Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-02765/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-02765-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Defendants are David Clark, M.D., Cal Terhune, Anthony LaMarque, D. Holt, Jr., M. Ross,

A. Alexander, K. Greeson, M.T.A. Harrison, David Thor, M.D., and Isaac Grillo, M.D.

2

 Defendants did not file a separate motion after the court granted leave to file a motion for

reconsideration, but filed a reply to plaintiff's opposition.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS ON RECONSIDERATION—C-03-02765 RMW

SPT

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

E-FILED on: 11/14/06

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

KENNETH HOLCOMB,

Plaintiff,

v.

DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONS, CAL

TERHUNE, et al.,

Defendants.

No. C-03-02765 RMW

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

ON RECONSIDERATION

[Re Docket No. 36]

On August 29, 2006 this court granted defendants' motion for leave to file a motion for

reconsideration and setting a briefing schedule with a hearing, if any, set for October 20, 2006.1

Defendants requested that the court reconsider its March 31, 2005 Order Denying Defendants'

Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. Plaintiff filed opposition and

defendants filed a reply brief.2 The court heard oral argument on October 20, 2006. The court has

read the papers submitted by the parties and considered the argument of counsel. For the reasons set

forth below, the court DENIES defendants' motion to dismiss on reconsideration. 

Case 5:03-cv-02765-RMW Document 43 Filed 11/14/06 Page 1 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS ON RECONSIDERATION—C-03-02765 RMW

SPT 2

I. BACKGROUND

In late June 2000, plaintiff was attacked by other inmates at Salinas Valley State Prison

("SVSP") and knocked unconscious during the altercation. Third Amended Complaint ¶ 19. 

Defendants Alexander, Holt, Ross, and Greeson, correctional officers employed at SVSP, responded

to the altercation and restrained the inmates involved in the altercation; Alexander handcuffed

plaintiff despite his being unconscious. Id. ¶ 20. Holt, Alexander, and Greeson then grabbed and

lifted plaintiff, trying to force him to stand. Id. ¶ 21. After being cautioned by inmates that lifting

plaintiff may exacerbate his injuries, the three officers let plaintiff drop to the ground. Id.

Defendant Harrison, a Medical Technical Assistant, was summoned, and plaintiff was placed on a

gurney, without spinal restraints, and taken to the prison infirmary. Id. ¶ 23.

At the infirmary, plaintiff regained consciousness and complained of severe neck and back

pain, difficulty breathing, and inability to move his body below the neck. Id. ¶ 24. Defendant Clark,

a physician, examined plaintiff at the infirmary, concluded that plaintiff was faking his injuries, and

released plaintiff for reassignment to his housing unit. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff was taken by wheelchair to

his cell and dumped there without further assistance. Plaintiff, unable to move or control his bowels

and bladder, laid in his own feces and urine until the following day. Id. ¶ 26.

The following afternoon, after repeated complaints from staff and inmates, medical staff

visited plaintiff's cell. Defendant Thor, also a physician, concurred with Clark's assessment that

plaintiff was faking his injuries. Id. ¶ 27. After additional, continued complaints from plaintiff's

cellmate, plaintiff was extracted from his cell and taken to the prison health services corridor. There

plaintiff was examined by defendant Grillo, another physician. Grillo also determined that plaintiff

was faking his injuries. Id. ¶¶ 28-30. After plaintiff's repeated pleas, he was transported to Salinas

Valley Memorial Hospital on June 28, 2000. Id. ¶ 31; Schmidt Decl., Ex. 23. There, plaintiff was

diagnosed as having sustained C4-5 quadriplegia due to a fracture dislocation. Plaintiff underwent

surgery and remained at the hospital until July 14, 2000. Complaint ¶ 32. On July 14, 2000 plaintiff

was transferred to Kentfield Memorial Hospital ("Kentfield"), where he remained until April 27,

2001. Schmidt Decl., Ex. 23. On that date, plaintiff was transferred to the Acute Care Hospital at

the California State Hospital in Corcoran where he presently resides. Id.

Case 5:03-cv-02765-RMW Document 43 Filed 11/14/06 Page 2 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS ON RECONSIDERATION—C-03-02765 RMW

SPT 3

On October 25, 2000 a State Board of Control claim for damages arising from the abovedescribed incident was executed on behalf of plaintiff. An attorney from Prison Law Office acting

on behalf of plaintiff prepared a State of California Board of Control Government Claim form on

December 18, 2000. See Defs.'s Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. A.

On July 20, 2001 plaintiff filed a suit in federal court. After the state defendants moved to

dismiss, the parties stipulated to plaintiff's filing of an amended complaint. An amended complaint

was filed and on June 21, 2002 the court dismissed plaintiff's claims with leave to amend for failure

to exhaust. On July 22, 2002 plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. Defendants again moved

to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff responded that no administrative

remedies were available because defendants were obstructing his ability to file an administrative

claim with the CDC. On October 28, 2002, the court granted plaintiff an additional thirty days

within which to exhaust his administrative claims with the CDC and to file a third amended

complaint. 

On October 4, 2002, plaintiff's counsel, William Schmidt, met with plaintiff and personally

completed two 602 appeals forms with plaintiff's signature. One was apparently labeled

"emergency." Schmidt's request to make a copy of the form was denied. Schmidt asked if he could

deliver the forms to one of the appeals coordinators on staff, but was told that none were available. 

After asking to see a warden or deputy warden, Schmidt was told that they, too, were not available. 

Schmidt was then directed to place the forms in an "in box." Schmidt secured a receipt from one of

the officers on duty documenting his submission of the forms. Schmidt Decl. ¶¶ 14-16. Schmidt

then contacted the Corcoran prison multiple times after October 22, 2002 to follow-up about the

appeals. There was no record of the appeals having been filed, and prison staff was unable to locate

the appeals forms. Id. ¶ 17.

On November 1, 2002, Schmidt again traveled to the Corcoran prison to meet with plaintiff. 

When Schmidt arrived, plaintiff informed him that the two forms filed on October 4 were returned to

him on October 30 and had been screened out because they needed to be forwarded to SVSP

directly. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. The screening form was dated and stamped October 9, 2002. Id., Ex. 12. 

Schmidt and plaintiff then completed two additional 602 appeal forms, again marking one

Case 5:03-cv-02765-RMW Document 43 Filed 11/14/06 Page 3 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

 By the time of this conversation, plaintiff had already filed his third amended complaint and

his opposition to the present motion was due in three days.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS ON RECONSIDERATION—C-03-02765 RMW

SPT 4

"emergency." With the assistance of the litigation coordinator at Corcoran, the forms were sent by

fax and overnight mail to the SVSP Appeals Office. Id. ¶ 21. In a letter accompanying the appeals,

Schmidt requested that the appeals be immediately forwarded to each subsequent level of review. 

Id., Ex. 14. Schmidt contacted the litigation coordinator at SVSP on November 5 and November 6,

and was told that the appeals had been returned to plaintiff via mail. As plaintiff had received no

response by November 18, 2002, Schmidt contacted both the litigation coordinator and warden at

Corcoran regarding the appeals. On November 25, 2002, the litigation coordinator responded with a

letter indicating that no decision regarding the appeals had been received at Corcoran from SVSP as

of November 21. Id. ¶¶ 21-22.

Ultimately, on November 27, 2002, Schmidt received a facsimile from the litigation

coordinator at SVSP attaching memorandum describing the action taken on plaintiff's appeals. Id. ¶

23, Ex. 21. Plaintiff's appeals had been screened out as untimely. Id., Ex. 22. A box on the appeals

screening form was marked with an "X" next to the following statement: "The appeal exceeds 15

working days time limit, and the inmate has failed too [sic] offer a credible explanation as to why he

could/did not submit appeal within the time limit, CCR 3084.2(c), 3084.3(c)(6), & 3084.5(c) (eff.

Nov. 96)." Id. A comment field on the form includes the handwritten comment "+ 2 yrs. after

event." Id. The bottom of the form reads "This screening action may not be appealed unless you

allege the above reason is inaccurate. In such a case please return this form to the Appeals

Coordinator with the necessary information." Id. Plaintiff took no further action with respect to this

appeal. Plaintiff's counsel states that during a conversation with the SVSP appeals coordinator on

January 14, 2003,3

 the appeals coordinator confirmed that the screening action was not appealable to

a higher level. Id. ¶ 25.

Additional facts and procedural background of this action are set forth in the court's prior

orders issued February 18, 2003 (in related case number C-01-20685 RMW) (the "Feb. 18 Order")

and March 31, 2005 (the "Mar. 31 Order"). 

Case 5:03-cv-02765-RMW Document 43 Filed 11/14/06 Page 4 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS ON RECONSIDERATION—C-03-02765 RMW

SPT 5

II. ANALYSIS

Defendants initially moved to dismiss the present action arguing that plaintiff failed to

exhaust all administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Defendants argued that because plaintiff's administrative appeal was rejected as

untimely, it is procedurally defaulted and incapable of exhaustion. See Mar. 31 Order at 1:28-2:3. 

Plaintiff countered that all administrative remedies that were available to him had been exhausted. 

Relying upon Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Ngo"), the court denied defendants'

motion to dismiss. Defendants now move for reconsideration based on the Supreme Court's recent

holding in Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (June 22, 2006) ("Woodford") reversing the Ninth

Circuit's holding in Ngo and remanding the case for further proceedings. 

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Under § 1997e(a)

Defendants argue that under Woodford plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative

remedies because, essentially, "if an appeal is presented and ultimately not accepted because it is . . .

not taken within the time period stated by the state system, the claim is a procedurally defective

claim" incapable of exhaustion. See Defs.'s Reply at 8:20-22. Plaintiff does not disagree that

Woodford requires proper exhaustion of remedies. Rather, plaintiff argues that Woodford does not

stand for the proposition "that all prisoners who untimely file for any reason are forever denied

access to federal court." Opp. at 1:11-12 (emphasis in original). In support, plaintiff relies upon the

Court's reasoning and concerns in Woodford and on the specific framework of the grievance system

in California. Plaintiff's arguments appear persuasive in light of the reasoning and policy concerns

set forth in the Woodford opinion. 

The Court in Woodford observed that the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement

serves two main purposes—it protects administrative agency authority and it promotes efficiency

since claims can generally be resolved more quickly and economically in proceedings before an

agency than through litigation. Id. at 2385. The Court explained that "the benefits of exhaustion can

be realized only if the prison grievance system is given a fair opportunity to consider the grievance":

For example, a prisoner wishing to bypass available administrative remedies could

simply file a late grievance without providing any reason for failing to file on time.

If the prison then rejects the grievance as untimely, the prisoner could proceed

directly to federal court. And acceptance of the late grievance would not thwart the

Case 5:03-cv-02765-RMW Document 43 Filed 11/14/06 Page 5 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 The court's Feb. 18 Order had observed these same policy considerations, noting that

Congress's objective behind the PLRA is to reduce quantity and improve quality of prisoner suits

and Congress sought to afford correctional officials time and opportunity to address complaints

internally before allowing a prisoner to initiate a federal lawsuit. In some instances the internal

review may lead to corrective action and in others, the review may filter out frivolous claims. 

Further, for cases ultimately filed in court, adjudication could be facilitated by an administrative

record that clarifies the controversy. See Feb. 18 Order at 7 n.9 (citing Porter v. Nustle, 122 S. Ct.

983, 988 (2002)).

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS ON RECONSIDERATION—C-03-02765 RMW

SPT 6

prisoner's wish to bypass the administrative process; the prisoner could easily

achieve this by violating other procedural rules until the prison administration has

no alternative but to dismiss the grievance on procedural grounds. We are confident

that the PLRA did not create such a toothless scheme.

Id. at 2388. The Court stated, "[E]xhaustion gives an agency 'an opportunity to correct its own

mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal court,' and

discourages 'disregard of [the agency's] procedures." Id. at 2385 (citation omitted).4 Thus, the Court

made clear its concern that permitting grievances filed late without any reason would render the

PLRA exhaustion requirements toothless and allow prisoners to bypass the administrative remedies

scheme at will. Where a plaintiff has good reason for the delay or does not have the opportunity to

file a timely claim, the Court's concerns do not appear to be implicated; that is, the prisoner is not

willfully bypassing the available administrative remedies, but rather is precluded by events outside

his control from availing himself of the administrative remedies. Indeed, the Court observed that the

exhaustion requirements are designed to deal with parties who do not want to voluntarily exhaust:

Because of the advantages of administrative review, some aggrieved parties will

voluntarily exhaust all avenues of administrative review before resorting to federal

court, and for these parties an exhaustion requirement is obviously unnecessary.

***

Because exhaustion requirements are designed to deal with parties who do not want

to exhaust, administrative law creates an incentive for these parties to do what they

would otherwise prefer not to do, namely, to give the agency a fair and full

opportunity to adjudicate their claims.

Id. (citation omitted).

Here, defendants propose a stringent reading of Woodford that any procedural defect in an

appeal, such as untimeliness, results in improper exhaustion. This does not seem to comport with

the Court's reasoning and concern, as discussed above. While an absolute bar for grievances filed

late without reason (such as the grievance at issue in Woodford) would further the policies of

Case 5:03-cv-02765-RMW Document 43 Filed 11/14/06 Page 6 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS ON RECONSIDERATION—C-03-02765 RMW

SPT 7

promoting voluntary exhaustion, an absolute bar for a grievance that is untimely, but with good

reason, would seem at odds with the very purposes set forth by the Court in Woodford. 

First, as plaintiff argues, the administrative remedies framework under California law and the

DOC's own operations manual both provide mechanisms for permitting grievances that exceed the

prescribed time limits. Under California Code of Regulations § 3084.3(c)(6), an inmates' appeal

may be rejected as untimely if it is filed after the prescribed times and the appellant had the

opportunity to file within such time constraints. Therefore, the regulations distinguish those

situations where the inmate, for some reason, did not have the opportunity to file the grievance

within the specified times. Under Article 53 of the CDC's Operations Manual, the acceptance of an

appeal after the 15-day policy is within the discretion of the appeals coordinator. Jennifer Marquez

Decl. Supp. Defs.'s Reply ("Marquez Decl."), Ex. A at 1. This suggests that the appeals coordinator

may have occasion to find that an appeal, filed untimely, nevertheless should be brought before the

grievance system. Although the CDC's Operations Manual permits lapse of time to be grounds for

rejection of an appeal, it places an obligation upon the appeals coordinator to consider whether the

inmate had the opportunity to file in a timely manner:

A decision may be made to refuse acceptance of any given appeal for the following

specific reasons:

***

There has been too great a time lapse between when the action or decision occurred

and when the appeal was submitted. The appeals coordinator shall be guided by

DOM 54100.5 and, in addition, ensure that the inmate or parolee had, in fact, the

opportunity to file in a timely manner.

Marquez Decl., Ex. A at 2 (§ 54100.8.1).

Because of these express mechanisms within the administrative remedies framework,

defendants' proposition that Woodford would bar all untimely appeals as improperly exhausted

appears to go too far. In particular, such a rule would mean that an inmate whose untimely

grievance was rejected cannot seek relief from the federal courts even where there was an abuse of

discretion in rejecting the grievance for untimeliness or where the inmate had no opportunity to

timely file. The court does not read Woodford to so wholly insulate the grievance system from

judicial review in all cases of untimely appeals. Indeed, the Court observed in dicta that it had no

Case 5:03-cv-02765-RMW Document 43 Filed 11/14/06 Page 7 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS ON RECONSIDERATION—C-03-02765 RMW

SPT 8

occasion to consider situations where the prison administrators purposely apply procedural

requirements to defeat meritorious claims (or otherwise bar meaningful opportunity for prisoners to

raise meritorious grievances):

Respondent contends that requiring proper exhaustion will lead prison administrators

to devise procedural requirements that are designed to trap unwary prisoners and

thus to defeat their claims. Respondent does not contend, however, that anything like

this occurred in his case, and it is speculative that this will occur in the future.

Corrections officials concerned about maintaining order in their institutions have a

reason for creating and retaining grievance systems that provide–and that are

perceived by prisoners as providing–a meaningful opportunity for prisoners to raise

meritorious grievances. And with respect to the possibility that prisons might create

procedural requirements for the purpose of tripping up all but the most skillful

prisoners, while Congress repealed the "plain, speedy, and effective" standard, see

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (1994 ed.) (repealed 1996), we have no occasion here to

decide how such situations might be addressed.

Id. at 2392-93.

Second, as plaintiff argues, the Court in Woodford had no occasion to evaluate the rejection

of an appeal for untimeliness where the appellant did not have opportunity to file within the

prescribed limits. In Woodford, the Court recognized that in California, an inmate's appeal may be

rejected if the "[t]ime limits for submitting the appeal are exceeded and the appellant had the

opportunity to file within the prescribed time constraints." Id. at 2383 (citing Cal. Code Regs.

§ 3084.3(c)(6)) (emphasis added). There, the respondent was placed in administrative segregation

for two months for allegedly engaging in inappropriate activity in the prison chapel. 126 S. Ct. at

2383. He claimed that after he was released from segregation he was barred from participation in

certain religious activities. Id. Approximately six months later, he filed a grievance challenging the

restrictions. Id. at 2383-84. However, the inmate appeal was untimely without reason. The

grievance was rejected as untimely because it was not filed within the requisite fifteen working days

from the challenged action. Id. at 2384. The Court held that exhaustion of the administrative

remedies must be "proper." In doing so, however, the Court did not purport to set forth what

constitutes "proper" exhaustion. Rather, in holding that proper exhaustion was necessary, the

Supreme Court appeared to primarily be rejecting Ngo's argument that § 1997e(a) represented

nothing more than what Ngo termed "exhaustion simpliciter." Id.; see, e.g., id. at 2387 ("Construing

§ 1997e(a) to require proper exhaustion also fits with the general scheme of the PLRA, whereas

respondent's interpretation would turn that provision into a largely useless appendage."); id. at 2389

Case 5:03-cv-02765-RMW Document 43 Filed 11/14/06 Page 8 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 This appears inconsistent with the rejection of plaintiff's appeal as untimely. As alleged, the

appeals screening form was marked with an "X" next to a box stating: "The appeal exceeds 15

working days time limit, and the inmate has failed too [sic] offer a credible explanation as to why he

could/did not submit appeal within the time limit, CCR 3084.2(c), 3084.3(c)(6), & 3084.5(c) (eff.

Nov. 96)." Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") ¶ 23, Ex. 22. A comment field on the form has the

handwritten comment "+2 yrs. after event." Id. The bottom of the form reads "This screening action

may not be appealed unless you allege the above reason is inaccurate." Id. Plaintiff argues that

because the injuries underlying his grievance rendered him a permanent quadriplegic "in critical

condition and undergoing acute care" during the fifteen days filing period and because of the extent

of his injuries he was also incapable of filling out and submitting grievance forms without

assistance, rejection of his first level appeal was not proper. 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS ON RECONSIDERATION—C-03-02765 RMW

SPT 9

("As interpreted by respondent, § 1997e(a) would permit a prisoner to bypass deliberately and

flagrantly administrative review without any risk of sanction."). Here, plaintiff has been rendered a

permanent quadriplegic from injuries sustained in the incidents that are the subject of his

administrative appeal whereas the grievance in Woodford did not involve physical injuries. What

circumstances, if any, warrant an exception because plaintiff did not have "opportunity to file within

the prescribed time constraints" is not addressed by Woodford.

In Days v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 863, 867 (5th Cir. 2003), the Fifth Circuit recognized that

certain circumstances may warrant an exception. There, an inmate filed his initial grievance late

because the injuries to his hand giving rise to his grievance prevented him from completing the

forms within the prescribed time. His appeals were rejected as untimely at all levels. The Fifth

Circuit observed that an inmate may be excused for untimeliness where a medical condition prevents

him from physically being able to pursue his administrative remedies. The court held that

"administrative remedies are deemed unavailable when (1) an inmate's untimely filing of a grievance

is because of a physical injury and (2) the grievance system rejects the inmate's subsequent attempt

to exhaust his remedies based on the untimely filing of the grievance." Id. at 868.

Thus, even in light of Woodford, plaintiff here has exhausted his administrative remedies

because, although his appeal was untimely, the delay was excusable and caused by physical injuries

and circumstances outside of plaintiff's control. In their reply brief, defendants agree that plaintiff's

explanations of untimeliness suffices to explain why he did not file within the fifteen day time limit,

but does not suffice to explain the more than two years lapse.5

 However, there is no dispute that

plaintiff sustained serious physical injuries. Due to his injuries, he was removed from SVSP in June

2000 and transported directly to a hospital where he was diagnosed with permanent quadriplegia. 

Case 5:03-cv-02765-RMW Document 43 Filed 11/14/06 Page 9 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

 According to the California Department of Corrections Manual, "[t]he acceptance of an

appeal request beyond the 15-day policy is at the discretion of the appeals coordinator." § 54100.4. 

Plaintiff initially filed an action in federal court after his first level grievance was rejected as

untimely. In its February 18, 2003 order, this court indicated that plaintiff could proceed with his

second level appeal and provide an explanation for the untimeliness of the first level filing and that

the appeals coordinator could exercise its discretion whether to accept the appeal. Feb. 18 Order at

10. The court observed "Under the circumstances of this case, any contention of the part of the CDC

that plaintiff should have filed his administrative appeal within fifteen days of the events is patently

unreasonable." Feb. 18 Order at 9. 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS ON RECONSIDERATION—C-03-02765 RMW

SPT 10

He was never returned to SVSP. He underwent surgery and was kept in hospitals until April 2001 at

which point he was moved to an acute care facility. As a result of his injuries he is a permanent

quadriplegic and has thereafter remained a resident of the acute care facility. Although an attorney

from Prison Law Office apparently prepared a State Board of Control claim form on behalf of

plaintiff in October 2000, this fact alone does not necessarily mean plaintiff had the opportunity to

file an appeal at SVSP. Plaintiff was not located at SVSP and probably did not even know the State

Board claim was filed by an attorney voluntarily trying to protect plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that he

submitted second and third level grievances along with an explanation of the untimeliness.6 Plaintiff

argues that these were rejected without consideration of the merits on the grounds that the initial

appeal had been rejected as untimely. If plaintiff's contentions are true, there does not appear to

have been any meaningful consideration of plaintiff's explanation of the delay in appealing. 

Defendants dispute that no explanation was attached to plaintiff's second and third level appeals. 

However, as noted above, the CDC Operations Manual provides that the appeals coordinator shall

ensure that the inmate had, in fact, the opportunity to file in a timely manner when rejecting an

untimely appeal on the basis that too much time has elapsed since the action. According to

plaintiff's allegations, this does not appear to have occurred. 

The court concludes that based upon the facts as they now appear, plaintiff must be deemed

to have exhausted his administrative remedies. Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss is denied

on reconsideration.

DATED: 11/3/06

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

Case 5:03-cv-02765-RMW Document 43 Filed 11/14/06 Page 10 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS ON RECONSIDERATION—C-03-02765 RMW

SPT 11

Notice of this document has been mailed or electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiff:

William L. Schmidt bschmidt@ncinternet.net

Counsel for State Defendants:

Tom Blake tom.blake@doj.ca.gov 

Counsel for Defendant Clark:

Van Longyear longyear@lolllp.com

James M. Davis mdavis@lolllp.com 

Counsel for Defendant Grillo:

Maureen H. Loftis mloftis@glattys.com 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 11/14/06 SPT

Chambers of Judge Whyte

Case 5:03-cv-02765-RMW Document 43 Filed 11/14/06 Page 11 of 11