Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00819/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00819-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Plaintiff failed to file any opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICKO REED,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv819 BEN (WMc)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

RE: GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. No. 10]

vs.

MORTIMER, et al., 

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Ricko Reed (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner currently incarcerated and proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, has filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges correctional

officers applied handcuffs too tightly to his wrists and failed to adjust them when they caused pain in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. [ECF No. 1] On November 14, 2011, Defendants filed a motion

to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. [ECF No. 10.]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Roger T.

Benitez, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.3 of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of California. After reviewing the pleadings, Defendants’ briefs and any exhibits

filed in support thereof,1

 for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends Defendants’ Motion

for to Dismiss be GRANTED as discussed below.

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II. ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated at the Centinela State Prison a race riot erupted.

Plaintiff asserts that while he was involved in the riot, he was not the aggressor, “but was only

protecting himself from any type of harm.” [Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1 at p. 2.] Plaintiff alleges

that when order was restored, he was placed in handcuffs by correctional officer Defendant Mortimer.

Plaintiff contends the handcuffs were too tight and he told Mortimer about the physical pain and

discomfort he was experiencing. Id. Nevertheless, Mortimer did nothing to adjust the handcuffs.

Plaintiff alleges he was thereafter escorted away from the prison yard to the “Facility C” law

library by another correctional officer, Defendant Valdivia. Plaintiff waited in the law library for a

medical evaluation and told Validivia at that time that his handcuffs, which held Plaintiff’s wrists

behind his back, were too tight. Plaintiff contends Valdivia ignored his comment. Id. Plaintiff alleges

that while sitting by Validivia, he next told correctional officer Defendant Barajas that the handcuffs

were causing him physical pain and asked if the cuffs could be loosened. Barajas, who “watch[ed]

over” Plaintiff in the law library, also ignored Plaintiff’s complaint of pain. [Plaintiff’s complaint,

ECF No. 1 at pp. 2-4.] Plaintiff alleges he also told the supervising sergeant Defendant Klester his

handcuffs were too tight and asked if they could be loosened. Plaintiff claims Klester ignored him and

walked away. Id. at 5. Plaintiff’s Exhibits to the Complaint indicate Plaintiff was detained in hand

cuffs for “approximately 10 hours.” [Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1 at pp. 10, 16 and 19-20.] 

III. STANDARD UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) 

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim,” focusing on the “sufficiency” of a claim statement

rather than on the claim’s substantive merits. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

Therefore, courts normally “look only at the face of the complaint to decide” the motion. Van Buskirk

v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). However, material which is properly

submitted as part of the complaint may be considered on a motion to dismiss. Lewis v. Ollison, 571

F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2008); see also Branch v. Tunnell, 14 3d . 449, 453-54 (9th Cir.

1994) (“[W]e hold that documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity

no party questions ... may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”). A Rule

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12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported

by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). In reviewing

a complaint for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal purposes, courts accept allegations of material fact as true and

construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,

80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Factual allegations asserted by pro se petitioners, “however

inartfully pleaded,” are held “to less stringent standards” than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-20 (1972); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621,

623 (9th Cir. 1988) (“In civil rights cases where a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the

pleadings liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt”). Nevertheless, while “the

pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it demands

more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949,

quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (in deciding a motion to dismiss,

the court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”); see

Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.) (the court need not accept as true

conclusory allegations, “unwarranted deductions,” or “unreasonable inferences”), amended on other

grounds, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Thus, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity

and then decide whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1250.

A Rule 12(b)(6)dismissal is properly granted if a plaintiff’s complaint does not contain “enough facts

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (2009),

citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Pleading facts

that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability “stops short of the line between possibility

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and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. When a plaintiff

has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [his] complaint must be

dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (“A pleading that

offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do’”) quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557 (a complaint is insufficient if it tenders “naked

assertions” devoid of “further factual enhancement”).

The Court may not itself supply missing elements in a deficient claim statement. In spite of

the deference courts accord to a plaintiff’s factual allegations, it is improper for the court to assume

“the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not alleged.” Associated General Contractors

of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Nor must the

court “accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by

exhibit.” Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988 (citation omitted); see also Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191,

1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (court need not accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusions of law cast

in the form of factual allegations). “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the nonconclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences [drawn] from that content, must be plausibly

suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d

962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009), quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.

IV. DEFENDANTS’ ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF DISMISSAL

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiff failed to

allege Defendant Mortimer applied handcuffs tightly for the purpose of maliciously causing harm

[Def.Mtn. to Dismiss ECF No. 10-1 at p.4]; and (2) Plaintiff failed to allege Defendants Valdivia,

Barajas and Kloster knew of or disregarded a risk to Plaintiff’s health by failing to loosen the

handcuffs at Plaintiff’s request. [Id. at pp. 5-6] 

V. DISCUSSION

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

All named Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims to the extent they are based on acts

taken in their official capacities. While the Eleventh Amendment bars a prisoner’s section 1983

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claims against state actors sued in their official capacities, Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989),

it does not bar damage actions against state officials in their personal or individual capacities. Hafer

v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472-73 (9th Cir. 1992). When a state

actor is alleged to have violated both federal and state law and is sued for damages under section 1983

in his individual or personal capacity, there is no Eleventh Amendment bar, even if state law provides

for indemnification. Ashker v. California Department of Corrections, 112 F.3d 392, 395 (9th Cir.

1997). Here, Plaintiff clearly indicates an intent to sue Defendants in both their individual and official

capacities. [See Compl. at ECF No. 1 at p.3.] Thus, IT IS RECOMMENDED THE COURT

GRANT all Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds, with prejudice, only

to the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against them in their official capacities.

2. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claim - Defendant Mortimer

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against

Defendant Mortimer on the grounds that he failed to adequately plead all the elements required to state

an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. [Def.Mtn. to Dismiss at ECF No. 10-1 at pp. 4-5.]

When an inmate claims that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by using excessive

force, the relevant inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore

discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992).

An Eighth Amendment violation occurs only when an inmate is subjected to the “unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). To determine whether

Plaintiff has satisfied the malicious and sadistic standard, the Court examines the following five

factors: (1) the extent of the injury suffered; (2) the need for the application of force; (3) the

relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by

Defendants; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S.

at 7; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321.

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege Defendant Mortimer maliciously applied the handcuffs to cause

harm. The allegations of the complaint indicate: (1) the handcuffs were tight, uncomfortable and

hurting Plaintiff; (2) the handcuffs were applied by Defendant Mortimer after Plaintiff’s own admitted

participation in a race riot; (3) the handcuffs were needed in order to transport Plaintiff to the law

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library for a medical evaluation; (4) Defendants were working to restore order after a race riot and (5)

Defendant Mortimer did not reduce the setting on the handcuffs despite Plaintiff’s complaint that the

handcuffs were too tight. As explained above, the relevant inquiry for the Court is whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause

harm. The facts as alleged and the reasonable inferences that flow from them do not indicate

Defendant Mortimer subjected Plaintiff to tight handcuffs capriciously. Plaintiff’s complaint contends

the handcuffs were applied by Defendant Mortimer after Plaintiff’s participation in a race riot and

were used in order to transport Plaintiff to the law library for a medical evaluation. There is no

allegation Defendant Mortimer knew Plaintiff’s handcuffs would not be adjusted for the medical

evaluation or that Plaintiff would stay cuffed in the same position for approximately 10 hours while

in the facility’s law library. Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force against Defendant Mortimer be

GRANTED. The facts alleged and the reasonable inferences therefrom fail to state a claim for

Eighth Amendment excessive force on the part of Defendant Mortimer.

3. Deliberate Indifference under the Eighth Amendment - Defendants Valdivia,

Barajas and Klester

Defendants note Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Valdivia, Barajas and

Klester is most accurately analyzed as a cause of action for deliberate indifference because

Defendants Valdivia, Barajas and Klester did not apply handcuffs to Plaintiff. Defendants Valdivia,

Barajas and Klester are subjects of Plaintiff’s complaint because they did not loosen Plaintiff’s

handcuffs after he notified them of his pain and requested an adjustment. [Def.Mtn. to Dismiss at ECF

No. 10-1 at pp. 5, 7.]

Prison officials violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment if they are deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s serious medical needs. Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989). To

succeed on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate facts sufficient to prove that

he has or had a serious medical need and that a particular defendant acted with deliberate indifference

to that need. See id. at 104-05 (1976). 

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A prisoner must satisfy both objective and subjective elements to establish an Eighth

Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834-837 (1994). To establish the subjective

component of a deliberate indifference claim, “an inmate must allege sufficient facts to indicate that

prison officials acted with a culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). A

prison official must have actual knowledge of an “excessive risk to inmate health and safety,”

possessing both the facts from which an inference of serious risk to health and safety could be drawn

and then drawing that inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Even gross negligence, without more, does

not constitute “deliberate indifference.” Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.1990).

Moreover, a mere delay in treatment does not constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment, unless

the delay or denial was harmful. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404,

407 (9th Cir. 1985); Hunt, 865 F.2d at 200 (“[D]elay in providing a prisoner with dental treatment,

standing alone, does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.”).

The court must also focus on the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical needs and the nature

of the defendants’ response to those needs. A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104. Differences in judgment between an inmate and prison

medical personnel regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment are not enough to establish

a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). The indifference

to medical needs must also be substantial; inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross

negligence, does not amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung,

391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.”) (citing Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 1204 (9th Cir. 2002); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.

1990). Lastly, a plaintiff must establish a causal link between the defendants’ conduct and the alleged

injury. Without causation, there is no deprivation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode,

423 U.S. 362, 370-371 (1976).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that while he waited in the law library for a medical evaluation, he told

Validivia that his handcuffs, which held Plaintiff’s wrists behind his back, were too tight. [Plaintiff’s

complaint, ECF No. 1 at p. 2.] Valdivia ignored his comment. While sitting “by Validivia”, Plaintiff

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next told Barajas that his handcuffs were painful and asked if the cuffs could be loosened. Id.

Barajas, who “watch[ed] over” Plaintiff in the law library, also ignored Plaintiff. [Id. at pp. 2-4.]

Plaintiff finally told supervising sergeant Defendant Klester that his handcuffs were too tight and

asked if they could be loosened, but Klester ignored him and walked away. Id. at 5. Plaintiff

remained in handcuffs for “approximately 10 hours.” [Id. at pp. 10, 16 and 19-20.] Plaintiff’s injuries

are alleged to be the pain and discomfort he suffered to the left hand and left shoulder while

handcuffed during the 10-hour period. [Id. at pp 13, 19.] 

After a review of Plaintiff’s allegations, it is recommended the Court find Plaintiff failed to

allege facts demonstrating Defendants Valdivia, Barajas and Klester had actual knowledge of an

“excessive risk to inmate health and safety,” by failing to adjust Plaintiff’s handcuffs or leaving him

cuffed for a 10-hour period. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. As the Court explained, even gross

negligence, without more, does not constitute “deliberate indifference.” Wood v. Housewright, 900

F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.1990). Moreover, a mere delay in treatment does not constitute a violation

of the Eighth Amendment, unless the delay or denial was harmful. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State

Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). From the facts alleged here, it does not appear

Defendants’ 10-hour delay in removing the handcuffs was harmful or resulted in significant injury.

These allegations do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. In

order to survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s complaint must contain specific, concrete and

nonconclusory allegations with evidence of unlawful intent. Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F.Supp. 1235,1239

(S.D. Cal. 1997). Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Valdivia, Barajas and Klester be GRANTED.

VI. CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order

GRANTING Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon

which § 1983 relief can be granted pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 22, 2012,any party to this action may file a

written objection with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than March 14, 2012. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may result in a waiver of the right to raise those objections on 

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); see also

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 31, 2012

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge, U.S.District Court

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