Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02173/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02173-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

NICKY ROTTENS INVESTMENT GROUP, 

INC., a California corporation, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

CITY OF CORONADO, a municipal 

corporation; BLAIR KING, 

 Defendants. 

Case No.: 3:12-CV-2173-JM (RBB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

Plaintiff Nicky Rottens Investment Group (“NRIG”) filed a complaint against the City 

of Coronado (the “City”) and City Manager Blair King (together “Defendants”) on September 

4, 2012 alleging that Coronado violated its constitutional rights to equal protection under the 

Fourteenth Amendment and substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment. NRIG filed 

this action in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal Civil Rights Act. Defendants 

now move to dismiss NRIG’s complaint for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, 

this court grants the Defendants’ motion to dismiss NRIG’s complaint with leave to amend as 

set forth below. 

/ / / 

JM

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. The Permits 

Around July 2010, NRIG purchased a real property located at 100-104 Orange Avenue, 

Coronado, California 92118 (the “premises”). Compl. ¶ 3. The premises previously consisted 

of a blighted bar named “Island Sports” and a Laundromat. Id. ¶ 8. NRIG wanted to convert 

the premises into “a world-class, family-friendly, neighborhood [r]estaurant which caters to and 

serves the residents, guests and tourists of the City of Coronado, San Diego County, California, 

the United States, and the world” (the “Restaurant”). Id. ¶ 11.

To achieve this vision, in September 2010, NRIG submitted applications to the City for 

an Encroachment Permit, which would allow NRIG to install railings defining an outdoor 

dining area, and a Use of City Property for Commercial Activity Permit (“Commercial Use 

Permit”), which would permit NRIG to use the outdoor area to serve food and drinks (together 

the “Permits”). Id. ¶ 5. Along with the premises, NRIG also purchased the Island Sports’ 

liquor type “48” license, which it sought to downgrade to a type “47” license that would permit 

it to serve families and minors in the same establishment.1

 Id. ¶ 4.

Prior to the City Council’s requisite meeting to approve the permits, NRIG met with 

nearby condominium complex residents to discuss any concerns based on previous problems 

with Island Sports. Id. ¶ 23. NRIG claims that it “agreed to consider the homeowners’ 

association’s speculative concerns about the alleged impact that the Restaurant might possibly 

have on the neighborhood.” Id. 

At its January 18, 2011 meeting, the City Council took up NRIG’s application for the 

Permits, along with three similar Encroachment Permit applications submitted by Saiko Sushi 

(“Saiko”), Sapori, and Coronado Firehouse Restaurant (“Coronado Firehouse”). Id. ¶ 18.

 

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 Establishments with type “48” licenses may not permit minors to enter the premises. 

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Saiko, Sapori, and Coronado Firehouse are similar to the Restaurant, include full bar service, 

and were already operating at the time of this hearing. Id. The Restaurant was not yet in 

operation. Id. ¶ 27. Saiko and Sapori had previously been granted temporary Encroachment 

Permits in December 2009. Coronado Firehouse had also previously been granted a temporary 

Encroachment Permit in June 2010. Id. All had previously received these Encroachment 

Permits subject to annual review. Id. ¶ 36. The City Council granted these establishments 

renewed permits for twelve months without imposing any conditions at the meeting. Id. ¶ 27. 

To date, the City has not placed any conditions on permits issued to Saiko, Sapori, Coronado 

Firehouse, or three other restaurants located in the immediate vicinity.2 Id. ¶ 15.

NRIG’s approval process did not go nearly as smoothly. At this meeting, the City’s 

Director of Engineering and Project Development, Ed Walton, brought forth a list of the nearby 

condominium complex residents’ concerns that NRIG had agreed to consider and a list of 

conditions to address these concerns.3

 Id. ¶ 25. Coronado resident Marilyn Field had drafted 

both lists and emailed them to the City. Id. Walton inserted most of Field’s recommendations 

 

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 The other restaurants are: The Little Club located at 132 Orange Avenue; Coronado Brewing Company located at 

170 Orange Avenue; and Tartine located across the street from the Restaurant at 1106 1st Street. Compl. ¶ 15. 

3

 These concessions include: 

1. Triple pane noise controlling windows and skylight closed. 

2. Outdoor diner will close at 10:00 p.m. and the windows will be closed. 

3. Last call for drinks will be well in advance of 1:30 a.m. with patrons 

leaving the bar before 2 a.m. 

4. Security guard patrolling the surrounding area from 10:00 p.m. until after 

closing. 

5. Outside smoking to be limited to small area on South end of patio. 

6. Trash, garbage, and bottle collection system to be indoors in a ventilated 

room and the trash will be picked up by Waste Management. No trash 

outside on street. 

7. No sports TVs outside. 

8. Indoor sports TVs shall be positioned away from patio dining and shall not 

be audible on the patio. Windows [are] to be closed if TVs are audible 

outside. 

9. Windows shall be closed at any time there is live entertainment. 

Compl. ¶ 25. 

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in his Staff Report.4 Id. ¶ 25. Field’s email was included in the City Council’s agenda. Id. 

¶ 28.

A few City officials expressed concerns about these concessions. Defendant King and 

City Attorney Morgan Foley believed that any use limitations attached to the permit should only 

address activities within the encroachment area. Id. ¶ 29. Councilmember Carrie Downey 

expressed concern about the City’s attempt to dictate how NRIG ran its business. Id. ¶ 31. The 

City Council also acknowledged that “it had not imposed similar conditions on other similarly 

situated businesses.” Id. ¶ 30. 

Nevertheless, the City Council ultimately voted unanimously in favor of issuing the 

Permits with all but one of Field’s proposed conditions.5

 The Commercial Use Permit was 

granted from January 18, 2011 to June 30, 2015, but the Encroachment Permit was subject to 

review every six months. Id. ¶ 36. The Encroachment Permit stated that “[p]ermittee hereby 

waives the right to assert any claim or action against the City of Coronado, its officers, agents or 

employees arising out of or resulting from the issuance or revocation of this permit or the 

restoration of the property or any other action taken in accordance with the terms of the permit 

by the city of Coronado, its officers, agents or employees.” MTD, Ex. A at ¶ 5. NRIG signed 

the Permits under protest and thus believes that it did not waive any of its rights by signing 

these Permits. Compl. ¶ 34. 

 

4

 Specifically, he recommended the following concessions: 

1. Stopping outdoor dining at 10 p.m., 

2. Requiring that all windows on Orange Avenue be closed at 10 p.m. 

3. Banning smoking on the patio or limiting it to the south end of the patio 

area.

4. Prohibiting amplified sound in the patio area. 

5. Requiring triple pane windows along Orange Avenue. 

Compl. ¶ 26. 

5

 The only concession not included was that the last call for drinks be well in advance of 1:30 a.m. with patrons 

leaving the bar before 2 a.m. Compl. ¶ 32. 

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On June 7, 2011, the City Council reviewed NRIG’s Encroachment Permit along with a 

request by NRIG for minor changes to the Encroachment Permit necessary to comply with the 

Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. ¶¶ 39, 40. The City Council renewed NRIG’s 

Encroachment Permit with the requested changes, but it added an additional condition requiring 

that patrons seated in the outdoor dining area order food. Id. ¶ 42. This permit contained the 

same waiver language as the originally issued Encroachment Permit. MTD, Ex. B at ¶ 5. 

NRIG accepted, albeit begrudgingly, the newly issued Encroachment Permit. 

On September 1, 2011, NRIG was granted a Temporary Certificate of Occupancy for the 

Restaurant and began operating the Restaurant. Compl. ¶ 45. 

On January 17, 2012, NRIG’s Encroachment Permit came up for review, and the City 

Council discussed using Commercial Use Permits as vehicles to enforce certain conditions. Id. 

¶ 46, 52. At this meeting, Defendant King noted that “[t]he Commercial Activity Permit is a 

device that had typically been used by the City to collect revenue for the public’s use of the 

right-of-way. In talking to staff, only recently, and specifically with [NRIG] permits did it 

become a tool for an imposition of conditions. It is probably not the best tool to do that but the 

reason the Council did that is because there was no other tool available to it. . . . In talking to 

staff, they are unaware of any proactive enforcement post Certificate of Occupancy for any type 

of permit – minor use permit, parking plans and this as well.” Id. ¶ 52. Although the meeting 

revealed no problems with the Restaurant, Council members approved NRIG’s permits with the 

caveat that City staff perform “objective assessments” of NRIG’s compliance with permit 

conditions. Id. ¶¶ 47-55. Pursuant to this new condition, the City’s Assistant Manager, Tom 

Ritter, conducted at least four secret inspections between January 17, 2012 and July 17, 2012. 

Id. ¶ 57. 

On July 17, 2012, NRIG’s Encroachment Permit was again up for review. Id. ¶ 59. The 

City’s Mayor noted that NRIG had met the permit’s requirements. Id. ¶ 59. City 

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Councilmember Woiwode noted that NRIG “noise complaints were not a significant issue for 

NRIG but they were a significant issue for other establishments [located on the Restaurant’s 

block].” Id. ¶ 61. However, City Councilmember Denny complained that the Restaurant was a 

“Gaslamp” type bar and a “nightclub masquerading as a family restaurant.” Id. ¶ 62. NRIG 

again protested the conditions at this meeting. Id. ¶ 63. The City Council approved NRIG’s 

permit, but refused to remove the Encroachment Permit’s attached conditions. Id. NRIG 

assented to the Encroachment Permit’s conditions and did not appeal these conditions. Id. 

B. The Laundromat and Mezzanine Spaces 

Coronado’s Orange Avenue Corridor Specific Plan (“OACSP”), Chapter IV, Section 

J.2c-g, requires a new eating and drinking establishment to provide one parking space per 

hundred square feet of floor area unless it occupies the same space as a former eating and 

drinking establishment that was grandfathered in because it existed prior to the OACSP. Id.; 

OASCP Ch. IV, J.2.c.; OASCP Ch. IV, J.2.g.

The City determined that the area previously housing Island Sports was exempt from 

this requirement because it was a grandfathered eating and drinking establishment. However, 

the City declined to extend this exemption to the area that previously housed the Laundromat or 

the mezzanine space, which had never been used by Islands Sports. Id. ¶ 67. The City has 

permitted NRIG to use the Laundromat area as “retail” space, but required NRIG to install a 

half-height wall before doing so. Id. ¶ 68. 

NRIG complains that the City’s incorrect application of local code has prevented it from 

using the space previously occupied by the Laundromat and the mezzanine floor in the 

Restaurant. Id. ¶ 64. NRIG notes that the premises previously housed one restaurant before it 

was divided into the Laundromat and Island Sports. NRIG asserts that “the City had 

grandfathered other similarly situated establishments after they expanded, but, unreasonably and 

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irrationally, not NRIG.” Id. ¶ 67. However, NRIG failed to provide any examples of differing 

treatment. 

To be able to use the space previously housing the Laundromat, NRIG proposed that it 

lease five parking spots belonging to a hardware store on the same block as the Restaurant. Id. 

¶ 69. The City Council approved this arrangement so long as NRIG provided valet parking for 

these spaces. Id. After some delay, the City Council also issued NRIG a corresponding Permit 

for Use of City Property for Commercial Activity: Valet Services (“Valet Permit”). Id. ¶¶ 70, 

72. Upon issuing the Valet Permit, the City’s Tom Ritter informed NRIG that it could not 

charge for the valet parking. Id. ¶ 73. If NRIG elected to charge for the valet parking, Ritter 

informed NRIG that it would be “out of business” and that its Valet and Encroachment Permits 

might be delayed or taken away. Id. ¶¶ 73, 74. 

The City has also prohibited NRIG from enforcing the no-parking sign, thereby 

preventing NRIG from actually offering the valet parking that the City required NRIG to offer.

Id. ¶ 75. NRIG alleges that the City enforces the no-parking rules for valet spaces, which 

permits other businesses to operate their valet parking services effectively. Id. ¶ 77. 

C. The State-Issued Alcohol Permit 

NRIG claims that the City has intentionally and improperly interfered with its 

application to the California Alcoholic Beverage Control (“ABC”) to downgrade its type 48 

license to a type 47 license. Id. ¶ 80. The ABC advertises that a permit application should take 

180 days to process. Id. ¶ 89. NRIG believes that such conversions are usually routine. Id. ¶ 

109. However, the process has been delayed because the City refuses to acknowledge that the 

premises are properly zoned for alcohol or that NRIG has the necessary permits. Id. ¶ 81. King 

further complicated the conversion process by sending separate letters to ABC Licensing 

Representative Rebekkah Horowitz and ABC District Administrator Jennifer Hill requesting 

that the City’s conditions on NRIG’s Permits be extended to its alcohol license. Id. ¶ 83-86.

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NRIG believes that the City’s interference has led to a delay in the ABC’s approval of its 

application. Id. ¶ 89.

D. Claims 

NRIG believes that it “has been the target of improper harassment and unreasonably 

stricter code enforcement, arbitrary and unreasonable land use regulations and/or unreasonable 

and unnecessary special conditions, and other unequal treatment because the City and/or certain 

members of the City government (including, but not limited to, City Council members Barbara 

Denny and Mike Woiwode) and/or City staff (including, but not limited to Blair King, Peter 

Fait and Tom Ritter, and others) have spite, an irrational or unreasonable personal animus or 

vendetta against NRIG, and/or its owners, and/or unreasonably do not like NRIG, the owners 

and/or prior owners of NRIG, and/or the image, brand, logo, marketing and/or name of NRIG.” 

Id. ¶ 15. Accordingly, NRIG has filed two claims alleging that Coronado violated (1) its 

constitutional right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) its 

constitutional right to substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Legal Standard 

For Plaintiffs to overcome this 12(b)(6) motion, their “[f]actual allegations must be 

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In evaluating the motion, the court must construe the pleadings in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party, accepting as true all material allegations in the 

complaint and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. See, e.g., Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 

1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003). The court should grant 12(b)(6) relief only if the complaint lacks 

either a “cognizable legal theory” or facts sufficient to support a cognizable legal theory.

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

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For plaintiff to be entitled to a remedy under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the 

defendant acted under the color of law in committing the conduct at issue, and (2) such conduct 

deprived plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of 

the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(en banc). The court must then determine if the defendant can be held liable under § 1983 or 

may claim any immunity from suit. In the case of municipalities, the court cannot hold a 

municipality liable under § 1983 unless that the municipality acted pursuant to an official 

policy, custom, or usage adopted by the municipality’s officers. Monell v. Dept. of Social 

Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

B. Discussion 

1. Preclusion Under California Civil Procedure Section 1094.5 

Defendants claim that NRIG is barred from seeking relief under § 1983 because NRIG 

failed to challenge the Permits under California Civil Procedure § 1094.5 (“Cal. Civ. § 1094.5”) 

proceeding (referred to as an administrative mandamus),6

 which is the “exclusive remedy for 

judicial review of quasi-adjudicatory administrative action of the local-level agency.” City of 

Santee v. Superior Ct., 228 Cal. App. 3d 713, 718 (1991). A permit holder’s failure to contest a 

permit’s validity through administrative mandamus estops the permit holder from later 

re-litigating the permit’s validity. Santee, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 718-19 (citing (Rossco Holdings 

Inc. v. State of California, 212 Cal. App. 3d 642, 656-57 (1989); California Coastal Com. v. 

Superior Court, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1488, 1494, 1499-1500, n. 8 (1989)).

 

6

 Cal. Civ. § 1094.5 provides: “Where the writ is issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final 

administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, 

evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, 

corporation, board, or officer, the case shall be heard by the court sitting without a jury.” 

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In United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966), the Supreme 

Court held that federal common law provides that administrative proceedings may be given the 

preclusive effect accorded to a court provided that an administrative agency is “acting in a 

judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have 

had an adequate opportunity to litigate.” Id. at 422. See also Plaine v. McCabe, 797 F.2d 713, 

721 (9th Cir. 1986). California has adopted the federal standard for preclusion specified in Utah 

Construction, so this court need not look beyond California’s preclusion law. Miller v. Cnty. of 

Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1032 (9th Cir. 1994); Plaine, 797 F.2d at 719-20.

California’s judicial exhaustion doctrine provides that an administrative proceeding has 

preclusive effect if it includes several judicial characteristics such as, but not limited to, 

“testimony under oath, the opportunity to call witnesses and introduce evidence, and a formal 

record of the hearing.” McDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. 4th 88 (2008); 

see also Y.K.A. Indus., Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of San Jose, 174 Cal. App. 4th 339, 357 

(“Indicia of proceedings undertaken in a judicial capacity include a hearing before an impartial 

decision maker; testimony given under oath or affirmation; a party’s ability to subpoena, call, 

examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce documentary evidence, and to make oral 

and written argument; the taking of a record of the proceeding; and a written statement of 

reasons for the decision.”); People v. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 479-80 (1982) (analyzing whether 

the administrative proceeding included factors such as requiring witnesses to testify under oath, 

an impartial hearing official, the parties’ ability to subpoena witness, and maintenance of the 

adjudicative record). Notably, no case cited by either party has ever held that these 

administrative proceedings must include every judicial characteristic listed therein. But 

Defendants correctly note that similar local-level agency decisions regarding permits have been 

recognized as having preclusive effect in California state courts. See, e.g., Briggs v. City of 

Rolling Hills Estates, 40 Cal. App. 4th 637, 645-48 (1995) (noting that this statute constitutes a 

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form of res judicata, not a requirement to exhaust administrative remedies); Santee, 228 Cal. 

App. 3d at 718 (upholding the city’s revocation of a builder’s occupancy permit for failure to 

comply with additional conditions the city placed on the building and noting that builder should 

have sought an administrative mandamus). 

NRIG counters that its § 1983 claims for substantive due process and equal protection 

violations are not precluded by Cal. Civ. § 1094.5 because the City’s hearing did not provide 

NRIG with an adequate opportunity to litigate the Permits’ conditions as required by Utah 

Construction.7 Specifically, NRIG argues that “there was no impartial decision maker, no 

testimony under oath, no subpoena power, no opportunity to call, examine or cross examine 

witnesses . . . [no] ability to introduce documentary evidence, [or] make any written argument 

. . . .” NRIG Opp. at 11. NRIG’s most compelling claim is that the City Council hearing lacked 

an impartial decision maker. City officials recognized that NRIG was being uniquely targeted 

and that other businesses were not subject to the same conditions. Compl. ¶¶ 29-31, 49-52, 62. 

NRIG further argues that having the federal government shield local government 

officials from constitutional scrutiny by giving preclusive effect to the City Council’s allegedly 

discriminatory proceedings would be “counterintuitive.” Guru Nanek Sikh Soc’y of Yuba v. 

Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2003); Contasti v. City of Solana Beach, 2012 WL 

4109207 (S.D. Cal., Sept. 18, 2012) (“The Court finds that the primary right presented by 

Plaintiffs in this action is outside the scope of the issue that was litigated during the City 

Council hearings. The Court concludes that the preclusive effect of the City Council’s decision 

does not extend to the substantive due process claim presented in this federal action.”); Jensen 

v. City of Sonoma, 2008 WL 5048203 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (concluding that a state administrative 

 

7

 The court declines to address Plaintiff’s argument that administrative exhaustion need not be shown according to 

Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), because the Defendants do not contend that NRIG failed to exhaust 

its administrative remedies before seeking relief in court. Rather, the Defendants have asserted that the City 

Council’s decision to provide NRIG with a discretionary permit is precluded because NRIG failed to challenge the 

City Council’s decision by administrative mandamus. 

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decision did not preclude Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional claims as those claims arose out of 

conduct at the administrative hearing). 

Although NRIG might have validly brought these § 1983 claims had its permit 

applications been denied following a contested hearing including the taking of evidence, 

creation of a record, and a reasoned decision, NRIG failed to contest conditions imposed upon 

the issued permits other than to verbally object to the conditions while accepting their 

limitations. NRIG does not allege that the conditions have been imposed following the taking 

of evidence, including witness testimony,8

 and further that NRIG has elected to stand on its 

application(s). Rather, under the present complaint, NRIG has attempted to have its cake and 

eat it too, i.e., to operate its restaurant under the complained of permits and simultaneously sue 

the City for substantial damages and injunctive relief under § 1983. This matter is therefore not 

ripe for review because no live controversy exists at present. Whether the underlying 

administrative action is ripe for judicial review requires the court to evaluate “(1) the fitness of 

the issues for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court 

consideration.” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003).

The basic rationale of the ripeness doctrine “is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of 

premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.” Murphy v. 

New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 347 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. 

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967). While a property owner need not necessarily pursue an 

available administrative procedure where to do so would be futile, id. at 349, “[t]he ripeness 

doctrine cautions a court against premature adjudication of disputes involving administrative 

policies or decisions not yet formalized and felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.”

Signature Props. Int’l Ltd. P’ship v. City of Edmond, 310 F.3d 1258, 1265 (10th Cir. 2002). 

 

8

 Although NRIG argues that it had no opportunity to present evidence or be otherwise heard, it has not alleged that 

no right to a hearing with a reviewable record exists such that § 1094.5 review is illusory. 

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Presently, the City has granted NRIG permits to operate its business with various 

conditions, which NRIG has accepted despite its protests. Such acceptance, even when couched 

with protests, means that the parties have reached an agreement that this court should respect. 

Allowing NRIG to both benefit from the conditioned permits while seeking § 1983 relief in 

federal court is tantamount to permitting NRIG to use the threat of litigation to obtain 

concessions in a negotiation about how to address possible concerns about its business. As 

such, the City’s issuance of conditioned permits is not fit for judicial review. 

Moreover, the current benefit derived by NRIG from accepting these Permits outweighs 

the hardship NRIG will suffer if this court refrains from adjudicating this matter. But if NRIG 

were to apply for permits, and the City were to deny an application(s), then, in the absence of 

NRIG accepting different treatment, an active controversy would exist and NRIG would be 

facing the hardship necessary for its claims to be ripe.9

 This court therefore declines to reach 

the merits of NRIG’s § 1983 equal protection and substantive due process claims regarding the 

Permits’ conditions. If NRIG were to allege an administrative hearing has been conducted with 

the taking of evidence, creation of a record, and issuance of a reasoned decision, or that such a 

procedure is unavailable, then upon the City’s unequivocal denial of NRIG’s application(s), 

NRIG’s claims would be arguably ripe. Leave to amend should therefore be granted for NRIG 

on this basis. 

Finally, NRIG’s claim regarding the City’s failure to provide the ABC with the 

information necessary to downgrade its type 48 license to a type 47 license may be ripe for 

review if NRIG adequately pleads that no further administrative or appeals process to compel 

the City to provide the ABC with the necessary information exists. If this is the case, then 

NRIG may be able to state § 1983 claims seeking relief. NRIG has also failed to allege that 

 

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 Assuming that NRIG unsuccessfully attempts to obtain permits with conditions similar to other similarly situated 

businesses from the City, this court notes that NRIG may well be able to successfully plead its § 1983 claims. 

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King was directly responsible for communicating certain information to ABC so that NRIG 

could downgrade its license. Accordingly, NRIG will be given leave to amend this claim. 

In conclusion, although many of the current allegations raise constitutional concerns, it 

is not clear from the complaint that NRIG’s asserted claims are ripe for review by this court. If 

they are not presently ripe, there appears to be a clear path to make them so. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: November 27, 2012 

______________________________

Jeffrey T. Miller 

 United States District Judge 

______________________________

JeffreyT. Miller

United States District Judge 

Case 3:12-cv-02173-JM-RBB Document 9 Filed 11/27/12 Page 14 of 14