Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00481/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00481-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL SAPIEN LOPEZ, SR., )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

)

ROSEANNE CAMPBELL, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:05-cv-00481-LJO-TAG HC

ORDER DENYING AS PREMATURE

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR EQUITABLE

TOLLING EXTENSION

(Doc. 4)

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

On April 11, 2005, Petitioner filed this federal habeas petition, including eight grounds for

relief that challenge his convictions for multiple violations of California’s Penal Code and Health &

Safety Code, as well as the resulting sentence of 201 years, eight months. (Doc. 1). April 11, 2005,

Petitioner filed a notice and explanation regarding why his federal petition was filed beyond the oneyear statute of limitations for filing federal petitions. (Doc. 3). That same date, Petitioner filed a

motion for equitable tolling in order to toll the statute of limitations and permit his petition to be

deemed timely. (Doc. 4). The Court did not rule on Petitioner’s motion at that time since it had not

conducted a preliminary review of the petition.

On August 17, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion for an abeyance, requesting that this Court stay

proceedings on the petition to permit Petitioner to exhaust a “newly discovered” claim for ineffective

assistance of counsel in state court. (Doc. 12). The Court granted that motion on December 29,

2005. (Doc. 13). Thereafter, Petitioner regularly filed Status Reports until March 30, 2007, when he

Case 1:05-cv-00481-LJO -TAG Document 31 Filed 08/31/07 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 2

advised the Court that the California Supreme Court had denied his petition and that his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel was fully exhausted in state court. (Doc. 26).

That same date, Petitioner filed a second motion for stay, indicating that he wished to exhaust

a claim in state court related to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in California v.

Cunningham, __U.S.__, 127 S.Ct. 856 (2007). (Doc. 27). On August 30, 2007, the Court denied

Petitioner’s motion to stay proceedings while he exhausts the Cunningham claim and, since his other

claim had been fully exhausted, lifted the stay and ordered Petitioner to file an amended petition

containing the newly exhausted claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 30).

DISCUSSION

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (the “AEDPA), which imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). The original

petition in this case was filed on January 12, 2005 (Doc. 1) and thus is subject to the provisions of

the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

///

///

Case 1:05-cv-00481-LJO -TAG Document 31 Filed 08/31/07 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 3

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In this case, the petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court on

November 24, 2003. Thus, direct review would conclude on February 22, 2004, when the ninetyday period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d

1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8th Cir.1998). The one-year

period would commence the following day, February 23, 2004, and Petitioner would have until

February 23, 2005, absent applicable statutory or equitable tolling, within which to file his federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petition was filed on April 11, 2005, some six weeks after

the AEDPA one-year period had expired. Thus, it does appear that the petition is untimely.

 Petitioner asserts no statutory tolling and has indicated that he never filed a state habeas

petition in this case that would entitled him to statutory tolling. However, Petitioner has requested

that this Court afford him equitable tolling based on his representation that the day after he gave

the prison law library the original petition to be copied, he was transferred to another facility and did

not receive his petition from his former prison until January 13, 2005. (Doc. 3, p. 1). Petitioner

apparently believed that the deadline had expired at that point, so he hired an attorney to file the

petition for him, but claims that the attorney defrauded him, kept his money, and did not file the

petition. (Id. at p. 2). 

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. United

States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998)(citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States,

107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996)), abrogated on other grounds, Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S.

202, 123 S. Ct. 1398 (2003). “When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence,

account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be

appropriate.” Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 2002)(quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)). In Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit

concluded that the petitioner “must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the but-for and

Case 1:05-cv-00481-LJO -TAG Document 31 Filed 08/31/07 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 4

proximate cause of his untimeliness.” Recently, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this rule in EspinozaMatthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). In that case, the Ninth Circuit pointed

out that the determination vis-a-vis equitable tolling is “highly fact-dependent” and that the

petitioner “bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.” Id.

At the same time, the Ninth Circuit noted that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005), in which the equitable tolling standard was framed

“in less absolute terms”:

Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.

Espinoza v. Matthews, 432 F.3d at 1026 at n.5, quoting Pace, 125 S. Ct. at 1814. The Ninth Circuit

declined to decide whether Pace had “lowered the bar somewhat” because it concluded that

petitioner had met the “more demanding” articulation found in Ninth Circuit case-law. Id. at 1027.

Although the test for justifying equitable tolling is understandably a difficult one for a

petitioner to meet, a federal habeas court cannot make such a determination without having before it

all of the pertinent facts. At this point in the proceedings, however, the Court is not in a position to

grant Petitioner’s motion for equitable tolling. First, the Court has just ordered Petitioner to file an

amended petition raising the newly exhausted claim along with his original claims (Doc. 30), and it

would be advisable for the Court to refrain from deciding the equitable tolling issue until the

operative amended pleading has been filed and the Court has had the opportunity to conduct a

preliminary review of the amended petition. Once the Court has conducted such a review, the Court

may either issue an Order to Show Cause why the amended petition should not be dismissed for a

violation of the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations or, alternatively, the Court may order

Respondent to file a response. Such a response may include a motion to dismiss the petition as

untimely. In either event, the Court will afford Petitioner ample opportunity to develop the facts

relating to his assertion of equitable tolling. However, at the present time, such a motion is

premature. 

///

///

Case 1:05-cv-00481-LJO -TAG Document 31 Filed 08/31/07 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 5

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that Petitioner’s Motion for Equitable Tolling

Extension (Doc. 4) is DENIED without prejudice as PREMATURE. Petitioner may re-assert his

claim of entitlement to equitable tolling at the appropriate time following the Court’s review of the

amended petition.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 30, 2007 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 1:05-cv-00481-LJO -TAG Document 31 Filed 08/31/07 Page 5 of 5