Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_20-cv-01837/USCOURTS-azd-2_20-cv-01837-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dillon Rock,

Plaintiff,

v. 

N. Cummings, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-20-01837-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is a motion for stay filed by Defendant Mike Miller 

(“Officer Miller”). (Doc. 103.) The motion is fully briefed (Docs. 104, 105) and neither 

side requested oral argument. For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

I. The Underlying Incident

In October 2019, several members of the Goodyear Police Department responded 

to a 911 call. (Doc. 84 at 1.) The subject of the call was Dillon Rock (“Plaintiff”), who 

lived with his father in the same neighborhood as the caller. (Id.) The caller reported—

mistakenly, as it turns out—that Plaintiff had just threatened Plaintiff’s parents with a knife. 

(Id.) This information was conveyed to the officers on their way to the scene. (Id.) 

After Plaintiff became aware of the officers’ arrival, he went into his backyard and 

hid in a shed. (Id.) Before entering the backyard, Officer Miller announced that if Plaintiff 

did not come out, Officer Miller would release a police dog, Toby, who would bite Plaintiff. 

(Id.) After Plaintiff did not respond to this announcement—which, he contends, he did not 

Case 2:20-cv-01837-DWL Document 106 Filed 12/13/24 Page 1 of 12
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

hear—several officers entered the backyard. (Id.) Upon arrival at the shed, and without 

providing any additional warnings, another officer opened the door and Officer Miller let 

Toby inside. (Id. at 1-2.) Toby bit Plaintiff for approximately 41 seconds, dragging 

Plaintiff out of the shed and causing Plaintiff to sustain extensive arm injuries that later 

required surgery. (Id. at 2.) 

II. This Action

In September 2020, Plaintiff initiated this § 1983 action. (Doc. 1.) Among other 

things, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Miller violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition 

against the use of excessive force by, inter alia, allowing Toby to continue biting him for 

too long. (Id.) 

On September 9, 2022, after the close of discovery, Officer Miller moved for 

summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. (Doc. 69.) 

On July 3, 2023, the Court issued an order concluding that Officer Miller was not 

entitled to qualified immunity, at least at the summary judgment stage, with respect to 

Plaintiff’s “duration and encouragement” claim. (Doc. 84.) However, the Court concluded 

that Officer Miller was entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s other theory of 

liability against him and that all of the remaining officers were also entitled to qualified 

immunity. (Id.) 

On July 17, 2023, Officer Miller filed a notice of appeal of the order denying his 

request for qualified immunity as to the “duration and encouragement” claim. (Doc. 87.) 

Soon afterward, the Court granted Officer Miller’s request to stay the proceedings as to 

that claim. (Doc. 93.)

III. The Interlocutory Appeal

On August 14, 2024, the Ninth Circuit issued a unanimous memorandum decision 

affirming the July 2023 summary judgment order. (Doc. 98.) Among other things, the 

panel “affirm[ed] the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Officer Miller, the 

canine handler, for allowing the dog to bite Rock for forty-one seconds even though Rock 

was unarmed and not resisting arrest. Our precedent clearly establishes that allowing a 

Case 2:20-cv-01837-DWL Document 106 Filed 12/13/24 Page 2 of 12
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

canine bite to continue when the plaintiff neither endangers officers nor attempts to flee or 

resist arrest violates the Fourth Amendment.” (Id. at 3.)

According to the Ninth Circuit’s docket, on August 28, 2024, Officer Miller filed a 

petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, and on September 26, 2024, that petition was 

denied. The order denying the petition stated that “[t]he full court has been advised of the 

petition for rehearing en banc, and no judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the 

matter en banc.” Officer Miller did not thereafter request a stay, and on October 4, 2024, 

the mandate issued. (Doc. 99.)

IV. Post-Remand Proceedings

On October 17, 2024, the Court ordered Officer Miller and Plaintiff to meet and 

confer and then identify mutually agreeable dates for trial in or after January 2025. (Doc. 

100.)

On November 15, 2024, Officer Miller filed the pending motion for stay. (Doc. 

103.)

On November 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. (Doc. 104.)

On December 4, 2024, Officer Miller filed a reply. (Doc. 105.)

DISCUSSION

I. The Parties’ Arguments

Officer Miller seeks a stay of these proceedings pending the outcome of a writ for 

certiorari he intends to file by December 26, 2024. (Doc. 103.) According to Officer 

Miller, a stay is necessary because the disputed issue is the denial of qualified immunity, a 

doctrine intended to protect defendants from the burden of being unnecessarily subjected 

to the litigation process. (Id. at 3.) Officer Miller also contends that, under Chuman v. 

Wright, 960 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1992), “[a] stay of proceedings is granted where a public 

official takes an appeal to assert a non-frivolous claim to absolute or qualified immunity.” 

(Id. at 4.) Officer Miller argues that “as convicted as this Court (or the Ninth Circuit Court 

of Appeal) may have been as to the correctness of the decisions, they are subject to differing 

views at the High Court. This matter does not meet the frivolous standard necessary to 

Case 2:20-cv-01837-DWL Document 106 Filed 12/13/24 Page 3 of 12
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

deny Chuman’s automatic stay, and this matter should not proceed until the U.S. Supreme 

Court either denies the prospective Petition for Writ of Certiorari, or renders a decision.” 

(Id. at 5.) Officer Miller also elaborates at length as to why he believes the July 2023 

summary judgment order and the Ninth Circuit’s August 2024 decision were wrongly 

decided. (Id. at 6-18.)

Plaintiff opposes the stay request, arguing that Officer Miller has already 

“successfully delayed trial in this case by approximately eighteen months by appealing this 

Court’s order to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,” which “affirmed this Court’s decision 

in all respects,” and that the Court should not allow Officer Miller “to delay the trial of this 

matter even further.” (Doc. 104 at 1.) Plaintiff also contends that a stay would be futile 

because any petition for certiorari will be unable to satisfy the considerations governing 

review established by Supreme Court Rule 10. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff further contends that 

Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009), establishes the applicable standard for considering 

whether to grant a stay in this circumstance and that Officer Miller cannot satisfy the Nken

standard because (1) Officer Miller “has not made a strong showing that he is likely to 

succeed with his Petition” and “[t]o the contrary, every indication is that it will be 

summarily denied”; (2) Officer Miller “has not presented a single fact as to how he would 

be irreparably harmed if the case proceeded forward—much less made that argument”; (3) 

“[d]elaying the trial further could result in the potential loss of evidence that could 

prejudice Plaintiff,” including testimony from Plaintiff’s “elderly father who is a main 

witness to the case” and “is beginning to experience the early onset of dementia”; and (4) 

the public interest “leans slightly in favor of Plaintiff” because “[t]he public has an interest 

in having their matters adjudicated within a reasonable amount of time after initiating an 

action and showing that a question of fact exists for a jury to determine.” (Id. at 2-3.)

In reply, Officer Miller accuses Plaintiff of invoking the wrong standard for a stay 

and argues that when, as here, the sole disputed issue is the denial of qualified immunity, 

Chuman requires a stay absent a determination that an appeal would be frivolous. (Doc.

105 at 1-2.) Officer Miller continues: “The [Nken] analysis is irrelevant here because this 

Case 2:20-cv-01837-DWL Document 106 Filed 12/13/24 Page 4 of 12
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

matter is governed by Chuman . . . . [T]his Court need not, and must not, rely on the Nken

factors in deciding the stay issue.” (Id. at 3.) Next, Officer Miller argues that his petition 

for certiorari will not be frivolous under Supreme Court Rule 10 because, among other 

things, the Ninth Circuit “engaged in flagrant and distinct disregard of U.S. Supreme Court 

authority” when affirming the denial of qualified immunity. (Id. at 3-5.) Officer Miller 

also notes that “even if this Court were to ‘play the odds’ of the High Court accepting 

review, the U.S. Supreme Court has shown a propensity to overrule the Ninth Circuit . . . 

when it comes to improper assessments of qualified immunity in § 1983 cases.” (Id. at 5.) 

II. Analysis

Even assuming the Court possesses discretion to issue a stay in these 

circumstances,1 Officer Miller’s stay request fails on the merits. The key threshold issue 

is whether that request is governed by the Chuman standard or the Nken standard. Although 

Ninth Circuit law is not a model of clarity on this issue, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that 

the Nken standard is applicable. 

It is helpful to begin with some background principles. Nken sets forth “the 

traditional criteria governing stays.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 422. See also United States v. 

Mitchell, 971 F.3d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 2020) (describing Nken as setting forth “the 

traditional test for stays”); Doe #1 v. Trump, 957 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2020) 

(describing Nken as setting forth “the familiar standard” for evaluating a stay request). 

Meanwhile, Chuman addresses an entirely different question—when a district court should

1 But see Merchant v. Fairfax County, Va., 2012 WL 12830388, *1-2 (E.D. Va. 2012) 

(“This matter was returned to the district court by mandate of the Fourth Circuit on May 

30, 2012, following that court’s decision on appeal affirming this Court’s decision on 

defendants’ qualified immunity claim. Following the return of the mandate, the trial was 

set to commence on Tuesday, September 25, 2012. Now defendants seek a stay of the trial 

pending disposition of a recently filed certiorari petition. . . . Once the mandate has issued, 

a district court must, except in rare circumstances, implement both the letter and the spirit 

of the mandate. It is therefore inappropriate for a district court to issue a stay in these 

circumstances. The proper method for seeking a stay of a circuit court’s mandate is to 

request a stay from either the issuing circuit court, under Rule 41(d)(2), or from the circuit 

justice, under Rule 23. In summary, defendants cite no statutory or precedential authority, 

and none has been found, that supports the proposition that the filing of a certiorari petition 

deprives a district court of jurisdiction to proceed to trial in accordance with the circuit 

court’s mandate; only the circuit court or a justice of the Supreme Court may issue an order 

staying the mandate.”) (cleaned up).

Case 2:20-cv-01837-DWL Document 106 Filed 12/13/24 Page 5 of 12
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

be deemed to retain jurisdiction even though a defendant has initiated an interlocutory 

appeal of a collateral order denying that defendant’s claim of qualified immunity, which 

ordinarily has the effect of divesting the district court of jurisdiction over the matter being 

appealed. In this narrow “context of interlocutory qualified immunity appeals,” Chuman

holds that “[s]hould the district court find that the defendants’ claim of qualified immunity 

is frivolous or has been waived, the district court may certify, in writing, that defendants 

have forfeited their right to pretrial appeal, and may proceed with trial. In the absence of 

such certification, the district court is automatically divested of jurisdiction to proceed with 

trial pending appeal.” 960 F.2d at 105. It was necessary to adopt this rule, Chuman

explained, because the Supreme Court’s decision in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511

(1985), recognized an automatic right of interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified 

immunity, which has the potential to “significantly disrupt and delay trial court 

proceedings.” Chuman, 960 F.2d at 104-05.

Chuman is inapplicable here because the posture of this case is no longer that of an 

“interlocutory qualified immunity appeal.” Indeed, Officer Miller already pursued such an 

appeal—and the Court granted his request for a stay of the proceedings while it was 

pending (Doc. 93)—but that appeal has now concluded and the mandate has now issued. 

Because the Court has now regained jurisdiction, there is no need to make the sort of 

frivolousness determination contemplated by Chuman—which, again, is only necessary 

when (unlike here) a district court has been divested of jurisdiction due to the filing of a 

notice of appeal regarding an order that is immediately appealable pursuant to the collateral 

order doctrine. None of the cases cited by Officer Miller holds, or even suggests, that the 

Chuman standard applies in this post-remand context. 

In arguing otherwise, Officer Miller effectively seeks to characterize the filing of a 

petition for certiorari as a routine part of the appellate process that should be treated no 

differently than the filing of a notice of appeal. But this approach overlooks significant 

differences between the two actions. “The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of 

jurisdictional significance [that] confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the 

Case 2:20-cv-01837-DWL Document 106 Filed 12/13/24 Page 6 of 12
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs 

v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). In contrast, there will be no 

jurisdiction-divesting effect if and when Officer Miller chooses to file a petition for 

certiorari. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 842 

F.3d 103, 106 n.1 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[T]he mere act of filing a petition for certiorari does not 

deprive the district court of jurisdiction over the case.”); United States v. Sears, 411 F.3d 

1240, 1242 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The mere filing of a petition for certiorari with the Supreme 

Court neither stops the mandate from issuing nor stops the case from proceeding in the 

district court.”); United States v. Davis, 2021 WL 1122574, *1 (E.D. Cal. 2021) 

(“[B]ecause the Ninth Circuit’s mandate has issued, this court has jurisdiction to consider 

Mr. Davis’s motion even though he has petitioned for certiorari in the Supreme Court.”). 

These differences underscore why Chuman is inapplicable here—it is only meant to 

address a jurisdiction-divestiture issue that is inapplicable in this context. 

It would also be anomalous if the Chuman standard applied here. As noted, the right 

to pursue interlocutory review of the denial of qualified immunity arises from Mitchell v. 

Forsyth, which held that “that a district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to 

the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the 

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” 472 U.S. 

at 529. Thus, under Mitchell, “an order rejecting the defense of qualified immunity at either 

the dismissal stage or the summary judgment stage is a ‘final’ judgment subject to 

immediate appeal.” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 307 (1996) (emphasis omitted). 

But the right of “immediate appeal” is simply the right to have the relevant Court of 

Appeals review the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. Officer Miller received 

that right, and nothing in Mitchell or Behrens suggests it also encompasses the right to stay 

the proceedings while further, discretionary review is sought in the Supreme Court. In a 

related vein, Officer Miller could have asked the Ninth Circuit to stay the issuance of the 

mandate pending the resolution of his anticipated certiorari petition. However, under Rule 

41(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Officer Miller would have needed to 

Case 2:20-cv-01837-DWL Document 106 Filed 12/13/24 Page 7 of 12
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“show that the [certiorari] petition would present a substantial question and that there is 

good cause for a stay.” This is a more exacting standard than Chuman, which merely 

requires a showing of non-frivolousness. It would be perplexing if a litigant could take 

advantage of the lower standard simply by delaying the stay request until after the mandate 

issues. 

Although not cited by the parties, the Court has identified a number of cases in 

which a district court denied a defendant’s request for qualified immunity in a § 1983 

action, the applicable Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of qualified immunity during 

the defendant’s interlocutory appeal, and the defendant then asked the district court to issue 

a post-remand stay (either as to discovery or trial) pending the defendant’s pursuit of a writ 

of certiorari. Such stay requests are routinely denied:

• Bradley v. Benton, 2021 WL 12313281, *1 (N.D. Ga. 2021) (“Benton seeks to 

stay litigation that has been pending for over three years. This case has already been stayed 

for almost a year and a half while Benton appealed this court’s denial of qualified immunity 

to the Eleventh Circuit. . . . [I]t will likely be January 2022 at the earliest before this case 

will proceed to trial. Thus, the court does not find that Benton will suffer irreparable harm 

by having to file the proposed consolidated pretrial order, which, given that it is due in five 

days, should be substantially completed at this point. Should Benton’s petition for 

certiorari be granted, he may renew his request for a stay. The motion to stay proceedings 

pending the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari is DENIED.”).

• Harte v. Bd. of Comm’rs of the Cnty. of Johnson Cnty., Kansas, 2017 WL 

4697506, *4 (D. Kan. 2017) (denying post-remand request for stay pending resolution of 

petition for certiorari in § 1983 action where the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 

denial of qualified immunity: “Defendants direct the court to no authority suggesting that 

at this procedural juncture their right not to stand trial shields them from trial until they 

have exhausted all available avenues of relief, including the filing and resolution of a 

certiorari petition.”).

• Sanchez v. Hartley, 2016 WL 7176718, *7 (D. Colo. 2016) (“While a stay of 

Case 2:20-cv-01837-DWL Document 106 Filed 12/13/24 Page 8 of 12
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

discovery during the pendency of an interlocutory appeal is consistent with the goals 

underlying the doctrine of qualified immunity, the importance of balancing competing 

interests . . . leads me to the conclusion that Defendants’ motion to continue the stay of 

discovery pending a decision on their petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.”).

• Wenk v. O’Reilly, 2015 WL 4916934, *3 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (denying stay request 

in § 1983 action where the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified 

immunity at summary judgment and the defendant sought a stay pending the resolution of 

her petition for certiorari: “Plaintiffs . . . have already suffered greatly from the delay in 

obtaining relief. This case was filed more than three years ago. In addition, it has been 

over a year since this Court denied Defendant’s summary judgment motion, and 

Defendants’ appeal to the Sixth Circuit has already postponed a final adjudication of this 

action for over a year. The Court therefore concludes that the balance of the equities weigh 

against Defendant’s request.”).

• Lowery v. County of Riley, 2008 WL 3562061, *2 (D. Kan. 2008) (“Defendants 

. . . [seek] the continued stay of all discovery in this case pending decision by the U.S. 

Supreme Court. The Court might agree had there been a dissenting opinion in the Tenth 

Circuit appeal or some indication that the decision by the Tenth Circuit was in conflict with 

those of other circuits or was a case of first impression. None of these circumstances are 

present in this case. There was no dissenting opinion, and only one judge out of the thirteen 

judges who considered the Petition for Rehearing En Banc voted to grant the motion. 

Nothing in the Tenth Circuit opinion indicates that it presents a case of first impression on 

a unique issue of law or that it is contrary to decisions of other circuits. While this is no 

guarantee that the Supreme Court will deny a petition for certiorari, it is a major indication 

of the difficulty Defendants face in convincing the Supreme Court that discretionary review 

is justified in this case. Thus, the present circumstances are significantly different than 

they were at the time this court previously refused to allow discovery to proceed during the 

Tenth Circuit appeal.”).

• McMillan v. DeKalb County, Ga., 2007 WL 9700671, *1-2 (N.D. Ga. 2007) 

Case 2:20-cv-01837-DWL Document 106 Filed 12/13/24 Page 9 of 12
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(“Defendants think that going to trial now would be ‘erroneous[ ]’ in light of the possibility 

that the Supreme Court might at some later date grant certiorari and overturn both the 

finding of the district court and the Eleventh Circuit’s unanimous affirmation of that 

decision. Of course, Defendants do not cite any cases from this jurisdiction or any other 

suggesting that such a course of action would be appropriate. Needless to say, the Eleventh 

Circuit case Defendants cite for the proposition that ‘proceedings in the district court are 

properly stayed upon the filing of a non-frivolous interlocutory appeal with the Circuit 

Court of Appeals,’ is inapposite. Unlike appeals from an order denying qualified 

immunity, which are immediately appealable even though interlocutory, petitions for writ 

of certiorari are far from automatically successful. . . . Defendants here have simply failed 

to convince the court that their petition is likely to be granted by the Supreme Court and 

thus that it would be ‘erroneous’ for this court to proceed to trial without delay. On the 

contrary, Defendants have had the opportunity to argue their position to both this court and 

to the Court of Appeals without success, and they have likewise failed to show this court 

that the Supreme Court will view the matter in a different light. As such, the court DENIES 

Defendants’ Expedited Motion to Stay/Continue District Court Proceedings Pending 

Petition for Certiorari.”) (cleaned up).

The Court finds these decisions persuasive in considering how to proceed here. 

Under the Nken standard—which, as discussed, is the “traditional” standard for evaluating 

a stay request—“[a] stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise 

result. . . . It is instead an exercise of judicial discretion, [that] is dependent upon the 

circumstances of the particular case.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 433 (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Judicial discretion in exercising a stay is to be guided by the 

following legal principles, as distilled into a four factor analysis in Nken: ‘(1) whether the 

stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) 

whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the 

stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where 

the public interest lies.’” Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation 

Case 2:20-cv-01837-DWL Document 106 Filed 12/13/24 Page 10 of 12
- 11 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

omitted). The first two of these factors “are the most critical.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. 

“The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an 

exercise of that discretion.” East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 909 F.3d 1219, 1246 

(9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). 

As an initial matter, because Officer Miller denies that the Nken standard applies, 

he has made no attempt to satisfy it. This, alone, makes it difficult to see how he could be 

deemed to have met his burden. Regardless, his stay request fails under Nken on the merits. 

As for the first factor, Officer Miller has not made a strong showing that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits. All four judges to have considered the issue thus far have concluded 

that Officer Miller is not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s “duration and 

encouragement” claim and not a single member of the Ninth Circuit believed that 

determination warranted en banc review. Moreover, although Officer Miller is correct that 

the Supreme Court has often reversed the Ninth Circuit in cases involving the denial of 

qualified immunity, it strikes the Court as unlikely that the Supreme Court would grant 

certiorari where, as here, the underlying appellate decision is unpublished and the claims 

of error that are largely factual in nature. 

The analysis of the second factor is bound up with the analysis of the first factor—

even assuming Officer Miller would suffer irreparable harm if forced go to trial in a case 

in which the claims against him should have been dismissed before trial based on qualified 

immunity, the Court does not believe that qualified immunity was improperly denied here. 

Turning to the third factor, as discussed in many of the decisions cited above, 

Plaintiff would be substantially injured by being forced to endure even more delay in this 

case, which has already been pending for over four years and arises from an incident that 

occurred over five years ago. Plaintiff’s concerns over the ability of his elderly father to 

testify only amplify the need to avoid further delay. 

Finally, the fourth factor either slightly favors Plaintiff or is neutral for the reasons 

identified in Plaintiff’s brief: “The public has an interest in having their matters adjudicated 

within a reasonable amount of time after initiating an action and showing that a question 

Case 2:20-cv-01837-DWL Document 106 Filed 12/13/24 Page 11 of 12
- 12 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of fact exists for a jury to determine.” (Doc. 104 at 3.) 

When the Court weighs all of these factors, it concludes in its discretion that a stay 

is not warranted.2 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Officer Miller’s motion for stay (Doc. 103) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties must meet and confer and, within 

seven days of the issuance of this order, file a notice providing an estimated length of trial 

and at least three dates in or after March 2025 on which counsel, the parties, and their 

witnesses will be available to begin trial.

Dated this 13th day of December, 2024.

2 This denial comes with a caveat—should Plaintiff’s “petition for certiorari be 

granted, he may renew his request for a stay” at that time. Bradley, 2021 WL 12313281 at 

*1. But for the reasons discussed above, unless and until that occurs, a trial date should be 

set and pretrial preparations should commence. 

Case 2:20-cv-01837-DWL Document 106 Filed 12/13/24 Page 12 of 12