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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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FI LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United Scates Court of Appeals 

Tenth CirCl!it 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT JUL 12 1991 

MELINDA C. SHAW, 

v. 

Plaintiff-Appel lee/ 

Cross-Appellant, 

MAST ADVERTISING & PUBLISHING, INC., 

Defendant-Appellant/ 

Cross-Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ROBERT L. .HOECKER 

Clerk 

) No. 90-3085 

) 90-3100 

) ( D. C. No . 8 7 - 2 5 5 4 -0) 

) (D. of Kansas) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before EBEL, Circuit Judge, MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, and ALLEY, 

District Judge**· 

Melinda c. Shaw filed this lawsuit against her former employer 

Mast Advertising & Publishing, Inc. ("Mast") alleging age 

discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act, 29 u.s.c. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"). Count One alleged 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not be 

cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for 

purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, res 

judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3 

**Honorable Wayne E. Alley, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

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that Mast had demoted Shaw from a management posi ion to a nonmanagement one because of her age, and Count Two alleged that she 

was discharged in retaliation for having filed a complaint of age 

discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

("EEOC") . The jury found for Mast on the discrimination claim, but 

for Shaw on the retaliation claim, and awarded her $62,000 in back 

pay. The trial court denied Mast's motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, new trial, on 

the retaliation claim. 

Although Shaw requested the remedy of front pay rather than 

reinstatement, the trial court ordered Mast to reinstate her. The 

trial court also reduced the attorney's fees requested by Shaw due 

to her loss on the discrimination claim. 

Mast appeals the denial of the motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, new trial, 

while Shaw appeals the order of reinstatement and the reduction of 

attorney's fees. 

I 

Mast argues that the evidence submitted to the jury by Shaw 

was insufficient to support a verdict on the retaliation claim. In 

reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for a judgment 

n.o.v., we may find error only when the evidence points but one way 

and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences sustaining the 

position of the party against whom the motion is made. Cooper v. 

Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1988). 

The court cannot weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of 

2 

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E.E.O.C. v. Prudential Savings and Loan Association, 763 F.2d 1166, 

1171 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946, 106 s.ct. 312, 

88 L.Ed.2d 289 (1985). On appeal, we employ the same standard of 

review as does the trial court. Brown v. McGraw-Edison Co., 736 

F.2d 609, 613 (10th Cir. 1984). Upon review of the record under 

the above standards, we conclude that a judgment n.o.v. is not 

warranted. 

Mast is a corporation that sells advertising in telephone 

directories and also publishes the directories. The directories 

that are compiled and published for telephone companies are called 

"utility" directories, and ones that are compiled and published for 

any other client are called "non-utility", "suburban", or "special" 

directories. Shaw began working for Mast in 1979, and in time 

became a manager in the non-utility side of Mast. In July, 1985, 

she was asked to assume temporary management responsibilities in 

the utility side as well, due to a vacancy. Another employee, Pat 

Thomas, who had filed a race discrimination lawsuit against Mast, 

was in line for promotion to the position offered to Shaw. When 

Shaw asked Barbara Simon, Director of Human Resources, why Thomas 

was not being promoted, Simon responded that Thomas "would sit 

there till she rotted." III R. 77. 

In August 1985, the temporary position in the utility side was 

offered to Shaw on a permanent basis, and she accepted it. In 

December, 1985, Shaw was removed from that position, told to take 

vacation, and that attempts would be made to find another position 

for her. Shortly thereafter, Simon sent Shaw a letter stating: 

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We would expect you to report to work on January 13, 

1986. If you do not do so, you will be considered to 

have abandoned this opportunity, and your separation from 

Mast will occur on that date. 

Shaw reported to work on the assigned date, and testified that the 

President of Mast, Ronald Kennedy, was shocked to see that she had 

indeed returned to work. The job given to her was as a nonmanagement account executive in another division of Mast, National 

Yellow Page Sales (NYPS). 

On May 16, 1986, Shaw filed her age discrimination charge with 

the EEOC and the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights. She testified 

that several people at Mast, including the switchboard operator, 

secretaries, and a janitor, as well as others, indicated to her 

that they knew about the EEOC charge, even though she herself had 

not told anyone. 

Prior to filing the EEOC charge, Shaw had asked Pat Black, a 

former supervisor, to write a recommendation letter for her. This 

he did, in glowing terms. However, after Mast received Shaw's EEOC 

charge, Simon asked Black to write a memo about Shaw that could be 

used in Mast's response to the EEOC. The memo written by Black 

could only be described as critical of Shaw, and opposite the 

recommendation letter he had previously written. Simon knew about 

the favorable recommendation letter written by Black, but did not 

forward it to the EEOC along with the critical memo, even though 

Black testified that he had given Simon a copy of it. 

On June 13, 1986, Shaw discovered that she had been using the 

wrong trademark for the advertising copy on a major account, and 

suspected that she had been set up and intentionally given 

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erroneous information. She spoke with Sheree Etzenhouser, the 

person assigned to work with her on the account, to find out 

whether Etzenhouser had been using the wrong trademark too. Shaw 

told Etzenhouser that she believed that both their jobs might be in 

jeopardy due to the size of the account and the magnitude of the 

mistake. Shaw confided in Etzenhouser about the EEOC charge, but 

said she did not want Etzenhouser to become involved in the matter. 

Shaw admitted that Etzenhouser seemed upset, but testified that she 

was trying to take responsibility for the mistake herself rather 

that have Etzenhouser caught in the middle. 

Later that same day, Shaw was called into a meeting with 

simon, Etzenhouser, 

meeting that Shaw 

and three other supervisors to discuss the 

and Etzenhouser had earlier. Etzenhouser 

recounted her version of the conversation, without comment from 

Shaw, but by the time Shaw was given an opportunity to recount her 

version, Etzenhouser had been excused from the room by Simon. Shaw 

testified that she did not contradict or interrupt Etzenhouser's 

account of the conversation because she did not want to start an 

argument, and she believed she would have an opportunity later to 

recount her own version of the conversation. Shaw testified that 

she felt put on the spot in the meeting, and that Simon's tone was 

loud, angry, harsh and scolding. Simon instructed Shaw not to 

discuss the EEOC charge again at Mast, and to treat Etzenhouser in 

the future as any other employee. Finally, Simon told Shaw that 

any further aggravation of other employees could result in Shaw's 

termination. 

5 

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June 13 fell on a Friday. On Monday, Etzenhouser was at work, 

as was Shaw, but Etzenhouser did not come in on the following 

Tuesday or Wednesday. On Thursday, June 19, 1986, Etzenhouser came 

to work and resigned. In a memo regarding the resignation, Simon 

stated that the reason Etzenhouser resigned was the June 13 meeting 

with Shaw. However, Etzenhouser had made statements in the June 13 

meeting with Simon, Shaw and the others that she had been looking 

for a job even prior to these events. Etzenhouser herself 

testified that prior to the June 13 meeting, she had been 

interviewed by a prospective employer and had filled out a job 

application on May 28, 1986 indicating that she could begin work 

within two weeks. Etzenhouser also testified that before the June 

13 meeting, she had decided she did not like the hours she was 

required to work at Mast, and wanted to be able to spend more time 

at home with her new husband. 

On June 25, 1986, Shaw was discharged for the stated reason 

that she had caused an employee to resign. Simon testified that 

Shaw was the only supervisor ever to be discharged at Mast because 

a subordinate employee had resigned. Simon also testified that 

although she did not remember Etzenhouser's statements of June 13 

that she [Etzenhouser) was looking for a job, "it basically didn't 

make any difference." VI R. 908. 

By its very nature, a motion for judgment n.o.v. does not 

consider the evidence in favor of the moving party, but only 

whether there was any evidence submitted to the jury from which it 

could have found for the prevailing party. Therefore, we need not 

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consider the evidence that Mast introduced to controvert Shaw's 

retaliation claim, and that Mast insists requires reversal. 

Mast argues that there was no evidence at all of retaliation, 

because Shaw was fired for her behavior toward Etzenhouser on June 

13 and on June 16, the one other day that both women were at Mast 

before Etzenhouser resigned on June 19. This argument ignores 

though the testimony that Mast had declined to promote Pat Thomas 

after she filed a race discrimination lawsuit. 1 This testimony, 

which the jury apparently found persuasive, constituted evidence of 

Mast's attitude toward those who file EEOC charges. The argument 

also ignores the favorable recommendation letter written by Pat 

Black, a former supervisor of Shaw's, and the subsequent critical 

letter written by Black for submission to the EEOC. Mast also 

ignores the fact that Simon omitted the favorable letter in 

response to the EEOC charge, even though Black testified that he 

had given Simon a copy of the letter. 

Etzenhouser's testimony that she had been looking for a job 

prior to June 13 casts in doubt her credibility as a witness when 

she testified that her reason for leaving Mast was her treatment by 

Shaw. She admitted that the long hours and her new husband were 

reasons she had already decided to look for another job, long 

before the June 13 incident. The jury was entitled to disbelieve 

Etzenhouser due to her conflicting testimony, and Mast cannot be 

heard to argue otherwise. 

1 Pat Thomas was eventually promoted into a managerial position, but the promotion came after Ms. 

Thomas dismissed her race discrimination lawsuit. 

7 

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The jury was further entitled to draw an inference of pretext 

and retaliation by Mast's admission that Shaw was the only 

supervisor ever discharged because a subordinate resigned. The 

jury was also entitled to evaluate the credibility of Mast's 

witnesses in determining whether Mast used the Etzenhouser 

resignation as an excuse to discharge Shaw. Mast argues that there 

was no evidence that its articulated reason for discharging Shaw 

was a sham, but the record is full of evidence from which that 

conclusion could reasonably be drawn. 

Mast also argues that Shaw's testimony is not credible as a 

matter of law and II should be discarded. 11 Mast's Reply Brief, p. 7. 

However, evaluating the credibility of witnesses is precisely what 

the court may not do in deciding a motion for judgment n. o. v. 

Regardless of what Simon or other Mast employees thought of Shaw, 

the jury heard all witnesses's testimony, evaluated their demeanor 

and credibility, and decide to believe Shaw. The record of this 

trial is absolutely replete with evidence that the jury properly 

considered and from which the jury could have reasonably concluded 

that Mast discharged Shaw in retaliation for her EEOC charge. Mast 

would have us weigh the evidence, conflicting as it was, and would 

have us evaluate the credibility of witnesses from a cold record. 

The Court's role is limited in a motion for judgment n.o.v. to 

determining whether any competent evidence was before the jury from 

which it could have reached the decision that it did. We have 

determined that there was more than ample evidence, and that the 

trial court's denial of the motion for judgment n.o.v. was proper. 

8 

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II 

In its second issue on appeal, Mast argues that the trial 

court should have granted its motion for new trial. A motion for 

new trial made on the ground that the verdict of the jury is 

against the weight of the evidence normally presents a question of 

fact and not of law and is addressed to the discretion of the trial 

court. Richardson v. city of Albuquerque, 857 F.2d 727, 730 (10th 

Cir. 1988) . The trial court's decision will not be disturbed 

absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Id. at 730. Our inquiry 

focuses on whether the verdict is "clearly, decidedly, or 

overwhelmingly" against the weight of the evidence. Id. at 730. 

Here, Mast argues that the verdict and the award of damages 

were against the weight of the evidence. Mast even agrees that its 

argument with respect to the motion for judgment n.o.v. applies 

equally to the motion for new trial. Because we have reviewed the 

record and found it more than sufficient to support the denial of 

a motion for judgment n.o.v., we need not repeat the task again 

with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

denial of a motion for new trial. Mast correctly argues that an 

employee's disruption of the workplace will support dismissal, but 

the jury found Shaw's evidence described above as more persuasive, 

and did not believe that Shaw was indeed discharged for 

misbehavior. 

Next Mast argues that the damage award of $62, ooo. oo was 

against the weight of the evidence because the amount must have 

included bonus and fringe benefit. Shaw's expert testified that 

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the damages were $68,886.63, and Mast's expert testified that the 

damages were $54,646.00. Significantly, Shaw's expert based his 

damage calculation on figures provided by Mast, but Mast argues 

that a damage award so calculated is against the weight of the 

evidence. 

However, Mast did not object at trial to the figures used by 

Shaw's expert, but instead now argues that it "did not provide 

specific, detailed fringe benefit information because it was not 

requested to do so by the interrogatories and, therefore, had no 

obligation to do so." Mast's Opening Brief, p. 34. Shaw's damage 

calculation was submitted to the jury, without objection, and based 

on figures supplied by Mast. The ultimate figure chosen by the 

jury was squarely between the two figures offered by Mast and Shaw, 

and we cannot say that the jury's decision was against the weight 

of the evidence. 

We have said before that a verdict will not be set aside on 

the basis of speculation as to the manner in which the jurors 

arrived at it. Mid-West Underground Storage. Inc. v. Porter, 717 

F.2d 493, 501 (10th Cir. 1983); Howard D. Jury, Inc. v. R & G 

Sloane Manufacturing Co., 666 F.2d 1348, 1352 (10th Cir. 1981). 

The $62,000.00 damage award was well within the range of the 

evidence submitted to the jury, and Mast's argument to the contrary 

is without merit. Mast has again made a one-sided argument without 

looking at the record as a whole, and we find no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial. 

10 

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III 

After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court allowed 

the parties to brief the issue of equitable relief. Shaw had 

requested reinstatement in her Complaint, but changed her request 

in the post-trial briefing to seek front pay. Mast requested 

reinstatement. Shaw's position, in the post-trial briefing and now 

on appeal, is that Mast has demonstrated such hostility toward her 

that no possible amicable working relationship could be established 

were she reinstated. On the other hand, Mast argues that there 

will be no employees in the chain of command above Shaw who were 

involved in her termination. The one exception is Ronald Kennedy, 

President of Mast, who is by definition in every Mast employee's 

chain of command. 

It is now settled law in the Tenth Circuit that under certain 

circumstances front pay is an appropriate remedy in lieu of 

reinstatement. Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d 631, 

637 (10th Cir. 1988). However, reinstatement is the preferred 

remedy, unless the employer has demonstrated such hostility that 

there is little or no hope that a working relationship would be 

possible. Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1157 (10th Cir. 

1990) . 

Shaw argues that she would be subject to hostility in the 

workplace if she is reinstated because many of the 

witness/employees from Mast who testified against her are still 

employed there. In support of her argument in favor of front pay, 

she relies on Spulak's award of front pay. There, the plaintiff 

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was a supervisor of an automobile repair shop and would have been 

required to return to a managerial position over employees in front 

of whom he had been humiliated and embarrassed. Shaw would not 

return to supervise employees who had testified against her, and 

would probably not return to a management position at all, as the 

position from which she was discharge was non-management. 

Reinstatement by its very nature is always awkward to a 

greater or lesser extent after the parties have spent months or 

years opposing each other in litigation. Nevertheless, 

reinstatement is the pref erred remedy, and Shaw will not be 

supervised by anyone who was involved in the termination of her 

job. Even though Kennedy was President of Mast at the time of 

Shaw's termination, and approved the termination, he will have no 

day-to-day contact with her. Thus, although Shaw may work in the 

same building or office with those who testified against her, she 

will not be supervised by any of them, and none will be in her 

chain of command. This situation is distinguishable from the facts 

of Spulak, and we do not believe that there will be such an 

atmosphere of hostility at Mast that a new working relationship 

cannot be forged. We therefore find support in the record for the 

trial court's decision to order reinstatement, especially as 

plaintiff once sought it, and find no grounds for disturbing the 

decision made below. 

IV 

The trial court awarded Shaw $49,181.00 in attorney's fees. 

The trial court reached this figure after eliminating (1) the 

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deposition costs of two witnesses whose testimony related only to 

the age discrimination claim; and (2) one-third of the amount for 

both fees and expenses claimed by Shaw. Shaw argues on appeal that 

the trial court abused its discretion in making the reduction, and 

Mast argues that the trial court was within the limits of 

discretion when it made the reduction. 

As the parties recognize, the trial court has discretion in 

determining a fee award. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 

s.ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). The easy case is one where 

the plaintiff prevailed on all claims, but where a plaintiff 

enjoyed only limited success as Shaw did here, the calculation is 

more difficult. If the claims are unrelated, the trial court 

should treat the losing claims as separate lawsuits and award no 

fees for that part of the litigation. Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 

556 (10th Cir. 1983). If the claims are related though and arise 

from a common core of facts, the inquiry is more difficult, and 

must focus on the degree of success obtained. Id. 

Shaw argues that the claims are so interrelated that the fee 

reduction should have been no more than ten percent. Shaw 

requested damages in the amount of $68,883.63, and received a 

verdict in the amount of $62,000.00. Therefore, Shaw argues, she 

received virtually all the relief she requested, and should 

likewise receive virtually all fees for virtually all hours spent. 

Mast argues that the two claims were not as closely related as 

Shaw would believe, because the demotion and the discharge covered 

two periods of time and two sets of supervisory personnel. In 

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short, Mast argues that Shaw is lucky the fee reduction was no more 

than it was. 

We reject Shaw's argument that she received almost all the 

damages she sought because she received a verdict only $6,000.00 

less than she sought. We have made it clear that attorney's fees 

are not to be awarded based on the amount of monetary recovery, but 

on the policy being vindicated. Ramos, 713 F.2d at 557. 

Therefore, the proper inquiry is what policies or claims were 

vindicated in the trial below. 

Al though it cannot be said that Shaw's two claims were 

entirely unrelated, each did involve a distinct employment 

decision, time period, and group of supervisors. Some reduction 

was definitely warranted, especially when the two claims were 

separable as to time and witnesses. Nevertheless, there was also 

overlap, as some of Shaw's proof of the retaliation claim involved 

evidence of events that occurred prior to her EEOC charge. For 

example, the favorable recommendation letter was written by Pat 

Black before the EEOC charge was filed, and Barbara Simon's 

derogatory comments about Pat Thomas's EEOC charge were made before 

Shaw filed hers. 

Shaw also argues that she obtained "excellent results" in the 

form of equitable relief, further questioning the reduction by the 

trial court. However, the equitable relief she obtained 

(reinstatement) is not the equitable relief she sought (front pay). 

She was entitled to receive one or the other after her verdict on 

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the retaliation claim, and so obtaining the one that she expressly 

did not want could not be construed as ''excellent results." 

After reviewing the nature of the two claims, the results 

sought, and the results achieved, we cannot say that the trial 

court abused its discretion in reducing the fees and costs by onethird. A reduction was called for, and the trial court exercised 

its discretion accordingly. We therefore find no reason to disturb 

the award of attorney's fees. 

V 

In summary, the trial court is AFFIRMED on the issues of 

denial of the motion for judgment n.o.v., denial of the motion for 

new trial, the order of reinstatement, and the reduction of 

attorney's fees. 

15 

Entered for the Court 

WAYNE E. ALLEY 

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