Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05112/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05112-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 2, 1997 Decided May 27, 1997

No. 96-5112

JUDITH E. CALDWELL, M.D.,

APPELLANT

v.

DONNA E. SHALALA, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

CONSOLIDATED WITH 

NO. 96-5143

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 94cv01752)

Stephanos Bibas, appointed by the court as amicus curiae, 

argued the cause on the side of appellant, with whom Jeffrey 

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G. Huvelle was on the briefs. Judith E. Caldwell, appearing 

pro se, also filed briefs.

W. Mark Nebeker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellees, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. 

Attorney, John D. Bates and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant 

U.S. Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and RANDOLPH, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: Appellant Judith Caldwell is a 

medical doctor who briefly worked at the Kenner Army 

Community Hospital ("Kenner"). Shortly after she began, 

Kenner revoked her clinical privileges due to alleged negligence. This revocation led to an "adverse action report" in 

the National Practitioner Data Bank ("Data Bank"), a national clearinghouse of information about doctors, see 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 11101-11152 (1994); 42 C.F.R. §§ 60.1-.14 (1996).

Caldwell filed suit, arguing, inter alia, that Kenner failed 

to comply with procedural due process before revoking her 

privileges. The District Court agreed and ordered a due 

process hearing; because it was not convinced that the first 

hearing was adequate, it then ordered a supplemental hearing. After the supplemental hearing, Kenner concluded that 

the revocation of Caldwell's privileges had been "unwarranted," and conditionally reinstated her privileges. Caldwell 

argued that the supplemental hearing was inadequate, but the 

District Court did not rule on this issue, as it believed that 

the conditional reinstatement would enable Caldwell to practice medicine again, thus mooting her claim.

Caldwell, however, has been unable to practice medicine. 

Her problems persist because the new Data Bank entry was 

only a "conditional reinstatement," and did not void the 

original negligence entry (as it could have). Thus, although 

Kenner has concluded that the original action was "unwarranted," Caldwell has been unable to practice medicine due to 

the original and remaining blight on her record. Caldwell 

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claims that if she had had full use of the relevant medical 

records at the supplemental hearing, she may have been able 

to convince Kenner to expunge the original "revocation" from 

the Data Bank records, and change the "conditional reinstatement" to something akin to an "instatement of privileges, 

subject to normal conditions."

There was no transcript of the supplemental hearing, and 

appellate counsel could not explain what had happened at the 

hearing. Because the District Court did not address the 

constitutional adequacy of the supplemental hearing, the case 

must be remanded for a determination of whether Caldwell 

had an opportunity to make full use of all relevant medical 

records at the supplemental hearing. If it determines that 

the hearing was inadequate, the District Court must order 

Kenner to conduct a new hearing (unless Kenner is willing to 

revise the Data Bank entries without further hearing). Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Revocation of Privileges and the Adverse Action 

Report

Caldwell, a black woman, was employed as a physician with 

Coastal Government Services, Inc., a private company under 

contract with the United States Department of the Army. 

Caldwell was assigned to Kenner, an Army hospital, and 

Kenner granted Caldwell clinical privileges at its facility. 

Caldwell worked at Kenner for only eleven daysfrom October 28, 1992 until November 12, 1992.

In early November 1992, shortly after Caldwell commenced 

working at Kenner, Dr. Joel Fishbain wrote a memorandum 

for the record in which he stated that he had observed 

deficiencies in Caldwell's competence. On November 13, 

1992, Caldwell received notice from Kenner's Credentials 

Committee that her clinical privileges were being placed in 

abeyance for fourteen days while the allegations against her 

were investigated.

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On December 2, 1992, the Credentials Committee wrote a 

letter to Caldwell informing her that her clinical privileges at 

Kenner were being revoked and that she had a right to a 

hearing. This letter, however, never reached her. On January 7, 1993, the Credentials Committee forwarded a report of 

the revocation of Caldwell's clinical privileges to the Office of 

the Army Surgeon General.

On July 22, 1993, the Army filed an adverse action report 

with the Data Bank, which stated that Caldwell's privileges 

had been revoked due to negligence. In November 1993, as a 

result of the adverse action report, the South Carolina Board 

of Medicine denied Caldwell's application for a permanent 

license to practice medicine. In February 1994, the Mississippi and Alabama Boards of Medicine denied her applications for medical licenses for the same reason. Finally, in the 

summer of 1994, Caldwell lost her medical licenses in California and Virginia because of the adverse action report.

B. The Court Proceedings and the Conditional Reinstatement

On August 11, 1994, Caldwell filed suit, asserting claims 

under, inter alia, the Due Process Clause, Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). The District 

Court dismissed Caldwell's discrimination claims, but remanded her due process claim, ordering Kenner to conduct a 

due process hearing.

On March 20, 1995, an Ad Hoc Credentials Hearing Committee at Kenner held a hearing to give Caldwell the due 

process required by the District Court. The committee concluded that Caldwell had provided substandard documentation of care. Caldwell filed a motion with the District Court 

to reopen the case, claiming that she had not been able to 

examine the full medical records or cross examine witnesses 

at the first hearing. Because the District Court was not 

convinced that the first hearing satisfied the requirements of 

due process, it ordered that Kenner give Caldwell a supplemental due process hearing to correct the alleged deficiencies.

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Another Ad Hoc Credentials Hearing Committee met on 

September 26, 1995. After the hearing, the Commanding 

Officer at Kenner informed Caldwell that the revocation of 

her privileges had been "unwarranted." He reinstated her 

privileges with two conditions: 100% concurrent chart review 

for the first three months or 750 charts, and monthly performance review by the Credentials Committee.

On November 13, 1995, the Army forwarded a revised 

information report to the Data Bank. The report showed that 

Kenner had revised its earlier action, but it did not void the 

original entry in the Data Bank (as it could have). The 

report stated that Caldwell's privileges were conditionally 

reinstated, subject to the two conditions.

The following day, the District Court held a scheduling 

conference. Caldwell argued that the supplemental hearing 

was inadequate. The Army could not fully answer this 

charge, as the attorney who had attended the supplemental 

hearing was unexpectedly absent (his wife was giving birth 

that morning). The District Court did not rule on the 

adequacy of the supplemental hearing, however, as it believed 

that the conditional reinstatement of Caldwell's privileges 

would enable her to practice medicine again. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Shalala, Civ. No. 94-1752, at 18 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 1995) 

(Status Call) ("[I]t looks like you are on the road to getting 

your license privileges back."), 19 ("I think that you will be 

able to get on with your life, once you get your National 

Practitioner Data Bank records straightened out."), reprinted 

in Appendix ("App.") D at 18-19. The District Court dismissed the case without prejudice, subject to reopening upon 

oral application by either party.

Caldwell later notified the District Court that the state 

medical boards had not reinstated her licenses. She then 

moved to reopen the case, but the District Court denied the 

motion as moot. The trial court then ordered that the case 

be dismissed with prejudice.

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1We find no merit in Caldwell's argument that the District 

Court erred in dismissing her discrimination claims. Likewise, we 

reject her claim for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 

Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Finally, 

lest there be any confusion over what is at issue here, we note that 

Caldwell has not raised any substantive due process claim. 

II. ANALYSIS

This case presents a straightforward request for procedural 

due process.1 Caldwell asserts that she did not have an 

opportunity to make full use of relevant medical records at 

the supplemental hearing. The District Court did not rule on 

this issue, because it erroneously believed that Caldwell's 

conditional reinstatement would allow her to practice medicine again, thus mooting her procedural due process claim. 

See, e.g., Caldwell v. Shalala, Civ. No. 94-1752, at 18 (D.D.C. 

Nov. 14, 1995) (Status Call) ("[I]t looks like you are on the 

road to getting your license privileges back."), 19 ("I think 

that you will be able to get on with your life, once you get 

your National Practitioner Data Bank records straightened 

out."), reprinted in App. D at 18-19.

Caldwell claims that, because her Data Bank records still 

show that her clinical privileges were "revoked" and that her 

privileges have only been "conditional[ly] reinstate[d]," state 

licensing boards have been unwilling to reinstate her medical 

licenses. She claims that, had she been able to explore fully 

the evidence at the supplemental hearing, she may have been 

able to convince Kenner to expunge the record reference to 

the original "revocation," and avoid any reference to a "conditional reinstatement."

There was no transcript of the supplemental hearing, and 

appellate counsel could not explain what happened at the 

hearing. Because the District Court did not rule on the 

adequacy of the supplemental hearing, the case must be 

remanded for a determination of whether Caldwell had an 

opportunity to make full use of all relevant medical records at 

the supplemental hearing. If it determines that the hearing 

was inadequate, the District Court must order Kenner to 

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conduct a new hearing (unless, of course, Kenner is willing to 

revise the Data Bank entries without further hearing).

We find it perplexing that, even though Kenner concluded 

that the original action taken against Caldwell was "unwarranted," the mark remains on her record. If the original 

action was unwarranted, then Caldwell should be in no worse 

position than when she startedi.e., with a clean record in 

the Data Bank. Furthermore, we fail to see why this case 

has floundered in litigation for these many years. It is 

undisputed that the Army has the power to void the original 

action; the Army's failure to give full redress is inexplicable 

in light of the determination that the original mark against 

Caldwell was unwarranted. We trust that the parties will 

promptly resolve this case and remove it from the courts' 

dockets.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the 

District Court, and remand for a determination of whether 

Caldwell had an opportunity to make full use of all relevant 

medical records at the supplemental hearing.

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