Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02497/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02497-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

Vfiled 1

\

2 pH 2» 3t

3

4

Mb PEfU^Y

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 ROBERT SIMBA MAKONI Case No.: 16cv2497-BEN (PCL)

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION

TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS; AND (2) DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM

13 v.

FACILITY COMMANDER EDWIN

SCHROEDER, DEPUTY RODRIGUEZ,

DEPUTY LOONEY, DEPUTY

SNYDER, DR. PHAM TRAN and

NURSE MANNIE,

14

15

16

17

Defendants.

18

19

20 On October 3, 2016, Robert Simba Makoni (“Plaintiff’), a person detained at the

Vista Detention Facility (“VDF”) in Vista, California, at the time offiling but subsequently

released from custody, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint (“Compl.”)

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) He alleges violations of: (1) his Fourteenth

Amendment right to freedom of association arising from a policy ofsegregating inmates

by race at the VDF; (2) his Eighth Amendment right to be free from deliberate indifference

to his serious medical needs as a result ofthe medical care he received at the VDF; (3) his

Eighth Amendment right to be free from deliberate indifference to his safety by the

disclosure of his medical condition to other inmates; and (4) his First Amendment right to

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

l

16cv2497-BEN (PCL)

Case 3:16-cv-02497-BEN-PCL Document 8 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 14
be free from retaliation after filing complaints about his treatment at the VDF. (Compl. at

6-29.) Plaintiffdid not prepay the $400 civil filing fee required to commence a civil action

by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), but instead filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) He also filed a Motion for a Preliminary

Injunction and a Temporary Restraining Order, and a Motion for Appointment ofCounsel.

(ECF Nos. 3-4.)

On December 19,2016, the Court denied all ofPlaintiffs motions, including his IFP

motion which was not properly supported, and dismissed this action without prejudice to

Plaintiffto either pay the filing fee or file a properly supported IFP application. (ECF No.

6.) Plaintiff has now filed a properly supported IFP Motion. (ECF No. 7.)

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

As Plaintiff was informed in the Court’s previous Order, all parties instituting any

civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court ofthe United States, except an application

for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An

action may proceed despite a plaintiffs failure to prepay the entire fee only ifhe is granted

leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176,

1177 (9th Cir. 1999). A federal court may authorize the commencement of a civil action

without prepayment of fees if a person submits an affidavit, including a statement of all

assets he possesses, that shows he is unable to pay the required filing fee. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). The determination ofindigency falls within the court’s discretion. California

Men’s Colony v. Rowland. 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds. 506

U.S. 194 (1993); see also Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339

(1948) (noting that while a civil litigant need not “be absolutely destitute to enjoy the

benefit ofthe [28 U.S.C. § 1915],” his affidavit must nevertheless demonstrate to the court

that he cannot, because of poverty, pay or give security for the costs of suit “and still be

able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.”) (internal quotations

omitted). The facts as to poverty must be stated with “some particularity, definiteness, and

certainty.” United States v. McOuade. 647 F.2d 938,940 (9th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11 I.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

16cv2497-BEN (PCL)

Case 3:16-cv-02497-BEN-PCL Document 8 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 14
1 Here, the Court finds that Plaintiffhas now submitted an affidavit sufficient to satisfy

both28U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and S.D. Cal. CrvLR 3.2. Plaintiffclaimsto receive a monthly

income of$649 in public assistance. (ECF No. 7 at 7.) From this supplemental accounting,

the Court finds Plaintiff has insufficient available funds from which to pay any filing fees

at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs

Motion to Proceed IFP.

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

“The Court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as

practicable after docketing,” complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP, and by those

who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and

1915A(b). The Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which

are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith. 203 F.3d 1122,

1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement ofthe claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals ofthe elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), citing

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twomblv. 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Determining whether a

complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is]... a context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. The

“mere possibility ofmisconduct” falls short ofmeeting the Iqbal plausibility standard. Id.;

see also Moss v. U. S. Secret Service. 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

16cv2497-BEN (PCL)

Case 3:16-cv-02497-BEN-PCL Document 8 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 14
1 Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes. 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“Under § 1983, when determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept

as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington. 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)

(noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6)”). However, while the court has an “obligation ... where the petitioner is pro se,

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler. 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010),

citing Bretz v. Kelman. 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.l (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc), it may not, in

so doing, “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v.

Board ofRegents ofthe University ofAlaska. 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under

color ofstate law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey,

263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive

rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a

right secured by the Constitution and laws ofthe United States, and (2) that the deprivation

was committed by a person acting under color ofstate law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc.,

698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that on June 6, 2016, he was arrested on a probation violation and

the arresting officers picked up a 30-day supply ofprescription medication for Plaintiff on

their way to the VDF. (Compl. at 8.) Plaintiffinformed the VDF medical staffupon arrival

that he was HIV positive and was required to take his prescribed medication at 10:00 p.m.

every day, and that he had not yet taken his medication that day. (Id.) Defendant Deputy

Looney allegedly denied Plaintiffs request for his medication despite Plaintiffhaving been

told by the medical staffthat the Deputies would see to it that he had his medication, and

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21 B.

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

16cv2497-BEN (PCL)

Case 3:16-cv-02497-BEN-PCL Document 8 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 14
1 he was denied his medication for the next 48 hours. (Id at 9.) After spending 48 hours in

a holding cell, Plaintiff asked Deputy Looney why the other inmates in the holding cell had

been assigned cells but he had not, and was told it was due to a policy of racially

segregating inmates. (Id. at 24.) On June 8, 2016, he again asked Deputy Looney for his

medication, and complained he was receiving peanut butter sandwiches despite a peanut

allergy, but the defendant dismissed his complaints and refused to allow Plaintiff access to

a nurse, and Plaintifffiled an inmate grievance against Deputy Looney. (Id. at 9-10.)

Plaintiff was seen by Defendants Dr. Tran and Nurse Mannie on June 9, 2016, and

complained about the lack of access to his HIV medication, the peanut butter sandwich

meals, and that he was not getting medication for his gastro-esophageal reflux disorder.

(Id. at 10.) Dr. Tran told Plaintiffthat he was unable to do anything for him because he

had not yet received Plaintiffs medical records, but there would be no harm in missing a

few days of his HIV medication. (Id. at 11.) With respect to Plaintiffs complaint about

receiving peanut butter sandwiches, Dr. Tran told him that “a lot of criminals who come

here use the same tricks to get a diet preference, so no.” (Id.)

On June 10, 2016, Plaintiff was approached by Deputy Looney who tore up the

inmate grievance Plaintiff had filed against him and threw it in the trash, and told Plaintiff

he was going to transfer him to the Central Jail or the George Bailey Detention Facility.

(Id.) Plaintiffsent a follow-up medical request on June 11, 2016, complaining that he had

still not received any medication, but received no response. (Id. at 12.) That same day he

was approached by Deputy Looney and Defendant Deputy Rodriguez, who told him he

needed to stop filing grievances and making ridiculous requests, and he was moved to a

module at the VFD. (Id.) Plaintiff attempted to speak to Defendant Nurse Mannie when

he arrived there, but Deputy Rodriguez told Nurse Mannie not to speak to Plaintiff, and

Deputy Rodriquez pushed Plaintiffinto his cell where he stayed until he was called to court

on July 18, 2016. (Id. at 12-13.) He filed a grievance against Dr. Tran, Nurse Mannie and

Deputy Rodriguez on July 14, 2016, which included a request for medical care, which was

returned to him the next day because it was a request and not a grievance. (Id. at 14.)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

16cv2497-BEN (PCL)

Case 3:16-cv-02497-BEN-PCL Document 8 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 14
1 On July 18, 2016, Plaintiff was transferred to a dormatory in the VDF, where he

received a response to his June 11, 2016 medical request, which informed him that his

medication had been ordered and an outside referral had been scheduled. (Id. at 13.)

Plaintiff asked Nurse Mannie that evening why his medication had only now been ordered

when he had been brought to the VDF with a 30-day supply, and was told that he should

be grateful he is getting the medical care he is receiving and if he wanted better care he

should stay out ofjail. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Nurse Mannie refused to allow him to see a

doctor and refused to change his peanut butter lunches. (Id.)

Plaintiff began receiving his medication on July 16, 2016, but was still not provided

with a no-peanut diet, and was informed on July 30, 2016 that the VDF would not approve

ofhis previously scheduled and recommended procedures for his gastro-esophageal reflux

disorder. (Id. at 16.) He filed a grievance that day against Dr. Tran in which he requested

an appointment, and the next day Nurse Mannie told Plaintiff that if he did not stop

requesting the same things and filing grievances he would be transferred and “cut out of

medical access completely.” (Id.) On July 21, 2016, Plaintiff tried to file a grievance

complaining that he had not received a response to his prior grievances, but Defendant

Deputy Snyder refused to accept it and refused to allow Plaintiffto go to the medical ward.

(Id. at 17.) On July 22, 2016, Deputies Snyder and Rodriguez refused to refer Plaintiffto

medical call, and later that day received a letter from his attorney which had been opened.

(Id.) Plaintiff filed a grievance against Deputies Snyder and Rodriguez the next day, and

was eventually told that his letter had been mistakenly opened by a rookie. (Id. at 18.)

Plaintiffwas told at “pill call” on August 1,2016 that there was nothing for him, and

was told by the nurse that perhaps his medication supply had run out. (Id.) His medication

was suspended from August 2, 2016 until September 25, 2016. (Id. at 19.) He was seen

by Dr. Tran and Nurse Mannie on September 25, 2016, and was told that he was

“extradition material” and not a medical priority. (Id. at 19-20.) Dr. Tran told him that

“even the commander didn’t care and was not bothered about trifle inmate complaints and

that everything was up to him,” and that Plaintiffmight still be getting his medication if he

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

16cv2497-BEN (PCL)

Case 3:16-cv-02497-BEN-PCL Document 8 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 14
had not continually filed grievances; Nurse Mannie told him that getting him on medication

or a no-peanut diet would take an act of congress. (Id)

Plaintiff alleges that from September 20-29, 2016, Deputy Rodriguez confronted

Plaintiff in front of other inmates and referred to Plaintiffs HIV positive status, and

Plaintiffreminded him that his medical status was confidential and could place him at risk

for assault and harassment. (Id. at 20-21, 33.) Plaintiff alleges he suffers from colds, flu,

body aches, headaches, chest congestion, stomach pain, acid reflux, joint pain, occasional

blood in his stool, panic attacks, insomnia, dizziness, pneumonia and high blood pressure,

but that nothing was done to relieve those conditions. (Id. at 21-23.)

Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment right to be free from deliberate

indifference to his safety was violated by Defendant Rodriguez by allowing other inmates

to learn of his medical condition, his Eighth Amendment right to be free from deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs was violated by all the Defendants in regards to

the medical care, his First Amendment right to be free from retaliation was violated by

Defendants Looney and Rodriguez when they retaliated in response to his grievances, and

his Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom of association was violated by the VDF’s

racial segregation policy. (Id. at 23-29.)

Defendant Commander Schroeder

First, the Court finds Plaintiffs Complaint requires sua sponte dismissal pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(l) and § 1915A(b)(l) to the extent it seeks relief under § 1983

against Defendant Commander Schroeder. “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the

plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of

the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person

acting under color ofstate law.” Campbell v. Washington Dep’t of Soc. Servs.. 671 F.3d

837, 842 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011), citing Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th

Cir. 1987). The Complaint contains no factual allegations describing what Defendant

Commander Schroeder did, or failed to do, other than an allegation that Defendant Dr. Tran

told Plaintiff that Commander Schroeder did not care about his medical needs, and a

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18 C.

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

16cv2497-BEN (PCL)

Case 3:16-cv-02497-BEN-PCL Document 8 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 14
1 conclusory statement that Commander Schroeder failed “to act on his knowledge of the

denial ofmedical care to plaintiff, harassment and abuse, retaliation and the substantial risk

of serious harm.” (Compl. at 26.) Plaintiff does not allege how this Defendant acquired

his knowledge ofPlaintiffs medical needs. To the extent Plaintiffseeks to hold him liable

for the actions ofhis subordinates, there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson. 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Rather, “deliberate

indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor

disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick v. Thompson. 563

U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (“A less stringent standard of fault for a failure-to-train claim ‘would

result in de facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities . . . .”’), quoting City of

Canton. Ohio v. Harris. 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989).

“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have

caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy. 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988),

citing Rizzo v. Goode. 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); Bergv. Kincheloe. 794 F.2d 457,460

(9th Cir. 1986); Estate of Brooks v. United States. 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.”) A person deprives

another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which

he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation ofwhich [the plaintiff complains].”

Johnson v. Duffy. 588 F.2d 740,743 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiffhas not stated a claim against

Commander Schroeder because he has failed to allege facts regarding what actions were

taken or not taken by the Defendant which caused the alleged constitutional violations. See

Canton. 489 U.S. at 385 (“Respondeat superior and vicarious liability will not attach under

§ 1983.”), citing Monell. 436 U.S. at 694-95.

D. Failure to Protect and Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Deputy Rodriguez violated his Eighth Amendment right

to be free from deliberate indifference to his safety by revealing his HIV positive status to

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

16cv2497-BEN (PCL)

Case 3:16-cv-02497-BEN-PCL Document 8 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 14
1 other inmates during his final week at the VDF. (Compl. at 20-21, 26, 33.) The rights of

pretrial detainees are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, but

the Court uses the standards for Eighth Amendment claims regarding allegations ofpretrial

detainees’ conditions of confinement claims. Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011,

1017-16 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff can state a failure to protect claim if he alleges that a

defendant: (1) made an intentional decision regarding the conditions under which Plaintiff

was confined which exposed Plaintiffto a substantial risk ofserious harm that could have

been avoided through reasonable and available measures, (2) did not take reasonably

available measures to abate that risk even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances

would have known of the risk, and (3) by not taking such measures caused Plaintiffs

injuries. Castro v. City of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc),

cert, denied. 2017 WL 276190 (Jan. 23, 2017).

Plaintiffs allegations do not satisfy the standard for stating a failure to protect claim.

Assuming the allegation that Deputy Rodriguez mentioned Plaintiffs HIV status “in front

of other inmates” satisfies the first Castro prong, Plaintiff has not alleged facts supporting

the other two prongs. He sets forth no factual allegations showing that Deputy Rodriguez

failed to take reasonable measures to avoid or abate the risk, such as ensuring that Plaintiff

was not in danger from other inmates, and has failed to allege that any injury resulted from

the disclosure. As Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the VDF, he must allege he was

injured in some manner by the disclosure of his HIV status in order to state a claim for

failure to protect. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071.

Plaintiff claims Deputy Rodriguez disclosed his medical status and interfered with

his legal mail, and that Deputy Looney threatened him with a transfer, in retaliation for his

complaints. (Compl. at 29.) However, Plaintiffhas not alleged that those Defendants were

in a position to, or did in fact carry out, their threats, or that he was injured as a result of

their actions, and has failed to state a § 1983 claim for retaliation. See Barnett v. Centoni,

31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A prisoner suing prison officials under § 1983 for

retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional rights

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

16cv2497-BEN (PCL)

Case 3:16-cv-02497-BEN-PCL Document 8 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 14
and that the retaliatory action does not advance legitimate penological goals, such as

preserving institutional order and discipline.”); Leer. 844 F.2d at 633 (“The inquiry into

causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each

individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional

deprivation.”); Brooks. 197 F.3d at 1248 (“Causation is, of course, a required element of a

§ 1983 claim.”)

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs

Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim based on a delay or denial of medical care.

In order to allege a violation of the Eighth Amendment for inadequate medical care,

Plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective standard. Colwell v. Bannister,

763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014). Only “deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs ofprisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by

the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,104 (1976) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). “A determination of ‘deliberate indifference’ involves an

examination oftwo elements: the seriousness ofthe prisoner’s medical need and the nature

ofthe defendant’s response to that need.” McGuckinv. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th

Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc, v. Miller. 104F.3dll33 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc).

Plaintiff must plead the existence of an objectively serious medical need.

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60 (“The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or

patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a

medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence

of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’

need for medical treatment.”) Assuming the Complaint provides sufficient allegations of

a serious medical need, it is clear, for the following reasons, the Complaint fails to include

any further “factual content” to show that any Defendant acted with “deliberate

indifference to [his] serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.

2006), quoting Gamble. 429 U.S. at 104.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 E.

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

16cv2497-BEN (PCL)

Case 3:16-cv-02497-BEN-PCL Document 8 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of 14
1 Plaintiff alleges that he asked the Deputy Defendants for access to medical care, but

does not set forth specific allegations regarding what they failed to do, other than delay his

access to his prescription medication which, as set forth below, does not amount to

deliberate indifference. Rather, he alleges he made requests for medical care which led to

his being examined by Defendants Dr. Tran and Nurse Mannie. The Complaint lacks any

specific allegations that the deputies acted with deliberate indifference to his plight by

“knowing of and disregarding an excessive risk to his health and safety.” Farmer v.

Brennan. 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 678; Twomblv. 550 U.S. at 557. To

the extent Plaintiffalleges the Deputy Defendants acted negligently and without knowledge

that Plaintiffhad a serious medical need, a § 1983 claim cannot sound merely in negligence

or substandard medical care. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (holding that a mere negligent failure

to protect an inmate from harm is not actionable under § 1983); Toguchi v. Chung, 391

F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.”), quoting

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. “Deliberate indifference,” on the other hand, “is a high legal

standard,” and claims of medical malpractice, negligence or a difference of opinion

concerning the course oftreatment are insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation.

Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1019, citing Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060.

Similarly, with respect to the allegations against the medical provider Defendants,

Dr. Tran and Nurse Mannie, Plaintiff alleges that he was in fact provided with medical care

while at the VDF. Although he alleges he was temporarily deprived of his prescription

medication despite having a supply with him when he reached the VDF, he states that Dr.

Tran informed him the delay was due to the fact that medication could not be provided

until a prisoner’s medical records had arrived. Moreover, Dr. Tran informed Plaintiffthat

the brief period of being without the medication would not adversely affect his condition,

and Plaintiff has not alleged that his condition was adversely affected by the delay in

providing him with his prescribed medication. Thus, he has merely alleged a difference of

opinion regarding his need for medical care, and has not alleged that Dr. Tran acted with

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

n

16cv2497-BEN (PCL)

Case 3:16-cv-02497-BEN-PCL Document 8 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of 14
deliberate indifference to his plight by “knowing of and disregarding an excessive risk to

his health and safety” with respect to the delay in providing his prescription medication.

Farmer. 511 U.S. at 837; Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 678; Twomblv. 550 U.S. at 557; Simmons. 609

F.3d at 1019 (claims of medical malpractice, negligence or a difference of opinion

concerning the course of treatment are insufficient to establish a constitutional

deprivation).

Although Plaintiff lists various illnesses during his stay at the VDF, he does not

allege they were caused by the delay in providing him medication. Rather, Plaintiffmerely

alleges that Dr. Tran and Nurse Mannie refused to change his peanut butter lunches, and

warned him to stop filing grievances, but does not allege these Defendants were aware of

and disregarded a serious medical need in those respects. For example, he does not allege

that his medical records showed he suffered from a peanut allergy, and does not describe

the severity ofthe allergy or that the Defendants were aware it was a serious medical need.

\

Although he states that he had a previously recommended suggested treatment for his

gastro-esophageal reflux disorder, he does not describe the severity ofthat medical need or

provide details regarding the suggested treatment, and, as with his peanut allergy, does not

allege that any Defendant was aware that the condition was severe or required immediate

attention. Rather, he disagrees with the manner in which he was provided with medical

care, and has therefore failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs. See Simmons. 609 F.3d at 1019 (recognizing that deliberate indifference

to medical needs “is a high legal standard,” and claims ofmedical malpractice, negligence

or a difference of opinion concerning the course oftreatment are insufficient to establish a

constitutional deprivation), citing Toguchi. 391 F.3d at 1060. IfPlaintiffwishes to proceed

with a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs based on a delay in

providing him with medication, or with the refusal to provide him with medical care, he

must not rely on conclusory allegations, but must allege facts which show that the

Defendants knew of and deliberately disregarded his serious medical needs. Iqbal. 556

U.S. at 678; Twomblv. 550 U.S. at 557; Farmer. 511 U.S. at 837.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

16cv2497-BEN (PCL)

Case 3:16-cv-02497-BEN-PCL Document 8 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of 14
1 F. Racial Segregation

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom of

association was violated by a VDF policy ofracially segregating inmates. (Compl. at 24.)

“Prisoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment

from invidious discrimination based on race.” Wolff v. McDonnell 418 U.S. 539, 556

(1974). Race-based policies in prisons must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling

state interest. Johnson v. California. 543 U.S. 499, 510-11 (2005).

Plaintiff alleges that the San Diego Sheriffs Department and the VDF have a policy

of using race in classifying and housing prisoners. (Compl. at 24.) To allege a claim of

municipal liability, Plaintiff must include in his pleading enough “factual content” to

support a reasonable inference to show that: (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right;

(2) the county had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate indifference to his

constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the “moving force behind the constitutional

violation.” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich. 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996); see also

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). “Threadbare

recitals ofthe elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of

meeting the Iqbal plausibility standard. Id.; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

As currently pleaded, Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) for municipal liability for a policy ofsegregating prisoners at

the VDF because Plaintiffhas not named as a defendant who he seeks to hold liable for the

existence of the policy, that is, which defendant he claims enacted the policy. The only

named Defendants to this action are employees of San Diego County. However, there is

no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer. 9 F.3d at 1437-38. Thus,

even if he has alleged facts which “might plausibly suggest” that he was classified by his

race pursuant to any municipal custom, policy, or practice implemented or promulgated

with deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights, or that such a policy was the

“moving force” or cause of his injury, he has not named a proper municipal defendant as

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

16cv2497-BEN (PCL)

Case 3:16-cv-02497-BEN-PCL Document 8 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of 14
to this claim. Id.; see also Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir.

2012) (applying Iqbal’s pleading standards to Monell claims); Board ofCounty Com’rs of

Bryan County. Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (“[I]t is not enough for a § 1983

plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality . . . [t]he

plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was

the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the

municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate

a causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation offederal rights.”)

III. Conclusion and Orders

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 (ECF No. 7).

DISMISSES Plaintiffs Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which

reliefmay be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and GRANTS

him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an Amended

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiffs Amended

Complaint must be complete in itselfwithoutreference to his original pleading. Defendants

not named and any claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered

waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc, v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc.,

896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”);

Lacey v. Maricopa Cntv.. 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed

with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an^tmended pleading may be “considered

waived if not j£pled.”)

13 2.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24 7

Hqh\|<ng©rT. Benitez

United States District Judge

25

26

27

28

14

16cv2497-BEN (PCL)

Case 3:16-cv-02497-BEN-PCL Document 8 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of 14