Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06663/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06663-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Contitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CENTRAL VALLEY CHRYSLER-JEEP, )

INC., et al., )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

CATHERINE D. WITHERSPOON, )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-04-6663 REC

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT (Doc. 30)

AND CERTIFYING VENUE ISSUE

FOR IMMEDIATE APPEAL

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §

1292(b) 

On July 25, 2005, the court heard defendant's Motion to

Dismiss the First Amended Complaint. 

Upon due consideration of the record and the arguments of

the parties, the court denies this motion for the reasons set

forth herein.

On December 7, 2004, plaintiffs filed a Complaint for

Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against defendant. On February

16, 2005, plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC). 

Plaintiffs in the FAC include the following automobile

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dealerships located in Modesto, Turlock, Merced, Madera, Lemoore,

Tulare, and Porterville: Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc.;

Kitahara Pontiac GMC Buick, Inc.; Madera Ford Mercury, Inc.;

Madera Chevrolet; Frontier Dodge, Inc.; Tom Fields Motors, Inc.;

Pistoresi Chrysler Dodge Jeep; Bob Williams Chevrolet; Courtesy

Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc.; Merle Stone Chevrolet, Inc.; Merle

Stone Porterville, Inc.; Sturgeon and Beck Incorporated; and

Swanson Fahrney Ford, Inc. General Motors Corporation and

DaimlerChrysler Corporation are also plaintiffs. The Tulare

County Farm Bureau and the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

are also plaintiffs. The defendant is Catherine E. Witherspoon

in her official capacity as Executive Officer of the California

Air Resources Board.

The FAC alleges an action for declaratory and injunctive

relief under the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the United

States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The FAC challenges the

requirements of A.B. 1493, codified at California Health and

Safety Code § 43018.5, and the regulation proposed by the

California Air Resources Board (CARB) set forth in Resolution No.

04-28, dated September 24, 2004. The FAC alleges that CARB has

interpreted the statute to require the adoption and enforcement

of rules to limit the release of carbon dioxide from new motor

vehicles sold in California beginning in the 2009 model year,

which starts in calendar year 2008. The FAC, which is very

verbose, alleges the following claims for declaratory and

injunctive relief:

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Defendant also moved to dismiss the FAC on the ground that 1

the case is not ripe because final action had not been taken to

adopt the regulatory amendments set forth in Resolution 04-28 and

for other reasons. However, in her reply brief, defendant limited

this aspect of her motion to dismiss to a stay pending final

adoption and approval of the proposed regulatory amendments. Just

prior to oral argument, the plaintiffs and defendant stipulated to

the withdrawal of this ground for dismissal of the action, without

3

1. Count I - Preemption under the Energy

Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA),

49 U.S.C. §§ 329021-32919, specifically

Section 32919(a).

2. Count II - Preemption under § 209(a) of

the Federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §

7543(a).

3. Count III - Preemption under the foreign

policy of the United States and the foreign

affairs powers of the Federal Government.

4. Count IV - Violation of the Dormant

Commerce Clause of the United States

Constitution.

5. Count V - Violation of the Sherman Act,

15 U.S.C. § 1.

The FAC prays for a declaratory judgment that “the regulation

adopted by CARB and Defendant on September 24, 2004, in

Resolution 04-28 violates federal law” and for a preliminary and

permanent injunction enjoining Defendant “from implementing or

enforcing the regulation adopted by CARB in Resolution 04-28, or

any substantially similar regulation.”

Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the FAC on the

following grounds: (1) venue is improper in the Fresno Division

and the case should be transferred to the Sacramento Division,

and (2) the primary jurisdiction doctrine requires dismissal of

Count II.1

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prejudice to its renewal, pending completion of the final approval

process by September 20, 2005. By notice filed on September 16,

2005, defendant advised the court that California’s Office of

Administrative Law approved the proposed regulatory amendments on

September 15, 2005 and that the state administrative process

necessary to the approval of the regulatory amendments is now

complete. Therefore, the court rules that this action is ripe for

review based on the grounds initially asserted by plaintiffs. 

4

1. Intra-District Venue.

The FAC alleges in pertinent part:

33. Each of the dealer plaintiffs and

members of plaintiff Tulare County Farm

Bureau are residents of this District, and

each will suffer harm in this District as a

result of Defendant’s actions. Each of the

manufacturers represented by the Alliance as

a plaintiff does business in this District

and will also suffer harm in this District as

a result of CARB’s regulations. Venue in

this Court is proper under 28 U.S.C. §

1391(b). 

Defendant moves the court to transfer venue of this action

from the Fresno Division to the Sacramento Division. In so

moving, defendant concedes that venue in the Eastern District of

California is proper. She also emphasizes that this motion is

not based on the convenience of the parties or witnesses. 

Rather, relying on Rule 3-120(d), Local Rules of Practice,

defendant contends that this is a civil action “arising in”

Sacramento County and not in any of the counties covered by the

Fresno Division of the Eastern District.

Plaintiffs have the burden of showing that venue is proper

in the Fresno division of the Eastern District of California. 

Piedmont Label Company v. Sun Garden Packing Company, 598 F.2d

491, 496 (9 Cir. 1979); see also Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. th

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Plaintiffs, citing Murphy v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 362 F.3d 2

1133 (9 Cir. 2004), argue that the court must accept plaintiffs’ th

allegations of venue as true as well as any evidence plaintiffs put

forward in opposition to the motion to dismiss and to require that

defendant present evidence in support of the contention that venue

in this division is improper. However, Murphy has no relevance to

the resolution of this motion. Murphy was discussing a venue

motion based on a forum-selection clause, a fact not present in

this action.

5

Nissan Computer Corporation, 89 F.Supp.2d 1154, 1161 (C.D.Cal.),

aff’d on other grounds, 264 F.3d 675 (9 Cir. 2000). th 2

Prior to 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provided that

federal question civil actions “may be brought only in the

judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the

claim arose, except as provided by law.” Section 1391(b) was

amended in 1990 to provide, in pertinent part, that federal

question civil actions 

may, except as otherwise provided by law, be

brought only in (1) a judicial district where

any defendant resides, if all defendants

reside in the same State, (2) a judicial

district in which a substantial part of the

events or omissions giving rise to the claim

occurred ..., or (3) a judicial district in

which any defendant may be found, if there is

no district in which the action may otherwise

be brought.

Although the parties generally agree that cases construing

Section 1391(b) control construction of Local Rule 3-120(d), the

parties dispute the applicability of decisions construing Section

1391(b) as in effect prior to 1990. Defendant relies on such

cases and plaintiffs argue that those decisions have no value. 

However, this dispute is immaterial to the resolution of the

motion. In Sutain v. Shapiro and Lieberman, 678 F.2d 115, 117

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(9 Cir. 1982), the Ninth Circuit, quoting Commercial Lighting th

Products, Inc. v. United States District Court, 537 F.2d 1078,

1080 (9 Cir. 1976), construed the term “claim arose” for th

purposes of Section 1391(b) to mean that venue is proper “‘in any

district in which a substantial part of the acts, events, or

omissions occurred that gave rise to the claim for relief.’”

Because the Ninth Circuit’s construction of the term “claim

arose” for purposes of Section 1391(b) prior to the 1990

amendment essentially tracks the current language of Section

1391(b), cases from the Ninth Circuit applying Section 1391(b)

prior to the amendment remain authoritative.

The essential issue is the relevance of harm to the

plaintiffs in determining intra-district venue.

Defendant contends that where the harm occurs is not

relevant to a determination of venue where venue is based on

where the claim arises. In so contending, defendant relies on

Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) and

District 1, Pacific Coast District, M.E.B.A. v. Alaska, 682 F.2d

797 (9 Cir. 1982). th

In Leroy, the plaintiff was a Delaware corporation with

headquarters in Texas that brought an action in the Northern

District of Texas against Idaho state officials challenging an

Idaho state statute that imposed restrictions on corporate

takeovers of companies having substantial assets in Idaho. The

district court ruled in pertinent part that venue in Texas under

Section 1391(b) did not lie because the defendants did not reside

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7

in Texas and the claim arose in Idaho. The Court of Appeals

reversed the district court on this issue, holding that, because

the allegedly invalid restraint against the corporation occurred

in Texas, Texas was the judicial district in which the claim

arose. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal, holding

in pertinent part:

Nor, as the District Court correctly

concluded, is venue available under §

1391(b). The first test of venue under that

provision - the residence of the defendants -

obviously points to Idaho rather than Texas. 

The Court of Appeals reasoned, however, under

the second relevant test that the claim arose

in Dallas because that is the place where the

Idaho officials ‘invalidly prevented Great

Western from initiating a tender offer for

Sunshine.’ ... The court buttressed its

conclusion by noting that a single action

against the officials of New York, Maryland,

and Idaho could not have been instituted in

any one place unless the claim was treated as

having arisen in Dallas ....

The easiest answer to this latter argument is

that Great Western’s complaint did not in

fact raise justiciable claims against any

officials save those in Idaho. But that is

not the only answer. Although the legal

issues raised in the complaint challenging

the constitutionality of the statutes of

three different States were similar, and the

convenience of Great Western would obviously

be served by consolidating the three claims

for trial in one district, the general venue

statute does not authorize the plaintiff to

rely on either of those reasons to justify

its choice of forum.

In most instances, the purpose of statutorily

specified venue is to protect the defendant

against the risk that a plaintiff will select

an unfair or inconvenient place of trial. 

For that reason, Congress has generally not

made the residence of the plaintiff a basis

for venue in nondiversity cases ... The

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desirability of consolidating similar claims

in a single proceeding may lead defendants,

such perhaps as the New York and Maryland

officials in this case, to waive valid

objections to otherwise improper venue. But

that concern does not justify reading the

statute to give the plaintiff the right to

select the place of trial that best suits his

convenience. So long as the plain language

of the statute does not open the severe type

of ‘venue gap’ that the amendment giving

plaintiffs the right to proceed in the

district where the claim arose was designed

to close, there is no reason to read it more

broadly on behalf of plaintiffs.

Moreover, the plain language of § 1391(b)

will not bear the Court of Appeals’

interpretation. The statute allows venue in

‘the judicial district ... in which the claim

arose.’ Without deciding whether this

language adopts the occasionally fictive

assumption that a claim may arise in only one

district, it is absolutely clear that

Congress did not intend to provide for venue

at the residence of the plaintiff or to give

that party an unfettered choice among a host

of different districts ... Rather, it

restricted venue either to the residence of

the defendants or to ‘a place which may be

more convenient to the litigants’ - i.e.,

both of them - ‘or to the witnesses who are

to testify in the case.’ ... In our view,

therefore, the broadest interpretation of the

language of § 1391(b) that is even arguably

acceptable is that in the unusual case in

which it is not clear that the claim arose in

only one specific district, a plaintiff may

choose between those two (or conceivably even

more) districts that with approximately equal

plausibility - in terms of the availability

of witnesses, the accessibility of other

relevant evidence, and the convenience of the

defendant (but not of the plaintiff) - may be

assigned as the locus of the claim ....

This case is not, however, unusual. For the

claim has only one obvious locus - the

District of Idaho. Most importantly, it is

action was taken in Idaho by Idaho residents

- the enactment of the statute by the

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9

legislature, the review of Great Western’s

filing, the forwarding of the comment letter

by Deputy Administrator Baptie, and the entry

of the order postponing the effective date of

the tender by Finance Director McEldowney -

as well as the future action that may be

taken in the State by its officials to punish

or to remedy any violation of its law, that

provides the basis for Great Western’s

federal claim. For this reason, the bulk of

the relevant evidence and witnesses - apart

from employees of the plaintiff, and

securities experts who come from all over the

United States - is also located in the State. 

Less important, but nonetheless relevant, the

nature of this action challenging the

constitutionality of a state statute makes

venue in the District of Idaho appropriate. 

The merits of Great Western’s claims may well

depend on a proper interpretation of the

State’s statute, and federal judges sitting

in Idaho are better qualified to construe

Idaho law, and to assess the character of

Idaho’s probable enforcement of that law,

than are judges sitting elsewhere.

We therefore reject the Court of Appeals’

reasoning that the ‘claim arose’ in Dallas

because that is where Great Western proposed

to initiate its tender offer, and that is

where Idaho’s statute had its impact on Great

Western. Aside from the fact that these

‘contacts’ between the ‘claim’ and the Texas

District fall far short of those connecting

the claim and the Idaho District, we note

that this reasoning would subject the Idaho

officials to suit in almost every district in

the country. For every prospective offeree -

be he in New York, Los Angeles, Miami, or

elsewhere, rather than in Dallas - could

argue with equal force (or Great Western

could argue on his behalf) that he had

intended to direct his broker to accept the

tender and was frustrated in that desire by

Idaho law. As we noted above, however, such

a reading of § 1391(b) is inconsistent with

the underlying purpose of the provision, for

it would leave the venue decision entirely in

the hands of plaintiffs, rather than making

it ‘primarily a matter of convenience of

litigants and witnesses.’ ... In short, the

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10

District of Idaho is the only one in which

‘the claim arose’ within the meaning of §

1391(b).

443 U.S. at 183-187. 

District 1 involved the Alaska Marine Highway System, which

is owned and operated by Alaska and operates ferries between

Washington and Alaska as well as between Alaskan ports. Many of

the System’s employees live in Washington, the System has a

terminal in Seattle, and much of the maintenance is performed in

Seattle. Alaska enacted a statute providing that no employee of

the System may be relieved at a duty station or port outside

Alaska. The union sued Alaska and Alaska officials in the

Western District of Washington, contending that the statute was

unconstitutional. The district court denied Alaska’s motion to

dismiss for improper venue, holding that the claim arose in the

Western District of Washington under either a “substantial

contacts” standard or a more lenient standard applicable to cases

involving challenges to statutes. The Ninth Circuit reversed the

district court, holding in pertinent part:

In Leroy ... [t]he Supreme Court acknowledged

that, under the broadest possible reading of

section 1391(b), a claim may arise in two or

more districts only in the unusual case in

which the districts may, with approximately

equal plausibility in terms of the

availability of witnesses, the accessibility

of other relevant evidence, and the

convenience of the defendant (but not of the

plaintiff), be called the locus of the claim. 

In such a case, the plaintiff may select the

forum from among these districts. The Court

held, however, that Leroy was not the unusual

case and that the claim in that case arose in

Idaho, not Texas. 

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11

First, the Court noted that all of the

defendants’ acts were, and their enforcement

of the statute would be, in Idaho. For that

reason, most of the relevant evidence and

witnesses, besides employees of the plaintiff

and securities experts, were in Idaho. 

Second, in deciding the constitutionality of

an Idaho statute, federal judges in Idaho are

better qualified to construe the statute and

to assess the character of Idaho’s

enforcement than judges elsewhere. The Court

rejected the argument that venue lay in Texas

because that was where the tender offeror

suffered harm, noting those contacts with

Texas fell ‘far short’ of the contacts with

Idaho and that such reasoning would subject

the Idaho officials to suit in many different

districts ....

The analysis in Leroy indicates that venue in

this case lies only in Alaska. First,

because the enactment of the ‘Change Port’

statute was, and any enforcement will be, in

Alaska, most of the evidence and witnesses

are there. Second, it would be preferable

for a federal judge in Alaska to decide these

claims rather than for one in Washington to

do so. Although the statute in this case

does not seem on its face susceptible of

narrowing interpretations, we cannot say that

the Alaska courts, or a district judge in

Alaska, could not read the statute narrowly

so as to save it from possible constitutional

infirmity. Thus, even though Alaska appears

to have been able to defend the statute’s

constitutionality in Seattle, the State of

Washington cannot be called the locus of

these claims as plausibly as Alaska.

Since Leroy, several courts have held, in

cases involving challenges to the

constitutionality or application of state

statutes, that venue was proper where the

effects of the statutes were felt as well as

where they were enacted and administered ...

Each of these cases, however, involved

districts in only one state. Thus, the

concern in Leroy that federal judges in a

state are better suited to rule on that

state’s statutes than are judges elsewhere

was inapplicable. Moreover, some of the

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cases failed to discuss Leroy ... To the

extent that these cases are inconsistent with

Leroy, we decline to follow them. 

This court has stated that a claim arises ‘in

any district in which a substantial part of

the act, events, or omissions occurred that

gave rise to the claim for relief.’ ... This

‘substantial contacts’ test suggests that a

claim may sometimes arise in more than one

district. Leroy did not indicate what

constitutes the unusual case in which a claim

may do so ... Thus, it is unclear what effect

Leroy had on the ‘substantial contacts’ test. 

However, we need not decide that question in

this case. We merely hold that, under the

analysis of Leroy, venue in this case,

involving a constitutional challenge to an

Alaska statute, lies only in Alaska.

682 F.2d at 798-799.

Relying on Leroy and District 1, defendant argues that a

claim challenging the propriety of a state law does not “arise”

where its effects are felt:

The location of a state law’s effects is

simply not relevant to venue. To say

otherwise would allow plaintiffs to challenge

state laws wherever they please. This would

make restrictions on venue meaningless. And

it would be bad policy. After all, as the

Supreme Court reminds us, the purpose of

venue provisions is to protect the defendant

from improper venue choices ....

In this case, these same principles are at

play. Plaintiff Alliance of Automobile

Manufacturers brings this case on behalf of

its members - including plaintiff General

Motors Corporation and DaimlerChrysler

Corporation - who are headquartered

throughout the country and who build

automobiles throughout the country as well

... If venue were appropriate where the

effects of the challenged proposed regulatory

amendments were felt, venue would also be

appropriate throughout the country. Such a

construction is both implausible and unfair.

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Instead, the question is where ‘a substantial

part of the acts, events, or omissions

occurred that gave rise to the claim for

relief.’ ... Here, Plaintiffs bring a facial

challenge to the Air Resources Board’s

proposed regulatory amendments. Plaintiffs

have sued the Air Resources Board’s Executive

Officer, the person who would issue the final

regulatory amendments and who would be

responsible for enforcing the then-final

regulatory amendments. Thus, the acts that

give rise to Plaintiffs’ claims are

defendant’s Witherspoon’s acts to adopt these

proposed regulatory amendments. Defendant’s

Witherspoon’s office and, thus, official

residence are in Sacramento ... Within this

District, Sacramento is the place where

defendant Witherspoon and her staff have

taken steps towards adopting these proposed

regulatory amendments ... Thus, the acts

within this District that Plaintiffs

challenge have occurred (and will occur) in

Sacramento. These are the acts that gave

rise to Plaintiffs’ claims. And so venue

within this District is proper only in the

Sacramento District.

However, as plaintiffs argue, the facts in Leroy and in

District 1 are sufficiently different from those before the court

with respect to the issue of venue to make these cases

inapplicable in resolving this motion. Specifically, this action

does not involve an attempted challenge to a state statute in a

district court sitting in an entirely different state. Here, the

issue is whether venue is proper in one division as opposed to

the other division of the same district court. The facts of

Leroy and District No. 1 are simply too different from those

before the court to make either case controlling in the

determination of intra-district venue in this action. 

Rather, the court concludes that proper intra-district venue

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Plaintiffs also refer the court to Myers v. Bennett Law 3

Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1075-1076 (9 Cir. 2001), wherein the Ninth th

Circuit held in pertinent part

Under [Section 1391(b)], venue is proper in a

judicial district if ‘a substantial part of

the events or omissions giving rise to the

claim occurred’ in that district. 28 U.S.C. §

1392(b)(2); see also Lamont v. Haig, 590 F.2d

1124, 1134-35 (D.C.Cir. 1978)(‘the

substantiality of the operative events is

determined by assessment of their

ramifications for efficient conduct of the

suit’). With this policy in mind at least one

court has found that in a tort action, the

locus of the injury was the relevant factor

... As noted above, at least one of the

‘harms’ suffered by Plaintiff is akin to the

tort of invasion of privacy and was felt in

Nevada. Accordingly, a substantial part of

the events giving rise to the claim occurred

in Nevada. Thus, venue was proper.

14

in this action is controlled by the analysis set forth in Bay

County Democratic Party v. Land, 340 F.Supp.2d 802 (E.D.Mich.

2004).3

In Bay City Democratic Party, political parties and other

organizations brought a Section 1983 action against Michigan’s

Secretary of State and Director of Elections, alleging that

Michigan’s intended provision ballet procedure would violate Help

America Vote Act. The district court rejected the defendants

contention that venue was proper only in the judicial district in

which the Secretary of State resides, i.e., where the capitol is

located. In so ruling, the district court held in pertinent

part:

The defendants also claim that no part of the

claim has occurred in this district since the

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election directives were drafted in and

distributed from Lansing, and no voter’s

provisional ballot has been ignored so no

injury has occurred yet. However, the

language of Section 1391(b)(2) - which

permits venue to be laid in a district ‘in

which a substantial part of the events giving

rise to the claim occur’ - has been

interpreted by the Sixth Circuit to mean a

substantial connection to the claim. After

the 1990 amendments to the venue statute,

courts ‘no longer ask which district among

the two or more potential forums is the best

venue. Rather they ask whether the district

the plaintiff chose has a substantial

connection to the claim, whether or not other

forums had greater contacts.’ First of

Mich., 141 F.3d at 263 ... To establish a

substantial connection to the claim, it is

generally sufficient to demonstrate that

injury or loss alleged in the lawsuit

occurred in the chosen venue. Uffner v. La

Reunion Francaise, S.A., 244 F.3d 38, 41-43

(1 Cir. 2001). In cases involving state st

officials, a substantial connection to the

claim occurs not only where the ‘triggering

event’ takes place, but also where the

effects of the decision are felt. See

McClure v. Manchin, 301 F.Supp.2d 564, 569

(N.D.W.Va. 2003)(rejecting secretary of

state’s claim that a state election law

challenge must be brought in the district

where the state government sits); Emison v.

Catalano, 951 F.Supp. 714, 721 (E.D.Pa.

1996)(suits challenging official acts may be

brought in the district where the effects of

the challenged statute are brought [sic]

despite being enacted elsewhere); School

Dist. of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Milk

Marketing Bd., 877 F.Supp. 245, 249 (E.D.Pa.

1995)(rejecting the argument that venue is

proper only where official decision was

made). In this case, the effects of the

election directive are felt statewide,

including within Bay County where one of the

plaintiffs is located.

340 F.Supp.2d at 808-809.

The court has reviewed the record in this action and

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concludes that plaintiffs have demonstrated that venue is proper

in the Fresno Division of the Eastern District of California

under the standards articulated in Bay City Democratic Party.

Consequently, the court denies defendant’s motion to dismiss

this action on the ground of improper venue. 

At oral argument, plaintiff requested that the court certify

the denial of the motion to dismiss on the ground of venue for

immediate appeal pursuant to 28 1292(b).

Section 1292(b) provides in pertinent part:

When a district judge, in making in a civil

action an order not otherwise appealable

under this section, shall be of the opinion

that such order involves a controlling

question of law as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion

and that an immediate appeal from the order

may materially advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation, he shall so

state in writing in such order. The Court of

Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an

appeal of such action may thereupon, in its

discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from

such order, if application is made to it

within ten days after the entry of the order;

Provided, however, That application for an

appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings

in the district court unless the district

judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge

thereof shall so order.

Section 1292(b) is to be used only in exceptional situations in

which allowing an interlocutory appeal would avoid protracted and

expensive litigation. United States Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359

F.2d 784, 785 (9 Cir. 1966). Plaintiff must demonstrate that th

(1) there is a controlling question of law, (2) that there are

substantial grounds for difference of opinion, and (3) that an

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immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination

of the litigation. In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 673 F.2d

1020, 1026 (9 Cir. 1982). th

“[A]ll that must be shown in order for a question [of law]

to be ‘controlling’ is that resolution of the issue on appeal

could affect the outcome of litigation in the district court.” 

In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, id., 673 F.2d at 1026. 

Here, the court concludes that the issue of where the claim

arose for purposes of intra-district venue is a controlling

question of law. 

To demonstrate “a substantial ground for difference of

opinion” on a question for Section 1292(b) certification, the

moving party must show more than its own disagreement with a

court’s ruling. The term refers to the legal standard applied in

the decision for which certification is sought and whether other

courts have substantially differed in applying that standard. 

See Harter v. GAF Corp., 150 F.R.D. 502, 518 (D.N.J. 1993). 

With regard to this factor, the court concludes that

defendant has demonstrated a substantial ground for difference of

opinion given defendant’s position that the determination of

intra-district venue is governed by Leroy and District 1.

The court concludes that an immediate appeal of the denial

of defendant’s motion to transfer venue to the Sacramento

division of the Eastern District will materially advance the

ultimate termination of this litigation. This is because a

reversal by the Ninth Circuit of this court’s ruling on intraCase 1:04-cv-06663-AWI-GSA Document 142 Filed 10/21/05 Page 17 of 28
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district venue may result in the vacation of any substantive

rulings made by this court and the transfer of this action to the

Sacramento Division. See Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 346

U.S. 338 (1953); Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc. v. Martino,

36 F.3d 291 (3 Cir. 1994); Gogolin & Stelter v. Karn’s Auto rd

Imports, Inc., 886 F.2d 100 (5 Cir. 1989); see also Bechtel v. th

Liberty Nat. Bank, 534 F.2d 1335 (9 Cir. 1976). th

Accordingly, the court certifies the issue of intradistrict

venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and Rule 3-120(d), Local Rules of

Practice, for immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b).

2. Primary Jurisdiction.

Count II of the FAC alleges preemption under the federal

Clean Air Act. Count II alleges in pertinent part:

122. The regulation adopted by CARB on

September 24, 2004, in Resolution 04-28, is a

standard related to the control of emissions

from new motor vehicles. The regulation is

preempted by section 209(a) of the Clean Air

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). In addition, the

regulation conflicts with the Clean Air Act

and stands as an obstacle to the objectives

of Congress in its comprehensive approach to

environmental regulation of motor vehicles.

123. EPA has determined that regulation of

carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases to

address global climate change is not

authorized by section 202(a) of the Clean Air

Act [42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)]. Notice of Denial

of Petition for Rulemaking, Control Emissions

from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68

Fed.Reg. 52922 (Sept. 8, 2003). That

authoritative determination by EPA precludes

California from adopting any new motor

vehicle emission standards for carbon dioxide

or greenhouse gases. California must, at a

legal minimum, seek reconsideration of EPA’s

interpretation of section 202(a) before

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California may adopt new motor vehicle

emission standards for carbon dioxide or

greenhouse gases.

Defendant moves to dismiss Count II based on the primary

jurisdiction doctrine, contending that the question raised by

Count II, whether the proposed regulatory amendments are

preempted by the Clean Air Act, is specifically entrusted to the

Administrator of the EPA, with any review by the U.S. Court of

Appeals. 

“The doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... is concerned with

promoting proper relationships between the courts and

administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory

duties.” United States v. Western Pacific Railroad, 352 U.S. 59,

63 (1956). The doctrine is applicable in federal courts when an

action “requires the resolution of issues which, under a

regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence

of an administrative body.” Id. at 64. As further explained in

United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th

Cir. 1987):

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction operates

as follows: ‘When there is a basis for

judicial action, independent of agency

proceedings, courts may route the threshold

decision as to certain issues to the agency

charged with primary responsibility for

governmental supervision or control of the

particular industry or activity involved.’

... The doctrine applies when ‘protection of

the integrity of a regulatory scheme dictates

preliminary resort to the agency which

administers the scheme.’ ... Thus, it is the

extent to which Congress, in enacting the

regulatory scheme, intends an administrative

body to have the first word on issues arising

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in judicial proceedings that determines the

scope of the primary jurisdiction doctrine

....

There are four factors uniformly present in

cases where the doctrine properly is invoked:

(1) the need to resolve an issue that (2) has

been placed by Congress within the

jurisdiction of an administrative body having

regulatory authority (3) pursuant to a

statute that subjects an industry or activity

to a comprehensive regulatory scheme that (4)

requires expertise or uniformity in

administration.

If a court refers an issue to an administrative agency pursuant

to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the court is not

deprived of subject matter jurisdiction; rather, the court “has

discretion either to retain jurisdiction or, if the parties would

not be unfairly disadvantaged, to dismiss the case without

prejudice.” Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993).

Section 7521(a) [Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act]

provides in pertinent part that 

[t]he Administrator shall by regulation

prescribe ... in accordance with the

provisions of this section, standards

applicable to the emission of any air

pollutant from any class or classes of new

motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines,

which in his judgment cause, or contribute

to, air pollution which may reasonably be

anticipated to endanger public health or

welfare.

Section 7543(a) [Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act]

provides in pertinent part:

No state or any political subdivision thereof

shall adopt or attempt to enforce any

standard relating to the control of emissions

from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle

engines subject to this part. No State shall

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require certification, inspection, or any

other approval relating to the control of

emissions from any new motor vehicle or new

motor vehicle engine as condition precedent

to the initial sale, titling (if any), or

registration of such motor vehicle, motor

vehicle engine, or equipment.

However, Section 7543(b) provides in pertinent part:

(1) The Administrator shall, after notice and

opportunity for public hearing, waive

application of this section to any State

which has adopted standards (other than

crankcase emission standards) for the control

of emissions from new motor vehicles or new

motor vehicle engines prior to March 30,

1966, if the State determines that the State

standards will be, in the aggregate, at least

as protective of public health and welfare as

applicable Federal standards. No such waiver

shall be granted if the Administrator finds

that -

(A) the determination of the

State is arbitrary and capricious,

(B) such State does not need 

such State standards to meet compelling and

extraordinary conditions, or

(C) such State standards and 

accompanying enforcement procedures are not

consistent with section 7521(a) of this

title.

(2) If such State standard is at least as

stringent as the comparable applicable

Federal standard, such State standard shall

be deemed to be at least as protective of

health and welfare as such Federal standards

for purposes of paragraph (1).

(3) In the case of any new motor vehicle or

new motor vehicle engine to which State

standards apply pursuant to a waiver granted

under paragraph (1), compliance with such

State standards shall be treated as

compliance with applicable Federal standards

for purposes of this subchapter.

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Defendant argues that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction

should apply to Count II because the issue whether CARB will

receive a waiver of the preemption of emissions has been

committed to the Administrator of the EPA by Congress pursuant to

Section 7453(b)(1). Defendant contends:

Importantly, the Administrator’s discretion

is significantly circumscribed. For example,

California’s regulations ‘are presumed to

satisfy the waiver requirements and ... the

burden of proving otherwise is on whoever

attacks them.’ MEMA I, 627 F.2d at 1121. 

California is given the ‘broadest possible

discretion.’ Id. at 1128. And ‘[t]he

agency’s longstanding interpretation [has

been] that section 209(b) does not require

California to establish perfect compliance

with’ the Clean Air Act. MEMA III, 142 F.3d

at 463. Thus, on at least the

‘protectiveness’ question, the Administrator

is not to overturn California’s

judgment lightly. Nor is he to

substitute his judgment for that of

the State. There must be clear and

compelling evidence that the State

acted unreasonably in evaluating

the relative risks of various

pollutants in light of the air

quality, topography, photochemisty,

and climate in that State, before

the EPA may deny a waiver.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 302 (1977) ... And

US EPA has consistently interpreted the

consistency requirement to be limited to the

factual question of whether ‘there is

inadequate lead time to permit the

development of the necessary technology given

the cost of compliance within that time

period or the Federal and State test

procedures impose inconsistent certification

requirements.’ See, e.g., California State

Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards;

Waiver of Federal Preemption, Decision, 57

Fed.Reg. 24788, 24789 (1992). See also MEMA

III, 142 F.3d at 463 (stating that ‘[n]either

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the court nor the agency has ever interpreted

compliance with section 202(a) to require

more’ than this).

In addition, Congress has specifically

designed how these decisions are to be

reviewed by the courts. Review of any final

action by the Administrator must be in either

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit or, if the final action is

‘locally or regionally applicable,’ in the

appropriate U.S. Court of Appeals. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(b)(1). That judicial review is also

circumscribed to whether the Administrator

acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or not

consistent with law. MEMA I, 627 F.2d at

1105-06. And that judicial review is based

solely on an administrative record ...

Lastly, the District of Columbia Circuit has

explained that the Administrator’s

construction of the Clean Air Act is given

deference because of his agency’s ‘technical

expertise.’ Id. at 1106. 

Relying on this legal exposition, defendant argues:

Plaintiffs are attempting to avoid this

administrative waiver process. They seek a

declaration from this Court that California

cannot meet the waiver requirements of Clean

Air Act section 209(a) because these proposed

regulatory amendments would be inconsistent

with Section 202 of the Clean Air Act. 

Congress has specifically entrusted that

decision to the Administrator of US EPA, with

direct appeal (on an administrative record)

to the U.S. Court of Appeals. This Court

need not - and should not - insert itself

into that process, risking the possibility

that two courts might reach inconsistent

decisions on that question. Rather, the

Court should apply the primary jurisdiction

doctrine.

The court concludes that the primary jurisdiction doctrine

does not apply to the allegations of Count II. The court concurs

with plaintiffs that the primary jurisdiction doctrine does not

apply because plaintiffs raise “two pure questions of statutory

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Plaintiffs also refer the court to Engine Mfgs. v. South 4

Coast Air Quality Manag., 541 U.S. 246 (2004), a decision which

does not address the issue of primary jurisdiction. Although

plaintiffs assert that “[t]here is no doubt that if ‘primary

jurisdiction’ had been raised in South Coast, it would have been

rejected”, because the issue is not raised or discussed in the

Supreme Court’s opinion, this court concludes that South Coast is

not relevant to resolution of the issue before this court. 

24

interpretation under the Clean Air Act that can and must be

determined by the federal courts.” As plaintiffs note, there is

no principle of administrative law requiring a court to await an

agency’s interpretation of the law before the court interprets

the law. If an agency has already interpreted a statutory

provision, the court looks to that agency interpretation only if

the statute at issue is silent or ambiguous on the issue. See

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984). Plaintiffs contend:

Interpreting the preemptive scope of the

Clean Air Act is no different. To the extent

EPA has already interpreted the relevant

provisions - and plaintiffs believe EPA’s

determination that section 202(a) does not

permit regulation of greenhouse gases forbids

CARB’s regulation ... - then the Court simply

applies Chevron’s two-step test. To the

extent there are unanswered questions of

statutory interpretation, the Court answers

those questions the same way it answers any

other questions of federal statutory

interpretation.

Plaintiffs’ position is supported by the holding in

International Auto. Mfrs. v. Commissioner, 208 F.3d 1 (1 Cir. st

2000). In International Auto. Mfrs., automobile manufacturers 4

challenged automobile emission standards adopted by

Massachusetts, contending that the regulations were preempted by

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the Clean Air Act. The district court ruled in favor of the

automobile manufacturers. In an earlier appeal from the district

court’s decision, the First Circuit opted to stay its

determination of the matter pending a referral of several

questions to the EPA under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,

including whether the Massachusetts ZEV mandates were “standards”

for purposes of Section 177 of the Clean Air Act, whether the

California MOAs were “standards” for purposes of Sections 177 and

209, and whether the ZEV mandates were otherwise “identical to

California standards for which a waiver has been granted” as

required by Section 177. After EPA issued an opinion letter

responding to these questions, a petition for review of that

letter was filed. In dismissing the petition for review, the

First Circuit ruled in pertinent part:

The litigation in Appeal No. 99-2245 is an

unfortunate consequence of our previous

decision to stay the appeal in No. 98-1036

pending a primary jurisdiction referral to

the EPA. While our intentions in making that

referral reflected an appropriate respect for

the policies underlying the doctrine of

primary jurisdiction, in retrospect our

referral to the EPA was somewhat inartful.

As is fairly clear from our prior opinion, it

was our intention to allow the EPA to issue

binding rulings or decisions on the questions

of statutory interpretation and application

that we referred to the agency. However, in

hindsight, our decision to invoke the primary

jurisdiction doctrine sua sponte without any

briefing from the parties was not a wise one. 

Of the several issues referred for the EPA’s

consideration, it now appears that the agency

was not in a position to determine any of

them authoritatively. For instance, as all

parties now apparently agree, the ultimate

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legal determination of whether the

Massachusetts regulations are preempted by

the CAA is a question of federal preemption

law for the courts alone to decide. 

Similarly, the subsidiary issues of what

constitutes a ‘standard’ under CAA §§ 209 and

177 and whether the ZEV mandates are

‘identical’ to California standards require

us to interpret the CAA for purposes of

applying federal preemption law, not for

purposes of administering the CAA; as such,

the issues fall squarely within this Court’s

jurisdiction but not within any particular

expertise or special administrative

competence of the EPA. Presumably, this is

why the EPA’s September 15, 1999 opinion

letter is written in terms of the EPA’s

‘beliefs’ regarding the various issues

referred for its consideration. In fact, in

the No. 99-2245 litigation, the EPA has taken

the position that the September 15, 1999

opinion letter was an advisory opinion only,

with no independent impact upon the parties. 

We agree with this characterization.

The Administrative Procedure Act subjects all

‘final agency actions’ to judicial review ...

Agency action is final if it constitutes a

‘”definitive statement [] of [the agency’s]

position” with “direct and immediate”

consequences.’ ... The EPA’s opinion letter

does not purport to be a definitive statement

by the agency of its position on these

various issues. For example, with regard to

the question of whether a waiver has been

granted for the California MOAs, the EPA

makes explicit reference to the pending

proceedings on California’s request for a

‘within the scope’ determination of its

amended LEV program. Likewise, the agency

takes great pains to limit its conclusion

that the MOAs constitute standards for

purposes of §§ 209 and 177 to the ‘unique

circumstances’ of this case, expressly

suggesting that a different analysis would be

appropriate in most cases. Nor does the

opinion letter have any direct or immediate

consequences for the parties. There was no

controversy before the agency other than the

referral from this Court, and the EPA

correctly recognized that this Court will

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decide the preemption issues before us on

appeal, not the agency. Because the

September 15, 1999 opinion letter was not

intended to be a definitive statement of the

EPA’s positions and has no direct or

immediate impact on the parties, we hold that

it is not a reviewable final agency action,

and we dismiss the petition for review ....

208 F.3d at 4-5.

Here, the issue before the court in Count II is whether the

regulations set forth in Resolution No. 04-28 constitute

standards related to the control of emissions from new motor

vehicles and, therefore, preempted by Section 209(a) of the Clean

Air Act. This is an issue for this court to decide. 

The fact that defendant has the ability to seek a waiver of

this preemption, if preemption is ultimately determined by this

court, does not cause the primary jurisdiction doctrine to apply. 

As plaintiffs contend:

This case is entirely different. Whether

CARB’s ‘greenhouse gas’ emission standards

are preempted ‘standards’ under Section

209(a) is a pure question of statutory

interpretation. Likewise, whether CARB’s

regulation of ‘greenhouse gases’ is

‘consistent with’ section 202(a), given that

EPA has concluded as a matter of statutory

interpretation that ‘greenhouse gases’ are

not ‘pollutants’ under section 202(a), is a

pure question of statutory interpretation. 

Of course, if CARB were to seek a waiver from

EPA, plaintiffs would be perfectly entitled

to argue that any waiver would be contrary to

the statute, and EPA’s decision could then be

reviewed by the D.C. Circuit. That

possibility is, however, irrelevant. It is

no more relevant than the possibility that

... Massachusetts might have petitioned for a

waiver in AIAM.

Whether a waiver can be sought, or will be

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The parties appear to dispute whether plaintiffs are 5

precluded from resorting to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce Section 209

of the Clean Air Act. However, because this issue is unrelated to

application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the court does

not address it further in resolving this motion to dismiss. 

28

sought, does not alter the substance of the

statutory interpretation question at issue. 

Count II presents pure questions of statutory

interpretation regardless whether a waiver is

sought. Courts may defer to an agency’s

authoritative construction of an ambiguous

federal statute, but courts simply do not

await an agency’s attempt at statutory

interpretation.

Therefore, the court denies defendant’s motion to dismiss

Count II pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine.5

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is denied.

2. The issue of intradistrict venue is certified for appeal

to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1292(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 20, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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