Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00739/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00739-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PHYLLIS BACHILLA, SHARLENE 

WALKER and WENDY LABORICO, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

PACIFIC BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY 

dba AT & T COMMUNICATIONS; 

COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF 

AMERICA; and DOES 1 through 

100, inclusive, 

 Defendants. 

_____________________________/ 

No. Civ. S-07-739 RRB KJM 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Plaintiffs, Phyllis Bachilla, Sharlene Walker and Wendy 

Laborico (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a state action 

against their employer Pacific Bell Telephone Company dba AT & T 

and their union Communication Workers of America (collectively 

“Defendants”) alleging, among other things, sex discrimination 

and retaliation. Defendants removed the action to federal court 

on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiffs now 

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move to dismiss the entire action under Rule 12(b)(6) on the 

ground that each and every claim is time-barred. Alternatively, 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ discrimination and 

retaliation claims under Rule 12(b)(1) on the ground that 

subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. For the following 

reasons, the court GRANTS the motion.1

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiffs are employees of Pacific Bell Telephone Company 

dba AT & T Communications (“Pacific Bell”). First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) ¶¶ 1-3. Plaintiffs are represented by a labor 

union Communication Workers of America Local 9421 (“CWA”) and 

employed pursuant to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) 

entered into between Pacific Bell and CWA. FAC ¶¶ 6, 32, 52. 

The CBA governs the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs’ 

employment, including promotions and transfers based on 

seniority. FAC ¶¶ 32-33; Decl. of Jerrie Collier (“Collier”) 

¶¶ 4-5, In Support of Def.’s Mot. for Removal. 

 

1 Inasmuch as the Court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999)(explaining that if the parties 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). As a result, the oral argument 

presently scheduled for Wednesday, September 5, 2007, at 10:00 

a.m., is hereby VACATED. 

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The instant action arose out of Defendants alleged 

discriminatory conduct in the form of denying Plaintiffs’ 

promotions to “Power Positions” in favor of male co-workers with 

less seniority. Pl.’s Opp. at 2; FAC ¶¶ 10-12. Following their 

denial of promotions, Plaintiffs filed grievances under the CBA 

against Pacific Bell through CWA on or about October 24, 2003. 

FAC ¶ 12. In or about August 2005, Plaintiffs received 

notification that their grievances had been addressed and 

settled. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiffs were subsequently informed that 

their grievances had been terminated on November 6, 2003, even 

though Defendants had led them to believe that the grievances 

were still being processed. Id. ¶ 16. 

In or about August 2005, Ms. Bachilla and Ms. Laborico were 

given settlement agreements offering them a different position 

on a “now or never” basis. FAC ¶ 17. In or about September 

2005, Ms. Walker was also given a settlement agreement offering 

her a different position on a “take it or leave it” basis. Id. 

¶ 20. Plaintiffs allege that the settlements contained terms 

that Defendants knew would be unacceptable to Plaintiffs. Id. 

¶¶ 18-21. On September 21, 2005, the grievance process was 

closed after the Plaintiffs refused to accept their settlement 

offers. Id. ¶¶ 18, 21. 

On or about September 29, 2005, Ms. Walker filed a 

complaint against CWA with the National Labor Relations Board 

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(“NLRB”) based on its handling of her grievance. FAC ¶ 22. On 

November 1, 2005, Ms. Walker was removed from her position as a 

Steward in Local 9421, allegedly in retaliation for pursuing a 

grievance and filing a complaint with the NLRB. Id. ¶¶ 23, 27. 

On December 14, 2006, Plaintiffs filed the present action 

alleging the following claims: (1) discrimination; (2) 

retaliation; (3) breach of implied contract; (4) fraud and 

deceit; (5) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 

(6) breach of fiduciary duty; and (7) gross negligence. Compl. 

at 3-11. On March 19, 2007, Plaintiffs filed their FAC and 

caused it and a copy of the summons to be served on Defendants. 

Notice of Removal ¶¶ 3-4.2

 

On April 17, 2007, Defendants filed a notice of removal on 

the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Notice of Removal 

¶ 6. Defendants moved for removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441(b) on the ground that the instant action arises under, 

and is preempted by, § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 

(“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185. Id. ¶ 6. 

// 

// 

 

2 Each and every claim in the FAC is alleged against all 

Defendants, except for the breach of fiduciary duty claim which 

is only alleged against CWA. FAC ¶¶ 9-56. Additionally, the 

FAC does not contain a gross negligence claim as alleged in the 

original complaint. Id. 

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II. DISCUSSION 

A. Legal Standard 

 1. Rule 12(b)(6) 

 Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss essentially “test whether 

a cognizable claim has been pleaded in the complaint.” Under 

Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint “should not be dismissed for failure 

to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the 

plaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] 

claim which would entitle [them] to relief.” Hughes v. Rowe, 

449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 

F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). All material allegations in the 

complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to plaintiff. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec 

Lit., 183 F.3d 970, 983 (9th Cir. 1999). But “the court [is not] 

required to accept as true allegations that are merely 

conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 

inferences.” Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988. 

If a claim is barred by the applicable state statute of 

limitations, dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate. 

Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 

2000). “A motion to dismiss based on the running of the statute 

of limitations period may be granted only if the assertions of 

the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not 

permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” 

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Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “In fact, a 

complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt 

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would 

establish the timeliness of the claim.” Id. at 1207. 

2. Rule 12(b)(1) 

 Rule 12(b)(1) authorizes a party to seek dismissal of an 

action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “When subject 

matter jurisdiction is challenged under Federal Rule of 

Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff has the burden of proving 

jurisdiction in order to survive the motion.” Tosco Corp. v. 

Communities for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 

2001). In adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, unlike a motion 

under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not limited to the pleadings, 

and may properly consider extrinsic evidence. See Ass’n of Am. 

Med. Colleges v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778 (9th Cir. 

2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (in a Rule 

12(b)(1) motion “the moving party may submit affidavits or any 

other evidence properly before the court. . . . It then becomes 

necessary for the party opposing the motion to present 

affidavits or any other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden 

of establishing that the court, in fact, possesses subject 

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matter jurisdiction”).3 The court presumes lack of jurisdiction 

until the plaintiff proves otherwise. See Stock West, Inc. v. 

Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). 

B. Timeliness of Removal 

 Plaintiffs argue that this motion should be denied for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction because Defendants failed to 

remove it within thirty days after receiving the initial 

pleadings. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants received the 

initial pleadings on February 12, 2007, but did not file their 

notice of removal until April 17, 2007. As such, Plaintiffs 

argue that remand is appropriate because Defendants notice of 

removal was untimely. The court rejects this argument. 

 As discussed more fully in the court’s order denying 

Plaintiffs’ motion to remand, removal was not untimely because 

Plaintiffs’ failed to demonstrate that service was properly 

effected thirty days prior to Defendants’ filing of their notice 

 

3

 Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), a court may take judicial 

notice of records and reports of administrative bodies. Mack v. 

South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 

1986), overruled on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan 

Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 111 (1991). It is also proper 

for the court to “take judicial notice of matters of public 

record outside the pleadings” and consider them for the purposes 

of this motion. MGIC Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 

504 (9th Cir. 1986); see Gallo v. Board of Regents of University 

of California, 916 F.Supp. 1005, 1007 (S.D. Cal. 1995)(holding 

that in the context of a motion to dismiss, a district court may 

consider both an EEOC right to sue letter and the EEOC charge, 

as public records subject to judicial notice). 

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of removal on April 17, 2004. In this regard, Plaintiffs’ have 

simply asserted that removal was untimely because the timeperiod for removal commenced when Defendants received the 

initial pleadings on February 12, 2007. However, contrary to 

Plaintiffs’ assertion, absent proper service, it is of no moment 

that Defendants received the initial pleadings thirty days prior 

to Defendants filing of the notice of removal. See Murphy 

Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347-

48 (1999) (“a named defendant’s time to remove is triggered by 

simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of 

the complaint, ‘through service or otherwise,’ after and apart 

from service of the summons, but not by mere receipt of the 

complaint unattended by any formal service.” A defendant’s time 

to remove only commences when a defendant is “notified of the 

action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal 

process”). Accordingly, absent proper service, the thirty-day 

removal period does not commence. Thus, the question before the 

court is whether service was properly effected regarding the 

initial pleadings to trigger the removal period. 

 Rule 4(h) states, in relevant part: “service upon a 

domestic . . . corporation . . . that is subject to suit under a 

common name, and from which a waiver of service has not been 

obtained and filed, shall be effected: (1) in a judicial 

district of the United States in the manner prescribed for 

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individuals by subdivision (e)(1), or by delivering a copy of 

the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or 

general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment 

or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one 

authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so 

requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant. . . .” 

Rule(e)(1) states that service may be effected “pursuant to the 

law of the state in which the district court is located, or in 

which service is effected, for the service of a summons upon the 

defendant in an action brought in the courts of general 

jurisdiction of the State. . . .” 

California Code of Civil Procedure § 415.30(a) provides: “A 

summons may be served by mail as provided in this section. A 

copy of the summons and of the complaint shall be mailed (by 

first-class mail or airmail, postage prepaid) to the person to 

be served, together with two copies of the notice and 

acknowledgment provided for in subdivision (b) and a return 

envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender.” “Service 

of a summons pursuant to this section is deemed complete on the 

date a written acknowledgment of receipt of summons is executed, 

if such acknowledgment thereafter is returned to the sender.” 

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415(c). 

Here, Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their burden to 

establish that service of the initial pleadings was proper under 

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Rule 4 to trigger the thirty removal period. See Universal 

Trading & Investment Co. v. Kiritchenko, 2007 WL 660083, *1 

(N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 

(9th Cir. 2004) (observing that once service is challenged, the 

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that service was 

valid under Rule 4)). Notably, Plaintiffs failed to offer proof 

that the written acknowledgement of service was returned with 

respect to the initial pleadings. As such, Plaintiffs did not 

prove that service of the initial pleadings was properly 

effected under § 415.30. See Thierfeldt v. Marin Hospital 

Dist., 35 Cal. App. 3d 186, 199 (1973) (holding that service is 

not properly effected until the defendant executes and returns 

an acknowledgement of service). 

 Accordingly, because Plaintiffs concede that service of 

process regarding the initial pleadings “may have been 

technically defective,” and because Plaintiffs failed to 

demonstrate that service of these pleadings was properly 

effected thirty days prior to Defendants’ filing of their notice 

of removal, removal was not untimely. 

C. Preemption 

Defendants argue that subject matter jurisdiction exists 

because each and every claim is preempted by the LMRA. As a 

consequence, Defendants contend that the entire action should be 

dismissed because Plaintiffs failed to file their action within 

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the LMRA’s six-month limitations period. These claims are 

addressed individually below. 

 Section 301 of the LMRA provides, in pertinent part: “Suits 

for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 

organization representing employees in an industry affecting 

commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the 

United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without 

respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the 

citizenship of the parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 185(a). “Section 301 

of the LMRA preempts state law claims that are based directly on 

rights created by a collective bargaining agreement, and also 

preempts claims that are substantially dependent on an 

interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.” Aguilera 

v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 223 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 

2000); see Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 

997 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[t]he preemptive force of section 301 is 

so powerful as to displace entirely any state claim based on a 

collective bargaining agreement . . . and any state claim whose 

outcome depends on analysis of the terms of the agreement”).

 Thus, the critical inquiry in whether state law claims will 

be preempted is whether the claims “require interpretation of a 

CBA, or [are] ‘substantially dependent upon analysis of the 

terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor 

contract,’ ” not whether the complaint is framed without 

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reference to a CBA. Busey v. P.W. Supermarkets, Inc., 368 

F.Supp.2d 1045, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Allis-Chalmers 

Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-11, 213 (1985)); Cook v. 

Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 237 (9th Cir. 1990). 

“[E]ven suits based on torts, rather than on breach of 

collective bargaining agreements, are governed by federal law if 

their evaluation is ‘inextricably intertwined with consideration 

of the terms of [a] labor contract.’ ” Miller v. AT & T Network 

Sys., 850 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 

471 U.S. at 213).4

 

Section 301 does not however preempt state law claims where 

a court can uphold independent state law rights without 

interpreting the terms of a CBA. Busey, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1049 

(citing Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211, 213); see Cook, 911 

F.2d at 237 (“[a] claim is not preempted if it does not threaten 

significantly the collective bargaining process and if it 

furthers a state interest in protecting the public that 

transcends the employment relationship”). Therefore, 

 

4 The purpose of expanding complete preemption beyond the 

“suits for violations of contracts” language of § 301 is to 

promote uniformity in the interpretation of CBAs and to generate 

and preserve a body of consistent federal labor law. Lingle v. 

Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988). 

Another is to promote the federal policy favoring arbitration 

and to prevent litigants from using state law litigation to 

side-step or alter the negotiated provisions of a CBA, including 

the dispute resolution procedures. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 

211. 

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nonnegotiable state-law rights independent of any right 

established by contract are not preempted because Congress never 

intended to preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or 

establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor 

contract. Miller, 850 F.2d at 546 (quotation marks omitted).5

In determining whether a state-law claim is preempted under 

§ 301, “a court must consider: (1) whether the CBA contains 

provisions that govern the actions giving rise to a state claim, 

and if so, (2) whether the state has articulated a standard 

sufficiently clear that the state claim can be evaluated without 

considering the overlapping provisions of the CBA, and (3) 

whether the state has shown an intent not to allow its 

prohibition to be altered or removed by private contract. A 

state law will be preempted only if the answer to the first 

question is ‘yes,’ and the answer to either the second or third 

is ‘no.’ ” Miller, 850 F.2d at 548. 

1. Breach of Contract 

 Plaintiffs argue that their claims are not preempted by § 

301 of the LMRA because they are based on an implied contract, 

which is primarily based on the policies and procedures of 

 

5 “A right is nonnegotiable if the state law does not permit 

it to be waived, alienated, or altered by private agreement.” 

Miller, 850 F.2d at 546. “Independent rights are those statelaw rights that can be enforced without any need to rely on the 

particular terms, explicit or implied, contained in the labor 

agreement.” Id.

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Pacific Bell, not the CBA. Pl.’s Mot. for Remand at 11. 

Plaintiffs argue that such contracts were breached when Pacific 

Bell failed to promote Plaintiffs in favor of less senior male 

co-workers in violation of Pacific Bell’s policies and oral 

representations that promotions were based on seniority. FAC ¶¶ 

11, 33-36. 

 Here, Plaintiffs acknowledge that they are members of CWA 

and that CWA entered into a CBA with Pacific Bell on their 

behalf, which governs the terms of their employment, including 

promotions and transfers. FAC ¶¶ 1-3, 32, 52; Def.’s Request 

for Judicial Notice, Exhs. D, E-1, E-2.6

 Plaintiffs also 

acknowledge that their grievances alleging sexual discrimination 

were filed against Pacific Bell through CWA. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. 

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs maintain that their claims are not 

substantially dependent on analysis of the terms of the CBA 

 

6 See Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 

1998), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in

Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 681 (9th 

Cir. 2006). (“a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may 

consider a document the authenticity of which is not contested, 

and upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies”). 

Ordinarily, when a defendant attaches extrinsic evidence to a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must convert that motion into 

one for summary judgment to give the plaintiff an opportunity to 

respond, this is unnecessary however where an attached document 

is integral to the plaintiff’s claims and its authenticity is 

not disputed. Id. at 706, n.4. Because Plaintiffs’ claims rest 

on the terms of the CBA, and because its authenticity is not 

disputed by the parties, it is proper for the court to consider 

the CBA in ruling on the motion to dismiss. Id. at 706. 

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because they are based on an “implied contract,” not the CBA. 

The court disagrees. 

 Here, Plaintiffs assert that their implied labor contracts 

are independent of the CBA and therefore their contract claim is 

not a claim for breach of the CBA. However, because the subject 

matter of their implied contracts is a job position covered by 

the CBA, any independent agreement of employment concerning that 

position could be effective only as part of the collective 

bargaining agreement, thus the CBA controls and Plaintiffs’ 

contract claim is preempted. See Aguilera, 223 F.3d at 1015 

(“where the position in dispute is ‘covered by the CBA, the CBA 

controls and any claims seeking to enforce the terms of [an 

agreement] are preempted’ ”); Young, 830 F.2d at 997 (alleged 

oral contract between employee and employer regarding 

reinstatement controlled by CBA since employee held position 

covered by the CBA).7

 To the extent that Plaintiffs rely on 

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) to 

support their position that the implied contract claim is not 

preempted, such reliance is misplaced. Caterpillar is 

 

7 Moreover, because Plaintiffs had access to a CBA-sanctioned 

grievance procedure, their breach of contract claim is preempted 

by § 301 of the LMRA. Price v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 99 

F.Supp.2d 1162, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that an employee 

in a position with access to a CBA-sanctioned grievance 

procedure cannot state an individual claim for breach of 

contract under state law because such claim is necessarily 

preempted by § 301 of the LMRA).

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inapplicable to the present circumstances because, unlike in 

Caterpillar, Plaintiffs did not negotiate an individual 

employment contract for a position not governed by the CBA at a 

time when they were not covered by the CBA. Caterpillar, 482 

U.S. at 388-89. Thus, the reasoning of Caterpillar does not 

support Plaintiffs’ position that the implied contract claim is 

not subject to preemption. 

 Accordingly, because Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim 

cannot be resolved without interpreting the CBA, it is preempted 

by § 301 of the LMRA.8 As such, Plaintiffs’ implied contract 

claim is subject to re-characterization as an artfully pled § 

301 claim and is therefore properly before this court. See

Busey, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (“where a relationship is 

otherwise governed by a collective bargaining agreement, state 

law theories of breach of contract and implied covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing are preempted, and subject to 

recharacterization as [§] 301 claim for breach of contract”). 

Consequently, because Plaintiffs were denied promotions in 

October 2003 and the grievance process was closed on September 

21, 2005, this claim is time-barred as the original Complaint 

was not filed until December 14, 2006, far beyond the LMRA’s 

 

8 Section 2.04 of the CBA expressly establishes the 

procedures to be followed with respect to the transfer and 

promotion of employees. Def.’s Request for Judicial Notice, 

Exhs. D, E-1. 

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six-month limitations period. See Audette v. Int’l 

Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, 195 F.3d 1107, 1111 

(9th Cir. 1999) (observing that the statute of limitations for 

claims under the LMRA is six-months); see also Allen v. United 

Food & Commercial Workers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, 43 F.3d 

424, 427 (9th Cir. 1994) (observing that “[a] cause of action 

accrues [under § 301 of the LMRA] when the plaintiff knew, or 

should have known, of the defendant’s wrongdoing and can 

successfully maintain a suit in the district court”).9

 

2. Fraud and Deceit 

 Plaintiffs’ fraud claim alleges that CWA promised to pursue 

their grievances against Pacific Bell but had no intention of 

ever doing so. FAC ¶¶ 39-40. Plaintiffs further allege that 

CWA and Pacific Bell acted in concert to conceal through 

misrepresentations, failure to disclose information and 

suppression of information, the fact that their grievances had 

been closed and were not being addressed. Id. ¶¶ 41-43. 

 As a threshold matter the court notes that although the 

language of § 301 is limited to “ ‘[s]uits for violation of 

contracts’ ” it has been broadly construed to cover most state-

 

9 Because the implied covenant derives from the contract and 

is defined by the contractual obligation of good faith, it is 

preempted to the same extent the breach of contract claim is. 

Audette, 195 F.3d at 1112 (citing Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 

218). Therefore, this claim is also time-barred.

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law actions that require interpretation of labor agreements, 

including fraud claims when resolution of such a claim is 

inextricably intertwined with terms in a labor contract. 

Aguilera, 223 F.3d at 1016. 

 “In order to establish intentional fraud under California 

law, appellants must prove (1) a false representation or 

concealment of fact; (2) knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to 

defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and 

(5) damages.” Aguilera, 223 F.3d at 1016. “ ‘A promise to do 

something necessarily implies the intention to perform, and 

where such intention is absent, there is an implied 

misrepresentation of fact, which is actionable as fraud.’ ” Id. 

 Here, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ fraud claim is 

premised on Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations, failure to 

disclose information, and suppression of evidence in connection 

with Plaintiffs’ grievances filed under the CBA, it is preempted 

because its resolution is substantially dependent upon analysis 

of the terms of the CBA. This claim cannot be evaluated without 

interpreting the grievance procedures of the CBA since 

Defendants will undoubtedly assert that they complied with the 

procedures set forth in the CBA. As such, the fraud claim in 

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this regard is preempted as it is inextricably intertwined with 

consideration of the CBA.10

Additionally, to the extent that the fraud claim 

encompasses the alleged oral representations and policies of 

Pacific Bell regarding promotions and transfers, it is also 

preempted. This is because in order to prove fraud, Plaintiffs 

would be required to show that the seniority terms of the CBA 

differed significantly from the terms of the implied contracts 

that Plaintiffs believed they had made based on Pacific Bell’s 

oral representations, policies and procedures outside the CBA. 

See Young, 830 F.2d at 1001; Aguilera, 223 F.3d at 1017. 

Accordingly, this claim is preempted because it is inextricably 

intertwined with consideration of the terms of the CBA as its 

resolution is substantially dependent upon interpretation of the 

CBA. 

For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ fraud claim is time-barred 

because the original Complaint was filed long after the LMRA’s 

six-month statute of limitations expired. 

3. Sex Discrimination & Retaliation 

 Plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claim alleges that Pacific 

Bell promoted less senior male co-workers in violation of 

 

10 Article 7 of the CBA expressly establishes the procedures 

to be followed with respect to employee grievances. Def.’s 

Request for Judicial Notice, Exhs. D, E-1. 

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Pacific Bell’s policy to promote based on seniority. FAC ¶¶ 10-

12. Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim alleges that Defendants 

retaliated against Plaintiffs for filing grievances by 

presenting them with settlement agreements that offered 

different “Power Positions” with terms that Defendants knew 

Plaintiffs would reject. Id. ¶¶ 17-19. Plaintiffs’ retaliation 

claim also alleges that CWA retaliated against Ms. Walker by 

removing her as a Steward in Local 9421 based on her pursuing a 

grievance and filing a complaint with the NLRB. FAC ¶¶ 23, 27. 

Plaintiffs allege that such conduct violated Cal. Gov’t Code § 

12900 et seq. (FEHA). FAC ¶ 26. 

 The Ninth Circuit has generally held that claims of 

discrimination under California’s Fair Employment and Housing 

Act law are not preempted by federal law. Guidry v. Marine 

Engineers’ Beneficial Ass’n, 2007 WL 707511, *4 (N.D. Cal. 2007) 

(citing Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 

748 (9th Cir. 1993)). The rights conferred by the California 

Employment Act are defined and enforced under state law without 

reference to the terms of any collective bargaining agreement 

therefore actions asserting those rights are independent of 

collective-bargaining agreements. Guidry, 2007 WL 707511 at *4 

(citing Ramirez, 998 F.2d at 748); see Madison v. Motion Picture 

Set Painters and Sign Writers Local 729, 132 F.Supp.2d 1244, 

1252, n.15 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (observing that the rights created 

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by the FEHA are non-negotiable and independent of rights under a 

CBA, and thus that FEHA claims are not preempted by § 301 of the 

LMRA). “Thus, as a general matter, claims of retaliation or 

racial discrimination under FEHA . . . are not preempted simply 

because they involve a relationship that is governed by a labor 

contract.” Guidry, 2007 WL 707511 at *4. The exception to this 

rule is narrow: “state-law claims are preempted only when the 

resolution of an allegation of discrimination itself hinges on 

the interpretation of a labor contract.” Guidry, 2007 WL 707511 

at *4 (italics in original); see e.g., Audette, 195 F.3d at 1113 

(concluding that a retaliation claim was preempted where it 

required the court to determine whether the terms of a prior 

settlement agreement provided the union with a legitimate 

justification for its conduct); Madison, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 

1253-54 (concluding that a discrimination claim was preempted 

where plaintiff’s prima facie case required reliance on the CBA 

and where it was almost certain that defendant’s articulated 

non-discriminatory reason for its actions would also require 

reliance on the CBA). 

 Here, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ discrimination claim 

is premised on Pacific Bell’s promotion of less senior male coworkers in violation of its seniority policy, it is preempted. 

This is because resolution of this claim is substantially 

dependent on an analysis of the terms of the CBA. This claim 

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cannot be evaluated without interpreting the seniority 

provisions of the CBA since the terms of Plaintiffs employment, 

including their eligibility for a promotion and/or transfer, are 

governed by the CBA. Moreover, because Pacific Bell will 

undoubtedly assert that it complied with the procedures set 

forth in the CBA, Plaintiffs’ discrimination claim is 

inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the 

CBA and is therefore preempted. Audette, 195 F.3d at 1113 

(finding preemption where “resolution of the [state] 

discrimination and retaliation claim turns on defendants’ offer 

of a ‘legitimate nondiscriminatory reason’ requiring 

interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement”).11 In 

short, preemption is appropriate under the circumstances because 

the question before the court is the interpretation to be given 

to the seniority and transfer provisions of the CBA. Indeed, 

because the factual inquiry as to whether Pacific Bell had a 

non-discriminatory reason for failing to promote Plaintiffs 

turns on the meaning of the provisions of the CBA, Plaintiffs’ 

 

11 To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination 

Plaintiffs would have to show: (1) they belong to a protected 

class, (2) they were performing according to their employer’s 

legitimate expectations, (3) they suffered an adverse employment 

action, and (4) other employees with qualifications similar to 

them were treated more favorably. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 

150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998). A prima facie case of sex 

discrimination can be rebutted by a defendant’s articulation of 

a nondiscriminatory reason for the allegedly discriminatory 

conduct. Id.

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state-law claim is not independent of the CBA. Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claim is preempted by the LMRA 

and time-barred as the original Complaint was filed long after 

the LMRA’s six-month statute of limitations expired.12 

Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ assert that 

CWA’s handling of the grievances, including the settlements 

offered, was discriminatory and retaliatory, such claims are 

preempted because they are inextricably intertwined with 

consideration of the terms of the CBA since CWA will undoubtedly 

assert that it complied with the procedures set forth in the CBA 

 

12 Alternatively, Plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claim is 

subject to dismissal because Plaintiffs failed to file 

administrative charges within one year from the alleged 

discriminatory action. See Paterson v. California Dept. of 

General Services, 2007 WL 756954 *6 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (a timely 

administrative charge is a precondition to the filing of a 

discrimination charge in court under FEHA); Rodriguez v. 

Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2001) (“ ‘In order 

to bring a civil action under FEHA, the aggrieved person must 

exhaust the administrative remedies provided by law[,]’ ” by 

“filing a written charge with DFEH within one year of the 

alleged unlawful employment discrimination, and obtaining notice 

from DFEH of the right to sue”); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12960(d) (“no 

complaint may be filed after the expiration of one year from the 

date upon which the alleged unlawful practice or refusal to 

cooperate occurred. . . . ”). Plaintiffs’ statutory claim under 

FEHA is clearly untimely because the alleged discrimination 

occurred in October 2003, FAC ¶¶ 11-12, and Plaintiffs’ filed 

their administrative charges in December 2005. Def.’s Request 

for Judicial Notice, Exhs. A-C. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs 

failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, i.e., submit 

claims to DFEH within one year of the alleged sex 

discrimination, Plaintiffs are time-barred from bringing suit on 

this claim. See Romano v. Rockwell Int’l, Inc., 14 Cal.4th 479, 

492 (1996). 

 

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regarding the handling of Plaintiffs’ grievances,13 i.e., it had 

a non-discriminatory reason for handling the grievances in the 

manner it did.14 

In sum, the FAC does not allege free-standing claims of 

discrimination and retaliation with respect to the promotion of 

less senior male co-workers and the handling of grievances. 

This is because such allegations implicate the scope of the 

contractual relationship between the parties and therefore 

require the court to interpret the obligations owed under the 

CBA. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ discrimination and retaliation 

claims are time-barred because the Complaint was filed long 

after the LMRA’s six-month statute of limitations expired. 

 

13 Article 7 of the CBA expressly establishes the procedures 

to be followed with respect to employee grievances. Def.’s 

Request for Judicial Notice, Exhs. D, E-1. 

 

14 Under FEHA it is an unlawful employment practice “[f]or any 

employer, labor organization, employment agency, or person to 

discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person 

because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under 

this part or because the person has filed a complaint, 

testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part.” Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 12940(h). To establish a prima facie case of 

retaliation, a plaintiff must show that he or she engaged in a 

protected activity, were thereafter subjected to adverse 

employment action and there was a causal link between the two. 

Mathieu v. Norrell Corp., 115 Cal. App. 4th 1174, 1185 (2004). 

A prima facie case of discrimination can be rebutted by the 

defendant’s showing of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason 

for the action taken. Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 

317, 355 (2000); Morgan v. Regents of University of California, 

88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 68 (2000). 

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Finally, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims 

are premised on Defendants retaliation arising out of 

Plaintiffs’ grievances and Ms. Walker’s filing of a complaint 

with the NLRB, such claims are preempted by the NLRA.15 

“The general rule of preemption in labor cases is that if 

the activity relied on as the basis for a suit is ‘arguably 

subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the States as well as the 

federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the 

National Labor Relations Board.’ ” Lumber Prod. Indus. Workers 

Local 1054 v. West Coast Indus. Relations Ass’n, Inc., 775 F.2d 

1042, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 1985); see Bassette v. Stone Container 

Corp., 25 F.3d 757, 759 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that “[a]n 

action brought under state law is preempted ‘[w]hen it is clear 

or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State 

purports to regulate are protected by [section] 7 of the 

National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor 

practice under [section] 8’ ”). 

Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor 

practice “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in 

 

15 As an initial matter, Ms. Walker’s state law retaliation 

claim fails as against Pacific Bell because CWA, not Pacific 

Bell, removed Ms. Walker from her position as a union steward. 

See Mathieu, 115 Cal.App.4th at 1185 (noting that in order to 

establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must 

show that he or she engaged in a protected activity, were 

thereafter subjected to adverse employment action and there was 

a causal link between the two). 

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the exercise” of their rights under the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 

158(a)(1). This section protects an employee’s right to file 

grievances. See NLRB v. Eaton Corp., 623 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 

1980) (finding that employer violated § 8 of the NLRA by firing 

employee for exercising right to file grievances under the 

collective bargaining agreement); See Toledo World Terminals, 

Inc., 289 N.L.R.B. 670, 706-07 (1988) (finding that a union 

violations section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA for retaliating against a 

member in response to the filing of a grievance). Section 

8(a)(3) of the NLRA prohibits discrimination in regard to “any 

term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage 

membership in any labor organization.” This section has also 

been found to prohibit discrimination for filing grievances. See

Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc. v. NLRB, 717 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 

1983) (finding that employer violated § 8(a)(3) by discharging 

an employee in retaliation for filing a grievance). 

Here, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim is 

premised on Pacific Bell’s retaliatory conduct in response to 

Plaintiffs’ filing their grievances, it is preempted by the NLRA. 

This is because the conduct that forms the basis of this state 

law retaliation claim is the same conduct that would support an 

unfair labor practice complaint filed with the NLRB - that 

Pacific Bell retaliated against Defendants for filing a 

grievance through her union. Likewise, to the extent that Ms. 

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Walker alleges a state law retaliation claim against CWA for 

removing her as a union steward, this claim is also preempted by 

the NLRA because the conduct that forms the basis of such claim 

is the same conduct that would support an unfair labor practice 

complaint with the NLRB. See Toledo World Terminals, Inc., 289 

N.L.R.B. at 673-74, 704-05 (a union violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) 

and (2) of the NLRA by removing a steward in retaliation for 

seeking to vindicate his or her rights in front of the Board by 

filing an unfair labor practice charge against the union). 

For these reasons, Plaintiffs retaliation claims are 

preempted by the NLRA and therefore dismissed. 

4. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 

 Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim alleges that CWA 

breached its duty under the CBA to act for the benefit of 

Plaintiffs in all matters relating to employment with Pacific 

Bell by acting against Plaintiffs’ interests. FAC ¶¶ 52-54. 

 “Section 9(a) of the LMRA authorizes a union to act as the 

exclusive agent for its members in collective bargaining with 

the employer.” Madison, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1256 (citing 29 

U.S.C. § 159(a)). “The exclusivity of the agency imposes on a 

union the duty ‘to represent all members . . . without hostility 

or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with 

complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary 

conduct.’ ” Madison, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1256. “The duty of 

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fair representation applies to all representational activity in 

which the union engages, including the ‘negotiation, 

administration, and enforcement of collective bargaining 

agreements.’ ” Madison, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1256 (quoting Int’l 

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 

(1979)). Because this duty is derived from the LMRA, it is 

defined solely by federal law and preempts the application of 

state substantive law that seeks to regulate conduct within its 

ambit. Madison, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1256. 

 Although Plaintiffs style this claim as a breach of 

fiduciary duty claim, it is more appropriately characterized as 

a breach of the duty of fair representation. This is because 

the gravamen of this claim is that CWA failed to adequately 

represent Plaintiffs regarding the processing of their 

grievances. See Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1509 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (observing that “[t]he vast majority of duty of fair 

representation claims arise in the grievance procedure context: 

the employee claims that a union failed to process a grievance 

or mishandled its presentation”). Therefore, since this claim 

rests on CWA’s representational activity, (i.e., handling of 

Plaintiffs’ grievances), it is preempted. 

For this reason, Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim 

is time-barred because the Complaint was not filed within sixmonths of the accrual of this claim. Galindo, 793 F.2d at 1509 

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(noting that statute of limitations for a duty of fair 

representation claim is six-months).16

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS the motion 

to dismiss. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2007. 

 s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 

16 CWA’s handling of Plaintiffs’ grievances was completed on 

September 21, 2005 and the original Complaint was filed on 

December 14, 2006, far beyond the six-month statutory period. 

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