Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01104/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01104-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRENDA ALLEN, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

JEANNE WOODFORD, et al., )

)

)

Defendants. )

)

)

No. CV-F-05-1104 OWW/GSA

ORDER DENYING NON-PARTIES'

REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

BY DISTRICT COURT OF

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S RULING

COMPELLING COMPLIANCE WITH

SUBPOENAS (Doc. 222) 

This matter is before the Court on the timely Request for

Reconsideration by District Court of Magistrate Judge’s Ruling,

which granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel compliance with

subpoenas to the custodians of records of various State agencies

involved in providing medial services to prison inmates (NonParties). 

Pursuant to Rule 72-303(f), Local Rules of Practice, and 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration

may be granted if the Magistrate Judge’s Order is “clearly

erroneous or contrary to law.”

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Non-Parties request reconsideration on the ground that the

Magistrate Judge’s Order is contrary to Estate of Gonzalez v.

Hickman, 466 F.Supp.2d 1226 (E.D.Cal.2006). They acknowledge and

are well aware the cited case has no effect on the District Court

as it is not bound by another District Court’s ruling. A

specific ruling has previously been made in this case that

Estate of Gonzalez has no application. Non-Parties assert that

the Court’s prior ruling related to defendants who are sued in

their individual capacities. Plaintiff’s motion to compel is

directed to Non-parties who were served with subpoenas in their

official capacities as state employees and/or custodians of

records. The Request for Reconsideration “request[s] 

clarification from the District Court as to whether it will

follow Estate of Gonzalez as it applies to Non-Parties.”

This concession that the Court has rejected and does not

follow Estate of Gonzalez, coupled with the request for

clarification, in effect acknowledges that the Magistrate Judge’s

ruling was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.

In Estate of Gonzalez, plaintiffs filed a federal civil

rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants employed

by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(CDCR). Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel compliance with

subpoenas served on the CDCR seeking information concerning

Officer Gonzalez’s employment with CDCR. Defendants objected to

the subpoenas on the ground that Eleventh Amendment immunity

precluded Plaintiffs from compelling the State to produce the

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requested discovery. Magistrate Judge Hollows ruled that absent

a waiver from the State, the Eleventh Amendment bars enforcement

of the subpoenas, but found that the State had waived its right

to assert sovereign immunity by enacting California Government

Code § 68097.1(b), which provides procedures for serving

subpoenas on State employees “required as a witness before any

court or other tribunal in any civil action”. Id. at 1227. The

Magistrate Judge concluded that the Ex Parte Young exception to

Eleventh Amendment immunity provided a separate ground for

granting the motion to compel. Id. 

On reconsideration, District Judge England ruled that “[t]he

language of Government Code section 68097.1(b) does not rise to

the level of constituting an ‘unequivocal expression’ of consent

sufficient to waive the State’s sovereign immunity”, that Section

68097.1(b) “was passed to remedy a procedural and administrative

problem unrelated to jurisdiction”, and that the State “did not

use unequivocal language in Government Code section 68097.1(b)

leaving room for an alternative reasonable construction that it

did not intend to waive its’ immunity.” Id. at 1228-1229. The

Estate of Gonzalez District Court found the Ex Parte Young

exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity did not apply because

“Plaintiffs do not have a federal right to force the State to

produce documents that, in a best case scenario, can only assist

Plaintiffs in obtaining relief for a past wrong” and because

“[t]here is no on going [sic] violation that could support a

finding that the present issue falls within the Ex Parte Young

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exception ....”. Id.

The Non-Parties recognize this Court is not bound by another

district court decision and, in fact, has not followed it. See

Allen v. Woodford, 2007 WL 309945 (E.D.Cal.2007) at * 3:

Courts focus on the 11 Amendment’s purpose th

to prevent federal court judgments that would

have to be paid out of a State’s treasury:

“(T)he vulnerability of the State’s purse

(is) the most salient factor in Eleventh

Amendment determinations.” Hess v. Port

Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (1994) 513 U.S.

30, 47 ...; see also Alaska Cargo Transport,

Inc. v. Alaska R.R. Corp. (9 Cir.1993) 5 th

F.3d 378, 380. Eleventh Amendment immunity

depends on the State’s potential legal

liability, regardless of the entity’s ability

to require indemnification from a third

party. Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Doe

(1997) 519 U.S. 425, 430-431 ... (breach of

contract action against the University was

barred by 11 Amendment because State was th

legally liable despite University’s right to

indemnification from U.S. Government.) Suits

against state officers in their individual

capacity for damages for violation of federal

law (e.g., a federal civil rights suit) are

not deemed actions against the state, and

hence are not barred by the 11 Amendment. th

Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974) 416 U.S. 232, 237

....

In the Eastern District, the 11 Amendment th

precludes a federal subpoena to the state to

obtain documents in support of a § 1983

claim. If this Court adopts the CDCR

defendants’ position, however, the Eleventh

Amendment would also bar discovery through

them to the State for the same documents. A

Civil Rights plaintiff could, therefore,

never obtain discovery in § 1983 actions. 

This is not a logical inference and the Court

declines to adopt such a wholesale preclusion

of discovery in Civil Rights cases.

See also Jones v. Tozzi, 2007 WL 1299795 (E.D.Cal.2007) at *2-*4.

In Laxalt v. C.K. McClatchy, 109 F.R.D. 632 (D.Nev.1986),

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the plaintiff sued defendant in a diversity action for libel. 

The district court rejected a claim by the Nevada State Gaming

Control Board that the Eleventh Amendment barred compliance with

a federal subpoena for inspection and copying of records in the

Board’s possession relating to the plaintiff and certain business

entities of which he had been a principal. The Board contended: 

“Whether or not a particular gaming record should be disclosed to

private civil litigants is for the state courts to decide.” Id.

at 633. The District Court held in pertinent part:

The Eleventh Amendment bars discovery

requests against a nonparty state in civil

litigation, according to the Board. They

amount to a ‘suit in law or equity’ for the

purposes of that Amendment, it is argued. 

Actions in which discovery was allowed

against federal agencies are inapposite, the

Board urges, because those agencies are not

protected by the Eleventh Amendment as are

state agencies. The fact that the State

Legislature provided a specific motion

procedure for obtaining a court order

authorizing discovery of confidential records

indicates its intent to retain discovery

under State control, the Board says. It does

not constitute a consent to disclosure in a

federal court case where the State is not a

party. A state’s waiver of its immunity to

suit in its own courts does not mean that the

same waiver subjects it to federal court

jurisdiction. The Board cites Kennecott

Copper Corp. v. Tax Comm’n, 327 U.S. 573,

577-80 ... (1946), for the principle that a

waiver by a state of its sovereign immunity

against tax suits in its own courts is

inapplicable to a federal court suit against

the state in the absence of a clear

declaration of consent. The opinion, at page

577, ... notes that the reason for the rule

is the direct impact of state tax litigation

upon the state’s finances. On page 579 ...,

the Kennecott court also points out that the

particular state (Utah) employs explicit

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language to indicate its consent to suit in

federal court in other kinds of litigation. 

The Board contends that the phrase ‘in a

court of competent jurisdiction’ as used in

the Nevada Gaming Control Act should be

construed to mean only State courts, as in

Kennecott.

...

It is clear that the Eleventh Amendment

establishes that a federal court has no

jurisdiction over any lawsuit against a

state. However, it has been construed to

refer to assertions of liability on the

state’s part and claims for relief against

it. Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541, 545

... (1918); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 ... (1984). In

Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors,

Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 699 ... (1982), the

plurality approved the service of process on

state officials to secure possession of

artifacts held by them. The analogy to the

instant proceedings, where inspection and

copying of State records is all that is being

sought, is apparent. Magistrate Atkins’

holding that the Amendment does not bar

discovery is not contrary to law.

Id. at 634-635. 

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall

not be construed to extend to any suit in law

or equity, commenced or prosecuted against

one of the United States by Citizens of

another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of

any Foreign State.

In the absence of a waiver by the State or a valid congressional

override, the Eleventh Amendment precludes a federal court from

entertaining a suit brought by a citizen against his own state. 

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). The Eleventh

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Amendment’s jurisdictional bar covers suits naming state agencies

and departments as defendants whether the relief sought is legal

or equitable in nature. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,100 (1984); Brooks v. Sulphur Springs

Valley Elec. Co-Op., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9 Cir. 1991), cert. th

denied, 503 U.S. 938 (1992). In Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31

(1991), the Supreme Court held that “state officials, sued in

their individual capacities, are ‘persons’ within the meaning of

§ 1983" and that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment does not bar such

suits, nor are state officials absolutely immune from personal

liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of the ‘official’ nature

of their acts.” In so holding the Supreme Court rejected the

argument that Section 1983 liability turns not on the capacity in

which state officials are sued but on the capacity in which they

acted when injuring the plaintiff. Id. at 27-29. As stated in

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757 (1999): 

Even a suit for money damages may be

prosecuted against a state official in his

individual capacity for unconstitutional or

wrongful conduct fairly attributable to the

officer himself, so long as the relief is

sought not from the state treasury but from

the officer personally.

The threshold issue is whether issuance and required 

compliance with a third-party subpoena by State custodians of

records in an action in which the State is not a party

constitutes “any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted

against one of the United States” within the meaning of the

Eleventh Amendment. In State of Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18,

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26-27 (1933), the Supreme Court quoted Chief Justice Marshall in

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 264, 407, 408, 51 L.Ed.

257 (1821):

What is a suit? We understand it to be the

prosecution, or pursuit, of some claim,

demand, or request. In law language, it is

the prosecution of some demand in a Court of

justice. The remedy for every species of

wrong is, says Judge Blackstone, ‘the being

put in possession of that right whereof the

party injured is deprived.’ ‘The instruments

whereby this remedy is obtained, are a

diversity of suits and actions, which are

defined by the Mirror to be ‘the lawful

demand of one’s right.’ Or, as Bracton and

Fleta express it, in the words of Justinian,

‘jus prosequendi in judicio quod alicui

debetur.’ Blackstone then proceeds to

describe every species of remedy by suit; and

they are all cases where the party suing

claims to obtain something to which he has a

right.

To commence a suit, is to demand something by

the institution of process in a Court of

justice; and to prosecute the suit, is,

according to the common acceptance of

language, to continue that demand. By a suit

commenced by an individual against a State,

we should understand process sued out by that

individual against the State, for the purpose

of establishing some claim against it by the

judgment of a Court; and the prosecution of

that suit is its continuance. Whatever may

be the stages of its progress, the actor is

still the same.

In Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963), the Supreme Court

held, in the context of sovereign immunity:

The general rule is that a suit is against

the sovereign if ‘the judgment sought would

expend itself on the public treasury or

domain, or interfere with the public

administration,’ Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S.

731, 738 ... (1947), or if the effect of the

judgment would be ‘to restrain the Government

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from acting, or to compel it to act.’ Larson

v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., ... 337 U.S. at

704 ...; Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 502

... (1921). 

The Supreme Court in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 n.11 (1984), cited Dugan v. Rank in

the context of the Eleventh Amendment.

It is recognized that the immunity of a state arises “only

when the state government (including state agencies, not its

political subdivision), is sued.” Rotunda and Nowak, Treatise on

Constitutional Law (4th ed. 2007), § 2.12(x), p. 210-11. There

is no suit in law or equity against the state in this case; nor

have the moving parties provided legal authorities that a

discovery request under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a

federal civil rights action in which the state is not sued,

constitutes “a suit” or “suing” the state within the meaning of

the Eleventh Amendment.

Based on these principles, the Eleventh Amendment does not

apply to preclude discovery from a State agency, which can only

be obtained through the State’s custodians of records or from 

other employees having custody and control of the information or

documents sought. Neither the State, nor any of its employees to

whom subpoenas have been directed to obtain the information

sought, that have been found essential to the prosecution of the

Plaintiff’s case, are parties, nor has any relief in law or

equity been sought against them or the State. No judgment will

be issued in this action against the State that could have any

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A plaintiff who sues a state employee in his or her 1

individual capacity in state court for violation of federal law in

order to avoid application of Estate of Gonzalez may be forestalled

by the removal of the action to federal court, thereby placing

plaintiff’s ability to conduct legitimate discovery in the hands of

a non-party to the suit. 

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conceivable effect on the State treasury; the State custodians

are only subpoenaed to produce documents for use in the

prosecution of this federal civil rights action. The NonParties’ assertion that they must comply with the subpoenas in

their official capacities as custodians of record is irrelevant;

no judgment or other relief of any kind is sought against them in

this litigation.

Non-Parties’ position, if upheld, invoking Estate of

Gonzalez, will abrogate the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hafer that

an action under Section 1983 against a state employee or official

in that official’s individual capacity is not barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. To apply Estate of Gonzalez would mean that

a plaintiff who sues a state official in his individual capacity,

a lawsuit specifically authorized by the United States Supreme

Court, will never be able to prove his or her case, if any

required proof is in the hands of the State’s custodian of

records. Such a result is ludicrous. This is evident from the 1

Eleventh Amendment’s express language, “any suit in law or

equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States”

as it has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. 

This analysis shows that Estate of Gonzalez cannot be the law and

Laxalt v. C.K. McClatchy is correctly decided. 

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Magistrate Judge Hollows’ ruling in Estate of Gonzalez, Misc. 2

No. S-06-0095 MCE GGH (Doc. 17) concluded that James was

controlling, that Laxalt v. C.K. McClatchy was decided without

reference to James and further stated:

The undersigned has performed a good bit of

research in addition, and cannot find further

on point authority involving the requested

discovery on a non-party state or state agency

in addition to that set forth above.

Nevertheless, the court is bound by James in

this regard, and finds that to the extent that

the subpoenas at issue were directed to a

state or state agency, sovereign immunity

initially precludes their enforcement.

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United States v. James, 980 F.2d 1314 (9 Cir.1992), cert. th

denied, 510 U.S. 838 (1993), must be addressed. In James, the

defendant was convicted of rape on an Indian reservation in

violation of federal statutes. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit

upheld, on tribal sovereign immunity grounds, the quashing of a

subpoena duces tecum issued by the defendant to the Quinault

Indian Nation for documents related to the victim’s alleged

alcohol and drug problems in the possession of the Quinault

Indian Nation Department of Social and Health Services. The

Ninth Circuit held:

By making individual Indians subject to

federal prosecution for certain crimes,

Congress did not address implicitly, much

less explicitly, the amenability of the

tribes to the processes of the court in which

the prosecution is commenced. Thus, we

conclude that the Quinault Tribe was

possessed of tribal immunity at the time the

subpoena was served, unless the immunity had

been waived.

Id. at 1319.2

Arguably, James is not controlling because it did not

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See United States v. Juvenile Male 1, 431 F.Supp.2d 1012 3

(D.Ariz.2006) for a cogent criticism of James.

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involve Eleventh Amendment immunity. Other than Estate of

Gonzalez and Laxalt, no other reported decisions have been

identified that address the issue raised by the motion to quash. 

Because the Supreme Court has construed Eleventh Amendment

immunity to be liability from suit to avoid the possibility that

a judgment will be paid out of the State’s treasury or because

the judgment will affect the public administration, the Eleventh

Amendment, by its terms and purposes, does not apply to nor does

it bar enforcement of the subpoenas here at issue.3

For all the reasons stated, Non-Parties’ Request for

Reconsideration by District Court of Magistrate Judge’s Ruling is

DENIED. The subpoenas shall be enforced as ordered by the

Magistrate Judge.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 3, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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