Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-03706/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-03706-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAROL JORDAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

VARGAS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-03706-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 47

Plaintiff, a California inmate incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), has 

filed the instant pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that SVSP correctional 

officers Vargas, Alvarez and Garcia violated his constitutional rights. Now pending before the 

Court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 47. Plaintiff has filed an 

opposition, Dkt. No. 51, and defendants have filed a reply, Dkt. No. 55. For the reasons set forth 

below, the Court GRANTS the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

BACKGROUND

I. General Overview

The following facts are undisputed. During the relevant time period, plaintiff worked as a 

second watch porter on SVSP Facility D, Yard D2, Housing Unit 5, and his supervisor was 

Defendant Vargas. On April 2, 2017, Defendant Vargas worked as a floor officer on Housing 

Unit 6; was not in charge of plaintiff’s schedule that day; and did not supervise him at his porter 

position that day. That day, plaintiff was assaulted by inmate Brandon Traveen Carr on the yard 

in SVSP housing unit D2. The following day, plaintiff was again assaulted by Carr. As a result of 

the assault, Plaintiff suffered serious bodily injury, including a bilateral jaw fracture, resulting in 

plaintiff being hospitalized and inmate Carr being issued a rules violation report for assault on an 

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inmate causing great bodily injury and transferred to administrative segregation. 

Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the events of April 2 and 3, 2017. In the operative complaint, 

plaintiff alleges that Defendant Vargas refused to allow him to carry out his job duties and he 

informed Defendant Vargas that he would submit a staff complaint regarding this refusal. In 

response, Defendant Vargas and Alvarez retaliated against plaintiff by ordering Carr to attack 

plaintiff on April 2 and 3, 2017, and by refusing to provide plaintiff with medical attention after 

the April 2, 2017 attack, in violation of the First Amendment’s prohibition on retaliation for 

accessing the courts and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on deliberate indifference to an 

inmate’s safety and deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Plaintiff also 

alleges that Defendant Vargas and Alvarez’s actions constituted a civil conspiracy. Plaintiff 

further alleges that Defendant Garcia refused to provide him with medical attention after the April 

2, 2017 attack, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Dkt. No. 19; Dkt. No. 21. 

The parties disagree as to why Plaintiff was attacked. 

According to plaintiff, the Northern Riders prison gang ordered Carr to attack plaintiff 

because plaintiff had sought a job on the yard crew, a position the Northern Riders had designated 

for their gang members, and Defendants Vargas and Alvarez coordinated the attack in retaliation 

for plaintiff stating that he would file a complaint against Defendant Vargas for refusing to allow 

plaintiff to carry out his job duties. 

According to defendants, inmate Carr independently decided to attack plaintiff because 

plaintiff had “snitched” on him; Defendants Vargas and Alvarez had no involvement with, or prior 

knowledge of, the attack; and on April 2, 2017, Defendant Vargas was working in SVSP housing 

unit D6 and not in D2.

The parties also disagree as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to his 

serious medical needs. Plaintiff alleges that defendants denied him medical attention on April 2, 

2017, despite his repeated requests. Defendants allege that plaintiff did not suffer serious injuries 

from the April 2nd attack and neither required nor requested medical attention.

Finally, the parties also disagree as to whether plaintiff exhausted his administrative 

remedies. Defendants argue that plaintiff only submitted only one relevant grievance prior to 

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filing this action and that this grievance was not exhausted. Defendants further argue that 

although plaintiff filed three more relevant grievances between filing this action and filing the 

operative complaint,1these grievances were properly cancelled or rejected in accordance with 

prison regulations. Dkt. No. 47 at 5-7, 14-18. Plaintiff argues that he attempted to exhaust his 

administrative remedies through at least six separate grievances filed while incarcerated at 

California Men’s Colony Hospital but the CDCR’s administrative remedies were effectively 

unavailable to him. Dkt. No. 51 at 2-6.

II. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations

From January to April 2017, correctional officers stationed at SVSP Facility D, Yard D2, 

consistently showed favoritism to the Northern Riders which assisted the Northern Riders in 

recruiting members. Northern Riders were given preferred job placements as yard crew, porters, 

and clerical staff, and were given recreational, visiting, special purchase, canteen and laundry 

privileges. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 4. The Northern Riders were allowed to hold large meetings on the 

yard, and to intimidate, extort and assault inmates. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 4. 

During this time period, plaintiff was a second watch lead porter for Housing Unit 5, and 

his supervisor was Defendant Vargas. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 4. In the weeks prior to April 2, 2017, the 

relationship between plaintiff and Vargas was nonexistent and was not improving. Defendant 

Vargas refused to allow plaintiff to perform his assigned job duties. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 4. Plaintiff 

informed Defendant Vargas that he would file a grievance if Defendant Vargas continued to 

prevent him from carrying out his job duties. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 4. Because of Defendant Vargas’s 

actions, plaintiff sought to change his job to Facility D2 yard crew. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 4. The 

Northern Riders gang leader told plaintiff that this job was reserved for Northern Riders gang 

members. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 4. Plaintiff spoke to Defendant Vargas about switching from second 

watch porter to Facility D2 yard crew. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 4. Defendant Vargas stated that he would 

look into it. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 4. An hour after this conversation, the Northern Riders gang leader 

approached plaintiff, and said, “Why are you still trying to get the homies yard crew job?,” which 

 

1 The amended complaint, filed on September 12, 2017, is the operative complaint. Dkt. No. 19; 

Dkt. No. 21.

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plaintiff alleges is a clear indication that Defendant Vargas had reported their conversation to the 

Northern Riders gang leader. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 4. Because plaintiff sought a position over which 

the Northern Riders gang claimed ownership, the Northern Riders and SVSP officers coordinated 

the attack on plaintiff by Carr. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 4. 

On April 2, 2017, inmate Carr assaulted plaintiff, causing plaintiff serious physical injury. 

Dkt. No. 51-1 at 1. Plaintiff was not provided with any medical attention following this assault. 

He was first escorted to the Housing Unit 5 holding cell, and then returned to his cell. Dkt. No. 

51-1 at 1. Defendant Alvarez visited plaintiff at his cell that day and asked plaintiff if he had any 

enemy concerns with respect to Carr or other inmates. Plaintiff asked Defendant Alvarez for 

medical attention. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 1. Initially, Defendant Alvarez stated that plaintiff had 

already been examined and cleared by medical staff. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 1. Then Defendant Alvarez 

stated that he did not see any physical reasons that plaintiff required medical attention but if 

plaintiff signed the marriage chrono, Defendant Alvarez would see about getting plaintiff medical 

attention. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 1-2. 2 Plaintiff signed the chrono and asked again for medical 

attention, informing Defendant Alvarez that he no longer could open his mouth, no longer had any 

feeling in his face, and had a severe headache. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 2. Defendant Alvarez said that he 

would have plaintiff seen by medical personnel, but plaintiff was not seen by medical personnel 

that day.

On April 3, 2017, plaintiff awoke with a visible black eye, a swollen and discolored jaw, 

and nasal blockage. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 2. He was unable to open or close his jaw, and he suffered 

from a severe headache and difficulties. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 2. Plaintiff was unable to eat his 

breakfast because he was unable to move his upper and lower jaw. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 2. Plaintiff 

informed the second watch officer that he required medical attention. The second watch officer 

stated that he would contact medical for plaintiff but did not do so. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 2. 

At 8:30 a.m. that day, correctional officers initially refused to release plaintiff from his 

 

2 A “marriage chrono” is a general chrono in which an inmate states that he does not consider 

another inmate to be an enemy and that he can safely program with that inmate on the same 

facility. Dkt. No. 47-2 (“Alvarez Decl.”) at ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 51-2 at 5.

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housing unit to attend his job as a second watch porter. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 2. After plaintiff was 

finally released from his housing unit, he was informed that he was not needed as a porter that 

morning and that he should return to his cell. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 3. Plaintiff again requested 

medical attention. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 3. The correctional officer stated that plaintiff could go to the

medical clinic at yard time. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 3. Plaintiff repeated that he really needed medical 

assistance and that his jaw was seriously damaged. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 3. The correctional officer 

called medical and directed plaintiff to go to the Facility D patio for medical services. Dkt. No. 

51-1 at 3. 

Around 9:00 a.m. that day, plaintiff was released from his housing unit and started walking 

on the yard track toward the program area’s gates. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 3. Several yards later, 

plaintiff saw Carr walking hurriedly towards him and cutting across the recreational field to reach 

him. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 3. Plaintiff states that it was clear that Carr intended to assault him. Upon 

reaching plaintiff, Carr began to throw punches. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 3. To defend himself, Plaintiff 

threw punches as well, and a fight ensured. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 3. Because plaintiff and Carr are 

from two opposing geographic locations of California, other inmates joined in, resulting in a 

melee of eight to ten inmates. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 3. The fight continued until the yard observation 

tower noticed the disturbance. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 3. Plaintiff was rendered unconscious and was 

transported away by ambulance. Dkt. No. 51-1 at 3. 

III. Defendants’ Version of Events

Defendant Vargas and Alvarez deny asking Carr to assault plaintiff, and state that they did 

not know beforehand, and had no reason to know, that Carr would assault plaintiff on April 2 and 

3, 2017. Dkt. No. 47-6 (“Vargas Decl.”) at ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 47-2 (“Alvarez Decl.”) at ¶ 17. 

On April 1, 2017, Defendant Vargas did not work at SVSP. Vargas Decl. at ¶ 2. 

On April 2, 2017, Defendant Vargas worked as a floor officer in housing unit D6 and was 

not in charge of plaintiff’s work schedule. Vargas Decl. ¶ 3. Carr’s assault on plaintiff happened 

sometime in the morning of April 2, before 2:00 p.m. Dkt. No. 47-3 (“Garcia Decl.”), at ¶ 3. 

Defendant Garcia was on the yard of housing unit D5 when Carr assaulted plaintiff, but Defendant 

Garcia did not observe the assault. Garcia Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5, 7. Defendant Garcia realized the assault 

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had occurred when the nurse blew the whistle after the assault. Garcia Decl. ¶ 7. By that time, 

Carr had already left the scene. Garcia Decl. ¶ 7. Defendant Garcia walked over to where 

plaintiff was located. Garcia Decl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff was conscious and was either lying on the ground 

or sitting on the ground with his back against the bench. Garcia Decl. ¶ 8. Defendant Garcia and 

a colleague helped plaintiff to his feet, and another officer escorted plaintiff away. Garcia Decl. ¶ 

9. Because everything happened so quickly, Defendant Garcia did not observe what kind of 

injuries, if any, plaintiff suffered. Garcia Decl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff did not ask Defendant Garcia for 

any medical help while on the yard, and Defendant Garcia did not see or speak with plaintiff 

again. Garcia Decl. ¶¶ 12, 14. Defendant Garcia remained on the yard and continued to monitor 

yard activities to ensure that no further incidents happened. Garcia Decl. ¶ 12. 

Defendant Alvarez did not arrive at housing unit D5 until 2:00 p.m. that day, after the fight 

had occurred. Alvarez Decl. ¶ 3. Defendant Alvarez stopped by plaintiff’s cell around 2:45 pm 

and asked if plaintiff had any enemy concerns with Carr or any other inmate in Facility D. 

Alvarez Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7. Plaintiff responded that he did not. Defendant Alvarez then asked plaintiff 

to sign a Form 128B, colloquially referred to as a marriage chrono, confirming that he did not 

have any enemy concerns. Alvarez Decl. ¶ 7. Plaintiff signed the Form 128B. Plaintiff also 

asked Defendant Alvarez for medical help. Alvarez Decl. ¶ 8. However, Defendant Alvarez saw 

no signs that plaintiff had any injuries that required immediate medical attention. Alvarez Decl. ¶ 

10. Defendant Alvarez saw no injuries on plaintiff’s body, such as bruises, scratches or swelling. 

Alvarez Decl. ¶ 10. Defendant Alvarez noted that plaintiff did not seem in distress during the 

conversation, was mobile, was coherent, and was fully able to have a conversation. Alvarez Decl. 

¶ 10. Defendant Alvarez therefore told plaintiff that he should follow the usual procedure to see 

medical staff, which is to either submit a medical slip requesting to be seen by a doctor or to speak 

with medical staff when they “round” the housing unit, which is done three times per the medical 

staff person’s shift. Alvarez Decl. ¶¶ 11, 12. Defendant Alvarez denies refusing to call for 

medical help unless plaintiff signed the marriage chrono; denies threatening plaintiff with further 

acts of violence; and denies telling plaintiff to stop filing complaints against SVSP staff. Alvarez 

Decl. ¶¶ 14, 15. 

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Inmate Carr stated that, on April 2, 2017, he learned that plaintiff had put in a “kite,” with 

his name and signature, that disclosed that Carr and other inmates were bringing phones into the 

prison. Dkt. No. 48 at 29. Carr was angry because Carr was making a lot of money at the prison 

bringing in phones and plaintiff’s kite constituted “snitching” and messed up Carr’s smuggling. 

Dkt. No. 48 at 32. Carr assaulted plaintiff because plaintiff had snitched on him which was a sign 

of disrespect. Dkt. No. 48 at 36. When Carr saw that the officers’ backs were turned to plaintiff, 

Carr went over to plaintiff, knocked plaintiff out, put on plaintiff’s hat and glasses and walked 

away. Dkt. No. 48 at 30-31. Carr signed the marriage chrono on April 2, 2017 because he wanted 

to finish what he started in that he felt that the April 2nd assault was not enough, and he wanted to 

send a message that plaintiff should not be snitching. Dkt. No. 48 at 38. At the time Carr signed 

the marriage chrono, plaintiff’s signature was already on the chrono. Dkt. No. 48 at 38. Carr 

denies being ordered or encouraged in any way by Defendants Vargas, Garcia and Alvarez, or by 

any other SVSP officer, to attack plaintiff. Dkt. No. 48 at 39-41. 

IV. CDCR Grievance Procedure and Plaintiff’s Relevant Grievances 

A. CDCR Grievance Procedure

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) provides its 

inmates the right to appeal administratively “any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission 

by the department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a material 

adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.1(a). In 

order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must submit his 

complaint on CDCR Form 602 (referred to as a “602”) and proceed through three levels of review: 

(1) screening at the first level of review by a prison official who did not participate in the event at 

issue and who is of equivalent or higher rank than the participating staff, unless the first level of 

review is exempted; (2) a second level of review by a hiring authority or designee at a level no 

lower than Chief Deputy Warden, Deputy Regional Parole Administrator, or the equivalent; and 

(3) a third level of review by a designated representative under the supervision of the third level 

Appeals Chief or equivalent. Id. § 3084.7. The third level of review exhausts administrative 

remedies. Id. § 3084.7(d)(3).

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The following CDCR regulations were in effect during the relevant time period. 

Time Limits for Submitting Grievances. Section 3084.8(b)(1) requires inmates to 

submit the grievance within thirty calendar days of the occurrence of the event being grieved. 15 

Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.8(b)(1). Section 3084.3(b) provides that this deadline for filing a 

grievance is not stayed by an inmate’s inability to obtain supporting documentation. Section 

3084.3(b) instructs that if an inmate is unable to obtain supporting documents, the inmate shall 

submit the grievance with all available supporting documents and in Part B of the grievance 

explain why any remaining supporting documents is unavailable. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.3. 

Section 3084.1 limits inmates to one grievance every fourteen calendar days unless the grievance 

is accepted as an emergency grievance. The fourteen calendar day period commences on the day 

following the inmate’s last accepted grievance. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.1(f). 

Rejection of Grievances. Section 3084.6(b) sets forth reasons that a grievance will be 

rejected. See generally 15 Cal. Code Regs § 3084.6(b). Section 3084.6(b)(3) provides that a 

grievance may be rejected if the inmate has exceeded the allowable number of grievances filed in 

a fourteen calendar day period pursuant to the provisions of Section 3084.1(f). 15 Cal. Code 

Regs. § 3084.8(b)(3). However, a grievance that is rejected pursuant to Section 3084.6(b) may 

later be accepted if the reason noted for the rejection is corrected and the appeal is returned by the 

inmate or parolee to the appeals coordinator within thirty calendar days of rejection. 15 Cal. Code 

Regs. § 3084.6(a)(2).

Cancellation of Grievances. Section 3084.6(c) sets forth a non-exhaustive list of 

circumstances that require cancellation of grievances. See generally 15 Cal. Code Regs 

§ 3084.6(c). Section 3084.6(c)(2), (4) provides that a grievance may be cancelled if it either 

duplicates an inmate’s previous grievance upon which a decision has been rendered or is pending, 

or if time limits for submitting the grievance are exceeded even though the inmate had the 

opportunity to submit within the prescribed time constraints. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.6(c)(2), 

(4). Inmates may not resubmit cancelled grievances unless a determination is made that the 

cancellation was erroneous or new information is received which makes the grievance eligible for 

further review. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.6(f). However, an inmate may file a separate 

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grievance challenging the application of the rules provided in Section 3084.6(c) that resulted in the 

cancellation of the grievance. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.6(f). 

Grievances Alleging Staff Misconduct / Staff Complaints. If an inmate submits a 

grievance challenging staff misconduct, correctional staff shall screen the grievance to determine 

whether it should be processed as a routine grievance, or processed as a staff complaint appeal 

inquiry, or referred to Internal Affairs (“OIA”) for an investigation. 15 Cal. Code Regs. 

§§ 3084.5(b)(4), 3084.9(i)(1). Staff complaints are considered an exception to the regular 

grievance process and undergo a separate and different screening and investigation process from 

routine grievances. 15 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 3084.7(e), (h); 3084.9(i). Staff complaints result in 

confidential reports which may be viewed only by the accused staff and the staff involved in 

processing the staff complaint; the inmate will only be informed whether the staff complaint has 

been referred to OIA, and whether the findings determined that the staff in question committed 

misconduct. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.9(i).

Identifying Staff Members Involved. Section 3084.2(a)(3)-(4) requires inmates to 

identify the staff members involved with the following level of specificity:

The inmate or parolee shall list all staff member(s) involved and shall describe their 

involvement in the issue. To assist in the identification of staff members, the inmate or 

parolee shall include the staff member’s last name, first initial, title or position, if known, 

and the dates of the staff member’s involvement in the issue under appeal. If the inmate or 

parolee does not have the requested identifying information about the staff member(s), he 

or she shall provide any other available information that would assist the appeals 

coordinator in making a reasonable attempt to identify the staff member(s) in question. [¶] 

The inmate or parolee shall state all facts known and available to him/her regarding the 

issue being appealed at the time of submitting the Inmate/Parolee Appeal form, and if 

needed, the Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form Attachment.

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.2(a)(3)–(4). However, the failure to identify staff members is not a 

basis for cancellation or rejection of a grievance. See generally 15 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 3084.6(b), 

(c).

B. Plaintiff’s Grievances Filed Between April 2, 2017 and September 22, 2017

1. Grievances Filed Between April 2, 2017 and May 26, 2017

Between April 2, 2017, the date of the first fight, and May 26, 2017, when plaintiff 

commenced this action, plaintiff submitted four grievances: Grievance No. CMC-E 17-00929 / 

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SVSP-L-17-01994, Grievance No. CMC-E 17-00951 / SVSP-L-17-01995, Grievance No. CMC-E 

17-00986 / SVSP-L-17-02138,3and Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02649. 

Grievance No. CMC-E 17-00929 / SVSP-L-17-01994. On April 11, 2017, plaintiff 

submitted Grievance No. CMC-E 17-00929 / SVSP-L-17-01994, which stated that he had been 

subject to a non-disciplinary transfer away from SVSP to California Men’s Colony (“CMC”) 

because he required medical attention after being battered by an inmate. This grievance requested 

that plaintiff’s property be sent from SVSP to CMC or that he be provided a television to calm his 

nerves. In a CDC Form 695 (screening form for inmate grievances) dated April 24, 2017, this 

grievance was rejected for failing to attach the necessary supporting documentation, specifically 

the relevant Form 1083 (inmate property inventory form) and a Form 22 answered by the SVSP 

property officer. Docket No. 47-4 (“Lomeli Decl.”), Ex. B. The CDC Form 695 has the following 

form language at the bottom:

Be advised that you cannot appeal a rejected appeal, but should take the corrective action 

necessary and resubmit the appeal within the timeframes specified in CCR 3084.6(a) and 

CCR 3084.8(b). Pursuant to CCR 3084.6(e), once an appeal has been cancelled, that 

appeal may not be resubmitted. However, a separate appeal can be filed on the 

cancellation decision. The original appeal may only be resubmitted if the appeal on the 

cancellation is granted.

Dkt. No. 47-4 at 17. There is no indication in the record that plaintiff corrected the issue that led 

to the rejection and resubmitted this grievance.

Grievance No. CMC-E 17-00951 / SVSP-L-17-01995. On April 12, 2017, plaintiff 

submitted Grievance No. CMC-E 17-00951 / SVSP-L-17-01995, which stated that as a result of 

being the victim of a serious bodily injury on April 3, 2017, he was transported away from SVSP 

without his property. This grievance requested a full receipt of his property and that his property 

be sent from SVSP to CMC. In a CDC Form 695 dated May 3, 2017, this grievance was granted 

in part at the first level of review in that plaintiff’s property had arrived at CMC’s Receiving and 

Release Department and plaintiff would receive the property allowable in his current housing 

situation. Lomeli Decl., Ex. C. There is no indication in the record that plaintiff appealed this 

 

3 Because Grievance No. CMC-E 17-00929 / SVSP-L-17-01994, Grievance No. CMC-E 17-

00951 / SVSP-L-17-01995, and Grievance No. CMC-E 17-00986 / SVSP-L-17-02138 were first 

submitted to the CMC appeals office and then transferred to the SVSP appeals office, they have 

grievance log numbers from both institutions.

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first level decision. 

Grievance No. CMC-E 17-00986 / SVSP-L-17-02138. On April 20, 2017, plaintiff 

submitted Grievance No. CMC-E 17-00986 / SVSP-L-17-02138. There are two versions of 

SVSP-L-17-02138 in the record. In one version, the subject of the grievance is identified as 

“personal injury” and the issue grieved is described as follows: “I was a victim of [serious bodily 

injury] on 4-2-17 and on 4-3-17. I had my jaw broken on both sides at S.V.S.P.” Dkt. No. 47-4 at 

29. In the other version, the subject of the grievance is also identified as “personal injury,” but the 

issue grieved is slightly different in that it specifies that the injury was caused by an assault by 

another inmate: “I was assaulted by the same inmate on 4-2-17 and on 4-3-17. I had my jaw 

broken on both sides, this happen a[t] S.V.S.P.” Dkt. No. 47-4 at 29. Both versions of the 

grievance requested compensation for his injuries, pain and suffering.” Dkt. No. 47-4 at 31. Both 

versions were accepted by the CMC Appeals Office on April 21, 2017. Dkt. No. 47-4 at 29, 31. 

In a letter dated April 21, 2017, plaintiff was informed that this grievance had been forwarded to 

SVSP for further review. Dkt. No. 47-4 at 33. In a CDC Form 695 dated April 28, 2017, plaintiff 

was informed that this grievance was rejected because he had exceeded the allowable number of 

grievances that could be filed in a fourteen calendar day period pursuant to Section 3084.1(f). 

Dkt. No. 47-4 at 43. 

On May 23, 2017, Plaintiff resubmitted a copy of this grievance4to the CMC appeals 

office, which forwarded it to the SVSP appeals office on or about May 25, 2017. Dkt. No. 47-4 at 

5, 35. In a CDC Form 695 dated June 1, 2017, the SVSP appeals office rejected this grievance as 

incomplete and requested that plaintiff explain how the resubmitted grievance was not duplicative 

of SVSP-L-17-02138. Dkt. No. 47-4 at 36. There is no indication in the record that plaintiff 

responded to this CDC Form 695. 

Grievance No. CMC-E 17-01187 / SVSP-L-17-02649. On May 3, 2017, plaintiff 

submitted Grievance No. CMC-E 17-01187 / SVSP-L-17-02649, stating that he was being 

subjected to cruel and unusual punishment and that his due process rights were being violated 

 

4 The record is unclear as to which version of Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02138 was resubmitted 

on May 23, 2017.

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because he had been placed in administrative segregation “without a 114D lockup order . . . or 

hearing” since April 3, 2017. Lomeli Decl., Ex. E. He requested immediate release from 

administrative segregation and removal from Salinas Valley State Prison. Id. At the first level of 

review, the request that plaintiff be removed from SVSP was granted in that he was housed at 

CMC at that time, but the first level decision noted that plaintiff could be returned to SVSP 

pending his classification status review. The first level decision denied the request to be released 

from administrative segregation on the grounds that plaintiff’s case factors were “inconsistent with 

CMC current institutional security.” Id. There is no indication in the record that plaintiff appealed 

this first level decision to the second level of review. 

ii) Grievances Filed Between May 26, 2017 and September 12, 2017

Between May 26, 2017, when plaintiff initiated this action, and September 12, 2017, when 

plaintiff filed the operative complaint, plaintiff submitted three grievances: Grievance No. SVSPL-17-03734, Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-3746, and Grievance No. SVSP-L-12-4267. 

Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-03734. On June 18, 2017, plaintiff submitted a Form 22 

Request for Interview asking that his property be transferred from CMC receiving and release and 

2nd floor hospital to his old cell in SVSP. Dkt. No. 47-4 at 48. He attached the following letter to 

his Form 22:

I was on D-yard 4-2-17 and I was batter[ed] by an inmate, forced to sign a chrono that 

clearly states I was battered and witness[ed] by staff. Then I was never given any medical 

attention or was a 7219 perform[ed] on me. Also the c/o’s officer never wrote a report on 

the incident. Then the next day in the mor[n]ing yard the exact same inmate (Carr) and his 

homie batter[ed] me again, which was so serious that I was rushed to Natividad Hospital 

and then transfer[red] to CMC. All my property is up there in R&R and in my old cell on 

the 2nd floor hospital, Sgt. Tomaliso & Sgt Cohen runs the hospital. I just want my 

property sent to me so I can have my stuff, and my legal work. I shouldn’t be in this 

situation if D-yard officer followed procedures dealing with [batteries]. Can you please 

make something happen so I can have my property please. Thank you.

Dkt. No. 47-4 at 49. This Form 22 was converted to a staff complaint and assigned the log 

number SVSP-L-17-03734. Dkt. No. 47-4 at 48. On a CDC Form 695 dated June 30, 2017, 

plaintiff was informed that the grievance had been rejected pursuant to Section 3084.6(b)(14) in 

that it had not been submitted on the departmentally approved appeal (grievance) form. Dkt. No. 

47-4 at 50. The CDC Form 695 contained the form language described supra. Dkt. No. 45-7 at 

50. There is no indication in the record that plaintiff corrected the issue that led to the rejection 

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and resubmitted this grievance.

Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-3746. On June 26, 2017, prior to receiving the rejection letter 

for Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-03734, plaintiff submitted Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-3746, which 

he titled “battery/policy and procedure.” In this grievance, he alleged that he had been battered by 

Carr on April 2 and 3, 2017, but that no incident report was written and no RVR issued regarding 

this incident. Plaintiff further alleged that correctional officials forced him to sign a chrono stating 

that he and Carr could program safely together, threatening him with loss of property or ad-seg 

placement if he did not sign the chrono. He alleged that staff failed to protect him. Plaintiff 

requested financial compensation for his injuries and that this grievance be processed, noting that 

this was his second attempt to grieve the battery. Lomeli Decl., Ex. G. In a letter dated June 27, 

2017, plaintiff was informed that this grievance had been screened at the first level and was being 

returned to him for an explanation as to how this grievance was not a duplicate of Grievance No. 

SVSP-L-17-3734. Dkt. No. 47-4 at 56. In a CDC Form 695 dated July 14, 2017, plaintiff was 

informed that this grievance had been cancelled as duplicative of Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-3734, 

pursuant to Section 3084.6(c)(2) of the California Code of Regulations, Title 15. Dkt. No. 47-4 at 

57. The CDC Form 695 contained the form language described supra. Dkt. No. 45-7 at 57. 

There is no indication in the record that plaintiff filed a separate grievance challenging this 

cancellation.

Grievance No. SVSP-L-12-4267. On July 19, 2017, plaintiff submitted Grievance No. 

SVSP-L-12-4267, which he titled “unprofessional/duties.” In this grievance, he alleged that on 

April 2, 2017, he was battered by inmate Carr and was forced to sign a marriage chrono; that 

Sergeant Alvarez did not provide him with medical treatment or an incident report on April 2, 

2017; and that the following day, inmate Carr attacked him again resulting in a broken jaw. 

Lomeli Decl., Ex. H. Plaintiff requested that the officer be retrained, and that the officer learn 

how to deal with battery and learn to not treat battery as mutual combat. Lomeli Decl., Ex. H. In 

a CDC Form 695 dated July 21, 2017, plaintiff was informed that his grievance had been screened 

at the second level and was being returned to him to explain why he did not submit a grievance 

regarding the April 2, 2017 incident within thirty days of the incident occurring. Dkt. No. 47-4 at 

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67. Plaintiff responded that the delayed submission was not his fault because he had to request

and obtain his classification records. Id. In a CDC Form 695 dated July 31, 2017, plaintiff was 

informed that his grievance had been cancelled pursuant to Section 3084.6(c)(4) in that he had 

exceeded the time limits for grieving that incident. Dkt. No. 47-4 at 68. Plaintiff was further 

informed that Section 3084.3(b) provides that an inmate should not delay submitting a grievance 

within the thirty day period due to failure to obtain supporting documentation, but should instead 

submit the grievance with all available supporting documentation and explain in Part B of the 

grievance form why the remaining supporting documents were unavailable. Dkt. No. 47-4 at 68. 

The CDC Form 695 contained the form language described supra. Dkt. No. 45-7 at 68.

On August 10, 2017, Plaintiff appealed this cancellation to the Office of Appeals, seeking 

a third-level review, stating as follows:

This cancellation is erroneous and the nature of the subject matter (extremely serious) 

should be given departmental review – please review at the third level of review.

Dkt. No. 47-7 at 18. The Office of Appeals returned the grievance to Plaintiff with a CDC Form 

695 dated September 18, 2017, which stated as follows:

It has been determined that you are attempting to submit an appeal that has previously been 

cancelled. Pursuant to CCR 3084.4 you are advised that this is considered misuse or abuse 

of the appeals process. Repeated violations may lead to your being placed on appeal 

restriction as described in CCR 3084.4(g).

Pursuant to CCR 3084.6(e), once an appeal has been cancelled, that appeal may not be 

resubmitted. However, a separate appeal can be filed on the cancellation decision. The 

original appeal may only be resubmitted if the appeal on the cancellation is granted. You 

have 30 calendar days to appeal the cancellation. You must submit your appeal to the 

appeals office that issued the cancellation. Time constraints begin from the date on the 

screen out form which cancelled your appeal.

Dkt. No. 47-7 at 22. 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies. Dkt. No. 47. Plaintiff argues that administrative remedies 

were effectively unavailable to him because he attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies 

through at least six separate grievances, all of which were screened out for a “myriad of 

unjustified reasons.” Dkt. No. 51 at 2-6. 

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Defendants also argue that Defendants Vargas and Alvarez are entitled to summary 

judgment on plaintiff’s claim for retaliation and civil conspiracy because the undisputed facts 

show that neither defendant took adverse action against plaintiff; that Defendants Vargas and 

Alvarez are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference to his 

safety because the undisputed facts show that they did not know that inmate Carr planned to 

assault plaintiff; and that all defendants were not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious 

medical needs. Dkt. No. 47.

Plaintiff disputes defendants’ assertion that he suffered no serious injuries from the April 

2, 2017 assault, stating that the initial assault left him with a visible black eye, swollen and 

discolored jaw, inability to open and close his jaw, severe headache and vision difficulties. 

Plaintiff further argues that Carr’s attack on him was coordinated by the Northern Riders gang and 

SVSP officers because soon after plaintiff informed Defendant Vargas that the Northern Riders 

claimed that the yard crew position sought by plaintiff was designated solely for Northern Riders 

members, the Northern Riders gang leader approached plaintiff and said, “why are you trying to 

get the homies’ yard crew job,” indicating that Defendant Vargas had spoken to the Northern 

Riders leader, and plaintiff was attacked soon thereafter by a Northern Riders member. Dkt. No. 

51.

A. Summary Judgment Standard 

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show there is 

“no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2014). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the 

case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material 

fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party. See id.

A court shall grant summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 

party will bear the burden of proof at trial [,] . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”

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See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The moving party bears the initial 

burden of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the 

pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, ‘designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See 

id. at 324 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party must show more than “the mere 

existence of a scintilla of evidence.” In re Oracle Corp Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252). “In fact, the non-moving party must come forth 

with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party’s 

favor.” Id. (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252). If the nonmoving party fails to make this 

showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp, 477 U.S. at 

323. 

For purposes of summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party; if the evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with 

evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the court must assume the truth of the evidence 

submitted by the nonmoving party. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations or 

weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., v. 

Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

B. Exhaustion

1. Legal Standard for Exhaustion 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) 

(“PLRA”), amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect 

to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in 

any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory and no longer left to the discretion of 

the district court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006). Courts may not create their own 

“special circumstances” exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 

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1856 (2016) (reversing Fourth Circuit’s ruling that failure to exhaust was justified where prisoner 

reasonably but mistakenly believed he had exhausted administrative remedies). 

A prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing his suit to federal court, 

even if the prisoner fully exhausts while the suit is pending. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 

1199 (9th Cir. 2002); see Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (where 

administrative remedies are not exhausted before prisoner sends complaint to court, action will be 

dismissed even if exhaustion is completed by time complaint is filed). Prisoners must exhaust all 

available remedies, regardless of whether the remedies meet federal standards or whether the 

remedies are plain, speedy and effective. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002); see also 

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 84. 

Proper exhaustion requires using all steps of an administrative process and complying with 

“deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. The level of detail in 

an administrative grievance necessary to properly exhaust a claim is determined by the prison’s 

applicable grievance procedures. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); see also Sapp v. 

Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 824 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To provide adequate notice, the prisoner need only 

provide the level of detail required by the prison’s regulations.”). 

The defendant’s burden is to prove that there was an available administrative remedy and 

that the prisoner did not exhaust that available administrative remedy. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 

1162, 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment 

to defendants on exhaustion issue because defendants did not carry their initial burden of proving 

that there was an available administrative remedy that prisoner-plaintiff failed to exhaust); see also 

Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2005) (there can be no absence of exhaustion 

unless some relief remains available; movant claiming lack of exhaustion must demonstrate that 

pertinent relief remained available, whether at unexhausted levels or through awaiting results of 

relief already granted as result of administrative remedy process). Once the defendant has carried 

the burden of proving that the prisoner did not exhaust the administrative remedy, the burden 

shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his 

particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively 

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unavailable to him. Id; see also Draper v. Rosario, 836 F.3d 1072, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2016). 

The Supreme Court has identified three circumstances where an administrative remedy is 

unavailable. Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859. First, “an administrative procedure is unavailable when 

(despite what regulations or guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end—

with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates.” Id.

(offering as example prison handbook “directing inmates to submit their grievances to a particular 

administrative office—but in practice that office disclaims the capacity to consider those 

petitions”). Second, “an administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically 

speaking, incapable of use.” Id. (offering as example situation where “some mechanism exists to 

provide relief, but no ordinary person can discern or navigate it”). Third, an administrative 

remedy is not available “when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a 

grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 1863 (citing as 

examples Woodford, 548 U.S. at 102, and various appellate court cases addressing “a variety of 

instances in which officials misled or threatened individual inmates so as to prevent their use of 

otherwise proper procedures”). The Ross court describes these categories as “three kinds of 

circumstances,” and does not suggest that these categories are exclusive. Id. at 1859.

2. Analysis 

Plaintiff does not dispute that he failed to exhaust CDCR’s administrative remedies for the 

claims raised in this action. Dkt. No. 51 at 3. Accordingly, the Court considers whether Plaintiff 

has carried his burden of providing evidence from which it can be reasonably inferred that there is 

something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative 

remedies effectively unavailable to him. The Court must first determine which grievances raised 

the claims in this action and whether the grievances submitted after plaintiff initiated this action 

can be considered for purposes of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.

a) Relevant Grievances

Plaintiff claims that he submitted six different grievances regarding the claims raised in 

this action, but only identifies three grievances: Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-03734 (submitted 

June 18, 2017), Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-03746 (submitted June 26, 2017), and Grievance No. 

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SVSP-L-17-04267 (submitted June 19, 2017). Dkt. No. 51 at 3–5. The Court’s review of the 

record indicates that plaintiff submitted four grievances related to the claims in this action — the 

three grievances identified by plaintiff and Grievance No. CMC-E 17-00986 / SVSP-L-17-02138 

(submitted April 20, 2017). Only Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02138 was filed prior to 

commencing this action.

The Ninth Circuit has clearly held that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement requires presuit

exhaustion even if there is exhaustion while the suit is pending:

Section 1997e(a) specifies that “[n]o action shall be brought ... until ... available remedies 

are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Under this provision, no claim may be pursued in 

court unless the prisoner has given the prison authorities an opportunity to consider 

providing some relief regarding the facts underlying the grievance. See Booth v. Churner, 

532 U.S. 731, 736 (2001). That requirement necessarily applies to all claims alleged . . . 

Also, a district court must dismiss a case without prejudice “when there is no presuit 

exhaustion,” even if there is exhaustion while suit is pending. McKinney v. Carey, 311 

F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (emphasis added).

Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005). There is an exception to the presuit 

exhaustion requirement. Where an amended complaint alleges new claims that were not 

exhausted prior to bringing the action, the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is met for the newly 

added claims as long as the new claims were exhausted prior to the filing of the amended 

complaint. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 2014). However, this exception 

does not apply here because the claims at issue in this action were alleged in the initial complaint, 

and not raised for the first time in the amended complaint. The initial complaint alleged that 

defendants “staged” Carr’s assault on plaintiff and refused to provide him with medical care, in 

retaliation for plaintiff complaining about not being allowed to perform his job duties, in violation 

of the First and Eighth Amendments, and as an act of conspiracy. Dkt. No. 1 at 4, 6, 8, 10–16; 

Dkt. No. 16. The amended complaint again raised these same claims. Dkt. Nos. 19 and 21. The 

primary difference between the initial complaint and the amended complaint is that the amended 

complaint omits certain claims which the Court had informed plaintiff were either deficient or not 

cognizable. Dkt. Nos. 1, 16, 19 and 21. Accordingly, in considering whether Plaintiff satisfied 

the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, the Court may only consider Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-

02138. 

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b) Claims Raised by Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02138

Plaintiff has raised four claims against Defendants Vargas and Alvarez in this action: 

(1) in retaliation for plaintiff stating that he would file a grievance against Defendant Vargas, 

Defendants Vargas and Alvarez ordered inmate Carr to attack plaintiff and denied plaintiff 

medical treatment on April 2, 2017, in violation of his First Amendment right to access the courts;

(2) Defendants Vargas and Alvarez ordered inmate Carr to attack plaintiff, in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment prohibition on deliberate indifference to inmate safety; (3) Defendants Vargas 

and Alvarez denied plaintiff medical treatment on April 2, 2017, in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment prohibition on deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs; and 

(4) Defendants Vargas and Alvarez engaged in a civil conspiracy when they ordered inmate Carr 

to attack plaintiff. Plaintiff has raised only one claim against Defendant Garcia, that Defendant 

Garcia denied him medical treatment on April 2, 2017, in violation of the Eighth Amendment 

prohibition on deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. 

In one version of Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02138, plaintiff stated that on April 2 and 3, 

2017, he was assaulted by the same inmate, resulting in his jaw being broken on both sides. Dkt. 

No.47-4 at 29. In another version, he stated that he was the victim of great bodily injury, resulting 

in his jaw being broken on both sides. Dkt. No. 47-4 at 31. In both versions, Plaintiff requested 

compensation for his injury, and for pain and suffering. Dkt. No. 47-4 at 29, 31. Viewing 

Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02138 in the light most favorable to plaintiff, this grievance can be 

construed as alleging that prison officials are responsible for the assault suffered by plaintiff on 

April 2 and 3 because plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to compensation for the injuries 

suffered from the assault. However, the grievance does not mention being denied medical care, or 

attribute the broken jaw to anything but the assault. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims regarding the 

denial of medical treatment were not exhausted. The Court therefore GRANTS summary 

judgment in favor of Defendant Garcia for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because the 

only claim against Defendant Garcia is that he denied plaintiff medical attention on April 2, 2017. 

The Court also GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendants Vargas and Alvarez for 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to the following claims: Defendants 

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Vargas and Alvarez denied plaintiff medical treatment on April 2, 2017, in violation of plaintiff’s 

First Amendment right to access the courts without retaliation and in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment prohibition on deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. The 

Court now turns to whether plaintiff has met his burden of showing that the CDCR grievance 

process was unavailable with respect to Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02138. 

c) Availability of CDCR Grievance Process for SVSP-L-17-02138

Plaintiff does not directly address the rejection of Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02138. His 

opposition argues generally that correctional officials made the grievance process unavailable by 

screening out his grievances for unjustified reasons. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that prison 

officials rendered the administrative grievance process unavailable when they improperly rejected 

Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02138 for violating the time limits set forth in 3084.1(f) because there 

are “no statute of limitations within[] the [California Code of Regulations]; time limits are only 

directory,” citing to 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3000.5(f). Plaintiff’s argument fails because his 

construction of Section 3000.5(f) is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the regulation; would 

have the practical consequence of rendering pointless certain portions of the CDCR regulations; 

and would be inconsistent with the grievance system set forth in 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084 et seq.

The standard canons of statutory construction require a court to give words used in a 

regulation their plain and ordinary meaning. Malat v. Ridell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966). 

Additionally, in determining the meaning of a regulation, the court examines the language of the 

regulation, the legislative history, and the practical consequences of any suggested interpretation. 

United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401, 1403–04 (9th Cir. 1969). All ambiguities should be 

resolved in favor of an interpretation consistent with the statutory and regulatory scheme. See 

United Telecommunications, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 589 F.2d 1383, 1390 (10th Cir.

1978). Section 3000.5 states as follows:

The time limits specified in these regulations do not create a right to have the specified 

action taken within the time limits. The time limits are directory, and the failure to meet 

them does not preclude taking the specified action beyond the time limits.

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3000.5(f). Giving the words in Section 3000.5(f) their plain and ordinary 

meaning, Section 3000.5(f) applies to regulations which set forth actions that shall be taken by 

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prison officials and specifies a time limit for taking those actions. Section 3000.5 specifies that 

the regulations does not create a right, such as a due process right, to have that action taken within 

the time specified. Cf. Bejarano v. Best, No. 111CV00589LJODLBPC, 2016 WL 4247856, at *1 

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Bejarano v. Allison, 698 F. App’x 471 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(“[Section 3000.5(f)] affords discretion to prison officials to excuse non-compliance with 

regulatory deadlines . . .”). Plaintiff’s broad application of Section 3000.5(f) to all time limits set 

forth in Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations, Division 3, Chapter 1, Rules and 

Regulations of Adult Operations and Programs, misreads the plain text of Section 3000.5(f). 

Plaintiff’s reading of Section 3000.5(f) would also result in invalidating all time limits set forth in 

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084 et seq., thereby fundamentally altering the CDCR’s grievance process 

by removing limits on the number of grievances an inmate can file within specified time periods 

and by not requiring an inmate to grieve an incident promptly after its occurrence. The rejection 

of Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02138 for failing to wait fourteen days to file another grievance, as 

required by Sections 3084.1(f) and 3084.6(b)(3), did not violate Section 3000.5(f). 

Although the Court finds plaintiff’s argument unpersuasive, viewing the record in the light 

most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the 

CDCR grievance process was available to him with respect to Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02138. 

An administrative procedure is unavailable to an inmate when prison administrators thwart an 

inmate from taking advantage of the grievance process by applying the procedural rules to prevent 

an inmate from having his grievance heard on the merits. Cf. Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1863 

(administrative remedy available “when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking 

advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.”). 

Here, viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there is a triable issue of fact as to 

whether correctional officials thwarted plaintiff from using the CDCR administrative grievance 

process when they did not process Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02138 as a staff complaint. 

Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02138 was rejected for violating Section 3084.1(f), which limits an 

inmate to one grievance per fourteen day calendar period. However, pursuant to Section 3084.9(i)

of the California Code of Regulations, title 15, when an inmate submits a grievance challenging 

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staff misconduct, correctional staff shall screen the grievance to determine whether it should be 

processed as a staff complaint appeal inquiry, which is considered an exception to the regular 

grievance process. Because staff complaints are an exception to the regular grievance process, 

they are not subject to the grievance limits set forth in Section 3084.1(f). In other words, if 

Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02138 had been designated a staff complaint, it would not have 

violated Section 3084.1(f). Section 3084(g) defines “staff misconduct” as “staff behavior that 

violates or is contrary to law, regulation, policy, procedure, or an ethical or professional standard.” 

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084(g). 

Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02138 could be 

construed as a staff complaint because it blamed prison officials for the assault suffered by 

plaintiff on April 2 and 3, 2017. Defendants argue that correctional officials correctly declined to 

categorize Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02138 as a staff complaint because it did not mention names 

of any SVSP staff. However, Section 3084.9(i) does not specify that a grievance must identify 

correctional staff by name to be categorized as a staff complaint. And although Section 

3084.2(a)(3)-(4) instructs inmates submitting grievances to identify staff members by last name, 

first initial, time or position, the failure to do so is not a basis for cancelling or rejecting a 

grievance.

Accordingly, viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds that 

Defendants have not demonstrated that there is no triable issue of fact as to whether the rejection 

of Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02138 as violating Section 3084.1(f) rendered the CDCR 

administrative grievance process unavailable to plaintiff. Where material facts regarding 

exhaustion are disputed, summary judgment on exhaustion grounds should be denied, and the 

district judge should determine the disputed facts. Albino, 747 F.3d 1166. However, here the 

Court declines to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding whether the rejection of Grievance No. 

SVSP-L-17-02138 as violating Section 3084.1(f) rendered the CDCR administrative grievance 

process unavailable to plaintiff because, as discussed infra, the record shows that plaintiff’s 

remaining claims against Defendant Vargas and Alvarez fail on the merits.

C. Remaining Claims Against Defendants Vargas and Alvarez

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Assuming arguendo that the rejection of Grievance No. SVSP-L-17-02138 rendered 

plaintiff’s administrative remedies unavailable to him, the claims remaining in this action are 

(1) Defendants Vargas and Alvarez ordered inmate Carr to attack plaintiff in retaliation for 

plaintiff stating that he would file a grievance against Defendant Vargas; (2) Defendants Vargas 

and Alvarez ordered inmate Carr to attack plaintiff, in violation of the Eighth Amendment 

prohibition on deliberate indifference to inmate safety; and (3) Defendants Vargas and Alvarez 

engaged in a civil conspiracy when they ordered inmate Carr to attack plaintiff. 

Plaintiff’s claims turn on his allegation that Defendants Vargas and Alvarez ordered inmate 

Carr to attack plaintiff. But Plaintiff proffers no direct evidence to support his allegation and the 

indirect evidence he proffers is purely speculative. In support of his allegation, he alleges that 

from January to April 2017, correctional officers stationed at SVSP Facility D, Yard D2, 

consistently showed favoritism to the Northern Riders prison gang which assisted the Northern 

Riders in recruiting members; in the months prior to the assault, Defendant Vargas regularly 

refused to allow plaintiff to perform his job duties; he informed Defendant Vargas that he would 

file a grievance regarding Defendant Vargas’s refusal; and after he spoke with Defendant Vargas 

about switching from second watch porter to Facility D2 yard crew, a position reserved by the 

Northern Riders for their members, the Northern Riders gang leader reproached him for trying to 

take a Northern Riders job. Assuming these allegations to be true, these allegations are 

insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Carr attacked plaintiff at Defendant Vargas 

or Defendant Alvarez’s direction. Nothing in the record indicates that Carr is a Northern Rider 

gang member or otherwise explains why Carr would act on behalf of the Northern Riders and/or 

Defendants Vargas and Alvarez. Plaintiff also does not proffer any evidence that Defendant 

Alvarez knew of plaintiff’s statement that he would file a grievance against Defendant Vargas. 

“[M]ere allegation and speculation do not create a factual dispute for purposes of summary 

judgment.” See Nelson v. Pima Community College, 83 F.3d 1075, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine dispute as to whether Defendants Vargas and Alvarez 

order inmate Carr to attack him. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of 

Defendants Vargas and Alvarez on the remaining claims.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

The Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds of non-exhaustion 

with respect to the following claims: Defendant Garcia denied plaintiff medical attention on April 

2, 2017; and Defendants Vargas and Alvarez denied plaintiff medical treatment on April 2, 2017, 

in violation of plaintiff’s First Amendment right to access the courts without retaliation and in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious 

medical needs. These claims are therefore dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. The Court grants summary judgment in favor of defendants with respect 

to the following claims on the grounds that there is no triable issue of fact as to whether 

Defendants Vargas and Alvarez ordered inmate Carr to attack plaintiff: (1) Defendants Vargas 

and Alvarez ordered inmate Carr to attack plaintiff in retaliation for plaintiff stating that he would 

file a grievance against Defendant Vargas; (2) Defendants Vargas and Alvarez ordered inmate 

Carr to attack plaintiff, in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on deliberate 

indifference to inmate safety; and (3) Defendants Vargas and Alvarez engaged in a civil 

conspiracy when they ordered inmate Carr to attack plaintiff. These claims are therefore 

dismissed with prejudice.

The Court shall terminate all pending motions, enter judgment in favor of defendants, and 

close the file. 

This order terminates Dkt. No. 47.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/30/2019

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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