Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01877/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01877-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Donald Fay Russell,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-14-1877-PHX-JJT (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 (Doc. 1) and Application in Support (Doc. 3) on August 22, 2014. On January 23, 

2015, Respondents filed their Limited Response (Doc. 17). Petitioner filed a Reply on 

February 17, 2015 (Doc. 21).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On November 21, 1994, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior 

Court in a 19 count Indictment (Exhibit C) on charges involving various sexual 

misconduct with children. (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 17, are referenced herein as 

“Exhibit ___.”) Petitioner eventually entered in to a written Plea Agreement, and 

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entered a plea of guilty. (Exhibit E, M.E. 10/4/95.) On October 4, 1994, Petitioner was 

sentenced to: (1) a 25 year sentence on a count of sexual conduct with a minor; (2) a 

consecutive five year sentence on an amended count of attempted molestation of a child; 

and (3) lifetime probation on a count of attempted sexual abuse. (Exhibit F, Sentence 

10/4/95.) 

On April 22, 2002, the Probation Officer filed a “Memo to the Court” (Exhibit G) 

pointing out that contrary to the written sentencing minute entry, the Conditions of 

Probation listed the start date of Petitioner’s probation as the date of sentencing. On 

April 11, 2002, the Trial Court amended nunc pro tunc the written sentencing minute 

entry to reflect that probation was to commence upon Petitioner’s release on the other 

counts, waiving community supervision on those counts, and affirming the minute entry 

in all other respects. (Exhibit H, M.E. 4/11/2.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 2.) 

Moreover, as a pleading defendant, Petitioner had no right to file a direct appeal. 

See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e); and Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258, 889 P.2d 

614, 616 (1995).

C. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

First PCR Proceeding – On February 4, 2005 (almost three years after 

amendment of the sentence), Petitioner commenced his first PCR proceeding by filing a 

Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit I), along with a Motion for Jurisdiction 

(Exhibit J), a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit K), and a “Petition” (Exhibit 

L). As part of those filings, Petitioner sought to excuse his late filing by asserting fear 

that had he sought relief sooner, state employees would have subjected him to beatings 

by other prisoners, loss of his records, limited legal resources, ineffectiveness of prison 

paralegals, and Petitioner’s limited legal skills. On March 14, 2005, the PCR Court 

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concluded that the allegations of fear were unsupported, but the other reasons for delay 

might provide justification for his delay, but that his claims were without merit. (Exhibit 

M, M.E. 3/4/15.) Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Exhibit N), which was 

denied on April 7, 2015 (Exhibit O, M.E. 4/7/5). 

Second PCR Proceeding – Over 15 months later, on July 20, 2006, Petitioner 

commenced his second PCR proceeding by filing a PCR Notice (Exhibit P), Petition 

(Exhibit Q), Motion to Vacate (Exhibit R), Motion for Delay (Exhibit S), and “Habeas” 

(Exhibit T). On August 10, 2006, the PCR court dismissed the Petition and related 

filings, finding his justifications for delay were unfounded, and that his claims had been 

previously raised and rejected. (Exhibit U, M.E. 8/10/6.) Petitioner then filed motions 

for reconsideration (Exhibits V and W), which were denied. (Exhibits X, M.E. 9/11/6, 

and Y, M.E. 9/13/6.)

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review by the Arizona Court of Appeals 

(Exhibit Z), which was denied on October 2, 2007 (Exhibit AA).

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit 

BB), which was denied on February 21, 2008 (Exhibit CC).

Third PCR Proceeding – Over three months later, on July 24, 2007, Petitioner 

commenced his third PCR proceeding by filing a PCR Notice (Exhibit DD) and Petition 

(Exhibit EE). On August 15, 2008, the PCR court dismissed the Petition, finding the 

petition untimely. (Exhibit FF M.E. 8/15/8.) Petitioner then filed a motion for 

reconsideration (Exhibit GG), which was denied on September 10, 2008. (Exhibit HH, 

M.E. 9/10/8.)

Fourth PCR Proceeding – Over 40 months later, on January 17, 2012,

Petitioner commenced his fourth PCR proceeding by filing a PCR Notice (Exhibit II). 

On February 1, 2012, the PCR court dismissed the proceeding, finding the proceeding 

untimely and successive. (Exhibit JJ M.E. 2/1/12.) Petitioner then filed a motion for 

reconsideration (Exhibit KK), which was denied on June 4, 2012. (Exhibit NN, M.E. 

6/4/12.)

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Fifth PCR Proceeding – In the meantime, on May 22, 2012, Petitioner 

commenced his fifth PCR proceeding by filing a PCR Petition (Exhibit LL). On May 

29, 2012, the PCR court dismissed the Petition, finding the Petition untimely and 

successive. (Exhibit MM M.E. 5/29/12.) Petitioner then filed a motion for 

reconsideration (Exhibit OO), which was denied on July 5, 2012. (Exhibit PP, M.E. 

7/5/12.)

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review by the Arizona Court of Appeals 

(Exhibit QQ), which was denied on October 3, 2013 (Exhibit RR).

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition – Over ten months later, Petitioner commenced the current case by filing 

his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 22, 2014 

(Doc. 1). Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following four grounds for relief:

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges a claim for ineffective assistance 

of counsel. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges he was not provided 

copies of his court records and transcripts. In Ground Three, 

Petitioner alleges that he “was denied the right to be informed of the 

charges against him.” In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that the 

sentence he received constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

(Order 10/30/14, Doc. 10 at 2.) Along with his Petition, Petitioner filed an Application

in Support (Doc. 3) in which he argues the merits of his claims and appends various state 

court records.

In the Service Order, the Court observed that Ground Two failed to assert a 

cognizable claim, and dismissed it. A response to Grounds One, Three, and Four was 

required.

Response - On January 23, 2015, Respondents filed their “Limited Answer” 

(Doc. 17). Respondents argue that the Petition is untimely, and barred by the habeas 

statute of limitations, and Petitioner’s state remedies on his claims are procedurally 

defaulted and thus his claims are barred from habeas review.

Reply - On February 17, 2015, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 21). Petitioner 

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argues that: (1) the state court found questions of fact whether Petitioner had been 

prevented from timely filing; and (2) any procedural default should be excused because 

of ineffective assistance of his PCR counsel.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

Conviction Final - The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions 

generally begins to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A).1 For an Arizona noncapital pleading defendant, the conviction becomes 

“final” at the conclusion of the first “of-right” post-conviction proceeding under Rule 32. 

“Arizona's Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct 

review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. Schriro, 481 

F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). “To bring an of-right proceeding under Rule 32, a pleaconvicted defendant must provide to the Arizona Superior Court, within 90 days of 

conviction and sentencing in that court, notice of his or her intent to file a Petition for 

 

1

Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly 

recognized constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Except as discussed hereinafter, Petitioner proffers no 

argument that any of these apply.

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Post-Conviction Review.” Id. at 715 (citing Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(a)). 

Here, Petitioner’s original sentence was entered on October 4, 1995. Ordinarily,

therefore, Petitioner had through January 2, 1996 to bring his of-right PCR petition. 

However, state prisoners whose convictions became final before the effective date 

of AEDPA “are entitled to a one-year grace period, beginning on April 24, 1996, in 

which to file their petitions.” Patterson v.Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The grace period expires on the anniversary of AEDPA’s enactment, April 24, 1997. Id.

Thus, Petitioner had at least through April 24, 1997 to commence his federal 

habeas proceeding. Respondents contend this was the commencement of Petitioner’s 

one year limitations period.

However, in Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S 147 (2007), the Court concluded that for 

purposes of the habeas statute of limitations, “[f]inal judgment in a criminal case means 

sentence. The sentence is the judgment.” Id. at 799 (quoting Berman v. United States, 

302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937)). See also Ferreira v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 494 

F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding re-sentencing judgment is relevant one, even if 

challenge is directed only to earlier conviction). Here, Petitioner was arguably 

“resentenced” on April 11, 2002, when the trial court amended its sentencing minute 

entry. (See Exhibit H, M.E. 4/11/2.) It is that amended sentence under which 

Petitioner is now restrained.

Because the parties have not addressed this issue, it is not clear whether Petitioner 

had, after such resentencing, a new opportunity to bring an of-right PCR petition. The 

undersigned has found no authority addressing this situation. Because it does not affect 

the outcome, the undersigned assumes (in Petitioner’s favor) that upon issuance of the 

order amending the sentence, Petitioner had an opportunity for a new of-right PCR 

proceeding. Thus, his conviction would have become final upon the expiration of the 

time for such proceeding, on July 10, 2002.

Moreover, in disposing of Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding, the PCR court did 

not reject it as being untimely filed. (See Exhibit M, M.E. 3/14/5.) Arguably, therefore, 

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the proceeding may have been a timely of-right proceeding, with the result that 

Petitioner’s conviction would not have become final until the expiration of Petitioner’s 

time to seek further review. Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(a) a PCR 

petitioner has fifteen days to move for a rehearing on his Petition. Petitioner did so. 

(See Exhibit N, Mot. Reconsider.) Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c), a 

PCR petitioner has thirty days after the denial of a motion for rehearing to seek review in 

the Arizona Court of Appeals. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on 

April 7, 2005. 

 Further, Arizona applies Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.3 to extend “the 

time to file an appeal by five days when the order appealed from has been mailed to the 

interested party and commences to run on the date the clerk mails the order.” State v. 

Zuniga, 163 Ariz. 105, 106, 786 P.2d 956, 957 (1990). However, that rule does not 

apply to in-court rulings. “We again stress that in most criminal cases, the defendant and 

counsel for both sides will be present in court when the appealed order, judgment, or 

sentence is entered and that in this opinion we deal only with cases in which notice is, in 

fact, given by mail.” Id. at 957, n. 2. This rule has been extended to post-conviction 

relief proceedings. See State v. Goracke, 210 Ariz. 20, 21 n.1, 106 P.3d 1035, 1036 n.1 

(Ct. App. Div. 12005). See also State v. Brock, 163 Ariz. 523, 526, 789 P.2d 390, 393 

(Ct. App. Div. 1 1989) (supplemental opinion), aff'd, 165 Ariz. 296, 798 P.2d 1305 

(1990) (applying to PCR motion for reconsideration of appellate court ruling).

Accordingly, Petitioner would have had 35 days, through May 12, 2005, to file a 

petition for review in his first PCR proceeding. Because it does not affect the outcome, 

the undersigned presumes (in Petitioner’s favor) that his time for review on his amended 

sentence did not expire until that date, and this one year habeas limitations period 

commenced running thereafter.

New Constitutional Right – In his Application in Support, Petitioner raises a 

number of constitutional decisions issued after his conviction became final. In arguing 

his Ground 1 (ineffective assistance) he relies on Missouri v. Frye, - - U.S. - - , 132 S. Ct. 

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1339 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, - - U.S. - - , 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), (Doc. 3 at Mot. 

Applic. at 3.) In arguing his Ground 3 (notice of charges), he relies upon Blakely v. 

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (Id. at 21, 24.) 

The habeas limitations statue provides a later commencement date of “the date on 

which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if 

the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). 

None of the recent U.S. Supreme Court cases relied upon by Petitioner qualify 

under § 2244(d)(1)(C) to delay the commencement of his limitations period.

Frye nor Lafler applied the prejudice prong of the Sixth Amendment right to 

effective assistance of counsel in the plea-bargaining context where ineffective 

assistance results in a rejection of the plea offer and the defendant is convicted at the 

ensuing trial. Neither case “decided a new rule of constitutional law,” but instead were 

an “application of an established rule to the underlying facts.” Buenrostro v. United 

States, 697 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012).

Blakely has not been made retroactively applicable on collateral review. See 

Cook v. U.S., 386 F.3d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 2004). Moreover, Blakely was decided on June 

24, 2004, before the date adopted hereinabove on which his limitations period began to 

run on the basis of the finality of his conviction.

Thus, the finality of Petitioner’s conviction remains the proper commencement 

date for his habeas limitations period.

Conclusion re Commencement – Based upon foregoing, the undersigned 

assumes that Petitioner’s one year began running no later than May 13, 2005, and 

without any tolling expired one year later on May 12, 2006, making his August 22, 2014 

Petition over eight years delinquent.2

 

2

Petitioner’s habeas Petition appears to be dated August 25, 2014. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 

11.) There is nothing in the record to suggest that Petitioner delivered it to prison 

officials for mailing anytime sooner than its filing date of August 22, 2014.

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3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This provision only applies to 

state proceedings, not to federal proceedings. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

Petitioner’s limitations period expired no later than May 12, 2006. Petitioner’s 

next PCR proceeding, his second was not commenced until July 20, 2006, over two

months afterwards, when he filed his second PCR Notice (Exhibit P).

3

 Once the statute 

has run, a subsequent post-conviction or collateral relief filing does not reset the running 

of the one year statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Petitioner has no statutory 

tolling resulting from his second PCR proceeding, or from his third, fourth, or fifth PCR 

proceedings. 

Consequently, Petitioner’s habeas petition was over eight years delinquent.

4. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

 

3

It is true that Petitioner’s first PCR notice was dated July 17, 2006. (Exhibit P at 3.) 

Arguably, it might be deemed filed for purposes of the habeas limitations period as of 

that date. See Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003) (“a pro se 

prisoner's filing of a state habeas petition is deemed filed at the moment the prisoner 

delivers it to prison authorities for forwarding to the clerk of the court”). The difference 

of three days would not make a difference.

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extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. 

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 

1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of 

limitations on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that 

equitable tolling is appropriate.”).

Petitioner seeks to excuse his delinquency by referencing his pro se untrained 

status, and the restraints on his liberty, counsel’s failure to file a PCR notice or to advise 

him of the AEDPA’s time limitations. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 12.) 

Pro Se Status - “It is clear that pro se status, on its own, is not enough to warrant 

equitable tolling.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). A prisoner's 

“proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and exceptional’ circumstance because it is typical of 

those bringing a § 2254 claim.” Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000). 

See also Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“a pro se petitioner's 

lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting 

equitable tolling”).

Restraints on Liberty – Similarly, the routine restraints on liberty applicable to 

virtually every prisoner cannot be deemed an “extraordinary circumstance.” By 

definition, a habeas petitioner is a prisoner with constraints on their liberty. Petitioner 

points to nothing exceptional about the constraints placed on him while his limitations 

period was expiring.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Petitioner complains that counsel failed to 

file a PCR notice and to advise Petitioner about the AEDPA statute of limitations. 

Although an attorney's behavior can establish the extraordinary circumstances required 

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for equitable tolling, mere negligence or professional malpractice is insufficient. Frye v. 

Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.2001). A “garden variety claim of excusable 

neglect,’ such as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss a filing deadline 

does not warrant equitable tolling.’ ” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651-652 (2010). 

Rather, the attorney’s misconduct must rise to the level of extraordinary circumstances. 

Id. 

Moreover, an unadorned failure to advise about a limitations period would, at 

best, be simple negligence. Cf. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(allowing equitable tolling where petitioner's counsel was hired almost a year in advance, 

failed to do anything to prepare the petition or to respond to numerous letters and phone 

calls, and withheld petitioner's file for over two months after the limitations period 

expired); Holland, supra (discussing potential for finding of extraordinary circumstances 

where counsel misinformed petitioner about filing deadline, failed to communicate 

conclusion of state appeals, and failed to communicate with petitioner at all over a period 

of years, all despite repeated requests by petitioner). 

Petitioner proffers nothing more than garden variety attorney negligence.

Moreover, under the presumptions adopted hereinabove in Petitioner’s favor, the 

time during which Petition would have been awaiting counsel to file his PCR notice (the 

time prior to his first PCR notice) has not been counted against Petitioner. Thus, any 

failing by counseling in filing such a notice would not have affected the timeliness of 

Petitioner’s habeas petition.

Delays in First PCR Proceeding – In his Reply, Petitioner argues that the state 

court found questions of fact whether Petitioner had been prevented from timely filing 

his first PCR proceeding. (Doc. 21 at 1.) Assuming there were extraordinary 

circumstances that preclude an earlier filing of Petitioner’s first PCR petition, those 

would not render Petitioner’s habeas petition timely. Under the assumptions made in 

Petitioner’s favor hereinabove, Petitioner’s habeas limitations period did not begin to run 

until after that first PCR proceeding was commenced, and concluded. Thus, any delays 

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arising prior thereto would be irrelevant to the timeliness of his habeas petition. 

Refusal to Provide Transcripts – In the dismissed Ground Two of the Petition, 

Petitioner complains that the trial court has refused to provide him a complete transcript 

of his trial. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.) The lack of a transcript might have explained delays 

in Petitioner proceeding on his first PCR proceeding. Bus as discussed hereinabove, 

those delays are irrelevant under the assumptions adopted herein. Moreover, Petitioner 

fails to explain how the lack of transcript let him to delay some 8 years, including gaps 

of a year between his first and second PCR proceeding, five months between his second 

and third proceeding, over three years between his third and fourth PCR proceeding, and 

over 10 months between his fifth PCR Proceeding and the instant habeas proceeding. 

Nor, assuming transcripts were necessary to filing his habeas petition, does 

Petitioner proffer anything to show his diligence in obtaining them throughout the 

passing years.

Conclusion - Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned finds no basis for 

equitable tolling. 

5. Actual Innocence

To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the habeas statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude “a court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 

S.Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013). To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a 

petitioner “’must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’” Id. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). This exception, referred to as the “Schlup gateway,” applies 

“only when a petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was 

free of nonharmless constitutional error.’ ” Id. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

316). 

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Petitioner makes no such claim of actual innocence in this proceeding. Nor do his 

claims make any suggestion of actual innocence, but instead rely upon ineffective 

assistance, procedural irregularities, and a cruel and unusual sentence. 

6. Summary re Statute of Limitations

Taking into account all arguable bases to extend the commencement of the habeas 

limitations period, and all available statutory tolling, Petitioner’s one year habeas 

limitations period commenced running no later than May 13, 2005, and expired no later 

than May 12, 2006, making his August, 22, 2014 Petition over 8 years delinquent. 

Petitioner has shown no basis for additional statutory tolling, and no basis for equitable 

tolling or actual innocence to avoid the effects of his delay. Consequently, the Petition 

must be dismissed with prejudice.

B. OTHER DEFENSES

Because the undersigned finds the Petition plainly barred by the statute of 

limitations, Respondents’ other defenses are not reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

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Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the 

reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the 

district court was correct in its procedural ruling. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed August 22, 2014 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

/ /

/ /

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VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: June 4, 2015

14-1877r RR 15 05 20 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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