Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01633/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01633-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 740
Nature of Suit: Railway Labor Act
Cause of Action: 45:151 Railway Labor Act

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All references to document number are to documents filed in CV08-1728-PHXNVW.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Don Addington; John Bostic; Mark

Burman; Afshin Iranpour; Roger Velez;

Steve Wargocki,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

US Airline Pilots Association; US

Airways, Inc.,

Defendants. __________________________________

Don Addington; John Bostic; Mark

Burman; Afshin Iranpour; Roger Velez;

Steve Wargocki, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Steven Bradford; Paul Diorio; Robert

Frear; Mark King; Douglas Mowery; John

Stephan, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 08-1633-PHX-NVW

(consolidated)

ORDER

CV08-1728-PHX-NVW

Defendants (“East Pilots”) filed a motion to dismiss this action under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1), (2), (3), (6) and (7). (Doc. # 16.1

) The motion has already been denied as to Rules

Case 2:08-cv-01633-NVW Document 118 Filed 12/24/08 Page 1 of 9
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12(b)(3) and (7). (Doc. # 21.) Now that the briefing on the remaining motions is complete,

the court considers the remainder of the East Pilots’ motion. It is unnecessary to restate the

factual background for reasons already made clear in the court’s November 21, 2008 order.

Although personal jurisdiction is proper in this case, the East Pilots’ motion to dismiss will

be granted because the state law claims are preempted by federal law. 

I. Personal Jurisdiction

 “Where a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction,

the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate.”

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). In a class

action such as this one, the test is whether the named defendants meet jurisdictional criteria.

See Abrams Shell v. Shell Oil Co., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1107 n.5 (C.D. Cal. 2001). “Unless

directly contravened, [a plaintiff’s] version of the facts is taken as true, and conflicts between

the facts contained in the parties' affidavits must be resolved in [a plaintiff’s] favor for

purposes of deciding whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists.” Harris

Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Arizona’s long-arm rule, applicable in this diversity suit, “provides for personal

jurisdiction coextensive with the limits of federal due process.” Doe v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross,

112 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a). Due process

requirements are satisfied if the out-of-state defendant has “at least ‘minimum contacts’ with

the relevant forum.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801. In this circuit, the test contains three

parts: “(1) the non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate

some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he

purposefully avails himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum . . . (2) the

claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities;

and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must . . . be reasonable.” CE Distribution, LLC v. New

Sensor Corp., 380 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004) (ellipses original).

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In this breach of contract action, the “purposeful availment” requirement is satisfied

because the East Pilots have “created continuing obligations to forum residents.” Id. at 1113

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In their First Amended Complaint (doc. # 8),

Plaintiffs (the “West Pilots”) allege that the East Pilots, as individuals, agreed to participate

in and be bound by an arbitration to resolve a seniority dispute between the two pilot groups.

The arbitration was conducted and an award (the “Nicolau Award”) spelled out the relative

seniority rights between the groups. According to the West Pilots, the East Pilots were

required to abide by this award as the final and contractually binding resolution of their

dispute. The East Pilots have not done so. Rather than conducting internal union affairs and

labor negotiations in accordance with the award, the East Pilots have announced an intent to

repudiate the Nicolau Award. They have mounted an ongoing campaign to impose a

different seniority structure on the West Pilots. This alleged breach must flow from a

continuing obligation to West Pilots (who are Arizona residents) to abide by the Nicolau

Award. The East Pilots therefore have minimum contacts with Arizona, and the claim

against them arises out of those contacts.

The exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable in this case. Seven factors govern this

inquiry: “(1) the extent of a defendant’s purposeful interjection into the forum state’s affairs;

(2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the

sovereignty of the defendant’s home state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the

dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the

forum to the plaintiff’s interests in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of

an alternative forum.” Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284

F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The East Pilots’ continuing obligation to the West Pilots under the alleged agreement

was a purposeful interjection into Arizona affairs; they knowingly concluded and sought to

undermine these duties to the Arizona pilots. This fact alone satisfies the standard as to all

named Defendants, but some of them also traveled to Arizona. Shortly before April 2008,

Defendants Bradford and King went to Phoenix to make a presentation to the West Pilots

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regarding the Nicolau Award. On the same day these two defendants and Defendant Mowery

met with US Airways management in Tempe. Evidence also suggests that the USAPA

Merger Committee and Negotiating Advisory Committee met with US Airways

representatives in Arizona to pass to the Company their date of hire seniority list. Defendant

Diorio is the Chairman of the Negotiating Advisory Committee and Defendant Frear is one

of its members.

None of the other factors renders jurisdiction unreasonable. The burden of defending

the case in Arizona is not extraordinary; though the East Pilots are far away, both the East

and West Pilots are employed by an Arizona company, and many of the events at issue and

witnesses to be called are located in Arizona. The case presents no apparent conflict with

the sovereignty of another state. Arizona has an interest in the adjudication of this dispute

as it relates to Arizona residents and an Arizona employer. Judicial efficiency favors keeping

the action here because some of the evidence is located in Arizona and this court is already

familiar with the complexities of the controversy. The forum is convenient for plaintiffs,

who reside and work here, and there is no persuasive reason why the East Pilots’ chosen

forum—North Carolina—would be preferable.

Defendants argue that their only contact with Arizona arises out of their official acts

as officers of USAPA and that they are therefore not subject to personal jurisdiction in this

forum, citing Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrochi, No. CV 05-2656-PHX-MHM, 2006 WL

2460595, at *6, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63299, at *16 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006). This

analysis is error. Plaintiffs do not base their claim on Defendants’ official acts as such.

Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants as individuals were contractually bound to honor the

Nicolau Award, and that Defendants as individuals have breached their obligation to do so.

Any official significance to their acts arises subsequent to that obligation; it does not create

a shield to the exercise of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs are alleged to have breached their personal

state law obligations whether or not they did so as union officials.

For these reasons, the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction will be

denied.

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II. Federal Preemption

The East Pilots next assert that the breach of contract action must be dismissed

because it is preempted by federal law. This court agrees. The West Pilots invoke a series

of contractual rights and remedies, each of which encroaches too far on the domain of federal

regulation. As both parties acknowledge, the East Pilots have formed USAPA, a union that

opposes the implementation of the Nicolau Award. In effect, the West Pilots seek injunctive

relief regarding union actions that are governed by the statutory duty of fair representation.

Their suit represents a challenge to the exclusive authority of a union to represent its

members. These areas of federal legislation preempt the application of state rules of decision.

“[S]tate laws that frustrate the purpose of the [Railway Labor Act (“RLA”)] are

preempted.” Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. City & County of S.F., 266 F.3d 1064, 1076 (9th Cir.

2001). While the Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed the preemptive force of the union’s

representational functions, caselaw from other circuits is persuasive. “The duty of fair

representation is a corollary of the union’s status as the exclusive representative of all

employees in a bargaining unit.” Peterson v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 759 F.2d 1161,

1169 (4th Cir. 1985). “The rights and duties of unions in carrying out their representational

functions is an area where the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal

statutes that legal relations which they affect must be deemed governed by federal law having

its source in those statutes, rather than by local law.” Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 387 F.3d

298, 322 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where federal labor

law protects the rights at issue—as it does here—two exceptions to preemption may apply.

They arise where there is “conduct ‘deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility’” or

“matters of only ‘peripheral concern’ to federal labor relations law.” Id. at 321 (quoting San

Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)). State law claims alleging

misconduct on the part of union officers in the course of their representational duties “can

hardly be called a peripheral concern to federal labor law.” Peterson, 759 F.2d at 1169. This

is the stuff of federal fair representation claims.

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 Although the West Pilots’ aim their present action at individual union members rather

than the union as a whole, the injunctive relief they seek is identical in function to the relief

sought in their companion action against the union. Enjoining USAPA’s officers to negotiate

toward implementing the Nicolau Award is tantamount to enjoining USAPA itself. See

id. at 1170 (finding preemption where same relief is sought under both the RLA and state

law). The potential for conflict between the state and federal law is clear; if the court were

to grant relief on the state contract claims but deny it under federal law, the injunction against

the union officer would trammel the union’s ability to represent US Airways pilots fairly and

in accordance with federal law. “[T]he representative is clothed with power not unlike that

of a legislature,” Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1944), delimited by

federal law in its powers and existence. It would defy this principle to allow some workers,

by invoking the law of a single state, to gain control over a union’s internal mechanisms of

representation. The West Pilots’ state contract actions bear directly on representation

concerning the seniority rights of the pilots. See Bensel, 387 F.3d at 321. There is no state

interest “deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility” here; the contract actions attempt

only to duplicate or override the federal framework of labor relations. See Bensel, 387 F.3d

at 321. Seniority rights are a “central aspect of employment”; “[t]he RLA determines the

rights, obligations, and duties of employees, their representatives, and carriers with respect

to negotiations and agreements” in this area. Id. The West Pilots’ claims for breach of

contract are therefore preempted.

It bears noting that the West Pilots have purported not to allege a breach of any

collective bargaining agreement. “[A] plaintiff covered by a collective-bargaining agreement

is permitted to assert legal rights independent of that agreement, including state-law contract

rights, so long as the contract relied upon is not a collective-bargaining agreement.”

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (NLRA case). Even assuming the

West Pilots’ claims are not based on a collective bargaining agreement, they nevertheless are

preempted because they interfere with the federal scheme of internal union decisionmaking

and governance.

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The East Pilots argue that preemption deprives the court of jurisdiction and requires

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). The court’s November 21, 2008 order established that there

is subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the original state court complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1441 and Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 261 (1994). That

jurisdictional basis—the complete preemption of state law claims by the RLA’s duty of fair

representation—remains sound. However, on reexamination, the question is a closer one

than the previous order indicates. 

In a lengthy and learned analysis, the Second Circuit has rejected complete

preemption under the RLA as a basis for removal jurisdiction. See Sullivan v. Am. Airlines,

Inc., 424 F.3d 267, 273-78 (2d Cir. 2005). Sullivan placed great weight on the Supreme

Court’s recent failure to mention the RLA as a source of complete preemption that supports

jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s language is as follows: “In the two categories of cases

where this Court has found complete pre-emption—certain causes of action under the LMRA

and ERISA—the federal statutes at issue provided the exclusive cause of action for the claim

asserted and also set forth procedures and remedies governing that cause of action.”

Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (footnote omitted). The Second

Circuit takes this omission of the RLA to mean that Hawaiian Airlines, which applied

substantive LMRA preemption doctrine in an RLA case, did not also import the jurisdictional

ramifications of LMRA preemption to the RLA context.

The Ninth Circuit has not addressed this issue; a split of authority within the circuit

predates both Hawaiian Airlines and Beneficial National Bank. See Holman v. Laulo-Rowe

Agency, 994 F.2d 666, 669 n. 4 (9th Cir.1993) (noting intra-circuit conflict). The Second

Circuit’s handling of the recent Supreme Court authority is persuasive, and this court agrees

with it. However, Sullivan and other similar circuit court opinions do not address the

preemptive force of the duty of fair representation, but only the preemptive force of the

federal law that governs minor disputes under a collective bargaining agreement. See

Sullivan, 424 F.3d at 270; Roddy v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 395 F.3d 318, 326 (6th Cir. 2005);

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Geddes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 321 F.3d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003); Ry. Labor Executives

Ass’n v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 858 F.2d 936, 942-43 (3d Cir. 1988).

The difference is significant. While the LMRA provides a federal right of action for

contract disputes, 29 U.S.C. § 185, the RLA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies.

See Sullivan, 424 F.3d at 275-76; Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 8 (lack of a federal cause

of action undermines complete preemption). It is fundamental, however, that a plaintiff may

bring suit under the RLA to enforce the duty of fair representation. Crusos v. United Transp.

Union, Local 1201, 786 F.2d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, there is still life to the older

authority holding that the duty is completely preemptive, as it is in the LMRA context. See

Kollar v. United Transp. Union, 83 F.3d 124, 125-26 (5th Cir. 1996). “Because federal law

completely governs the duties owed by an exclusive collective bargaining representative to

those within the bargaining unit, and because this manifestation of congressional will so

closely parallels Congress’s intentions with regard to section 301 . . . a district court

possesses federal question jurisdiction when a complaint, though garbed in state-law raiment,

sufficiently asserts a claim implicating the duty of fair representation.” BIW Deceived v.

Local S6, Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of Am., 132 F.3d 824, 831-32 (1st

Cir. 1997) (LMRA case). But see US Airways Master Executive Council, Air Line Pilots

Assoc., Int’l. v. Am. West Master Executive, Council, Air Line Pilots Assoc., Int’l., 525 F.

Supp. 2d 127, 134 (D.D.C. 2007). The court is persuaded that complete preemption still

provides a basis for jurisdiction in the narrow realm of RLA cases where a state cause of

action has the purpose and effect of dictating a union’s representation of its members. The

original state court complaint explicitly did just that.

Jurisdiction having been established, the force of the preemption is therefore to

prevent state law from supplying a claim or rule of decision upon which the West Pilots can

be granted relief. Any legal effect of the Transition Agreement or other agreements will be

adjudicated in light of federal rules of decision, which may or may not refer to principles of

state contract law. It is unnecessary to consider the parties’ remaining arguments regarding

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the validity of any federal fair representation claim or the preemptive force of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (doc. # 16) is

denied as to Rules 12(b)(1), (2), (3), and (7), and granted as to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the alleged state law claims being federally

preempted.

DATED this 24th day of December, 2008.

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