Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-02349/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-02349-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE E. JACOBS,

Plaintiff,

v.

A.C. QUINONES, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:10-cv-02349-OWW-JLT (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff George E. Jacobs IV (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his First Amended

Complaint on December 20, 2010, asserting claims against the following individuals at Corcoran

State Prison (“CSP”): Lieutenant A.C. Quinones; Captain R. Davis; Sergeants D. Scaiffe and S.

Sztukowski; Correctional Officers Huff, Meza, Bravo, T.J. Williams, Silva, Gonzalves, Haywood,

Foley, T. Cogdill, G. Bardonnex and M. Magana; Medical Technician Pruitt; Appeals Coordinator L.

Cano; Warden Derral G. Adams; third watch Sergeant John Doe 1 (“Doe 1”); second watch sergeant

John Doe 2 (“Doe 2”); and Medical Technician Assistant Jane Doe 3 (“Doe 3”) (collectively

“Defendants”). 

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I. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen any complaint filed by a prisoner seeking “redress from a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity” in order to identify any

“cognizable claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). The Court should dismiss the case if it is “frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” or if the prisoner is “seek[ing]

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A Court should dismiss a claim as frivolous only “when the facts alleged

rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially

noticeable facts available to contradict them” and not simply because the Court may believe the

“plaintiff’s allegations unlikely.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). When

determining whether a claim is malicious, the Court will analyze whether it was made in good faith. 

Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46 (1915).

II. Pleading Requirements

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outline the general requirements of pleading a

complaint. A complaint is required to have a “short and plain statement” that outlines the grounds

for jurisdiction in that court as well as “showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and a demand

for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pro se complaints are generally held to “less stringent

standards” than complaints drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). 

A complaint must afford fair notice to the defendant as well as state the elements of the claim

in a plain and succinct manner. Jones v. Cmty Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984). The complaint is supposed to give the defendant fair notice of the claims that are being

brought against him/her as well as the grounds for bringing them. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534

U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The Supreme Court noted,

Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers

labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of

further factual enhancement.

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Allegations that are conclusory and vague do not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Board of Regents,

673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court further clarified that,

[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face." [Citation] A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. [Citation] The

plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. [Citation] Where a

complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it

"stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. A Court is required to assume as true in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, any well-pled factual allegations, when determining if the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id.

However, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. If a complaint fails to state a

recognizable claim, the Court has the discretion to grant leave to amend the complaint in order to

amend the deficiencies in the factual allegations. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc). 

III. § 1983 Claims

Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code does not confer substantive rights; but

instead provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver,

510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Section 1983 states in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,

of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured

in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts that

support that (1) he was deprived of a right afforded to him by federal law, and (2) the deprivation

was committed by someone acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49

(1988); Williams v. Gorton, 529 F.2d 668, 670 (9th Cir. 1976). Additionally, a plaintiff is required

to allege a specific injury suffered, as well as show a causal relationship between the defendant’s

conduct and the injury suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377

(1976); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person deprives another of a federal

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right “if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an

act which he is legally required to do so that it causes the deprivation of which complaint is made”). 

Section 1983 does not recognize respondeat superior liability. Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Accordingly, a supervisor may not be held liable merely because a

subordinate the plaintiff’s constitutional. Id. “A supervisor is only liable for constitutional

violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Lastly, similar to any other complaint, conclusory allegations that lack supporting facts are

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977). 

IV. Discussion & Analysis

Plaintiff alleges claims against Defendants under § 1983 for violation of his First, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 1 at 14-29). Plaintiff claims his First Amendment right was

violated when prison officials retaliated against him for filing grievances and lawsuits against

various prison officials. Id. at 17, 25. He alleges that the deprivation of basic necessities, exposure

to excessive force and brutality, lack of adequate medical care, and lack of recreation time in the yard

amounts to a violation of his Eighth Amendment right. Id. at 17-29. Lastly, Plaintiff claims that he

was arbitrarily prevented from utilizing the prison appeals process for filing grievances against

officials as well as denied an explanation for why he was being disciplined with a suspension of yard

time. Id. at 4, 24, 26. 

 A. “Official Capacities” and the Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to any State in any type of lawsuit “...in law or

equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by

Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend XI. This immunity is extended to

state officials acting in their official-capacities because “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects

other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-

66 (1985); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Therefore, “neither a State

nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Id. 

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Here, Defendants are employees of CSP and the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), a state entity. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants acting in

their official capacities amounts to a suit against CDCR and the State of California, which is

prohibited under the Eleventh Amendment. Therefore, as to the claims against Defendant’s in their

official capacities, the complaint is DISMISSED. 

B. Eighth Amendment Protections

Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment right was violated in several ways. Specifically

he alleges claims of deprivation of basic necessities, use of excessive force, failure to provide

adequate medical care and denial of recreation time in the outdoor yard. Each claim is analyzed

under the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. 1 at 17-29). 

The Eighth Amendment “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized

standards, humanity, and decency.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v.

Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1976)). It prohibits the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain,” including sanctions that are “so totally without penological justification that it results in the

gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). However, the Eighth Amendment does not require

that a prison be comfortable; the requirement is only that prison officials maintain that conditions are

humane. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Accordingly, a prison is not required to

provide every amenity desired but only must provide for basic human needs, which includes proper

“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

Eighth Amendment claims have both an objective and subjective component. Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). To properly allege a claim, a prisoner needs to allege (1) that

conditions of his imprisonment objectively posed a “substantial risk of serious harm” depriving him

of basic necessities and (2) that prison officials subjectively acted with “deliberate indifference” to

his health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 

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1. Deprivation of basic necessities

 The Eighth Amendment may not be used as a vehicle for prison reform, and absent a

constitutional violation a court is unable to interfere with prison policy. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246. 

When assessing prison conditions, the Court evaluates each condition individually and determines

whether it violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. In doing so, the Court must consider the

“circumstances, nature, and duration of a deprivation of these necessities.” Johnson v. Lewis, 217

F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining the more basic a need the shorter amount of time it can be

deprived before it becomes a violation). 

Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations section 3332(f) defines provides,

An inmate who persists in unduly disruptive, destructive or dangerous behavior and

who will not heed or respond to orders and warnings to desist from such activity, may

be placed in a management cell on an order of the unit’s administrator or, in his or her

absence, an order of the watch commander.

This Court has determined that placing an inmate in management status does not offend the

Eighth Amendment. In Loeb v. Felker, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14280 at *14-15 (E.D. CA 2007), the

Court held,

California’s regulations permit prison officials to place a prisoner on management cell

status if he persists in disruptive, destructive or dangerous behavior (i.e. cell

extraction, refusal to exit the yard, etc.). While on management status, a prisoner

receives one t-shirt, one pair of socks, one pair of boxer shorts, and one blanket. He

also may be denied yard access. While plaintiff argues that these conditions are

harsh, they are not sufficiently serious to be violative of the Eighth Amendment.

Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d at 732. Plaintiff was on management cell status for

relatively short periods of time to address his refusals to follow orders, and the limited

duration of those time periods counsels against finding an Eighth Amendment

violation. Id. The measures taken to respond to each of plaintiff's episodes of

disruptive behavior were reasonable. On the evidence presented here, no reasonable

jury could find in plaintiff’s favor on this claim.

Here, Plaintiff claims he was placed on management status by defendants Sztukowski and

Scaiffe, initially for 30 days but that this period was extended for a second 30-day stint. (Doc. 1 at

14-15.) Plaintiff alleges that during the first 30-day period on management status, he was “without a

mattress, linens, blankets, clothing, toothbrush, toothpaste, soap, shoes, sheets, toilet paper, towels,

socks, spoon, or drinking cup” for thirty-days Id. at 14. He states that his drinking water and toilet

were turned off during the second 30-day period. Id. at 18. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that the air

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conditioning was turned on full blast, the windows were opened during the winter, and the lights left

on “24/7” which prevented Plaintiff from sleeping. Id. at 20. 

Management status is designed to discipline inmates who refuse to comply with orders to cease

disruptive conduct. Thus, the fact that Plaintiff was placed on management status, with the concomitant

reduction in privileges and the removal of excess possessions, alone does not state a claim under the

Eighth Amendment. Minor deprivations suffered for short periods of time will not rise to the level of

an Eighth Amendment violation but “substantial deprivations of shelter, food, drinking water, and

sanitation” may meet the standard despite their even shorter duration. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726,

732 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1994) (“the length

of time required before a constitutional violation is made out decreases as the level of filthiness

increases.”). Though virtually none of the alleged deprivations rise to the level of a constitutional

deprivation, Plaintiff’s claim that he was deprived of water and functioning toilet, states a claim. In

Johnson, the court held that deprivation of adequate drinking water and toilets for a span of four days

was held to be serious enough to constitute a violation due the fact that they relate to basic human

necessities of food and sanitation. Id. at 732. Likewise, Plaintiff’s claim that he was held in

management status for 80 days with the lights on 24-hours per day, is sufficient to state a claim. See

Young v. Smalls, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37391 at *5-6 (S.D. Cal. April 15, 2010).

On the other hand, the fact that an inmate is required to “bundle up” while indoors does not state

an Eighth Amendment claim. Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. Ill. 1997). However, Plaintiff

alleges that he was not provided clothing or blankets that would have allowed him to adequately “bundle

up.” Thus, ordinarily, these facts would be sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment challenge. Wilson

v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (U.S. 1991). Nevertheless, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that any of the

named defendants, except for Huff, Meza, Brand, Williams, Davis and Jane Doe 2, were aware of the

lack of water and functioning toilet or the temperature of the cell. Instead, he merely concludes that they

were aware. Likewise, though he alleges that “psych tech” Pruitt and Jane Doe 3 were aware of his cell

conditions, there is no showing that they had any control over his housing. Moreover, Plaintiff admits

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that he names Quinones , Scaipe, Adams, John Doe 2 and John Doe 1as defendants only because they 1

were “administrative superiors and correctional segeants.” Doc. 1 at 25. In essence, he seeks to impose

respondeat superior liability on these defendants. This is not permitted Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d

1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 

2. Excessive force and brutality

The proper inquiry for Eighth Amendment claims in the context of excessive force, is whether

the use of force was done in good-faith to “to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). Any malicious or sadistic

use of force to cause harm will always violate contemporary standards of decency. Id. at 9.

Accordingly, the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim does not requirePlaintiff to allege

significant injury as a result of excessive force. Id.

Here, Plaintiff alleges defendant Cogdill beat him with a broom stick and repeatedly stabbed him

with the broken end of the broomstick. (Doc. 1 at 17). He claims defendants Cogdill and Scaiffe further

retaliated against him by spraying him with over fifteen cans of pepper spray for “about two hours

straight” and introducing “t-16 grenade bombs” into his cell. Id. Plaintiff claims that Quinones and

Dvais were present during this event and videotaped it. Id. 

Because the Court must assume these facts to be true at this stage, it appears that Plaintiff has

properly plead factual allegations that establish defendants Cogdill and Scaiffe used excessive force and

Quinones and Davis condoned the use of excessive for that was used with malice rather than in a good

faith attempt to restore order. Therefore, Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim against defendants

Cogdill, Scaiffe, Quinones and Davis for excessive force.

Also, Plaintiff alleges defendants Haywood and Gonzalves used excessive force when they used

a “lanyard device chain” to remove Plaintiff from his cell and chain him to a cell door when Plaintiff

feinted. (Doc. 1 at 24). Plaintiff states he had to bear the weight of the chains attached to the lanyard

device, on his wrists where the device was attached, causing pain and numbness. Id. He claims that the

Though Plaintiff alleges that Quinones and Davis were present at his cell during the claimed beating by Cogdill

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and that after the beating he was placed on an additional 20 days of management status, there is no showing that the lack of

water or toilet facilities were available or that they were aware or condoned the continued management status. Id. at 18.

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use of these restraints was excessive and done as a punitive measure to inflict pain. Id. He does not

allege that the use of these devices was unnecessary to the security of the prison but that because they

were heavy, they hurt his wrists. However, the Court is not permitted to second-guess prison officials’

decisions to use particular security measures that are used in good faith to preserve prison security. 

Notably, the fact that Plaintiff concludes that a different type of security device should be used falls well

short of the necessary factual allegations to demonstrate that their use was malicious and for the purpose

of causing harm. Thus, complaint fails to state a claim against these defendants.

3. Failure to provide adequate medical care

To properly allege a claim based on a failure to administer adequate medical care, “a prisoner

must allege acts or omissionssufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. A prisoner is required to allege that (1) he objectively has a “serious

medical need” and (2) that the defendant subjectively responded with “deliberate indifference” to that

need. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX

Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997).

Serious Medical Need

A prisoner has a serious medical need if failure to treat a condition of his “could result in further

significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059

(quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). A serious medical need is any condition that a reasonable doctor

would find worthy of treatment and one that significantly impacts a person’s daily activities, or causes

substantial or chronic pain. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th

Cir. 1990)). 

Here, Plaintiff allegesseveral separate claims that his medical needs were not properlyaddressed.

He claims that he had been prescribed a medication and a medical device when he was placed in

management status but was not provided the medication and the device was confiscated. Doc. 1 at 15. 

However, he fails to allege what condition the medication was designed to address, what the device was

or any facts to support that the deprivation of this medication or the device caused him any harm. Id. 

Likewise there are no facts alleged to tie these deprivations to any particular defendant. Thus, he has

not stated a claim based upon these facts.

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Plaintiff alleges also that while in management status, he developed suicidal thoughts. Id. at 21.

He made Pruitt aware of his mental deterioration and requested mental health treatment. Id. However,

Pruitt, a “psych tech” refused to provide care. Id. The Ninth Circuit has held heightened suicide risk to

be a serious medical need. Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1018 (9th Cir. 2010). Therefore,

Plaintiff has established that his suicidal thoughts were a serious medical need.

However, though Plaintiff had received mental health treatment in the past, Plaintiff’s mere

allegation that he told her that he was having the suicidal thoughts is insufficient to establish that Pruitt

subjectively believed Plaintiff to be at substantial risk. See Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1018-20. There are

no other allegations that there was anything else observable to Pruitt that made her believe that

Plaintiff’s condition was acute. Thus, Plaintiff has to state a cognizable claim against Pruitt for

inadequate medical care. 

Plaintiff claims that he went on a hunger strike and, despite that according to CDCR policy, he

should have been seen by a doctor within 72 hours, he was not. Doc. 1 at 22. He admits that he was

seen by a medical technician but complains that he was not seen by a doctor as the policy requires. Id.

However, he does not allege that he suffered any harm from the failure to see a doctor and there are no

allegations that he suffered any ill effects due to the nine days that Plaintiff refused to eat. Jett v. Penner,

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir 2006); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, the

complaint fails to state a claim in this regard. 

4. Deprivation of outdoor exercise

The deprivation of outdoor exercise can amount to a violation of a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment

rights. Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit has stated, “some form

of regular outdoor exercise is extremely important to the psychological and physical well being of the

inmates.” Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979). Therefore, as a general rule, prison

officials may not deprive inmates of regular exercise. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F. Supp. 1388,

1393 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Nevertheless, outdoor exercise can be restricted on the basis of weather, unusual

circumstances, or disciplinary needs. See Spain, 600 F.2d at 199; see also LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d

1444, 1457-58 (9th Cir. 1993) (where the deprivation of outdoor exercise “most of a five-yearsentence”

as a disciplinary measure for plaintiff’s rule violations did not rise to a constitutional violation because

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the plaintiff was still able to exercise in his cell). Likewise, this Court has held that an inmate may be

denied yard time for limited periods while placed on management status. Loeb v. Felker, 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 14280 at *14-15. In any event, “the Ninth Circuit has not identified a specific minimum amount

of weekly exercise that must be afforded” under the Eighth Amendment.” Jayne v. Bosenko, No.

2:08-cv-2767-MSB, 2009 WL 4281995, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2009) (citation omitted). In

determining whether a deprivation of outdoor exercise is sufficiently serious, the Court must consider

the circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivation. Spain, 600 F.2d at 199. 

Here, Plaintiff alleges he was denied “yard” exercise time by defendants Williams and

Bardonnex for a total of forty-four days. (Doc. 1 at 24). He states he was told by these officers that he

was on “yard restriction for 60 days.” Id. at 25. There is no indication that they issued the yard

restriction, knew why the restriction was in place or had any authority to refuse to obey the yard

restriction. In essence, the allegations demonstrate at most that these defendants were mere messengers

who conveyed to Plaintiff the information about the yard restriction. Thus, the factual allegations are

insufficient to demonstrate that these defendants acted deliberately to cause Plaintiff harm or knowing

that harm would result.

C. First Amendment Protections

Plaintiff alleges two claims which implicate his First Amendment rights. First, Plaintiff alleges

he was retaliated against by prison officials for filing grievances and lawsuits against other prison

personnel. (Doc. 1 at 17-18). Second, he claims while in management cell-status he was prevented from

sending mail including legal mail which prevented access to the courts. Id. at 15. 

1. Retaliation

Prisoners have rights under the First Amendment to pursue civil rights litigation and file prison

grievances. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005). A prisoner “retains those First

Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate

penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). The

Ninth Circuit has stated, 

Without those bedrock constitutional guarantees, inmates would be left with no viable

mechanism to remedy prison injustices. And because purely retaliatory actions taken

against a prisoner for having exercised those rights necessarily undermine those

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protections, such as actions violate the Constitution quite apart from any underlying

misconduct they are designed to shield.

Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567. Therefore, allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s exercise of these

First Amendment rights can support a claim under § 1983. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9th

Cir. 1985).

For a prisoner to properly state a claim for of violation of his First Amendment rights, he is

required to establish “five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse

action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4)

chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably

advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. The proper inquiry is whether

the defendant’s action is defined as one that “would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness

from future First Amendment activities.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quoting Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges defendants Scaiffe, Cogdill, Davis, Quinones, Meza, Huff, Bravo,

Williams, Bardonnex, Pruitt, Silva, Gonzalves, Haywood, Foley, Magana and Doe 1-3 all retaliated

against Plaintiff for filing “602 prison grievances” regarding the conditions of his imprisonment. 

(Doc. 1 at 16-17). He states defendants Cogdill and Scaiffe assaulted because he had filed previous

grievances. Id. at 17. Likewise, he claims defendants Huff, Meza, Bravo, and Williams turned off

his cell’s drinking water and toilet and concludes that this was done to retaliate against him for filing

grievances. Id. However, he provides no factual support for his conclusion that this action was

taken in retaliation. Thus, he has failed to state a claim for retaliation against these defendants.

Likewise, as to Bardonnex, Pruitt, Silva, Gonzalves, Haywood, Foley, Magana and Doe 1-3,

Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to support that these defendants took specific adverse action

against Plaintiff for retaliatory purposes that chilled his First Amendment rights. Plaintiff has only

made general conclusory allegations that they retaliated. This is insufficient. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at

1949. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for retaliation against above-named

defendants. 

///

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2. Access to the courts

Prisoners have a fundamental constitutional right of “meaningful” access to the courts. Lewis

v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 246 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). The Supreme Court

has defined prisoners’ right of access to the courts as the “right to bring to court a grievance.” Lewis,

518 U.S. at 354. This right of access to courts is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas corpus

proceedings, and civil rights actions challenging conditions of confinement. Id. at 351. A prisoner

or detainee alleging a violation of his right of access to the courts is required to demonstrate that he

has suffered an “actual injury.” Id. at 349-50. 

An actual injury is defined as “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing

litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at

348. Therefore, a plaintiff must show that the defendants “hindered his efforts to pursue a legal

claim.” Id. at 351. When seeking relief for a lost opportunity to present a legal claim or relief from

an unfavorable outcome in a prior legal claim, “a plaintiff must show 1) the loss of a non-frivolous

or arguable claim; 2) the defendant’s acts frustrating the litigation; and 3) that the relief sought is

unobtainable in a presently existing suit.” Hollis v. York, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109820, at *19

(E.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2010) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-416 (2002)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges he was denied the right to send “legal mail” and was not allowed to

communicate with his lawyers or the courts. (Doc. 1 at 15). However, Plaintiff has failed to allege

any actual injury suffered as a result of not being able to access his legal mail. He fails to establish

that he suffered any prejudice regarding any contemplated or pending litigation. Therefore, Plaintiff

has failed to state a cognizable claim for denial of access to the courts in regards to his denial of legal

mail. 

Plaintiff also alleges he was also arbitrarily denied the ability to appeal a prison grievance

that he filed. (Doc. 1 at 26). He claims defendant Cano, the Appeals Coordinator at CSP,

“arbitrarily interpreted policy” to obstruct Plaintiff’s chance to appeal the decision on his prison

grievance. Id. Plaintiff states that he was directed to attach documents to his appeal, but after doing

so and resubmitting his appeal he was told that Cano never received it. Id. at 16. Plaintiff claims

these arbitrary procedural requirements were used to impede the filing of the § 1983 claims for the

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same issue and ultimately resulted in his appeal being dismissed for violating the procedural time

restraints. Id. at 27. Even if true, however, Plaintiff fails to state actual injury resulting therefrom.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in

any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is a prerequisite to the inmate filing a lawsuit. See

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001). The PLRA

requires the inmate to exhaust every level in the administrative process. See McKinney v. Carey,

311 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002). If the Court concludes that the prisoner has failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315

F.3d 1108, 1119-1120 (9th Cir. 2003). 

However, where an inmate is prevented from exhausting the administrative remedy, in effect,

the remedy becomes “unavailable.” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing

Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2010)). If Plaintiff can demonstrate that the remedy

was unavailable, the inmate is excused from compliance with the PLRA. Id. Here, Plaintiff does not

allege that he was prevented from filing a § 1983 action as a result of the failure to timely file the

appeal of the grievance. Thus, he has failed to state a claim.

V. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff has stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment against Defendants Huff, Meza,

Brand, Williams, Davis and Jane Doe 2 related to the fact that he was housed in a cell that had no

water or operational toilet and being kept in a cold cell without an ability to “bundle Up” against the

temperature. Likewise, he has stated a claim Eighth Amendment against Defendants Cogdill,

Scaiffe, Quinones and Davis for the use of excessive force. He has not stated a claim in any other

regard and all other claims and Defendants are ordered DISMISSED.

Plaintiff has the option of either moving forward with these stated cognizable claims or the

Court will provide him with the opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies

identified by the Court in this order. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987)

(pro se litigants bringing a suit in forma pauperis are entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint

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unless it is clear the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment). If Plaintiff does not wish to file

an amended complaint, and agrees to proceed only with his already stated cognizable claims,

Plaintiff may notify the Court in writing, and the Court will dismiss the rest of the defendants and the

other claims. At that time, the Court will forward Plaintiff a summons and USM-285 forms for

completion and return. Upon receipt of the forms, the Court will direct the United States Marshal to

initiate service of process. 

If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), it must

be brief but must describe the particular actions of each defendant that he claims deprive him of his

constitutional or federal rights. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934

(9th Cir. 2002). Factual allegations will be accepted as true, but “must be [sufficient] to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level” and establish plausibility. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (citations omitted). Plaintiff is advised that mere conclusions that are

unsupported by factual allegations are insufficient to state a claim.

Plaintiff should be aware that an amended complaint supercedes any prior complaints. 

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

(9th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 220, an amended complaint must be “complete in itself

without reference to the prior or superceded pleading.” Plaintiff is advised that “[a]ll causes of

action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.”

King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981));

accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Within 20 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court 

in this order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he is willing to proceed only on the 

following cognizable claims:

i. Deprivation a working toilet, water and exposure to cold temperatures

in violation of the Eighth Amendment against defendants Huff, Meza,

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Brand, Williams, Davis and Jane Doe 2; 

ii. Use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment against

defendants Cogdill, Scaiffe, Quinones and Davis.

2. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the action will be dismissed for failure

to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 11, 2011 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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