Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02000/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02000-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD RAYMOND RESSLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO, et al.,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 11-cv-2000 BEN (NLS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT

[Doc. No. 13.]

I. INTRODUCTION

Richard Raymond Ressler (“Plaintiff”) is currently a California State prisoner incarcerated at the

Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”). On August 30, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Complaint [Doc.

No. 1] alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments, and further alleging a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Compl. at

1-14.1

 Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. [Doc. No. 13.] 

Defendants contend dismissal of the constitutional claims is appropriate under either Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) or (6) because Defendants, in their official capacities, are (1) immune from suits by

operation of the Eleventh Amendment, and (2) not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 

(Motion to Dismiss Compl. (“Mot.”) at 2.) Defendants further contend that the ADA claim should be

dismissed on the ground that the ADA does not apply to medical care decisions, as in Plaintiff’s case. (Id.) 

1

All citations to the Complaint are to the page numbers assigned by the ECF system.

1 11-cv-2000 BEN (NLS)

Case 3:11-cv-02000-BEN-NLS Document 20 Filed 03/20/12 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff has filed an Opposition (“Opp.”). [Doc. No. 18.]

After a thorough review, the court RECOMMENDS granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, with

leave to amend the Complaint to sue Defendants as individuals, rather than in their official capacities.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff is a prisoner at RJD. Compl. at 1. On February 20, 2008, the RJD medical staff prescribed

Plaintiff morphine sulphate to help relieve his chronic pain. Compl. at 9. Plaintiff received this medication

until December 21, 2010 when Dr. Canlas, an RJD doctor, discontinued the medication after a blood and

urine screening showed both morphine and methadone in Plaintiff’s system. Id. Plaintiff alleges he never

took methadone. Id. It appears that the combination of morphine and methadone in Plaintiff’s system was

dangerous, and could have resulted in Plaintiff’s death. See Compl., Ex. 2. Since the medication was

discontinued, Plaintiff’s quality of life has deteriorated. He experiences constant, severe pain in the course

of his daily functions. Compl. at 14. 

Plaintiff now alleges that the denial of medication violates his constitutional rights under the Fourth,

Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Compl. at 9-12. Plaintiff also raises a claim of disability discrimination

under the ADA. Id. at 13. 

III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the

plaintiff’s claims. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). For the sake of deciding the

motion, the court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, and the reasonable inferences

drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th

Cir. 2002). This tenet does not extend, however, to legal conclusions cast as factual allegations. Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009); see also Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). “Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Where there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement of relief.” Id. at 1950.

2 11-cv-2000 BEN (NLS)

Case 3:11-cv-02000-BEN-NLS Document 20 Filed 03/20/12 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___, 129

S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The plausibility standard requires showing “more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are

merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility

of entitlement to relief.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (quotations omitted). 

B. Pro Se Litigants.

Where a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally

and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621,

623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik

v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

complaint, however, the court may not “supply essential elements of [a] claim that w[ere] not initially pled.” 

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The court must give a pro

se litigant leave to amend his complaint “unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured

by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Doe

v. U.S., 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

C. Section 1983

“[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)

(quotation omitted). A section 1983 claim must allege: (1) a violation of rights protected by the Constitution

or created by federal statute, (2) proximately caused, (3) by conduct of a ‘person,’ (4) acting under color

of state law.” Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). “[N]either a State nor its officials

acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491

U.S. 58, 71 (1989). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff raises several 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claims for alleged violations of his rights under the

Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Compl. at 2-3. Defendants request dismissal of these claims

3 11-cv-2000 BEN (NLS)

Case 3:11-cv-02000-BEN-NLS Document 20 Filed 03/20/12 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

because Defendants, in their officials capacities, are (1) immune from suit in federal court, and (2) not

“persons” within the meaning of section 1983. (Mot. at 2.) 

The Complaint filed by Plaintiff includes check boxes to indicate whether Plaintiff intends to sue

Defendants in their individual or official capacities, or both. Compl. at 2. Plaintiff checked only the box

marked “official capacity,” and left the “individual” box unchecked. Id. Because of this, the section 1983

claims fail on two grounds: (1) an essential element of a section 1983 claim–conduct by a ‘person’–is absent

(see Will, 491 U.S. at 71); and (2) the Eleventh Amendment bars federal damages actions against state

officials sued in their official capacities, unless a state has expressly waived such immunity or Congress has

clearly abrogated the immunity for a particular type of claim. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169

(1985) (citing Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982). No such action by Congress or the State of California

has occurred. Thus, the claims against Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed with

prejudice. 

However, in the interests of justice, Plaintiff should have an opportunity to amend his Complaint

to cure the deficiency by suing Defendants in their individual capacities. Leave to amend should be freely

given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see also DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833

F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff claims he did not

know which boxes to check in the Complaint, and that he did not intend to foreclose recovery by failing to

check both boxes. (Opp. at 2.) The Court finds this explanation to be plausible, and gives Plaintiff leave

to amend his Complaint to clearly state his intention to sue Defendants in their individual capacities.

B. Plaintiff’s ADA Claim

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of

such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or

activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 

The Supreme Court has held that Title II applies to state prisons. Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S.

206, 210 (1998); see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 691 (9th Cir. 2001). 

To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, Plaintiff must allege:

(1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to participate in or 

receive the benefit of some public entity's services, programs, or activities; (3) he was 

either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity's services, 

programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; 

4 11-cv-2000 BEN (NLS)

Case 3:11-cv-02000-BEN-NLS Document 20 Filed 03/20/12 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of [his] 

disability.

McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9h Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The focus here is whether Dr. Canlas’ decision to discontinue Plaintiff’s medication was by reason of

Plaintiff’s disability. Dr. Canlas discontinued Plaintiff’s medication after Plaintiff tested positive for

both morphine and methadone. Plaintiff was notified that this behavior could lead to overdose or death.

Compl., Ex. 1 at 2. Plaintiff fails to allege in his Complaint that his medication was withheld from him

because of his disability. “The ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not inadequate

treatment for disability.” Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing

Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[The Act would not be violated by a prison’s

simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners . . . The ADA does not create a

remedy for medical malpractice.”). Because Plaintiff has not alleged a discriminatory act taken for

reasons of his disability, the claim should also be dismissed without prejudice.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the preceding discussion, this Court RECOMMENDS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint [Doc. No. 13] be GRANTED with leave to amend the entire Complaint.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States district judge assigned to this

case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties on or before April 10, 2012. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.” Any response to the objections shall be filed and served on or before

April 20, 2012.

Failure to file objections within the specified time may affect the scope of review on appeal. Baxter

v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED 

DATED: March 19, 2012

 

NITA L. STORMES

United States Magistrate Judge

5 11-cv-2000 BEN (NLS)

Case 3:11-cv-02000-BEN-NLS Document 20 Filed 03/20/12 Page 5 of 5