Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_08-cv-00480/USCOURTS-almd-1_08-cv-00480-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PATRICK JACKSON, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:08-CV-480-TMH

) [WO]

)

DOTHAN EAGLE and HOUSTON )

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, )

)

 Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case is pending before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by

Patrick Jackson [“Jackson”], an indigent inmate currently confined in the Houston County

Jail. In this complaint, Jackson challenges actions taken by The Dothan Eagle, a local

newspaper, in reporting prior youthful offender convictions imposed upon him by the

Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama. Specifically, Jackson complains that the

reports contained in the newspaper constituted slander and referenced confidential

information. Jackson seeks monetary damages for the alleged violations of his

constitutional rights. 

Upon consideration of the claims presented in the complaint, the court concludes

that dismissal of this case prior to service of process is proper in accordance with the

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 A prisoner who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in this court will have his complaint screened

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in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure requires the court to

dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if it determines that the complaint is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

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directives of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 

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I. DISCUSSION

A. The Dothan Eagle

Jackson complains The Dothan Eagle printed reports containing information

relevant to his youthful offender convictions which he “feel[s] [is] slander.” Plaintiff’s

Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1 at 2. The claims against this defendant entitle Jackson to no

relief in this cause of action. 

An essential element of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is that the alleged constitutional

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law or a person whose

conduct is fairly attributable to the State. American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v.

Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 119 S.Ct. 977, 985, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999); Parratt v. Taylor, 451

U.S. 527 (1981); Willis v. University Health Services, Inc., 993 F.2d 837, 840 (11 Cir. th

1993). To state a viable claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must assert that he was

“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the

alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law. Like the state-action

requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983

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excludes from its reach “‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or

wrongful,”’ Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982)

(quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948)).”

American Manufacturers, 526 U.S. at 49-50, 119 S.Ct. at 985. Consequently, the Eleventh

Circuit has repeatedly insisted “that state action requires both an alleged constitutional

deprivation ‘caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a

rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible,’ and

that ‘the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be

a state actor.’ Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d

482 (1982); see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d

185 (1978).” Id. 

The Dothan Eagle is not a person nor can its actions be considered those of a state

actor. Additionally, it is clear from the complaint that the actions of this defendant about

which the plaintiff complains resulted from “merely private conduct” excluded from the

reach of § 1983. In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that the allegations of

constitutional violations presented against The Dothan Eagle are frivolous and subject to

dismissal pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

 B. The Houston County Circuit Court

Jackson names the Houston County Circuit Court as a defendant in this cause of

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 Although Neitzke interpreted the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the predecessor to § 1915(e)(2),

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the analysis contained therein remains applicable to the present statute.

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action. A state court is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Moity v.

Louisiana State Bar Association, 414 F.Supp. 180, 182 (E.D. La. 1976), aff’d, 537 F.2d

1141 (5 Cir. 1976). Dismissal of the claims against this defendant is therefore appropriate th

under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 

C. The Slander Claim

To the extent Jackson seeks compensation for the purported slander of his name, the

law is well settled that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action cannot be predicated upon the theory of

slander, defamation or libel. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); see also Von Stein v.

Brescher, 904 F.2d 572 (11 Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff's claim for relief based on such th

theory of liability is frivolous as it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The slander claim is therefore due to be 2

summarily dismissed in accordance with the directives of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 

II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this case

be dismissed with prejudice prior to service of process pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). It is further

ORDERED that on or before September 22, 2008 the parties may file objections to

this Recommendation. Any objections filed must clearly identify the findings in the

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Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981,

en banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 10 day of September, 2008. th

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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