Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00578/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00578-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:1332ct Diversity-(Citizenship)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT

DISTRICT, a public corporation; and

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a municipal

corporation,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 15-cv-578-WQH-JLB

ORDER

vs.

MONSANTO COMPANY; SOLUTIA

INC.; and PHARMACIA LLC,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss the City of San Diego’s

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 31) and the Motion to Dismiss the San Diego Unified

Port District’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 32) filed by Defendants. 

I. Background

On March 13, 2015, Plaintiffs San Diego Unified Port District (the “Port

District”) and City of San Diego (the “City”) commenced this action by filing the

Complaint. (ECF No. 1). On August 3, 2015, the City and the Port District filed

separate First Amended Complaints (“FACs”) against Defendants Monsanto, Solutia,

and Pharmacia (“Monsanto”), which are the operative pleadings in this case. (ECF Nos.

24, 25). 

On August 31, 2015, Monsanto filed a Motion to Dismiss the City’s FAC. (ECF

No. 31) and a Motion to Dismiss the Port District’s FAC. (ECF No. 32). On

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September 21, 2015, the Port District and the City filed responses. (ECF Nos. 33, 34). 

On October 10, 2015, Monsanto filed replies. (ECF Nos. 37, 38). 

On May 25, 2016, the Court held oral argument on the Motions to Dismiss. 

(ECF No. 61). On June 3, 2016, the Port District filed a sur-reply in opposition to

Monsanto’s Motion to Dismiss addressing the issue of standing. (ECF No. 65). On

June 10, 2016, Monsanto filed a response to the sur-reply. (ECF No. 67). On June 14,

2016, the Port District filed a reply to the sur-reply. (ECF No. 68). On August 23,

2016, Monsanto filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority in Support of Motion to its

Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 69). On August 31, 2016, the Port District and the City

filed responses to Monsanto’s Notice of Supplemental Authority. (ECF Nos. 73, 74). 

On September 7, 2016, Monsanto filed a reply to the Port District’s response to

Monsanto’s Notice of Supplemental Authority. (ECF No. 78). On September 19,

2016, Monsanto filed a reply to the City’s Notice of Supplemental Authority. (ECF No.

79). 

II. Allegations of the FAC1

Plaintiff City is a “California Charter City and municipal corporation.” (ECF No.

25 ¶ 7). The City was “the trustee of certain relevant tidelands and submerged lands in

and around the [San Diego] Bay from the early 1900s through 1963, when that property

was transferred to the Port District.” Id. 

 “Plaintiff Port District is a public entity created by the San Diego Unified Port

District Act.” Id. ¶ 5. “The Port District is a trustee for the people of the State of

California, which holds and manages the tidelands and submerged lands in and around

San Diego Bay ‘for the development, operation, maintenance, control, regulation, and

management of the harbor of San Diego . . . and for the promotion of commerce,

navigation, fisheries, and recreation therein.’” Id. “The Port District is specifically

authorized to use its ‘powers and authority . . . to protect and enhance . . . physical

1 The factual allegations in the FACs (ECF Nos. 24 and 25) are identical in aspects relevant to these motions. 

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access to the bay . . . natural resources of the bay, including plant and animal life . . .

[and] quality of water in the bay.’” Id. 

Defendant companies, Monsanto, Pharmacia, and Solutia, are corporate spin-offs

of the original Monsanto Company. Id. ¶ 12. “Monsanto Company was the sole

manufacturer of [polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”)] in the United States from 1935

to 1979, and trademarked the name ‘Aroclor’ for certain PCB compounds.” Id. ¶ 2. 

PCBs “are man-made chemical compounds that have become notorious as global

environmental contaminants found in bays, oceans, rivers, streams, soil, and air.” Id.

¶ 1. “In humans, PCB exposure is associated with cancer as well as serious non-cancer

health effects, including effects on the immune system, reproductive system, nervous

system and endocrine system, among others.” Id. ¶ 1. “In the environment, PCBs have

widespread deleterious effects and can impair and even destroy populations of fish,

birds, and other animals.” Id. 

“While the scientific community and Monsanto knew that PCBs were toxic and

becoming a global contaminant, Monsanto repeatedly misrepresented these facts, telling

governmental entities the exact opposite – that the compounds were not toxic and that

the company would not expect to find PCBs in the environment in a widespread

manner.” Id. ¶ 56.

Although Monsanto knew “that landfills were not suitable for PCB contaminated

waste,” Monsanto “instructed its customers to dispose of PCB containing wastes in

local landfills” instead of “having customers return the old formula fluids.” Id. ¶ 51. 

Having “determined that the only effective method of disposing of PCBs was high

temperature incineration, which was not commercially available to it or its customers,”

Monsanto “constructed an incinerator for the disposal of its own liquid PCB

contaminants.” Id. “Monsanto made its incinerator available to its customers, for a fee,

for the disposal of their liquid PCB wastes.” Id. 

Monsanto “continued producing PCBs until Congress enacted the Toxic

Substances Control Act (‘TSCA’), which banned the manufacture of and most uses of

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PCBs.” Id. ¶ 2. 

 “PCBs are identified as a Primary Chemical of Concern (‘COC’) in California

Regional Water Quality Control Board, San Diego Region (‘Regional Water Board’)

Cleanup and Abatement Order (‘CAO’) No. R9-2012-0024, dated March 14, 2012,

which directed the City and the Port District to, among other things, remediate PCB

contaminated sediments within a discrete area known as the Shipyard Sediment Site.” 

Id. ¶ 65. “There are other sites and public properties within and around the Bay that are

currently under investigation for PCB contamination and that will be investigated for

PCB contamination in the future.” Id. ¶ 66. 

“The Regional Water Board estimated human health risks due to the consumption

of PCB contaminated fish tissue found in the Bay and employed human fish

consumption rates and bioaccumulation factors in the analysis.” Id. ¶ 67. “The

Regional Water Board . . . concluded that human ingestion of seafood caught within

certain assessment areas can significantly increase cancer risk, specifically identifying

PCBs as a carcinogenic chemical.” Id. ¶ 68.

“PCBs have entered the Bay through various sources.” Id. ¶ 69. “PCBs sluff

from myriad products and uses promoted by Monsanto and enter the environment . . .

.” Id. “PCBs are also found in commercial and industrial waste water as a result of

Monsanto’s directions to its customers to dispose of their PCB contaminated wastes in

landfills when Monsanto knew, in fact, that disposal of PCBs in landfills was not

proper.” Id. “PCBs also leach out of paints, caulk, sealants and other applications and

are transported by air and water to the Bay.” Id. 

The City “manages and operate a municipal stormwater system, which collects

and transports stormwater to be discharged into the Bay.” (ECF No. 24 ¶ 70). “In order

to discharge stormwater into the Bay, Plaintiff is required to receive a Municipal

Regional Stormwater Permit from the Regional Water Board, pursuant to the National

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System under the Clean Water Act.” Id. “As former

and current trustees of the Bay, and as stormwater dischargers into the Bay, [the City]

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has spent substantial amounts of money to limit the amount of PCBs in the Bay.” Id.

¶ 71. “[The City] will also likely continue to incur costs to remove PCBs from the Bay

and to keep PCBs from entering the Bay for the foreseeable future.” Id. “PCBs were

not only a substantial factor in causing the City to incur costs and damages, but PCBs

were also the primary driving force behind the need to clean up and abate the Shipyard

Sediment Site.” Id. ¶ 72. 

“As trustees of the Bay, Plaintiff Port District has spent substantial amounts of

money to limit the amount of PCBs in the Bay.” (ECF No. 25 ¶ 70). “The Port District

will also likely continue to incur costs to remove PCBs from the Bay and to keep PCBs

from entering the Bay for the foreseeable future.” Id. “PCBs were not only a

substantial factor in causing the Port District to incur costs and damages, but PCBs were

also the primary driving force behind the need to clean up and abate the Shipyard

Sediment Site.” Id. ¶ 71. “Without abatement of the health hazard caused by PCBs in

the Bay, Plaintiff Port District will continue to suffer injuries and damages.” Id. “In

addition, PCB contamination has resulted in the impairment of navigational capabilities

within the Bay.” Id. “For example, previous PCB driven remedial actions have resulted

in the creation of permanent engineered caps isolating PCB-contaminated sediments at

the Campbell Shipyard and Convair Lagoon sediment sites, at significant cost and

interference to the Port District.” Id. “Navigation is prohibited above and around these

caps to ensure their stability and continued effectiveness.” Id. “ PCBs have similarly

impaired and interfered with the use of other properties and functions of the Port

District.”

The FAC filed by the City asserts claims for public nuisance and for equitable

indemnity. The FAC filed by the Port District asserts claims for public nuisance,

equitable indemnity, and purpresture. 

III. Judicial Notice

“As a general rule, a district court may not consider any material beyond the

pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d

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668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the doctrine of

incorporation by reference, “[a] district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may

consider documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity

no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the plaintiff’s pleadings.” 

Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The “incorporation by reference” doctrine has been extended “to situations

in which the plaintiff’s claim depends on the contents of a document, the defendant

attaches the document to its motion to dismiss, and the parties do not dispute the

authenticity of the document, even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the

contents of that document in the complaint.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076

(9th Cir. 2005). 

The Court takes judicial notice of the CAO, issued by the California Regional

Water Quality Control Board, No. R9-2012-0024, dated March 14, 2012, in both

motions to dismiss because the document is referenced in both FACs. The Court denies

the request for judicial notice of the remaining documents because the documents are

unnecessary for the resolution of the motions to dismiss. See, e.g., Asvesta v.

Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1010 n. 12 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying request for judicial

notice where judicial notice would be “unnecessary”). 

IV. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8(a) provides that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must

contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “A district court’s dismissal for failure to state a

claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a ‘lack of a

cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable

legal theory.’” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)).

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“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citation omitted). “When there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “In

sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content,

and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim

entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.

2009) (quotations and citation omitted).

V. Motion to Dismiss the Port District’s First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 32)

A. Public Nuisance

Under California law, a nuisance is defined as “[a]nything that is injurious to

health,” “interfere[s] with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property,” or

“unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use of any navigable lake, or river, bay.” Cal.

Civ. Code § 3479. A public nuisance is one which “affects at the same time an entire

community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons.” Cal. Civ. Code

§ 3480. 

In California, a nuisance action can be brought in two ways. First, California

Civil Code section 731 states

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A civil action may be brought in the name of the people of the State of

California to abate a public nuisance, as defined in Section 3480 of the

Civil Code, by the district attorney or county counsel of any county in

which the nuisance exists, or by the city attorney of any town or city in which the nuisance. 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 731. Second, an action can be “brought by any person whose

property is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by a nuisance,

as defined in Section 3479 of the Civil Code, and by the judgment in that action the

nuisance may be enjoined or abated as well as damages recovered therefor.” Cal. Civ.

Proc. Code § 731. “Where a public entity can show it has a property interest injuriously

affected by the nuisance, then, like any other such property holder, it should be able to

pursue the full panoply of tort remedies available to private persons.” Selma Pressure

Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 596, 604 (Ct. App. 1990)

(interpreting the term “person” in section 731 to include governmental units). 

i. Standing

Monsanto contends that the Port District lacks the standing to bring a

representative public nuisance claim under California Code of Procedure section 731

because the Port District is not a district attorney, county counsel, or city attorney. 

(ECF No. 38 at 6-7). Monsanto contends that even though the San Diego Unified Port

District Act (the “Port Act”) gives the Port District the right to sue and be sued, “the

Port is simply not authorized to bring a representative public nuisance claim and cannot

seek abatement.” Id. at 7. Monsanto contends that the Port District “is not on equal

legal footing with the State, San Diego County or the five perimeter cities that

surrendered tideland property five decades ago,” because it is a public corporation

under the Port Act. (ECF No. 67 at 6). Monsanto contends that “[n]o statutory or case

law authority exists supporting the proposition that a California ‘public corporation’ can

bring a public nuisance claim on behalf of the State.” Id. 

The Port District contends that it “brings this action as trustee for the people of

the State of California, an inherently representative capacity, to hold Monsanto

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responsible for the PCB contamination in the Bay.”2 (ECF No. 33 at 9). The Port

District contends that the State of California delegated the public trust responsibilities

to the Port District as the trustee for the people of the State of California through the

Port Act in 1963. (ECF No. 65). The Port District contends that

[w]hen the State of California transferred “all right, title and interest” in

the tidelands and submerged lands ringing the Bay from the State and the

local governments to the newly created Port District in 1963, the State also

gave the Port District broad powers to “protect, preserve, and enhance”

those properties it holds in trust. Harb. & Nav. Code App. 1 at §§ 4, 5.5,

14. Not only did the State of California delegate to the Port District the

State’s authority to manage the Bay and the submerged lands now

contaminated with PCBs, the State also expressly transferred the cities’

and county’s proprietary rights in those submerged lands and the

concomitant powers to protect those properties, including the power to

bring a public nuisance action. See Harb. & Nav. Code App. 1 at § 70.

Id. at 6. 

California Code of Civil Procedure section 731 provides, 

A civil action may be brought in the name of the people of the State of

California to abate a public nuisance . . . by the district attorney or county

counsel of any county in which the nuisance exists, or by the city attorney

of any town or city in which the nuisance exists. 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 731. Section 731 gives the “district attorney or county counsel

of any county” and “the city attorney of any town or city” in which the nuisance exists

the authority to bring a civil action to abate a public nuisance. In Lamont Storm Water

District v. Pavich, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288 (Ct. App. 2000), the California Court of Appeal

held that only public bodies explicitly authorized to abate a public nuisance may bring

an action. Relying on a general empowerment section of the Stormwater District Act

of 1909, the plaintiff, a storm water district, brought an action to abate a public

nuisance. The court held that the plaintiff had not been granted authority to maintain

an action to abate a nuisance. The court determined that the “enabling legislation grants

2

 At oral argument, counsel confirmed that the Port District is only bringing its public nuisance claim in a representative capacity. (ECF No. 66 at 64:21-24, 53:13-14). 

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the general power to sue and be sued, and the specific power to acquire property

through eminent domain,” but the legislation “does not enumerate the power to file

actions to abate nuisance as among a storm water district’s powers.” Id. at 291. The

court held that “when the Legislature has intended to grant the power to abate a

nuisance, it has done so specifically and in clear terms.” Id.

In this case, the FAC alleges that the Port District “is a public entity created by

the San Diego Unified Port District Act (California Harbors & Navigation Code,

Appendix 1, § 1 et seq.) enacted by the California Legislature in 1962 (the ‘Port Act’).” 

(ECF No. 25 ¶ 5). The FAC alleges that the Port District “is a trustee for the people of

the State of California, which holds and manages the tidelands and submerged lands in

and around San Diego Bay.” Id. The FAC alleges that the “Port District is specifically

authorized to use its ‘power and authority . . . to protect and enhance . . . physical access

to the bay . . . natural resources of the bay, including plant and animal life . . . [and]

quality of water in the bay.’” Id. (quoting Harb. & Nav. Code App. 1, §§ 2, 4, 5, 5.5). 

The FAC alleges that the “Port District holds and exercises land management authority

over the tidelands and submerged lands in and around San Diego Bay.” Id. The FAC

alleges that the “Port District is the successor to the powers vested in the cities that

make up the Unified Port District, and the powers of those cities related to these

properties are vested in the Port District.” Id.

In 1963, through the Port Act, the State of California and the cities of San Diego,

Chula Vista, Coronado, National City, and Imperial Beach granted and conveyed “all

right, title and interest” in the tidelands and submerged lands around San Diego Bay to

the Port District. See Harb. & Nav. Code App. 1 §§ 4, 5, 5.5. The Port District was

granted the authority over “control, regulation, and management of the harbor of San

Diego upon the tidelands and lands lying under the inland navigable waters of San

Diego Bay.” Id. § 4. The Port Act provides the authority to “sue and be sued in all

actions and proceedings in all courts and tribunals of competent jurisdiction.” Id. § 23. 

The Port District was given the power to “protect, preserve, and enhance,” 

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(1) The physical access to the bay. 

(2) The natural resources of the bay, including plant and animal life. 

(3) The quality of water in the bay. 

Id. § 4. The Port Act states that the Port District is

the successor of the county and each of the cities included therein as to all

powers theretofore vested in the county or each such city or exercisable by

its officers, which are by the provisions of this act granted to the district

or are exercisable by its officers. Such powers are relinquished by the

county and the cities and surrendered to the [Port] district.

Id. § 70. The Port Act gives the Port District the power to pass and enforce “all

necessary ordinances and resolutions for the regulation of the district.” Id. § 21. San

Diego Unified Port District Code, Published Pursuant to San Diego Unified Port

District Ordinance 19, authorizes the Port District to abate public nuisances by bringing

a civil action. See SDUPD Code § 0.11(f) (“[A]ny violation of the provisions of the

District Code is deemed to be a public nuisance. Such violations may be abated by civil

action or pursuant to applicable administrative abatement procedures.”). 

The Legislature granted the Port District “all powers theretofore vested in the

county or each such city or exercisable by its officers, which are by the provisions of

this act granted to the district or are exercisable by its officers.” Harb. & Nav. Code

App. 1 § 70. This includes, the power to “protect, preserve, and enhance” the Bay. Id.

§ 4. Before the conveyance of the Bay to the Port District, the State of California and

the cities of San Diego, Chula Vista, Coronado, National City, and Imperial Beach had

the authority to bring a public nuisance claim to protect the Bay. Because the authority

of the State and cities to bring a public nuisance claim was specifically transferred to

the Port District, the Court concludes that the Legislature expressed its intention in

specific and clear terms to grant the Port District the power to abate a nuisance.3

 See

Lamont, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291 (“[W]hen the Legislature has intended to grant the

3

 Monsanto contends that the Port District can only seek abatement and cannot seek to “recover the costs to investigate and remediate” contamination. See ECF No.

25 at 26. The Court does not address the issue of damages the Port District may recover in a representative capacity at this stage of the proceedings. 

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power to abate a nuisance, it has done so specifically and in clear terms.”). The Court

concludes that the Port District has standing to bring a representative cause of action

under section 731.

ii. Causation

Monsanto contends that the Port District’s public nuisance claim should be

dismissed because the Port District has not set forth facts demonstrating a connection

between Monsanto’s alleged acts and the disposal of the products that ultimately led to

the alleged nuisance. (ECF No. 32-1 at 16). Monsanto contends that the “mere

placement of a product (even an allegedly dangerous product) into the stream of

commerce is insufficient for liability to attach under California law.” Id. at 17.

The Port District contends that Monsanto is liable for the creation of a public

nuisance due to Monsanto’s conduct beyond that of merely supplying a product. (ECF

No. 33 at 14-15). The Port District contends that despite knowing that PCBs were

dangerous to human health and the environment, Monsanto concealed the dangers of

PCBs, promoted the use of PCBs, and improperly instructed customers how to dispose

of PCBs. Id. 

“[C]ausation [is] a necessary element of a public nuisance claim.” In re Firearm

Cases, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 659, 678 (Ct. App. 2005). “[L]iability for nuisance does not

hinge on whether the defendant owns, possesses or controls the [nuisance-creating]

property, nor on whether [the defendant] is in a position to abate the nuisance; the

critical question is whether the defendant created or assisted in the creation of the

nuisance.” City of Modesto Redev, Agency v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 865, 872

(Ct. App. 2004). A defendant may be liable for assisting in the creation of a nuisance

if he either “(1) affirmatively instructs the polluting entity to dispose of hazardous

substances in an improper or unlawful manner or (2) manufactures or installs the

disposal system.” Team Enterprises, LLC v. W. Inv. Real Estate Trust, 647 F.3d 901,

912 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). “Mere but-for causation, on the other

hand, does not give rise to nuisance liability.” Id. 

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In City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum Co., the City of San Diego brought a

nuisance action against manufacturers of asbestos-containing building materials,

seeking to recover damages for money the City had spent and would spend to identify

and abate asbestos. 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 876, 877 (Ct. App. 1994). On appeal, the court

affirmed the order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that

the City could not maintain an action based on nuisance. The court concluded that the

case was a “products liability action in the guise of a nuisance action.” Id. at 884. The

court noted that the “City cites no California decision . . . that allows recovery for a

defective product under a nuisance cause of action. Indeed, under [the] City’s theory,

nuisance ‘would become a monster that would devour in one gulp the entire law of

tort.’” Id. at 883. 

In City of Modesto, the City of Modesto brought claims under the Polanco Act

against dry cleaning solvent and equipment manufacturers and distributors. 13 Cal.

Rptr. 3d at 865. The court analyzed the claim in light of common law nuisance

principles due to the statutory language of the Polanco Act. Id. at 868-72. The superior 

court granted summary judgment to the defendants. On appeal, the court affirmed the

order granting the defendants’ summary judgment. The court concluded that the

defendants, whose conduct “was limited to manufacturing or selling solvents to dry

cleaners, with knowledge of the hazards of those substances, without alerting the dry

cleaners to proper methods of disposal,” were not responsible parties because they

“merely placed solvents in the stream of commerce without warning adequately of the

dangers of improper disposal.” Id. at 875-76. The court stated that “any failure to warn

was not an activity directly connected with the disposal of solvents” and that “such

behavior . . . does not fall within the context of nuisance, but is better analyzed through

the law of negligence or products liability . . . .” Id. at 875. However, the court also

stated that “those who create or assist in creating a system that causes hazardous wastes

to be disposed of improperly, or who instruct users to dispose of wastes improperly, can

be liable under the law of nuisance.” Id. at 874; see also Team Enterprise, 647 F.3d at

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912 (“A defendant may be liable for assisting in the creation of a nuisance if he either

(1) affirmatively instructs the polluting entity to dispose of hazardous substances in an

improper or unlawful manner or (2) manufactures or installs the disposal system.”

(internal citations omitted)). 

In County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the court held that the

defendants, who manufactured lead paint, could be liable for public nuisance because

“the alleged basis for defendants’ liability for the public nuisance created by lead paint

[was] their affirmative promotion of lead paint for interior use, not their mere

manufacture and distribution of lead paint or their failure to warn of its hazards.” 40

Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 328 (Ct. App. 2006). The court noted that the “defendants’

promotion of lead paint for interior use with knowledge of the hazard that such use

would create” is conduct “distinct from and far more egregious than simply producing

a defective product or failing to warn of a defective product; indeed, it is quite similar

to instructing the purchaser to use the product in a hazardous manner, which Modesto

found could create nuisance liability.” Id.

In this case, the Port District alleges that PCBs “are man-made chemical

compounds that have become notorious as global environmental contaminants found

in bays, oceans, rivers, streams, soil, and air.” (ECF No. 25 ¶ 1). The Port District

alleges that Monsanto was the “sole manufacturer of PCBs in the United States from

1935 to 1979, and trademarked the name ‘Aroclor’ for certain PCB Compounds.” Id.

¶ 2. The Port District alleges that Monsanto knew that PCBs presented a health risk and

“were causing widespread contamination of the environment, far beyond the areas of

its use.” Id. ¶ 40. The Port District alleges that despite knowing of the health and

environmental risks associated with PCBs, Monsanto “promot[ed] the use and sale of

Aroclor and other PCB compounds.” Id. ¶ 35. The Port District alleges that “Monsanto

instructed its customers to dispose of PCB containing material in local landfills,

knowing that landfills were not suitable for PCB contaminated waste.” Id. ¶ 51. The

Port District alleges that Monsanto “had determined that the only effective method of

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disposing of PCBs was high temperature incineration, which was not commercially

available to it or its customers, and it had constructed an incinerator for the disposal of

its own liquid PCB contaminants.” Id. The Port District alleges that Monsanto “made

its incinerator available to its customers, for a fee, for the disposal of their liquid PCB

wastes,” but “instructed its customers to dispose of solid PCB contaminated wastes in

landfills. Id. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to

support a claim for public nuisance. See Modesto, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 864 (“[T]hose

who create or assist in creating a system that causes hazardous wastes to be disposed

of improperly, or who instruct users to dispose of wastes improperly, can be liable

under the law of nuisance.”); Team Enterprise, 647 F.3d at 912 (“A defendant may be

liable for assisting in the creation of a nuisance if he . . . affirmatively instructs the

polluting entity to dispose of hazardous substances in an improper or unlawful manner

. . . .”); County of Santa Clara, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 328 (“[L]iability is premised on

defendants’ promotion of lead paint for interior use with knowledge of the hazard that

such use would create.”); but see City of Bloomington, Ind. v. Westinghouse Elec.

Corp., 891 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir.1989) (“Since the pleadings do not set forth facts

from which it could be concluded that Monsanto retained the right to control the PCBs

beyond the point of sale . . . Monsanto cannot be held liable on a nuisance theory.”);

Town of Westport v. Monsanto Co., No. CIV. A. 14-12041-DJC, 2015 WL 1321466,

*4 (D. Mass. Mar. 24, 2015) (granting the motion to dismiss a public nuisance claim

because, after the point of sale, Monsanto “did not have the power or authority to

maintain or abate these PCB-containing building materials”).

B. Equitable Indemnity 

Monsanto contends that the Port District “fails to state a cognizable claim for

equitable indemnity because its FAC is devoid of any facts showing Monsanto is jointly

and severally liable with the Port District to an injured third party for alleged harm to

the Bay.” (ECF No. 32-1 at 23). Monsanto contends that it “has not been investigated

by the State or named as a discharger in the 2012 CAO, nor does the FAC include any

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allegations that would support Monsanto being named as a discharger . . . . ” Id. 

Monsanto also contends that the Port District’s claim is barred by the statute of

limitations.

The Port District alleges that the Port District has been named in a CAO issued

by the Regional Water Board for the Shipyard Sediment Site. (ECF No. 25 at 19). The

Port District contends that the “PCB contamination was a driving force behind the

Cleanup and Abatement Order and that the Water Board found that the contamination

was a nuisance.” (ECF No. 33 at 25). The Port District contends that “[t]he allegations

in the FAC . . . clearly establish Monsanto’s liability under public nuisance and

purpresture for the PCB contamination addressed by the Water Board’s [CAO].” (ECF

No. 33 at 24). The Port District contends that its claim is not time barred because the

CAO was issued on March 14, 2012, and the Port District’s Complaint was filed March

13, 2015. Id. at 24. 

Equitable indemnity “allows one tortfeasor to seek either full or partial indemnity

from a joint tortfeasor on a comparative fault basis.” Selma, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 601. For

the purpose of indemnity, joint tortfeasors are “two or more persons who are liable to

the same person for the same harm.” Id. at 602 (citing Restatement Second of Torts §

886A, com. b). “It is not necessary that [the tortfeasors] act in concert or in pursuance

of a common design, nor is it necessary that they be joined as defendants.” Id. “It can

apply to acts that are concurrent or successive, joint or several, as long as they create

a detriment caused by several actors.” Greystone Homes, Inc. V. Midtec, Inc., 86 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 196, 205 (Cal. App. 2008). However, equitable indemnity is not available “in

the absence of a joint legal obligation to the injured party.” Prince, 202 P.3d at 1122. 

The California Supreme Court “has consistently ruled that a cause of action for

indemnity does not accrue until the indemnitee suffers loss through payment of an

adverse judgment or settlement.” City of San Diego, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 884; see also

Valley Circle, 659 P.2d at 1165 (holding that an action for equitable indemnity accrues

for limitation purposes at “the time the tort defendant pays a judgment or settlement as

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to which he is entitled to indemnity.”). California courts apply a three-year statute of

limitation on equitable indemnity claims. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338; City of San

Diego, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881 (applying a three-year statute of limitations in a public

nuisance claims for injury to buildings). 

In Selma, the State of California and the Regional Water Quality Control Board

(the “State”) brought a nuisance cause of action against the defendants, owners of a

wood treatment facility, arising from the discharge of hazardous waste at defendant’s

facility. 271 Cal. Rptr. at 599. The State brought the nuisance claim, among others,

following defendants’ “alleged failure to comply with [a] cleanup and abatement order.” 

Id. at 601. The defendants filed cross-complaints and sought equitable indemnity from

several cross-defendants, including Osmose and a group of chemical suppliers. Id. at

598-99. The chemical suppliers allegedly provided “assistance and advice” about the

chemicals used by the defendants at the facility and failed to warn of the risks

associated with improper use or disposal of the chemicals. Osmose was a company

involved in the design and installation of the wood treatment system and facilities. Id.

at 600. The defendants alleged that “Osmose misrepresented the injurious nature of the

wood treating chemicals on the environment,” recommended harmful disposal methods,

and “did not inform” defendants of the environmental harm caused by the waste. Id. 

 

The state court concluded that the defendants stated facts sufficient for an

equitable indemnity claim against both Osmose and the chemical suppliers. Id. at 610.

The court stated that in “deciding the propriety of allowing an indemnification claim

. . . we look for joint liability to the plaintiff or injured party by both the would-be

indemnitee and indemnitor.” Id. at 602. The court concluded that because “the State

could plead a cause of action for damages flowing from nuisance against [Osmose and

the chemical companies], ” the defendants could state a claim for equitable indemnity

allege that Osmose and the chemical companies contributed to the public nuisance. Id.

at 606-07. The court concluded that the defendants “could state a claim for equitable

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indemnity against Osmose for Osmose’s contribution or assistance in the creation of a

nuisance insofar as Osmose helped design the system of chemical waste disposal used.” 

Id. Osmose recommended disposal of the product into an “unlined dirt pond” and

“knew, or should have known, such disposal practices might threaten the safety of the

underlying water supply.” Id. at 607. The court concluded that the pleadings

demonstrated that Osmose “knew of the dangerous propensities of the chemicals if

improperly disposed of and failed to warn appellants of these dangerous propensities.” 

Id. Similarly, the court concluded that the defendants stated a claim for equitable

indemnity against the chemical companies. Id. at 610. The court concluded that “in

failing to warn an unknowledgeable [defendant] of the hazards to the environment of

which [the chemical companies] knew could flow from the improper handling and

disposal of the wood-treating chemicals, [the chemical companies] failure could be

found to be a substantial factor in the creation of the nuisance.” Id. The court

concluded that “[u]nder the principles of equitable indemnity, [Osmose and the

chemical companies] should be liable for their share of the harm” caused by the public

nuisance which formed the basis of the action brought by the State against the

defendants. Id. at 610. 

In this case, the Port District alleges that it has been named in a CAO issued by

the California Regional Water Board.4

 (ECF No. 25 ¶ 65). The Port District alleges 

that “PCBs are identified as a Primary Chemical of Concern” in the CAO. Id. The Port

District alleges that the California Regional Water Board “directed . . . the Port District

to . . . remediate PCB contaminated sediments within [the Bay].” Id. ¶ 70. The Port

District alleges that it “has incurred substantial costs deriving from state-mandated PCB

clean-up.” Id. ¶ 85. The Port District alleges that “Monsanto’s creation of the public

nuisance is a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff Port District’s injury.” Id. ¶ 92. The

4

 The CAO states, “The San Diego Water Board finds that the Port District

caused or permitted wastes to be discharged or to be deposited . . . into San Diego Bay and created, or threatened to create a condition of pollution or nuisance.” (ECF No. 31- 6 at 8). 

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Court concludes that these allegations are not sufficient to support an inference that

Monsanto could be jointly liable to the California Regional Water Board for the alleged

injury. In addition, the Port District does not allege that there has been a judgment or

settlement rendered as a result of this joint liability. See City of San Diego, 35 Cal.

Rptr. 2d at 884 (stating that the California Supreme Court “has consistently ruled that

a cause of action for indemnity does not accrue until the indemnitee suffers loss through

payment of an adverse judgment or settlement.”); Sullins v. Exxon/Mobile Corp., 729

F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (granting summary judgment for the defendant

against a claim of equitable indemnity because a final cleanup order from a regulatory

agency was not a money judgment or settlement). Monsanto’s motion to dismiss the

Port District’s equitable indemnity claim is granted. 

C. Purpresture

Monsanto contends that the Port District fails to state a claim for purpresture

because the Port District cannot show that Monsanto physically encroached upon the

Bay and that the “mere presence of contamination” does not limit navigation. (ECF No.

32-1 at 25). Monsanto contends that the Port District’s purpresture claim is time barred

under the four-year “catch all” statute. Id. at 28. 

The Port District contends that “the PCB contamination constitutes an unlawful

purpresture of the tidelands and submerged lands of the Bay . . . .” (ECF No. 33 at 21). 

The Port District contends that the “accumulation of PCBs in the sediments of the Bay

interferes with navigation and the unobstructed use and enjoyment of the Bay by the

people of California . . . .” Id. at 22. The Port District contends that purpresture, like

public nuisance, is not subject to any statute of limitations. 

A purpresture is an unlawful encroachment, intrusion, or obstruction of a public

highway or navigable waterway. People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152,

1155 (Cal. 1884). “An unauthorized invasion of the rights of the public to navigate the

water flowing over the soil is a public nuisance; and an unauthorized encroachment

upon the soil itself is known in law as a purpresture.” Id. In California, a purpresture

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is a kind of public nuisance. People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152 (1884);

Cal. Civ. Code § 3479 (“Anything which . . . unlawfully obstructs the free passage or

use, in the customary manner, of any navigable . . . bay . . . is a nuisance.”). There is

no statute of limitations for a public nuisance action. Cal. Civ. Code § 3490. 

The FAC alleges that “[t]he presence of PCBs in the waters and sediments of the

Bay constitutes an unauthorized invasion of the rights of the public to navigate the

waters of the Bay and constitutes a purpresture.” (ECF No. 25 ¶ 96). The FAC alleges

that the “presence of PCBs in the waters and sediments of the Bay impairs the

navigation of the Bay, related commercial uses of the Bay, and the rights of the entire

community to free use and enjoyment of the Bay.” Id. ¶ 97. The FAC alleges that

“[a]s a direct and proximate result of Monsanto’s creation of an unauthorized invasion

and obstruction of the rights of the public to navigational uses of the waters of the Bay,

the Port District and the people of the State of California have suffered, and continue

to suffer, interference with public and navigational uses of the Bay.” Id. ¶ 98. The

FAC alleges that “previous PCB driven remedial actions have resulted in the creation

of permanent engineered caps isolating PCB-contaminated sediments at the Campbell

Shipyard and Convair Lagoon sediment sites, at significant cost and interference to the

Port District.” Id. ¶ 71. “The FAC alleges that Navigation is prohibited above and

around these caps to ensure their stability and continued effectiveness.” Id. 

The Court concludes that the Port District has alleged facts sufficient to plausibly

support a cause of action for purpresture. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied. 

D. Prayer of Relief for Natural Resource Damages

Monsanto contends that the Port District cannot recover damages for injury to

and loss of us of natural resources because there is no “federal or state law” that

designates the Port District as “a lawfully designated natural resource trustee” that can

sue for natural resource damages. (ECF No. 32-1 at 28). Monsanto contends that the

Port Act does not designate the Port District “as a natural resource trustee” or give the

Port District “statutory authorization to recover natural resources damages.” Id. at 29. 

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 The Port District contends that it can recover for natural resource damages

because the tidelands and submerged lands of the Bay are public trust lands that the Port

District holds in trust. (ECF No. 33 at 27). The Port District contends that “[p]rotection

and preservation of the natural resources . . . are an integral part of the Port District’s

‘uses’ of its trust duties.” Id. 

“It has long been established that the sovereign’s interest in the preservation of

public resources and the environment enables it to maintain an action to prevent injury

thereto.” Selma, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 606. “The State has not only the right but also the

affirmative fiduciary obligation to ensure that the rights of the public to a viable marine

environment are protected, and to seek compensation for any diminution in that trust

corpus.” Id. Section 25352 of the California Health and Safety Code provides that “the

Governor, or the authorized representative of the state, shall act on behalf of the public

as trustee of the natural resources to recover costs.” Cal. H & S Code § 25352(c). 

The tidelands and submerged lands of the Bay are public trust lands. Cal. Harb.

& Nav. Code App 1 at §§ 5.5., 14 (The title to the tidelands and submerged lands of the

Bay “reside in the district, and the district shall hold such lands in trust . . .”). The Port

District was granted the authority over “control, regulation, and management of the

harbor of San Diego upon the tidelands and lands lying under the inland navigable

waters of San Diego Bay.” Id. § 4. The Port District was given the power to “protect,

preserve, and enhance” the Bay. Id. One of the purposes for which the Port District

holds the lands is “for the establishment and maintenance of those lands for open space,

ecological preservation, and habitat restoration.” Id. § 87. Through the Port Act, the

State of California delegated the public trust rights and authority to the Port District. 

The Court finds that the Port District has alleged sufficient facts to seek damages for

“the injury to and loss of use of natural resources deriving from the presence of PCBs

in and around the Bay, including the cost of restoring those natural resources.” See

ECF No. 25 at 27; Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928, 944 (9th Cir.

2002) (“[T]o the extent that natural resources owned or held in trust by Lodi are

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damaged by environmental contamination, we find that nothing in CERCLA or HSAA

prevents the City from suing under MERLO to recover for damage to such resources.”).

E. Prayer of Relief for Attorney’s Fees and Punitive Damages

Monsanto contends that the Port District’s “prayer for punitive damages must be

dismissed because the Port District has not alleged sufficient facts showing that

Monsanto’s lawful, historical manufacture of PCBs involved any ‘oppression, fraud,

or malice.’” (ECF No. 32-1 at 31). Monsanto contends that the Port District “has not

identified any statute or agreement entitling it to attorney’s fees” in this case and that

“a public entity, such as the Port District, is specifically precluded from recovering

attorney’s fees from a private defendant.” Id. at 32. 

The Court declines to strike the Port District’s request for attorney’s fees and

punitive damages at this stage in the proceedings. 

VI. Motion to Dismiss the City’s First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 31)

A. Public Nuisance Claim

Monsanto contends that the City lacks standing to bring this action for public

nuisance. (ECF No. 31-1 at 25). Monsanto contends that the City has failed to properly

state a representative public nuisance claim under California Civil Code section 731

because the City “failed to mention the People of California anywhere in its FAC.” Id. 

Monsanto contends that the City does not have standing to assert a non-representative

public nuisance claim under section 731, because the City does not have a property

interest in the Bay. Id. Monsanto contends that, to the extent that the City alleges a

property interest in the rainwater transported through the stormwater conveyance

system, that property interest does not provide the “requisite property interest to assert

a public nuisance in the Bay, which is the property that the FAC alleges is injured.” 

(ECF No. 37 at 6-7). 

The City contends that it has standing to bring a non-representative claim because

it has alleged both a special injury and a property interest. (ECF No. 34 at 8). The City

contends that the presence of PCBs in the Bay is “specially injurious” to the City

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because “the Board has directed the City to, among other things, incur significant costs

to remediate PCB contamination in a discrete area of the Bay known as the Shipyard

Sediment Site.” Id. at 11. 

In this case, the City brings the public nuisance claim in its individual capacity.5

(ECF No. 24). The City alleges that it is “a public property owner and former trustee

of the Bay . . . .” (ECF No. 24 ¶ 4). The City alleges that it was “the trustee of certain

relevant tidelands and submerged lands in and around the Bay from the early 1900s

through 1963, when that property was transferred to the Port District.” Id. ¶ 5. The

City alleges that it “manages and operate[s] a municipal stormwater system, which

collects and transports stormwater to be discharged into the Bay.” Id. The City alleges

that “PCBs . . . leach out of paints, caulk, sealants and other applications and are

transported by air and water to the Bay. Id. ¶ 70. The City alleges that “[t]he presence

of PCBs adversely affects the quality of water in the Bay and causes inconvenience and

annoyance to Plaintiff, who has been required to incur costs in order to protect plant and

animal life, and their presence.” Id. ¶ 81. The City alleges that the presence of PCBs

“affects a substantial number of people who use the Bay for commercial and

recreational purposes and interferes with the rights of the public at large to clean and

safe resources and environment.” Id. ¶ 82. The City alleges that it “has suffered and

will continue to suffer harm that is different from the type of harm suffered by the

general public . . . .” Id. ¶ 85. The City seeks “[a]ny and all compensatory damages 

. . . including . . . all past and future costs and expenses related to the investigation,

remediation, and removal of PCBs from in and around the Bay.” Id. at 25. The City

seeks “[a]n order that Defendants pay for establishment of a fund used by the City to

abate the public nuisance created by the presence of PCBs in and around the Bay,

including remediating all PCB contamination in the Shipyard Sediment Site and other

5

 At oral argument, Counsel for the City stated that the City “never alleged a representative claim” and that it was “alleging a claim in [its] individual capacity.” (ECF No. 66 at 27:8-10). The FAC does not state that the City is bringing its public nuisance claim as a representative claim “in the name of the people of the State of California.” See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 731. 

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areas . . .” Id. 

i. Special Injury

The City asserts that section 731 provides a public nuisance action “for

abatement and monetary damages by any plaintiff who has special injury.” (ECF No.

34 at 9). The City asserts that “[t]o be consistent with the substantive right guaranteed

by Civil Code section 3493, the action for damages must extend to a municipality that

alleges special injury caused by the nuisance.” Id. 

Section 731 provides that “any person whose property is injuriously affected” can

bring a public nuisance claim. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 731. Under section 731,

“[w]here a public entity can show it has a property interest injuriously affected by the

nuisance, then, like any other such property holder, it should be able to pursue the full

panoply of tort remedies available to private persons.” Selma, 271 Cal. Rptr. 596, 603

(Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting the term “person” in section 731 to include governmental

units).

Under section 3493, “A private person may maintain an action for a public

nuisance, if it is specially injurious to himself, but not otherwise.” Cal. Civ. Code §

3493. In City of Los Angeles v. Shpegel-Dimsey, Inc., the court concluded that “Civil

Code section 3493 provides no authority for . . . a public entity rather than a private

party, to recover damages for a ‘specially injurious’ public nuisance . . .” 244 Cal. Rptr.

507, 512 (Ct. App. 1988); see also Torrance Redevelopment Agency v. Solvent Coating

Co., 763 F. Supp. 1060, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 1991). 

The City, as a public entity rather than a private party, cannot establish standing

for a public nuisance claim under section 731 by alleging a “special injury” under

section 3493. The City can only establish standing for a public nuisance claim by

alleging that its “property is injuriously affected.” See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 731. 

ii. Property Damage

The City asserts that it has “property” which “is injuriously affected” by PCBs

and seeks “removal of PCBs from in and around the Bay.” (ECF Nos. 34 at 10; 24 at

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25). In the FAC, the City alleges that it was divested of its property interest in the Bay

in 1963. The City does not allege a property interest in the Bay. Although the City

alleges a property interest in the municipal stormwater system, the City does not allege

facts sufficient to infer that the municipal stormwater system is “injuriously affected by

the nuisance” nor does the City seek damages based on the presence of PCBs in the

sewer system.6

 See Selma, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 603 (“Where the State has a property

interest which has been injuriously affected by a nuisance, the State can, like any

property owner, seek damages.”). The FAC does not allege sufficient facts to infer that

the City has standing to bring a public nuisance claim as a “person whose property is

injuriously affected” under California Code of Civil Procedure section 731.7

 The Court

grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss the City’s public nuisance claim. 

B. Equitable Indemnity

Monsanto contends that the City “fails to state a cognizable claim for equitable

indemnity because its FAC is devoid of any facts showing Monsanto is jointly and

severally liable with the City to an injured third party for alleged harm to the Bay.” 

(ECF No. 31-1 at 28). Monsanto contends that it “has not been investigated by the State

or named as a discharger in the 2012 CAO . . . nor does the FAC include any allegations

that would support Monsanto being named as a discharger or liable jointly with the

6

 In its opposition papers, the City asserts that it has a property interest in the water that runs through the stormwater system, derived under the doctrine of “Pueblo

Rights,” and that PCBs interfere with the City’s property interests to that water. (ECF No. 34 at 10). The City contends that “it seeks to recover the costs of removing the

PCBs from the stormwater system.” Id. at 11. Those allegations are not in the FAC, therefore, the Court does not consider whether those allegations would give the City the requisite standing to state a claim for public nuisance.

7

 On August 23, 2016, Monsanto filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority in support of their Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 69). Monsanto’s submission included notice of an order in a case currently in the Northern District of California. (ECF No. 69-1). On August 22, 2016, the court dismissed three cases involving public nuisance and equitable indemnity causes of action brought by three Northern California cities against Monsanto. The court granted Monsanto’s motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim in regards to the non-representative public nuisance cause of action. Id. at 6-9. 

The cities argued that they had a property interest in the stormwater that had been

polluted by Monsanto’s PCB; however, the court concluded that the cities failed to

establish a property interest that was injuriously affected in the stormwater. Id. at 7-9.

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City. . . .” Id. at 29. Monsanto contends that the “CAO is not a ‘payment to any third

party in settlement of a claim or in satisfaction of a judgment’ necessary to sustain an

equitable indemnity claim.” (ECF No. 37 at 12). Monsanto contends that the City’s

claim is also barred by the statute of limitations because the alleged contamination of

the Bay was first addressed as early as “the 2006 Campbell Shipyard Settlement under

which the City paid $3.45 million to remediate PCBs.” Id. at 14. 

The City contends that “the key to joint and several liability in the equitable

indemnity context is that both the indemnitee and indemnitor carry a responsibility for

the same underlying harm.” (ECF No. 34 at 25). The City contends that it has “alleged

facts showing that the [California Regional Water Quality Control Board] may consider

both the City and Monsanto to be responsible for the contamination of the Shipyard

Sediment Site.” Id. The City contends that it filed its FAC within the applicable threeyear statute of limitations period. Id. 

Equitable indemnity “allows one tortfeasor to seek either full or partial indemnity

from a joint tortfeasor on a comparative fault basis.” Selma, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 601. For

the purpose of indemnity, joint tortfeasors are “two or more persons who are liable to

the same person for the same harm.” Id. at 602 (citing Restatement Second of Torts §

886A, com. b). Equitable indemnity is not available “in the absence of a joint legal

obligation to the injured party.” Prince v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 202 P.3d 1115, 1122

(Cal. 2009). However, “[i]t is not necessary that [the tortfeasors] act in concert or in

pursuance of a common design, nor is it necessary that they be joined as defendants.” 

Id. “It can apply to acts that are concurrent or successive, joint or several, as long as

they create a detriment cause by several actors.” Greystone Homes, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d at

205. 

The California Supreme Court “has consistently ruled that a cause of action for

indemnity does not accrue until the indemnitee suffers loss through payment of an

adverse judgment or settlement.” City of San Diego, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 884; see also

Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consolidated, Inc., 659 P.2d 1160, 1165 (Cal. 1983)

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(holding that an action for equitable indemnity accrues for limitation purposes at “the

time the tort defendant pays a judgment or settlement as to which he is entitled to

indemnity.”). California courts apply a three-year statute of limitation on equitable

indemnity claims. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338; City of San Diego, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d

at 884 (applying a three-year statute of limitations in an equitable indemnity claim). 

In this case, the City alleges that it has been named in a CAO issued by the

California Regional Water Board.8

 (ECF No. 24 ¶ 66). The City alleges that “PCBs are

identified as a Primary Chemical of Concern” in the CAO. (ECF No. 24 ¶ 66). The

City alleges that it “has incurred substantial costs deriving from state-mandated PCB

clean-up.” Id. ¶ 85. The City alleges that it “is obligated to pay for certain remediation

of the Shipyard Sediment Site pursuant to the March 14, 2012 CAO.” Id. The City

alleges that “Monsanto’s creation of the public nuisance is a substantial factor in

causing Plaintiff’s injury.” Id. ¶ 92. The Court concludes that the City does not allege

facts sufficient to support an inference that Monsanto could be jointly liable to the

California Regional Water Board for the alleged injury. In addition, the FAC does not

allege that there has been a judgment or settlement rendered as a result of this joint

liability. See id. ¶ 85; City of San Diego, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 884 (stating that the

California Supreme Court “ has consistently ruled that a cause of action for indemnity

does not accrue until the indemnities suffers loss through payment of an adverse

judgment or settlement.”); Sullins, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (granting summary

judgment for the defendant against a claim of equitable indemnity because a final

cleanup order from a regulatory agency was not a money judgment or settlement). 

Accordingly, the City fails to state a claim for equitable indemnity. Monsanto’s motion

to dismiss the City’s equitable indemnity claim is granted. 

VII. Conclusion

8

 The CAO states, “The San Diego Water Board finds that the City of San Diego has caused or permitted wastes to be discharged or to be deposited . . . into San Diego Bay and created, or threatened to create, a condition of pollution or nuisance.” (ECF No. 31-6 at 4). 

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Monsanto’s Motion to Dismiss the Port

District’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 32) is granted as to the Port District’s

equitable indemnity cause of action and denied in all other respects. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Monsanto’s Motion to Dismiss the City’s

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 31) is granted. 

Plaintiffs shall file any motions for leave to amend complying with Local Rule

15.1 within sixty (60) days of this Order. 

DATED: September 28, 2016

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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