Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_14-cv-00175/USCOURTS-alnd-4_14-cv-00175-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

ROGER W. WATTS, JR., as Trustee

for Bethlehem Management,

Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES E. TURNBACH, et al.,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 4:14-CV-0175-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Roger W. Watts, Jr. (“Mr. Watts”) is representing himself in this

action. (Doc. 1). This matter is before the court on the objections (Doc. 16) of Mr.

Watts to Magistrate Judge John H. England, III’s report and recommendation (the

“R&R”) (Doc. 15), which proposes that Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss (Doc. 7) 1

(the “Dismissal Motion”) be granted and that Mr. Watts’s lawsuit be dismissed

without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 15 at 7).

Defendants’ Dismissal Motion and supporting brief were all filed on February

The parties have not consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge.

1

Therefore, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the magistrate judge entered a

report and recommendation.

FILED

 2014 May-12 PM 01:54

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:14-cv-00175-VEH Document 18 Filed 05/12/14 Page 1 of 13
17, 2014. (Docs. 7, 8). Mr. Watts filed a response and affidavit in opposition to the

Dismissal Motion on March 3, 2014. (Docs. 12, 13). 

The R&R was entered on April 11, 2014. (Doc. 15). Mr. Watts’s objections

were filed on April 22, 2014. (Doc. 16). This case was randomly reassigned to the

undersigned judge on May 1, 2014. (Doc. 17). The matter, therefore, is now under

submission, and for the reasons explained below, the court OVERRULES Mr.

Watts’s objections, and ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge England’s R&R as

minimally modified below.

Additionally, the court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions

(Doc. 10) (the “Sanctions Motion”) filed on February 28, 2014, and TERMS as

MOOT Mr. Watts’s Objection Motion To Quash and Dismiss Unrecognized

Respondent(s) Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions (Doc. 14) (the “Objection”), filed on

March 12, 2014, for the reasons discussed below.

II. Standards

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Dismissal Standard

As the Eleventh Circuit has explained the standard on motions to dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction:

Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1) come in two forms. “Facial attacks” on the complaint “require[

] the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently

2

Case 4:14-cv-00175-VEH Document 18 Filed 05/12/14 Page 2 of 13
alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his

complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion.” Menchaca

v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449

U.S. 953, 101 S. Ct. 358, 66 L. Ed. 2d 217 (1980) (citing Mortensen v.

First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)).

“Factual attacks,” on the other hand, challenge “the existence of subject

matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters

outside the pleadings, such astestimony and affidavits, are considered.”

Id.

These two forms of attack differ substantially. On a facial attack,

a plaintiff is afforded safeguards similar to those provided in opposing

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion-the court must consider the allegations of the

complaint to be true. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S. Ct. 396, 70 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1981). But

when the attack is factual, 

the trial court may proceed asit never could under 12(b)(6)

or Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1)

motion is the trial court’s jurisdiction-its very power to

hear the case-there is substantial authority that the trial

court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to

the existence of its power to hear the case. In short, no

presumptive truthfulness attachesto plaintiff's allegations,

and the existence of disputed material facts will not

preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits

of jurisdictional claims.

Id. at 412-13 (quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).

Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990). Here, the

jurisdictional attack by Defendants is facial.

B. District Court Review of Report and Recommendation

After conducting a “careful and complete” review of the findings and

3

Case 4:14-cv-00175-VEH Document 18 Filed 05/12/14 Page 3 of 13
recommendations, a district judgemayaccept, reject, ormodify the magistrate judge’s

report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court may

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made

by the magistrate judge.”); Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1982)

(quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 408 (5thCir. 1982), overruled on other

grounds by Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996)).2

The district judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the

magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the

report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is

made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This requires that the district judge “give fresh

consideration to those issues to which specific objection has been made by a party.”

Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ., 896 F.2d 507, 512 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing H.R. Rep.

No. 94-1609, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

News 6162, 6163). In contrast, those portions of the R&R to which no objection is

made need only be reviewed for clear error. Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781,

The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit 2

decisions issued before October 1, 1981, as well as all decisions issued after that date

by a Unit B panel of the former Fifth Circuit. Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d

33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1361 n.4

(11th Cir. 2009) (discussing the continuing validity of Nettles).

4

Case 4:14-cv-00175-VEH Document 18 Filed 05/12/14 Page 4 of 13
784 (11th Cir. 2006).

3

“Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review, de

novo, findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct.”

United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.

2003)). It is incumbent upon the parties to timely raise any objections that they may

have regarding a magistrate judge’s findings contained in a report and

recommendation, as the failure to do so subsequently waives or abandons the issue,

even if such matter was presented at the magistrate judge level. See, e.g., United

States v. Pilati, 627 F.3d 1360 at 1365 (11th Cir. 2010) (“While Pilati raised the issue

of not being convicted of a qualifying offense before the magistrate judge, he did not

raise thisissue in his appeal to the district court. Thus, this argument has been waived

or abandoned by his failure to raise it on appeal to the district court.”). However, the

Macort dealt only with the standard of review to be applied to a magistrate’s 3

factual findings, but the Supreme Court has held that there is no reason for the district

court to apply a different standard to a magistrate’s legal conclusions. Thomas v. Arn,

474 U.S. 140, 150, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985). Thus, district courts in

this circuit have routinely applied a clear-error standard to both. See Tauber v.

Barnhart, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1373-74 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (collecting cases). This is

to be contrasted with the standard of review on appeal, which distinguishes between

the two. See Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437, 1440 (11th Cir. 1991) (when a

magistrate’s findings of fact are adopted by the district court without objection, they

are reviewed on appeal under a plain-error standard, but questions of law remain

subject to de novo review).

5

Case 4:14-cv-00175-VEH Document 18 Filed 05/12/14 Page 5 of 13
district judge has discretion to consider or to decline to consider arguments that were

not raised before the magistrate judge. Stephens v. Tolbert, 471 F.3d 1173, 1176 (11th

Cir. 2006); see also Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009)

(“Thus, we answer the question left open in Stephens and hold that a district court has

discretion to decline to consider a party’s argument when that argument was not first

presented to the magistrate judge.”).

“Parties filing objections must specifically identify those findings objected to.

Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the district

court.” Nettles, 677 F.2d at 410 n.8. “This rule facilitates the opportunity for district

judges to spend more time on matters actually contested and produces a result

compatible with the purposes of the Magistrates Act.” Id. at 410. Indeed, a contrary

rule “would effectively nullify the magistrate judge’s consideration of the matter and

would not help to relieve the workload of the district court.” Williams, 557 F.3d at

1292 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d

615, 622 (9th Cir. 2000)).

III. Analysis

A. Motions Addressed by the R&R

The R&R correctly recognizesthat federal courts are judicial bodies of limited

power and are precluded from acting “beyond [their] constitutional orstatutory grant

6

Case 4:14-cv-00175-VEH Document 18 Filed 05/12/14 Page 6 of 13
of subject-matter jurisdiction.” (Doc. 15 at 5 (citing Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d

1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001)). The R&R recommends that a jurisdictional dismissal

of Mr. Watts’s action is appropriate because neither diversity jurisdiction, as

bestowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1332, nor federal question jurisdiction, as delineated by 28

U.S.C. § 1331 is present. (Doc. 15 at 5-7).

The court has studied Mr. Watts’s objections (Doc. 16) and nothing contained

in them specifically contests or otherwise brings into question the thorough

jurisdictional analysis conducted by Magistrate Judge England. Further, the court

agrees with the contents of the R&R and concludes that Mr. Watts’s dispute is due

to be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Relatedly,

the court further determines that Mr. Watts’s separately filed Motion for Entry of

Default by the Clerk of Court (Doc. 4) (the “Default Motion”), which is discussed in

the R&R but never expressly addressed in the formof a recommended ruling is, in the

absence of any authority for this court to exercise jurisdiction, due to be termed as

moot. 

B. Defendants’ Sanctions Motion and Mr. Watts’s Objection

Defendants’ Sanctions Motion seeks reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees and

injunctive relief preventing Mr. Watts “from making any further filing in this Court,

or in any other federal or state court related to the Defendants without prior

7

Case 4:14-cv-00175-VEH Document 18 Filed 05/12/14 Page 7 of 13
permission from the Court.” (Doc. 10). Defendants’ brief in support asserts Mr.

Watts’s claim is a frivolous one regarding a fictitious judgment based on Sovereign

Citizen principles and therefore supports sanctions under Rule 11. In response, Mr.

Wattsfiled a document titled “Objection Motion to Quash and Dismiss Unrecognized

Respondent(s) Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions,” (Doc. 14), which continues the similar

statements to previous filings and does not specifically address any of the

Defendants’ arguments.

Under Rule 11, “[i]f, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the

court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an

appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is

responsible for the violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). “A sanction imposed under

this rule must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or

comparable conduct by others similarly situated. The sanction may include

nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion

and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of

part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from

the violation.” Id.(c)(4). 

“In this circuit, a court confronted with a motion for Rule 11 sanctions first

determines whether the party’s claims are objectively frivolous—in view of the facts

8

Case 4:14-cv-00175-VEH Document 18 Filed 05/12/14 Page 8 of 13
or law—and then, if they are, whether the person who signed the pleadings should

have been aware that they were frivolous; that is, whether he would have been aware

had he made a reasonable inquiry.” Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F.3d

1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1996). Although pro se plaintiffs are not protected from

sanctions under Rule 11, see Patterson v. Aiken, 841 F.2d 386, 387 (11th Cir. 1988),

the Eleventh Circuit has been somewhat reluctant to impose them except in certain

situations where, for example, the litigant was an attorney or had already been

advised of the meritlessness of his claims by the court or prior adverse litigation. See

United States v. Morse, 532 F.3d 1130, 1133 (11th Cir. 2008).

The Eleventh Circuit has also held “[f]ederal courts have both the inherent

power and the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct

which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions.” Procup v. Strickland,

792 F.2d 1069, 1073 (11th Cir. 1986). The discretion to do so is broad, “[t]he only 4

restrictions this Circuit has placed upon injunctions designed to protect against

A finding of absence of jurisdiction does not deprive the district court of the

4

power to impose such sanctions. See Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1073-74

(11th Cir. 1986) (“The fact that [Mr. Watts]’s complaint in this case may have failed

to state a justiciable federal claim is of no impact on the court’s power to enter

injunctive relief against such a recalcitrant litigant. The court has a responsibility to

prevent single litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery

needed by others. Were a frivolous lawsuit a bar to the court's inherent jurisdiction,

the court would be powerless to act upon even a flood of frivolous lawsuits which

threatened to bring judicial business to a standstill.”).

9

Case 4:14-cv-00175-VEH Document 18 Filed 05/12/14 Page 9 of 13
abusive and vexatious litigation [being] that a litigant cannot be completely

foreclosed from any access to the court.” Martin–Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384,

1387 (11th Cir. 1993).

Unlike with a traditional injunction, requiring the movant to show four

elements, courts dealing with injunctions prohibiting further vexatiouslitigation have

adopted standards more suitable to the situationsin which these injunctions arise. “In

making the determination whether the litigant’s conduct is sufficient to justify the

entry of what is referred to as a Martin–Trigona injunction to stop continued

vexatious litigation . . . , it is sufficient to show a history of litigation entailing

vexation, harassment, and needless burden on the courts and their supporting

personnel.” In re Dicks, 306 B.R. 700, 705-06 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004) (citing

Martin–Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1993). To support a request

for a Martin-Trigona injunction, “the movant must show: (1) the litigant’s history of

litigation and in particular whether it entailed vexatious, harassing or duplicative

lawsuits, (2) the litigant’s motive in pursuing the litigation, e.g., doesthe litigant have

an objective, good-faith expectation of prevailing, (3) whether the litigant is

represented by counsel, (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other

parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel, and (5)

whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties.”

10

Case 4:14-cv-00175-VEH Document 18 Filed 05/12/14 Page 10 of 13
Id. (citing Ray v. Lowder, No. 5:02–CV–316–OC–10GRJ, 2003 WL 22384806, at *2

(M.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2003)).

It certainly seems Mr. Watts may be on the first steps of a trail of frivolous and

vexatious litigation directed at Defendants. He has filed the present suit without

stating a claim of any sort, much less an arguably viable one. (See Doc. 1). According

to Defendant’s contentions, it is also in violation of an injunction imposed by the

Circuit Court of Etowah County, Alabama. (Doc. 15 at 2 n.4). Defendants have also 5

referred to a second filing in the Superior Court of Lamar County, Georgia. (Doc. 11 6

at 2). However, this history of lawsuits is not nearly as extensive as others found to

warrant this extreme sanction. See Shell v. U.S. Dep’t Of Hous. And Urban Dev., 355

F. App’x 300, 308 (11th Cir. 2009) (listing seven cases in five years and 34 motions,

including 12 motion for reconsideration and three interlocutory appeals); Procup v.

Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986) (relying on facts in Procup v.

Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 148 (M.D. Fla. 1983), listing, among others, 176 cases

filed in a single federal district); In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1259 (2d Cir.

1984) (“Martin-Trigona is known to have filed over 250 civil actions, appeals, and

If Mr. Watts has violated that injunction, Defendants may seek to have that 5

court enforce its order, through contempt proceedings or otherwise.

A few days after filing this suit, Mr. Watts also attempted to domesticate

6

what purports to be a $1,005,000,000 foreign judgment against Defendants in the

Northern District of Georgia. See Bethlem Management v. Turnbach, Warren,

Roberts & Lloyd, P.C., No. 1:14-mi-00010-UNA (N.D. Ga. 2014).

11

Case 4:14-cv-00175-VEH Document 18 Filed 05/12/14 Page 11 of 13
other matters throughout the United States . . . .”). But see Ray, 2003 WL 22384806,

at *2-3 (imposing a Martin-Trigona injunction not for multiple lawsuits but for “a

history—at least with regard to [this one IRS Notice of Levy]—of filing harassing

and duplicative papers”).

Mr. Watts is not an attorney, and, because it appears Mr. Watts had never

previously filed suit in federal court, he may have believed his suit has legal merit in

the federal forum. He also appears to believe his “claim” is valid, and there is no

indication that he wasinformed otherwise prior to filing this action by either the court

or a prior adverse litigation. It is also not clear at this time that he has a bad-faith

motive. Although Mr. Watts has imposed some needless expense on Defendants and

some burden on the court as well, his conduct has not yet reached a level to overcome

the reluctance in this Circuit to imposing sanctions on a pro se litigant. While Mr.

Watts’s claims are objectively frivolous, sanctions are not appropriate under these

circumstances.

Although the court has determined that sanctions are not appropriate as the

circumstances currently stand, Mr. Watts should be aware that, if he attempts to relitigate this matter by filing yet another suit in federal court, he may subject himself

to sanctions in the future. Such sanctions in this court could take the form of

monetary sanctions or injunctive relief directing the clerk to not accept any future

12

Case 4:14-cv-00175-VEH Document 18 Filed 05/12/14 Page 12 of 13
case filings by Mr. Watts without first obtaining prior leave of court. 

Accordingly, it isORDEREDthat Defendants’ Sanctions Motion is DENIED.

Further, because the court has, at this time, declined to enter any sanctions against

Mr. Watts for his filings, his Objection to Defendants’ Sanction Motion is due to be

TERMED as MOOT.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set out above, the court OVERRULES Mr. Watts’s objections

and ACCEPTS the R&R as modified slightly herein. Accordingly, Defendants’ 

Dismissal Motion (Doc. 7) is due to be GRANTED on jurisdictional grounds.

Additionally, Mr. Watts’s Default Motion (Doc. 4)is due to beTERMED as MOOT. 

Further, Defendants’ Sanctions Motion (Doc. 10) is DENIED and Mr. Watts’s

related Objection (Doc. 14) is TERMED as MOOT. Finally, the court will enter a

separate order of dismissal consistent with this memorandum opinion.

DONE and ORDERED this the 12th day of May, 2014.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

13

Case 4:14-cv-00175-VEH Document 18 Filed 05/12/14 Page 13 of 13