Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03161/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03161-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Contract Dispute

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD A. KEMPF,

Plaintiff,

v.

BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC., 

Defendant.

 

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No. C-06-3161 SC

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN

PART PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO AMEND

MEMORANDUM OF

DECISION AND JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Richard Kempf ("Plaintiff" or "Kempf") brought this

suit against Barrett Business Services, Inc. ("Defendant" or

"Barrett"), alleging causes of action for unpaid wages, breach of 

contract, and wrongful termination. See Compl., Docket No. 1. 

Before trial, Kempf abandoned his wrongful termination claim. The

Court held a trial on the remaining issues on June 18 and 19,

2007, and issued its Memorandum of Decision, Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law on July 31, 2007. See Docket No. 34

("Memorandum of Decision"). 

In a letter to the Court dated August 1, 2007, Plaintiff

expressed concern that certain of the claims in his Complaint were

not addressed in the Memorandum of Decision, and asked whether the

Court would prefer to resolve the issue through a properly-noticed

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1When a party requests, by informal letter or otherwise, that

the Court take some action, and the Court takes that action, it can

hardly be considered "sua sponte." See Black's Law Dictionary 1464

(8th ed. 2004) ("sua sponte. . . Without prompting or suggestion;

on its own motion").

2

motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), or by amending

the decision sua sponte. See Docket No. 36.1 The Court ordered

Plaintiff to file a Rule 59(e) motion, and that motion is now

before the Court. See Docket Nos. 38, 39. Defendant opposed the

motion and Plaintiff replied to that Opposition. See Docket Nos.

44, 45.

Plaintiff asks the Court to amend three aspects of the

Memorandum of Decision. See Pl.'s Mem. of P. & A. in Support of

Mot. to Amend, Docket No. 43, at 1 ("Pl.'s Mem."). First,

Plaintiff requests that the Court hold that Defendant violated

California Labor Code section 201. Second, Plaintiff asks the

Court to rule as a matter of law that Plaintiff is entitled to

reasonable attorneys' fees, litigation costs, and interest

pursuant to California Labor Code sections 218.5 and 218.6. 

Finally, Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse its prior holding

that Defendant did not willfully withhold Plaintiff's wages in

violation of California Labor Code section 203.

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court concludes that

Barrett violated section 201 of the California Labor Code, and

that Kempf is therefore entitled to interest, attorney's fees, and

costs. However, the Court concludes that Kempf has shown no basis

for amending the Court's ruling with regard to willfulness. The

Court therefore GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Kempf's motion.

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2

This discussion summarizes the Court's findings of fact and

conclusions of law, as set forth in the Memorandum of Decision.

3

II. BACKGROUND

Barrett is a human resources management provider offering its

customers a number of human resources-related services such as

temporary staffing and recruitment.2

 From April 2, 2002, to

November 8, 2005, Kempf was the Branch Manager for Barrett's

Napa/Fairfield branch office. The branch managers received as a

quarterly bonus a percentage of the Branch Manager Bonus Basis

("Basis"). Barrett determined the Basis by applying certain

adjustments to the branch's net income before taxes. In the third

quarter of 2005, Barrett began adjusting the quarterly Basis to

reflect the branch's workers' compensation expenses. The new

workers' compensation adjustment reduced Kempf's bonus for the

third quarter of 2005 by $29,961.00.

The Court concluded that Barrett had the right to change

unilaterally its system for calculating the branch managers'

bonuses. The Court further concluded, however, that Barrett could

not apply such a change retroactively, and that its attempt to do

so breached its contract with Kempf. Kempf was therefore entitled

to recover the $29,961.00 of bonus he lost as a result of Barrett

applying the new bonus calculations to the previous quarter's

income.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

"the district court has the discretion to reopen a judgment if one

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has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of

fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions." 

Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 928-29 (9th Cir.

2000); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Rule 59(e) relief is an

extraordinary remedy to be granted sparingly and with

consideration for judicial efficiency. See Kona Enters., Inc. v.

Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). "Under Rule

59(e), a motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent

highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is

presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error,

or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law." 389

Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)

(citing Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. Acands, Inc., 5

F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)).

IV. DISCUSSION

Kempf has not provided the Court with any newly discovered or

previously unavailable evidence. Nor has he cited an intervening

change in controlling law. The Court will therefore consider the

motion as an argument that the Court has committed clear error.

A. California Labor Code Section 201

Kempf asserts that "the Court has issued a specific finding

of fact that Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff $29,961.00 in wages

that Plaintiff earned during Plaintiff's former employment with

Defendant." Pl.'s Mem. at 3. Kempf does not cite any of the

enumerated findings of fact in the Court's Memorandum of Decision

because no such finding of fact exists. Rather, the Court found

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that Kempf and Barrett entered a contract (the "Agreement"); that

under the Agreement, Kempf was allowed to, and in fact did,

participate in the Barrett Branch Manager Profit Sharing Program

("PSP"); that in November 2005, Barrett retroactively changed the

terms of the PSP; and that by retroactively changing the terms,

Barrett reduced Kempf's bonus for the third quarter of 2005 by

$29,961.00. See Mem. of Decision ¶¶ 13-15, 25-29. The Court

concluded as a matter of law that the retroactive application of

the new bonus calculation was a breach of the Agreement, which

damaged Kempf in the amount of $29,961.00.

The Court must now consider whether, based on the established

facts, the retroactive adjustment to the bonus calculation also

amounted to a violation of California Labor Code section 201(a). 

Neither party has provided the Court with any guidance on this

issue beyond what was contained in the pre-trial briefing and what

was argued during trial.

The California Labor Code's protections against unpaid wages

are applicable not only to employees paid by the hour, but also to

salaried executives such as Kempf. See On-Line Power, Inc. v.

Mazur, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 698, 702 (Ct. App. 2007). It is

immaterial that a salaried employee may also have a claim for

breach of contract. See id. at 703. According to the Labor Code,

"wages" are defined to include "all amounts for labor performed by

employees of every description, whether the amount is fixed or

ascertained by the standard of time, task, piece, commission

basis, or other method of calculation." Cal. Labor Code § 200(a). 

This includes incentive-based bonuses such as the PSP. See

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Neisendorf v. Levi Strauss & Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216, 225 (Ct.

App. 2006) (stating that "bonuses are 'wages' within the meaning

of Labor Code section 200") (citing Lucian v. All States Trucking

Co., 171 Cal. Rptr. 262, 263 (Ct. App. 1981)).

Pursuant to California Labor Code section 201(a), "[i]f an

employer discharges an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at

the time of discharge are due and payable immediately." When

Barrett terminated Kempf on November 8, 2005, it owed him the full

and unadjusted amount of the third quarter bonus. Barrett did not

dispute that Kempf was due some bonus for the quarter, as it sent

him a quarterly bonus schedule and paid him the adjusted bonus. 

The only dispute is over the amount. The Court has already

determined that the retroactive adjustment reduced Kempf's bonus

by $29,961.00. The Court now concludes that, as a matter of law,

Barrett's failure to pay Kempf the unadjusted bonus at the time of

his termination was a violation of California Labor Code section

201(a). 

Kempf alleged this violation of section 201 in the Complaint. 

See Compl., Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 25-29. Kempf subsequently proved

this claim during trial. As such, the Court GRANTS Kempf's motion

with respect to section 201 and will amend the Memorandum of

Decision to reflect this.

B. California Labor Code Section 203

Section 203 imposes a penalty on employers that willfully

withhold wages due to an employee upon termination. See Cal.

Labor Code § 203. The Court previously concluded that because

Barrett put forth legitimate defenses to Kempf's claims, there was

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a good faith dispute about whether Barrett owed Kempf any

additional wages, and therefore the statutory penalty for willful

withholding was inappropriate. See Mem. of Decision at 16-17. 

Kempf now asks the Court to reverse this holding, but provides no

new evidence and points the Court to no new controlling law. Nor

does Kempf even assert that the Court committed clear error. This

is precisely the sort of rehashing of previously litigated issues

that makes Rule 59(e) practice disfavored. See Costello v. United

States, 765 F. Supp. 1003, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (noting that

"courts avoid considering Rule 59(e) motions where the grounds for

amendment are restricted to either repetitive contentions of

matters which were before the court on its prior consideration or

contentions which might have been raised prior to the challenged

judgment").

The parties addressed willfulness in their pre-trial briefing

and during trial. In fact, Kempf has reproduced the relevant

paragraph from his pre-trial brief verbatim in his brief in

support of this motion, adding nothing. Compare Pl.'s Trial Br.,

Docket No. 16, at 11, with Pl.'s Mem. at 6-7. The only authority

Kempf provides in either brief is Barnhill v. Robert Saunders &

Co., 177 Cal. Rptr. 803, 806 (Ct. App. 1981). Barnhill is of no

help to Kempf, as it acknowledges that where an employer believes

in good faith that it does not owe the employee the disputed

wages, there should be no penalty for willful withholding. See

id. at 807; see also Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d

460, 469 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing Barnhill for the proposition that

"[a] good faith belief in a legal defense will preclude a finding

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of willfulness."). Even if Barnhill did not recognize a good

faith exception where the employer has a legal defense, the court

there distinguished its facts from situations, as here, in which

the amount of wages withheld is also in dispute. See Barnhill,

177 Cal. Rptr. at 806 n.3.

The only authority Kempf cites is neither new nor helpful. 

As Kempf has not demonstrated that the Court's previous ruling

regarding willful withholding was made in error, the Court DENIES

Kempf's motion with respect to his section 203 claim.

C. California Labor Code Section 218.5

Kempf asks the Court to conclude that he is entitled to

recover reasonable attorney's fees, litigation costs, and prejudgment interest. Section 218.5 of the Labor Code provides that

"In any action brought for the nonpayment of wages . . . the court

shall award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing

party if any party to the action requests attorney's fees and

costs upon the initiation of the action." Cal. Labor Code §

218.5. Kempf requested an award of fees and costs in the

Complaint. See Compl. ¶ 29. Because the Court has now ruled that

Barrett violated section 201, Kempf is entitled to recover his 

reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

Barrett argues that Kempf's request for fees at this juncture

is "procedurally defective." Opp'n at 9. The Court disagrees. 

Kempf correctly included the request for fees and costs in the

Complaint. Upon concluding that Barrett violated section 201, it

is appropriate for the Court to also conclude that Kempf is

entitled to fees pursuant to section 218.5, as that entitlement is

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a legal conclusion. 

The Court finds Barrett's authority in support of this

procedural argument unavailing. Barrett relies on Ferrellgas,

Inc. v. American Premier Underwriters, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1160,

1163 (C.D. Cal. 1999), for the proposition that "'recovery of

attorneys' fees and costs is treated as separate and distinct from

the recovery of other elements and damages.'" See Opp'n at 9

(quoting Ferrellgas, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1163). Barrett strips the

quote entirely of its context. The court in Ferrellgas was merely

restating the basic notion that fees and costs are not part of the

claim for damages. See Ferrellgas, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1163. This

is unremarkable, as the court acknowledged that, for example, a

contract may provide for recovery of fees and costs. See id.

Nothing in Ferrellgas suggests that the Court lacks the authority

to address fees and costs concurrently with a Rule 59(e) motion. 

Barrett also relies on Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.

384, 395 (1990). Contrary to Barrett's assertion, Cooter &

Gell did not hold that motions for fees are "necessarily"

independent proceedings or that a district court cannot consider

fees concurrently with a Rule 59(e) motion. The relevant portion

of that case explained that the court may address fees as an

independent proceeding and retains jurisdiction to do so even when

the original dispute is no longer pending. See id. 

The remaining question is whether the fees Kempf seeks to

recover are in fact reasonable. "[A] court assessing attorney

fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the

'careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly

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compensation of each attorney . . . involved in the presentation

of the case.'" Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 741 (Cal. 2004)

(quoting Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1316 n.23 (Cal. 1977)). 

Kempf asks the Court to set a reasonable hourly rate of $400 per

hour for his lead counsel, Mr. Adelman, and $325 per hour for cocounsel, Ms. Mancl. See Pl.'s Mem. at 4-5.

Mr. Adelman has been out of law school and in practice for

over thirteen years. See Declaration of Alan Adelman in Support

of Accounting for Attorney's Fees and Costs ("Adelman Decl."),

Docket No. 40, ¶¶ 3-4. For the last eleven years, he has

specialized in employment-related litigation. Id. ¶ 5. Kempf

refers the Court to the Laffey Matrix as a tool for determining

the reasonable hourly rate for an attorney based on years of

experience. See Pl.'s Mem. at 5; Declaration of Elizabeth S.

Mancl in Support of Application for Attorney's Fees and Costs

("Mancl Decl."), Docket No. 41, Ex. 1. The Laffey Matrix is

designed to provide objective guidance in appropriate hourly rates

for attorneys in the Washington, D.C. area, and has been approved

by courts in that region. See Mancl Decl., Ex. 1. It has also

been recognized as a valuable tool in this district, with some

modification for economic differences between the San Francisco

Bay Area and Washington, D.C. See, e.g., Chanel, Inc. v. Doan,

No. C-05-3464 VRW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22691, at *17-19 (N.D.

Cal. March 13, 2007). According to the Laffey Matrix for 2006-

2007, the time during which counsel worked on this case, a

reasonable hourly rate for an attorney 11-19 years out law school

is $509. Mancl Decl., Ex. A. The appropriate hourly rate for an

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attorney 8-10 years out of law school is $452. 

The hourly rates Kempf seeks to recover for Mr. Adelman's and

Ms. Mancl's time are reasonable. Both rates are significantly

below the Laffey Matrix rates for attorneys of comparable

experience, and are comparable to the rates this Court has

observed in similar matters. 

The Court next considers whether the amount of time Mr.

Adelman and Ms. Mancl spent working on the case was reasonable. 

"[A]bsent circumstances rendering the award unjust, an attorney

fee award should ordinarily include compensation for all the hours

reasonably spent, including those relating solely to the fee." 

Ketchum, 17 P.3d at 742 (emphasis in original). While the Court

must carefully review the accounting for inefficient or

duplicative billing, see id., "the verified time statements of the

attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in

the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous." 

Horsford v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644,

673 (Ct. App. 2005). Although he claims to have spent

significantly more hours working on this matter, Mr. Adelman can

account for 79.0 hours. See Adelman Decl. ¶¶ 12-13, Ex. 1. Ms.

Mancl's accounting shows 35.4 hours spent on this matter. Mancl.

Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. 2. 

The Court has reviewed the documentation of hours worked by

both attorneys and finds that they are generally reasonable. 

However, the Court notes two areas of concern. First, Mr. Adelman

acknowledges that he did not keep contemporaneous records of the

hours he spent working on this matter. Adelman Decl. ¶¶ 12, 14. 

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Although he was representing Kempf on a contingent-fee basis, Mr.

Adelman clearly anticipated an attempt to recover his fees at the

end of the litigation, as evidenced by Kempf's request for fees in

the Complaint. Mr. Adelman believes the hourly figure he has

reconstructed is reasonable, and has made an effort to reduce the

bill by not including certain activities related to the early

stage of the litigation. See id. ¶¶ 14-16. The Court appreciates

this, and in the absence of a well-supported objection from

Barrett, will not adjust the total hours billed on that basis. 

However, it is the responsibility of the attorney to maintain

accurate and contemporaneous records for billing purposes, and the

Court strongly encourages Mr. Adelman to do so in the future. 

The second area of concern to the Court is the time Mr.

Adelman and Ms. Mancl spent preparing the Rule 59(e) motion and

the supporting documentation. Although, as noted above, hours

spent working on fees are generally recoverable, the Court finds

the time spent on this motion excessive. The majority of

Plaintiff's Memorandum is made up of verbatim excerpts from the

Court's Memorandum of Decision and from Kempf's previous briefing. 

The only portion of the brief demonstrating new effort is that

relating to Mr. Adelman's and Ms. Mancl's hourly rates. However,

had counsel been as diligent in briefing the legal issues

surrounding section 201(a) and presenting those issues to the

Court as they were in briefing the value of their own time, the

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3Plaintiff's Memorandum contains citations to a total of nine

cases. Of those, the only cases not presented either in

Plaintiff's Trial Brief or in the Court's Memorandum of Decision

are the five cases relating to the reasonableness of counsel's

hourly rates. The Court does not suggest that one can determine

the value of a brief solely by counting citations. That said, the

absence of reference to legal authority on the fundamental issues

of the litigation, when substantial authority exists, is

noteworthy. Kempf's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law contained no legal authority whatsoever, and his Trial Brief

cited only four cases. A more thorough presentation of the law

and, in particular, the legal theories on which Plaintiff intended

to rely, would have been appropriate at an earlier stage of the

dispute. 

13

instant motion likely would not have been necessary.3 The Court

therefore declines to award Kempf attorney's fees incurred after

trial. This results in a reduction of 13.0 hours from Mr.

Adelman's total, and a reduction of 3.0 hours from Ms. Mancl's

total. 

At the approved rate of $400 per hour, for 66.0 hours, Mr.

Adelman's total fees amount to $26,400.00. At $325 per hour for

32.4 hours, Ms. Mancl's fees total $10,530.00. Mr. Kempf is

therefore entitled to recover $36,930.00 in attorney's fees from

Barrett.

The Court has also reviewed the litigation costs and

concludes that Kempf's request for $478.46 in costs is reasonable. 

See Adelman Decl. ¶ 22. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Kempf's motion

with regard to section 218.5 with the noted adjustments, and will

amend the Memorandum of Decision and Judgment accordingly.

D. California Labor Code Section 218.6

Section 218.6 provides that a prevailing plaintiff in an

action for nonpayment of wages may recover interest from the date

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the wages were due. See Cal. Labor Code § 218.6. The appropriate

interest rate is 10% per year, as determined in California Civil

Code section 3289. See id.; Cal. Civ. Code § 3289(b). 

Kempf incorrectly calculated the interest from November 1,

2005, through September 1, 2007. See Pl.'s Mem. 2-3. The correct

starting date for the accrual of prejudgment interest is the date

Kempf was fired from Barrett, November 8, 2005, as that is the

date on which payment of all outstanding wages became due. The

correct end date for the accrual of interest is July 31, 2007, the

date on which the Court first entered judgment. At the statutory

rate of 10% per year, the prejudgment interest on Kempf's

$29,961.00 in unpaid wages amounts to $5179.56.

Having prevailed on his section 201 claim, Kempf is entitled

to prejudgment interest on the unpaid wages. The Court therefore

GRANTS Kempf's motion with respect to section 218.6, and will

amend the Memorandum of Decision and Judgment accordingly.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby GRANTS

Kempf's Motion to Alter the Court's Memorandum of Decision in

part, and DENIES the motion in part. The Court ORDERS as follows:

1. The Court AWARDS Kempf $36,930.00 in attorney's fees and

$478.46 in litigation costs, pursuant to California

Labor Code section 218.5.

2. The Court AWARDS Kempf $5179.56 in prejudgment interest

pursuant to California Labor Code section 218.6.

3. The Court will issue an Amended Memorandum of Decision

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and Amended Judgment promptly, reflecting the Court's

conclusion that Barrett violated California Labor Code

section 201(a) and including a total award of $72,549.02

for damages, interest, attorney's fees, and litigation

costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 20, 2007

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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