Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05340/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05340-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 05:551 Administrative Procedure Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUSTAVO RODARTE,

Petitioner,

v.

M.E. SPEARMAN,

Respondent.

Case No. 12-cv-05340-VC 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS; DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Gustavo Rodarte is a California state prisoner. He has filed a pro se habeas petition 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the decision of the California Board of Prison Terms 

(“Board”) to defer his next parole hearing for five years. Respondent M.E. Spearman has filed a 

motion to dismiss the petition for failing to raise a federally cognizable habeas claim. Although 

given an opportunity, Rodarte did not file an opposition. The Court stayed this case pending the 

disposition of Burnight v. Swarthout, Case No. 11-16062 (9th Cir.), because the issues on appeal 

in Burnight were similar to Rodarte’s claim. However, on April 30, 2015, the Ninth Circuit 

dismissed the appeal in Burnight as moot because the prisoner had been released on parole. 

Subsequently, this Court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing in light of the Ninth 

Circuit’s opinion in Nettles v. Grounds, 788 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2015). Spearman has filed his 

supplemental brief in support of the motion to dismiss. Rodarte did not file any opposition. The

petition is dismissed because Rodarte has failed to state a federally cognizable habeas claim.

BACKGROUND

Rodarte was convicted in 1985 of solicitation of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. 

He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of life in state prison. The Board found him unsuitable 

for parole in 2006 and again in 2011. On both occasions, the Board set Rodarte’s next parole 

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United States District Court

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eligibility hearing for five years away. Rodarte challenged the Board’s 2011 decision 

unsuccessfully in all three levels of the state courts. 

In the federal petition, Rodarte challenges the Board’s 2011 decision to delay his next 

parole eligibility hearing for five years. Specifically, Rodarte claims that the application of 

California’s “Marsy’s Law” (Proposition 9), which was passed in 2008 and which precipitated the 

delay in his hearing, violates his constitutional rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause. 

DISCUSSION

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Habeas is the “exclusive remedy” for the prisoner who seeks “‘immediate or speedier release’” 

from confinement. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2011) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 

544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)). “Where the prisoner’s claim would not ‘necessarily spell speedier 

release,’ however, suit may be brought under § 1983.’” Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1293 (quoting 

Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82). 

After the Supreme Court’s decision in Skinner, the Ninth Circuit concluded that an inmate 

may bring a habeas action only if success on the claim would “necessarily spell speedier release.” 

Nettles, 788 F.3d at 1000. Habeas relief is therefore proper when an inmate is seeking 

“termination of custody, acceleration of the future date of release from custody, or reduction of the 

level of custody.” Id. at 1007. 

Here, Rodarte claims that the decision to delay his next parole eligibility hearing pursuant 

to Marsy’s Law violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Prior to the passage of 

Marsy’s Law, California Penal Code section 3041.5 provided for an initial parole hearing and 

annual subsequent parole eligibility hearings, but allowed for longer periods between parole 

hearings under certain conditions. For example, the Board could schedule the next hearing two 

years (or five years for a prisoner convicted of murder) after a hearing at which parole was denied 

if the Board found it was not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted the following year. 

See Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(2)(B) (West 2008). In 2008, Marsy’s Law amended section 

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3041.5 to lengthen the default periods for subsequent parole hearings for all prisoners to whom 

that section applied. As amended, section 3041.5 now provides for a subsequent parole hearing to 

be scheduled in 3 to 15 years. See Cal. Penal Code 3041.5(b)(3).

Even if Rodarte were to successfully litigate this claim, it would not “necessarily spell 

speedier release” from custody. Nettles, 788 F.3d at 1001. That is, success on this claim would 

not terminate Rodarte’s custody, or necessarily accelerate the future date of his release from 

custody, or reduce his level of custody. See id. (citing Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1299 & n.13). The 

result would only be a more immediate opportunity to be found eligible for parole. Nettles

concluded: “To the extent our cases have indicated that the writ of habeas corpus may extend to 

claims that, if successful, would merely be likely to or have the potential to lead to a speedier 

release, they are superseded by the Supreme Court’s rulings.” Id.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

1. The Court grants the motion to dismiss on the ground that the claim presented is not a 

federally cognizable habeas claim. The Court does not address Spearman’s alternative argument 

the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction because Rodarte is a member in a civil rights 

class action seeking the same relief. 

2. The Court does not issue a certificate of appealability because jurists of reason would 

not find debatable whether this ruling is correct. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000).

3. The Clerk of the Court will issue a separate judgment, terminate all pending motions and 

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 14, 2015

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

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