Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00192/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00192-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jonathon Alan Farnham, Sr., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

State of Arizona; ACPTC, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-11-00192-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Jonathon Alan Farnham, Sr.’s Application to Proceed in

District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 5), otherwise known as a motion for

leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court will grant Farnham’s in forma pauperis

application and screen his complaint. Screening his complaint reveals defects that require

the Court to dismiss it. However, the Court will give Farnham an opportunity to amend his

complaint and correct certain problems.

I. Background

Farnham has been committed to the Arizona Community Protection and Treatment

Center, commonly known as the state hospital. He has filed a complaint with this Court,

alleging that he has been deprived of his personal property unconstitutionally. The complaint

includes a lengthy, itemized list of all such property he can remember. However, his

complaint contains no details about when the state hospital took his property, why they did

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it, how they did it, or who did it.

By way of relief, Farnham asks this Court for “compensation” for the lost property

and for “the mental anguish he has felt, endured.” Farnham also “seeks to insure, that this

never happens to another resident ever again.”

II. Legal Standard

Farnham has moved for leave to file in forma pauperis. The Court is satisfied that

Farnham qualifies for in forma pauperis status. However, permitting Farnham to proceed

in forma pauperis also obligates this Court to screen his complaint under the following

standards.

A. Screening Standard

When this Court permits a party to file in forma pauperis, the Court “shall dismiss the

case at any time if the court determines” that the “allegation of poverty is untrue” or that the

“action or appeal” is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). While much of § 1915 outlines how prisoners can file proceedings

in forma pauperis, § 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed

by prisoners. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“section 1915(e) applies

to all in forma pauperis complaints”). “It is also clear that section 1915(e) not only permits

but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a

claim.” Id.

B. Failure-to-State-a-Claim Standard

To state a claim for relief under Rule 8, a plaintiff must make “‘a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). This “short and plain

statement” must also be “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009). A claim is plausible if it contains sufficient factual matter to permit a reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged. Id. A proper complaint needs

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no “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,

but the plaintiff must at least “allege sufficient facts to state the elements of [the relevant]

claim,” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2008).

All of the plaintiff’s plausible factual allegations are accepted as true and the pleadings are

construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072

(9th Cir. 2005). Further, despite Twombly and Iqbal, courts continue to construe pro se

filings liberally, and give such plaintiffs “the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627

F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).

III. Analysis

A. Claims Against the State of Arizona

1. Claim for Money Damages

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution does not permit Farnham

to sue the state of Arizona (or its agencies, such as the state hospital) for money damages.

The Eleventh Amendment states: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”

Although this amendment appears only to prohibit suits against states brought by

non-citizens, the Supreme Court has interpreted it to prohibit suits against states brought by

their own citizens, if those suits ask for money damages. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706

(1999); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Therefore, Farnham’s complaint is dismissed

without leave to amend to the extent Farnham is seeking money damages from the state.

2. Request for an Injunction

Farnham also “seeks to insure, that this never happens to another resident ever again.”

The Court interprets this as a request for an injunction. The Eleventh Amendment also

prohibits Farnham from asking for an injunction directly against the state. Ex parte Young,

209 U.S. 123 (1908). Thus, the Court must dismiss Farnham’s complaint without prejudice

to the extent it requests an injunction directly against the state.

Because this dismissal is “without prejudice,” Farnham may attempt to bring this

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claim again in an amended complaint. However, Farnham must sue for an injunction against

an individual state officer (such as the director of the state hospital) in their “official

capacity.” The Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit such suits. Nonetheless, Farnham

must also narrow his request. He does not have “standing” to seek an injunction on behalf

of all state hospital residents — if other state hospital residents have had their property

confiscated unconstitutionally, those residents need to bring their own lawsuits. Farnham is

not permitted to sue on their behalf, nor may he bring a class action pro se. See McShane v.

United States, 366 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1966) (non-lawyer had no authority to appear as

an attorney for other persons in a purported class action); Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d

1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (plain error to permit an inmate proceeding pro se to represent

fellow inmates in a class action).

On the other hand, the Court may grant an injunction that protects Farnham

personally. But before the Court can do that, Farnham must establish that the state hospital

will likely deprive him of his property again unconstitutionally. See, e.g., City of L.A. v.

Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (“Lyons’ standing to seek the injunction requested depended

on whether he was likely to suffer future injury . . . .”). As currently written, Farnham’s

complaint alleges no facts that plausibly suggest a threat of future unconstitutional

deprivations of property. Thus, if Farnham chooses to request an injunction in his amended

complaint, he must: (1) sue a relevant state officer in their “official capacity,” and (2) include

enough factual detail to plausibly show a likelihood of future unconstitutional property

deprivations of his property.

B. Claims Against Individuals

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits Farnham from suing the state for money damages,

but it does not prohibit him from suing individuals employed by the state for money

damages, if those individuals violated his constitutional rights while acting as state

employees. Such a claim is usually brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The only defendant named in the caption of Farnham’s complaint is “State of Arizona,

ACPTC.” Farnham names no individuals. Farnham titles his complaint “Resident

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Farnham’s Complaint Against Arizona State Hospital Mr. Cooper and ACPTC Security

Chief. Missing Personal Property,” and the Court therefore presumes that Farnham intended

to name “Mr. Cooper” and “ACPTC Security Chief” as defendants, in addition to the state

hospital. But unless Farnham names “Mr. Cooper” and “ACPTC Security Chief” in the

caption (the “[name of plaintiff] v. [name of defendant(s)]” section on the first page), the

Court does not consider them parties to the case. The Court will therefore dismiss Farnham’s

§ 1983 claim without prejudice for failure to name individual defendants acting in their

individual (as opposed to official) capacities.

Because this dismissal is “without prejudice,” Farnham may attempt to bring his

claims against “Mr. Cooper” and “ACPTC Security Chief” again in an amended complaint,

if he names them as defendants in the caption. However, the Court warns that Farnham must

also include enough allegations in his complaint to establish a plausible § 1983 claim against

“Mr. Cooper” and “ACPTC Security Chief.” These two persons are nowhere mentioned in

Farnham’s current complaint except in its title. In fact, the complaint says nothing about any

specific person. Nor does it provide any details about when Farnham’s property was taken

away, why it was taken away, and so forth. Farnham must also plausibly allege that “Mr.

Cooper” and “ACPTC Security Chief” intentionally (as opposed to accidentally) deprived

Farnham of his property. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (constitution not violated

by accidental deprivations of property). Lacking such details, the complaint is not plausible

on its face, even under liberal pro se pleading standards.

Therefore, if Farnham chooses to file an amended complaint and he still wishes to sue

“Mr. Cooper,” “ACPTC Security Chief,” or any other state hospital employee, Farnham must

(1) name those persons in caption, and (2) include enough factual detail in the complaint to

plausibly suggest that each person intentionally violated his constitutional rights.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Farnham’s Application to Proceed in District

Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 5) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Farnham’s complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED

without leave to amend to the extent it seeks money damages against the state of Arizona,

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and with leave to amend to the extent it seeks an injunction against an Arizona state official

acting in his or her official capacity and money damages from state hospital employees acting

their individual capacities.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Farnham chooses to file an amended complaint, he

must do so by April 1, 2011.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Farnham does not file an amended complaint by

April 1, 2011, the Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this action without further order of

this Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Farnham files an amended complaint, the

complaint may not be served on any defendant until and unless the Court screens the

amended complaint pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

DATED this 22nd day of February, 2011.

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