Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-00771/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-00771-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited.

Case No. C06-00771 JF

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

(JFLC1)

**E-Filed 9/21/06 **

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ERIC J. QUIGLEY,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

 Defendant.

Case Number C06-00771 JF

ORDER1 DENYING REQUEST FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

[re: docket no. 6]

Plaintiff Eric J. Quigley (“Quigley”) filed a complaint (“Complaint”) pursuant to Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging employment discrimination on February 3, 2006. On the

same date, Quigley filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and a request for

appointment of counsel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(B). The Court denied Quigley’s

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and his request for appointment of counsel on

March 20, 2006 (“March 20th Order). As the Court wrote in that order, counsel may be

appointed in Title VII cases “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C.

§2000e-5. In determining whether to appoint Counsel, the Court must assess three factors: (1)

Case 5:06-cv-00771-JF Document 14 Filed 09/21/06 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Case No. C06-00771 JF

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

(JFLC1)

the plaintiff’s financial resources; (2) the efforts made by the plaintiff to secure counsel; and (3)

whether the plaintiff’s claims have merit. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego, 662

F.2d 1301, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981). Quigley submitted a list of forty-six attorneys who have

declined to represent him in the instant action, demonstrating that he had made efforts to secure

counsel. The Court concluded, however, that it could not judge the merits of Quigley’s claims as

they were stated at that time: “While it is possible that [Quigley’s] claims have merit, the vague

and general allegations do not support the appointment of counsel.” March 20th Order 3. The

Court consequently denied Quigley’s application for appointment of counsel.

Quigley filed a second application for appointment of counsel with a supporting

declaration on March 30, 2006. The supporting declaration provides Quigley’s detailed account

of a series of disputes that he had with his employer and the steps that he took to resolve these

disputes. The supporting declaration also describes the negative impact that the loss of

employment has had on Quigley. The Court appreciates the additional detail that Quigley has

provided, but must determine merit on the basis of allegations and evidence of the type of

forbidden discrimination which forms the basis of a Title VII action.

Title VII makes it illegal for an employer to discriminate against employees or applicants

on the basis of an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. 2000(e)-

(2)(a)(1). A Title VII claim without a showing of such discrimination does not have merit. A

court will assess the merit of a Title VII claim in reviewing an application for the appointment of

counsel. Bradshaw, 662 F.2d at 1318. The Court cannot assess a claim’s merit without detail of

the discrimination which forms the basis of the claim. As the Court noted in its March 20th

Order, vague and general allegations do not establish a claim’s merit. March 20th Order 3. The

Court therefore reviews Quigley’s supporting declaration for detail of the discrimination required

for a successful claim. To this end, Quigley writes:

The plaintiff considers that this is a mixed-motive case and that this case is based

on retaliatory and discriminatory reasons based upon my age, race, color, national

origin, and OSHA and Labor Relations matters. That the same set of facts may be

stated in claim of overlapping bases of prohibited discrimination. That this

employer has unlawfully discharged his employ based on these reasons and not

based upon fair or progressive discipline decisions that are typically based on

either employee misconduct or unsatisfactory work performance.

Case 5:06-cv-00771-JF Document 14 Filed 09/21/06 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Quigley previously wrote:

I was treated less favorably because I was not closely associated with the group of

people at that Division whom are largely all from that area and who share a

culture and other similar social characteristics that comes from that particular

place. It could be shown that may be defined as a smaller ethnic group, of people

sharing a common culture, ancestry, and/or similar social characteristics. This

group discriminates against anyone who does not belong to or is closely

associated with that particular ethnic group. The harassment of restrictive

workplace policies and on going efforts of constructive discharge gravitate to an

unlawful dismissal.

Complaint 2. 

3

Case No. C06-00771 JF

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

(JFLC1)

Declaration 25-26.2 Quigley refers here to race, color, and national origin, all of which are

forbidden bases of discrimination under Title VII. Quigley does not provide additional detail on

the nature of this discrimination or how it contributed to his discharge, however. While it is

possible that his claims may have merit, the Court sees nothing in the record that would allow it

to make such a determination.

The Court must also assess Quigley’s financial resources when determining whether to

appoint counsel. Bradshaw, 662 F.2d at 1318. The Court considered Quigley’s financial

resources in evaluating his application to proceed in forma pauperis, March 20th Order 2, but did

not evaluate them in assessing the application for appointment of counsel. The Court now

evaluates Quigley’s financial resources and finds that they argue against the appointment of

counsel. Quigley is unemployed and has limited assets, Complaint 3, but his wife continues to

earn $2,860/month gross income. Complaint 2. 

The Court therefore concludes that Quigley has demonstrated his efforts to secure

counsel, but that he has not demonstrated the merit of his claim or his lack of financial resources

with which to retain counsel. Accordingly, Quigley’s application for appointment of counsel is

DENIED. 

Case 5:06-cv-00771-JF Document 14 Filed 09/21/06 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Case No. C06-00771 JF

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

(JFLC1)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 21, 2006.

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

Case 5:06-cv-00771-JF Document 14 Filed 09/21/06 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Case No. C06-00771 JF

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

(JFLC1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Eric J. Quigley

Post Office Box 8173

Salinas, CA 93912

Case 5:06-cv-00771-JF Document 14 Filed 09/21/06 Page 5 of 5