Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05120/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05120-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 2, 2004 Decided January 11, 2005

No. 03-5120

LAWRENCE BATTLE,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv01350)

Thomas J. Gagliardo argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant.

Oliver W. McDaniel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S.

Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered

an appearance.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

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ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Lawrence Battle appeals the grant

of summary judgment to the Federal Aviation Administration

(“FAA”) in his lawsuit seeking to enforce an arbitration award

that arose from internal FAA personnel procedures of which

Battle availed himself upon being dismissed from employment.

Despite the FAA’s termination of the neutral arbitrator’s

services, the neutral arbitrator, with the employee member,

issued an opinion and award in Battle’s favor, which the FAA

refused to recognize. The district court concluded that it had

jurisdiction and granted summary judgment to the FAA. Battle

appeals, contending that the arbitration panel acted within its

authority and the FAA had no discretion under its internal rules

to abandon the arbitration process midstream. The FAA

responds that the district court lacked jurisdiction, that the case

is not ripe, and that, in any event, it did not violate its internal

rules. Upon de novo review, we hold that the district court had

subject matter jurisdiction over Battle’s complaint because the

termination of the neutral arbitrator’s services was not a final

order of the FAA Administrator concerning “aviation duties and

powers.” 49 U.S.C.A. § 46110(a) (West Supp. 2004). We

further hold that, in light of Battle’s pursuit of disability

discrimination claims and the neutral arbitrator’s stated intent to

consider such claims in the internal appeals proceeding, the

FAA’s actions are properly understood as enforcing its rules,

which preclude consideration of discrimination claims, and

therefore Battle’s claim under United States ex rel. Accardi v.

Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), is without merit.

Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

I.

In 1995, Congress divested the Merit Systems Protection

Board (“MSPB”) of jurisdiction over certain types of FAA

adverse personnel actions and authorized the FAA to establish

an internal process to be known as “Guaranteed Fair Treatment”

(“GFT”). See Department of Transportation and Related

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Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No.

104-50, § 347, 109 Stat. 436, 460 (1995). Congress

retroactively restored the MSPB’s jurisdiction in May 2000, but

the GFT appeals process remains. See Wendell H. Ford

Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, Pub.

L. No. 106-181, tit. III, § 307(a), 114 Stat. 61, 124 (2000)

(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40122(g)-(i) (2000)). Under the GFT

rules promulgated by the FAA, an employee has the right to

appeal a removal decision to a three-person arbitration panel

composed of a representative of the employee, a representative

of the FAA, and a neutral arbitrator. FAA Personnel

Management System ch. III, § 5(e) (Mar. 28, 1996)

(“FAAPMS”). However, the rules provide exceptions and

restrictions. Thus, “[c]laims of statutorily prohibited

discrimination may not be raised in the FAA Appeals

Procedure,” but shall be pursued under an alternative procedure

for such claims that begins with a consultation with an Equal

Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor in the

Transportation Department’s Office of Civil Rights. Id. ch. III,

§ 5(n). Under the May 2000 amendment, the MSPB also has

jurisdiction over so-called “mixed claims,” i.e., cases partially

involving claims of statutory discrimination. See 49 U.S.C. §

40122(g)(2)(H), (g)(3); 5 U.S.C. § 7702 (2000); Miller v. Dep’t

of Transp., 86 M.S.P.R. 293 (2000). The GFT rules also do not

permit an award of attorney or representation fees. FAAPMS

ch. III, § 5(l). Finally, the rules provide that “[d]ecisions of the

[arbitration] panel shall be issued as final orders of the [FAA]

Administrator under 49 U.S.C. [§] 46110.” Id. ch. III, § 5(m).

The FAA notified Battle on January 7, 2000, following his

absence from work for nearly seventeen months, of its proposal

to terminate his employment for “non-disciplinary reasons,”

namely because of his “unavailability to perform the duties of

[his] current position” and his “inability to perform the essential

functions of [his] position.” The termination became effective

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February 20, 2000, based on the FAA’s conclusion that although

Battle claimed he was unable to work a class of jobs or perform

a class of functions because of a “generalized anxiety disorder,”

he was not “disabled” under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §

791(g) (2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2000), because he

only was unable to work for a particular supervisor. The letter

of termination also advised that Battle could appeal the decision

through the GFT process, or, if he believed the decision was

based on discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex, national

origin, disability, age, or sexual orientation, or retaliation for

participation in the EEO process, he could file a discrimination

claim with the Transportation Department’s Office of Civil

Rights. 

Battle appealed his termination on two fronts. A letter from

his counsel advised the FAA that Battle claimed that he was

“disabled,” that he was discriminated against on the basis of race

or participation in the EEO process, and that he was denied

procedural due process. First, Battle invoked the GFT appeals

process rather than the more formal processes before the MSPB

that became available in May 2000. See 49 U.S.C. §

40122(g)(2)(H), (g)(3); 5 U.S.C. § 7702 . Second, he invoked

the EEO process, and he ultimately sued the FAA in federal

court alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2000), the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2000), and the

Rehabilitation Act, id. § 701 et seq. 

Pursuant to Battle’s request to proceed with the GFT appeal,

the FAA appointed Dr. Andrée McKissick as the neutral

member of the three-person arbitration panel to hear his appeal.

However, the FAA advised Battle that it would file a motion to

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction if he presented his discrimination

claims to the panel and requested relief – such as money

damages for emotional distress, attorneys’ fees and costs – that

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was unavailable under the GFT appeals process. At the time,

the neutral arbitrator stated that the arbitration would proceed

because Battle’s attorney advised that there were issues

unrelated to the discrimination claims that could be presented to

the panel. When Battle persisted in raising allegations that the

FAA viewed to be claims of discrimination, the FAA moved to

dismiss. The neutral arbitrator held the motion in abeyance

while conducting three days of hearings in which the panel

heard evidence of discrimination. At this point the FAA wrote

to the neutral arbitrator seeking assurance that the discrimination

claims would not be considered during the GFT appeals process.

The FAA explained that it was not seeking to prevent Battle

from making his claims; rather, it was seeking to ensure that he

brought them in the appropriate forum. The neutral arbitrator

responded by letter of July 14, 2000, that her inquiry into

whether the FAA had “just cause” to fire Battle necessitated

consideration of general notions of discrimination by looking to

the treatment of similarly situated persons. Three days later the

FAA – by letter signed by the Assistant Administrator for

Human Resource Management, the Deputy Chief Counsel, and

the Director of Air Traffic System Requirements – informed the

neutral arbitrator that her services were terminated. The FAA

also informed Battle’s counsel of its action and advised, by

letters of July 18 and 19, 2000, that, in light of the MSPB’s

jurisdiction over “mixed cases,” it had forwarded Battle’s case

file to the MSPB. 

On September 18, 2000, the ex-neutral arbitrator issued an

“Opinion and Award” for herself and the employee member of

the arbitration panel, finding discrimination in the removal

process, ordering that Battle be reinstated with back pay, and

awarding attorneys’ fees. The FAA refused to recognize the

award and so informed Battle on November 28, 2000. Battle

filed suit in the district court seeking to enforce the Opinion and

Award, alleging that the FAA’s refusal violated “[FAA] policy

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and federal law,” as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment. On cross motions for summary judgment, the

district court ruled it had jurisdiction because an “adverse

employment action . . . is not the kind of action” that falls within

the courts of appeals’ exclusive jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C.A.

§ 46110(a), and it granted the FAA’s motion for summary

judgment. Construing Battle’s complaint to raise an Accardi

claim based on the allegation that the FAA had violated its rules,

the district court assumed a violation but found no prejudice

because Battle’s EEO lawsuit against the FAA was still pending.

The district court rejected Battle’s due process claim on the

ground that he did not have a protected interest in pursuing a

discrimination claim before the GFT panel. Battle appeals only

the denial of his Accardi claim.

II.

As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the

district court had jurisdiction over Battle’s lawsuit to enforce the

arbitration award. The FAA argues that the district court was

statutorily barred from addressing the merits of Battle’s claims

because 49 U.S.C.A. § 46110(a) vests exclusive jurisdiction in

the courts of appeals. Although neither party addresses the

current version of § 46110(a), as amended in 2003, that version

is controlling. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.

244, 274 (1994); Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112, 116-17

(1952). As relevant, the 2003 amendment to § 46110(a) deleted

the word “safety” (as shown below in brackets). See Century of

Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176, tit. II, §

228, 117 Stat. 2490, 2532 (2003). Section 46110(a) now

provides, in relevant part:

[A] person disclosing a substantial interest in an

order issued by the Secretary of Transportation (or

the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security

with respect to security duties and powers

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designated to be carried out by the Under Secretary

or the Administrator of the Federal Aviation

Administration with respect to aviation [safety]

duties and powers designated to be carried out by

the Administrator) in whole or in part under this

part, part B, or subsection (l) or (s) of section 114

may apply for review of the order by filing a

petition for review in the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in

the court of appeals of the United States for the

circuit in which the person resides or has its

principal place of business. 

49 U.S.C.A. § 46110(a) (West Supp. 2004) (emphasis

added). 

We begin with the statutory text, see e.g., Engine Mfrs.

Ass’n v. S. Coast Air QualityMgmt. Dist., 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761

(2004), viewed in the context of the GFT appeals process, while

recognizing the obligation to give effect to each word in a

statute, see Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540

U.S. 461, 489 n.13 (2004); Asiana Airlines v. FAA, 134 F.3d

393, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The plain language of § 46110(a)

limits the courts of appeals’ exclusive jurisdiction to the

Administrator’s orders relating to her “aviation duties and

powers.” The FAA maintains that its decision to terminate

Battle’s GFT appeal was a final decision under FAAMS, which

falls within Part A of Subtitle VII of Title 49, and that Battle’s

attempt to enforce the arbitration award is a collateral attack on

that final FAA decision. While there may be personnel actions

that would relate to the Administrator’s “aviation duties and

powers,” see, e.g., Lopez v. FAA, 318 F.3d 242 (D.C. Cir. 2003),

this is not such a case. The decision to terminate the GFT

appeals process was made in the context of an intra-agency

appeal involving a personnel claim by an employee who was a

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Management and Program Analyst and whose responsibilities,

so far as the record reveals, were administrative in nature.

Battle’s attempt, through enforcement of the arbitration award,

to be reinstated with back pay, as well as the FAA’s termination

of the neutral arbitrator, were unrelated to the Administrator’s

“aviation duties and powers” except to the extent that anything

involving the FAA relates to aviation duties and powers. Were

the court to hold that any intra-agency appeal challenging

dismissal from employment falls within § 46110(a), there would

be no meaning left to the limiting clause. 

 The court owes no deference to the FAA’s interpretation of

our jurisdiction. See Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. U.S.

Dep’t of Interior, 252 F.3d 473, 478-80 (D.C. Cir.), modified on

denial of reh’g, 270 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Consequently,

the FAA’s reliance on the FAAPMS’s provision that

“[d]ecisions of the [arbitration] panel,” FAAMPS ch. III, § 5(m),

are treated as the Administrator’s final orders under § 46110(a),

is of no moment. While the court has previously considered a

petition for review from an opinion and award of the GFT

arbitration panel under the pre-2003 version of § 46110(a), see

Kropat v. FAA, 162 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the court did not

confront the jurisdictional issue now raised by the FAA.

Moreover, the FAA’s decision to terminate the neutral

arbitrator’s services and to end the GFT appeals process were

not “[d]ecisions of the [arbitration] panel” to which FAAMPS

ch. III, § 5(m) applies. 

Accordingly, we hold that the district court had jurisdiction

over Battle’s complaint challenging the FAA’s termination of

the neutral arbitrator and seeking enforcement of her Opinion

and Award. 

III.

Our review of the grant of summary judgment is de novo.

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See Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Battle’s

appeal is limited to his Accardi claim that the FAA violated its

GFT rules through termination of the neutral arbitrator’s

services and cancellation of the appeals proceeding in the

absence of an internal rule permitting it to do so. Hence, his due

process claim is waived. 

In Accardi, 347 U.S. 260, the Supreme Court held that the

Attorney General acted improperly in attempting to influence

deportation proceedings before the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) despite his prior delegation, by regulation, to

the BIA of his discretionary authority under the immigration

laws. The Court stated that “as long as the regulations remain

operative, the Attorney General denies himself the right to

sidestep the [BIA] or dictate its decision in any manner.” Id. at

267. Accardi has come to stand for the proposition that agencies

may not violate their own rules and regulations to the prejudice

of others. See, e.g., Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 639 (D.C.

Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court has explained that the

application of this principle is not limited to instances like

Accardi where an agency “fail[s] to exercise it own discretion,

contrary to existing valid regulations,” 347 U.S. at 268, but it

also applies where dismissal from federal employment falls

“substantially short of the requirements of the applicable

departmental regulations,” Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535,

545 (1959); see also Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 373-76

(1957). As this court has recognized, “‘[a] court’s duty to

enforce an agency regulation[, while] most evident when

compliance with the regulation is mandated by the Constitution

or federal law,’ embraces as well agency regulations that are not

so required.” Lopez, 318 F.3d at 247 (quoting United States v.

Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 749 (1979)). “[A]gencies cannot ‘relax

or modify’ regulations that provide the only safeguard

individuals have against unlimited agency discretion in hiring

and termination.” Id. (citing Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d

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701, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 

Count One of Battle’s complaint alleges that the FAA’s

“refusal to abide by the decision of the arbitration panel violates

[FAA] policy.” As the essence of an Accardi claim is that an

agency did not follow its rules, and Battle argued his claim in

the district court as if it was based on Accardi, the FAA’s

suggestion that it lacked sufficient notice to mount an adequate

defense is unpersuasive. Cf. Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

216 F.3d 1111, 1114-15 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Its ripeness claim

fares no better. Maintaining that the Accardi claim is not ripe

because Battle could prevail and obtain all the relief he seeks in

his EEO lawsuit, the FAA overlooks that Battle’s EEO suit is

the result of a proceeding unrelated to the FAA’s internal GFT

appeals process and has no bearing on whether the FAA had

authority to terminate the neutral arbitrator’s services and to end

the appeals proceeding. Moreover, the harm resulting from the

delay in enforcement of the arbitration award, if valid, is

obvious, and Battle’s contention is hardly an abstract

controversy that will reach a more definite form by postponing

review. Cf. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FAA, 292 F.3d 875,

881 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

Turning to the merits of his Accardi claim, Battle contends

that once the arbitration panel was convened, the FAA, as

required by the GFT rules, ceded authority over Battle’s

personnel status to the arbitration panel, and the FAA’s decision

to abandon the arbitration process midstream was not authorized

by any provision of the GFT rules. Battle, however, does not

dispute that the GFT proceedings are not to encompass statutory

discrimination claims. Yet the record shows that Battle pursued

two parallel proceedings in which he raised the same

discrimination claims. His pleadings in his GFT appeal

contained references to the same statutorily prohibited

discrimination that he also pursued in his EEO complaint to the

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Transportation Department’s Office of Civil Rights.

Specifically, Battle’s written statement of appeal to the GFT

panel raised claims of disability discrimination and alleged that

the FAA had failed to provide an appropriate accommodation

for his “generalized anxiety disorder.” While his then-counsel

assured FAA officials that he was raising issues unrelated to

statutory discrimination claims, his GFT appeal did not proceed

in that manner. Instead, Battle sought to use discovery, which

is not permitted in GTF proceedings, see FAAPMS ch. III, §

5(g), to press his claims of discriminatory and retaliatory

removal. Furthermore, he presented evidence of statutorily

prohibited discrimination in addressing the “fairness” of his

termination. 

Faced with an employee who, although forewarned, was not

following the GFT rules in appealing the termination of his

employment, the FAA first moved to dismiss the GFT appeals

proceeding. When the neutral arbitrator deferred ruling on the

motion, the FAA sought assurance from the neutral arbitrator

that she was not going “to allow testimonial and/or documentary

evidence, and/or issue rulings/decisions involving allegations of

prohibited discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil

Rights Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act, or any other anti-discrimination law.” The

FAA explained in its letter to the neutral arbitrator that it took its

“stewardship of [the GFT] process seriously” and that the

neutral arbitrator’s failure to assure the FAA that she would

comply with the GFT rules or to act consistently with her

assurance would result in the termination of her services. The

neutral arbitrator’s response failed to provide assurance.

Asserting that she had “fully complied with the FAA’s [GFT]

Appeals Procedure,” the neutral arbitrator took the position,

however, that “to analyze whether or not the process of

[Battle’s] removal was fair[,] it is crucial to discern how other

similarly situated employees were treated under the same or

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similar circumstances.” The neutral arbitrator continued:

Since the circumstances of this grievance involves [sic]

the request for reasonable accommodations and the

concurrent request for [Battle] to be categorized as a

disabled person, it is essential to weigh the testimonies

of the [FAA] officials who dealt with this request and

their rationale for not characterizing [Battle] as being

handicapped. It is impossible to judge the merits of

this case and exercise due process without this

analysis.

Fairness is implicit to [sic] the concept of just cause;

. . . Clearly, the [FAA] is required to demonstrate that

its action to remove [Battle] was reasonable and thus

implemented in a non-discriminatory manner. In sum,

I have requested that the [FAA] show, through

testimony of [its] officials, the absence of

discrimination in this regard. 

In other words, the neutral arbitrator informed the FAA that she

was addressing disability discrimination, under the guise of a

“just cause” determination, in terms virtually indistinguishable

from a statutory claim under the Rehabilitation Act. See 29

U.S.C. § 791(g); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111. 

Now faced not only with an employee who was attempting

to use the GFT appeals process to pursue claims that the GFT

rules barred, but also with a neutral arbitrator whom the FAA

reasonably could conclude was allowing the employee’s claims

to be considered contrary to the GFT rules, the FAA, having

previously alerted both individuals to the limited nature of GFT

appeals process and having been rebuffed, terminated the neutral

arbitrator’s services. While the FAA could not have known the

content of the neutral’s purported “Opinion and Award” at the

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time that it terminated her services (or that she would even issue

a decision), the Opinion and Award was consistent with the

position taken by the neutral arbitrator, namely, that

discrimination would be addressed. The Opinion proved the

FAA’s concerns to be legitimate by repeatedly using

terminology found in Title I of the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117, as incorporated into

the Rehabilitation Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 791(g), determining that

Battle’s inability to perform essential duties was caused by a

“legitimate mental impairment,” and ruling that a FAA

employee proficient in reasonable accommodations under the

ADA should consider Battle’s request for a transfer. 

Under the circumstances, Battle mischaracterizes the nature

of the FAA’s termination of the neutral arbitrator’s services.

Rather than seeking to exert improper influence on the

substantive outcome of the proceeding, as the Attorney General

sought to do in Accardi, or otherwise failing to provide Battle

with a process to which he is entitled, the FAA’s action is

properly understood as enforcing the GFT rules, which provide

that discrimination claims are beyond the purview of the GFT

appeals process and are to be addressed by the Transportation

Department’s Office of Civil Rights, see FAAMPS ch. III, §

5(n), or by the MSPB, see 49 U.S.C. § 40122(g)(2)(H), (g)(3);

5 U.S.C. § 7702. Absent such action by the FAA in the face of

the neutral arbitrator’s stated intent and failure in fact to abide

by the limitations of the GFT appeals process, the integrity of

the GFT appeals process would have been compromised.

Further, the FAA would have abdicated its responsibility to

facilitate the prompt, fair, and consistent resolution of claims

properly within the GFT appeals process while ensuring that

discrimination claims are resolved in the proper forum.

Contrary to Battle’s suggestion on appeal, nothing in the record

suggests that the FAA sought to interfere with the substantive

relief to which Battle may be entitled; rather, the FAA sought to

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channel his claims to the authorized forum and did so. While

Battle maintains that the FAA could have waited for an award

to be issued by the panel and then raised the ultra vires issue in

a timely action seeking direct review, or, alternatively, waited

until Battle attempted to enforce the award, Battle cites only §

46110(a), which provides no statutory authority for the former,

and Accardi does not require the latter. It was Battle and the

neutral arbitrator, not the FAA, who ignored the FAA’s GFT

rules. Under these extraordinary circumstances, the FAA’s

action in bringing the ultra vires GFT appeals proceeding to a

halt by terminating the neutral arbitrator’s services was not

precluded by Accardi.

Morever, the FAA’s decision to terminate the GFT appeals

process and transfer Battle’s case file to the MSPB, which has

jurisdiction over “mixed cases,” instead of appointing another

neutral arbitrator to hear Battle’s claims presents no Accardi

violation. Despite Battle’s discrimination claims, the FAA did

not attempt unilaterally to terminate the GFT appeals process at

the outset. Instead, the FAA advised Battle of the proper forum

for such claims, and when he persisted in presenting

discrimination claims in his GFT appeal, the FAA filed a motion

with the arbitration panel to dismiss the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction. While Battle had the option to elect among the

available fora for review of “a major adverse personnel action,”

49 U.S.C. § 40122(i), he had no right to select an inappropriate

forum, here contesting statutorily prohibited discrimination

through the GFT appeals process, see FAAPMS ch. III, § 5(n),

when such claims were within the purview of the Transportation

Department’s EEO process, see id., or the MSPB, see 49 U.S.C.

§ 40122(g)(2)(H), (g)(3); 5 U.S.C. § 7702. Because Battle was

not entitled to pursue discrimination claims in the GFT appeals

process, yet persisted in attempting to do so, the FAA did not

violate Accardi when it terminated the proceeding and

transferred his appeal to the MSPB after the neutral arbitrator

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allowed him to proceed. 

Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

So ordered.

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