Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01440/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01440-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

STACIA TATUM, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

TERESA SCHWARTZ, JONATHAN ZEH, 

and LANCE JENSEN, in their 

individual capacities; and 

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, 

 Defendants. 

 /

No. 2:06-CV-01440 JAM EFB 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

Plaintiff Stacia Tatum (“Tatum”), a former secretary with 

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(“CDCR”), brought this action against defendants Teresa Schwartz 

(“Schwartz”), Jonathan Zeh (“Zeh”), Lance Jensen (“Jensen”) and 

CDCR (collectively “Defendants”) alleging, among other things, 

hostile work environment sexual harassment and retaliation 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and retaliation pursuant to Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.

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(“Title VII”). Defendants now move for summary judgment or, in 

the alternative, summary adjudication pursuant to Rule 56(c) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Tatum filed a crossmotion for summary adjudication. For the reasons set forth 

below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED and Tatum’s cross-motion is 

DENIED.1 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Tatum worked at the CDCR medical facility in Vacaville 

(California Medical Facility (“CMF”)) from February 1998 until 

June 10, 2004.2 Defendant Jensen was a Correctional Plant 

Manager in the Plant Operation Department (“Plant Ops”) during 

the time Tatum worked at CMF and was her direct supervisor. 

Defendant Zeh was a Chief Engineer I during the time Tatum 

worked at CMF. Defendant Schwartz was the Warden at CMF from 

April 2003 to October 2005. 

In September 2001, Tatum began working as an administrative 

assistant in Plant Ops. As an administrative assistant, Tatum’s 

duties involved various administrative tasks, including 

obtaining gate clearances, taking minutes at meetings, answering 

and transferring phone calls, processing time sheets for all 

1

 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. 

L.R. 78-230(h). 

2

 CMF is a public entity serving as a medical psychiatric 

institution for the health care needs of the male felon 

population of California’s prisons. 

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staff and proofreading memos. Tatum performed additional 

administrative tasks for Jensen. In addition to her 

administrative duties, Tatum supervised inmates who performed 

clerical duties, including an inmate named Oetter. Tatum 

supervised Oetter for approximately one week in April 2004. She 

ceased doing so, however, after discovering that he had been 

convicted of rape. In June 2007, Oetter was reassigned to a 

different work area. 

On or before May 13, 2004, Tatum complained to Ruben Perez, 

an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EOC”) counselor, that Jensen 

and Zeh had sexually harassed her. On May 14, 2004, Schwartz 

was informed of Tatum’s allegations against Jensen and Zeh. 

Thereafter, Schwartz assigned Lieutenant Damino Cano to conduct 

an internal fact-finding inquiry, which commenced on May 20, 

2004. Tatum alleges that in June 2004 she complained directly 

to Schwartz about the sexually hostile working environment 

created by Jensen and Zeh, but Schwartz refused to remedy the 

situation. On or about June 8, 2004, Tatum was allegedly 

offered a transfer to CMF’s Education Department. On or about 

June 10, 2004 Tatum ceased working at CMF due to an alleged 

disability, though she allegedly had a final meeting with 

Schwartz on June 30, 2004. 

In her complaint, Tatum alleges that she could not 

“function or think clearly for several months after she left 

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work in June 2004” as a result of Jensen and Zeh’s conduct. In 

2005, she hired an attorney to assist her in obtaining workers’ 

compensation benefits. Tatum claimed stress injury due to 

sexual harassment, intimidation and retaliation by Jensen and 

Zeh, and from being forced to work with an inmate convicted of 

rape. On April 28, 2005, Tatum filed a charge of discrimination 

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 

alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. On May 6, 2005 

Tatum requested a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. On June 9, 

2005, Tatum received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, 

advising her that she had ninety days to file suit under Title 

VII. On November 17, 2005, a workers’ compensation ALJ issued 

an opinion finding that Tatum had been psychiatrically disabled 

due to the actions of her co-employees. The ALJ found that 

Tatum had been “temporarily totally disabled from June 10, 2004 

to date and continuing.” 

In early 2006, Tatum’s treating physician, David L. Green 

(“Green”), sent medical files to CMF indicating that Tatum could 

return to work provided that she was not placed in the proximity 

or under the supervision of Jensen or Zeh. She did not return, 

however, because she was allegedly offered a lower-paying 

position at a different facility. On June 27, 2006 Tatum filed 

the instant action alleging hostile work environment sexual 

harassment and retaliation. Specifically, Tatum alleges that 

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Jensen and Zeh sexually harassed her by watching her 

inappropriately, making sexual advances, and forcing her to work 

in close proximity to an inmate convicted of rape. Tatum 

alleges that Zeh “would sneak into her office 30 to 40 times a 

day and stand behind her watching her.”3 She alleges that Jensen 

made inappropriate comments about her clothing and unwelcome 

sexual advances “suggesting that she and he needed ‘to spend 

more time together.’ ” She alleges that Zeh and Jensen did not 

help her reassign Oetter, and that they intimidated her when she 

complained. Tatum further alleges that Schwartz’s response to 

her complaint of harassment was to transfer her to a less 

desirable position. Finally, Tatum alleges that when she sought 

to return to work in May 2006, she was offered a lower-paying 

position at a different facility. 

On July 9, 2006 Tatum filed a second charge of 

discrimination with the EEOC alleging that CDCR retaliated 

against her by: (1) not selecting her for a promotion in May 

2005; and (2) offering her a lower-paying position at a 

different facility when she sought to return to work in May 

2006. On August 9, 2006 Tatum received a right-to-sue letter 

from the EEOC. On September 1, 2006, Tatum amended her 

complaint to add a claim for retaliation pursuant to Title VII. 

3

 Tatum, however, concedes that Zeh never touched or made 

inappropriate comments to her. 

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On June 9, 2008, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment 

or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. On June 12, 2008, 

Tatum filed a cross-motion for summary adjudication.4

II. OPINION 

A. Legal Standard 

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, the 

discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden 

of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

If the moving party sustains its burden, the burden then shifts 

to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by his or 

her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 

324. The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law when the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing 

 

4

 As a preliminary matter, to the extent Tatum’s summary 

judgment declarations conflict with her deposition testimony, 

her deposition testimony controls. See School Dist. No. 1J, 

Multnomah County v. Acands, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1264 (9th Cir. 

1993); see also Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 

266 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that “a party cannot create an 

issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior deposition 

testimony”). 

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on an essential element of a claim in the case on which the 

nonmoving party has the burden of proof. Id. at 323. There is 

no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record, taken as a 

whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (nonmoving party must present 

specific, significant probative evidence, not simply “some 

metaphysical doubt”). Conversely, a genuine dispute over a 

material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting 

the claimed factual dispute, requiring a judge or jury to 

resolve the differing versions of the truth. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 253 (1986). Summary judgment 

is appropriate if, viewing the evidence and the inferences 

therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 

there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 1989). 

B. First Claim: Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment

 Defendants argue that Tatum’s first claim, hostile work 

environment/sexual harassment pursuant to § 1983, is timebarred. 

In § 1983 actions, federal courts apply the forum state’s 

statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with 

the forum state’s law regarding tolling, including equitable 

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tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent 

with federal law. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 

2004). Prior to January 1, 2003, California’s one-year statute 

of limitations for personal injury actions applied to § 1983 

suits in federal court. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 

(9th Cir. 2004). Effective January 1, 2003, the new California 

statute of limitations for assault, battery, and other personal 

injury actions is two years. Cal.Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1. 

Since the last alleged act of sexual harassment occurred after 

January 1, 2003, the applicable statute of limitations for 

Tatum’s hostile work environment sexual harassment claim is two 

years. However, because it is undisputed that the last act of 

sexual harassment occurred more than two years before this 

action was filed, this claim is time-barred, absent tolling. 

As to tolling, Tatum advances two arguments. First, Tatum 

contends that the limitations period should be tolled because 

she was “insane” during the relevant period insofar as she was 

incapable of taking care of her property or transacting business 

without the substantial assistance of her husband. Second, 

Tatum contends that the limitations period should be equitably 

tolled because she suffered from a severe disability during the 

relevant period. In support of her position, Tatum primarily 

relies on Dr. Green’s deposition testimony, which indicates that 

Tatum reported symptoms overlapping with a post-traumatic stress 

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disorder and that she was diagnosed with an adjustment disorder 

with anxiety and depression. Dr. Green’s testimony further 

indicates that Tatum was “totally and temporarily disabled” 

until September 1, 2004. 

In California, a statute of limitations is tolled if the 

plaintiff was “insane” when the claim accrued. Cal.Code Civ. 

Proc. § 352. Insanity under § 352 is defined as a condition of 

“mental derangement” that renders the individual “incapable of 

caring for his or her property or transacting business, or 

understanding the nature or effects of his or her acts.” Hsu v. 

Mt. Zion Hospital, 259 Cal.App.2d 562, 571 (1968); cf. Feeley v. 

Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 234 Cal.App.3d 949, 951-52 

(1991) (tolling proper under § 352 for time during which 

plaintiff was in a coma immediately after the injury that gave 

rise to his cause of action); Snyder v. Boy Scouts of America, 

205 Cal.App.3d 1318, 1324, (1988) (post-traumatic stress 

disorder does not constitute “insanity” under § 352 to toll the 

limitations period). 

 In the instant case, the Court finds that the tolling of 

the limitations period is not warranted under § 352. Nothing in 

the extensive record before the Court indicates that Tatum 

suffered from a condition of “mental derangement” during the 

relevant period that rendered her incapable of caring for her 

property or transacting business, or understanding the nature or 

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effects of her acts. Contrary to Tatum’s assertion, Dr. Green’s 

testimony does not support a finding that Tatum was “insane” 

under § 352. Dr. Green’s testimony indicates that from July 

2004 to October 2004, Tatum “wouldn’t have been capable in some 

circumstances” of transacting business or making a “big 

decision” “if it involved complex decision-making and focus and 

concentration and a clear head” because “she was tired most of 

the time and preoccupied and emotionally prone to becoming 

emotional.” Green Dep. at 107-108. Dr. Green’s testimony 

further indicates that Tatum could have made complex decisions 

if she had assistance from somebody, such as “the counsel of a 

friend, a doctor, an attorney . . .” Green Dep. at 108-109. 

Dr. Green testified that Tatum’s symptoms were “fairly broad 

rang[ing] from being tense and a little obsessive to being 

somatically ridden with stomach aches, headaches, tiredness from 

poor sleep and nightmares.” Green Dep. at 110. Dr. Green 

identified Tatum’s chief complaint as the loss of function due 

to poor sleep, with major concerns about returning to work and 

feelings of dread and apprehension. Green Dep. at 45. Dr. 

Green diagnosed Tatum with an “adjustment disorder with anxiety 

and depression.” Green Dep. at 45. In response to the question 

of whether he felt that Tatum was in any way incapable of 

understanding the nature of her acts, Dr. Green testified that 

“[s]he seemed to possess a[n] intact judgment about her basic 

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acts in the world” as distinguished from complex decisions. 

Green Dep. at 111. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that 

Tatum did not suffer from a condition of “mental derangement” 

during the relevant period to justify tolling of the limitations 

period on the basis that she was “insane” under § 352. 

Turning to the issue of whether the limitations period 

should be equitably tolled, such tolling may be applied when an 

“extraordinary circumstance” beyond a plaintiff’s control made 

it impossible to file a claim on time, such as mental 

incapacity. Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 

1999). While mental disability may be a basis for equitable 

tolling in an “extraordinary circumstance,” Tatum has not 

offered sufficient evidence to establish a mental disability of 

sufficient severity to permit tolling on this basis. See id.

(equitable tolling is proper where “overwhelming evidence” 

demonstrates that complainant was completely disabled during the 

limitations period). In Stoll, unlike here, the evidence 

indicated that the plaintiff had been “completely 

psychiatrically disabled during the relevant time period.” Id. 

Here, Tatum did not offer such overwhelming evidence indicating 

that she was completely psychiatrically disabled during the 

relevant period as to be unable to protect her legal rights, as 

was the case in Stoll. In fact, Tatum’s conduct during the 

period from June, 2004 to June 2006 shows that she was capable 

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of many things and understood the nature and effects of her 

acts. For instance, Tatum hired a lawyer, successfully pursued 

a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, filed a complaint 

with the EEOC and requested a right-to-sue letter. Moreover, as 

discussed above, the record indicates that Tatum possessed an 

intact judgment about her basic acts in the world and could have 

made complex decisions with the assistance of others. The 

record further indicates that Tatum was medically cleared to 

return to work in or about May 2006. These facts militate 

against equitable tolling. Thus, while Tatum has offered 

evidence of some injury to her psyche, she did not offer 

overwhelming evidence of an exceedingly compelling nature to 

justify a finding that her symptoms constituted an 

“extraordinary circumstance” which prevented her from protecting 

her legal rights. See Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th 

Cir. 1996) (a showing of mental illness alone will not toll the 

limitation period; rather, mental illness tolls a limitation 

period only if “the illness in fact prevents the sufferer from 

managing his affairs and thus from understanding his legal 

rights and acting upon them”). Accordingly, the Court finds 

that equitable tolling is not warranted. As such, Tatum’s 

hostile work environment/sexual harassment claim is time-barred 

and the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants on 

this claim. 

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C. Second Claim: Retaliation

Tatum’s second claim, retaliation pursuant to § 1983, 

alleges violations of her rights under the equal protection 

clause of Fourteenth Amendment. However, because this theory of 

liability for retaliatory conduct falls outside of § 1983, Tatum 

is precluded from bringing a retaliation claim pursuant to § 

1983 predicated upon alleged violations of her equal protection 

rights. See Boyd v. Illinois State Police, 384 F.3d 888, 898

(7th Cir. 2004) (“the right to be free from retaliation may be 

vindicated under the First Amendment or Title VII, but not the 

equal protection clause”); see also Long v. Laramie County 

Community College District, 840 F.2d 743, 752 (10th Cir. 1988) 

(a theory of liability for retaliatory conduct, asserting 

violations of the equal protection clause does not come within § 

1983). 

 Moreover, even assuming that Tatum could state an 

actionable claim for retaliation pursuant to § 1983 for 

violations of her rights under the equal protection clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment, the claims of retaliation asserted 

under this theory of liability are time-barred. None of the 

retaliatory conduct alleged under this theory occurred within 

the two year period prior to the commencement of this action. 

Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of 

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Defendants on Tatum’s second claim, retaliation pursuant to § 

1983. 

D. Third Claim: Title VII Retaliation 

 Defendants argue that Tatum’s third claim, retaliation 

pursuant to Title VII, is time-barred. Defendants alternatively 

argue that summary judgment is appropriate with respect to this 

claim because Tatum cannot make a prima face case of retaliation

and, even if she could, she failed to rebut CDCR’s legitimate, 

non-retaliatory reason for the unlawful retaliation alleged. The 

Court agrees with Defendants’ arguments as further explained 

below. 

 As an initial matter, the Court notes that only part of 

this claim is timely, namely Tatum’s claim that CDCR retaliated 

against her by offering her a lower-paying position at a 

different facility when she sought to return to work in May 

2006. In this regard, it is undisputed that Tatum filed a 

second charge of discrimination with the EEOC in July 2006, 

received a right-to-sue letter in August 2006, and amended her 

complaint to add this claim of retaliation in September 2006. 

To the extent Tatum argues that she can state actionable claims 

of retaliation predicated upon retaliatory acts that allegedly 

occurred in 2004, the Court disagrees. Tatum did not file an 

EEOC charge within three hundred days after these alleged 

unlawful acts of retaliation occurred. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e14

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5(e)(1) (“A charge under [Title VII] shall be filed by or on 

behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after 

the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred[.]”). It is 

undisputed that the last alleged act of unlawful retaliation 

that took place in 2004 occurred on or before June 10, 2004, and 

that Tatum filed her EEOC charge more than three hundred days 

later on April 28, 2005. As such, Tatum’s Title VII retaliation 

claims predicated upon retaliatory acts occurring on or before 

June 10, 2004 are time-barred. The Court also notes that Tatum 

concedes that her claim that CDCR retaliated against her by not 

offering her a promotion in May 2005 is untimely. (Plaintiff’s 

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 

17:16-18.) 

 Thus, the remaining question is whether Tatum has an 

actionable claim of retaliation based on CDCR’s decision to 

offer her a position at a different facility when she sought to 

return to work in May 2006. To make a prima face case of 

retaliation, plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in 

protected activity, (2) she was subject to an adverse employment 

action, and (3) a causal link exists between the protected 

activity and the adverse action. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 

1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). A lateral transfer can constitute 

an adverse employment action. Id. at 1241-42. As to the 

causation element, the passing of time between the protected 

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activity and the adverse action makes it more difficult to prove 

causation. Porter v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 419 F.3d 

885, 895 (9th Cir. 2005). Where 10 months separated a 

plaintiff’s termination from her protected activity, temporal 

proximity alone was insufficient to prove a causal connection 

between the two. Grosz v. The Boeing Company, 455 F.Supp.2d 

1033, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 2006); see also Manatt v. Bank of America, 

NA, 339 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir. 2003) (no retaliation inferred 

when approximately nine months between the date of complaint and 

adverse action). If plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, 

the burden of production shifts to the defendant employer to 

advance legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for any adverse 

actions taken against plaintiff, who has the ultimate burden to 

show that the defendant employer’s proffered reasons are 

pretextual. Stegall v. Citadel Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2003). To establish that a defendant’s nonretaliatory explanation is a pretext for unlawful retaliation, a 

plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence. However, such 

evidence “must be specific and substantial to create a genuine 

issue of material fact.” Cornwell v. Electra Central Credit 

Union, 439 F.3d. 1018, 1029 (9th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff may 

show pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a 

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or 

indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation 

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is unworthy of credence.” Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. 

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, (1981). Plaintiff bears the 

ultimate burden of submitting evidence indicating that the 

Defendants’ proffered reason is merely a pretext for a 

retaliatory motive. Nilsson v. City of Mesa, 503 F.3d 947, 954 

(9th Cir. 2007). 

In the present case, the Court finds that Tatum failed to 

offer sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case of 

retaliation. Specifically, Tatum failed to offer sufficient 

evidence demonstrating that the proposed transfer was materially 

adverse. In this regard, Tatum’s only evidence is her 

uncorroborated self-serving declaration attesting that the 

proposed transfer was inferior in various ways to her former 

position. (See footnote 4, supra.) The Court finds this showing 

insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on the 

question of whether Tatum was subject to a materially adverse 

employment action. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 

281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (uncorroborated self-serving 

declaration insufficient to create a genuine issue of material 

fact). Tatum’s declaration is simply not meaningful evidence 

from which a fact finder could compare her former position with 

the proposed transfer to determine if the positions were 

materially similar. 

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 Moreover, even assuming Tatum was subject to a material 

adverse employment action, Tatum failed to offer sufficient 

evidence on the issue of causation. Tatum did not offer direct 

evidence demonstrating a causal connection between Tatum’s 

protected activity (EEOC complaint) and the adverse employment 

action (proposed transfer), nor can a causal connection be 

inferred. While close proximity in time between Tatum’s EEOC 

complaint and the proposed transfer could support an inference 

of a causal connection, causation cannot be inferred under the 

circumstances because more than twelve months separated Tatum’s 

first EEOC complaint and the proposed transfer. The lack of 

temporal proximity without some additional circumstance 

suggesting causation makes it too difficult for Tatum to create 

a genuine issue of material fact as to causation. See Vasquez 

v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 646 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Tatum has not offered any evidence from which a trier of fact 

could find a causal connection between her EEOC complaint and 

the proposed transfer. Finally, even assuming causation, Tatum 

failed to offer sufficient evidence on the issue of pretext. 

Tatum neither offered direct evidence of pretext nor specific 

and substantial evidence indicating that CDCR’s non-retaliatory 

reason given for the proposed transfer, namely that CDCR could 

not accommodate Tatum’s request to place her in a position at 

CMF that was not in the proximity or under the supervision of 

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Jensen or Zeh, was merely a pretext for retaliation. See

Hardage v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1188-89 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (even assuming causation, summary judgment for 

employer granted where plaintiff failed to rebut the legitimate 

reason for giving adverse performance review). For instance, 

Tatum did not offer evidence indicating that CDCR could have 

offered her a position at CMF in May 2006 that accommodated her 

restrictions. Nor did she offer specific and substantial 

evidence indicating that the proposed transfer was inferior in 

any meaningful way to her former position at CMF. In short, 

Tatum failed to rebut CDCR’s legitimate reason given for the 

proposed transfer by showing that a discriminatory reason more 

likely motivated CDCR or that CDCR’s proffered explanation for 

the proposed transfer is unworthy of credence. There is no 

compelling evidence before the Court supporting the notion that 

Tatum was offered a transfer for any other reason than to 

accommodate her restrictions. Accordingly, the Court grants 

summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Tatum’s third claim, 

retaliation pursuant to Title VII.5

 

5

 In light of the foregoing, the Court need not consider the 

alternative arguments raised by Defendants in support of their 

motion for summary judgment. In addition, the Court need not 

consider the collateral estoppel arguments raised by Tatum in 

her cross-motion for summary adjudication. 

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III. ORDER 

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment is GRANTED and Tatum’s cross-motion for summary 

adjudication is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to 

enter judgment in accordance with this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 8, 2008 

 

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