Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07793/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07793-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Docket No. 14. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARLON CRUMP,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO and

TENDERLOIN HOUSING CLINIC, 

Defendants. /

No. C06-7793 MJJ

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant City of San Francisco (“City”) and Defendant Tenderloin

Housing Clinic’s (“Clinic”) (collectively “Defendants”) Motions to Dismiss.1 Pro se Plaintiff

Marlon Crump (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motions. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS

Defendant Clinic’s motion to dismiss and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant City’s

motion to dismiss.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The material allegations taken from Plaintiff’s operative complaint are as follows.

On October 7, 2005, at approximately 11:50 p.m., two San Francisco police officers entered

the All Star Hotel (“Hotel”), which is managed by Defendant Clinic. (Complaint (“Compl.”) at ¶ 1.) 

The officers, Defendants Angel Lozano and Raymond Lee (collectively “Officers”), told the resident

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Witnesses to the robbery described the suspect as a black male in his sixties, with a salt and pepper moustache.

(Compl. at ¶ 13.) Further, the suspect stood approximately 5'8"-5'9", wore a leather jacket that came down mid-thigh, and

tan pants. (Id.) Plaintiff was twenty-seven years old, did not have grey streaks in his moustache, and stood 6'3" tall. (Id.

at ¶ 14.) 

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manager on duty, Robert Williams (“Williams”), that they were in hot pursuit of a robbery suspect. 

(Id. at ¶ ¶ 1, 2.) The Officers described the robbery suspect as a tall black man wearing a long

leather coat and they inquired if Williams had seen anyone matching that description.2

 (Id. at ¶ 2.) 

Williams confirmed the description as that of a tenant, Plaintiff Marlon Crump. (Id. at ¶ 3.) 

The Officers demanded that Williams provide them with the location and a spare key to

Plaintiff’s room. (Id.) Williams told the Officers that he could not provide them with Plaintiff’s

room key, unless they were in hot pursuit or could produce a valid warrant. (Id.) The Officers

continued to demand a key to Plaintiff’s room. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Subsequently, Williams made an

emergency phone call to the general manager of Defendant Clinic, Melissa Bray (“Bray”), seeking

authorization to provide the Officers with a key. (Id.) Bray authorized Williams to provide the

Officers with a key to Plaintiff’s apartment. (Id.) The Officers, now joined by additional officers

from the Mission District Station, proceeded to Plaintiff’s apartment. (Id. at ¶ 4.) 

Meanwhile, Plaintiff was sitting in his room watching television and preparing to go to the

local supermarket. (Id.) Suddenly, Plaintiff saw his door lock click open and he jumped up in

fright. (Id.) The Officers entered Plaintiff’s room with guns drawn and ordered him onto the floor. 

(Id. at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff complied with their orders and the Officers handcuffed him prior to taking him

down the hallway, through the entrance of the building. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Subsequently, Plaintiff was

seated on the front steps of the Hotel and questioned as to his whereabouts that evening, the length

of his residency at the Hotel, and his occupation. (Id.) 

Approximately ten minutes later, a squad car carrying a witness to the robbery drove up to

the Hotel to verify if Plaintiff was the robbery suspect. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff was ordered to face

four different directions with his long leather overcoat draped over his shoulders. (Id.) Ten minutes

later, another squad car containing a second witness to the robbery drove past the Hotel to confirm

whether Plaintiff was indeed the robbery suspect. (Id.) Both witnesses stated that Plaintiff was not

the robbery suspect. (Id.) Subsequently, Plaintiff was released from custody and Officers returned

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Although Plaintiff does not expressly state that his claim arises under section 1983, Plaintiff’s allegations of

deprivation of rights protected under the Constitution are actionable only through that statute. See, e.g., Robins v. Harum,

773 F.2d 1004, 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, rather than dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction, the Court will

analyze Plaintiff’s claim as a section 1983 claim.

4

See also Compl. at ¶ ¶ 2, 10, 51, 52, 53.

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See also Id. at ¶ 53.

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See also Id. at ¶ 34.

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See also Id. at ¶ ¶ 2, 5, 10, 52.

8

See also Id. at ¶ 5.

9

See also Id. at ¶ ¶ 21, 22.

10See also Id. at ¶ ¶ 34, 38, 54. 

11San Francisco County Superior Court, Case No. 05-446393 (filed Nov. 4, 2005).

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the spare apartment key. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims that his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when

Williams gave the Officers a key to Plaintiff’s apartment, and when Officers entered the apartment

without a warrant. (Compl. at p. 1; Plaintiff’s Demand for Injunctive Relief, General Damages, and

Punitive Damages (“Demand”) at ¶ 1.) Plaintiff has brought the present suit under 42 U.S.C. §

1983.3

 During a hearing on Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff stated his claims to be the following. As

to Defendant Clinic, Plaintiff asserts federal claims for civil rights violations under section 19834

and state law claims for a violation of “tenants rights”5 and “emotional distress.”6 As to Defendant

City, Plaintiff asserts federal claims for civil rights violations under section 19837 and state law

claims for unlawful entry,8

 false imprisonment,9 and infliction of emotional distress.10 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 On November 4, 2005, Plaintiff filed his first complaint against Defendant Clinic in the

Superior Court of California for the City and County of San Francisco (“Superior Court”), Civil

Division regarding the events of October 7, 2005.11 (Compl. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff failed to attend the

hearing on Defendant Clinic’s demurrer, which was sustained and, subsequently, judgement was

entered against Plaintiff with prejudice. (Declaration of Carol L. Healey (“Healey Dec.”) at ¶ 3.) 

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Clinic based on the same facts in the Superior

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12San Francisco County Superior Court, Small Claims Division, Case No. 818225.

13San Francisco County Superior Court, Case No. 06-456881 (filed Oct. 11, 2006). Plaintiff included 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 as grounds for relief in his second claim before the Superior Court. Id.

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Court, Small Claims Division.12 (Compl. at ¶ 27.) Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed with

prejudice. (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff then filed a second suit against Defendant Clinic in the Superior

Court, Civil Division based upon the same facts and allegations raised in his first two suits.13 (Id. ¶¶ 

29, 30.) Plaintiff again failed to respond to the demurrer filed by Defendant Clinic and he did not

appear at a hearing on the motion. (Id. ¶ 31.) The court entered judgment for Defendant Clinic

dismissing the complaint with prejudice and declared Plaintiff a vexatious litigant, pursuant to

motion by Defendant Clinic. (Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff was also required to post a $3,000 bond before

filing further causes of action on the same facts. (Id.) Defendant City was not a party to any of the

prior actions filed by Plaintiff in Superior Court. 

A short summary of Defendants’ arguments are as follows. Defendant Clinic claims that this

Court should dismiss this suit because: (1) Plaintiff filed three prior law suits alleging the same

causes of action and, therefore, all of Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (2)

Defendant Clinic was a private party and, accordingly, was not an agent of the state for liability

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) Defendant Clinic was privileged to assist officers in furtherance of

their duties. Defendant City avers that: (1) Plaintiff’s state law claims are untimely under the CTCA

because he failed to file a complaint within the six-month statute of limitations; and (2) Plaintiff’s

section 1983 claims are improper because he failed to identify a particular unconstitutional policy of

Defendant City for municipality liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services 

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of a claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the focus of a

12(b)(6) motion is on the legal sufficiency, rather than the substantive merits of a claim, the Court

ordinarily limits its review to the face of the complaint. See Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network,

Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). Generally, dismissal is proper only when the plaintiff has

failed to assert a cognizable legal theory or failed to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal

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14Because this Court Grants Defendant Clinic’s motion on the doctrine of res judicata, the Court need not determine

whether Defendant Clinic was privileged to assist the Officers in their entry of Plaintiff’s apartment or whether Defendant

Clinic was a state actor for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

15Defendant Clinic requests this Court to take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s prior Superior Court documents pertaining

to the prior suits filed against Defendant Clinic. Under Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 201, a court may take judicial notice

of “matters of public record.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). Judicially noticed facts “often

consist of . . . prior court proceedings . . .” Del Puerto Water District v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1224,

1232 (E.D. Cal. 2003). The Court accordingly takes judicial notice of these court documents.

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theory. See SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 782 (9th Cir.

1996); Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); Robertson v. Dean

Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). Further, dismissal is appropriate only if it

appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of a claim. See

Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the

Court accepts the plaintiff’s material allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). 

ANALYSIS

I. Defendant Tenderloin Housing Clinic

Defendant Clinic alleges three distinct grounds for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 

Defendant Clinic claims that this Court should dismiss this suit because: (1) Plaintiff filed three prior

law suits alleging the same causes of action and, therefore, all of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the

doctrine of res judicata; (2) Defendant Clinic was a private party and, accordingly, was not an agent

of the state for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) Defendant Clinic was privileged to assist

officers in furtherance of their duties.14 

 In support of its res judicata argument, Defendant Clinic argues that Plaintiff filed three prior

complaints in California state court alleging the same causes of action, involving the same parties,

and requesting the same relief.15 Thus, the present action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 

Plaintiff claims that the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable to the present case because he was

never given a chance to present an oral argument in the prior suits and his theories for relief in the

present case are not entirely identical to those alleged before the Superior Court.

A challenge based on res judicata grounds may be properly raised in a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 253 (2d. Cir. 1994); Scott

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v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984). Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final

judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privities based on the same cause of

action. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979). A person may be precluded from pursuing a

claim if a prior party so closely represented his legal interests as to be his virtual representative. See

Nordhorn v. Ladish Co., Inc., 9 F.3d 1402 (9th Cir. 1993); Bechtel Petro., Inc. v. Webster, 636 F.

Supp. 486, 498 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Specifically, a federal action may be barred by the doctrine of res

judicata where an earlier lawsuit: (1) involved the same claim as the present suit; (2) reached a final

judgment on the merits; and (3) involved the same parties or their privies. See Blonder-Tongue

Laboratories v. Univ. Of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323-324 (1971). “[R]es judicata bars not only all

claims that were actually litigated, but also all claims that ‘could have been asserted’ in the prior

action.” Int’l Union of Operating Engineers-Employers Constr. Indus. Pension, Welfare and

Training Trust Funds v. Karr, 994 F.2d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing McClain v. Apodaca, 793

F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1986)). Likewise, “[r]es judicata bars all grounds for recovery that could

have been asserted, whether they were or not, in a prior suit between the same parties on the same

cause of action.” Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., 966 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir. 1992). “One major

function of claim preclusion is to force a plaintiff to explore all the facts, develop all the theories,

and demand all the remedies in the first suit.” 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and

Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4408 (2006).

The Ninth Circuit considers four factors in determining whether successive claims constitute

the same cause of action: (1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be

destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same

evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same

right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts. Int'l Union

of Operating Engineers-Employers, 994 F.2d at 1429 (citing Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681

F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982)). These factors, however, are “tools of analysis, not

requirements.” Id. at 1430 (citing Derish v. San Mateo-Burlingame Bd. of Realtors, 724 F.2d 1347,

1349 (9th Cir. 1983)). For example, the Ninth Circuit has previously applied the doctrine of res

judicata solely on the ground that the two claims arose out of the same transaction, without reaching

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16San Francisco County Superior Court, Case No. 06-456881 (filed Oct. 11, 2006). Plaintiff included 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 as grounds for relief in his second complaint before the Superior Court. Id.

17Plaintiff states that he failed to file oppositions and attend the hearings on the demurrers because he was

preoccupied with weekly meetings to address his post-traumatic stress disorder. Compl. at ¶ 33.

18Federal courts apply the doctrine of res judicata to a state court judgment to the same extent that courts of that state

would apply the doctrine. Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 759 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1985); Moore v. City of Costa Mesa,

678 F. Supp. 1448, 1450 (C.D. Cal. 1987). Under California law, a superior court judgment on an order sustaining a demurrer

without leave to amend is a final judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata analysis. Crowley v. Modern Faucet

Manufacturing, 44 Cal. 2d 321, 323 (1955). See also Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass’n v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362,

364 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that in California, a demurrer without leave to amend is always a final judgment on the

merits, and when a court finds that the facts alleged do not establish a cause of action, res judicata applies). “The fact that

a plaintiff requests a different type of relief, or even presents a different legal theory, does not negate or lessen the binding

effect of the previous state court judgment.” Moore, 678 F. Supp. at 1450.

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the other factors. See id. at 1430 (citing C.D. Anderson & Co. v. Lemos, 832 F.2d 1097, 1100 (9th

Cir. 1987)). Determining whether two events are part of the same transaction is essentially

dependent on whether the events are related to the same set of facts and whether the events could

conveniently be tried together. See id. at 1429 (citing Western Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864, 871

(9th Cir. 1992)).

Preliminarily, the Court notes that although Plaintiff included a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in his

second complaint filed in the Superior Court, which was not present in his first complaint against

Defendant Clinic, the Superior Court barred that claim on res judicata grounds because Plaintiff

could have asserted the claim in his first complaint. See Int’l Union of Operating EngineersEmployers, 994 F.2d at 1430. Moreover, having considered Defendant Clinic’s Motion, coupled

with a review of the prior Superior Court decisions, this Court finds that the doctrine of res judicata

bars all of Plaintiff’s claims as to Defendant Clinic. 

First, Plaintiff’s present suit against Defendant Clinic is based upon the same operative facts,

the events of October 7, 2005, as his prior suits before the Superior Court. Moreover, the basis for

Plaintiff’s present suit, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was precisely the same basis for relief alleged in his

second complaint.16 Second, having taken judicial notice of the Superior Court’s decision to sustain

Defendant Clinic’s demurrer with prejudice as to both of Plaintiff’s prior complaints,17 this Court

finds that the Superior Court’s holding constitutes a final judgment on the merits.18 Third, Plaintiff

has brought three prior state court proceedings against the same party, Defendant Clinic. 

Additionally, at the hearing on this matter, Plaintiff conceded that his claims against Defendant

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28 19Opposition at ¶ 11 (Case No. C 06-2141 MJJ).

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Clinic were barred by res judicata. Because Plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief can be

granted, the Court GRANTS Defendant Clinic’s motion to dismiss on the doctrine of res judicata as

to all claims against Defendant Clinic. The Court DISMISSES all of Plaintiff’s claims against

Defendant Clinic WITH PREJUDICE. 

II. Defendant City of San Francisco

Defendant City moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on two

grounds. Defendant City argues that: (1) Plaintiff’s state law claims are untimely under the CTCA

because he failed to file a complaint within the six-month statute of limitations; and (2) Plaintiff’s

section 1983 claims are improper because he failed to identify a particular unconstitutional policy of

Defendant City for municipality liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658

(1978).

A. Timeliness Under California Tort Claims Act

Defendant City argues that Plaintiff’s state law claims must be dismissed because he failed to

file suit within six-months of Defendant City’s denial of his claim pursuant to the CTCA. Plaintiff

claims that on March 22, 2006, he filed a pro se complaint in this Court, which was dismissed sua

sponte for failure to state a cognizable claim and subsequently for failure to pay this Court’s filing

fee.19 Therefore, Plaintiff avers that he filed suit within the six-month time period under the CTCA. 

The CTCA is found at California Government Code §§ 900 et seq. Under California

Government Code § 911.2, “[a] claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person or

to personal property . . . shall be presented [to the public entity] . . . not later than six months after

the accrual of the cause of action.” Id. Additionally, California Government Code § 945.4 provides

that “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for

which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the

public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the

board . . . .” Cal. Gov. Code § 945.4; see Hart v. Alameda County, 76 Cal. App. 4th 766, 778 (Cal.

Ct. App. 1999). Finally, section 945.6 provides that, “any suit brought against a public entity on a

cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . must be commenced, if written

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20The relation back provisions of state law generally govern federal § 1983 actions in which the state statute of

limitations is applied. See Merritt v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 768 & n. 5 (9th Cir. 1989). Under California

Law, an amended complaint relates back to the original complaint and avoids the bar of the statute of limitations if recovery

is sought in both pleadings on the same general set of facts. See Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 56 Cal. 2d 596,

600 (1961). The two pleadings seek recovery on the same general set of facts if the complaint and the amendment refer to

the same incident and injury. See Carrier Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 4 Cal. App. 4th 1522, 1530 (1992); Espinosa v. Superior

Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 409, 414 (1988). Here, Plaintiff’s first suit before this Court, filed on April 3, 2006, was based on

the same facts and included the same parties as the present suit. Therefore, this Court will treat Plaintiff’s present complaint

as an amended complaint from Plaintiff’s prior suit. As such, Plaintiff’s present complaint relates back to his complaint filed

on March 22, 2006. 

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notice is given in accordance with section 913, not later than six months after the date such notice is

personally delivered or deposited in the mail.” Cal. Gov. Code § 945.6. “[T]he combined effect of

sections 911.2 and 945.6 is that a claim for a personal injury action against a public entity must be

presented within six months of the injury; and if the claim is denied, suit must be filed within six

months of the date of denial.” Schmidt v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist., 14 Cal. App. 4th

23, 25-26, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 340 (1993) (emphasis added). If a claimant fails to timely file a claim

with the public entity, and the claim is consequently rejected by the public entity for that reason,

courts are without jurisdiction to hear the claimant's cause of action. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.

County of Santa Clara, 187 Cal. App. 3d 480, 487 (1986); Moyer v. Hook, 10 Cal. App. 3d 491,

492-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Carr v. State of Cal., 58 Cal. App. 3d 139, 144-46 (Cal. Ct. App.

1976); Williams v. Mariposa County Unified Sch. Dist., 82 Cal. App. 3d 843, 848-49 (Cal. Ct. App.

1978). 

Here, Defendant City denied Plaintiff’s tort claims on December 14, 2005. Subsequently,

Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court on March 22, 2006, naming the City of San Francisco as a

Defendant. This Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, sua sponte, for failure to state a cognizable

claim and failure to pay a filing fee. Rather than amending his previous complaint, Plaintiff filed a

new complaint in this Court on December 20, 2006. Although Plaintiff filed his original complaint

against Defendant City within the six-month time period,20 the present complaint was filed outside

the six-month window. However, the Court will relate the date of the present complaint back to the

date of Plaintiffs first complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff first complaint filed in this Court was timely

for the purposes of the CTCA. Accordingly, this Court DENIES Defendant City’s motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims. 

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21See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant City’s Motion to Dismiss at ¶ 2.

22Plaintiff incorrectly argues that the Monell standard does not apply to his claims against Defendant City; however,

the Court finds that this argument is misplaced because Defendant City is a local government organization within the meaning

of Monell. See Monell 436 U.S. at 690. 

23“There is certainly no constitutional impediment to municipal liability. ‘The Tenth Amendment’s reservation of

nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of

unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment.”’ Monell, 436 U.S. 691 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433

U.S. 267, 291 (1977)). There is no “basis for concluding that the Eleventh Amendment is a bar to municipal liability.” Id.

(citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890)).

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B. Monell Liability

Defendant City avers that although Plaintiff has named Defendant City in his section 1983

claims, Plaintiff has failed to identify an official custom, practice, or policy of Defendant City that

caused the constitutional violation. Therefore, Defendant City argues that this Court should dismiss

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims. Plaintiff acknowledges that he has failed to state a Monell claim in

his current Complaint,21 but argues that Monell does not apply to the present case.22

Local governments are “persons” subject to suit for “constitutional tort[s]” under 42 U.S.C. §

1983.23 Haugen v. Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n. 55 (1978)). “[T]he legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871

compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to

be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Local

governments can be sued for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where such suits arise out of

unconstitutional actions that implement or execute a “policy statement, ordinance, or decision

officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers. . . .” Id. 690-91. If no official policy

exists, “customs and usages” may fulfill this element of a Section 1983 claim against a local

government. Id.

A local government’s liability is limited, however. Although a local government can be held

liable for its official policies or customs, it will not be held liable for an employee’s actions outside

of the scope of these policies or customs. “A municipality cannot be held liable solely because it

employs a tortfeasor - or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a

respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. “A local government may not be sued under

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24Defendant City notes that contrary to the summons, which according to this Court’s docket was returned executed

on February 16, 2007, the individual officers have not been served. (See Defendant City’s Motion to Dismiss at ¶ 4.)

25Opposition at ¶ 2.

26Opposition at ¶ 8.

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§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a

government’s policy or custom, whether made by its law-makers or by those whose edicts or acts

may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is

responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694.

To prevail on a section 1983 complaint against a local government under Monell, a plaintiff

must satisfy a three-part test: (1) The local government official(s) must have intentionally violated

the plaintiff's constitutional rights; (2) The violation must be a part of policy or custom and may not

be an isolated incident; and (3) A nexus must link the specific policy or custom to the plaintiff’s

injury. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-92.

Presently, Plaintiff alleges that two named San Francisco police officers violated his

constitutional rights when the Officers procured a key from Williams and entered Plaintiff’s

residence.24 Further, Plaintiff cites to numerous sections of the internal San Francisco Police

Department General Orders that the Officers allegedly violated when they removed Plaintiff from

his apartment. (See Compl. at ¶ ¶ 16, 21.) However, having liberally assessed Plaintiff’s allegations

set forth in his complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action as to

Defendant City’s section 1983 liability under the Monell standard. 

First, Plaintiff has not established that Defendant City, as a local government, intentionally

violated his constitutional rights. Conversely, other than the two individual San Francisco Police

Officers named in the complaint, Plaintiff has failed to identify a particular local governmental

official or agency that has allegedly promulgated an unconstitutional policy. Second, Plaintiff has

failed to establish that the alleged constitutional violation was part of a policy or custom, rather than

an isolated incident. To the contrary, Plaintiff does not deny his failure to state a basis for Monell

liability in his current complaint.25 Moreover, Plaintiff argues that a constitutional violation is

evident because the Defendant Officers failed to conform to their own departmental policies.26 Such

Case 3:06-cv-07793-MJJ Document 36 Filed 04/17/07 Page 11 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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a contention implies that it was the failure to adhere to a particular policy that resulted in a

constitutional violation, not that a particular policy of Defendant City is unconstitutional. Finally,

because Plaintiff failed to identify a policy, practice, or custom that resulted in a violation of his

constitutional rights, he has also failed to establish the third element for liability under the Monell

standard, the nexus between the policy and Plaintiff’s injury. Without an alleged unconstitutional

policy, one cannot establish a nexus to an injury. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a section

1983 claim on which relief can be granted and, accordingly, this Court GRANTS Defendant City’s

motion to dismiss. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against Defendant City

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claim on which relief can be granted as to both Defendants. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

Defendant Clinic’s motion to dismiss and DISMISSES all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant

Clinic WITH PREJUDICE. Further, the Court GRANTS Defendant City’s motion to dismiss as to

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims and DISMISSES these claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

However, the Court DENIES Defendant City’s motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff’s state law claims. 

Plaintiff shall have twenty days from the filing date of this order to file an amended complaint

against Defendant City.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 17, 2007 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:06-cv-07793-MJJ Document 36 Filed 04/17/07 Page 12 of 12