Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01411/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01411-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DUHN OIL TOOL, INC., CASE NO. CV F 05-1411 OWW LJO

Plaintiff, ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S PROTECTIVE

ORDER MOTION

vs. (Docs. 24, 29.)

COOPER CAMERON CORPORATION,

Defendant.

 /

INTRODUCTION

In this patent infringement action, plaintiff Duhn Oil Tool, Inc. (“Duhn”) and defendant Cooper

Cameron Corporation (“Cooper”) disagree on whether to include a “prosecution bar” provision in their

otherwise agreed upon protective order. Cooper seeks a “prosecution bar” provision to preclude patent

litigation counsel to prosecute related patents before the United States Trademark and Patent Office

(“Patent Office”). Duhn claims that a “prosecution bar” provision prejudicially prevents its use of

established patent counsel.

This Court considered the issue of the “prosecution bar” provision on the record and without the

August 3, 2006 hearing or oral argument. See Local Rule 78-230(h). For the reasons discussed below,

this Court ORDERS that:

1. Duhn’s current law firm may continue to represent Duhn to prosecute this action and

related patents before the Patent Office without a “prosecution bar” provision but must

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forego discovery materials which Cooper designates as “CONFIDENTIAL –

ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY”; or

2. DUHN enter into the protective order with Cooper’s proposed “prosecution bar”

provision. 

BACKGROUND

Proposed Protective Order

Duhn designs and manufactures oil industry products which are sold in the United States. On

July 26, 2005, Duhn was issued a wellhead isolation tool patent (“patent”). On November 9, 2005,

plaintiff filed this action to allege that Cooper sells products to infringe the patent.

The parties anticipate the disclosure of confidential, trade secret and proprietary information and

agree to measures to protect such information. The parties agree to designate information as

“CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY” which a party “believes in good faith to constitute,

contain, reveal or reflect proprietary or confidential, financial, business, technical, personnel or related

information which is so highly sensitive and confidential as to require the possession of such information

to be limited to the counsel of record and their agents only.” The parties agree that information

designated as “CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY” “shall not be disclosed, given,

shown, made available or communicated in any way to any person or entity other than counsel of record

for a party. Such information shall be used only for the purposes of this litigation, and shall not

directly or indirectly be used for any business, financial or other purpose whatsoever.” The parties agree

to disclosure of “CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY” information to “outside experts

or consultants” who sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement that the expert/consultant understands the

protective order, agrees to the protective order, will not use or disclose confidential information received

under the protective order, and will keep safe confidential information.

 The parties disagree on Cooper’s proposed “prosecution bar” provision:

T. PATENTING AND PATENT PROTECTED PERSONS.

Persons who have access to information designated “CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEY’S

EYES ONLY” shall be restricted from patenting for a party for the Pendency of this

action and for two years after its conclusion. 

a. “Patenting” shall mean and include:

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( i ) preparing and/or prosecuting any patent application (or portion

thereof), whether design or utility, and either in the United States or abroad, in the field

of isolation sleeves for fracturing processes;

(ii) preparing patent claim(s) relating to the field listed above; and

(iii) providing advice, counsel, or suggestion regarding, or in any other

way influencing, claim scope and/or language, embodiment(s) for claim coverage,

claim(s) for prosecution, or products or processes for coverage by claim(s) relating to the

field listed above.

Duhn’s Contentions

Duhn contends that Cooper’s proposed “prosecution bar” provision would prohibit Duhn’s patent

attorney Constantine Marantidis (“Mr. Marantidis”) to handle Duhn’s “patent portfolio” and to provide

patent advice. Mr. Marantidis is member of the law firm which represents Duhn in this action. Duhn

argues that Cooper’s proposed “prosecution bar” provision would prejudice Duhn to force it to forego

Mr. Marantidis’ services and advice in this action or as patent counsel in future years. Duhn notes that

the otherwise agreed upon protective order “limits use of information subject to the Order to use in

connection with this litigation and for no other business, financial or other purpose whatsoever.” 

Cooper’s Contentions

Cooper contends that its proposed “prosecution” bar provision is standard in patent litigation to

preclude patent litigation counsel, who have access to an opposing litigant’s confidential information,

to simultaneously prosecute related patents before the Patent Office. Cooper notes that counsel advice

related to patent prosecution is defined as “competitive decision-making” to warrant preclusion of patent

litigation counsel with access to an opponent’s confidential information to participate in patent

prosecution in a technologyarea. According to Cooper, Duhn’s law firm engages in unorthodox practice

to represent Duhn in this action and in no less than three pending patent applications before the Patent

Office related to the patent-in-suit. Cooper claims that patent litigants avoid retaining as litigation

counsel the same law firm that prosecuted the patent-in-suit before the Patent Office. Thus, Cooper

argues that the “prosecution bar” provision merely requires Duhn “to retain separate litigation and patent

prosecution counsel” and “to do what it should have done from the outset of this action.”

DISCUSSION

F.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(7) allows a district court to designate disclosure of trade secret and confidential

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information:

Upon motion by a party . . ., accompanied by a certification that the movant has

in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to

resolve the dispute without court action, and for good cause shown, the court in which

the action is pending . . . may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or

person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,

including . . .

. . .

(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial

information not be revealed or be revealed only in a designated way . . .

F.R.Civ.P. 26(c) further permits a court to:

1. Prohibit disclosure or discovery;

2. Condition disclosure or discovery “on specified terms and conditions”; and

3. Limit “the scope of the disclosure or discovery . . . to certain matters.”

“When determining counsel’s access to the opposing parties’ confidential information, a court

should balance the risk of inadvertent disclosure of trade secrets and the risk of impairing the process

of litigation by denying discovery.” Chan v. Intuit, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 659, 661 (N.D. Cal. 2003). A

crucial factor is “whether in-house counsel was involved in ‘competitive decisionmaking’; that is,

advising on decisions about pricing or design ‘made in light of similar or corresponding information

about a competitor.’” Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9 Cir. 1992). th

Cooper proposes to prohibit disclosure of confidential information to persons involved in

patenting for a party and patenting by counsel to whom confidential information is disclosed during the

pendency of this action plus two years. Cooper’s proposed “prosecution bar” provision is nearly

identical to provision adopted by the court in Chan, 218 F.R.D. at 661-662. As such, this Court must

determine “when allowing counsel to view confidential information of its client’s competitor, whether

counsel’s involvement in future patent prosecution strategy will be affected by such information to the

competitor’s detriment.” See Chan, 218 F.R.D. at 662. As the Chan court further explained:

The Court must consider whether counsel might inadvertently use confidential

information obtained in the course of this litigation to shape advice regarding the scope

of patent claims as part of the prosecution of patents for any party to this action, to the

detriment of the opposing party, its competitor. If so, then such counsel should either be

denied access to confidential information or be precluded from patenting for a party.

Chan, 218 F.R.D. at 662.

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The Chan court explained that the “prosecution bar” provision (nearly identical to Cooper’s here)

is “sufficiently related to competitive decision-making to require protection of confidential information

from inadvertent disclosure.” Chan, 218 F.R.D. at 662. The Chan court found that “patent prosecution

includes advice regarding the scope of claims of a patent” and thus the “prosecution bar” provision is

“sufficiently related to competitive decision-making to justify the restriction imposed on counsels’ future

services to their clients.” Chan, 218 F.R.D. at 662.

The focus here is Mr. Marantidis, Duhn’s patent attorneywho is a member of the law firm which

represents Duhn here. The gist of Duhn’s objection to Cooper’s proposed “prosecution bar” provision

is that the provision bars Mr. Marantidis’ services. Duhn does not focus on the merits of Cooper’s

proposed “prosecution bar” provision, that is, Mr. Marantidis’ potential advice and services provided

“in light of” information about Cooper. Duhn fails to address whether Mr. Marantidis may use,

inadvertently or otherwise, Cooper’s confidential information to advise on future patent prosecutions

and fails to demonstrate the absence of detriment to Cooper. As in Chan, Cooper’s proposed

“prosecution bar” provision is sufficiently related to competitive decision-making to require protection

of confidential information from inadvertent disclosure and to warrant restriction on the future services

of the parties’ respective counsel. 

Nonetheless, this Court acknowledges Duhn’s claim of prejudice if Mr. Marantidis is precluded

to represent Duhn as patent counsel. To avoid Duhn’s loss of Mr. Marantidis, this Court gives Duhn

an option to forego discovery materials which Cooper designates as “CONFIDENTIAL –

ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY.” Duhn’s election to forego such discovery materials would mitigate

issues raised by the Chan court and permit Duhn’s use of its current law firm, including Mr. Marantidis,

in this action and in matters before the Patent Office. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court ORDERS that:

1. Duhn’s current law firm may continue to represent Duhn to prosecute this action and

related patents before the Patent Office without a “prosecution bar” provision but must

forego discovery materials which Cooper designates as “CONFIDENTIAL –

ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY”; or

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2. Duhn enter into the protective order with Cooper’s proposed “prosecution bar” provision.

This Court further ORDERS:

1. Duhn, no later August 8, 2006, to inform Cooper whether Duhn elects to enter into the

protective order with Cooper’s proposed “prosecution bar” provision or to forego

discovery materials which Cooper designates as “CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’

EYES ONLY”; and

2. The parties, no later than August 11, 2006, to submit to this Court for signature a clean

version of the appropriate protective order (with or without Cooper’s proposed

“prosecution bar” provision) based on Duhn’s election. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 1, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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