Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00188/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00188-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Peter David Maassen, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 13-00188 PHX SRB (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

On January 28, 2013, Petitioner, proceeding pro se,

docketed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 9) on May 10, 2013.

Petitioner filed a reply to the answer to his petition on June

6, 2013. See Doc. 10.

I Procedural History

A Maricopa County grand jury indictment returned March

12, 2009, charged Petitioner with one count of shoplifting as a

continuing criminal episode, a Class 5 felony, and one count of

trafficking in stolen property in the first degree, a Class 2

felony. See Answer, Exh. C. With regard to the charges

asserted in the indictment, the Arizona Court of Appeals’

memorandum decision affirming Petitioner’s convictions and

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sentences found the following facts:

 During the last quarter of 2008, J.B., a

retail crime investigator for Target, noticed

a trend of high-end Logitech universal remote

control devices missing from stores in Mesa,

Scottsdale, Gilbert and Marana. Surveillance

video recorded between October 13, 2008, and

November 20, 2008, revealed numerous

instances of [Petitioner] entering a Target

store, standing near the displayed remotes,

and when alone, cutting the packaged remotes

from the locked displays. The videos showed

[Petitioner] cutting open the plastic

clamshell containers to remove the remotes

and exiting the stores apparently

empty-handed. To avoid setting off alarms

when leaving the stores, [Petitioner] walked

around the security antennas located inside

the exit doors. On one occasion, J.B.

personally witnessed [Petitioner] engaged in

this furtive behavior. 

 On November 20, 2008, Mesa police officers

arrived at [Petitioner’s] home in Apache

Junction to arrest him for the thefts.

[Petitioner] did not answer the door. An

officer turned off the electricity to the

home, and [Petitioner], wearing only his

boxer shorts, came outside to investigate.

[Petitioner] was handcuffed and brought

inside to retrieve clothing. Sergeant Langley

noticed a large number of packaged used

consumer electronics. [Petitioner] explained

that he purchased the equipment from various

retail outlets and refurbished the items

before selling them on eBay. Further

investigation revealed [Petitioner’s] eBay

account where he offered 14 unpackaged

Logitech remote controls for sale. Police

obtained a search warrant for [Petitioner’s]

home, and during the subsequent search,

officers seized a number of new remotes that

looked similar to the ones on [Petitioner’s]

eBay account.

Id., Exh. P at 2-3 (footnote omitted). 

On January 11, 2010, Petitioner’s defense counsel filed

a motion to suppress evidence arising from the search of

Petitioner’s residence. In his motion to suppress, Petitioner

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argued that he did not consent to the police entering his

bedroom closet to retrieve clothing for him following his

arrest, and that, without the information obtained from the

protective sweep of his home, the search warrant was not

supported by probable cause. Id., Exh. D. 

An evidentiary hearing was conducted March 5, 2010,

regarding the motion to suppress. The trial court found that

the protective sweep performed by the police was unlawful. Id.,

Exh. F at 39. However, the state trial court also found that

“[t]he question on whether to suppress these items goes to

whether or not they were seized during the course of the valid

search warrant.” Id., Exh. F.

The state court concluded: 

I find if you excise out the information

gleaned from the protective sweep, it still

contains probable cause. Let me say further,

I do believe there is substantial evidence

within the affidavit, and presented today,

that the defendant did invite individual

officers into his home so that he could

gather clothing, that he directed them that

they could obtain clothing from his bedroom,

and that it was reasonable for them to go

into the master bedroom closet to obtain that

clothing. I further find that even if on

later review of another court it’s determined

that such a consent was not given, that this

affidavit nevertheless contains probable

cause to search, even without the consent to

look into the master bedroom closet. Because

I believe even without viewing the remotes in

the closet, the affidavit[] still contains

probable cause. 

Id., Exh. F at 39-40. Accordingly, the state trial court denied

the motion to suppress. Id., Exh. F at 40.

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During Petitioner’s trial the first count of the

indictment was reduced to allege shoplifting of property with a

value of at least $1,000.00, a Class 6 felony. Id., Exh. I at

51-58. Petitioner testified at his trial. The jury found

Petitioner guilty of shoplifting property with a combined value

of $1,000.00 or more, and guilty of trafficking in stolen

property in the first degree. Id., Exh. L at 3; Exh. J at 115.

Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion seeking a new trial, which

was denied, and a motion seek a judgment of acquittal, which was

denied.

The trial court found the state had proved five

historical prior felony convictions, two of which were used in

Petitioner’s sentencing. Id., Exh. K at 16-18. On August 11,

2010, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to mitigated

concurrent terms of three years imprisonment on Count 1 and

fourteen years imprisonment on Count 2. Id., Exh. K at 28.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. On March 27, 2012, the Arizona Court

of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences.

Id., Exh. P. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review in

Petitioner’s direct appeal on October 18, 2012. Id., Exh. R.

On November 13, 2012, Petitioner initiated an action

for state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. S. The state trial

court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner in his Rule 32

proceedings. Id., Exh. T. On March 11, 2013, Petitioner’s

counsel notified the state court that he was “unable to discern

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any colorable claim upon which to base” claims for relief in

Petitioner’s Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. U. On April 1, 2013,

the state trial court allowed Petitioner until approximate July

1, 2013, to file a brief outlining his claims for postconviction relief. Id., Ex. X. Accordingly, Petitioner’s

state action for post-conviction relief is still pending in the

state courts.

Respondent further aver: 

On March 25, 2013, after the superior court

extended the time for Petitioner to file a

pro se PCR petition, Petitioner filed a

“motion to vacate this PCR without baring

[sic] the claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel.” (Ex. W.) In that filing, Petitioner

sought to “vacate[]” the proceeding “since no

petitions have been prepa[red]” and to be

permitted to raise a different claim,

presumably ineffective assistance of counsel.

(Id.) The superior court ruled that

Petitioner’s request amounted to a request

for a stay, which was not authorized by the

rules governing PCR proceedings. (Ex. X, at

1.) Although the superior court denied that

request accordingly, the court stated that it

would “give the [Petitioner] a generous

extension of time to submit a petition for

post-conviction relief due to the

circumstances.” (Id.) The court gave

Petitioner an additional 90 days, or until

approximately July 1, 2013, to file his PCR

petition. (Id.) As of the date of this

filing, Petitioner has not filed any PCR

petition. Thus far, Petitioner has not

specified his PCR claim(s) in the superior

court; however, based on his March 25, 2013,

presumably any such claim would be based on

ineffective assistance of counsel—a claim

that is not raised in his habeas petition. Accordingly, his pending PCR proceeding does

not appear to be relevant to the claims

raised in this habeas proceeding. 

Answer at 5 n.2.

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To the extent Petitioner is raising claims already

exhausted in the state courts, i.e., claims raised in his direct

appeal, this habeas petition is timely. Petitioner does not ask

the Court to stay his petition pending the resolution of any

claims for ineffective assistance of counsel which he may be

exhausting in the state courts. To decide the claims raised in

this petition would require Petitioner to file a “second or

successive” petition when or if he decides to bring his

ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a federal habeas

action.

In his habeas petition, Petitioner asserts:

1. Petitioner asserts the Mesa Police Department

violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching his home

without probable cause, and without a warrant for his arrest or

search warrant. Petitioner states: “Further did not have a

warrant to kill the power to my home, flush me out” [and] arrest

me.”

2. Petitioner contends his Sixth Amendment rights were

violated because the state was allowed to amend Count I of the

indictment.

3. Petitioner contends his federal and state

constitutional rights were violated because the police came onto

his property without a search warrant or a warrant for his

arrest. Petitioner alleges that, after entering onto his

property, the police did not announce their presence.

4. Petitioner contends his Fourth Amendment rights were

violated because the police used a trick to flush him out of his

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house and then entered and searched his house without a warrant

or his permission.

Petitioner asks the Court to reverse his convictions on

Count I and Count II and to order that the evidence seized as a

result of the search be suppressed.

Respondents argue that the Arizona Court of Appeal’s

decision denying Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claims was not

clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal

law. Respondents further assert that the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision with regard to Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment

claim was not clearly contrary to or an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law. 

II Standard of review

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Carey v. Musladin, 549

U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque,

555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). “Under AEDPA, a federal

court may not grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

unless the state court’s adjudication on the merits was

‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States.’” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct.

1376, 1390 (2012), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

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A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of United States

Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a set of facts that

is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme

Court but reaches a different result. See, e.g., Brown v.

Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438 (2005);

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149

(2004); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 785 (9th Cir. 2012),

cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2766 (2013). For example, a state

court’s decision is considered contrary to federal law if the

state court erroneously applied the wrong standard of review or

an incorrect test to a claim. See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556

U.S. 111, 121, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009); Wright v. Van

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124–25, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746–47 (2008);

Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 784-85; Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d

1276, 1288 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1557

(2011). See also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir.

2008); Bledsoe v. Bruce, 569 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009).

A state court decision involves an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law if it correctly

identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts

in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or

fails to extend, a clearly established legal principle to a new

set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. See

McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010). When

considering such a claim, “a habeas court must determine what

arguments or theories supported or ... could have supported, the

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state court’s decision; and then it must ask where it is

possible fair-minded jurists could disagree that those arguments

or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior

decision of this Court.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770,

786 (2011).

The state court’s determination of a habeas claim may

be set aside under the unreasonable application prong if, under

clearly established federal law, the state court was

“unreasonable in refusing to extend [a] governing legal

principle to a context in which the principle should have

controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct.

2113, 2120 (2000). See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987,

994 (9th Cir. 2010). However, the state court’s decision is an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only

if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g.,

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010);

Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785. An unreasonable application of

law is different from an incorrect one. See Renico, 130 S. Ct.

at 1862; Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005).

“That test is an objective one and does not permit a court to

grant relief simply because the state court might have

incorrectly applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.”

Adamson v. Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2011).

A state court’s determination that a claim

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief

so long as “fairminded jurists could

disagree” on the correctness of the state

court's decision. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541

U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140,[ ] (2004).

And as this Court has explained,

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“[E]valuating whether a rule application was

unreasonable requires considering the rule’s

specificity. The more general the rule, the

more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes

in case-by-case determinations.” Ibid. “[I]t

is not an unreasonable application of clearly

established Federal law for a state court to

decline to apply a specific legal rule that

has not been squarely established by this

Court.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111,

129 S.Ct. 1411, 1413–14, [ ] (2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786.

The phrase “clearly established Federal law”

refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the

dicta,” of the Supreme Court's decisions “as

of the time of the relevant state-court

decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

412, 120 S. Ct. 1495 [ ] (2000). A state

court's decision is “contrary to” this body

of law if it applies a rule that contradicts

the governing law articulated by the Supreme

Court or arrives at a result different than

that reached by the Supreme Court in a case

with materially indistinguishable facts. Id.

at 405–06, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, [].

 A decision involves an “unreasonable

application” of clearly established federal

law if it “identifies the correct governing

legal principle ... but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case.” Id. at 413, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct.

1495 []. The Supreme Court has emphasized

that “an unreasonable application of federal

law is different from an incorrect

application of federal law.” Id. at 410, 529

U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, []. Accordingly,

“a federal habeas court may not issue the

writ simply because that court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly.” Id. at 411, 529 U.S. 362, 120

S. Ct. 1495.Instead, the court must determine

whether the state court's application of

Supreme Court precedents was objectively

unreasonable. Id. at 409, 529 U.S. 362, 120

S. Ct. 1495, []. Although the Supreme Court’s

decisions are the focus of the

unreasonable-application inquiry, we may look

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to Ninth Circuit case law as “persuasive

authority for purposes of determining whether

a particular state court decision is an

‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court

law.” Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600

(9th Cir. 2000).

Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2010).

A lower federal court may not grant habeas relief under

§ 2254(d)(1) based on federal circuit court opinions; the

statute requires that the particular legal point be clearly

established by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Marshall v.

Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450-51 (2013). Accordingly, if the

Supreme Court has not addressed a specific issue in its

holdings, the state court’s adjudication of the issue cannot be

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

See Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2007),

citing Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10, 126 S. Ct. 407,

408 (2006). Stated another way, if the issue raised by the

petitioner “is an open question in the Supreme Court’s

jurisprudence,” the Court may not issue a writ of habeas corpus

on the basis that the state court unreasonably applied clearly

established federal law by rejecting the precise claim presented

by the petitioner. Cook, 538 F.3d at 1016; Crater v. Galaza,

491 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2007). The United States Supreme

Court “has held on numerous occasions that it is not an

unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for

a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has

not been squarely established by this Court.” Knowles, 129 S.

Ct. at 1419, citing Wright, 552 U.S. at 124-25, 128 S. Ct. at

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746-47.

 Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be

correct and can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when

the federal court is presented with clear and convincing

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller–El v. Dretke, 545

U.S. 231, 240–41, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Miller–El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003);

Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 763 n.1; Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d

943, 950 (9th Cir. 2010); Stenson, 504 F.3d at 881; Anderson v.

Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006). The “presumption

of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate

court, as opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of

fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303,

1304–05 (1982). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court

has held that, with regard to claims adjudicated on the merits

in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to

the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the

claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388,

1398 (2011).

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision

was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedent, the Court

must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were

violated, i.e., the state’s ultimate denial of relief, without

the deference to the state court’s decision that the

Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

otherwise requires. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v.

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Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953–54, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 2858–59

(2007); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785-86; Greenway v. Schriro,

653 F.3d 790, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2011).

III Analysis

A. Petitioner’s claims for relief

Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claims

Three of Petitioner’s claims for federal habeas relief

assert a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free of

unreasonable searches and seizures.

Petitioner’s defense counsel brought a motion to

suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search of

Petitioner’s home. Counsel argued that the search was without

a warrant and did not meet any exception to the rule that a

reasonable search required a warrant. After conducting an

evidentiary hearing, the state trial court denied the motion to

suppress. Petitioner raised the constitutionality of the search

and the trial court’s decision regarding the motion to suppress

in his direct appeal and the state appellate court found relief

not warranted on these claims.

Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate

his Fourth Amendment claims in the state courts. Accordingly,

pursuant to the holding of the United States Supreme Court in

Stone v. Powell, the Court should not re-consider Petitioner’s

Fourth Amendment claims.

Because we hold that Stone v. Powell is

applicable to the claims presented by

appellant, our inquiry is necessarily of

limited scope. We have emphasized on more

than one occasion that “Under Stone a federal

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district court may not relitigate a fourth

amendment issue tried fully and fairly in a

state court, regardless of its view of the

correctness of the state decision.” Mack v.

Cupp, 564 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1977) [].

The record of the state proceedings compels

the conclusion that appellant received a full

and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth

Amendment claims. The identical claims

pressed upon us were considered, and squarely

rejected, by the Arizona courts. The

transcript of the evidentiary hearing on the

motion to suppress alone consists of 45

typewritten pages. The issues were thoroughly

briefed at the trial level and rejected. The

briefs on appeal to the Arizona Court of

Appeals are substantial. The opinion of the

Arizona Court of Appeals is four pages long,

and it clearly indicates that appellant’s

contentions were carefully considered and

squarely rejected. Appellant filed a motion

for rehearing and a supporting memorandum

which, in substance, raised the same claims.

This motion was considered and denied by a

three judge panel of the Arizona Court of

Appeals. Thereafter, appellant fully

exhausted his Arizona State post-conviction

remedies. It is clear, therefore, that

appellant was afforded a full and fair

opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment

claims in the state court.

Abell v. Raines, 640 F.2d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 1981).

If the state has provided a state prisoner an

opportunity for full and fair litigation of

his Fourth Amendment claim, we cannot grant

federal habeas relief on the Fourth Amendment

issue. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494, 96

S.Ct. 3037, [] (1976). Moormann contends that

he did not have a full and fair opportunity

to litigate his warrant challenge because the

state court’s factual findings are not

supported by the evidence. Moormann was

provided a full and fair opportunity to

litigate his state claims, however. He raised

the warrant issue in a pre-trial motion; the

trial court held a hearing on the issue at

which Moormann was allowed to present

evidence and examine witnesses; the trial

court made a factual finding, and

appropriately limited the admissible evidence

to that described in the warrant affidavit;

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and the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the

trial court’s decision.

Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005).

Because Petitioner received a full and fair opportunity

to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims in his state criminal

proceedings, the Court should not consider the merits of nor

grant relief on his Fourth Amendment claims.

B. Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim

Petitioner contends his federal constitutional rights

were violated because the indictment was amended during his

trial to assert a lesser charge. Petitioner raised this issue

in his direct appeal. The Arizona Court of Appeals determined

that “amending Count 1 did not change the nature of the

offense.” Answer, Exh. P at 11. The state appellate court found

that the “amendment merely lowered the classification of the

offense by decreasing the value of the shoplifted items, and it

did away with the element regarding the frequency of alleged

incidences necessary to find a ‘continuing criminal episode.’”

Id., Exh. P at 11-12. Accordingly, the court found, “the

amendment did not deprive [Petitioner] of his constitutional

right to notice.” Id., Exh. P at 12. The Arizona Court of

Appeals further concluded that Petitioner had not met his burden

of establishing he was prejudiced by the amendment.

The Sixth Amendment requires a state defendant to be

adequately informed of the charges against him. Notice and an

opportunity to defend against the charges as guaranteed by the

Sixth Amendment are an integral part of the due process

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protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and are, accordingly,

applicable in state prosecutions. See, e.g., Cole v. Arkansas,

333 U.S. 196, 201, 68 S. Ct. 514, 517 (1948); Stephens v. Borg,

59 F.3d 932, 934–35 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The Sixth Amendment provides that “In all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusations....”

Allowing the prosecution to amend an indictment at trial to

enable the prosecution to seek a conviction on a charge not

brought by the grand jury constitutes a denial of due process,

when the defendant is not given fair notice of the criminal

charges brought against him. See, e.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299

U.S. 353, 362, 57 S. Ct. 255, 259 (1937); Sheppard v. Rees, 909

F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1990). However, “deficiencies in

state court indictments are not ordinarily a basis of federal

habeas corpus relief unless the deficiency makes the trial so

egregiously unfair as to amount to a deprivation of the

defendant’s right to due process.” Ashford v. Evans, 780 F.2d

405, 407 (4th Cir. 1985). To be entitled to relief on such a

claim, the habeas petitioner must establish that they were

prejudiced by the amendment of the indictment. See, e.g., Brodit

v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985, 988–89 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded Petitioner was

not entitled to relief based on the amendment of the indictment

because Petitioner was not prejudiced by amendment to a lesser

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1

 Rule 13.5(b), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,

provides: 

The preliminary hearing or grand jury indictment

limits the trial to the specific charge or

charges stated in the magistrate's order or grand

jury indictment. The charge may be amended only

to correct mistakes of fact or remedy formal or

technical defects, unless the defendant consents

to the amendment. The charging document shall be

deemed amended to conform to the evidence adduced

at any court proceeding.

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charge.1 The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision was not clearly

contrary to federal law because the decision applied the correct

standard to Petitioner’s claim. Additionally, the decision was

not an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court

precedent regarding Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Accordingly,

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

IV Conclusion

The claims raised in Petitioner’s timely habeas

petition were raised in the state courts in a procedurally

correct manner and denied on the merits by the state courts.

Because Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate

his Fourth Amendment claims in the state courts, the Court

should not examine those claims nor grant relief thereon.

Additionally, the state court decision denying Petitioner’s due

process claim regarding amendment of the indictment was not

clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal

law.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Maasen’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

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of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 27th day of August, 2013.

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