Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07093/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07093-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 14, 1999 Decided March 12, 1999

No. 98-7093

The Keefe Company,

Appellant

v.

Americable International, Inc.,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cv01568)

Griffith L. Green argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs were Thomas C. Green and Mark D. Hopson.

Robert P. Parker argued the cause for appellee. With him

on the brief was Gaela K. Gehring-Flores. Swati Agrawal

entered an appearance.

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Before: Wald, Silberman and Sentelle, Circuit Judges.

Wald, Circuit Judge: The Keefe Co. ("Keefe"), a selfdescribed "governmental relations/public affairs firm," Joint

Appendix ("J.A.") at 428, entered into a contract in 1985 with

Americable International, Inc. ("Americable"), a Floridabased operator of cable television facilities, to help Americable break into the burgeoning business of supplying cable

television to United States military installations. Keefe

claims that in 1988, Americable stopped making payments

due under the contract. Americable argues that the contract

is void because it violates a statutory prohibition of contingent

fee arrangements for the procurement of government services, and also, that Keefe is barred from bringing this suit by

the District of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations on

breach of contract claims. On Americable's motion for summary judgment, the district court ruled that some of Keefe's

claims were not time-barred, but granted summary judgment

to Americable on the grounds that the contract violated the

statute. For the reasons stated below, we disagree that the

contract is invalid as a matter of law, and certify the statute

of limitations issue to the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals.

I.

In a letter agreement executed by Keefe and Americable

on September 4, 1986,1 Keefe agreed to provide Americable

with "consulting, advisory, liaison, marketing, negotiating and

related services which may be required in obtaining contracts

to install cable television (CATV) service systems to United

States Government installations both in the United States and

abroad." J.A. at 8. Paragraph 4 of the letter agreement

states in relevant part:

In the event that [Americable is] awarded a contract to

install a CATV system on a U.S. Government installation

__________

1 The first agreement between the parties was executed on

September 24, 1985. We will refer only to the more recent agreement, which does not materially differ from the earlier one.

after the date of this agreement, The Keefe Company

shall be entitled to receive fees as follows:

(A) The Keefe Company shall be paid a one-time fee of

$10.00 for each "home passed." "Home" means a singlefamily residence. BOQ's, barracks, multi-family residential buildings and the like shall be considered as one

home....

(B) The Keefe Company shall receive 3% of the gross

monthly subscriber revenues received by the system

from and after 90 days after initiation of service. Such

payment shall be made once a month on the first of the

month and shall continue until sale of the system. In

the event the Government Installation is closed or [AmUSCA Case #98-7093 Document #422494 Filed: 03/12/1999 Page 2 of 16
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ericable] ceases to provide services to said Government

Installation [Americable's] obligation to pay The Keefe

Company shall cease. Termination of this agreement as

hereinafter provided shall not affect The Keefe Company

[sic] right to said fee or [Americable's] obligation to pay

the same on bases where a service agreement has been

executed and a CATV system has been constructed by

[Americable].

J.A. at 9. In addition, if Americable sold a cable system,

Keefe was to receive 2 percent of the gross sale price. Keefe

also agreed not to represent any other cable company while

working for Americable. Id.

Keefe alleges that in 1988, Americable stopped making

payments under paragraphs 4(A) and 4(B) of the letter

agreement. Americable's version is that the relationship

"soured." J.A. at 411 (Defendant's Statement of Material

Facts Not in Dispute). Americable now argues that the

entire contract is void because it violates the law against

contingent fee arrangements for the procurement of government services. That law, 41 U.S.C. s 254(a), provides that:

Every contract ... shall contain a suitable warranty, as

determined by the agency head, by the contractor that

no person or selling agency has been employed or retained to solicit to secure such contract upon an agreement or understanding for a commission, percentage,

brokerage, or contingent fee, excepting ... bona fide

established commercial or selling agencies maintained by

the contractor for the purpose of securing business, for

the breach or violation of which the Government shall

have the right to annul such contract without liability or

in its discretion to deduct from the contract price the full

amount of such commission, percentage, brokerage, or

contingent fee.

As we have previously held, "[a] compensation contract in

violation of the required warranty will not be enforced by the

courts." Le John Mfg. Co. v. Webb, 222 F.2d 48, 50 (D.C. Cir.

1955) (violation of materially identical warranty previously

required by executive order); accord Quinn v. Gulf & Western Corp., 644 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1981).

Keefe argues that it falls within the "bona fide agency"

exception to the warranty requirement. The applicable Federal Acquisition Regulations define "bona fide agency" as "an

established commercial ... agency, maintained by a contractor for the purpose of securing business, that neither exerts

nor proposes to exert improper influence to solicit or obtain

Government contracts nor holds itself out as being able to

obtain any Government contract or contracts through improper influence." 48 C.F.R. s 3.401 (1986).2 "Improper influence" is defined as "any influence that induces or tends to

induce a Government employee or officer to give consideration or to act regarding a Government contract on any basis

other than the merits of the matter." Id. Finally, the

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following guidelines "describe circumstances ordinarily existing in acceptable arrangements in which the agency is bona

fide ...":

(1) The fee should not be inequitable or exorbitant

when compared to the services performed or to custom-

__________

2 Although these are the primary governing regulations, the

parties also cite other subparts of the Code of Federal Regulations

that are identical to 48 C.F.R. ss 3.400-3.410, see, e.g., 48 C.F.R.

s 52.203-5 (1984), cited in Keefe's Brief (K. Br.) at 15. For the

sake of consistency we refer to subpart 3.4 throughout our opinion.

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ary fees for similar services related to commercial business.

(2) The agency should have adequate knowledge of the

contractor's product and business, as well as other qualifications necessary to sell the products or services on

their merits.

(3) The contractor and the agency should have a continuing relationship or, in newly established relationships, should contemplate future continuity.

(4) The agency should be an established concern that

has existed for a considerable period, or be a newly

established going concern likely to continue in the future.

The business of the agency should be conducted in the

agency name and characterized by the customary indicia

of the conduct of regular business.

(5) While an agency that confines its selling activities

to Government contracts is not disqualified, the fact that

an agency represents the contractor in Government and

commercial sales should receive favorable consideration.

Id. s 3.408-2(c).

The district court rejected the notion that Keefe qualified

as a bona fide agency. The court applied a two-part test:

first, the court held that there is a "threshold requirement

that an entity not use improper influence"; and second, that

the federal regulations establish additional criteria for evaluating the applicability of the bona fide agency exception.

Keefe Co. v. Americable Int'l, Inc., Civ. No. 94-1568, at 5

(D.D.C. May 11, 1998). The court awarded summary judgment to Americable because Keefe failed the threshold test.

"Principally, it is Keefe's efforts at using congressional contacts to advance Americable's business that steer the Court to

this conclusion," the district court found. "Keefe arranged to

have two congressmen--in their capacities as members of the

House Appropriations Committee on Military Construction--

write letters lauding Americable to the commanders of bases

that Americable wished to service. These letters were sent

during the procurement process and can be read to suggest

that the bases hire Americable based on reasons other than

the merits of their work." Id. at 6-7.

The district court was referring to identical letters jointly

signed by Reps. Vic Fazio and Bill Lowery and addressed to

commanders of naval bases in California (three of these

letters appear in the record). J.A. at 305-07. Each letter

began by explaining that the congressmen were writing about

requests for proposals (RFPs) that had recently been issued

for interactive-capable CATV services at the naval bases.

The letters continued:

As Members of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction we are particularly concerned about quality of life programs for servicemen and

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women and their families. We are pleased therefore that

the Navy is pursuing the installation of cable TV at this

base. Given the expanded viewing opportunities that

cable afford the subscribers, we feel that this will be of

great benefit to those who live and work on Navy facilities.

In view of the scope of this RFP, we wanted to let you

know that one of the firms which has submitted a

proposal, Americable International, Inc. has earned an

excellent reputation for the service it provides at other

military bases throughout the country. This company

which has been awarded contracts at Vanderberg [sic]

AFB, Homestead AFB, Roosevelt Roads Naval Station

and all five Navy bases in San Diego[3], provides state-ofthe-art equipment and the type of organization needed to

provide quality service for military personnel and their

families.

We share your desire to provide our service families

with a top notch cable system at the lowest possible

price. Thus, we hope that you will give the Americable

proposal every consideration.

__________

3 The congressmen sent their first letter to the naval commander

in San Diego. Americable was eventually awarded the contract for

the San Diego installations, and this fact appeared in the two

subsequent letters that appear in the record. J.A. at 306, 307.

J.A. at 305 (letter to Captain J.W. Cook, Navy Public

Works Center, August 26, 1986). Other letters, which were

not discussed by the district court but appear in the record,

provide further detail of Keefe's contacts with politicians on

behalf of Americable. Most of these contacts seem to have

been initiated by Eli Feinberg, a Florida consultant who

introduced Americable's chairman, Charles Hermanowski, to

Keefe officers, and who entered into a contract with Keefe to

help in its representation of Americable. See J.A. at 33. In

May 1986, Feinberg sent a note to Rep. William M. Lehman,

the congressman for Americable's district. Feinberg wrote,

"It was good talking to you today and I hope this note finds

you and Joan in the best of health," and he then mentioned

that Americable was vying for the cable franchise at the

McClellan Air Force Base in California. Feinberg asked

Rep. Lehman if he would ask Rep. Fazio, whose district

included McClellan, "to put in a good word for Ameri-Cable

International [sic], as your constituent, with the Base Commander." J.A. at 304. In addition, three letters appear in

the record that were sent to Feinberg: one from Rep. Dante

Fascell of Florida, one from Sen. Lawton Chiles' administrative assistant, and one from Sen. Chiles. J.A. at 308, 309,

311. The letters address the fact that Feinberg had contacted Fascell's and Chiles' offices regarding Americable's protest

of a contract that was awarded to another cable provider at

the Guantanamo Naval Station. It appears from these letters

that Rep. Fascell and Sen. Chiles agreed to contact, and did

contact, the General Accounting Office (GAO) regarding Americable's protest. See also J.A. at 310, 312 (letters from

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GAO to Rep. Fascell acknowledging his correspondence).

Americable argues that this series of correspondence, as

the district court concluded, "can be read to suggest" that

Keefe improperly tried to use its political connections so "that

the bases [would] hire Americable based on reasons other

than the merits of [Americable's] work." "Most importantly,

the district court relied on the uncontradicted fact that Keefe

invited the intervention of influential Congressmen into the

procurement process. That fact is sufficient to trigger the

contingent-fee prohibition...." Americable's Brief (Am. Br.)

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at 14. In addition to letters from politicians, Americable

points to testimony in the record showing that Keefe met

with the staff of Sen. Murkowski regarding Alaska military

installations and used a personal connection to gather information about cable outlets at Nellis Air Force Base near Las

Vegas. Am. Br. at 8-9.

We disagree that this evidence is sufficient to support

summary judgment on Americable's argument that Keefe

intended to "induce a Government employee or officer to give

consideration or to act regarding a Government contract on

any basis other than the merits of the matter." 48 C.F.R.

s 3.401. "A court may dispose of a case on summary judgment before trial only where there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact." Shields v. Eli Lilly & Co., 895 F.2d 1463,

1465 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). "The

standard test for summary judgment is 'whether a fairminded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmovant] on the

evidence presented.' " Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986)). Where more than one

plausible inference can be drawn from the undisputed facts,

summary judgment is not appropriate. See United States v.

Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1995). However, if

" '[u]ndisputed facts ... point unerringly to a single, inevitable conclusion,' " summary judgment would be warranted.

Id. (quoting In re Varrasso, 37 F.3d 760, 764 (1st Cir. 1994)).

Finally, "[i]n reviewing a district court's decision on a summary judgment motion, our role is" the same as the trial

court's. Shields, 895 F.2d at 1465.

As this case is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment to Americable, in order to sustain that judgment we

must conclude that Americable has succeeded in showing that

an inference of improper influence is the only reasonable one

to be drawn from this set of circumstances. We cannot so

conclude. Even if, as the trial judge found, the letters from

Reps. Fazio and Lowery "can be read" to suggest that Keefe

intended to exercise "improper influence," it is just as plausible that the letters "can be read" to suggest that Keefe

merely used its knowledge of the political process to press

Americable's case "on the merits." The letters from Reps.

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Fazio and Lowery, as well as Feinberg's letter to Rep.

Lehman, all focus (at least in part) on Americable's qualifications to provide cable service at military bases. The letters

from the GAO to Rep. Fascell and Sen. Chiles acknowledge

the lawmakers' interest in Americable's bid protest but nowhere suggest the use of any improper pressure to resolve

the protest in a certain way.4 It is true, as the district court

noted, that Keefe cannot win its case by resting on the

absence of evidence that it actually exerted improper influence. Rather, the definition of "improper influence" in the

regulations requires us to look to the tendency of Americable's and Keefe's contractual relationship, as well as the

tendency of Keefe's business practices, to germinate improper

influence. See 48 C.F.R. s 3.401. Even so, we do not find

that the contract and Keefe's activities on behalf of Americable give rise to only one reasonable inference--that Keefe

"propose[d] to exert improper influence to solicit or obtain

Government contracts." Id.

Although the district court did not reach the second part of

its test for the bona fide agency exception, applying the

factors listed in the FARs, we note that Americable does not

argue that Keefe's fees were "inequitable or exorbitant," id.

s 3.408(c)(1); or that Americable and Keefe did not contemplate a "continuing relationship," id. s 3.408(c)(3); or that

Keefe is not an "established concern that has existed for a

considerable period," id. s 3.408(c)(4). Instead, Americable

argues that Keefe did not have adequate knowledge of the

cable industry, id. s 3.408(c)(2), and that Keefe's only mission

was to sell Americable to the government, id. s 3.408(c)(5).

Americable folds these two arguments into one general objection: that Keefe's supposed lack of regular and specified

duties shows that it was hired to curry influence with public

officials, and not for its expertise in the cable industry and

with business contracts. But as the Second Circuit observed

in Puma Industrial Consulting, Inc. v. Daal Assoc. Inc., 808

F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1987), "[t]he consideration and application of

__________

4 We assume, without deciding, that Feinberg's letters are attributable to Americable.

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these enumerated factors can be meaningful only in light of

the policies underlying s 254(a). The purpose of this warranty requirement is to 'protect government agencies against

corrupting influences.' " 808 F.2d at 985 (quoting Mitchell v.

Flintkote Co., 185 F.2d 1008, 1010 (2d Cir. 1951)). Applying

the FAR factors to a case much like the one at bar, the

Second Circuit in Puma upheld a district court judgment in a

consulting firm's favor. The court found that the bona fide

agency exception applied to a firm whose business was assisting small companies in obtaining government contracts and

who had helped a textile wholesaler obtain government business by, among other things, gathering information on bid

proposals. "Puma is in the business of assisting small businesses in procuring contracts with the government and other

agencies. There is not even a hint of the selling of governmental influence." Id. We think many of the same considerations apply here.

Americable argues, however, that the regulations should be

read restrictively to permit contingent fee contracts to procure government services only when the performing party fits

"into the narrow category reserved for technical and administrative experts," Am. Br. at 25, because that is what the

common law presumption against contingent fee arrangements required. Even if that were what the common law

required--and we are not at all sure it was so confined, see

generally Acme Process Equipment Co. v. United States, 347

F.2d 538, 548-550 & n.11 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (common law adopted

totality of the circumstances approach to evaluating the challenged relationship), Le John, 222 F.2d at 51 (restrictive

approach of the common law nonetheless involves evaluating

totality of the circumstances)--we find no support for this

view in the statute or the regulations.

We therefore conclude that the district court erred in

granting summary judgment to Americable on the ground

that--as a matter of law--its contract with Keefe violated the

statute against contingent fee contracts for obtaining government services.

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II.

Having decided that this case is not fit for summary

judgment on the question of whether the contract violates

public policy, we are still faced with another potentially

determinative issue: whether all of Keefe's contract claims

are barred by the District of Columbia's three-year statute of

limitations on contract claims. See D.C. Code s 12-301(7).

Keefe claims that Americable breached paragraph 4(A) of the

September 4, 1986 letter agreement when Americable failed

to pay Keefe the "one-time fee of $10.00 for each home

passed"--that is, $10.00 for each military base resident connected to cable on all contracts Americable obtained at United States military installations--resulting in unpaid fees of

$395,000. Complaint ("Compl.") %57 4. Keefe also claims that

Americable breached paragraph 4(B) of the letter agreement,

in which Americable had agreed to pay Keefe a monthly fee

of 3 percent of the gross monthly subscriber revenues earned

by Americable on the military contracts until the sale of the

cable system, amounting to $870,000 in unpaid fees. Id.

Keefe alleges that Americable stopped making payments to

Keefe under both paragraphs some time in 1988; Americable

avers that the "Keefe-Americable relationship soured in midto late-1987." J.A. at 411 (Defendant's Statement of Material

Facts Not in Dispute).5 Keefe brought this action in 1994.

Americable argues that the three-year statute of limitations

has run on all of Keefe's claims because Keefe did not file suit

to recover the one-time fees and the subscriber revenue fees

within three years of the date the payments ended in 1988.

Keefe responds that the contract should be viewed as one for

installment payments. The law governing installment pay-

__________

5 Neither party provides details of this alleged termination.

There is a vague allusion in the record to an instance in which

Hermanowski communicated to Keefe that Americable was terminating the contract. See J.A. at 183 (testimony of Richard D.

Shelby, former senior vice president of Keefe); J.A. at 592 (testimony of Eli M. Feinberg, Florida lobbyist who assisted Keefe). But

neither party raised this information before the district court, nor is

it discussed in this appeal. We will therefore treat it as immaterial.

ments is that "the Statute of Limitations begins to run on

each instalment [sic] when it becomes due and payable....

This is also true where a monetary obligation is payable in

instalments." 18 Samuel Williston & Walter H.E. Jaeger, A

Treatise on the Law of Contracts s 2926(C) (3d ed. 1978).

Thus, Keefe, argues, it should be able to recover for all

payments due within three years of the time it filed suit. The

district court agreed with Americable that Keefe was timebarred from bringing suit on Americable's failure to make the

"one-time fee" payments because, by their nature, one-time

fees are not "installments"--they are due and owing only

once--and these fees were due and owing six years before

Keefe filed suit.6 But the court also held that Keefe was not

time-barred from bringing suit on the unpaid monthly subscriber fees because such fees were payable in installments.

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Americable appeals the latter ruling, arguing that its alleged

failure to pay fees beginning in 1988 constituted a complete

"termination" of the contract, thus triggering a single limitations period that ran from the date of termination.

We find there is no clear precedent in the decisions of the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals. We therefore certify

the following question of law to the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals pursuant to D.C. Code s 11-723:

Under District of Columbia law, and upon the facts

described in this opinion, when parties have entered into

a contract in which payment is due on the first of each

month, calculated as a percentage of the promisor's

revenues from a specific service already rendered by the

promissee, does the limitation period begin to run separately on each missed payment, as is generally the case

with installment contracts, or, does repudiation or breach

of the contract as a whole trigger a single limitations

period?

Americable argues that "termination of a contract to make

a stream of payments does not establish a pattern of 'repeated breaches,' " as in an installment contract, because it is

__________

6 Keefe does not challenge this ruling.

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"a single breach of a contract to make a series of payments."

Resp. Br. at 34 (emphasis in original). The local D.C. courts

have not addressed this argument--or at least, not so recently or directly that we can discern a clear answer.

In one very early case, the plaintiff sued the estate of a

woman who had promised to pay the plaintiff $50 a month for

life in exchange for services the plaintiff performed for the

woman when she was alive. But the suit was filed more than

five years after the payments had stopped--well outside the

three-year limitation period. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia opined: "[I]t is well settled

that where a debt is payable in independent instalments [sic]

the right of action accrues upon each as it matures, and if the

obligee shall fail to commence his action until the statutory

bar has intervened in the case of one or more instalments, he

can only recover those not barred when his action was

commenced." Washington Loan & Trust Co. v. Darling, 21

App. D.C. 132, 140 (D.C. 1903). In Darling, however, the

court did not discuss the possibility that the contract had

been repudiated or totally breached. Instead, the Darling

court, directly applying the general rule of installment payments, concluded that the limitations period began to run at

the time each payment was due and owing and that the

plaintiff could therefore bring suit on unpaid installments for

the previous three years.

In Le John Mfg. Co. v. Webb, 91 A.2d 332 (D.C. 1952),7 the

court held that a contract identical to the one at issue--a

contingent fee contract to procure government business, with

payments for services based on a percentage of the business

procured and payable in installments--can be viewed as an

"ordinary installment contract." 91 A.2d at 335 (holding that

plaintiff had to bring claims for all installment payments that

were past due at the time he filed suit or be barred by res

judicata; accordingly, plaintiff could not disaggregate his

__________

7 This case was the precursor to Le John Mfg. Co. v. Webb, 222

F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1955), discussed above. The District of Columbia

Municipal Court dismissed the earlier case for lack of jurisdiction,

see infra.

claims to avoid the $3,000 jurisdictional limit on cases brought

in municipal court). But Le John does not advance the ball

much, because the court again was not presented with the

question of whether to treat the breach of an employment

contract providing for monthly payments over an indefinite

period of time as a total breach of the whole contract triggering one limitations period, or as a series of separate breaches

for failure to make payments, each triggering its own limitations period. A case cited with approval in Le John, Goodwin

v. Cabot Amusement Co., 149 A. 574 (Me. 1930), held that a

plaintiff who had received a judgment in an earlier suit for

missed installment payments on an employment contract was

not barred by res judicata from bringing another suit for

subsequently missed payments. The defendant in Goodwin

had argued that the plaintiff's judgment on the earlier suit

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was for total breach and accordingly encompassed all future

damages and barred him from suing again on the same

contract. The Goodwin court held that the plaintiff in his

first suit had a "right to have chosen to proceed either on the

basis of a total breach and in that action recover all damages,

present and future, or to sue for the separate installments

due at the time suit might be brought," 149 A. at 579, and

found that the plaintiff had only sued for separate installments.

Where an agreement provides for the payment of

installments of money, suit may be brought for successive installments, if they are not paid as they become

due, during the continuance of the agreement....

In view of ... a clear intent to give the [plaintiff] the

benefit of definite and regular payments of money at

agreed periods, we find that the agreement is divisible in

its terms, susceptible of successive breaches on failure to

pay installments when due, and that each successive

failure to pay under the agreement constitutes a fresh

cause of action of which the plaintiff can avail himself if

he chooses.

Id. at 579. See also Davis v. Young, 412 A.2d 1187 (D.C.

1980) (holding with regard to a claim for unpaid wages under

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the Minimum Wage Act that "[i]n cases of periodic payment,

such as wages, each payment date gives rise to a new claim").

This, of course, suggests that the promisee of installment

payments, such as Keefe, may choose to bring suit on the

payments due and owing instead of on the entire contract.

More recently, in Press v. Howard University, 540 A.2d

733, 735 (D.C. 1988), the Court of Appeals addressed the

converse factual setting of Darling and Le John--a single,

total breach of an employment contract. But the Press court

was not presented with the argument that the contract could

be viewed as providing for installment payments. The plaintiff in Press relied on Davis to argue not only that each

missed salary payment stemming from the total suspension of

his employment gave rise to a new limitation period, but

further, that all missed payments for which the limitation

periods had expired could still be recovered under a "continuing violation" theory. The Press court rejected this argument, holding that "[i]n the case before us [ ], the alleged

breach of contract--the suspension--occurred only once...."

Id. Press expressly rejected application of Davis on the

grounds that Davis had nothing to do with the "continuing

violation" doctrine; rather, it involved a "series of repeated

acts occurring at different times, not a single act extending

over a long period," id., as the continuing violation doctrine

would normally require. Moreover, the court noted that

Davis did not involve a contract claim. Thus, Press did not

precisely address the issue before us because Keefe is not

arguing that Americable committed a "continuing violation"--

only that the law governing installment payments should

apply here.

In short, the Press scenario, where an employment contract

was totally breached in a single instance, and the Darling

scenario, where breach of an employment contract was

viewed as a series of individual breaches of the duty to make

installments, have not yet been interposed as competing

arguments before the Court of Appeals. Thus, we do not

know whether the Davis-Le John-Goodwin line of cases is

available to Keefe, and we are compelled to certify the

question for resolution. Appended to this certification are

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the briefs and portions of the district court record on summary judgment provided by the parties to this appeal.

III.

For the reasons stated above, we vacate the judgment of

the district court on the issue of the validity of the contract

and remand for proceedings in accordance with this opinion

and we certify the statute of limitations issue to the District

of Columbia Court of Appeals for resolution.

So ordered.

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