Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01808/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01808-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Insurance Contract

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Etta Reeves, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-07-1808-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.’s (“MetLife”) motion for

summary judgment (doc. 12) and separate statement of facts (doc. 13), plaintiff’s response

(doc. 14) and separate statement of facts (doc. 15), and MetLife’s reply (doc. 19).

I

Vicki Jackson (the “insured”) was an employee of the United States Postal Service

covered by a group life insurance policy. The postal service purchased the policy from

MetLife pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act (“FEGLIA”),

5 U.S.C. § 8701, et seq., which also partly governs administration of the policy.

Upon the death of a covered employee, proceeds are to be paid out according to a

statutory order of precedence. Crucial to this action, proceeds are paid out “First, to the

beneficiary or beneficiaries designated by the employee in a signed and witnessed writing

received before death in the employing office.” 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a) (emphasis added).

Case 2:07-cv-01808-FJM Document 22 Filed 06/09/08 Page 1 of 5
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1

 Though plaintiff asserts that the designation of beneficiary form “was entrusted to

the U.S. Post Office the morning of May 5, 2003,” Response at 3, there appears to be no

serious contention that the insured’s “employing office” was anywhere other than the Van

Buren Street post office. 

2

 Plaintiff does not dispute these facts from defendant’s statement of facts. We note

that plaintiff did not comply with LRCiv 56.1(b), requiring a party opposing a motion for

summary judgment to file a controverting statement of facts that specifically addresses,

paragraph by paragraph, the movant’s statement of facts. 

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If there is no designated beneficiary, proceeds go to a surviving spouse; if no surviving

spouse, proceeds go to surviving children or their descendants; if none of the above, proceeds

go to parents of the employee. Id. The insured was never married, had no children, and had

not designated a beneficiary. 

However, on May 5, 2003, the insured completed and signed, with two witnesses, an

official designation of beneficiary form designating plaintiff Etta Reeves as the sole

beneficiary of the policy. That morning, a friend of the insured, Bobbie Jo Nicol, mailed

the form in a priority envelope from the Mesa, Arizona, post office to the insured’s place of

work at the post office on East Van Buren Street in Phoenix.1

 The insured died May 6, 2003,

at approximately 11 p.m.

The designation of beneficiary form was stamped “received May 12, 2003” by

personnel services at the Van Buren Street post office, six days after the insured’s death.

For some reason the document is also stamped “received June 30, 2003.” DSOF, Ex. B.

After the insured’s death, the post office informed MetLife that the insured had no named

beneficiary. On August 22, 2003, MetLife paid out the life insurance proceeds of

$283,251.74 to the insured’s parents, in accordance with the statutory order of precedence

for an employee with no named beneficiary. DSOF ¶ 8. On August 25, 2003, MetLife

received a claim for death benefits from plaintiff and the designation of beneficiary form

dated May 5, 2003, naming plaintiff as beneficiary. Id. ¶¶ 9–10.2

 

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II

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. The

opponent may not merely rest on the pleadings, but “must set forth specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Rule 56(e), Fed. R. Civ. P. If we conclude that

plaintiff has failed “to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to [her] case, and on which [she] will bear the burden of proof at trial,” then there

is no genuine issue of material fact, and defendant will be entitled to summary judgment.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). 

In this action, it is plaintiff’s burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence

that the designation of beneficiary form was received by the Van Buren Street post office

prior to the death of the insured on the night of May 6, 2003. Defendant has put forth

evidence that the form was stamped “received” by personnel services at the post office on

May 12, 2003. DSOF, Ex. A ¶ 16; DSOF, Ex. B. But defendant does not claim any

conclusive legal significance to the date stamp. Rather, with this motion, defendant contends

that plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to establish that the form was

timely received. Motion at 1. 

 In response, plaintiff presents an affidavit from Bobbie Jo Nicol, stating that she

mailed the designation of beneficiary form to the Van Buren Street post office from Mesa on

Monday, May 5, 2003. PSOF, Ex. D. Plaintiff contends that “common sense would indicate

that [the form] was received at another post office less than 20 miles distant within the next

36 hours.” Response at 5–6. Plaintiff also presents her own affidavit asserting that she was

told by Van Buren Street post office employees that there was short staffing in the personnel

office the week of May 5, 2003. PSOF, Ex. A ¶ 11. This, she suggests, could have caused

significant delay between actual receipt of the form and the “received May 12, 2003” date

stamp. Id. 

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Without more, the fact that the beneficiary form was mailed on May 5, 2003, is

insufficient to show that it was received the very next day. In Schikore v. Bankamerica

Supplemental Retirement Plan, 269 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2001), the court employed the

common law mailbox rule, which “provides that the proper and timely mailing of a document

raises a rebuttable presumption that the document has been received by the addressee in the

usual time.” Here, however, plaintiff has put forth no evidence that the “usual time” for

cross-town priority mailing is one day. 

Furthermore, in Vacek v. U.S. Postal Service, 447 F.3d 1248, 1251–52 (9th Cir.

2006), the court refused to employ the mailbox rule because the statute that controlled that

case, the Federal Tort Claims Act, is “strictly construed.” Because administrative

convenience and speedy payment are paramount policies of FEGLIA, it too is strictly

construed. Ward v. Stratton, 988 F.2d 65, 67 (8th Cir. 1993). Thus, plaintiff is likely not

entitled to the presumption afforded by the mailbox rule. 

Plaintiff’s own affidavit about short-staffing at the Van Buren Street post office

does not comply with Rule 56(e), Fed. R. Civ. P., which states that affidavits opposing a

motion for summary judgment “must be made on personal knowledge [and] set out facts that

would be admissible in evidence.” Plaintiff’s affidavit is not based on personal knowledge

and it contains hearsay. Furthermore, even if admissible, evidence of staffing problems in

the personnel office the week of May 5, 2003, might tend to prove that the form was received

before the date stamp “received May 12, 2003,” but it is scarcely probative that the form

arrived on May 6, 2003, the only date that matters.

The standard for summary judgment mirrors the standard for judgment as a matter

of law under Rule 50(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. Thus,

summary judgment is appropriate if we find “that a reasonable jury would not have a legally

sufficient evidentiary basis” to find for the opponent. Rule 50(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. We

conclude that plaintiff has failed to establish a sufficient evidentiary basis for her claim that

the designation of beneficiary form was received before the death of the insured. 

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3

 Under the terms of the policy, “Payment shall be made to the Beneficiary of record

of the Employee . . . immediately after receipt of such proof [of death] and of proof that the

claimant is entitled to such payment.” Policy § 5, DSOF, Ex. 1 at 3.

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Though we have accepted the parties’ presentation of the case and grant summary

judgment on that basis, we note in passing that the undisputed evidence is that, after the

insured’s death, the post office informed MetLife that the insured had died without a

designated beneficiary.3

 DSOF ¶ 7. Plaintiff asserts that there is “no question but [that] the

United States Post Office, the employer of the [insured], knew of the beneficiary designation

before the funds were paid out.” Response at 5. But this strikes us as irrelevant to MetLife’s

liability. Nowhere does plaintiff contend that MetLife had knowledge of the designation of

beneficiary form before paying out on the policy. 

III

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED GRANTING defendant’s

motion for summary judgment (doc. 12). The clerk is directed to enter final judgment.

DATED this 6th day of June, 2008.

 

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