Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07181/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07181-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 27, 1997 Decided March 21, 1997

No. 96-7181

WASHINGTON TEACHERS' UNION LOCAL # 6, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,

ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv01250)

Sally M. Tedrowargued the cause for appellants. With her on the brief were James R. O'Connell and

Curtis J. Lewis.

Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the

brief were Charles F.C. Ruff, Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation

Counsel. Lutz A. Prager, Assistant Deputy Corporation Counsel, entered an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Responding to the financial crisis facing the District of Columbia and

exercising newly granted Congressional authority to implement emergency reductions-in-force, the

Board of Education fired over 400 teachers in July 1996. Several laid-off teachers and their union

sued, claiming that because principals selected teachers for firing based on school-wide rather than

system-wide seniority and considered teachers' professional experiences, contributions to their

schools, and other non-seniority factors in ranking teachers for retention, the RIF violated the

teachers' collective bargaining agreement and thus the Contract Clause of the United States

Constitution. The Union also argued that the District's failure to provide pre-termination hearings

violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. We affirm the district court's grant of summary

judgment for the District. Not only were the emergency RIF procedures authorized by Congress,

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which is not subject to the Contract Clause, but we discern no conflict between those procedures and

the collective bargaining agreement. The Due Process Clause does not require pre-termination

hearings where, as here, the RIF is necessitated by a serious financial crisis, principals' decisions are

highly discretionary, and D.C. law provides for post-termination challenges.

I

Until May 1996, District of Columbia regulations governing reductions-in-force of teachers

and other employees in the Educational Service operated on the basis ofseniority. D.C. Mun. Regs.

tit. 5, § 1504 (1995). Under those regulations, teachers were grouped according to tenure

statuspermanent, probationary, ortemporaryandwithinthose three categories, further separated

into subgroups depending on veteran status. Id. § 1501. Within each subgroup, employees were

ranked according to years ofservice. Id. § 1501.5(b). Employees earning "outstanding" ratings on

their most recent performance evaluations were credited with four extra years of service.

"Unsatisfactory" performance evaluations stripped employees of retention rights. Id. §§ 1503.4-.5.

Reductions-in-force began by firing least-senior, non-veteran temporary employees, continuing if

necessary to temporary employees with veteran status, then to non-veteran and veteran probationary

employees, and finally to non-veteran and veteran permanent employees. Id. § 1504.

Also prior to May 1996, reductions-in-force were implemented agency-wide. D.C. CODE

ANN. § 1-625.1 (1992 Repl.) Teachers competed with teachers in every other school for their

positions; their "competitive area" was the entire school system, and their "competitive level" flowed

from the requirements of their particular teaching positions. See id.; D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5, §

1501.1 (defining "competitive level"). Eliminating ten social studies teacher positions, for example,

required city-wide assessment of tenure status, years ofservice, and performance ratings of allsocial

studies teachers in the schoolsystem. Depending on seniority and performance ratings, more-senior

teachers could supplant less-senior teachers in other schools.

These procedureswere changed significantlybytwo statutes enacted byCongressto dealwith

the District's financial crisis: the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management

Assistance Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-8, 109 Stat. 97 (1995), and the District of Columbia

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Appropriations Act of 1996 ("Budget Act"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The

Financial Responsibility Act, which created the city's Control Board, repealed the 1979 Home Rule

Act's guarantee of personnel benefits "at least equal to those provided [under the federalsystem]" to

allfederal employees who, with the advent of home rule, became District employees, replacing it with

the following provision: "nothing in [the Home Rule Act] shall prohibit the District from separating

an officer or employee ... in the implementation of a financial plan and budget for the District

government approved under [the FinancialResponsibilityAct.]" Pub. L. 104-8, Tit. II, § 202(h), 109

Stat. 97, 116 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-242(3) (1996 Supp.)).

Enacted one year later, the 1996 Budget Act amended the District's personnelstatutesin two

relevant respects. First, it amended section 1-625.1 of the D.C. Code to allow agency heads to

establish "lesser competitive areas within an agency" for purposes of a reduction-in-force. Pub. L.

104-134, Tit. I, § 149(a), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-97 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-

625.1 (1996 Supp.)). This amendment allowed the Superintendent of Schools to designate each

school as a separate "competitive area," so that teachers at one school would compete for available

positions only with teachers in that school, rather than city-wide.

Second, the Budget Act temporarily amended District law governing reductions-in-force by

enacting section 1-625.5 of the D.C. Code. Pub. L. 104-134, Tit. I, § 149(b), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-

98 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-625.5 (1996 Supp.)). Subsection (a) of the new statute

provided: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, regulation, or collective bargaining

agreement either in effect or to be negotiated while this legislation is in effect for the fiscal year

ending September 30, 1996, each agency head is authorized, within the agency head's discretion, to

identify positions for abolishment." D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-625.5(a). Subsection (c) provided that

"[n]otwithstanding any rights or procedures established by any other [personnelstatute], anyDistrict

government employee,regardless of date of hire, who encumbers a position identified for abolishment

shall be separated without competition or assignment rights, except as provided in this section." Id.

§ 1-625.5(c). An employee "affected by the abolishment of a position" under section 1-625.5 was

entitled to "[one] round of lateral competition pursuant to Chapter 24 of the District of Columbia

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Personnel Manual ... limited to positions in the employee's competitive level." Id. § 1-625.5(d).

Section 1-625.5 of the D.C. Code also prohibited RIF'd teachers from challenging "the

establishment of a competitive area smaller than an agency, ... the determination that a specific

position is to be abolished, [ ]or separation pursuant to this section...." Id. § 1-625.5(g). Laid-off

employees could appealseparation on three other grounds. If they believed their terminations were

discriminatory, they could file complaintsfor violation ofthe District ofColumbia HumanRights Act

with the District's Office of Human Rights. Id. § 1-625.5(g)(1); see also id. § 1-2544 (1992 Repl.).

If they believed their terminations were in retaliation for protected speech in violation of their rights

as District employees, they could file suit in Superior Court. Id. §§ 1-616.2-.3 (1992 Repl.). Or if

they believed the notice and separation procedures ofsection 1-625.5 were not followed, they could

file complaints with the Office of Employee Appeals. Id. § 1-625.5(g)(2).

In May 1996, a month after Congress passed the Budget Act, the School Board repealed its

regulations governing reductions-in-force and enacted emergency rules instituting new RIF

procedures. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5, § 1500 (1996). Instead of basing RIFs on seniority, the new

rules directed school principals to fill out a "competitive level documentation form"the

"CLDF"ranking allteachers occupying positionsslated for abolishment on a scale of 1 to 25 in each

of four areas: (1) relevant contributions, accomplishments, or performance, including "negative

factors" such as disciplinaryand attendance problems and failure to meet professionalresponsibilities;

(2) relevant professional experience; (3) office or school needs, including curriculum and

extracurricular sponsorship; and (4) length of service, with five years added for District residents.

Id. § 1503; D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-625.5(e) (requiring five additional years of service for District

residents); Decl. of James R. Daugherty (July 17, 1996), Ex. 4. Other than the computation of each

teacher'slength ofservice, performed bytheSchoolBoard's humanresources division, the regulations

effectivelymade principals'rankings unreviewable by otherschool district officials. Daugherty Decl.,

Ex. 2 at 4-5.

ImmediatelyaftertheBoard issued the emergency rules, the Superintendent notified principals

of the number of positions abolished at their schools. Principals then determined which positions at

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which competitive levels to abolish. Id. at 4. Using CLDF's and giving teachers an opportunity to

review and sign them, principalsselected teachersto be RIF'd. Beginning in mid-June, RIF'd teachers

were given thirty days' notice of the loss of their positions. In July, at each school in the District, in

eachcompetitive levelwhere teaching positions were eliminated, teachers with the lowest totalscores

on their ranking forms lost their jobs. Each of the over 400 teachers who were laid off received

severance pay keyed to years of service. Daugherty Decl., Ex. 5.

The Washington Teachers' Union, the sole bargaining representative of the District's

approximately 5,000 teachers, together with three RIF'd teachers, filed suit in the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia. They claimed that by enacting the emergency rules

governing the reduction-in-force, the School Board breached the Union's collective bargaining

agreement in violation of the Constitution's Contract Clause; violated teachers' Fifth Amendment

procedural and substantive due processrights; and violated the Home Rule Act. After a hearing, the

district court granted summary judgment for the District, and plaintiffs appealed. Our review is de

novo. Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

II

We beginwith the Union's argument that the RIF procedures carried out under the emergency

rules conflicted with the collective bargaining agreement, thus violating the Constitution's Contract

Clause, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10. Although the District of Columbia is subject to the Contract

Clause, D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-204 (1992 Repl.), the legislation which led the Board of Education to

repeal itsreduction-in-force regulations was enacted byCongress, and Congressis not subject to the

Contract Clause, even when legislating for the District. John McShain, Inc. v. District of Columbia,

205 F.2d 882, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1953); District of Columbia v. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees,

619 A.2d 77, 81 (D.C. 1993). Congress authorized agency heads to designate "competitive areas"

smaller than the entire schoolsystem, D.C. Code Ann. § 1-625.1, permitted agency headsto identify

positions for abolishment "notwithstanding any other provision of law, regulation, or collective

bargaining agreement," id. § 1-625.5(a), and provided that anyDistrict employee, "regardless of date

of hire, who encumbers a position identified for abolishment shall be separated without competition

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or assignment rights, except as [specifically] provided...." Id. § 1-625.5(c). Because the 1996

Budget Act amendments expressly authorized the emergency rules, they are insulated fromchallenge

under the Contract Clause.

Claiming that the Board exceeded its 1996 Budget Act authority when it adopted the

emergency rules, the Union argues that the rules independently impaired the collective bargaining

agreement. We need not decide whether the Board exceeded its Congressional authority, however,

for even if it did, we find no violation of the Contract Clause. To determine whether a change in law

or regulation violates the Contract Clause, we ask the three questions set forth in General Motors

Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992): Does a contractual relationship exist? Did a change in

law or regulation impair that relationship? If a contract has been impaired, was the impairment

substantial? If these questions lead to the conclusion that a substantial impairment occurred, we then

ask whether the change is "reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose." United

States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).

We need go no farther than Romein's second question. The collective bargaining agreement

says nothing about system-wide seniority procedures in the event of a RIF. Article 43 of the

collective bargaining agreement, captioned "Reduction-In-Force and Furlough," provides: "Prior to

a reduction-in-force or furlough during the life of this Agreement, the Board agrees to consult with

the Union." Agreement Between the Board of Education of the District of Columbia and the

Washington Teachers' Union Local 6, art. 43. According to the record, the School Board consulted

extensively with the Union before the RIF occurred. Aff. of Eva R. Rousseau (July 19, 1996) ¶ 2.

Because the collective bargaining agreement required nothing more of the Board, the District's

adoption of the emergency regulations did not impair the collective bargaining agreement.

The Union argues that seniority-driven, system-wide RIF procedures are implicit in the

collective bargaining agreementspecifically, that the procedures are the "law of the shop," based

on the parties' longstanding past practice. Appellants' Br. at 17. But as the District points out, labor

arbitrators, not courts, consult the "law of the shop." "Skilled labor arbitrators, rather than judges,

are better positioned and equipped to identify and to apply the common law of the shop." McKinney

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v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 954 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 1992); see also United Steelworkers of

America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) ("The labor arbitrator is

usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop....

The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the

determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed."); NCR Corp., E&M-Wichita

v. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 906 F.2d 1499, 1501 (10th Cir. 1990);

International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. General Elec. Co., 865 F.2d 902, 906

(7th Cir. 1989).

We are equally unpersuaded by the Union's argument that the emergency rules violated the

Contract Clause because they conflicted with the collective bargaining agreement's requirement to

evaluate all teachers pursuant to a "Teacher Appraisal Form," known as a "TAP." Agreement

Between the Board of Education of the District of Columbia and the Washington Teachers' Union

Local 6, art. 17. The emergency rules did not supplant teacher evaluation pursuant to the TAP; the

rules' only function was to implement the 1996 RIF. For all other purposes, the TAP remains alive

and well. For the same reason, contrary to the Union's argument, nothing in the emergency rules

abrogated the collective bargaining agreement's "for-cause" termination provisions. Terminations

pursuant to RIFs are not terminations "for cause." Teachers fired for reasons other than the abolition

of their positions in the 1996 RIF continue to have full access to for-cause termination procedures.

III

We next turn to the Union's argument that the emergency regulations violated the Fifth

Amendment's Due Process Clause. In so arguing, the Union acknowledges that RIF'd teachers have

available several avenues for challenging their removals in post-termination hearings if they believe

either that their terminations were discriminatory or retaliatory, or that notice and separation

procedures were not followed. See supra p. 5. Counsel for the Union told us at oral argument that

many teachers are indeed pursuing these procedures. The Union argues that in addition to

post-termination procedures, due process required pre-termination hearings. Although the Union's

briefs do not propose any particular type of proceeding, counsel conceded at oral argument that

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nothing in due process law required the District to provide an evidentiary hearing before a neutral

arbiter prior to termination, but only "an opportunity to present reasons ... why the proposed action

should not be taken." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985); see also

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976) ("[S]omething less than an evidentiary hearing is

sufficient prior to adverse administrative action."). The Union's position thus boils down to a claim

that teachers should have had an opportunity to discuss their CLDF rankings with principals before

the rankings became final.

We have no doubt that prior to the 1996 RIF, District teachers enjoyed a constitutionally

protected property interest in their jobs. See D.C.CODEANN. § 1-617.1 (1992 Repl.); Loudermill,

470 U.S. at 538; cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). We are less sure whether

enactment of the 1996 Budget Act and of the emergency rules extinguished their property interests.

See American Federation of Government Employees v. OPM, 821 F.2d 761, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

("it is by no means obviousthat a property interest ... survive[s] a reduction-in-force"). But we need

not resolve that question. Even assuming teachers' property interests survived the 1996 RIF, we think

nothing in principles of due process required giving teachers an opportunity to respond to their

rankings prior to termination.

Although due process normally requires pre-termination proceedings of some kind prior to

the discharge of employees with constitutionally protected interests in their jobs, Loudermill, 470

U.S. at 542, post-deprivation hearings suffice in "extraordinary situations where some valid

governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event." United

States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 501 (1993) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted); see also UDC Chairs Chapter, Amer. Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Board of

Trustees, 56 F.3d 1469, 1473 (D.C. Cir. 1995). To determine whether post-deprivation hearings

satisfy "minimal requirements of due process," UDC Chairs, 56 F.3d at 1473, we balance the three

factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge: the private interest affected by the government's action;

the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest and the likely value of additional safeguards; and

the government's interest, including the administrative burdens that additional procedural

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requirements would impose. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see also Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542-43.

In this case, the first factorthe private interest atstakeweighs heavilyin favor ofrequiring

pre-termination proceedings. Courts have repeatedly recognized that "the significance of the private

interest in retaining employment cannot be gainsaid." Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543; see also Brock

v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 263 (1987) (employee's interest in retaining job

"substantial"); Garraghty v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 1274, 1282 (4th Cir. 1995); Texas Faculty Ass'n v.

University of Texas at Dallas, 946 F.2d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 1991). We also suspect that unlike in the

usual RIF, where "the individual characteristics, qualifications or reputations of the [employees] are

not at issue," UDC Chairs, 56 F.3d at 1474, the 1996 RIF may have carried with it some stigma.

Teachers were ranked by their principals, at least in part, on the basis of performance. Among other

things, the CLDF required principals to consider teachers' "relevant significant contributions,

accomplishments or performance," including "student outcomes, ratings, awards, special

contributions, etc.," as well as "negative factors such as disciplinary, attendance and failure to meet

professional responsibilities, etc." Daugherty Decl., Ex. 4.

Weighing against requiring pre-termination proceedings are the two remaining Mathews

factors. The "risk of an erroneous deprivation" of teachers' interests in their jobs is minimal.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Aside from the objective question of the length of service and the

statutory requirement to add five years for District residents, school principals have total discretion

to rank their teachers. By alluding to the "subjective and individualized nature" of principals'

evaluations, appellants' counseladmitted asmuchat oral argument. Although the Union suggests that

factual errors, such as attributing disciplinary proceedings to the wrong teachers, could produce

erroneous scores on ranking forms, the record contains no evidence showing that such errors have

occurred, much less that the risk of such errors is significant. "[P]rocedural due process rules are

shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases,

not the rare exceptions." Id. at 344. Because principals enjoyed near-total discretion in ranking their

teachers and because the record contains no evidence that factual errors occurred, we also doubt the

"probable value" of giving teachers an opportunity to respond to principals' CLDF rankings. Id. at

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335. Challenges to ranking decisions, pitting teachers' interpretations of their worth against

principals' evaluations, are not likely to be resolved in the type of summary pre-termination

proceedings the Union seeks.

Our analysis of the third Mathews factor, the District's interest and the burden that requiring

pre-termination proceedings would impose, turns largely on sheer numbers. Over 400 teachers lost

their jobs in the 1996 RIF. Although the Union does not demand full-blown evidentiary hearings,

giving over 400 teachers time to respond to their ranking forms and requiring principals to answer

each would have slowed the RIF process considerably, both delaying and reducing the financial

savings the District so desperately needed. See Appellees' Br. at 26; cf. UDC Chairs, 56 F.3d at

1474; see also Mayfield v. Kelly, 801 F. Supp. 795, 798 (D.D.C. 1992) (District's "interests weigh

differently in a RIF than they do in a removal for cause ... [a] RIF involves a large number of

employees ... for whom it is impossible to have pre-termination hearings.").

Balancing the Mathewsfactors and taking account ofthe availabilityofpost-terminationrelief,

we hold that due process did not require pre-termination proceedings before the 1996 RIF. The

District's need to cut expenditures quickly and efficiently outweighed teachers' interests, especially

in light of the minimal risk of error in the ranking process and the questionable value of

pre-termination proceedings.

IV

The Union'sremaining argumentsrequire little discussion. Claiming that the emergency rules

allowed individual principals to make subjective, virtually unreviewable decisions in ranking and

RIF'ing their teachers, the Union argues that the rules violated teachers' substantive due process

rights. Substantive due process "prevents governmental power from being used for purposes of

oppression, or abuse of government power that shocks the conscience, or action that is legally

irrational [in that] it is not sufficiently keyed to any legitimate state interests." Committee of United

States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Tri-County Indus., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 104

F.3d 455, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("our circuit requires[a] plaintiff [asserting a substantive due process

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claim] to show "grave unfairness' by state (or District) officials") (quoting Silverman v. Barry, 845

F.2d 1072, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). We think the Union has fallen far short of meeting its burden of

demonstrating "no rational connection" between the Board's action and the interests the Board

asserts. Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 198 (1979). In keeping with its

"school-based" management system, the Board gave individualschools autonomy in the RIF process

by allowing principalsto rank their own teachers. See, e.g., Appellees' Br. at 26; Defs.' Reply to Pls.'

Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 2. While people might disagree about the extent to which the

Board shifted authority to its principals, no one could reasonably suggest that the emergency rules

were irrational, or that they "shock[ed] the conscience" or were "used for purposes of oppression."

See Committee of United States Citizens, 859 F.2d at 943-44 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

We also disagree with the Union's argument that the emergency rules violated the Home Rule

Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-242(3) (1992 Repl.). According to the Union, the emergency rules

reduced personnel benefits below the floor guaranteed by the Home Rule Act to federal employees

transitioning to District employment in 1980. But as we have pointed out, the Financial

Responsibility Act, specifically amending the Home Rule Act, provides that "nothing in [it] shall

prohibit the District from separating an ... employee ... in the implementation of a financial plan and

budget for the District government approved under [the Financial Responsibility Act]." D.C. CODE

ANN. § 1-242(3) (1996 Supp.) Because the emergency regulations "implement[ed]" the 1996 Budget

Act, they were expressly authorized by the amended Home Rule Act, even though they may have

divested long-time school system employees of personnel benefits protected by the original Home

Rule Act. Moreover, section 1-625.5(c), contained in the 1996 Budget Act, specifically provides that

"any District government employee, regardless of date of hire, who encumbers a position identified

for abolishment shall be separated without competition or assignment rights...." D.C. CODE ANN. §

1-625.5(c) (1996 Supp.) (emphasis added). Although the Union asserts that this provision did not

eliminate seniority rights under the Home Rule Act, the statute clearly states otherwise.

The Union argues finally that section 1-625.5 itself required the Board to conduct the 1996

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RIF according to system-wide seniority. Subsection (c) of section 1-625.5 required separation of

employees "without competition or assignment rights, except as provided in this section," while

subsection (d) permitted an affected employee "one round oflateral competition pursuant to Chapter

24 of the District of Columbia Personnel Manual." D.C.CODEANN. §§ 1-625.5(c)-(d). Chapter 24,

like the pre-May 1996 regulations applicable to District teachers, doesindeed require seniority-based

RIFs. See supra pp. 2-3; D.C. Personnel Regs. ch. 24, §§ 2410, 2415-18 (1993). By its terms,

however, Chapter 24 does not apply to teachers. D.C. Personnel Regs. ch. 24, § 2402.1 ("This

chapter does not cover employees in the Educational Service."). If, as the Union argues, section 1-

625.5(d) made Chapter 24 applicable to teachers, we do not understand why, in view of subsection

(c)'s requirement that employees occupying abolished positions be "separated without competition

or assignment rights except as provided in this section," the School Board nonetheless enacted its

own, seemingly conflicting set of emergency rules. To the extent section 1-625.5(d) conflicts with

Chapter 24, however, federal courts are not the appropriate forumfor resolving the conflict. Section

1-625.5(g)(2) of the D.C. Code provides that "[a]n employee may file with the Office of Employee

Appeals an appeal contesting that the separation procedures ofsubsection[ ] (d) ... were not properly

applied." D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-625.5(g)(2). Decisions of the Office of Employee Appeals are

appealable to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Id. § 1-606.3(d) (1992 Repl.).

We affirm the decision of the district court.

So ordered.

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