Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02714/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02714-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CELEBRITY CHEFS TOUR, LLC, 

a California limited liability company;

and PROMARK PRODUCTIONS,

LLC, a California limited liability

company,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 13-CV-2714 JLS (KSC)

ORDER: (1) GRANTING

DEFENDANTS SCOTT

DUMMLER AND JACK

O’DONNELL’S REQUESTS 

FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND

OVERRULING PLAINTIFFS’

OBJECTION THERETO; AND 

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS SCOTT

DUMMLER AND JACK

O’DONNELL’S MOTIONS TO

DISMISS PURSUANT TO

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE 12(b)(6)

(ECF Nos. 65, 68, 75-1)

vs.

MACY’S, INC, a Delaware

corporation; WHIRLPOOL

CORPORATION, a Delaware

corporation; LEC MEDIA, LLC, 

an Illinois limited liability company;

EXECUTIVE PROGRAM

SERVICES, INC., a Washington

corporation; JACK O’DONNELL, 

an individual; SCOTT DUMMLER, 

an individual; DEVIN ALEXANDER,

INC, a California corporation; DEVIN

ALEXANDER, a.k.a. RENEE

SIMONE, an individual; and DOES

1–10, inclusive,

Defendants.

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Presently before the Court are Defendants Scott Dummler (“Dummler”) and Jack

O’Donnell’s (“O’Donnell,” and, collectively, “Defendants”) Motions to Dismiss

(“MTD”) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 65, 68.) 

Also before the Court are Plaintiffs Celebrity Chefs Tour, LLC (“CCT”) and Promark

Productions, LLC’s (“Promark,” and, collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Responses in

Opposition to (ECF Nos. 69, 70) and Defendants’ Omnibus Reply in Support of (ECF

No. 75-3) the MTDs, as well as Defendants’ Requests for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) (ECF

Nos. 65-2, 68-2, 75-1), Plaintiffs’ Objection thereto (ECF No. 73), and Defendants’

Response to Plaintiffs’ Objection (ECF No. 75-5). The Court vacated the hearings on

Defendants’ MTDs and took the matters under submission without oral argument

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. (ECF No. 74.) Having considered the parties’

arguments and the law, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ RJNs and GRANTS IN

PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ MTDs. 

BACKGROUND

The Court thoroughly summarized the factual and procedural background of this

case in ruling on a related motion to dismiss, and accordingly the Court hereby

incorporates by reference the background as set forth therein. (See Order 2–7, ECF No.

78.) 

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 provides that “[t]he court may judicially notice a

fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within

the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined

from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” “Judicially noticed

facts often consist of matters of public record.” Botelho v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 692 F.

Supp. 2d 1174, 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citations omitted); see also W. Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ass’n v. Heflin Corp., 797 F. Supp. 790, 792 (N.D. Cal. 1992). While “a court may take

judicial notice of the existence of matters of public record, such as a prior order or

decision,” it should not take notice of “the truth of the facts cited therein.” Marsh v.

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Cnty. of San Diego, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2006). 

Defendants first ask the Court to judicially notice five (5) documents. (See ECF

Nos. 65-2, 68-2.) Defendants ask the Court to take notice of the Declaration of Scott

Dummler (“the Dummler Declaration”) in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Motion for

Temporary Restraining Order, filed on November 27, 2012 in the action Celebrity Chefs

Tour LLC v. LEC Media, LLC, et al., Case No. 37-2012-00085275-CU-BC-CTL,

Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego. Defendants also ask

the Court to judicially notice the following four (4) documents, all filed with the United

States Patent and Trademark Office: (1) Trademark/Service Mark Application for

“Great American Chefs Tour,” Serial No. 85284912, filed on April 4, 2011; (2) Office

Action regarding Trademark Application Serial No. 85284912; (3) Response to Office

Action regarding Trademark Application Serial No. 85284912; and (4) Trademark

Registration No. 4,145,234, registered May 22, 2012.

In addition, Defendants ask the Court to judicially notice the following five (5)

documents, all from the action Celebrity Chefs Tour LLC v. LEC Media, LLC, et al.,

Case No. 37-2012-00085275-CU-BC-CTL, Superior Court of the State of California,

County of San Diego: (1) Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed on November 13, 2012; (2)

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Verified), filed on January 8, 2013; (3) Jack

O’Donnell’s and Scott Dummler’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support

of Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Verified), filed on March 29,

2013; (4) LEC Media, LLC’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of

Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Verified), filed on March 29, 2013;

and (5) Register of Actions Docket. (ECF No. 75-1.)

Plaintiffs argue that the request to judicially notice the Dummler Declaration “is

not necessary nor proper.” (Obj. to RJN 2, ECF No. 73.) Yet, this is incorrect. 

Normally, declarations filed in the same or prior cases are matters of public record

potentially subject to judicial notice. See, e.g., Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d

1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012); Stamas v. Cnty. of Madera, 795 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1061

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(E.D. Cal. 2011); Peviani v. Hostess Brands, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1117 (C.D.

Cal. 2010). Unless the facts therein are generally known or undisputed, however, a

court may usually only judicially notice the fact that the declaration exists, that it was

filed, and the date on which it was filed, not the contents of the declaration. See

Stamas, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 1061; Hicks v. Evans, No. C 08-1146 SI (pr), 2012 WL

398821, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2012). 

Nevertheless, a court ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) may consider “documents attached to the complaint,

documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial

notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary

judgment.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations

omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). “The defendant may offer such a document, and the

district court may treat such a document as part of the complaint, and thus may assume

that its contents are true for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),” so

long as the complaint alleges the document’s contents and no party questions the

document’s authenticity. Id.; Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir 1994),

overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th

Cir. 2002).

Far from disputing the Dummler Declaration’s authenticity, in their Complaint,

Plaintiffs recite for their truth ten admissions from the Dummler Declaration concerning

the ownership of the CCT Assets. (See Comp. ¶ 78, ECF No. 1.) Thus, not only is the

Dummler Declaration properly judicially noticed, but, under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(d), it is also incorporated by reference into the Complaint, and therefore

the Court may consider the substance of the Dummler Declaration in ruling on this

MTD. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defendants’

RJNs. 

Further, all of the remaining documents are available to the public and are

certified and maintained by an official office. Their accuracy cannot therefore be

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reasonably disputed. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ RJNs as to all ten

(10) documents. However, given that some of the facts in these documents may be

subject to reasonable dispute, the Court does not take notice of the truth of the facts

asserted therein—with the exception, of course, of the Dummler Declaration.

MOTION TO DISMISS

I. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the

defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,”

generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint

states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand[] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a plaintiff’s obligation

to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Nor

does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is

facially plausible when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556). That is not to say that the claim must be probable, but there must be

“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts

“‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to

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relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, the Court need not accept as

true “legal conclusions” contained in the complaint. Id. This review requires contextspecific analysis involving the Court’s “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at

679 (citation omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not

‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id.

Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless

the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged

pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,

957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well

Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words, where leave to

amend would be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. 

II. Analysis

Plaintiffs assert the following seventeen claims: (1) breach of contract (Macy’s);

(2) breach of contract (Dummler, LEC, and O’Donnell); (3) breach of contract

(Alexander); (4) intentional misrepresentation (Alexander, DAI, Dummler, LEC,

Macy’s, and O’Donnell); (5) negligent misrepresentation (Alexander, DAI, Dummler,

LEC, Macy’s, and O’Donnell); (6) conversion (all Defendants); (7) trademark

infringement (all Defendants); (8) false designation of origin (all Defendants); (9)

trademark dilution (all Defendants); (10) common law unfair competition (all

Defendants); (11) unfair competition in violation of California Business and Professions

Code § 17200 (all Defendants); (12) misappropriation of ideas (all Defendants); (13)

intentional interference with contractual relations (EPS, Dummler, LEC, Macy’s,

O’Donnell, and Whirlpool); (14) intentional interference with prospective economic

advantage (EPS, Dummler, LEC, Macy’s, O’Donnell, and Whirlpool); (15) negligent

interference with contractual relations (EPS, Dummler, LEC, Macy’s, O’Donnell, and

Whirlpool); (16) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage (EPS,

Dummler, LEC, Macy’s, O’Donnell, and Whirlpool); and (17) declaratory relief (EPS,

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LEC, Macy’s, and Whirlpool).1

A. Alter Ego Liability

As an initial matter, Dummler and O’Donnell contend that all of Plaintiffs’

claims against them rely solely on a factually unsupported invocation of the alter ego

doctrine. (Dummler MTD 10–12, ECF No. 65-1; O’Donnell MTD 10–12, ECF No. 68-

1.) Plaintiffs claim to have sufficiently pleaded an alter ego theory of liability as to both

Dummler and O’Donnell.2

 (Opp’n to Dummler MTD 12–15, ECF No. 69; Opp’n to

O’Donnell MTD 12–15, ECF No. 70.) The Court, however, agrees with Defendants

that Plaintiffs’ alter ego theory of liability fails.

Generally, a member or manager of an LLC—such as LEC Media, LLC

(“LEC”)—cannot be held liable for the “debts, obligations, or other liabilities” of the

LLC, “whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise,” solely by reason of his status as

a member or manager. Cal. Corp. Code § 17703.04(a); see Sonora Diamond Corp. v.

Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 4th 523, 538 (2000) (“Ordinarily, a corporation is

regarded as a legal entity, separate and distinct from its stockholders, officers and

directors, with separate and distinct liabilities and obligations.” (citations omitted)). 

Plaintiffs allege that Dummler and O’Donnell were each “an officer, managing agent,

owner, proprietor, or otherwise executive in charge of production for LEC” at the

relevant points in time. (Compl. ¶¶ 7–8, ECF No. 1.) 

Nevertheless, an LLC member may become liable for the LLC’s obligations

under California’s common law alter ego doctrine. Cal. Corp. Code § 17703.04(b). 

Alter ego liability permits a plaintiff to “pierce the corporate veil” “where an abuse of

the corporate privilege justifies holding the equitable ownership of a corporation liable

1

Defendants do not seek to dismiss this seventeenth claim, and accordingly this Order

does not address it.

2

 Plaintiffs concede in their Oppositions that many of their claims against Defendants

are premised on the alter ego doctrine. It appears that Plaintiffs’ breach of contract, conversion

(as to O’Donnell), trademark infringement, false designation of origin, trademark dilution, and

common law unfair competition claims are premised solely on alter ego liability. (See

generally Opp’ns, ECF Nos. 69, 70.)

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for the actions of the corporation.” Sonora Diamond, 83 Cal. App. 4th at 538 (citation

omitted). Under California law, two requirements must be met to invoke the alter ego

doctrine: (1) that there be such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate

personalities of the corporation and individual no longer exist, and (2) that, if the acts

are treated as those of the corporation alone, an inequitable result will follow. See

Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 702 P.2d 601, 606 (Cal. 1985) (en banc). 

In assessing unity of interest, some of the factors that courts consider include: (a)

the sole ownership of all the stock in a corporation by one individual or members of a

family; (b) the use of the same office location and employment of the same employees;

(c) the undercapitalization of the corporation; (d) the domination or control of the

corporation by the stockholders; and (e) the disregard of formalities and the failure to

maintain arms-length transactions with the corporation. See Politte v. United States,

Civil No. 07cv1950 AJB (WVG), 2012 WL 965996, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2012). 

 To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need only plead two or three of these factors. 

Pac. Mar. Freight, Inc. v. Foster, No. 10-cv-0578-BTM-BLM, 2010 WL 3339432, at

*6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2010) (citation omitted).

Plaintiffs allege that Dummler and O’Donnell each “gained dominion and control

of LEC and through the exercise of such dominion and control caused the separate

identity of” LEC to cease. (Compl. ¶¶ 7–8, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs further claim that

“the acts, business and contracts of LEC were the acts of” Dummler and O’Donnell,

“and vice versa,” rendering LEC a mere “business conduit” through which Dummler

and O’Donnell transact their own business. (Id.) However, beyond these conclusory

assertions of dominion and control, Plaintiffs fail to address the relevant factors. For

example, Plaintiffs make no allegations concerning, inter alia: whether Dummler and

O’Donnell are the sole members of LEC; whether LEC is undercapitalized; whether

Dummler, O’Donnell, and LEC share an attorney; how, specifically, Dummler and

O’Donnell have asserted dominion and control over LEC; or whether any payments for

LEC’s services were made out to either Dummler or O’Donnell instead of LEC. These

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allegations are simply insufficient to plead unity of interest.

Because Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a unity of interest between either

Dummler and LEC or O’Donnell and LEC, Plaintiffs’ alter ego theory of liability

against Defendants fails. Therefore, the Court need not address at this time whether,

as to each alter-ego claim against Defendants, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that

recognizing the corporate form would lead to an inequitable result. Accordingly, the

Court GRANTS Defendants’ MTDs as to all claims alleging Dummler and O’Donnell’s

liability under an alter ego theory. However, the dismissal of these claims is

WITHOUT PREJUDICE, as Plaintiffs claim to be capable of alleging additional facts

establishing Defendants’ alter ego liability. (Opp’n to Dummler MTD 14–15, ECF No.

69; Opp’n to O’Donnell MTD 14–15, ECF No. 70.)

B. Individual Liability

Of course, a member of a limited liability company (“LLC”) will be liable to

third parties for his own participation in tortious conduct or breach of contractual duty. 

Cal. Corp. Code § 17703.04(c). Plaintiffs appear to argue that Defendants are liable in

their individual capacities for the following claims: (1) intentional and negligent

misrepresentation; (2) conversion (only as to Dummler); (3) violations of California’s

Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”); (4) misappropriation of ideas; (5) intentional

interference with contractual relations; and (6) intentional and/or negligent interference

with prospective business relationships. (See generally Opp’ns, ECF Nos. 69, 70.)

i. Claim 4: Intentional Misrepresentation

The elements of a claim for intentional misrepresentation are: “(1) a

misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge

of falsity (or scienter); (3) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (4) justifiable

reliance; and (5) resulting damage.” Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d

268, 274 (Cal. 2004) (citing Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (1996)). 

Because a claim for misrepresentation sounds in fraud, the heightened pleading

standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) apply. For misrepresentation claims,

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this standard is met when a party specifies the time, place, and specific content of the

alleged fraudulent representation; the identity of the person engaged in the fraud; and

“‘the circumstances indicating falseness’” or “‘the manner in which [the]

representations were false and misleading.’” Genna v. Digital Link Corp., 25 F. Supp.

2d 1032, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (quoting In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541,

1547–48 (9th Cir. 1994)). However, “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions

of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claim for intentional misrepresentation fails

because Plaintiffs do not allege with the requisite level of specificity: (1) the purported

false representations, (2) intent to induce reliance or actual reliance, and (3) damage. 

(Dummler MTD 13–16, ECF No. 65-1; O’Donnell MTD 12–16, ECF No. 68-1.) 

Plaintiffs counter that the Complaint adequately pleads Defendants’ fraud. The Court

agrees with Plaintiffs. 

First, Plaintiffs allege that, on June 21, 2012, Defendants urged Plaintiffs to

continue the Tour by falsely telling Plaintiffs “that they would be able to get Macy’s to

perform its obligations.” (Compl. ¶¶ 74, 105, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs also claim that,

on June 25, 2012, Dummler told Plaintiffs that LEC would hold the CCT Assets until

Plaintiffs told him where to ship them. (Id. ¶¶ 75, 105.) These factual allegations are

detailed and specify who said them, the date on which they were said, and where. 

Second, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants knew these representations were false. (Id. ¶¶

105, 113.) Third, Plaintiffs allege Defendants’ intent to defraud or induce reliance. (Id.

¶¶ 106, 113.) Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, knowledge and intent may be pled

generally. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 

Fourth, Plaintiffs allege justifiable reliance by stating, inter alia, that: Plaintiffs

had a “mutual understanding [with Dummler and LEC] that ownership of all intellectual

property and creative assets pertaining to GACT . . . were and would, at all times,

remain exclusively the property of [Plaintiffs] and would be delivered to [Plaintiffs] at

any time, on demand”; Dummler and LEC promised to “do as instructed by

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[Plaintiffs]”; LEC and Dummler had “extensive workings with public television

programming”; and Defendants asked Plaintiffs to “have confidence” that they could

get Macy’s to make its sponsorship payments. (Id. ¶¶ 48, 50, 74.) Finally, Plaintiffs

allege damage. (Id. ¶¶ 109, 115.) Defendants’ appear to have caused Plaintiffs’ harm,

since Plaintiffs would have stopped the Tour earlier had Defendants not urged them

otherwise. (Id. ¶ 74.) As a whole, the Complaint satisfactorily gives Defendants notice

of their purported fraud and makes out a prima facie claim for intentional

misrepresentation. Accordingly, the Court finds that these allegations are sufficient to

survive Defendants’ MTDs and DENIES the MTDs as to this claim.

ii. Claim 5: Negligent Misrepresentation

To allege a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must plead: “(1) the

misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact, (2) without reasonable ground for

believing it to be true, (3) with intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact

misrepresented, (4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and (5) resulting

damage.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. FSI, Fin. Solutions, Inc., 196 Cal. App. 4th 1559,

1573 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, under

California law, “[t]he existence of a duty of care is necessary to support a negligent

misrepresentation claim.” Jackson v. Fischer, 931 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1068 (N.D. Cal.

2013) (citations omitted). 

Defendants make the same arguments against this claim as against Plaintiffs’

intentional misrepresentation claim. (See Dummler MTD 13–16, ECF No. 65-1;

O’Donnell MTD 12–16, ECF No. 68-1.) For the reasons provided above, however, the

Court believes that Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded the five elements of a claim for

negligent misrepresentation. Yet Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ claim must fail

because Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants owed them a duty of care. (Dummler

MTD 15, ECF No. 65-1; O’Donnell MTD 15, ECF No. 68-1.) The Court agrees that,

on its face, the Complaint fails to allege that Defendants owed Plaintiffs a duty of care. 

Plaintiffs’ purported contract was with LEC, not with Defendants individually, and

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Plaintiffs have alleged no other relationship that would create a duty. Accordingly, the

Court GRANTS Defendants’ MTDs as to this claim WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

iii. Claim 6: Conversion

Dummler argues that Plaintiffs’ conversion claim fails “because Plaintiffs do not

allege Dummler actually possessed the CCT Assets at any time, let alone converted the

‘CCT Assets.’ Plaintiffs admit they voluntarily shipped (i.e. consented) the CCT Assets

to LEC’s offices in Chicago, not to Dummler; therefore they [sic] can be no wrongful

act.” (Dummler MTD 16, ECF No. 65-1 (emphasis in original).) Dummler argues that

Plaintiffs merely allege that Dummler used the CCT Assets, and that mere use is

insufficient. (Id. at 16–17.) Dummler also claims that, as an “innocent receiver” of the

CCT Assets, he cannot be held liable for conversion. (Id. at 17.) Plaintiffs argue that

they properly allege conversion because they allege “more than mere use,” and “[a]n

action for conversion lies not only in the taking of another’s property, but also in the

wrongful retention and/or use of that property.” (Opp’n to Dummler MTD 20, 21, ECF

No. 69.) The Court agrees with Plaintiffs.

The elements of a claim for conversion consist of (1) ownership or a right to

possession, (2) wrongful disposition of the property, and (3) damages. G. S. Rasmussen

& Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 906 (9th Cir. 1992). First,

Plaintiffs repeatedly assert their ownership of the GACT copyright, trademark, and

content. (Compl. ¶¶ 14–16, 28, 48, 118, ECF No. 1.) While Plaintiffs purportedly

“consented to LEC holding the CCT Assets temporarily until it could be determined

where they should be sent,” Plaintiffs have since requested the return of the CCT

Assets. (Id. ¶¶ 75, 77.) Thus, Plaintiffs had a right to immediate possession of the CCT

Assets. 

Second, Plaintiffs allege that, despite Plaintiffs’ requests, Dummler has not

returned the CCT Assets. (Id. ¶ 77.) Rather, Plaintiffs claim that Dummler released at

least some of the CCT Assets to Macy’s, and that he has engaged various public

television stations to air GACT, claiming that he and other defendants produced and

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own the show. (Id. ¶¶ 78(i), 85.) Thus, Plaintiffs allege that Dummler engaged in a

wrongful disposition of the CCT Assets by retaining and then distributing them for his

own benefit.

Dummler also contends, however, that the claim must be dismissed because

Plaintiffs improperly seek compensatory damages rather than the damages for

conversion mandated by California Civil Code § 3336. (Dummler MTD 17, ECF No.

65-1.) However, Plaintiffs allege that they “ha[ve] been damaged” by their loss of the

CCT Assets and their inability to distribute GACT themselves. (Compl. ¶¶ 102, 122,

ECF No. 1.) This is all that is required on a motion to dismiss. See Summit Tech., Inc.

v. High-Line Med. Instruments, Co., 933 F. Supp. 918, 927–28 (C.D. Cal. July 16,

1996) (“[A] Rule 12(b)(6) motion will not be granted merely because a plaintiff

requests a remedy to which he or she is not entitled” (citation, alteration, and internal

quotation marks omitted).). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have stated a prima facie claim for

conversion, and the Court DENIES Dummler’s MTD as to this claim.

iv. Claim 11: Violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits “any unlawful, unfair

or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading

advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claim

is too conclusorily pleaded to state a viable claim. (Dummler MTD 23–24, ECF No.

65-1; O’Donnell MTD 23–24, ECF No. 68-1; Reply 13, ECF No. 75-3.)3

Plaintiffs argue that, because Defendants’ actions constitute business practices,

and because those acts “form the basis of several other claims for relief” in the

Complaint, they have satisfactorily alleged unlawful business activities. (Opp’n to

Dummler MTD 26–27, ECF No. 69; Opp’n to O’Donnell MTD 26, ECF No. 70.) The

3

 Defendants also claim that Plaintiffs’ request for purportedly unavailable remedies

also mandates dismissal of the claim. (Dummler MTD 24, ECF No. 65-1; O’Donnell MTD

24, ECF No. 68-1.) Because “a Rule 12(b)(6) motion will not be granted merely because a

plaintiff requests a remedy to which he or she is not entitled,” however, the Court disregards

this argument. Summit Tech., 933 F. Supp. at 927–28 (citation, alteration, and internal

quotation marks omitted). 

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Court agrees. “An unlawful business activity includes anything that can properly be

called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” Blank v.

Kirwan, 703 P.2d 58, 69 (Cal. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting People

v. McKale, 25 Cal. 3d 626, 631–32 (1979)). The act of promoting and distributing a

television show is certainly a business practice. Further, the Court has found that

Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged at least one violation of law as to each of Dummler and

O’Donnell. Accordingly, those violations can serve as predicate unlawful business

activities under the UCL. See Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973

P.2d 527, 539–40 (Cal. 1999) (“[S]ection 17200 ‘borrows’ violations of other laws and

treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently

actionable” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).).

Plaintiffs also claim to have pleaded unfair business practices against Defendants. 

Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ unfair acts include, inter alia, refusing to return the

CCT Assets, giving Macy’s the CCT Assets, and finishing and promoting the allegedly

infringing show. (Opp’n to Dummler MTD 26, ECF No. 69; Opp’n to O’Donnell MTD

25–26, ECF No. 70.) Plaintiffs claim that the question of whether such acts are “unfair”

is one of fact best left to the jury. (Id.) Under the UCL, however, “the word ‘unfair’

. . . means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates

the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the

same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms

competition.” Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc., 973 P.2d at 544. Plaintiffs’ allegations, if

true, allege unfair acts in a more generalized moral sense. See F.T.C. v. Sperry &

Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972) (explaining that “a practice that is neither

in violation of the antitrust laws nor deceptive [can] nonetheless [be] unfair” if it is

“immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous”). However, Plaintiffs’ allegations

fail to allege acts that more narrowly violate the spirit of the antitrust laws, such as

horizontal price fixing, exclusive dealing, or monopolization. See Holmes &

Mangiaracina, Antitrust Law Handbook § 7:2. Accordingly, Plaintiffs do not allege

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unfair business practices within the meaning of the UCL.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have engaged in fraudulent business

practices by promoting the show and claiming to be its sole owners. (Opp’n to

Dummler MTD 27, ECF No. 69; Opp’n to O’Donnell MTD 26–27, ECF No. 70.) The

Court agrees that such acts are fraudulent under the UCL. “The fraud prong of the UCL

is unlike common law fraud or deception. A violation can be shown even if no one was

actually deceived[ or] relied upon the fraudulent practice. . . . Instead, it is only

necessary to show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” Schnall v.

Hertz Corp., 78 Cal. App. 4th 1144, 1167 (2000) (internal quotation marks, citations,

and alteration omitted). Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, Defendants are

actively trying to deceive the public into believing that Plaintiffs’ show is their own. 

And, because Plaintiffs are unable to promote or distribute the show themselves,

Defendants are likely to deceive the public into believing this to be true. Accordingly,

Plaintiffs have pleaded with adequate specificity that Defendants engaged in unlawful

and fraudulent acts plausibly violating the UCL, and thus the Court DENIES

Defendants’ MTDs as to this claim.

v. Claim 12: Misappropriation of Ideas

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ twelfth claim is preempted by the Copyright Act

of 1976 (“the Act”). “Preemption occurs when (1) the work at issue comes within the

subject matter of copyright and (2) the rights granted under state law are ‘equivalent to

any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright’ set forth in the Act.” 

Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting

Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

First, because Plaintiffs’ ideas have been affixed in a tangible, copyrighted

work—the GACT footage—Plaintiffs’ twelfth claim falls within the scope of federal

copyright law. See id. at 1057–59. Second, the rights afforded by the Act are

equivalent because Plaintiffs “allege an implied-in-fact contract not to use [their] ideas

and concepts . . . without compensating [them],” rather than a contract that “protects or

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creates any rights not equivalent to the Act’s exclusive prohibitions of unauthorized

reproduction, performance, distribution, or display.” Id. at 1062, 1060–61 (citation

omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ twelfth claim is preempted, and therefore this Court

GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE Defendants’ MTDs as to this claim. 

vi. Claim 13: Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations

According to the Supreme Court of California,

“The elements which a plaintiff must plead to state the cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations are (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach [or] disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.” 

Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 960 P.2d 513, 530 (Cal. 1998) (quoting Pac.

Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 50 Cal. 3d 1118, 1126 (1990)). The third

element incorporates a requirement that the defendant’s “alleged wrongful or unjustified

conduct caused the breach.” Bank of N.Y. v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 523 F.3d 902, 909

(9th Cir. 2008). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ general allegations “fail to provide any specifics

about: (1) the various contracts or the terms thereof; (2) the identity of the defendant

that allegedly interfered with which contract; (3) whether there was an actual breach of

any contract . . . [;] and (4) the intentional act that was independently wrongful.” 

(Dummler MTD 26, ECF No. 65-1; O’Donnell MTD 26, ECF No. 68-1.) Defendants

further suggest that Plaintiffs cannot allege damages at all, much less that Defendants’

actions caused any damages, because “the television series at issue was going to air on

PBS and it is nearly axiomatic that PBS does not pay for content.” (Dummler MTD 27,

ECF No. 65-1; O’Donnell MTD 27, ECF No. 68-1.) Plaintiffs, on the other hand, claim

to have adequately pleaded all five elements. (Opp’n to Dummler MTD 28, ECF No.

69; Opp’n to O’Donnell MTD 28, ECF No. 70.) 

First, Plaintiffs plead the existence of valid contracts with Macy’s and Alexander,

and have attached the contracts as exhibits to the Complaint. (See Compl., ECF Nos.

1, 1-1.) Second, the Complaint contains sufficient allegations that Dummler and

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O’Donnell knew of Plaintiffs’ various contracts. (See id. ¶¶ 50 (Dummler

acknowledged Macy’s role as a GACT sponsor), 68 (O’Donnell became involved in

GACT when he grew concerned that Macy’s had not paid its sponsorship fees, and

inserted himself into Plaintiffs’ relationships with, inter alia, Macy’s, Whirlpool, and

Alexander), 74 (Plaintiffs explained to Defendants “how much money [Plaintiffs]

would lose if the Tour continued without Macy’s performance of its promises”), 78(e)

(Defendants knew Macy’s had neither signed the purchase order nor paid its

sponsorship fees), 161 (Defendants knew of Plaintiffs’ “existing contracts and

relationships with, among others, Alexander, WTTW, APT, chefs, and public

broadcasting stations”).)

Third, Plaintiffs claim to allege the following intentional acts by Defendants

designed to induce third partiesto breach their contracts with Plaintiffs: giving Macy’s

and/or Whirlpool at least some of the CCT Assets, and shooting and editing the

remaining GACT episodes for Macy’s. (Opp’n to Dummler MTD 28, ECF No. 69

(citing Compl. ¶ 78, ECF No. 1); Opp’n to O’Donnell MTD 28, ECF No. 70 (citing

Compl. ¶ 78, ECF No. 1).) Further, Plaintiffs allege that, “[d]espite knowing of these

contracts and existing business relationships, said Defendants, and each of them,

intentionally interfered with those contracts and business relationships.” (Id. ¶ 162.)

As to Dummler, these assertions are insufficient to establish the third element

because they do not allege causation—namely, Plaintiffs do not allege why Dummler,

rather than other forces, caused Macy’s or other parties to breach their contracts. As to

O’Donnell, however, Plaintiffs satisfactorily plead intentional acts that disrupted

Plaintiffs’ contractual relationships. Plaintiffs additionally plead that O’Donnell

“inserted himself, over the objections of [Plaintiffs], into the relationships of

[Plaintiffs], Macy’s, Whirlpool, and Alexander, among others. In so doing he attempted

to renegotiate those relationships, for the benefit of LEC, Dummler, and himself.” 

(Compl. ¶ 68, ECF No. 1.) This allegation suggests that, in so acting, O’Donnell caused

Macy’s, Whirlpool, and Alexander to form new relationships with O’Donnell. This

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resulted in the disruption of those parties’ relationships with Plaintiffs by causing said

parties to forego their contractual duties to Plaintiffs and market GACT as their own.

Fourth, Plaintiffs allege an actual breach of their contract with Macy’s, as Macy’s

never made its third sponsorship payment. (Id. ¶ 75.) Finally, Plaintiffs allege 

damages, not only monetary, but also to their “business, reputation and good will.” (Id.

¶¶ 163–66.) These harms are purported to be the result of O’Donnell’s interference. 

Further, even if—as Defendants allege—Plaintiffs would have received no direct

compensation from public broadcasting stations for the GACT content, missing out on

the opportunity to market GACT may nonetheless have harmed Plaintiffs by causing

them to lose the opportunity to gain publicity and positive ratings that could have led

to further business. Further, a cooking show seems particularly well-suited to the

marketing of additional revenue-generating tie-ins such as, inter alia, cookware,

packaged foods, cookbooks, T-shirts, and restaurants.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible claim for intentional interference

with contractual relations as to Dummler, and thus the Court GRANTS WITHOUT

PREJUDICE Dummler’s MTD as to this claim. However, Plaintiffs do state a claim

for intentional interference with contractual relations as to O’Donnell, and therefore the

Court DENIES O’Donnell’s MTD as to this claim.

vii. Claims 14 and 16: Intentional and Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

To state a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic

advantage, a plaintiff must allege: 

(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.

Youst v. Longo, 729 P.2d 728, 733 n.6 (1987) (citing Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d

815, 827 (1975)). Similarly, a plaintiff pleads a claim for negligent interference with

prospective economic advantage if he alleges:

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(1) an economic relationship existed between the plaintiff and a third party which contained a reasonably probable future economic benefit or advantage to plaintiff; (2) the defendant knew of the existence of the

relationship and was aware of should have been aware that if it did not

act with due care its actions would interfere with this relationship and cause plaintiff to lose in whole or in part the probable future economic benefit or advantage of the relationship; (3) the defendant was negligent; and (4) such negligence caused damage to plaintiff in that the relationship was actually interfered with or disrupted and plaintiff lost in whole or in part the economic benefits or advantage reasonably

expected from the relationship.

N. Am. Chem. Co. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 4th 764, 786 (1997) (citations

omitted). “[A]s a matter of law, a threshold causation requirement exists for

maintaining a cause of action for eithertort, namely, proofthat it isreasonably probable

that the lost economic advantage would have been realized but for the defendant’s

interference.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

Asto Dummler, theCourt has already found, with regardsto Plaintiffs’thirteenth

claim, that Plaintiffs fail to establish that Dummler’sintentional acts caused Plaintiffs’

harm. (See supra p. 17.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for intentional

interference with prospective economic advantage as to Dummler, and the Court

GRANTSWITHOUTPREJUDICE Dummler’s MTD asto this claim. However, the

Court has also found that Plaintiffs have pleaded all five elements as to O’Donnell. 

(See supra pp. 17–18.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs state a claim for intentional interference

with prospective economic advantage as to O’Donnell, and the Court DENIES

O’Donnell’s MTD as to this claim. 

As for the negligent form of the tort, the Court has determined that Plaintiffs fail

to allege that Defendants owed them a duty of care. (See supra pp. 11–12.) 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for negligent interference with prospective

economic advantage, and the Court GRANTS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Defendants’

MTDs as to this claim.

viii. Claim 15: Negligent Interference with Contractual Relations

Finally, Defendants argue that this claim must be dismissed because California

does not recognize the tort of negligent interference with contractual relations. 

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(Dummler MTD 27, ECF No. 65-1; O’Donnell MTD 27, ECF No. 68-1.) The Court

agrees, and accordingly GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE Defendants’ MTDs as to this

claim. See Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 636–37 (1960) (explaining that

California courts “have quite consistently refused to recognize a cause of action based

on negligent, as opposed to intentional, conduct which interferes with the performance

of a contract between third parties,” and refusing to recognize said cause of action

because “to so hold would constitute an unwarranted extension of liability for

negligence”); see also Express Diagnostics Int’l, Inc. v. Tydings, No. C 06-01346 JW,

2009 WL 111736, at *7 n.14 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2009) (citation omitted) (“[T]he

Supreme Court [of California] has yet to disapprove Fifield.”).

CONCLUSION 

In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Requests for Judicial

Notice. The Court also GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’

Motions to Dismiss.

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss WITHOUT

PREJUDICE as to claims 2, 5, 6 (as to O’Donnell), 7, 8, 9, 10, 13 (as to Dummler),

14 (as to Dummler), and 16. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss

WITH PREJUDICE as to claims 12 and 15, as amendment of these claims would be

futile. See DeSoto, 957 F.2d at 658. The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motions to

Dismiss as to claims 4, 6 (as to Dummler), 11, 13 (as to O’Donnell), and 14 (as to

O’Donnell). 

If Plaintiffs wish, they SHALL FILE an amended complaint within fourteen (14)

days of the date on which this Order is electronically docketed. Failure to file an

amended complaint by this date may result in dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against

Defendants with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 25, 2014

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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