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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 21, 2014 Decided April 15, 2014

No. 12-5412

COMMON CAUSE, ON ITS OWN BEHALF AND BEHALF OF ITS

MEMBERS, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cv-00775)

Emmet J. Bondurant II argued the cause for appellants. 

With him on the briefs was Stephen Spaulding.

Thomas E. Caballero, Assistant Senate Legal Counsel,

Office of Senate Legal Counsel, argued the cause for appellees. 

With him on the brief were Morgan J. Frankel, Senate Legal

Counsel, Patricia Mack Bryan, Deputy Senate Legal Counsel,

and Grant R. Vinik, Assistant Senate Legal Counsel.

Before: HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: A bill that would have

become the “DISCLOSE” Act and a bill that would have

become the “DREAM” Act never became law. Both bills passed

the House of Representatives during the 111th Congress and

then stalled in the Senate. See generally H.R. 5281, 111th Cong.

(2d Sess., 2010) (DREAM bill); H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2d

Sess., 2010) (DISCLOSE bill). The Senate never put either to a

vote. Both fell to a filibuster. According to the plaintiffs, the

Senate rule governing filibusters is unconstitutional.

The mechanics of a filibuster are these. Senators are entitled

to debate any bill indefinitely unless the Senate passes a motion,

known as a “cloture” motion, to end debate and proceed to a

vote on the bill. See WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH

SERV., CLOTURE:ITS EFFECT ON SENATE PROCEEDINGS (2008).

The Senate typically operates by majority rule. But under Senate

Rule XXII, invoking cloture requires a three-fifths majority of

all Senators—sixty votes. See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE,

S. DOC. 113-18, R. XXII § 2, at 15-17 (2013). In other words,

even when a majority of Senators support a bill, a minority of

Senators can put off a vote indefinitely. 

Historically, a Senator determined to prevent a vote on a

measure he opposed would stand and speak for hours on end.

Unless he yielded the floor, the Senate could not move forward.

Modern filibusters are less physically demanding. Due to a

change in the Senate’s legislative procedure, filibustering no

longer requires that a Senator “actually stand before the chamber

speaking.” Tonja Jacobi & Jeff VanDam, The Filibuster and

Reconciliation: The Future of Majoritarian Lawmaking in the

U.S. Senate, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 261, 277-78 (2013). About

forty years ago, the Senate began to conduct its legislative

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business on parallel “tracks.” See Josh Chafetz, The

Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003,

1010 (2011). As a result, the defeat of a cloture motion allows

the Senate to take up other business while the “filibuster”

remains, in a technical sense, ongoing.1 Id.

The DREAM and DISCLOSE bills foundered on this

modern version of the filibuster. The Senate considered cloture

motions on both bills. Although the motions garnered the votes

of a majority of Senators, neither motion achieved the sixty

votes necessary to cut off debate. See 156 CONG. REC. S10,665

(daily ed. Dec. 18, 2010) (defeating cloture, 41-55, on the

House-passed DREAM bill); 156 CONG. REC. S7388 (daily ed.

Sept. 23, 2010) (defeating cloture, 39-59, on the Senate version

of the DISCLOSE bill after the House passed a similar bill).

After the failed cloture votes, the Senate turned to other business. 

The plaintiffs in this case are House members who voted for

the DREAM and DISCLOSE bills, individuals who would have

benefitted from the DREAM Act, and an association, Common

Cause, that supported passage of the DISCLOSE Act. We shall

refer to the plaintiffs collectively as Common Cause. They

brought suit in the district court in May 2012 against the Vice

President and three Senate officers. Their complaint alleged that

the effect of Rule XXII is to require sixty votes to get legislation

through the Senate, that the rule prevents the passage of

legislation that has the support of a majority of both houses of

Congress, and that the rule therefore violates the Constitutional

principle of majority rule. They asked the court to strike the

1

 Making filibusters easier has made them more frequent. Today 

the mere threat of a filibuster may be “enough to convince the

majority leader to devote the Senate’s time to other matters.” RICHARD

S. BETH & VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,

FILIBUSTERS AND CLOTURE IN THE SENATE 23 (2013).

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sixty-vote requirement from Rule XXII and replace it with a

majority-rule requirement.2

The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of

jurisdiction. Common Cause v. Biden, 909 F. Supp. 2d 9, 17-27

(D.D.C. 2012). The court ruled that none of the plaintiffs—

neither the Congressmen, the individuals, nor the association—

had suffered a cognizable injury. See id. at 18-20 (procedural

injury), 21-22 (substantive injury), 23-26 (vote nullification). It

found that the plaintiffs could not satisfy the causation and

redressability prongs of standing, because there was no

guarantee the bills would have passed but for Rule XXII and

because nothing the court could do would provide effective

relief. Id. at 22-23. The court also determined that the suit

presented a nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 27-31. 

We agree with the district court that Common Cause lacks

standing, but for a different reason. Our analysis focuses on

whom Common Cause chose to sue—or, more to the point, not

to sue. 

The Senate has the power to “determine the Rules of its

Proceedings.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. Accordingly, it was the

Senate that adopted the cloture rule in 1917, see Catherine Fisk

& Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181,

195 (1997); it was the Senate that amended the rule thereafter,

2

 This is not the first constitutional challenge to the filibuster. No

court has reached the merits of the dispute. See, e.g., Judicial Watch,

Inc. v. U.S. Senate, 432 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (dismissing for lack

of standing); Patterson v. U.S. Senate, No. 13-2311 (N.D. Cal. Mar.

31, 2014) (same); Page v. Shelby, 995 F. Supp. 23 (D.D.C. 1998)

(same). But the filibuster remains a topic of scholarly debate. See, e.g.,

Josh Chafetz & Michael J. Gerhardt, Debate, Is the Filibuster

Constitutional?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 245 (2010).

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see id. at 209-13; and it was the Senate that failed to invoke

cloture on the DREAM and DISCLOSE bills. If “we assume for

purposes of standing that [Common Cause] will ultimately

receive the relief sought,” Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94

F.3d 658, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), it will be the Senate

that has to conduct its legislative business according to a courtordered change in its rule. 

Yet the complaint named neither the Senate nor a Senator.3

It is apparent why. See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 11, Common Cause v.

Biden, No. 12-5412 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2014). The Constitution’s

Speech or Debate Clause provides that “for any Speech or

Debate in either House,” Senators and Representatives “shall not

be questioned in any other Place.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 6. The

Clause confers immunity for any act that falls “within the sphere

of legitimate legislative activity.” Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s

3

 Citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979), Common

Cause argues that no matter who the defendants are, the Senate will be

bound by the result of this lawsuit because it “has undertaken and is

controlling the defense” on behalf of the Senate officers sued. Reply

Br. of Appellants 1 n.2. We seriously doubt whether Montana—a case

about collateral estoppel—supports Common Cause’s position. But

even if it did, the argument has at least two fatal flaws. First, it appears

only in Common Cause’s reply brief and is forfeit. See Newspaper

Ass’n of Am. v. Postal Regulatory Comm’n, 734 F.3d 1208, 1212

(D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that we do not consider

arguments raised only in a reply brief.”). Second, there is no reason to

think Common Cause’s ipse dixit—that the Senate is “controlling” the

defense—is true. Senate Resolution 485, cited by Common Cause,

simply authorizes Senate Counsel “to represent” the defendants in this

lawsuit. S. Res. 485, 112th Cong. (2012). We doubt the Senate’s

involvement extended any further. Indeed we doubt Senate Counsel

would have allowed it to. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.

1.8(f) (barring interference with the client-lawyer relationship by a

third party who pays for the representation).

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Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975); see alsoKilbourn v. Thompson,

103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880) (the Clause covers all “things

generally done in a session of the House [or Senate] by one of

its members in relation to the business before it”). And it

protects not only elected legislators but their aides, to whom

legislative work is delegated. See Gravel v. United States, 408

U.S. 606, 616-18 (1972). That is, the Clause covers aides when

their conduct “would be a protected legislative act if performed

by the Member himself.” Id. at 618.

When the Clause applies, it is an absolute bar to suit. See

Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503. The right not to be “questioned in any

other Place,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, means that lawmakers are

protected “not only from the consequences of litigation’s results

but also from the burden of defending themselves.” Dombrowski

v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967).

What defeated the DREAM and DISCLOSE bills was

legislative action, activity typically considered at the heart of the

Speech or Debate Clause. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S.

306, 311-12 (1973). Yet Common Cause, in objecting to the

Senate rule dealing with how Senators “Debate” legislation,

named as defendants only the Vice President, in his capacity as

President of the Senate, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; the Secretary

of the Senate; the Parliamentarian of the Senate; and the

Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate. Relying on the Supreme

Court’s Speech or Debate Clause decisions, the defendants

mount an argument that the Clause protects them from suit, just

as it does Senators and their aides.4 Whether they are right is

4

 For instance, the Constitution designates the Vice President

“President of the Senate.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. As such, he has “no

Vote, unless [the Senate] be equally divided.” Id. When “the Vice

President is fulfilling his duties under Article I to preside over the

Senate and break ties,” he might “be considered part of the legislative

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unnecessary for us to decide. In suing only non-Senators,

Common Cause is “Hoist with [its] own petar.” WILLIAM

SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc. 4.

To invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a plaintiff

must allege (1) a concrete injury (2) caused by the defendant

(3) that a favorable judicial decision will redress. See, e.g.,

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146-47 (2013).

The causation element requires that a proper defendant be sued.

See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &

PROCEDURE § 3531.5 (3d ed. 2013); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare

Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976). That is, a plaintiff’s

claimed injury must have been caused by “acts of the defendant,

not of some absent third party.” Fla. Audubon Society, 94 F.3d

at 663.

The defendants argue that the Senate, acting through its

voting Members, caused the injuries alleged in the complaint. In

response, Common Cause cites Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.

486 (1969), for the proposition that it may challenge the cloture

rule by suing the Senate officers responsible for “implementing”

it, even if it cannot sue the legislators who created it. Reply Br.

of Appellants 15 (emphasis omitted). The analogy to Powell

does not hold up. After the House of Representatives voted to

branch and fall within the ambit of the Speech or Debate Clause.” Roy

E. Brownell II, Vice Presidential Secrecy: A Study in Comparative

Constitutional Privilege and Historical Development, 84 ST. JOHN’S

L. REV. 423, 579 (2010) (footnote omitted); see also Memorandum

from Robert G. Dixon Jr., Ass’t Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Re: Amenability of the President, Vice President

and Other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal Prosecution While in

Office, at 36 (Sept. 24, 1973) (“With respect to his responsibility as tie

breaker his immunity . . . should be analogized to that of Members of

Congress under Article I, section 6 . . ..”). 

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exclude Adam Clayton Powell, Powell sued the Speaker of the

House, five Members of the House, the Clerk of the House, the

Sergeant at Arms, and the House Doorkeeper for “refus[ing] to

pay Powell his salary” and “threaten[ing] to deny Powell

admission to the House chamber.” Powell, 395 U.S. at 493. The

Court concluded that Powell could sue the House officers “for

their acts” in implementing the House resolution. Id. at 505.

The causal connection between the named officers and the

specific injuries alleged was obvious.

Here, Common Cause does not identify anything the

defendants did (or refrained from doing) to cause its alleged

injuries. The Senate established the cloture rule and the Senators

voting against cloture doomed the DREAM and DISCLOSE

bills. It is hard to imagine how any of the defendants bore

responsibility for that outcome. Consider, for instance, the

defendant Senate Parliamentarian. If he enforced or executed

Senate rules, then perhaps he could be held to account if the rule

were unconstitutional. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 503-06. But the

Parliamentarian’s role is “purely advisory.” Chafetz, supra, at

1036. Rulings on Senate procedure are the purview of the

Senate’s presiding officer. Id. at 1036-37. And Senate Rule XX

makes the rulings of the presiding officer appealable to the full

chamber.5 See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE,supra, R. XX.

5

 That opportunity to appeal constituted the so-called “nuclear

option” the Senate invoked to modify the cloture rule as applied to

executive branch and lower federal court nominees. See generally

Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the

Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013). On November 21, 2013, the

Senate considered, and defeated, a cloture motion on a nomination to

a judgeship on this court. Senator Reid, the majority leader, then

raised a point of order to the Chair, positing that a cloture vote for

such nominations required only a majority. The Chair rejected the

point of order under Rule XXII. Senator Reid then appealed the ruling

to the full Senate, and, by a 52-48 vote, the Chair’s ruling was

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Thus the Vice President is an improper defendant, too, even

though he may preside over Senate proceedings. In any event,

the Vice President did not preside over the cloture votes on the

DREAM and DISCLOSE bills.

In short, Common Cause’s alleged injury was caused not by

any of the defendants, but by an “absent third party”—the

Senate itself. Fla. Audubon Society, 94 F.3d at 663. We

therefore lack jurisdiction to decide the case.

The judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

overturned. Thus was set new Senate precedent interpreting Rule XXII

in the context of executive branch and lower federal court

nominations. See 159 CONG.REC. S8417-18 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013).

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