Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02821/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02821-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLENN GARY,

Petitioner,

v.

M.C. KRAMER,

Respondent.

 No. CV-06-02821-FVS 

 ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

 WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

 

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner's Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Ct.

Rec. 1). Petitioner is proceeding pro se. Respondent is represented

by Robert C. Cross of the California Attorney General's Office.

BACKGROUND

At the time this petition was filed, Petitioner was in the

custody of the Folsom State Prison in Folsom, California, pursuant to

his August 19, 1982 conviction for first-degree murder with use of a

firearm. (Ct. Rec. 1). Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of

25-years-to-life with the possibility of parole. Petitioner has not

been found suitable for parole. Petitioner is challenging the August

4, 2005, decision by Board of Parole Hearings of the State of

California ("BPH") finding him unsuitable for parole. (Ct. Rec. 1).

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 The Factual History is taken from the Fifth Appellate 1

District’s opinion denying relief on appeal. These facts were

adopted by the BPH as the basis for their denial of Petitioner’s

parole.

Order - 2

I. FACTUAL HISTORY

On March 11, 1981, the body of Casey Wallace was found in an

orchard in Stanislaus County. (Ct. Rec. 1, Exh. C). Wallace died 1

from multiple gunshot wounds to the head. The entry wounds were in

Wallace's face, and there were three (3) .38-caliber bullets found in

his body.

At the time of Wallace's death, Petitioner was the president of

the Bar Hoppers Motorcycle Club. Christopher Avila, another member of

the club, testified under a grant of immunity that Petitioner told him

he killed Wallace. According to Avila, Petitioner said Wallace was

killed because he was involved in an attempt to have Petitioner

assassinated by another motorcycle club. Avila testified that

Petitioner told him he shot Wallace in the head three times with a

.38-caliber revolver in an orchard near Turlock, California. Avila

further testified that Petitioner thought it "comical" that he had

"blow Wallace away with his own weapon." 

On the morning of the murder, Mr. Hammond, another member of the

motorcycle club, was present at Petitioner’s residence. He testified

(under immunity) that Petitioner told him, "I blew that [expletive]

away." Hammond also testified that Petitioner told him he shot

Wallace three times in the head, and the shooting took place in an

orchard.

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Order - 3

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner was convicted in Stanislaus County Superior Court on

August 19, 1982. (Ct. Rec. 1). On September 15, 1982, he was

sentenced to 25 years to life, plus a two-year enhancement for use of

a firearm. (Ct. Rec. 10, Exh. A). After serving two years for the

firearm enhancement, Petitioner began serving his life term on July

18, 1985. (Ct. Rec. 1, Exh. E). Petitioner has been incarcerated for

the past 28 years. Petitioner's minimum eligible parole date ("MPED")

was May 17, 1998. (Ct. Rec. 1, Exh. E).

On August 4, 2005, the BPH found Petitioner unsuitable for

parole. (Ct. Rec. 1). After he was denied parole, Petitioner filed

habeas petitions with the Stanislaus County Superior Court, the Fifth

District Court of Appeals, and the California Supreme Court, all of

which were denied. (Ct. Rec. 1, Exhs. M, N). 

Petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus on

December 13, 2006. (Ct. Rec. 1). Respondents filed a response to the

petition on March 19, 2007. (Ct. Rec. 10). Petitioner filed a

traverse to the response on May 9, 2007. (Ct. Rec. 14).

DISCUSSION

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

("AEDPA"), a federal court may grant habeas relief if a state court

adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or resulted in a

decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(2009); see

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Order - 4

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000). "Clearly established

federal law" consists of "the governing legal principle or principles

set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court render[ed]

its decision." Anderson v. Terhune, 516 F.3d 781, 798 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003)). A decision is

"contrary to" clearly established federal law in two circumstances. 

First, a state court decision is contrary to clearly established

federal law when "the state court applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases." Williams, 529 U.S.

at 405. Second, a state court decision is contrary to clearly

established federal law when the state court "arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has

on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 412-413. 

Under the "unreasonable application" standard, a state court

unreasonably applies clearly established federal law when it applies

the law in a manner that is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409. 

"[The] AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt any one

methodology in deciding the only question that matters under §

2254(d)(1) - whether a state court decision is contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71. 

In examining whether state courts reached a decision that was

contrary to federal law or whether the state courts unreasonably

applied such law, the Court should look to the last reasoned state

court decision. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002)

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Order - 5

cert. dismissed, 538 U.S. 919 (2003). Where no reasoning is given in

either the state court of appeals or the state supreme court, Ninth

Circuit courts must determine whether a state court's decision was

objectively unreasonable based on an independent review of the record. 

Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Delgado

v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-982 (9th Cir. 2000)). "Independent review

of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but

rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent

state court decision is objectively unreasonable." Id. 

Here, neither the Fifth District Court of Appeal nor the

California Supreme Court issued a "reasoned opinion": both courts

summarily denied review. (Ct. Rec. 1, Exh. N). Thus, this Court must

conduct an independent review of the record in order to determine

whether the California courts decisions denying relief were "contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law."

Petitioner alleges that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due

process rights were violated because the BPH's denial of parole was

not supported by "some evidence", the BPH's failure to set a uniform

term is illegal, the BPH's failure to disclose a victim letter until

the day of the hearing violated his right to notice, and the Superior

Court's "summary denial" is an unreasonable application of the facts

and law. (Ct. Rec. 1). The Court disagrees for the reasons below.

A prisoner's due process claim is addressed in two steps: first,

a court must ask whether the state has interfered with a

constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and second, a

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Order - 6

court must decide whether the procedures accompanying the interference

were constitutionally sufficient. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v.

Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Sass v. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461

F.3d 1123, 1127 (9 Cir. 2006). th

Respondent maintains that California inmates do not have a

protected liberty interest in parole. (Ct. Rec. 10 at 3). The United

State Supreme Court has determined that state parole statutes create a

federally protected liberty interest in parole if the statute uses

mandatory language that creates a presumption that parole will be

granted if certain findings are made. See Board of Pardons v. Allen,

482 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal, 442

U.S. 1, 12 (1979). Respondent bases his claim on In re Dannenberg, 34

Cal.4th 1061 (2005). In that case, the California Supreme Court held

that the California parole statute was not mandatory because it only

required a parole date to be set after suitability was established. 

Id. However, the Ninth Circuit has held to the contrary, finding that

California life prisoners have a protected liberty interest in parole.

Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127-28 (9th

Cir. 2006); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9 Cir. 2002). th

According to the Ninth Circuit, this liberty interest vests all

"prisoners whose sentence provides for the possibility of parole with

a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the receipt of a

parole release date, a liberty interest that is protected by the

procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause." Irons v. Carey, 505

F.3d 846, 850 (9 Cir. 2007). Thus, under Ninth Circuit precedent, th

California's parole scheme creates a cognizable liberty interest in

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Order - 7

parole.

Since Petitioner has a federally protected liberty interest in

parole, the Court must determine whether Petitioner was afforded

constitutionally sufficient due process during the parole hearing. 

Under Greenholtz, the due process protections guaranteed in a parole

hearing are minimal, requiring only an opportunity to be heard and

notice of the reasons for the adverse decision. 442 U.S. at 16. 

Petitioner does not argue that he was deprived of either of these

protections. However, he does argue that the BPH decision was not

supported by "some evidence." The Ninth Circuit has held that a

parole board's decision deprives a prisoner of due process with

respect to a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole if

the board’s decision is not supported by "'some evidence in the

record,' or is 'otherwise arbitrary.'" Irons, 505 F.3d at 851 (quoting

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (1985)

(holding the "some evidence" standard applies in prison disciplinary

proceedings)). The "some evidence" standard requires this Court to

determine "whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Hill, 472

U.S. at 455-56. Although Hill involved the accumulation of good time

credits rather than parole, later Ninth Circuit cases have held that

the same constitutional principles apply in the parole context because

both situations directly affect the duration of the prison term. See

Jancsek v. Or. Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987)

(adopting the "some evidence" standard set forth by the Supreme Court

in Hill in the parole context); accord, Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-1129;

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Order - 8

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915; McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904. Because the

Supreme Court has never held the "some evidence" standard to be

applicable in the parole context, Respondent argues that the basic

protections of Greenholtz are all that is constitutionally required,

and that Greenholtz is the only "clearly established federal law" on

point. (Ct. Rec. 13 at 7.) This Court will not address the validity

of Respondent's argument, but will proceed in accordance with Ninth

Circuit precedent holding that "some evidence" is required to justify

the denial of parole. 

"To determine whether the some evidence standard is met 'does not

require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of

the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead,

the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record

that could support the conclusion reached'" by the parole board. 

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-456). In order

to determine whether "some evidence" supported the BPH’s decision with

respect to Petitioner, the Court must first consider the California

statutes and regulations that govern the BPH's decision-making. See

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. Under California law, the BPH must set a

release date "unless it determines that the gravity of the current

convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or

past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the

public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration . . .

and that a parole date therefore, cannot be fixed . . . ." Cal. Penal

Code § 3041(b). The overriding concern in determining parole

suitability is public safety and the focus is on the inmate's current

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Order - 9

dangerousness. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1086 (2005), cert.

denied, 546 U.S. 844 (2005). 

The BPH has promulgated regulations setting forth the guidelines

it must follow when determining parole suitability. See Cal. Code.

Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(c) and (d). Circumstances tending to show that

a prisoner is unsuitable for release include the following: 

(1) the commitment offense, where the offense was committed in an

“especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner”; (2) the

prisoner’s previous record of violence; (3) “a history of

unstable or tumultuous relationships with others”; (4) commission

of “sadistic sexual offenses”; (5) “a lengthy history of severe

mental problems related to the offense”; and (6)“serious

misconduct in prison or jail.” 

Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(c). Circumstances tending to

show suitability for release include: 

(1) the prisoner has no juvenile record of assaulting others or

committing crimes with a potential of personal harm to victims;

(2) the prisoner has experienced reasonably stable relationships

with others; (3) the prisoner has performed acts that tend to

indicate the presence of remorse or has given indications that he

understands the nature and magnitude of his offense; (4) the

prisoner committed the crime as the result of significant stress

in his life; (5) the prisoner lacks any significant history of

violent crime; (6) the prisoner’s present age reduces the

probability of recidivism; (7) the prisoner “has made realistic

plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be

put to use upon release”; and (8) “[i]nstitutional activities

indicate an enhanced ability to function within the law upon

release.”

Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(d). 

In examining its own statutory and regulatory framework, the

California Supreme Court recently held that the proper inquiry for a

reviewing court is "whether some evidence supports the decision of the

Board . . . that the inmate constitutes a current threat to public

safety, and not merely whether some evidence confirms the existence of

certain factual findings." In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1212

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Order - 10

(2008). The Court also asserted that the Board's decision must

demonstrate "an individualized consideration of the specified

criteria," but "[i]t is not the existence or nonexistence of

suitability or unsuitability factors that forms the crux of the parole

decision; the significant circumstance is how those factors

interrelate to support a conclusion of current dangerousness to the

public." Id. at 1204-1205. As long as the evidence underlying the

BPH's decision has "some indicia of reliability," parole has not been

arbitrarily denied. Jancsek, 833 F.2d at 1390.

In the present case, the BPH determined Petitioner was not

suitable for parole because he would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger if released from prison. (Ct. Rec. 10, Exh. B at 87). The BPH

informed Petitioner that the denial was based largely on the

commitment offense. (Ct. Rec. 10, Exh. B at 87). In addressing the

commitment offense, the BPH noted that it was "certainly callous" and

"was carried out in a manner that demonstrates a callous disregard for

human suffering." (Ct. Rec. 10, Exh. B at 88.) The BPH also found

that Petitioner had a history of assaultive behavior, including an

assault on a federal officer. (Id.). Further, the BPH found that

Petitioner failed to benefit from "society's previous attempts to

correct his criminality." (Id.) The BPH also expressed its concern

with Petitioner's refusal to accept the gravity of his crime, to show

remorse, and his minimization of the role he played in a motorcycle

club that participated in criminal activity. (Ct. Rec. 10, Exh. B at

89-91). While the BPH did commend Petitioner for his discipline-free

prison record and participation in educational and treatment programs,

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Order - 11

it found him unsuitable for parole. (Ct. Rec. 10, Exh. B at 87-91). 

As the record indicates, Petitioner was given individualized

consideration by the BPH, and all regulatory factors were considered. 

In California the gravity of the commitment offense alone can be

a sufficient basis for denying parole where the facts are especially

heinous or egregious. In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4 616, 682 (2002); th

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1126; Biggs, 334 F.3d at 913-916; Irons, 505 F.3d at

852-853. Here, Petitioner and two other men took the victim, a member

of a rival motorcycle club, to an orchard after beating him severely. 

(Ct. Rec. 10, Exh. B at 14-21). Once in the orchard, Petitioner shot

the victim in the face three times with a .38-caliber handgun. (Id.) 

The Petitioner also found it "comical" that he shot the victim with

the victim’s own weapon, and that now members of the rival gang would

"know I'm not fucking around." (Id.) The motivation for the crime

was the Petitioner's belief that the victim was involved in a plot to

kill Petitioner. (Id. at 88). Based upon these facts, the BPH held

that the crime was especially callous and cruel. (Id.) This Court

finds that Petitioner's due process claims must fail because the BPH

decision was supported by "some evidence" in the record.

ORDER 

Based on this Court's review of the record, it finds the

decisions of the California courts denying habeas relief were not

"objectively unreasonable" because the BPH decision was supported by

"some evidence." Petitioner was given all of the due process

protections he is constitutionally entitled to. Under the AEDPA

standard, the state court decisions were not contrary to or

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Order - 12

unreasonable applications of clearly established federal law, and this

Court cannot grant Petitioner habeas relief. Accordingly,

Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus (Ct. Rec. 1) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk hereby directed to enter this order,

furnish copies to counsel, enter judgment for Respondent, and CLOSE

THE FILE.

DATED this 28th day of April, 2010.

 s/ Fred Van Sickle 

Fred Van Sickle

Senior United States District Judge

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