Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-03618/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-03618-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 740
Nature of Suit: Railway Labor Act
Cause of Action: 45:151 Railway Labor Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS RACHFORD, et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. C 03-3618 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING ALPA’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, 

INTERNATIONAL, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Before the court is the motion of defendant Air Line Pilots Association, International

(“ALPA”) for an order dismissing the claim asserted against it in the fourth amended

complaint, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment. Having read the parties’

papers and carefully considered their arguments, and good cause appearing, the court

hereby GRANTS the motion.

BACKGROUND

This is a proposed class action filed by individuals formerly employed as pilots and

flight engineers by defendant Emery Worldwide Airlines (“EWA” or “Emery”). Also named

as defendants are Emery Air Freight Corp. d/b/a Emery Air Freight Forwarding, Inc. a/k/a

Menlo Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. (“EWW”); CNF, Inc. (“CNF”); and ALPA. At the time of

the events alleged in the complaint, CNF was the parent company of EWA and EWW. 

(EWA, EWW, and CNF are referred to as “the corporate defendants.”) ALPA was the

exclusive bargaining representative for the EWA pilots. 

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 ALPA’s Constitution and By-Laws establish “Master Executive Councils” (“MECs”),

which are coordinating and governing organs for members employed by one airline. ALPA

imposed the custodianship or trusteeship in accordance with 29 U.S.C. § 462, and pursuant

to its Constitution and By-Laws, as discussed below. 

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On September 28, 2000, the pilots and flight engineers employed by EWA (“the

EWA pilots” or “the Emery pilots”) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”)

with EWA. 

In August 2001, after finding numerous safety violations, the FAA shut down EWA’s

operation on a temporary basis. Plaintiffs claim that CNF and EWW caused the grounding

of EWA by failing to adequately fund the maintenance costs of EWA’s fleet of aircraft. 

Plaintiffs claim that CNF, EWW, and EWA declined to bring EWA into FAA compliance,

with the result that the FAA ordered a permanent shut-down in December 2001. 

In January 2002, ALPA filed a grievance against EWA (“the shut-down grievance”)

on behalf of the Emery pilots, asserting that the cessation of flight operations violated the

CBA. 

On January 16, 2002, ALPA, acting pursuant to its Constitution and By-Laws,

imposed a custodianship on the EWA Master Executive Council (“EWA MEC”).1

 The

custodian appointed by ALPA was Captain Jeffrey Haddock, a pilot who, according to

plaintiffs, was not the choice of the Emery pilots when they voted to choose their

representatives on the Emery MEC. Plaintiffs contend that ALPA should have appointed

one of the Emery pilots’ chosen representatives instead of Captain Haddock. 

On March 14, 2003, Thomas Rachford and other former EWA crew members filed

the complaint in Rachford v. ALPA, C-03-1109 PJH (“Rachford I“ against ALPA and EWA,

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging a right to self-representation in

proceedings on ALPA’s grievances related to the permanent shut-down of EWA. Plaintiffs

also asserted that the proper forum for resolving those grievances was the court, not

arbitration. Rachford I was dismissed in December 2005. 

 On August 4, 2003, Thomas Rachford and 269 other individual plaintiffs filed the

present action – Rachford II. In the original complaint, plaintiffs alleged that ALPA, EWA,

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and EWW had improperly settled grievances filed by ALPA regarding the permanent shutdown. 

On November 25, 2003, four of the original plaintiffs – Thomas Rachford, Jon del

Turco, Wendy Albright, and Mark Luthi – filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) as a

proposed class action, against ALPA, EWA, EWW, and CNF. The FAC asserted a claim of

breach of the duty of fair representation, against ALPA, asserting that ALPA had improperly

entered into a settlement agreement with EWA regarding the shut-down grievance, plus

three contract claims against the corporate defendants. 

On January 26, 2004, ALPA filed an answer and counterclaims for breach of

fiduciary duty, negligence, accounting, restitution, and breach of contract against Wendy

Albright and Mark Luthi. On March 23, 2004, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to filed a

second amended complaint (“SAC”). On March 24, 2004, CNR and EWW filed a motion to

dismiss the FAC.

On May 28, 2004, the court issued a written order denying EWA’s motion to dismiss

and EWW/CNF’s motion to dismiss, and granting plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a SAC. 

One basis for denying the motions to dismiss was that there was a disputed issue of fact

with regard to whether the parties had settled the shut-down grievance during the February

2001 mediation session. 

On June 30, 2004, plaintiffs Rachford, del Turco, Albright, and Luthi filed the SAC. 

In the SAC, plaintiffs alleged a claim of breach of the duty of fair representation, against

ALPA, asserting that ALPA had improperly entered into a settlement of the shut-down

grievance with EWA, plus three contract claims against the corporate defendants. 

On September 30, 2004, and October 1, 2004, the court conducted an evidentiary

hearing on the question whether EWA and ALPA had settled the shut-down grievance

during the February 2004 mediation. 

On October 4, 2004, CNF entered into a stock purchase agreement with United

Parcel Service, Inc., pursuant to which CNF sold its interest in EWW to UPS. 

On June 15, 2005, the court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law following

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the evidentiary hearing, and concluded that the parties had not reached a settlement of the

shut-down grievance.

On September 9, 2005, the court dismissed the first cause of action against ALPA

and the contract claim asserted against EWW and EWA as moot, in view of the court’s

having found that the parties had not settled the shut-down grievance in the February 2004

mediation. This ruling left in place the three contract claims asserted against CNF. 

On October 24, 2005, the four named plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a third

amended complaint (“TAC”). The motion was granted, and the TAC was filed on

December 15, 2005. In the TAC, plaintiffs alleged one cause of action against ALPA, for

improper imposition and maintenance of a trusteeship in violation of Title III of the Labor

Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 402, 462, 464. They

also asserted nine causes of action against one or more of the corporate defendants. On

December 28, 2005, ALPA filed a motion to dismiss the TAC, or in the alternative, for

summary judgment.

On January 24, 2006, pursuant to stipulation, the four named plaintiffs filed a fourth

amended complaint (“4thAC”). The 4thAC alleges eleven causes of action. As in the TAC,

the only claim asserted against ALPA is the first cause of action for improper imposition

and maintenance of a trusteeship – specifically, alleging that the custodianship of the EWA

MEC is improper under Title III of LMRDA.

Plaintiffs allege by appointing a custodian whom 89 percent of the EWA MEC did not

support, and for purposes other than those authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 462, and by

subsequently refusing to “relinquish control of the MEC back to the elected representatives

of the members,” ALPA created an actionable improper trusteeship under 29 U.S.C. § 464

and 29 U.S.C. § 402(c). Plaintiffs claim that ALPA acted in bad faith by imposing and

maintaining this “improper trusteeship.” Plaintiffs allege further that as the elected

representatives of the EWA MEC, they are presently willing and able to resume control of

the MEC, and, if necessary, arbitrate the shut-down grievance against EWA. They assert

that ALPA’s refusal to allow them to resume control of the MEC, and resistance to allowing

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2

 Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945) (" Burley") (union cannot settle

grievance under Railway Labor Act without consent of individual employees). 

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plaintiffs and the members of the proposed class to exercise their Burley rights2 has

created a hostile environment that impairs the ability of the System Board to fairly

adjudicate the grievance. 

Plaintiffs bring the first cause of action under 29 U.S.C. § 464, which provides

authority for bringing a “civil action for enforcement” in connection with any alleged violation

by a labor union of the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §§ 462, et seq., relating to the imposition of

trusteeships. They seek injunctive relief, “ordering dissolution of the trusteeshipcustodianship, stay of the System Board Arbitration of the Grievance, and whatever other

relief justice requires.” 

ALPA now seeks an order dismissing the first cause of action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The parties stipulated that ALPA’s motion

to dismiss the TAC would be considered a motion to dismiss the 4thAC.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

1. Subject matter jurisdiction

Subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental and cannot be waived. Billingsly v. C.I.R.,

868 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989). The court is under a continuing duty to dismiss an

action whenever it appears that the court lacks jurisdiction. Id. Federal courts can

adjudicate only those cases which the Constitution and Congress authorize them to

adjudicate – those involving diversity of citizenship or a federal question, or those to which

the United States is a party. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375,

377 (1994). 

When presented with a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of

demonstrating that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See, e.g., Tosco Corp. v.

Communities for a Better Env't, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001). The defendant may

either challenge jurisdiction on the face of the complaint or provide extrinsic evidence

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demonstrating lack of jurisdiction on the facts of the case. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214,

1242 (9th Cir. 2000). 

2. Failure to state a claim

A court should dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to

state a claim only where it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 45-46 (1957); Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Lerner, 31 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Review is limited to the contents of the complaint. Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. Gen.

Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th Cir. 1995). Allegations of material fact are taken

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Smith v.

Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). Conclusory allegations of law and

unwarranted inferences, however, are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. 

Associated Gen. Contractors v. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., 159 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir.

1998).

Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are disfavored, see Gilligan v. Jamco

Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997), and 12(b)(6) dismissals are proper only in

“extraordinary” cases. United States v. City of Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir.

1981). In dismissing for failure to state a claim, “a district court should grant leave to

amend even if no request to amend the pleadings was made, unless it determines that the

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Doe v. United States,

58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).

3. Summary judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to material

facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 

Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there

is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The court may not weigh the evidence, and is required to view the evidence in the light

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most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of

the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery

responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof

at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other

than for the moving party. On an issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of

proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by pointing out to the district court that

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Id. If the moving

party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth specific facts showing

that there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. 

“To show the existence of a ‘genuine’ issue, . . . [a plaintiff] must produce at least

some significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Smolen v. Deloitte,

Haskins & Sells, 921 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1990) (quotations omitted). Regardless of

whether plaintiff or defendant is the moving party, each party must “establish the existence

of the elements essential to [its] case, and on which [it] will bear the burden of proof at

trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 

B. Title III of the LMRDA

Title III of the LMRDA governs the circumstances under which a labor organization

may establish a trusteeship over a subordinate body. A trusteeship is defined as “any

receivership, trusteeship, or other method of supervision or control whereby a labor

organization suspends the autonomy otherwise available to a subordinate body under its

constitution and bylaws.” 29 U.S.C. § 402(h). 

Section 462 of Title III describes the manner in which a trusteeship may be

established:

Trusteeships shall be established and administered by a labor organization

over a subordinate body only in accordance with the constitution and bylaws

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of the organization which has assumed trusteeship over the subordinate body

and for the purpose of correcting corruption or financial malpractice, assuring

the performance of collective bargaining agreements or other duties of a

bargaining representative, restoring democratic procedures, or otherwise

carrying out the legitimate objects of such labor organization.

29 U.S.C. § 462.

The establishment or maintenance of a trusteeship may be challenged by a civil

action. 29 U.S.C. § 464(a). This statute includes a burden-shifting provision. A trusteeship

established in conformity with the procedural requirements of a labor organization’s

constitution and bylaws and “authorized or ratified after a fair hearing either before the

executive board or before such other body as may be provided in accordance with its

constitution or bylaws” is presumed to be valid for the first 18 months after it is established. 

29 U.S.C. § 464(c). Following this period, trusteeships are “presumed invalid” and should

be discontinued “unless the labor organization . . . show[s] by clear and convincing proof

that the continuation of the trusteeship is necessary for the purpose allowable” under § 462

of Title III. Id. Where a labor organization proffers evidence that the trusteeship is for a

permissible purpose, the civil action should be dismissed. Id. 

C. ALPA’s Constitution and By-Laws

ALPA’s Constitution and By-Laws give ALPA’s Executive Council authority to

suspend self-governance of an MEC in two ways: by establishing a “trusteeship,” and by

instituting a “custodianship.” Both forms may qualify as “trusteeships” under the LMRDA,

but their purposes are different, and they are clearly distinguished by ALPA’s Constitution

and By-Laws. A “trusteeship” of an MEC is governed by Article XIX of ALPA’s Constitution

and By-Laws, and is appropriate when ALPA has reason to believe that an MEC is

mismanaging its finances, or is refusing its duties as a collective bargaining representative. 

After a period of trusteeship to correct these problems, the MEC can be returned to

democratic governance. ALPA Const., Art. XIX.

By contrast, Article XXI of the ALPA Constitution and By-Laws authorizes the

establishment of a “custodianship” of an MEC in order to provide representation to pilots

employed by an airline that ceases all or substantially all operations, in order to wind up the

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affairs of those pilots or former employees of the defunct airline. Article XXI provides that

the President of ALPA, “with the concurrent approval of the Executive Council, is

authorized to take emergency action to provide representation for the pilots in the service

of any airline which interrupts all or substantially all operations.” ALPA Const., Art. XXI, 

§ 1. Where the President of ALPA determines that emergency action prior to a hearing is

not warranted, the President may cause the Executive Council to be convened and conduct

a hearing prior to establishing a custodianship. ALPA Const., Art. XXI, § 3. 

The President is also authorized to appoint one or more custodian representatives,

“who shall function as representatives in place of the last Master Executive Council and

Local Executive Councils on the airline and their officers.” ALPA Const., Art. XXI, § 2. The

number of such custodian representatives and their duties “shall be determined by the

President and may vary from time to time as circumstances may require. ALPA Const.,

Art. XXI, § 2.

Under the ALPA Constitution and By-Laws, a custodianship is particularly necessary

in the case of an airline, such as EWA, that ceases all operations and permanently

furloughs all its employees, because an ALPA member becomes an “inactive” member

automatically when he/she is placed on an involuntary furlough. ALPA Const., Art. II, § 3. 

All EWA pilots and flight engineers were automatically placed in inactive status when they

were furloughed by EWA.

Under ALPA’s Constitution and By-Laws, only active members in good standing may

vote or hold elective office within ALPA. ALPA Const., Art. IV, §§ 1, 5, 10. “Inactive”

members such as the furloughed EWA flight crew members are ineligible to vote or hold

MEC office. Id. Thus, the only method of providing continuing representation to ALPA

members who have been permanently furloughed is through a custodianship. 

D. ALPA’s Motion

ALPA argues that the first cause of action, alleging that ALPA violated Title III of the

LMRDA by establishing a custodianship over the EWA MEC, should be dismissed for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. In the alternative, ALPA seeks

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summary judgment. 

1. Subject matter jurisdiction

ALPA argues that plaintiffs lack standing to assert the LMRDA claim because they

cannot show that they have been injured by the custodianship, or that the relief they seek

in the 4thAC would redress their alleged injury, and that the court therefore lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over this claim. 

A party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that Article III

standing – that he/she has suffered in “injury in fact” that is concrete and particularized,

actual and imminent, and not conjectural or hypothetical; that the injury is fairly traceable to

the challenged action of the defendant; and that it is likely that the injury will be redressed

in a favorable decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Sys (TOC), Inc., 528

U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). A suit brought by plaintiffs without Article III standing is not a

“case or controversy,” and must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Steel

Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998); Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386

F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Plaintiffs allege that ALPA’s establishment and maintenance of a custodianship over

the EWA MEC violates Title III of the LMRDA. However, the only injury that plaintiffs allege

is caused by the custodianship is the creation of a “hostile environment that impairs the

ability of the System Board to fairly adjudicate the grievance.” ALPA argues that plaintiffs’

real complaint is that they disagree with ALPA’s president’s choice of a custodian, not that

they believe that the imposition of the custodianship in any way violated ALPA’s

Constitution and By-Laws. ALPA also asserts that nothing in the Constitution or By-Laws

requires that the president appoint a particular person as custodian of the MEC, but rather,

provides that the president “may” appoint former MEC officers as custodian. ALPA argues

that there can be no question that the custodianship was instituted for a legitimate object,

as required by the LMRDA, and that the alleged injury is purely speculative, as plaintiffs

have made no showing that the purportedly “hostile” environment is fairly traceable to the

custodianship. 

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ALPA argues that even if plaintiffs had alleged a non-speculative injury traceable to

ALPA’s establishment of the custodianship, that injury would not be redressable. In the

4thAC, plaintiffs ask the court to dissolve the custodianship, and argue that ALPA should

“relinquish control of the MEC back to the elected representatives of the members.” 

However, ALPA asserts, if the court were to dissolve the custodianship, neither the named

plaintiffs nor any of the other former EWA crew members could take over the running of the

MEC, because under the ALPA Constitution and By-Laws, furloughed former EWA crew

members are “inactive members” and not eligible to serve as EWA MEC officers. Thus,

ALPA argues, plaintiffs lack Article III standing to bring the LMRDA claim.

In opposition, plaintiffs argue that ALPA has not established lack of standing. First,

they argue that § 464 can provide the foundation for the necessary injury, and that it is not

necessary for the court to determine whether plaintiffs have an actual injury resulting from

ALPA’s “improper maintenance” of the custodianship. They assert that it is sufficient for

them to allege that the custodianship has been improperly maintained. 

With regard to redressability, plaintiffs contend that § 464 provides “for such relief

(including injunctions) as may be appropriate,” and that the court has viable options to

fashion equitable relief, including replacing Captain Haddock with one or more

representatives chosen by the pilots, or with one or more representatives selected in a new

election. In the alternative, they assert, the court could simply “order the amendment of a

few phrases in the ALPA Constitution,” to eliminate the provisions that plaintiffs consider

“anti-democratic” (presumably including the provisions relating to the imposition of

custodianships and the appointment of custodians). 

The court finds that plaintiffs fail to establish constitutional standing to bring their

LMRDA Title III claim against ALPA, because they have not identified any injury-in-fact that

was caused by the imposition of the custodianship, and because their requested relief is

unavailable and will not redress their claimed injury. Plaintiffs’ argument that Title III

confers its own standing is not persuasive. Constitutional standing cannot be legislatively

conferred, but rather must be established by the plaintiff. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S.

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811, 820 & n.3 (1997). 

The alleged injuries suffered by the plaintiffs – the “creat[ion] of a hostile

environment that impairs the ability of the System Board to fairly adjudicate the Grievance,”

as asserted in the 4thAC at ¶ 51, and the “lack of unity of the pilots” resulting from the

appointment of Captain Haddock to serve as custodian, as stated in plaintiffs’ opposition

brief (but not in the 4thAC) – are not injuries resulting from a violation of LMRDA Title III. 

Title III is concerned with internal union governance, not with the filing of grievances by

employees against employers or the arbitration of such grievances; and plaintiffs have not

established any protected interest in the “unity” of the pilots. 

Moreover, it is clear that plaintiffs’ objection is to the appointment of Captain

Haddock as custodian (rather than some other person or persons of the pilots’ own

choosing). Whatever actions of Captain Haddock may have caused a “hostile

environment” at the System Board, that “hostile environment” was not caused by ALPA’s

imposition of a custodianship on the EWA MEC. Plaintiffs have confused the imposition of

the custodianship with the appointment of the custodian. The two are not the same, and 

§ 464 provides a cause of action to challenge an improperly imposed custodianship, not to

challenge the appointment of an individual who is not universally admired to serve as

custodian. ALPA’s Constitution leaves the decision as to the identity of the appointed

custodian to the discretion of ALPA’s president. Thus, the relief requested by plaintiffs –

the appointment of one of their own in place of Captain Haddock – is not available under

Title III or any other law. 

Plaintiffs’ argument that the court may “order the amendment of a few phrases in

ALPA’s Constitution” is not persuasive. The only authority cited by plaintiffs, Brennan v.

United Mine Workers of America, 475 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1973), involved the judicial

resolution of a case in which the union lacked a constitution. In that case, the court

ordered adoption of a new constitution. Id. at 1295-96 & n.6. Here, ALPA has a viable and

lawful constitution, and there is nothing in Title III of the LMRDA that suggests that the

court has the authority to order a labor union to “amend a few phrases” in its constitution

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simply because a plaintiff is unhappy with an action taken pursuant to that constitution. 

2. Failure to state a claim

ALPA argues that the first cause of action fails to state a claim because the claim is

time-barred. The custodianship was instituted on January 17, 2002, and plaintiffs amended

the complaint to add the claim for improper imposition and maintenance of a trusteeship on

December 15, 2005. ALPA argues that the claim is therefore untimely, whether considered

under the six-month statute of limitations that applies to most federal labor claims, see

DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983), or under California’s twoyear statute of limitations for personal injury claims, Cal. Civ. P. Code § 335.1, or the threeyear statute of limitations for liability arising under a statute, Cal. Civ. P. Code § 338(1). 

ALPA asserts that while the LMRDA does not specify a limitations period, courts

have generally held that either the 6-month limitations period for federal labor claims

applies, or the closest analogous state law statute of limitations. See, e.g., Reed v. United

Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 323-23 (1989). ALPA argues in addition that the claim

cannot be said to relate back to the filing of the original Rachford II complaint, because it

does not arise “out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be

set forth in the original pleading,” as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2). 

Plaintiffs assert, however, that the LMRDA cause of action is not time-barred

because the 29 U.S.C. § 464 does not contain its own limitations period, and because the

custodianship is presently in place. Plaintiffs contend that so long as the trusteeship is in

place, an action can be brought under § 464 for improper maintenance of the trusteeship,

and argue that there can therefore be no time limitation on filing a § 464 claim so long as

the trusteeship remains in place.

The court finds that the first cause of action must be dismissed as untimely, as it is

barred under even the longest of the potentially applicable statutes of limitations –

California’s three-year statute of limitations for liabilities arising under statute. Plaintiffs

provide no support for their argument that their claim under Title III of the LMRDA is

governed by no statute of limitations, simply because the statute itself does not specify a

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 Plaintiffs do argue that the ALPA Constitution does not categorically require a

custodianship whenever an airline ceases operations, asserting that an MEC representative

need not be an active member of ALPA to remain in elective office if he/she was an active

member at the time of nomination and election, that inactive members have voted for MEC

representatives, and that an MEC is not always replaced with a custodianship after an airline

ceases operations. However, the court finds that none of these arguments creates a disputed

issue of material fact with regard to whether ALPA properly imposed the custodianship.

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period of limitations and because they are seeking equitable relief. Where a pre-1990

federal statute does not provide an express limitations period, a court must look to state law

to select the most analogous statute of limitations, subject to the proviso that the selected

limitations period be consistent with federal law and policy. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235,

239 (1989); see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). The court finds that

either California Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1 or California Code of Civil Procedure 

§ 338(1) may provide the appropriate limitations period. Since the claim is time-barred

under either, ALPA’s motion must be granted. 

3. Summary judgment

Having found that plaintiffs have failed to establish Article III standing to assert the

LMRDA claim, and also that the LMRDA claim is time-barred, it is unnecessary for the court

to decide ALPA’s alternative motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, the court

provides the following as an alternative basis for its finding that the LMRDA claim is not

viable. 

ALPA argues that summary judgment should be granted on the first cause of action

because the custodianship was properly imposed under, and has been maintained in

accordance with, ALPA’s Constitution and By-Laws. ALPA contends that the custodianship

was established in January 2002 because EWA had permanently furloughed all flight crew

members, and that it has continued to the present so that ALPA may resolve all

outstanding grievances against EWA, EWW, and CNF. 

In opposition, plaintiffs argue that “this custodianship” – by which they mean the

appointment of Captain Haddock as custodian – is not necessary and proper, although they

are apparently not opposed to the imposition of the custodianship itself.3

 Plaintiffs argue

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that even if ALPA is correct in asserting that it imposed the trusteeship in good faith, their 

§ 464 claim would be valid because they assert both that ALPA improperly imposed the

trusteeship, and that ALPA improperly maintained the trusteeship. They claim that the

custodianship has been improperly maintained because the appointed custodian is Captain

Haddock rather than a representative favored by a majority of the pilots. Plaintiffs also

assert that because the custodianship has been in place more than 18 months, the burden

of showing that it is properly maintained has shifted to ALPA. Thus, they submit, their

concession that the custodianship was originally proper is immaterial. 

Finally, plaintiffs argue, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), that they

should be given the opportunity for discovery before the court considers summary

judgment. They contend that the fact that EWA has ceased operations does not establish

that ALPA’s insistence on retaining Captain Haddock as custodian is legitimate, and that

they should be permitted to obtain further evidence demonstrating that ALPA’s

interpretation of its own rules, as evidenced by ALPA’s conduct, would allow the court to

replace Captain Haddock with elected representatives of the pilots or to take some other

action to ensure that ALPA is “democratically governed.”

The court finds that the establishment and maintenance of the custodianship over

the EWA MEC does not violate Title III of the LMRDA because it was established for a

proper purpose under the LMRDA and because the selection of a particular individual as

custodian by ALPA’s President does not provide a viable Title III claim.

As explained above, Title III of the LMRDA permits a union such as ALPA to impose

a trusteeship over subordinate bodies if it does so “in accordance with the constitution and

bylaws of the organization which has assumed trusteeship” and “for a purpose that carr[ies]

out the legitimate objects of such labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 462. 

The evidence shows that ALPA followed its Constitution and By-Laws in establishing

the custodianship over the EWA MEC. Pursuant to Article XXI of the Constitution and ByLaws, ALPA’s president notified the Chairman of the EWA MEC on January 9, 2002, that

the Executive Council would hold a hearing on whether to implement a custodianship over

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the EWA MEC. At the January 14-16, 2002, Executive Council meeting, the Council

approved the custodianship. At that time, plaintiff Thomas Rachford was an Executive

Vice-President of ALPA and a member of the Executive Council. Together with all the

other members of the Executive Council, he voted to impose the custodianship. Plaintiff

Mark Luthi also attended and spoke at the hearing, and did not object to the custodianship. 

On January 24, 2002, pursuant to his authority under Article XXI of ALPA’s

Constitution and By-Laws, ALPA’s president appointed Captain Haddock as the custodian

of the EWA MEC. Captain Haddock has served as the sole custodian since that time. 

Under Article XXI of ALPA’s Constitution and By-Laws, the purpose of the custodianship

over the EWA MEC is to provide continuing representation to flight crew members formerly

employed by EWA – a shut-down airline – with regard to any outstanding grievance or

other collective bargaining matters. ALPA Const., Art. XXI, § 1. As the custodian, Captain

Haddock has filed and continues to pursue grievances regarding the permanent shut-down

of EWA. Those grievances remain pending.

The custodianship also serves a legitimate purpose in light of EWA’s permanent

shut-down, because it was imposed for the purpose of providing representation to inactive

pilots formerly employed by EWA after the airline had permanently ceased all flight

operations. EWA has not resumed flight operations since December 2001, nor has it

recalled any of its permanently furloughed flight crew members. The U.S. Department of

Transportation has revoked EWA’s certificate authority specifically because the airline has

been dormant since its shut-down in December 2001. The propriety of the custodianship is

supported the fact that EWA permanently ceased operations in December 2001, the fact

that EWA cannot resume flight operations, the fact that EWA permanently furloughed all

flight crew members in December 2001, and the fact that EWA has not recalled any of the

furloughed flight crew members. 

Plaintiffs essentially concede that the custodianship was imposed for a proper

purpose when it was established. Plaintiffs’ argument that ALPA should have appointed

one or more of the pilots’ own elected representatives as custodian does not support either

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 If the first cause of action were not dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

the court would grant summary judgment for ALPA.

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the claim that the custodianship was improperly imposed nor the claim that it has been

improperly maintained. 

The election of representatives referred to by plaintiffs had been scheduled by ALPA

in November 2001, prior to the announcement of EWA’s permanent shut-down. The voting

period was scheduled to begin on November 30, 2001, and conclude on January 8, 2002. 

As of January 8, 2002, the ALPA Executive Council had not yet met to discuss the

proposed custodianship and had not yet placed the MEC into custodianship. The two

events – the election of MEC representatives, and the decision by ALPA to impose the

custodianship – were not related, and ALPA’s president was under no obligation to select

one or more of the winners of the MEC election as the custodian of the EWA MEC. 

Finally, the court denies plaintiffs’ request for Rule 56(f) discovery. Plaintiffs have

not identified any disputed material facts that are relevant to the question whether the

custodianship is proper under Title III.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the court finds that the first cause of action must

be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.4

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 10, 2006 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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