Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01917/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01917-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1391 Personal Injury

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This order addresses only the claims made against Defendants City of Phoenix and

Phoenix Police Department. For purposes of this order, “Defendants” refers only to these

Defendants unless otherwise noted.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Martha E. Payan; Xavier Payan, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

City of Phoenix; et al,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-09-1917-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended

Complaint (Doc. #25).1

 For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion.

I. Background

Plaintiffs allege that on or about May 11, 2009, the Defendant Phoenix Police officers

entered their home and arrested them without a warrant or probable cause, thereby violating

their constitutional rights. (Doc. #1at 7; Doc. #25 at 4). Plaintiffs further allege that the

police officers mistreated them and committed various torts against them. (Doc. #1 and #25).

Plaintiffs proceed in this case pro se. Plaintiffs Martha Payan and Xavier Payan each filed

a notice of claim with the City of Phoenix on June 5, 2009. (Doc. #26-1). Plaintiffs filed

their Complaint with this Court on September 15, 2009 (Doc. #1), and their Amended

Case 2:09-cv-01917-JAT Document 40 Filed 05/04/10 Page 1 of 7
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 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (Doc. #25) includes by reference all allegations

made in Plaintiffs’ original Complaint (Doc. #1). This order will refer in text to the two

documents as “the Complaint,” but will cite to them individually as necessary.

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Complaint on December 21, 2009 (Doc. #25). The Complaint2

 contains a Section 1983 claim

for “malicious prosecution” and tort claims for gross negligence, intentional and negligent

infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. (Id.) Plaintiffs also make a claim

for “retaliation.” (Id. at 10–11). On January 13, 2010, the City of Phoenix filed its Motion

to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint on behalf of itself and the Phoenix Police

Department. (Doc. #26). 

II. Legal Standards

A. Failure to state a claim

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet

the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice of what

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “Without some factual

allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of

providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the

claim rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, n.3 (citing 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1202, at 94–95 (3d ed. 2004)). “In determining the propriety

of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s

moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.”

Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t Of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). “The focus of

any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal—both in the trial court and on appeal—is the complaint.” Id.

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the facts

alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter of the complaint and the

Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. See Shwarz v. United States,

234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, the Court does not have to “accept as true

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a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286

(1986). Although a complaint attacked for failure to state a claim does not need detailed

factual allegations, the pleader’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief requires “more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate

where the complaint lacks either a cognizable legal theory or facts sufficient to support a

cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1988).

It is well established that pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded[,] are held

to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449

U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In civil rights cases where the plaintiff

appears pro se, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and must afford plaintiff the

benefit of any doubt.” Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.

1988). 

B. Failure to exhaust non-judicial remedies

The requirement of filing a notice of claim with the state or its political subdivisions

is mandatory and must be fulfilled before a Plaintiff can maintain a cause of action against

them. Pritchard v. State, 788 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Ariz. 1990). A failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies should be treated as a matter in abatement, which is subject to an

unenumerated 12(b) motion to dismiss. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir.

2003). In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust non-judicial remedies, the court

may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20.

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 Pierre v. Schlemmer, 932 F.Supp. 278, 280 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Baldi v. City of

Philadelphia, 609 F.Supp. 162, 168 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Reese v. Chicago Police Dep’t, 602

F.Supp. 441, 443 (N.D. Ill. 1984).

4

 In the Complaint, Xavier Payan is not listed as a plaintiff under the Section 1983

claim. However, for purposes of this Order, the Court is construing the assertion made in the

Complaint that Xavier Payan was wrongfully arrested and “denied his constitutional right to

liberty [and] freedom of movemnet (sic)” (Doc. #25 at 4), as a Section 1983 claim under the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because it seems to implicate wrongful seizure and due

process concerns. 

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III. Analysis

A. Dismissal of Phoenix Police Department as a non-jural entity

There is no consensus in the case law concerning whether police departments are jural

entities3

. See Williams v. City of Tempe, 2006 WL 798701 (D. Ariz.). In any event,

Defendants have not applied the three part test set forth in McClanahan v. Cochise College,

540 P.2d 744 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975), to determine whether the Phoenix Police Department

is a jural entity. Because this issue has not been properly argued in the Motion, the Court

will not address the jural entity question at this time.

B. Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim for failure to state a claim

Count One of the Complaint is dismissed as to Defendants City of Phoenix and

Phoenix Police Department. Plaintiffs do not have a valid Section 1983 claim against

Defendants because Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint fails to allege that Defendants have a

policy or custom which led to Plaintiffs’ injuries.4

 A local government cannot be sued under

Section 1983 for the actions of its employees by way of respondeat superior. Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). However, a local

government can be sued under Section 1983 where that government’s “policy or custom”

gives rise to the injury. Id. at 694. The statute “plainly imposes liability on a government

that, under color of some official policy, ‘causes’ an employee to violate another’s

constitutional rights. At the same time, that language cannot be easily read to impose

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liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an employeremployee relationship with a tortfeasor.” Id. at 692. 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “contributed to the presentation of false police

reports” which led to Plaintiffs’ arrest. (Doc. #1 at 7). Plaintiffs further allege that their

arrest “caused needless interuption (sic)” to their “right to freedom” (Id.) and “constitutional

right to liberty [and] freedom of movemnet (sic).” (Doc. #25 at 4). The Court concludes

from these allegations that Plaintiffs are basing their claim on the Fourth Amendment right

to be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Fourteenth Amendment

right not to be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 

Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he plain fact that the [officers], did not honor their oath” to

serve and protect confers liability upon Defendants. (Doc. #1 at 13). This statement appears

to allege that Defendants are liable merely because they employ the involved officers. The

law cannot sustain such a claim. See Monell, 436 at 690–91. Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to

allege that the Defendants had in place any policy or custom which led to Plaintiffs’ alleged

injuries. Plaintiffs’ statement that Defendants “contributed to the presentation of false police

reports” (Doc. #1 at 7) lacks any facts that would indicate a causal link between a policy of

the Defendants and the alleged wrongful acts of the officers. Because Plaintiffs have not

shown that their injuries were caused by any of Defendants’ policies or customs, Plaintiffs’

Section 1983 claim is dismissed as to Defendants City of Phoenix and Phoenix Police

Department.

C. Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ tort claims for failure to comply with the Arizona Notice

of Claim Statute

Counts Two, Three, Four, and Six of the Complaint are dismissed as to Defendants

City of Phoenix and Phoenix Police Department. Plaintiffs’ claims for gross negligence,

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment are tort

claims arising under state law. The Arizona Notice of Claim Statute provides that anyone

with a claim against a public entity must file a notice of claim with the entity within 180 days

of the accrual of the cause of action. A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). The statute also requires that

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the claim state a “specific amount for which the claim can be settled and the facts supporting

that amount.” Id. The Arizona Supreme Court has held that this amount of settlement

requirement must be specifically met in order for the notice of claim to preserve a plaintiff’s

right of action. Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97 v. Houser, 152 P.3d 490, 494–96 (Ariz.

2007). 

Defendants attached to their Motion the notice of claim forms filled out by Plaintiffs.

(Doc. #26-1). On page three of the form is a section entitled “Amount of Claim,” where

Plaintiffs were required to list an amount they would accept to settle their claim. (Id. at 4,

10). Both Plaintiffs failed to list a proposed settlement amount and left this section blank on

their respective claim forms. Id. Plaintiffs have, therefore, failed to comply with the amount

of settlement requirement of the statute. Accordingly, Counts Two, Three, Four, and Six are

dismissed as to Defendants City of Phoenix and Phoenix Police Department. 

D. Plaintiff Martha Payan’s “retaliation” claim

Count Five of the Complaint is dismissed as to Defendants City of Phoenix and

Phoenix Police Department. In Count Five, Plaintiff Martha Payan makes a claim for

“retaliation.” (Doc. #1 at 10–11). It is unclear from the Complaint whether this claim is pled

as a type of tort or whether it is intended as a further Section 1983 claim. Therefore, the

Court will address both possible scenarios.

To the extent that this claim is intended to allege a tort arising under state law, it is

dismissed because of Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the Notice of Claim Statute described

in the preceding section. Plaintiff has failed to fulfill the amount of settlement requirement

of A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A), and is therefore barred from pursuing state law claims against the

City of Phoenix and Phoenix Police Department. See Houser, 152 P.3d at 494–96. The

Court will not reach the question of whether Arizona recognizes a tort of retaliation. 

To the extent that the retaliation claim was intended to address a constitutionally

protected right, it is dismissed as to the City of Phoenix and Phoenix Police Department for

failure to state a claim. Although Plaintiff alleges facts in support of her assertion that the

police acted against her out of retaliation, she fails to cite any constitutional rights that were

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violated by the police’s alleged retaliatory behavior. A claim lacking a “cognizable legal

theory” is appropriately dismissed. See Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699; Weisbuch, 119 F.3d at

783 n.1. Moreover, even if the Court were able to construe a valid constitutional argument

from Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the claim is dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege any

custom or policy of the City of Phoenix or Phoenix Police Department that caused the

officers to retaliate against her. A local government can only be sued under Section 1983

where that government’s “policy or custom” gives rise to the injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at

694. Therefore, Plaintiff Martha Payan’s claim for “retaliation” is dismissed as to

Defendants City of Phoenix and Phoenix Police Department.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint (Doc. # 26) is GRANTED as to Defendants City of Phoenix and Phoenix Police

Department.

DATED this 4th day of May, 2010.

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