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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FEB 18 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

DELORES A. BRADSHAW, 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v . 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 91-4079 

ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT, BOARD 

) (D.C. No. 88-C-350G) 

OF EDUCATION OF ALPINE SCHOOL 

DISTRICT, CLARK L . COX, COLENE 

GRANGER, and WILLIAM STANFORD STUBBS, 

Defendants - Appellees. 

) (D. Utah) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, BARRETT, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

Plaintiff- Appellant Dr. Delores Bradshaw, former employee of 

the Alpine School District, brought this§ 1983 action against 

the school district, its Board of Education, and three 

administrators of the school district. She now appeals summary 

judgment entered in favor of defendants. 1 The district court 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establi shing t he doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3 . 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal . See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Ci r. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument . 

1 

Appellate Case: 91-4079 Document: 010110222578 Date Filed: 02/18/1992 Page: 1 
granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, its 

board of education, and the three individual defendants acting in 

their official capacities on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment 

sovereign immunity. The district court also granted summary 

judgment in favor of the individual defendants in their individual 

capacities based on sovereign immunity. The district court ruled 

that plaintiff presented insufficient evidence that these 

defendants were acting outside their official duties or in 

contravention of the school district's policies and procedures and 

that they were, therefore, under the protection of sovereign 

immunity when sued in their individual as well as their official 

capacities. For the reasons stated below, we affinn in part and 

reverse in part. 

This case comes to us on appeal of summary judgment. 

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record 

shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 

as a matter of law." The moving party has the initial 

burden to show "that there is an absence of evidence to 

support the non-moving party's case." If the moving 

party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the 

non-moving party to show that there is a genuine issue 

of material fact. The non-moving party "may not rest 

upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings." 

On review of the record all facts must be considered in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party, but 

summary judgment is mandated if after adequate time for 

discovery a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to 

establish the existence of an element essential to the 

party's case and on which the party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial." 

Culver v. Town of Torrington, 930 F.2d 1456, 1458 (10th Cir. 

199l)(citations omitted). 

Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal. First, whether the 

school district, and consequently its Board of Education and its 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-4079 Document: 010110222578 Date Filed: 02/18/1992 Page: 2 
administrators acting in their official capacities, constitutes an 

arm of the state of Utah, and is thus entitled to Eleventh 

Amendment sovereign immunity. And second, whether the three 

individual defendants were entitled to "qualified immunity." 

Brief for Appellant at 31. We will consider the sovereign 

immunity issue first and then turn to the liability of the 

individual defendants. 

A. Sovereign immunity of local school districts in Utah. 

The district court's Memorandum Opinion and Order properly 

analyzes the issue of the sovereign immunity afforded school 

district and board of education in Utah. In Harris v. Tooele 

County School District, 471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973), this court 

held that Utah school districts are an arm of the state protected 

by sovereign immunity against civil lawsuits because of the 

state's ultimate financial responsibility for such lawsuits. Id. 

at 220. See also Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358, 1991 WL 221067, 

at *6 (1991)("[T]he Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court 

'by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be 

paid from public funds in the state treasury.'")(quoting Edelman 

v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)). 

In a more recent case, the federal district court in Utah 

revisited the analysis of Harris and found its analysis still 

sound in light of current Utah law. Martinez v. Board of Educ. of 

Emery County Sch. Dist., 724 F . Supp. 857, 861-63 (D. Utah, 

1989)(using two tests: state financial interest in the outcome of 

the case and state control over management of local school 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-4079 Document: 010110222578 Date Filed: 02/18/1992 Page: 3 
districts). This three-judge panel cannot overrule a previous 

opinion of the court. United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 

710 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990); Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 

F.2d 1470, 1481 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Plaintiff refers us to Utah statutes, state constitutional 

sections, and state court opinions, but none either postdate or 

overrule the principle stated in Harris. We affirm the district 

court's order of summary judgment in favor of the Alpine School 

District and the Board of Education of the Alpine School District. 

B. Summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants. 

In her brief on appeal, plaintiff mistakenly refers to the 

district court's summary judgment in favor of the individual 

defendants as being based on qualified immunity. This was not the 

holding of the district court. The court held that in their 

official capacities, the individual defendants were acting on 

behalf of and within the stated policies of the school district 

and, as such, were entitled to the same protection of sovereign 

immunity available to the school district itself. Bradshaw v. 

Alpine School District, No. 88-C-0350G, Memorandum Decision and 

Order at 8-9 (D. Utah Mar. 26, 1991)(district court order). The 

district court was correct in this analysis. See Hafer v. Melo, 

112 S. Ct . 358, 1991 WL 221067, at *4 (1991)("State officers sued 

for damages in their official capacity are not 'persons' for the 

purposes of the suit because they assume the identity of the 

government that employs them.")(citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of 

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (1989)). 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-4079 Document: 010110222578 Date Filed: 02/18/1992 Page: 4 
However, we must reverse the district court's decision as it 

pertains to these three defendants in their individual capacities. 

The district court granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claims 

against these defendants acting in their individual capacities, 

holding that the individual defendants were not acting outside 

their official duties or in contravention of the school district's 

policies and procedures in the conduct for which plaintiff was 

bringing suit: 

Even though invited to do so by the court, plaintiff has 

failed to come forward with sufficient evidence to 

demonstrate that the actions complained of in fact were 

performed by defendants personally and not at the 

direction of the School District or as part of the 

official duties of employment. Plaintiff has failed to 

show that the action of the individual defendants were 

in contravention to policies and procedures of the 

Alpine School district. 

District court order at 11-12. 

After the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order was 

filed, the Supreme Court clarified its previous decision, 

published in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 

(1989), concerning whether state officials acting in their 

official capacities but sued in their individual capacities were 

"persons" liable for suit under§ 1983. In Hafer v. Melo, 112 

S. Ct. 358, 1991 WL 221067 (1991), the Court held that "state 

officials, sued in their individual capacities, are 'persons' 

within the meaning of§ 1983. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar 

such suits, nor are state officers absolutely immune from personal 

liability under§ 1983 solely by virtue of the 'official' nature 

of their acts." Id., at *7 (emphasis added). 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-4079 Document: 010110222578 Date Filed: 02/18/1992 Page: 5 
The district court issued summary judgment in favor of these 

three defendants in their individual capacities on the grounds of 

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. In light of Hafer v. Melo, 

we must reverse the order of the district court with respect to 

Clark L. Cox, Colene Granger, and William Stanford Stubbs in their 

2 individual capacities only. Under Hafer, these defendants in 

their individual capacities are not protected by sovereign 

immunity from a§ 1983 lawsuit for their actions, even though 

these actions were conducted as part of their official duties. 

The individual defendants, however, may be entitled to "qualified 

immunity" recognized in a long line of cases. The inquiry in this 

regard to be undertaken by the trial court on remand is whether 

the conduct charged to the individual defendants is such that it 

violates clearly established constitutional or statutory rights 

which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 

457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982); Houston v. Reich, 932 F.2d 883, 886-87 

(10th Cir. 1991). 3 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Utah is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and 

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order. The 

mandate shall issue forthwith. 

2 Defendants' 

hereby GRANTED. 

46 . 6.1 is hereby 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

James E. Barrett 

Senior Circuit Judge 

Motion to File Memorandum on Recent 

Defendants' motion for sanctions 

DENIED. 

Decision is 

under Rule 

3 

We offer no opinion as to the substance of plaintiff's claims 

against these three defendants in their individual capacities. 

6 

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