Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00948/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00948-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DURRELL A. PUCKETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. ZAMORA, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:12-cv-00948 DLB PC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF No. 32] 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

[ECF No. 37]

I. Background

Plaintiff Durrell A. Puckett (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 12, 2012. The parties 

have voluntarily consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

On March 13, 2013, the Court issued orders dismissing certain claims and defendants and 

finding service appropriate for other defendants. On March 27, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion to 

add additional defendants or amend the complaint, which the Court granted on March 28, 2013. 

On April 14, 2013, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 14.) On September 30, 

2013, the Court issued an order finding that this action shall proceed against Defendants Zamora, 

Rodriguez, and Acevedo for excessive force and against Defendant Gutierrez and six Doe 

Defendants for failing to intervene to protect Plaintiff’s safety in violation of the Eighth 

Case 1:12-cv-00948-JLT Document 43 Filed 02/23/15 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Amendment. 

On May 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 32.) On June 

20, 2014, Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 37.) On June 30, 

2014, Plaintiff filed an opposition. (ECF No. 38.) Defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 39) on July 

2, 2014. The motions have been submitted upon the record without oral argument.1 Local Rule 

230(l). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment. The Court will grant Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment on the ground 

that Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force against Defendants Rodriguez and Acevedo as it pertains 

to the initial takedown of Plaintiff is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-87 (1994). 

The cross-motion will be denied on all other grounds. 

II. Legal Standard

Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall grant summary judgment 

if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (quotation marks omitted); 

Washington Mut. Inc. v. U.S., 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each party’s position, 

whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by (1) citing to particular 

parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, 

or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a 

genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The Court may consider other materials in the 

record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen 

v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Simmons v. 

Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

In resolving cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court must consider each party’s 

evidence. Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff bears 

 

1 Concurrently with his motion for summary judgment, Defendant served Plaintiff with the requisite notice of the 

requirements for opposing the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939-41 (9th Cir. 2012); Rand v. Rowland, 154 

F.3d 952, 960-61 (9th Cir. 1998).

Case 1:12-cv-00948-JLT Document 43 Filed 02/23/15 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

the burden of proof at trial, and to prevail on summary judgment, he must affirmatively 

demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for him. Soremekun v. Thrifty 

Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). Defendants do not bear the burden of proof at 

trial and in moving for summary judgment, they need only prove an absence of evidence to 

support Plaintiff’s case. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). 

In judging the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court does not make 

credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984 (quotation 

marks and citation omitted), and it must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party and determine whether a genuine issue of material fact precludes entry of 

judgment, Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 942 

(9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

III. Plaintiff’s Claim2

Plaintiff was incarcerated at Corcoran State Prison (“CSP”) in Corcoran, California, where 

the events giving rise to this action are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names as Defendants 

correctional officers R. Zamora, P. Rodriguez, C. Acevedo, R. Gutierrez, and six Doe Defendants. 

Plaintiff alleges the following. Defendant Zamora attacked Plaintiff on an unknown date. 

After the incident, Defendant Zamora and Rodriguez came to his cell and threatened Plaintiff. On 

January 10, 2012, they both stated that they would beat up Plaintiff if he came out of his cell. 

Defendants Rodriguez and Acevedo returned an hour later to take Plaintiff to the mental health 

group. Defendant Rodriguez slapped Plaintiff, and Defendant Acevedo tried to trip Plaintiff and 

used racial slurs. As Plaintiff is knocked to the ground, Defendants Acevedo and Rodriguez both 

started to punch Plaintiff. Defendant Zamora came running from outside and kicked Plaintiff in 

the ribs. Defendant R. Gutierrez, along with six Doe Defendants, stood by and watched as Plaintiff 

screamed for help. Defendants stated that they did this because Plaintiff had a camera interview 

 

2

Plaintiff’s complaint is verified and his allegations constitute evidence where they are based on his personal 

knowledge of facts admissible in evidence. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2004). The 

summarization of Plaintiff’s claim in this section should not be viewed by the parties as a ruling that the allegations 

are admissible. 

Case 1:12-cv-00948-JLT Document 43 Filed 02/23/15 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

regarding a prior use of force incident. Plaintiff contends that he notified Defendant Gipson of this 

but she did nothing. Since the incident, Plaintiff is paranoid, has flashbacks, and suicidal thoughts.

IV. Undisputed Facts3

1. Plaintiff Durrell Puckett (G-05549) is an inmate in the lawful custody of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). (Delgado Decl., Exs. A, B.)

2. Plaintiff was housed at California State Prison, Corcoran (CSP-Corcoran) at all times 

relevant to this case. (Delgado Decl., Exs. A, B.)

3. On January 10, 2012, Correctional Officer Rodriguez and another officer4 were attempting 

to escort Plaintiff from his housing unit to group therapy in the gym. (Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 4.)

4. Defendant Rodriguez was positioned on Plaintiff’s left side and the other officer was on 

his right. (Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 4.)

5. Plaintiff’s hands were cuffed behind his back, and he was wearing a spit mask because he 

had been involved in an assault on a Correctional Sergeant just ten days prior.5 (Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 

3; Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 4.)

6. At some point during the escort, Defendant Rodriguez took Plaintiff to the ground.6 

(Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 6.)

7. Once Plaintiff was taken to the ground, Defendant Zamora responded from inside the 

housing unit. (Gutierrez Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7; Rodriguez Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9; Zamora Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4.)

8. Officers Zamora and Gutierrez helped Plaintiff to his feet, and then escorted him to his 

cell. (Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 8; Zamora Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7.)

9. Plaintiff was medically examined at his cell a few minutes later. (Delgado Decl. Ex. E 

[CDCR Form 837—Crime/Incident Report, p. 2]; Ex. F [CDCR Form 7219—Medical Report of 

 

3

Facts which are immaterial to resolution of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, unsupported by admissible 

evidence, and/or redundant are omitted.

4 The parties dispute the identity of the second escort officer. Plaintiff maintains it was Defendant Acevedo. (Pl.’s 

Statement of Undisputed Facts “PSUF” 4.) Defendant Acevedo denies he was the second officer. (Acevedo Decl. ¶

2.) Defendant Gutierrez states he was the second escort officer. (Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 3.)

5Defendants state Plaintiff was wearing a spit mask because he had attempted to spit on the Correctional Sergeant. 

Plaintiff disputes this and claims this incident occurred because Defendant Zamora attacked him. 

6The parties have completely different accounts of how and why the takedown occurred. 

Case 1:12-cv-00948-JLT Document 43 Filed 02/23/15 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Injury or Unusual Occurrence]; Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 8; Zamora Decl. ¶ 7.)

10. Medical staff completed a medical evaluation form, which noted that Plaintiff did not have 

any visible injuries at the time of the examination. (Delgado Decl. Ex. F [CDCR Form 7219—

Medical Report of Injury or Unusual Occurrence].)

11. Plaintiff was issued a Rules Violation Report that charged him with “Resisting a Peace 

Officer Resulting in Use of Force” in violation of state law. (Delgado Decl. Ex. D [CDC Form 

115—Rules Violation Report, p. 1].)

12. At a disciplinary hearing several weeks later, Plaintiff was found guilty of the offense. 

(Delgado Decl. Ex. D [CDC Form 115—Rules Violation Report, pp. 1, 4].)

13. Plaintiff forfeited 90 days of good-time credit, among other penalties, as a result of the 

guilty finding. (Delgado Decl. Ex. D [CDC Form 115—Rules Violation Report, p. 1].)

14. The hearing officer’s guilty finding was based, among other things, on: (1) Officer 

Rodriguez’s written report which documented Plaintiff’s verbal and physical threats; and (2) the 

investigative report, which contained reports from staff eyewitnesses that corroborated Officer 

Rodriguez’s narrative of events. (Delgado Decl. Ex. D [CDC Form 115—Rules Violation Report, 

p. 4].)

V. Discussion

A. Heck Bar

Defendant Rodriguez argues that Plaintiff’s claim, at least as it concerns the takedown of 

Plaintiff by Defendant Rodriguez, is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-87 

(1994). Defendant’s argument is persuasive.

It has long been established that state prisoners cannot challenge the fact or duration of 

their confinement in a section 1983 action and their sole remedy lies in habeas corpus relief. 

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78, 125 S.Ct. 1242 (2005). Often referred to as the favorable 

termination rule or the Heck bar, this exception to section 1983’s otherwise broad scope applies 

whenever state prisoners “seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement - either directly 

through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination 

that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State’s custody.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81 

Case 1:12-cv-00948-JLT Document 43 Filed 02/23/15 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

(emphasis added). Thus, “a state prisoner’s [section] 1983 action is barred (absent prior 

invalidation) - no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the 

prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) - if success in 

that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Id. at 81-

2.

It is uncontroverted that Plaintiff lost ninety days of good-time credits as a result of being 

found guilty in a prison disciplinary proceeding of “Resisting a Peace Officer Resulting in Use of 

Force.” (Delgado Decl. Ex. D.) In finding Plaintiff guilty, the hearing officer found Defendant 

Rodriguez’s narrative of the events to be true based on corroborating written testimony by other 

staff. According to Defendant Rodriguez’s narrative, he and his partner Defendant Gutierrez were 

escorting Plaintiff from his cell to the gym. Plaintiff was wearing a spit-shield. While waiting for 

clearance for the escort to proceed, Plaintiff became agitated and stated, “If I didn’t have this mask 

on I would spit in your face.” Defendant Rodriguez told Plaintiff to remain quiet and keep 

walking. Plaintiff then twisted his body to the left toward Defendant Rodriguez in an aggressive 

manner. Defendant Rodriguez had control of Plaintiff’s left forearm with his right hand. Utilizing 

his left hand, he grabbed Plaintiff’s left shoulder area of his jumpsuit and pulled him downward 

towards the ground into the prone position, while giving verbal orders to get down. Once in the 

prone position, Defendant Rodriguez summoned staff to assist. 

In Plaintiff’s version of the events, Defendants Rodriguez and Acevedo escorted him. 

During the escort, Defendant Rodriguez slapped Plaintiff while Defendant Acevedo tried to trip 

him. Plaintiff states that both made racial slurs. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Rodriguez took 

him to the ground without provocation, and he claims that Defendant Rodriguez “slammed” him 

to the ground. 

A finding in Plaintiff’s favor on his excessive force claim would mean that Defendants

Rodriguez and Acevedo used physical force to maliciously and sadistically cause Plaintiff harm 

rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. The two versions of events are 

entirely inconsistent with one another. If Plaintiff prevailed on his claim that Defendants, 

unprovoked by Plaintiff and without any justification, used excessive physical force against him in 

Case 1:12-cv-00948-JLT Document 43 Filed 02/23/15 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

taking him to the ground, his success would necessarily invalidate the result of the disciplinary 

hearing, which was based on the finding that Plaintiff instigated the entire incident by refusing 

direct orders to stay quiet and keep walking, and by suddenly twisting his body aggressively 

toward Defendant Rodriguez, which caused Defendants to have to take him to the ground to regain 

control over him. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against 

Defendant Rodriguez for his takedown of Plaintiff is barred by the favorable termination rule, and 

the claim must be dismissed. Heck, 512 U.S. at 489 (until and unless favorable termination of the 

conviction or sentence occurs, no cause of action under section 1983 exists). 

Likewise, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims concerning Defendant Acevedo’s alleged 

actions during the escort and takedown are barred by the favorable termination rule. The hearing 

officer found that Defendant Gutierrez was the second escort officer, not Acevedo. A favorable 

ruling on Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Acevedo provoked Plaintiff, threatened him, and used 

excessive and unnecessary force during the escort and takedown would invalidate the findings of 

the disciplinary hearing officer that Defendant Acevedo had no part in the escort and takedown. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s excessive force claim as it pertains to Defendant Acevedo during the escort 

and takedown is barred by the favorable termination rule. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81-2; Edwards 

v. Balisok, 520 U.S 641, 80-81, 117 S.Ct. 1584 (1997). 

However, Defendants do not argue, and the Court does not find, that the favorable 

termination rule bars Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force and failure to protect once Plaintiff was 

taken to the ground. Plaintiff claims that once he was taken to the ground, Defendants used 

excessive force against him by physically beating him while he was restrained. Plaintiff claims 

that Defendant Zamora ran in from outside and kicked Plaintiff in the ribs. He claims that

Defendants Acevedo and Rodriguez repeatedly punched Plaintiff while he was on the ground. He 

further claims that Defendant Gutierrez, along with six Doe Defendants, stood by and watched as 

Plaintiff screamed for help. Plaintiff’s success on these claims would not necessarily invalidate 

the result of the disciplinary hearing, because the guilty finding concerned only the initial 

takedown and the necessity of the force used by Defendant Rodriguez in responding to Plaintiff’s 

provocation. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims pertaining to Defendants’ actions 

Case 1:12-cv-00948-JLT Document 43 Filed 02/23/15 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

once Plaintiff had been taken to the ground are not barred under Heck.

B. Excessive Force

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Acevedo, Rodriguez and Zamora assaulted him and used 

excessive force while he was lying prone on the ground. Plaintiff contends that the uncontroverted 

facts demonstrate that he is entitled to summary judgment on his claim. On the other hand, 

Defendants contend that the undisputed facts would not allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict 

for Plaintiff.

1. Legal Standard

The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment protects prisoners 

from the use of excessive physical force. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37, 130 S.Ct. 1175, 

1178 (2010) (per curiam); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992). What is 

necessary to show sufficient harm under the Eighth Amendment depends upon the claim at issue, 

with the objective component being contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of 

decency. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quotation marks and citations omitted). For excessive force 

claims, the core judicial inquiry is whether the force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain 

or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37, 130 

S.Ct. at 1178 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7) (quotation marks omitted). 

Not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. 

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37, 130 S.Ct. at 1178 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9) (quotation marks 

omitted). Necessarily excluded from constitutional recognition is the de minimis use of physical 

force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind. 

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-8, 130 S.Ct. at 1178 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10) (quotations marks 

omitted). In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, courts may 

evaluate the extent of the prisoner’s injury, the need for application of force, the relationship 

between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible 

officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 

7 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

While the absence of a serious injury is relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, it does 

Case 1:12-cv-00948-JLT Document 43 Filed 02/23/15 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

not end it. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always 

violates contemporary standards of decency. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37, 130 S.Ct. at 1178 (citing 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, it is the use of force rather than the 

resulting injury which ultimately counts. Id. at 37-8.

2. Analysis

Defendants move for summary judgment based on their contention that Plaintiff instigated 

the incident by refusing direct orders and by aggressively turning on Defendant Rodriguez, and 

that they used only the minimal amount of force necessary to maintain control. However, for the 

reasons that follow, genuine disputes of material fact exist that prevent summary judgment.

According to Plaintiff, once he was taken to the ground, he did not resist and remained 

prone. He contends that Defendants Rodriguez and Acevedo then repeatedly punched him despite 

his lack of resistance. He further contends that Defendant Zamora rushed in and delivered a kick 

to his ribs. 

Defendants first contend that Defendant Acevedo was not even present. Defendants point 

to various pieces of evidence such as the Rules Violation Report and the Crime/Incident Report 

which reflect that it was Gutierrez who was the second escort officer. (Delgado Decl. Exs. D, E.) 

Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s statements in his verified First Amended Complaint should be taken into 

account in determining whether a dispute of fact exists, and Plaintiff maintains that it was 

Defendant Acevedo who was the second escort officer who assaulted him. In addition, Plaintiff 

has submitted two declarations from inmates that state Defendant Acevedo was involved. (Pl.’s 

Mot. Summ. J.) Thus, there is a material dispute whether Acevedo was involved. 

Defendants further contend that Plaintiff was taken to the ground in a fluid motion, that 

once Plaintiff was on the ground Rodriguez called for assistance, and that Defendant Zamora 

responded and took responsibility for the escort. Defendants contend they never attacked Plaintiff 

or admitted to attacking Plaintiff. They deny having threatened, beaten, or kicked Plaintiff in any 

way. Thus, there is a material dispute whether Defendants assaulted Plaintiff.

Case 1:12-cv-00948-JLT Document 43 Filed 02/23/15 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Defendants argue that the lack of injury to Plaintiff demonstrates that Plaintiff’s version of 

the incident is entirely unsupported. As noted above, while the absence of a serious injury is 

relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, it does not end it. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Taking the 

facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a genuine dispute exists as to whether Defendants 

used force maliciously or sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. Therefore, the Court finds 

that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and Defendants’ cross-motion for summary 

judgment must be denied.

C. Failure to Protect

Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Gutierrez and six other Doe Defendants stood by and 

watched Plaintiff getting assaulted despite Plaintiff’s pleas for help.

1. Legal Standard

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 

from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 

2006). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must provide 

prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) (quotations omitted). Prison officials have 

a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners because being violently 

assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses 

against society. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833-34 (quotations omitted); Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 

1181 (9th Cir. 2009); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). However, prison 

officials are liable under the Eighth Amendment only if they demonstrate deliberate indifference 

to conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 841 

(quotations omitted); Clem, 566 F.3d at 1181; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040.

2. Analysis

It is disputed whether Defendants physically assaulted Plaintiff while Plaintiff was lying 

prone on the ground. It is undisputed that Defendant Gutierrez and other staff were in the vicinity 

when Plaintiff was being restrained on the ground. Plaintiff contends that Gutierrez and Doe 

Defendants stood by and allowed Plaintiff to be beaten and kicked by Defendants Rodriguez, 

Case 1:12-cv-00948-JLT Document 43 Filed 02/23/15 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Acevedo, and Zamora. Defendants claim no physical assault by any Defendant took place; 

therefore, there was no reason to protect Plaintiff. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiff, a genuine dispute exists as to whether Defendants used force maliciously or sadistically 

for the purpose of causing harm. A genuine dispute further exists as to whether Plaintiff pleaded 

for aid, but Defendant Gutierrez and Doe Defendants ignored him. Therefore, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment 

must be denied.

D. Qualified Immunity

Finally, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. 

Qualified immunity is “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like 

an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” 

Mueller v. Auer, 576 F.3d 979, 993 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 

Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages unless their conduct violates 

“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982). “Qualified immunity 

balances two important interests - the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise 

power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability 

when they perform their duties reasonably,” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 

808 (2009), and it protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 

law,” Mallei v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092 (1986). 

In resolving the claim of qualified immunity, the Court must determine whether, taken in 

the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right, and if so, 

whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 

(2001); Mueller, 576 F.3d at 993. While often beneficial to address in that order, the Court has 

discretion to address the two-step inquiry in the order it deems most suitable under the 

circumstances. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (overruling holding in Saucier that the two-step inquiry 

must be conducted in that order, and the second step is reached only if the court first finds a 

constitutional violation); Mueller, 576 F.3d at 993-94. 

Case 1:12-cv-00948-JLT Document 43 Filed 02/23/15 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

In this instance, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff demonstrates a 

constitutional violation, and there exist triable issues of fact as to whether that right was violated. 

Therefore, the Court proceeds without further discussion to the second step of the inquiry.

“For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently clear 

that a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Hope v. 

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002). While the reasonableness inquiry may not be 

undertaken as a broad, general proposition, neither is official action entitled to protection “unless 

the very action in question has previously been held unlawful.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 739. 

“Specificity only requires that the unlawfulness be apparent under preexisting law,” Clement v. 

Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted), and prison personnel “can still be on 

notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances,” Hope, 536 

U.S. at 741. 

In 2012, an inmate’s right to be free from the use of excessive physical force was clear. 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7 (articulating the standard for excessive force claims under the Eighth 

Amendment). Likewise, the duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of others was 

clear. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833-34

The Court recognizes that the existence of material factual disputes does not necessarily 

preclude a finding of qualified immunity. Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1053 

(9th Cir. 2002). “Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make 

reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions,” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, __ U.S. __, 

__, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011). Here, however, assuming the facts in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiff, no reasonable officer would have believed that kicking and hitting an inmate who had 

complied with orders, and did not pose a threat, was lawful, nor would a reasonable officer have 

believed that standing by while others beat and kicked such an inmate was lawful.

Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

VI. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Court HEREBY ORDERS:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED; and

Case 1:12-cv-00948-JLT Document 43 Filed 02/23/15 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and 

DENIED IN PART as follows:

a. Defendant’s cross-motion is GRANTED on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

claims of excessive force and failure to protect pertaining to the initial takedown of 

Plaintiff; 

b. Defendant’s cross-motion is DENIED on all other grounds.

3. This matter will be set for jury trial by separate order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2015 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:12-cv-00948-JLT Document 43 Filed 02/23/15 Page 13 of 13