Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-56957/USCOURTS-ca9-11-56957-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHEYENNE DESERTRAIN; STEVE

JACOBS-ELSTEIN; BRADFORD

ECKHART; PATRICIA WARIVONCHIK;

LEROY BUTLER; WILLIAM CAGLE;

CHRIS TAYLOR,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal

entity; JON PETERS; RANDY

YOSHIOKA; JASON PRINCE; BRIANNA

GONZALES,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11-56957

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-09053-

RGK-PJW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 5, 2013—Pasadena, California

Filed June 19, 2014

Before: Harry Pregerson, Marsha S. Berzon,

and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Pregerson

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2 DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment

in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging

the constitutionality of Los Angeles Municipal Code

Section 85.02, which prohibits the use of a vehicle “as living

quarters either overnight, day-by-day, or otherwise.”

The panel held that Section 85.02 provides inadequate

notice of the unlawful conduct it proscribes, and opens the

door to discriminatory enforcement against the homeless and

the poor. Accordingly, the panel held that Section 85.02

violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment as an unconstitutionally vague statute.

COUNSEL

Carol A. Sobel (argued), Law Office of Carol A. Sobel, Santa

Monica, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Blithe S. Bock (argued), Carmen A. Trutanich, Amy Jo Field,

Lisa S. Berger, City Attorney’s Office, Los Angeles,

California, for Defendants-Appellees.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 3

OPINION

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case concerns the constitutionality

of Los Angeles Municipal Code Section 85.02, which

prohibits use of a vehicle “as living quarters either overnight,

day-by-day, or otherwise.” Plaintiffs include four homeless

individuals who parked their vehicles in the Venice area of

Los Angeles and were cited and arrested for violating Section

85.02. Defendants are the City of Los Angeles and individual

LAPD officers. Plaintiffs argue that Section 85.02 is

unconstitutionally vague on its face because it provides

insufficient notice of the conduct it penalizes and promotes

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. We agree.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. Section 85.02 and theVenice Homelessness Task Force

In 1983, the City of Los Angeles enacted Municipal Code

Section 85.02:

USE OF STREETS AND PUBLIC

PARKING LOTS FOR HABITATION.

No person shall use a vehicle parked or

standing upon any City street, or upon any

parking lot owned by the City of Los Angeles

and under the control of the City of Los

Angeles or under control of the Los Angeles

County Department of Beaches and Harbors,

as living quarters either overnight,

day-by-day, or otherwise.

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4 DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

On September 23, 2010, Los Angeles officials held a

“Town Hall on Homelessness” to address complaints of

homeless individuals with vehicles living on local streets in

Venice. Present at the meeting were a member of the City

Council, the Chief of the LAPD, the Chief Deputy to the City

Attorney, and the Assistant Director of the Los Angeles

Bureau of Sanitation. City officials repeated throughout the

meeting that their concern was not homelessness generally,

but the illegal dumping of trash and human waste on city

streets that was endangering public health. To address this

concern, officials announced a renewed commitment to

enforcing Section 85.02.

Within the week, the LAPD created the Venice

Homelessness Task Force (the “Task Force”). The Task

Force’s twenty-one officers were to use Section 85.02 to cite

and arrest homeless people using their automobiles as “living

quarters,” and were also to distribute to such people

information concerning providers of shelter and other social

services.

Defendant Captain Jon Peters ran the Task Force, which

included Defendant Officers Randy Yoshioka, Jason Prince,

and Brianna Gonzales. Task Force officers received

informal, verbal training, as well as internal policy

memoranda, on how to enforce Section 85.02. Supervisors

instructed officers to look for vehicles containing possessions

normally found in a home, such as food, bedding, clothing,

medicine, and basic necessities. According to those

instructions, an individual need not be sleeping or have slept

in the vehicle to violate Section 85.02. Supervisors directed

officers to issue a warning and to provide information

concerning local shelters on the first instance of a violation,

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DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 5

to issue a citation on the second instance, and to make an

arrest on the third.

II. Enforcement of Section 85.02

Beginning in late 2010, the Task Force began enforcing

Section 85.02 against homeless individuals. Four such

homeless individuals are Plaintiffs in this case:1

Plaintiff Steve Jacobs-Elstein ran his own legal temp

company for almost ten years before losing his business and

his home in the economic downturn of 2007. He

subsequently suffered severe anxiety and depression. He was

able to keep his car, a small SUV, and pay for insurance,

maintenance, and gas with the $200 he collects each month

from General Relief. He kept his few possessions — mainly

two computers and some clothes — in his car because he

could not afford storage fees.

When Jacobs-Elstein first became homeless, he slept in

his car. In mid-2009, an LAPD officer approached JacobsElstein while parked on a city street, warning him that if he

1 Plaintiffs also include four homeless disabled individuals (“Disabled

Plaintiffs”) who the police cited for violating local parking ordinances

from which they are exempt under California law because their vehicles

display handicapped license plates and placards. At oral argument, both

parties acknowledged that Task Force officers had issued these tickets by

mistake, and that these officers were no longer issuing parking tickets to

Disabled Plaintiffs. Disabled Plaintiffs seek only injunctive and

declaratory relief. Because Disabled Plaintiffs disclaimany argument that

the challenged conduct is reasonably likely to recur, their challenge to the

parking tickets is moot. See Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 898 (9th

Cir. 2013) (the voluntary cessation of challenged conduct moots a case

where it is “absolutely clear that the allegedlywrongful behavior could not

reasonably be expected to recur” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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6 DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

slept in his vehicle at night on public streets he would be

arrested. At the time, Jacobs-Elstein was unaware that such

conduct was unlawful. He then looked up Section 85.02 on

the Internet and, based on what he read and what the officer

told him, understood Section 85.02 to mean that he could not

sleep in his car on a public street in Los Angeles. He began

sleeping at motels and on other private property, and soon

obtained permission from a Methodist Church in Venice to

sleep in his car while it was parked in the church parking lot,

provided he leave the lot by 8:00 a.m. each day. He also

registered with the People Assisting The Homeless’s “Venice

Vehicles to Homes” program, secured a spot on the housing

wait lists maintained by the Department of Mental Health and

the Los Angeles Housing Authority, and was approved for a

Section 8 housing voucher through the Department of

Housing and Urban Development.

On the morning of September 13, 2010, Jacobs-Elstein

was waiting in his car on a public street for the First Baptist

Church of Venice to open so that he could volunteer to serve

at the food distribution program, and also receive a meal. 

That morning, Defendant Officer Gonzales and her partner

ordered Jacobs-Elstein out of his car, searched his car, and

cited him for violating Section 85.02. The officers provided

him no shelter or social services information.

A few weeks later, Jacobs-Elstein was again waiting in

his car on a public street for First Baptist to open when

Officer Gonzales banged on the driver’s side window and

told Jacobs-Elstein it was illegal to live in his vehicle. Two

weeks later, Gonzales and her partner again spotted JacobsElstein, this time when he was parked legally in the First

Baptist parking lot, and yelled at him from across the street

that the next time they saw him they would take him to jail.

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DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 7

On the morning of October 31, 2010, Jacobs-Elstein was

exiting his car when Officer Gonzales and her partner

detained, handcuffed, and arrested Jacobs-Elstein for

violating Section 85.02. The car contained personal

belongings, such as boxes and computer equipment, as well

as plastic bottles of urine. Jacobs-Elstein was in custody for

about seven hours before being released, after which he

borrowed money to get his car out of impoundment. He had

no criminal record before this arrest.

On January30, 2011, Defendant Officer Yoshioka and his

partner cited Jacobs-Elstein again for violating Section 85.02,

this time while Jacobs-Elstein was sitting in his car, talking

on his cell phone. Jacobs-Elstein had dog food in the car. He

told Officer Yoshioka the dog food was from a friend whose

dog he would later take to the park. The car also contained

salad boxes, water bottles, a portable radio, and bags of

clothes. Jacobs-Elstein showed Officer Yoshioka proof that

he resided on private property, and thus was not sleeping in

his vehicle. Officer Yoshioka informed him that he need not

sleep in his car to violate Section 85.02.

During this last incident, Officer Yoshioka’s partner gave

Jacobs-Elstein a “Local Resources Information” pamphlet. 

This was the first time he was offered any such information. 

The flyer claimed to provide guidance on how to comply with

Section 85.02. Yet Jacobs-Elstein soon discovered that this

information was not helpful to him. It provided information

only on RV parks, where Jacobs-Elstein could not park his

car, and shelters, where he could not keep his belongings

during the day.

Plaintiff Chris Taylor sells his artwork at a booth on

Venice Beach, where he works every day. In October 2010,

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8 DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Officer Yoshioka issued a warning to Taylor for sleeping in

his small two-door car through the night, in violation of

Section 85.02. He then began sleeping on the sidewalk,

which is legal. Starting December 1, 2010, Taylor began

sleeping at Winter Shelter in Culver City. He rented a storage

facility to get his excess property out of the car, though he

kept his sleeping bag with him in case he missed the bus to

the shelter and had to sleep on the streets.

On the morning of December 18, 2010, Officer Yoshioka

and his partner arrested Taylor for violating Section 85.02

and had his car impounded. At the time he was arrested,

Taylor was sitting in his car to get out of the rain. The

vehicle contained one tin of food, clothing, and a bottle of

urine. Taylor informed the officers that he slept at Winter

Shelter and not in his car, and that he had an identification

card issued by Winter Shelter to prove it. He was arrested

nonetheless.

Plaintiff Patricia Warivonchik has lived in Venice for

thirty-four years. She is epileptic, and after suffering a

significant head injury, is unable to work full time. Because

she could no longer afford to pay rent in Venice, but did not

want to leave the area, she began living in her RV. Since

becoming homeless, Warivonchik has supported herself with

part-time jobs and by selling ceramic artwork. She is also a

member of a church in Santa Monica where she legally parks

her RV at night.

On November 13, 2010, Warivonchik was driving her RV

through Venice — taking her artwork to a local fair — when

she was pulled over by Officer Yoshioka and his partner for

failing to turn off her left blinker. She was not cited for the

blinker, but was given a written warning for violating Section

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DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 9

85.02 and told that she would be arrested if ever seen again

in Venice with her RV.

Plaintiff William Cagle has been a resident of Venice

since 1979. He suffers from congestive heart failure, which

causes fluid to build up in his legs, preventing him from

walking even short distances. His sole source of income is

Social Security, which is not enough to pay both for rent and

for the medicine he needs that is not covered by his insurance. 

Cagle became homeless in 1993, but was able to keep his

small van.

In the earlymornings of October 17, 2010, and November

22, 2010, Officer Yoshioka and his partner cited and arrested

Cagle for violating Section 85.02. Among the items found in

Cagle’s van were clothing, bedding, boxed food, bottles of

medicine, and a portable radio. Cagle explained to the

officers that he was not sleeping in his vehicle. Officer

Yoshioka’s partner responded that sleeping is not the only

criteria for violating Section 85.02.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. The Complaint

In their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs challenged

Section 85.02 under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments, various sections of the California Constitution,

and several state and federal statutes. Although Plaintiffs

alleged that enforcement of Section 85.02 “violates due

process,” they did not specifically allege that the statute is

unconstitutionally vague.

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10 DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

II. Discovery

The parties proceeded to discovery. Plaintiffs filed a

discovery request for “[a]ny and all documents regarding the

incident(s) described in the Complaint.” On August 22, 2011

— eight days before the discovery cut-off date — Defendants

filed their tenth response to Plaintiffs’ discovery request. In

their response, Defendants for the first time produced copies

of internal memoranda instructing officers on how to enforce

Section 85.02.

In one memo from 2008, officers were told that any arrest

“report must describe in detail observations . . . that establish

one of the following— (i) overnight occupancyfor more than

one night or (ii) day-by-day occupancy of three or more

days.” The arrest reports for Plaintiffs Jacobs-Elstein, Taylor,

and Cagle, however, contained no such observations. In

another memo, from 2010, officers were told to “adhere to the

‘Four C’s’ philosophy: Commander’s Intent, Constitutional

Policing, Community Perspective, and Compassion,” with no

further details.

On August 26, 2011, Plaintiffs’ attorneydeposed the Task

Force’s lead officer, Defendant Captain Jon Peters. 

Plaintiffs’ attorney questioned Captain Peters extensively on

whether the Task Force had been given any limiting

instructions on how to enforce Section 85.02. Specifically,

Plaintiffs’ attorney asked about the 2008 memo directing

officers to make an arrest only after observing a suspect

occupying a vehicle for more than one night or for three

consecutive days, an instruction Defendant Officers had

ignored. Captain Peters then stated that he disapproved of

this memo because he felt it did not offer Task Force officers

enough discretion, and had instead instructed officers to

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DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 11

follow the broadly-worded “Four C’s” policy. Plaintiffs’

attorney asked Captain Peters if he believed a person who

slept at a shelter but was found in her vehicle during the day

would be in violation of Section 85.02. Captain Peters

responded, “I don’t believe that they would be violating the

law, in my opinion.”

On August 30, 2011, Plaintiffs’ attorney deposed

Defendant Officer Jason Prince. Again, Plaintiffs’ attorney

repeatedly asked whether Task Force officers had been given

any specific training or guidance on how to enforce Section

85.02, particularly if a suspect did not sleep in the vehicle at

night. Officer Prince responded, “The totality of the

circumstances is what brings us to the conclusion that they’re

in violation of [Section] 85.02, not where they’re sleeping at

nighttime.”

After those two depositions revealed conflicting views

among the enforcing officers as to what Section 85.02 means,

Plaintiffs’ attorney told Defense counsel that Plaintiffs would

now be challenging the constitutionality of Section 85.02 on

vagueness grounds. On September 13, 2013, Plaintiffs’

attorney emailed Defense counsel confirming that one of

Plaintiffs’ “primary arguments [is] vagueness,” then

mentioned three Supreme Court cases discussing the voidfor-vagueness doctrine: Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,

405 U.S. 156 (1972), Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352

(1983), and City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).

III. Motions for Summary Judgment

On September 14, 2011, the parties filed cross-motions

for summary judgment. In their motion, Plaintiffs argued that

“§ 85.02 is unconstitutionally vague and criminalizes

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12 DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

otherwise innocent behavior with insufficient notice as to

what constitutes a violation of the law. . . . Section 85.02 is

totally devoid of any standards or guidelines to limit police

discretion in enforcing a vague law.”

On September 26, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their opposition

to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, again raising

the argument that Section 85.02 is impermissibly vague.

That same day, Defendants filed their opposition to

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. As to Plaintiffs’

vagueness challenge, Defendants first argued that “Plaintiffs’

allegations and theories of liability are confined to those

found in the operative complaint,” and that Defendants were

not on notice that vagueness would be at issue during

summary judgment. Defendants went on, however, to defend

Section 85.02 against Plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge, on the

merits.

On October 3, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their reply in support

of their motion for summary judgment. In it, Plaintiffs

explained to the district court that it was not until eight days

before the end of discovery that Defendants disclosed the

LAPD’s internal memoranda describing the discretion

officers had in enforcingSection 85.02. This was “significant

since, when faced with a vagueness challenge to a municipal

ordinance, courts are required to consider any possible

limiting instructions . . . .” Thus, “[D]efendants can hardly

complain when they only turned over key documents a week

before the end of discovery.” Plaintiffs also informed the

court that Plaintiffs’ attorney had told Defense counsel on

August 30, 2011, that Plaintiffs would now be raising a

vagueness challenge, and sent an email confirming this on

September 13, 2011.

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DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 13

On October 28, 2011, the district court denied Plaintiffs’

motion for summary judgment and granted Defendants’

motion for summary judgment as to all claims. In a footnote,

the district court held that because Plaintiffs failed to raise a

vagueness challenge in their First Amended Complaint,

“Defendants were not on notice that Plaintiffs would

challenge the constitutionality of § 85.02 [on vagueness

grounds] and such arguments are inappropriate.”

Plaintiffs timely appeal.2 We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a grant or denial of summary

judgment “to determine whether, viewing the evidence in a

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are any

genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court

applied the relevant substantive law.” Tzung v. State Farm

Fire & Cas. Co., 873 F.2d 1338, 1339–40 (9th Cir. 1989)

(internal citation omitted).

2 Plaintiffs also appeal their claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s

right to travel, the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable

searches and seizures, and various California statutes. Because Plaintiffs

seek only injunctive and declaratory relief, and because we find that

Section 85.02 is unconstitutionally vague on its face — a dispositive

holding — we need not address Plaintiffs’ other claims.

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14 DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

DISCUSSION

I. The district court abused its discretion by not

addressing Plaintiffs’ vagueness claim on the merits.

The district court refused to consider the merits of

Plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge because it was not expressly

raised in their First Amended Complaint. That ruling was an

abuse of discretion: Plaintiffs should have been granted leave

to amend their First Amended Complaint to add their new

claim.

Plaintiffs made their vagueness argument both in their

motion for summary judgment and in their opposition to

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Where plaintiffs

“fail[] to raise [a claim] properly in their pleadings, . . . [if]

they raised it in their motion for summary judgment, they

should [be] allowed to incorporate it by amendment under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b).” Jackson v. Hayakawa, 605 F.2d 1121,

1129 (9th Cir. 1979). And “when issues are raised in

opposition to a motion to summary judgment that are outside

the scope of the complaint, ‘[t]he district court should have

construed [the matter raised] as a request pursuant to rule

15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to amend the

pleadings out of time.’” Apache Survival Coal. v. United

States, 21 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Johnson v.

Mateer, 625 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1980)).

“[L]eave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so

requires,’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), and this policy is to be applied

with extreme liberality.” Morongo Band of Mission Indians

v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). “Five factors

are taken into account to assess the propriety of a motion for

leave to amend: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the

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DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 15

opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the

plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Johnson v.

Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004). “The denial of

a motion to amend a complaint is reviewed for abuse of

discretion.” Id.

First, there is no evidence of bad faith. Second, there was

no undue delay because Plaintiffs only fully understood

Defendants’ enforcement policieslate in the discoveryperiod. 

Defendants made Plaintiffs aware of the LAPD’s 2008 and

2010 internal memoranda — describing the Task Force’s

policy of enforcement — eight days before the discovery cutoff. As discussed in Part II.B below, the vagueness analysis

of a statute includes a review of any limiting interpretation

adopted by the enforcement agency. These two memoranda

alerted Plaintiffs that Task Force officers had either received

ambiguous instructions, or had ignored the explicit directives

they had been given. Once Plaintiffs received these key

documents, they advanced their vagueness argument.

Third, there was no prejudice to Defendants. The district

court found that Defendants were not on notice that Plaintiffs

would raise a vagueness challenge at summary judgment. 

Yet the record shows otherwise. After finally receiving

Defendants’ 2008 and 2010 internal memoranda, Plaintiffs’

attorneyrepeatedlyasked Defendants during their depositions

whether Task Force officers had any criteria to limit their

enforcement of Section 85.02, especially when it came to

suspects — like Plaintiffs — who did not spend the night in

their vehicles. This questioning put Defendants on notice that

Plaintiffs were concerned with the vagueness of Section

85.02 and the lack of limiting instructions provided by the

LAPD.

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16 DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Once Plaintiffs fully understood Defendants’ policy of

enforcingSection 85.02, Plaintiffs confirmed that they sought

to challenge Section 85.02 on vagueness grounds. Plaintiffs’

attorney told Defense counsel weeks before the parties filed

cross-motions for summary judgment that Plaintiffs would be

raising a vagueness challenge, and repeated this statement by

email the day before cross-motions for summary judgment

were filed.

By the summary judgment stage, Defendants had ample

notice of Plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge, and the issue did

not require further discovery. Both parties fully argued the

vagueness issue in their respective summary judgment

briefings. Thus, any claim of surprise or prejudice by

Defendants is unpersuasive. See Howey v. United States, 481

F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding no undue prejudice

when defendant “was fully prepared to litigate” new issues

raised in amended complaint).

Fourth, there is no showing that amendment would be

futile. And fifth, Plaintiffs only amended their complaint

once, long before they received Defendants’ internal

memoranda.

The district court should have construed Plaintiffs’

vagueness argument at summary judgment as a motion to

amend their First Amended Complaint. And given

Defendants’ late disclosures and inability to make a credible

claim of surprise or prejudice, the district court abused its

discretion by not amending the First Amended Complaint to

conform to the evidence and argument, and by not

considering the vagueness claim on the merits.

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DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 17

II. Section 85.02 is unconstitutionally vague.

A statute fails under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment “if it is so vague and standardless

that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits

. . . .” Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966). A

statute is vague on its face when “no standard of conduct is

specified at all. As a result, men of common intelligence

must necessarily guess at its meaning.” Coates v. City of

Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

“Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of

two independent reasons. First, it may fail to provide the

kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand

what conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize and even

encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 

Morales, 527 U.S. at 56 (citation omitted). Section 85.02

fails under both standards.

A. Section 85.02 fails to provide adequate notice of

the conduct it criminalizes.

“[T]he purpose of the fair notice requirement is to enable

the ordinary citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law.” 

Id. at 58. A penal statute cannot require the public to

speculate as to its meaning while risking life, liberty, and

property in the process. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.

451, 453 (1939).

Section 85.02 offers no guidance as to what conduct it

prohibits, inducing precisely this type of impermissible

speculation and uncertainty. It states that no person shall use

a vehicle “as living quarters either overnight, day-by-day, or

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18 DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

otherwise.” Yet the statute does not define “living quarters,”

or specify how long — or when — is “otherwise.” We know

that under Defendants’ enforcement practices sleeping in a

vehicle is not required to violate Section 85.02, as JacobsElstein learned, nor is keeping a plethora of belongings

required, as Taylor learned. But there is no way to know

what is required to violate Section 85.02.

Instead, Plaintiffs are left guessing as to what behavior

would subject them to citation and arrest by an officer. Is it

impermissible to eat food in a vehicle? Is it illegal to keep a

sleeping bag? Canned food? Books? What about speaking

on a cell phone? Or staying in the car to get out of the rain?

These are all actions Plaintiffs were taking when arrested for

violation of the ordinance, all of which are otherwise

perfectly legal. And despite Plaintiffs’ repeated attempts to

comply with Section 85.02, there appears to be nothing they

can do to avoid violating the statute short of discarding all of

their possessions or their vehicles, or leaving Los Angeles

entirely. All in all, this broad and cryptic statute criminalizes

innocent behavior, making it impossible for citizens to know

how to keep their conduct within the pale.

In this respect, Section 85.02 presents the same vagueness

concerns as the anti-loitering ordinance held unconstitutional

in Morales, 527 U.S. 41. There, the Supreme Court found

that a Chicago law prohibiting “loitering,” which it defined as

“remain[ing] in any one place with no apparent purpose,”

lacked fair notice, as it was “difficult to imagine how any

citizen . . . standing in a public place with a group of people

would know if he or she had an ‘apparent purpose.’” Id. at

56–57.

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DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 19

So too here. It is difficult to imagine how anyone loading

up his or her car with personal belongings, perhaps to go on

a camping trip or to donate household wares to the Salvation

Army, and parking briefly on a Los Angeles street, would

know if he or she was violating the statute. What’s worse,

even avoiding parking does not seem to be sufficient;

Plaintiff Warivonchik was not even parked — she was

driving her RV through Venice when she was pulled over and

issued a warning. So, under the Task Force’s expansive

reading of this alreadyamorphous statute, any vacationer who

drives through Los Angeles in an RV may be violating

Section 85.02. As “the [C]ity cannot conceivably have meant

to criminalize each instance a citizen” uses a vehicle to store

personal property, vagueness about what is covered and what

is not “dooms this ordinance.” Id. at 57.

Because Section 85.02 fails to draw a clear line between

innocent and criminal conduct, it is void for vagueness.

B. Section 85.02 promotes arbitrary enforcement that

targets the homeless.

A statute is also unconstitutionally vague if it encourages

arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. See Papachristou,

405 U.S. at 162. If a statute provides “no standards

governing the exercise of . . . discretion,” it becomes “a

convenient tool for harsh and discriminatory enforcement by

local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed

to merit their displeasure.” Id. at 170 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is exactly what

has occurred here. As noted, Section 85.02 is broad enough

to cover any driver in Los Angeles who eats food or

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20 DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

transports personal belongings in his or her vehicle. Yet it

appears to be applied only to the homeless. The vagueness

doctrine is designed specifically to prevent this type of

selective enforcement, in which a “‘net [can] be cast at large,

to enable men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in

the eyes of the police and prosecution, although not

chargeable in any particular offense.’” Id. at 166 (quoting

Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948) (Frankfurter,

J., dissenting)).

Section 85.02 raises the same concerns of discriminatory

enforcement as the ordinance in Papachristou, 405 U.S. 156. 

There, the Supreme Court held that a city ordinance

prohibiting “vagrancy” — which was applied to “loitering,”

“prowling,” and “nightwalking,” among other conduct —was

unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 158, 163. The Court viewed

the ordinance in its historical context as the descendant of

English feudal poor laws designed to prevent the physical

movement and economic ascension of the lower class. Id. at

161–62. In America, such laws had been used to “roundup

. . . so-called undesireables,” and resulted “in a regime in

which the poor and the unpopular [we]re permitted to stand

on a public sidewalk . . . only at the whim of any police

officer.” Id. at 170, 171 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Court concluded that “the rule of law implies equality

and justice in its application. Vagrancy laws . . . teach that

the scales of justice are so tipped that even-handed

administration of the law is not possible. The rule of law,

evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor

as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society

together.” Id. at 171.

The Cityargues that its enforcement goals were motivated

by legitimate health and safety concerns. It notes that some

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DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 21

of the plaintiffs were arrested while in cars with garbage,

pets, and their personal belongings, and that it was unsafe for

plaintiffs to occupy their cars under these circumstances. We

do not question the legitimacy of these public health and

safety issues, but the record plainly shows that some of the

conduct plaintiffs were engaged in when arrested — eating,

talking on the phone, or escaping the rain in their vehicles —

mimics the everyday conduct of many Los Angeles residents. 

The health and safety concerns cited by the City do not

excuse the basic infirmity of the ordinance: It is so vague that

it fails to give notice of the conduct it actually prohibits. As

shown by the City’s own documents, the different ways the

ordinance was interpreted by members of the police

department make it incompatible with the concept of an evenhanded administration of the law to the poor and to the rich

that is fundamental to a democratic society.

Defendants correctly note that they can bring clarity to an

otherwise vague statute “through limiting constructions given

. . . by the . . . enforcement agency.” Hess v. Bd. of Parole &

Post-Prison Supervision, 514 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Defendants point to their 2008 internal memorandum

instructing officers making an arrest to first “establish one of

the following — (i) overnight occupancy for more than one

night or (ii) day-by-day occupancy of three or more days.” 

This memo is irrelevant. First, Defendant Captain Peters,

who heads the Task Force, admitted that he disfavored these

instructions, and instead advised his officers to adhere to the

“Four C’s” philosophy, which gave Task Force officers no

more guidance than the statute itself. Second, even if Task

Force officers had been given the 2008 memo, they did not

follow it. Officers did not observe Plaintiffs in their vehicles

overnight or for three consecutive days before arresting them.

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22 DESERTRAIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

In sum, Section 85.02 has paved the way for law

enforcement to target the homeless and is therefore

unconstitutionally vague.

CONCLUSION

Section 85.02 provides inadequate notice of the unlawful

conduct it proscribes, and opens the door to discriminatory

enforcement against the homeless and the poor. Accordingly,

Section 85.02 violates the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment as an unconstitutionally vague

statute.

For many homeless persons, their automobile may be

their last major possession — the means by which they can

look for work and seek social services. The City of Los

Angeles has many options at its disposal to alleviate the

plight and suffering of its homeless citizens. Selectively

preventing the homeless and the poor from using their

vehicles for activities many other citizens also conduct in

their cars should not be one of those options.

REVERSED.

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