Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00484/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00484-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BARRY LOUIS LAMON,

Plaintiff,

v.

MAURICE JUNIOUS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:09-cv-00484-GSA PC

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO EITHER

FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY

COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED

ONLY ON CLAIMS FOUND TO BE

COGNIZABLE

(Doc. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Screening Order

I. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Barry Louis Lamon, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on March 16, 2009.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

Case 1:09-cv-00484-AWI-SAB Document 6 Filed 10/08/09 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)), and courts “are not required to

indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal

conclusion are not. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated

in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis

added). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for

relief. Iqbal at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere

possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal at 1949-50; Moss

at 969. 

II. Plaintiff’s Claims

A. Allegations

Plaintiff, who is incarcerated at California State Prison-Corcoran, alleges that as a result of

the inmate grievances and lawsuits he has filed, prison officials retaliated against him by falsely

reporting he was suicidal, stripping his cell of his property, taking his television, admitting him to

the Acute Care Hospital, and involuntarily treating him with psychiatric medication for six months.

Plaintiff seeks money damages and declaratory relief.

Plaintiff alleges that on February 20 and 21, 2008, Defendant Maguass served him his

breakfast and lunch in a soupy, unidentifiable mess. On February 21, 2008, after Plaintiff

complained and demanded to speak to a sergeant, Maguass called the staff psychiatric technician,

falsely reported that Plaintiff said he was suicidal, and requested that Plaintiff be admitted to the

Acute Care Hospital for a day so that Maguass could get Plaintiff out of the unit. 

While awaiting an escort to the hospital, Plaintiff watched as Maguass stripped his cell of his

property and placed it on a cart, in violation of prison regulations requiring that staff hold an

Case 1:09-cv-00484-AWI-SAB Document 6 Filed 10/08/09 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

inmate’s cell for him for at least ten days if the inmate is at the hospital, out to court, or at some other

location. Maguass told Plaintiff he was tired of Plaintiff filing grievances and lawsuits, and that

Plaintiff had better beg the doctors to keep him for ten days because Maguass was taking all of his

property and was not going to feed Plaintiff if he returned to the unit. 

After Plaintiff was escorted to the Acute Care Hospital, staff psychiatrist Dr. Barda falsely

claimed that Plaintiff told him he was feeling suicidal, and had Plaintiff admitted to the Acute Care

Hospital. On February 22, 2008, Staff Psychiatrist Dr. Cohen and members of the ACH Unit 3

Interdisciplinary Treatment Team (IDTT), all of whom were named as defendants in a section 1983

suit Plaintiff filed on February 19, 2008, falsely stated that Plaintiff refused to accept psychotropic

medication and ordered that Plaintiff be involuntarily treated with medication. Plaintiff alleges that

they took that action after he told them he would take psychotropic medication but would then file

suit against them for prescribing it when they knew he did not need it. 

On April 2, 2008, an administrative law hearing was held on Staff Psychiatrist Marc Z.

Talisman and the IDTT’s petition to continue involuntarily medicating Plaintiff. Dr. Talisman was

named as a defendant in the lawsuit Plaintiff filed February 19, 2008, and during the hearing he gave

false testimony to support the petition, and mentioned the number of lawsuits Plaintiff had filed

against staff at Corcoran to date and other information about Plaintiff’s litigation that he should not

have legitimately or lawfully known. The petition was granted by a judge, leading to the extension

of the involuntarily treatment until September 24, 2008.

Finally, on April 9, 2008, Defendant Magana issued Plaintiff ’s property to him. Plaintiff ’s

television, hundreds of pages of legal documents and medical records, witness statements, more than

one-hundred dollars worth of vitamins, books, and other items were missing. Plaintiff was

permanently deprived of his television based on Maguass’ false statement in the February 21

property inventory sheet that all of the buttons were altered.

Plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against in violation of the First Amendment, and

subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the invasion

of his personal security interest in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff also alleges 

///

Case 1:09-cv-00484-AWI-SAB Document 6 Filed 10/08/09 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

supervisory liability claims, an assault and battery claim, and a claim for violation of California Civil

Code section 52.1. 

B. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance

a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim against Defendant Maguass for having

Plaintiff admitted to the ACH, stripping his cell of his property, and causing Plaintiff to be

permanently deprived of his television in retaliation against Plaintiff for filing grievances and

lawsuits. 

However, there are no facts in the complaint supporting a retaliation claim against Defendant

Barda for admitting Plaintiff to the hospital. Although Plaintiff alleges Barda falsely claimed that

Plaintiff told him he was suicidal, there is no indication of motive. Even if based on a false

statement by Barda, the mere decision of Barda to admit Plaintiff to the hospital does not support

a retaliation claim.

The retaliation claim against Defendant Cohen also fails. The allegation that Cohen and the

IDTT falsely stated that Plaintiff refused medication and ordered that he be involuntarily medicated

after he said he would take the medication but would then sue them falls short of stating a claim for

retaliation. A mere threat to file suit does not rise to the level of a protected activity, and Plaintiff

has not alleged any facts demonstrating that Cohen and the IDTT took the action they did because

///

///

///

Case 1:09-cv-00484-AWI-SAB Document 6 Filed 10/08/09 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff did not file any lawsuits in the Eastern District of 1

California on or around February 19, 2008. Court records reflect that the only 2008 suit filed in this district was

filed by Plaintiff on July 30, 2008. Plaintiff’s own recitation of his lawsuits in the complaint includes only the

aforementioned suit for 2008. (Doc. 1, court record pp. 5-6.)

5

of a previous lawsuit filed by Plaintiff or demonstrating that they had any knowledge of his previous

lawsuits.1

Plaintiff ’s allegation that Defendant Talisman knew he was not suicidal or delusional and

did not need to be treated, but falsely testified to the contrary at the administrative hearing is

sufficient to state a claim. Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Talisman was aware of his litigation

activities, and that Talisman acted in retaliation against Plaintiff.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges only that when Defendant Magana issued Plaintiff his property,

Magana “conspired with the aforementioned Defendants to retaliate against [Plaintiff] by deliberately

enforcing Corcoran property rules in a biased, unreasonable and malicious fashion” by depriving

Plaintiff of property items that were allowable or previously authorized. (Doc. 1, ¶47.) This

allegation does not support a viable claim for relief under section 1983. A conclusory assertion of

wrongdoing is insufficient. Iqbal at 1949-50; Moss at 969.

C. Eighth Amendment Claim

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from

inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006).

Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim, and only those

deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form

the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995

(1992) (citations and quotations omitted). In order to state a claim for violation of the Eighth

Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that prison officials knew of

and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Defendant Maguass reported that Plaintiff was suicidal and requested that Plaintiff be taken

to the Acute Care Hospital, and Defendant Barda admitted Plaintiff to the Mental Health Acute Care

Unit. Assuming the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations that Maguass had him escorted to the hospital in

Case 1:09-cv-00484-AWI-SAB Document 6 Filed 10/08/09 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 There is no factual support in the complaint linking Maguass or Barda to the decision to involuntarily 2

medicate Plaintiff with antipsychotic drugs for six months. Therefore, they may not be held accountable under

section 1983 for that decision or course of action.

6

order to get him out of Maguass’ unit and that Barda falsely claimed Plaintiff stated he was suicidal,

these actions do not give rise to a claim against Maguass or Barda for acting with deliberate

indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. 

2

Although antipsychotic medications have therapeutic benefits, they also “can have serious,

even fatal, side effects.” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229, 110 S.Ct. 1028 (1990). As

psychiatrists, Drs. Cohen and Talisman would be aware of the benefits versus the risks, and of the

seriousness of administering such medication. Plaintiff’s allegations that Cohen and Talisman knew

he did not need treatment but nonetheless participated in the filing of a petition to continue Plaintiff’s

treatment, and that Talisman gave false testimony in support of the petition are sufficient to support

a claim under the Eighth Amendment. 

D. Due Process Claim

Prisoners have a substantial liberty interest, grounded in the Due Process Clause, in avoiding

the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication. Harper, 494 U.S. at 229. Prisoners may

be involuntarily medicated if they are dangerousto themselves or others, and the treatment is in their

best medical interest, but they must be provided with procedural protections to ensure that the

decision to medicate them involuntarily is not arbitrary or erroneous. Id. at 227-28. 

Plaintiff’s allegations establish that he was provided with an administrative hearing and that

a judge granted the petition to involuntarily medicate him. As a result, Plaintiff ’s allegations do not

support a claim that he was deprived of a protected liberty interest without due process of law.

Plaintiff ’s disagreement with the issuance of the petition and Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant

Talisman perjured himself are not sufficient to demonstrate that he was denied due process. 

E. Supervisory Liability Claims

Plaintiff filed grievances concerning the allegedly retaliatory psychiatric treatment and

property deprivation. Defendants McGuinness, Minn, Sanchez, Cheung, Jensen, Junious, Davis,

Hodges-Wilkins, and Mason were involved in responding to the grievances, and Plaintiff alleges 

///

Case 1:09-cv-00484-AWI-SAB Document 6 Filed 10/08/09 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

claims against them for the violation of his constitutional rights under a theory of supervisory

liability. 

The Supreme Court recently emphasized that the term “supervisory liability,” loosely and

commonly used by both courts and litigants alike, is a misnomer. Iqbal at 1949. “Government

officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory

of respondeat superior.” Id. at 1948. Rather, each government official, regardless of his or her title,

is only liable for his or her own misconduct, and therefore, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each

defendant, through his or her own individual actions, violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id.

at 1948-49. Further, the involvement of prison personnel in reviewing and issuing decisions on

Plaintiff’s inmate appeals does not provide a basis for the imposition of liability on them for the

conduct of others. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007); also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334

F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); Massey v.

Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff is attempting to impose liability on Defendants McGuinness, Minn, Sanchez,

Cheung, Jensen, Junious, Davis, Hodges-Wilkins, and Mason because he found their responses to

his grievances to be unsatisfactory. Plaintiff’s disagreement and displeasure with the resolution of

his grievances by these Defendants do not provide any basis for the imposition of liability under

section 1983. Plaintiff fails to state any claims against Defendants McGuinness, Minn, Sanchez,

Cheung, Jensen, Junious, Davis, Hodges-Wilkins, and Mason. 

F. Federal Assault and Battery Claim

Plaintiff alleges claims for assault and battery, in violation of state law and his federal

constitutional rights. Assault and battery are tort claims under California law, and are not federal

claims, constitutional or otherwise. Plaintiff’s attempt to state these tort claims under federal law

is disregarded.

California’s Tort Claims Act requires that a tort claim against a public entity or its employees

be presented to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, formerly known

as the State Board of Control, no more than six months after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov’t

Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950-950.2 (West 2009). Presentation of a written claim, and

Case 1:09-cv-00484-AWI-SAB Document 6 Filed 10/08/09 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

action on or rejection of the claim are conditions precedent to suit. State v. Superior Court of Kings

County (Bodde), 32Cal.4th 1234, 1245, 90 P.3d 116, 124, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 543 (2004); Mangold

v. California Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). To state a tort claim against

a public employee, a plaintiff must allege compliance with the Tort Claims Act. State v. Superior

Court, 32 Cal.4th at 1245, 90 P.3d at 124, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d at 543; Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477; KarimPanahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988).

Although Plaintiff alleges he exhausted the prison’s administrative grievance procedure,

Plaintiff fails to allege compliance with the Tort Claims Act. As a result, Plaintiff is precluded from

pursuing any state law tort claims.

To the extent that this deficiency is curable, Plaintiff also fails to state a claim on the merits.

Under California law, “[a]n assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit

a violent injury on the person of another” and “[a] battery is any willful and unlawful use of force

or violence upon the person of another.” Cal. Penal Code § 240, 242 (West 2009); 5 B. E. Witkin,

Summary of California Law, Torts § 346 (9th ed. 1988). Plaintiff’s complaint contains no

allegations supporting assault and battery claims against any Defendant.

G. Violation of Civil Code Section 52.1

Plaintiff alleges a claim for violation of California Civil Code § 52.1, which authorizes a

claim for relief “against anyone who interferes, or tries to do so, by threats, intimidation, or coercion,

with an individual’s exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by federal or state law.” Jones v. Kmart

Corp., 17 Cal.4th 329, 331 (1998). A claim under section 52.1 requires “an attempted or completed

act of interference with a legal right, accompanied by coercion.” Id. at 334. 

Plaintiff’s failure to allege compliance with the Tort Claims Act precludes his claim. Further,

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts demonstrating that he was threatened, intimidated, or coerced

during the interference with his First and Eighth Amendment rights. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state

a cognizable claim for violation of section 52.1.

H. Claim for Declaratory Relief

Finally, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that his rights were violated. “‘A case or controversy

exists justifying declaratory relief only when the challenged government activity is not contingent,

Case 1:09-cv-00484-AWI-SAB Document 6 Filed 10/08/09 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

has not evaporated or disappeared, and, by its continuing and brooding presence, casts what may well

be a substantial adverse effect on the interests of the petitioning parties.’” Feldman v. Bomar, 518

F.3d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Management, Medford

Dist., 893 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations and citation omitted)). “Declaratory

relief should be denied when it will neither serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal

relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and afford relief from the uncertainty and

controversy faced by the parties.” U.S. v. State of Wash., 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985)

(citations omitted). 

The governmental conduct at issue in this action occurred in 2008, and Plaintiff’s remedy is

damages should he prevail on his claims that his constitutional rights were violated. Therefore,

Plaintiff is not entitled to declaratory relief and this action shall proceed as one for damages only.

III. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint states claims against Defendants Maguass and Talisman for retaliation

in violation of the First Amendment, and against Defendants Cohen and Talisman for violation of

the Eighth Amendment, but does not state any other claims for relief.

The Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v.

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff does not wish to file an amended

complaint and is agreeable to proceeding only against Defendants Maguass and Talisman on his First

Amendment claim, and Defendants Cohen and Talisman on his Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff

may so notify the Court in writing, and his other claims will be dismissed. Plaintiff will then be

provided with three summonses and three USM-285 forms for completion and return. Upon receipt

of the forms, the Court will direct the United States Marshal to initiate service of process on

Defendants Maguass, Cohen, and Talisman.

If Plaintiff opts to amend, his amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but

must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or

other federal rights, Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49; Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Although accepted as true,

the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level

. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 

Case 1:09-cv-00484-AWI-SAB Document 6 Filed 10/08/09 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,

114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must

be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 15-220.

Therefore, “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an

amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand,

644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief is dismissed from this action;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in

this order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended

complaint and is willing to proceed only against Defendants Maguass and

Talisman on his First Amendment claim, and Defendants Cohen and

Talisman on his Eighth Amendment claim; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 8, 2009 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:09-cv-00484-AWI-SAB Document 6 Filed 10/08/09 Page 10 of 10