Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00184/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00184-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1See Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1314 (11th Cir. 2004); Lee v. Ferraro, 284

F.3d 1188, 1192 (11th Cir. 2002); Dorsey v. Chapman, 262 F.3d 1181, 1183 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001);

Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1217 (11th Cir. 1991); Hattaway v. McMillian, 903 F.2d 1440,

1443 (11th Cir. 1990); Funchess v. Wainwright, 788 F.2d 1443, 1445 (11th Cir. 1986); United

States v. Lake, 709 F.2d 43, 44 (11th Cir. 1983).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHAUNNA CROCKER, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 04-0184-WS-B

 )

CITY OF FAIRHOPE, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the defendant’s motion to disqualify plaintiffs’ expert Jodi

Brewer. (Doc. 83). The plaintiffs have filed a response, (Doc. 91), and the motion is ripe for

resolution. After careful consideration of these materials, the Court concludes that the motion is due to

be granted in part and denied in part.

Brewer is a licensed professional counselor (“LPC”) who has spent nine hours in therapy with

plaintiff Shaunna Crocker. In her deposition, Brewer opined that Shaunna is suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) due to her sexual encounters with the defendant. The defendant’s

motion is based on the assertion that Brewer “is not qualified to render the medical opinions she asserts

herein.” (Doc. 83 at 4). An expert witness must be “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. The plaintiffs identify no qualification that

Brewer possesses other than her status as an LPC. (Doc. 91). 

In every known Eleventh Circuit case in which PTSD was diagnosed, the diagnosis was made

by a medical doctor or psychologist.1 The plaintiffs argue that an LPC is qualified, by dint of her title,

to render a diagnosis of PTSD, but they have identified no judicial opinion supporting the proposition. 

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2E.g., Jackson v. Bayou Industries, 1995 WL 143538 at *1-2 (E.D. La. 1995)( an LPC with

a masters in psychology, one formal course and one afternoon seminar in Diagnostic Statistical

Manuals, no specialization in psychiatric testing and no administration of psychiatric tests to the plaintiff,

was “not an expert qualified to diagnose plaintiffs’ psychological condition [of PTSD]”); State v. Willis,

888 P.2d 839, 847 (Kan. 1995)(“for a witness to qualify as an expert on post-traumatic distress

disorder and rape trauma syndrome, the witness must possess special training as an expert in that field

of psychiatry”; a clinical social worker with a masters degree in social work has no such qualification),

modified by statute, Welch v. State, 13 P.3d 882, 886-87 (Kan. 2000); State v. Lee, 502 A.2d

332, 335 (R.I. 1985)(“[C]ourts have required that PTSD be proven through expert medical testimony

by licensed physicians or psychiatrists.”); see also Hall v. United Insurance Co., 367 F.3d 1255,

1261 (11th Cir. 2004)(upholding trial court’s exclusion of LPC’s testimony that the decedent was

incompetent, which rested in part on the plaintiff’s failure to show that “counselors with similar training

are qualified to render an opinion as to an individual’s mental capacity”); United States v. Crosby, 713

F.2d 1066, 1076 (5th Cir. 1983)(upholding trial court’s exclusion of counselor’s testimony on the

grounds that “only physicians could qualify as diagnostic experts concerning this medical condition [of

PTSD]”). 

-2-

On the other hand, a wealth of authority rejects the idea that an LPC is qualified to render such an

opinion.2 The plaintiffs have expended no effort to demonstrate that the persuasive force of these cases

should be ignored or that Brewer falls outside their scope. The Court concludes that Brewer is not

qualified to testify that Shaunna suffers from PTSD.

The defendant seeks to “disqualify [Brewer] from testifying in this case.” (Doc. 83 at 1). While

Brewer is not qualified to render a diagnosis of Shaunna’s condition, she is competent to testify as a lay

witness as to what she heard, observed and did in the course of her treatment of Shaunna. See

Jackson v. Bayou Industries, 1995 WL 143538 at *2 (“[T]he Court will allow the witness to testify

concerning her interviews with plaintiffs, any behavioral characteristics she observed during these

interviews, and the course of counseling she used with plaintiffs.”).

For the reasons set forth above, the defendant’s motion is granted to the extent it seeks to

preclude Brewer from offering a diagnosis of Shaunna’s mental condition. In all other respects, the

motion is denied.

DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of May, 2005.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-00184-WS-B Document 104 Filed 05/04/05 Page 2 of 2