Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01678/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01678-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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Mr. Carreno’s son will be referred to as “G.” throughout this order, as he is a minor.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Emanuel Carreno, 

on behalf of his minor son, 

G. Carreno, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 07-1678-PHX-SMM

ORDER

I. BACKGROUND

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and

Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, both filed pursuant to Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After careful consideration of the motions and the

arguments set forth therein, the Court finds the following.

A. Procedural History

On June 30, 2005, Emanuel Carreno (“Mr. Carreno”) filed an application for

Supplemental Security Income Benefits on behalf of his minor son, G. Carreno1

 (Date of

Birth: 7/23/97). The application was denied on September 23, 2005, and upon

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reconsideration, denied again on March 6, 2006. Following a hearing on November 13,

2006, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that G. had a “severe” learning and

conduct disorder. However, the ALJ affirmed the denial of benefits, finding that G.’s

impairment did not “functionally equal” the level of impairment established by the regulation

for determining functional equivalence of a disability in children, 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a.

Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment to appeal the ALJ’s decision to this

Court. Defendant thereafter filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

B. Relevant Background Regarding ALJ’s Decision

1. Academic History and Teacher Evaluations

However, several weeks into second grade, on December 7, 2004, G. was held back

to repeat the first grade (R. at 140) because his father and teachers had determined that he

was not adequately completing his school work. (R. at 266-267.) At the time of the ALJ’s

decision on January 31, 2007, G. was in the third grade. (R. at 24.) 

On August 25, 2005, G.’s first special education teacher, Ms. Pretianger, completed

a Teacher Questionnaire evaluating G. as a student. (R. at 129-136.) Having only worked

with G. for three weeks, Ms. Pretianger noticed that while G. was “well behaved,” he “has

difficulty reading and comprehending written passages.” (R. at 130.) She noted that G.’s

attempts to do this independently were “not always successful.” (R. at 129.) Ms. Pretianger

did not note any problem with G’s ability to attend to and complete tasks. (R. at 131.)

On January 18, 2006, G.’s new special education teacher, Ms. Tundle, completed the

same Teacher Questionnaire. (R. at 121-128.) Ms. Tundle reported that G. had an “obvious

problem” in the domain of “Acquiring and Using Information.” (R. at 122.) Ms. Tundle

noted that G. went to the “resource room” on a daily basis for help with his needs. (Id.). She

also emphasized that the help G. received from his peer tutors allowed him to “complete his

assignments successfully.” (Id.) Ms. Tundle also reported that G. had a problem attending

to and completing tasks on a daily basis. (R. at 123.) She noted that he “needs constant

encouragement to complete a task along with repeated verbal instruction.” (Id.) 

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On November 2, 2006, G.’s teacher, Ms. Turman, completed the Teacher

Questionnaire. (R. at 113-120.) Ms. Turman reported that within the domain of “Acquiring

and Using Information,” G. had a problem in 9 out of 10 areas. (R. at 114.) Among these

areas, Ms. Turman noted that G. had a “very serious problem” expressing ideas in written

form. (Id.) Further, G. had a “serious problem” understanding vocabulary, reading and

comprehending written material, and learning new material. (Id.) Within the domain of

“Attending and Completing Tasks,” Ms. Turman reported that G. had a problem in 9 of 13

areas. (R. at 115.) She noted a “serious problem” with G.’s ability to complete class and

homework assignments, to do so accurately without careless mistakes, and to work without

distracting himself or others. (Id.) Ms. Turman also noted an “obvious problem” with G.’s

ability to focus long enough to finish assignments and to refocus when necessary. (Id.)

Additionally, G. had an “obvious problem” changing activities and working at a reasonable

pace in order to finish an activity in a timely manner. (Id.)

2. Witness Statements

G.’s father, Mr. Carreno, testified that G. has behavioral and learning problems. (R.

at 266-273.) Mr. Carreno further reported that G. does very poorly in school, and G.’s

teachers report to Mr. Carreno that G. is forgetful, hyperactive, and “bothers other kids in

class.” (R. at 269-270.) Mr. Carreno also described G. as having behavioral problems at

home as evidenced by G. disobeying and forgetting to do things that Mr. Carreno asks of

him. (R. at 273-274.)

Friends and family of the Carrenos confirmed Mr. Carreno’s concerns. (R. at 177-

179.) Dianna Giron (“Ms. Giron”), a close family friend, described G. as being the most

troublesome of Mr. Carreno’s children. (R. at 179.) Ms. Giron explained that G. ignores Mr.

Carreno’s directions and forgets what Mr. Carreno asks him to do. (Id.) Paul Medlin (“Mr.

Medlin”), Mr. Carreno’s nephew, confirmed Ms. Giron’s observations. (R. at 178.) Mr.

Medlin reported that G. often forgets what Mr. Carreno has told G. to do or does not

understand how to do “simple things.” (Id.) Another family friend, Joseph Favela, described

G. as rebellious and “difficult to control.” (R. at 177.)

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3. Psychoeducational Evaluation

In order to determine how best to handle G.’s academic and behavioral needs, G. was

referred for a psychoeducational evaluation. (R. at 139.) For the purposes of the evaluation,

G. was observed during in-class reading time. (R. at 141.) While his teacher was reading

aloud to his class, G. “had no apparent difficulty remaining on task,” and even volunteered

an answer to the whole class. (Id.) The teacher then split the class up for partner reading.

(Id.) During this activity, G. was able to track print with his finger and summarize what he

read to his partner. (Id.) 

G. was also given a standardized test designed to measure an individual’s intellectual

ability. G. received an overall score of 87, which corresponds to the 19th percentile. (R. at

142.) G.’s verbal comprehension was in the 16th percentile. (Id.) His Perceptual Reasoning

Index (a measurement of perceptual and fluid reasoning, spacial processing, and visual-motor

integration) was in the 8th percentile. (Id.) G. struggled to complete tasks which required the

use of information retained in the memory. (Id.) When tested in the area of memory

retention, G. needed “frequent reminders as to the task demands,” and he ultimately scored

in the 27th percentile. (Id.) G.’s ability to process information was above average, at the 79th

percentile (Id.); his ability to integrate his visual and motor abilities was within the 45th

percentile (Id. at 143); his reading comprehension and decoding speed was measured in the

3rd percentile (Id.); and his ability to reason and solve math problems was in the 46th

percentile. (Id.)

As a result of this evaluation, it was determined that G. was eligible for special

education for his “Specific Learning Disability.” (R.. at 144.) According to Alisa Fallon,

the School Psychologist who performed the evaluation, G. “demonstrates an inability to learn

which cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory, or other health factors. (Id.) 

4. Expert Testimony

On November 13, 2006, a hearing took place before the ALJ, at which Dr. Edward

Jasinski (“Dr. Jasinski”), a licensed Psychologist (R. at 60), provided expert testimony on the

significance of the evidence in G.’s file. (R. at 259.) Dr. Jasinski was not G.’s treating

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psychologist, nor had he personally examined G. (Id.) Rather, Dr. Jasinski’s testimony was

based solely on the information ascertained from G.’s record. (Id.) 

Dr. Jaskinski testified that, based on his interpretation of the psychoeducational

evaluation, G. suffered from a learning disability, particularly in the area of reading. (R. at

259-260.) Dr. Jasinski then testified that because G. was receiving special education services

for reading, G.’s impairment in the domain of “acquiring and using information” was

“marked.” (R. at 261.) Dr. Jasinski also testified that G.’s impairment in the area of

“attending to and completing tasks” was “less than marked.” (Id.)

5. ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ concluded that G.’s limitation in the domain of “acquiring and using

information” was “marked.” (R. at 28.) In making this finding, the ALJ acknowledged that

G. has a learning disability in the area of reading and, consequently, G. receives special

education services. (Id.) The ALJ also discussed the psychoeducational evaluation and the

fact that G. scored in the 3rd percentile in reading. (Id.) The ALJ further noted that G. scored

in the 46th percentile in math, which was in the “average range” and recognized that G.’s full

scale (overall measure of intellectual ability) and verbal comprehension scores - in the 19th

and 16th percentiles respectively - were in the “Low Average” range. (Id.) The ALJ then

considered the expert testimony of Dr. Jasinski, who testified that, based on these scores in

the psychoeducational evaluation, G.’s limitations should be labeled “marked.” (Id.) The

ALJ agreed. (Id.)

G.’s limitation in the domain of “attending to and completing tasks,” however, was

determined by the ALJ to be “less than marked.” (Id.) The ALJ noted that Mr. Carreno

described G. as having an inability to pay attention and complete tasks. (Id.) Moreover, the

ALJ acknowledged that one of G.’s teachers reported that he needs “constant encouragement

to complete tasks along with repeated verbal instruction.” (Id.) The ALJ then noted that

during the psychoeducational evaluation, G. was observed as having “no apparent difficulty

remaining on task” in the classroom, and that he “demonstrated a positive attitude and good

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attention focus.” (R. at 28-29.) The ALJ concluded that, while all of G.’s teachers have

reported problems in this domain, G. has no more than a “mild limitation.” (R. at 29.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Standard for Review of ALJ’s Decision

When deciding a Social Security appeal, the decision of the Commissioner must be

affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence and the Commissioner applied the correct

legal standards. See Batson v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th

Cir. 2004); Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). When reviewing factual

determinations by the Commissioner, acting through the Administrative Law Judge, this

Court affirms if substantial evidence supports the determinations. See Celaya v. Halter, 332

F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003); Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996).

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See

Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003); Mayes v. Massanari,

276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a

reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion when the entire record

is considered. Howard, 341 F.3d at 1011; Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d

595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or

reversing the Commissioner's conclusion, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that

of the Commissioner. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193; McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072,

1075 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts

in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities. See Benton, 331 F.3d at 1040; Edlund

v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ's determinations of law are

reviewed de novo, although deference is owed to a reasonable construction of the applicable

statutes. See Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156; McNatt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir.

2000).

B. Standard for Determining Child Disability

A child is considered “disabled” if the child has a “medically determinable physical

or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations.” 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1382c(a)(3)(C)(I). A child claimant must show that (1) he or she is not working, (2) that

he or she has a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments, and (3) that his or her

impairment(s) meets, medically equals, or functionally equals the severity of an impairment

in the Listing Impairments (discussed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, app. 1 subpt. P) (“Listings”). 

The Listings establish six domains for determining functional equivalence: (1)

acquiring and using information; (2) attending to and completing tasks; (3) interacting and

relating with others; (4) moving about and manipulating objects; (5) ability to care for self;

and (6) health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1) (2007). An impairment

functionally equals that of an impairment in the Listings, if the impairment causes “marked”

limitations in two of the six domains, or “extreme” limitations in one of the six domains. 20

C.F.R. § 416.926a(d). 

A limitation is “marked,” if it seriously impacts a child’s ability to initiate, sustain, or

complete activities on a daily basis. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(I). A “marked” limitation

is “more than moderate” but “less than extreme.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(I). An

“extreme” limitation is “more than marked,” but “does not necessarily mean a total lack or

loss of ability to function.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3)(I). 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the evidence when finding that

Plaintiff’s impairment caused a “marked,” rather than an “extreme” limitation in Plaintiff’s

ability to acquire and use information. In addition, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ incorrectly

concluded that Plaintiff’s ability to attend to and complete tasks was “less than marked,”

rather than “marked.” 

As long as there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the

decision was not based upon incorrect legal standards, this Court must affirm the decision

of the ALJ. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). However, this Court finds

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that the ALJ’s decision was not based on substantial evidence and that the ALJ’s decision

was based upon the incorrect legal standard.

A. Lack Of Substantial Evidence

1. Acquiring and Using Information 

Expert Witness Testimony 

The ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence because by merely

summarizing the evidence in the record, the ALJ failed to establish that Dr. Jasinski’s

testimony alone justified denying benefits. When the ALJ is confronted with inconsistent

evidence, the ALJ must weigh “all of the evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (emphasis

added). The ALJ must “explain in the decision the weight given to the opinions of a . . .

psychological consultant or other program physician or psychologist, as the [ALJ] must do

for any opinions from . . . nontreating sources, and other nonexamining sources.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(f)(2)(ii); See also Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (Cal. 1989) (citing

Davis v. Heckler, 868 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1987).) (To determine whether substantial

evidence exists to support denying benefits, an ALJ must consider “the administrative record

as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and [that which] detracts from the

ALJ’s conclusion.”) (emphasis added). 

Here, the ALJ provided no reason why Dr. Jasinski’s opinion was given controlling

weight, at the exclusion of all other opinions and evidence, despite the fact that Dr. Jasinski

was a nonexamining psychologist. Instead of evaluating and reconciling the conflicting

evidence in the record, the ALJ adopted, without explanation, the testimony of Dr. Jasinski.

(R. at 28). The ALJ merely stated that “[t]he medical expert testified that the claimant had

a marked limitation in this domain. The undersigned agrees and finds that in this domain,

the child has ‘marked’ limitations.” (Id.) Without justification, Dr. Jasinski’s opinion does

not constitute “substantial evidence” supporting the ALJ’s decision. Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908

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F.2d 502, 506 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The nonexamining physicians’ conclusion, with nothing

more, does not constitute substantial evidence.”). 

Layperson Testimony

In addition to the fact that the ALJ failed to provide an explanation for solely adopting

the opinion of Dr. Jasinski, the ALJ erred by failing to address the significance of the teacher

evaluations and witness statements. Lay witnesses are often in the unique position to observe

a claimant on a daily basis, and if an ALJ wishes to discount their testimony, he must

articulate specific reasons for doing so. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993).

In his ruling, the ALJ thoroughly summarized the opinions of G.’s teachers, each of whom

had personal contact with G. on a regular basis. However, the ALJ failed to explain why

their opinions were outweighed by the testimony of Dr. Jasinski, an individual who had never

had any personal contact with G. 

When an ALJ does not adequately consider the opinions of lay witnesses favorable

to the claimant, “a reviewing court cannot consider the error harmless unless it can

confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the testimony, could have

reached a different disability determination [than the lay witness].” Stout v. Comm’r Soc.

Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, if fully credited, the teachers’

testimony supports the conclusion that G.’s limitation in the domain of acquiring and using

information was “extreme.” Each of G.’s teachers indicated problems in this area,

specifically acknowledging his difficulty with reading and writing. The ALJ’s failure to

articulate any reasons for discounting these evaluations does not qualify as harmless error.

Id. When an ALJ commits error that is not harmless, the ALJ’s decision is not based on

substantial evidence. Id.

2. Attending to and Completing Tasks

The ALJ further failed to justify his finding that G.’s limitation in “attending to and

completing tasks” was “less than marked.” The ALJ is obligated to articulate some minimal

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level of reasoning justifying his findings. See also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th

Cir. 1995) (“General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony

is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.”).

Here, the ALJ did not set forth how the evidence led him to his decision. Instead, the

ALJ merely stated, in a conclusory manner, “there is no evidence of more than a mild

limitation in this domain.” On the contrary, the record is replete with evidence of “more than

a mild limitation.” For example, Ms. Turman reported that G. had a “serious problem”

working without distracting himself and others, on an hourly basis. She also reported that

G. had a “serious problem” on a daily basis with completing assignments, and doing so

without careless mistakes. She also listed several other problems for which G. had an

“obvious problem” on a daily basis, including (1) focusing to complete a task, (2) refocusing

when necessary, (3) carrying out multi-step instructions, (4) changing activities without being

disruptive, and (5) working at a reasonable pace. Furthermore, G.’s special education

teacher, Ms. Tundle, reported “obvious problems” on a daily basis in several of the

aforementioned categories. Ms. Tundle also described G. as needing “constant

encouragement” to complete his schoolwork along with “repeated verbal instruction.” 

Despite the fact that the ALJ acknowledged G.’s inability to attend to and complete

tasks, the ALJ still concluded, without explanation, that there was “no evidence,” that G.’s

limitation was more than mild. If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or

reversing the Commissioner's conclusion, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that

of the Commissioner. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193; McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072,

1075 (9th Cir. 2002). However, without the ALJ specifically articulating his reasoning, the

ALJ has effectively prevented this Court from reviewing whether the ALJ’s judgement was

a reasonable interpretation of the evidence. 

The ALJ stated that, on one occasion, G. was “observed in the classroom to have no

apparent difficulty remaining on task” but again, the ALJ failed to resolve the discrepancy

between this observation and the observation of G’s teachers. (R. at 28). The ALJ did not

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explain why a one-day observation by a school psychologist, outside the context of the

normal learning environment, should be given more weight than the opinions of G.’s teachers

who work with him on a daily basis and are uniquely positioned to evaluate his limitations.

(Id.) There was no explanation as to why one piece of evidence was more compelling, or

should be given more weight, than another competing piece of evidence. (Id.) The ALJ also

mentioned that during the psychoeducational evaluation, G. “demonstrated a positive attitude

and a good attentional focus.” (Id.) However, the ALJ did not explain why the

psychoeducational evaluation, which resulted in G.’s referral for special education and found

G.’s overall intellectual performance to be within the 19th percentile, should be interpreted

to mean that G.’s limitation in this area was “less than marked.” (Id.) The ALJ must

articulate some justification for such conclusions. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 834.

Finally, while the ALJ did acknowledge Mr. Carreno’s testimony and the witness

statements of friends and family of the Carrenos, he did not consider these statements in the

context of “attending to and completing tasks.” Rather, the ALJ discussed these statements

only in the context of “interacting and relating with others.” The ALJ acknowledged that

G.’s father, Mr. Carreno, was a credible witness when he testified during the hearing that G.

suffers from behavioral and learning problems and has difficulty following directions. These

sentiments were corroborated by the written witness statements of various friends and family

members. It is not clear why the ALJ discussed these statements in the context of

“interacting and relating with others,” rather than giving them weight within the context of

“attending to and completing tasks.” On its face, it would seem that G.’s inability to do

things that his father asks him to do would be more relevant to the domain of “attending to

and completing tasks.” Perhaps the ALJ’s conclusion would have been different if he had

considered these statements within the context of “attending to and completing tasks.” Or,

perhaps the ALJ had good reason to discuss these statements only in the context of

“interacting and relating with others.” However, the ALJ’s failure to articulate his reasons

makes it impossible for the Court to understand the ALJ’s decision.

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For these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ’s conclusions that G’s limitations in

the domain of “acquiring and using information” and “attending to and completing tasks” are

merely “marked” and “less than marked,” respectively, are not based on substantial evidence

from the record. 

B. Incorrect Legal Standard

In addition to not justifying the weight given to Dr. Jasinski’s testimony, the ALJ

failed to reconcile the inconsistencies between Dr. Jasinski’s testimony and the legal standard

for determining a child’s level of impairment. When determining whether a child suffers

from limitations, the ALJ must compare the child to other children of the same age without

impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a(b)(3) (emphasis added). During his testimony, in

response to being asked whether G.’s reading level, in the 3rd percentile, called for a label of

“extreme” limitation, Dr. Jasinski responded, “[n]o, not at all. That’s pretty standard for

people with learning disability problems.” (R. at 265). Dr. Jasinski erred by comparing G.’s

performance to people with learning disabilities, rather than to other children without any

impairments. Thus, the ALJ’s adoption of Dr. Jasinski’s opinion, without resolution of Dr.

Jasinski’s application of the incorrect legal standard was legal error. 20 C.F.R. §

416.924a(b)(3).

IV. REMAND FOR AWARD OF BENEFITS

This Court has discretion to decide whether to remand for the award of benefits, or

for further administrative proceedings. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996)

(citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 1989)). Generally, benefits are

awarded where the record has been fully developed and where further administrative

proceedings would serve no useful purpose. Id.; Ramirez v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449, 1455 (9th

Cir. 1993); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). In Smolen, the court found

it appropriate to award benefits where:

(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting [the

claimant’s supporting] evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must

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be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear

from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled

were such evidence credited.

8 F.3d at 1292. Here, the ALJ did not provide any reasons or explanation for rejecting the

opinions of G.’s teachers, or his friends and family. Instead, the ALJ’s decision was based

exclusively on Dr. Jasinski’s interpretation of the objective evidence on record, and Dr.

Jasinski’s incorrect understanding of the law. There are also no remaining issues that must

be resolved by additional administrative procedures before a determination of disability can

be made. Rather, the record is full of objective psychological evidence, along with reports

from G.’s teachers and statements from friends and family. Remanding for further

proceedings would serve no useful purpose, but would unnecessarily delay the award of

benefits. In addition, allowing the ALJ “to decide the issue again would create an unfair

‘heads we win; tails, let’s play again’ system of disability benefits adjudication.” Benecke

v. Barnhart, 379 F.2d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the decision of the ALJ is

REVERSED and REMANDED for the award of benefits.

IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that the ALJ erred in his disability

determination. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

11), is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 14) is DENIED.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly. 

DATED this 3rd day of July, 2008.

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