Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02209/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02209-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

URIDD STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SANTIAGO TAPIA, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

FILED 

United StateJ Court of Appeals 

Tenrh Circuit 

MAR 5 lQ!H 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 89-2209 

ROBERT TANSY, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE URIDD STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF HEW IIBXICO 

(D.C. BO. 87-1250 SC) 

Tova Indritz, Federal Public Defender (Teresa E. Storch, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, on the briefs), Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant. 

Anthony Tupler, Assistant Attorney General (Hal Stratton, Attorney 

General, with him on the brief), Santa Fe, New Mexico, Attorneys 

for Respondent-Appellee. 

Before LOGAR, ABDERSOB, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

ABDERSOB, Circuit Judge. 

Santiago "Jimmy" Tapia ("Jimmy" or "Tapia") was convicted in 

New Mexico state court of second degree murder in the death of 

Jeffrey Stevers and aggravated battery of Sergio de la Rosa. 

After exhausting his appeals in state court with respect to issues 

raised here, Tapia filed for habeas relief in federal court pursuant to 28 u.s.c. S 2254, contending that: (1) the loss of the 

original preliminary hearing tapes violated his Sixth Amendment 

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 1 
right to confrontation by depriving him of material information 

necessary to effectively cross-examine witnesses, and the court's 

failure to arraign him after the second preliminary hearing denied 

him due process: (2) the trial court's sealing of the police 

chief's affidavit denied Tapia his Sixth Amendment right to 

confront and cross-examine the witness against him; (3) the 

submission of a second degree murder instruction on an accessory 

theory denied him due process and a fair trial: (4) the admission 

of allegedly perjured testimony deprived him of due process and a 

fair trial: and, (5) ineffective assistance of counsel in pursuing 

his direct appeal denied him his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 

Upon review of the briefs, the magistrate submitted his 

proposed findings on Tapia's contentions to the district court and 

recommended that Tapia's petition be dismissed with prejudice. 

The district court, after a de nQYQ review, adopted the 

magistrate's findings and recommended disposition and, accordingly, dismissed the petition with prejudice. On appeal, Tapia 

reasserts his claims raised below. We affirm. 1 

BACKGROUND 

The key witnesses against Tapia were Sergio de la Rosa and 

Pam Carrillo. Both witnesses gave different accounts of the 

relevant evening's events to the police, at the two preliminary 

hearings, and at trial. However, the basic facts as presented at 

1 After oral argument, Tapia sent this court a notarized 

affidavit and a letter confessing that he killed Jeffrey Stevers. 

However, since the documents are outside the record, we have not 

relied on them in reaching our decision. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 2 
trial are as follows: A group of people were at Jeffrey Stevers's 

house the night of September 7, including Jeffrey Stevers, Robert 

and Pam Carrillo, Sergio de la Rosa, Boo Boo and Julio Visarraga, 

and Mike Lucero. Many had been drinking and sniffing paint. 

Jimmy and his brother, Eddie Tapia, came to the house later that 

evening. When Stevers left the house for a short time to buy some 

beer, Jimmy and de la Rosa began to fight. In the altercation, de 

la Rosa suffered a knife wound. Pam Carrillo testified that she 

saw both the Tapia brothers with a knife. She testified first 

that Jimmy alone stabbed de la Rosa, but she later stated that 

Eddie had also stabbed de la Rosa. De la Rosa testified that only 

Jimmy had stabbed him and that he never saw Eddie with a knife. 

Upon Stevers's return, he and Jimmy went outside. Carrillo 

testified that the two went out alone and that Eddie Tapia 

remained inside. De la Rosa stated that when Stevers returned he 

told everyone to leave. De la Rosa was leaving through a bathroom 

window when he heard people talking outside the house and heard 

Jimmy say "dejame matarlo" (let me kill him). When Stevers reentered the house, he collapsed with a fatal stab wound. 

On the first day of trial, de la Rosa testified that Detective Sergeant Ramiro Flores, the officer investigating the murder, 

promised to release him on other pending charges if he would 

testify (presumably against Jimmy) in court. He stated that 

Flores questioned him in the hospital, tape-recording only 

specific portions of de la Rosa's statements, and told de la Rosa 

to state that he heard Jimmy say "dejame matarlo." Flores allegedly also told de la Rosa that if he did not give a taped state-

-3-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 3 
ment he would be charged with the murder. On the second day of 

trial, the prosecution recalled de la Rosa to the stand. De la 

Rosa recanted his original testimony and admitted to perjuring 

himself because of threats of harm to his family. He then denied 

that Flores selectively recorded his hospital statements and 

prompted his answers. He testified that he did actually hear 

Jimmy say "dejame matarlo." 

Carrillo testified that she accepted $40 from Flores the day 

after the preliminary hearing and that Flores told her he needed 

her testimony. Boo Boo Visarraga admitted to accepting $30 from 

Flores. His brother, Julio Visarraga, testified that Flores offered him money to lie and say that Jimmy was at Stevers's house 

that night. Julio rejected the offer. Although the amount is 

disputed, Flores admitted he gave money to Carrillo and Boo Boo, 

but claimed that he did so for humanitarian reasons. 

Tapia went to trial under an amended criminal information 

charging him with second degree murder as a principal in violation 

of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-l(B) (1978), and with aggravated battery 

in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 30-3-S(C) (1978). The jury 

found him guilty on both counts and he was sentenced to 13 years 

imprisonment. 

Our review of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is 

confined to alleged denials of federal constitutional rights. 

Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 843 (lOth Cir. 1979), cert. 

denied, 444 u.s. 1047 (1980). With respect to claims asserting a 

denial of due process, we will not question the evidentiary or 

procedural rulings of the state court unless Tapia can show that, 

-4-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 4 
because of the court's actions, his trial, as a whole, was 

rendered fundamentally unfair. Nichols v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 

1250, 1253 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 109 s.ct. 3169 (1989). With 

respect to Tapia's various Sixth Amendment claims, we review 

ultimate legal conclusions de ~· Laycock v. State of New 

Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 1187 (lOth Cir. 1989) (ineffective 

assistance of counsel); Nichols v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d at 1253 

(citing Taylor v. Lombard, 606 F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1979) 

(addresses alleged prosecutorial use of perjured testimony), cert. 

denied, 445 u.s. 946 (1980)); Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillow State 

Farm, 715 F.2d 1050, 1055 (6th Cir. 1983) (right to 

confrontation), cert. denied, 464 u.s. 1071 (1984); see Browning 

v. Foltz, 837 F.2d 276, 280-81 (6th Cir. 1988) (notice of 

charges), cert. denied, 488 u.s. 1018 (1989). Underlying findings 

of fact are accorded a presumption of correctness. 28 u.s.c. 

§ 2254(d); Case v. Mondragon, 887 F.2d 1388 (lOth Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 110 s.ct. 1490 (1990). 

DISCUSSION 

I. 

LOSS OF PRELIMINARY HEARING TAPES 

Through inadvertence, the original preliminary hearing tapes 

were lost and the district court held a second preliminary hearing. Tapia claims that, since he did not have access to the tapes 

of the first preliminary hearing, he was deprived of a source of 

material information necessary for effectively cross-examining and 

impeaching the testimony of de la Rosa, thus violating his Sixth 

-5-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 5 
Amendment right to confrontation. Because of that alleged violation, he contends that the trial court was required to dismiss the 

case against him. We disagree. 

"The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections 

for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who 

testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination." 

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987); see also United 

States v. Lane, 883 F.2d 1484, 1502 (lOth Cir. 1989) (citing Davis 

v. Alaska, 415 u.s. 308, 315-17 (1974)), cert. denied, 110 s.ct. 

872 (1990). However, "the Confrontation Clause only guarantees 

'an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever 

extent, the defense might wish.'" Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 

u.s. at 53 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 u.s. 15, 20 (1985) 

(per curiam)) (emphasis omitted). A defendant has engaged in effective cross-examination if "the jury had sufficient information 

to make a discriminating appraisal" of the relevant issue. United 

States v. Larranaga, 787 F.2d 489, 498 (lOth Cir. 1986) (quoting 

United States v. Swingler, 758 F.2d 477, 498 (lOth Cir. 1985)). 

Defense counsel extensively examined de la Rosa and 

thoroughly impeached him with his many prior inconsistent statements, some of which were made during trial before the jury. The 

trial court did not restrict Tapia's cross-examination of de la 

Rosa in any way. Tapia's questioning was limited only by the unavailability of the information contained in the preliminary hearing tapes. It is wholly speculative whether the missing tapes 

would have provided more material for impeachment, but even if 

-6-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 6 
they had, additional impeachment would merely have been cumulative. The jury had sufficient information to determine de la 

Rosa's credibility. 

The situation is not unlike that in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 

480 u.s. 39 (1987). In that case, the defendant argued that he 

could not effectively question his daughter, the victim of his 

alleged sexual assaults, without access to the records of the 

Children and Youth Services ("CYS"). Under Pennsylvania law, 

information obtained in the course of a CYS investigation is 

confidential. Like Tapia in this case, Ritchie argued that, had 

the files been disclosed, he would have been able to impeach his 

daughter with her prior inconsistent statements. The Supreme 

Court held that withholding the CYS file did not violate the 

Confrontation Clause. "[I]t only would have been impermissible 

for the judge to have prevented Ritchie's lawyer from crossexamining the daughter." 480 u.s. at 54. The same rule applies 

here. We hold that de la Rosa's availability for unlimited crossexamination satisfies Tapia's Sixth Amendment Confrontation 

rights. 

Tapia also argues that, since he was not arraigned in open 

court after the information against him was filed pursuant to 

S.C.R.A. 5-303, he was denied due process. Since he has shown no 

resulting prejudice, we find no violation. United States v. 

Coffman, 567 F.2d 960, 961 (lOth Cir. 1977) (when no demonstration 

of prejudice, failure to arraign is not error). 

-7-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 7 
II. 

SEALING OF POLICE CHIEF'S AFFIDAVIT 

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Sergeant Flores 

whether he had made any "requests for money from the police 

contingency funds concerning [the Stevers] case." Appellant's 

Brief at 16. The officer answered that he had not. In order to 

impeach that testimony, Tapia sought the police contingency fund 

records. The court directed police chief Ray Sisneros to prepare 

an affidavit concerning the fund's records. The affidavit was 

submitted and reviewed in camera. The court then answered questions regarding the information contained in the affidavit, 2 

2 

Court: If I remember correctly, I did ask Chief 

Sisneros to check the records and if he determined that 

Sgt. Flores did not use contingency funds fees with 

respect to any witness in this case, he was to prepare 

an affidavit notifying me of that fact. He has prepared 

a sworn affidavit whereby he indicates that no 

contingency fund fees were paid by Mr. Flores, to any 

witness in this case and that is dispositive in this 

matter. I will go ahead and take the D.A.'s request to 

seal the affidavit. 

State: Your Honor, one additional question, is 

there any indication in that affidavit whether anyone in 

the Santa Fe Police Department used any contingency fee 

monies to be paid to any of the witnesses in this case? 

Court: No. 

Defendant: Are you talking about just the 

witnesses in this case that have the top headline "The 

Tapia Case" or talking about any contingency funds paid 

to any witnesses in this case? 

Court: To any witnesses. 

Defendant: For anything? 

Court: Yes. 

[footnote continued] 

-8-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 8 
determined that nothing in the affidavit contradicted Flores's 

testimony and then, over defense objection, ordered the affidavit 

sealed. During a later post-conviction proceeding, the sealed 

affidavit was redacted in part by the appellate court, and 

provided to appellate counsel. The affidavit stated, in part: 

I have reviewed the detective division's contingency 

fund file and on September 10, 1985, Sgt. Ramiro Flores 

obtained $100 to be used in the Stevers homicide case. 

Tapia argues that exposure of Flores's alleged willingness to 

lie under oath about using police funds in the Stevers case was 

critical to prove that he would also engage in other unethical 

acts, in particular, telling de la Rosa to testify that he heard 

Tapia say "dejame matarlo." He contends that such impeachment was 

crucial to undermining Flores's credibility and in defusing the 

"reasonable inference" from his testimony that, since he gave 

money to the witnesses for humanitarian reasons, he was an 

exemplary police officer who would never engage in any misconduct. 

Tapia claims that the trial court's sealing of the affidavit 

precluded him from access to this important impeachment material 

and thereby deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to confront 

and cross-examine the witnesses against him. 3 We disagree. 

[footnote continued) 

Defendant: And they claim no? 

Court: That is correct. 

R. Tape No. 26, at counter 247. 

3 Tapia also urges us to independently review, as a mixed 

question of law and fact, the trial court's determination that the 

affidavit did not bear on Flores's credibility. However, as 

discussed above, we will not review the correctness of a trial 

court's evidentiary ruling absent a showing of a constitutional 

[footnote continued] 

-9-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 9 
As previously indicated, the Confrontation Clause ensures the 

defendant the opportunity to engage in "effective cross-examination" of the witnesses against him, Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 

u.s. at 53, but it does not include "the power to require the 

. . . disclosure of any and all information that might be useful 

in contradicting unfavorable testimony." Id. at 51. Effective 

cross-examination only requires that the trial judge not limit the 

scope of cross-examination so much that it prevents the jury from 

having sufficient information to make a "discriminating appraisal" 

of the relevant issue. United States v. Larranaga, 787 F.2d 489, 

498 (lOth Cir. 1986); ~United States v. Lane, 883 F.2d 1484, 

1502 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 s.ct. 872 (1990); United 

States v. Atwell, 766 F.2d 416, 419-20 (lOth Cir.) (trial judge 

has discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination as long as 

basic right to confrontation is protected), cert. denied, 474 u.s. 

921 (1985); United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 288 (lOth 

Cir. 1983). 

In this case, the judge did not limit the scope of Tapia's 

cross-examination of Flores. The judge merely ruled on the probative and impeachment value of the contents of the affidavit, 

disclosed all requested information to the defendant and then 

sealed the record. Tapia was free to question Flores regarding 

the use of contingency fund money in the case and to discredit 

[footnote continued] 

violation. Since Tapia has not shown that the sealing of the 

affidavit rendered his trial constitutionally infirm, we will not 

review the correctness of the court's decision. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 10 
Flores's test~ony fully with the conflicting test~ony of the 

other witnesses, and he did so. 

De la Rosa testified that Flores had doctored his recorded 

test~ony in the hospital and that he had been threatened with an 

indictment h~self if he did not cooperate. Carrillo cla~ed that 

Flores told her he needed her test~ony, that she received $40 

from Flores after she testified at the prel~inary hearing and 

that he gave $10 to her boyfriend. Boo Boo Visarraga testified 

that Flores told h~ to lie and that Flores gave h~ $20 at the 

police station after being interviewed about the stabbings. 

Flores also allegedly gave h~ $10 on another occasion. Julio 

Visarraga stated at trial that Flores had offered h~ $20 to say 

that Jimmy was at Stevers's house the evening of the stabbing. 

Julio refused to give a statement at that t~e and did not take 

the money. Flores admitted to giving money to the witnesses, but 

cla~ed that he only gave Boo Boo $10 at the station. He also 

stated that he gave the money to the witnesses for humanitarian 

reasons. This evidence was clearly sufficient for the jury to 

adequately appraise Flores's credibility, even without the additional, cumulative ~peachment concerning the use of police 

contingency fund money.

4 

Tapia attempts to distinguish this case from Pennsylvania v. 

Ritchie by emphasizing that, unlike Ritchie, he did not seek the 

4 Tapia h~self admits that a reasonable inference could be 

drawn from the evidence presented that de la Rosa and Carrillo 

were afraid of Flores and were willing to cooperate with h~ at 

any cost and that Flores gave money to the witnesses to reward 

correct answers. Appellant's Brief at 40-41. In addition, Tapia 

states that the jury could reasonably infer that Flores threatened 

or bribed the witnesses. Appellant's Brief at 40-41. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 11 
affidavit as pretrial discovery. He then tries to analogize his 

case to the facts and issues in Davis v. Alaska, 415 u.s. 308 

(1974). 5 We are not convinced. The Supreme Court explained Davis 

in Ritchie. The Court stated that the withholding of the information in Davis did not render the defendant's trial unconstitutiona!. It was the trial judge's direct limitation on questioning 

about that information that violated the Confrontation Clause. 

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 54. Davis dealt with a 

judicial limitation on questioning a witness whereas Ritchie dealt 

with the issue of access to information to aid in cross-examination. In this case, Tapia was not prevented from questioning 

Flores about the contingency fund money. Instead, he "complains 

of • . . the failure of the trial court to allow him access to 

that affidavit." Appellant's Brief at 39. As a question of a 

right of access, under Ritchie, the sealing of the affidavit did 

not violate Tapia's confrontation rights. 

III. 

SECOND DEGREE MURDER INSTRUCTION ON AIDING AND ABETTING 

In an information filed October 10, 1985, the prosecution 

originally charged both Eddie and Jimmy Tapia with first degree 

murder, also alleging accessory liability in violation of § 30-1-

5 In Davis, the trial court issued a protective order 

prohibiting defense counsel from questioning a key prosecution 

witness concerning his juvenile criminal record and his probation 

status. The Supreme Court held that the trial court denied the 

defendant his right to confrontation by limiting the crossexamination and precluding him from showing the witness's possible 

bias. 

-12-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 12 
6 13, N.M. Stat. Ann. (1984). R. Vol. II at 1. On February 25, 

1986, the State filed a Nolle Prosequi and dismissed the charges 

against Eddie Tapia without prejudice. R. Vol. II at 133. On the 

same day, an amended information was filed, charging Jimmy Tapia 

with second degree murder as a principal in violation of N.M. 

Stat. Ann. § 30-2-l(B) (1978). 7 R. Vol. II at 134-35. The court 

instructed the jury on accessory liability in Instruction No. 15 

as follows: 

6 

The defendant may be found guilty of a second degree 

murder even though he himself did not do the acts 

constituting the crime, if the State proves to your 

satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that: 

1. The defendant intended that the crime be committed. 

2. The crime was committed. 

3. The defendant helped, encouraged or caused the 

crime to be committed. 

A person may be charged with and convicted of the crime 

as an accessory if he procures, counsels, aids or abets 

in its commission and although he did not directly 

commit the crime and although the principal who directly 

committed such crime has not been prosecuted or 

convicted, or has been convicted of a different crime or 

degree of crime, or has been acquitted, or is a child 

under the Children's Code. 

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-13 (1984) (previously N.M. Stat. Ann. 

§ 40A-l-14 (1953)). 

7 

Unless he is acting upon sufficient provocation, upon a 

sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, a person who 

kills another human being without lawful justification 

or excuse commits murder in the second degree if in 

performing the acts which cause the death he knows that 

such acts create a strong probability of death or great 

bodily harm to that individual or another. 

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-l(B). 

-13-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 13 
R. Vol. II at 184. 

The jury subsequently found Tapia guilty of murder in the 

second degree with a special finding stating, "We the jury found 

the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree within the 

context of Instruction #15." R. Vol. II at 184. 

Tapia argues that the submission of Instruction No. 15 to the 

jury violated his due process right to a fair trial in two ways: 

(1) he lacked notice of the accessory charge because the second 

information did not include that charge; and, (2) there was insufficient evidence to establish the requisite accessory element 

of community of purpose. 8 We disagree. 

Notice 

The "sufficiency of an indictment or information is primarily 

a question of state law." Franklin v. White, 803 F.2d 416, 418 

(8th Cir. 1986) (quoting Goodloe v. Parratt, 605 F.2d 1041, 1045 

n.12 (8th Cir. 1979)), cert. denied, 481 u.s. 1020 (1987). Under 

New Mexico law, Tapia had sufficient notice to be convicted on the 

accessory theory, even though the information did not charge him 

as an accessory. 

New Mexico, like many other states, long ago abolished the 

distinction between conviction as a principal and an accessory, so 

that the charge as principal includes a corresponding accessory 

8 At the instruction conference, Tapia's counsel apparently 

objected only to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

accessory charge and argued that the instruction would confuse the 

jury. He did not claim that he lacked notice because of the 

prosecution's imposition of a new offense not charged in the 

information. However, he raised it on appeal and it was addressed 

on the merits. Therefore, we will consider his contention on this 

appeal from denial of habeas. 

-14-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 14 
charge. 9 State v. Wall, 94 N.M. 169, 608 P.2d 145, 147 (1980); 

State v. Nance, 77 N.M. 39, 419 P.2d 242, 246-47 (1966); State v. 

Ochoa, 41 N.M. 589, 72 P.2d 609 (1937). Given the clarity of the 

New Mexico case law on this issue, "[the defendant] was on notice 

that he could be charged as a principal and convicted as an accessory or vice-a-versa." State v. Wall, 608 P.2d at 147-48; State 

v. Nance, 419 P.2d at 247 (holding that everyone concerned with 

the offense may be indicted as a principal by reading § 30-1-13 as 

though the words "as an accomplice" were omitted); State v. Roaue, 

91 N.M. 7, 569 P.2d 417, 418-19 (Ct. App.) (an indictment need 

only allege the offense, not necessarily charge defendant as accessory), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 4, 569 P.2d 414 (1977); see State 

v. McCall, 101 N.M. 616, 686 P.2d 958, 968 (Ct. App. 1983) 

(conviction of fraud on an accessory theory would not have been 

improper). 

Furthermore, we agree with the magistrate and the district 

court that trial counsel's failure to argue lack of notice or to 

request a continuance to meet the allegedly new theory of liability at the time of the instruction's submission suggests that 

he was not surprised by the instruction nor did he consider his 

9 While the statute explicitly stating that accomplices may be 

informed against as principals, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-6-34 (1953), 

was repealed by Supreme Court Order of May 3, 1972, the New Mexico 

courts have continued to hold that the legislature intended to 

abolish the distinction between principals and accessories under 

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-13. State v. Wall, 608 P.2d at 147; State 

v. McCall, 686 P.2d 958, 968 (Ct. App. 1983); State v. Martinez, 

85 N.M. 198, 510 P.2d 916, 917-18 (Ct. App. 1973); State v. Rogue, 

569 P.2d 417, 419 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 4, 569 P.2d 

414 (1977). We are bound by the interpretation of state law by 

the New Mexico courts since it does not conflict with the 

fundamental rights of justice and liberty. Chavez v. Baker, 399 

F.2d 943, 943 (lOth Cir. 1968). 

-15-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 15 
defense to be substantially disadvantaged by its submission. R. 

10 Vol. I, Doc. 38, at 5. 

Tapia also argues that the fact that the district attorney 

only charged him as a principal in the second indictment leads to 

a reasonable inference that there was no probable cause to believe 

that he had committed the crime as an accessory. Tapia asserts 

that he relied on this disavowal of accomplice liability as he 

prepared for trial. However, as discussed above, the prosecution 

did not disavow Tapia's involvement as an accomplice. Rather, 

the charge as principal included the accomplice charge. 

We, therefore, find that Tapia had sufficient notice of the 

accessory charge when charged as a principal. 

Sufficiency of the evidence 

Tapia contends that even if he had notice, the evidence on 

community of purpose necessary to convict him on accessory liability was so deficient as to amount to a constitutional violation.11 He claims that the chief evidence supporting the accessory verdict was Eddie Visarraga's taped statement to Sergeant 

Flores, played in court to impeach Visarraga's trial testimony. 

In the tape, Visarraga stated that both Jimmy and Eddie Tapia went 

outside with Stevers. He stated that he heard the three scuffling 

and then Stevers came back into the house, fatally wounded. The 

Tapias ran off. Tapia argues that Visarraga's testimony should be 

10 As previously indicated, these contentions were considered on 

the merits by the state appellate court; therefore, no issue of 

procedural bar is presented. 

11 Tapia does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support any other element of the accessory charge. 

-16-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 16 
disregarded as inherently incredible. 12 He contends that without 

this testimony, there was insufficient evidence to convict him. 

We disagree. 

Sufficiency of the evidence for constitutional purposes is 

ultimately a question of law. Beachum v. Tansy, 903 F.2d 1321, 

1325 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 111 s.ct. 269 (1990); Smith v. 

Atkins, 678 F.2d 883, 885 (lOth Cir. 1982). As such, we review a 

habeas challenge of sufficiency to determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Cordoba v. Hanrahan, 910 

F.2d 691, 694 (lOth Cir.) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 890 (1979)) (emphasis in 

original), cert. denied, 1990 u.s. LEXIS 6276 (1990); Beachum v. 

Tansy, 903 F.2d at 1332. However, we do not sit as a new trier of 

fact. We presume that the jury's findings in evaluating the credibility of each witness are correct. Case v. Mondragon, 887 F.2d 

1388, 1393 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 s.ct. 1490 (1990). 

We may disregard testimony on review only if we find that the witness is inherently incredible. Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140, 

1146 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 u.s. 925 (1987). 

12 Under New Mexico rules of evidence, a witness's prior 

inconsistent statements are admissible as substantive evidence. 

N.M. R. Evid. § ll-80l(D)(l)(a) (1978); State v. Maestas, 92 N.M. 

135, 584 P.2d 182, 191 (Ct. App. 1978). Tapia contends that the 

state court should have followed the more restrictive federal 

hearsay rule, which admits only a witness's prior inconsistent 

statements given under oath. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(l). However, 

since New Mexico's rule does not implicate Tapia's constitutional 

right to a fair trial, we defer to the state court's evidentiary 

ruling regarding Visarraga's testimony. Nichols v. Sullivan, 867 

F.2d 1250, 1253 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 109 s.ct. 3169 (1989). 

-17-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 17 
Testimony, to be considered incredible, "must be unbelievable 

on its face, i.e., testimony as to facts that [the witness] 

physically could not have possibly observed or events that could 

not have occurred under the laws of nature." United States v. 

Garner, 581 F.2d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 1978): United States v. 

Rivera, 775 F.2d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 

u.s. 1051 (1986): Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d at 1146 (the testimony 

must be so "at odds with ordinary common sense or physically impossible under the laws of nature" that no reasonable person would 

believe it beyond a reasonable doubt). Confused, selfcontradicting testimony by a drug addict does not make the 

witness's testimony inherently incredible. Wilcox v. Ford, 813 

F.2d at 1146: United States v. Garner, 581 F.2d at 485: see also 

United States v. Martinez, 877 F.2d 1480, 1482 (lOth Cir. 1989) 

(impeachment of witness as a drug addict or as possessing 

emotional problems is a question of credibility for the jury). 

Nor does the fact that there are several conflicting versions 

regarding the events of the evening of September 7 affect our 

determination of credibility as a matter of law. Such inconsistencies are matters within the province of the jury. United 

States v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382, 1391 (lOth Cir. 1985). 

It is undisputed that Visarraga was present at Stevers's 

house the night of the murder. He could easily have heard the 

alleged scuffling between Stevers, Jimmy and Eddie outside before 

Stevers reentered the house, fatally wounded. Therefore, his 

testimony was not inherently incredible and the jury could have 

-18-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 18 
rationally relied on this evidence that both Eddie and Jimmy Tapia 

were involved in stabbing Stevers. 

Relying on Visarraga's testimony, the jury could have reasonably believed that Eddie killed Stevers. "[C]ommunity of purpose 

may be shown by evidence of . . . words . . . or any means sufficient to incite, encourage, or instigate commission of the offense." State v. Luna, 92 N.M. 680, 594 P.2d 340, 343 (Ct. App. 

1979). Tapia's exclamation of "dejame matarlo," as testified to 

by de la Rosa, showed that he had the intent to kill Stevers and 

that he encouraged such action or sought to do it himself. Such 

involvement is sufficient to show community of purpose and sustain 

a conviction of aiding and abetting. 13 

Eddie Visarraga heard the scuffling between Eddie, Jimmy and 

Stevers and de la Rosa heard Jimmy Tapia say "dejame matarlo." 

Together, these two witnesses gave consistent, albeit circumstantial, evidence that Tapia aided and abetted in the murder of 

Stevers. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict. 

United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1529 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 475 u.s. 1128 (1986). Thus, viewing all the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the government, there was sufficient 

13 Tapia argues that the prosecution's belief that no reasonable 

person would believe that Eddie Tapia aided the defendant, Jimmy 

Tapia, in the murder legally and ethically prevents them from 

trying to prove that Jimmy aided Eddie with the same evidence. 

However, this overlooks the fact that there was no testimony 

indicating that, if Jimmy had actually killed Stevers, Eddie, 

though perhaps present, had the requisite intent to harm Stevers 

or that he acted to encourage or further the crime. On the other 

hand, de la Rosa testified that he heard Jimmy yell "dejame 

matarlo." If the jury believed that Eddie had killed Stevers, 

Jimmy, at that moment, joined the partnership by encouraging the 

murder of Stevers. 

-19-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 19 
evidence with respect to the conviction of aiding and abetting to 

satisfy constitutional requirements. 

Since we find that Tapia had adequate notice of accessory 

liability and that there was sufficient evidence to convict on 

that charge, the jury instruction on aiding and abetting was not 

constitutionally defective. 

IV. 

ADMISSION OF ALLEGEDLY PERJURED TESTIMONY 

Tapia contends that the prosecution's use of perjured 

testimony deprived him of due process. 14 He argues that the trial 

court should have acquitted him on that ground. We disagree. 

Tapia's argument centers around the inconsistent testimonies of 

Carrillo and de la Rosa to infer both perjury and the 

prosecution's knowing presentation of the false testimony. 

Contradictions and changes in a witness's testimony alone do 

not constitute perjury and do not create an inference, let alone 

prove, that the prosecution knowingly presented perjured 

testimony. United States ex rel. Burnett v. Illinois, 619 F.2d 

668, 674 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 880 (1980); United 

States v. Holladay, 566 F.2d 1018, 1019 (5th Cir.), ("Presentation 

of a witness who recants or contradicts his prior testimony is not 

to be confused with eliciting perjury."), reh'g denied, 573 F.2d 

14 When Tapia brought this claim in a motion for directed 

verdict, he alleged only that the witnesses lied, not that the 

prosecutor was responsible. However, he raised the issue of 

prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal. Since the state court 

considered the issue on its merits, we will review defendant's 

claim of the prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony on 

this appeal. 

-20-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 20 
1309 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 u.s. 831 (1978). Although de 

la Rosa and Carrillo changed their story several times, the jury 

heard all versions and both witnesses were thoroughly impeached. 15 

It was for the jury to decide which version to believe. Id.; see 

United States v. Cueto, 628 F.2d 1273 (lOth Cir. 1980). 

v. 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

Every convicted person has a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel for his first appeal of right. Evitts 

v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393-94, reh'g denied, 470 U.S. 1065 

(1985). Tapia claims that he was denied this right when his appellate counsel declined to raise or brief the issues discussed 

above concerning the lost preliminary hearing tapes and the use of 

perjured testimony, when his counsel misstated trial facts and 

when his counsel inadequately researched the law in support of his 

appeal. We disagree. 

The two-part test set forth by the Supreme Court in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 u.s. 

1267 (1984), most recently construed by this court in United 

States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1472 (lOth Cir. 1990), states 

15 Tapia argues that the prosecution should not be allowed to 

put de la Rosa on the stand twice to testify as to two entirely 

different versions of the same event, knowing that one is a lie. 

However, Tapia has not shown that the government knew that de la 

Rosa would perjure himself on either occasion. If the prosecution 

discovered that de la Rosa's testimony on the first day was 

untrue, then in the interests of justice they should be allowed to 

reopen direct and present truthful testimony. In fact, a 

prosecutor is required to correct false testimony. Napue v. 

Illinois, 360 U.S. at 270. 

-21-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 21 
• ' J 

that the appellant must show both that his attorney's performance 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but 

for the counsel's inadequacies, the result of the proceedings 

would have been different. Tapia has failed to overcome the 

"strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 u.s. at 689. 

A defendant does not have a "constitutional right to compel 

appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the 

client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment decides 

not to present those points. Legal contentions, like the 

currency, depreciate through overissue." Jones v. Barnes, 463 

u.s. 745, 751-52 (1983), cited with approval in Evitts v. Lucey, 

469 U.S. at 394. "Winnowing out weaker arguments" is not a 

constitutionally deficient practice and, indeed, is the hallmark 

of effective advocacy. Smith v. Murray, 477 u.s. 527, 536 (1986) 

(quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 752). Counsel's decision 

not to present those issues on appeal did not deny Tapia the effective assistance of counsel. 

Tapia's only example of misstated trial fact is the insignificant fact of who requested the second preliminary hearing 

and is insufficient to show deficient representation. Tapia's 

claim of inadequate research is equally without support. 

-22-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 22 
"' ' , 

VI. 

CONCLUSION 

We find no constitutional deficiency in the state court 

proceedings or reversible error in the proceedings below. Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED. 

-23-

Appellate Case: 89-2209 Document: 01019301412 Date Filed: 03/05/1991 Page: 23