Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00495/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00495-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Petronilo Alvarado, Jr., 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV 11-495-TUC-JGZ (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Petronilo Alvarado, Jr.’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the 

Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Following a trial in his absence, a jury found Alvarado guilty of aggravated 

assault, driving under the influence of an intoxicating liquor (“DUI”), driving with a 

blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) of .10 or more, and multiple counts of criminal 

damage and endangerment. Ex. A, pp. 1-2.1

 The trial court sentenced him to 

concurrent, presumptive terms of imprisonment ranging from 1.5 to 7.5 years on four 

of the nine counts and to time served on the remaining five. Ex. A, p. 2. Count 10 

was omitted from the trial court’s sentencing minute entry and therefore was not 

addressed on appeal. Id., p. 2 n. 1. 

 In its Memorandum Decision affirming Alvarado’s convictions, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals summarized the factual background as follows:2

the evidence at trial showed that Alvarado caused a five-vehicle 

accident when he failed to avoid a car that was stalled in the roadway 

with its emergency lights flashing. The driver of a vehicle traveling in 

front of Alvarado just prior to the accident testified she had seen the 

emergency lights from approximately one-half mile away. She changed 

lanes to pass the stalled vehicle, but Alvarado apparently did not. He 

collided with the stalled vehicle, injuring its passenger and setting off a 

chain reaction of additional collisions. The injured passenger, who had 

been standing outside the stalled vehicle just prior to impact, sustained 

cuts and scratches, and her ear was nearly severed. She testified she had 

looked for approaching traffic when she got out of the vehicle but 

 

1

 Unless otherwise indicated, all exhibit references are to the exhibits attached to the 

Respondents’ Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 9). 

2

 The factual summary of the Arizona Court of Appeals is accorded a presumption of 

correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n. 1 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

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“wasn't worried” because the “few cars” she saw coming were “fairly 

far back.” 

 A victim from a different vehicle testified that, prior to the 

accident, Alvarado had been driving “fast,” “recklessly,” and “cutting 

in and out of traffic.” Another victim described Alvarado's vehicle as 

“speeding” and “darting in and out” of traffic. A deputy sheriff who 

spoke with Alvarado at the accident scene testified he had “smell[ed] a 

strong odor of intoxicants” and that Alvarado's speech had been 

slurred. Another deputy administered field sobriety tests and a 

horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test to Alvarado at the scene. She 

testified Alvarado “had red, watery, bloodshot eyes”; “his face was 

flushed”; and “[h]e was stumbling, kind of staggering, swaying back 

and forth.” Alvarado exhibited six out of six possible “cues of 

impairment” on the HGN test, and he performed badly on, or was 

unable to complete, the field sobriety tests. After he was arrested and 

read his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 

1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), Alvarado admitted having drunk “a 

couple shots of peppermint schnapps.” Testing of blood drawn from 

Alvarado within two hours after the accident revealed an alcohol 

concentration of .149 percent. 

Ex. A, p. 2. 

 After Alvarado’s appointed appellate counsel could find no issues for appeal 

and filed a brief in compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

Alvarado filed a pro se supplemental brief raising the following claims: 

1. The trial court erred when it failed to give the jury proper 

instructions and by failing to properly answer jury questions. 

2. The trial court erred in denying Alvarado’s motion for a directed 

verdict on all counts because there was insufficient evidence to support 

his conviction. 

3. The trial court erred in denying Alvarado’s motion in limine 

which sought to prevent the prosecution from introducing evidence that 

one of the victims was pregnant at the time of the collision. 

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Ex. C (Supplemental Brief), pp. 4-6. By Memorandum Decision filed on May 9, 

2008, the Court of Appeals denied Alvarado’s appeal on the merits and affirmed the 

convictions and sentences. Ex. A. Alvarado then sought review of the decision by 

the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied the petition by letter dated October 21, 

2008. Ex. D. 

 On October 31, 2008, Alvarado initiated state post-conviction relief (“PCR”) 

proceedings with the filing of his pro se PCR petition. Ex. E. In his subsequently 

filed memorandum, he argued that: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to jury instructions and the trial court’s answers to jury questions, failing to 

object to witness testimony that was contradicted in police reports, and failing to 

object to the sentence imposed based on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); 

(2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred in 

denying his motion in limine which sought to prevent the prosecution from 

introducing evidence that one of the victims was pregnant at the time of the collision; 

(4) the trial court and a juror improperly commented on his absence at trial; (5) his 

post-collision statement was taken in violation of Miranda; (6) his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object to the court’s responses to the jurors’ questions and to 

the illegal sentence imposed; and (7) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 

to provide Alvarado with trial transcripts. Ex. D (memorandum filed in support of 

PCR petition) pp. 1-15; Ex. E (Trial Court Ruling), p. 2 (summary of PCR claims). 

The trial court denied each of Alvarado’s claims, rejecting the ineffective assistance 

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claims on the merits and finding the remaining claims precluded because they had 

either been waived or were previously raised and denied on direct appeal. Ex. F. 

 Alvarado filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, raising 

claims that (1) the trial judge improperly commented on his absence during trial, (2) 

the trial court and trial counsel erred in allowing his statement into evidence in 

violation of Miranda, (3) the sentencing court erred in not acknowledging a claim of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, (4) the sentencing court erred in not 

acknowledging a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Ex. G, p. 2. 

By Memorandum Decision filed on March 8, 2011, the Court of Appeals granted 

review, but denied relief. Ex. B. The Court of Appeals noted that it would not 

disturb the trial court’s ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Id., p. 2. The court then 

found that Alvarado arguably had raised his Miranda claim as an ineffective 

assistance of counsel but, even if considered as such, found the claim meritless. Ex. 

B, pp. 4-5. The court then found that Alvarado’s claims of ineffectiveness related to 

the pretrial investigation of the case and the failure to present mitigating evidence at 

sentencing were not raised before the trial court and therefore would not be 

addressed. Id., pp. 4-5. The court then addressed Alvarado’s claim that his counsel 

did not provide him the transcripts necessary to raise a claim that the trial court 

improperly commented on his absence, and found it without merit. Id., pp. 5. 

Alvarado sought review of the Court of Appeals’ order by the Arizona Supreme 

Court, and by letter dated June 15, 2011, the petition was denied. Ex. H. 

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 In the petition now before the Court, Alvarado raises six claims. In Ground 

One, he claims the trial court violated his rights to due process by improperly 

instructing the jury on questions of law. In Ground Two, he alleges that his due 

process and fair trial rights were violated because the evidence against him was 

insufficient to support his conviction. In Ground Three, he contends that the trial 

court violated his fair trial and due process rights by denying his motion in limine to 

preclude the introduction into evidence of the victim’s pregnancy. In Ground Four, 

he claims his lawyers were ineffective at trial and on appeal. In Ground Five, he 

alleges that his right against self-incrimination was violated by the introduction at 

trial of his statement to police. In Ground Six, he alleges that his right to due process 

was violated because he is “actually innocent” of aggravated assault. Petition, pp. 6-

9. 

II. TIMELINESS 

 The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

provides for a one year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations 

period must be dismissed. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that: 

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

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States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

 Here, in Alvarado’s direct appeal proceedings, the Arizona Supreme Court 

denied review on October 21, 2008. Ex. D. Alvarado then had 90 days to petition the 

U.S. Supreme Court for review. Sup.Ct.R. 13. When he did not do so, his judgment 

became final on January 19, 2009. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 

1999). 

 However, the limitations period was statutorily tolled because Alvarado’s 

PCR was pending at the time. Ex. E; See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a). Alvarado’s properly filed PCR petition remained pending until June 15, 

2011, when the Arizona Supreme Court denied relief. See Lawrence v. Florida ̧ 549 

U.S. 327, 332 (2007). Because Alvarado filed the instant petition on August 11, 

2011, well within a year of that date, it is timely. 

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III. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 Respondents argue that Grounds Three and Five are procedurally defaulted 

and not subject to habeas review. Additionally, Respondents contend that the state 

court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in rejecting the 

remaining claims. 

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default 

 A state prisoner must exhaust the available state remedies before a federal 

court may consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). “[A] petitioner 

fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the 

exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through 

the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the 

claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations 

omitted). 

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these 

claims. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). "To exhaust one's 

state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct 

appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief 

pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then 

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present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 Additionally, a state prisoner must not only present the claims to the proper 

court, but must also present them fairly. A claim has been “fairly presented” if the 

petitioner has described the operative facts and federal legal theories on which the 

claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 

F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). “Our rule is that a state prisoner has not ‘fairly 

presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically 

indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law.” Lyons v. 

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 

904 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must alert the state court to the specific federal 

constitutional guaranty upon which his claims are based, Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 

F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001), however, general appeals in state court to broad 

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair 

trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. 

Lyons, 232 F.3d at 669. 

 Moreover, it is not enough that a petitioner presented to the state court all the 

facts necessary to support an inadequately identified federal claim or that a 

“somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 28 

(2004); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (mere similarity 

between a claim of state and federal error insufficient to establish exhaustion). 

“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of 

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an underlying federal legal theory.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

 Claims may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas review 

in a variety of circumstances. If a state court expressly applied an adequate and 

independent state procedural bar when the petitioner attempted to raise the claim in 

state court review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court is barred. See 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). Arizona courts have been consistent 

in the application of the state’s procedural default rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 

856, 860 (2002) (holding that Ariz.R.Cirm.P. 32.2(a) is an adequate and independent 

procedural bar). In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts on 

either direct appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review 

because any attempt to return to state court to present them would be futile unless the 

claims fit into a narrow range of exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) 

(precluding claims not raised on direct appeal or in prior post-conviction relief 

petitions), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty 

days of trial court’s decision). Because these rules have been found to be 

consistently and regularly followed, and because they are independent of federal law, 

either their specific application to a claim by an Arizona court, or their operation to 

preclude a return to state court to exhaust a claim, will procedurally bar subsequent 

review of the merits of such a claim by a federal habeas court. Stewart, 536 U.S. at 

860; Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998) (Rule 32, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

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is strictly followed); State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996) (waiver and 

preclusion rules strictly applied in postconviction proceedings). 

 1. Ground Three

 In Ground Three, Alvarado claims that the trial court violated his rights to due 

process and a fair trial by denying his motion in limine seeking to preclude evidence 

that one of his victims was three months pregnant at the time of the collision. 

Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 6-7. Respondents contend that the claim was not 

properly exhausted because Petitioner did not fairly present the claim as based on 

federal law. Answer, p. 7. In his opening brief on direct appeal, Alvarado, without 

any reference to state or federal cases, or to his due process or fair trial rights, 

asserted that the trial courts’ denial of the motion “caused a violation of defendants[‘] 

VI and XIV amendment rights under the United States Constitution.” Ex. C, p. 6. 

As Respondents contend, the bald reference to the United States Constitution was 

insufficient to inform the State court of the federal nature of the claim. 

 To properly exhaust this claim, Alvarado was required to make the federal 

nature of the claim “explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of the 

federal courts.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 

F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). Also, because Alvarado was representing himself on 

appeal, the citation to a state case applying the appropriate federal standard to the 

claim would have sufficed. Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (2003). Here, 

however, Alvarado did neither. Under similar circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has 

made it clear that “general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due 

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process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish 

exhaustion.” Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (1999), citing Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996). The Ninth Circuit has also required “more 

than drive-by citation” to find a claim properly federalized. Castillo v. McFadden, 

399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005). Under these standards, Alvarado did not present 

his claims in a manner that would have sufficiently alerted the Arizona Court of 

Appeals to the federal nature of his claim. He referenced two constitutional 

amendments, but did not identify any specific rights provided for in those 

amendments that were violated by the trial court. Understandably, addressing the 

claim on appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals addressed the claim solely on state 

evidentiary grounds. Ex. A, pp. 6-7. Accordingly, Alvarado did not exhaust his fair 

trial or due process claims in the Arizona state courts. 

 Any attempt by Alvarado to return to state court to present Ground Three 

would be futile because it would be procedurally barred pursuant to Arizona law. See 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. 1, and 32.2(a) and (b); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th

Cir. 2002) (a state post-conviction action is futile when it is time-barred); State v. 

Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1048–53 (Ariz. 1996); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(a)(3) (relief is 

precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral 

proceeding); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a) (notice of post-conviction review “must be filed 

within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later”); 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9 (petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial 

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court's decision). Because no state remedies are currently available, Alvarado’s 

claim is technically exhausted and procedurally barred. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

732, and 735 n. 1. 

 2. Ground Five 

Alvarado’s fifth claim is that his statement that he had “a couple of shots of 

peppermint Schnapps” was improperly admitted at trial in violation of his rights 

under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Alvarado did not raise this claim on 

direct appeal. Ex. C. He attempted to raise it in his PCR proceedings, but the trial 

court found the claim precluded under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a). Ex. F. Reviewing the 

trial court’s decision, the Court of Appeals found that Alvarado had “couched this 

claim in terms of ineffective assistance of trial counsel,” and found the trial court 

improperly found it precluded. Ex. B, pp. 4-5. However, the claim that Alvarado 

raises in Ground Five of the instant petition is not based on ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Here, he argues that the admission of the statement was “plain error” and 

makes no mention of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner’s Memorandum, 

pp. 8-9. Thus, he has not presented the state court with the same claim he presents 

here, see Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971), and it is not properly 

exhausted. 

 As is the case in Ground Three, this claim is also procedurally barred under 

Arizona law and can be addressed by this Court only it Alvarado can establish a basis 

to overcome the bar. 

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 3. Cause and Prejudice or Actual Innocence 

 A federal court may not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim 

unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for his noncompliance and actual 

prejudice, or establish that a miscarriage of justice would result from the lack of 

review. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). To establish cause, a 

petitioner must point to some objective factor external to the defense impeded his 

efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (2004). “[C]ause is an external impediment such as government interference 

or reasonable unavailability of a claims factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 

1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Ignorance of the state’s procedural 

rules or lack of legal training do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for a 

petitioner’s failure to fairly present a claim. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of 

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908-10 (9th Cir. 1986); Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 

1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the 

constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 

1984); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Alternatively, a federal court may review the merits of a procedurally 

defaulted claim where a petitioner can establish that a “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice” would otherwise result. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. at 327. A fundamental 

miscarriage of justice exists when a constitutional violation resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent. Id. 

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 Alvarado argues that his lack of access to a law library and to a “person 

adequately trained in the law” caused his inability to develop and federalize his 

claims. Supplemental Memorandum, p. 9. However, Alvarado’s claimed 

inadequacies and lack of expertise in the legal system do not excuse his procedural 

defaults of Grounds Three and Five. Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. Of Corrections, 800 

F.2d 905, 907-09 (9th Cir. 1986). Additionally, his pro se briefs filed here and in the 

state courts are replete with citation to authority, both state and federal, and 

undermine any claim that he did not have access to legal materials. In fact, he 

successfully exhausted some of his claims, but simply failed to do so on Grounds 

Three and Five. As such, he has not presented the sort of external impediment 

sufficient to support a finding of cause for his failure to properly raise this claim in 

State court. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (requiring “some 

objective factor external to the defense” to support a finding of cause). 

 Alvarado also argues that he is actually innocent of aggravated assault. 

Separate Memorandum, pp. 9-10. In an extraordinary case, where a constitutional 

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of a person who is actually innocent 

of the crime, a federal court may grant habeas relief even in the absence of a showing 

of cause for a procedural default. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 388-89 (2004). As 

discussed below in relation to Alvarado’s Ground Six, Alvarado cannot establish that 

he is not guilty of aggravated assault. Therefore, the Court recommends the finding 

that Grounds Three and Five are not subject to review. 

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 B. Merits

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect 

to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal 

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a 

new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails 

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is 

objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 1. Ground One 

Alvarado’s first claim is that his due process and fair trial rights were violated 

when the trial court improperly responded to a jury question. Specifically, he 

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contends that after the jury submitted a question about the removal of “knowingly” 

and “intentionally” as mental states applicable to the charge of aggravated assault, 

the trial court provided a response that was “insufficient and ambiguous to the degree 

that the jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was 

guilty of aggravated assault.” Separate Memorandum, p. 4. 

 Issues regarding jury instructions usually present questions of state law only 

and are not subject to federal habeas corpus review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 

71–72 (1991). A challenged jury instruction requires habeas relief only if the 

instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates 

due process. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 378 (1990) 

(citation omitted). A federal habeas court must determine whether there is a 

reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way 

that violates the Constitution. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 63. Here, there is no such 

likelihood. 

 In finding that the trial court’s answer was “clear, complete, and legally 

sound,” the Arizona Court of Appeals reasoned as follows: 

 The jury’s first question expressed confusion over differences in 

the trial court’s preliminary versus final instructions regarding the 

assault charge; the court directed the jury to apply the final instructions, 

which were based on the evidence presented at trial. 

Ex. A, pp.4-5. 

 In the petition and the supporting memorandum, Alvarado does not explain 

how he believes the Court of Appeals’ treatment of this claim constituted an 

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unreasonable application of federal law. In fact, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion is 

fully-supported by the note in question. When the jurors asked about changes in the 

jury instructions after the trial was completed, the trial court explained: 

The “elements” of assault, as given to you in the beginning of the trial . 

. . were all-encompassing (i.e., the various ways that an assault could 

be committed). The “elements” of an assault, as given to you at the end 

(as final jury instruction #19D.(1)) constitutes the only basis (recklessly 

causing personal injury), if any, by which an assault could have been 

committed in this case. 

Ex. H. Thus, the record reflects that the trial court, after concluding that the evidence 

presented at trial could not support a finding that Alvarado committed assault either 

“knowingly” or “intentionally,” removed those options from the instructions. The 

Court cannot understand why Alvarado believes that the change to the instructions 

altered the State’s burden of proof. Under A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(1), the State, in 

order to obtain a conviction for assault, remained obligated to show that Alvarado 

acted “recklessly.” A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(1) (West 2001). Given these facts, and the 

lack of any compelling argument by Alvarado, there is no basis to question the 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision on this claim. 

 2. Grounds Two and Six

 Alvarado’s next argument is that insufficient evidence was presented to 

support his conviction and that the State, in violation of In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 

(1970), did not prove him guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Separate Memorandum, pp. 4-5. The Court of Appeals determined that the evidence 

at trial showed that Alvarado caused a five-vehicle accident when he failed to avoid a 

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car that was stalled in the roadway. A witness testified that, prior to the accident, 

Alvarado had been driving “fast,” “recklessly,” and “cutting in and out of traffic.” 

Another victim described Alvarado's vehicle as “speeding” and “darting in and out” 

of traffic. The injuries caused by the accident included cuts, scratches, and nearlysevered ear. After the crash, testing of blood drawn from Alvarado revealed an 

alcohol concentration of .149 percent. Ex. A, p. 2. These factual findings of the 

state courts are presumed to be correct and are subject to review only if the findings 

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2) & (e)(1). Alvarado has presented nothing that would cause the Court to 

question the presumed validity of the state courts’ factual findings. 

 Turning next to the Arizona law under which Alvarado was convicted, the 

assault statute in effect at the time provided that “[a] person commits assault by . . . 

[i]ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing any physical injury to another 

person . . . .” A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(1) (West 2001). An assault committed under 

section 13-1203 could be aggravated if it caused “serious physical injury to another,” 

or if a “deadly weapon or dangerous instrument” was used. A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(1)-

(2) (West 2001). Applying this law to the facts found by the Court of Appeals, it was 

certainly not unreasonable for the jury or the state courts to find that Alvarado acted 

recklessly by driving in the condition and manner in which he did, that he caused 

physical injury, and that his car was a dangerous instrument and/or that the severing 

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of an ear constitutes “serious physical injury.” As such, this Court can find no basis 

for relief on this claim under the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 The foregoing analysis applies with equal force to Alvarado’s sixth claim. 

There, he alleges that he is actually innocent because “there is no conceivable way 

the Petitioner can be guilty of aggravated assault because the intent element cannot 

be proved.” Actual innocence means factual innocence, not merely legal 

insufficiency. Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, the evidence 

presented at trial was sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to convict Alvarado of 

aggravated assault under Arizona law and Alvarado has presented no additional 

evidence that undermines the verdict. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995). 

As such, Alvarado’s claim of actual innocence is meritless. 

 3. Ground Four 

 In Ground Four, Alvarado alleges three instances of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. The operative legal standard applicable to these claims is a familiar one, 

addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984). The standards enunciated there by the Court are applied unless there is 

other Supreme Court precedent directly on point. See Wright v. Van Patten, 128 

S.Ct. 743, 746 (2008). Under Strickland, Alvarado must show both deficient 

performance and prejudice in order to establish that counsel’s representation was 

ineffective. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Deficient performance is established by a 

petitioner’s showing that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Hill, 474 U.S. at 57 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). In the 

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context of rejecting a plea offer, the question is “not whether ‘counsel’s advice [was] 

right or wrong, but . . . whether that advice was within the range of competence 

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 880 

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). 

“Counsel cannot be required to accurately predict what the jury or court might find, 

but he can be required to give the defendant the tools he needs to make an intelligent 

decision.” Id. at 881. 

 To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. at 1384 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694). “In the context of pleas, a defendant must show the outcome of the plea 

process would have been different with competent advice.” Id. When applying these 

standards to a claim that ineffective assistance led to the improvident rejection of a 

guilty plea, the petitioner must show “that but for the ineffective advice of counsel 

there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the 

court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution 

would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the court 

would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the 

offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that 

in fact were imposed.” Cooper, 132 S.Ct. at 1386. 

 Federal habeas rules also instruct that, if the state court has already rejected a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a federal habeas court may grant relief 

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only if it finds the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of the Strickland standards. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 

(2003). The review of counsel’s performance must be “highly deferential” and must 

adopt counsel’s perspective at the time of the challenged decision or conduct, in 

order to avoid the distorting effects of hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There 

is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable assistance, id., and the Supreme Court had described federal review of a 

state court’s decision on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as “doubly 

deferential.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (quoting Knowles v. 

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 112-113 (2009)). 

 Alvarado’s first claim of ineffective assistance alleges that his trial counsel 

should have objected to the trial court’s response to the juror question regarding the 

elimination of the “knowingly” and “intentionally” options for the mental state 

required to support a conviction for aggravated assault. Separate Memorandum, pp. 

6-7. The substance of this claim, that the trial court’s response constituted error, was 

rejected on direct appeal. The Court of Appeals found that the court’s answer was 

“clear, complete, and legally sound,” and resolved the jury’s “confusion over 

differences in the trial court’s preliminary versus final instructions regarding the 

assault charge” by directing the jury to “apply the final instructions, which were 

based on the evidence presented at trial.” Ex. A, pp. 4-5. As discussed above in 

relation to Ground One, Alvarado’s argument fails to present any reason for 

questioning the propriety of the trial court’s instructions or response to the jury 

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question regarding the mental state required for his conviction. Accordingly, the 

Court recommends this claim be denied because any objection by Alvarado’s counsel 

would have been futile and thus cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 

See, e.g., James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding no prejudice in trial 

counsel’s failure to raise futile objection to jury instruction). 

 Alvarado’s second claim of ineffective assistance is that his trial counsel 

failed to seek suppression under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), of his 

admission that he had been drinking prior to the collision. In rejecting this claim in 

Alvarado’s appeal in his PCR proceedings, the Court of Appeals explained: 

 The only statement Alvarado identifies as involuntary was his 

admission to a police officer that he had drunk “a couple shots of 

peppermint schnapps” before driving. Even had that evidence not been 

admitted, however, other evidence still demonstrated Alvarado’s BAC 

within two hours of the accident in question was .149. Thus, any error 

in the admission of his statement was plainly harmless, and Alvarado 

therefore has not demonstrated he was prejudiced by his counsel’s 

failure to raise a Miranda claim, even assuming there was a valid basis 

for him to do so. 

Ex. B, p. 4. Alvarado does not attempt to explain how or why the Court of Appeals’ 

decision could be characterized as contrary to, or an unreasonable application of the 

Strickland standards. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). Alvarado 

simply has not established “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-94. The evidence of Alvarado’s BAC, to which Alvarado 

does not object, was more probative of his condition than his admission to drinking. 

It is therefore recommended that this claim be denied. 

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 Alvarado’s final claim is that his appellate counsel was ineffective because he 

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), thereby failing to 

properly federalize his claim that that the trial court erred in denying his motion in 

limine to preclude evidence of the victim’s pregnancy. Separate Memorandum, p. 8. 

The Strickland framework applies to this claim, and to demonstrate prejudice, 

Alvarado must show a reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on appeal 

absent counsel’s errors. See Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989). 

This he cannot do. 

 As Respondents contend, Alvarado was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged 

failure because he raised the claim himself on appeal, see Ex. C (Supplemental 

Brief), and because the claim is meritless. The Arizona Court of Appeals, addressing 

the substantive claim underlying Alvarado’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, reasonably explained as follows: 

 Finally, Alvarado contends that the trial court erred by denying 

his motion in limine and admitting evidence that the passenger of the 

stalled vehicle had been three months pregnant at the time of the 

accident. . . . Alvarado argues the victim’s pregnancy was irrelevant, 

“[t]here was no complication in the pregnancy nor was there any injury 

to the unborn child,” and “[a]llowing this information to be introduced 

was highly prejudicial.” But even assuming the evidence was 

irrelevant, it was not unduly prejudicial, and no prejudice resulted. As 

Alvarado acknowledges, the jury heard evidence that there was no 

harm to the pregnancy or the unborn child, and the trial court 

specifically questioned the jurors during voir dire to determine they 

would not be biased by the fact of the victim’s pregnancy. 

Ex. A, pp. 6-7. Alvarado does not explain how this claim could have been improved 

had it been raised by counsel rather than be Alvarado himself. Moreover, Alvarado 

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has not identified any clearly established federal law under which this claim could be 

found meritorious had it been “properly federalized.” Accordingly, this claim is 

without merit. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Alvarado’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Replies shall not be filed without 

first obtaining leave to do so from the District Court. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 11-0495-TUC-JGZ. Failure to timely 

 . . . . 

 . . . . 

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file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 5th day of September, 2013. 

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