Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00420/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00420-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ERICA BROADUS, SUBSTITUTE :

PARTY FOR FRANKLIN D. BROADUS, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. :

: CIVIL ACTION 15-420-M

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, :

Social Security Commissioner, :

 :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Attorney’s 

Application for Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice 

Act (hereinafter EAJA), with supporting Documentation (Doc. 21). 

After considering the pertinent pleadings, it is ORDERED that 

the Motion be GRANTED and that Plaintiff be AWARDED an EAJA 

attorney’s fee in the amount of $3,521.21. 

Plaintiff filed this action on August 18, 2015 (Doc. 1). 

On March 30, 2016, the undersigned Judge entered a Memorandum 

Opinion and Order, reversing the decision of the Commissioner 

and remanding this action for further proceedings (Doc. 19). 

Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant 

(Doc. 20).

On May 2, 2016, Plaintiff’s Attorney, filed an EAJA Fee 

Case 1:15-cv-00420-M Document 22 Filed 06/02/16 Page 1 of 7
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Application requesting a fee of $3,534.11, computed at an hourly 

rate of $188.99 for 18.7 hours spent in this Court (Doc. 21-1). 

Defendant has not responded to Plaintiff’s request and Plaintiff 

has indicated that the request is not opposed. 

The EAJA requires a court to

award to a prevailing party . . . fees and 

other expenses . . . incurred by that party 

in any civil action . . . including 

proceedings for judicial review of Agency 

action, brought by or against the United 

States . . . unless the court finds that the 

position of the United States was 

substantially justified or that special 

circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). EAJA requires a prevailing party to 

file an application for attorney’s fees within thirty days of 

final judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The 

court’s judgment becomes final sixty days—the time an appeal may 

be taken pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. Rule 4(a)—after it is entered. 

See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993).

 Three statutory conditions must be satisfied before EAJA 

fees may be awarded. See Myers v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 659, 666 

(11th Cir. 1990). First, the claimant must file a fee 

application within the thirty-day period following the entry of 

final judgment. Second, the claimant must be a prevailing 

party. Third, the Government’s position must not be 

Case 1:15-cv-00420-M Document 22 Filed 06/02/16 Page 2 of 7
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substantially justified. Since Plaintiff’s motion was unopposed, 

Defendant apparently concedes all three EAJA requirements. The 

Court finds that they have been met.

Having found the prerequisites satisfied, the Court will 

discuss the fee to be awarded. EAJA is a fee-shifting statute. 

The Supreme Court has indicated that “‘the most useful starting 

point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the 

number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied 

by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 

1562, 1586 (11th Cir. 1985 (EAJA) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhartt, 

461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (§ 1988)). In describing this lodestar 

method of calculation, the United States Supreme Court stated:

This calculation provides an objective basis 

on which to make an initial estimate of the 

value of a lawyer’s services. The party 

seeking an award of fees should submit 

evidence supporting the hours worked and the 

rates claimed. Where the documentation of 

hours is inadequate, the district court may 

reduce the award accordingly. The district 

court also should exclude from this initial 

fee calculation hours that were not 

“reasonably expended.” . . . Cases may be 

overstaffed, and the skill and experience of 

lawyers vary widely. Counsel for the 

prevailing party should make a good-faith 

effort to exclude from a fee request hours 

that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise 

unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private 

practice ethically is obligated to exclude 

such hours from his fee submission. In the 

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private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is an 

important component in fee setting. It is 

no less important here. Hours that are not 

properly billed to one’s client also are not 

properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant 

to statutory authority.

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted). Counsel must use 

professional judgment in billing under EAJA. A lawyer should 

only be compensated for hours spent on activities for which he 

would bill a client of means who was seriously intent on 

vindicating similar rights. Norman v. Housing Authority, 836 

F.2d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988).

 After examining Plaintiff’s Attorneys’ Application, and 

supporting documentation (Doc. 21), and considering the 

reasonableness of the hours claimed, the Court finds that the 

18.7 hours expended in prosecuting this action is reasonable.

 In determining the hourly rate to apply in a given EAJA 

case, express statutory language provides as follows:

The amount of fees awarded under this 

subsection shall be based upon prevailing 

market rates for the kind and quality of the 

services furnished, except that . . . 

attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess 

of $125 per hour unless the court determines 

that an increase in the cost of living or a 

special factor, such as the limited 

availability of qualified attorneys for the 

proceedings involved, justified a higher 

fee.

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28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1997).

 In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1992), the 

Eleventh Circuit determined that the EAJA established a two-step 

analysis for determining the appropriate hourly rate to be 

applied in calculating attorney’s fees under the Act:

The first step in the analysis, . . . is to 

determine the market rate for “similar 

services [provided] by lawyers of reasonably 

comparable skills, experience, and 

reputation.” . . . The second step, which is 

needed only if the market rate is greater 

than $75 per hour, is to determine whether 

the court should adjust the hourly fee 

upward . . . to take into account an 

increase in the cost of living, or a special 

factor.

Meyer, 958 F.2d at 1033-34 (citations and footnote omitted).1 

The applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory 

evidence that the requested rate is in line with prevailing 

market rates. NAACP V. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1338 

(11th Cir. 1987). Satisfactory evidence at a minimum is more 

than the affidavit of the attorney performing the work. Blum v. 

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). Where the fees or time 

claimed seem expanded or there is lack of documentation or 

 1

Subsequent to Meyer, the cap was raised from $75.00 per hour to $125.00 

per hour, as set out above in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 

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testimony in support thereof, the court may make an award on its 

own experience. Norman v. City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 

1303 (11th Cir. 1988). Where the documentation is inadequate, 

the court is not relieved of its obligation to award a 

reasonable fee; traditionally, it has had the power to make an 

award with no need of further pleadings or an evidentiary 

hearing. Id.

 Beginning in 2001, the prevailing market rate in the 

Southern District of Alabama was $125.00 per hour. See, e.g., 

Smith v. Massanari, Civil Action 00-0812-P-M (S.D. Ala. October 

25, 2001); and Square v. Halter, Civil Action 00-0516-BH-L (S.D. 

Ala. April 12, 2001). However, in 2007, United States 

Magistrate Judge Cassady fashioned a formula to adjust the 

prevailing market hourly rate to account for the ever-increasing 

cost-of-living. Lucy v. Barnhart, Civil Action 06-0147-C (S.D. 

Ala. July 5, 2007 (Doc. 32)). As set out in Lucy, the formula 

for calculating all future awards of attorney’s fees under the 

EAJA is as follows: “‘($125/hour) x (CPI-U Annual Average “All 

Items Index,” South Urban, for month and year of temporal 

midpoint2)/152.4, where 152.4 equals the CPI-U of March 1996, the 

 2

“The appropriate endpoint for computing the cost of living adjustment 

is the temporal midpoint of the period during which the compensable services 

were rendered[;] . . . [t]he temporal midpoint is calculated by computing the 

number of days from the date the claim was prepared until the date of the 

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month and year in which the $125 cap was enacted.’” (Lucy, Doc. 

32, at p. 11) (quoting Lucy, Doc. 31, at p. 2). The undersigned 

also adopts this formula in EAJA fee petition actions for use in 

arriving at the appropriate hourly rate.

 The Complaint was filed on August 18, 2015 (Doc. 1) and the 

Court entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order and Judgment on 

March 30, 2016 (Docs. 19 and 20), so the temporal midpoint in 

this action was December3. The CPI-U for December was 229.581. 

Plugging the relevant numbers into the foregoing formula renders 

the following equation: $125.00 x 229.581/152.4, the 

computation of which renders an hourly rate of $188.30. This 

hourly rate for 18.7 hours equals $3,521.21.

 In conclusion, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application 

be GRANTED as set out above and that Plaintiff be AWARDED an 

EAJA Attorney’s fee in the amount of $3,521.21.

DONE this 1st day of June, 2016.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 Magistrate or District Judge’s Order and Judgment.” Lucy v. Barnhart. Civil 

Action 06-0147-C (S.D. Ala. Doc. 31, at p. 3). 3 Plaintiff’s attorney calculated the temporal midpoint as November 

based on the fact that the “case existed” from the end of July. However, the 

time sheet submitted by counsel (doc. 21-1 at 8) reflects that counsel began 

working on this action in August. Therefore, the correct calculation results 

in a temporal midpoint of December.

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