Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00961/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00961-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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17-cv-00961-AJB-WVG 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CAROL ADRIANNE SMITH, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

ANDY COOK. 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 17-cv-00961-AJB-WVG 

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 

COUNSEL; AND 

(2) DENYING AS MOOT 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

(Doc. Nos. 9, 10) 

 Presently before the Court are two motions from Plaintiff Carol Smith (“Plaintiff”). 

Based on the reasoning below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel 

and DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff filed her complaint on May 8, 2017, asserting several causes of action 

against Defendant Andy Cook (“Defendant”). (Doc. No. 1.) From what the Court can 

discern, Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to adequately represent her interests in a 

child support case. (Id. at 5.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant acted 

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fraudulently, charged her fees of over $70,000.00, and failed to correctly address her claims 

for military spousal retirement. (Id.) On the same day, Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and a motion to appoint counsel. (Doc. Nos. 2, 3.) On 

May 12, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP, sua sponte dismissed 

Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim, and denied as moot her motion to appoint 

counsel. (Doc. No. 4.) On June 20, 2017, Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint 

(“FAC”), a second motion for leave to proceed IFP, and her second motion to appoint 

counsel. (Doc. Nos. 8, 9, 10.) 

LEGAL STANDARD 

The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case unless 

an indigent “litigant may lose his [or her] physical liberty if he [or she] loses the litigation.” 

Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(1), district courts are granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. 

However, this discretion may be exercised only under “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell 

v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). “A finding of exceptional circumstances 

requires an evaluation of both the ‘likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the 

petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues 

involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and both must be viewed together before 

reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 

1986) (citation omitted)). 

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel states that she resides in Beaverton, 

Oregon, and that Oregon does not provide pro se clinic services. (Doc. No. 10 at 3.) 

Plaintiff then requests a pro bono attorney, or access via the phone to a pro bono attorney 

in the federal pro se office. (Id.) Plaintiff makes no further arguments concerning the 

complexity or merits of her case. 

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s motion, the Court concludes that no exceptional 

circumstances exist to justify appointment of counsel for Plaintiff at this time. The Court 

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notes that “any pro se litigant certainly would be better served with the assistance of 

counsel.” Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn in part on 

other grounds by Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). But a plaintiff 

is only entitled to appointed counsel if he or she can show “that because of the complexity 

of the claims [they are] unable to articulate [their] positions.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. 

Bearing this in mind, the Court finds that Plaintiff is capable of articulating her claims and 

navigating the federal court system as demonstrated by the filing of her FAC. Moreover, 

Plaintiff’s arguments that she resides in Oregon with two young children and must travel 

to California for court are unfortunately not reasons to warrant the finding of exceptional 

circumstances to support a motion for appointment of counsel. Accordingly, the Court

DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

On a final note, the Court highlights that pursuant to the Court’s order dated May 

12, 2017, Plaintiff’s initial motion to proceed IFP was granted, and her complaint was 

dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. No. 4.) The Court then provided Plaintiff thirty days to 

file a new amended complaint and inaccurately instructed Plaintiff to file another motion 

for IFP. As a result, on June 20, 2017, Plaintiff filed a second motion to proceed IFP 

pursuant to the Court’s instructions. However, the Court clarifies that as Plaintiff’s initial 

motion for IFP was granted, Plaintiff’s second motion for IFP is DENIED AS MOOT. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE, (Doc. No. 10), and Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP 

is DENIED AS MOOT. (Doc. No. 9.) 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 6, 2017 

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