Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02986/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02986-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT COURT OF CALIFORNIA 

JANIS TRULSSON, 

 Plaintiff, No. 2:11-cv-02986-KJM-DAD 

 vs. 

COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, THE 

DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 

and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,1

 Defendants. ORDER 

________________________________/ 

This case is before the court on defendants’ motion for relief from the court’s 

scheduling order. For the reasons explained below, the motion is DENIED. 

 1

 The Ninth Circuit provides that “‘[plaintiffs] should be given an opportunity through 

discovery to identify [] unknown defendants’” “in circumstances . . . ‘where the identity of the 

alleged defendant[] [is] not [] known prior to the filing of a complaint.’” Wakefield v. 

Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 

642 (9th Cir. 1980)). Plaintiff is warned, however, that such defendants will be dismissed 

where “‘it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint would 

be dismissed on other grounds.’” Id. (quoting Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642). Plaintiff is further 

warned that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), which states that the court must dismiss 

defendants who have not been served within 120 days after the filing of the complaint unless 

plaintiff shows good cause, is applicable to doe defendants. See Glass v. Fields, No. 1:09-cv-00098-OWW-SMS PC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97604 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011); 

Hard Drive Prods. v. Does, No. C 11-01567 LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109837, at *2-4 (N.D. 

Cal. Sep. 27, 2011). 

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I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed her complaint on November 9, 2011, alleging several employment 

discrimination claims arising out of her former employment at the County of San Joaquin 

District Attorney’s Office. (ECF 1.) Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on 

May 13, 2013 (ECF 18), which is currently pending before the court. 

The scheduling order in this case was issued on April 30, 2012 by Magistrate 

Judge Gregory G. Hollows, as authorized by this court. (ECF 11.) Judge Hollows set a 

deadline of April 1, 2013 for disclosure of expert witnesses, along with written reports prepared 

and signed by each expert witness in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

26(a)(2)(B). Defendants assert that although they disclosed two of their expert witnesses, 

Thomas Sartoris and Grover Trask, on April 1, they were unable to provide their expert reports 

until April 10. (ECF 21-1 at 3.) Trask is a former District Attorney who, if allowed, would 

testify about the selection criteria for the Chief Investigator Position. (ECF 21-6.) Sartoris is a 

vocational expert who would testify about plaintiff’s ability to find new work after being laid 

off by San Joaquin County. (ECF 21-8.) Defendants explain that Sartoris was on vacation and 

unreachable and Trask had not finished his report by April 1. (Decl. of Velma Lim ¶ 5, ECF 

21-2.) On April 3, 2013, defendants’ counsel sent a letter to plaintiff’s counsel, explaining that 

she would provide expert reports by April 15, and proposing to extend the deadline for plaintiff 

to depose defendants’ expert witnesses. (Id. ¶ 6; Ex. C, ECF 21-5.) 

On April 17, 2013, plaintiff filed an objection to allowing the testimony of 

Sartoris and Trask at trial. Plaintiff does not object to defendants’ third expert witness, Eric 

Volk, as his expert report was provided on the April 1 deadline. (ECF 17.) Defendants filed 

their motion for relief from scheduling order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 on 

May 24, 2013. (ECF 21.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on June 28, 2013.2

 (ECF 33.) 

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 2

 Defendants’ motion was originally incorrectly noticed before Magistrate Judge Dale 

Drozd, then was renoticed for this court’s July 19, 2013 calendar. (ECF 25.) 

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II. STANDARD 

Rule 16(b)’s good cause standard focuses primarily on the diligence of the 

moving party and that party’s reasons for seeking modification. C.F. ex rel. Farnan v. 

Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2011). If the moving party was not 

diligent, “the inquiry should end” and the motion to modify should not be granted. Zivkovic v. 

S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Johnson v. Mammoth 

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992)). “[C]arelessness is not compatible with a 

finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. 

To demonstrate diligence under Rule 16, the movant may be required to show: 

(1) that he was diligent in assisting the court in creating a workable Rule 16 order; (2) that his 

noncompliance with a Rule 16 deadline is occurring, notwithstanding his diligent efforts to 

comply, because of the development of matters that could not have been reasonably foreseen or 

anticipated at the time of the Rule 16 scheduling conference; and (3) that he was diligent in 

seeking amendment of the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent that he could not comply 

with the order. Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 608 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party must 

disclose the identity of any expert witness, accompanied by a written report prepared and 

signed by the witness, and this disclosure must occur “at the times and in the sequence that the 

court orders,” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(D). In the absence of a stipulation or a court order, the 

disclosures are to be made “at least 90 days before the date set for trial . . . .” Id. A party who 

fails to provide information or identify a witness when required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e) “is not 

allowed to use that information or witness . . . at a trial, unless the failure was substantially 

justified or harmless.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1). The burden is on the party facing sanctions to 

prove harmlessness. Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1107 

(9th Cir. 2001). In determining whether a violation of the discovery deadline is harmless, the 

court should consider “(1) prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the evidence is 

offered; (2) the ability of that party to cure the prejudice; (3) the likelihood of disruption of the 

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trial; and (4) bad faith or willfulness in failing to make a timely disclosure.” Lanard Toys Ltd. 

v. Novelty, Inc., 375 F. App’x 705, 713 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished). 

III. ANALYSIS 

Defendants argue that the scheduling order should be modified because they 

have shown good cause: specifically, the failure of their expert witnesses to timely provide 

their reports. (ECF 21-1 at 4.) But defendants have not shown that they themselves diligently 

attempted to comply with the scheduling order. The unavailability of Sartoris and Trask at the 

time the expert reports were due does not excuse defendants from taking steps to ensure that the 

reports were available by the deadline, set nearly a year in advance. As plaintiff points out, 

Sartoris’s expert report reveals that defendants did not contact him until March 27, 2013, only 

several days before the April 1 expert report deadline. (Ex. B, ECF 21-7.) Moreover, 

defendants have not explained their delay in seeking leave to amend the scheduling order until 

May 24, almost two months after they had already missed the April 1 deadline. 

Defendants also assert that despite the lateness of their expert reports, Sartoris 

and Trask should not be precluded from testifying at trial because none of the factors described 

in Lanard Toys is present here. (ECF 21-1 at 4.) Plaintiff responds that she is prejudiced by 

defendants’ untimeliness because she did not have the reports of Sartoris and Trask before the 

deadline for supplemental expert disclosures, meaning she was unable to make an informed 

decision regarding whether to provide her own supplemental experts. (ECF 33 at 5.) 

For the same reasons that defendants have not shown good cause to modify the 

scheduling order under Rule 16(b), defendants also have not shown their failure to timely 

provide expert reports under Rule 26 is justified. Moreover, plaintiff has been prejudiced as 

she suggests by the lateness of the expert reports. Accordingly, defendants’ motion is 

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED 

DATED: August 29, 2013. 

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