Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01764/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01764-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JOHN DAVID DUFF, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-1764 PHX PGR (MEA)

)

DORA B. SCHRIRO, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

On July 15, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Petitioner challenges the sentence imposed pursuant to his

criminal conviction by an Arizona state court. Respondents

filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”)

on January 31, 2007. Docket No. 11. Respondents assert

Petitioner’s habeas claims were not properly exhausted in the

Arizona state courts and are procedurally defaulted. Therefore,

Respondents argue, the petition must be denied and dismissed

with prejudice. Petitioner filed a traverse to the government’s

answer to the petition on February 14, 2007. See Docket No. 12.

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 The written plea agreement states:

The crime carries a presumptive sentence of 6

years; a minimum sentence of 4 years (na if trial

court makes exceptional circumstances finding);

and a maximum sentence of 8 years (na) if trial

court makes exceptional circumstances finding).

...)

Answer, Exh. A at 46. The government agreed in the written plea

agreement to dismiss an “allegation of A.R.S. Section 13-702.02.”

Id., Exh. A. This section provides:

A person who is convicted of two or more felony

offenses that were not committed on the same

occasion but that either are consolidated for

trial purposes or are not historical prior felony

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I Procedural History

On August 13, 2003, Petitioner was charged by

indictment with second-degree murder, committed on April 24,

2003, in docket number CR2003-018500. Answer, Exh. A. The

grand jury found in the indictment that the offense was a

dangerous felony because it involved the discharge, use, or

threatening exhibition of a handgun, deadly weapon or dangerous

instrument and the intentional or knowing infliction of serious

physical injury upon the victim. Id., Exh. A. On November 25,

2003, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Petitioner pled

guilty to a reduced count of negligent homicide, a class 4

dangerous felony, in docket number CR2003-018500. Id., Exh. A.

The plea agreement provided Petitioner would “be sentenced to a

term no less than the presumptive in this cause number.” Id.,

Exh. A at 46. The plea agreement further provided: “The

defendant’s total sentence in this case, [and] CR 2003-01393

[committed on April 14, 2003] and CR 2003-014034 [committed on

May 13, 2003] [both charging theft of a means of transportation]

shall not exceed 14 years.” Id., Exh. A at 46.1

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convictions as defined in § 13-604 shall be

sentenced, for the second or subsequent offense,

pursuant to this section.

B. A person sentenced pursuant to this section

shall not be eligible for suspension of sentence,

probation, pardon, or release from confinement on

any basis except as specifically authorized by §

31-233, subsection A or B until the sentence

imposed by the court has been served, the person

is eligible for release pursuant to § 41-1604.07

or the sentence is commuted. The presumptive term

for paragraphs 1 through 4 of this subsection may

be aggravated within the range under this section

pursuant to § 13-702, subsections B, C and D. The

presumptive term for paragraph 3 or 4 of this

subsection may be mitigated within the range

under this section pursuant to § 13-702,

subsections B, C and D. 

2

 The factual basis for the charge of negligent homicide

was:

[O]n April 24th [2003], Mr. Duff was threatened

by Thomas Woodard at his home--in his parents’

home in Scottsdale, Maricopa County, and he did

shoot at Mr. Woodard, and subsequently he died

from a gunshot to the head.

And he shot while Mr. Woodard was riding away on

a motorcycle....

Answer, Exh. B at 18. Petitioner’s counsel stated he would have

offered a defense of self-defense or justification, based on

Petitioner’s belief the victim possessed a gun, had the charge of

second-degree murder gone to trial, but that he believed there was a

factual basis for a plea of guilty to negligent homicide. Id., Exh.

B at 18-19. Police discovered the stolen motorcycles in Petitioner’s

possession in the course of investigating the shooting. Id., Exh. B.

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At a court hearing on November 25, 2003, Petitioner

entered a plea of guilty to the charge of negligent homicide.

Id., Exh. B. At that time the Arizona trial court also accepted

Petitioner’s guilty pleas with regard to docket numbers CR2003-

01393 and CR2003-014034, alleging the theft of a motorcycle and

possession of a different stolen motorcycle. Id., Exh. B at 9,

14, 20. Petitioner admitted the factual basis for guilt on all

three charges. Id., Exh. B at 17, 22.2

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3 The sentencing court stated:

I am not going to find at all that the use of a

gun is aggravating... I do think the nature of

the offense is aggravating. I think it is also

aggravating that he has the prior, if you will,

theft of means of transportation crime which

occurs the day before, I think, of the

homicide.... I think something more than six

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At the time Petitioner committed his crimes, Arizona

statutes provided the presumptive term of imprisonment for a

conviction for negligent homicide, a class 4 felony, was six

years, which could be aggravated by the sentencing court to a

maximum term of eight years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-

604(B) (2001 & Supp. 2006). The presumptive sentence for theft

of a means of transportation, a class 3 felony, was three and

one-half years in prison, and the minimum sentence for this

crime was two years in prison. Id. The range of sentencing

faced by Petitioner, as acknowledged by the sentencing court and

counsel at the time of sentencing, was from six years in prison

without probation to a total of 14 years in prison followed by

a term of probation. Answer, Exh. B at 23.

On January 22, 2004, after a sentencing hearing and

preparation of a presentence report, Petitioner was sentenced to

an aggravated term of seven years in prison pursuant to his

conviction for negligent homicide. See id., Exh. A. The

sentencing court imposed the aggravated sentence based on

Petitioner’s additional conviction for theft of a means of

transportation, which crime occurred prior to the date of the

homicide, and the recklessness of Petitioner’s conduct leading

to the shooting of the victim. Id., Exh. C.3 Petitioner was

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years is called for on the homicide, because, as

I say, I think--I think his conduct was reckless.

 Frankly, I was going to give him prison

sentences on both the theft of means crimes...

Answer, Exh. C at 95.

4 Counsel conceded:

The Court’s reference to a “prior” conviction for

Theft of Means of Transportation actually refers

to a conviction for a crime that was discovered

during the course of the murder investigation.

Duff pled to that case and the Court sentenced

him on that case on the same days as the present

case. Arguably the Court is authorized to find

this aggravating factor without benefit of a jury

trial.

Answer, Exh. E at 5.

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sentenced to a consecutive presumptive term of three and one

half years in prison pursuant to his conviction in CR 2003-

018500, for theft of a means of transportation. Id., Exh. C at

97. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of probation pursuant to

his conviction on the other charge of theft of a means of

transportation. Id., Exh. C at 96-98.

Petitioner filed a timely action seeking state postconviction relief on January 30, 2004. Id., Exh. D. Petitioner

was appointed counsel, who filed a brief on Petitioner’s behalf

on August 6, 2004, arguing Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights

were violated by his sentence for negligent homicide, citing

Blakely v. Washington. Id., Exh. E.4 The Arizona Superior Court

dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief on January 21,

2005. Id., Exh. F. In denying relief, the Arizona trial court

relied on the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision in Arizona v.

Martinez, 209 Ariz. 280, 100 P.3d 30 (2004). Id., Exh. F The

Arizona trial court noted Petitioner’s potential sentencing

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range for negligent homicide was “opened up” by the simultaneous

conviction for theft of a means of transportation, permitting

the trial court “to make a finding that the reckless nature of

the defendant’s crime was aggravating as well.” Id., Exh. F.

Petitioner sought review of the Superior Court’s

decision denying relief by the Arizona Court of Appeals, noting

other panels of the Arizona Court of Appeals had reached

decisions contrary to the holding in Martinez. Id., Exh. G.

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review in a

decision issued November 3, 2005. Id., Exh. H. 

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Supreme Court. Id., Exh. I. Petitioner asserted the

Court of Appeals’ decision in Martinez was wrong and that the

“prior” conviction relied upon by the sentencing court was not

a prior conviction as that term is defined by the relevant

Arizona statutes. Id., Exh. I. While Petitioner’s petition for

review was pending before the Arizona Supreme Court, that court

issued its opinion in Martinez, affirming the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision in that matter. See Arizona v. Martinez, 210

Ariz. 578, 115 P.3d 618 (2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S.

Ct. 762 (2005). Accordingly, on May 23, 2006, the Arizona

Supreme Court denied review of the Arizona Court of Appeals’

decision denying Petitioner post-conviction relief. Id., Exh.

J.

In his federal habeas petition Petitioner asserts his

sentence violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Petitioner

contends that, even if the conclusion in Martinez is “Blakely

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5

 The Arizona courts’ determination that Petitioner’s

simultaneous conviction for an act occurring prior to the date of the

act giving rise to the negligent homicide conviction was a “prior”

felony conviction, as that term is defined by state law, is binding

on this Court. See Powell v. Lambert, 357 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir.

2004); Chapman v. LeMaster, 302 F.3d 1189, 1196 (10th Cir. 2002). 

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compliant”, he was improperly sentenced because he “had no

historical prior convictions.” Docket No. 3.

II Analysis

The United States Supreme Court announced a new

constitutional rule regarding criminal procedure in Blakely v.

Washington on June 24, 2004. However, Petitioner’s conviction

became final prior to the date that the United States Supreme

Court issued the Blakely decision in June of 2004. Petitioner

was sentenced pursuant to his conviction for negligent homicide

on January 22, 2004. Petitioner waived his right to a direct

appeal of his conviction and sentence and, accordingly, his

conviction for negligent homicide became “final” on the date he

was sentenced.

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has conclusively

held the Supreme Court’s Blakely decision does not apply

retroactively to a state conviction which was final before the

date Blakely was issued, i.e., June 24, 2004. See Schardt v.

Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005), petition for cert.

filed, No. 05-9237 (Nov. 10, 2005). Because Petitioner’s

conviction was final prior to Blakely, he is not entitled to

resentencing based on this opinion.

The fact that Petitioner’s sentence was aggravated by

a “prior” conviction5 and that he admitted this conviction

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6

Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any

fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt. [] Here, only the existence of

a prior conviction is at issue, and Petitioner

has no federal right to have a jury decide that

question. .... The Constitution permits prior

convictions to be used to enhance a sentence,

without being submitted to a jury, so long as the

convictions were themselves obtained in

proceedings that required the right to a jury

trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 120 S. Ct. 2348 [].

There is no suggestion that Petitioner’s []

conviction was obtained without the requisite

procedural safeguards. Thus, we reject

Petitioner’s claim that his sentence violated

Apprendi. Davis v. Woodford, 446 F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 2006).

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removes his circumstance from the umbrella of both Apprendi and

Blakely.6 See Hughes v. Harrison, 129 Fed. App. 340, 341 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 130 (2005); Stevenson v. Lewis,

116 Fed. App. 814, 815 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Apprendi carved out a

“narrow exception” for sentence enhancements based on “the fact

of a prior conviction.”). Petitioner could properly be

sentenced to a term of seven years imprisonment for his

conviction on a class 4 felony based solely on facts admitted by

Petitioner, i.e., his simultaneous felony conviction for a crime

occurring prior to the date of the homicide. Petitioner

admitted in the written plea agreement and in open court at the

time of sentencing he had committed the crimes charged. At the

time Petitioner was sentenced, Arizona law provided for a

statutory maximum of 8 years imprisonment for an individual

convicted of a class 4 felony if the individual was previously

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convicted of a felony. Accordingly, Petitioner’s case is

excepted from the rule stated in Blakely, which does not apply

to a sentence aggravated by a “prior” felony conviction.

The state courts’ decision that Petitioner’s conviction

for theft of a means of transportation was a “prior” felony

conviction is an issue of state law not cognizable on habeas

review. See, e.g., Bueno v. Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir.

1993); Zaragoza v. Lamarque, 145 Fed. App. 572, 573 (9th Cir.

2005); Berry v. Morgan, 137 Fed. App. 952, 954 & n.2 (9th Cir.

2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1364 (2006).

III Conclusion

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits of

his Blakely claim because Blakely was decided after Petitioner’s

state conviction became final and Blakely has not been made

retroactive to cases on collateral review. Additionally,

Petitioner’s sentence was within the statutory maximum for his

crime and his sentence was predicated on a fact, i.e., his

“prior” conviction, admitted by Petitioner. Therefore,

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits of his

Blakely claim.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Duff’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

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appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 26th day of February, 2007.

 

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