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Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 7, 2020*

Decided January 27, 2020

Before

 DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

 ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

 DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 18-3627

ROBERT L. COLLINS BEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TIMOTHY HAINES, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Western District of 

Wisconsin.

No. 13-cv-618-jdp

James D. Peterson,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Robert Collins Bey, a Wisconsin prisoner, seeks

damages from two prison dentists for violating the Eighth Amendment by unduly 

delaying his dental care. He also seeks an injunction to compel prison officials to hire a

full-time dentist to reduce wait times. The district court reasoned that although 

systemic problems, such as understaffing and long patient waitlists, may have 

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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complicated the dentists’ work, the defendant dentists were not at fault for these 

problems, nor were they deliberately indifferent to Collins Bey’s dental needs. The court 

also held that because the prison has now hired a full-time dentist, Collins Bey’s request 

for an injunction request is moot. We affirm. 

I

While at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility, Collins Bey needed dental care.

He received partial dentures (for chewing and sore and bleeding gums), fillings, 

treatment for an abscess, and tooth restorations and extractions. He obtained his partial 

dentures in 1992. When they broke 15 years later in 2007, he wanted replacements

immediately. A dentist decided that this did not qualify as an “urgent” request, and so 

Collins Bey was put on the “routine” waitlist. Two months later, Collins Bey renewed 

his request for partial dentures and added a complaint about a broken filling. The 

prison’s new dentist, James Wommack, saw him, took X-rays of his teeth, and replaced 

the filling. Like the earlier dentist, Dr. Wommack concluded that Collins Bey did not 

have an immediate need for new partial dentures—first, some of his teeth had to be 

restored to anchor the dentures. He therefore put Collins Bey on the “essential” waitlist 

to restore some teeth. This is a higher priority than “routine,” but lower than “urgent.” 

Collins Bey began receiving restorative treatment 11 months later, when

Dr. Wommack saw him in June 2008. The lapse of time occurred because Dr. Wommack 

visited the prison only once a week, yet he was supposed to serve all the inmates. He 

advised Collins Bey: “I am only here 4 days/month so the list is very long. I will try to 

get to you in ASAP.” At the June 2008 visit, after examining an X-ray Dr. Wommack 

filled cavities in two teeth, noted that other teeth were decayed, and two months later, 

restored another two teeth. The following year, in 2009, Collins Bey complained of 

severe pain in his teeth. A different part-time dentist, James Thorpe, saw Collins Bey a 

month later at the next available appointment. Dr. Thorpe refilled a cavity but did not 

extract a broken tooth. He reasoned that, although that tooth was broken down to the 

gum line, it would not cause pain because it had no nerve. 

With the limited staffing, Collins Bey’s next dental treatment did not occur until

two years later, when in 2011 he moved to another prison. He complained about the

still-absent partial dentures, sore and bleeding gums, the broken tooth, and a tooth with 

an abscess. This time he was put on the “essential” list. Dr. Thorpe saw Collins Bey at 

the new prison the next month. He extracted the abscessed tooth but did nothing else 

because the abscess was Collins Bey’s chief complaint and other patients had greater 

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needs. After Collins Bey filed another request to have the broken tooth extracted, a new

dentist extracted it two weeks later. This dentist confirmed that Collins Bey still needed 

more restorative work before he could receive partial dentures. A few days later, he

filled cavities in two more teeth. The next month, Collins Bey complained that parts of 

the extracted tooth remained in his gums. A few days later, Dr. Thorpe removed loose 

bone, extracted a root fragment, and smoothed sharp edges of the remaining bone. 

The glacial pace of his treatment prompted Collins Bey to bring this suit, but he 

encountered three problems. He first clashed with his attorneys, whom the district court 

had recruited upon his request. After helping Collins Bey amend his complaint, they 

asked to withdraw, citing “highly inappropriate, sexually-explicit advances” from

Collins Bey. He admitted that he had proposed a “personal relationship” with them but 

promised to stop now that he knew they were not interested. The court granted their

motion. It ruled that it was “beyond any reasonable dispute” that he had solicited an 

improper “sexual and romantic relationship” and “impair[ed] [the attorneys’] ability to 

effectively represent him.” Finding that Collins Bey had “abused the privilege provided 

to him,” the court also refused to recruit new counsel unless he had “immediate need of 

dental care that prison officials refuse to provide.” But by 2015, Collins Bey—now back 

at his original prison—had finally received his new partial dentures and other dental

treatment. 

The second problem concerned discovery. One defendant (Mary Miller, the 

Health Services Unit manager) swore that she could not provide testimony because of 

illness. She later filed substantive testimony, which Collins Bey moved to strike and for 

which he sought sanctions, because (he said) she had not proven that she now was well. 

She filed another declaration, which explained that her health had improved. The 

district court accepted Miller’s assertions and denied sanctions.

Third, later in the case, Collins Bey asked for another lawyer or an expert 

witness. Citing Federal Rule of Evidence 706, he argued that “[his] case will involve 

issues of medical expertise for which counsel or an expert will be necessary” to “assist 

the district court.” The court ruled that because Collins Bey had harassed prior counsel, 

it would not recruit new counsel or an expert unless he needed dental care urgently, 

which was not the case given his new partial dentures and other dental treatment. The 

court recognized that this meant “that his medical malpractice claims will fail.” 

Treating the case as raising damages and injunction claims, the court entered

summary judgment for the defendants. It rejected Collins Bey’s claims that Drs. 

Wommack and Thorpe had violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment and state 

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law and thus owed him damages based on his long waits for dental care. The court 

explained that any delays resulted from staffing decisions, not a faulty “cavalier” 

attitude by either dentist. It added that the dentists “used their medical judgment to 

prioritize which patients to treat first.” The court then assessed Collins Bey’s request to 

enjoin his prison to hire a full-time dentist to reduce wait times. It observed that in 2018 

the prison hired a full-time and a part-time dentist; “routine” visits now take under 30 

weeks and “essential” visits take no more than eight weeks. This information convinced 

the court that the request for injunctive relief was moot.

II

A

Collins Bey contests the rulings allowing recruited counsel to withdraw; denying 

his motion for an expert; and denying his motion to strike Miller’s testimony and for 

sanctions. We review each of these decisions for abuse of discretion. See Fidelity Nat. 

Title Ins. Co. v. Intercounty Nat., 310 F.3d 537, 541 (7th Cir. 2002) (motion to withdraw); 

Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997) (motion for expert witness); Zuppardi 

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 770 F.3d 644, 647 (7th Cir. 2014) (motion to strike testimony); In 

re Thomas Consolidated Industries, Inc., 436 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 2006) (sanctions).

On the ruling allowing counsel to withdraw, we apply the Wisconsin Supreme 

Court’s Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys. “[M]ost federal courts use the 

ethical rules of the states in which they sit,” Watkins v. Trans Union, LLC, 869 F.3d 514, 

519 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted), and the Western District of 

Wisconsin is no exception. See, e.g., Tucker v. George, 569 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837 (W.D. Wis. 

2008). Under these rules, a court may allow counsel to withdraw if “good cause for 

withdrawal exists.” Wisc. Sup. Ct. R. 20:1.16. Collins Bey admitted to making “personal 

advances.” He contends that he did not know that his lawyers would reject these

advances, but that defense is irrelevant. Once he made the conceded advances, the

district court was entitled to find that counsel had good cause to believe it would be 

“unreasonably difficult” to continue representation. 

Second, although Collins Bey is correct that the district court provided no reason 

for refusing to appoint an expert witness for him (beyond stating that he had harassed 

his prior counsel), we see no reversible error. Collins Bey is correct to note that his past 

harassment of the lawyers does not explain why the court refused to appoint an expert, 

who would play a different role. Indeed, the court’s rationale conflicts with its earlier 

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statement that Collins Bey needed expert testimony for his malpractice claim. See Spann 

v. Roper, 453 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 2006). Other circuits have held that when a party 

requests the appointment of a neutral expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 706, a 

court must provide a “reasoned explanation” for its ultimate decision. Gaviria v. 

Reynolds, 476 F.3d 940, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Quiet Technology DC-8 v. Hurel-Dubois UK 

Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2003); Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 1996). 

But here, any defect in the court’s reasoning was harmless. It was unclear whether 

Collins Bey was asking for a neutral expert under Rule 706, or a partisan expert to assist 

him in defeating the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, he says that 

he sought the latter. Yet we know of no authority, and Collins Bey has not directed us to 

anything, stating that Rule 706 empowers a district court to appoint a partisan expert at 

public expense. The district court thus did not unreasonably deny the request that

Collins Bey now says he made.

Finally, the district court properly denied Collins Bey’s motions to strike Miller’s 

testimony and for sanctions. Collins Bey contends that the district court should not have 

accepted Miller’s declaration that her health had improved. But the court reasonably 

accepted Miller’s assertions about her health because those assertions did not contradict 

her prior declaration or any other evidence. See Zuppardi, 770 F.3d at 647 (motion to 

strike denied where defendant’s later statements did not contradict prior ones).

B

On the merits, Collins Bey raises two Eighth Amendment claims: first, he wants 

damages from Dr. Wommack for not giving him new partial dentures in 2007; and 

second, he seeks damages from Dr. Thorpe for not extracting his broken tooth in 2009. 

We review de novo the entry of summary judgment, viewing the record in the light most 

favorable to Collins Bey. Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017). 

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs may violate the 

Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To survive summary 

judgment on this claim, Collins Bey needed to submit evidence of an objectively serious 

medical need to which a defendant was deliberately indifferent. Duckworth v. Ahmad, 

532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008). We review the full record of Collins Bey’s treatment—

his X-rays, fillings, restorations, extractions, bone-fragment removals, and repairs—

when assessing the two decisions he challenges. See Dunigan ex rel. Nyman v. Winnebago 

County, 165 F.3d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 1999).

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No evidence suggests that Dr. Wommack’s decision in 2007 not to replace the 

partial dentures immediately reflected deliberate indifference. According to 

Dr. Wommack’s unrebutted professional judgment, in 2007 replacing the partial 

dentures was not an urgent medical need. Rather, restoring Collins Bey’s teeth was the 

priority because (as another dentist confirmed) he first required restorative treatment to 

anchor new partial dentures. No evidence indicates that Dr. Wommack believed that 

delaying replacement of the partial dentures until Collins Bey’s teeth were restored 

would cause unnecessary pain. See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 777–78 (7th Cir. 2015). 

And no evidence suggests that Dr. Wommack believed that without new partial 

dentures, Collins Bey lacked enough teeth to function. See Duckworth, 532 F.3d at 679.

Thus, Dr. Wommack permissibly used his professional judgment in 2007 to prioritize 

restoring Collins Bey’s teeth. See Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 698 (7th Cir. 2008).

Collins Bey responds that Dr. Wommack nonetheless waited 11 months to start

the restoration process that ultimately stretched over seven years. This, Collins Bey, is 

explainable only by deliberate indifference. But Collins Bey is overlooking other critical 

facts. During the two years that Dr. Wommack saw Collins Bey, he was the prison’s 

only dentist, whom the prison retained just one day per week to treat the inmates. He

used his professional judgment to treat each inmate based on the severity of their needs. 

No evidence suggests that Dr. Wommack preferred inmates with minor dental issues 

over Collins Bey. Rather, with his limited time, he permissibly used his judgment to 

treat Collins Bey’s most urgent needs first—by inserting a filling in 2007, and then in 

2008, by restoring four of his teeth on two separate visits. See Jackson, 541 F.3d at 698.

Similarly, Dr. Thorpe’s decision to decline extracting the broken tooth in 2009

does not reflect deliberate indifference to Collins Bey’s dental needs. When he first saw 

Collins Bey in 2009, he filled a cavity in another tooth and reasonably decided not to

extract the broken tooth because, it is undisputed, that tooth had no nerve and could 

not cause pain. When Dr. Thorpe saw Collins Bey in 2011, he reasonably removed the

tooth with an abscess but again did not remove the broken tooth, because the abscess 

posed the imminent need, while the broken tooth with the dead nerve did not. Further,

like Dr. Wommack, Dr. Thorpe had limited time to attend to all his patients. He too was 

entitled to use his professional judgment to prioritize Collins Bey’s urgent dental needs, 

see Jackson, 836 F.3d at 698, and to meet the pressing needs of all other patients. 

Finally, Collins Bey challenges the dismissal of his injunction claim as moot. “[A]

court’s power to grant injunctive relief only survives if such relief is actually needed.”

Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 882 (7th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. 

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Carter, 915 F.3d 1147, 1149–50 (7th Cir. 2019). Collins Bey sued to force his current 

prison to keep a full-time dentist on staff to reduce long wait times. It is undisputed that 

the Department of Corrections has hired a full-time and a part-time dentist for his 

prison. “Routine” visits now occur in about a half-year and “essential” visits (which 

apply to the restorative treatment that caused Collins Bey’s long wait times) take place 

in under two months. Collins Bey’s request for injunctive relief is therefore moot. 

AFFIRMED

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