Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05108/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05108-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 25, 1997 Decided July 15, 1997 

No. 96-5108

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,

AFL-CIO, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Consolidated with 

No. 96-5141

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 92cv01779) 

(No. 92cv02184)

-

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Edith S. Marshall, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellants, with whom Frank W. Hunger,

Assistant Attorney General, Stephen W. Preston, Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General, Eric H. Holder, Jr., United 

States Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Leonard Schaitman, Attorney, and Freddi Lipstein, Senior Counsel, United States Department of Justice, 

were on the briefs.

Kevin M. Grile, Assistant General Counsel, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, argued the 

cause for appellees, with whom Mark D. Roth, General 

Counsel, and Charles A. Hobbie, Deputy General Counsel, 

were on the brief.

Gregory O'Duden, Elaine Kaplan and Barbara A. Atkin

were on the brief for amicus curiae National Treasury 

Employees Union.

Before: GINSBURG, SENTELLE and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: In companion cases, the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") and the 

Department of Defense ("DOD") challenge orders of the 

district court enjoining the agencies from requiring designated employees to answer questionnaires concerning, among 

other things, illegal drug use and financial history. Because 

the two cases present the same issue as a matter of constitutional law, we will address them with one opinion. The 

district court held that certain questions posed by HUD and 

DOD violate the employees' constitutional right to keep private information with which the government does not have a 

legitimate concern. While we have grave doubts that such a 

right exists, we hold that, even assuming a constitutional 

right to nondisclosure of personal information, the questions 

would be permissible. We reverse.

I. HUD BACKGROUND

Regulations promulgated by the Office of Personnel Management ("OPM") require that agencies evaluate the risk 

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level of every competitive service position in terms of the 

potential for adverse impact from the misconduct of an employee in that position. 5 C.F.R. § 731.302(a). Employees 

may be subjected to background investigations, the scope of 

which is dictated by the risk level. Id. In this case, HUD 

determined that approximately 2,500 employees would potentially be investigated using the Standard Form 85P, Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions. ("SF 85P"). A public trust 

position is one "involving policymaking, major program responsibility, law enforcement duties, or other duties demanding the highest degree of public trust; and positions involving 

access to or operation or control of unclassified confidential or 

financial records, with a relatively high risk for causing grave 

damage or realizing a significant personal gain." 61 Fed. 

Reg. 398.

Information elicited by the SF 85P is used to determine 

whether the person is suitable for employment or, in the case 

of incumbent employees, is suitable for continued employment, in a public trust position. 5 C.F.R. §§ 731.301, 731.302. 

Failure to provide the requested information may result in 

removal from federal employment. A challenge to the SF 

85P was brought by individual incumbent employees at HUD 

and by the American Federation of Government Employees 

("AFGE") on behalf of its members. The individual plaintiffs, 

all of whom are long-term employees, were determined to be 

in "public trust positions" because of their access to a computer database known as the Line of Credit Control System 

("LOCCS") which controls $10 billion in annual disbursements. The individual plaintiffs each have "review" privileges 

under LOCCS, meaning that they can approve and reject 

vouchers, alter data, and approve payments under certain 

circumstances. HUD determined that employees with access 

to LOCCS were properly designated public trust employees 

because federal funds could be lost or redirected by the 

employees' misconduct and because the privacy interests of 

program beneficiaries could be compromised.

The plaintiffs sought to enjoin HUD from subjecting current HUD employees to periodic reinvestigation using the SF 

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85P. In particular, the plaintiffs challenged three items on 

the form. Question 21 on the SF 85P asks:

a. In the last year, have you illegally used any controlled substance, for example, marijuana, cocaine, crack 

cocaine, hashish, narcotics (opium, morphine, codeine, 

heroin, etc.), amphetamines, depressants (barbiturates, 

methaqualone, tranquilizers, etc.), hallucinogenics (LSD, 

PCP, etc.) or prescription drugs?

b. In the last 7 years, have you been involved in the 

illegal purchase, manufacture, trafficking, production, 

transfer, shipping, receiving, or sale of any narcotic, 

depressant, stimulant, hallucinogen, or cannabis, for your 

own intended profit or that of another?

Question 22 requires employees to reveal certain personal 

financial information. It reads as follows:

a. In the last 7 years, have you, or a company over 

which you exercised some control, filed for bankruptcy, 

been declared bankrupt, been subject to a tax lien, or 

had legal judgment rendered against you for a debt?

b. Are you now over 180 days delinquent on any loan or 

financial obligation?

Finally, the form requires the employee to sign a release that 

states:

I authorize any investigator, special agent, or other duly 

accredited representative of the authorized Federal 

agency conducting my background investigation, to obtain any information relating to my activities from individuals, schools, residential management agents, employers, criminal justice agencies, credit bureaus, consumer 

reporting agencies, collection agencies, retail business 

establishments, or other sources of information. This 

information may include, but is not limited to, my academic, residential, achievement, performance, attendance, disciplinary, employment history, criminal history 

record information, and financial and credit information. 

I authorize the Federal agency conducting my investigation to disclose the record of my background investigaUSCA Case #96-5108 Document #284536 Filed: 07/15/1997 Page 4 of 16
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tion to the requesting agency for the purpose of making 

a determination of suitability or eligibility for a security 

clearance.

The employees and the AFGE challenged the questions on 

both constitutional and statutory grounds. The government 

responded by moving to dismiss or in the alternative for 

summary judgment. Plaintiffs also moved for summary judgment. Granting the plaintiffs' motion, the district court held 

that "[t]he Constitution protects a citizen's privacy interest, 

inter alia, with respect to personal information with which 

the government does not have a legitimate concern." According to the district court, courts are required to "balance the 

individuals' interests in nondisclosure against the government's interest in obtaining the information." Accordingly, 

the district court concluded that the government had not 

presented an adequate justification for compelling disclosure 

of the drug use or financial history, or for compelling the 

plaintiffs to sign the release form. This appeal followed.

II. DOD BACKGROUND

DOD regulations stipulate that a person is eligible for 

access to classified information or for placement in a position 

deemed to be "sensitive" only if "based on all available 

information, the person's loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness are such that entrusting the person with classified 

information or assigning the person to sensitive duties is 

clearly consistent with the interests of national security." 32 

C.F.R. § 154.6(b). Incumbent employees may be subject to 

reinvestigation to examine their fitness for continued employment. To evaluate a person's fitness for employment in a 

position with access to classified information or in a position 

designated "critical sensitive," DOD has used questionnaires 

known as the DD Form 398 and the DD Form 398-2 ("DD 

Forms") which have recently been superseded by the Standard Form 86 ("SF 86"). Failure to provide requested 

information might result in the denial of security clearance 

and/or removal from a sensitive position.

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Individual employees and the AFGE brought suit alleging 

that the DD Forms violate the employees' constitutional right 

to privacy, their fifth amendment right against selfincrimination, and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. The 

individual plaintiffs, all incumbent civilian employees of DOD, 

include a cement finisher at Robins Air Force Base, a sheet 

metal worker at Robins, and an administrative contracting 

officer.

The challenged items on the DD forms include a question 

regarding financial history which asks:

a. Have you ever filed a petition under any chapter of 

the bankruptcy code (to include Chapter 13)?

b. Have you ever had your wages garnished or anything repossessed?

c. Have you ever had a lien placed upon your property 

for failing to pay taxes?

d. Do you have any judgment against you which you 

have not paid?

e. Are you now or have you been significantly delinquent on debts (Paid more than 120 days from scheduled payment due date)?

Another challenged question asks:

a. Have you ever been arrested, charged, cited, held, or 

detained by Federal, State, or other law enforcement or 

juvenile authorities regardless of whether the charge was 

dropped or dismissed or you were found not guilty?

DOD considers an employee's arrest record even when the 

record has been expunged. 32 C.F.R. pt. 154, App. H. A 

question regarding substance abuse asks:

a. Have you ever tried or used or possessed any narcotic (to include heroin or cocaine), depressant (to include 

quaaludes), stimulant, hallucinogen (to include LSD or 

PCP), or cannabis (to include marijuana or hashish), or 

any mind-altering substance (to include glue or paint),

even one time or on an experimental basis, except as 

prescribed by a licensed physician?

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b. Have you ever been involved in the illegal purchase, 

manufacture, trafficking, production, or sale of any narcotic, depressant, stimulant, hallucinogen, or cannabis?

c. Have you ever misused or abused any drug prescribed by a licensed physician for yourself or for someone else?

d. Has your use of alcoholic beverages (such as liquor, 

beer, wine) ever resulted in the loss of a job, disciplinary 

action, arrest by police, or any alcohol-related treatment 

or counseling (such as for alcohol abuse or alcoholism)?

DOD also poses questions regarding the mental health of the 

employee:

e. Have you ever been treated for a mental, emotional, 

psychological, or personality disorder/condition/problem?

f. Have you ever consulted or been counseled by any 

mental health professional?

Finally, the DD Forms require individuals to sign a release 

authorizing

any duly accredited representative of the Department of 

Defense ... to obtain any information relating to my 

activities from individuals, schools, residential management agents, employers, criminal justice agencies, financial or lending institutions, credit bureaus, consumer 

reporting agencies, retail business establishments, medical institutions, hospitals or other repositories of medical 

records. This information may include, but is not limited 

to, my academic, residential, achievement, performance, 

attendance, personal history, disciplinary, criminal history record, arrest, conviction, medical, psychiatric/psychological, and financial and credit information.

The district court granted a preliminary injunction against 

the administration of the questionnaire. This court reversed 

in NFFE v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993), holding 

that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed in their facial 

attack. The plaintiffs then amended their complaint and the 

government moved to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. Plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgUSCA Case #96-5108 Document #284536 Filed: 07/15/1997 Page 7 of 16
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ment. While the action was pending, the DD Forms were 

superseded by the SF 86 effective January 1, 1996. The SF 

86 provides that answers to the drug use question will not be 

used in subsequent criminal proceedings and limits inquiries 

regarding financial history, drug use, and mental health to 

the past 7 years. The district court then issued an opinion 

dismissing the AFGE for lack of standing because the class 

was not sufficiently tailored. With regard to the claims of the 

individual plaintiffs, the district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the question whether the government could compel disclosure of expunged criminal history. 

The court held that this information was relevant to trustworthiness but that there was a strong individual privacy interest 

in resisting disclosure. The district court permitted the 

substance abuse question only for two plaintiffs who had 

previously reported substance abuse to DOD and had taken 

related leaves of absence. As for the other plaintiffs, the 

district court concluded that there was not a sufficient nexus 

between the positions occupied by the plaintiffs and the 

dangers cited by the government. The court disposed of the 

mental health question similarly, permitting it to be asked 

only of the plaintiffs with a background of substance abuse. 

With one exception the court held that the interest of the 

plaintiffs in financial privacy outweighed the government's 

interest in obtaining the information; the court permitted the 

questions to be posed only to a contract warrant officer with 

authority to bind the government. In regard to the release 

form, the district court held that the release form could not 

be constitutionally required of any of the plaintiffs. Because 

none of the plaintiffs was in a position to pose a direct threat 

to national security, "so vast an intrusion by the government" 

could not be justified. Finally, the court held that the illegal 

drug use question on the SF 86 would not violate the Fifth 

Amendment because it contains the equivalent of a use immunity statement. Because the DD Forms did not contain such 

a statement, the court held that their use was unconstitutional. The government filed the instant appeal. Because the 

questionnaires administered by HUD and DOD raise similar 

issues, we decided to hear the cases together.

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III. ANALYSIS

We begin our analysis by expressing our grave doubts as to 

the existence of a constitutional right of privacy in the nondisclosure of personal information. Were we the first to 

confront the issue we would conclude with little difficulty that 

such a right does not exist, but we do not, of course, write on 

a blank slate. The Supreme Court has addressed the issue in 

recurring dicta without, we believe, resolving it. In Whalen 

v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977), the Court considered whether the State of New York could constitutionally keep a 

centralized computer file of the names of persons who had 

obtained dangerous prescription drugs. The Court stated, 

"The cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' 

have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. 

One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in 

making certain kinds of important decisions....[T]he New 

York program does not, on its face, pose a sufficiently grievous threat to either interest to establish a constitutional 

violation." Id. at 598-600. The opinion then concluded with 

a disclaimer that stated that the government duty to avoid 

disclosure of personal information only "arguably has its 

roots in the Constitution.... We ... need not, and do not, 

decide any question which might be presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data.... We simply hold that this record does not establish an invasion of any 

right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 

Id. at 605-06 (emphasis added).

The Court was equally Delphic in Nixon v. Administrator 

of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), in which the former 

President challenged a statute that required disclosure of 

documents and tape recordings kept during his presidency. 

Under the Act and the regulations, the President was required to turn over both public and private materials. Archivists would then remove any personal materials. The Court 

stated, "We may agree with appellant that, at least when 

Government intervention is at stake, public officials, including 

the President, are not wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of personal life unrelated to any 

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acts done by them in their public capacity." Id. at 457 

(emphasis added). The Court then held that, even assuming 

that President Nixon had a legitimate expectation of privacy 

in the materials, the public interest in preserving the documents was sufficiently important to uphold the Act.

If the Court's apparent hesitance to recognize such a right 

were not enough to give us pause, we also note that the cases 

cited in Whalen as evidence of "the individual interest in 

avoiding disclosure" confirm our doubts that the Constitution 

protects a general right to privacy in the nondisclosure of 

information. The Court cited two dissents, Olmstead v. 

United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Constitution protects "the right to be 

let alonethe most comprehensive of rights and the right 

most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every 

unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of 

the individual, whatever the means employed, must be 

deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment."), and California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85-86 (1974) 

(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen ... the Government gets 

large access to one's beliefs, ideas, politics, religion, cultural 

concerns, and the likethe Act should be 'narrowly drawn' 

... to meet the precise evil."), neither of which argued for a 

general constitutional right to privacy in the nondisclosure of 

information. The Court also cited Griswold v. Connecticut,

381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) ("[T]he First Amendment has a 

penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental 

intrusion."), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding a 

statute prohibiting private possession of obscene material 

unconstitutional), and Justice Powell's concurrence in California Bankers, 416 U.S. at 78-79 ("[T]ransactions can reveal 

much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs. At 

some point, governmental intrusion upon these areas would 

implicate legitimate expectations of privacy."). One reading 

of these citations, perhaps the one intended in Whalen, is that 

the Constitution protects against mandatory disclosure only 

where it threatens a particularized right such as the associational rights protected by the First Amendment. See 

NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) ("[C]ompelled 

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disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may 

constitute ... a restraint on freedom of association.").

This court has not purported to resolve the issue, although 

we have suggested in dicta the existence of a constitutional 

right to privacy in personal information. United States v. 

Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 304-06 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing Whalen for the proposition that there are constitutionally protected spheres of personal privacy); Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 

1226, 1238 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (suggesting that a right to 

privacy could be violated by the government's collection and 

dissemination of criminal information); Utz v. Cullinane, 520 

F.2d 467, 482 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ( "[I]t would appear that 

there is another constitutional right which might be impaired 

by the dissemination of preconviction or post-exoneration 

arrest data for other than law enforcement purposesthe 

right of privacy."). In another case alluding to the question, 

Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1985), Judge Starr 

referred in a concurrence to the putative right as a "novel 

constitutional right[ ] of dubious applicability." Id. at 92 

(Starr, J., concurring). The majority, in response, stated only 

that it was declining to address the merits of the appellant's 

constitutional claim. Id. at 90 n.27.

Finally, several of our sister circuits have concluded based 

on Whalen and Nixon that there is a constitutional right to 

privacy in the nondisclosure of personal information. See 

United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 

577-580 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that there is a constitutional 

right to privacy of medical records kept by an employer, but 

that the government's interest in protecting the safety of 

employees was sufficient to permit their examination); Plante 

v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. 

denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979) (identifying a "right to confidentiality" and holding that balancing is necessary to weigh 

intrusions); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 

(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983) (applying an 

intermediate standard of review to uphold a financial disclosure requirement). See also, Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y Dist. 

Branch v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1043 (D. Hawaii 1979) 

(holding that disclosure of psychiatric records implicates the 

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constitutional right to confidentiality); McKenna v. Fargo,

451 F. Supp. 1355, 1381 (D.N.J. 1978) ("The analysis in 

Whalen ... compels the conclusion that the defendant ... 

must justify the burden imposed on the constitutional right of 

privacy by the required psychological evaluations."). The 

Sixth Circuit, which until today was alone among the courts of 

appeals, has been dubious. In J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 

1090 (6th Cir. 1981), the court stated,

"Virtually every governmental action interferes with personal privacy to some degree." Katz v. United States,

389 U.S. at 350 n.5, 88 S.Ct. at 510 n.5. Courts called 

upon to balance virtually every government action 

against the corresponding intrusion on individual privacy 

may be able to give all privacy interests only cursory 

protection. The Framers .... cannot have intended that 

the federal courts become involved in an inquiry nearly 

as broad balancing almost every act of government, both 

state and federal, against its intrusion on a concept so 

vague, undefinable, and all-encompassing as individual 

privacy.

Inferring very broad "constitutional" rights where the 

Constitution itself does not express them is an activity 

not appropriate to the judiciary. In this context, we note 

that of the cases cited holding that there is a constitutional right to nondisclosure of private information, none 

cites a constitutional provision in support of its holding. 

It is understandable, though rare, to fail to cite a supporting provision of the Constitution when one is dealing 

with such well-established rights as those in the first or 

fourth amendments. It is quite a telling failure when the 

constitutional right at issue is not well-established.

The court determined, "Absent a clear indication from the 

Supreme Court we will not construe isolated statements in 

Whalen and Nixon more broadly than their context allows to 

recognize a general constitutional right to have disclosure of 

private information measured against the need for disclosure." Id. at 1089. See also Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 

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740 (6th Cir. 1994) (concluding that there is no general right 

to nondisclosure of private information).

Having noted that numerous uncertainties attend this issue, 

we decline to enter the fray by concluding that there is no 

such constitutional right because in this case that conclusion 

is unnecessary. Even assuming the right exists, the government has not violated it on the facts of this case. Whatever 

the precise contours of the supposed right, both agencies have 

presented sufficiently weighty interests in obtaining the information sought by the questionnaires to justify the intrusions 

into their employees' privacy.

To begin with, we hold that the individual interest in 

protecting the privacy of the information sought by the 

government is significantly less important where the information is collected by the government but not disseminated 

publicly. In fact, the employees could cite no case in which a 

court has found a violation of the constitutional right to 

privacy where the government has collected, but not disseminated, the information. In Whalen, for instance, the Court 

noted that mandatory disclosure of a patient's use of certain 

prescription drugs could lead to the information being publicly disseminated to the detriment of the patient's reputation. 

429 U.S. at 600. Fear of public disclosure might cause some 

patients to decline to obtain a prescription even where it was 

medically necessary. The Court noted that the state had 

enacted security provisions protecting the privacy of patients, 

and that there was no record evidence that the security 

provisions would prove insufficient. Accordingly, the Court 

held that unsubstantiated fear of public disclosure was not a 

sufficient reason for invalidating the statute. See also Nixon,

433 U.S. at 465 (relying on the archivists' unblemished record 

of discretion).

Here, as well, there are measures designed to protect the 

confidentiality of the employees' responses to questionnaires. 

The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), states that no agency 

shall disclose any record, except where it has written consent 

from the individual or under certain limited exceptions, none 

of which would permit public dissemination of the information 

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obtained here. In addition, the records are maintained under 

secure conditions. Those charged with maintaining the records are, themselves, subject to background checks. These 

measures, designed to protect the confidentiality of the information, substantially reduce the employees' privacy interests. 

Security precautions are never fool-proof, but where the 

government has enacted reasonable devices to secure the 

confidentiality of records we cannot, without grounds, assume 

that the devices will prove insufficient. See Whalen, 429 U.S. 

at 601-02.

Given the employees' diminished interest in resisting disclosure in cases in which disclosure is not likely to lead to public 

dissemination, we conclude that the agencies have presented 

sufficiently important justifications for each item on the questionnaires. We turn first to the questions posed by the SF 

85P and hold that HUD has adequately defended its need for 

the information. The employees in this case have access to 

confidential information about program beneficiaries. Within 

limits, the employees are able to alter information within the 

database and to misdirect funds. The agency has presented 

evidence that an employee using illegal drugs is more likely 

to compromise the integrity of the computer database by 

making a negligent error. HUD has also determined that 

employees with a substance abuse history or a history of 

financial indiscretion are more likely to embezzle funds. The 

determination of "trustworthiness is an 'inexact science at 

best.' " Greenberg, 983 F.2d at 297 (Sentelle, J., concurring) 

(internal quotation omitted). When presented with a reasonable determination we are reluctant to second-guess the 

agencies' conclusions regarding the dangers associated with 

drug use or financial trouble among employees in public trust 

positions. As the Supreme Court stated in Whalen, "[Government action] which has some effect on individual liberty or 

privacy may not be held unconstitutional simply because a 

court finds it unnecessary, in whole or in part." 429 U.S. at 

597. We hold that HUD may constitutionally require employees to disclose prior drug use and financial history.

The release form required by HUD is more problematic, 

though not fatally so, because it is more far reaching. The 

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district court held that "so vast an intrusion" cannot be 

justified in the absence of a direct threat to national security. 

We disagree that the release form "leaves nothing untouched." The government asserted, both in oral argument 

and in its brief, that the legitimate use of the release form is 

limited to verifying information solicited by other parts of the 

form. In addition, the Privacy Act requires that an agency 

"maintain in its records only such information about an 

individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or 

by executive order of the President." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1). 

Therefore, the release authorizes the government to collect 

only information "relevant" to determining the fitness of an 

individual for a public trust position. Relying on the limitation that the release form authorizes the government to 

obtain only relevant information used to verify representations made by the employee, we hold that administration of 

the form is constitutional.

We turn to the questions posed by the challenge to the 

DOD questionnaire. "[U]nder the Constitution the Executive 

must have the largely unshared duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to exercise 

[national security powers] successfully." New York Times 

Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-29 (1971) (Stewart, J., 

concurring). The drug use and financial history questions 

posed by DOD are slightly more intrusive than those asked 

by HUD, but the questions are the same in their material 

particulars. The release form is substantially identical. As 

the questions could constitutionally be required to protect the 

integrity of a computer database they are, a fortiori, constitutional when used in the interests of national security. DOD 

employees also challenged questions regarding the employees' mental health and expunged criminal history. No constitutional right of privacy is violated even by the disclosure "of 

an official act such as an arrest." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 

693, 713 (1976). Questions concerning an employees' mental 

health, on the other hand, may solicit highly personal information. Nevertheless, we uphold the requirement consistent 

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sionmaking in the area of national defense. See, e.g., Gilligan 

v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973).

We are left with one remaining issue that is presented only 

in the case against DOD. The district court held that because the DD Forms do not guarantee that answers to the 

substance abuse question would not be used against the 

employee in subsequent criminal proceedings, the questions 

were unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. We disagree. As we held in Greenberg, the privilege against selfincrimination must be invoked. 983 F.2d at 291. "[T]he 

Fifth Amendment does not forbid the government from asking questions and it does not forbid the government from 

taking answers." Id. Instead, the Fifth Amendment prohibits use of that information in a subsequent criminal proceeding. There is no indication in the record that the employees 

have a reasonable basis for a fear of criminal prosecution 

based on their answers to the DD Forms. Should a subsequent criminal proceeding ensue, that court could address 

whether answers were compelled or voluntary. If the answers are deemed compelled, the Fifth Amendment will, of its 

own force, prohibit use of the information in the proceeding.

IV. CONCLUSION

We hold, therefore, that even assuming the existence of a 

constitutional right to avoid disclosure of personal information, the challenged questions in both cases are permissible. 

We also hold that the DD Forms do not violate the employees' Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. We 

accordingly reverse the district court.

So ordered.

USCA Case #96-5108 Document #284536 Filed: 07/15/1997 Page 16 of 16