Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02871/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02871-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Petitioner named Warden Kane as the respondent in his petition. Although the

respondent in a habeas corpus proceeding is the person having custody of the person

detained, see 28 U.S.C. 2243, the answer was filed on behalf of the Board, as well, because

petitioner claims the Board’s actions violated his constitutional rights.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERT VALLES,

Petitioner,

 v.

A. KANE, Warden of Correctional Training

Facility, and the BOARD OF PRISON

TERMS,

Respondents. /

No. C 04-2871 MMC (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

On July 15, 2004, petitioner Albert Valles, a California prisoner proceeding pro se,

filed the above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 

challenging the decision by the Board of Prison Terms (“Board”) denying him parole in

2002. On September 27, 2004, the Court ordered respondent Warden Kane to show cause

why the petition should not be granted based on petitioner’s cognizable claims for relief. 

Respondents Kane and the Board1

 filed an answer accompanied by a memorandum and

exhibits, and petitioner filed a traverse. After being granted leave to do so by the Court,

respondents filed a supplemental answer, and petitioner filed a supplemental traverse. For

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the reasons set forth below, the petition will be denied.

BACKGROUND

On January 15, 1991, the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles,

(“Superior Court”) sentenced petitioner to a term of fifteen years to life in prison upon

acceptance of petitioner’s plea of no contest to a charge of second degree murder. (See

Answer Exs. A, B.) The events giving rise thereto were summarized in the probation report

prepared for the Superior Court for sentencing purposes. (See Answer Ex. D at 2-3.) The

Board read the summary of events into the record at petitioner’s initial parole suitability

hearing in 1999, (see Answer Ex. G at 5-7 ), and at petitioner’s 2002 parole suitability

hearing, the Board incorporated by reference the summary from the 1999 hearing record to

establish the facts of petitioner’s commitment offense, (see Answer Ex. F at 7 ). Petitioner

did not object to the factual summary at either of his hearings, and the Court includes the

summary here:

On May 12, 1990, at 12:20 a.m., Ricardo Valles, Alberto Valles, Ortega,

Mendez, Caudillo, and Magana, acting in concert attacked 19-year-old victim

Jesse Jiminez with beer cans, fists and feet with Ricardo Valles subsequently

firing the fatal shot into the head of the victim. 

At that date and time, the victim and a female friend had gone to a

discount liquor store to buy a six pack of beer. After the victim had purchased

the beer, he and his friend walked out of the store toward the victim’s car

which he had parked in front. Suddenly, the victim turned and began running

back inside the door, followed closely by the defendants. The defendants were

throwing full beer cans at the victim who ran around the counter. He was

followed around the counter by several of the defendants who knocked him to

the ground and began beating the victim with their fists and continuing to

throw beer cans and other merchandise at him. In the meantime, Ricardo

Valles – according to witnesses – jumped on top of the counter, leaned over

and fired one shot from a revolver. After firing the first round, the gun

jammed. Ricardo Valles then struggled with the gun, trying to get it

unjammed. While this was going on, the other defendants continued to beat the

victim. Ricardo Valles then leaned over the counter top and fired a [sic]

another round at the victim who was lying on the floor. After firing the shot,

all of the defendants left the store. Police and paramedics were called to the

location and the victim was transported to the Pomona Valley Hospital with a

gunshot wound to the head. Four days later, he was pronounced dead.

(See Answer Ex. D at 1-2.)

The incident at the liquor store was recorded by a security video camera. With the

help of an informant and witnesses, police were able to identify all of the assailants, and

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subsequently arrested them. (See id. at 4.) Petitioner, Ricardo Valles’s brother, was one of

those arrested. Petitioner told police he just happened to arrive at the liquor store at the same

time the others did, he did not know any of the other people involved, and he did not do

anything. (See id. at 4-5.) He admitted he was a member of the “Pomona Sur” Gang. (See

id. at 5.) 

On June 16, 1999, at petitioner’s initial parole suitability hearing, the Board found

petitioner unsuitable for parole, stating he “would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to

society and a threat to public safety if released from prison.” (See Answer Ex. G at 36:8-10.) 

The Board explained the offense had been carried out in “an especially cruel and callous

manner,” (see id. at 36:10-11), “a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an execution

style murder,” (see id. at 36:12-13), and “a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally

callous disregard for human suffering” (see id. at 36:15-16). The Board further observed the

victim had been abused during the offense, (see id. at 36:14), and “the motive for the crime

was inexplicable and very trivial in relation to the offense,” (see id. at 36:17-18.) The Board

also pointed to petitioner’s escalating pattern of criminal conduct, his history of unstable or

tumultuous relationships with others, and his “failure to profit from society’s previous

attempts to correct his criminality.” (See id. at 36:22-26.) The Board further noted that the

District Attorney opposed parole. (See id. at 37:9-10). The Board commended petitioner for

“upgrading vocationally, educationally and participating in some self-help programming,”

but found, “[t]hese positive aspects of his behavior do not outweigh the factors of

unsuitability.” (See id. at 37:22-26.) Consequently, the Board concluded petitioner needed

to participate in additional therapy, because he “continues to be unpredictable and a threat to

others.” (See id. at 37:15-16.) The Board denied petitioner parole for a period of three years. 

(See id. at 38:1.) 

On June 20, 2002, at petitioner’s second parole suitability hearing, the Board again

determined petitioner was “not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison,” (see Answer Ex. F at

45:9-12). The Board found that, 

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[t]he offense was carried out in an especially cruel and callous manner. The

offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner such as an

execution-style murder. The victim was abused during the offense. The

offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally

callous disregard for human sufferings [sic]. The motive for the crime was

inexplicable and very trivial in relationship to the offense . . . .

(See id. at 45:13-22.) The Board explained its conclusions were drawn from the facts of the

crime, wherein petitioner and his partners “attacked an innocent young man,” and beat and

shot him to death. (See id. at 45:24-46:6.) The Board further noted petitioner’s unstable

relationships, including his history of involvement in street gangs, as well as his substance

abuse problems, prior criminality, and previous encounters with the criminal justice system. 

(See id. at 46:9-21.) The Board found petitioner had not sufficiently participated in self-help

therapy, (see id. at 46:22-23), and pointed to the District Attorney’s and victim’s family’s

continued opposition to parole. (See id. at 47:8-14.)

The Board also relied upon a February 1, 1999, Mental Health Evaluation Report 

prepared by M. Carswell, Ph.D., a staff psychologist, that was not “totally supportive” of

release, (see id. at 46:25-26), and a 2002 report prepared by petitioner’s prison counselor,

M.S. Morton, which found petitioner posed a “moderate degree of threat” if released to the

community, (see id. at 47:16-19). The Board concluded: “[T]he petitioner needs therapy in

order to face, discuss, understand and cope with stress in a non-destructive manner so that he

can better understand, cope with his culpability in this particular life crime, that he doesn’t

minimize his involvement in the particular crime. Until progress is made, the prisoner

continues to be unpredictable and a threat to others.” (See id. at 47:21-48:2.) 

The Board acknowledged petitioner had viable parole plans, (see id. at 47:6), and

lauded him for his exemplary, disciplinary-free record in prison, and his continued

participation in various self-help and work-related programs. (See id. at 48:2-13.) The

Board found, however, that “these positive aspects” of petitioner’s behavior “don’t outweigh

factors of unsuitability at this time.” (See id. at 48:13-15.) The Board denied petitioner

parole for the next two years. 

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of a habeas corpus in the Superior Court,

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challenging the Board’s decision. The Superior Court denied the petition on December 13,

2002, stating: “[The] Court finds no facts to support issue raised, only defendant’s argument

and conclusions why defendant should be granted parole. Furthermore, the Court has no

jurisdiction on this issue.” (See Answer Ex. J.) Petitioner subsequently filed petitions for a

writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court,

both of which were summarily denied. (See id.) Petitioner thereafter filed the instant

petition, in which he claims the Board violated his federal constitutional rights in 2002 by

denying him parole (1) without sufficient evidence to support its decision that his release

would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety, and (2) in violation of his plea agreement. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a

federal court may grant a habeas petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the

basis of a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the state court’s

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition from a state prisoner

challenging the denial of parole. Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123,

1126-27 (9th Cir. 2006). 

A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court applies a

rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases” or “if the state

court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the

Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court]

precedent.” See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). An “unreasonable application” of federal law occurs “if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the [Supreme Court’s]

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decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” See id.

at 75. “The ‘unreasonable application’ clause requires the state court decision to be more

than incorrect or erroneous.” Id. “The state court’s application of clearly established law

must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. An “unreasonable determination of the facts” occurs

where “an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not

reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record” or “that the state court’s

fact-finding process was adequate.” See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (2004).

In determining whether to grant a petition, a federal court must analyze the state

court’s “last reasoned decision.” Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Here, the “last reasoned decision” is the Superior Court’s order of December 13, 2002. (See

Answer Ex. J.)

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

In a supplemental answer to the petition, respondents assert that the present petition

should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because petitioner has no

constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole.

While there is “no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be

conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence,” Greenholtz v. Inmates

of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), a state’s statutory parole scheme,

if it uses mandatory language, may create a presumption that parole release will be granted

when, or unless, certain designated findings are made, and thereby give rise to a

constitutionally protected liberty interest, see id. at 11-12. Where such mandatory language

is used, a prisoner gains a legitimate expectation in parole that cannot be denied without

adequate procedural due process protections. See id. at 11-16.

Respondents filed their supplemental answer in reliance upon In re Dannenberg, 34

Cal. 4th 1061 (2005), in which the California Supreme Court addressed various aspects of

California’s parole scheme. Since then, the Ninth Circuit has squarely rejected respondents’

argument, and has made clear that “California inmates continue to have a liberty interest in

parole after [Dannenberg].” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125. Consequently, in accord with Sass,

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petitioner was entitled to the protections of due process at his parole suitability hearing, and

the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.

C. Petitioner’s Claims

1. Denial of Due Process

Petitioner contends the Board violated his right to due process by denying him parole

in 2002 because the Board’s decision was not supported by some evidence. 

According to “clearly-established” federal law, a parole board’s decision must be

supported by “some evidence” to satisfy due process. See id. at 1128-29. “[The] some

evidence standard is minimal, and assures that ‘the record is not so devoid of evidence that

the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.’” Id. at

1129 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985)). “To determine whether the

some evidence standard is met ‘does not require examination of the entire record,

independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.’” Id. at

1128 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56.) “Instead, the relevant question is whether there is

any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached’” by the Board. See id.

(quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56.)

When assessing whether a state parole board’s suitability determination was supported

by “some evidence,” the Court’s analysis is framed by the statutes and regulations governing

parole suitability determinations in the relevant state. Irons v. Carey, --- F.3d ---, 2007 WL

2027359, at *3 (9th Cir. July 13, 2007). In California, the criteria for determining whether a

life prisoner is suitable for parole are set forth at title 15, § 2402, of the California Code of

Regulations. The opening paragraph of § 2402(a) states: “Regardless of the length of time

served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of

the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from

prison.” See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(a). Circumstances “tending to indicate

unsuitability” for parole include whether (1) “[t]he prisoner committed the offense in an

especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner;” (2) the prisoner has a “[p]revious [r]ecord of

[v]iolence;” (3) the prisoner has an “[u]nstable [s]ocial [h]istory;” (4) the prisoner has

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previously committed a “[s]adistic [s]exual [o]ffense;” (5) “[t]he prisoner has a lengthy

history of severe mental problems related to the offense;” and (6) “[t]he prisoner has engaged

in serious misconduct in prison or jail.” See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c). Factors to be

considered in determining whether the offense was committed “in an especially heinous,

atrocious or cruel manner” include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or separate

incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such

as an execution-style murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the

offense.

See id. 

Circumstances “tending to indicate suitability” for parole include: (1) “[t]he prisoner

does not have a record of assaulting others as a juvenile or committing crimes with a

potential of personal harm to victims;” (2) the prisoner has a “[s]table [s]ocial [h]istory;” 

(3) “[t]he prisoner performed acts which tend to indicate the presence of remorse;” (4) “[t]he

prisoner committed his crime as the result of significant stress in his life, especially if the

stress has built over a long period of time;” (5) “the prisoner suffered from Battered Woman

Syndrome;” (6) “[t]he prisoner lacks any significant history of violent crime;” (7) “[t]he

prisoner’s present age reduces the probability of recidivism;” (8) “[t]he prisoner has made

realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon

release;” and (9) “[i]nstitutional activities indicate an enhanced ability to function within the

law upon release.” See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(d). 

The Board’s 2002 denial of parole was based in part on findings that petitioner posed

an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety because “[t]he offense was carried out in an

especially cruel and callous manner.” See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1); (see also

Answer Ex. F at 45:13-14, 48:21-22). Specifically, the Board stated, the victim was

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“abused” during the offense and “the motive for the crime was inexplicable and very trivial

in relation to the offense.” (See id. at 45:17-22, 49:2-7.) Based on evidence the victim was

attacked and beaten severely by petitioner and several other individuals, was shot once by

petitioner’s brother, was again beaten when the gun jammed, and then was shot a second

time in the head by petitioner’s brother, the Board had “some evidence” that the victim was

abused. (See Answer Ex. G at 5-7.) Further, because petitioner conceded he had no

motivation for killing the victim, other than his belief the victim was a rival gang member

and it was “either kill or be killed,” the Board had “some evidence” to support its finding that

the motive for the crime was very trivial in relation to the offense. (See Answer Ex. F at 8:2-

15.) The above-referenced facts similarly provide “some evidence” to support the Board’s

findings that the offense “was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner such as an

execution-style murder,” and “was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human sufferings [sic].” (See id. at 45:13-20, 48:26-

49:5.) 

The Board also considered petitioner’s previous record of violence, see Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(2), and based its denial of parole in part on its finding that petitioner

had an escalating pattern of criminal conduct and violence. (See Answer Ex. F at 46:8-9.) 

Based on evidence of petitioner’s history as a gang member, and his arrests as a juvenile for

auto theft, receiving stolen property, carrying a concealed weapon in a vehicle, carrying a

loaded firearm in a public place, robbery and assault, there was “some evidence” to support

the Board’s finding. (See id. at 10:1-11:5.)

The Board further considered petitioner’s social history, see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 2402(c)(3), and based its denial of parole in part on its finding that petitioner had a history

of unstable, tumultuous relationships with others. (See Answer Ex. F at 46:9.) Based on

evidence petitioner was “highly involved” with the 12th Street gang, that he had a substance

abuse problem with drugs and alcohol, and that he previously had been on probation and

confined at a juvenile detention center, but had not changed his ways, there was “some

evidence” to support the Board’s finding. (See id. at 46:11-17.)

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The Board also determined petitioner needed to participate in additional self-help

programs and therapy before he could be found suitable for parole, (see id. 46:21-34, 47:21-

26), and concluded that, “[u]ntil progress is made, the prisoner continues to be unpredictable

and a threat to others.” (See id. at 48:1-2.) The Board noted the 1999 Mental Health

Evaluation Report from the prison psychologist, M. Carswell, was not totally supportive of

petitioner’s release. Although the report found petitioner’s violence potential, if released to

the community, to be “no more than the average level two inmate within the community,” it

did not find petitioner’s violence potential to be average or low relative to the general

population. (See Answer Ex. H at 5). The Board further noted petitioner’s counselor had

concluded petitioner continued to pose a moderate degree of threat to the public if released. 

(See Answer Ex. F at 47:15-19, Ex. I at 2.) These evaluations constituted “some evidence”

to support the Board’s finding. 

Petitioner contends the Board’s continued reliance on his prior conduct and the nature

of the commitment offense violates due process. (See Petition at 5.) The Ninth Circuit,

however, has held that a denial of parole based on an unchanging factor, such as the gravity

of the offense, may constitute “some evidence” to justify a denial of parole. See Irons, 2007

WL 2027359, at *5 (holding Board’s sole reliance on commitment offense in denying parole

comported with due process); Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 (holding Board’s reliance “on the

gravity of [petitioner’s] convicted offenses in combination with his prior offenses . . .

amount[ed] to some evidence to support the Board’s determination”); Biggs v. Terhune, 334

F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he parole board’s sole supportable reliance on the gravity

of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment to justify denial of parole can be initially

justified as fulfilling the requirements set forth by state law.”) Although the Ninth Circuit, in

Biggs, stated that “[a] continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor . . . runs

contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due

process violation,” see Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917, this exception has never been applied by the

Ninth Circuit. Most recently, in Irons, the Ninth Circuit noted that it has never found a

violation of due process where the denial of parole was based solely on the gravity of the

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offense, and the prisoner had not yet served the minimum number of years required by his

sentence. See Irons, 2007 WL 2027359, at *6. In the instant case, petitioner had served only

eleven years of his fifteen-years-to-life sentence when the Board denied him parole in 2002. 

Lastly, other circumstances presented in the instant action are not materially

distinguishable from those found not to warrant the granting of a habeas petition in Irons,

Sass, and Biggs. Here, petitioner had received no disciplinary infractions during his period

of incarceration, had participated in numerous self-help and educational classes, had

developed several vocational skills, and had positive work reports. (See Answer Ex. F at

48:3-13.) The petitioner in Irons was “extremely industrious” in prison, maintained “average

to exceptional job performance in every position he ha[d] occupied,” and “received

certificates of completion in several vocational training programs.” See Irons, 2007 WL

2027359, at *2. Likewise, in Sass, the petitioner displayed “exemplary conduct in prison,”

had “detailed plans” for his release, received vocational training and certificates, and “had

taken college classes, for which he received all A’s except for one B minus.” See Sass, 461

F.3d at 1136 n.16 (Reinhardt, dissenting). Similarly, the petitioner in Biggs was a “model

inmate,” received praise from his supervisors for his “skills and efforts,” received

certification from the FAA in two aviation programs, and earned Associate’s, Bachelor’s and

Masters in Business Administration degrees. See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 912. The Ninth Circuit

nonetheless found the petitioners’ accomplishments in Irons, Sass, and Biggs insufficient to

require a grant of parole. See Irons, 2007 WL 2027359, at *5; Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129; Biggs,

334 F.3d at 916.

In sum, the Board had “some evidence” to support its decision to deny petitioner

parole in 2002. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

2. Breach of Plea Bargain

Petitioner next argues the Board’s denial of parole breached the terms of his plea

agreement, in violation of due process. (See Petition at 5.) He contends that, although he

entered a plea of no contest to second degree murder, the Board denied parole by

characterizing his conviction as one for first degree murder, by using terms such as

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“calculated” and “execution-style” to describe the commitment offense. (See id. at 9.) He

further contends the District Attorney breached the plea agreement by objecting to his

release, thereby advocating that he serve a longer term than is uniformly served for second

degree murder. (See id.)

“[D]ue process rights conferred by the federal constitution allow [a defendant] to

enforce the terms of the plea agreement.” Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir.

2003). Plea agreements are construed using the ordinary rules of contract interpretation. See

id. at 1159. “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the

prosecutor, so that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or consideration, such

promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); see also

Brown, 337 F.3d at 1159 (holding prosecutor’s promise that petitioner would be released on

parole after serving half the minimum sentence discipline-free was binding). 

Assuming all of petitioner’s allegations are true, he has failed to state a claim for relief

because he has not alleged the prosecutor made any promise that petitioner would be released

on parole. See Murphy v. Espinoza, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1053 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2005)

(“Brown is inapposite because the prosecution here never promised petitioner he would be

released in 7-1/2 to 10 years, or even 15 years.”). A review of the plea transcript and the

sentencing transcript shows the absence of any promise by the District Attorney’s Office as

to when petitioner would be released from prison. (See Answer Exs. B, C.) The only

statement made to petitioner at the plea hearing was that he would be sentenced to fifteen

years to life, (see Answer Ex. B at 3:23-4:12), and the only statement made to petitioner at

the sentencing hearing was that he “shall serve 15 years to life in state prison,” (see Answer

Ex. C at 2:23). Further, there is no evidence to support petitioner’s contention that, because

of the plea agreement, the Board was prohibited from characterizing his crime in a certain

manner when considering his suitability for parole. The Board’s findings could not, and did

not, breach any agreement entered into between petitioner and the District Attorney’s Office. 

Lastly, petitioner’s contention that the plea agreement was breached because the

District Attorney advocated that he serve longer than the “uniform” term because of the

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nature of the crime, also is without merit. The California Supreme Court held, in In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1098 (2005), that the Board is not required to set uniform

parole dates for prisoners convicted of similar offenses before assessing a prisoner’s parole

suitability in light of public safety. 

3. Summary

For the reasons set forth above, the state court decision upholding the Board’s 2002

denial of parole was not “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” clearly established

Federal law, or “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented” in the state court proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, the

petition for a writ of a habeas corpus will be denied. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of a habeas corpus is hereby

DENIED. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 15, 2007

 _________________________ MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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