Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-14-01667/USCOURTS-ca3-14-01667-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 14-1667

_____________

DONALD D. PARKELL,

 Appellant

v.

CARL DANBERG, Commissioner of Prisons, in his 

individual and official capacities; WARDEN PERRY 

PHELPS, in his individual and official capacities; DEPUTY 

WARDEN DAVID PIERCE, in his individual and official 

capacities; MAYOR MICHAEL COSTELLO, in his 

individual and official capacities; CAPTAIN M. RISPOLI, in 

his official and individual capacities; LIEUTENANT JOHN 

DOE, in his individual capacity; BRIAN KUHNER, in his 

individual capacity; MS. WEST, in her individual capacity; 

MAINTENENCE SUPERVISOR JOHN DOE, in his official 

and individual capacities; CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL 

SERVICES; BETTY BRYANT, in her individual capacity; 

DR. BAEDER, in his individual capacity; DEPUTY 

WARDEN CHRISTOPHER KLEIN, in his individual and 

official capacities; CAPTAIN JOHN DOE, in his official and 

individual capacities; CHRIS DAMRON, in her individual 

capacity; CORRECT CARE SERVICE LLC; MENTAL 

HEALTH MANAGEMENT; ALLEN HARRIS; JOHN DOE, 

Medical Director for C.M.S.; JOHN DOE, Medical Director 

for C.C.S. 

______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware

(D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-00412)

District Judge: Hon. Sue L. Robinson

______________

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2

Argued January 20, 2016

Before: FISHER, CHAGARES, and COWEN, Circuit

Judges

(Filed: August 17, 2016) 

Suzanne M. Bradley (Argued)

Brendan M. Walsh (Argued)

Pashman Stein

21 Main Street

Court Plaza South, Suite 200

Hackensack, NJ 07601

Attorneys for Appellant

Joseph C. Handlon

Devera B. Scott (Argued)

Office of Attorney General of Delaware

820 North French Street, 6th Floor

Wilmington, DE 19801

Attorneys for Appellees Danberg, Phelps, Pierce, 

Costello, Rispoli, and Klein

Chad J. Toms (Argued)

Whiteford, Taylor & Preston

405 North King Street

The Renaissance Centre, Suite 500

Wilmington, DE 19801

Attorney for Appellees Correctional Medical Services, 

Bryant, and Damron

Daniel A. Griffith (Argued)

Scott G. Wilcox

Whiteford, Taylor & Preston

405 North King Street

The Renaissance Centre, Suite 500

Wilmington, DE 19801

Attorneys for Appellee Correct Care Service LLC 

_______________

 OPINION 

 _______________

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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff Donald Parkell is a Delaware state prisoner 

who claims that state officials deprived him of his rights 

under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by 

subjecting him to unreasonable thrice-daily visual bodycavity searches and harsh conditions and by depriving him of 

adequate medical care. He seeks damages and injunctive 

relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States District 

Court for the District of Delaware granted summary judgment 

to the defendants, and Parkell timely appealed. For the 

reasons that follow, we will affirm in part and reverse in part. 

We will reverse only as to Parkell’s claim under the Fourth 

Amendment for prospective injunctive relief.1

I.2

Parkell was an inmate at James T. Vaughn 

Correctional Center (“VCC”) in Smyrna, Delaware, during 

the relevant time period, which began on January 1, 2009, 

when Parkell slipped and fell at VCC and was injured. He 

was transported to Kent General Hospital in Dover, 

Delaware, and examined. His chest, spine, head, and right 

hand and wrist were x-rayed with normal results, except for 

loss of normal lumbar lordosis possibly due to muscular 

strain. He was then discharged to the prison infirmary, where 

he was housed for approximately a week. Parkell was placed 

under 24-hour supervision and prescribed pain medication 

and exercises. He received this treatment through a small slot 

 1 Parkell’s attorneys are appearing pro bono. We 

express our gratitude to those attorneys for accepting this 

matter pro bono and for the quality of their representation of 

their client. Lawyers who act pro bono fulfill the highest 

service that members of the bar can offer to indigent parties 

and to the legal profession.

2 Much of Parkell’s version of events is supported 

solely by his own statements in verified complaints and other 

court filings. Because those documents were signed under 

penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, we 

consider them as equivalent to statements in an affidavit. See

United States v. 225 Cartons, More or Less of an Article or 

Drug, 871 F.2d 409, 414 n.4 (3d Cir. 1989). 

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in the cell door, approximately three feet off the ground, and 

was told that medical staff were not permitted to enter his cell 

because of his high-security status as a resident of the

Secured Housing Unit (“SHU”). He complained of intense 

pain, but medical staff refused to treat his elbow because his 

chart did not mention an elbow injury. Staff refused to give 

him ice for his injury, again citing his high-security status. 

His room was unheated, and he complained. But prison 

officials told him that he would not be moved and had to 

endure the cold because of his SHU status; they did not 

provide any extra linens or clothing. 

After his week in the infirmary, Parkell was returned 

to the SHU. He submitted a request for “sick call” for his 

elbow, which was swollen, discolored, and painful. On or 

about January 12, he was brought to Betty Bryant, a nurse 

employed at VCC. According to Parkell, Bryant never truly 

examined the elbow and “would not allow [Parkell] to talk 

while in her presence” or to “describe his injury and 

symptoms.” Appendix (“App.”) 96, 178. She characterized 

his condition as mere “edema” (i.e., swelling) even though it 

was a “massive infection,” and accused Parkell of “run[ning] 

game” to get Vicodin, adding that she would not bother the 

doctor because he would not “fall for it” either. Id. She said 

that she would order an x-ray herself and that if Parkell 

needed aspirin he could buy it from the commissary. She 

then told officers to “get him out of here.” App. 96. Bryant, 

on the other hand, claims in her affidavit that she examined 

his elbow, saw no sign of infection, advised him to avoid 

sleeping on his arm, and ordered follow-up x-rays. She 

argues that that is corroborated by a January 12, 2009 

physician order implementing her own x-ray order, along 

with the x-ray reports, dated January 16, showing normal 

results. Parkell’s elbow got worse “[o]ver the next few days,” 

and the wound ultimately opened and “squirted” pus. App. 

96. A doctor arrived to perform emergency surgery and 

prescribe antibiotics and pain medication. Testing revealed 

that Parkell had had a staph infection. When Parkell later 

complained about tingling and numbness, a doctor performed 

nerve testing and told Parkell that there might be “branching 

damage.” App. 97. 

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Several months later, on November 4, 2009, Parkell 

was moved to an isolation cell in a unit known as “CBuilding” because of disciplinary misconduct, where he 

remained for twelve days. Parkell, like other inmates in 

isolation in C-Building, was locked in a stripped-down cell, 

was given only a t-shirt, boxer briefs, and socks to wear, was 

not permitted to keep rags, towels, or rolls of toilet paper in 

his cell, and was provided with soap and other hygienic items 

only during thrice-weekly showers. Parkell was also denied 

exercise, never permitted to leave the cell except during the 

five-minute thrice-weekly showers, and required to eat meals 

in his cell without any opportunity to wash his hands first. 

Three times per day officers “strip searche[d]” him, visually 

inspecting his anus and genitals while he “was forced to squat 

naked and cough loudly.” App. 99. Parkell attests that he 

had “no contact with any other human beings” while in 

isolation, though he says that “[n]urses would arrive daily to 

pass out medication.” App. 98-99. When nurses arrived to 

pass out medication, Parkell showed them the infection, but 

they said it was against policy for medical staff to visit 

inmates in isolation. His elbow again deteriorated and 

released pus. 

There is some question as to precisely how long it took 

for Parkell to receive treatment for his elbow injury while in 

C-Building. Parkell’s account provides little detail. He 

claims that his elbow was not evaluated until “[a] few days” 

into his isolation period, when a mental health worker who 

visited him finally advocated for him. App. 98, 180. He was

then taken to the infirmary and given antibiotics and pain 

medication, and nurses were ordered to clean the wound. But 

“Interdisciplinary Progress Notes” dated November 5, 2009 

(Parkell’s second day in C-Building), which appear to be 

prepared by a nurse (although it is unclear who prepared 

them), note the swollen elbow and pus drainage and suggest 

that the nurse took a culture, cleaned and dressed the wound, 

and called the on-call doctor, who ordered medication. App. 

959-60. Records of physician orders suggest that the 

medication was to begin on November 5, 2009, although the 

order was not actually signed by the doctor until November 

10. Further progress notes dated November 9 note that 

Parkell was “referred . . . to a provider” on November 6 but 

“[w]as never seen” and that “[t]he lab report[ed] never 

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receiving specimen.” App. 962. The preparer of those notes 

describes cleaning and dressing the wound, “reculturing” it, 

and “refer[ring] to provider again — tomorrow.” Id. The 

report of the culture result lists the collection date as 

November 9. Records suggest that further treatment was 

ordered on November 10 and Parkell’s elbow was x-rayed on 

November 13. Parkell agrees that his elbow was operated on 

a second time on December 4, 2009. 

The final series of events concerns Parkell’s physical 

therapy for his elbow, which was ordered (presumably by his 

treating doctor, but the complaint is unclear) to begin in 

August 2009. By March 2010, Parkell had received only 

three physical therapy sessions. His therapist informed him 

that he had ligament damage, most likely requiring an MRI, 

and that the long delay between his injury and the start of 

therapy had caused him to heal incorrectly. He was taken for 

an MRI around June 1, 2010, and then referred to an 

orthopedic specialist who recommended surgery. Two 

months later, there had been no “progression in treatment,” so 

Parkell filed a grievance. App. 196. He was initially told in 

response to the grievance that there was no record of the 

surgery recommendation, but the recommendation was later 

uncovered. The surgery was performed on March 9, 2011. 

He then spent two weeks in the infirmary, where he was 

denied any time outside his cell, even to shower, and required 

to receive medication and therapy through the small slot in 

the door, which caused Parkell pain. 

On March 21, 2011, his orthopedic surgeon, Dr. 

DuShuttle, prescribed four Vicodin per day for pain, but upon 

his return to VCC, Parkell was given only two per day. One 

day Parkell received only one pill, and on two occasions he 

received no pills for the day; he was told that there was a 

supply shortage. During a follow-up visit on April 13, 2011, 

Dr. DuShuttle ordered more pain medication and physical

therapy three times per week. But Parkell received therapy 

only once per week, and even then only about two-thirds of 

the weeks. 

Proceeding pro se, Parkell filed a lawsuit against 

Correctional Medical Services, Inc. (“CMS”) and Correct 

Care Services, LLC (“CCS”), which were contractors 

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providing medical care to the Delaware Department of 

Correction (“DOC”);3 Nurse Bryant in her individual 

capacity; Chris Damron (another nurse employed by CMS at 

VCC) in her individual capacity — these four will be referred 

to collectively as the “Medical Defendants” — DOC 

Commissioner Carl Danberg in his individual and official 

capacities; Warden Perry Phelps in his individual and official 

capacities; Deputy Warden David Pierce (a supervisor of 

security matters) in his individual and official capacities; 

Deputy Warden Christopher Klein (a supervisor of medical 

issues) in his individual and official capacities; Captain M. 

Rispoli (a shift commander) in his individual and official 

capacities; and Major Michael Costello (a supervisor of 

security matters) in his individual and official capacities —

these defendants will be referred to collectively as the “State 

Defendants.”4

Parkell alleged that his Eighth Amendment rights were 

violated because he was provided inadequate healthcare and 

subjected to cruel conditions of confinement. Commissioner 

Danberg was accused of renewing CMS’s contract with the 

DOC despite knowing of the inadequate care being provided, 

signing a contract with CCS without doing due diligence, and 

implementing policies and practices that denied adequate

care. The remaining DOC officials (Phelps, Pieces, Klein, 

Rispoli, and Costello), as well as CMS and CCS, were 

accused of implementing policies or practices that deprived 

Parkell of adequate healthcare and exposed him to cruel 

conditions. Bryant allegedly violated Parkell’s Eighth 

Amendment rights by refusing to examine his infected arm 

and provide needed treatment, and Damron allegedly violated 

his rights by maliciously twisting and yanking his arm 

through a door slot, causing immense pain and exacerbating 

his injury. 

 3 CMS provided medical services to the DOC from 

July 1, 2005, through June 30, 2010, at which point CCS 

replaced CMS. 

4 The complaints named additional defendants who 

were dismissed by the District Court before the summary 

judgment ruling, but those dismissals are not being appealed. 

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Parkell also alleged that Danberg, Phelps, Pierce, 

Costello, Rispoli, Klein, CMS, and CCS violated his due 

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing 

to treat him and subjecting him to conditions significantly 

worse than other inmates with similar circumstances had to 

endure. 

The District Court granted summary judgment to the 

defendants on all claims, concluding that: (1) Parkell could 

not pursue damages from DOC officials in their official 

capacities because of the Eleventh Amendment, and any 

claim for prospective relief was rendered moot when Parkell 

was moved to a different correctional facility; (2) his medicalneeds Eighth Amendment claim failed because any 

deficiencies in his medical care did not rise to the level of 

deliberate indifference to his needs; (3) his conditions-ofconfinement Eighth Amendment claim failed because the 

conditions did not constitute a denial of basic human needs, 

and the defendants were not personally involved in creating 

the conditions; and (4) his due process clam failed because 

the conditions of his confinement did not constitute atypical 

and significant hardship in comparison to general prison 

conditions. Parkell timely appealed.

II.

The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. 

We apply a plenary standard of review to a district 

court order granting summary judgment. Willis v. UPMC 

Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 

2015). “Summary judgment is appropriate when ‘the movant 

shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 

of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). An issue of fact 

is material and genuine if it “affects the outcome of the suit 

under the governing law and could lead a reasonable jury to 

return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id.

(quotation and alteration marks omitted). The party seeking 

summary judgment “has the burden of demonstrating that the 

evidentiary record presents no genuine issue of material fact.” 

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Id. In order to avoid summary judgment, “the nonmoving 

party must identify facts in the record that would enable them 

to make a sufficient showing on essential elements of their 

case for which they have the burden of proof.” Id. 

“Reviewing the record as a whole, we will draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party and 

will not weigh the evidence or make credibility 

determinations.” Armour v. Cty. of Beaver, PA, 271 F.3d 

417, 420 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted). 

III.

On appeal, with the aid of pro bono counsel, Parkell 

has clarified and narrowed his claims somewhat. He argues 

that: (1) the State Defendants violated his Fourth 

Amendment and procedural due process rights by subjecting 

him to thrice-daily visual body-cavity searches while he was 

in isolation in C-Building; (2) his demand for prospective 

injunctive relief is not moot because he has returned to VCC; 

(3) the State Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment 

rights by subjecting him to harsh conditions in both CBuilding and the infirmary; (4) Nurse Bryant violated his 

Eighth Amendment rights through her deliberate indifference 

to his serious elbow injury;5 (5) CMS and CCS violated his 

Eighth Amendment rights by turning a blind eye to practices 

that deprived him of the full amount of pain medication and 

physical therapy that had been prescribed; and (6) the District 

Court abused its discretion in declining to appoint pro bono

counsel. 

As set forth in detail below, we conclude that all of 

Parkell’s claims lack sufficient evidence to submit to a factfinder, except for his claim that the thrice-daily visual bodycavity searches in C-Building were unreasonable and violated 

the Fourth Amendment, for which Parkell could potentially 

receive prospective injunctive relief. We will therefore 

reverse summary judgment as to Parkell’s claim against the 

State Defendants for prospective injunctive relief under the 

Fourth Amendment and remand it to the District Court for 

 5 Although Nurse Damron is also named in the appeal, 

Parkell makes no argument as to why the District Court erred 

in granting summary judgment in favor of Damron.

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further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other 

respects, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of the defendants. 

A.

Parkell’s claim under the Fourth Amendment pertains 

to the thrice-daily visual body-cavity searches conducted in 

C-Building.6

 We agree with Parkell that the State Defendants 

were not entitled to summary judgment on the question of 

whether the searches violated the Fourth Amendment. The 

record before us could support a finding in Parkell’s favor on 

that issue. The same record could not, however, support a 

finding that any of the State Defendants were personally 

involved in the Fourth Amendment violation and liable for 

money damages. As to injunctive relief to prevent future 

Fourth Amendment violations, we are unable to determine 

from the record whether the issue is still live and justiciable; 

that question must be answered by the District Court on 

remand. 

1.

a.

As an initial matter, we must address the applicability 

of the Fourth Amendment to Parkell’s claim. Following the 

 6

 The Fourteenth Amendment extends Fourth 

Amendment protections to searches and seizures by state 

officials. Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 

422 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2005). 

Parkell’s Fourth Amendment claim was not clearly 

pled or argued while he was pro se. Although courts liberally 

construe pro se pleadings, unrepresented litigants are not 

relieved from the rules of procedure and the requirements of 

substantive law. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 

(1993); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975). 

Pro bono counsel now representing Parkell have focused his 

Fourth Amendment claim considerably, noting this legal 

precept. The State Defendants have raised no objection to our 

consideration of this refocused claim, and, accordingly, we 

will consider counsel’s Fourth Amendment arguments as well 

as the State Defendants’ opposition to those arguments. 

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approach taken by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 

U.S. 520, 558 (1979), we have previously assumed that the 

Fourth Amendment applies to strip searches of inmates 

without so holding. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen 

Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 

2010) (“Florence I”), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).7 In Bell, 

the Court analyzed a Fourth Amendment claim under the 

“assum[ption] for present purposes that inmates, both 

convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, retain some Fourth 

Amendment rights upon commitment to a corrections 

facility.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 545, 558 (emphasis added). 

The Court subsequently held in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 

U.S. 517 (1984), that “the Fourth Amendment proscription 

against unreasonable searches does not apply within the 

confines of the prison cell.” Id. at 526. But we do not read 

Hudson to foreclose a Fourth Amendment claim arising from 

an unreasonable search of an inmate’s body. Hudson

involved a “shakedown” search of a prisoner’s locker and 

cell, during which his property was destroyed, and the Court 

considered whether “[t]he recognition of privacy rights for 

prisoners in their individual cells” could “be reconciled with 

the concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of 

penal institutions.” Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 538 

(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The fact of arrest and 

incarceration abates all legitimate Fourth Amendment privacy 

and possessory interests in personal effects, and therefore all 

searches and seizures of the contents of an inmate’s cell are 

reasonable.” (citations omitted)). The “shakedown” searches 

at issue in Hudson were categorically different from the 

bodily searches described by Parkell. Despite some of the 

broad language in the opinion, Hudson does not directly 

address the issue before us. 

 7 Although Florence I involved strip searches of 

pretrial detainees, we noted that “[t]he Bell analysis applies 

equally to all individuals [properly assigned to the facility’s 

general population] — whether they be convicted inmates, 

indicted pretrial detainees, contemnors, material witnesses, or 

arrestees awaiting preliminary hearings before a magistrate.” 

621 F.3d at 308 n.7.

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The Court’s opinion in Hudson does, however, provide 

the framework for our analysis. “The applicability of the 

Fourth Amendment turns on whether the person invoking its 

protection can claim a justifiable, a reasonable, or a legitimate 

expectation of privacy that has been invaded by government 

action.” Id. at 525 (quotation marks omitted). In other 

words, we must decide whether an inmate’s expectation of 

bodily privacy “is the kind of expectation that society is 

prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Id. (same). We hold 

that it is and that the Fourth Amendment therefore grants 

inmates a limited right of bodily privacy, subject to 

reasonable intrusions necessitated by the prison setting. 

 We conclude that a right to privacy in one’s own body, 

unlike a right to maintain private spaces for possessions, is 

not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and is so 

fundamental that society would recognize it as reasonable 

even in the prison context. Our conclusion “necessarily 

entails a balancing of interests.” Id. at 527. Like the Court in 

Hudson, we recognize that “[t]he curtailment of certain rights 

is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad 

of institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities, chief 

among which is internal security,” but also that prisoners 

must be “accorded those rights not fundamentally inconsistent 

with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives 

of incarceration.” Id. at 523, 524 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

We also note that most of our sister Courts of Appeals 

have concluded that the Fourth Amendment has some 

applicability to bodily searches in prison.8

 And,

 8 See, e.g., Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 42 

n.5 (1st Cir. 2009) (listing cases) (“Although the Supreme 

Court in Hudson ‘foreclosed any [F]ourth [A]mendment 

challenge to the search of a prison cell,’ this court, like those 

in most other circuits, ‘has recognized a qualitative difference 

between property searches and searches of a prisoner’s 

person.’”) (quoting Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1191 

(10th Cir. 1989)); Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 

F.3d 560, 572 n.2 (6th Cir. 2013); Bull v. City & Cty. of S.F., 

595 F.3d 964, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Levine v. 

Roebuck, 550 F.3d 684, 687 (8th Cir. 2008); Boxer X v. 

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notwithstanding Hudson, the Supreme Court has recently 

applied the Fourth Amendment reasonableness framework 

from Bell in upholding the constitutionality of strip searches 

of pretrial detainees. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders 

of Cty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1516 (2012) 

(“Florence II”). 

b.

Our conclusion that the Fourth Amendment applies to 

bodily searches in prison does not, however, speak to the 

contours of prisoners’ Fourth Amendment rights. They are 

very narrow. The application of the Fourth Amendment once 

again requires us to balance interests. “The test of 

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment . . . requires a 

balancing of the need for the particular search against the 

invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Bell, 441 

U.S. at 559. “Courts must consider the scope of the particular 

intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the 

justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is 

conducted.” Id. Inmate search policies are constitutional if 

they “str[ike] a reasonable balance between inmate privacy 

and the needs of the institutions.” Florence II, 132 S. Ct. at 

1523. 

In balancing those interests in the prison context, we 

must give considerable weight to the “place in which [the 

search] is conducted” — prisons being “places of involuntary 

confinement of persons who have a demonstrated proclivity 

for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct,” Hudson, 

468 U.S. at 526 — and considerable deference to “the 

justification for initiating it.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. 

“[C]orrectional officials must be permitted to devise 

reasonable search policies to detect and deter the possession 

of contraband in their facilities.” Florence II, 132 S. Ct. at 

1517. A regulation “impinging on an inmate’s constitutional 

rights must be upheld if it is reasonably related to legitimate 

penological interests.” Id. at 1515 (quotation marks omitted). 

We recognize that “[t]he task of determining whether a policy 

 

Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006); Nicholas v. 

Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 2005); Elliott v. Lynn, 38 

F.3d 188, 191 n.3 (5th Cir. 1994).

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is reasonably related to legitimate security interests is 

peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of 

corrections officials.” Id. at 1517 (quotation marks omitted). 

Unless there is “substantial evidence in the record to indicate 

that the officials have exaggerated their response to these 

considerations courts should ordinarily defer to their expert 

judgment in such matters.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

In Bell, the Supreme Court upheld a program under 

which inmates were “required to expose their body cavities 

for visual inspection as a part of a strip search conducted after 

every contact visit with a person from outside the institution.” 

441 U.S. at 558. After “[b]alancing the significant and 

legitimate security interests of the institution against the 

privacy interests of the inmates,” the Court concluded that 

“visual body-cavity inspections . . . [could] be conducted on 

less than probable cause.” Id. at 560. Specifically, the Court 

cited possible “[s]muggling of money, drugs, weapons, and 

other contraband . . . by concealing them in body cavities.” 

Id. at 559. 

But Bell does not categorically uphold all bodily 

searches in prisons. The facts of our case differ materially 

from those of Bell. In Bell, the searches occurred after 

visitation sessions involving in-person contact with outsiders. 

In our case, the searches occur thrice daily, regardless of how 

much contact, if any, an isolated inmate has had with other 

people. We therefore must conduct our own balancing of the 

interests in this case, taking into account “the scope of the 

particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the 

justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is 

conducted.” Id. at 559. 

The “particular intrusion” at issue here is a 

requirement that three times every day inmates remove their 

clothing and submit their anal and genital regions to visual 

inspection while they squat and cough, whether or not they 

have had any contact with others. The State Defendants do 

not dispute that this is the policy in C-Building. The parties 

use the term “strip search” — as do many courts — but “strip 

search,” although an “umbrella term” in some contexts, 

“generally refers to an inspection of a naked individual, 

without any scrutiny of the subject’s body cavities,” whereas 

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“[a] ‘visual body cavity search’ extends to visual inspection 

of the anal and genital areas” and “[a] ‘manual body cavity 

search’ includes some degree of touching or probing of body 

cavities.” Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 561 n.3 (1st Cir. 

1985). Our analysis concerns only the specific type of “strip” 

search at issue in this case — that is, visual body-cavity 

searches, like those in Bell — and not other more intrusive or 

less intrusive types of bodily searches, which entail a 

different balancing of interests. 

Turning to the balancing of interests, we do not 

understand the State Defendants to be disputing that the 

searches are a significant intrusion into bodily privacy. The 

Court in Bell expressed no doubt that visual body-cavity 

searches constituted a significant intrusion. 441 U.S. at 558, 

560 (“Admittedly, this practice instinctively gives us the most 

pause. . . . We do not underestimate the degree to which 

these searches may invade the personal privacy of inmates.”). 

And we have recognized that even strip searches “less 

intrusive than . . . visual body-cavity searches” are an 

“extreme intrusion on privacy.” Florence I, 621 F.3d at 307. 

Regarding the countervailing security interests, we 

again emphasize that our review is deferential and that the 

State Defendants’ burden is light, for the reasons already 

given. Nonetheless, on the record before us, we conclude that 

the particular search policy enforced in C-Building is not 

reasonably related to VCC’s legitimate interests in detecting 

and deterring contraband, particularly given the significant 

intrusiveness of the thrice-daily visual body-cavity searches. 

The State Defendants are unable to articulate a single 

plausible theory as to how inmates in isolation in C-Building 

would have thrice-daily opportunities to smuggle in 

contraband from outside their cells or use unsupervised time 

in their locked cells to transform a harmless object into 

something dangerous. And we cannot imagine a plausible 

scenario ourselves. It is undisputed that inmates in isolation 

in C-Building live in stripped-down cells in which they wear 

only t-shirts, boxer briefs, and socks, are not permitted to 

keep rags, towels, or rolls of toilet paper, and are provided 

with soap and other hygienic items only during their thriceweekly showers. And according to Parkell’s version of 

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16

events, the credibility of which we do not doubt in the context 

of summary judgment, he left his isolation cell only three 

times per week for brief showers and had no human contact 

while in isolation, except for daily visits from nurses for the 

limited purpose of dispensing medication (along with, of 

course, the thrice-daily visual body-cavity searches 

themselves). He therefore had few, if any, opportunities to 

obtain contraband — and certainly not three opportunities per 

day — which distinguishes this case from the searches in Bell

that took place after visitations involving in-person contact. 

Parkell’s daily visits from nurses and thrice-weekly 

visits to the showers cannot justify the quantity of searches. 

It may well be reasonable for VCC to conduct visual bodycavity searches of C-Building inmates after each such visit.9

 

But at most, that would justify ten searches per week, not 

twenty-one. And although the State Defendants have 

suggested that Parkell’s contact with medical personnel while 

in isolation was more extensive, they conceded at oral 

argument that the record does not evidence thrice-daily 

interactions. In any event, in the context of summary 

judgment, we construe the record in Parkell’s favor, crediting 

the portions that describe only once-daily visits from nurses 

dispensing medication. 

The fact that Parkell, like others in C-Building, was 

being punished for disciplinary violations does not alter our 

conclusion. Arguably, it does magnify the State Defendants’ 

security interest, insofar as inmates who have already broken 

prison rules may be more likely to seek and utilize dangerous 

contraband. But the reasonable relationship to the search 

policy is still missing. When dangerous inmates are 

completely isolated in C-Building, it is the isolation that 

prevents the smuggling of contraband. Thrice-daily bodily 

searches have little, if any, value in that context unless the 

period of complete isolation has somehow been interrupted. 

 9 The record is unclear as to whether those visits 

actually presented any opportunity for contraband to be 

smuggled. Indeed, Parkell describes his interactions with 

nurses as taking place through the narrow pass-through slot in 

his cell door, under the supervision of prison officials. 

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We emphasize the narrowness of our holding. We do 

not underestimate inmates’ potential zeal and creativity for 

finding ways to smuggle or create dangerous contraband if 

given any opportunity to do so. In Bell, the probability that 

an inmate would obtain contraband during a visitation was 

low but still sufficient to justify the search policy. But here, 

the probability is vanishingly small that an inmate locked in a 

stripped-down isolation cell in C-Building, once searched, 

could then obtain contraband during a subsequent eight-hour 

period involving no human contact. As such, the intrusive 

thrice-daily searches are not a reasonable means of advancing 

VCC’s legitimate interest in detecting and deterring 

contraband. 

We do not mean to suggest that VCC must point to a

history of C-Building inmates who successfully smuggled 

contraband into their isolation cells. As in Bell, the lack of 

history may be “a testament to the effectiveness of this search 

technique as a deterrent.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. It is the 

virtual impossibility of smuggling contraband into CBuilding, rather than the absence of a history of smuggling, 

that is relevant here. Deterrence is a legitimate concern but a 

far less weighty concern when the conduct to be deterred is 

already virtually impossible. 

Nor does our holding concern individualized 

suspicion. Individualized suspicion that a C-Building inmate 

had somehow obtained contraband would, of course, still 

justify a search of that particular inmate. This case concerns 

the implementation of general, routine search policies, for 

which individualized suspicion is not required. As we have 

previously noted, “Bell did not require individualized 

suspicion for each inmate searched; it assessed the facial 

constitutionality of the policy as a whole, as applied to all 

inmates.” Florence I, 621 F.3d at 308. “The absence of an 

individualized suspicion requirement in Bell is consistent 

with the Fourth Amendment doctrine of special needs 

searches.” Id. at 308 n.8; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor 

Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1989) (categorizing 

Bell as a “special needs” search case); Hudson, 468 U.S. at 

538 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that in certain 

contexts, such as the one considered in Bell, “the Court has 

rejected the case-by-case approach to the ‘reasonableness’ 

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inquiry in favor of an approach that determines the 

reasonableness of contested practices in a categorical 

fashion”). “Under the ‘special needs’ analysis, the 

government need not show probable cause or even 

individualized suspicion for its search” and instead “must 

prove that its search meets a general test of ‘reasonableness.’” 

Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366, 373-74 (3d Cir. 

1998). 

Routine, suspicionless inmate search policies may 

sweep quite broadly and still be reasonable. In Florence II, 

the Supreme Court declined to require jails to adopt a policy 

of exempting new detainees “who ha[d] not been arrested for 

a serious crime or for any offense involving a weapon or 

drugs” from the blanket strip searches conducted before 

detainees were committed to the general population. Florence 

II, 132 S. Ct. at 1520. The Court held that it was reasonable 

for jails to conclude that such an exemption was 

“unworkable” because “the seriousness of an offense is a poor 

predictor of who has contraband” and “it would be difficult in 

practice to determine whether individual detainees fall within 

the proposed exemption.” Id. The Court in Florence II

recognized that narrowly targeted search policies are 

generally not required in prisons and jails because they tend 

to be incompatible with the setting. They are often difficult, 

if not impossible, to implement without an unacceptable risk 

of false negatives (instances in which dangerous contraband 

is missed because an inmate is incorrectly classified as lowrisk and subjected to less thorough searches). Thus, it is 

usually reasonable for prisons to favor more broadly drawn 

search policies. 

But VCC’s search policy sweeps too broadly with 

insufficient justification. VCC’s security interests are not 

reasonably advanced by a blanket policy of frequently and 

intrusively searching inmates who have previously been 

thoroughly searched and held in a stripped-down isolation 

cell without human contact ever since.10 Unlike the search 

 10 In similar cases, our sister Courts of Appeals have 

allowed inmates to pursue Fourth Amendment claims after 

being subjected to bodily searches when they had had no 

opportunity to obtain contraband. See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 

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policy in Florence II, VCC’s search policy in C-Building is 

not a blanket policy that has been reasonably selected over a 

more targeted policy that would be unworkable. In Florence 

 

F.3d 218, 261 n.44 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[C]onsistent with 

Hodges, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they were strip 

searched when there was no opportunity to acquire 

contraband, including in instances where they were shackled 

and under escort, or were never permitted to leave their 

cells.”); Franklin v. Lockhart, 769 F.2d 509, 510-11 (8th Cir. 

1985) (“[T]he evidence shows that Franklin was strip 

searched twice a day while he was confined to his cell with 

access to only staff-issued meals and tissue. We cannot say 

that defendants’ mere declaration that these searches occurred 

‘according to policy’ to maintain security and prevent the 

flow of contraband clearly establishes defendants’ right to 

judgment on this claim. Though defendants’ objectives may 

indeed have been legitimate, . . . [t]he search must be 

reasonable in its scope and its manner of execution.”); 

Hodges v. Stanley, 712 F.2d 34, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The 

second search took place shortly after the first, and Hodges 

had been under continuous escort. Under these circumstances 

it seems clear that there was no possibility that Hodges could 

have obtained and concealed contraband. Thus the second 

search appears to have been unnecessary. We therefore 

cannot say that Hodges has failed to state a constitutional 

claim.”); Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609, 617 (7th Cir. 1980) 

(“Guards handcuff the inmates before they leave the Control 

Unit and escort them to the visitation area. The inmates are 

separated from the visitors by plexiglass, and guards observe 

these visits. We do not believe that the rationale announced 

in Bell v. Wolfish, supra, justifies these strip searches. Thus, 

the Supreme Court in Wolfish relied on the possibility of 

contraband being brought into the prison during contact visits 

to justify the use of strip searches. Those contact visits were 

not closely supervised by guards. Wolfish should not be 

extended to the facts of this case without a showing that there 

is some risk that contraband will be smuggled into Marion 

during non-contact, supervised visits, or that some other risk 

within the prison will be presented. Since defendants do not 

discuss the searches in their brief, we are not in a position to 

dispose of the issue and, therefore, the district court should 

consider it on remand.”). 

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II, it was plausible that any new detainee might be carrying 

contraband from the outside world into the institution, and 

distinguishing between high-risk detainees and low-risk 

detainees would have been costly and error-prone.11 But in 

our case, the only generalized risk that C-Building inmates 

will obtain contraband arises from their limited contact with 

the world outside their stripped-down cells. Tying routine 

visual body-cavity searches to instances of outside contact, 

rather than an unyielding thrice-daily schedule, would seem 

to be a simple and categorical policy to implement, especially 

given that prison officials have the ability to closely regulate 

isolated inmates’ limited contact with the world outside their 

cells; the State Defendants have given us no reason to 

conclude otherwise. And, of course, those officials are free to 

search C-Building inmates individually suspected of 

possessing contraband. 

Thus, construing the record in Parkell’s favor, we 

conclude that the search policy in its present form is an 

“exaggerated . . . response to [security] considerations” and 

thus violates the Fourth Amendment. Florence II, 132 S. Ct. 

at 1517. The State Defendants were therefore not entitled to 

summary judgment on Parkell’s Fourth Amendment claim. 

 

2.

Having determined that Parkell presents a triable 

Fourth Amendment claim, we next consider whether Parkell 

may pursue money damages from the State Defendants, who 

did not themselves conduct the visual body-cavity searches 

but may have had supervisory involvement. A plaintiff 

“cannot predicate liability on her § 1983 claims on a 

respondeat superior basis.” Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of 

Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015). We have recognized 

that “there are two theories of supervisory liability, one under 

which supervisors can be liable if they established and 

maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused 

the constitutional harm, and another under which they can be 

 11 In their concurring opinions in Florence II, Chief 

Justice Roberts and Justice Alito (members of the five-person 

majority) both emphasized the narrowness of the Court’s 

holding. See 132 S. Ct. at 1523-25. 

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liable if they participated in violating plaintiff’s rights, 

directed others to violate them, or, as the persons in charge, 

had knowledge of and acquiesced in their subordinates’ 

violations.” Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 

n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation and alteration marks omitted). 

Parkell argues that both theories apply here but has not 

supported his argument with evidence. Although it is 

certainly plausible that some of the named defendants had 

supervisory involvement in the searches, Parkell has not come 

forward with enough evidence for a reasonable fact-finder to 

conclude that they did. 

As to Commissioner Danberg, Parkell points only to 

Danberg’s generalized admission that he “is familiar with the 

policies of the Department of Correction” and “approved the 

DOC policies.” App. 775. “[T]o establish a claim against a 

policymaker under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege and prove 

that the official established or enforced policies and practices 

directly causing the constitutional violation.” Chavarriaga, 

806 F.3d at 223. The problem with Parkell’s attempt to hold 

Danberg liable is that he has not pointed to any evidence of 

where the search policy, practice, or custom came from. 

Danberg does not acknowledge any involvement in 

establishing or enforcing any specific policies (much less 

specific search policies in C-Building or at VCC), or even any 

awareness that the searches were occurring. And although 

the defendants concede that inmates in isolation were 

routinely subjected to thrice-daily visual body-cavity 

searches, it is unclear whether this was in accordance with 

official DOC policy endorsed by Danberg, a policy limited to 

VCC, or even just an informal practice or custom. To 

presume that the search practices arose from Danberg’s 

policies merely because of his position as commissioner is to 

rely on respondeat superior. 

Likewise, there is no evidence linking Warden Phelps 

to the establishment of the search policy, practice, or custom 

in C-Building. Unlike Danberg, however, Phelps has 

admitted knowledge that C-Building inmates were strip

searched three times per day. If Phelps knew about the search 

practices in C-Building and had authority to change them but 

chose not to, that might constitute supervisory involvement in 

violating Parkell’s rights. Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129 n.5 

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(supervisors liable if, “as the persons in charge, [they] had 

knowledge of and acquiesced in their subordinates’ 

violations”). But there is no evidence that Phelps had such 

authority. Parkell has merely asserted in a brief that “Phelps, 

as Warden, w[as] responsible for ensuring . . . compli[ance] 

with the acknowledged strip search policy,” without pointing 

us to any facts or legal authorities to support the assertion. 

Reply Br. 21. We have no evidence addressing whether CBuilding had dominion over its own search practices, 

followed orders from the warden on the matter, or was held to 

policies delivered directly from the DOC. And we do not 

believe that an official is “enforcing,” “maintaining,” or 

“acquiescing in” a policy merely because the official 

passively permits his subordinates to implement a policy that 

was set by someone else and is beyond the official’s authority 

to change. Knowing nothing more than Phelps’s title as 

warden, a factfinder could not reasonably conclude that 

Phelps was a “person[ ] in charge” of search practices in CBuilding and thereby “acquiesced” in the practice of thricedaily visual body-cavity searches. See Santiago, 629 F.3d at 

129 n.5.

Like Phelps, Captain Rispoli admits awareness of the 

search practices in C-Building, but there is no evidence of 

Rispoli’s role in establishing or enforcing the practices, and it 

is unclear whether Rispoli had any authority to intercede. 

Rispoli admits to being the “unit commander for the 

maximum security units, including the Secured Housing Unit 

(“SHU”), which consists of Buildings 17, 18, and 19.” App. 

414. He then describes Building 18 and C-Building as 

separate “units” and says, “The shift commander for the 

maximum security housing units is responsible for assigning 

inmates to an isolation unit. When I am the shift commander, 

I make those assignments. . . . I am responsible for the 

inmates assigned to Building 18 isolation. But I am familiar 

with both the Building 18 isolation unit and the C-Building 

isolation unit.” App. 415. The most natural reading of those 

statements is that Rispoli commanded isolation units other

than C-Building. But even if there were ambiguity to be 

resolved in Parkell’s favor, there would still be insufficient 

evidence that Rispoli’s position gave him control over search 

policies such that he could be charged with “acquiescence” in 

their enforcement. 

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The evidence of the remaining State Defendants’ 

involvement is even weaker. Parkell points only to Deputy 

Warden Pierce’s admission that he is “familiar with DOC 

policies” and Major Costello’s admission that he is “aware of 

security matters in the areas of the institution in which he [is] 

assigned.” Reply Br. 22 (citing App. 781-82). There is no 

evidence of Deputy Warden Klein’s knowledge of the 

searches. 

We therefore affirm the District Court insofar as it 

granted summary judgment in favor of the State Defendants 

in relation to any Fourth Amendment claim for money 

damages. 

3.

Our conclusion that the State Defendants lacked 

personal involvement in past constitutional violations does 

not preclude Parkell from obtaining prospective injunctive 

relief for ongoing violations. Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. 

& Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013); Gonzalez v. 

Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 

see also Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs 

Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 70, 77 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Plaintiffs 

failed to allege a plausible claim to relief on the basis of the 

supervisors’ ‘knowledge and acquiescence’ or any other 

similar theory of liability . . . [but] are still free to pursue their 

official capacity claims for injunctive relief against any 

further intimidation or unlawful entry into their home.”); 

Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1996) 

(similar). In seeking a prospective injunction against the 

implementation of an unconstitutional state policy, Parkell is 

required to name an official or officials “who can 

appropriately respond to injunctive relief.” Hartmann, 707 

F.3d at 1127; see also Gonzalez, 663 F.3d at 315 (proper 

defendant is one “responsible for ensuring that any injunctive 

relief is carried out”). He has done so. Although we leave it 

to the District Court to determine which defendants would 

appropriately be named in an injunction should Parkell 

prevail on his claim, at the very least Commissioner Danberg 

or his successor could appropriately respond to injunctive 

relief. 

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The State Defendants, however, argue that the issue of 

injunctive relief is moot. They do not deny that Parkell is 

currently incarcerated at VCC, nor do they contend that the 

search practices in the isolation units have changed.12 Rather, 

they argue that the issue is moot because Parkell’s Fourth 

Amendment claim arose from his temporary confinement in 

C-Building and he is no longer confined there. We agree 

with the State Defendants but also believe that an exception 

to the mootness doctrine could potentially apply. Parkell 

argues that, in light of his current incarceration at VCC and 

the likelihood of a return to isolation units in the future, a 

Fourth Amendment violation is “capable of repetition yet 

evading review,” which makes injunctive relief appropriate. 

Reply Br. 26. He requests that we at least remand the issue to 

the District Court to consider in the first instance with the aid 

of further factual development. 

The “capable of repetition yet evading review” 

doctrine is an exception to mootness that applies when “(1) 

the challenged action is, in its duration, too short to be fully 

litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a 

reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will 

be subject to the same action again.” United Indus., Serv., 

Transp., Prof’l & Gov’t Workers of N. Am. Seafarers Int’l 

Union ex rel. Bason v. Gov’t of V.I., 767 F.3d 193, 212 (3d 

Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). The exception is 

“narrow and available only in exceptional situations.” 

Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2007) 

(quotation marks omitted). 

The capable-of-repetition exception is inapplicable 

when a previously incarcerated plaintiff has been completely 

released from the system through expiration of a sentence or 

 12 We note that, even if VCC had voluntarily changed 

its search practices since the lawsuit was filed, that alone 

would not necessarily moot Parkell’s claim for injunctive 

relief. DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 310 (3d Cir. 

2008) (“[V]oluntary cessation does not moot a case or 

controversy unless subsequent events make it absolutely clear 

that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be 

expected to recur.” (quotation and alteration marks omitted)). 

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acquittal upon retrial, because it would be mere “conjecture” 

to conclude that the plaintiff might be reincarcerated and 

subjected to the same conditions again. See, e.g., Doe v. 

Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 313-14 (3d Cir. 2001) (plaintiff 

acquitted upon retrial). A more difficult and fact-intensive 

question is raised, however, when the plaintiff is still 

connected to the system. In Micklus v. Carlson, 632 F.2d 227 

(3d Cir. 1980), we held that there was a “realistic possibility 

of reincarceration” for a parolee “because of the low standard 

for reincarceration.” Id. at 232-33 (noting that the parole 

commission “cannot be totally arbitrary, [but] may 

nevertheless revoke [his] parole status if at any time . . . [it] is 

of the opinion that [he] will be benefited by further treatment 

in an institution or other facility” (quotation marks omitted)). 

But in Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1993), a 

prisoner had been released from a maximum security unit 

three-and-a-half years into his eight-year sentence, and the 

District Court applied the capable-of-repetition exception, 

citing “the procedures through which inmates may be 

classified into and out of maximum security.” Abdul-Akbar 

v. Watson, 775 F. Supp. 735, 755 (D. Del. 1991). When the 

case was appealed, we rejected the capable-of-repetition 

theory and held that the District Court had improperly 

“speculat[ed]” that the prisoner could be returned to a 

maximum security unit. 4 F.3d at 197, 206-07. 

Parkell’s point is well-taken that, as a general matter, 

confinement of inmates in isolation units is hardly unusual, 

which we have acknowledged in other contexts. Cf. Torres v. 

Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[D]isciplinary 

detention and administrative segregation [are] the sort[s] of 

confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate 

receiving at some point in their incarceration . . . .”). But 

Parkell must present more than generalities; he must establish 

a reasonable expectation that he, specifically, will again be 

subjected to the unconstitutional search practices carried out 

in VCC’s isolation units. See OSHA Data/CIH, Inc. v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Labor, 220 F.3d 153, 168 (3d Cir. 2000) (placing the 

burden on the plaintiff to show that the capable-of-repetition 

exception applied). We reject Parkell’s last-minute effort to 

meet that burden by claiming to have returned to isolation for 

five days in June 2015, which is not reflected in the record 

and is merely asserted in his reply brief. 

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We are also mindful, however, that the issue was 

understandably never explored in the District Court,13 where 

discovery could have occurred and factual findings could 

have been made regarding crucial issues, such as Parkell’s 

history of confinement in isolation units, the frequency with 

which and conditions under which VCC officials send 

inmates to isolation units, and exactly how much discretion 

officials have to do so. We will therefore leave it for the 

District Court to determine on remand whether Parkell’s 

request for injunctive relief in relation to the visual bodycavity searches remains a live issue under the capable-ofrepetition exception to mootness. See, e.g., Williams v. 

Anderson, 959 F.2d 1411, 1417 (7th Cir. 1992) (capable-ofrepetition finding was “fact-intensive” and not welldeveloped on the record and therefore “best left to the district 

court”).

B.

Parkell also challenges the visual body-cavity searches 

as violating his right to procedural due process. He concedes 

that he was given notice and a hearing concerning his 

placement in isolation. His claim is that, in addition to that 

process, he was also owed notice about the visual body-cavity 

searches specifically and a hearing on the matter. We 

disagree and will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of 

summary judgment on this claim. 

A prisoner holds a liberty interest triggering due 

process if either (1) “state statutes and regulations create a 

liberty interest in freedom from restraint that imposes an 

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to 

the ordinary incidents of prison life,” or (2) “severe changes 

in conditions of confinement amount to a grievous loss that 

should not be imposed without the opportunity for notice and 

an adequate hearing.” Evans v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 645 

 13 The District Court was under the impression that 

Parkell was no longer at VCC, but Parkell had in fact been 

returned to VCC three weeks before the District Court’s 

summary judgment ruling. The District Court was not 

informed of Parkell’s return. 

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F.3d 650, 663 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). 

Parkell argues only the “severe changes” theory. 

Examples of “severe changes in in conditions of 

confinement” include “forced administration of antipsychotic 

medication, or involuntary transfer to a mental hospital, or, 

for a prisoner not convicted of a sex offense, forced 

participation in sex-offender therapy.” Id. at 665 (citations 

omitted). Such changes result in punishment that is 

“qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically 

suffered by a person convicted of crime, and ha[s] 

stigmatizing consequences.” Renchenski v. Williams, 622 

F.3d 315, 326 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). 

We cannot say that routine visual body-cavity searches 

are “qualitatively different from the punishment 

characteristically suffered by a person convicted of a crime,” 

that they impose “stigmatizing consequences” akin to being 

labeled psychotic or a sex offender, id., or that they otherwise 

constitute “severe changes in conditions of confinement

amount[ing] to a grievous loss,” Evans, 645 F.3d at 663. 

Parkell therefore lacks a constitutionally protected liberty 

interest under a “severe changes” theory, and his procedural 

due process claim fails. 

C.

Parkell raises two Eighth Amendment claims: (1) that 

the State Defendants subjected him to harsh conditions of 

confinement and (2) that the Medical Defendants ignored his 

medical needs. Because there is insufficient evidence of 

deliberate indifference as to either claim, we will affirm the 

District Court’s grant of summary judgment on these claims. 

1.

A claim regarding prison conditions “does not rise to 

the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless: (1) the 

prison official deprived the prisoner of the minimal civilized 

measure of life’s necessities; and (2) the prison official acted 

with deliberate indifference in doing so, thereby exposing the 

inmate to a substantial risk of serious damage to her future 

health.” Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 226. We need not 

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determine whether Parkell was deprived of “the minimal 

civilized measure of life’s necessities” because the record 

would not permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the 

State Defendants were deliberately indifferent. See id. We 

will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment in the State Defendants’ favor as to Parkell’s Eighth 

Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim. 

In the Eighth Amendment context, “deliberate 

indifference” is “a subjective standard of liability consistent 

with recklessness as that term is defined in criminal law.” 

Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 811 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if the official 

“knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm 

and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures 

to abate it.” Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 229 (quotation marks 

omitted). A plaintiff “may demonstrate deliberate 

indifference by showing that the risk of harm was 

longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted 

by prison officials in the past such that the defendants must 

have known about the risk.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. 

Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks 

omitted). But the plaintiff must show that the officials were 

“aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that 

a substantial risk of harm exists, and that they also drew the 

inference.” Id. (quotation and alteration marks omitted). “It 

is not enough merely to find that a reasonable person would 

have known, or that the defendant should have known . . . .” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 n.8 (1994). 

Parkell attests that during his first stay in the infirmary 

in January 2009, he was held in a cell without working heat, 

and during his second stay in March 2011, he was permitted 

no exercise and no showers for over two weeks. He also 

attests that during his time in C-Building isolation in 

November 2009, he was subjected to thrice-daily visual bodycavity searches and denied exercise and access to basic 

hygienic materials. And he claims to have been denied access 

to medical personnel during his time in both the infirmary and 

C-Building, insofar as the nurses who visited refused to 

examine him, citing a policy against entering the cells. 

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As evidence of the State Defendants’ deliberate 

indifference, Parkell points to little more than their 

“admissions” of awareness of certain DOC policies. That 

evidence fails because most of the policies of which the 

defendants admit to have knowledge differ in subtle but 

important ways from the conditions that Parkell claims to 

have experienced. Thus, although the defendants admit 

knowledge of restrictive policies, those policies do not 

amount to cruel and unusual punishment. And to the extent 

that Parkell may have experienced even harsher conditions 

beyond what those policies call for, there is no evidence that 

the defendants were aware of that. 

In his affidavit, Pierce claims that there are no VCC 

policies preventing medical staff from entering the cells of 

maximum-security inmates housed in the infirmary, as long 

as the staffer is accompanied by two other officers; no 

policies preventing maximum-security inmates housed in the 

infirmary from showering; and no policies preventing an 

inmate from receiving extra blankets or clothing if the heat is 

malfunctioning. He admits that ice and recreation time are 

not ordinarily provided to maximum-security inmates housed 

in the infirmary but says that both would be provided if 

directed by a doctor. He also admits that the infirmary had 

intermittent heating problems in 2009, but never for extended 

periods. He adds that it was practice to provide extra blankets 

when heating problems arose, and certainly not practice to 

deny extra blankets to an inmate who requested them. In his 

affidavit, Rispoli claims that inmates in isolation in CBuilding are taken out of their cells for one hour three times 

per week, during which time they can shower and recreate. 

According to him, inmates in C-Building are permitted 

medical treatment, which they can request, and are checked at 

every shift for medical needs. In his discovery responses, 

Phelps claims that inmates in isolation are seen by medical 

staff every eight hours and can be taken out of isolation for 

treatment if needed. He says that soap and hygienic items are 

provided during shower and recreation time, and while 

inmates may not store toilet paper in their cells, it is provided 

upon request. 

The defendants do concede that thrice-daily visualbody cavity searches occurred for inmates in isolation, but 

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such searches do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment 

unless they are “undertaken maliciously or for the purposes of 

sexually abusing an inmate.” Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 

252, 258 (2d Cir. 2015); see also King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 

889, 897 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“A prisoner states a 

claim under the Eighth Amendment when he plausibly alleges 

that the strip-search in question was motivated by a desire to 

harass or humiliate . . . .”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 

916 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). As Parkell does not point 

to any evidence of maliciousness, the search policy cannot 

serve as a basis for imposing Eighth Amendment liability on 

the defendants. 

The only other evidence of the State Defendants’ 

knowledge of the conditions that Parkell experienced are two 

letters signed by Phelps, informing Parkell of the results of 

his grievance appeals. But those particular letters refer to 

grievances (nos. 191813 and 192952) that deal only with 

Parkell’s requests for further medical services, not relief from 

harsh conditions. Although the letters from Phelps could 

demonstrate Phelps’s awareness of Parkell’s medical 

complaints,14 they do not demonstrate deliberate indifference, 

as Phelps is not medical staff. See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 

F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993) (non-medical defendants not 

deliberately indifferent “simply because they failed to 

respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who 

was already being treated by the prison doctor”); Spruill v. 

Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent a reason 

to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their 

assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a nonmedical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the 

Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate 

indifference.”). 

 14 Our oft-cited holding in Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 

F.2d 1195, 1208 (3d Cir. 1988) that the mere filing of a 

grievance does not show actual knowledge by a supervisor is 

not applicable, as Phelps’s letters show that he actually had 

reviewed the grievances. Cf. Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 

236, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that an official who 

wrote back in response to a grievance had “played an active 

role” in a constitutional violation). 

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A grievance expressly challenging a practice of 

prohibiting medical personnel from interacting with an inmate 

might require intervention by non-medical staff, in that it 

would suggest that the inmate was not receiving care at all. 

But Parkell’s grievances were different. Parkell wrote that he 

“complain[ed] often and mostly [was] ignored,” described his 

symptoms, and asked for further treatments beyond what he 

was already receiving. App. 492. The written responses to 

those grievance show that the prison officials ensured that 

Parkell was under the care of medical personnel and being 

treated, and therefore that the officials were not deliberately 

indifferent. See Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655-56 (7th 

Cir. 2005) (“Miller reviewed Greeno’s complaints and 

verified with the medical officials that Greeno was receiving 

treatment. We do not think Miller’s failure to take further 

action . . . can be viewed as deliberate indifference.”). 

Because there is insufficient evidence to find 

deliberate indifference on the part of any of the State 

Defendants, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of 

summary judgment in the State Defendants’ favor as to 

Parkell’s Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement 

claim. 

2.

We now turn to Parkell’s Eighth Amendment medicalneeds claim. To prove this claim, “evidence must show (i) a 

serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison 

officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” 

Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d 

Cir. 2003). The parties dispute only the issue of deliberate 

indifference, not whether Parkell had a serious medical need. 

The record would not permit a reasonable factfinder to 

conclude that the Medical Defendants were deliberately 

indifferent to Parkell’s medical needs, and therefore we will 

affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in the 

Medical Defendants’ favor as to this claim.

We have acknowledged that “prison authorities are 

accorded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment 

of prisoners.” Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67. A prisoner bringing a 

medical-needs claim “must show more than negligence; he 

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32

must show ‘deliberate indifference’ to a serious medical 

need.” Id. “Allegations of medical malpractice are not 

sufficient to establish a Constitutional violation,” nor is 

“[m]ere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment.” 

Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235. A “failure to provide adequate care . 

. . [that] was deliberate, and motivated by non-medical 

factors” is actionable under the Eighth Amendment, but 

“inadequate care [that] was a result of an error in medical 

judgment” is not. Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69. “We have found 

‘deliberate indifference’ in a variety of circumstances, 

including where the prison official (1) knows of a prisoner’s 

need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to 

provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a 

non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving 

needed or recommended medical treatment.” Rouse v. 

Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). 

First, Parkell argues that Nurse Bryant violated his 

Eighth Amendment right to medical treatment during her 

encounter with him in January 2009. Parkell attests that 

Bryant refused to let him speak to describe his symptoms, 

accused him of “run[ning] game” to obtain Vicodin, declared 

that she was not “fall[ing] for it,” told him he could purchase 

aspirin himself, and instructed prison officers to “get him out 

of here.” App. 96, 178. If Bryant had ignored Parkell’s 

medical needs, her brusqueness might suggest that she did so 

deliberately and for non-medical reasons. But Bryant did not 

ignore his needs. Parkell claims that Bryant never properly 

examined his injury in person even though he had a “massive 

infection” and that she should have given him medication for 

pain. App. 96, 178. But there is no dispute that the most 

serious complications of Parkell’s injury (including the 

visible releasing of pus) had not yet appeared when he saw 

Bryant. There is also no dispute that Bryant ordered an x-ray 

that showed normal results. And there is nothing in the 

record suggesting that, at the time that Parkell saw Bryant, it 

was improper to recommend over-the-counter pain 

medication rather than to seek a prescription from a doctor. 

Particularly in light of the normal x-ray results, a factfinder 

could not reasonably conclude that Bryant deliberately 

ignored risks to Parkell’s health. 

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Second, Parkell argues that CMS and CCS deprived 

him of needed medical care, in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment, in two respects: (1) Parkell was twice (first in 

August 2009 on CMS’s watch, then again in March 2011 on 

CCS’s watch) prescribed regular physical therapy but was 

only provided with limited, sporadic therapy, and his injury 

was exacerbated as a result; (2) Parkell was prescribed pain 

medication in March 2011, but CCS provided only half the 

prescribed dosage and, on some occasions, even less. Again, 

the contested issue is deliberate indifference — that is, 

whether “inadequate care was a result of an error in medical 

judgment” or “deliberate, and motivated by non-medical 

factors,” Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69 — and Parkell fails to make 

a sufficient showing. 

The deliberate indifference inquiry is complicated by 

the fact that CMS and CCS are institutional defendants. It is 

not enough for Parkell to show that a medical staffer was 

deliberately indifferent to his needs, because CMS and CCS 

“cannot be held responsible for the acts of [their] employees 

under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” 

Natale, 318 F.3d at 583. Parkell must impute that deliberate 

indifference to CMS and CCS by showing that they “turned a 

blind eye to an obviously inadequate practice that was likely 

to result in the violation of constitutional rights” such that 

they, as “policymaker[s,] can reasonably be said to have been 

deliberately indifferent to the need.” Id. at 584 (quotation 

marks omitted). Parkell has not brought claims against 

specific CMS or CCS employees other than Bryant. But in 

order to succeed in his claim against CMS and CCS for 

violating the Eighth Amendment, Parkell need not name 

particular CMS or CCS employees who were deliberately 

indifferent, as long as a factfinder could conclude that some

CMS or CCS employee was deliberately indifferent and the 

deliberate indifference can be attributed to CMS or CCS. See

id. at 583 n.8. 

As to the failure to provide prescribed physical 

therapy, Parkell argues that there was no medical reason to 

deny him therapy and the true reason was that, as a general 

practice, therapy for SHU inmates was often skipped because 

the prison lacked enough staff to transport them from the 

SHU or were unable to transport them when certain security 

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events occurred.15 CMS and CCS do not deny this but rather 

argue that they are not liable because the alleged logistical 

difficulties that undermined Parkell’s therapy were 

indisputably caused by the DOC, which is the relevant 

“policymaker” in that arena, not CMS and CCS. See Natale, 

318 F.3d at 584. 

We agree with CMS and CCS. Systemic logistical 

constraints such as understaffing, which are unrelated to 

medical judgment, will typically not excuse failure to provide 

adequate medical care. See Inmates of Allegheny Cty. Jail v. 

Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 763 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that 

deliberate indifference is shown “where the size of the 

medical staff at a prison in relation to the number of inmates 

having serious health problems constitutes an effective denial 

of access to diagnosis and treatment”). But there is a 

difference between actors who are actually responsible for 

those logistical constraints (or capable of remedying them) 

and actors who are not. In Pierce, it was the jail 

administration, not the individual medical providers, that was 

responsible for the understaffing and deliberately indifferent 

to its effects. See id. at 762-63; see also Byrd v. Shannon, 

715 F.3d 117, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[Byrd] has not shown 

that the delays in supplying his eye drops were due to 

deliberate indifference. . . . Under Byrd’s self-medication 

program, he is responsible for the renewal of his 

prescriptions, and thus, he was responsible for this delay. 

Other delays were caused by the pharmacy that provided the 

eye drops. Therefore, the District Court properly granted 

summary judgment to [prison healthcare officials].”). That 

the DOC’s transportation practices caused SHU inmates to 

miss needed physical therapy does not mean that CMS or 

CCS was indifferent to the problem. And even if they were 

indifferent, their indifference could not have been the cause 

of Parkell’s inadequate therapy, as there is no evidence that 

CMS or CCS had control over inmate transportation. While 

 15 Parkell reportedly learned this from a conversation 

with his physical therapist, and it is unclear whether his 

statements would be admissible at a trial. But CMS and CCS 

do not dispute Parkell’s claims about the transportation 

difficulties; indeed, their defense relies on it. 

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Parkell could conceivably sue DOC officials in relation to the 

transportation practices, he has not done so. 

Parkell’s medical-needs claim also fails in relation to 

his pain medication prescription (which implicates only 

CCS). According to Parkell’s version of events, which CCS 

disputes, he was initially prescribed four Vicodin per day by 

Dr. DuShuttle, an amount that he never received once he 

returned to VCC. He typically received only two Vicodin per 

day, and on three occasions (March 23, 2011, March 29, 

2011, and April 6, 2011) doses were missed. Nurses told 

Parkell that CCS’s medical director could modify prescription 

recommendations made by outside consulting doctors and 

that the missed doses were caused by a short-term shortage.

With regard to the halving of the dosage, there is 

insufficient evidence that it was done for non-medical 

reasons, as Parkell alleges. The record is essentially silent as 

to why CCS’s medical director would have reduced Parkell’s 

pain medication below the level recommended by an outside 

consulting doctor (assuming, of course, that this actually 

happened). There could be several legitimate medical reasons 

for doing so, including generalized professional disagreement 

about the appropriate level of prescription pain medication for 

most patients. And a fact-finder could not reasonably reject 

those explanations in favor of an illegitimate explanation 

merely because Parkell claims to have heard other inmates 

say that “[the medical director] slash[es] in half everybody’s 

order when you go out” to see a specialist, and to have heard 

Dr. DuShuttle say that “[t]hey cut my orders every time I 

make an order,” App. 328 — even if those statements were 

admissible as evidence at trial. 

As to the three missed doses, there is insufficient 

evidence that CCS turned a blind eye to an inadequate 

practice happening on its watch. There is no evidence that 

shortages were a common or systemic problem. And there is 

no evidence that CCS leadership would have known about 

isolated shortages in time to intervene. Parkell filed a 

grievance on April 16, 2011, alluding vaguely to “lapses in 

medication occur[ring] randomly,” App. 234, but even if that 

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36

was sufficient to put CCS on notice, all three of the alleged 

shortages predated the grievance.16

We will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of the Medical Defendants in 

relation to Parkell’s Eighth Amendment medical-needs 

claims.17

IV.

Finally, we reject Parkell’s argument that the District 

Court abused its discretion by denying him appointed 

counsel. 

“Indigent civil litigants possess neither a constitutional 

nor a statutory right to appointed counsel.” Montgomery v. 

Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 498 (3d Cir. 2002). Appointing 

counsel for an indigent civil litigant is “usually only granted 

upon a showing of special circumstances indicating the 

likelihood of substantial prejudice to him resulting, for 

example, from his probable inability without such assistance 

to present the facts and legal issues to the court in a complex 

 16 Parkell also cites a “Memorandum of Agreement 

between the United States Department of Justice and the State 

of Delaware that resulted from a DOJ investigation of 

Delaware prison facilities, including [VCC],” but Parkell only 

seeks to use this as evidence that “CMS and the DOC” — not 

CCS, which entered the picture later — “were on notice 

regarding deficiencies in the medical care afforded to 

inmates.” Parkell Br. 49-50. Parkell also fails to explain 

what “deficiencies” were actually noted in the Memorandum 

and how they would have put CMS “on notice” with regard to 

the specific issues in this lawsuit. 

17 We do not address CCS’s argument that Parkell’s 

claim is barred by his failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies. Aside from being unnecessary to our disposition of 

the case, the issue was forfeited because CCS did not raise 

this issue in its summary judgment motion in the District 

Court, and thus Parkell never had an opportunity to respond 

with evidence of exhaustion. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 

295 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[F]ailure to exhaust is an affirmative 

defense to be pleaded by the defendant.”). 

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but arguably meritorious case.” Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 

F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984) (emphasis added). 

District courts have “broad discretion to determine 

whether appointment of counsel in a civil case would be 

appropriate.” Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 498 (quotation marks 

omitted). First, the court “must assess whether the claimant’s 

case has some arguable merit.” Id. at 498-99. If there is 

arguable merit, then the court should consider a range of 

factors, including: 

1. the plaintiff’s ability to present his or her 

own case; 2. the difficulty of the particular 

legal issues; 3. the degree to which factual 

investigation will be necessary and the ability 

of the plaintiff to pursue investigation; 4. the 

plaintiff’s capacity to retain counsel on his or 

her own behalf; 5. the extent to which a case is 

likely to turn on credibility determinations, and; 

6. whether the case will require testimony from 

expert witnesses. 

Id. at 499. These factors are “not exhaustive, but should 

serve as a guidepost for the district courts.” Id. (quotation 

marks omitted). The plaintiff’s ability to present a case is 

“[p]erhaps the most significant” consideration and depends on 

factors such as “the plaintiff’s education, literacy, prior work 

experience, and prior litigation experience.” Id. at 501. We 

have noted that prisoners have the ability to “proceed with an 

investigation through interrogatories, document requests, and 

requests for admissions” but are unable to conduct 

depositions, which are sometimes necessary to building a 

case. Id. at 502-04. 

Parkell’s chief complaint is that appointed counsel 

could have more aggressively pursued documents when the 

defendants resisted his requests for DOC policies and prison 

log books. But Parkell did file motions to compel, along with 

copious discovery requests, which demonstrated a 

considerable ability to pursue discovery. His discovery 

efforts were at times unsuccessful, and an appointed attorney 

may well have done better. But that could be said of nearly 

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38

any pro se case and does not, on its own, lead us to believe 

that the District Court abused its discretion. 

Parkell also cites the complexity of the case and the 

centrality of credibility determinations as grounds to appoint 

counsel. But the core legal issues in this case — deliberate 

indifference and the reasonableness of searches — are not so 

complex that a pro se litigant would be altogether unable to 

grasp them. Further, Parkell had significant litigation 

experience, and his filings (including significant motion 

practice) in the District Court were coherent and 

demonstrative of both literacy and basic knowledge of the 

mechanics of litigation. Witness credibility is indeed central 

to the case, but that suggests a need for appointed counsel 

during trial, not at the summary judgment phase, where 

credibility determinations are not made. 

The District Court, therefore, acted within the bounds 

of its broad discretion to deny Parkell appointed counsel. 

V.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 

Court will be affirmed in part and reversed in part. The 

judgment will be reversed as to Parkell’s claim against the 

State Defendants for prospective injunctive relief under the 

Fourth Amendment, which will be remanded to the District 

Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In 

all other respects, the judgment will be affirmed. 

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