Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00500/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00500-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 11cv0500

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOBY THOMPSON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv0500 DMS (CAB)

vs. ORDER (1) DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND (2)

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Docket Nos. 14, 15]

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Toby L. Thompson (“Plaintiff”) moves for reversal of Defendant’s decision to deny him

disability and social security benefits. Defendant Michael J. Astrue, in his capacity as Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration, opposes Plaintiff’s motion and cross-moves for summary

judgment. Plaintiff did not file an opposition to Defendant’s motion, and neither side filed reply briefs.

In his motion, Plaintiff argues the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed to provide legally sufficient

reasons to reject Plaintiff’s testimony. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment, and grants Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a 43-year old male who was involved in a severe motorcycle accident when he was

17 years old. (Administrative Record (“AR”) at 92.) Plaintiff was riding a motorcycle at a high speed

Case 3:11-cv-00500-DMS-CAB Document 17 Filed 01/17/12 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 11cv0500

when he broadsided a van. (Id. at 261.) Plaintiff was wearing a helmet, but nevertheless sustained a

severe head injury, among other physical injuries. (Id.) Plaintiff has held various, intermittent jobs

since his accident.

On May 28, 2009, filed an application for disability benefits and an application for supplemental

security income alleging a disability onset date of March 19, 2009. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff alleged he was

disabled due to the traumatic brain injury he suffered in the motorcycle accident. (Id. at 170.)

Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially, (id. at 54-58), and again upon reconsideration. (Id. at 65-69.) 

Plaintiff thereafter filed a request for hearing by an ALJ. (Id. at 71.) ALJ Edward D. Steinman

held a hearing on August 13, 2010. (Id. at 10) Attorney David Shore represented Plaintiff at the

hearing. The ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff, medical expert Kent Layton, Psy.D., and vocational

expert, Dr. Mary Jesko. On August 23, 2010, ALJ Steinman issued a written decision finding Plaintiff

not disabled. (Id. at 10-17.) Plaintiff filed a request for review of that decision, (id. at 5), which the

Appeals Council denied on December 9, 2010. (Id. at 2-4.) Plaintiff filed the present case on March

15, 2011.

II.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in his assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility. Plaintiff asserts this

error warrants reversal and remand for an award of benefits. Defendant disputes there was error, and

asserts that even if there was, Plaintiff’s case should be remanded for further proceedings, not an award

of benefits. 

A. Legal Standard

Under the Social Security Act, “disability” is defined as the: 

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of

not less than twelve months.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The impairment must be so severe that the claimant “is not only unable to

do his previous work but cannot . . . engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(2)(A). In addition, the impairment must result “from anatomical, physiological, or

Case 3:11-cv-00500-DMS-CAB Document 17 Filed 01/17/12 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 11cv0500

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

A court cannot set aside a denial of benefits unless the Commissioner’s findings are based upon

legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989); Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th

Cir. 1986); Taylor v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales,

402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1995). It is more than a scintilla

but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). 

To determine whether substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s decision, a court reviews

the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the decision of the ALJ. Walker v. Matthews,

546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1976). A court may not affirm the Commissioner’s decision simply by

isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1989). In short, a court must weigh the evidence that supports the Commissioner’s conclusions and that

which does not. Martinez, 807 F.2d at 772.

If there is substantial evidence to support the decision of the ALJ, the decision must be upheld

even when there is evidence on the other side, Hall v. Secretary, 602 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979),

and even when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. Gallant v. Heckler,

753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). If supported by substantial evidence, the findings of the

Commissioner as to any fact will be conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Vidal v. Harris, 637 F.2d 710, 712

(9th Cir. 1981).

B. Claimant Testimony

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting

Plaintiff’s testimony. “To determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or

symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. First, the ALJ must determine

whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which

could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Lingenfelter v. Astrue,

504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991)

Case 3:11-cv-00500-DMS-CAB Document 17 Filed 01/17/12 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 11cv0500

(en banc)). If the claimant satisfies this first element, “and there is no evidence of malingering, ‘the ALJ

can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear

and convincing reasons for doing so.’” Id. at 1036 (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th

Cir. 1996)).

Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff had met the first element. (See AR at 15) (“After careful

consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s medically determinable

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms[.]”) However, he rejected

Plaintiff’s credibility for two reasons. (Id.) First, the ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s work history, during

which Plaintiff was “not sheltered, and ... given no special consideration.” (Id.) The ALJ also noted

Plaintiff held his last job for two years. (Id.) Work history is an appropriate consideration in evaluating

the claimant’s subjective symptom testimony. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) (listing prior work record

as factor that may be considered in evaluating intensity and persistence of symptoms). Thus, this reason

supports the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s testimony. 

Second, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff “is independent in his activities of daily living.” (Id.)

Those activities included driving to the library and a career center, where Plaintiff used a computer to

look for work. (Id.) “The ALJ was permitted to consider daily living activities in his credibility

analysis.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). As the Ninth Circuit has explained,

“if a claimant engages in numerous daily activities involving skills that could be transferred to the

workplace, the ALJ may discredit the claimant’s allegations upon making specific findings relating to

those activities.” Id. Thus, this evidence also supports the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s subjective

testimony about his symptoms. 

In sum, the ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s

testimony. Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary does not warrant reversal or remand. 

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED, and

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:11-cv-00500-DMS-CAB Document 17 Filed 01/17/12 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 11cv0500

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter judgment

accordingly, and terminate this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 17, 2012

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

Case 3:11-cv-00500-DMS-CAB Document 17 Filed 01/17/12 Page 5 of 5