Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02510/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02510-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONIE L. HARRIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROSSI THOMAS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-02510-JCS 

ORDER REGARDING SUFFICIENCY 

OF AMENDED COMPLAINT

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915

Re: Dkt. No. 11

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Tonie Harris, pro se, brings this action alleging sexual harassment and abuse, 

including rape, by her then supervisor Defendant Rossi Thomas while she was employed by 

Defendant United Airlines (―United‖). The Court previously granted Harris‘s application to 

proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed her initial Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

for failure to adequately state a claim on which relief could be granted. Harris has now filed an 

Amended Complaint (dkt. 11), asserting eleven claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, California‘s Fair Employment and Housing Act (―FEHA‖), and California common law. 

For the reasons stated below, Harris‘s FEHA claims (claims five through eight) are dismissed with 

leave to amend for failure to plead administrative exhaustion, but the Court finds her remaining 

claims adequate for the purpose of review under § 1915. If Harris wishes to file a second 

amended complaint, she may do so no later than December 14, 2015. If Harris declines to 

further amend those claims, the Court will instruct the United States Marshal to serve process as to 

the remaining claims on both Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

1

 

1 Harris has consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c). Because no other party has been served or appeared, her consent is sufficient for 

the undersigned to evaluate her Amended Complaint.

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II. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Harris initiated this action by filing a Complaint under Title VII against United and 

Thomas. See Compl. (dkt. 1). The Court granted Harris‘s application to proceed in forma 

pauperis, reviewed her Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and dismissed the Title VII 

claim against Thomas with prejudice because that statute provides ―no personal liability for 

employees, including supervisors.‖ Order Dismissing Compl. (dkt. 10)2at 4 (quoting Greenlaw v. 

Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 1995)). The Court also dismissed Harris‘s claim against 

United for failure to include sufficient factual allegations to support a plausible entitlement to 

relief, but allowed leave to amend. Id. at 5−6. Harris filed her Amended Complaint on September 

14, 2015. 

B. Allegations of the Amended Complaint

Harris‘s allegations are taken as true at the pleading stage. Parks Sch. of Bus. v. 

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). The following paragraphs summarize her 

allegations but should not be construed as resolving any factual issues that might be disputed.

Harris was employed as a United customer service agent for fifteen years and performed 

competently. Am. Compl. ¶ 9. In the summer of 2012, she took a position as a personal assistant 

to Thomas, ―a high ranking supervisor and regional director of United‘s customer service 

department.‖ Id. ¶ 10.3 In the months after Harris took that position, Thomas began to look at 

Harris inappropriately and told her ―that he  ̳liked to party‘ and was a  ̳playboy.‘‖ Id. ¶ 12. He 

later ―began making moaning noises around Ms. Harris, as if he were moaning for or as a result of 

sexual activity.‖ Id.

Harris ―became aware of a steady stream of United female customer service employees 

who visited Thomas regularly.‖ Id. ¶ 13. Thomas told Harris that he had sex with female 

employees and advanced their careers, as well as that ―he built relationships with women in the 

 

2 Harris v. Thomas, No. 15-cv-02510-JCS, 2015 WL 4735179 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2015).

3

The Amended Complaint uses all capital letters for the names of entities and individuals 

discussed therein. For ease of reading and consistency with the remainder of this Order, such 

capitalization is altered in quotations throughout this Order without further indication.

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company, and that they became close friends after sex.‖ Id. ¶¶ 13, 14. He showed her ―pictures of 

women in United‘s organizational chart whom he had helped at the company.‖ Id. ¶ 14. Harris 

―observed physical intimacy including touching and kissing‖ between Thomas and one employee, 

and ―[a]t least one of Thomas‘s regular female visitors openly complained in front of Ms. Harris 

that Thomas had not done enough for her.‖ Id. ¶ 13. ―Thomas‘s conduct became an  ̳open secret‘ 

among United employees and [was] known by United management,‖ and Harris was aware of 

complaints regarding Thomas‘s sexual conduct. Id.

Amy Pellatz, who is not a party to this case, was another United employee who served as 

Thomas‘s assistant and Harris‘s supervisor. Id. ¶ 15 Pellatz was aware of Thomas‘s conduct with 

other United employees and aided him ―by, among other things, warning Thomas of inquiry and 

complaint [and] providing or insuring female employees special access to Thomas and his office.‖ 

Id. Pellatz ―suggested that Ms. Harris would or should have sex with Thomas.‖ Id. ¶ 14. After 

Harris rejected Thomas‘s advances, and apparently spoke out against ―the workplace disruption 

and risk inherent in‖ Thomas‘s liaisons with other female employees, Pellatz retaliated against 

Harris ―by not assisting, verbally attacking, complaining about, turning the lights off on, 

attempting to suspend, and taking other hostile or adverse actions.‖ Id. ¶ 15. Thomas himself also 

―warned Ms. Harris that he could and would send her back to customer service.‖ Id.

On or about May 31, 2013, Harris was making a breakfast smoothie for Thomas while 

Thomas prepared to leave for a flight home to his family in New Jersey. Id. ¶ 17. Thomas told 

Harris that she looked nice, and then stated, ―[t]he only way you are going to move up in this 

company is if you have sex.‖ Id. (alteration in original). Thomas then groped Harris‘s breasts, 

restrained her by grabbing her arm, removed her pants, and raped her. Id. He stopped when he 

was interrupted by his cell phone and went to his office to take the call. Id. ―Thomas reemerged 

with his luggage, and blew Ms. Harris a kiss as he passed on his way out the door to catch his 

flight.‖ Id.

Later in 2013, Thomas ―continued assaulting Ms. Harris by touching her buttocks with his 

hand, or rubbing his genital region against her buttocks.‖ Id. ¶ 18. On one occasion in November 

of 2013, ―Thomas directed Ms. Harris to suck one of the pickles [from a jar in the office] as if she 

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were performing fellatio.‖ Id. ¶ 19. He then told her to perform fellatio on him, but Harris 

refused. Id. 

Harris was traumatized by Thomas‘s treatment of her and feared losing her job if she 

reported it. Id. ¶ 20. ―United‘s head of Human Relations in San Francisco‖ was Mike 

Cheeseman, a personal friend and ally of Thomas. Id. Harris nevertheless complained to him in 

the spring of 2013 and asked to be removed from working with Thomas, but Cheeseman refused 

to transfer her. Id. Another Human Relations employee at United, Carolyn White, later reached 

out to Harris and befriended her. Id. Harris tried to raise Thomas‘s improprieties with White, but 

White said she did not want to discuss Thomas and advised Harris that reporting such issues could 

affect her job. Id.

In January of 2014, ―Thomas, Pellatz, Cheeseman, and/or White either individually or 

collectively told Ms. Harris . . . that she was no longer welcome back to her position as an 

assistant to Thomas, and Ms. Harris understood she was terminated.‖ Id. ¶ 21. Around the same 

time—the exact sequence of events is not entirely clear from the Amended Complaint—Harris had

begun seeing a therapist through United‘s Employee Assistance Program, and felt sufficiently 

empowered by therapy to report the harassment she experienced to United. Id. ¶ 20. Harris 

explains the results of that report as follows:

After Ms. Harris‘ report of Thomas‘s harassment, United recharacterized her termination as a medical leave of absence, and 

offered her an inferior position in the same facility with or under 

Thomas. United did not remove Thomas from the facility and 

otherwise took no adverse action against Thomas as a result of Ms. 

Harris‘s complaint, at least to her knowledge. Ms. Harris‘s therapist, 

however, had placed Ms. Harris on disability largely because of her 

experience with Thomas, and United‘s offer of replacement 

employment was otherwise inadequate.

Id.

The Amended Complaint includes eleven claims, each against United, Thomas, or both of 

them (as well as unidentified Doe defendants). The first four claims invoke Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964 against United and Doe defendants, and specifically allege: (1) sexual 

harassment creating a hostile work environment, id. ¶¶ 22−26; (2) quid pro quo sexual harassment, 

id. ¶¶ 27−31; (3) wrongful termination based on sex discrimination, id. ¶¶ 32−36; and (4) 

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retaliatory termination, id. ¶¶ 37−41. The fifth through eighth claims assert the same theories

against United and Does, but under California‘s Fair Employment and Housing Act (―FEHA‖). 

See id. ¶¶ 42−61. Harris brings her final three claims under California common law, and 

respectively asserts: (9) wrongful termination in violation of public policy, against United and 

Does; (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress, against United, Thomas, and Does; and (11) 

assault and battery, against Thomas. Id. ¶¶ 62−73.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Where a plaintiff is found to be indigent under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and is granted leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must screen the plaintiff‘s complaint and dismiss any claims 

that: (1) are frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B); see Marks v. Solcum, 98 F.3d 494, 495 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading must contain a ―short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.‖ A complaint that lacks such statement fails to 

state a claim and must be dismissed. 

In determining whether a plaintiff fails to state a claim, the court assumes that all factual 

allegations in the complaint are true. Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th 

Cir. 1995). However, ―the tenet that a court must accept a complaint‘s allegations as true is 

inapplicable to legal conclusions [and] mere conclusory statements.‖ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The pertinent 

question is whether the factual allegations, assumed to be true, ―state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.‖ Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Thus, to meet this requirement, the 

complaint must be supported by factual allegations. Id.

Where the complaint has been filed by a pro se plaintiff, as is the case here, courts must 

―construe the pleadings liberally . . . to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.‖ Hebbe v. 

Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). ―A district court should not dismiss a 

pro se complaint without leave to amend unless  ̳it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 

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complaint could not be cured by amendment.‘‖ Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203−04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). 

Further, when it dismisses the complaint of a pro se litigant with leave to amend, ―the district court 

must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the 

litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively.‖ Id. (quoting Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 

1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)). ―Without the benefit of a statement of deficiencies, the pro se litigant 

will likely repeat previous errors.‖ Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)).

B. Administrative Exhaustion and Dismissal of FEHA Claims

Both Title VII and FEHA require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before 

filing a claim in court. 

Under Title VII, a plaintiff usually must obtain a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC before 

bringing an action in court. Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1104–05 (9th Cir. 

2008) (discussing this requirement and certain exceptions). Harris‘s initial Complaint attached a 

right-to-sue letter dated April 22, 2015. See Compl. at ECF p. 5. Her Amended Complaint, 

however, fails to include or discuss that letter. As a general rule, an amended complaint replaces 

the original complaint, which is ―treated thereafter as non-existent.‖ Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262 

(quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967)). But in the specific circumstances of this 

case, there would be little if any practical value in requiring Harris to amend her complaint to 

allege the existence of a document that already appears in the record. The Court therefore takes 

judicial notice of the right-to-sue letter included with Harris‘s original Complaint and deems it 

attached to the Amended Complaint. Taking that letter into account, the Court finds no basis to 

dismiss Harris‘s Title VII claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

California law similarly requires that ―the FEHA administrative process must be pursued 

with respect to the specific rights and remedies enumerated in the act,‖ and constitutes ―a 

precondition to bringing a civil suit on a statutory cause of action.‖ Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 

83, 84 (1990) (emphasis omitted). ―Exhaustion in this context requires filing a written charge with 

[the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ( ̳DFEH‘)] within one year of the 

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alleged unlawful employment discrimination, and obtaining notice from DFEH of the right to 

sue.‖ Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Romano v. 

Rockwell Int’l, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 479, 492 (1996)). ―An EEOC right-to-sue letter does not satisfy 

the jurisdictional requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies as to FEHA actions.‖ 

Downs v. Dep’t of Water & Power, 58 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 1099 n.2 (1997) (citing Martin v. 

Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 29 Cal. App. 4th 1718, 1726 (1994)). There is no indication in 

Amended Complaint or elsewhere in the record that Harris received a right-to-sue letter from the 

DFEH. Harris‘s FEHA claims—specifically, the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth claims of her 

Amended Complaint—are therefore DISMISSED. Harris may file a second amended complaint 

to pursue these claims if she can allege facts to show that she complied with the FEHA 

administrative exhaustion requirement.

C. Title VII Sexual Harassment

The first and second claims of Harris‘s Amended Complaint assert two forms of sexual 

harassment in violation of Title VII: hostile work environment and quid pro quo. As with her 

other Title VII claims, she brings these claims against United and unidentified Doe defendants, but 

not against Thomas. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds both of these claims 

sufficient to proceed at this stage.

1. Hostile Work Environment

―[S]exual harassment so  ̳severe or pervasive‘ as to  ̳alter the conditions of [the victim‘s] 

employment and create an abusive working environment‘ violates Title VII.‖ Faragher v. City of 

Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 

67 (1986)). ―Workplace conduct is not measured in isolation; instead, whether an environment is 

sufficiently hostile or abusive must be judged by looking at all the circumstances, including the 

frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or 

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 

employee‘s work performance.‖ Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270−71 (2001) 

(per curiam) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The ―standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII 

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does not become a  ̳general civility code.‘‖ Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (citation omitted). Rather, 

―conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.‖ Id. 

Although a workplace need not be ―so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy 

completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers‖ to be actionable, 

―[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work 

environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond 

Title VII‘s purview.‖ Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Further, ―[t]o hold her employer liable for sexual harassment under 

Title VII, [a plaintiff] must show that she reasonably feared she would be subject to such 

misconduct in the future because the [employer] encouraged or tolerated [the] harassment.‖ 

Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2000).

Because only the employer can change the terms and conditions of 

employment, an isolated incident of harassment by a co-worker will 

rarely (if ever) give rise to a reasonable fear that sexual harassment 

has become a permanent feature of the employment relationship. By 

hypothesis, the employer will have had no advance notice and 

therefore cannot have sanctioned the harassment beforehand. And, if 

the employer takes appropriate corrective action, it will not have 

ratified the conduct. In such circumstances, it becomes difficult to 

say that a reasonable victim would feel that the terms and conditions 

of her employment have changed as a result of the misconduct.

Id. (considering sexual harassment claims under Title VII and California law).

―Physical sexual assault has routinely been prohibited as sexual harassment under Title 

VII.‖ Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (collecting extensive 

authority). ―[A] hostile environment exists when an employee can show (1) that he or she was 

subjected to . . . physical conduct of a sexual nature, (2) that this conduct was unwelcome, and 

(3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of the victim‘s 

employment and create an abusive working environment.‖ Id. (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 

872, 875−76 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Here, among other allegations, Harris alleges that her supervisor raped her. Am. Compl. 

¶ 17. The Ninth Circuit has addressed sexual harassment claims based on rape:

Rape is unquestionably among the most severe forms of sexual 

harassment. Being raped by a business associate, while on the job, 

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irrevocably alters the conditions of the victim‘s work environment. 

It imports a profoundly serious level of abuse into a situation that, 

by law, must remain free of discrimination based on sex. Being 

raped is, at minimum, an act of discrimination based on sex. See 

Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (―Just as 

every murder is also a battery, every rape committed in the 

employment setting is also discrimination based on the employee‘s 

sex.‖). Thus, the employer‘s reaction to a single serious episode may 

form the basis for a hostile work environment claim.

Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 967−68 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Moreover, Harris‘s allegations go beyond ―a single serious episode,‖ see id. at 968, but 

rather describe an ongoing pattern of unwelcome sexual advances and contact by her supervisor, 

Thomas. See Am. Compl. at, e.g., ¶¶ 14, 18, 19. Harris alleges that United was aware of 

Thomas‘s conduct with respect to other female employees. She also alleges that she reported 

Thomas‘s ―improprieties‖ to Mike Cheeseman to no avail, and attempted to report Mr. Thomas to 

another United employee who ―responded by stating that she did not want to talk about Thomas‖ 

and warned Harris that pursuing such complaints could jeopardize Harris‘s job. Id. ¶ 20. When 

she later reported the abuse ―to United,‖ United took no action against Thomas. Id. ¶¶ 20−21. 

The Court finds these allegations adequate to state a claim that Harris experienced unwelcome 

sexual contact and harassment sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of her 

employment. See Rene, 305 F.3d at 1065.

2. Quid Pro Quo

A plaintiff bringing a Title VII claim based on quid pro quo harassment ―must show that [a 

supervisor]  ̳explicitly or implicitly condition[ed] a job, a job benefit, or the absence of a job 

detriment, upon an employee‘s acceptance of sexual conduct.‘ If a plaintiff is able to make such a 

showing, the employer is strictly liable for the supervisor‘s conduct.‖ Craig v. M & O Agencies, 

Inc., 496 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 

1994)) (citation omitted; second alteration in original). Harris alleges that immediately before 

Thomas raped her, Thomas stated, ―[t]he only way you are going to move up in this company is if 

you have sex.‖ Am. Compl. ¶ 17. The Court finds this allegation sufficient to state a claim.

D. Title VII Employment Discrimination

Harris‘s third claim asserts that ―Defendants United and Does actually or constructively 

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terminated Ms. Harris‘s employment on the basis of her sex and refusal to have sex with 

Thompson [sic, presumably referring to Thomas].‖ Am. Compl. ¶ 34.

Under Title VII, it is ―an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge 

any individual . . . because of such individual‘s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.‖ 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ―[H]ostility toward nonconformance with gender stereotypes also constitutes 

impermissible gender discrimination.‖ Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 486 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 

864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001)). A plaintiff must generally present ―actions taken by the employer from 

which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such 

action was based upon [an] impermissible criterion.‖ Bodett v. CoxCom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 743 

(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Gay v. Waiters’ Union, 694 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

Discrimination need not be the only reason for the termination. ―It suffices instead to show that 

the motive to discriminate was one of the employer‘s motives, even if the employer also had other, 

lawful motives that were causative in the employer‘s decision.‖ Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. 

Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013). 

A plaintiff may rely either on direct evidence that her termination was improperly

motivated, or on circumstantial evidence by showing that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; 

(2) she was qualified for her position and performed adequately; (3) she experienced adverse 

employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals not in her protected class were treated 

more favorably, or other circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination. See Hawn v. 

Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010). Although a plaintiff does not 

necessarily need to plead each of these elements specifically in her complaint, they nevertheless 

―help to determine whether Plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim.‖ Khalik v. United Air Lines, 

671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012); see also Sheppard v. David Evans & Assocs., 694 F.3d 

1045, 1050 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2012).

As a starting point, it is not clear from the Amended Complaint whether Harris was 

actually terminated. She alleges that Thomas and/or other United employees told her ―that she 

was not longer welcome back to her position as an assistant to Thomas,‖ and that she ―understood 

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she was terminated.‖ Am. Compl. ¶ 21. Soon thereafter, ―United re-characterized her termination 

as a medical leave of absence.‖ Id. The Court need not resolve this issue at this stage, because the 

Amended Complaint includes sufficient factual allegations to support a claim based on 

constructive termination.4

―Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee‘s reasonable decision to resign 

because of unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial

purposes. The inquiry is objective: Did working conditions become so intolerable that a 

reasonable person in the employee‘s position would have felt compelled to resign?‖ Penn. State 

Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004) (citation omitted). Mere ―evidence of transfer and 

demotion is insufficient,‖ and the bar for such a claim is relatively high ―because federal 

antidiscrimination policies are better served when the employee and employer attack 

discrimination within their existing employment relationship, rather than when the employee 

walks away and then later litigates whether his employment situation was intolerable.‖ Poland v. 

Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007). Ninth Circuit precedent holds, however, that ―the 

plaintiff need not show that the employer subjectively intended to force the employee to resign.‖ 

Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir. 1987) (alteration in original); see also 

Poland, 494 F.3d at 1184 n.7. 

Harris alleges that she experienced sexual assault and verbal sexual abuse at the hands of 

her supervisor, that she was told that complaining about the harassment could jeopardize her job, 

that soon after reporting abuse she was removed from her position and offered an inferior position 

under the same supervisor, and that United took no action against the allegedly abusive supervisor. 

Taken as a whole, the Court finds that these allegations describe conditions ―so intolerable that a 

reasonable person in the employee‘s position would have felt compelled to resign.‖ See Suders, 

542 U.S. at 141. Moreover, giving Harris the benefit of the doubt and drawing all reasonable 

inferences in her favor, it is plausible to infer at this stage that her constructive discharge was 

 

4

The Court also need not address at this stage whether the Amended Complaint could be 

construed as stating a Title VII discrimination claim based on adverse employment actions other 

than termination, despite Harris explicitly framing the claim as based on actual or constructive 

termination. See Am. Compl. ¶ 34.

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motivated at least in part by her sex or her failure to conform to a gender-based stereotype of 

female submission. The Court therefore finds the Amended Complaint sufficient to proceed on 

this claim.

E. Title VII Retaliation

Title VII prohibits an employer from ―discriminat[ing] against any of his employees . . . 

because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this 

subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in 

an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In 

general, employers‘ ―unlawful employment practices‖ under Title VII encompass discrimination 

and harassment based on ―race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.‖ See id. § 2000e-2(a).

―To succeed on a retaliation claim, [a plaintiff] must first establish a prima facie case [by] 

demonstrat[ing] (1) that she was engaging in a protected activity, (2) that she suffered an adverse 

employment decision, and (3) that there was a causal link between her activity and the 

employment decision.‖ Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 

EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1513−14 (9th Cir. 1989)). The Ninth Circuit has long 

held that ―a plaintiff does not need to prove that the employment practice at issue was in fact 

unlawful under Title VII,‖ but instead ―must only show that she had a  ̳reasonable belief‘ that the 

employment practice she protested was prohibited under Title VII.‖ Id. Making an internal 

―complaint that a supervisor has violated Title VII may constitute protected activity for which the 

employer cannot lawfully retaliate.‖ EEOC v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 963 (9th 

Cir. 2009); see also Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass’n Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994) (―We have 

held that when an employee protests the actions of a supervisor such opposition is a  ̳protected 

activity.‘‖). As for the causation element, ―Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire 

to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.‖ Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 

2528.

As discussed above, Harris has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim that her supervisor 

violated Title VII. She alleges that she reported the alleged harassment to another supervisor 

(Cheeseman) and later to United. Am. Compl. ¶ 20. These allegations are sufficient to satisfy the 

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―protected activity‖ element of a retaliation claim. See Go Daddy, 581 F.3d at 963; Trent, 41 F.3d 

at 526. Harris has also adequately alleged adverse employment actions, including demotion and, 

as discussed above, constructive discharge. Taking into account Carolyn White‘s warning that 

reporting Thomas‘s misconduct could ―adversely affect [Harris‘s] job,‖ Am. Compl. ¶ 20, and 

allowing Harris the benefit of any doubt, see Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 342, the Court finds Harris‘s 

allegations adequate to support a plausible inference that those adverse actions were caused by a 

desire to retaliate for Harris reporting Thomas‘s alleged misconduct. The Court declines to 

dismiss Harris‘s Title VII retaliation claim.

F. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

Harris‘s ninth claim asserts wrongful termination in violation of public policy under 

California common law against United, based on the policies set forth in Title VII and FEHA. 

Am. Compl. ¶ 63. Although employment in California is generally at-will, California courts allow 

wrongful termination claims—often referred to as Tameny claims—on the condition that the claim 

―find[s] support in an important public policy based on a statutory or constitutional provision.‖ 

Green v. Ralee Eng’g Co., 19 Cal. 4th 66, 79 (1998). A plaintiff may base a California wrongful 

termination claim on the public policy set forth in Title VII, yet still maintain it as a distinct state 

law claim. See Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 345 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that such a 

claim does not give rise to federal subject matter jurisdiction so long as it is based at least in part 

on a state statute or constitution).5 The prohibition of sexual abuse and gender discrimination in 

the workplace, recognized in both state and federal law, is an important public policy. For 

substantially the same reasons discussed above in the context of Harris‘s Title VII claims, the 

Court finds her Amended Complaint adequate to state a common law wrongful termination claim 

as well, and declines to dismiss this claim.

 

5 Here, Harris has explicitly asserted several claims under federal law, specifically Title VII, and 

the Court therefore has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court has 

supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Rains—a case in 

which the plaintiff did not bring a claim directly under Title VII—is cited here only to illustrate 

that a common law wrongful termination claim based on the policies of Title VII can be 

maintained separately from a direct Title VII claim.

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G. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The tenth claim of the Amended Complaint asserts intentional infliction of emotional 

distress against both United and Thomas.

The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 

distress are: ―(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant 

with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability 

of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff‘s suffering severe or 

extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation 

of the emotional distress by the defendant‘s outrageous conduct 

. . . . Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all 

bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.‖ The 

defendant must have engaged in ―conduct intended to inflict injury 

or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.‖

It is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous. It 

must be conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of 

a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.

Chistensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (1991) (quoting Davidson v. City of 

Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 209−10 (1982)) (citations and second-level internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Taking the allegations of the Amended Complaint as true, physically restraining and raping 

a subordinate employee certainly meets the threshold of outrageous conduct ―so extreme as to 

exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.‖ See id.; see also Am. 

Compl. ¶ 17. Harris alleges that the rape left her in ―a state of disbelief and shock,‖ Am. Compl. 

¶ 17, and that she ultimately needed to see a therapist who ―placed [her] on disability largely 

because of her experience with Thomas,‖ id. ¶ 21. These allegations are sufficient to support a 

claim that Harris suffered ―severe or extreme emotional distress.‖ Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 903. 

The Court is also satisfied that Harris has alleged conduct ―directed at‖ her, and finds it reasonable 

to infer—again, taking Harris‘s allegations as true—that Thomas knew or should have known that 

his conduct would cause emotional distress. The Court therefore declines to dismiss this claim.

H. Assault and Battery

Harris‘s final claim is for common law ―assault and battery,‖ against Thomas. Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 70−73. Under California law, ―battery is any intentional, unlawful and harmful contact 

by one person with the person of another. A harmful contact, intentionally done is the essence of a 

battery. A contact is  ̳unlawful‘ if it is unconsented to.‖ Ashcraft v. King, 228 Cal. App. 3d 604, 

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611 (1991) (citations omitted). Harris alleges, with specific factual detail, that Thomas restrained 

her by the arm and raped her. Am. Compl. ¶ 17. The Court declines to dismiss this claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court declines to dismiss Harris‘s Amended Complaint 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), except that Harris‘s FEHA claims (claims five through eight) are 

DISMISSED for failure to adequately allege compliance with California‘s administrative 

exhaustion requirement. 

If Harris wishes to pursue those claims, she may file a second amended complaint no later 

than December 14, 2015. A second amended complaint must include the caption and civil case 

number used in this Order (15–cv–02510–JCS) and the words SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces the previous 

complaint, any amended complaint must include all the claims Harris wishes to present and all of 

the defendants she wishes to sue. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any amended complaint may not 

incorporate material from the prior complaint by reference and must address the deficiencies 

discussed above. Alternatively, if Harris declines to pursue her FEHA claims, she need not file a 

second amended complaint and may proceed on her Title VII and common law claims, and the 

Court will instruct the United States Marshal to serve process on Defendants. 

Harris, who is not represented by counsel, is encouraged to consult with the Federal Pro 

Bono Project‘s Legal Help Center in either of the Oakland or San Francisco federal courthouses 

for assistance. The San Francisco Legal Help Center office is located in Room 2796 on the 15th 

floor at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94102. The Oakland office is located in 

Room 470–S on the 4th floor at 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, CA 94612. Appointments can be 

made by calling (415) 782–8982 or signing up in the appointment book located outside either 

office. Lawyers at the Legal Help Center can provide basic assistance to parties representing 

themselves but cannot provide legal representation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 12, 2015 ______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

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