Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-1_19-cv-00116/USCOURTS-ared-1_19-cv-00116-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

BATESVILLE DIVISION 

FRANKIE BROWN PLAINTIFF 

ADC #083131 

v. No: 1:19-cv-00116 BSM-PSH 

KASHEENA WILSON, et al. DEFENDANTS 

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

INSTRUCTIONS 

 The following Recommendation has been sent to United States District Judge 

Brian S. Miller. You may file written objections to all or part of this 

Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the 

factual and/or legal basis for your objection, and (2) be received by the Clerk of this 

Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you 

may waive the right to appeal questions of fact. 

DISPOSITION 

 Plaintiff Frankie Brown, an inmate at the Arkansas Department of 

Correction’s Grimes Unit, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

alleging that he was issued a false disciplinary in October 2019 (Doc. No. 2). Brown 

was instructed to file an amended complaint clarifying his claims and the defendants 

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who were responsible for the violation of his rights. See Doc. No. 5. Brown was 

also instructed to describe the conditions he endured while in punitive isolation and 

whether those conditions were harsh or different than his incarceration in the general 

population. Id. Brown subsequently filed an amended complaint. See Doc. No. 9. 

The Court has reviewed Brown’s amended complaint and finds that his claims 

should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

I. Screening Standard 

 Federal law requires courts to screen prisoner complaints. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 

1915(e)(2). Claims that are legally frivolous or malicious; that fail to state a claim 

for relief; or that seek money from a defendant who is immune from paying damages 

should be dismissed before the defendants are served. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 

1915(e)(2). Although a complaint requires only a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, the factual allegations set forth 

therein must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007) (“a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment]to 

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do. . . .”). While construed liberally, a pro se 

complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its 

face, not merely conceivable. 

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II. Analysis 

 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the 

conduct of a defendant acting under color of state law deprived him of a right, 

privilege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitution or by federal law. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Liberally construing1

 Brown’s complaint for screening purposes 

only, it appears that Brown seeks to bring due process and defamation claims based 

on an allegedly false disciplinary issued against him in October 2019. 

Due Process Claims 

 Brown’s allegation that Kasheena Wilson issued a false disciplinary against 

him is not sufficient to state a § 1983 claim as a matter of law. See Dixon v. Brown, 

38 F.3d 370 (8th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that “the filing of a false disciplinary charge 

is not itself actionable under § 1983”); Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th 

Cir. 1989) (same). Further, Brown cannot maintain a due process claim based on 

the disciplinary process unless he can “demonstrate that he was deprived of life, 

liberty or property by government action.” Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 846 (8th 

Cir. 2003). Brown was not deprived of life or property; accordingly, he must identify 

the deprivation of a liberty interest to sustain a due process challenge to his prison 

                                                             1 See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004) (“When we say that a pro 

se complaint should be given liberal construction, we mean that if the essence of an 

allegation is discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district 

court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be 

considered within the proper legal framework.”).

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disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 847; Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). A 

prisoner has no liberty interest in having certain procedures followed in the 

disciplinary process; rather, the liberty interest arises from the “nature of the 

prisoner’s confinement.” Phillips, 320 F.3d at 847. “In order to determine whether 

an inmate possesses a liberty interest, we compare the conditions to which the inmate 

was exposed in segregation with those he or she could ‘expect to experience as an 

ordinary incident of prison life.’” Phillips, 320 F.3d at 847 (quoting Beverati v. 

Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 503 (4th Cir. 1997)). 

 Brown states that he was confined to restrictive housing for 30 days as a result 

of his disciplinary conviction. Doc. No. 9 at 5. An inmate has no liberty interest in 

avoiding segregated confinement, as long as the conditions do not amount to an 

“atypical and significant” hardship that would give rise to due process protection as 

set forth in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-484 (1995). The Eighth Circuit 

Court of Appeals has “consistently held that administrative and disciplinary 

segregation are not atypical and significant hardships under Sandin.” Portly-El v. 

Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir. 2002). Because Brown describes no change in 

conditions that could constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest, he fails to state 

sufficient facts to support a due process claim based on an alleged false disciplinary. 

 Brown also complains that defendants failed to follow certain prison 

procedures in the disciplinary process. Doc. No. 9 at 5-7. However, prisoners do 

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not have a federally protected due process right to require prison officials to comply 

with internal rules or procedures. See Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 

2003); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997). 

 Finally, Brown alleges he lost good time credits and seeks to have those 

restored along with the good time he could have earned if he had not received the 

disciplinary. Doc. No. 9 at 8. While a prisoner may have a liberty interest in keeping 

good time credits he has already earned, he can only pursue the restoration of those 

good time credits in a federal habeas action, after he has exhausted all of his available 

remedies in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643–

44; Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Portley–El, 288 F.3d at 1066–67. 

Similarly, a prisoner cannot obtain damages for the loss of any wrongfully taken 

good time credits until his allegedly improper disciplinary convictions are reversed 

by the highest state court or in a federal habeas action. Id. To the extent Brown 

seeks damages and restoration of good time credits for his allegedly wrongful 

disciplinary conviction, his claims fall within Heck and Balisok and should be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

Defamation Claim 

To the extent Brown raises a defamation claim based on the publication of 

disciplinary convictions he received (see Doc. No. 9 at 5-6), he fails to state a 

constitutional claim. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), the United States 

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Supreme Court held that defamation by a state or local official does not by itself 

violate rights protected by the federal constitution. In addition, in Johnson v. Barker, 

799 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986), the court stated that defamation is not actionable 

under section 1983, and that damage to reputation, standing alone, does not state a 

claim for relief, because reputation is “neither ‘liberty’ nor ‘property’ guaranteed 

against state deprivation without due process of law.” See also Jones v. McNeese, 

746 F.3d 887, 898 (8th Cir. 2014). 

 For the reasons stated herein, it is recommended that: 

 1. Brown’s claims be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted; and 

 2. Dismissal of this action count as a “strike” within the meaning of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

 3. The Court certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma 

pauperis appeal from the order adopting this recommendation would not be taken in 

good faith. 

 It is so recommended this 24th day of January, 2020. 

 

 ___________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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