Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01625/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01625-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Christian Dale Lowery, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

Unknown Barcklay, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 12-1625-PHX-RCB (LOA) 

 O R D E R 

 Plaintiff Christian Dale Lowery, who is a prisoner in the custody of the Arizona 

Department of Corrections (ADC), brought this civil rights case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§1983 against Karen Barcklay for alleged indifference to serious medical needs. (Doc. 

1.) Plaintiff moves for summary judgment, and Defendant opposes on the ground that, 

inter alia, the motion is premature as it was filed fewer than two weeks after the 

Scheduling Order was issued. (Docs. 39, 44.) 

 The Court will deny the motion without prejudice to refiling a proper motion when 

the deadline for discovery has passed. 

I. Background 

Plaintiff’s claim arises from an injury to his hand sustained while working as a 

plumber for ADC. (Doc. 1.) In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that his hand was injured on 

March 14, 2011, and that Dr. Milazzo sutured the wound, prescribed antibiotics, and 

placed Plaintiff on limited-duty status, which did not exclude Plaintiff’s work 

assignment. From then on, Plaintiff was dependent on Defendant for medical care, and 

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he made nine contacts with Health Services seeking medical attention complaining that 

he had twice re-injured his hand and was experiencing pain, swelling, and an inability to 

extend his finger. On April 19, Defendant notified Plaintiff that she had made a request 

for an “ortho” evaluation. Plaintiff was seen on May 5 by an orthopedic surgeon who 

concluded that Plaintiff had severed a tendon and that because so much time had elapsed, 

the chance for successful surgery and recovery was greatly diminished. Although 

Plaintiff had the surgery on June 6, his hand capacity has been diminished, and he has 

suffered pain. (Doc. 1 at 3-3a.) 

 On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff 

stated a claim in Count I against Barcklay and directed her to answer. The Court 

dismissed the remaining claims and Defendants. (Doc. 3.) 

II. Motion for Summary Judgment 

 A. Legal Standards 

 1. Summary Judgment 

 A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 

(1986). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial 

responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the 

record, together with affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact. Id. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the 

burden then shifts to the opposing party who must demonstrate the existence of a factual 

dispute and that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome 

of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 250; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). The opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed 

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factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties= differing 

versions of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 

253, 288-89 (1968). 

 When considering a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits or declarations, if any. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). At summary judgment, the 

judge=s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine 

whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of 

the non-movant is “to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his 

favor.” Id. at 255. But, if the evidence of the non-moving party is merely colorable or is 

not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 248-49. 

Conclusory allegations, unsupported by factual material, are insufficient to defeat a 

motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). See

Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[c]onclusory, 

speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine 

issues of fact and defeat summary judgment”). 

 2. Medical Claim 

To prevail on a claim under the Eighth Amendment for prison medical care, a 

prisoner must demonstrate “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. 

Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 

(1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that failure 

to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant=s response was deliberately indifferent. 

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citations omitted). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison 

official must both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; the official 

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Deliberate indifference in the medical context may be shown by a 

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purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and 

harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

 But mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or “medical malpractice” do not 

support a claim under § 1983. Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th 

Cir. 1980). Inadequate treatment due to malpractice or even gross negligence does not 

constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 

(9th Cir. 1990). Moreover, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison 

medical personnel regarding an appropriate medical diagnosis or treatment are not 

enough to establish a deliberate-indifference claim. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 

1058 (9th Cir. 2004); Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). To prevail 

on a claim involving choices between alternative courses of treatment, a prisoner must 

show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable in light 

of the circumstances and that it was chosen in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to 

the plaintiff’s health. Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332. 

 B. Discussion

Defendant filed her answer to the Complaint on January 7, 2014, and the Court 

issued its Scheduling Order on January 14. (Docs. 37, 38.) Plaintiff filed his motion for 

Summary Judgment on January 27.1

 (Doc. 39.) 

Although Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment, he has not submitted a 

separate Statement of Facts or supporting documentation. Instead, he relies on the 

allegations in his Complaint. (Doc. 39 at 3-4.) He claims that although Defendant has 

filed an answer she has not disputed any material fact, that she has only made general 

denials, and that she does not deny that her effort to fill out a form 36 days after the 

 1

 Under the “prison mailbox rule,” a pleading is deemed filed when handed by the 

prisoner to a prison official for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71 

(1988); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2009); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 

F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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injury was inadequate and untimely. (Id. at 4-5.) He asserts that she cannot produce 

evidence that she was unaware of Plaintiff’s medical needs because he complained of 

pain and she responded that she would not do anything. (Id. at 6; ref. Doc. 35, Ex. A, 

Resp. to Plaintiff’s Health Needs Request (HNR), stating that “we are still waiting to get 

the x-ray report.”) 

 Defendant argues that not only has Plaintiff not complied with the Local Rule of 

Civil Procedure requiring a separate Statement of Facts, more importantly, the Motion is 

premature. (Doc. 44 at 2, citing LRCiv 56.1(a).) 

 The Court agrees. As to Plaintiff’s claim that the Answer does not specifically 

deny each allegation in the Complaint, Defendant argues that the standard for responding 

to a summary judgment motion does not apply to answering a complaint and a defendant 

is not required to dispute material issues of fact in the same way she would in a summary 

judgment motion. (Doc. 44 at 5-6.) The Court notes that because Defendant denied the 

allegations in the Complaint, she has not admitted them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(B); 

Doc. 37. 

 Defendant further contends that she is unable to offer evidence regarding the 

relevant facts until she obtains Plaintiff’s medical records. (Doc. 44 at 2.) And she 

cannot specifically deny Plaintiff’s allegations—that is, appropriately respond to a proper 

summary judgment motion—without access to the medical records.2

 (Id. at 5.) Defense 

counsel attests that she did not receive the authorization for the medical records until 

February 27. (Doc. 44, Watanabe Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff claims that defense counsel had 

the authorization when she prepared her response and that Defendant herself had access 

to the records before that. (Doc. 46 at 6.) The Court rejects Plaintiff’s position; 

Defendant is entitled to sufficient time to prepare her defense with her attorney and to 

pursue discovery. The Scheduling Order establishes the time frames for discovery and 

dispositive motions: March 28 for written discovery, May 12 for depositions, all 

 

2

 Defendant also points out that Plaintiff has a pending motion for production of documents. (Id., ref. Doc. 40.) 

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discovery to be completed by July 28, and dispositive motions filed by September 29. 

(Doc. 38.) 

 Plaintiff also refers to a recent decision by the Court regarding his Motion for a 

Default Judgment.3

 (Doc. 39 at 8; Doc. 46 at 3.) In the Order denying the default 

judgment, the Court analyzed the three factors related to “good cause” for setting aside an 

entry of default by the Clerk, including whether the Defendant had a meritorious defense. 

(Doc. 36 at 5-13.) The Court concluded that Defendant failed to carry her burden on that 

issue. (Id. at 12.) But Defendant did not have access to Plaintiff’s medical record when 

responding to the Motion for a Default Judgment, and the Court did not determine that 

Defendant had no meritorious defense. 

 In addition, Defendant argues that without the medical records, Plaintiff cannot 

support his claim. (Doc. 44 at 2.) The Court agrees. In support of the allegations in the 

Complaint, the record contains only HNRs from Plaintiff and the Director’s response to 

Plaintiff’s grievance; these are insufficient to establish Defendant’s deliberate 

indifference. (Doc. 35, Pl.’s Reply to Response to Order to Show Cause, Exs. A-D.) For 

example, Plaintiff relies on his HNR and the April 13 response—which states that 

Defendant is waiting for the x-ray report—to argue that she knew of the injury. (Doc. 39 

at 6; Doc. 46 at 4.) But it is not enough that Defendant knew Plaintiff had been injured; 

Plaintiff must show that Defendant knew the extent and nature of the injury and that 

Plaintiff needed to be seen by the orthopedic surgeon. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (the 

official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference). Assuming 

that the April 13 response was from Defendant, it shows that she was waiting for the xray to make a determination about what Plaintiff needed. Id. at 844 (even a prison 

official who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found 

 3

 On January 7, 2014, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for a Default Judgment, 

granted Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside the Default, and granted Defendant’s motion to 

file an untimely answer. (Doc. 36.) 

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free from liability if he responded reasonably to the risk, although the harm ultimately 

was not averted). And the record does not show when Defendant became aware of 

Plaintiff’s injury, the extent and nature of it, and the need for surgery to correct the 

injury. 

 Likewise, a mere delay in medical care, without more, is insufficient to prevail on 

a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference; a plaintiff must show the delay 

in treatment was harmful. Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 

404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff offers only inadmissible hearsay from an unidentified 

surgeon that the surgeon said so much time had elapsed, the chance for successful 

surgery and recovery was greatly diminished. (Doc. 1, Count I at 4.) Plaintiff must offer 

competent medical evidence that the delay caused harm, and he must show that 

Defendant’s conduct caused the delay. 

 In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is 

premature and will deny it without prejudice to refiling at an appropriate time. 

 IT IS ORDERED that the reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39) and it is denied without prejudice. 

 DATED this 17th day of April, 2014. 

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