Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01864/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01864-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Paul Anthony Robledo,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Nicole Taylor, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-01864-PHX-JAT (DMF)

ORDER 

Plaintiff Paul Anthony Robledo, who is currently confined in Arizona State Prison 

Complex-Lewis (“ASPC-Lewis”), brought this civil rights case against Defendant Nicole 

Taylor pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docs. 16, 109). Pending before the Court is a 

Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) from the Magistrate Judge, (Doc. 193),

recommending the Court do the following: (1) strike the Reply in Support of Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 152); (2) strike Defendant’s Objection to 

Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts and Supplemental Statement of Facts, (Doc. 153); (3) strike 

Defendant’s Sealed Exhibits to the Supplemental Statement of Facts, (Doc. 157); 

(4) deny, as moot, Plaintiff’s Motion for an Extension of Time and for Miscellaneous 

Relief, (Doc. 168); and (5) deny, as moot, Plaintiff’s Supplement to his Motion for an 

Extension, (Doc. 187). 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff is suing Defendant, who was a psychologist at ASPC-Lewis, for allegedly 

denying him constitutionally adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth 

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Amendment. (Doc. 16 at 3, 8). 

In response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant to Produce his Medical and 

Mental Health Records, (Doc. 58), the Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff’s Motion 

pursuant to Arizona Department of Corrections Department Order 1104. (Doc. 61 at 2). 

Department Order 1104 sets forth a specific procedure in response to an inmate’s request 

to review his mental health records.1 Ariz. Dep’t of Corr. Dep’t Order 1104.02. First, a 

psychiatrist or licensed psychologist determines whether an inmate’s review of his mental 

health records would be “detrimental to the inmate’s condition or treatment.” Id. 

at 1104.02(1.2.4). Next, where “there is no contraindication to the inmate reviewing” 

particular sections of the records, the inmate may review those sections in the presence of 

the reviewing psychiatrist or licensed psychologist. Id. at 1104.02(1.2.5). However, for 

sections of the records for which review is contraindicated, the psychiatrist or licensed 

psychologist is to “verbally advise” the inmate that access to the records is denied. Id. 

at 1104.02(1.2.6). 

Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and accompanying Statement of 

Facts, which, because Plaintiff had not yet complied with Department Order 1104,

contained excerpts of Plaintiff’s mental health records that had not been produced to him. 

(Docs. 89, 90, 105, 107). Six weeks after filing her Motion for Summary Judgment, 

Defendant filed a motion to seal the “documents attached as exhibits and submitted in 

support of [Defendant’s] Statement of Facts in [S]upport of [Defendant’s] Motion for 

Summary Judgment.” (Doc. 107). Given Defendant’s delay and the fact that Plaintiff had 

already reviewed the filed portions of Plaintiff’s mental health records, the Magistrate

Judge ordered Defendant to “produce to Plaintiff a full copy of Plaintiff’s mental health 

 

1 The Court notes that Department Order 1104.03 sets forth a specific procedure by which inmates may “obtain copies of their medical records for use in litigation of 

medical issues.” Ariz. Dep’t of Corr. Dep’t Order 1104.03 (2012). The parties appear to have disregarded this Department Order and instead used Department Order 1104.02, by which an inmate may simply “review” his medical records. Id. at 1104.02; see also, e.g., Aros v. Ryan, No. CV11-2565-PHX-SRB (LOA), 2014 WL 936131, at *3 (D. Ariz. 

Mar. 11, 2014) (requiring a plaintiff to attempt to obtain his medical records following the procedures set forth in ADOC Department Order 1104.02 before filing a motion to 

compel with the court). 

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records” in her possession, instructing that “a mental health provider need not be present 

during Plaintiff’s review of such records.” (Doc. 120 at 3–4). 

Plaintiff later filed a “Motion for Interrogatories,” with five questions regarding 

terms or phrases from Plaintiff’s mental health records that Plaintiff found unclear.2

(Doc. 125). Plaintiff asked that the interrogatories be “answered by the [Facility Health 

Administrator (“FHA”)] at ASPC-Lewis or any other qualified individual.” (Id. at 2). The 

Magistrate Judge ordered that “Defendant shall respond to [Plaintiff’s] Motion.” 

(Doc. 127). In her Response, Defendant stated that “Defendant Taylor will timely 

respond to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories.” (Doc. 129) (emphasis added). In a following 

Order, however, the Magistrate Judge, noted that “Defendant has responded that 

Defendant will timely answer the interrogatories” and, therefore, ordered that “Defendant 

timely answer Plaintiff’s [I]nterrogatories.” (Doc. 130) (emphasis added). In responding 

to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories, Defendant drafted the following objection for each question: 

OBJECTION. Plaintiff specifically notes he “submits [his Interrogatory] to Defendant Taylor to by [sic] answered by 

the FHA at ASPC-Lewis [where he is presently incarcerated] 

or any other qualified individual” . . . . Plaintiff’s 

2

 Plaintiff’s Motion for Interrogatories included the following questions: 

(1) What does the following mean: NOS[;] Diagnosis Deferred On Axis II[;] Axis I, II, III, etc.[;] Diagnosis 

Code[s] #311[,] #298.9[,] 799.9a[,] #e99.04[,] #e99.11[,] 

#309.28[.] *These terms and codes are in my mental health 

record[;] 

(2) When my mental health record states: “Rule Out 

Malingering Assessed,” does it mean that a provider determined I was not malingering?[;] 

(3) If “no” to #2, what does: “Rule Out Malingering Assessed” mean?[;] 

(4) When my mental health record states: “Rule Out 

Personality Disorder Assessed,” does it mean that a provider determined I do not have a personality disorder?[;] 

(5) If “no” to #4, what does: “Rule Out Personality Disorder Assessed” mean? 

(Doc. 125 at 4). 

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Interrogatory therefore requests a response from an individual other than a party to this lawsuit, i.e., Defendant Taylor. 

Plaintiff fails to cite to any authority that requires a party to 

respond to a discovery request that is not directed to any party in a lawsuit. Rule 33 allows a party to serve on any other 

party a request for written interrogatories. Plaintiff’s discovery request is not directed to any party as required under Rule 33. As such, no response from Defendant Taylor 

is warranted. To the extent Plaintiff seeks a Response from 

the FHA or any other qualified individual, he may utilize the Health Needs Request forms, which are available to him at 

ASPC-Lewis. 

(See Doc. 144 at 5–8). In response to Defendant’s objections, Plaintiff filed a Motion to 

Compel, asking the Magistrate Judge to order Defendant to respond to his Interrogatories. 

(Id. at 1–4). The Magistrate Judge, construing Plaintiff’s Motion as a request for 

sanctions, found “that Defendant and her counsel provided evasive and incomplete 

responses to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories” and ordered that Defendant “timely and 

completely answer” Plaintiff’s Interrogatories and show cause as to why the Court should 

not sanction Defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rule”) 37. 

(Doc. 150 at 6–7). 

II. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 A. Legal Standard 

The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that 

the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de 

novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); accord Schmidt v. Johnstone, 

263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“Following Reyna-Tapia, this Court 

concludes that de novo review of factual and legal issues is required if objections are 

made, ‘but not otherwise.’”); Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land 

Mgmt., 589 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the district court “must review 

de novo the portions of the [Magistrate Judge’s] recommendations to which the parties 

object”). District courts are not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that 

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is not the subject of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (emphasis 

added); see also 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the [R&R] to which objection is made.”). 

 B. Analysis 

Both Plaintiff and Defendant object to the Magistrate Judge’s R&R. Defendant 

argues that sanctions are not appropriate and, alternatively, that the sanctions 

recommended are inappropriate in relation to Defendant’s conduct. (Doc. 200). Plaintiff 

argues that “the only suitable sanction is rendering a default judgment against 

Defendant.” (Doc. 197 at 6). 

Upon a party’s motion, a court may impose sanctions on another party pursuant to 

Federal Rule 37(d). Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(A). Federal Rule 37(d)(1)(A)(ii) provides 

that a court may order sanctions if “a party, after being properly served with 

interrogatories under [Federal] Rule 33 fails to serve its answers, objections, or written 

response.” However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Ninth Circuit”) has held 

that Federal Rule 37(d) is only triggered when a party completely fails to respond to 

another party’s interrogatories. See Fjelstad v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 762 F.2d 1334, 

1339–40 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that Federal Rule 37(d) “did not give the district court 

authority to impose sanctions against” a party because the party “did not ‘fail . . . to serve 

answers or objections to interrogatories’” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d))); see also 

Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 (9th Cir. 

1992) (“[W]e [have] held that [Federal] Rule 37(d) does not extend to situations in which 

the rule is ‘inapplicable by its very terms,’ even when general discovery misconduct is 

alleged.” (quoting Halaco Eng’g Co. v. Costle, 843 F.2d 376, 380 n.1 (9th Cir. 1992))). 

Further, Federal Rule 37(d)(1)(B) requires that a party requesting sanctions “must include 

a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the 

party failing to act in an effort to obtain the answer or response without court action.” 

Here, Federal Rule 37(d) is not triggered for two reasons. First, Defendant did 

respond to Plaintiff’s interrogatories. The Magistrate Judge noted that Federal Rule 

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37(d)(2) states that a “failure described in [Federal] Rule 37(d)(1)(A) is not excused on 

the ground that the discovery sought was objectionable” and, thus, found that 

Defendant’s objections were no excuse to possible Federal Rule 37 sanctions. (Doc. 193 

at 6). However, as described above, the Ninth Circuit has held that Federal Rule 

37(d)(1)(A) is not triggered unless a party completely fails to respond. Given the Ninth 

Circuit’s holding, the situation that Federal Rule 37(d)(2) appears to anticipate is where a 

party refuses to even respond to interrogatories because the party finds them 

objectionable. 

 Second, Plaintiff has failed to comply with Federal Rule 37(d)(1)(B), which 

requires a movant to certify that he has, in good faith, conferred or attempted to confer 

with the noncompliant party. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, (Doc. 144), which the 

Magistrate Judge construed as Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, (Doc. 150 at 6), contains 

no certification and details no attempt to resolve the parties’ dispute without court 

involvement. All discovery is conducted pursuant to Federal Rule 1, which directs that 

the rules “shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 

determination of every action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. The Court expects the parties to carry 

out the spirit of the Federal Rules by working collaboratively throughout the discovery 

process and attempting to resolve any differences before bringing those issues to the 

Court for disposition. The provision in Federal Rule 37(d)(1)(B) serves a valuable 

purpose in reminding parties that the role of a federal court is not to micromanage all 

disputes between parties during discovery. Because Plaintiff has not complied with 

Federal Rule 37(d)(1)(B) by attempting to confer with Defendant regarding this dispute, 

the sanctions provisions available under Federal Rule 37(d) are not triggered. 

The Court further finds that no other sanctions are warranted at this time. For 

example, while a federal court may impose sanctions against anyone “who so multiplies 

the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously,” 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 

Defendant’s filings have not been vexatious. Additionally, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel 

is procedurally defective to warrant Federal Rule 11 sanctions. See Fed. R. 

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Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (providing for a 21-day safe harbor between service of motion and 

filing). Finally, while a federal court has the inherent power to levy sanctions for a 

party’s “bad faith or willful disobedience of a court’s order,” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 

501 U.S. 32, 46–47 (1991), the Magistrate Judge explicitly noted that Defendant had not 

acted in bad faith, (see Doc. 120 at 3 (“[T]he Court does not find Defendant was acting at 

any time in bad faith . . . .”)). Thus, the Court finds that sanctions against the Defendant 

are inappropriate at this time.3

III. CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation 

(Doc. 193) is REJECTED.

4 Thus, Defendant’s pending Motion for Summary Judgment 

will be decided based on Defendant’s Motion and Supporting Statement of Facts 

(Docs. 89, 90), Plaintiff’s replacement Response and Supporting Statement of Facts 

(Docs. 145, 146), Defendant’s Reply in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 152), Defendant’s Objection to Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts and 

Supplemental Statement of Facts (Doc. 153), Defendant’s Sealed Exhibits to the 

Supplemental Statement of Facts (Doc. 157), and Plaintiff’s Controverting Statement of 

Facts to Defendant’s Supplemental Statement of Facts (Doc. 198). 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

///

 

3 Because the Court rejects the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, the Court must rule on 

Plaintiff’s Motion for an Extension of Time to File a Controverting Statement of Facts to 

Defendant’s Supplemental Statement of Facts (Doc. 168). Because Plaintiff has filed a 

Supplemental Statement of Facts, (Doc. 198), on November 23, 2016, the Court rules that 

Plaintiff’s filing was timely and his Motion for an Extension of Time is moot. 

4

 The parties’ objections are sustained and/or rejected consistent with this Order. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff’s Motion for an Extension of Time 

(Doc. 168) is DENIED as moot.

 Dated this 21st day of December, 2016. 

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