Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01376/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01376-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

PUBLISH Ucited State$ Courr of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT FEB 111991 

HAMILTON STORES, INC., ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

DONALD HODEL, Secretary, ) 

Department of the Interior; ) 

WILLIAM MOTT, Director, ) 

National Park Service; ) 

LORRAINE MINTZMEYER, ) 

Regional Director, ) 

Rocky Mountain Region, ) 

National Park Service; ) 

ROBERT D. BARBEE, Superintendent, ) 

Yellowstone National Park, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 86-1376 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. C85-0378-Bl) 

Francis J. Nielson of Arnovitz, Smith & Nielson, Salt Lake City, 

Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Robert L. Klarquist, Attorney, Department of Justice, Land and 

Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C. (David c. Shilton, 

Attorney, Department of Justice, Land and Natural Resources 

Division, Washington, D.C., with him on the brief); F. Henry 

Habicht II, Assistant Attorney General, Richard A. Stacy, United 

States Attorney, and Francis Leland Pice, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Cheyenne, Wyoming (Of Counsel: Lars A. Hanslin, Office 

of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C., 

with him on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, LOGAN and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant Hamilton Stores, Inc. ("HSI"), a Delaware 

corporation, commenced this suit against the Secretary of the 

Interior ("the Secretaryn or "the government") and other officials 

of the Department of the Interior in the United States District 

Court for the District of Wyoming . The dispute concerns the 

alleged failure of the Secretary to honor HSI's contractual and 

statutory rights as a concessioner providing various visitor 

services in Yellowstone National Park pursuant to a long-term 

contract with the National Park Service ("NPS"), an agency of the 

Interior Department. The district court granted summary judgment 

for the Secretary and dismissed HSI's cause with prejudice. 

Hamilton Stores, Inc. v. Hodel, No. C85-0378-81 (unpublished 

order). The principal issues on appeal are (1) whether the 

district court had jurisdiction to consider HSI's claims for 

injunctive, mandamus, and declaratory relief, and (2) whether the 

court appropriately entered summary judgment for the federal 

defendants. 

I 

The Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of 

the National Park Service, is empowered to enter into contracts 

with private concessioners selected to provide visitor services in 

the national parks. See National Park Service Act of 1916, 16 

u.s.c. 3; Concessions Policy Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. 20, et seg. 

The NPS entered into such a concession contract (Contract No. 

14-10-9-900-227) with the Yellowstone Park Company ("YPC") in 1966 

("1966 contract"). This contract with YPC authorized the company 

to provide a broad range of services to Yellowstone National Park 

2 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 2 
. •t 1 v~s~ ors. In April of 1970 the NPS entered into another 

concession contract (Contract No. 14-10-9-9-990-2) with HSI ("1970 

contract"), authorizing HSI to provide a substantially similar 

list of services within Yellowstone National Park. 2 Both the 1966 

1 

2 

Section 2 of the 1966 YPC contract provided: 

(a) The 

during the term 

provide for the 

the following: 

Secretary authorizes the Concessioner 

of this contract [10/1/66 - 9/30/96], to 

public within Yellowstone National Park 

(1) Lodging accommodations. 

(2) Food and beverage service facilities. 

(3) Boating facilities and services. 

(4) Transportation facilities and services. 

(5) Automobile service stations. 

(6) Campers' service facilities. 

(7) Any and all services and merchandising which 

are necessary in connection with the above operations. 

Section 2(a) of the 1970 contract with HSI states: 

(a) The Secretary authorizes the Concessioner, 

during the term of this contract [10/1/69 - 9/30/99], to 

provide accommodations, facilities, and services for the 

public within Yellowstone National Park, as follows: 

(1) Merchandising, including but not limited to 

stores, shops, and other units for the sale of: 

Groceries, meats, and other foodstuffs; bakery products; 

liquor, wine, beer and other beverages; sporting goods 

and equipment including fishing tackle sales and rental; 

clothing and shoes; proprietary drugs, cosmetics and 

sundries; hardware and furniture; curios, gifts, 

souvenirs, handicrafts, books, etc.; smokers' supplies; 

general merchandise, etc.; but excluding prescrptive 

drugs, and medical appliances or supplies. 

(2) Food and beverage service as follows: 

In its merchandising units wherever located, soda 

fountains, and service of soft drinks, ice sales, light 

lunches, beer and other refreshments; and such other 

services as may be specifically approved by the 

Secretary, not in conflict with other existing 

contracts. 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

3 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 3 
YPC contract and the 1970 HSI contract also contain substantially 

similar "preferential right 11 provisions3 giving the concessions 

qualified rights of first refusal4 regarding "new or additional 

(Footnote continued): 

(3) Automobile service stations. 

* * * * 

(7) All facilities, service, and operations 

necessary to or customary in connection with, any of the 

above described operations. 

(b) The Secretary reserves the right to determine and 

control the nature and type of merchandise and services 

which may be sold or furnished by the Concessioner 

within the Park. 

1970 HSI Contract at 6 (emphasis added). 

3 

Section 16 of the 1966 YPC contract reads in pertinent part: 

Preferential Right. (a) The Concessioner is 

granted a preferential right, not an exclusive or 

monopolistic right, to provide public accommodations, 

facilities, and services in the park of the character 

authorized hereunder. The Secretary will request the 

Concessioner to provide such new or additional 

accommodations, facilities, or services, of the same 

character as the Secretary may consider necessary or 

desirable for the accommodation and convenience of the 

public. * * * * 

Contract No. 14-10-9-900-227 (emphasis added). 

4 

The terms "right of 

defined in regulations 

Fed. Reg. 62,895 (1979), 

16 u.s.c. § 10, et seq.: 

§ 51.3 Definitions. 

* * * * 

preference" and "preferential right" are 

promulgated by the Secretary in 1979, 44 

pursuant to 16 u.s.c. § 3, et seq., and 

(b) "Right of Preference" refers to the right of 

existing satisfactory concessioners to a preference in 

the renewal or negotiation of a new contract or permit 

covering substantially the same accommodations, 

facilities and services as provided by the concessioner 

under the terms of its existing contract or permit. 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

4 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 4 
accommodations, facilities or services" of the type authorized to 

be provided under the 1966 and 1970 contracts. The term "new or 

additional accommodations, facilities or services" is not defined 

in the concession contracts, nor in the applicable statutes and 

regulations. However, both the 1966 YPC contract and the 1970 HSI 

contract contain the following provision (Section 16(b)) relating 

to existing and/or potential competitors: 

Nothing contained in this section or elsewhere in 

this contract shall be construed as prohibiting or 

curtailing operations now authorized by the Secretary to 

provide accommodations therein for the public. This 

subsection shall also include the successors or assigns 

of such concessioners, when approved by the Secretary. 

1966 YPC Contract at 16; 1970 HSI Contract at 17. 

In 1979 the NPS declared YPC to be an unsatisfactory 

concessioner, revoked its authority to provide facilities and 

accommodations earlier permitted, terminated NPC's contractual 

relationship with YPC, and began searching for a concessioner to 

replace YPC. Brief of Appellant at 7. To facilitate the search, 

NPS issued a prospectus in August of 1979 soliciting offers from 

all qualified bidders for a two-year interim contract5 for "the 

(Footnote continued): 

Prior to the expiration or termination of a contract or 

permit a determination shall be made based on annual 

evaluations, as to whether or not the concessioner is 

entitled to a preference in the renewal of its contract 

or permit. An unsatisfactory rating, results in the 

loss of the right of preference. 

(c) "Preferential Right" refers to the right to 

provide new or additional services and facilities which 

may be granted to a concessioner by Concession Contract 

as the Director may consider necessary for the 

accommodation and convenience of the public. 

36 C.F.R. § 51.3 (emphasis added). 

5 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

5 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 5 
concession currently operated by the Yellowstone Park Company." 

1979 Prospectus at 1. Shortly after the issuanqe of the 1979 

Prospectus, NPS and HSI officials negotiated and executed a 

"Memorandum of Understanding" ("MOU") clarifying the scope of the 

respective rights of HSI and YPC's "successor" to sell certain 

types of gifts in Yellowstone National Park. MOU at 1. 

The parties to the August 1979 MOU expressly stipulated that: 

"[i]t was agreed that the language authorizing gift operations in 

each of the applicable current contracts did not duplicate or 

conflict with either parties [sic) contract authorization." Id. 

HSI was provided with a copy of the prospectus, but HSI did not 

submit a proposal, and the interim contract was awarded to a third 

company, TWA Services, Inc. ("TWS"), effective November 1, 1979 

and covering the period ·through October 31, 1981. Brief of 

Appellant at 11. 

In June of 1981 the NPS issued another prospectus inviting 

bids for the long-ter.m operation of the concession then being 

operated by TWS under the 1979 interim contract. Again HSI did 

not bid for the concession and in February of 1982, the NPS and 

TWS entered into a five-year renewable contract (Contract No. 

cc 1570-2-0001), authorizing TWS to continue operating the 

concession it had begun operating in 1979. 

It is HSI's position that the process by which the Secretary 

awarded the 1979 contract to TWS violated the Department of the 

Interior's regulations governing awards of 

(Footnote continued): 

It is undisputed that the NPS complied with 

procedure mandated by 36 C.F.R. § 51.4 (1989) 

concessioner for the 1979 interim contract. 

6 

national park 

the regulatory 

when it sought a 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 6 
concession contracts. 6 More specifically, HSI claims that the 

Secretary illegally solicited and awarded the 1979 contract to TWS 

pursuant to the procedures outlined in 36 C.F.R. S 51.4 (1989) 

("Solicitation and award of concession contracts and permits where 

no right of preference exists."), when the NPS was legally 

obligated to follow the procedures set forth in 36 C.F.R. S 51.6 

(1980) ("Preferential right for additional services where a right 

to additional services and facilities exists by specific contract 

prov~s~ons. . . ' ) 7 ' • Brief of Appellant at 8. 

HSI argues that in 1978 and subsequently it has consistently 

complained about encroachments on its contract rights by a new 

gift shop's operations at Grant Village. Brief of Appellant at 

11. It says that there were encroachments by TWS and the NPS. 

6 

7 

36 C.F.R. SS 51.1- 51.7 (1980). 

36 C.F.R. S 51.6 (1980)provided in part: 

Where the Director seeks to authorize new or 

additional accommodations, facilities and services of 

generally the same character as provided by an existing 

§atisfactory concessioner in a park area, and such 

concessioner by Concession Contract has a right to 

provide such additional services, the Director shall 

develop a description of the new or additional services 

and the terms and conditions upon which they are to be 

provided without reference to any private party and give 

the existing concessioner a reasonable opportunity to 

review such description to determine if it wishes to 

provide the services. If so, the Director shall 

authorize the additional services by amendment to the 

concessioner's contract. If the existing concessioner 

does not agree to provide the additional services upon 

the terms and conditions described, the Director shall 

authorize additional services to be provided by a new 

concessioner under substantially the same terms and 

conditions and pursuant to the procedures of § 51.4 

hereof. 

(Emphasis added.) 

7 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 7 
HSI's affidavit from Mr. Povah detailed expanding operations in 

the areas of merchandising, food and beverage service, automobile 

service stations, studio shops and stands selling pictorial 

souvenirs, maps and recordings. Id. at 12. On August 11, 1982, 

HSI wrote a letter to the NPS alleging that a gift shop to be 

built at Grant Village and operated by TWS would encroach on HSI's 

exclusive contract rights, and that the prospectus on which the 

TWS contract was based had provided the concessioner would be 

limited to operating gift shops in its lodging facilities. Brief 

for Federal Appellees at 14. 

II 

HSI initially filed an action in the District of Wyoming 

against the Secretary for damages pursuant to the Federal Tort 

Claims Act in 1985. The tort claims suit was dismissed without 

prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Later HSI attempted to file 

with the NPS an administrative claim for damages under the 

Contract Disputes Act, 41 u.s.c. § 602, et seq., but the filing 

was rejected for failure to comply with the certification 

requirements of § 605(5) of the Act. Several months later, HSI 

filed a suit in the United States District Court for the District 

of Montana for .injunctive and declaratory relief. The Montana 

suit was dismissed without prejudice for improper venue. 

In September of 1985 HSI filed the instant suit in the 

District of Wyoming seeking (1) an injunction barring NPS 

interference with the company's statutory and contractual rights 

under 16 u.s.c. § 20c and 36 C.F.R. § 51.6; (2) a writ of 

mandamus directing the Secretary and his agents to rescind its 

contract with TWS and to offer HSI the opportunity to provide the 

8 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 8 
"new or additional accommodations, facilities and services" that 

are being performed by TWS; (3) a declaration of the rights and 

duties of HSI and the Secretary under the 

statutory, and regulatory provisions; 

under the Equal Access to Justice Act. 

relevant contractual, 

and (4) attorneys' fees 

Finding no violation of HSI's contractual rights, nor any 

illegal action by the Secretary, the district court granted 

summary judgment for the defendants and dismissed HSI's suit with 

prejudice in its unpublished order. The court concluded that no 

"new or additional services" were entailed in the contracts 

awarded to TWS because TWS had effectively stepped into the shoes 

of YPC by taking over in 1979 the services YPC had provided under 

the 1966 YPC contract. The court reasoned that the Secretary 

properly followed the procedures mandated by 36 C.F.R. § 51.4 

(1980), rather than those set forth at 36 C.F.R. § 51.6 (1980). 

Id. at 4. 

Moreover, HSI's contentions that there were material 

questions of fact as to (1) whether the Secretary improperly 

applied 36 C.F.R. § 51.4, and (2) whether TWS was YPC's successor 

as that term is used in section 16(b) of the 1970 HSI contract, 

were rejected on several grounds. The court determined that the 

question regarding the Secretary's compliance with the applicable 

regulations is one of law. As to the second question, the court 

concluded that TWS' successor status is irrelevant, given that no 

"new or additional" services were performed by TWS and HSI's 

preferential right applies only to accommodations, services or 

facilities that are "new or additional." It was also noted that 

HSI had impliedly forfeited its successorship argument when it 

9 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 9 
agreed to the terms of the 1979 Memorandum of Understanding in 

which TWS was unambiguously identified as YPC's "successor." 

HSI now asks this court to reverse the summary judgment and 

remand for further proceedings. 

III 

A. 

Our threshold issue, pressed by the federal defendants, is 

whether the district court had jurisdiction of HSI's claims 

against the Secretary. HSI argues that jurisdiction was proper 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 28 u.s.c. 

§ 1361 (mandamus), 28 u.s.c. § 2201 (declaratory judgments), 5 

u.s.c. § 704 (Administrative Procedure Act), and 16 u.s.c. § 20, 

et seq. (Concessions Policy Act of 1965). Brief of Appellant at 

3. The government says that the district court lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction; that the APA waiver of sovereign Lmmunity, 5 

u.s.c. § 702, does not apply to what is essentially a disguised 

action for damages; and HSI may only seek damages in the Claims 

Court under the Tucker Act, 28 u.s.c. § 1491. Brief of Appellee 

at 19-23. 

Since it is settled that the APA, 5 u.s.c. §§ 701, et seq., 

does not afford an implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction 

permitting federal judicial review of agency action, Califano v. 

Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977), we focus on the availability of 

jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1331 of civil actions arising under 

the federal Constitution, laws or treaties. 

"We begin with the strong presumption that Congress intends 

judicial review of administrative action." Bowen v. Michigan 

Academy of Family Physicians, 476 u.s. 667, 670 (1986); ~also, 

10 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 10 
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 u.s. 136, 140 {1967). This 

presumption favoring judicial review has been reaffirmed over many 

years by Congress, 8 and is embodied in Sections 702, 9 703, and 

70410 of the APA. Abbott Laboratories at 140; N.A.A.C.P. v. 

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 817 F.2d 149, 152 (1st 

8 

See, ~., H.R. REP. No. 94-1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 

reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. 7 ADMIN. NEWS 6121, 6130 ("As 

Government programs grow, and agency activities continue to 

pervade every aspect of life, judicial review of the 

administrative actions of Government officials becomes more and 

more important"). 

9 

10 

Section 702 provides: 

§ 702. Right of review 

A person suffering legal wrong because of agency 

action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency 

action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is 

entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a 

court of the United States seeking relief other than 

money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an 

officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an 

official capacity or under color of legal authority 

shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on 

the ground that it is against the United States or that 

the United States is an indispensable party. The United 

States may be named as a defendant in any such action, 

and a judgment or decree may be entered against the 

United States: Provided, That any mandatory or 

injunctive decree shall specify the Federal officer or 

officers (by name or by title), and their successors in 

office, personally responsible for compliance. Nothing 

herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review 

or the power or duty of the court to dismiss any action 

or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or 

equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to grant 

relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit 

expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is 

sought. 

5 U.S.C. § 704 reads in pertinent part: 

Agency action made reviewable by statute and final 

agency action for which there is no other adequate 

remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. 

11 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 11 
Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, the presumption "may be overcome by 

specific language or specific legislative history~~ indicating that 

Congress has decided to exempt a certain type of administrative 

action from judicial review. Block v. Community Nutrition 

Institute, 467 u.s. 340, 349 (1984). 

In reviewing a legislative structure for evidence of 

congressional intent regarding judicial review of agency action, 

we first note that "the mere fact that some acts are made 

reviewable [by the express language of the relevant statute or 

statutes] should not suffice to support an implication of 

exclusion as to others." Bowen v. Michigan Academy at 674 (citing 

Abbott Labs. at 141). Second, "[e)ven without an explicit 

provision for judicial review , in the absence of strong 

indications that a statute commits a decision irrevocably to 

agency discretion • , the propriety of the agency's action 

presents a federal question cognizable in the district courts." 

Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 792 (1983) (citations omitted). 

We have construed the Tucker Act, 28 u.s.c. § 1491, to 

mandate that the Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction over 

claims against goverrunent agencies if (1) "the action seeks 

monetary relief .in excess of $10,000," and (2) "the action is 

founded upon the Constitution, federal statute, executive 

regulation, or goverrunent contract." Rogers v. Ink, 766 F.2d 430, 

433 (lOth Cir. 1985), transferred to, 14 Cl. Ct. 39 (1987), aff'd, 

861 F.2d 

(1989). 11 

729 (Fed. Cir. 1988), 

The second condition 

cert. denied, 109 s. Ct. 1930 

for exclusive Claims Court 

11 

In Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 u.s. 879, 910 (1988), the 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

12 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 12 
jurisdiction is satisfied here whether HSI's action is understood 

to be "founded upon" the 1966 contract between th~ NPS and HSI, 

the APA (5 u.s.c. §§ 701, et seq.), the Concessions Policy Act of 

1965 (16 u.s.c. 20, et seq.), regulations promulgated under the 

authority of the Concessions Policy Act, or any combination 

thereof. The critical question here then, for purposes of 

determining whether the Tucker Act and 28 u.s.c. § 1331 permit 

consideration of HSI's claims in the district court, is whether 

HSI's is an action seeking monetary relief in excess of $10,000. 

We think it is not. 

Although HSI's prayer for relief does not request money 

damages, we scrutinize claims against the United States to be 

certain that the plaintiff has not endeavored to "transform a 

claim for monetary relief into an equitable action simply by 

asking for an injunction that orders the payment of money ... State 

of N.M. v. Regan, 745 F.2d at 1322. We have emphasized that if 

the "prime objective" or "essential purpose" of the claim is to 

recover money from the federal government, the action belongs in 

the Claims Court. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. United States, 

(Footnote continued): 

Court explains that the Claims Court's jurisdiction over claims 

against the United States for more than $10,000, "is 'exclusive' 

only to the extent that Congress has not granted any other court 

authority to hear the claims that may be decided by the Claims 

Court." Id. at 2740 n.48. Even if money damages for a given 

claim are only available in the Claims Court, the Tucker Act does 

not preclude the same claimant from seeking nonmonetary relief in 

a district court. Id. at 2740-41 n.48 ("the fact that the purely 

monetary aspects of the case could have been decided in the Claims 

Court is not a sufficient reason to bar that aspect of the relief 

available in a district court"); ~also Adamson v. Radosevic, 

685 F.Supp. 814, 818 (D.Kan. 1988) ("[f]or matters outside the 

scope of the Tucker Act, section 1331 gives district courts 

jurisdiction to review agency action"), citing Califano v. 

Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). 

13 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 13 
et al., 901 F.2d 1530, 1532 (lOth Cir. 1990), citing State of N.M. 

v. Regan, 745 F.2d 1322; Rogers v. Ink, 766 F.2d at 434. 

Applying that test here, we are satisfied that the "prime 

objective" and "essential purpose" of HSI's action is not to 

obtain·monetary relief. At the core of HSI's claim is a challenge 

to the procedural fairness of a government agency's award of a 

public contract (to TWS). HSI has not requested compensatory 

damages, nor money payment of any kind. 12 Rather, the complaint 

is devoid of any direct or indirect demand for compensatory 

relief, except attorneys' fees pursuant to the Equal Access to 

Justice Act. The complaint prays: (1) that the court issue a 

preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent defendant NPS, its 

agents, employees, etc. from renewing or negotiating to renew the 

12 

Recognition that HSI's action against the Secretary is not an 

action for money damages resolves the issue of the waiver of 

sovereign immunity raised by the government. ~B=r~i~e~f~~f~o~r~_t=h==e 

Federal Appellees at 20. The A.P.A. states in pertinent part: 

• • • An action in a court of the United States 

seeking relief other than money damages and stating a 

claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof 

acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under 

color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor 

relief therein be denied on the ground that it is 

against the United States . • . . 

5 u.s.c. § 702. 

In Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 894, et seq. (1988), 

the Court pointed out the specific meaning Congress intended when 

it provided the "money damages" exception from the waiver of 

sovereign immunity in the 1976 amendment. The Court quoted Judge 

Bark's views in Maryland Dept. of Human Resources v. Department of 

Health and Human Services, 763 F.2d 1441, 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1985): 

"The term 'money damages,' 5 u.s.c. § 702, we think, normally 

refers to a sum of money used as compensatory relief. Damages are 

given to the plaintiff to substitute for a suffered loss, whereas 

specific remedies 'are not substi tute remedies at all, but attempt 

to give the plaintiff the very thing to which he was entitled.'" 

(citing D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies 135 (1973) 

(emphasis in original). 

14 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 14 
contract between NPS and TWS; negotiating with any other 

concessioner or other party to provide the services plaintiff 

provided in Yellowstone National Park; or interfering with 

plaintiff's contractual and statutory rights under 18 U.S.C. 

S 20(c) and 36 C.P.R. § 51.6; {2) that the court issue a writ of 

mandamus ordering defendant NPS, its agents and employees to 

rescind its contractual relationship with TWS, to honor 

plaintiff's contractual and statutory rights "by offering 

Plaintiff the opportunity to provide the new or additional 

accommodations," and not to renew TWS' contract; {3) for a 

judgment declaring the rights and duties of plaintiff and 

defendant NPS under the contract and adjudging that "filt is 

mandatory that Defendant NPS honor Section 16 of the contract 

... [and] comply with ·36 C. F.R. S 51.6 when it seeks to 

authorize new or additional accommodations," and that defendants 

failed to comply with the contract and that NPS failed to follow 

the mandatory requirements of 36 C.F.R. S 51.6; and (4) for 

attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. 

Complaint at B-10 (emphasis added). 13 

I R. 

Thus, the complaint specifically sought to require the 

defendant NPS to offer plaintiff the opportunity to provide the 

13 

Further evidence of the absence of a demand for money damages 

in the instant suit appears in the district court's order granting 

defendants' motion for summary judgment, the foundation of this 

appeal. That order points out, at p. 6, that plaintiff HSI 

brought an earlier tort action under the FTCA for damages, which 

suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (the complaint not 

stating a tort claim for FTCA jurisdiction and no administrative 

claim required by the FTCA having been filed). The court then 

said, p. 6: "Plaintiff chose not to bring an action for damages 

in the United States Claims Court, and instead filed the present 

action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the rescission of the 

TWS contract." 

15 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 15 
new and additional acconunodations in accordance with plaintiff 

HSI's preferential right, and not to require payment of 

compensatory damages. This makes the instant case analogous to 

Adamson v. Radosevic, 685 F.Supp. 814 (D. Kan. 1988), where the 

right to submit a bid was being protected. Eagle-Picher's 

analysis did not question district court jurisdiction in the 

latter type of case like Adamson. 901 F.2d at 1532-33. 

In sum, here the primary purpose and es~«=m .. ial objective of 

HSI's suit was to protect its preferential right to offer to 

afford new or additional accommodations, not to require the 

payment of compensatory damages. The claim of violation of 

: 

plaintiff HSI's rights under the statute and regulations, and the 

parallel contract provisions, comes within federal question 

jurisdiction of the dist·rict court under 28 u.s.c. § 1331 for 

review of the challenged agency action. See Bell v. New Jersey, 

461 u.s. 773, 777-778 n.3. There is appropriate federal question 

jurisdiction under S 1331 to adjudicate the plaintiff's federal 

claims here of violation by the defendants of the Concessions 

Policy Act of 1965, 16 u.s.c. § 20, et seg.; regulations 

promulgated under that Act, 36 C.F.R. §§ 51.1- 51.7 (1989); and 

the plaintiff's claim premised on its contract with NPC, a federal 

agency a federal question itself. United States v. Allegheny 

County, 322 u.s. 174, 183 (1944)(validity and construction of 

contracts through which the government exercises its 

constitutional functions and their consequences on rights and 

obligations of the parties present questions of federal law). 

Moreover, an action asserting a claim founded on such a contract 

with a federal agency is one arising under the Constitution or 

16 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 16 
laws of the United States within the jurisdiction conferred by 28 

U.S.C. § 1331 on the federal district courts. See Eatmon v. 

Bristol Steel & Ironworks, Inc., 769 F.2d 1503, 1517 (11th Cir. 

1985); cf. National Farmers Union Ins. Companies v. Crow Tribe, 

471 u.s. 845, 850-51 (1985). 

We hold that plaintiff HSI's case was within the district 

court's § 1331 jurisdiction and not within the exclusive Tucker 

Act jurisdiction of the Claims Court over monetary claims. 14 

14 

The Supreme Court has indicated the importance of district 

court review of agency action in preference to Claims Court Tucker 

Act jurisdiction. In Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 u.s. at 908 n.46 

(1988), the Court quotes the following discussion from Delaware 

Div. of Health and Human Services v. DHHS, 665 F.Supp. 1104, 1117 

n.15 (D. Del. 1987): 

[T]he policies of the APA take precedence over the 

purposes of the Tucker Act. In the conflict between two 

statutes, established principles of statutory 

construction mandate a broad construction of the APA and 

a narrow interpretation of the Tucker Act. The Court of 

Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction, because its 

jurisdiction is statutorily granted and it is to be 

strictly construed. 

Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. at 908 n.46 (emphasis added). 

See also Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 867 

(D.C. Cir. 1970) ("Clearly the Congress favors [district court] 

review for those who are likely to be injured by illegal agency 

action in the context of government contracting."); Chemung 

County v. Dole, 78l F.2d 963, 969 (2d Cir. 1986) ("To maintain the 

integrity of the bidding process, the district court must be able 

to review the procedures followed and determine the successful 

offeror after . [a government contract] award has been 

made. 11 ) ; accord Choctaw Mfq. Co. , Inc . v. United States, 7 61 F. 2d 

609, 619 n.17 (11th Cir. 1985) (in dispute over procedure by which 

government contract was awarded, "[w]e •.. do not hesitate to 

review the contracting officer's interpretation of the regulatory 

scheme that governed his conduct .•.. "); United States v. John 

C. Grimberq Co,, Inc., 702 F.2d 1362, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (en 

bane); Glacier Park Foundation v. Watt, 663 F.2d 882, 886 (9th 

Cir. 1981) (district court has jurisdiction to review agency 

contracting officer's compliance with contracting regulations); 

Fort Sumter Tours, Inc., 564 F.2d 1119, 1121-23 (4th Cir. 1977) 

(district court had jurisdiction to review meaning and scope of 

"preferential right" provision in contract between concessioner 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

17 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 17 
B. 

Turning to the propriety of the summary judgment for the 

defendants, we begin with the pertinent language of Rule 56(c) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law. 

As noted, the district court rejected HSI's contentions that 

there were material questions of fact as to (1) whether the 

Secretary improperly applied 36 C.F.R. § 51.4, and (2) whether TWS 

was YPC's successor, as that term is used in section 16(b) of the 

1970 HSI contract. The court concluded that the first question 

regarding the Secretary's compliance with the applicable 

regulations is one of law. On the second question, the court 

reasoned that TWS' successor status is irrelevant, given that no 

new or additional services were performed by TWS and that HSI's 

preferential right applies only to accommodations, services or 

facilities that are "new or additional." We must determine 

whether there was a genuine issue of material fact and whether the 

defendants were entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of 

(Footnote continued): 

and NPS.); Adamson v. Radosevic, 685 F.Supp. 814, 820 (D. Kan. 

1988) (district court has jurisdiction to hear post-award claim by 

terminated public contractor seeking nonmonetary relief for 

wrongful termination.); ~also Integrity Mgt. Intern. v. Tombs 

& Sons, 836 F.2d 485, 489 (lOth Cir. 1987) (dictum) (acknowledging 

right of unsuccessful public contract bidder to challenge 

procedure by which contract was awarded); Feide lman & Ursini, 

Contract Jurisdiction of the United States Claims Court, 32 CLEV. 

ST. L. REV. 41, 50 (1983-84) ( "disappointed [public contract] 

bidders in post-award situations may seek relief in the district 

courts."). 

18 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 18 
law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 u.s. 242, 248-50 

(1986). 

We agree with the district court's conclusion that there is 

no genuine issue of material fact for trial. Even when all 

justifiable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, the question whether the NPS was 

obliged to follow 36 C.F.R. § 51.4, remains one of law. At issue 

is the relation of the HSI/NPS 1970 contract, the YPC/NPS 1966 

contract, the 1979 and 1982 TWS/NPS contracts and the Secretary's 

regulations at 36 C.F.R. §§ 51.1- 51.7. In the circumstances of 

this case, the construction and reconciliation of the contractual, 

statutory and regulatory provisions is an essentially legal 

enterprise. 15 

First, we deal with· the central question of whether HSI's 

"preferential right", set forth in§ 16(a) of its 1970 contract 

with the NPS, required NPS to follow § 51.6 (preferential right 

for additional services where specific contract provision exists) 

rather than § 51.4 (award of concession services where no 

contractual right of preference exists) in awarding concession 

services to TWS. 36 C.F.R. §§ 51.4 & 51.6 (1985). We note at the 

outset that we agree with the district court's conclusion that the 

NPS correctly followed § 51.4. 

Section 16 (a) defines HSI's preferential right and provides, 

in part: 

15 

(a) The Concessioner is granted a preferential right, 

not an exclusive right or monopolistic right, to provide 

lOA WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE§ 2730.1 at 180-81 (1983) ("The 

legal effect or construction of a contract is a question of law . . . . . ") 

19 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 19 
public accommodations, facilities, and services in the 

park of the character authorized hereunder, •.• The 

Secretary will request the Concessioner to provide such 

new or additional accommodations. facilities, or 

services, of the same character as the Secretary may 

consider necessary or desirable for the accommodation 

and convenience of the public. 

1970 HSI Contract, S 16(a)(emphasis added). 

As indicated by the district court, S 16(a) appears to have 

been based on S 51.3(c)("Definitions") which states that a: 

"'(p]referential [r]ight' refers to the right to provide new or 

additional services and facilities which may be granted to a 

concessioner by Concession Contract as the Director may consider 

necessary for the accommodation and convenience of the public." 

36 C.F.R. S 51.3(c)(l980). Furthermore, when a preferential right 

exists S 51.6 requires the NPS' Director to: 

develop a description of the new or additional services 

and the terms and conditions upon which they are to be 

provided without reference to any private party and give 

the existing concessioner a reasonable opportunity to 

review such description to determine if he wishes to 

provide the services. Id. at § 51.6. 

HSI contends that its preferential right in § l6(a) was 

violated when NPS awarded TWS the right to operate the concession 

facilities that were previously operated by YPC because the award 

involved "new and additional services" that should have been 

offered first to HSI. Brief for Appellant at 19-21. We note that 

the NPS has not articulated a precise definition of what 

constitutes "new and additional services." Consequently, we must 

compare the grant of services expressed in the previous contract 

between YPC and NPS with the two subsequent contracts between TWS 

and NPS to see if NPS provided TWS with "new and additional 

services" that should have been offered to HSI. 

20 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 20 
HSI claims that the "new and additional services" included: 

(1) the expansion of the size and scope of TWS' gift services, 

especially involving the sale of souvenirs; (2) the construction 

of a new gift shop and restaurant facilty; (3) the addition of 

ice cream parlors, visitor-viewed fudge machines, fast food 

services, and various handcraftsmen to its retail operation; and 

(4) the acquisition of an interest in service stations in 

Yellowstone National Park for increasing its food and beverage 

services and selling souvenirs. Id. at 25-26 (citing Affidavit of 

Trevor Povah, President of HSI, September 12, 1985). According to 

HSI, these services were never envisioned by either YPC or NPS 

when they entered into their contract in 1966 and, therefore, are 

"new and additional services." 

We disagree and affirm· the district court's decision that 

these services were not "new and additional services" but rather 

preexisting services that were initially sanctioned in Section 

2(a) of the original 1966 YPC/NPS contract. Dist. Ct. Op. at 6. 

Section 2(a) expressly and broadly authorized YPC to provide the 

public with "[l]odging accommodations [and] food and beverage 

service facilities" -- the very items HSI now complains constitute 

"new and additional services." Brief for Appellant at 4 . Indeed, 

these preexisting services had been performed by YPC for some 

years and were subsequently incorporated into the two-year and 

five-year contracts between TWS and NPS. Furthermore, HSI 

received a prospectus from NPS concerning its offer to sell the 

preexisting services of YPC but HSI never submitted any proposals 

to acquire them. Brief for Appellant at 10; Brief for Appellee 

at 10-11. Instead, representatives of HSI and NPS signed a 

21 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 21 
"Memorandum of Understanding re: Scope of Gift Operations to be 

Carried out by Yellowstone Park Company's Successor/August, 1979", 

which clarified HSI's right to sell souvenirs and limited such 

sales by YPC's successor -- ultimately TWS. Id. 

HSI's preferential right to offer "new and additional 

services" under § 16(a) of the 1970 HSI/NPS contract was never 

violated because no "new and additional services" are involved in 

the contracts between TWS and NPS. Therefore, we cannot say that 

the Secretary's decision that the NPS should follow 36 C.F.R. 

§ 51.4 was plainly erroneous or otherwise inconsistent with the 

16 regulations at 36 C.F.R. SS 51.1 -51.7 (1989). 

In addition, the district court points out that the 

Secretary's interpretation of the term, "new or additional 

services", and the relation of that term to HSI's "preferential 

right" contract provision, renders irrelevant the question whether 

TWS was YPC's "successor" under § 16(b) of the HSI/NPS contract. 

Section 16 (b) provides: 

Nothing contained in this section or elsewhere in this 

contract shall be construed as prohibiting or curtailing 

operations conducted in the park by other concessioners 

now authorized by the Secretary to provide 

accommodations therein for the public. This subsection 

shall include . also the successors and assigns of such 

concessioners, when approved by the Secretary. (emphasis 

added). 

Thus, HSI's contractual rights are not to be construed to prohibit 

or curtail existing services that were originally provided by YPC. 

16 In a case that also concerned the Secretary of the Interior's 

discretion under the general mandates of the Concessions Policy 

Act, 16 u.s.c. § 20, and 16 u.s.c. S 3, the Ninth Circuit held 

that "[w]here several administrative solutions exist for a 

problem, courts will uphold any one with a rational basis," as 

long as it is not arbitrary. Wilderness Public Rights Fund v. 

Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 

u.s. 982 (1980). 

22 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 22 
1970 HSI Contract S 16(b) at 17. It is within the realm of 

reasonable interpretation for the Secretary to understand § 16(b) 

to apply to TWS, as TWS provides substantially the same services 

that had previously been provided by YPC. Edwards v. Califano, 

619 F.2d 865, 868 (lOth Cir. 1980)(standard of review under 5 

u.s.c. S 706(2)(A) "is a narrow one"). Therefore, we agree with 

the Secretary's interpretation. 

We also agree with the district court's finding that even if 

S 16(b) were applicable to the services provided by TWS, the 

meaning of "successor .. is not a material question of fact because 

HSI acknowledged in its 1979 MOU with NPS that there would be a 

"successor" to YPC. Moreover, both HSI and NPS agreed in the MOU 

to incorporate a provision into any successor's contract limiting 

the successor's sales of souvenirs. Accordingly, NPS complied 

with the MOU and incorporated this limitation on souvenir sales 

into its two contracts with TWS. HSI cannot now complain that TWS 

is not a successor to YPC after it has reaped the benefits of the 

provision limiting TWS' sales of souvenirs. 

AFFIRMED. 

23 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 23 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

CHARLES DOUGLAS PRICE, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

FILED 

Uniwd States V.)Utt of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

FEB 8 1991 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-8039 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. CR-89-044-J) 

Sean Connelly (Richard A. Stacy, United States Attorney, and John 

R. Green and Maynard D. Grant, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

District of Wyoming, with him on the brief), for the PlaintiffAppellant. 

Robert T. Moxley (Victor L. Abbo, Boulder, Colorado, with him on 

the brief), Cheyenne, Wyoming, for the Defendant-Appellee. 

Nancy Hollander, Freedman, Boyd & Daniels, P.A., Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, on the brief for amicus curiae, National Association of 

Criminal Defense Lawyers. 

Before LOGAN, and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and GREENE, District 

Judge.* 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable J. Thomas Greene, United States District Judge for 

the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 24 
Defendant-appellee Charles Douglas Price was indicted for 

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 

u.s.c. §§ 841(a)(l) and 84l(b)(l)(C) while in possession of a 

handgun in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 924(c). Price filed a motion 

to suppress the cocaine and the handgun from evidence, arguing 

they were recovered during an illegal search of the vehicle he had 

been driving. The district court denied the motion but later 

granted a motion for reconsideration. Upon reconsideration, the 

district court reversed its earlier ruling and suppressed the 

evidence. On appeal, the government argues the district court 

erred by applying a presumption against a waiver of constitutional 

rights in suppressing the evidence. We reverse and remand for 

reconsideration consistent with this opinion. 

The items of suppressed evidence were seized when Wyoming 

Highway Patrol Officer Wyatt Howard stopped Price for exceeding 

the speed limit and driving wit h expired license plate decals. 

Price was unable to produce a registration when asked, explaining 

he had borrowed the car from a friend. The officer gave Price a 

verbal warning for speeding and cited him for a violation of 

registration requirements. When Howard confirmed by a computer 

check that the vehicle was registered to the individual Price had 

named, he returned Price's driver's license. 

Because Howard still was concerned about whether Price had 

the owner's permission to use the vehicle, he asked Price if he 

had the owner's phone number. Before Price gave the officer the 

number, the officer said he would like to ask Price a couple 

questions. Price agreed to respond. Howard testified he asked 

2 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 25 
Price "if he was carrying any illegal weapon, illegal drugs of any 

kind, or large amounts of cash." Price replied he was not. The 

officer then asked if he could look in the vehicle. Price told 

Howard he could "look in the trunk." 

Price opened his trunk, moved the luggage around, and said, 

"[a]s you can see, there's no large caches of drugs in my trunk 

here.'' Officer Howard responded by telling Price to stand 

approximately thirty feet behind the vehicle. Howard then 

unsnapped the spare tire cover and reached for a small pouch that 

contained various documents. Price approached the vehicle and 

said, "I know my plates are expired, but I'm a well-respected 

businessman." Howard again ordered Price to stand back and not 

make any more "sudden movements or rapid approaches," lest he 

misinterpret Price's intentions. 

After examining the pouch, Howard replaced it and began to 

search Price's luggage. This search revealed a baggie containing 

a small amount of marijuana. Howard then searched the entire 

vehicle. He found twenty-five grams of cocaine, approximately 

$12,000 in cash, and a loaded nine-millimeter handgun in the 

automobile. · Howard arrested Price. 

Price premised his motion to suppress on three grounds. 

First, he asserted the stop was pretextual. Second, he argued his 

consent was obtained after an unlawful detention in violation of 

the fourth amendment . Finally, Price contended Howard's search 

exceeded the scope of his consent. 

The district court rejected all three theories and denied 

Price's motion. The judge found the traffic stop legitimate. He 

3 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 26 
also found Price had consented to a search of the luggage in his 

trunk and had not revoked that consent. 

Six-and-one-half months later, the district court 

reconsidered Price's motion and decided to suppress the evidence. 

The court did not revisit the pretextual stop argument but found 

Price had given his consent to a very limited search that only 

involved a "look" in the trunk. The court also found Price had 

not expanded his consent implicitly by acquiescing in Howard's 

decision to continue to search through the contents of the trunk. 

Finally, the court concluded that even if Price acquiesced in an 

expansion of the scope of the search, any consent implied by 

acquiescence was vitiated by an unlawful arrest. The government 

appeals this superseding order, contending it was premised on a 

misapplication of the law. 

We review a district court's factual findings regarding 

consent under a clearly erroneous standard. United States Yi 

Benitez, 899 F.2d 995, 997 (lOth Cir. 1990). However, when 

findings are premised on "an erroneous view of the law, a remand 

is the proper course unless the record permits only one resolution 

of the factual issue." Pullman-Standard Y..!.. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 

292 {1982). 

To admit evidence obtained in a consent search, a district 

court must find from the totality of the circumstances that (1) 

the defendant's consent to an officer's search was voluntary and 

(2) the search did not exceed the scope of the defendant's 

consent. See, ~~ United States ~ Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 

(lOth Cir. 1986). 

4 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 27 
Although the district court's factual conclusions on these 

issues in the initial and superseding orders are contradictory, we 

cannot say they are clearly erroneous. For example, on the key 

issue of the scope of Price's consent, the district court first 

found a broad consent, then a limited consent. The record could 

support either finding. Officer Howard's testimony was that when 

he requested to look in Price's car, Price responded, "you can 

look in the trunk, sure." Bernard Boyle, an agent of the Wyoming 

Division of Criminal Investigation, spent several hours 

interviewing Howard about the search. Boyle's report indicated 

Howard had asked to make a "cursory search" of Price's trunk. 

Finally, Price's actions and comments when Howard began an indepth search of the trunk, although ambivalent, lend support to 

the district court's finding in its superseding order that Price 

had consented to a limited search, i.e., a "look in" the trunk. 

We do not affirm the court's superseding order, however, 

because it contains an error of law that apparently affected its 

view of the facts. The court announced in that order that i t 

reviewed the facts regarding the scope of Price's consent with "a 

presumption against waiver of fundamental constituti onal rights." 

It is unclear from the record precisely what role this presumption 

played in the district court's reversal of its initial order. 

However, it is clear the court's application of the presumption 

was error that may have influenced the decision to suppress. 

The presumption against voluntary waiver of constitutional 

rights does not apply in consent search cases. In Schneckloth~ 

Bustamante, 412 u.s. 218, 235-37 (1973), the Supreme Court 

5 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 28 
reviewed cases that had applied a waiver analysis in determining 

whether defendants had forfeited constitutional rights. The Court 

found this mode of analysis is proper when constitutional rights 

guaranteeing a fair trial under the fifth and sixth amendments, 

such as the right to counsel or against self-incrimination, are at 

issue. Id. at 241-42. The Court painstakingly distinguished 

cases involving the fourth amendment concern with consent 

searches, id. at 236-37, 241-46, concluding the state need not 

prove a "knowing waiver" of the right to refuse consent, id. at 

246-47; see also id. at 245 ("'waiver' approach to consent 

searches would be thoroughly inconsistent with our decisions that 

have approved 'third party consents' 11 ). Significantly, the Court 

emphasized the proper test in consent search cases is not whether 

there was a waiver of the defendant's fourth amendment rights, id. 

at 245-47, but whether the consent to search was voluntary under 

the totality of the circumstances, id. at 227, 232-33, 249. 

Because the focus of the inquiry is not whether rights were waived 

but whether consent was voluntary, the Court further held a 

presumption against waiver should not apply in these cases. Id. 

at 243. 

Before Schneckloth was decided, we had adopted a test for 

voluntariness of consent searches that included the presumption 

against waiver: 

"The government must prove that consent was given. It 

must show that there was no duress or coercion, express 

or implied. The consent must be 'unequivocal and 

specific' and 'freely and intelligently given.' There 

must be convincing evidence that defendant has waived 

his rights. • . . "Courts indulge every reasonable 

presumption against waiver" of fundamental 

constitutional rights. u 

6 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 29 
Villano ~ United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (lOth Cir. 1962) 

(quoting United States ~ Page, 302 F.2d 81, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1962) 

{emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 1 In subsequent consent 

search cases, we recited the Villano test without explicity 

considering the intervening Schneckloth holding that the 

presumption against waiver should not be transposed from the trial 

rights context to the consent search context. See, ~' United 

States~ Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1150 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 

479 u.s. 914 (1986); United States~ Gay, 774 F . 2d 368, 376 (lOth 

Cir. 1985). Although we apparently did not rely on the presumption 

in any of these cases, we have retained the presumption language as 

part of our test for voluntariness of a defendant's consent to a 

search. In contrast to our position, every other circuit has 

followed Schneckloth by rejecting the waiver approach and employing 

the traditional "totality of the circumstances .. test in this 

context. 2 

1 The Page court, from whom we adopted the test, in turn took 

the "presumption against waiver" approach from Johnson Y..:.. Zerbst, 

304 u.s. 458, 464 (1938) . Page, 302 F.2d at 84 & n.6. Johnson 

involved the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel and 

was one of the principal cases the Supreme Court distinguished in 

Schneckloth. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235-46. 

2 See, ~' United States Y..:.. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 420 (D.C. 

Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 214 (1990}; United States v. 

Rodriquez Perez, 625 F.2d 1021, 1024 (1st Cir. 1980); United States~ Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1023 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. 

denied, 471 u.s. 1021 (1985); United States~ Sebetich, 776 F.2d 

412, 424 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1017 {1988); 

United States Y..:.. Poole, 718 F.2d 671, 674 (4th Cir. 1983); United 

States~ Hall, 565 F.2d 917, 920-21 (5th Cir. 1978); United 

States~ Williams, 754 F.2d 672, 674-75 (6th Cir. 1985); United States~ Scott, 578 F.2d 1186, 1188-89 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 

439 U.S. 870 (1978); United States~ Colonia, 870 F.2d 1319, 1324 

(7th Cir. 1989); United States Y..:.. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1296 (8th 

Cir. 1986); United States~ Licata, 761 F.2d 537, 544 (9th Cir. 

(Footnote Continued on Following Page) 

7 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 30 
In liqht of the Schneckloth decision, we are convinced a 

district court determining the admissibility of evidence should not 

presume a defendant's consent to a search is either involuntary, 

412 u.s·. at 242-43, or voluntary, Carson, 793 F.2d at 1150. The 

voluntariness of consent always must be determined from the 

totality of the circumstances. See, ~' Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 

227, 232-33, 249; Espinosa, 782 F.2d at 892. The government, of 

course, has the burden of proving a voluntary consent. §gg, ~' 

Florida~ Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 

at 249. The general inquiry outlined in Villano and its progeny 

remains relevant. See 310 F.2d at 684 . We find only the Villano 

test's application of the presumption against waiver improper. 3 

Similarly, a district court should not apply the presumption 

in determining the scope of consent. The question of the scope of 

consent is "[a] subspecies of the voluntariness inquiry." United 

States~ Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760, 764 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Just as it is inappropriate to apply a presumption against waiver 

(Footnote Continued from Previous Page) 

1985); United States~ Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 740 (9th Cir. 

1985); United States~ Blake, 888 F.2d 795, 798 (11th Cir. 1989); 

see also Florida~ Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983); Stuntz, 

Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Va. L. Rev. 761, 780-82, 

787 (1989). But~ United States~ Shaibu, 895 F.2d 1291, 1293-

94 (9th Cir. 1990) (reciting presumption) (citing United States ~ 

Page, 302 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir. 1962) without reference to 

Schneckloth or post-Schneckloth Ninth Circuit cases, ~' ~, 

supra); Tartar~ Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 980 (6th Cir. 1984) 

(reciting presumption) (citing no authority), cert. denied, 470 

U.S. 1051 (1985); cf. United States~ Jones, 641 F.2d 425, 419 

(6th Cir. 1981) (discussing consent as "wai ver 11 of fourth 

amendment rights but employing totality of circumstances test 

without presumption). 

3 This opinion has been circulated among the entire Tenth 

Circuit Court of Appeals, which concurs in our resolution of this 

issue. 

8 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 31 
in determining voluntariness, it is inappropriate to use the 

presumption in determining the scope of consent. See generally 

Schneckloth, 412 u.s. 241-47. As we held in United States~ 

Brandon, 847 F.2d 625, 630 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 488 u.s. 973 

{1988), a court should consider the totality of the circumstances 

to determine the scope of consent. See also Espinosa, 782 F.2d at 

892. 

Because of our resolution of the foregoing issue, we also 

must remand on the district court's finding that "(e)ven assuming 

that Price acquiesced in an expansion of the [scope of] the search 

• • . such acquiescence was vitiated by an unlawful seizure of 

Price' [sic] person. " The district court found that Price was 

uulawfully seized when he was ordered to stand thirty feet ;rom his 

vehicle. If Price already had consented to an in-depth search of 

his trunk at that t~e, and his intervening actions did not amount 

to a withdrawal of that consent, then the evidence discovered 

during that search is not tainted by the subsequent unlawful 

seizure. If, however, Price had given Howard only l~ited consent 

to "look in" the trunk, the illegal seizure vitiates any subsequent 

acquiescence in an expanded search. The resolution of this 

question depends on facts the district court must reassess without 

applying the presumption against waiver. 

Because the district court explained the result in the 

superseding suppression hearing based on a misapplication of the 

law, we hold the court must reconsider the factual findings 

regarding voluntariness and scope of consent without applying the 

presumption against waiver. We therefore REVERSE the district 

9 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 32 
court's order granting the motion to suppress and REMAND for 

reconsideration consistent with this opinion. 

10 

Appellate Case: 86-1376 Document: 01019725762 Date Filed: 02/11/1991 Page: 33