Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_22-cv-01107/USCOURTS-alnd-4_22-cv-01107-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

MIDDLE DIVISION

JEANTY SAINT JEAN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. Case No. 4:22-cv-1107-CLM 

ALTOONA, ALABAMA, CITY 

OF, et al., 

Defendants. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Jeanty Saint Jean sues the City of Altoona, Officer Harrelson, and 

Unknown Officer A. (Doc. 29). Defendants ask the court to grant summary 

judgment on all counts in their favor. (Doc. 45). After reviewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Saint Jean, the court GRANTS IN 

PART AND DENIES IN PART. 

BACKGROUND 

Saint Jean is a black immigrant. Officer Harrelson pulled Saint 

Jean’s car over while he was driving through an Altoona public park. 

Officer Harrelson informed Saint Jean that the park was closed to the 

public and that Saint Jean’s taillight wasn’t working. When Saint Jean 

failed to produce proof of insurance, Officer Harrelson cited Saint Jean 

with two tickets. But Saint Jean refused to sign either ticket upon Officer 

Harrelson’s request. 

In response, Officer Harrelson ordered Saint Jean out of the vehicle 

and placed him in handcuffs. But the handcuffs were too small and cut 

Saint Jean’s wrists severely enough to require medical attention. Officer 

Harrelson then tried to place Saint Jean into his patrol car, and Saint 

FILED

 2025 Jan-06 PM 03:37

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:22-cv-01107-CLM Document 57 Filed 01/06/25 Page 1 of 11
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Jean resisted. Either because of Officer Harrelson’s use of force (Saint 

Jean claims Officer Harrelson kicked him) or Saint Jean’s resistance, 

Saint Jean struggled to enter the car. Saint Jean says this struggle 

injured his knee, requiring surgery. 

Officer Harrelson then searched Saint Jean’s vehicle before 

transporting him to jail. At no point during this arrest did Officer 

Harrelson recite Saint Jean’s Miranda rights. Saint Jean was charged 

with four counts that the Etowah County Circuit County later dismissed 

with prejudice because of a procedural deficiency by the State. 

Saint Jean now sues Officer Harrison for negligence, unlawful 

seizure, and excessive force. Saint Jean also sues unnamed Officer A for 

excessive force and the City of Altoona for negligence, malicious 

prosecution, and abuse of process. 

STANDARD 

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this court views the 

facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 

the non-moving party. See Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., 285 

F.3d 962, 966 (11th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is appropriate when 

there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine 

dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party asking for 

summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing 

the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the 

pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56 requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and—by pointing to affidavits, 

or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file—

designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.

at 324.

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ANALYSIS 

Saint Jean brings various claims against the three defendants. The 

court breaks its discussion into three parts: (1) claims against Officer 

Harrelson, (2) claims against the City of Altoona, and (3) claims against 

others. 

A. Claims against Officer Harrelson

i. Count I: § 1983 Unlawful Seizure 

Saint Jean sues Officer Harrelson under § 1983 for unlawfully 

seizing him after a traffic stop. Traffic stops fall within the Fourth 

Amendment meaning of “seizure.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 

(1996). To lawfully effect a traffic stop, an officer must have reasonable 

suspicion. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 880 (11th Cir. 2022). 

Reasonable suspicion is “a particularized and objective basis for 

suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity,” including traffic 

violations. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014). Reasonable 

suspicion can be based on reasonable mistakes of law or fact. Heien v. N. 

Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 61 (2014).

In short, to avoid summary judgment, Saint Jean must show that a 

reasonable jury could find Officer Harrelson lacked reasonable suspicion 

to survive summary judgment on Count I. He cannot. 

Officer Harrelson says that he had reasonable suspicion that Saint 

Jean’s broken tail light violated Alabama’s laws governing the color of 

rear lights. Combined, three statutes dictate that tail lights must be red, 

stop (or brake) lights must be red or yellow, back up lights must be white, 

and license plates must be illuminated in white: 

(c) Tail lamps. 

(1) Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, and pole trailer 

and any other vehicle which is being drawn at the end of a 

train of vehicles shall be equipped with at least one tail lamp 

mounted on the rear which, when lighted as required, emits 

Case 4:22-cv-01107-CLM Document 57 Filed 01/06/25 Page 3 of 11
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a red light plainly visible from a distance of 500 feet to the 

rear. When vehicles are drawn in a train, only the tail lamp 

on the rearmost vehicle need actually be seen from the 

distance specified.

(2) Every tail lamp upon every vehicle shall be located at a 

height of not more than 60 inches nor less than 20 inches to 

be measured as set forth in Section 32-5-242.

(3) Every motor vehicle shall have a tail lamp or a separate 

lamp so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a white 

light the rear registration plate and render it clearly legible 

from a distance of 50 feet to the rear. Any tail lamp or tail 

lamps, together with any separate lamp for illuminating the 

rear registration plate, shall be so wired as to be lighted 

whenever the head lamps or auxiliary driving lamps are 

lighted. 

Ala. Code. § 32-5-240(c); 

(b) Signal lamps and signal devices. 

(1) Any motor vehicle may be equipped and when required 

under this division shall be equipped with the following 

signal lamps or devices: 

a. A stop lamp on the rear which shall emit a red or yellow

light and which shall be actuated upon application of the 

service (foot) brake and which may but need not be 

incorporated with a tail lamp. 

b. A lamp or lamps or mechanical signal device capable of 

clearly indicating any intention to turn either to the right or 

the left and which shall be visible both from the front and 

rear.

(2) A stop lamp shall be plainly visible and understandable 

from a distance of 100 feet to the rear both during normal 

Case 4:22-cv-01107-CLM Document 57 Filed 01/06/25 Page 4 of 11
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sunlight and at nighttime and a signal lamp or lamps 

indicating intention to turn shall be visible and 

understandable during daytime and nighttime from a 

distance of 100 feet both to the front and rear. When a 

vehicle is equipped with a stop lamp or other signal lamps, 

such lamp or lamps shall at all times be maintained in good 

working condition. No stop lamp or signal lamp shall project 

a glaring or dazzling light. 

(3) All mechanical signal devices shall be self-illuminated 

when in use at the time mentioned in subsection (a) of 

Section 32-5-240.

Ala. Code. § 32-5-241(b); and, 

(g) Color of clearance lamps, side marker lamps, and 

reflectors. 

(1) Front clearance lamps and those marker lamps and 

reflectors mounted on the front or on the side near the front 

of a vehicle shall display or reflect an amber color. 

(2) Rear clearance lamps and those marker lamps and 

reflectors mounted on the rear or on the sides near the rear 

of a vehicle shall display or reflect a red color. 

(3) All lighting devices and reflectors mounted on the rear of 

any vehicle shall display or reflect a red color, except the stop 

light or other signal device, which may be red, amber, or 

yellow, and except that the light illuminating the license 

plate or the light emitted by a back-up lamp shall be white. 

Ala. Code § 32-5-242(g). 

 

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Body camera footage shows that Saint Jean’s taillight was broken, 

resulting in tail lights that appeared to be white and/or projected dazzling 

light, either of which violated Alabama law:

Relying on other body cam photos, Saint Jean argues that his 

taillight didn’t violate Alabama law because it displayed red and white

light. (Doc. 53, p. 5). 

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Saint Jean’s evidence shows that his rear lights did project some red 

light. But it also emitted white light in a place other than the license plate, 

meaning that Officer Harrelson had reasonable suspicion to believe Saint 

Jean was committing a traffic violation. Because we must assume that 

jurors will follow Alabama law as instructed, the court finds that no 

reasonable juror could find differently. 

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In sum, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to if Saint 

Jean’s taillight was broken and emitting a color other than red. Whether 

Saint Jean violated Alabama law doesn’t matter. Saint Jean fails to show 

that a reasonable jury could find that Officer Harrelson acted without

reasonable suspicion. Because Saint Jean fails to show a constitutional 

violation, Officer Harrelson is protected by qualified immunity. Grider v. 

City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1254 (11th Cir. 2010). 

ii. Count II: § 1983 Excessive Force 

Saint Jean also sues Officer Harrelson under § 1983 for excessive 

force. Because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to the type 

and amount of force used, the court DENIES summary judgment. 

The court analyzes excessive force claims “under the Fourth 

Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 

F.3d 898, 905 (11th Cir. 2009). “That standard asks whether the force 

applied is objectively reasonable in light of the facts confronting the 

officer, a determination [this court makes] from the perspective of a 

reasonable officer on the scene and not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” 

Mobley v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff Dep’t., 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 

2015) (quotations omitted). In determining reasonableness, the court 

considers “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an 

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is 

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham 

v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 

Saint Jean claims he never resisted Officer Harrelson. Instead, 

Officer Harrelson’s body cam video shows Saint Jean trying to comply 

when cuffed (Body Camera 03:00:28), explaining his arms couldn’t bend 

in the way Officer Harrelson was moving them (Body Camera at 03:00:35-

03:00:04), walking to Officer Harrelson’s car without the need for 

manhandling (Body Camera 03:02:54-03:03:09), trying to climb into 

Officer Harrelson’s patrol car (Body Camera, 03:03:45-03:03:46), and 

reacting when Officer Harrelson “kicked” him. (Doc. 46-1 at 70:1-73:22); 

(doc. 46- 1 at 72:12-73:22, 77:5-80:22); (doc. 46-1 at 77:5-23). 

Case 4:22-cv-01107-CLM Document 57 Filed 01/06/25 Page 8 of 11
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But the video and Officer Harrelson’s testimony tell a different 

story. The video shows Saint Jean being argumentative, making Officer 

Harrelson repeat his requests, yelling, fighting, and not being compliant. 

It’s impossible to tell from the video if Officer Harrelson kicked Saint Jean 

or not. And both parties testified to two versions of the incident. (Doc. 46-

2, p. 42); (doc. 46-1, p. 29). 

In short, there is a genuine dispute over the kick, and reasonable 

jurors could judge what happened differently. Because the court must 

view the evidence in a light most favorable to Saint Jean, the court 

DENIES summary judgment on Count II. 

B. Claims against the City of Altoona 

i. Count IV: § 1983 Monell Liability 

Saint Jean’s first claim against Altoona is for Monell liability under 

§1983. Municipalities, like Altoona, can face liability under § 1983 if a 

plaintiff shows “a [] policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or 

by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, 

inflict[ed] the injury.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of City of New York, 

436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). But a court can’t find a municipality vicariously 

liable under § 1983. 

Saint Jean presents no evidence showing an official Altoona policy 

causing his injury. Instead, Saint Jean argues that the “Altoona police 

force has a pattern of practice of disproportionately stopping and 

harassing Black drivers and immigrants.” (Doc. 29, p. 8). Yet Saint Jean 

presents no evidence to support his claim of an unofficial policy of racial 

discrimination. (See generally doc. 53 and doc. 29). The only evidence 

Saint Jean presents supporting a custom or policy is his own experience 

of being pulled over by an Altoona officer on one other occasion over 20 

years ago. (Doc. 46-1, p. 95); (doc. 46-3, p. 39). And this isn’t nearly enough 

under Monell. 

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Because Saint Jean presents no evidence supporting Monell

liability, and because Defendants present evidence refuting Monell

liability, the court GRANTS summary judgment for Defendants. 

ii. Counts V and VI: §1983 Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process

Because Saint Jean hasn’t sufficiently satisfied Monell, the court 

must GRANT summary judgment for Defendants on Count V (malicious 

prosecution under § 1983) and Count VI (abuse of process under § 1983). 

iii. Counts VII and VIII: Alabama law Malicious Prosecution and Abuse 

of Process 

Saint Jean also accuses Altoona of malicious prosecution and abuse 

of process under state law. But the court GRANTS summary judgment 

for Defendants on these claims as well because municipalities can’t act 

with malice under Alabama law,. Neighbors v. City of Birmingham, 382 

So.2d 113 (Ala. 1980); Franklin v. City of Huntsville, 670 So. 2d 848, 850 

(ala. 1995); see Ala. Code 1975 § 11-47-190. And malice is required to 

establish malicious prosecution and abuse of process. See Mithell v. 

Folmar & Associates, LLP, 854 So.2d 1115, 1118 (Ala. 2003); Willis v. 

Parker, 814 So.2d 857, 865 (Ala. 2001). 

iv. Count IX: Negligence 

Finally, Saint Jean claims that Officer Harrelson acted negligently 

in arresting and apprehending Saint Jean and that his negligence can be 

attributed to Altoona. (Doc. 29, p. 11). Claims of negligence against either 

Officer Harrelson or Altoona fail. 

The Alabama Code grants police officers immunity from tort 

liability “arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any 

discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law 

enforcement duties.” Ala Code. 1975 § 6-5-338(a). And “the plain language 

of § 6–5–338(b), Ala. Code 1975, extends that discretionary-function 

immunity to the City.” Ex parte City of Gadsden, 781 So.2d 936, 940 (Ala. 

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2000). Making a lawful arrest is a discretionary function. Telfare v. City 

of Huntsville, 841 So.2d 1222, 1228 (Ala. 2002). 

As explained above, Officer Harrelson lawfully arrested Saint Jean. 

Perhaps a jury could find Officer Harrelson effected his arrest in an 

unlawful manner, but that doesn’t make the arrest itself unlawful. 

Accordingly, both Officer Harrelson and Altoona are immune from tort 

liability under § 6-5-338. 

C. Claims against Others

i. Count II: § 1983 Excessive Force against Officer A 

The court GRANTS summary judgment for the Defendants on any 

claims against fictitious party Officer A. Fictious party practice is 

generally not allowed in federal court. Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 

734, 738. 

ii. Count III: Supervisory Liability against Freehling 

The court already dismissed Freehling after Saint Jean’s 

stipulation. (Doc. 24). The court won’t allow Saint Jean to bring Freeling 

back into the case through his amended complaint. As a result, the court 

(again) dismisses this count against Freehling. 

CONCLUSION 

 The court GRANTS summary judgment for Defendants on all 

counts except for Count II. As to Saint Jean’s excessive force claim, the 

court DENIES summary judgment because there is a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to if Officer Harrelson used excessive force in carrying out 

Saint Jean’s arrest. 

DONE and ORDERED on January 6, 2025. 

 _________________________________ 

 COREY L. MAZE 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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