Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00162/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00162-81/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1338 Patent Infringement

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By separate order filed concurrently herewith, the Court has construed the claim in

each of the four subject patents. Accordingly, the Court does not herein address issues of

claim construction.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NICHIA CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SEOUL SEMICONDUCTOR LTD., et al.,

Defendants

 /

No. C-06-0162 MMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART, DENYING

IN PART, AND DEFERRING IN PART

RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING AS

MOOT MOTION TO STRIKES;

VACATING HEARING

Before the Court are two motions for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: (1) plaintiff Nichia Corporation’s (“Nichia”) “Motion[ ] for

Summary Judgment of Patent Infringement, Validity, and Seoul’s Equitable Defenses,” filed

June 16, 2007, and (2) defendants Seoul Semiconductor Co., Ltd., and Seoul

Semiconductor’s (collectively, “Seoul”) “Motion for Claim Construction and for Summary

Judgment,” filed June 15, 2007.1

 Also before the Court are Seoul’s “Motion to Exclude the

Testimony of Cooper C. Woodring,” filed June 29, 2007, and Seoul’s “Motion to Strike the

Declarations of Akira Onikiri and Hidehiko Naete from Plaintiff Nichia Corporation’s Reply

Brief in Support of Its Motions for Summary Judgment,” filed July 11, 2007. Having

Case 3:06-cv-00162-MMC Document 665 Filed 08/22/07 Page 1 of 8
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Each design patent at issue herein claims an ornamental design for a light emitting

diode (“LED”). The asserted point of novelty is the shape of the electrodes that are laterally

attached to the body of the LED.

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In denying Seoul’s motion for summary judgment on this issue, the Court has not

relied on the testimony offered by Nichia’s expert, Cooper A. Woodring, because a jury

could find the design of the accused devices is substantially similar to the patented designs

based solely on a comparison of the accused products with the patented designs. See,

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considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motions, the Court deems

the matters suitable for decision on the papers, VACATES the hearing scheduled for July

27, 2007, and rules as follows.

A. Infringement

1. A triable issue of fact exists as to whether the design of the accused products,

Seouls’ 902 Series LEDs (“902 LEDs”) is substantially similar to any of the claimed

designs, which similarity encompasses their asserted “points of novelty.” See Catalina

Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 F. 3d 1277, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding “if, in the

eye of an ordinary observer, . . . two designs are substantially similar,” the “first one

patented is infringed by the other”); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber

Co., 162 F. 3d 1113, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Similarity of overall appearance is an

insufficient basis for a finding of infringement, unless the similarity embraces the points of

novelty of the patented design.”). The parties agree that distinctions between 902 LEDs

and the subject designs exist, specifically, 902 LEDs’ lack of a rectangular recession on the

rear surface, as well as 902 LEDs’ inclusion of a translucent window on the front surface,

and, in at least some models, a flattened outer corner on the vertical leg of the electrode.2

The Court finds the question of whether such distinctions are insubstantial, as Nichia

argues, or significant, as Seoul asserts, constitutes an issue of fact for the jury. See, e.g.,

Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp., 975 F. 2d 815, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding, even though

“readily noticeable difference” and other asserted “dissimilarities” existed between claimed

design and design of accused product, jury entitled to determine, after conducting visual

comparison, whether accused product infringes). Accordingly, neither party is entitled to

summary judgment on the issue of whether Seoul’s 902 LEDs infringe.3

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e.g., Catalina Lighting, 295 F. 3d at 1287 (holding accused lamp and patented design

“alone” constituted “substantial evidence of whether an ordinary observer would believe the

patented lamp and the [accused] lamp to be substantially the same”). Further, the Court

has not relied on the paragraphs in the Declarations of Akira Onikiri or Hidehiko Naete that

Seoul seeks to strike. Accordingly, Seoul’s motions to strike will be denied as moot.

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2. For the reasons stated by Seoul, assuming, arguendo, the accused products

infringe the subject design patents, Seoul is entitled to summary judgment on Nichia’s

claims that Seoul induced two non-parties to directly infringe Nichia’s patents:

a. With respect to Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (“Samsung Electronics”),

Nichia offers insufficient evidence to support a finding that Samsung Electronics has sold or

offered to sell in the United States products containing 902 LEDs. To the extent Nichia’s

claim is based on the theory Samsung Electronics sold products containing 902 LEDs to a

subsidiary, which, in turn, sold or offered to sell those products in the United States, Nichia

offers insufficient evidence that Seoul took any action to assist or otherwise encourage

Samsung Electronics’s sales to its subsidiary. See MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v.

Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F. 3d 1369, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding claim of

inducement requires evidence defendant was “not only aware of the potentially infringing

activities in the United States by [a third party], but also that [defendant] intended to

encourage those activities”). Even assuming the evidence, read in the light most favorable

to Nichia, could support a finding that Seoul knew or should have known that its 902 LEDs

would become components of products sold in the United States by a subsidiary of

Samsung Electronics, such evidence, standing alone, is insufficient as a matter of law to

support a claim of inducement. See DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F. 3d 1293, 1305

(Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding “knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute infringement is not

enough” to support claim of inducement) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

b. With respect to Samsung SDI Co., Ltd. (“SDI”), Nichia has offered

insufficient evidence to support a finding that SDI has sold or offered to sell products

containing 902 LEDS in the United States, with the exception of the 40 products containing

902 LEDs sold by SDI in the United States to its subsidiary Samsung SDI America (“SDI

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America”) in September 2005. (See Corrected Song Decl. Ex. 47.) Further, Nichia has

offered insufficient evidence to support a finding that Seoul took any action to assist or

otherwise encourage any sales or offers to sell by SDI in the United States. With respect to

SDI’s sales to SDI America, Nichia’s reliance on two indemnification agreements signed by

Seoul and SDI in 2006 is unavailing; such agreements were executed after the September

2005 sales to SDI America, and, consequently, could not have induced SDI to sell products

to SDI America in 2005. See MEMC Electronic Materials, 420 F. 3d at 1378-79 (holding

indemnification agreement between defendant and third party insufficient to prove

inducement, in absence of evidence that “primary purpose” of agreement “was to induce

[third party] to infringe”).

B. Invalidity

1. For the reasons stated by Nichia, Nichia is entitled to summary judgment on

Seoul’s claim of invalidity on the ground of functionality and Seoul is not entitled to

summary judgment on said claim. Although Seoul relies on the report of its expert, Richard

A. Flasck (“Flasck”), who opines that various elements of the claimed designs perform

functions, (see Notice of Errata to Kim Decl. Ex. LL at 27-28, 31-35), Flasck does not opine

that the “overall appearance” of the LEDs designed by Nichia is “dictated by the utilitarian

purpose” of the LEDs. See L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F. 2d 1117, 1123

(Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting “the utility of each of the various elements that comprise the design

is not the relevant inquiry,” but, rather, whether “the overall appearance of the article . . . is

dictated by the utilitarian purpose of the article”; holding fact that “elements” of shoe

perform functions, such as “mesh on the side of the shoe” providing “support for the foot,”

and fact that “position of each [such] element on the shoe is due to its function,” insufficient

to establish claim that shoe design invalid on ground of functionality).

2. For the reasons stated by Nichia, Seoul is not entitled to summary judgment on

Seoul’s claim of invalidity on the ground of lack of ornamentality. First, to the extent

Seoul’s claim is based on the theory that LEDs are hidden while in use, Nichia has offered

evidence that manufacturers of LEDS intend that ordinary purchasers view LEDs during

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Although Seoul asserts it has never claimed that the ‘538 Patent and ‘784 Patent

are invalid as anticipated, Seoul’s counterclaims allege invalidity in general terms, without

specification of any ground and/or patent to which such counterclaims are directed.

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the ordering process, (see, e.g., Corrected Song Decl. Exs. 1-18); such evidence is

sufficient to create a triable issue of fact. See In re Webb. 916 F. 2d 1553, 1557-58 (Fed.

Cir. 1990) (while acknowledging “general rule” that “presumes the absence of

ornamentality when an article may not be observed,” holding evidence article intended to

be seen during “process of sale,” even if product is “completely hidden from view in the

final use,” sufficient to support finding of ornamentality). Second, to the extent Seoul’s

claim is based on the theory that no ordinary purchaser considers the design of LEDs, a

triable issue of fact exists in light of Nichia’s evidence that ordinary purchasers express

interest in the designs of LEDs. (See, e.g., Corrected Song Decl. Exs. 19 at 34-36, 20 at

41, 52-53.)

3. Nichia is entitled to summary judgment on Seoul’s claim of anticipation, to the

extent such claim pertains to United States Design Patent No. 491,538 (“‘538 Patent”) and

United States Design Patent No. 490,784 (“‘784 Patent”), in light of Seoul’s representation

that it is not pursuing such claim. (See Defs. Opp, filed June 29, 2007, at 1-2.)4

4. Nichia is not entitled to summary judgment on Seoul’s claim of anticipation, to the

extent such claim pertains to United States Design Patent No. 503,388 (“‘388 Patent”) and

United States Design Patent No. 499,385 (“‘385 Patent”), and is based on the “SC70-6

package.” Assuming, arguendo, the opinion of Seoul’s expert, Flasck, is too conclusory to

constitute admissible evidence, (see Notice of Errata to Kim Decl. Ex. LL at 57), Nichia fails

to show that a reasonable trier of fact could not find, upon visually comparing the prior art

and the claimed designs, that the two designs are substantially similar. See Door-Master

Corp. v. Yorktowne, Inc., 256 F. 3d 1308, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding “design patent

infringement test also applies to design patent anticipation”); Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp.,

975 F. 2d at 821 (holding, even though “readily noticeable difference” and other asserted

“dissimilarities” existed between claimed design and design of accused product, jury

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Seoul’s objections if any, are due no later than August 28, 2007.

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entitled to determine, after conducting visual comparison, whether accused product

infringes).

5. Nichia is entitled to summary judgment on Seoul’s claim of anticipation, to the

extent such claim pertains to the ‘388 Patent and the ‘385 Patent, and is based on United

States Design Patent 336,106 (“‘106 Patent”). For the reasons stated by Nichia in its

Motion to Strike the Supplemental Expert Report of Richard A. Flasck, and in Magistrate

Judge Joseph C. Spero’s August 14, 2007 order granting said motion, such claim was

disclosed by Seoul after the close of discovery, and Seoul has failed to show Nichia is not

prejudiced by such late disclosure.

6. The Court will defer ruling on Nichia’s motion to the extent Nichia seeks summary

judgment on Seoul’s claim of obviousness, until the Court has considered whether to adopt

the “Report and Recommendation Re Plaintiff’s Motion to Bar Obviousness Defense,” filed

August 14, 2007 by Magistrate Judge Spero.5

C. Equitable Defense

For the reasons stated by Nichia, Nichia is entitled to summary judgment on the

defense of unclean hands, which defense is based on undisputed evidence that Nichia

asked NanoScience Exchange (“NanoScience”) to purchase 902 LEDs from Seoul without

disclosing Nichia’s involvement therein. (See Parker Decl. Exs. 4, 30, 31.) Seoul cites no

case, and the Court has located none, holding a plaintiff may not base an infringement

claim on a purchase, made through a third party, of suspected infringing products. Indeed,

to the extent authority bearing on the issue exists, such authority is to the contrary. See,

e.g., Olan Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 23 F. 3d 1345, 1348 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding, in

copyright infringement action, where plaintiff’s investigator “approached” defendant and

“offered [defendant] an opportunity to infringe,” defendant’s act of selling infringing

products to plaintiff’s investigator constituted infringement); Wahpeton Canvas Co. v.

Bremer, 893 F. Supp. 863, 871-82 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (holding, in patent infringement action,

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defendant’s sale of infringing product to plaintiff’s investigator constituted act of

infringement; stating there is “no basis in law” to dismiss infringement claim in light of

plaintiff’s having used investigator to purchase infringing products) (citing Olan Mills, 23 F.

3d at 1347-48).

D. DeMinimis Defense

For the reasons stated by Nichia, Nichia is entitled to summary judgment on Seoul’s

defense that its direct sales in the United States are not infringing because they are de

minimis. The “de minimis exception” to infringement is “very narrowly” construed, providing

a “defense to infringement performed for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly

philosophical inquiry,” see Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., 216 F. 3d 1343, 1349

(Fed. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Seoul has failed to submit any

evidence that the sales and offers to sell on which Nichia’s direct infringement claim are

based were performed for such purposes.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. Nichia’s motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED in part, DENIED in

part, and DEFERRED in part as follows:

a. Nichia is entitled to summary judgment on Seoul’s claim of invalidity on the

ground of functionality;

b. Nichia is entitled to summary judgment on Seoul’s claim of anticipation, to

the extent such claim pertains to the 538 Patent and the 748 Patent;

c. Nichia is entitled to summary judgment on Seoul’s claim of anticipation, to

the extent such claim is based on the ‘106 Patent;

d. Nichia is entitled to summary judgment on Seoul’s defense of unclean

hands;

e. Nichia is entitled to summary judgment on Seoul’s defense of de minimis

infringement;

//

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f. To the extent Nichia seeks summary judgment on Seoul’s claim of

obviousness, the Court DEFERS ruling thereon; and

g. In all other respects, the motion is DENIED.

2. Seoul’s motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED

in part as follows:

a. Seoul is entitled to summary judgment on Nichia’s claim of inducement;

and

b. In all other respects, the motion is DENIED.

3. Seoul’s motions to strike are DENIED as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 22, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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