Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02396/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02396-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY ARCEO,

Plaintiff,

v.

SOCORRO SALINAS, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:11-cv-2396 KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a civil detainee presently housed at Coalinga State Hospital, proceeding pro se 

with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed a second amended 

complaint on December 8, 2014, alleging that defendants retaliated against plaintiff based on the 

exercise of his free speech rights by, inter alia, denying grievances as well as denying his mother 

visitation, and also appears to challenge the constitutionality of the jail’s administrative grievance 

procedure. 

However, on January 6, 2015, and January 21, 2015, plaintiff’s mother, Sylvia Arceo, 

filed amended complaints signed solely by Sylvia Arceo, alleging that San Joaquin Jail staff 

denied her visitation with her son, Anthony Arceo. Sylvia Arceo is not a plaintiff in this action, 

and was not granted permission to file amended complaints herein. Moreover, in plaintiff’s 

second amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants retaliated against plaintiff in various 

ways, including the alleged deprivation of visitation with his mother. Although Sylvia Arceo 

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claims her son is helping her file her amended complaints, it is unclear whether plaintiff intended 

for his mother to pursue her claims in this action, or her own action. In any event, this action may 

proceed only on one operative complaint. Thus, Ms. Arceo’s third and fourth amended 

complaints are stricken from the record, and the court now screens plaintiff’s second amended 

complaint. 

1. Grievance Process

First, prisoners have no stand-alone due process rights related to the administrative 

grievance process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Ramirez v. 

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no liberty interest entitling 

inmates to a specific grievance process), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1063 (2004). Put another way, 

prison officials are not required under federal law to process inmate grievances in a specific way 

or to respond to them in a favorable manner. Because there is no right to any particular grievance 

process, plaintiff cannot state a cognizable civil rights claim for a violation of his due process 

rights based on allegations that prison officials ignored or failed to properly process grievances. 

See, e.g., Wright v. Shannon, 2010 WL 445203 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2010) (plaintiff’s 

allegations that prison officials denied or ignored his inmate appeals failed to state a cognizable 

claim under the First Amendment); Walker v. Vazquez, 2009 WL 5088788 at *6-7 (E.D. Cal. 

Dec.17, 2009) (plaintiff’s allegations that prison officials failed to timely process his inmate 

appeals failed to a state cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment); Towner v. Knowles, 2009 

WL 4281999 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2009) (plaintiff’s allegations that prison officials screened 

out his inmate appeals without any basis failed to indicate a deprivation of federal rights); 

Williams v. Cate, 2009 WL 3789597 at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (“Plaintiff has no protected 

liberty interest in the vindication of his administrative claims.”). Because plaintiff has no 

constitutional right to a particular grievance process, his attempt to challenge the constitutionality 

of such process fails to state a cognizable claim.

2. Alleged Denial of Visitation

Second, the alleged temporary denial of visitation claim is unavailing as to plaintiff or his 

mother.

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“[F]reedom of association is among the rights least compatible with incarceration.” 

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003). Some curtailment must be expected in the prison 

context. Id.; Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2002) (loss of intimate association 

part and parcel with confinement). Spouses and family members of prisoners do not have rights 

or privileges to visitation distinct from those of the inmate to which they are married or related. 

Hill v. Washington State Dep’t of Corrections, 628 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1263 (W.D. Wash. 2009); 

Harris v. Murray, 761 F.Supp. 409, 412 (E.D. Va.1990). “Such incarcerated persons . . . maintain 

no right to simple physical association -- with their parents or with anyone else -- grounded in the 

first amendment. Thorne v. Jones, 765 F.2d 1270, 1273-75 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding prisoner had 

no absolute right to visits from his parents).

Prison regulations that curtail the right to freedom of association by restricting family 

visiting privileges are not necessarily unconstitutional. Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (right to freedom of association is limited in prison, thus, imposition of prison 

regulation preventing inmate from visitation with his children permissible); Overton, 539 U.S. at 

129-32 (despite how severely the prison regulations at issue restricted the prisoners’ right to 

receive visits from family, they were still constitutional); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586, 

589 (1984) (“[T]he Constitution does not require that pretrial detainees be allowed contact visits 

when responsible, experienced administrators have determined, in their sound discretion, that 

such visits will jeopardize the security of the facility.”); Gerber, 291 F.3d at 621(right of intimate 

association is necessarily abridged in the prison setting); Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 682 

(5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding the removal of prisoner’s sons from the approved visitors 

list did not violate his constitutional rights). 

A court need not determine the extent to which freedom of association survives 

incarceration if the regulation at issue bears a rational relationship to legitimate penological 

interests. See Overton, 539 U.S. at 132. Great deference must be shown to prison administrators 

“in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to 

preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Hill, 628 F.Supp.2d 

at 1263; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979). The courts must not become unnecessarily 

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involved in prison administration. Id.; see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974), 

overruled in part on other grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989). Prison 

officials must have the ability to anticipate security problems and address such problems as 

needed. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405. Prison security decisions are “peculiarly within the province 

and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in 

the record to indicate that prison officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, 

courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 

U.S. 817, 827 (1974).

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from the deprivation of life, liberty or property 

without due process of law. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460. But individuals claiming a protected 

interest must have a legitimate claim to it, either from the Due Process clause itself, or through 

state laws. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460. However, the “denial of prison access to a particular 

visitor ‘is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence,’

and therefore is not independently protected by the Due Process Clause.” Thompson, 490 U.S. at 

460, quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983).1 Moreover, federal and state laws have 

not created a protected interest in visitation. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 

1994) (per curiam) (holding that prisoners have no constitutional right to contact visitation); 

Thompson, 490 U.S. at 461; Egberto v. McDaniel, 2011 WL 1233358, *9 (D. Nev. Mar. 28, 

2011) (“law is clear that inmates do not have a right to visitation under the Due Process Clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment”) (citing Thompson, 490 U.S. at 461.)

Moreover, in Dunn, the Ninth Circuit found that defendants were entitled to qualified 

immunity where the prisoner was temporarily subjected to an 18 month suspension of visitation 

privileges with his three minor children. Id., 621 F.3d at 1204. The Ninth Circuit found that the 

right of a prisoner to receive visits from his children was not clearly established: 

In Block v. Rutherford, the Court held “that the Constitution does 

not require that detainees be allowed contact visits when 

responsible, experienced administrators have determined, in their 

 

1

 Hewitt was overruled, in part, on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 

(1995).

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sound discretion, that such visits will jeopardize the security of the 

facility.” 468 U.S. 576, 589, 104 S. Ct. 3227, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 

(1984). [Footnote omitted.] In Kentucky Department of 

Corrections v. Thompson, the Supreme Court held “[t]he denial of 

prison access to a particular visitor is well within the terms of 

confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence, and 

therefore is not independently protected by the Due Process 

Clause.” 490 U.S. 454, 461, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 

(1989) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

In Overton v. Bazzetta, the Court considered a substantive due 

process claim challenging various prison regulations restricting 

prisoners’ rights to receive visits from family members. 539 U.S. 

126, 129-30, 123 S. Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003). The Court’s 

own hesitation in articulating the existence and nature of an 

inmate’s right to receive visits from family members while in 

prison is instructive. The Court acknowledged that “outside the 

prison context, there is some discussion in our cases of a right to 

maintain certain familial relationships, including association among 

members of an immediate family and association between 

grandchildren and grandparents.” Id. at 131, 123 S. Ct. 2162 

(emphasis added). The Court, however, declined to “attempt to 

explore or define the asserted right of association at any length or 

determine the extent to which it survives incarceration.” Id. at 132, 

123 S. Ct. 2162. At the same time, the Court observed that “[a]n 

inmate does not retain rights inconsistent with proper 

incarceration,” and that “freedom of association is among the rights 

least compatible with incarceration.” Id. at 131, 123 S. Ct. 2162 

(emphasis added). Further, despite how “severe[ly]” the prison 

regulations at issue in Overton restricted the prisoners’ right to 

receive visits from their own family, including minors, id. at 134, 

123 S. Ct. 2162, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 

challenged regulations, id. at 136-37, 123 S. Ct. 2162.

Dunn, 621 F.3d at 1201-02.

Taking the above cases into account, the court notes that the plaintiff here is not a 

prisoner, but is a civil detainee, who is similar in some ways to convicted “prisoners,” i.e.,

persons serving criminal sentences, but different in other ways. Thus, the undersigned cautiously 

draws upon authority from related contexts to address the temporary denial of visitation at issue. 

For example, civil detainees enjoy constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 

Due Process Clause -- not the Eighth Amendment, which analogously protects prisoners -- from 

state facilities’ imposition of restrictions and other general conditions of confinement that do not 

reasonably serve a legitimate, non-punitive government objective. Cf. Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39 

(discussing rights of pretrial criminal detainees). The same Due Process Clause also bars 

particular acts or omissions by facility staff that are done with deliberate indifference or cruelty. 

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See Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 645-48 (5th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing Bell in such 

situations based on DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 198-

200 (1989) (indicating that, whether source of detained person’s right is Fourteenth Amendment 

or Eighth Amendment, the rationale for applying a governmental duty to aid confined persons 

was the same for both criminals and civil detainees)).

Civil detainees like plaintiff enjoy the same or greater First and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights as those enjoyed by prisoners. See, e.g., Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(the “more protective” Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process standard protects 

detainees, not the Eighth Amendment standard applicable to prisoners). Prisoners and civil 

detainees do not leave all of their constitutional rights at the prison or jail gates. See Bell, 441 

U.S. at 545. Nevertheless, institutional authorities may restrict the constitutional freedoms that 

institutionalized persons would otherwise enjoy, so long as those restrictions are rationally related 

to a legitimate and neutral governmental objective. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987); 

Bell, 441 U.S. at 460-61.

Courts use a four-part test to determine whether a prison regulatory policy is “reasonably 

related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner, 482 at 89. The first factor is whether there is 

a “valid, rational connection” between the regulation and a legitimate government interest. Id.

The second is whether the inmate has an alternative means of exercising the allegedly impinged 

constitutional right. Id. at 90. Third, the court considers the cost to accommodate the asserted 

right on guards, deputies, and other prison or jail resources. Id. Finally, the court considers 

whether there are ready alternatives to the challenged regulation. Id. The “absence of ready 

alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation.” Id.

 In addition, the Supreme Court, citing Turner and Bell, has upheld a greater restriction --

barring even through-the-glass contact visits to inmates by their minor nieces and nephews -- than 

that imposed on plaintiff and his mother. Overton, 539 U.S. at 126. In 1995, the Michigan 

Department of Corrections (MDOC) enacted new restrictions on visits to state prisoners. Inmates 

deemed to be the highest security risks could not receive any personal-contact visits. Such 

inmates had to “communicate with their visitors through a glass panel, [with] the inmate and the 

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visitor being on opposite sides of a booth.” Overton, 539 U.S. at 130. Further, MDOC did not 

allow even non-contact visits by minors unless the minors were the children, grandchildren or 

siblings of the high-security inmates. Michelle Bazzeta and other MDOC inmates brought a civil 

rights action, relying on the First and Fourteenth Amendments, challenging the latter restrictions,

but not the more general rule barring all personal-contact visits. Id. The Supreme Court, relying 

on Bell and Turner, rejected their claims:

Turning to the restrictions on visitation by children, we conclude 

that the regulations bear a rational relation to MDOC’s valid 

interests in maintaining internal security and protecting child 

visitors from exposure to sexual or other misconduct or from 

accidental injury. The regulations promote internal security, 

perhaps the most important of penological goals, see, e.g., Pell, 

supra, at 823, 94 S. Ct. 2800, by reducing the total number of 

visitors and by limiting the disruption caused by children in 

particular. Protecting children from harm is also a legitimate goal, 

see, e.g., Block, supra, at 586-587.

Overton, 539 U.S. at 133.

Although Overton involved a prison, and not a jail, the interest in maintaining internal 

security is the same. In addition, the Block case involved pretrial detainees, but the Court found

that in this context pretrial detainees should be treated similarly to convicted inmates. Block, 468 

U.S. at 587. Thus, while plaintiff is to be afforded more considerate treatment than a prisoner, 

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982), the Constitution does not require that detainees 

be allowed contact visits, Block, 468 U.S. at 589, and the court has not found any authority 

requiring that civil detainees be allowed contact visits. 

Moreover, plaintiff was not deprived of all family visits, or permanently deprived of all 

visits with his mother. Rather, other family members were allowed to visit, and plaintiff was 

temporarily deprived of visits with his mother for a total period of 22 days: on March 4, 2012, 

and April 3, 2012, and his mother was subject to two separate ten-day visit suspensions: from 

November 15, 2011, to November 24, 2011, and from February 12, 2012, to February 22, 2012. 

(ECF No. 22 at 4.) In Overton, the restriction on visitation was far more onerous than the 

restrictions on plaintiff’s mother’s visits alleged here, and the 22 day time frame is far shorter 

than the 18 month suspension of visitation in Dunn. 

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In addition, plaintiff and his mother provided a copy of the November 6, 2011 letter from 

Sgt. Cholula, San Joaquin County Disciplinary Sergeant, stating that plaintiff’s mother’s visits 

were suspended for ten days in 2011 because jail personnel complained that while she was in the 

visiting lobby, plaintiff’s mother was soliciting visitors to join the mother’s support group, 

despite prior requests that the mother stop such solicitations. (ECF Nos. 21 at 48; 23 at 29.) Such 

letter provides a rational basis in maintaining internal security for the ten day suspension of 

visitation in 2011, to which this court must defer. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 827; Bell, 441 U.S. at 

547. “[T]he Constitution does not require that detainees be allowed contact visits when 

responsible, experienced administrators have determined, in their sound discretion, that such 

visits will jeopardize the security of the facility.” Block, 468 U.S. at 589. Thus, jail officials 

have wide discretion to regulate visits between detainees and their family members. 

Therefore, the temporary suspension of visits for a 24 day period fails to rise to the level 

of a constitutional violation. But even if it did, jail employees would be entitled to qualified 

immunity because the right of a civil detainee to have visits with his mother is not clearly 

established. See, e.g., Howard v. Hunter, 2011 WL 2711095 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2011) 

(defendants entitled to qualified immunity because the right of an institutionalized sexually 

violent predator to visit with his daughter is not clearly established); Cerniglia v. Carona, 2010 

WL 4823896, *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2010) (government officials entitled to qualified immunity 

because “[t]he right of a civil detainee to have visits with his children is not clearly established”). 

In light of the above, plaintiff should not renew any claim based on the alleged temporary 

denial of visitation in any third amended complaint.

3. No Respondeat Superior Liability

Third, plaintiff’s claims based on defendants’ alleged “supervisory” actions also fail 

because supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 

employees under a theory of respondeat superior. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th 

Cir. 1979) (no liability where there is no allegation of personal participation); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978) (no liability where there is no evidence of personal 

participation), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning 

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the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. 

Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (complaint devoid of specific factual 

allegations of personal participation is insufficient).

4. Alleged Retaliation

Finally, plaintiff included a section in his second amended complaint which is entitled 

“Retaliation.” (ECF No. 21 at 9.) In this section, plaintiff recounts a litany of events, many of 

which pertain to his efforts to obtain grievance forms, or that complain about how the grievance 

was addressed or not addressed. As noted above, plaintiff has no due process right to a particular 

grievance process. Thus, plaintiff’s efforts to challenge such incidents by including them in a 

section entitled “retaliation” is insufficient to state a claim for retaliation. As plaintiff was 

previously informed (ECF No. 7 at 5), “[p]risoners have a First Amendment right to file 

grievances against prison officials and to be free from retaliation for doing so.” Watison v. 

Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th 

Cir. 2009)). A viable retaliation claim in the prison context has five elements: “(1) An assertion 

that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s 

protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment 

rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Thus, a defendant’s response to a grievance, without more, is insufficient to state a claim 

for retaliation. Moreover, defendant Adams’ act of kicking plaintiff’s legal mail, while 

unprofessional, does not rise to the level of adverse action. Plaintiff received the legal mail and 

was able to file a grievance concerning defendant Adams’ actions. While plaintiff’s allegations 

that he was unable to obtain a grievance form may be relevant to rebut a claim that plaintiff failed 

to exhaust administrative remedies in connection with the underlying claim, such arguments are 

not presently before the court, and such claims, standing alone, fail to state a cognizable 

retaliation claim. None of the allegations contained in plaintiff’s retaliation section, as presently 

written, state a cognizable retaliation claim. However, plaintiff is granted leave to amend should 

he be able to allege facts meeting the required elements of Rhodes. 

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5. Conclusion

In an abundance of caution, plaintiff’s second amended complaint is dismissed, and he is 

granted one final opportunity to file a third amended complaint. If plaintiff chooses to file a third 

amended complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions complained of have resulted 

in a deprivation of plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 

F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the third amended complaint must allege in specific terms how 

each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there 

is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of 

Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s third amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement is 

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. 

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a third amended complaint, the 

original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in a third amended 

complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The third and fourth amended complaints (ECF Nos. 22 & 23) submitted by plaintiff’s 

mother, Sylvia Arceo, are stricken; 

2. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (ECF No. 21) is dismissed; 

3. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a third

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the third amended complaint must bear the 

docket number assigned this case and must be labeled “Third Amended Complaint”; plaintiff 

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must file an original and two copies of the third amended complaint; failure to file a third

amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action 

be dismissed; and

4. The Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this order on Sylvia Arceo, 3309 

Telegraph Avenue, Stockton, California 95204.

Dated: March 16, 2015

/arce2396.14a

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