Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01937/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01937-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited.

Case No. C 05-01937-JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

(JFEX1)

** E-filed on 11/18/05 **

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

RICHARD LYTEL,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

JANET SIMPSON,

 Defendant.

Case Number 05-01937-JF

ORDER1 GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

[Docket No. 64]

AND RELATED CROSS-ACTION

Defendant Janet Simpson (“Simpson”) moves, pursuant to California Civil Procedure

Code § 425.16(c) and Civil Local Rule 7-2, for recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in

defending against certain claims brought by Plaintiff Richard Lytel (“Lytel”). Lytel opposes the

motion. Having considered the briefs, the applicable law, and the arguments of counsel at the

hearing on November 10, 2005, the Court will grant the motion in part, for the reasons set forth

below.

Case 5:05-cv-01937-JF Document 79 Filed 11/18/05 Page 1 of 7
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2

 The parties dispute the number of times Simpson reported Lytel’s alleged harassment to

HRD and the dates on which any such reports occurred.

2

Case No. C 05-01937-JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

(JFEX1)

I. BACKGROUND

In or about August 2003, Lytel was employed by Sun Microsystems, Inc. (“Sun”) as Vice

President of the Advanced System Development (“ASD”) Center located in Menlo Park,

California. Lytel had principal responsibility for three research and development projects, one of

which was the Life Sciences project. After Lytel received approval to expand the Life Sciences

project, Lytel and Simpson discussed an opportunity for Simpson to work on the project. At the

time, Simpson was a Sun employee working in Dallas, Texas, having been hired in or about

December 2000 as a Strategic Sales Development Representative. Simpson transferred to the

Life Sciences project in September 2003, with the understanding that she would continue to work

out of the Sun offices in Dallas and travel as needed to the company offices in Menlo Park and

the lab facilities in San Diego. In this new capacity, Simpson worked under the direct

supervision of Lytel.

Simpson alleges that while working under Lytel’s supervision she was the victim of

sexual harassment. As a result, Simpson reported Lytel’s alleged harassment to Sun’s Human

Resources Department (“HRD”) on at least one occasion.2 The parties dispute the substance of

the allegations made by Simpson to HRD. Lytel claims that Simpson told HRD that Lytel

violated Sun’s confidentiality policy, was involved in a conflict of interest, and engaged in sexual

harassment. According to Lytel, the sexual harassment claim included allegations that he had

kissed Simpson on the head, hugged Simpson, sent Simpson personal e-mails and flowers, and

provided Simpson with a short story containing sexual content that Lytel had written for a short

fiction class. Simpson contends that she reported numerous additional examples of Lytel’s

sexual harassment to HRD. Answer, ¶ 34.

On August 26, 2004, Lytel was informed that the fictional story he provided to Simpson

was grounds for termination and that he no longer would be an employee at Sun. As a result,

Lytel elected to resign from his position.

Case 5:05-cv-01937-JF Document 79 Filed 11/18/05 Page 2 of 7
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3

 Simpson previously filed suit in San Mateo Superior Court against Lytel and Sun on

May 23, 2005, alleging the same ten causes of action. This case was voluntarily dismissed.

3

Case No. C 05-01937-JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

(JFEX1)

In April 2005, Simpson filed a complaint against Lytel with the California Department of

Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”), alleging charges of sexual harassment, retaliation and

gender based discrimination. On the same date, Simpson filed a complaint with the DFEH

against Sun containing substantially similar allegations. The DFEH complaints contain

allegations that Lytel promised Simpson a pay raise if she was responsive to his romantic

requests, made romantic overtures toward Simpson, repeatedly touched Simpson without her

consent, represented to third parties that he was having a romantic relationship with Simpson,

and threatened Simpson with demotion, transfer, or termination in retaliation for her

communications with HRD. Lytel claims that he did not know of these additional allegations

until he received a copy of Simpson’s DFEH complaint, wherein Simpson stated that she

previously had made these allegations to Sun employees.

Lytel filed the instant action against Simpson on May 10, 2005, alleging defamation,

intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and intentional infliction of

emotional distress. On June 21, 2005, Simpson filed a counterclaim against Lytel and Sun,

alleging ten claims for relief.3 On July 29, 2005, Simpson moved to strike Lytel’s first through

fourth claims pursuant to California Civil Procedure Code Section 425.16 (“anti-SLAPP

statute”), to the extent that they are based upon statements Simpson made to the DFEH. On

September 20, 2005, the Court issued an order granting Simpson’s motion to strike, noting

Lytel’s position that “it is undisputed that any statements made by Simpson to the DFEH are

privileged and, as such, they are not the subject of any allegation in the complaint.” 

Simpson now moves to recover attorneys’ fees, arguing that she is entitled to recover

“nothing less than all reasonable defense fees and costs . . . incurred to defend against the First

through Fourth Causes of Action of the Complaint.” Motion at 5. Moreover, because the antiSLAPP motion was granted as to each and every claim contained in the complaint, Simpson

maintains that she is entitled to recover the total amount of attorneys’ fees incurred to date in

Case 5:05-cv-01937-JF Document 79 Filed 11/18/05 Page 3 of 7
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4

 As of September 19, 2005, Simpson had accrued a total legal bill of $95,703.50, of

which $39,165.50 was for services unrelated to the defense of Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Motion at 6. 

Accordingly, the total amount of fees incurred by Simpson in defense of the instant action

amounts to $56,538.00. Id.

4

Case No. C 05-01937-JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

(JFEX1)

defense of the instant action — an amount totaling $56,538.00.4 Id. at 6. Finally, Simpson seeks

to recover an additional $8,165.50 in fees that were incurred in bringing the present motion. 

Reply at 11. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the California anti-SLAPP statute, “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to

strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §

425.16(c) (emphasis added). Thus, an award of attorney fees to a prevailing defendant on a

special motion to strike is mandatory. See Pfeiffer Venice Properties v. Bernard, 101 Cal. App.

4th 211, 215 (2002) (citing Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1131 (2001)). However, “[t]he

court has broad discretion in determining the reasonable amount of attorney fees and costs to

award a prevailing defendant.” Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1222

(S.D. Cal. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

Lytel argues that Simpson should not be considered to be a “prevailing party” on the antiSLAPP motion and that her request for attorneys’ fees therefore should be denied. In support of

this argument, Lytel cites Coltrain v. Shewalter, 66 Cal. App. 4th 94, 107 (1998), in which the

court held that the determination of whether there is a prevailing party depends upon whether the

party realized its objectives in the litigation. Lytel maintains that Simpson’s anti-SLAPP motion

did not achieve its intended objective because the motion did not result in any claim for relief or

language being stricken from the complaint. The Court disagrees. The allegations contained in

Lytel’s complaint were sufficiently ambiguous to warrant Simpson’s filing of the anti-SLAPP

motion. Specifically, the complaint states that “plaintiff has made new and different defamatory

statements against defendant, both written and verbal, and both to Sun employees and others.” 

Complaint, ¶ 37 (emphasis added). Lytel proceeds to identify the “new and different”

Case 5:05-cv-01937-JF Document 79 Filed 11/18/05 Page 4 of 7
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5

 In addition, Simpson claims she was influenced to file the anti-SLAPP motion after

reading Mr. Kastner’s declaration filed in support of Lytel’s motion for early discovery, in which

Mr. Kastner stated: “Because [the] DFEH allegations were completely concocted and untrue,

Lytel commenced this action for defamation, tortuous interference with prospective economic

advantage and intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 3, ¶

8. However, in evaluating Simpson’s decision to file the anti-SLAPP motion, the Court declines

to make too much of Mr. Kastner’s declaration. First, an examination of the billing records

presented to the Court by Mr. Ryan reveals that over twenty five hours of work had been

performed on anti-SLAPP motion prior to the date on which Mr. Kastner’s declaration was filed. 

See Ryan Decl., Ex. A. Second, without expressing an opinion on whether communications

between Simpson and Sun employees may also be privileged, the Court is mindful of Mr.

Kastner’s explanation that the DFEH complaint, even if privileged as such, is relevant because it

put Lytel on notice that Simpson had engaged in the publication of further allegedly defamatory

statements.

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Case No. C 05-01937-JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

(JFEX1)

defamatory statements using language substantially similar to the allegations of sexual

harassment contained in Simpson’s DFEH complaint. Id. The ambiguity relating to Simpson’s

publication of the allegedly defamatory statements, paired with the apparent use of language

contained in the DFEH complaint provided Simpson with an adequate basis to file the antiSLAPP motion.5

 By filing the anti-SLAPP motion, Simpson succeeded in narrowing the scope

of the instant action by clarifying that Simpson’s communications to the DFEH are not the

subject of the complaint’s allegations. Accordingly, Simpson is properly deemed to have

prevailed on her motion to strike and is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees under the anti-SLAPP

statute.

Although Simpson is entitled to a mandatory recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs under

the anti-SLAPP statute, Simpson’s request for $56,538.00 is unreasonable under the

circumstances. As an initial matter, Simpson is not entitled to recover all attorneys’ fees incurred

in her defense of Lytel’s complaint. The cases cited by Simpson in which the prevailing

defendant was granted an award of all defense costs are distinguishable, given that in each case

the defendant was successful in either extricating herself from the lawsuit or eliminating one or

more claims in their entirety. See, e.g., Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1220

(S.D. Cal. 2002); Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628 (1996). Here,

Simpson did not achieve such sweeping success. Awarding Simpson all of her defense costs

Case 5:05-cv-01937-JF Document 79 Filed 11/18/05 Page 5 of 7
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6

 Although the Court recognizes that the instant litigation and its underlying events have

had a great emotional impact upon the parties, the Court wishes to emphasize the need for

counsel to remain professional, and to communicate openly with one another when appropriate.

6

Case No. C 05-01937-JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

(JFEX1)

would not advance the public policy underlying the anti-SLAPP statute, which was enacted “to

allow early dismissal of meritless first amendment cases aimed at chilling expression through

costly, time-consuming litigation.” Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir.

2001).

More importantly, the Court’s order granting Simpson’s anti-SLAPP motion was merely

a confirmation of what had already been conceded by Lytel in the first few pages of his

opposition — that any statements made by Simpson to the DFEH are privileged and, as such,

properly cannot be the subject of any allegation in the complaint. Indeed, a substantial portion of

the ninety hours of work performed by Simpson’s attorneys on the anti-SLAPP motion could

have been avoided had counsel for both parties elected to discuss the substance of the motion in

advance or agreed to take the motion off calendar when it became clear that Lytel did not dispute

the privileged nature of Simpson’s communications to the DFEH.6 Accordingly, the Court will

limit Simpson’s attorneys’ fees to $10,000.00.

IV. ORDER

Simpson’s motion to recover attorneys’ fees is GRANTED IN PART. Simpson shall be

entitled to recover attorneys’ fees in the amount of $10,000.00.

DATED: November 17, 2005

 /s/ electronic signature authorized 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

Case 5:05-cv-01937-JF Document 79 Filed 11/18/05 Page 6 of 7
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Case No. C 05-01937-JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

(JFEX1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Counsel for Plaintiff

eck@kastnerbanchero.com

slh@kastnerbanchero.com

fh@kastnerbanchero.com

ln@kastnerbanchero.com

mbisbee@ropers.com

jsimonson@ropers.com

pdunn@ropers.com

knguyen@ropers.com

Counsel for Defendant

jfr@olimpia-whelan-lively.com

Counsel for Cross-Defendant

urosales@wsgr.com

ggansle@wsgr.com

lreagan@wsgr.com

Case 5:05-cv-01937-JF Document 79 Filed 11/18/05 Page 7 of 7