Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00013/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00013-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Constance L. Gyore, 

Plaintiff,

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of

Social Security Administration,

Defendant

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No. CV-07-13-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiff has filed a motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access

to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Dkt. #30. A response and reply have been filed.

Dkt. ##31-32. The Court will grant the motion.

I. Background.

An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff’s application for social security

benefits at step one of the five-step evaluation process, finding that Plaintiff’s work as a

babysitter for her daughter’s two children constituted substantial gainful employment

(“SGA”). This decision became Defendant’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied

review. Plaintiff then brought this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

The Court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and remanded the case to

Defendant for further proceedings.

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II. Discussion.

“The EAJA creates a presumption that fees will be awarded to prevailing parties.”

Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff is a prevailing party because

this matter was remanded pursuant to sentence four of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). See Dkt. ##1, 28; Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001)

(“An applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for purposes of the EAJA

if the denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of whether disability benefits

ultimately are awarded.”); Flores, 49 F.3d at 567 (“If the district court enters judgment

reversing and remanding under sentence four, then the claimant must apply for fees within

30 days of the date the judgment becomes final.”). The Court should award reasonable

attorney fees and costs under the EAJA unless Defendant shows that its position in this case

was “substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d)(1)(A); see Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258. 

A. Was Defendant’s Position Substantially Justified?

Defendant contends that an award of fees and costs is not appropriate in this case

because its position was substantially justified. Dkt. #31. Under the EAJA, “substantial

justification” means that “‘the government’s position must have a reasonable basis in law

and fact.’” Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Corbin v. Apfel,

149 F.3d 1051, 1052 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Where, as here, the ALJ’s decision was reversed on

the basis of procedural errors, the question is not whether [Defendant’s] position as to the

merits of [Plaintiff’s] disability claim was substantially justified. Rather, the relevant

question is whether [Defendant’s] decision to defend on appeal the procedural errors

committed by the ALJ was substantially justified.” Id. (emphasis in original).

The Court concludes that Defendant’s decision to defend the ALJ’s step one

determination was not substantially justified. As the Court explained in its summary

judgment order, the ALJ provided only a bare conclusion that Plaintiff’s babysitting activities

constituted “comparable worth” and failed to engage in the detailed analysis required by

SSR 83-34. Dkt. #28 at 3-4. The ALJ also failed to consider how well Plaintiff performed

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her work and whether it was done under special conditions that took her impairments into

account as required by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1573(b)-(c) and 416.973(b)-(c). Id. at 4-6.

Defendant’s “‘defense of basic and fundamental errors such as the ones in the present case’

lacked substantial justification.” Shafer, 518 F.3d at 1071-72 (quoting Corbin, 149 F.3d at

1053).

B. Is the Amount of the Requested Fee Award Reasonable? 

Plaintiff’s counsel, Eric Slepian, has filed an affidavit and an itemized statement of

fees showing that he worked 34.1 hours on this case and that the fees and costs total

$6,082.49. Dkt. #30-2 at 2-12. Defendant contends that the .8 of an hour Mr. Slepian spent

obtaining extensions of time and approximately 12 hours he spent researching and briefing

the request for an award of benefits should be deducted as unreasonable. Dkt. #31 at 4-7.

The Court disagrees. Having reviewed counsel’s affidavit and the statement of fees,

and having considered the relevant fee award factors, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424, 429-30 & n.3 (1983), the Court finds that a total of 34.1 hours was not excessive. The

Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion and award her $6,419.97 in attorney’s fees. This amount

includes $337.48 for the two hours Mr. Slepian spent preparing a reply in support of his fee

application. See Dkt. #32. 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees (Dkt. #30) is granted.

2. Plaintiff is awarded $6,419.97 in attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Equal

Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.

DATED this 29th day of May, 2008.

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