Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03240/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03240-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ernest Andrade, on behalf of Anthony

Goodman, a minor, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

United States of America, 

Defendant. 

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No. CIV-05-3240-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court is Defendant United States of America's ("Defendant" or

"United States") Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt.#12). After reviewing the pleadings the Court

issues the following Order. 

I. Factual Background

On October 13, 2005, Plaintiff Ernest Andrade, as the legal guardian of his grandson,

Anthony Goodman, filed the instant Complaint in this Court. (Dkt.#1). Plaintiff's suit alleges

that in March of 2004, two minor children under the care of Child Protective Services

("CPS") of the Colorado Indian Tribe ("CRIT") were placed in his custody as a foster parent.

(Complaint "Compl." ¶10). Anthony Goodman was allegedly sexually assaulted by the two

foster children and "suffered serious and permanent bodily injuries" as well as "pain,

suffering, aggravation, inconvenience, mental and emotional distress..." that continues to this

day. (Compl.¶20,21). Plaintiff alleges that at the time the two children were placed with

Plaintiff by CRIT CPS, "it knew, or should have known, that these minors had a history and

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propensity for acting out sexually." (Compl.¶11). Further, Plaintiff alleges that it was

foreseeable that these minors would act out sexually against another minor and that CRIT

CPS was aware that Plaintiff's grandson resided with Plaintiff when it placed the minors with

Plaintiff. (Compl.¶12,13). Plaintiff alleges that CRIT CPS breached its duty "to act safely

and reasonably" by placing these minors in Plaintiff's home and by failing to inform Plaintiff

of the minors' history and propensity to act out sexually. (Compl.¶15,16). Plaintiff's

Complaint against the United States is based upon the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"),

28 U.S.C.A. §§2671-2680. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the Bureau of Indian Affairs

("BIA") of the Department of Interior is the "interested agency" of the United States.

(Compl.¶4). Plaintiff asserts that the BIA entered into a contract with CRIT in which "the

BIA agreed to provide monies for law enforcement and investigative services to [CRIT] and

to monitor [CRIT's] use of said funds in accordance with the Contract and applicable law."

(Compl.¶7). Plaintiff states that by entering into the Contract, for the purposes of the FTCA,

that "[CRIT] and its employees are deemed to be employees of the Federal government while

performing work under this Contract." (Compl.¶9). 

At the Rule 16 Scheduling Conference held on February 9, 2006, the United States

disclosed its intent to file a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this

case. (Dkt.#10). The Court then issued its Scheduling Order regarding the briefing and

discovery schedule addressing this issue. (Dkt.#11). On April 11, 2006, the United States

filed its Motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Parties then engaged

in limited discovery and this matter became fully briefed on September 8, 2006. (Dkt.#18).

II. Standard of Review

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdiction is a

threshold matter that must be established by the plaintiff. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Statutory jurisdictional doubts are to be resolved against federal

jurisdiction. See Navajo Tribal Util. Auth. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 608 F.2d 1228, 1233

(9th Cir. 1979). Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised any time, by any

party, or by the Court. See Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194 n.2 (9th Cir.

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1988). "For motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), unlike a motion under Rule 12(b)(6),

the moving party may submit affidavits or any other evidence properly before the court....

It then becomes necessary for the party opposing the motion to present affidavits or any other

evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing that the court, in fact, possesses

subject matter jurisdiction." Ass’n of Am. Med. Colleges v. United States, 217 F.3d 770,

778-79 (9th Cir.2000).

III. Discussion

The United States' Motion to dismiss is premised on the basis that this Court does not

have jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff's Complaint because of the sovereign immunity

afforded to the United States. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981)(noting

that United States "is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued..."). The United States

contends the waiver of sovereign immunity provided by the FTCA does not apply to

Plaintiff's claims because there is no indication that the alleged torts were committed by

federal employees acting within the scope of their employment. See United States v.

Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976) (stating that FTCA is a limited waiver of the

Government's sovereign immunity applying to certain torts of federal employees acting

within the scope of their employment). Specifically, the United States cites the lack of any

contractual relationship between CRIT CPS, the entity identified in Plaintiff's Complaint as

being negligent in placing the foster children at Plaintiff's home, and the United States. 

Thus, the United States contends that because Plaintiff's Complaint does not suggest any

negligence of governmental employees, dismissal is proper. 

The United States notes that while there was a contract pursuant to the Indian Self

Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 (ISDEAA), commonly referred to as

a 638 contract, with the CRIT Social Services division ("Social Services"); no such contract

extended to CRIT CPS. Support for this position is based upon the declaration of Evelyn

Roanhorse, a Regional Social Service Worker, with the BIA. (Defendant's Motion, Exhibit

4). According to Ms. Roanhorse, she possessed the authority to oversee compliance of CRIT

Social Services with all 638 contracts; however she did not have any such type of authority

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with respect CRIT CPS. (Id.). While the contract between CRIT Social Services and the

BIA did possess a provision deeming employees performing work under the contract to be

federal employees for purposes of the FTCA (Defendant's Motion, Exhibit 3, Attachment 2

p.32 of 35) no such provision extended to CRIT CPS. Thus, the United States argues that

because the CRIT CPS employees are not employees of the United States for purposes of the

FTCA, the United States' sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff's suit. 

In response to the United States' position and after performing limited discovery on

this issue, Plaintiff concedes that the CRIT CPS employees identified in the Complaint are

not United States employees for purposes of the FTCA. However, Plaintiff asserts that this

fact does not deprive this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, Plaintiff contends that

while he may have referenced the wrong tribal entity in CRIT CPS in the Complaint, the

limited discovery performed demonstrates that CRIT Social Services, the agency which does

possess federal employees for purposes of the FTCA, may have acted negligently as

generally alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint. For instance, Plaintiff notes that Ms. Roanhorse

testified at her deposition that CRIT Social Services should have been the CRIT entity to

place the foster children at Plaintiff's residence rather than CRIT CPS. Ms. Roanhorse

testified in pertinent part:

Q: Had the placement of this boy in the Andrade family been done pursuant to the

regulations, the placement should have been done by social services?

A. Placement should have been done by social services, yes.

Q: And that should have been done by social service, yes.

A. Under a 638 contract, yes, after all the eligibility conditions have been met...

(Plaintiff's Response, Exhibit 1, p.28, ll. 15-23). 

In addition, Ms. Roanhorse acknowledges that in this case even though placement of

the foster children was performed solely by CRIT CPS, federal funding for such placement

and care for the foster children was provided by CRIT Social Services. (Plaintiff's Response,

Exhibit 1, pp.24-25, ll.11-2). Based upon this testimony, Plaintiff believes that dismissal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction is inappropriate because the testimony suggests that CRIT

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Social Services, a contracting party with the United States, may have breached its duty to

Plaintiff with respect to placement and supervision of the foster children at issue. Plaintiff

states that "[w]hile the references to CRIT CPS [in the Complaint] may be incorrect and

CRIT social services should have been referenced, neither of these entities are the named

defendant - that is the United States of America and properly based on the testimony of Ms.

Roanhorse." (Plaintiff's Response, p.5). Thus, Plaintiff requests that the Court deny the

United States' Motion to dismiss and grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint to

reference CRIT Social Services as the proper CRIT agency in the amended complaint. 

The Court agrees with the United States that dismissal of Plaintiff's existing

Complaint is warranted as there is no dispute that CRIT CPS, the identified CRIT entity in

Plaintiff's Complaint, is not an employee of the United States. In looking specifically to

Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff's basis for subject matter jurisdiction based upon the FTCA

is clearly premised on the existence of a contractual relationship between CRIT CPS and the

United States. Because there is no such relationship suggesting CRIT CPS employees are

federal employees for purposes of the FTCA, dismissal is appropriate as the United States'

sovereign immunity applies.

However, while the Court finds that dismissal is warranted based upon Plaintiff's

erroneous allegations regarding the relationship between the United States and CRIT CPS,

the Court finds that leave to amend, as requested by Plaintiff, is warranted. It is clear that

CRIT Social Services acts in employer-employee relationship with the United States for

FTCA purposes in the context of 638 contracts. (Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit 3, Attachment

2, p.32 of 35). Moreover, based upon the limited discovery presented it appears that CRIT

Social Services may have been the entity that should have placed the foster children rather

than CRIT CPS. The limited discovery also suggests that CRIT Social Services provided the

funding for placement and care of the foster children with Plaintiff. (Plaintiff's Response,

Exhibit 1, pp.24-25, ll.11-2). Thus, the contractual relationship between the United States

and CRIT Social Services as well as CRIT Social Service's involvement in the placement and

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care of the foster children provides the foundation for Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the

FTCA. 

In addition, the Court finds unpersuasive the United States' argument regarding the

futility of any amendment because of Plaintiff's alleged non-compliance with 28 U.S.C. §

2675(a) in filing his administrative complaint with the Department of the Interior. Section

2675(a) provides in pertinent part:

An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for

money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death

caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the

Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless

the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal

agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing

and sent by certified or registered mail. 

The filing of an administrative claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite which must be

strictly adhered to. Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2000)(citing

Cadwalder v. United States, 45 F.3d 297, 300 (9th Cir. 1995). The purpose of the

administrative claim requirement is "to encourage administrative settlement of claims against

the United States and thereby prevent an unnecessary burdening of the courts." Brady, 211

F.3d at 503 (citing Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Lopez

v. United States, 758 F.2d 806, 809-10 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating purpose of administrative

claims process is "to furnish notice to the government sufficient to allow it to investigate the

alleged negligent episode to determine if settlement would be in the best interests of all.").

With respect to the detail of an administrative claim, the person injured or personal

representative, "need only file a brief notice or statement with the relevant federal agency

containing a general description of the time, place, cause and general nature of the injury and

the amount of compensation demanded. Goodman v. United States, 298 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing Warren v. United States Dep't. of Interior Bureau of Land Mgmt., 724 F.2d

776, 779 (9th Cir. 1984); Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[a]

skeletal claim form, containing only the bare elements of notice of accident and injury and

a sum certain representing damages, suffices to overcome an argument that jurisdiction is

lacking."). 

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The United States contends that any amendment of Plaintiff's Complaint providing

allegations against CRIT Social Services would be futile because Plaintiff failed to properly

exhaust his administrative remedies as to claims of negligence involving CRIT Social

Services. The United States takes exception to the fact that the administrative complaint like

the present Complaint before this Court did not identify CRIT Social Services as the

potentially negligent United States employee, but rather identified only CRIT CPS and its

employees. However, the United States' position ignores the lack of detail that need be

associated with an administrative complaint to satisfy the FTCA's requirement pursuant to

§ 2675(a). For instance, the Ninth Circuit in Avery, made clear that a "skeletal claim form,

containing only the bare elements of notice of accident and injury and a sum certain

representing damages, suffices to overcome an argument that jurisdiction is lacking." Id. at

610. Here, these requirements were met. For instance, the conduct and incident that is at

the heart of this very litigation was identified; the sexual assault of Anthony Goodman by the

foster children placed at Plaintiff's residence and the lack of any notice given to Plaintiff

regarding such a possibility based upon the foster children's propensity for such conduct. In

addition, Plaintiff provided a sum certain as an offer of settlement. (Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss, Exhibit 5). The fact that Plaintiff identified CRIT CPS, rather than CRIT Social

Services is not fatal, nor does the United States cite any such authority suggesting such.

Thus, because the requirements of § 2675(a) were met with Plaintiff's administrative

complaint, an amendment of Plaintiff's Complaint to properly assert allegations of

jurisdiction based upon the actions of CRIT Social Services is not futile.

In sum, the Court finds that based upon the pleadings and exhibits presented, dismissal

of Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is warranted. It is undisputed

that CRIT CPS is not an employee of the United States for purposes of the FTCA. However,

the Court finds that leave to amend to include CRIT Social Services as the appropriate CRIT

entity in Plaintiff's allegations against the United States is proper. There is a sufficient basis

to assert Plaintiff's claims of negligence against the United States based upon the actions or

omissions of CRIT Social Services. In addition, Plaintiff's administrative complaint complies

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with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). As such, an amended complaint would not be

futile. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting the United States Motion to Dismiss for lack

of subject jurisdiction. (Dkt.#12).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby dismissed without

prejudice and with leave to amend. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is directed to file any amended complaint

within twenty (20) days of the date this Order is filed. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter a

judgment of dismissal without prejudice and without further notice to Plaintiff, if Plaintiff

fails to timely file an amended complaint within 20 days from the date this Order is filed

DATED this 31st of January, 2007.

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