Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_96-cv-01401/USCOURTS-caed-2_96-cv-01401-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Through their cross-motions, the parties seek adjudications on the merits of 1

petitioner’s guilt-phase claims. The court, therefore, will treat the motions as merits briefs. 

The court also notes that respondents were directed to brief those guilt phase

claims for which summary judgment would be appropriate. In their motion for summary

judgment, respondents have not briefed Claims AA1, AA2, or AA3, which argue ineffective

assistance of counsel at the guilt phase. Because these claims were not briefed, the court

concludes that respondents have determined these claims are not appropriate for summary

judgment. Additionally, as with penalty phase claims, petitioner’s claims regarding the postconviction process have not been briefed and are not presently before the court for decision. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM A. PROCTOR, No. CIV S-96-1401-DFL-CMK

Petitioner, DEATH PENALTY CASE

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ROBERT L. AYERS, JR., et al.,

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding with appointed counsel, seeks a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to court order, the parties have filed

cross-motions for summary judgment (Docs. 176 and 189) addressing 20 guilt phase claims

raised in the petition. Petitioner has also filed a motion (Docs. 185 and 186) under Federal Rule 1

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 1 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “. . . a determination of a factual issue made 2

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this

presumption. See id. These facts are, therefore, drawn from the state court’s opinion(s), lodged

in this court. Petitioner may also be referred to as “defendant.”

2

of Civil Procedure 56(f). 

In their cross-motion, respondents seek adjudications, as a matter of law, on

Claims A through T. In his cross-motion, petitioner seeks adjudications on Claims C, D, F

through H, J, M through O, and Q through S. As to Claim A, petitioner asserts through his Rule

56(f) motion that additional discovery is required in order to address this claim. 

At the time respondents filed their cross-motion, findings and recommendations

had been issued recommending that a number of claims be dismissed. Respondents filed their

cross-motion under the assumption that the findings and recommendations would be adopted in

full but requested the opportunity to brief the merits of any claims the court ultimately declined

to dismiss. On March 30, 2005, the court issued an order adopting some, but not all, of the

findings and recommendations. In particular, and relevant to the pending cross-motions, the

court dismissed Claims B, E, I, and T. The court, however, declined to dismiss Claim L. As to

Claim K, the court dismissed only that portion of the claim raising a causal connection argument. 

The rest of the claim remains. Pursuant to court order, the parties have submitted supplemental

briefing on Claim K, except to the extent such claim has been dismissed, and Claim L. 

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of murder with special circumstances in 1982 and, after

a re-trial of the penalty phase, was sentenced to death in 1983. 

A. Facts2

The California Supreme Court recited the following summary of facts:

The evidence at trial established that on the evening of April 21, 1982,

defendant entered the residence of Mrs. Bonita Stendal, a widow living

alone, and sometime that evening or early the next morning, raped,

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 2 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 Petitioner’s case was consolidated with Tuilaepa’s case in the Supreme Court. 3

3

tortured, and murdered her. Defendant then transported her body in the

trunk of her automobile to a site near a lake 12 miles away, where he

pushed the body off an embankment. 

People v. Proctor, 4 Cal.4th 499, 514 (1992). 

On review of the California Supreme Court’s decision in this case regarding constitutional

vagueness claims, the United States Supreme Court summarized the facts as follows:

Petitioner Proctor murdered Bonnie Stendal, a 55-year-old schoolteacher

who lived in Burney, a small community in Shasta County, California. On

a night in April 1982, Proctor entered Mrs. Stendal's home and beat her,

causing numerous cuts and bruises on her face. Proctor stabbed Mrs.

Stendal in the neck several times and inflicted seven stab wounds in the

area of the right breast. Proctor raped Mrs. Stendal and committed further

sexual assaults with a foreign object. After beating, torturing, and raping

Mrs. Stendal, Proctor strangled her to death and dumped her body on the

side of the road near Lake Britton, 12 miles from Burney. The body was

found late the next afternoon, clad in a nightgown with hands tied behind

the back. 

Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 970-71 (1994). 

3

As to the cause of Mrs. Stendal’s death, the California Supreme Court offered the following:

On April 24, Dr. Boyd Stephens of the San Francisco City and County

Coroner’s office performed an autopsy on the body. He estimated that

Mrs. Stendal had been killed sometime between the early evening hours of

April 21 and the early morning hours of April 22. She was not killed in

the location at which her body was found but had been transported there

after death. 

In Dr. Stephens’s opinion, Mrs. Stendal’s death was caused by

asphyxiation, initiated by nonfatal strangulation. The face had suffered

numerous cuts and bruises from a blunt force. The eyes were swollen shut

and the nose and lips also were swollen. Dr. Stephens believed that most

of these injuries resulted from seven to nine blows. There were various

internal injuries in the area of the neck. There were a number of shallow

stab wounds and incisions caused by dragging a weapon across the skin in

the area of the neck. The curvature of some of the injuries indicated they

had been inflicted slowly and deliberately. There were seven wounds less

than two inches deep to the area of the right breast which had been

inflicted while Mrs. Stendal still was alive but unable to move away from

her assailant. In Dr. Stephens’s opinion, these wounds were inflicted for

the purpose of causing pain or fear. 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 3 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Petitioner’s theory of the case is that Robert Manley perpetrated the crimes 4

against Mrs. Stendal.

4

Prior to death, Mrs. Stendal had suffered four stretching injuries on the

labia and a fifth injury which extended into the opening of the vagina. In

the coroner’s opinion, four of these probably were caused by a foreign

object, and the fifth, probably by a penis. There was no semen inside or

on the body.

Also while alive, Mrs. Stendal had received a blunt-force injury to the area

of her right kidney. There also were blunt-force injuries to her left foot. 

The ligatures used to tie her hands were tied so tightly they had cut into

her wrists. There were post mortem abrasion injuries attributed to

dragging the body. 

Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 516-17.

Concerning petitioner’s connection to the crime, the California Supreme Court stated:

In view of the circumstantial nature of the evidence connecting defendant

to the commission of the crimes, and the nature of the defense that was

presented at trial, we consider it necessary to set forth in substantial detail 4

the evidence relating to defendant's activities immediately preceding and

following the commission of the murder.

Mrs. Stendal's son David (who was approximately 21 years of age at the

time of trial) had lived with Mrs. Stendal until 1979, when he moved to

Chico. David had known defendant (20 years of age at the time of trial)

and Robert Manley (26 years of age at the time of trial) for several years

and often had smoked marijuana with them. David had concealed

marijuana in various locations within the Stendal residence until sometime

in 1979 or 1980. Manley resided with his mother, Neta Manley, less than

one block from the Stendal residence.

From February 18, 1981, to April 9, 1982, defendant was not present in

the Burney area. In late January 1982, defendant commenced a four-week

general truck-driving course at Western Truck School, where he received

instruction in tying knots. Students at the school were taught to tie several

types of trucker's knots, which knots were identical to those found on the

ligatures used to bind Mrs. Stendal's wrists.

Approximately two weeks prior to the murder of Mrs. Stendal, defendant

returned to live with his mother and two brothers in Burney. In the early

morning hours of either Friday or Saturday, April 16 or 17, defendant and

Robert Manley made four or five obscene or “crank” telephone calls from

the Manley residence to various Burney residents. Robert Manley

telephoned Mrs. Stendal and told her he would like to have sexual

relations with her. Defendant made a separate obscene telephone call to an

unnamed person.

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 4 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

On April 21, 1982, defendant hitchhiked to the Manley residence, arriving

approximately 2 p.m. Mrs. Manley returned from work at 3 p.m. Prior to 5

p.m., Mrs. Manley drove defendant to a market in Burney to purchase

liquor. When they returned to the Manley residence, the three had a drink

and then ate dinner at 5 p.m. Approximately 5:30 p.m., defendant and

Robert Manley walked to a local convenience store, where Manley

purchased two packs of unfiltered Camel cigarettes (the brand and type

they both smoked), giving one pack to defendant. They returned to the

Manley residence to drink and watch a baseball game on television, and

remained there after Mrs. Manley departed at 7 p.m. Defendant had three

or four drinks. The baseball game commenced at approximately 7:35 p.m.

Between 8 p.m. and 8:30 p.m., defendant telephoned his mother to report

he was at the Manley residence and intended to remain there for the night.

Approximately 8:30 p.m. defendant departed, informing Robert Manley

that he was going to one of the local bars to “pick up a woman” and would

return later to spend the night. When he left, defendant was wearing

thongs, white socks, blue jeans, a blue shirt, and a gold-colored

windbreaker borrowed from Robert Manley, because defendant did not

have his own jacket with him. Shortly after 8:30 p.m., defendant arrived at

the residence of his friend Jeffrey Bohall, who lived five to six blocks

from the Manley residence and four to five blocks from the Stendal

residence. Defendant remained at that location until sometime before 10

p.m., when he departed in order to have a few drinks and “get a piece of

butt.” Defendant inquired whether Bohall wanted to accompany him but

Bohall declined. Bohall's mother, Juanita Bohall, who was home during

defendant's visit, testified that defendant was wearing blue jeans and an

off-white or cream-colored lightweight jacket with a rust-brown trim. She

could not clearly remember his shoes but thought they were lightweight.

When Mrs. Manley returned to her residence between 10:30 p.m. and 11

p.m. that evening, defendant was not present. When Robert Manley retired

at 2:30 a.m. after watching the baseball game and a late-night movie,

defendant still had not returned. When Mrs. Manley left for work between

5:30 and 6 a.m., defendant was not at the Manley residence. According to

defendant's mother, Julia Proctor, the defendant did not return to the

Proctor residence during the night of April 21.

After sunrise, at 5:30 a.m. on the morning of April 22, defendant's aunt,

Sharon Palkki, observed defendant walking across the street in front of

Palkki's residence, which was located approximately 500 feet from Mrs.

Stendal's residence, several miles from defendant's residence in Johnson

Park on the outskirts of Burney. Defendant was wearing loose-fitting blue

jeans, white socks, and sandals, and what appeared to be a pair of gloves

was dangling from his right pants pocket. Between 6 a.m. and 7 a.m.,

defendant telephoned his brother, Ed Proctor, instructing him to have their

mother give defendant a ride home from the local market. Another witness

observed defendant telephoning from that location during the same time

period. When defendant's mother picked him up, defendant was wearing

blue jeans and a gold-colored windbreaker, which she did not recognize.

His mother did not remember the type of footwear defendant was wearing

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 5 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

but testified he owned a pair of thongs.

Approximately 11:30 a.m. on April 22, Robert Manley arose and

telephoned defendant, who informed Manley that defendant had seen his

(defendant's) mother downtown the previous evening and had driven home

with her. When Robert Manley asked defendant whether he had watched

the baseball game, the late-night movie, or any other television program at

home, defendant responded he had not, and stated he was tired and wanted

to sleep. Defendant agreed to meet Robert Manley after doing defendant's

laundry. Later that day, Robert Manley and his mother drove to the

Proctor residence, where they picked up defendant. They proceeded to

Redding in order to purchase tickets to a concert. Defendant returned

Robert Manley's jacket at that time, and Manley observed it was cleaner

than it had been when he had given it to defendant the previous evening.

After being dropped off and obtaining the tickets, Robert Manley and

defendant met two women and spent the night with them at a motel in Redding.

On the morning of April 23, Shasta County officers brought defendant and

Robert Manley to the sheriff's station for questioning. Defendant told

Sergeant Jarrett that he had been at Robert Manley's residence until 8:30

p.m. on April 21 and then had gone into Burney. Defendant stated he had

received a ride home that evening from an unidentified man in a pickup

truck. At his residence, defendant had sharpened some knives for his

mother, and had been home several hours before retiring at 11 p.m.

Defendant did not arise until 9 a.m. on April 22, and did not leave the

residence until after 3 p.m., when he went to Redding with Robert Manley

and spent the night at a motel. Defendant showed Jarrett a motel room

receipt, which defendant volunteered he had kept for an alibi in case

anything flared up. Defendant denied having visited Mrs. Stendal's residence.

Defendant was placed in custody for a parole violation he admitted to the

officers. One of the officers observed that defendant had suffered

abrasions below each knee, and that there were what appeared to be five

or six somewhat parallel scratch marks above defendant's right knee. On

April 24, Dr. Stephens examined defendant's leg injuries and determined

they probably were two days old, and had not been sustained through any

layers of clothing but rather while defendant's legs were uncovered. The

injuries were similar to injuries Dr. Stephens had observed in other sexual

assault cases.

On May 1, Mrs. Proctor visited defendant in custody and afterward

informed one of the detectives that her son had asked her to tell Sergeant

Jarrett that he had been at home on the night of the murder. When Mrs.

Proctor had advised defendant she already had told Jarrett otherwise,

defendant asked her to tell Jarrett that defendant had been at a party that evening.

The bloody palm print obtained from one pamphlet proved to match

defendant's palm print, and the other, latent palm prints obtained from the

booklets also matched defendant's palm prints. A very faint print from

footwear was found at the location where the body was discovered and

proved to be similar in design to the tread of a pair of thongs recovered

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 6 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

from defendant's possession. On May 2, defendant was placed under arrest

for the murder of Mrs. Stendal. 

Id. at 517-20.

The following time line summarizes the facts concerning petitioner’s activities from April 21,

1982, to May 1, 1982. 

April 21

8:00 – 8:30 p.m. Petitioner telephoned his mother on the evening of the

murder to tell her that he was at the Manley residence and

intended to stay there for the night. 

8:30 p.m. Petitioner told Manley that we was going out to a local bar

to “pick up a woman” but would return to spend the night;

before he left, he borrowed a gold-colored wind breaker

from Manley. 

8:30 – 10:00 p.m. Petitioner was at the residence of his friend, Jeffrey Bohall,

who lived four to five blocks from the Stendal residence. 

10:00 p.m. Petitioner left the Bohall residence in order to have a few

drinks and “get a piece of butt”; Bohall declined to go with

petitioner; Mrs. Bohall, who was home at the time, testified

that petitioner was wearing a gold-colored jacket when he

left. 

10:30 – 11:00 p.m. Mrs. Manley returned home; petitioner was not present but

Robert Manley was at home.

April 22

2:30 a.m. Manley retired after watching television; petitioner still had

not returned to the Manley residence as he had said he

would. 

5:30 – 6:00 a.m. When Mrs. Manley left for work, petitioner was not at the

Manley residence. 

5:30 a.m. Petitioner was seen by his aunt 500 feet from the Stendal

residence.

6:00 – 7:00 a.m. Petitioner was seen making a telephone call from a public

location outside a market; petitioner called his brother in

order to get a ride home; when petitioner’s mother arrived

to pick him up, petitioner was wearing a gold-colored

jacket she did not recognize. 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 7 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The jury was presented with four alternate factual bases for first degree murder: 5

(1) premeditation and deliberation; (2) felony murder based on burglary; (3) felony murder based

on rape; and (4) torture murder. 

8

11:30 a.m. Petitioner called Manley on the telephone and told Manley

that he had seen his mother (Mrs. Proctor) downtown the

prior evening and had gone home with her; Manley

testified at trial that when petitioner returned his jacket,

Manley observed that it was cleaner than when he had

given it to petitioner. 

April 23

Petitioner was brought to the sheriff’s station for questioning, where he told the

police that he had received a ride home from an unidentified man on the evening

of April 21. Petitioner also stated that he was home the entire evening and retired

at 11:00 p.m. after sharpening some knives for his mother. He denied having

been in the Stendal residence. 

April 24

Petitioner’s leg abrasions were examined by the coroner, who testified at trial that

they were caused when petitioner’s legs were bare, were probably two days old,

and were consistent with sexual assault cases.

May 1

After learning that his mother had already told the police that he was not home

the night of the murder, petitioner asked his mother to say that he had been at a

party that evening. Petitioner’s mother, with whom petitioner lived, testified at

trial that petitioner did not return to the Proctor residence during the night of

April 21-22. 

Petitioner was found guilty of first degree murder, forcible rape, and first degree

5

burglary. See id. at 514. The jury also found true each of the three special circumstance

allegations. Specifically, the jury found that petitioner committed the murder: (1) in the course

of rape; (2) in the course of burglary; and (3) with the infliction of torture. See id.

B. Post-Conviction Procedural History

In June 1997, petitioner filed his automatic direct appeal with the California

Supreme Court. Briefing was complete on March 14, 1988. On April 21, 1992, the California

Supreme Court directed the parties to update their briefing. Supplemental briefs were filed in

June and July 1992. On December 28, 1992, the California Supreme Court issued an opinion

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 8 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

affirming the conviction and sentence. See Proctor, 4 Cal.4th 499. The United States Supreme

Court granted certiorari and issued a decision affirming the California Supreme Court’s decision

on June 30, 1994. See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. 967. 

On November 22, 1994, petitioner filed a habeas petition in state court. Petitioner

raised the following claims:

Claim I Financial pressures in Shasta County deprived petitioner of a fair

trial;

Claim II Petitioner was entitled to, but did not receive, effective

representation of counsel;

Claim IV Inadequate jury instructions on penalty factors permitted the

prosecutor to argue contrary to California law; and

Claim V The California death penalty scheme is unconstitutionally

overbroad because it does not make a meaningful distinction

between cases in which the death penalty is and is not imposed.

In denying this petition on June 26, 1996, the California Supreme Court stated:

Petition for writ of habeas corpus DENIED.

The claims . . . set forth as I and II are denied on the merits.

The petition does not include a claim set forth as III.

The claim set forth as IV is denied on the procedural ground of 

 waiver, in that it could have been, but was not, raised on appeal 

 from the judgment. (In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 829; In re 

 Dixon (1959) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759). To the extent that claim IV 

 raises a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, it is denied as an issue 

 that was raised in the appeal from the judgment. (In re Harris, 

 supra, 5 Cal.4th 813, 829; In re Waltreus (1965) 62 al.2d 218).

The claim set forth as V is denied on the merits. (citation omitted).

Justices Mosk and Kennard were of the opinion that an order to show cause should issue. 

Petitioner filed a second habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on

August 12, 1997. In that petition, petitioner raised the following claims:

Claim A Petitioner’s jury was unfairly skewed towards a guilty verdict by

the death qualification of the jury and by the removal of

prospective jurors for cause due to their views on the death

penalty;

Claim B Ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase;

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 9 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

Claim C The penalty phase petit jury venire in Sacramento County did not

represent a fair cross-section of the community;

Claim D Improper denial of defense juror challenges for cause;

Claim E The trial court improperly denied petitioner’s Batson/Wheeler

motion;

Claim F Introduction of numerous irrelevant and unduly prejudicial

photographs at the penalty phase violated petitioner’s right to due

process; 

Claim G Ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase;

Claim H The trial court committed prejudicial error in considering matters

not before the jury when conducting its mandatory constitutional

reappraisal of the death verdict;

Claim I The cumulative effect of the errors on the issues of guilt, special

circumstances, and penalty warrant reversal;

Claim J Execution after prolonged confinement under sentence of death;

Claim K Execution by lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment;

Claim L Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel;

Claim M Ineffective assistance of state post-conviction counsel;

Claim O The California Supreme Court denied petitioner fair consideration

of his habeas corpus petition; and

Claim P Petitioner’s death sentence violates international law.

Petitioner did not raise any claim designated as Claim N. The California Supreme Court denied

petitioner’s second habeas petition, stating:

The petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed August 12 1997, is

denied.

All claims are denied on the merits.

All claims except claim I . . . , claim J . . . , claim O . . . , and claim

P . . . also are denied as untimely. (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770,

784-815; In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 782-787, 797-798). All claims

except claim I, claim J, claim K, claim M . . . , and claim O are denied as

successive, because they could have been, but were not, raised in the first

petition for writ of habeas corpus. (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p.

788, fn. 9; In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 767-768). 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 10 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Petitioner argues that the deferential standards of review under AEDPA should 6

not apply in this case because, had the state court resolved his case sooner, he would have been

able to file his federal petition prior to AEDPA’s effective date. The court notes that petitioner

has already raised this argument and that it was rejected in the court’s May 23,1997, order,

reconsideration of which was denied on June 5, 1998. The court declines to re-visit this issue. 

11

Claims A . . . , C . . . , D . . . , E . . . ., F . . . ., H . . . , and P . . . are

denied because they should have been, but were not, raised on appeal. (In

re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759). 

Brown, J., would deny the petition solely on the merits.

Petitioner’s request to take judicial notice of the petition for writ of

habeas corpus and Exhibit Numbers 11 through 34 filed by petitioner in In

re Fierro (S057031) is denied.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. 6

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. When it is clear that a state court has not reached

the merits of a petitioner’s claim, because it was not raised in state court or because the court

denied it on procedural grounds, the AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal

habeas court must review the claim de novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to

reach petitioner’s claim under its “relitigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204,

1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on

perjury claim, AEDPA did not apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the

evidentiary hearing in federal court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing

petition de novo where state court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the

claim alleged by petitioner). When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, 

“concerns about comity and federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 11 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

Where AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is

not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is available where the state court’s decision

is “contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. In

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a majority of the

Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A state court

decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently than

the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state

court decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate

that Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the

wrong legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme

Court cases to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See

id. at 406. If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to

determine first whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 293 F.3d 1040,

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which

case federal habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question

is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 12 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

State court decisions are reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See id.; see also Wiggins v. Smith,

123 S.Ct. 252 (2003). While declining to rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams,

suggested that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an

erroneous or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot

necessarily be found even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision

is clearly erroneous. See Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175. This is because “. . . the gloss of clear

error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with

unreasonableness.” Id. As with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal

law, where a state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal

habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn,

283 F.3d at 1052 n.6. 

The “unreasonable application of” standard also applies where the state court

denies a claim without providing any reasoning whatsoever. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 233 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). Such decisions

are considered adjudications on the merits and are, therefore, entitled to deference under the

AEDPA. See Green v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982.

The federal habeas court assumes that state court applied the correct law and analyzes whether

the state court’s summary denial was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that

law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 13 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

III. DISCUSSION

The court will address petitioner’s claims in the general order the issues arose at

trial. In Claim H, petitioner challenges where the trial was held, asserting that the denial of his

motions for change of venue denied him a fair trial because of prejudicial pretrial publicity. In

Claim A, petitioner challenges the death qualification jury selection process. In Claims C, D, F,

H, and G, petitioner challenges various comments the trial court made to the jury. As to the

evidence adduced at trial, in Claims J, K, L, M, N, O, S, and Q, petitioner argues that the

evidence was insufficient to establish various findings. Next, in Claim R, petitioner challenges

the trial court’s jury instruction on the torture special circumstance. Finally, in Claim P,

petitioner argues that “financial and political pressures” in Shasta County denied him a fair trial. 

A. Change of Venue (Claim H)

Petitioner claims that the trial court denied him a fair trial by denying his motions

for change of venue because extensive press coverage impacted the pool of potential jurors. In

his motion for summary judgment, petitioner elaborates on this claim as follows:

. . . Because of the extensive and prejudicial pretrial publicity, it

was not possible to select an unbiased jury in Mr. Proctor’s case, and the

jury that sat at Mr. Proctor’s trial was actually biased. Accordingly, Mr.

Proctor i[s] entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Claim H. [¶] The

Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to be tried by a “panel of impartial,

‘indifferent’ jurors.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); Nebraska

Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551 (1976). The trial court may be

unable to seat an impartial jury because of prejudicial pretrial publicity or

an inflamed community atmosphere, or both. In such a case, due process

requires that the trial court grant defendant’s motion for a change of

venue. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 360-61 (1966); Daniels v.

Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005).

* * *

In determining whether a change of venue motion should have

been granted, the reviewing court must consider whether the publicity was

sufficiently pervasive so as to apply a presumption of prejudice, or, if not,

whether the defendant suffered “actual” prejudice from the denial of the

motion. Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1988). To

demonstrate actual prejudice, Mr. Proctor must show actual partiality or

hostility that could not be laid aside. Id. at 1363. Prejudice may be

presumed, however, “when the record demonstrates that the community

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 14 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 This argument is boilerplate as petitioner asserts it to almost all of his claims. 7

15

where the trial was held was saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory

media publicity about the crime.” Ainsworth v. Calderon, 138 F.3d 787,

795, as amended, 152 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998). 

In their motion for summary judgment, respondents argue:

. . . To prevail on Claim H, Petitioner must show that the state

court was objectively unreasonable for not finding that prejudicial pretrial

publicity made it impossible to seat an impartial jury. Murphy v. Florida,

421 U.S. 794, 799-803 (1975); Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th

Cir. 1988). 

Respondents next outline the facts concerning petitioner’s motions for change of venue, as set

out in the California Supreme Court’s opinion on direct review and conclude:

In light of the undisputed facts surrounding the motions to change

venue, Claim H is amenable to summary adjudication. The most that the

record discloses is that some of the jurors were familiar with the facts or

issues involved in the case. But mere familiarity with the facts and issues

does not indicate a change of venue is appropriate.. . . [. . .Irvin v. Dowd,

366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961)]. None of the jurors in Petitioner’s case had

formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of Petitioner and there has

been no showing that a substantial percentage of persons in the venire who

were not seated had formed fixed opinions on the question of guilt. 

Further, the impact of pre-trial publicity was mitigated due to the lapse of

nearly three months between the issuance of the last report (8/17/82) and

the commencement of jury selection (11/10/82). Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 525;

accord Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 195 (1952) (finding no due

process violation from widespread reports of defendant’s confession

where publicity receded six weeks before trial). On these facts it cannot

be said that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of Claim H was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.

Before continuing, it is necessary to address the standard of review applicable to

this claim. Petitioner states in his motion for summary judgment that this court must conduct a

de novo review to determine whether he is entitled to relief on this claim because “. . . the

California Supreme Court either failed to adjudicate the merits of Mr. Proctor’s constitutional

claims, did so in a manner contrary to clearly established federal law, or unreasonably applied

that law to the facts of Mr. Proctor’s case. . . .” and concludes that “. . . the limits on relief

established in [AEDPA] do not apply here. . . .” Elsewhere in his briefing, however, petitioner 7

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 15 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

As discussed in more detailed below, the first factor listed by petitioner relates to 8

actual prejudice. The remaining factors relate to presumed prejudice.

16

seems to indicate that AEDPA applies to this claim by arguing that the state court’s decision was

“objectively unreasonable.” He also suggests that some other standard should apply because the

state applied only state law and ignored the factors required to be considered under federal law. 

It could be that petitioner is asserting that the state court applied the wrong law and, therefore,

the “contrary to” standard of review applies. Or, he could be asserting that, by considering only

state law, the state court did not adjudicate his constitutional claim on the merits, in which case

review would be de novo. 

Setting this confusion aside, petitioner argues that the correct legal test involves

consideration of the following factors: (1) whether actual partiality or hostility existed among

jury members that could not be laid aside; (2) whether the community where the trial was held

was saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory media publicity about the crime “amounting to

a wave of public passion”; (3) whether news accounts were primarily factual; and (4) whether

media accounts contained inflammatory material not admissible at trial. The court agrees that

this is an accurate expression of clearly established law. 

8

A review of the California Supreme Court’s opinion reveals that it considered the

following facts, which this court must presume to be true because petitioner has not challenged

them with clear and convincing evidence to the contrary:

1. The seriousness of the charges against petitioner;

2. The nature of the acts committed upon the victim;

3. The nature and extent of pretrial publicity, particularly:

a. Copies of six newspaper articles in the Inter-Mountain News, and

approximately 20 in the Redding Record Searchlight, between

April 1982 and August 1982; and

b. More than 60 “copy-notes” from local television and radio stations

between the same times;

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 16 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

17

4. The results of a telephone public-opinion survey conducted between

September 21, and 22, 1982, revealing that, of the 169 persons contacted,

80% had heard of the case, 55% had heard of an arrest having been made,

and 31% had formed an opinion as to defendant’s guilt;

5. The lapse of nearly three months between the issuance of the last news

report on August 17, 1982, and the commencement of jury selection on

November 10, 1982; 

6. The trial was held in Redding, a larger community and not the locus of the

crime, which was committed in Burney, 35 miles away;

7. The size of community;

8. The respective prominence of the defendant and the victim – Mrs. Stendal

was well-liked and well-known in Burney and was described as having

“taught everyone’s kids”; defendant was also a long-time Burney resident

who had not earned any notoriety; and

9. All but three of the jurors had learned something about the case from news

reporting.

See Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 524-27.

As to the news reports, the state court observed: “Many of these news reports detailed the

conditions in which Mrs. Stendal’s body was found and the circumstances of her death; several

included the circumstance that defendant’s palm print had been found at the murder scene, and

several reported that the prosecutor intended to seek the death penalty because of the heinous

nature of the crime.” Id. As to the press exposure on the actual jurors in petitioner’s case, the

state court noted:

. . . Our review of the record reveals, however, that most of those jurors

[who had heard of the case through news reporting] had received only

minimal pretrial exposure to the case, that such exposure took place

during a period well before commencement of the trial, that the jurors had

not been informed of the evidence linking defendant to the case but only

that the murder had occurred, and that when questioned on the subject, all

of these jurors attested to their ability to put aside everything they had

learned about the case and to decide the issues based solely on the

evidence presented at trial.

Id. at 527.

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 17 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

18

The state court next considered whether petitioner was prejudiced by the denial of his change of

venue motions:

. . . It appears that, although he established the possibility of an unfair trial

in [Redding], defendant failed to carry his burden of proving there was a

reasonable likelihood that jurors drawn from Shasta County would have

formed such fixed opinions as a result of the pretrial publicity that they

could not make the required determinations with impartiality. 

Considering the relative closeness of the issue, however, we turn next to

the question whether any error in the trial court’s ruling – that defendant

did not carry the burden – would be prejudicial, that is, whether the record

demonstrates a reasonable likelihood he did not in fact receive a fair trial. 

With this purpose in mind, we consider the jury voir dire surrounding the

case, bearing in mind that no presumption of a deprivation of due process

of law arises from juror exposure to publicity concerning the case. 

(citation omitted). 

* * *

Having considered the totality of the evidence, we conclude defendant has

not met his burden on appeal of demonstrating both that it was reasonably

likely he could not receive a fair trial in Shasta County absent a change of

venue, and that it was reasonably likely he did not in fact receive a fair

trial. Therefore, reversal is not required. 

Id. at 526-28.

According to the 1961 Supreme Court case Irvin v. Dowd – cited by both parties

– the general rule is that “[i]t is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and

render a verdict based on the evidence.” Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723. This rule, however, does not

foreclose the possibility that, in a particular case, “the nature and strength of the opinion formed 

. . . raise the presumption of partiality.” Id. The petitioner must show the actual existence of

such an opinion. See id. After reciting the publicity concerning Irvin’s case, the Court stated:

It cannot be gainsaid that the force of this continued adverse publicity

caused a sustained excitement and fostered a strong prejudice among the

people of Gibson County. In fact, on the second day devoted to the

selection of the jury, the newspapers reported that “strong feelings, often

bitter and angry, rumbled to the surface,” and that “the extent to which the

multiple murders – three in one family – have aroused feelings throughout

the area was emphasized Friday when 27 of the 35 prospective jurors

questioned were excused for holding biased pretrial opinions . . . .” A few

days later the feeling was described as “a pattern of deep and bitter

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 18 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

19

prejudice against the former pipe-fitter.” Spectator comments, as printed

by the newspapers, were “my mind is made up”; “I think he is guilty”; and

“he should be hanged.”

Finally, and with remarkable understatement, the headlines reported that

“impartial jurors are hard to find.” The panel consisted of 430 persons. 

The court itself excused 268 of those on challenges for cause as having

fixed opinions as to the guilt of petitioner; 103 were excused because of

conscientious objection to the imposition of the death penalty; 20, the

maximum allowed, were peremptorily challenged by petitioner and 10 by

the State. . . . An examination of the 2,783-page voir dire record shows

that 370 prospective jurors or almost 90% of those examined on the 

point . . . entertained some opinion as to guilt – ranging in intensity from

mere suspicion to absolute certainty. A number admitted that, if they were

in the accused’s place in the dock and he in theirs on the jury with their

opinions, they would not want him on a jury. 

Id. at 726-27.

As to actual bias of the jurors seated, the Court noted that “[e]ight out of the 12 thought

petitioner was guilty.” Id. at 727. On these facts, the Court concluded that habeas relief was

warranted because petitioner had been denied an impartial jury. See id. at 728. 

In Ainsworth v. Calderon, the Ninth Circuit framed the rule as follows:

A defendant need only demonstrate one of two different types of prejudice

in support of a motion to transfer venue: presumed or actual. Prejudice is

presumed when the record demonstrates that the community where the

trial was held was saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory media

publicity about the crime. Prejudice is rarely presumed because

“saturation” defines conditions found only in extreme situations. To

establish actual prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that the jurors

exhibited actual partiality or hostility that could not be laid aside. 

138 F.3d at 795.

The court concluded that, because media reporting was factual and had waned for several months

prior to jury selection, presumed prejudice did not exist. See id. (citing Harris v. Pulley, 885

F.2d 1254, 1362 (9th Cir. 1988), and Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976)). 

In also concluding that actual prejudice had not been shown, the court noted that only eight of

the 95 prospective jurors questioned had formed an opinion (three from sources other than the

media, and five from media reporting). See id. at 796. 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 19 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

20

In Daniels v. Woodford, the Ninth Circuit outlined the factors to be considered in

determining presumed prejudice. See 428 F.3d at 1211. As petitioner states, the factors are: 

(1) whether there was a barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior to trial, amounting

to a huge wave of public passion; (2) whether the news accounts were primarily factual because

such accounts tend to be less inflammatory than editorials or cartoons; and (3) whether the media

accounts contained inflammatory or prejudicial material not admissible at trial. See id. (citing

Ainsworth, 138 F.3d at 795). Based on the facts as outlined in the state court’s decision, the

Ninth Circuit concluded that “the public’s response to [the] publicity clearly amounted to a

‘huge’ wave of public passion.” Id. 

Comparing the foregoing discussion of the clearly established tests for presumed

and actual prejudice with the California Supreme Court’s discussion in petitioner’s case, this

court concludes that the state court applied the correct law. It appears that petitioner’s assertion

that the California Supreme Court did not address his claim is derived from the state court’s

reliance on state law to analyze the change of venue claim. Where, however, the state court

applies the functional equivalent of the federal standard, the state court has applied the correct

law in adjudicating the constitutional claim. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (per

curiam). In this case, based on the facts discussed in its opinion, it is clear that the California

Supreme Court considered the factors relevant under the federal standard to both presumed and

actual prejudice. See Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 523-28. Therefore, this court must review the state

court’s determination under the deferential “unreasonable application of” standard. 

Turning now to the parties’ arguments, this court may rely on the facts as recited

by the California Supreme Court. See Daniels, 428 F.3d at 1211. As to presumed prejudice, the

state court noted that there was a lapse of nearly three months between the issuance of the last

news report in August 1982, and the commencement of jury selection in November. 

See Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 525. The state court also noted that the pretrial reporting had been

primarily factual in nature – an arrest had been made, the prosecutor was going to seek the death

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 20 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

21

penalty, and a palm print had been found at the scene. See id. at 524-25. In stating that these

factors do not “strongly weigh in favor of or against a change of venue,” the state court

necessarily concluded that there was not a huge wave of public passion about the case, such as

would establish presumed prejudice. See id. at 526; see also Daniels, 428 F.3d at 1211. Under

Ainsworth and Daniels, this court concludes that the facts as recited by the California Supreme

Court cannot lead to any other conclusion. Therefore, the state court’s determination that there

was no presumed prejudice is not based on an unreasonable application of clearly established

law. 

In considering actual prejudice, the California Supreme Court noted that, while all

but three of the jurors had learned something about the case from news reporting, “most of those

jurors had received only minimal pretrial exposure to the case. . . .” See Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at

527. Unlike Irvin, where eight of the 12 jurors had formed the opinion prior to trial that the

petitioner was guilty, there is no evidence that the jurors in this case formed such stark pretrial

opinions. Certainly, minimal pretrial exposure could not lead to such opinions. Moreover, in

contrast to Irvin and Ainsworth, there is also no evidence concerning the actual attitudes of the

prospective jurors in this case. The nearest evidence petitioner offered was the phone survey. 

However, the court finds that this is more relevant to the question of presumed prejudice based

on the general attitude in the community than it is to the question of actual prejudice on the part

of the jurors seated in petitioner’s trial. Finally, the state court noted that all the jurors attested

that they could lay aside whatever they had heard about the case and be impartial. Because there

is no evidence to establish that either the prospective jurors or seated jurors formed a prejudicial

opinion, or that they could not lay any bias aside and carry out their duty, this court cannot say

that the state court’s determination is unreasonable application of the clearly established actual

prejudice test. 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 21 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The court observes that, because the California Supreme Court reached the 9

correct conclusion based on clearly established federal law, this result would be the same even if

the court applied the “contrary to” or de novo standards of review. 

Petitioner repeats his boilerplate argument that “[t]he California Supreme Court 10

did not address Mr. Proctor’s constitutional arguments and thus they were not adjudicated by the

state court.” This is incorrect. Petitioner raised this claim as Claim A in his second state habeas

petition and argued the constitutional issue, citing as he does here, to Lockhart. In addressing

the claim, the California Supreme Court denied the claim both on the merits and for various

22

For these reasons, respondents’ motion for summary judgment on this claim

should be granted and petitioner’s motion for summary judgment on this claim should be denied. 

Claim H should be denied on the merits.9

B. Death Qualification (Claim A)

Petitioner argues:

Petitioner’s conviction, confinement, and death sentence are illegal

in that the death qualification of the jury and the removal of prospective

jurors because of their views regarding the death penalty produced a jury

unfairly skewed towards a guilty verdict. . . . [¶] The process of

questioning prospective jurors regarding their views concerning the death

penalty and the removal of prospective jurors based on such views

deprived petitioner of his federal constitutional rights to both a jury

selected from a fair cross-section of the community and a reliable

determination of whether death is an appropriate penalty. 

In the amended petition, petitioner recognizes that the United States Supreme Court’s decisions

in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), and Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987),

seem to foreclose his argument as a matter of law. Petitioner argues, however, that “empirical

evidence continues to show that the exclusion from juries of persons with strong opposition to

capital punishment leaves a non-representative jury with a significant pro-prosecution bias,

actually resulting in verdicts against the defendant.” Petitioner concludes that, because of this

“overwhelming evidence,” the facts which supported the decision in Lockhart have been

undermined, rendering the decision invalid today. Because the state court denied this claim on

the merits but did not provide any reasoning, this court applies the “unreasonable application of”

standard to review the state court’s determination of this claim. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; 10

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 22 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

procedural defaults, including failure to raise the claim in petitioner’s automatic direct appeal. 

The court observes that the holding in Carolene Product is narrower than 11

petitioner asserts. There, the Court considered the facts underlying a statute which was under

constitutional challenge and concluded that, if those facts no longer exist, there may be no

rational basis for the legislation. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153-54. Here, petitioner is

not challenging the facts which provide a rational basis for legislation. 

23

Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. Under this standard, the court will assume that the California

Supreme Court applied the correct law and review to determine whether the state court’s denial

of this claim was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that law. See id.

Not surprisingly, respondents argue in their motion for summary judgment that

Claim A “must be rejected as a matter of law” in light of Lockhart and Buchanan. In response,

petitioner has filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) “. . . to obtain

affidavits or other evidence necessary to oppose respondent’s motion for summary judgment as

to Claim A.” Specifically, petitioner argues:

To defeat respondent’s motion for summary judgment on Claim A,

petitioner must be allowed to establish that the “constitutional facts”

underlying the Supreme Court’s holding in [Lockhart] have changed. 

See e.g. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938)

(where a finding of constitutionality is predicated upon the existence of a

particular set of facts beyond the sphere of judicial notice, that finding

may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts no longer

exist). Expert testimony or declarations are required to make this

showing.11

In support of this argument, petitioner states that studies have been conducted regarding the

impact of the death qualification process since Lockhart was decided. Petitioner cites to nine

law review articles which “document the existence of, and analyze, those studies. . . .” Petitioner

asserts that the studies “. . . overcome the factual problems identified in the Supreme Court in

[Lockhart]. The studies, conducted within the past 20 years, and on actual jurors, demonstrate

that death qualification jury selection does in fact result in biased juries that do not represent a

fair cross-section of the community.” Petitioner intends to obtain expert testimony from the

authors of the studies. 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 23 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

24

Before addressing the parties’ arguments, the court observes again that petitioner

did not raise this claim in his automatic direct appeal. If he had, the issue would have been

preserved when the Supreme Court reviewed petitioner’s case in Tuilaepa. In this context, the

limitations on federal habeas review set forth in AEDPA would not have applied and petitioner

could have argued directly to the Supreme Court that Lockhart should be overturned. Because

petitioner did not raise this claim on direct review, however, this court is limited in how it may

review the claim. Specifically, petitioner first raised the claim in his second state habeas petition

and now presents it to this court in the context of a federal habeas petition. Therefore, under

AEDPA, this court may only review the state court’s decision to determine if it was based on an

objectively unreasonable application of clearly established law as set out by the Supreme Court. 

As respondents note in their briefs, this court’s review is even more limited. This

court must review the state court’s decision in light of the Supreme Court precedent which was

clearly established at the time the state court rendered its decision. See Williams, 529 U.S. at

390; see also Jackson v. Giurbino, 364 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the inquiry

must center on the state of Supreme Court law as of February 2002 when the California Supreme

Court denied this claim. 

Lockhart is a logical starting point. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the

death qualification jury selection process does not violate the constitutional rights to an impartial

jury and a jury consisting of a fair cross-section of the community. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 

184. The record in Lockhart contained various studies regarding the impact of the death

qualification process on juries. See id. at 167-68. The Supreme Court began its discussion by

considering those studies:

Before turning to the legal issues in the case, we are constrained to point

out what we believe to be several serious flaws in the evidence upon

which the courts below reached the conclusion that “death qualification”

produces “conviction-prone” juries. McCree introduces into evidence

some 15 social science studies in support of his constitutional claims, but

only 6 of the studies even purported to measure the potential effects on the

guilt-innocence determination of the removal from the jury of

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 24 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

In Witherspoon, jurors who held a conscientious objection to the death penalty 12

were systematically excluded from the jury, regardless of whether such jurors could nonetheless

carry out their duty to follow the law. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 513-15. The Court stated:

“If the State had excluded only those prospective jurors who stated in advance of the trial that

they would not even consider returning a verdict of death, it could argue that the resulting jury

was simply ‘neutral’ with respect to penalty. But when it swept from the jury all who expressed

conscientious or religious scruples against capital punishment and all who opposed it in

principle, the State crossed the line of neutrality. In its quest for a jury capable of imposing the

death penalty, the State produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.” Id. at

520-21. Thus, the death qualification process must include an inquiry as to whether a juror can

set aside his beliefs and carry out his duty. 

25

“Witherspoon-excludables” [Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510

(1968)]. Eight of the remaining nine studies dealt solely with 12

generalized attitudes and beliefs about the death penalty and other aspects

of the criminal justice system, and were thus, at best, only marginally

relevant to the constitutionality of McCree’s conviction. The 15th and

final study dealt with the effects on prospective jurors of voir dire

questioning about their attitudes toward the death penalty, an issue

McCree raised in his brief to this Court but that counsel for McCree

admitted at oral argument would not, standing alone, give rise to a

constitutional violation. 

Of the six studies introduced by McCree that at least purported to deal

with the central issue in this case, namely, the potential effects on the

determination of guilt or innocence of excluding “Witherspoonexcludables” from the jury, three were also before this Court when it

decided Witherspoon. 

Id. at 170.

While petitioner argues in his Rule 56(f) motion that the constitutional analysis would surely be

different in light of more recent studies, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lockhart did not

depend on studies at all. Before discussing why death qualification was not unconstitutional, the

Supreme Court stated:

Having identified some of the more serious problems with McCree’s

studies, however, we will assume for purposes of this opinion that the

studies are both methodologically valid and adequate to establish that

“death qualification” in fact produces juries somewhat more “convictionprone” than “non-death-qualified” juries. We hold, nonetheless, that the

Constitution does not prohibit the States from “death qualifying” juries in

capital cases.

Id. at 173.

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 25 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

26

As to the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section right, the Supreme Court held that

the “essence of a ‘fair cross-section’ claim is the systematic exclusion of ‘a “distinctive” group

in the community.’” Id. at 175 (citing, Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)). The Court

stated that groups defined solely by shared attitudes – such as Witherspoon excludables – are not

“distinctive groups” for fair cross-section purposes. See id. While declining to precisely define

“distinctive groups,” the Court noted that blacks, women, and Mexican-Americans were such

groups. See id. The Court also separated Witherspoon excludables from distinctive groups

because, unlike blacks, women, and Mexican-Americans, Witherspoon excludables are singled

out on the basis of an attribute that is within the individual’s control – beliefs about the death

penalty and the ability to set those beliefs aside in deference to the rule of law. See id. at 175-76. 

As to the claim that death qualification violates the constitutional right to an

impartial jury, the Supreme Court stated that an impartial jury consists of nothing more than

jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts. See id. at 177-78. The Court

observed that the inquiry focuses on individual jurors and not on the jury as a whole. See id. at

178. In rejecting the claim, the Court held:

. . . On a more practical level, if it were true that the Constitution required

a certain mix of individual viewpoints on the jury, then trial judges would

be required to undertake the Sisyphean task of “balancing” juries, making

sure that each contains the proper number of Democrats and Republicans,

young persons and old persons, white-collar executives and blue-collar

laborers, and so on. 

* * *

In our view, it is simply not possible to define jury impartiality, for

constitutional purposes, by reference to some hypothetical mix of

individual viewpoints. Prospective jurors come from many different

backgrounds, and have many different attitudes and predispositions. But

the Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross-section

of the community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individual

viewpoints actually represented on the jury, so long as the jurors can

conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to

the facts of the particular case. 

Id. at 178, 183-84. 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 26 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 As in Lockhart, studies formed no basis for the decision in Furman. 13

27

Applying AEDPA, the Ninth Circuit addressed death qualification in Furman v.

Wood, 190 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir 1999) (reviewing under both the “contrary to” and

“unreasonable application of” standards). Commenting on Lockhart, the Ninth Circuit stated:

[T]o the extent that attitudes toward the death penalty influence

deliberations, the Court found greater cause for concern in the prospect

that jurors who are hostile to the death penalty may be acquittal-prone. 

(citation to Lockhart omitted). Furthermore, the Court ruled that, even if

it assumed that death qualified jurors are conviction-prone, the presence

on the jury of jurors who are opposed to the death penalty is not protected

by the fair cross-section requirement. (citation to Lockhart omitted). 

Id. at 1004-05.

The Ninth Circuit also recognized that Lockhart rejected the argument that death qualification

violates the right to a fair and impartial jury. See id. at 1005. In light of the clear Supreme Court

precedent, the court in Furman held that the state court’s rejection of the petitioner’s death

qualification claims was neither “contrary to” nor an “unreasonable application of” Lockhart. 

See id. Thus, in 1999, Lockhart remained clearly established law. 

13

Between 1999 – when Furman was decided – and February 2002 – when the state

court denied petitioner’s death qualification claim – the state of the law did not change. Whether

or not studies had been produced during that time showing that the death qualification process

produced conviction-prone juries is irrelevant. For Lockhart to no longer be considered the

clearly established Supreme Court precedent governing death qualification claims, the Supreme

Court itself would have to demonstrate a significant doctrinal shift by overturning the decision. 

Because that has not happened, the court concludes that Lockhart was the clearly established law

in 2002, and remains so today. Moreover, the existence of post-Witherspoon studies is simply

not relevant to the analysis. The court finds that the state court’s determination of petitioner’s

death qualification claim was neither “contrary to” nor an “unreasonable application of”

Lockhart. Accord Scott v. Ryder, 2007 WL 505117 (D. Ariz., Feb. 14, 2007). 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 27 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

28

For these reasons, petitioner’s Rule 56(f) motion should be denied and

respondents’ motion for summary judgment on this claim should be granted. Claim A should be

denied on the merits. 

C. Trial Court’s Comments to the Jury (Claims C, D, F, and G)

Petitioner asserts four claims for relief based on comments the trial judge made to

the jury. In particular, petitioner asserts that the trial judge erred in: (1) commenting on the

evidence in the middle of jury deliberations; (2) commenting on the jury’s numerical division

during deliberations; and (3) singling out one juror. Petitioner also asserts that the cumulative

effect of these alleged errors warrants habeas relief. Both parties seek summary adjudication in

their favor as to these four claims. In his motion for summary judgment, petitioner offers the

following introductory remarks concerning these claims:

Although Mr. Proctor’s Amended Petition separates Claim C, D, F

and G, they all allege the same constitutional violation, and are controlled

by the same principles of law – a defendant is entitled to an impartial jury,

and the trial court is prohibited from coercing a jury to reach a particular

verdict. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241 (1988). Pursuant to

Lowenfield, to determine whether the judge’s comment was

impermissibly coercive, the reviewing court must evaluate the trial court’s

comments “in [their] context and under all the circumstances.” Id. at 237;

see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002) (per curiam) (acknowledging

Lowenfield requires consideration of the “totality of the circumstances”). 

Accordingly, this Court must consider the different aspects of the trial

court’s comments, alleged separately as Claims C, D, & F, together to

determine whether the trial court’s comments coerced the jury. Claim G

asserts that the errors alleged in those claims must be considered

cumulatively to assess prejudice. 

1. Comments on the Evidence (Claim F)

In the amended petition and in his motion for summary judgment, petitioner

challenges lengthy comments made by the trial judge during the deliberation process. 

Specifically, petitioner argues that the following comments on the evidence coerced the jury’s

verdict:

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury and the alternates, for the

purpose of assisting you in deciding this case, I am permitted by the

constitution of California to comment on the issues, the evidence and the

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 28 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

29

testimony and credibility of any witness. And it occurred to me that

before you retired to continue your deliberations this morning that some

comment along those lines might be of some assistance to you.

Now, you should keep in mind that my comments are intended to

be advisory only, and are not binding on you, as you are the exclusive

judges of the questions of fact submitted to you and of the credibility of

the witnesses. You should disregard any or all of the comments, if you do

not agree, if they do not agree with your view of the evidence and the

credibility of the witnesses. 

Now, under California law, by definition , the word “homicide”

means the killing of one human being by another, either lawfully or

unlawfully. Now, under the instructions that I’ve given you, the word

homicide includes murder. And I’ve given you in that connection

instructions on first degree murder as well as instructions on second

degree murder. There is the word homicide, however, also means the

lawful killing of another – of a person by another. An that’s in situations

where the act occurs as a result of some excusable or justifiable – under

the law – reason for killing. In this particular case, we do not have a

justifiable or lawful killing of a human being by another. There shouldn’t

be any doubt in anyone’s mind that the death, the killing of Bonita Bergh

Stendal was an unlawful killing of her by another person. There is

absolutely no evidence whatsoever that she was killed in self defense or

any other type of reason or that she killed herself. There shouldn’t be any

doubt in anyone’s mind on the facts that have been presented in this case,

that we have an unlawful killing of Ms. Stendal by another person.

Now, the real question in this case is whether the State, the district

attorney, has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is

legally responsible for the killing. That’s basically the issue here, as well

as if the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that it’s murder in the

first degree or murder in the second degree. And if they’ve proved

beyond a reasonable doubt that it’s murder in the first degree, you go on to

whether they proved beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the

special circumstances that have been mentioned. And you are also called

upon to determine as to whether they’ve proved beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant committed the rape, whether they proved beyond

a reasonable doubt the defendant committed a burglary.

Now, in that connection, there have been several statements

attributed to the defendant out of court concerning his whereabouts and

activities on the night of April the 21st and the early morning hours of

April the 22nd. These statements attributed to him are inconsistent with

one another and are also inconsistent with his testimony here in court

concerning his activities that evening and in the early morning hours of

April the 22nd.

Now, the district attorney has placed him in the house of Bonita

Bergh Stendal through three palm prints; one bloody right palm print,

which I think Mr. Collins testified to, was created by blood being on the

palm first and then transferred to the booklet. In addition to that, Mr.

Collins has testified there were two dry palm prints. By that, they were

latent. There was a left palm print, which was latent, but that it had a

chemical, had to be applied to one of the booklets to raise that palm print

to where it could be seen. And another dry palm print of the right palm. 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 29 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

This argument is puzzling given that, as petitioner admits, his defense at trial was

14

that he was not the killer. His position was never that he killed her for some justifiable reason. 

In the amended petition, petitioner states: “The defense position was that circumstances

suggested that Manley, rather than defendant, was the killer.” Moreover, as respondents note,

petitioner admitted on direct appeal that this was a nonissue. 

30

Again, one that could only be seen after being treated with chemicals, and

that was on a different booklet. 

Now, the defendant has testified and given you an explanation as

to what he did in that house that morning which explains the presence of

the bloody palm print, but does not explain the presence of the two dry or

latent palm prints. Under those circumstances, I have difficulty in

believing the testimony of the defendant. Now, again, my comments are

intended to be advisory only and are not binding on you as you are the

exclusive judges of the questions of fact submitted to you and of the

credibility of the witnesses. You should disregard any or all of the

comments that I’ve made if they do not agree with your views of the

evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. 

Petitioner argues that these comments resulted in error because: (1) the trial judge did not

correctly instruct the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 17.32 that the purpose of judicial comments

is only to isolate issues of relevance and not to impose the court’s will; (2) the trial judge

relieved the prosecution of its burden of proving that the killing of Mrs. Stendal was unlawful;14

(3) the trial judge improperly resolved for the jury the question of petitioner’s credibility; and (4)

the trial judge improperly told the jury that the criminologist expert’s opinion was conclusive. In

sum, petitioner quotes Justice Mosk’s dissent in his automatic direct appeal:

It is plain that the jury would have heard the court’s comment as

tantamount to an argument for conviction. How could it not? The

substance of the comment was the same as part of the prosecutor’s

summation: it added nothing and it subtracted nothing. The prosecutor’s

summation was, literally, an argument for conviction. The court’s

comment effectively approved and adopted what was urged therein. From

all that appears on the face of record, the court did not deliver the words in

the passionate manner employed by the prosecutor. But it delivered them

nonetheless. 

It is also plain that the jury would have heard the court’s comment to

suggest that the court itself believed defendant was guilty. Again, how

could it not? Innocence depended on the credibility of defendant’s

exculpatory testimony. The court expressed its own view on the question

in no uncertain terms: “. . . I have difficulty in believing the testimony of

the defendant.” 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 30 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Respondents argue alternate theories. In their answer, respondents argue that

15

AEDPA deference applies. In making this argument, respondents assert that the state court

adjudicated the instant federal claim on the merits because it referenced state law more stringent

than the federal standard and because the state law, in turn, referenced Supreme Court precedent. 

However, as to whether relief is warranted under AEDPA, respondents also argue that there is no

clearly established Supreme Court precedent governing this claim and, therefore, the state

court’s decision cannot be an unreasonable application of non-existent law. 

Obviously, if the court concludes that the state court’s determination of this claim 16

was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of presumed clearly established law, it

would have to make a specific finding that such clearly established law in fact existed before the

court could recommend granting relief. 

31

* * *

. . . The court’s erroneous comment was its final remark. Evidently, it was

dispositive. About four hours thereafter, the jury returned guilty verdicts

on all the charges and true findings on all the allegations – even though it

had been unable to agree on any verdict or finding in the approximately

nine hours that preceded. 

Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 565-66 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 

In their answer, respondents argue that there is no clearly established Supreme

Court precedent addressing the constitutionality of a trial judge’s comments on credibility. If 15

the court agrees, the result of such a finding would be that relief on this claim is not available

under AEDPA. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 852 (9th

Cir. 2002). If the court disagrees, then relief would only be available if the state court’s

determination was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law. If

the court presumes, without making a specific finding, that clearly established Supreme Court

precedent governing this claim exists, and also concludes that the state court’s determination was

neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of that law, relief would not be available. If

this is the case, then the question of whether there is clearly established law would become moot

because the result would be the same under either theory – petitioner would not be entitled to

relief.16

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 31 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

32

Presuming that there is clearly established law governing Claim F, several Ninth

Circuit cases shed light on what that law is. The general rule is that comments by the trial judge

violate constitutional right to trial by jury if they coerce a verdict. See Gonsior v. Craven, 449

F.2d 20, 21 (9th Cir. 1971); Jiminez v. Myers, 40 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1993). In Rodriguez v.

Marshall, the court held that the trial judge can make comments and call the jury's attention to

parts of the evidence so long as the comments neither distort the evidence nor add to it, and the

judge reminds the jurors of their exclusive duty to determine facts. See 125 F.3d 739, 749 (9th

Cir.1997) (citing Quercia v. U.S., 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1932)). Thus, the comments, evaluated in

light of the totality of the circumstances, may not distort the evidence or add to it. 

See Rodriguez v. Marshall, 125 F.3d 739, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1997). There is no constitutional

error if the trial judge stresses that the comments are advisory only and that the jurors are the

sole arbiters of the facts. See Davis v. Craven, 485 F.2d 1138, 1142 (9th Cir. 1973); cf Jiminez,

40 F.3d at 981 (noting that failure to remind the jury that it was the sole arbiter of guilt strongly

supports the conclusion that the jury was impermissibly coerced). 

In their reply to petitioner’s motion for summary judgment on this claim,

respondents argue that this claim should be denied on the merits because the trial judge told the

jurors on two separate occasions – before and after his comments – that they were the exclusive

judges of the facts and credibility and that his comments were not binding. A review of the trial

judge’s comments in this case reveals that respondents are correct regarding the admonitions

given by the trial judge. Just prior to making his comments on petitioner’s credibility, the judge

stated:

Now, you should keep in mind that my comments are intended to

be advisory only, and are not binding on you, as you are the exclusive

judges of the questions of fact submitted to you and of the credibility of

the witnesses. You should disregard any or all of the comments, if you do

not agree, if they do not agree with your view of the evidence and the

credibility of the witnesses. 

/ / /

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 32 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Interestingly, petitioner does not assert this argument in his amended petition. 17

Rather, petitioner argues in the amended petition that the trial judge’s comments essentially

resolved questions of fact, thereby usurping the jury’s role and coercing a verdict. Petitioner

never argues that the trial judge added to the evidence.

33

And, at the conclusion of his comments, the judge repeated the admonition:

. . . Now, again, my comments are intended to be advisory only

and are not binding on you as you are the exclusive judges of the

questions of fact submitted to you and of the credibility of the witnesses. 

You should disregard any or all of the comments that I’ve made if they do

not agree with your views of the evidence and the credibility of the

witnesses. 

Because, on both occasions, the trial judge instructed the jury that they were the sole arbiters of

the facts and that they could disregard his comments, the court finds the admonitions to be

adequate in light of the law outlined above. See Davis, 485 F.2d at 1142. While petitioner

argues in the amended petition that the court “omitted constitutionally required warnings” and

that the trial judge should have instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 17.32, he does not

point to any authority requiring this specific language. 

Having concluded that the trial judge gave the proper admonitions with his

comments on petitioner’s credibility, the court next examines whether the trial judge’s comments

either distorted the evidence or added to it, or both. In his motion for summary judgment, and

his reply to respondents’ motion for summary judgment, petitioner argues that the trial judge’s

comments distorted the evidence. In particular, he challenges the trial court's statement to the 17

jury that he had a hard time believing petitioner's testimony given that petitioner did not explain

the latent palm prints. The court does not agree that this distorted the evidence. First, the trial

judge did nothing more than comment on the evidence in stating that petitioner's testimony did

not explain the latent prints. The statement does not direct a particular conclusion such that it

could be coercive. Similarly, the judge's statement that he had a hard time believing petitioner's

testimony was simply his view of the evidence which does not violate the constitution in light of

the admonitions given at both the beginning and end of the judge's comments. As the California

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 33 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

34

Supreme noted in petitioner’s direct appeal:

In the present case, the trial court essentially observed that defendant had

made inconsistent statements concerning his whereabouts during the

pertinent period, and that defendant’s testimony as to his presence in the

residence, while explaining the presence of the bloody palm print, did not

explain the presence of the two dry or latent palm prints, causing the trial

court to entertain doubts as to defendant’s credibility. The trial court did

not inaccurately state or distort any testimony . . . and its comment that

defendant’s testimony “explains the presence of the bloody palm print”

permitted an inference more helpful to defendant than the jury might have

drawn in the absence of the comment. Although the court commented

upon defendant’s credibility in a specific context, it did not comment on

the defendant’s guilt or innocence, nor did it direct that the jury reach a

given verdict. Moreover, both prior to and after its comments, the court

admonished the jury that it was free to disregard those comments. We

conclude that the trial court’s remarks fell within the scope of the

constitutional privilege. 

Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 542-43. 

Because the trial court properly instructed the jury -- before and after the

comments on the evidence -- that the jury was the sole arbiter of the facts and that they were free

to disregard the judge's statements, and because the judge’s comments neither distorted nor

added to the evidence, relief is not warranted. It is not necessary to this conclusion to decide

whether there is clearly established Supreme Court precedent on this claim because, even if there

is not, the result would be the same. Therefore, respondents' motion for summary judgment on

Claim F should be granted and petitioner's motion for summary judgment on this claim should be

denied. Claim F should be denied on the merits. 

2. Inquiry as to the Jury's Numerical Division (Claim C)

According to petitioner, after the jury had been deliberating less than six hours,

the foreperson conveyed a message to the trial judge that there was an impasse and that guidance

as to how to proceed was needed. He states that the trial judge immediately asked for a

numerical count and, when he learned that the count was 11 to 1, he ordered a recess to allow the

jury to rest. Petitioner argues: "The obvious message was that the jury's division was not merely

‘of importance,’ but the only topic worthy of attention. The court showed no interest in and

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 34 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

35

mentioned nothing else, and did nothing in response. Thus, the jurors were told that there was

something 'wrong,' to be 'cured' by a good night's rest, about that numerical division." Petitioner

concludes that this denied him a fair trial under the standard of Lowenfield which prohibits the

judge from coercing the jury to reach a particular verdict. See 484 U.S. at 241.

The California Supreme Court addressed this claim in petitioner's direct appeal

and stated:

At 4 p.m. on . . . the first full day of deliberations, the jury conveyed a

message to the court that the jury had reached an impasse and was

requesting guidance as to how to proceed. The court, stating it had

received the jury's message, requested that the jury foreman inform the

court as to the numerical division of the jurors, without revealing the

respective numbers for a guilty or a not guilty verdict.

Defendant contends the court's inquiry into the jury's numerical division

impaired the fairness of the trial. "[T]he practice of inquiring into the

jury's numerical division, without finding out how many are for conviction

and how many are for acquittal, was expressly approved in [People v.]

Carter [(1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 815]." (additional citation omitted). Such

inquiry is justified in the discharge of the court's "statutory responsibility

of assuring that a verdict is rendered 'unless, at the expiration of such time

as the court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is no

reasonable probability that the jury can agree.' (Pen. Code, § 1140)."

(additional citation omitted). 

Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 538.

The state court then noted that, although the federal rule is otherwise, that rule is not binding on

the states and continued:

. . . In view of the circumstance that the court inquired in a neutral manner

as to the numerical count in order to determine whether further

deliberations would be productive, we decline to disapprove the practice

as it was employed in the present case.

We also disagree with defendant's contention that the court's order

declaring a recess until the following morning, once it had ascertained the

vote was split, implied the court had found "something wrong" with the

vote which might be remedied by a night's rest. The determination,

pursuant to section 1140, whether there is a "'reasonable probability'" of

agreement, rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. (citations

omitted). Although the court must take care to exercise its power without

coercing the jury into abdicating its independent judgment in favor of

considerations of compromise and expediency (citation omitted), the court

may direct further deliberations upon its reasonable conclusion that such

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 35 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Respondents cite to Lowenfield for the general proposition that, if this case

18

represents controlling Supreme Court precedent, the rule is simply that jury polling must not be

coercive.

36

direction would be perceived "'as a means of enabling the jurors to

enhance their understanding of the case rather than as mere pressure to

reach a verdict on the basis of matters already discussed and considered.'

[Citation]." (citations omitted). Nothing in the trial court's comment in the

present case properly may be construed as an attempt to pressure the jury

to reach a verdict; the court correctly concluded there was a reasonable

probability the jurors could agree on a verdict.

Id. at 539.

In their answer to this claim and in their motion for summary judgment,

respondents argue, as they do with respect to Claim F regarding the court's comments on

petitioner's credibility, that there is no clearly established law governing this claim. See

Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 240 n.3 (concluding that the federal rule prohibiting a judge from

inquiring about the numerical division of a deliberating jury is not constitutionally based). 

Respondents also argue that, in any event, there was no coercion because the trial judge was

neutral in his inquiry, being careful not to ask where the jury stood on guilt or acquittal. 

Respondents assert that the neutral manner of the court's inquiry belies any indication of pressure

or coercion. Their reasoning is that neutral comments cannot impermissibly coerce the jury to 18

reach any particular verdict because such comments do not suggest one verdict over another. 

Because there is either no law controlling this claim, or because there can be no dispute that the

trial court was neutral in its inquiry and, therefore, not coercive, respondents conclude that

petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim C. 

As with Claim F, discussed above, it is not necessary to decide whether there is

clearly established law if, presuming Lowenfield controls, the court concludes that no error

occurred. If Lowenfield controls, the court must agree with respondents. Their argument is

based on sound logic -- if the judge's comment was neutral with respect to the verdict, then the

comment cannot be said to have coerced any particular verdict. The record makes clear that the

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 36 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

37

judge never asked which way the jury was leaning. To the contrary, the judge specifically

stated: "Without telling me which way the numeral [sic] count is, would you tell me what the

numerical count is. Don't tell me which way, but what is the numerical count." Proctor, 4

Cal.4th at 538 n.6. Based on this record, the court concludes that the judge's comments were

neutral as to the verdict. At best, the judge's comment could be seen as encouraging the jury to

continue deliberating in order to reach a verdict, which is the judge's statutory duty in California. 

See id. at 538-39. 

In his motion for summary judgment, petitioner contends that relief is warranted

on this claim because inquiry into the numerical breakdown of a deadlocked jury is deemed to be

coercive. See Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 (1926); Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 239. 

This argument is unpersuasive because there is no indication that the jury was deadlocked at the

time the judge made the inquiry, or ever. The foreperson stated that the jury was "at an impasse"

as to how to proceed. This is not the same as being deadlocked as to a verdict in the sense that it

could not reach a verdict even if it proceeded further. The very indication that the jury needed

guidance as to how to proceed indicates that the jury believed it could proceed. 

Petitioner also argues that some error is to be found because the jury indicated

that it had only deliberated the murder charge. The basis of this argument is that, given the other

charges against petitioner, the judge suggested by the order to recess that the jury could go no

further until it was able to reach a verdict on the murder charge. There is some initial attraction

to this argument because, of course, the judge could have told the jury to continue their

deliberations by moving on to the next charge and, by not doing so, he improperly focused the

jury on the murder charge. The court, however, does not see how this could be coercive. The

trial judge was within his sound discretion under California law to direct further deliberations as

are appropriate under the circumstances. Given the circumstance of the jury’s impression that it

had reached an “impasse,” a resting period was sensible. Additionally, it would not make sense

to tell the jury to move on to another charge. Because, the jury had already spent time

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 37 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

As with Claim F, if there is no clearly established law, petitioner would not be 19

entitled to relief. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. If there is clearly established law, petitioner

would still not be entitled to relief because court's comment did not violate that law. The

question of whether there actually is clearly established law is rendered moot. 

Presuming, however, that there is clearly established law, the “unreasonable

application of” standard of review applies. The court rejects petitioner's argument that the

California Supreme Court failed to consider the constitutional aspect of his claim. In particular,

the court notes that the state court held that the trial judge's comment could not be coercive as to

a particular verdict because it was neutral. This analysis encompasses the Lowenfield standard. 

Therefore, the state court applied the correct presumed clearly established law. 

38

deliberating the murder charge, directing them to continue deliberating other charges would have

resulted in confusion and a waste of time when the jury returned to the murder charge. And,

ultimately, it cannot be ignored that the comments were entirely neutral. 

Next, petitioner argues that the state court considered only the actual statement

made by the trial court, thereby failing to consider all the circumstances of the comment, as

required by Lowenfield. Again, the court finds that this argument is not particularly persuasive. 

There simply was no need to consider any circumstance other than the comments themselves

because they clearly demonstrated neutrality. This neutrality rendered petitioner's argument to

the California Supreme Court without merit, as it does here. Moreover, nothing in the

circumstances of the comment indicates coercion. 

Given the neutrality of the trial judge's comments, they could not have coerced

the jury to reach any particular verdict. In addition, the jury was never deadlocked. Therefore,

petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. Respondents' motion for summary judgment on 19

Claim C should be granted and petitioner's motion for summary judgment on this claim should

be denied. Claim C should be denied on the merits. 

3. Juror Singled Out (Claim D)

In a different approach to petitioner's challenge to the judge's comment on the

jury's numerical division, petitioner argues in Claim D that the trial judge erred in "singling out"

the lone dissenting juror -- Juror Turner. In the amended petition, petitioner argues that Juror

Turner was "subjected to an additional vulnerability to pressure" because she was the only

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 38 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

As discussed above, the trial judge did not actually know which way the hold-out 20

juror was leaning at the time. 

 Aside from the state court's discussion of the trial judge's comments on the jury's 21

division, the California Supreme Court did not specifically address Claim D. However, because

petitioner's argument is based on the notion that Juror Turner was singled out by the judge's

comments on the jury's numerical division, this court finds that the California Supreme Court

adequately addressed this claim in its discussion of Claim C.

39

African-American on the jury and because she was the one hold-out for acquittal on the murder

charge. Petitioner adds: "Juror Turner, a person already susceptible to feeling ostracism and 20

disapproval was singled out for special attention in front of her peers because she did not agree

with them." As to how the trial judge "singled out" Juror Turner, petitioner states that, at one

point, "the court referred to her as the 'black lady.'" Other than this comment, petitioner's

assertion of error regarding Juror Turner is based on the judge’s inquiry into the jury's numerical

division.21

In their answer, respondents note that petitioner cites to no authority in the

amended petition in support of this argument, and does not explain how any comment by the

judge as to Juror Turner coerced a particular verdict. Respondents point to Early v. Packer in

support of their conclusion that Claim D lacks merit. Specifically, respondents state that, in

Early, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction even though the trial judge read a note from the

jury which singled a juror out by name and accused her of not following the jury instructions. 

See Early, 536 U.S. at 4-5. Respondents observe that this "singling out" was more extreme than

the comments by the trial judge in petitioner's case. 

As with Claims F and C, the parties dispute whether there is clearly established

law addressing a claim that the trial judge impermissibly singled out a juror by commenting on

the jury's numerical division. Therefore, the court will use the framework for review used for

Claims C and F. Specifically, the court will presume that Lowenfield represents clearly

established law and that the test is whether the comments coerced a particular verdict. If

petitioner is not entitled to relief under this test, it does not matter whether or not there is clearly

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 39 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

40

established law because, if there is not, petitioner would also not be entitled to relief. 

Turning to the trial court's comments, petitioner's claim is based on the following

comments: (1) the trial judge's comments on the jury's numerical division which ultimately

identified Juror Turner as the lone dissenting juror; and (2) the trial judge's reference to Juror

Turner as the "black lady." Under Lowenfield, as discussed in greater detail above, the general

question is whether these comments coerced the jury to reach a particular verdict. Based on the

court’s discussion above with respect to Claim C, the trial court's comments on the numerical

division of the jury were neutral. There is nothing in the identification of Juror Turner as the

holdout juror which would tend to erode this neutrality because Juror Turner's position was not

sought or disclosed. Petitioner recognizes as much in the amended petition when he states that

Juror Turner was singled out as the "holder of a different opinion as to petitioner's guilt."

Significantly, petitioner never asserts that the trial judge asked what Juror Turner's opinion was

or that Juror Turner's opinion was disclosed. In any event, neither occurred.

Petitioner also appears to assign error to the trial judge's reference to Juror Turner

as the "black lady." Again, the court will presume that Lowenfield is the controlling law. Under

this standard, the court concludes that this reference did not affect the neutrality of the judge's

other references to the numerical division of the jury in general or Juror Turner in particular. 

There is nothing inherent in the reference to Juror Turner's race -- one which was a distinct

minority in the community -- to suggest that the trial court favored one verdict over another. 

For these reasons, respondents' motion for summary judgment on Claim D should

be granted and petitioner's motion for summary judgment on this claim should be denied. Claim

D should be denied on the merits. 

4. Cumulative Effect (Claim G)

Claim G is based on the theory that the state court failed to adhere to Lowenfield

by discussing "the relevant circumstances that must be considered in toto." See Lowenfield, 484

U.S. at 237. Specifically, petitioner re-asserts the arguments raised in Claims F, C, and D and

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 40 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 The portion of Claim K raising a causal connection argument has been dismissed. 22

41

agues that, considered cumulatively, relief is warranted. Respondents summarize their position

succinctly as follows: "Briefing on the [jury] deliberation issues is adequate. . . ." 

The court agrees with respondents that the discussion of Claims F, C, and D

suffices to resolve this claim, as framed by petitioner. Put simply, there was no jury coercion

under Lowenfield. For this reason, respondents' motion for summary judgment on Claim G

should be granted and petitioner's motion for summary judgment on this claim should be denied. 

Claim G should be denied on the merits. 

D. Sufficiency of the Evidence (Claims J, K, L, M, N, O, Q, and S)

Petitioner asserts eight claims based on the sufficiency of the evidence. In Claim

N, petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence to support felony murder based on rape. 

He does not, however, challenge the special circumstance finding of murder based on rape. In

Claim J, petitioner alleges that there was insufficient evidence to support felony murder based on

burglary. Petitioner concludes that, absent facts sufficient to establish felony murder based on

burglary, the special finding of murder in the course of burglary is also not supported by the

evidence. In Claim O, petitioner asserts that there was insufficient evidence to prove first degree

murder based on premeditation and deliberation. In Claim S, petitioner argues that the evidence

was not sufficient to support the torture special circumstance finding. Finally, in Claim Q,

petitioner states that the cumulative effect of claimed errors resulting from insufficient evidence

warrants habeas relief. 

Three of petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence claims -- Claims K, L, and M --

relate to torture murder. In the remaining portion of Claim K, petitioner states that there is a

significant difference between a torture special circumstance finding and torture murder, and

asserts that the evidence does not establish torture murder. In Claim L, petitioner argues that

22

the evidence does not support instructing the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.24. Claim M

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 41 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Even though Jackson is a pre-AEDPA case, this expression of the law is valid

23

under AEDPA’s standard of federal habeas corpus review. A state court decision denying relief

in the face of a record establishing that no rational jury could have found proof of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt would be either contrary to or an unreasonable application of the law as

outlined in Jackson. Cf. Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 959 (denying habeas relief on

sufficiency of the evidence claim under AEDPA standard of review because a rational jury could

make the finding at issue). 

42

challenges the California Supreme Court's finding that California law does not require that any

specific act of torture actually cause the victim's death. 

When a challenge is brought alleging insufficient evidence, federal habeas corpus

relief is available if it is found that, upon the record of evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Under

23

Jackson, the court must review the entire record when the sufficiency of the evidence is

challenged on habeas. See id. It is the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony,

to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. 

“The question is not whether we are personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. It is

whether rational jurors could reach the conclusion that these jurors reached.” Roehler v. Borg,

945 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1993). The

federal habeas court determines sufficiency of the evidence in the context of the substantive

elements of the criminal offense, as defined by state law. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16.

Before continuing, the court must comment on petitioner’s argument concerning

the effect of some of these claims on the verdict as a whole. As to Claims J, K, L, M, N, and O -

- which together challenge the alternate factual bases put forward by the prosecution to support

first degree murder -- petitioner argues:

This failure of proof . . . invalidates the entire guilt-phase result. 

When a case is submitted to the jury on alternative theories, and it is

impossible to determine on which theory the verdict of guilt relied, the

unconstitutionality of any of the theories requires that the conviction be

set aside. 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 42 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

43

The court, however, cannot find any citation to authority in the amended petition or any of

petitioner's briefs supporting this significant proposition. Nor does petitioner challenge

respondents' argument that Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991), expresses the law

applicable to these claims. In Griffin, the jury returned a general guilty verdict on a multipleobject conspiracy charge. The Supreme Court concluded that due process does not require the

verdict to be set aside for insufficiency of the evidence as long as the evidence was sufficient to

support a conviction on at least one object. See id. at 59. Thus, where there are alternate factual

bases for a finding of guilt under a single theory of criminal liability – first degree murder, for

example – insufficient evidence as to one basis does not warrant reversal as long as the evidence

is sufficient as to any other basis.

Petitioner’s rule of law would apply if one of the theories supporting a general

guilty verdict was legally inadequate (i.e., the action in question is protected by the Constitution

or fails to come within the statutory definition of the crime) because “there is no reason to think

that [the jury’s] own intelligence and expertise will save them from . . . error.” Id. at 59. 

Insufficient evidence goes to factual, as opposed to legal, adequacy. “[J]urors are well equipped

to analyze the evidence. . . .” Id. (emphasis in original); cf. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 880-

84 (1983) (refusing to set aside a capital conviction because one of the alleged aggravating

circumstances was found to be unconstitutionally vague because the jury made specific findings

as to other, legally and factually adequate aggravating circumstances).

Petitioner in fact appears to concede the applicability of Griffin. In supplemental

briefing filed in support of Claims K and L, he states that "when the trial court instructs on a

factually inadequate theory of guilt, relief is required unless there is another theory of guilt for

which the evidence was sufficient." He acknowledges the impact of this principle on his case by

arguing that none of alternate bases for first degree murder were supported by sufficient

evidence. The converse of this expression is that, as long as the evidence is sufficient on at least

one of the alternate factual bases for first degree murder, petitioner is not entitled to relief due to

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 43 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

44

a failure of proof on any particular basis. This is precisely the holding in Griffin. 

The court, therefore, concludes that Griffin applies to its analysis of petitioner's

claims of insufficient evidence and that relief is not warranted on any particular claim if the

evidence is sufficient on at least one factual basis of first degree murder.

1. Felony Murder Based on Rape (Claim N)

Petitioner's claim is straightforward: "No evidence was presented from which the

prosecution could link Mr. Proctor to the rape of the victim." He adds:

a. Evidence that petitioner was in the victim's home on the night of the crime

does not prove that he raped her.

b. Abrasions and other scraping injuries on petitioner's lower legs were

observed two days after the crime. Petitioner's legs were examined by the

coroner, who testified that he had previously examined suspects in sexual

assault cases and that he had seen these type[s] of injuries in sexual assault

cases. This testimony however was insubstantial and insufficient to

establish that petitioner committed a rape. 

c. The victim's hands had been tied with knots that were identified at trial as

"trucker's hitches." The jury was also presented with testimony that

established that petitioner had been in a class where instruction was given

in tying a "trucker's hitch." At most, this testimony demonstrates that

whoever killed Stendal bound her hands, that the knots used to restrain her

were common, and that Mr. Proctor had taken a class at which these knots

were taught. No evidence was presented that Mr. Proctor actually learned

the knots, that he was the one who restrained the victim, or that whoever

restrained the victim raped her as well. 

Respondents argue that, under the Jackson standard, this court must review the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution and that, in this light, the state court's determination

cannot be an unreasonable application of clearly established law, or an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Specifically, in their motion for summary judgment, respondents

assert that the following facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, would

allow a reasonable jury to conclude that petitioner raped Mrs. Stendal:

1. A short time prior to the commission of the present offenses, petitioner

participated in making telephone calls of a harassing nature to various

persons;

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 44 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

45

2. Petitioner was present when his companion Robert Manley made a call of

a sexual nature to Mrs. Stendal;

3. On the evening the offenses were committed, petitioner informed Robert

Manley that he was going tp “pick up a woman,” and told Jeffrey Bohall

that he was going to "get a piece of butt;"

4. An unfiltered cigarette butt was found just outside Mrs. Stendal's

residence and petitioner had received a pack of unfiltered cigarettes from

Manley a few hours before the murder;

5. Petitioner admittedly was present inside Mrs. Stendal's residence on the

night of the murder;

6. Mrs. Stendal was tied in a manner consistent with petitioner's education in

trucker's knots;

7. Mrs. Stendal was forcibly raped prior to her murder;

8. Mrs. Stendal suffered nonsexual injuries that were methodically inflicted;

9. Approximately one day after the murder, police observed abrasions on

petitioner's legs that were incurred while his legs were unclothed and were

consistent with sexual assault cases; and

10. Within hours of Mrs. Stendal's murder, petitioner was observed walking

down the street 500 feet from her residence. 

As to Claim N, the California Supreme Court addressed the issue in petitioner's

direct appeal and stated:

Defendant urges that the only items of evidence linking him to the

commission of the rape are the unfiltered cigarette butt found near the

residence, his presence in the residence on the night in question, and

certain marks on his legs which an expert opined were similar to marks

seen on other perpetrators of sexual assaults. Defendant ignores the

additional circumstantial evidence that a short time prior to the

commission of the present offenses, he participated in making telephone

calls of a harassing nature to various persons and was present when his

companion made a call of a sexual nature to the murder victim. On the

evening the offenses were committed, defendant informed one witness that

he was going to “pick up a woman,” and another that he was going to "get

a piece of butt." The evidence that Mrs. Stendal was forcibly raped, prior

to her death, was uncontradicted. This evidence, considered with the

circumstances that the victim was tied in a manner consistent with

defendant's formal education in the art of trucker's knots, that the

abrasions below the defendant's knees and above his right knee were

incurred by defendant while his legs were unclothed, and that these

abrasions were consistent with injuries observed in other cases of sexual

assault, amply support the jury's implied finding that defendant

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 45 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

While the state court concluded that the evidence "amply supported the jury's 24

implied finding" that petitioner committed the rape, it later referred to what "a rational trier of

fact could conclude." Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 532-33.

As with many of his other claims, petitioner contends that the California Supreme 25

Court did not address the constitutional aspect of this claim. The court rejects this contention. 

Because the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and because

the California Supreme Court did just that, the court also rejects petitioner's suggestion that the

state court's determination was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The

Jackson standard allows only one determination of the facts -- the one most favorable to the

prosecution.

In his motion for summary judgment, petitioner argues for the first time that "no 26

reasonable inference of an intent to rape could be drawn from any of the circumstantial

evidence." The amended petition is clear, however, that petitioner's claim regarding intent, as set

forth in Claim J, is that the evidence does not establish that petitioner formed an intent to rape

before he entered the Stendal residence. Claim N questions whether the evidence supports the

inference that petitioner was the rapist, not that someone formed the intent to rape Mrs. Stendal.

46

specifically intended to commit rape and that the rape was not a mere

incident of the murder. 

Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 532-33.

Petitioner does not dispute that this decision is based on the prosecution's view of the evidence. 

By considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in deciding whether a

rational jury could imply that petitioner was the rapist, the California Supreme Court applied the

correct clearly established law under Jackson. Therefore, this court must give the state court 24

deference and may only recommend granting relief if the state court's decision was an

unreasonable application of Jackson.25

At the outset, the court notes that petitioner is not claiming that the prosecution

failed to establish the necessary elements under California law to prove that Mrs. Stendal was

forcibly raped. Rather, petitioner claims that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that he

was the one who committed the rape. Therefore, because it is undisputed that someone

committed the crime of rape, it is not necessary to discuss the proof of specific elements of the

crime. Rather, the inquiry centers on the proof of petitioner's involvement in the crime. In this 26

regard, the court is mindful that the California Supreme Court described the evidence relating to

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 46 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

47

petitioner's activities "in substantial detail" due to "the circumstantial nature of the evidence

connecting defendant to the commission of the crimes" and petitioner's defense that someone else

was the perpetrator. See Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 517-18. 

In his opposition to respondents' motion for summary judgment, petitioner argues

that the state court relied on impermissible inferences. For example, petitioner states:

. . . They point to the evidence of Robert Manley's obscene phone

call to Ms. Stendal, made in Mr. Proctor's presence and Mr. Proctor's

statements to another friend that he was going to pick up a woman. The

state court's reliance on these facts to infer Mr. Proctor had the requisite

intent to rape Ms. Stendal was unreasonable . . . 

This argument, however, is conclusory in that it does not explain why these facts do not support

the inference. Additionally, petitioner's argument is somewhat confused in that Claim N relates to

whether he was the one who raped Mrs. Stendal, and not whether the particular element of intent

had been established. As discussed below, petitioner raises the issue of intent to commit rape in

Claim J. This argument is also not particularly persuasive given that it presumes the state court

considered this specific evidence in a vacuum. In any event, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, the obscene phone calls and petitioner’s statements that he was

going to pick up a woman” and “get a piece of butt” reasonably suggest a sexual intent. 

He also states that he ". . . could have scraped his knees in numerous ways other

than during a sexual assault." Petitioner acknowledges the coroner's expert testimony that the

scrapes were consistent with sexual assault cases, but argues that innocent inferences could be

drawn from the injuries. While it is certainly true that there may have been an innocent

explanation for the scrapes on petitioner's knees, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, as required by Jackson, and in conjunction with the coroner's testimony, a rational

jury could conclude that petitioner scraped his knees while committing a sexual assault. This

would not have been an inappropriate inference. 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 47 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

48

As another example of an "inappropriate inference," petitioner argues:

An inference that Mr. Proctor was the one who tied up the victim

simply because he knew how to tie [the] exceedingly common [trucker's

hitch] knot is not proper because there are numerous alternative, innocent

inferences that could be drawn from the fact that this particular knot was

used. 

Again, while petitioner is correct that innocent inferences could be drawn from the facts

concerning the "trucker's knot," the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the

prosecution's case. Viewed in this light along with all the other circumstantial evidence of

petitioner's involvement in the crimes, a rational jury could conclude that petitioner tied the knots

used to restrain Mrs. Stendal. It stands to reason that a person takes a class in order to learn what

is being taught. Therefore, the jury could reasonably infer that petitioner learned the “trucker’s

hitch” from the class he took just weeks before the murder. Coupled with the undisputed fact that

Mrs. Stendal was forcibly raped, that petitioner took the class where the specific knots were

taught, and all of the other circumstantial evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that

petitioner restrained Mrs. Stendal as part of that rape. 

This court cannot say that the California Supreme Court's determination of this

claim was an unreasonable application of Jackson. The state court outlined sufficient facts which,

when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, support reasonable inferences that

petitioner committed the rape. The evidence established that petitioner took a four-week truckdriving course at which students were taught various knots, one of those being the knot used to

restrain the victim. While there is no direct evidence that petitioner actually learned the knot in

question, the jury could reasonably infer that he did, given that he took the course and that the

knots were taught. Next, the evidence established that petitioner and Manley made obscene

phone calls and that petitioner made statements indicating sexual intentions. The evidence also

shows that Manley gave petitioner a pack of unfiltered cigarettes. A cigarette butt from the same

brand was later found near the crime scene. This could reasonably connect petitioner to the crime

scene. Additionally, on the morning of April 22, petitioner was seen 500 feet from the Stendal

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 48 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 Petitioner argues only that the prints can be innocently explained. 27

49

residence. Finally, petitioner admits that he was in the Stendal residence on the night of April 21-

22, 1982. 

Aside from the evidence of abrasions on petitioner's legs, which the coroner

testified were consistent with sexual assault cases, petitioner makes no reference in his briefing on

this claim to other evidence linking him to the crimes. Specifically, petitioner does not discuss

the bloody palm prints which were found at the scene and which matched petitioner's prints.27

Nor does petitioner mention the shoe tread print found at the scene which matched the tread on

thongs he possessed. Finally, it is undisputed that Mrs. Stendal was raped and that petitioner was

in the Stendal residence on the night of the crimes. Given these facts, and the foregoing evidence

of petitioner's connection to the crime scene, a rational jury could infer that petitioner committed

the rape.

It bears noting that petitioner’s claim is based on the notion that innocent alternate

explanations undercut the reasonableness of the jury’s inferences. Whether an explanation was

believed is solely a question for the jury. It is not for this court to second-guess the jury's

determination to believe or not believe a particular explanation where, as here, the jury's ultimate

determination is based on reasonable inferences supported by the evidence as a whole. As

respondents note, petitioner argued alternate explanations at trial and this court cannot re-weigh

the evidence. Petitioner recognizes this principle when he states in his opposition to respondents'

motion for summary judgment that "while it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds

that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and

the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the

defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 49 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

50

Because the state court's determination of this claim was not an unreasonable

application of clearly established law under Jackson, respondents' motion for summary judgment

on Claim N should be granted and petitioner's motion for summary judgment on this claim should

be denied. Claim N should be denied on the merits. 

2. Felony Murder Based on Burglary (Claim J)

As stated in the amended petition, petitioner narrows this claim to focus on

whether "petitioner intended, before he entered the Stendal home, to commit the assumed rape,

thereby committing a substantive burglary. . ." Petitioner's logic is as follows:

Unless . . . petitioner formed an intention to rape prior to entering

the victim's home, there could be no reasonable finding of felonious intent

and thus no substantive burglary, and no . . . first degree felony murder

based on burglary. Because there was not even a modicum of evidence to

demonstrate felonious purpose, a significant portion of the guilt and

enhancement structure on which the prosecutor relied crumbles. 

To establish that Stendal was killed in the course of petitioner's

commission of a burglary, the prosecution was required to establish not

only the admitted fact that [petitioner] was in her home on the night of

April 21-22, 1982, but also that as he [entered the Stendal home] he

intended to rape her. 

Petitioner argues that "there was absolutely no evidence that he entered the house intending to

rape [Mrs. Stendal]." 

In their motion for summary judgment, respondents argue:

. . . Claim J's assertion there was no evidence of felonious intent is

flawed because it fails to recognize that intent is nearly always inferred,

and there was ample evidence from which a rational trier of fact could infer

Petitioner's felonious intent prior to his entry into Ms. Stendal's residence. 

Specifically, the cigarette butt suggested Petitioner stood outside the

residence contemplating his next course of action and the methodical

manner in which Petitioner isolated Ms. Stendal and subjected her to a

prolonged rape, torture and finally murder was ample evidence of his

intent. 

In his opposition to respondents' motion for summary judgment, petitioner responds by arguing

that any inference from these facts that he formed the intent to rape Mrs. Stendal before he

entered her residence is based on "mere speculation." Petitioner asserts that the inference of preCase 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 50 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

51

entry intent is not supported by a chain of logic, which is required for an inference to be

reasonable. 

See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1277 (9th Cir. 2005). 

As to this claim, the California Supreme Court stated:

Defendant also urges there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of

felony murder based upon the underlying felony of burglary because there

is no evidence demonstrating he entered the residence with the requisite

felonious intent, in this case the intent to commit rape. Such intent usually

must be inferred from all the facts and circumstances revealed by the

evidence, because only rarely can it be revealed by the evidence, because

only rarely can it be proved directly. (citations omitted). In view of (1) the

previously described evidence of defendant's conduct in the hours

preceding his entry of the Stendal residence, (2) the evidence he spent a

period of time immediately outside the residence, presumably

contemplating his next act, and (3) the methodical manner in which

defendant isolated the victim and committed the rape, the nonsexual

physical abuse, and finally the murder itself, it is clear that a rational trier

of fact could conclude defendant had the requisite felonious intent prior to

his entry into the residence. 

Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 533. 

Because the California Supreme Court considered what inferences a rational jury could draw

from the evidence, it applied the correct clearly established law under Jackson. Therefore, the

court must review under the "unreasonable application of" standard. 

The central issue to Claim J is whether the cigarette butt evidence logically leads

to the inference that, prior to entering the Stendal residence, petitioner stood just outside

"contemplating his next act." Petitioner argues:

Respondent, and the state court, found the strongest evidence of

pre-entry intent in the discovery of a cigarette butt outside Ms. Stendal's

window. For this evidence to support a finding of felonious intent, the jury

would have had to built inference upon inference upon inference. None of

the necessary inferences were based on the evidence, but on speculation. 

This is not permissible under California law. Inferences must be the

probable outcome of logic applied to direct evidence; not mere speculative

possibilities or conjecture based on other evidence. (citations omitted;

emphasis in original). 

For the jury to place any weight on the cigarette butt evidence, it

would have had to infer that the cigarette butt came from an unfiltered

cigarette. From evidence suggesting Mr. Proctor had purchased a pack of

Camel cigarettes, the jury was then required to infer that the discovered

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 51 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

52

cigarette butt was of the same brand smoked by Mr. Proctor. From this

inference, unsupported by any evidence whatsoever, the jury would have to

infer that the cigarette butt had been left outside the window on the day of

the crime. Basing yet another inference on these preceding inferences, the

jury would have to further infer that Mr. Proctor had left the cigarette butt

there. . . It would then have to infer that he left it there before entering Ms.

Stendal's house on the day of the crime. Finally, the jury would have to

draw its determinative inference that while standing outside the victim's

house smoking, Mr. Proctor "contemplated his next course of action," i.e.,

that he formed and intent to rape . . . Mr. Stendal. 

Respondents do not address this argument other than by referring to the California Supreme

Court's analysis. 

The parties agree that the following facts relate to the cigarette butt: (1) petitioner

smoked unfiltered cigarettes; (2) Manley gave petitioner a pack of unfiltered cigarettes the day of

the crime; and (3) a cigarette butt from an unfiltered cigarette was found outside Mrs. Stendal's

window 11 days after the crime. The ultimate inference, of course, is that petitioner formed the

intent to rape Mrs. Stendal before entering her home. To reach this ultimate inference, the jury

would have had to make the following inferences based on the direct evidence: (1) the cigarette

butt found at the scene 11 days after the crime was from the same brand of cigarette smoked by

petitioner; (2) petitioner smoked the particular cigarette before entering Mrs. Stendal's house

while standing outside her window; (3) while smoking the cigarette, petitioner "contemplated his

next move"; and (4) petitioner went beyond contemplation of a variety of possible next moves

and actually formed the intent to enter the house in order to rape Mrs. Stendal. The question

under Jackson is whether these inferences are reasonable in light of the evidence viewed in the

light most favorable to the prosecution. 

In this light, the direct evidence concerning the cigarette butt reasonably leads to

the inference that the cigarette butt found outside Mrs. Stendal's window 11 days after the crime

was from a cigarette smoked by petitioner. Petitioner smoked unfiltered cigarettes; Manley gave

petitioner a pack of such cigarettes; and a butt from an unfiltered cigarette was found 11 days

after the crime. While certainly not the only conclusion to be drawn from this evidence, the

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 52 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

53

inference that petitioner had produced the particular cigarette butt found is within the realm of

reason and directly flows from the evidence. 

Several of the other necessary inferences, however, do not flow directly from the

cigarette butt evidence. For example, even though it is reasonable to infer that petitioner

produced the cigarette butt, the court is troubled by the next inference -- that petitioner smoked

the cigarette before entering the Stendal residence. The record does not reflect any evidence

suggesting when petitioner smoked the cigarette in question. Even more troubling are the next

required inferences -- that petitioner smoked the cigarette outside Mrs. Stendal's window while

thinking about what to do next and that, before entering, he ultimately decided to rape Mrs.

Stendal. 

The California Supreme Court concluded that the direct evidence concerning the

cigarette butt, along with all the other evidence, supported these inferences. As to the other

evidence, the state court noted petitioner's "conduct in the hours preceding his entry of the Stendal

residence" and the nature of the crimes. See Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 533. In addition, petitioner had

abrasions on his legs consistent with sexual assault cases. As discussed above, this court agrees

that the facts support the ultimate inference that petitioner raped Mrs. Stendal. The same

evidence, however, does not say anything about when petitioner formed the intent to commit this

crime. 

Though not specifically discussed by the state court in connection with this claim,

other evidence that petitioner "spent a period of time immediately outside the residence,

presumably contemplating his next act" could arguably be a hand print found on Mrs. Stendal's

window. This evidence, however, does not reasonably support the inference for at least two

reasons. First, there is no evidence linking the hand print to petitioner. It could have been

anybody's. Second, even if the hand print was petitioner's and even if it's presence on the window

suggested that petitioner peered into Mrs. Stendal's residence in contemplation prior to entering

her residence, it does not tend to show what petitioner may have contemplated or, if he

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 53 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

54

contemplated a felony, that he concluded that contemplation before entering the residence by

actually deciding to commit a felony. 

Though both Claims J and N involve inferences from the evidence, the court

observes that Claim J differs from Claim N in at least one key respect. In Claim N -- regarding

the inferences necessary to conclude that petitioner committed the rape -- the jury made

reasonable inferences based directly on the evidence to conclude that petitioner was the rapist. 

For example, abrasions were found on petitioner's legs shortly after the crime. In light of the

coroner's testimony that the abrasions were consistent with sexual assault cases, the jury could

directly infer that petitioner had committed a sexual assault, namely the rape which Mrs. Stendal

undeniably suffered. Other evidence leading directly to the inference that petitioner committed

the rape was the knot evidence. From this evidence, the jury could directly infer that petitioner

used the “trucker’s hitch” knot to restrain Mrs. Stendal for the purpose of raping her. 

Additionally, there was direct evidence in the form of the obscene phone calls and petitioner’s

statements indicating a sexual intention. In contrast, the ultimate inference at issue in Claim J --

concerning when petitioner formed the intent to rape Mrs. Stendal -- cannot be reached directly

from the evidence. 

The court's concerns, however, do not warrant relief. Even assuming that the

evidence does not permit the inference that petitioner formed the intent to commit rape prior to

entering the Stendal residence, the evidence is sufficient on at least one other factual basis of first

degree murder. As discussed above, the court concludes that the evidence supports felony murder

based on rape, which is first degree murder. A failure of proof on felony murder based on

burglary does not violate due process in this context. 

Because the state court's determination of this claim was not an unreasonable

application of clearly established law under Jackson and Griffin, respondents' motion for

summary judgment on Claim J should be granted and petitioner's motion for summary judgment

on this claim should be denied. Claim J should be denied on the merits. 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 54 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Claim K argues that: (1) the evidence is not sufficient to support the conclusion 28

that acts of torture caused Mrs. Stendal's death; and (2) the evidence is not sufficient to support

the conclusion that petitioner intended to inflict extreme pain. The causal connection portion of

this claim has been dismissed. The district judge declined to dismiss Claim L.

This conclusion as to the elements required to establish torture murder under 29

California law was the basis for dismissal of the causal connection portion of Claim K.

Petitioner states that the prosecution admitted that the cause of death was 30

strangulation, not torture.

55

3. Torture Murder (Claims K, L, and M)

In Claims K, L, and M, petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of

torture murder. In the remaining portion of Claim K, petitioner asserts that "there exists nothing 28

beyond 'the condition of the body' to establish any intent on the killer's part to inflict tortious [sic]

pain on Stendal -- let alone any evidence of revenge, extortion, or the like as a motive." In Claim

L, petitioner argues that the evidence does not support instructing the jury on torture murder

pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.24 because the proof at trial did not establish that a specific act of

torture caused the victim's death. In Claim M, petitioner challenges the California Supreme

Court's finding that California law does not require that a particular act of torture actually cause

the victim's death. The parties have filed supplemental briefs addressing Claims K and L. 29

Claim M

The court turns first to Claim M, as to which both parties seek summary judgment

in their favor. Petitioner challenges the California Supreme Court's holding in his direct appeal

that, under California law, the crime of torture murder does not require that a specific act of

torture actually cause the victim's death. He argues that the state court unconstitutionally

enlarged the definition of the crime by eliminating this causal element. Petitioner asserts that this

was the first time the California Supreme Court interpreted the torture murder statute as not

including this kind of causal requirement and that, with such a requirement, there would have

been a failure of proof as to torture murder. 

30

/ / /

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 55 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The court takes this to mean de novo review. Given that the state court was not 31

presented with the constitutional aspect of the claim, the court agrees that review is de novo.

Given his citation to Bouie, petitioner agrees. 32

56

Respondents assert in their motion for summary judgment that Claim M presents a

pure question of law. Specifically, according to respondents, the question is whether the state 31

court's holding was "unexpected and indefensible." See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347,

354 (1964). Respondents argue that petitioner cannot make this showing because "the state 32

court's explanation of torture-murder -- that acts of torture may not be segregated into their

constituent elements in order to determine whether any single act by itself caused the death;

rather, it is the continuation of sadistic violence that constitutes torture -- was logical, foreseeable,

and evident from multiple precedents." 

Generally, the California Supreme Court's interpretation of California law controls

and cannot be re-interpreted by a federal court. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691

(1975). In certain cases, however, the retroactive application of an interpretation of state law

which is "unexpected and indefensible" violates due process. See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354. This is

because an unforeseeable interpretation eliminates fair warning of what is prohibited. See Marks

v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1977); see also Bouie, 378 U.S. at 351. To determine

whether a judicial construction of state law violates due process, courts consider the law's plain

language, the legislative history behind the law, and other constructions of the law. See Webster

v. Woodford, 369 F.3d 1062, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2004). 

California Penal Code § 189 defines torture murder as murder "by means of

torture." See Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 530; People v. Pensiger, 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1239 (1991); People

v. Davenport, 41 Cal.3d 247, 267 (1985). The phrase "by means of torture" means that "there

must be a causal relationship between the torturous act and death. . . ." Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 530

(citing Pensiger, 52 Cal.3d at 1239). This does not, however, mean that any specific act of torture

must be the cause-in-fact of the victim's death. See Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 530). "[R]ather, it is the

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 56 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

In his reply brief, petitioner cites Clark v. Brown, 442 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2006), in

33

support of his argument. In that case, unlike petitioner's case, the court concluded that there had

been a reinterpretation of state law which was unforeseeable. Because there has been no

reinterpretation of the torture murder statute, Clark does not apply here.

57

continuum of sadistic violence that constitutes the torture." Id. In petitioner's case, the California

Supreme Court concluded that, while the actual cause of Mrs. Stendal's death was strangulation,

her death was "brought about by torture" and that this satisfied the causal connection requirement

of the torture murder statute. Id. at 530-31. Thus, the "causal" requirement of the torture murder

statute does not require that a specific act cause the victim's death, but requires that the torture be

part of the "totality of the brutal acts and the circumstances which led to the victim's death." Id. at

530. In other words, California Penal Code § 189 always required a causal connection between

the acts of torture and the victim's death, but not one as narrow as petitioner asserts. 

Petitioner's argument relies on the premise that the California Supreme Court's

decision in his case resulted in a "reinterpretation" of the torture murder statute. Specifically,

petitioner argues that the state court eliminated the requirement that a specific act of torture be the

cause-in-fact of the victim's death. This is what petitioner refers to in his briefing as the "causal

requirement." As discussed above, however, § 189 never required the narrow kind of cause-infact asserted by petitioner. Instead, the state courts have consistently interpreted the causation

element of § 189 -- stemming from the phrase "by means of torture" -- as referring to the

"continuum of sadistic violence" or "totality of the brutal acts." Regardless of the terminology,

the court concludes that the state court's interpretation of § 189 has been consistent. Therefore,

there has been no reinterpretation in petitioner's case. 

33

In their briefing on Claim M, the parties argue the significance of one California

Court of Appeal opinion in particular: Talimantez v. Superior Court, 122 Cal.App.3d 629 (1981). 

Petitioner argues that, because it interpreted the torture special circumstance statute, it has no

bearing on interpretation of the torture murder statute. Given that the California Supreme Court

cited favorably to this opinion in petitioner's case, this court concludes that the state court adopted

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 57 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

58

the reasoning from Talimantez in the torture murder context. Moreover, Talimantez has bearing

because both the torture murder and torture special circumstance statutes contain similar

causation requirements. Torture murder requires murder by means of torture. See Cal. Penal

Code § 189. The torture special circumstance requires murder involving infliction of torture. See

Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(18). 

Because there has been no reinterpretation of the torture murder statute, Claim M

has no merit. In this regard, the court agrees with respondents that the California Supreme

Court's decision in petitioner's case does not violate the Bouie test. Respondents' motion for

summary judgment on this claim should be granted and petitioner's motion for summary judgment

on this claim should be denied. Claim M should be denied on the merits. 

Claim L

It is logical to consider Claim L next. In Claim L, petitioner argues that the trial

court erred in instructing the jury under CALJIC No. 8.24 that torture murder requires causation

in fact because it was undisputed that strangulation -- not any act of torture -- was the cause of

death. This claim necessarily fails because, as discussed above, the torture murder statute never

required that any particular act of torture actually cause the victim's death. In any event, the

instruction referred to the torturous "act or acts" which cause the victim's death. Thus, by

allowing for multiple acts of torture, the instruction reflects the interpretation that no specific one

act need be the actual cause of death. In other words, the instruction correctly expressed the

causation requirement.

For these reasons, the court concludes that the state court's determination of Claim

L was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of the law. Respondents' motion for

summary judgment on this claim should be granted. Claim L should be denied on the merits. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 58 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Under California law, torture murder requires proof of three elements: (1) a 34

willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to inflict (2) extreme and prolonged pain (3) for the

purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any other sadistic purpose. See Pensiger, 52

Cal.3d at 1239. Thus, torture murder focuses on the intent of the defendant, the nature and

duration of the pain, and the reason it was inflicted.

The district judge's order regarding respondents' motion to dismiss is in accord. 35

Specifically, the district judge stated: "In Claim K, petitioner . . . asserts that two of the elements

of first-degree torture murder were not proven, namely, that (a) there was a causal link between

the acts of torture and death, and (b) that petitioner intended to cause extreme pain." The district

judge first stated that Claim K challenges two elements, and then referred to the "causal link"

element and whether petitioner "intended to cause extreme pain." Given the lack of argument in

the amended petition concerning extreme and prolonged pain, the two elements challenged in

59

Claim K

In the remaining portion of Claim K, petitioner asserts that the evidence does not

establish "that the killer intended to inflict extreme pain," a requirement for torture murder. A 34

close reading of the remainder of Claim K suggests that petitioner is challenging the

requirements of extreme and prolonged pain and a prohibited motive in addition to intent. 

Petitioner also argues that there was no evidence beyond the condition of the body, which is

insufficient to establish intent to torture. As outlined in the amended petition, petitioner states:

Even if stab wounds constituted extremely painful acts that were

inflicted on Stendal while she was living, that evidence, by itself, cannot

satisfy the equally necessary element of intent. Under California law,

"[M]urder by torture cannot be inferred solely from the condition of the

victim's body [citation], but other evidence of intent to cause suffering is

also required [citations]." People v. Wiley, 18 Cal.3d 162, 168 (1976); see

also People v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d 72, 77-78 (1949); People v. Walkey, 177

Cal.App.3d 268, 276 (1986). "The test cannot be whether the victim

merely suffered severe pain since presumably in most murders severe pain

precedes death." Tubby, 34 Cal.2d at 77-78.

There is nothing in the amended petition concerning the requirements of extreme and prolonged

pain and a prohibited motive. Because the argument offered in the amended petition focuses

exclusively on the intent element, the court concludes that Claim K does not raise a challenge to

any element of torture murder other than intent (the challenge regarding the causal element

having been dismissed). Respondents did not address Claim K in their answer, and neither

35

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 59 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 Claim K are the required causal link and intent.

60

party addressed the claim in their cross-motions for summary judgment. At the court's request,

however, the parties filed supplemental briefing.

The California Supreme Court addressed this claim in petitioner's direct appeal. 

As to the injuries suffered by Mrs. Stendal, the state court noted:

In the present case, the victim was subjected to strangulation by two

different methods, her wrists were bound so tightly as to cut into her skin,

she was beaten in the face severely enough to have caused her eyes to be

swollen shut and her lips to be swollen, she received severe blows to other

parts of her body, and she suffered repeated, incision-type wounds to her

neck, chest, and breast area. We conclude that this evidence amply

supports the finding that Mrs. Stendal's death was brought about by torture. 

Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 531. 

As to intent, the California Supreme Court held:

In the present case, the coroner testified that many of the victim's wounds,

particularly the knife "drag" marks, were inflicted while she still was alive

but after she had been rendered incapable of avoiding further attack. The

wounds revealed that a relatively slow, methodical approach had been

employed in their infliction, rather than their having resulted from sudden,

explosive violence. The nature of many of the wounds, including the

repeated blows to the face and to other parts of the body, as well as the

knife "drag" marks, suggests that they were administered over a substantial

period of time and that defendant intended to inflict cruel pain and

suffering on the victim. Considered with the circumstances that the victim

was isolated and prevented from resisting or escaping during these acts,

this evidence establishes defendant's intent to torture the victim. 

Id. at 531-32. 

Regarding the standard of review for this claim, the court observes that the

California Supreme Court's ultimate conclusion -- that there was sufficient evidence of

petitioner's intent to torture -- is not stated in terms of what a rational jury could find. It follows,

however, that if the state court believed that the evidence was sufficient, it necessarily believed

that a rational jury could conclude that petitioner intended to torture the victim. In light of the

state court's consistent application of the Jackson standard to petitioner's other claims of

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 60 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Once again, the court rejects petitioner's boilerplate argument that the "California

36

Supreme Court did not address Mr. Proctor's constitutional arguments and thus they were not

adjudicated by the state court."

61

insufficient evidence, there is no reason to think that it did otherwise when considering this

claim. Therefore, this court will review Claim K under the "unreasonable application of" 36

standard.

In his supplemental brief on Claim K, petitioner argues that there was no evidence

of intent to torture. In support of this contention, he raises several points concerning the coroner's

testimony, which was central to the state court's opinion. Specifically, petitioner describes the

substance of the coroner's testimony as follows:

1. He testified that there was no evidence to establish the duration of the

assault on the victim; the only opinion he offered on this point was that it

was "probably not over a prolonged period of time. . . ." and that all of the

acts could have been committed in as little as three to five minutes;

2. The victim suffered no fractured bones, but only bruising and swelling;

3. Even modest force to the face and eyes can cause prominent bruising;

4. The kidney injury resulted from some kind of mild or moderate force, the

cause of which could not be determined;

5. The knife wounds were superficial, light, did not penetrate the skin, and

were not inflicted with great force;

6. One wound on the neck was made slowly;

7. The coroner admitted there was no evidence to show whether the victim

was conscious or unconscious during the infliction of the wounds; and

8. The coroner opined that the victim was conscious at the time the wounds

were inflicted because the non-fatal wounds would make no sense if the

victim "was totally unconscious and unable to perceive that injury." 

In their supplemental brief on Claim K, respondents state that, under California

law, the intent to inflict extreme pain may be inferred from: (1) the circumstances of the crime;

(2) the nature of the killing; and (3) the condition of the victim's body. See People v. Morales, 48

Cal.3d 559 (1989). According to respondents, evidence of premeditated and prolonged assault,

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 61 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The cases contrast the intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain with pain 37

inflicted in an explosion of anger, which would not indicate the necessary intent.

62

numerous stab wounds, and rape support a finding of intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain. 

See id. at 560. While respondents argue that the evidence shows that petitioner inflicted

"prolonged physical abuse," beyond conclusory references to the state court's analysis, they do

not discuss how the facts cited by the state court show he intended to do so. 

37

Notwithstanding petitioner's summary of the coroner's testimony, this court

concludes that the evidence reasonably supports the inference that petitioner intended to torture

Mrs. Stendal. As discussed above, the evidence establishes that petitioner raped the victim. Of

note is the following additional evidence: (1) the victim was restrained; (2) a wound to the neck

was made slowly; (3) the victim suffered numerous non-fatal wounds; (4) according to the

coroner, the victim was conscious when these injuries were inflicted; and (5) the knife "drag"

wounds were superficial. From these facts a rational jury could conclude that petitioner

restrained the victim in order to provide himself options provided by time and to deprive Mrs.

Stendal of options, particularly the option of escape. A jury could also reasonably infer that the

extra time provided by restraining Mrs. Stendal allowed petitioner to make the slow neck wound. 

Thus, it is reasonable to infer that petitioner restrained Mrs. Stendal in order to inflict wounds. 

Additionally, the existence of non-fatal wounds suggests that petitioner's intent was not just to

rape (and later kill) the victim, but also to inflict injuries short of those which would cause death. 

As to whether the victim was conscious when the various wounds were inflicted --

evidence which would support an inference that petitioner intended to torture the victim --

petitioner argues that the coroner's testimony cannot be accepted because he admitted that there

was no direct evidence on the issue. The court disagrees. Even though there was no direct

evidence, the coroner's logic is sound and reasonable when all the evidence is viewed in the light

most favorable to the prosecution. Specifically, it is reasonable to say that the reason petitioner

inflicted non-fatal wounds (one of them slowly) was to cause apprehension and fear, which would

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 62 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The California Supreme Court has outlined a "formula" for relief on a challenge 38

to the sufficiency of the evidence to show premeditation and deliberation. In Anderson, the

California Supreme Court noted: "[T]his court sustains verdicts of first degree murder [based on

premeditation and deliberation] typically when there is evidence of all three types and otherwise

requires at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of (2) in conjunction with either (1)

or (3)." Anderson, 70 Cal.2d at 26-27. Premeditation and deliberation cannot be found solely

from the manner of the killing. See id. at 27.

63

have been impossible if Mrs. Stendal had not been conscious when they were inflicted. The

desire to create apprehension and fear can also be inferred from evidence the victim was

restrained. 

Finally, even if the evidence was insufficient to establish torture murder because of

a failure of proof of intent to torture, relief is not warranted because the evidence is sufficient on

an alternate factual basis of first degree murder. Therefore, this court cannot say that the state

court's determination of the remaining portion of Claim K was an unreasonable application of the

law. For this reason, respondents' motion for summary judgment on this claim should be granted. 

To the extent it has not been dismissed, Claim K should be denied on the merits. 

4. Murder Based on Premeditation and Deliberation (Claim O)

Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish premeditation and

deliberation. Petitioner contends in the amended petition that the "Prosecution did not make more

than a token attempt at advancing this theory of guilt." According to petitioner, facts which show

premeditation and deliberation fall into three categories: (1) planning – facts about how and what

the defendant did prior to the killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity

directed toward and intended to result in the killing; (2) motive – facts about the defendant's prior

relationship with the victim from which the jury could infer a motive to kill the victim and that

the killing resulted from reflection; and (3) manner – facts about the nature of the killing from

which the jury could infer that the manner of the killing was so particular and exacting that the

defendant must have planned to kill. See People v. Anderson, 70 Cal.2d 15, 25, 26-27 (1968).38

Petitioner argues that the facts of his case do not fall into any of these categories. 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 63 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

64

Claim O was addressed by the California Supreme Court in petitioner's direct

appeal. The state court held:

In order to ascertain whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding

of first degree murder based upon premeditation and deliberation, we

generally examine whether there is evidence of planning, motive, or

method, although these factors are not exclusive. (citations omitted). 

When the record discloses evidence in all three categories, the verdict

generally will be sustained. Otherwise, convictions for first degree murder

typically have been upheld where there is "'either very strong evidence of

planning, or some evidence of motive in conjunction with planning or a

deliberate manner of killing.' [Citations]." (citations omitted).

Our review of the record reveals evidence falling within all three

categories. With respect to planning, the evidence (the unfiltered cigarette

butt found near a window and a hand print on the window sill) supports an

inference defendant spent a period of time just outside Mrs. Stendal's

residence observing her, before entering to commit the offenses. Once

inside, defendant rendered the victim subject to complete control by tying

her hands and cutting the telephone lines. After binding the victim,

defendant had a significant period of time in which to contemplate and plan

her eventual death as he engaged in various acts of torture. (citations

omitted). 

Although evidence of defendant's motive is less clear, a rational trier of fact

could have determined that defendant's motive in murdering Mrs. Stendal

was to avoid detection for the sexual and other physical abuses he had

committed against her. (citations omitted). 

Finally, the manner of killing supports a finding of premeditation. The

evidence establishes that defendant sequentially strangled the victim -- first

manually, and then by means of ligature -- after subjecting her to prolonged

physical abuse through the infliction of various types of wounds, some of

which were not random. During the infliction of these wounds, defendant

could have quickly dispatched the victim by means of stabbing and beating,

had he chosen to do so. These circumstances do not suggest an

unreflecting explosion of violence, but rather a preconceived design to kill

the victim by the particular means chosen, and then to prolong her agony in

the process. (citations omitted). Therefore, we conclude the evidence,

although circumstantial, affords an adequate foundation for an inference of

premeditation and deliberation by a rational trier of fact. 

Proctor,4 Cal.4th at 529-30.

By considering what a rational jury could conclude from the evidence, when viewed in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, the state court necessarily applied the Jackson standard.

Therefore, AEDPA precludes relief unless the state court's determination of this claim was an

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 64 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

65

unreasonable application of Jackson. 

As a starting point, the court refers to the formula outlined by the California

Supreme Court in Anderson. Typically, verdicts are upheld where the record reflects all three

categories of facts tending to show premeditation and deliberation -- planning, motive, and

manner. See Anderson, 70 Cal.2d at 26-27. If there is not a showing in all three categories, then

the verdict is upheld if there is an extremely strong showing of planning or a showing of motive

and either planning or manner. Under this formulation, an inference of deliberation and

premeditation would be reasonable if any one of the following four expressions is true:

1. Evidence = planning + motive + manner; 

2. Evidence = strong showing of planning;

3. Evidence = motive + planning;

4. Evidence = motive + manner.

With respect to manner and motive, petitioner asserts:

. . . The cause of death was manual strangulation and/or

strangulation with a scarf. The scarf had been taken from the victim's

dresser. Because the implements used were at hand, no inference of

planning can be drawn from the manner of death. Similarly, there was no

evidence Mr. Proctor had a motive to kill Ms. Stendal.

These arguments are not particularly persuasive. Even though the "implements used were at

hand," that does not rule out the reasonable inference that, once inside the bedroom, and after

raping and torturing the victim, petitioner then formed the intention to kill her in order to

eliminate the sole witness to his crimes. Planning does not require the passage of any specific

amount of time and can happen quickly. Similarly, as to petitioner's contention that there was no

motive, it is reasonable to infer that the motive arose from the desire to escape apprehension. So,

the evidence that he had a motive to kill Mrs. Stendal is the evidence that he raped and tortured

the victim. This was the theory for premeditation and deliberation the prosecution argued to the

jury. 

/ / /

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 65 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

66

As to manner, respondents argue that this is the most pervasive evidence of

premeditation and deliberation. The essence of respondents' argument -- and the state court's

analysis on this point -- is that, unless petitioner intended to inflict prolonged pain and suffering,

he would have killed Mrs. Stendal quickly. Respondents conclude, therefore, that the manner of

Mrs. Stendal's death -- rape followed by acts of torture followed by strangulation -- demonstrates

premeditation and deliberation. This argument is more persuasive. More specifically, the court

concludes that a rational jury could infer that the manner of the entire series of crimes reflects

prolonged violence and that this reflects premeditation and deliberation. 

With respect to planning, it is reasonable to infer from the rape and other acts that

petitioner planned to murder the victim in order to hide the other crimes. Thus, there is evidence

of all three categories of facts in this case -- planning, motive, and manner -- and, as a result, the

inference of premeditation and deliberation is supported by the evidence. And, even if there is no

evidence of planning, for the reasons discussed above, the court concludes that the inference is

nonetheless supported by evidence in the categories of motive and manner. Therefore, the

evidence in this case was sufficient to support the inference of premeditation and deliberation.

Finally, as with all of petitioner's claims of insufficient evidence, Griffin applies to

this claim because the conviction for first degree murder is supported by another factual basis,

namely felony murder based on rape. Either because the evidence supported the inference that

petitioner committed first degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation, or because the

first degree murder conviction is supported by another factual basis, the state court's

determination of Claim O was not an unreasonable application of the law. Therefore,

respondents' motion for summary judgment on this claim should be granted and petitioner's

motion on this claim should be denied. Claim O should be denied on the merits. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 66 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Petitioner begins this claim by noting that the torture special circumstance

39

requires "proof the defendant intended to . . . torture the victim . . . and the infliction of

extremely painful acts upon a living victim." People v. Davenport, 52 Cal.3d 247, 271 (1985). 

By arguing only the intent element, petitioner concedes that the evidence establishes the

requirement under the torture special circumstance statute of extremely painful acts.

The court notes that the intent elements of both torture murder and the torture

40

special circumstance are essentially the same -- both require an intent to torture the victim.

67

5. Torture Special Circumstance Finding (Claim S)

In this claim, petitioner repeats the arguments raised in Claim K, discussed above,

regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to establish torture murder. In particular, petitioner

contends that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to infer the necessary intent to torture.39

As in Claim K, petitioner argues in this claim that there was nothing beyond the condition of the

victim's body to establish that he had the intent to torture. The California Supreme Court

addressed this claim on direct appeal by stating:

Defendant's claim that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of

a torture murder special circumstance must be rejected. . . .

As discussed in detail above [in relation to petitioner's Claim K that the

evidence does not establish the intent required for torture murder], there

was ample evidence to support the jury's finding . . . that defendant

intended to torture his victim. . . .

Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 534-35.

Petitioner does not point to any reason why the analysis applicable to Claim K

does not also apply to this claim, and the court finds no reason to apply a different approach.40

Based on the court's conclusion with respect to Claim K, the state court's determination of Claim

S was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of controlling law. Therefore,

respondents' motion for summary judgment on this claim should be granted and petitioner's

motion for summary judgment on Claim S should be denied. Claim S should be denied on the

merits. 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 67 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

As respondents note in their answer, this claim is limited to the guilt phase jury’s 41

eligibility determination. Petitioner does not argue that the torture instruction affected the

penalty phase jury’s selection decision. 

68

6. Cumulative Effect (Claim Q)

Claim Q is not a traditional cumulative error claim, but is based on petitioner's

unsupported assertion that failure of proof on any of the factual bases of first degree murder

requires reversal of the entire conviction. Griffin, which petitioner concedes applies to these

claims, forecloses this assertion. Therefore, respondents' motion for summary judgment on this

claim should be granted and petitioner's motion for summary judgment on Claim Q should be

denied. Claim Q should be denied on the merits. 

E. Torture Special Circumstance Jury Instruction (Claim R)

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the torture

special circumstance under California Penal Code § 190.2(a)(18). Specifically, petitioner

contends the instruction was flawed because it did not tell the jury that it must find that petitioner

intended to inflict extreme pain before it could find petitioner eligible for the death penalty based

on the torture special circumstance. The record reflects that the guilt phase jury was instructed

41

pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.81.18 as follows:

To find that the special circumstance referred to in these

instructions is a murder involving infliction of torture is true, each of the

following facts must be proved:

One, that the murder was intentional and two, that the murder

involved the infliction of torture. 

To prove the infliction of torture, the infliction of extreme and

physical pain must be proved no matter how long its duration. 

Petitioner also argues that this instructional error was not harmless because “[n]o other

instructions were given from which an inference could be drawn that the jury necessarily found

that Mr. Proctor had an intent to inflict extreme pain.”

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 68 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

69

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of a

transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083,

1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is not available

for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085; see

also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378,

1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. See Milton v.

Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). Thus, a challenge to jury instructions does not generally

give rise to a federal constitutional claim. See Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). 

However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” 

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1980)); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). In order to raise such a

claim in a federal habeas corpus petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete

miscarriage of justice.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Crisafi v. Oliver, 396

F.2d 293, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1968); Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1960). 

In general, to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot

be merely ‘undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due

process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317

(9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). To prevail, petitioner

must demonstrate that an erroneous instruction “‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp,

414 U.S. at 147). In making its determination, this court must evaluate an allegedly ambiguous

jury instruction “‘in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial

process.’” Prantil, 843 F.2d at 817 (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir.

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 69 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

70

1984)). Further, in reviewing an allegedly ambiguous instruction, the court “must inquire

‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a

way’ that violates the Constitution.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494

U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). Petitioner’s burden is “especially heavy” when the court fails to give an

instruction. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). Where an instruction is missing a

necessary element completely, the “reasonable likelihood” standard does not apply and the court

may not “. . . assume that the jurors inferred the missing element from their general experience or

from other instructions. . . .” See Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994),

overruled on other grounds by Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 815 (9th Cir.

2003). In the case of an instruction which omits a necessary element, constitutional error has

occurred. See id.

It is well-established that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every

element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364

(1970). Therefore, due process is violated by jury instructions which use mandatory

presumptions to relieve the prosecution’s burden of proof on any element of the crime charged. 

See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985); see also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510

(1979). A mandatory presumption is one that instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed

fact if certain predicate facts are proved. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 314. On the other hand, a

permissive presumption allows, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer an elemental fact

from proof of a basic fact. See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157

(1979). The ultimate test of the constitutionality of any presumption remains constant – the

instruction must not undermine the factfinder’s responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced

by the government, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 156 (citing In

re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364). Finally, even if constitutional error is found, habeas relief is not

warranted if the error was harmless. See Ho v. Carey, 332 F.3d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 2003). 

/ / /

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 70 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The court rejects petitioner’s assertion that “[t]he California Supreme Court did 42

not address Mr. Proctor’s constitutional arguments and thus they were not adjudicated by the

state court.”

71

The California Supreme Court addressed this claim in petitioner’s automatic direct

appeal and held:

Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that in

order to find the special circumstance charged under section 190.2,

subdivision (a)(18) (murder involving torture), to be true, it had to

determine that defendant possessed the intent to torture Mrs. Stendal. 

(People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 271). . . .

Although [the] instruction did not specifically inform the jury that the

concept “infliction of torture” included an “intent to torture,” nothing in the

instruction was inconsistent with that understanding of the concept. . . .

[T]he present jury was instructed at the guilt phase both as to first degree

torture murder and as to the torture-murder special circumstance. The first

degree torture murder instruction specifically informed the jury that an

“intent to cause cruel pain and suffering” . . . was a required element of the

offense. As in [People v.] Wade, “nothing in the present record suggests

the jury in this case was likely to have drawn any . . . distinction in the use

of the term ‘torture’ in the two instructions.” (44 Cal.3d at p. 994). Also,

as in Wade, “neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel suggested at any

point that a torture-murder special circumstance could be established

without first proving an intent to torture.” (Id. at p. 994-995). [¶] . . . In

light of the various instructions and the entire trial record, we conclude

there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the torturemurder special circumstance instruction as not requiring a finding of intent

to torture. (citations omitted). 

Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 533-34.

Because the California Supreme Court considered whether the challenged instruction relieved the

prosecution of its burden of establishing every element of the torture special circumstance beyond

a reasonable doubt, this court finds that it considered petitioner’s constitutional claim on the

merits. Therefore, AEDPA’s standard of review applies to this claim. 42

In order to prevail on this claim, petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) the jury

instruction relieved the government of its burden of establishing every element of the torture

special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the instruction had a substantial and

injurious effect on the guilt phase verdict. In other words, petitioner must show constitutional

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 71 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The trial court instructed the jury on first degree torture-murder as follows: 43

. . . The essential elements of such a murder are one, the act or acts

which caused the death must involve a high degree of probability of death

and two, the defendant must commit such act or acts with the intent to

cause cruel pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion,

persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose. 

72

error which is not harmless. If petitioner cannot make either of these two showings, the state

court necessarily reached the correct result in denying the claim and it cannot be said that the state

court’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of the law. See Lockyer, 123

S.Ct. at 1175. 

As to whether constitutional error occurred as a result of the challenged torture

special circumstance jury instruction, the California Supreme Court agreed with petitioner that the

instruction was incomplete under California law because it omitted the intent element. 

See People v. Davenport, 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 (1985); People v. Leach, 41 Cal.3d 92, 109-10

(1985). However, the California Supreme Court concluded that no error occurred because, in

light of the other jury instructions, the jury knew that intent to torture was a necessary element

under California Penal Code § 190.2(a)(18). In particular, the court reasoned that the jury knew

of the intent requirement based on first degree torture-murder instruction, which included the

intent element. 

43

Petitioner argues in his opposition to respondents’ motion for summary judgment

that the California Supreme Court applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether

constitutional error occurred. Specifically, petitioner asserts that, rather than considering the

challenged instruction in light of the other instructions to determine if the jury was misled –

which is the correct standard for an ambiguous instruction – the correct law requires a finding of

constitutional error when a jury instruction is flawed on its face. Petitioner cites Wade v.

Calderon, 29 F.3d at 1321 – a pre-AEDPA case – in support of this argument. Based on this

/ / /

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 72 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

It is interesting that petitioner asserts in the amended petition that the California 44

Supreme Court did not adjudicate this claim on the merits but then asserts in later briefing that

the state court did in fact adjudicate the claim, but under the wrong standard. 

73

argument, petitioner concludes that the “contrary to” standard of review should apply.44

The court agrees with petitioner in this regard. In Wade, a capital case, the

petitioner was found death eligible based on two special circumstance findings – the crime was

“heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” and torture under California Penal Code § 190.2(a)(18). See Wade,

29 F.3d at 1316. The California Supreme Court concluded that the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel”

special circumstance was unconstitutionally vague, but allowed the torture special circumstance

finding to stand. See id. As to the torture special circumstance, the state court concluded: “[W]e

believe that in the light of the accompanying torture-murder instruction . . . there is no reasonable

likelihood that the jury was misled on this issue.” See id. at 1320. In concluding that

constitutional error had occurred as a result of the facially erroneous instruction, the Ninth Circuit

rejected this reasoning and also rejected the argument that the jury understood torture to include

an intent requirement based on the ordinary meaning of the word. See id. at 1321. Finally, the

Ninth Circuit concluded that the error was not harmless because, as the only remaining eligibility

determination, the jury’s finding that Wade was eligible for the death penalty was necessarily

influenced by the error. See id. at 1322. Specifically, the court held: “Here, the effect of the error

was to permit the jury to find Wade eligible for the death penalty without having to make any

finding of his intent to torture.” The error thus influenced the jury’s verdict. See id.

Based on Wade, this court concludes that the California Supreme Court applied the

incorrect standard to petitioner’s torture jury instruction claim. However, regardless of whether

the “contrary to” standard applies as a result of the application of the wrong legal standard, or

whether the “unreasonable application of” standard applies as respondents urge, both standards

require this court to consider whether the constitutional error was harmless. Here the similarity

between this case and Wade ends. In Wade, the torture special circumstance finding was the only

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 73 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

74

basis upon which Wade was eligible to receive the death penalty. In contrast, petitioner was

found eligible on three alternate theories – torture, murder in the course of burglary, and murder

in the course of rape. Petitioner does not challenge the jury instructions on either of the latter

special circumstances, and, as discussed above, the court concludes that sufficient evidence

supported those findings. Accepting that the torture special circumstance cannot serve as a basis

for death eligibility given the omission of the intent element, it is still true that petitioner was

eligible for the death penalty based on either of the other two special circumstance findings. 

Therefore, the result would have been the same – petitioner was death eligible. Cf. id. at 1322-23

(granting the writ because the only other special circumstance finding had been invalidated as

unconstitutionally vague). 

In concluding that any error with respect to the torture special circumstance

instruction was harmless, the court rejects petitioner’s argument, as set forth in his opposition to

respondents’ motion for summary judgment, that “[t]o prevail . . . respondent must demonstrate

that the erroneous special circumstance finding did not have a substantial injurious impact on the

jury’s penalty verdict.” (emphasis in original). While petitioner again cites to Wade in support of

this proposition, this is not a correct reading of Wade. In that case, the Ninth Circuit specifically

considered whether the error had an impact on the jury’s eligibility finding – not the actual

sentence determination. See id. at 1322. Moreover, a careful reading of Wade reveals that this

issue was discussed in the context of guilt phase claims. 

Because the omission of the intent element from the torture special circumstance

jury instruction was harmless error, the court cannot say that the state court’s determination of

this claim was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law. 

Respondents’ motion for summary judgment on this claim should be granted and petitioner’s

motion for summary judgment on this claim should be denied. Claim R should be denied on the

merits. 

/ / /

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 74 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Again, petitioner is not correct in his amended petitioner when he states “[t]he 45

California Supreme Court did not address Mr. Proctor’s constitutional arguments and thus they

were not adjudicated by the state court. 

75

F. Financial and Political Pressures in Shasta County (Claim P)

In Claim P, petitioner asserts:

Stephen Kennedy, a Shasta County public defender, was

petitioner’s trial counsel. Kennedy had a financial and an actual conflict of

interest due to economic and political pressures applied by the Shasta

County Board of Supervisors. This placed counsel in a position adverse to

petitioner and caused him to make litigation decisions that were not in

petitioner’s best interest. A prejudicial conflict of interest existed between

trial counsel’s loyalty to petitioner, on the one hand, and his loyalty to the

fiscal interests of Shasta County and of his employer, who had won his

public defender’s contract by promising to spend less money. 

Petitioner states that the Shasta County Board of Supervisors fired the previous public defender –

Russell Schwartz – because Mr. Schwartz had “. . .spent too much money defending another

capital defendant, Darrell K. Rich, for investigators, experts, and retained second counsel.” 

Petitioner adds:

Due to the economic conflict, Kennedy made numerous decisions

regarding the preparation, investigation, and presentation of petitioner’s

defense that were adverse to petitioner’s best interests. In this regard,

Kennedy:

a. Failed to request sufficient funds for investigation;

b. Failed to request co-counsel

c. Failed to stipulate to a new guilt phase trial;

d. Failed to investigate petitioner’s background and social

history; and

e. Failed to incur necessary transportation and housing costs

for, and present available witnesses in mitigation at

petitioner’s penalty phase trial in Sacramento. 

This claim was raised as Claim I in petitioner’s first state habeas petition. The California

Supreme Court denied the claim on the merits without comment or citation. Therefore, this

45

court will assume the state court applied the correct law and will review the state court’s decision

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 75 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

76

to determine if it was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that law. See Himes,

336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. 

In the amended petition, while petitioner cites to Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984), in support of this claim, he asserts that relief is warranted if he can demonstrate

that an actual conflict existed which adversely affected counsel’s performance. Petitioner cites

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1979), in support of this position. Citing to Mickens v. Taylor,

535 U.S. 162 (2002), respondents argue that petitioner must also show actual prejudice under

Strickland. In other words, respondents assert that petitioner must establish a reasonable

probability that, but for the deficient performance created by the conflict of interest, the outcome

of the trial would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

In Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court considered a claim based on an alleged

conflict of interest with counsel arising from counsel’s representation in the same proceeding of

multiple defendants. See 446 U.S. 335 (1979). In Cuyler, the Court considered, among other

things, the following question: “[W]hether the mere possibility of a conflict of interest warrants

the conclusion that the defendant was deprived of his right to counsel.” Id. at 345. The court

held that, to prevail on such a claim, the petitioner would have to show that “. . . an actual conflict

of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Id. at 348. The Court noted that, at

least in cases involving a conflict arising from multiple representation, “. . . a defendant who

shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not

demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.” Id. at 349-50. In remanding for further

proceedings, the Supreme Court made its holding clear:

The Court of Appeals granted Sullivan relief because he had shown that the

multiple representation in this case involved a possible conflict of interest. 

We hold that the possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal

conviction. In order to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment

rights, a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest

adversely affected his lawyer’s performance. . . . Since the Court of

Appeals did not weigh [the] conflicting contentions under the proper legal

standard, its judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 76 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

77

Id. at 350. 

In Bonin v. Calderon, the Ninth Circuit applied the Cuyler test to the petitioner’s

claim that “[h]e was denied effective assistance of counsel . . . because his trial attorney suffered

from a conflict of interest.” 59 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit described the

alleged conflict as follows:

. . . Bonin asserts that he and [his trial attorney, William Charvet] had

entered into a literary rights agreement before Charvet became his trial

attorney, and that the existence of the literary rights agreement gave

Charvet an incentive, subsequent to his retention, to maximize publicity

about the case rather than to represent Bonin effectively. Bonin also

alleges that Charvet agreed to represent him . . . in return for an additional

ten percent of the literary rights proceeds, and argues that a conflict of

interest existed because Charvet had to pay for investigative costs out of

his own pocket. Bonin further asserts that Charvet refused to call a

potential witness, Dr. Lunde, at the penalty phase . . . because he feared Dr.

Lunde would reveal the literary rights agreement. . . . [¶] The State

maintains that . . . any arrangement had been terminated before Charvet

began representing Bonin. . . .

Id. at 824. 

The Ninth Circuit began its analysis from the starting point that “[t]he Sixth Amendment right to

counsel includes the right to counsel of undivided loyalty.” Id. (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S.

261, 272 (1981)). Applying the Cuyler test, the court rejected Bonin’s claims based on the

alleged 

conflict because it concluded that no actual conflict existed. See id. at 827. 

In Rich v. Calderon, where, as here, the petitioner was represented at the trial level

by the Shasta County Public Defender’s Office, the Ninth Circuit addressed the same argument

raised by petitioner in this case. See 187 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). In rejecting the

petitioner’s claim, the Ninth Circuit applied the Cuyler test and held:

Rich claims that his trial counsel labored under an “economic conflict” of

interest because of pressures put on him by Shasta County funding

authorities. The result of these pressures, Rich claims, was twofold: (1) his

counsel was “chilled” from obtaining experts “untainted” by a confession

that was ultimately suppressed; and (2) an investigator was not hired to

look into jailhouse conditions and their impact on Rich. 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 77 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

78

Even under the deferential standard the district court applied to this claim,

it fails because Rich cannot show that: (1) his counsel actively represented

conflicting interests; and (2) an actual conflict of interest adversely affected

counsel’s performance. See [Bonin, 59 F.3d] at 825. Rich’s failure to

make out such a prima facie case relieved the district court of any

responsibility to hold an evidentiary hearing on the claims. (citation

omitted).

A claim that a conflict produced adverse impact is not made out by simply

claiming such; it must be an impact that significantly worsens the client’s

representation. See United States v. Mett, 65 F.3d 1531, 1535-36 (9th Cir.

1995). Rich’s trial counsel provided an affidavit discussing the financial

pressures he perceived at the time, which does not even suggest that he

gave in to those pressures in any way that produced demonstrable harm of

any kind to Rich’s defense. 

The finding below that Rich was denied the effective assistance of counsel

at trial is supported by substantial evidence. 

Rich, 187 F.3d at 1069. 

In Mickens, the Supreme Court revisited the conflict issue and clarified its holding

from Cuyler. The Supreme Court stated that the general rule requiring a showing of prejudice

consistent with the standard set forth in Strickland still applies in the conflict context and

identified Cuyler as an exception to this general rule applicable in cases of multiple

representation. See 535 U.S. 162, 176 (2002). The Court characterized the Strickland prejudice

requirement as an additional element for a conflict claim not involving multiple representation. 

See id. at 174. Therefore, under Cuyler, Bonin, and Rich, petitioner must demonstrate that an

actual conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance. Under Mickens, petitioner must also

demonstrate actual prejudice with respect to the outcome of the trial.

In moving for summary judgment, respondents argue that, as a matter of law,

petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. In light of the standard of review under AEDPA,

respondents conclude that they must prevail because the state court’s denial of this claim was not

an objectively unreasonable application of the law. To reach this result, respondents apparently

argue that, even if an actual conflict existed, petitioner cannot establish prejudice under

/ / /

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 78 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

79

Strickland. Specifically, in their answer to this claim, respondents argue:

In addition, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is a

reasonable probability the outcome of his trial would have been different if

counsel had taken some action that was not taken because of a financial

conflict of interest. In Rich v. Calderon, . . . the Ninth Circuit pointed out

there must be more than mere speculation that a financial conflict of

interest affected the outcome; instead, there must be an adverse impact that

“significantly worsens” the client’s representation. Petitioner, however,

cannot point to any solid evidence that his representation was significantly

worsened by alleged pressure to limit expenses. Defense counsel did an

admirable job in the face of “extremely strong” evidence of guilt that

included Petitioner’s palm print in Ms. Stendal’s blood at the scene of the

murder. Proctor, 4 Cal.4th at 537. And the fact that Petitioner literally

tortured Ms. Stendal to death deflates any assertion that funding pressure

significantly worsened Petitioner’s chances during the penalty phase.

 

The first sentence of this paragraph clearly sets out the familiar Strickland prejudice standard. 

The court, however, is puzzled by respondents’ reliance on Rich in support of their assertion that

petitioner cannot establish prejudice under Strickland. As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit in

Rich applied the Cuyler test, which did not have a Strickland prejudice component. See Rich,

187 F.3d at 1069. Therefore, the “adverse impact that ‘significantly worsens’ the client’s

representation” refers to the requirements under Cuyler that there be an actual conflict and that

such conflict adversely impacts counsel’s performance. Therefore, Rich provides no authority on

the question of prejudice under Strickland. 

As to the Cuyler requirements, respondents argue that petitioner cannot

demonstrate that a conflict existed which adversely affected Mr. Kennedy’s performance. 

Specifically, in their motion for summary judgment, respondents assert:

The record simply does not even remotely suggest that defense

counsel had any personal financial stake in Petitioner’s defense. To the

contrary, the undisputed facts show that defense counsel hired a

professional pollster to canvas the community and prepare a survey in

support of his motion for change of venue. (8CT 209-11). And defense

counsel hired Dr. Bruce T. Kaldor to perform a psychiatric examination of

Petitioner. (Doc. Y at 18-19, ¶ 42). These actions by counsel persuasively

refute Petitioner’s speculation that his attorney labored under a debilitating

pressure to cut costs. Moreover, our circuit has rejected a similar claim

originating from Shasta County in Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1069

(9th Cir. 1999). 

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 79 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Respondents argued earlier in this case that Claim P should be dismissed for 46

failure to state a claim. The court denied that motion, concluding that “[e]ven if the Cuyler

presumed prejudice standard is now inapplicable to petitioner’s case, he still has a cognizable

federal claim based upon the general standards set out in Strickland. . . .”

80

The facts cited by respondents, however, do not necessarily establish that Mr. Kennedy was not

operating under a conflict of interest. For example, if these were the only things he did in

petitioner’s defense, it still may be true that other things were not done because of fiscal

pressures, as petitioner claims. 

Thus, the question remains – was the state court’s denial of this claim without

comment or citation an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court

precedent? Setting aside for the moment the question of prejudice under Strickland, the Ninth

Circuit in Rich was able to conclude that the petitioner could not make out a prima facie case

because “. . .trial counsel provided an affidavit discussing the financial pressures he perceived at

the time, which does not even suggest that he gave in to those pressures in any way that produced

demonstrable harm of any kind to Rich’s defense.” Rich, 187 F.3d at 1069. Similarly, in

Mickens, the district court had held an evidentiary hearing and the Supreme Court affirmed the

appellate court’s conclusion that the petitioner had not demonstrated adverse impact. See

Mickens, 535 U.S. at 165. The parties in this case have not pointed to any declaration from Mr.

Kennedy similar to the one available in Rich. Nor has this case advanced to the evidentiary

hearing stage. 

Respondents essentially argue a failure of facts on necessary elements of

petitioner’s conflict of interest claim. While it may be true nearer the end of this litigation that 46

petitioner will not be able to prove the facts necessary to warrant relief on this claim, the court

simply cannot make that determination at this point in the proceedings. Based on clearly

established law, in order to resolve this claim, the court will need further evidence. Of course,

this begs further procedural questions. For example, if the state court was not presented with any

declaration from Mr. Kennedy when petitioner raised this claim in his second habeas petition,

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 80 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

For this reason, the court does not express any opinion at this time concerning 47

these procedural issues. 

Claims AA1, AA2, and AA3 assert guilt phase ineffective assistance of counsel. 48

81

petitioner will need to make a specific showing before this court would be able to consider such a

declaration. Similarly, petitioner must make a showing of entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. 

These issues are not yet before the court. 

47

The court notes that, in presenting guilt phase claims for summary judgment,

respondents chose not to brief claims relating to assistance of counsel. Yet, respondents move 48

for summary judgment on Claim P, which requires an assessment of counsel’s performance in

order to determine whether an actual conflict existed and, if so, whether it adversely impacted

petitioner’s defense. Such an assessment is also required to determine whether any actual conflict

resulted in prejudice under Strickland. Put simply, the court finds that Claim P is more

appropriately considered with petitioner’s other claims relating to performance of counsel. In this

way, the court will be able to resolve all claims involving the Strickland standard at the same

time, and after any additional evidence is adduced, if appropriate. Respondents’ motion for

summary judgment on this claim, therefore, should be denied without prejudice. If, after

resolving procedural issues and after conducting an evidentiary hearing, if petitioner is entitled to

one, petitioner is unable to prove essential elements of this claim, respondents’ argument may be

more persuasive. 

IV. CONCLUSION

With the exception of Claim P (regarding financial and political pressures in

Shasta County), the court recommends denying all of the claims discussed in these findings and

recommendations on the merits. Therefore, petitioner's motion for summary judgment should be

denied in its entirety. Only respondents seek summary judgment as to Claim P. The court herein

concludes that Claim P cannot be properly resolved at this time and, for this reason, recommends

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 81 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Claim P should be decided in conjunction with petitioner's claims of ineffective 49

assistance of counsel, which are not currently before the court on the parties' cross-motions. 

82

that respondents’ motion for summary judgment on this claim be denied without prejudice to

renewal at a later stage in the proceedings. As to all other claims addressed in respondents' 49

motion for summary judgment, the court recommends that the motion be granted. 

Finally, the court recommends that petitioner's Rule 56(f) motion be denied. The

basis for the motion, which is limited to Claim A, is that the "constitutional facts" underlying the

Supreme Court's holding in Lockhart v. McCree have since changed. The holding in Lockhart,

however, was not premised on any particular set of facts (relevant here, studies which petitioner

contends show that "death qualification" leads to conviction-prone juries). Rather, the Court

concluded that the death qualification process did not violate the constitution, even assuming

studies showing what petitioner asserts. Therefore, there is no need for a continuance under Rule

56(f) to conduct further discovery on the "constitutional facts." 

Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, the court recommends that:

1. Petitioner's Rule 56(f) motion (Docs. 185 and 186) be denied; 

2. Petitioner's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 189) be denied in its

entirety;

3. Respondents' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 176) be granted in part

and denied in part without prejudice, as outlined herein; and

4. Claims A, C, D, F, G, H, J, K (to the extent not already dismissed), L, M,

N, O, Q, R, and S should all be denied on the merits. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 82 of 83
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

83

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 30 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings

and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right

to appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 14, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:96-cv-01401-DAD-DMC Document 226 Filed 05/15/07 Page 83 of 83