Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03861/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03861-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELENA ASTURIAS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-03861-RS 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Elena Asturias and Carlota Del Portillo financed and purchased a property at 176 

Randall Street in San Francisco, California, but fell behind on their mortgage payments, which 

resulted in the sale of the property. Contending defendants failed to comply with the Homeowner 

Bill of Rights (“HBOR”), plaintiffs advance a host of claims for relief: (1) violation of California 

Civil Code § 2923.5; (2) violation of California Civil Code § 2923.6; (3) violation of California 

Civil Code § 2923.7; (4) declaratory relief pursuant to California Civil Code § 2924.11; (5) 

violation of the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), California Business and Professions Code § 

17200 et seq.; (6) to set aside the trustee’s sale; (7) cancellation of the trustee’s deed upon sale; 

and (8) quiet title. Defendants move to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). 

Pursuant to Local Rule 7-1(b) this matter is amenable to disposition without argument.

Asturias and Del Portillo have received three opportunities to state claims for relief. Each 

time they have filed nearly identical pleadings heavy with quotations from the California Civil 

Code and light on facts. This dearth of details doomed the complaint and the First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”), as it does the SAC. Because plaintiffs have failed to state claims for relief 

despite having three opportunities to do so, their claims for relief must be dismissed without 

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further leave to amend.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

In October 2005, Asturias, Del Portillo, or both2entered into a mortgage agreement with 

All California, Inc., in the amount of $1,000,000, and secured by the property at 176 Randall 

Street. The Deed of Trust named Fidelity National Title the trustee. In April 2010, US Bank 

National Association was substituted as the trustee, and, at some point, Bank of America, N.A., 

replaced All California, Inc., as the loan servicer. During BOA’s tenure as plaintiffs’ loan 

servicer, plaintiffs submitted an application for a loan modification to BOA. They “never received 

a written determination on the status of the application” before BOA sold its interest in the loan to 

Nationstar. Subsequently, plaintiffs submitted a new application for loan modification to 

Nationstar, but never received a written determination on the status of the application prior to the 

foreclosure sale of the property. 

In January 2015, Veriprise became the trustee under the Deed of Trust and recorded a 

Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust. Attached to the Notice of Default was 

a declaration from a Veriprise employee, who stated that Veriprise had contacted plaintiffs to 

assess their financial situation and explore options to avoid foreclosure, but had not heard from 

plaintiffs in the past thirty days. In April 2015, a Notice of Trustee’s Sale was recorded, 

announcing that the sale of the 176 Randall Street property would take place on July 10, 2015. 

The property sold at the July foreclosure sale.

Shortly after the sale, in August 2015, Asturias and Del Portillo filed this suit in San 

Francisco County Superior Court. Defendants removed the case to federal court and filed a 

motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiffs sought a remand to San Francisco Superior Court. The 

 

1 Because Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss, all facts alleged in the SAC are taken as true 

for the purpose of this motion. In addition, defendants request judicial notice of documents 

recorded with the San Francisco Assessor-Record regarding the 176 Randall Street property, most 

of which are attached to the complaint. Plaintiffs do not oppose this request. Because the records 

are appropriate for judicial notice, the defendants’ request is granted.

2

The SAC defines “plaintiff” as both Del Portillo and Asturias.

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court denied the motion to remand and granted with leave to amend defendants’ motion to 

dismiss. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which was also 

deficient for three reasons. First, Asturias and Del Portillo did not aver facts establishing that 

either of them used 176 Randall as their principal residence, as required to have standing to assert 

claims arising from the HBOR. Second, they did not plead fraud with sufficient particularity to 

satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Third, to set aside the trustee’s 

sale and cancel the trustee’s deed, plaintiffs had to plead unconditional tender, which they did not 

do. In light of these deficiencies, Del Portillo and Asturias were afforded one final opportunity to 

state viable claims for relief. 

They have elected to file a SAC, which does not materially differ from the FAC. For the 

most part, the SAC includes rote recitations of the statutory provisions of the HBOR, as the FAC 

and the initial complaint did. There are, however, three identifiable differences. First, plaintiff 

inserted a paragraph clarifying that Asturias treats 176 Randall Street as her permanent residence, 

but Del Portillo resides elsewhere to tend to her ailing spouse. SAC ¶ 27. Plaintiffs also expanded 

upon the paragraph addressing their willingness and ability to tender funds to cure the deficiency. 

Finally, plaintiffs added a new claim for relief: cancellation of the trustee’s deed upon sale. 

Defendants contend none of these additions cure the pleading deficiencies present in the complaint 

and FAC, and that inclusion of an eighth claim for relief is improper.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[D]etailed 

factual allegations are not required,” but a complaint must provide sufficient factual allegations to 

“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(quoting Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In addition, “in allegations of fraud or 

mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud and mistake.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must plead “the who, what, when, 

where, and how that would suggest fraud.” Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997) 

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(internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff must set forth more than the neutral facts 

necessary to identify the transaction. The plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about 

a statement, and why it is false.” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 

2003) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides a mechanism to test the legal sufficiency 

of the averments in the complaint. Dismissal is appropriate when the complaint “fail[s] to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint in whole or in 

part is subject to dismissal if it lacks a cognizable legal theory or the complaint does not include 

sufficient facts to support a plausible claim under a cognizable legal theory. Navarro v. Block, 

250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). When evaluating a complaint, the court must accept all its 

material allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. This standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that the defendant 

has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a 

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to 

relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted, leave to amend should be granted unless “the complaint could not be 

saved by any amendment.” Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Standing to Raise HBOR Claims 

Plaintiffs’ Claims 1 through 4 all arise under California’s HBOR—a set of provisions 

enacted to forestall some of the worst effects of the homeowner foreclosure crisis. The provisions 

of the HBOR obligate lenders to provide certain information to borrowers, to issue written 

determinations regarding the borrower’s eligibility for a loan application, and to provide a single 

point of contact for borrowers seeking loan modification. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2923.5-.7. The 

HBOR also provides borrowers a cause of action for injunctive relief if a trustee’s deed upon sale 

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has not been recorded. Id. § 2924.12. HBOR protections apply only to first lien mortgages or 

deeds of trust secured by owner-occupied, one-to-four unit properties. Id. § 2924.15. An “owneroccupied” property is “the principal residence of the borrower and is security for the loan made for 

personal, family, or household purposes.” Id.

The FAC was deficient because plaintiffs did not aver that 176 Randall Street was their 

principal residence. Plaintiff added a new paragraph, which provides: “The Subject Property is 

the primary (principal) residence of Elena Asturias. Carlota Del Portillo is her mother who 

currently lives away in order to support her husband who is currently in assisted living.” SAC ¶ 

27.3 Defendants contend this does not remedy the problem because Del Portillo cannot claim 176 

Randall Street as her principal residence and Asturias is not the “borrower” on this loan. 

According to defendants, Del Portillo is the only borrower listed on the promissory note, which is 

not attached to the complaint or included in defendants’ request for judicial notice. As the 

complaints that came before it, the SAC is not a model of clarity—particularly with respect to 

which plaintiff did what. The SAC exacerbates this confusion by defining the term “Plaintiff” to 

mean both Asturias and Del Portillo. SAC ¶ 1. 

Despite this confusing choice, plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient facts to show they are 

entitled to HBOR protections. On the first point, defendants are technically correct; the SAC does 

not establish that 176 Randall Street is currently Del Portillo’s principal residence. Nevertheless, 

construing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the SAC suggests Del Portillo used 

176 Randall Street as her principal residence at the time she initiated the loan, thereby bringing the 

loan within the protections of the HBOR.

As to defendants’ second point, there is nothing in the SAC or documents submitted for 

judicial notice to determine whether Asturias signed the promissory note. The October 2005 deed 

of trust lists both Asturias and Del Portillo as “borrowers.” RJN Ex. 1. Moreover, the notices of 

 

3

The SAC contains two paragraphs with the number 27. One immediately precedes the heading 

for first claim for relief under the heading “GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS.” The 

second follows the heading “FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.”

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default, trustee’s sale, and rescission reference the deed of trust executed by Asturias and Del 

Portillo, suggesting both women were “borrowers” within the meaning of the HBOR. See RJN 

Exs. 2-5. At this stage, it would be improper to accept as true defendants’ representation that 

Asturias’s name is absent from the promissory note. Thus, the SAC includes the absolute

minimum facts necessary to establish that Asturias and Del Portillo have the right to invoke the 

HBOR’s protections.

B. Claim 1: Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.55

Mortgage servicers, mortgagees, trustees, beneficiaries, and authorized agents may not 

record a notice of default until they satisfy certain requirements. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.55(a).

First, they must send the borrower “[a] statement that the borrower may request” copies of the 

“promissory note or other evidence of indebtedness,” the deed of trust or mortgage, any 

assignment of the borrower’s deed of trust, and “the borrower’s payment history since the 

borrower was last less than 60 days past due.” Id. § 2923.55(b)(1)(B)(i)-(iv). If the mortgage 

servicer has satisfied the requirements of section 2923.55, they must wait 30 days after making 

initial contact with the borrower in accordance with section 2923.55(b)(2), or after satisfying the 

due diligence requirements designed to ensure servicers attempt to make contact with the 

borrower. Id. § 2923.55(a)(2), (f). Defendants contend the SAC fails to establish a section 

2923.55 violation because plaintiffs do not aver that they did not receive a statement of their right 

to request documents or that defendants did not make contact with Asturias or Del Portillo as 

required by section 2923.55(b)(1).

Plaintiffs have not responded to defendants’ arguments in favor of dismissal, which 

amounts to a concession. Angeles v. U.S. Airways, Inc., No. C 12-05860 CRB, 2013 WL 622032, 

at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2013). In any event, they have not pleaded sufficiently any violation of 

section 2923.55.

The SAC includes few factual details about the alleged violation of section 2923.55. One 

or both of the plaintiffs contacted requested the documents listed in section 2923.55(b)(1)(B), but 

this subsection does not require mortgage services actually to supply the documents; it requires 

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only that the mortgage servicer provide “[a] statement that the borrower may request” them. See 

id. § 2923.55(a)-(b). Plaintiffs further contend defendants violated the statute by failing to follow 

the due diligence requirements of section 2923.55(f). Those steps are not required, however, if the 

mortgage servicer makes contact with the borrower in accordance with section 2923.55(b)(2). 

Yet, the declaration of the mortgage servicer attached to the notice of default states, “The 

mortgage servicer has contacted the borrower pursuant to California Civil Code § 2923.55(b)(2) 

and “[t]hirty days, or more, have passed since the initial contact was made.” RJN Ex. 4; see also

Compl. Ex. D. Thus, plaintiffs have failed to plead facts giving rise to a violation of 2923.55. 

Instead, they assert the declaration is false. That bald assertion is insufficient to state a claim for 

relief. Because plaintiffs have thrice failed to plead a violation of section 2923.55 and their claim 

apparently arises from a misreading of the statute, no leave to amend will be granted.

C. Claim 2: Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6

“Dual tracking”—the practice of pursuing foreclosure while a borrower’s loan 

modification application is still pending—was one of the unsavory business practices the 

California legislature sought to curb by passing the HBOR. Rockridge Trust v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 

985 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Jolley v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 213 

Cal.App.4th 872, 904 (2013)). To that end, section 2923.6 provides that if a mortgage servicer 

offers a first lien loan modification, and the borrower has submitted a completed application, the 

mortgage servicer “shall not record a notice of default, notice of sale, or conduct a trustee’s sale” 

while the application is pending unless certain requirements are met. Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6(c). 

“[A]n application shall be deemed ‘complete’ when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer 

with all documents required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable timeframes specified 

by the mortgage servicer.” Id. § 2923.6(h). Mortgage servicers need not review applications 

submitted prior to January 1, 2013, which were “evaluated or afforded a fair opportunity to be 

evaluated for a first lien loan modification” “unless there has been a material change in the 

borrower’s financial circumstances since the date of the borrower’s previous application and that 

change is documented by the borrower and submitted to the mortgage servicer.” Id. § 2923.6(g).

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Plaintiffs contend one or both of them submitted an application for a loan modification by 

fax to defendants’ “loss mitigation department,” but never received any written response before 

defendants recorded a notice of default. SAC ¶ 35. They have offered no other facts to support 

the claims, and have therefore failed to state a claim for relief. Plaintiffs fail to identify which 

defendant supposedly received the application for a loan modification. There is no information 

regarding whether the application plaintiffs sent was offered by a mortgage servicer, what were 

the documentary requirements of the application, or whether they had applied for a loan 

modification before. These threadbare averments are insufficient to state a claim for relief even 

though plaintiffs have had three opportunities to state cognizable claims. Their inability to do so 

on the third try warrants the conclusion they are incapable of stating a claim for relief under 

section 2923.6, and thus the claim will be dismissed without leave to amend.

D. Claim 3: Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.7

When a borrower requests “a foreclosure prevention alternative,” the mortgage servicer 

must “establish a single point of contact” and a means to communicate with that person. Cal. Civ. 

Code § 2923.7(a). Plaintiffs insist one (or both) of them requested a foreclosure prevention 

alternative from one (or all) of defendants sometime after January 1, 2013, but never received the 

contact information of the single point of contact. Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the 

averments, and plaintiffs have failed to respond, amounting to a concession.

In any event, plaintiffs have not stated a viable claim for a material violation of section 

2923.7. The SAC does not provide any information regarding the date of contact, how plaintiffs 

initiated contact, or even from whom a foreclosure prevention alternative was sought. In addition, 

plaintiffs have not pleaded facts establishing why defendants’ alleged failure to provide a single 

point of contact was material. Violations of HBOR are actionable only if they are “material.” Cal. 

Civ. Code § 2924.12(b). Plaintiffs nakedly assert defendants’ alleged violation of section 2923.7 

caused numerous harms, but they have not pleaded any facts to demonstrate how the supposed 

failure to provide a single point of contact made any difference at all. Without these critical 

details—absent for a third time—plaintiffs cannot state a claim for relief under section 2923.7, and 

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thus it must be dismissed without leave to amend.

E. Claim 4: Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 2924.12

Section 2924.12 created remedies for material violations of the HBOR. See Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 2924.12. The type of remedy available depends on, whether the trustee’s deed upon sale has 

been recorded, compare id. § 2924.12(a), with id. § 2924.12(b), or whether the mortgage 

servicer’s conduct was intentional or reckless, id. § 292412(b). Judicially noticeable documents

confirm the trustee’s deed upon sale of 176 Randall Street has been recorded, and therefore 

plaintiffs’ only available remedy is an award of actual damages or treble or statutory damages 

should they prove the defendants acted recklessly or intentionally. See id. § 292412(b). These 

remedies are available only if plaintiffs have stated viable claims for relief for material violations 

of other provisions of the HBOR. They have not. Thus, plaintiffs’ fourth claim for relief must be 

dismissed without leave to amend.

F. Claim 5: The UCL Claim 

The UCL prohibits all unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices. Cal. Bus. 

& Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. Each of these three types of business acts or practices are 

independently actionable; “a plaintiff may show that the acts or practices at issue are either 

unlawful or unfair or deceptive.” Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 4th 

1158, 1169 (2002) (emphasis in original). “A business practice is ‘unlawful’ if it is forbidden by 

law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Unfair” business practices are those which 

“offend[] an established public policy”; are “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or 

substantially injurious to consumers”; or those which do not outweigh “the gravity of the harm to 

the alleged victim.” Id. at 1170 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, a business practice is 

“deceptive” if “members of the public are likely to be deceived.” Id. at 1170. 

To raise a claim under the UCL, however, a plaintiff must aver facts showing that she has 

“suffered an injury in fact and . . . lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” 

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. Asturias and Del Portillo must therefore include facts in their 

complaint establishing a “‘causal connection’ between [defendants’] alleged UCL violation and 

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[their] injury in fact.” Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Hall v. Time Inc., 158 Cal.App.4th 847, 855 (2008)).

The FAC included one conclusory averment addressing causation, which was insufficient 

to demonstrate standing. Plaintiffs have not altered the wording of their UCL claim in the 

slightest. Without any facts supporting a nexus between defendants’ actions and the harm 

plaintiffs suffered, their UCL claims cannot advance.

Moreover, even if plaintiffs had adequately pleaded standing to pursue a claim arising 

under the UCL, the SAC is devoid of the factual averments necessary to state claims under any of 

the three prongs. Asturias and Del Portillo presumably rely upon the alleged HBOR violations to 

serve as the basis for their claim that defendants’ conduct was “unlawful.” Yet, those claims are 

not pleaded sufficiently, and therefore their UCL claim cannot piggyback on these deficiently 

pleaded claims. 

In addition, to plead a claim for fraudulent conduct, plaintiffs must satisfy the heightened 

pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and include “the who, what, when, 

where, and how that would suggest fraud.” Cooper, 137 F.3d at 627 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The SAC does not come remotely close to satisfying that standard. Who contacted 

which defendant when, or any other important detail that might establish fraud, are missing from 

the SAC. Accordingly, plaintiffs have not pleaded fraud with sufficient particularity. 

Finally, plaintiffs contend defendants’ conduct was unfair because defendants did not 

comply with the HBOR’s requirements. They have not included facts supporting that contention, 

and therefore may not use the alleged HBOR violations to prove defendants’ conduct was unfair. 

In sum, even if plaintiffs had standing to pursue claims for UCL violations, the SAC does 

not include enough factual detail to permit such claims to advance. They will not have leave to 

amend the complaint a fourth time. 

G. Claims 6 and 7: To Set Aside the Trustee Sale and Cancel the Trustee’s Deed

“After a nonjudicial foreclosure sale has been completed, the traditional method by which 

the sale is challenged is a suit in equity to set aside the trustee’s sale.” Lona v. Citibank, N.A., 202 

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Cal. App. 4th 89, 103 (2011). That remedy is generally available only in three circumstances: 

procurement of the foreclosure decree by fraud; “where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or 

unlawfully conducted, or is tainted by fraud”; or “where there has been a mistake” and equity 

requires setting aside the sale. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To prevail on a claim to set 

aside the trustee sale, a mortgagor-plaintiff must prove “(1) the trustee or mortgagee caused an 

illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of real property pursuant to a power of sale in a 

mortgage or deed of trust”; (2) the sale prejudiced the plaintiff; and (3) that she “tendered the 

amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering.” Id. at 104. Because these 

claims for relief sound in fraud, Rule 9(b) applies.

Asturias and Del Portillo have failed to meet their pleading burden again for the same 

reason they failed to do so in the FAC. Indeed, the FAC and SAC are identical with respect to the 

factual basis pleaded in support of the sixth and seventh claims for relief. Thus, Asturias and Del 

Portillo have once again failed to outline any information that would establish fraudulent conduct 

or to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s pleading requirements. 

Finally, as before, Asturias and Del Portillo have not averred that they made a valid offer 

“to pay back what the plaintiff has received less interest and finance charges.” Pantoja v. 

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2009). Instead, they aver 

willingness and ability to “tender funds to satisfy the alleged deficiency,” but they expressly admit 

that they “did not tender those funds” because defendants informed them that the sale would not 

proceed as a result of the review of the loan modification application. SAC ¶ 59. Instead, 

plaintiffs assert they were not required to tender funds because defendants lacked authority to 

initiate the sale. “Tender may not be required where it would be inequitable to do so.” Onofrio v. 

Rice, 55 Cal. App. 4th 413, 424 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The California Court 

of Appeal has held such a circumstance arises when the mortgage servicer violates California Civil 

Code § 2923.5 because “the whole point of section 2923.5 is to create a new, even if limited right, 

to be contacted about the possibility of alternatives to full payment of arrearages.” Mabry v. 

Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 4th 208, 225 (2010) (emphasis in original). Finally, when a sale 

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would be void, tender is unnecessary. Lester v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 926 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 

1093 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Dimock v. Emerald Props. LLC, 81 Cal. App. 4th 868, 876 (2000)). 

None of these circumstances is present here, however, because plaintiffs have failed to 

plead a viable violation of section 2923.5. Nor have they averred sufficient facts to conclude the 

sale of 176 Randall Street was void. Accordingly, they have not demonstrated they are relieved of 

the tender requirement. 

In sum, plaintiffs have not satisfied the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b). Nor 

have they pleaded adequate tender. Accordingly, Claims 6 and 7 must be dismissed. That 

plaintiffs have been unable to cure pleading deficiencies when given the opportunity suggests they 

cannot rectify these problems. Therefore, leave to amend is not granted.

H. Quiet Title

The FAC did not include an eighth claim for relief to quiet title even though the caption 

suggested one might appear in the body of the pleadings. In contrast, the SAC includes such a 

claim. Defendants move to dismiss this claim outright because plaintiffs never sought leave to 

add this eighth claim for relief. Plaintiffs do not respond, amounting to a concession that they 

failed to follow proper procedure. 

Even if they had responded, this claim for relief may not advance because plaintiffs’ 

claimed entitlement to quiet title is predicated on alleged violations of the HBOR. The fact they 

have not sufficiently stated violations of those provisions dooms their eighth claim for relief. 

Plaintiffs do not have leave to amend this or any other claims.

V. CONCLUSION

Asturias and Del Portillo have failed adequately to plead claims for relief after three 

opportunities to do so. The motion to dismiss is therefore granted without leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Case 3:15-cv-03861-RS Document 51 Filed 04/22/16 Page 12 of 13
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE SAC

CASE NO. 15-cv-03861-RS

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Dated: April 22, 2016

______________________________________

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

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