Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02090/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02090-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A; Resnickv. Hayes, 213F.3d.44S,-,446 (9th Cir. 2000) " . 

(§ 1915A); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9~ Cir. 2000) (~n banc) 

(§ 1915(e)(2)). ' ., 

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua 

sponte dismissal ofonly frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. 

An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. 

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). However 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now 

mandate that the court reviewing an IFP or prisoner's suit make and rule on its own 

motion to dismiss before effecting service ofthe Complaint by the U. S. Marshal pursuant 

to Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 4(c)(2). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 ("[S]ection 1915(e) 

not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint 

that fails to state a claim."); seealsoBarrenv. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9thCir. 

1998) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). 

"[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as 

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff." Resnick, 213 F.3 d at 447; see also Barren, 152 F .3d at 1194 

(noting that § 1915(e)(2) "parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

l2(b)(6)"). In addition, the Court's duty to liberally construe a pro se's pleadings, see 

Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep 't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is "particularly 

important in civil rights cases." Ferdikv. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9thCir. 1992). 

B. Inadequate Medical Care Claims 

It appears as though Plaintiff may have been a detainee at the time the claims 

found in his Complaint arose. Thus, the Eighth Amendment may not apply to him. Bell 

v Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) ("Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate 

only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally 

associated with criminal prosecutions .... [and] the State does not acquire the power to 

punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal 

adjudication ofguilt in accordance with due process oflaw."); see also Gibson v. Cnty. 

-3- 13cv2090 BEN (WMc) 

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of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Because [pefJ.ti(Joer.] had not been 

convicted of a crime, but had only been arrested, his rights derive~from th~ due process 

clause rather than the Eighth Amendment's protection agai,nst crqel and unusual 

punishment."). 

Rather, ifPlaintiff was a detainee at the time his claims arose, his conditions of 

confinement claims must be analyzed under "the more protective" substantive due 

process standard. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918,931-33 (9th Cir. 2004); see also 

Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 538-39 ("Absent a showing of an express intent to punish on the 

part of detention facility officials, ... if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial 

detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, 

without more, amount to 'punishment."'); Nunez v. City ofLos Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 

871 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The concept of 'substantive due process,' semantically awkward 

as it may be, forbids the government from depriving a person oflife, liberty, or property 

in such a way that 'shocks the conscience' or 'interferes with rights implicit in the 

concept of ordered liberty.'" (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 

(1987))). However, "the due process clause imposes, at a minimum, the same duty the 

Eighth Amendment imposes: 'persons in custody ha[ ve] the established right to not have 

officials remain deliberately Indifferent'" to their needs. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1187 

(quoting Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977,979 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Lolli v. Cnty. of 

Orange, 351 F.3d 410,418-19 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court will therefore look to Eighth 

Amendment standards to determine the minimum level ofprotection afforded Plaintiff. 

The Eighth Amendment, which prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments," 

imposes a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions ofconfinement and to 

take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety ofthe inmates. Helling v. McKinney, 

509 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1993). However, every injury suffered by an inmate does not 

necessarily translate into constitutional liability for prison officials. Osolinski v. Kane, 

92 F.3d 934, 936-37 (9th Cir. 1996); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981) 

(noting that the U.S. Constitution "does not mandate comfortable prisons."). 

-4- 13cv2090 BEN (WMc) 

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