Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00595/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00595-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

– 1 – 15cv595 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OBESITY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 

LLC, 

 Plaintiff, 

Case No. 15-cv-595-BAS(MDD) 

ORDER OVERRULING ORI’S 

OBJECTION TO MAGISTRATE 

JUDGE’S AUGUST 11, 2016 

ORDER 

[ECF No. 314] 

 v. 

FIBER RESEARCH 

INTERNATIONAL, LLC, et al., 

 Defendants. 

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM. 

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Obesity Research Institute, LLC’s 

(“ORI”) meritless objection to the magistrate judge’s August 11, 2016 Order. The 

objection specifically addresses Defendant Fiber Research International, LLC’s 

(“FRI”) production of voluminous emails on December 7, 2015, which ORI contends 

was produced in a non-compliant format. (See ECF No. 308.) 

Rather than complying with United States Magistrate Judge Mitchell D. 

Dembin’s Chambers Rules: Civil Pretrial Procedures § IV(C)(2)—which, applied to 

Case 3:15-cv-00595-BAS-MDD Document 356 Filed 06/23/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 7
 – 2 – 15cv595 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the circumstances of this case, would have made ORI’s discovery challenge due 30 

days after the emails were produced in December 2015—ORI sought relief over eight 

months later on August 10, 2016. (ECF No. 308.) The magistrate judge promptly 

denied ORI’s request, observing that “[ORI] is seeking production of certain 

documents provided to [ORI] in mid-December 2015 based upon the formatting of 

the documents,” and ultimately concluding that “[t]he time to bring that motion 

before the court expired many months ago and no good cause for the delay [was] 

presented.” (ECF No. 309.) 

 For the following reasons, the Court OVERRULES ORI’s objection in its 

entirety. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

A party may object to a non-dispositive pretrial order of a magistrate judge 

within fourteen days after service of the order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The 

magistrate judge’s order will be upheld unless it is “clearly erroneous or contrary to 

law.” Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The “clearly erroneous” standard applies to 

factual findings and discretionary decisions made in connection with non-dispositive 

pretrial discovery matters. F.D.I.C. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 196 F.R.D. 375, 

378 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Joiner v. Hercules, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 695, 697 (S.D. Ga. 1996) 

(reviewing magistrate judge’s order addressing attorney-client issues in discovery for 

clear error). Review under this standard is “significantly deferential, requiring a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Concrete Pipe & 

Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. of S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 623 

(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 On the other hand, the “contrary to law” standard permits independent review 

of purely legal determinations by a magistrate judge. See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett Grp., 

Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he phrase ‘contrary to law’ indicates plenary 

review as to matters of law.”); Gandee v. Glaser, 785 F. Supp. 684, 686 (S.D. Ohio 

Case 3:15-cv-00595-BAS-MDD Document 356 Filed 06/23/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 7
 – 3 – 15cv595 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1992), aff’d, 19 F.3d 1432 (6th Cir. 1994); 12 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 3069 (2d ed., 2010 update). “Thus, [the district court] must

exercise its independent judgment with respect to a magistrate judge’s legal 

conclusions.” Gandee, 785 F. Supp. at 686. “A decision is contrary to law if it fails 

to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” United 

States v. Cathcart, No. C 07-4762 PJH, 2009 WL 1764642, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 18,

2009). 

II. ANALYSIS 

ORI argues that its objection is timely because: (1) “it does not seek any 

additional documents,” but rather “merely seeks to correct the format of that which 

has already been disclosed”1

; and (2) the “magistrate judge’s imposition of [the] 30-

day limit is contrary to law.”2

 Throughout its objection, ORI repeatedly invokes 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1’s policy that the rules “should be construed, 

administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, 

and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” 

A. The Magistrate Judge’s 30-Day Rule Is Not Contrary to Law. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(b) permits judges to “regulate practice in 

any manner consistent with federal law, rules . . . and the district’s local rules.” In 

this district, “[a]ll motion to compel discovery are referred to the magistrate judge 

assigned to the case[,]” and “[t]he magistrate judge maintains discretion to waive all 

 

1 This argument presented by ORI is wholly contradicted by the fact that ORI filed a 

discovery motion. Such motions categorically are subject to deadlines regulating discovery, 

whether imposed by court order or a judge’s chambers rules. Thus, the Court rejects this argument 

from the outset. 

2 ORI also argues that FRI’s production is “not compliant and unmanageable,” but that is 

outside the scope of this Court’s review because August 11, 2016 Order did not reach the substance 

of ORI’s discovery challenge. For this Court to reach that issue, ORI would first need to 

demonstrate that its discovery challenge was timely, which if fails to do.

Case 3:15-cv-00595-BAS-MDD Document 356 Filed 06/23/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 7
 – 4 – 15cv595 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

or part of the requirements of Civil Local Rule 7.1.f in deciding discovery motions.” 

Civ. L.R. 26.1(e). With this referral by operation of Civil Local Rule 26.1(e), most 

magistrate judges maintain clearly defined deadlines to file discovery motions in the 

event a dispute arises. See, e.g., Hon. Nita L. Stormes’ Civil Case Procedures § VI(C) 

(45-day deadline from the date of the event giving rise to the dispute); Hon. William 

V. Gallo’s Chambers Rules § IV(B) (30-day deadline); Hon. David H. Bartick’s Civil 

Chambers Rules § IV(C) (45-day deadline); Hon. Ruben B. Brooks’ Chambers Rules 

(30-day deadline to file discovery motions). The magistrate judge assigned to this 

case requires “[a]ny motion related to discovery disputes . . . be filed no later than 

thirty (30) days after the date upon which the event giving rise to the dispute 

occurred.” Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin’s Civil Pretrial Procedures § IV(C)(2). 

“[A] case that is stalled or unreasonably delayed by a party’s failure to comply 

with deadlines and discovery obligations cannot move forward to resolution on the 

merits.” In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 

(9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit has also warned: 

In these days of heavy caseloads, trial courts in both the 

federal and state systems routinely set schedules and 

establish deadlines to foster the efficient treatment and 

resolution of cases. Those efforts will be successful only 

if the deadlines are taken seriously by the parties, and the 

best way to encourage that is to enforce the deadlines. 

Parties must understand that they will pay a price for 

failure to comply strictly with scheduling and other orders, 

and that failure to do so may properly support severe 

sanctions and exclusions of evidence. 

Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 The crux of ORI’s argument that “[t]he Magistrate Judge’s 30-day rule, in this 

instance, is not ‘generally helpful to the orderly progress of litigation’ because it runs 

contrary to Rules 1, 16, 26, 34, and 37[,]” because “the application of a magistrate 

judge’s chamber rule has no basis in meeting the aims of federal law and, in fact, its 

Case 3:15-cv-00595-BAS-MDD Document 356 Filed 06/23/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 7
 – 5 – 15cv595 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

application is inconsistent with the FRCP[.]”3 (ORI’s Objection 9:6-19 (artificial 

emphasis omitted).) This position is blatantly wrong and disingenuous. 

 There is a strong policy in favor of establishing and enforcing deadlines to 

facilitate “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 

proceeding.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Rule 16 is consistent with that policy, authorizing 

courts to issue scheduling orders to “limit the time to join other parties, amend the 

pleadings, complete discovery, and file motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(A) 

(emphasis added). 

The remaining rules of civil procedure that ORI relies upon to argue that the 

magistrate judge’s 30-Day Rule is contrary to law are not relevant to timeliness. 

These remaining rules—Rules 26, 34, and 37—provide the parties’ duties in 

discovery; they do not provide any grounds to conclude that a time limit to filing 

discovery motions is somehow contrary to law. Rule 37 does provide a procedure to 

challenge an opposing party that fails to make disclosures or to cooperate in 

discovery, but it is the aggrieved party’s responsibility to notify the court of any 

infractions. The deadline to notify the court is typically established by either the 

scheduling order pursuant to Rule 16, or a district’s local rules or judge’s chambers 

rules pursuant to Rule 83. ORI, as the aggrieved party, wholly failed to timely notify 

the magistrate judge, and rather than recognizing its own negligence in failing to 

follow the appropriate rules, ORI took the extreme route of challenging the validity 

of the magistrate judge’s 30-Day Rule. 

Needless to say, this Court rejects ORI’s challenge to the magistrate judge’s 

30-Day Rule in its entirety as baseless and frivolous, and concludes that the 30-Day 

 

3 ORI attempts to limit the scope of its challenge of the 30-Day Rule to “this instance.” But 

ORI fails to recognize that the broad policy arguments presented challenging the assigned 

magistrate judge’s 30-Day Rule effectively asks this Court to invalidate all similar rules of 

magistrate judges in this district. There is no way that such an extreme result of invalidating all 

such rules would fulfill the purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to, among other things, 

“secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 1.

Case 3:15-cv-00595-BAS-MDD Document 356 Filed 06/23/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 7
 – 6 – 15cv595 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Rule is not contrary to law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(A); Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 72(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(b); In re Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1228; 

Wong, 410 F.3d at 1060; Cathcart, 2009 WL 1764642, at *2.

B. ORI’s Discovery Challenge Was Untimely. 

Having concluded that the magistrate judge’s 30-Day Rule is not contrary to 

law, the Court now must determine whether the magistrate judge’s determination that 

ORI’s discovery challenge, filed on August 10, 2016, was untimely is clearly 

erroneous or contrary to law. 

Based on the magistrate judge’s 30-Day Rule, and following the production of 

the emails in question on December 7, 2015, the deadline to file any discovery 

challenge was on January 6, 2016. ORI’s discovery challenge, however, was filed on 

August 10, 2016. There is no doubt that here that ORI was untimely in filing its 

discovery challenge 6 months late. 

Rule 6(b) states that “[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specified 

time, the court may, for good cause extend the time . . . with or without motion or 

notice if the court acts, or if a request is made, before the original time or its extension 

expires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A). “Once the time has expired, a noticed motion 

for relief, based on a showing of excusable neglect, is required.” Gurvey v. Legend 

Films, Inc., No. 09–cv–942, 2012 WL 4061773, at *5 (S.D.Cal. Sept.14, 2012) 

(Battaglia, J.) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B)). Under Rule 6(b), ORI had the 

opportunity to justify its delay—a delay that even it recognizes—if it established 

excusable neglect, but ORI completely failed to do so instead arguing that the 

magistrate judge should reach the merits of the discovery challenge because “ORI’s 

delay in request is harmless.” (ECF No. 308.) It is ORI’s burden to as the untimely 

party to demonstrate either good cause or excusable neglect to make a late filing. ORI 

has yet to explain what caused the unreasonable 6-month delay before it filed its 

discovery challenge. 

Case 3:15-cv-00595-BAS-MDD Document 356 Filed 06/23/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 7
 – 7 – 15cv595 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the magistrate judge’s determination 

that ORI’s discovery challenge was untimely is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary 

to law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 196 F.R.D. at 378. 

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER 

In light of the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES ORI’s objection to the 

magistrate judge’s August 11, 2016 Order. (ECF No. 314.) 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 23, 2017 

Case 3:15-cv-00595-BAS-MDD Document 356 Filed 06/23/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 7