Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03585/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03585-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOYD A. FROST,

No. C- 03-03585 EDL

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER GRANTIN G IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL

PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL

RECORDS; GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL

PLAINTIFF’S DEPOSITION; GRANTING IN

PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SANCTIONS; DEFERRING RULING ON

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND SETTING BRIEFING

SCHEDULE

CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

Plaintiff Boyd Allen Frost alleges generally that San Francisco police officers, in particular

Officers Watts and Fischer, used excessive force when they entered his apartment and beat him

without provocation for an extended period of time on May 24, 2002. Defendants contend that the

officers were responding to a complaint from one of Plaintiff’s neighbors and that Plaintiff’s injuries

were caused when he resisted arrest. 

On April 11, 2006, the Court held a hearing on four motions filed by the parties. For the

reasons stated below and at the hearing, the Court rules as follows:

Defendants’ Motion to Compel Psychiatric and Psychological Records

On January 24, 2006, Plaintiff underwent an independent psychological examination by Dr.

William Hooker. Among other conclusions, Dr. Hooker’s report called into question Plaintiff’s

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ability to accurately recall events. Declaration of Robert Bonta in Support of Defs.’ Mot. to Compel

at Ex. G. Defendants now seek Plaintiff’s psychiatric and psychological records from several mental

health treaters on the grounds that the records are necessary to show that Plaintiff’s memory,

perception and ability to perceive reality are unreliable and to counter any attempt to undermine the

value of Dr. Hooker’s opinion based on his lack of review of such records. 

The threshold showing required for production of mental health records is substantially lower

than that required for an independent psychological examination. See Price v. County of San Diego,

165 F.R.D. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (“Plaintiffs have cited no case law which would suggest that

because the emotional distress is only ‘ordinary,’ the opposing party is not entitled to at least

discovery of any existing psychological records. The invasion of privacy occasioned by allowing

opposing counsel to obtain copies of a plaintiff’s psychological records, where there is a claim of

ordinary mental distress, is exceedingly less burdensome than a Rule 35(a) examination. Therefore,

the court does not find that discovery of psychological records is governed solely by the same ‘at

issue’ standard as under Rule 35(a). Rather, as here, the issues raised by the plaintiffs and the

relevance of the information govern the discoverability of the otherwise privileged information.”). 

Here, even though Plaintiff is not seeking extraordinary emotional distress damages, he is seeking

emotional distress damages. His psychological and psychiatric records are relevant to his damages

and may also be relevant to the existence of a factual basis for Plaintiff’s claims, particularly in light

of the conclusions in Dr. Hooker’s report. On balance, the need for the information in the records

outweighs any privacy interests that Plaintiff has in them. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Compel is granted in part. At the hearing, Defendants

conceded that the production of records should be limited in time. Therefore, Excel Behavioral

Health Services, San Francisco General Hospital, San Francisco Jail Health Services/Jail

Psychological Service, Kaiser, and the counseling program associated with the San Francisco Police

Department in which Plaintiff stated that he participated shall produce Plaintiff’s psychiatric and

psychological records for the period beginning five years prior to May 24, 2002 through the present. 

Plaintiff shall sign releases for these records if requested. The records shall be treated as confidential

and shall be used solely for purposes of this litigation. 

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Defendants’ Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Deposition

Defendants seek an order compelling Plaintiff to attend his continued deposition, payment of

$1,500 in cancellation fees for an independent medical evaluation and payment of attorney’s fees for

preparing this motion. 

The parties agreed that Plaintiff’s continued deposition regarding photographs taken by

Plaintiff would take place in San Francisco on the morning of February 23, 2006. Defendants served

a deposition notice for that date on Plaintiff. Declaration of Robert Bonta in Support of Defs.’ Mot.

to Compel at Ex. E. Plaintiff failed to appear for the deposition, and that failure is not excused. 

Plaintiff argues that the parties had agreed to a telephonic deposition, but there is no evidence of

such an agreement. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Deposition is granted in part. The

deposition shall take place as soon as possible, but no later than April 24, 2006. If Plaintiff is

traveling to San Francisco for another purpose, the deposition shall take place in person. Otherwise,

the deposition may be conducted by telephone. If a telephone deposition proves ineffective because

of the need to ask about the photographs, however, it may be reconvened in person. 

On October 25, 2005, Defendants noticed Plaintiff’s independent medical examination

relating to his physical injuries for November 17, 2005. Bonta Decl. Ex. A. The notice explains that

if the appointment were canceled or rescheduled on less than twenty-four hours’ notice, the doctor

would charge a cancellation fee of $1,500.00. Id. Plaintiff’s counsel confirmed the date of the

examination (Id. Ex. B; Declaration of Russell Robinson in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Compel at Ex.

2), but Plaintiff failed to appear. Defendants were charged the $1,500.00 cancellation fee, which

Plaintiff refused to pay. Bonta Decl. Ex. D. Plaintiff argues that: “Plaintiff was clear, or thought he

had been, that he would not appear for deposition and examination unless all parties’ depositions

were set in the same week.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Compel at 4:14-15 (emphasis added). At

the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged that he did not clearly convey this position to

Defendants. Plaintiff provides no adequate reason for failing to attend. Accordingly, Defendants’

Motion to Compel Payment of the Cancellation Fee is granted. 

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Defendants seek attorney’s fees incurred in preparation for Plaintiff’s continued deposition

and in drafting the motion to compel. Defendants’ Motion to Compel Payment of Fees is denied

because it was not filed separately as required by Civil Local Rule 7-8. 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions and Default

Plaintiff seeks monetary and evidentiary sanctions and default because Defendant Watts did

not appear for his deposition. Watts no longer works for the San Francisco Police Department and

now lives in Southern California. The parties had an informal agreement to depose Watts on January

25, 2006, but Plaintiff did not issue a deposition notice. Declaration of Russell Robinson in Support

of Pl.’s Mot. for Sanctions at Ex. 2. Watts did not appear for the deposition, and there is no

explanation for his failure to appear. On or about February 13, 2006, Plaintiff issued a deposition

notice for February 23, 2006 for Watts’ deposition. Declaration of Robert Bonta in Opp’n to Pl.’s

Mot. for Sanctions at Ex. K. Due to communication issues, Watts did not appear for this deposition. 

Bonta Decl. ¶ 20. 

Plaintiff is seeking monetary sanctions in the amount of $356.65 in court reporter’s fees and

$2,440.00 in attorney’s fees for the time to prepare twice for the deposition and to prepare this

motion. Plaintiff also seeks not only terminating sanctions against Watts, but additional terminating

and evidentiary sanctions: (1) default as to Defendant City and County of San Francisco with regard

to Monell liability focused on Watts; (2) issue preclusion prohibiting Defendants from presenting

any case that would tend to suggest that Watts was ever assaulted by Plaintiff, that Watts was injured

by Plaintiff, and that the force used against Plaintiff was not excessive; and (3) issue preclusion

prohibiting Defendants from presenting any case that would tend to suggest that the initial entry into

Plaintiff’s home was reasonable.

If a party fails to appear for a properly noticed deposition, the court may sanction the party,

up to and including default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d); 37(b)(2)(A) - (C). Sanctions are appropriate

even in the absence of a prior court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d

762, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1996). However, default is a drastic remedy that should be reserved for

extraordinary circumstances. See In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F. 3d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1996). Before

ordering a terminating sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d) for failure to appear at a

deposition, the court must balance five factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of

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litigation, (2) the court’s need to manage its dockets, (3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking

sanctions, (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits and (5) the availability of

less drastic sanctions. Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F. 3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Wanderer

v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990)). “The first two of these factors favor the imposition

of sanctions in most cases, while the fourth cuts against a . . . dismissal sanction. Thus the key

factors are prejudice and the availability of lesser sanctions.” Wanderer, 910 F.2d at 656. 

Here, the factors, especially the key factors of prejudice and availability of lesser sanctions,

weigh against granting terminating and evidentiary sanctions. Plaintiff makes no showing of

prejudice to support these extreme sanctions. Plaintiff asserts that he has suffered prejudice not only

because Watts failed to appear at his deposition but also because Watts failed to produce documents

in response to the deposition notice. This argument misses the mark; the document production

portion of the deposition notice was untimely and therefore unenforceable (Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(5);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 34). Further, Watts has submitted a declaration stating that he has no responsive

documents. Moreover, default, which is disfavored, as to any Defendant based on Watt’s conduct is

not warranted in this case. The Watts deposition was only formally noticed once and Plaintiff did

not file a motion to compel the deposition before filing this motion for terminating sanctions. In

addition, Plaintiff failed to meaningfully participate in subsequent discussions after February 23,

2006 regarding when to reschedule the deposition. See Bonta Decl. Ex. P, Q, R, S. Therefore, to the

extent that Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions seeks terminating or evidentiary sanctions, it is denied. 

The Hyde & Drath factors, however, weigh in favor of monetary sanctions. Plaintiff incurred

fees and costs associated with preparing for the Watts deposition. Defendants shall reimburse

Plaintiff for $356.65 in court reporter’s fees. Plaintiff is also entitled to attorney’s fees, but the Court

declines to order reimbursement for preparing twice for the deposition and for drafting this motion,

which is largely denied. Accordingly, Defendants shall pay Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees in the reduced

amount of $915.00 (3 hours multiplied by $305 hourly rate).

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims: (1) excessive force

against all Defendants; (2) negligence against all Defendants; (3) false arrest and imprisonment

against all Defendants; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants; and (5)

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the Monell claim against Defendant City and County of San Francisco. Plaintiff presented no

evidence in response to the summary judgment motion and instead moved under Rule 56(f) for more

discovery. At the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel confirmed that Plaintiff is not pursuing claims for

negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, those claims are dismissed. 

Rule 56(f) states:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the

party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify

the party’s opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or

may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions

to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.

The party opposing summary judgment bears the burden of satisfying the requirements of Rule 56(f)

by making a timely application which specifically identifies relevant evidence, where there is some

basis for believing that the evidence sought actually exists, and shows that the evidence would

prevent summary judgment. See Employers Teamsters Local Nos. 175 and 505 Pension Trust Fund

v. Clorox Co., 353 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Plaintiff’s counsel filed an affidavit in support of the Rule 56(f) motion, stating that if he had

been able to depose Watts, he would have found out: (1) whether Watts was in fact injured on May

24, 2002; (2) whether there was a legitimate reason for Watts and his partner Fischer to enter

Plaintiff’s apartment on that day; (3) whether Watts has a history of using excessive force or other

misconduct that would show deliberate indifference by the City; (4) whether Watts was terminated

or forced to resign for reasons related to excessive force, honesty or other relevant issues; (5)

whether the blood at the scene belonged to Plaintiff and/or Watts; (6) why there were so many

bruises on Plaintiff’s back if no one hit him with a baton; (7) why certain evidence was not

preserved, including photographs of a bloody baton or the baton itself; and (8) whether probable

cause existed on May 24, 2002. Even if Watts testifies on these issues, it is questionable whether

that testimony will reveal any evidence to defeat summary judgment. However, given Watts’

unexcused failure to appear at his deposition and despite Plaintiff’s lack of diligence in securing

Watts’ deposition after February 23, 2006, Plaintiff is entitled to depose Watts. The Watts

deposition shall take place on April 24, 2006 at 11:00 a.m. in San Francisco. Defendants shall pay

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the additional cost over normal delivery of the transcript to obtain an expedited transcript of the

deposition testimony, and provide a copy to Plaintiff. 

Accordingly, a ruling on the merits of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is

deferred. However, as stated at the hearing, unless the deposition testimony alters the undisputed

material facts, the Court’s tentative ruling is to grant summary judgment on all remaining claims

except for the excessive force claim. Plaintiff shall file his opposition to the summary judgment

motion no later than May 8, 2006. The opposition may only address deposition testimony by Watts

and deposition testimony, if any, by Plaintiff that is directly responsive to Watts’ testimony. He may

not otherwise cure his failure to timely oppose the motion for summary judgment on its merits. 

Defendants shall file a reply no later than May 15, 2006. The Court will notify the parties if a

hearing is necessary. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 13, 2006

 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE

United States Magistrate Judge

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