Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00412/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00412-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAREN M. FUENTES, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

Case No.: 15-CV-00412-BEN-MDD

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION ON 

CROSS MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF NOS. 10, 15]

Plaintiff Caren M. Fuentes (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the decision of the 

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) 

denying Plaintiff’s second application for a disability and disability 

insurance benefits under Title II for supplement security income 

payments under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff moves 

the Court for summary judgment reversing the Commissioner and 

ordering an award of benefits, or in the alternative to remand the case 

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for further administrative proceedings. (ECF No. 10). Defendant has 

moved for summary judgment affirming the denial of benefits. (ECF 

No. 15).

For the reasons expressed herein, the Court recommends that 

Plaintiff’s motion be DENIED and Defendant’s motion be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that she became disabled on September 22, 2006, 

due to several medical and mental conditions including depression, 

anxiety, low blood pressure, thyroid, schizophrenic affective disorder 

and a foot condition. (A.R. at 93).1 Plaintiff’s date of birth of August 27, 

1965, categorizes her as a younger individual at the time of filing.

A. Procedural History

In October of 2006, Plaintiff filed applications for social security 

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. (ECF 

No. 10-1 at 4). After a hearing, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 

Jesse J. Pease denied Plaintiff’s claims by a written decision dated July 

30, 2009. (Id.). On November 19, 2009, the Appeals Council upheld the 

ALJ’s decision. (Id.).

On February 10, 2012, Plaintiff filed a second application for

disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social 

Security Act. (A.R. at 23). On February 17, 2012, Plaintiff also filed a 

Title XVI application for supplemental security income. (Id.). On May 

31, 2012, and upon reconsideration on September 28, 2012, both claims 

 

1 “A.R.” refers to the Administrative Record filed on May 4, 2015, and is

located at ECF No. 8.

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were denied. (Id.). On June 24, 2013, Plaintiff appeared with a nonattorney representative at a hearing in Palm Springs, California before 

ALJ Joseph D. Schloss. (ECF No. 10-1 at 5). Plaintiff, Medical Expert 

David Glassmire and Vocational Expert (VE) Troy L. Scott testified. 

(A.R. at 23).

On July 15, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision finding 

Plaintiff not disabled. (Id.). Plaintiff appealed and the Appeals Council 

declined to set aside the ALJ’s decision. (ECF No. 10-1 at 5). 

Consequently, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner. (Id.).

On February 24, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court 

seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. (ECF No. 1). 

On May 4, 2015, Defendant answered and lodged the administrative 

record with the Court. (ECF Nos. 7, 8). On June 8, 2015, Plaintiff 

moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 10). On August 7, 2015, the 

Commissioner cross-moved for summary judgment and responded in 

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. (ECF Nos. 15, 16).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

The supplemental security income program provides benefits to 

disabled persons without substantial resources and little income. 42 

U.S.C. § 1383. To qualify, a claimant must establish an inability to 

engage in “substantial gainful activity” because of a “medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment” that “has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 

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U.S.C. § 1383(a)(3)(A). The disabling impairment must be so severe 

that, considering age, education, and work experience, the claimant 

cannot engage in any kind of substantial gainful work that exists in the 

national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(3)(B).

The Commissioner makes this assessment through a process of up 

to five-steps. First, the claimant must not be engaged in substantial, 

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). Second, the claimant must 

have a “severe” impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Third, the medical 

evidence of the claimant’s impairment is compared to a list of 

impairments that are presumed severe enough to preclude work. 20 

C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If the claimant’s impairment meets or is 

equivalent to the requirements for one of the listed impairments, 

benefits are awarded. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If the claimant’s 

impairment does not meet or is not equivalent to the requirements of a 

listed impairment, the analysis continues to a fourth and possibly fifth 

step and considers the claimant’s residual functional capacity. At the 

fourth step, the claimant’s relevant work history is considered along 

with the claimant’s residual functional capacity. If the claimant can 

perform the claimant’s past relevant work, benefits are denied. 20 

C.F.R. § 416.920(e). At the fifth step, reached if the claimant is found 

not able to perform the claimant’s past relevant work, the issue is 

whether claimant can perform any other work that exists in the 

national economy, considering the claimant’s age, education, work 

experience, and residual functional capacity. If the claimant cannot do 

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other work that exists in the national economy, benefits are awarded. 

20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f).

Section 1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, through Section 

405(g) of the Act, allows unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review 

of a final agency decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c)(3), 

405(g). The scope of judicial review is limited and the Commissioner’s 

denial of benefits “will be disturbed only if it is not supported by 

substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Brawner v. Secretary of 

Health & Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting 

Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less 

than a preponderance. Sandqathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 

1997). “[I]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala 

53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court must consider the record 

as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and detracts from 

the Commissioner’s conclusions. Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & 

Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). If the evidence 

supports more than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold 

the ALJ’s decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). 

When the evidence is inconclusive, “questions of credibility and 

resolution of conflicts in the testimony are functions solely of the 

Secretary.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982).

The ALJ has a special duty in social security cases to fully and 

fairly develop the record in order to make an informed decision on a 

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claimant’s entitlement to disability benefits. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 

F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). Because disability hearings are not 

adversarial in nature, the ALJ must “inform himself about the facts 

relevant to his decision,” even if the claimant is represented by counsel. 

Id. (quoting Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 471 n.1 (1983)).

Even if a reviewing court finds that substantial evidence supports 

the ALJ’s conclusions, the court must set aside the decision if the ALJ 

failed to apply the proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and 

reaching his or her decision. Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th 

Cir. 1978). Section 405(g) permits a court to enter a judgment 

affirming, modifying or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S. 

C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand the matter to the 

Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id.

B. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from July 30, 2009, through the date of the ALJ’s 

decision, July 15, 2013. (A.R. at 23). The ALJ found that Plaintiff did 

not make a showing of changed circumstances material to the 

determination of disability from the first ALJ decision dated July 30, 

2009. (Id.).

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s schizoaffective disorder, substance 

induced psychotic disorder with hallucination, methamphetamine 

dependence and obesity severe. (Id. at 26). The ALJ found Plaintiff’s 

diabetes mellitus and thyroid disorder non-severe. (Id.). The ALJ 

found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 

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impairments that meets or is medically equivalent to the severity of one 

of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 

(20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526). (Id.). Specifically, the 

ALJ found that “[n]o treating or examining physician has recorded 

findings equivalent in severity to the criteria of any listed impairment, 

nor does the evidence show medical findings that are the same or 

equivalent to those of any listed impairment.” (Id.).

The ALJ also found that Plaintiff has mild restrictions in daily 

living activities, moderate difficulties in social functioning, moderate

difficulties with regard to concentration, persistence or pace and 

experienced no episodes of decompensation of extended duration. (A.R. 

at 27). The ALJ stated that Plaintiff “is able to perform household 

tasks, prepare meals, and care for her children.” (Id.).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity

(RFC) to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, but 

Plaintiff is limited to simple and repetitive tasks in a habituated work 

setting, to non-public work with no intense interactions and is 

precluded from work with machinery or fast paced work. (A.R. at 27-

28). Specifically, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s past work experience 

and daily activities illustrate an ability to work. For example, Plaintiff 

worked at Subway Sandwich Shop for a substantial period of time 

before quitting because her manager left. (A.R. at 28-29). Additionally, 

Plaintiff lives with her two teenage children. (A.R. at 28). She takes 

her children to school, visits her mother who lives nearby, cleans her 

home, cares for her pets and attends church. (Id.). She also is able to 

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vacuum, mop and do the dishes. (Id.). Plaintiff also does crafts, like 

beading and painting. (Id.). She reported that she can care for her own 

personal hygiene needs without assistance, can prepare meals, use 

public transportation, shop in stores and accompany her children on 

fieldtrips. (Id.).

Relying on the testimony of Troy L. Scott, the VE, the ALJ found 

that although Plaintiff could not perform past work, she could perform 

other work in the national economy, and therefore did not meet the 

final step of the evaluation process. (A.R. at 32). Plaintiff’s ability to 

perform work at all exertional levels has been compromised by 

nonexertional limitations, which have little or no effect on the 

occupational base of unskilled work at all exertional levels. (Id.). 

Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can do simple duties that can 

be learned on the job in a short amount of time and is capable of other 

basic mental work activities, like understanding, following and 

remembering simple instructions, appropriately responding to 

supervision, coworkers and other usual work situations and dealing 

with changes in a routine work setting. (Id.). 

VE Scott testified that Plaintiff would be able to perform 

occupations such as an assembler of small products. (Id.). Accordingly, 

the ALJ concluded that “considering [Plaintiff’s] age, education, work 

experience, and RFC, the claimant is capable of making a successful 

adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the 

national economy.” (Id.). The ALJ specifically noted the following to be 

of particular relevance:

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1. Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff alleged that her condition has worsened since the prior 

2009 ALJ decision, she is unable to work due to depression, anxiety, 

back pain, and schizophrenia, has difficulty dealing with the public and 

has trouble finishing tasks on time. (A.R. at 28). The ALJ found 

Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting 

effects of her symptoms less than fully credible. (A.R. at 29). 

Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling mental 

and physical limitations inconsistent with the objective medical 

evidence. (Id.).

The ALJ found it particularly relevant that Plaintiff was not fired 

from her job at Subway, but quit because her manager left. (Id.). 

Plaintiff’s allegations of worsened condition directly conflict with 

treatment records, which show improvement in her mental condition 

with abstention from methamphetamine. (Id.). Plaintiff also failed to 

show changed circumstances in her condition since the prior ALJ 

decision in 2009. (Id.).

2. Third Party Function Report

Norma Avila, Plaintiff’s caseworker, submitted a third party 

function report dated April 24, 2012. (Id.). Avila reported that Plaintiff 

has trouble socializing with others and suffers from sleep disturbance. 

Avila stated that Plaintiff must be reminded to take medication. (Id.). 

Avila also recounted Plaintiff’s daily household abilities and limitations. 

(Id.). The ALJ found Avila’s third party function report only partially 

credible. (Id.). He stated that “[u]nless Ms. Avila lives with [Plaintiff], 

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it can be assumed her report was based at least partly on [Plaintiff’s] 

subjective recitation.” (Id.). The ALJ also acknowledged that Avila’s 

statements regarding Plaintiff’s limitations are consistent with 

schizoaffective disorder, but that “those limitations are not disabling.” 

(Id.).

3. Treatment Records

The ALJ found that the treatment records after the first 

application show stabilization of Plaintiff’s schizoaffective disorder with 

medication. (A.R. at 30). The same records from late 2009 and 2010 

show an increase in Plaintiff’s symptoms with “continued and 

intermittent methamphetamine use.” (Id.). Even with 

methamphetamine use, the mental status examination findings 

indicate moderate impairment with moderate to severe paranoia and 

hallucinations. (Id.). Plaintiff acknowledged that her symptoms were 

well controlled with medication and sobriety. (Id.). Plaintiff’s increased 

symptoms after losing her job were stabilized after a medication 

adjustment. (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiff’s most recent records indicate 

that she is doing well on medication, reported only a few mild mood 

swings and denied any auditory or visual hallucinations. (Id.).

4. David Glassmire, Ph.D.

At the hearing, Dr. Glassmire testified Plaintiff had 

schizoaffective disorder and methamphetamine abuse. (Id.). He 

considered the time period from July 2009, the date of the prior ALJ 

decision, to the date of the hearing. (Id.). Dr. Glassmire reviewed all 

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the exhibits of record, questioned Plaintiff and heard Plaintiff’s 

testimony. (Id.).

Dr. Glassmire testified that there are not many treatment records

since the prior 2009 ALJ decision, but that the available records show 

Plaintiff has improved since 2009 due to abstaining from 

methamphetamine and starting prescription medication injections. 

(Id.).

Dr. Glassmire opined that Plaintiff has mild restriction in daily 

living activities, moderate difficulties in social functioning, moderate 

difficulties with regard to concentration, persistence or pace and 

experienced no decompensation of extended duration. (Id.). Dr. 

Glassmire stated the maximum RFC determined in the prior ALJ 

decision is still applicable. (Id.).

5. Rakesh Bhansali, M.D.

The ALJ afforded little weight to the disability statements 

submitted by Rakesh Bhansali, M.D. (Id.). Dr. Bhansali wrote a letter 

stating that Plaintiff has mood swings even with her injections. (Id.). 

This letter conflicts with medical records indicating improvement in 

Plaintiff’s condition and stabilization with medication compliance. (Id.).

6. State Agency Review Physicians – Dr. Amado, M.D., and Dr. 

Funkenstein, M.D. 

The ALJ afforded great weight to the State agency review 

physicians who opined the prior ALJ decision should be adopted as 

Plaintiff failed to show any material change in her position. (Id.). 

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Nothing in the record contradicts the State agency medical consultants’ 

opinions that Plaintiff does not meet or equal a medical listing.

C. Issues on Appeal

1. Res Judicata Presumption of Non-Disability

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed harmful legal error in 

finding that she did not prove changed circumstances since the July 

2009 ALJ decision. (ECF No. 10-1 at 15-16). Plaintiff argues that the 

only treating and examining source opinions since the prior ALJ 

decision indicate marked limitations that would be incompatible with 

full-time, competitive work. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that this new 

evidence constitutes changed circumstances. (Id.).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s evidence of changed 

circumstances conflict with the record. (ECF No. 15-1 at 4). Defendant 

explains that the record indicates Plaintiff’s condition improved since 

the prior decision. (Id.).

If a prior ALJ decision on a disability claim became final, then 

administrative res judicata applies to a subsequent disability claim 

under the same title of the Act “if the same parties, facts, and issues are 

involved in both the prior and subsequent claims.” Acquiescence Ruling 

97-4(9)2. A presumption of non-disability exists if the prior final 

decision by the ALJ found the claimant not disabled. Chavez v. Bowen, 

844 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1988). To overcome the presumption of 

 

2 Acquiescense Rulings “are binding on all components of the Social 

Security Administration,” except under specified circumstances, and 

accorded deference by a reviewing court. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(2).

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continuing non-disability, the claimant must prove “‘changed 

circumstances’ indicating a greater disability.” Id. (citing Taylor v. 

Heckler, 765 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1985)). Changed circumstances 

include a change in the claimant’s age category, an increase in the 

severity of the claimant’s impairments, existence of new impairments 

not previously considered, or a change in the criteria for determining 

disability. Acquiescence Ruling 97-4(9). Where the prior final decision 

of non-disability by the ALJ “contained findings on the claimant’s 

[RFC], education, and work experience, SSA may not make different 

findings in adjudicating the subsequent disability claim unless there is 

new and material evidence relating to the claimant’s [RFC], education 

or work experience.” Id.

Plaintiff points to Dr. Rakesh Bhansali’s letter dated April 16, 

2013 as new and material evidence of increased severity. (ECF No. 10-1 

at 15-16). Dr. Bhansali’s letter opines that Plaintiff is unable to sustain 

full-time or even part-time work due to her mental condition. (AR at 

388). Dr. Bhansali explains that Plaintiff was hospitalized in 2006 for 

manic psychotic break down and has been on injectable medication for a 

few years. (Id.). He further explained that Plaintiff suffered 

“breakthrough episodes of mood swings and psychotic symptoms” while 

on the injectable medication. (Id.).

In 2009, ALJ Pease found that Plaintiff had the RFC “capacity to 

perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the 

following non-exertional limitations: SRT [simple and repetitive tasks 

in a] habituated work setting, non-public, no intense interactions, no 

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machinery or fast paced work.” (A.R. at 88). ALJ Pease explained that 

Plaintiff was hospitalized in September of 2006 and diagnosed with 

amphetamine-induced psychosis, was hallucinating, delusional and 

reported using amphetamines. (A.R. at 89). In October 2006, Plaintiff 

suffered auditory hallucinations daily and was diagnosed with 

schizoaffective disorder and polysubstance dependence. (Id.). In 

August 2008, Plaintiff reported auditory hallucinations once a week 

with occasional depressed mood. (Id.). In January 2009, Plaintiff 

reported daily auditory hallucinations with a depressed mood and mood 

swings. (Id.). In April 2009, Plaintiff continued to suffer from 

hallucinations and depression on a frequent basis. (A.R. at 90).

The current ALJ decision adopted ALJ Pease’s RFC after 

considering objective medical evidence and opinion evidence following 

April 2009. On December 23, 2009, Plaintiff reported auditory and 

visual hallucinations, depression, and mood swings. (A.R. at 364). On 

March 24, 2010 she explained that her medications were working, but 

still had both auditory and visual hallucinations. (A.R. at 362). She 

reported improvement in depression, but explained her mood swings 

were “up and down still.” (Id.). Plaintiff also reported she used 

methamphetamine for one week daily, the week prior to March 24, 

2010. (Id.). On April 13, 2010, Plaintiff reported she was still taking 

methamphetamine. (A.R. at 360). She reported serious paranoia, 

anxiety, fear, and suffered visual and auditory hallucinations. (Id.). On 

June 29, 2010, Plaintiff reported exacerbated symptoms and explained 

she was still using methamphetamine. (A.R. at 358). 

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By January 31, 2011, Plaintiff began reporting that her symptoms 

were well controlled with her medication and denied drug use. (A.R. at 

353, 354). On August 10, 2011 Plaintiff explained that “her meds are 

beneficial,” but that she still gets nervous and anxious sometimes. 

(A.R. at 352). She indicated that she wanted to continue on her current 

management plan. (Id.). On February 29, 2012, Plaintiff reported that 

her psychiatric symptoms were worsening since she quit her job. (A.R.

at 351).

Treatment notes from April 12, 2012, show that Plaintiff was 

“doing better on her current meds regimen” and was “sleeping and 

eating fine.” (A.R. at 350). She explained that she had “no delusions, 

paranoid ideations or no ideas of reference.” (Id.). On July 12, 2012, 

Plaintiff reported to Dr. Bhansali that she was doing “OK” and found 

the injectable medication “very helpful.” (A.R. at 368). She also 

explained that she “stopped hearing voices” and denied having 

delusions. (Id.).

On April 16, 2013, the date of Dr. Bhansali’s letter, Plaintiff 

reported “doing OK” and explained that overall her “medication is 

helping.” (A.R. at 387). She reported that she still has some mild mood 

swings that do not cause significant problems, denied “hearing voices, 

seeing things” and “other positive psychotic symptoms.” (Id.). 

Additionally, she reported sleeping well, that her motivation and energy 

levels were okay and denied suicidal thoughts. (Id.). Dr. Bhansali 

opines in his letter that Plaintiff’s psychotic condition impairs her 

ability to focus for a sustained amount of time, impairs her motivation, 

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and impairs her ability to work. (A.R. at 388). This directly conflicts 

with the treatment record from the same date, where Plaintiff reported 

having adequate motivation and energy. (A.R. at 387).

Dr. Bhansali noted that Plaintiff has a medically documented 

persistence of marked incoherence, illogical thinking, sleep disturbance, 

decreased energy, and thoughts of suicide. (A.R. at 390). As indicated 

above, the objective treatment record contradicts Dr. Bhansali’s 

findings. (See A.R. 350 (“she is sleeping and eating fine” and denies 

suicidal ideation), 352 (“sleeping OK” and no suicidal ideation), 353 

(“denies any SI/HI plans or intentions”), 354 (“denies any SI/HI plans or 

intentions” and Plaintiff “admitted feeling good about being a 

contributing member of the society”), 385 (“she last experienced suicidal 

ideations about 20 years ago but none since then”)). 

Dr. Bhansali’s psychiatric questionnaire also directly conflicts 

with Plaintiff’s Adult Function Report. (A.R. at 392-400). For example, 

Dr. Bhansali found that Plaintiff had a marked limitation in her ability 

to remember locations and work-like procedures, understand and 

remember detailed instructions, carry out detailed instructions, 

maintain attention and concentration for extended periods and accept 

instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors. 

(Id.). In contrast, Plaintiff reported that she can pay attention for an 

hour, follows written instructions well, follows spoken instructions 

“good,” gets along okay with authority figures and handles changes in 

routines “OK.” (A.R. at 284-86).

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Plaintiff’s impairments have not increased in severity since the 

prior ALJ decision. Plaintiff concedes that “the record does show some 

evidence of improvement . . . undoubtedly as a consequence of both her 

abstinence from drugs and the positive effects of her medication 

regiment.” (ECF No. 10-1 at 19). Plaintiff further admits that her 

“condition has shown some sporadic improvement.” (ECF No. 10-1 at 

17). Even with Plaintiff’s “repeated resumption of psychotic symptoms,” 

the treatment record shows stabilization with medication and only 

moderate impairment – both of which are improvements since 

Plaintiff’s prior disability determination in 2009. (ECF No. 10-1 at 19; 

A.R. 350-69). Plaintiff has not shown changed circumstances to rebut 

the presumption of non-disability. Additionally, Dr. Bhansali’s letter 

does not warrant a different RFC from the prior ALJ decision because it 

is unsupported by the objective medical record.

2. Weight Afforded to Dr. Bhansali and Dr. Berg

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in granting little or no 

weight to the opinions of treating psychiatrist Bhansali and examining 

psychologist Berg. (ECF No. 10-1 at 16). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts 

that the ALJ did not have clear and convincing or specific and 

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence to contradict Dr. 

Bhansali’s opinion and did not consider Dr. Berg’s opinion at all. (Id. at 

16, 19).

Defendant asserts that the ALJ properly afforded little weight to 

Dr. Bhansali’s opinion because it is unsupported by the objective

treatment record. (ECF No.15-1 at 8). Defendant also explains that 

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Plaintiff did not submit Dr. Berg’s opinion until after the ALJ issued his 

decision and that the ALJ “could not comment on a report that was not 

provided to him.” (Id. at 10). Defendant argues that even with Dr. 

Berg’s opinion the ALJ decision should be upheld because it is contrary 

to the objective medical record. (Id. at 13).

Where the record contains medical evidence conflicting with a 

treating or examining physician’s opinion, “the ALJ is charged with 

determining credibility and resolving the conflict.” Benton v. Barnhart, 

331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). Generally, a treating physician’s 

opinion carries more weight than a non-treating physician and an 

examining physician’s opinion carries more weight than a nonexamining physician. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Where a treating or examining physician’s opinion is contradicted by 

another doctor, the ALJ may reject the opinion if there are “specific and 

legitimate reasons in the record that are supported by substantial 

evidence.” Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 

(9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31).

a. Dr. Bhansali

Dr. Glassmire, an impartial medical expert who reviewed all the 

medical and other exhibits prior to the hearing, testified that “the 

records in general show that [Plaintiff] has improved since 2009 largely 

due to getting off the methamphetamine and starting the injectable 

medication.” (A.R. at 43). He explained that he found Dr. Bhansali’s 

opinions indicating that Plaintiff is disabled with several marked 

limitations as being unsupported in the ongoing treatment records. 

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(A.R. at 45). After providing in-depth testimony about Plaintiff’s 

treatment records, Dr. Glassmire concluded that “the record generally 

indicates that when [Plaintiff] stopped using methamphetamine in 

early 2011 her symptoms generally became stable, particularly while 

she was taking the injectable anti-psychotic medication.” (A.R. at 49).

Dr. Glassmire’s opinion contradicts Dr. Bhansali. As a result, the 

ALJ could reject Dr. Bhansali’s opinion if there were specific and 

legitimate reasons in the record that are supported by substantial 

evidence. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164. The ALJ gave two specific and 

legitimate reasons in the record for giving Dr. Bhansali’s opinion little 

weight. First, the medical records indicated improvement in Plaintiff’s 

condition with abstention from methamphetamine. (A.R. at 31). As 

explained above, the treatment records provide substantial evidence of 

improvement. (A.R. at 350-64). Second, the ALJ stated that Dr. 

Glassmire found Dr. Bhansali’s letter unsupported by the treatment 

records. (A.R. at 31). As previously indicated, this is also substantiated 

by the contradictions between Dr. Bhansali’s medical opinion and the 

objective treatment records. (A.R. at 350-64, 392-400). An “ALJ need 

not accept the opinion of any physician including a treating physician, if 

that opinion is brief, conclusory and inadequately supported by clinical 

findings.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th 

Cir. 2009). The ALJ properly afforded little weight to Dr. Bhansali’s 

opinion.

//

//

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b. Dr. Berg

Dr. Berg, an examining physician, administered a psychological 

history questionnaire, mental status examination, a psychological 

impairment questionnaire, and several tests on May 23, 2013. (A.R. at 

400). The hearing was held on June 24, 2013, over a month after Dr. 

Berg’s examination of Plaintiff. (A.R. at 38). The ALJ did not receive 

Dr. Berg’s opinions and findings until after the decision. (A.R. at 320 

(“Since the recent decision, this office obtained and submitted a medical 

opinion from examining psychologist, Dr. Gene Berg.”)). 

Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ “cannot reach a conclusion by 

ignoring competent evidence which would support the opposite result” 

without explaining “why ‘significant probative evidence has been 

rejected’” is irrelevant because the ALJ was not given the evidence to 

consider before making a decision. (ECF No. 10-1 at 19) (citing Gallant 

v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1984) and Vincent v. Heckler, 

730 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984), (A.R. at 320). Additionally, 

Plaintiff is incorrect in stating that the Appeals Council did not even 

acknowledge Dr. Berg’s opinion. (ECF No. 10-1 at 19). The Appeals 

Council reviewed Dr. Berg’s medical opinion, but found that it did not 

provide a basis for changing the ALJ’s decision. (A.R. at 2).

“When the Appeals Council considers new evidence in deciding 

whether to review a decision of the ALJ, that evidence becomes part of 

the administrative record, which the district court must consider when 

reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence.” 

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Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citing Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Dr. Berg’s medical opinion consists of a letter to Plaintiff’s counsel 

and a psychological impairment questionnaire. (AR at 400-12). Dr. 

Berg acknowledged that Plaintiff was referred for a psychological 

evaluation by her counsel. (A.R. at 400). He based his opinion on his 

examination, Dr. Bhansali’s letter and Plaintiff’s medical records from 

Imperial County Behavioral Health for 2011. (Id.).

Dr. Berg found that Plaintiff’s grooming and hygiene were

appropriate, she was alert and oriented to time, place and 

circumstances, her speech was of average rate and volume, her eye 

contact was appropriate and she was compliant and cooperative. (A.R.

at 401). Plaintiff reported to Dr. Berg that she did not have homicidal 

or suicidal ideation, but did have episodes of depression, sadness, 

suicidal ideation, anxiety, and episodes of changing mood and mood 

instability. (Id.). Plaintiff also reported irregular sleep, “vaguely” 

hearing voices and seeing things and that she feels “fearful about the 

devil wanting to take her and take her soul.” (Id.). Additionally, 

Plaintiff denied using methamphetamine and told Dr. Berg she drank 

alcohol excessively in her younger years. (A.R. at 402).

Dr. Berg explained that the medical records indicate that Plaintiff 

“has fewer mental health symptoms” than alleged, but substantiated a 

history of mental illness. (Id.). After Plaintiff took The Bender Visual 

Motor Gestalt Test (Bender), the Shipley Institute of Living Scale, Wide 

Range Achievement Test (WRAT-4) and the Minnesota Multiphasic 

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Personality Inventory (MMPI-2) tests, Dr. Berg opined that “it is likely 

that the client exaggerated the extent of some of her personal 

difficulties.” (A.R. at 400-03).

Dr. Berg concluded there is sufficient evidence that Plaintiff 

“suffers from a major mental disorder which significantly impacts upon 

her social occupational functioning” and that Plaintiff “would not be 

able to work a full time job in the next year.” (A.R. at 404).

Dr. Berg’s opinion is based only on Dr. Bhansali’s letter, which is 

unsupported by the objective medical record, and Plaintiff’s 2011 

medical records, which do not support Dr. Berg’s opinion. (A.R. at 400). 

On January 1, 2011, Plaintiff’ was found socially unimpaired, felt 

that her symptoms were well controlled with her injected medication,

overall “admitted feeling good about being a contributing member of 

society” and was making efforts to empower and boost her self-esteem. 

(A.R. at 354). She also denied auditory or visual hallucinations, 

paranoia and depressive or manic symptoms. (Id.). She was alert, well 

groomed, kept eye contact, had no signs of agitation, no abnormal 

movements and denied any homicidal or suicidal ideations. (Id.). This 

is contrary to Dr. Berg’s findings of social withdrawal or isolation, 

hostility and irritability, delusions or hallucinations, suicidal ideation 

or attempts and paranoia or inappropriate suspiciousness. (A.R. at 

406).

On May 19, 2011, Plaintiff reported she was happy to move in to 

her new place, denied auditory or visual hallucinations, paranoia, 

depressive or manic symptoms, suicidal or homicidal ideations, slept 

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five to six hours a night and felt her symptoms were well controlled 

with medication. (A.R. at 353). She was alert, well groomed, kept eye 

contact, had no signs of agitation and no abnormal movements. (Id.). 

Additionally, she was found to have no social impairments. (Id.). Dr. 

Berg’s findings of delusions or hallucinations, suicidal ideation or 

attempts, paranoia or inappropriate suspiciousness, sleep disturbance, 

social withdrawal or isolation and hostility or irritability are 

unsupported by the record. (A.R. at 406).

On August 10, 2011, Plaintiff reported some residual paranoid 

ideations and that she gets nervous and anxious sometimes, but that 

she is doing fairly okay and sleeping okay. (A.R. at 352). She felt her 

medications were still beneficial, reported no overwhelming stressors, 

and denied symptoms of mania, suicidal or homicidal ideation and no 

auditory or visual hallucinations. (Id.). Her cognition and memory 

were intact, she had good eye contact, hygiene and cooperation, no 

abnormal motor movements and normal speech. (Id.). This contradicts 

Dr. Berg’s findings of paranoia or inappropriate suspiciousness, sleep 

disturbance, hostility and irritability, suicidal ideation or attempts and 

delusions or hallucinations. (A.R. at 406).

On November 11, 2011, Plaintiff denied auditory or visual 

hallucinations and said “the medication helps me a lot . . . I haven’t had 

any hallucinations since taking it.” (A.R. at 379). Additionally, her 

symptoms and behaviors were found not to impair her activities of daily 

living. (A.R. at 380). Plaintiff reported that she regularly initiates 

social contacts, communicates clearly with others, participates in group 

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activities, is not involved in arguments or fights, does not fear strangers 

or avoid interactions, and explained that she enjoys beading and 

shopping. (Id.). She was well-groomed, well dressed, oriented, had good 

eye contact, normal mood, calm motor activity, intact thought process, 

normal speech, and difficulties falling asleep. (A.R. at 384). Plaintiff 

explained that she “last experienced suicidal ideations about 20 years 

ago but none since then.” (A.R. at 385). This is contrary to Dr. Berg’s 

findings of delusions or hallucinations, significant social functioning 

impairments, paranoia or inappropriate suspiciousness, suicidal 

ideation or attempts, social withdrawal or isolation and hostility and 

irritability. (A.R. at 404-06).

Notably, Dr. Berg failed to review Plaintiff’s entire medical record 

following the prior ALJ decision, despite existing treatment records 

from 2009 until 2013. (A.R. at 349-69). Dr. Berg’s opinion is given little 

weight due to his limited review of the objective medical record. He 

could not reasonably substantiate his conclusion without reference to 

Plaintiff’s entire objective medical record. See Sandqathe, 108 F.3d at 

980 (“[Substantial evidence] is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”).

3. Credibility of Plaintiff’s Testimony

In her motion, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to articulate 

clear and convincing reasons for rejecting her testimony. (ECF No. 10-1 

at 20). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by: (1) finding

her daily activities demonstrate a greater mental capacity than alleged; 

(2) considering her work at Subway for over a year as evidence Plaintiff 

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is capable of working; and (3) finding the record evidence demonstrates 

an improvement in Plaintiff’s alleged mental disability. (Id. at 23-24).

Plaintiff concludes that the ALJ’s decision is based on “an unjustifiably 

inaccurate account of the record evidence.” (Id. at 22).

Defendant contends that the ALJ properly found Plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints not credible. (ECF No. 15-1 at 14). Particularly, 

Defendant explains that the ALJ found Plaintiff’s alleged limitations 

inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, that her daily 

activities indicated she could work and that Plaintiff quit her job 

because her manager left, not due to her limitations. (Id. at 16). 

Additionally, Defendant states that Dr. Glassmire’s opinion that 

Plaintiff “retained the ability to perform a limited range of unskilled 

work” constitutes substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s RFC 

finding and that she failed to show changed circumstances. 

The ALJ must make two findings before he can find Plaintiff’s 

testimony not credible. Treichler v. Commissioner of SSA, 775 F.3d 

1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014). The ALJ must first determine “whether the 

claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 

impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or 

other symptoms alleged.’” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 

1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991)). Second, if the claimant has produced such 

objective medical evidence, “and the ALJ has not determined that the 

claimant is malingering, the ALJ must provide ‘specific, clear and 

convincing reasons for’ rejecting the claimant’s testimony regarding the 

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severity of the claimant’s symptoms.” Id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ must specifically identify the 

testimony he finds not to be credible and explain what evidence 

undermines that testimony. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 

1208 (9th Cir. 2001).

In this case, the ALJ did find that Plaintiff’s medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some 

of the alleged symptoms. (A.R. at 29). However, the ALJ found 

Plaintiff’s testimony “less than fully credible.” (Id.). The ALJ cited to 

the objective medical evidence in the record, Plaintiff’s daily activities,

evidence regarding Plaintiff’s medical treatment and inconsistencies in 

Plaintiff’s testimony.

a. Objective medical evidence in the record

Where the ALJ has found that medically determinable

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 

symptoms, the ALJ may not reject a claimant’s statements regarding 

intensity or severity of pain or its effect on the ability to work solely 

because it is not supported by the objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1529(c)(2). “The ALJ must specifically identify what evidence 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 

750 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the severe impairment of

schizoaffective disorder, substance induced psychotic disorder with 

hallucination and methamphetamine dependence. Plaintiff’s obesity 

was found to be a severe impairment and was considered in 

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determining her RFC. (A.R. at 26). The ALJ reviewed and considered 

the Plaintiff’s medical history in determining that the evidence did not 

support the severity of Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms. (A.R. at 29). 

The ALJ determined that “the records do not corroborate 

Plaintiff’s allegations of worsening symptoms in her condition since 

2009.” (A.R. at 29). Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s 

treatment records show improvement in her mental condition once she 

stopped using methamphetamine. For example, in January 2011, after 

her last admitted use of methamphetamine, Plaintiff was treated by Dr. 

Chennamchetty, M.D. During that appointment Plaintiff appeared well 

groomed, maintained eye contact, and showed no signs of agitation. 

(A.R. at 354). Dr. Chennamchetty’s report notes that Plaintiff was 

working at that time that she felt good about being a contributing 

member of society. (A.R. at 354). Dr. Chennamchetty assessed 

Plaintiff’s GAF at 60. (Id.). Similarly, in May of 2011, during 

Plaintiff’s follow-up with Dr. Chennamchetty, Plaintiff’s mood was good. 

She had no delusions and she reported her psychiatric symptoms were 

well controlled. (A.R. at 353). In August of 2011, Plaintiff was seen for 

foot/leg pain. (A.R. at 339). The attending nurse noted in Plaintiff’s 

medical record that Plaintiff’s mental status was found to be within 

normal limits. (A.R. at 342). At that time, Plaintiff reported she 

continued to have anxiety and depression but no hallucinations. (A.R. 

at 340). In December of 2011, at a follow-up exam for Plaintiff’s foot/leg 

pain, Dr. Mashhadian, D.O. reported that Plaintiff still complained of 

leg cramps but she presented with no altered mental state. (A.R. at 

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333). Notably, Dr. Glassmire testified that “the records in general show 

that the [Plaintiff] has improved since 2009 largely due to getting off 

methamphetamine and starting injectable medication.” (A.R. at 43). 

Based upon these records the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s mental 

status stabilized once she stopped using methamphetamine and with 

the benefit of regular follow-up care. 

The ALJ noted that Plaintiff suffered a set-back in her mental 

functioning in February 2012. She reported to one of her treating 

physicians, Dr. Adiboshi, that her psychiatric symptoms were 

worsening. However, Dr.Adiboshi reported that Plaintiff’s judgment 

and insight were fair, her thought content contained no delusions, 

paranoid ideations and no ideations of reference. Dr. Adiboshi also 

noted that her attitude was cooperative despite being anxious and 

irritable. (A.R. at 351). 

In addition, the ALJ considered other opinion evidence in the 

record. In particular, he cited to testifying medical expert Dr. 

Glassmire. Dr. Glassmire testified that Plaintiff could work but would 

be limited to simple non-exertional “repetitive tasks in a habituated 

work setting; non-public with no intention (sic) or actions with the 

public, and no machinery or fast-paced work.” (A.R. at 45). 

After considering the objective medical evidence in the record, the 

ALJ found insufficient support for the level of limitations alleged by 

Plaintiff. Consequently, the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s allegations of 

disabling mental limitations was not error.

//

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b. Daily Activities

The Social Security regulations explicitly instruct an ALJ to 

evaluate the claimant’s daily activities when determining the claimant’s 

credibility. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(I); Social Security Ruling 96-7p, 

(SSA July 2, 1996). An ALJ is permitted to use “ordinary techniques of 

credibility evaluation” such as inconsistent prior statements. 

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). 

“Consistency is one strong indication of the credibility of an individual’s 

statements . . . .” Social Sec. Ruling, 96-7p, (SSA July 2, 1996). 

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s self-reported daily activities appeared to 

demonstrate greater functional capacity than Plaintiff alleged. (A.R. at 

27). For example, Plaintiff stated her daily routine consists of getting 

her children off to school, cooking breakfast, doing the dishes, doing 

light cleaning, getting crafts, picking up the children, and cooking 

dinner. (A.R. at 279). Plaintiff also reported that she enjoys beading 

and bike riding, both of which she does well and on a daily basis. (A.R. 

at 283). Plaintiff reported she regularly goes to church, her sister’s 

house, and on field trips with her children, but needs to be reminded to 

go places and cannot go alone. (Id.). At the administrative hearing, 

Plaintiff testified she beads necklaces and paints. (A.R. at 53). She also 

testified that every other day she cleans around the house including 

vacuuming, mopping, dumping the trash and doing the dishes. (A.R. at 

55). According to Plaintiff, her father “comes in weekly and checks” to 

make sure she is doing her chores. (A.R. at 56). 

It is well settled that “[d]isability does not mean that a claimant

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vegetate in a dark room excluded from all forms of human and social 

activity.” Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal 

citations omitted). An ALJ may, however, discredit a claimant’s 

statements when the claimant reports participation in everyday 

activities indicating capacities that are transferable to a work setting. 

See Morgan v. Cmm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 

1999); Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. Even where those activities suggest some 

difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the 

claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a 

totally debilitating impairment. See Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009). After considering the 

relevant evidence in the record, the ALJ found insufficient support for 

the level of limitations alleged by the Plaintiff. Specifically, the ALJ 

stated “[s]ome of the physical and mental disabilities and social 

interactions required in order to perform these activities are the same 

necessarily for obtaining and maintaining employment. [Plaintiff’s] 

ability to participate in such activities diminishes the credibility of the 

[Plaintiff’s] allegations of functional limitations.” (A.R. at 29). 

c. Medical Treatment

Evidence that a claimant only received conservative treatment is a

valid ground for questioning claimant’s assertions regarding severity of 

pain or symptoms. Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 

1995). Additionally, the ALJ is permitted to consider the effectiveness 

of medication in treating Plaintiff’s symptoms. Social Security Ruling 

88-13. Here, the ALJ opined that the treatment records fail to show a 

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decline in Plaintiff’s condition since the time of the prior ALJ decision. 

(A.R. at 30). 

The ALJ considered the effectiveness of medications used to treat 

Plaintiff’s condition. The record shows Plaintiff was prescribed Invega 

Sustenna by monthly injection, Risperdal and Klonopin. (A.R. at 30). 

The ALJ noted that her medical records indicated a stabilization of 

symptoms with medication. (Id.). Likewise, as noted earlier, Dr. 

Glassmire testified that “[t]he records in general show that the 

[Plaintiff] has improved since 2009 largely due to getting off the 

methamphetamine and starting the injectable medication.” (A.R. at 43). 

At her medical appointments in December 2009 (A.R. at 364), 

March 2010 (A.R. at 362), April 2010 (A.R. at 360), June 2010 (A.R. at 

359) and August 2010 (A.R. at 356), Plaintiff reported actively using 

methamphetamine. Tellingly, Plaintiff’s treatment records for 2010, 

2011, and 2012, including when she was still a regular 

methamphetamine user, demonstrate only two reports of delusions, 

three reports of moderate auditory hallucinations and no reports of 

visual hallucinations. (A.R. at 356, 359, 360, 362, and 364). This was 

substantiated by Dr. Glassmire’s testimony in response to questioning 

by Plaintiff’s Representative:

Q: Doctor, you mentioned that the Claimant continued to

have residual symptoms, including paranoia and suicidal 

ideation at several points in the record, correct?

A: I mentioned that – those were mentioned one or two 

times; wouldn’t say several times in the record. But she 

did report those symptoms on occasions.

(A.R. at 49). 

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As noted herein, the ALJ identified several contradictions between 

Plaintiff’s claims of disability and the medical treatment evidence 

presented in the record. Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F. 2d at 642 (“In 

reaching his findings, the administrative law judge is entitled to draw 

inferences logically flowing from the evidence”). The ALJ’s citations to 

the record evidence regarding Plaintiff’s treatment represent clear and 

convincing reasons for finding Plaintiff less than credible regarding her 

functional limitations.

d. Inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s Testimony

An acceptable reason that an ALJ may consider when assigning 

little weight to a claimant’s testimony is inconsistency in the claimant’s

testimony. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 636 (9th Cir. 2007). In this 

case, Plaintiff testified that she had not used methamphetamine for five 

to seven years at the time of the hearing. (A.R. at 42). However, the 

medical records clearly document Plaintiff’s methamphetamine use in 

2009 and throughout 2010. (A.R. at 356, 359, 360, 362, 364). 

Additionally, Plaintiff stated in her Adult Function Report that she is 

unable to handle money, handle a savings account or use a 

checkbook/money orders. (A.R. at 282). Plaintiff testified at her 

administrative hearing, however, that her duties while employed at 

Subway included keeping track of inventory, cleaning the back room 

and working the register. (A.R. at 51).

Tellingly, Plaintiff never testified that she could not work. She 

testified that she sometimes had difficulty dealing with the public in 

her last job with Subway and she also noted in her Adult Function 

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Report that she doesn’t handle stress well. (A.R. at 285). In the same 

report, however, she noted that most of the time she finishes what she 

starts, follows written instructions well, follows spoken instructions 

“good”, gets along with authority figures “OK”, has never been fired due 

to problems of getting along with other people and handles changes in 

routine “OK”. (A.R. at 285). 

The ALJ made specific findings justifying his decision to 

disbelieve an allegation of disability. The ALJ discussed the evidence 

and provided clear and convincing reasons upon which his adverse 

determination of Plaintiff’s credibility was based. Treichler v. 

Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 

2014). “Credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ” and are 

entitled to deference if sufficiently supported by the record. Fair v. 

Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Russell v. Bowen, 856 

F.2d 81, 83 (9th Cir. 1988)). “Where, as here, the ALJ has made specific 

findings justifying a decision to disbelieve an allegation. . . and those 

findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, our role is 

not to second guess that decision.” Id.

III. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ANALYSIS

A review of the record presented, demonstrates that substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision finding Plaintiff not disabled with 

the RFC to perform “unskilled entry-level work requiring little or no 

judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short 

period of time (20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.968).” (A.R. at 32). The ALJ 

gave great weight to the opinion of Dr. Glassmire, the testifying expert, 

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regarding Plaintiff’s mental disability claims. (A.R. at 32). Likewise, 

the opinions of the State agency review physicians Dr. Amado and Dr. 

Funkenstein were given great weight by the ALJ. (A.R. at 31). 

Acknowledging the preference for treating physicians’ opinions 

over other medical source opinions, the ALJ stated, “it is possible in a 

particular case, depending on all the facts of that case, to give greater 

weight to the opinion of a non-examining source.” (A.R. at 33 citing 20 

C.F.R. 404.1527 and 416.927). With this general preference in mind, 

the ALJ set forth specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial 

evidence in the record for crediting the opinions of Dr. Glassmire, Dr. 

Amado and Dr. Funkenstein. 

The ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of Dr. Glassmire, the 

testifying expert. The Ninth Circuit has held the ALJ may give more 

weight to doctors, non-examining or otherwise, who testify because they 

have been subject to cross-examination. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 1995). Dr. Glassmire testified that Plaintiff’s 

medical record supports a finding of mild restriction in activities of 

daily living, with moderate difficulties in social functioning, 

concentration, persistence and pace. (A.R. at 44). Dr. Glassmire also 

noted that Plaintiff has “experienced no episodes of decompensation.” 

(Id.). Dr. Glassmire ultimately opined that he saw nothing in Plaintiff’s 

medical records to date that would change the RFC attributed to 

Plaintiff in the ALJ’s final decision dated July 30, 2009, based upon her 

prior application for disability benefits. (A.R. at 45). 

The ALJ found that the reports of State agency consultants, Dr. 

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Amado, and Dr. Funkenstein deserved great weight. According to the 

ALJ, “State agency medical consultants are specifically empowered to 

make judgments regarding whether a person has the severity of 

symptoms required either singly or in combination to meet or equal any 

conditions found under the medical Listings (see 20 CFR 404.1527(f)(1) 

and 416.927(f)(1)).” (A.R. at 31).

The ALJ cited to Dr. Amado’s report which stated that updated 

medical records show an “improvement trend, with claimant retaining 

sobriety.” (A.R. at 138). Dr. Amado went on to state, “[i]f anything 

there has been an improvement vis-à-vis the unfavorable ALJ decision 

on file, but by convention best to adopt ALJ determination as (in this 

case) more restrictive/more favorable to the claimant.” (Id.). 

Dr. Funkenstein’s review and report of Plaintiff’s records led him 

to conclude that Plaintiff’s RFC as set out by the previous ALJ in 2009 

is consistent with Plaintiff’s current RFC. (A.R. at 102). For example, 

Plaintiff is only moderately limited in a few functional areas including 

the ability to carry out detailed instructions, maintain attention and 

concentration for extended periods, or interact appropriately with the 

general public. (A.R. at 101). Dr. Funkenstein also reported that 

Plaintiff had no adaptation limitations. (A.R. at 102).

The ALJ clearly relied on the findings of the treatment record and 

reports cited in the administrative record. The ALJ’s findings are 

consistent with the record as a whole. Title 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b) 

states “after the [ALJ] review[s] all of the evidence relevant to your 

claim, including medical opinions [the ALJ] make[s] findings about 

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what the evidence shows.” (Id.). Further, Title 20 C.F.R. § 

416.927(6)(d)(1) states in part, “[the ALJ is] responsible for making the 

determination or decision about whether [a claimant] meet[s] the 

statutory definition of disability.” The Court’s review of the 

administrative record revealed no ambiguity or error indicating that the 

ALJ’s decision was based on less than substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). With few exceptions, the opinion evidence in the record 

supports the ALJ’s decision. 

Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ’s findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, including Plaintiff’s RFC, is supported by 

substantial evidence and free of legal error. Additionally, the Court 

finds that there are no changed circumstances indicating a different 

outcome than the 2009 ALJ decision.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion be DENIED

and that Defendant’s Motion be GRANTED. This Report and 

Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to 

the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objection to this 

report must be filed with the court and served on all parties no later 

than February 22, 2016. The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Report and Recommendations.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections 

shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

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February 29, 2016. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specific time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 8, 2016

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