Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01494/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01494-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN L. HOPKINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE SALVATION ARMY,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-01494-JD 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Re: Dkt. No. 23

Plaintiff, a former state prisoner proceeding pro se, has brought an action pursuant to Title 

II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Defendant has filed a motion for summary 

judgment. Plaintiff has filed an opposition. The motion is denied in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s original complaint was filed while he was incarcerated at California State Prison 

- Solano.1 Liberally construing the complaint, the Court found that plaintiff was bringing a claim 

pursuant to Title II of the ADA against Defendant Salvation Army’s Adult Rehabilitation 

Program, a Contra Costa County superior court judge, and plaintiff’s appointed trial attorney.2 

Plaintiff only sought money damages. He contended that he was in the Salvation Army Adult 

Rehabilitation Program when he injured his knee and that the Salvation Army did not allow him to 

return to the program due to the injury. As a result, according to plaintiff, his probation was 

revoked and he was sent to prison. The Court dismissed the claims against the judge and the 

appointed attorney and dismissed the complaint with leave to amend to provide more information 

 

1

Plaintiff appears to have been released from custody several months after this motion was filed. 

2

Plaintiff stated he was bringing the action under articles one and two of the ADA. Original 

Complaint at 3.

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regarding his ADA claim against the Salvation Army.

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, again only seeking money damages, and stated that 

his cause of action was pursuant to Title II of the ADA (although both complaints were filed on

the Court’s form complaint for prisoners entitled, “Complaint Under the Civil Rights Act, 42 

U.S.C. § 1983”.) The Court found that, liberally construed, plaintiff’s claim was sufficient to 

demonstrate a violation of Title II of the ADA for purposes of screening. The Court also noted 

that for purposes of screening and based on the allegations in the complaint, it appeared that the 

Salvation Army was an appropriate public entity pursuant to Title II of the ADA. Defendant was 

served and has filed this motion.

ANALYSIS

Defendant argues in this motion for summary judgment that plaintiff has brought this 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the Salvation Army is not a state agency and did not act 

under color of state law. Defendant also argues that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative 

remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Defendant asserts that as part of a separate parole 

agreement between plaintiff and the State of California, plaintiff agreed to voluntarily participate 

in the Salvation Army Adult Rehabilitation Program. 3 Defendant contends that the Salvation 

Army was not party to this agreement and is unrelated to the State of California, the Department of 

Corrections, or the Parole Board. Defendant maintains that there was no color of state action or

privity of contract, and that they were not state actors. Defendant also states that its services are 

provided free of charge.4 

Plaintiff states in his opposition that he is proceeding under the ADA and that this action is 

not brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

5

 Because plaintiff has expressly stated that he is not 

proceeding under § 1983, and to the extent he has made any claims under § 1983, all those claims 

are dismissed from this action. However, his claim under the ADA continues and has not been 

 

3 Defendant states that plaintiff has alleged three separate personal injury claims during his time in 

the program and filed a civil action in the superior court.

4

It is unclear if the Salvation Army program at issue receives any funding from the county or state 

for its rehabilitation services.

5 Defendant did not file a reply addressing plaintiff’s opposition.

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addressed in Defendant’s motion. The motion for summary judgment is dismissed without 

prejudice and defendant may file an additional motion for summary judgment regarding the ADA 

claim.

Title II of the ADA “prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of disability,” Lovell v. 

Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002), and provides that “no qualified individual with a 

disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the 

benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination 

by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II of the ADA applies to inmates within state 

prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998).

In order to state a claim that a public program or service violated Title II of the ADA, a 

plaintiff must show: he is a “qualified individual with a disability;” he was either excluded from 

participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was 

otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and such exclusion, denial of benefits, or 

discrimination was by reason of his disability. McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 

(9th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff may bring a claim under Title II of the ADA against state entities for injunctive 

relief and damages. See Phiffer v. Columbia River Correctional Institute, 384 F.3d 791, 792 (9th 

Cir. 2004). The standard for recovery of damages is deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s rights 

under the ADA. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). “Deliberate 

indifference requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially 

likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood.” Id. at 1139. Plaintiff cannot seek damages 

pursuant to the ADA against defendants in their individual capacities. Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 

1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002).

While defendant argues that the Salvation Army is not a state actor and that there was no 

color of state action on its part pursuant to § 1983, defendant has not addressed whether it is a 

public entity pursuant to Title II of the ADA. Assuming arguendo that defendant is not a public 

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entity, plaintiff could perhaps still proceed with this case pursuant to another title of the ADA.6 

However, if plaintiff proceeded under Title III, the only remedy available to him would be 

injunctive relief. See Antoninetti v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, 643 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2010).

Defendant also alleged that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The 

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (“PLRA”), 

amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison 

conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, 

prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In his complaint, plaintiff indicated that he did not exhaust his 

administrative remedies, and in his opposition he states that he is “suing outside the scope of the 

State of California and the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, hence, making 

exhaustion remedies moot.” Opposition at 2-3. However, plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed 

the complaint and appeared to be a parolee when the underlying events occurred and when he was 

released. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation provides that, “any inmate 

or parolee under the department’s jurisdiction may appeal any policy, decision, action, condition, 

or omission by the department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a 

material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 

3084.1(a). Thus, parolees have administrative remedies available to them, and a prisoner suing 

under the ADA must exhaust prison administrative remedies, notwithstanding the absence of a 

federal administrative exhaustion requirement in those statutes. See O’Guinn v. Lovelock 

Correctional Center, 502 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007). Yet, the PLRA only applies to actions 

brought “with respect to prison conditions” in a jail, prison or other correctional facility. If 

defendant seeks to dismiss the case for failure to exhaust it must address if the claim in the action 

arose with respect to prison conditions and if it occurred in a correctional facility where the claim 

would be subject to exhaustion.

 

6

The ADA contains five titles: Employment (Title I), Public Services (Title II), Public 

Accommodations and Services Operated by Private Entities (Title III), Telecommunications (Title 

IV), and Miscellaneous Provisions (Title V).

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CONCLUSION

1. Any claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is dismissed from this action. The 

motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 23) is DENIED without prejudice in all other 

respects. Defendant may file an additional dispositive motion regarding the ADA claim within 60 

days. If defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, it 

shall so inform the Court prior to the date that the summary judgment motion is due. All other 

aspects of the Court’s order of service (Docket No. 12) remain in effect.

2. It is the plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 

informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of 

Change of Address,” and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to 

do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2015

________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN L. HOPKINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE SALVATION ARMY,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-01494-JD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on July 29, 2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing 

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Kevin L. Hopkins

2344 East 15th Street

Oakland, CA 94601 

Dated: July 29, 2015

Richard W. Wieking

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JAMES DONATO

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