Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_08-cv-00786/USCOURTS-almd-1_08-cv-00786-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN RE: STAGE DOOR )

 DEVELOPMENT, INC., )

)

Debtor, )

)

WILLIAM C. CARN, III, )

Trustee in Bankruptcy for )

Stage Door Development, )

Inc., )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 1:08cv786-MHT

) (WO)

H. JACK MIZELL, )

) 

Defendant and Third- )

 Party Plaintiff, )

)

JAMES TIMOTHY TURNER, )

)

Third-Party Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

HON. DWIGHT H. WILLIAMS, )

et al., )

)

Third-Party )

 Defendants. )

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OPINION AND ORDER

On July 3, 2008, H. third-party plaintiffs Jack

Mizell and James Timothy Turner filed, within the context

of an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court, a

pleading labeled “Affidavit of Negative Averment,

Opportunity to Cure, And Counterclaim.” This pleading,

which is designated as a third-party complaint, makes

several vague and confusing claims against Chief United

States Bankruptcy Judge Dwight H. Williams as a result of

his role presiding over the underlying bankruptcy

proceedings. The case is now before the district court

following Judge Williams’s unopposed motion to withdraw

reference, which this court granted on September 22,

2008. 

Judge Williams now moves to dismiss all of the claims

asserted against him by Mizell and Turner. Because Judge

Williams retains absolute judicial immunity from these

claims, and because the proper remedy for challenging the

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actions of the bankruptcy judge would be an appeal, his

motion is granted.

I.

Mizell has filed a number of documents making various

demands and allegations throughout the course of the

bankruptcy proceedings. On July 28, 2008, Mizell filed

a “Demand for Payment” that named Judge Williams, among

others, as a “Libelee” and sought $17,600,000,000. On

August 4, Mizell made a similar “Second Demand for

Payment.” These demands for payment are presumably based

on the third-party complaint, in which Mizell and Turner

make a number of allegations. These allegations include:

“Dishonor in Commerce,” “Theft or Attempted Theft of

Private Property,” “Abuse of Power,” “Failure to respond

as outlined herein,” “Denial of Due Process,”

“extortion,” and several others. Each of these claims

seeks damages of $2,000,000 from each third-party

defendant. The third-party complaint then sets forth the

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terms of payment, including penalties for delay,

applicable interest rates, and punitive damages.

Judge Williams argues that the third-party complaint

and demands for payment, which curiously attempt to

invoke admiralty jurisdiction, are “marked by quasi-legal

gibberish” and are typical of “fraudulent commercial

documents utilized to harass federal officials.” Thirdparty Def.’s Motion to Dismiss at 4. Furthermore, he

argues that the claims must be dismissed because he is

protected by absolute judicial immunity from civil

liability for judicial acts and omissions. 

Mizell argues that Judge Williams “has volunteered to

become a defendant in this case” because, in the course

of the bankruptcy proceedings, he appointed a trustee to

manage Stage Door Development, Inc., a radio broadcaster

owned by Mizell. Moreover, Mizell contends, there can be

no judicial immunity when a judge acts “under color of

law.” Third-party Pl.’s Response at 2. As a result,

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* In Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th

Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions

of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the

close of business on September 30, 1981.

5

Mizell “re-assert[s] the demand for payment from him.”

Id.

II.

It is a fundamental principle that judges, in

exercising their judicial authority, are not subject to

civil damages. Stump v. Sparkmen, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57

(1978). “Judges are entitled to absolute judicial

immunity from damages for those acts taken while they are

acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in

the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Bolin v. Story,

225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations and

internal quotation omitted). It is also well established

that this immunity extends to bankruptcy judges.

Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. Mar. 9,

1981)* (holding that trustee appointed by bankruptcy judge

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was entitled to absolute immunity as an arm of the

court).

In determining whether a judge’s actions were taken

while acting in a judicial capacity, courts consider

whether: “(1) the act complained of constituted a normal

judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge's

chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved

a case pending before the judge; and (4) the

confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the

judge in his or her judicial capacity.” Coggins v.

United States District Court for the Middle District of

Alabama, 2008 WL 1929904 at *4 (M.D. Ala. April 28, 2008)

(Hobbs, J.); see also Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067,

1070 (11th Cir. 2005). Here, Judge Williams was clearly

acting within his jurisdiction as a bankruptcy judge, and

the conduct in question amounted to nothing more than

normal, lawful, and relatively common actions incident to

bankruptcy proceedings. The events in question all

occurred in open court or in written court orders, and

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they all directly involved the pending bankruptcy matter.

Thus, Judge Williams is quite clearly entitled to

absolute immunity from the claims made in the third-party

complaint.

Portions of the third-party complaint, however, could

be read as seeking other forms of relief in addition to

civil damages. Specifically, Mizell and Turner demand

that all third-party defendants “dismiss any and all

claims” against them and, apparently in the alternative,

furnish the “lawfully required Proof of Claim.” Thirdparty Complaint, at 2-3. As a penalty for failure to

meet these demands, Mizell and Turner seek damages. 

However these claims are styled, it is clear that an

action against Judge Williams is an improper manner in

which to pursue their vindication. Without commenting on

the actual merits of Mizell’s and Turner’s claims, if

Judge Williams has been in error in his official rulings

or in his handling of the bankruptcy proceedings, the

proper remedy is an appeal to the appropriate court that

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adheres to the appropriate temporal and procedural

requirements. As this court has held, “[t]he law does

not subject a ... judge to suit by unsuccessful

litigants.” Coggins, 2008 WL 1929904, at *4.

Thus, Mizell and Turner fail to state a claim upon

which this court can grant relief. Accordingly, Judge

Williams’s motion to dismiss all claims against him is

granted. Because these claims cannot be cured, they are

dismissed with prejudice.

DONE, this the 8th day of October, 2008.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson _____________________________

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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