Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00971/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00971-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAMMY MCLEAN,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

RUDESINDO FERNANDEZ, aka 

RUDESINDO R. FERNANDEZ, III, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:15-cv-00971-LJO-JLT

ORDER DISMISSING WITHOUT

PREJUDICE ALL CLAIMS AGAINST 

DEFENDANT RUDESINDO R. 

FERNANDEZ (Docs. 6, 9 & 10)

This action was removed from Kern County Superior Court on June 25, 2015 by Defendant 

District Director of the Internal Revenue Service of the United States of America (“Federal Defendant”), 

the only defendant to make an appearance in this case as of the date of entry of this Order. Doc. 1. 

Federal Defendant answered on July 1, 2015. Doc. 3. On August 13, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Notice 

indicating that she filed a notice of voluntarily dismissal in the underlying action in Kern County 

Superior Court as of July 2, 2015. Doc. 6. The Court construed the August 13, 2015 filing as a request 

for voluntary dismissal with prejudice of the entire, above-captioned, removed action, but requested the

input of Federal Defendant prior to entering an order of dismissal. Doc. 7. On August 19, 2014, the 

United States objected to dismissal of the entire action. Doc. 8. Plaintiff later pointed out that the Notice 

filed in Kern County Superior Court dismissed only Defendant Rudesindo Ferndandez from that lawsuit. 

Case 1:15-cv-00971-DAD-JLT Document 14 Filed 08/28/15 Page 1 of 2
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Doc. 10. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks dismissal of Defendant Fernandez only. Id. 

Federal Defendant nevertheless objects that Plaintiff has failed to show why dismissal of 

Defendant Fernandez is appropriate, as he “appears to be a necessary party to this action to quiet title.”

Doc. 8 at 2. Plaintiff’s counsel attests that Defendant Fernandez “was dismissed [from the Kern County 

action] because he agreed to sign a deed transferring the entirety of his interest in the subject real 

property to Plaintiff.” Doc. 10 at 2. While the Court cannot say with certainty that Defendant Fernandez 

is not a necessary party unless and until the transfer deed is signed, Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) permits 

Plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss Defendant Fernandez without a court order if dismissal is noticed before 

Defendant Fernandez filed an answer or motion for summary judgment. Pedrina v. Chun, 987 F.2d 608, 

609 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Rule 41(a)(1) allows a plaintiff to dismiss without a court order any defendant who 

has yet to serve an answer or a motion for summary judgment... Permitting a plaintiff to dismiss fewer 

than all of the named defendants is consistent with [the] purpose [of Rule 41(a)(1)].”). Accordingly, the 

Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Defendant Fernandez as a defendant in this action. Should 

Federal Defendant determine that Defendant Fernandez may be a necessary party (e.g., if no transfer 

deed is executed), Federal Defendant may file an appropriate motion to join (or, in this case, re-join) 

Defendant Fernandez as a party to the case. The Clerk of Court is also directed to administratively 

terminate the two pending motions for reconsideration, Docs. 9 &10, which are resolved by this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 28, 2015 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00971-DAD-JLT Document 14 Filed 08/28/15 Page 2 of 2