Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05393/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05393-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 11, 1997 Decided June 6, 1997 

No. 95-5393

FRIENDS OF THE VIETNAM VETERANS MEMORIAL, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

ROGER G. KENNEDY, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(95cv00808)

Marina Utgoff-Braswell, Assistant United States Attorney, 

argued the cause for appellants, with whom Eric H. Holder, 

Jr., United States Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, were on the briefs.

David M. Liberman argued the cause for appellees, with 

whom Alexander P. Humphrey was on the brief.

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Arthur B. Spitzer was on the brief for amicus curiae

American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area.

Before: SILBERMAN, RANDOLPH, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge: The National Park Service prohibits the sale of a number of items, among them t-shirts, on 

the National Mall. Friends of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial challenged that prohibition as a violation of the First 

Amendment and prevailed in the district court. We reverse.

I.

The Mall is an approximately two-mile long strip of national parkland situated in the midst of Washington, D.C. It is 

the site of monuments marking great figures and events in 

our nation's history. At the west end sits the Lincoln Memorial, flanked to the north by the Vietnam Veterans Memorial 

and to the south by the Korean War Veterans Memorial. 

The towering Washington Monument stands in the middle of 

the Mall, the museums of the Smithsonian run along either 

side, and the United States Capitol forms the eastern border. 

But the Mall is more than home to these enduring symbols of 

our nationhood. Its grassy expanse provides areas for any 

number of recreational activities, and its location in the heart 

of the nation's capital makes it a prime location for demonstrations. It is here where Martin Luther King, Jr., delivered his famous "I Have a Dream" speech, where both sides 

of the abortion debate have staged passionate demonstrations, and where on any given day one may witness people 

gathering to voice their public concerns. As we have said 

before, "It is here that the constitutional rights of speech and 

peaceful assembly find their fullest expression." ISKCON of 

Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

But Congress has charged the National Park Service with 

regulating the use of the Mall so as to "conform" such use "to 

the fundamental purpose" of "conserv[ing] the scenery and 

the natural and historic objects ... and ... provid[ing] for 

the enjoyment of the same in such manner ... as will leave 

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1 These include Gaudiya Vaishnava Society, One World One 

Family Now, Inc., Warriors Inc., Open Art, Inc., Last Firebase 

Archives Project, and Americans for Freedom Always. 

them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." 

16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). To this end, the Park Service has 

promulgated regulations providing that "[d]emonstrations and 

special events may be held only pursuant to a permit issued" 

by the Park Service. Although the Park Service has generally prohibited sales on federal parkland in the D.C. area 

without a (rarely issued) permit, it did in 1976 promulgate a 

regulation allowing the sale or distribution of "newspapers, 

leaflets and pamphlets" in the context of special events and 

demonstrations. Over time, the Park Service issued enforcement guidelines extending "newspapers, leaflets and pamphlets" to include t-shirts, bumper stickers, buttons, and 

posters, so long as the sale of those items conveyed a 

message "directly related" to the special event or demonstration. In 1995, however, concerned chiefly with an increasing 

atmosphere of commercialism on the Mall, the Park Service 

rescinded its enforcement guidelines and promulgated a regulation limiting sales on federal parkland in the D.C. area to 

"books, newspapers, leaflets, pamphlets, buttons and bumper 

stickers." 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(k)(1), (2) (1996).

Friends of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial (Friends), along 

with six other nonprofit organizations1that "seek to educate 

the general public about their respective beliefs and activities," sought declarative and injunctive relief in the district 

court on the ground that the new regulation, as applied to 

prohibit the sale of message-bearing t-shirts on the Mall, 

violated the First Amendment. The district court agreed and 

enjoined the regulation.

II.

The government contends that the district judge's order is 

palpably in conflict with our recent opinion in ISKCON. We 

agree. There, we reviewed the constitutionality of this very 

same regulation insofar as it prohibited in-person solicitations, the sale of audiotapes, and the sale of religious beads on 

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the Mall. We determined that the regulation was contentneutral and would thus be upheld as long it was " 'narrowly 

[tailored] to serve a significant governmental interest' " and 

" 'le[ft] open ample alternative channels for communication' of 

the message." 61 F.3d at 955 (quoting Clark v. Community 

for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)); see also 

White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 

1518, 1527 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Although the solicitation ban did 

not pass musterwe could not see how allowing "individuals 

or groups participating in an authorized demonstration ... to 

solicit donations within the confines of a restricted permit 

area" would "add to whatever adverse impact [would] result" 

from the demonstration itself, 61 F.3d at 956we upheld the 

proscription on the sale of beads and audiotapes. We rejected the argument that the regulation was fatally underinclusive because it prohibited the sale of beads and audiotapes 

while permitting the sale of, for example, books and bumper 

stickers. We did not think that underinclusiveness "ha[d] the 

effect of favoring a particular view" or "diminish[ed] the 

credibility of the Park Service's rationale" for prohibiting the 

sale of certain items. See id. at 956-57; but see id. at 960 

(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

Because the regulation was not " 'substantially broader than 

necessary to achieve the government's interests,' " and because the alternative ways in which the complainants could 

express their message were "more than adequate," the regulation did not violate the First Amendment. See id. at 958 

(quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 

(1989)).

Friends concede that the government's asserted interests 

in reducing "discordant and excessive commercialism, as well 

as degraded aesthetic values," id. at 952 (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 

at 25,857 (1994)), are legitimate. In ISKCON, we thought 

those interests jeopardized by the sale of beads and audiotapes. It is the Park Service's view that the "relatively 

constant, intrusive and intimidating" t-shirt sales activities 

were largely responsible for the "pronounced commercialization" of the Mall that the regulation seeks to contain. 60 

Fed. Reg. at 17,644 (1995). The Service may certainly take 

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steps to limit the commercialization of the Mall, and the 

record is replete with evidence that t-shirt sales, even more 

than the sale of beads and audiotapes, substantially contributed to that phenomenon. We agree with Judge Ginsburg that, 

if anything, the ban on t-shirt sales is more easily justified 

than the ban on audiotapes. See 61 F.3d at 961 (Ginsburg, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part). If the Park 

Service's interests were significant in ISKCON, then a fortiori they are significant here.

Friends argue that t-shirts should nevertheless be distinguished from beads and audiotapes. The district court in this 

regard characterized the sale of t-shirts as "a unique and 

especially effective means of communicating the plaintiffs' 

point of view" because the purchaser aids the seller in 

spreading the message by wearing the t-shirt; the buyer 

becomes, in the district judge's words, "a human billboard." 

(Under that reasoning, the sale of billboards would be even 

more entitled to protection.) But the very billboard characteristics of the t-shirtits eye-catching naturemake its 

display for sale and sale on parkland a particularly discordant 

interruption of the park's tranquility. And that the buyer 

may wear the t-shirt on parkland or elsewhere does not 

support appellee's asserted First Amendment right to engage 

in a sale on park premises.

Of course, there is nothing to stop appellees from giving 

away their expressive t-shirts on the Mall (or selling them 

near the Mall). That is unsatisfactory, according to Friends, 

because it does not promise an adequate source of fundraising. Yet raising money is not a First Amendment concern that the regulation bears upon: The cases protecting the 

right to solicit contributions in a public forum do so not 

because the First Amendment contemplates the right to raise 

money, but rather because the act of solicitation contains a 

communicative element. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. 

Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) 

(charitable solicitation is protected because it is "characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive 

speech"); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 363 

(1977) (speech is protected "even though it is ... in the form

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2 The government relies on White House Vigil, 746 F.2d at 

1540-41, in which we questioned (in dicta) whether a restriction on 

placing parcels on a sidewalk during a demonstration warrants any 

First Amendment concern at all. The government would have us 

conduct a preliminary inquiry into whether proscribing the sale of 

an expressive item poses more than a "minimal" burden on expression. That is a curious position in light of the long-established 

proposition that an expressive item does not lose its protection 

simply because it is sold. See, e.g., ISKCON, 61 F.3d at 953. As 

the t-shirts in question are message-bearing, the regulation proscribing their sale on the Mall, like one proscribing the sale of 

books or newspapers, raises First Amendment concerns. Accord 

One World One Family Now v. City and County of Honolulu, 76 

F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996). 

3

In a related point, Friends rely on City of Cincinnati v. 

Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993), to contend that the 

validity of the regulation is fatally undermined by the activities the 

of a solicitation") (emphasis added). We do not deny that the 

sale of a t-shirt is expressive, but it is only the expression 

inherent in the transmission of the t-shirt from the seller to 

the buyerand not the fact that the seller raises money 

therebywhich warrants constitutional protection.2

Friends' final contention is that the Park Service's blanket 

ban on t-shirt sales on the Mall should have been more 

narrowly tailored to allow the sale of t-shirts in areas where 

the Park Service already tolerates a certain degree of commercialism. In this regard, Friends point out that the Park 

Service, pursuant to its statutory mandate to provide "services ... necessary and appropriate for public use" and that 

"are consistent to the highest practicable degree with the 

preservation and conservation" of the national parks, 16 

U.S.C. § 20 (1994), allows the sale of t-shirts (among other 

paraphernalia) from regulated kiosks. Friends also emphasize that certain areas of the Mall, such as the area in front of 

the National Air and Space Museum, are virtually overrun 

with tourists and thus suffer from the effects the Park 

Service complains of regardless of whether appellants are 

there selling t-shirts.3 Although it may be that the Park 

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Park Service allows. But see ISKCON, 61 F.3d at 957 (squarely 

rejecting this argument in evaluating the same regulation). 

4 On appeal, amicus American Civil Liberties Union repeatedly 

asserts that this case presents a "facial challenge" to the regulation. 

But this assertion is at odds with the complaint below and the 

argument as joined by the parties on appeal, so we ignore it. See, 

e.g., Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

Service could have limited its regulation to allow the sale of 

t-shirts in some particular locales, it also may be that the 

Park Service could have more broadly proscribed the sale of 

items, message-bearing and otherwise, on the Mall. Our 

inquiry is directed not at what the Park Service could have 

done, but rather at what it did, and whether that action 

furthers significant interests, does not burden substantially 

more speech than necessary to achieve those interests, and 

leaves open ample alternative means of communication. This 

task does not "assign to the judiciary the authority to replace 

the Park Service as the manager of the Nation's parks or 

endow the judiciary with the competence to judge how much 

protection of parklands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be attained." Clark, 468 U.S. at 299.4

* * * *

For the reasons stated, we reverse the district court's 

conclusion that the Park Service's regulation violates the 

First Amendment.

So ordered.

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