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Nature of Suit Code: 430
Nature of Suit: Banks and Banking
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

BONNIE GLENN AND GLENN'S 

ENTERPRISES INC., a Colorado 

Corporation, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN GRAND 

JUNCTION, a Federal Banking 

Institution, ALLEN E. HEIMER, 

WAYNE BEEDE, and CAROL RODGERS, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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FI LED· 

Unit.eel St.at.es Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

FEB 1 51989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 87-1312 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 86-C-520) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Bradley P. Pollock of Bell & Pollock, P.C., Littleton, Colorado, 

for Appellants. 

Timothy P. Schimberg of Fowler & Schimberg, P.C., Of Counsel; 

Thomas J. Bissell; and Jane E. Westbrook, Denver, Colorado, for 

Appellees. 

Before LOGAN, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

* After exam1n1ng the briefs and the appellate record, this 

panel has unanimously determined that oral argument would.not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 87-1312 Document: 01019740031 Date Filed: 02/15/1989 Page: 1 
Plaintiffs, Bonnie Glenn and Glenn's Enterprises, Inc. 

(Appellants), filed a complaint against the bank; two of the 

officers of the bank; and a guarantor. {The bank and the bank 

officers hereinafter are referred to as Appellees.) Appellants 

asserted a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations Act (RICO) under 18 u.s.c. §§ 1961-1968 (1984), and 

five pendent claims. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the 

complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12{b)(6) for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Appellants 

filed a response to this motion, asking the trial court to require 

the defendants to answer, or, in the alternative, "that leave be 

given to the Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint or file a more 

definite statement with 

the Court believes and/or 

respect to those particular areas where 

determines that the Plaintiffs have 

failed to state a claim for relief~" 

Setting forth detailed reasons for its actions, the trial 

court dismissed the RICO claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12{b){6), and 

dismissed the pendent claims for lack of jurisdiction. The order 

dismissing the complaint did not address Appellants' "request to 

amend" contained in their response to the motion to dismiss. 

Following the trial court's dismissal, Appellants did not file a 

motion for leave to amend under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, nor a motion 

to alter or amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), nor a 

motion for relief from a judgment for mistake under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 60(b), nor any other motion. Rather, Appellants chose to 

appeal. Appellants assert the trial court erred in not allowing 

them to amend their complaint. They assert further error in the 

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Appellate Case: 87-1312 Document: 01019740031 Date Filed: 02/15/1989 Page: 2 
trial court's refusal to review the introductory allegations 

contained in their complaint in order to match them with the 

elements of a RICO claim. We AFFIRM the decision of the trial 

court. 

I 

Appellants state their first issue as follows: "Did the 

court error [sic] in its failure to allow the plaintiffs to amend 

their complaint to state a claim for relief prior to dismissing 

the subject case and complaint?" Appellants contend that they 

moved for leave to amend and erroneously were denied that 

permission. In our view, no such motion was before the court. 

Appellants failed to exercise their right to amend prior to the 

trial court's decision, and also failed to move for leave to amend 

after the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15, in conjunction with a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

59(e} or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b}. Because the district judge was 

not obliged to consider the matter, he committed no error. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a} provides that a party may amend its 

pleadings once as a matter of course at any time before a 

responsive pleading is served. Recognized pleadings are listed in 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a} as a complaint, an answer, a reply to a 

counterclaim denominated as such, an answer to a cross-claim, a 

third-party complaint, and a third-party answer. "No other 

pleading shall be allowed." Id. Ordinarily, a motion to dismiss 

is not deemed a responsive pleading. Cooper v. Shumway, 780 F.2d 

27, 29 (10th Cir. 1985). Consequently, Appellants could have 

amended as of right after they received the motion to dismiss and 

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Appellate Case: 87-1312 Document: 01019740031 Date Filed: 02/15/1989 Page: 3 
prior to the trial court's decision. Appellants failed to 

exercise their right to amend and chose instead to stand on their 

complaint. 

After the court granted the motion to dismiss, Appellants 

could have amended their complaint only by leave of court or by 

written consent of the adverse party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); 

O'Bryan v. Chandler, 352 F.2d 987, 990 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. 

denied, 384 U.S. 926 (1966). Appellants could have filed a motion 

under Rule 15(a) in conjunction with a motion to amend the 

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 ( e), or a motion for relief due 

to mistake under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

7(b), "[a]n application to the court for an order shall be made by 

motion which shall state with particularity the grounds 

. therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought.'' Id. 

\-. 

Appellants failed to file any motion. 

In response to the Appellees' motion to dismiss, Appellants 

requested that the court require the Appellees to answer, or, in 

the alternative, "that leave be given to the Plaintiffs 

[Appellants] to amend their Complaint or file a more definite 

statement with respect to those particular areas where the Court 

believes and/or determines that the Plaintiffs have failed to 

state a claim for relief." Appellants urge us to construe this 

request, made prior to the dismissal, as a motion for leave to 

amend. We decline to do so. In our view, Appellants' request 

does not rise to the status of a motion. The request is not an 

application for an order contemplated under the rules, and the 

request states no grounds let alone "particular" grounds for the 

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Appellate Case: 87-1312 Document: 01019740031 Date Filed: 02/15/1989 Page: 4 
request. If Appellants had any grounds for amending, they could 

have amended as a matter of right at the time they issued their 

request. Obviously, either they had no additional facts or they 

felt they had stated a claim. 

Appellants could not file a request for leave to amend 

without first complying with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 requires 

that the signature of an attorney on a pleading certify to the 

best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief, formed 

after reasonable inquiry, that the pleading is well grounded in 

fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for 

a change in the law. Furthermore, Rule 11 contemplates and 

demands an attorney's investigation of both the facts and the law, 

and this cannot be done when the attorney, as here, apparently 

does not know what is necessary to state a claim. Rule 11 applies 

to motions. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1191 

at 34 (1971). The premature request for leave to amend was 

without basis and was a mere "shot in the dark." There could be 

no compliance with Rule 11 until Appellants first ascertained what 

was necessary to state a claim. 

Because the issue was never before it, the district court did 

not refuse to permit Appellants to amend their complaint. For the 

same reason, we will not construe the court's silence as an 

implicit denial of a motion. 

Appellants next urge us to grant leave to amend as a matter 

of right after dismissal as a "request" therefor was made prior to 

the court's dismissal. We cannot agree. If Appellants' theory 

were to be adopted, the pleading phase of a lawsuit would never 

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Appellate Case: 87-1312 Document: 01019740031 Date Filed: 02/15/1989 Page: 5 
end. Such a practice would undermine the distinctions in Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15 between "right" to amend and "leave" to amend, and 

plaintiffs' counsel would then have the right to amend 

indefinitely simply by including a "request to amend" in their 

response to a motion to dismiss. 

Under the facts of this case, we hold that Appellant did not 

move the court for leave to amend the complaint and therefore the 

district judge committed no error in not ruling thereon. A naked 

request for leave to amend asked for as alternative relief when a 

party has the unexercised right to amend is not sufficient. After 

a motion to dismiss has been granted, plaintiffs must first reopen 

the case pursuant to a motion under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) and 

then file a motion under Rule 15, and properly apply to the court 

for leave to amend by means of a motion which in turn complies 

with Rule 7. In that event, in accordance with Rule 15, "leave 

shall be freely given when justice so requires." Id.; Foman v. 

Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Furthermore, this court has 

allowed the plaintiff ten days after dismissal to amend the 

complaint. Eames v. City of Logan, 762 F.2d 83, 85 (10th Cir. 

1985); Leggett v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 178 F.2d 436, 438 (10th 

Cir. 1949). Appellants availed themselves of none of their legal 

options. Appellants' failures are well beyond "mere 

technicalities" and this court will not protect them from their 

own inaction. 

II 

Appellants state their second issue 

court error [sic] in its refusal to 

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as follows: "Did the 

review the introductory 

Appellate Case: 87-1312 Document: 01019740031 Date Filed: 02/15/1989 Page: 6 
allegations to determine if said allegations are sufficient to 

state a claim for relief?" The trial court reviewed all of 

Appellants' allegations and liberally construed the complaint. 

The trial judge described Appellants' method of pleading as 

"shotgun" pleading and stated that he was not going to do 

Appellants' work for them to connect assertions with elements of 

all sections of the RICO law. Most importantly, the trial court 

found the allegations "too vague and conclusory to state a claim 

for relief under RICO." The trial court's order of January 16, 

1987, thoroughly analyzed the RICO claim and concluded in part: 

Plaintiffs have failed to state the facts that 

support the elements of their RICO claim within the 

allegations of their First Claim for Relief. I will not 

search through the several paragraphs of the plaintiffs' 

"Introductory Allegations" and attempt to match the 

factual assertions with the elements of all subsections 

of the RICO statute to determine if the complaint states 

a claim for relief. Neither will I require the 

defendants to "piece" together the plaintiffs' 

complaint. Plaintiffs are required to assert, in good 

faith and subject to Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. P. the RICO 

subsection or subsections on which they rely and support 

each claim with allegations of fact. 

Moreover, the plaintiffs' allegations are too vague 

and conclusory to state a claim under RICO. 

The law recognizes a significant difference between notice 

pleading and "shotgun" pleading. 

Apparently, even Appellants do not contend their purported 

RICO claim was sufficient. They neither contend nor establish in 

their brief that this "pleading" sets forth a claim as required by 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Appellants cite two unpersuasive cases in 

support of their contentions on this issue: New York State 

Waterways Ass'n, Inc. v. Diamond, 469 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1972), and 

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Appellate Case: 87-1312 Document: 01019740031 Date Filed: 02/15/1989 Page: 7 
Rehler v. TRW, Inc., "576 P.2d 1260 (C.A.7th 1978)."1 In New York 

State Waterways, the court held that: "it is our duty to read 

[the complaint] liberally, to determine whether the facts set 

forth justify taking jurisdiction •..• " 469 F.2d at 421. In our 

case, the record indicates that the court did in fact liberally 

construe the complaint. The trial court's meticulous order 

recites in part as follows: "Plaintiffs have attempted to set 

forth the details of their action in the 'Introductory 

Allegations' section of their complaint. Liberally construing the 

complaint, it appears that •••• " Furthermore, Appellants' second 

issue is not a liberal construction issue, but whether the trial 

court was obligated to construct a cause of action from 

allegations in a complaint filed by a party who was unwilling or 

unable to plead the cause of action himself. Consequently, New 

York State Waterways does not apply to this case. 

Likewise, Rehler is distinguishable. In Rehler, the court 

dismissed the complaint, but plaintiff filed a motion for 

reconsideration and for leave to file an amended complaint, 

complete with a proposed amended complaint. The trial court 

denied permission to amend. The circuit court reversed, holding 

the court must grant leave to amend to allow plaintiff to attempt 

to comply with the jurisdictional requirement. In this case, 

however, Appellants filed no motion for leave to amend, and they 

neither conceived nor produced a proposed amended complaint. 

1 Rehler was miscited as "576 P.2d 1260 (C.A.7th 1978)." We 

located the case at 576 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1978), and note that 

Rehler was not the only case miscited by appellants in their 

brief. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1312 Document: 01019740031 Date Filed: 02/15/1989 Page: 8 
Consequently, Rehler is distinguishable from this case on the 

facts. 

Although Appellants did not designate the complaint as part 

of the record on appeal, we have obtained a copy of the complaint 

in accordance with 10th Cir. R. 10.2.4. After reviewing the 

record as supplemented by us, we conclude the trial court did not 

err in refusing to attempt to create order out of chaos. The 

complaint failed to state a claim under any conceivable matching 

of allegations. 

Because Appellants neither made a showing in accordance with 

Rule 11 that they were able to amend and state a claim, nor filed 

a motion in accordance with Rule 7 showing with particularity the 

grounds therefor, we will not direct Appellants be given an 

opportunity to amend. The complaint failed to state a claim. The 

decision of the trial court as set forth in its order of January 

16, 1987 is AFFIRMED. 

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