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Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 14, 2003 Decided August 19, 2003

No. 00-3120

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MILTON J. TAYLOR,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cr00035-01)

Elaine J. Mittleman, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Thomas J.

Tourish, Jr., and S. Elisa Poteat, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #00-3120 Document #767328 Filed: 08/19/2003 Page 1 of 15
2

Barbara J. Valliere, Kenneth W. Cowgill, and Mary-Patrice

Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, entered appearances.

Before: TATEL and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAMS,

Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Milton Taylor contends that he

was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his

attorney did not file a notice of appeal from the sentence

Taylor received after pleading guilty to a federal offense. We

conclude that Taylor’s counsel was not constitutionally ineffective under the test set forth in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528

U.S. 470 (2000), and we therefore affirm the judgment of the

district court.

I

On January 28, 1997, a federal grand jury indicted Taylor

and co-defendant Antoinette Stoddard on twelve counts of

violating federal and District of Columbia law in connection

with a scheme involving the theft of personal checks from the

mail, the creation or acquisition of false identification matching the names on the stolen checks, the forging of signatures

on the checks, and the passing of the forged checks at area

stores. Taylor and Stoddard recruited others to assist in

various aspects of the scheme, particularly in the exchange of

the checks for store merchandise.

On May 19, 1997, Taylor entered into a written agreement

to plead guilty to one count of possession of stolen mail in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708, in return for the government’s

agreement to drop the other charges and to terminate its

investigation of his activities. The agreement described the

parties’ joint understanding of which United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) would likely apply to the case, but

also recited Taylor’s understanding that he faced a maximum

sentence of five years, that ‘‘the sentence to be imposed on

him TTT [would] be determined solely by the Court,’’ and that

‘‘he [could not] withdraw his guilty plea’’ if the court imposed

a sentence greater than that provided by the guidelines.

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Plea Agreement ¶ 3 (May 19, 1997). It further noted, however, that Taylor ‘‘may have a right [to] appeal’’ the sentence.

Id. ¶ 3(c).

On the same day, the district court conducted the plea

hearing required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.

During the course of the hearing, Taylor’s counsel, Shawn

Moore, told the court that he had advised Taylor that his

‘‘preliminary calculations’’ indicated a Sentencing Guidelines

range of ten to sixteen months’ imprisonment. 5/19/97 Tr. at

21. The court then warned Taylor that it would make its own

guidelines calculations, that it alone would decide the final

sentence, and that it was not possible to predict what the

result would be. Taylor said he understood, and after completing the requirements of Rule 11, the court accepted

Taylor’s plea.

The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) prepared by

the United States Probation Office matched Moore’s guidelines calculations in all respects except one: the PSR recommended an additional four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 3B1.1(a), based on Taylor’s role as an organizer or leader of

the criminal activity involved in the scheme. Taylor filed an

objection to the report, contending that, at most, a three-level

enhancement was appropriate under § 3B1.1(b). On November 4, 1997, the district court conducted a presentence hearing at which the prosecutor informed the court that she had

eleven witnesses available to testify regarding Taylor’s role if

he truly meant to contest the issue.

The sentencing hearing was held on November 13, 1997.

In his opening statement, Moore declared the defense’s desire

to withdraw its objection to the four-level ‘‘organizer or

leader’’ enhancement. After reviewing the evidence and the

law, the court concluded that the enhancement was appropriate. It then calculated the relevant Sentencing Guidelines

range as 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment (plus time on supervised release). At that point, the court advised the parties

that the remaining issue was where within that range the

defendant should be sentenced. When given his turn to

speak, Taylor complained that it was not he but his coUSCA Case #00-3120 Document #767328 Filed: 08/19/2003 Page 3 of 15
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defendant, Stoddard, who had been the ‘‘mastermind’’ of the

scheme.

The court sentenced Taylor to 27 months’ imprisonment, to

be followed by 36 months of supervised release. After pronouncing the sentence, the court advised Taylor of his right to

appeal. Taylor then, unbidden, asked the court if he could

‘‘get an order forthwith,’’ by which he apparently meant a

direction to the U.S. Marshals to take him directly to a

federal prison without stopping at the D.C. Jail. 11/13/97 Tr.

at 30. After saying it would do what it could to accommodate

him, the court asked Taylor whether there was ‘‘[a]nything

else.’’ Id. at 32. Taylor responded that, despite suggestions

to the contrary by the government, he had never intimidated

any witnesses. After the judge assured Taylor that he had

not taken the allegations of intimidation into account in

setting the sentence, Taylor thanked the court and the hearing concluded.

Neither Taylor nor his counsel filed a notice of appeal

within the ten-day period fixed by Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 4(b)(1)(A). However, on March 16, 1998, Taylor

sent a letter to the district court, raising a number of

challenges to his conviction and sentence. In particular, he

contended that Moore had failed to honor Taylor’s request,

allegedly made immediately after the sentencing hearing, that

he file a notice of appeal on Taylor’s behalf. Taylor also

alleged that his wife had tried to contact Moore to ask him to

file an appeal, but that Moore had failed to respond to two

telephone messages that she had left with his secretary.

The district court treated Taylor’s letter as a motion to

vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The court

appointed an attorney to represent Taylor, and the attorney

supplemented Taylor’s initial letter by adding two new claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel: that Moore had failed to

investigate and pursue an entrapment defense, and that he

had been ineffective in failing to anticipate the four-level

enhancement under § 3B1.1(a). On August 14, 2000, the

district court denied those two claims. The court held that

Moore had in fact investigated a possible entrapment defense,

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but that he had rightly concluded there was no basis for such

a defense. It further held that Moore’s failure to predict the

§ 3B1.1(a) enhancement was not prejudicial because the court

itself had made clear to Taylor, before accepting his plea, that

his sentence would be determined by the court and could not

be predicted.

This left only the question of whether Moore had been

constitutionally ineffective in failing to file a notice of appeal.

The court held an evidentiary hearing on that question on

November 8, 2000. Taylor testified that before he was taken

from the courtroom after the sentencing, he had personally

asked Moore to file an appeal. Taylor’s wife testified that she

had called Moore to ask him to do the same, but that he had

not returned her messages. In contrast, Moore testified that

Taylor had never asked him to appeal and that he had never

received any messages from Taylor’s wife. The court credited Moore’s testimony. Applying Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528

U.S. 470 (2000), the court concluded that Moore had not been

constitutionally ineffective in failing to file a notice of appeal

because: Taylor had not asked Moore to file an appeal; there

was no reason to believe that a rational defendant would have

wanted to appeal; and Taylor had not otherwise demonstrated any interest in appealing.

Taylor filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s

dismissal of his § 2255 motion on November 17, 2000. We

directed the court to determine whether a certificate of

appealability should issue, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), and thereafter the district court issued a certificate with respect to

three ineffectiveness claims: (1) Moore’s failure to file a

notice of appeal; (2) Moore’s failure to pursue a possible

entrapment defense while advising Taylor to accept a plea;

and (3) Moore’s incorrect calculation of the defendant’s possible Sentencing Guidelines range when explaining the consequences of pleading guilty. Before this court, Taylor has

briefed and argued only the first claim, and has further

limited that claim to Moore’s failure to file an appeal of the

four-level enhancement of § 3B1.1(a). The defendant has not

argued the other two claims, which effectively go to the

question of whether he should be permitted to withdraw his

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plea. Taylor has adopted this strategy, we assume, because

he has little to gain and much to lose by withdrawing his plea

and submitting his case to a jury: the evidence of his guilt

appears to be overwhelming, while the plea bargain agreed to

by the government is, in the district court’s apt description, a

‘‘generous’’ one. 11/8/00 Tr. at 103.

Taylor’s briefs ask us to hold the other two claims in

abeyance, and to permit supplemental briefing if we determine that he is not entitled to a direct appeal. But those

issues were decided by the district court and are ripe for our

consideration. Accordingly, Taylor was required to raise

them in his opening brief, and his failure to do so constitutes

waiver as far as this appeal is concerned. See Anderson v.

Litscher, 281 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that when

an appellant fails to brief claims on which a certificate of

appealability has issued, those claims are waived); see also

Artis v. Greenspan, 158 F.3d 1301, 1302 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1998);

Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1996).1

 That

leaves for our consideration only the question of whether

Taylor’s counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to

file a notice of appeal from the sentence imposed by the

district court.

II

In general, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are

governed by the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under that test, a defendant claiming

ineffective assistance must show: (1) ‘‘that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’’

and (2) ‘‘that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.’’ 466 U.S. at 687–88; see Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,

57–58 (1985) (applying the Strickland framework to ineffective assistance claims in the context of guilty pleas). In Roe

v. Flores-Ortega, the Supreme Court extended Strickland to

claims of ineffective assistance based on a defense attorney’s

failure to file a notice of appeal. 528 U.S. at 476–77. Because we conclude that Taylor cannot satisfy the first prong

1 Taylor’s brief ‘‘presum[es]’’ that he may raise the two claims in

a subsequent motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Appellant’s Br. at 10.

Although we doubt that those claims survive his waiver here, that

issue is not before us.

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of the Strickland test, we need not consider the second-prong

issue of whether Taylor was prejudiced. See Strickland, 466

U.S. at 697.

Flores-Ortega directs that the first question we must examine under Strickland’s reasonableness standard is whether

the defendant instructed his attorney to file an appeal.

Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477. As the Court said, ‘‘a lawyer

who disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file

a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally

unreasonable.’’ Id. At the § 2255 evidentiary hearing, Taylor testified that after the sentencing he expressly told Moore

that he wanted to appeal; in addition, Taylor’s wife testified

that she called Moore to ask him to file the necessary papers,

leaving messages when she was unable to reach him. Moore

testified that Taylor had never told him, after the sentencing

or at any other time, that he wanted to appeal; nor did

Moore ever receive a message from Taylor’s wife.

The district judge, having heard the witnesses testify in

person, credited Moore’s version of the events. He did so

based not only on Moore’s and Taylor’s specific testimony,

but also on his opportunity to observe both of them during

the evidentiary hearing: ‘‘I have a lot of problems with Mr.

Taylor’s credibility based on my experience in this case and I

don’t have problems with Mr. Moore’s credibility.’’ 11/8/00

Tr. at 100. Moreover, the judge noted that, although he had

personally advised Taylor of his right to appeal and had given

him several opportunities to say anything he wanted, and

although Taylor ‘‘was not reticent during the course of the

sentencing proceedings, [speaking] up several times,’’ the

defendant had never mentioned an appeal. Id. at 98. On

these grounds, the court found that neither Taylor nor his

wife had asked (or attempted to ask) Moore to file an appeal.

We review ‘‘[t]he district court’s findings of fact in [this]

collateral proceeding TTT under the deferential ‘clearly erroneous’ standard,’’ United States v. Streater, 70 F.3d 1314,

1318 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and we perceive no clear error here.

Where a defendant did not instruct his attorney to appeal,

Flores-Ortega requires that we determine whether the defendant ‘‘explicitly [told] his attorney not to file an appeal,’’

USCA Case #00-3120 Document #767328 Filed: 08/19/2003 Page 7 of 15
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because if so he ‘‘cannot later complain that, by following his

instructions, his counsel performed deficiently.’’ 528 U.S. at

477. As no one contends that was the case here, we must

next ask ‘‘whether counsel in fact consulted with the defendant about an appeal.’’ Id. at 478. If he did, then ‘‘[c]ounsel

performs in a professionally unreasonable manner only by

failing to follow the defendant’s express instructions with

respect to an appeal.’’ Id. Again, there is no dispute that,

while Moore did advise Taylor in advance of the sentencing

hearing that he would have the right to appeal, counsel did

not consult with the defendant about an appeal after the

sentence was pronounced.

This brings us to the last question Flores-Ortega makes

relevant to this case: ‘‘whether counsel’s failure to consult

with the defendant itself constitutes deficient performance.’’

Id. Although the Court made clear ‘‘that the better practice

is for counsel routinely to consult with the defendant regarding the possibility of an appeal,’’ it ‘‘reject[ed] a TTT rule that

counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an

appeal.’’ Id. at 479–80. Instead, the Court said, ‘‘counsel has

a constitutionally imposed duty to consult’’ only when ‘‘there

is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would

want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous

grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant

reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in

appealing.’’ Id. We now turn to these two parts of the

Flores-Ortega test.

A

Flores-Ortega indicates that ‘‘there is reason to think TTT

that a rational defendant would want to appeal’’ where ‘‘there

are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal.’’ Id. We do not perceive any nonfrivolous grounds here. The only ground urged

in Taylor’s briefs is that the sentencing court erred in enhancing his guidelines offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 3B1.1(a). That guideline instructs the sentencing court to

increase a defendant’s offense level by four ‘‘[i]f the defendant

was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved

USCA Case #00-3120 Document #767328 Filed: 08/19/2003 Page 8 of 15
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five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.’’

U.S.S.G. MANUAL § 3B1.1(a). Based on Taylor’s admissions

to the Probation Office, the district court made findings that

put Taylor comfortably within the category of defendants to

which this guideline applies:

[H]e acknowledges that there were more than five people

involved in the scheme TTT so therefore TTT I find that

there were as required by 3B1.1 the five or more participantsTTTT And I find TTT the statements in the presentence report, many of which Mr. Taylor himself TTT

provided to the probation officer, make him an organizer,

and a leader. Looking at the application note [for]

3B1.1, he had decisionmaking authority. He recruited

some of the accomplices and he clearly controlled and

exercised authority over the others in the scheme.

Whether or not he and Miss Stoddard had an equal level

of control or whether she was his lieutenant or whether

she initiated it, clearly his activities constituted leadership of the scheme, and I think under the case law and

the application notes there doesn’t have to be a single

leader of the scheme. There can be more than one to

justify the four point upward adjustmentTTTT I find that

the four points should be added.

11/13/97 Tr. at 15–16. Taylor has not challenged any of the

district court’s factual findings. Even if he had, we would

accept those findings ‘‘unless they [were] clearly erroneous.’’

18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); see United States v. Wilson, 240 F.3d

39, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Since the court’s findings were based

on Taylor’s own admissions to the Probation Office, there is

no basis for our regarding them as error.2

Taylor suggests that the district court’s error was in applying the law to the facts, because Stoddard, not he, was the

‘‘ringleader’’ of the conspiracy. Even if true, the district

2 Taylor admitted that he had ‘‘recruited [a total of seven] individuals for participation [in the scheme], accompanied them when they

obtained fraudulent identification and went on their shopping

sprees, dictated the items to be purchased by the individuals, and

received a larger share of the profits and merchandise.’’ PSR at 37.

USCA Case #00-3120 Document #767328 Filed: 08/19/2003 Page 9 of 15
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court correctly noted that Taylor would nonetheless remain

within the compass of § 3B1.1(a). As Application Note 4 to

the guideline explains:

In distinguishing a leadership and organizational role

from one of mere management or supervision, titles such

as ‘‘kingpin’’ or ‘‘boss’’ are not controlling. Factors the

court should consider include the exercise of decision

making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices,

the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the

crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal

activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. There can, of course, be more than

one person who qualifies as a leader or organizer of a

criminal association or conspiracy.

U.S.S.G. MANUAL § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4 (emphasis added); see

Wilson, 240 F.3d at 46. We owe the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts ‘‘due deference.’’ 18 U.S.C.

§ 3742(e). Moreover, because Taylor withdrew his objection

to the application of § 3B1.1(a) during the sentencing hearing, on direct appeal we would review the court’s determination only for plain error. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52; United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). In light of Taylor’s

admissions and the text of the application note, the possibility

that we would find plain error is vanishingly small.

Nor can we conceive of any other ground upon which

Taylor might have based a sentencing appeal. And we are

not alone. When Taylor’s appellate counsel was pressed at

oral argument, she could offer no ground other than the

alleged error in applying § 3B1.1(a). She did, however,

direct us to the Supreme Court’s statement, which appears in

the section of Flores-Ortega discussing Strickland’s prejudice

prong, that ‘‘it is unfair to require an indigent, perhaps pro se,

defendant to demonstrate that his hypothetical appeal might

have had merit before any advocate has ever reviewed the

record in his case in search of potentially meritorious grounds

for appeal.’’ 528 U.S. at 486 (emphasis omitted). But that

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admonition does not apply here: the district court appointed

counsel to represent Taylor during his § 2255 proceeding,

and we appointed counsel to represent him on appeal. Yet,

despite the fact that two advocates have now reviewed the

record ‘‘in search of potentially meritorious grounds for appeal,’’ none has appeared.

Flores-Ortega also instructs that, in considering whether

counsel had a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with

the defendant about an appeal, ‘‘a highly relevant factor TTT

will be whether the conviction follows a TTT guilty plea, both

because a guilty plea reduces the scope of potentially appealable issues and because such a plea may indicate that the

defendant seeks an end to judicial proceedings.’’ Id. at 480.

Although the latter point seems to us to go more to the

second part of the Flores-Ortega test than to the first, the

former point is certainly relevant here: Taylor did plead

guilty, and that plea did in fact reduce the scope of potentially

appealable issues — to the degree that Taylor had nothing

left other than the frivolous § 3B1.1 claim discussed above.

Flores-Ortega further directs that ‘‘[e]ven in cases when the

defendant pleads guilty, the court must consider such factors

as whether the defendant received the sentence bargained for

as part of the plea and whether the plea expressly reserved

or waived some or all appeal rights.’’ Id. For reasons

considered in Part II.B, the first of these factors, whether

Taylor received the sentence for which he had bargained, is of

no assistance to him. Nor is the second factor of any help,

because while Taylor did not waive the right to appeal his

sentence, he had no nonfrivolous issue upon which to base any

such appeal.

In sum, Taylor has not proffered any ground that would

have given his counsel ‘‘reason to think TTT that a rational

defendant would want to appeal’’ the sentence that was

imposed on him. Id. Accordingly, he cannot satisfy the first

part of the Flores-Ortega test.

B

The second part of the Flores-Ortega test requires us to

determine whether ‘‘there is reason to think TTT that this

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particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that

he was interested in appealing.’’ 528 U.S. at 480. In making

that determination, we ‘‘must take into account all the information counsel knew or should have known.’’ Id. One thing

Taylor’s lawyer knew was that his client had pled guilty, thus

indicating that he sought ‘‘an end to judicial proceedings.’’

Id. Taylor asserts, however, that his counsel also knew that

he had not ‘‘received the sentence bargained for as part of the

plea.’’ Id.

But Taylor’s assertion is not quite accurate. As part of the

plea agreement, the prosecution dropped eleven charges of

forging and passing checks stolen from the mail, and pledged

not to indict Taylor on further charges that might evolve from

a still-ongoing investigation of ‘‘Treasury check forgeries and

thefts.’’ Plea Agreement ¶ 2. In exchange, Taylor agreed to

plead to a single count of theft or receipt of stolen mail, with

the ‘‘understand[ing] that the sentence to be imposed in [the]

case [would] be determined in accordance with’’ the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. ¶ 3. As Part I demonstrates, that is

exactly how Taylor’s sentence was determined. And while it

is true that his defense counsel made sentencing predictions

that failed to take into account the four-level enhancement of

§ 3B1.1(a), the district court clearly advised Taylor that it

would do its ‘‘own analysis under the guidelines,’’ that the

court would make the final decision regarding Taylor’s sentence, and that ‘‘no one knows yet what your sentence would

be.’’ 5/19/97 Tr. at 24, 28. When Taylor said that he

understood and wanted to plead guilty nonetheless, he accepted the possibility — as part of the ‘‘sentence bargained

for’’ — that the court’s guidelines calculation would differ

from that of his lawyer. See United States v. Horne, 987

F.2d 833, 837–38 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Moreover, there was still more that defense counsel knew

regarding whether Taylor was satisfied with his sentence.

The four-level enhancement for Taylor’s role in the scheme

was first recommended by the Probation Office in its PSR of

July 7, 1997. In the objections he filed to that report, Taylor

challenged the appropriateness of a four-level enhancement,

arguing that he ‘‘should be given at most a three-level enUSCA Case #00-3120 Document #767328 Filed: 08/19/2003 Page 12 of 15
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hancement.’’ PSR at 37. The difference between three and

four levels was only a three-month increase in the guidelines

range. See U.S.S.G. MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A; PSR at 20–21;

11/13/97 Tr. at 25–29. At the presentence hearing held on

November 4, the prosecutor advised the court that if Taylor

continued to contest the four-level enhancement, she would

offer eleven witnesses to testify regarding his role in the

offense. As Taylor conceded, that warning caused the defense to reevaluate its position, see 11/8/00 Tr. at 14, a logical

step since such witnesses could have persuaded the court not

only to reject Taylor’s objection but also to sentence him at

the top of the resulting guidelines range.

By the time the sentencing hearing itself commenced on

November 13, Taylor and his counsel had agreed to rescind

the objection to the four-level enhancement. At the beginning of the hearing, before the prosecutor could offer her

witnesses in support of the ‘‘organizer or leader’’ enhancement, Moore withdrew his client’s objection. See 11/13/97 Tr.

at 3 (‘‘[T]hat’s no longer a contested issue. So there’s not

going to be an evidentiary hearing or a fight about that. I

discussed that with Mr. Taylor.’’). Accordingly, when the

court thereafter pronounced Taylor’s sentence, it was indisputably within the sentencing range that Taylor and his

counsel had anticipated from the outset of the hearing, and

there was thus no reason for Moore to believe that Taylor

was dissatisfied or would want to appeal.

Nor did Taylor say anything at the sentencing hearing to

suggest that he was interested in an appeal, despite the

several opportunities the court gave him to say whatever he

wished. See id. at 22, 25, 32. Indeed, after the court

pronounced the sentence and advised Taylor of his right to

appeal, Taylor, without awaiting an invitation to speak, asked

not about an appeal but rather whether he could ‘‘get an

order forthwith’’ for transfer to a federal prison. Id. at 30.

The court said that it would try ‘‘to accommodate Mr. Taylor’s request.’’ Id. at 31. And when the court asked whether

there was ‘‘[a]nything else, Mr. Taylor,’’ the defendant again

did not respond with a question about his appeal rights, but

rather by telling the judge that he had not intimidated any

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witnesses. Id. at 32. To this, too, the court replied in a way

that left Taylor satisfied, assuring him that allegations of

obstruction had played no role in the sentence that the court

had imposed. Id. Taylor responded with a ‘‘thank you.’’ Id.

As the court later noted in rejecting Taylor’s § 2255 motion,

the defendant ‘‘was not reticent during the course of the

sentencing proceeding,’’ and it was reasonable to expect that

had he wanted to appeal he would have said so. 11/8/00 Tr.

at 98.

Taylor argues that counsel should have realized that he

wanted to appeal the § 3B1.1 determination because, prior to

the pronouncement of the sentence, he had told the court that

it was his co-defendant Stoddard, not he, who was the ‘‘mastermind’’ of the scheme. But in light of the fact that Taylor

had withdrawn his objection to the § 3B1.1(a) enhancement

just moments before, reasonable counsel would have understood that statement as Taylor’s effort to persuade the court

to sentence him at the lower end of the guidelines range,

rather than as a challenge to the calculation of the range

itself. That is particularly so because Taylor’s remark came

in response to the court’s request for comments from the

parties regarding ‘‘the appropriate sentence within [the]

range.’’ 11/13/97 Tr. at 19.

Finally, Taylor’s appellate counsel contended at oral argument that there was no need for the defendant to demonstrate an interest in appealing, because the district court

itself advised him that ‘‘Mr. Moore will file a notice of appeal

for you.’’ See id. at 30. That, counsel claims, misled Taylor

into believing that an appeal would be filed automatically and

that he therefore did not have to say anything to Moore. But

this claim relies on a selective quotation of the court’s advice

regarding Taylor’s right to file an appeal, the full recitation of

which makes such confusion appear implausible:

You may appeal this sentence and you have ten days

within which to do so. Mr. Moore will file a notice of

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appeal for you and will either represent you on appeal or

will provide you with the necessary papers so I can

appoint another lawyer for you if [you] want to appeal it.

Id. (emphasis added). In short, the court advised Taylor that

Moore would file an appeal for him if he wanted to appeal,

not that Moore would file one automatically.

We therefore conclude that ‘‘this particular defendant’’ did

not ‘‘reasonably demonstrat[e] to counsel that he was interested in appealing,’’ Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480, and he is

thus unable to satisfy the second part of the Flores-Ortega

test.

III

Like the Supreme Court, we believe ‘‘that the better practice is for counsel routinely to consult with the defendant

regarding the possibility of an appeal,’’ and we exhort all

defense counsel in this circuit to follow that practice. FloresOrtega, 528 U.S. at 479. Flores-Ortega makes clear, however,

that such consultation is not constitutionally required in all

cases, and this case plainly is one of those in which there was

no ‘‘constitutionally imposed duty to consult.’’ Id. at 480.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

USCA Case #00-3120 Document #767328 Filed: 08/19/2003 Page 15 of 15