Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02914/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02914-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LANCE R. MARTIN,

CDCR # E-17299,

Civil No. 14cv2914 BEN (PCL)

Plaintiff, ORDER SUA SPONTE

DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

vs.

T. HARRINSTON; L. MILLER;

C. OROZCO; CESCOLINI;

J. JUAREZ; S. MILLER;

HARRINGTON; ODELL,

Defendants.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 8, 2014, Lance R. Martin (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently

incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, and

proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Plaintiff did not prepay the $400 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);

instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No. 2). 

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The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and sua sponte dismissed his

Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A (ECF Doc. No. 3.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an

amended complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the

Court’s Order. (Id.) On February 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”) and approximately one month later, Plaintiff filed supplemental exhibits to his

FAC (ECF Doc. Nos. 14, 16.) 

TheCourt, once again, conducted the required sua sponte screening and found that

Plaintiff had not corrected the deficiencies in his pleading previously identified by the

Court. Thus, Plaintiff’s FAC was dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted on April 20, 2015. (ECF Doc. No. 17.) On May 20, 2015, Plaintiff

filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (ECF Doc. No. 21.)

II.

SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status

or the payment of any partial filing fees, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)

obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of,

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which

are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants

who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621

F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

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All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement ofthe claimshowing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se,

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir.

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents

of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Access to Courts Claims

Plaintiff continues to claim that Defendants have delayed in mailing confidential

legal mail that he has submitted to them. Prisoners have a constitutional right to access

to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right islimited to the filing

of direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims

for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a

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litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from the loss

of a suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury,

536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002); see also Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir.

2011) (differentiating “between two types of access to court claims: those involving

prisoners’ right to affirmative assistance and those involving prisoners’ rights to litigate

without active interference.”).

However, asthis Court’s previous Order explained, a plaintiff must allege “actual

injury” as the threshold requirement to any access to courts claim. See Lewis, 518 U.S.

at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. An “actual injury” is “actual prejudice with respect

to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or

to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; see also Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936

(9th Cir. 2004) (defining actual injury as the “inability to file a complaint or defend

against a charge”). The failure to allege an actual injury is “fatal.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518

F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Failure to show that a ‘non-frivolous legal claim

had been frustrated’ is fatal.”) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.4). 

In addition, the prisoner must allege the loss of a “non-frivolous” or “arguable”

underlying claim. See Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413-14. The nature and description of the

underlying claim must be set forth in the pleading “as if it were being independently

pursued.” Id. at 417. Finally, the plaintiff must specifically allege the “remedy that may

be awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be

brought.” Id. at 415.

Plaintiff’s SAC failsto allege the actual injury required to state an accessto courts

claim. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. Specifically, he has

failed to allege how the delay in the mailing of legal documents resulted in an “actual

prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such asthe inability to meet

a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; Jones, 393 F.3d at 936;

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The basis of Plaintiff’s claim is the alleged failure to process his

legal mail which consisted of a “‘proposed’ order to produce prisoner” for unspecified

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proceedingsin San Diego Superior Court. (SAC at 11.) Even if Plaintiff was denied the

right to personally appear by the state court, there are no allegations that Plaintiff had

any action relating to his conditions of confinement or criminal proceedings dismissed

due to the alleged delay in mailing documents by prison officials.

In addition, once again, Plaintiff’s SAC also fails to identify or even nominally

describe the non-frivolous or arguable nature of the underlying cause of action he either

anticipated or lost as a result of Defendants’ actions. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 416 (“[L]ike

any other element of an access claim[,] . . . the predicate claim [must] be described well

enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the

underlying claim is more than hope.”).

For these reasons, the Court finds, once again, that Plaintiff’s access to courts

claims must be dismissed for failing to state a plausible claim upon which § 1983 relief

can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

C. Legal Mail

Throughout his SAC, Plaintiff also claims that Defendants tampered with his legal

mail. The mail that he describes is mail that he sent to, or received from, various courts. 

However, while mail from his legal counsel can constitute “legal mail,” mail from the

courts is not legal mail. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996).

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court:

1. DISMISSES this civil action without prejudice for failing to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and

§ 1915A(b)(1). 

2. DENIES Plaintiff leave to amend as futile. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins.

Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an abuse of

discretion where further amendment would be futile); see also Robinson v. Cal. Bd. of

Prison Terms, 997 F. Supp. 1303, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Since plaintiff has not, and

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cannot, state a claim containing an arguable basis in law, this action should be dismissed

without leave to amend; any amendment would be futile.”) (citing Newland v. Dalton,

81 F.3d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1996)).

The Clerk of Court shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 13, 2015

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

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