Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02217/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02217-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

RALPH RODNEY EARNEST, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

. FILED 

UDJ&ed Statet Court or Appe~Js Tench Circuit 

JUN 2 6 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

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No. 94-2217 

v. 

DONALD DORSEY, ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW 

MEXICO, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. 89-948) 

J. Thomas Sullivan, Little Rock, Arkansas, (Susan Gibbs, Santa Fe, New Mexico, 

with him on the brief) for Petitioner/ Appellant. 

William McEuen, Assistant Attorney General, Sante Fe, New Mexico, (Tom 

Udall, Attorney General, with him on the brief) for Respondent/Appellee. 

Appellate Case: 94-2217 Document: 01019279512 Date Filed: 06/26/1996 Page: 1 
Before EBEL and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge*. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Ralph Rodney Earnest appeals the district court's denial of his petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus. Earnest seeks relief on the grounds that: (1) he was 

retried after his first trial ended in a mistrial, in violation of the Double Jeopardy 

Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (2) a custodial statement by a nontestifying 

accomplice was admitted into evidence at his retrial in violation of the 

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment; and (3) on retrial, the prosecutor 

impermissibly referred to Earnest's post-arrest silence. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and now AFFIRM. 

I. 

On the morning ofF ebruary 12, 1982, the body of David Eastman was 

discovered. Eastman had been shot and his throat had been cut. Ralph Rodney 

Earnest, Philip Boeglin, and Perry Connor were seen in Eastman's car that 

morning. The three were arrested and charged with murder, conspiracy to 

commit murder, kidnaping, conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and 

• Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior United States District Court Judge for 

the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

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possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Boeglin gave a statement 

to the police in which he incriminated all three defendants. Earnest, Boeglin and 

Connor were each tried separately. State y. Earnest, 703 P.2d 872, 873 (N.M. 

1985). 

Earnest's first trial ended in a mistrial. He was subsequently retried, 

convicted on all counts, and sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, eighteen 

years for conspiracy to commit murder (with nine years suspended), nine years 

for kidnaping, eighteen months for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and 

three years for possession of methamphetamine. These sentences were to be 

served consecutively. Earnest appealed his conviction to the New Mexico 

Supreme Court on the grounds that his retrial subjected him to double jeopardy, 

that the prosecutor at retrial impermissibly referred to his post-arrest silence, that 

the admission at retrial of a prior statement by codefendant Boeglin violated the 

Confrontation Clause, and other grounds which are not relevant here. The New 

Mexico Supreme Court ruled that: (1) the second trial did not violate the Double 

Jeopardy Clause; (2) the references to Earnest's silence were not improper; but 

(3) the introduction of Boeglin's statement had violated Earnest's Sixth 

Amendment right to confrontation. It therefore set aside Earnest's conviction and 

ordered a new trial. State y. Earnest, 703 P.2d 872, 877 (N.M. 1985) ("Earnest 

I"). 

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The United States Supreme Court vacated that decision and remanded to 

the New Mexico Supreme Court for proceedings "not inconsistent with the 

opinion in Lee y. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986)." New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 

U.S. 648, 648 (1986). In~. the Supreme Court held that the custodial 

statement of a nontestifying accomplice is presumptively unreliable and therefore 

inadmissible, but that the state can rebut this presumption by demonstrating 

"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 476 U.S. at 543 (quoting Qhi.Q. Y... 

Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,66 (1980)). On remand, the New Mexico Supreme Court 

concluded that Boeglin's statement was reliable under the l&..e. standard and 

reversed its prior holding, thus affirming Earnest's conviction. State v. Earnest, 

744 P.2d 539, 540 (N.M. 1987) ("Earnest II"). Earnest's petition for certiorari to 

the United States Supreme Court was denied. Earnest v. New Mexico, 484 U.S. 

924 (1987). 

Earnest filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2254 in 

federal district court. The federal district court, adopting the findings and 

recommendations of a magistrate judge, dismissed Earnest's petition and denied a 

certificate of probable cause to appeal to this Court. I 

I We grant a certificate of probable cause on appeal pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 

2253. On April 24, 1996, while this case was pending on appeal, the President 

signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 

Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Title I of this Act significantly curtails the 

scope of collateral review of convictions and sentences. We need not decide in 

(continued ... ) 

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II. 

Earnest's first contention is that his retrial after a mistrial was declared 

violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. At Earnest's first 

trial, Earnest moved for a mistrial on the ground that the court had admitted 

hearsay statements by Boeglin and Connor that had not been made in furtherance 

of the alleged conspiracy. The trial judge responded that he had instructed the 

jury not to accept the truth of the hearsay evidence until instructed otherwise. He 

went on to say that were the state to rest at that point, it would lose on all counts 

because it had not yet demonstrated the elements of any count. The trial judge 

denied the motion for mistrial "at this time, at least ... because as of this point, 

and unless we change some things, you're going to be better having a trial and a 

directed verdict, then you are a mistrial." He then stated that although he was 

denying defendant's motion at that time, he would hold it in abeyance and 

consider it a continuing motion which could be raised by the court again. 2 

1

( ... continued) 

this case to what extent the amendments in the Act apply to petitions pending 

when the Act was signed into law, or what effect those amendments have if they 

apply, because, even under the more expansive scope of review permitted prior to 

the Act, the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 

2 In Earnest I the New Mexico Supreme Court characterized the court as 

having "taken the[] [mistrial] motion[] under advisement." 703 P.2d at 874. That 

finding is fairly supported by the record. 

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Defen~e counsel agreed with this procedure and neither withdrew the mistrial 

motion nor moved for a directed verdict. 

Later in the proceedings, the state called Boeglin to testify. Although 

Boeglin had been granted use immunity, Boeglin's counsel informed the court that 

Boeglin would refuse to answer any questions relevant to this case. The trial 

judge responded that Boeglin would be sworn in and questioned outside the 

presence of the jury, and would be sentenced to no more than thirty years 

imprisonment for the first question he refused to answer and one year for every 

subsequent question he refused to answer. Earnest's counsel again moved for 

mistrial, on the grounds that the judge's threat was coercive and showed improper 

involvement in the case. The trial judge replied that he would withhold ruling on 

the motion until after Boeglin's testimony, and might grant it then. He stated that 

he would be more than glad to grant a mistrial rather than dismiss the charges, 

since only if a mistrial were granted could Earnest be retried. Despite these 

warnings, Earnest's counsel did not withdraw the motion for mistrial. During 

Boeglin's testimony, Boeglin repeatedly refused to answer questions, and with 

each refusal the court found Boeglin in contempt of court, ultimately sentencing 

him to twenty-six years in prison for criminal contempt. 

At the conclusion of Boeglin's testimony, the trial judge announced that he 

would grant defendant's motions for a mistrial. Earnest's counsel then 

immediately attempted to withdraw the motions. The judge nonetheless ordered a 

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mistrial based upon defendant's motions, particularly the most recent motion. To 

Earnest's objection, the trial judge responded that he had warned counsel that his 

outstanding mistrial motion was not in Earnest's best interests because at the time 

it was made the state had not shown all of the elements of any of the offenses 

charged. The judge reiterated that he was declaring a mistrial based upon 

Earnest's motion and the court's confession of error on questioning Boeglin out 

of the jury's presence. The court found that the mistrial was also required by 

manifest necessity. 

Whether a defendant's retrial is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause is a 

question of law which we review de novo. Mannes v. Gillespie, 967 F .2d 1310, 

1313 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1048 (1993). However, the factual 

findings of the state appellate court, absent factors not present here, are presumed 

to be correct,~ 28 U.S. C. § 2254(d), even when those facts may be dispositive 

of the ultimate constitutional issue,~ Y.. Mondragon, 887 F.2d 1388, 1393 

(lOth Cir. 1989), ~denied, 494 U.S. 1035 (1990). The federal magistrate's 

factual findings are reviewed for clear error. ~HillY.. Reynolds, 942 F.2d 

1494, 1495 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

When a trial is not completed and a mistrial is declared, the Double 

Jeopardy Clause precludes the retrial of the defendant unless the defendant 

consl!nted to the mistrial,~ United States y. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607 (1976), 

or unless the mistrial was compelled by "manifest necessity," ~Arizona y. 

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Appellate Case: 94-2217 Document: 01019279512 Date Filed: 06/26/1996 Page: 7 
Washin~on, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). "[A] motion by the defendant for mistrial 

is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution, even if the 

defendant's motion is necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error." United 

States y. Jom, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971) (plurality opinion). There is, however, 

an exception to this principle: when a defendant's motion for mistrial is the result 

of judicial or prosecutorial impropriety that was intended to provoke the 

defendant into filing the motion, there has been no consent and the Double 

Jeopardy Clause bars retrial. Oregon y. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679 (1982). 

Earnest protests that although he moved for a mistrial, his attempt to 

withdraw the motions immediately upon the trial court's announcement that it 

would terminate the trial demonstrates that he did not in fact consent to a 

mistrial. He directs our attention to cases in which a defendant's motion for 

mistrial was not found to constitute consent when the defendant timely withdrew 

or attempted to withdraw it. In United States y. Crotwell, 896 F.2d 437, 438-39 

(lOth Cir. 1990), this Court held that a defendant who moved for a mistrial but 

then withdrew the motion at the hearing on the mistrial request had not consented 

to a mistrial. A similar approach was followed in Weston y. Kernan, 50 F. 3d 633 

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 351 (1995). In Weston, the defendant made an 

oral motion for mistrial without specifying whether he sought the mistrial with or 

without prejudice. He did not withdraw his oral motion, but subsequently entered 

a written motion which made it clear that he sought only a mistrial with 

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Appellate Case: 94-2217 Document: 01019279512 Date Filed: 06/26/1996 Page: 8 
prejudice. The trial court declared a mistrial without prejudice, to which 

defendant immediately and repeatedly objected. The Ninth Circuit found that 

defendant did not consent to the mistrial without prejudice as declared. Id.. at 

637. 

We find Earnest's case distinguishable, however. Unlike the defendant in 

Crotwell, Earnest did not attempt to withdraw the motions before they were 

granted. Neither did Earnest, like the defendant in Weston, make an intervening 

motion which could fairly be seen as an attempt to clarify, or withdraw and 

replace, his open-ended mistrial motions. Nor may Earnest explain his failure 

timely to object by claiming that he was misled into believing that the judge had 

decided not to grant his mistrial motions. Cf.. United States ex rel. Russo v. 

Superior Court, 483 F.2d 7, 17 (3d Cir.) (defendant did not consent to mistrial 

when, after defendant moved for mistrial on grounds of jury deadlock, the judge 

allowed jury to deliberate another day before unexpectedly declaring mistrial for 

jury exhaustion without allowing defendant to object), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 

1023 (1973). Rather, Earnest stood by his mistrial motions in the face of the trial 

court's explicit statements that the motions were under consideration, that they 

might be granted, and even that they were not in his best interests. We agree 

with the New Mexico Supreme Court that "defense counsel was given ample 

opportunity prior to the declaration of mistrial to withdraw the motions and failed 

to do so." Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 875. We therefore find that Earnest's consent to 

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Appellate Case: 94-2217 Document: 01019279512 Date Filed: 06/26/1996 Page: 9 
mistrial may be properly implied. & United States y. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061, 

1067 (2d Cir.) (consent was implied where defendants moved for a mistrial and 

failed to communicate their alleged change in position to the trial judge 

notwithstanding adequate opportunity to do so), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 873 

(1973). 

Earnest also argues that, although the court found manifest necessity for 

the mistrial, "the true reason mistrial was granted was ... the court's concern that 

the State's case would fail without the testimony of witness Boeglin." Br. of 

Appellant at 21. Because we have determined that Earnest's failure timely to 

withdraw his own motion for mistrial removed the double jeopardy barrier to 

reprosecution, we need not address whether there was manifest necessity for a 

mistrial. However, in discussing the court's desire to avoid acquittal, Earnest 

suggests that the trial judge deliberately forced him into moving for a mistrial 

through his "improper coercion exercised against witness Boeglin" in trying to 

force Boeglin to testify. Br. of Appellant at 203

• We therefore must determine 

whether Earnest's motion for a mistrial was intentionally provoked by the trial 

court. 

Judicial conduct which prompts the defendant to move for a mistrial will 

bar retrial "[o]nly where the ... conduct in question is intended to 'goad' the 

3 Boeglin's twenty-six year sentence for contempt of court was later reversed 

on appeal. ~State y. Boeglin, 686 P.2d 257 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984). 

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Appellate Case: 94-2217 Document: 01019279512 Date Filed: 06/26/1996 Page: 10 
defendant into moving for a mistrial." Oregon y. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 

(1982). 4 The defendant has the burden of proving that the judge acted with intent 

to provoke a mistrial. ~United States y. Borromeo, 954 F.2d 245, 247 (4th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1212 (1992). This is an extremely exacting standard. 

~United States y. Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d 1467, 1469 (2d Cir. 1993) ("only a 

high-handed wrong intentionally directed against defendant's constitutional right 

will trigger" the Double Jeopardy Clause). This intent standard requires the court 

to make a finding of fact as to the judge's motivation. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675. 

The federal magistrate, in findings adopted by the district court, determined that 

the trial judge's behavior in threatening Boeglin was improper under Webb v. 

Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 97 (1972) (that witness who was previously willing to testify 

refused to testify after judge's stern warnings strongly suggests that the judge's 

conduct caused the witness's refusal). However, observing that the trial judge 

had granted use immunity for Boeglin's testimony, the magistrate found that 

Earnest had failed to demonstrate that he "was forced to make his second motion 

for mistrial by improper bad faith judicial conduct." We find no error in this 

finding. Moreover, we note that the trial court's repeated warnings to defense 

4 Although in Kennedy it was prosecutorial and not judicial conduct that was 

at issue, this standard is also applied to judicial conduct. See, e. g., Crotwell, 896 

F.2d at 439 n.5. 

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counsel that his motions for mistrial were not in defendant's interest contradict 

any inference that the court deliberately provoked a mistrial. 

III. 

Earnest next contends that the admission, at his retrial, of a statement by 

codefendant Boeglin violated his right under the Sixth Amendment to confront 

the witnesses against him. After being arrested and advised of his rights, Boeglin 

made a voluntary statement to law enforcement officers which was taped and 

subsequently transcribed. The statement implicated all three defendants in 

planning and executing the victim's murder. At Earnest's second trial, Boeglin 

was called as a witness and refused to testify, invoking his Fifth Amendment 

privilege against self-incrimination. Boeglin was declared an unavailable witness 

and Boeglin's audiotaped statement was played for the jury. The jury was also 

allowed to use individual transcripts of the statement to follow along with the 

tape. Earnest objected both to Boeglin's being declared an unavailable witness 

and to the use of the statement, arguing that the use of the statement violated his 

rights to confront and cross examine the witness. 

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, applicable to the states 

through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 

the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against 

him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. However, the right to confrontation has never 

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been regarded as absolute, and "does not necessarily prohibit the admission of 

hearsay statements against a criminal defendant." Idaho y. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 

813 (1990). In general, an out-of-court statement may constitutionally be 

introduced against a defendant only if the statement bears adequate "indicia of 

reliability." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 5 

Accordingly, the issue before us is whether the statement was sufficiently 

reliable to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Generally, evidence is 

presumptively reliable if it comes within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. l.d... 

Boeglin's statement, however, cannot be immunized by the exception for 

statements against interest. Although it is a statement against penal interest, d. 

5 In at least some instances it must also be shown that the declarant was 

unavailable. £e..e. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. Earnest does not challenge on appeal 

the district court's determination of Boeglin' s unavailability. We therefore do 

not address whether such a showing would be necessary here, where the 

statement sought to be introduced was not made in the course of a prior judicial 

proceeding. £e..e. Whitey. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354 (1992) (characterizing 

Roberts as "stand[ing] for the proposition that unavailability analysis is a 

necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged outof-court statements were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding"); 

Minner y. Kerby, 30 F.3d 1311, 1315 (lOth Cir. 1994), (noting that White 

"indicates that the unavailability requirement announced in Ohio v. Roberts may 

be limited to its facts, where the prosecution seeks to introduce prior testimony," 

but relying on other grounds to find the unavailability requirement inapplicable to 

the admission of chemist's notes); but cf. Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1467 

(1Oth Cir. 1995) (stating in dicta that "[f]or the admission of hearsay evidence to 

comply with the Sixth Amendment, the witness must be unavailable and the 

statement must bear 'sufficient indicia of reliability."') (citing Roberts), .em... 

denied, 116 S. Ct. 1881 (1996). 

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Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3), the Supreme Court has held that in this context that 

hearsay exception "defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause 

analysis." Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544 n.5 (1986). 6 Moreover, custodial 

confessions "have traditionally been viewed with special suspicion." ld... at 541. 

Therefore, Boeglin's statement was "presumptively unreliable," id..., and was 

admissible against Earnest only if the state demonstrated "particularized 

6 We do not address whether, in general, the exception for statements against 

penal interest is firmly rooted. ,Cf. United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1363 

n.4 (7th Cir.) (noting that I.&..e. did not determine whether the declaration against 

interest exception to the hearsay rule is firmly rooted but rather held only that an 

accomplice's declarations inculpatory of the defendant are presumptively 

unreliable), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 916 (1991). We are aware that at least one 

court has interpreted language from our opinion in Jennings v. Maynard, 946 F. 2d 

1502, 1505-06 (lOth Cir. 1991), as holding that the statement against penal 

interest exception is a firmly rooted hearsay exception. ~United States v. 

Dean, 59 F.3d 1479, 1493 n.24 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 794 

(1996). However, Jennings is not inconsistent with our decision today, as it did 

not hold that an accomplice's statement inculpating a defendant is presumptively 

reliable. Such a holding would be inconsistent not only with l&..e., but with two 

cases decided by this Court after l&..e. but prior to Jennings. In United States v. 

Gomez, 810 F.2d 947,954 n.8 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 908 (1987), and 

United States v. Hill, 901 F.2d 880, 883 n.l (lOth Cir. 1990), we recognized that 

a confession by an accomplice proffered at trial to incriminate a criminal 

defendant falls within a subset of "statements against penal interest" which 

implicates special constitutional concerns and requires separate analysis under 

I.&..e.. The panel decision in Jennings, of course, could not overrule prior circuit 

precedent. ~United States v. Zapata, 997 F.2d 751, 759 n.6 (lOth Cir. 1993) 

(one panel of the court cannot overrule the decision of another panel). Moreover, 

the Jennings court did not find the statement at issue reliable only because it was 

a statement against the declarant's interest; rather, the court found that "other 

indicia of reliability clearly support the trustworthiness of [the] statement." 946 

F.2d at 1506. Thus, any language indicating that an accomplice's confession 

incriminating a codefendant is presumptively reliable merely because it falls 

within the statement against interest exception would be dicta. 

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guarantees of trustworthiness." ld... at 543. In evaluating the reliability of the 

hearsay statements, we presume that the factual findings of the New Mexico 

Supreme Court are correct; however, whether the hearsay statements are reliable 

is a mixed question of law and fact reviewed de novo. Myatt v. Hannigan, 910 

F.2d 680, 685 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the New Mexico 

Supreme Court found that Boeglin's statement was sufficiently reliable to 

withstand Earnest's Confrontation Clause challenge. The court found four 

independent indicia of reliability. First, "the colloquy between Boeglin and the 

investigating officers reflects the fact that Boeglin was not offered any leniency 

in exchange for his statement. In fact, Boeglin was convicted of murder and is 

serving a life sentence." Earnest II, 744 P.2d at 540. Second, the New Mexico 

Supreme Court found the statement reliable because it "was strongly against 

Boeglin's penal interest." ld... The court noted that Boeglin, in his statement, 

admitted to trying to cut the victim's throat at a time when those wounds were 

thought to have been the cause of death. ld... Moreover, the admission of 

participation in the murder exposed Boeglin to a possible death sentence, as it 

was admittedly committed under aggravating circumstances. ld.. Third, the court 

found the statement reliable "because Boeglin did not attempt in the statement to 

shift responsibility from himself to his accomplices" but rather "told a gruesome 

story which equally implicated all three men." ld... Finally, the court found the 

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statement reliable "because there was independent evidence presented at trial 

which substantially corroborated Boeglin's description of events surrounding the 

murder." l.d.. For example, Boeglin' s description of initial efforts to kill the 

victim with an overdose of methamphetamine was corroborated by the testimony 

of a toxicologist, and his description of where the murder weapon was hidden led 

to the recovery of the gun. 

The magistrate judge who considered Earnest's federal habeas claim also 

concluded that Boeglin's statement was reliable. In addition to finding that the 

statement was primarily against Boeglin's penal interest, the magistrate 

determined that the statement was reliable because: (1) Boeglin was not induced 

by promises by the police or district attorney to confess; (2) Boeglin had no 

cause to retaliate against Earnest nor would he lightly decide to be a "snitch"; (3) 

Boeglin was willing to undergo a lie detector test; and ( 4) Boeglin's emotional 

state was no more agitated than would be expected from one arrested on a murder 

charge. However, the magistrate refused to consider evidence that corroborated 

Boeglin's statement as an indication that the statement itself was inherently more 

reliable. He explained that he was excluding such evidence in accordance with 

the Supreme Court's decision in Idaho y.Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 823 (1990) that 

corroborating evidence may not be considered as an indicium of reliability for 

hearsay statements. 

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The government protests that the holding in Idaho v.Wright is a "new rule" 

and may not be applied to Earnest, whose conviction became final when the 

United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1987. 8..e..e. Caspari v. Bohlen, 

114 S. Ct. 948, 953 (1994) ("A state conviction ... become[s] final for purposes 

of retroactivity analysis when the availability of direct appeal to the state courts 

has been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has 

elapsed or a timely filed petition has been finally denied.") (citation omitted). A 

habeas petitioner may not seek to enforce a "new rule" of law that was announced 

after his conviction became final unless the rule fits into one of two narrow 

exceptions: if it "places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct 

beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe" or if it 

"requires the observance of those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept 

of ordered liberty." Tea~e y. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). "[A] case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by 

precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction was final." l.d.. at 301 

(emphasis in original). In determining whether a decision results in a new rule, a 

federal court must "determine whether a state court considering [the defendant's] 

claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by 

existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the 

Constitution." Caspari, 114 S. Ct. at 953 (quoting Saffle y. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 

488 (1990)). 

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We do not believe that a state court considering Earnest's claim in 1987 

would have felt compelled to conclude that the Constitution forbade the use of 

corroborating evidence to demonstrate the reliability of a hearsay statement. 

Indeed, this Court in 1989 stated that "independent corroboration [of a hearsay 

statement] is an important indicium of reliability in Confrontation Clause 

analysis." Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1201 (lOth Cir. 1989) (citing 

cases), on reh'g on other grounds, 888 F.2d 1286 (lOth Cir. 1989) (en bane),~ 

denied, 497 U.S. 1010 (1990). Our opinion was shared by several other circuits. 

See. e.g., Berrisford y. Wood, 826 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

484 U.S. 1016 (1988); Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir. 1985), 

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063 (1986). Moreover, as acknowledged in Idaho v. 

Wright, a plurality of the Supreme Court in the earlier case of Dutton y. Evans, 

400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970), had looked to corroborating evidence as one of four 

factors in determining whether a specific hearsay statement possessed sufficient 

indicia of reliability. ~ 497 U.S. at 823. Thus, because the Supreme Court's 

decision in Idaho v. Wright was "a 'developmen[t] in the law over which 

reasonable jurists [could] disagree,"' Caspari, 114 S. Ct. at 956 (quoting Sawyer 

v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990)), it constitutes a new rule for purposes of 

retroactivity analysis. 7 

7 The Ninth Circuit has stated that Idaho v. Wright did not announce a new 

(continued ... ) 

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We further find that the rule excluding corroborating evidence from 

consideration does not fit into one of the two exceptions justifying retroactive 

application. It neither places individual conduct beyond the reach of lawmakers 

nor announces a "'watershed rule[] of criminal procedure' .implicating the 

fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Caspari, 114 S. 

Ct. at 956 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)). Thus, the New 

Mexico Supreme Court did not err in 1987 when it considered corroborating 

evidence as indicative of the reliability of Boeglin's statement. 

Even without consideration of the trial evidence corroborating Boeglin's 

statement, however, we find the statement reliable, as it bears other important 

indicia of reliability. First, the statement was strongly against Boeglin's penal 

interest. We are mindful that in~' the Supreme Court found an accomplice's 

confession unreliable, and, as noted above, stated that the concept of a 

declaration against penal interest "defines too large a class for meaningful 

Confrontation Clause analysis." 476 U.S. at 544 n.5. Accordingly, in light of 

~we view a hearsay statement's adverse effect on the declarant's penal interest 

7 ( ••• continued) 

rule but rather "applied existing precedents in measuring the admissibility of 

child hearsay statements." Webb v. Lewis, 44 F.3d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2002 (1995). Unlike Webb, however, this case does not 

concern the specific precedents regarding child hearsay statements relied on by 

Wri~t but rather concerns the general issue of whether independent 

corroborating evidence may serve as an indicium of reliability. 

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not as dispositive of reliability, but as "one factor entitled to some 

consideration." United States y. Gomez, 810 F.2d 947, 954 n.8 (lOth Cir.), ~ 

denied, 482 U.S. 908 (1987). 

Earnest relies heavily on Williamson y. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431 

(1994), in which the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 

804(b)(3), which permits the admission of hearsay statements against the 

declarant's penal interest, "does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory 

statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally selfinculpatory." ld... at 2435. Earnest concedes that Williamson expressly declined 

to address whether the Confrontation Clause mandates a similar rule, i.d.. at 243 7, 

but argues that its reasoning is compelling and ought to have been applied by the 

state court and the magistrate to his case. The government argues, predictably, 

that were we to determine that Williamson should be so applied we would be 

guilty of a retroactive application of a new rule in violation of Teague. 

We need not resolve this dispute, however, as we see no inconsistency 

between the analysis of Boeglin's statement undertaken in accordance with the 

mandate of~ and the Supreme Court's reasoning in Williamson. Williamson 

states that a "district court may not just assume for purposes of [the exception 

against penal interest] that a statement is self-inculpatory because it is part of a 

fuller confession," !.d.. at 2435, or because of its "proximity to self-inculpatory 

statements," ~ !.d.., or because the statement is "collateral to a self-inculpatory 

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statement," ~ i.d.. Rather, "whether a statement is self-inculpatory or not can 

only be determined by viewing it in context" and "in light of all the surrounding 

circumstances." ld.. at 2436-37. 

Neither the state supreme court nor the federal magistrate assumed that 

Boeglin's entire narrative was reliable merely because some elements of it were 

self-inculpatory. Rather, both the state supreme court and the federal magistrate 

inquired into particulari2.ed guarantees of trustworthiness surrounding those 

portions of the statement incriminating Earnest, including the fact that the entire 

statement inculpated both Earnest and Boeglin equally, rather than relying on 

mere proximity to statements inculpatory of Boeglin. C.f.. United States y. Sasso, 

59 F.3d 341, 349 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding Williamson consistent with prior Second 

Circuit precedent for this reason). "Even the confessions of arrested accomplices 

may be admissible if they are truly self-inculpatory, rather than merely attempts 

to shift blame or curry favor." Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2436. The state 

supreme court and the federal magistrate specifically concluded that Boeglin 

attempted neither to shift blame to his co-conspirators nor to curry favor from the 

police or prosecutor. We agree. The following portion of Boeglin's statement is 

representative: 

[W]e more or less took a vote, you know, what we was going to do with 

[the victim] to get rid of him ... we took him out to the- well- those two 

other guys left then ... and left me- Rob [Earnest] and Red and me was 

there- and we took him out to the country on Loving Highway and ... Red 

starts to slow down, you know, and said, well, we might as well do it now, 

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and I was- we was all four in the front of that El Camino- I was setting 

here, [the victim] was here, Rob was here, and I was there, and uh- I 

opened up my door and the car slid around like that, and I fell out my f---

ing door, and uh- [the victim] jumped out his, and- soon as he turned, he 

caught it by- right between the eyes and uh- he ... was still alive, and I had 

the knife with me-- I went to cut his throat, but it didn't cut- and I was -cut 

it again and it just barely cut it, and- I just dropped the knife after thatand- I don't know who else- could it be, but uh- the gun started jamming 

up, and uh- I don't know how many shots he jammed on- they reloaded it, 

and- fired two more shots into him- uh I guess into his head, I don't knowthen we jumped into the car ... and cleaned up everything .... 

(R.O.A., Vol. I, doc. 18, at 16-17). Earnest protests that it is clear from 

Boeglin's statement that he was trying to negotiate a deal with the police. & 

id.. at 11 ("I was hoping I could make some kind of deal."). Such a deal, 

however, was unequivocally refused at the outset of the interview. & id.. at 12 

("I'm not offering you any deals") . • 

In addition to being "truly self-inculpatory," we find the statement 

describes the crime at a level of detail which would be difficult to render in a 

fabricated admission. Moreover, the record discloses no evidence that Boeglin 

was threatened or coerced by law enforcement officers when he made the 

statement; rather, Boeglin appears to have made the statement voluntarily. 

Finally, we find no error in the magistrate's factual findings, nor any evidence to 

rebut the state court's factual findings, that Boeglin was offered no leniency in 

exchange for his statement, that at the time of the statement the act Boeglin 

confessed to was thought to have caused the victim's death, that Boeglin had no 

reason to retaliate against Earnest, and that Boeglin was not unduly agitated when 

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he mad.e the statement. We agree that these factors, taken together with the other 

factors discussed above, are sufficiently indicative of the statement's reliability. 

We therefore conclude that the admission of Boeglin's statement against Earnest 

did not violate the Confrontation Clause. 8 

IV. 

Earnest's final claim of error is that at his second trial, the prosecutor 

impermissibly referred to his post-arrest silence. The use for impeachment 

purposes of a defendant's post-arrest silence following a Miranda warning 

violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Doyle v. Ohio, 

426 U.S. 610 (1976). "This rule is based upon a recognition that it is 

fundamentally unfair for the government to inform a defendant of his right to 

remain silent and then ask at trial that a negative inference be drawn from that 

silence." United States y. Canterbury, 985 F.2d 483, 486 (1Oth Cir. 1993). 

However, the Supreme Court noted in Doyle that: 

8 Earnest also argues that there were insufficient indicia of reliability that he 

was the "Rob" referred to in Boeglin's statement, as this fact was proven by 

reference to other evidence from Boeglin's own trial. This argument misconstrues 

the nature of the hearsay problem. An out-of-court statement is generally 

inadmissible when offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein. To satisfy 

the Confrontation Clause there must be indicia that the statement is reliable as to 

its substance. Thus, the relevant hearsay question is whether Boeglin truthfully 

recounted "Rob's" participation in the events; other evidence may be properly 

looked to establish whether "Rob" is the defendant. Earnest has not alleged that 

there in fact is any doubt that he was "Rob." We therefore reject this claim. 

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[i]t goes almost without saying that the fact of post-arrest 

silence could be used by the prosecution to contradict a 

defendant who testifies to an exculpatory version of events 

and claims to have told the police the same version upon 

arrest. In that situation the fact of earlier silence would not 

be used to impeach the exculpatory story, but rather to 

challenge the defendant's testimony as to his behavior 

following arrest. 

426 U.S. at 619 n.11. Even under this circumstance, such a reference to postarrest silence may be used only to rebut the defendant's trial testimony; the 

government may not attempt to use it as substantive evidence of guilt. ~ 

United States y. Shue, 766 F.2d 1122, 1130 (7th Cir. 1985). 

Defense counsel's opening statement asserted that Earnest "from the very 

beginning maintained his innocence -- maintained it all along." Earnest testified, 

in response to his counsel's question, that he had maintained his innocence "from 

day one." He then described his actions on the night of the murder, denying any 

awareness of or participation in the murder or kidnaping of the victim. On crossexamination, the prosecutor asked "who else" Earnest had told the account to 

which he had just testified, and Earnest replied, "I've maintained that since the 

first day I was arrested." The prosecutor repeated the question, and Earnest 

replied that he had related the version of events "to my attorney." The prosecutor 

then asked, "Did you ever at any point in time, from the time of your arrest, all 

the way up through to the beginning of this trial, ever tell anyone in law 

enforcement 'Look, let me tell you what really happened, I wasn't there, this is 

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the way it went down'?" Defense counsel objected, and the objection was 

sustained after a bench conference. The question was not answered. The 

prosecutor was then permitted to ask, over defense counsel's objection, whether 

Earnest had voluntarily allowed the police to administer a nitrate swab test upon 

his arrest. Earnest replied that he had resisted the test because he had asked to 

speak to an attorney before saying anything or submitting to any test. 

The prohibition against reference to post-arrest silence does not allow the 

defendant to "freely and falsely create the impression that he has cooperated with 

police when, in fact, he has not." United States v. Fairchild, 505 F.2d 1378, 

1383 (5th Cir. 1975) (cited with approval in Doyle). Thus, reference to postarrest silence is permissible for rebuttal purposes when a defendant implies that 

he cooperated with the police, see United States y. Gant, 17 F.3d 935, 941-42 

(7th Cir. 1994), or implies that he gave police an exculpatory statement, .s..e..e_ 

Leecan v. Lopes, 893 F.2d 1434, 1441-42 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 929 

(1990). Earnest testified that he had consistently maintained his innocence, and 

implied that he had consistently offered the exculpatory version of events that he 

offered on the stand. We therefore find that this testimony invited impeachment, 

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and that the prosecutor did not make improper use of Earnest's silence. 9 

v. 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is 

AFFIRMED. 

9 It is unclear whether a Doyle violation would be found in this case in any 

event, as the defense's objection to the prosecutor's single question was promptly 

sustained. £e..e. Greer y. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 759 (1987) (no Doyle violation 

occurred when (1) defense counsel's immediate objection to single improper 

question was sustained; (2) jury was immediately instructed to ignore the 

question, and subsequently instructed to disregard questions to which objections 

were sustained; (3) the prosecutor did not pursue the issue further nor mention it 

in closing argument; and ( 4) defense counsel did not renew his objection or 

request a curative instruction). Even assuming we were to find a Doyle violation, 

moreover, the references challenged by Earnest did not have "substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict" and thus any error 

was harmless. Brecht y. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (holding Doyle 

violations subject on habeas review to the quoted harmless error analysis). Given 

that Earnest does not allege that the prosecutor referred again to his silence, 

either later in cross-examination or in oral argument, and given the other 

evidence against Earnest, the allusion to Earnest's silence was so minimal as to 

be harmless. 

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