Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01942/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01942-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 04cv1942-WQH(RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAWN CURRAN,

Petitioner,

v.

JEANNE S. WOODFORD, Director,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 04cv1942-WQH (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS [DOC. NO. 1]

Petitioner Shawn Curran, a state prisoner proceeding pro se,

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [doc. no. 1] on

September 24, 2004. Petitioner alleges that the trial court's

evidentiary rulings during the guilt phase of his bifurcated trial

deprived him of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to

present evidence in support of his defense. (Pet. 6.) Curran

claims that on direct appeal, the state appellate court should have

applied the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), harmless

error standard to the trial court’s exclusion of evidence because

the trial court’s ruling deprived him of the best evidence

available to prove his state of mind at the time of the incident. 

(Id.)

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After reviewing the Petition, Respondent’s Answer, and the

Lodgments, this Court finds that Curran is not entitled to the

relief requested and recommends that his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be denied for the reasons outlined below.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Shawn Curran worked for Brown Bulk Transportation as the

driver of an eighteen-wheel truck and trailer weighing

approximately fifteen tons. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8,

286-89, 294-95, 298, Sept. 12, 1997.) Brown Bulk Transportation

(also known as J.B.T.) is a trucking company partially owned by

Jeffrey Brown and his father. (Id. at 284-85, 295.) The company

is located on the Pala Indian Reservation, next to the Pala Acorn

Campground. (Id. at 295.) 

Curran lived with his girlfriend, Nancy Hill (known as Nancy

Wooten at the time of the incident), and his mother. (Lodgment No.

18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 348, 351-52, Sept. 15, 1997.) Petitioner

and his girlfriend were methamphetamine users. (Id. at 353.) 

During the week of June 4, 1996, Curran and Nancy Hill moved into a

camper located on the Pala Acorn Campground. (Id. at 351-52, 368-

70.) A motorcycle rally involving two to three hundred bikers took

place on the campground the same weekend they moved into the

camper. (Id. at 368, 549-50.)

On Friday night, Petitioner and Hill used methamphetamine;

then Curran asked Hill to go with him to put gas in the eighteenwheeler, and she agreed. (Id. at 373-75.) After filling up the

truck, Petitioner told Hill he was taking her to the top of Palomar

Mountain because aliens from outer space were going to be there. 

(Id. at 373-74.) Curran drove erratically up the mountain, while

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listening to the radio for messages from the aliens and warning

Hill that if she got out of the truck the aliens would kill her. 

(Id. at 375.) Curran drove Hill around for several hours Friday

night; they did not return to the campground until Saturday

morning. (Id. at 378.)

When they returned, Hill went to take a shower. (Id. at 380-

81.) Petitioner followed her into the women’s shower area and

screamed, “What’s taking you so long? Don’t you know there’s

bikers all over the place?” (Id. at 382.) He was concerned

something would happen to her while she was taking a shower. (Id.

at 382-83.)

Later that day, Petitioner was driving erratically in the

truck yard; as a result, Jeffrey Brown fired Curran from his job. 

(Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 305-08, 310.) Curran told

Brown that living with Curran’s mother had pushed him over the edge

and that he and his girlfriend wanted to stab her. (Id. at 308.) 

Brown testified that Curran appeared to be under the influence of

methamphetamine. (Id. at 312-14.) After retrieving his belongings

from the truck, Curran left the truck yard and walked back to the

campground. (Id. at 309, 311.) Petitioner was angry and told Hill

he was going to drive the truck until it was out of gas to get back

at Brown. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.'s Tr. vol. 9, 387.)

That evening, Curran repeatedly told Hill that somebody was

digging their graves and that the bikers were going to kill them. 

(Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 394, 448-49, 462.) At

approximately 11:00 p.m. that night, Cynthia Snow and her

girlfriend were coming out of the campground bathroom when Curran

referred to them as “more of Satan’s play toys.” (Id. at 823.) 

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Earlier in the day, she saw Petitioner with a crescent wrench ducttaped to his right forearm. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 11,

829-30, Sept. 17, 1997.) Curran told Maureen Buchanan, who was

selling beer at the campground beer stand, that he was carrying the

wrench and a mallet in case somebody tried to hurt him. (Id. at

908-10.) Buchanan refused to serve Curran beer because she thought

he was high on methamphetamine and “out of control.” (Id. at 906-

08; Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 12, 1002-04, 1008-10, Sept.

18, 1997.) She explained: “[Y]ou have a certain way you act when

you’re under that, that kind of drug, and especially if you’ve been

taking it for a long period of time. You start losing, basically,

your mind.” (Id.)

As part of the motorcycle rally, a bandstand was set up for

live music performances. Hill testified that except for sitting

with Curran for ten minutes listening to the music, she stayed

inside on Saturday night reading a book, and she never approached

the bandstand. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 398-99, 449.) 

Other witnesses, however, saw her dancing near the bandstand and

“flashing” her breasts to the band members. (Lodgment No. 18,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 11, 826-27; Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 12,

1072-74.) A member of the band testified that he did not remember

seeing any girls dancing suggestively or exposing their breasts

that night. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 15, 1526-27, Sept.

23, 1997.)

A neighbor saw Curran walk to Brown’s truck lot around 1:00

a.m. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 12, 1121-22.) At the time,

it was possible to drive directly from the J.B.T. truck lot to the

campground because there were no fences or other barriers. 

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(Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 297; Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 11, 879.) At about 1:35 a.m., Petitioner drove the

eighteen-wheel truck and trailer through the campground. (Lodgment

No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 11, 832-34; Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 9, 568-69.) 

As he began to veer off the dirt road, Curran nearly hit a

woman who managed to get out of the truck’s way. (Lodgment No. 18,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 12, 1013-16, 1021; Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol.

10, 605-06, Sept. 16, 1997.) Petitioner managed to abruptly stop

the truck in front of another individual attending the biker rally,

preventing the truck from injuring him. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 15, 1539-41, Sept. 23, 1997.) Curran drove through the

campground, between a Quonset hut and the bandstand. (Lodgment No.

18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 12, 1013-16, 1021; Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 10, 605-06.)

Petitioner turned the truck and trailer around and headed

south, hitting some pickup trucks and a few motorcycles in the

process. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 10, 606-07; Lodgment

No.18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 11, 834-38.) The trailer ran over a dome

tent and into a tree. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 10, 607,

610; Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 11, 833-34; Lodgment No. 18,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 15, 1543.) Jim Flannery was inside the tent and

suffered a crushed skull, killing him instantly. (Lodgment No. 18,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 208-10.)

As Curran drove the truck through the campground, numerous

campers fired guns at him, trying to get him to stop. (Lodgment

No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 10, 604-05; Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 12, 1017-19.) When the truck was later inspected, it had a

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total of sixty-nine bullet holes. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 12, 963.) Curran finally hit a tree, backed up, ran over more

tents and a minivan, then he drove out of the campground. 

(Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 10, 607-08.)

Deputy Sheriff Steven Spoelstra was on duty nearby and heard

gunfire coming from the campground. (Id. at 642.) The deputy saw

the truck knocking over telephone poles as it drove away from the

campground. (Id. at 643.) He followed the truck for about a mile

until it pulled off the road. (Id. at 645-46.) Curran had already

left the truck by the time the officer inspected it. (Id. at 651-

52.) The officer then contacted highway patrol, requested dog

units, and sent another deputy to the campground to assess the

situation. (Id. at 652-53.)

At 5:00 a.m., Curran knocked on the door of Harold Byrd, a

homeowner in the Pala area, and asked to use Byrd’s phone to call

his mother. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 11, 751-54.) 

Initially, Byrd called Petitioner’s mother for him; but she wanted

to speak to Curran, and Byrd agreed. (Id. at 756-59, 762.) Curran

arranged to have his mother pick him up. (Id. at 761-62.)

Byrd drove Petitioner to meet his mother at a nearby

campground. (Id. at 762.) During the drive, Curran asked Byrd how

old he was, what he did 2000 years ago, and what planet he was

from. (Id. at 767-68.) Petitioner also started shaking and

bouncing up and down in his seat. (Id. at 768.) Byrd dropped

Curran off at the Four Seasons Campground at approximately 5:45

a.m. and drove home. (Id. at 770-72.)

San Diego County Sheriff’s Department deputies confronted

Curran at the campground. (Id. at 720-22.) They ordered him to

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the ground. (Id. at 724.) Curran eventually complied, but once on

the ground, he resisted arrest and it took three officers to

restrain and handcuff him. (Id. at 724-28.) Blood samples taken

from the Petitioner at 8:58 a.m. on Sunday, June 9, 1996, were

tested and contained concentrations of methamphetamine and

amphetamine. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 228-29.) Dr.

Jain, the prosecution’s expert, testified that it would take two to

three days to clear that amount of drugs from Curran’s system. 

(Id. at 235-36.) At 9:21 a.m., Petitioner was interviewed by

detectives with the sheriff’s department, and a video of the

interview was made. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 15, 146; see

Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 2, 475-97, June 9, 1996.)

The prosecution presented evidence that Curran drove the truck

through the campground out of jealousy over Hill’s flirting and

exposing herself to the band members. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 11, 891; Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 17, 1750, 1761,

1764-65, Sept. 25, 1997.) Defense counsel argued that James

Flannery’s death was “an unfortunate accidental death,” and the

prosecution did not prove its driven-by-jealousy theory. (Id. at

1780, 1784, 1786.) Curran’s attorney maintained that Petitioner

was under the influence of drugs and did not have the specific

intent to commit the crimes charged. (Id. at 1798-99.)

During the guilt phase portion of the trial, Curran relied on

testimony from two psychiatrists and one psychologist. The first

expert, psychiatrist Charles Rabiner, examined Petitioner

approximately sixteen days after the crime, while he was being held

at the George Bailey Detention Center. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 14, 1239, 1243-44, 1246, Sept. 22, 1997.) The interview

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was not tape recorded. (Id. at 1244, 1280.) The trial court

allowed the expert to give his opinion that Curran was

hallucinating and suffering from delusions at the time of the

incident, but the court excluded any specific statements Petitioner

made to the psychiatrist as hearsay. (Id. at 1249-52, 1262-63.) 

Dr. Rabiner explained that Curran’s delusions involved a belief

that people were trying to kill him. (Id. at 1322.) The

psychiatrist had reviewed Curran’s taped interview with police, but

the court did not permit him to testify about specific statements

Curran made during that interview. (Id. at 1253-54.) 

Dr. Rabiner found that Petitioner’s drug use on the night of

the crime was partly the cause of his hallucinations. (Lodgment

No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 14, 1254-55.) The expert testified Curran

suffered from bipolar disorder and was having a severe manic

episode on June 9, 1996. (Id. at 1255-60, 1264.) On crossexamination, the prosecuting attorney asked Dr. Rabiner about a

report by a “jail psychiatrist” who interviewed Curran on the same

day as Dr. Rabiner but found no major mental illness,

hallucinations, or delusions. (Id. at 1295-97.)

The defense presented a second psychiatrist, Dr. Nancy

McTigue. (Id. at 1344.) She interviewed Petitioner two months

after the incident. (Id. at 1350, 1359.) Dr. McTigue also

reviewed police reports and listened to Curran’s audiotaped

interview with police when forming her opinion. (Id. at 1351-

1354.) The court precluded her from describing post-arrest

statements Curran made during his taped police interview, but she

was able to describe his disconnected thought process and paranoia

during the interview. (Id. at 1351-56.) Dr. McTigue also stated

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that she observed fixed and paranoid delusions during her interview

with Petitioner and concluded that he was psychotic. (Id. at 1360-

65.) Again, the court excluded as hearsay the specific statements

Curran made to Dr. McTigue during that interview. (Id.)

The third expert for the defense was Dr. Katherine

DiFrancesca, a psychologist, who interviewed the defendant ten days

after the incident. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 15, 1462,

1472, Sept. 23, 1997.) The trial court sustained similar hearsay

objections during Dr. DiFrancesca’s testimony, limiting her

description of Petitioner’s delusions. (Id. at 1470, 1474, 1480.) 

Even so, she testified that Curran was “floridly psychotic” and

suffered from delusional and manic symptoms. (Id. at 1467, 1478-

79.)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Count one of the information charged Curran with murder and

alleged that he used a semi-truck as a deadly and dangerous weapon,

and he acted with the intent to inflict great bodily injury on

James Flannery in violation of California Penal Code section

187(a), section 12022(b), and section 1203.075. (Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1, 1-2, June 12, 1996.) Count two charged

Petitioner with gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated in

violation of California Penal Code section 191.5(a). (Id. at 2.) 

Count three charged Curran with assault with a deadly weapon and

with force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of

California Penal Code section 245(a)(1) and section 1192.7(c)(23). 

(Id. at 2.) Finally, count four charged Petitioner with unlawful

driving or taking of a vehicle and further alleged one prior

serious felony conviction in violation of California Penal Code

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section 10851(a), section 667(a)(b), and section 1192.7(c)(19). 

(Id. at 2-3.)

Curran pled not guilty by reason of insanity. (Lodgment No.

19, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 1, Jan. 22, 1997.) His trial was bifurcated

into a guilt phase and a sanity phase. (See Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr. vol. 3, 570, Sept. 29, 1997.) After the guilt phase,

the jury found Curran not guilty of first-degree murder but guilty

of second-degree murder with a deadly weapon used with the intent

to inflict great bodily injury. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol.

2, 285-86, Sept. 29, 1997.) The jury also found Curran guilty of

gross vehicular manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon, and

unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. (Id. at 287-89.)

At the conclusion of the sanity phase, the jury found

Petitioner sane when he committed all of the offenses. (Lodgment

No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 3, 576-77, Oct. 3, 1997.) Curran waived

jury trial on the prior allegations, and the trial judge found the

alleged prison prior and strike conviction to be true. (Id. at

577-78; Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 21, 2378, 2384, Oct. 3,

1997.)

On August 10, 1998, the trial court sentenced Curran to

fifteen years imprisonment for second-degree murder, doubled to

thirty years to life because of the strike conviction, with a

concurrent term of six years for the auto theft charge. (Lodgment

No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 3, 528, 582, Aug. 10, 1998.) The court

stayed the sentences for the gross vehicular manslaughter and

assault with great bodily injury convictions pursuant to California

Penal Code section 654. (Id. at 528.) The sentence included an

additional five years for the prior serious felony and one year for

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personal use of a deadly weapon. (Id.) Petitioner’s prison term

totaled thirty-six years to life. (Id.)

Curran filed an appeal in the California Court of Appeal

raising claims arising from the guilt, sanity, and sentencing

phases of his trial. (Id. at 529, Aug. 13, 1998.) Petitioner

asserted the trial court erred in the guilt phase by: (1)

improperly excluding as hearsay statements Curran made in

psychiatric interviews and taped interviews with the police; (2)

admitting evidence of a prior assault; (3) denying a motion to

reduce his second-degree murder conviction to manslaughter; and (4)

failing to include a unanimity jury instruction on the assault

charge. (Lodgment No. 2, Appellant’s Opening Brief 23, 36, 46, 53,

People v. Curran, No. D031737 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 1999).) 

Petitioner claimed the trial court erred in the sanity phase by

denying his motion for continuance due to his counsel’s illness and

by improperly excluding his statements in taped interviews as

hearsay. (Id. at 57, 76.) Curran also raised ineffective

assistance of counsel. (Id. at 66.) Finally, Petitioner claimed

the court erred at his sentencing hearing by finding a prior

serious felony and prior strike conviction based upon a robbery in

Missouri and by not staying the vehicle theft conviction. (Id. at

79, 86.)

The California Court of Appeal affirmed Curran’s second-degree

murder conviction and the driving or taking of a vehicle conviction

but struck the gross vehicular manslaughter conviction as a lesser

included offense of second-degree murder. (Lodgment No. 5, People

v. Curran, No. D031737, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 28,

1999).) The court reversed the assault conviction because the

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trial court failed to give a unanimity jury instruction, and the

appellate court stayed the sentence for the taking and driving of a

vehicle conviction. (Id.) It also ordered the sanity phase to be

retried because the trial judge erred by refusing to admit the tape

recording of Curran’s interview with the deputy sheriffs. (Id.) 

The same result, however, was not required for the guilt phase of

the trial.

The appellate court concluded that some of Petitioner’s

statements to his psychiatrists and to police were properly

excluded as hearsay. (Id. at 17.) But other statements about his

delusions were not hearsay because they provided circumstantial

evidence of Curran’s state of mind. (Id. at 17-19.) The court of

appeal found that at the guilt phase, the trial court’s error in

excluding the statements did not rise to constitutional error, so

it reviewed prejudice under the standard of People v. Watson, 46

Cal. 2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, 254 (Cal. 1956), rather than the

higher standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18. (Id. at 18-

19.) By applying the Watson standard, the court concluded that

although prejudice resulted from the exclusion of the statements in

the sanity phase, no prejudice occurred from the error in the guilt

phase. (Id. at 18-19, 33-34.) The appellate court granted

Petitioner a new sanity-phase trial, but he was not granted a new

guilt-phase trial because Curran was not prejudiced by the guiltphase errors. (Id. at 20, 33.)

Curran raised the same issues in his petition for review to

the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 6, Pet. for Review,

People v. Curran, No. S085773 (Cal. Mar. 29, 2000).) The court

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summarily denied his petition on March 29, 2000. (Lodgment No. 7,

People v. Curran, No. S085773, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Mar. 29, 2000).)

The case was remanded to the superior court for a new sanity

trial. In October of 2001, Petitioner waived his right to a jury

trial, and the court retried the issue of his sanity at the time of

the offenses. (Lodgment No. 8, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 86-87, Oct. 9,

2001, 129, Oct. 17, 2001.) The court found Curran was legally sane

when the crimes were committed in June of 1996. (Id. at 140-41,

Nov. 1, 2001.)

Petitioner appealed the decision to the California Court of

Appeal, alleging that the trial court applied the incorrect legal

standard for insanity and that the court’s findings were contrary

to the evidence. (Lodgment No. 9, Appellant’s Opening Brief 28,

38, People v. Curran, No. D039253 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2003).) 

The appellate court denied both of Curran’s claims and affirmed his

conviction. (Lodgment No. 12, People v. Curran, No. D039253, slip

op. at 11-12 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2003).) Petitioner filed a

petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was

denied on June 25, 2003. (Lodgment No. 13, Pet. for Review at 1,

People v. Curran, No. S115980 (Cal. June 25, 2003); Lodgment No.

14, People v. Curran, No. S115980, slip op. at 1 (Cal. June 25,

2003).)

Curran filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [doc. no. 1]

in this Court on September 24, 2004, claiming that the trial court

deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense by

excluding evidence during the guilt phase of his trial. (Pet. 6.) 

He also moved to hold his Petition in abeyance pending exhaustion

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of related state claims. (Id. at 12.) The Court granted the

motion and stayed the case until May 31, 2005 [doc. no. 6].

Petitioner requested the stay be extended due to his

difficulties in accessing the law library and a change in his

mental medications [doc. no. 11]. The Court found good cause and

granted the request, staying the case until August 8, 2005 [doc.

no. 12]. Curran filed a combined Status Report and Request for

Stay and Abeyance on July 15, 2005 [doc. no. 16]. The Court

granted the request, staying the case until December 15, 2005 [doc.

no. 17].

Petitioner submitted a Motion for Order to Obtain Work Product

and another Request for Extension of Stay and Abeyance in December

2005 [doc. nos. 18, 19]. The Court denied his motion to obtain

work product but granted the stay and abeyance until April 30,

2006, noting that Curran must file a habeas petition in state court

before that date or proceed with his Petition on the one exhausted

claim [doc. no. 20]. Petitioner renewed his request to obtain work

product and filed another request for stay and abeyance in April

2006 [doc. no. 22]. The Court denied the motion for work product

but granted a third stay and abeyance, ordering the parties to

proceed with the single issue in the Petition on July 31, 2006, if

Curran failed to file an amended petition before that date [doc.

no. 24].

Curran did not file an amended petition. Respondent was given

an extension of time to answer and filed her Answer to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus [doc. no. 26] on October 17, 2006. The Court

authorized Curran to file a Traverse by February 16, 2007 [doc. no.

28], but Petitioner did not submit a Traverse.

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”),

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006), applies to all federal habeas

petitions filed after April 24, 1996. Woodford v. Garceau, 538

U.S. 202, 204 (2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326

(1997)). AEDPA sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas

corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see also Reed v. Farley, 512

U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th

Cir. 1991). Because Curran filed his Petition on September 24,

2004, AEDPA applies to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204. 

In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the law of 

habeas corpus.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim --

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (West 2006). 

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 To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained “in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Petitioner must allege that the state court

violated his federal constitutional rights. See Reed, 512 U.S. at

347; Hernandez, 930 F.2d at 719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885

(9th Cir. 1990).

A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state

supreme court” with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court’s application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(concluding that federal courts have no authority to review a

state’s application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of state

law unless they rise to the level of a constitutional violation). 

 The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law.” Id. at 71 (citation omitted). In other words, a

federal court is not required to review the state court decision de

novo. Id. Rather, a federal court can proceed directly to the

reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id. 

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The “novelty” in § 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to ‘Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (emphasis added). Section

2254(d)(1) “explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the

font of ‘clearly established’ rules.” Id. “[A] state court

decision may not be overturned on habeas corpus review, for

example, because of a conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law.” 

Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. “[A] writ may issue only when the state

court decision is ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of,’ an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court.” 

Id.; see also Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir.

1996); Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997);

Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996).

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the trial

court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006).

IV. DISCUSSION

Curran claims his right under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to present a defense was violated during the guilt phase

of his trial when the trial court excluded his statements to the

mental health experts and a taped interview with police. (Pet. 6.) 

The California Court of Appeal found the exclusion of the evidence

was error, but after applying People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 299

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P.2d 243, the court determined the error was not prejudicial

because there was no reasonable probability that the jury would

have returned a more favorable verdict if the evidence had been

introduced. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Curran, No. D031737, slip

op. at 19.) Petitioner contends the trial court committed

constitutional error, so the appellate court should have applied

the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, harmless error test. (Pet.

6.)

The trial court prevented Petitioner’s experts from testifying

about statements Curran made during his psychiatric examinations

and during his taped interview with police. (Lodgment No. 18,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 14, 1249-54, 1262-63, 1360-64; Lodgment No. 18,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 15, 1470, 1474, 1480.) The first expert,

psychiatrist Charles Rabiner, reviewed Curran’s taped interview

with police, but he was not permitted to testify about the content

of any of Petitioner’s statements. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 14, 1253-54.) The court told the doctor: “You can’t get into

what [Curran] told you.” (Id. at 1263.) Similar rulings prevented

Dr. McTigue and Dr. DiFrancesca from testifying about the delusions

they observed during their interviews with Curran. (Lodgment No.

18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 14, 1360-64; Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol.

15, 1470, 1474, 1480.)

The California Court of Appeal examined the taped police

interview and concluded that some of Petitioner’s statements should

have been admitted. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Curran, No.

D031737, slip op. at 15-18.) It found that the trial court’s

decision to exclude evidence was an error of state law, subject to

the People v. Watson prejudice test. (Id. at 19); see People v.

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Guiton, 4 Cal. 4th 1116, 1130, 847 P.2d 45, 53, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d

365, 373 (Cal. 1993).

According to state law, Curran’s statements to police that he

thought the motorcycle group members were demons, that the bikers

were evil, communicated telepathically, and that he had died many

times, were circumstantial evidence of his state of mind and not

hearsay. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Curran, No. D031737, slip. op.

at 17-19; see Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 2, 478-79, 481-82,

484, 493.) The court of appeal concluded that the trial court

erred under California law by excluding these and similar

statements Curran made to the mental health experts. (Lodgment No.

5, People v. Curran, No. D031737, slip. op. at 18.) But the error

did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation by

depriving Curran of his due process right to present his defense. 

(Id. at 18-19.) 

“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to

reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. In

conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding

whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties

of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991)

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975)).

This Court must determine whether the state appellate court’s

finding of no constitutional error and subsequent decision to apply

the Watson prejudice standard was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. (Pet. 6); 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Curran contends “the [trial court’s] error

raised constitutional concerns,” and thus, reversal was required

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under Chapman unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. (Pet. 6); see Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.

“Incorrect state court evidentiary rulings cannot serve as a

basis for habeas relief unless federal constitutional rights are

affected.” Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir. 1990)

(quoting Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 816 (9th Cir. 1987)). In

order to warrant habeas relief, an incorrect state ruling “must be

so prejudicial as to jeopardize the defendant’s due process

rights.” Id. (citing Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994 (9th

Cir. 1985), amended on other grounds, 768 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir.

1985)). Due process requires that “criminal defendants be afforded

a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” 

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). Under federal

law, “when a hearsay statement bears persuasive assurances of

trustworthiness and is critical to the defense, the exclusion of

that statement may rise to the level of a due process violation.” 

Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Chambers

v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).

In deciding “whether the exclusion of evidence in the trial

court violated petitioner’s due process rights,” the Court must

balance the state’s interest in excluding the evidence against the

importance of the evidence to the defense. Chia, id. The state

has an interest in preserving orderly trials, in judicial

efficiency, and in excluding unreliable evidence. Id. (citing

Miller, 757 F.2d at 994). The federal courts do not question “the

power of States to exclude evidence through the application of

evidentiary rules that themselves serve interests of fairness and

reliability –- even if the defendant would prefer to see that

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evidence admitted.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)

(citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302). On the other hand, a

defendant’s right to present a defense is a fundamental

constitutional right. Chia, 360 F.3d at 1004 (citing Perry v.

Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1450-51 (9th Cir. 1983)). Due process

requires the defendant have a fair opportunity to defend against

the state’s accusations. Id. at 1003 (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at

294).

To determine whether a habeas petitioner’s due process right

to present a defense was violated by the exclusion of evidence, the

Court must balance the state interest against Petitioner’s due

process rights, applying five factors: (1) the “probative value of

the evidence on the central issue; (2) its reliability; (3) whether

it is capable of evaluation by the trier of fact; (4) whether it is

the sole evidence on the issue or merely cumulative; and (5)

whether it constitutes a major part of the attempted defense.” 

Miller, 757 F.2d at 994. The stronger the state interest, the more

critical, reliable, and highly probative the excluded evidence must

be in order to violate due process. Perry, 713 F.2d at 1452. “A

defendant must show that his interest clearly outweighs the state’s

before [a federal court] will interfere with routine [state]

procedural matters.” Id. at 1453. The federal court must place

the competing interests on the scales and ultimately decide whether

the state court’s decision to exclude the evidence was

unreasonable. Chia, 360 F.3d at 1004.

Curran’s mental condition was in dispute during the guilt

phase of the trial. Indeed, he pled not guilty by reason of

insanity. (Lodgment No. 19, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 1.) Petitioner

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wanted the jury to find that he could not have formed the intent

necessary to commit murder. His specific statements to police and

mental health experts would have been relevant to the issue because

they would have provided information about Curran’s mental state at

the time of the crime. The probative value of the excluded

evidence, therefore, weighs in favor of the Petitioner.

The interview with police was taped, and thus the tape would

provide a reliable representation of Curran’s statements. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 2, 474-97.) Curran’s out-ofcourt statements to his psychiatrists and psychologist were not

recorded, but they carry some indicia of reliability. One, the

statements were fairly detailed. Two, Curran made substantially

similar statements to the three mental health professionals and the

deputy sheriffs. Three, Nancy Hill testified about similar

statements made by Petitioner before the incident. (Lodgment No.

18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 373-75, 394, 448-49, 462.) The statements,

however, are not susceptible to easy evaluation by the trier of

fact. The prosecution and defense counsel both called expert

witnesses who evaluated Curran’s out-of-court statements in

reaching their opinions. The second and third Miller factors do

not support the admission of the statements.

The fourth factor weighs heavily in favor of a finding that

Petitioner was not deprived of due process. Evidence which is

merely cumulative or of little probative value “will almost never

outweigh the state interest in efficient judicial process.” Id. at

1453. Perry, 713 F.2d at 1453. Other evidence relating to

Petitioner’s mental state, aside from the police interview

statements and statements made to Curran’s psychiatrists and

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psychologist, was admitted at trial. His specific statements would

have been cumulative of evidence actually presented. These

statements were not the only source for determining Curran’s mental

state.

All three defense experts testified about their conclusions

that Curran was psychotic at the time of the incident. (Lodgment

No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 14, 1255-60, 1264, 1360-65; Lodgment No.

18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 15, 1467, 1478-79.) The jury also heard expert

testimony that Petitioner suffered from delusions and

hallucinations. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 14, 1249-52,

1262-63, 1360-65.) Dr. Rabiner explained that Curran’s delusions

resulted from a belief that people were trying to kill him. (Id.

at 1322.) Dr. McTigue described how Petitioner’s police interview

revealed paranoia and a disconnected thought process. (Id. at

1352-56.) The trial court instructed the jury to consider the

evidence of Curran’s mental disease, mental disorder, or mental

defect in deciding whether he had the required specific intent,

premeditated, or deliberated. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol.

17, 1834-35.)

In addition to the expert testimony, other witnesses testified

about Curran’s delusions. Nancy Hill told the jury that while he

was listening to messages from the aliens from outer space on the

radio, Petitioner drove her up Palomar Mountain to meet with them. 

(Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 373-75.) She also testified

that Curran told her many times that somebody was digging their

graves and that the bikers were going to kill them. (Id. at 448-

49.) Byrd, the man who drove Petitioner to the Four Seasons

Campground the morning after the crime, testified that Curran asked

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how old he was, what he did 2000 years ago, and what planet he was

from. (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 11, 767-79.) Other

witnesses noticed a crescent wrench taped to Petitioner’s arm,

which he carried in case somebody tried to hurt him. (Id. at 908-

10, Sept. 17, 1997.) This testimony, coupled with the experts’

conclusions, provided the jury with ample evidence of Curran’s

delusions. The jury was made aware of Petitioner’s paranoia that

others were trying to kill him and his belief in aliens, even

without hearing Curran’s specific interview statements. 

Petitioner’s statements, if admitted, would have been cumulative of

evidence already presented.

Finally, Curran’s out-of-court statements did not constitute a

major part of his defense. His mental state was put before the

jury through the testimony of his experts and others. Furthermore,

Petitioner’s counsel also argued that the death was “an unfortunate

accidental death.” (Lodgment No. 18, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 17, 1780.)

The California Court of Appeal concluded Curran was able to

present a defense because “[h]is experts testified that he was

psychotic and suffered delusions, hallucinations and paranoia at

the time of the incident.” (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Curran, No.

D031737, slip op. at 18-19 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1999).) The

defense was able to present evidence that Curran suffered from a

mental disorder, so the exclusion of his statements did not

interfere with Petitioner’s right to present a defense. (Id. at

19.) 

A petitioner must present unusually compelling circumstances

to outweigh the strong state interest in administration of its

trials. Perry, 713 F.2d at 1453. For example, in Chambers v.

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Mississippi the Court found a violation of due process because an

excluded statement was trustworthy and indicated that someone other

than the defendant committed the crime. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 288,

302. Similarly, in Chia v. Cambra, an accomplice told police that

the defendant was not involved in the crime and tried to talk him

out of going through with the plan. Chia, 360 F.3d at 1001. In

these cases, the excluded evidence would have exonerated the

defendant of the primary offense, and there were no other avenues

to prove the defendants’ stories. See Perry, 713 F.2d at 1452. 

Here, Petitioner was able to present three expert witnesses

who examined him and concluded that he was mentally ill. The

experts were allowed to testify that Curran was paranoid and afraid

that someone was trying to kill him. The hearsay evidence

overlapped other testimony at trial about the defendant’s paranoia

and delusions. The specific statements in the mental health and

police interviews, although graphic, were not critical to Curran’s

defense that he lacked the requisite intent. The nature of his

delusions was admitted through other testimony. The exclusion of

the evidence did not deprive Petitioner of his due process rights.

Therefore, the California Court of Appeal’s finding that

Curran’s constitutional right to present a defense was not violated

was not contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law. Accordingly, Curran’s

Petition should be DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the district court should DENY Curran’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

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K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\HABEAS\CURRAN1942\R&R.wpd 26 04cv1942-WQH(RBB)

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the district court and serve a copy on all parties

on or before June 18, 2007. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before June 29, 2007. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 17, 2007 ________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Hayes

All Parties of Record

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