Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04141/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04141-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Office of the Clerk 

Byron White United States Courthouse 

1823 Stout Street 

Denver, co 80257 

April 7, 1995 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 94-4141, Jones v. Babbitt 

Filed February 22, 1995 by Judge Ebel 

Please be advised that the court has entered an order 

granting the appellee's motion to publish the captioned 

opinion. Attached is the published version. · 

Attachment 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, 

Clerk 

ByV!u~IN·~JL4u-(f.__/ Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 94-4141 Document: 01019283511 Date Filed: 02/22/1995 Page: 1 
PUBLISH FILED 

United States Court or Appc:::: 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

G. KEVIN JONES, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

BRUCE BABBITT, Secretary of the 

Interior, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

F:2 2 ~ i995 

PATRICK FISi-T~h Cl~rt~ 

No. 94-4141 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 90-CV-822) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

G. Kevin Jones, pro se. 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr., United States Attorney, Salt Lake City, 

Utah, and Michael E. Hegarty, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, 

D. Utah, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before MOORE, BARRETT, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff, an employee of the Department of the Interior 

(DOI), appeals the district court's decision granting defendant's 

Appellate Case: 94-4141 Document: 01019283511 Date Filed: 02/22/1995 Page: 2 
motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of reprisal.l 

See Jones v. Babbitt, 851 F. Supp. 1500 (D. Utah 1994). Plaintiff 

argues that as a federal employee he was entitled to 

administrative leave and per diem travel expenses to assist his 

counsel in pre-hearing preparation and to attend a Title VII 

hearing. We disagree, and therefore affirm the district court's 

granting of summary judgment. 

The events underlying this action began in 1988 when 

plaintiff commenced a Title VII handicap discrimination action 

against defendant.2 A trial was scheduled, and plaintiff 

requested forty-eight hours of administrative leave to prepare for 

and attend the trial. The request was denied based on agency 

policy providing for retroactive administrative leave and 

restoration of annual leave only if plaintiff prevailed in the 

litigation. Prior to trial, but before plaintiff received notice 

of the denial of administrative leave, the parties settled. The 

district court approved the settlement and dismissed the action. 

Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to amend or in the 

alternative for clarification of the settlement agreement, 

asserting that the settlement could be interpreted to interfere 

with the independent statutory authority of the Inspector General 

(IG) of the DOI to conduct investigations, 5 U.S.C. app. 3, 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 All proceedings were against the named Secretary of the 

Interior; thus, all of the Secretaries from 1988 to present will 

be referred to as defendant. 

2 

Appellate Case: 94-4141 Document: 01019283511 Date Filed: 02/22/1995 Page: 3 
§ 3(a). Contending that the motion to amend or for clarification 

of the settlement caused him illness, plaintiff sought an 

additional forty hours of administrative leave in lieu of sick 

leave, which also was denied based on the same DOI policy. The 

district court held a hearing on the motion to amend on June 8, 

1990. Plaintiff requested sixteen more hours of administrative 

leave to prepare for and attend that hearing, as well as per diem 

expenses for travel from Washington, D.C. to Salt Lake City. 

Again, the request was denied pursuant to the same DOI policy, and 

plaintiff was required to use annual leave and pay his travel 

expenses. After the hearing, the district court denied the motion 

to amend.3 

Thereafter, plaintiff commenced an action in district court 

alleging that his requests for leave were not settled and that the 

denial of leave constituted unlawful reprisal in violation of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793-794, and Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. 

The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, holding 

that the settlement barred the reprisal claims. On appeal, this 

court held in part that the settlement agreement did not release a 

claim of retaliation arising after the settlement. Jones v. 

Lujan, 986 F.2d 1427, 1993 WL 5948, at **3 (lOth Cir. 

3 Plaintiff then sought, among other things, to enforce the 

settlement agreement, claiming the IG's continuing investigation 

was a breach of the settlement agreement. The district court 

denied the motion, determining it had no jurisdiction over the IG 

and the IG was not a party to the agreement. This court agreed 

with the district court's conclusion that the settlement agreement 

may not be enforced against the IG. Jones v. Lujan, 936 F.2d 583, 

1991 WL 114635, at **1 (lOth Cir. 1991) (table). 

3 

Appellate Case: 94-4141 Document: 01019283511 Date Filed: 02/22/1995 Page: 4 
1993) (table). Accordingly, the issue concerning the sixteen hours 

of administrative leave was remanded to the district court. Id. 

On remand, the district court granted defendant's request for 

summary judgment. See Jones v. Babbitt, 851 F. Supp. 1500. The 

court concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to administrative 

leave for three separate reasons: (1) the hearing was not a Title 

VII hearing; (2) even if the hearing was a Title VII hearing, 

plaintiff failed to prove that defendant's facially 

nondiscriminatory reason for denying leave was pretextual; and (3) 

under the DOI leave policy, plaintiff was not the prevailing party 

at the hearing. Id. at 1502-03. On appeal, plaintiff argues that 

Title VII entitles him to administrative leave and per diem 

expenses, and therefore the district court erred in granting 

summary judgment for defendant. 

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). James v. Sears. Roebuck & Co., 21 F.3d 

989, 997-98 (lOth Cir. 1994). "Summary judgment is appropriate if 

'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the 

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" 

Hagelin for President Comm. v. Graves, 25 F.3d 956, 959 (lOth Cir. 

1994) (quoting Rule 56(c)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995). 

"In applying this standard, we construe the factual record and 

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the 

party opposing summary judgment." Blue Circle Cement. Inc. v. 

Board of County Comm'rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1503 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

4 

Appellate Case: 94-4141 Document: 01019283511 Date Filed: 02/22/1995 Page: 5 
Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in holding 

that defendant presented a facially nondiscriminatory reason for 

denying plaintiff administrative leave and per diem travel 

expenses to assist his attorney and attend the hearing, and in 

holding that plaintiff had failed to present evidence that the 

reason given was pretextual. We disagree. 

After defendant conceded that plaintiff set forth a prima 

facie case of reprisal, defendant then had the burden of showing a 

facially nondiscriminatory reason for denying administrative 

leave. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 

(1993); EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1316, 1317-18 (lOth 

Cir. 1992). 

that the 

Defendant's facially nondiscriminatory reason was 

DOI's policy permitted administrative leave only 

retroactively for successful employee litigants. Because 

defendant met his burden, plaintiff then was required to show that 

defendant's reason was merely a pretext for unlawful reprisal and 

that defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiff 

because of his claim. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 113 S. Ct. at 

2747-48, 2749, 2752. Plaintiff maintains that he was the 

prevailing party at the June 8, 1990 hearing and that he, 

therefore, was entitled to leave pursuant to DOI policy. 

Plaintiff argues that defendant's reimbursement policy was shown 

to be pretextual when he was not provided administrative leave 

under the circumstances. However, plaintiff was not the 

prevailing party. Although the district court denied defendant's 

motion to amend and did not change the terms of the settlement, 

the settlement agreement could not and did not restrict the IG's 

5 

Appellate Case: 94-4141 Document: 01019283511 Date Filed: 02/22/1995 Page: 6 
authority criminally to investigate plaintiff. Furthermore, the 

settlement agreement provided that plaintiff was the prevailing 

party only for attorney's fees and costs. Thus, failure to give 

the administrative leave was not pretext for unlawful reprisal. 

Plaintiff next argues that Title VII entitles him to 

administrative leave and per diem travel expenses related to the 

hearing.4 Plaintiff contends the denial of leave and expenses 

violates 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), concerning discriminatory terms 

or conditions of employment, and § 2000e-3(a), concerning 

reprisal. We disagree. 

Title VII does not expressly permit administrative leave or 

per diem expenses for this kind of court proceeding. The 

regulations implementing Title VII do provide entitlement to 

administrative leave to pursue administrative remedies. 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1613.214(b) (2). The regulation, however, does not provide for 

leave for court litigation. 

In Mitchell v. Baldrige, 662 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1987), the 

court extended the regulation to permit administrative leave for 

pretrial preparation. Recognizing there was no express provision 

for such an extension, the court nonetheless believed the policy 

behind Title VII required the extension. Id. at 908-09 (citing 

Davis v. Bolger, 496 F. Supp. 559 (D.D.C. 1980)). In addition, 

the court reasoned that although the plaintiff in Mitchell was not 

a true prevailing party, he was not an "untested litigant," 

4 The district court did not reach this issue. "We are free to 

affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is 

a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not 

relied upon by the district court." United States v. Sandoval, 29 

F.3d 537, 542 n.6 (lOth Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted). 

6 

Appellate Case: 94-4141 Document: 01019283511 Date Filed: 02/22/1995 Page: 7 
because the appellate court had remanded after determining the 

plaintiff had made a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination 

and perhaps could show pretext. Id. at 909. 

We disagree with Mitchell. There is no express provision in 

Title VII or its regulations permitting administrative leave or 

per diem expenses for judicial proceedings. We decline to read 

such into Title VII or its regulations. If a plaintiff prevails 

on the merits, he or she would potentially be entitled to recovery 

of reasonable pre-trial and trial expenses, including compensation 

for leave that might have been required in connection with the 

trial. Id.; Kyles v. Secretary of Agric., 604 F. Supp. 426, 437 

n.21 (D.D.C. 1985); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 

F. Supp. 354, 385-86 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd in part and remanded in 

part on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. 

denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985). Thus, a federal employee who is 

successful in his or her litigation is not without remedy.5 

Because we agree with the district court's conclusion that 

plaintiff is not entitled to administrative leave and per diem 

expenses, we need not address his argument that the district court 

erred in holding the June 8 1 1990 hearing was not a Title VII 

hearing. Griffin v. Davies, 929 F.2d 550, 554 (lOth 

5 Even if we agreed with the result in Mitchell, Mitchell is 

factually distinguishable from the case at bar. Plaintiff is an 

"untested litigant." On remand, this court gave no indication 

plaintiff was to be considered a prevailing party. See Jones v. 

Lujan, 1993 WL 5948, at **3 (without suggesting which party was 

correct, court remanded on ground settlement agreement did not 

include sixteen hours of administrative leave) . 

7 

Appellate Case: 94-4141 Document: 01019283511 Date Filed: 02/22/1995 Page: 8 
Cir.) (refusing to decide issues not affecting outcome of appeal), 

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 878 (1991) .6 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Utah is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff's renewed request for 

oral argument and his request for attorney's fees and costs on 

appeal are DENIED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

6 Plaintiff also argues that the district court erred in 

permitting defendant to prepare a memorandum decision for the 

court rather than an order as permitted by Utah Rule 206. 

Plaintiff's claim is without merit. The district court properly 

allowed defendant to draft the memorandum decision. See Hernandez 

v. George, 793 F.2d 264, 266-67 (lOth Cir. 1986). Additionally, 

plaintiff's argument that the district court erred in failing to 

award him attorney's fees and costs is without merit. 

8 

Appellate Case: 94-4141 Document: 01019283511 Date Filed: 02/22/1995 Page: 9