tiles will usually retain the “look of stone

carving” and many manufacturers seek the “the rustic look of handshaped tiles.”

Finally, plaintiff’s design is common in the industry. 

Plaintiff’s own witnesses admit that at least eight competitors

market and sell a French provençal tile line. Doc #84, Ex I

(Leiferman depo) at 38:3-12; Ex G (Reef depo) at 37:9-12; 38. 

Indeed, the very reason plaintiff’s tiles evoke the “look of Old

World handiwork” is because the tiles copy styles that craftsman

have used for centuries. Plaintiff’s tile display design is

similarly generic. Despite representations to the contrary,

plaintiff did not “pioneer” the marketing strategy of “build[ing] a

full-size model” in order to “demonstrate how its tiles may be used

in a real life.” 

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That defendant takes issue with the proposed trade dress

elements should not come as a surprise to plaintiff. Throughout

this litigation, defendant has sought further details regarding the

scope of plaintiff’s claimed trade dress. The deposition of

plaintiff’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness, who was produced specifically to

testify regarding plaintiff’s alleged trade dress elements,

amounted to an exercise in evasion. For example, in response to

inquiries about “depth of relief,” plaintiff’s Rule 30(b)(6)

witness remarked: “[t]he thing that is most unique about the depth

of relief and dimension of the design relief is that they are

elements that are used in creating specific and unique designs.” 

Doc #84 (Degenshein decl), Ex B at 76:21-25. When asked to

describe the trade dress of plaintiff’s Romanesque tile,

plaintiff’s witness replied: “[w]hat it is about their tile * * *

is the fact that this tiles is a part of a collection that is

recognized to be plaintiff’s product.” Id at 38: 22-25. 

Based on the evidence submitted by the parties, the court

concludes that the trade dress proposed by plaintiff is generic. 

The concept of trade dress is not so pliable that it can be

stretched to give exclusive rights to such abstract images or

marketing themes as those proposed by plaintiff here. See

Landscape Forms, 113 F3d at 381 (“If the law protected style at

such a level of abstraction, Braque might have prevented Picasso

from selling cubist paintings in the United States.”). 

Having found plaintiff’s trade dress to be generic, the

court must determine the appropriate remedy. Courts occasionally

permit a trade dress plaintiff to offer an updated formulation of

the trade dress elements at a later stage in the litigation. See

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Coach, Inc v We Care Trading Co, Inc, 2001 US Dist LEXIS 9879 (SDNY

2001) (“Coach had provided varying formulations of this trade dress

in its pre-trial papers but offered this definition at the

pre-trial conference when asked by the court for a final statement

of its trade dress.”). Yet the court has not found a case

permitting such revisions after a motion for summary judgment has

been filed. This absence of case law is not surprising; it would

be inappropriate to allow plaintiff to attempt to remedy a legal

deficiency in the trade dress articulation after defendant’s

principal summary judgment briefing, especially in view of

plaintiff’s apparent efforts to resist offering a precise

definition. Moreover, because the court concludes, as explained

below, that defendant is entitled to summary judgment on other

grounds as well, the court declines to grant plaintiff leave to

revise its trade dress elements. 

1

Trade dress protection extends only to design features 

that are nonfunctional. See Qualitex Co v Jacobson Prods Co, 514

US 159, 164 (1995). Courts consider a feature functional if it is

“essential to the use or purpose of the article [or] affects [its]

cost or quality.” Inwood Labs, Inc v Ives Labs, Inc, 456 US 844,

851 n10 (1982). This definition is often referred to as

“utilitarian” functionality, as it relates to the performance of

the product in its intended purpose. Hence, “[t]he functionality

doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition

by protecting a firm’s reputation, from instead inhibiting

legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful

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product feature.” Qualitex, 514 US at 164. See also TraFix

Devices, Inc v Marketing Displays, Inc, 532 US 23 (2001).

Under Qualitex and TrafFix, the test for functionality

proceeds in two steps. First, courts inquire whether the alleged

“significant non-trademark function” is “essential to the use or

purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the

article.” TrafFix, 532 US at 32-33. Next, courts determine

whether protection of the feature as a trademark would impose a

significant non-reputation-related competitive disadvantage. Id. 

See also Qualitex, 514 US at 165. If the feature does not satisfy

either step, it is nonfunctional and protectible. 

To assist courts in determining functionality, the Ninth

Circuit has offered a four-part test: (1) whether the design

yields a utilitarian advantage; (2) whether alternative designs are

available; (3) whether advertising touts the utilitarian advantage

of the design; and (4) whether the particular design results from a

comparatively simple or inexpensive method of manufacture. Disc

Golf Ass’n, Inc v Champion Discs, Inc, 158 F3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir

1998). See also Talking Rain Beverage Co v South Beach Beverage

Co, 349 F3d 601, 603-04 (9th Cir 2003) (applying the four factors

to conclude that a bottle design was utilitarian). 

Defendant contends the tile designs yield utilitarian

advantages due to their aesthetic functionality. In response,

plaintiff insists the Ninth Circuit has “expressly rejected the

‘aesthetic functionality’ standard.” Doc #104 at 16. Yet neither

party correctly characterizes the status of the aesthetic

functionality standard, which, according to a recent Ninth Circuit

decision, “retains some limited vitality.” Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc v

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Volkswagen of Am, Inc, 457 F3d 1062 (9th Cir 2006). In practice,

aesthetic functionality has been limited to product features that

serve an aesthetic purpose wholly independent of any

source-identifying function. See Qualitex, 514 US at 166 (coloring

dry cleaning pads served non-trademark purpose by avoiding visible

stains); Publications Int’l, Ltd v Landoll, Inc, 164 F3d 337, 342

(7th Cir 1998) (coloring edges of cookbook pages served nontrademark purpose by avoiding color “bleeding” between pages);

Brunswick Corp v British Seagull Ltd, 35 F3d 1527, 1532 (Fed Cir

1994) (color black served non-trademark purpose by reducing the

apparent size of outboard boat engine). 

As the Ninth Circuit admits, its case law on aesthetic

functionality “do[es] not easily weave together to produce a

coherent jurisprudence.” Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F3d at 1068. On

the one hand, plaintiff’s tiles serve an aesthetic function

unrelated to source-identification: namely, their function is

decoration. But on the other hand, the functionality doctrine

apparently distinguishes between “ornamental” and utilitarian

functions. See Talking Rain Beverage Co, 349 F3d at 603-04 (9th

Cir 2003) (applying this distinction between functional and

ornamental); Clicks Billiards, Inc v Sixshooters Inc, 251 F3d 1252,

1260 (9th Cir 2001) (characterizing “aesthetic functionality” as an

“oxymoron”). Hence, the Ninth Circuit’s view that ornament is nonutilitarian obliges the court to conclude that plaintiff’s tiles do

not yield a utilitarian advantage, notwithstanding their decorative

function. 

That the tile’s aesthetic appeal cannot constitute a

utilitarian benefit undermines defendant’s remaining contentions

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regarding functionality. Defendant alleges that plaintiff “touts

the trade dress’ utilitarian advantages.” Doc #82 at 14. But

these advertisements describe the aesthetic beauty of the tiles,

not the functional utility. 

Because plaintiff’s tile design is not essential to the

use or purpose of the product, the court turns to the second

inquiry: whether plaintiff’s design performs a function so that

the “exclusive use of [the design] would put competitors at a

significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.” TrafFix, 532 US

at 32 (quoting Qualitex, 532 US at 165). The parties do not

discuss this issue, but it appears to pose factual questions that

cannot be resolved at this stage in the litigation. Plaintiff

asserts in its brief that other manufacturers sell tiles and tile

collections with a French provençal theme, implying that

competition is not disadvantaged. But more extensive market data

would be necessary to demonstrate the absence of significant

competitive disadvantage. 

In sum, plaintiff’s design features constitute ornamental

attributes of the product; therefore, the court concludes these

features are nonfunctional. 

2

In an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress

under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, “a product’s design is

distinctive, and therefore protectible, only upon a showing of

secondary meaning.” Wal-Mart Stores, 529 US at 216. Such meaning

occurs when, “in the minds of the public, the primary significance

of a [mark] is to identify the source of the product rather than

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the product itself.” Id at 211 (quoting Inwood Labs, Inc v Ives

Labs, Inc, 456 US 844, 851 n11 (1982)). See also TraFix, 532 US at

29 (2001) (noting that “product design almost invariably serves

purposes other than source identification”). 

In the Ninth Circuit, secondary meaning is defined as

“the mental association by a substantial segment of consumers and

potential consumers between the alleged mark and a single source of

the product.” Levi Strauss & Co v Blue Bell, Inc, 778 F2d 1352,

1354 (9th Cir 1985) (quoting in part 1 J McCarthy, §§ 15:2 at 659

and 15:11(B) at 686)). An expert survey of purchasers typically

provides the most persuasive evidence of secondary meaning. Levi

Strauss & Co v Blue Bell, Inc, 778 F2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir 1985)

(en banc). 

Here, plaintiff’s survey performed by Dr Henry Ostberg

found that 36% of interior designers in the six states where the

parties compete, and 25% of interior designers interviewed

nationwide, recognized either all or some of plaintiff’s tiles as

being produced by a specific company known to them. Overlend decl,

Ex K at 3. Defendant criticizes Dr Ostberg for utilizing an

underinclusive test group; that is, the survey sampled interior

designers, yet plaintiff’s customers include builders, design

centers, architects, contractors and end users (i e, home owners or

purchasers and retail customers). Doc #84, Ex A (Petrocelli depo)

at 91:15-25, Ex I (Leiferman depo) at 100: 2-25; 101:9-15; Ex M

(Wright depo) at 8:23-25; 9:1-2. See also Vision Sports, Inc v

Melville Corp, 888 F2d 609, 615 (9th Cir 1989) (noting that “an

expert survey of purchasers may provide the most persuasive

evidence of secondary meaning”) (emphasis added). 

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The court agrees with defendant that the limited survey

population reduces its probative value, but the court declines to

rule the survey inadmissible, Doc #87. See J T McCarthy, McCarthy

on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, (4th Ed 2003) § 32:159 (“A

survey of the wrong ‘universe’ will be of little probative value in

litigation.”). To assess secondary meaning, the courts “must stand

in the shoes of the ordinary purchaser, buying under the normally

prevalent conditions of the market and giving the attention such

purchasers usually give in buying that class of goods.” Iowa Paint

Mfg Co, Inc v Hirshfield’s Paint Mfg, Inc, 296 F Supp 2d 983, 998

(SD IA 2003) (emphasis added). Yet even plaintiff’s Rule 30(b)(6)

witness concedes that interior designers are not “retail” or

“average” customers, as they hold specialized knowledge of the tile

industry. Doc #84, Ex B (Becker depo) at 136:12-18; 141:20-25;

142:1-9. See also, Id, Ex F (Reed depo) at 33:2-6. Due to these

shortcomings, the court assumes that, if the survey had included a

proportionate sampling of all customers, the percentage of

respondents identifying the tile design would be lower. See Yankee

Candle, 259 F3d at n14 (noting that opinions of retailers and those

active in the field not evidence of views of the consuming public).

Indeed, plaintiff’s survey undercuts its argument for secondary

meaning: the survey suggests that over three quarters of the most

sophisticated purchasers do not recognize plaintiff’s tiles as

being produced by a specific company. 

In view of plaintiff’s unconvincing direct evidence, the

court turns to circumstantial evidence, which includes: (1) the

length and exclusivity of use of the trade dress; (2) the nature

and extent of advertising and promotion of the trade dress (3) the

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existence of substantial advertising; (4) the product’s established

place in the market; (5) proof of intentional copying; and (6)

“look for” promotion that specifically directs a consumer’s

attention to those features claimed as trade dress. Yankee Candle,

259 F3d at 43-44. 

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in First Brands Corp v Fred

Meyer, Inc, 809 F2d 1378 (9th Cir 1987) governs whether advertising

expenditures support a finding of secondary meaning:

Evidence of sales, advertising and promotional

activities may be relevant in determining whether a

trade dress has acquired a secondary meaning * * *. 

However, the advertising and promotional activities must

involve “image advertising,” that is, the ads must

feature in some way the trade dress itself. Otherwise,

even evidence of extensive advertising or other

promotional efforts would not necessarily indicate that

prospective buyers would associate the trade dress with

a particular source. A large expenditure of money does

not in itself create legally protectable rights. The

test of secondary meaning is the effectiveness of the

effort to create it.

Id at 1383 (internal citations omitted). The plaintiff in First

Brands sought to establish secondary meaning for its yellow

antifreeze container by introducing evidence of its total

advertising expenditures and its five-year, exclusive use of the

container. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s

denial of injunctive relief, noting that plaintiff’s advertising,

although extensive, did not “attempt to engender consumer

identification with the yellow, F-style jug” and “did not, for

example, urge consumers to look for the ‘familiar yellow jug.’” 

Id.

Akin to the plaintiff in First Bank, the plaintiff here

submits advertising that emphasizes design product traits, but

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fails to draw attention to these features as source identifiers. 

See Yankee Candle, 259 F3d at 44. Plaintiff concedes it has not

used so-called “look for” advertising, but urges the court to infer

secondary meaning from the magnitude of plaintiff’s advertising

expenditures, which amounts to approximately eight million dollars. 

The court rejects plaintiff’s reasoning. To be probative of

secondary meaning, the advertising must direct the consumer to

those features claimed as trade dress; merely “featuring” the

relevant aspect of the product does not suffice. To provide

protection based on extensive advertising would extend trade dress

protection to the design of every product with national marketing. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s advertising expenditures do not constitute

circumstantial evidence in support of secondary meaning. 

Plaintiff also asks the court to infer secondary meaning

from plaintiff’s exclusive use of its design between 1999 and 2004,

the period between product introduction and the date defendant

commenced its alleged infringement. Whether secondary meaning

attaches after a period of exclusive use depends on how, rather

than how long, the plaintiff used its mark or design. See McCarthy

§ 15:53 at 15-77 (noting that length of time “is merely one

additional piece of evidence to be weighed with all others in

determining the existence of secondary meaning.”). Widespread

promotional activities enable a design to obtain secondary meaning

in a short period. See, e g, LA Gear, Inc v Thom McAn Shoe Co, 988

F2d 1117, 1130 (Fed Cir 1993) (secondary meaning achieved for

sports shoe design after only six months due to extensive

advertising and promotion). But a lack of evidence supporting the

other factors relevant to secondary meaning may diminish the

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probative value of even a long period of exclusive use. See Bank

of Texas v Commerce Southwest, Inc, 741 F2d 785, 788 (5th Cir 1984)

(no secondary meaning for “Bank of Texas” mark despite nine years

of exclusive use because plaintiff did not promote its mark outside

narrow geographic area)

Here, plaintiff’s five-year period of exclusive use

provided ample time for its design to obtain secondary meaning. 

But secondary meaning cannot emerge in a vacuum, and the undisputed

evidence detailed earlier confirms that plaintiff undertook little

effort to create secondary meaning during this period of exclusive

use. Despite a considerable amount of advertising, only a trivial

amount highlights the particular trade dress as source identifying.

Finally, plaintiff proffers evidence of defendant’s

copying to support an inference of secondary meaning. See Vision

Sports, Inc v Melville Corp, 888 F2d 609, 615 (9th Cir 1989). See

also Transgo, Inc, v Ajac Transmission Parts Corp, 768 F2d 1001

(9th Cir 1985) (citing Audio Fidelity, Inc, v High Fidelity

Recordings, Inc, 283 F2d 551, 557 (9th Cir 1960)). Prior to the

litigation, defendant allegedly admitted it took plaintiff’s tiles

to China to have them copied. Overend decl, Ex I (Reed) at 56:13-

57:9-12, 79:23-80:10. Further, the court agrees with plaintiff

that the similarity between the tiles is striking. See Id, Ex Q. 

Proof of deliberate copying is not determinative,

however, as it does not necessarily establish that the copying is

intended to confuse customers and capitalize on recognition of the

plaintiff’s product. See Fuddruckers, Inc v Doc’s B R Others, Inc,

826 F2d 837, 844-45 (9th Cir 1987). Competitors may intentionally

copy product features for a variety of reasons; they may, for

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example, choose to copy design traits in response to consumer

preference. Given the lack of direct and circumstantial evidence

supporting secondary meaning, the court concludes that defendant’s

copying does not suffice. The court thus concludes that

plaintiff’s trade dress is unprotectible because its tiles have not

acquired secondary meaning. Accordingly, the court GRANTS summary

judgment on plaintiff’s trade dress claims under the Lanham Act. 

B

Defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s false

advertising claim, asserting that “[p]laintiff has not produced any

evidence to support any one of [the claim’s] elements.” Doc #82 at

22. 

To state a claim for false advertising under §

43(a)(1)(B), a plaintiff must allege:

(1) a false statement of fact by the defendant

in a commercial advertisement about its own or

another’s product; (2) the statement actually

deceived or has the tendency to deceive a

substantial segment of its audience; (3) the

deception is material, in that it is likely to

influence the purchasing decision; (4) the

defendant caused its false statement to enter

interstate commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has

been or is likely to be injured as a result of

the false statement, either by direct diversion

of sales from itself to defendant or by a

lessening of the goodwill associated with its

products.

Southland Sod Farms v Stover Seed Co, 108 F3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir

1997) (citing Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc v Northern Cal

Collection Serv, Inc, 911 F2d 242, 244 (9th Cir 1990)) (footnote

omitted).

//

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In the court’s order on defendant’s motion to dismiss,

the court warned plaintiff that its complaint was “weak in the

first element in particular, because it is light on allegations

specific to defendant’s ‘commercial advertising,’ as opposed to the

‘statements’ it generally attributes to defendant.” Doc #26 at 15-

16. For the following reasons, plaintiff has failed to remedy this

weakness.

Representations constitute commercial advertising or

promotion under the Lanham Act if they are: (1) commercial speech;

(2) by a defendant who is in commercial competition with plaintiff;

(3) for the purpose of influencing consumers to buy defendant’s

goods or services. Coastal Abstract Serv v First Am Title Ins Co,

173 F3d 725, 735 (9th Cir 1999). Further, although the

representations need not be made in a “classic advertising

campaign,” they must be “disseminated sufficiently to the relevant

purchasing public to constitute ‘advertising’ or ‘promotion’ within

that industry.” Id. 

The alleged false statements at issue here fall into two

categories; neither satisfies the test set forth above. First, the

alleged statements to customers are not “disseminated sufficiently

to the relevant purchasing public.” See Coastal Abstract Serv, 173

F3d at 735. Although plaintiff portrays defendant’s dissemination

as widespread, see Doc #104 at 24 (defendant “repeatedly tell[s]

customers that the parties’ tiles are the same”), the deposition

testimony fails to substantiate such a claim. See Overend decl, Ex

L at 104:24-106:14. Additionally, plaintiff cites defendant’s

admission that it “has stated to at least one third party that

[defendant’s] and [plaintiff’s] tiles product [sic] are both made

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in China.” Overend decl, Ex Z. This admission does not

demonstrate sufficient dissemination. A handful of statements to

customers does not trigger protection from the Lanham Act unless

“the potential purchasers in the market are relatively limited in

number,” Coastal Abstract Serv, Inc v First Am Title Ins Co, 173

F3d 725 (9th Cir 1999), which is not the case here. 

Plaintiff’s second category of false advertising consists

of defendant’s promotion of “its Bellissimia tile line through its

catalog” and use of “confusingly similar display boards.” Doc #104

at 24. The Lanham Act encompasses “more than blatant falsehoods”;

it also embraces “innuendo, indirect intimations, and ambiguous

suggestions evidenced by the consuming public’s misapprehension of

the hard facts underlying an advertisement.” William Morris Co v

Group W, Inc, 66 F3d 255 (9th Cir 1995). But if an advertisement

is not false on its face, as here, plaintiff must produce evidence,

usually in the form of market research or consumer surveys, showing

exactly what message ordinary consumers perceived. See Merck

Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co v Smithkline Beecham Corp, 960 F2d 294

(2d Cir 1992); Johnson & Johnson v Smithkline Beecham Corp, 960 F2d

294, 297-98 (2d Cir 1992) (requiring plaintiff to demonstrate that

“a statistically significant part of the commercial audience holds

the false belief allegedly communicated by the challenged

advertisement”); J T, McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair

Competition, § 27-07[2][d] (4th ed 1992).

Because defendant’s advertisements are not false on their

face, plaintiff alleges that the mere subject matter of the

advertisement — defendant’s similar tiles — is enough to constitute

false advertising. Under this interpretation of section 43(a),

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trade dress violations would ipso facto constitute false

advertising. Plaintiff has not identified, and the court has not

found, a case in which the truthful promotion of a product whose

design violates another’s trade dress has given rise to a false

advertising claim. Accordingly, the court GRANTS summary judgment

on plaintiff’s claim for false advertising. 

C

In the Ninth Circuit, claims of unfair competition and

false advertising under state statutory and common law are

“substantially congruent” to claims made under the Lanham Act. 

Cleary v News Corp, 30 F3d 1255 (9th Cir 1994). Accordingly, for

reasons discussed supra, the court GRANTS summary judgment on

plaintiff’s claim for unfair competition pursuant to California

Business and Professions Code § 17200 and GRANTS summary judgment

on plaintiff’s claim for false advertising. 

D

Defendant contends plaintiff’s copyright infringement

claim fails because plaintiff’s tile designs are not original. For

reasons that follow, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for copyright infringement.

To prevail on a claim for copyright infringement,

plaintiff must ultimately prove both ownership of a valid copyright

and copying of protected expression by defendant. Feist

Publications v Rural Telephone Service Co, 499 US 361-63 (1991)

Copying may be inferred from (1) access to the copyrighted work by

defendant and (2) substantial similarity of both ideas and

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expression between the copyrighted work and the allegedly

infringing work. Data East USA, Inc v Epyx, Inc, 862 F2d 204, 206

(9th Cir 1988).

Any copyrighted expression must be “original.” Feist,

499 US at 345. Although the amount of creative input by the author

required to meet the originality standard is low, it is not

negligible. See Feist, 499 US at 362. There must be something

more than a “merely trivial” variation, something recognizably the

artist’s own. Three Boys Music Corp v Bolton, 212 F3d 477, 489

(9th Cir 2000). A combination of unprotectible elements, however,

may qualify for copyright protection. Apple Computer, Inc v

Microsoft Corp, 35 F3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir 1994); United States v

Hamilton, 583 F2d 448, 451 (9th Cir 1978) (Kennedy, J)

(“[O]riginality may be found in taking the commonplace and making

it into a new combination or arrangement.”). 

As a preliminary matter, the court addresses the parties’

dispute over the effect of plaintiff’s copyright registration. It

is undisputed that on February 11, 2004, the United States

Copyright Office issued certificates of copyright registration to

plaintiff for its “Avignon Romanesque Molding” and “Avignon

Triellage Moding” designs. Doc #1, Ex B (copyright registrations).

The registration of a copyright certificate constitutes prima facie

evidence of the validity of a copyright in a judicial proceeding

commenced within five years of the copyright’s first publication. 

17 USC § 410(c); see also North Coast Industries v Jason Maxwell,

Inc, 972 F2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir 1992). A certificate of copyright

registration, therefore, “shifts to the defendant the burden to

prove the invalidity of the plaintiff’s copyrights.” Masquerade

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Novelty v Unique Indus, 912 F2d 663, 668 (3d Cir 1990). An accused

infringer may rebut this presumption of validity, however. See, e

g, North Coast, 972 F2d at 1033. To do so, a defendant must offer

some evidence or proof to dispute or deny the plaintiff’s prima

facie case of infringement. See, e g, North Coast, 972 F2d at

1033.

Defendant, through its expert, Travis Culwell, presents

to the court various historical sources that raise serious

questions whether plaintiff’s tiles are sufficiently “original” to

merit copyright protection. In particular, these materials reveal

that plaintiff’s tiles are nearly identical in appearance to public

domain designs. This evidence suffices to show that plaintiff’s

tiles are “not original but copied from another’s work”; therefore,

the court finds that defendant has rebutted the statutory

presumption, and the burden of proving validity shifts back to

plaintiff. See North Coast, 972 F2d at 1033; see also Masquerade

Novelty, 912 F2d at 668-69; Durham, 630 F2d at 908-09 (holding that

the presumption of validity was rebutted where “one look” at the

plaintiff’s allegedly copyrightable figures revealed an absence of

originality). See also 4 Melville B Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer

on Copyright § 12(11)[B] n50 (1999) (noting “proof that the

plaintiff copied from prior works should involve the same elements

* * * as are required to establish copying by the defendant from

the plaintiff, i e, access and similarity.”).

Having dealt with the registration issue, the court next

evaluates whether plaintiff’s tiles are copyrightable. That

plaintiff’s tiles derive from public domain designs does not

necessarily deprive them of copyright protection. See Kamar,

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Int’l, Inc v Russ Berrie & Co, 657 F2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir 1981). 

Nevertheless, the copyright protection afforded to works derived

from the public domain is more limited than it is for original

works of authorship.

The court finds that differences exist between the

designs in the public domain and those in plaintiff’s tiles; hence,

the critical issue is whether the differences are non-trivial. Not

every modification of a work in the public domain is protectibile. 

For example, copyright law protects “expressions” and not “ideas”;

consequently, the concepts underlying an expression, however

ingenious, may be copied freely. Likewise, the copyright on a work

whose design reflects the artist’s original advance in technique

does not extend to the technical development itself. See 17 USC §

102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work

of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,

method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless

of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or

embodied in such work.”). Finally, even original expression goes

unprotected insofar as it is “necessary” to something unprotectible

like an idea or a method or process. The expression is then said

to merge with the unprotected attribute, and the merger deprives it

of protection. See Computer Assocs Int’l, Inc v Altai, Inc, 982

F2d 693, 707 (2d Cir 1992)

Upon review of defendant’s expert report, the court

concludes that the Westport and Perle molding designs do not evince

sufficient originality for copyright protection. See Nimmer on

Copyright § 2-08(C)(2)(noting that “mere production of a work of

art in a different medium should not constitute the required

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originality, for the reason that no one can claim to have

independently evolved any particular medium”). See also North

Coast, 972 F2d at 1034 (stating that summary judgment is

appropriate “where no reasonable trier-of-fact could find even

trivial differences in the designs” that were claimed to be

copyrightable). By contrast, the Romanesque, Treillage and Fleur

de Lis molding designs contain non-trivial differences from the

public domain designs. In the Romanesque molding design, for

example, plaintiff appears to have made some copyrightable

contributions, such as the curls in the leaf, the orientation of

the blades and the shape of the veins. To the extent that these

and other artistic choices were not copied from the public domain

or governed by the ceramic tile medium, they are original elements

that plaintiff may protect through copyright law. 

The court notes that plaintiff’s copyrights on the

original elements in the Romanesque, Treillage and Fleur de Lis

designs are “thin,” comprising no more than plaintiff’s original

contribution to ideas already in the public domain. As a result,

plaintiff’s copyrights only protect against virtually identical

copying. See Ets-Hokin, 323 F3d 763, 766 (9th Cir 2003) (“When we

apply the limiting doctrines, subtracting the unoriginal elements,

Ets-Hokin is left with * * * a ‘thin’ copyright, which protects

against only virtually identical copying.”); Apple, 35 F3d at 1439

(“When the range of protectible expression is narrow, the

appropriate standard for illicit copying is virtual identity.”).

Accordingly, the court DENIES defendant’s motion for

summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for copyright infringement of

the Romanesque, Treillage and Fleur de Lis molding designs and

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GRANTS summary judgment on claims for copyright infringement of the

Westport and Perle molding designs.

IV

In sum, the court DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART

defendant’s motions for summary judgment and DENIES defendant’s

motion to strike the surveys conducted by plaintiff’s expert, Dr

Henry Ostberg. The court also DENIES plaintiff’s motion to exclude

the testimony of defendant’s expert, Travis Culwell. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:04-cv-01946-VRW Document 174 Filed 12/01/06 Page 30 of 30