Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00384/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00384-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO SC 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert Monroe Barrett, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Mesa Police Department, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-0384-PHX-GMS (LOA) 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Robert Monroe Barrett, who was then-confined in Maricopa County’s 

Fourth Avenue Jail in Phoenix, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.) He subsequently filed a First Amended Complaint and a 

motion to appoint counsel. The Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint for failure 

to state a claim with leave to amend and denied the motion. (Doc. 13.) Plaintiff has filed 

a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion for appointment of counsel and 

has filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 15, 16.) Plaintiff has also filed a notice 

of change of address reflecting that he is now incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex, Cimarron Unit, in Tucson, Arizona. (Doc. 18.) The Court will order 

Defendants Carmichael, Badger, and Riesmersma to answer Counts I-III of the Second 

Amended Complaint and will dismiss the remaining Defendant without prejudice. The 

Court will deny the motion for reconsideration. 

Case 2:13-cv-00384-GMS-LOA Document 19 Filed 11/04/13 Page 1 of 9
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I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

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II. Second Amended Complaint 

 Plaintiff alleges three counts for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against 

unreasonable searches and seizures and the use of excessive force. Plaintiff sues the City 

of Mesa and the following members of the Mesa Police Department: Officer Christopher 

Carmichael, Erik L. Badger, and Christoph M. Riesmersma. Plaintiff seeks declaratory, 

compensatory, and punitive relief. 

 Except as otherwise indicated, Plaintiff alleges the following facts in his Second 

Amended Complaint: on January 7, 2013, Plaintiff was at a church during normal 

“business” hours attending services open to the public. Three Mesa police officers seized 

Plaintiff, searched his clothing, and removed the contents of his wallet to learn his 

identity. Plaintiff contends that the search and seizure violated his Fourth Amendment 

rights. According to Plaintiff, he was sitting down praying when Defendants Carmichael, 

Badger, and Riesmersma “tackled” him and forced him face down on the ground and 

caused him abrasions and bruising. Carmichael and Badger jumped on Plaintiff’s back, 

landing on his neck and torso, while Riesmersma used knee strikes to Plaintiff’s head and 

back and shot Plaintiff in the back with a taser, while Plaintiff was prone on the ground 

and even after Plaintiff was handcuffed. Plaintiff contends that Riesmersma maliciously 

used excessive force against him. Plaintiff denies that he was combative at the time and 

claims that he was already detained by the other two officers. 

 Paramedics were summoned to evaluate Plaintiff. (Doc. 16, Ex. A.) In their 

report, they indicated that Plaintiff was cuffed on the ground when they arrived, that he 

had been tased, and that he had minor abrasions to his extremities. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff 

refused transport to a hospital or emergency room for treatment and was taken into 

custody. 

Background

 Plaintiff was charged with one count of resisting arrest in Maricopa County 

Superior Court, case# CR2013-101169, with an offense date of January 7, 2013.1

 

 

1

 Error! Main Document Only.See

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Plaintiff was also charged with violating the terms of his probation in CR2012-106893 

based on the filing of new criminal charges.2

 On March 5, 2013, the court determined 

that Plaintiff was competent following a Rule 11 evaluation.3

 On June 24, 2013, Plaintiff 

pleaded guilty to resisting arrest in the 2013 case4

 and was found guilty of having 

violated the terms of probation in the 2012 case.5

 On August 7, 2013, Plaintiff was 

sentenced to 1.75 years in prison in the 2013 case6

 and imposition of sentence was 

suspended and probation reinstated in the 2012 case.7

III. Failure to State a Claim

 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the 

conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of 

state law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. 

Wood v. Outlander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). Negligence is not sufficient to 

state a claim under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). In 

addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct 

 http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CriminalCourtCases/case 

Info.asp?caseNumber=CR2013-101169 (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 

2

 Error! Main Document Only.See 

http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/012013/ m5590142. pdf (last 

visited Oct. 28, 2013). 

3

 Error! Main Document Only.See

http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/032013/m5664901. pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 

4

 Error! Main Document Only.See

http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/072013/m5839245. pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 

5

 Error! Main Document Only.See

http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/072013/m5839247. pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 

6

 Error! Main Document Only.See

http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/082013/m5893827. pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) 

7 Error! Main Document Only. See

http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/082013/m5893835. pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 

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of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and 

the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

 Plaintiff sues the City of Mesa. A municipality is a “person” for purposes of 

§ 1983, i.e., a municipality such as a city or county, may be sued. See Leatherman v. 

Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993); 

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To state a claim against a 

municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional 

rights were violated pursuant to a policy or custom of the municipality. Cortez v. County 

of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91); 

Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on 

other grounds by Bull v. City & County of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Thus, a municipality may not be sued solely because an injury was inflicted by one of its 

employees or agents. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2006). Therefore, a § 1983 claim against a municipal defendant “cannot succeed as a 

matter of law” unless a plaintiff: (1) contends that the municipal defendant maintains a 

policy or custom pertinent to the plaintiff’s alleged injury; and (2) explains how such 

policy or custom caused the plaintiff’s injury. Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 

(9th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of a municipal defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6)). 

 Plaintiff alleges that the Officer Defendants used excessive force against him in 

violation of City policies. Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that the officers used 

excessive force against him pursuant to a policy established or condoned by the City. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the City and it will be dismissed. 

IV. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required 

 In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant Officers unreasonably seized and 

searched him, prior to arrest.1

 In Counts II and III, he alleges that after he had been 

 

1

 It does not presently appear that the validity of Plaintiff’s conviction would be 

necessarily invalidated if the claimed Fourth Amendment violation is proven. 

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handcuffed, Defendant Officers continued to deliver knee strikes to his head and back 

and shot him with a taser. See Smith v. Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 693 (9th Cir. 2005) (en 

banc) (concluding claims were not barred under Heck v. Humphrey “because the 

excessive force may have been employed against him subsequent to the time he engaged 

in the conduct that constituted the basis for his conviction [for resisting arrest].”); Sanford 

v. Motts, 258 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim for 

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful search and use of excessive 

force. Defendants Carmichael, Badger, and Riesmersma will be required to respond to 

these claims. 

V. Motion for Reconsideration 

The Court previously denied Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel. 

Plaintiff has filed a motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 15.) Generally, motions to 

reconsider are appropriate only if the Court “(1) is presented with newly discovered 

evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if 

there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah 

County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993); Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 

Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009). A motion for 

reconsideration should not be used to ask a court “to rethink what the court had already 

thought through, rightly or wrongly.” Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannon Roofing, 

Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)). Rather, such arguments should be directed to 

the court of appeals. Sullivan v. Faras-RLS Group, Ltd., 795 F. Supp. 305, 309 (D. Ariz. 

1992). 

 Plaintiff seeks reconsideration on the basis that he is unable to afford counsel, his 

ability to litigate will be hampered by his incarceration, he lacks access to a law library, 

and any trial will likely involve conflicting testimony. Plaintiff does not allege or show 

that the Court clearly erred in previously denying his request, that there has been an 

intervening change in controlling law, or other grounds for reconsideration. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration will be denied. 

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VI. Warnings

A. Release

 Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his 

release. Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he 

intends to pay the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to 

comply may result in dismissal of this action. 

B. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

C. Copies

 Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 

copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, 

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 

5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

D. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Defendant City of Mesa is dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. 16.) 

 (2) Defendants Carmichael, Badger, and Riesmersma must answer Counts IIII. (Doc. 16.) 

 (3) Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied. (Doc. 15.) 

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 (4) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the 

Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 16), this Order, and both summons and request for 

waiver forms for Defendants Carmichael, Badger, and Riesmersma. 

 (5) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 

 (6) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 

complete service of the Summons and Second Amended Complaint on a Defendant 

within 120 days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this 

Order, whichever is later, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i). 

 (7) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the Second 

Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 

 (8) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement 

of this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this 

Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the 

summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not 

returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was 

sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Second Amended 

Complaint, and this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure; and 

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 

service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 

service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 

upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 

form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 

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photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Second Amended Complaint, or 

this Order and for preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if 

required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant 

pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise 

ordered by the Court. 

 (9) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and Second 

Amended Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States 

Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

 (10) Defendant must answer the Second Amended Complaint or otherwise 

respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of 

Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 (11) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on 

whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or 

paper that does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. 

 (12) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. Anderson pursuant 

to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings 

as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 Dated this 4th day of November, 2013. 

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