Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01662/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01662-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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The Defendants in this matter include the County of 1

Sacramento, the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff

Lou Blanas, the City of Elk Grove, and Sacramento County

Sheriff’s Deputy Robert Barnes. Hereinafter all defendants will

be referred to collectively as “Defendants”.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL WITKIN, No. 2:05-cv-1662-MCE-DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, THE 

SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT, SHERIFF LOU

BLANAS, THE CITY OF ELK GROVE

and SACRAMENTO COUNTY

SHERIFF’S DEPUTY ROBERT BARNES

acting as an ELK GROVE POLICE

OFFICER and DOES 1 through 25

inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This case arises from the events surrounding the arrest of

Plaintiff Michael Witkin (“Plaintiff”) on August 21, 2004. 

Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by

Defendants during said arrest and now seeks recovery under 42 1

U.S.C. section 1983. 

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Unless otherwise stated, all further references to a “Rule” 2

are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 3

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

The Court relies extensively on Plaintiff’s Request for 4

Judicial Notice in its recitation of the facts. See MGIC Indem.

Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that

a court may take judicial notice of matters of public records

without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary

judgment). The Court additionally notes that Plaintiff’s Request

for Judicial Notice is unopposed by Defendants.

2

Plaintiff additionally asserts state tort claims for false

imprisonment, false arrest, battery, and negligence. This matter

is now before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Alternatively, Defendants move for 2

judgement on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c). As set forth

below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and

denied in part. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

is denied.3

BACKGROUND4

Plaintiff was arrested on August 21, 2004, for violation of

Penal Code section 69 and Penal Code section 243(b). Penal Code

section 69 makes it a felony for a person to deter an officer, by

means of threat or violence, from performing any duty imposed

upon the officer by law, or to knowingly resist such officer in

the performance of his duty. 

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Sacramento County provides a number of its sheriff’s 5

deputies to the City of Elk Grove pursuant to a law enforcement

services contract between the city and county.

3

Penal Code section 243(b) prohibits battery on a peace officer. 

Plaintiff was charged and convicted for the above crimes and is

currently serving his sentence in state prison.

The chain of events leading to Plaintiff’s arrest originated

when Defendant Deputy Barnes observed Plaintiff commit an

undetermined traffic offense. Deputy Barnes followed Plaintiff

until Plaintiff stopped his vehicle at a residence later

determined to be Plaintiff’s home. Immediately after Plaintiff

exited his vehicle, Deputy Barnes ordered Plaintiff to “stop”. 

Rather than comply with the directions of an officer in full

uniform who had just exited a marked patrol vehicle, Plaintiff

began to run. A pursuit followed which led to a physical

confrontation between Plaintiff and Deputy Barnes. Plaintiff

eventually broke away and, as he was fleeing, was shot multiple

times in the back and buttocks by Deputy Barnes.

Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Barnes used excessive force in

shooting Plaintiff and that the excessive force employed was

caused by deliberate indifference on the part of the Sacramento

County Sheriff’s Department in the training of its officers. In 5

addition to his constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

Plaintiff asserts state tort claims for false imprisonment, false

arrest, battery, and negligence. 

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4

A. Motion to Dismiss

STANDARD

A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) where

the complaint either asserts a legal theory that is not

cognizable as a matter of law or fails to allege facts to

sufficiently support a cognizable legal claim. SmileCare Dental

Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th

Cir. 1996). A court should not dismiss a complaint, however, for

a party’s failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

[its] claim which would entitle [it] to relief." Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, (1957); see also Yamaguchi v. United

States Dep’t of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir.

1997). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court should take

all allegations of material fact in the complaint as true and

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. North

Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir.

1983).

“Generally, a district court may not consider any material

beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Hal

Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555

n.19 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley

Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a

court may take judicial notice of matters of public records

“without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary

judgment.” 

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MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1984). 

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The Court should

"freely give[]" leave to amend when there is no "undue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of . . . the amendment,

[or] futility of the amendment. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a);

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to

amend is only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of

the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow

Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

ANALYSIS

1. Plaintiff’s claims for false arrest and false

imprisonment

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), the United

States Supreme Court held that: 

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983

suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment

in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would,

the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already

been invalidated.

Thus, in order to pursue a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that

would undermine a prior conviction, Plaintiff must prove that the

underlying conviction has been “reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

. . ., or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a

writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-477.

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It is unclear from the Complaint whether Plaintiff’s false 6

imprisonment and false arrest claims are asserted under state law

or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In either case, the Heck analysis

remains the same. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-487 (holding that a

section 1983 Plaintiff is barred from recovering damages for

“unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment” as well as “for

other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid”)(emphasis added); see also Hainze

v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795 (holding that a section 1983

Plaintiff’s state law claims for assault and battery were barred

by Heck); Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 94 Cal.App.4th 1401,

1412-13, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 (2002)(holding Heck applicable to

section 1983 Plaintiff’s state law claims for assault and false

imprisonment). Because Plaintiff does not specifically identify

his claims for false imprisonment and false arrest as section

1983 claims, the Court treats them as tort claims under

California law. 

6

Here, Plaintiff was convicted of battery on a peace officer

and deterring a police officer from the performance of his

duties. (Def.’s Req. Jud. Notice, Ex. A.) Plaintiff has

presented no evidence that either of these convictions has been

reversed or invalidated. Plaintiff nonetheless raises claims for

false imprisonment and false arrest. A finding in Plaintiff’s 6

favor on either of these claims would necessarily challenge the

validity of his prior convictions. In light of the fact that

neither conviction has been deemed invalid, both claims must fail

under Heck. See Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374

(9th Cir. 1998) (Section 1983 claim for false arrest and false

imprisonment barred by Heck). 

Faced with this authority, Plaintiff now acknowledges that

his Third Cause of Action, alleging false arrest and false

imprisonment, should be dismissed from the Complaint. (Opp.

4:22-23). Because the Court does not believe the deficiencies in

Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action can be cured by amendment, that

claim is dismissed with prejudice. 

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7

2. Plaintiff’s claims for excessive force and deliberate

indifference

Defendants additionally contend that Plaintiff’s First and

Second Causes of Action, alleging excessive force and deliberate

indifference respectively under § 1983, are also barred under

Heck. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that these claims are

unrelated to the conduct for which he was convicted and,

therefore, should not be dismissed. Specifically, Plaintiff

contends that a verdict in his favor on his excessive force and

deliberate indifference claims would not necessarily be

inconsistent with his prior conviction under Penal Code sections

69 and 243(b). The Court agrees.

An excessive force claim is not barred by Heck if the

excessive force alleged was employed subsequent to the time that

the defendant engaged in the conduct that constituted the basis

for his conviction. Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 693

(9th Cir. 1996). A conviction based on conduct that occurred

before an officer commences the process of arrest is not

necessarily rendered invalid by the officer’s subsequent use of

excessive force in making the arrest. Id. at 696. Here, it is

unclear whether Plaintiff’s conviction was based solely on

conduct that occurred prior to his being shot by Deputy Barnes. 

On the one hand, Plaintiff clearly violated Penal Code sections

69 and 243(b) before he was shot by Deputy Barnes. He had

already fled from Deputy Barnes and engaged him in physical

confrontation. (Pl.’s Req. Jud. Notice at 268-269; Compl. 3:10-

14.) 

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On the other hand, there is at least an argument that Plaintiff

was still violating Penal Code section 69 (deterring or knowingly

resisting an officer, by means of threat or violence, from

performing duties imposed on him by law) at the time he was shot.

In any event, at this stage in the proceedings the Court

must interpret the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. North Star Int’l, 720 F.2d at 580. Thus, the

Court must presume that Plaintiff’s underlying conviction was

based solely on conduct that occurred before Deputy Barnes shot

Plaintiff in the back.

Significantly, the manner in which Plaintiff’s criminal

trial was conducted also reinforces this conclusion. In closing

arguments at the trial, the Deputy District Attorney argued to

the jury that “[w]hether or not Officer Barnes [sic] shooting of

the defendant was justified is not the issue before you . .

.[a]ll the charged crime [sic] occurred before the shooting. All

the charged crimes occurred before the shooting.” (Pl.’s Req.

Jud. Notice 269:18-26.) The Deputy District Attorney further

stated that the shooting was “an issue [for] another day, another

court.” (Id. at 315:4-6.) These statements strongly suggest

that Plaintiff was tried solely for conduct that occurred prior

to his being shot. 

Furthermore, if Plaintiff’s prior conviction was based on

his conduct at the time of the shooting, then the jury at his

criminal trial should have considered Plaintiff’s claims of

excessive force. 

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Smith involved Penal Code section 148(a)(1), which 7

prohibits a person from “resist[ing], delay[ing], or

obstruct[ing] any public officer . . . in the discharge [of] any

duty of his or her . . . employment.” While Penal Code section

148(a)(1) differs slightly from the statute in the instant case,

Penal Code section 69, the Court believes the statutes are so

similar that any discrepancies in analysis would be

inconsequential.

9

See Smith, 394 F.3d at 695-696 (holding that, “if a police

officer uses excessive force at the time of an arrest, the arrest

is unlawful and the arrestee may not be convicted of

resisting”) . Yet, at Plaintiff’s criminal trial, the Deputy 7

District Attorney instructed the jury that they were not to

consider whether excessive force was used. (Pl.’s Req. Jud.

Notice 269:18-26.) This is further evidence that Plaintiff was

tried solely for conduct that occurred prior to the time at which

he was shot. Consequently, at this stage in the proceedings,

when all facts must be interpreted in the light most favorable to

the Plaintiff, the Court can not say that success on Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim would be inconsistent with Plaintiff’s

conviction under Penal Code sections 69 and 243(b). Finally,

because Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against the

County of Sacramento, the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department,

Sheriff Lou Blanas, and the City of Elk Grove, for improper

training also relates to Deputy Barnes’ decision to shoot

Plaintiff and not to the underlying conduct for which Plaintiff

was convicted, that claim also survives Heck.

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3. Plaintiff’s state tort claims for battery and negligence

As with Plaintiff’s constitutional claims, Plaintiff’s

negligence claim rests solely on Deputy Barnes’ decision to shoot

Plaintiff, and not on the underlying conduct for which Plaintiff

was convicted. Consequently, Plaintiff’s negligence claim

survives Heck. Plaintiff’s battery claim, on the other hand, is

premised on Deputy Barnes’ “attacking and shooting” of Plaintiff. 

(Compl. 5:22.) In using the term “attacking,” it is unclear

whether Plaintiff is referring to the discharge of Deputy Barnes’

firearm, the preceding physical confrontation with Deputy Barnes,

or both. To the extent that Plaintiff’s battery claim is based

on the physical confrontation, that portion of the claim is

barred by Heck. In California, “the lawfulness of [an] officer’s

conduct is an essential element of the offense of resisting,

delaying, or obstructing a peace officer.” Smith, 394 F.3d at

695. Consequently, Plaintiff could not have been convicted for

conduct that occurred during the physical confrontation if Deputy

Barnes actions during that confrontation were unlawful. Thus,

insofar as Plaintiff’s battery claim rests on his physical

confrontation with Deputy Barnes, success by Plaintiff on that

claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his prior

conviction. 

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Defendants have not yet filed an answer to Plaintiff’s 8

Complaint.

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B. Motion for judgment on the pleadings

After the pleadings are closed, any party may move for

judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(c). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A Rule 12(c) motion

challenges the legal sufficiency of the opposing party’s

pleadings and operates in much the same manner as a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Irish Lesbian and Gay Org. v.

Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 644 (2nd Cir. 1998). The primary

distinction between a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and a motion for

judgment on the pleadings is one of timing. Rule 12(b)(6)

motions are typically brought before the defendant files an

answer, while a motion for judgment on the pleadings can only be

brought after the pleadings are closed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c);

Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). 

Here, Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings before

the pleadings have closed. Furthermore, Defendants say 8

absolutely nothing in their Reply Brief to controvert the

procedurally improper timing of their motion. For these reasons,

Defendants’ Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings is denied. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ third claim for relief,

alleging false imprisonment and false arrest, is dismissed with

prejudice. 

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In addition, Plaintiff’s fourth claim for relief, alleging

battery, is dismissed, insofar as it relates to Plaintiff’s

physical confrontation with Defendant Deputy Barnes. Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss, as it relates to Plaintiff’s remaining claims,

is DENIED. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 8, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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