Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01683/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01683-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 230
Nature of Suit: Rent, Lease, Ejectment
Cause of Action: 28:1441nr Notice of Removal

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18-cv-1683-JAH-BGS

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRECKENRIDGE PROPERTY FUND 

2016, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

MATTHEW D. INGRAM; WANDA 

FORD INGRAM; MICHELE CUELLO, 

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-1683-JAH-BGS

ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING 

UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION 

TO STATE COURT AND DENYING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AS MOOT

On May 24, 2018, Plaintiff Breckenridge Property Fund 2016, LLC 

(“Breckenridge”) filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of San 

Diego alleging unlawful detainer against Defendants Matthew D. Ingram, Wanda Ford 

Ingram, Michele Cuello, and Does 1 to 10. See Doc. No. 1–2. The complaint alleges one 

state law cause of action and confirms it is a limited civil case with a demand under 

$10,000.00. Id. On July 23, 2018, Defendant Michele Cuello, appearing pro se, filed a 

notice of removal, as well as a motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Doc. Nos. 1, 2. For the reasons set forth below, this Court finds it lacks 

jurisdiction over the complaint and, therefore, sua sponte REMANDS the matter to state 

court for all further proceedings.

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18-cv-1683-JAH-BGS

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DISCUSSION

Federal Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.

v. New York, 790 F.2d 769,774 (9th Cir. 1986). As such, federal courts cannot reach the 

merits of any dispute until it confirms its own subject matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. 

Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998). Thus, a “district court must 

remand ‘if at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction.’ ” Kenny v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 881 F.3d 786, 789–90 (9th Cir. 

2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). “In essence, subject matter jurisdiction is the 

touchstone for a district court’s authority to remand sua sponte.” Id.

Removal jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. A state court action

can be removed if it could have originally been brought in federal court under either federal 

question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 

386, 392 (1987). District courts must construe the removal statutes strictly against removal 

and resolve any uncertainty as to removability in favor of remanding the case to state court. 

Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988). The burden is on the removing party 

to demonstrate federal subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See Emrich v. Touche Ross 

& Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988).

Upon review of the notice of removal, this Court finds it appropriate to sua sponte

remand the case to state court because the notice of removal fails to establish a proper basis 

for this Court’s jurisdiction. Defendant maintains this action is removable because the 

Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (“PTFA”) preempts state law as to bona fide

residential tenants of foreclosed landlords. Doc. No. 1, pg. 2. However, preemption gives 

rise to federal question jurisdiction only when an area of state law has been completely 

preempted by federal law. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393. Defendant fails to demonstrate 

that the PTFA completely preempts state law. “Only the following three areas have been 

recognized as areas of complete preemption by the United States Supreme Court and circuit 

law: (1) claims under the Labor Management Relations Act; (2) claims under the 

Employment Retirement and Insurance Security Act; and (3) certain Indian land grant 

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rights.” Wells Fargo Bank v. Lapeen, No. C 11-01932 LB, 2011 WL 2194117, at *4 (N.D. 

Cal. June 6, 2011) (citing Robinson v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co. Inc., 918 F.2d 579, 585 

(9th Cir.1990)). Moreover, the express language of the statute indicates Congress did not

intend the PTFA to be the exclusive remedy. 12 U.S.C. § 5220 Note § (a) (Stating that the

Act does not affect the requirements of any state or local law providing for longer time

periods or additional protections for tenants); see also PNC Bank, National Association v. 

Branch, 2011 WL 281806 (D.Arizona 2011). To the extent Defendant asserts the PTFA as 

a defense, a federal defense is insufficient to establish federal question jurisdiction. See

Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The instant complaint is sua sponte REMANDED to state court for 

all further proceedings; 

2. Defendant’s Motion for Leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 

No. 2] is DENIED as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 15, 2018

 

_________________________________

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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