Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-00548/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-00548-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANA LEMANSKI,

Plaintiff,

v.

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-08-0548 EMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR MORE

DEFINITE STATEMENT; AND

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO TRANSFER

(Docket Nos. 34, 45)

Previously, Defendants Johnson Controls, Inc. and Johnson Controls of Northern New

Mexico, LLC (collectively “Johnson”) filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Dana Lemanski’s first

amended complaint, which the Court granted on May 14, 2008. See Docket No. 43 (order). In the

order, the Court held that the claims asserted by Mr. Lemanski were subject to the exclusivity

provision of the Energy Employees’ Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act

(“EEOICPA”). The Court, however, gave Mr. Lemanski leave to amend his complaint. 

Mr. Lemanski thereafter filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”), which Johnson now

challenges through another motion to dismiss and a motion for a more definite statement. Having

considered the parties’ briefs and accompanying submissions, as well as the oral argument of

counsel and all other evidence of record, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN

PART the motion to dismiss and GRANTS the motion for a more definite statement. In addition,

pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the Court hereby orders that the case be transferred to the

District of New Mexico.

Case 3:08-cv-00548-EMC Document 53 Filed 08/22/08 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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I. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

Under Rule12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss based on the failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss based on Rule

12(b)(6) tests for the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. See Parks Sch. of

Business v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). All material allegations of the complaint

are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Cahill v.

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 340 (9th Cir. 1996). 

In the instant case, Johnson’s contends that Mr. Shaw has failed to state a claim for relief

because, even if the Court takes all of the allegations in the SAC as true, all claims are subject to the

Energy Employees’ Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (“EEOICPA”).

As the Court held in its previous order, the exclusivity provision of the EEOICPA applies

only to liability of

(C) a contractor that contracted with the Department of Energy to

provide management and operation, management and

integration, or environmental remediation of a Department of

Energy facility (in its capacity as a contractor); [or]

(D) a subcontractor that provided services, including construction,

at a Department of Energy facility (in its capacity as a

subcontractor) . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 7385c(a)(1) (emphasis added). 

The issue in the instant case is whether the allegedly wrongful conduct by Johnson was

undertaken in performance in its role as a subcontractor that provided “services” at the LANL or that

provided “management and operation, management and integration, or environmental remediate” of

the LANL. If so, the exclusivity provision applies. See also Docket No. 43 (Order at 5) (“[I]f those

instruments were at the LANL in conjunction with Johnson’s providing services as a . . .

subcontractor, the exclusivity provision applies.”).

The SAC, like the first amended complaint (“FAC”), alleges that the Regents of the

University of California operated and maintained the Los Alamos National Laboratory (“LANL”),

see SAC ¶ 6, and that Johnson was “subcontracted by the UC Regents to perform operation and

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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maintenance of the LANL’s utility system and infrastructure, custodial services, waste removal,

maintenance of roads and grounds, construction support and engineering services.” Id. ¶ 7. The

SAC alleges further that he was injured because the LANL “contained old, damaged or destroyed

instrumentation supplied by [Johnson] . . . that contained mercury.” Id. ¶ 9. More significantly, the

SAC contains new allegations:

Plaintiff is . . . informed and believes and thereon alleges that

designing, manufacturing, supplying and/or distributing

instrumentation for LANL was never included in the above described

subcontracts, nor was it part of their duties under the subcontracts to

do so. Additionally, Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon

alleges Defendant, JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC., had been

responsible for designing, manufacturing, supplying and/or

distributing instrumentation for LANL before it entered into the above

described subcontracts, and continued to provide instrumentation after

the aforestated subcontracts were taken over by Defendant,

JOHNSON CONTROLS NORTHERN NEW MEXICO.

Id. ¶ 7. In essence, Plaintiff contends to offending instruments were supplied by Johnson Controls,

Inc. in a capacity distinct from that of its role as a subcontractor providing operation and

maintenance services.

Johnson argues that allegation that Johnson Controls, Inc. supplied instruments before the

subcontracts at issue and that it continued to supply instruments after the subcontracts at issue were

taken over by the other Defendant, Johnson Controls of Northern New Mexico, LLC does not take

the claim out of EEOICPA. In footnote 5 of its motion, Johnson argues that the complaint does not

state that “the instrumentation was not supplied pursuant to some contract or subcontract at LANL,

and the only fair reading is that any ‘instrumentation’ was provided pursuant to some other services

contract.” Mot. at 8 n.5. Why that is the only fair reading is unexplained. At this stage, any

inference must be drawn in favor of Mr. Lemanski, not Johnson. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,

80 F.3d 336, 340 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that all material allegations of the complaint are taken as

true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party). The complaint can fairly be

read as alleging the instruments were not supplied as part of another service contract.

At the hearing, Johnson refined its argument and contended that even the mere supplying of

instruments (as alleged in the second amended complaint) should still be considered a “service”

within the meaning of the exclusivity provision of EEOICPA. The Court finds this a strained and

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For the Northern District of California

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implausible interpretation of the statutory language. There is a difference between providing a

“service” and providing a “product.” Congress could have but did not refer to “products” in the

exclusivity provision, choosing instead to exempt a contract for “services” only. Again, the

inferences at this stage must be drawn in Plaintiff’s favor. Merely designing, supplying, distributing

or manufacturing an instrument for the LANL without being tied to e.g., a maintenance or operation

contract would appear not to constitute “services” under the EEOICPA. Defendants have failed to

provide any authorities to support such an interpretation of EEOICPA.

Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to dismiss with respect to Johnson Controls, Inc. 

The Court, however, grants the motion to dismiss with respect to Johnson Controls of Northern New

Mexico, LLC, because there are no allegations that its allegedly wrongful conduct took place outside

of its role as a subcontractor that provided services at the LANL. The dismissal is without prejudice.

B. Motion for More Definite Statement

Johnson argues that, to the extent the motion to dismiss is denied, the Court should still order

a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). According to Johnson,

Mr. Lemanski’s SAC is “so vague or ambiguous that [Johnson] cannot reasonably prepare a

response,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e), because it fails to specify (1) “what alleged product injured [Mr.

Lemanski]” and (2) “who [i.e., which Johnson entity] provided that product to LANL.” Mot. at 9. 

In light of the Court’s ruling above, “who” is no longer an issue; the only question is whether Mr.

Lemanski should provide more specificity as to “what.”

In response, Mr. Lemanski contends that any claim of vagueness has been waived by

Johnson pursuant to Rule 12(g). Rule 12(g) states in relevant part as follows: “[A] party that makes

a motion under this rule [i.e., Rule 12] must not make another motion under this rule raising a

defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(g); see also 5C Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d § 1386 (“The prohibition in

Federal Rule 12(g) against successive motions expressly covers only motions under ‘this rule,’

which, of course, means motions authorized by Rule 12.”). Mr. Lemanski notes that the FAC which

Johnson challenged via a Rule 12(b)(6) motion contained nearly identical language but Johnson

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 Mr. Lemanski’s position is supported both by legal treatises and case law. See 2-12 Moore’s

Fed. Prac. -- Civ. § 12.21 (noting that “Rule 12(g)’s consolidation requirement applies not only to Rule

12(b) defenses, but also to a motion for more definite statement under Rule 12(e) and to a motion to

strike under Rule 12(f)”); Teasdale v. Heck, 499 F. Supp. 2d 967, 972 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (indicating that

the filing of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim will generally waive the right to assert that

a more definite statement is required); Cima v. Wellpoint Healthcare Networks, Inc., No.

05-cv-4127-JPG, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25771, at *10-11 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2007) (finding support for

the position that Rule 12(g) applies to motions under Rule 12(e) and Rule 12(f)); DiMaria v. Silvester, 89 F. Supp. 2d 195, 196 n.5 (D. Conn. 1999) (concluding that Rule 12(e) motion was waived under Rule

12(g) “because the defendants failed to consolidate it with their previous Rule 12 motions to dismiss”);

Clark v. Associates Commercial Corp., 149 F.R.D. 629, 632 (D. Kan. 1993) (noting that “[t]here is

nothing in the express language of Rule 12 that would exempt a Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite

statement from the rule requiring consolidation of all Rule 12 defenses and objections”).

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failed to include a request for a more definite statement as part of that earlier motion.1

 See Opp’n at

4.

In its reply brief, Johnson disputes that the FAC contained identical language. The Court

agrees and finds there has been no waiver. Although both the FAC and SAC refer to instruments,

and although there is similar language about the instruments in both complaints, there is significant

difference in the discussion of instruments between the FAC and the SAC. As noted above, in the

SAC, Mr. Lemanski refers specifically to instruments that were supplied by Johnson Controls, Inc.,

before and after the subcontracts at issue. The identity of these instruments supplied at various

points in time have thus been accorded legal significance not evident in the FAC. In light of this

difference, the Court cannot say that there has been a waiver for failure to bring this motion against

the prior complaint.

Turning to the merits, the Court concludes that a more definite statement is appropriate. 

Given the specific allegation by Mr. Lemanski that Johnson Controls, Inc., supplied instruments

both before and after the subcontracts at issue, he should provide Johnson with additional

information about the instruments, the time frames the instruments were provided, the general type

of instruments involved, and so forth. This will enable Johnson Controls, Inc. to frame a more

specific answer, thus advancing the litigation.

The Court therefore orders Mr. Lemanski to file a more definite statement within twenty (20)

days of the date of this order. Within forty (40) days of the date of this order, Johnson Controls, Inc.

shall file an answer.

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C. Motion to Transfer

Previously, Johnson filed a motion to transfer the instant case to the District of New Mexico,

which the parties agreed could be deferred until after the Court decided the merits of Johnson’s

motion(s) to dismiss. The Court has now issued rulings on the motions herein which should frame

the pleadings. It thus turns to the question of transfer. Mr. Lemanski has indicated in prior

proceedings that he does not oppose the request for transfer to the District of New Mexico. In light

of the parties’ agreement, the Court hereby transfers the case to the District of New Mexico given

the parties’ stipulation and the fact that the locus of evidence is likely located there, the site where

the alleged injury occurred. The transfer shall be effective within forty-five (45) days of the date of

this order.

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part, and the

motion for a more definite statement is granted. The Court instructs the Clerk of the Court to

transfer the case to the District of New Mexico, with the transfer being effective forty-five (45) days

of the date of this order.

This order disposes of Docket Nos. 34 and 45.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 22, 2008

 EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:08-cv-00548-EMC Document 53 Filed 08/22/08 Page 6 of 6