Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01746/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01746-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL MCNEIL,

Plaintiff,

v.

LVN HAYES, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:10-cv-01746-AWI-SKO PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO DEFER CONSIDERATION OF MOTION

TO DISMISS BE DENIED AS MOOT AND 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR

FAILURE TO EXHAUST BE DENIED, WITH

PREJUDICE

(Docs. 27, 39, and 41)

THIRTY-DAY OBJECTION DEADLINE

Findings and Recommendations Recommending Defendants’ Motion be Denied

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Michael McNeil, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on September 23, 2010. Pursuant to the Court’s

screeningorder, this action for damages is proceeding on Plaintiff’s second amended complaint,filed

on June 28, 2011, against Defendants Hayes, Raman, Soto, Byers, Doe, and Rotman on Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment medical care claims.

On June 28, 2012, Defendant Soto filed a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust the

administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). On the same day, the Court

granted Defendant Raman’s request for an extension of time to file a response to Plaintiff’s second

amended complaint, pending resolution of Defendant Soto’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff filed an

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opposition on July 30, 2012, and Defendant Soto filed a reply on August 7, 2012. On August 13, 1

2012, Defendant Byers filed a notice of joinder and joinder in Defendant Soto’s motion to dismiss

and reply. 

On August 23, 2012, Plaintiff, citing to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), which is now

56(d), filed a motion seeking to postpone consideration of the motion to dismiss until trial so he may

engage in full discovery. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff exhausted 2

his Eighth Amendment medical care claims and Defendants Soto and Byers are not entitled to

dismissal. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for a continuance pending discovery shall be denied as

moot. 

II. Discussion

A. Statutory Exhaustion Requirement and Unenumerated 12(b) Motions

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Prisoners are required to exhaust the available

administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211, 127 S.Ct. 910 (2007);

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002). Exhaustion is required regardless

of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, Booth v.

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819 (2001), and the exhaustion requirement applies to all

suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 435 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983 (2002). 

///

Plaintiff was provided with notice of the requirements for opposing a motion to dismiss for failure to

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exhaust on July 9, 2012. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 2012).

When facts are unavailable to the nonmoving party, Rule 56(d) permits the Court to defer or deny a

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motion for summary judgment, allow time to obtain evidence, or issue any other appropriate order. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(d). In as much as the Ninth Circuit has recognized that pro se prisoners have “a substantial right to notice

explaining the process associated with a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies where the

district court will consider materials beyond the pleadings,” Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004, ___ (9th Cir. 2012), a

plaintiff’s contention that he lacks the evidence necessary to oppose an exhaustion motion and he needs discovery

must be given due consideration.

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The failure to exhaust in compliance with section 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense under

which the defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Jones, 549

U.S. at 216; Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). The failure to exhaust is

subject to an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, and in resolving the motion, the Court may look

beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Morton v. Hall, 599 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.

2010); Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20. If the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust, the

proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. Jones, 549 U.S. at 223-24; Lira v. Herrrera, 427 F.3d

1164, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2005).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims arise from events which occurred at California

Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison (SATF) beginning on March 26, 2009, and

lasting thirty-five days, approximately. 

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from degenerative disc disease, and he has multiple disc

herniations in his neck and lower back with spinal compression – conditions which cause him to

suffer from severe pain and for which he is prescribed morphine and gabapentin. On March 26,

2009, Defendant Hayes, a licensed vocational nurse, requested that Plaintiff’s morphine prescription

be discontinued because she believed he had “cheeked” his medication, conduct which is prohibited. 

Defendant Raman, the physician on dutythat day, agreed to authorize the discontinuation,which was

abrupt rather than tapered and which was done without a review of Plaintiff’s medical file and

without consideration of his medical history. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the abrupt

discontinuation of his morphine, he needlessly suffered from withdrawal symptoms, extreme pain,

sleeplessness, and increased mobility impairment for thirty-five days. 

The defendants against whom this action is proceeding were all medical staff members who

interacted with Plaintiff during the thirty-five day time period, and theyeither were directlyinvolved 

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in the allegedly improper discontinuation of Plaintiff’s morphine prescription or failed to take action

despite their knowledge that Plaintiff was in severe pain and in need of pain medication. 

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C. Appeal Log Number SATF-33-09-11762

In support of her motion to dismiss, Defendant Soto identifies what she contends are the only

two inmate appeals filed between March 23, 2009, and the date this suit was filed which both grieved

events at SATF and were submitted to the final level of appeal review, known as the Director’s

Level. With respect to the first appeal, log number SATF-33-09-11762, Defendant Soto argues that

the appeal does not concern any conduct by her and instead sets forth the events of March 23, 2009,

involving Defendant Hayes. (Doc. 27, Motion, 4:4-21.) Although Defendant Soto concedes that

Plaintiff need not identify all involved parties by name to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, she

argues that the appeal was filed prior to the date of the incident in which she was allegedly involved

and therefore, the appeal could not have sufficed to exhaust an event which had not yet occurred. 

(Doc. 38, Reply, 3:14-23.)

The documentary evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff filed appeal number SATF-33-09-

11762 on March 23, 2009. (Motion, Doc. 28-1, court record pp. 5-8.) In the appeal, Plaintiff set

forth the events of that day involving Defendants Hayes and Raman, and he stated that his morphine

had been abruptly discontinued and he was already suffering from withdrawal symptoms. (Id.) 

Plaintiff requested that his medication be re-prescribed, staff stop forcing inmates to put their fingers

in their mouths, and staff comply with OP-430. (Id.) 

The appeal was denied at the Director’s Level on March 25, 2010. (Motion, Doc. 28-1, court

record p. 2-4.) The Director’s Level decision summarized the appeal issue as follows:

Your CDC 602 indicated that during your morning medication on March 23, 2009,

nursing staff asked you to place your fingers in your mouth and inside your cheeks

and lips to verify you swallowed your medication. You further stated you refused

because the medication management procedure authorizes the licensed health care

staff to conduct a visual mouth check and view the empty cup; the nurse threatened

to push her alarm and did so; and your Morphine was discontinued.

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An exhaustive summary of Plaintiff’s allegations is set forth in the screening order filed on March 12,

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2012.

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You requested this appeal be processed as an emergency because your Morphine was

abruptly stopped; Morphine 90 milligrams be re-prescribed; stop forcing inmates to

put their fingers in their mouths; and comply with Operational Procedure 420.

(Id.)

The Director’s Level decision summarized the appeal history, in relevant part, as follows:

“Your UHR indicated you submitted numerous Inmate Requests for Health Services (CDC 7362s) 4

concerning your need for pain medications and requests to see the doctor.” (Id.) In addition, the

decision stated that Plaintiff’s request for morphine had been forwarded to the Narcotics Committee

for review; Defendant Rotman evaluated Plaintiff on April 13, 2009, and prescribed morphine for

sixty days with a follow-up in one month; Dr. Beregovskaya prescribed morphine for ninety days

on August 10, 2009; and Plaintiff’s request to be re-prescribed morphine had been granted. (Id.)

D. Findings

An appeal “suffices to exhaust a claim if it puts the prison on adequate notice of the problem

for which the prisoner seeks redress.” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822-23 (9th Cir. 2010). 

“[T]he prisoner need onlyprovide the level of detail required bythe prison’s regulations,” and during

the relevant time period, “[t]he California regulations require[d] only that an inmate describe the

problem and the action requested.” Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). While the standard provides a low floor, it advances the primary purpose of a grievance,

which is to notify the prison of a problem. Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s appeal sufficed if it alerted the prison to

the nature of the wrong for which redress is now sought. Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824 (quotation marks

omitted).

Plaintiff was not required in his appeal “to identify responsible parties or otherwise signal

who may ultimately be sued.” Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824. The relevant prison regulation required

Plaintiff only to describe the problem, and Plaintiff’s appeal described the general problem and

alerted the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress now is sought: the abrupt

discontinuation of his morphine prescription, which caused him to needlessly suffer. Sapp, 623 F.3d

Unit Health Record.

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at 824 (citing Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120) (quotation marks omitted); Rowe v. Dep’t of Corr., No.

1:06-cv-01171-LJO-SMS PC, 2010 WL 5071015, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2010); cf. McCollum v.

California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 647 F.3d 870, 876 (9th Cir. 2011) (while inmates’ grievances

provided notice the failure to provide for certain general Wiccan religious needs and free exercise,

they were not sufficient to place prison on notice that the chaplaincy-hiring program itself was the

problem); Morton, 599 F.3d at 946 (appeal grieving prison’s decision to deny visitation with minors

did not place prison on notice of the plaintiff’s claim that staff conduct contributed to a prior assault

on him by inmates). 

In a situation such as this, which involves the alleged denial of pain medication over a period

of thirty-five days during which multiple staff members were alerted to the problem, the Court is not

persuaded by Defendant Soto’s argument that the appeal did not suffice to exhaust the claim against

her because it was filed prior to the incident in which she was allegedly involved. Plaintiff described

the problem (the discontinuation of his morphine) and he sought relief (the renewal of his

prescription for morphine); he was not required to file a separate appeal every time he unsuccessfully

sought relief for the same medical issue from a different care provider. Plaintiff’s appeal provided

clear notice to the prison of the medical issue upon which his claims in this action are based and it

was therefore sufficient. Akhtar v. Mesa, __, F.3d __, __, No. 11-16629, 2012 WL 5383038, at *6-7

(9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2012). 

In as much as the appeal was resolved at the final level of review prior to the date this suit

was filed, Plaintiff has exhausted his Eighth Amendment medical care claims in this action and it

is unnecessary for the Court to reach Defendant Soto’s argument that the second relevant appeal was

properly screened out and therefore unexhausted.5

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

In conclusion, the Court finds that appeal log number SATF-33-09-11762 was sufficient to

exhaust Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment medical care claims in this action, all of which arise out of

If an appeal is improperly screened out, a court may find that the administrative remedy process was

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rendered unavailable and the exhaustion requirement is satisfied. Sapp, 623 F.3d at 822-24.

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the discontinuation of his morphine prescription and the resulting harm to Plaintiff. Akhtar, __, F.3d

at __, 2012 WL 5383038, at *7. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion to defer consideration of Defendant Soto’s motion to dismiss, filed

on August 23, 2012, be DENIED as moot;

2. Defendant Soto’s motion to dismiss, filed on June 28, 2012, and in which Defendant

Byers joined on August 13, 2012, be DENIED, with prejudice; and 

3. Defendants Soto, Byers, and Raman be required to answer the second amended

complaint.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 28, 2012 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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