Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00216/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00216-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Lee Saiers,

Petitioner,

v.

Dora B. Schriro, et al.,

Respondents.

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CV 06-216-TUC-DCB

ORDER

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied as barred by the statute of

limitations.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

On May 3, 2006, Petitioner Saiers filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and violations to his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel (Petition at 5-6.) He

alleges that his attorney failed to effectively represent him at trial and on appeal. 

Specifically, he alleges supporting facts for these claims as follows:

After a jury rejected Petitioner's insanity defense, the trial court

sentenced him to aggravated consecutive terms of prison totaling 64

years. Appellate counsel was ineffective because she failed to raise the

issue that the consecutive sentences violated Arizona law and were cruel

and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Id. at 6.

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On September 6, 2006, the Respondents answered the Petition. Respondent

asserts that the Petition is untimely and should be dismissed. Also, Respondent argues

that the federal claims asserted by the Petitioner must be dismissed because they are

precluded by his failure to exhaust their review before the Arizona Supreme Court and

have been procedurally defaulted in the state courts under Rule 32.2(a)(3).

Petitioner argues that Respondents have waived their statute of limitations

defense and are precluded from asserting it now. And even if the statute of limitations

constitutes an affirmative defense, in light of the issues raised in the petition, Petitioner is

entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: 28 U.S.C. § 2254

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law that is binding on state courts. Engle v. Isaac, 546 U.S.

107, 119 (1982); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). In other

words, a writ of habeas corpus is available to "a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or law or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA), “to restrict the availability of habeas corpus relief,” Greenawalt v. Stewart,

105 F.3d 1268, 12751 (9th Cir. 1997), specifically as follows:

An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State Court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added).

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A federal court must presume the correctness of the state court's factual findings. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

In deciding whether the state court ruling was contrary to or involved an

unreasonable application of the law, this Court looks exclusively to the holdings of the

United States Supreme Court. A state court decision is contrary to clearly established

Supreme Court precedent if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite that reached

by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court confronts facts that are

materially indistinguishable from relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result

opposite that of the Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A

state court’s application of clearly established Supreme Court law is unreasonable where

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principal but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Id. at 407. This is an objective

assessment, id. at 378; an objectively unreasonable application of federal law is different

from an incorrect application of federal law. Id. at 410.

It is not enough that the state court erroneously or incorrectly applied clearly

established Supreme Court precedent, “rather the application must also be unreasonable.” 

Id. at 411. Accordingly, a writ only issues if the federal reviewing court has a firm

conviction that the state court committed clear error in its application of Supreme Court

precedent. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 112, 1153-54, 1157 (9th Cir. 2000). In

other words, a Petitioner will not prevail even if he has the better of two reasonable legal

arguments because a writ will issue only if this Court has a firm conviction that one

answer, the one proposed by Petitioner and rejected by the state court, was correct and

the other, the one adopted by the state court was erroneous. Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234

F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1153-54).

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Saiers' Petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the AEDPA's effective date, so the

provisions of the Act apply to this case. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th

Cir. 2001) (citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 268 n. 3 (2000)).

According to assertions in the Petition, "Petitioner argued in a Petition for PostConviction Relief that his constitutional rights were violated by virtue of the consecutive

sentences and . . . Petitioner further argued that appellate counsel was ineffective in

failing to raise these issues on appeal." (Petition at 6.) On April 8, 2004, the trial court

rejected arguments challenging the consecutive sentences imposed in Petitioner's case. 

The state court of appeals affirmed the trial court. It held that under the three part test in

State v. Gordon, 161 Ariz. 308 (1989), the consecutive sentences were proper. 

Consequently, his appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this as an issue

on appeal. (Answer, Ex. V: Decision Order at 2-5.) The state court's ruling was neither

contrary to nor involved an unreasonable application of the law, and a writ may not issue

under such circumstances. 

Timeliness: 1-Year Statute of Limitations

The AEDPA imposed, for the first time, a one-year statute of limitations on

habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

The limitation period shall run from the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review,

whichever comes latest. Id. To calculate when the clock starts running for the one-year

statute of limitations period, the conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing

a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court's affirmation of conviction, which is

90 days. Clay v. United States, ___ U.S. ____, ____, 123 S. Ct. 1072, 1074 (2003)

(conviction becomes final 90 days later, when the time for filing a petition for writ of

certiorari expires); see Bowen v. Roe, 118 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (period of

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direct review includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for writ of

certiorari with the United States Supreme court whether or not such a petition is filed).

On December 16, 1997, the trial court imposed Petitioner's consecutive

sentences: Count I, an aggravated 20-year term of imprisonment for kidnaping; Count II,

an aggravated term of 15 years in prison for aggravated assault; an aggravated term of 20

years on Counts III and IV for armed robbery, and four years for Count V, an unlawful

use of means of transportation. On December 31, 1997, Petitioner filed a direct appeal. 

On March 17, 1998, he filed a petition for post conviction relief (PCR). The trial court

summarily dismissed it, and it was consolidated with the direct appeal. On May 25,

1999, the court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences and affirmed the

dismissal of the PCR petition. 

The Second petition for PCR, wherein Petitioner raised the claims he alleges

here, was filed four years later on November 20, 2003. On April 8, 2004, the trial court

denied the Second PCR petition. Petitioner sought review by the state appellate court,

which affirmed the trial court's dismissal on March 11, 2005. Fourteen months later, on

May 3, 2006, Petitioner filed his federal claim for habeas relief. 

The running of the statute of limitations is tolled for any period of time during

which a properly filed application for state post-conviction review is pending and

continues to toll while a Petitioner appeals the denial in state court. Welch v. Newland,

267 F.3d 1013, (9th Cir. 2001). Section 2244(d)(2) provides: "The time during which a

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation."

The Supreme Court interpreted this statutory tolling provision as covering the

time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher

state court. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). The Court held that the definition of

"pending," within the context of 2244(d)(2), "means that an application is pending as long

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as the ordinary state collateral review process is "in continuance" – i.e., "until the

completion of" that process." Id. at 220. "In other words, until the application has

achieved final resolution through the State's post-conviction procedures, by definition it

remains 'pending.'" Id.

The Court explained that any other definition would defeat the important

principle of exhaustion codified in the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c), that a federal

habeas petitioner must exhaust his state remedies as long as he has "'the right under

[state] law . . . to raise' in the State, 'by any available procedure, the question presented.'" 

Id. Otherwise, the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations would require state prisoners

to file federal habeas petitions before the State completes a full round of collateral

review. Id.

Filing for post-conviction relief in state court triggers the tolling of the statute of

limitations for filing a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court looks at the

state's laws and rules governing filings, and considers whether anything would prevent

the petition from being placed in the court's record. Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724,

726-27 (9th Cir. 2001) (following Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8-11 (2000) (holding that

federal courts look to state law when analyzing AEDPA's tolling provision). It is

undisputed that Petitioner's PCR motions for post-conviction relief were properly filed

with the trial and appellate courts of Arizona for purposes of entry into the record, and

therefore triggered the tolling of the statute of limitations for filing this action.

The state appellate court ruled on the First PCR petition on May 25, 1999, the

Second PCR petition was filed November 20, 2003. The one-year statute of limitations

period for filing this action ran before Petitioner even filed the Second PCR in state court. 

Once the period expires, the prisoner may not restart it and there is no further tolling by

subsequently filed motions for PCR in state court. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820,

823 (9th Cir. 2003); Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2001); Payton v.

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Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2001); Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th

Cir. 2001). Here, there was approximately a five or six-year delay in Petitioner's filing of

his federal habeas action. It is barred by the one-year statute of limitations for filing such

petitions.

Exhaustion: Procedural Default

The procedural posture of a Petition is as important as its timeliness because 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b) provides for the presentation of claims of constitutional magnitude to

the district courts as follows:

(1) An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of State court shall not be granted

unless it appears that–(a) the applicant has exhausted the remedies

available in the courts of the State; or (b) (i) there is an absence of

available State corrective process; or . . .

(2) An applicant for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the

merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the

remedies available to the courts of the State.

(3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion

requirements or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless

the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.

Before a federal district court may consider a state prisoner’s application for

relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, the prisoner must have exhausted, in state court, every claim

raised in his petition. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Castille v.

Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989). To properly exhaust remedies, the prisoner must

have afforded the state courts the opportunity to rule on the merits of his federal

constitutional claim by fairly presenting the claim to the state courts in a procedurally

appropriate manner. Id. at 351-52; Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994).

State prisoners, except those sentenced to death or life imprisonment, exhaust

state court remedies by presenting their claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Swoopes

v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). When a life sentence has been imposed,

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1

 A "mixed" Petition with exhausted and unexhausted claims may be held in abeyance until

state claims are exhausted, so that subsequently the prisoner may file an amended habeas petition

inclusive of all his claims. Calderon v. United States District Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 986-88

(9th Cir. 1998); Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 2000); Rose, 455 U.S. at 510.

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the "complete round" requires a defendant to seek discretionary review of his claims by

the Arizona Supreme Court. Id. "If state remedies have not been exhausted, a district

court is directed to provide the habeas petitioner "with the choice of returning to state

court to exhaust his claims or of amending or resubmitting the habeas petition to present

only exhausted claims to the district court." Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982).1

If a federal constitutional claim can no longer be raised because of a failure to

follow the state's prescribed procedure for presenting such an issue the claim is

"technically" exhausted but procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to present the

claim to the state's highest court in a procedurally proper manner. Boyd v. Thompson,

147 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Calderon, 96 F.3d at 1129 (quoting

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30)); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989).

The procedural default doctrine applies to bar a federal habeas claim when a state

court declined to address a prisoner's claims because the prisoner failed to meet a state

procedural requirement. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman,

501 U.S. at 731-32l; Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Even if the state court also addressed the merits of the underlying federal claim as an

alternative ruling, the claims are, nevertheless, procedurally defaulted and barred from

federal consideration. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989)); Poland v.

Stewart, 151 F.3d 1014, 1021 n. 7 (9th Cir. 1998); Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333

(9th Cir. 1992). A subsequent “silent” denial of review affirms the lower court’s

application of a procedural bar. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803; Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle,

7 F.3d 139, 142 (9th Cir. 1992).

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The procedural default doctrine also applies when the prisoner has not presented

a claim in state court, but pursuant to the state court’s procedural rules, there are no

currently available state court remedies or procedures to obtain review of the claim. 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Engle, 456 U.S. at 125 n. 8; White, 874

F.2d at 602.

Here, the Petitioner exhausted his claims before the Arizona Court of Appeals.

He challenged the consecutive sentences imposed in this case and argued ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issue on appeal, however, he failed

to argue that the consecutive sentences were cruel and unusual punishment. He argued

only that the consecutive sentences violated Arizona law, under Gordon. He has,

therefore, failed to exhaust this claim. Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, however, precludes late claims from review unless they fit within narrow

exceptions, such as being newly discovered evidence. Rule 32(e). Rule 32 forecloses

the possibility for Petitioner to bring a third motion for PCR to exhaust the constitutional

claim of cruel and unusual punishment. Consequently, this claim is precluded from

federal review because it has been procedurally defaulted in the state courts.

Procedural default precludes federal review of the claim unless the prisoner can

demonstrate “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Teague,

489 U.S. at 298; Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 900 F.2d 904, 907-08 (9th

Cir. 1986). 

To demonstrate cause, a state prisoner must show that some objective factor

external to the prisoner or his counsel impeded efforts to comply with the state’s

procedural rules. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1977); Hughes, 900 F.2d at

908-09. To show prejudice, the prisoner must demonstrate that the alleged constitutional

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). 

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To establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a state prisoner must establish by clear

and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror could find him guilty of the offense. 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). Petitioner neither argues cause and prejudice

nor a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Petitioner's federal habeas claim of cruel and

unusual punishment is procedurally defaulted in the state courts and consequently

precluded from federal review. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition (document 1) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that for the reasons set forth in the Respondent's

Answer, the Clerk of the Court shall dismiss the Petition with prejudice and enter

Judgment accordingly.

DATED this 7th day of February, 2007.

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