Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01547/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01547-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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. ,, ....... 

PUBLISH 

IN THE oMITED sii~ATro:s coURT OF AJlPEA.Ls 

I""?J>f.t·~ •·_j{'; 

E'OR THE T~T~ CIRCUIT 

MAY 3 0 1990 

ROBE~.! L. HOJ!C,f(ER 

•· Clerk•·· : '"·: ·/;,};-~•.,:'-. 

HERBERT CHARLES BLATCHF'ORD,; JR. u 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

GEORGE SULLIVAN, Warden, and 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF 

NEW MEXICO, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

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No. 87-1547 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRIC:t? 1c:OURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEt/W MEXICO 

(D.C~ NO. 84-0384HB) 

'\t;'.>:'<f 'i1f:t"\,, ·,. ··, 

Tova Indr i tz, Feder al Public Def ender, Albuquerque~ N!f\lf Me:ifico, 

Attorney for Appellant. 

• ,i~, ·~.{ t:"i.·' I .. L.i ~·-~ ' .., Norman S. Thayer, Sutin, Thayer & Browne, Albuquerc;p.l;e'f'·Nfw Mexico 

(Hal Stratton, Attorney General of the State of Nevi ·r,f€'.!1{~-{c5, George 

Snyder, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico," Stephen 

Charnas, Sasha Siemel, and James Lawrence Sanchez, Sutin, ihijy~r-~ 

Browne, Albuquerque, New Mexico, with him on the brief), Attbiney~. 

for Appellees. 

Roger J. Marzulla, Acting Assistant Attor~ey Gen~ral, Willia~ L. 

Lutz, United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mex·ico, Jacque's B. 

Gelin and Maria A. Iizuka, Attorneys, Department of Justice, 

Washington, o.c., on the brief for the United States as· A.micus 

Curiae. 

Paul E. Frye, Nordhaus, Hal tQ!J), Taylo.r·, T'.ft'a.dash & F:ry,t::, 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, on the brief fort the Navajd'Ttib~ of 

Indians as Ainicus Curiae. 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

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This case is a companion case to Pittsburgh & Midway Coal 

Mining Co. v. Yazzie, No. 88-2413, slip op. (10th Cir., May 30, 

1990). Although Pittsburgh & Midway is a civil case and this one 

a criminal case, both raise the same legal issue, i.e., whether 

1.9 million acres in northwest New Mexico remain part of the 

Navajo Reservation by virtue of two Executive Orders issued in 

1907 and 1908. Oral arguments in the two cases were consolidated, 

and the extensive documentary records were read side by side. We 

today decide in Pittsburgh & Midway that the area in New Mexico 

set aside by Executive Order ("EO") 709, as amended by EO 744, 

lost reservation status when EOs 1000 and 1284 were issued in 1908 

and 1911. Our ruling in that case governs this case as well. 

Nonetheless, we proceed to write separately to dispose of a second 

issue arising in this case that was not present in Pittsburgh & 

Midway. 

BACKGROUND 

Charles Blatchford, a Navajo Indian, was convicted in 1978 in 

the New Mexico courts of being an accessory to criminal sexual 

penetration of a Navajo child and an accessory to the kidnapping 

of a second Navajo child. He was sentenced concurrently to ten to 

fifty years on the first count and life imprisonment on the 

second. After pursuing various appeals in state court, he filed a 

writ of habeas corpus in federal court, alleging that the state of 

New Mexico lacked jurisdiction to try him for his offenses. The 

district court determined that Blatchford's unsuccessful appeal in 

Blatchford v. Gonzales, 670 P.2d 945 (N.M. 1983), cert. denied, 

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464 U.S. 1033 (1984), and its procedural aftermath had completed 

the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies. 

The criminal acts of which Blatchford was convicted occurred 

in 1977 within a rural settlement area known as Yah-Ta-Hey, more 

specifically within section 7 of Township 16 North, Range 18 West, 

New Mexico Principal Meridian. Section 7 and the surrounding 

sections fall within an area added in 1907 to the Navajo 

Reservation by EO 709, as amended by EO 744. Blatchford alleged 

that the 709/744 area had never lost its reservation status and 

that, therefore, exclusive federal jurisdiction to try him lay 

with the federal courts under the Federal Major Crimes Act, 18 

U.S.C. § 1153. Alternatively, he alleged that even if the area 

had lost reservation status, it was a "dependent Indian 

community," also mandating federal criminal jurisdiction in his 

case. After an eight-day evidentiary hearing before the U.S. 

Magistrate, and after proposed findings by the Magistrate, to 

which both parties objected, U.S. District Judge Howard Bratton 

ruled that the crimes of which Blatchford had been convicted did 

not occur within either an Indian reservation or a dependent 

Indian community and, therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 did not apply. 

The district court dismissed Blatchford's petition, and he 

appeals. We affirm. 

I . 

The Federal Major Crimes Act provided 

"Any Indian who commits against the person or property 

of another Indian or other person any of the following 

offenses, namely ... kidnapping, rape, ... , within 

the Indian country, shall be subject to the same laws 

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and penalties as all other persons committing any of the 

above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 

United States." 

18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982). For purposes of the Act, Indian country 

is defined as 

"(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States 

Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, 

and, including rights-of-way running through the 

reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within 

the borders of the United States whether within the 

original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and 

whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) 

all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have 

not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running 

through the same." 

18 u.s.c. § 1151. 

Blatchford concedes that the offenses of which he was 

convicted did not occur on an Indian allotment under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 115l(c). We have already ruled in Pittsburgh & Midway that the 

area in which the offenses occurred lack reservation status. 

Therefore, they do not fall within section 115l(a). That leaves 

for resolution the issue of whether they occurred within a 

dependent Indian community under section 115l(b). The issue 

before us raises a jurisdictional question, and we review de novo 

the district court's legal conclusion that Yah-Ta-Hey is not a 

dependent Indian community. The factual characteristics of the 

Yah-Ta-Hey area are essentially undisputed, and in reviewing them 

this court is essentially reviewing the legal conclusion drawn 

from them by the district court. See United States v. Morgan, 614 

F.2d 166, 170 (8th Cir. 1980). 

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II. 

The standards guiding the determination of what constitutes a 

dependent Indian community have been spelled out in a series of 

federal cases dating back to 1913. The early cases from which 

interpretation of the term dependent Indian community derives are 

United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) and United States v. 

McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938). Sandoval concerned the status of 

about twenty scattered pueblos (communities or villages) owned 

communally in fee simple by the Pueblo Indians under grants from 

the King of Spain that were subsequently confirmed by Congress. 

Like reservation Indians, the Indians of the pueblos were treated 

by the United States as dependent peoples, Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 

40-41. The federal government provided agents and superintendents 

to "guard their interests," established Indian schools in the 

pueblos, constructed darns and irrigation works, and set aside 

additional lands for the use and occupancy of the Pueblo Indians 

where their own lands were insufficient. Id. at 40. In addition, 

Congress forbade New Mexico from taxing the lands and other 

property within the pueblos. Id. The Sandoval Court concluded 

that the pueblos had been treated by the legislative and executive 

branches as dependent communities in need of protection and 

federal guardianship, especially from the evils of liquor. Id. at 

46-48. The Court thus declared that the pueblos were subject to a 

federal criminal prohibition on the introduction of liquor into 

Indian country. The fact that the lands were held communally 

rather than in individual ownership and that the pueblos were 

"distinctly Indian communities" were significant to the outcome. 

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The McGowan case also applied the federal law prohibiting the 

introduction of liquor into Indian country. In McGowan, the 

United States had purchased a tract of land in which to settle 

needy, nonreservation Indians living in Nevada. The United States 

held title to the land for the benefit of the Indians. The Court 

observed that "Indians of the Reno Colony have been established in 

homes under the supervision and guardianship of the United 

_states." McGowan, 302 U.S. at 538. The Court added that "[t]he 

fundamental consideration of both Congress and the Department of 

the Interior in establishing this colony has been the protection 

of a dependent people." Id. The colony was given the "same 

protection" as that given Indians on reservations. Id. Finally, 

in declaring the Reno Indian Colony to be a dependent Indian 

community, the Court summarized the facts as follows: 

"The Reno Colony has been validly set apart for the use 

of the Indians. It is under the superintendence of the 

Government. The Government retains title to the lands 

which it permits the Indians to occupy. The Government 

has authority to enact regulations and protective laws 

respecting this territory .... [I)t is not reasonably 

possible to draw any distinction between this Indian 

'colony' and 'Indian country.'" 

Id. at 539. 

The next case to interpret the term dependent Indian 

community was United States v. Martine, 422 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 

1971). In Martine, we concluded that the term applied to the 

Navajo community of Ramah, New Mexico, which is typically seen as 

one of three satellite communities of the Navajo Reservation. 

Martine was indicted for involuntary manslaughter of a passenger 

in a truck that he allegedly had been driving when it overturned 

on land within Ramah. The land was "owned by the Navajo Tribe, 

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... having been purchased with tribal funds from a corporate 

owner." Id. at 1023. We stated in Martine that Sandoval 

confirmed the propriety of the trial court's approach to the 

determination of dependent Indian community status. The trial 

court had considered (1) the nature of the area in question, (2) 

the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to Indian Tribes 

and to the federal government, and (3) the established practice of 

government agencies toward the area. Id. We acknowledged that 

other factors could be relevant as well. Id. at 1024. Without 

further discussion of the specific facts, we affirmed the trial 

court's decision that Ramah was a dependent Indian community and 

that the federal government had jurisdiction over the crime. 1 

In each of the above cases, the dependent communities 

represented clusters of Indians grouped together in their own 

special communities on land owned by a tribe or held in trust for 

them and arguably outside an established reservation. 

Since Martine, a series of cases elaborating on the 

parameters of dependent Indian community status have emerged from 

within the Eighth Circuit. In United States v. Mound, 477 F. 

Supp. 156 (D.S.D. 1979) the court ruled that the Cheyenne River 

Housing Project SD5-0l in Eagle Butte, South Dakota was a 

dependent Indian community, and that the crimes allegedly 

1 The only other ruling issued from a court within the Tenth 

Circuit of which we are aware is United States v. Oceanside 

Oklahoma, Inc., 527 F~ Supp. 68 (W.D. Okla. 1981). In Oceanside, 

the court held that a tract of land held in fee patent by a nonIndian and surrounded by checkerboarded Indian and non-Indian 

lands was not part of an Indian community and was not within 

Indian country; therefore, the statutory prohibition on sales of 

liquor in Indian country did not apply. Id. at 69-70. 

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committed therein were subject to federal jurisdiction. In doing 

so, the court examined the purpose and composition of the 

community, its relationship to the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and 

the federal government, and the practice of state government 

agencies toward the community. Id. at 158-59. The housing 

project was on tribal trust land owned by the United States and 

leased to the Housing Authority for the purpose of constructing a 

low-rent housing project. The Housing Authority Board was 

appointed by the Tribal Council, and the project was funded by the 

United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). 

The federal government also provided water, sewer, medical, road, 

and some educational services for the project. The city/county 

attorney for the area in which the project was located treated the 

project as under federal jurisdiction. The exact population of 

the housing project could not be determined, although it was noted 

that there were both Indian and non-Indian occupants, consistent 

with the nondiscrimination requirements imposed by HUD. The court 

concluded that the "crucial consideration" was whether the 

community "'has been set apart for the use, occupancy and 

protection of dependent Indian peoples.'" Id. at 160 (quoting 

Youngbear v. Brewer, 415 F. Supp. 807, sog (N.D. Iowa 1976), 

a ff ' d , 5 4 7 F . 2 d 7 4 ( 8 th Ci r . 19 7 7 ) ) . " [ A ] n y s i n g 1 e ta 1 i s man i c 

standard such as percentage of Indian occupants" could not be 

allowed to defeat the purpose of section 115l(b). Id. In Mound, 

the dependent Indian community apparently was a subunit within the 

larger community of Eagle Butte. 

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The following year, the Eighth Circuit decided United States 

v. Morgan, 614 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1980). Morgan did not concern 

the meaning of dependent Indian community, but rather the meaning 

of "non-Indian communities" under 18 u.s.c. § 1154, a statute 

prohibiting the introduction of intoxicants into Indian country. 

The term "Indian country" in section 1154 specifically excluded 

fee-patented lands in non-Indian communities. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1154(c). In Morgan, two non-Indian bars within the exterior 

boundaries of the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation were 

judged to be within non-Indian communities under the statute. In 

deciding that the Dew Drop Inn and the Cattleman's Saloon were not 

subject to the statute, Morgan relied on the dictionary definition 

of "community" supplied in Berry v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes, 

420 F. Supp. 934, 940 (D. Wyo. 1976) ("'unified body of 

individuals with common interests living in a particular 

area; ... an interacting population of various kinds of 

individuals in a common location"' (quoting Webster's New 

Collegiate Dictionary (1975)). Morgan concluded that an element 

of cohesiveness was basic to the definition of community. 

Cohesiveness could be manifested, it said, by economic pursuits in 

the area, by common interests, or by the needs of the inhabitants 

as supplied by the locality. Morgan, 614 F.2d at 170. The court 

then found that the bars, despite their on-reservation location, 

were part of non-Indian communities for economic purposes. The 

Dew Drop Inn, whose patrons were mostly non-Indian, was found to 

be within the tiny non-Indian community of Mahto. Id. The 

Cattleman's Saloon was found to be within the "community of 

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interest and influence" of the adjacent, off-reservation, nonIndian community of McLaughlin. Id. at 171. 

Soon after Morgan, the Eighth Circuit ruled in Weddell v. 

Meierhenry, 636 F.2d 211 (1980), that Wagner, South Dakota was not 

a dependent Indian community even though located within the 

exterior boundaries of the original Yankton Sioux Reservation. In 

affirming the correctness of state court jurisdiction over grand 

larceny and burglary charges against Weddell, the court found 

dispositive the incorporation of Wagner as a municipality 

independent of the Tribe, private ownership of 95 percent of the 

property within the town, and the overwhelmingly non-Indian 

population of the town (only 16.3% of the population was Indian). 

Id. at 213. 

The following year the Eighth Circuit decided the case of 

United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837 (8th Circuit 1981). 

The circuit ruled that the housing project located in Sisseton, 

South Dakota was a dependent Indian community. Paralleling the 

structure of the Mound decision, 477 F. Supp. 156, it evaluated 

who held title to the land in question and then considered the 

purpose and composition of the community, its relationship to the 

federal government and the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, and the 

relationship between the federal and state government. It 

reviewed the undisputed findings that the land was tribal trust 

land held for the Tribe for use as a low-rent housing project, 

that the primary beneficiaries of the project were Tribal members, 

and that extensive services were provided to Indian residents by 

both the federal government and the Tribe. It ruled that the 

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state's assertion of jurisdiction over the project did not defeat 

federal jurisdiction. Id. at 842-43 (citing United States v. 

John, 437 U.S. 634, 653 (1978)). 2 Notably, it declined to 

consider the state's arguments, raised for the first time on 

appeal, that (1) the proper community of reference should be the 

entire community of Sisseton because the project relied on the 

city for all vital services, and (2) establishment of the project 

as a dependent Indian community would result in a checkerboard 

jurisdiction, undermining state law enforcement efforts. Id. at 

841-42. 

The most recent case on point comes again from the Eighth 

Circuit. In United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986), 

an alleged assault occurred on land immediately adjacent to the 

Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. The land was held in trust by 

the United States for the Reservation. The court ruled that the 

land could be classified as a de facto reservation, "at least for 

purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction." Id. at 339. It also 

ruled in the alternative that the land could be considered a 

dependent Indian community because the United States retained 

title to the sparsely populated rural area, the Tribe leased the 

land only to Indians, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs was 

involved in the provision of services in the area. Id. 3 

2 The John court observed that past lack of continuity of 

federal supervision over the Choctaws had not destroyed federal 

power to deal with them in the present, an observation not 

precisely analogous to the situation in South Dakota. 

3 Aside from the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, only one other 

circuit court has ruled on dependent Indian community status under 

18 U.S.C. § 1153. In United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75 (1st 

[footnote continued] 

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In summary, courts within the E~ghth Circuit have found 

dependent Indian community status in three cases (Azure, South 

Dakota, and Mound), found it lacking in a fourth (Weddell), and 

found non-Indian community status in a fifth (Morgan). 4 In all 

three of the cases in which dependent Indian community status was 

established, the lands in question were tribal trust lands. 

III. 

We come now to the facts of the case before us. The crimes 

of which Blatchford was convicted occurred at Yah-Ta-Hey, McKinley 

[footnote continued] 

Cir. 1982), the court ruled that Peter Dana Point, within the 

Passamaquoddy Indian Reservation in the state of Maine, was a 

dependent Indian community. Levesque is something of an anomaly 

because, until litigation in the 1970s, the Passamaquoddy 

Reservation had always been state regulated. In the aftermath of 

Passamaquoddy v. Morto~, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975), the federal 

government declared the Tribe a "'tribal entity'" and eligible for 

programs administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Levesque 

at 77 & n.3 (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 7235-36 (1979)). Relying on the 

prior case law in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, the First Circuit 

held that Peter Dana Point was a dependent Indian community by 

virtue of its location within a township belonging to the Tribe 

and almost entirely occupied by Indians. The court also relied on 

evidence that the federal government offered extensive support to 

the Tribe and that the state of Maine was no longer funding the 

Tribe. Id. at 78. After Levesque was decided, the state of Maine 

and the United States apparently agreed that Maine would assume 

jurisdiction over future crimes within the reservation. See Id. 

at'77 n.4. -- --

4 A second non-Indian-community case from within the Eighth 

Circuit applied factors used in the dependent Indian community 

cases under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153. United States v. Mission 

Golf Course, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 1177 (D.S.D. 1982). It found that 

a golf course near the City of Mission, South Dakota was part of 

the City for purposes of determining whether or not it was within 

a non-Indian community under statutes governing the introduction 

of liquor in Indian country. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1161. Both 

the City and the golf course were located within the Rosebud Sioux 

Reservation. The court concluded that the non-Indian elements in 

the City did not predominate, thereby subjecting the defendant 

golf course to the above cited liquor statutes. Id. at 1183. 

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County, New Mexico. The district court described Yah-Ta-Hey as a 

rural and "readily identifiable residential and trading community" 

including the commercial establishments at the intersection of 

U.S. Highway 666 and State Highway 264, a small housing subdivision known as Navajo Estates, and the surrounding area within 

three to five miles of the intersection. District Court Opinion 

at 18. The record establishes that Yah-Ta-Hey is located 

approximately eight miles north of Gallup, New Mexico and two 

miles south of the southern boundary of the Navajo Reservation. 

The crime site was at and around Navajo Estates, adjacent to the 

intersection. 

The relevant facts surrounding the land status dispute are 

essentially uncontested. In analyzing the facts, the district 

court followed the standards established by Martine and South 

Dakota and addressed land title, community composition and 

purpose, and the relationship of the community to the federal 

government and the Navajo nation, as well as to the state and 

county government. With respect to land title, the court noted 

that section seven, which included the commercial junction and 

housing subdivision, was in private ownership although the 

surrounding area was largely Navajo allotment land. It found the 

composition of the commercial intersection to be largely nonIndian, the composition of Navajo Estates to be mixed, and the 

surrounding area to be largely Navajo. It found the primary 

purpose of the community to be commercial, "where local merchants 

buy Navajo made goods, then distribute them in other locations." 

Id. at 20. It also noted that Yah-Ta-Hey could be characterized 

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as a suburb of Gallup, New Mexico. Finally, the court found that 

the relationship of the community to the federal government and 

the Navajo nation was such that the Navajos must travel outside 

the community to obtain BIA and tribal services with the exception 

of some tribal law enforcement services. In contrast, Gallup, 

McKinley County, and the state of New Mexico all provided a 

variety of services to Yah-Ta-Hey, including water, roads, 

landfills, public schools, and law enforcement. 5 Yah-Ta-Hey 

businesses paid state and county taxes and were subject to state 

and county health and building codes. They were also subject to 

regulations affecting pawn shops, liquor sales, unemployment 

compensation, and worker's compensation. Id. at 21. 

In reviewing the record it becomes clear that the Yah-Ta-Hey 

"community" is one born out of opportunities for private 

commercial gain, not one born out of a public need to provide land 

for use, occupancy, and protection of a dependent people. In 

other words, the primary purpose of the community is not federal 

protection of dependent Indians but private commercial activity. 

Yah-Ta-Hey is in both an Indian and non-Indian commercial stream 

by virtue of its economic activities (e.g., trading post and cafe, 

gas stations, 7-11 store, pawn shop) at the intersection of two 

highways. Its cohesiveness springs not primarily from its rural 

5 The record reveals that McKinley County and the Navajo Tribe 

shared law enforcement responsibility in the area between Gallup 

and the Reservation. Eighty percent of the Navajo police had 

state commissions so that they could arrest non-Indians. The 

state police were in the process of seeking Navajo police 

commissions so that they could arrest Indians on Indian land. R. 

Vol. Vat 82-83, 124. Police from both units patrolled the 

checkerboarded area regularly. 

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A • 

residential pattern but rather from its commercial roots emanating 

from the highway junction. Nothing in the record indicates that 

it would be characterized as a community, were it not for its nonIndian commercial center. 

The federal government's relationship with the Yah-Ta-Hey 

community is not with the community qua community, unlike the 

housing project communities in Mound and South Dakota. Instead, 

it is with the approximately 350 Indians who happen to live in the 

Yah-Ta-Hey area. The same is true for the Tribe's relationship 

with the community. Although Navajo inhabitants vote in tribal 

elections and are a part of the Rock Springs chapter (local 

governmental unit) of the Tribe, eligibility for a variety of 

services flows to individual inhabitants of the area by virtue of 

their identification as part of the Navajo Nation, not by virtue 

of their settlement within an established Indian community. 

There is no indication from the Federal Major Crimes Act, or 

case law construing it, that Congress intended to include Indian 

allotments clustered around a non-Indian commercial junction on 

private land as together constituting a dependent Indian 

community. The fact that much of the area is held in the form of 

trust allotments does not establish that the "community" itself 

was established for the use, occupancy, and protection of a 

dependent people. The case before us contrasts with those 

described previously, in which dependent Indian communities were 

located on tribal lands or tribal trust lands and were created by 

the Indians themselves or the federal government to provide for 

their economic and political protection. Here, private interests 

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crea!=ed the "community" character of Yah-Ta-Hey. As Martine 

noted, "[t]he mere presence of a group of Indians in a particular 

area would undoubtedly not suffice [to establish a dependent 

Indian community]." Martine, 442 F.2d at 1024. Just because 

Indians constituted the bulk of the population and gave the area a 

distinctly Indian character does not convert the community into a 

dependent Indian community. 

We affirm the district court's ruling that although Yah-TaHey is a community populated largely by Indians, it is nonetheless 

not within the Navajo Reservation and is not a dependent Indian 

community for purposes of the Federal Major Crimes Act. The 

district court's dismissal of Blatchford's habeas corpus petition 

is, therefore, also affirmed. 

AFFIRMED. 

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