Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02632/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02632-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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RP

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jon T. Vanderhoof, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 09-2632-PHX-DGC (DKD)

ORDER

Plaintiff Jon T. Vanderhoof, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison ComplexLewis, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. #1). The

$350.00 civil action filing fee has been paid. Court will require Defendants to answer

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims and dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims.

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

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demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951.

II. Complaint 

Named as Defendants in the Complaint are: (1) Charles Ryan, Director of the Arizona

Department of Corrections (ADOC); (2) Ada Tutu, Doctor, Director of Inmate Health

Services, ADOC Central Office; (3) Greeley, Facility Healthcare Administrator, Arizona

State Prison Complex-Tucson (ASPC-Tucson); and (4) Kevin Lewis, Healthcare Provider,

ASPC-Tucson. Plaintiff’s sole ground in the Complaint is that his Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights have been violated. Plaintiff seeks a jury trial, declaratory and injunctive

relief, and nominal, compensatory, and punitive monetary damages.

III. Discussion

A. Eighth Amendment claims

In Count I, Plaintiff claims that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by

Defendants Charles Ryan, Greeley, Kevin Lewis, and Adu Tutu when they were deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff’s Hepatitis C (HCV) condition and his pain and suffering. Liberally

construed, Plaintiff has stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court

will call for an answer to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims from Defendants Ryan,

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Greeley, Lewis, and Tutu. 

B. Fourteenth Amendment claims

In Count I, Plaintiff further claims that his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal

protection were violated by Defendants Charles Ryan and Adu Tutu when they discriminated

by affording general population inmates with serious medical conditions a greater level of

care than protective segregation inmates, “resulting in unnecessary pain and suffering and

physical injuries.” Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ryan initiated a policy that discriminates

against Plaintiff and his fellow inmates who are classified as protective segregation inmates.

Plaintiff further alleges that in November of 2009, Defendant Ryan “ordered that all inmates

with serious medical conditions to be transferred to the ASPC-Tucson where Ryan would

concentrate ADOC’s medical personnel and resources in order to try and meet the inmates’

needs.” Plaintiff also alleges that as of December 4, 2009, all protective segregation inmates,

including Plaintiff, had been transferred to ASPC-Lewis “where there are far fewer medical

resources and where [Plaintiff] is still not receiving treatment for his HCV and his pain and

suffering.”

To state a claim for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must show

that the defendants acted with intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based

upon membership in a protected class. Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.

1998). For purposes of equal protection, inmates are not a suspect class. See Webber v.

Crabtree, 158 F.3d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1998); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834 (9th

Cir. 1991). Inmates are not entitled to identical treatment as other inmates merely because

they are all inmates. See Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963). A mere demonstration of

inequality is not enough to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 

When a suspect class is not implicated, the complainant must allege invidious

discriminatory intent. McQueary, 924 F.2d at 834-35. However, conclusory allegations

alone do not establish an equal protection violation without proof of invidious discriminatory

intent. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265

(1977). In addition, when a suspect class is not implicated, the court must determine whether

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the alleged discrimination is “patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a

legitimate governmental interest.” Vermouth v. Corrothers, 827 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir.

1987) (internal quotations omitted).

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v.

Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further,

a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the

claim that were not initially pled. Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.

Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege that he is a member of a suspect class, that

Defendants’ conduct was the result of purposeful or invidious discrimination, or that the

conduct bore no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Plaintiff’s

conclusory allegation that Defendant Ryan’s policy “discriminates” against Plaintiff and his

fellow inmates in protective segregation is not enough to show invidious discriminatory

intent. Moreover, Plaintiff had not alleged that the claimed discrimination bears no rational

relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Indeed, it is apparent that the ADOC has

a legitimate governmental interest in housing protective segregation inmates in a different

location than general population inmates for their own protection. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims in Count I will be dismissed for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IV. Warnings

A. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

B. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy

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of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate

stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit

an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply

may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

C. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protections claims in Count I of the

Complaint (Doc. #1) are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

(2) Defendants Charles Ryan, Greeley, Kevin Lewis, and Adu Tutu must answer

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims in Count I of the Complaint (Doc. #1).

(3) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the

Complaint (Doc. #1), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for

Defendants Charles Ryan, Greeley, Kevin Lewis, and Adu Tutu.

(4) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court

within 20 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(5) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on a Defendant within 120 days of the

filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the

action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv

16.2(b)(2)(B)(I).

(6) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the

Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use.

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(7) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants Charles Ryan, Greeley,

Kevin Lewis, and Adu Tutu of the commencement of this action and request waiver of

service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The

notice to Defendants must include a copy of this Order. The Marshal must immediately file

requests for waivers that were returned as undeliverable and waivers of service of the

summons. If a waiver of service of summons is not returned by a Defendant within 30 days

from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must:

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order upon

the Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for the Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of

the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon

Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service form

(USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying

additional copies of the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new

process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be

taxed against the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(8) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and Complaint

must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

(9) Defendants must answer the Complaint (Doc. #1) or otherwise respond by

appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(10) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose

behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that

does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed.

(11) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan pursuant to Rules

72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as authorized

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under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

DATED this 9th day of March, 2010.

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