Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02406/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02406-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

PATRICK BYNES, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 06-2406 PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R 

)

CITY OF EL MIRAGE, et al., )

)

Defendants. ) )

This matter is currently before the Court on Plaintiff's

motion to remand (doc. # 7) and Defendants' motion for fees and

costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (doc. # 10). Having

carefully considered the arguments raised, the Court now rules.

I. MOTION TO REMAND

This case arises out of a wrongful termination suit originally

filed by Plaintiff in the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa

County on August 7, 2007. Notice (doc. # 1), Ex. A at 4. On

October 10, 2006, Defendants filed a notice of removal pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441 and 1446, asserting that Plaintiff's

allegations of First Amendment and Due Process violations raised 

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federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Notice (doc. # 1) at 2. 

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a timely motion to remand, moving

simultaneously for voluntary dismissal of those federal claims. 

Mot. (doc. # 7) at 1-2. Having realized that the Supreme Court's

recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct.

1951, 164 L. Ed. 689 (2006), would seriously undercut any First

Amendment or Due Process claims, Plaintiff apparently made the

tactical decision to dismiss those claims and pursue only his state

law claims. Mot. (doc. # 7) at 1-2.

In view of the early posture of this case and Plaintiff's

willingness to dismiss his federal claims with prejudice,

Defendants do not oppose remand. Resp. (doc. # 10) at 1-2. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims for alleged First Amendment and Due

Process violations will be dismissed with prejudice. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Furthermore, having considered and weighed the

"values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity," the

Court will remand Plaintiff's remaining state law claims to the

Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County. See Nishimoto v.

Federman-Bachrach & Ass'n, 903 F.2d 709, 715 (9th Cir. 1990).

II. MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)

Although they do not oppose remand, Defendants argue that they

are entitled to an award of fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1447(c) for filing the notice of removal and responding to

Plaintiff's motion to remand. Resp. (doc. # 10) at 2-4. Plaintiff

opposes their request for fees. Reply (doc. # 12) at 1-3.

In an order remanding a case, the district court "may require

payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney

fees, incurred as a result of the removal." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

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Section 1447(c) has scarcely been used as a basis to authorize an

award of fees and costs against plaintiffs. See Baddie v. Berkeley

Farms, 64 F.3d 487, 490 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995). Rather, it is

frequently the plaintiff who moves, concurrently with his motion to

remand, for an award of fees and costs against the removing

defendants. To that end, the Supreme Court recently set forth the

standard for determining whether a plaintiff successful in

obtaining remand should also be entitled to an award of fees and

costs under section 1447(c). See Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp.,

546 U.S. 132, 126 S. Ct. 704, 711, 163 L. Ed. 2d 547, 555 (2005).

"Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney's fees

under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively

reasonable basis for seeking removal." Id., 126 S. Ct. at 711. In

exercising its discretion to award fees under section 1447(c), the

district court must consider "the desire to deter removals sought

for the purpose of prolonging litigation and imposing costs on the

opposing party, while not undermining Congress' basic decision to

afford defendants a right to remove as a general matter, when the

statutory criteria are satisfied." See id.

In view of the considerations highlighted in Martin, the Court

does not regard an award of fees and costs against Plaintiff for

Defendants' expenses in removing this action and opposing remand as

a necessary or just result under section 1447(c). As the Ninth

Circuit has explained before, the expense of opposing remand "is

proximately caused by the plaintiff's subsequent action [in seeking

remand] rather than by the removal itself," and therefore "is not

'a result of the removal.'" See Baddie, 64 F.3d at 490. Moreover,

there is no evidence of bad faith or manipulative conduct by

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1

 The Court is aware that the Ninth Circuit has recently, by way

of an unpublished memorandum opinion, disavowed certain portions of

Baddie that may be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent

decision in Martin. See Assocs. Nat'l Bank v. Erum, 2006 U.S. App.

LEXIS 26288 at *1-2 (9th Cir. 2006). Given the unorthodoxy of

overruling prior precedent by unpublished opinion, and the

overwhelming consistency of the Baddie propositions cited in this

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Plaintiff deliberately designed to put Defendants through the

expense of a needless removal and remand. See id. at 490 n.3. 

Unlike the plaintiff in the Barraclough case relied upon by

Defendants, there is no indication that Plaintiff here has employed

any manipulative tactics or baited Defendants down a garden path to

removal through repeated assurances of his intent to pursue certain

federal claims. See Barraclough v. ADP Auto. Claims Servs., Inc.,

818 F. Supp. 1310, 1313 (N.D. Cal. 1993). In sum, the Court finds

that the policy considerations highlighted by the Supreme Court,

see Martin, 126 S. Ct. at 711, disfavor an award of fees and costs

for reasons best explained by the Ninth Circuit in Baddie:

Filing federal claims in state court is a

legitimate tactical decision by the plaintiff:

it is an offer to the defendant to litigate the

federal claims in state court. The defendant

is not obligated to remove; rather, he has the

choice either to submit to state court

resolution of his claims, or to assert his

right to a federal forum. If the defendant

rejects the plaintiff's offer to litigate in

state court and removes the action, the

plaintiff must then choose between federal

claims and a state forum. Plaintiffs in this

case chose the state forum. They dismissed

their federal claims and moved for remand with

all due speed after removal. There was nothing

manipulative about that straightforward

tactical decision, and there would be little to

be gained in judicial economy by forcing

plaintiffs to abandon their federal causes of

action before filing in state court.

Baddie, 64 F.3d at 491.1

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order with the policy considerations discussed in Martin, the Court

regards the portions of Baddie relied upon herein as persuasive if

not controlling.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's request for voluntary

dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for alleged First

Amendment and Due Process violations and related federal claims is

GRANTED. Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for alleged First

Amendment and Due Process violations and related federal claims are

hereby dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to remand (doc.

# 7) is GRANTED. This case is remanded to the Superior Court of

Arizona in Maricopa County.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' motion for fees and

costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (doc. # 10) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to send

the file in this Case to the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa

County.

DATED this 22nd day of December, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record

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