Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02000/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02000-106/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MONOLITHIC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., a

Delaware corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

O2 MICRO INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, a

Cayman Island corporation,

Defendant. /

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS.

 /

O2 MICRO INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, a

Cayman Island corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

MONOLITHIC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., a

Delaware corporation, et al., 

Defendants. /

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS AND CROSSCLAIMS.

 /

No. C 04-2000 CW

(consolidated with

No. C 06-2929 CW)

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED

MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT

AS A MATTER OF LAW

AND CONDITIONAL

MOTIONS FOR A NEW

TRIAL, AND DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR

JUDGMENT AS A MATTER

OF LAW AND CROSSMOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Defendants Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. (MPS) and ASUSTeK

Computers, Inc. renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law

that they do not infringe claims 12 and 14 of Plaintiff O2 Micro

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1

Ordinarily, post-verdict motions for judgment as a matter of

law are filed after the entry of judgment. At the Court’s

direction, however, the parties’ motions in this case were filed

before judgment was entered. Judgment was subsequently entered

based on the jury’s verdict and the Court’s determinations of

certain claims. Because the motions had already been submitted at

that time, the Court deems them filed within ten days of the entry

of judgment, as required by Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. No additional post-judgment motions need be

made, and the parties’ time for appeal will run from the date this

2

International Limited’s (O2 Micro) U.S. Patent No. 6,396,722 (the

‘722 patent) under the doctrine of equivalents. They move

conditionally for a new trial on this issue if the jury’s verdict

invalidating claims 12 and 14 were to be overturned. In addition,

Defendants renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law,

should the Court grant Plaintiff’s cross-motion and find that they

literally infringe the ‘722 patent, that the patent’s claims are

invalid due to prior invention by MPS. They conditionally request

a new trial on this issue as well, also if the jury’s verdict

invalidating claims 12 and 14 were to be overturned.

Plaintiff O2 Micro opposes Defendants’ renewed motions for

judgment as a matter of law and conditional motions for a new

trial. It also cross-moves for judgment as a matter of law that:

1) the ‘722 patent is not invalid based on the on-sale bar; 2) the

‘722 patent is not invalid based on obviousness; and 3) claims 1,

2, and 18 of the ‘722 patent are literally infringed by the accused

products. Plaintiff also moves for a new trial due to the trial

testimony of the court-appointed expert.

The matters were taken under submission on the papers. Having

considered the papers submitted by both parties, the Court denies

both parties’ motions.1

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order is filed.

3

BACKGROUND

On May 15, 2007, the jury returned a verdict finding that

Defendants did not literally infringe any of the claims in the ‘722

patent, but did infringe claims 12 and 14 under the doctrine of

equivalents. However, while rejecting Defendants’ argument that

the patent was invalid due to anticipation or prior invention, the

jury found that all relevant claims were invalid because of the onsale bar and because they were obvious in light of prior art.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Judgment as a Matter of Law

A motion for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict

renews the moving party’s prior Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a

matter of law at the close of all the evidence. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 50(b). Judgment as a matter of law after the verdict may be

granted only when the evidence and its inferences, construed in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party, permits only one

reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. Where there is sufficient

conflicting evidence, or if reasonable minds could differ over the

verdict, judgment as a matter of law after the verdict is improper. 

See, e.g., Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 775 (9th

Cir. 1990); Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., 880 F.2d 176,

181 (9th Cir. 1989). 

II. New Trial

A new trial may be granted if the verdict is not supported by

the evidence. There is no easily articulated formula for passing

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on such motions. Probably the best that can be said is that the

Court should grant the motion “[i]f, having given full respect to

the jury’s findings, the judge on the entire evidence is left with

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.” Landes Constr. Co., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833

F.2d 1365, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting 11 Wright & Miller,

Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2806, at 48-49).

The Ninth Circuit has found that the existence of substantial

evidence does not prevent the court from granting a new trial if

the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence. Landes,

833 F.2d at 1371. “The judge can weigh the evidence and assess the

credibility of witnesses, and need not view the evidence from the

perspective most favorable to the prevailing party.” Id.

Therefore, the standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the

evidence is less stringent than that governing the Rule 50(b)

motions for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict.

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants’ Motion

Defendants make three principal arguments in support of their

motion for judgment as a matter of law that the accused products do

not infringe claims 12 or 14 of the ‘722 patent under the doctrine

of equivalents. First, they argue that Plaintiff is barred from

pursuing an infringement claim under this doctrine because of

prosecution history estoppel. Second, they claim that the asserted

scope of equivalence would encompass prior art, and thus is

invalid. Third, they claim that there is insufficient evidence to

support a verdict of infringement given the requirements of the

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2Defendants also move conditionally for a new trial on the

issue of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in the

event that the jury’s verdict invalidating claims 12 and 14 of the

‘722 patent is overturned. Because the Court does not overturn the

jury’s verdict, it need not rule on this conditional motion. 

Defendants further move for judgment as a matter of law that,

should the Court find as a matter of law that the accused products

infringe the ‘722 patent literally, the patent is invalid because

MPS invented the infringing products first. Because the Court does

not find literal infringement, it need not rule on this motion

either.

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doctrine of equivalents.

As discussed below, the Court upholds the jury’s verdict that

claims 12 and 14 are invalid due to obviousness and the on-sale

bar. Therefore, the Court need not consider Defendants’ arguments

that they did not infringe these claims, and their motion is denied

as moot.2

II. Plaintiff’s Motions

A. The on-sale bar

The jury found that all of the relevant claims in the ‘722

patent are invalid due to the on-sale bar. Under this statutory

bar, a patent is invalid pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) if the

invention is both: 1) the subject of a commercial offer for sale in

the United States more than one year prior to the date of the

patent application; and 2) ready for patenting at the time of the

offer. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998). The

jury likely based its verdict on a March, 1998 sales trip made by

James Moyer, MPS’s lead chip designer, to Taiwan. During that

trip, Mr. Moyer met with Peter Liu of Ambit Broadband, a potential

purchaser, and demonstrated a prototype of the first-generation

MP1010 chip – the precursor to one of the groups of accused

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3

Defendants assert that Plaintiff waived its right to make

this argument by not raising it in its original motion for judgment

as a matter of law. It is arguable that Plaintiff’s pre-verdict

motion, which simply alleged a lack of sufficient evidence to

support the on-sale bar, did not preserve Plaintiff’s right to

argue now that the sale took place outside the United States. The

Court need not resolve this issue, however, because it finds

sufficient evidentiary support for a finding that the offer for

sale was made in the United States.

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products in this case. After MPS agreed to make certain

modifications at Ambit’s request, Ambit agreed to order a specific

quantity of chips.

Plaintiff now argues that the on-sale bar is not available to

Defendants because: 1) the products were not offered for sale in

the United States; 2) the discussions between MPS and Ambit did not

constitute an offer for sale in any event; and 3) the MP1010 was

not ready for patenting at the time the offer was made. For the

following reasons, the Court rejects each of these arguments and

denies Plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law that the

patent was not invalid due to the on-sale bar.

1. Sale in the United States

Plaintiff first argues that Defendants cannot satisfy the

first element of Pfaff because the offer for sale was not made in

the United States.3 There is little case law examining the

requirement that the offer be made in the United States. However,

Robbins Co. v. Lawrence Manufacturing Co., 482 F.2d 426, 434 (9th

Cir. 1973), held that the requirement is met “if substantial

activity prefatory to a sale occurs in the United States.” 

Plaintiff is correct in noting that Robbins also held that an

“offer for sale, made in this country, is sufficient prefatory

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activity occurring here.” Id. (emphasis added). However, there is

no support for Plaintiff’s contention that an offer made in the

United States is necessary under Robbins.

While MPS’s actual offer to sell the MP1010 chip to Ambit took

place in Taiwan, it cannot be considered in a vacuum. The

arrangements for MPS’s sales trip were made from its United States

offices, and MPS communicated from the United States with Ambit

about the sale. The products were also made in and shipped from

this country. Given this additional evidence, the fact that the

offer itself was not made while the offeree and offeror were in the

United States is not dispositive. The Court finds that sufficient

activity prefatory to the sale occurred in the United States to

satisfy the first prong of the Pfaff test.

2. Offer for sale

In order for the on-sale bar to apply where, as here, no

actual sale was consummated prior to the critical date, a defendant

must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence activity that

rises to the level of a formal offer under general principles of

contract law. Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d

1041, 1045–47 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Plaintiff argues that the

interaction between MPS and Ambit did not constitute such an offer.

What constitutes an offer will depend on the facts of the

particular case. In determining whether an offer has been made,

courts may look to interpretive principles contained in the Uniform

Commercial Code (UCC) and the Restatement of Contracts. See id. at

1047–48. The Restatement defines an offer as “the manifestation of

willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another

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person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited

and will conclude it.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24. 

Plaintiff characterizes Mr. Moyer’s trip to Taiwan as promotional

in nature and asserts that too many details – including the price

of the MP1010 parts – were left unresolved after his meeting with

Ambit to support the conclusion that he made an offer.

Mr. Moyer testified that, at the meeting with Ambit, Mr. Liu

was enthusiastic about incorporating the MP1010 chip in Ambit’s

products. Tr. at 905. Mr. Moyer came away from the meeting with

an agreement to ship parts according to a specified schedule. Id.

at 906. This testimony is corroborated by Mr. Moyer’s notes from

his Taiwan trip and a shipping schedule prepared by Mr. Liu. Trial

Ex. 546, Mathiowetz Dec. Ex. E. The shipping schedule requests

specific quantities of parts and sets target dates by which

production goals should be met. Id. at 1049. John Shannon, a cofounder and former employee of MPS was also present at the meeting

with Ambit. He confirmed Mr. Moyer’s account that at the meeting,

Ambit “made a commitment to move forward.” Tr. at 1065. 

Considered as a whole, this evidence is sufficient to support a

finding that MPS made an offer to sell the MP1010 chip to Ambit in

March, 1998. The fact that certain terms were not finalized at the

meeting does not preclude the conclusion that an offer was made. 

The UCC specifically states that a contract for sale may be formed

even though multiple terms, including the price term, are left

open. U.C.C. §§ 2-204, 2-305.

In support of its position, Plaintiff cites Linear Technology

Corp. v. Micrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2001), which held

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that mere promotional activity does not constitute an offer. 

However, Linear Technology is distinguishable from this case. In

that case, the plaintiff had internally developed an extensive

marketing strategy, distributed advertising materials to potential

customers and discussed providing samples to certain customers

before the product’s release date. While it received numerous

purchase orders prior to the release date, it did not commit to

filling any of these orders until after the release date. The

court found that none of these actions sufficiently demonstrated

the intent to be bound that is required for an offer. In contrast

to the plaintiff in Linear Technology, here MPS made contact with a

specific customer and agreed to ship a certain quantity of parts as

a result of that customer’s order. This is sufficient for a jury

to find that MPS intended to be bound by its offer.

Plaintiff argued to the jury that MPS did not make an offer

for sale, and the jury rejected this argument. Given the

corroborated evidence at trial, the Court cannot conclude that,

under general principles of contract law, no reasonable jury could

have found that MPS’s activities constituted an offer for sale. 

The Court therefore finds that the verdict on this point is

supported by sufficient evidence.

3. Device ready for patenting

Plaintiff also argues that because the first-generation MP1010

prototype that Mr. Moyer demonstrated at his meeting with Ambit was

later modified to incorporate open lamp protection and currentcontrol circuitry, which Plaintiff claims are two essential

elements of the patent, the device offered for sale at the March 6,

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4Defendants correctly note that many of the cases Plaintiff

cites were decided under the Federal Circuit’s pre-Pfaff rule,

which required that an invention be “substantially complete” and

took account of the “totality of the circumstances.” Later Federal

Circuit cases have employed the standard set forth in Pfaff, which

focuses on the date of conception. See, e.g., Robotic Vision Sys.,

Inc. v. View Eng’g, Inc., 249 F.3d 1307, 1311–12 (Fed. Cir. 2001)

(comparing the pre-Pfaff and post-Pfaff tests for the on-sale bar).

10

1998 meeting was not “ready for patenting,” and thus fails to meet

the second element of Pfaff. However, Pfaff does not require that

an invention be reduced to practice in order to be complete and

ready for patenting. 525 U.S. at 66. It requires only that the

concept of the invention be complete.4 Id. at 67.

At trial, Mr. Moyer testified that he and Mr. Shannon came up

with the idea for providing open lamp protection on the flight home

from Taiwan. Tr. at 909. Mr. Shannon testified that it took about

two days after his meeting with Ambit to change the chip to a

current-control design. Tr. at 966. Their testimony is

corroborated by a March 15, 1998 email from Mr. Moyer to Mr. Liu of

Ambit. Brigham Reply Dec. Ex Q. The jury was entitled to conclude

from this evidence that the conception of the second-generation

MP1010 chip was completed prior to the critical date of July 22,

1998 and, as noted above, that this chip was offered for sale prior

to the critical date as well.

B. Obviousness

Plaintiff moves for judgment as a matter of law that the

asserted claims in the ‘722 patent are not invalid due to

obviousness, arguing that there is insufficient evidence to support

the jury’s verdict on this point. Specifically, Plaintiff claims

that there is insufficient evidence that certain elements of the

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5

Defendants again argue that many of Plaintiff’s arguments in

support of its motion for a judgment of non-obviousness are waived

because Plaintiff did not make them in its pre-verdict motion. 

Plaintiff did, however, state in its pre-verdict motion that there

was insufficient evidence to support a finding of obviousness. Tr.

at 1368. As with Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff waived its

“sale in the United States” argument, the Court need not resolve

this issue because it finds sufficient evidentiary support for the

jury’s finding of obviousness.

11

claims exist in prior art and, in any event, there is insufficient

evidence that the proper combination of these elements would be

obvious to a practitioner skilled in the art. However, Plaintiff

does not so much assert the complete absence of evidence as argue

that the jury was not entitled to credit the evidence and come to

its conclusions in the way that it did. In so arguing, Plaintiff

repeatedly asks this Court to substitute its judgment for that of

the jury. As explained below, there is no basis for doing so, and

the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion accordingly.5

1. Evidence of a flow-through switch (claims 2 and 9)

One of the elements of claims 2 and 9 is a “flow-through

switch.” At trial, Dr. Horenstein testified that the sawtooth

generator in the Henry patent, “which has an output that goes

between high and low states” serves the function of a flow-through

switch. Tr. at 1200. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Horenstein’s

explanation is insufficient and contradicts the Court’s claim

construction, which defines a flow-through switch as “a switch

which passes a selected voltage signal to its output node.” The

Court disagrees on both points. The jury was entitled to credit

Dr. Horenstein’s expert opinion on the flow-through switch element. 

This opinion, incidentally, is not inconsistent with Professor

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Santi’s testimony on the matter, as Plaintiff claims. See Tr. at

336–38.

2. Evidence of the second state (claims 1, 2, 9 and 18)

Claims 1, 2, 9, and 18 specify an inverter with a second state

that “overlaps the first signal with a predetermined minimum

overlap to deliver a predetermined minimum power to the load.” 

Plaintiff argues that because the Henry patent does not teach a

minimum output state under a fault condition but, rather, turns off

the controller during such a condition, it cannot satisfy the

“predetermined minimum power” element. This is at odds with

Plaintiff’s endorsement of Dr. Rhyne’s testimony, which it cited in

support of the jury’s verdict that claim 14 was infringed under the

doctrine of equivalents, that a complete shutdown “is about as

predetermined a minimum overlap as I can think of.” Pl.’s Mot. at

11 (citing Tr. at 425–26). Additionally, Dr. Horenstein testified

about the way in which the Henry patent specifies a minimum overlap

state that provides a minimum power output to the controller. Tr.

at 1196. This provides ample evidence to support the jury’s

verdict.

3. Evidence of elements of claims 12 and 14

Plaintiff also claims that there is insufficient evidence to

establish in the prior art claim 12’s requirement that power be

delivered to the load “only if” the feedback signal is above a

predetermined threshold. Professor Santi testified, however, that

the Henry patent teaches a circuit that “carries the load only if

that current feedback signal is above the threshold given.” Tr. at

338; see also Tr. at 320. Dr. Horenstein also testified that there

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were multiple examples of prior art utilizing the “only if”

functionality stated in claim 12. See Tr. at 1202–03, 1102–04.

In its reply, Plaintiff also argues that the Henry patent

cannot be used to satisfy the “only if” element of claim 12 because

it does not use overlap control as a means of regulating power to

the load. However, Professor Santi’s testimony established that

phase shift modulation, which the accused products employ as a

means of controlling overlap, is a widely known technique in the

prior art. Tr. at 408; see also Professor Santi’s Expert Report,

Brigham Reply Dec. Ex. D, at 12-13. Taken together, the evidence

was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that each element

of claim 12 could be found in the prior art.

Plaintiff’s arguments that not all of claim 14’s limitations

are found in prior art echo its arguments about the second state in

claims 1, 2, 9, and 18. This is not surprising, in that the

difference between claim 14 and claim 12, on which it is dependent,

is the addition of a second pulse signal having a minimum overlap

with the first pulse signal to reduce power to a predetermined

minimum, which is an element of claims 1, 2, 9, and 18. Just as

the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find those claims

obvious in light of prior art, so it was sufficient to find claim

14 obvious as well. See also Tr. at 1204–05.

4. Combination of elements in the prior art

Plaintiff further argues that, even if Defendants could show

the existence of each element of the ‘722 patent in the prior art,

there is insufficient evidence that the combination of these

elements was obvious. As was its argument that there is

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insufficient evidence of each element in the prior art, its

argument here is based largely on an asserted lack of specificity

in the testimony supporting a finding of obviousness. See KSR

Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007) (to

support summary judgment of invalidity, “there must be some

articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support

the legal conclusion of obviousness”).

Plaintiff cites several snippets of testimony and portrays

them as bald conclusions of obviousness. Yet it fails to account

for the abundance of testimony underlying those conclusions. There

was ample evidence - indeed, too much to recite here - that the

‘722 patent “only unite[d] old elements with no change in their

respective functions,” KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739, in a way that would

have been obvious to a person skilled in the art. See, e.g., Tr.

at 260, 319-21, 815, 1106–18, 1190-1207. The fact that there was

also evidence to the contrary (including some evidence of

Plaintiff’s commercial success) or that Plaintiff’s expert came to

a different conclusion regarding obviousness provides no basis for

overturning the jury’s verdict. The jury was entitled to conclude

from the sum of the evidence presented at trial that a person

skilled in the art would have had reason to combine the existing

elements to create a product covered by the claims in the ‘722

patent.

C. Literal infringement

Plaintiff asks the Court to find that claims 1, 12 and 18 of

the ‘722 patent are literally infringed by the accused products

because various portions of Professor Santi’s and Dr. Horenstein’s

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testimony are purportedly inconsistent with the Court’s claim

construction. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that these witnesses

did not adhere to the Court’s construction of the terms

“predetermined,” “feedback control loop circuit,” “pulse

generator,” “only if,” “first pulse signal” and “second pulse

signal.” The Court has reviewed the testimony cited by Plaintiff,

and finds nothing inconsistent with its claim construction. 

Plaintiff’s arguments are not persuasive and, in any event, are

waived because it did not raise them in its pre-verdict motion for

judgment as a matter of law; that motion argued only that the

evidence could support no finding other than one of literal

infringement. See Docket No. 1016 at 6–9.

D. New trial

Plaintiff moves for a new trial because of what it describes

as Professor Santi’s “incompetent and legally erroneous opinions.” 

Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence clearly permits the Court

to appoint an expert and allow him to testify at a jury trial on

contested issues. Fed. R. Evid. 706(a). It also permits the Court

to disclose to the jury that the expert is Court-appointed. Fed.

R. Evid. 706(c).

The Court considered Professor Santi’s significant experience

prior to appointing him, and finds nothing in his testimony to

support Plaintiff’s assertion of his “utter incompetence.” There

is no basis for Plaintiff’s assertion that a gross “miscarriage of

justice” has occurred. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s claims that the

jury blindly followed Professor Santi’s testimony are belied by the

verdict, which differed from Professor Santi’s conclusions on

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 1172 Filed 10/30/07 Page 15 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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several points. While a Court-appointed expert would not be

appropriate in every case, having presided over a previous trial

with the same technology at issue, the Court found the technology

particularly complex and difficult to understand. Plaintiff’s

motion for a new trial is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ renewed motions for

judgment as a matter of law and conditional motions for a new trial

are DENIED. Plaintiff’s renewed cross-motions for judgment as a

matter of law and for a new trial are DENIED. The judgment entered

according to the jury’s verdict shall stand.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/30/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 1172 Filed 10/30/07 Page 16 of 16