Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08185/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08185-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mel Harris, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 10-8185-PCT-SRB (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

This matter comes before this Court upon consideration of a pro se Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus, filed on September 23, 2010, by Petitioner Mel Harris, who is confined

in the Arizona State Prison (Doc. 1). Respondents filed an Answer on November 8, 2010

(Doc. 11). Petitioner filed a Reply on December 9, 2010 (Doc. 9).

BACKGROUND OF STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner was charged in the Mohave County Superior Court of Arizona with two

counts of Second-Degree Murder, in violation of A.R.S. §13-1104, class 1 felonies, one

count of Kidnapping, in violation of A.R.S.§ 13-1304, a class 2 felony, and one count of

Sexual Assault, in violation of A.R.S. §13-1406, a class 2 felony. (Doc. 11, Exhs. B, C, at

1.) After a trial, Petitioner was convicted on both counts of murder and sentenced on

November 14, 2006, to consecutive, mitigated 13-year sentences. (Id., Exh. E, at 5.)

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Arizona Court of Appeals, raising one issue, that the

trial court had erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence “that was seized as

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a result of the unlawful entry into [Petitioner]’s home without a warrant.” (Id., Exh. B.)

On April 15, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction,

concluding that (1) the physical evidence seized from Petitioner’s home was obtained

pursuant to a valid warrant and, thus, was admissible under the independent source doctrine;

(2) Petitioner did not have standing to challenge the statements made by another individual

who was present when the entry was made; (3) that the trial court properly denied the

suppression of Petitioner’s own statements because some of the statements were made prior

to the search warrant entry; and (4) Petitioner waived his right to appeal the introduction of

his “spontaneous statement” for failing to make a timely objection or renew his objection to

its admission at trial. (Doc. 11, Exh. E.) 

On May 6, 2009, Petitioner filed his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (hereinafter

“PCR”). (Doc. 11, Exh. F.) On the form Notice, under the section a petitioner must

complete if his notice is untimely, he selected the following exception to the timeliness

requirement: “[f]acts exist which establish by clear and convincing evidence that the

[petitioner] is actually innocent.” (Id., Exh. F, at 2-3.) Petitioner did not elaborate in his

Notice of the facts in support of this claim. The trial court dismissed Petitioner’s PCR on

May 11, 2009, ruling as follows:

The defendant has filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. The defendant

alleges that he can present clear and convincing evidence that he is actually

innocent in this case. While the defendant’s notice is untimely under Rule

32.4, A.R.Crim.P, such allegations can be raised at any time in post-conviction

relief proceedings. See, Rule 32.2, A.R.Crim.P. However, the defendant’s

notice is required to set forth the substance of his claim as well as the reasons

for not raising the claim in a timely manner, otherwise the notice must be

summarily dismissed. See, Id. The defendant’s notice fails to provide this

information. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED summarily dismissing the defendant’s Notice of PostConviction Relief filed on May 6, 2009. 

(Id., Exh. G.)

Petitioner did not file a petition for review of the trial court’s decision to the Arizona

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 1, at 5.) Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition on September

23, 2010, raising the following as grounds for relief: 

(1) Violation of Fourth Amendment: Petitioner alleges an illegal search of his residence.

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(2) Violation of Fourth Amendment: Petitioner alleges that police relied on information

known to be false in obtaining a warrant to search his residence.

(3) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Fourth Amendment Violation: Petitioner alleges

that his trial counsel knew of the unlawful search and did not challenge its validity in court.

(4) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Petitioner alleges that his counsel did not renew a

Fourth Amendment objection to the introduction of a statement he had made to witness “R.”

(Doc. 1, at 6-9.)

DISCUSSION

 The AEDPA imposes a statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed by state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). A state prisoner must file a

federal petition within one year from "the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A); see also Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002). Petitioner’s

conviction became final “upon the expiration of the time for seeking [state post-conviction]

relief.” Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that for an Arizona

non-capital pleading defendant, the conviction becomes “final” at the conclusion of the first

“of right” post-conviction proceeding under Rule 32).

Petitioner was sentenced on November 14, 2006. His direct appeal concluded on

April 15, 2008. He did not file an appeal of that decision to the Arizona Supreme Court,

thus, his conviction became final when the time for filing a petition for review to the Arizona

Supreme Court expired, that is, on May 15, 2008. 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A). Thus, absent

tolling, he was required to file his petition for writ of habeas corpus by May 15, 2009.

28U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A). "The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward" the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also

Lott, 304 F.3d at 921.

Petitioner’s deadline for initiating PCR proceedings was within 90 days after the entry

of judgment and sentence or within 30 days from the order and mandate in the direct appeal,

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whichever is later. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(a). Petitioner filed his PCR petition on May 6,

2009, nearly a year after conclusion of direct review. The trial court dismissed Petitioner’s

PCR proceedings as untimely May 11, 2009. As Petitioner’s PCR petition was not “properly

filed” he is not entitled to statutory tolling of the time that his petition was pending in the

state court. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). "When a post-conviction

petition is untimely under state law, 'that [is] the end of the matter' for purposes of §

2244(d)(2)." Id. at 414. To hold otherwise “would turn §2244(d)(2) into a de facto extension

mechanism, quite contrary to the purpose of AEDPA, and open the door to abusive delay.”

Id. at 413. For purposes of statutory tolling, a federal district court defers to the state court’s

determination that the state post-conviction relief request was “properly filed.” Id., at 414.

 Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely because he did not file it by May 15, 2009, and

should therefore be dismissed, unless Petitioner can demonstrate grounds for equitable

tolling.

In order for a petitioner to be entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 1-year

limitations period, he must show: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2)

that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland

v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) (citation omitted). Equitable tolling

is appropriate “if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible

to file a petition on time.” Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,

1288 (9th Cir.1997), overruled on other grounds, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (tolling of

statute of limitations due to extraordinary circumstances requires that a defendant diligently

pursue his claim). A petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he pursued his rights

diligently and that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. Pace, 544 U.S. at

418. Grounds for equitable tolling are “highly fact-dependent.” Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d

919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc).

Petitioner acknowledges that his petition is untimely, but argues that the AEDPA oneyear limitations period does not bar his petition because “[he] is mentally handicapped and

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requires assistance” and he “has suffered from a brain aneurysm and is unable to timely file

his petition without assistance.” (Doc. 1, at 11.) Petitioner also asserts in his Reply that

“[d]uring [his] incarceration in county jail it was discovered that Petitioner is autistic,”... and

that “in December 2008, [he] suffered a stroke from a brain aneurysm leaving [him] with

memory loss, and impaired speech.” (Doc. 9, at 2.) Petitioner does not submit any medical

records, or any evidence in support of these claims. Nothing in the trial or appellate court

record was submitted reflecting Petitioner’s counsel, or the court’s concern regarding his

competence. Even if Petitioner did suffer a stroke in December, 2008, that does not explain

his failing to timely file his PCR notice in June, 2008. In his untimely PCR notice, filed on

May 6, 2009, he did not raise the issue of his mental capacity in explaining why his PCR was

untimely, despite having the option on the form notice to indicate that his failure to file was

“without fault on [his] part.” (Doc. 11, Exh. F, at 3.) His reported autism and stroke also do

not explain why the habeas petition he did file in this court could not have been filed earlier.

He waited over 16-months after the dismissal of his PCR before filing the instant habeas

petition.

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate equitable tolling applies in his case. He has not

demonstrated that he has “purs[ued] his rights diligently,” and that “some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-19 & n.8. “Equitable tolling will not

be available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary

circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Calderon, 128 F.3d at 1288. Extraordinary circumstances “necessarily suggests the doctrine’s

rarity, and the requirement that extraordinary circumstances ‘stood in his way’ suggests that

an external force must cause the untimeliness, rather than, . . . merely ‘oversight,

miscalculation or negligence’” on a petitioner’s part. Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556

F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that even if prisoner had difficulty developing

his claims, he did not show diligence because, inter alia, “he could have prepared a basic

form habeas and filed it to satisfy the AEDPA deadline” and amended the petition later)

(citations omitted). 

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Petitioner’s conclusory assertions regarding his mental functioning are insufficient to

establish equitable tolling. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 337 (2007) (finding that

the petitioner “made no factual showing of mental incapacity” and thus had fallen far short

of showing extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling). In addition to failing

to present evidence of mental impairment, Petitioner has made no attempt to establish a

“casual connection” between his alleged mental impairment and his ability to file a timely

habeas petition. See Bryant v. Schriro, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (habeas

petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling when he “failed to establish the requisite causal

connection” between alleged impediment and his ability to file a timely habeas petition). 

Petitioner’s case is distinguishable from the facts in Laws v. Lamarque, a case that the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine what

period of time should be equitably tolled due to petitioner’s mental incompetence. 351 F.3d,

at 924-25. In Laws, the petitioner had made claims of incompetency in his state proceedings,

had been evaluated by five mental health professionals, and had submitted psychiatric and

medical records to document his claim. Id, at 921-23 (the court noted that, “[i]n 1993 it took

three psychiatrists, two psychologists, and a judge to decide Laws’s competence at the time

of the inquiry”). The Court also noted that its holding was in accord with a Third Circuit

decision that held that even though there was “no evidence in the record that [petitioner]’s

current mental status affected his ability to present his habeas petition,” there was evidence

of “ongoing, if not consecutive, periods of mental incompetency.” Id., at 924 (citation

omitted).

Here, Petitioner’s bare allegations of mental deficiencies, without evidentiary support,

and without an explanation as to how the alleged deficiencies prevented him from acting

diligently or filing a timely PCR or habeas petition, do not warrant the granting of

Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing, or the application of equitable tolling.

Petitioner was required to file his habeas petition by May 15, 2009, but did not file it until

September 23, 2010, and thus his petition is untimely and must be dismissed with prejudice.

This Court will therefore recommend that the petition be denied and dismissed.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

 That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be

DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because denial of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar, and jurists of reason would not find the procedural bar

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to

file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge's recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 20th day of January, 2011.

 

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