Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01855/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01855-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANTIAGO CRUZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

ZAHED UDDIN AHMED and JOHN DOES 

1-10,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-01855-KAW 

ORDER OF SERVICE

Plaintiff Santiago Cruz, a state prisoner incarcerated at the California Training Facility 

(“CTF”) in Soledad, has filed a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the 

violation of his constitutional rights by Dr. Zahed Uddin Ahmed and Doe Defendants. Plaintiff 

has consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge over this 

action. Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), which is 

granted in a separate order. The Court now addresses the claims asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1988).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:

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(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the 

plaintiff can show that the defendant’s actions both actually and proximately caused the 

deprivation of a federally protected right. Lemire v. Caifornia Dep’t of Corrections & 

Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 

1988); Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A person deprives 

another of a constitutional right within the meaning of § 1983 if he does an affirmative act, 

participates in another's affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to 

do, that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. 

Under no circumstances is there respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Lemire, 756 

F.3d at 1074. Or, in layman's terms, under no circumstances is there liability under section 1983 

solely because one is responsible for the actions or omissions of another. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 

680-81 (9th Cir. 1984). A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal 

involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 

1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)). It is 

insufficient for a plaintiff only to allege that supervisors knew about the constitutional violation 

and that they generally created policies and procedures that led to the violation, without alleging 

“a specific policy” or “a specific event” instigated by them that led to the constitutional violations. 

Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012).

II. Plaintiff’s Claims

The following is a summary of the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint. On May 5, 2014, 

Plaintiff was assaulted by an inmate and he was rushed to an outside hospital. After Plaintiff’s

return from the hospital, Dr. Ahmed “would choose to see Plaintiff for his pain and injuries thirty 

days later.” During the thirty days, Plaintiff suffered extreme pain due to fractured ribs. Plaintiff 

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could not eat or breathe correctly because of the fractured ribs.

A. Doe Defendants

Plaintiff names Dr. Ahmed and John Does 1-10. Although the use of “John Doe” to 

identify a defendant is not favored in the Ninth Circuit, see Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 

642 (9th Cir. 1980); Wiltsie v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections, 406 F.2d 515, 518 (9th Cir. 1968), 

situations may arise where the identity of alleged defendants cannot be known prior to the filing of 

a complaint. In such circumstances, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through 

discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover 

their identities or that the complaint should be dismissed on other grounds. Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 

642; Velasquez v. Senko, 643 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 1986). Plaintiff must provide to the 

Court the name of the John Doe defendants by the date scheduled for defendants to file their 

dispositive motion. Failure to do so will result in dismissal of these defendants without prejudice 

to Plaintiff filing a new action against them.

B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth 

Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 

1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 

1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two 

requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the 

official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s health or safety. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a 

prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. A prison official exhibits deliberate indifference 

when he knows of and disregards a substantial risk of serious harm to inmate health or safety. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Such indifference may appear when prison officials deny, delay or 

intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown in the way in which prison 

officials provide medical care. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062 (delay of seven months in providing 

medical care during which medical condition was left virtually untreated and plaintiff was forced 

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to endure "unnecessary pain" sufficient to present colorable § 1983 claim).

Plaintiff’s allegations meet the objective prong of the Farmer test in that his fractured ribs 

appear to be a serious medical need. Liberally construed, the allegations also appear to meet 

Farmer’s subjective prong because they indicate that Dr. Ahmed knew of Plaintiff’s fractured ribs 

and delayed treating him for thirty days, causing Plaintiff to endure extreme pain during that time.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his 

serious medical needs against Dr. Ahmed. 

2. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of 

Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a copy of the complaint 

(docket no. 1) and all attachments thereto, a copy of this Order and a copy of the form “Consent or 

Declination to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction” to CTF Defendant Dr. Zahed Uddin Ahmed. This 

form can also be found at www.cand.uscourts.gov/civilforms. The Clerk shall also mail a copy of 

the complaint and a copy of this Order to the State Attorney General’s Office in San Francisco, 

and a copy of this Order to Plaintiff.

3. Defendant is cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require him

to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of the summons and complaint. Pursuant to 

Rule 4, if Defendant, after being notified of this action and asked by the Court, on behalf of 

Plaintiff, to waive service of the summons, fails to do so, he will be required to bear the cost of 

such service unless good cause be shown for his failure to sign and return the waiver forms. If 

service is waived, this action will proceed as if Defendant had been served on the date that the 

waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B), Defendant will not be required to serve 

and file an answer before sixty days from the date on which the request for waiver was sent. (This 

allows a longer time to respond than would be required if formal service of summons is 

necessary.)

Defendant is advised to read the statement set forth at the foot of the waiver form that more 

completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to waiver of service of the summons. If 

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service is waived after the date provided in the Notice but before Defendant has been personally 

served, the answer shall be due sixty days from the date on which the request for waiver was sent 

or twenty days from the date the waiver form is filed, whichever is later. 

4. Defendant shall file his Consent or Declination to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction on or 

before the date his answer is due.

5. The following briefing schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action:

a. No later than thirty days from the date his answer is due, Defendant shall file a 

motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If Defendant files a motion for 

summary judgment, it shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in 

all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. If Defendant is of the opinion that this case 

cannot be resolved by summary judgment, he shall so inform the Court prior to the date the 

summary judgment motion is due. All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on 

Plaintiff. 

At the time of filing the motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion, 

Defendant shall comply with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th 

Cir. 2012), and provide Plaintiff with notice of what is required of him to oppose a summary 

judgment motion. 

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment or other dispositive 

motion shall be filed with the Court and served on Defendant no later than twenty-eight days after 

the date on which Defendant’s motion is filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice 

should be given to pro se plaintiffs facing a summary judgment motion:

The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment by which they seek to have 

your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. 

Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material 

fact -- that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your 

case, the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 

which will end your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary 

judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot 

simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in 

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declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as 

provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendant’s declarations and 

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not 

submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be 

entered against you. If summary judgment is granted [in favor of the defendants], your 

case will be dismissed and there will be no trial.

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Before filing his opposition, Plaintiff is advised to read the notice that will be provided to 

him by Defendant when the motion is filed, and Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment must come 

forward with evidence showing triable issues of material fact on every essential element of his 

claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that because he bears the burden of proving his allegations in this 

case, he must be prepared to produce evidence in support of those allegations when he files his 

opposition to Defendant’s summary judgment motion. Such evidence may include sworn 

declarations from himself and other witnesses to the incident, and copies of documents 

authenticated by sworn declaration. Plaintiff will not be able to avoid summary judgment simply 

by repeating the allegations of his complaint.

c. Defendant shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen days after the date 

Plaintiff’s opposition is filed.

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 

hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date.

6. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Leave of the Court pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2) is hereby granted to Defendant to depose 

Plaintiff and any other necessary witnesses confined in prison.

7. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendant, or 

Defendant’s counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to 

Defendant or his counsel.

8. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. He must keep the Court informed 

of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion.

9. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be granted. Any 

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motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than fourteen days prior to the deadline 

sought to be extended.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 7, 2015

______________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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