Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01801/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01801-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CHARLES FREDERICK FISHER and 

BILLIE JEAN FISHER, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

vs. 

OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLASS CORPORATION, 

FIBREBOARD CORPORATION, EAGLE-PICHER 

INDUSTRIES, INC., PITTSBURGH-CORNING 

CORPORATION, CELOTEX CORPORATION, GAF 

CORPORATION, NICOLET INDUSTRIES, INC., 

KEENE CORPORATION, and OWENS-ILLINOIS 

CORPORATION, INC., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

FILED 

United St.ates Court pf Appeals Tenth Circuit 

FEB 2? 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 87-1801 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 86-C-735-E) 

Mark H. Iola, of Ungerman, Conner & Little, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 

for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Mort Welch, (Noma D. Gurich and Murray E. Abowitz with him 

on the brief), of Abowitz & Welch, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, and 

BROWN*, Senior District Judge. 

BROWN, Senior District Judge. 

* The Honnrable 

District Judge 

designation. 

Wesley E. Brown, United States Senior 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by 

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Appellate Case: 87-1801 Document: 01019739908 Date Filed: 02/27/1989 Page: 1 
This is an appeal from an order granting the 

defendants' motion to dismiss. The motion was granted on 

the grounds that a release signed by the plaintiff barred 

the plaintiff's claim. The district court, applying 

Oklahoma law, rejected plaintiff's argument that the release 

should be set aside due to a mutual mistake of fact. We 

affirm. 

As an initial matter, plaintiff-appellant argues that 

it was improper for the district court to dismiss the claim 

under Rule 12(b)(6) Fed. R. Civ. P. Although the motion for 

dismissal was brought under Rule 12 (b) (6), it is apparent 

that the court, as well as the parties, treated the motion 

as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. The parties were 

given a reasonable opportunity to present any material 

pertinent to the motion and the plaintiff submitted 

affidavits in support of his position. Appellant does not 

contend that the notice or time allowed by the magistrate on 

the hearing of the motion was inadequate by Rule 56 

standards. We therefore review the district court's order 

as one granting a request for summary judgment. See 

Prospero Associates v. Burroughs Corporation, 714 F.2d 1022 

(10th Cir. 1983). 

In 1985, plaintiff-appellant and his wife sued the 

defendants, alleging that he had been injured as a result of 

his exposure to asbestos. In his first complaint, which we 

will refer to as the "1985 complaint," plaintiff alleged 

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Appellate Case: 87-1801 Document: 01019739908 Date Filed: 02/27/1989 Page: 2 
that he suffered from "asbestosis, cancer, broncogenic 

carcinoma, and possibly malignant mesothelioma, which was 

solely caused by his exposure to and the use of asbestos 

" (Plaintiff's complaint, Case No. 85-C-379-C). 

Following negotiations, the parties reached a settlement. 

In exchange for a payment of $60,000.00, the plaintiffs and 

their counsel signed a document entitled "Full And Complete 

Release Of All Claims." The release provided in part that 

the defendants were relieved of all liability arising: 

[F]rom any and all actions, claims, demands 

and suits whatsoever which we now have, known 

or unknown, developed or undeveloped, growing 

out of the physical harm or death allegedly 

due to Charles Frederick Fisher's exposure to 

insulation products containing asbestos manufactured and/or distributed by said company. 

Such claims are those asserted in the United 

States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, Case No. 85-C-379-C filed 

by these Plaintiffs and against these Defendants. 

The release further provided: 

[W]e are relying solely upon our independent 

judgment as supplemented by the advise of legal counsel and warrant that the above mentioned sum is received in full and complete 

settlement and satisfaction of all claims and 

demands whatsoever. 

The release was signed on June 10, 1986. The parties then 

stipulated to an order of dismissal with prejudice of the 

1985 complaint. 

On June 30, 1986, plaintiff Charles Fisher was 

diagnosed as having malignant mesothelioma. Shortly 

thereafter, plaintiffs filed a second complaint against the 

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Appellate Case: 87-1801 Document: 01019739908 Date Filed: 02/27/1989 Page: 3 
same defendants in U. S. District Court. In this "1986 

complaint,'.' plaintiff alleged that he suffered from 

"peritoneal malignant mesothelioma and pleural mesothelioma 

which was solely caused by his exposure to and use of 

asbestos " (Plaintiff's complaint, Case No. 

86-C-735-E). 

The defendants moved for dismissal of the 1986 

complaint, contending that the claims contained therein were 

barred by the prior release and the prior order of 

dismissal. The plaintiff argued that the release was based 

on a mutual mistake of fact and should be set aside. 

Plaintiff contended that the parties were unaware that 

plaintiff had mesothelioma and that the release was intended 

to apply only to a claim for asbestosis. Plaintiff did not 

seek relief from the agreed upon dismissal with prejudice of 

his 1985 complaint. Rather, he argued that the 1986 cause 

of action was separate and distinct from the 1985 cause of , 

action. The district court found as a matter of law that 

the release barred the 1986 action and dismissed plaintiff's 

complaint. 

We believe the district court correctly dismissed the 

plaintiff's claim. By signing the release and dismissing 

the 1985 complaint with prejudice, the plaintiff surrendered 

any cause of action he had against the defendants for 

mesothelioma caused by exposure to asbestos. This 

conclusion is inescapable from the language of the release. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1801 Document: 01019739908 Date Filed: 02/27/1989 Page: 4 
In addition to stating that the plaintiff releases "any and 

all actions, claims, demands and suits whatsoever which we 

now have or may have, known or unknown, developed or 

undeveloped," the release defines such claims as "those 

asserted in Case No. 85-C-379-C . II In Case No. 

85-C-379-C, plaintiff clearly asserted claims for 

asbestosis, cancer, broncogenic cancer, and possibly 

mesothelioma. The plain and specific language chosen by the 

parties shows that the plaintiff released the very claim he 

now seeks to assert. 

Plaintiff's argument that the release was based on a 

mutual mistake of fact is unavailing. Under Oklahoma law, a 

release is a contract and, if it is unambiguous, is to be 

interpreted as a matter of law. Corbett v. Combined 

Communications Corp., 654 P.2d 616 (Okl. 1982). Under 

certain limited circumstances, however, a mutual mistake of 

fact may justify setting aside a release: 

A mutual mistake of fact should justify the 

recission of a release executed under the 

belief that injuries are trivial and temporary, when as a matter of fact they are 

serious and permanent in their nature, where 

it appears that the purpose of the release 

was to compensate for apparent injuries, 

known injuries, and that serious or permanent injuries were not contemplated by the 

parties at the time of the execution of the 

agreement or release, although in its terms 

the agreement or release is broad enough to 

cover all injuries, resulting from the particular incident. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1801 Document: 01019739908 Date Filed: 02/27/1989 Page: 5 
Holmes v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad, 574 P.2d 297, 299 

(Okl. 1978) (citing St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company 

v. Cauthen, 112 Okl. 256, 241 P. 188 (1925)). 

The decisions that plaintiff relies upon are factually 

distinguishable from the instant case. In Cauthen, for 

example, the plaintiff was assured by the defendant's 

physician that his injuries were minor and temporary and 

that he would fully recover. 241 P. at 292. In virtually 

every Oklahoma case setting aside a release, neither the 

injured plaintiff nor the defendant had any reason to 

suspect that the injuries were anything other than minor or 

temporary. See ~' Pickering Lumber Company v. Campbell, 

295 P. 596 (Okl. 1931) (plaintiff was advised by a physician 

that his injury was trivial); Smith v. Chicago, Rock Island 

& Pacific Railroad, 525 P. 2d 1404 (Okl. App. 

1973)(statements of physicians led both plaintiff and 

defendant to believe that plaintiff's injuries were not 

serious or permanent); Tulsa City Lines, Inc. v. Mains, 107 

F. 2d 3 77 (10th Cir. 1939) (defendant's doctor told plaintiff 

that her injuries were not serious). In each of these 

cases, the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff was an 

unforseeable result of the incident giving rise to the 

injury. 

By contrast, 

undeniably aware 

the plaintiff in 

that he had a 

the present case was 

possible claim for 

mesothelioma against the defendants. Plaintiff cannot deny 

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Appellate Case: 87-1801 Document: 01019739908 Date Filed: 02/27/1989 Page: 6 
this fact because his 1985 complaint alleged that he 

suffered from asbestosis, cancer, and possibly mesothelioma. 

This is clearly not a case where the parties believed the 

injuries were "trivial and temporary." The plaintiff's 

awareness ·of the possible serious consequences of his 

exposure to asbestos (i.e., that he might develop 

mesothelioma) takes this case outside of the rule applied in 

Cauthen and Holmes v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 

574 P.2d 297 (Okl. 1978). See Cauthen, 241 P. at 194 

(distinguishing Davis v. Higgins, 217 P. 193 in part because 

the plaintiff in that case was in possession of facts 

sufficient to put him on notice as to the extent of his 

injury); see also Powell v. Sinclair Oil Corporation, 439 

F. 2d 114 (10th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff's mistaken belief as to 

the probable developments from and permanence of a known 

injury will not avoid a release). Furthermore, the release 

in the present case was entered as part of a settlement of 

the plaintiff's lawsuit. The agreement specifically 

provided for the release of all claims in the 1985 suit 

which included claims for cancer and the possibility of 

mesothelioma. The purpose of this release, as shown by its 

terms, was not merely to compensate for apparent injuries 

(Cf. Holmes, supra) but was to settle all legal claims that 

might arise out of the plaintiff's exposure to asbestos. 

The clear, specific language used in the release, when 

combined with the plaintiff's knowledge of the possible 

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Appellate Case: 87-1801 Document: 01019739908 Date Filed: 02/27/1989 Page: 7 
consequences of his exposure to asbestos, simply precludes 

an argument that the parties did not recognize that 

plaintiff might have had a possible claim for mesothelioma 

when he signed the release. Cf. Kay Pharmacal Company v. 

Dalious Construction Company, 2 76 P. 2d 756 (Okl. 1954) (If 

there was any doubt of the existence of other rights, or 

causes of action, plaintiff should have refrained from 

executing the release, or should have had it modified to 

cover only known claims). Any other conclusion would make 

it impossible to settle a claim without a trial on the 

merits. The policy of the law, in Oklahoma, however, is to 

encourage the settlement and compromise of controversies 

without litigation. Birch v. Keen, 449 P.2d 700 (Okl. 

1969). See also Kay Pharmacal, supra, (One seeking a 

settlement and release has a right to buy peace from all 

future contention on existing claims of every character). 

The judgement of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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