Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00971/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00971-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

DELORIS CARTER, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:09-cv-971-MEF-CSC

 )

MONTGOMERY HOUSING )

AUTHORITY, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This cause is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend Complaint filed on

December 31, 2009. (Doc. #29). Defendants have opposed this motion. For the reasons set

forth in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court finds that the motion is due to be

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Plaintiffs are nine women who all participate in the Housing Assistance program

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (“Section 8”), administered locally by the Housing Authority

of the City of Montgomery (“MHA”). Each plaintiff received a letter from MHA stating that

MHA would end Section 8 assistance at the end of the month. As grounds for termination,

MHA asserted engagement in “drug-related criminal activity or violent criminal activity or

other criminal activity that threatensthe health,safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of other

residents and persons residing in the immediate vicinity of the premises” in violation of

Plaintiffs’ Section 8 agreements. MHA also noted in each letter that Plaintiffs had the right

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 Specifically, Plaintiffs cite to alleged violations of requirements given by 42 U.S.C. § 1

1437d and 24 C.F.R. Part 982.

to request a hearing to dispute this charge. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs claim that

Defendants deprived them of rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. § 1437 and the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments.

1

On November 5, 2009, the parties submitted a Report of Parties’ Planning Meeting

suggesting a trial in March of 2010 and failing to propose a deadline for any amendments to

the pleadings. (Doc. #24). On November 6, 2009, this Court entered a Uniform Scheduling

Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16. (Doc. #25). This Uniform Scheduling

Order set a deadline of December 9, 2009 for the amendment of the pleadings by any party.

Plaintiffs did not object to this deadline, nor did they file any motion seeking to extend it

prior to its passing.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) provides that a schedule, such as the one this

Court set by entering the Uniform Scheduling Order in this case, “may be modified only for

good cause” and by leave of court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (emphasis added). This means that

in making a motion for leave to amend a pleading after the deadline set by this Court’s

scheduling order, Plaintiffs must show good cause exists for their untimely attempt to amend

their complaint. See Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1232 (11th

Cir. 2008) (finding that Rule 16's good cause standard precludes modification of the

scheduling order unless the schedule cannot be met despite the diligence of the party seeking

the extension.); Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1419 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying

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 Plaintiffs added paragraphs 20, parts of 22, 23, parts of 27, 32, 33, and 34. They also 2

added subpart (d) and (e) and parts of subpart (c) to the prayer.

 Plaintiffs added subpart (h) to the prayer. 3

 In their initial motion, Plaintiffs failed to give any reason for missing the deadline to 4

amend with regards to these changes. Plaintiffs asserted these arguments for the first time in

their reply to this Court’s show cause order.

the Rule 16 good cause standard rather than the more liberal standard of Rule 15 to attempt

to amend pleading after deadline set by Court’s scheduling order is appropriate).

Plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint in two ways: (1) note the significance of both

the defects in Defendants’ policy on Section 8 terminations and the lack of training provided

to the hearing officer, and (2) add a claim for attorneys’ fees. (See Doc. #29-2). 2 3

With regards to the first purpose for amending, Plaintiffs added allegations that their

benefits were terminated without investigation and with the use of form letters by a hearing

officer that MHA failed to train. Plaintiffs also added allegations that Defendants’

procedures were generally inadequate and failed to inform Plaintiffs of their rights, causing

substantial harm to Plaintiffs. In their prayer, Plaintiffs add requests that the Court make

findings on these assertions and enjoin Defendants from terminating benefits in the future

without first revising their policy for termination. Plaintiffs argue that these additions merely

clarify their claims and do not prejudice Defendants.4

As noted by Defendants, most if not all of these additions requested by Plaintiff are

stated in their memorandum in support of their motion for a preliminary injunction and

temporary restraining order. (Doc. #4). Therefore, it appears that Plaintiffs had all the

information they needed to amend their complaint on October 19, 2009 but failed to seek

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leave to amend their complaint until over two months thereafter. The Court is not satisfied

that Plaintiffs have made a showing of good cause for allowing these amendments.

Furthermore, since Plaintiffs say that these additions merely clarify rather than alter their

claims, there is no need for an amended complaint to add these changes. Any clarification

may be included in the pretrial order.

Plaintiffs also argue that they should be allowed to amend their complaint to add a

claim for attorneys’ fees because the statutory bar against Legal Services lawyers collecting

and retaining attorneys’ fees was not removed until December 16, 2009, after the deadline

set in the Uniform Scheduling Order for filing amendments to pleadings. While Plaintiffs

and Defendants agree that the 2010 appropriations bill removes the restriction on Legal

Services attorneys seeking attorneys’ fees, Defendants argue that prohibition remains in the

regulations. See 45 C.F.R. § 1642. However, the Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”) Board

of Directors issued a letter dated December 17, 2009 stating that LSC would not enforce the

regulatory restriction on claiming, collecting, and retaining attorneys’ fees until it determined

whether it would rescind or amend that regulatory restriction pursuant to the new legislation

lifting the statutory ban. Plaintiffs, despite their diligence, may not have known they could

file a claim for attorneys’ fees prior to the December 9, 2009 deadline for amendments given

in the Uniform Scheduling Order. Once the letter from the LSC Board issued, Plaintiffs’

filed their motion for leave to amend in less than two weeks.

For the foregoing reasons, its is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend

Complaint (Doc. #29) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is granted in that

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Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint which adds only a claim for attorneys’ fees; it is

denied in all other respects. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs must file their amended

complaint no later than 5:00 p.m. on Friday, March 19, 2010.

DONE this the 12th day of March, 2010.

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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