Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02322/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02322-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 134
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: 

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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JULIAN R. HOOD, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-2322

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in Nos. 1:15-cv-01200-MBH and 1:15-cv-01501-

MBH, Judge Marian Blank Horn.

______________________ 

Decided: November 4, 2016

______________________ 

JULIAN R. HOOD, JR., Escondido, CA, pro se.

AMANDA TANTUM, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., MARTIN 

F. HOCKEY, JR. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

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2 HOOD v. US

PER CURIAM. 

Julian R. Hood, Jr. (“Hood”), proceeding pro se, appeals from a final decision of the United States Court of 

Federal Claims dismissing his complaint in Case Number 

15-1200 and his complaint in Case Number 15-1501

under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the 

United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”). Hood v. 

United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 192 (Fed. Cl. 2016). We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

In October 1999, Hood began working as a mail 

processing clerk with the United States Postal Service 

(“USPS” or “the agency”) in Grand Rapids, Michigan. 

Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 198. Hood alleges that, while he 

was employed with the USPS, “he suffered from numerous medical disabilities, including post-traumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety.” Id. According 

to Hood, these issues required “occupational accommodations in the form of time off, hours restrictions, and worksite preferences.” Id. Ultimately, on August 22, 2003, the 

USPS notified Hood that he would be removed from his 

position on October 11, 2003, for failure to maintain 

regular attendance. Id. 

In September 2003, Hood filed an Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) complaint alleging 

discrimination, denial of Family and Medical Leave Act 

(“FMLA”) leave and rights, retaliation, and a hostile work 

environment. The agency removed Hood in April 2004. 

Id. 

Hood entered into a Settlement Agreement with the 

USPS in November 2005 that resolved all of his claims 

pending before the EEOC. Pursuant to that agreement, 

Hood “waived his rights to all claims, including employment discrimination claims, against the USPS, with the 

exception of [his] then-pending claim under the Federal 

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HOOD v. US 3

Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-

8193 (2012).” Id. In exchange, the agency agreed to pay 

Hood compensatory damages and attorney fees, and to 

change the entry on his Standard Form 50 (SF-50) Notification of Personnel Action in his personnel file from 

“removal” to “resignation.” Id. 

Between 2014 and 2015, Hood filed several complaints in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan stemming from his employment 

with the USPS. Id. at 197 n.1 (collecting cases). Relevant 

to this appeal, on October 24, 2015, Hood filed Case 

Number 1:14-cv-1104, alleging that the USPS discriminated against him, denied him reasonable accommodations for his disability, and interfered with his ability to 

obtain FMLA coverage. The USPS moved to dismiss 

Hood’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The district 

court granted the government’s motion, finding, among 

other things, that Hood’s claims were barred by his settlement agreement with the agency. Hood v. Brennan, 

Case Nos. 1:14-CV-1104, et al., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

89631 (W.D. Mich. July 10, 2015). Hood timely appealed 

that decision to the Sixth Circuit on August 12, 2015 

(docketed as Case Number 15-1937), and that appeal 

remains pending. 

On October 15, 2015, Hood filed a complaint in the 

Court of Federal Claims (Case Number 15-1200), alleging

“breach of express contract and implied in fact contract,” 

breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 

misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment, and 

conspiracy. Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 198.1 According to 

Hood, between 2006 and 2008, the USPS breached the 

Settlement Agreement on at least three occasions in 

 

1 Hood amended his complaint in Case Number 15-

1200 several times. The allegations discussed herein are 

drawn from all of his complaints. 

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4 HOOD v. US

communications with the Department of Labor when it 

stated that Hood’s employment ended as a result of termination, rather than as a voluntary resignation. Id. at 

198-99. Hood also alleged that the USPS terminated him 

because he filed an EEOC complaint, in violation of First 

Amendment rights, and that he was denied equal protection and due process. Id. at 199. Hood further alleged 

that, between 2001 and 2004, the USPS fraudulently 

concealed relevant information pertaining to his qualification for protection under the FMLA and misled a FMLA 

investigator, resulting in denial of FMLA coverage. Id. 

Finally, Hood alleged that the “agency entered into a 

conspiracy with the Union and [his] attorney,” such that 

he was denied adequate legal representation. Id. 

Less than two months later, Hood filed a separate 

complaint with the Court of Federal Claims (Case Number 15-1501) alleging: (1) “regulatory and physical taking 

of private property (Job and benefits)”; (2) violations of his 

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (3) breach of 

“Common Law Promissory Estoppel/Quasi contract” for 

breach of the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”); 

(4) denial of equal protection and due process of law; 

(5) “breach of promise to accommodate under the CBA”; 

and (6) “breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealings for failure to provide equal protection in the 

workplace.” Compl. at 1, Hood v. United States, No. 15-

cv-1501C (Fed. Cl. Dec. 11, 2015), ECF No. 1. According 

to Hood, the USPS concealed facts and made misrepresentations to the EEOC which caused a delay in the 

processing of his claim for compensation with the Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation 

Programs (“OWCP”). Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 200.

The government moved to dismiss both of Hood’s 

complaints. As to Case Number 15-1200, the government 

argued that the Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction to hear his claims, the contract claims were timebarred under 28 U.S.C. § 2501, and Hood failed to state a 

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HOOD v. US 5

claim upon which relief may be granted. The government 

separately moved to dismiss Hood’s complaint in Case 

Number 15-1501, asserting that: (1) his claims were 

barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1500, and were otherwise timebarred, (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to hear certain 

claims; and (3) Hood failed to state a claim upon which 

relief could be granted. 

On May 27, 2016, the Court of Federal Claims issued 

a single decision granting both of the government’s motions. As a threshold matter, the court found Case Number 15-1501 jurisdictionally barred under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1500. It also found that, even if it could overcome the 

jurisdictional hurdle of § 1500, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim was warranted. Specifically, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that it 

lacked jurisdiction to address the constitutional claims 

Hood asserted in both cases and that his contract claims 

were time-barred. The court further concluded that it 

lacked jurisdiction to review the tort-based claims in Case

Number 15-1200, and that Hood failed to sufficiently 

allege a takings claim in Case Number 15-1501. 

Finally, the court recounted the sheer number of complaints Hood filed “across the federal judiciary system.” 

Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 216. Because Hood’s complaints 

included allegations that were not warranted by existing 

law, failed to put forth a nonfrivolous argument for extending or modifying the law, and was “informed on 

multiple occasions by other federal courts that his claims 

are time-barred or otherwise fatally flawed,” the court 

deemed his complaints frivolous and vexatious. Id. As a 

sanction, the court barred Hood from filing any future 

complaints in the Court of Federal Claims without an 

order from a judge of the court approving such a filing. 

Id. 

Hood timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). We review the Court of Federal 

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6 HOOD v. US

Claims’ dismissals de novo. Frazer v. United States, 288 

F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Hood argues that the Court of Federal 

Claims erred in dismissing his complaints in both Case 

Number 15-1200 and Case Number 15-1501. Specifically, 

he alleges that the court erred when it: (1) found that it 

lacked jurisdiction to consider his claims in Case Number 

15-1501 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1500; (2) determined that 

it lacked jurisdiction to consider his claims of constitutional violations; (3) failed to apply equitable tolling and 

the accrual suspension rule to his contract claims; 

(4) determined that he failed to sufficiently allege a 

takings claim in Case Number 15-1501; and (5) found that 

he failed to plead fraud with particularity in Case Number 15-1200. For the reasons explained below, each of 

these arguments is without merit.

A. Section 1500

At the outset, the Court of Federal Claims found that 

Hood’s claims in Case Number 15-1501 were barred under 

28 U.S.C. § 1500 because he had previously brought 

claims based on the same operative facts in district court, 

and those claims were then on appeal. While the Tucker

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), grants the Court of Federal 

Claims jurisdiction over “any claim against the United 

States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of 

Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or 

upon any express or implied contract with the United 

States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases 

not sounding in tort,” § 1500 divests the court of jurisdiction when a related action is pending in another court. 

Specifically, § 1500 provides that the Court of Federal 

Claims “shall not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in 

respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee has pending 

in any other court any suit or process against the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1500. 

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HOOD v. US 7

Determining whether § 1500 applies involves two inquiries: “(1) whether there is an earlier-filed ‘suit or 

process’ pending in another court, and, if so, (2) whether 

the claims asserted in the earlier-filed case are ‘for or in 

respect to’ the same claim(s) asserted in the later-filed 

Court of Federal Claims action.” Brandt v. United States, 

710 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). If 

the answer to either of these questions is negative, then 

the Court of Federal Claims retains jurisdiction. Id. 

As to the first inquiry, whether an earlier-filed suit is 

“pending” for § 1500 purposes is determined at the time 

the complaint is filed at the Court of Federal Claims. Id. 

at 1375. Hood filed suit in the Western District of Michigan in October 2014. Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 206. After the 

district court dismissed his claims, Hood filed an appeal 

in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on August 12, 2015. Id. That appeal was still pending on December 11, 2015, when Hood filed his complaint 

in Case Number 15-1501 with the Court of Federal 

Claims. See Brandt, 710 F.3d at 1380 (a case is “pending” 

under § 1500 once a notice of appeal is filed). Accordingly, 

there was an earlier-filed suit pending in the Sixth Circuit 

when Hood filed his complaint below. 

With respect to the second inquiry, two lawsuits are 

“for or in respect to” the same claim(s) if “they are based 

on substantially the same operative facts, regardless of 

the relief sought in each suit.” United States v. Tohono 

O’Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307, 317 (2011). As detailed in 

the decision on appeal, the facts alleged in Hood’s Court of 

Federal Claims complaint are nearly word-for-word 

identical to the facts alleged in his Western District of 

Michigan complaint. Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 206-09 (comparing the complaints). Both cases are based on a nearly 

identical set of alleged interactions between Hood and the 

USPS, namely that the agency discriminated against him, 

failed to provide reasonable accommodations, and failed 

to allow absences that Hood maintains should have been 

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8 HOOD v. US

permitted. Id. Accordingly, the two suits are “based on 

substantially the same operative facts.” Tohono, 563 U.S. 

at 317. 

On appeal, although Hood states that he “believe(s) 

the Court erred when determining that [his] complaints 

were barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1500,” he provides no explanation or support for his position. Informal Br. 12. 

Because the Court of Federal Claims correctly determined 

that Hood’s complaint in Case Number 15-1501 was based 

on the same set of operative facts as his pending Sixth 

Circuit appeal, we agree that the court lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction under § 1500. As explained below, 

however, even if Hood’s claims in Case Number 15-1501

were not statutorily-barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1500, we find 

no error in the Court of Federal Claims’ decision dismissing that complaint on other grounds. 

B. Constitutional Claims 

Turning to Hood’s constitutional claims, it is well established that the Court of Federal Claims is a court of 

limited jurisdiction. Under the Tucker Act, it has authority over claims for money damages against the United 

States based on sources of substantive law that “can fairly 

be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal 

Government.” United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 

287, 290 (2009) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). The Tucker Act is merely “a jurisdictional 

statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages. . . . 

[T]he Act merely confers jurisdiction upon it whenever the 

substantive right exists.” United States v. Testan, 424 

U.S. 392, 398 (1976). Therefore, to pursue a substantive 

right within the jurisdiction of the Tucker Act, a plaintiff 

must identify a Constitutional provision, federal statute, 

executive agency regulation, or a contractual relationship 

with the United States that provides a substantive right 

to recover money damages. See Todd v. United States, 

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HOOD v. US 9

386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[J]urisdiction 

under the Tucker Act requires the litigant to identify a 

substantive right for money damages against the United 

States separate from the Tucker Act itself.”).

The Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that 

it was without jurisdiction to consider Hood’s claims 

alleging violation of his constitutional right to due process 

under the Fifth Amendment and his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Hood, 127 Fed. 

Cl. at 209. It is well established that those constitutional 

provisions do not create a substantive right to money 

damages from the government. See LeBlanc v. United 

States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Due 

Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 

[and] the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment” do not provide “a sufficient basis for jurisdiction because they do not mandate payment of money by 

the government.”); see also Crocker v. United States, 125 

F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 

Likewise, the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Hood’s claim 

for “First Amendment Violation of free Speech” in Case 

Number 15-1200. Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 209-10. “That 

amendment merely forbids Congress from enacting certain types of laws; it does not provide persons aggrieved 

by governmental action with an action for damages in the 

absence of some other jurisdictional basis.” United States 

v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (en banc). 

As such, we have held the First Amendment, “standing 

alone, cannot be so interpreted to command the payment 

of money.” Id. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ decision to dismiss Hood’s constitutional claims 

in Case Number 15-1200 and Case Number 15-1501. 

C. Contract Claims 

Hood asserted multiple breach of contract claims in 

both Case Number 15-1200 and Case Number 15-1501, 

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10 HOOD v. US

including breach of the Settlement Agreement, breach of 

an implied-in-fact contract, breach of common law promissory estoppel, breach of an implied covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing as to the Settlement Agreement, 

breach of the promise to accommodate, and breach of the 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for failure 

to provide equal treatment in the workplace. Hood, 127 

Fed. Cl. at 213. The Court of Federal Claims found that 

Hood’s contract claims were time-barred under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2501, and that neither equitable tolling nor accrual 

suspension applied. The court likewise rejected Hood’s 

contention that his alleged disability tolled the statute of 

limitations. As explained below, we find no error in the 

court’s analysis. 

Suits against the United States are subject to a sixyear statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (“Every 

claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims 

has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.”). It is well established that this limitations period 

“is jurisdictional and may not be waived or tolled.” 

FloorPro, Inc. v. United States, 680 F.3d 1377, 1380-81 

(Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 130, 136-39 (2008)). 

The statute of limitations begins to run, and a Tucker 

Act claim accrues, “as soon as all events have occurred 

that are necessary to enable the plaintiff to bring suit, i.e.,

when ‘all events have occurred to fix the Government’s 

alleged liability, entitling the claimant to demand payment and sue’” for money. Martinez v. United States, 333 

F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Nager 

Elec. Co. v. United States, 368 F.2d 847, 851 (Ct. Cl. 

1966)). The question of “whether the pertinent events 

have occurred is determined under an objective standard; 

a plaintiff does not have to possess actual knowledge of all 

the relevant facts in order for the cause of action to accrue.” FloorPro, 680 F.3d at 1381 (citation omitted). 

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HOOD v. US 11

Generally, “[i]n the case of a breach of a contract, a cause 

of action accrues when the breach occurs.” Holmes v. 

United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Alder Terrace, Inc. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1372, 

1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 

The Court of Federal Claims found that, in Case 

Number 15-1501, Hood’s factual allegations spanned from 

December 2000 through August 2008, and his allegations 

in Case Number 15-1200 spanned from August 2006

through September 2008. Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 214. 

Hood filed his complaint in Case Number 15-1200 on 

October 15, 2015, and his complaint in Case Number 15-

1501 on December 11, 2015—both over six years after the 

last alleged breach. Because Hood’s contract claims were 

filed more than six years after they accrued, the Court of 

Federal Claims was without jurisdiction to consider them. 

Hood argues that the Court of Federal Claims should 

have applied principles of equitable tolling and accrual 

suspension to find his complaint timely. We disagree.

First, as noted, equitable tolling is precluded under 

§ 2501. See FloorPro, 680 F.3d at 1382 (“Because section 

2501’s time limit is jurisdictional, the six-year limitations 

period cannot be extended even in cases where such an 

extension might be justified on equitable grounds.”); 

Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1318 n.11 (“[T]he accrual suspension 

rule is distinct from equitable tolling, which the Supreme 

Court has stated is precluded under 28 U.S.C. § 2501.”). 

As the Court of Federal Claims noted, however, the 

accrual of a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2501 may be suspended in certain limited scenarios. The accrual suspension rule provides that “the accrual of a claim against the 

United States is suspended, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2501, until the claimant knew or should have known 

that the claim existed.” Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1319. For 

the rule to apply, the plaintiff “must either show that

defendant has concealed its acts with the result that 

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12 HOOD v. US

plaintiff was unaware of their existence or it must show 

that its injury was ‘inherently unknowable’ at the accrual 

date.” Id. (citation omitted). “It is a plaintiff’s knowledge 

of the facts of the claim that determines the accrual date.” 

Young v. United States, 529 F.3d 1380, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 

2008). 

The Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded that 

Hood was not entitled to the benefit of the accrual suspension rule. As the court explained, Hood did not allege 

that the USPS concealed from him “the actions which 

form the basis of the breach claims, or that information 

regarding the alleged breaches was inherently unknowable.” Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 215. 

Hood maintains on appeal that he was unaware of his 

claims until, as part of his Merit Systems Protection 

Board appeal, the administrative law judge “advised” him 

that “the agency’s actions were arbitrary and capricious.” 

Informal Br. 9. According to Hood, he then requested his 

records from the Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ 

Compensation Programs (“OWCP”) in December 2013, 

and “discover[ed] that the agency breached the agreement.” Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 215. 

As the Court of Federal Claims found, however, Hood 

did not “allege[] that these records were unavailable, or 

that he could not have accessed them, prior to December 

2013.” Id. Instead, “the record suggests that the documents which [Hood] alleges contain various breaches of 

the Settlement Agreement were readily available and 

that he received them upon request.” Id. And, although 

Hood alleges that he was not aware of his claims, the law 

is clear that “[i]gnorance of rights which should be known 

is not enough” to suspend the accrual of a claim. Braude 

v. United States, 585 F.2d 1049, 1051 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (quoting Japanese War Notes Claimants Ass’n v. United States, 

373 F.2d 356, 358-59 (Ct. Cl. 1967)). Given these circumstances, and because the accrual suspension rule is 

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HOOD v. US 13

“strictly and narrowly applied,” we agree with the Court 

of Federal Claims that Hood’s claims should not be suspended to avoid application of the six-year statute of 

limitations. See Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1319 (quoting 

Welcker v. United States, 752 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 

1985)). 

Hood also alleges that the Court of Federal Claims 

erred in rejecting his claim for tolling due to his alleged 

legal disability. Section 2501 states that “[a] petition on 

the claim of a person under legal disability . . . at the time 

the claim accrues may be filed within three years after 

the disability ceases.” As our predecessor court explained, 

“[o]nly a serious impediment can qualify to suspend 

running of the statute [of limitations].” Goewey v. United 

States, 612 F.2d 539, 544 (Ct. Cl. 1979). Because the law 

presumes “sanity and competency rather than insanity 

and incompetency,” a plaintiff bears a heavy burden of 

demonstrating a “legal disability” for purposes of § 2501. 

Id. 

Section 2501 “require[s] a mental derangement precluding a person from comprehending rights which he 

would be otherwise bound to understand.” Id. at 545. In 

Goewey, for example, although the plaintiff was diagnosed 

as obsessive compulsive, depressed, and had a diagnosis 

of “latent schizophrenia,” the court found no “legal disability” given his “active involvement” in “efforts to secure” 

benefits. Id. at 543-45. The court explained that the 

plaintiff’s activities “ma[d]e it abundantly clear that [he] 

was able to understand such complexities and was decidedly not adverse to protecting his interests to the utmost.” 

Id. at 545. 

Hood argues that the Court of Federal Claims erred 

when it “determined that [he] was not under a psychiatric/mental illness in 2007.” Informal Br. 7. According to 

Hood, he has “been under a psychiatric disability for ptsd, 

anxiety, and major depression commencing December 

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14 HOOD v. US

2000 and continuing into the present.” Id. at 8. The

Court of Federal Claims found that, although Hood’s 

medical documents “suggest various medical issues,” his 

complaint “falls short of sufficiently asserting or establishing an inability by plaintiff to comprehend his legal 

rights during the relevant statute of limitations time 

period.” Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 215. The court further 

found that Hood failed to allege “sufficient facts to determine that he suffered from an alleged disability in 2004 

when he was removed from his job at the USPS, or since 

that date.” Id. at 216. 

As the Court of Federal Claims explained, “[t]he general rule is that after the termination of a legal disability 

the statute of limitations commences to run and the 

tolling is not reinstated by a recurrence of the disability.” 

Goewey, 612 F.2d at 546. Even assuming that Hood did 

suffer a legal disability at one time, the court noted that 

one of the documents he submitted, which was “labeled as 

a physician’s initial exam and purportedly a medical 

record,” stated that, as of November 14, 2007, “[c]ognitive 

functioning and fund of knowledge is intact and age 

appropriate” and “[t]here are no signs of anxiety.” Hood, 

127 Fed. Cl. at 215. The court concluded that, even if 

Hood had a disability that terminated on exactly November 14, 2007, “if his disability reoccurred later, the statute 

of limitations would have continued to run.” Id. at 216. 

Thus, even if Hood had a disability in 2006, when his 

claim would have otherwise begun to accrue, that claim 

would have expired before he filed either complaint in 

2015. Id.2 

 

2 Hood submitted several documents for the first 

time on appeal, including additional medical evidence and 

2016 correspondence from the OWCP regarding payment 

of compensation for an unnamed disability. See Informal 

Br. Ex. B; Motion to Add Additional Medical Evidence, 

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HOOD v. US 15

We agree with the Court of Federal Claims that Hood 

failed to provide evidence to meet his burden of showing 

that a mental impairment precluded him from comprehending his legal rights and pursuing his claims. Hood, 

127 Fed. Cl. at 215. Because neither tolling nor the 

accrual suspension rule serves to avoid application of the 

six-year statute of limitations, we agree with the Court of 

Federal Claims that Hood’s contract claims are timebarred. 

D. Takings Claim 

In Hood’s sole remaining claim in Case Number 15-

1501, he alleges that the government’s action in terminating his employment amounted to a regulatory and physical taking of private property. The Court of Federal 

Claims dismissed Hood’s takings claim, finding that he 

failed to “allege a property interest subject to a valid 

constitutional takings claim.” Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 211. 

We agree. 

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides, 

in part, that private property shall not “be taken for 

public use without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. 

amend. V, cl. 4. We have developed a two-part test to 

determine whether a taking has occurred. First, we must 

determine whether the claimant has established a property interest for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. Adams 

v. United States, 391 F.3d 1212, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “It 

 

Hood v. United States, No. 16-2322 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 15, 

2016), ECF No. 12. Because our review is limited to the 

evidence in the record before the Court of Federal Claims, 

we cannot consider new materials presented for the first 

time on appeal. See Biery v. United States, 818 F.3d 704, 

710 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In general, an appellate court’s 

review is limited to the record presented at the court 

below.”); see Fed. R. App. P. 10(a). 

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16 HOOD v. US

is axiomatic that only persons with a valid property 

interest at the time of the taking are entitled to compensation.” Am. Pelagic Fishing Co., L.P. v. United States, 

379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Second, if the court identifies a valid 

property interest, it must determine “whether the governmental action at issue amounted to a compensable 

taking of that property interest.” Id. 

The Court of Federal Claims found that, to the extent 

Hood alleges that he had a property interest in his position with the USPS, he “has not sufficiently alleged a 

cognizable property interest.” Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 211. 

This court has recognized that, “[i]f the government gives 

a public employee assurances of continued employment or 

conditions dismissal only for specific reasons, the public 

employee has a property interest in continued employment.” Stone v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 179 F.3d 1368, 

1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999). As the Court of Federal Claims

found, Hood failed to specify whether he received such 

assurances with respect to his employment with the 

USPS. Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 211. 

On appeal, Hood submits that: (1) he was “a member 

of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which 

guaranteed employment rights”; and (2) he believed his 

position with the USPS was permanent. Informal Br. 11-

12. These allegations are not sufficient to show that Hood 

had a property interest in his continued employment, and 

even if they were, Hood has not identified a property 

interest compensable under the takings clause of the Fifth 

Amendment. Notably, as the Court of Federal Claims 

concluded, Hood did not allege “that he possessed the 

right to dispose of, transfer, or exclude others from the 

USPS job.” Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 211; see also Members of 

the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n v. United States, 421 F.3d 

1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he decisions by both the 

Supreme Court and this court imply that a compensable 

interest [under the takings clause] is indicated by the 

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HOOD v. US 17

absence of express statutory language precluding the 

formation of a property right in combination with the 

presence of the right to transfer and the right to exclude.”). 

As the Court of Federal Claims explained, moreover, 

when an employee has a property interest in continued 

public employment, that interest is protected under the

due process clause of the Fifth Amendment—not under 

the takings clause. See Stone, 179 F.3d at 1374-75. And, 

as explained previously, the Court of Federal Claims does 

not have jurisdiction over claims arising under the due 

process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, the 

Court of Federal Claims did not err in dismissing Hood’s 

takings claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted. 

E. Tort Claims

Finally, we address Hood’s tort claims. “The plain 

language of the Tucker Act excludes from the Court of 

Federal Claims jurisdiction claims sounding in tort.” 

Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 

1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) 

(limiting jurisdiction “to claims for damages not sounding 

in tort”). In his second amended complaint in Case Number 15-1200, Hood alleges fraud and conspiracy, both of 

which are tort claims. See Brown v. United States, 105 

F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Because Brown and 

Darnell’s complaints for ‘fraudulent assessments’ are 

grounded upon fraud, which is a tort, the court lacks 

jurisdiction over those claims.”); Hickman v. United 

States, 629 F. App’x 988, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Because 

Ms. Hickman’s Complaint alleged injuries recognized as 

torts—i.e., misrepresentation, fraud, and conspiracy—the 

court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to hear her 

claims.”). The Court of Federal Claims therefore correctly 

concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Hood’s 

allegations of fraud and conspiracy. 

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18 HOOD v. US

The court further found that, to the extent Hood’s 

fraud allegations could be construed as claims of contract 

fraud, he failed to properly state a claim for relief. Hood, 

127 Fed. Cl. at 212. We find no error in the court’s conclusion. Rule 9(b) of the Rules of the Court of Federal 

Claims, which is identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that, “[i]n alleging 

fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity 

the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” As we 

have explained in the context of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, a plaintiff must plead “the who, what, when, 

where and how” of the alleged fraud. Exergen Corp. v. 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 

2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Here, the Court of Federal Claims found that, although Hood’s complaint in Case Number 15-1200 “alleges 

that defendant engaged in fraud,” he “does not specifically 

identify individuals who he asserts committed such 

fraudulent conduct.” Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 213. Nor does 

he allege underlying facts from which the court could 

infer that any of the government’s actions were “committed with the requisite state of mind.” Id. 

On appeal, Hood argues that the Court of Federal 

Claims should have allowed his fraud claims to go forward because he satisfied the pleading requirements set 

forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). But 

those cases considered the pleading standard set forth in 

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not Rule 

9(b). Indeed, citing Rule 9, the Court in Twombly specifically recognized that, “[o]n certain subjects understood to 

raise a high risk of abusive litigation, a plaintiff must 

state factual allegations with greater particularity than 

Rule 8 requires.” 550 U.S. at 569 n.14. 

Hood claims that he sufficiently pled “contract fraud 

and mistake” with particularity when he alleged that “the 

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HOOD v. US 19

agency reasons for taking such action was to defraud me 

of my employment.” Informal Br. 11. In his amended 

complaint in Case No. 15-1200, Hood alleged that the 

Settlement Agreement “was the result of fraud, coercion, 

and I was under duress because of my psychiatric conditions.” Amended Compl., Hood v. United States, No. 1:15-

cv-1200 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 11, 2015), ECF No. 8 at 4. As the 

Court of Federal Claims found, however, Hood failed to 

identify any individual who committed the alleged fraudulent acts. Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 213. Nor has he alleged 

any facts from which a court could infer that a specific 

individual acted with the requisite state of mind. See 

Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327. The Court of Federal Claims 

therefore correctly determined that Hood’s allegations 

were deficient under Rule 9(b). 

III. CONCLUSION

We have carefully considered Hood’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing 

reasons, we affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ decision 

dismissing Hood’s complaints.

AFFIRMED

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