Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-21-02535/USCOURTS-ca2-21-02535-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 

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21-2535(L)

JLM Couture, Inc. v. Gutman

United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit

August Term 2023

Argued: September 19, 2023

Decided: January 17, 2024

Nos. 21-2535; 22-1694

JLM COUTURE, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

HAYLEY PAIGE GUTMAN,

Defendant-Appellant.*

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of New York

Before: CALABRESI, PARK, and NARDINI, Circuit Judges.

Fashion designer and social-media influencer Hayley Paige 

Gutman challenges a preliminary injunction and contempt order 

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption 

as set forth above.

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entered against her in litigation with her former employer, JLM 

Couture, Inc. The district court (Swain, C.J.) issued a preliminary 

injunction awarding JLM sole control of two social-media accounts—

an Instagram Account and a Pinterest Account (together, the 

“Disputed Accounts”)—and preliminary enforcement of a five-year 

restrictive covenant prohibiting Gutman from “identifying herself” as 

a designer of certain goods. The district court also held Gutman in 

civil contempt for a series of Instagram posts that it found to be 

“marketing” in violation of an earlier version of the preliminary 

injunction. Gutman argues on appeal that this was reversible error 

and that the preliminary injunction should be dissolved. 

We DISMISS Gutman’s appeal from the district court’s 

interlocutory contempt order for lack of appellate jurisdiction. We 

AFFIRM the district court’s refusal to dissolve its preliminary 

injunction based on the law of the case. We VACATE in part the 

district court’s order modifying its preliminary injunction because it 

erred in determining ownership of the Disputed Accounts and failed 

to assess the reasonableness of the five-year noncompete restraint on 

Gutman. We thus REMAND for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

SARAH M. MATZ, Adelman Matz P.C., New York, NY 

(Gary Adelman, Adelman Matz P.C., New York, NY, on 

the brief  ), for Plaintiff-Appellee.

JOSEPH C. LAWLOR, Haynes & Boone, LLP, New York, NY 

(Richard D. Rochford, Jr., Haynes & Boone, LLP, New 

York, NY, on the brief  ), for Defendant-Appellant.

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PARK, Circuit Judge:

Fashion designer and social-media influencer Hayley Paige 

Gutman challenges a preliminary injunction and contempt order 

entered against her in litigation with her former employer, JLM 

Couture, Inc. The district court (Swain, C.J.) issued a preliminary 

injunction awarding JLM sole control of two social-media accounts—

an Instagram Account and a Pinterest Account (together, the 

“Disputed Accounts”)—and preliminary enforcement of a five-year 

restrictive covenant prohibiting Gutman from “identifying herself” as 

a designer of certain goods. The district court also held Gutman in 

civil contempt for a series of Instagram posts that it found to be 

“marketing” in violation of an earlier version of the preliminary 

injunction. Gutman argues on appeal that this was reversible error 

and that the preliminary injunction should be dissolved. 

We dismiss Gutman’s appeal from the district court’s 

interlocutory contempt order for lack of appellate jurisdiction. We 

affirm the district court’s refusal to dissolve its preliminary injunction 

based on the law of the case. We vacate in part the district court’s 

order modifying its preliminary injunction because it erred in 

determining ownership of the Disputed Accounts and failed to assess 

the reasonableness of the five-year noncompete restraint on Gutman. 

We thus remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. Employment History

In July 2011, Hayley Paige Gutman signed an employment 

agreement with JLM (the “Contract”). See Appellant’s App’x at 376-

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94. Gutman agreed to design a line of bridal wear in exchange for a 

salary plus “additional compensation” tied to the sales of the 

products she designed. See Contract ¶ 4. The contract included 

provisions to protect JLM’s investment in Gutman’s name and brand 

association. Thus, among other terms, Gutman: (1) agreed not to use 

her name (or any derivatives of her name) in commerce once JLM 

registered a trademark thereof, id. ¶ 10(b)-(d); (2) agreed that various 

categories of creative material she produced would be JLM’s 

property, id. ¶¶ 11-12; and (3) agreed to certain noncompete, 

nonsolicit, and nondisclosure restrictions, id. ¶ 9. The Contract 

allowed JLM to fire Gutman at any time, with or without cause, but 

included no provision for Gutman to terminate the arrangement. 

Although the parties amended the Contract in 2014, and JLM later 

exercised an option to extend it through August 1, 2022, the relevant 

features remained the same throughout the term of the Contract. 

In 2019, the parties attempted to negotiate amendments to the 

Contract but were unable to reach agreement. That November, 

Gutman changed the passwords to the Disputed Accounts and 

refused to give JLM access. Although the accounts had been used to 

post content advertising JLM’s products, Gutman informed JLM that 

she would “not be posting any JLM related business.” JLM Couture, 

Inc. v. Gutman, No. 20-cv-10575, 2021 WL 827749, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 

4, 2021). JLM then filed this lawsuit. Relevant here, JLM alleged 

that Gutman had breached the Contract and that she was liable for 

conversion and trespass to chattels for taking control of the Disputed 

Accounts.

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2. The Disputed Accounts

Gutman created the Pinterest Account on November 3, 2011 

and the Instagram Account on or about April 6, 2012. For both, she 

used the handle “@misshayleypaige,” a derivative of her name that 

she had used for other social-media profiles not in dispute, including 

several that were created before her employment with JLM. The 

Disputed Accounts were created using Gutman’s name, personal cell 

phone number, and a personal email account that she also used for 

work purposes. She created her own passwords.

JLM did not direct Gutman to open the accounts. Gutman 

says she created them at the suggestion of a friend. JLM argues that 

she must have created them to advertise for the company, as the 

Contract required her to “perform such other duties and services 

commensurate with her position . . . as may be assigned to her by an 

officer of the Company, including . . . assisting with advertising 

programs.” Contract ¶ 2.

Although the district court did not find that Gutman created 

the Disputed Accounts for JLM, it did find that “the Instagram 

Account was utilized to showcase JLM’s products almost 

immediately after its creation.” Special App’x at 18. It also found

credible the testimony of JLM’s CEO that the creation of the Instagram 

Account was “timed to coincide with the week of the Fall 2012 New 

York bridal market.” Id. The district court further noted that JLM 

products were featured in several of Gutman’s early posts to the 

Instagram Account. 

Gutman’s earliest posts include pictures of wedding dresses, as 

well as pictures of the New York City skyline, chairs, dogs, a wine 

bottle, and what appears to be a beach vacation.

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Over time, however, the Disputed Accounts came to serve as 

“critical advertising platforms” for JLM’s products. JLM Couture, 

Inc. v. Gutman, No. 20-cv-10575, 2023 WL 2503432, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 

14, 2023). In addition to posts depicting bridal gowns, the Disputed 

Accounts provided information about JLM’s promotional events, and 

Gutman used Instagram’s messaging function to respond to sales 

inquiries. Promotional posts were interspersed with more personal 

content, in a strategy that JLM referred to as the “personal glimpse.” 

Special App’x at 26. Other JLM employees came to assist in

managing the Disputed Accounts and responding to customer 

messages and, by 2019, at least two other employees had access to the 

Instagram Account.

B. Procedural History

1. Preliminary Injunction and Contempt Order

On March 4, 2021, after discovery and an evidentiary hearing, 

the district court entered a preliminary injunction against Gutman. 

Gutman, 2021 WL 827749, at *1. As relevant here, the district court 

enjoined Gutman from:

[b]reaching the employment Contract, dated July 13, 

2011, together with the amendments and extensions 

thereto, by . . . [d]irectly or indirectly, engaging in, or 

being associated with . . . , any person, organization or 

enterprise which engages in the design, manufacture, 

marketing or sale of: (i) bridal apparel, including 

bridesmaids’, mother of the bride and flower girls’ 

apparel and related items; (ii) bridal accessories and 

related items; (iii) evening wear and related items; and/or 

(iv) any other category of goods designed, 

manufactured, marketed, licensed or sold by JLM.

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Id. at *23. The district court later denied Gutman’s request for 

reconsideration but modified the preliminary injunction to expire on 

August 1, 2022, when the Contract expired. See JLM Couture, Inc. v. 

Gutman, No. 20-cv-10575, 2021 WL 2227205, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 

2021).

In a previous appeal, this Court affirmed the preliminary 

injunction in part and vacated it in part. JLM Couture, Inc. v. Gutman, 

24 F.4th 785, 801-02 (2d Cir. 2022). We affirmed with respect to (1) 

Paragraph 3(a) of the preliminary injunction, which prohibited 

Gutman from using her name or derivatives in trade or commerce, id.

at 796; (2) Paragraph 3(b) of the preliminary injunction, which 

prohibited Gutman from competing with JLM through the expiration 

of the Contract on August 1, 2022, id. at 795; and (3) the district court’s 

ruling that JLM did not breach the Contract by failing to pay Gutman 

after she stopped working, id. at 801. 

We vacated the portion of the preliminary injunction that 

awarded JLM control of the Disputed Accounts because the district 

court had neither concluded that JLM was likely to succeed on the 

merits of its conversion or trespass claims nor tied the injunctive relief 

to JLM’s breach-of-contract claim. Id. at 797-800. We noted that, on 

remand, the district court could either “choose to answer directly the 

question of JLM’s likelihood of success on the merits of its conversion 

and trespass claims, properly weigh the relevant injunction factors, 

and grant or deny injunctive relief accordingly”; “decide that the 

balance of equities favors denying any property-based injunction and 

thereby avoid the merits question, leaving Gutman in control of the 

Disputed Accounts”; or “modify the vacated portion of the injunction 

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to provide JLM with relief for JLM’s breach-of-contract claims that 

stems from Gutman’s obligations under the Contract.” Id. at 800.

While Gutman’s first appeal was pending, the district court 

held her in contempt of the preliminary injunction based on a series 

of Instagram posts teasing her return to the bridal industry. JLM 

Couture, Inc. v. Gutman, No. 20-cv-10575, 2021 WL 4084573, at *1-3

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2021). The district court reasoned that these posts 

constituted marketing of competitive goods, and it ordered Gutman 

to remove them within five days, not to post the same or similar 

content, and not to announce the name of her new brand. Id. at *4-5,

*9. It further ordered Gutman to pay $5,000 for each day she 

remained out of compliance with the injunction. Id. at *9. Gutman 

filed a notice of appeal. Notice of Civil Appeal, JLM Couture, Inc. v. 

Gutman, No. 21-2535 (2d Cir. Oct. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1. 

2. Modified Preliminary Injunction

On remand, the district court concluded that the Disputed 

Accounts were advertising platforms that JLM was contractually 

entitled to access. See JLM Couture, Inc. v. Gutman, No. 20-cv-10575, 

2022 WL 5176849, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2022). The district court 

thus modified the preliminary injunction to give both parties access 

to the Disputed Accounts through the term of the Contract based on 

JLM’s breach-of-contract claim. Id. at *7. The court further 

enjoined Gutman from using the Disputed Accounts for any “nonJLM promotional purposes.” Id. Gutman filed another notice of 

appeal. Notice of Civil Appeal, JLM Couture, Inc. v. Gutman, No. 22-

549 (2d Cir. Mar. 17, 2022), ECF No. 1. 

The preliminary injunction terms giving JLM control over the 

Disputed Accounts and enjoining Gutman from competitive 

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employment were based on JLM’s breach-of-contract claims, so they 

were set to expire with the Contract on August 1, 2022. See Gutman, 

2022 WL 5176849, at *7. The district court thus requested briefing on 

any modifications that might be warranted in light of the approaching 

expiration date. Order, JLM Couture, Inc. v. Gutman, No. 20-cv-10575 

(S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2022), ECF No. 344. Both parties requested 

modifications. 

Gutman moved for dissolution of the preliminary injunction

based on JLM’s failure to pay her compensation allegedly due under 

the Contract in March 2022. The district court rejected this 

argument. It ruled that Gutman had already raised the same claim 

in an earlier motion for dissolution and, construing her argument as 

a motion for reconsideration, denied the motion. See JLM Couture, 

Inc. v. Gutman, No. 20-cv-10575, 2022 WL 2916600, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. 

July 25, 2022), reissued and amended No. 20-cv-10575, 2023 WL 2499581, 

at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2023). 

JLM moved for several modifications to the preliminary 

injunction, two of which the district court granted. First, the district 

court modified the preliminary injunction to give JLM exclusive 

control over the Disputed Accounts based on JLM’s likelihood of 

success on its claims for conversion and trespass to chattels. See JLM 

Couture, Inc. v. Gutman, 616 F. Supp. 3d 359, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2022), 

reissued and amended No. 20-cv-10575, 2023 WL 2503432, at *9 

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2023). Second, the court prohibited Gutman from 

“identifying herself” to the public as a designer of competing goods 

for five years based on Paragraph 10(e) of the Contract, which it 

interpreted as a post-employment restrictive covenant. Seeid. at 388.

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Gutman appealed from the district court’s denial of her request 

for dissolution of the preliminary injunction and its grant of JLM’s 

requested modifications. Notice of Civil Appeal, JLM Couture, Inc. 

v. Gutman, No. 22-1694 (2d Cir. Aug. 4, 2022), ECF No. 1. These two 

appeals and her appeal of the district court’s contempt order were 

consolidated before this Court. Order, Gutman, No. 21-2535 (2d Cir. 

Aug. 23, 2022), ECF No. 65.1 

II. DISCUSSION

We review contempt orders for abuse of discretion. Chevron 

Corp. v. Donziger, 990 F.3d 191, 202 (2d Cir. 2021). We also review for 

abuse of discretion the grant, denial, or modification of a preliminary 

injunction. Oneida Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 645 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 

2011) (grant or denial); Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc. v. Luigino's, Inc., 423 

F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 2005) (modification).

A district court has abused its discretion if it “(1) based its 

ruling on an erroneous view of the law, (2) made a clearly erroneous 

assessment of the evidence, or (3) rendered a decision that cannot be 

1 On February 21, 2023, this Court remanded Gutman’s appeal from 

the district court’s orders of July 25, 2022 (Docket No. 22-1694) and 

dismissed as moot her appeal from its order of February 14, 2022 (Docket 

No. 22-549). Order, Gutman, No. 21-2535 (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2023), ECF No. 

183. Although moot, the appeal docketed at 22-549 had divested the 

district court of jurisdiction to enter the July 25, 2022 orders, so an appeal 

from those orders was not properly before this Court at that point. Id. 

We therefore instructed the district court to reissue the July 25 orders, this 

time with proper jurisdiction. Id. The district court did so, see Am. Mem. 

Order, Gutman, No. 20-cv-10575 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2023), ECF No. 430; Am.

Op. & Order Modifying Prelim. Inj., Gutman, No. 20-cv-10575 (S.D.N.Y. 

Mar. 14, 2023), ECF No. 431, and this appeal was reinstated on March 30, 

2023, Order, Gutman, No. 21-2535 (2d Cir. Mar. 30, 2023), ECF No. 191.

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located within the range of permissible decisions.” Oneida Nation of 

N.Y., 645 F.3d at 164 (quoting Lynch v. City of New York, 589 F.3d 94, 

99 (2d Cir. 2009)). Factual findings are reviewed for clear error; 

conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.

In this consolidated appeal, Gutman challenges three orders of 

the district court. We address each in turn.

A. Contempt Order

First, Gutman challenges the district court’s September 8, 2021 

contempt order. Before addressing the merits, however, we must 

ensure that we have jurisdiction to hear Gutman’s appeal. 

Uniformed Fire Officers Ass'n v. de Blasio, 973 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2020). 

Here, we do not.

An order of civil contempt may ordinarily be challenged on 

appeal only after the entry of final judgment. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. 

v. United States, 493 F.2d 112, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1973). But orders

“granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions” 

are immediately appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). These 

categories are narrowly drawn, and orders merely clarifying or 

interpreting injunctions do not create appellate jurisdiction. Weight 

Watchers Int’l, 423 F.3d at 141.

Clarifications and interpretations can look like modifications. 

Indeed, an erroneous interpretation that extends an injunction 

“beyond its original reach” can amount to a modification warranting 

immediate review. In re Tronox Inc., 855 F.3d 84, 98 (2d Cir. 2017). 

But district courts are entitled to deference when interpreting their 

own injunctions, including an injunction’s “original reach.” Id. at 

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98-99. Only an “obvious or blatant” misinterpretation rises to the 

level of a modification permitting interlocutory review. Id. at 99.

Here, Gutman argues that we have jurisdiction because the 

contempt order modifies Paragraph 3(b) of the preliminary 

injunction. At the time of Gutman’s alleged violations, that 

paragraph enjoined her from:

directly or indirectly, engaging in . . . the design, 

manufacture, marketing or sale of: (i) bridal apparel . . . ; 

(ii) bridal accessories and related items; (iii) evening 

wear and related items; and/or (iv) any other category of 

goods designed, manufactured, marketed, licensed or 

sold by JLM.

Gutman, 2021 WL 4084573, at *1. Gutman argues that the contempt 

order modified this paragraph by (1) prohibiting her from 

announcing a new brand name for any venture that would compete 

with JLM, and (2) prohibiting her from posting “any similar content” 

to the Instagram Account and imposing a monetary fine for each day 

she remains noncompliant. See id. at *8-9. 

We disagree. The alleged modifications are merely

interpretations of the original preliminary injunction with which 

Gutman disagrees. We thus lack appellate jurisdiction to review the 

contempt order. 

Competing Brand Name. In June 2021, Gutman posted a video 

on Instagram announcing that she would launch a new bridal brand 

in August 2022. In its contempt order, the district court reasonably 

concluded that such behavior constituted “marketing” in violation of 

the injunction. If advertising Gutman’s planned return to the 

industry is “marketing,” so too is announcing the name under which 

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she plans to compete. The district court’s instruction that Gutman 

not announce that name merely interprets the injunction and thus 

does not create appellate jurisdiction. 

“Similar Content.” In its contempt order, the district court 

identified six Instagram posts that violated the preliminary 

injunction. It ordered Gutman to remove those posts within five 

days and not to post the same or similar content on pain of a $5,000 

penalty for each day she remained out of compliance with the order. 

In context, then, “similar content” is content that violates the 

preliminary injunction in a way that is similar to the posts at issue in 

the contempt order. And only posts that would independently 

violate Paragraph 3(b) of the injunction, at least as that provision was 

interpreted in the contempt order, would qualify as “similar content.” 

As a result, this instruction would constitute a modification only if the 

district court misinterpreted Paragraph 3(b). 

But the district court’s interpretation of Paragraph 3(b) is

reasonable. It explained at length why Gutman’s promotion of her 

return to the bridal industry and various videos of her sketching dress 

designs—including a design she had previously created for JLM—

constituted prohibited “marketing” under the preliminary injunction.

The contempt order did not grant, continue, modify, refuse, or 

dissolve an injunction, so Gutman must await final judgment before 

she can appeal it.2 We thus dismiss her appeal from the contempt 

order. 

2 To the extent that Gutman asks this Court to exercise pendent 

jurisdiction, we decline to do so. Gutman identifies no “inextricably 

intertwined” interlocutory order over which this Court has appellate 

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B. Denial of Motion To Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction

Gutman next argues that JLM is not entitled to a preliminary 

injunction because it chose to terminate the Contract as its remedy for 

Gutman’s alleged breach. We disagree. 

When one party breaches a contract, their counterparty must 

ordinarily choose between “declaring a breach and terminating the 

contract or, alternatively, . . . continuing to perform under the 

contract.” Todd Eng. Enters. LLC v. Hudson Home Grp., LLC, 171 

N.Y.S.3d 474, 476 (1st Dep’t 2022) (quoting Rebecca Broadway L.P. v. 

Hotton, 143 37 N.Y.S.3d 72, 79 (1st Dep’t 2016)). 

Gutman asserts that JLM is trying to have it both ways: 

although JLM requested and received a preliminary injunction 

enforcing certain contract terms, it has failed to pay her as required 

under other parts of the Contract. But we rejected this argument in 

Gutman’s prior appeal. The Contract provides that “[f]or the full, 

prompt and faithful performance of all the duties and services to be 

performed by [Gutman] hereunder, [JLM] agrees to pay, and 

[Gutman] agrees to accept, the amounts set forth” as base and 

additional compensation. Gutman, 24 F.4th at 801. “Faithful 

performance is thus a condition precedent to payment of base and 

additional compensation, so JLM had no duty to pay Gutman if she 

did not work.” Id.

jurisdiction that might justify such a step. See Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 

F.3d 537, 552-53 (2d Cir. 2010). And in any event, pendent jurisdiction is a 

discretionary doctrine applied only “rarely,” “sparingly,” and in 

“exceptional circumstances,” “if ever.” Id. at 553; Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 

46, 65 (2d Cir. 2006).

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“When a court has ruled on an issue, that decision should 

generally be adhered to by that court in subsequent stages in the same 

case,” absent “cogent and compelling” reasons to the contrary. 

United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1225 (2d Cir. 2002) (cleaned 

up). Here, Gutman identifies no material difference between JLM’s 

refusal to pay “additional compensation” due in March 2022—the 

“breach” Gutman now alleges—and the compensation allegedly due

in March 2021 that we considered previously. The district court thus

correctly denied Gutman’s motion for dissolution of the preliminary 

injunction based on JLM’s alleged breach of the Contract.

C. Modification to the Preliminary Injunction

1. Social-Media Account Ownership

a. Ownership Analysis

Gutman next argues that the district court erred by modifying 

its preliminary injunction to give JLM exclusive control over the 

Disputed Accounts. We agree. 

The district court revised its injunction before the Contract was 

set to expire on August 1, 2022. In doing so, it evaluated JLM’s 

likelihood of success on the merits of its claims for conversion and 

trespass to chattels. As the court noted, “[t]he issue of ownership of 

a social media account is novel, and few courts have examined the 

question.” Gutman, 616 F. Supp. 3d at 375. 

To resolve the issue, the district court identified six factors “at 

the core of a proper social media account ownership inquiry.” 

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Gutman, 2023 WL 2503432, at *10.3 Based on these factors, the district 

court ruled that “JLM has established [a] clear likelihood of success in 

demonstrating that it owns the Instagram Account and Pinterest 

Account or (to the extent Ms. Gutman or the relevant platforms may 

hold title to the Accounts) has a right to use and control the Accounts 

vastly superior to any such right of Ms. Gutman.” Id. at *15. 

The district court expressly declined to consider whether 

Gutman owned the Disputed Accounts when they were created. See

id. at *11. It stated that such an approach would be “overly 

simplistic, and the dynamics of social media warrant a much fuller 

examination of how the accounts were held out to the public, the 

purposes for which the accounts were used, and the methods by 

which the accounts were managed.” Id. 

We conclude that this approach was error. The law has long 

accommodated new technologies within existing legal frameworks. 

See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-40 (2001) (holding that 

the use of thermal imaging technology can constitute a search under 

the Fourth Amendment); Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 8 N.Y.3d 

283, 292-93 (2007) (treating electronic records as property equivalent 

to physical records for the purposes of conversion). We see no 

reason to depart from this traditional approach here. Determining 

3 They are: “(1) whether the account handle reflects the business or 

entity name; (2) how the account describes itself; (3) whether the account 

was promoted on the entity’s advertisements or publicity materials; 

(4) whether the account includes links to other internet platforms of the 

entity; (5) the purpose for which the account was used, including whether 

it was tied to promotional or mission-oriented activities of the entity; and 

(6) whether employees or members of the entity had access to the account 

and participated in its management.” Gutman, 2023 WL 2503432, at *10.

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the ownership of social-media accounts is indeed a relatively novel 

exercise, but that novelty does not warrant a new six-factor test.4 

The Disputed Accounts should be treated in the first instance 

like any other form of property. This includes determining the

original owner. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. 1805)

(determining original owner of a fox); Lightfoot v. Davis, 198 N.Y. 261, 

265 (1910) (discussing the principle of title by first possession); see also

Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 

73, 73 (1985). When Gutman created the Disputed Accounts, any

associated property rights belonged to someone. And if she created 

them using her personal information and for her personal use, then 

those rights belonged to her, no matter how the Disputed Accounts

may have been used later.5 See 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries

*389.

If the district court concludes that Gutman owned the Disputed 

Accounts at creation, it will then need to consider whether JLM 

4 To be sure, the district court relied on two cases in adopting its 

test—In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. 359 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015), and International 

Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 651 v. Philbeck, 464 F. Supp. 3d 863 (E.D. Ky. 

2020). But neither interprets New York law, which governs here. See

Gutman, 2023 WL 2503432, at *9-10.

5 In evaluating the initial ownership of the Disputed Accounts, we 

note that Gutman’s use of the “@misshayleypaige” username does not 

support a presumption that she created the account for business purposes. 

First, Gutman had licensed her name and its derivatives to JLM for use only 

in trade or commerce. Contract ¶ 10(b). She was entitled to continue 

using her name for noncommercial purposes, including personal socialmedia accounts. Second, even if Gutman created the Disputed Accounts 

for commercial purposes, it remains possible that she did so on her own 

behalf and in violation of the Contract.

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subsequently took ownership by operation of the Contract. 6 

Traditional principles of property law guide this analysis. Thus, the 

fact that Gutman transferred some or all of her rights in particular 

content posted on the Disputed Accounts does not by itself support 

an inference that she transferred ownership of the Disputed Accounts 

themselves. 7 Nor should it ordinarily matter to the question of 

ownership whether an account owner permits others to assist in 

managing the account, or whether one or the other party holds itself 

out as owning it. See, e.g., Meisels v. Meisels, 630 F. Supp. 3d 400, 411

(E.D.N.Y. 2022) (management of rental property not probative of 

ownership); Porter v. Wertz, 53 N.Y.2d 696, 698 (1981) (permitting suit 

for recovery of a painting purchased from a middleman who lacked 

authority to sell the painting). Determining ownership by reference 

6 It appears that ownership of the Disputed Accounts may depend 

at least in part on the terms of service governing their creation and use. 

See, e.g., Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-cv-4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *11 (E.D. Pa. 

2013) (discussing LinkedIn’s User Agreement). The district court may 

thus consider on remand what rights are inherent in “ownership” of the 

Disputed Accounts and whether they include the right to transfer or assign 

those accounts.

7 Rights in the Disputed Accounts and rights in content posted on 

them—including ancillary content like direct messages, captions, profile 

pictures, and the like—need not be intertwined. See, e.g., Agence Fr. Presse 

v. Morel, 934 F. Supp. 2d 547, 562-63 (S.D.N.Y.) (discussing Twitter’s terms 

of service providing that “users retain their rights to the content they post”), 

reconsideration granted in part on other grounds, 934 F. Supp. 2d 584 (S.D.N.Y. 

2013); Sinclair v. Ziff Davis, LLC, 454 F. Supp. 3d 342, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)

(discussing Instagram’s terms of service providing that the user grants to 

Instagram “a non-exclusive, fully paid and royalty-free, transferable, sublicensable, worldwide license” to the content they post), reconsideration 

granted in part on other grounds, 2020 WL 3450136 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2020). 

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to such principles would promote transfer by surprise and complicate 

contractual arrangements under which an account owner might agree 

to advertise another’s goods on his or her platform.8

Moreover, the district court erred by concluding that JLM is 

likely to succeed in demonstrating ownership of the Disputed 

Accounts under Paragraph 11 of the Contract.9 See Gutman, 2023 WL 

2503432, at *15. That paragraph provides that all “designs, 

drawings, notes, patterns, sketches, prototypes, samples, 

improvements to existing works, and any other works conceived of 

or developed by [Gutman] in connection with her employment with 

the Company involving bridal clothing, bridal accessories and related 

bridal or wedding items,” are works for hire and the exclusive 

property of JLM. Contract ¶ 11.

The district court ruled that the Disputed Accounts themselves 

qualify as “any other works” conceived of or developed by Gutman 

in connection with her employment. It thus concluded that Gutman 

8 To the extent that the district court held that JLM has a superior 

right to use and control the Disputed Accounts, it erred by relying on its 

six-factor ownership test. If the district court concludes on remand that 

Gutman owns the Disputed Accounts, it could still find that JLM has a 

superior right of possession. But that conclusion would depend on

identifying the nature and source of any superior possessory interest. See, 

e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 225 (discussing persons entitled to 

immediate possession); cf. Guiffrida v. Storico Dev., LLC, 876 N.Y.S.2d 793, 

795 (4th Dep’t 2009) (holding that tenants could sue for conversion because 

they had an immediate superior contractual right to possession).

9 We do not, however, disturb the district court’s application of that 

provision as it relates to JLM’s likelihood of success in showing ownership 

of particular content posted on the Disputed Accounts or compilations of 

posted content. Gutman, 2023 WL 2503432, at *15.

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likely assigned them to JLM in the Contract. But the ordinary 

meaning of general terms at the end of a list must be interpreted to 

“embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated 

by the preceding specific words.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 

545 (2015) (quoting Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. 

Guardianship Est. of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 384 (2003)) (applying ejusdem 

generis). Otherwise, giving general terms an “all-encompassing” 

meaning would render specifically enumerated terms surplusage. 

See id. at 545-46 (quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142 

(2008)).

Here, the specific terms—“designs, drawings, notes, patterns, 

sketches, prototypes, samples, [and] improvements to existing 

works”—are all closely related. Contract ¶ 11. They describe steps 

in the process of fashion design and capture much (if not all) of the 

creative output that Gutman might produce in her role as a designer. 

Moreover, the enumerated terms are all items that JLM might 

conceivably sell to the public and appear to be presumptively 

copyrightable. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) et seq. The Disputed Accounts 

by contrast share none of these core attributes, despite featuring 

content that does, such as sketches and drawings of wedding 

dresses.10 It would thus be inconsistent with ordinary principles of 

10 Although the copyrightability of the Disputed Accounts is not 

before us, we note that, at the very least, the functional portions of socialmedia accounts are likely ineligible for protection. See Compendium of U.S. 

Copyright Office Practices § 1006-07 (3d ed. 2021). Further, it is an open 

question in this Circuit whether the overall “look and feel” of a website may 

be copyrightable. See ID Tech LLC v. Toggle Web Media LLC, No. 20-cv5949, 2023 WL 2613625, at *6-7 & n.7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2023) (collecting 

cases).

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contract interpretation to conclude that Paragraph 11 of the Contract 

assigned the Disputed Accounts to JLM.

To summarize: the analysis of social-media-account ownership 

begins where other property-ownership analyses usually begin—by 

determining the account’s original owner. The next step is to 

determine whether ownership ever transferred to another party. If 

a claimant is not the original owner and cannot locate their claim in a 

chain of valid transfers, they do not own the account. 

We thus remand to the district court to analyze ownership of 

the Disputed Accounts under the framework discussed above.

b. Standard for Granting Preliminary Injunctive Relief

The next question is what standard JLM must satisfy on 

remand to obtain its requested preliminary injunctive relief. We 

have recognized two different standards governing preliminary 

injunctions. The first requires the party seeking a preliminary 

injunction to demonstrate that “(1) absent injunctive relief, he will 

suffer irreparable injury, and (2) there is a likelihood that he will 

succeed on the merits of his claim.” Mastrovincenzo v. City of New 

York, 435 F.3d 78, 89 (2d Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). We have applied 

this standard to prohibitory injunctions, which simply bar a party 

from taking action that disturbs the status quo, defined as “the last 

peaceable uncontested status preceding the present controversy.” 

Mastrio v. Sebelius, 768 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 2014). The second, and 

more demanding, standard requires the movant, “in addition to 

demonstrating irreparable harm,” to show that it has “a clear or 

substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” Mastrovincenzo, 435 

F.3d at 89 (emphasis added) (cleaned up). We have applied this 

standard to mandatory injunctions, which “alter the status quo by 

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22

commanding some positive act,” id. (emphasis omitted), as well as to 

injunctions that “(1) would provide the plaintiff with all the relief that 

is sought and (2) could not be undone by a judgment favorable to 

defendants on the merits at trial,” id. at 90 (cleaned up). 

JLM’s requested relief cannot be characterized as merely

maintaining the status quo ante or prohibiting Gutman from 

disturbing it. The parties agree that “the last peaceable uncontested 

status preceding the present controversy,” Mastrio, 768 F.3d at 121, 

was a moment when both JLM and Gutman had access to the 

Disputed Accounts. But JLM does not seek a return to shared access. 

It asks instead that Gutman turn over the credentials to the Disputed 

Accounts and give JLM exclusive control over them. As both parties 

recognize, that relief would change the status quo, making the 

injunction mandatory. JLM must therefore meet the more stringent 

standard to succeed on remand.11

2. Restrictive Covenant

Finally, Gutman argues that the district court impermissibly 

granted a preliminary injunction restricting her from identifying 

herself as a designer of certain products based on Paragraph 10(e) of 

the Contract. We agree. 

11 JLM has not yet made such a showing. The district court 

awarded exclusive control to JLM by characterizing Gutman’s prior access 

as derivative of her role as JLM’s employee. But the question whether 

Gutman had access to the Disputed Accounts because they were her 

property or only because she was an employee goes to the crux of the 

parties’ dispute. The district court, then, effectively assumed JLM’s 

success on the merits. On remand, the burden is on JLM to demonstrate a 

clear or substantial likelihood of success.

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As interpreted by the district court, Paragraph 10(e) is a 

restrictive covenant that limits Gutman’s ability to work for five years 

following the termination of her employment with JLM. But the 

district court failed to consider whether the restrictive covenant was 

likely to be enforceable under New York law, as it was required to do 

before concluding that JLM was likely to succeed on its breach of 

contract claim under Paragraph 10(e) of the Contract.12

In light of the “powerful considerations of public policy which 

militate against sanctioning the loss of a man’s livelihood,” restrictive 

covenants are disfavored in New York and will be enforced only after 

careful analysis. Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co. v. A-1-A Corp., 

42 N.Y.2d 496, 499 (1977) (quoting Purchasing Assocs., Inc. v. Weitz, 13 

N.Y.2d 267, 272 (1963)). “[A]restrictive covenant will only be subject 

to specific enforcement to the extent that it is reasonable in time and 

area, necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interests, not 

harmful to the general public and not unreasonably burdensome to 

the employee.” BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 389 (1999) 

(quoting Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 307 (1976)).

Although protection against competition by a former employee 

whose services are “unique or extraordinary” may constitute a 

12 We affirmed an earlier iteration of the district court’s preliminary 

injunction that ordered Gutman not to compete with JLM. Gutman, 24 

F.4th at 795. That provision, however, was premised on Paragraph 9 of 

the Contract, which restricted Gutman’s ability to compete during the term 

of her employment. See id. “[T]he availability of equitable relief against the 

former employee diminishes appreciably” after the term of employment 

ends. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d 394, 403-04 & n.6 (1981). Our 

previous ruling thus provides little guidance as to the restrictive covenant 

before us now.

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legitimate employer interest, any such restrictions must still meet 

BDO Seidman’s remaining criteria for enforcement.13 Id. Here, the 

district court declined to consider those criteria. See Gutman, 2023 

WL 2503432, at *19 n.13. 

On remand, the district court should consider (1) whether 

Paragraph 10(e)’s five-year term is reasonable in duration; 14

(2) whether JLM has made a sufficient showing that it has a legitimate 

interest warranting enforcement of a restrictive covenant; 15 and 

13 Nor is it clear that the mere label “unique or extraordinary” is 

sufficient to constitute a legitimate interest after BDO Seidman. There, the

Court of Appeals was concerned with whether a former employee, alleged 

to be “unique or extraordinary,” in fact “possessed any unique or 

extraordinary ability . . . that would give him a competitive advantage” 

over his former employer. BDO Seidman, 93 N.Y.2d at 390; see also Am. 

Broad. Cos., 52 N.Y.2d at 403 n.6. But see Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 

F.3d 63, 70-72 (2d Cir. 1999) (enforcing, pre-BDO Seidman, a restrictive 

covenant against a unique or extraordinary employee subject only to an 

overarching reasonableness requirement).

14 See, e.g., BDO Seidman, 93 N.Y.2d at 393; Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc. 

v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, LLC, 813 F. Supp. 2d 489, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)

(noting that ten-year restrictive covenants are consistently held 

unenforceable and collecting cases); Maxon v. Franklin Traffic Serv., Inc., 689 

N.Y.S.2d 559, 561 (4th Dep’t 1999) (holding five-year noncompete 

unreasonable in duration); Greenwich Mills Co. v. Barrie House Coffee Co., Inc., 

459 N.Y.S.2d 454, 458 (2d Dep’t 1983) (collecting cases striking three- and 

five-year restrictive covenants); Asness v. Nelson, 273 A.D.2d 165, 165 (N.Y. 

App. Div., 1st Dep’t 2000) (holding a one-year noncompete reasonable in 

duration).

15 See BDO Seidman, 93 N.Y.2d at 388-89, 391 (“[T]he only 

justification for imposing an employee agreement not to compete is to 

forestall unfair competition. It seems self-evident that a former employee 

may be capable of fairly competing for an employer’s clients by refraining 

from use of unfair means to compete. . . . [T]he employer’s interest in 

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(3) whether its interpretation of the prohibition in Paragraph 10(e) is 

reasonable in scope and not overly burdensome on Gutman.16

III. CONCLUSION

We have considered all of Gutman’s remaining arguments and 

found them to be without merit. For the reasons set forth above, we 

(1) dismiss Gutman’s appeal, No. 21-2535, from the district court’s 

contempt order of September 8, 2021; (2) affirm the district court’s 

March 14, 2023 order denying Gutman’s motion to dissolve the 

preliminary injunction; and (3) affirm in part and vacate in part the 

district court’s March 14, 2023 order modifying its preliminary 

injunction and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

preserving its client base against the competition of the former employee is 

no more legitimate and worthy of contractual protection than when it vies 

with unrelated competitors for those clients.”).

16 Specifically, the enforceability of a prohibition extending to 

Gutman’s “tastes, voice, vision, face, and mannerisms,” Gutman, 2023 WL 

2503432, at *20, is questionable, see BDO Seidman, 93 N.Y.2d at 389.

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