Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00009/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00009-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 371
Nature of Suit: Truth in Lending
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CRAIG HUMMEL & ASSOCIATES 

PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN CASTON AND DOES 1 

THROUGH 10,

Defendants.

No. 1:16-CV-00009-DAD-JLT

ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING 

MATTER TO THE KERN COUNTY 

SUPERIOR COURT AND DENYING AS 

MOOT MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS

(Doc. Nos. 1, 2)

This is an unlawful detainer action brought under California state law by plaintiff Craig 

Hummel & Associates Property Management against John Caston and Doe codefendants. On 

January 6, 2016, defendant Caston removed the case from the Kern County Superior Court on the 

basis of diversity and federal question jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1.) Defendant Caston alleges that 

the parties are diverse, the amount in controversy is over $75,000, and that defendants seek 

damages for alleged violations under the federal statute the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 

For the reasons that follow, the court will remand this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) due 

to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and deny defendant Caston’s motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis (Doc. No. 2) as moot.

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I. Legal Standard

A district court has “a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action 

sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.” United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell 

& Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, is 

strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 

599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010); Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 

F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). It is presumed that a case lies outside the limited jurisdiction of 

the federal courts, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1106-07; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 

F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). In addition, “the existence of federal jurisdiction depends solely 

on the plaintiff’s claims for relief and not on anticipated defenses to those claims.” ARCO Envtl. 

Remediation, LLC v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality, 213 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000). 

“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction” means that “the court resolves all 

ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042; Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 

F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). That is, federal jurisdiction over a removed case “must be rejected 

if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Geographic Expeditions, 599 

F.3d at 1107; Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. “If 

at any time prior to judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the 

case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 932 (9th 

Cir. 2001). Remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) “is mandatory, not discretionary.” Bruns v. 

NCUA, 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997); see also California ex. rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 

375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). Where it appears, as it does here, that the district court lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, “the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1447(c).

II. Federal Question Jurisdiction

“The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded 

complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 

presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” California v. United States, 

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215 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 838; Duncan, 76 F.3d at 1485. 

Under the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, courts look to what “necessarily appears in the 

plaintiff’s statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything in 

anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.” 

California, 215 F.3d at 1014. Accordingly, “a case may not be removed on the basis of a federal 

defense . . . even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint and both parties concede 

that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 

386, 392 (1987); Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002); see 

also Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 70 (2009) (“It does not suffice to show that a federal 

question lurks somewhere inside the parties’ controversy, or that a defense or counterclaim would 

arise under federal law.”).

Here, defendant Caston has not shown that removal of this action is appropriate on the 

basis of federal question jurisdiction. The complaint filed by plaintiff is an unlawful detainer 

action that is based entirely on state law. Defendant Caston relies on his answer to establish 

federal jurisdiction under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Specifically, defendant Caston

alleges that defendants’ “claims against Plaintiff are based on Plaintiff’s alleged 

misrepresentation of the amount of debt due, and their own fraudulent actions.” (Doc. No. 1, 2:5-

7.) Defendant Caston is attempting to remove this case on the basis of what appears to be a type 

of federal defense. This is improper, as the defensive invocation of federal law cannot form the 

basis of this Court’s jurisdiction. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 70; Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392; 

Wayne, 294 F.3d at 1183; California, 215 F.3d at 1014. Because there is no federal question 

appearing in plaintiff’s complaint, defendant Caston has failed to properly invoke this court’s 

federal question jurisdiction.

III. Diversity Jurisdiction

Federal courts may exercise “diversity jurisdiction” when the amount in controversy 

exceeds $75,000 and the parties are in complete diversity, i.e. that citizenship of each plaintiff is 

different from that of each defendant. See Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1043; Matheson v. Progressive 

Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “Absent 

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unusual circumstances, a party seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction should be able to allege 

affirmatively the actual citizenship of the relevant parties.” Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 

F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2002).

Defendant Caston, however, has clearly not met the amount in controversy requirement of 

diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s complaint states that the AAmount demanded does not exceed 

$10,000.@ (Doc. No. 1, 8.) Where it is Anot facially evident from the complaint that more than 

$75,000 is in controversy,@ defendants are required to prove, Aby a preponderance of the evidence, 

that the amount in controversy [met] the jurisdictional threshold.@ Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 

F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). There is no proof submitted that the $75,000 threshold is met 

here other defendant Caston’s conclusory statement that the amount in controversy more likely 

than not exceeds $75,000. Plaintiff alleges that the Exhibit “A” demonstrates an amount in 

controversy in excess of $75,000. (Doc. No. 1, 3:15-19.) However, Exhibit “A” clearly 

contradicts this assertion as the only document therein that references anything related to the

amount in controversy is the complaint, which states the exact opposite. Defendant Caston has

therefore failed to establish that the amount in controversy is over $75,000. Accordingly, he has

not met his burden of establishing diversity jurisdiction.

IV. Conclusion

Courts have a duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction over removed actions sua 

sponte. United Investors, 360 F.3d at 967. There is a strong presumption against subject matter 

jurisdiction that a removing defendant must overcome, and any doubt over subject matter 

jurisdiction results in a remand. See Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1106-07; Hunter, 582 

F.3d at 1042. Defendant Caston has failed to overcome the strong presumption against federal 

jurisdiction. Therefore, this court is without subject matter jurisdiction and must remand this case 

to the Kern County Superior Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Bruns, 122 F.3d at 1257; Page v. 

City of Southfield, 45 F.3d 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1995).

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V. Order

Based upon the foregoing:

1. This case is REMANDED forthwith to the Kern County Superior Court, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1447(c) due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction;

2. Defendant Caston’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is DENIED as 

moot; and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 7, 2016 

 DALE A. DROZD

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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