Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00840/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00840-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

WILLIAM M. POLK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:10cv840-WC

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff William M. Polk applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the

Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq, and supplemental security income

payments under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. His applications were

denied at the initial administrative level. Plaintiff then requested and received a hearing

before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a

decision in which he found Plaintiff not disabled from the alleged onset date through the date

of the decision. The Appeals Council rejected Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s

decision. The ALJ’s decision consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner

of Social Security (Commissioner). See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir.

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Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1

1994, Pub. L. No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human

Case 2:10-cv-00840-WC Document 15 Filed 09/14/11 Page 1 of 9
1986). The case is now before the court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties have consented to the conduct of all proceedings and entry

of a final judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. Pl.’s Consent to

Jurisdiction (Doc. #14); Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. #13). Based on the Court’s

review of the record and the briefs of the parties, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the

Commissioner.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when the

person is unable to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result

in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of not less than 12 months.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

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To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2006).

(1) Is the person presently unemployed?

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? [the Listing of

Services with respect to Social Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social

Security.

A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, 2

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.

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Impairments]

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of “not

disabled.”

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).

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The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step 4. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357

F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of qualifying

disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step 1 through Step 4. At Step 5,

the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show there are a significant number

of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id.

To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s Residual

Functional Capacity (RFC). Id. at 1238-39. RFC is what the claimant is still able to do

despite his impairments and is based on all relevant medical and other evidence. Id. It also

can contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at 1242-43. At the fifth step,

the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience to determine if

there are jobs available in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986), is a supplemental security 3

income case (SSI). The same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising

under Title II are appropriately cited as authority in Title XVI cases. See, e.g., Ware v.

Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981).

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do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical Vocational Guidelines (grids) or call a vocational

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expert (VE). Id. at 1239-40.

The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary or

light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job experience.

Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available to an

individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a statutorilyrequired finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id.

The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This Court must

find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). “Substantial

evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such relevant evidence

as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). See also Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d

1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence preponderates against the

Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the decision reached is

supported by substantial evidence.”). A reviewing court may not look only to those parts of

the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must view the record in its

entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ.

Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986).

See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2. 4

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[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No similar

presumption of validity attachesto the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal conclusions,

including determination of the proper standards to be applied in evaluating

claims.

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff was forty-four years old on the alleged disability onset date and had at least

a high school education. Tr. 19. Plaintiff’s past work experience was as a mechanic,

construction worker, sewing machine operator, cutter, and material handler at a sewing

machine factory. Tr. 29-31. Following the administrative hearing, and employing the fivestep process, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the

alleged onset date. Tr. 15. At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from the following

severe impairments: “including degenerative disc disease with left radiculitis, coronary artery

disease, hypertension, non post-stenting elevation myocardial infarction, and alcoholism.”

Tr. 15. The ALJ then found that “[t]he claimant does not have an impairment or combination

of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments.” (Step 3) Tr.

16. Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the “residual functional capacity to perform

light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he requires an option

to sit and stand during the work day. Further, the claimant can occasionally bend, balance,

stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl.” Tr. 16. The ALJ then found that Plaintiff is unable to

perform past relevant work. (Step 4) Tr. 18. The ALJ next found that, “[c]onsidering the

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claimant’s age, education, work experience, and [RFC],” and after consulting a vocational

expert, “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the

claimant can perform.” Tr. 19. The ALJ identified the following occupations as examples:

“calibrator,” “product line assembler,” and “gas meter reader.” Id. Accordingly, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability . . . from October 1, 2005, through

the date of this decision.” Tr. 20.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM

Plaintiff’s sole claim is that “the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to evaluate

medical opinions of record.” Pl.’s Brief (Doc. #10) at 3. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that

the ALJ erred when he failed to “denote” or evaluate the opinion expressed by Dr. Douglas

that Plaintiff was “unable to work.” Pl.’s Brief (Doc. #10) at 3. He also asserts that the

opinion of Dr. Brizendine supported Dr. Douglas’s opinion. Id. Plaintiff’s argument is based

on the correct notion that an ALJ is required to “state with particularity the weight he gave

different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.” Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279

(11th Cir. 1987).

The problem for Plaintiff, however, is that neither Dr. Douglas’s conclusion that

Plaintiff was unable to work, nor the statement in Dr. Brizendine’s treatment notes that

Plaintiff cannot work are medical opinions. In the case of Dr. Douglas, Plaintiff points this

court to a “Patient Charity Care Application” wherein Dr. Douglas circled the terms “6-

months” in answer to the question: “What is the estimated time frame that you expect the

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patient to be unable to work?” Tr. 213. According to the applicable regulations, a declaration

that Plaintiff is unable to work is not considered a “medical opinion” to be considered by the

ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). Instead, the issue of ability to work is reserved for the

Commissioner. Id. See also, Lanier v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 252 F. App’x 311, 314 (11th

Cir. 2007). Furthermore, there is no context surrounding Dr. Douglas’s statement. As the

Commissioner rightly notes:

There is no indication in the record that Dr. Douglas ever reviewed Plaintiff’s

medical records, much less examined or treated Plaintiff. This questionnaire

did not include any information concerning symptoms, diagnoses, prognoses,

what Plaintiff could still do despite his impairments, or any specific

restrictions on Plaintiff’s activities (Tr. 213).

Def.’s Brief (Doc. #11) at 7. While there is a standard and process for the rejection of a

treating physician’s opinion, here, Dr. Douglas’s statement is not an opinion, and he is not

a treating physician. And, as the statement by Dr. Douglas lacks any evidentiary support,

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the ALJ was free to disregard the statement. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th

Cir.1985) (An ALJ “is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports

a contrary conclusion.”). Again, because Dr. Douglas was not a treating physician, the ALJ

was not bound by the strict requirements for the rejection of a treating source’s opinion. This

court then evaluates the ALJ’s implicit rejection of Dr. Douglas’s statement to determine if

 A “treating source” (i.e., a treating physician) is a claimant’s “own physician, 5

psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who provides you, or has provided you, with

medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship

with you.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (emphasis added). 

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it is supported by substantial evidence, and finds that it does.

6

In the case of Dr. Brizendine’s treatment notes, the court finds Plaintiff’s arguments

to be without merit. In offering evidentiary support for Dr. Douglas’s statement, Plaintiff

states: “Dr. Brizendine expressed that [Plaintiff’s] chronic back pain has been present ‘for

nineteen to twenty years but does seem to be progressive over the past several years so that

he cannot work’ (Tr. 236).” Pl’s Brief (Doc. #10) at 3 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff

makes this argument by taking this “treatment note” out of context. The above quote from

Dr. Brizendine appears in the Plaintiff’s history notes, titled “Interval History” and consists

of information regarding Plaintiff’s history and subjective complaints. It is not an opinion

made by Dr. Brizendine, but rather an allegation made by Plaintiff to the doctor and then

recorded as part of the patient history. Accordingly, the ALJ would have no duty to address

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Plaintiff’s subjective statements to his doctor that he cannot work and the court finds no

error.

VI. CONCLUSION

In making this determination, this court notes that Plaintiff fails to offer any evidentiary

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support for Dr. Douglas’s opinion other than Dr. Brizendine’s treatment notes. The court will

address those notes below. In addition, the court also finds it significant that Dr. Douglas chose

to answer the questionnaire by circling “6-months” rather than choosing a longer period of time. 

As Defendant rightly points out, “[a] disability is defined as the ‘inability to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any . . . impairment which can be expected to result in

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months.’ 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).” Def.’s Brief (Doc. #11) at 7-8.

 Of course, even if it were an opinion, the above analysis would apply to the statement 7

that Plaintiff “cannot work.”

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The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, for

the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

evidence and is AFFIRMED. A separate judgment will issue.

DONE this 14th day of September, 2011.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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