Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00838/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00838-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kurzie Lee Curtis,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV-12-0838-PHX-PGR (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT, SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Kurzie Lee Curtis filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 on April 23, 2012, and an Amended Petition on July 27, 2012, challenging his

convictions in Maricopa County Superior Court for one count each of armed robbery, armed

burglary and unlawful flight, and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed

a 2.5 year prison term for the flight conviction, to be served concurrently with three terms

of life imprisonment. For one of the aggravated assault convictions, the trial court imposed

a term of life imprisonment to be served consecutively to the other three concurrent terms.

In his Amended Petition, he raises four grounds for habeas relief, challenging his sentences

and alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondents contend that Curtis’s

Amended Petition is untimely filed, and that he is not entitled to either statutory or equitable

tolling. In the alternative, Respondents contend that his claims are unexhausted and

procedurally defaulted. The Court agrees that the Amended Petition is untimely, and

recommends that it be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Case 2:12-cv-00838-PGR Document 34 Filed 05/15/13 Page 1 of 6
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BACKGROUND

The facts surrounding the convictions are summarized in the Arizona Supreme Court

memorandum decision:

In August of 1986, appellant was released on parole after

serving four years of two concurrent eight-year sentences for

armed robbery in Maricopa County Superior Court Number CR125232. On November 12, 1986, appellant was seen following

the night manager of the Fair Lanes Bowling Alley into the

office shortly after the manager had closed out the cash drawers

in preparation for closing at approximately 11:30 p.m. Ed

Malumphy, an off-duty Phoenix police officer and secretary of

the night bowling league, noticed appellant because he is black

and there were no black members of the bowling league.

Upon entering the office, appellant threatened the

manager, Michael Ruffing, with a nine-inch butcher knife and

demanded money. Appellant grabbed the paper money and

started to leave the office. After hearing loud voices and the

sound of change hitting the floor, Malumphy, who was outside

the office, informed Donald Casey, another off-duty police

officer in the league, that a robbery was in progress. Malumphy

initially confronted appellant as he was emerging from the

office. Appellant forced Malumphy against a wall, holding the

knife to his chest, and ran toward one of the entrances, which

was locked. Casey and Malumphy attempted to block

appellant’s path when he failed to get out through the locked

entrance but appellant pulled out the knife, forcing them to back

off, and was able to get to his car and flee. The officers wrote

down appellant’s license number and called the Glendale police.

When the police located appellant sitting in his car,

appellant sped off. He drove the vehicle into an alley, rammed

it against a wall, and fled on foot. A wallet was found in the

vehicle containing appellant’s driver’s license. Appellant was

eventually apprehended by another officer at a school building,

where the exact amount of money taken from the bowling alley

was later found. Ruffing, Malumphy and Casey positively

identified appellant as the robber. Additionally, appellant’s

fingerprint was found on a business card in the bowling alley

office and his palm print was found on the abandoned car.

(Doc. 18, Exh A at 2-4).

On April 18, 1989, the supreme court affirmed Curtis’s convictions and sentences

(Id.). On November 17, 1989, Curtis filed a timely pro se Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief, alleging the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel (Id., Exh E).

Attached to the petition was a typed “Affidavit in Support of Post-Conviction” signed by

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Curtis, in which he cited specific facts, legal principles, statutes, constitutional amendments,

and rules supporting his claims of ineffective assistance (Id.). On February 9, 1990, counsel

filed a Notice of Intention Not to File Amended Petition, informing the trial court that he had

written Curtis on two occasions and received no reply. Counsel also informed the trial court

that he had reviewed Curtis’s petition and the entire court file, and had failed to discover any

additional colorable claims for relief (Id., Exh F). On February 20, 1990, the trial court

summarily denied and dismissed Curtis’s petition, ruling that his ineffective assistance claims

were precluded by his failure to raise them on direct review, and that they were otherwise

without merit (Id., Exh G). Curtis did not seek review in either the court of appeals or the

supreme court.

On March 21, 2007, 17 years later, Curtis filed a second pro se post-conviction

petition, challenging his consecutive sentences, as he had on direct review (Id., Exh H). On

April 23, 2007, the trial court construed his argument regarding his sentences as a Blakely

claim, and denied the petition because his convictions became final before Blakely was

decided (Id., Exh I). On January 27, 2012, Curtis filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in Maricopa County Superior Court, challenging his consecutive sentences (Id., Exh J). On

March 13, 2012, the trial court construed the petition as a notice of post-conviction relief and

summarily denied the petition, concluding that the sentencing claim either was or could have

been raised on direct review, and was therefore precluded (Id., Exh K). Curtis did not seek

review in the court of appeals or the supreme court. He filed his original Habeas Petition on

April 23, 2012, and his Amended Petition on July 27, 2012.

DISCUSSION

A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court conviction is required

to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). The period of limitations is statutorily tolled during the time in which a

“properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect

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to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in the State courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

Curtis’s conviction became final on February 20, 1990, when the trial court denied and

dismissed his post-conviction petition. Because his conviction became final before April 24,

1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the

statute of limitations began to run on April 25, 1996, and expired on April 24, 1997.

Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1256 (9th Cir. 2001). He was required to file his federal

petition on or before April 24, 1997. His federal petition, filed 15 years later, is untimely

filed, absent any statutory or equitable tolling.

Curtis filed nothing in state court from 1989 until 2007. There was no “properly

filed”petition for post-conviction relief pending during this time, and therefore nothing to toll

the running of the one-year period of limitations. Curtis’s second Petition for PostConviction Petition, filed almost 10 years after the period of limitations had expired, did not

serve to restart the statute of limitations. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th

Cir. 2003).

In addition, Curtis has not demonstrated that he is entitled to equitable tolling. He has

not established that he had been “pursuing his rights diligently,” and that “some

extraordinary circumstance stood in [his] way.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. , 130 S.Ct.

2549, 2562 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418-19 (2005)). Curtis must

also show that the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness. Spitsyn

v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable

tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v.

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). Curtis has the burden of establishing that

equitable tolling is appropriate. Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1065.

The Court concludes that Curtis has not met this burden. He states in his habeas

petition as follows:

Petitioner completely relied upon counsel “court appointed” which

served him naught. Petitioner “avows” he has lack of access to the Rules of

Procedure or assistance from persons trained in the law. Petitioner further

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“avows” he has no access to legal resources necessary to discover issues to

raise. After the decision in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 . . . (1996), the state

removed law books from its state prisons needed to research the “elements” of

claim[s] to be presented in post-conviction relief. In 2004 the state enacted a

statu[t]e within the state that prohibits (any person) that’s not authorized to

practice law by the bar may not legally advise or assist any person with

preparations with any legal document.

A review of the record reveals that Curtis was well aware of the applicable rules and

statutes, as he cited them in each of his post-conviction petitions. He was also well-versed

in the elements of his claims, as he argued them in each of his post-conviction petitions and

in his federal petition. Curtis has demonstrated his ability to prepare and file pleadings in

state and federal court. He has not established that anything stood in the way of him timely

filing his federal petition. In any event, ignorance of the law is not an extraordinary

circumstance warranting equitable tolling. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.

2006).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Kurzie Lee Curtis’s Amended Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 12).

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

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factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 15th day of May, 2013.

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