Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05812/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05812-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUST MARION JANIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:04-cv-05812-AWI-SMS PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN

CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS, AND

RECOMMENDING PLAINTIFF BE

GRANTED LEAVE TO FILE A FOURTH

AMENDED COMPLAINT LIMITED TO

CURING HIS FTCA CLAIM

(Doc. 39)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

I. Findings and Recommendations Following Screening of Third Amended Complaint

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Gust Marion Janis (“plaintiff”) is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil

action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.

388 (1971), which provides a remedy for violation of civil rights by federal actors, and pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (the Federal Tort Claims Act), which provides a limited remedy for torts

committed by federal employees. Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this action on June 10,

2004, and an amended complaint on December 20, 2004. On February 4, 2005, the court dismissed

plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and for

failure to state a claim upon which reliefmay be granted. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint

on June 20, 2005. On June 9, 2006, the court dismissed plaintiff’s second amended complaint for

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failure to state any claims upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff filed a third amended

complaint on August 21, 2006. 

B. Screening Requirement

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may

appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the

test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a

plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

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initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

C. Plaintiff’s Bivens Claims

Plaintiff’s constitutional claims arise from events which allegedly occurred at United States

Penitentiary-Lompoc and United States Penitentiary-Atwater. Plaintiff names forty-five defendants

in the caption of his complaint, in addition to Henderson, Easton, Sanford, Carlson, and Horton, who

are named in the body of the complaint but not in the caption. Plaintiff is seeking monetary and

declaratory relief. 

The court has twice before screened plaintiff’s complaint, and provided plaintiff with notice

of the applicable legal standards and notice of the deficiencies in plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s

lengthy, narrative format and inclusion of unnecessary, peripheral facts makes summarization of his

separate claims unduly burdensome. As a result, the court will first set forth the legal standards

applicable to plaintiff’s claims, and then identify by numbered paragraph(s) which allegations do and

do not give rise to cognizable claims for relief for violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

1. Legal Claims

a. Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance

a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). An

allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison grievance is

sufficient to support claim. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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 b. Denial of Access to the Courts

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil

rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration

or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from

the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v.

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2185-87 (2002). To state a claim based on denial

of access to the courts, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that he suffered an actual injury

by being shut out of court. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415; Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351.

c. Medical Care

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in

a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may

be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,”

or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment,

the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. “Under this

standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be

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drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’”

Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have been aware of the

risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the

risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Further, “[a] difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities

regarding treatment does not give rise to a . . . claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th

Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted). To prevail, plaintiff “must show that the course of treatment

the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . . and . . . that they chose

this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.” Jackson v. McIntosh,

90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted).

d. Property Deprivation

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of property without due

process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and prisoners have a protected

interest in their personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). However,

allegations of the unauthorized deprivation of personal property do not give rise to a claim for relief

for violation of the Due Process Clause. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-34 (1984); Barnett

v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994). 

2. Allegations by Paragraph

The allegations set forth in paragraphs 6 through 8, on pages 7 and 8 of the court record, do

not give rise to any claims for relief.

The allegations set forth in paragraph 9 give rise to a claim for relief against defendants

Herrera, Horton, Greggs, R. Johnson, Keffer, Smith, Henderson, Pacheco, Brown, Marshall, Tuite,

Solis, and Stephenson for acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs, in

violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The allegations set forth in paragraph 10 give rise to a claim for relief against defendants

Pacheco, Brown, Stephenson, and Claridy for retaliation, in violation of the First Amendment.

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The allegations set forth in paragraphs11 and 12 give rise to a claim for relief against

defendants Johnson, Tuite, and Smith for acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious

medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The allegations set forth in paragraphs 13 through 16 do not give rise to a claim for relief

against defendants Gross, Pollock, R. Johnson, Smith, and Easton for acting with deliberate

indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff

was provided with medical care and his disagreement with the treatment provided, to the extent

plaintiff is attempting to impose liability on that basis, does not support a constitutional claim.

Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1344. 

The allegations set forth in paragraph 17 give rise to a claim for relief against defendants

Sanford, Keffer, Herrera, Kramer, Smith, Johnson, and Haro for violation of the Eighth Amendment,

based on the conditions of the cell plaintiff was confined in.

The allegations set forth in paragraphs 18 and 19 do not give rise to a claim for relief for

violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff’s disagreement with the course of treatment chosen

by prison officials provides no basis upon which to impose liability against them. Franklin, 662 F.2d

at 1344. 

The allegations set forth in paragraphs 20 through 22 do not give rise to any claims for relief

for violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

 The allegations set forth in paragraphs 23 and 24 give rise to claims for relief against

defendants Carlson and Horton for retaliation, in violation of the First Amendment.

The allegations set forth in paragraphs 25 through 34 do not give rise to any claims for relief

for violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

 The allegations set forth in paragraph 35 give rise to a claim for relief against defendant D.

Nodle for retaliation, in violation of the First Amendment.

The allegations set forth in paragraphs 36 and 37 do not give rise to any claims for relief for

violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

The allegations set forth in paragraph 38 give rise to a claim for relief against defendants

Schultz, Gant, Booth, Luna, Stahley, Orozoco, Brown, Milligan, Rios, DeVere, Spencer, and Wolf

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numbered 45. 

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for acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth

Amendment

The allegations set forth in paragraphs 39 through 43 do not give rise to any claims for relief

for violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

 The allegations set forth in paragraphs 44 and 45 give rise to a claim for relief against

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defendants Orozoco and Milligan for retaliation, in violation of the First Amendment.

The allegations set forth in the second paragraph numbered 45 do not give rise to a claim for

relief for violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

The allegations set forth in paragraphs 46 and 47 do not give rise to any claims for relief for

violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Plaintiff was already warned that he may not pursue any claims that did not accrue and were

not exhausted prior to June 10, 2004. (Doc. 19, 5:8-6:6.) Therefore, the court recommends that

plaintiff’s allegations set forth in paragraphs 46 through 49, pages 22 and 23 of the court record, be

stricken from the complaint. 

D. FTCA Claims

“The United States is the only proper defendant in a [Federal Tort Claims Act] action.”

Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Woods v. United States, 720 F.2d

1451, 1452 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983)). Although plaintiff alleges a Federal Tort Claims Act claim,

plaintiff did not name the United States as a party to this action and therefore fails to state a claim

for relief.

Because plaintiff was not previously given leave to amend to cure this deficiency, the court

will recommend that plaintiff be allowed to amend the claim. Plaintiff is required to set forth the

basis of his FTCA claim against the United States. Plaintiff may not place defendant in the position

of guessing as to the basis of the claim against it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

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E. Prayer for Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief. “A declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable

relief, should be granted only as a matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the public interest.”

Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948). “Declaratory relief should

be denied when it will neither serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in

issue nor terminate the proceedings and afford relief from the uncertainty and controversy faced by

the parties.” United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985). In the event that

this action reaches trial and the jury returns a verdict in favor of plaintiff, that verdict will be a

finding that plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated. Accordingly, a declaration that defendants

violated plaintiff’s rights is unnecessary.

Further, when an inmate seeks injunctive or declaratory relief concerning the prison where

he is incarcerated, his claims for such relief become moot when he is no longer subjected to those

conditions. Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 2001); Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368

(9th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff is no longer

incarcerated at the prisons at which his claims arose.

F. Conclusion

As set forth herein, plaintiff’s third amended complaint contains some claims for relief which

are cognizable under Bivens. However, plaintiff’s third amended complaint also contains numerous

deficient claims. Plaintiff was previously given leave to amend with respect to his constitutional

claims and failed to cure the deficiencies. The court therefore recommends that the deficient claims

be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

With respect to his Federal Tort Claims Act claim, plaintiff was not previously given leave

to amend to cure the deficiency. As a result, the court is compelled to recommend plaintiff be given

the opportunity to amend the claim. The court recommends that plaintiff be limited to amending his

FTCA claim and if plaintiff adds any new claims or any new parties other than the United States, or

if plaintiff again alleges any of the claims dismissed from this action, plaintiff’s fourth amended

complaint be stricken from the record and plaintiff be subject to sanctions for failing to obey a court

order.

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28 The first paragraph numbered 45. 

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For the reasons set forth in this order, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Paragraphs 46 through 49, on pages 22 and 23, be stricken;

2. This action proceed on the following claims brought pursuant to Bivens:

a. An Eighth Amendment medical care claim against defendants Herrera,

Horton, Greggs, R. Johnson, Keffer, Smith, Henderson, Pacheco, Brown,

Marshall, Tuite, Solis, and Stephenson based on the allegations set forth in

paragraph 9;

b. A retaliation claim against defendants Pacheco, Brown, Stephenson, and

Claridy based on the allegations set forth in paragraph 10;

c. An Eighth Amendment medical care claim against defendants Johnson, Tuite,

and Smith based on the allegations set forth in paragraphs11 and 12;

d. An Eighth Amendment claim against defendants Sanford, Keffer, Herrera,

Kramer, Smith, Johnson, and Haro based on the conditions of the cell

plaintiff was confined in as set forth in paragraph 17;

e. A retaliation claim against defendants Carlson and Horton based on the

allegations set forth in paragraphs 23 and 24;

f. A retaliation claim against defendants D. Nodle based on the allegations set

forth in paragraph 35;

g. An Eighth Amendment medical care claim against defendants Schultz, Gant,

Booth, Luna, Stahley, Orozoco, Brown, Milligan, Rios, DeVere, Spencer, and

Wolf based on the allegations set forth in paragraph 38;

h. A retaliation claim against defendants Orozoco and Milligan based on the

allegations set forth in paragraphs 44 and 45 ;

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3. All other claims for violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, brought pursuant to

Bivens, be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim;

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4. Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief be dismissed from this action and this action

proceed as one for damages only;

5. Defendants Adams, Gunji, Lappin, Aramdarez, Gonzalez, Chavez, Bills, Falkowski,

Klein, Sterling, Franco, Willis, Nodle, Oliva, and Flores be dismissed from this

action based on plaintiff’s failure to state any claims upon which relief may be

granted against them; and

6. Plaintiff be granted leave to amend his Federal Tort Claims Act claim, with the

restriction that if plaintiff attempts to add any new claims or parties other than the

United States to this action or includes any claims previously dismissed, his fourth

amended complaint will be stricken from the record and plaintiff will be subject to

sanctions for failing to obey a court order.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 2, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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