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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 20, 2001 Decided March 15, 2002

No. 00-5363

Victoria L. Breen,

Appellant

v.

Department of Transportation,

Federal Highway Administration and

Norman Y. Mineta, Administrator,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv01003)

Kurt W. Hague argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs were Theodore Whitehouse and Joseph G.

Davis.

Scott S. Harris, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellees. With him on the brief were Roscoe C. Howard,

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Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

Attorney.

Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, Rogers and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Victoria Breen, a former file clerk

at the Federal Highway Administration, brought this suit

alleging that she was discharged from her job in violation of

the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. s 791 et seq. Breen alleges

that she suffers from mental and physical disabilities, but

would have been able to perform her work with a reasonable

accommodation. The district court granted summary judgment against Breen on the ground that no reasonable accommodation would have enabled her to perform the essential

functions of her position. Because we find that there are

genuine issues of material fact as to Breen's ability to perform with an accommodation, we reverse the judgment of the

district court.

I

Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts

are as follows. Breen began working as an office automation

clerk at the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) in

1991, with duties that included the maintenance of office files.

For the first several years, she received "satisfactory" evaluations. Some time in 1994, in connection with taking time off

for knee surgery, Breen developed a backlog of filing that she

was unable to reduce in a timely fashion--to the growing

dissatisfaction of her employer. Beginning in December

1994, the FHWA rated her performance as "needs improvement" and implemented a series of "Performance Improvement Plans" (PIPs), which, inter alia, admonished her to

accomplish her filing duties more expeditiously.

In November 1995, Breen provided the FHWA with letters

from her doctors that showed that she suffered from a variety

of physical and psychiatric disorders, the one most relevant to

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compulsive disorder.1 The letter from Breen's psychiatrist,

Dr. Julie Redditt, also suggested certain accommodations.

Most relevant here were Dr. Redditt's suggestions for a

"structured time schedule which rarely varies without at least

a week's notice" and for an "[a]bsence of 'extra' or different

tasks requested during her work period, especially the filing

period." 1995 Redditt Letter at 4 (Nov. 15, 1995). The

psychiatrist stated that Breen "is able to perform each of the

required operations of her job as an office automation clerk,"

and that with the accommodations "Ms. Breen's performance

could return to its previous level." Id. at 4, 5. Dr. Redditt

suggested the same accommodations in a second letter dated

February 12, 1996. 1996 Redditt Letter at 1 (Feb. 12, 1996).

Breen herself proposed accommodations at various times

between the onset of her employer's dissatisfaction and her

termination. Chief among these was an "alternative work

schedule," pursuant to which she would have worked one hour

past normal business hours every day for eight days, in

exchange for one day off every two-week pay period--thus

maintaining a normal eighty-hour pay period.2 According to

Breen, the "hour of quiet time after business hours to do solid

filing" would have permitted her to complete her filing without the interruptions that she found difficult to deal with as a

consequence of her obsessive-compulsive disorder. Rev.

Breen Decl. p 30; see id. p 27. Breen requested this accommodation a number of times. At the end of her second and

third PIPs in June and September 1995 respectively, Breen

asked for an alternative work schedule that would have

permitted her to work during the "quiet hours." Id. pp 6, 37.

Breen also presented her request for an alternative work

schedule at a meeting on February 29, 1996, id. p 18, and

__________

1 An orthopedist also diagnosed Breen as having knee problems

(chondromalacia and a laterally tracking patella).

2 Other accommodations requested by Breen included prior

notification of the work that she would be required to do on a given

day, a plastic floor mat to allow her stool to roll around the office

filing area, and training another employee to cover for her when she

was absent from the office.

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again in writing one month later, Mem. from Breen to Perros

(requesting "Alternative Work Schedule or overtime (with

compensatory time)") (Apr. 1, 1996).

The FHWA declined to grant Breen the alternative work

schedule, or any of the other accommodations she requested,

and, on April 16, 1996, terminated her employment. One

year later Breen filed this lawsuit, alleging that her termination was unlawful under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.

s 791 et seq., because the FHWA had failed to reasonably

accommodate her disabilities. The FHWA moved to dismiss

or alternatively for summary judgment. Both sides filed

affidavits setting forth their versions of the facts, and Breen's

counsel filed an additional affidavit pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56(f) requesting discovery. The district

court granted summary judgment against Breen, without

permitting discovery, on the ground that "no reasonable

accommodation will enable her to perform the essential functions of her position." Breen v. United States Dep't of

Transp., No. 97-1003 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2000).

II

The Rehabilitation Act provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability" may be discriminated against

by a federal agency "solely by reason of her or his disability."

29 U.S.C. s 794(a). The Act states that "[t]he standards used

to determine whether this section has been violated in a

complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied under [certain provisions

of] the Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA]." 29 U.S.C.

s 794(d). The ADA, in turn, bars discrimination against a

"qualified individual with a disability ... in regard to ... the

... discharge of employees ... and other terms, conditions,

and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. s 12112(a). A

"qualified individual with a disability" is defined as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the

employment position that such individual holds or desires."

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Id. s 12111(8); see 29 C.F.R. s 1614.203(a)(6) (EEOC Rehabilitation Act regulation).3 Accordingly, an individual with a

disability is "qualified" if he or she can perform the essential

functions of the position with a reasonable accommodation.

Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The ADA

further defines the term "reasonable accommodation" to include "job restructuring [and] part-time or modified work

schedules." 42 U.S.C. s 12111(9); see 29 C.F.R.

s 1614.203(c)(2).

The district court granted summary judgment against

Breen solely on the ground that no reasonable accommodation would have enabled her to perform the essential functions of her position. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, and--as we have done in reciting the facts

above--must view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Borgo v. Goldin, 204 F.3d 251, 254

(D.C. Cir. 2000). We may affirm a decision granting summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)). There plainly is a genuine

and material factual dispute in this case.

Breen contends that her proposed alternative work schedule would have permitted her to perform her responsibilities

by giving her time during the day in which her work would

not have been interrupted. In support of this assertion, she

offers her own affidavit, an affidavit from a disabilities expert,

Barclay Decl. pp 12-13, and the letters from her psychiatrist

referred to above. The FHWA responds with three reasons

why Breen's proposal would not have enabled her to perform

her responsibilities.

__________

3 In addition, the ADA defines the term "discriminate" to

include "not making reasonable accommodations to the known

physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual

with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such

covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would

impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such

covered entity." 42 U.S.C. s 12112(b)(5)(A); see 29 C.F.R.

s 1614.203(c)(1).

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First, the FHWA argues that Breen's proposed alternative

work schedule would not have "increased [her] total number

of hours," and hence would not have given her any more time

to accomplish her filing than she had had before. FHWA Br.

at 16. The FHWA is correct that the proposed alternative

work schedule, like Breen's prior schedule, would have totaled

only eighty hours per pay period. But this contention is

wholly unresponsive to the thrust of Breen's request for

accommodation. Her request was not for more time, but for

uninterrupted time. See Rev. Breen Decl. p 30 ("An alternative work schedule would have provided me with an hour of

quiet time after business hours to do solid filing, with no

interruptions."). The affidavits of Breen and her disabilities

expert, as well as the letters from her psychiatrist, describe

the nature of her problem as a difficulty in dealing with

unexpected interruptions in assigned tasks. See Rev. Breen

Decl. p 30; Barclay Decl. p 12; 1995 Redditt Letter at 4; see

also Rev. Breen Decl. p 27 ("Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder

makes it hard for me to refocus after changing tasks. It was

important for me to have an uninterrupted block of time to

complete the filing."). All declare that this problem could

have been overcome, and that Breen could have met her

responsibilities, if her schedule had been restructured to

provide not more time but uninterrupted time. Rev. Breen

Decl. p 30; Barclay Decl. pp 12-13; see also 1995 Redditt

Letter at 4 (stating that Breen could perform her job if there

were an "[a]bsence of 'extra' or different tasks requested

during her work period, especially the filing period").

Second, the FHWA contends that, prior to termination, the

agency had provided Breen with uninterrupted time, setting

aside a period during her workday that was devoted solely to

filing--to no avail. In support, the FHWA offers an affidavit

to that effect by a second-level supervisor. Perros Decl.

pp 18, 35. Breen, however, declares that the promised period

of uninterrupted work never materialized; that, to the contrary, she was constantly interrupted during the appointed

time, often with the approval of her direct supervisor. Rev.

Breen Decl. pp 25-29. For purposes of reviewing a grant of

summary judgment, we must take Breen's affidavit to be

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true. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Borgo, 204 F.3d at 257.

As the FHWA acknowledged at oral argument, this creates a

factual dispute that cannot be resolved on affidavits alone.

Finally, the FHWA asserts that it could not have provided

the alternative work schedule Breen requested, which included a biweekly day off to balance the extra hour on other days,

because her services were needed in the office every day.

Perros Decl. p 41. Breen disputes this, and asserts that the

FHWA allowed a number of other employees with similar

jobs in her department to work alternative schedules that

permitted them to be out of the office during normal business

hours. Rev. Breen Decl. pp 22-24.4 This creates a genuine

issue of material fact. See Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201

F.3d 718, 726 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that employer's allowance of medical leave to other employees created genuine

issue of fact as to whether grant of leave to plaintiff would

have constituted reasonable accommodation); Swanks v.

Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 934

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (observing that an employer " 'may not

obtain summary judgment by declaring it has a policy when

[the employee] may have evidence that [the employer] follows

the policy ... selectively' " (quoting Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 1998)) (brackets in

original)); Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1346 (10th

Cir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff demonstrated factual dispute

by providing evidence that employer had granted another

employee the requested accommodation in a similar situation).

Carr v. Reno, cited by the defendant, is not to the contrary.

In Carr, the plaintiff, a coding clerk at the United States

Attorney's Office, suffered from intermittent dizziness and

nausea that frequently forced her to miss work without

notice--477 hours in her first seven months alone. 23 F.3d at

527. Plaintiff sought an accommodation that the court described as "an open-ended 'work when able' schedule." Id. at

531. The Office denied the request on the ground that Carr's

work, which involved coding papers relating to recent arrests

__________

4 In addition, Breen's Rule 56(f) affidavit specifically sought

discovery on this point. Dean Decl. pp 10(d), 11(c), (d).

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in the District of Columbia, had a strict 4:00 p.m. deadline

each day--a point plaintiff conceded. Id. at 530. Under

those circumstances, we concluded that there was no genuine

dispute that the requested accommodation would not have

permitted Carr to perform the essential functions of her job.

Id. at 530-31.5

In this case, by contrast, the plaintiff has not conceded that

there was a critical element of her position--such as a daily

deadline--that rendered the accommodation she proposed

ineffectual. To the contrary, she has disputed that there is

any such critical element. Accordingly, the precedent that is

relevant is not Carr but Langon v. Department of Health and

Human Services, 959 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In that

case, plaintiff Langon, an HHS computer programmer stricken with multiple sclerosis, sought the accommodation of working at home. HHS refused to grant Langon's request, asserting that "due to the exactness required of computer

programmers like her, the short deadlines, and the frequent

face-to-face contacts, her position did not lend itself to working at home." 959 F.2d at 1060 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Langon countered with her own deposition testimony, which "disagreed with HHS about the length of the

deadlines and the need for frequent face-to-face contacts,"

and which affirmed that her position did not require her to

work in the office. Id. That conflict, we said, created "a

genuine issue about whether, with the accommodation she

sought, Ms. Langon could perform the essential functions of

her position." Id. at 1061. We therefore reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment.

Breen, like Langon, has offered evidence disputing her

employer's claim that the job restructuring she proposed was

incompatible with the essential functions of her position. She

has, therefore, raised a genuine issue of material fact as to

the ground on which the district court ruled against her: the

__________

5 Carr also noted that "it is the unusual Rehabilitation Act case

that, like this one, can be resolved against the plaintiff without

extensive fact finding." 23 F.3d at 531.

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unavailability of any reasonable accommodation that would

have permitted her to accomplish her required tasks.6

III

In assessing the evidence on this appeal from a grant of

summary judgment we do not, of course, reach any conclusions as to the ultimate merits of Breen's case. The FHWA

may yet be able to establish that it could not have reasonably

accommodated Breen's disabilities, or that her Rehabilitation

Act claim founders on other grounds. At this stage of the

litigation, however, it is apparent that a genuine issue of

material fact precludes summary judgment on the ground

stated by the district court.7 Accordingly, the judgment of

that court is reversed and the case is remanded for further

proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

__________

6 We do not consider whether there are also genuine disputes

regarding the other accommodations that Breen requested, see

supra note 2, because the briefs are not clear as to whether the

others were intended as additional requirements or merely as

alternatives to the proposed job restructuring.

7 The FHWA argues that even if Breen raised a genuine

dispute regarding that ground, we should nonetheless affirm the

grant of summary judgment on another ground not relied upon by

the district court. The FHWA contends that Breen did not inform

it of her claimed disabilities and proposed accommodations in a

timely fashion, and thus failed to participate in good faith in an

interactive process that would have permitted the agency to determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation. Cf. 29 C.F.R.

s 1630.2(o)(3). Resolving reasonable inferences in Breen's favor,

however, she has raised a disputed question of material fact concerning this ground as well by proffering evidence that it was the

FHWA that was responsible for the asserted delays of which the

agency complains. See, e.g., Rev. Breen Decl. p 7 (averring that it

took the FHWA almost a year to provide specific guidance as to the

kind of medical documentation it required).

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