Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-02262/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-02262-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUAN ANTONIO FALCON,

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

M. R. PHILLIPS,

 Defendant.

1:10-cv-02262-EPG-PC

 

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON 

WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED 

UNDER SECTION 1983

(ECF No. 22.)

ORDER THAT THIS DISMISSAL IS

SUBJECT TO THE “THREE-STRIKES” 

PROVISION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO 

CLOSE CASE

I. BACKGROUND

Juan Antonio Falcon (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. Plaintiff filed the 

Complaint commencing this action on December 6, 2010. (ECF No. 1.) 

On December 16, 2010, Plaintiff consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this 

action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c), and no other parties have made an appearance. (ECF 

No. 5.) Therefore, pursuant to Appendix A(k)(4) of the Local Rules of the Eastern District of 

California, the undersigned shall conduct any and all proceedings in the case until such time as 

reassignment to a District Judge is required. Local Rule Appendix A(k)(3).

The Court screened the original Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A and entered an 

order on December 20, 2012, dismissing the Complaint for failure to state a claim, with leave 

to amend.1 (ECF No. 8.) 

 

1 This prior order was issued by Magistrate Judge Gary S. Austin, to whom this case was 

previously assigned. On October 2, 2015, the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Erica P. Grosjean. (ECF No. 

21.)

Case 1:10-cv-02262-EPG Document 23 Filed 05/17/16 Page 1 of 6
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On January 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 9.) The 

Court screened the First Amended Complaint and entered an order on October 3, 2013, 

dismissing this action in its entirety for failure to state a claim and closing the case. (ECF No. 

11.) Judgment was entered on October 3, 2013. (ECF No. 12.)

On November 1, 2013, Plaintiff appealed the Court‟s judgment to the Court of Appeals 

for the Ninth Circuit. (ECF No. 13.) 

On September 4, 2015, the Ninth Circuit issued an order vacating the judgment and 

remanding the case to the district court. (ECF No. 18.) The Ninth Circuit‟s mandate was 

issued on September 29, 2015. (ECF No. 19.)

The Ninth Circuit‟s order held, in relevant part:

“ The district court properly dismissed Falcon‟s complaint 

because Falcon failed to allege facts sufficient to show that his 

placement in segregated housing as a result of his disciplinary 

hearing imposed an “atypical and significant hardship” on him 

“in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” to create a 

constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 

515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995) (constitutionally protected liberty 

interest arises only when a restraint imposes an “atypical and 

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life”). However, although it gave notice of the 

complaint‟s deficiencies in the order filed on October 3, 2013, the 

district court did not provide an opportunity to amend with the 

benefit of that notice. See Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 

1205 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Dismissal of a pro se complaint without 

leave to amend is proper only if it is absolutely clear that the 

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Lopez v. Smith, 

203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth 

abuse of discretion standard of review). Although Falcon was 

previously granted leave to amend, the guidance in the prior 

order did not speak to the deficiencies at issue in this complaint. 

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand to the district 

court with instructions to provide Falcon with an opportunity to 

file an amended complaint.” (ECF No. 18 at 2-3.)

Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit‟s order, this Court issued an order on October 2, 2015 

providing Plaintiff with another opportunity to amend his complaint. (ECF No. 20.) On 

November 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint, which is now before the 

Court for screening. (ECF No. 22.)

///

Case 1:10-cv-02262-EPG Document 23 Filed 05/17/16 Page 2 of 6
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

' 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff‟s allegations are 

taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

To state a viable claim, Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

„state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). While factual allegations are accepted as 

true, legal conclusions are not. Id. The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id. 

III. SUMMARY OF SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison in Soledad, California. 

The events at issue in the Second Amended Complaint allegedly occurred while Plaintiff was 

housed at the Kern Valley State Prison KVSP) in Delano, California, in the custody of the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Plaintiff names as defendant 

Lieutenant M. R. Phillips, who was employed by the CDCR at KVSP during the relevant time. 

Following are Plaintiff‟s factual allegations in their entirety. 

Case 1:10-cv-02262-EPG Document 23 Filed 05/17/16 Page 3 of 6
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

During the hearing for a serious Rules violation Defendant 

Phillips went against the rules and regulations established in the 

Title 15 and D.O.M. by denying Plaintiff access to vital 

witnesses. Furthermore, the one witness that Plaintiff was 

allowed to question, Defendant Phillips refused to ask the 

questions prepared in advance by Plaintiff. The hearing was 

done through speakerphone which Defendant Phillips took 

advantage of to reject nearly every question asked by Plaintiff 

even though those questions were within the rules and regulations 

established in the Title 15 and D.O.M.

As a result of Defendant‟s blatant disregard for the Title 15 and 

the D.O.M. Plaintiff faced discrimination and harassment within 

administrative segregation due to the nature of the serious rules 

violation (battery on a female nurse). Given the seriousness of 

the rules violation, and the fact that the district attorney found the 

charges unworthy of pursuing, Defendant Phillips should have 

taken the matter more seriously.

(Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 22 at 2-3.)

Plaintiff requests dismissal of the Serious Rules Violation and $5,000.00 compensation.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S DUE PROCESS CLAIM

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 

under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the 

Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2006). “A person >subjects‟ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 

meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another‟s affirmative 

acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of 

which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “The 

requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal 

Case 1:10-cv-02262-EPG Document 23 Filed 05/17/16 Page 4 of 6
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which 

the actors knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional 

injury.” Johnson at 743-44).

Due Process

The Due Process Clause protects Plaintiff against the deprivation of liberty without the 

procedural protections to which he is entitled under the law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 

209, 221 (2005). To state a claim, Plaintiff must first identify the interest at stake. Id. Liberty 

interests may arise from the Due Process Clause or from state law. Id. The Due Process 

Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding more adverse conditions 

of confinement, id. at 221-22 (citations and quotation marks omitted), and under state law, the 

existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the 

nature of the condition of confinement at issue, id. at 222-23 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 

472, 481-84 (1995)) (quotation marks omitted). Liberty interests created by prison regulations 

are generally limited to freedom from restraint which imposes atypical and significant hardship 

on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221 

(citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484) (quotation marks omitted); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 

718 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in being 

confined in the general prison population instead of administrative segregation. See Hewitt v. 

Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983); see also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 

1997) (convicted inmate=s due process claim fails because he has no liberty interest in freedom 

from state action taken within sentence imposed and administrative segregation falls within the 

terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence) (quotations omitted); Resnick v. 

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff=s placement and retention in the SHU was 

within range of confinement normally expected by inmates in relation to ordinary incidents of 

prison life and, therefore, plaintiff had no protected liberty interest in being free from 

confinement in the SHU) (quotations omitted). 

///

Case 1:10-cv-02262-EPG Document 23 Filed 05/17/16 Page 5 of 6
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that his placement and retention in 

the SHU imposed an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of 

prison life. Plaintiff alleges that he “faced discrimination and harassment within administrative 

segregation due to the nature of the serious rules violation (battery on a female nurse),” but he 

does not describe conditions that posed an atypical and significant hardship in comparison to 

the conditions of prison life in general. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for 

violation of his rights to due process.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state any 

cognizable claims in the Second Amended Complaint upon which relief may be granted under 

' 1983. Plaintiff was previously granted leave to amend the complaint with ample guidance by 

the Court, and Plaintiff has now filed three complaints without stating any cognizable claims. 

The Court finds that the deficiencies outlined above are not capable of being cured by 

amendment, and therefore further leave to amend should not be granted. 28 U.S.C. '

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. This action is DISMISSED in its entirety, with prejudice, for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted under ' 1983;

2. This dismissal is subject to the “three-strikes” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. '

1915(g). Silva v. Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011); and

3. The Clerk is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 16, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:10-cv-02262-EPG Document 23 Filed 05/17/16 Page 6 of 6