Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00671/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00671-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kevin Glass, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Intel Corporation, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 06-671-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Presently pending before the Court is Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary

Judgment and Motion for Continuance of Trial Date (Doc. 75). Plaintiff has filed a Response

(Doc. 86) and Defendants have filed a Reply (Doc. 93). Defendants also have filed a

Supplemental Citation of Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Renewed Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 104). Plaintiff has filed a Notice of Motion and Motion for

Consolidation of Action under Rule 42, Fed.R.Civ.P. (Doc. 101) to which Defendants have

filed a Response (Doc. 103). Finally, Defendants have filed a Motion in Limine to Preclude

Testimony Regarding Dismissed Claims (Doc. 97). The Court considers the papers

submitted and issues the following Order. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Kevin Glass, filed a Complaint for injunctive relief and damages against

Intel Corporation ("Intel") on December 22, 2003 in the Central District of California.

Case 2:06-cv-00671-MHM Document 107 Filed 08/06/07 Page 1 of 9
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Plaintiff asserted several causes of action including a claim for employment retaliation for

having opposed allegedly discriminatory practices under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). While the case was

pending in California, Defendants sought summary judgment, which the California court

granted as to all claims except Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. In the court’s ruling, it found that

there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor

Malcolm Smith issued a mid-year performance update in retaliation for Plaintiff having filed

a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).

Defendants then requested and were granted a change of venue to the District of

Arizona. Defendants now seek Renewed Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s retaliation

claim. Defendants assert that the recent Supreme Court decision of Burlington Northern &

Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006), warrants this Court’s reconsideration

of the Central District of California’s summary judgment order. Because Defendants

already sought summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim when the case was pending

in the Central District of California, this Court interprets Defendants’ Renewed Motion as

a Motion for Reconsideration of the Central District of California’s Order granting in part

and denying in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 

On May 8, 2006, Plaintiff filed a second lawsuit against Intel based on similar issues

under the ADA. Since that time, Plaintiff has filed a Notice of Motion and Motion for

Consolidation of Actions under F.R.C.P., Rule 42.

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DISCUSSION

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I. RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT / MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION 

A. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants did not file their Motion within ten days of the original summary judgment

order, therefore, the Court considers Defendants’ Motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) seeking

relief from judgment or order. Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part as follows: 

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court may relieve a party or a

party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the

following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been

discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether

heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other

misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has

been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is

based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that

the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason

justifying relief from the operation of judgment. 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Motions for reconsideration are not the place for parties to make new

arguments not raised in their original briefs. See Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 252 F.Supp.2d

936, 938 (D. Ariz. 2003) (citing Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841

F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1988). Nor is it the time to ask the court to rethink what it has

already thought. Id. (citing United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1116 (D.Ariz.

1998). Accordingly, courts grant such motions only in rare circumstances. See Sullivan v.

Faras-RLS Group, Ltd., 795 F.Supp. 305, 308-09 (D.Ariz. 1992). 

B. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment is an

untimely and improper Motion for Reconsideration. Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ Motion

does not fit within any of the six provisions in Rule 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. However, 60(b)(5)

provides for relief from a judgment or order due to changed circumstances, including a

change in legislative or decisional law. Thus, in order to obtain modification of the Central

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District of California’s summary judgment ruling under Rule 60(b)(5), Defendants must

show that a significant change in the facts or the law warrants revision of the original order.

Defendants have asserted that Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 126

S.Ct. 2405 (2006), effects the outcome of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim on summary judgment.

Accordingly, the Court finds it appropriate to consider Defendants’ Motion. Plaintiff also

asserts that it is inappropriate for this Court to reconsider the ruling from the Central District

of California because the ruling came from a different court and because Defendants chose

to remove the case to this Court. 

Due to the subsequent change of venue, it is not possible for the original court to hear

the instant Motion. Though this Court finds it inappropriate to reconsider or second-guess

another court’s ruling, it still finds that reconsideration under the new Supreme Court case

is warranted. Thus, this Court’s consideration of the issue will be narrow and will only

extend to how the new Supreme Court case of Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.

v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006), may effect summary judgment of Plaintiff’s retaliation

claim. 

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show the following: (1)

that he engaged in a protected activity, (2) that he suffered an adverse employment decision,

and (3) that there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse

employment decision. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1064 (9th Cir.

2000) (citing Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also Chaboya v.

Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1093 (D. Ariz. 1999). The recent Supreme Court

decision of Burlington Northern requires a plaintiff to show “that a reasonable employee

would have found the challenged action materially adverse. . . .” Burlington Northern, 126

S.Ct. at 2415. Materially adverse actions are actions that would “dissuade[] a reasonable

worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. The Court emphasized

that “trivial harms” do not rise to the level of actionable retaliation. Id. at 2414. Individuals

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are not statutorily protected from all retaliation, rather, individuals are protected “from

retaliation that produces an injury or harm.” Id. 

The court in the Central District of California found that Plaintiff had asserted

sufficient facts in his Complaint to show a genuine issue of material fact exists to overcome

summary judgment with regard to his retaliation claim. This Court will not second-guess the

Central District of California court’s decision. This Court must consider only whether

Plaintiff has asserted that he was subjected to what a reasonable employee would have

considered as a materially adverse action sufficient to preclude summary judgment. 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s negative performance evaluations were not adverse

employment actions and, therefore, Plaintiff has not met the “materially adverse”

requirement under Burlington Northern. Plaintiff, on the other hand, asserts that in 2000, he

received a “very negative evaluation” that had been placed in his personnel file while he was

out on medical leave. Plaintiff also asserts that it is a violation of Intel rules to rank and rate

an employee while he is out on leave medical leave. Plaintiff claims that, according to Intel

rules, if an employee is reviewed while out on leave, the employee is to receive a raise.

Plaintiff states that when he returned from medical leave, he returned to a different position

at the company but received the same salary and did not receive a raise, in violation of the

company rules. This example alone is sufficiently adverse such that a reasonable person

would have found the action materially adverse.

In further support of its position, Defendants filed a Supplemental Citation of

Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. In its

Supplemental Citation of Authorities, Defendants provide three recently-decided cases that

use the new Burlington Northern test and find that the plaintiffs in those cases have not

shown “a materially adverse employment action” actionable under Burlington Northern

because the action “would not materially dissuade a reasonable employee from bringing a

charge of discrimination.” See DeHart v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. 214 Fed.

Appx. 437 (5th Cir. 2007); Toulan v. DAP Products, Inc., 2007 WL 172522 (D.Md. Jan. 17,

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2007); Owusu v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., 2006 WL 3500884 (D.Conn. Nov.

28 2006). 

None of the cases Defendants have cited are from the Ninth Circuit. Moreover,

Defendants fail to cite the Ninth Circuit case of Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 542 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2006), in which the Ninth Circuit concluded that a jury instruction stating that an adverse

action “is defined as any action that is reasonably likely to deter the plaintiff or others from

engaging in protected activity” was harmless, even in light of Burlington Northern, because

the jury instruction, as given, would have led the jury to consider whether any action was

materially adverse by a reasonable employee. In light of Freitag, the Court is not persuaded

that Burlington Northern presents as significant a change to the retaliation test as Defendants

have asserted. 

In their Reply, Defendants also argue that Plaintiff agreed in the Joint Proposed

Pretrial Order to limit the scope of his retaliation claim only to retaliation Plaintiff

experienced in a November 2003 performance message and that this characterization is

binding. 

There are two problems with Defendants’ argument. First, the Court never adopted

the parties’ Joint Proposed Pretrial Order as the order of the Court because the Court

continued the trial shortly after the parties filed the joint proposed pretrial order. Thus, the

parties' Joint Proposed Pretrial Order is not a binding order. 

Second, Defendants have asserted this argument for the first time in their Reply.

Arguments raised for the first time in a reply are generally not considered because to do so

may unfairly deprive the opposing party of the opportunity to make a meaningful response.

See, e.g., Pacific Coast Federation of Fisherman's Ass'n. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 138

F.Supp.2d 1228, 1248, n.17 (N.D. Cal. 2001). The Court therefore has not considered

Defendants’ argument regarding an assertion in the joint proposed pretrial order. 

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Defendants have not demonstrated that this Court should revise the Central District

of California’s summary judgment ruling. Accordingly, Defendants’ Renewed Motion for

Summary Judgment is denied. 

II. MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE 

A. LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Consolidate the instant case with Glass v. Intel

Corporation, No. CV 06-1404 PHX-MHM. Plaintiff asserts that consolidation is appropriate

based on the similar issues presented in both matters and in the interest of judicial efficiency.

Rule 42(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., provides that:

When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before

the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue

in the actions; it may order the actions consolidated; and it may make such

orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs

or delay. 

All claims and issues sharing common aspects of law or fact may be consolidated to

avoid unnecessary cost or delay. Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a). Consolidation is inappropriate,

however, if it leads to inefficiency, inconvenience, or unfair prejudice to a party.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b).

B. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff asserts that the two cases at issue here have a common question of law, that

being whether Defendants discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Though commonality between

the cases may exist, the Court, nevertheless, finds it inappropriate to consolidate the two

cases because of the distinct postures the cases are in. Defendants oppose consolidation due

to the varying stages the two cases are in. 

In this case, consolidation may likely lead to unreasonable delay in this action, seeing

as this case is poised to proceed to trial, whereas case CV-06-1404, is at the initial stages of

litigation. See Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 9 Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 2383 (2006) (“[A] motion under Rule 42(a) may be denied . . . if consolidation will cause

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delay in the processing of one or more of the individual cases” or “when one of the actions

has proceeded further in the discovery process than the other.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff's

Motion to Consolidate is denied. 

III. MOTION IN LIMINE

Defendants have filed a Motion in Limine to Preclude Testimony Regarding

Dismissed Claims. Defendants assert that the only remaining claim is Plaintiff’s retaliation

claim and that Plaintiff should not be permitted to elicit testimony and present evidence

supporting his claims that have been dismissed. 

Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states as follows: 

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of

time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Defendants cite the Joint Proposed Pretrial Order as binding and limiting the scope

of the claim. However, as stated above, Defendants fail to recognize that the Joint Proposed

Pretrial Order was never adopted as the order of the Court and, therefore, is not binding.

Moreover, in its Motion in Limine, Defendants state that Plaintiff’s Declaration in

Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment lists more than a hundred alleged facts,

“most, if not all, of which are completely irrelevant to the current claim.” Def.s’ Motion in

Limine at 3. However, Defendants do not specifically state nor provide examples of the

evidence Plaintiff has cited that Defendants seek to exclude as irrelevant. Without more, the

Court is not inclined to grant Defendants’ Motion in Limine. Accordingly, Defendants’

Motion in Limine is denied without prejudice to be reasserted with greater specificity. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

75) is denied.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Supplement Citation of

Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 104)

is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate Cases (Doc. 101)

is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Preclude

Testimony Regarding Dismissed Claims (Doc. 97) is denied without prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED setting this case for a Status Hearing on September 10,

2007 at 3:30 p.m. 

DATED this 3rd day of August, 2007.

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