Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00010/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00010-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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FILED' 

AUG 31 2012 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CASE NO. 05cvOOlO WQH (JMA) 

Petitioner, 

WILLARD JAMES HALL, 

ORDER 

vs. 

F.W. HAWS, Warden, 

Respondent. 

HAYES, Judge: 

The matter before the Court is the Supplemental Motion for Relief from Judgment 

under Rule 60(b) filed by Petitioner Willard James Hall. (ECF No. 51). 

BACKGROUND 

On June 7, 2001, Petitioner Hall and his co-defendant Ronnie Sherrors were convicted 

ofmurder in California Superior Court. On September 28, 2001, the trial court sentenced both 

Hall and Sherrors to life without the possibility ofparole. On July 16,2003, the appeals filed 

by Hall and Sherrors were denied by the California Court ofAppeal. On October 1, 2003, the 

appeals were denied by the California Supreme Court. 

On January 3, 2005, Hall, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ ofhabeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court challenging his June 7, 2001 conviction in 

California Superior Court. (ECF No.1). On March 15, 2005, Hall filed an Amended Petition 

claiming that the trial court committed constitutional error by: (I) improperly modifying 

California Jury Instruction ("CALJIC") No. 2.15; (2) improperly modifying CALJIC No. 

8.81.17; and (3) presenting the jury with incomplete verdict forms. (ECF No.5 at 6-9). 

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On June 15, 2005, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Hall had 

failed to exhaust state remedies as to his claim regarding CALJIC No. 8.81.17. (ECF No.9). 

On August 11, 2005, Hall filed a Motion for Stay and Abeyance, requesting that the Court stay 

his case so that he could present his unexhausted claim in state court. (ECF No. 15). On 

September 16, 2005, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation 

recommending that this Court deny the Motion for Stay and Abeyance on the grounds that Hall 

had failed to demonstrate good cause for failing to exhaust his second claim. (ECF No. 16, 

citing Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269,277, 125 S.Ct. 1528, 1528 (2005)). No objections were 

filed to the Report and Recommendation. On January 24,2006, this Court adopted the Report 

and Recommendation in its entirety and informed Hall of his options to either "voluntarily 

dismiss his entire federal petition and return to state court to exhaust his unexhausted claims," 

or "formally abandon his unexhausted claim and proceed with his exhausted claims," including 

the exhausted claim regarding CALJIC No. 2.15. (ECF No. 17 at 3-4). The COll;rt stated: "If 

Petitioner [Hall] chooses this second option, he must file a pleading entitled 'Formal 

Abandonment of Un exhausted Claim' with this Court no later than 30 days after the District 

Judge issues his decision." Id. 

On February 28,2006, Hall filed an "Application for Extension ofTime to File Motion 

to Fonnally Abandon Unexhausted Claim," indicating his intention to abandon the 

unexhausted second claim and proceed with his remaining exhausted claims, including the 

claim regarding CALJIC No. 2.15. (ECF No. 18 at 1). On March 27,2006, the Magistrate 

Judge granted Hall's request for additional time and ordered that "Petitioner [Hall] shall have 

until April 24, 2006 to file his 'Formal Abandonment ofUn exhausted Claim.'" (ECF No. 19 

at 3). Hall failed to file a formal abandonment of unexhausted claim or any other filing in 

response to the Court's Order. 

On May 19,2006, this Court issued an Order finding that "Petitioner [Hall] has filed 

a mixed Petition, has been given two options, but has failed to proceed under either option 

given by [the] Court." (ECF No. 20 at 2-3). The Court ordered that Hall's petition for habeas 

corpus be dismissed "without prejudice." Id. at 4. On May 21,2006, the Clerk of the Court 

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entered Judgment dismissing Hall's petition without prejudice. (ECF No. 21). 

On June 20, 2005, Hall's co-defendant, Ronnie Sherrors, filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 2254 in this Court challenging his June 7, 2001 

conviction. (Case No. 05cvI262-IEG-LSP; ECF No.1). Sherrors' petition asserted the same 

claim regarding CALJIC No. 2.15 that was asserted in Hall's petition. (Case No. 05cv1262; 

ECF No.1 at 14). On May 24, 2007, the Magistrate Judge in Sherrors' case issued a Report 

and Recommendation recommending that this Court conditionally grant Sherrors' petition on 

the grounds that the trial court's use ofCALJIC No. 2.15 constituted prejudicial constitutional 

error. (Case No. 05cv1262; ECF No.45). On November 2,2007, United States DistrictJudge 

Irma E. Gonzalez adopted the Report and Recommendation, "conditionally granting the writ 

unless the State decides to retry [Sherrors] within a reasonable time." (Case No. 05cv1262; 

ECF No. 56 at 12). On November 15,2007, Respondent appealed the November 2,2007 

Order to the Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit. (Case No. 05cv1262; ECF No. 58; Ninth 

Circuit Case No. 07-56756). 

On May 18,2009, Hall filed a "Motion to Join the Case of Co-Defendant" (ECF No. 

26), which the Court treated as a motion to reopen Hall's petition and proceed on the exhausted 

first and third claims for relief. (ECF No. 27). Hall stated that the circumstances ofhis case 

"mirror that of Sherrors from arraignment until they split in federal habeas petitions .... 

Petitioner [Hall] suffered the exact same damning testimony, the exact same sentence and their 

appeals throughout the state courts (laying the foundation for the federal claims) were and are 

exactly the same .... " (ECF No. 26 at 17). Hall alleged that his due process rights were violated 

by the trial court's use ofCALJIC 2.15 and requested "relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 parallel 

to that ofhis co-defendant Sherrors." [d. at 18. 

On October 9,2009, the Court denied the motion "without prejudice to refile ... once 

the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issues a final decision in Sherrors' habeas case." 

(ECF No. 33 at 6). The Court stated: 

Petitioner's "Motion to Join Case of Co-Defendant" is based solely on the 

conditional grant ofhabeas reliefto his co-defendant, Sherrors. This Court makes 

no ruling at this time as to whether the granting of conditional habeas relief to 

Sherrors constitutes "extraordinary circumstances" sufficient to warrant relief 

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pursuant to Rule 60(b)( 6). The Court finds that consideration of the matter is 

premature while Sherrors' habeas case remains on appeal. 

Id. The Court ordered Respondent "to file in this action and serve on Petitioner [Hall] a copy 

of any final decision issued by the Ninth Circuit in Sherrors' habeas case" and stated that 

"Petitioner [Hall] may refile his motion to reopen this case no later than sixty (60) days after 

he is served with a copy ofthe Ninth Circuit's fmal decision in Sherrors' habeas case." Id. 

On March 31, 2011, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the November 2, 2007 decision ofthis 

Court granting Sherrors a conditional writ of habeas corpus on the claim regarding CALJIC 

2.15. Respondent represents to the Court that "Sherrors has been returned to San Diego 

County for retrial, has been appointed a lawyer, and has a trial date ofJanuary 2013." (ECF 

No. 51 at 6). On August 31,2011, Respondent filed in this action and served on Hall a copy 

of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sherrors' case. (ECF No. 39). 

On October 27,2011, Hall mailed the Court a "Motion to Join Case ofCo-Defendant" 

and "Motion to Re-Open Case." (ECF No. 41). In his motion, Hall states that, after this Court 

issued the Judgment dismissing Hall's petition, Sherrors "continued to advise Petitioner via 

intermittent third-party communications that he was filing 'Writs and Motions' with 

Petitioner's name included as a co-submission". Id. at 3. Hall states that, "due to the 

intermittent third-party communications Petitioner received from Sherrors, that he was 

included in Sherrors' Writs and Motions, Petitioner had good faith reason to believe his 

interests were included in any outcome of [Sherrors' case]." Id. at 4. Hall states that 

"throughout the state courts [process,] counsel for both co-defendants used this language of 

joinder to ensure that both defendants benefitted from any success through their appeals ... [and 

that] Petitioner relied on Sherrors to continue to include his name as a co-submitter." Id. Hall 

states that, "[c ]onsidering the Ninth Circuit's affirmation of the district court's reversal of 

Sherrors' [ conviction], Petitioner's joint conviction is a gross miscarriage ofjustice." Id. at 

6. On December 20,2011, Respondent filed an opposition. (ECF No. 47). 

On May 22, 2012, the Court found that "the appointment of counsel is appropriate in 

this matter, as a denial ofPetitioner [Hall]' s motion under Rule 60(b) may raise significant due 

process issues." (ECF No. 49 at 5). On June 22, 2012, Hall, with the assistance ofappointed 

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counsel, filed a supplemental Motion for Relief under Rule 60(b). (ECF No. 50). On July 9, 

2012, Respondent filed an opposition. (ECF No. 51). On July 13,2012, Hall filed a reply. 

(ECF No. 52). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Timeliness of the Rule 60(b) Motion 

The Court's dismissal ofHall's petition for failure to exhaust state remedies and failure 

to respond to the Court's Order "terminated the litigation." Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 

1241 (9th Cir. 1999). Judgment has been entered in the case, and subsequent motions "can 

only be entertained ifthe judgment is first reopened under a motion brought under [Federal] 

Rule [ofCivil Procedure] 59 or 60."1 Lindauerv. Rogers, 91 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1996). 

A motion pursuant to Rule 59 must be filed no later than ten days after the entry ofjudgment 

and a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) subsections (1), (2), and (3) must be filed within one year 

of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(c)(l). Rules 59 and 60(b)(l), (2) and (3) are not 

available to Hall because his first "Motion to Join Case of Co-Defendant" was tiled almost 

three years after Judgment was entered in this case. 

Rule 60(b)( 6) entitles the moving party to relief from judgment for "any other reason 

that justifies relief," and such a motion must be filed "within a reasonable time ... after the 

entry ofthe judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), (c)(1). "What constitutes reasonable time 

depends on the facts of each case." u.s. v. Holtzman, 762 F .2d 720, 725 (9th Cir. 1985). 

"The facts are analyzed to determine whether the government was prejudiced by the delay ... 

and whether [the party seeking relief] had a good reason for failing to take the action 

sooner .... " Id. (citations omitted) (finding a five year delay reasonable in light ofdefendant's 

misreading ofthe court's order and a lack ofprejudice to the government). The Court should 

also be "mindful ofthe strong policy in favor of finality." Id. 

In this case, prejudice to the government is minimal because the government has 

IFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) entitles the moving party to relief from judgment for the 

following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; 

(3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct ofan adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has 

been satisfied, released, or discharged, or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; (6) any other reason 

justifying relief from the operation ofthe judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 

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scheduled a retrial of Hall's co-defendant, whose habeas claim regarding CALJIC 2.15 was 

favorably ruled upon by this Court and affmned by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and 

whose trial is identical to that of Hall. The government will not be prejudiced by litigating 

potentially meritorious claims in Hall's habeas petition when a retrial of the underlying case 

is already scheduled in state court. 

Regarding "good reason for failing to take the action sooner," Hall expected that his 

federal habeas claims were being advanced by co-submission in Sherror's case after Hall's 

case was dismissed. Holtzman, 762 F.2d at 725. This expectation was based on third-party 

communications with Sherrors and a history ofjointly filed habeas petitions in state court. Hall 

did not have the benefit of counsel to assist in this case prior to 2012, and he believed that his 

filings could be re-filed without prejudice based on the Court's previous orders using that 

language. The Court finds that Hall's delay in filing his first motion for relief under Rule 60(b) 

was reasonable in light ofthe facts ofthis case. The Court finds that Hall's motion for relief 

occurred within a reasonable time after entry of the final judgment. 

II. The Rule 60(b) Motion is Not a Successive Habeas Petition 

Rule 60(b), regarding relief from judgment, applies in habeas proceedings to the extent 

that the rule is not inconsistent with applicable federal statutes such as the Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act ("'AEDPA"). 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 Rule 11; Gonzalez v. Crosby, 

545 U.S. 524, 529-30 (2005). Under the AEDPA, substantive claims presented in a second or 

successive habeas petition which were presented in the prior petition must be dismissed, 

barring specific exceptions. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b). The AEDPA dictates "that the only new 

law on which a successive petition may rely is 'a new rule of constitutional law, made 

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 

unavailable.'" Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531-32. The United States Supreme Court has cautioned 

that a Rule 60(b) motion based on a purported change in the substantive law governing the 

claim could be used to circumvent this dictate. Id. "Such a pleading, although labeled a Rule 

60(b) motion, is in substance a successive habeas petition and should be treated accordingly." 

Id. at 531. Similarly, "a Rule 60(b) motion that seeks to revisit the federal court's denial on 

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the merits of a claim for relief should be treated as a successive habeas petition." Id. at 534 

(emphasis in original). 

However, "a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in a § 2254 case is not to be treated as a successive 

habeas petition if it does not assert, or reassert, claims of error in the movant's state 

conviction." Id. at 538. ··Ru1e 60(b) motions in § 2254 cases, [that confine themselves] not 

only to the first federal habeas petition, but to a nonmerits aspect of the first federal habeas 

proceeding" are not construed as a successive habeas petition and may be addressed as a Rule 

60(b) motion without conflict with federal statutes. Id.; see Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F 3d 1120 

(9th Cir. 2009) (finding that a Rule 60(b) motion does not amount to a second or successive 

petition, and is an appropriate means to challenge a judgment, when the challenge is based on 

intervening change in law that applies to the petitioner's federal habeas petition). "When a 

district court dismisses with prejudice a petition for writ ofhabeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 without reaching the merits of the claims raised therein, the petitioner may seek relief 

from judgment through a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), because such 

a motion is not the equivalent of a second or successive petition under [AEDPA]." Butz v. 

Mendoza-Powers, 474 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 2007)(fmding that, where "the district court 

dismisses the petition for failure ... to comply with the court's orders, the district court does not 

thereby reach the 'merits' of the claims presented in the petition and a Rule 60(b) motion 

challenging the dismissal is not treated as a second or successive petition.") 

The Court dismissed Hall's petition because Hall had failed to exhaust one ofhis claims 

and failed to proceed with his petition under one ofthe options set forth by the Court. To the 

extent that the petition was dismissed for failure to respond to the Court's Order, a dismissal 

on such procedural grounds does not render Hall's subsequent Rule 60(b) motion a successive 

petition. See Butz, 474 F.3d at 1194. Hall's Rule 60(b) motion "does not assert, or reassert, 

claims of error in the movant's state conviction," but contends that Hall is entitled to relief 

from judgment because of an intervening change of law and a reasonable misunderstanding 

regarding the representation ofHall's claims in his co-defendants petition. Gonzalez} 545 U.S. 

at 538. The Court dismissed Hall's petition without prejudice and without reaching the merits 

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ofany claim. The Court does not construe Hall's Rule 60(b) motion as a second or successive 

habeas petition. The Court construes the motion as proper under Rule 60(b) to re-open the case 

and proceed on the exhausted claims for relief. 

III. Relief Under Rule 60(b)( 6) 

"Rule 60(b)(6) is a grand reservoir of equitable power, and it affords courts the 

discretion and power to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish 

justice." Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1135. "[T]he exercise ofa court's ample equitable power under 

Rule 60(b)( 6) to reconsider its judgment requires a showing ofextraordinary circumstances." 

Id., see also Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 542 ("a movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) [must] 

show 'extraordinary circumstances' justifYing the reopening of a fmal judgment."). "[T]he 

decision to grant Rule 60(b)( 6) relief must be measured by the incessant command of the 

court's conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts." Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1141 

(quotations omitted). 

"[C]ourts applying Rule 60(b)(6) to petitions for habeas corpus have considered a 

number of factors in deciding whether a prior judgment should be set aside or altered," 

including: (1) whether there was an intervening change in law; (2) the extent and nature ofthe 

change in the law; (3) whether the petitioner was proceeding diligently; (4) the delay between 

judgment and the motion for 60(b) relief; (5) whether reliefwould disturb the parties' reliance 

interest in the finality ofjudgment; and (6) interests of comity. I d at 1135-40. These factors 

are not a "mechanical list of considerations" and do not "impose a rigid or exhaustive 

checklist," but are "principles that should guide courts in exercising their discretion under Rule 

60(b)(6)." Id at 1135, 1140. 

After Hall and Sherror's conviction for murder, but before the California Court of 

Appeal decided their direct appeal, the California Supreme Court held that the jury instruction 

CALJIC 2.15 should not be used in the context ofnon-theft cases such as murder. In deciding 

Hall and Sherrors' appeal, the California Court ofAppeals recognized that the trial court erred 

in instructing the jury with CALJIC 2.15. However, the Court ofAppeals failed to recognize 

that this instructional error was of constitutional magnitude and instead applied a 

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nonconstitutional standard to detennine that the instructional error was hannless. According 

to the Ninth Circuit, this constituted an unreasonable application of clearly-established 

Supreme Court law. (See the Ninth Circuit Memorandum affinning the conditional grant of 

Sherrors' petition at ECF No. 39-1). This intervening change in law, triggered by the Ninth 

Circuit decision in Sherrors' case, is directly relevant to Hall's case because the underlying 

facts and circumstances of the two cases are identical and the underlying trial was the same. 

The United States Supreme Court in Gonzalez emphasized the importance of a 

petitioner's diligence in detennining whether to grant equitable relief under Rule 60(b)( 6). 

Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 537-38 (finding that "[t]he change in law ... is all the less extraordinary 

in petitioner's case, because ofhis lack ofdiligence in pursuing review ofthe... issue"). After 

his petition in federal court was dismissed, Hall stated that he relied on third-party assurances 

from his co-defendant that his claims were still being represented in federal habeas 

proceedings. After filing his first motion to reopen the case, Hall was instructed to await a 

ruling from the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals in Sherrors' case before renewing the motion. 

Hall proceeded as instructed and renewed his motion to re-open the case upon receipt of the 

Ninth Circuit's favorable ruling in Sherrors' case. The Court fmds that the delay between 

dismissal ofHall's petition and the filing ofhis motion to re-open was reasonable and that Hall 

has proceeded diligently in pursuing his habeas claims in federal court. 

There is a "strong public interest in timeliness and finality" ofjudgments. Phelps, 569 

F.3d at 1138, quoting Flores v. Arizona, 516 F.3d 1140, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008). In this case, the 

government's reliance on the fmality of the judgment issued in Hall's case is diminished 

because Hall's co-defendant was conditionally granted a writ of habeas corpus and is 

scheduled to be retried in state court next year. The government cannot reasonably argue 

reliance on the finality of Hall's judgment because there has been no finality for Hall's codefendant who has successfully proceeded through federal court asserting the same claims, 

based on the same facts and the same state court trial, as Hall, . A grant of Hall's motion for 

relief under Rule 60(b) would not disturb the parties' reliance interest in the finality of 

judgment in this case. 

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The Ninth Circuit has stated that "in the context of Rule 60(b)( 6), we need not be 

2 concerned about upsetting the comity principle when a petitioner seeks reconsideration not of 

3 a judgment on the merits of his habeas petition, but rather of an erroneous judgment that 

4 prevented the court from ever reaching the merits ofthat petition," Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1139 

(emphasis in original). In this case, the Court did not reach the merits ofHall's habeas petition 

6 and Hall seeks reliefunder Rule 60(b)(6) on the grounds that the Court's Order dismissing his 

7 case was erroneous. Consideration ofcomity between the sovereign state and federal judiciary 

8 is not a factor that weighs against Hall in seeking relief. 

9 CONCLUSION 

"[T]he decision to grant Rule 60(b)( 6) relief must be measured by the incessant 

11 command ofthe court's conscience that justice be done in light ofall the facts." Phelps, 569 

12 F.3d at 1141 (quotations omitted). The United States Supreme Court made clear in Gonzalez 

13 that the power embodied in Rule 60(b) is the power "to vacate judgments whenever such action 

14 is appropriate to accomplish justice." Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 542. The Court fmds that Hall 

has made a showing of "extraordinary circumstances" such that the Court's "exercise of... 

16 ample equitable power under Rule 60(b)( 6) to reconsider its judgment" is appropriate in this 

17 case. Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1135. 

18 The Supplemental Motion for Relief under Rule 60(b) filed by Petitioner Hall is 

19 GRANTED. (ECF No. 51). The Clerk of the Court is instructed to reopen this case so the 

parties may proceed on Petitioner Hall's exhausted first and third claims for relief. The case 

21 is referred to the Magistrate Judge for scheduling ofbriefing on the Petition for Writ ofHabeas 

22 Corpus (ECF No.5) consistent with this Order. 

23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Holly Sullivan shall remain as Petitioner Hall's 

24 appointed counsel for all matters in this case. 

26 DATED: 

27 

UNITED STATES TRICT COURT 

28 

WILLIAM Q. HAYES 

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