Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02276/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02276-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Ronnie Gene Sartin, Jr., 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV 14-2276-TUC-RCC (JR) 

 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

 

 Petitioner Ronnie Gene Sartin, Jr., filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 6, 2014.1

 In accordance 

with the Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge 

for report and recommendation. Sartin raises eighteen grounds for relief. 

 

1

 Sartin signed the Petition on August 6, 2014, and the Court assumes that he 

deposited it in the prison mailing system that day. The Clerk of Court docketed the 

Petition two days later, on August 8, 2014. 

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Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. 13) contending that the Petition is untimely and 

that most of his claims are procedurally defaulted or non-cognizable on federal 

review. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge finds that the Petition is untimely 

and that Sartin is not entitled to equitable tolling and, therefore, recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice because it is untimely. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 In its Memorandum Decision affirming Sartin’s conviction and sentence on 

direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the factual background as 

follows:2

In May 1998, while in Marc T.’s apartment, Sartin stabbed Marc to 

death and stole his television and videocassette recorder (VCR). Sartin 

immediately exchanged the television and VCR for cocaine. 

 That same day, Sartin told members of his family he had hurt 

someone. They arranged for Sartin to fly the next day to California to 

temporarily reside with his brother, Chad R. While in California, 

Sartin told Chad he had been in a man’s apartment and became angry 

when the man had undressed and made sexual advances toward him. 

Sartin then admitted to Chad that he had decided to rob the man and 

Sartin stabbed him during the struggle and had then taken the man’s 

television and VCR. Chad reported Sartin’s admissions to the police 

and Sartin was arrested. 

Ex. A, pp. 2-3. 3 After a jury trial, Sartin was convicted of premeditated first-degree 

murder and the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld his conviction and sentence on 

 

2

 The factual summary of the Arizona Court of Appeals is accorded a presumption of 

correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n. 1 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

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appeal. Ex. A, p. 3. However, a few years later, his conviction and sentence were 

vacated after the Arizona Supreme Court disapproved of language in the 

premeditation instruction given at Sartin’s trial. Ex. A, p. 3. 

 Before his new trial began, Sartin successfully moved to remand the case to 

the grand jury for a redetermination of probable cause. The state presented both a 

premeditated murder theory and a felony murder theory, and the grand jury returned 

a true bill for first-degree murder. Ex. A, pp. 3-4. Sartin then unsuccessfully moved 

to dismiss the case with prejudice or remand it again to the grand jury. Ex. A, p. 4. 

 On retrial, Sartin admitted that he had stabbed Marc, stolen his television and 

VCR, and exchanged the items for cocaine, but contended this was the result of posttraumatic stress disorder resulting from having been previously shot. Ex. A, p. 4. 

The jury found Sartin guilty of first-degree murder and he was sentenced to life in 

prison without the possibility of parole. Ex. A, p. 4. 

 Prior to his direct appeal, Sartin initiated a first post-conviction relief (“PCR”) 

proceeding, requesting an evidentiary hearing to address potential substance abuse 

problems and other potential misconduct by the state’s latent fingerprint examiner 

and the state’s failure to disclose those potential problems. Exs. C, D, E. The trial 

court found the issues raised by Sartin to be “collateral and not relevant” and 

 

3

 Numbered exhibit references are to the exhibits attached to the Sartin’s Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). Lettered exhibit references are to the exhibits 

attached to the Respondents’ Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 

13). 

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summarily denied post-conviction relief. Ex. F. Sartin appealed the trial court’s 

denial of an evidentiary hearing and the PCR petition was eventually consolidated 

with Sartin’s direct appeal. Ex. G; Ex. A, pp. 19-21. 

 By Memorandum Decision filed on October 16, 2009, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals addressed Sartin’s direct appeal claims and his PCR claim and affirmed his 

conviction and sentence. Ex. A, p. 21. On April 7, 2010, the Arizona Supreme Court 

denied review without comment. Ex. L. 

 On April 26, 2010, Sartin initiated a second PCR action by filing a timely 

PCR notice. Ex. M. Following a two day evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied 

Sartin’s PCR petition. Ex. T. By Memorandum Decision filed on July 11, 2012, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Ex. V. Sartin did not 

seek review of the decision by the Arizona Supreme Court. Ex. W. 

 On February 20, 2013, Sartin initiated a third PCR action by filing a petition 

asserting new claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Exs. X, Y, Z. The trial 

court found the claims meritless and denied relief. Ex. AA. Sartin sought review by 

the Arizona Court of Appeals which, in a Memorandum Decision filed on October 

31, 2013, granted review but denied relief. Exs. BB, CC. 

 Sartin commenced this action with the Petition now before the Court which 

was signed on August 6, 2014 and filed on August 8, 2014. (Doc. 1). In his Petition, 

Sartin raises the following 18 grounds for relief: 

 1. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, the trial failed to remand his case to the 

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grand jury with instructions to the state to present exculpatory 

evidence; 

 2. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, the state failed to present the underlying 

felony murder charges of burglary or robbery; 

 3. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, the state proceeded under a felony 

murder theory and the trial court did not direct a verdict; 

 4. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, the prosecutor relied on “time” to have 

the jury negate the actual reflection necessary for premeditated murder 

lowering the state’s burden of proof; 

 5. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, the trial court failed to grant a mistrial 

based on juror misconduct; 

 6. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, the state presented evidence barred by 

the statute of limitations of robbery and burglary and denied proper 

lesser included offense jury instructions; 

 

 7. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, the trial court failed to grant a motion to 

dismiss predicated on prosecutorial misconduct; 

 8. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, the trial court failed to issue a jury 

instruction pursuant to State v. Willits, 393 P.2d 274 (1964) (jury 

entitled to draw adverse inference against state where reasonably 

accessible evidence with tendency to exonerate defendant not 

preserved); 

 9. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, the state was permitted to make 

characterizations, improper remarks, and obtain substantive evidence 

from out-of-court and unsworn hearsay statements; 

 

 10. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, the state failed to disclose exculpatory 

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evidence relative to the background and conduct of Tucson Police 

Crime Lab latent fingerprint examiner Steven Skowron; 

 11. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, the trial court failed to grant Sartin’s 

request for an evidentiary hearing in relation to Mr. Skowron’s 

conduct; 

 12. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, the trial court permitted the prosecution 

to take a position contrary to the position it took in previous cases; 

 13. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to move for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct, object to 

evidence offered pursuant to Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b), impeach witness 

Mario Duran with is prior testimony, and request a limiting instruction; 

 14. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, appellate counsel was ineffective for 

failing to raise a claim of prosecutorial misconduct and for not arguing 

that the trial court’s failure to provide a limiting instruction constituted 

fundamental error; 

 15. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, counsel was ineffective by failing to 

investigate cumulative PTSD symptoms; 

 16. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, counsel was ineffective during plea 

negotiations; 

 17. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, PCR counsel was ineffective by failing 

to raise the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims; and 

 18. In violation of Sartin’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, the trial court failed to instruct the jury 

on felony murder based on all the circumstances of the case and 

because his case was tried in 1999 solely on the theory of premeditated 

murder. 

Petition, pp. 17-58. 

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II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A. Timeliness 

 The threshold issue is whether Sartin’s Petition is barred by the statute of 

limitation. See White v. Klizkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2002). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) provides for a one 

year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations period must be dismissed. 

Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that: 

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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 The other provisions of section 2244(d) being inapplicable here, Sartin must 

have filed his habeas petition within one year from “the date on which the judgment 

became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see also McQuiggin v. Perkins, 

133 S.Ct. 1924, 1929 (2013). The Ninth Circuit has held that when an Arizona 

defendant does not file a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court on direct 

review, his “direct appeal [is] final . . . [on] the date that he allowed his time for 

seeking review in the [Arizona] Supreme Court to expire.” Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 

F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 656 

(2012) (“with respect to a state prisoner who does not seek review in a State’s highest 

court, the judgment becomes ‘final’ under § 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for seeking 

such review expires”). Additionally, if a petitioner does seek review in a State’s 

highest court but fails to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme 

Court, the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period begins to run on the date the 90-day 

period defined by Supreme Court Rule 13 expires. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 

1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 In this case, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review on direct appeal on 

April 7, 2010. Ex. L. Because Sartin did not file a petition for certiorari in the 

United States Supreme Court, his conviction became final 90 days later on July 6, 

2010. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Thus, absent any tolling, the one-year 

limitations period would have commenced on July 7, 2010 and expired on July 7, 

2011. See Bowen, 188 F.3d at 1159 (“when a petitioner fails to seek a writ of 

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certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, the AEDPA’s one-year limitations 

period begins to run on the date the ninety-day period defined by Supreme Court 

Rule 13 expires.”) 

B. Statutory Tolling 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244, the one-year limitations period is tolled for the 

“time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” See 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). An 

application for State post-conviction relief is properly filed “when its delivery and 

acceptance are in compliance with the applicable law and rules governing filings.” 

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). If the application is rejected by the State 

court as untimely, it cannot be construed as “properly filed” and the petitioner is not 

entitled to statutory tolling. Pace v. Guglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 

 In Arizona, an application for post-conviction review is pending once a notice 

of post-conviction relief is filed, even though the petition is not filed until later. Isley 

v. Arizona Dep’t of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.4(a) (“A proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction 

relief with the court in which the conviction occurred.”). An application for review 

remains “pending” in state court until it “has achieved final resolution through the 

State’s post-conviction procedures.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002). The 

District Court of Arizona has held that, “when the Arizona Court of Appeals grants 

review of the trial court’s decision on a petition for post-conviction relief but denies 

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relief, and the petitioner does not seek further review, the post-conviction proceeding 

is pending until the date the appellate court issues its mandate.” Ortega v. Ryan, 

2016 WL 6822208, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 18, 2016) (quoting Wells v. Ryan, 2015 WL 

9918159, at *9 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2015)); Ramon v. Ryan, 2010 WL 3564819, at *6 

(D. Ariz. July, 23, 2010) (noting that Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.23(a)(1) “states that ‘[i]f 

there has been no motion for reconsideration and no petition for review filed, the 

clerk of the Court of Appeals shall issue the mandate at the expiration of the time for 

the filing of such motion or petition,” (emphasis added in Ramon) and collecting state 

cases). 

 Here, no non-tolled time elapsed between the conclusion of Sartin’s direct 

appeal and the conclusion of his properly-filed second PCR action. Sartin’s second 

PCR action was denied on July 11, 2012. Respondents contend that the limitations 

period began to run on “August 10, 2012—the final day of the 30-day period in 

which Sartin could have but did not seek state supreme court review of the court of 

appeals’ July 11, 2012, memorandum decision.” Response, p. 7. However, the 

District of Arizona, as noted above, has found that a PCR petition that is denied by 

the Arizona Court of Appeals and not appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court 

remains pending until the mandate is issued. Thus, in Sartin’s case, his second PCR 

remained pending for tolling purposes until the mandate was issued on October 19, 

2012. Ex. W. 

 Then, nothing was pending in the state courts until 123 days later when, on 

February 20, 2013, Sartin initiated a third PCR action by filing a petition asserting 

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new claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Exs. X, Y, Z. The trial court, after 

noting that any claims that could have been raised previously were precluded under 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(1), found that Sartin: 

is not precluded from raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

against previous Rule 32 counsel . . . if her failure to raise the alleged 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the previous Rule 32 petition 

fell below an objective standard [of] reasonableness, and was 

prejudicial to the defendant. 

Ex. AA, p. 3. Thus, the trial court proceeded to examine and deny Sartin’s 

ineffective assistance of PCR counsel claim on the merits. Ex. AA, p. 6. 

 On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals first affirmed the trial court’s 

determination that Sartin’s ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel were 

precluded “because Sartin could have raised, and in fact did raise, claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel in his second Rule 32 petition.” 

Ex. CC, p. 3. The Court of Appeals then addressed the trial court’s treatment of 

Sartin’s claim of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel claim and, contrary to the trial 

court’s determination, found that: 

this claim is not cognizable under Rule 32. “[T]he non-pleading 

defendant has ‘no constitutional right to counsel or effective assistance 

in post-conviction proceedings’; although the non-pleading defendant 

has the right to effective representation on appeal, he has no ‘valid, 

substantive claim under Rule 32’ for ‘ineffective assistance on a prior 

[post-conviction relief] petition.’” Osterkamp v. Browning, 226 Ariz. 

485, ¶ 18, 250 P.3d 551, 556 (App. 2011), quoting State v. Krum, 183 

Ariz. 288, 292 & n. 5, 903 P.2d 596, 600 & n. 5 (1995) (alteration in 

Osterkamp). See also State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 336-37, 916 P.2d 

1035, 1052-53 (1996). 

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Ex. CC, p. 4. By finding the IAC claim not cognizable under Rule 32, the Court of 

Appeals’ implicitly found that Sartin’s third PCR petition was not “properly filed” 

because it did not satisfy any Rule 32 exception allowing the filing of an untimely 

successive petition. See Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir.2005) 

(“Examining the court’s words against the backdrop of California law regarding 

untimeliness, it is clear that the court was denying Bonner’s petition as untimely”). 

Because the third PCR petition was not properly filed, Sartin is not entitled to tolling 

for the period during which his third post-conviction action was pending in the state 

courts. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 410 (holding that untimely state post-conviction 

petition is not “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2)). Thus, absent 

equitable tolling, the time for filing the instant petition expired on October 20, 2012, 

which is one year after the mandate was issued after the denial of Sartin’s second 

PCR petition. 

 As a side note, in his Reply, Sartin argues that, under Martinez v. Ryan, 132 

S.Ct. 1309 (2012), the actions of counsel during his second post-conviction 

proceeding excuse his untimely filing in this Court. Reply, p. 7. However, Martinez

does not delay or toll the AEDPA limitations period. In Martinez, the Court held 

that, under limited circumstances, ineffective post-conviction counsel could 

constitute cause to excuse the procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. 132 S.Ct. at 1315. Martinez does not provide a basis for tolling of the 

AEDPA limitations period. See Luz-Hernandez v. Ryan, No. CV 14-2516-PHX-JJT 

(DMF), 2016 WL 2646741, at *5 (D. Ariz. April 5, 2016); Arthur v. Thomas, 739 

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F.3d 611, 630 (11th Cir. 2014) (“the Martinez rule explicitly relates to excusing a 

procedural default of ineffective-trial-counsel claims and does not apply to AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations or the tolling of that period.”) Therefore, the alleged ineffective 

assistance of counsel during Sartin’s second post-conviction proceeding does not 

justify equitably tolling the limitations period. 

C. Equitable Tolling 

 AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). A petitioner is 

entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period “only if he shows (1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance 

stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Lakey v. Hickman, 633 F.3d 782, 786 

(9th Cir. 2011). “The high threshold of extraordinary circumstances is necessary lest 

the exceptions swallow the rule.” Id. Petitioner bears the burden of showing 

“extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 

345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

 Here, Sartin only briefly touches on issues related to equitable tolling. In his 

Reply, he notes that a “state must provide an indigent defendant with the basic tools 

to present an adequate defense or appeal.” Reply, p. 7. This vague statement does 

not even expressly allege that “the basic tools” were not provided to Sartin. Without 

some description of any alleged shortcomings, the Court is unable to embark on any 

evaluation of the barriers to filing that may have resulted. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 

F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that equitable tolling evaluations “turn[ ] on an 

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examination of detailed facts”). Additionally, even if Sartin had provided a more 

detailed explanation, a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not an 

extraordinary circumstance to justify equitable tolling. See Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 

948, 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2012); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th 

Cir.2006); Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (pro se status, 

missing law books, and reliance on helper who transferred were not extraordinary 

circumstances). Sartin has not established any entitlement to equitable tolling of the 

AEDPA limitations period. 

D. Actual Innocence 

 In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924 (2013), the Supreme Court held that 

actual innocence, “if proved,” serves as an exception to the AEDPA statute of 

limitations. Id. at 1928. However, the Court noted that tenable claims of actual 

innocence are rare and require a petitioner to “show that it is more likely than not that 

no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id. at 

1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). In his Reply, Sartin has 

not argued that actual innocence excuses his untimely filing of the petition. 

III. RECOMMENDATION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Sartin’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1) as untimely. 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

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Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a 

copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the 

District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. Replies shall not be filed without first 

obtaining leave to do so from the District Court. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 14-2276-TUC-RCC. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). 

 Dated this 24th day of January, 2017. 

Honorable Jacqueline M. Rateau 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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