Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01692/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01692-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Bobby Joe Scott,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-14-1692-PHX-JAT (JFM)

Order and

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Eloy, 

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 

28, 2014 (Doc. 1). On March 18, 2015 Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 13). 

Petitioner filed a Reply on April 3, 2015 (Doc. 16), together with a Supplemental Reply 

(Doc. 14) and a Motion for Evidentiary Hearing (Doc. 15) to which Respondents have 

responded (Doc. 19).

The Petitioner's Petition and Motion for Evidentiary Hearing are now ripe for 

consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned makes the following orders and proposed 

findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) 

and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In his Petition (Doc. 1), Petitioner challenges a sentence imposed based on a 2010 

violation of probation granted in a 1997 case. He violated that probation in 2008, but 

was reinstated. All three proceedings are relevant. 

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A. FACTS UNDERLYING 1997 CASE

Although not the direct focus of the Petition, the facts underlying the 1997 case 

are relevant, and peculiarly so to Petitioner’s claim of cruel and unusual punishment. 

The Presentence and Probation Violation Report in that case related the following based 

upon police reports:

On July 31, 1996, Glendale Police responded to a Holiday 

Inn after they received a call from the victim's father. The father 

reported his fourteen-year-old daughter was a runaway and 

currently staying at the hotel with the twenty-four-year-old 

defendant, Bobby Joe Scott. Upon their arrival the officers noted the 

defendant's car which had coins, three cellular telephones and a 

compact disk player in plain view. Coincidently, the defendant came 

out of the room, was identified and secured in the police vehicle. 

The officers contacted the victim who allowed them into the hotel 

room. Inside, the officers noted two or three additional telephones, a 

box of compact disks and a pair of Reebok tennis shoes. A pipe and 

a small amount of marijuana was also found. The fourteen-year-old 

female victim advised the officers the property, including the pipe, 

was stolen from vehicles all over the Valley. She also advised that 

the defendant was responsible for damage to the bathroom door, 

which he kicked in while the victim was taking a bath. The victim 

either denied having sex with Bobby Joe or refused to answer those 

questions. 

The officers interviewed the victim's female friend, a minor. 

Both girls ran away from home. She stated she was in the hotel 

room while the victim and the defendant engaged in sexual activity 

under the covers. She stated the defendant was aware of both their 

ages shortly after they met. The friend slept in one bed whi1e the 

victim and the defendant slept in the other. She confirmed the 

property was stolen. The three of them would go "car prowling" and 

the friend would wait in the car while the defendant and the victim 

went to find unlocked cars. She also described an incident when, 

after shop1ifting at a department store, the defendant punched an 

adult male in the head when confronted in the parking lot. The man 

fell to the ground.

At the request of her parents, the victim submitted to a sexual 

assault examination. The physician stated there was fresh damage to 

the hymen area as well as a healed tear which was estimated to be a 

week old. During the examination the victim disclosed that she and 

the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse on a daily basis since 

she ran away six days prior. In a subsequent interview with the 

police officers the victim repeated this statement and was adamant 

that the defendant did not force her nor was she afraid of him at any 

time. She stated she wanted to have sex with him. The defendant 

consented to a taped interview. He eventually, admitted he knew the 

victim was only fourteen-years-old. He denied any sexual 

involvement with the victim and maintained that denial when 

confronted with the victim's disclosure. The defendant was evasive 

regarding the multiple burglaries. A search warrant for physical 

characteristics was obtained; and. while waiting for the 

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phlebotomist to arrive, the defendant was left in the locked 

interview room. The officers heard a loud thump noise coming from 

the room and then found the defendant on the floor and a chair 

against the wall. There were footprints up the wall leading to 

missing ceiling panels and a portion of the fire sprink1er system was 

on the floor. The defendant admitted he disconnected the video 

camera as part of h1s attempt to escape. He then proceeded to 

attempt to negotiate with the officer by offering to admit to the 

burglaries in order to drop the sexual offense charges. Whi1e the 

defendant was being processed in the booking area, the officers 

were counting the money in the defendant's possession. The 

defendant initiated a conversation where he offered the officers the 

$185.00 in cash to drop the sex charges. 

On August 2, 1996, the investigating police officer received a 

call from the victim's mother who stated her daughter confided the 

defendant made statements regarding the demise of her friend. The 

defendant stated he wanted to take the friend out to the desert and 

kill her. He wanted her out of the way. The defendant also made 

statements regarding his wanting to kill the victim's parents by 

putting bullets through their heads so they can stay in the house. On 

September 9, 1996, police officers were made aware that the 

defendant was sending letters to the victim from jail. Their content 

included admissions of the sexual activity with the victim and the 

humor the defendant found in getting into a fight and knocking his 

opponent to the ground. In one 1etter the defendant attempted to 

convince the victim to falsify her testimony in Court. He wanted her 

to testify that she told the defendant she was twenty-one years old.

(Exhibit G, Present. Rep. at 1-2.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 13, are referenced herein 

as “Exhibit ___.”) (See also Exhibit D, R.T. 3/18/97 at 18-20.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON CONVICTION IN 1997 CASE

At Trial - On October 9, 1996, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County 

Superior Court on a series of charges, including six counts of sexual conduct with a 

minor, escape, criminal damage, and tampering with a witness. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) 

Petitioner eventually entered into a Plea Agreement (Exhibit B), providing for a 

guilty plea to two amended counts of attempted sexual conduct with a minor, with a 

stipulated minimum of lifetime probation with one year of jail time. On March 18, 1997, 

Petitioner entered his guilty plea, which was accepted. (Exhibit C, M.E. 3/18/97.) 

On August 27, 1997, Petitioner was sentenced to 12 years on count I, and 

sentence on Count II was suspended and Petitioner was placed on lifetime probation. 

(Exhibit E, Sentence.) 

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1st PCR Proceeding - Petitioner instituted a post-conviction relief proceeding, 

filing his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief on September 2, 1997.) He eventually filed a 

PCR petition, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel at prior to the plea and at 

sentencing, denial of counsel at an initial appearance, denial of due process in his guilty 

plea proceeding, denial of counsel during questioning by detectives, denial of a 

preliminary hearing, coercion by counsel leading to guilty plea, etc. (Exhibit I, PCR 

Petition.) The PCR court summarily dismissed the petition on the merits. (Exhibit K, 

Order 2/4/99.) 

State Habeas Petition - Petitioner then filed a state habeas petition, dated August 

16, 1999, with the Arizona Supreme Court seeking review of the denial of PCR petition 

(Exhibit L). (No information on the filing date of this proceeding is provided.) That 

petition was summarily dismissed as an improper means of obtaining review. (Exhibit 

M, Order 9/28/99.) Reconsideration was summarily denied on November 29, 1999. 

(Exhibit N.) 

Federal Habeas Petition - On July 25, 2000, Petitioner filed in this Court a 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Exhibit O), challenging his conviction in the 1997

case and a 1994 burglary conviction. That Petition was denied with prejudice based on 

Petitioner’s procedural default of his state remedies. (Exhibit P, Order 9/17/4, CV-00-

1422-PHX-JAT (VAM).) Petitioner appealed that judgment, and the judgment was 

affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on September 7, 2006. (Exhibit Q, Order 

9/7/6.) 

Second PCR Proceeding – On November 22, 2004, while his appeal in his

federal habeas was pending with the Ninth Circuit, Petitioner filed a second PCR notice 

(Exhibit R) asserting new evidence of innocence, i.e. evidence impeaching the 

investigating detective. The PCR court summarily dismissed the proceeding based upon 

Petitioner’s guilty plea. (Exhibit T, M.E. 4/19/05.) Petitioner did not seek further 

review in that proceeding.

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C. PROBATION REVOCATIONS

Petitioner was eventually released from prison some 11 years later, on or about 

June 26, 2008, and proceeded on with his “lifetime” probation on Count II in the 1997

case. (See Exhibit U, Pet. Revoke (listing probation start date as 6/26/08); Exhibit X, 

M.E. 12/18/08 (same).)

2008 Probation Violation - On December 17, 2008, Petitioner’s probation officer 

filed a Petition to Revoke Probation, based upon allegations of illicit drug use, and 

failure to comply with various conditions of probation. (Exhibit U.) Petitioner 

eventually admitted one violation, and was continued on probation for “a period of 5 

years,” running from his prison release date, June 26, 2008. (Exhibit X, M.E. 12/18/08.) 

2009 Probation Violation – On March 11, 2009, Petitioner’s probation officer 

filed a second Petition to Revoke Probation (Exhibit Y), asserting that Petitioner had 

absconded and violation of other terms of probation. Petitioner was not in custody, and a 

warrant was requested.

D. PROCEEDINGS ON CONVICTION IN 2010 CASE 

At Trial Court - On January 15, 2010, a Direct Complaint (Exhibit Z) was filed 

in Maricopa County Superior Court charging Petitioner with two counts of robbery and 

one count of theft arising out of a bank robbery. On January 27, 2010, an Indictment 

(Exhibit AA) was filed on the same charges.

Petitioner eventually entered into a written Plea Agreement (Exhibit EE), 

agreeing to plead guilty to one count of theft, with a non-binding stipulation to 

supervised probation, and one count of robbery, with a stipulated sentence of 6 years and 

an agreement to revoke his probation in the 1997 case, with a consecutive (but prior) 

sentence of at least 10 years.

On May 26, 2010, Petitioner’s probation in the 1997 case was violated, and he 

was sentenced to 12 years in prison. On the same date, he was sentenced in the 2010 

case to a suspended sentence on the theft count, and probation of five years, consecutive 

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to release from prison, and a sentence of 6 years in prison on the robbery count, 

consecutive to the 1997 sentence. (Exhibit II, R.T. 5/26/10 at 12-14.)

PCR Proceeding – On June 29, 2010, Petitioner filed a PCR Notice (Exhibit JJ), 

and counsel was appointed (Exhibit KK, M.E. 7/1/10), who eventually filed a Notice of 

Completion of Review (Exhibit OO) evidencing an inability to find an issue for review. 

Petitioner was granted leave to file a pro per PCR Petition. (Exhibit PP, M.E. 3/28/11.) 

Petitioner then filed his pro per Petition (Exhibit QQ), raising claims challenging the 

1997 conviction based the detective’s credibility, misrepresentations to the grand jury, 

improper letters from counsel to the sentencing judge, failure of the judge to recuse 

himself, and lack of statutory authority to impose lifetime probation. The Petition 

challenged the 2010 conviction based upon ineffective assistance of counsel in advising 

Petitioner on his exposure in the probation violation, illegal transport to Arizona, 

presentence incarceration credits for time spent in California prison, ineffective 

assistance of counsel, breach of the plea agreement by promising a recommendation to a 

presumptive sentence but requesting an aggravated sentence, violations of his rights 

when deputies stole his motions, denial of counsel when he couldn’t telephone counsel, 

violation of the terms of the plea, ineffective assistance of PCR counsel, violation of 

Petitioner’s right of access to the courts, and cumulative errors. The PCR court rejected 

all of Petitioner’s claims on the merits. (Exhibit TT, ME. 7/21/11.) 

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, raising claims 

regarding authority to impose lifetime probation in the 1997 case, improper transport and 

denial of incarceration credit, unlawfully induced plea agreement, denial of counsel, 

stealing of Petitioner’s motions, violation of the terms of the plea agreement, ineffective 

assistance of counsel, and denial of right of access. (Exhibit UU). The Arizona Court of 

Appeals summarily denied review. (Exhibit AAA, Order 4/5/13.) 

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Exhibit BBB.) On 

October 8, 2013, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review (Exhibit FFF).

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E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 28, 2014 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts the following four grounds for relief:

(1) The trial court did not have statutory authority to impose 

lifetime probation; 

(2) Petitioner’s sentence is illegal because the trial court 

lacked jurisdiction in violation of the due process clause, the 

sentence constitutes double jeopardy, and the sentence constitutes 

cruel and unusual punishment; 

(3) Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective in violation of 

the Sixth Amendment; and 

(4) Petitioner should have been granted an evidentiary 

hearing during his Rule 32 proceedings in state court.

(Order 11/20/14, Doc. 4 at 2.) With regard to Ground 2, the claims are:

A. Petitioner’s due process rights were violated because the 1997 sentence to

lifetime probation was unauthorized, only a 5 year term was permitted, that 

term ran from the date of imposition and expired in 2002, and therefore the 

court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate Petitioner on probation in 2008, and to 

sentence him to prison in 2010;

B. Petitioner’s double jeopardy rights were violated when he was again 

placed on probation in 2008 for the 1997 case, and when he was sentenced 

in the 2010 case; and

C. Petitioner’s combined sentences of the original 12 year sentence, lifetime 

probation, 5 years probation, and another 12 years imprisonment are cruel 

and unusual punishment for his offenses.

With regard to Ground 3, the claims are:

A. Petitioner’s original counsel in his 1997 case was ineffective in failing to 

adequately advise him in the course of accepting the plea agreement on the 

permissible probation term;

B. Petitioner’s counsel at sentencing in his 1997 case was ineffective in 

failing to object to a sentence to lifetime probation which was not 

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authorized by law;

C. Petitioner’s counsel in his 2008 probation revocation proceeding was 

ineffective in failing to pursue the expiration of his 1997 probation term; 

and

D. Petitioner’s counsel in his 2010 probation revocation proceeding was 

ineffective in failing to pursue the expiration of his 1997 probation term.

Response - On March 18, 2015, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 13). Respondents argue that: (1) Petitioner’s challenges to his 1997 case are 

barred as a successive Petition; (2) any claims raised based on the 1997 conviction or 

2008 probation violation are barred by the habeas statute of limitations; (3) claims based 

on Petitioner’s convictions in his 1997 and 2010 case were waived by his guilty pleas; 

(4) Petitioner claims concerning his 1997 case were barred on state grounds; (5) 

Petitioner’s claims concerning his 2008 probation violation are procedurally defaulted; 

(6) Petitioner’s double jeopardy claim is procedurally defaulted; and (7) the remainder of 

Petitioner’s claims are without merit, i.e. the balance of Ground 2, and Ground 3.

Reply - On April 3, 2015, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 15). Petitioner argues: 

(1) the invalidity of his lifetime probation sentence is based on a 2008 decision, and 

concerns the validity of his 2010 sentence; (2) his petition is timely because he is 

challenging the 2010 conviction and sentence; (3) his claims are not waived by his guilty 

plea because it is a product of ineffective assistance; (4) no procedural bar was applied to 

Petitioner’s claims, including his double jeopardy claim raised in Ground Two of his 

PCR petition, and any procedural default should be excused for cause; (5) Petitioner’s 

claims are meritorious.

In addition, Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend or Supplement (Doc. 14) seeking 

to supplement his Reply with arguments that: (1) pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.2, the 

Arizona Department of Corrections was required to impose any regulations on probation; 

pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-107(B)(1), there was a 7 year statute of limitations; and 

pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.3, the trial court had only 60 days to correct its illegal 

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sentence term. The motion was granted, and consequently, the arguments in the Motion 

(Doc. 14) are considered in connection with Petitioner’s Reply (Doc. 15).

Motion for Evidentiary Hearing – Petitioner also filed a Motion for Evidentiary 

Hearing (Doc. 15), requesting an evidentiary hearing and various prison records.

Respondents have responded (Doc. 19) to the motion, arguing that the evidentiary 

hearing will not establish relief on his untimely or procedurally defaulted claims, and 

will not support his Grounds 2 or 3.

Petitioner has not replied.

Because the discussions involved in addressing the merits of Petitioner’s claims 

are relevant to the resolution of that motion (either directly or to the extent that such 

claims are removed from consideration), the undersigned addressed the motion herein.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that, to the extent that Petitioner challenges the 1997 case or 

the 2008 probation violation, Petitioner’s Petition is untimely.1 As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

 

1 Because this Court lacks jurisdiction over second or successive claims and applications, 

the “second or successive” issues discussed hereinafter arguably take priority, and should 

be addressed prior to considering the applicability of the statute of limitations. Because 

the depth of consideration required to address the statute of limitations is greater than 

that to address the “second or successive” issue, the undersigned addresses the statute of 

limitations first. Ultimately, the recommendation to dismiss portions of the Petition as 

second or successive will take priority.

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2. Commencement of Limitations Period

Conviction Final - The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions 

generally begins to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A).2 

Petitioner does not contest that direct challenges to his 1997 and 2008 judgments 

would be untimely, but replies that he is only challenging the 2010 judgment revoking 

his probation from that case, and that his claims of illegal sentence and fundamental 

error may be raised at any time. (Reply, Doc. 16 at 4.) 

The essence of Petitioner’s claims related to these earlier proceedings is as 

follows: First, that the trial court’s imposition of lifetime probation in 1997 was 

unauthorized, and the maximum probation term authorized was five years. (Respondents 

concede that the Arizona Supreme Court so held in State v. Peek, 219 Ariz. 182, 195 

P.3d 641 (2008).3) Second, that the trial court directed that the probation term was to 

commence on July 22, 1997, the date of his sentence, resulting in the expiration of his 

term of probation five years later, before he was ever released from prison. Thus, 

Petitioner contends that there was no valid order of probation which could have been 

violated in 2009 when he committed the robberies. (Respondents counter this 

 

2

Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly 

recognized constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Petitioner proffers no argument that any of these apply. 

Changes in law are addressed by subsection (d)(1)(C) of § 2244. The 2008 decision in 

Peek would not justify a later commencement date. Absent unusual circumstances, such 

as a vacating of a petitioner’s own prior conviction, the issuance of a state court decision 

does not constitute the discovery of a “factual predicate” for a habeas claim for purposes 

of a delayed commencement under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). See Shannon v. Newland, 

410 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005). Further, the changes in the law permitting a 

delayed commencement under § 2244(d)(1)(C) is limited to newly recognized 

constitutional rights made retroactively applicable by the U.S. Supreme Court to cases on 

collateral review. Peek does not qualify.

3

In Peek, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that changes in the applicable statutes in 

1994 had removed lifetime probation as a potential sentence for attempted dangerous 

crimes against children, although the statute was subsequently amended again in 1997 to 

permit lifetime probation as a sentence. Peek, 219 Ariz. at 184, 195 P.3d at 643. 

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proposition by referencing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-903(E) which precludes satisfying a 

term of probation while incarcerated.)

In Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S 147 (2007), the Court concluded that for purposes 

of the habeas statute of limitations, “[f]inal judgment in a criminal case means sentence. 

The sentence is the judgment.” Id. at 799 (quoting Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 

211, 212 (1937)).

Here, the sentence attacked by Petitioner in Ground 1 (no authority to impose 

lifetime probation), is the sentence in the 1997 proceeding.

4

 

The sentences attacked in Ground 2A (due process, lack of jurisdiction) include 

the 1997 sentence, the 2008 revocation, and the 2010 revocation. This claim depends 

upon this Court addressing the validity of all three judgments. Petitioner argues it is 

really only the latter judgment. If his theory were limited to an argument that the 

probation imposed in 1997 had already expired, and thus the court in 2010 was reviving 

an expired probation sentence, then this claim would be limited to an attack on the 2010 

judgment. No inquiry into the validity of the 1997 sentence would be required. But, 

such a theory would ignore the 2008 judgment, when Petitioner was reinstated on 5 years 

probation. To grant relief under Ground 2A on the 2010 sentence on revocation, this 

Court must determine the validity of the 2008 judgment reinstating Petitioner on 

probation. Thus, Petitioner is attacking the 2008 judgment in Ground 2A, and the 

finality of that judgment initiated the habeas statute of limitations with regard to claims 

that the 2008 judgment was invalid. This of course, does not preclude Petitioner from 

challenging his 2010 sentence, but it does preclude him from relying upon any invalidity 

in the 1997 or 2008 judgments, because, as discussed hereinafter, the habeas statute of 

limitations on those judgments has expired.

Similarly, Ground 2B (double jeopardy) depends upon Petitioner breaking the tie 

 

4

. This claim is arguably moot because, by the time of Petitioner’s 2008 probation 

revocation proceeding, the parties had apparently acknowledged the applicability of 

Peek, and thus Petitioner had been reinstated on probation for only a term of 5 years. 

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between the 1997, 2008 and 2010 judgments, from successive rulings on the original 

probation order, into separate sentences, with the probation sentence between each 

having expired. To that extent, as discussed hereinafter, Ground 2B is barred by the 

habeas limitations period.

Conversely, Ground 2C (cruel and unusual punishment), does not depend upon 

any validity in the 1997 or 2008 judgments, but focuses upon the cumulative punishment 

imposed after the 2010 judgment. Accordingly, the relevant judgment for limitations 

purposes is the 2010 judgment. 

In Ground 3 (ineffective assistance of counsel), Petitioner attacks the 

performance of counsel in all three proceedings, and thus effectively attacks the 1997

(Ground 3A and 3B), 2008 (Ground 3C) and 2010 (Ground 3D) judgments. Because 

they attack the 1997 and 2008 proceedings, as discussed hereinafter, Grounds 3A, 3B, 

and 3C are barred by the habeas limitations period.

In Ground 4 (denial of PCR evidentiary hearing), Petitioner attacks only the 

validity of the 2010 PCR proceedings. Accordingly, the relevant judgment in this 

ground is the 2010 judgment.

Finality of 1997 Sentence – Petitioner was sentenced in the 1997 case on August 

27, 1997. (Exhibit E, Sentence.) 

For an Arizona noncapital pleading defendant, the conviction becomes “final” at 

the conclusion of the first “of-right” post-conviction proceeding under Rule 32. 

“Arizona's Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct 

review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. Schriro, 481 

F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). “To bring an of-right proceeding under Rule 32, a pleaconvicted defendant must provide to the Arizona Superior Court, within 90 days of 

conviction and sentencing in that court, notice of his or her intent to file a Petition for 

Post-Conviction Review.” Id. at 715 (citing Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(a)). 

Here, Petitioner instituted his of-right PCR proceeding by filing his PCR notice 

on September 2, 1997. That proceeding remained pending through February 4, 1999 

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when the PCR court dismissed the petition. Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

32.9(c), a PCR petitioner has thirty days after the dismissal of his petition to seek review 

in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Arizona applies Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

1.3 to extend “the time to file an appeal by five days when the order appealed from has 

been mailed to the interested party and commences to run on the date the clerk mails the 

order.” State v. Zuniga, 163 Ariz. 105, 106, 786 P.2d 956, 957 (1990). This rule has 

been extended to post-conviction relief proceedings. See State v. Goracke, 210 Ariz. 20, 

21 n.1, 106 P.3d 1035, 1036 n.1 (Ct. App. Div. 1 2005). See also State v. Brock, 163 

Ariz. 523, 526, 789 P.2d 390, 393 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1989) (supplemental opinion), aff'd, 

165 Ariz. 296, 798 P.2d 1305 (1990) (applying to PCR motion for reconsideration of 

appellate court ruling). The order dismissing the Petition was not filed until February 4, 

1999, and there is no indication that it was delivered to Petitioner other than by mail. 

Accordingly, Petitioner had 35 days thereafter, or until Thursday, March 11, 1999, to 

seek further review.

Petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, Petitioner’s 1997 judgment became final 

on March 11, 1999, his one year limitations period commenced running thereafter, and 

without any tolling, expired on March 11, 2000.

Finality of 2008 Order – Petitioner’s sentence on the 1997 case was again 

suspended and he was reinstated on probation for five years on December 18, 2008. 

(Exhibit X.) Because Petitioner admitted violating his probation (id.), Petitioner’s only 

right of review of such a decision was by an of-right petition for post-conviction relief. 

See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1; State v. Brown, 112 Ariz. 29, 32, 536 P.2d 1047, 1050 

(1975). Petitioner had 90 days to seek review of that determination, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.4(a), but did not do so. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.3 (time for mailing) 

does not extend that time because Petitioner was present when the order was entered. 

“We again stress that in most criminal cases, the defendant and counsel for both sides 

will be present in court when the appealed order, judgment, or sentence is entered and 

that in this opinion we deal only with cases in which notice is, in fact, given by mail.” 

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State v. Zuniga, 163 Ariz. 105, 106, 786 P.2d 956, 957 n.2 (1990). Accordingly, the 

2008 order became final by expiration of the time for further review on Wednesday, 

March 18, 2009, his one year limitations period commenced running thereafter, and 

without any tolling, expired on March 18, 2010.

Finality of 2010 Sentence and Order – Petitioner was sentenced on the 2010 

conviction and revocation on May 26, 2010. Because both were based upon Petitioner’s 

admissions, his right of direct review was by an of-right PCR proceeding. Summers, 481 

F.3d at 717. Petitioner filed his PCR notice on July 29, 2010 (Exhibit JJ), within the 90 

day time limit, making it an of-right petition. That proceeding remained pending 

through October 8, 2013, when the Arizona Supreme Court denied review (Exhibit FFF). 

Accordingly, the 2010 order and sentence became final by the conclusion of direct 

review on that date, his one year limitations period commenced running thereafter, and 

without any tolling, expired on October 8, 2014.

3. Timeliness Without Tolling

Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 1) was filed on July 28, 2014. However, the Petition 

asserts that it was placed in the prison mailing system on July 21, 2014. “In determining 

when a pro se state or federal petition is filed, the ‘mailbox’ rule applies. A petition is 

considered to be filed on the date a prisoner hands the petition to prison officials for 

mailing.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010).

As determined in subsection (1) above, without any tolling Petitioner’s one year 

habeas limitations period expired no later than March 11, 2000 on his 1997 sentence, 

March 18, 2009 on his 2008 revocation order, and October 8, 2014 on his 2010 sentence 

and revocation order. Thus, without any tolling, Petitioner’s Petition is delinquent to the 

extent that it seeks review of his 1997 sentence or 2008 order. It is timely with regard to 

the 2010 order and sentence.

/ /

/ /

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4. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This provision only applies to 

state proceedings, not to federal proceedings. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

Properly Filed - Statutory tolling of the habeas limitations period only results 

from state applications that are “properly filed,” and an untimely application is never 

“properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 

(2005). On the other hand, the fact that the application may contain procedurally barred 

claims does not mean it is not “properly filed.” “[T]he question whether an application 

has been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims 

contained in the application are meritorious and free of procedural bar.” Artuz v. 

Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9 (2000). 

Even if the state court provides alternative grounds for disposing of the state 

application, a ruling that the application was untimely precludes it from being “properly 

filed” and tolling the limitations period. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225-26 (2002). 

If the state court summarily disposes of a state application without identifying if it was 

on timeliness grounds, or otherwise fails to give a clear indication wehther it has deemed 

the application timely or untimely, the federal habeas court “must itself examine the 

delay in each case and determine what the state courts would have held in respect to 

timeliness.” Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198 (2006).

Mailbox Rule - For purposes of calculating tolling under § 2244(d), the federal 

prisoner “mailbox rule” applies. Under this rule, a prisoner’s state filings are deemed 

“filed” (and tolling thus commenced) when they are delivered to prison officials for 

mailing. In Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit noted: 

[I]n Saffold v. Newland, 224 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir.2000), we squarely 

held that the mailbox rule applies with equal force to the filing of 

state as well as federal petitions, because "[a]t both times, the 

conditions that led to the adoption of the mailbox rule are present; 

the prisoner is powerless and unable to control the time of delivery 

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of documents to the court." Id. at 1091. 

Id. at 575. 

Similarly, the “mailbox rule” applies to determining whether an Arizona 

prisoner’s state filings were timely. Although a state may direct that the prison mailbox 

rule does not apply to filings in its court, see Orpiada v. McDaniel, 750 F.3d 1086, 1090 

(9th Cir. 2014), Arizona has applied the rule to a variety of its state proceedings. See e.g. 

Mayer v. State, 184 Ariz. 242, 245, 908 P.2d 56, 59 (App.1995) (notice of direct appeal); 

State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266, 987 P.2d 226, 228 (App.1999) (PCR notice); State 

v. Goracke, 210 Ariz. 20, 23, 106 P.3d 1035, 1038 (App. 2005) (petition for review to 

Arizona Supreme Court).

Application to 1997 Judgment - Petitioner’s limitations period on his 1997 

sentence commenced running on March 11, 1999 when his time to seek further review in 

his PCR proceeding expired. Petitioner’s next proceeding challenging this judgment was 

his habeas petition filed with the Arizona Supreme Court on or about August 16, 1999. 

At that time, 158 days of Petitioner’s one year had expired, leaving 207 days remaining

That proceeding remained pending, at most, until November 29, 1999, when the Arizona 

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal. (Exhibit 

N.) Thus Petitioner’s one year commenced running again on November 30, 1999, and 

expired 207 days later on Monday, June 26, 2000. 

On July 25, 2000, Petitioner filed his first federal habeas petition (Exhibit O). 

However, that federal proceeding did not toll the statute of limitations. Duncan, 533 U.S. 

167.

Petitioner’s next state PCR proceeding was not commenced until November,

2004, when Petitioner filed his second PCR notice (Exhibit R). At that time, his one 

year had been expired for over four years. Once the statute has run, a subsequent postconviction or collateral relief filing does not reset the running of the one year statute. 

Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Petitioner has no statutory tolling resulting from 

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his second PCR proceeding, or any subsequent proceedings, and his limitations period 

expired on June 26, 2000.

Consequently, even with the available statutory tolling, Petitioner’s current 

habeas petition, was over 14 years delinquent for purposes of challenging his 1997 

sentence.

2008 Revocation Order – Petitioner’s one year to challenge his 2008 revocation 

order began running on March 19, 2009. Petitioner sought no review of any of these

state court judgments between then and when his one year expired on March 18, 2010. 

Consequently, Petitioner’s current habeas petition was over 4 years delinquent for 

purposes of challenging his 2008 revocation order.

5. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations 

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on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling 

is appropriate.”).

Petitioner does not proffer any grounds for equitable tolling, and the undersigned 

finds none.

6. Actual Innocence

To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the habeas statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude “a court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 

S.Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013). To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a 

petitioner “’must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’” Id. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). This exception, referred to as the “Schlup gateway,” applies 

“only when a petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was 

free of nonharmless constitutional error.’ ” Id. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

316). 

Petitioner makes no such claim of actual innocence in this proceeding.

7. Summary re Statute of Limitations

Based on the foregoing, to the extent that Petitioner challenges his 1997 sentence 

or his 2008 revocation order, his Petition is delinquent. 

Petitioner’s Ground 1 (no authority to impose lifetime probation) challenges only 

the 1997 sentence. Accordingly, this claim is barred by the statute of limitations and 

must be dismissed. Petitioner’s Ground 2A (due process, lack of jurisdiction) attacks 

the 1997 sentence, the 2008 revocation, and the 2010 revocation. The attacks on the 

former two are delinquent, but any remaining attack on the 2010 revocation order is not 

delinquent (although perhaps rendered meritless by Petitioner’s inability to invalidate the 

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earlier judgments). Petitioner’s Ground 2B (double jeopardy) depends upon Petitioner 

breaking the tie between the 1997, 2008 and 2010 judgments, from successive rulings on 

the original probation order, into separate sentences, with the probation sentence 

between each having expired. To that extent, Ground 2B is barred by the habeas 

limitations period. The portion attacking the 2010 conviction is timely (although 

perhaps rendered meritless by Petitioner’s inability to invalidate the earlier judgments). 

Petitioner’s Ground 2C (cruel and unusual punishment), does not depend upon any 

validity in the 1997 or 2008 judgments, but focuses upon the cumulative punishment 

imposed after the 2010 judgment. Accordingly, this claim is timely. Petitioner’s 

Grounds 3A, 3B, and 3C (ineffective assistance of counsel) attack the performance of 

counsel in his 1997 and 2008 proceedings and are barred by the habeas limitations 

period. Petitioner’s Ground 4 (denial of PCR evidentiary hearing), Petitioner attacks 

only the validity of the 2010 PCR proceedings, and is timely. 

Therefore, this Court must dismiss with prejudice Ground 1, and the portions of 

Grounds 2A, 2B and 3 challenging the 1997 and 2008 judgments.

B. SUCCESSIVE PETITION

Respondents argue that Petitioner challenged his 1997 sentence in his 2000 

federal habeas petition, and therefore, to the extent that Petitioner again challenges that 

sentence in this Petition, the petition is successive. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 13, et seq.)

Successive Claims – A habeas petitioner is barred from presenting a claim in a 

second or successive petition if the claim “was presented in a prior application.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). Because there is no process to revive a “second or successive” 

claim, it must be dismissed with prejudice. 

Successive Petitions – In addition to being precluded from presenting the same 

claims successively, a habeas petitioner is generally prohibited by the AEDPA from 

filing a "second or successive" habeas petition asserting any claims attacking the same 

judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Thus, a claim in a second or successive petition must

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be dismissed (even if that particular claim was not presented in a prior habeas petition). 

However, where the particular claim was not previously presented, the petitioner may be 

able to be revive it by obtaining leave from the court of appeals to present it. 

Accordingly, such a dismissal should be without prejudice.

In Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010), the Court clarified that “ the 

phrase ‘second or successive’ must be interpreted with respect to the judgment 

challenged.” Id. at 333. Thus, a new sentence rendered following a grant of habeas 

relief mandating resentencing was not a “second or successive” petition, inasmuch as it 

only challenged the new sentence.

In Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit answered 

the question left unanswered in Magwood, whether a subsequent petition, filed after a 

resentencing, was “second or successive” when it challenged not only the new sentence, 

but the underlying and undisturbed conviction as well. The court found that successive 

applications must be evaluated “with respect to the judgment challenged and not with 

respect to particular components of that judgment.” 674 F.3d at 1127. 

The Ninth Circuit has also concluded that § 2244(b)(2) does not “preclude 

prisoners from bringing habeas claims that could not have been brought in earlier 

petitions.” Hill v. State of Alaska, 297 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, in Hill, a 

prior petition challenging a conviction did not preclude a subsequent petition challenging 

the conditions of parole. Id. “A prisoner whose conviction and sentence were tested 

long ago may still file petitions relating to denial of parole, revocation of a suspended 

sentence, and the like because such claims were not ripe for adjudication at the 

conclusion of the prisoner's first federal habeas proceeding.” United States v. 

Buenrostro, 638 F.3d 720, 725 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Denial or Dismissal With Prejudice Required - In Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473 (2000) the Supreme Court held that when a habeas petition has been dismissed for 

failure to exhaust (in that case, a mixed petition of exhausted and unexhausted claims), a 

subsequent petition “is to be treated as ‘any other first petition’ and is not a second or 

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successive petition.” Id. at 487. Conversely, where the dismissal was with prejudice 

based upon a procedural default, a subsequent petition is “second or successive.” 

Henderson v. Lampert, 396 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Leave for Exceptional Petitions - A successive petition (but not a successive 

claim) may be presented if it rests on new law, new evidence, or the petitioner’s actual 

innocence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Even in these circumstances, leave of the Court of 

Appeals is required to maintain the successive petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 

Referral to Court of Appeals - Section 2244 directs dismissal of successive 

claims or petitions. With regard to the latter, where the petitioner “was required to 

receive authorization from the Court of Appeals before filing his second challenge...[and 

failed to do so], the District Court was without jurisdiction to entertain it.” Burton v. 

Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 153 (2007).

However, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a rule intended to redirect the petitioner. 

“If a second or successive petition or motion, or an application for authorization to file 

such a petition or motion, is mistakenly submitted to the district court, the district court 

shall refer it to the court of appeals.” Ninth Circuit Rule 22-3. 

Application to Petitioner’s Claims – In his 2000 habeas petition, Petitioner 

asserted claims related to the 1997 case that: (1) he received ineffective assistance 

because his attorney had failed to consult with him; (2) the prosecutor engaged in 

misconduct at the grand jury; (3) he received ineffective assistance as a result of 

counsel’s: (a) failure to file a petition for special action, (b) bad advice on the expected 

prison sentence as a result of the plea agreement, and (c) writing a letter to the trial judge 

accusing Petitioner of threatening harm to her if she would not have sex with him; (4) he 

received ineffective assistance when his replacement attorney refused to file a motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea; (5) denial of his right to self-representation; (6) ineffective 

assistance when counsel misinformed Petitioner about the sentencing date; (7) 

ineffective assistance when counsel refused to show Petitioner the letter written to the 

judge, causing Petitioner to waive his motion to recuse the judge; (8) prosecutorial 

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misconduct by misrepresenting at sentencing that Petitioner had threatened the victim; 

and (9) cruel and unusual punishment based on the prison term, lifetime probation, 

restitution, and insufficient credit for time served. (Exhibit O.) 

In his current Petition, Petitioner asserts two potentially overlapping claims: his 

cruel and unusual punishment claim, and his ineffective assistance claims in Ground 3. 

With regard to the cruel and unusual punishment claim in Ground 2C, Petitioner’s 

current claim is based on the totality of punishment in all three judgments. In his earlier 

petition, it was based solely on the original sentences. Consequently, the claim now 

presented is fundamentally different from that asserted in his 2000 petition. Moreover, it 

is based on subsequently occurring judgments, and thus could not have been brought in 

2000. Accordingly, this is not a successive claim.

With regard to ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner now argues in 

Grounds 3A that his first attorney in the 1997 case was ineffective in advising him of 

his exposure at sentencing with regard to probation terms. He raised a similar claim in 

Ground 3(b) of his 2000 petition, but that claim was focused on advice regarding the 

potential prison term, not the impropriety of a lifetime term of probation. This is a 

fundamentally different claim, the one focusing on a prognostication of the expected 

prison sentence, and the other on the legality of the term of probation. Consequently, it 

is not a successive claim. He also argues in Ground 3B that his second counsel failed 

to adequately research the sentencing statutes, so as to prevent the imposition of the 

unauthorized term of lifetime probation. Although Petitioner challenged the 

effectiveness of his second counsel in his 2000 Petition, he did not do so based on the 

unauthorized nature of the lifetime probation. Accordingly, this is not a successive 

claim. 

Accordingly, none of Petitioner’s claims are second or successive claims.

Application to Petitioner’s Petitions – In his present Petition, Petitioner 

challenges in Grounds 1 (lack of jurisdiction), 2A (due process re lifetime probation) and 

2B (double jeopardy re lifetime probation), and 3A (ineffectiveness in plea agreement) 

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and 3B (ineffective assistance at sentencing) the validity of his original sentence in the 

1997 case. That sentence was the subject of his 2000 federal habeas petition. That 

petition was dismissed with prejudice on the basis that Petitioner had procedurally 

default his state remedies. (Exhibit P, Order at 4-5.) A dismissal based on procedural 

default renders a subsequent petition “second or successive.” Henderson, 396 F.3d at 

1053. 

Therefore, to the extent the present petition challenges the 1997 sentence, it is 

second or successive. Petitioner has not obtained leave from the Ninth Circuit to file 

such a petition.5 Accordingly, those portions of the instant petition must be dismissed as 

a second or successive application.

Summary re Second or Successive – Based upon the foregoing, Ground 1 and 

those portions of Grounds 2A, 2B, 3A and 3B challenging Petitioner’s 1997 sentence are 

a second or successive application, and must be dismissed without prejudice.

Petitioner should be referred to the Ninth Circuit, pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 

22-3(a), and provided a form of application for second or successive habeas petition.

C. EXHAUSTION & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims challenging his 1997 sentence and 

2008 revocation order are either procedurally defaulted or were procedurally barred on 

an independent and adequate state ground, and thus are barred from federal habeas 

review.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

 

5

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2244(b)(2) applicable. That task falls to the Ninth Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 

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codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

"A petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of 

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, 

(2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for 

the claim." Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005).

Proper Forum - “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, 

‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the 

Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 

(9th Cir. 2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Proper Vehicle - Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a 

petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction 

in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 

F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted 

before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative 

avenues of reviewing constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. 

Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989). 

Factual Basis – A petition must have fairly presented the operative facts of his 

federal claim to the state courts as part of the same claim. A petitioner may not broaden 

the scope of a constitutional claim in the federal courts by asserting additional operative

facts that have not yet been fairly presented to the state courts. Expanded claims not 

presented in the highest state court are not considered in a federal habeas petition. 

Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1995); see also, Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 

F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1219 (1983). And, while new factual 

allegations do not ordinarily render a claim unexhausted, a petitioner may not 

"fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts." Vasquez v. 

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Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). See also Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1468 (9th 

Cir.1994).

Legal Basis - Failure to so alert the state court to the constitutional nature of the 

claim will amount to failure to exhaust state remedies. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364,

366 (1995). While the petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal 

constitution,” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. 

Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary 

to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state 

law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). “[T]he 

petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by specifying particular 

provisions of the federal Constitution or statutes, or by citing to federal case law,” 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005), or by “a citation to a state 

case analyzing [the] federal constitutional issue." Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 

1158 (9th Cir. 2003). But a drive-by-citation of a state case applying federal and state 

law is not sufficient. 

For a federal issue to be presented by the citation of a state decision 

dealing with both state and federal issues relevant to the claim, the 

citation must be accompanied by some clear indication that the case 

involves federal issues. Where, as here, the citation to the state case 

has no signal in the text of the brief that the petitioner raises federal 

claims or relies on state law cases that resolve federal issues, the 

federal claim is not fairly presented. 

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 912 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Fair Presentation - "[O]rdinarily a state prisoner does not 'fairly present' a claim 

to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) 

that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a 

lower court opinion in the case, that does so." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). 

The Arizona habeas petitioner "must have presented his federal, constitutional issue 

before the Arizona Court of Appeals within the four corners of his appellate briefing." 

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005). But see Insyxiengmay v. 

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2005) (arguments set out in appendix attached 

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to petition and incorporated by reference were fairly presented).

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 

13 at 21.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, no 

provision is made for a successive direct appeal. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer 

available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s preclusion, waiver and 

timeliness bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Preclusion Bar – Under the rules applicable to Arizona’s post-conviction process, 

a claim may not be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief if the claim was 

“[f]inally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding.” 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

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shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). But see State v. Diaz, 236 Ariz. 361, 340 P.3d 

1069 (2014) (failure of PCR counsel, without fault by petitioner, to file timely petition in 

prior PCR proceedings did not amount to waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel). 

For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show that the 

defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the 

ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional 

rights “that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 

390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in 

Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to 

counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelveperson jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a 

personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071. Claims based upon ineffective 

assistance of counsel are determined by looking at “the nature of the right allegedly 

affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

Here, none of Petitioner’s claims are of the sort requiring a personal waiver, and 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance similarly have at their core the kinds of 

claims not within the types identified as requiring a personal waiver.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

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Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appear that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning 

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claims of actual innocence, has no application to the procedural claims Petitioner asserts 

in this proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that 

were not fairly presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

3. Procedural Bar on Independent and Adequate State Grounds

Related to the concept of procedural default is the principle of barring claims 

actually disposed of by the state courts on state grounds. “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ 

and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] 

declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 

state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011).

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit addressed 

the burden of proving the independence and adequacy of a state procedural bar.

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent 

and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the 

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The 

petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, 

including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent 

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate 

burden is the state's. 

Id. at 584-585. 

4. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

Here, Petitioner has made two forays to the Arizona appellate courts which could 

result in the proper exhaustion of his state remedies. 

The first was his 1999 state habeas petition to the Arizona Supreme Court 

(Exhibit L). That petition was dismissed as an improper attempt to obtain review of his 

PCR proceeding. (Exhibit M.) Moreover, where a claim is cognizable in the Arizona 

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courts on direct appeal or in a Rule 32 post-conviction relief proceeding, presenting it in 

a state habeas petition is not adequate to exhaust state remedies. Roettgen v. Copeland,

33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994).6 Thus, whatever claims may have been presented in that 

petition, it was an improper vehicle, and thus did not result in fair presentation.

The second was his Petition for Review in his 2010 revocation proceedings 

(Exhibit UU). That Petition was summarily denied (Exhibit AAA), as was his 

subsequent petition for review (Exhibit BBB) to the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit 

FFF). Thus, this court looks through to the last reasoned decision, Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 

501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991), which in this case was the Arizona PCR court’s ruling 

(Exhibit TT).

a. Ground 1 – (Lifetime Probation) - In Ground One of his Petition, Petitioner 

argues that the state court lacked authority to impose a sentence of lifetime probation, 

but was limited to five years.7 This claim is barred as a second or successive petition, 

and as untimely. Accordingly, the undersigned does not address the exhaustion of this 

claim.

b. Ground 2A – (Due Process re Lifetime Probation) - In Ground 2A of his 

Petition, Petitioner argues that his rights to due process under the 14th Amendment were 

violated because the trial court lacked jurisdiction in 1997 to impose a sentence of 

lifetime probation, the permissible 5 year term had expired in 2002 and thus the trial 

court lacked jurisdiction in 2008 to reinstate him on 5 years probation, and therefore 

 

6 One potentially relevant exception to the appropriateness of direct appeal or petition 

for post conviction relief, would be for Petitioner’s double jeopardy claim. A petition for 

special action is the appropriate vehicle to obtain judicial appellate review of an 

interlocutory double jeopardy claim. See State v. Moody, 94 P.3d 1119, 1133 (Ariz. 

2004)(citing Nalbandian v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa, 786 P.2d 

977, 981 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989)). A habeas petition, however, would not be. 

7

 Petitioner asserted the same claim in section 5 of his amended 2011 PCR petition 

(Exhibit QQ at 14, et seq.)

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there was no probation term over which the trial court had jurisdiction in 2010 to impose 

a prison sentence upon revocation. 

To the extent that Petitioner directly attacks his 1997 and 2008 judgments, this 

claim is untimely. To the extent that Petitioner directly attacks his 1997 judgment, the 

claim is barred as a second or successive petition.

As to the remainder of the claim, in section 15 of his PCR Petition, Petitioner 

argued that the trial courts lacked jurisdiction because of the erroneous lifetime probation 

sentence. (Exhibit QQ at 22, et seq.) He contended “No authority need be cited for the 

proposition that when a court lacks jurisdiction, any judgment rendered by it is void and 

unenforceable. Hooker v. Bales, 346 F.2d 285, 286 (1965).” (Id. at 22-23.) Petitioner 

reasserted the same claim, almost verbatim, including the reference to Hooker, in Section 

7(a) of his Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Exhibit UU at 14.)

Ordinarily, a citation to federal case law is sufficient to fairly present the federal 

legal basis for a claim. Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Here, however, it is not clear that the citation to Hooker fairly alerted the PCR court to a 

due process claim based on a lack of jurisdiction.

In Hooker, the Fourth Circuit faced a due process challenge to a sentence under a 

recidivist statute which required advice to a defendant about the statute before he 

admitted to prior convictions. The Court concluded that under applicable state law, in 

the absence of such advice, the recidivist statute could not be applied, and thus the trial 

court had lacked jurisdiction to impose the enhanced sentence. In so concluding, the 

Fourth Circuit observed: 

Regardless of the fundamental fairness required in a proceeding to 

constitute due process of law, no authority need be cited for the 

proposition that, when a court lacks jurisdiction, any judgment 

rendered by it is void and unenforceable. 

Hooker, 346 F.2d at 286. While the federal basis for setting aside a sentence based on a 

lack of jurisdiction was not made plain in Hooker, the only federal law the Hooker court 

referenced was the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a prior Fourth 

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Circuit decision relating to the same state statute, Mounts v. Boles, 326 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 

1963). Mounts turned upon the due process rights in eliciting incriminating admissions 

from a defendant. See Mounts v. Boles, 326 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1963). Thus, on a careful 

reading, the federal nature of the claim raised and decided in Hooker did not appear to be 

a due process right to jurisdiction of the court, but a due process right to admonition 

prior to an incriminating admission.

Nonetheless, the undersigned concludes that, particularly in light of Petitioner’s 

pro se status at the time, the reference to due process and a lack of jurisdiction in Hooker

was sufficient to constitute fair presentation of his due process claim.

Respondents argue that the 2010 PCR court disposed of this claim as waived 

under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) by failure to raise it previously. The trial court ruled:

The Court finds that all of the Defendant's claims are 

meritless. 

Rule 32.2(a) subsections 2 and 3, of the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure provides relief for all 4 of the Defendant's initial 

claims in the CR1996-010575 matter. Further, there was no 

prejudice with regard to his claim that he could be placed on 

probation for only 5 years since he had only been on probation for 2 

years when he was found in violation of that probation. Defendant's 

other claims regarding being transported to Arizona from California, 

as well as credit for time served in California, are not supported by 

the record and are without merit.

(Exhibit TT, M.E. 7/21/11 at 1.) Respondents contend this amounted to the application 

of a waiver bar because of the reference to Rule 32.2(a). Respondents construe the trial 

court’s ruling as correctly reading “Rule 32.2(a) subsections 2 and 3, of the Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure [precludes] relief for all of...[Petitioner’s] claims in the CR 

1996-010575 matter.” (Answer, Doc. 13 at 22-23 (modifications in quotation).) 

Respondents correctly argue that alternatively disposing of claims on the merits does not 

vitiate the application of an independent and adequate state procedural bar. (Id. at 23, n. 

7 (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989)).) 

However, “the mere fact that a federal claimant failed to abide by a state 

procedural rule does not, in and of itself, prevent this Court from reaching the federal 

claim: The state court must actually have relied on the procedural bar as an independent 

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basis for its disposition of the case." Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1989) 

(internal quotations omitted). The undersigned is not convinced that Respondents fairly 

read the PCR court’s ruling as an application of the state’s preclusion bars. On its face, it 

contains no determination of preclusion. Moreover, this purported procedural ruling was 

not merely adjunct to a merits determination, it was in the midst of conclusions that the 

claims were meritless. 

Even if Respondents are correct, however, the PCR court relied upon two vastly 

different procedural bars when it referenced Rule 32.2(a)(2) and 32.2(a)(3). The former 

applies to claims “[f]inally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous 

collateral proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). The latter applies to claims that 

have “been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any collateral proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(a)(3). A finding of preclusion, i.e. that the claims have been raised before, “does 

not provide a basis for federal courts to apply a procedural bar.” Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 

1246, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Where an Arizona Court asserts both conditions apply to a group of claims 

without delineating which applied to which, it “did not clearly base its decision on 

independent and adequate state law grounds.” Id. See also Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court 

for Eastern Dist. of California (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. (Cal.) 1996); Valerio 

v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 774-75 (9th Cir. (Nev.) 2002) (“By failing to specify which 

claims were barred for which reasons, the Nevada Supreme Court ‘did not clearly and 

expressly rely on an independent and adequate state ground.’”); and Koerner v. Grigas, 

328 F.3d 1039, 1053 (9th Cir. (Nev.) 2003). To avoid habeas review, a state court 

decision must “clearly and expressly rely on an independent and adequate state ground.” 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 (1991).

Moreover, this Court may not look beyond the pronouncement of the PCR court, 

to the procedural history, and conclude that the true decision was one that the claims had 

not been raised, were thereby waived, and thus procedurally barred on that ground. In 

Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009), the Court was faced with a state appellate decision 

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which disposed of a federal claim on the mistaken basis that it had been previously 

presented. The record reflected that the claim had clearly not been presented or passed 

on in any prior proceeding. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held: “When a state court 

declines to review the merits of a petitioner's claim on the ground that it has done so 

already, it creates no bar to federal habeas review...When a state court refuses to 

readjudicate a claim on the ground that it has been previously determined, the court's 

decision does not indicate that the claim has been procedurally defaulted.” 556 U.S. at 

466-67. The Court further rejected the state’s request to treat the rejection as a 

procedural bar based upon the state’s waiver rule. “Although we have an independent 

duty to scrutinize the application of state rules that bar our review of federal claims, we 

have no concomitant duty to apply state procedural bars where state courts have 

themselves declined to do so. The Tennessee courts did not hold that Cone waived his 

Brady claim, and we will not second-guess their judgment.” 556 U.S. at 468-69.

In his dissent to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Koerner, Judge Beezer argued that 

the reference to an ”ambiguous” order “should be understood in light of the state court 

opinion and the record in that case, rather than looking solely to the face of the state 

court’s opinion.” 328 F.3d 1039, 1056 (Beezer, J. dissenting). However, Judge Beezer’s 

dissent plainly acknowledged the import of the majority decision in Koerner:

Today's opinion holds that a federal court may only look to the state 

court opinion at issue in determining whether a state court opinion 

relies on a procedural default. If a state court opinion is ambiguous 

on its face, today's opinion makes it impossible to find a procedural 

default because any such state court opinion does not “clearly and 

expressly rely on an independent and adequate state ground.” 

Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 773 (9th Cir.2002) (citation 

omitted).

Koerner, 328 F.3d at 1056 (Beezer, J. dissenting). But see McElyea v. Schriro, 2009 WL 

222375, CV-06-0884-PHX-SMM(HCE) (D. Ariz. 2009) (looking beyond state court 

opinion, based on pre-Koerner 9th Circuit cases doing so, citing Koerner, but without 

noting Beezer’s dissent).

The opinion of the PCR court is ambiguous on its face, proposing two mutually 

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exclusive reasons for disposing of the claims. According to Koerner, this Court is not 

free to look beyond that ambiguity and attempt to ascertain the true basis for disposing of 

the claim.

Accordingly, the PCR court’s ambiguous rejection of the claim in Ground 2A 

must be treated as one on the basis that the claim has previously been presented and 

decided, and thus must conclude that Petitioner has exhausted his state remedies on this 

claim. 

c. Ground 2B - (Double Jeopardy) - In Ground 2B of his Petition, Petitioner 

argues (based upon his conclusion that the original probation term expired in 2002) 

that the imposition of a successive term of probation and then a prison term based 

thereon, amounted to double jeopardy. Petitioner did not assert a claim of double 

jeopardy in his 2011 PCR petition (Exhibit QQ). In Section 7(d) of his Petition for 

Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner did argue that his double jeopardy 

rights were violated when the trial court ran his sentences on the attempt charges 

consecutively. (Exhibit UU at 16.)

Although a federal habeas petitioner may reformulate somewhat the claims made 

in state court, Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796 F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d in part on 

other grounds by Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 1995), the substance of the federal 

claim must have been “fairly presented” in state court. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 

6 (1982)(per curiam); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971); Tamapua, 796 F.2d 

at 262. Thus, a petitioner may not broaden the scope of a constitutional claim in the 

federal courts by asserting additional operative facts that have not yet been fairly 

presented to the state courts. Expanded claims not presented in the highest state court 

are not considered in a federal habeas petition. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 

1995); see also, Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,

459 U.S. 1219 (1983).

In the present Petition, Petitioner challenges the propriety of the successive 

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probation and prison terms in the various proceedings on the one count for which he 

originally received lifetime probation. In his petition for review to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, he challenged the consecutive nature of the sentences by the trial court on the 

separate counts. Thus the claim presented now is fundamentally different from that 

previously presented.

Moreover, Petitioner did not present this claim to the trial court. Presentation to 

the Arizona Court of Appeals for the first time is not sufficient to exhaust an Arizona 

state prisoner’s remedies. "Submitting a new claim to the state's highest court in a 

procedural context in which its merits will not be considered absent special 

circumstances does not constitute fair presentation." Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 

38 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)). In Casey v. 

Moore, 386 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2004), the court reiterated that to properly exhaust a 

claim, "a petitioner must properly raise it on every level of direct review." Id. at 916.

Academic treatment accords: The leading treatise on federal habeas corpus 

states, “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement if he 

properly pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire direct appellate process 

of the state, or (2) throughout one entire judicial postconviction process 

available in the state.” 

Id. (quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b 

(4th ed. 1998) (emphasis added)).

In Arizona, review of a petition for post-conviction relief by the Arizona Court of 

Appeals is governed by Rule 32.9, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which clarifies 

that review is available for “issues which were decided by the trial court.” Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(ii). See also State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468, 616 P.2d 924, 928 

(Ariz.App., 1980) (issues first presented in petition for review and not presented to trial 

court not subject to review). Thus, Petitioner’s presentation of the claim for the first 

time to the Arizona Court of Appeals was not fair presentation. 

Thus, this claim was not fairly presented, was not properly exhausted and, for the 

reasons discussed hereinabove, is now procedurally defaulted.

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d. Ground 2C – (Cruel and Unusual Punishment) - In Ground 2C, Petitioner 

argues that his combined sentences of the original 12 year sentence, lifetime probation, 5 

years probation, and another 12 years imprisonment are cruel and unusual punishment 

for his offenses. In section 15 of his 2011 PCR petition, Petitioner argued that his 

combined sentences were “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime,” citing 

two federal cases. (Exhibit QQ at 22-23.) See Seritt v. State of Ala., 731 F.2d 728, 731-

32 (11th Cir. 1984) (“eighth amendment prohibits imposition of a sentence that is grossly 

disproportionate to the severity of the crime”); and United States v. Hollis, 718 F.2d 277, 

279 (8th Cir. 1983) (same). Petitioner repeated the same arguments in Section 7 of his 

Petition for Review. (Exhibit UU at 14-15.) Thus this claim was fairly presented, and 

for the reasons expressed with regard to Ground 2A, the undersigned finds that this

Court must conclude the claim was previously exhausted.

e. Ground 3A – (IAC re Plea Agreement) - In Ground 3A, Petitioner argues 

that Petitioner’s original counsel in his 1997 case was ineffective in failing to adequately 

advise him in the course of accepting the plea agreement on the permissible probation 

term. This claim is barred as a second or successive petition, and as untimely. 

Accordingly, the undersigned does not address the exhaustion of this claim.

f. Ground 3B – (IAC at Sentencing) - In Ground 3B of his Petition, Petitioner 

argues that his counsel at sentencing in his 1997 case was ineffective in failing to object 

to a sentence to lifetime probation which was not authorized by law. This claim is barred 

as a second or successive petition, and as untimely. Accordingly, the undersigned does 

not address the exhaustion of this claim.

g. Ground 3C - (IAC in 2008 Revocation) - In Ground 3C of his Petition, 

Petitioner argues that Petitioner’s counsel in his 2008 probation revocation proceeding 

was ineffective in failing to pursue the expiration of his 1997 probation term. This claim 

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is barred as a second or successive petition, and as untimely. Accordingly, the 

undersigned does not address the exhaustion of this claim.

h. Ground 3D – (IAC in 2010 Revocation) - In Ground 3D of his Petition, 

Petitioner argues that Petitioner’s counsel in his 2010 probation revocation proceeding 

was ineffective in failing to pursue the expiration of his 1997 probation term. Petitioner 

asserted in Section 8 of his 2011 PCR petition a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective 

assistance. (Exhibit QQ at 16 et seq.) In subsection 8(d) he challenged the 

ineffectiveness of his counsel in the 2010 proceeding for not “attacking the illegality of 

that [lifetime] probation” which “did not exist and/or was expired [and] could not be 

revoked.” (Id. at 18.) Petitioner repeated that claim in Section 8 of his Petition for 

Review. (Exhibit UU at 18.) The PCR court addressed this claim on its merits, albeit in 

summary fashion. (Exhibit TT, M.E. 7/21/11 at 2.) 

Accordingly, this claim has been fairly presented and properly exhausted.

i. Ground 4 – (PCR Evidentiary Hearing) - In Ground 4 of his Petition, 

Petitioner argues that he should have been granted an evidentiary hearing in his PCR 

proceeding. In particular, Petitioner references his claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9, et seq. ) Respondents primarily argue this claim is not 

cognizable on habeas review, but also argue in a footnote that it is procedurally 

defaulted. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 33 and n. 12.) Indeed, no portion of Petitioner’s Petition 

for Review challenged the PCR court’s failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing, and 

certainly did not do so on federal grounds. Accordingly, this claim was never fairly 

presented, was not properly exhausted, and for the reasons discussed hereinabove, is now 

procedurally defaulted.

e. Summary Re Exhaustion – Because they are fully barred as a second or 

successive petition and untimely, the undersigned does not address the exhaustion, 

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procedural default, or procedural bar of Grounds 1, 3A, 3B, or 3C of the Petition.

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner exhausted his 

state remedies as to Grounds 2A (due process re lifetime probation), and 2C (cruel and 

unusual punishment), and 3D (IAC in 2010 Revocation).

Also based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has 

procedurally defaulted his state remedies on Grounds 2B (Double Jeopardy) and 4 (PCR 

evidentiary hearing).

5. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner argues that this Court should find cause to excuse his procedural 

defaults based on: (1) his untrained, pro se status; and (2) his limited access to case law 

(“I have to order and pay for case law”). (Reply, Doc. 16 at 11.) However, the “cause 

and prejudice” standard is equally applicable to pro se litigants. Harmon v. Barton, 894 

F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990); Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 

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905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). 

A pro se petitioner may be able to establish cause if he can establish a lack of 

access to the law, as opposed to a lack of knowledge of the law. See e.g. Dulin v. Cook, 

957 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1992) (remanding for a determination of cause where a pro se 

petitioner’s incarceration in Nevada precluded access to Utah legal materials required to 

challenge a Utah conviction). Cf. Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(holding lack of library materials may establish an “impediment” which would toll the 

statute of limitations applicable to habeas petitions). The petitioner must establish, 

however, that the lack of access resulted in an inability to assert his claims. See e.g. 

Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding no “cause” where despite lack 

of resources generally, pro se prisoner had not shown personal deprivation, and had 

managed to file other adequate petitions.) 

Here, Petitioner was not left to his own devices and limited access to case law at 

least during his 2010 PCR petition. Rather, Petitioner had been appointed counsel. 

Although counsel ultimately was unable to find a viable claim for review, counsel was 

ordered to remain of counsel in an advisory capacity. (Exhibit PP, M.E. 3/28/11.) 

Moreover, Petitioner was able to file his PCR petition and petition for review, 

including a variety of claims and citations to federal constitutional principles and 

authorities. Thus, there is no reason to presume that Petitioner’s failure to raise the 

claims he now presents was caused by any lack of access to case law, as opposed to his 

own failure to identify or argue his claims.

Finally, Petitioner points to no particular resources he was unable to access, or the 

claims their absence prevented him from raising.

Summary re Cause and Prejudice – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner had failed to establish cause to excuse his procedural defaults.

Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

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F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's 

claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

6. Actual Innocence as Cause

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although 

not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet 

recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual 

innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 

1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to 

claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 

(1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not 

sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found 

the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup

gateway.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, Petitioner fails to proffer any new evidence to make a showing that no 

reasonable juror would have found him guilty. Accordingly, his procedurally defaulted 

claims must be dismissed with prejudice. 

/ /

/ /

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D. WAIVER

Respondents contend that Petitioner has waived, by entry of pleas of guilty (or 

admissions to probation violations), various portions of his claims. The undersigned will 

address any such waiver in connection with the individual claims whose merits are 

reached.

Ignoring for the moment this wavier defense, after applying the second or 

successive limitation, statute of limitations, and procedural default, the following is the 

status of Petitioner’s claims:

Ground 1 (lifetime probation) is barred as second or successive and untimely.

Ground 2A (due process re lifetime probation) is barred as second and successive 

to the extent that it challenges the 1997 judgment, and as untimely to the extent that it 

challenges the 1997 and 2008 judgments. The portion of this claim challenging the 2010 

judgment must be addressed on the merits.

Ground 2B (double jeopardy) is second or successive and untimely to the extent 

that it challenges the 1997 judgment, and untimely to the extent that it challenges the 

2008 judgment. It is procedurally defaulted to the extent that it challenges the 2010 

judgment.

Ground 2C (cruel and unusual) is ripe to be addressed on its merits.

Ground 3A (IAC re 1997 plea agreement) is second or successive and untimely.

Ground 3B (IAC re 1997 sentencing) is second or successive and untimely.

Ground 3C (IAC re 2008 plea agreement) is untimely.

Ground 3D (IAC re 2010 plea agreement) is ripe for consideration on the merits.

Ground 4 (PCR evidentiary hearing) is procedurally defaulted.

That leaves ripe for consideration on the merits (or waiver) of (at least portions) 

of Grounds 2A (due process re lifetime probation), 2C (cruel and unusual), and 3D (IAC 

re 2010 plea agreement).

/ /

/ /

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E. MERITS OF GROUND 2A (Due Process re Lifetime Probation)

In Ground 2A, Petitioner argues his due process rights were violated because the 

1997 sentence to lifetime probation was unauthorized, only a 5 year term was permitted, 

that term ran from the date of imposition and expired in 2002, and therefore the court 

lacked jurisdiction to reinstate Petitioner on probation in 2008, and to sentence him to 

prison upon revocation in 2010. The undersigned has determined hereinabove that this 

claim is barred as second and successive to the extent that it challenges the 1997 

judgment, and as untimely to the extent that it challenges the 1997 and 2008 judgments. 

The portion of this claim challenging the 2010 judgment must be addressed on the 

merits. However, Petitioner’s theory for relief under Ground 2A on the 2010 sentence 

on revocation requires this Court to determine the validity of the 2008 judgment 

reinstating Petitioner on probation and the original 1997 sentence. Because this Court is 

barred from doing so, Petitioner cannot sustain his attack on the 2010 sentence. 

Accordingly, this portion of Ground 2A is without merit and must be denied.

F. MERITS OF GROUND 2C (Cruel and Unusual)

In Ground 2C, Petitioner argues his combined sentences of the original 12 year 

sentence, lifetime probation, 5 years probation, and another 12 years imprisonment are 

cruel and unusual punishment for his offenses. He argues that his combined sentences 

were disproportionate to his crime of “attempting nonviolent, nonincestuous, hetrosexual 

[sic], and consensual sex with a single 14 nearly 15 year-old female.” (Petition, Doc. 1 

at 7f.) 

Waiver - Respondents contend that Petitioner has waived his claims by entering 

guilty pleas in the 1997 and 2010 proceedings. “As a general rule, a guilty plea erases 

claims of constitutional violation arising before the plea.” United States v. Montilla, 870 

F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1989) amended, 907 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Tollett v.

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)). Petitioner’s sentence, or at least that portion 

imposed most recently, was not imposed and his Eighth Amendment claim did not arise 

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until sentencing, after his plea, and thus was not waived by that plea. 

Moreover, Petitioner’s Plea Agreement did not contain any restriction on his 

ability to challenge his sentence, beyond the stipulation that a sentence of at least ten 

years would be imposed. (Exhibit EE, 2010 Plea Agreement at 2.) Respondents do not 

argue that this stipulation amounted to a waiver of Eighth Amendment claims.

Proportionality - The Eighth Amendment “forbids...extreme sentences that are 

‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 

(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This narrow 

proportionality principle applies to noncapital sentences. Id. at 997. Nonetheless, 

“outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality 

of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 

21 (2003) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)). “In determining 

whether a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment, [courts] must accord substantial 

deference to legislative determinations of appropriate punishments.” United States v. 

Patterson, 292 F.3d 615, 631 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted).

In the end, Petitioner received two, consecutive, 12 year prison sentences, 

separated by a period of probation which he violated. His probation was revoked at the 

time of the 2010 sentence, and thus is not relevant to the actual sentences imposed. 

Instead, he served a term of probation of no less than 2 years, from the time he was 

released from prison on or about June 26, 2008, and when he was rearrested in January 

2010. Thus, effectively, Petitioner will, upon his release have served no more than 24 

years in prison and 2 years on probation for both of his offenses. Petitioner points to no 

basis for deeming such a sentence disproportionate. 

The courts apply two different approaches to evaluating the proportionality of a 

sentence, an as-applied analysis and a categorical analysis. See Graham v. Florida, 560 

U.S. 48, 59 (2010).

As-Applied Proportionality - Under the as-applied analysis, first “the Court 

considers all of the circumstances of the case to determine whether the sentence is 

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unconstitutionally excessive.” Graham, 560 U.S. 59. The court “must begin by 

comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.” Id. at 60. “’[I]n 

the rare case in which [this] threshold comparison ... leads to an inference of gross 

disproportionality’ the court should then compare the defendant's sentence with the 

sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences 

imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. If this comparative analysis 

‘validate[s] an initial judgment that [the] sentence is grossly disproportionate,’ the 

sentence is cruel and unusual.” Id. (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005). 

Petitioner fails to show that the gravity of his offenses and the severity of his 

sentences are grossly disproportionate. 

Gravity of the Offense - Petitioner argues he merely attempted consensual sex

with a 14 year old. Petitioner was, in effect, convicted of attempted statutory rape. 

Statutory rape laws are intended to protect minors from sexual predators, and are

founded upon the societal determination that minors are incapable of giving consent. See 

State v. Snyder, 25 Ariz. App. 406, 409, 544 P.2d 230, 233 (1976) (“Although consent is 

a defense where the crime [of rape] involves an adult, it is not a defense where the 

female is under 18.”). Thus some element of coercion or predation is presumed to be 

inherent in such conduct. See e.g. United States v. Gomez-Mendez, 486 F.3d 599, 604 

(9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing statutory rape as a crime of violence). 

That is not to suggest that all statutory rapes are equal. Although not controlling, 

the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Davis is illustrative. In Davis, a 

twenty-year-old defendant was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifty-two 

years without the possibility of parole for having voluntary sex with two post-pubescent 

teenage girls.” State v. Davis, 206 Ariz. 377, 379, 79 P.3d 64, 66 (2003). The Arizona 

court held that the sentence, which was composed of four consecutive sentences, each of 

13 years flat time, was “so grossly disproportionate to the crime as to violate the Eighth 

Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. The facts in Davis 

reflected several young teenage girls, at least one of whom was otherwise sexually 

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active, whose social encounters with several 19 to 20 year old young men resulted in 

unforced sex between the defendant and two of the girls at parties and at a home where 

one teen was babysitting. 

Comparing to an earlier case, the Court found relevant the following facts:

Many of the factors deemed important in determining that [the 

sentence in the earlier case] was disproportionate to his crimes are 

also present here: (1) Davis's sexual relations with the girls involved 

neither actual nor threatened violence; in each instance the girls 

knew what they were doing and willingly participated. Indeed, the 

victims sought Davis out; all acts occurred after the victims went 

voluntarily to Davis's home. (2) Davis does not have an adult 

criminal record, nor has he committed any previous crimes against 

children. (3) Post-pubescent sexual conduct appears to be no less 

common today than it was in 1990. (4) There is evidence in the 

record that Davis's intelligence and maturity level fell far below that 

of a normal young adult. (5) Like Bartlett, Davis was caught in the 

very broad sweep of the governing statute, which makes any sexual 

conduct with a person younger than fifteen years old by a person 

older than eighteen years old a “dangerous crime against children,” 

whether the offense is a rape-incest by a step-parent who forces sex 

on a trusting ward or a pedophile who uncontrollably preys upon 

young children, or the more benign boyfriend-girlfriend situation in 

which one party is older than eighteen and the other younger than 

fifteen.

Davis, 206 Ariz. at 384-85, 79 P.3d at 71-72. The Davis court concluded: 

The trial judge, the jury, the pre-sentence report writer, and even the 

victims' mothers all recognized the injustice of sentencing Davis to 

a fifty-two-year prison sentence with no possibility of early release 

for the crimes at issue in this case. We cannot ignore that injustice. 

While recognizing that many sex crimes against children may well 

justify such a sentence, others do not. We conclude that given the 

circumstances of Davis's offenses, the sentence imposed in this case 

appears to be grossly disproportionate to his crimes. 

Id. at 385, 79 P.3d at 72.

In contrast, here, a number of factors indicate a substantially higher degree of 

culpability. The age difference between Petitioner and the victim was substantially 

higher (10 years) than in Davis (6 years). Cf. U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2) and comments 

thereto (“In a case in which a participant is at least 10 years older than the minor, there 

shall be a rebuttable presumption that [undue influence enhancement applies]. In such a 

case, some degree of undue influence can be presumed because of the substantial 

difference in age between the participant and the minor.”) This is compounded by the 

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fact that Petitioner’s time as an adult was substantially greater (6 years) than Davis’s (2 

years). Petitioner’s victim was a runaway, and thus vulnerable; Davis’s victim was 

living at home, free to come and go, and in no way dependent on Davis. Although 

initially denying coercion, by the time of sentencing, the victim was reporting fear of the 

defendant:

The victim stated she wants the defendant incarcerated long enough 

for her to grow up and get her life started so she will not have to 

worry when the defendant is released. She does not want him on the 

streets for at least ten years. She is only fifteen-years-old. The 

defendant taught the victim things she should not know. She is 

really terrified of the defendant. The family is considering moving 

out of state in order to avoid any potential contact with the 

defendant. She is extremely concerned about the death threats 

toward her parents. She stated she became pregnant and suffered a 

miscarriage. The victim is very hurt by this whole thing and the 

family continues to suffer.

(Exhibit G, Present. Rep. at 3.) Moreover, Petitioner was involving his victim in an 

apparent crime spree; Davis and his victim were essentially just boyfriend and girlfriend. 

The trial court had additional facts to suggest that this was not an age mismatched 

boyfriend/girlfriend, but a pattern of violent and predatory conduct. At the time of his

arrest, Petitioner was on probation for attempted burglary and aggravated assault. (Id. at 

7.) Recidivism is a relevant factor in Eighth Amendment analysis. See Rummel v. 

Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980) (life sentence for theft of $120 under recidivist 

statute). Further, the presentence report in the 1997 case reflected:

Adult Probation Officer Anne Griffin supervised the defendant from 

November 6, 1995. She described the defendant as predatory and 

not motivated to comp1y with probation...The defendant was 

deliberate and very calculated in his deception to Officer Griffin. 

She described him as being hard core and unmotivated to implement 

changes as he has continued to live a criminal life-style. Prior to his 

arrest in July, 96, Officer Griffin was notified that the defendant 

befriended a fourteen-year-old male, who was on probation, and 

was planning to leave the state with him. Though there is no 

evidence of any sexual deviancy, the defendant was contributing to

the delinquency of this minor...In an effort to obtain clarification of 

the defendant’s relationship with this particular minor male, a 

telephone call was placed to his mother. She stated that, while her 

son was a runaway, the defendant befriended him. The mother 

determined they were staying in hotels together but is not aware of 

any impropriety. The boy's mother later learned that her son was 

involved in stealing from cars. She also learned from another 

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adolescent girl, the defendant was sexually involved with her and 

she was manipulated into the same behavior as the victim in the 

present offense.

(Id. at 6.)8

Petitioner points to the fact that he was only convicted of attempts. That does not 

alter the fundamental nature of his crime. Despite the fact that, under the terms of 

Petitioner’s plea agreement, the conviction was for an attempt, the factual background 

reflected that Petitioner had indeed completed the offenses. Perhaps, had Petitioner truly 

attempted the act, but had second thoughts before completion and retreated, some 

diminished culpability might exist. But Petitioner never veered from his course of 

conduct. Cf. James v. U.S., 550 U.S. 192 (2007), overruled on other grounds, Johnson v. 

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015) (recognizing that offense of attempted 

burglary generates the same risk as the complete offense). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) 

(same sentence for completed or attempted sexual enticement of a minor).

Severity of the Punishment - On the punishment side, the Eighth Amendment 

analysis “focuses on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, not on the cumulative 

sentence.” United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 265 (2nd Cir.1988). As the Supreme 

Court has made clear, if the defendant

has subjected himself to a severe penalty, it is simply because he has 

committed a great many such offenses. It would scarcely be 

competent for a person to assail the constitutionality of the statute 

prescribing a punishment for burglary on the ground that he had 

committed so many burglaries that, if punishment for each were 

inflicted on him, he might be kept in prison for life.

O'Neil v. State of Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331 (1892).

The defendant in Davis received sentences of 13 years flat time for each offense. 

In contrast, Petitioner was sentenced to 12 years, and there was no restriction on early 

release. (See Exhibit E, Sentence 8/22/97 at “47”; Exhibit HH, Sentence 5/26/10 at 2.) 

Other courts have found similar sentences to evidence no gross disproportionality. In 

 

8

There is no indication that the trial court relied upon or made findings concerning 

Petitioner’s sexual threats to counsel in his 1997 prosecution. The undersigned does not 

consider them in evaluating Petitioner’s culpability.

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Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1976), the Fourth Circuit found a sentence 

between 10 and 20 years was not disproportionate to a non-forcible, statutory rape 

charge involving a 13 year old. In United States v. Nagel, 559 F.3d 756, 764 (7th Cir. 

2009), the Seventh Circuit found no gross disproportionality in a ten year sentence for 

the offense of attempted sexual enticement of a 14 year old. The Sixth Circuit reached 

the same conclusion in United States v. Hughes, 632 F.3d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 2011) (10 

year sentence for attempted sexual enticement of a 14 year old). See also U.S.S.G. § 

2G1.3(a)(3), 2G1.3(b)(2) and Sentencing Table (Base offense level 28 for sexual 

enticement of minor, 2 level enhancement for undue influence based on 10 year age 

difference, with sentencing range of 97 to 210 months). In United States v. Williams, 

636 F.3d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit observed: “A life term of 

supervised release is particularly appropriate for sex offenders given their high rate of 

recidivism.” 

Conclusion under As-Applied Analysis - Under these circumstances, a twelve 

year sentence, even if coupled with Petitioner’s probation term, is not so severe a 

punishment as to be grossly disproportionate in light of the gravity of his crime. 

Finding no gross disproportionality, this Court need not engage in a comparative 

analysis of other offenses and jurisdictions.

Categorical Proportionality – In Graham, the Court extended the concept of 

categorical proportionality outside the realm of capital punishment to prison sentences. 

Under this approach the Court: 

first considers “objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed 

in legislative enactments and state practice, to determine whether 

there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue. 

Next, guided by “the standards elaborated by controlling precedents 

and by the Court's own understanding and interpretation of the 

Eighth Amendment's text, history, meaning, and purpose,” the Court 

must determine in the exercise of its own independent judgment 

whether the punishment in question violates the Constitution. 

Graham, 560 U.S. at 61 (citations omitted). These types of cases have developed into 

two categories: “one considering the nature of the offense, the other considering the 

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characteristics of the offender.” Id. at 60. 

The kinds of situations where the courts have found such a national consensus 

regarding the nature of the offense have included determinations that capital punishment 

is not permissible for non-homicide crimes against individuals. See Kennedy v. 

Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (rape of child); Enmund v. Florida, 58 U.S. 782 (1982) 

(felony murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (rape of adult). Petitioner 

proffers nothing to suggest a national consensus against the kind of sentence imposed 

here. The punishment ultimately meted out to Petitioner was an unremarkable routine 

term of 24 years, and a five year term of probation, of which he served less than 2 years. 

See U.S. v. Shill, 740 F.3d 1347 (9th Cir. 2014) (declining to apply categorical approach 

to ten year mandatory prison term for non-juvenile); and United States v. Williams, 636 

F.3d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011) (‘“objective indicia’ suggest that society is comfortable 

with lifetime sentences of supervised release for sex offenders”). 

The kinds of situations where the courts have found such a national consensus 

regarding the characteristics of the offender have included: (1) capital punishment for 

minors, see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); (2) capital punishment for low 

intellect offenders, see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); (3) life without parole for 

juveniles who did not commit homicide, Graham, supra; (4) mandatory life without 

parole for juveniles committing a homicide, see Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 

(2012); (5) 254 year sentence for juvenile convicted of non-homicide offenses, see 

Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir.2013). Petitioner points to no characteristic of 

himself as an offender to cause concern; he was neither a juvenile, or of low intellectual 

function. The Presentence Report indicated that Petitioner had a “reading ability above 

the sixth grade level.” (Exhibit G, Present. Report at 10.)

Accordingly, Petitioner fails to show his sentence was disproportionate under the 

categorical test.

Conclusion re Ground 2C – Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s Ground 2C is 

without merit, and must be denied.

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G. MERITS OF GROUND 3D (IAC re 2010 Plea Agreement)

In his Ground 3D, Petitioner argues his counsel in his 2010 probation revocation 

proceeding, Lina Garcia, was ineffective in failing to pursue the expiration of his 1997 

probation term. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8, 8c.) Respondents argue that the claim is without 

merit because the underlying attack on the 1997 probation term was without merit.

This claim was raised in Petitioner’s 2010 PCR proceeding, and summarily 

disposed of on the merits. (Exhibit TT, M.E. 7/21/11.) The PCR court did make a 

finding that “there was no prejudice with regard to his claim that he could be placed on 

probation for only 5 years since he had only been on probation for 2 years when he was 

found in violation of that probation.” (Id. at 1.) 

Habeas Standards of Review - While the purpose of a federal habeas proceeding 

is to search for violations of federal law, in the context of a prisoner “in custody pursuant 

to the judgment a State court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e), not every error justifies 

relief. 

Errors of Law - “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because 

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [the 

law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24– 25 (2002) (per curiam). To 

justify habeas relief, a state court’s decision must be “contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States” before relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).

Errors of Fact - Federal courts are further authorized to grant habeas relief in 

cases where the state-court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court's 

fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the 

state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 

F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, a state prisoner is not free to attempt to retry his case in the federal 

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courts by presenting new evidence. There is a well-established presumption of 

correctness of state court findings of fact. This presumption has been codified at 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which states that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State 

court shall be presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof to rebut 

the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." 

Applicable Decisions – In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas 

court looks through summary opinions to the last reasoned decision. Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

No Decision on the Merits – The limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) only apply 

where a claim has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court.” Thus, where a 

petitioner has raised a federal claim to the state courts, but they have not addressed it on 

its merits, then the federal habeas court must address the claim de novo, and the 

restrictive standards of review in § 2254(d) do not apply. Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 

1088, 1091-92 (2013). See id. (adopting a rebuttable presumption that a federal claim 

rejected by a state court without being expressly addressed was adjudicated on the 

merits).

This claim was raised in Petitioner’s PCR petition on his 2010 judgment. The 

PCR court did not address the claim explicitly, but found that Petitioner’s claims were 

without merit, and explicitly rejected the claim that his 1997 probation term had expired. 

(Exhibit TT, ME 7/21/11.) Because the state courts actually addressed this claim on its 

merits, the AEDPA’s limitations on habeas relief in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) apply.

Applicable Standard on Ineffective Assistance Claims – Generally, claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, Petitioner must show: (1) deficient 

performance - counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard for 

reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Id. at 687-88. Although the petitioner must prove both elements, a court may reject his 

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claim upon finding either that counsel's performance was reasonable or that the claimed 

error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

There is a strong presumption counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance and that, under the circumstances, the challenged 

action might be considered sound trial strategy. U.S. v. Quinterro-Barraza, 78 F.3d 

1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 (1996); U.S. v. Molina, 934 F.2d 

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). The court should “presume that the attorneys made 

reasonable judgments and decline to second guess strategic choices.” U.S. v. Pregler, 

233 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000).

An objective standard applies to proving such deficient performance, and requires 

a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel’s actions were “outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.” United States v. Houtcens, 926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90). The reasonableness of counsel’s actions is judged 

from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the 

circumstances. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 689. 

“The law does not require counsel to raise every available nonfrivolous defense. 

Counsel also is not required to have a tactical reason—above and beyond a reasonable 

appraisal of a claim's dismal prospects for success—for recommending that a weak claim 

be dropped altogether.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 127 (2009) (citations 

omitted). 

Moreover, it is clear that the failure to take futile action can never be deficient 

performance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.1996); Sexton v. Cozner, 

679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012). “The failure to raise a meritless legal argument 

does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 

F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Application to Claim- Here, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance in 

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Ground 3D is founded upon the presumption that Petitioner’s term of lifetime probation 

on Count II was limited to five years and had expired in 2002, while Petitioner was 

serving his original prison term on Count I. It is undisputed that the lifetime probation 

was unauthorized, and was limited to a five year term. However, Petitioner’s theory is 

founded on the assumption that because the trial court directed in 1997 that the probation 

term was “commencing August 22, 1997” (Exhibit E, Sentence at “48”), the date of his 

sentence, it expired five years later, on August 21, 2002. Petitioner appears to ignore the 

governing state statutes. 

Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-903 provides: 

If probation is imposed on one who at the time is serving a sentence 

of imprisonment imposed on a different conviction, service of the 

sentence of imprisonment shall not satisfy the probation.

Under this statute, none of the time spent by Petitioner in prison on his conviction on 

Count I counted towards his term of probation on Count II. Petitioner remained in prison 

on Count I until June 26, 2008. Thus, when his probation was revoked and reinstated on 

December 18, 2008, less than 6 months of the permissible five year term had expired. 

Accordingly, when Petitioner’s probation was revoked in December 2008, and 

then reinstated, it was for a period of five years from June 26, 2008. (Exhibit X, M.E. 

12/18/08 at 2.) Thus, but for his subsequent crimes, Petitioner would have continued on 

probation until at least 2013. Therefore, when Petitioner violated his probation again on 

March 2, 2009 by robbing the bank, and his probation was consequently revoked and he 

was sentenced on May 26, 2010, his term of probation was still running. 

Therefore, any challenge by counsel would have been futile, and cannot form the 

basis of a claim of ineffectiveness.

Arguments in Supplemental Reply - In his Supplemental Reply (“Motion to 

Amend or Supplement”) (Doc. 14), Petitioner adds arguments based on Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 27.3 (regulation of probationers),9 Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-107(B)(1) 

 

9

Petitioner cites Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.2. Effective December 1, 2005, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

27.2 was renumbered as Rule 27.3.

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(the state statute of limitations), and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.3 (amendment of judgment).10 

Rule 27.3 provides that the probation officer may impose regulations on a 

probationer. Petitioner argues that “A.D.O.C., which was designated by the court, had to 

carry out the condition of imprisonment on probation.” (Supp. Reply, Doc. 14 at 2.) 

Petitioner’s argument is factually and legally flawed. The Sentence provided that 

Petitioner was placed “under the supervision of the Adult Probation Department,” not the 

Arizona Department of Corrections. (Exhibit E, Sentence at “48.”) Moreover, the 

supervising party (whether the probation office or the prison) would not have had 

authority to alter the mandate of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-903 regarding the running of a 

term of probation. Raising a claim on this basis would have been futile, and thus cannot 

form the basis of a claim of ineffective assistance.

Petitioner’s statute of limitations argument is similarly flawed. Arizona statutes 

set a seven year statute of limitations on class 2 through class 6 felonies. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

§ 13-107(B)(1). Petitioner was convicted of class 3 felonies. (Exhibit E, Sentence.) 

However, the statute simply limits the time in which “prosecutions...must be 

commenced.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-107(B). The statute further provides that “a 

prosecution is commenced when an indictment, information or complaint is filed.” Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 13-107(C). Petitioner’s prosecution on the underlying convictions was 

commenced by the filing of an Indictment on October 9, 1996 (Exhibit A), less than 

three months after the offenses. Therefore, the statute of limitations was satisfied, and 

raising a claim on this basis would have been futile, and thus cannot form the basis of a 

claim of ineffective assistance.

Finally, Petitioner’s reliance on Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.3 is factually and legally 

flawed. That rule generally limits a trial court’s authority to modify a sentence to a 

period “within 60 days of entry of judgment and sentence.” Had the trial court acted sua 

 

10 Because these arguments are plainly without merit, the undersigned does not address 

whether they constitute new claims nor whether Petitioner’s state remedies on such new 

claims have been exhausted or procedurally defaulted. 

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sponte to modify its sentence after that time, e.g. by modifying it from imposing lifetime 

probation to a five year term of probation, the action would have been unauthorized. 

Here, however, the trial court did not undertake that action. Rather, Petitioner’s 

probation term was functionally modified in the course of reinstating Petitioner on 

probation after his 2008 violation. (See Exhibit X, M.E. 12/18/08 at 2.) 

Moreover, even if counsel in the 2010 PCR proceeding could have raised a 

challenge to the 2008 modification, the result would not have been the invalidation of his 

probation sentence (and thus an inability to violate it and impose a sentence), but rather 

the reduction of the sentence to its authorized length. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c) (PCR 

based on sentence that “exceeded the maximum authorized”); Peek, 219 Ariz. at 185, 

195 P.3d at 644 (on petition for review, directing PCR court to resentence based on 

unauthorized lifetime probation). Thus, the outcome of PCR counsel raising such a 

claim would have been recognition of the excess sentence by the PCR court, the 

(purported) impropriety of the 2008 modification, recognition that the probation sentence 

remained validly pending at the time of his 2010 violation, and the revocation of that 

probation and imposition of sentence. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot show any 

prejudice from PCR counsel’s failure to rely upon Rule 24.3.

Conclusion – Based upon the forgoing, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel in Ground 3D is without merit, and must be denied.

H. SUMMARY

Petitioner’s claims in Grounds 1, 2B, 3A, 3B, 3C and 4, and portions of Ground 

2A, are either second or successive, untimely, or procedurally defaulted. Petitioner’s 

claims in the remainder of Ground 2A and Grounds 2C and 3D are without merit. 

I. MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

In his Motion for Evidentiary Hearing (Doc. 15), Petitioner requests an 

evidentiary hearing and his prison records from 1998 through 2008, “including his file, 

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sentencing orders, reclassification papers, and all court documents the files contained.” 

He additionally requests subpoenas of various prison officials, court staff transmitting 

records to the prisons, and his attorney in the 1997 case. He requests these records and 

subpoenas “[t]o prove that the August 22, 1997 Sentencing Order was on my prison file 

and that prison officials designated by the court through that order, carried out the order 

as mandated.”

Respondents have responded (Doc. 19) to the motion, arguing that the evidentiary 

hearing will not establish relief on his untimely or procedurally defaulted claims, and 

will not support his Grounds 2 or 3.

Petitioner has not replied.

“In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must 

consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual 

allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro 

v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007).11 

To be relevant to the Petition, the various records sought and proffered would 

have to take this case outside the limitations of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-903. But under the 

terms of that statute, the only way to have Petitioner’s probation term commence running 

any sooner than June 26, 2008 (when he was released) would be for Petitioner to show 

that he was not “serving a sentence of imprisonment” on Count I earlier than that date. 

Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest that this was the case. At best, Petitioner suggests 

that some records will assert that Petitioner was then on probation, a fact rendered 

meaningless by § 13-903. Accordingly, the requested records would not be relevant to 

this Petition, and a hearing to introduce them or related testimony would be unnecessary.

To the extent that Petitioner simply makes a generalized request for an evidentiary 

hearing, his motion is without merit. Where a petitioner does not proffer any evidence to 

 

11 Because the undersigned finds no reason to order an evidentiary hearing, the 

limitations on evidentiary hearings in state habeas cases and the applicable burdens of 

proof and limitations on review of factual questions, is not addressed.

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be adduced at an evidentiary hearing which would prove the allegations of the petition, 

the habeas court need not grant a hearing. Chandler v. McDonough, 471 F.3d 1360, 

1363 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The failure to proffer any additional evidence defeats 

[petitioner's] argument that he was entitled to an additional evidentiary hearing in federal 

court.”); Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 977 (6th Cir.2004) (“district court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying Williams's request, given his failure to specify ... what 

could be discovered through an evidentiary hearing”); Lincecum v. Collins, 958 F.2d 

1271, 1279–80 (5th Cir.1992) (denying evidentiary hearing “[a]bsent any concrete 

indication of the substance of the mitigating evidence” the hearing supposedly would 

provide).

The motion will be denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

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district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part

on the merits. Under the reasoning set forth herein, for the claims disposed of on 

procedural grounds, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the district 

court was correct in its procedural ruling. Under the reasoning set forth herein, the 

constitutional claims disposed of on the merits are plainly without merit. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. ORDERS

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Evidentiary 

Hearing, filed April 3, 2015 (Doc. 15) is DENIED.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus, filed July 28, 2014 (Doc. 1) be disposed of as follows:

(A) Ground 1 (authority for lifetime probation) be DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE as a second or successive application, or alternatively DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE as barred by the habeas statute of limitations;

(B) Ground 2A (due process re lifetime probation), to the extent it challenges 

Petitioner’s 1997 sentence, be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as a second or 

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successive application, to the extent it challenges Petitioner’s 1997 sentence or 2008 

judgment, be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as barred by the habeas statute of 

limitations, and to the extent it challenges Petitioner’s 2010 sentence, be DENIED as 

without merit;

(C) Ground 2B (double jeopardy), to the extent it challenges Petitioner’s 1997 

sentence, be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as a second or successive 

application, to the extent it challenges Petitioner’s 1997 sentence or 2008 judgment, be 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as barred by the habeas statute of limitations, and to 

the extent it challenges Petitioner’s 2010 sentence, be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE as procedurally defaulted;

(D) Ground 2C (cruel and unusual punishment) be DENIED as without merit;

(E) Ground 3A (ineffectiveness re 1997 Plea Agreement), be DISMISSED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE as a second or successive application, or alternatively be 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as barred by the habeas statute of limitations;

(F) Ground 3B (ineffectiveness at 1997 sentencing), be DISMISSED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE as a second or successive application, or alternatively be 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as barred by the habeas statute of limitations;

(G) Ground 3C (ineffectiveness in 2008 plea agreement), be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE as barred by the habeas statute of limitations, 

(H) Ground 3D (IAC re 2010 plea agreement) be DENIED as without merit;

(I) Ground 4 (PCR evidentiary hearing) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as 

procedurally defaulted.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Clerk of the Court be directed to 

provide Petitioner with the forms required to file an application for leave to file a second 

or successive petition with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

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VII. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

The recommendations made herein are not orders that are immediately appealable 

to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district 

court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: October 18, 2015

14-1692r RR 15 09 15 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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