Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02399/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02399-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Scott W. Smith,

Petitioner,

v.

Shawn Hatton, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 16-cv-02399-LAB-JLB

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION GRANTING 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS

[ECF No. 9]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Larry 

Alan Burns pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of California.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Scott W. Smith (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF 

No. 5, hereinafter “Pet.”)

1

 Before the Court is Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss on the 

grounds that Petitioner’s first claim for habeas relief is not a federal constitutional claim; 

the Petition is an unauthorized second petition; and the Petition is barred as untimely by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) statute of limitation

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (ECF No. 9-1.) Petitioner did not file an opposition to the 

motion to dismiss.

2

 

1 The Petition is docketed as the “First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” (See ECF No. 5.) 

The first petition filed in this case was dismissed without prejudice because Petitioner failed to sign the 

petition under penalty of perjury. (ECF Nos. 4, 5.)

2 Pursuant to this Court’s October 25, 2016 Order, the deadline for Petitioner to file his opposition, if any, 

to the motion to dismiss was January 30, 2017. (ECF No. 6 at ¶4.) 

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The Court, having reviewed the operative Petition, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, 

and the state court records filed, concludes that the Petition is barred as a successive petition 

and as it is untimely under AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitation. Accordingly, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) be GRANTED.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 5, 2002, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to willfully and unlawfully 

committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years in violation of

Cal. Penal Code § 288(a). (ECF No. 10-2 at 3-7; see also ECF 10-5 at 9 (Count 1), 104, 

112.) He further admitted having two strike priors for separate incidents, one for violation 

of Cal. Penal Code § 288(a) and one for violation of Cal. Penal Code § 288(b). (ECF No. 

10-2 at 8-9.) On December 30, 2002, and in accordance with the plea, the Superior Court

of California sentenced Petitioner to prison for a stipulated term of 25 years to life. (ECF 

Nos. 10-4 at 2, 6.) See also People v. Smith, No. D041776, 2004 WL 348882, at *1 (Cal. 

Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2004).

On March 7, 2003, Petitioner initiated a direct appeal by filing a notice of appeal. 

(ECF No. 10-5 at 94-102; ECF No. 10-6 at 6.) On direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal, Petitioner’s appellate counsel filed a brief that requested a review of the record for 

error, but raised no specific issues as permitted under People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436 

(1979).

3

 (ECF Nos. 10-6, 10-7.) In addition, with leave of court, Petitioner filed a 

supplemental brief before the Court of Appeal. (ECF Nos. 10-7, 10-8.)

The Court of Appeal provided the following summary of Petitioner’s claims on 

direct appeal:

He states that he is unable to file a supplemental brief because he does 

not have the trial court transcripts. He contends the rule precluding 

raising an issue in a collateral proceeding if it has been raised on appeal 

deprives him of due process of law. However, he informally states that

 

3

See People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d at 441 (“We conclude that Anders [v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1976)] 

requires the court to conduct a review of the entire record whenever appointed counsel submits a brief 

which raises no specific issues or describes the appeal as frivolous.”).

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his appellate counsel was ineffective in filing the Wende brief when 

issues exist regarding effective assistance of trial counsel; the trial court 

failing to hold a Marsden hearing (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 

118) or an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw the guilty 

plea; the entry of the guilty plea not meeting the requirements of In re 

Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 and Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238; 

and the court not inquiring into a factual basis for the guilty plea.

(ECF No. 10-9 at 2.) The Court of Appeal reviewed the entire record and affirmed the 

judgment of the Superior Court on February 25, 2004. (ECF No. 10-9.) Petitioner did not 

seek review in the California Supreme Court. (ECF No. 10-10 at 5-6; ECF No. 10-16 at 

3.)

Next, Petitioner timely initiated and completed a full round of state habeas corpus 

petitions. (See ECF No. 10-16.) The Superior Court denied the first habeas petition in a 

written opinion on May 26, 2004. (ECF No 10-17 at 4.) On September 21, 2004, the Court 

of Appeal denied the second petition in a written decision. (Id.) Then, on September 21, 

2005, the California Supreme Court denied the final petition without citation of authority. 

(Id.) By the end of 2005, Petitioner had exhausted the following habeas issues in state 

court: (1) whether his Sixth Amendment right to competent counsel was violated when his

appellate counsel allegedly rendered ineffective assistance; (2) whether his Sixth 

Amendment right to competent counsel was violated when his trial counsel allegedly 

rendered ineffective assistance; (3) whether the state trial court violated his Fourteenth 

Amendment right to due process and his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by allegedly 

failing to ensure his guilty plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, failing

to ensure there was a factual basis for his guilty plea, admitting the facts of his prior 

conviction under Penal Code section 1108, and failing to properly handle his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. (Id. at 5.)

On December 21, 2005, Petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus petition, raising the 

same claims that he had previously exhausted in the state courts. (Id. at 4-5.) The district 

/ / /

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court analyzed the 2005 petition on the merits, denied each claim for habeas relief with 

prejudice, and entered judgment on July 10, 2007. (ECF No. 10-17.)

More than seven years later, after the California Supreme Court decision in People 

v. Vargas, 59 Cal.4th 635 (2014), Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Superior Court, case number HSN-1412. (See ECF No. 10-19.) At that time, 

Petitioner claimed that he was given two strike priors for one crime and one victim, which 

he argued was unconstitutional and should be stricken under Vargas. (Id. at 1.) On October 

22, 2015, the Superior Court denied the Petition on the merits. (Id. at 1-2.) The court 

concluded that “Petitioner’s claim that his two strikes were based on the same act is 

incorrect and the reasoning of Vargas does not apply.” (Id. at 2.)

On November 10, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Court of Appeal, case number D069202, wherein he raised the same claim that 

had been presented in the Superior Court. (ECF No. 10-20.) Petitioner also raised claims 

that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to argue 

Petitioner’s two prior convictions could not be counted as two separate strikes; the 

prosecution denied him due process by requesting and obtaining imposition of a third-strike 

sentence based on those convictions without an evidentiary hearing; and the Superior Court

denied him due process by misapplying Vargas and denying the habeas corpus petition he 

filed in that court without holding an evidentiary hearing. (Id.; ECF No. 10-21 at 1-2.) 

On November 13, 2015, the California Court of Appeal denied the petition. (ECF 

No. 10-21.) It determined that the entire petition was barred as untimely “without any 

explanation for the long delay.” (Id. at 2.) Further, with respect to Petitioner’s claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court of Appeal held that it was also barred as a 

successive petition “because it is merely a variation on claims considered and rejected on 

direct appeal and in his prior habeas corpus petitions.” (Id.) Finally, the Court of Appeal 

denied Petitioner’s petition on the merits, reasoning:

Even if Smith’s petition were not procedurally barred, it would 

fail on the merits. His claim the prosecution did not adequately prove 

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his prior convictions for purposes of sentencing under the Three Strikes 

law is an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence, which is “not 

cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (In re Reno, supra, 55 

Cal.4th at p. 505.) His claim based on Vargas, supra 59 Cal.4th 635, 

has no merit. In Vargas, the California Supreme Court considered 

“whether two prior convictions arising out of a single act against a 

single victim can constitute two strikes under the Three Strikes law” 

and “conclude[d] they cannot.” (Id. at p. 637.) Smith has not included 

with his petition the plea agreement, the transcript of the plea hearing, 

or any other document concerning his prior convictions that would 

allow this court to determine whether or not those convictions arose out 

of a single act against a single victim. His conclusory assertion “there 

was one victim, one act” is insufficient to sustain his pleading burden. 

(People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.) The assertion is also 

contradicted by the superior court’s order denying habeas corpus relief, 

which Smith attached to his petition and which states the plea 

agreement showed the two prior convictions were “for separate

incidents.” Without presenting evidence the prior convictions did in 

fact arise out of a single act against a single victim, Smith cannot fault 

his trial counsel for not arguing the convictions could not be counted as 

separate strikes under the Three Strikes law. (See, e.g., In re Reno, 

supra, at pp. 499-500 [“unadorned and unexplained assertions of

ineffective assistance of counsel . . . are inadequate to satisfy 

[petitioner’s] pleading burden”]; People v. Stratton (1988) 205 

Cal.App.3d 87, 93 [defendant must prove by preponderance of 

evidence that counsel’s representation was deficient].)

Finally, this court does not consider Smith’s objections to the 

superior court’s order denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus he 

filed in that court. Such an order is not appealable or otherwise 

reviewable by this court. (In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 767, fn. 7;

In re Crow (1971) 4 Cal.3d 613,621, fn. 8.).

(Id.)

On March 14, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition in the California Supreme Court. 

(ECF No. 10-22.) On May 11, 2016, the California Supreme Court denied the petition with 

citation to People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995) and In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304

(1949), but otherwise without comment. (ECF No. 10-23.)

/ / /

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Petitioner again filed a federal habeas petition in this district court on September 21, 

2016, which was amended on October 20, 2016. (ECF Nos. 1, 5.) The amended petition 

is the Petition presently before the Court. (ECF No. 5.) The Petition presents three grounds

for relief: (1) whether “Petitioner received unauthorized sentence that requires reversal and 

remand for due process;” (2) whether “Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel 

during the Superior Court appearances and on appeal;” and (3) whether the state court erred 

in denying Petitioner an evidentiary hearing to which he was entitled. (Id. at 6-8.)

III. ANALYSIS

A. Second or Successive Petition

Respondent argues the Petition must be dismissed under AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(b), because Petitioner filed a prior federal petition seeking habeas relief arising 

from his 2002 conviction. (ECF No. 9-1 at 13.) The Court agrees.

As set forth herein, the instant Petition is not the first petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus Petitioner has filed with this district court challenging his 2002 conviction and 

sentence for committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 following a guilty plea

in San Diego County Superior Court. On October 26, 2005, Petitioner filed his first federal

petition arising from his 2002 lewd act conviction in this district court in case number 

05cv2021. (ECF No. 10-17 at 1.) On July 10, 2007, the district court denied the petition

on the merits. (ECF No. 10-17 at 1-32.) Petitioner appealed that determination. On 

November 22, 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s request for a 

certificate of appealability. (See Order filed Nov. 22, 2010 in case No. 05cv2021-H-POR, 

[ECF No. 37].)

The instant Petition, filed in 2016, must be dismissed as a successive petition. 

Petitioner is again challenging the sentence and conviction he challenged in his prior 

federal habeas petition. Unless a petitioner shows he has obtained an order from the 

appropriate court of appeals authorizing the district court to consider a successive petition, 

the petition may not be filed in the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); see also 

Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 153 (2007) (a petition is successive where it challenges 

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“the same custody imposed by the same judgment of a state court” as a prior petition). A 

successive application is permissible “only if it rests on a new rule of constitutional law, 

facts that were previously unavailable, or facts that would be sufficient to show 

constitutional error in the petitioner’s conviction.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). “Even if a 

petitioner can demonstrate that he qualifies for one of these exceptions, he must seek 

authorization from the court of appeals before filing his new petition with the district 

court.” Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)). 

Here, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not granted Petitioner leave to file a 

successive petition. Therefore, this Court cannot consider the Petition.

B. Statute of Limitation under AEDPA

Even if the Petition were not successive, it would still be dismissed as untimely. 

Federal habeas corpus petitions are governed by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitation. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). AEDPA, enacted on April 24, 1996, applies to convictions 

finalized thereafter. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), the one-year limitation begins at 

the latest of: 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). In most cases, the one-year period runs pursuant to

subsection (A), the date on which the judgment becomes final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of time for seeking such review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

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Here, Petitioner did not appeal to the California Supreme Court after the Court of 

Appeal filed its decision affirming the judgment on February 25, 2004. The California 

Court of Appeal’s decision became “final” for purposes of filing a petition for review on

March 26, 2004, 30 days after the California Court of Appeal’s February 25, 2004, 

decision. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.264(b). The time to file a petition for review in the California 

Supreme Court expired 10 days later, on April 5, 2004. Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(e)(1). Thus, 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations started to run on April 5, 2004 and expired one year later, 

on April 5, 2005.

4 Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Gaston’s 

conviction became final . . . forty days after the dismissal by the [California] Court of 

Appeal”) (citing Cal. R. Ct. 24(b)(1) (renumbered Rule 8.264, effective January 1, 2007)). 

Thus, pursuant to subsection (A) of § 2244(d)(1), the Petition, which was first filed in 2016,

is untimely unless Petitioner can show that he is entitled to statutory tolling, a delayed start 

date, or equitable tolling.5

1. Statutory Tolling

As a threshold matter, once a petitioner is notified that his petition is subject to 

dismissal based on AEDPA’s one-year limitation period, he bears the burden of 

demonstrating that limitation period is sufficiently tolled under statutory and/or equitable 

principles. Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2002) overruled on other 

grounds by Pace v. Diglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Johnson v. Lewis, 310 F. Supp. 

2d 1121, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating 

tolling facts). Petitioner fails to make such a showing.

Section 2244(d)(2) provides for statutory tolling for the time during which a 

“properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect 

to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Generally, “the 

 

4 Respondent contends finality occurred on April 6, 2004, presumably not accounting for the fact that 

2004 was a leap-year. (See ECF No. 9-1 at 16.)

5 Respondent points out that it may be argued that the Petition was filed in June, August, or September 

when Petitioner handed the federal petitioner to prison officials. (ECF No. 9-1 at 16.) Because the exact 

date of filing is inconsequential to this Court’s analysis, the Court need not decide the exact date of filing.

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statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the 

California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge[,]” Nino v. 

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 

1104 (2000), so long as the petitioner did not unreasonably delay in seeking collateral 

relief. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). This includes so-called “gap tolling” 

for the periods of time between such state habeas petitions, provided that the petitioner 

proceeds in a hierarchical order from one lower state court to a higher state court. Id. 

However, “AEDPA’s statute of limitations is not tolled from the time a final decision is 

issued on direct state appeal and the time the first state collateral challenge is filed because 

there is no case ‘pending’ during that interval.” Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006.

Here, AEDPA’s statute of limitations would have begun to run on April 5, 2004. 

However, the limitations period did not begin to run on that date because, on March 25, 

2004, Petitioner timely initiated procedurally proper state collateral review proceedings of 

the pertinent judgment. (ECF No. 10-10 at 7; ECF No 10-17.) State collateral review 

concluded with the California Supreme Court’s denial of habeas relief on September 21, 

2005. (See ECF No. 10-15.) Thus, pursuant to AEDPA, Petitioner had until September 

21, 2006 to file a federal petition.

On October 26, 2005, Petitioner timely filed a petition in this district court in case 

number 05cv2021. (ECF No. 10-17 at 1.) However, that is not the petition presently before 

this court. Further, AEDPA’s statute of limitations was not tolled while Petitioner’s prior 

federal habeas petition filed in 2005 was pending. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-

82 (2001) (“we are convinced that § 2244(d)(2) does not toll the limitation period during 

the pendency of a federal habeas petition”).

Petitioner initiated a second round of state collateral review of the pertinent 

judgment at some point in 2014 or 2015, when he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

in the California Superior Court. (ECF No. 10-19.) However, under section 2242(d)(2), 

Petitioner cannot rely on this round of state collateral review to revive his one-year 

limitation period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding 

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that AEDPA does not “permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before 

the state petition was filed,” even if the state petition was timely filed); see also Moore v. 

Crosby, 321 F.3d 1377, 1381 (11th Cir. 2003) (maintaining a state application for postconviction relief does not revive the one-year limitations period if such period has expired). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s round of state collateral review that he initiated in 2014 or 2015

does not revive or restart AEDPA’s one-year limitation period that expired several years

earlier.

Therefore, the Petition is barred as untimely under AEDPA, unless a delayed start 

date or equitable tolling is applicable.

2. Delayed Start Date 

As set forth above, AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitation period begins at the latest 

of four possible dates, each outlined in subsections (A) through (D) of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244 (d)(1). As discussed above, subsection (A) provides for a start date of April 5, 

2004, but that start date was statutorily tolled until September 21, 2005. Subsections (B) 

and (D) do not apply to this case.

6

 Accordingly, the Court turns to whether the application 

of subsection (C) results in a delayed start date for Petitioner’s limitation period.

At best, Petitioner seems to contend that § 2244(d)(1)(C) applies to trigger a later 

start to the limitations period. (Pet. at 10-12.) Under § 2244(d)(1)(C), the one-year statute 

of limitations begins to run on “the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the 

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(C). Petitioner seems to believe that the case upon which he relies in seeking 

federal habeas relief – the California Supreme Court’s July 10, 2014 decision in People v.

/ / /

 

6 Subsections (B) and (D) are not applicable to the current matter. As to subsection (B), Petitioner has not 

alleged a state-action impediment prevented him from filing. As to subsection (D), Petitioner argues that 

there is a new rule of law that should apply, but has not alleged that the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence. (See 

generally Pet.)

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Vargas, 59 Cal.4th 635 (2014) – was decided by the United States Supreme Court and, 

thus, revives his untimely claims. Such an argument is without merit.

As an initial matter, the California Supreme Court’s decision in Vargas involved a 

matter of state statutory construction and does not purport to set forth a newly recognized 

constitutional right. See generally Vargas, 59 Cal.4th at 640-49. “[I]t is only 

noncompliance with federal law that renders a State's criminal judgment susceptible to 

collateral attack in the federal courts. Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010). The text 

of the habeas statute unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue a writ of habeas

corpus to a state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Thus, a writ 

of habeas corpus “is unavailable for alleged error in the interpretation or application of 

state law.” Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Hubbart v. Knapp, 

379 F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir. 2004).

Moreover, § 2244(d)(1)(C) applies only when the United States Supreme Court itself 

makes a new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. See Dodd v. United States, 545 

U.S. 353, 357 (2005) (construing identical language in § 2255 as expressing “clear” 

congressional intent that delayed accrual is inapplicable unless the United States Supreme 

Court itself has made the new rule retroactive). As Petitioner’s claims are not based on a 

constitutional right that the United States Supreme Court has newly recognized and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, § 2244(d)(1)(C) does not apply.

Consequently, subsection (C), does not save Petitioner’s untimely petition. 

Accordingly, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) should be granted as the 

Petition is barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitation, unless Petitioner can show 

equitable tolling is applicable.

3. Equitable Tolling

Petitions filed under Section 2244(d) may be subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). Generally, a litigant 

seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been 

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pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. The Ninth Circuit has found equitable tolling appropriate 

only in rare circumstances that truly rise to the level of extraordinary. 

Here, the Court need not address Petitioner’s diligence because there is no 

“extraordinary circumstance” before the Court to warrant the applicability of equitable 

tolling to the Petition. The Petition is merely a variation on claims considered and rejected 

on direct appeal and in his prior habeas corpus petitions. Further, the California Supreme 

Court’s recent decision in Vargas does not address a federal question, nor does it establish 

a new federal constitutional rule. On this record, there are no extraordinary circumstances

before the Court.

Turning to the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Vargas, the court held 

that two prior convictions arising out of a single act against a single victim cannot constitute 

two strikes under California’s Three Strikes Law. Vargas, 59 Cal.4th at 637. Petitioner’s 

claim that his sentence is contrary to the decision in Vargas presents a purely state 

sentencing law claim not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. See Swarthout v. 

Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (“We have stated many times that ‘federal habeas corpus 

relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”); Russell v. Fox, No. 15cv2709, 2016 WL 

1599481, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2016) (“Petitioner’s claim that his life sentence under 

the Three Strikes Law does not conform with Vargas presents a purely state sentencing 

law claim not cognizable in federal habeas”). Thus, the California Supreme Court’s recent 

decision in Vargas does not constitute extraordinary circumstances supporting equitable 

tolling.

Moreover, Petitioner’s state law claim under Vargas appears to be without merit 

because, as the state courts on collateral review reasonably concluded:

His claim based on Vargas, supra 59 Cal.4th 635, has no merit. 

In Vargas, the California Supreme Court considered “whether two prior

convictions arising out of a single act against a single victim can 

constitute two strikes under the Three Strikes law” and “conclude[d]

they cannot.” (Id. at p. 637.) Smith has not included with his petition

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the plea agreement, the transcript of the plea hearing, or any other

document concerning his prior convictions that would allow this court

to determine whether or not those convictions arose out of a single act

against a single victim. His conclusory assertion “there was one victim, 

one act” is insufficient to sustain his pleading burden. (People v. Duvall

(1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.) The assertion is also contradicted by the 

superior court’s order denying habeas corpus relief, which Smith

attached to his petition and which states the plea agreement showed the

two prior convictions were “for separate incidents.” Without presenting

evidence the prior convictions did in fact arise out of a single act against

a single victim, Smith cannot fault his trial counsel for not arguing the

convictions could not be counted as separate strikes under the Three 

Strikes law. (See, e.g., In re Reno, supra, at pp. 499-500 [“unadorned

and unexplained assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . are

inadequate to satisfy [petitioner’s] pleading burden”]; People v. 

Stratton (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 87, 93 [defendant must prove by

preponderance of evidence that counsel’s representation was

deficient].).

(ECF No. 10-21.) Therefore, equitable tolling does not apply based on the record before 

the Court, and Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) should be granted. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court 

issue an order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and 

(2) granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition (ECF No. 9) with prejudice.

IT IS ORDERED THAT any party to this action may file written objections with

the District Court and serve a copy on all parties no later than May 2, 2017. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the District Court and served on all parties no later than May 16, 2017. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise 

/ / /

/ / /

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those objections on appeal of the District Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 10, 2017

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