Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00187/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00187-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Robert John Sparks,

Petitioner, No. Civ. S 02-0187 DFL PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

Diane Butler, et al., 

Respondents.

-oOoPetitioner is a state prisoner with counsel seeking a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner challenges his June 21, 2000, conviction in the

Tehama County Superior Court of transporting and possessing

methamphetamine (Health and Safety Code §§ 11379(a) & 11377(a)),

possessing drug paraphernalia (Health and Safety Code § 11364)

and escape (Penal Code § 836.6(b)). The possession charge was

dismissed as a lesser included offense of the transportation

charge. The court also found petitioner was convicted of a prior

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felony. 

After petitioner crashed his truck into a tree, left the

scene, and returned (wearing a blue shirt), officers at the scene

found a bag containing methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia on

the ground near the truck. Petitioner admitted to one of the

officers he had been driving the truck. (RT 89.) 

Petitioner claims trial counsel provided constitutionally

deficient assistance. One witness, a Bell Carter employee,

reported seeing the truck crash and the driver, a man in a blue

shirt, got out of the truck and stagger away. Petitioner’s

friend Carmen Cook, would have testified that petitioner was

wearing a black vest and jacket and had his dog with him when he

came to her house to get help after the accident but he took off

the vest and jacket and left them at her house before returning

to the scene. Petitioner argues that these accounts cast doubt

on his guilt because they allowed an inference that drugs and

paraphernalia may have belonged either to a man in a blue shirt

or a man in a black vest and jacket with a dog. Petitioner

contends that counsel worsened matters by reading into the record

the description given by the Bell Carter employee, without

calling Cook to testify.

Petitioner did not testify at trial and adduced no 

witnesses. Defense counsel argued that law enforcement testimony

at the preliminary hearing and trial was inconsistent on minor

details, that petitioner’s fingerprints were not found on the

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black bag or its contents and that it was not established beyond

a reasonable doubt that the bag had ever been in petitioner’s

truck. (RT 170-81.)

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal for

the Third District. He argued, without evidentiary support, that

trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in failing to

call unspecified witnesses. While the appeal was pending,

petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the appellate

court in November 2000, submitting Carmen Cook’s declaration in

support of his claim he received ineffective assistance of

counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

The court of appeal denied the petition for habeas corpus,

without citation or analysis, on December 7, 2000. Then on April

30, 2001, the court of appeal affirmed petitioner’s conviction,

stating as follows: 

In the early afternoon of February 29, 2000, Officer

Gina Giannoni was sent out to investigate a reckless

driving call. Upon arriving at the scene, she saw a

blue Ford pickup, which had crashed into a tree. 

Shortly after Officer Giannoni arrived, a female

employee of nearby Bell Carter told Officer Giannoni

she had seen the driver of the truck stagger away from

the scene after he hit the tree. She described the

driver as wearing a blue shirt and blue pants. This

unidentified woman then left.

Checking the area of the accident, Officer Giannoni

noticed a backpack and two bags inside the truck. 

Officer Woods then arrived at the scene. He also saw a

backpack and two bags inside the truck.

After the officers arranged for the truck to be towed,

defendant, wearing a blue shirt and blue jeans,

returned. He told the officers the brakes had gone out

in the truck, causing him to crash. While speaking

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with the officers, defendant began rummaging through

things in the truck.

Officer Woods noticed the smell of alcohol on

defendant’s breath and asked him whether he had been

drinking. Defendant answered he had had one beer after

the accident.

The officers sought and obtained defendant’s consent to

search the truck. During the course of the search,

Officer Giannoni found a small black bag on the ground

approximately 15 feet away from the truck. Inside the

bag, the officers found a syringe, a glass pipe and .4

grams of methamphetamine. Although defendant denied

the bag was his, and there were no indicia of his

ownership of the bag, the officers placed defendant

under arrest, handcuffed him and placed him in the back

seat of the patrol car.

Officer Woods began to take an inventory of the items

in the truck. He found the backpack and one of the

bags he had seen in the truck previously, but the

second small bag was no longer in the truck. Officer

Woods heard keys jingling and turned to see defendant

running away. Officer Woods chased defendant and

caught him about 200 yards away.

At trial, defendant offered no evidence or witnesses

nor was there any objection to the imposition of

consecutive sentences.

***

On direct appeal, defendant contends his trial counsel

was ineffective because he did not call as a witness

either the eyewitness from Bell Carter or the

“person/persons whom [defendant] visited upon leaving

the scene following the accident.” Defendant

speculates that the witnesses would have confirmed his

claim that the contraband found in the truck belonged

to another person who departed the scene. Defendant

has not made an adequate showing to sustain this claim.

“‘Reviewing courts will reverse convictions [on direct

appeal] only if the record on appeal affirmatively

discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose

for [his or her] act or omission.’” (People v. Zapien

(1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 980.) “[T]his ineffective

assistance claim cannot properly be raised on appeal,

because the record before us does not reveal the basis

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for trial counsel’s decision not to [call particular

witnesses] . . . , and that decision is not of the type

for which there could be no satisfactory explanation.” 

(People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 625.)

“To sustain a claim of inadequate representation by

reason of failure to call a witness, there must be a

showing from which it can be determined whether the

testimony of the alleged additional defense witness was

material, necessary, or admissible, or that defense

counsel did not exercise proper judgment in failing to

call him.” (People v. Hill (1969) 70 Cal.2d 678, 690.) 

There is no such showing on this record. 

There are myriad of reasons why defense counsel may

have chosen not to call these witnesses, not the least

of which is their testimony might have further

implicated defendant, rather than being exculpatory. 

On the record before us, defendant has not established

there were any witnesses who were not called who would

have provided testimony material to his defense. (See

People v. Rowland (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 371, 374.) In

the absence of a record demonstrating either the

materiality of the potential witness’s testimony or the

complete lack of any rational tactical purpose for this

failure, we will not deem counsel’s actions deficient.

Answer, Exhibit A.

Petitioner petitioned the California Supreme Court June 14,

2001, raising as issues for review the propriety of the appellate

court’s deciding his appeal based on lack of supporting evidence

while simultaneously denying his petition for habeas corpus,

which was supported by evidence, without citation. Answer Ex. C. 

The petition for review was denied summarily without comment July

18, 2001. Answer, Exhibit B. 

This court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state

court’s determination of petitioner’s claim was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law as clearly established by

the United States Supreme Court. A decision is contrary to

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clearly established federal law if it fails to apply the correct

controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling authority

to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those

in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different

result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413-14 (2000). A

decision involves an unreasonable application of federal law if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

but applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case in

a manner that is “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63 (2003). “Clearly established federal law” is defined

as the holdings of the United States Supreme Court existing when

the state court issued its decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 

Circuit law is “persuasive authority” for purposes of determining

whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.

2003); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Where the state court summarily denies the petition without

comment, the district court will look to the last reasoned state

decision on the issue. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991). 

If none exists, the district court must independently review the

record to determine whether the state ruling was contrary to or

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000). 

This court looks to the appellate decision as the last

reasoned state decision on petitioner’s claim of ineffective

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assistance. Respondent contends petitioner’s claim is “factually

unexhausted” because he never filed a petition for habeas corpus,

supported by the Cook declaration, in the California Supreme

Court. Petitioner argues exhaustion requirements are met because

his petition for review attached a copy of the habeas petition to

the court of appeal and the Cook declaration. This court finds

the California Supreme Court had a fair opportunity to act on

petitioner’s claim, and it is exhausted. See Kelly v. Small, 315

F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). 

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner

must first show that, considering all the circumstances,

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688

(1984). The court must determine whether the acts or omissions

identified by the petitioner were outside the wide range of

professional, competent assistance. Id. at 690. If so, the

court must then examine whether those errors prejudiced the

petitioner. Id. at 693. Prejudice is found where “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” 

Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.; see

also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d

972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). The prejudice analysis focuses on

“whether counsel’s deficient performance render[ed] the result of

the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” 

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Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). 

Petitioner argues that trial counsel’s performance, in

offering the Bell Carter employee’s description of the man

driving while failing to offer the available testimony of Carmen

Cook that petitioner arrived at her house wearing a black vest

and jacket and leading a dog, fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. 

Assuming without deciding that counsel’s performance fell

below that of a competent lawyer, petitioner fails to show he

suffered prejudice as defined by Strickland. The jury clearly

reached a conclusion that the bag was in the truck when

petitioner arrived at the scene, and it was petitioner who moved

it to its location on the ground 15 feet away from the truck. 

This, coupled with petitioner’s escape after he was arrested, the

needle marks on his arm, and his strange behavior in ignoring

Officer Giannoni and desperately rummaging through the property

in the truck, supported the jury’s implicit finding that he knew

contents. There is no reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s alleged error, the result of the proceedings would have

been different; petitioner fails to “undermine confidence in the

outcome” of his trial. 

Accordingly, the court hereby recommends that the petition

for habeas corpus be denied.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be

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filed within 20 days of service of these findings and

recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: April 19, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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