Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02293/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02293-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael Stucker, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social 

Security, 

Defendant.

No. CV-10-2293-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 

 Plaintiff suffers from low back pain and arthritis in his right knee, and has had 

multiple knee surgeries. He applied for disability insurance benefits in November 2007, 

claiming to be disabled since May 1, 2006. Doc. 11, Tr. 100-02, 152. The application 

was denied. Tr. 53-63. A hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) was held 

on January 19, 2010. Tr. 24-52. The ALJ issued a written decision on February 16, 

2010, finding Plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 

Tr. 11-18. This decision became Defendant’s final decision when the Appeals Council 

denied review. Tr. 1-3. 

 Plaintiff then commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). Doc. 1. The issues are fully briefed. Docs. 12, 13, 15. Oral argument has not 

been requested. For reasons that follow, the Court will reverse Defendant’s decision and 

remand for further proceedings. 

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I. Standard of Review.

 The Court has the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of record, a 

judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 

Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits “should be upheld unless it is based on legal 

error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 

1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). In determining whether the decision is supported by 

substantial evidence, the Court “must consider the entire record as a whole and may not 

affirm simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Id.

II. Discussion.

 Whether a claimant is disabled is determined using a five-step evaluation process. 

To establish disability, the claimant must show (1) he has not worked since the alleged 

disability onset date, (2) he has a severe impairment, and (3) his impairment meets or 

equals a listed impairment or (4) his residual functional capacity (RFC) precludes him 

from performing his past work. At step five, the Commissioner must show that the 

claimant is able to perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. 

 Plaintiff has met his burden. He has not worked since May 1, 2006. Tr. 13, ¶ 2. 

He has severe degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, patellofemoral arthritis of 

the right knee, and status post partial medial menisectomy. Tr. 13, ¶ 3. While those 

impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment (Tr. 13, ¶ 4), they do preclude 

Plaintiff from performing his past work as a printer (Tr. 17, ¶ 6). At step five, the ALJ 

concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled because he has the RFC to perform sedentary 

work with certain limitations. Tr. 13-17, ¶¶ 5, 9-11. Specifically, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff experiences only moderate pain and has the RFC to lift and carry up to 20 

pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, to stand or walk 2 hours and sit 6 hours in 

an 8-hour workday with the ability to alternate positions, and to occasionally climb stairs, 

crouch, crawl, squat, balance, and stoop. Tr. 13-14, ¶ 5. 

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 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in three respects: rejecting the opinions of 

treating physicians, finding Plaintiff’s symptom testimony not entirely credible, and 

failing to consider lay witness testimony. Doc. 12. Defendant contends that the ALJ did 

not err and his decision is supported by substantial evidence. Doc. 13. 

A. The Treating Physicians’ Opinions.

 On January 4, 2010, Drs. Benjamin Venger and Jeffrey Carls opined that Plaintiff 

is unable to work due to right knee problems, chronic pain, and side-effects from pain 

medication. Tr. 319, 332. The ALJ erred in rejecting those opinions, Plaintiff contends, 

because he failed to provide specific, legitimate reasons supported by substantial 

evidence. Doc. 12 at 5-6. The Court does not agree. 

 The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any medical source, including a treating 

physician, “if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical 

findings.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ found, 

correctly, that Drs. Venger and Carls’ opinions of disability are conclusory and not 

supported by their own clinical findings. Tr. 15-16; see Tr. 319-82. Nowhere in their 

opinions do the doctors assess Plaintiff’s RFC or provide examples of how Plaintiff’s 

impairments limit his work-related abilities. “The ALJ’s rejection of [the treating 

physicians’] opinion[s] is supported by substantial evidence and was based on a 

permissible determination within the ALJ’s province.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 

1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005); see Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2003). 

B. Plaintiff’s Testimony.

 Plaintiff testified at the hearing that he is able to stand for only a few minutes 

before needing to sit down (Tr. 29), that he can sit for five minutes at a time (Tr. 30), that 

he barely can walk around the house (Tr. 30), and that at least once a month his right 

knee locks up causing debilitating pain (Tr. 38-39). 

 The ALJ found not credible Plaintiff’s testimony concerning the intensity, 

persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms to the extent the testimony is 

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inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC assessment. Tr. 14. There is no dispute that Plaintiff’s 

impairments could reasonably produce some symptoms. Given this fact, and because 

there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ was required to present “specific, clear and 

convincing reasons” for his adverse credibility finding. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by “implicitly” finding him not credible 

(Doc. 12 at 7), but there is nothing implicit about the ALJ’s credibility finding. The ALJ 

noted (Tr. 14-15) that in November 2006, Plaintiff complained of only moderate knee 

and low back pain and that a physical exam at the time was relatively unremarkable (Tr. 

252-54). After successful knee surgery in August 2007, Dr. Theron Tilgner found 

Plaintiff to be “very apprehensive subjectively with any knee mobility” and opined that 

Plaintiff “obviously was mentally blocking his progress and his mobility.” Tr. 238-39. 

Following surgery by Dr. Daniel Heiner in February 2008, Plaintiff was doing well, had 

no problems or complications, and had regained full range of motion in his right knee. 

Tr. 292. Plaintiff reported in December 2008 that he “walks a mile daily and is moving 

more quickly.” Tr. 326. In March 2009, Plaintiff was able to play softball with his 

children, though with some difficulty. Tr. 316. 

 The ALJ also noted (Tr. 15) that Plaintiff was receiving pain medication from both 

Dr. Heiner and nurse Susan Dockins, but told each of them that he was getting 

medication only from them (Tr. 273-74). Given Plaintiff’s “drug seeking behavior,” 

Dockins decided that only Dr. Heiner should prescribe pain medication to Plaintiff. 

Tr. 274. The ALJ explicitly found that these documented concerns over suspected drug 

abuse suggests Plaintiff’s “allegations regarding the intensity of his pain are not entirely 

credible.” Tr. 16. That finding was not erroneous. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959 

(upholding adverse credibility finding where the claimant made inconsistent statements 

about drug use); Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001) (claimant’s 

drug-seeking behavior was a sufficient reason to discount his credibility about pain). 

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 In summary, the ALJ “gave specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting 

[Plaintiff’s] testimony.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. Because those reasons are supported 

by substantial evidence in the record, the Court “may not engage in second-guessing.” 

Id.

C. Lay Witness Testimony.

 “In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must consider lay witness 

testimony concerning a claimant’s ability to work.” Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 

454 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d)(4), 404.1545(a)(3). 

Indeed, because statements from family members and friends may provide insight into 

the severity of the impairments and how they affect the claimant’s ability to function, see 

SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2 (Aug. 9, 2006), such statements constitute 

“‘competent evidence and therefore cannot be disregarded without comment.’” Stout, 

454 F.3d at 1053 (quoting Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(emphasis in original)); see Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001) (the ALJ 

must consider lay witness testimony unless he “expressly determines to disregard such 

testimony and gives reasons germane to each witness for doing so”). 

 In December 2009, Plaintiff’s girlfriend provided a sworn statement describing the 

severe pain Plaintiff experiences and the debilitating nature of his knee problems. 

Tr. 200. Similar statements were provided by a friend and a medical assistant. 

Tr. 201-02. The ALJ committed reversible error in failing to consider this evidence. 

Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056 (“[W]e, along with our sister circuits, have consistently reversed 

the Commissioner’s decision for failure to comment on [lay witness] testimony.”); 

Nguyen, 100 F.3d at 1467 (“By failing to include in the hypothetical the physical 

manifestations that where described by the witnesses or expressly rejecting the testimony 

for legitimate reasons, the ALJ erred.”); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288 (“Disregard of the 

testimony of friends and family members violates 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513[.]”). 

 Defendant asserts that the daily activities described by the lay witnesses actually 

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support the ALJ’s decision. Doc. 13 at 30. But the Court “cannot affirm the decision of 

an agency on a ground that the agency did not invoke in making its decision.” Pinto v. 

Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ, not this Court, “is required to 

provide specific reasons for rejecting lay testimony.” Stout, 454 F.3d at 1054. 

D. Remedy.

 The Court has discretion to remand for further development of the record or for an 

award benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1173-74 (9th 

Cir. 2000). Plaintiff asks the Court to consider granting him disability status based upon 

the opinions of his treating physicians. Doc. 12 at 9. As explained more fully above, 

however, the ALJ did not err in rejecting those opinions. 

 This Circuit has held that evidence should be credited as true, and an action 

remanded for an award of benefits, where three conditions are met: the ALJ has failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, no outstanding issue remains 

that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and it is clear 

from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were the 

rejected evidence credited as true. See, e.g., Varney v. Sec’y of HHS, 859 F.2d 1396, 

1400 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 In cases where the testimony of the vocational expert has failed to address 

functional limitations as established by improperly discredited evidence, this Circuit 

“consistently [has] remanded for further proceedings rather than payment of benefits.” 

Harman, 211 F.3d at 1180 (citation omitted). In this case, the vocational expert offered 

no opinion as to Plaintiff’s ability to work based on the pain and functional limitations 

described by the lay witnesses. A remand for further proceedings is therefore 

appropriate. See Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056-57. 

IT IS ORDERED:

 1. Defendant’s decision denying disability insurance benefits is reversed. 

 2. The case is remanded to Defendant for further proceedings. 

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 3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 20th day of June, 2011. 

Case 2:10-cv-02293-DGC Document 16 Filed 06/20/11 Page 7 of 7