Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00817/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00817-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Pursuant to the court’s September 22, 2005, order, petitioner’s traverse is 1

disregarded. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD EMMETT WARD, No. CIV S-05-0817-GEB-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

D.L. RUNNELS,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), filed on April 26, 2005, and respondent’s answer (Doc. 6), filed

on August 11, 2005.1

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 1 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “. . . a determination of a factual issue made 2

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. These facts are, therefore, drawn from

the state court’s opinion(s), lodged in this court. Petitioner may also be referred to as

“defendant.”

2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts2

The state court recited the following facts, and petitioner has not offered any clear

and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that these facts are correct:

On March 21, 2001, sisters Michelle Coleman and Eva Jacobs,

along with three children, lived in a two-bedroom duplex on the cul-de-sac

end of Libra Avenue in Sacramento County. That evening, Coleman and

Jacobs went to the Cordova Inn nightclub in Rancho Cordova. They were

joined by Jacobs’ boyfriend, Emory Jackson. Coleman’s brother-in-law,

Joe Johnson, babysat the children at the duplex.

At the club, both Coleman and Jacobs consumed alcohol. 

Coleman became drunk. While there, Jacobs saw defendant, whom she

had met when she was 15. They embraced, exchanged greetings, and had

a friendly conversation.

At approximately 2:00 a.m., Jacobs and Jackson left the club in

Jackson’s Chevy Impala. Jackson drove the back streets because he had

been drinking and did not want to be pulled over. He was the subject of

an outstanding warrant. While they were stopped at a stop sign, a dark

green or purple car pulled up along the driver’s side of their car. Jacobs

saw someone from the other car fire a gun in their direction. She ducked

down for a while, then raised her head and saw the dark car drive away. It

was followed by a Cadillac, which Jacobs described as white and an older

model. Jackson and Jacobs then drove to the duplex, arriving at

approximately 2:15 a.m.

Meanwhile, shortly after Jackson and Jacobs left the club,

Coleman left the club with Mark Bluster, a man she had met that evening. 

He drove them to the duplex, where they parked the car and chatted. 

While there, Coleman observed a silver or gray new model car drive

around the cul-de-sac. The car had its high beam headlights on, but its tail

lights and back license plate light were off. This gave Coleman a bad

feeling about the car. Felling uncomfortable outside, Coleman went inside

the duplex and asked Jacobs if she could bring Bluster in. Jacobs refused

as she did not want strangers in the house. Coleman then decided to go to

a motel, and retrieved $40 from her bedroom.

As Coleman left the house, Jacobs heard a car pull up. She did not

see headlights reflected off her window blinds as she normally did when a

car turned around in the cul-de-sac. She asked Jackson to look out the

window. He did, and saw the same car from which someone had shot at

him and Jacobs earlier that night. Jackson called 911 while Jacobs woke

up Johnson and told him to get out of the house. Jackson and Jacobs then

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 2 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

left the house with one of the children, Jacobs’ daughter, and hid in a

neighbor’s shed. Jacobs called the police from there.

Meanwhile, after Coleman left the duplex and got back into

Bluster’s car, someone immediately pulled her coat over her head and

dragged her out of the car and towards the duplex, hitting her along the

way with what felt to Coleman to be a pistol. Because her house key

opened only one of the two locks on the door, the man dragging her

kicked the door open. He put Coleman face-down on a mattress in the

living room and put a gun to her head. Bluster was lying on the mattress

beside her, and was being hit. He was forced to remove his clothes and

his jewelry. Coleman was forced to pull down her pants, insert her finger

into her vagina, and massage it.

Coleman thought there were several people in the house. She

heard three or four different voices. She cried about her babies, and a man

told her he would not hurt them.

After being awakened by Jacobs, Johnson put the two remaining

children into the bedroom corner. As he left the bedroom but before he

was able to close the door, he was met by four men. One of them stuck a

gun into the side of his neck. The men were all wearing black masks,

large black jackets, gloves, dark jeans, and dark boots. 

The man holding the gun to Johnson asked where he could find

money, jewelry, and keys to the car parked in front. Johnson told him he

did not know because it was not his house. The man then ordered Johnson

to lie on the floor. Johnson heard the men rifling through the house and

the garage. Someone found some money in Coleman’s room, and asked

Johnson where was the rest of the money. He replied that he did not

know. A man stepped on Johnson while he was lying on the floor; another

struck him on the head.

Johnson described the gun pulled on him as similar to a Beretta or

a nine-millimeter automatic handgun, a type of gun owned by his father. 

Johnson also noticed another man held a gun that resembled a police

officer’s gun. After a few minutes, he heard someone whistle from the

front of the house, and the men left, telling the victims not to get up.

Ultimately, Coleman got up and found the house in a mess. She

discovered approximately $400 was missing from her bedroom dresser

drawer. Her keys had also been taken. Coleman could not remember the

denominations of the money taken from her: “I think it was some 20s and

some different ones, probably – oh, I don’t remember.”

At approximately 3:00 a.m., sheriff’s deputies were dispatched to

the duplex. The officers were informed the suspects might be in a newer

silver Cadillac. As she approached the house with her headlights off,

Deputy Kristina Albright observed a newer silver Cadillac come out of the

court on Libra Avenue. Albright turned on her headlights and followed

the car. She had difficulty determining how many people were in the car,

but she noticed someone in the car besides the driver was trying to duck

down.

Two additional deputies followed Albright’s car. One deputy,

Robert Rinelli, observed the Cadillac’s driver was a light-skinned Black

male. The driver’s passenger was darker-skinned, and was wearing a dark

knit ski-type cap and all dark clothing.

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 3 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

Albright activated her overhead lights, and the Cadillac

accelerated. Then it stopped abruptly in the street. The passenger door

opened, and a Black male ran from the car. He was wearing a black

jacket, black pants, black gloves, and a black stocking cap.

Deputies took the driver – defendant – into custody without

incident. Defendant wore a red and black coat, a white tank top, black

shorts, and black shoes. Deputies found $435 in cash wadded up inside

defendant’s pants pocket, and a wallet in another pants pocket. The

money found in defendant’s pocket consisted of four $100 bills, one $20

bill, two $5 bills, three $1 bills, and two silver dollars. Deputies also

found a loaded nine-millimeter Beretta about five to ten feet away from

the Cadillac’s opened passenger door. 

Minutes later, the deputies located co-defendant John-Charles

hiding in a garbage can in the neighborhood. With him, deputies found a

black jacket, black sweatshirt, black stocking cap, and a black glove. 

John-Charles was positively identified as the person who ran from the

Cadillac driven by defendant. 

Coleman identified the stopped Cadillac as the same car she saw

that night driving on the cul-de-sac with its taillights off before she went

into the house. Inside the Cadillac, deputies located a duffel bag with

stereo equipment inside. Jacobs later identified the equipment as

belonging to her. 

B. Procedural History

Petitioner and co-defendant Curtis Michael John-Charles were charged with:

(1) two counts of robbery, in violation of California Penal Code § 211; (2) one count of receiving

stolen property, in violation of California Penal Code § 496(a); and (3) one count of assault with

a firearm, in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(2). Following a jury trial, petitioner

was convicted on all charges. The jury also found true the charges that petitioner acted in

concert with three or more people, in violation of California Penal Code § 213(a)(1)(A), and that

a principal was armed with a firearm in the commssion of the offenses, in violation of California

Penal Code § 12022.53(b). The trial court found true the allegation that petitioner had two or

more prior serious felony convictions. Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term of 82 years

to life, consisting of three consecutive 25-year to life sentences, plus seven years enhancements. 

The trial court stayed a 25-life sentence on one of the counts. Petitioner’s conviction and

sentence were affirmed by the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court

denied direct review. Petitioner did not file any state habeas actions. 

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 4 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. When it is clear that a state court has not reached

the merits of a petitioner’s claim, because it was not raised in state court or because the court

denied it on procedural grounds, the AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal

habeas court must review the claim de novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to

reach petitioner’s claim under its “relitigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204,

1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on

perjury claim, AEDPA did not apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the

evidentiary hearing in federal court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing

petition de novo where state court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the

claim alleged by petitioner). When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, 

“concerns about comity and federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

Where the AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F. 3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 5 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

Under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is available where the state court’s decision

is “contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. In

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a majority of the

Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A state court

decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently than

the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state

court decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate

that Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the

wrong legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme

Court cases to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See

id. at 406. If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to

determine first whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 293 F.3d 1040,

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which

case federal habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question

is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

State court decisions are reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See id.; see also Wiggins v. Smith,

123 S.Ct. 252 (2003). While declining to rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams,

suggested that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refused to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 6 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

erroneous or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot

necessarily be found even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision

is clearly erroneous. See Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175. This is because “. . . the gloss of clear

error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with

unreasonableness.” Id. As with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal

law, where a state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal

habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn,

283 F.3d at 1052 n.6. 

The “unreasonable application of” standard also applies where the state court

denies a claim without providing any reasoning whatsoever. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 233 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). Such decisions

are considered adjudications on the merits and are, therefore, entitled to deference under the

AEDPA. See Green v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982.

The federal habeas court assumes that state court applied the correct law and analyzes whether

the state court’s summary denial was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that

law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. 

III. DISCUSSION

In his pro se petition, petitioner raises the following claims:

1. The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could not find

petitioner guilty as an aider and abettor of a crime that was committed

before petitioner became an accomplice;

2. Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request an aiding and abetting

instruction that the requisite act, knowledge, and intent must precede or

coincide with the offense, and that a late joiner is not criminally

responsible for crimes committed before he joined;

/ / /

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 7 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

3. The prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument and the trial /

court erred in making statements to the jury during closing argument,

resulting in an unfair trial;

4. Trial court erred by not inquiring further into petitioner’s request for a

new attorney to represent him in his motion for a new trial;

5. Petitioner’s sentence of 82 years to life in prison constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment;

6. The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike one of petitioner’s

prior convictions;

7. Even if the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior

serious felony conviction as to all of the counts, it did abuse its discretion

in failing to strike a prior serious felony allegation as to two of the counts

and/or in imposing consecutive sentences; and

8. Assuming that sentencing issues were waived, defense counsel was

ineffective in failing to object to petitioner’s sentence on the grounds that

it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and to request that the court

sentence petitioner concurrently and/or dismiss a prior serious felony

conviction allegation as to some counts. 

Respondent concedes that these claims are exhausted. 

A. Aiding and Abetting Instruction (Claim 1)

The state court summarized petitioner’s claim as follows:

Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error

when it failed to instruct sua sponte on the timing of defendant’s

involvement in the crimes. Specifically, he claims the prosecutor

presented a possible theory that defendant did not join the criminal

enterprise until co-defendant John-Charles got into defendant’s car with

the stolen property. Thus, he argues the court should have instructed the

jury it could not find defendant guilty of robbing Bluster and assaulting

Johnson if the jury concluded defendant’s participation began after those

two crimes were committed and consisted only of letting co-defendant

John-Charles in his car and driving him away. 

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of a

transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083,

1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is not

available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d

at 1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright,

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 8 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, a challenge to jury instructions does not generally

give rise to a federal constitutional claim. See Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). 

However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” 

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1980)); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). In order to raise such a

claim in a federal habeas corpus petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete

miscarriage of justice.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Crisafi v. Oliver, 396

F.2d 293, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1968); Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1960). 

In general, to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot

be merely ‘undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due

process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317

(9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). To prevail, petitioner

must demonstrate that an erroneous instruction “‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp,

414 U.S. at 147). In making its determination, this court must evaluate the challenged jury

instructions “‘in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial

process.’” Prantil, 843 F.2d at 817 (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.

1984)). Further, in reviewing an allegedly ambiguous instruction, the court “must inquire

‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a

way’ that violates the Constitution.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494

U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). Petitioner’s burden is “especially heavy” when the court fails to give an

instruction. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). 

/ / /

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 9 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

It is well-established that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every

element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364

(1970). Therefore, due process is violated by jury instructions which use mandatory

presumptions to relieve the prosecution’s burden of proof on any element of the crime charged. 

See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985); see also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510

(1979). A mandatory presumption is one that instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed

fact if certain predicate facts are proved. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 314. On the other hand, a

permissive presumption allows, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer an elemental fact

from proof of a basic fact. See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157

(1979). The ultimate test of the constitutionality of any presumption remains constant – the

instruction must not undermine the factfinder’s responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced

by the government, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 156 (citing In

re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364). Finally, even if constitutional error is found, habeas relief is not

warranted if the error was harmless. See Ho v. Carey, 332 F.3d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In addressing this claim, the state court began with the general principles of law

concerning aiding and abetting. The court explained that, under California law, if a defendant’s

liability is predicated on a theory of aiding and abetting, the defendant’s intent to encourage or

facilitate must be formed prior to or during the commission of the offense. The court added:

. . . Because the commission of robbery does not end until the loot has

been carried away to a place of temporary safety, a getaway driver who

joins the crime after the property has been taken but before it reaches a

place of safety is guilty of aiding and abetting the robbery. (citation

omitted). [¶] However, late-joiners to a criminal enterprise are not guilty

of aiding and abetting crimes committed before they joined. (citation

omitted). For example, a participant in a robbery is not an aider and

abettor of a homicide committed before he became an accomplice. 

(citation omitted). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 10 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

As to petitioner’s assertion that the prosecutor presented a possible theory that he did not join the

criminal enterprise until co-defendant John-Charles got into the car with the stolen property, the

state court disagreed:

. . . The prosecutor did not argue defendant’s involvement could

have begun only at the point in time when John-Charles entered

defendant’s car. Rather, the prosecutor argues defendant participated in

the crime from its beginning as a co-principal and co-conspirator, and

either as an active participant inside the house or as the getaway driver

waiting outside the entire time. 

Defendant points us to the prosecutor’s closing argument, where

she acknowledged defendant’s role may have been the getaway driver and

he may not have entered the house, to claim the prosecutor argued

defendant was a late-joiner to the crime. The mere fact the prosecutor said

the defendant could still be convicted even if he served as the getaway

driver and did not go inside the house did not equate with a theory the

defendant did not join the criminal activity until after his co-defendant got

into his car. 

* * *

Moreover, defendant himself did not argue he was innocent of

robbing Bluster and assaulting Johnson because we has a late-joiner to

those crimes. Defendant simply denied committing any of the charges

offenses, and argued the prosecution had not proven each element of each

crime. He even argues he did not serve as the getaway driver. 

The state court concluded that, because “the issue of when defendant formed the intent to aid and

abet the robbery was not even remotely an issue ‘commonly or closely and openly connected to

the facts before the court . . .’ (citation omitted). The court thus was under no obligation to

instruct sua sponte on the timing element of aiding and abetting. 

The basis for petitioner’s claim of instructional error is the mistaken assessment

of the record that the prosecutor argued that petitioner was a late joiner. Under petitioner’s

logic, if he did not join the criminal enterprise until after John-Charles got into his car with the

stolen property, the jury should have been instructed on the timing element of aiding and

abetting. As the state court observed, petitioner’s interpretation of the record is not accurate. 

Moreover, even if petitioner merely sat in his car while the others committed the crimes, his

participation by driving the car from the scene of the crime would still make him guilty of aiding

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 11 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

and abetting. Under California law the crime of robbery is not complete until the items stolen

reach safety. Petitioner clearly participated in the crime before the stolen property reached

safety by driving the car intended to take the property to safety. Thus, the crime of robbery had

not been completed before petitioner’s involvement and, for this reason, no timing instruction on

late joiners was required. 

B. Prosecutorial Misconduct (Claim 3)

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct through her comment

during closing arguments on the lack of fingerprint evidence. Respondent argues that this claim

is procedurally barred and that it lacks merit. 

In addition to addressing the merits of this claim, the state court concluded that

petitioner had defaulted on the claim by not making a contemporaneous objection to the alleged

misconduct at the time of trial. Based on concerns of comity and federalism, federal courts will

not review a habeas petitioner's claims if the state court decision denying relief rests on a state

law ground that is independent of federal law and adequate to support the judgment. See

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-62 (1989). 

Generally, the only state law grounds meeting these requirements are state procedural rules. 

Even if there is an independent and adequate state ground for the decision, the federal court may

still consider the claim if the petitioner can demonstrate: (1) cause for the default and actual

prejudice resulting from the alleged violation of federal law, or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of

justice. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 262 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485, 495 (1986)). 

In Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999), and Van Sickel v.

White, 166 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit held that California’s contemporaneous

objection rule is an adequate and independent state procedural rule when properly invoked by the

state courts. The Ninth Circuit has also concluded that the contemporaneous objection rule has

been consistently applied by the California courts. See Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1125

(9th Cir. 2002).

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 12 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Respondent raises the procedural bar argument in his answer to the petition. 3

Petitioner’s traverse, in which he could have raised cause and prejudice, was stricken because it

was not accompanied by a proof of service on respondent. This order was issued in September

2005 and petitioner has not re-submitted his traverse or otherwise sought to argue cause and

prejudice concerning his procedural default in state court.

13

Here, the contemporaneous objection rule was properly invoked by the California

Court of Appeal and the Ninth Circuit has concluded that the rule is adequate, independent, and

consistently applied. Because petitioner has not demonstrated cause and prejudice, the court

agrees with respondent that this claim is procedurally barred.3

Even if the procedural bar did not apply, the claim lacks merit. Concerning the

allegedly improper statements, the following exchange took place at trial:

PROSECUTOR: Then, Your Honor, I would ask the Court to

address the issue, because I think I have a right to respond to the

representations that [defense counsel] made in front of the jury about the

lack of fingerprints [on the money].

THE COURT: Well, you do. [¶] The Court did consider

the issue of the [fingerprints on the] money and I presented certain options

to counsel. And it was decided to proceed with the trial and so that’s what

we did.

PROSECUTOR: [To the jury]: So you don’t have that

evidence before you, you don’t have it before you for a reason.

According to petitioner, the underlying dispute concerning the fingerprints arose because the

money was never fingerprint tested due to police error. Petitioner states that the effect of the

above exchange was to make defense counsel appear deceptive by suggesting that defense

counsel was the “reason” the jury did not have fingerprint evidence. 

Success on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct requires a showing that the

conduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process. See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987). The conduct must be examined to

determine “whether, considered in the context of the entire trial, that conduct appears likely to

have affected the jury's discharge of its duty to judge the evidence fairly.” United States v.

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 13 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 806 (9th Cir. 1990). Even if an error of constitutional magnitude is

determined, such error is considered harmless if the court, after reviewing the entire trial record,

concludes that the alleged error did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). Error is

deemed harmless unless it “is of such a character that its natural effect is to prejudice a litigant's

substantial rights.” Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760-761 (1946). Depending on

the case, a prompt and effective admonishment of counsel or curative instruction from the trial

judge may effectively “neutralize the damage” from the prosecutor’s error. United States v.

Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1291 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Simtob, 901 F.2d at 806).

As to the merits of petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the state court

held:

Even were we to find the issue had not been waived, we would

find no misconduct and therefore no prejudice. “Ultimately, the test for

misconduct is whether the prosecutor has employed deceptive or

reprehensible methods to persuade either the court or the jury.” (citation

omitted). The prosecution’s attempt to neutralize defense counsel’s clear

inference the fingerprint evidence was not introduced solely because of

the prosecution’s actions was neither deceptive nor reprehensible. 

The basis for the state court’s conclusion is that the “reason” the fingerprint evidence was not

before the jury was because the trial judge gave the parties options concerning the issue and an

option was selected to proceed to trial without the fingerprint evidence. This is consistent with

the exchange that took place in front of the jury. It is clear that the “reason” referred to by the

prosecutor was the choice outlined by the judge, and not due to any deception on the part of

defense counsel, as petitioner urges. On this record, the court cannot say that the state court’s

determination of this claim was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of controlling

federal law. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 14 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

15

C. Substitution of Counsel (Claim 4)

As summarized by the state court:

Defendant alleges the trial court erred in refusing to inquire further

into his grounds for seeking substitute counsel to bring a motion for a new

trial on the basis his trial counsel provided ineffective legal assistance. 

“A State has a duty to provide an indigent defendant with effective assistance of

counsel through his first appeal.” Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 669 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963)). In California, a criminal defendant who is

dissatisfied with court-appointed counsel must be permitted to state the reasons why the

defendant believes the attorney should be replaced. See Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d at 123-24. When a

defendant seeks to discharge counsel and substitute another attorney on the ground of inadequate

representation, the court is required to allow the defendant to explain the basis for the motion

and relate specific instances of the attorney’s deficient performance. See id. Denial of a

Marsden motion can only amount to a constitutional violation where there was a conflict

between the defendant and counsel which prevented effective representation. See Schell v.

Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th cir. 2000) (en banc). 

At the outset, the court finds that this claim, as articulated by petitioner, is not

cognizable on federal habeas review because it asserts an error of state law. In particular,

petitioner contends that the trial court did not completely exercise its duty to inquire as to the

reasons behind petitioner’s Mardsen motion. This is a question of state law and the state court

found no error because the trial judge had given petitioner an opportunity to explain in open

court why he wanted substitute counsel. A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 only on the basis of a transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See

Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195,

1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of

state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir.

1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Habeas corpus cannot be

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 15 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

16

utilized to try state issues de novo. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). 

To the extent petitioner raises a cognizable federal habeas claim, however, the

court concludes that there is nothing in the record to establish a conflict between petitioner and

counsel which prevented effective representation. 

D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment (Claim 5)

Petitioner claims that his sentence of 82 years to life constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This claims was raised for the first time on

direct appeal. The state court concluded that petitioner had waived the claim by not making a

contemporaneous objection to the sentence. See People v. Norman, 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229

(2003). Respondent argues that, because petitioner procedurally defaulted this claim by not

making a contemporaneous objection, and because the state court invoked the procedural default

to deny the claim on direct appeal, this court is barred from reviewing the state court’s denial of

the claim. The court agrees. As discussed above, the contemporaneous objection rule is

independent, adequate, and consistently applied. Because petitioner has demonstrated neither

cause nor prejudice, this court is barred from granting relief on the claim.

E. Abuse of Discretion (Claims 6 and 7)

Petitioner asserts that the trial court abused its discretion. In claim 6, petitioner

contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to strike a prior felony conviction for

sentencing enhancement purposes. In claim 7, petitioner argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by sentencing him to consecutive sentences on all counts. As discussed below, this

court cannot grant relief on either claim.

1. Refusal to Strike Prior Felony Conviction

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in its application of California Penal

Code § 1385, which governs consideration of motions to strike prior convictions. Petitioner’s

argument relies entirely on state law and, as such, the claim is not cognizable in this case.

/ / /

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 16 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

17

2. Consecutive Sentences

The essence of claim 7 is that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing

petitioner to consecutive sentences. The state court invoked the contemporaneous objection

default to deny this claim because petitioner had not raised an objection at the time of

sentencing. Respondent argues that this court is procedurally barred from reviewing the state

court’s denial of this claim. Again, because the default was properly applied by the state court

and because petitioner has asserted neither cause nor prejudice, the court must agree. 

F. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Claims 2 and 8)

In claim 2, petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he

failed to request the aiding and abetting jury instruction he argues in claim 1; and the trial court

erred by not giving it sua sponte. In claim 8, petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to raise contemporaneous objections at sentencing. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a petitioner must show that, considering

all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

See id. at 688. To this end, petitioner must identify the acts or omissions that are alleged not to

have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. See id. at 690. The federal court must

then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were

outside the wide range of professional competent assistance. See id. In making this

determination, however, there is a strong presumption “that counsel’s conduct was within the

wide range of reasonable assistance, and that he exercised acceptable professional judgment in

all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 17 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Petitioner does not argue that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a 4

contemporaneous objection regarding the prosecutorial misconduct issue. In any event, as

discussed above, that claim lacks merit. Therefore, counsel could not have been deficient for

18

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 693. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.;

see also Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered

by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be

followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697).

As to each of petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court

finds that petitioner cannot prevail. 

1. Failure to Request Aiding and Abetting Jury Instruction

This claim is related to claim 1 in which petitioner argues instructional error

because the trial court failed to sua sponte instruct the jury on the timing element of aiding and

abetting for late joiners to the criminal enterprise. Here, petitioner argues that his trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to request such an instruction. As discussed above, the court finds that

no timing instruction was required or even suggested on the facts of this case. Therefore,

counsel’s performance was not deficient for failing to request the instruction. 

2. Failure to Raise Contemporaneous Objections

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not raise

contemporaneous objections regarding: (a) consecutive sentences; (b) cruel and unusual

punishment; and (c) the prior felony conviction. It follows that, as to each of these asserted bases

4

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 18 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 failing to raise a contemporaneous objection, nor could petitioner have been prejudiced. 

19

of ineffective assistance, if such objections would have had no merit to begin with, then counsel

could not have been deficient for failing to raise them and, likewise, petitioner could have

suffered no prejudice. Therefore, the court will examine the merits of each of these claims. 

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

In non-capital cases, a sentence of a term of years will not be disturbed as violating

the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment except in rare cases where

the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11

(2003). Under this principle, the Supreme Court recognizes that repeat offenders, particularly

those who repeatedly commit violent crimes, may be treated more harshly under statutory

schemes intended to deal with recidivism. See id. 

In this case, petitioner was convicted of two counts of home-invasion robbery and

one count of assault with a deadly weapon. Petitioner’s record reflects a prior conviction as an

adult for attempted home-invasion robbery and residential burglary. This prior incident resulted

in a shooting death. In addition, petitioner’s juvenile record demonstrates that he became a ward

of the court in 1990 following conviction for felony assault with a deadly weapon. Petitioner also

escaped from juvenile custody and evaded arrest on several occasions. In 1994 petitioner was

convicted of misdemeanor possession of marijuana. And, just a few months before his 18th

birthday, petitioner was convicted of battery after he hit his girlfriend in the face with his fist and

then kicked her several times. 

Given this criminal history, the court cannot say that the current sentence is

grossly disproportionate. Not only were the offenses giving rise to the current sentence extremely

violent and involved a deadly weapon, but petitioner has a history of repeating this kind of

conduct since he was a juvenile. Because an objection to the sentence based on the theory that it

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment would not have had merit, counsel was not deficient for

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 19 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The adult conviction was based on petitioner’s participation in 1996 in a home 5

invasion robbery which resulted in the shooting death of at least one person. Petitioner was

convicted of attempted first degree robbery and first degree burglary. While on parole from this

conviction, petitioner committed the current offenses. 

20

failing to raise such an objection and petitioner was not prejudiced. 

Prior Felony Conviction

Under California’s Three Strikes law, which imposes harsher punishment on

certain repeat offenders, when determining whether to strike a prior conviction, the trial court

must consider “whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior

serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and

prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and

hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious

and/or violent felonies.” People v. Williams, 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 (1998). As to the merits of this

claim under state law, the California Court of Appeal reviewed for abuse of discretion and

concluded:

Here, the record demonstrates the trial court did not abuse its

discretion. Following argument on the matter, the court based its

determination on the current case, defendant’s prior record, and his

background and concluded defendant met the spirit of the Three Strikes

law: “. . . [defendant] has an abysmal record. It’s true, his only conviction

as an adult was the a [sic] 211 and the 459, but if I read his age and the

history appropriately, he had just turned 18. 

5

The court then recited petitioner’s history, which includes a number of instances of escape from

juvenile facilities, resisting arrest, vehicle theft, and drug offenses. On this record, the court does

not disagree with the state court’s assessment that petitioner fell within the spirit of the Three

Strikes law. Given petitioner’s record, any objection regarding the prior would have been futile. 

Therefore counsel was not deficient for failing to make such an objection and petitioner was not

prejudiced. 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 20 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

21

Consecutive Sentences

As the state court observed, petitioner concedes that it was within the trial court’s

discretion to impose consecutive sentences. Therefore, to raise a successful objection, counsel

would have had to convince the trial judge that imposition of consecutive sentences constituted an

abuse of discretion. As discussed above, the trial court properly found that petitioner’s offense

and history place him within the spirit of the Three Strikes law. Further, as also discussed above,

the sentence is not grossly disproportionate. Because petitioner may properly be treated more

harshly as a repeat violent offender, the court cannot see how it could have been an abuse of

discretion to impose consecutive sentences. Therefore, counsel was not deficient and petitioner

was not prejudice due to failure to object to consecutive sentences. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings

and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right

to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 30, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-00817-GEB-CMK Document 14 Filed 05/31/07 Page 21 of 21