Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02416/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02416-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jamal Leland Landrum,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Louis W. Winn, Warden,

Respondent.

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No. CV-14-02416-TUC-RCC (CRP)

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Jamal Leland Landrum, proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition Under 28

U.S.C. § 2241 For A Writ of Habeas Corpus By A Person In Federal Custody (Doc. 1, Pet.),

and a Memorandum of Law. (Doc. 1-1, Mem.). Respondent has filed a Return and Answer

(Doc. 9, Answer). Petitioner has not filed a Reply. This matter has been referred to the

Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 5, Order). For the reasons that

follow, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be

dismissed. 

Petitioner is presently incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Tucson,

Arizona (“USP-Tucson”) based on his conviction for sex trafficking of children. (Answer

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1 Respondent has provided the Declaration of Andrew Roush who is employed by

the Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), as a Correctional Programs Specialist

at the Designation and Sentence Computation Center in Grand Prairie, Texas. (Doc. 9, Ex.

A, Roush Decl.). Mr. Roush has certified that certain records attached to his Declaration are

true and accurate copies of records possessed and maintained by the BOP. (Id.). 

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at 1 & Doc. 9, Ex. A, Roush Decl. ¶ 4).1

 Petitioner is serving a 120-month sentence with a

projected release date of December 8, 2022. (Id.).

Petitioner contends in his Petition and Memorandum that Respondent has improperly

calculated his federal sentence by failing to award him prior jail time credit as required

under Setser v. United States, __U.S.__, 132 S.Ct. 1463 (2012) and 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).

Petitioner contends he is entitled to 505 days of prior jail time credit. (Mem. at 4). Petitioner

admits that he has not exhausted available administrative remedies but contends that

exhaustion should be excused because pursuing administrative remedies would be futile.

(Mem. at 4-5). 

Respondent contends that the Petition should be dismissed for lack of exhaustion as

Petitioner filed administrative remedies with the Warden only and failed to subsequently

appeal to the regional level. (Answer at 4-5). Respondent also contends that if the Court

considers the merits of Petitioner’s claim, Petitioner’s federal sentence has been properly

calculated and thus the Petition should be dismissed. (Id. at 5-8).

I. Background Facts

On December 18, 2012, the same date as Petitioner’s federal offense, Petitioner was

arrested on state narcotics and firearms charges in California. (Doc. 9, Ex. A, Roush Decl.

¶ 5). On February 27, 2013, Petitioner was sentenced on the California state charges to 16

months in state custody with 144 days of jail credit. (Id. ¶ 6, Attach. 3). While in state

custody, on or about March 12, 2013, Petitioner was “borrowed” pursuant to a writ of habeas

corpus ad prosequendum and brought into federal custody. (Id. ¶ 6, Attach. 4). Petitioner

remained in the primary custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and earned credit on his state sentence while out on the writ. (Id.

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¶ 7 & Attach. 3 at 5). On June 20, 2014, Petitioner was sentenced in the U.S. District Court

for the Southern District of California to 120 months of incarceration on one count of the

federal charges. (Id. ¶ 7 & Attach. 5 (Judgment in a Criminal Case)). On July 9, 2014, the

CDCR determined that Petitioner had completed his state sentence as of that date. (Id. ¶ 8

& Attach. 3 at 5). Petitioner’s federal sentence computation began to run as of July 9, 2014.

(Id. ¶ 8 & Attach. 1). On August 4, 2014, Petitioner was transferred from the custody of the

United States Marshal’s Service to BOP custody. (Id. ¶ 8 & Attach. 1).

BOP records show that Petitioner filed an administrative remedy with the Warden.

(Id. ¶ 10). Upon review by the BOP Designation and Sentence Computation Center,

Petitioner’s sentence computation was determined to be correct based on then available

documents. (Id.). Petitioner did not appeal that decision to the next level, which is the

regional level of review. (Id.).

After Petitioner filed the present habeas action, the Designation and Sentence

Computation Center again reviewed the matter and obtained a copy of the CDCR’s sentence

computation for Petitioner. (Id. ¶ 11 & Attach. 3). Based on this review, it was determined

that Petitioner had been sentenced to state custody for 16 months, or 487 days, that he had

spent from December 18, 2012 (date of state arrest and date of federal offense) until August

4, 2014 (date admitted to BOP custody) in state custody, for a total of 595 days, meaning that

Petitioner had over-served his state sentence by 108 days. (Doc. 9, Ex. A, Roush Decl. ¶ 11).

This computation included the time Petitioner was in federal custody from March 2013 until

August 2014 on a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum for which he was earning state

credit, not federal credit. (Id.) 

BOP has updated Petitioner’s sentence computation to reflect 108 days prior jail

credit. (Id. ¶ 12 & Attach. 1 at 3). Petitioner’s revised projected release date is December

8, 2022. (Doc. 9, Ex. A, Roush Decl. ¶ 13).

II. Discussion

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) provides that writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the

district courts “within their respective jurisdictions.” A writ of habeas corpus operates not

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upon the prisoner, but upon the prisoner's custodian. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court

of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 494–495 (1973). See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 446–47

(2004) (the warden of the penitentiary where a prisoner is confined constitutes the custodian

who must be named in the § 2241 petition, and the petition must be filed in the district of

confinement). A habeas corpus action is the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge

the fact or duration of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484-87, 500

(1973); Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that a claim that time

spent serving a state sentence should have been credited against a federal sentence concerned

the fact or duration of confinement and thus should have been construed as a petition for writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to § 28 U.S.C. § 2241).

A. Exhaustion of Available Remedies

“As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available

judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez,

678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir.2012). The BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program allows

inmates to seek formal review of issues related to aspects of their confinement. (Doc. 9, Ex.

A, Roush Decl. ¶ 9). The program has four levels of review. (Id.). At the first level, the

inmate is required to try and informally resolve his grievance with Unit Team staff. (Id.).

If the grievance is not resolved informally, at the next level the inmate may submit an

Administrative Remedy Request to the Warden using the appropriate form. (Id.). If the

inmate is not satisfied with the Warden’s response, the inmate may submit an appeal using

the appropriate form to the Regional Director within 20 days of the Warden’s response. (Id.).

If not satisfied with the Regional Director’s response, within 30 days thereafter, the inmate

may seek an appeal using the appropriate form to the General Counsel which is the fourth

and final review level. (Id.). See also 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 et seq. for BOP’s administrative

remedy program.

The records on file show that Petitioner attempted to informally resolve the sentence

computation issue with Unit Team staff followed by an administrative remedy to the Warden,

the first and second levels of review. (Answer at 3 & Ex. A, Roush Decl. ¶ 10). Petitioner

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did not submit an appeal to the Regional Director. (Id.). Respondent contends that the

habeas petition should be dismissed for Petitioner’s failure to exhaust his administrative

remedies. (Answer at 5). Petitioner acknowledges that he did not exhaust his administrative

remedies but contends that any further review request would have been futile based on the

Warden’s October 2, 2014 response that Petitioner’s sentence had been properly calculated.

(Mem. at 4-5 & Doc. 1-1 at 18 (Request for Administrative Remedy, Remedy ID No.

795710-F1, Part B, Response dated 10-2-2014)). 

In the context of habeas actions, exhaustion of administrative remedies is futile

“where the agency’s position on the question at issue appears already set, and it is very likely

what the result of recourse to administrative remedies would be.” Sun v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d

932, 943 (9th Cir. 2004). Courts generally have limited the futility exception to

circumstances in which a prisoner has shown that further appeals within the prison system

would be denied based on BOP’s official policy. See, e.g., Fraley v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons,

1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1993).

In this case, the BOP conducted another review of Petitioner’s sentence computation

issue after the denial of relief at the administrative level of review before the Warden.

Respondent characterizes this subsequent review as “the same review that would have been

completed if Petitioner had proceeded to the regional level of an administrative remedy

appeal.” (Answer at 3 & Ex. A, Roush Decl. ¶ 11). Because the BOP reviewed the sentence

computation issue as if Petitioner had pursued an appeal to the Regional Director, the

Magistrate Judge finds that it is not necessary to consider Respondent’s argument that the

habeas petition should be dismissed for lack of administrative exhaustion or Petitioner’s

argument that a further appeal would have been futile. Both arguments have essentially

become moot. 

B. Consideration of the Merits of Petitioner’s Claim

Pursuant to18 U.S.C. § 3585(a), “A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences

on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives

voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the

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sentence is to be served.” Section 3585(b) provides as follows regarding credit for prior

custody:

A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment

for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence

commences-

(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or

(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after

the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed;

that has not been credited against another sentence.

18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).

Based on § 3585(b), a defendant is only entitled to credit for time served prior to

sentencing if that time has not been credited against another sentence. The Supreme Court

has made clear that § 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to compute the credit at

sentencing. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333-35 (1992); see also Allen v.

Crabtree, 153 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir.1998). Rather, “the Attorney General, through the

BOP, has the responsibility for administering the sentence.” Wilson, 503 U.S. at 335. 

Generally, “[d]etermination of priority of custody and service of sentence between

state and federal sovereigns is a matter of comity to be resolved by the executive branches

of the two sovereigns.” United States v. Warren, 610 F.2d 680, 684–85 (9th Cir.1980). The

production of a defendant in state custody to a federal court pursuant to a writ of habeas

corpus ad prosequendum does not constitute the commencement of a sentence under federal

law. Schleining v. Thomas, 642 F.3d 1242, 1243 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2011). The prisoner “is

considered to be ‘on loan’ to the federal authorities so that the sending state’s jurisdiction

over the accused continues uninterruptedly.” Thomas v. Brewer, 923 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th

Cir. 1991) (quoting Crawford v. Jackson, 589 F.2d 693, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). See also,

Taylor v. Reno, 164 F.3d 440, 444-45 (9th Cir. 1998) (same). 

Petitioner was in California custody when federal authorities obtained custody of him

pursuant to a federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. California was Petitioner’s

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primary custodian and his transfer to federal custody did not transfer primary jurisdiction

from California to the federal government. 

Petitioner’s California sentence was completed on July 9, 2014 and his federal

sentence computation commenced that same date. The BOP has now reviewed relevant

California state records and determined that Petitioner served 595 days in state custody when

he should have served 487 days. Because the extra 108 days Petitioner spent in state custody

have not been credited toward any other sentence, the BOP has credited those 108 days

toward Petitioner’s federal sentence. The 487 days that Petitioner correctly served as his

state court sentence have been credited toward that state sentence and thus cannot be credited

against Petitioner’s federal sentence. (Doc. 9, Ex. A, Roush Decl. ¶ 12). See 18 U.S.C. §

3585(b); Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337. Petitioner has received all of the prior custody credit to

which he is entitled. Petitioner has not filed a reply contesting this prior custody credit.

Petitioner therefore has received the remedy requested in his habeas petition and his petition

should be dismissed. 

III. Recommendation 

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court,

after its independent review, enter an Order dismissing the Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

For A Writ of Habeas Corpus By A Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and LRCiv 7.2(e) of the Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of

Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within Fourteen (14) Days after

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to

another party’s objections within Fourteen (14) Days after being served with a copy.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). No replies to objections shall be filed unless leave is granted from

the District Court to do so. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case

number: CV-14-02416-TUC-RCC.

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Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).

DATED this 17th day of May, 2016.

 

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