Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02425/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02425-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEROME BORDELON,

Petitioner,

 v.

M.E. SPEARMAN,

Respondent.

 /

No. C-14-2425 TEH (PR)

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Docket No. 12

Petitioner Jerome Bordelon, a state prisoner incarcerated

at Correctional Training Facility, has filed a pro se Petition for a

Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a judgment

of conviction from Contra Costa County Superior Court asserting the

claims of (1) ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his plea

of no contest and (2) invalid use of a prior plea agreement from

1980 to enhance the sentence. Docket No. 1. Respondent has filed a

motion to dismiss the petition as untimely under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d). Petitioner filed an opposition and Respondent has filed a

reply. For the reasons stated below, Respondent’s motion to dismiss

is GRANTED. 

I

Petitoner pleaded no contest on March 2, 2006, to two

counts of child molestation, with two prior serious felony

convictions, and one prior strike. Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) at 2. 

Petitioner was sentenced to thirty years in state prison. Id. 

Petitioner did not directly appeal and the time to do so expired on

Case 3:14-cv-02425-TEH Document 21 Filed 03/04/15 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 The Court affords Petitioner application of the mailbox rule

as to all his habeas filings. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275-76

(1988) (pro se prisoner filing is dated from the date prisoner

delivers it to prison authorities). 

2

May 16, 2006, sixty days after the judgment. See Mendoza v. Carey,

449 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) (because California prisoner did

not appeal his conviction, process of direct review became final 60

days after conviction); Cal. Rule of Court 8.308(a). 

On March 20, 2013, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in

the California Supreme Court that was denied on May 15, 2013. MTD,

Ex. B.1 Petitioner filed the instant federal petition on May 14,

2014. Docket No. 1. 

II

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA), which became law on April 24, 1996, imposed for the first

time a statute of limitations on petitions for a writ of habeas

corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners

challenging noncapital state convictions or sentences must be filed

within one year of the latest of the date on which: (A) the

judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the

time passed for seeking direct review; (B) an impediment to filing

an application created by unconstitutional state action was removed,

if such action prevented the petitioner from filing; (C) the

constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court,

if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (D) the factual

predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Time during

Case 3:14-cv-02425-TEH Document 21 Filed 03/04/15 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or

other collateral review is pending is excluded from the one-year

time limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2). The one-year period generally will

run from "the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

Petitioner concedes that he filed his federal petition

beyond the one-year limitations period provided in § 2244 (d)(1)(A),

but argues that his petition is timely under § 2244(d)(1)(C).

1

Under § 2244(d)(1)(C), the one-year limitation period

starts on the date on which "the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review." In interpreting an

analogous provision for federal prisoners seeking to file under §

2255, the Supreme Court has held that the one-year limitation period

begins to run on the date on which the Court recognized the new

right being asserted, not the date on which that right was made

retroactive. See Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005).

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a later start

date of the statute of limitations due to the Supreme Court’s

decision in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), and Lafler v.

Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), which he contends established a new

constitutional rule. Frye and Lafler concerned defense counsel's

failure to communicate to defendant a formal plea offer from the

prosecution regarding a plea with favorable terms and conditions and

Case 3:14-cv-02425-TEH Document 21 Filed 03/04/15 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Even if Petitioner was entitled to a later start date, the

instant federal petition is still untimely. Lafler and Frye were

decided on March 21, 2012. Petitioner filed a petition with the

California Supreme Court on March 20, 2013. The petition was denied

4

allowing that offer to lapse. Frye, at 1410; Lafler, at 1383. The

Supreme Court found this constituted deficient performance. Id.

However, Petitioner’s claims in this petition do not

concern any failure by trial counsel to communicate a favorable plea

offer, as was the situation in Frye and Lafler. Petitioner argues

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to limit sentencing

enhancements regarding a 1980 case when negotiating his current plea

deal. 

Even assuming that Frye and Lafler were relevant to

Petitioner’s case, he would not be entitled to a later start date of

the statute of limitations. This contention has been directly

rejected by the Ninth Circuit. In Buenrostro v. United States, 697

F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit held that neither

Frye nor Lafler decided a new constitutional rule but rather applied

the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel

according to the test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 686 (1984), and extended it to the plea-bargaining context

in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). “Because the Court in Frye

and Lafler repeatedly noted its application of an established rule

to the underlying facts, these cases did not break new ground or

impose a new obligation on the State or Federal Government.” 

Buenrostro, 697 F.3d at 1140. Petitioner is not entitled to an

alternate start date of the statute of limitations under §

2244(d)(1)(C).2

 Thus, absent equitable tolling, this petition is

Case 3:14-cv-02425-TEH Document 21 Filed 03/04/15 Page 4 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

on May 15, 2013, but Petitioner did not file the instant federal

petition until May 14, 2014. Even if Petitioner had one year from the

Supreme Court decisions, he was more than a year late.

5

untimely. As discussed below, equitable tolling does not apply. 

2

Equitable tolling requires that the petitioner establish

two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.” 

Bryant v. Arizona Atty. Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citation omitted); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 648 (2010). 

The petitioner bears the burden of showing that this "extraordinary

exclusion" should apply to him. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1065 (9th Cir. 2002). The petitioner also must show that “the

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness and

that the extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a

petition on time.” Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir.

2009) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Where a prisoner fails to show “any causal

connection” between the grounds upon which he asserts a right to

equitable tolling and his inability to timely file a federal habeas

application, the equitable tolling claim will be denied. Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005). He must,

furthermore, show that his untimeliness was caused by an external

impediment and not by his own lack of diligence. Bryant, 499 F.3d

at 1061 (no equitable tolling where petitioner was not diligent in

that he failed to seek any state court relief for six years, or to

take advantage of available paralegal assistance).

Case 3:14-cv-02425-TEH Document 21 Filed 03/04/15 Page 5 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Petitioner presents brief and conclusory statements that

his petition should be found timely because he has little education

and knowledge of the law and has been manic and depressive since

2006. But Petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication and knowledge of

the law is not an extraordinary circumstance to justify equitable

tolling. See Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 952, 959 (9th Cir.

2012); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006).

Under Ninth Circuit law, Petitioner must satisfy a twopart test to be eligible for equitable tolling for mental

impairment. Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir.

2010). First, Petitioner 

must show his mental impairment was an “extraordinary

circumstance” beyond his control, by demonstrating the

impairment was so severe that either (a) petitioner was

unable rationally or factually to personally understand the

need to timely file, or (b) petitioner’s mental state

rendered him unable personally to prepare a habeas petition

and effectuate its filing. Second, the petitioner must show

diligence in pursuing the claims to the extent he could

understand them, but that the mental impairment made it

impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of

the circumstances, including reasonably available access to

assistance. 

Id. (citations and emphasis omitted). If “petitioner has made a

non-frivolous showing that he had a severe mental impairment during

the filing period,” an evidentiary hearing is appropriate to

determine whether equitable tolling applies. Id. at 1100. However,

an evidentiary hearing is not necessary “[w]here the record is amply

developed, and where it indicates that petitioner’s mental

incompetence was not so severe as to cause the untimely filing of

his habeas petition . . . notwithstanding a petitioner’s allegations

of mental incompetence.” Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773

Case 3:14-cv-02425-TEH Document 21 Filed 03/04/15 Page 6 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Based on Petitioner's failure to plead specific facts

concerning how his mental health issues caused his delay in filing the

petition and after reviewing the mental health record provided by

Respondent, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary. See Roberts, 627

F.3d at 773-73.

7

(9th Cir. 2010).

Petitioner provides no specific details on how his mental

health issues caused his delay in filing the petition. He has

failed to make a showing to warrant more than six years of tolling

pursuant to Bills. Moreover, Respondent has included Petitioner’s

mental health records and other records, and a review of these

exhibits does not demonstrate that Petitioner was unable to

rationally understand the need to timely file this case or that his

mental state rendered him unable personally to prepare a habeas

petition and effectuate its filing. Petitioner is able to advocate

on his behalf and on behalf of others using inmate appeals,

petitions and writs, and he frequently visits the law library. 

Reply, Ex. 1 at 2, 36, 141, 183-84. Thus, equitable tolling is not

warranted, and the petition is untimely by more than six years.3

III

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent’s motion to dismiss

the petition is GRANTED. Docket No. 12. Further, a certificate of

appealability will not issue because Petitioner has not made “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Petitioner has not shown that “jurists of

reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid

claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of

reason would find it debatable whether the district court was

Case 3:14-cv-02425-TEH Document 21 Filed 03/04/15 Page 7 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

478 (2000). 

A separate judgment shall be entered in favor of 

Respondent. The Clerk is directed to terminate any pending motions

as moot and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED 03/04/2015 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\TEH\HC.14\Bordelon2425.mtd.wpd

Case 3:14-cv-02425-TEH Document 21 Filed 03/04/15 Page 8 of 8