Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902-53/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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ORDER CONFIRMING FINAL AWARD AND ENTERING JUDGMENT

Jamin S. Soderstrom, Bar No. 261054

jamin@soderstromlawfirm.com

SODERSTROM LAW PC

1 Park Plaza, Suite 600

Irvine, California 92614

Tel: (949) 667-4700

Fax: (949) 424-8091

Counsel for Plaintiffs, Putative Class Members,

and Aggrieved Employees

Joseph W. Ozmer II (SBN 316203)

jozmer@kcozlaw.com

Nathan D. Chapman (SBN 338735)

nchapman@kcozlaw.com

J. Scott Carr (SBN 136706)

scarr@kcozlaw.com

KABAT CHAPMAN & OZMER LLP

333 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 2225

Los Angeles, California 90071

Tel: (213) 493-3980

Fax: (404) 400-7333

Counsel for Defendant Charter Communications, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LIONEL HARPER, DANIEL SINCLAIR, 

HASSAN TURNER, LUIS VAZQUEZ, and 

PEDRO ABASCAL, individually and on behalf of 

all others similarly situated and all aggrieved 

employees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC

ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION, 

CONFIRMING FINAL AWARD OF 

ARBITRATOR, AND ENTERING

JUDGMENT (VAZQUEZ ARBITRATION)

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 330 Filed 09/28/23 Page 1 of 55
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ORDER CONFIRMING FINAL AWARD AND ENTERING JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Luis Vazquez and Defendant Charter Communications, LLC jointly submitted Notice 

of Final Award of Arbitrator and Joint Stipulation and Motion to Confirm Final Award and Enter 

Judgment (Vazquez Arbitration), which provides as follows:

WHEREAS, on October 13, 2021, the Court granted Charter’s motion to compel individual 

arbitration of Vazquez’s claims under the Mutual Arbitration Agreement (also known as the Solution 

Channel Agreement), and stayed his individual claims pending the completion of arbitration 

proceedings. Dkt. 202.

WHEREAS, on September 12, 2023, Arbitrator Claude D. Ames, Esq., who was appointed by 

the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and presided over the arbitration between Vazquez and 

Charter, issued a Final Award that concluded the arbitration. Exhibit 3 (Final Award).

NOW, THEREFORE, Vazquez and Charter stipulate and jointly move the Court to: (1) issue 

an order pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 9 and 13, confirming the Final Award; 

(2) file such order with the clerk for the entry of judgment thereon; and (3) file the following papers 

with the clerk in accordance with 9 U.S.C. § 13:

a. the Mutual Arbitration Agreement, attached as Exhibit 1;

b. the AAA’s appointment of the Arbitrator, attached as Exhibit 2;

c. the Final Award, attached as Exhibit 3; and

d. the Court order dated October 13, 2021, attached as Exhibit 4 (also in the Court’s 

record as Docket 202).

Having reviewed the Final Award, and finding no basis to vacate, modify, or correct the Final 

Award pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (the parties having raised none), and 

pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the Court hereby GRANTS the joint motion and confirms the 

Final Award in full.

Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 9 and 13, the Court attaches the following 

papers and instructs the clerk to file them with this ORDER:

a. the Mutual Arbitration Agreement, attached as Exhibit 1;

b. the AAA’s appointment of the Arbitrator, attached as Exhibit 2;

c. the Final Award, attached as Exhibit 3; and

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ORDER CONFIRMING FINAL AWARD AND ENTERING JUDGMENT

d. the Court order dated October 13, 2021, attached as Exhibit 4 (also in the Court’s 

record as Docket 202).

The Parties’ joint motion is GRANTED, the Final Award is CONFIRMED, and 

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED. The clerk shall docket this judgment pursuant to Federal Arbitration 

Act, 9 U.S.C. § 13, and it shall have the same force and effect, in all respects, as, and be subject to all 

the provisions of law relating to, a judgment in an action.

IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED. LET JUDGMENT BE FORTHWITH 

ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

Dated: September 28, 2023

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EXHIBIT 1

MUTUAL ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

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EXHIBIT 2

AAA APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATOR

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 330 Filed 09/28/23 Page 10 of 55
 

Southeast Case Management Center

Charles Dorsey

Assistant Vice President

2200 Century Parkway

Suite 300

Atlanta, GA 30345

Telephone: (404)325-0101

Fax: (877)395-1388

July 29, 2022

Jamin S. Soderstrom, Esq.

Soderstrom Law PC

1 Park Plaza, Suite 600

Irvine, CA 92614

Via Email to: jamin@soderstromlawfirm.com 

J. Scott Carr, Esq.

Kabat Chapman & Ozmer LLP

171 17th Street NW, Suite 1550

Atlanta, GA 30363

Via Email to: scarr@kcozlaw.com 

Re: Case Number: 01-22-0002-2071

Luis Vazquez v. Charter Communications, LLC

Dear Parties:

Inasmuch as there were no objections to the appointment of Claude Ames, Esq., his appointment is hereby

confirmed by the American Arbitration Association (the AAA).

Accordingly, a telephonic Arbitration Management Conference needs to be scheduled. Please confer with the

other side and provide mutually agreeable dates and times from August 12 - 26, 2022.

The parties are requested to advise the undersigned of their availability on or before August 5, 2022.

We look forward to working with you and should there be any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the 

undersigned.

Sincerely,

/s/ Karen D. Smith, on behalf of 

Jenn Ashenfelter

Manager of ADR Services

Direct Dial: (401)354-2372

Email: JennAshenfelter@adr.org

Fax: (877)395-1388

Enclosure

cc: Nathan D. Chapman, Esq.; Chad Williams, Esq.; Diana Alderete, Esq.

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EXHIBIT 3

FINAL AWARD DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 2023

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Arbitrator’s Decision and Award

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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION

Employment Arbitration Tribunal

LUIS VAZQUEZ,

Claimant,

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, 

Respondent.

Case No. 01-22-0002-2071

ARBITRATOR’S 

DECISION AND AWARD

Re: Classification of Luis Vazquez

Before: Claude Dawson Ames, Arbitrator

Appearances:

For Luis Vazquez: Jamin S. Soderstrom, Esq.

Soderstrom Law P.C. 

3 Park Plaza, Suite 100

Irvine, CA 92614

For Charter Communications, LLC: Nathan D. Chapman, Esq.

Kabat Chapman & Ozmer LLP

171 17th Street Northwest, Suite 1550

Atlanta, GA 30363

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I

INTRODUCTION

This arbitration proceeding involves a dispute over the proper job classification of 

Claimant Luis Vazquez (“Vazquez” or “Claimant”) during his three weeks of training before being 

fully hired by Charter Communications, LLC (“Charter” or “Respondent”) as a direct sales 

representative. The parties selected Claude Dawson Ames, Esq., to serve as Arbitrator and 

stipulated that this employment dispute was properly before him for a final and binding resolution.

This case is being administered by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”).

The evidentiary hearing took place remotely on June 13, 2023. All witness testimony was

under oath, and a stenographic transcript was taken of the proceedings. The parties were afforded 

an opportunity to present documentary and testimonial evidence and examine witnesses. The 

parties submitted their timely post-hearing briefs on August 1, 2023, and the Arbitrator officially 

closed the record on August 2, 2023.

II

ISSUES

Did the Claimant spend more than 50% of his working time outside the office engaged in 

sales-related activities and therefore exempt from California’s minimum wage, overtime, meal 

break, and rest break requirements?

Did Respondent misclassify Claimant as an exempt outside salesperson under California 

law, and, if so, did he suffer any Labor Code violations?

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III

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent, Charter Communications, LLC (“Charter” or “Respondent”) hired Claimant, 

Luis Vazquez (“Vazquez”), to work out of its Bakersfield, California office as a Direct Sales 

Representative (“DSR”), also known as a door-to-door salesperson in 2019. Charter sells cable, 

internet, and wireless mobile phone services to individuals through door-to-door solicitation. 

Charter advertised the DSR position as an outside salesperson required to complete three weeks of 

training. (JX 3) Vazquez received an offer letter on October 14, 2019, after interviewing for the 

position. (JX 5) 

The offer letter specifically stated that the base salary would be $19,200 plus commission 

and that Vazquez would not be entitled to overtime. (JX 5) According to the wage statement for 

the first week of training, Vazquez received a $500 advance on commission. (JX 14) Vazquez also 

received another $500 advance for the second week of training even though he made no sales. (JX 

15) According to the Commission Plan, Vazquez received on his second day of work and was 

entitled to receive a $500 advance commission for the first five pay periods regardless of whether 

he made a sale. (JX 18) 

Vazquez’s first day of work was November 1, 2019, and he participated in three weeks of 

training until November 21, 2019. Vazquez worked for Charter as a DSR until he resigned on 

March 12, 2020. (JX 23) Vazquez alleges Charter misclassified him as an exempt employee during 

his three weeks of training. Vazquez contends he was not paid a minimum wage, was denied 

overtime pay, rest, and meal breaks, and did not receive timely, complete, or accurate wage 

statements. He then filed this claim and joined a class action lawsuit brought by former Charter 

trainees.

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A. The Training

Charter’s training for DSRs had two primary components: classroom training and field 

training, which involved shadowing an experienced DSR to observe how customer interactions are 

conducted and how in-the-field sales pitches are made. On the first day of work, Vazquez testified 

he spent a few hours in the Bakersfield office, where he received his schedule and completed some 

paperwork. Vazquez reported that on the first day, Charter also took him and other trainees to 

lunch, which lasted approximately 90 minutes before he joined an experienced DSR in the field to 

begin his hands-on training. 

The first three days of classroom instruction involved a virtual self-guided review of 

manuals and other materials. On the fourth day of classroom training, an instructor-led the training. 

During the three weeks of training, except for Saturdays, Vazquez spent approximately ten (10) 

days in the classroom for training. The classroom training usually began between 10:00 and 11:00 

in the morning and lasted approximately four (4) hours a day, except for two days when it may 

have lasted as much as five hours. After the in-office training, Vazquez would meet the 

experienced DSR in the field for another 4 hours of hands-on training. 

Vazquez testified that he typically finished classroom training between 1:00 p.m. and 2:30 

p.m. and went directly into the field with his experienced DSR, where he remained until 

approximately 8:00 p.m. Vazquez could not recall how long it took him to get onto the field each 

day. While Vazquez testified at his deposition and at the arbitration hearing that he typically 

arrived in the field around 2:30 p.m., he contradicted this testimony when he testified that maybe 

it was closer to 3:00 p.m. or 4:00 p.m. when he arrived in the field.

According to Vazquez, he was never given a rest or meal break during the four hours of 

classroom training and was only permitted to take bathroom breaks as needed. Classroom 

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instruction began on November 6, 2019, and the last class and graduation took place on November 

19, 2019. Vazquez received his lead list on November 14, 2019 (JX 25) and made his first sale 

that day. (JX 26) Vazquez spent the last two days of the training, approximately nine hours each 

day, in the field on his own as a DSR.

Linda Arnold, Charter’s Director of Learning and Development, testified that the 

classroom training lasted four hours each day and that there were at least two 15-minute breaks 

during the classroom training. Raul Salcedo, Charter’s Director of Residential Connectivity,

explained that the in-field training is a necessary component to develop the peer-to-peer learning 

opportunity and that the focus of the training was to incorporate as much actual sales exposure as 

possible. Training includes participating in the sales pitch and entering orders on the Charterprovided tablets. The goal at the conclusion of the training is that the new hires feel comfortable 

making their own sales based on the intense hands-on shadowing with experienced DSRs.

B. Compensation

Salcedo testified that Charter considers all DSRs, including exempt trainees, and this 

employment status information is communicated to all new hires at the time of hire. (JX 5) Salcedo 

explained that new hires are told at the outset that they will receive a base salary plus commission. 

(JX 18) Salcedo testified that during the ramp-up period, including the three weeks of training, 

new hires receive an advance commission in the amount of $500 for the first five pay periods. New 

hires are also told that they can schedule their own rest and meal breaks once they are on their own 

in the field, but during the training period, trainees are free to take comfort breaks as needed, and 

the instructor typically takes two breaks during the four-hour classroom training. New hires are 

also told that they will not receive any overtime.

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After he resigned for health reasons, Vazquez joined a class action lawsuit challenging 

Charter’s practice with new hires during the training period. Vazquez testified at a deposition 

before the arbitration hearing, and Charter’s counsel pointed out several inconsistencies between 

Vazquez’s deposition testimony and his testimony at the arbitration hearing.

IV

POSITION OF THE PARTIES

A. Vazquez’s Position:

Charter violated California labor laws by misclassifying Vazquez as an exempt employee,

denying him the Fair Labor Standards Act protections, including providing rest and meal breaks, 

minimum and overtime wages, and providing timely, complete, and accurate wage statements. 

Charter is liable for violating these Labor Code requirements, and as a result, Vazquez is entitled 

to be compensated appropriately and to receive any and all penalties imposed on Charter.

Charter has not met its burden of proof that it properly classified Vazquez as an exempt 

employee during his three-week training period in November 2019. Charter failed to establish that 

Vazquez spent 50% of his time outside the office engaged in sales-related activities. During his 

three-week training, Charter did not require Vazquez to devote most of his time outside of the 

office engaged in sales-related activity. In fact, Charter cannot establish that an exemption existed 

for each of the three weeks of training, as there were some weeks when Vazquez spent more time 

participating in classroom instruction. Charter cannot classify Vazquez as an exempt employee if 

he was not exempt throughout the training period.

Vazquez only qualifies as an exempt employee when he is “actually” selling. Therefore, 

any time Vazquez spent outside of the office that did not specifically involve his active 

involvement in negotiating his own sales does not count when determining exempt status. For 

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example, during the first week, even though Vazquez spent half of his time outside of the office 

shadowing an experienced DSR, he did not spend any time actually selling anything on his own 

behalf. Likewise, in weeks two and three, even though he spent more than 50% of the time outside 

of the office, he was only engaged in actual selling less than 50% of the time (6.1% in week two 

and 49.5% in week three). Vazquez did not spend any time actually selling until November 14, 

2019, just 5 days before the conclusion of the training period. Charter did not expect Vazquez to 

spend more than 50% of his time actually “selling” because they did not give him his leads list 

until November 14, 2019, and still expected him to spend at least four hours in the office 

participating in classroom training.

Since Charter is unable to establish Vazquez spent 50% of his training time actually 

“selling”, it cannot escape the requirements to pay Vazquez minimum wage and overtime pursuant 

to California law. Moreover, Charter’s misclassification also entitles Vazquez to statutory 

penalties because of the misclassification and Labor Code violations. Labor Code §515(d)(2) 

requires non-exempt employees to be paid a minimum wage for working 40 hours per week, and 

any work more than eight hours in a single workday entitles the non-exempt employee to overtime. 

During the three-week training period, Vazquez worked over eight hours on a given day on 

numerous occasions, yet he never received a fixed minimum wage or overtime wages.

Charter is also responsible for meal and rest break violations. Charter provided no evidence 

that it “affirmatively” carved out time during the three-week training period for Vazquez to take 

two 10-minute and one 30-minute lunch breaks. Even if Vazquez could find time to take a break 

and have lunch, it does not relieve Charter of the responsibility to provide these statutorily required 

breaks. In addition, under the Code, Charter was required to maintain records that Vazquez

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received daily breaks. There were no such records submitted in this matter. Accordingly, Charter 

is liable for failing to compensate Vazquez for rest and meal breaks.

Charter failed to maintain complete and accurate wage statements. Labor Code §226 

requires that an employer provide “an accurate itemized statement in writing showing (1) gross 

wages earned, (2) total hours worked by the employee, except as provided in subdivision (j), . . . 

(5) net wages earned, . . . and (9) all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the 

corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee.” The November 21, 

2019, and December 5, 2019, wage statements provided by Charter fail to accurately reflect the 

number of hours Vazquez worked and the compensation he should have received during the 

training periods. Based on Charter’s failure to provide the required information on the two wage 

statements, Vazquez is entitled to recover damages.

Likewise, Vazquez is entitled to waiting time penalties based on Charter’s failure to pay 

him minimum wage and overtime. Labor Code §§201-202 provides that unpaid wages must be 

made when the employment relationship is terminated. Any defense proffered by Charter that it 

was unnecessary because Vazquez was an exempt employee is unreasonable and in bad faith. 

Accordingly, Charter should be penalized for waiting time penalties, costs, and attorney fees due 

to this Labor Code violation.

Finally, Vazquez is entitled to an award in his favor because Charter failed to give him a 

complete copy of his personnel records within the statutory 30-day period as requested. On April 

26, 2021, Vazquez submitted a request to Charter’s outside counsel for all personnel records 

related to his job performance. When the request was accepted, Vazquez was never told to submit 

the request to a different person. Yet, on May 26, 2021, when Charter responded to the request, 

Charter failed to produce all of Vazquez’s personnel records. Specifically, the production did not 

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include the Employee Handbook, Vazquez’s commission plan documents, the Code of Conduct or 

timekeeping policy, or all of Vazquez’s job performance documents. Charter’s failure to provide 

a complete personnel file violates Labor Code §1198.5, and Vazquez is entitled to the statutory 

penalty in the amount of $750 plus costs and attorney fees.

Charter has not met its burden of proof that Vazquez was an exempt employee during the 

training period. As such, Vazquez is entitled to recover damages for the multiple Labor Code 

violations that occurred because of Charter’s intentional and willful misclassification.

B. Charter’s Position

Charter properly classified Vazquez as an exempt employee because even during his 

training period, Vazquez spent more than 50% of his time outside of the office making sales calls 

and other sales-related activities. Vazquez meets the criteria of an exempt salesperson and is not 

entitled to meal breaks, rest breaks, overtime, or minimum wage. The California Supreme Court

identified the criteria for exempting outside salespeople in Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., (1999) 

20 Cal.4

th 785. The Court defined an “outside salesperson as any adult who customarily and 

regularly works more than half the working time away from the employer’s place of business 

selling.... or obtaining orders.” Here, Vazquez falls squarely within this definition and is therefore 

exempt.

First, during Vazquez’s training, he shadowed an experienced salesperson in the field,

negotiating sales and practicing his sales pitch between 4 to 7 hours a day in the field during the 

three weeks of his training. Vazquez only spent a maximum of four (4) hours a day in the 

classroom, and that was only during the first two weeks of his training. After his classroom training 

concluded, Vazquez worked exclusively in the field and did not go into the office. Vazquez

confirmed that out of the 50 hours he worked during each week of his training, he spent a minimum 

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of thirty (30) hours in the field and most weeks much more than that, and definitely, more than 

50% of his time was spent in the field as required to be considered exempt under California law. 

(Ramirez, 20 Cal.4th 785, 801; Wage Order No. 4-2001 §2(M).) The Court in Ramirez held that to 

determine if the employee is exempt, the arbitrator must examine “the realistic requirements of the 

job and how the employee is expected to spend his or her time.” Id. Vazquez acknowledged that 

he worked 50 hours a week during the first two weeks of employment and 60 hours a week during 

his third week of training.1 Based on this admission, if he spent half of the time in the field on 

sales-related activities, he was properly classified as an exempt employee. 

Vazquez testified that he went into the field every day he worked during the three-week

training period. He also spent at least 4 hours in the field each Saturday he worked during the 

training period and 4.5 to 5 hours in the field on his first and third day of training. Thereafter, he 

spent 5.5 to 7 hours in the field during the remainder of his training and even spent up to 9 hours 

in the field on November 20 and 21, 2019. Vazquez confirmed that he spent at least 30 of the 50 

hours in the field during his first week of training. During the second week, Vazquez spent a 

minimum of 31.5 hours out of 50 hours in the field, and during the third week, he spent a minimum 

of 38.5 hours in the field out of the 60 hours he worked. Based on these minimum hours he spent 

in the field and out of office, Vazquez clearly exceeded the 50% threshold requirement for an 

exemption pursuant to Ramirez and the Wage Order. 

Second, while in the field, Vazquez acknowledged spending his time exclusively on sales 

and sales-related activities. Specifically, he shadowed experienced DSRs, knocked on doors to sell 

Charter products and services, received his own leads, and even made his first sale before 

 

1 There was some discrepancy in Vasquez’s testimony regarding how much time was spent in the classroom. The 

discrepancy was not only inconsistent with Vasquez’s prior deposition testimony but also with the testimony given 

during the arbitration hearing.

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completing his new-hire training period. Charter intentionally designed its in-office training to be 

shorter than the field training, as Vazquez was expected to spend most of his time there. While 

Vazquez spent the first few days completing paperwork and other onboarding tasks, such as 

reviewing self-guided orientation modules before going into the field, it was not until day 5 that

he participated in four hours of instructor-led classroom training a day. The classroom training was 

always followed by at least 5 hours of sales-related activity in the field. Accordingly, Vazquez

spent most of his training time in the field and outside the office, consistent with the description 

of exempt employees. His job was advertised as a door-to-door sales position that required him to 

generate new business by identifying and engaging with potential customers in the field, and his 

compensation expressly included commission payments. Vazquez’s claims of misclassification 

also failed based on Vazquez’s prior sales experience and the fact he was aware he had applied for 

a field sales position. 

However, even if he was misclassified, Vazquez did receive appropriate meal and rest 

breaks during the classroom component. The classroom training incorporated a 15-minute break 

every two hours of instruction, and he was free to take breaks at any other time as necessary, either

in the field or in the office. Vazquez was also given the opportunity to take a lunch break. For 

example, Charter treated the new trainees to a 90-minute lunch at a local restaurant on the first 

day. On other training days, while there was no required or set time for lunch, Vazquez could have 

easily taken a lunch break before joining the DSR in the field. Vazquez never testified that he was 

denied either rest breaks or meal breaks, even though it was not required for exempt employees. 

Vazquez testified that he could not recall skipping lunch during his training period. Absent 

evidence that Charter forced Vazquez to skip his meal break or denied him his lunch break, 

Vazquez’s misclassification claim fails.

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Vazquez’s wage and waiting time claims also fail. To prevail on wage and waiting time 

penalties, Vazquez must establish knowing and intentional or willful violation of California law. 

There is no such evidence of willful violation because Charter had a good faith belief that it had 

properly classified Vazquez as an exempt employee. Therefore, it neither intentionally nor 

knowingly failed to pay Vazquez consistent with the minimum wage rates associated with nonexempt employees.

Finally, Charter contends it provided Vazquez with all relevant documents even though he 

never properly requested certain documents from Charter. Vazquez failed to provide evidence that 

he requested his employment records; however, Charter voluntarily provided his personnel records 

in a timely manner and, therefore, should not be penalized for failing to respond to a request that 

was not substantiated. Additionally, Vazquez was not a credible witness because he repeatedly 

contradicted himself; therefore, all his testimony should be excluded.

Charter has established that it properly classified Vazquez as an exempt employee, and 

even if he was not exempt, Vazquez’s Labor Code claims fail, and Charter is entitled to an award 

in its favor.

V

DECISION

Charter bears the burden of persuasion in this case to show it properly classified Vazquez

as an exempt outside direct sales employee during his three-week training in November 2019. 

While Vazquez contends Charter failed to pay him minimum and overtime wages during the threeweek training period and denied his rest and meal breaks, he failed to provide evidence to support 

these claims. Vazquez also alleges he is entitled to waiting time penalties for Charter’s failure to 

pay him all the wages due to him. Moreover, Charter should be penalized for failing to respond to 

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a request for his employment records and failing to provide complete and accurate wage 

statements. Charter argues that it properly classified Vazquez as an exempt employee based on the 

advertised job description (JX 3) and that Vazquez spent more than fifty percent of his time in the 

field engaged in sales-related activities. Accordingly, Charter maintains that there is no evidence 

it violated California labor laws or that Vazquez is entitled to any additional wages for the time

spent during his three weeks of training. 

After careful consideration and review of the evidence record before me, including the 

parties’ arguments, relevant documents, legal citations, testimony of the witnesses, and their posthearing briefs, the Arbitrator finds in favor of Respondent Charter Communications, LLC.

1. Vazquez was an Exempt Employee

First, Vazquez failed to present sufficient evidence to refute Charter’s claim that he was 

properly classified as an exempt employee during his training period. According to Vazquez, he 

did not spend the required 51% of his time outside of the office engaged in sales-related activities. 

Vazquez’s evidence, however, was simply not credible at arbitration. He provided inconsistent 

testimony regarding the amount of time he was in the office and the amount of time he was in the 

field. The inconsistency of his testimony was further complicated by the chart he submitted and

his pre- and post-hearing briefs. Based on his chart, Vazquez contends he spent significantly less

than 50% of his time in the field and should have been entitled to protections of California Labor 

Law and under the FLSA. However, Vazquez contradicted his deposition testimony wherein he 

acknowledged he received his leads list on the third day of training, which indicates that he was 

actively engaged in sales-related activities early in his training. At arbitration, Vazquez changed

his statement and testified he did not receive the leads list until November 14, 2019, but he also 

made his first sale that same day. Regardless of when Vazquez received the list, there is no dispute 

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that the classroom training only lasted a maximum of four hours a day. Vazquez testified that after 

the classroom training, he frequently spent 5.5 to 7 hours a day in the field during his training. 

Vazquez testified he was not denied rest or meal breaks, but his post-hearing brief asserts

he was not provided rest and meal breaks as promised and was not given a tool for recording and 

recovering missed breaks. The contradictions in his testimony and hearing brief undermine

Vazquez’s claim that Charter misclassified him as an exempt employee. Hence, his testimony was 

not credible, and this Arbitrator is inclined to discount the self-serving testimony that frequently 

changed even during the hearing. Notwithstanding Vazquez’s claims that he was non-exempt and 

that Charter was required to compensate him according to the rules outlined in the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (“FLSA”), Charter has nonetheless met its burden of proof and clearly established

that Vazquez was an exempt employee. 

California case law provides guidance on interpreting the Industrial Welfare Commission 

wage orders to determine whether an employee is exempt under the FLSA, especially where the 

employee performs both sales and non-sales tasks. Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Company, Inc.

(1999) 20 Cal.4th 785, is found dispositive here. Ramirez relied on Wage Order No. 7-80 2(1) and 

defines an exempt employee as one who spends more than half of their time in the field engaged 

in sales-related activities away from the employer’s place of business. The Court concluded that 

an outside salesperson is not just determined based on the amount of time spent in the field but 

also on the realistic requirements of the job. A careful review of the facts and examination of all 

the credible testimony supports the finding that Vazquez was an exempt employee during histhreeweek training period. As discussed below, Charter has met its burden of proof that it properly 

classified Vazquez as an exempt employee.

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The Arbitrator finds that Vazquez’s frequent contradictions and unsupported claims fail to 

support his allegations of misclassification and Labor Code violations. Vazquez testified that 

during his training, he was only in the office for the first week of virtual classroom instruction and 

only for approximately four hours a day. The fact that subsequent testimony and arguments in

Vazquez's brief contradict these statements is troubling. Accordingly, notwithstanding Vazquez’s 

inconsistencies in testimony and arguments, Charter’s exempt classification of Vazquez is 

appropriate once the Ramirez analysis is applied to the credible evidence. 

According to the undisputed evidence, Vazquez’s DSR position was advertised as a doorto-door salesperson, requiring him to spend most of his time selling Charter products and services 

in the field. (JX 3) The training he received during the three weeks was designed to develop and 

refine his sales acumen. Although some training time was spent in the office, Vazquez confirmed 

that he shadowed experienced DSRs in the field for up to 7 hours a day. (TR at 69:15-85:12) This 

training model was consistent with the salesperson's job description and the nature of the DRS

position that Vazquez was hired to perform. 

Vazquez even acknowledged that his goal was to make sales while in the field, and he used 

the time to mirror experienced DSRs and develop his sales pitch. He could only refine and improve 

this skill by working in the field. Although Vazquez contends that the time spent in the field during 

the first week of training cannot be counted as a sales-related activity because he was not actually 

“selling,” his analysis is consistent with the holding in Ramirez. Even if Vazquez did not make 

any sales during this period, he was actively engaged in a sales-related activity.

Vazquez observed an experienced DSR engaging with clients and making a sales pitch. 

He was in the field performing sale-related activities and learning to enter orders on the companyprovided tablet. Vazquez testified he completed his first sale before his training was complete. 

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Based on the credible and corroborated evidence presented in this case, the Arbitrator finds that 

Charter properly classified Vazquez as an exempt employee.

2. Charter Expected Vazquez to Engage in Sales-Related Activity

When Charter advertised the position of direct sales representative, it expected that 

anyone hired for this position would work in the field, outside of the office, selling their products 

and services. As a result, Charter designed a training program that focused on outside sales-related

activities, limiting the in-classroom instruction to a few hours a day and only during the first ten 

days of the training period. In addition to viewing a few hours of self-guided virtual in-classroom

instruction, Vazquez was assigned to mirror and shadow experienced DSRs in the field, interacting 

with customers and observing the sales process firsthand.

 Vazquez testified that on the first day, he went into the field with an experienced DSR and 

spent more and more time in the field during his three-week training. In fact, on his third day of 

training, Vazquez testified that he only spent an hour in the office doing classroom training before 

going into the field. (TR at 69:15-71:5)

Based on the evidence, the focus was clearly on Vazquez’s direct hands-on experience in 

the field, not classroom instruction. Moreover, Vazquez was given his list of leads as early as the 

third training day. (TR at 65:10-23) Although Vazquez was not expected to do homework during 

his training period, he was expected to develop the field skills necessary to make verifiable sales 

transactions with customers based on hands-on instruction from the experienced DSRs. Given

these facts by Charter, Vazquez clearly falls within the Ramirez requirements for identifying 

exempt employees satisfying the exempt employee criteria.

3. Charter Did Not Violate the California Labor Code

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Vazquez contends Charter violated the California Labor Code when it failed to provide 

him

with complete and accurate wage statements and when it failed to respond to his request for his 

personnel records. Charter contends that Vazquez has no proof the request was properly delivered 

to Charter instead of the outside lawyer representing Charter in an unrelated case. Charter 

voluntarily provided Vazquez with a copy of his personnel file and relevant information. Vazquez

could not provide evidence that he submitted a request for personnel records to the proper 

individuals. Since the personnel records were sent timely, Vazquez is not entitled to penalty 

payments, and his claim for violating the California Labor Code fails.

The evidence supports the conclusion that Charter properly classified Luis Vazquez as an 

exempt employee. Vazquez was not entitled to rest and meal breaks or minimum and overtime 

wages. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Luis Vazquez’s claim is hereby denied, and he 

is not entitled to recover any damages from the Respondent.

VI

CONCLUSION

The administrative fees of the American Arbitration Association, totaling $2,950.00, and

the compensation of the Arbitrator, totaling $62,812.50, shall be borne as incurred by Charter.

This Award is in full settlement of all claims submitted to this Arbitration. All claims not 

expressly granted herein are hereby denied.

I, Claude Dawson Ames, do hereby affirm upon my oath as Arbitrator that I am the 

individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my Final Award.

 Respectfully submitted,

Dated: September 12, 2023 /s/ Claude Dawson Ames 

 Claude Dawson Ames, Arbitrator

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 330 Filed 09/28/23 Page 29 of 55
EXHIBIT 4

OCTOBER 13, 2021 ORDER COMPELLING ARBITRATION

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

----oo0oo---- 

LIONEL HARPER, DANIEL SINCLAIR, 

HASSAN TURNER, LUIS VAZQUEZ, and 

PEDRO ABASCAL, individually and 

on behalf of all others 

similarly situated and all 

aggrieved employees, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:19-cv-00902 WBS DMC

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS 

TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 

----oo0oo---- 

Plaintiffs Lionel Harper, Daniel Sinclair, Hassan 

Turner, Luis Vazquez, and Pedro Abascal (“plaintiffs”) brought 

this putative class action against their former employer, Charter 

Communications, alleging various violations of the California 

Labor Code. Among other things, plaintiffs allege that Charter 

misclassified them and other California employees as “outside 

salespersons,” failed to pay them overtime wages, failed to 

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provide meal periods or rest breaks (or premium wages in lieu 

thereof), and provided inaccurate wage statements. (See

generally Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Docket No. 147).) 

Charter now moves to (1) compel arbitration of plaintiff Harper’s 

claims and stay the action and (2) compel arbitration of 

plaintiff Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal’s claims and dismiss them 

from the case. (Mots. to Compel Arbitration (Docket Nos. 162, 

165).)1

I. Facts & Procedural History

Much of this case’s factual background is set forth in 

the court’s accompanying Order Re: Plaintiffs’ Motion to Modify 

the Scheduling Order and for Leave to File a Third Amended 

Complaint. Accordingly, the court will not repeat it here except 

where relevant to the instant motions.

A. Plaintiff Harper

Plaintiff Harper worked for Charter from September 2017 

to March 2018. (SAC at ¶ 5 (Docket No. 147).) Upon hire, Harper 

signed an agreement to arbitrate “any and all claims, disputes, 

and/or controversies between [Harper] and Charter arising from or 

related to [Harper’s] employment with Charter,” designating JAMS 

1 The parties have requested that the court take judicial 

notice of two filings in Harper’s related FEHA case, other 

documents filed in this litigation, the American Arbitration 

Association’s rules and procedures, and two unpublished Los 

Angeles Superior Court decisions addressing Charter’s motions to 

compel arbitration in other cases. (See Docket Nos. 171, 184, 

185.) Plaintiffs object to Charter’s request as to the Los 

Angeles Superior Court decisions. (See Docket No. 191.) Because 

the court does not find these materials relevant to this matter 

or helpful in deciding any of the issues currently before the

court, however, the court declines to take judicial notice of 

these materials.

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as the arbitration provider and stating that JAMS rules, 

procedures, and policies would govern arbitrations under that 

agreement (the “JAMS Agreement”). (Order re Mot. to Compel Arb. 

at 2 (Docket No. 24).) The JAMS Agreement included a waiver of 

representative, collective, and class actions (the “Waiver”) and 

a severance and so-called “poison pill” provision. (Id. at 2.) 

The severance provision stated that if any part of the agreement 

was found to be void or unenforceable, that part would be severed 

and the remainder enforced. (Id. at 2-3.) It went on to state 

one exception (the “poison pill”): that if a dispute involved a 

representative, collective, or class action claim, and the Waiver 

were found to be invalid or unenforceable, “then th[e] entire 

Agreement . . . shall be null and void and the dispute will not 

be arbitrable.” (Id. at 3.)

In October 2017, while Harper was still employed by 

Charter, Charter adopted a new arbitration agreement requiring 

arbitration of claims via “Solution Channel,” Charter’s 

employment-based legal dispute resolution program, which provided 

for arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration 

Association (the “Solution Channel Agreement”). (Id. at 3.) 

When announcing the change, Charter notified employees that they 

would be bound by the Solution Channel Agreement unless they 

opted out within thirty days. (Id.) Harper did not do so. 

(Id.)

In November 2018, Harper filed a Demand for Arbitration 

and Request for Rulings as to Inarbitrability with JAMS, seeking 

a ruling on whether his employment-related grievances against 

Charter could be arbitrated under the JAMS Agreement. (Id. at 5-

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6.) Charter consented to and participated in the ensuing 

arbitration process with JAMS, and in April 2019 an arbitrator 

issued an award finding that Harper’s wage-and-hour claims were 

inarbitrable and dismissing the arbitration. (Id. at 6; see Mot. 

to Confirm Arb. Award, Ex. 16 (“Order of Dismissal”), at 157-66 

(Docket No. 9-1).)

Specifically, the arbitrator determined that because 

pre-dispute waivers of representative claims brought under PAGA 

are unenforceable under California law, the JAMS Agreement Waiver 

could not be enforced. (Order of Dismissal at 159-61 (Docket No. 

9-1) (citing Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A. LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 

384 (2014)).) The arbitrator accordingly determined that this 

activated the poison pill, nullifying the entire agreement. 

(Id. at 163-65.) The arbitrator rejected Charter’s argument that 

the poison pill be limited so as to nullify the agreement only as 

to the representative, collective, or class action claim at issue 

as contrary to the JAMS Agreement’s plain text, which included no 

such limitation. (Id.)

In May 2019, after Harper had initiated this action in 

state court, Charter sought to enforce the Solution Channel 

Agreement against Harper, who refused. (Order re Mot. to Compel 

Arb. at 6-7 (Docket No. 24).) In August 2019, this court 

confirmed and entered judgment pursuant to the JAMS arbitration 

award. (Id. at 19.) Further, the court found that there had 

been a novation as a result of Charter’s acquiescence to 

arbitration under the JAMS Agreement rather than the Solution 

Channel Agreement, held that any rights Charter had as against 

Harper under the Solution Channel Agreement with respect to his 

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wage-and-hour claims were thus “dead and extinguished,” and 

denied a motion by Charter to compel arbitration under the 

Solution Channel Agreement. (Id. at 18-20.)2

In May 2021, Harper again sought employment with 

Charter via an online application. (Fries Decl. at ¶ 16, Ex. D

(Docket No. 162-1).) When proceeding through Charter’s online 

application, applicants are presented with a webpage featuring 

information about Charter’s Solution Channel Agreement, with 

links to the agreement itself and to Solution Channel Program 

Guidelines, both of which applicants may save and print. (Id. at 

¶¶ 7-10.) To proceed with their application, applicants are 

required to affirmatively agree to be bound by the Solution 

Channel Agreement by clicking an “I Agree” button. (Id. at 

¶ 11.) They are informed that if they do not agree, they will be 

removed from consideration for employment; their application is 

not submitted, and they are given the option to begin the 

application process again. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.) On May 23, 2021, 

Harper consented to the Solution Channel Agreement and submitted 

an online application to Charter. (Id. at ¶ 16, Ex. D.)

2 In late 2019, the court also adjudicated a separate, 

related action between Harper and Charter brought under 

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). See

Harper v. Charter Comms., LLC, 2:19-cv-01749 WBS DMC, 2019 WL 

6918280 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2019). There, Harper had also sought 

to arbitrate his FEHA claims under the JAMS agreement, but this 

time Charter did not participate. Id. at *2. The court held 

that because “Charter did not engage with [Harper’s] FEHA claims” 

in the manner it had with his wage-and-hour claims, there had 

been no novation of arbitration agreements with respect to the 

FEHA claims. Id. at *3. After determining that the Solution 

Channel Agreement applied to Harper’s FEHA claims and was valid, 

the court granted a motion by Charter to compel arbitration of 

those claims under that agreement. Id. at *3-6.

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B. Plaintiffs Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal

In addition to consenting to the Solution Channel 

Agreement in order to complete Charter’s online application, 

individuals who accept offers of employment from Charter are 

again required to consent to the same agreement, or else they 

cannot become a Charter employee. (Fries Decl. re Turner at 

¶¶ 9-18 (Docket No. 165-2).) Plaintiff Turner submitted an 

online application on May 23, 2018, consenting to the Solution 

Channel Agreement, and subsequently completed Charter’s employee 

onboarding process, consenting to the agreement again. (Id. at 

¶¶ 8, 19, Exs. A & B.) Plaintiff Vazquez did the same, 

submitting his application on October 9, 2019. (Fries Decl. re 

Vazquez at ¶¶ 8, 19, Exs. A & B.) Plaintiff Abascal did as well, 

submitting his application on November 5, 2019. (Fries Decl. re 

Abascal at ¶¶ 8, 19, Exs. A & B.)

C. The Solution Channel Agreement

The Solution Channel Agreement contains several

provisions currently at issue. It requires parties to the 

agreement to resolve “all disputes, claims and controversies that 

could be asserted in court or before an administrative agency for 

which you or Charter have an alleged cause of action related to 

pre-employment, employment, employment termination or postemployment-related claims,” including wage-and-hour-related 

claims, through binding arbitration. (Fries Aff., Ex. C 

(“Solution Channel Agreement”), at §§ A, B(1) (Docket No. 165-

2).)

The agreement specifically excludes certain claims from 

arbitration, including “[a]ny claims that have already been filed 

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in federal or state court at the time you execute this Agreement, 

provided that such claims were not previously subject to any 

arbitration agreement.” (Id. at § C(14).) It also includes a 

merger clause, providing that the Solution Channel Agreement 

represents the complete agreement between parties on the 

resolution of covered disputes, but noting that “this Agreement 

will not apply to the resolution of any charges, complaints, or 

lawsuits that have been filed with an administrative agency or 

court before the Effective Date of this Agreement.” (Id. at 

§ P.) Finally, like the JAMS Agreement, the Solution Channel 

Agreement includes a waiver of representative, class, or 

collective action claims. (Id. at § D.)

II. Analysis

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that a 

written provision in a “contract evidencing a transaction 

involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 

thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, 

irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 

law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. 

§ 2. Because arbitration is a matter of contract, “the central 

. . . purpose of the FAA is to ensure that private agreements to 

arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.” Stolt-Nielsen 

S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) 

(internal quotations omitted); see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 

483, 490 (1987) (under the FAA, arbitration agreements “must be 

rigorously enforced”) (internal quotations omitted, alterations 

adopted).

The FAA “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion 

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by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts 

shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as

to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” Dean Witter 

Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985). Accordingly, 

“the FAA limits courts’ involvement to determining (1) whether a 

valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether 

the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” Cox v. Ocean 

View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal 

quotations omitted).

“[A]s a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning 

the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 

arbitration, whether the problem at hand is a construction of the 

contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or 

like defense to arbitrability.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 

Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983); see Poublon v. 

C.H. Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1259 (9th Cir. 2017) (same). 

Upon a showing that a party has failed to comply with a valid 

arbitration agreement, the district court must issue an order 

compelling arbitration. See Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble Cooke, Inc., 

841 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1988).

The primary exception to courts’ obligation to enforce 

arbitration agreements under the FAA comes from the Act’s “saving 

clause,” which “allows courts to refuse to enforce arbitration 

agreements ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 

the revocation of any contract.’” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 

S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). Such “generally 

applicable contract defenses” most frequently include “fraud, 

duress, or unconscionability,” but do not include “defenses that 

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apply only to arbitration.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 

U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (internal quotations omitted).

A. Applicability of the Solution Channel Agreement

Charter seeks to compel plaintiffs Harper, Turner, 

Vazquez, and Abascal to submit their California Labor Code and 

Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) claims to arbitration on an 

individual basis. (See Mot. to Compel Arb. re Harper at 1 

(Docket No. 162); Mot. to Compel Arb. re Turner, Vazquez, & 

Abascal at 1 (Docket No. 165).) Plaintiffs contend that to do 

so, Charter must prove that (1) a valid agreement to arbitrate 

exists and (2) the agreement encompasses the claims Charter seeks 

to arbitrate. (See Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 16-17 (citing 

Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2000)) (Docket No. 172); Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 

14 (same) (Docket No. 173).)

Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal acknowledge that they each 

executed the Solution Channel Agreement both when applying for 

employment with Charter and when accepting their jobs, (see Opp. 

to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 9-11 (Docket No. 173)), and Harper 

acknowledges that he did when re-applying for employment with 

Charter in May 2021, (see Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 14 

(Docket No. 172)). On this basis, plaintiffs concede that a 

valid agreement to arbitrate exists. (See id. at 17; Opp. to 

Mot. to Compel Arb. at 14 (Docket No. 173).) Accordingly, the 

question becomes whether the agreement applies to plaintiffs’ 

Labor Code and UCL claims, of which Charter seeks to compel 

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arbitration.3

The Solution Channel Agreement provides that “[y]ou and 

Charter mutually agree that . . . any dispute arising out of or 

relating to your pre-employment application and/or employment 

with Charter or the termination of that relationship, except as 

specifically excluded below, must be resolved through binding 

arbitration.” (Solution Channel Agreement at § A (Docket No. 

165-2).) This is followed by a section titled “Covered Claims,” 

(id. at § B), which specifies that such disputes include “wage 

and hour-based claims including claims for unpaid wages, 

commissions, or other compensations or penalties (including meal 

and rest break claims, claims for inaccurate wage statements, 

[and] claims for reimbursement of expenses),” (id. at § B(1)). 

The parties do not dispute that the claims of which Charter seeks 

to compel arbitration clearly fall into this category.

However, that section is followed by another, titled 

“Excluded Claims,” which lists a variety of claims to which the 

“Covered Claims” section does not apply. (See id. at § C.) 

Notably for purposes of the instant motions, these include “[a]ny 

claims that have already been filed in federal or state court at 

the time you execute this Agreement, provided that such claims 

were not previously subject to any arbitration agreement.” (Id.

3 Although at oral argument the parties briefly discussed 

whether questions of arbitrability should themselves be submitted 

to an arbitrator, neither party raised this issue in their 

briefing. Accordingly, this court will decide whether 

plaintiffs’ claims are arbitrable rather than submit the issue to 

the arbitrator. See also Momot v. Mastro, 652 F.3d 982, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (gateway issues of arbitrability are presumptively 

reserved for the court).

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at § C(14).) The aforementioned merger clause, which appears 

later in the agreement, also provides that “this Agreement will 

not apply to the resolution of any charges, complaints, or 

lawsuits that have been filed with an administrative agency or 

court before the Effective Date of this Agreement.” (Id. at 

§ P.)

Plaintiffs argue that these two provisions operate to 

exclude plaintiffs Vazquez and Abascal’s claims from mandatory 

arbitration under the agreement. Specifically, they argue that 

because plaintiff Harper had already filed this action by the 

time Vazquez and Abascal executed the agreement, their claims 

qualify as having “already been filed in . . . court” and having 

“been filed with a[ ] . . . court before the Effective Date of 

th[e] Agreement” under these provisions.4 (See Opp. to Mot. to 

Compel Arb. at 15-19 (Docket No. 173).) 

They argue the same as to Harper, given that he 

executed the operative agreement in May 2021, after bringing this 

action, and contend that his claims “were not previously subject 

to any agreement” pursuant to section C(14) because the 

agreements he previously signed were no longer in effect by May 

2021. (See Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 16-22 (Docket No. 

172).) In light of the differing arguments put forward with 

respect to Harper and to the other plaintiffs for whom Charter 

seeks to compel arbitration, the court will address the two 

4 Plaintiffs do not make this argument with respect to 

plaintiff Turner, as he had already executed the agreement when 

this litigation began, and therefore they concede that sections 

C(14) and P do not apply to him. (See Opp. to Mot. to Compel 

Arb. at 17 n.6 (Docket No. 173).)

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groups separately.

1. Plaintiffs Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal

Charter argues that Vazquez and Abascal improperly seek 

to avoid arbitration by, in essence, piggybacking off of Harper’s 

already-filed claims, which they did not join until well after 

executing the agreement. (See Def.’s Reply at 5-10 (Docket No. 

182).) It contends that because section C creates exceptions to 

section B’s requirement that various claims be arbitrated, the 

two sections must be read together, and that because section B by 

its terms applies to “claims . . . for which you or Charter have 

an alleged cause of action,” the exclusion contained in section 

C(14) is properly read to exclude only already-filed claims 

between the signing party and Charter, rather than any alreadyfiled claims to which Charter is a party. (Solution Channel 

Agreement at § B(1) (emphasis added) (Docket No. 165-2); see id.

at 5-6.) The court agrees.

Because, as a general matter, contract interpretation 

is a matter of state law, the court looks to California law in 

construing these provisions. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 

U.S. 47, 54 (2015) (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. 

of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)). 

Three provisions of the California Civil Code, governing the 

interpretation of contracts, are relevant here. First, “[t]he 

language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the 

language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an 

absurdity.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1638. Second, “[a] contract must 

be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of 

the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as 

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the same is ascertainable and lawful.” Id. at § 1636. Third, 

“[t]he whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give 

effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause 

helping to interpret the other.” Id. at § 1641.

Under these provisions, it is clear that section C(14) 

of the agreement cannot be read to prevent arbitration of Vazquez 

and Abascal’s claims by virtue of Harper’s previously filed 

claim. Because section C specifically lists exclusions to 

section B, the two must be read together. See also id. Per 

section B’s clear language, claims covered under that section —

and thus excluded under section C — are those between “You” 

(i.e., the individual signatory) “and Charter.” This clearly 

signifies an intention to require arbitration of claims — and

thus, under section C, exclude from arbitration — only claims 

that might arise as between the signatory and Charter. See id.

at §§ 1636, 1638. To allow signatories to avoid arbitration of 

otherwise-covered claims by joining suits filed by individuals 

not party to the contract would plainly frustrate this intention.

For similar reasons, section P likewise does not 

exclude Vazquez and Abascal’s claims from arbitration. As noted 

above, the Solution Channel Agreement’s core provisions specify 

that it applies to disputes between “You and Charter.” Although 

section P does not directly incorporate this language in the 

manner that section C does, to apply it in plaintiffs’ preferred 

manner would run counter to the contract’s central purpose, which 

is to require arbitration of disputes. See id. at § 1636. And 

to the extent that this omission creates a conflict between 

sections P and C(14), “in a contract, when a general and 

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particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to 

the former,” meaning that “a particular intent will control a 

general one that is inconsistent with it.” Karpinski v. Smitty’s 

Bar, Inc., 246 Cal. App. 4th 456, 464 (1st Dist. 2016) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

For these reasons, together with the FAA’s mandate that 

any doubts as to an arbitration agreement’s applicability be 

resolved in favor of arbitration, see Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 

460 U.S. at 24–25; Poublon, 846 F.3d at 1259, the court concludes 

that the Solution Channel Agreement applies to compel arbitration 

of Vazquez and Abascal’s claims. Plaintiffs do not contest that 

the agreement applies to Turner’s claims, and sections C(14) and 

P clearly do not exclude them, as this action had not yet been 

filed at the time he executed the agreement. Accordingly, the 

court concludes that the Solution Channel Agreement applies to 

Turner’s claims as well.

2. Plaintiff Harper

Plaintiffs also contend that section P of the agreement 

excludes Harper’s claims from its coverage. (See Opp. to Mot. to 

Compel Arb. at 18-19 (Docket No. 172).) They further argue that, 

because this court confirmed the JAMS arbitrator’s award finding 

that the JAMS agreement was “null and void,” and because it 

subsequently held that Charter’s acquiescence to the JAMS 

arbitration effected a novation of Harper’s first Solution 

Channel contract — rendering it “dead and extinguished” —

Harper’s claims do not qualify as “previously subject to any 

arbitration agreement” under section C(14). (See id. at 20-22.) 

Accordingly, they argue that section C(14) excludes Harper’s 

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claims from coverage under the agreement as well. (See id.)

As noted above, section C(14) provides that the 

agreement excludes “[a]ny claims that have already been filed in 

federal or state court at the time you execute this Agreement, 

provided that such claims were not previously subject to any 

arbitration agreement.” (Solution Channel Agreement at § C(14) 

(Docket No. 165-2).) Thus, because it is undisputed that 

Harper’s claims had already been filed in court when he executed 

the agreement, (see Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 20 (Docket No. 

172)), the only question is whether those claims “were . . . 

previously subject to any arbitration agreement,” (Solution 

Channel Agreement at § C(14) (Docket No. 165-2)). The court 

concludes that they were.

While Harper was employed by Charter, he consented to 

the JAMS Agreement, and later to the Solution Channel Agreement. 

Plaintiffs argue that the JAMS arbitrator’s determination that 

the JAMS Agreement was invalid means that Harper’s claims were 

never “subject to” that agreement, contending that claims are

only “subject to” an arbitration agreement if they are validly 

required to be arbitrated under that agreement. (See Opp. to 

Mot. to Compel Arb. at 20 (Docket No. 172).)

The court assumes, for these purposes, that plaintiffs’ 

construction of “subject to” is correct, such that Harper’s 

claims were not “previously subject to” the JAMS Agreement. Even 

so, it is clear that they were nonetheless “previously subject 

to” the Solution Channel Agreement. Although this court 

determined that there was a subsequent novation, extinguishing 

that agreement, the fact remains that for a period of time --

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beginning when Harper first executed the Solution Channel 

Agreement and ending with Charter’s acquiescence to the JAMS 

arbitration -- Charter could have asserted the Solution Channel 

Agreement against Harper with respect to any wage-and-hour claims 

he had. Under the plain meaning of “previous” -- earlier in time 

-- Harper’s claims, at the time he executed the Solution Channel 

Agreement in May 2021, were “previously subject to” the earliersigned copy of the same agreement. As such, Harper’s claims are 

not excluded from arbitration under section C(14).5

To the extent that Harper challenges Charter’s ability 

to compel him to arbitrate his individual claims arising out of 

his prior employment because his latest execution of the Solution 

Channel Agreement occurred when he applied for another position, 

(see id. at 14), at least one other district court in California 

has already held that the Solution Channel Agreement applies in

such circumstances. In Durruthy v. Charter Communications, LLC, 

like in this case, the plaintiff was hired by Charter, was later 

terminated, subsequently reapplied for employment, and in doing 

so executed the agreement, which Charter then sought to enforce 

against her. Durruthy, 20-CV-1374-W-MSB, 2020 WL 6871048, at *1 

(S.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2020). As the court in the Southern District 

5 Plaintiffs contend that to find that Harper’s claims 

were previously subject to the initial Solution Channel 

Agreement, the court would need to reconsider whether that 

agreement was extinguished by the previously mentioned novation, 

which they argue the court is precluded from doing under the law 

of the case doctrine. (See Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 21 

(Docket No. 172).) However, plaintiffs are mistaken in their 

logic, as finding that an applicable agreement had terminated is 

not the same as concluding that it was never applicable in the 

first place. Although the court did the former, it did not do 

the latter.

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of California observed:

The Agreement covers “any dispute arising 

out of or relating to [an applicant’s] 

preemployment application and/or employment 

with Charter or the termination of that 

relationship . . . .” The Agreement does 

not limit its application to future 

employment, nor does it exclude claims from 

prior employment periods. Therefore, an 

objective reading supports that “employment” 

reasonably means any employment period 

between the two parties of the agreement. 

. . . . Plaintiff’s alleged lack of consent 

to arbitrate claims from her prior 

employment period with Defendant are absent 

from the Agreement, and “unexpressed 

subjective intentions are irrelevant 

. . . .”

Id. at *4-5 (quoting Martinez v. BaronHR, Inc., 51 Cal. 

App. 5th 962, 970 (2020)) (alterations in original). This court 

agrees with the Durruthy court’s analysis of this issue.6

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the 

Solution Channel Agreement applies to Harper’s claims.

B. Unconscionability

Plaintiffs also argue that the Solution Channel 

Agreement is unconscionable. (See id. at 22-38; Opp. to Mot. to 

Compel Arb. at 19-34 (Docket No. 173).) If true, this would mean

that the contract was not validly entered into in the first 

instance, allowing the court to invalidate the agreement pursuant 

to the FAA’s saving clause. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339.

“Unconscionability under California law has ‘both a 

procedural and a substantive element, the former focusing on 

oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the 

6 This court’s agreement with the Durruthy court’s 

evaluation of the Solution Channel Agreement, however, does not 

extend to its unconscionability analysis.

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latter on overly harsh or one-sided results.’” Kilgore v. 

KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947, 963 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 

83, 99 (2000)). While courts “use a ‘sliding scale’ in analyzing 

these two elements . . . . [n]o matter how heavily one side of 

the scale tips . . . , both procedural and substantive 

unconscionability are required for a court to hold an arbitration 

agreement unenforceable.” Id. (citing Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 

99).

This court previously assessed whether the Solution 

Channel Agreement is unconscionable in the related action between 

plaintiff Harper and Charter. See Harper v. Charter Comms., LLC, 

2:19-cv-01749 WBS DMC, 2019 WL 6918280, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 

18, 2019). There, the court determined that the agreement was 

not procedurally unconscionable, relying in large part on the 

fact that when Harper was first confronted with the Solution 

Channel Agreement, it was via an email notifying employees of 

their ability to opt out of the agreement within thirty days. 

Id. at *1, 5 (citing Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 718 F.3d 

1052, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (deeming an arbitration 

agreement not procedurally unconscionable because it noted the 

option to opt out within sixty days of signing)). Here, on the 

other hand, there is no indication that plaintiffs were given the 

same option to opt out; indeed, they assert that they received 

none, (see Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 24 (Docket No. 172); 

Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 21 (Docket No. 173)), which 

Charter does not contest, (see Def.’s Reply at 15-17 (Docket No. 

182); Def.’s Reply at 16-18 (Docket No. 183)).

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The Ninth Circuit has previously held that an

arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable where it 

was presented to employees “on an adhere-or-reject basis,” with 

no opportunity to opt out. See Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, 

Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Steele v. Am. 

Mortg. Mgmt. Servs., 2:12-cv-00085 WBS JFM, 2012 WL 5349511, at 

*4-5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2012) (holding pre-employment 

arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable because it did 

not contain an opt-out clause). Conversely, it has also held 

that an arbitration agreement that included an opt-out provision 

was not procedurally unconscionable. See Mohamed v. Uber Techs., 

Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir. 2016). 

Thus, an arbitration agreement that individuals are 

required to sign as a condition of employment, with no ability to 

opt out, is procedurally unconscionable, though Ninth Circuit 

precedent also establishes that this form of procedural 

unconscionability is “low” on California’s sliding scale 

analysis. See Poublon, 846 F.3d at 1261. In such a situation, 

if “there is no other indication of oppression or surprise, then 

the agreement will be enforceable unless the degree of 

substantive unconscionability is high.” Id.

Regardless of the particular degree of procedural 

unconscionability present here, however, in order for their 

unconscionability defense to succeed, plaintiffs must also show 

that the agreement is substantively unconscionable. See Kilgore, 

673 F.3d at 963. And as this court previously held in the

related action between Harper and Charter, in which Charter 

sought to enforce the Solution Channel Agreement against him with 

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respect to claims not present in the current litigation, the 

agreement is not substantively unconscionable. See Harper, 2019 

WL 6918280, at *5-6.7 Because the agreement at issue in this 

litigation is the same as the one upon which the court ruled in 

the separate litigation, and plaintiffs do not allege that it has 

changed,8 the court again concludes that the Solution Channel 

Agreement is not substantively unconscionable.

Because the Solution Channel Agreement is not 

substantively unconscionable, plaintiffs’ unconscionability 

defense must fail.

C. California Labor Code Section 432.6

7 Specifically, the court determined that (1) the 

Solution Channel review process was not one-sided, as Harper 

contended, but rather its requirements applied equally to 

employees and to Charter; (2) the agreement did not enable 

Charter to conclusively decide whether a claim is arbitrable, 

instead providing claimants the ability to proceed with 

arbitration on this and other issues; and (3) a provision of the 

agreement requiring “each party [to] bear its own attorney’s fees 

regardless of the action brought,” although unenforceable under 

California law, could be severed pursuant to the agreement’s 

severability clause in light of the court’s determination that 

the agreement was “not otherwise permeated by unconscionability.” 

See Harper, 2019 WL 6918280, at *5-6 (citing Serpa v. Cal. Sur. 

Investigations, Inc., 215 Cal. App. 4th 695, 709-10 (2d Dist. 

2013)).

8 Although plaintiff Harper refers to the Solution 

Channel Agreement to which he consented the first time as the 

“Old SC Agreement” and the one to which he consented when reapplying as the “New SC Agreement,” his bases for these 

differences in nomenclature are that the former was included in 

an email informing him that he could opt out, whereas the latter 

was not — not that the agreement itself had changed. (See Opp. 

to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 9 n.1 (Docket No. 172).)

Moreover, the Solution Channel Agreement is dated 

September 25, 2017 — well before plaintiffs Turner, Vazquez, and 

Abascal first applied for employment with Charter — further 

indicating that it had not changed between when plaintiff Harper 

first signed it and when they did. (See Solution Channel 

Agreement (Docket No. 165-2); supra Section II.B.)

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Finally, in supplemental briefing, plaintiffs argue 

that the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Chamber of Commerce 

of the United States v. Bonta, — F.4th —, 2021 WL 4187860 (9th 

Cir. Sept. 15, 2021), precludes enforcement of the Solution 

Channel Agreement against Harper. (See Not. of Supp. Auth. at 2

(Docket No. 196).) That decision upheld part of California Labor 

Code section 432.6, which prohibits employers from “requir[ing] 

any applicant for employment or any employee to waive any right, 

forum, or procedure” established under the Labor Code or 

California Fair Employment and Housing Act as a condition of 

employment, on the basis that it was not preempted by the FAA.9 

See id. at *4-10; Cal. Lab. Code § 432.6(a).

Plaintiffs contend that under Chamber of Commerce, 

Charter’s use of the Solution Channel Agreement violates section 

432.6 because Harper’s consent to the agreement was a mandatory 

condition for consideration of his application and for any 

subsequent employment, with no ability to opt out. (See Not. of 

Supp. Auth. at 2 (Docket No. 196).) Per Chamber of Commerce’s 

clear language, however, whether this requirement violated

section 432.6 has no effect on the court’s present decision to 

enforce the Solution Channel Agreement: “§ 432.6 does not make 

invalid or unenforceable any agreement to arbitrate, even if such 

agreement is consummated in violation of the statute.” 2021 WL 

4187860, at *7 (emphasis added); see also 2021 WL 4187860, at *6 

9 Because section 432.6 came into effect after Turner, 

Vazquez, and Abascal executed the Solution Channel Agreement, but 

before Harper did in May 2021, plaintiffs only contend that the 

Ninth Circuit’s decision applies to Harper. (See Not. of Supp. 

Auth. at 2 n.1 (Docket No. 196).)

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(“§ 432.6 cannot be used to invalidate, revoke, or fail to 

enforce an arbitration agreement . . . .”).

The most that Chamber of Commerce does to aid employees 

who seek to challenge arbitration agreements is to simply 

reaffirm the applicability of the FAA’s saving clause to 

arbitration agreements under section 432.6. See id. at *6 

(citing Cal. Lab. Code § 432.6(f) (“Nothing in this section is 

intended to invalidate a written arbitration agreement that is 

otherwise enforceable under the [FAA].”)) (other citations

omitted). In doing so, the Ninth Circuit observed, in dicta:

[A]n employee may attempt to void an 

arbitration agreement that he was compelled 

to enter as a condition of employment on the 

basis that it was not voluntary. If a court 

were to find that such a lack of 

voluntariness is a generally applicable 

contract defense that does not specifically 

target agreements to arbitrate, the 

arbitration agreement may be voided in 

accordance with saving clause jurisprudence.

Id. at *9. However, here the court has addressed Harper’s

“generally applicable contract defense[s]” and determined that 

they do not apply here. Chamber of Commerce thus has no impact 

on this decision.

For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant 

Charter’s motions to compel arbitration of plaintiffs Harper, 

Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal’s individual claims.

D. Motions to Dismiss or Stay Judicial Proceedings

In its motion to compel arbitration of Harper’s Labor 

Code and UCL claims, Charter requests that, should the court 

grant that motion, the court stay this case -- including Harper’s 

PAGA claim -- pending arbitration of the other claims. (See Mot. 

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to Compel Arb. re Harper at 23-24 (Docket No. 162).) Charter 

suggests that although it has not sought arbitration of the PAGA 

claim, staying proceedings as to the PAGA claim would avoid 

conflicting rulings between this court as to the PAGA claim and 

the arbitrator as to the other claims. (See id. at 24.) 

Plaintiffs oppose this request, pointing out that because this 

court will not be bound by any rulings the arbitrator might make, 

staying Harper’s PAGA claim would not in fact avoid conflicting 

rulings. (See Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 38-39 (Docket No. 

172).) They further argue that proceedings as to the PAGA claim 

should not be stayed because of the distinct nature of a PAGA 

claim, which belongs to the state rather than to Harper. (See

id. at 39.)

Further, in its motion to compel arbitration of Turner, 

Vazquez, and Abascal’s claims, Charter also requests that, should 

the court grant that motion, the court dismiss those plaintiffs 

from the case. (See Mot. to Compel Arb. re Turner, Vazquez, & 

Abascal at 20-21 (Docket No. 165).) Plaintiffs oppose this 

request and instead request that the court stay proceedings as to 

these plaintiffs pending arbitration of their individual claims. 

(See Opp. to Mot. to Compel Arb. at 35 (Docket No. 173).) In 

response to the court’s questioning at oral argument, counsel for 

plaintiffs indicated that they preferred a stay of plaintiff 

Sinclair’s individual claims pending arbitration of the other 

plaintiffs’ individual claims.

The FAA provides that, where a suit presents “issue[s] 

referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such 

arbitration,” the court “shall on application of one of the 

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parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has 

been had.” 9 U.S.C. § 3. Further, the Supreme Court has stated 

that “[i]n some cases, it may be advisable to stay litigation 

among the nonarbitrating parties pending the outcome of the 

arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 

Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 n.23 (1983).

Because plaintiffs have requested a stay of Turner, 

Vazquez, and Abascal’s individual claims, the court will stay 

those claims pending arbitration. Additionally, because Charter 

has requested that the court otherwise stay this case pending 

arbitration of Harper’s individual claims, because plaintiffs’ 

counsel supported a stay of Sinclair’s individual claims at oral 

argument, and because the court agrees that a stay of Sinclair’s 

claims pending arbitration is “advisable,” the court will stay 

Sinclair’s individual claims pending arbitration as well. 

However, because a stay would impede vindication of 

California’s interests in enforcing the Labor Code through 

representative PAGA actions, discussed above, and because the 

PAGA claim represents a distinct “action” in this case, the court 

will not stay Harper’s PAGA claim. See Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto 

Grp., 53 Cal. App. 5th 539, 557 (1st Dist. 2020) (“Because a PAGA 

claim is representative and does not belong to an employee 

individually, an employer should not be able dictate how and 

where the representative action proceeds.”).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Charter’s Motions to 

Compel Arbitration (Docket Nos. 162, 165) be, and the same hereby 

are, GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as to the claims presented 

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in Counts One through Nine of the Second Amended Complaint only,

this action is STAYED pending arbitration of plaintiff Harper, 

Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal’s individual claims.

Dated: October 12, 2021

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