Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01115/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01115-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES W. MOORE, JR., a minor, by )

and through his Guardian ad litem, )

ALICIA MOORE, individually and as )

successor in interest of James W. Moore, )

deceased, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

v. )

)

COUNTY OF KERN, KERN COUNTY )

SHERIFF’S DEPT., MACK WIMBISH, )

DANIEL THOMAS LINDINI, ANGELA )

LOPEZ BRAVO, LISA DIANE )

ROMERO, RANDALL HOLTZ, )

JULIAN TREVINO, LARRY GENE )

JOHNSON, GREGORY MORGAN, )

SHANNON HAIUNGS, JAIME )

TELLEZ, MARK JIMENEZ, MOSES )

ADAME, CLINTON MINOR, )

GREGORY COSSEL, JEFF COLBERT, )

MARCUS HUDGINS, and DOES 1 to )

100, inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

)

____________________________________)

)

AND RELATED CONSOLIDATED )

CASE AND CROSS-CLAIMS )

____________________________________)

CIV F 05-1115 AWI LJO

Consolidated with: 

CV F 06-0120 OWW SMS

ORDER ON DEFENDANT

HOLTZ’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

This is a civil rights case that stems from the death of James Moore (“Decedent”) from

multiple applications of allegedly improper force while Decedent was in custody at the Kern

County Jail and while Decedent was in transit to a hospital. James Moore, Jr., by and through his

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This case has been consolidated with a case brought by Bryce Moore, another minor son of Decedent. 1

Bryce Moore is also a plaintiff, but this motion deals with the allegations made by James Moore, Jr.

The Second Amended Complaint, as per the order signed by the Magistrate Judge on April 14, 2006, is

2

Document 35-2 in the Court’s docket.

The motion to dismiss indicates that it seeks dismissal of the SAC, but then only argues that dismissal of 3

four of the nine alleged causes of action is appropriate. Given the substance of Holtz’s motion, the Court construes it

as a motion for partial dismissal of the SAC.

2

guardian ad litem Alicia Moore, (“Plaintiff”) is a minor son of Decedent who brought suit against

Kern County and numerous Kern County law enforcement personnel. In his Second Amended

1

Complaint (“SAC”), Plaintiff alleges nine causes of action under both federal and state law 2

against Defendants. Defendant Randall Holtz (“Holtz”) has filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss the third (42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy), sixth (state law negligent infliction of emotional

distress), seventh (state law intentional infliction of emotion distress), and ninth (state law

conspiracy) causes of action. For the reasons that follow, Holtz’s motion will be granted in part 3

and denied in part.

 LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 8(a)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) sets the pleading standard for claims for relief. 

“Under the liberal rules of pleading, a plaintiff need only provide a ‘short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Sagana v. Tenorio, 384 F.3d 731, 736

(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). This rule does “not require a claimant to set out in

detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The

pleadings need only give the opposing party fair notice of a claim and the claim’s basis. Conley,

355 U.S. at 47; Sagana, 384 F.3d at 736; Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2001).

47). The pleadings are also to “be construed as to do substantial justice,” and “no technical

forms of pleading . . . are required.” Fed. Rules Civ. Pro. 8(e)(1), 8(f); Sagana, 384 F.3d at 736;

Fontana, 262 F.3d at 877. “Specific legal theories need not be pleaded so long as sufficient

factual averments show that the claimant may be entitled to some relief.” Fontana, 262 F.3d at

877; American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat’l Bank, 690 F.2d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 1982). 

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Rule 12(b)(6)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed because of the

plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

This rule provides for dismissal of a claim if, as a matter of law, “it is clear that no relief could be

granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Parks Sch. of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480,

1484 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, the determinative question is whether there is any set of “facts that

could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint” that would entitle plaintiff to

some relief. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). In reviewing a complaint

under Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 788 (9th

Cir. 2002); Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court must also assume

that general allegations embrace the necessary, specific facts to support the claim. Smith v.

Pacific Prop. and Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004); Peloza v. Capistrano Unified

Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994). But, the Court is not required “to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable

inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); see also

Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003); Western Mining

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Courts will not “assume the truth of legal

conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Warren, 328 F.3d at

1139; Western Mining Council, 643 F.2d at 624. Furthermore, Courts will not assume that

plaintiffs “can prove facts which [they have] not alleged, or that the defendants have violated . . .

laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v.

California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or

on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Navarro v. Block, 250

F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

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1988). If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is granted, “[the] district court should grant leave to

amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,

1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

In other words, leave to amend need not be granted when amendment would be futile. Gompper

v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002).

 HOLTZ’S MOTION

1. Third Cause of Action – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Conspiracy

Defendant’s Argument

Citing to a treatise, Holtz argues that conspiracies to violate civil rights are only

actionable through 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Because Plaintiff has improperly alleged conspiracy under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, the cause of action should be dismissed. Further, to the extent that Plaintiff

claims the existence of a conspiracy, the allegations are insufficient to show a meeting of the

minds. Although Plaintiff does not need to rely on direct proof, there must be at least

circumstantial evidence that Holtz was a member of the conspiracy. The allegations of

conspiracy at paragraphs 15 and 69 contain insufficient material facts and do not show that Holtz

was involved in the conspiracy.

Plaintiff’s Opposition

Plaintiff argues that a conspiracy claim may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violations of constitutional rights and that he is not limited to only 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

As for the adequacy of the “meeting of the minds” allegations, Plaintiff argues that

Defendant is impermissibly relying on summary judgment cases and is not viewing the SAC in

the light of the liberal 12(b)(6) standard. The allegations place Holtz on notice of the conspiracy

claim, there are allegations that Holtz participated in a combination to violate Decedent’s civil

rights, and there are allegations of specific acts by Holtz in furtherance of the agreement. The

SAC alleges more facts than those found to be sufficient in Carreon v. Bauman, 747 F.Supp.

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1290, 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1990), and the motion should be denied. 

Allegations In The Complaint

On August 15, 2005, Kern County law enforcement personnel were in the process of

transporting Decedent when, without cause, they assaulted and used excessive and ultimately

deadly force upon Decedent. See SAC at ¶ 14. All Defendants, including Holtz, are alleged to

have assaulted, battered, punched, choked, etc. Decedent without cause, to have refused (with

various mental states alleged) to intervene to prevent the other Defendants from assaulting

Decedent, to have failed to report the wrongful conduct of the other Defendants towards

Decedent, to have inflicted emotional distress on Decedent, and to have aided and abetted and

entered into a conspiracy to assault Decedent as well as cover-up their wrongful conduct. See id.

at ¶¶ 15(a)-(e), 16, 17. On August 15, 2005, Holtz unreasonably and unnecessarily applied a

carotid hold on Decedent, which rendered the Decedent unconscious. Id. at ¶ 16. Holtz also

used a baton on Decedent. Id. at 17. As a result of the trauma inflicted upon Decedent by all

Defendants, Decedent died on August 21, 2005. Id. at ¶ 19. After incorporating by reference all

prior allegations, Plaintiff alleges:

Defendants . . . [including] Randall Holtz . . . entered into a civil conspiracy and

agreement, within the meaning of, e.g., Mendocino Environmental Center v.

Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301-02 (9th Cir. 1999), and Hampton v.

Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 620-21 & n.19 (7th Cir. 1979) . . . to violate the civil

rights of: (a) Decedent, by assaulting, battering, kicking, punching, and using

excessive force, and ultimately deadly force upon Decedent without cause, reason,

or justification; and (b) Plaintiff, by depriving Plaintiff of his familial relationship

with, and the love, society, affection, [etc.] of Decedent by harming, injuring and

ultimately killing Decedent. In fact, inter alia, that said Defendants aided, abetted,

approved, ratified and/or deliberately and knowingly failed, refused, and/or

refrained from intervening in or stopping the assault and battery upon Decedent,

and/or deliberately and knowingly failed, refused and/or refrained from promptly

and accurately reporting the incident to their superiors and/or other appropriate

authorities.

Id. at ¶ 69.

Resolution

A plaintiff may allege a conspiracy under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 42 U.S.C. § 1985. 

See Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1449 n.6 (10th Cir. 1990); Klingele v. Eikenberry,

849 F.2d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1988); Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24, 27-28 (9th Cir. 1962); Hopper

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28 Reversed in part on other grounds, 448 U.S. 913 (1980). 4

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v. Hayes, 573 F.Supp. 1368, 1371 (D. Idaho 1983). A conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is “a

conspiracy to deprive a plaintiff of a constitutional or federally protected right under color of

state law.” Dixon, 898 F.2d at 1449 n.6. In order to “recover under a § 1983 conspiracy theory,

a plaintiff must plead and prove not only a conspiracy, but also an actual deprivation of rights;

pleading and proof of one without the other will be insufficient.” Id.; see also Nieves v.

McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2001); Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1512 (9th

Cir. 1991); Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989); Dooley v.

Reiss, 736 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984); Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 622-23 (7th

Cir. 1979); Crowe v. County of San Diego, 303 F.Supp.2d 1050, 1086 (S.D. Cal. 2004); Hopper, 4

573 F.Supp. at 1371. The “essence of a § 1983 claim is the deprivation of the right rather than

the conspiracy.” Dixon, 898 F.2d at 1449; Lesser v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 518 F.2d 538, 540 n.2

(7th Cir. 1975). Unlike a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 does not require a plaintiff to prove a racial or class-based animus. See Dixon, 898 F.2d at

1449 n.6; Klingele, 849 F.2d at 413; Hopper, 573 F.Supp. at 1371. 

 “To establish a conspiracy, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of an agreement or

‘meeting of the minds’ to violate constitutional rights.” Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino

County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999); Vieux v. E. Bay Reg'l Park Dist., 906 F.2d 1330,

1343 (9th Cir. 1990); Woodrum, 866 F.2d at 1126. “The defendants must have, by some

concerted action, intended to accomplish some unlawful objective for the purpose of harming

another which results in damage.” Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 F.3d at 1301; Gilbrook v. City of

Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir. 1999). This agreement or meeting of the minds may be

inferred on the basis of circumstantial evidence, such as the actions of the defendants. See

Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 F.3d at 1301; Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 856. A showing that defendants

committed acts that “are unlikely to have been undertaken without an agreement” may support

the inference of a conspiracy. Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 F.3d at 1301. Conclusory allegations

of conspiracy, however, are not enough to support a § 1983 conspiracy claim. See Burns v.

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County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989); Woodrum, 866 F.2d at 1126; Aldabe v.

Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). A plaintiff must allege specific facts to support the

existence of the claimed conspiracy. See Olsen v. Idaho Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 929 (9th

Cir. 2004); Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992); Burns, 883

F.2d at 821; Woodrum, 866 F.2d at 1126. Allegations that identify “the period of the conspiracy,

the object of the conspiracy, and certain other actions of the alleged conspirators taken to achieve

that purpose,” Marchese v. Umstead, 110 F.Supp.2d 361, 371 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Fioriglio v. City

of Atlantic City, 996 F.Supp. 379, 386 (D. N.J. 1998), and allegations that identify “which

defendants conspired, how they conspired and how the conspiracy led to a deprivation of his

constitutional rights,” Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 1997), have been held to

be sufficiently particular to properly allege a conspiracy.

Here, Holtz’s argument that no conspiracy claim is available under § 1983 is meritless. A

Plaintiff’s ability to allege a conspiracy under § 1983 in the Ninth Circuit is well established. 

E.g. Klingele, 849 F.2d at 413; Dooley, 736 F.2d at 1395; Cohen, 300 F.2d at 27-28. 

As for the adequacy of the conspiracy allegations, the SAC alleges that all Defendants,

including Holtz, entered into a conspiracy to violate Decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights

through the application of excessive force. The SAC shows that the Decedent’s rights against

excessive and deadly force were violated on August 15, 2005, through a variety of assaults that

were done without cause, including the use of a carotid hold and a baton against Decedent

specifically by Holtz. The SAC alleges and shows that none of the Defendants, including Holtz,

intervened to prevent any of the assaults against Decedent and that the conduct against Decedent

was not timely or accurately reported by the Defendants, including Holtz, to their supervisors. 

There are numerous Defendants who are alleged to have assaulted Decedent on August 15, 2005,

and no one intervened, and no one timely or accurately reported the assaults against Decedent. 

Since this is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court assumes the truth of these allegations and views

them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Given that the SAC alleges that the Defendants,

including Holtz, conspired against Decedent, alleges the object of the conspiracy, alleges conduct

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done in furtherance of the conspiracy by Holtz and all Defendants, alleges how the Decedent was

harmed, and identifies at least part of the time period of the conspiracy, and given the number of

persons who are alleged to have acted in conformity with a conspiracy to use excessive force and

then not timely or accurately report the incident, the allegations are sufficiently particular to

allege a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Holtz for purposes of a 12(b)(6) motion. See

San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Aguirre, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38166 at *26-*27 (S.D. Cal.

2005); Slade v. Gates, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20402 at *7-*9 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Carreon, 747

F.Supp. at 1291-92. Holtz’s motion to dismiss this claim is denied. 

2. Ninth Cause of Action – State Law Conspiracy

Holtz seeks to dismiss the Ninth Cause of Action, state law conspiracy. The allegations

in the SAC and the arguments made both in favor of and in opposition to the federal conspiracy

claim are essentially the same as those regarding the state conspiracy claim.

The elements of an action for civil conspiracy are (1) formation and operation of the

conspiracy and (2) damage resulting to plaintiff (3) from a wrongful act done in furtherance of

the common design. Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1062 (Cal. 2006). “A civil

conspiracy, however atrocious, does not per se give rise to a cause of action unless a civil wrong

has been committed resulting in damage.” Doctors’ Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.3d 39, 44

(1989). Given the elements of a civil conspiracy under California law and the liberal federal

pleadings standards that are applicable, the Court sees no reason why the same analysis made

regarding the federal conspiracy claim would not also apply to the state law conspiracy claim. 

For the reasons discussed in connection with Plaintiff’s § 1983 conspiracy claim, Holtz’s motion

to dismiss this claim is denied.

3. Sixth & Seventh Causes of Action – State Law Intentional & Negligent Infliction Of 

 Emotional Distress

Defendant’s Argument

Holtz argues that Plaintiff alleges causes of action for intentional and negligent infliction

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of emotional distress as a successor in interest to Decedent. However, California Code of Civil

Procedure § 377.34 (“C.C.P. § 377.34”) prohibits a successor in interest from recovering

damages for pain, suffering and disfigurement. Holtz argues that this is understood to include

mental anguish and emotional distress. Given C.C.P. § 377.34’s prohibition, Plaintiff cannot

maintain these causes of action.

Plaintiff’s Opposition

Plaintiff addresses C.C.P. § 377.34 in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but does not

respond to Holtz’s argument that the state law causes of action alleged in the Sixth and Seventh

causes of action should be dismissed. 

Discussion

California law provides that, “a cause of action for or against a person is not lost by

reason of the person’s death, but survives subject to the applicable limitations period.” Cal. Code

Civ. Pro. § 377.20(a); Chavez v. Carpenter, 91 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1438 (2001). “A cause of

action that survives the death of the person . . . may be commenced by the decedent’s personal

representative or, if none, by the decedent’s successor in interest.” Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 377.30;

Estate of Lowrie, 118 Cal.App.4th 220, 228 n.8 (2004). Unlike a wrongful death cause of action,

a survival cause of action is not a new cause of action that vests in heirs on the death of the

decedent, rather it is a separate and distinct cause of action which belonged to the decedent

before death but, by statute, survives that event. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 864 (1953);

Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center, 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1264-65 (2006). However, California has

placed the following limitation on the damages that are recoverable in a survival cause of action:

In an action or proceeding by a decedent’s personal representative or successor in

interest on the decedent’s cause of action, the damages recoverable are limited to

the loss or damage that the decedent sustained or incurred before death, including

any penalties or punitive or exemplary damages that the decedent would have

been entitled to recover had the decedent lived, and do not include damages for

pain, suffering, or disfigurement.

Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 377.34 (emphasis added); see also Quiroz, 140 Cal.App.4th at 1264-65. 

In other words, “a decedent’s cause of action for pain and suffering dies with him.” 

Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center, 184 Cal.App.3d 961, 969 (1986). Courts have

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The 1992 Law Revision Comments state that, “Section 377.34 restates former Probate Code Section

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573(c) without substantive change . . . .” 1992 Law Revision Comments to Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 377.34; see also

ARA Living Centers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.App.4th 1556, 1563 (1993). 

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held, both under C.C.P. § 377.34 and its predecessor Probate Code § 573(c), that emotional 5

distress damages are within the definition of “pain and suffering damages” and do not survive the

death of a decedent under the California survival statute. See Sposato v. Electronic Data Sys.,

188 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 1999); Maddox v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 77 F.Supp.2d

1123, 1134 (S.D. Cal. 1999); California v. Home Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 1989 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 15947 at *7-*8 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., 35 Cal.4th 1159,

1176-77 (2005); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 21 Cal.3d 910, 920 n.3 (1978); Urbaniak v.

Newton, 226 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1142 (1991). 

Additionally, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a § 1983 claim that accrued before death survives

the decedent where state law authorizes a survival action as a “suitable remedy . . . not

inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1988;

Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588-90 (1978). Federal California courts have reached

opposite conclusions whether the limitations set by C.C.P. § 377.34 applies to the damages

available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cf. Venerable v. City of Sacramento, 185 F.Supp.2d 1128

(E.D. Cal. 1128) (holding that C.C.P. § 377.34 applies) with Williams v. City of Oakland, 915

F.Supp. 1074 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding C.C.P. § 377.34 does not apply).

In the case at bar, the motion to dismiss is limited to whether the Court should dismiss the

Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action, which are state law claims for intentional and negligent

infliction of emotional distress. The torts of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional

distress both contain as an essential element that the plaintiff actually suffered serious emotional

distress. See Badell v. Celtic Life Ins., Co., 159 F.Supp.2d 1186, 1194 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Bogard

v. Employers Cas. Co., 164 Cal.App.3d 602, 618 (1985); California Jury Instructions – Civil

(CACI) (January 2006 ed.) at §§ 1600, 1620. Plaintiff is attempting to recover for the emotional

distress experienced by Decedent prior to Decedent’s death. See SAC at ¶¶ 81, 84, 86, 89. 

Under C.C.P. § 377.34, a successor in interest, such as Plaintiff, cannot recover damages for the

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C.C.P. § 377.34 does not bar recovery of pain and suffering damages awarded in a judgment if the plaintiff 6

dies after that judgment is rendered but while an appeal is pending. Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 15 Cal.4th 288,

305 (1997). However, that is not the posture of this case.

Plaintiff raises the issue of C.C.P. § 377.34’s application to his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims in opposition. In

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his reply brief, Holtz argues that C.C.P. § 377.34 does apply. However, Holtz’s original motion to dismiss did not

argue that pain and suffering damages suffered by the Decedent are unavailable to Plaintiff in the § 1983 causes of

action, i.e. that C.C.P. § 377.34 applies. Rather, Holtz’s argument regarding C.C.P. § 377.34’s applicability was

limited to the Sixth and Seventh causes of action, which are state law claims. The Court believes that full briefing on

the issue in the form of an initial motion that actually raises the issue should be filed before the Court decides the

matter. Accordingly, the Court will not decide the issue of C.C.P. § 377.34’s applicability to Plaintiff’s § 1983

claims at this time.

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emotional distress suffered by a decedent prior to death. See Maddox, 77 F.Supp.2d at 1134; 6

California, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15947 at *7-*8; Simon, 35 Cal.4th at 1176-77; Neal, 21

Cal.3d at 920 n.3; Urbaniak, 226 Cal.3d at 1142. Whether such emotional distress was

negligently or intentionally inflicted is of no consequence. See California, 1989 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 15947 at *7-*8. Since damages for emotional distress under the Sixth and Seventh

causes of action are barred by C.C.P. § 377.34, and since Plaintiff has failed to address the

application of C.C.P. § 377.34 to these claims, the Sixth and Seventh causes of action are

dismissed without leave to amend.7

 

ORDER

In light of the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant Holtz’s motion to dismiss the Third and Ninth Causes of Action is

DENIED;

2. Defendant Holtz’s motion to dismiss the Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action is

GRANTED and those causes of action are DISMISSED without leave to amend;

and 

3. Holtz is to file an answer to Plaintiff’s second amended complaint within ten (10)

days of service of this order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 31, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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