Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03217/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03217-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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1

The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3217

___________

Robert W. Odem, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa

Frank X. Hopkins, Warden, *

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney *

General of the State of Iowa, *

*

Appellants. *

___________

Submitted: May 14, 2004

 Filed: September 10, 2004

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, SMITH, Circuit Judge, and DORR,1

 District Judge.

___________

DORR, District Judge.

Appellants appeal from the decision of the district court granting Robert W.

Odem’s amended petition for habeas corpus relief on a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the district court.

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I. Background

Robert W. Odem (“Odem”) was convicted of two counts of first degree murder

for the murders of Bill and Kimberly Smith and received a sentence of life without

the possibility of parole. Odem filed a direct appeal, which was denied, and a state

postconviction action, which was also denied, as was the related appeal. Odem filed

a second state postconviction action and appeal, which were both denied. Odem then

filed this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, on August 24, 1992, and filed an

amended petition on September 23, 1996. 

The district court granted relief on a Brady claim and held that the prosecution

failed to disclose evidence relating to a head hair found in a red jacket owned by

Odem’s brother. On appeal, this Court allowed the record to be expanded to include

evidence that showed the information concerning the jacket had been disclosed to

Odem’s counsel prior to his trial. The case was then remanded to the district court

to reconsider its Brady ruling in light of these materials.

On remand, the district court again granted the writ, this time on the basis that

the disclosures, made six weeks apart, were not done in a clear enough manner to

comply with Brady. On appeal, this Court reversed the district court’s finding of a

Brady violation and the granting of Odem’s habeas corpus petition, but ordered a

remand for consideration of Odem’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

On remand, the district court allowed Odem to amend his petition to include

for the first time his claim that defense counsel at trial had been ineffective for failing

to use at trial the evidence that the red jacket owned by Odem’s brother, Richard

Odem, had a hair inside it that was similar to Kimberly Smith’s hair. The district

court granted relief to Odem finding that defense counsel provided ineffective

assistance of counsel. The instant appeal followed. 

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II. Facts

As stated in our previous opinion in this case, Bill Smith and his wife Kimberly

were murdered at their home the evening of December 26, 1980. The two

eyewitnesses to that event were Bill Smith’s children from a former marriage, Chad,

age 8, and Steven, age 5, who testified that they saw a man wearing a red jacket and

blue jeans come into the house. Chad at first told the police that there was some

white cursive writing on the jacket with the letters “C,” “R,” “H,” and “A,” but at trial

he testified that there was no lettering on the jacket. A few minutes after the boys saw

the man enter the premises, they heard gunshots from their father’s bedroom, and in

the morning they went to alert a neighbor. When the Iowa Department of Criminal

Investigation (DCI) arrived, Bill and Kimberly Smith were found dead on the floor

from two gunshot wounds each. The DCI found no evidence connecting Odem to the

crime scene. Evidence at trial showed that on the night of the murders, Odem was

wearing blue jeans and a red jacket with no writing, and that for most of the evening

he had been bar hopping.

In early January 1981, at the DCI’s request, Odem turned over a .22 caliber

rifle that Odem’s brother, Richard, owned. Odem stated that he had been in

possession of the rifle since 1979 and from November to the last week of December

1980, the gun was in the back of his seldom locked car. After this period, Odem

indicated that he took the gun inside his house and hung it on the wall. Ballistics

tests conclusively proved that this was the weapon that killed Bill and Kimberly

Smith.

In a DCI Report dated February 27, 1981, the DCI summarized their analysis

of a red nylon jacket that belonged to Odem’s brother, Richard, as follows:

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BD The red nylon jacket and (Item BD) was examined for the presence of

blood splatters or stains and none were detected. Several hairs were recovered

from the inside of the jacket.

BD vs Z & AJ A light colored head hair recovered from the insides of the red

jacket (Item BD) was compared with the known head hair from KIMBERLY

SMITH (Item AJ). Similarities were noted between the jacket (Item BD) and

the known hair from KIMBERLY SMITH (Item AJ) in color diameter, length

and microscopic characteristics. Based on this comparison, it is the opinion of

this examiner that the hair from the red jacket (Item BD) may have originated

from the same sources as the known hair (Item AJ). It should be noted that

hairs lack sufficient characteristics to affect a positive identification.

The known hair from WILLIAM SMITH (Item Z) was determined to be

dissimilar to the hair recovered from the red jacket. (Item BD).

A second page of this DCI report references Exhibit BD as “One (1) red ‘Aristo Jac’

Jacket with lettering “U NEED A CAR WASH.’”

Odem’s counsel’s billing records indicate that he received and reviewed a copy

of the DCI report before trial on April 6, 1981. Six weeks later, on May 19, 1981, the

State sent Odem’s counsel a 12-page letter explaining a variety of potentially

exculpatory evidence. On page 11 of this letter, the State indicated that it had seized

Richard Odem’s red jacket with “You Need a Car Wash” printed in black letters on

the back.

During the trial, Odem’s counsel did not attempt to put Richard Odem’s jacket

into evidence or make the connection between Richard’s jacket and the DCI Report

concerning the hair found inside the jacket.

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III. Discussion

The issue before us is whether the district court erred in granting relief on

Odem’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We conclude that it did.

Appellants present two primary arguments – one is procedural, the other is

substantive. First, Appellants argue that the district court should have found that

Odem’s current ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally defaulted

because Odem never presented such claim to an Iowa state court. In addition,

Appellants contend that the district court erred in allowing Odem to amend his

petition after remand over the objections of Appellants. Second, Appellants argue

that the district court erred in finding that Odem’s trial counsel’s performance fell

below the objective standard of reasonableness because of his failure to use at trial

the evidence that Odem’s brother’s red jacket had a head hair in it that was similar to

Kimberly Smith’s hair. Further, Appellants argue that the district court erred in

conducting the prejudice analysis called for by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). We will address Appellants’

substantive argument first and will assume, solely for the purpose of addressing the

substantive argument, that there is no procedural bar to Odem’s claim.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and law.

Id. at 698. Thus, the district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and

its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Reed v. Norris, 195 F.3d 1004, 1006 (8th

Cir. 1999); see also Pruett v. Norris, 153 F.3d 579, 584 (8th Cir. 1998); Wilson v.

Armontrout, 962 F.2d 817, 819 (8th Cir. 1992). A state court’s findings of fact made

in the course of deciding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are presumed to

be correct. Wilson, 962 F.2d at 819.

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A. Substantive Ruling

In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must show that the performance of his counsel was deficient and that he was

prejudiced by the deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To establish

that his counsel’s performance was deficient, the defendant must show that counsel’s

representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. To

establish prejudice, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694.

When addressing the adequacy of counsel’s performance, we must be “highly

deferential” and make “every effort [] to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight,

to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the

conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. There is a strong

presumption that a counsel’s performance “falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.” Id. 

Error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not necessarily

require that a judgment in a criminal proceeding be set aside if the error had no effect

on the judgment. Id. at 691. In an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must

affirmatively show prejudice. Id. at 693. It is not sufficient for a defendant to show

that the error(s) had some “conceivable effect” on the result of the proceeding

because not every error that influences or affects a proceeding undermines the

reliability of the outcome of the proceeding. Id. The defendant must show that

because of counsel’s error, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. 

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It is undisputed that the billing records of Odem’s trial counsel indicate that he

received and reviewed a copy of the DCI report. It is also undisputed that six weeks

later he received the letter from the State, revealing that the state had seized Richard

Odem’s red jacket, which matched the jacket described in the DCI Report. We have

previously stated that the connection between these two disclosures was “readily

apparent.” Odem v. Hopkins, 192 F.3d 772, 777 (8th Cir. 1999). Appellants argue

that it was a tactical decision for defense counsel not to offer the evidence that

Richard Odem’s red jacket had a hair inside of it that was similar to Kimberly Smith’s

hair. Appellants claim it would have been directly contrary to the strong alibi of

Odem’s brother as well as the strategy employed at trial that Odem was not “trying

to point the finger to somebody else.” Appellants further suggest that the district

court refused to accord the actual trial strategy employed by defense counsel the

appropriate level of deference. 

Odem claims that his counsel at trial was ineffective for failing to present the

hair and jacket evidence. Odem argues that it is clear that trial counsel did not

recognize the significance of the information he apparently received and that his

counsel, and co-counsel both testified that they did not recall having this information.

The district court found on remand that while Odem’s counsel, Mr. Pappas,

should have made the connection, he did not. The district court concluded that

because defense counsel did not present the existence of the other red jacket

containing a hair similar to Kimberly Smith’s to the jury it “robbed” the jury of

considering that issue and, therefore, undermined the confidence in the verdict. The

district court stated that it “finds it hard to envision any set of circumstances where

a defense lawyer, . . . would not use and push those facts” and concluded that Odem’s

defense attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. 

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We disagree. Defense counsel had received records regarding the red jacket

with the hair similar to Kimberly Smith’s hair. The evidence in the record is that

Richard Odem, the owner of the other red jacket, had an alibi for the night of the

murders and was reportedly in Iowa City, nearly 300 miles and six hours away from

Latimer, Iowa, where the murders occurred. In addition, the evidence is that the red

jacket owned by Richard Odem had black block lettering on the back with a cartoonstyle elephant and the words “U Need A Car Wash,” which is different from the

descriptions of the red jacket obtained from the Smith children. Alternatively, two

red nylon jackets were obtained from defendant Odem, and neither had any writing

or lettering on the back. 

Although the district court stated that it could not “envision any set of

circumstances” in which a defense lawyer would not use such evidence, the focus

when addressing the adequacy of counsel’s performance is on evaluating the conduct

from counsel’s perspective at the time. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Just because

defense counsel did not use the evidence of Richard Odem’s red jacket and the head

hair during Odem’s trial does not mean that counsel’s performance falls below an

objective standard of reasonableness. The evidence at the time of trial was that two

red nylon jackets with no lettering on their backs were obtained from Odem, the

children of the victim described the gunman’s jacket as red with no lettering, Odem

turned over to police the .22 caliber Winchester rifle that was conclusively

determined to be the murder weapon, Odem had purchased Remington ammunition

of the same type that was used in the murders, and Odem’s inconsistent report of his

whereabouts on the night of the murders boiled down to a night of bar-hopping. By

using the evidence about Richard Odem’s red jacket and the head hair similar to

Kimberly Smith’s hair, Odem would have been pointing the finger at his brother,

Richard Odem, who had an alibi. Based on the foregoing and the other evidence of

record, and considering defense counsel’s conduct based on his perspective at the

time, we find that the strong presumption that defense counsel’s performance “falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” is not overcome. See id.;

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see also Wilson v. Armontrout, 962 F.2d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that a

defense counsel is not ineffective when the counsel does not present an “implausible

theory of defense” (quotations and citations omitted)).

It is not necessary for us to consider the prejudice portion of the Strickland

analysis in light of our aforementioned finding. However, we have done so and find

that Odem has not shown that there is a “reasonable probability” that the result of the

trial would have been different had the connection between Odem’s brother’s red

jacket and the similar head hair been presented during trial. 

As previously discussed, a defendant must show that there is a “reasonable

probability” that the result of the trial would have been different to satisfy the

prejudice requirement under Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. It is not

sufficient for a defendant to show that the error had some “conceivable effect” on the

result of the proceeding because not every error that influences a proceeding

undermines the reliability of the outcome of the proceeding. Id.

There was extensive evidence adduced by the State at trial, including the facts

that Richard Odem had an alibi for the night of the murders, that the red jacket owned

by Richard Odem did not match the description given by the Smith children of the red

jacket worn by the gunman, that Odem was in possession of the murder weapon, and

that Odem’s alibi of bar-hopping for the night of the murders had gaps in it. We find

that even if the failure to use the evidence of Richard Odem’s red jacket and the head

hair was error, it was not so prejudicial so as to undermine the reliability of the trial

result. There was overwhelming evidence at trial of Odem’s guilt and Odem has

failed to show that there is a “reasonable probability” that the result of his trial would

have been different if the evidence of the other red jacket and the head hair had been

used. Therefore, we find that there was no prejudice by defense counsel’s failure to

use the evidence of the other red jacket and the head hair at trial.

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Further, we note that at this stage, even if a new trial were ordered, it is

counterintuitive that the evidence of the red jacket owned by Richard Odem with the

head hair inside would be helpful to Odem. We are cognizant that the analysis under

Strickland requires that counsel’s conduct be judged under the then-existing

circumstances. However, if a new trial were ordered, it is highly unlikely that the

evidence of the red jacket owned by Richard Odem and related head hair would even

be admissible, much less that it would be favorable to Odem, because mitochondrial

DNA testing now confirms that the head hair found in the sleeve of Richard Odem’s

red jacket did not come from Kimberly Smith. 

B. Procedural Default

Having assumed that there was no procedural obstacle to Odem’s claim of

ineffective assistance, we have concluded that Odem’s claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel is without merit and does not rise to the level of constitutional error.

Therefore, we find that it is not necessary to address the merits of whether Odem was

procedurally barred from raising such claim in this federal habeas petition.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Odem’s claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel fails, the judgment of the district court in granting the writ of habeas

corpus is reversed, and the original conviction and sentence are reinstated. 

______________________________

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