Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02860/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02860-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 871
Nature of Suit: IRS 3rd Party Suits 26 USC 7609 (U.S. plaintiff)
Cause of Action: 26:7609 IRS: Petition to Quash IRS Summons

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WENDY LEE MOORE, RICHARD

ANDREW TARANTINO, JR., dba T&M

CONSTRUCTION

Petitioners,

 v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA INTERNAL REVENUE

SERVICE 

Respondents. /

No. C 07-02860 CRB

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION TO

QUASH, GRANTING MOTION FOR

SUMMARY ENFORCEMENT

Petitioners Wendy Lee Moore and Richard Andrew Tarantino move to quash an

Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) summons served on Wells Fargo bank in April 2007. 

Tarantino did not file Form 1040 federal income tax returns for the years 1990-93, 1999-

2001, and 2003. Accordingly, the IRS assessed Tarantino over $284,000 in unpaid tax

liability. Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a)(2), IRS Revenue Officer Richard Lowe issued a

summons to Wells Fargo Bank to produce records pertaining to all accounts in the name of

T&M Construction, a corporation under whose name Tarantino does business or has done

business. 

The Internal Revenue Code features a special notice provision where, as here, the IRS

issues a summons to a third party. See 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a). Critically, a party has no

standing to initiate an action to quash a third-party summons unless they are entitled to notice

Case 3:07-cv-02860-CRB Document 18 Filed 09/21/07 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Petitioners also challenge the summons on the ground that release of their financial

information would violate their rights under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §

3413. Although that statute protects against the disclosure of financial information to the

government except upon certain conditions, it contains an exception where information is sought

pursuant to the IRC. See 12 U.S.C. § 3413(c) (“Nothing in this chapter prohibits the disclosure

of financial records in accordance with the procedures authorized by Title 26.”). Because the

IRS followed appropriate Title 26 procedures in issuing the summons, § 3413(c)’s exception

applies in this case. See Lidas, Inc. v. United States, 238 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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under § 7609(a). See Ip v. United States, 205 F.3d 1168, 1170 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000). The

petition to quash must be dismissed because petitioners were not entitled to notice under §

7609(a), and therefore do not have standing. The IRS is relieved of its notice obligation

when it issues a summons in aid of the collection “of an assessment made . . . against the

person with respect to whose liability the summons has issued.” 26 U.S.C. §

7609(c)(2)(D)(i). As explained by the Ninth Circuit in Ip, this exception applies “where the

assessed taxpayer has a recognizable [legal] interest in the records summoned.” 205 F.3d at

1176 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because Tarantino does business or

has done business under the name T&M Construction, there is no doubt that he has a

recognizable legal interest in T&M’s financial records.1

 The petition to quash is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

The IRS has cross-motioned for summary enforcement of its summons. Because IRS

summonses are not self-enforcing, the government must seek enforcement from a federal

district court if the person on whom a summons has been served refuses to comply. See

United States v. Samuels, Kramer & Co., 712 F.2d 1342, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1983). Revenue

Officer Lowe’s sworn declaration – providing that the summons was issued for the legitimate

purpose of collecting previously assessed income taxes, the summonsed information may be

relevant to the collection of assessed taxes, the information is not in the possession of the

IRS, and all administrative steps required by the IRC have been taken – is sufficient to satisfy

the government’s prima facie burden of establishing that its use of the summons is “in good

faith.” See id. at 1344-45. 

Case 3:07-cv-02860-CRB Document 18 Filed 09/21/07 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Petitioners, on the other hand, have not satisfied their “heavy” burden of alleging

specific facts that support their allegations of bad faith. See id. at 1348. Petitioners forward

“mere conclusory allegations” of bad faith rather than “specific facts and evidence.” United

States v. Tanoue, 94 F.3d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1996) (quotation and citation omitted). 

Accordingly, the government’s motion for summary enforcement is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 21, 2007 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:07-cv-02860-CRB Document 18 Filed 09/21/07 Page 3 of 3