Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-18-55914/USCOURTS-ca9-18-55914-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 462
Nature of Suit: Naturalization, Petition For Hearing of Denial
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WOUL SOO PARK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney

General; CHAD F. WOLF; KEN

CUCCINELLI ; SUSAN M. CURDA;

CORINNA LUNA,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-55914

D.C. No.

2:16-cv-09329-

SJO-FFM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 5, 2019

Pasadena, California

Filed January 7, 2019

Before: Jerome Farris, M. Margaret McKeown, and

Barrington D. Parker, Jr.,* Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

*The Honorable BarringtonD. Parker, Jr., United States CircuitJudge

for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by

designation.

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2 PARK V. BARR

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel reversed the district court’s denial of Woul

Park’s petition challenging a decision by the United States

Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denying her

application for naturalization, and remanded, holding that: a

B-2 nonimmigrant whose lawful status has lapsed is

precluded from establishing lawful domicile in California by

operation of federal law; and, therefore, Park’s divorce and

subsequent marriage to a U.S. citizen were valid under

California law, she was properly admitted for permanent

residency, and is entitled to naturalization.

Park, a Korean citizen, married Byung Gug Choi in

Korea, and later came to the United States on a B-2 tourist

visa in 2003. She overstayed her visa and has resided in

California ever since. Park and Choi obtained a valid divorce

under Korean law, and Park later married James Yong Park,

a U.S. citizen, in California and received lawful permanent

residency based on that marriage.

USCIS then denied Park’s application for naturalization. 

USCIS found that Park and Choi were California

domiciliaries when their Korean divorce decree was executed

and, as a result, the divorce could not be recognized under

California law. Having determined that Park’s divorce was

invalid, USCIS concluded that her marriage to James Yong

Park was similarly invalid, and therefore, Park was never

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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PARK V. BARR 3

lawfully admitted for permanent residency. Accordingly,

USCIS denied Park’s application for naturalization because

she could not satisfy the requirement of having been lawfully

admitted for permanent residency. The district court granted

summary judgment in favor of the Government.

The panel observed that the case turned on whether Park

was “domiciled” in California and that the validity of Park’s

marriage to James Yong Park was governed by California

law. The panel explained that, under California law, domicile

is established by physical presence and an intention to remain

indefinitely. However, the panel further explained that

federal immigration laws impose outer limits on a state’s

freedom to define it. Here, the B-2 tourist visa classification

requires nonimmigrants to maintain a residence in their

country of citizenship with no intention of abandoning it. It

follows, the panel explained, that Congress has not permitted

B-2 nonimmigrants to lawfully form a subjective intent to

remain in the United States; such an intent would inescapably

conflict with Congress’s definition of the nonimmigrant

classification. Therefore, the panel held that Park, as a

nonimmigrant who entered the United States and unlawfully

overstayed her visa, was precluded from establishing

domiciliary intent to remain in the United States. As a result,

her divorce and subsequent marriage were valid, she had been

lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and was thus

entitled to naturalization.

Rejecting the government’s contention that those who

violate the conditions of their visa are no longer subject to the

statutes that preclude them from establishing a lawful

subjective intent to remain, the panel explained that it would

be inconsistent to conclude that Congress sought to preclude

nonimmigrants who comply with federal immigration law

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4 PARK V. BARR

from the benefits that flow from state domiciliary status while

permitting nonimmigrants who violate their visa conditions

to share in them.

The panel also addressed In re Marriage of Dick, 15 Cal.

App. 4th 144 (Ct. App. 1993), in which the California Court

of Appeal held that nonimmigrant status does not preclude a

finding of residence under California law for purposes of

obtaining a dissolution of marriage. The panel declined to

read Dick as applicable to this case, explaining that the

California Court of Appeal in Dick interpreted the word

“residence” rather than “domicile,” that the cases turned on

different state codes, and that USCIS and the district court

erred in interpreting “domicile” in line with the interpretation

of “residence” in Dick given the conflict with federal law that

would result from such an interpretation.

COUNSEL

Shirley Wei (argued), Law Office of Shirley Wei, Los

Angeles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Sergio Sarkany (argued), Counsel for National Security;

Kathleen A. Connolly, Senior Counsel for National Security;

William C. Peachey, Director, District Court Section; Joseph

H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Office of Immigration

Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of

Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees.

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PARK V. BARR 5

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Woul Park appeals from the district court’s denial of her

petition challenging a decision by the United States

Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denying her

application for naturalization. We review the district court’s

summary judgment order de novo. United States v. Arango,

670 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 2012). We reverse.

I.

Woul Park, a Korean citizen, married Byung Gug Choi in

Korea in 1988. Park came to the United States on a B-2

tourist visa in 2003. Park overstayed her visa and has resided

in California ever since. Park and Choi jointly filed a

Request for Divorce at the Korean Consulate in California,

and the divorce became valid and final under Korean law as

of May 12, 2009. Following the divorce, Park married James

Yong Park, a United States citizen, in California. Park

applied for and received lawful permanent residencybased on

this putative marriage. Park then applied for naturalization in

2014.

USCIS denied Park’s application for naturalization

because it determined that Park’s divorce from Choi was

invalid under California law, thus invalidating her marriage

to James Yong Park. USCIS found that both Park and Choi

were California domiciliaries when their Korean divorce

decree was executed. The agency then concluded that Park’s

purported 2009 divorce would not have been recognized

under California law because California Family Code § 2091

bars the state from recognizing a foreign divorce when both

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6 PARK V. BARR

parties are California domiciliaries. This finding set off a

cascade of legal consequences. If Park’s divorce from Choi

was invalid under California law, then Park’s marriage to

James Yong Park was similarly invalid. Park’s application

for permanent residence was dependent on her lawful

marriage to a United States citizen. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(i); Hammad v. Holder, 603 F.3d 536, 537–38

(9th Cir. 2010). Since Park’s marriage was invalid at its

inception, USCIS reasoned, Park could never have been

lawfully admitted for permanent residency. See Matter of

Hosseinian, 19 I. & N. Dec. 453, 454 (BIA 1987). And

finally, since Park had to show that she had been lawfully

admitted as a permanent resident in order to naturalize, see

8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1), USCIS denied her application for

naturalization.

The district court reviewed Park’s application de novo. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). The district court adopted USCIS’s

reasoning and granted summary judgment in favor of the

Government. The court recognized that California’s

interpretation of “domicile” in the family law context

appeared to conflict with other state and federal precedents

that precluded certain nonimmigrants from establishing the

subjective intent to remain in a United States jurisdiction

necessary to lawfully establish “domicile.” Compare In re

Marriage of Dick, 15 Cal. App. 4th 144, 154 (Ct. App. 1993)

(holding that “nonimmigrant status does not preclude a

finding of residence under California law for purposes of

obtaining a dissolution of marriage”) with Toll v. Moreno,

458 U.S. 1, 14 (1982) (explaining that “Congress has

precluded [certain nonimmigrants who are required to

maintain permanent foreign domiciles] from establishing

domicile in the United States”). Regardless, the district court

determined that it was bound by Marriage of Dick as the

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PARK V. BARR 7

controlling California precedent, ordered summary judgment

in favor of the Government, and dismissed Park’s action.

We reverse and hold that Park, as a B-2 nonimmigrant

whose lawful status had lapsed, was precluded from

establishing lawful domicile in California by operation of

federal law. Her divorce and subsequent marriage were

therefore valid under California law, she was properly

admitted for permanent residency based on her marriage to a

United States citizen, and she is entitled to naturalization.

II.

This case turns on whether Park was “domiciled” in

California at the time of her divorce. The law of the state in

which the marriage was celebrated governs the validity of a

marriage in the immigration context. Hosseinian, 19 I. & N.

Dec. at 455; see also United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264,

268 (9th Cir. 1970). Park’s marriage to James Yong Park,

which was celebrated in California, is thus governed by

California law. California has adopted the Uniform Divorce

Recognition Act, which was drafted in 1948 by the

Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in order “to

discourage the so-called migratory divorce.” Donald F.

Powell, Foreign Divorce Recognition in California,

16 Hastings L.J. 121, 123 (1964). Under California law, a

divorce obtained in a foreign jurisdiction is invalid if “both

parties to the marriage were domiciled in [California] at the

time the proceeding for the divorce was commenced.” Cal.

Fam. Code § 2091. USCIS and the district court found that

Park and Choi were both California domiciliaries at the time

they obtained their Korean divorce, meaning that their

divorce was of “no force or effect” in California. Id.

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8 PARK V. BARR

Under California law, domicile is established by

“(1) physical presence . . . with (2) an intention to remain

there indefinitely.” In re Marriage of Tucker, 226 Cal. App.

3d 1249, 1258–59 (Ct. App. 1991) (citations and quotations

omitted); see also Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v.

Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989) (calling domicile a “widely

used” concept with a “generally uncontroverted” meaning). 

Domicile is primarily a creature of state law, but federal

immigration laws impose outer limits on a state’s freedom to

define it. See, e.g., Toll, 458 U.S. at 10–11. In Toll, the

Supreme Court held that the Supremacy Clause precluded

states from imposing burdens on state domiciliaries lawfully

present in the United States on G-4 nonimmigrant visas. Id.

at 17. Where Congress specifically “permitted [the G-4

nonimmigrants] to establish domicile” through the text of the

INA, a state university lacked authority to “impose

discriminatory tuition charges and fees solely on account of

[their] federal immigration classification.” Id.

Here, Congress has done essentially the opposite. The

B-2 tourist visa classification requires nonimmigrants to

maintain a residence in their country of citizenship with no

intention of abandoning it. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B). It

follows that Congress has not permitted B-2 nonimmigrants

to lawfully form a subjective intent to remain in the United

States; such an intent would inescapably conflict with

Congress’s definition of the nonimmigrant classification. 

The Supreme Court has recognized as much. See Elkins v.

Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 665 (1978) (noting that

nonimmigrants cannot establish domicile where “Congress

expressly conditioned admission . . . on an intent not to

abandon a foreign residence,” and specifically citing

§ 1101(a)(15)(B)); Toll, 458 U.S. at 14 & n.20 (citing the

nonimmigrant classification described at § 1101(a)(15)(B) as

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PARK V. BARR 9

one in which “Congress has precluded the covered alien from

establishing domicile in the United States”). Nonimmigrants

on tourist visas are thus “precluded . . . from establishing

domicile in the United States.” Von Kennel Gaudin v. Remis,

379 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Toll, 458 U.S.

at 14 & n.20).

The Government seeks to distinguish these cases by

arguing that they have nothing to say about whether visa

overstays, or persons outside of any lawful status, are

similarly precluded from establishing domicile. Those who

violate the conditions of their visa, the Government argues,

are no longer subject to the statutes that preclude them from

establishing a lawful subjective intent to remain in the

country. Our court has already rejected that interpretation. 

See Carlson v. Reed, 249 F.3d 876, 880–81 (9th Cir. 2001)

(explaining that a nonimmigrant precluded from establishing

residency could not gain California residency by violating

visa conditions because then her very presence in the country

would be illegal); see also Von Kennel Gaudin, 379 F.3d

at 638 (quoting Graham v. INS, 998 F.2d 194, 196 (3d Cir.

1993)). It would be inconsistent to conclude that Congress

sought to preclude nonimmigrants who comply with federal

immigration law from the benefits that flow from state

domiciliary status while permitting nonimmigrants who

violate their visa conditions to share in them. By restricting

the domiciliary intent of B-2 nonimmigrants, Congress did

not merely seek to restrict them from establishing a domicile

for a temporary period, after which they could establish

domicile simply by violating the terms of their entry and

staying in the country unlawfully. Rather, “Congress must

have meant aliens to be barred from these classes if their real

purpose in coming to the United States was to immigrate

permanently.” Elkins, 435 U.S. at 665. The Supreme Court

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10 PARK V. BARR

found it similarly “clear that Congress intended that, in the

absence of an adjustment of status . . . , nonimmigrants in

restricted classes who sought to establish domicile would be

deported.” Id. at 666. We hold that Park, as a nonimmigrant

who entered the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(15)(B) and unlawfully overstayed her visa—like

those in lawful B-2 status, see Von Kennel Gaudin, 379 F.3d

at 637—was precluded from establishing domiciliary intent

to remain in the United States.

In the face of this federal precedent, USCIS and the

district court still felt bound by California statutory and

decisional law that would seem to demand a contrary result. 

The California Court of Appeal, seemingly in contrast to

these federal decisions, has held that “nonimmigrant status

does not preclude a finding of residence under California law

for the purposes of obtaining a dissolution of marriage.” In

re Marriage of Dick, 15 Cal. App. 4th at 154 (reasoning that

a nonimmigrant on a renewable visa “may have the dual

intention of remaining in this country indefinitely by

whatever means including renewal of a visa and of returning

to his or her home country if so compelled”). In Dick, the

California Court of Appeal exercised jurisdiction over a

tourist visa holder in a dissolution proceeding,

notwithstanding a statute requiring the husband to have been

a California “resident” for six months preceding the divorce. 

Id. at 156–157.

We generally “follow decisions of the California Court of

Appeal unless there is convincing evidence that the California

Supreme Court would hold otherwise,” Carvalho v. Equifax

Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir. 2010), but we

decline to read Dick as applicable to the new circumstance

addressed in this case. In Dick, the California Court of

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PARK V. BARR 11

Appeal interpreted the word “residence” rather than

“domicile,” and the case turned on Cal. Civ. Code § 4530(a)

(1992)1rather than Cal. Fam. Code § 2091. 15 Cal. App. 4th

at 152–53. We recognize that the Court of Appeal expressly

conflated “residence” with “domicile.” Id. at 153

(“[R]esidency is synonymous with domicile, the latter term

meaning ‘both the act of residence and an intention to

remain. . . .”) (emphasis in original) (citation and quotation

omitted). Regardless, USCIS and the district court erred in

interpreting “domicile” in § 2091 in line with the California

Court of Appeal’s interpretation of “residence” in Dick given

the conflict with federal law that would result from such an

interpretation. In addition to the federal precedents relied

upon above, the California Supreme Court has also

recognized the clear import of Elkins, Toll, and their progeny. 

See Martinez v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 50 Cal. 4th 1277,

1290 (2010) (citing Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Sup. Ct.,

225 Cal. App. 3d 972, 979 (Ct. App. 1990)) (explaining that

undocumented immigrants cannot establish domicile in order

to qualify for in-state tuition).

In our view, and under the circumstances here, we read

the holding of Marriage of Dick narrowly so as to

accommodate the “preeminent role of the Federal

Government with respect to the regulation of aliens within

our borders.” Toll, 458 U.S. at 10. Under federal law, Park

was precluded from establishing domiciliary intent by virtue

of her status as an out-of-status nonimmigrant initially

present in the United States on a tourist visa.

1

 This statutory provision now appears at Cal. Fam. Code § 2320.

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12 PARK V. BARR

We REVERSE the order of the district court, and

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

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