Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01658/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01658-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL JEROME MITCHELL,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SNOWDEN, SEATON, LARIOS, COMPTON,

ENGELLEMER, S. VANCE, JOHN/JANE

DOE,

Defendants.

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2:08-cv-01658-HDM(DAD)

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this

action. He seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has

requested authority to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915. 

I. In Forma Pauperis Application

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (#5) Accordingly, the request to

proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

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Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of

$350.00 for his application. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). 

Plaintiff wrote two letters to this court, dated March 2, 2009 and

March 15, 2009, requesting that a friend pay the entire filing fee

amount directly to the court. In an order dated April 2, 2009,

this court advised the plaintiff that “pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

the total in forma pauperis application fee is $350. Plaintiff

owes the full amount. Any such amount should be paid directly to

the clerk of court with certification made that the payment is on

plaintiff’s behalf and is to be applied to the filing fee.” (#10)

As instructed, a payment of $200 was made toward the filing fee on

plaintiff’s behalf. (#11) The remaining $150 balance is

forthcoming. (#11) If the remainder is not paid by Thursday, July

30, 2009, the court will direct the California Department of

Corrections to collect the remaining fee owed from plaintiff’s

prison trust account.

II. Relief Pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983

This court is required to screen complaints brought by

prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or

employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). This

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner

has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that

fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and (2), 1915(e)(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis

in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325

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(1989). Therefore, a court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where

it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the

factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327.

Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court applies the same standard

under Section 1915(e)(2) when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint

or amended complaint. Such review is a ruling on a question of

law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir.

2000). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only if it

is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in

support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See

Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making

this determination, the court takes as true all allegations of

material fact stated in the complaint, and construes them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp.,

74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations in a pro se

complaint are held to a less stringent standard than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-

21 (1972).

III. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff is a California state prisoner, housed at New Folsom

California State Prison in Sacramento, California. On March 17,

2007, plaintiff was assaulted by three other inmates during the

“P.M. (Evening) Day-Room” activities in an enclosed maximum

security mental health unit with approximately twenty other inmates

present. A minimum of two prison officers supervise the unit from

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a control tower. At least one officer must be present at the post

at all times. 

Plaintiff alleges he was attacked twice over a twenty-minute

period. The first assault lasted two minutes. The second assault

occurred approximately five minutes after the first and lasted

between fifteen and twenty minutes, during which plaintiff lost

consciousness. According to plaintiff, prison staff failed to

intervene during the attacks and failed to respond promptly

afterward. Plaintiff claims that corrections officers delayed

coming to his aid until after the conclusion of the day-room

activities. 

Plaintiff sustained several severe injuries from the assault

including a mandibular fracture, a compound tibula fracture, nasal

fracture, orbital fracture, the loss of two teeth (one which was

ingested into plaintiff’s lung), permanent brain damage, and

extensive psychological trauma including post traumatic stress

disorder. Plaintiff received medical treatment for his injuries,

but some of his injuries are permanent. Administrative action was

taken against plaintiff’s three inmate-assailants. 

Plaintiff names seven defendants in his complaint: Snowden,

Seaton, Larios, Compton, Engellemer, S. Vance, and John/Jane Doe. 

Plaintiff alleges the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment

rights by acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s health

and safety, which resulted in the March 17, 2007 attack on

plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks punitive and compensatory damages in

the amount of $1,000,000, or what the court may deem just and

proper.

All defendants are employed at New Folsom Prison. Defendants

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Snowden, Seaton, Larios, and Compton are corrections officers at

the prison. Defendant Engellemer is a corrections sergeant. 

Defendant S. Vance is a corrections captain. Defendant John/Jane

Doe is a corrections lieutenant. All defendants are being sued in

their individual capacities and are persons for purposes of § 1983.

See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319

F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003); DeNieva v. Reyes, 966 F.2d 480, 483

(9th Cir. 1992). Prison officials and corrections officers are not

entitled to absolute immunity. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434

U.S. 555, 561 (1978). In addition, in cases involving claims of

deliberate indifference to a prisoner being attacked by another

prisoner, defendant guards are denied qualified immunity. Rider v.

Louw, 957 F. Supp. 983 (E.D.Mich. 1997). Thus, all defendants are

subject to monetary damages.

Plaintiff’s specific allegations as to each defendant are as

follows. Plaintiff alleges defendant Snowden was aware plaintiff’s

assailants were planning to attack an inmate during the day-room

activities on March 17, 2007. Plaintiff also alleges defendant

Snowden was aware of prior attacks on other inmates by two of

plaintiff’s assailants, but failed to report those attacks. 

Plaintiff claims that defendant Snowden knew unit staff relied on

his reporting of any acts of violence or assaultive behavior that

would impact the security in the unit. Finally, plaintiff claims

defendant Snowden was the officer assigned to the control tower on

March 17, 2007. Plaintiff alleges that at no time did defendant

Snowden intervene or act to protect plaintiff during the attacks. 

Plaintiff alleges defendant Seaton was a unit floor officer

present during the previous attack by plaintiff’s assailants on

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another inmate, but did not report that attack. Plaintiff also

alleges defendant Seaton was the unit floor officer on duty during

the day-room activities on March 17, 2007, but did not intervene to

protect plaintiff when he was attacked.

Plaintiff alleges defendant Larios was also present as a unit

floor officer on the day he was assaulted, but failed to monitor

the unit properly and did not intervene to protect plaintiff. 

Plaintiff alleges defendant John/Jane Doe was aware the

control tower was short-staffed on March 17, 2007. Plaintiff also

alleges defendant Doe was aware that one of plaintiff’s assailants

was improperly housed in the mental health unit and posed a

security risk to the other inmates in the unit.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant S. Vance was also aware that

one of plaintiff’s assailants should not have been allowed to

interact with inmates in the mental health unit. Plaintiff also

alleges defendant Vance knew that one of plaintiff’s assailants was

planning to assault another inmate on March 17, 2007. Finally,

plaintiff alleges defendant Vance knew, or should have known, there

would be only one officer posted in the control tower during the

P.M. day-room activities on March 17, 2007.

Plaintiff alleges defendant Compton was present in the unit

when plaintiff was attacked and stole $250.00 worth of his personal

property after the attack. In addition, plaintiff alleges

defendant Compton knew of at least two prior assaults by one of

plaintiff’s assailants on other inmates, and of at least one

assault by two of plaintiff’s assailants on another inmate that

occurred prior to plaintiff’s attack on March 17, 2007. Plaintiff

alleges defendant Compton failed to properly report or investigate

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these other assaults, thus subjecting inmates in the unit to an

increased risk of harm. 

Lastly, plaintiff alleges defendant Engellemer, who was the

supervising sergeant of the unit on March 17, 2007, attempted to

interview the assailants about their plans to attack another inmate

prior to the assault on plaintiff and guaranteed the assailants

would not be put into administrative segregation if they consented

to be interviewed. This, according to plaintiff, facilitated the

attack on him on March 17, 2007. In addition, plaintiff alleges

defendant Engellemer knew one of his assailants should not have

been allowed to interact with plaintiff and the other inmates in

the mental health unit. Finally, plaintiff alleges defendant

Engellemer knew the control tower for the unit would be shortstaffed during the P.M. day-room activities on March 17, 2007,

thus, lowering security on the unit. 

IV. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Claims

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of prisoners, including protection

from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). However, not “every injury suffered by

one prisoner at the hands of another...translates into

constitutional liability for prison officials.” Id. at 834. In

order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to

protect, an inmate must show: (1) that his incarceration posed a

“substantial risk of serious harm,” and (2) that prison officials

acted with “deliberate indifference” towards him by disregarding an

“excessive risk to [his] health or safety.” Id. Thus, merely

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failing to exercise due care in failing to prevent an assault by

other prisoners will not suffice. Id. at 835, 837; see also

Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 345-48 (1986) (finding that

prison officials’ negligent failure to heed prisoner’s notification

of threats from another inmate, followed by an assault, is not a

deprivation of constitutional rights); see also Schwartz v. County

of Montgomery, 843 F. Supp. 962 (E.D.Pa.), aff’d, 37 F.3d 1488 (3d

Cir. 1994) (stating that corrections officers’ failure to observe

institutional policies regarding the supervision of dangerous

inmates constitutes negligence, which cannot support a § 1983

action for violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments). 

Still, while “threats between inmates are common and do not,

under all circumstances, serve to impute actual knowledge of a

substantial risk of harm,” a plaintiff who alleges additional

reasons for prison officials to be concerned, such as previous

incidents between assailant and plaintiff, any history of assailant

attacking other inmates, or cause for retaliation by assailant

against plaintiff, may be sufficient to establish prison officials

knew of a substantial risk of harm. See Perkins v. Grimes, 161

F.3d 1127, 1130 (8th Cir. 1998); Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538, 541-2

(8th Cir. 1996). In addition, “a prison official [cannot] escape

liability for deliberate indifference by showing that, while he was

aware of an obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety, he did not

know that the complainant was especially likely to be assaulted by

the specific prisoner who eventually committed the assault.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843. “[I]t does not matter whether the risk

comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it

matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for

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reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation

face such a risk.” Id. Thus, a defendant may be held criminally

liable for injury to an unanticipated victim. Id. at 844; see also

State v. Julius, 185 W.Va. 422, 431-2, 408 S.E.2d 1, 10-11 (1991). 

Further, a “correctional officer’s presence at an attack of an

inmate, where he does nothing to stop an assault, may be sufficient

to establish a claim under Section 1983.” Williams v. Russo, 2009

WL 185758, *3 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). 

Finally, personal participation is an essential allegation in

a Section 1983 claim. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633-34 (9th

Cir. 1988). “A defendant in a civil rights action must have

personal involvement in the alleged wrongs, liability cannot be

predicated solely on the operation of respondent superior. 

Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal

direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). However, it is

the prison officials who must “prove that they were unaware even of

an obvious risk to inmate health and safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

844. 

Accordingly, plaintiff has stated a claim against defendants

Snowden, Seaton, Larios, Vance, and Compton. Defendants Snowden,

Seaton, Largos, and Compton were present when plaintiff was

attacked and allegedly failed to intervene over a 20 minute period. 

In addition, plaintiff has alleged these defendants were aware of

the substantial risk plaintiff’s three assailants posed to other

unit inmates’ health and safety, even though they may not have

known the assailants would attack plaintiff specifically. A

corrections officer cannot escape liability for deliberate

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indifference if he was aware of an obvious, substantial risk to

inmate safety, even though he did not know that the plaintiff was

especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner or

prisoners who eventually committed the assault. Farmer, 511 U.S. at

843. Defendant Vance, although not alleged to be present when

plaintiff was attacked, is alleged to have knowledge of additional

reasons to be concerned about inmate safety, such as the

assailants’ plans to attack another inmate, the improper housing of

one of plaintiff’s assailants, and the insufficient staffing of the

unit during the P.M. day-room activities in May 17, 2007. 

Plaintiff alleges defendant Vance failed to act on this knowledge. 

This may be sufficient to establish defendant Vance knew of a

substantial risk of harm, that defendant Vance ignored. See

Perkins, 161 F.3d at 1130; Prater, 89 F.3d at 541-2. 

However, plaintiff has failed to state a claim against

defendant Engellemer. Under the Eighth Amendment, it is a prison

official’s duty to ensure “reasonable safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

845. This standard “incorporates due regard for prison officials’

‘unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under

humane conditions.’” Id. (citing Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189,

193 (CA9 1979) (Kennedy, J.)); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

520, 547-8. Thus, “prison officials who actually knew of a

substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from

liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the

harm was not averted.” Id. at 844. As alleged by plaintiff,

defendant Engellemer’s response to the potential risk to inmate

health and safety posed by plaintiff’s assailants was reasonable.

Defendant Engellemer was responsive to inmate concerns for safety –

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he interviewed the assailants about their plans to attack another

inmate in order to verify a generalized threat (a threat that was

not specific to plaintiff). The Supreme Court has held that less

responsive action by a prison official falls short of deliberate

indifference. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S. Ct. 662, 88

L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (A prison guard’s failure to read a note passed

by an inmate regarding threats to inmate’s safety by other

prisoners and failure to notify other officers of the threat does

not constitute deliberate indifference, even when inmate was

subsequently attacked and suffered severe injuries. Mere negligence

or lack of due care is not cognizable under Section 1983.); see

also Demaio v. Coughlin, 1994 WL 714537, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

18391 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1994) (fact that prisoner and others for

him called or wrote to commissioner of corrections protesting

prisoner’s transfer to another institution and advising that

prisoner had “enemies” there, failed to establish that commissioner

knew of a specific risk of harm). A defendant’s awareness of a

possibility of attack does not constitute deliberate indifference.

See Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 794 (4th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim against defendant

Doe. Defendant Doe is an unknown defendant. In addition, plaintiff

cannot proceed against defendant Doe only on allegations that

defendant Doe failed to observe institutional policies regarding

the supervision of inmates. Schwartz, 843 F. Supp. 962 (E.D.Pa.),

aff’d, 37 F.3d 1488 (3d Cir. 1994). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is

granted;

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2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the entire statutory filing

fee of $350.00 for this action, as instructed by this court in its

order dated April 2, 2009. A balance of $150.00 remains to be

paid. The balance shall be paid by Thursday, July 30, 2009. If it

is not, the remaining fee owed will be collected from plaintiff’s

prison trust account.

3. Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Engellemer and Doe

are dismissed for the reasons discussed above, with leave to file

an amended complaint within thirty days from the date of service of

this order. Failure to file an amended complaint will result in

dismissal of defendant Engellemer and Doe from this action. 

4. Upon filing an amended complaint or expiration of the time

allowed therefor, the court will make further orders for service of

process upon some or all of the defendants.

DATED: This 16th day of June, 2009.

____________________________ 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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