Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00118/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00118-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ANGELIA PRIM, : 

 

 Plaintiff, : 

 

vs. : CA 16-0118-KD-C 

MEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster : 

General of the United States Postal 

Service, et al., : 

 

 Defendants. 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 This cause is before the Magistrate Judge for issuance of a report and 

recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(S), 

on plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1) and the motion to dismiss filed by the only defendant 

served in this matter, Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General of the United States (Doc. 

11). The plaintiff did not file a response in opposition, though extended the 

opportunity to do just that. (Compare Doc. 12 (“The motion to dismiss will be taken 

under submission by the undersigned on August 30, 2016. Plaintiff is ORDERED to file 

any response in opposition not later than August 19, 2016.”) with Docket Sheet (no 

response in opposition filed by plaintiff).) Upon consideration of the foregoing 

pleadings, the Magistrate Judge is constrained to recommend that the Court DENY the 

Postmaster General’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 11). 

FINDINGS OF FACT 

 On March 17, 2016, Angelia Prim signed a form complaint, which she filed in this 

Court on March 18, 2016, alleging wrongful termination; failure to make reasonable 

accommodations; sex discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

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1964, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; discrimination based on a physical disability 

(narcolepsy) pursuant to the Americans with Disability Act, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 

12117; and age discrimination pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 

of 1967, specifically 29 U.S.C. § 626. (Doc. 1, at 1-4.) Prim attached to her complaint a 

final decision by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 

Office of Federal Operations in Washington, D.C., which concurred with the final 

decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”) finding no discrimination. 

(See Doc. 1, Attached DECISION, at 1-2.)

Petitioner worked as a Mail-handler at the Agency’s U.S. Postal Service 

facility (Mobile P&DC) in Mobile, Alabama. Petitioner alleged that the 

Agency discriminated against her on the bases of sex (female) and 

disability when by letter dated September 9, 2013, the Agency’s deciding 

official and the Plant Manager for the Mobile P&DC sustained her 

proposed removal for failure to maintain a regular work schedule.

A hearing was held and thereafter an MSPB Administrative Judge (AJ) 

issued an initial decision affirming Petitioner’s removal. The AJ found that 

the Agency proved its charge of failure to maintain a regular work 

schedule, and found that the Agency’s decision to remove Petitioner was 

reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, the AJ found that 

Petitioner was unable to sustain her affirmative defenses. The initial 

decision held that the Agency did not breach its obligation to provide a 

reasonable accommodation because there is no evidence Petitioner 

engaged in the interactive process, nor was she able to show that her 

alleged medical conditions caused her to have unscheduled absences on 

the dates indicated in the notice of proposed removal. With respect to 

Petitioner’s allegations of gender discrimination, the AJ found that she 

was unable to establish that she was treated more harshly than similarly 

situated employees who were outside her protected category. 

Additionally, the Agency presented legitimate non-discriminatory reasons 

for the removal. Petitioner appealed to the MSPB Board for a review of the 

initial decision. The Board denied the petition and affirmed the initial 

decision. Petitioner then filed the instant petition.

. . .

EEOC Regulations provide that the Commission has jurisdiction over 

mixed case appeals on which the MSPB has issued a decision that makes 

determinations on allegations of discrimination. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.303 et 

seq. The Commission must determine whether the decision of the MSPB 

with respect to the allegation of discrimination constitutes a correct 

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interpretation of any applicable law, rule, regulation or policy directive, 

and is supported by the evidence in the record as a whole. 29 C.F.R. § 

1614.305(c).

The Commission finds that the MSPB’s decision in the instant matter 

constitutes a correct interpretation of the laws, rules, regulations, and 

policies governing this matter and is supported by the evidence in the 

record as a whole. Upon review of the record, the Commission finds that 

even assuming arguendo that Petitioner established a prima facie case of 

discrimination based on disability and gender, the Agency provided 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for her removal. Petitioner 

presented no persuasive evidence of discriminatory animus surrounding 

the removal. The record evidence clearly establishes that Petitioner had 

been disciplined four times previously for the same offense, and two of 

the disciplinary letters advised Petitioner that additional offenses could 

lead to additional discipline, including removal. Petitioner did not dispute 

the six instances of unscheduled absences indicated in the notice of 

proposed removal prior to the hearing. Like the MSPB, the Commission 

finds that Petitioner failed to establish that the decision to remove her was 

based on any purported disability. 

. . .

Based upon a thorough review of the record, it is the decision of the 

Commission to CONCUR with the final decision of the MSPB finding no 

discrimination. The Commission finds that the MSPB’s decision 

constitutes a correct interpretation of the laws, rules, regulations, and 

policies governing this matter and is supported by the evidence in the 

record as a whole.

(Id. (emphasis supplied).) 

The foregoing decision of the Commission, dated February 9, 2016 (id. at 3), 

advised Prim that she had “no further right of administrative appeal[,]” but she did 

have the “right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court, based 

on the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, within thirty (30) calendar days 

of the date that you receive this decision.” (Id. at 2-3 (emphasis in original).) The 

certificate of mailing attached to the Commission’s final decision and also dated 

February 9, 2016 reads, in relevant part, as follows: “For timeliness purposes, the 

Commission will presume that this decision was received within five (5) calendar 

days after it was mailed.” (Id. at 4.) 

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In accordance with the foregoing, if Prim is presumed to have received the final 

decision of the Commission five calendar days after it was mailed on February 9, 2016, 

that is, on February 14, 2016, thirty days therefrom (that is, from February 14, 2016) 

would fall on March 15, 2016. Since plaintiff did not file her action in this Court until 

March 18, 2016 (Doc. 1, at 1), instead of answering the complaint, the defendant 

Postmaster General, Meghan J. Brennan, filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to both 

Rule 12(d)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), arguing therein that Prim’s claims are time-barred and, 

therefore, due to be dismissed. (See Doc. 11, at 1-7.) However, the undersigned need 

note that Prim specifically alleges in her complaint that she received the Commission’s 

final decision on February 20, 2016. (See Doc. 1, at 3.)1

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant 

may move to dismiss a complaint on the basis that the plaintiff has failed to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion 

to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 

1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.’” (citation omitted)). Since a Rule 12(b)(6) motion questions the legal sufficiency 

of a complaint, in assessing the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must assume 

that all the factual allegations set forth in the complaint are true. See, e.g., United States v. 

 1 Based upon a receipt date of February 20, 2016, plaintiff’s complaint in this case, 

filed on March 18, 2016, necessarily would be considered timely filed.

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Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 1276, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991); Powell v. Lennon, 

914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990). Moreover, all factual allegations are to be construed 

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 

598, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1382, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). Obviously, therefore, a district court 

may not resolve factual disputes when adjudicating a motion to dismiss. Page v. 

Postmaster General and Chief Executive Officer of the U.S. Postal Service, 493 Fed.Appx. 994, 

995 (11th Cir. Oct. 30, 2012), citing, among other cases, Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 

1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (indicating that, under Rule 12(b)(6), the existence of 

disputed material facts precludes a district court from granting a motion to dismiss). 

Finally, “’[w]hen considering a motion to dismiss . . . the court limits its consideration to 

the pleadings and all exhibits attached thereto.’” Thaeter v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s 

Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006), quoting Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 

F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see also Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & 

Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211, 1215-1216 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Because the Ellis law firm’s 

dunning letter and enclosed documents were attached to the Reeses’ complaint as an 

exhibit, we treat them as part of the complaint for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.”).

2

 2 The defendant has also filed her motion in accordance with Rule 12(b)(1) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 11, at 1) A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

can be based upon either a facial or factual challenge to the complaint. If the 

challenge is facial, “the plaintiff is left with safeguards similar to those retained 

when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is raised.” 

[Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981)]. Accordingly, the “court 

must consider the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true.” Id.

A “facial attack” on the complaint “require[s] the court merely to look 

and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter 

jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the 

purposes of the motion.” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) 

(quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980)). 

“’Factual attacks,’ on the other hand, challenge ‘the existence of subject matter 

(Continued)

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jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the 

pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits are considered.’” Id. Furthermore, in 

Williamson, the former Fifth Circuit held that “[t]he district court has the power 

to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any of three separate bases: 

(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts 

evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts 

plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Williamson, 645 F.2d at 413.

McElmurray v. Consolidated Gov’t of Augusta-Richmond County, 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 

2007); see also Andersen v. Omni Ins. Co., 2014 WL 838811, *1 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 4, 2014) (“Attacks on 

subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) come in two forms. ‘Facial attacks’ on the 

complaint require the court merely to look and see if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis 

of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the 

purposes of the motion. ‘Factual attacks,’ on the other hand, challenge the existence of subject 

matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such 

as testimony and affidavits, are considered. These two forms of attack differ substantially. On a 

facial attack, a plaintiff is afforded safeguards similar to those provided in opposing a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion—the court must consider the allegations of the complaint to be true. But when 

the attack is factual, the trial court may proceed as it never could under 12(b)(6) or Fed.R.Civ.P. 

56. Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court’s jurisdiction—its very power to 

hear the case—there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and 

satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case. In short, no presumptive 

truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will 

not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” 

(internal emphasis, citations, brackets, and most quotation marks omitted)).

Initially, the undersigned is a bit circumspect about performing any 12(b)(1) analysis in 

this case since it appears that in this Circuit “timely filing is not a prerequisite to federal 

jurisdiction[.]” Lee v. U.S. Postal Service, 774 F.2d 1067, 1068 (11th Cir. 1985); see also id. 

(“Assuming, without deciding, that timely filing is not a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction and 

that equitable tolling principles may be applied to the filing of a complaint for judicial review of 

an MSPB decision, we find that in the district court Lee did not proffer any facts which might be 

grounds for equitable tolling.” (footnotes omitted)). Moreover, the performance of such analysis 

is complicated by the defendant’s failure to explicitly assert whether her attack on subject 

matter jurisdiction in this case is a facial or factual attack. (See Doc. 11.) Nevertheless, it appears 

to the undersigned that the defendant is asserting a facial attack because she does not challenge 

the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, irrespective of the allegations in the complaint, by 

pointing to matters outside the complaint (or not attached thereto) for this Court to consider in 

determining whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists in this case. Given that this is a facial 

attack and the undersigned must take as true the allegations in Prim’s complaint, the 

undersigned cannot find in favor of the defendant in accordance with Rule 12(b)(1) for the 

simple fact that plaintiff alleges in her complaint that she received the Commission’s final 

decision on February 20, 2016 (see Doc. 1, at 3.) Therefore, based on the plaintiff’s “receipt” 

allegation, this Court would have to find, at this juncture in the litigation, that her complaint 

filed in this Court on March 18, 2016 (id. at 1) was timely filed within thirty (30) days of her 

receipt of the Commissioner’s final decision.

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It is all too clear that “[w]hen [a federal employee] complains of discrimination 

prohibited by another federal statute that is related to or stemming from an action that 

may be appealed to the MSPB, the complaint is classified as a ‘mixed case.’” Smith v. 

Donahoe, 2015 WL 5719614, *2 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2015), citing Kloeckner v. Solis, U.S. 

, 133 S.Ct. 596, 601, 184 L.Ed.2d 433 (2012) (“When an employee complains of a 

personnel action serious enough to appeal to the MSPB and alleges that the action was 

based on discrimination [prohibited by another federal statute], she is said (by pertinent 

regulation) to have brought a ‘mixed case.’”); see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(a)(1) (“A mixed 

case complaint is a complaint of employment discrimination filed with a federal agency 

based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, or genetic information 

related to or stemming from an action that can be appealed to the Merit Systems 

Protection Board (MSPB).”). Because it is apparent from the Commission’s final decision

that Prim alleged she was terminated by U.S. Postal Service Agency in Mobile on the 

basis of her sex and disability, this is a mixed-case employment discrimination case. (See 

Doc. 1, Attached DECISION, at 2 (“EEOC Regulations provide that the Commission has 

jurisdiction over mixed case appeals on which the MSPB has issued a decision that 

makes determinations on allegations of discrimination.”).) 

“Although federal agency decisions concerning mixed case complaints are 

reviewable by federal district courts, such review may be sought, if at all, within thirty 

days after receiving notice of the agency’s final decision.” Rivera v. Holder, 2010 WL 

5187929, *4 (E.D. Va. Dec. 14, 2010) (citations omitted). In this case, there is no question 

but that the EEOC issued its final decision in this matter on February 9, 2016 and, that 

same date, mailed the final decision to Prim. (Doc. 1, Attached DECISION, at 3 & 4.) 

There is also no question but that Prim filed her complaint in this Court on March 18, 

2016 (Doc. 1, at 1), some thirty-eight (38) days after the date of issuance of the 

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Commission’s final decision. Based on the language contained in the mailing certificate 

attached to the Commission’s final decision, specifically that “[f]or timeliness 

purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision was received within five 

(5) calendar days after it was mailed[,]” (Doc. 1, Attached DECISION, at 4), the 

defendant effectively argues that Prim’s complaint was untimely filed by some three (3) 

days (see Doc. 11, at 3 n.1 (in arguing that the presumptive deadline for filing of the 

complaint was March 16, 2016, two days before the filing of the complaint in this case, 

the defendant’s calculations fail to take into consideration that there were 29 days in 

February)). Because the defendant cites to no case law establishing that this 

“presumption” is not rebuttable, in order for this Court to agree with the defendant and 

dismiss Prim’s complaint for failure to state a claim, on the basis that her claims are 

time-barred, it would necessarily have to “reject” plaintiff’s clear statement in her 

complaint that she received the Commission’s final decision on February 20, 2016 (see 

Doc. 1, at 3). In other words, to side with the defendant at this point in the litigation this 

Court would be resolving a “disputed” fact (that is, the date she received the 

Commission’s final decision) in the Postmaster General’s favor, an action prohibited on 

a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6). See Page, supra, 493 Fed.Appx. at 995

(finding that, under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may not resolve factual disputes when 

adjudicating a motion to dismiss).3

 3 The sole basis for defendant’s motion to dismiss is her argument that Prim’s 

claims are time-barred. (See Doc. 11.) To the extent the defendant parenthetically notes that she 

is not waiving any affirmative defense to plaintiff’s ADA claim (see id. at 3 n.2) or her age 

discrimination claim (see id. at 4 n.4), the undersigned would simply note defendant’s 

reservation of defenses and suggest these are matters that can be discussed at any scheduling 

conference conducted in this matter.

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CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court 

DENY the Postmaster General’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 11).

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in 

it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(b); S.D.ALA. L.R. 72.4. The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, 

“[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations 

contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based 

on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time 

period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence 

of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if 

necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection 

must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state 

the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not 

specific.

DONE this the 2nd day of September, 2016.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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