Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01841/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01841-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff LaToya Johnson is a former employee of Defendant Golden Empire Transit District. 

Plaintiff contends she was discharged from her employment after suffering a knee injury that rendered 

her unable to perform her job duties as a bus driver, and taking medical leave. Accordingly, Plaintiff 

asserts the company and Toddash Kim, an operations supervisor, are liable for a violation of the Family 

and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 and that GET is liable for discrimination in violation of the 

California Family Rights Act, discrimination based upon disability and failure to accommodate in 

violation of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, and failure to take reasonable steps to 

prevent discrimination.

Defendants assert Plaintiff is unable to succeed on her claims, and seek summary judgment 

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 43) The Court heard the oral 

arguments of the parties on June 21, 2016. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

LATOYA JOHNSON,

 Plaintiff,

v.

GOLDEN EMPIRE TRANSIT DISTRICT 

and TODDASH KIM,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-001841 – JLT

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN 

PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. 43)

Case 1:14-cv-01841-JLT Document 49 Filed 07/25/16 Page 1 of 22
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I. Undisputed Material Facts1

In October 2012, Plaintiff was employed by Golden Empire Transit District as a bus driver with 

a Class B license. (JSF 1; Doc. 46-2 at 2, Johnson Decl. ¶ 1) She drove “a bus known as a Get-a-lift 

bus that does not have regular routes,” but instead picked up and dropped off customers at specific 

locations. (Doc. 46-2, Johnson Decl. ¶ 3) 

While working on December 26, 2013, Plaintiff went to the apartment complex of her fiancé’s 

sisters where she parked the Get-a lift bus. (Doc. 46-2 at 3, Johnson Decl. ¶ 5) According to Plaintiff, 

she had previously parked at the apartment complex and had spoken to the apartment manager to obtain 

permission to park there. (Id.) Plaintiff reports she “punched a code to dispatch indicating [she] was 

exiting the bus,” and left the bus to eat. (id.) She contends that when she returned, she turned on the 

bus—leaving “the key in the position of allowing the electrical system to work by without the engine

running—and punched in a code to inform dispatch of Plaintiff’s return. (Id.) Plaintiff contends she 

then “exited the bus and stood outside, had a cigarette, and waited by the bus until [she] was ready to 

leave, which occurred approximately 45 minutes later.” (Id.) The same day, Plaintiff suffered a knee 

injury while “helping a big customer in a wheelchair.” (Id. at 4, ¶ 8) Plaintiff visited a GET doctor, 

who “took [her] off work for two weeks.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff was asked to return to a modified duty assignment—that accommodated her knee 

injury--on January 9, 2014. At that time, Crystal Hamlet, GET’s Human Resources Administrative 

Assistant, gave Plaintiff a document which stated:

We have received information from your treating physician that you have been released 

to temporary alternate work. The Golden Empire Transit District’s modified duty 

program enables you to remain safely in the workforce while you are recovering from 

your medical condition. 

We have chosen modified duty assignments for you that are within your physician’s 

guidelines. However, if you consider any of the alternate tasks to be beyond your 

physical capabilities, immediately report your concerns to your supervisor. Since you 

are the best judge of your physical abilities, you must take responsibility for staying 

within the physician’s restrictions.

(Doc. 46-3 at 20) GET indicated that while on modified-duty, Plaintiff would be “in a classroom 

 

1 The parties prepared a “Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts” (Doc. 43-3), and any facts from the Joint Statement 

will be identified as “JSF.” In addition, Defendant prepared a separate statement of facts (Doc. 43-2), to which Plaintiff 

filed a response (Doc. 46-1). Defendants’ undisputed facts will be identified as “DUF.” 

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setting training on the new routes,” and after she completed training, GET would “conduct orientation 

meetings on how to interact with the public during outreach.” (Id.) Plaintiff signed the document, after 

which Ms. Hamlet directed Plaintiff to go see Toddash Kim, another employee of GET. (Id.; Doc. 46-3 

at 4, Johnson Decl. ¶ 9)

Plaintiff reports that Mr. Kim gave her a letter indicating it was “[a] pre-disciplinary review, 

that may result in discipline up to and including termination,” because she “received her 5th discipline 

on a five step discipline track.” (Doc. 46-3 at 5) GET had a progressive discipline policy, under which 

GET had the right to terminate an employee who “has violations in a particular track within a floating 

12 month period.” (JSF 12) Before December 26, 2013, the plaintiff had been the subject of prior 

disciplinary actions. For example, on December 22, 2012, Plaintiff received an Employee Discipline 

Report for running over a center divider, and admitted she committed the violation. (Doc. 43-4 at 13, 

171) 

On April 9, 2013, Plaintiff received an Employee Discipline Report for failing to be at work on 

time, and she was given a written warning. (JSF 5; Doc. 43-4 at 15, 172) On October 4, 2013, Plaintiff 

received an Employee Discipline Report for being “late for duty.” (JSF 6; Doc. 43-4 at 33) Plaintiff 

received a “[t]hird written warning, resulting in one day off without pay.” (Id.) Plaintiff admitted she 

committed the violation of the GET policy, which required operators to clock in “by the start time of 

the assigned shift.” (JSF 7; see also Doc. 43-4 at 34) 

On October 15, 2013, Plaintiff “called at the time she was due to check in and informed 

dispatch [that] she didn’t have a car to come to work,” and Plaintiff arrived at work two and half hours 

late. (Doc. 43-4 at 37, 177) She received an Employee Discipline Report on October 16, which 

indicated it was Plaintiff’s “[f]inal written warning, resulting in three days off without pay.” (JSF 8; 

Doc. 43-4 at 37, 177) Despite this, in November 2013, Plaintiff “failed to attend one of seven 

mandatory safety meetings beginning November 1 through 11th.” (Doc. 43-4 at 41) The Employee 

Discipline Report indicated that the “[c]urrent action being [t]aken” was discharge, and it was 

“pending.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff testified that Mr. Kim said she could attend a make-up safety 

meeting at a later date, and if Plaintiff did so then she would not receive a disciplinary write-up. (Doc. 

46-3 at 41, Johnson Depo. 83:23-25)

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During her employment, Plaintiff “was a member of the Teamster Local #517 Creamery 

Employees and Drivers Union, Public Professional and Medical Employees Union.” (JSF 3) As a 

Union member, Plaintiff “was bound by [a] Collective Bargaining Agreement from the period from 

April 1, 2012 through March 31, 2014.” (JSF 4) The CBA allowed the union to grieve discipline 

imposed on the employees but did not allow the employee to grieve the discipline otherwise. (Doc. 43-

4 at 218.) 

The letter given by Mr. Kim to the plaintiff on January 9, 2014, was signed by Operations 

Manager Candra Cheers. (Doc. 46-3 at 5) The letter indicated the last violation Plaintiff committed 

was leaving the bus “unattended for over an hour” on December 26, 2013. (Id.) Also, the letter from 

Ms. Cheers indicated:

Upon review you were observed pulling into an apartment complex and parking the 

vehicle to conduct activity of a personal nature. This is a violation of the Golden Empire 

Transit Coach Operator Procedural Manual and is listed as the fifth discipline on your 

five step discipline track, resulting in suspension pending a pre-disciplinary review.

(Doc. 46-3 at 5) During the meeting, Plaintiff informed Mr. Kim the charge “was untrue,” that she “did 

not leave [the] bus unattended for over an hour on that date.” (Doc. 46-2 at 4, Johnson Decl. ¶ 10) 

Plaintiff was informed she had “the right to respond to the charges either in writing or orally and to be 

represented at the review by a person of [her] choice.” (Doc. 46-3 at 5) Plaintiff did not respond. 

(DUF 8, 16)

On January 22, 2014, Plaintiff received a letter from Ms. Cheers, who informed her that a predisciplinary review meeting would be held on January 27, 2014. (JSF 13) Plaintiff, Ms. Cheers, Union 

representative Gary Jenkins, and David Epperson attended the meeting, during which Plaintiff was 

“advised that GET was considering whether to terminate her employment due to the claimed 

violations” addressed in the Employee Discipline Reports dated April 9, 2013; October 4, 2013; 

October 16, 2013; November 19, 2013; and January 9, 2014. (DUF 13, 14) 

On February 3, 2014, Candra Cheers drafted and mailed a letter informing Plaintiff that “her 

employment with GET had been terminated due to her violation of GET’s progressive discipline 

policy.” (JSF 14; Doc.43-4 at 3, Cheers Decl. ¶ 18) Specifically, Ms. Cheers identified the following 

violations in Employee Discipline Reports from March 2013 through January 2014:

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 03/31/13- Operator failed to report for work or call in

 10/04/13- Operator was five minutes late for duty

 10/12/13- Operator failed to give an hour notice before calling in and showed up 

2 1⁄2 hours late.

 11/1/13- Operator failed to attend one of seven mandatory safety meeting[s].

 01/09/14- Operator drove to an apartment complex and left the paratransit bus 

unattended for over an hour.

(Doc. 43-5 at 194) This action followed.

II. Evidentiary Objections

Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of the Civil Procedure, “an affidavit or declaration 

used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be 

admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters 

stated.” See also Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 419 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that it was an 

abuse of discretion for the district court, at the summary judgment stage, to consider information from 

an affidavit based on inadmissible hearsay rather than the affiant’s personal knowledge).

A. Objections to Plaintiff’s Declaration

1. Paragraph 3, Lines 23 through 26

In the declaration, Plaintiff reported:

What drivers have done during [their] down time since I began working at GET involves 

any number of things, including stopping at a restaurant for lunch, stopping in a parking 

lot and engaging in personal matters such as reading or talking on a cell phone, going to 

the next pick up and parking nearby on the street, among other things.

(Doc. 46-2 at 2, ¶ 3) Defendants object this statement is hearsay and lacks foundation. (Doc. 47-2 at 2, 

citing United States v. Tanner, 628 F.3d 890, 903 n.5 (7th Cir. 2010))

Significantly, Plaintiff reported that her instructor had them stop at a local restaurant for a meal 

break on one occasion during training. (Doc. 46-2 a 2, ¶ 3) To that extent, Defendants’ objection is 

OVERRULED. On the other hand, Plaintiff does not assert that she personally witnessed other drivers 

reading or talking on phones. (See id. at 2-4, ¶¶ 3, 6) The Court is unable to determine this portion of 

the statement is based upon Plaintiff’s personal knowledge, and the source of the information is 

unclear. Consequently, the statement concerning drivers reading and talking on cell phones while 

stopped in parking lots is inadmissible hearsay, and Defendants’ objection thereto is SUSTAINED.

2. Paragraph 6, Lines 1 through 2

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Plaintiff reported, “I discussed with other drivers at GET the fact that they stopped during down 

time at stores, restaurants, on streets, or anywhere just as long as it did not interfere with our routes.” 

(Doc. 46-2 at 4, ¶ 6) Defendants object to Plaintiff’s statement as hearsay and lacking foundation. 

(Doc. 47-2 at 2) 

Hearsay statements are those “(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current 

trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the 

statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Here, Plaintiff is offering statements made by other unidentified 

individuals to explain her subsequent conduct. Notably, she explains that she was trained that she 

could park at various locations for “down time” and other drivers told her they stopped at various 

locations for “down time” and, as a result, she stopped at these various locations for “down time.”

Therefore, Defendants’ objection on the grounds of hearsay is OVERRRULED.

3. Paragraph 8, Lines 18 through 19

Plaintiff reported that after her injury, a physician took her off work for a two-week period “but 

indicated that [Plaintiff] could engage in light or modified duty work.” (Doc. 46-2 at 4, ¶ 8) 

Defendants object to the report of what the physician said as hearsay. (Doc. 47-2 at 2) 

The statement was made by an unidentified physician, and offered as evidence that Plaintiff 

was able to perform light or modified duty. Plaintiff’s statement regarding what she was told by the 

physician is inadmissible hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); Crayon v. Hill, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

7723 at * 23 (E.D. Cal. Jan 22, 2016) (holding the plaintiff’s testimony regarding what a doctor at told 

him was “hearsay and cannot be properly considered in opposition to a summary judgment motion”). 

Accordingly, Defendants’ objection is SUSTAINED.

4. Paragraph 10, Lines 3 through 4

Plaintiff asserted she was awaiting a full knee replacement and stated, “I am advised that I will 

be able to drive as Class B driver after such surgery.” (Doc. 46-2 at 5, ¶ 10) Defendants object that 

this statement is hearsay, lacks foundation, and is speculative. (Doc. 47-2 at 2)

Significantly, the statement Plaintiff refers to was made by an unidentified third party, and 

Plaintiff offers the statement as evidence that she will be able to perform her former job duties. Thus, 

it is inadmissible hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); Crayon, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7723 at *23. 

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Therefore, Defendants’ objections to the statement are SUSTAINED.

5. Paragraph 12, Lines 15 through 19

Plaintiff asserted at she had various supervisors during the time she worked for GET, but “the 

ultimate supervisor over the bus drivers was Toddash Kim.” (Doc. 46-2 at 5, Johnson Decl. ¶ 12) In 

addition, she asserts:

[Mr. Kim] was the person who was involved in discipline of drivers and is the person 

who is responsible for telling me I was suspended due to the alleged abandonment of 

my bus for over an hour on 12/26/13. Mr. Kim was involved in the major decisions 

relating to bus drivers.

(Id.) Defendant objects to each of these sentences, asserting they are hearsay and lack foundation of 

Plaintiff’s personal knowledge. (Doc. 47-2 at 2)

Importantly, Plaintiff has not set forth any facts to show she has personal knowledge of whether 

Mr. Kim was the “ultimate supervisor” or involved in disciplinary decisions related to other bus 

drivers. For example, Plaintiff does not assert she has personal knowledge of Mr. Kim disciplining 

other drivers, or how he supervised the drivers at GET. Therefore, Defendants’ objections to the 

statements in lines 15 to 16 and 18 to 19 are SUSTAINED.

On the other hand, Plaintiff asserts the day she returned from her leave, she was told to see Mr. 

Kim, who informed Plaintiff she was suspended. (Doc. 46-2 at 4, ¶ 9) Thus, Plaintiff stated facts 

sufficient to show a personal knowledge that Mr. Kim was “responsible” for telling Plaintiff that she 

was suspended from GET. To the extent that Defendants object to the report that Mr. Kim told Plaintiff 

she was suspended as hearsay, an opposing party’s statement offered against that party is not 

considered hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Likewise, statements offered against a party that were 

made by the party’s agent or employee on a topic that is within the scope of the employment 

relationship, are excluded from the hearsay rule. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). Accordingly, Defendants’ 

objections to this statement are OVERRULED.

B. Objections to the Declaration of Randy Rumph

Defendants object to several statements in the declaration of Randy Rumph related to exhibits to 

attached to his declaration. (Doc. 47-2 at 3-4) Mr. Rumph is counsel for Plaintiff, as noted in his 

declaration, and identified documents “provided to Plaintiff during discovery” that were attached as 

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exhibits to his declaration, such as a computer printout of Plaintiff’s logins from her bus, the letter from 

GET related to modified job duties following leave, and a letter about her suspension. (See Doc. 46-3 

at 2-3, ¶¶ 1-7). 

According to Defendants, Mr. Rumph’s statements are hearsay, lack foundation, and are 

improper authentication of the documents. (Doc. 4-2 at 3-4) However, Defendants fail to explain why 

the documents are “hearsay,” and Mr. Rumph clearly has personal knowledge of what documents were 

produced by Defendants during the course of discovery. Because the documents—produced by the 

defendants—are now offered by Plaintiff, they are deemed authentic. See Maljack Prods., Inc. v. 

GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 889 n.12 (9th Cir. 1996) (documents produced by a party 

in discovery were deemed authentic when offered by the party-opponent); Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 

839 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1988) (same). Consequently, Defendants’ objections to the declaration 

of Mr. Rumph are OVERRULED.

C. Plaintiff’s Objections as to Relevance

Previously, this Court observed that “attorneys routinely raise every objection imaginable 

without regard to whether the objections are necessary, or even useful, given the nature of summary 

judgment motions in general, and the facts of their cases in particular.” Burch v. Regents of the Univ. 

of Cal., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006). Plaintiff objects to several of the facts identified 

by Defendants as irrelevant and asserts they are not “issue[s] of material fact.” (See generally Doc. 

46-1 at 3-14) However, such objections are inappropriate, because the Court must determine whether 

a fact is relevant and material as part of “the summary judgment standard itself.” See id. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s objections on these grounds are OVERRULED.

D. Conclusion

To the extent that statements offered by either party are speculative or represent a legal 

conclusion, the Court, as a matter of course, will not factor that material into the analysis. See Burch, 

433 F. Supp.2d at 1119 (“[S]tatements in declarations based on speculation or improper legal 

conclusions, or argumentative statements, are not facts and likewise will not be considered on a motion 

for summary judgment. Objections on any of these grounds are simply superfluous in this context.”) 

(citation omitted, emphasis in original). Rather, the Court’s analysis relies on evidence only that it has 

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deemed admissible. 

III. Legal Standards for Summary Judgment

The “purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to 

see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a). In addition, Rule 56 allows a court to grant summary adjudication, or partial summary 

judgment, when there is no genuine issue of material fact as to a particular claim or portion of that 

claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 769 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) 

(“Rule 56 authorizes a summary adjudication that will often fall short of a final determination, even of a 

single claim . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The standards that apply on a 

motion for summary judgment and a motion for summary adjudication are the same. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56 (a), (c); Mora v. Chem-Tronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 

Summary judgment, or summary adjudication, should be entered “after adequate time for 

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of 

proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the “initial 

responsibility” of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 

323. An issue of fact is genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find 

for the non-moving party, while a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Wool v. Tandem 

Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1422, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). A party demonstrates summary adjudication is 

appropriate by “informing the district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of 

‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, 

if any,’ which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 323 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to 

present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue of a material fact. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e); 

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Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. An opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Id. at 587. The party is required to tender evidence of 

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention 

that a factual dispute exits. Id. at 586 n.11; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Further, the opposing party is not 

required to establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed 

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth 

at trial.” T.W. Electrical Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 

1987). However, “failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case 

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 

The Court must apply standards consistent with Rule 56 to determine whether the moving party 

demonstrated there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment is appropriate as a matter of law. 

Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). In resolving a motion for summary 

judgment, the Court can only consider admissible evidence. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 

F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 

F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988)). Further, evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party” and “all justifiable inferences” must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Orr, 

285 F.3d at 772; Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).

IV. Discussion and Analysis

A. Interference with Rights under the FLMA

Plaintiff alleges GET and Toddah Kim interfered with her rights under the Family Medical 

Leave Act of 1993. (Doc. 1 at 3) Specifically, she claims that the defendants terminated her because 

she took FMLA leave. Id. 

A substantive right under the FMLA prevents an employer from interfering with the exercise of 

the employee’s right to take leave. 29 U.S.C § 2615(a); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(a). Specifically, pursuant 

to the FMLA, it is “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the 

attempt to exercise, any right provided.” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a). Interference with an employee’s rights 

“include[s], for example, not only refusing to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee 

from using such leave.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.220. Likewise, the employer may not “discriminat[e] or 

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retaliate[e] against an employee or prospective employee for having exercised or attempted to exercise 

FMLA rights.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). Thus, the FMLA prohibits an employer from the use of 

FMLA-protected leave as “a negative factor” in employment decisions. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c); see 

also Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) (“attaching negative 

consequences to the exercise of protected rights surely ‘tends to chill’ an employee’s willingness to 

exercise those rights,” and employees are less likely to take FMLA leave “if they can expect to be fired 

or otherwise disciplined for doing so”). 

The Ninth Circuit does not apply burden-shifting framework to interference claims. Rather, a 

plaintiff must simply prove her case with “either direct or circumstantial evidence” of interference. 

Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1125. The Court explained: “The regulation promulgated by the Department of

Labor, 29 C.F.R. 825.220(c) plainly prohibits the use of FMLA-protected leave as a negative factor in 

an employment decision.” Id. Therefore, “[i]n order to prevail on her claim... [a plaintiff] need only 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her taking of FMLA-protected leave constituted a 

negative factor in the decision to terminate her.” Id. On summary judgment, the Court must determine 

“whether there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether the FMLA leave taken by [the plaintiff] 

was impermissibly considered as a factor in” the adverse employment actions she experienced. Liu v. 

Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2003).

1. Liability of Toddash Kim

Defendants contend Plaintiff is unable “to establish Defendant Kim’s individual liability under 

the FMLA Claim.” (Doc. 43-1 at 11, emphasis omitted). According to Defendants, Kim does not 

qualify as an “employer” for purposes of the FMLA, and as such the claim fails. (Id. at 11-13) On the 

other hand, Plaintiff argues that Kim was her supervisor and may be held liable under the FMLA. 

(Doc. 46 at 22-24)

Pursuant to the FMLA, the term employer includes “any person who acts, directly or indirectly, 

in the interest of an employer to any of the employees of such employer.” 29 U.S.C. §2611(4)(A)(ii)(I). 

Under this definition of “employer,” supervisors and corporate officers may be held individually liable

under the FMLA. Hibbs v. Dep’t of Human Resources, 273 F.3d 844, 872 (9th Cir. 2001) (indicating 

the Court “agree[d] with the other circuits that some supervisory employees can be sued as employers 

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under the FMLA”); see also Modica v. Taylor, 465 F.3d 174, 186 (5th Cir. 2006); Haybarger v. 

Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 414 (3d Cir. 2012). In agreeing with its sister 

circuits, the Ninth Circuit noted the similarity between the definitions of “employer” under the Fair 

Labor Standards Act and the FMLA. Id., 273 F.3d at 872 (citing, e.g., Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 

683, 685-87 (11th Cir. 1999) (discussing § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I) and case law interpreting identical 

language in the FLSA)). Accordingly, the Court employs the same “economic reality” test to determine 

whether an individual is an employer under the FMLA and the FLSA. Mercer v. Borden, 11 F. Supp. 

2d 1190, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 1998); see also Moreau v. Air France, 356 F.3d 942, 946-47 (using the same 

“economic realities” test for determining joint employment in the context of FMLA, as it would under 

the FLSA).

Courts consider four factors to determine the “economic realities” of an employment 

relationship: “whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) 

supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the 

rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records.” Bonnette v. Cal. Health & 

Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983). Consequently, “where an individual exercises 

‘control over the nature and structure of the employment relationship,’ or ‘economic control’ over the 

relationship, that individual is an employer ... and is subject to liability.” Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 

F.3d 997, 1012 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding the CEO and COO were employers under the FLSA where they 

had a significant ownership interest, operational control over significant aspects of the company’s dayto-day functions, power to hire and fire employees, power to determine salaries, and the responsibility 

to maintain employment records); Boucher v. Shaw, 572 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding an 

individual defendant responsible for handling labor and employment matters, who also held 30% 

ownership over a company, was an “employer”); Solis v. Best Miracle, 709 F. Supp. 2d 843, 847 (E.D. 

Cal. 2010) (finding a manager who had authority to hire and fire employees, instructed employees to 

falsify time cards, maintained employment records, filled out time and wage sheets, signed paychecks, 

and “paid all the bills” was an “employer” under the FLSA). 

Plaintiff contends Kim is an employer under the FMLA because he “was Plaintiff’s supervisor,”

and “[h]is title was/is ‘operations supervisor.’” (Doc. 46 at 23) Plaintiff observes that when Kim 

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testified as to his job duties:

Q. What are your job duties as operations supervisor?

A. I oversee the transportation supervisors, dispatch, review complaints, interviews, 

disciplines. I monitor -- well, there’s a whole list. Everything?

Q. Yes.

A. I monitor the -- currently the uniform spreadsheets, driver call-in-sick slips, 

timekeeping for dispatch, also supervisors. I do retraining for the coach operators. I 

do final sign off for the new hires. I assist the HR department, marketing department. 

Whatever needs there may be.

(Id., quoting Doc. 46-3 at 70, Kim Depo. 7:24- 8:10) In addition, Plaintiff contends “Kim was involved 

in disciplining Plaintiff,” and “the decision maker (Cheers) relied solely on him when she prepared 

Plaintiff’s notice of suspension on January 22, 2015.” (Id., citing Cheers Depo. 54-57)

Significantly, Plaintiff presents no evidence that Kim “supervised and controlled” the work 

schedules for GET bus drivers, determined the rate of pay the bus drivers would receive, or maintained

all employment records for the bus drivers. Rather, Kim testified his “supervision” of the bus drivers 

was limited to call-in-sick slips and re-training. (Doc. 46-3 at 70, Kim Depo. 7:24- 8:10) Though Kim 

reported he did “a final sign off for the new hires,” it is unclear whether he meant these “new hires” 

were all GET employees—thereby including bus drivers such as Plaintiff—or for transportation 

supervisors and dispatch, over whom Mr. Kim admits he exercised supervisory authority. (Doc. 46-3 at 

70, Kim Depo. 7:24- 8:10) Further, while Kim acknowledged he “wrote up the discipline” for Plaintiff 

being away from her coach for over an hour, he submitted it “to Candra Cheers to review.” (Doc. 46-3 

at 83, Kim Depo. 24:7-11). Ms. Cheers reported that it was her responsibility “to decide wither GET 

employees who are subject to termination under GET’s progressive discipline policy should be 

terminated and to participate in the proceedings leading up to that decision.” (Doc. 43-5 at 1, Cheers 

Decl. ¶ 2) Though Ms. Cheers accepted the investigation conducted by Mr. Kim, she also viewed the 

videotape of the December 26, 2013 and then, according to Ms. Cheers, it was her decision alone to 

terminate Plaintiff’s employment with GET. (Id. at 4, ¶ 24) Thus, even though Kim acted for GET in 

conducting the investigation, it was Ms. Cheers who acted in the interest of her employer, in this 

instance.

Moreover, as Defendants observe, Kim’s recommendation that Plaintiff be disciplined is not 

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sufficient to find Kim is an “employer” for under the FMLA. Previously, the Court observed that 

individuals may be supervisors and managers who “set ... schedules, assisted in the drafting of 

employee handbooks, ...recommended or reviewed the termination of other employees, and maintained 

employment records”—and yet not be “employers” under the meaning of the Act because they did not 

“control the purse strings” over the plaintiff’s position. Baird v. Kessler, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1311 

(E.D. Cal. 2001) (emphasis added). Here, at most, the evidence shows Kim submitted the Employee 

Discipline Report to Cheers, who made the ultimate decision to terminate Plaintiff after finding she 

committed five violations of GET policies in the twelve-month period. (Doc. 43-5 at 4, Cheers Decl. 

¶¶ 21, 24). The evidence does not show that Kim was responsible for hiring or firing Plaintiff, that he 

supervised the day-day-operations for bus drivers, determined her rate of pay, or was responsible for 

maintaining her employment records at GET. 

Accordingly, applying the “economic realities” test, the Court finds Plaintiff has not 

demonstrated that Toddash Kim was Plaintiff’s “employer” within the meaning of the FMLA. See

Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470. Thus, Plaintiff fails to establish the existence of an element essential to her 

claim against Kim for interference with her rights under the FMLA. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a). Thus, 

Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the FMLA claim against Kim is GRANTED. See

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

2. Liability of GET

The Ninth Circuit determined that when “an employee is subjected to ‘negative consequences... 

simply because he has used FMLA leave,’ the employer has interfered with the employee’s FMLA 

rights.” Liu, 347 F.3d at 1136 (quoting Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124). Thus, to establish a claim for 

interference with rights, “a plaintiff must show that (1) he took ‘FMLA-protected leave’; and (2) it 

constituted ‘a negative factor’ in an adverse employment decision. Jadwin v. County of Kern, 610 F. 

Supp. 2d 1129, 1159 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1125). Here, there is no dispute 

that Plaintiff took leave protected under the FMLA or that she suffered an adverse employment action. 

However, the parties disagree whether Plaintiff is able to establish the protected leave was a “negative 

factor” in the decision to terminate her employment with GET.

To support a claim for a violation of the FMLA, a plaintiff must supply direct or indirect 

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evidence, or both, of the violation. Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1125; Jadwin, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 1159. 

Direct evidence typically consists of statements or actions by the employer. See Coghlan v. Am. 

Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005). Indirect evidence “requires an additional 

inferential step.” Id. A “close temporal proximity” between an employee taking leave and being 

terminated may support an inference of unlawful interference. See Liu, 347 F.3d at 1137 (citing 

Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 168 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the “close temporal 

proximity between two events may give rise to an inference of causal connection”).

Defendants argue Plaintiff is unable to show a causal connection, because “the process leading 

to plaintiff’s termination had begun over 8 months prior to her injury and 80% of the violations 

occurred prior to that time.” (Doc. 43-1 at 9) As Defendants observe, the Ninth Circuit opined “an 

employer is not required to cease pursuing a disciplinary course of action against an employee that 

began before that employee took FMLA-related leave, simply because that employee took leave.” (Id.

at 9-10, quoting Swan v. Bank of America, 360 Fed. Appx. 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2009). Therefore, 

Defendants contend “the fact that the final decision was made shortly after [P]laintiff was injured is 

insufficient to create a triable issue of fact.” (Doc. 43-1 at 9)

In Swan, the plaintiff argued that “she had a ‘stellar’ employment history,” and was targeted 

“with frivolous disciplinary measures only after she gave notice of her intent to take FMLA-related 

leave.” Id., 360 Fed. Appx at 906. Despite this claim, the Court found the record belied the Plaintiff’s 

assertion about her work performance, because “there [was] ample documentation of her performance 

problems long before she gave notice of her intent to take FMLA-related leave.” Id. In addition, the 

Court found the plaintiff was not able to “establish that her termination is causally related to her leave” 

because she was terminated “four months after her return from leave.” Id. The Court found the four 

month delay between the leave and adverse employment action “was too remote in time to support a 

finding of causation premised solely on temporal proximity.” Id. (citing Clark County Sch. Dist. v. 

Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (explaining in the context of a Title VII claim that “cases that 

accept mere temporal proximity between an employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an adverse 

employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold 

that the temporal proximity must be ‘very close’”).

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However, this Court has held that temporal proximity between the taking of protected leave and 

the adverse actions by the employer bears on the “negative factor” analysis. Sutton v. Derosia, 2012 

WL 4863788, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2012) [“The temporal relationship is significant because the 

Ninth Circuit has held that the proximity in time between the taking of FMLA leave and an adverse 

employment action ‘provides supporting evidence of a connection between the two events.’”]; 

Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (“causation can be inferred 

from timing alone where an adverse employment action follows on the heels of protected activity”)).

Notably, in Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 2003), the Court held, “[T]he 

proximity in time between the leave and her termination also provides supporting evidence of a 

connection between the two events.” 

It is undisputed Plaintiff received several Employee Discipline Reports for violations before

taking her FMLA leave. However, Plaintiff presents evidence that though she missed a safety meeting 

in November, she was informed that she could attend a makeup session and the violation would not 

count against her on GET’s progressive discipline process. (Doc. 46-3 at 40-41, Johnson Depo. 83:23-

84:10). Indeed, Ms. Cheer confirms this was the understanding provided to the plaintiff, though she 

iterates that she did not promise that if the makeup session was not provided by GET that the discipline 

report would not count toward termination. (Doc. 46-3 at 101-102) 

Notably, after Plaintiff took FMLA leave, she was not permitted to attend a makeup session and 

she was informed the day she returned to work that she had committed five violations—including that 

the missed safety meeting counted against her on the disciplinary track. Moreover, as discussed below, 

there is a question of fact whether Plaintiff committed the fifth violation identified by GET on its “five 

step discipline track.” Indeed, it appears that GET no longer contends that the plaintiff left the bus 

unattended for over an hour. Thus, the evidence before the Court shows the adverse decisions by GET 

to count the missed meeting as a basis for termination and to terminate Plaintiff’s employment for 

leaving the bus unattended for an hour, were made “on the heels” of her taking FMLA leave. See 

Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1065.

On the other hand, GET argues that there can be no liability on the interference claim because

from July 2014, Plaintiff was unable to return to work as a bus driver or a driver of a vehicle that 

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requires a Class B license because her knee was and is in very bad condition.” (JSF 16, 17) The 

plaintiff argues, however, this is irrelevant because, “Plaintiff has alleged that she was terminated 

because she took leave that qualified under the FMLA/CFRA, not that defendant refused to reinstate 

her at the end of her leave . . .” (Doc. 46 at 10) The Court agrees. The fact that GET would not have 

been required to reinstate Plaintiff to her bus driver job at the end of her leave, had she been unable to 

return to it, is irrelevant to the undisputed facts that Plaintiff’s FMLA leave did not expire. Rather, 

GET required Plaintiff to return from FMLA leave and placed her into a modified, light duty position. 

In short, though GET could have refused to reinstate the plaintiff when she completed FMLA leave—

had this been the facts confronting it—this has no bearing on whether GET interfered with her taking 

leave protected by the FMLA and CFRA.

Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as the Court is obligated to do on a 

motion for summary judgment, the Court must find the close proximity in time supports an inference 

that the protected leave was a “negative factor” in the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment with 

GET. See Liu, 347 F.3d at 1137; Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 168. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for 

summary adjudication of the FMLA claim against GET is DENIED.

B. Discrimination in Violation of the CFRA

Plaintiff contends GET is liable for discrimination based upon her request for leave in violation 

of the California Family Rights Act (Doc. 1 at 4), which is the state counterpart to the FMLA. Weeks v. 

Union Pac. R.R. Co., 137 F. Supp.3d 1204, 1230 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Rogers v. County of Los 

Angeles, 198 Cal.App.4th 480, 487 (2011)). Significantly, as observed by the Ninth Circuit, “CFRA 

adopts the language of the FMLA and California state courts have held that the same standards apply.” 

Liu, 347 F.3d at 1132 n.4 (citing Dudley v. Dep’t of Transp., 90 Cal. App. 4th 255, 261 (2001)); see 

also Lew v. Superior Ct., 348 Fed. Appx 227, 229 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The CFRA adopts the same 

language as the FMLA, and California state courts have held that the same standards apply; therefore, 

this memorandum will treat both causes of action together”). 

Because the Court determined summary adjudication of the FMLA claim is not appropriate 

against GET, given the close proximity in time between Plaintiff taking leave and the termination of 

her employment, summary adjudication of the CFRA claim is likewise not appropriate. Accordingly, 

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Defendants’ motion as to the second cause of action is DENIED.

C. Violations of FEHA

Plaintiff contends that pursuant to California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, which 

prohibits discrimination on the basis of a disability, GET “was barred from discharging [Plaintiff] from 

employment and discriminating against her in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” (Doc. 1 

at 4-5) In addition, Plaintiff asserts, “GET had an affirmative obligation to reasonably accommodate 

Plaintiff, a disabled person.” (Id. at 5) Finally, Plaintiff contends GET also violated FEHA by failing 

to take reasonable steps to prevent discrimination. (Id. at 6). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims for violations of 

FEHA are based upon disability discrimination, failure to prevent the discrimination, and the failure to 

accommodate her disability. 

1. Shifting burdens and the McDonnell Douglas framework

Plaintiff’s claims under FEHA involve the shifting of burdens articulated by the Supreme 

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). See Guz v. Bechtal 

National Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (2000) (“Because of the similarity between state and federal 

employment discrimination laws, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying 

our own statutes”). 

First, the plaintiff bears the burden to establish a prima facie case of a violation of FEHA. 

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Hawn v. Executive Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1155 

(9th Cir. 2010). The evidence may be either direct or circumstantial, and the amount that must be 

produced to create a prima facie case is “very little.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 

248, 253 (1981). If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “the burden of production, but not 

persuasion, then shifts to the [defendant] to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 

challenged action.” Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1155; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp, 411 U.S. at 803. If 

the defendant carries this burden, the inquiry does not end. Rather, the burden shifts back to the 

plaintiff to demonstrate the reasons proffered by defendant are pretextual. Id.; McDonnell Douglas 

Corp, 411 U.S. at 805. Consequently, the plaintiff has “the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of 

fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against [her].” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 

Products, Inc. 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000).

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2. Application

FEHA requires employers “to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or 

mental disability of an applicant or employee” and “to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive 

process with the employee or applicant to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in 

response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee or applicant with a known 

physical or mental disability or known medical condition.” Cal. Gov. Code §12940 (m) and (n). In 

addition, it is an unlawful employment practice under FEHA “for an employer . . . to fail to take all 

reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring” in the workplace. 

Cal. Govt. Code § 12940(k). Here, Plaintiff contends that GET failed to meet satisfy the obligations to 

accommodate her disability and prevent discrimination. 

a. Plaintiff’s prima facie case

“A prima facie case for discrimination on grounds of physical disability under the FEHA 

requires plaintiff to show: (1) he suffers from a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to do his job; 

and, (3) he was subjected to adverse employment action because of his disability.” Faust v. Cal. 

Portland Cement Co., 150 Cal. App. 4th 864, 886 (2007) (citations omitted). see also Scotch v. Art Inst. 

of California-Orange Cnty., Inc., 173 Cal. App. 4th 986, 1009-10 (2009) (“elements of a failure to 

accommodate claim are (1) the plaintiff has a disability under the FEHA, (2) the plaintiff is qualified to 

perform the essential functions of the position, and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate 

the plaintiff’s disability”). Here, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff has a disability as defined by 

FEHA, but argue Plaintiff fails to state a prima facie case because she is unable to perform the job 

duties of a bus driver. (Doc. 43-1 at 10-11)

Significantly, at the time Plaintiff was terminated, GET received notice that Plaintiff was 

“released to temporary alternate work.” (Doc. 46-3 at 20) The company determined Plaintiff was able 

to perform “modified duty assignments ...within [the] physician’s guidelines,” which included training 

on new routes, attending orientation meetings and staffing GET’s transit stations where she would 

“pass out flyers, information, give route information.”. (Id. at 20, 149) Thus, the evidence before the 

Court indicates that, despite the fact GET was aware Plaintiff was unable to drive, she remained 

qualified to work modified duties under GET’s program to allow employees “to remain safely in the 

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workforce while...recovering from [a] medical condition.” (See id.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff was not 

given the opportunity to start the modified work, because she was suspended the same day from work, 

pending the disciplinary meeting. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff states a prima facie case for 

discrimination and failure to accommodate her knee injury. 

b. Legitimate reason

Once Plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to GET “to 

articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.” Hawn, 615 F.3d at 

1155. Under FEHA, a defendant must identify “reasons that are facially unrelated to prohibited bias,” 

but the articulated reasons “need not necessarily have been wise or correct.” Guz, 24 Cal.4th at 358. 

GET argues it had a legitimate business reason for terminating Plaintiff due to her violations of 

GET policies. The company employs a five-step discipline policy, under which GET has the right to 

terminate an employee who “has violations in a particular track within a floating 12 month period.” 

(JSF 12) In the termination letter, GET indicated Plaintiff reached five violations with the following

Employee Discipline Reports dated March 2013 through January 2014:

 03/31/13- Operator failed to report for work or call in

 10/04/13- Operator was five minutes late for duty

 10/12/13- Operator failed to give an hour notice before calling in and showed up 

2 1⁄2 hours late.

 11/1/13-11/1/13- Operator failed to attend one of seven mandatory safety 

meeting[s].

 01/09/14- Operator drove to an apartment complex and left the paratransit bus 

unattended for over an hour.



(Doc. 43-5 at 194) In light of these violations, and the fact that Plaintiff did not grieve the violations 

under the Collective Bargaining Agreement2, GET maintains it was proper for Plaintiff to be 

terminated.

Significantly, however, there is a question as to whether the fifth violation actually occurred, 

and whether it was a proper basis for termination. Plaintiff contends she drove to the apartment 

complex and left the bus unattended for only seventeen minutes, and remained by the bus during the 

 

2 Notably, however, the CBA does not allow the employee to grieve; this right is reserved to the union. Failing this, the 

employee has no right to grieve. (Doc. 43-4 at 218 [“Q. . . [C]an the employee [notwithstanding the union’s agreement] 

themselves, file a grievance? A No.”]

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balance of her “down time.” (Doc. 46-2 at 3, Johnson Decl. ¶ 5) In addition, Ms. Cheers testified that 

she reviewed the video of the December 26, 2013, and saw Plaintiff drive to the apartment parking lot, 

leave the bus, and return “a few minutes later.” (Doc. 46-3 at 126- 127, Cheers Depo. 59:16- 60:13) 

Thus, the assertion that Plaintiff left the bus unattended for an hour is not supported by the evidence. 

On the other hand, the Employee Disciplinary Report also indicated Plaintiff “parked in a no parking 

area” (Doc. 43-4 at 43) and Ms. Cheers testified that Plaintiff parked in “an unauthorized, like a red 

zone or no-parking location” (Doc. 46-3 at 126- 127, Cheers Depo. 59:16- 60:13) However, it is 

unclear whether this parking location was not, in fact, “unauthorized” because Plaintiff reports she 

received permission to park in the location. (See Doc. 46-2 at 3, Johnson Decl. ¶ 5)

Moreover, Plaintiff presents evidence that despite the written policy to not leave the bus, she 

was trained that in practice, it was permitted when her trainer had them stop at a restaurant “where 

[they] were gone from the bus for approximately an hour.” (Doc. 46-2 at 2-3, Johnson Decl. ¶ 3) 

Further, Plaintiff contends she observed other drivers “stopping at stores, restaurants, and on streets 

during their down times between customers.” (Id. at 4, ¶ 6) Given the conflicts in the evidence 

presented by Plaintiff and Defendants, the Court is unable to determine whether, and to what extent, 

Plaintiff violated GET policies on December 26. Thus, GET fails to demonstrate it had a legitimate 

business reason for terminating Plaintiff for five violations under its disciplinary process. 

c. Pretext

Even assuming GET carried the burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 

terminating Plaintiff’s employment, Plaintiff maintains the burden to “raise a triable issue of material 

fact as to whether the defendant’s proffered reasons . . . are mere pretext.” See Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1155-

56. 

Under FEHA, a plaintiff can demonstrate pretext with direct or indirect evidence. Vasquez, 

349 F.3d at 641; Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1094-95. As discussed above, the timing of the adverse 

employment decisions—both to count Plaintiff’s missed safety meeting as violation on the five-step 

program and to terminate Plaintiff’s employment— supports an inference that the decisions were 

related to Plaintiff’s disability. See Liu, 347 F.3d at 1137; Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 168. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff carries the burden to show a triable issue of fact as to whether the actions taken by GET were 

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pretextual, and Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s FEHA claims is DENIED.

V. Conclusion and Order

As discussed above, Defendants carry their burden to demonstrate Plaintiff is unable to succeed 

upon her claim for a violation of the FLMA against Defendant Kim. However, Defendants have not 

carried their burden to show an absence of a genuine issue of material fact related to Plaintiff’s claims

against GET. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. A jury must make credibility determinations and resolve 

the conflicts between the evidence. See T.W. Electrical Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. 

Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the FMLA claim against Toddash Kim 

is GRANTED; and 

2. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the FMLA, CFRA, and FEHA claims 

against Golden Empire Transit District is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 25, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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