Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05268/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05268-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 15, 1995 Decided April 12, 1996

No. 94-5268

BRIAN P. MOORE,

APPELLANT

v.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 90cv00883)

Glenn H. Carlson argued the cause for appellant, with whom Diane E. Cafferty was on the briefs.

Daniel F. Van Horn, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellees, with whom

Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States

Attorney, were on the brief. John D. Bates, Assistant United States Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: SILBERMAN, SENTELLE and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Brian P. Moore again appeals the dismissals of his due-process

claims against two government officials, George Wachtenheim and Ronald Roskens, in their

individual capacities. See Moore v. Agency for Int'l Development, 994 F.2d 874, 875 (D.C. Cir.

1993). The district court dismissed the claims against Wachtenheim because it concluded that they

were not filed within the proper limitations period and dismissed the claims against Roskens because

they did not meet the "heightened pleading" standard necessary to maintain a suit against a

government official in his individual capacity. Moore contends that he should be able to proceed

against both individuals, who allegedly deprived him of a liberty interest by defaming himin a manner

that prompted his private employer to fire him. As defamation alone is not a constitutional tort,

however, neither Wachtenheim nor Roskens, as individuals, denied Moore any process due him or

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1Though Moore may have once alleged First Amendment claims in the proceedings below, any

such claims were not preserved on appeal and are also dismissed. 

otherwise violated Moore's constitutional rights.1 Because Moore has thus not demonstrated a

threshold element of any Bivens claim, we affirm the district court, albeit on grounds distinct from

those on which the district court based its dismissals.

I. BACKGROUND

In February 1987, Brian Moore began serving as a technical advisor to the private

corporation, Management Sciences for Health ("MSH"), which had contracted with the Agency for

InternationalDevelopment ("AID") to offer medicalservicesinBolivia. See Moore, 994 F.2d at 875.

On May 15, 1987, MSH fired Moore, allegedlybecause of various defamatory attacks against Moore

by George Wachtenheim, who was the Acting Director of AID/Bolivia at the time and who had

supervised Moore in the past. According to Moore, Ronald Roskens, the then-Director of AID, also

interfered with Moore's continued employment with MSH, though Moore has not clearly specified

what acts of Roskens contributed to Moore's dismissal. See id. at 875-76.

Moore sued Wachtenheim and Roskensin both their official and individual capacities, as well

as AID itself, on April 13, 1990. Of particular import to this appeal, Moore filed Bivens claims

against WachtenheimandRoskens asindividuals, alleging that theyhad violated his FifthAmendment

right to due process. In those claims, Moore contended that the defendants' statements had

effectively "blacklisted" Moore, which caused MSH to terminate him and discouraged other

corporations in the region from hiring him. The district court dismissed the entire litigation for a

varietyofshortcomings. Moore appealed only the dismissals of the Bivenssuits against Wachtenheim

and Roskens in their individual capacities. Concluding that Moore, then proceeding pro se, had not

been afforded sufficient notice of defects in his pleadings, we remanded in order to permit him "to

amend his complaint and to correct his service of process" as necessary to press a claim. See id. at

875.

On remand, Moore amended his complaint and the parties stipulated as to proper service of

process. The district court, however, again dismissed both suits on different grounds. This time the

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court held that the claim against Wachtenheim was not filed within the proper statute of limitations,

though that court did not state what the proper limitations period was. The court also denied

Moore's claim against Roskens because Moore had not satisfied the "heightened pleading" standard

required to sue a government official as an individual.

Moore again appeals the dismissals. He protests that a Bivens claim based on defamation

should have a three-year limitations period, not the shorter period that the district court apparently

applied. He also argues that the Supreme Court has recently eliminated the "heightened pleading"

standard, which demandsthat a plaintiffstate with particularity the factual basis of a claim within the

pleadings, through a textual analysis of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure. Appellees respond that

the district court applied the proper statute of limitations, that the "heightened pleading" standard is

a necessary element of a qualified-immunity defense, and that, in any case, Moore did not

demonstrate the violation of a clearly established constitutional right necessary to maintain a Bivens

claim on which a court may grant relief. Although we treat Moore's allegations as true in this appeal

from dismissal, see id., we need address only the last issue in order to affirm the district court.

II. DISCUSSION

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

(1971), the Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for a plaintiff who sought relieffrom federal

officials who, acting asindividuals, violated the plaintiff's clearlyestablished constitutionalrights. See

id. at 390-97; Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Moore has brought such a Bivens

claim here, contending that Wachtenheim and Roskens, in their individual capacities, have violated

his constitutional right not to be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"

U.S.CONST. amend. V, through their alleged defamation of his character and conduct. Moore seeks

relieffrom Wachtenheim and Roskens either because Wachtenheim and Roskens defamed Moore or

because they denied Moore some process that they had a duty to provide him. As neither allegation,

on these pleadings, can give rise to the constitutional violation necessary for a Bivens claim against

these defendants as individuals, we affirm both dismissals.

A. Denial of Process

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Neither Wachtenheim nor Roskens, acting in their individual capacities, wronged Moore by

denying process owed to him. In his complaint, Moore sought only a Codd hearinga procedure

through which an agency or other employer permits an individual to clear his name from some

falsehood. SeeCodd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627-28 (1977). But neither Wachtenheim nor Roskens

could have ordered such a Codd hearing for Moore,see, e.g., Lyons v. Barrett, 851 F.2d 406, 410-11

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (presuming that a name-clearing hearing is ordered and conducted byan agency, not

by an individual), especially as neither employed Moore. See Codd, 429 U.S. at 627 (noting that the

sole purpose ofsuch a hearing isto settle factual disputes between employer and employee); Melton

v. City of Oklahoma City, 928 F.2d 920, 928 n.12 (10th Cir.) (emphasizing that Codd required a

hearing onlybetween an employer who created and disseminated a false statement about an employee

and that employee), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 906 (1991); cf. Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't,

40 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 1994) (observing that a government actor who was not the employer

of the plaintiff could not "directly deprive [plaintiff] of due process"). Nor has Moore identified,

either at trial or on appeal, any other type of process that Wachtenheim or Roskens could provide.

Because Wachtenheim or Roskens, acting in their individual capacities, did not deny Moore any

process, Moore cannot maintain a Bivens action on this ground.

B. Defamation

AsWachtenheimor Roskens have not denied Moore some processto which he had the clearly

established constitutionalright necessary for a Bivens claim, we are left to consider onlywhether their

alleged defamation ofMoore otherwise violatesthe Constitution. It does not. Defamation that does

not occur "in the course of " the impairment ofsome legalstatus or right does not transgressthe Fifth

Amendment. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976); see also Kartseva v. Department of State,

37 F.3d 1524, 1530 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (remanding a Bivens action against federal employees who may

have terminated plaintiff 's security clearance, but dismissing as to those employees who clearly did

not act to change the plaintiff's legal status). While prior opinions, such as our recent dicta in

Kartseva, 37 F.3d at 1526-30, may offer additional guidance to courts considering whether past

defamation contributed to the deprivation of a legitimate liberty interest, see, e.g., Fried v. Hinson,

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No. 94-1663, slip op. at 7 (D.C. Cir. March 15, 1996), such commentary cannot obscure or replace

the requirement that a defaming official must also impair the legal protections of an individual to be

liable for that individual's loss of liberty. See, e.g., Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232-34 (1991);

Paul, 424 U.S. at 710.

Neither of Moore's claims satisfy that key criterion, as neither Wachtenheim nor Roskens

denied Moore his proper legal due. Comparison to recent Supreme Court precedent supports our

conclusion. In Siegert, the Supreme Court held that an official at a federal hospital, who wrote a

negative reference for a former employee after that employee had resigned from the hospital, could

not be held constitutionally liable for defamation, even if his statements caused the former employee

not to be hired by other federal employers and contributed to the employee's general inability to find

comparable work. See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232-34. As in this case, the defendant in Siegert worked

neither for the current employer nor a prospective employer of the defamed individual. See id. at

228-29. And, as in this case, damages for the defamation could not be "recoverable in a Bivens

action" because the defamation "was not uttered incident to" anydeprivation ofsome legal protection

of the plaintiff by the defaming official or by the entity for whom the official worked. Id. at 234.

Thus, as neither Wachtenheim nor Roskens has personally impaired Moore'slegalstatus, neither can

be liable for a Bivens defamation claim.

III. CONCLUSION

Reason confirms our legal result. The prospect of government officials braving the logistical

difficulties of providing hearings to persons not in their employ is itself persuasive argument against

allowing government officials to be threatened with vicarious liability for the due-process failings of

private employers. Moreover, to permit Bivenssuits based on only the words, not deeds, of a federal

official would effectively transformbare defamation into a constitutional tort, despite the many cases

holding the contrary. See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 233-34; Paul, 424 U.S. at 701-12.

Although we usually stay our discussion of these matters until the district court has had an

appropriate opportunity to analyze them, the threshold nature of this issue persuades us to resolve

the matter conclusively. See, e.g., Siegert, 500 U.S. at 231-32. Whatever the statute of limitations

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for a Bivens claim arising from alleged defamation within D.C. law, and whatever the condition of

the "heightened pleading" standard after Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and

Coordination Unit, 113 S.Ct. 1160 (1993), we affirm the dismissal of each suit because neither

alleges a constitutional violation sufficient for a Bivens claim.

Affirmed.

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