Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01533/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01533-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

BEVERLY TOWNE AND JERRY TOWNE,

NO. CIV. 05-1533 WBS CMK

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SHASTA COUNTY, SHASTA COUNTY

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,

a Public Entity, and DOES 1 to

50, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Beverly Towne and Jerry Towne allege that

defendants violated their rights under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Unruh

Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code §§ 51 and 51.5, and the

Federal Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. (Compl.) Pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), defendants Shasta

County and Shasta County Department of Social Services now move

for summary judgment, maintaining that plaintiffs cannot

establish differential treatment on the basis of their

disabilities.

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I. Factual Background

Plaintiff Beverly Towne has a congenital disability

that affected the formation of her arms and hands. (Defs.’

Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Defs.’ SUF”) No. 1.) She is

married to and lives with Jerry Towne. (Id. Nos. 1, 21.) Jerry

Towne has a disability by virtue of having undergone lower limb

amputation. (Id. No. 1.) Plaintiffs live in a two-bedroom home

and they share one of the two bedrooms. (Id. No. 21.) Beverly

Towne has a daughter, Theresa Edenstrom, who has three children

of her own. (Id. No. 2.) 

On August 31, 2004, Theresa’s children were removed

from her care by a state agency. (Id. No. 3.) Wendy Dickens is

a social worker employed by the Shasta County Department of

Social Services, and she was assigned to this case until

approximately December 2004 or January 2005. (Monique Grandaw

Decl. Ex. G (Wendy Dickens Dep. 23:11-12).) Initially, Beverly

Towne informed Dickens that she did not want the children placed

with her. (Defs.’ SUF No. 4.) However, Beverly Towne changed

her mind, called Dickens back, and indicated that she did want to

have her grandchildren placed in her home. (Id. No. 5.) 

The Department of Social Services evaluates candidates

for placement of foster children by asking the candidates to

submit an application and be fingerprinted, and then using the

fingerprints to obtain the candidate’s criminal history report. 

(Id. No. 7.) Fingerprinting is used to verify the candidate’s

criminal history and to obtain Federal Bureau of Investigation

(“FBI”), Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and Child Abuse Index

reports. (Id. No. 12.) Additionally, an informal interview

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process occurs while the candidate’s application is pending. 

(Id. No. 8.) Often, the caseworker conducts a home study,

conducts a psychological interview of the candidate or

candidates, and gets references from neighbors, friends, and

employers. (Grandaw Decl. Ex. L (Doris Sami Dep. at 21:3-20).) 

There is no clear order in which these steps must be conducted,

but because a candidate’s significant criminal history may be

dispositive of the application, it is generally more efficient to

obtain fingerprints and the criminal history before taking other

steps. (Id. at 21:3-8.) Moreover, a home study is not conducted

until the criminal history reports are obtained. (Defs.’ SUF No.

17.) The requirements assessed by social workers include that

for two children of the same gender to be placed in a foster

home, there must be at least one bedroom set aside for their use. 

(Defs.’ SUF No. 21.) 

Dickens sent plaintiffs an application for placement of

children with relatives, which they received, completed, and then

submitted to the agency. (Id. No. 6.) After submitting their

application for child custody, plaintiffs were asked to go to the

Department of Social Services for fingerprinting. (Id. No. 11.) 

However, because of her disability, Beverly Towne could not be

fingerprinted on the Department’s LiveScan machine. (Id.) 

Dickens informed plaintiffs that there were alternative ways of

acquiring the necessary reports without obtaining Beverly Towne’s

fingerprints, and said that she would contact the County’s

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Plaintiffs now dispute whether such an alternative 1

procedure exists, given that (1) no such procedure was undertaken

in this case, (2) the last social worker to work on this case did

not know about an alternative procedure, and (3) California state

law requires that fingerprints be obtained. (Pls.’ Opp’n to Mot.

for Summ. J. 5.) It does not appear that Dickens was aware of

what the process involved, other than that it involved additional

paperwork. (See Grandaw Decl. Ex. G (Dickens Dep. 22-23).) 

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attorneys to investigate these alternative approaches. (Id. No. 1

14.) Until a candidate is fingerprinted and the additional

agency reports (e.g., FBI and DOJ reports) are obtained, a home

study cannot be conducted and placement of a child in the

candidate’s home cannot occur. (Defs.’ SUF No. 17.) 

The social worker assigned to plaintiffs’ case had

certain concerns that she expressed to plaintiffs. She was

concerned that for a certain period of time, plaintiff’s son,

Ritchie, lived in the second bedroom of their home. (Id. No.

21.) While Ritchie Towne lived in the home, there was not a

bedroom that could be used for plaintiffs’ two granddaughters. 

(Id.) Additionally, Child Protective Services had previously

removed Ritchie Towne’s children from his care. (Id.) Ritchie

had also been involved in an incident with Theresa’s youngest

child, in which he had placed some sort of physical restraint on

the child (either tape or rope), and injured the child in the

process of cutting the restraints off of him. (Jason K.

Singleton Decl. Ex. G (Brenda Becker Dep. 24:1-5).) However,

Ritchie Towne eventually moved out of plaintiffs’ home, and they

informed the agency of that fact. (Grandaw Decl. Ex. H (Bonnie

Rightmier Dep. 21: 13-14).) 

Additionally, Dickens informed plaintiffs that the

grandchildren needed to be protected from their mother and to

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Larry Rowten’s last name appears to be misspelled as 2

“Routon” in Rightmier’s deposition transcript.

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have limited contact with her. (Defs.’ SUF No. 22.) Yet,

because Beverly Towne had informed Dickens that Theresa was

living there at a previous point in time, and Theresa had

answered the phone at the residence when Dickens called, Dickens

believed that Theresa was living at the plaintiffs’ residence. 

(Id.) The Department of Social Services was also aware of the

fact that Theresa did not want her children to live with her

parents, had informed Dickens that Beverly Towne was

“manipulative and aggressive,” and had stated that she “did not

have a childhood” because she had to care for her mother. 

(Defs.’ SUF 26.) Dickens indicated that she had observed Beverly

Towne exhibit aggressive behavior in a manner that lent

credibility to Theresa’s statements. (Grandaw Decl. Ex. G

(Dickens Dep. 76-78.) However, Dickens also indicated that she

was aware that Theresa had mental health problems. (Id.) 

The Department of Social Services also noted in this

case that when the children lived with their mother, a nonrelative, Larry Rowten, also lived there and shared a bed with

one of the young girls. (Grandaw Decl. Ex. H (Rightmier Dep. 2

35).) Rowten was also Beverly Towne’s care provider, and

although it is not clear whether Rowten lived with plaintiffs,

the social workers believed that this could result in more

contact with the girls. (Id. at 36.) Based on these concerns,

Dickens summarized her position as follows: “[i]n this case, it

was determined that due to non-protection issues, placement would

not be made with the Townes, so it was not necessary to complete

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the rest of the process.” (Id. at 25:14-17.) 

In December 2004 or January 2005, plaintiffs were still

being considered as potential foster parents, and Dickens passed

the responsibility for their file to another social worker,

Bonnie Rightmier. (Id. at 23:11-12, 24:5-8; Grandaw Decl. Ex. H

(Bonnie Rightmier Dep. 13:10-17).) Around this time, the

grandchildren were in foster care placement. (Defs.’ SUF No.

33.) Although defendants indicate that the children were doing

well and were stabilized, plaintiffs disagree and note that the

children had been caught stealing from their foster parents and

other schoolchildren. (Compare Grandaw Decl. Ex. H (Rightmier

Dep. 17:6-8); with Jason K. Singleton Decl. Ex. J (Shasta County

Dept. of Social Servs. Notes).) 

Rightmier discussed the issue of fingerprinting with

plaintiffs and informed them that she had personal knowledge of

the alternative procedure for obtaining information. Rightmier

explained that she knew that fingerprinting was not necessary

because “I myself did not give fingerprints and the department

had to go outside and do a paper trial [sic] on me . . . .” 

(Grandaw Decl. Ex. H (Rightmier Dep. 19:19-22).) She also

informed plaintiffs that the primary issue was their “failure to

protect” the children. (Id. at 34:15-16.) She suggested that

plaintiffs apply for a temporary restraining order against their

daughter. (Id. at 20:19-20.) 

Beverly Towne subsequently informed county officials

that Theresa had moved out of the residence, and that she was

willing to “do whatever it took” to obtain custody of her

grandchildren, including obtaining a restraining order against

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her daughter to alleviate any concerns. (Grandaw Decl. Ex. J

(Beverly Towne Decl. 29-31).) 

On April 25, 2005, the state court adjudicating custody

proceedings ordered the Department of Social Services to reassess

the grandparents for potential placement in light of the fact

that no fingerprints had been obtained. (Singleton Decl. Ex. B

(Six Month Review by State Court) (“Attorney Richard Bay requests

that the Court order the Department to reassess the grandparents

home for placement. Mr. Bay advises the Court that the

grandmother has a birth defect, which makes it difficult to

fingerprint. The Court grants the request.”).) 

Although Rightmier did not submit any subsequent

reports to the court (Grandaw Decl. Ex. H (Rightmier Dep. 44:12-

18)), it appears that another case worker filed an interim review

report. (Defs.’ Request to Take Judicial Notice Ex. D (May 6,

2005 Interim Review Report).) In this report, the social worker

indicated that plaintiffs had demonstrated an inability to

protect their grandchildren, and that the mother of the children

did not want them to stay with plaintiffs. (Id. at 3.) 

Additionally, the social worker noted that plaintiffs failed to

have Larry Rowton call a social worker to discuss why he should

not visit the children. (Id.) At a hearing on May 9, 2006, the

state court ordered that the grandchildren remain in their

current placement, and not be placed with their maternal

grandmother. (Id. Ex. F (May 9, 2005 Court Order).) The state

court noted that plaintiffs’ son, Ritchie, was no longer living

with plaintiffs, but was particularly persuaded to leave the

children where they were by the fact that the children “were very

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happy in their current placement.” (Id. at 5, 7.) 

In approximately July, 2005, Rightmier turned over the

responsibility for plaintiffs’ file to Brenda Becker, another

social worker in the department. (Grandaw Decl. Ex. H (Rightmier

Dep. 44-45)); (Singleton Decl. Ex. G (Brenda Becker Dep. 24).) 

Becker indicated that, upon receiving a call from plaintiffs

asking about fingerprinting, she asked them whether anything had

changed with regard to the other issues that social workers had

previously noticed. (Id. 24:18-25.) She asked whether

plaintiffs had obtained a temporary restraining order, whether

they had adequate housing for the children, and whether their

son, Ritchie, would have access to the children in their home. 

(Id.) Becker stated that plaintiffs informed her that nothing

had changed, which made the inability to fingerprint Beverly

Towne a non-issue. (Id. at 25: 1-3.) Becker further explained,

“if the home isn’t going to pass, then there’s no sense in

fingerprinting.” (Id.) 

II. Discussion

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of

the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). 

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Defendants request that the court take judicial notice 3

of court records of the Superior Court of the State of California

in and for the County of Shasta in proceedings related to the

custody of plaintiffs’ grandchildren. “Federal courts may ‘take

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without

the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct

relation to the matters at issue.’” Cactus Corner, LLC v. U.S.

Dept. of Agric., 346 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2004)

(quoting United States ex rel Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council

v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

Accordingly, the court takes judicial notice of the court records

submitted by defendants--a status review report filed April 19,

2005, a court order entered April 25, 2005, a transcript of court

proceedings of April 25, 2005, an interim review report filed May

6, 2005, a court order entered May 9, 2005, and a transcript of

the court proceedings of May 9, 2005. 

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The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case.3

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving

party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element

upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id.

Any inferences drawn from the underlying facts must, however, be

viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

With regard to the substance of plaintiffs’ claims, 

title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a

disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from

participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to

discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 

Additionally, pursuant to the Federal Rehabilitation Act, “[n]o

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otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall,

solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794. 

Thus, both code sections cited by plaintiffs “prohibit

discrimination on the basis of disability.” Lovell v. Chandler,

303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). The distinction between

these two statutes is that “[t]he ADA applies only to public

entities, whereas the [Rehabilitation Act] proscribes

discrimination in all federally-funded programs.” (Id.) 

Summarizing the requirements of these two statutes, the Ninth

Circuit has explained that:

To establish a violation of Title II of the 

ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is a 

qualified individual with a disability; (2) she 

was excluded from participation in or otherwise

discriminated against with regard to a public 

entity’s services, programs, or activities[;] 

and (3) such exclusion or discrimination was by 

reason of her disability. To establish a violation 

of § 504 of the [Rehabilitation Act (“RA”)], a

plaintiff must show that (1) she is handicapped 

within the meaning of the RA; (2) she is otherwise

qualified for the benefit or services sought; 

(3) she was denied the benefit or services solely 

by reason of her handicap; and (4) the program

providing the benefit or services receives federal

financial assistance.

Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Weinreich v.

L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir.

1997)).

Additionally, when a state agency is considering

placing a child in the home of a relative, California Welfare and

Institutions Code § 361.4(b) requires that, “[w]henever a child

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may be placed in the home of a relative . . . the court or county

social worker placing the child shall cause a state and federal

level criminal records check to be conducted . . . .” Such a

criminal records check occurs pursuant to a “fingerprint

clearance check of the relative.” Cal. Welfare & Institutions

Code § 361.4(b). The statutory language specifies that a social

worker “shall ensure” that this fingerprint clearance check takes

place and “shall review” the results of the criminal records

check to determine whether the foster home is safe. Id. 

Defendants contend that plaintiffs cannot establish

that they were denied due process solely because of their

disability. They argue that fingerprinting was one of several

steps to be completed before an application for the placement of

children in a foster home could be processed, and that plaintiffs

were unqualified for placement for several other reasons. 

However, the provisions of the California Welfare and

Institutions Code cited above imply that defendants’ duties were

obligations they had to fulfill before making a placement. This

in itself may create a reasonable inference that Beverly Towne’s

disability was the determining factor in defendants’ decision not

to place the children with her.

 Further, there appear to be disputed issues of fact in

relation to the other reasons defendants contend they decided not

to place the children with plaintiffs. Specifically, defendants

cite the following reasons for their decision: (1) Theresa, the

mother of the children, resided with plaintiffs as recently as

June of 2005, and plaintiffs did not sufficiently assure county

officials that they would protect the grandchildren from their

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mother; (2) Ritchie Towne resided in plaintiffs’ home at various

points and presented some danger to the grandchildren; (3) the

fact that Larry Rowton resided in plaintiffs’ home at a certain

point was problematic, given his previous contact with the

granddaughters; and (4) there was insufficient room in the home

for the grandchildren because there were only two bedrooms, and

both Ritchie Towne and Larry Rowton may have occupied the second

bedroom at different times. 

Plaintiffs dispute all of these factual conclusions,

and defendants never conducted a home study of plaintiffs’

residence to independently verify whether these things were true.

More specifically, Beverly Towne testified in her deposition that

Theresa was not living in their home at all relevant times, and

that she was willing to obtain a temporary restraining order to

protect the children from their mother. Additionally, defendants

had independently verified the fact that Theresa did not live

permanently in the residence. Although Ritchie Towne lived in

the home for some time, he subsequently moved out. There is no

clear indication that Larry Rowton resided in plaintiffs’ home at

any time. Finally, because plaintiffs sought to have their two

granddaughters live with them (and not their grandson, who had

been placed with his paternal grandmother), the fact that they

had a two-bedroom home meant that the extra bedroom was

sufficient space for the granddaughters.

Based on the foregoing, there appear to genuine issues

of material fact as to whether the inability to obtain

fingerprints, and thus Beverly Towne’s disability, played a part

in the decision of defendants as to placement of the children. 

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However, there is no evidence whatsoever that Jerry Towne’s

disability contributed to any decision or conduct of the

defendants. At oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs conceded

that Jerry Towne is not entitled to sue on the basis of Beverly

Towne’s disability and that defendants would be entitled to

summary judgment as against Jerry Towne if he could not prove

discrimination based upon his own disability. Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment must therefore be granted as against

plaintiff Jerry Towne.

Defendants further argue that plaintiffs cannot

establish the intentional discrimination necessary in order to

obtain monetary damages under the ADA or the RA, and that

plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive damages, pursuant to the

guidance issued by the United States Supreme Court in Barnes v.

Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002). In response, plaintiffs

voluntarily withdraw their claims for monetary damages and

punitive damages under these federal law provisions. Thus, there

is no dispute on this point for the court to resolve.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on all claims of plaintiff Jerry Towne be, and

the same hereby is, GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED as to

plaintiff Beverly Towne’s claims for monetary and punitive

damages under the Federal Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794,

and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et

seq.

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AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in all other respects,

defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the claims of

plaintiff Beverly Towne be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

DATED: October 31, 2006

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