Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-01123/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-01123-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN PERRIDON,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-00-1123 LKK JFM P

vs.

ERNIE ROE, Warden, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with an application for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents’ motion to dismiss came on

regularly for hearing May 3, 2007. Marylou Hillberg appeared for petitioner. Patrick Whalen,

Deputy Attorney General, appeared for respondents. Upon review of the motion and the

documents in support and opposition, upon hearing the arguments of counsel and good cause

appearing therefor, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS:

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner was convicted on November 21, 1997. On February 2, 1999, the

California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed petitioner’s conviction. (Answer,

Ex. A.) On May 12, 1999, the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review. 

(Answer, Ex. B.) 

On May 22, 2000, petitioner filed the instant petition raising three claims: (1)

violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); (2) a search and seizure claim; and (3) a

Case 2:00-cv-01123-LKK -JFM Document 45 Filed 10/22/07 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Petitioner abandoned the search and seizure claim and the prosecutorial misconduct 1

claim contained in the original petition. (Am. Pet. at 18.) 

 Relying on the Ninth Circuit decision in Felix v. Mayle, 379 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2004), 2

this court held that the new claims related back to the filing of the original petition in this action

and thus were not time-barred. The court found no evidence of bad faith or prejudice. (Order,

filed June 3, 2005, at 2.) 

 Respondents cited the June 23, 2005 opinion of the United States Supreme Court 3

reversing the Circuit’s decision in Felix and adopting a stringent relation back test for habeas

petitions. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005). 

2

prosecutorial misconduct claim based on the examination of a trial witness. (Pet. at 1.) 

Respondents filed an answer on July 31, 2000.

On June 3, 2005, petitioner filed an amended petition, which set forth the

following three claims: (1) the same Miranda claim; (2) a new claim under Batson v. Kentucky,

476 U.S. 79 (1986); and (3) a new claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing

to raise the Batson claim on appeal. (Am. Pet. at 14-17.) On June 3, 2005, the court granted

1

petitioner’s motion to amend and recommended that the action be stayed pending exhaustion of

state remedies. Respondent had opposed the motion to amend on the grounds that (1) petitioner 2

unduly delayed raising the claims; (2) it was likely the California Supreme Court would reject

them as untimely; and (3) the new claims were barred by the statute of limitations. 

On July 8, 2005, respondent filed a motion for relief from the June 3, 2005 order.3

On July 12, 2005, the district court adopted the recommendation that this action be stayed. On

July 13, 2005, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of that order. 

While this action was stayed, petitioner exhausted state remedies. The state court

denied relief on May 10, 2006. (See Resp.’s Response filed March 16, 2007, at 2 n.1.)

On March 21, 2007, petitioner’s motion to lift the stay was granted and

respondents’ motions were denied without prejudice to their right to reassert the statute of

limitations defense in a new motion to dismiss. On March 23, 2007, respondents filed the instant

motion to dismiss. 

Case 2:00-cv-01123-LKK -JFM Document 45 Filed 10/22/07 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Respondents assert that the two new claims alleged in petitioner’s amended

petition should be dismissed because they were filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations

and do not relate back to any claim alleged in the original petition. Respondents argue that the

Supreme Court’s decision in Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005), mandates dismissal of the two

new claims at issue. 

Petitioner does not dispute the contention that the two claims added in June 2005

do not relate back to the claims raised in the original petition. Petitioner contends, however, that

respondent has not presented any authority for the proposition that Mayle should apply

retroactively to amended petitions filed before its effective date. Petitioner also claims he is

entitled to equitable tolling of the limitation period. 

ANALYSIS

I. The AEDPA Statute of Limitations

On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

was enacted. The AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by adding the following provision:

 (d) (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

latest of – 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the Constitution

or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

/////

Case 2:00-cv-01123-LKK -JFM Document 45 Filed 10/22/07 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

 (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The one-year AEDPA statute of limitations applies to all federal habeas

corpus petitions filed after the statute was enacted and therefore applies to the present case, filed

in 2001. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997).

II. Application of § 2244(d)(1)(A)

For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), the judgment entered against

petitioner on May 12, 1999, became final on August 10, 1999, ninety days after the California

Supreme Court denied review on July 19, 2000. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th

Cir. 1999). Petitioner did not raise any Batson claims in his state petitions for collateral relief in

the year following August 10, 1999. Thus, the one-year period of limitation ran without

interruption from August 10, 1999, until it expired on August 9, 2000. 

Petitioner’s amended petition was filed on June 3, 2005, almost five years after

the statute of limitations expired. All new claims alleged in the amended petition are barred by

the AEDPA statute of limitations unless some other statutory provision applies, equitable tolling

is warranted, or the new claims relate back to the original claims. Petitioner has not argued that

any provision of § 2244(d) other than § 2244(d)(1)(A) is applicable, and the court finds that no

other provision applies. Petitioner’s argument that Mayle should not be applied retroactively is

unavailing. The decision in Mayle was applied by the Supreme Court to the parties in that case

and therefore “must be applied by the courts retroactively to all pending cases not barred by

procedural requirements or res judicata.” Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564, 1572

(9th Cir. 1993) (citing James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 111 S.Ct. at 2448

(1991)). It must therefore be applied to this case.

Case 2:00-cv-01123-LKK -JFM Document 45 Filed 10/22/07 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

III. Equitable Tolling

The one-year period of limitation contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is a statute of

limitations subject to tolling. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,

1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998). “Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as

extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s

control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Calderon, 128 F.3d at 1288-89. Courts are

expected to “take seriously Congress’s desire to accelerate the federal habeas process.” Id. at

1289. See also Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing the Ninth

Circuit’s standard as setting a “high hurdle” to the application of equitable tolling).

Even where extraordinary circumstances are shown, equitable tolling will not be

available unless the petitioner diligently pursued his claims. 128 F.3d at 1289. Equitable tolling

is appropriate only when external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for

the petitioner’s failure to file a timely habeas petition. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999). The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating grounds for equitable tolling. 

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005); Miranda v. Castro, 292

F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002).

In the instant case, petitioner claims he is entitled to equitable tolling of the

limitation period due to “uncertainty in the law and subsequent change of the standard for finding

a prima facie case of discrimination in jury selection in” a Batson case. As a corollary of the

latter argument, petitioner contends that the Batson claim did not arise until the United States

Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), holding that the standard

used by the California courts in People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258 (1978), unconstitutionally

conflicted with the federal constitutional standard set forth in Batson. 

/////

/////

Case 2:00-cv-01123-LKK -JFM Document 45 Filed 10/22/07 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

However, the decision in Johnson v. California was an interpretation of Batson,

not a new rule of constitutional law. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Boyd v. Newland, 467

F.3d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006):

The Johnson opinion relies almost exclusively on the wording used

in the Batson opinion; we have concluded that Johnson explains

Batson, [Citation omitted]. 

Id. The decision in Johnson v. California was also foreshadowed by several years of Ninth

Circuit precedent. See Williams v. Runnels, 432 F.3d 1102, 1105 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006):

Our explanation in Paulino is also applicable to this case:

We would normally be required to defer to the court of appeal’s

factual finding that there was no prima facie showing of bias. See

Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc). In

making this finding, however, the court of appeal explicitly

required Paulino to “show a strong likelihood” . . . of bias under

Wheeler, and did not mention Batson or its inference standard. We

have held that the Wheeler standard “is impermissibly stringent in

comparison to the more generous Batson ‘inference’ test.” Wade v.

Terhune, 202 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir.2000). Thus, “California

courts in following the ‘strong likelihood’ language of Wheeler are

not applying the correct legal standard for a prima facie case under

Batson.” Id. Because the court of appeal employed the incorrect

legal standard in reviewing Paulino’s claim, we examine his

Batson claim de novo. Id.; see also Fernandez v. Roe, 286 F.3d

1073, 1077 (9th Cir.2002); Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d

1042, 1046 (9th Cir.2001).

371 F.3d at 1090 (footnote omitted).

Williams v. Runnels, 432 F.3d at 1105 n.3. Thus, Johnson was not the initial recognition by the

Supreme Court of the constitutional right not to have jurors excluded from the jury based on their

race so as to permit a delayed start of the limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). 

Put another way, the rule applied in Johnson was not a “new rule” that started the running of the

statute of limitations anew. Petitioner’s Batson claims could have been asserted any time after

his conviction, and did not depend on the existence of Johnson. Accordingly, petitioner is not

entitled to have the running of the statute of limitations begin anew and is not entitled to 

/////

Case 2:00-cv-01123-LKK -JFM Document 45 Filed 10/22/07 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

equitable tolling under a theory of uncertainty in the law. Respondents’ motion to dismiss should

be granted.

In light of the above, this action should proceed on the first claim of petitioner’s

June 3, 2005 amended petition. Respondents answered that Miranda claim on July 31, 2000. 

Petitioner will be granted an additional thirty days in which to file a traverse addressing only the

Miranda claim.

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondents’ March 29, 2007 motion to dismiss (#42) be granted.

2. The claims alleged as Grounds 2 and 3 in petitioner’s amended petition be

dismissed and this action proceed on the claims alleged as Ground 1.

3. Within thirty days of any order of the district court adopting the instant

findings and recommendations, petitioner shall file a traverse. At that time the habeas petition

will stand submitted.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

ten days after these findings and recommendations are served, any party may file and serve

written objections with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 22, 2007.

001;perr1123.mtd

Case 2:00-cv-01123-LKK -JFM Document 45 Filed 10/22/07 Page 7 of 7