Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-00618/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-00618-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

GLC Restaurants, Inc. d/b/a McDonald's

Restaurant, an Arizona corporation, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV05-618 PCT-DGC

ORDER

The parties have filed a number of motions in anticipation of trial. This order will

address those motions. 

1. Plaintiff and Plaintiffs/Intervenors have filed Motion in Limine #1. Dkt. #227.

The motion seeks to preclude evidence concerning the financial condition of Rick and Cindy

Mayotte, the parents of Tiara Brazle. The motion argues that such evidence is irrelevant and

unduly prejudicial. The Court cannot assess the relevancy and potential prejudice of the

evidence at this point. These matters must be decided at trial in the context of the evidence

and arguments of the parties. Because the Court may rule this evidence inadmissible,

Defendants should not mention it to the jury during opening statements. The motion (Dkt

#227) is denied.

2. Plaintiff and Plaintiffs/Intervenors have filed Motion in Limine #2. Dkt. #229.

The motion seeks to exclude evidence of Jessica Tubandt’s felony convictions for possession

of marijuana pipes and use of marijuana. Defendants argue that the evidence is relevant to

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Ms. Tubandt’s failure to mitigate damages and therefore relevant to any claim for back pay.

Back pay is an equitable remedy to be awarded by the Court. Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co.,

Inc., 224 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court will seek an advisory verdict from the

jury on the question of back pay, but ultimately will determine what back pay, if any, should

be awarded against Defendants. Because the Court concludes that evidence of Ms.

Tubandt’s felony convictions would be unfairly prejudicial before the jury and would

outweigh the relevance of the convictions on the advisory verdict concerning back pay, the

Court will grant the motion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. If the jury renders an

advisory verdict in favor of Ms. Tubandt on the question of back pay, Defendants will be

able to argue to the Court that any award of back pay should be reduced or eliminated on the

basis of Ms. Tubandt’s failure to mitigate damages in light of her felony convictions. For

purposes of the jury trial, however, the motion in limine (Dkt. #229) is granted.

3. Plaintiff and Plaintiffs/Intervenors have filed Motion in Limine No. 3.

Dkt. #230. The motion seeks to exclude evidence of drug and alcohol use by the claimants

and class members. The motion argues that such evidence is irrelevant and highly

prejudicial. Defendants respond by arguing that evidence of drug and alcohol use is relevant

to the claimants’ ability to recollect events at issue in this case and to their claim for

emotional distress damages. The Court concludes that the marginal relevance of the

evidence on these issues is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and

therefore will grant the motion under Rule 403. Although it is true that drug and alcohol may

in some cases affect an individual’s ability to perceive or recollect events, Defendants cite

no evidence to suggest that it has had that effect in this case. Nor do Defendants cite any

specific evidence to suggest that the claimants used drugs or alcohol while working at

Defendants’ establishment. In the absence of such specific evidence, the relevancy of

general drug or alcohol use is marginal, and yet such evidence clearly could be unfairly

prejudicial to the Plaintiffs’ case. The motion (Dkt. #230) is granted.

4. Plaintiff and Plaintiffs/Intervenors have filed Motion in Limine #4. Dkt. #231.

The motion seeks to exclude statements and actions of Rick Mayotte during the September

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2002 GLC investigation of alleged discrimination against Tiara Brazle. Mr. Mayotte was

Ms. Brazle’s step-father. As stated above with respect to Motion in Limine #1, the Court

cannot conclude at this stage that Mr. Mayotte’s actions and statements during the

investigation are irrelevant, nor can the Court determine at this stage whether evidence about

such actions and statements would be unduly prejudicial. As a result, the motion will be

denied. Because the Court may exclude this evidence during trial, Defendants should not

mention it during their opening statements. The motion (Dkt. #231) is denied.

5. Plaintiff and Plaintiffs/Intervenors have filed Motion in Limine #5. Dkt. #232.

The motion seeks to exclude evidence of financial or living conditions of the claimants and

their families. Defendants respond by stating that they will seek to introduce such evidence

only with respect to Tiara Brazle and the actions of her step-father, Rick Mayotte. The Court

accordingly will grant the motion with respect to all claimants other than Tiara Brazle. For

the reasons stated above, the Court cannot determine at this stage that the evidence

concerning Ms. Brazle’s and Mr. Mayotte’s financial or living conditions is irrelevant or

would be unduly prejudicial. As a result, the Court will deny the motion with respect to such

evidence. Because the evidence may be excluded during trial, it should not be mentioned by

Defendants during opening statements. The motion (Dkt. #232) is granted in part and

denied in part as set forth above.

6. Plaintiff and Plaintiffs/Intervenors have filed a motion in limine to exclude

reference to evidence subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 412. Dkt. #325. The motion seeks

to exclude evidence of claimants’ alleged sexual behavior outside the workplace and alleged

sexual comments in the workplace. Defendant GLC responds by stating that it does not

intend to introduce evidence of claimants’ sexual behavior prior to or outside of their

employment at GLC. The response of Defendants Ehresman is less precise, but seems also

to suggest that they seek to introduce evidence concerning claimants’ statements in the

workplace. The Court concludes that the claimants’ sexual activities outside the workplace

are largely irrelevant and that their presentation to the jury would be highly prejudicial.

Because Defendants cannot show that the probative value of such evidence would

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1

 The parties’ requested oral argument on this motion. The Court concludes that such

argument is not necessary because the parties’ briefs fully address the issues relevant to this

motion. In order to comply with Rule 412(c)(2), however, the Court will permit the parties

to provide any additional arguments or comments they deem relevant to this motion during

the Final Pretrial Conference on January 5, 2007.

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substantially outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice, the evidence must be excluded under

Rule 412(b)(2). 

The Court concludes, however, that statements of a sexual nature made by claimants

in the presence of any alleged harassers are relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. Such

statements go directly to Plaintiffs’ claim that the actions of the harassers were unwelcome,

created an abusive environment, and caused claimants to suffer emotional and mental pain.

The Court concludes that the probative value of such evidence substantially outweighs the

danger of unfair prejudice to any party and that the evidence is therefore admissible. Thus,

to the extent Defendants possess evidence that any of the claimants made statements of a

sexual nature in the presence of Mr. Ehresman or other alleged harassers, the Court will deny

the motion in limine. 

The Court cannot determine at this stage whether statements of a sexual nature made

by the claimants in the workplace but not in the presence of the alleged harassers should be

excluded. The Court must evaluate the probative value and potential prejudicial effect of

such statements during trial. As a result, the Court will deny the motion with respect to such

statements as well. Because the Court may ultimately exclude evidence of statements made

in the workplace outside the hearing of an alleged harasser, however, Defendants should not

mention such evidence during their opening statements. The motion in limine (Dkt. #325)

is granted in part and denied in part as set forth above.1

7. Defendant GLC has filed motions in limine to bar testimony and evidence

regarding alleged misconduct by Juan Cruz and Joe Hubbard. Dkt. ##240, 241. GLC argues

that the allegations against these individuals by class member Candace Jackson-Hannah were

never included in an EEOC charge or any complaint filed in this case, and therefore may not

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be admitted at trial. The Court does not agree. Although specific allegations against Cruz

and Hubbard are not set forth in the EEOC’s complaint, the complaint does allege that GLC

discriminated against “a class of individuals . . . by subjecting them to sexual harassment and

creating a sexually hostile work environment.” Dkt. #241, Ex. E at 1. The complaint further

alleges that these violations “include, but are not limited to,” actions by Steve Ehresman. Id.

at 11. The complaint, which is judged by a notice pleading standard, thus placed GLC on

notice that the EEOC was claiming creation of a sexually hostile work environment, and that

the actions giving rise to this environment were not limited to those of Mr. Ehresman. The

Court also concludes that the EEOC’s evidence is not limited by the allegations set forth in

the charges filed by non-class members. GLC cites no authority for the proposition that a

class complaint by the EEOC may include only those charges asserted by non-class members.

Moreover, the Court concludes that the allegations against Cruz and Hubbard are “like or

reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge” of the non-class

members. Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations and quotations

omitted). The Court also concludes that the original EEOC investigation likely would have

encompassed sexual harassment by individuals other than Mr. Ehresman. Id. For these

reasons, GLC’s motions (Dkt. ##240, 241) are denied. 

8. Defendant GLC has filed motions in limine seeking to preclude allegations of

sexual harassment against Steve Ehresman by Holly Procunier and Julie Downing.

Dkt. ##242, 243. GLC argues that such evidence will not be relevant unless and until

Plaintiffs establish sexual harassment on the part of GLC. The Court does not agree.

Although harassing conduct by Mr. Ehresman against individuals other than the claimants

and at locations other than the Cordes Junction store are not relevant to the question of

whether the claimants perceive the environment at Cordes Junction to be sexually hostile,

such evidence is relevant to a number of other issues in this case. Past complaints against

Mr. Ehresman, and GLC’s apparent conclusion that those complaints established sexual

harassment on his part, are relevant to GLC’s defense that Mr. Ehresman’s conduct toward

the claimants in this case was not harassment, but instead was mere teasing. Such evidence

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2

 Because this evidence will not be admitted for purposes of showing that the

claimants perceived the environment at GLC to be sexually hostile, a limiting instruction may

be appropriate. If Defendants desire such a limiting instruction, they should propose one to

the Court before the testimony of Ms. Procunier and Ms. Downing.

3

 As noted in the preceding footnote, Defendants may propose limiting instructions

before the testimony of Ms. Hannah and Ms. Hellman. 

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is also relevant to GLC’s claim that it implemented an anti-harassment policy in good faith.

The evidence is also relevant to the knowledge and state of mind of Mr. Ehresman and GLC,

and whether these Defendants possess the state of mind necessary for punitive damages.

Because the Court cannot conclude that the evidence of sexual harassment against Ms.

Procunier and Ms. Downing is irrelevant, nor that the probative value of such evidence

would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, GLC’s motions (Dkt.

##242, 243) are denied.

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9. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to bar testimony from Charlene

Hannah and Mary Hellman regarding alleged sexual harassment by Steve Ehresman.

Dkt. ##244, 245. GLC argues that this testimony is not relevant because it will not establish

whether any of the remaining claimants perceived Mr. Ehresman’s actions to be harassment.

While it is true that the testimony of Ms. Hannah and Ms. Hellman may not be used to prove

that other claimants perceived the environment at GLC to be sexually hostile, the evidence

is, as noted above, relevant on a number of other issues. These issues include GLC’s

assertion of the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense, Defendants’ liability for punitive

damages, and Defendants’ assertion that Mr. Ehresman’s conduct constituted mere teasing.

GLC’s motions (Dkt. ##244, 245) are denied.

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10. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to bar admission of a tape

recording and transcript of an investigation allegedly conducted at GLC’s Camp Verde store.

Dkt. #246. The investigation allegedly concerned Holly Procunier’s allegations of

misconduct against Mr. Ehresman. GLC argues that the tape and transcript should be

excluded because the tape cannot be authenticated under Federal Rule of Evidence 901 and

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 Plaintiffs assert that the tape may be authenticated by playing portions of it outside

of the hearing of the jury. The Court will set strict time limits for the trial at the Final Pretrial

Conference. Plaintiffs are cautioned that any time spent authenticating the tape outside the

hearing of the jury will be charged against their allotted trial time. If this presents a problem

for Plaintiffs, the problem could have been avoided by authentication of the tape during

discovery.

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the transcript constitutes inadmissible hearsay. GLC argues that the tape could have been

authenticated during the discovery process, but was not. Plaintiffs respond by asserting that

the tape will be authenticated at trial by witnesses Harges, Procunier, and Ehresman. They

further assert that the tape and transcript are admissible under a number of exceptions to the

hearsay rule. The Court cannot conclude at this stage that Plaintiffs will be unable to

authenticate the tape and transcript at trial. And because Defendant GLC has not provided

the Court with a copy of the tape or transcript, the Court cannot determine whether it is

inadmissible hearsay. GLC’s motion (Dkt. #246) is therefore denied.

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11. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to bar testimony from Plaintiffs’

expert C. Brady Wilson, Ph.D. Dkt. #247. GLC’s motion incorporates briefing previously

submitted to the Court. Id. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, arguing that Dr. Wilson’s testimony

is admissible under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Dkt. #302.

Dr. Wilson is a trained psychologist. His expert report provides general observations

on a number of issues arguably relevant to this case. Dkt. #136, Ex. A. For example, he

opines that sexually harassing predators tend to minimize their behavior and marginalize

their victims and the victims’ complaints; that perpetrators define the propriety of their

behavior as a function of the victims’ response; that sexual harassment cases tend to be

addressed only in the context of the alleged perpetrator’s acts, when in fact the entire

“sexualized work environment” must be considered; that the record in this case “reveals that

the pervasive and persistent conduct of the male supervisor (Mr. Ehresman) continued to be

tolerated by his employer despite a well-defined sexual harassment history”; that a corporate

sexual harassment policy can be effective only if it includes four specific components; that

an employer’s assurances that sexual harassment will not be tolerated do nothing to

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5

In response to GLC’s motion, Plaintiffs assert that they will not present testimony

from Dr. Wilson to support their claim for damages. Thus, even though Dr. Wilson

specifically opines on the mental and emotional effects of harassment, Plaintiffs suggest that

this evidence will not be presented to support the claimants’ allegations of mental and

emotional injury in this case. Instead, Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Wilson’s opinions will assist

the trier of fact to understand how people behave in the context of a sexually harassing

environment. Dkt. #302 at 2. 

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effectively address the issue or make the environment safe for employees; that cultural

taboos, corporate inhibitions to reporting, and concerns about retaliation tend to reduce

reports of sexual harassment; that groups of women in a sexually harassing environment may

tend to splinter into different classes, some of whom acquiesce and some of whom resist; that

harassed individuals often delay their complaints of harassment; that victims tend to recall

specific events in a sequential nature, later recalling additional events; that victims feel fear

regardless of whether an actual physical assault or rape is threatened; that strain caused by

sexual harassment can result in significant mental problems and a serious disruption to the

victim’s sense of safety and security; that the impact of harassing behaviors is more severe

when perceived to be permitted or sponsored by the corporation; and that a number of

assumptions often drawn in sexual harassment cases are incorrect. Id. at ¶¶ 9-23.5

Rule 702 provides that a witness qualified as an expert may testify on relevant issues

“if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product

of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods

reliably to the facts of the case.” Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Wilson’s testimony is based on

reliable, peer-reviewed research. Dr. Wilson does cite a number of sources in the footnotes

of his report, but fails to identify specific portions of these sources that support his general

opinions. Because GLC has failed to attack any of these sources or their reliability, however,

the Court will assume that Dr. Wilson’s general views are the product of reliable principles

and methods.

The Court cannot conclude, however, that Dr. Wilson’s opinions are based on

sufficient facts or data concerning this case, nor that he has applied the principles or methods

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See Fed. R. Ev. 702 Advisory Committee Notes (2000 Amendments).

7

Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Wilson’s testimony is akin to expert testimony on battered

women’s syndrome as accepted by the Ninth Circuit in Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.

2001). But the Ninth Circuit in Roe did not generally approve the admissibility of such

testimony. Roe merely held that the admission of such testimony in the petitioner’s criminal

trial did not violate his due process rights and thereby entitle him to habeas corpus relief. Id.

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reliably to the facts of this case. Dr. Wilson testified in deposition that his opinions do not

concern the facts of this case: “I’ve been very clear[.] [N]ot only am I not offering opinions

about Mr. Ehresman or these individuals; I’m precluded from doing it because I haven’t

conducted my own examination.” Dkt. #136, Ex. B at 153. Dr. Wilson explained that he is

testifying only about a generalized class of individuals, not about the claimants in this case.

Id. at 12. See also id. at 10-12, 152-153, 171, 188-189, 227, 238. 

Although there may be cases where generalized expert testimony is relevant, such as

basic explanations of the laws of thermodynamics,6

 the Court cannot conclude that Dr.

Wilson’s testimony is of that kind. Dr. Wilson presents rather specific conclusions that, if

admitted, would lead the jury to reach specific conclusions about the facts in this case: that

Mr. Ehresman is a predator, that as a predator he tended to minimize the claimants’

allegations, that the claimants were understandably reluctant to complain about his behavior,

that the claimants suffered fear and mental stress as a result of his conduct, that the claimants

fear was made worse by GLC’s apparent acquiescence in his conduct, and so forth. While

expert testimony on such matters might be entirely appropriate if properly presented under

Rule 702, it would have to be founded “upon sufficient facts or data” and applied “reliably

to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Ev. 702 (1), (3). Dr. Wilson admits that the has not done

so. His opinions are not based on the conduct of Mr. Ehresman, the actions of GLC, or the

reactions of the claimants. He instead attempts to provide generalized observations for the

jury to apply to the specific facts in this case, but without having considered those facts

himself. Such testimony does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 702. GLC’s motion (Dkt.

#247) is therefore granted.

7

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28 at 766-67. 

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12. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to bar the testimony of Plaintiffs’

expert witness Jan Salisbury. Dkt. #248. GLC argues that Ms. Salisbury’s testimony is

misleading because she applies standards established in her own handbook, not requirements

of the law. This argument goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony, and

GLC is fully capable of making this point during cross-examination. Moreover, GLC has

identified its own expert on the requirements of an effective anti-discrimination policy.

GLC next argues that Ms. Salisbury’s opinion is unreliable because she cites no

source other than her own book. Rule 702 makes clear, however, that experts may be

qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. Ms. Salisbury’s resume

suggests that she is qualified by knowledge, experience, training, and education to opine on

anti-discrimination policies. 

GLC notes that Ms. Salisbury criticizes GLC for not preparing a written report of its

investigation at the Cordes Junction store, and yet her book states that oral reports may be

sufficient. GLC will be fully capable of making this point on cross-examination.

Finally, GLC argues that Ms. Salisbury has failed to base her opinion on reliable prelitigation research. GLC notes that a study conducted by the University of Illinois is only

preliminary and argues that the study was based in part on a discredited study tool. Again,

GLC will be fully capable of making these points on cross-examination.

The Court concludes that Ms. Salisbury has reasonable qualifications to opine on the

adequacy of GLC’s anti-discrimination policy and has rendered relevant testimony. The

testimony is based on sufficient facts, appears to be based on reliable principles and methods

developed by Ms. Salisbury during her years of work in this field, and is applied to the

specific facts of this case. The Court accordingly concludes that the testimony is generally

admissible under Rule 702. GLC may cross-examine Ms. Salisbury and present its own

expert to oppose her testimony. GLC’s motion (Dkt. #248) is denied.

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13. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to bar testimony and evidence

regarding allegations of retaliation. Dkt. #249. GLC correctly notes that there is no

retaliation claim in this case, and asks the Court to bar any evidence of retaliatory actions.

GLC fails to specify the evidence to which its motion is addressed. The motion will be

denied. Although it is true that Plaintiffs have not asserted a retaliation claim in this case,

alleged acts of retaliation may be relevant to the jury’s evaluation of Defendant’s

Faragher/Allerth affirmative defense and Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. Because

the Court cannot determine at this stage that such evidence would be irrelevant to these or

other issues, and cannot at this stage evaluate the prejudicial effect of admitting such

evidence, GLC’s motion (Dkt. #249) is denied.

 14. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to bar testimony and evidence

regarding swing clubs. Dkt. #250. The Court concludes that evidence concerning Mr.

Ehresman’s alleged involvement in swing clubs is irrelevant and inadmissible under Rules

401, 402, and 403. The motion will be granted insofar as it concerns evidence of his

participation in such clubs. To the extent Mr. Ehresman discussed his involvement in such

clubs while at work, however, his discussions may be relevant to issues in this case. Such

comments would particularly be relevant if made to claimants. The Court cannot determine

at this stage whether comments made in the workplace to non-claimants would be relevant

or unduly prejudicial. As a result, GLC’s motion concerning statements in the workplace

about swing clubs will be denied. Because the Court may ultimately exclude this evidence,

Plaintiffs should not mention it during opening statements. GLC’s motion (Dkt. #250) is

granted in part and denied in part as set forth above.

15. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to bar testimony and evidence

regarding subsequent remedial measures. Dkt. #251. GLC argues that modifications made

to its sexual harassment policies in 2006 cannot be admitted in evidence under Rule 407.

Plaintiffs, in a somewhat confusing response, do not address the 2006 modifications to

GLC’s policies. Rather, Plaintiffs appear to discuss GLC’s actions in response to the

claimants’ complaints, arguing that such responses are highly relevant to the

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Faragher/Allerth defense and punitive damages. The Court cannot determine precisely what

evidence is at issue in this motion. Although it is true that GLC’s responses to the claimants’

complaints are relevant to the Faragher/Ellerth defense and perhaps to punitive damages,

the Court cannot determine whether the 2006 modifications (which neither party explains)

are likewise relevant. The Ninth Circuit has noted that the admission of post-discrimination

measures by a Defendant is within the discretion of the district court. See Swinton v.

Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 804 (9th Cir. 2001). If the 2006 modifications were remedial

measures seeking to improve GLC’s policies, and not specific responses to the claimants’

complaints, the Court will be inclined to exclude evidence of such modifications under Rule

407. Because the parties’ memoranda do not discuss the specific evidence at issue, however,

the Court cannot decide the issue at this point. The question will be decided during trial.

Defendants’ motion (Dkt. #251) is denied.

16. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence relating to

settlement negotiations, offers to compromise, and insurance. Dkt. #252. Plaintiffs do not

oppose the granting of this motion, but note that all parties should be prevented from

inquiring into these subjects during direct and cross-examination. The Court agrees. GLC’s

motion (Dkt. #252) is granted.

17. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to bar testimony concerning

GLC’s net worth. Dkt. #253. GLC argues that evidence of its net worth is irrelevant, even

on the question of punitive damages. GLC cites State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Campbell,

538 U.S. 408 (2003), for the proposition that wealth may not be considered in assessing

punitive damages. Campbell does not so hold. The Supreme Court merely stated in

Campbell that “[t]he wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional

punitive damages award.” Id. at 427. The Supreme Court specifically cited its previous

decision in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), and Justice Breyer’s

concurring opinion in that case, which noted that consideration of a defendant’s wealth is

neither unlawful nor inappropriate. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 527-28. The Court cannot

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conclude from this discussion that the wealth of a defendant is no longer relevant on the issue

of punitive damages. GLC’s motion (Dkt. #253) is denied.

18. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine regarding Greg Cook’s net worth.

Dkt. #254. Plaintiffs agree that evidence of Mr. Cook’s net worth is inadmissible.

Dkt. #290. GLC’s motion (Dkt. #254) is granted.

19. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to preclude evidence or remarks

concerning Seyfarth Shaw LLP or its attorneys. Dkt. #255. Plaintiffs do not oppose the

granting of this motion. Dkt. #291. GLC’s motion (Dkt. #255) is granted. 

20. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to bar testimony and evidence

regarding the location or status of Mr. Ehresman’s personnel file. Dkt. #256. The Court will

deny the motion. The absence of Mr. Ehresman’s file, which arguably contained documents

relevant to the issues in this case, is relevant for the jury’s consideration. Defendants will

be able to present testimony concerning the reasons for the file’s non-existence. The

significance of the file’s absence will be for the jury to decide. Whether the Court will give

a spoliation instruction is a separate issue to be decided when jury instructions are settled.

GLC’s motion (Dkt. #256) is denied.

21. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence

concerning the equitable remedies of front pay and back pay. Dkt. #257. As noted above,

the Court will seek an advisory verdict from the jury on these issues. Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c).

Because evidence concerning front and back pay will be relevant to this advisory verdict, and

will not be unfairly prejudicial to Defendants, GLC’s motion (Dkt. #257) is denied.

22. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to exclude witness testimony not

supported by personal knowledge. Dkt. #258. This motion seeks to anticipate specific

testimony from specific witnesses without identifying the questions or answers that will be

at issue. The Court will rule on relevancy, foundation, and hearsay objections at trial. The

motion (Dkt. #258) is denied.

23. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence and testimony

regarding class members’ lack of medical insurance. Dkt. #259. Plaintiffs do not oppose the

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Plaintiffs addressed the same case in their response. Both parties are advised to review Ninth

Circuit rules before citing unpublished opinions.

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motion. No party should refer to the lack of medical insurance at trial. GLC’s motion

(Dkt. #259) is granted.

24. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to exclude emotional distress

damages caused by this litigation. Dkt. #260. Specifically, the motion suggests that

Ms. Henry has had panic attacks and Ms. Tubandt has had a recurring dream as a result of

the lawsuit. Both women, however, have attributed their problems to the conduct of

Mr. Ehresman. The cause of the alleged panic attacks and bad dreams will be for the jury

to decide. The Court cannot conclude that this litigation is the only possible cause of the

panic attacks and recurrent dreams. GLC’s motion (Dkt. #260) is denied.

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25. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to exclude lay witness testimony

regarding Amanda Henry’s panic attacks. Dkt. #261. Whether Ms. Henry’s mother and

step-father can provide lay opinions admissible under Rule 701 is a question that must be

decided at trial. The Court will rule on Defendants’ objections when questions are asked of

these witnesses. GLC’s motion (Dkt. #261) is denied.

26. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to exclude lay witness testimony

regarding Plaintiff’s emotional distress injuries. Dkt. #262. Again, the Court cannot rule on

the admissibility of lay witness testimony at this stage of the proceeding. The Court must

evaluate such testimony in the context of the trial, the foundation laid for particular opinions,

and objections made to such opinions. Because such determinations accurately can be made

only during trial, GLC’s motion (Dkt. #262) is denied.

27. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to sequester witnesses. Dkt. #263.

Whether either party will invoke the provisions of Federal Rule of Evidence 615 is a matter

that will be discussed at the Final Pretrial Conference. It is not an appropriate subject for a

motion in limine. GLC’s motion (Dkt. #263) is denied.

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28. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to bar testimony of the EEOC’s

custodian of records. Dkt. #264. Whether the custodian of records can render admissible

testimony, and whether documents to be introduced into evidence on the basis of that

testimony will be admissible, are matters that can only be decided in the context of the

testimony and trial. GLC’s motion (Dkt. #264) is denied.

29. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to bar testimony of Candace

Jackson-Hannah. Dkt. #265. The motion argues that Ms. Jackson-Hannah has no knowledge

of the conduct of Mr. Ehresman and therefore should not be permitted to testify concerning

his conduct. The Court will rule on objections to Ms. Jackson-Hannah’s testimony at trial.

GLC’s motion (Dkt. #265) is denied.

30. Defendant GLC has filed a motion in limine to bar testimony and evidence

regarding the ultimate issues for the jury. Dkt. #266. GLC seeks to preclude witnesses from

providing opinions on whether conduct in this case constitutes sexual harassment. Whether

a particular question or answer is objectionable under the Federal Rules of Evidence must

be decided at trial. The Court cannot determine at this stage whether a particular witness’

perception of discrimination is or is not admissible under the Rules of Evidence. GLC’s

motion (Dkt. #266) is denied.

31. Defendants GLC and Ehresman have filed motions seeking to exclude evidence

of calculable damages not disclosed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(C). Dkt.

##235, 267. In response, Plaintiffs assert that only claimant Tiara Brazle asserts a claim for

back pay. Defendants’ motion will thus be granted with respect to back pay evidence for any

other claimant. With respect to Ms. Brazle, Plaintiffs do not assert that they disclosed a

damages calculation as required by Rule 26(a)(1)(C). Plaintiffs argue that Defendants

obtained various categories of financial information from Ms. Brazle during discovery, but

they do not assert that they disclosed a “computation” of her damages as required by the rule.

 When a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), the party may not

subsequently introduce the required information at trial unless the failure to disclose was

substantially justified or harmless. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Plaintiffs do not argue that their

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failure to disclose a computation of damages was substantially justified. Nor do they

specifically suggest it is harmless. As a general matter, disclosing a computation of damages

under Rule 26(a) is necessary for the opposing party to produce responding evidence, such

as an expert report. The Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs’ failure to disclose a

computation of damages for Ms. Brazle was harmless. Thus, pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1),

Plaintiffs will be prevented from presenting at trial any computation of damages or other

information required by Rule 26(a)(1)(C) with respect to Ms. Brazle. Defendants’ motions

(Dkt. ##235, 267), are granted.

32. Plaintiff and Plaintiffs/Intervenors have filed a motion to exclude the expert

testimony and report of Ginger S. McRae. Dkt. #225. Plaintiffs argue that Ms. McRae will,

in effect, provide legal instructions to the jury. The Court does not agree. Ms. McRae’s

report constitutes a detailed examination of the facts in this case as applied to guidance

provided by the EEOC. The Court will rule on specific objections at trial concerning

inappropriate legal opinions. 

Plaintiffs further argue that the trier of fact will be capable of evaluating the totality

of the evidence on its own and that expert testimony on the reasonableness of Defendants’

conduct is not necessary. The Court does not agree. Expert testimony may be admitted to

assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Fed. R. Ev.

702. The reasonableness of Defendants’ conduct is such a fact in issue. Indeed, Plaintiffs

have presented their own expert, Ms. Salisbury, on this issue.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Ms. McRae may not opine on the credibility of witnesses.

Ms. McRae’s report constitutes her assessment of the facts, as does Ms. Salisbury’s. The

Court agrees that an expert generally should not state an opinion on the credibility of a

witness, but it does not appear from her report that Ms. McRae intends to do so. Objections

will be addressed at trial. 

The Court finds that Ms. McRae’s opinions satisfy the requirements of Rule 702. The

motion to exclude her testimony (Dkt. #225) is denied.

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33. Defendants Steve and Shari Ehresman have filed a motion for a severed and

separate trial of the state law claims against them. Dkt. #236. The motion will be denied.

The state tort claims brought against the Ehresman Defendants substantially overlap the Title

VII claims brought against GLC. Indeed, the Title VII claims are based primarily on the

conduct of Mr. Ehresman. Separating the trials would result in substantial inefficiency,

including the duplicative presentation of the testimony of numerous witnesses. Moreover,

the Court concludes that careful control of the trial and appropriate instructions will avoid

prejudicial confusion. The Court intends to impose strict time limits on all parties in this

case, ensuring an efficient presentation of the evidence and preventing the unnecessary

expenditure of time and resources. The motion (Dkt. #236) is denied.

34. Defendant GLC has filed a motion to “trifurcate” the trial. Dkt. #268. The

motion will be denied.

In this motion as in other motions, Defendants rely on a quotation from the Court’s

Order dated October 26, 2006. Dkt. #268 at 3-4. The Court’s previous ruling, however,

merely stated that allegations regarding Mr. Ehresman’s harassment of Ms. Downing and Ms.

Procunier may not be used to establish that other claimants believe they were subject to a

hostile work environment (because none of the other claimants knew of the previous

harassment of Ms. Downing and Ms. Procunier), but may be relevant in assessing GLC’s

liability. Specifically, such evidence might be relevant to the credibility of Defendants’

claim that the environment was not hostile or that Defendants sought to implement an antidiscrimination policy in good faith. GLC cannot rely on the Court’s previous statement as

a basis for trifurcating the trial.

Moreover, as noted with respect to the preceding motion, careful management of this

case will avoid prejudice to all parties. The trial will be conducted efficiently, the jury will

be accurately instructed on the law, and limiting instructions will be provided where

appropriate. If Defendants believe that particular limiting instructions are necessary to

ensure a fair trial, they may propose such instructions. The Court does not conclude that

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GLC’s proposed three-way division of the trial is either necessary or warranted in this case.

GLC’s motion (Dkt. #268) is denied.

35. Plaintiffs have filed a motion to strike Defendants’ expert Jesse Viner, M.D.,

or, alternatively, to obtain a Rule 104 evidentiary hearing. Dkt. #234. Dr. Viner opines on

two general subjects: the reliability of opinions provided by Dr. Wilson and whether specific

claimants have suffered “psychiatric damages.” Dkt. #234, Ex. A. Because the Court has

excluded Dr. Wilson’s testimony, Dr. Viner’s critique of that testimony is no longer relevant.

The question to be decided, then, is whether Dr. Viner’s opinion concerning the lack of

claimants’ “psychological damages” is admissible. 

Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Viner’s opinions are not admissible because he never

conducted a personal examination of the claimants. They assert that his opinions based on

review of the claimants’ depositions are unreliable. In support of this argument, Plaintiffs

discuss the specific requirements set forth in the Daubert case, including whether the

scientific theory or technique can be tested, whether the theory or technique has been subject

to peer review and publication, whether there is a known or potential error rate, and whether

the theory or technique is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. Dkt. #234

at 4. Plaintiffs also submit an affidavit from Dr. Wilson criticizing Dr. Viner’s approach. 

The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ discussion of the Daubert factors. The

factors relied on by Plaintiffs constitute a non-exclusive list of considerations in assessing

the admissibility of expert testimony. See Fed. R. Ev. 702 Advisory Committee Notes (2000

Amendments). In this case, Dr. Viner purports to apply his education and years of clinical

experience to an evaluation of the claimants’ psychiatric condition. Dr. Viner clearly has

expertise in this area. The question is whether he has applied that expertise reliably in this

case and whether his opinions are relevant.

The Court concludes that it need not address the reliability issue because Dr. Viner’s

opinions are not relevant. Dr. Viner opines that none of the claimants have suffered

“psychiatric damages.” Dkt. #234, Ex. A. His expert report, which is required to set forth

a detailed and complete statement of the testimony he will present during direct

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B), Advisory Committee Notes (1993 Amendments).

10If the Court has misunderstood Plaintiffs’ case and they do in fact intend to assert

a claim for psychiatric damages, they shall so inform the Court at the final pretrial conference

and the Court will address the reliability of Dr. Viner’s opinions.

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examination,9 does not define “psychiatric damages.” Dr. Viner did concede in his

deposition, however, that a claimant can experience emotional pain, mental anguish, and loss

of enjoyment in life without suffering a diagnosable psychiatric disorder. Dkt. #234, Ex. C

at 49-50. 

Plaintiffs in this case will seek recovery of emotional pain, mental anguish, and loss

of enjoyment of life, but, as the Court understands their evidence, will not claim to have

suffered psychiatric damages. Plaintiffs have presented no expert testimony suggesting they

suffered psychiatric damages and, so far as the Court is aware, were never diagnosed as

suffering from such damages. Thus, Dr. Viner’s testimony that they did not suffer such

damages is irrelevant. Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Dr. Viner’s opinions (Dkt. #234) is

therefore granted.

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DATED this 4th day of January, 2007.

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