Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-02112/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-02112-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONTAY HAYES,

CDC #K-88757,

Civil No. 04-2112 IEG (NLS)

Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT

GARCIA’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c)

AND TERMINATING CASE

[Doc. No. 61-1]

vs.

SILVIA GARCIA, Warden,

Defendant.

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Dontay Hayes (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Calipatria State

Prison (“CAL”), is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a Second Amended Complaint

(“SAC”) filed pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that CAL’s

Warden Silvia Garcia denied him all outdoor exercise from December 27, 2001, through

September 25, 2002, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (SAC at 4.) 

Currently pending before the Court is Defendant Garcia’s Motion for Summary Judgment

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 56 [Doc. No. 61]. 

/ / /

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1

 Klingele and Rand together require the district court “‘as a bare minimum, [to provide a pro

se prisoner] with fair notice of the requirements of the summary judgment rule.’” Klingele, 849 F.2d

at 411 (quoting Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1968)). “It would not be realistic to

impute to a prison inmate ... an instinctual awareness that the purpose of a motion for summary

judgment is to head off a full-scale trial by conducting a trial in miniature, on affidavits, so that not

submitting counter affidavits is the equivalent of not presenting any evidence at trial.” Jacobsen v.

Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation omitted). Actual knowledge or any

level of legal sophistication does not obviate the need for judicial explanation. Klingele, 849 F.2d at

411-12. Thus, the district court is required to “tell the prisoner about his ‘right to file counter-affidavits

or other responsive materials and [to][ alert[] [him] to the fact that his failure to so respond might result

in the entry of summary judgment against him.’” Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1365 n.8 (quoting Klingele, 849

F.2d at 411). 

2

 While this case was randomly referred to the Honorable Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for disposition, the Court has determined that a Report and

Recommendation regarding the disposition of Defendant Garcia’s pending Motion for Summary

Judgment is unnecessary. See S. D. CAL. CIVLR 72.3(a) (assigning “[a]ll of the District’s civil §1983

prisoner caseload” to the District’s magistrate judges for disposition either upon consent of all parties,

or in absence of unanimous written consent, “upon submission of proposed findings and

recommendations to the district judge, unless the district judge orders otherwise.”). 

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II.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Garcia moves for summary judgment on grounds that: (1) no genuine issues

of material fact exist to show she violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights; and (2) she is

entitled to qualified immunity. On September 15, 2006, the Court has advised Plaintiff of his

rights and obligations to oppose Garcia’s Motion pursuant to Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d

409 (9th Cir. 1988) and Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).1

 Plaintiff filed

his Opposition on October 19, 2006 [Doc. No. 70]. Moreover, Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint is verified under penalty of perjury. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460

(9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a complaint or motion duly verified under penalty of perjury

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 may be used as an opposing affidavit under FED.R.CIV.P. 56.).

Having now exercised its discretion to consider the matter as submitted on the papers

without oral argument pursuant to S.D. CAL. CIVLR 7.1.d.1, the Court hereby GRANTS

Defendant Garcia’s Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c) for the

reasons set forth in detail below.2 

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3

 The court may consider documents or exhibits “whose contents are alleged in a complaint and

whose authenticity no party questions.” Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled

on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002); Hal Roach

Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 (9th Cir. 1990). 

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III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that Warden Garcia deprived him of outdoor exercise from December 27,

2001 through September 25, 2002, in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from

cruel and unusual punishment. (Compl. at 3.)

In support of his claim, Plaintiff’s Opposition and Second Ad mended Complaint both

refer to numerous documents including inmate appeal/parolee CDC 602 grievance forms,

correspondence and “Program Status Reports” which provide most of the factual background.3

These documents, as well as Defendant Garcia’s Declaration in Support of Summary Judgment

[Doc. No. 63], show that a riot first occurred between African-American and Caucasian inmates

on or about December 2, 2001 in CAL’s “B” Facility. (Pl.’s Ex., Inmate/Parolee Inmate Appeal

Form, Log No. CAL-B-02-00517, dated February 28, 2002; Garcia Decl. ¶ 5.) “As a result of

this riot, [Garcia] placed B Facility on Modified Program beginning December 3, 2001.”

(Garcia Decl. ¶ 5.) The “modified program” included cell feeding, controlled showers, and

critical worker” movement only. Further, library access limited to only “inmates with verified

court deadlines” and “30- minute non-contact visits.” (Id.) According to Garcia, this modified

program was implemented for“safety and security while the cause of the riot was investigated

and the yards and common areas were searched for weapons.” (Id.) On December 11, 2001,

after searches were complete, Garcia ordered that the modified programming plan be continued

for the African-Americans and Caucasian inmates, and restoration of “normal programming” for

all other inmates. (Id. at 6.)

 According to CDC 602 Group Appeal Log No. CAL-B-02-00517, “[o]n December 27,

2001, in an attempt to return to normal program, Facility ‘B’ was conducting release to the

morning meal when a racially motivated stabbing incident occurred.” (See also Garcia Decl.

¶ 10.) An African-American inmate was killed by a Caucasian inmate on Facility B, Yard 1.

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4

 CAL.CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3383 (a) provides that “[a] state of emergency shall exist when the

institution head ... temporarily suspends any nonessential operation, procedure, service, or function, and

the normal time limits or schedules for such activity in order to prevent, contain, or control a

disturbance.” A “lockdown” occurs when “a portion of the facility is affected by suspension of required

programs or services, and inmates are not released except as determined by the facility administration

on an individual[], case-by-case basis.... [U]nder such circumstances only critical inmate workers in the

affected housing units/sub-facilities will be permitted to attend work assignments under escort, and all

but essential functions are suspended in those affected housing units or sub-facilities, e.g., yard, canteen

draws, religious services, and visiting.” CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3000. 

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(Id.) As a result of the homicide, and other incidents of inmate-on-inmate violence in other

facilities, Garcia obtained permission to declare a state of emergency and imposed an

“institutional lockdown.”4

 (Id.)

The December 27, 2001 lockdown continued until January 8, 2002, when a “modified

program,” including yard privileges for inmates in Facilities A, C, and D, was reinstated. (Id.

¶ 11.) Other privileges were restored gradually, and by February 5, 2002, all inmates--other than

the African-American and Caucasian inmates, who continued on a modified schedule due to

“continuing intelligence that racial violence was likely” to reoccur--were restored to “normal’

programming. (Id. ¶ 13.)

From February 5, 2002 through April 7, 2002, Garcia gradually reintroduced normal

program privileges to the African-American and Caucasian inmates in Facility B. (Id. ¶ 14.)

On April 7, 2002, however, a Caucasian inmate attacked a fellow Caucasian inmate with a

weapon in Unit B5, causing him serious injury. (Id. ¶ 15.) On the following day, inmates

engaged in a work stoppage. As a result of these two incidents, Facility B was ordered back to

modified programming so that searches could be completed. During this time, Caucasian

inmates were placed on higher restriction status than African-Americans. (Id.) Nevertheless,

on April 20, 2002, a “mutual combat” occurred in Unit B3, involving two Caucasian and five

African-American inmates. (Id. ¶ 16.) 

By May 20, 2002, normal programming was restored to all inmates except the AfricanAmericans and Caucasians, who remained on a modified program. (Id. ¶ 17.) In addition,

Defendant Price presented Warden Garcia with a plan to restore some yard privileges to the

African-American and Caucasian inmates in Facility B beginning on May 23, 2002 at randomly

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selected and unannounced times. (Id. ¶ 17.) However, on May 23, 2002 and again on May 24,

2002, race riots re-erupted between the African-American and Caucasian inmates who had been

randomly selected for yard release. (Garcia Decl. ¶¶ 19-20.) Based on these riots and Price’s

opinion that the African-American and Caucasian inmates in Facility B were “not ready for yard

release, and that more time and effort were required to ensure the safety and security of inmates

and staff,” Garcia “temporarily suspended all privileges” for African-Americans and Caucasians,

except for law library access, showers, medical appointments” and issued “other passes under

escort only.” (Garcia Decl. ¶ 20.) 

On July 10, 2002, in-cell canteen purchases were restored in Facility B, “as the first phase

in a transition to normal programming.” (Id. ¶ 21.) On July 11, 2002, five Hispanic inmates in

Facility A stabbed a correctional officer and injured other staff. (Id.¶ 22.) As a result the entire

institution was placed on lockdown pending investigation into the Facility A incident; however

the African-American and Caucasian inmates in Facility B continued on a modified program

until July 28, 2002, when Garcia re-imposed an institutional lockdown after an AfricanAmerican inmate committed a battery on another correctional officer. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) 

After an August 6, 2002 investigation revealed that the July 28, 2002 incident was an

“isolated” one, Garcia lifted the lockdown for inmates identified as Hispanic or “Other.” (Id.

¶ 24.) However, because the same investigation indicated that African-American and Caucasian

still had “ongoing problems,” Garcia maintained their modified program restrictions. (Id.) On

August 9, 2002, a meeting was held with six African-American and Caucasian inmate

representatives; however the African-Americans “refused to participate and left the meeting.”

(Id. ¶ 25.) Thereafter, a Caucasian inmate “who had attempted to mediate between the groups,

was subsequently assaulted because of his efforts.” (Id.) 

“Because of these events, [Garcia] decided to retain African-American and Caucasian

inmates on B Facility on a modified program status until tension abated.” (Id.) By September

3, 2002, “additional agitators had been identified and transferred.” (Id. ¶ 26.) Restrictions were

lifted, beginning with authorized quarterly packages on August 20, 2002, and on September 23,

2002, unit-by-unit dining room feeding, canteen, telephone and “normal” yard privileges were

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permitted. (Id. ¶ 28.) However, “on the same day,” another riot erupted when a group of

African-American inmates assaulted a group of Caucasian inmates. (Id. ¶ 29.) All involved

were placed in administrative segregation, but Facility B was again returned to modified

programming. (Id.) Facility B remained on a modified program schedule until October 5, 2002,

when African-American and Caucasian critical workers were released for work assignments and

were granted 30-minute non-contact visitation privileges. (Id. ¶ 30.)

Plaintiff alleges his yard privileges were restored on September 25, 2002. (SAC at 3.)

He seeks $150,000 in general and $150, 000 in punitive damages. (Id. at 6.)

IV.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is properly granted when “there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c).

Entry of summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

The court shall consider all admissible affidavits and supplemental documents submitted on a

motion for summary judgment. See Connick v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 784 F.2d 1018,

1020 (9th Cir. 1986).

The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is

proper. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). However, to avoid summary

judgment, the nonmovant cannot rest solely on conclusory allegations. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794

F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Rather, he must present “specific facts showing there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). The Court may not

weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on a motion for summary judgment. Quite

the opposite, the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255; United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,

655 (1962). The nonmovant’s evidence need only be such that a “fair minded jury could return

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a verdict for [him] on the evidence presented.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, in

determining whether the nonmovant has met his burden, the Court must consider the evidentiary

burden imposed upon him by the applicable substantive law. Id. 

 A verified complaint or motion may be used as an opposing affidavit under FED.R.CIV.P.

56 to the extent it is based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in

evidence. McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (complaint);

Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1998) (motion). To “verify” a

complaint, the plaintiff must swear or affirm that the facts in the complaint are true “under the

pains and penalties of perjury.” Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 n.10 (9th Cir. 1995).

B. Defendant’s Arguments

Defendant Garcia argues she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to

FED.R.CIV.P. 56 because: 1) no genuine issues of material fact exist to show that the restrictions

of Plaintiff’s access to outdoor exercise deprived him of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities,” (Def.’s P&As at 14-15, citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)); and

2) no triable issue of fact exists to show that she acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s

health or safety. (Id. at 837.) Defendant further argues she is entitled to qualified immunity.

(Id. at 20-24, citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).) 

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 authorizes a “suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress” against

any person who, under color of state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution.” Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122 (2004). Here, there is

no dispute that Warden Garcia acted under color of state law when she ordered implementation

of lockdown procedures at CAL which limited Plaintiff’s access to outdoor exercise from

December 27, 2001, through September 27, 2002. Thus, the resolution of her Summary

Judgment Motion turns on the second inquiry: whether a genuine issue of material fact exists

to show that Garcia’s actions constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment rights.

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2. Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

“Whatever rights one may lose at the prison gates, ... the full protections of the eighth

amendment most certainly remain in force. The whole point of the amendment is to protect

persons convicted of crimes.” Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1979) (citation

omitted). The Eighth Amendment, however, is not a basis for broad prison reform. It requires

neither that prisons be comfortable nor that they provide every amenity that one might find

desirable. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 349 (1981); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237,

1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the Eighth Amendment proscribes the “unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain,” which includes those sanctions that are “so totally without penological

justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.

153, 173, 183 (1976); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. This includes

not only physical torture, but any punishment incompatible with “the evolving standards of

decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958);

see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).

Although prison administrators generally have broad discretion in determining whether

to declare emergencies and impose “lockdowns” to control institutional disturbances, the

conditions imposed during the lockdown may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the

Eighth Amendment. See Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1980) (denial of

outdoor exercise may give rise to Eighth Amendment violation even in response to emergency

conditions). To assert an Eighth Amendment claim for deprivation of humane conditions of

confinement, a prisoner must satisfy two requirements: one objective and one subjective.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994).

“Under the objective requirement, the prison official’s acts or omissions must deprive an

inmate of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. This

objective component is satisfied so long as the institution “furnishes sentenced prisoners with

adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Hoptowit, 682

F.2d at 1246; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833; Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir.

1981).

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The subjective requirement, relating to the defendants’ state of mind, requires “deliberate

indifference.” Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087. “Deliberate indifference” exists when a prison official

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must be both

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.

a. Objective Requirement

Plaintiff alleges that the conditions resulting from Garcia’s decision to implement

lockdown and modified lockdown restrictions constituted cruel and unusual punishment because,

as a result of those restrictions, he was denied outdoor exercise for nearly ten months. (SAC at

3.) The Ninth Circuit has stated that “regular outdoor exercise is extremely important to the

psychological and physical well being of the inmates.” Spain, 600 F.2d at 199 (holding that

prisoners in long-term and continuous segregation must be provided regular outdoor exercise

unless “inclement weather, unusual circumstances, or disciplinary needs” make it impossible).

However, as the Ninth Circuit further recognized in Hayward, when a lockdown is instituted in

response to a genuine emergency, the decisions regarding when and how to provide for outdoor

exercise “are delicate ones, and those charged with them must be given reasonable leeway.”

Hayward, 629 F.2d at 603. 

Here, the record is clear that the initial restrictions placed on Plaintiff’s ability to exercise

outdoors arose from racial tension and rioting between approximately twenty Caucasian and

African-American inmates beginning on December 2, 2001, in CAL’s Facility B. (Garcia Decl.

¶ 5.) As a result of the riot, Warden Garcia implemented modified programming for Facility B

which took effect the next day, and which provided for in-cell feeding, controlled showers,

library access for inmates with verified court deadlines, thirty-minute non-contact visits, and outof-unit movement of Hispanic and Other critical inmate workers. (Id.) The restrictions were in

the process of being lifted when, on December 27, 2001, a Caucasian inmate killed an AfricanAmerican inmate and the entire facility was placed on lock down. (Id. ¶ 10) The lockdown

ended on January 8, 2002, and by February 5, 2002, all inmates at CAL, except the Caucasian

and African-American inmates on Facility B, had returned to normal programming. (Id. ¶¶ 11-

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13.) Garcia attempted to return Facility B to “normal programming” at least 3 separate times

between the December 27, 2001 homicide and September 27, 2002, when Plaintiff, who is an

African-American inmate who was housed in Facility B, claims his outdoor exercise privileges

were restored. (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 16, 18, 20.)

“Although exercise is ‘one of the basic human necessities protected by the Eighth

Amendment’ ... a temporary denial of outdoor exercise with no medical effects is not a

substantial deprivation.” May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (twenty-two days

insufficient to establish Eighth Amendment violation) (quoting LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444,

1457 (9th Cir. 1993)). Here, although Plaintiff claims he was denied outdoor exercise for nearly

nine months from December 27, 2001 through September 27, 2002, and not just “temporarily,”

May, 109 F.3d at 565, Defendant argues he was not denied exercise altogether, but rather, only

the opportunity to exercise outdoors. Specifically, Defendant claims the conditions of Plaintiff’s

confinement during the 9 1/2-month lockdown do not satisfy the objective component of an

Eighth Amendment violation because Plaintiff “was not confined to his cell during the entire

lockdown period,” his cell was “large enough to perform various exercises, including pushups,

situps, biceps curls, leg squats, running in place and stretching” and he was permitted to go to

the law library and dental clinic. (Garcia Decl. ¶ 38.)

Under the circumstances of this case and Ninth Circuit precedent, however, the Court

finds evidence in the record sufficient to create genuine issues of fact as to whether the denial

and/or limitations on Plaintiff’s outdoor exercise for a period of just over nine months meets the

objective standards required to support an Eighth Amendment violation. See e.g., Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (finding six and one-half weeks

deprivation of “all access to outdoor exercise” sufficient to satisfy Eighth Amendment’s

objective requirements); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended 135

F.3d 1318 (finding triable issues of facts existed as to whether a six-month deprivation of

outdoor exercise due to Plaintiff’s placement in the Intensive Management Unit violated the

Eighth Amendment).

////

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b. Subjective Requirement

However, in order to avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff must also show there are triable

issues as to the Eighth Amendment’s subjective requirement. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. In this

regard, the Court finds no evidence in the record to support Plaintiff’s claim that the denial of

outdoor exercise, which began as a result of racial tension and violence which culminated in an

inmate’s murder in CAL’s B Facility, was the result of Defendant’s “deliberate indifference.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1133.

The evidence before the Court shows that the suspension of outdoor exercise began after

racial tensions in Facility B erupted on December 2, 2001; on that day a riot involving

approximately twenty Caucasian and African-American inmates occurred in Housing Unit B3.

(Garcia Decl. ¶ 5.) One inmate sustained serious injury and one weapon was recovered, and

Garcia instituted a modified program schedule for Facility B on the day after. (Id.) Garcia

indicates she first instituted those restrictions “for the safety and security while the cause of the

riot was investigated, and the yards and common area were searched for weapons.” (Id.) The

searches were completed by December 11, 2001, and although modified programming continued

for African-Americans and Caucasian inmates, normal programming was restored for all other

inmates. (Id. ¶ 6.)

A review of the documents submitted by Defendant indicates that racial tensions between

Caucasian and African-American inmates during the relevant time periods. (Id. ¶ 41). Indeed,

Garcia recounts that between December 2, 2001 and September 27, 2002, and despite the

institution’s best efforts to restrict opportunities for further violence, Facility B was the site of

four race riots. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 10, 16, 19, 20.) Each attempt to lift programming restrictions and reintegrate the African-American and Caucasian inmates was met with further violence. (Id.) On

many occasions, inmates were found to possess weapons, several inmate-on-inmate batteries

occurred without serious injury, and six occurred with serious injuries. (Id.) Plaintiff, for his

part, points to absolutely no evidence in the record to rebut this testimony of events. 

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Thus, the record is replete with facts which reveal that restrictions on outdoor exercise

were instituted for the primary purpose of preventing further race-based attacks, injuries and

homicides. In addition, Warden Garcia claims, and all documentary evidence offered by both

Plaintiff as well as Defendant Garcia shows, that the restrictions in Facility B were designed and

continually modified in an effort to “stop [the] racially-motivated violence, secure the safety of

all inmates and institutional staff, protect institutional property, facilitate an investigation into

the racially motivated riots and their causes, determine the likelihood and nature of future

violence, and discover and confiscate inmate manufactured weapons and contraband.” (Garcia

Decl. ¶ 40.) There is simply no evidence before this Court which supports Plaintiff’s claims that

Garcia’s actions were the product of any “deliberate indifference” on her part. Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. 

As noted above, determinations such as how to best protect inmates from racial violence

“are delicate ones, and those charged with them must be given reasonable leeway.” Hayward,

629 F.2d at 602. Defendant Garcia has demonstrated as a matter of law that yard restrictions in

Facility B were imposed as a result of a serious racial instability, that each time she attempted

to relax those restrictions further violence immediately erupted, and that integrated yard release

in Facility B was slow and, at times, impossible. Thus, without more, this Court finds no

genuine issues of material fact exist to show that Garcia deprived Plaintiff of outdoor exercise

with the “deliberate indifference” to his health or safety necessary to support an Eighth

Amendment violation. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Rather, the uncontroverted evidence

establishes that the suspension of outdoor exercise was a response to ongoing and sometimes

even deadly racial violence. Plaintiff has come forward with no evidence to support a finding

that the initial suspension or delay in restoration of outdoor exercise amounted to a violation of

his Eighth Amendment rights. 

Accordingly, Defendant Garcia is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Berg, 794 F.2d at 459.

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3. Qualified Immunity

Because the Court has found no violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, the

Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. See County of Sacramento v.

Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the

defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the

deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)

(“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is

no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”).

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For all the reasons set forth in the Order the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant Garcia’s

Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 56 [Doc. No. 61-1]. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment for Defendant Garcia and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 27, 2006

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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