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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 12-13281

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 5:10-cv-00237-WTH-TBS

DONNIE WAYNE NIPPER, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

WARDEN, FCC COLEMAN – MEDIUM, 

 Respondent-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(January 8, 2015)

Before HULL, MARTIN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Donnie Wayne Nipper, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the

district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for a writ of habeas 

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corpus. Nipper argues that the 195-month prison sentence imposed after he 

pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), exceeds the maximum 120-month term authorized by

Congress. Specifically, he argues that because of several intervening U.S. 

Supreme Court decisions, his prior convictions for common-law robbery and

“breaking or entering” did not qualify as predicate convictions supporting an 

enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(1).1

 Nipper further argues that the government may not support his 

ACCA enhancement now by relying on prior convictions it did not rely upon at 

sentencing. After careful review, and in light of our recent decision in Bryant v. 

Warden, FCC Coleman – Medium, 738 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2013), we affirm.

We review de novo whether a prisoner may bring a § 2241 petition under the 

28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) “savings clause.” Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1262. “When a 

conviction has become final, a federal prisoner usually may challenge the legality 

of his detention only through a § 2255 motion [to vacate].” Id. at 1256. Once a 

prisoner has filed a § 2255 motion, he must apply for and receive permission from 

this Court before filing a successive § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); 

Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1260. Here, Nipper unsuccessfully sought permission to file a 

 1 Under the ACCA, a defendant convicted under § 922(g) is subject to a mandatory 

minimum 15-year prison sentence if he has 3 prior convictions for a violent felony or a serious 

drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(1). A § 922(g) conviction otherwise carries a 10-year maximum prison term. 

§ 924(a)(2).

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successive § 2255 motion in the Fourth Circuit. 

However, a prisoner may file a § 2241 petition if he shows that a § 2255 

motion was “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2255(e); Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1256, 1262. Whether this provision—the 

§ 2255(e) “savings clause”—may “open the portal” to a § 2241 petition is a 

“jurisdictional question” that must be decided before addressing the merits of a 

petitioner’s claims. Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1262. The restrictions on filing successive 

§ 2255 motions do not alone render a § 2255 remedy inadequate or ineffective for 

purposes of the “savings clause.” See id. at 1267.

In Bryant, we held that to show that a prior § 2255 motion was inadequate or 

ineffective, a petitioner asserting a sentencing error must establish that: (1) binding 

circuit precedent squarely foreclosed the claim “throughout his sentencing, direct 

appeal, and first § 2255 proceeding”; (2) “subsequent to his first § 2255 

proceeding,” a U.S. Supreme Court decision overturned that circuit precedent; 

(3) the rule announced in that decision applies retroactively on collateral review; 

and (4) as a result of that new rule, the petitioner’s sentence exceeds the statutory 

maximum authorized by Congress. 738 F.3d at 1274, 1281. The claims Nipper 

raises in his § 2241 petition do not satisfy these jurisdictional requirements because 

none of the U.S. Supreme Court cases on which he relies were decided 

“subsequent to his first § 2255 proceeding,” id. at 1274, which concluded on 

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October 29, 2010. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 130 S. Ct. 

2577 (decided June 14, 2010); Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 130 S. Ct. 

1265 (decided March 2, 2010); Hunter v. United States, 558 U.S. 1143, 130 S. Ct. 

1135 (decided January 19, 2010), Watts v. United States, 558 U.S. 1143, 130 S. Ct. 

1134 (same)2; Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 129 S. Ct. 687 (decided 

January 13, 2009); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (decided 

April 16, 2008); cf. In re Hill, 113 F.3d 181, 182–84 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding 

that a new rule of law was not “previously unavailable” for purposes of a 

successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition because the Supreme Court decision 

forming the basis for the new rule was issued while the petitioner’s prior § 2254 

proceedings were pending). Consequently, the district court lacked jurisdiction to 

consider Nipper’s § 2241 petition. 

During this appeal, Nipper has filed several Notices of Supplemental 

Authorities, in which he seeks to rely on cases decided since the conclusion of the

district court proceedings. The only Supreme Court case he cites is Descamps v. 

United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). There, the Court considered

whether a sentencing court may examine certain documents to determine whether a 

prior conviction for a crime with a single, indivisible set of elements qualifies as a 

 2 Hunter and Watts do not satisfy the § 2255(e) savings clause for the additional reason 

that neither case overruled circuit precedent. Both decisions consisted of a single sentence in 

which the Supreme Court granted the petitions for certiorari and remanded the cases to this Court 

in light of the position asserted in the government’s briefs. See Hunter, 558 U.S. 1143, 130 S.

Ct. 1135; Watts, 558 U.S. 1143, 130 S. Ct. 1134.

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“violent felony” under the ACCA’s enumerated-offenses provision, 

§ 924(e)(2)(B). Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281–83. The Court concluded that, 

when faced with a prior conviction for violating an indivisible statute—i.e., one not 

containing alternative elements—sentencing courts may apply only the 

“categorical approach,” which requires comparing the elements of the statute 

forming the basis of the prior conviction with the elements of the “generic” version 

of that crime. See id. at 2283

Nipper may not “open the portal” to a § 2241 petition based on Descamps. 

Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has held that Descamps applies 

retroactively on collateral review. Beyond that, Descamps was decided in the 

context of a direct appeal, and the Supreme Court has not since applied it to a case 

on collateral review. See id. at 2282–83; cf. In re Anderson, 396 F.3d 1336, 1339 

(11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 

738 (2005), was not retroactively applicable in part because it was decided on 

direct appeal and the Supreme Court had not applied it to a case on collateral 

review).

Finally, none of the remaining cases cited in Nipper’s Notices of 

Supplemental Authorities contradict the fact that all of the Supreme Court cases on 

which he relied in his § 2241 petition were decided well before the conclusion of 

his § 2255 proceedings. For those reasons, we affirm the dismissal of Nipper’s 

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§ 2241 petition. 

AFFIRMED.

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