Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_98-cv-02164/USCOURTS-azd-2_98-cv-02164-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Murray Hooper,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 98-2164-PHX-SMM

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s renewed motion for leave to add Claim 16 to

his amended petition. (Dkt. 106.) In Claim 16, Petitioner alleges that his death sentence

violates the Eighth Amendment because Arizona relied upon invalid Illinois convictions in

support of two statutory aggravating circumstances. Respondents oppose the motion,

maintaining that it is futile to add Claim 16 to the amended petition. (Dkt. 111.) The Court

agrees and will deny the motion.

STANDARD FOR AMENDMENT

 A petition for habeas corpus may be amended pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 2242; see also Rule 11, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.

foll. § 2254 (providing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied to habeas

petitions to the extent the rules are not inconsistent with the habeas rules). Thus, the Court

looks to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to address a party’s motion to

amend a pleading in a habeas corpus action. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the

Case 2:98-cv-02164-SMM Document 114 Filed 06/21/07 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(1) and (F)(2) (1980), provides as follows:

F. Aggravating circumstances to be considered shall be the following:

1. The defendant has been convicted of another offense in the United States

for which under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death was

imposable. 2. The defendant was previously convicted of a felony in the

United States involving the use or threat of violence on another person.

- 2 -

N. Dist. of Cal., 134 F.3d 981, 986 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S.

680, 696 n.7 (1993)). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend “shall

be freely given when justice so requires,” and courts must review motions to amend “in light

of the strong policy permitting amendment.” Gabrielson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 785

F.2d 762, 765 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The factors which may justify denying a motion to amend are undue delay, bad faith

or dilatory motive, futility of amendment, and undue prejudice to the opposing party. Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Leave to amend may be denied based upon futility

alone. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). To assess futility, a court

necessarily evaluates whether relief may be available on the merits of proposed claims. See

Caswell v. Calderon, 363 F.3d 832, 837-39 (9th Cir. 2004) (conducting a two-part futility

analysis reviewing both exhaustion of state court remedies and the merits of the proposed

claim); see also Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1560 (10th Cir. 1994) (reviewing the

evidence presented at trial and determining it would be futile to allow the addition of a

sufficiency of the evidence claim).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner, William Bracy (deceased) and Edward McCall (deceased) were convicted

in Arizona state court of the Redmond/Phelps homicides. State v. Hooper, 145 Ariz. 538,

703 P.2d 482 (1985). At sentencing, the trial court determined Petitioner had been convicted

of a triple homicide, armed robbery and aggravated kidnapping, and sentenced to death in

Illinois in September 1981, and that such convictions established two statutory aggravating

circumstances, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(1) and (F)(2).1

 See Hooper, 145 Ariz. at 550, 703 P.2d

at 494. In addition, the trial court found three more statutory aggravating circumstances, §

Case 2:98-cv-02164-SMM Document 114 Filed 06/21/07 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(3), (F)(5) and (F)(6) (1980), provides as follows: 

3. In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave

risk of death to another person or persons in addition to the victim of the

offense. 5. The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the

receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value. 6.

The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or

depraved manner.

- 3 -

13-703(F)(3), (F) (5) and (F)(6).2 Hooper, 145 Ariz. at 550, 703 P.2d at 494. The Arizona

Supreme Court concluded that one of the aggravating circumstances, § 13-703(F)(3), did not

exist. Id.

In Claim 16 of his amended petition, Petitioner alleged that his prior convictions in

Illinois would likely be overturned because the trial judge, Thomas Maloney, was

subsequently convicted of taking bribes while trying cases, including murder cases, around

the time of Petitioner’s capital trial (Dkt. 29 at 9; Dkt. 31 at 59). See United States v.

Maloney, 71 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1995). Petitioner argued that if his Illinois convictions are

overturned, his Arizona sentence would violate the Eighth Amendment because the

sentencing court relied upon those convictions in finding the (F)(1) and (F)(2) statutory

aggravating circumstances. (Dkt. 29 at 9; Dkt. 31 at 59.)

 The Court determined that Claim 16 was unexhausted. (Dkt. 32.) In response,

Petitioner withdrew the claim, and this Court stayed his habeas petition while Petitioner

proceeded to exhaust his Eighth Amendment claim in Arizona post-conviction relief (“PCR”)

proceedings. After Petitioner filed his PCR petition, the PCR court stayed its proceedings

while Petitioner sought Illinois post-conviction relief. (Dkt. 106, Ex. C.) After more than

five years of waiting for Petitioner to complete exhaustion, this Court vacated its stay,

commenting that, if appropriate, Petitioner may move for leave to amend his habeas petition

once exhaustion of the claim in state court is concluded. (Dkt. 55.)

Subsequently, but prior to the conclusion of Illinois PCR proceedings, the Arizona

Case 2:98-cv-02164-SMM Document 114 Filed 06/21/07 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Currently, in Illinois, Petitioner has been denied PCR in the trial court and he

has appealed that denial. (Dkt. 112 at 2; Dkt 113.)

4 A.R.S. § 13-703(E) (1980) provides, in pertinent part: 

In determining whether to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment .

. . , the court shall take into account the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances included in subsections F and G of this section and shall impose

a sentence of death if the court finds one or more of the aggravating

circumstances enumerated in subsection F of this section and that there are no

mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.

- 4 -

PCR court denied relief.3 (Dkt. 106, Ex. C.) The PCR court determined:

Even if the Illinois convictions are subsequently declared invalid, there remain

two valid aggravators, § 13-703(F)(5) and (6), and no mitigators. Pursuant to

§ 13-703(E) (1982), the court was required to impose the death penalty if it

found one or more aggravating circumstances and that there were no

mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. . . .

Because [Petitioner] cannot demonstrate that the invalidity of his Illinois

convictions would probably have resulted in a sentence less than death, he has

not presented a colorable claim for relief.4

(Id.) Following this ruling, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for

review. (Id., Ex. J.) Petitioner now seeks to add Claim 16 back into his habeas petition.

DISCUSSION

Respondents contend that adding Claim 16 is futile. Citing the proposition that prior

convictions are a verity until formally vacated, see State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 287, 614

P.2d 825, 829 (1980), Respondents argue that because Petitioner’s Illinois’ convictions have

not been vacated, they continue to support the statutory aggravating circumstances found at

sentencing. (Dkt. 111 at 5.) On this basis, the Court agrees that Claim 16 is without merit

and amendment is futile.

Petitioner requests that the Court not resolve his claim on this basis because Illinois

PCR proceedings are ongoing and may still set aside his prior convictions, rendering invalid

two of his Arizona statutory aggravating circumstances. (Dkt. 106 at 8.) Due to this

possibility, the Court will review the PCR court’s alternative ruling on this claim. The PCR

court concluded that even if Petitioner’s prior Illinois convictions were to be set aside, he

would still receive the death penalty because the two remaining aggravating circumstances

Case 2:98-cv-02164-SMM Document 114 Filed 06/21/07 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

carry more weight than the mitigating circumstances presented at sentencing. (Dkt. 106, Ex.

C.) 

Petitioner contends that the alternative ruling is unconstitutional per se because the

sentencer relied upon invalid aggravating circumstances in sentencing him to death. (Dkt.

106 at 6.) Further, the alternative ruling is unconstitutional because the PCR court believed

a death sentence was required based on the remaining aggravating and mitigating

circumstances. (Dkt. 106 at 8.)

AEDPA Standard

Because this case was filed after April 24, 1996, it is governed by the AEDPA. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). AEDPA deference applies to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits; that is, any claim not resolved on the basis of a state procedural rule or bar. See

Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). Pursuant to the AEDPA, 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), Petitioner is not entitled to relief on any claim adjudicated on the merits

in state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States

To assess a habeas claim under subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the

“clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on habeas

review. “Clearly established” federal law includes the holdings of the Supreme Court at the

time of the challenged state court decision. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 365

(2000). Habeas relief cannot be granted if the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient

legal ground” on a constitutional principle advanced by a petitioner, even if lower federal

courts have decided the issue. See id. at 381. A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established federal law if it reaches a conclusion on a question of law that is counter to a

decision of the Supreme Court or if it applied the correct authority to a case involving facts

materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling Supreme Court case, but nonetheless

reached a different result. Id. at 413; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003);

Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Case 2:98-cv-02164-SMM Document 114 Filed 06/21/07 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

A state court decision amounts to an “unreasonable application” under § 2254(d)(1)

if the state court correctly identifies the governing “clearly established” legal principle from

the Supreme Court’s decisions, but then makes an objectively unreasonable application of

that principle to the facts of the petitioner’s case. See Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75. An

“objectively unreasonable” application of federal law involves more than an incorrect or even

clearly erroneous application of federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-11 (“[A] federal

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.”) 

In considering a challenge under either the “contrary to” or “unreasonable

application” prong of subsection (d)(1), state court factual determinations are presumed

correct pursuant to § 2254(e)(1) and can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.

See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004).

Controlling Supreme Court Authority

Under the AEDPA, this Court must identify the clearly established law of the

Supreme Court at the time of the applicable state court decision. See Nguyen v. Garcia, 477

F.3d 716, 722 (9th Cir. 2007). At the time of the PCR court’s ruling on Claim 16, Stringer

v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992), was the controlling standard. In Stringer, the Court

distinguished “weighing states,” in which the aggravating factors are weighed against the

mitigating circumstances to determine whether death is the appropriate sentence, from

“nonweighing states.” Id. at 231. In a weighing state, if the sentencing court weighs an

invalid aggravating circumstance, upon review a court cannot assume the sentence would

remain the same if the weight of the invalid aggravating factor is removed from “death’s side

of the scale.” Id. at 232. Rather, “only constitutional harmless-error analysis or reweighing

at the trial or appellate level suffices to guarantee that the defendant received an

individualized sentence.” Id. In Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40 (1992), a case on direct

review, the Supreme Court determined that Arizona was a weighing state and evaluated an

Arizona death sentence in which the sentencing court had weighed an invalid aggravating

Case 2:98-cv-02164-SMM Document 114 Filed 06/21/07 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

circumstance. The Court held that such an error cannot be cured unless the trial or appellate

court decides that the valid aggravating factors are weightier than the mitigating factors. Id.

at 48-49 (citing Stringer, 503 U.S. at 232).

Application of Controlling Authority

In the PCR court’s alternative ruling, the court reweighed the aggravation against the

mitigation. (Dkt. 106, Ex. C.) Regarding mitigation, the PCR court reviewed the mitigation

record presented at sentencing and discussed by the Arizona Supreme Court, “At the

sentencing hearing, defendant’s counsel argued as a mitigating circumstance that the death

penalty was immoral. Defendant’s opposition to the death penalty, however, is not a

mitigating circumstance sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.

Reviewing the record, we find no other mitigating circumstances.” (Id., citing Hooper, 145

Ariz. at 551, 703 P.2d at 495.) The court then reweighed the remaining aggravating

circumstances against the presented mitigation, “The fact that there are only two aggravators

rather than five does not affect the resulting death sentence in this case. Because the

defendant cannot demonstrate that the invalidity of his Illinois convictions would probably

have resulted in a sentence less than death, he has not presented a colorable claim for relief.”

(Dkt. 106, Ex. C.) Based on this record, the PCR court complied with Stringer; it reweighed

and concluded that the remaining aggravating evidence was weightier than the mitigation

presented at sentencing. Therefore, the death sentence was upheld and PCR relief denied.

Under the AEDPA, the state court’s reweighing and conclusion denying relief was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of Stringer.

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner’s request for amendment and opposition to a finding of futility relies on

other caselaw discussed below. Based upon Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 126 S. Ct. 884

(2006), Petitioner argues that his death sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because two

statutory aggravating circumstances rely upon invalid convictions and that the sentencer

weighed those invalid circumstances. (Dkt. 106 at 8.)

Petitioner’s Brown argument is rejected. First, at the time of the relevant state court

Case 2:98-cv-02164-SMM Document 114 Filed 06/21/07 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

decision in 2005, Brown v. Sanders had not been decided and cannot constitute clearly

established federal law under the AEDPA. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 365. 

Second, even if Brown were applicable to the state court decision, Brown only

concerns the threshold issue of whether the invalidity of an aggravating circumstance renders

a death sentence unconstitutional. The Brown Court set forth the following guideline, “An

invalidated sentencing factor (whether an eligibility factor or not) will render the sentence

unconstitutional by reason of its adding an improper element to the aggravation scale in the

weighing process unless one of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give

aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances.” 126 S. Ct. at 892. The Court

further indicated the analysis that must be undertaken for an unconstitutional sentence,

stating, “In a weighing State [such as Arizona], therefore, the sentencer’s consideration of

an invalid [aggravating circumstance] necessarily skewed its balancing of aggravators with

mitigators, and required reversal of the sentence (unless a state appellate court determined

the error was harmless or reweighed the mitigating evidence against the valid aggravating

factors).” 126 S. Ct. at 890 (further citation omitted). As supported by the Brown Court, in

response to an unconstitutional sentence, state courts have the opportunity to reweigh the

aggravating and mitigating evidence. See id. (expressing that harmless error analysis or

reweighing may be accomplished by either the state trial or appellate court). 

The state court followed Brown by removing the invalid statutory aggravators from

the sentencing calculus and then reweighing the remaining valid aggravating factors against

the mitigation evidence. After reweighing, the court upheld the death sentence. Thus,

Petitioner’s Brown argument must be rejected.

Next, Petitioner maintains that the state court automatically affirmed his death

sentence without reweighing the evidence, believing it was required to return a death

sentence if there remained valid aggravating circumstances and there was a lack of mitigation

presented at sentencing. (Dkt. 106 at 8.) Petitioner argues that such automatic affirmance

is unconstitutional because Arizona is a weighing state. (Id.)

Petitioner relies upon Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990) and Johnson v.

Case 2:98-cv-02164-SMM Document 114 Filed 06/21/07 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988), in which the Supreme Court held that, in a weighing state,

if an appellate court invalidates an aggravating circumstance, it cannot automatically affirm

a death sentence, even if there remains one or more valid aggravating circumstances. See

Clemons, 494 U.S. at 751-52; Johnson, 486 U.S. at 585-90. Rather, the court must reweigh

the aggravation evidence against the mitigation evidence or conduct a harmless error analysis

pursuant to Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See Clemons, 494 U.S. at 751-54.

As discussed above, the PCR court’s alternative ruling did not automatically

resentence Petitioner to death; rather, the court reviewed Petitioner’s sentencing proceeding.

The PCR court considered the sparse mitigation record and determined that when it weighed

the remaining two aggravating circumstances against the mitigation, the mitigation was not

sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency. (Dkt. 106, Ex. C.) 

Based on this record, Petitioner’s Clemons argument must be rejected. The PCR

court’s upholding of the death sentence was not automatic because it believed that death was

the “required” sentence but because it weighed the remaining aggravation evidence against

the mitigation evidence and determined that the mitigation was not sufficiently substantial

to warrant leniency. (Id.) 

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Petitioner’s renewed motion for leave to amend

his habeas petition to include exhausted Claim 16. (Dkt. 106.)

DATED this 21st day of June, 2007.

Case 2:98-cv-02164-SMM Document 114 Filed 06/21/07 Page 9 of 9