Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02393/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02393-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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1

The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.

 United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2393

___________

Gelpi Boudwin, *

*

Plaintiff – Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Eastern

Hastings Bay Marina, Inc., doing * District of Arkansas.

business as Little Rock Yacht Club, *

in personam; Lovie Dovie, in rem, *

also known as Lucy Dovie, *

*

Defendants – Appellees. *

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Submitted: April 12, 2010

Filed: August 3, 2010

___________

Before BYE, BEAM, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Gelpi Boudwin appeals the district court’s1

 grant of summary judgment in favor

of Hastings Bay Marina in Boudwin’s negligence action for injuries he sustained

when he fell into a hatch in a boat on the marina’s premises. Boudwin argues he

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It is undisputed that Hastings Bay did not own the Lovie Dovie, and rather the

boat was simply moored at the marina by its private owners. Hastings Bay asserts it

was not in the business of selling boats and Gossage attempted to show the vessel as

a favor to the then-owners. Boudwin ultimately purchased the boat from the owners.

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raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hastings Bay was liable for

injuries caused by its employee. We affirm.

I

In an effort to purchase a houseboat, Gelpi Boudwin enlisted the aid of his sonin-law, Tim Shelton, to contact local marinas and inquire whether they had any boats

for sale. One of these marinas, Hastings Bay Marina, informed Shelton there were a

couple of boats for sale at the marina and Shelton and Boudwin could view the boats

if they desired. The person on the telephone also told Shelton to contact Sean

Gossage, Harbor Master at the Yacht Club, when he arrived to view the boats.

Gossage’s duties at the club included renting slips, pumping fuel, keeping the grass

and grounds cleaned, and hauling boats in and out of the water.

Upon arriving at the marina, Shelton asked to be directed to Gossage.

Thereafter, Gossage, Boudwin, Shelton, and Shelton’s wife inspected the first boat

that was for sale without incident. The group then proceeded to the second boat for

sale moored at Hastings Bay, the Lovie Dovie.2

 When they reached the Lovie Dovie,

the group discovered the interior cabin of the boat was locked. Gossage told the group

he would break into the boat to allow them to inspect the internal cabin, to which

Boudwin and Shelton protested. Gossage, who lived in a vessel moored in the slip

next to the Lovie Dovie, assured Boudwin it was okay to break into the boat because

“they don’t have a problem with us doing this.”

After entering and inspecting the inside cabin, Boudwin wished to inspect the

bottom of the boat. Upon locating the hatch cover, Shelton initially tried to pry the

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cover loose but was unsuccessful. Gossage was able to remove the hatch cover

shortly thereafter. After inspecting the boat’s instrument control panel, Boudwin

accidentally stepped into the hole where the hatch cover was located and sustained

physical injury after falling through the opening.

Boudwin apparently purchased the Lovie Dovie at some point after the

accident. On June 1, 2004, Hastings Bay entered into a slip rental agreement with

Melodye Boudwin (Gelpi Boudwin's wife) for the Lovie Dovie. Boudwin failed to

make payments for the slip rental and Hastings Bay eventually obtained a marina

operator’s lien on the boat and on August 24, 2006, sold the Lovie Dovie to satisfy

Boudwin’s outstanding debt to the Marina.

On March 28, 2007, Boudwin filed this negligence action against Hastings Bay,

joining the Lovie Dovie in rem. Hastings Bay answered and counterclaimed for abuse

of process and tortious interference with contract, claiming the lawsuit was intended

to interfere with the transfer of the boat and was an attempt to regain possession of the

Lovie Dovie. Hastings Bay subsequently brought a motion for summary judgment,

contending it could not be liable because it did not have ownership, possession, or

control of the Lovie Dovie. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

Hastings Bay. Boudwin appealed, but the appeal was dismissed as premature because

the district court had not entered judgment and the counterclaims were still pending.

The district court subsequently entered judgment on Boudwin’s claims and the parties

agreed to stay the trial on the counterclaims until the resolution of this appeal. Despite

the stay, we maintain jurisdiction over this appeal because the district court certified

the case for appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). 

II

We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo.

Anda v. Wickes Furniture Co., Inc., 517 F.3d 526, 531 (8th Cir. 2008). Summary

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Before reaching the merits, the district court determined this matter did not

satisfy the connection test required to invoke maritime jurisdiction, negating

Boudwin’s initial invocation of maritime jurisdiction. See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v.

Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995) (“[A] party seeking to

invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) over a tort claim

must satisfy conditions both of location and of connection with maritime activity.”).

However, the court concluded it had diversity jurisdiction, and thus the dispute was

governed by Arkansas law. The parties do not dispute this holding on appeal.

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judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We

view the evidence, and make all reasonable inferences from the evidence, in favor of

the nonmoving party. Sitzes v. City of West Memphis Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465 (8th

Cir. 2010). “Disputes that are not ‘genuine,’ or that are about facts that are not

‘material,’ will not preclude summary judgment.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)).

In a diversity action such as this, we apply the substantive law of the forum

State, which is Arkansas in this matter.3

 Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc., 601 F.3d

852, 856 (8th Cir. 2010). “Under Arkansas law, in order to prevail on a claim of

negligence, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff,

that the defendant breached the duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of

the plaintiff’s injuries.” Fordyce Bank & Trust Co. v. Bean Timberland, Inc., 251

S.W.3d 267, 270-71 (Ark. 2007). “Proof of an accident, with nothing more, is not

sufficient to make out a claim for negligence.” Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Gill, 100

S.W.3d 715, 724 (Ark. 2003). In this case, Boudwin’s opposition to summary

judgment is based on a number of different legal theories, including respondeat

superior, actual authority, and apparent authority. We address each theory in turn.

Generally, plaintiffs seek to hold employers responsible for the negligent acts

of their employees through the doctrine of respondeat superior. Med. Assurance Co.,

Inc. v. Castro, 302 S.W.3d 592, 597 (Ark. 2009). Under the doctrine, an employee’s

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The district court noted Boudwin failed to cite, nor did the court find, any

Arkansas case that holds a principal liable for a tort committed by an agent acting

outside the scope of his employment but under apparent authority. The court also

noted the agency theories argued by Boudwin are typically relevant in contract cases,

not tort cases such as the instant matter. We need not address these issues because

even assuming Boudwin’s agency arguments are properly made in this case, he fails

to present a triable issue of fact under these theories for the reasons set forth herein.

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tortious conduct may cause the employer to be held liable if the conduct of the

employee or agent occurred within the scope of his employment. Id. (citing Cooper

Clinic, P.A. v. Barnes, 237 S.W.3d 87, 92 (Ark. 2006)). In determining whether an

employee acted within the scope of his employment, Arkansas courts look to whether

the employee is acting in the interests of his employer, as opposed to acting solely in

his personal interest. Barnes, 237 S.W.3d at 92-93.

Hastings Bay argues that Gossage was not acting within the scope of his

employment when he showed the Lovie Dovie to Boudwin in order to gauge his

interest in purchasing the boat. We agree. It is undisputed that Hastings Bay did not

own, possess, manage, or control the Lovie Dovie; nor is Hastings Bay in the business

of selling boats. Rather, Gossage was unequivocal in his testimony that he was

showing the Lovie Dovie for sale as a favor to the then-owners. Gossage’s actions

therefore were not taken for the benefit of Hastings Bay, and his conduct fell outside

his scope of employment because his position as harbor master did not involve selling,

or brokering sales of, the independently owned vessels at the marina. As a result, no

reasonable jury could find in favor of Boudwin under typical respondeat superior

grounds.

Boudwin also contends Gossage was Hastings Bay’s agent under theories of

actual and apparent authority. As a result, Boudwin argues, Hastings Bay is

vicariously liable for Gossage’s negligence. We disagree.4

 First, for the reasons set

forth above, Gossage did not maintain actual authority because Hastings Bay did not

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direct him to engage in the sale of the Lovie Dovie, much less to break into and enter

the vessel in order to accomplish such a purpose. See Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc. v.

Way, 270 S.W.3d 369, 376 (Ark. App. 2007) (noting it was not clear whether actual

authority was conferred on the agent because he was not acting on behalf of the

principal); Trs. of the Graphic Commc’ns Int’l Union Upper Midwest Local 1M

Health & Welfare Plan v. Bjorkedal, 516 F.3d 719, 727 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Actual

authority is that authority given by the principal to the agent to act on its behalf, and

it requires that the principal manifest its consent to the agent’s ability to bind the

principal.”) (citing Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.01 (2006)); 3 Am. Jur. 2d

Agency § 70 (“Actual authority is such as a principal intentionally confers upon the

agent, or intentionally or by want of ordinary care allows the agent to believe himself

or herself to possess.”).

In addition, Boudwin fails to satisfy the elements necessary to support a

showing of apparent authority. “Under Arkansas law . . . apparent authority is such

authority as a principal proclaims or permits, such authority which a principal by lack

of care causes or allows, or such authority as a reasonably prudent man using

diligence and discretion would naturally suppose.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crist, 855

F.2d 1326, 1331 (8th Cir. 1988). To support his theory, Boudwin must demonstrate

(1) Hastings Bay held Gossage “out to the public as possessing sufficient authority to

embrace the particular act in question, or knowingly permitted him to act as having

such authority;” and (2) that Boudwin “knew of the facts and acting in good faith had

reason to believe and did believe that the agent possessed the necessary authority.”

Id. (citing Cent. Surety & Ins. Corp. v. O. & S. Wholesale Co., 101 S.W.2d 167, 172

(Ark. 1937)).

To satisfy these elements, Boudwin relies heavily on Shelton’s telephone call

to the marina wherein an unnamed employee directed Shelton to Gossage in response

to Shelton’s inquiry regarding boat sales. Boudwin argues this was a manifestation

from Hastings Bay that Gossage had the authority to act on its behalf. However, even

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assuming this to be true, we agree with the district court that no reasonable person

would have believed Hastings Bay authorized Gossage to break into the boat in order

to show Boudwin the inside cabin, and therefore Boudwin cannot meet the second

element. “Apparent authority of an agent is . . . such authority as a reasonably prudent

man, using diligence and discretion, in view of the principal’s conduct, would

naturally suppose the agent to possess.” Found. Telecomm., Inc. v. Moe Studio, Inc.,

16 S.W.3d 531, 536 (Ark. 2000). The third party’s belief must be predicated on the

principal’s conduct, not the agent’s conduct, because no agent can create evidence of

apparent authority on his own. Id. Here, no reasonably prudent person would believe

Gossage had the authority to break into the Lovie Dovie, irrespective of Gossage’s

statements to the contrary, which are irrelevant for purposes of the apparent authority

inquiry. See Hunt v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 732 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Ark. 1987) (“The

authority of an agent must be shown by positive proof or by circumstances that justify

the inference that the principal has assented to the acts of his agent.”) (quoting Mack

v. Scott, 323 S.W.2d 929, 931-32 (Ark. 1959)). As the district court noted, a

reasonable person would expect that if Gossage was acting on behalf of Hastings Bay,

he would have maintained a key in order to properly enter the vessel. Indeed,

Boudwin and Shelton were initially uncomfortable with breaking into the boat as

Gossage suggested. Under these circumstances, the district court did not err in

granting summary judgment on Boudwin’s apparent authority argument because

Boudwin did not maintain a reasonable belief of Gossage’s authority.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Hastings Bay. 

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