Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-12-03401/USCOURTS-ca7-12-03401-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 12-3401

LARRY NELSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, RONALD LIS,

ELIZABETH WILSON, RICHARD 

NOVOTNY, and BRADLEY RUZAK,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 09 C 883 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2014 — DECIDED JANUARY 20, 2016

____________________

Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Larry Nelson was driving home one 

night when four Chicago police officers in two squad cars 

pulled him over, pointed a gun in his face, threatened to kill 

him, handcuffed him, and searched his car for no apparent 

reason. The officers have no recollection of the stop but insist 

that it couldn’t have happened the way Nelson said it did. 

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2 No. 12-3401

Their squad-car computers, however, confirm that they ran 

Nelson’s name through the law-enforcement database at the 

time of the stop and turned up nothing that would justify 

stopping him and searching his car.

Nelson sued the officers and the City of Chicago under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the seizure and search violated

his rights under the Fourth Amendment. A jury found for 

the defendants. On Nelson’s posttrial motion, the district 

judge ordered a new trial based on an instructional error but

later reversed course and reinstated the verdict.

Nelson’s appeal raises no fewer than seven claims of error. Three have merit. First, and most significantly, the 

district judge should not have admitted evidence of Nelson’s 

arrest record. A second error occurred when the defense 

attorney was allowed to cross-examine Nelson about other 

civil suits he had filed against the City. Third, the judge 

improperly allowed one of the officers to offer generalized 

testimony about when the police might be justified in using

firearms and handcuffs during a traffic stop. These errors 

were not harmless. Nelson is entitled to a new trial.

I. Background

Larry Nelson spent the evening of February 11, 2008, 

meeting with supporters of his unsuccessful campaign for 

Democratic committeeman in Chicago’s 24th Ward. The 

election was just six days earlier, and he still had dozens of 

campaign signs and brochures in the back of his white Ford 

Windstar minivan. By 9:30 p.m. Nelson had left the gathering and was on his way home. He stopped for gas near the 

intersection of North Pulaski Road and West Iowa Street, an 

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No. 12-3401 3

area that was under heightened surveillance by Chicago 

police because of its high crime rate.

Two police cruisers followed Nelson into the gas station.

After paying for his gas, Nelson began to drive away. The 

police followed him, activated their lights, and pulled him 

over.

What happened next is disputed—sort of. The four officers involved—Bradley Ruzak and Elizabeth Wilson in one 

squad car, Richard Novotny and Ronald Lis in the other—do 

not remember anything about the stop. They had made 

thousands of traffic stops (Officers Ruzak and Wilson 

stopped more than 40 drivers that night alone), and apparently nothing about their interaction with Nelson left an 

impression. But we do know that the officers used the laptop

computers in their squad cars to run Nelson’s name through 

the Illinois Secretary of State’s database listing vehicle registrations and the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System 

(“LEADS”), which lists arrest warrants. One of the squad-car 

computers conducted a database search of Nelson’s name at 

9:44 p.m., the other at 9:50 p.m. These queries revealed that 

Nelson’s car was properly registered and there were no 

warrants for his arrest. 

While the officers remember nothing about the traffic 

stop, Nelson says he will never forget it. At trial he testified 

that Officer Ruzak approached his minivan with his gun 

drawn and aimed at his head. Nelson told the jury that he 

could see a red laser sight pointed at his face. Nelson turned 

off the engine of his van, threw the keys on the dashboard, 

and put his hands up. Officer Novotny then ordered him out 

of the van, but Officer Ruzak said, “Don’t move or I’ll blast 

your ass!” three times. Faced with conflicting orders, Nelson 

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4 No. 12-3401

stayed put. Officer Novotny then opened the car door and 

dragged Nelson out, saying, “Next time somebody tell[s]

you to move, you know, you move.” Nelson was placed in

handcuffs. When he asked why, the officers told him to 

“shut up.” 

Nelson testified that the officers then searched him and 

took his driver’s license from his pocket. They passed the 

license between them and appeared to enter his name into 

the laptops in their squad cars. He testified that all four 

officers then searched the minivan and appeared confused 

when they found campaign materials. Officer Wilson asked, 

“Who [is] Larry Nelson?” and her tone changed “360 degree[s]” when Nelson replied that it was his name on the 

signs. About 25 or 30 minutes after initiating the traffic stop, 

the officers told Nelson he was free to go. The laptop in one 

of the squads recorded a search of someone else’s name at 

9:56 p.m. Nelson was not given a traffic ticket, nor was he 

cited for any other violation of the law. None of the officers

filed a “contact card” to document the stop, as required by 

departmental policy.

When Nelson got home, he called a district commander 

whom he knew from his community-outreach work and 

asked for advice. The commander suggested that Nelson call 

the Independent Police Review Authority (“IPRA”) and ask 

it to retain copies of any street camera footage from the area 

where the stop occurred. Nelson made this request in a 

timely manner. Two days later he was interviewed by an 

IPRA investigator. The investigator’s report—which Nelson 

signed but claims not to have reviewed—stated that the stop 

began at 10:05 p.m. rather than shortly after 9:30 p.m. As a 

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No. 12-3401 5

result of this discrepancy, the wrong video recording was

preserved and the relevant film was destroyed.

Before trial the defendants entered into formal judicial 

admissions that they had “no present recollection of probable cause or reasonable suspicion sufficient for the arrest or 

stop of Larry Nelson on February 11, 2008,” and that “[n]o 

information obtained by Chicago police officers as a result of 

the inquiries on Larry Nelson’s name on computer databases 

on February 11, 2008 gave the officers any probable cause to 

arrest him.” Despite these admissions, they took the witness 

stand and challenged Nelson’s description of the stop. For 

example, Officer Ruzak testified that he never once used a 

red laser sight on his firearm or said “I’ll blast your ass.” 

Officer Novotny said he never pulled anyone out of a vehicle 

and never said anything like “[n]ext time you’re given an 

order, follow the order.”

Numerous evidentiary skirmishes occurred at trial. Several are relevant to Nelson’s appeal; we’ll elaborate as needed later in this opinion. For now, it’s enough to say that the

general defense strategy was to convince the jury that Nelson was lying about what happened during the traffic stop. 

As the defense attorney summed it up before the jury: “This 

lawsuit is a fraud, it’s a sham, and [Nelson’s] trying to con 

you.”

The jury apparently agreed, returning a verdict for the 

defendants. Nelson moved for a new trial under Rule 59,

raising multiple claims of evidentiary and instructional 

error. The judge initially granted the motion, finding that

one of the jury instructions was confusing. The defendants

asked the judge to reconsider that ruling; they maintained

that Nelson had waived the relevant objection. Reversing 

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6 No. 12-3401

course, the judge agreed, reinstated the jury’s verdict, and 

entered final judgment for the defendants. 

II. Discussion

On appeal Nelson reprises the arguments he made in his 

Rule 59 motion. We need address only three; all relate to 

evidentiary rulings made before and during trial. Most 

significantly, Nelson argues that the judge improperly 

admitted evidence about his prior arrests and other lawsuits 

he filed against the City. He also contends that the judge

should not have allowed Officer Novotny to testify about the 

general circumstances in which police officers might justifiably use their guns and handcuffs during a traffic stop.1

Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Cerabio LLC v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 410 F.3d 981, 994 (7th 

Cir. 2005). “[E]ven in the face of error, we will not reverse a 

judgment entered on a jury verdict unless the erroneous 

ruling violated the objecting party’s substantial rights.” 

Maurer v. Speedway, LLC, 774 F.3d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “To meet 

that threshold, a significant chance must exist that the ruling 

affected the outcome of trial.” Id. Whether or not an error is 

harmless is determined in light of the trial record as a whole. 

 

1 Nelson raises the following additional claims of error: (1) the officers 

were erroneously permitted to testify in contradiction of their judicial 

admissions, and the district court’s attempted cure was inadequate; 

(2) the burden of proof was misallocated; (3) the jury instructions were 

confusing; and (4) the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. Because we’re remanding for a new trial based on other 

errors, we do not need to address these claims.

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No. 12-3401 7

Barber v. City of Chicago, 725 F.3d 702, 715 (7th Cir. 2013).

A. Evidence of Nelson’s Prior Arrests

Between 1983 and 1999, Nelson was arrested nine 

times—once for an alleged felony and eight times for alleged 

misdemeanors. These arrests are ancient history (the stop at 

issue here occurred in 2008), and all the charges were dismissed. A bit more recently, in November 2005, Nelson was

arrested and charged with the unauthorized use of a weapon. See Complaint, Nelson v. Balesteri, No. 06CV6316 (N.D. Ill. 

Nov. 20, 2006), ECF No. 1. Unlike the other charges, this case 

went to trial and Nelson was acquitted. He thereafter sued 

the arresting officers. The City settled this case for $34,000, 

though without admitting any wrongdoing. See Release and 

Settlement Agreement, Nelson v. Balesteri, No. 06CV6316

(N.D. Ill. May 29, 2007), ECF No. 23.

Nelson moved in limine to bar evidence of his previous 

arrests at trial. The judge ruled that the prior-arrest evidence

could come in only for impeachment purposes on the issue 

of Nelson’s “fear of the police.” The judge later clarified the 

scope of her ruling:

If Mr. Nelson were to testify, for example, “I 

had never had any encounter with police before. I was terrified. I had never seen a uniform 

or a badge before. ... ,” then obviously he 

could be impeached, if it’s possible to impeach 

him, with evidence that, in fact, he has been arrested before.

On direct examination Nelson testified at length about 

his public-service background, including the fact that he had 

occasionally worked with the police on community-outreach 

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8 No. 12-3401

projects. This line of questioning tried the judge’s patience 

and drew repeated objections on relevance grounds from the 

defense. Nelson’s counsel responded that the testimony was 

offered to rebut the defense attorney’s insinuations that 

Nelson was greedy, financially desperate, or had a grudge 

against the police.

Nelson also testified about his emotional distress during 

the traffic stop. Asked how he felt when Officer Ruzak

pointed his gun at him, Nelson said, “I was terrified, humiliated, ready to piss on myself, everything. I mean, I was 

just—I mean, I feared for my life.” He continued on in this

same vein, saying that he felt “[e]mbarrassed, terrified. I 

feared for my life. Don’t know what this man was gonna do. 

I didn’t know if he gonna shoot me or whatever. He still had 

his gun out.” In response to a question about how he felt

even now about his treatment during the traffic stop, he 

said, “I feel embarrassed, terrified. Right now, I’m still mad 

just looking at them right now as I speak.” When asked why

he was still angry despite the passage of time, Nelson answered, “Because that man had—I looked death in the face 

that night in that man[’s] hand.”

At the conclusion of Nelson’s direct examination, the defense attorney requested a sidebar and argued that Nelson 

had opened the door for admission of evidence about his 

prior experience with the police—namely, his history of 

arrests. The judge agreed: “If there were other episodes, 

counsel [is] entitled to explore the possibility that there are 

other reasons he might be terrified by police that have 

nothing to do with the alleged incident.”

The defense attorney then cross-examined Nelson about 

his prior arrests, asking: “And, sir, isn’t it true that you’ve 

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No. 12-3401 9

actually been arrested in numerous cases?” Nelson answered, “I’ve been arrested before and never been found 

guilty of no crime.” On redirect Nelson’s attorney made an 

effort to rehabilitate, eliciting testimony that his arrests were 

“a long time ago,” none resulted in a conviction, and none 

involved an officer aiming a gun at his face. No limiting 

instruction was given to the jury, but the judge did prohibit 

counsel from making any reference to the arrests in closing

argument.

The judge later elaborated on her rationale for allowing 

this cross-examination. In her ruling on Nelson’s posttrial 

motion, the judge said the arrest evidence was relevant to 

Nelson’s character for truthfulness and whether he was a 

law-abiding citizen. But the judge hedged a bit, saying that 

she “may resolve this issue differently at the second trial in 

this case,” which she had ordered based on an unrelated 

error. The opportunity to revisit the matter never came, of 

course; the judge rescinded her new-trial order and reinstated the jury’s verdict.

Nelson claims that admitting this evidence was reversible 

error. We agree. It’s well established that “[i]n general, a 

witness’s arrest record will not be admissible.” Thompson v. 

City of Chicago, 722 F.3d 963, 977 (7th Cir. 2013). 

This rule is based upon a clear recognition of 

the fact that the probative value of such evidence is so overwhelmingly outweighed by its 

inevitable tendency to inflame and prejudice 

the jury against the [party-witness] that total 

and complete exclusion is required in order 

that the right to trial by a fair and impartial jury may not be impaired.

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10 No. 12-3401

Barber, 725 F.3d at 709 (alteration in original) (quotation 

marks omitted). Notwithstanding this general rule, the judge 

allowed the defense attorney to elicit testimony that Nelson 

had “numerous” prior arrests, apparently for two purposes: 

(1) to impeach the implication that he was an upstanding 

public servant with a good relationship with the police (the 

reason the judge cited in her Rule 59 ruling); and (2) to limit 

Nelson’s damages, on the theory that some of his fear of the 

police may have been attributable to his earlier arrests (the 

reason she gave at trial).

We start with the impeachment rationale. “Impeachment 

can be effected in a number of ways, including contradiction, 

which involves presenting evidence that the substance of a 

witness’s testimony is not to be believed.” United States v. 

Boswell, 772 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2014). But Nelson never

made any factual statements that could be contradicted by 

evidence of his prior arrests. To use the example initially 

posited by the judge, he did not testify that he “never had 

any encounter with the police before.” Nor did he make any 

remotely similar claim on the witness stand.

In her posttrial ruling, the judge added that the evidence 

of Nelson’s prior arrests was admissible to impeach his 

“character for truthful and law-abiding citizenship.” We 

don’t see how. First, a witness’s character for truthfulness 

may be impeached only by specific instances of prior conduct and only “if they are probative of the character for 

truthfulness or untruthfulness.” FED. R. EVID. 608(b). Unlike 

a criminal conviction, an arrest is not, in itself, probative of 

the arrested person’s character for truthfulness. See Michelson 

v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 482 (1948) (“Arrest without 

more does not, in law any more than in reason, impeach the 

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No. 12-3401 11

integrity or impair the credibility of a witness. It happens to 

the innocent as well as the guilty.”); cf. FED. R. EVID. 609 

(permitting impeachment by evidence that the witness has 

been convicted of a crime). If the specific conduct underlying

the arrest is probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness, the conduct itself may be inquired into on crossexamination, subject to Rule 403 balancing for undue prejudice or some other ground for excluding the evidence. But 

the defense attorney did not seek permission to crossexamine Nelson about any specific conduct, nor are we 

given any reason to believe that any of his arrests were based 

on allegations of dishonest or untruthful conduct.

The judge’s “law-abiding citizenship” rationale for admitting this evidence is likewise flawed. Simply put, evidence of a prior arrest does not support a conclusion that the

arrested person has in fact broken the law.

So it’s no surprise that the defendants have all but abandoned the impeachment rationale on appeal and argue 

instead that the arrest evidence was relevant to the issue of 

damages. Their theory is that Nelson’s history of arrests 

either mitigated his fear during the traffic stop (because being 

arrested was old hat for him) or augmented it (because his 

numerous encounters with the police suggest that some of 

his emotional injury might have been preexisting).2

 2 It is unclear whether the damages “mitigation” theory offered by the 

defendants is viable given the rule that “[t]he tortfeasor takes his victim 

as he finds him. That is the ‘eggshell skull’ rule, which like most principles of the common law of torts is applicable to a constitutional tort case 

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Richman v. Sheahan, 512 F.3d 876, 884 

(7th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).

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12 No. 12-3401

We’ve cast doubt on this type of argument before. In Barber, another false-arrest case, the defense introduced evidence of the plaintiff’s subsequent arrest for the sole purpose 

of distinguishing between the damages attributable to the

alleged false arrest at issue in the litigation and those that 

might be attributable to the later arrest. 725 F.3d at 708. We 

warned against admitting a civil-rights plaintiff’s arrest 

history on this theory of relevance:

[It] would seemingly permit any civil-rights 

plaintiff’s criminal history to come in on the issue of emotional-distress damages, no matter 

how tenuous a connection the evidence has to 

the issue of damages or how central a role 

emotional distress plays during the plaintiff’s 

case. This, of course, would be contrary to our 

prior statements instructing courts to proceed 

carefully when deciding to admit evidence of a 

§ 1983 plaintiff’s criminal past.

Id. at 715. In Barber we held that the relevance of the plaintiff’s subsequent arrest was “tenuous at best,” id. at 712,

because his claim for emotional-distress damages was

closely tied to the arrest at issue in the litigation rather than 

“any fear of police generally,” id. at 713.

This reasoning applies here in full.3 Nelson’s arrest history had “miniscule probative value” on the question of his 

 3 The defendants try to distinguish Barber by arguing that the evidence of 

the plaintiff’s subsequent arrest in that case was necessarily less probative 

of his emotional distress at the time of his false arrest than the evidence 

of Nelson’s prior arrests would be here. But in either scenario, the real 

question is whether the probative value of the plaintiff’s arrests is 

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No. 12-3401 13

damages, id. at 714; the arrests were distant in time, and 

Nelson carefully limited his claimed emotional injury to the 

fear he felt during the 30 minutes of the traffic stop itself. 

Although he said he remained angry about the incident 

despite the passage of time, he never claimed that the experience left him fearful of the police more generally.

On the other side of the ledger, the risk of prejudice from 

this testimony was enormous. It’s doubtful that the jury 

drew the distinction between an arrest and a legal finding of 

wrongdoing; where there’s smoke, there’s fire. Even assuming the jury accounted for this distinction, evidence of prior 

arrests—here numerous prior arrests—generally impugns

character. And in a false-arrest case, the prejudice is even 

greater because it invites the jury to draw a propensity 

inference, forbidden by Rule 404(b), that the plaintiff is a 

serial law breaker and general troublemaker and the police 

must have had probable cause to arrest him.4 See Barber, 

725 F.3d at 714 (noting that that other-arrest evidence in a 

false-arrest suit “presents a substantial risk that the jury will 

render a defense verdict based not on the evidence but on 

emotions or other improper motives, such as a belief that 

bad people should not be permitted to recover from honorable police officers”). Even considering the special deference 

 

substantial enough to outweigh the risk of undue prejudice inherent in 

this type of evidence. 

4 Under Rule 404(b), evidence of “a crime, wrong, or other act” may be 

admissible if it is introduced for a purpose other than a propensity 

inference, such as “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” FED. R.

EVID. 404(b). The defendants do not contend that Nelson’s prior arrests 

were otherwise admissible for any of the purposes listed in Rule 404(b).

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14 No. 12-3401

we give to the trial judge’s evidentiary rulings, the evidence 

of Nelson’s prior arrests should not have been admitted in 

light of the narrow scope of his claimed damages and the 

inherent risk of unfair prejudice.

What remains is to decide whether this error was harmless. Barber is instructive on this point as well. There we 

noted that the damage caused by admitting evidence of this 

sort in a false-arrest case is two-fold: First, it encourages the 

jury to draw an improper propensity inference that the 

plaintiff’s other arrest made it more likely that he was committing some crime on the day of the arrest in question; and,

second, it “provide[s] powerful ammunition to support a 

jury argument that [the plaintiff] is a despicable human 

being who should not be permitted to recover from the 

angelic police officers being wrongly sued.” Id. at 717.

Because the trial “boiled down essentially to a credibility 

contest between [the plaintiff] and the two officers,” we held 

in Barber that the error was not harmless, and a new trial was 

required. Id. at 715. 

The risk of an improper propensity inference was even 

greater here. The jury heard that Nelson had been arrested 

numerous times, making him appear particularly unsympathetic. The trial turned entirely on his credibility, so the harm

caused by improperly admitting this damaging evidence 

would naturally be substantial. In Barber the jury was instructed to limit its use of the other-arrest evidence to the 

question of damages; we held that the instruction did not

cure the error. Id. at 716–17. Here there was no limiting 

instruction.

The defendants offer a couple of counterarguments but 

we find them unavailing. They argue that the evidence of 

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No. 12-3401 15

Nelson’s other arrests could not have been too prejudicial 

because it was elicited in a single cross-examination question. But that single question was especially damning, 

referring to “numerous” prior arrests. The defendants also 

direct us to Sanchez v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 919, 931–32 

(7th Cir. 2012), in which we found the admission of priorarrest evidence to be harmless error. But that case is distinguishable along several dimensions, not least because the 

judge gave an appropriate limiting instruction.5 The erroneous admission of Nelson’s prior arrests was not harmless.

B. Nelson’s Other Lawsuits

This wasn’t Nelson’s first time as a civil plaintiff. He had 

previously filed two lawsuits arising out of minor traffic 

accidents, including one against the Chicago Police Department after he was accidentally hit by a police car. That case

settled for $6,000. Nelson also sued the City twice under

§ 1983 for alleged civil-rights violations. In one action, Nelson 

v. Balesteri, No. 06CV6316 (N.D. Ill. 2007), he claimed that 

police illegally searched his unoccupied parked car and 

home and later falsely arrested him. As we’ve noted, the City

settled that case for $34,000; the State’s Attorney’s Office also

instituted a grand-jury investigation against the officers 

involved. See id. at ECF No. 23. The other civil-rights suit, 

 5 The defendants argue that Nelson waived his objection because the 

judge said she would consider a limiting instruction on this issue if 

Nelson presented one, but Nelson’s attorney moved for a mistrial

instead. The judge denied the mistrial motion but prohibited the parties 

from referring to the prior arrests in closing argument, calling the entire 

subject “a red herring.” We’re satisfied that Nelson’s motion in limine 

and his continuous objection to this evidence during trial adequately

preserved this issue. 

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16 No. 12-3401

Nelson v. Salgado, No. 09CV5357 (N.D. Ill. 2012), involved an 

alleged use of excessive force by police during an investigative detention, which aggravated Nelson’s pre-existing 

shoulder injury. That litigation was pending when this case 

went to trial. In 2012 a jury found for Nelson and awarded 

compensatory damages of $30,000 and $5,000 in punitive 

damages. Id. at ECF No. 109.

Nelson’s motion in limine sought to exclude any reference to his other lawsuits. The judge granted the motion in 

part, barring evidence of the other suits unless Nelson 

opened the door to their use as impeachment evidence. After 

Nelson concluded his direct testimony, the defense attorney

sought permission to cross-examine him about the prior 

lawsuits, arguing that Nelson had opened the door by 

“making it seem this [arrest] was so traumatizing for him.” 

The judge agreed: “If the fact is he also had other episodes 

that generated complaints, the jury is entitled to consider 

that, because if he’s fearful from other episodes, those are 

episodes that are not related to these defendants.”

The defense attorney’s first question on crossexamination was, “Mr. Nelson, isn’t it true that this is not 

your first lawsuit against Chicago Police?” Nelson answered 

in the affirmative, and counsel continued on this subject for 

several more questions: “And in all these cases, you allege 

the police did things that were wrong to you?” and “[Y]ou 

also have a case currently pending in another courtroom 

against Chicago Police?” On recross the defense attorney

returned to this subject, asking Nelson if the same lawyer

was representing him in his other cases.

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No. 12-3401 17

Based on this line of questioning, Nelson’s attorney

moved for a mistrial. The judge denied the motion but 

issued the following admonition to the jury:

You have heard evidence that ... Larry Nelson 

has filed lawsuits against the City of Chicago. 

A person is entitled to file a lawsuit. There is 

no evidence that any of his other claims were 

not valid. You may consider this evidence only 

in deciding whether Larry Nelson’s testimony 

concerning his damages is truthful in whole, in 

part, or not at all. 

Despite this limiting instruction, Nelson’s litigiousness was a 

major theme of the defense. To give a flavor, we note a few 

assertions from the defense attorney’s closing argument:

• It’s his burden. He knows that. He’s done 

this before.

• He’s working with the lawyer that sues the 

police.

• Why would he go through this litigation? ... Because he’s been paid before. 

That’s why. And he’s wanting it again.

• [Nelson claims] garden variety mental injuries with no evidence to support it. And it’s 

the same kind of injuries he’s suing the 

[C]ity for in other cases.

In her ruling on Nelson’s posttrial motion, the judge explained that the evidence of the other lawsuits was admissible because it “went to whether or not these Defendants and 

this incident were the source of Plaintiff’s injuries” and also 

countered the idea that he enjoyed a “cordial relationship” 

with the police. These are essentially the same impeachment 

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18 No. 12-3401

and damages rationales offered to admit evidence of Nelson’s arrest history, so our analysis proceeds similarly.

As a general matter, “a plaintiff’s litigiousness may have 

some slight probative value, but that value is outweighed by 

the substantial danger of jury bias against the chronic litigant.” Mathis v. Phillips Chevrolet, Inc., 269 F.3d 771, 776 (7th 

Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted). There are rare exceptions when the evidence is admitted for reasons other than 

to show the plaintiff’s litigious character and it is sufficiently 

probative to survive Rule 403 balancing. For example, in 

Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 137 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 

1998), a workplace sexual-harassment suit, we affirmed the 

district court’s decision to admit testimony that the plaintiff

had sued three of his former employers because the evidence

was probative of his “modus operandi of creating fraudulent 

documents in anticipation of litigation.” We also noted that 

the evidence helped explain why the employer in that case 

had kept a detailed record of the plaintiff’s actions. Id. 

Finally, the evidence provided insight into the plaintiff’s

mental state and alleged damages because he had not mentioned the earlier suits to his expert psychologist. Id.

Here, however, neither of the reasons for admitting this 

evidence holds up. We fail to see how evidence of Nelson’s 

other suits qualifies as impeachment. Nothing in his direct 

testimony could be contradicted by evidence that he had 

filed other suits against the City. The judge apparently 

thought that Nelson’s testimony about his public-service 

experience left a general impression that he had a “cordial 

relationship” with local police. But Nelson never claimed to 

have wholly placid relations with the Chicago Police Department. Rather, he testified: “I complain when I see someCase: 12-3401 Document: 48 Filed: 01/20/2016 Pages: 26
No. 12-3401 19

thing wrong, I fully do. ... If I see the officer doing wrong, I 

complain about it. If they[’re] doing right, I praise them for 

doing the[ir] jobs.”

The damages rationale fares no better. Without knowing 

more about the facts underlying the prior suits, there’s no 

way for the jury to meaningfully evaluate this evidence visà-vis Nelson’s claimed damages in this case. The City had no 

interest in putting the facts of the prior lawsuits before the 

jury, so it’s not surprising that it did not do so. As such, the 

only possible purpose for admitting this evidence was to

brand Nelson as a litigious person who (at best) had thin 

skin or (at worst) had a vendetta against the Chicago Police 

Department and was gaming the system to make an easy 

buck. Those inferences are especially prejudicial in a falsearrest suit with no third-party witnesses because the plaintiff

is always vulnerable to the accusation that he made everything up. The gratuitous question about Nelson’s lawyer—

apparently meant to suggest the attorney and her client were 

in cahoots in a scheme to defraud the City—compounded 

the prejudice.

The defendants insist that Nelson’s testimony about his 

favorable settlements with the City would lead the jury to 

conclude that his earlier claims were meritorious. Maybe so; 

but we think there’s a significant chance that the jury also

concluded that the City had paid Nelson enough already. 

That was certainly the thrust of the defense attorney’s closing argument. The evidence of his prior lawsuits should not 

have been admitted.

Though wrongly admitted, this evidence was accompanied by a limiting instruction, and that has a bearing on the 

harmless-error inquiry; we presume that “juries follow their 

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20 No. 12-3401

instructions.” Barber, 725 F.3d at 717. But “[a]t some point 

judicial presumptions must give way to common sense, and 

the formulaic recitation of a pro forma limiting instruction 

may not suffice to cure an error.” Id. Here, the prejudice 

engendered by the erroneous admission of the evidence of 

other lawsuits was significant enough that the presumption 

must give way. The defense attorney’s questions on this 

subject were multiple and inflammatory. The repeated 

references to Nelson’s other lawsuits during closing argument were clearly intended to undermine Nelson’s credibility and stir juror bias against him as a chronic litigant.

Indeed, the evidence of Nelson’s other lawsuits went to the 

heart of the defense theory of the case: that Nelson had 

fabricated his story and was using it to “con” the jury into 

giving him money. The error was not harmless. 

C. Officer Novotny’s Testimony

During Nelson’s case-in-chief, Officer Novotny testified, 

consistent with his judicial admission, that he had no recollection of the traffic stop. On cross-examination, however, 

his attorney asked him to “tell the ladies and gentlemen of 

the jury some of the circumstances by which you pull a 

handgun on an individual in a traffic stop.” Nelson objected, 

but the judge allowed Novotny to answer, though she gave 

the jury the following admonition: “Ladies and gentlemen, 

the testimony you are about to hear is general background 

information, it’ll be very brief, and it’s not intended to 

suggest that any of these circumstances existed on the 

evening in question. This witness has no recollection.”

The testimony was not brief. Officer Novotny began by 

telling the jury that if “I felt for any reason that my safety 

was in jeopardy or my partner[’s] safety was in jeopardy, by 

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No. 12-3401 21

all means, I would have my handgun out of the holster and 

at least in a ‘ready’ position.” His attorney then asked him to 

explain the circumstances in which he might have good 

reason to point his gun at someone during a traffic stop. He 

answered,

[I]f we ran the license plate and there was a 

LEADS message that contained the message 

that said “armed and dangerous,” “known to 

fight with police,” “known to try to disarm the 

police.” These are all common messages that 

they attach to the LEADS message when you 

run a license plate.

If for some reason the driver or the occupant 

was making [furtive] movements in the vehicle, meaning reaching under the seat, ignoring 

verbal direction, it would put us officers on 

high alert. We would definitely feel our safety 

was in jeopardy at that point. You know, it’s a --

to obtain a weapon? You know, we don’t know 

on the traffic stop.

That’s not all. The defense attorney asked Officer Novotny to identify circumstances that might give an officer 

cause to search a stopped vehicle. He replied that if “our 

safety was in jeopardy”—say, for example, if the occupants 

made “[furtive] movements[,] ... we could ask the occupants 

to exit the vehicle and do a plain-view search of the vehicle 

for weapons.” He went on to explain why Nelson’s description of the search was not believable: 

It would be such a disregard for safety if four 

officers -- if the only officers on the scene, I’m 

assuming, turn their backs on a subject who 

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22 No. 12-3401

was in cuffs for a reason that there was a risk 

already and for four people to ignore him and 

search a car, not to mention the fact that it 

wouldn’t take four officers to search one vehicle. We would never practice anything like 

that. 

Finally, Officer Novotny was asked to identify circumstances that might justify handcuffing the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop. He testified that “[i]f at that time 

they’re not listening to verbal direction by keeping their 

hands where you know where they’re at so they ... wouldn’t 

retrieve a weapon and then try to harm you or your partner.”

In her posttrial ruling, the judge explained that this 

“background” testimony from Officer Novotny was admissible because it was “phrased in a clearly hypothetical 

fashion” and the risk of prejudice was low. She also observed 

that because the defendants “have no recollection of the 

incident in question, there is very little evidence they can 

offer beyond illustrating how Plaintiff’s account of the 

incident departs from official procedure.”

Nelson argues that admitting this testimony was reversible error, and again we largely agree. We note for starters 

that evidence of a person’s “habit” is admissible to prove

that he acted in accordance with the habit on a specific 

occasion, FED. R. EVID. 406, but neither the defendants nor 

the district court relied on this rule as a basis to pursue this 

line of questioning. That’s understandable. “[B]efore a court 

may admit evidence of habit, the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform 

response that ensures more than a mere ‘tendency’ to act in a 

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No. 12-3401 23

given manner, but rather, conduct that is ‘semi-automatic’ in 

nature.” Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Sys., Inc., 847 F.2d 

1290, 1293 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Thompson v. Boggs, 33 F.3d 

847, 854 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting the Federal Rules of Evidence 

Advisory Committee’s position that habit “describes one’s 

regular response to a repeated specific situation”). The 

defense never made this showing, and it’s hard to see how

Rule 406 can be applied in this particular context. A police

officer’s decision to draw his gun, use handcuffs, or search a 

car during a traffic stop can hardly be characterized as 

“habitual” or “semi-automatic.” Indeed, the judge’s instruction to the jury—that Officer Novotny’s testimony was “not

intended to convey what actually happened”—is inconsistent with the proper use of habit testimony, which is 

intended to show that the person acted in accordance with 

his habit on a particular occasion. 

Nelson argues that Officer Novotny’s “background” testimony was speculative and contradicted the defendants’ 

judicial admissions that they had no recollection of stopping

Nelson.6 To evaluate this argument, it’s helpful to divide

Officer Novotny’s testimony into three categories. The first is 

testimony that was flatly incompatible with the agreed facts 

 

6 “Judicial admissions are formal concessions in the pleadings, or 

stipulations by a party or its counsel, that are binding upon the party 

making them. ... Indeed, they are ‘not evidence at all but rather have the 

effect of withdrawing a fact from contention.’” Keller v. United States, 

58 F.3d 1194, 1198 n.8 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting [30B] MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, 

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 6726 (Interim Ed.) 

(currently found at § 7026)).

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24 No. 12-3401

of the case. This includes Officer Novotny’s testimony that 

an officer would have his gun in the “ready” position if a 

LEADS warning indicated that a driver was “armed and 

dangerous,” “known to fight with police,” or “known to try 

to disarm police.” As we’ve explained, the defendants 

entered formal judicial admissions that the LEADS database 

said nothing of the sort about Nelson, and the computer logs 

confirmed it. As a result, the “hypothetical” LEADS warnings Officer Novotny described could not possibly have 

made Nelson’s account of the stop any more or less probable.

This testimony should not have been permitted.

The second category is the testimony that directly contradicted specific parts of Nelson’s account of the stop. This 

includes Officer Novotny’s assertions that “it wouldn’t take 

four officers to search one vehicle” and “[i]t would be such a 

disregard for safety if four officers [would] ... turn their 

backs on a subject who was in cuffs.” This testimony was

relevant because it provided specific reasons, grounded in 

the officer’s training and experience, to doubt some of the 

particulars of Nelson’s account of the stop as he recounted it 

on the witness stand. Indeed, Nelson doesn’t challenge the 

admission of these specific statements.

The third category includes testimony that was not conclusively refuted by judicial admission or undisputed evidence but also was not clearly related to the circumstances of 

Nelson’s stop. For example, Officer Novotny testified that 

officers would put their guns in the ready position during a 

traffic stop if someone in the stopped car made furtive 

movements. He also testified that the driver of a stopped car 

might be handcuffed if he did not obey an officer’s orders. In 

the context of this case, this testimony was entirely speculaCase: 12-3401 Document: 48 Filed: 01/20/2016 Pages: 26
No. 12-3401 25

tive: It posits that if the events Nelson described actually 

happened—if guns were drawn, if he was handcuffed, if his 

car was searched, etc.—here are some possible factual circumstances that would provide justification. But of course 

Officer Novotny doesn’t know if any of these things actually 

happened; none of the officers do. The only possible purpose 

and effect of this testimony was to invite the jury to speculate that Nelson acted in the ways Officer Novotny described.

And this speculative testimony was heavily prejudicial. 

Officer Novotny presented a worst-case scenario involving 

furtive movements, hidden weapons, and disobeyed orders, 

but without any reason to believe that Nelson engaged in 

this behavior, was otherwise dangerous, or that the officers’ 

safety was threatened during this stop. Associating Nelson 

with this kind of suspicious behavior—without any factual 

basis whatsoever—was plainly prejudicial to him and likely 

stimulated sympathy for the officers. This testimony bore 

only a speculative link to Nelson’s stop and should not have 

been permitted.

Was this testimony harmless? On one hand, the testimony was specifically framed as hypothetical, and the judge 

gave two limiting instructions to that effect. With respect to 

the LEADS testimony in particular, the jury had the defendants’ judicial admissions as well as testimony from all four 

officers that the LEADS system did not in fact provide any

reason to stop Nelson or to suppose that he might be armed 

and dangerous. On the other hand, as we’ve just explained, 

it was highly prejudicial to associate Nelson with the most 

dangerous class of suspects officers might encounter in a 

traffic stop.

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26 No. 12-3401

If Officer Novotny’s “background” testimony were the 

only evidentiary error at this trial, the harmlessness question

might be closer. But harmlessness is evaluated “in light of 

the entire record,” and “[w]here there are several errors, 

each of which is harmless in its own right, a new trial may 

still be granted if the cumulative effect of those otherwise 

harmless errors deprives a litigant of a fair trial.” Barber, 

725 F.3d at 715 (quotation marks omitted). We’ve already 

concluded that a new trial is warranted because other evidence was erroneously admitted. The error in admitting 

Officer Novotny’s speculative testimony only bolsters that 

conclusion.

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, the judgment 

is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Case: 12-3401 Document: 48 Filed: 01/20/2016 Pages: 26