Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-03957/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-03957-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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Case No. 16-CV-03957-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART WITH PREJUDICE AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JUAN HERNANDEZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF SAN JOSE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.16-CV-03957-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART WITH 

PREJUDICE AND DENYING IN PART 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 44

Plaintiffs Juan Hernandez, Nathan Velasquez, Frank Velasquez, Rachel Casey, Mark 

Doering, Mary Doering, Barbara Arigoni, Dustin Haines-Scrodin, Andrew Zambetti, Christina 

Wong, Craig Parsons, the minor I.P., Greg Hyver, Todd Broome, Donovan Rost, Michele Wilson, 

Cole Cassady, Theodore Jones, Martin Mercado, and Christopher Holland (collectively, 

“Plaintiffs”) bring this putative class action against Defendants the City of San Jose (“City”); San 

Jose Police Chief Edgardo Garcia (“Garcia”); Police Officers Loyd Kinsworthy, Lisa Gannon, 

Kevin Abruzzini, Paul Messier, Paul Spagnoli, Johnson Fong, and Jason Ta (collectively, “City 

Defendants”); Anthony Yi; the minor H.A.; the minor S.M.; Victor Gasca; Daniel Arciga; Rafael 

Medina; Anthony McBride; and Does 1–55. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 35. 

Before the Court is the City Defendants’ second motion to dismiss. ECF No. 44. Having 

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considered the submissions of the parties, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court 

GRANTS IN PART with prejudice and DENIES IN PART the City Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The FAC alleges the following facts. 

Plaintiffs are individuals who attended a rally for then presidential candidate Donald J. 

Trump (“Trump”) on June 2, 2016 at the McEnery Convention Center (“Convention Center”) in 

San Jose, California. FAC ¶¶ 62–63. At the end of the rally, as Plaintiffs were leaving the 

building, San Jose police and other police officers directed Plaintiffs from the east-northeast exit 

of the Convention Center. Id. ¶ 89. A police line outside the exit “directed the Trump supporters to 

turn north and to proceed along Market Street, into [a] crowd of violent anti-Trump protesters.” Id. 

¶ 90. “The police also actively prevented the Trump Rally attendees from proceeding south along 

Market Street, away from the anti-Trump protesters, or from leaving the convention center 

through alternative exits.” Id. ¶ 91. When Plaintiffs reached the anti-Trump protesters, the 

protesters attacked. Id. ¶ 92.

Plaintiffs Hernandez and Haines-Scrodin allege that Defendant Gasca repeatedly struck 

them in the face. Id. ¶¶ 119–126. Plaintiff Nathan Velasquez was allegedly assaulted by Anthony 

Yi. Id. ¶¶ 127–39. Defendants McBride, Gasca, and Arciga also allegedly confined Plaintiff Casey 

against the entrance of the Marriot hotel while protesters threw a bottle, eggs, and a tomato at 

Plaintiff Casey. Id. ¶ 140–59. The minor I.P. was allegedly assaulted by the minor H.A. and was 

then allegedly denied assistance by the San Jose Fire Department. Id. ¶¶ 160–71. An unknown 

individual hit Plaintiff Andrew Zambetti with a bag of rocks. Id. ¶ 172–75. Plaintiffs Mark 

Doering, Mary Doering, Wilson, and Arigoni were assaulted. Id. ¶¶ 176–201. During the assaults, 

Plaintiff Wilson allegedly asked for help from a police officer who said that the police had been 

ordered not to intervene but only to disperse the crowd in order to avoid inciting a riot. Id. ¶¶ 198–

99. Other unknown individuals threatened and intimidated Plaintiffs Greg Hyver and Todd 

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Broome and assaulted and/or battered Plaintiffs Wong, Mercado, Holland, Jones, Rost, and 

Cassady. Id. ¶¶ 202–272. During these attacks, Plaintiffs allege that police officers deliberately 

directed Plaintiffs into dangerous areas and did not intervene when violence erupted. Id. ¶¶ 198–

99.

According to the complaint, Garcia, Kinsworthy, and other unspecified actors devised the 

crowd-control plan for the Trump Rally and were deliberately indifferent to whether the plan 

caused harm to Plaintiffs. Id. ¶¶ 75, 87. As evidence of Garcia’s alleged deliberate indifference, 

Plaintiffs claim that Garcia knew that “some violence ha[d] been reported” at other Trump Rallies 

in California, id. ¶ 75, and that Garcia requested additional officers through mutual aid channels to 

deal with the known risk of violence, id. ¶¶ 67–69, 83. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that before 

the rally, Chief Garcia edited a proposed “Media Advisory” that originally announced a “zero 

tolerance approach to violent protesters” to instead announce only that police officers “will do 

everything possible to ensure the event is safe for all a[t]tendees and surrounding neighborhoods.” 

Id. ¶ 77. Plaintiffs also allege that Garcia stated that even before the Trump Rally, Garcia knew 

that “we did not have the staffing to have the arrest teams and personnel to keep the parties 

separated.” Id. ¶ 82.

Plaintiffs also claim that the police officers on duty on the night of the Trump Rally acted 

with “deliberate indifference, reckless and/or conscious disregard of a known and obvious danger, 

by directing Plaintiffs into the mob, preventing Plaintiffs from leaving the event through other, 

safer paths, and by failing to intervene in the many attacks perpetrated on Plaintiffs and the Class 

members, which would not have occurred but for the Individual City Defendants’ actions.” Id. ¶ 

287. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that violence had been reported as early as 6:00 p.m. on the 

night of the Trump Rally, and yet police officers continued to direct Plaintiffs out of the same 

single exit of the convention center even after realizing that doing so placed Plaintiffs in serious 

danger. Id. ¶ 1. Plaintiffs also claim that the City itself is vicariously liable for the actions of its 

police officers on the night of the Trump Rally. Id. ¶¶ 292–96, 303–10. Plaintiffs claim that the 

City is liable in part because after the rally Chief Garcia allegedly praised officers for their 

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“discipline and restraint” because “additional force can incite more violence in the crowd.” Id. ¶ 

102.

Finally, Plaintiffs make other allegations against Anthony Yi, the minor H.A., the minor 

S.M., Victor Gasca, Daniel Arciga, Rafael Medina, Anthony McBride, and Does 42–55. Id. ¶¶ 

311–556. However, the claims against these Defendants are not before the Court because none of 

these Defendants have joined the instant motion.

B. Procedural History

The instant action began with a complaint filed on July 14, 2016. ECF No. 1. In the 

complaint, fourteen Plaintiffs asserted twenty-eight claims for relief against six named defendants.

Compl. ¶¶ 153–336. The original complaint named the City of San Jose, Mayor Sam Liccardo

(“Liccardo”), and Garcia as City Defendants. Id. The remaining police officers were not yet 

named in the original complaint, but instead were listed as Doe Defendants. Id. Plaintiffs’ 

complaint also sought to represent a class consisting of “[a]ll persons who attended the June 2, 

2016 Trump Rally at the McEnery Convention Center in San Jose, California, and exited the rally 

from the east-northeast exit.” Id. ¶ 146.

The City Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the original complaint on August 4, 2016. 

ECF No. 6. The motion sought to dismiss all four claims against the City Defendants, which were 

as follows: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Liccardo, Garcia, and the City for violation 

of Plaintiffs’ rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Count 1); (2) a claim for 

violation of the Bane Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1, against Liccardo, Garcia, and the City (Count 

2); (3) a claim for violation of the Ralph Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.7, against Liccardo, Garcia, 

and the City (Count 3); and (4) a California common law negligence claim against the City as 

employer of Does 1–15 (Count 4). Compl. ¶ 153–85.

On October 13, 2016, the Court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss.

ECF No. 30. The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims because the Court found that Plaintiffs 

had not sufficiently alleged that Liccardo and Garcia had acted with malicious intent or targeted 

Plaintiffs because of their political affiliations. Id. at 7–13.The Court also found that Plaintiffs had 

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not alleged a municipal policy sufficient to render the City of San Jose vicariously liable for the 

actions of Liccardo, Garcia, or the police officers. Id. at 13–18. The Court further found that 

Plaintiffs’ Bane Act and Ralph Act claims were based on essentially the same allegations as 

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim, and therefore the Court dismissed the Bane Act and Ralph Acts claims. 

Id. at 18–21. However, the Court found that Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a negligence claim 

against the Doe police officers and the City. Id. at 21–25.

After the Court granted the motion to dismiss in part, Plaintiffs filed an Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 35. The FAC added numerous Plaintiffs, Defendants, and causes of 

action. The FAC contains 43 claims by 20 individual plaintiffs against 17 named defendants and

55 Doe defendants. ECF No. 35. As relevant to the instant motion, the FAC omitted Liccardo as a 

Defendant but added police officers Loyd Kinsworthy, Lisa Gannon, Kevin Abruzzini, Paul 

Messier, Paul Spagnoli, Johnson Fong, and Jason Ta (collectively, “named police officers”) as 

defendants. Id. The FAC also asserted claims against Does 1–15, who are other unidentified police 

officers present at the rally. Therefore, under the FAC the City Defendants are the City of San 

Jose, Police Chief Edgardo Garcia, and Police Officers Loyd Kinsworthy, Lisa Gannon, Kevin 

Abruzzini, Paul Messier, Paul Spagnoli, Johnson Fong, and Jason Ta, as well as Does 1–15.

The FAC asserts four claims against the City Defendants: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 against Garcia, the named Police Officers, and Does 1–15 for violation of Plaintiffs’ rights 

under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count 1); (2) a claim against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

and Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1987) for 

violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment the City (Count 2); a claim for 

violation of the Bane Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1, against Garcia, the City, the named Police 

Officers, and Does 1–15 (Count 3); and (4) a California common law negligence claim against the 

City (Count 4). FAC ¶¶ 280–310.

In the FAC, Plaintiffs also seek to represent the following class: “All persons who attended 

the June 2, 2016 Trump Rally at the McEnery Convention Center in San Jose, California, and who 

exited the rally from the east-northeast exit, were denied the ability to leave through alternative 

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exits by the City Defendants, or agents under the City Defendants’ control, and/or were directed 

toward the anti-Trump protest by the City Defendants, or agents under the City Defendants’ 

control, and/or were refused assistance by the City Defendants, or agents under the City 

Defendants’ control after being directed towards the dangerous protest.” ECF No. 273.

The City Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on December 22, 2016. ECF No. 

44. Plaintiffs filed an opposition on January 19, 2017. ECF No. 60. The City Defendants filed a 

reply on January 26, 2017. ECF No. 61.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint 

that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Rule 8(a) requires a 

plaintiff to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For purposes of ruling on 

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and 

construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. 

Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not 

accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticeable facts, see Shwarz v. United States, 

234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and it “may look beyond the plaintiff’s complaint to matters of 

public record” without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment, 

Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). Nor must the Court “assume the truth of 

legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Fayer v. 

Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Mere “conclusory allegations of law 

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and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 

F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004).

B. Leave to Amend

If the Court concludes that the complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide whether 

to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend 

“shall be freely given when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule

15. . . [is] to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez 

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (ellipsis in original). Nonetheless, a 

district court may deny leave to amend a complaint due to “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory 

motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] 

futility of amendment.” Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008).

III. DISCUSSION

As stated above, Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts 43 claims for relief. Only the first four claims 

are relevant to the instant motion because these are the only claims against the City Defendants. 

These claims are as follows: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Garcia, the named Police 

Officers, and Does 1–15 for violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 

(Count 1); (2) a claim against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social 

Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1987), for violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the 

Fourteenth Amendment (Count 2); (3) a claim for violation of the Bane Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §

52.1, against Garcia, the City, the named Police Officers, and Does 1–15 (Count 3); and (4) a 

California common law negligence claim against the City (Count 4). FAC ¶¶ 280–310. Plaintiffs’

claim against the City under § 1983 is derivative of Plaintiffs’ claim against Garcia, the named 

Police Officers, and Does 1–15 under § 1983 because Plaintiffs assert that the City is vicariously 

liable under Monell for the actions of Garcia, the named Police Officers, and Does 1–15.

The named City Defendants move to dismiss each of Plaintiffs’ four claims against them

on different grounds. As to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against Garcia, the named Police Officers, and 

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Does 1–15, the City Defendants argue that (1) Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim; and (2) the 

individual Defendants have qualified immunity. As to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the City, the 

City Defendants argue that the City is not subject to suit under § 1983 and Monell. As to 

Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim, the City Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim. 

As to Plaintiffs’ negligence claims, the City Defendants argue that the City is immune under 

California Government Code § 820.2. The Court considers these arguments in turn.

A. Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Garcia, the Named Police Officers, and Does 

1–15

The City Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against Garcia, the named 

Police Officers, and Does 1–15 on two grounds: (1) Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for 

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the individual City Defendants have qualified 

immunity. The Court considers these arguments in turn.

1. Failure to State a Claim

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs must allege that “(1) the 

conduct that harm[ed] [Plaintiffs] [was] committed under color of state law (i.e., state action), and 

(2) the conduct . . . deprive[d] [Plaintiffs] of a constitutional right.” Ketchum v. Alameda Cty., 811 

F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 

the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek, 519 F.3d at, 1031.

Ordinarily, “members of the public have no constitutional right to sue state actors who fail 

to protect them from harm inflicted by third parties.” Johnson v. City of Seattle, 474 F.3d 634, 639 

(9th Cir. 2007). However, Plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeks to take advantage of an 

exception to this general rule called the “state-created danger” doctrine. To state a claim under the 

state-created danger doctrine, a plaintiff must first allege that “the state action affirmatively 

place[d] the plaintiff in a position of danger, that is, . . . state action create[d] or expose[d] an 

individual to a danger which he or she would not have otherwise faced.” Id. More particularly, in 

order to state claim against police for failing to provide protection, a plaintiff must allege facts 

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showing that the police put the plaintiff in a “worse position than that in which he would have 

been had [the police] not acted at all.” DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 

U.S. 189, 202(1989); see also Johnson, 474 F.3d at 641 (holding that a police department’s 

adoption of a crowd-control plan did not give rise to liability because the plaintiffs would have 

been in a worse position if police had adopted no plan at all).

Additionally, in order to state a claim under the state-created danger doctrine, a plaintiff 

must allege “deliberate indifference” by the state actor to the “known or obvious danger” created 

by the state action. Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2011). Deliberate 

indifference is “a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a 

known or obvious consequence of his action.” Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997).

The Ninth Circuit defined the contours of deliberate indifference in L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894 

(9th Cir. 1996). Under Grubbs, the standard applied in determining “deliberate indifference is 

even higher than gross negligence—deliberate indifference requires a culpable mental state.” 

Patel, 648 F.3d at 974 (citing Grubbs, 92 F.3d at 898–900). The state actor must “recognize[ ] [an] 

unreasonable risk and actually intend[ ] to expose the plaintiff to such risks without regard to the 

consequences to the plaintiff.” Grubbs, 92 F.3d at 899 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other 

words, a defendant is deliberately indifferent if the defendant “knows that something is going to 

happen but ignores the risk and exposes [the plaintiff] to it.” Id. at 900.

Using this standard, the Court first considers whether Plaintiffs have stated a § 1983 claim 

against Garcia and then considers whether Plaintiffs have stated a § 1983 claim against the named 

police officers and Does 1–15 (“police officers”).

i. Garcia

In Plaintiffs’ original complaint, Plaintiffs asserted that Garcia was not only deliberately 

indifferent to the danger to a risk of harm to Plaintiffs, but also that Garcia intended to subject 

Plaintiffs to harm based on Plaintiffs’ political affiliation in violation of the First Amendment.

Compl. ¶¶ 57–58. In dismissing Plaintiffs’ original complaint, the Court found that Plaintiffs’ 

factual allegations were “‘merely consistent’ with the ‘sheer possibility’ that Garcia gave the 

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alleged orders with the alleged state of mind” of intent or deliberate indifference. ECF No. 30, at

12. The Court noted that Garcia was likely involved in developing the crowd-control plan for the 

Trump Rally, but the Court held that “in order to state a claim for relief under their theories of 

liability under § 1983, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that in making that plan, Garcia . . . created 

a danger and was deliberately indifferent to whether Plaintiffs were harmed by that danger.” Id. 

However, in the original complaint, the only specific fact that Plaintiffs alleged about 

Garcia was that before the Trump Rally, Garcia stated that “we will do everything possible to 

protect the First Amendment, those attending our Community, and our officers.” Compl. ¶ 43. 

The Court found that this allegation did not demonstrate intent or deliberate indifference, and 

therefore the Court found that Plaintiffs had offered no non-conclusory allegations suggesting that 

Garcia was deliberately indifferent to a danger that Garcia created. Id.

In the FAC, Plaintiffs no longer assert that Garcia intentionally targeted Plaintiffs because 

of their political affiliation. Instead, the FAC asserts only that Garcia was deliberately indifferent 

to a risk of harm to Plaintiffs in devising the crowd-control plan. FAC ¶¶ 280–91. Plaintiffs have 

added new allegations regarding Garcia to support this claim, but none of these allegations 

suggests that Garcia demonstrated deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger that 

Garcia created. These new allegations are as follows.

First, Plaintiffs claim that Garcia sent an email in which he warned that “[r]ecent Trump 

rallies in other communities in California have drawn large crowds, and some violence has been 

reported.” FAC ¶ 75. 

Second, Plaintiffs allege that Sergeant Enrique Garcia of the San Jose Police Department’s 

Media Relations Unit emailed Garcia a proposed “Media Advisory” which stated, “[W]e are 

taking a zero tolerance approach to violent protesters. We will utilize all resources within the 

Department and through mutual aid to ensure a safe event for everyone.” Id. ¶ 76. Garcia allegedly 

changed the Media Advisory to instead state, “[W]e will do everything possible to ensure the 

event is safe for all a[t]tendees and surrounding neighborhoods.” Id. ¶ 77.

Third, Plaintiffs allege that after the Trump Rally, Garcia made statements indicating that 

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he had known beforehand of the risk of danger posed by anti-Trump protesters. According to a 

San Jose Police Officer’s Association (POA) online publication, Garcia stated that “[i]t wasn’t 

until Monday that we were notified of the location, it all happened very quickly. We immediately 

turned to special Ops to coordinate and recognized we did not have the staffing to have the arrest 

teams and personnel to keep the parties separated. [Garcia] said that they recognized they could’ve 

done things better and is committed to work with the POA to improve things in the future.” Id. ¶ 

82.

Finally, Plaintiffs allege that after the Trump Rally, Garcia stated that “[o]ur officers 

should be commended for both their effectiveness and their restraint” because “additional force 

can incite more violence in the crowd.” Id. ¶ 102.

These allegations do not remedy the deficiencies that the Court identified in the original 

complaint. In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court “construe[s] the pleadings in the light most 

favorable to” Plaintiffs. Manzarek, 519 F.3d at1031. However, even construing these new 

allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, these allegations do not demonstrate that

Garcia was deliberately indifferent to a danger that Garcia created. Specifically, these allegations 

do not show that Garcia “recognize[d] the unreasonable risk and actually intend[ed] to expose the 

plaintiff to such risks without regard to the consequences to the plaintiff.” Grubbs, 92 F.3d at 899.

Plaintiffs argue that their allegations are sufficient to demonstrate deliberate indifference to 

a heightened risk because Garcia knew that “previous [Trump] rallies in the state had been met by 

violence.” Opp. at 9. Plaintiffs argue extensively that although Garcia knew of a risk of harm from 

third parties, Garcia failed to adopt a crowd-control plan that would deal with the risk effectively. 

For example, Plaintiffs allege that Garcia requested additional officers through mutual aid 

channels, FAC ¶¶ 67–69, 83, and that Garcia knew and warned the City Council that “some 

violence has been reported” at other Trump rallies, FAC ¶ 75. Nevertheless, despite knowing of 

the risk, Plaintiffs allege that Garcia instructed police officers to adopt a passive strategy to avoid 

further antagonizing the crowd and not to intervene when police officers saw attacks. Id. ¶ 80. In 

doing so, Plaintiffs allege that Garcia departed from the City’s previous “zero tolerance” approach 

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART WITH PREJUDICE AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS

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to violent protesters. Id. ¶¶ 76–78.

However, whether Garcia adopted a plan that adequately protected Plaintiffs is not the 

relevant inquiry. In general, state actors are under no obligation to protect the public from harm by 

third parties. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197. More specifically, the Ninth Circuit has held that a state 

actor cannot be held liable simply for adopting a passive crowd-control strategy instead of “a more 

aggressive operation plan,” even in the face of a known risk of violence. Johnson, 474 F.3d at 640. 

Instead, under the state-created danger doctrine, state actors are liable only when they 

“affirmatively place[] the plaintiff in a position of danger” and are deliberately indifferent to the 

danger they create. Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1061. Therefore, Garcia can be liable only if he was 

deliberately indifferent to the fact that the crowd-control plan he helped to devise created a 

danger. See Johnson, 474 F.3d at 640 (rejecting a claim against police officers for failing to 

intervene in a riot because the “police officers did not create the dangerous conditions”). Indeed, 

under Ninth Circuit law Garcia can be liable only if he was deliberately indifferent to the fact that

the crowd-control plan created a danger so serious that it would have been better “had the police 

not come up with any operational plan whatsoever.” Id. at 641. Thus, the relevant question is not 

whether Garcia knew that the crowd-control plan did not adequately deal with the risk of violence

from third parties, the question is whether Garcia knew that the adoption of the crowd-control plan

increased the risk of violence to the point that Plaintiffs would have been better off “had the police 

not come up with any operational plan whatsoever.” Id.

The only aspect of the crowd-control plan that Plaintiffs allege increased the danger to 

Plaintiffs was the decision to close off certain streets and to have attendees to exit from the eastnortheast exit of the McEnery Convention Center toward Market Street, rather than allowing 

attendees to exit in any direction. FAC ¶¶ 89–91. Plaintiffs allege that by requiring Plaintiffs to 

exit only in this direction, Garcia led Plaintiffs into a crowd of anti-Trump protesters and therefore 

subjected Plaintiffs to a risk that they would not otherwise have faced.

The Court “construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to” Plaintiffs, and 

therefore the Court assumes for the purposes of the instant motion that leading Plaintiffs from a 

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single exit did in fact increase the risk of harm to Plaintiffs. Manzarek, 519 F.3d at 1031. As 

discussed further below, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that if police officers had allowed 

Plaintiffs to leave the Trump Rally out of any exit, Plaintiffs would not have been subjected to the 

same risk of harm by anti-Trump protesters. See infra Part III.A.ii.

However, even if the crowd-control plan did increase the risk of harm to Plaintiffs, 

Plaintiffs must also allege that Garcia “recognize[d]” the increased danger from using a single exit 

and “actually intend[ed]” by adopting that plan to expose Plaintiffs to such a danger. Grubbs, 92 

F.3d at 899. In other words, Plaintiffs must allege that Garcia knew before the rally or was 

willfully blind to the fact that limiting Plaintiffs to this single exit would “place them in [a] worse 

position than they would have been in had the police not come up with any operational plan 

whatsoever.” Johnson, 474 F.3d at 641.

Plaintiffs have not alleged that at the time Garcia developed the crowd-control plan, Garcia 

had any reason to believe that such a plan would increase the risk of harm to Plaintiffs. The FAC 

does not allege that Garcia knew where anti-Trump protesters were likely to be located, nor does 

the FAC allege that Garcia knew that Plaintiffs would be safer if they were allowed to leave in any 

direction.1 Additionally, the FAC does not allege that Garcia knew that the crowd-control plan 

was so defective that Plaintiffs would be better off if police simply had no plan whatsoever.

Therefore, Plaintiffs have not alleged that Garcia had actual knowledge of or willful 

blindness to an elevated risk of harm from the adoption of the crowd-control plan. Grubbs II, 92 

 

1

In their Opposition, Plaintiffs state that since the filing of the FAC, Plaintiffs have acquired a 

copy of the City’s crowd-control plan, which “required Plaintiffs to exit the Rally in the direction 

of one of two designated free speech zones . . . which the City Defendants knew, or should have 

known, would have contained anti-Trump protesters.” Opp. at 6 n.2. The court may not consider 

this allegation because in deciding a motion to dismiss, a court may not “consider the facts that 

Plaintiff asserts only in its opposition.” Bd. of Trustees of the Bay Area Roofers Health & Welfare 

Trust Fund v. Gudgel Yancey Roofing Inc., 2016 WL 7049240, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2016). 

However, even if the Court took this fact into account, it would not change the Court’s decision. 

Even if Garcia knew that the crowd-control plan might place Plaintiffs in rough proximity to antiTrump protesters, this does not suggest that violence was an “obvious consequence of” Garcia’s 

adoption of the crowd-control plan. Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 410. The contents of the plan 

certainly do not suggest that Garcia knew that the crowd-control plan was so deficient that 

Plaintiffs would have been better off “had the police not come up with any operational plan 

whatsoever. See Johnson, 474 F.3d at 641. 

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F.3d at 900. Plaintiffs have not pleaded facts sufficient to meet the requirements of the statecreated danger doctrine. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not stated § 1983 claim against 

Garcia.

In granting the City Defendants’ first motion to dismiss, the Court stated that “[f]ailure to . 

. . cure the deficiencies identified in this Order will result in a dismissal with prejudice of 

Plaintiffs’ claims.” ECF No. 30, at 17. Despite this explicit warning, in the FAC Plaintiffs failed to 

make the necessary allegations regarding Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against Garcia. Thus, because 

Plaintiffs have failed to cure the deficiencies in the complaint, the Court concludes that further 

amendment would be futile.2See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (holding that leave to amend is not 

warranted when amendment would be futile). Additionally, granting leave to amend after an 

explicit warning that failure to cure identified deficiencies would result in dismissal with prejudice 

would cause “undue delay” and “undue prejudice to the opposing party.” See Leadsinger, 512 

F.3d at 532. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Garcia with prejudice.

ii. Police Officers

The Court next considers Plaintiffs’ claim under the state-created danger doctrine against

Does 1–15 and the named police officers: Loyd Kinsworthy, Lisa Gannon, Kevin Abruzzini, Paul 

Messier, Paul Spagnoli, Johnson Fong, and Jason Ta. Kinsworthy is a police captain, and Gannon, 

Abruzzini, Messier, Spagnoli, Fong, and Ta are police lieutenants. FAC at 2. According to the 

FAC, each of the police officers was “physically present at and/or outside the Rally.” Id. ¶ 284. 

Kinsworthy was allegedly involved in creation of the crowd-control plan before the Trump Rally,

Id. ¶ 87, and was the “primary point of contact for all units deployed at the Rally.” Id. ¶ 72. Fong 

was allegedly the “sub-commander at the Trump Rally” and acted as the “Commander for the 

skirmish line.” Id. ¶¶ 45, 74. The FAC does not specifically identify the roles of Gannon, 

 

2 As noted above, in their Opposition Plaintiffs state that if given the opportunity to amend,

Plaintiffs will add an allegation regarding the location of designated free speech zones in the

crowd-control plan. See supra n.1. However, as discussed above, the Court finds that adding this 

allegation would not be sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against Garcia. Amendment to add this 

allegation would therefore be futile.

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Abruzzini, Messier, Spagnoli, and Ta, but all are allegedly lieutenants who were present at the 

Trump Rally and directed Plaintiffs out of the convention center. Id. ¶ 304. Does 1–15 are other 

unnamed police officers who were allegedly present at the Trump Rally. Id. ¶ 281.

Plaintiffs argue that the police officers exhibited deliberate indifference to a danger that 

they created because the officers “acted according to the City’s officially planned street closures 

and policies permitting non-intervention, even where due process mandate[d] such intervention.” 

Opp. at 19. Plaintiffs allege that the police officers violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights both 

when Kinsworthy helped to devise the crowd-control plan before the Trump Rally, FAC ¶ 87, and 

on the night of the Trump Rally when all of the officers continued to follow that plan after it 

became clear that the plan was subjecting Plaintiffs to a serious risk of harm. Opp. at 11; FAC ¶ 

89.

The Court again applies the standard for the state-created danger doctrine. First, the Court 

considers whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the police officers’ actions 

“affirmatively place[d] the plaintiff[s] in a position of danger, that is, . . . state action create[d] or 

expose[d] an individual to a danger which he or she would not have otherwise faced.” Id. Next, the 

Court considers whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the police officers demonstrated 

deliberate indifference—that is, the officers “kn[ew] that something [was] going to happen but 

ignore[d] the risk and expose[d] [Plaintiffs] to it.” Id. at 900.

Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that by leading Plaintiffs along a particular path out of 

the convention center, the police officers took an affirmative action that exposed Plaintiffs to a 

danger that Plaintiffs “would not have otherwise faced.” Johnson, 474 F.3d at 639. Specifically, 

Plaintiffs allege that the police officers actively prevented Plaintiffs and other Trump Rally 

attendees from leaving the convention center by safer alternative routes. FAC ¶ 89. For example, 

the FAC alleges that Plaintiff I.P. and his father attempted to turn right “to safety” after exiting the 

convention center. Id. ¶ 161. However, a line of police officers allegedly forced I.P. and his father 

to turn left, into the anti-Trump protesters, where I.P. was struck in the back of the head. Id. ¶ 162. 

Additionally, Plaintiff Christina Wong and her son allegedly were prevented from exiting directly 

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to their car. Id. ¶ 204–06. Instead, after exiting from the only open exit of the convention center, 

Wong’s son was assaulted. Id. ¶ 211. Thus, construing the facts alleged in the FAC in the light 

most favorable to Plaintiffs, the complaint plausibly suggests that by directing Plaintiffs in a 

particular direction from the Trump Rally, the police officers exposed Plaintiffs to a danger that 

they would not otherwise have faced.

Next, the Court considers whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the police 

officers demonstrated deliberate indifference. In order to plead deliberate indifference, Plaintiffs 

must plead facts plausibly suggesting that the police officers either knew or were willfully blind to 

the risk posed by their actions. Grubbs, 92 F.3d at 900. As discussed above, Plaintiffs allege that 

the police officers violated the constitution both when Kinsworthy helped to devise the crowdcontrol plan before the Trump Rally and when all of the officers assisted with crowd control 

during and after the Trump Rally. The Court addresses these allegations in turn.

As with Garcia, Plaintiffs have not alleged specific facts showing that when Kinsworthy

(along with Garcia and any other unknown actors) devised the crowd-control plan before the 

Trump Rally, Kinsworthy knew that leading Plaintiffs from the convention center on the 

designated path would increase the danger to Plaintiffs. As discussed above, Plaintiffs have argued 

that those who created the crowd-control plan knew of a risk of violence from anti-Trump 

protesters. However, Plaintiffs have not alleged that those who created the crowd-control knew 

that the designated path would increase the danger to Plaintiffs, let alone that doing so would 

increase the risk so substantially that Plaintiffs would be better off if “the police [had] not come up 

with any operational plan whatsoever. See Johnson, 474 F.3d at 641. Thus, Plaintiffs’ allegations 

about Kinsworthy’s actions before the Trump Rally are insufficient to state a claim. Plaintiffs do 

not allege that any other police officers violated the constitution through actions taken before the 

Trump Rally. The Court therefore DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ claim against Kinsworthy to the extent 

that the claim is based on Kinsworthy’s role in devising the crowd-control plan before the Trump 

Rally.

Although Kinsworthy was not named in Plaintiffs’ original complaint, the original 

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complaint asserted claims against Kinsworthy as a Doe Defendant for his role in devising the 

crowd-control plan. See FAC ¶ 157. In granting the City Defendants’ first motion to dismiss, the 

Court found that Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim against these Doe Defendants. The Court also

stated that “[f]ailure to . . . cure the deficiencies identified in this Order will result in a dismissal 

with prejudice of Plaintiffs’ claims.” ECF No. 30, at 17. Despite this explicit warning, in the FAC 

Plaintiffs failed to make the necessary allegations regarding Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against 

Kinsworthy based on his role in formulating the crowd-control plan. Thus, because Plaintiffs have 

failed to cure the deficiencies in the complaint, the Court concludes that further amendment would 

be futile. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (holding that leave to amend is not warranted when 

amendment would be futile). Additionally, granting leave to amend after an explicit warning that 

failure to cure identified deficiencies would result in dismissal with prejudice would cause “undue 

delay” and “undue prejudice to the opposing party.” See Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 532. The Court 

therefore dismisses with prejudice Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against Kinsworthy based on his role in 

formulating the crowd-control plan.

The Court next considers Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the police officers’ actions on 

the night of the Trump Rally. Plaintiffs allege that after the Trump Rally, the police officers “were 

fully aware of the volatile situation” and knew that anti-Trump protesters had begun to assault 

rally attendees. FAC ¶ 1. Nevertheless, despite knowing that violence had already broken out and 

was likely to continue, Plaintiffs claim that the police officers “continued to direct the Rally 

attendees into the mob, deny Plaintiffs the ability to exit through alternative paths, and refuse to 

direct the officers under their control to do so.” Opp. at 12.

Unlike Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding actions before the Trump Rally, Plaintiffs’ 

allegation that the police officers knew of the risk to Plaintiffs on the night of the Trump Rally is 

supported by specific facts. Plaintiffs allege that as early as 6:00 p.m. on the night of the Trump 

Rally, “the San Jose police warned all officers deployed around th[e] Rally that assaults had 

already been reported outside the Rally.” FAC ¶ 1. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that an unnamed 

officer told Plaintiff Christina Wong and her son “Good luck!” as the officer directed them 

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“towards the violent protest.” Id. ¶ 284. Thus, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that officers on the 

scene, including named and unnamed Defendants, were aware that the crowd-control plan was 

putting Plaintiffs in danger. Unlike Garcia, who devised the crowd-control plan beforehand, 

Plaintiffs allege that the police officers were present at or around the Trump Rally. FAC ¶ 284. 

Thus, construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the police officers were in a 

position to know that anti-Trump protesters were targeting Plaintiffs along the designated exit 

path.

In short, Plaintiffs have not alleged that any of the City Defendants had any reason to know 

before the Trump Rally that the crowd-control plan was so deficient that Plaintiffs would have 

been better off if “the police [had] not come up with any operational plan whatsoever. See 

Johnson, 474 F.3d at 641. However, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the police officers 

present at the Trump Rally had reason to know that due to the location and unusual aggressiveness 

of the anti-Trump protesters, the crowd-control plan was in fact putting Plaintiffs in serious 

danger. Cf id. at 640 (suggesting that liability may be appropriate if police had “confine[d] the 

[plaintiffs] to a place where they would be exposed to a risk of harm by private persons”).

Thus, Plaintiffs have stated a claim against the police officers for continuing to direct 

Plaintiffs into a dangerous area after the police officers became aware that the crowd-control plan 

was subjecting Plaintiffs to an increased risk of harm by anti-Trump protesters.

2. Qualified Immunity

City Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The defense of 

qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as 

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A court 

considering a claim of qualified immunity must determine: (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged the 

deprivation of an actual constitutional right, and (2) whether such right was clearly established 

such that it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 

confronted. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). The Court may exercise its discretion 

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in deciding which prong to address first, in light of the particular circumstances of each case. Id.3

In assessing a qualified immunity defense on a motion to dismiss, a court must “regard all 

of the allegations in [the] complaint as true.” Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1999). 

A court should deny a motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity if the complaint 

“allege[s] acts to which qualified immunity may not apply.” Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 

851 (9th Cir. 2001). Under this standard, in many cases it is impossible to determine based on a 

complaint alone that qualified immunity is warranted. Morley, 175 F.3d at 761. In such 

circumstances, a court may deny a qualified immunity defense without prejudice and after further 

factual development a defendant may re-raise the qualified immunity issue “at summary judgment 

or at trial.” Id.; see also Treglia v. Kernan, 2013 WL 4427253, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013)

(denying a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity without prejudice).

In the instant case, City Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity 

because Plaintiffs have not “adduce[d] case law establishing that it would have been clear to ‘a 

reasonable officer’ that his decision to develop a dangerous crowd-control plan would violate the 

due process clause.” Mot. at 11. However, as Plaintiffs point out, “the state-created danger 

doctrine is clearly established.” Opp. at 12. As the Ninth Circuit held over ten years ago, “[i]t is 

beyond dispute that [when the alleged violation occurred] in September 1998, it was clearly 

established that state officials could be held liable where they affirmatively and with deliberate 

indifference placed an individual in danger she would not otherwise have faced.” Kennedy, 439 

F.3d at 1066. Thus, at the time of the Trump Rally, City Defendants were on notice that they could 

not affirmatively expose Plaintiffs to danger with deliberate indifference.

Additionally, Defendants were on notice that the state-created danger doctrine applied to 

police crowd-control decisions. In Johnson v. City of Seattle, 474 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2007), the 

Ninth Circuit applied the state-created danger doctrine to a crowd-control plan made by the City of 

Seattle. Although the Ninth Circuit found that the elements of the state-created danger doctrine 

 

3

In the instant case, the Court has exercised its discretion to first consider whether Plaintiffs 

sufficiently alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right. See supra Part III.A.1.

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were not met because the City’s plan did not place the plaintiffs in a worse position than they 

would have been in with no police protection, Johnson nevertheless made clear that the statecreated danger doctrine applies to the conduct at issue in this case. Id. at 640–41.

Thus, at this stage of litigation, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law that qualified 

immunity protects the police officers’ actions on the night of the Trump Rally. Instead, as in most 

cases, “[t]hose issues must be resolved at summary judgment or at trial.” Morley, 175 F.3d at 761. 

Therefore, City Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity is DENIED 

without prejudice.

B. Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against the City

The City Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim under § 1983 against the City on the 

grounds that the City is not vicariously liable for the actions of Garcia, the named police officers, 

or Does 1–15 under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 

658, 691 (1987). Under Monell, a municipality is not liable under § 1983 unless “official 

municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Id. at 691. More specifically, “it is 

when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those 

whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the 

government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. To establish an official policy 

that would give rise to Monell liability, a plaintiff may show (1) that “the individual who 

committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority,” (2) that the 

City failed to train its employees in circumstances such that “the government’s omission . . .

amount[s] to ‘deliberate indifference’ to a constitutional right,” or (3) that a policymaking official 

“ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Clouthier v. Cty. 

of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. 

Cty. of Los Angeles, 2016 WL 4268955 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2016).

In the FAC, Plaintiffs allege that the City is liable under § 1983 for four reasons. First, 

Plaintiffs claim that “Police Chief Garcia acted as a final policymaker for the City when setting the 

City’s policy regarding the handling of civil disturbances at the Rally.” Id. ¶ 293(b). Second, 

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Plaintiffs claim that the City Defendants “acted in accordance with officially adopted and 

promulgated City policies” including “the policies and procedures promulgated in the Duty 

Manual and the City’s action plan.” FAC ¶ 293(a). Third, Plaintiffs claim that “the City failed to 

train its officers not to deny Plaintiffs and the class members their ability [to] leave through 

alternative, safe exits; failed to train its officers to not direct Plaintiffs and the class members 

toward a dangerous mob; and failed to train its officers to protect Plaintiffs and the class members 

from danger created by the Individual City Defendants’ actions.” Id. ¶ 293(c). Fourth, Plaintiffs 

claim that “Police Chief Garcia ratified the Individual City Defendants’ unconstitutional acts by 

publicly declaring his support for those actions and by failing to reprimand officers for their 

conduct.” Id. ¶ 293(d). The Court addresses each of these claims in turn.

1. Garcia as Policymaker for the City

First, Plaintiffs allege that “Police Chief Garcia acted as a final policymaker for the City 

when setting the City’s policy regarding the handling of civil disturbances at the Rally.” Id. ¶ 

293(b). For the purpose of § 1983 claims, official policies may include “fixed plans of action to be 

followed under similar circumstances consistently and over time” as well as “course[s] of action 

tailored to a particular situation and not intended to control decisions in later situations.” Pembaur 

v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480–81 (1986). Therefore, if Garcia’s creation of the crowdcontrol plan were a constitutional violation, the Court would have to consider whether creation of 

this plan for a single event was sufficient to set policy for the City. However, as discussed above, 

Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that Garcia’s creation of the crowd-control plan before the 

Trump Rally violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights. Therefore, even if this plan was an official 

policy of the City, this official policy would not constitute a violation of Plaintiffs’ due process 

rights. Thus, Plaintiffs allegation that Garcia acted as policymaker for the City is insufficient to 

subject the City to liability under Monell.

2. Policies in City Documents

Second, Plaintiffs allege that City Defendants’ unconstitutional actions were taken in 

accordance with City policy as expressed in documents such as “the Duty Manual and the City’s 

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action plan created by the City, Police Chief Garcia, Captain Kinsworthy, and/or DOES 1–15, 

specifically for the Rally.” FAC ¶ 293(a). As discussed above, the Court has found that the 

creation of the City’s action plan before the Trump Rally, whether by Garcia, Kinsworthy, or other 

unknown actors, did not violate Plaintiffs’ due process rights. Thus, even if the plan were the 

official policy of the City, this would not subject the City to liability under Monell.

The other documents to which Defendants point, including the Duty Manual, also do not 

create a policy of unconstitutionally exposing people to danger by third parties. To the contrary, as 

City Defendants point out in their motion, “the only policy [from the duty manual that] Plaintiffs 

explicitly set forth in their FAC . . . appears to instruct the opposite.” FAC ¶ 66 (“Where a 

demonstrator uses physical violence upon another person or property, officers should promptly 

make an arrest . . . .”). Indeed, the FAC alleges that City Defendants are liable under § 1983 

because they violated the City’s “normal ‘zero tolerance’ approach to violent protesters.” Id. ¶ 79 

(“Instead of following the City’s normal “zero tolerance” approach to violent protesters, by 

making targeted arrests during the protest, the City implemented an entirely different policy.”) 

(emphasis in original). Thus, Plaintiffs have pointed to no documents that created an 

unconstitutional policy of exposing people to harm from third parties.

3. Failure to Train

Third, Plaintiffs allege that “the City failed to train its officers not to deny Plaintiffs and 

the class members their ability [to] leave through alternative, safe exits; failed to train its officers 

to not direct Plaintiffs and the class members toward a dangerous mob; and failed to train its 

officers to protect Plaintiffs and the class members from danger created by the Individual City 

Defendants’ actions.” Id. ¶ 293(c).

In order to establish that a municipality is liable under § 1983 for failure to train, Plaintiffs 

must allege that a particular training deficiency was so egregious that it “amount[ed] to deliberate 

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton v. 

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). To make such a showing, Plaintiffs must show a pattern of 

similar constitutional violations or otherwise demonstrate that training was obviously necessary to 

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avoid constitutional violations. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (“A pattern of 

similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate 

deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.”); City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 (“[I]t 

may happen that . . . the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so 

likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can 

reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.”).

In the FAC, Plaintiffs allege that the City was on notice of the need to train because

“violence had already occurred at other Trump rallies.” FAC ¶ 293(c). Despite this “ample and 

advanced warning,” Plaintiffs allege that the City “failed to train its officers to appropriately 

respond to similar acts of violence that occurred after the Rally in this case.” Id.

However, as discussed above, the mere fact that the City Defendants failed to adequately 

contain and prevent violence by anti-Trump protesters is insufficient to state a claim for violation 

of Plaintiffs’ due process rights. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202 (holding that the state’s failure to 

protect a plaintiff from harm by third parties—“though calamitous in hindsight—simply does not 

constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause”); see also Johnson, 474 F.3d at 641 (finding no 

constitutional violation from a crowd-control plan because police “did not place [the plaintiffs] in 

any worse position than they would have been in had the police not come up with any operational 

plan whatsoever”).

Therefore, the mere fact that some violence had occurred at other Trump Rallies is 

insufficient to demonstrate a “pattern of similar constitutional violations” that put the City on 

notice of a specific need for training. Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. Even if violence had occurred at 

other Trump Rallies, DeShaney and other cases make clear that the City was under no 

constitutional obligation to take steps to prevent such violence. Thus, the City also had no 

constitutional obligation to train police officers to take steps to prevent such violence.

Instead, as discussed above, the only constitutional violation that Plaintiffs have 

sufficiently alleged is that the police officers continued to direct Plaintiffs in the direction 

designated by the crowd-control plan after realizing that doing so placed Plaintiffs in serious 

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danger. Plaintiffs do not allege that the City Defendants had any reason to know in advance that 

the crowd-control plan might be worse for Plaintiffs than no police presence at all, let alone that 

there was a pattern of similar issues sufficient to put the City on notice of a need for specific 

training about the issue.

Therefore, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing that the City was aware of a need for 

training on this issue, and Plaintiffs certainly have not established that the City’s training 

deficiency was so egregious that it “amount[ed] to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons 

with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. Thus, Plaintiffs have 

not stated a claim for Monell liability under a failure to train theory.

4. Ratification of the Actions of City Employees

Finally, Plaintiffs allege that “Police Chief Garcia ratified the Individual City Defendants’ 

unconstitutional acts by publicly declaring his support for those actions and by failing to 

reprimand officers for their conduct.” Id. ¶ 293(d). Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that after the rally, 

Garcia did not discipline any of the police officers involved and stated that “[o]ur officers should 

be commended for both their effectiveness and their restraint.”

Under Ninth Circuit law, a plaintiff states a claim under Monell if the plaintiff alleges that 

the “authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.” Christie v. 

Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir.1999) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 

(1988)). Specifically, “[p]olicy or custom may be inferred if, after the [incident] . . . officials took 

no steps to reprimand or discharge the guards, or if they otherwise failed to admit the guards’

conduct was in error.” McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir.1986); see also Gomez v. 

Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A policy or custom may be found either in an 

affirmative proclamation of policy or in the failure of an official ‘to take any remedial steps after 

the violations.’”) (quoting Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 647 (9th Cir. 1991).

In their motion to dismiss, the City Defendants concede that “Chief Garcia, as head of 

police, [was] aware of his officers’ actions at the rally and the reasons for them” at the time that 

Garcia “commended” the officers after the Trump Rally. Mot. at 7. Nevertheless, the City 

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Defendants argue that Garcia’s statements approving of police officers’ actions merely “show a 

police chief fulfilling his role as the public face for his department.” Id. However, this argument 

shows precisely why Garcia’s statements approving of the police officers’ actions can give rise to 

liability under Monell. Acting as the public face of the police department, and with knowledge of 

“his officers’ actions at the rally and the reasons for them,” id., Garcia allegedly made “statements 

. . . tending to show that [he] endorsed or approved the unconstitutional conduct of individual 

officers.” Dorger v. City of Napa, 2012 WL 3791447, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2012). Under 

Ninth Circuit law, this “evinces ratification” and therefore is sufficient to plausibly allege that the 

police officers’ actions constituted municipal policy. Id.; see also Christie, 176 F.3d at 1240 

(holding that Monell liability is appropriate if a representative of the municipality “affirmatively 

approved” of the allegedly unconstitutional conduct”).

City Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs “have not alleged facts showing that Chief 

Garcia had the legal authority to make . . . policy” in the area of police matters. Mot. 13. However, 

Plaintiffs have alleged that as Police Chief, Garcia was a “competent authority” in the area of 

police matters. FAC ¶ 309; see also id. ¶ 78. Because a police chief is likely to have authority in 

the area of police matters, Plaintiffs’ allegation is plausible even without citations to specific 

portions of the City Charter or other provisions of state law. Cf. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 

F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that police chief had policymaking authority on police 

matters); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); Clark v. City of Tucson, 238 

F.3d 427 (9th Cir. 2000) (same).

Therefore, Plaintiffs allegations regarding Garcia’s statements after the Trump Rally and 

Garcia’s failure to reprimand police officers are sufficient to state a claim that the municipality 

ratified the police officers’ allegedly unconstitutional actions.

In short, in conformity with the Court’s previous findings, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ 

allegations regarding City Defendants’ actions before the Trump Rally in devising the crowdcontrol plan are not sufficient to state a claim under § 1983 against the City. However, the Court 

finds that Garcia’s statements after the Trump Rally praising the actions of police officers are 

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sufficient to state a claim that the City is liable for the police officers’ allegedly unconstitutional 

actions in directing Plaintiffs along a particular path after realizing that doing so placed Plaintiffs 

in danger.

5. Summary

For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS the City Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss the § 1983 claim against the City to the extent that the claim is based on the adoption of a 

policy in City documents prior to the Trump Rally, on the adoption of a policy by Garcia prior to 

the Trump Rally, or on the City’s failure to train. The Court considered and rejected these same 

arguments in granting the City Defendants’ first motion to dismiss. ECF No. 30, at 16–18. The 

Court also stated that “[f]ailure to . . . cure the deficiencies identified in this Order will result in a 

dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs’ claims.” ECF No. 30, at 17. Despite this explicit warning, 

Plaintiffs failed to cure these deficiencies. Thus, because Plaintiffs have failed to cure the 

deficiencies in the complaint, the Court concludes that further amendment would be futile. See 

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (holding that leave to amend is not warranted when amendment would be 

futile). Additionally, granting leave to amend after an explicit warning that failure to cure 

identified deficiencies would result in dismissal with prejudice would cause “undue delay” and 

“undue prejudice to the opposing party.” See Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 532. Therefore, to the extent 

that the § 1983 claim against the City is based on the adoption of a policy in City documents prior 

to the Trump Rally, on the adoption of a policy by Garcia prior to the Trump Rally, or on the 

City’s failure to train, the Court dismisses this claim with prejudice.

However, for the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES the City Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss the § 1983 claim against the City to the extent that the claim is based on Garcia’s 

alleged ratification of the police officers’ actions after the Trump Rally.

C. Bane Act Claim

In the FAC, Plaintiffs assert a claim under the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (“Bane Act”), 

CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1, against each of the City Defendants: the City, Garcia, Officers 

Kinsworthy, Gannon, Abruzzini, Messier, Spagnoli, Fong, and Ta, and Does 1–15. The Bane Act 

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punishes any “person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, [who] interferes by 

threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with 

the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or 

laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state.” CAL.

CIV. CODE § 52.1(a). The Bane Act also provides a cause of action for anyone whose rights are 

harmed in this way. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1(b). In order to state a claim under the Bane Act, 

Plaintiffs must allege “(1) interference with or attempted interference with a state or federal 

constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by threats, 

intimidation, or coercion.” Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 67 (2015).

Plaintiffs claim that the City Defendants violated the Bane Act in three ways. First, 

Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he City Defendants instructed police officers to require the Plaintiffs and 

the Class members to exit the convention center in the direction of the violent mob.” FAC ¶ 299. 

Second, Plaintiffs allege that City Defendants “failed to assist Plaintiffs and the Class members 

after directing them to the dangerous situation.” Id. Third, Plaintiffs allege that the City 

Defendants “prevented Plaintiffs and the Class members from using alternative, safer routes.” Id. 

Plaintiffs allege that each of these actions violated the constitution and “constitute[d] threats, 

intimidation, or coercion.” Id. Plaintiffs do not argue that the violence of the mob itself constituted 

threats, intimidation, or coercion for the purposes of Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claims against the City 

Defendants. The Court addresses each of Plaintiffs’ allegations in turn.

First, the Court addresses Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the City Defendants’ instructions 

to Plaintiffs. As discussed above, the Court has found that the City Defendants’ planning of the 

crowd-control plan did not constitute a constitutional violation. Therefore, this conduct also 

cannot form the predicate for a Bane Act violation. See ECF No. 30, at 18–19 (dismissing 

Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim because Plaintiffs had not stated a claim for a constitutional violation).

Second, the Court addresses Plaintiffs’ allegations that the City Defendants used threats, 

intimidation, or coercion by failing to assist Plaintiffs. Threats, intimidation, and coercion all 

involve affirmative acts. See Meyers v. City of Fresno, 2011 WL 902115, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 

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2011) (Coercion is ‘the application to another of such force, . . . as to constrain him to do against 

his will something he would not otherwise have done.”) (quoting Ex Parte Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488, 

526 (1942)). A failure to assist Plaintiffs, on the other hand, is a failure to act rather than an 

affirmative act violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Plaintiffs do not cite any cases holding 

that a failure to act can constitute threats, intimidation, or coercion. Therefore, the Court holds that 

the City Defendants’ failure to intervene does not constitute threats, intimidation, or coercion 

under the Bane Act.

Finally, the Court considers Plaintiffs’ allegation that officers used threats, intimidation, or 

coercion by preventing Plaintiffs from leaving out of alternative exits. Plaintiffs do not explain 

how closing certain streets and exits could constitute threats, intimidation, or coercion. Plaintiffs 

do not allege that police ever threatened Plaintiffs or that police physically touched Plaintiffs at all. 

Construing the complaint most favorably to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs may be alleging that by closing 

off certain exits, police forced Plaintiffs into the one designated path, and that there was an 

implied threat of physical force if Plaintiffs attempted to use an alternative exit.

However, these allegations are insufficient to establish that the alleged constitutional 

violation was accomplished “by threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Allen, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 67. 

The decision in Allen is instructive. In Allen, homeless individuals and two people providing 

services to the homeless sued Sacramento City police. Id. at 46. The plaintiffs had been camping 

on a private lot with permission of the owner, but police informed the plaintiffs that they were 

violating a city ordinance by camping on public or private property without a City permit. Id. 

After issuing two citations, police eventually arrested the plaintiffs. Id. The plaintiffs claimed that 

police violated the Bane Act because “an arrest is inherently coercive.” Id. at 675–76.

The California Court of Appeals rejected this argument. The Court held that the Bane Act 

“requires threats, coercion, or intimidation in addition to a constitutional violation, and the 

plaintiff cannot graft one act onto two distinct burdens.” Id. at 677–78 (citing Santiago v. Keyes, 

890 F. Supp. 2d 149, 155–56 (D. Mass. 2012)). Specifically, the Court found that “wrongful arrest 

or detention, without more, does not satisfy” the Bane Act. Id. 69; see also Shoyoye v. County of 

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Los Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 4th 947, 958 (2012) (“[W]e conclude that where coercion is inherent 

in the constitutional violation alleged, . . . the statutory requirement of ‘threats, intimidation, or 

coercion’ is not met.”).

In the instant case, Plaintiffs do not even allege that they were actually arrested or 

physically detained. Instead, Plaintiffs merely allege that barriers and the presence of officers 

prevented them from leaving the convention center out of certain exits. FAC ¶ 299. However, as 

discussed above, this is the same conduct that Plaintiffs allege constituted the constitutional 

violation. Plaintiffs provide no additional allegations establishing that this alleged constitutional 

violation was accomplished by means of threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Indeed, if the conduct of which Plaintiffs complain constituted threats, intimidation, or 

coercion, then essentially any instruction from police officers would also qualify as threats, 

intimidation, or coercion. Nearly all instructions from police officers come with the implied threat 

that if the person does not obey the instruction, the police officer may use coercive means to force 

compliance or even arrest the person. See Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1) (“Every person who 

willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public officer, . . . shall be punished by a fine not 

exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one 

year . . . .”). If this possibility of coercive force were enough to constitute “threats, intimidation, or 

coercion” for the purposes of the Bane Act, all constitutional violations by police officers would 

also be Bane Act violations. However, Allen, Shoyoye, and other decisions make clear that this is 

not the case. Instead, Plaintiffs must allege coercion beyond the de minimis possibility of coercion 

inherent in a police officer’s instruction that someone avoid a particular area. See also Rodgers v. 

City of Pasadena, 2016 WL 7240135, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2016) (finding that a plaintiff had 

not stated a Bane Act claim against a police officer who “forced [the plaintiff] to walk outside to 

the sidewalk”).

Plaintiffs argue that to state a Bane Act claim, Plaintiffs need only show that the 

constitutional interference was intentional, and “deliberate indifference” qualifies as intentional 

conduct for the purposes of a Bane Act claim. Opp. at 19 (citing M.H. v. Cty. of Alameda, 90 F. 

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Supp. 3d 889, 898 (N.D. Cal. 2013)). Plaintiffs are correct that M.H. and some other federal 

district court cases have addressed Shoyoye’s rule that threats, intimidation, or coercion inherent in 

the constitutional violation are insufficient to state a claim and have held that “Shoyoye applies 

only when the conduct is unintentional.” M.H., 90 F. Supp. 3d at 898; see also, e.g., Bass v. City of 

Fremont, 2013 WL 891090, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2013) (limiting Shoyoye to violations 

involving “human error rather than intentional conduct”); but see Luong v. City & Cnty. of San 

Francisco, 2012 WL 5869561, at *7–*8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2012) (declining to limit Shoyoye to 

unintentional conduct); Hunter v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 2012 WL 4831634, at *5–*6

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2012) (same); Lanier v. City of Fresno, 2011 WL 149802, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 

18, 2011) (“[A]llegations of excessive force do not equate to section 52.1 threats, intimidation or 

coercion . . . .”). Plaintiffs are also correct that M.H. held that deliberate indifference qualifies as 

intentional conduct for the purposes of a Bane Act claim. M.H., 90. F. Supp. 3d at 898.

However, M.H. was decided before Allen, which reaffirmed the rule of Shoyoye in a case 

involving “intentional conduct that allegedly violated plaintiff’s rights, not negligence or human 

error as in Shoyoye.” Harrington-Wisely v. State, 2015 WL 1915483, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 

2015) (unpublished). Additionally, in Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2015), 

the Ninth Circuit followed Allen and held that in search-and-seizure cases, which also involve

intentional conduct rather than negligence, a plaintiff “must allege threats or coercion beyond the 

coercion inherent in a detention or search in order to recover under the Bane Act.” Id. at 1196.

In light of Allen and Lyall, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that any intentional act 

qualifies as “threats, intimidation, or coercion” for the purpose of a Bane Act claim. Some 

constitutional violations may be serious enough that the coercion inherent in those violations is 

enough to constitute coercion for the purposes of a Bane Act claim. See Adamson v. City of San 

Francisco, 2015 WL 5467744, at *2, *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2015) (distinguishing Allen in a case 

involving excessive use of force when plaintiff was allegedly “slam[med] . . . to the ground.”). 

However, like an arrest or a search-and-seizure, the coercion inherent in police officers’ use of 

barricades and instructions to direct a crowd is minimal. Therefore, following Allen and Lyall, the

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Court holds that in order to state a Bane Act claim, Plaintiffs must allege coercion separate from 

the minimal coercion inherent in the alleged constitutional violation in the instant case. See also 

Gravquick A/S v. Trimble Navigation Int’l Ltd., 323 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2003) (“In the 

absence of a controlling California Supreme Court decision, [a federal court] must predict how the 

California Supreme Court would decide the issue, using intermediate appellate court decisions, 

statutes, and decisions from other jurisdictions as interpretive aids.”).

As discussed above, Plaintiffs have failed to allege any threats, intimidation, or coercion in 

connection with the alleged constitutional violation. Even if the police officers’ refusal to allow 

Plaintiffs to “us[e] alternative, safer routes” was coercive in some minimal sense, FAC ¶ 299, the 

coercion was inherent in the constitutional violation and thus is not enough to support a Bane Act 

claim under Allen. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ “conclusory allegations of ‘forcible’ and ‘coercive’ 

interference with plaintiffs’ constitutional rights are inadequate to state a cause of action for a 

violation of section 52.1.” Id. at 678.

In granting the City Defendants’ first motion to dismiss, the Court stated that “[f]ailure to . 

. . cure the deficiencies identified in this Order will result in a dismissal with prejudice of 

Plaintiffs’ claims.” ECF No. 30, at 17. Despite this explicit warning, Plaintiffs failed to make the 

necessary allegations in the FAC. Thus, because Plaintiffs have failed to cure the deficiencies in 

the complaint, the Court concludes that further amendment would be futile. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 

1127 (holding that leave to amend is not warranted when amendment would be futile).

Additionally, granting leave to amend after an explicit warning that failure to cure identified 

deficiencies would result in dismissal with prejudice would cause “undue delay” and “undue 

prejudice to the opposing party.” See Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 532. The Court therefore dismisses 

Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claims with prejudice.

D. Negligence Claim

As in the original complaint, Plaintiffs assert a negligence claim against the City, alleging 

that “[p]ursuant to Government Code § 815.2(a), the City is vicariously liable for the negligent 

actions of Captain Kinsworthy, and Lieutenants Gannon, Abruzzini, Messier, Spagnoli, Fong, and 

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Ta, and DOES 1-15.” FAC ¶ 304.4In the FAC, Plaintiffs have also added a claim that the City is 

vicariously liable for Garcia’s negligence in devising the crowd-control plan before the Trump 

Rally. Id. ¶ 305. However, in granting the City Defendants’ first motion to dismiss, the Court 

stated that “Plaintiffs may not add new causes of action or parties without leave of the Court or 

stipulation of the parties.” ECF No. 30, at 26. Plaintiffs never filed a stipulation or motion for 

leave to add a negligence claim based on Garcia’s actions prior to the Trump Rally. Therefore, the 

Court STRIKES as procedurally improper the negligence claim against the City based on Garcia’s 

actions prior to the Trump Rally. Even if this claim were procedurally proper, the Court would 

dismiss it because Plaintiffs have not alleged that prior to the Trump Rally, Garcia had any reason 

to believe that the crowd control plan might increase the danger to Plaintiffs. See People v. Oliver, 

210 Cal. App. 3d 138, 147 (1989) (holding that a negligence claim based on harm from third 

parties is viable only in limited circumstances, such as “where some act or omission on the part of 

the defendant . . . created or increased the risk of injury to the plaintiff . . . .”).

The Court thus considers only the negligence claim based on police officers’ actions on the 

night of the Trump Rally. The City Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ negligence claim based 

on California Government Code § 820.2, which provides that “a public employee is not liable for 

an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the 

exercise of discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” City Defendants 

claim that the decision to have Plaintiffs leave the convention center out of only one exit was 

“precisely the type of discretionary act that entitles a governmental decision-maker to immunity.” 

Mot. at 16.

In their Opposition, Plaintiffs claim that by raising the issue of § 820.2 immunity for the 

first time in a second-round motion to dismiss, the City Defendants violated Federal Rule of 

Procedure (“Rule”) 12(g)(2). Opp. at 19–20. Rule 12(g)(2) provides that “[e]xcept as provided in 

 

4

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these same police officers as Doe Defendants. Compl. ¶¶ 180–85. 

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Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a party that makes a motion under this rule must not make another motion 

under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its 

earlier motion.” Rule 12(h)(2), in turn, provides that arguments which pertain to a plaintiff’s 

“[f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . may be raised: (A) in any pleading 

allowed or ordered under Rule 7(a); (B) by a motion under Rule 12(c); or (C) at trial.”5To 

summarize, under Rule 12(g)(2) and Rule 12(h)(2), a party that seeks to assert a defense pertaining 

to a failure to state a claim that was available but omitted from an earlier Rule 12 motion can only 

do so in a pleading, a Rule 12(c) motion, or at trial. Thus, if the defense of § 820.2 immunity was 

available to the City Defendants in the first motion to dismiss and the City Defendants failed to 

raise the defense in the first motion to dismiss, then the City Defendants may not raise the defense 

in the instant second-round motion to dismiss. 

The City Defendants have not argued that the § 820.2 immunity defense was unavailable to 

them at the time of the first motion to dismiss. The first complaint also involved extensive 

allegations about the City Defendants’ crowd-control plan, and there was no reason that the City 

Defendants could not have asserted that the crowd-control plan was a discretionary act that was 

potentially subject to § 820.2 immunity. Thus, the Court finds that the § 820.2 immunity defense 

was reasonably available to the City Defendants at the time of the first motion to dismiss.

However, although the § 820.2 immunity defense was available to City Defendants at the 

time of the first motion to dismiss, the City Defendants did not assert this defense in the firstround motion to dismiss. The first-round motion contained no reference to § 820.2 and never 

discussed or mentioned discretionary act immunity. Additionally, the City Defendants have 

offered no reason for their failure to assert § 820.2 immunity in the first motion to dismiss.

Therefore, under Rule 12(g)(2), the City Defendants may not raise the defense of § 820.2 

immunity for the first time in a second-round motion to dismiss. Instead, under Rule 12(g)(2) and 

Rule 12(h)(2), the City Defendants may argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim because of 

 

5 Rule 12(h)(3), which allows a court to consider subject matter jurisdiction at any time, is not 

relevant to the instant motion.

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§ 820.2 immunity in a pleading, a Rule 12(c) motion, or at trial.

In their Reply, the City Defendants argue that they “did not ‘omit’ the relevant defense 

from their motion to dismiss the first complaint—as in the present motion, City Defendants argued 

there that Plaintiffs had failed to state a negligence claim” Reply at 12 n.5. However, a number of 

cases make clear that a defendant must specifically address a defense in order to maintain the right 

to raise that defense in a later motion to dismiss. For example, in Herron v. Best Buy Stores, LP, 

2013 WL 4432019, *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2013), defendant Toshiba had “failed to squarely raise 

[an] argument in its initial dismissal motion, even though the argument was available to Toshiba 

when it originally sought to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint.” Accordingly, “this portion of Toshiba’s 

dismissal motion [was] not considered.” Id. Similarly, in Northstar Financial Advisors Inc. v. 

Schwab Investments, 135 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2015), the court found that because 

defendants had not argued a particular preemption defense in an earlier 12(b) motion, the 

defendants could not raise that issue in a later 12(b) motion, but could raise it in a later 12(c) 

motion. See In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 2016 WL 3029783, at *44 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 

2016) (applying the same reasoning to a defendant’s belated attempt to argue that a claim was 

preempted by ERISA).

In short, the purpose of Rule 12(g) is to provide for “an omnibus pre-answer motion in 

which the defendant advances every available Rule 12 defense and objection he may have that is 

assertable by motion.” Wright & Miller, 5C Federal Practice & Procedure § 1384, 479 (3d ed. 

2004). By neglecting to mention § 820.2 in their first motion to dismiss, City Defendants 

frustrated this purpose and failed to give the Court notice of an issue that may have been 

dispositive. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 12(g)(2), the Court will not consider the City Defendants’ 

claims of immunity under § 820.2.

Section 820.2 is the only ground that the City Defendants assert for dismissal of Plaintiffs’ 

negligence claim. Therefore, because the Court cannot consider the City Defendants’ argument 

under § 820.2, the Court DENIES the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ negligence 

claim.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS with prejudice the motion to dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ claim against Defendant Garcia for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. The Court GRANTS with prejudice the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim under § 

1983 against Captain Kinsworthy to the extent that that claim is based on Kinsworthy’s actions in 

developing the crowd-control plan before the Trump Rally. However, the Court DENIES the 

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under § 1983 against Captain Kinsworthy and Lieutenants 

Gannon, Abruzzini, Messier, Spagnoli, Fong, and Ta to the extent that those claims are based on 

those officers’ actions during and after the Trump Rally after allegedly realizing that the crowdcontrol was placing Plaintiffs in danger.

The Court DENIES without prejudice the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims on 

the basis of qualified immunity.

The Court GRANTS with prejudice the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against 

the City to the extent that the claim is based on the adoption of a policy by Garcia prior to the 

Trump Rally, on the adoption of a policy in City documents prior to the Trump Rally, or on the 

City’s failure to train. However, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim 

against the City to the extent that the claim is based on Garcia’s alleged ratification of the actions 

of officers after the Trump Rally.

The Court GRANTS with prejudice the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim under the Bane 

Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1, against the City, Garcia, Officers Kinsworthy, Gannon, Abruzzini, 

Messier, Spagnoli, Fong, and Ta, and Does 1–15.

The Court STRIKES Plaintiffs’ negligence claim based on Garcia’s actions before the 

Trump Rally as procedurally improper. The Court DENIES the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

negligence claim against the City based on the actions of Kinsworthy, Gannon, Abruzzini, 

Messier, Spagnoli, Fong, and Ta, and DOES 1-15. The City Defendants may re-raise California 

Government Code § 820.2 in a pleading, a 12(c) motion, or at trial, in accordance with Rule 

12(g)(2) and Rule 12(h)(2).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 14, 2017

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LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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