Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01558/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01558-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIRELL TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION,

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:13-cv-01558 AWI DLB PC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

[ECF No. 12]

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO PAY 

THE FILING FEE WITHIN FOURTEEN 

DAYS OR SUFFER DISMISSAL

Plaintiff Kirell Taylor (“Plaintiff”) is a California state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on September 26, 2013. On 

September 5, 2014, the undersigned revoked Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status that had been 

initially granted on December 12, 2013, based on the fact that Plaintiff suffered three or more strikes 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), at the time this action was filed. The Court directed Plaintiff to submit 

the $400.00 filing fee in full within thirty days or suffer dismissal of the action. 

On September 19, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the order revoking his 

in forma pauperis status. 

DISCUSSION

 Rule 60(b) allows the Court to relieve a party from an order for “(1) mistake, inadvertence, 

surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could 

Case 1:13-cv-01558-AWI-DLB Document 17 Filed 10/23/14 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 

previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) 

the judgment is void; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Rule 60(b)(6) 

“is to be used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice and is to be utilized 

only where extraordinary circumstances ...” exist. Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 

2008) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). The moving party “must demonstrate both 

injury and circumstances beyond his control....” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

In seeking reconsideration of an order, Local Rule 230(k) requires Plaintiff to show “what new or 

different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon 

such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion.”

“A motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, 

unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if 

there is an intervening change in the controlling law,” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma 

GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir.2009) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted, 

and “[a] party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court's 

decision, and recapitulation ...” of that which was already considered by the Court in rendering its 

decision,” U.S. v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D.Cal.2001). To succeed, a 

party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its 

prior decision. See Kern–Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 

1986), affirmed in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987).

Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that he has three “strikes” but contends he qualifies for the 

imminent danger exception under § 1915(g). The three strikes provision precludes Plaintiff from 

proceeding in forma pauperis unless he was, at the time of filing the complaint, under imminent 

danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). In Plaintiff’s complaint, he alleges 

misappropriation of trade secrets and copyrights, misappropriation of art or invention, retaliation by 

failing to provide Plaintiff with photocopying services, deliberate indifference concerning an 

incident which took place in 2011, retaliation by issuing a false rules violation report, interference 

and destruction of mail, denial of access to courts, and retaliation by destruction of property. Based 

Case 1:13-cv-01558-AWI-DLB Document 17 Filed 10/23/14 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

on Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to make a “plausible allegation” that he 

faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed the complaint. Andrews v. 

Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007).

In his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff contends that he is a “Negro with a damaged left 

lung due to a gunshot wound in 1997 and [is] being housed amid a [contraction of] a lethal fungal 

infection known as Valley Fever [and] inhaling spores in the soil which is an environmental hazard.” 

(Pl’s Mot. Recons. at 1.) Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegation in his complaint that he is in 

imminent danger of Valley Fever, which was not the basis of the allegations in the complaint, does 

not satisfy the “imminent danger” exception to § 1915(g). Even a liberal reading of the allegations 

throughout the complaint cannot transform their true nature into allegations concerning imminent 

danger of contracting Valley Fever, and the Court finds the inclusion of this vague allegation to be a 

transparent attempt to avoid paying the filing fee after suffering three strikes under § 1915(g). See, 

e.g., Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Frequent filers sometimes allege that 

they are in imminent danger so they can avoid paying a filing fee.”).

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED; and

2) Plaintiff is DIRECTED to pay the filing fee in full within fourteen (14) days or suffer 

dismissal of the action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 23, 2014 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-01558-AWI-DLB Document 17 Filed 10/23/14 Page 3 of 3