Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02507/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02507-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1964 Civil Remedies: Racketeering (RICO) Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTON EWING,

Plaintiff,

vs.

EMPIRE CAPITAL FUNDING GROUP, 

INC., et al., 

Defendants.

CASE NO. 17cv2507-LAB (MDD)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING 

MOTION TO STRIKE [Dkt. 87]

After receiving a series of robocalls, Anton Ewing originally sued nine defendants

for violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). Seven of the

defendants either defaulted or have been dismissed, so only two remain: Ascend Funding

and Peter Tafeen (“Defendants”). Defendants previously moved to dismiss Ewing’s

original complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Court

granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and denied the motion to dismiss

for lack of jurisdiction, but invited Defendants to renew their jurisdictional challenges if

Ewing amended. Dkt. 82. Ewing did amend, and Defendants took the Court up on its

offer to renew their motion to dismiss, which is now before the Court. Defendants also

move to strike a portion of Ewing’s complaint that details a settlement offer. For the

following reasons, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

Dkt. 87.

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I. Motion to Dismiss 

A. Personal Jurisdiction 

Defendants move to dismiss Ewing’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), arguing 

they lack sufficient contacts with California to permit jurisdiction over them. Ewing says

this Court has already determined it has jurisdiction over the Defendants and that 

Defendants are therefore “estopped” from relitigating the issue. He is incorrect. When it 

denied Defendants’ original jurisdictional challenge, the Court explicitly invited 

Defendants to “renew their motion after Ewing amends.” Dkt. 82 at 2. There is nothing 

improper about their decision to do so.

Since neither Ascend nor Tafeen are “essentially at home” in California, Ewing 

must show the Court has specific jurisdiction over these out-of-state defendants. 

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014). That means Ewing’s claims must 

arise out of activity they purposefully directed at California and it’s reasonable to ask 

them to defend in California. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1990). As the 

party looking to invoke the federal court’s jurisdiction over the Defendants, Ewing has 

the burden of establishing that such jurisdiction exists. Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems 

Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). To meet this burden, 

Ewing has to allege facts that, if true, would support exercising personal jurisdiction over 

the Defendants. See Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995).

The crux of Ewing’s allegations are that someone affiliated with Ascend 

Funding—and, by extension, Peter Tafeen, who is Ascend’s CEO—robocalled him and 

recorded him without his consent. Ewing alleges that “Defendant Ascend . . . used a 

[robodialer] to call Plaintiff,” he heard a “distinctive click,” and there was a “two-second 

delay before a live human operator came on to the call.” FAC, Dkt. 84, at ¶7. 

Specifically, he alleges that he received a call from an Ascend employee named 

Anthony Ortega, who “expressly confessed” to using an automatic telephone dialing 

system (“ATDS”). Id. at ¶45; Ewing Decl., Dkt. 92, at ¶44. 

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Defendants attempt to rebut these allegations with a declaration from Ascend’s 

Vice President of Operations, Bernard Lynch. Dkt. 87-3. Lynch’s sworn declaration 

provides that all of Ascend’s employees are located in New York and that Ascend does 

not solicit or market for business in California, a state where it’s not registered to do 

business. Id. at ¶¶4-14. Lynch also notes that Ascend does not employ an ATDS—

instead, the employee operating the phone system must click input commands to make 

each call. Id. at ¶15. Finally, as relevant to the call or calls at issue in Ewing’s complaint, 

Lynch notes that it was a third party lead generator, not Ascend, that first called and 

spoke with Ewing. Id. at ¶17. Ewing was transferred to Ascend only after Ewing himself 

expressed a “desire to apply for working capital for his business.” Id. As to the call by 

Anthony Ortega, Lynch admits that there is an employee at Ascend by that name, but 

that Ascend’s internal records do not show any call to Ewing’s phone number on the 

date alleged.

At this juncture, the Court is confronted largely with a case of “he said, she said.” 

Ewing says he was robodialed by Ascend, while Ascend says it doesn’t robodial. 

Ascend may be able to disprove the allegations through discovery, but the Court finds 

Ewing has pleaded sufficient facts to give rise to personal jurisdiction over Ascend. The 

Court does not, however, have jurisdiction over Tafeen as an individual. Ewing does 

not plausibly allege that Tafeen was the one who robodialed him, that Tafeen directly 

ordered the robodialing, or that Tafeen has any other contacts that would permit an 

exercise of jurisdiction. Ewing makes a threadbare allegation that Ascend is simply an 

alter ego of Tafeen—a proposition for which he provides no actual support—but 

otherwise provides no basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over Tafeen. See

FAC, Dkt. 84, at ¶61; see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 

(1984) (“[J]urisdiction over an employee does not automatically follow from jurisdiction 

over the corporation which employs him . . . .”). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED with respect to Peter Tafeen, but 

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DENIED with respect to Ascend Funding, LLC. Plaintiff’s claims against Peter Tafeen 

individually are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

1

 

B. Failure to State a Claim 

Defendants also argue that Ewing’s complaint—which contains one claim under 

the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”) and another claim under the TCPA—

should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

Defendants argue that Ewing’s CIPA claim is barred because the statute only 

covers calls to landlines, while the robodials Ewing allegedly received were to a cell 

phone. Cal. Penal Code § 632 prohibits the eavesdropping or recording of confidential 

conversations “carried on among the parties in the presence of one another or by means 

of a telegraph, telephone, or other device, except a radio . . . .” In examining the legislative 

history of this section, other cases from this District have held that the definition of 

“‘telephone’ means a landline telephone.” See McEwan v. OSP Grp., L.P., 2015 WL 

13374016, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 2015). This Court agrees. Accordingly, because Ewing’s 

complaint is predicated on calls made to his cell phone, he cannot state a cognizable 

CIPA claim. See Compl., Dkt. 84 at ¶6 (referring to calls made to “Plaintiff’s . . . registered 

private cellular phone.”). Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Ewing’s CIPA claim is 

therefore GRANTED and the claim is DISMISSED.

That leaves only Ewing’s TCPA claim. The TCPA generally prohibits calls to 

numbers that are listed on the National Do Not Call Registry as well as the use of 

robodialers. See 47 U.S.C. § 227. Defendants’ arguments for dismissal largely mirror 

 

1 Defendants also make various evidentiary objections to Ewing’s declaration. The only 

statement in the declaration that is relevant to the Court’s decision here is Ewing’s 

statement that he “was called on August 14, 2017 from 347-246-5579 by Ascend 

Funding’s Anthony Ortega who is a ‘funding specialist’ and he attempted to sell me a

loan.” Dkt. 87-2 at ¶44. Defendants object that this is self-serving and conclusory. Dkt. 

93-1, Obj. 42. But Ewing’s statement provides sufficient detail and Defendants 

themselves admit that they employ someone named Anthony Ortega, so the Court finds

this objection meritless. That objection is OVERRULED and the remainder are 

OVERRULED AS MOOT at this stage.

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their arguments for lack of jurisdiction—that Ewing should be suing a third-party and that 

they did not make the calls at issue. For the same reasons stated above, however, Ewing 

has plausibly pleaded a violation of the statute. Ascend may well be able to disprove the 

allegations through discovery and summary judgment, but at this point Ewing has met his 

burden. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Ewing’s TCPA claim is DENIED. 

II. Motion to Strike

Defendants urge the Court to strike a portion of Ewing’s FAC that disclosed the 

dollar value of a settlement offer made by Ascend. See Dkt. 84 at ¶49. This type of 

disclosure in a public filing is damaging to both the parties and the judiciary because it 

undermines free, open, and honest settlement negotiations. This Court has inherent 

authority to strike such disclosures under FRCP 12(f), and accordingly STRIKES

Paragraph 49 of Ewing’s First Amended Complaint. 

The Court will also take this opportunity to caution Ewing against further 

unprofessional conduct. Ewing’s complaint and opposition are replete with personal 

attacks against various defendants, references to irrelevant details about Tafeen’s 

criminal history, and accusations of perjury. See, e.g., Dkt. 84 at ¶3.e (“Shirreffs is an 

arrogant, pompous and angry person who just does not get it. He needs to be taught a 

lesson . . . .”); Id. at ¶28 (“[Tafeen] is a felon and he recently filed for bankruptcy.”); Id. at 

¶¶39-42 (thoroughly reciting Tafeen’s criminal history); Id. at ¶24 (“Nobody, including 

republicans and democrats, conservatives and liberals, likes telemarketers and yet 

[Defendants] have the gall and audacity to accuse Plaintiff of wrong-doing when it is 

[Defendants] who are the criminal telemarketers running boiler-rooms filled with dozens 

of cubicles packed with telemarketers using robo-dialers.”); Dkt. 92 at ¶14 (“Importantly, 

Tafeen is a convicted felon and as such, should not be believed.”); Dkt 92-2 at ¶68 

(“Tafeen recently committed felony perjury and had his attorney forge his signature on a 

court form filed in the Superior Court in San Diego County.”). Ewing has already been 

sanctioned in this case and other cases in this District, so he is not a first-time offender. 

A fair and efficient judiciary requires civility and professionalism on the part of litigants. 

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Personal attacks or continued incivility will lead to further sanctions. This is a case about 

whether Ewing received unlawful robocalls—Ewing should omit extraneous information 

and limit his future filings to only those facts and arguments that make his allegations

more or less probable.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART. Ewing’s claims against Peter Tafeen individually are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for lack of personal jurisdiction. Ewing’s CIPA claim is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court STRIKES Paragraph 49 of Ewing’s First

Amended Complaint. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is otherwise DENIED and Ewing

may proceed with his claim for violation of the TCPA against Ascend Funding, LLC. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 9, 2019

Honorable Larry Alan Burns

United States District Judge

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