Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00400/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00400-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCISCO ARRIETA,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

COUNTY OF KERN, DEPUTY ENRIQUE 

BRAVO, DEPUTY BRANDON RUTLEDGE, 

and DOES 1 to 100, Inclusive,

 Defendants.

LEAD CASE 1:14-cv-00400-LJO-JLT

MEMBER CASE: 1:14-cv-00401-LJO-JLT

MEMBER CASE: 1:14-cv-00402-LJO-JLT

MEMBER CASE: 1:14-cv-00403-LJO-JLT

MEMBER CASE: 1:14-cv-00404-LJO-JLT

MEMBER CASE: 1:14-cv-00717-LJO-JLT

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION (DOC. 

47)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs in the six (6) above-captioned cases claim to have witnessed and/or videotaped a 

violent encounter on or about May 7, 2013 between unnamed Kern County Sheriff’s (KCS) Deputies

and a man unrelated to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claim to have been subjected to unlawful treatment when 

Deputies Enrique Bravo and Brandon Rutledge, along with other unnamed officers, attempted to retrieve 

the cellular telephones on which videos had been recorded.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs Francisco Arrieta, Laura Vasquez, Sulina Quair-Vasquez, Maria Melendez and Melissa 

Quair filed complaints in the above captioned cases on March 31, 2014. Doc. 1. On April 14, Defendant 

County of Kern moved to dismiss these cases. Doc. 7. The cases were consolidated on April 28, 2014. 

Doc. 12. The Court granted Defendant’s motions to dismiss in part, and allowed Plaintiff leave to amend 

most of the dismissed claims. Doc. 28. 

On May 12, 2014 minor T.A. filed a related case, through his guardian ad litem. T.A. v. County 

of Kern, 1:14-cv-00717-LJO-JLT, Doc. 1. This case was consolidated with the other five cases on May 

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21, 2014. Doc. 15.

Plaintiffs in all six consolidated cases filed an amended complaint on July 15, 2014. First 

Amended Complaint (FAC), Doc. 32. Plaintiffs seek to recover against Defendants under state and 

federal civil rights statutes, as well as under various tort theories. Plaintiffs’ claims are based on two 

separate events. The first occurred after midnight on May 8, 2013 at Melissa Quair’s residence. FAC ¶¶ 

17-39. The second event occurred later that morning, between 10 am and noon, at the same location. 

Compl. ¶¶ 40-52. 

Defendants now move for summary judgment as to KCS Deputies Bravo and Rutledge with 

respect to the Arrieta’s claims regarding the first event, on the basis that they were not present at this 

incident. P. & A. in Support of Mot. for Summ. Adjudication (MSJ), Doc. 47-1. Plaintiffs timely 

responded. Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (Opposition), Doc. 51. Defendants filed a reply on 

April 15, 2015. Defs.’ Reply to Pls.’ Opp’n (Reply), Doc. 53. The motion was set for hearing April 22, 

2015, but the hearing was vacated and the matter submitted for decision on the papers pursuant to Local 

Rule 230(g).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

The parties agree to the following facts: At around midnight, May 7, 2013 all Plaintiffs in this 

action, except Melissa Quair, witnessed a physical encounter between various law enforcement officers 

and David Silva in front of Kern Medical Center. Pls.’ Separate Statement of Material Facts (PSSMF), 

Doc. 51-1, #2. Francisco Arrieta and Maria Melendez recorded videos of the encounter on their cell 

phones. PSSMF #3. Sulina Quair-Vasquez called 911 to report the incident using T.A.’s phone. Id. A 

KCS representative contacted Sulina and asked if they could all be at one place to speak with 

investigators. PSSMF #4. Arrieta, Quair, Quair-Vasquez, and Vasquez agreed to meet with KCS 

 

1 Because on summary judgment the evidence of the non-moving party is assumed to be true and disputed facts are construed 

in the non-movants favor, the Court sets forth the undisputed facts and notes those disagreements of fact that are relevant to 

this decision.

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deputies at Melissa Quair’s apartment. Deputies spoke with or interviewed these Plaintiffs at this time. 

PSSMF #5. Plaintiffs claim that KCS officers demanded that Arrieta turn over his cell phone to them 

without a warrant. Pls.’ Additional Disputed Material Facts (PADMF), Doc. 51-1, #5.

2 Plaintiffs claim 

that KCS officers would not allow Arrieta to leave the apartment until he gave them his phone. PADMF 

#6, 9. The Parties also dispute whether Defendant Officers Bravo and Rutledge were present at this 

event. The parties agree that KCS officers left around six am on the morning of May 8, 2013. PSSMF 

#6.

The parties also agree that Bravo and Rutledge went to Melissa Quair’s residence at ten a.m. that 

same morning. PSSMF #7. Melendez appeared at the apartment 20-25 minutes later. PSSMF #9. Sulina 

Quair came by sometime after that. Id. Arrieta was not present at this time. Id. Plaintiffs claim that 

officers demanded Maria Melendez’s phone from her, but that they did not have a warrant for it. 

PADMF #18. Plaintiffs argue that while Bravo was at the house, he admitted that he had been present 

for the first event (hereinafter, the “Early Morning Event”). PADMF #28. Plaintiffs state that they were 

never provided with a search warrant for either phone. PADMF #30. 

IV. STANDARD OF DECISION

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party 

bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those 

portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 

the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). A fact is material 

if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law; “irrelevant” or 

“unnecessary” factual disputes will not be counted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

 

2 Defendants suggest that Plaintiff’s assertion of its own disputed facts is somehow improper. Reply at 3-4. This jurisdiction’s 

local rules permit a party opposing summary judgment to file their own statement of disputed facts. L.R. 260(b). 

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(1986).

If the moving party would bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial, that party must 

“affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.” 

Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). In contrast, if the non-moving 

party bears the burden of proof on an issue, the moving party can prevail by “merely pointing out that 

there is an absence of evidence” to support the non-moving party’s case. Id. When the moving party 

meets its burden, the non-moving party must demonstrate that there are genuine disputes as to material 

facts by either: 

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including 

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or 

declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion 

only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or 

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce 

admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court does not make credibility determinations or 

weigh evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Rather, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be 

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. Only admissible evidence may 

be considered in deciding a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). “Conclusory, 

speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and 

defeat summary judgment.” Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984.

V. ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment against all claims raised by Arrieta 

on the basis that he can’t point to evidence that either Bravo and Rutledge were responsible for any of 

the constitutional deprivations he alleged. MSJ at 4. Plaintiffs argue that a) Defendants’ motion is 

procedurally improper, b) Bravo and Rutledge may be liable under a conspiracy theory and c) in the 

alternative, that a ruling on this issue should be continued to allow for further discovery. Opposition at 4. 

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A. Current Procedural Validity of Partial Motions for Summary Judgment 

Plaintiff cites to a number of federal district court decisions from other jurisdictions as support 

for their theory that Rule 56 does not allow for summary judgment as to parts of a claim or defense. 

Opposition at 7-8. The cases Plaintiff cites no longer represent good law. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure was amended effective December 1, 2010 and now expressly recognizes “partial 

summary judgment.” The current Rule 56(a) provides that a party “may move for summary judgment, 

identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment 

is sought.” (Emphasis added.). Defendants’ motion is procedurally valid.

B. Liability for Early Morning Events

1. Conspiracy Theory and State Civil Rights Claims

Plaintiffs argue that Bravo and Rutledge may be liable for the Early Morning Events, even if 

they weren’t physically present because they conspired with co-defendants after the fact. Opposition at 

10. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts or offer any evidence that would support a 

state conspiracy theory under California Civil Code Sections 51, 51.5, 51. 7 and 52.1.3 MSJ at at 5. 

First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs can point to no evidence that would support recovery 

under Sections 51 or 51.5 because those codes only apply to civil rights violations attributed to business 

establishments; and the conduct at issue occurred in a private residence at the hands of public officers. 

Plaintiffs do not dispute these assertions. This Court agrees that Sections 51 and 51.5 do not apply to the 

facts of this case. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(a) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and 

equal, [and] . . . are entitled to the full and equal accommodations . . . in all business establishments of 

every kind whatsoever.”); Cal. Civ. Code § 51.5(a) (“No business establishment of any kind whatsoever 

shall discriminate against . . . any person in this state on account of any characteristic listed or defined in 

 

3 In their Reply, Defendants express concern that Plaintiffs’ Opposition invoked federal conspiracy theories. Reply at 4-5. As 

Defendants point out, the FAC limited conspiracy claims to California law. FAC ¶ 123 (“All Plaintiffs assert this Eighth 

Cause of Action for Civil Conspiracy under California Law.”); FAC ¶¶ 126-27 (alleging liability of Defendants under Cal. 

Gov't Code §§ 815.2(a) & 820(a). The Court does not see where Plaintiffs may have introduced federal conspiracy claims, as 

their Opposition cites only to state law. Opposition at 9-11.

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subdivision (b) or (e) of Section 51.”4). Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to these 

claims. 

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs point to no evidence that would sustain a cause of action 

under Section 51.7. This section protects a citizen’s “right to be free from any violence, or intimidation 

by threat of violence,” with respect to political affiliation, position in a labor dispute “or on account of 

any characteristic listed or defined in subdivision (b) or (e) of Section 51.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7 (a). 

Section 52.1 similarly penalizes individuals, “whether or not acting under color of law,” who 

“interefere[]” with someone’s civil rights by “threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempt[] to interfere 

by threat, intimidation, or coercion.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a).

Defendants produced testimonial evidence that neither Bravo nor Rutledge was present at the 

Early Morning Events. Decl. of Enrique Bravo (Bravo Decl.), Doc. 47-6, ¶ 3; Decl. of Brandon Rutledge 

(Rutledge Decl.), Doc. 47-7, ¶ 3. Plaintiffs dispute this and point to an incident report submitted by 

Rutledge that morning. PSSMF # 8. This report, however, establishes only that Rutledge was on duty at 

4:00 am the morning of May 8, 2013; not that he was at the Quair residence earlier that morning. 

Incident Report, Opposition Ex. 1, Doc. 51 at 17.5 Plaintiffs also cite to a transcript of the conversation 

that occurred between officers and Plaintiffs during their second encounter. PSSMF #10; Transcript, 

Decl, of Stephanie Olsen, Ex. 1, Doc. 47-8. In this encounter, Quair asks Bravo if he is in possession of 

a warrant for Arrieta’s phone. Transcript at 95. Bravo responds that it’s included in the search warrant 

he was serving at the time. Id. At this point, Quair asks him why officers took Arrieta’s phone earlier if 

they didn’t have a search warrant at the time. Id. Bravo responds, “Well first he gave it to us voluntarily 

and then when we realized what it was . . .,” at which point Quair interrupts him, saying, “Not true.” Id.

Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof to establish that Bravo and Rutledge were personally involved 

 

4 These attributes are: “sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, 

marital status, or sexual orientation,” and are defined in subsection (e). Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b), (e). 5 Exhibits should be uploaded to CM/ECF as attachments separately from the motion itself. Plaintiff’s Counsel is directed to 

review the tutorials available here: http://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caed/DOCUMENTS/CMECF/ecf2d/index.html. 

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with the seizure of Arrieta’s phone. Since Plaintiffs are the non-moving party, Defendants prevail if they 

can show there is an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff’s case. Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. 

Defendants meet this burden. The only evidence that Plaintiffs offer as to Rutledge is that he was on 

duty prior to the later morning encounter. Incident Report at 17. This report, however, does not place 

him at the Quair apartment so it does not serve as a basis for a genuine dispute on this matter. Bravo’s 

statement that Arrieta gave the phone to “us” and “we” can be understood to include him. Transcript at 

95. This is sufficient to create a dispute as to whether Bravo was at the apartment and seized the cell 

phone illegally. This evidence, however, does not tend to support that Bravo threatened, intimidated or 

caused violence to Arrieta or any other Plaintiff. Nor does it support a theory that either Bravo or 

Rutledge formed and operated in a conspiracy to do so during or after the event. Thus, there is an 

absence of evidence that either is liable under Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7 or 52.1.

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Arrieta’s

claims based on California Civil Code Sections 51, 51.5, 51.7, and 52.1 against Defendants Bravo and 

Rutledge. 

2. Federal Civil Rights Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not point to evidence that Bravo or Rutledge were personally 

involved in constitutional deprivations alleged to have occurred during the Early Morning Events. MSJ 

at 4-5. As discussed above, Plaintiffs fail to present evidence that Rutledge was present at the Early 

Morning Events. There is however, a genuine dispute as to whether Bravo was present at the event and 

whether he seized Arrieta’s cell phone illegally. Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment as to Arrieta’s federal civil rights claims against Defendant Rutledge. The Court 

DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Arrieta’s federal civil rights claims against 

Defendant Bravo.

C. Whether This Court Should Issue a Stay 

Plaintiffs argue that the Court should stay an award of summary judgment to Defendants because 

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they hope to discover documents that would show Bravo and Rutledge’s involvement in the seizure of 

Arrieta’s phone. Opposition at 12. Defendants do not address this argument squarely in their reply. 

“Rule 56(d)6 offers relief to a litigant who, faced with a summary judgment motion, shows the 

court by affidavit or declaration that it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” 

Michelman v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 685 F.3d 887, 899 (9th Cir. 2012). Litigants must show “(1) 

that they have set forth in affidavit form the specific facts that they hope to elicit from further discovery, 

(2) that the facts sought exist, and (3) that these sought-after facts are ‘essential’ to resist the summary 

judgment motion.” State of Cal., on Behalf of California Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell, 

138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1998). “[T]he non-moving party must demonstrate that additional discovery 

would uncover specific facts which would preclude summary judgment.” Poole v. City of Los Angeles, 

41 F. App'x 60, 64 (9th Cir. 2002). Denial of a Rule 56(f) application is proper where it is clear that the 

evidence sought is almost certainly nonexistent or is the object of pure speculation. Volk v. D.A. 

Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987).

Plaintiffs argue that they are waiting for Defendants to comply fully with their requests for the 

production of policies and procedures regarding the preparation and execution of warrants as well as the 

search warrants at issue. Opposition at 11-12; Decl. of Chantal Trujillo (Trujillo Decl.), Doc. 51 ¶ 5. 

Plaintiffs also explain that they are seeking to depose two additional detectives from the Kern County 

Sheriff’s office “about their involvement and communication with Defendants Bravo and Rutledge 

leading up to the second incident at Plaintiff Melissa Quair’s apartment.” Trujillo Decl. ¶ 7. Plaintiffs, 

however, fail to identify specific facts they hope to obtain from the documents and depositions or 

explain how these facts would preclude summary judgment. See Suhovy v. Sara Lee Corp., No. 1:12-

CV-01889-LJO-GSA, 2014 WL 1400824, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2014). Rather, Plaintiffs’ hopes to 

turn up additional information linking Bravo and Rutledge to the events seem to be based on pure 

 

6 Plaintiffs moved under former Rule 56(f), which is substantively the same as current Rule 56(d).

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speculation. Denial of a Rule 56(d) application is proper under these circumstances. Volk, 816 F.2d at

1415.

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For these reasons the discussed above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Doc. 47, as follows: 

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Arrieta’s claims based on 

California Civil Code Sections 51, 51.5, 51.7, and 52.1 against Defendants Bravo and Rutledge.

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Arrieta’s federal civil 

rights claims against Defendant Rutledge. The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment as to Arrieta’s federal civil rights claims against Defendant Bravo.

The Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for a continuance pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated: April 22, 2015

 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill

 United States District Judge

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