Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02247/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02247-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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 The REAL ID Act of 2005 does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction because the Act was

"not intended to 'preclude habeas review over challenges to detention that are independent of challenges

to removal orders.'" Hernandez v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 42, 42-42 (1st Cir. 2005)(quoting

H.R.Cong.Rep.No. 109-71, at 2873 (2005)). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Adeniran Richard Adeogba,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et

al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV-05-2247 PHX-MHM (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241.1

 (document # 1) Respondents have filed a Response in Opposition to the

Petition. (document # 10) to which Petitioner has replied. (document # 13) The Court also

ordered supplemental briefing (document # 16) which the parties have filed. (documents # 17,

# 18) Also before the Court is Petitioner's Motion to Amend to Add Parties (document # 11) to

which Respondents have replied. (document # 21)

MOTION TO AMEND TO ADD PARTIES

In his Motion to Amend to Add Parties (document # 11), Petitioner seeks to add as

Defendants David Kollus, Petitioner's custodian in Florence, Arizona; Michael Chertoff,

Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; and Alberto Gonzales, United States

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 In March 1, 2003, the INS ceased to exist and its functions were transferred to the Department

of Homeland Security. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.L.No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2135. The

Court will refer to the agency as DHS because the proceedings in this case have continued after the

2003 transfer. 

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Attorney General. (document # 11) Petitioner cites Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 246 (2004)

in support of his motion. In opposition to the Motion to Amend, Respondents claim that none

of the foregoing individuals is a proper respondent in this case. Rumsfeld indicates that the

proper respondent in this case is the Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") Field

Office Director, Phillip Crawford, who has control over Petitioner's custody. Rumsfeld, 542

U.S. at 435. Petitioner has already named ICE as the Respondent in this matter. Petitioner has

named the proper respondent in this matter, thus, there is no need for Petitioner to amend his

Petition to include the proper respondent. Accordingly, the motion to amend should be denied.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Nigeria who first entered the United States in 1979.

Petitioner, using the alias Ademuyiwa Oguntade-Oluwniyi, was ordered deported from the

United States on February 21, 1991 at El Paso, Texas. On March 6, 1991, Petitioner was

physically removed from the United States under the name Ademuyiwa Oguntade-Oluwniyi.

Petitioner subsequently reentered the United States on March 24, 1991 without permission.

On June 2, 1995, Petitioner pleaded guilty to Theft with One Prior Felony in violation

of A.R.S. § 13-1802 and was sentenced to 7.5 years imprisonment. (Respondents' Exh. 1)

Petitioner was committed to the Arizona Department of Corrections to serve his sentence. 

On August 13, 2000, Petitioner was released from the ADOC and taken into the custody

of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now the Department of Homeland Security2

("DHS")) under the name Richard Adeniran Adeogba. (Respondents' Exh. 2) DHS instituted

administrative removal proceedings alleging that Petitioner was removable under 8 U.S.C. §

1228(b) which provides for expedited removal of an alien who is in the United States without

lawful residence and who has been convicted of an aggravated felony. Id. Petitioner was

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ordered removed as an aggravated felon based on his 1995 theft conviction under 8 U.S.C. §

1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). (Respondents' Exh. 3) Before he could be removed, Petitioner requested

asylum asserting that he feared persecution upon return to Nigeria. DHS granted Petitioner an

interview with a DHS asylum officer. (Respondents' Exh. 4) 

On December 22, 2000, the Asylum Officer found that Petitioner failed to establish a

"reasonable fear of persecution" or "torture" if he were returned to Nigeria. (Id.) Petitioner

requested that the Immigration Judge ("IJ") review the Asylum Officer's determination.

(Respondents' Exhs. 5, 6) On January 12, 2001, the IJ affirmed the Asylum Officer's

determination that Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable fear of persecution if he were

removed to Nigeria. (Respondents' Exh. 7) The case was returned to DHS to remove

Petitioner. (Respondents' Exh. 7) DHS attempted to remove Petitioner pursuant to the final

order of removal. However, on May 21, 2001, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review and Stay

of Removal with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Respondents' Exh. 7) On September 14,

2001, the Ninth Circuit dismissed Petitioner's petition because it lacked jurisdiction to consider

the case when Petitioner had been convicted of an aggravated felony. (Respondents' Exh. 9)

DHS again attempted to remove Petitioner. On December 30, 2001 and March 11, 2002,

the DHS requested travel documents from the Consul General of Nigeria. (Respondents' Exhs.

9, 10) On June 4, 2002, the Nigerian General Consul issued an "Emergency Travel Certificate"

to facilitate Petitioner's return to Nigeria. However, the travel document was only valid for one

week commencing on June 4, 2002. (Respondents' Exh. 11) In the meantime, on May 28, 2002,

Petitioner filed a second motion to stay his removal and petition for review with the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. (Respondents' Exh. 18) On May 28, 2002, the Ninth Circuit granted

the stay of deportation pending review of the petition for review. (Respondents' Exh. 18)

Because of the foregoing events, DHS could not remove Petitioner from the United States

pending resolution of the grant of stay and petition for review with the Ninth Circuit. 

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On February 20, 2003, the Ninth Circuit dismissed Petitioner's petition for review for

failure to prosecute. (Respondents' Exh. 18) On March 19, 2003, DHS requested another travel

document from the Consul General of Nigeria. (Respondents' Exh. 13) 

On March 11, 2003, Petitioner filed his first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the

United States District Court, District of Arizona, Adeogba v. INS, CV-03-481-PHX-MHM

(LOA). On May 5, 2005, the district granted Petitioner's first petition for writ of habeas corpus

and remanded the matter to the Board of Immigration Appeals for further consideration of

Petitioner's claims for discretionary relief under § 212 of the INA, asylum, and for relief under

the Convention Against Torture. (Respondents' Exh. 14; Adeogba v. INS, CV-03-481-PHXMHM (LOA)(D.Ariz., May 5, 2005)(unpublished order)) The Court also granted Petitioner

a stay of removal pending further proceedings before the BIA. (Id.)

 On October 31, 2005, the Board of Immigration Appeals remanded the case to the

Immigration Court for a ruling consistent with the District Court's Order. (Respondents' Exh.

15) On February 22, 2006, the Immigration Court denied Petitioner's application for asylum

and withholding of removal, denied Petitioner's request for a waiver under § 212, and denied

Petitioner's application for deferral of removal under Article III of the Convention Against

Torture. (document # 15, Exh. 1) On or about March 14, 2006, Petitioner filed an appeal with

the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). (document # 18, Exh. 1) That appeal is pending

with the BIA. 

In the meantime, on December 20, 2005, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus claiming that his current detention without bond for more than five years is

unconstitutional. Petitioner contends that his detention is authorized by § 236 of the INA.

Respondents assert that the Petition should be denied because Petitioner has not exhausted his

administrative remedies. In the alternative, Respondents contend that the Petition fails on the

merits. 

ANALYSIS

I. Exhaustion

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Respondents assert that the Petition should be denied because Petitioner failed to exhaust

administrative remedies. Respondents assert that Petitioner must first exhaust administrative

remedies under the INA before the federal court can review Petitioner's § 2241 petition.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is only required if either the statute specifically

requires exhaustion or it is called for by the administrative scheme. McKart v. United States,

395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969). Respondents argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) requires Petitioner

to exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing his § 2241 petition. Section 1252(d)

provides, in relevant part, that: "(d) Review of final orders. A court may review a final order

of removal only if — (1) the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the

alien as of right. . . ." Id. In Sun v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit

addressed whether § 1252(d)(1) requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before filing a

§ 2241 petition concerning a removal order. Id. at 936. The Court held "that § 1252(d)(1)

imposes a statutory exhaustion requirement on immigration habeas petitioners." Id. at 939.

The Ninth Circuit then found that the petitioner in that case was required to exhaust

administrative remedies with respect to his non-constitutional statutory argument that an alien

originally admitted as a refugee should be able to request a waiver of inadmissibility under INA

§ 209(c). Sun, 370 F.3d at 944. 

Neither Sun's holding nor § 1252(d)(1) applies to this case. Section 1252(d)(1) only

applies to review of a final removal order. In Sun, petitioner raised a statutory challenge to his

removal order. Unlike Sun, in the pending § 2241 Petition, Petitioner does not challenge his

removal order. Rather, he raises a constitutional challenge to his continued detention under §

1226(c). There is no specific statutory language requiring Petitioner to exhaust his

administrative remedies as to his constitutional claim. "Where Congress has not clearly

required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs." McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140,

144 (1992). The court should require exhaustion if "reviewing the petition would interrupt the

administrative review process and if Petitioner could seek relief through these means . . . ." 

Duong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 118 F.Supp.2d 1059, 1063 (S.D.Cal. 2000).

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The Immigration Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner's constitutional challenge to his

detention under § 1226(c). Wang v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1996)(holding that an alien was

not required to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of his due

process claim because that claim fell outside the scope of the Immigration and Nationality Act);

Van Eeton v. Beebe, 49 F.Supp.2d 1186, 1189 (D. Oregon 1999)(holding that an alien detained

pending removal proceedings was not required to exhaust administrative remedies before

bringing federal habeas petition challenging denial of bail on due process grounds). There is

no administrative proceeding to address Petitioner's claim that his continued detention violates

the Constitution. Duong, 118 F.Supp.2d at 1064. In view of the foregoing, the Court will not

require that Petitioner exhaust his administrative remedies before pursuing his claim that his

continued detention is unconstitutional. II. Merits of Petitioner's Claim

Petitioner has been detained by DHS since August of 2000. In 2001, Petitioner was

ordered removed to Nigeria as an aggravated felon. However, before he could be removed,

Petitioner filed an application for asylum and for relief from removal. Petitioner's request for

relief was denied by the IJ and the BIA and the case was returned to the DHS to remove

Petitioner. On May 21, 2001, Petitioner filed a petition for review and request for stay with the

Ninth Circuit. On September 14, 2001, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the petition. DHS again

attempted to remove Petitioner and obtained travel documents on two separate occasions.

Before DHS could remove Petitioner, he filed a second motion for review and for a stay of

removal with the Ninth Circuit. On June 5, 2002, the Ninth Circuit granted the stay. On

February 20, 2003, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the petition for review. Thereafter, on March

11, 2003, Petitioner filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus with this court challenging

the denial of relief from removal. Adeogba v. INS, No. CV-03-481-PHX-MHM (LOA). On

May 5, 2005, the district court granted the petition and remanded this matter to the BIA for

further consideration of Petitioner's claims for discretionary relief under § 212 of the INA,

asylum, and for relief under the Convention Against Torture. Id. The district court stayed

Petitioner's removal pending remand of this matter to the BIA. 

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On October 31, 2005, the BIA remanded Petitioner's case to the Immigration Court. On

February 22, 2006, the Immigration Judge denied Petitioner relief. Thereafter, on March 14,

2006, Petitioner appealed to the BIA. Because Petitioner's removal order is presently on

appeal to the BIA and this Court has ordered a stay of removal, the removal period has not

commenced and Petitioner's current detention is authorized by INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. §

1226(c). See, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(stating that "the removal period begins on the latest of

the following: (i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final. (ii) If the

removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the

date of the court's final order). See also, Armijo v. Gonzales, No. CV-05-1055-NVW (MEA),

2005 WL 2897520 (D. Ariz., Nov. 1, 2005). 

A. Application of Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)

Petitioner claims that his detention pending removal proceeding violates the Supreme

Court's pronouncement in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). When an alien is found

removable and a final order of removal has been entered, the Attorney General ordinarily

secures removal of that alien during a 90-day statutory “removal period” during which the alien

is detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)-(B). In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001),

the Supreme Court held that the post-removal-period detention provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6),

implicitly limits an alien’s detention to a “period reasonably necessary to bring about that

alien’s removal” and does not permit indefinite detention. Id. at 689. The Due Process Clause

applies to aliens who have entered the United States, and the Court found that a "statute

permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem." Id. at

690. The Zadvydas Court held that six months is a presumptively reasonable period of postremoval-period detention. Id. at 701. The Court then established a guideline to assist habeas

courts in determining whether a period of post-removal-period detention in excess of six months

is permissible. First, the alien must provide "good reason to believe that there is no significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." 533 U.S. at 701. If the alien meets

this burden, "the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing." Id.

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"[F]or detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior post-removal confinement grows,

what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.” Id. at 701.

The Court clarified that under its holding “an alien may be held in confinement until it has been

determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future.” Id. 

In Zadvydas, the Court emphasized that its due process analysis applies to detention after

the removal period has expired. Id. at 682-83. In framing the issue in Zadvydas, the Court

stated that "[w]e must decide whether this post-removal-period statute [§ 1231(a)(6)(1)]

authorizes the Attorney General to detain a removable alien indefinitely beyond the removal

period or only for a period reasonably necessary to secure the alien's removal . . . ." Id. at 682-

83. The removal period commences on the latest of the following: (i) The date the order of

removal becomes administratively final. (ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if

a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court's final order. 8 U.S.C. §

1231(a)(1)(B).

Here, the removal period has not commenced. Thus, Zadvydas does not apply to

Petitioner's current detention. Rather, Petitioner's is currently detained pursuant to INA § 236,

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and his detention is governed by the Supreme Court's decision in Demore

v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). Armijo v. Gonzales, No. CV-05-1055-PHX-NVW (MEA), 2005

WL 2897520, * 3 (D.Ariz., November 1, 2005)(noting that petitioner's order of removal was

not final because Immigration Judge's decision finding petitioner ineligible for cancellation of

removal was still on appeal before the BIA. Therefore, petitioner was being detained pursuant

to INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)). 

2. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003)

As previously stated, Petitioner is removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated

felony and is not a lawful permanent resident. Regardless, the Due Process Clause protects

Petitioner from prolonged detention. Demore, 538 U.S. at 523. See also Fuller v. Gonzales,

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No. Civ. A. 3:04CV2039SRU, 2005 WL 818614, * 3 (D.Conn. April 5, 2005); Oyedeji v.

Ashcroft, 332 F.Supp.2d 747, 753 (M.D.Pa. 2004). 

In Demore v Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003), the Supreme Court approved the mandatory

detention of criminal aliens during removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) even in the

absence of an individualized finding that the alien was unlikely to appear for his removal

hearing if released on bond. Specifically, the Court held that the government could detain

aliens who had been convicted of a crime for "the brief period necessary for their removal

proceedings." Id. at 513. (emphasis added) The Court in Demore discussed the data

concerning the length of detention and noted that detention under § 1226(c) lasts approximately

a month and a half in most cases, and about five months in cases where the alien appeals. Id.

at 530. 

In Demore, petitioner had been detained for over six months which the Court stated was

"somewhat longer than average." Id. at 530-31. However, the Court considered that

"temporary" confinement permissible. Id. "Demore endorses the general proposition of "brief"

detentions, with a specific holding of a six-month period as presumptively reasonable."

Nadarajah v. Gonzales, No. 05-56759, 2006 WL 686385, * 10 (9th Cir., March 17,

2006)(holding that a five-year period of confinement of an alien who had not been charged with

any crime, and who had won relief from removal at every administrative level, was

unreasonable under the standards articulated by the Supreme Court.). 

Unlike Demore, Petitioner has been detained for over five years, not six months. The

Ninth Circuit has held that "[a] detention of nearly five years — ten times the amount of time the

Supreme Court has considered acceptable absent a special showing — is plainly unreasonable

under any measure." Nadarajah, 2006 WL 686385, * 11. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit noted

that Demore authorized a "brief period" of confinement pending removal proceedings but that

nothing in Demore indicates that the "Court would countenance an indefinite detention." Id.

Petitioner's detention which has lasted over five years cannot be considered a "brief" or

temporary period that would be considered reasonable under Demore. In Tijani v. Willis, 430

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F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that an alien was entitled to release on bail after

being detained for nearly three years during removal proceedings, either because detention for

such a period was not expeditious, and therefore did not conform to the Immigration and

Nationality Act's (INA) mandatory detention provision, or because detention for such a period

violated the alien's due process rights. Id. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit noted that Tijani's

case was distinct from Demore, where the alien conceded deportability. Id. at 1242. In Tijani,

petitioner was being detained while he continued to litigate whether his offenses actually fell

within the reach of the mandatory detention statute. Id. at 1244. Tashima, J., concurring, found

that petitioner "almost certainly had a winning argument that he is not removable for having

committed an aggravated felony." Id. at 1247. 

The Tijani court found that "the authority conferred by § 1226(c) . . . appl[ies] to

expedited removal of criminal aliens." Id. at 1242. The court held that "[t]wo years and eight

months of process is not expeditious; and the foreseeable process in this case . . . is a year or

more." Id. The Ninth Circuit remanded the matter "to the district court with directions to grant

the writ unless the government within 60 days provides a hearing to [petitioner] before an

Immigration Judge with the power to grant him bail unless the government establishes that he

is a flight risk or will be a danger to the community." Id. (citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S.

348, 363 (1996)). 

Unlike Tijani, Petitioner neither challenges his removability as an aggravated felon nor

challenges the characterization of his offenses as aggravated felonies. Rather, Petitioner claims

that he is entitled to relief from removal under the Convention Against Torture, asylum, or relief

from removal. Although Petitioner concedes his removability based on having been convicted

of an aggravated felony, this Court cannot ignore the fact that Petitioner's detention has exceeded

five years. The Supreme Court has approved mandatory detention during removal proceedings

which lasts for a relatively brief period, usually less than 90 days. Demore, 538 U.S. 529. In

Demore, the Court held that detention incidental to removal must bear a reasonable relation to

its purpose. Demore, 538 U.S. at 527. The Demore court found that detention during removal

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proceedings was "reasonably related" to the goal of preventing flight both because the alien was

unquestionably removable, and thus presented a high flight risk, and the time period was lasting

on average for a mere 47 days. Demore, 538 U.S. at 527-29. 

Here, Petitioner is unquestionably removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated

felony. (Adeogba v. INS, No. CV-03-481-PHX-MHM (LOA), document # 54, May 5, 2005

Order (unpublished)(stating that it is "undisputed" that Petitioner's conviction and sentence

qualify as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). However, Petitioner's detention

has lasted over ten times the 6-month period approved in Demore. In Demore, Justice Kennedy,

concurring, noted that there is a point at which the length of detention becomes so unreasonable

that it can no longer be considered to be "reasonably related" to an alien's removal." Id. at 532.

See Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 272 (6th Cir. 2004)(finding detention for 1 1⁄2 years

unreasonable); Fuller, 2005 WL 818614, * 6 (finding two-year detention under § 236(c)

unconstitutional).

In Demore, the Supreme Court affirmed the detention of a criminal alien for "the limited

period [six months] of his removal proceedings." 538 U.S. at 531. Unlike petitioner in Demore,

Petitioner in this case has been detained over 60 months which cannot be characterized as a

"brief" or "limited period" which the Demore Court found acceptable. Id. Petitioner's five-year

detention is more than 40 times the average length of detention (1 1⁄2 months) under § 1226(c)

and 12 times the average when an alien chooses to appeal (five months), and it is more than 10

times as long as the six months that the Supreme Court suggested would be reasonable in

Demore. 538 U.S. at 530. Petitioner's detention pending removal proceedings far exceeds that

contemplated in Demore. 

It is true that Petitioner has sought judicial review and a stay of removal which has

contributed to the length of his detention. Indeed, Petitoner could secure his release by asking

the Court to lift the stay of removal, thereby permitting DHS to execute his final order of

removal. However, such a choice is untenable for Petitioner who claims that he would be

exposed to an extreme risk of harm if removed to Nigeria. Lawson v. Gerlinski, 332 F.Supp.2d

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735, 745 (M.D.Pa. 2004)(rejecting INS' argument that petitioner's continued detention was not

indefinite because he held the "keys to his cell" in view of the stay of removal which petitioner

had requested.); but see Singh v. Gonzales, No. C05-1686-JLR-JPD, 2006 WL 1041838, * 4

(W.D.Wash., April 3, 2006)(denying § 2241 petition challenging detention pending removal

finding that petitioner's detention was a result of a stay of removal he had requested.). ""The

price for securing a stay of removal should not be prolonged incarceration." Id.; Oyedeji, 332

F.Supp.2d at 753 (noting that "prolonged incarceration for an alien whose potentially meritorious

challenge to removal is part of a congested docket is indistinguishable from lengthy incarceration

because the alien's native country refuses to issue travel documents."). Petitioner "should not

be effectively punished for pursuing applicable legal remedies." Lawson, 332 F.Supp.2d at 746.

Although Petitioner is responsible for seeking further relief, "he is not responsible for the amount

of time that such determinations may take." Ly, 351 F.3d at 272. 

Where detention becomes prolonged, "special care must be exercised so that the

confinement does not continue beyond the time when the original justifications for custody are

no longer tenable." Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 398 (3rd Cir. 1999). The record in this case

reveals little about the review of Petitioner's custody status since he was taken into INS custody

in 2000. It appears that Petitioner's continued detention has not been considered. 

The District Court has found that Petitioner's requests for relief under § 212(h), asylum,

and for relief under the Convention Against Torture have merit. Petitioner continues to pursue

non-frivolous claims based on a risk of substantial harm should he be removed to Nigeria. Under

the circumstances of this case, Petitioner's continued detention under § 236(c) runs afoul of the

Constitution. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Motion to Amend to Add Parties

(document # 11) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(document # 1) be GRANTED unless within 60 days of the District Court's ruling on the Report

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and Recommendation Respondents provide Petitioner with a bond hearing before an Immigration

Judge with the power to grant Petitioner bail.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Respondents be ordered to file a status report

every thirty days until Petitioner is granted a bond hearing.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The parties shall have

ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific

written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna- Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in

an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 23rd day of May, 2006.

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