Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01640/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01640-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUE WHITE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER

OF SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant. /

No. C 06-01640 JSW

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

REMAND AND DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Now before the Court is Plaintiff Sue White’s (“White”) Motion for Remand and the

Commission of the Social Security Administration’s (“Commissioner”) Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 16-5, the motions have been submitted on

the papers without oral argument. Having carefully reviewed the administrative record and

considered the parties’ papers and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the

Court hereby GRANTS White’s Motion to Remand and DENIES Commissioner’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment

BACKGROUND

White brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review of a

final decision of the Commissioner denying her request for Social Security disability benefits. 

White, a 59 year old female, injured her knee at work in 1991. (Certified Transcript of Record

Proceedings (“Tr.”) at 22.) As a result, she had three arthroscopic surgeries between 1992 and

1999. (Id.) White applied for disability benefits in 1999, but the Administrative Law 

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Judge (“ALJ”) ultimately denied the application in 2001. (Id. at 31-35.) After the Appeals

Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision, White did not seek judicial review and instead

returned to work during 2001 and 2002. (Id. at 413-14.) 

Citing increased knee pain and instability, as well as new complaints of thumb pain and

possible carpal tunnel syndrome, White quit her job as a law office manager on October 25,

2002. (Id. at 23.) She filed a second disability benefit application on September 26, 2003 for

the period between her departure date and the date her Social Security insured status expired,

December 31, 2002. (Id. at 20.) Though res judicata usually applies to repeat applications,

here the ALJ found that new and material evidence of thumb impairment amounted to a change

in circumstances that rebutted any res judicata effect. (Id. at 22.) 

Drs. Reynolds and Goldman have been treating White for her continuing knee problems,

since 1992 and 1999, respectively, culminating in a total knee replacement in August 2003. (Id.

at 310, 337, 355.) However, neither doctor ever commented on her ability to work with her

current impairments. Instead, the ALJ considered medical evaluations conducted by three

different examining physicians from 2001 to 2003: Dr. William Talmage, Dr. Bryan Barber,

and Dr. Lynn Shafer. (Id. at 213, 233, 254.) Dr. Talmage examined White’s knee and reviewed

her medical records on September 6, 2001. (Id. at 213.) In his opinion, White’s treatment had

been correct and her condition was “stable for the foreseeable future.” (Id. at 228.) He felt

White was “capable of work of a semi-sedentary nature,” citing her personal expression that she

frequently needed to “get up and walk around.” (Id. at 229.) 

Dr. Barber examined White on January 6, 2003, just after her last insured date. (Id. at

233.) He found knee pain when he palpated the medial joint line and when he performed the

McMurray’s test. (Id. at 238.) He also cited objective evidence from her magnetic resonance

imaging (“MRI”) conducted in 1999, which showed “25% loss of medial compartment joint

space and an osteochondral defect in the tibial plateau.” (Id.) Dr. Barber diagnosed White with

“increasing degenerative arthritis medial compartment left knee” and recommended limiting her

to sedentary work “with the option of sitting or standing as symptoms dictate” (“sit/stand

option”). (Id.) In her hands, he found “visible enlargement of the thumb metacarpal-carpal

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joints bilaterally and a palpable ganglion on top of her left nondominant thumb metacarpalcarpal joint.” (Tr. at 240.) Noting White’s subjective complaints of intermittent slight to

moderate thumb pain, Dr. Barber believed she was “on the doorsteps of surgical intervention.” 

(Id.) 

A few months later, on August 5, 2003, Dr. Shafer examined White’s thumbs, but not

her knee. (Id. at 254.) She diagnosed White with “bilateral carpal metacarpal osteoarthritis of

both hands” but found no evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome or any cysts. (Id. at 259-60.) Dr.

Shafer recommended many conservative treatments but did not feel surgery was as imminent as

Dr. Barber had believed. (Id. at 260.) Dr. Shafer indicated that limiting White to lifting 20

pounds intermittently, 40 pounds occasionally, and using the keyboard 25-30% of the workday

would be a sufficient work restriction. (Id. at 261.)

However, Dr. Shafer noted White actually left her job for interpersonal reasons, and had

not notified her employer of any medical issues regarding her thumbs. (Id.) Dr. Shafer stated

that White “did not seem eager to seek medical care, inasmuch as it has been over nine months

since her termination and claimed knowledge of date of injury” and “she had recommendations

of treatment from Dr. Barber back in 1/03 . . . on which [she] has not acted.” (Id. at 260.) Dr.

Shafer disagreed with Dr. Barber about the severity of White’s thumb impairment, stating

“should her symptoms truly have been as invasive as she describes, that at least some follow-up

would have been pursued under rational circumstances.” (Id. at 262.) (emphasis in original) 

After conducting an administrative hearing, the ALJ found that White had not engaged

in substantial gainful activity since October 25, 2002. (Id. at 25.) He further found that her

medical problems constituted “severe impairments which significantly limited her ability to

perform basic work activities.” (Id. at 26.) However, the ALJ found White’s impairments did

not satisfy any of the criteria outlined in the Listing of Impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R., Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.) Proceeding to step four of the sequential evaluation process,

the ALJ rejected Dr. Barber’s sit/stand option in compiling White’s residual functional capacity. 

(Id. at 25.) The ALJ concluded White was capable of doing a reduced range of sedentary work,

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and therefore was not “disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act because she

could perform her past relevant work. (Tr. at 26.)

White filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals Council

denied. (Id. at 6.) Having exhausted her administrative remedies, White commenced this

action for judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. 

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review of Commissioner’s Decision to Deny Social Security Benefits.

A federal district court may not disturb the Commissioner’s final decision unless it is

based on legal error or the findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g); Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). “Substantial evidence means

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53

F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). To determine whether substantial evidence exists, courts must

look at the record as a whole, considering both evidence that supports and undermines the

ALJ’s findings. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. The ALJ’s decision must be upheld, however, if the

evidence is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Id. at 720-21.

B. Legal Standard for Establishing A Prima Facie Case for Disability.

The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case for disability. Gallant v.

Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1984). The ALJ follows a five-step process in

determining whether the claimant is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987);

see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the claimant must not be engaging in substantial gainful

activity. 20 C.F.R. 416.920(b). Second, the claimant must have a severe impairment. 20

C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Third, if the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the

impairments listed in Appendix 1 to the regulation (a list of impairments presumed severe

enough to preclude work), claimant will be found disabled without consideration of age,

education, or work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Fourth, if the claimant’s impairments

do not meet or equal a listed impairment, the Commissioner will assess and make a finding

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about the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) based on all relevant medical and

other evidence in the claimant’s case record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). If the claimant can still 

perform her past relevant work, she will not be found disabled, otherwise the ALJ will go to

step five. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). In the fifth step, if the claimant’s impairments prevents her

from making an adjustment to any other work in the national economy, she will be found

disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through

four; the burden shifts to the ALJ at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir.

1999). 

Here, the ALJ determined that White was not disabled because (1) she did not have any

of the related clinical findings so as to meet or equal the level of severity of any of the listings

in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4; and (2) she was capable of performing her past

relevant work as an administrative secretary. (Tr. at 25.)

C. Substantial Evidence in the Record Supports the ALJ’s Conclusion Regarding

White’s Upper Extremity Impairment and Episodes of Instability.

1. The ALJ properly considered White’s upper extremity impairment.

White argues the ALJ incorrectly found her not disabled because he improperly

excluded her thumb condition from her RFC and did not call a medical advisor to determine the

onset date of this upper extremity impairment. (Mot. at 8, 9.) The RFC, used in step four of the

sequential evaluation, measures “the most [claimant] can do despite [her] limitations.” 20

C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). When compiling a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must consider all relevant

evidence in the record. Id. The ALJ will consider “any statements about what [claimant] can

still do that have been provided by medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3). 

White misinterprets the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ did properly consider White’s upper

extremity impairment in his findings. First, he deemed White’s thumb impairment both severe

and sufficiently “new and material” to overcome res judicata from her prior application. (Tr. at

24.) Second, a close reading of the hearing transcript reveals that the ALJ included restrictions

pertaining to White’s thumbs in his RFC findings. The initial hypothetical posed by the ALJ to

the vocational expert did not include any weightlifting restrictions. (Id. at 427-28.) However,

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when White’s attorney asked for another hypothetical including Dr. Barber’s opinion of her

thumb impairment, the ALJ introduced a weightlifting restriction of five to ten pounds. (Id. at

431-32.) In his final RFC, the ALJ concludes that White is limited to lifting between five and

ten pounds. (Id.) Thus, it is clear that the ALJ took White’s thumb impairment into account. 

To the extent White argues that the ALJ improperly concluded her thumb impairment

was not disabling despite Dr. Barber’s report, the ALJ’s conclusion was supported by

substantial evidence. The ALJ may reject the opinion of an examining physician, such as Dr.

Barber, who is contradicted by another physician, if the ALJ provides specific and legitimate

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830

(9th Cir. 1995). Dr. Barber indicated White’s thumb injuries were serious, verging on the need

for surgery, but did not give any specific work restrictions beyond precluding her from “forceful

gripping/grasping and heavy lifting.” (Tr. at 240.) Dr. Shafer stated specific weight and typing

time restrictions of “20 pounds intermittently and 40 pounds occasionally” and “25-30% of her

workday” on the keyboard, absent her knee problems. (Id. at 260.) However, she noted that

White “did not seem eager to seek medical care” for her thumb injuries because she had not yet

acted on Dr. Barber’s recommendations for treatment given to her nine months prior. (Id.) Dr.

Shafer further noted that White left her employment “for non-medical reasons.” (Id. at 261.)

Moreover, the ALJ is “entitled to draw an inference from the general lack of medical

care,” especially where claimant seeks treatment for other medical issues. Flaten v. Sec’y of

Health and Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, the ALJ noted that

White failed to pursue any treatment for her thumb pain and never mentioned the pain to her

employer. (Tr. at 24.) The ALJ listed this failure to seek treatment, along with Dr. Shafer’s less

severe diagnosis and notation that White actually left work because of interpersonal conflicts,

among his reasons for discounting the severity of her functional limitations. (Tr. at 24.) 

Because the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the

record to support his conclusions, to the extent the ALJ concluded White’s thumb impairment

was not disabling despite Dr. Barber’s report, the ALJ did not err.

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Finally, White contends the ALJ improperly discounted Dr. Barber’s report because Dr.

Barber wrote it after her insured date expiration. Therefore, she argues, the ALJ erred by not

consulting a medical advisor to determine whether the onset of her impairment could have

occurred prior to her insured date expiration. However, the ALJ adhered to the rule that

“medical evaluations made after the expiration of a claimant’s insured status are relevant to an

evaluation of the preexpiration condition.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 832 (citing Smith v. Bowen, 849

F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988)). There is no evidence in the record indicating that the ALJ

ignored Dr. Barber’s opinion because it was completed after White’s insurance had expired. 

Nor did the ALJ dispute that it was acceptable to use Dr. Barber’s report to establish disability

during her insured period. Indeed, the ALJ credited most of Dr. Barber’s post-expiration

evaluation when making his findings. (Tr. at 25.) Moreover, because the ALJ concluded that

White was not disabled, he was under no obligation to consult a medical advisor to determine

whether the onset of her impairment could have occurred prior to the expiration of her insured

date. See Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1996) (“holding that “[b]ecause the ALJ

found that [the plaintiff] ... was not disabled, the judge needed no medical expert to determine

the onset date of the alleged disability”). Accordingly, the ALJ’s consideration of White’s

thumb impairment was supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

2. The ALJ properly excluded White’s knee instability claims from her RFC.

White also argues that the ALJ erred by excluding her episodes of knee instability from

her final RFC. (Mot. at 11.) When the ALJ assesses the RFC, “claimant’s credibility becomes

important . . . .” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001). To make a

credibility determination, the ALJ can use “‘ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation,’ such 

as considering the claimant’s reputation for truthfulness and any inconsistent statements in her

testimony.” Id. at 1148. The ALJ may reject claimant’s testimony, but only if he provides 

“specific, convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant’s subjective statements.” Id. (citing

Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 1989)). In Tonapetyan, the ALJ cited claimant’s

inconsistent statements as one reason for rejecting her disability claim. Id. 

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Additionally, the ALJ may consider “claimant’s daily activities, [her] work record, and

testimony from physicians . . . concerning the nature, severity, and effect” of her injuries. 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). The Thomas court held the ALJ had

provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting claimant’s testimony. Id. at 959. Examples

of sufficient reasons were that there was “no objective medical evidence” to support claimant’s

limitations and because claimant “had not been a reliable historian.” Id. 

Here, the ALJ cited the fact that White initially stated she had episodes of falling down,

but when further questioned she clarified that she never actually fell all the way to the ground. 

(Tr. at 24.) Moreover, the ALJ found that there were no medical records relating to her reported

falls. (Id.) Indeed, the only mention of any instability was Dr. Barber’s notation that, according

to White, her “knee swells and buckles but has not dropped [her] all the way to the ground.” 

(Id. at 235.) No doctor had witnessed this phenomenon or found any objective causative

factors. Also, the ALJ again noted the conflicting explanations for why White left her job. (Id.

at 24 These reasons are sufficient substantial evidence to call her credibility partly into

question and to discount her testimony. 

Finally, White argues the ALJ should have given more weight to the vocational expert’s

opinion that she would be disabled if knee instability was included in her RFC. In step four of

the sequential process for determining whether claimant is disabled, the ALJ “may use the

services of vocational experts . . . to help [] determine whether [claimant] can do [her] past

relevant work given [her] residual functional capacity.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.960. A hypothetical

question to the vocational expert must “set out all the limitations and restrictions of the

particular claimant.” Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in

original). However, a vocational expert’s testimony “is valuable only to the extent that it is

supported by medical evidence” and “has no evidentiary value if the assumptions in the

hypothetical are not supported by the record.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756 (9th

Cir. 1989). Moreover, “the ALJ is not bound to accept as true the restrictions presented in a

hypothetical question propounded by a claimant’s counsel. . . . Rather, the ALJ is ‘free to accept

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or reject these restrictions . . . as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.’” 

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 756-57. 

Here, White contends the ALJ posed an incomplete hypothetical to the vocational

expert. She points out that when her counsel posed a hypothetical containing the instability

issue, the vocational expert testified it would limit her ability to work. However, considering

the lack of medical evidence and that White may actually have left work for “interpersonal”

reasons, the ALJ determined her claimed limitations with respect to knee instability were not

supported by the record. Moreover, White’s counsel had difficulty quantifying how the

problem actually manifested itself in the workplace when he posed the hypothetical to the

vocational expert. (Id. at 429-31.) Thus, the ALJ’s decision not to rely on White’s attorney’s

hypothetical and the resulting testimony by the vocational expert was supported by substantial

evidence. 

D. The ALJ Improperly Rejected Dr. Barber’s Sit/Stand Option Recommendation.

 Finally, White contends the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Barber’s recommendation for a

sit/stand option, which was not contradicted by any other physician. The ALJ may not reject

the uncontroverted opinion of an examining physician without giving specific and legitimate

reasons that are clear and convincing. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. 

The ALJ gave specific reasons for rejecting Dr. Barber’s sit/stand option, namely

because “(1) Dr. Barber does not explain how standing would relieve knee pain or stiffness; (2)

he does not explain why normal breaks and simply stretching the left leg would not suffice to

relieve pain or stiffness; (3) no other evidence suggests the need for a sit/stand option; and (4)

claimant’s own testimony focused on the need to avoid standing and walking.” (Tr. at 25.) 

The ALJ’s first two reasons essentially state that Dr. Barber did not properly explain

himself, and consequently, the ALJ concluded Dr. Barber was wrong. However, “the ALJ must

do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and explain why

they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.” Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22. In Embrey, the ALJ

rejected claimant’s disability claim despite conditions listed on his application such as

“herniated disc and acute lumbosacral strain, heart disease . . . and diabetes mellitus.” Id. at

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420. Among many symptoms, claimant testified to being bedridden once or twice a week

because of fatigue, and that he needed to lie down for one to two hours every day. Id. The

court found that “he can walk five to six blocks if he rests along the way, and he can stand for

one hour . . . He experiences a constant dull ache in his back, which worsens after 15 to 20

minutes of sitting . . . His diabetes can make him feel sick, light-headed, and dizzy.” Id. All of

his doctors agreed that he was either permanently disabled or severely limited. Id. at 421. The

Embrey court held “[t]he assumption that Embrey can alternate between sitting and standing for

a full eight-hour workday has no support in the record, and indeed is flatly contradicted by

Embrey’s own testimony and that of [his doctors].” Id. at 423. The court emphasized that

physicians’ subjective judgments are important and their “ultimate conclusions . . . must be

given substantial weight.” Id. at 422.

Similarly, the claimant in Tackett had knee problems for more than a decade. 180 F.3d

at 1097. His various doctors agreed that he needed to “change positions, shift his body, walk,

or stand about every half hour.” Id. at 1102. Nevertheless, the ALJ determined, in part based

on claimant’s testimony about taking a long car trip, that he could work an eight hour workday. 

Id. To provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting an uncontroverted physician’s

opinion, the ALJ was required to “set out in the record his reasoning and the evidentiary support

for his interpretation of the medical evidence.” Id. at 1102. Because there was no medical

evidence to support the ALJ’s finding, the court concluded that the ALJ had not properly

rejected the uncontradicted medical opinions regarding claimant’s need to frequently change

positions. Id. at 1103. Likewise here, the ALJ points to no medical evidence that demonstrates

White can “sit for up to six hours in an eight hour workday,” and none of her doctors expressed

that opinion. (Tr. at 25.) Rather, both Drs. Barber and Talmage agreed that White needed a

sit/stand option. (Id. at 229, 238.) 

The ALJ’s third reason for rejecting Dr. Barber’s opinion is that there is no other

evidence indicating the need for a sit/stand option. Because “the mere absence of a

corroborating opinion cannot in itself constitute a conflict,” the ALJ was required to provided

clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Dr. Barber’s opinion. Widmark v. Barnhart, 454

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F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). In Widmark, the ALJ rejected a doctor’s opinion regarding the

plaintiff’s thumb impairment in part because “the record contained no other thumb opinion.” 

Id. at 1067. However, the Widmark court held that this was not a legally adequate reason for

rejecting the uncontradicted doctor’s opinion because it “merely states a fact and does not

explain . . . how that fact leads to the conclusion that [the doctor’s] evaluation should be

disregarded.” Id. Similarly here, the statement of fact that no other doctor said White needed

the option to sit or stand does not explain why Dr. Barber’s medical opinion should not be fully

accepted. Thus, it was not a sufficient reason to reject Dr. Barber’s sit/stand option. Moreover,

Dr. Talmage’s report corroborates Dr. Barber and consists of additional evidence demonstrating

White’s need for a sit/stand option. 

Finally, though the ALJ states White claimed she needed to avoid standing and walking

as his fourth reason for rejecting the sit/stand option, the Court can find no testimony in the

record indicating she must avoid standing or walking. Rather, the evidence regarding White’s

subjective complaints supports her position that she needs to move around regularly to avoid

discomfort. Dr. Talmage recommended White obtain work of a “semi-sedentary” nature, based

on the fact that White “specifically indicated that her tolerance for sitting is quite limited and

that she is dependent upon the need to get up and walk about on a frequent basis.” (Tr. at 229.) 

Dr. Barber also noted that White’s knee was aggravated by “sitting for more than 30 minutes,

standing for more than 40 minutes . . . .” (Id. at 235.) Finally, even though Dr. Shafer did not

examine White’s knee, she noted that White indicated an ability to only “sit and stand for about

a half hour.” (Id. at 256.) 

Commissioner cites to Crane and Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services,

839 F.2d 432, 433-34 (9th Cir. 1988), for the proposition that the ALJ properly rejected Dr.

Barber’s sit/stand option because it was based only on White’s subjective complaints and “did

not contain any explanation of the bases of [his] conclusions.” Crane, 76 F.3d at 253. The

Commissioner’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. In Crane, the court rejected medical

reports because they were “check-off reports” instead of “individualized medical opinions,” not

because a narrative report lacked explanation. Id. In Brawner, the court affirmed the ALJ’s

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rejection of a physician’s report based solely on the complaints of a claimant whose 

misrepresentations and falsification of records undermined his credibility. 839 F.2d at 433-34. 

Here, as distinguished from Brawner, the ALJ did not question White’s credibility

regarding her need to move around, nor did he cite it as a reason to reject Dr. Barber’s sit/stand

option. Moreover, while Dr. Barber listened to White’s subjective complaints of pain, he also

took note of her long history of knee trouble, including three unsuccessful surgeries. (Tr. at

234.) He observed an “increase in [] symptoms” since his previous report, and noted she was

scheduled to see Drs. Goldman and Reynolds to discuss another surgery, possibly a total knee

replacement. (Id. at 238.) Dr. Barber also watched her walk and saw her limited ability to do a

deep-knee bend. (Id. at 236.) He examined her MRI and noted an “osteochondral defect” and

loss of “medial compartment joint space.” (Id. at 239.) Based on these clinical findings and

observations, he made a professional recommendation that she needed to be able to sit or stand

as her symptoms dictated. Thus, Dr. Barber’s opinion was not conclusory, brief, or based solely

on White’s subjective complaints, and should have been accepted in its entirety by the ALJ. 

Because the ALJ did not provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Dr. Barber’s

uncontradicted medical opinion, the ALJ erred in ignoring his sit/stand option recommendation. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS White’s Motion for Remand and

DENIES Commissioner’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. This matter is HEREBY

REMANDED to the Social Security Administration for reconsideration of White’s alleged

disability taking Dr. Barber’s sit/stand option into account.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Case 3:06-cv-01640-JSW Document 19 Filed 08/17/07 Page 12 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Dated: August 17, 2007 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:06-cv-01640-JSW Document 19 Filed 08/17/07 Page 13 of 13