Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08124/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08124-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Exhibits are attached with Respondents’ Answer at Doc. 13. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Leroy Montoya, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 11-8124-PCT-JAT (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner, confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex, Florence, Arizona, and

proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 For A Writ of Habeas Corpus

By A Person In State Custody (Non-Death Penalty). (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed an

Answer (Doc. 13) and Petitioner has filed a Reply. (Doc. 14).

I. Background

In the spring of 2007, Petitioner was charged in a series of criminal cases filed in the

Superior Court, Mohave County, Arizona. (Doc. 13 at 2 & Ex. K-L).1

 In his § 2254 Petition,

Petitioner challenges his conviction in Case No. CR-2007-0363, Mohave County Superior

Court. (Doc. 1 at 1-2). Regarding this conviction, on March 14, 2007, Petitioner was charged

by information with fraudulent schemes and artifices, a Class 2 felony, and theft, a Class 6

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 William Higgins owned the carpet cleaner. (Ex. Z at 57-61). 

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felony, stemming from his alleged rental of a carpet cleaner and failure to return it. (Ex. AB). Petitioner was represented by attorney Kenneth L. Sondgeroth. (Ex. C-D).

On June 12, 2007, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. (Ex. BB at 196-

97 & Ex. CC at 2-5). On July 31, 2007, Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive term

of one year on the theft conviction and to a concurrent mitigated sentence of four years on

the fraudulent schemes and artifices conviction. (Ex. OO at 17-19, Ex. PP at 2-3 & Ex. YY).

Petitioner was ordered to pay $473.00 in restitution. (Ex. QQ at 7 & Ex. RR at 1). 

The evidence showed that on October 6, 2006, Petitioner rented the carpet cleaner

from a store for 24 hours but failed to return it. (Ex. Z at 43-45 & Ex. HHH). When the store

clerk contacted Petitioner a “couple [of] weeks later,” he told her a friend from California

had taken it and he was going to try and get it back. (Ex. HHH). The store manager later

contacted Petitioner who said the carpet cleaner had been stolen from him and he had filed

a police report. (Id.). The machine was owned by someone other than the store and the

owner contacted Petitioner and offered to charge him for only three days’ rental if he

returned the cleaner.2

 Petitioner told the owner he did not know where the carpet cleaner

was. The owner said he would press charges if the machine was not returned. (Id.). On

January 9, 2007, the police were at the Parra-Rodriguez residence on another matter and

came across the carpet cleaner in the garage. (Ex. Z at 83-87). This family had a close

relationship with Petitioner. (Ex. HHH). Petitioner testified at trial he used the carpet cleaner

to do a job and asked a man who helped on the job to return it. When he learned the cleaner

had not been returned, he tried unsuccessfully to contact that person. (Ex. HHH). 

Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the trial court under

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. (Ex. SS). The trial court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner in the

post-conviction proceedings. (Ex. TT). Petitioner also filed a “motion for release” which the

trial court denied. (Ex. UU). Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed a motion to dismiss the

post-conviction proceedings without prejudice because Petitioner had filed a notice of appeal.

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The proceedings were dismissed. (Ex. VV). Petitioner on appeal challenged the sufficiency

of the evidence that supported his convictions. (Ex. CCC, DDD & FFF). While his appeal

was pending, Petitioner submitted another motion for release dated July 18, 2008. (Ex. EEE).

On November 18, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision

affirming Petitioner’s theft conviction and reversing and setting aside his conviction and

sentence for fraudulent schemes and artifices. (Ex. HHH [State of Arizona v. Leroy Montoya,

Case No. 1 CA-CR 07-0690 (Ariz. App. Mem. Nov. 18, 2008)]). On January 2, 2009, the

state appellate court filed its order and mandate noting a motion for reconsideration and

petition for review had not been filed. (Ex. III).

However, Petitioner did submit to the state appeals court a motion for reconsideration

that was dated and seemingly mailed on December 22, 2008 and bears a file stamp of January

14, 2009. (Ex. KKK). The Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration on January 22, 2009. (Ex. LLL). Petitioner’s counsel, but not Petitioner,

was noted as a recipient of the mailed Order. (Id.).

In a letter dated January 22, 2009, Petitioner notified the trial court that his family was

being prevented from posting bond due to an alleged “hold” on him. (Ex. MMM). The trial

court issued two orders following receipt of Petitioner’s letter. 

In an Order filed on January 29, 2009, the trial court acknowledged receipt of

Petitioner’s letter and that Petitioner still had criminal cases pending in Mohave County for

which the court had set release conditions. (Ex. NNN). The trial court observed that

Petitioner “in effect [was] being held without release conditions because of confusion about

the sentence in CR-2007-0363.” (Id.). After noting Petitioner had received 156 days credit

for time served and mentioning the state court of appeals ruling, the trial court determined

Petitioner’s sentence in CR-2007-0363 “effectively became one year in prison with credit for

156 days time served” and that Petitioner’s “sentence should have been completed on

February 25, 2008.” (Id.). The trial court ruled in the Order as follows:

IT IS ORDERED releasing [Petitioner] on CR-2007-0363 as he

has completed the sentence imposed in that case.

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The Court would prefer if this order closes out the file in CR2007-0363. However, if it is required by law or policy that the

Defendant must be transported to the Arizona Department of

Correction to close out the case file in CR-2007-0363 and

remove the current hold, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Mohave County Sheriff’s Office

transport [Petitioner] to the appropriate prison facility to have

that done.

If that transport is required, when [Petitioner’s] file is closed at

the Department of Corrections regarding CR-2007-0363, 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [Petitioner] be transported

back to the Mohave County Jail to be held under the release

conditions currently in place in CR-2007-0058, CR-2007-0095

and CR-2007-0190.

(Ex. NNN). 

In a second Order filed on February 2, 2009, the trial court “waiv[ed] the requirement

for community supervision previously imposed in this matter, as [Petitioner’s] sentence

actually terminated on February 25, 2008 and any period of community supervision would

have ended.” (Ex. NNN). 

In August 2009, Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief. He filed a

petition for post-conviction relief in or about September 2009. (Ex. RRR). Petitioner’s

appointed post-conviction counsel found no claims for relief to file in the post-conviction

proceedings and requested an extension of time for Petitioner to file a pro se supplemental

post-conviction petition which was granted. (Ex. YYY & ZZZ). 

In June 2010, Petitioner filed a pro se supplemental Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief primarily arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel. (Ex. CCCC). After

the matter was fully briefed, on September 23, 2010, the trial court denied post-conviction

relief, finding Petitioner had not raised any colorable claims showing ineffective assistance

of trial counsel. (Ex. IIII). Petitioner filed in the trial court a “motion for ruling” that was filestamped September 24, 2010. (Ex. JJJJ). In or about November 2010, Petitioner filed in the

Arizona Court of Appeals a request for an extension of time to file a motion for

reconsideration. (Ex. KKKK). Petitioner thereafter filed in the trial court a motion for

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extension of time to file motion for reconsideration, a motion for reconsideration and a

motion for ruling. (Ex. MMMM - OOOO). In or about January 2011, Petitioner filed a

petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals that was dismissed as untimely although

the appellate court observed the trial court might allow a late filing if supported by proper

evidence. (Ex. PPPP & QQQQ). In or about February 2011, Petitioner filed a motion for late

filing in the Arizona Court of Appeals which was dismissed without prejudice to the filing

of an appropriate motion in the trial court. (Ex. RRRR & SSSS). 

In March 2011, Petitioner filed a motion for late filing in the trial court and asked for

a ruling on previously-filed enumerated motions. (Doc. 13 at 11-12 & Ex. UUUU). On April

7, 2011, the trial court denied on the merits and for untimeliness Petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration but did not appear to rule on Petitioner’s motion seeking leave to allow a late

filing of the petition for review in the court of appeals. (Ex. UUUU). In June 2011,

Petitioner filed a motion to accept late filing in the Arizona Court of Appeals that was

construed as a motion for reconsideration and denied. (Ex. VVVV & WWWW). 

 In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the federal district court, Petitioner

asserts two grounds for relief. (Doc. 1). 

In Ground One, Petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel in

violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1 at 6-6A). Petitioner identifies ten

issues on which defense counsel allegedly was ineffective:

(1) Counsel failed to ensure that Bullhead City Police Officer Jeanette Briggs who

wrote the October 18, 2006 police report would testify at trial;

(2) Counsel failed to ensure that Andrew and Abraham Parra-Rodriguez would

testify at trial; 

(3) Counsel failed to ensure that Norma Rodriguez would testify at trial; 

(4) Counsel failed to ensure that Randy Fisher would testify at trial;

(5) Counsel failed to properly investigate, hire a private investigator, file proper

motions or respond to motions filed by the State;

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 The underline indicates a blank space in this allegation. 

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(6) Counsel failed to properly interview witnesses, police officers, and prosecutors

regarding the July 11, 2007 incident;

(7) Counsel failed to introduce the October 23, 2006 incident report of State’s

witness Bullhead City Police Officer Alan Harrison in which Harrison advised

Store Manager Mr. Criss and Bill Higgins that “he could go after Montoya in

civil court for the cleaner” and that Petitioner had already filed a police report

for the theft of the carpet cleaner;

(8) Counsel failed to admit evidence that the owner filed a small-claims suit

against Petitioner which was later dismissed;

(9) Counsel failed to present that Officer Briggs’ police report contains Briggs’

statement that characterizes the offense as a misdemeanor and not a felony;

and,

(10) Counsel failed to present evidence that the police report Officer Briggs wrote

on ___3

 and the alleged second police report were falsified by Bullhead City

police officers.

In Ground Two, Petitioner contends the bid system for obtaining indigent counsel in

Mohave County “regarding allowable case loads” violated his state and federal rights. (Doc.

1 at 7). In support of Ground Two, Petitioner has listed alleged circumstances concerning

trial counsel as including the following: 

(1) Counsel specialized in civil and real estate law;

(2) Petitioner had seven pending cases involving 22 felonies when counsel was

assigned to his case;

(3) Counsel did not file any motions regarding the seven cases to indicate those

cases were complex;

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(4) Counsel informed Petitioner that Petitioner was his first contract case and

admitted he might be “in over his head” because he did not do many criminal

cases;

(5) Counsel was incompetent in criminal law and regarding what a defense

attorney should investigate and in criminal procedure, jury selection, Rule 20,

and interviews; and,

(6) Counsel’s case load was “above the allowable” in that it included

approximately 92 felony cases, 57 misdemeanor cases and 34 types of other

cases.

II. Discussion

A. Timeliness of the Petition

Respondents have concluded that Petitioner’s habeas petition was timely filed. (Doc.

13 at 14).

B. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Respondents argue the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s

habeas petition (Doc. 13 at 13), noting Petitioner’s conviction for fraudulent schemes and

artifices for which he received a four-year sentence was reversed and he completed his oneyear sentence on the affirmed theft conviction on February 25, 2008. Respondents argue that

while Petitioner was “in custody” for other crimes when he filed the pending habeas petition,

he has failed to challenge any conviction he is either currently serving or that is otherwise

affected by the conviction he is presently challenging in this habeas petition. Respondents

contend Petitioner has not satisfied the “nexus” requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) that

his “in custody” status will be potentially affected by the resolution of his federal habeas

petition, citing Bailey v. Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 978-81 (9th Cir. 2010), and Resendiz v.

Kovensky, 416 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Here, the state trial court determined that Petitioner should have completed his

sentence on the theft conviction on February 25, 2008. Petitioner submitted his present

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4

 Petitioner declared that he placed his § 2254 petition in the prison mailing system

on July 22, 2011. (Doc. 1 at 11). The Court applies the “mailbox rule” in this case.

Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2010) (under the mailbox rule, which

applies to state and federal petitions alike, a prisoner’s pro se habeas petition is “deemed filed

when he hands it over to prison authorities for mailing to the relevant court”) (citation

omitted).

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habeas petition regarding his theft conviction on July 22, 2011.4

 It appears Petitioner was

not “in custody” when he filed his habeas petition. Generally, a petitioner is no longer in

custody for purposes of federal habeas jurisdiction where the sentence imposed has fully

expired prior to the filing of the petition. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-92 (1989)

(per curiam). 

Respondents recognize in the alternative that Petitioner in his reply may argue that one

or more of the sentences he is presently serving are affected by the one-year sentence he

received and completed on the theft conviction or that some other form of “collateral

consequences” may flow from his theft conviction. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-16

(1998). Respondents alternatively have addressed the merits of Petitioner’s habeas claims.

Petitioner asserts in his Reply that his completed one-year sentence on the theft

conviction was used as a prior conviction in CR-2007-0058 and CR-2007-0095. (Doc. 14 at

2). Petitioner has not supported this assertion with a citation to the state court record or

submitted documents. Petitioner has alleged in the Petition he is serving a 19-year state court

sentence imposed in April 2009. (Doc. 1 at 10). 

The Court has found in the record a purported “Judgment & Sentencing Prison” filed

on November 12, 2010 in State of Arizona v. Leroy Montoya, Case No. CR-2007-0058,

Superior Court, Mohave County, State of Arizona, regarding Petitioner’s conviction on other

state criminal offenses. More specifically, this purported “Judgment” shows that as to

Petitioner’s conviction on Count 2 - Criminal Damage, Petitioner was sentenced to two years

and this sentence “is an aggravated sentence with one historical felony conviction out of

Mohave County Superior Court Cause Number CR-2007-0363 for Theft, committed on

October 18, 2006.” (Doc. 13, Ex. RRRR, Pet. Mot. for Late Filing, Ex. B). Petitioner’s

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pending pro se habeas petition challenging an expired conviction may be liberally construed

as an attack on Petitioner’s current sentence as enhanced by the allegedly invalid conviction.

Feldman v. Perrill, 902 F.2d 1445, 1448 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491-94);

Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing Feldman). The court will

consider Petitioner’s Grounds One and Two. 

C. Exhaustion of State Remedies and Procedural Default of Claims

Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner attempted to exhaust his state remedies but

the state courts unreasonably declined to rule on his efforts. (Doc. 13 at 15). Respondents

have declined to raise a procedural default defense under the facts of this case. (Id.). 

D. Merits Analysis of Grounds One and Two

1. Legal Standards

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a

federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect to “any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the State court decision was (1) contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United

States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785-86 (2011).

A state court's decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,” or (2)

“if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision

of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. A state court’s decision is an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). The “unreasonable application” clause requires

the state court’s application of Supreme Court law to be more than incorrect or erroneous;

it must be objectively unreasonable. Id. 

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As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court,

a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the

claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in

justification that there was an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87.

“Clearly established Federal law” in § 2254(d)(1) refers to the Supreme Court’s

precedents in effect at the time the state court renders its decision. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71-

72; Greene v. Fisher, 132 S.Ct. 38, 44 (2011). “A legal principle is ‘clearly established’

within the meaning of this provision only when it is embodied in a holding of this Court.”

Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S.Ct. 1171, 1173 (2010). In applying these standards, the federal

habeas court reviews the last reasoned decision by the state court. Barker v. Fleming, 423

F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005).

Criminal defendants are entitled to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth

Amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To establish ineffective

assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Id. at 687-88, 694. With respect to the first component, it is strongly presumed that

counsel’s performance fell within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Regarding the second component, a petitioner must establish

prejudice. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails if either prong of the analysis

is not met and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing both prongs. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 697; United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995).

Petitioner bears the burden of showing the state court applied Strickland to the facts of his

case in an objectively unreasonable manner. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002).

2. Application

a. Ground One - Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel (subclaims 1-10)

# 1. Petitioner contends counsel failed to ensure that Bullhead City Police Officer

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Briggs testified at trial but does not explain why this constitutes deficient performance.

Respondents note that the jury would have heard Officer Briggs confirm that Petitioner

reported the carpet cleaner stolen. The trial court ruled the police report was likely

inadmissible hearsay but Briggs could be questioned as indicating Petitioner made a report.

(See Doc. 13 at 20 & Ex. J, M-N & O at 5-10). Although Officer Briggs was not called as

a defense witness, Petitioner was not prejudiced. The jury was made aware that Petitioner

had filed a report with the police concerning the missing carpet cleaner through Petitioner’s

testimony and the testimony of the store manager. (Ex. Z at 52-55, 132-33, 139). 

## 2-3. Petitioner contends counsel was deficient for not calling as witnesses Andrew

and Abraham Parra-Rodriguez and their mother, Norma Rodriguez. He previously claimed

they would have provided testimony about the carpet cleaner being found at their house.

(Doc. 13 at 22-23 & Ex. J at 2, Ex. CCCC at 12 ¶¶ 2-4). At a pretrial hearing, counsel and

the court discussed that the carpet cleaner was found at the Parra-Rodriguez house and

Andrew and Abraham Parra-Rodriguez either would not testify or might invoke the Fifth

Amendment if called to testify. Counsel was unsure what these proposed witnesses would

say if called to testify. (Ex. O at 13-17). Petitioner does not provide these proposed

witnesses’ affidavits or elaborate on how their testimony would have been exculpatory.

Shepard v. Chavez, 2012 WL 4038446 *22-23 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (ineffective assistance claim

insufficient where petitioner failed to provide direct evidence that proposed witness would

have testified in a manner that might have led to a different result at trial, citing cases). 

# 4. Similarly, Petitioner has not proffered the proposed testimony of Randy Fisher.

Defense counsel proffered in his Notice of Defenses that Fisher would testify about “the

carpet cleaning machine and his use of the same.” (Ex. J at 2). The record contains a letter

allegedly written by Fisher to the sentencing court on Petitioner’s behalf stating in part: “I

was with Leroy Montoya on two separate occasions, to where the machine was absolutely

‘for-gotton.’ [sic] So much work and activity was presence, that although I did the work, I

thought, Leroy thought I had, he had returned it.” (Ex. LL). Petitioner testified at trial he

left the carpet cleaner with Randy Fisher. When asked at trial, “And where’s Randy today?”,

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Petitioner answered, “I don’t know, sir.” (Ex. Z at 138). Petitioner has not shown counsel

was ineffective in not calling Fisher as a witness. 

## 5-6. In his fifth subclaim, Petitioner contends counsel failed to investigate his

case, hire a private investigator, and file proper motions and responses. He does not identify

what should have been investigated, what motions and responses should have been filed, and

how the outcome of the trial would have been different. In his sixth subclaim, Petitioner

contends counsel failed to interview witnesses, police officers and prosecutors regarding the

incident on July 11, 2007. Respondents speculate Petitioner is referring to an incident in

which he and his attorney prior to sentencing went to the police station for an alleged “free

talk” regarding a possible plea bargain but Petitioner was arrested. (Doc. 13 at 25).

Conclusory allegations of counsel’s omissions are insufficient. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199,

205 (9th Cir. 1995) (conclusory allegation that counsel provided ineffective assistance failed

to state a valid claim of constitutional violation).

# 7. Petitioner contends counsel failed to introduce testimony regarding Police

Officer Alan Harrison’s incident report that Harrison advised the store manager and carpet

cleaner owner they could pursue the matter against Petitioner in civil court and that Petitioner

had filed a report for the theft of the cleaner. Petitioner has not shown how the outcome of

the trial would have been different even if the jury knew of Harrison’s alleged advice

regarding a civil suit. As previously discussed, evidence that Petitioner reported the carpet

cleaner stolen to the police was admitted. 

# 8. Petitioner contends counsel was ineffective for not introducing evidence that

the carpet cleaner owner filed a small-claims suit against Petitioner and then dismissed it.

Petitioner has not explained how such evidence would have affected the outcome of the trial.

The evidence showed the carpet cleaner was recovered by the police. Petitioner submitted

with a state post-conviction filing an order of dismissal filed in the Justice Court dated July

20, 2007 showing dismissal of a suit by Higgins against him regarding the carpet cleaner.

(Doc. 13, Ex. CCCC [Pet. at Ex. I]). The jury’s verdict on the underlying criminal charges

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involving the carpet cleaner was returned on June 12, 2007. The dismissal of a small-claims

suit was mentioned at the July 31, 2007 sentencing hearing. (Ex. OO at 15). 

# 9. Petitioner contends counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that

Officer Briggs in her police report characterized the offense as a misdemeanor. The charging

decision was ultimately made by the prosecutor, not a police officer. See State v. Serna, 857

P.2d 384, 388 (Ariz. App. 1993) (rejecting defendant’s contention he should have been

charged with a different crime, noting that charging decisions are within the prosecutor’s

discretion). 

# 10. Petitioner contends counsel “failed to present evidence that the police report

that Officer Briggs wrote on ____ and the alleged 2nd police report was falsified by Bullhead

City police officers.” Petitioner does not identify the date of either report or explain how

they were allegedly “falsified.” Petitioner’s conclusory allegations are not sufficient to show

counsel provided ineffective assistance at trial. 

b. Ground Two - Mohave County Bid System and Alleged Problems with

Counsel’s Representation

In Ground Two, Petitioner contends the bid system for obtaining counsel for indigent

defendants in Mohave County “regarding allowable case loads” violated his state and federal

rights. (Doc. 1 at 7). In support of this claim, he alleges circumstances without discussion

concerning defense counsel, including counsel specialized in civil and real estate law,

Petitioner had seven pending cases when counsel was assigned, counsel admitted he was “in

over his head,” and counsel was incompetent. Petitioner does not further explain how his

federal rights have been violated. He has not raised the issues in Ground Two as part of his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Petitioner’s Ground Two is conclusory and does not

warrant habeas relief. 

III. Conclusion

The court will recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and

dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

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That the Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 For A Writ of Habeas Corpus By A Person

In State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (Doc. 1) be DENIED AND DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED:

That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal

be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

Dated this 5th day of December, 2012.

Case 3:11-cv-08124-JAT Document 30 Filed 12/05/12 Page 14 of 14