Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06126/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06126-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

---

' 

F IL 14 ,t) UNITED s·TATES COURT OF APPEALS United Stat.es Court of Appeal!' Tenth Cireuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

NOV 3 0 1992 

MARJORIE PRINCE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

> Clerk 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 92-6126 

) (D.C. No. CIV-91-1399-B) 

) (W. D. Okla. ) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and SAFFELS,** Senior 

District Judge. 

**Honorable Dale E. Saffels, Senior District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Plaintiff Marjorie Prince appeals from the district court's 

grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Farmers Insurance 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not · be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-6126 Document: 010110149220 Date Filed: 11/30/1992 Page: 1 
Company, Inc. in this action seeking fire insurance proceeds. We 

reverse for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de 

nova applying the same standard to be applied by the district 

court. · Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1230 (10th 

Cir. 1990). Summary judgment should be granted only if "there is 

no genuine issue as to 

party is entitled to a 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

any material fact and ... the moving 

judgment as a matter of law." 

Farmers moved for summary judgment on its affirmative defense 

that Mrs. Prince forfeited the proceeds of her insurance policy by 

refusing to submit to an examination under oath as required by the 

policy. A defendant may use a motion for summary judgment to 

assert 

matter 

Mary Kay 

1983). 

an affirmative defense that entitles it to judgment as a 

of law. l0A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & 

Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2734 (2d ed. 

Unlike a motion for summary judgment used to test the 

sufficiency of plaintiff's case, however, the defendant ultimately 

bears the burden of persuasion on its affirmative defense at 

trial. On its motion for summary judgment, therefore, Farmers 

must initially and ultimately demonstrate that there is no 

material fact in issue as to the affirmative defense asserted and 

that it is sufficient as a matter of law to bar Mrs. Prince's 

claim. See id. If Farmers meets its initial burden to 

demonstrate the absence of a material factual dispute related to 

its affirmative defense, the burden shifts to Mrs. Prince to come 

forward with specific facts demonstrating the presence of a 

2 

Appellate Case: 92-6126 Document: 010110149220 Date Filed: 11/30/1992 Page: 2 
.... 

material factual dispute. Mrs. Prince argues that the 

reasonableness of Farmers' examination under oath requirement is 

just such a material issue. 

In this diversity action, we apply Oklahoma substantive law. 

See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Whether an 

insurer's request for an examination under oath is reasonable 

under the circumstances has not previously been considered in 

Oklahoma. Our review of the district court's determination of 

state law is de novo. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 

1217, 1221 (1991) . 

We need not decide whether Farmers carried its initial burden 

because, whether it did or not, Mrs. Prince came forward with 

specific facts demonstrating the presence of a material issue as 

to whether Farmers' request for an examination under oath was 

reasonable under the circumstances. 

The policy provides that the policyholder must submit to an 

examination under oath "as often as we reasonably require." 

Homeowners Policy, "Your Duties After Loss," Appellant's App. at 

30. Farmers cited West v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 868 

F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1989), in support of its argument that its 

request for an examination under oath was reasonable as a matter 

of law. West, however, was decided under California law and is 

distinguishable on its facts. 

In West, a policyholder submitted 

for $10,000 for property allegedly 

an unsubstantiated claim 

taken in a burglary. The 

policyholder gave a preliminary interview, but never answered any 

other questions or provided substantiation for his claim. His 

3 

Appellate Case: 92-6126 Document: 010110149220 Date Filed: 11/30/1992 Page: 3 
wife and children also refused to answer any questions about the 

alleged burglary or stolen property. The court determined that 

reasonableness can be decided as a matter of law "when only one 

conclusion about the conduct's reasonableness is possible." 868 

F. 2d at ·351. The court held that the insurer's demand for an 

examination under oath was, under these circumstances, reasonable 

as a matter of law. Id. at 351-52. 

In this case, by contrast, Farmers interviewed both Mrs. 

Prince and her husband twice before ever requesting an examination 

under oath. At the second examinations of the Princes, Farmers 

suspected arson and asked both of them questions about their 

financial condition, about the value of their house and some of 

their goods, whether they had moved property out of the house 

before the fire, see generally Pl.'s Objection to Def.'s Mot. for 

Summ. J., Appellant's App. at 117-48, 171-96, and whether they had 

set or procured the fire. Id. at 139-40, 187, 189. In addition 

to the interviews, the Princes signed releases giving Farmers 

access to all of their financial information, id. at 100, 150, and 

submitted a sworn proof of loss with nineteen pages of 

b . . 1 

su stant1.at1.on. Mot. for Summ. J. of Def., Appellant's App. at 

38. 

1 Farmers presented three pages of Mrs. Prince's sworn proof of 

loss to the district court with its motion for summary judgment; 

they are also included in the record before this court. See Mot. 

for Summ. J. of Def., Appellant's App. at 38. The second page of 

the proof of loss indicates that Mrs. Prince provided Farmers with 

nineteen pages of substantiation for her claim, id. at 39, 

although Farmers did not include those pages with its motion. 

Mrs. Prince's claim was for $77,156 out of total coverage of 

$198,500. Id. at 38. 

4 

Appellate Case: 92-6126 Document: 010110149220 Date Filed: 11/30/1992 Page: 4 
To underscore its contention that the demand for an 

examination under oath was reasonable as a matter of law, Farmers 

offered evidence that property was moved from the Princes' house 

before the fire. This evidence was in the form of the claims 

manager's testimony that the company's investigation showed that 

picture hooks on the wall were unprotected by an object during the 

fire, and that the Princes moved a truck from beside the house out 

to the barn the day before the fire. Id. at 43. Farmers, 

however, has mischaracterized the nature of this evidence. Rather 

than demonstrating that its request was reasonable as a matter of 

law, Farmers' allegations merely raise a jury question whether its 

request for an examination under oath was reasonable under the 

circumstances. 

Even if Farmers' request was per se reasonable, however, the 

district court should not have dismissed Mrs. Prince's case 

without first giving her a reasonable time to cure the defect. 

Under Oklahoma law, a policyholder's noncompliance with policy 

provisions does not work a forfeiture unless the policy clearly 

provides for forfeiture. See George v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 

201 P. 510, 512-13 (Okla. 1921). Rather, the policyholder is 

allowed a reasonable time to cure the defect before his or her 

claim is dismissed. See Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Iglehart, 386 

P.2d 145, 147-48 (Okla. 1963). 

5 

Appellate Case: 92-6126 Document: 010110149220 Date Filed: 11/30/1992 Page: 5 
The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED 

for trial. 

Entered for the Court 

Dale E. Saffels 

Senior District Judge 

6 

Appellate Case: 92-6126 Document: 010110149220 Date Filed: 11/30/1992 Page: 6