Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01095/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01095-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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10cv1095 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES RICHARD WOOD,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM B. KOLENDER, San Diego

County Sheriff,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 10-1095-MMA(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, James Richard Wood (hereafter “Petitioner”), a

state prisoner proceeding with counsel, has filed a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (hereafter

“Petition”) challenging his conviction for one count of attempting

to dissuade a witness. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 341.)

Petitioner contends that habeas relief is proper based on the

following five grounds: (1) the court’s refusal to allow photographs

into evidence at trial violated his right to due process; (2) his

trial counsel’s failure to introduce a nanny cam video into evidence

violated his right to effective assistance of counsel; (3) his trial

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 All further references are to the California Penal Code, unless

otherwise specified. 

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counsel’s failure to introduce testimony of character and conduct

witnesses violated his right to effective assistance of counsel; (4)

Cal. Penal Code Section 136.1(b)(1)1/

 is either constitutionally

flawed or the trial court’s instruction was error, and his trial

counsel’s failure to request an appropriate jury instruction

violated his right to effective assistance of counsel; and (5) his

due process rights were violated based on insufficient evidence to

support a violation of Section 136.1(b)(1). (Petition at 2.) 

This Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s Answer,

Petitioner’s Traverse, and all supporting documents submitted by the

parties. Based on the documents and evidence presented, and for the

reasons set forth below, this Court finds that Petitioner is not

entitled to the relief requested and RECOMMENDS that the Petition be

DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact

and presumes them to be correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see

also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of

historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from such

facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). The

facts as found by the state appellate court are substantially set

forth below: (See Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 4-8.)

In late October 2006, Christina H. drove to Petitioner’s Del

Mar Heights home, which was also his photography studio. Christina

was not a professional model and she had never been involved in

pornography, but she had responded by email to an online advertiseCase 3:10-cv-01095-MMA-WVG Document 11 Filed 04/29/11 Page 2 of 39
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10cv1095 3

ment on Craigslist that offered a “free photo shoot for a sexy

calendar.” Feeling like she was auditioning, Christina emailed

Petitioner in response to his advertisement, and she attached some

sexy photographs of herself that had been taken by a friend.

Petitioner responded with an email offering Christina the opportunity to participate in a three-hour photo shoot at his home.

Christina then hired Petitioner to take photographs of her in

sexually suggestive and sometimes nude poses for a calendar for her

boyfriend. Petitioner instructed Christina to come to the photo

shoot alone. 

When Christina arrived at Petitioner’s home for the photo

shoot, he provided her a written contract that explained that

Christina would receive the promised calendar and a disk containing

500 photographic images, but Petitioner would have the rights to all

of the photographs. Christina signed the contract.

During the photo shoot, Christina followed Petitioner’s

instructions and began taking off her clothes. She was nude almost

right away. Although she was naked and spreading her legs in many

of the photographs, Christina never placed anything into her vagina

or engaged in masturbation. She said that she trusted Petitioner,

and denied that any “chemistry” existed between them.

Toward the beginning of the photo shoot, Petitioner asked

Christina, “Does the photographer get some of that?” Christina

testified that she might have responded with a “funny face.” She

did not know whether Petitioner was serious, and she testified that

she assumed he was joking.

Later on in the photo shoot, as she was lying on her back on

a couch with her legs raised and vagina exposed, Petitioner

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10cv1095 4

approached Christina and began adjusting her legs. Without saying

anything, he opened her legs and began to lick her vagina.

Christina testified that she was shocked and she froze. She

indicated that she had not said anything that would have given

Petitioner permission to lick her vagina.

After trying to think of something to say, Christina told

Petitioner, “I’m just here for the photos.” Petitioner started

licking her again, and she said a second time, “I’m just here for

the photos.” When she repeated this statement a third time, he

finally stopped. Christina testified that she felt scared because

Petitioner had crossed a boundary, and she did not know what he was

capable of doing. She did not know whether he would try to hurt or

stop her if she just left, so she felt that the best thing to do was

to act calm. When Petitioner stopped licking her, Christina

continued to smile and pose naked for photographs. She testified

that she wanted to get out of Petitioner’s house safely, so she did

not want to make it seem like something was wrong. 

Christina also testified that when the photo shoot was over

and she got into her car, she called her sister, best friend, and

boyfriend. She was hysterical when she spoke with her sister,

crying and “freaking out because of how [Petitioner] had licked”

her. She was not sure whether she should call the police, but she

did want to call them because she felt extremely violated. When

shown her cell phone bill during her testimony, Christina identified

the phone calls that she had made to her sister, best friend, and

boyfriend that afternoon. After speaking to all of them, she called

the police. Christina’s boyfriend testified that she called him at

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around 4:40 p.m. that day. She was crying and told him that she had

gone to get a calendar made and had been assaulted.

The police came to Christina’s apartment and took her

statement. She was then taken to a medical facility where she

underwent a Sexual Assault Response Team (SART) examination, and her

vagina was swabbed for DNA.

In late November 2006, San Diego Police Department Detective

Richard Metz contacted Petitioner by telephone, identified himself,

and said that he was calling about a complaint that Christina had

filed with the San Diego Police Department. This conversation was

recorded and played for the jury at trial and the transcript of the

recorded conversation was admitted into evidence. During the phone

conversation with Detective Metz, Petitioner denied touching

Christina in an inappropriate way. When asked whether he “kiss[ed]”

Christina’s vagina, Petitioner said no, and he accused Christina of

“just making stuff up.” When Detective Metz asked Petitioner

whether he was saying that Christina’s allegation that he “had gone

down on her” while he was posing her was “absolutely not true,”

Petitioner said yes. Detective Metz asked Petitioner if he was

willing to give a consensual mouth swab. Petitioner responded that

he thought it was an invasion of privacy “based upon somebody’s

false accusations.” 

At trial, Detective Metz testified that Petitioner denied

Christina’s allegations, and he also denied that he orally copulated

her. Although Petitioner initially did not want to voluntarily

provide a DNA mouth swab, he eventually did provide one. By means

of a stipulation, the jury was informed that Petitioner could not be

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excluded as a possible contributor to the low level non-sperm DNA

found on Christina’s vagina.

On January 9, 2007, Christina received an email from

Petitioner, warning her that it was a crime to file a false police

report. Petitioner’s email also said that Christina would “be

facing a very costly civil suit” from him if she continued her

criminal claims against him. He wrote that she should instruct

Detective Metz to “back off” if she wanted to keep her graphic

photographs private. Christina testified that she felt threatened

after she received that email. She contacted Detective Metz after

receiving the email from Petitioner.

On January 10, 2007, Detective Metz arranged a recorded

telephone call from Christina to Petitioner. A recording of the

conversation was played for the jury, and the transcript was

admitted into evidence. During the call, Petitioner told Christina

that he “didn’t do anything that [she] didn’t consent to.” He also

said that her “masturbating in front of [him]” was “basically

consent.” When Christina replied that she was posing, not masturbating, Petitioner said to her “[Your] hands are there. You’ve got

objects down there. You’ve got bananas. You’ve got all kinds of

stuff.” Christina said that she was posing with props and trying to

look sexy. She also told Petitioner that she was upset about him

licking her. Petitioner then told her that “it needs to go away

before it gets ugly,” and “if I meet with my attorney today is when

it starts to get ugly.” Petitioner continued, “You have to tell the

detective that you . . . rethought this,” and “you just need to . .

. convince him that you were . . . overreacting or however you want

to put it.” Petitioner stated, “[I]t needs to go away. . . unless

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10cv1095 7

you want this to turn into a nightmare.” When Petitioner told

Christina that she didn’t say stop and didn’t close her legs when he

began licking her vagina, Christina replied that she did freeze.

She acknowledged that Petitioner did not force her, but she said

“[y]ou just did it without my permission.”

 During cross-examination at Petitioner’s trial, defense

counsel presented a series of photographs that were taken before the

licking incident occurred. Over 800 photographs were admitted into

evidence in the form of a slide show, along with 10 additional still

photographs. Christina agreed that some of the images depicted her

touching her private parts, posing with a banana, and permitting

Petitioner to position her legs. 

Christina testified that after the oral copulation incident,

she was in “survival mode.” She said that she wanted to leave, but

admitted that she continued participating in the photo shoot for at

least one-and-a-half hours after the incident. Defense counsel

showed Christina photographs (exhibits that were later admitted into

evidence) that depicted her wearing different outfits, and she

acknowledged that one photograph showed her smiling while wearing a

purple bodice. The purple bodice was the outfit that she wore

immediately after the licking incident occurred. Christina also

acknowledged that she was smiling in several of the other photographs, and that the photographs captured her demeanor.

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In San Diego Superior Court case number SCD205782, a jury

found Petitioner guilty of one count of sexual battery (Cal. Penal

Code § 243.4(e)(1)) (count one), and one count of attempting to

dissuade a witness (Cal. Penal Code § 136.1(b)(1)) (count two).

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2/

 Cal. Penal Code Section 290, subdivision (a) reads: “Sections 290

to 290.023, inclusive, shall be known and may be cited as the Sex

Offender Registration Act. All references to ‘the Act’ in those

sections are to the Sex Offender Registration Act.”

3/ Petitioner’s direct appeal was consolidated with his Petition for a

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal.

10cv1095 8

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 341.) The trial court sentenced

Petitioner to a term of 120 days in custody, along with 3 years of

probation with the requirement of registration under Section 290.2/

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3 at 16.) 

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth

Appellate District, Division One, in case number D054112. (Respondent’s Lodgment Nos. 3, 4, 5.) On December 17, 2009, the Court of

Appeal reversed the judgment for sexual battery (count one), and

affirmed the judgment for attempting to dissuade a witness (count

two), in an unpublished opinion. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7.)

On May 27, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate

District, Division One. (California Court of Appeal, Docket, Case

Number D055201, http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/

search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=4.) On December 17, 2009, the Court of

Appeal denied the Petition in an opinion consolidated with Petitioner’s appeal.3/ (California Court of Appeal, Docket, Case Number

D055201, http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/

case/dockets.cfm?dist=4.) Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in

the California Supreme Court in case number SCD205782. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 8.) On March 30, 2010, the California Supreme

Court denied the Petition without comment. (Respondent’s Lodgment

No. 9.)

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On May 20, 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in this Court. On May 24, 2010, this Court ordered a

response to the Petition. On September 10, 2010, Respondent answered

the Petition. 

IV. SCOPE OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by Title 28, United States Code, §

2254, as amended by the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Section 2254(a) sets forth the following

scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or

a district court shall entertain an application for a writ

of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treatises of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings

unless the adjudication of the claim- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2245(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).

“AEDPA establishes a ‘highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Womack v. Del Papa,

497 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007) [quoting Woodford v. Viscotti,

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)]. To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See

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Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court has

ruled that the “contrary to” clause of § 2254(d)(1) permits a grant

of habeas relief “if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if

the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 412-13. The

Supreme Court has also interpreted the “unreasonable application”

clause of § 2254(d)(1) to allow a grant of “the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the

facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The Supreme Court has

clarified that under § 2254(d)(2), even an erroneous or incorrect

application of clearly established federal law does not support a

habeas grant, unless the state court’s application was “objectively

unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

When there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). If

the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th

Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-

76). A state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when

resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). Absent citations to Supreme Court precedent, habeas relief

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10cv1095 11

is not merited if the state court decision neither contradicts the

reasoning nor the result of Supreme Court rulings. Id.

V. DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims that habeas relief is proper based on the

following five grounds: (1) the court’s refusal to allow photographs

into evidence at trial violated his right to due process; (2) his

trial counsel’s failure to introduce a nanny cam video into evidence

violated his right to effective assistance of counsel; (3) his trial

counsel’s failure to introduce testimony of character and conduct

witnesses violated his right to effective assistance of counsel; (4)

Section 136.1(b)(1) is either constitutionally flawed or the trial

court’s instruction was error, and his trial counsel’s failure to

request an appropriate jury instruction violated his right to

effective assistance of counsel; and (5) his due process rights were

violated based on insufficient evidence to support a violation of

Section 136.1(b)(1). (Petition at 2.)

A. Petitioner’s Due Process Rights Were Not Violated By the

Limitation of Photographs Because the Photographs Were

Not Relevant to the Attempt to Dissuade a Witness

Conviction

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated

because the court only allowed into evidence a portion of the 4,021

photographs that he took of Christina. (Petition at 24.) Specifically, Petitioner claims that all of the photographs were the

“center of the bulls eye” of his defense and that they provided the

foundation for his reasonable belief that Christina consented to his

sexual touching. (Petition at 24.) Respondent argues that the

photographic evidence is “weak, if not entirely irrelevant” to

Petitioner’s conviction for attempting to dissuade a witness.

(Answer at 9.) 

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In the California Court of Appeal, Petitioner challenged the

trial court’s limitation on the number of photographs of Christina

that could be admitted into evidence. The California Court of Appeal

agreed with Petitioner that the photographs were relevant to prove

Christina’s consent as a defense to the sexual battery charge.

Therefore, the appellate court reversed Petitioner’s conviction on

count one, sexual battery. However, the Court of Appeal denied

Petitioner’s appeal from his conviction on count two, attempting to

dissuade a witness. He then filed a Petition for Review in the

California Supreme Court which denied his Petition without comment.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 9.) The last reasoned state decision

which addressed the merits of the claim is the California Court of

Appeal’s opinion affirming Petitioner’s conviction for attempting to

dissuade a witness. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7.) It is to that

decision this Court must direct its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-

06. 

“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to

deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68

(1991). As the Supreme Court noted in Dowling, “the category of

infractions that violate ‘fundamental fairness’ is a very narrow

one.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990). The

Supreme Court reiterated in Dowling, when determining whether a due

process violation has occurred, courts “are to determine only

whether the action complained of . . . violates those fundamental

conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and

political institutions, and which define the community’s sense of

fair play and decency.” Dowling, 493 U.S. at 353. 

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Petitioner claims that because the jury did not see all 4,021

photographs, it was not able to fully evaluate whether his act of

writing Christina the email on January 9, 2007 was conduct proscribed under Section 136.1(b)(1), which prohibits attempts to

dissuade a victim or witness from reporting a crime to the law

enforcement authorities. (Petition at 25.) To support this argument,

Petitioner contends that if the jury had been shown all of the

photographs that he took of Christina during the photo shoot, it

would have concluded from her demeanor that there was no crime, and

therefore her report to the police was improper and his email was

simply urging her to withdraw a false report. (Petition at 25.) 

In response to Petitioner’s challenge to the sexual battery

conviction, the California Court of Appeal determined that the trial

court had “violated [Petitioner’s] right to present a defense and

abused its discretion under California Evidence Code Section 352 by

unreasonably limiting the number of photographs presented to the

jury.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 10.) The appellate court

reasoned that a defendant’s reasonable and good faith belief that a

victim voluntarily consented to an alleged criminal act can be a

defense to a sexual offense charge. [Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at

10); citing People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal.3d 143, 155 (1975.)] It was

undisputed that Christina did not give express verbal consent to

Petitioner to lick her vagina. Therefore, the appellate court

determined that Petitioner was entitled to present all relevant

evidence of significant probative value that would tend to prove

that Christina engaged in nonverbal consent. (Respondent’s Lodgment

No. 7 at 22.) The appellate court explained that evidence related

to nonverbal consent is relevant to Petitioner’s claim that he had

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10cv1095 14

a good faith mistaken belief that she consented. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 7 at 22.) For these reasons, the appellate court

concluded that Petitioner’s inability to present all 4,021 photographs was fatal to his mistake-of-fact defense to the sexual

battery charge. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 23.) His conviction

on that charge was reversed. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 23.) 

However, the Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s claim that

his due process rights were violated as to the attempt to dissuade

a witness conviction. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 32-33.) The

appellate court reasoned, 

A review of the e-mail, which Christina read to the jury,

shows that it was far from “benign” or “measured.” In it,

[Petitioner] warned her she should instruct Detective Metz

to “back off” if she wanted to keep “[her] graphic

photographs” private. [Petitioner] expressly threatened in

the e-mail to “make public” those sexually explicit

photographs for “the world to see.” From this evidence,

any jury could reasonably find that [Petitioner] attempted

to dissuade Christina from reporting a crime in violation

of [S]ection 136.1(b)(1).

 

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 31.)

This Court agrees with the Court of Appeal. The Constitution

permits judges to exclude evidence that is repetitive, only

marginally relevant, or poses an undue risk of harassment or

prejudice. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326 (2006). The

Court of Appeal reasoned that all of the photographs were direct

evidence of Christina’s demeanor, and that her demeanor was critical

to Petitioner’s mistake-of-fact defense to the sexual battery

charge. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 22-23.) Therefore,

Petitioner was entitled to present all 4,021 photographs because

they were relevant to that charge. On the other hand, the photographs were irrelevant, and certainly not critical, to Petitioner’s

defense against the attempt to dissuade a witness charge. ChrisCase 3:10-cv-01095-MMA-WVG Document 11 Filed 04/29/11 Page 14 of 39
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tina’s demeanor during the photo shoot is completely irrelevant to

his attempt to dissuade her from continuing her report of the

incident to law enforcement authorities. 

Section 136.1(b)(1) reads:

Except as provided in subdivision (c), every person who

attempts to prevent or dissuade another person who has

been the victim of a crime or who is witness to a crime

from doing any of the following is guilty of a public

offense and shall be punished by imprisonment in a county

jail for not more than one year or in the state prison:

(1) Making any report of that victimization to any peace

officer or state or local law enforcement officer or

probation or parole or correctional officer or prosecuting

agency or to any judge.

Clearly, viewing all 4,021 photographs that Petitioner took

of Christina would not assist the jury in making a determination as

to whether Petitioner attempted to dissuade her from reporting the

incident. The relevant evidence for his attempt to dissuade a

witness charge was the email that Petitioner wrote to Christina on

January 9, 2007, urging her to call Detective Metz to tell him to

back off. The only limited relevance that the photographs possibly

may have had to the attempt to dissuade a witness charge is as

Petitioner stated in his email that Christina would need to call off

the detective if she wanted to keep her graphic photographs private.

But the jury was shown approximately 800 photographs of Christina

from the photo shoot in the form of a slide show, along with 10

other still photographs. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr. Tr.

App. Vol. 7 at 1597-1598.) There was absolutely no need for the

jury to see all 4,021 photographs in order to determine whether

Petitioner’s email was an attempt to get her to call Detective Metz

to try to stop the sexual battery complaint from proceeding. 

 Petitioner asserts that the only evidence presented in support

of the attempt to dissuade a witness charge was the email that he

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wrote to Christina on January 9, 2007. (Petition at 12.) He fails to

acknowledge, however, that the email is the only evidence that was

needed to support a conviction for count two. The jury was presented

with the email, which Petitioner sent to Christina shortly after he

learned that she had filed a sexual battery complaint against him

with the San Diego Police Department. During her testimony,

Christina read Petitioner’s email to the jury. Petitioner’s email

read, in part: 

Do you realize that you will be facing a very costly civil

suit from me if you continue with your criminal claims?

Do you want the courts to make public and the world to see

your graphic photos or would you rather have them kept

private? You need to call Detective Metz, (provided

Detective Metz’s phone number), IMMEDIATELY and tell him

to back off and that you’ve had a change of heart. . .

Lawsuits are extremely costly, stressful and very unpleasant, lots of sleepless nights, etc. Please reconsider. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr. Tr. App. Vol. 3 at 699-700.)

Christina also testified that she felt threatened and scared

after receiving Petitioner’s email. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2,

Rptr. Tr. App. Vol. 3 at 700, 704.)

There is no support for Petitioner’s claim that the outcome

of count two would have been any different if the jury had seen all

4,021 photographs, rather than the over 800 photographs that were

presented. Although he did succeed in showing that all of the

photographs were necessary for his mistake-of-fact defense as to the

sexual battery charge, he is unable to demonstrate that they are in

any way relevant to his conviction for attempting to dissuade a

witness. It is clear by the language of Petitioner’s email that he

was trying to dissuade Christina from continuing her complaint to

the San Diego Police Department. The jury heard the words that

Petitioner wrote to Christina, where he provided Detective Metz’s

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phone number and expressly urged her to call the detective and tell

him to back off. The jury also heard Christina testify that she felt

threatened by the email. Since the photographs were irrelevant to

count two, there was no need to present the over 3,000 additional

photographs in order to put Petitioner’s words into context.

Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeal did not

address his argument that the trial court’s limitation of photographs adversely impacted on the adjudication of count two.

(Petition at 27.) This claim is also without merit. The Court of

Appeal clearly stated,

In support of his appeal, [Petitioner] also claims the

court’s failure to admit all of the photographs into

evidence, his trial counsel’s failure to introduce the

nanny cam videotape, and his trial counsel’s failure to

present the testimony of the four female character

witnesses impacted directly on the issue of count 2 and

acted to deny him a fair trial. We reject this claim of

cumulative error. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 30.)

The appellate court then provided support for its conclusion,

noting that, from the email to Christina, “any jury could reasonably

find that [Petitioner] attempted to dissuade Christina from

reporting a crime in violation of [S]ection 136.1(b)(1).” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 31.) 

Therefore, it is entirely reasonable that the jury found the

dissuading a witness charge to be true based on the email that

Petitioner wrote to Christina, and Christina’s testimony that she

felt threatened and scared after receiving the email. The photographs of Christina had no relevance to the charge of attempting to

dissuade a witness. Accordingly, Petitioner’s right to due process

was not violated by the trial court’s decision not to admit all

4,021 photographs of Christina into evidence. 

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The appellate court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. Therefore, this Court RECOMMENDS that

Petitioner’s claim for habeas relief in this regard be DENIED.

B. Petitioner’s Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel Was Not Violated Because Trial Counsel

Made a Rational Tactical Decision To Not Introduce The

Nanny Cam Video Into Evidence

Petitioner claims that his constitutional right to effective

assistance of counsel was violated because his trial counsel did not

introduce a nanny cam video into evidence. (Petition at 20.)

Specifically, Petitioner asserts that while the nanny cam video did

not seem necessary at the beginning of his trial, “[b]y the end of

the defense case, it should have been very clear” that the video

should have been introduced. (Petition at 28.) Respondent argues

that Petitioner’s trial counsel had valid tactical reasons for

making the decision not to offer the video into evidence, and

therefore the conduct did not constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel. (Answer at 12.) 

In the California Court of Appeal, Petitioner challenged the

effectiveness of his trial counsel because of the decision not to

admit the nanny cam video into evidence. The California Court of

Appeal denied Petitioner’s appeal. He then filed a Petition for

Review in the California Supreme Court which denied his Petition

without comment. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 9.) The last reasoned

state decision which addressed the merits of the claim is the

California Court of Appeal’s opinion affirming Petitioner’s

conviction on count two. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7.) It is to

that decision this Court must direct its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S.

at 805-06.

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The clearly established United States Supreme Court law

governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d

1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996). In a petition for writ of habeas corpus

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court must consider

two factors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. First, the petitioner

must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. Deficient

performance requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious

that he or she was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by

the Sixth Amendment. Id. The petitioner must show that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,

and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that were not

the result of reasonable professional judgment considering the

circumstances. Id. at 688; United State v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d

1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly deferential. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A court

indulges a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 687.

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result . . . would have been different.” Id. at 694.

Petitioner must show that counsel’s errors were so egregious as to

deprive defendant of a fair trial, one whose result is unreliable.

Id. at 687. The Court must evaluate whether the entire trial was

fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id., Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1348.

A court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner

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as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697. The court need not address both prongs if a petitioner fails

to make a sufficient showing of either one. Id. at 697.

“In a federal habeas challenge to a state criminal judgment,

a state court conclusion that counsel rendered effective assistance

is not a finding of fact binding on the federal court. . .” Id. at

698. Instead, “it is a mixed question of law and fact.” Id. [citing

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 (1980)]. Federal habeas courts

must defer to “state court findings of fact made in the course of

deciding an ineffectiveness claim.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698.

Because “both the performance and prejudice components of the

ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact,”

Section 2254(d)(1)’s “unreasonable application of” clause applies.

Id.; see Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 265 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Petitioner argues that he felt “there would have been little

risk of a negative jury reaction” to the nanny cam video. (Petition

at 27-28.) He claims that “the tape carries with it enormous value

in helping the jury see what happened.” (Petition at 28.) He

further asserts that, because the whole issue at trial was whether

Petitioner’s belief that Christina consented was reasonable

“considering all the events leading up to the licking, . . . the

video could have been extremely valuable.” (Petition at 28.) 

The Court of Appeal concluded that Petitioner had failed to

demonstrate that there could have been no rational tactical purpose

for his counsel’s deliberate decision to not present the video.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 29.) Addressing the issue of trial

counsel’s performance, the Court of Appeal noted, 

Had the defense presented the nanny cam video at trial,

the jury would likely have found that [Petitioner] falsely

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told Christina during the recorded telephone conversation

that “the video record would show [her] having fun for six

minutes” when he orally copulated her. The jury would

also have learned that [Petitioner] gave shots of tequila

to Christina when she was naked and had then squirted

something down her throat during the photo shoot. The

likelihood that the showing of the video would have been

prejudicial to the defense is manifest. In sum, we reject

[Petitioner’s] contention that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance by failing to introduce the nanny

cam videotape into evidence.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 29.) 

The Court of Appeal also determined that Petitioner was

unable to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 7 at 28.) The Court of Appeal noted that there was not

a reasonable probability that the verdict as to Count 2 would have

been more favorable to him absent the alleged ineffective assistance

of counsel. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 28.) 

This Court agrees with the Court of Appeal. Like the

limitation of photographs in Claim One, the nanny cam video is

clearly irrelevant to Petitioner’s charge for attempting to dissuade

a witness. The jury was shown over 800 photographs of Christina from

the photo shoot. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr. Tr. App. Vol.

7 at 1597-1598.) Again, the relevant evidence for Petitioner’s

attempt to dissuade a witness charge was the January 9, 2007 email

that he wrote to Christina, urging her to call Detective Metz and

tell him to “back off.” There was absolutely no need for the jury to

see the nanny cam video in order to determine whether Petitioner’s

email was an attempt to get her to call Detective Metz to try to

stop the complaint from proceeding.

 Petitioner claims that, if the nanny cam video had been

presented to the jury, none of the prosecution’s attacks on his

character during closing argument, nor the evidence brought out

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during testimony, would have been available, and that the video

would have shown that he was not a liar. (Petition at 28.) To

support his claim, Petitioner urges that the nanny cam would have

provided the jury with the best and strongest evidence to show the

“‘first date’ flirtatious interaction” between himself and Christina. (Petition at 29.) He also asserts that he wanted to introduce

the nanny cam video to show the jury what he saw before the

incident. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3 at 49.) 

Similar to the request to introduce all 4,021 photographs of

the photo shoot, introduction of the nanny cam video would have been

cumulative and unnecessary to Petitioner’s defense to the attempt to

dissuade a witness charge. The jury was presented with plenty of

evidence of Christina’s behavior during the photo shoot. Christina

testified about her demeanor prior to the incident with Petitioner.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr. Tr. App. Vol. 4 at 960.) She

told the jury that she was uninhibited, having fun, touching her

private parts, and posing with a banana. (Respondent’s Lodgment No.

2, Rptr. Tr. App. Volume 4 at 906, 911.) Additionally, the jury was

shown over 800 photographs in a slide show and 10 still photographs

of the photo shoot, both before and after the licking incident.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr. Tr. App. Vol. 3 at 726.) 

Introduction of the video would also likely have been

prejudicial to Petitioner. He secretly videotaped Christina during

the photo shoot in his house. Although she was posing for photographs, she was unaware that she was being videotaped. That

information may have caused concern to the jury. Further, the video

likely would not have helped support Petitioner’s contention that he

did not lie to Christina. To the contrary, as the Court of Appeal

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pointed out, the video would have shown the jury that Petitioner was

untruthful with Christina when he told her that the video did

capture the licking incident. Instead, the video cut off before the

incident occurred. 

Following his conviction, Petitioner filed a motion for a new

trial and argued that his trial counsel’s performance had been

deficient due to the failure to introduce the video into evidence.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 4. at 24.) At the hearing, Petitioner

called his trial counsel to testify in support of the motion.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr. Tr. App. Vol. 7 at 1586.) His

trial counsel testified as to his reasons for deciding not to

present the video to the jury. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr.

Tr. App. Vol. 7 at 1586.) He testified that he had watched the video

before trial, and noted that it depicted Petitioner providing

Christina with tequila shots and squirting lime juice down her

throat while she was naked. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr. Tr.

App. Vol. 7 at 1589-1590.) He also testified that it appeared that

Christina did not know that she was being videotaped. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 2, Rptr. Tr. App. Vol. 7 at 1590.) After being

presented with the evidence of counsel’s reasons for keeping the

video from the jury, the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for

a new trial. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr. Tr. App. Vol. 7 at

1614, 1617.) 

 Trial counsel’s performance is not deficient unless it falls

below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 688. Here, trial counsel made a rational tactical decision to not

show the video to the jury. Counsel had valid reasons for making the

determination that it was possible that the jury would not react

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well to the fact that Petitioner secretly videotaped Christina while

she was naked at his house. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show

that his trial counsel’s performance constituted deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland.

 Petitioner also argues that his trial counsel’s decision not

to admit the nanny cam video into evidence “created distinct

prejudice” to him as it relates to the attempt to dissuade a witness

charge. (Petition at 29.) As in Claim One, he again asserts that the

jury evaluated the email to Christina as to whether or not the

police report was false. (Petition at 29.) He claims, “[H]ad [the

jury] been shown the video it would have concluded that there was no

crime, that the report of it to the police was improper,” and that

his email was really urging her to withdraw a false report.

(Petition at 29-30.) Petitioner’s counsel reasoned that the video

would likely prejudice Petitioner, rather than assist with his

defense. Therefore, he had a rational tactical purpose for not

presenting the video to the jury. Moreover, it is clear from the

record why his counsel could have thought the video may not only be

unhelpful, but also prejudicial to Petitioner. Therefore, he made

the rational, tactical determination to keep the video from the

jury. The Court, having determined that Petitioner received

effective assistance of counsel, the Court need not reach the issue

of prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 697.

For these reasons, trial counsel’s decision did not fall

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and Petitioner did

not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court’s

denial of Petitioner’s claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

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Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim for habeas

relief in this regard be DENIED.

C. Petitioner’s Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel Was Not Violated Because Trial Counsel’s Decision Not to Introduce the Testimony of

Character and Conduct Witnesses Into Evidence Was a

Rational Tactical Decision

Petitioner contends that “trial counsel has a duty to

investigate all defenses and in this case it would have yielded

important information.” (Petition at 30.) Specifically, Petitioner

claims that there were a number of women that he had previously

photographed in his home who were available to testify that his

regular course of conduct was completely appropriate. (Petition at

30.) Respondent argues that Petitioner was unable to meet his burden

under Strickland of establishing that there could be no rational

tactical purpose for his trial counsel’s decision. (Answer at 11.)

 In the California Court of Appeal, Petitioner challenged his

counsel’s effective assistance for failing to introduce certain

character witnesses at trial. The California Court of Appeal denied

Petitioner’s appeal. He then filed a Petition for Review in the

California Supreme Court, which denied his Petition without comment.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 9.) The last reasoned state decision

which addressed the merits of the claim is the California Court of

Appeal’s opinion affirming Petitioner’s conviction on count two.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7.) It is to that decision this Court

must direct its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-806.

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel had a duty to

investigate all defenses, and therefore he should have introduced

three women who would testify that Petitioner had previously

photographed them in the nude or partially nude, and also his former

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female personal assistant. (Petition at 30-31.) He asserted that he

never forced himself on these women, that he never made improper

advances, and he wanted the women to testify as to his character.

(Petition at 30.) Petitioner contends that these witnesses could

have supported his case and countered the prosecution’s argument

that he was manipulative in general, and specifically towards

Christina, because he never forced himself on these other women or

made improper advances. (Petition at 30.) 

 The Court of Appeal denied this claim, stating,

Given the state of the evidence at trial - including

Christina’s testimony that during the “professional” photo

shoot [Petitioner] asked her, “Does the photographer get

some of that?,” and his own recorded statement that her

act of masturbation, which Christina said was only posing,

constituted “consent” for his act of vaginally licking her

- [Petitioner] has failed to demonstrate that his trial

counsel had no rational tactical purpose for his decision

to not call the women as character witnesses. (People v.

Zapien, 4 Cal.4th 929,980 (1993)). A reasonably competent

defense attorney may have had a valid tactical reason for

not opening up the subject of [Petitioner’s] character and

his history of using the Internet to persuade young women

to come to his home studio to participate in sexually

provocative nude photography. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 29-30.)

This Court agrees with the Court of Appeal. Similar to

Petitioner’s claim, the defendant in Strickland asserted ineffective

assistance of counsel, claiming, among other things, that his

counsel had failed to investigate and present character witnesses.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675. The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that

“[C]ounsel’s strategy choice was well within the range of professionally reasonable judgment, and the decision not to seek more

character or psychological evidence than was in hand was likewise

reasonable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699. 

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Here, Petitioner claims that the character witnesses would

have testified that they were photographed in Petitioner’s home like

Christina had been, but Petitioner never touched them in a sexual

way. (Petition at 31.) However, it is undisputed that Petitioner

licked Christina. Therefore, it is reasonable for Petitioner’s

counsel to have believed that there was no benefit to Petitioner in

presenting the women to testify. Further, Petitioner’s counsel may

also have determined that it would have been prejudicial to

Petitioner to introduce the testimony of several other women that he

had photographed naked in his home. Moreover, Plaintiff would have

opened the door to the prosecution’s rebuttal evidence of Petitioner’s character, if any existed. Therefore, counsel’s performance

was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and

did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness required

by Strickland. Having determined that Petitioner received effective

assistance of counsel, the Court need not reach the issue of

prejudice. Id. at 694, 697. 

The appellate court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that

Petitioner’s claim for habeas relief in this regard be DENIED.

D. California Penal Code Section 136.1(b)(1) is Not

Constitutionally Flawed, the Jury Instruction was Not

Error, and Trial Counsel’s Failure to Request an

Appropriate Jury Instruction Did Not Violate Petitioner’s Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of

Counsel

Petitioner asserts that it is a fundamental principle in

criminal jurisprudence that conviction of a crime requires proof of

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both the actus reas and the mens rea of the crime. (Petition at 32.)

Specifically, he argues that California Penal Code Section

136.1(b)(1) is a crime without the requirement of mens rea as

applied and instructed at his trial. (Petition at 32.) Respondent

contends that the Court of Appeal specifically determined that

Section 136.1(b)(1) does include a mens rea element. (Answer at 15.)

In the California Court of Appeal, Petitioner challenged the

constitutionality of Section 136.1(b)(1), along with the trial

court’s jury instruction, and the effectiveness of his trial

counsel. The California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s appeal.

He then filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court,

which denied his Petition without comment. (Respondent’s Lodgment

No. 9.) The last reasoned state decision which addressed the merits

of the claim is the California Court of Appeal’s opinion affirming

Petitioner’s conviction on count two. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7.)

It is to that decision this Court must direct its analysis. Ylst,

501 U.S. at 805-806. 

Challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under

state law does not state a claim cognizable in a federal habeas

corpus action. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72. To obtain federal

collateral relief for errors in a jury charge, a petitioner must

show that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire

trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. Id. at 72.

The instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must

be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the

trial record. Id. Where “no erroneous instruction was given[,]” a

petitioner’s burden is “especially heavy,” because “[a]n omission,

or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than

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a misstatement of the law.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155

(1977). 

In apparent support of his claim that Section 136.1(b)(1) is

constitutionally flawed because it does not have a mens rea

requirement, Petitioner contends that the only “intent” included in

the statute is the specific intent to attempt to dissuade a witness

from reporting a crime. (Petition at 34.) He claims that the statute

makes no distinction between acting improperly or maliciously to

attempt to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime, versus acting

legally and properly to attempt to dissuade a witness from reporting

a crime. (Petition at 34.) He argues that the statute does not

require that the crime about to be reported be legitimate, perceived

to be legitimate, known to the reporter as legitimate, or known to

the dissuader as being legitimate. (Petition at 34.) He asserts that

the statute forbids the act of dissuading a witness from ALL reports

of a crime, even if the report is mistakenly or knowingly false.

(Petition at 34.) Petitioner’s arguments are unavailing.

The appellate court noted that the trial court instructed the

jury under CALCRIM No. 2622 as follows with regard to count two:

The defendant is charged in Count 2 with intimidating a

witness. To prove that the defendant is guilty of this

crime, the People must prove that: 1, The defendant tried

to prevent or discourage [Christina] from cooperating or

providing information so that a complaint could be sought

and prosecuted, and from helping to prosecute that action;

2, [Christina] was a witness or a crime victim; and 3, The

defendant knew he was trying to prevent or discourage

[Christina] from causing prosecution and intended to do

so. 

(emphasis added.)

As used here, a witness means someone, or a person the 

defendant reasonably believed to be someone, who has reported a

crime to the police. A person is a victim if there is reason to

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believe that a federal or state crime is being, or has been,

committed or attempted against him or her.

 The appellate court concluded that Section 136.1(b)(1) does

in fact have a mens rea requirement. Specifically, Section

136.1(b)(1) requires specific intent to dissuade the victim from

reporting her victimization to law enforcement authorities. Cal.

Penal Code § 136.1(b)(1). 

This Court agrees with the Court of Appeal. The crime of

attempting to prevent and dissuade a victim of a crime from making

a report of that victimization to a peace officer in violation of

Section 136.1(b)(1) clearly does have a mens rea requirement. It

requires the specific intent to dissuade the victim from reporting

her victimization to the authorities. Cal. Penal Code § 136.1(b)(1).

The mens rea element is satisfied by the requirement that the

Petitioner knew that he was attempting to dissuade, and that he

intended to attempt or dissuade the victim. Therefore, the statute

is not unconstitutionally flawed.

A review of the instructions that the jury received regarding

count two shows that the court, using standard Judicial Council of

California Criminal Jury Instructions (2006-2007) (CALCRIM),

properly instructed the jury as to the elements of count two. The

trial court instructed that in order to convict Petitioner of

unlawfully attempting to prevent and dissuade Christina as a victim

and witness of a crime from making a report of her victimization to

a peace officer or law enforcement agency, the jury was required to

find beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time of his alleged

criminal act, Petitioner knew he was trying to prevent or discourage

Christina from causing prosecution, and that he intended to do so.

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As the Court of Appeal asserted, “[w]ith respect to the mens rea

element of the offense charged in count two, the constitution

requires nothing further.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 34-35.)

Here, the evidence shows that Petitioner knew that he was attempting

to dissuade Christina from continuing with her report to the police

when he sent her the January 9, 2007 email. 

Petitioner also claims ineffective assistance of counsel for

failure to request an appropriate jury instruction. (Petition at

38.) Since Section 136.1(b)(1) does contain a mens rea element, and

the jury was properly instructed, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel is also without merit. Trial counsel’s

performance did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness required by Strickland for failing to object to a proper jury

instruction. The appellate court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that

Petitioner’s claim for habeas relief in this regard be DENIED.

E. Petitioner’s Due Process Rights Were Not Violated

Because There Was Sufficient Evidence To Support His

Conviction For Attempting To Dissuade A Witness Under

Section 136.1(b)(1)

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated

because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction

for attempting to dissuade a witness under Section 136.1(b)(1).

(Petition at 38, 41.) Specifically, Petitioner claims that Section

136.1(b)(1) only addresses the act of attempting to stop the initial

reporting of a crime, and it does not prohibit attempts to dissuade

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a witness from withdrawing a report that has already been filed.

(Petition at 39.) Respondent asserts that Christina’s testimony was

sufficient to sustain Petitioner’s conviction because it supports a

reasonable finding that Petitioner was attempting to pressure her

into withdrawing her report to the police that she was the victim of

a sex crime. (Answer at 17.) 

In the California Court of Appeal, Petitioner challenged the

sufficiency of the evidence upon which he was convicted. The

California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s appeal. He then filed

a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court which denied

his Petition without comment. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 9.) The

last reasoned state decision which addressed the merits of the claim

is the California Court of Appeal’s opinion affirming Petitioner’s

conviction on the dissuading a witness count. (Respondent’s Lodgment

No. 7.) It is to that decision this Court must direct its analysis.

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. 

The clearly established federal law regarding sufficiency of

the evidence claims in the criminal context is set forth in Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In Jackson, the Court held

that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is violated, and

an applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief, “if it is found

that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier

of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. In making this determination, habeas

courts must respect the province of the jury to determine the

credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw

reasonable inferences from proven facts by assuming the jury

resolved all conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict. Id.

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at 319. Once a state court fact finder has found a defendant guilty,

federal habeas courts must consider the evidence “in the light most

favorable to the prosecution.” Id. Federal habeas courts must also

analyze Jackson claims “with explicit reference to the substantive

elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.” Id. at

324 n. 16. 

The Ninth Circuit has stated, “(a)fter AEDPA, we apply the

standards of Jackson with an additional layer of deference.” Juan H.

V. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005). In Allen, the Ninth

Circuit first reviewed the standard of review applied by the state

appellate court to a sufficiency of the evidence claim, and found

that, although the state court did not cite to the relevant federal

case law, “such a citation is not required ‘so long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts’

Supreme Court precedent.” Id. at 1274 n. 12 (quoting Early, 537 U.S.

at 8.) 

Viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the

prosecution,” as this Court must, it is clear that sufficient

evidence was adduced at trial to support Petitioner’s conviction for

attempting to dissuade a witness under California law. Jackson, 443

U.S. at 319.

Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to

convict him of the attempt to dissuade a witness charge because

Section 136.1(b)(1) is not meant to penalize attempts to dissuade

someone to withdraw a charge that has already been filed. (Petition

at 39.) He argues that a crime had already been reported when he

warned Christina to drop the charges against him in his January 9,

2007 email. (Petition at 41.) He further claims that attempting to

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persuade someone to withdraw a charge “is an entirely different act

not covered by [Section 136.1(b)(1)].” (Petition at 39.) Petitioner

asserts that, because the prosecution did not have to prove that he

was trying to dissuade Christina from actually filing a report, his

conviction cannot stand. 

The appellate court denied this claim, stating:

[Petitioner] contends that [S]ection 136.1(b)(1) should be

interpreted narrowly as prohibiting ‘the act of attempting

to stop the initial reporting of the crime itself.’ He

claims ‘there is no evidence that [he] attempted to

prevent Christina from reporting the occurrence of the

crime’ and all he did was ‘contact Christina once after

the report had already been made, and advise her that she

made a false report’ and that ‘he was going to sue her in

a civil court, because it was his belief that no crime had

occurred.’ These contentions are unavailing. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 35-36.)

 

The Court of Appeal determined that Christina’s testimony was

sufficient evidence to sustain Petitioner’s conviction for attempting to dissuade a witness. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 36.)

Christina testified that she received the email from Petitioner on

January 9, 2007. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr. Tr. App. Vol.

3 at 698.) He wrote the email after he was contacted by Detective

Metz about the licking incident that Christina had reported to the

police. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr. Tr. App. Vol. 3 at 699.)

Christina read the email out loud during her testimony. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr. Tr. App. Vol. 3 at 699-700.) The jury

heard the entire email, including, “Do you realize that you will be

facing a very costly civil suit from me if you continue with your

claims?” and “Do you want the courts to make public and the world

to see your graphic photos or would you rather have them kept

private?” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr. Tr. App. Vol. 3 at

699-700.) Petitioner’s email also instructed Christina to “call

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Detective Metz IMMEDIATELY and tell him to back off and that you’ve

had a change of heart.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr. Tr. App.

Vol. 3 at 700.) He even provided the detective’s phone number.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr. Tr. App. Vol. 3 at 700.)

Petitioner wrote that if he did not hear from her in response to the

email, then he would assume that she was proceeding with her claim,

and he would retain an attorney. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr.

Tr. App. Vol. 3 at 700.) He added, “Lawsuits are extremely costly,

stressful and very unpleasant, lots of sleepless nights, et cetera.

Please reconsider.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr. Tr. App.

Vol. 3 at 700.) After reading Petitioner’s email to the jury,

Christina testified that it made her feel threatened and scared.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, Rptr. Tr. App. Vol. 3 at 700, 704.) 

 The Court of Appeal concluded,

Christina’s testimony was sufficient to sustain [Petitioner’s] conviction of count two, as it supports a

reasonable finding that [Petitioner] was attempting to

pressure Christina into withdrawing her report to the

police that she was the victim of a sex crime. [Petitioner] ignores the obvious point that a defendant’s act

of using a threat to persuade a victim or witness to

withdraw a report she has made to the police is tantamount to using a threat to dissuade a victim or witness

from filing such a report. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 36.) 

 This Court agrees with the Court of Appeal. Under California

law, it is a misdemeanor to “attempt to prevent or dissuade another

person who has been the victim of a crime or who is witness to a

crime from . . . [m]aking any report of that victimization to any

peace officer or state or local law enforcement officer . . . or to

any judge.” Cal. Penal Code § 136.1(b)(1). A conviction will be

upheld so long as the defendant’s “words or actions support the

inference” that defendant sought to dissuade a victim or potential

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witness from . . . reporting a crime.” People v. Thomas, 83

Cal.App.3d 511, 514 (1978). 

Here, Petitioner relies on People v. Fernandez, 106

Cal.App.4th 943 (2003), to support his claim that the act of

attempting to dissuade a victim or witness to withdraw her complaint is an act that is not covered by Section 136.1(b)(1).

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 36.) However, Fernandez is not on

point. Fernandez did not involve an attempt to dissuade a witness

after a complaint had already been filed. Instead, the question in

Fernandez was whether an attempt to dissuade a witness from making

a “report . . . to any judge” includes an attempt to influence a

victim’s testimony at a preliminary hearing. Fernandez, 106

Cal.App.4th at 945. In Fernandez, the court determined that

Section 136.1(b)(1) is not a catchall provision designed to punish

efforts to improperly influence a witness. Id. at 948. The

Fernandez court found that section 136.1(b)(1) was being used as a

catchall provision because the defendant was convicted of attempting to dissuade a witness from testifying, but the statute makes

no reference to testimony or courtroom appearances. Id. The court

also determined that there is a difference between a “report” and

“testimony.” Id. at 951. It reasoned that a report may generally

be defined as “an account presented,” and “[i]n the context of

reporting a crime, it generally means notifying the authorities

that the crime has occurred and providing information about the

offense.” Id. at 948. The Fernandez court distinguished “testimony” from a “report,” reasoning that testimony is more specifically defined as a “declaration by a witness under oath, as that

given before a court.” Id. Here, Section 136.1(b)(1) was not

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used as a catchall provision. Petitioner’s behavior is clearly

covered by this statute. Although Petitioner’s reliance on

Fernandez is misplaced, it is clear that the conduct that he was

attempting to dissuade falls into the Fernandez definition of a

“report.” Petitioner’s email urged Christina not to provide

information about an offense to the authorities. He was not

trying to persuade her not to testify at a preliminary hearing or

at trial. Rather, Petitioner asked her to call Detective Metz

“immediately” and tell him to “back off.” 

Petitioner also argues that because the Court of Appeal

reversed his conviction for sexual battery on the ground that the

trial court violated his right to present a defense, the Court of

Appeal “essentially inferred that if [Petitioner] had been able to

present his full defense, the most probable outcome would have

been a jury finding of [Petitioner’s] innocence of the crime.”

(Petition at 41-42.) Petitioner claims that, “[i]t is logical that

the conviction for violation of Section 136.1(b)(1) cannot stand

if there was no crime to report, as the [S]ection required specifically a report of a ‘crime.’” (Petition at 42.) 

Petitioner’s argument lacks merit. His ultimate acquittal

of sexual battery is irrelevant and does not relate back to the

time when Christina made the initial report of the crime. There is

nothing in the record to indicate that Christina did not reasonably believe that she was a victim of a federal or state crime.

She testified that when Petitioner began licking her vagina, she

froze, she was scared because she did not know what Petitioner was

capable of doing, and that she felt violated. She also testified

that she called her sister, best friend, and boyfriend immediately

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upon leaving Petitioner’s house the afternoon of the incident, and

that she was hysterical when she made the phone calls, and she

told them that she had been “assaulted.” She called the police and

underwent a Sexual Assault Response Team examination, where her

vagina was swabbed for DNA. The Court of Appeal reversed Petitioner’s sexual battery conviction because of a limitation of the

number of photographs admitted into evidence. However, that does

not erase the fact that the evidence shows that Christina felt she

had been victimized by Petitioner, and he attempted to dissuade

her from continuing with her complaint to the police. 

In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, this Court finds that a rational trier of fact

could have found sufficient evidence that Petitioner attempted to

dissuade Christina from proceeding with her report of the incident

in violation of Section 136.1(b)(1). Thus, this Court concludes

that the appellate court’s denial of this claim was not contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, nor was it an unreasonable determination of the

facts. Therefore, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim

for habeas relief in this regard by DENIED. 

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be DENIED with prejudice. This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to

the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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IT IS ORDERED that no later than May 31, 2011, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections

shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later

than June 15, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v.

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: April 29, 2011

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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