Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01585/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01585-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANTOINE L. PITTMAN, 

Petitioner,

v. 

M.E. SPREARMAN, Warden, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 16cv1585-AJB (BLM) 

ORDER: 

(1) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION; 

(Doc. No. 12) 

(2) OVERRULING PETITIONER’S 

OBJECTIONS; 

(Doc. No. 13) 

(3) DISMISSING CASE WITH 

PREJUDICE; AND 

(4) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

 On August 19, 2016, Petitioner Antoine L. Pittman (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner 

proceeding pro se, filed his first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 5.) Petitioner alleges that the trial judge provided flawed jury 

instructions, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 6-

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33.) On August 24, 2016, the Court reopened Petitioner’s case. (Doc. No. 6.) Subsequently, 

M.E. Sprearman (“Respondent”) filed a motion to dismiss on October 12, 2016. (Doc. No. 

10.) 

 On December 16, 2016, Magistrate Judge Barbara L. Major filed a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the Court grant Respondent’s motion to 

dismiss. (Doc. No. 12.) Petitioner filed timely objections to the R&R on January 9, 2017. 

(Doc. No. 13.) Respondent did not file a Reply by the deadline as set forth by the R&R. 

(Doc. No. 12 at 14.) For the reasons set forth more fully below, the Court ADOPTS the 

R&R in full, (Doc. No. 12), OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections, (Doc. No. 13), 

GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss Petitioner’s first amended petition for writ of 

habeas corpus WITH PREJUDICE, (Doc. No. 10), and DECLINES to issue a certificate 

of appealability. 

I. BACKGROUND1

 In December of 1994, Petitioner fatally shot Lon Smithwick (“Smithwick”), who 

had earlier refused to buy alcohol for Petitioner’s girlfriend. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 3.) The next 

month, Petitioner, who was eighteen years old at the time, conspired with three fourteen 

year olds to rob Tariq Khamisa (“Khamisa”), a pizza delivery man. (Id. at 4.) When 

Khamisa refused to give up his pizzas, Petitioner told the armed fourteen year old to shoot 

Khamisa, which the boy did. (Id. at 5.) 

 A jury convicted Petitioner of second degree murder of Smithwick, first degree 

murder of Khamisa, attempted robbery of Khamisa, and conspiracy to commit robbery. 

(Id. at 1.) Petitioner was then sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of 

parole for the murder of Khamisa, and was sentenced to fifteen years to life for the murder 

of Smithwick. (Id.) 

 In 1995, Petitioner appealed his conviction on several grounds including that: (1) his 

                                                                

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 The Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct; Petitioner 

may rebut this presumption, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also 

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 324 (2003). 

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conviction for the murder of Smithwick be reversed because the trial court failed to instruct 

sua sponte on the defense of others or the honest but unreasonable belief in the need to 

defend others; (2) the trial court refused to instruct on voluntary manslaughter; (3) the trial 

court failed to instruct sua sponte that efforts by others to intimidate a witness could not be 

used against a defendant unless the jury found he had authorized such efforts; and (4) 

Petitioner’s conviction for the murder of Khamisa be reversed because the charge was 

submitted to the jury on a legally incorrect conspiracy theory. (Id. at 2.) On May 21, 1997, 

the California Court of Appeal rejected each of Petitioner’s claims and affirmed the 

judgment. (Id.) 

 On June 24, 1997, Petitioner petitioned to have his conspiracy theory claim reviewed 

by the California Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 11-2.) On August 25, 1997, the California 

Supreme Court denied the petition to review. (Doc. No. 11-3.) 

 On September 18, 1997, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Supreme Court asserting that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury 

that to be liable for first degree murder under an aiding and abetting theory, it had to find 

that Petitioner had the knowledge and intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or 

facilitating the confederate’s crime. (Doc. No. 11-4 at 4.) On December 23, 1997, the 

California Supreme Court denied the petition. (Doc. No. 11-5.) 

 On June 24, 1998, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

raising the following claims: (1) the trial court gave an erroneous instruction on aiding and 

abetting; (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) that Petitioner’s 

first degree murder conviction was submitted to the jury on a legally incorrect conspiracy 

theory; and (4) the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on either the 

defense of others or the honest but unreasonable defense of others. (Doc. No. 11-6.) On 

September 10, 1998, respondent Susan Yearwood filed an answer to the petition. (Doc. No. 

11-7.) 

 On March 15, 1999, the district court filed an amended order agreeing with 

respondent Yearwood’s answer and found that Petitioner had failed to exhaust his state 

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court remedies on grounds two and four listed above. (Doc. No. 11-8 at 1.) The Court thus 

provided three options for Petitioner: (1) dismiss the case in order to exhaust state court 

remedies; (2) file a “Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Exhaustion”; or (3) formally 

and permanently abandon the unexhausted claims. (Id. at 5-6.) In response, Petitioner sent 

a letter on March 25, 1999, stating that he chose to dismiss the case in order to exhaust 

state court remedies. (Doc. No. 11-9 at 3.) On April 12, 1999, Magistrate Judge Louisa S. 

Porter issued an R&R. (Doc. No. 11-10.) The R&R recommended that Petitioner’s motion 

to dismiss be granted, and that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed without 

prejudice. (Id. at 2.) 

 On June 20, 2016, Petitioner filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus with 

this Court. (Doc. No. 1.) Shortly thereafter, the Court issued a notice regarding possible 

failure to exhaust and one-year statute of limitations. (Doc. No. 2.) On June 23, 2016, the 

Court dismissed Petitioner’s case without prejudice for failure to pay the $5.00 filing fee 

or in the alternative failing to move to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 3.) On August 

3, 2016, Petitioner paid the $5.00 filing fee. (Doc. No. 4.) 

 Thereafter, Petitioner filed his first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus 

(“FAP”) on August 19, 2016. (Doc. No. 5.) The FAP raises the same four claims that 

Petitioner raised in his 1998 federal habeas petition, discussed supra p. 3, with the same 

supporting arguments, verbatim. (See generally Doc. No. 5; Doc. No. 11-6.) On October 

12, 2016, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the FAP. (Doc. No. 10.) Respondent asserts 

that the FAP is time-barred by the one-year limitations period, and that the FAP contains 

unexhausted claims. (Id. at 8-12.) On December 16, 2016, Magistrate Judge Major filed an 

R&R recommending that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be granted and Petitioner’s FAP 

be dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. No. 12.) On January 9, 2017, Petitioner filed a timely 

objection. (Doc. No. 13.) For the following reasons, the Court agrees with the R&R. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

A. Review of the Report and Recommendation 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district 

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judge’s duties in connection with a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The 

district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to 

which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the 

finding or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see 

also United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). However, in the absence 

of timely objection(s), the court “need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the 

face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory 

Committee Notes (1983); see also United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003). 

 B. Standard of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

 A petitioner in state custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court may challenge 

his detention only on the grounds that his custody is in violation of the United States 

Constitution or the laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); accord Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000). The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(“AEDPA”) applies to § 2254 habeas corpus petitions filed after 1996, and employs a 

“‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ which demands that statecourt decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 

(2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 & n.7 (1997)). Federal 

habeas relief is available only if the result reached by the state court on the merits is 

“contrary to” or “an unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent, or if the 

adjudication is “an unreasonable determination” based on the facts and evidence. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1)-(d)(2). 

III. DISCUSSION

 Here, Petitioner’s “objections” consist of seven pages of text stating that “the courts 

know ‘very well’ young boys coming to these prisons with life sentences know nothing of 

the law, and have little education,” as well as requesting the Court do the “Christian thing.” 

(Doc. No. 13 at 5-6.) Petitioner then objects arguing that “[r]espondents would like to bury 

any mistakes with a [sic] unexhausted claim, and a [sic] untimely claim, ‘but’ if the trial 

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courts would have done this correctly the first time around, there would be no untimely or 

unexhausted claims.” (Id. at 6.) Additionally, Petitioner claims that “the trial court should 

not be able to make these enormous and exceedingly wicked mistakes . . . then close the 

door on many petitioners with untimely claims . . . .” (Id.) The Court first clarifies that 

these are not objections, but are unsubstantiated allegations to which the Court is not 

required to respond to. See Carter v. Yellowstone Cnty., No. CV-07-09 BLGRFC, 2007 

WL 1562569, at *2 (D. Mon. May 25, 2007). 

 Next, the Court highlights that Petitioner’s objection fails to challenge the findings 

and recommendations made in Magistrate Judge Major’s R&R. Instead, Petitioner repeats 

the arguments made in his FAP, argues that his conviction should be reversed, as well as 

requests the Court to “see the mistakes of the trial court” and execute a “proper punishment 

for the petitioner, strictly from the trial courts mistakes, and do away with the life without 

parole sentence . . . .” (See Generally, Doc. No. 13.) The Court finds these general 

objections to the entirety of Magistrate Judge Major’s R&R has the “same effect as a failure 

to object.” See Alcantara v. McEwen, No. 12-CV-401-IEG (DHB), 2013 WL 4517861, at 

*1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013); see also Johnson v. Gains, No. 09cv1312-LAB (POR), 2011 

WL 765851, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2011) (following the sixth circuit and finding that 

objections to the report in its entirety do not satisfy the requirement that parties may file 

“specific written objections” under FRCP 72(b)(2)); Morris v. Barra, Civil No. 10cv02642 

AJB (BGS), 2013 WL 1190766, at *17, n.11 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2013). Accordingly, 

without any further reference to any supplementary legal conclusions or facts, Petitioner is 

unable to support these broad conclusions and has thus failed to object.2

 

 In sum, as currently pled, Petitioner’s objection fails to provide the Court with any 

colorable claim why Magistrate Judge Major’s R&R should not be adopted. First, 

                                                                

2 See Page v. Lee, 337 F.3d 411, 416 n.3 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[P]etitioner’s failure to object to the 

magistrate judge’s recommendation with the specificity required by the Rule is, standing alone, a 

sufficient basis upon which to affirm the judgment of the district court as to this claim.”); see also 

Howard v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991) (“A general objection to 

the entirety of the magistrate’s report has the same effect as would a failure to object.”). 

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Petitioner does not provide evidence to suggest that he was unable to file his FAP within 

the one-year statute of limitations due to an “extraordinary circumstance beyond his 

control” or that he has been pursuing his rights diligently; thus he is entitled to equitable 

tolling and his FAP is timely. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). Second, 

Petitioner has not presented evidence to allege that he has exhausted his state court 

remedies as to the second and fourth claims present in his FAP. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982) (holding that a federal 

court may not consider a petition for habeas corpus unless the petitioner has first presented 

his claims to the state courts, thereby “exhausting” them). Accordingly, Petitioner has 

unsuccessfully objected to any of the conclusions made in the R&R. 

 Thus, finding Magistrate Judge Major’s R&R to have carefully reviewed the pending 

motions, the applicable law, and the relevant facts presented by Petitioner, the Court agrees 

with the R&R and finds that as Petitioner’s FAP was filed more than fifteen years past the 

statute of limitations, it is untimely. Additionally, despite electing to dismiss his first 

federal petition in 1999 so that Petitioner could exhaust his state court remedies, Petitioner 

has failed to provide evidence that he has done so, and thus has forfeited these claims. As 

a result, the Court DISMISSES Petitioner’s FAP WITH PREJUDICE.

3

 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

 When a district court enters a final order adverse to the applicant in a habeas corpus 

proceeding, it must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability, which is required to 

appeal a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate 

of appealability is appropriate only where the petitioner makes a “substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

                                                                

3 See Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that if no objection is 

made by either party, the Court may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s proposed findings 

of fact and decide the motion on the applicable law). 

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reasonable jurists could debate whether “the petition should have been resolved in a 

different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483–84 (2000) (citation omitted). 

Here, Petitioner did not attempt to make a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right, instead arguing that the Court should resentence Petitioner, and 

generally repeating the claims made in his FAP. Thus, finding that reasonable jurists could 

not debate the Court’s conclusion to dismiss with prejudice Petitioner’s claims, the Court 

DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

V. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, having reviewed the R&R, the Court finds it is thorough, 

well grounded in the law, and contains no clear error. Accordingly, the Court hereby: (1) 

ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety; (2) OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections; (3) 

GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss; (4) DISMISSES the case WITH 

PREJUDICE; and (5) DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 8, 2017 

 

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