Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02914/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02914-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332pl Diversity-Product Liability

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BROCK MATHIS; MICHELLE 

MATHIS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MILGARD MANUFACTURING, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-02914-BEN-JLB

ORDER:

(1) DENYING WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE 

EXPERT TESTIMONY; 

(2) GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ EX 

PARTE MOTION TO FILE SURREPLY; and

(3) GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Brock Mathis and Michelle Mathis1 bring this products liability action to 

recover damages arising out of injuries Mr. Mathis sustained during an accident 

 

1 The Court shall individually refer to Brock Mathis as “Mr. Mathis” and Michelle 

Mathis as “Mrs. Mathis.”

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involving the failed installation of an “Ultra Fiberglass 123” x 60” clear tampered [sic] 

window” (hereinafter “the Subject Window”) manufactured by Defendant Milgard 

Manufacturing, Inc. (“Milgard”). (Docket No. 1-2, Compl. at p. 5.)2 Plaintiffs assert

Milgard is liable for Mr. Mathis’s injuries under California state-law theories of strict 

liability, negligence, and breach of implied warranty, as well as Mrs. Mathis’s alleged 

resulting loss of consortium. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 30, 2016, Defendant removed Plaintiffs’ lawsuit from the Superior 

Court of California to this Court. (Docket No. 1.) Now pending is Defendant’s motion 

for summary judgment, or in the alternative, partial summary judgment.3 (Docket No. 

36.) The motion is fully briefed.4 For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion is 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND5

Mr. Mathis is the owner of BPM Builders, Inc. (“BPM”). (Docket No. 36-11, 

Def.’s Notice of Lodgment in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“DNOL”), Ex. G, Dep. of 

 

2 Except for the excerpts of deposition testimony, the Court’s reference to page 

numbers shall be to the page number generated by the CM/ECF system.

3

In conjunction with its motion for summary judgment, Defendant filed a motion 

in limine to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert witness, David Rondinone, Ph.D. 

(“Dr. Rondinone”). (Docket No. 37.) The motion is fully briefed. Based on the Court’s 

review of the parties’ briefings, it appears Dr. Rondinone’s testimony is admissible for 

purposes of evaluating Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Therefore, 

Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude Dr. Rondinone’s testimony is DENIED without 

prejudice to re-raising the issue of admissibility at trial.

4 Plaintiffs’ filed an ex parte motion to file a sur-reply, to which Defendant 

objected. (See Docket Nos. 52-54, 56.) Because the Court finds the interests of justice 

and judicial economy favor consideration of Plaintiffs’ sur-reply, Defendant’s objections 

are OVERRULED, and Plaintiffs’ ex parte motion is GRANTED. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.

5 The Court’s reference to certain pieces of evidence is not an indication that it is 

the only pertinent evidence relied on or considered by the Court. The Court has reviewed

and considered all the admissible evidence submitted by the parties.

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Brock Mathis (“Mathis Dep.”) at pp. 29:15-18, 31:11-18.) Since 2002, Mr. Mathis has 

been a California licensed general contractor, either individually or through BPM. (Id. at 

pp. 29:4-30:1, 31:2-4.) For the past four years, BPM’s business has primarily involved 

upscale residential remodeling construction. (Id. at pp. 3:5-23, 50:20-51:3.) 

On April 18, 2016, Mr. Mathis authorized BPM’s purchase of the Subject Window

from a Dixieline Lumber Co. sales representative. (Id. at pp. 40:11-18, 51:16-52:21 & 

Mathis Dep. Ex. 4.) The Subject Window was intended to be installed on the second 

floor addition as part of a remodel of Mr. Mathis’s father’s home, which also served, and 

continues to serve, as Plaintiffs’ present residence and BPM’s address. (Mathis Dep. at 

pp. 7:21-24, 31:19-25, 34:3-39:4.)

On May 31, 2016, Mr. Mathis attempted to install the Subject Window with his 

two general laborer employees, Denis and Walter. (Id. at pp. 25: 6-2, 58:21-59:5.) In 

essence, Plaintiffs allege that during the attempted installation, the Subject Window 

frame bent, flexed, buckled and/or bowed such that it fell into the intended window 

opening, and its flanges folded, buckled, and/or got unintentionally locked into the

opening, at which point the Subject Window became stuck. Ultimately, as Mr. Mathis, 

Denis, and Walter tried to dislodge the Subject Window, it swung back and knocked 

them off the scaffold they were standing on. (Id. at pp. 116:7-119:20, 136:2-24, 138:3-

139:24; see also DNOL Ex. D, Mr. Mathis’s Resp. to Interrog. No. 1; Ex. E, Mr.

Mathis’s Supp. Resp. to Interrog. No. 1 (“The [Subject Window] was structurally 

unsound, did not maintain its form during installation resulting in its collapse, thereby 

pushing [Mr. Mathis] and this co-workers off the scaffold.”).)

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A fact is 

material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 248. “Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be 

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counted.” Id. A dispute is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. In considering a summary judgment 

motion, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are 

to be drawn in his or her favor. Id. at 255. 

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing there are no genuine issues 

of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It can do so by 

negating an essential element of the non-moving party’s case, or by showing that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. The burden 

then shifts to the non-moving party to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. As 

a general rule, the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” will be insufficient to raise 

a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. There must be evidence on 

which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Id. 

DISCUSSION

A. Products Liability Claims

In California, “[p]roducts liability may be premised upon a theory of design defect, 

manufacturing defect, or failure to warn.” Trejo v. Johnson & Johnson, 13 Cal. App. 5th 

110, 125 (2017) (citing Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 

995 (1991)). Each of these theories in turn may be advanced under a theory of strict 

liability or negligence (or both), which require a plaintiff to prove that a defect caused the 

plaintiff’s injury. Id., 13 Cal. App. 5th at 125 (citations omitted in original). 

A plaintiff seeking recovery for a manufacturing or design defect under a theory of

negligence must also prove an additional element: “that the defect in the product was due 

to negligence of the defendant.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 995-96) (internal 

citations omitted in original). However, this additional element is not required in the 

context of a failure to warn claim, where “there is little functional difference between the 

two theories.” Johnson v. Am. Standard, Inc., 43 Cal. 4th 56, 71-72 (2008) (citing Cupp 

& Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical 

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Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 874 (2002)) (“[noting there is little substantive distinction 

between negligence and strict liability causes of action in the failure to warn context].”). 

Defendant’s motion argues summary judgment is appropriate under any theory of 

products liability. As will be discussed in further detail below, the Court has considered 

each of Plaintiffs’ potential6claims and, with the exception of a manufacturing defect 

claim, the Court disagrees.

1. Manufacturing Defect

Under California law, “[a] product has a manufacturing defect if it differs from the 

manufacturer’s intended result or from other ostensibly identical units of the same 

product line.” Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 214 Cal. App. 4th 173, 190 

(2013) (citing Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429 (1978). “In other words, a 

product has a manufacturing defect if the product as manufactured does not conform to 

the manufacturer’s design.” Id. at 190 (citing In re Coordinated Latex Glove Litig., 99 

Cal. App. 4th 594, 607 (2002)). 

Defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment on this claim because “there 

is no dispute that Summary Judgment on any alleged manufacturing defect should be 

granted.” (Mot. at p. 11.) To support its argument, Defendant offers evidence that 

Plaintiffs only seek to advance their claims under “design defect” and “failure to warn” 

theories. (See DNOL, Ex. D, Mr. Mathis’s Resp. to Interrog. No. 1; Ex. E, Mr. Mathis’s 

Supp. Resp. to Interog. No. 1.) Additionally, Defendant submitted an excerpt from the 

deposition testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr. Rondinone, wherein Dr. 

Rondinone testified that he would not be offering an opinion that the Subject Window 

 

6 Plaintiffs’ Complaint consists of a “form complaint” approved by the Judicial 

Council of California. (See Docket No. 1-2.) Due to the brevity of the Complaint’s 

factual allegations, the Court construes Plaintiffs’ pleading as seeking recovery under all 

potential theories. Therefore, the Court’s analysis of Defendant’s summary judgment 

motion considers whether there is a genuine issue of material fact based on the admissible 

evidence submitted by the parties in support of their respective positions.

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“was not built as it was designed to be built.” (See DNOL, Ex. J, Dep. of David 

Rondinone (“Rondinone Dep.”) at p. 141:2-6.) 

Plaintiffs’ opposition did not respond to Defendant’s arguments or otherwise argue 

the viability of a manufacturing defect claim.7 The Court concludes that Plaintiffs 

concede Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Moreover, because it 

appears to the Court that there is no triable issue of material fact, Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ manufacturing defect claim is GRANTED. 

2. Design Defect

California law permits a plaintiff to prove a product’s design defect “under either

of two alternative tests – the consumer expectations test or the risk-benefit test.” Demara 

v. Raymond Corp., 13 Cal. App. 5th 545, 553 (2017) (citing Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 418, 

432, 435) (emphasis in original omitted). Under the consumer expectations test, a 

product is defective in design “if the product fails to perform as safely as an ordinary 

consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.” 

Garrett, 214 Cal. App. 4th at 182 (citing Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 418). Under the riskbenefit test, a product is defective in design “if the benefits of the design do not outweigh 

the risk of danger inherent in the design.” Id. 

The tests are not mutually exclusive; “depending on the facts and circumstances of 

the case, both may be presented to the trier of fact in the same case.” Demara, 13 Cal. 

App. 5th at 554 (citing Saller v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 187 Cal. App. 4th 1220, 

1232 (2010); Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 418, 430, 435). Both tests require a plaintiff to 

establish that “the product’s failure to perform safely was a substantial factor in causing” 

the plaintiff’s alleged harm. Id., 13 Cal. App. 5th at 554. “A substantial factor in causing 

 

7 Notably, although Plaintiffs’ sur-reply disputes Defendant’s argument that they 

conceded the applicability of the consumer expectations test, which will be discussed,

infra, it does not dispute Defendant’s contention that Plaintiffs impliedly concede 

summary judgment should be granted on the manufacturing defect claim. (See Docket 

No. 52.) 

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harm is a factor that a reasonable person would consider to have contributed to the harm.” 

It must be more than a remote or trivial factor. It does not have to be the only cause of 

the harm.” Id. at 554-55 (quoting CACI No. 430).

i. Consumer Expectations Test

Defendant argues the consumer expectations test is not applicable to the facts of 

Plaintiffs’ case because the asserted design defect, i.e., that the Subject Window was 

structurally unsound, “does not involve minimum safety standards a consumer might 

expect.” (Mot. at p. 13.) Defendant contends, without citing to any authority, that an 

ordinary consumer’s experience is limited to “installed window products,” not windows 

in their “uninstalled state.” (Id.) As a result, Defendant argues, “the ordinary consumer 

cannot reasonably form minimum safety expectations about the degree of rigidity an 

uninstalled window should have,” and the Court should decline to find the test applicable 

to this case. (Id.) 

Curiously, the only evidence Defendant cites to support its conclusion is Dr. 

Rondinone’s testimony, which it unsuccessfully moved to exclude. (See Mot. at p. 13.) 

Defendant suggests that because Dr. Rondinone testified that “absolute rigidity is not 

possible,” it follows that “flexibility is not a per se defect and the degree of flexibility to 

which a pre-installed window is susceptible is not a subject on which an ordinary 

consumer can form minimum safety expectations.” (Id.) (citing DNOL, Ex. J, Rondinone 

Dep. at p. 109:10-14.) However, it is not clear to the Court how acknowledging that 

“absolute rigidity is not possible” prevents an ordinary consumer from forming minimum 

safety expectations about the Subject Window or other similar windows. Additionally, 

based on Plaintiffs’ Complaint and the submitted discovery responses, it is not clear to 

the Court that Plaintiffs’ design defect claim is ultimately based on the Subject Window’s 

lack of “absolute rigidity.” 

In short, the Court is unpersuaded by Defendant’s conclusory assumptions about 

the ordinary consumer’s experience with window products similar to the Subject 

Window, and declines to find the consumer expectations test inapplicable to this case. 

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Since Defendant did not offer any alternative argument or evidence as to why it is 

entitled to summary judgment even if the consumer expectations test applied, the Court 

need not resolve this question.

ii. Risk-Benefit Test

Defendant further argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 

design defect claim because Plaintiffs cannot establish a genuine issue of material fact 

that the Subject Window is defectively designed. Defendant’s argument primarily relies 

on its assumption that Dr. Rondinone’s testimony and expert report would be excluded. 

However, as discussed above, the Court concluded this evidence is admissible. Thus, it 

appears a genuine issue of material fact exists because Defendant represents that Dr. 

Rondinone opines that the Subject Window “was defective in design because it ‘was 

sufficiently flexible to allow it to bend in a manner that was unsafe,’” and that “the 

design of the Subject Window was a cause of [Mr. Mathis’s] injury.” (Mot. at p. 15) 

(citing DNOL, Ex. F, Dr. Rondinone’s Expert Report at p. 7.) Accordingly, Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ design defect claim must be DENIED.

3. Failure to Warn

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ failure to warn claim 

also fails. First, Defendant again relies on its assumption that Dr. Rondinone’s testimony 

and report are inadmissible. But as Defendant acknowledges, Dr. Rondinone’s opinions 

create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant should have warned 

Plaintiffs of the risk, harm, or danger created by the Subject Window. (See Mot. at p. 21 

) (“Dr. Rondinone opines that there were no specific instructions provided to the installer 

on the required support of the Subject Window during installation and that there were no 

warnings that the Subject Window was sufficiently flexible to bend to an equivalent 

length shorter than the designed opening for the window.”) (quoting DNOL, Ex. F. Dr. 

Rondinone’s Expert Report at p. 7.) 

Second, Defendant alternatively argues it is entitled to summary judgment because 

Mr. Mathis is a “sophisticated user,” and thus barred from raising a failure to warn claim. 

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California law recognizes the “sophisticated user defense,” whereby “[a] manufacturer is 

not liable to a sophisticated user of its product for failure to warn of a risk, harm, or 

danger, if the sophisticated user knew or should have known of that risk, harm, or 

danger.” Johnson, supra, 43 Cal. 4th at 70-71. “[U]nder the sophisticated user defense, 

the inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff knew, or should have known, of the particular 

risk of harm from the product giving rise to the injury.” Id. at 71.

The Court is not persuaded that the sophisticated user defense applies. Defendant 

fails to provide any evidence to support its conclusion that Mr. Mathis is a “sophisticated 

user” such that he should be barred from recovery under a failure to warn theory. 

Notably, Defendant never identifies what “risk, harm, or danger” Plaintiff knew, or 

should have known. Rather, Defendant suggests that because Mr. Mathis testified that he 

“has ‘a lot of experience’ installing windows, including windows the size of the Subject 

Window” and “knows the proper installation of a window ‘practically by heart,’” the 

Court should find he is a sophisticated user. However, Defendant does not offer any 

evidence to establish that a similar user would have been aware of the risk, harm, or 

danger Plaintiffs actually identify: that the Subject Window might not be sufficiently 

rigid such that it would bend in a manner that was unsafe. 

In sum, because the Court finds Defendant has not met its burden to prove no 

triable issue of material fact exists, its motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ failure 

to warn claim is DENIED.

C. Breach of Implied Warranty Claim

Next, Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ breach of implied 

warranty claim. Plaintiffs’ did not respond to this issue.8 The Court has reviewed the 

merits of Defendant’s arguments and agrees that summary judgment is appropriate.

 

8 Like the manufacturing defect claim, Plaintiffs’ sur-reply does not dispute

Defendant’s contention that Plaintiffs impliedly concede summary judgment should be 

granted on their implied warranty claim. (See n.7, supra.)

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California recognizes two types of implied warranties: (1) the Implied Warranty of 

Merchantability under California Commercial Code § 2314; and (2) the Implied

Warranty for Fitness of Purpose under California Commercial Code § 2315. Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint does not state whether their claim arises out of either or both of these sections. 

(See Docket No. 1-2 at p. 5.) In any event, both sections require that a plaintiff asserting 

breach of implied warranty stand in vertical contractual privity with the defendant. See 

Jones v. ConocoPhillips, 198 Cal. App. 4th 1187, 1201 (2011) (“As a general rule, a 

cause of action for breach of implied [or express] warranty requires privity of contract; 

‘there is no privity between the original seller and a subsequent purchaser who is in no 

way a party to the original sale.’”) (quoting Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 

682, 695 (1954); accord, Arnold v. Dow Chem. Co., 91 Cal. App. 4th 698, 720 (2001)). 

“A buyer and seller stand in privity if they are in adjoining links of the distribution 

chain.” Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 

Osborne v. Subaru of Am. Inc., 198 Cal. App. 3d 646, 656 n.6 (1988)). “[A]n end 

consumer . . . who buys from a retailer is not in privity with a manufacturer.” Id.

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs purchased the Subject Window from Dixieline 

Lumber Co., not Defendant. (Mathis Dep. at pp. 40:11-18, 51:16-52:11 & Mathis Dep. 

Ex. 4.) The Court’s research indicates that there are exceptions to the privity rule, but 

none appear to apply to the facts of this case. Clemens, 534 F.3d at 1023 (“Some 

particularized exceptions to the rule exist. The first arises when the plaintiff relies on 

written labels or advertisements of a manufacturer . . . The other exceptions arise in 

special cases involving foodstuffs, pesticides, and pharmaceuticals, and where the end 

user is an employee of the purchaser.”) (citing California state-court cases). Nor do

Plaintiffs offer any authority or arguments to support application of an exception. As a 

result, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have conceded the viability of this claim, and that 

there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute that Plaintiffs do not stand in vertical 

contractual privity with Defendant. Therefore, Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of implied warranty is GRANTED.

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D. Loss of Consortium Claim

Finally, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Mrs. Mathis’s loss of 

consortium claim must be denied because it completely relies on the Court’s grant of 

summary judgment as to each of Mr. Mathis’s claims, which did not occur. (See Mot. at 

p. 22.)

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is 

GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ products liability claim under a manufacturing defect theory 

and breach of implied warranty claim. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is 

DENIED as to Plaintiffs’ products liability claims (under both a design defect and a 

failure to warn theory), and loss of consortium claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 7, 2018

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