Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00569/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00569-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

JAMES A. STEPHENS, III, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 2:14cv569-MEF-WC 

 ) 

GLEN GOGGANS and JO LYNN ) 

BURNETTE, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Before the court is Plaintiff’s Complaint. Compl. (Doc. 1). On June 9, 2014, the 

District Judge entered an Order referring this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge 

“for all pretrial proceedings and entry of any orders or recommendations as may be 

appropriate.” Order (Doc. 3). Plaintiff requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 

Mot. (Doc. 2), which obligates the court to undertake review of Plaintiff’s Complaint 

pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). That statute instructs the court to 

dismiss any action wherein it is determined that an in forma pauperis applicant’s suit is 

“frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or 

“seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). 

Upon review of the Complaint and Plaintiff’s Response to the court’s order to 

show cause, the court finds that this case is due to be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 

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I. BACKGROUND

On June 5, 2014, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint alleging violations 

of Plaintiff’s civil rights, and seeking injunctive relief from defendants, state court judge 

Glen Goggans (“Judge Goggans”) and court referral officer (“CRO”) Jo Lynn Burnette 

(“CRO Burnette”). Compl. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleged the following: 

During the course of these (3) years, I have been jailed numerous time’s for 

failure to pay or report to my CRO. . . . Judge Goggans awarded me 

indigent status for my defense, but refused to do so for any drug classes and 

or CRO fee’s, even though there is a state fund set aside for it. . . . “It was 

pay or stay” even if you were effectively indigent. Elmore County wants 

there money, or you will be in jail. 

. . . 

I’ve sent letters faxes made phone calls to the Judge’s office, and Mrs. 

Burnette and enclosed is a letter written Dec 2014 telling her plainly I had 

major health problems. Any reasonable person can understand my letters to 

both Judge Goggans and Mrs. Jo Lynn Burnette. They just didn’t care 

about my civil rights. Denial by both of them to be released from the 

program no reasonable person would make these kind of major 

constitutional errors if they had any respect for the United States laws. 

Id. at 3. Thus, it appears Plaintiff’s chief complaint centers around a criminal sentence 

given by Judge Goggans, which included attending treatment classes and paying “CRO 

fees” that Plaintiff alleges he should be excused from because he is indigent. 

Additionally, Plaintiff complained, “I went to chemical addiction’s program with a 

terrible infection in my prostate and had to set to give urine samples, it was the same at 

the CRO office.” Id. at 4. In this regard, Plaintiff appears to be complaining that he was 

made to comply with the terms of his sentence/supervision. 

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On June 16, 2014, the court entered an Order (Doc. 5) granting Plaintiff leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis and staying service of process pending review under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915. Concerned about Plaintiff’s ability to state a claim on these facts, the court then 

ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to why this case should not be dismissed based on the 

Younger abstention doctrine, as this case appeared to be an attempt to have this court 

interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 

(1971). On June 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File1

 (Doc. 

7), as well as a Response to the Order to Show Cause (Doc. 8). 

II. DISCUSSION 

 Upon review of Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 8), as best the court can discern, 

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against Judge Glen Goggans and Court Referral Officer Jo 

Lynn Burnette to prevent Defendants from incarcerating Plaintiff when Plaintiff is 

noncompliant with the terms of his criminal sentence. Even upon a very liberal 

construction of Plaintiff’s pleadings,2

 the court finds that this case is due to be dismissed, 

as Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

To the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from orders issued by a state court 

which have become final under state law, this court lacks jurisdiction to render such 

                                                            

1

 Plaintiff sought an extension of time in order to retain counsel to represent him in this case. (Doc. 7). In 

an order filed contemporaneously with this recommendation, the Undersigned denied the motion for 

extension, as additional time would be futile. 

2

 “In the case of a pro se action . . . the court should construe the complaint more liberally than it would 

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990). “While a 

complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, ‘a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of 

his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a 

cause of action’s elements will not do.’” Simpson v. Zwinge, 2013 WL 5340509, at *1 (11th Cir. Sept. 

25, 2013) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

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judgment in an action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

prevents . . . lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by 

‘state-court losers’ challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court 

proceedings commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (quoting Exxon 

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Although “RookerFeldman is a narrow doctrine,” it remains applicable to bar Plaintiff from proceeding 

before this court, as this case is “‘brought by [a] state-court loser[] complaining of 

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” Lance, 

546 U.S. at 464 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284); see also D.C. Court of Appeals 

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983) (federal district courts “do not have jurisdiction . . . 

over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial 

proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was 

unconstitutional.”). 

Plaintiff’s argument is not that Judge Goggans failed to take into account 

Plaintiff’s ability to pay; rather Plaintiff disagrees with Judge Goggan’s determination 

that Plaintiff was, in fact, able to pay some fees as part of his sentence. Plaintiff states, 

“The fact remains that the defendants were aware of my ability to pay and . . . it was 

impossible to comply: there was no possible way to satisfy either Judge Goggans or Mrs. 

Jo Lynn Burnette.” (Doc. 8) at 3-4 (emphasis added); see also (Doc. 8) at 5 (“I asked for 

[indigent] status in a letter to Judge Goggans, and it was refused.”). With this argument, 

Plaintiff is “[a] state-court loser[] complaining of injuries caused by state-court 

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judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district 

court review and rejection of those judgments.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 464. This is 

precisely the situation Rooker-Feldman bars. 

Moreover, a § 1983 action is inappropriate either to compel or to appeal a 

particular course of action by a state court. Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252, 254 (11th Cir. 

1995) (§ 1983 suit arising from alleged erroneous decisions of a state court is merely a 

prohibited appeal of the state court judgment); see also Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 

163 (11th Cir. 1988). Here, Plaintiff requests this court order Plaintiff to serve an 

alternative sentence: “I would be receptive to also just about any reasonable offer to set 

aside my existing cases in Elmore County,” (Doc. 8) at 4; “Any judge has the 

responsibility to render an alternative sentence, and I am not opposed to some sort of 

closure, work for . . . police dept, washing cars a church fire dept wherever as long as I 

can afford the gasoline to do so,” (Doc. 8) at 3. Plaintiff seeks, through a § 1983 action, 

to compel or to appeal a particular course of action by a state court. This court is 

prohibited from doing so. The court concludes that any requests seeking relief from 

orders issued or actions taken by Judge Goggans or CRO Burnette in any criminal case 

involving Plaintiff are due to be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

To the extent Plaintiff’s complaint in this case is an attempt to have this court 

interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings, such interference is barred by the 

Younger abstention doctrine. The abstention doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris, 

401 U.S. 37 (1971), reaffirmed the “strong federal policy against federal-court 

interference with pending state judicial proceedings.” Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. 

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Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982). In determining whether it must 

abstain from exercising jurisdiction under Younger, a court must consider three factors: 

(1) whether there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) whether the proceeding 

implicates important state interests; and (3) whether there is an adequate opportunity to 

raise constitutional challenges in the state proceeding. Id. In this case, all three factors 

require the court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. First, in 

response to concerns raised by the court in the order to show cause, Plaintiff stated that 

“this is an ongoing situation.” (Doc. 8) at 1. Second, criminal prosecutions clearly 

implicate important state interests. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 (relying on a “fundamental 

policy against federal interference with state criminal prosecutions”). Third, Plaintiff 

could have raised his challenges before Judge Goggans, and indeed it appears he did so at 

least to some extent, and then could appeal any adverse rulings as desired to the 

appropriate state court. It is not however, appropriate for this court to interfere with the 

state court’s proceedings. 

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s suit is due to be dismissed as it fails to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted. 

II. CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the 

Magistrate Judge that Plaintiffs’ case be DISMISSED prior to service of process pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted. Further, it is 

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 ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before July 24, 2014. Any objections filed must specifically 

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is 

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the 

District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of 

the court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

 Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the 

District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on 

appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except 

upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 

(5th Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see 

also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as 

binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to 

the close of business on September 30, 1981. 

 Done this 10th day of July, 2014. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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