Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01244/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01244-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 

NASHVILLE DIVISION 

DALE MAISANO, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 3:13-cv-0947 

 ) 

CORIZON HEALTH INC., ) Judge Sharp 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED ) 

STATES, ERIC HEMPTON HOLDER, JR., ) 

WEXFORD HEALTH SERVICES, and ) 

STATE OF ARIZONA, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

ORDER 

 Before the Court are yet another a pro se complaint (ECF No. 1) and an application to proceed in 

forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) filed by plaintiff Dale Maisano. 

 As an initial matter, the Court finds that the plaintiff has substantially complied with the restraining 

order entered against him on August 11, 1992 by Senior United States District Judge Stephen M. 

McNamee, see Maisano v. Lewis, CIV 92-1026-PHX-SMM (MS) (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 1992) (Order and 

Restraining Order). The Court will therefore provisionally permit the present filing. 

A. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner bringing a civil 

action may be permitted to file suit without prepaying the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). 

Because the plaintiff has submitted an in forma pauperis affidavit and a certified trust fund account 

statement, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), and because it appears from his submissions that the 

plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources from which to pay the full filing fee in advance, the application 

ordinarily would be granted without further discussion. 

 In this case, however, as suggested above, the plaintiff has filed dozens of cases that have 

previously been dismissed for failure to state a claim or for frivolity. The effect of the PLRA was to 

implement “constraints designed to prevent sportive filings in federal court.” Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 

1289, 1299 (2011). The PLRA provides that a prisoner who would otherwise be qualified to proceed in 

forma pauperis is not eligible to do so if he has, 

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on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an 

action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it 

[was] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). In other words, a prisoner-plaintiff who meets this standard—that is, who has “three 

strikes”—while not precluded from filing a civil lawsuit in federal court, may not do so at taxpayer expense 

unless he is under “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Id.

 The plaintiff here seeks to avoid the application of § 1915(g) by alleging that he is under imminent 

danger of serious physical injury based on prison officials’ failure to treat the plaintiff’s “urology/bladder 

etc. kidney urin[e] issues” (ECF No. 1, at 3). The plaintiff alleges that he has a serious urological condition 

that has been diagnosed by a urologist, that treatment has been ordered but never provided, that he has 

suffered from the problem for over a year and it has become worse as a result of the failure to treat it, and 

that it affects his daily activities and causes ongoing hardship. (ECF No. 2–4.) More specifically, the 

plaintiff alleges that he experiences pain when passing urine, and that he has a “leakage” problem that 

has become more pronounced recently. The plaintiff seeks to hold Corizon Health, Inc. and Wexford 

Health Services, as well as the state of Arizona and Attorney General Eric Holder, liable for the failure 

adequately to treat his condition. He alleges that “all defendants” and the medical staff employed at the 

prison where he is incarcerated are aware of his condition and have acted with deliberate indifference in 

failing to treat it. He also alleges that the failure to treat is motivated by the medical providers’ desire to 

save money. The plaintiff states he was sent to an outside doctor a “few days ago,” but that this doctor 

did not have any of the plaintiff’s past medical records, and, although he prescribed medication, the 

plaintiff never received that medication. The plaintiff asserts that he is in imminent danger of serious 

physical injury as a result of the failure to treat his worsening urological problems. The plaintiff’s complaint 

is supplemented by documentation indicating he has been requesting treatment for pain upon urination 

and increased problems with leaking urine. 

 Because the Court finds that the plaintiff has adequately alleged imminent danger of serious 

physical injury resulting from the alleged failure to treat a potentially serious medical condition, the 

application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. However, under § 1915(b), the 

plaintiff nonetheless remains responsible for paying the full filing fee. In accordance with the PLRA, the 

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plaintiff is hereby assessed1

 the full $350 filing fee,2 to be paid as follows: 

 (1) The custodian of the plaintiff’s inmate trust fund account at the institution where he now 

resides is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, “20 percent of the greater of – 

(a) the average monthly deposits to the plaintiff’s account; or (b) the average monthly balance in the 

plaintiff’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(1). 

 (2) After the initial filing fee is fully paid, the trust fund officer must withdraw from the plaintiff’s 

account and pay to the Clerk of this Court monthly payments equal to 20% of all deposits credited to the 

plaintiff’s account during the preceding month, but only when the amount in the account exceeds $10. 

Such payments must continue until the entire $350 filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

 (3) Each time the trust account officer makes a payment to this court as required by this order, he 

must print a copy of the prisoner’s account statement showing all activity in the account since the last 

payment made in accordance with this order and submit it to the Clerk along with the payment. All 

submissions to the court must clearly identify the plaintiff’s name and the case number as indicated on 

the first page of this order, and must be mailed to: Clerk, United States District Court, Middle District of 

Tennessee, 801 Broadway, Nashville, TN 37203. 

 If the plaintiff is transferred to a different prison or released, he is ORDERED to notify the court 

immediately, in writing, of his change of address. 

 The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED send a copy of this order to the Warden of the Arizona State 

Prison to ensure that the custodian of the plaintiff’s inmate trust account complies with that portion of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining to the payment of the filing fee. If the plaintiff is transferred from his present 

place of confinement, the custodian of his inmate trust fund account MUST ensure that a copy of this 

order follows the plaintiff to his new place of confinement for continued compliance with this order. 

 1

 The Court is fully aware of the futility of assessing the fee against Maisano, but is required by 

statute to do so nonetheless. 

2

 Effective May 1, 2013, the Judicial Conference of the United States established a $50 

administrative fee for filing a civil action in a U.S. District Court, as a result of which the fee for filing a new 

civil case increased to $400. The $50 administrative fee does not apply to cases filed by pro se prisoner 

plaintiffs who have been provisionally granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. 

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B. Transfer of Case 

 Having granted the application to proceed as a pauper, the Court would ordinarily conduct an 

initial review of the plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. In this case, however, 

an initial perusal of the complaint reveals that it was filed in the wrong venue. 

 The plaintiff is housed at the Arizona State Prison (“ASP”) in Tucson, Arizona. Although he 

alleges that one of the defendants named in the complaint, Corizon, has its principle place of business in 

Tennessee, the claims in his complaint are based upon the conditions of the plaintiff’s confinement while 

he has been detained at the ASP. The defendants named in the complaint other than Corizon have no 

connection whatsoever to the state of Tennessee, and this Court lacks jurisdiction over them. 

 The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) states: 

A civil action may be brought in– 

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the 

State in which the district is located; 

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to 

the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is 

situated; or 

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this 

section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal 

jurisdiction with respect to such action. 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)–(3). An entity named as a defendant is deemed to “reside” “in any judicial district 

in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in 

question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). While Corizon’s corporate headquarters are in Tennessee, it also 

“resides” in Arizona for purposes of the venue statute, since it operates in and is subject to jurisdiction in 

that state for purposes of the plaintiff’s claims. Moreover, none of the other defendants reside in 

Tennessee. Venue is therefore not appropriate in Tennessee under § 1391(b)(1). Because the events 

giving rise to Maisano’s complaint occurred in Arizona, venue in Tennessee is not appropriate under § 

1391(b)(2) either. Venue is appropriate in Arizona under both provisions, however. Consequently, the 

last-resort venue provision in § 1391(b)(3) does not apply. In short, regardless of the fact that Corizon 

would be subject to jurisdiction in this Court, venue for this action is appropriate only in the state of 

Arizona. 

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 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that this case be transferred to the United States District Court for 

the District of Arizona, Tucson Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), for all further proceedings. 

 This Court has not conducted an initial review of the plaintiff's complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2) or § 1915A. 

 It is so ORDERED. 

 

Kevin H. Sharp 

United States District Judge 

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