Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17564/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17564-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DINO WAYNE KYZAR,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES L. RYAN; STATE OF

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 12-17564

D.C. No.

CV-06-02015-

SRB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 19, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed March 12, 2015

Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

Circuit Judges, and Elaine E. Bucklo, Senior District

Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Bucklo

* The Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 1 of 22
2 KYZAR V. RYAN

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Arizona

state prisoner Dino Wayne Kyzar’s habeas corpus petition

challenging his conviction for conspiring with LeroyCropper

to commit a deadly or dangerous assault by a prisoner, in a

case in which Cropper stabbed a correctional officer to death.

The panel held that Kyzar’s pro se filings before the

Arizona trial court and Arizona Court of Appeals fairly

presented his sufficiency of the evidence claim, which was

sufficient to exhaust his state remedies and avoid a procedural

default.

The panel held, after reviewing the full trial record, that

the Arizona trial court did not apply Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307 (1979), in an objectively unreasonable fashion when

it rejected Kyzar’s sufficiency of the evidence claim, where

the State presented evidence that Kyzar knew Cropper

intended to attack someone, agreed to help him obtain a knife,

and took an overt act in furtherance of this conspiracy.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 2 of 22
KYZAR V. RYAN 3

COUNSEL

Tara K. Hoveland (argued), South Lake Tahoe, California, for

Petitioner-Appellant.

David A. Simpson (argued), Deputy Attorney General;

Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General; Joseph T. Maziarz,

Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section; and David A.

Sullivan, Assistant Attorney General, Arizona Attorney

General’s Office, Phoenix, Arizona, for RespondentsAppellees.

OPINION

BUCKLO, Senior District Judge:

On March 7, 1997, Leroy Cropper, an Arizona prisoner,

stabbed a correctional officer to death at the Perryville state

prison. A jury convicted Petitioner Dino Kyzar of conspiring

with Cropper and others to commit a deadly or dangerous

assault by a prisoner in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 13-1206.

Kyzar sought federal habeas relief on multiple grounds. 

In Kyzar’s first appeal, we vacated and remanded for the

limited purpose of having the district court consider in the

first instance whether the evidence adduced at trial was

constitutionally insufficient to support his conviction. See

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (holding that

petitioner is entitled to habeas relief if, after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, “no

rational [jury] could have found proof of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt”).

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 3 of 22
4 KYZAR V. RYAN

On remand, the district court rejected Kyzar’s sufficiency

of the evidence claim. We affirm.

I. Background

At this stage, we must view the record in the light most

favorable to the prosecution and presume that the jury

resolved any evidentiary conflicts in its favor. Id. at 326

(“[A] federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of

historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must

presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the

record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in

favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.”). 

Moreover, we “cannot second-guess the jury’s credibility

assessments; rather, ‘under Jackson, the assessment of the

credibility of witnesses is generally beyond the scope of

review.’” U.S. v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 2010)

(en banc) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 330 (1995));

see also Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004)

(“A jury’s credibility determinations are...entitled to neartotal deference under Jackson.”).

A. Facts

At the time of the murder, Cropper lived in Building 26

of the San Juan unit at Perryville prison. The building was

divided into four pods—A, B, C, and D—with each pod

having an upper and lower tier. Cropper lived in Cell No.

258 on the D pod’s upper tier. Cropper’s cellmate was Lloyd

Elkins. Cropper and Elkins had been cellmates for about one

month in Building 24 before they were transferred to

Building 26 on March 3, 1997, four days before the murder.

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 4 of 22
KYZAR V. RYAN 5

While Cropper was living in Building 24—but before he

was cellmates with Elkins—Kyzar gave him a nine to twelve

inch steel knife with electrical tape wrapped around the base

to form a handle. A few weeks later, after Cropper and

Elkins became cellmates, Elkins saw Cropper in possession

of a second knife with a serrated blade. According to Elkins,

Cropper generally knew where to find knives buried around

the prison yard. With respect to the prevalence of knives at

Perryville, Cropper testified at trial that “[e]verbody on the

yard ha[d] some type of weapon.”

On the day of the murder, Deborah Landsperger, a

correctional officer assigned to Building 26, discovered that

mops and brooms were missing from the equipment room. 

Around 10:30 A.M., Landsperger and Brent Lumley, another

correctional officer, decided to conduct a cell-to-cell search

for the missing items. They started searching in the D pod’s

upper tier of cells.

Cropper and Elkins lived in the second cell searched. 

After Landsperger noticed tattoo patterns on top of a cabinet,

she ordered Cropper and Elkins to exit the cell. Lumley did

a pat down search of the inmates. The officers ordered

Cropper and Elkins to wait outside the cell until the search

was over.

Landsperger and Lumley confiscated several items of

contraband during their search of Cell No. 258, including

more tattoo paraphernalia, a serrated knife blade without a

handle, and either a “cement nail,” or a four to six inch

“railroad spike.” At some point during the search, Cropper

came back into his cell and called Landsperger a “corncob

cunt” and a “bitch.” Lumley told Cropper, “Don’t be doing

that,” which prompted Cropper to curse at Lumley too. 

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 5 of 22
6 KYZAR V. RYAN

Cropper acknowledged that his tirade was so loud that other

inmates in D pod probably heard him.

Landsperger and Lumley ordered Cropper to sit in the dirt

area on the bottom tier of the D pod for the remainder of the

search. Joshua “Tiny” Brice, an inmate who lived in the B

pod of Building 26, saw Cropper standing by the stairs during

the search. As Brice walked by, Cropper said that his cell

was being shaken down. The search concluded around 11:30

A.M. because Landsperger and Lumley needed to count the

inmates and take them to lunch.

Landsperger showed her supervisor, Lieutenant Hugh

Matson, the knife she had confiscated from Cropper’s cell

and recounted his verbal tirade. Matson, Landsperger and

one or two sergeants went to Cropper’s cell to address his

behavior. When asked if he had been verbally abusive

towards Landsperger, Cropper said, “Fuck that bitch. She

doesn’t know what she’s doing.” Cropper told Matson,

“Fuck you, punk. Get out of my fucking house, you little

punk. Step off. I’ve got nothing to say to you.” Id. Cropper

also declared, “It’s on,” which Matson interpreted as a direct

threat of violence. Cropper agreed that his words were a

threat of revenge. Matson placed Cropper and Elkins on

lockdown pending a disciplinary investigation. Cropper

kicked or punched his cell door as the officers were leaving. 

Id.

After the correctional officers left, Cropper had a

conversation with Eugene Long through the vent between

their cells. Long lived in the neighboring cell, No. 257, with

Bruce Howell. According to Elkins, Long characterized the

shakedown of Cropper’s cell as a form of harassment and said

there “needed to be a fallout on the yard.” Elkins testified

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 6 of 22
KYZAR V. RYAN 7

that Cropper was acting “like a maniac” after this

conversation and ranting about how the correctional officers

had disrespected him.

About twenty minutes after his first conversation with

Long, Cropper said through the vent, “Hey, homeboy, go get

Dino and Blue for me.” Dino Kyzar and Sean “Blue” Gieslin

were inmates who lived together in the A pod of Building 26

and exercised authority over the other white prisoners. A

week or two before the murder, Gieslin told Dave Fipps,

another inmate in Building 26, that Kyzar was running the

yard to deflect attention from Gieslin. According to Fipps,

Kyzar and Gieslin were the people to see if you needed a

weapon because they were effectively in charge among the

white inmates.

Shortly after lunch, Kyzar and Gieslin arrived at

Cropper’s cell. Elkins, who was sitting on his bed, overheard

the conversation that took place through the cell door

window. Cropper told Kyzar, “I want the good one,” while

making a stabbing motion. A “good one” is prison slang for

a knife or “shank” with a handle on it. Kyzar responded, “I

ain’t got it. You got it.” Cropper replied, “Give me any

one.” Kyzar then cautioned Cropper about his apparent

intentions, “Well, are you sure about this? How much time

you got, homeboy?” Cropper said, “It don’t fucking matter. 

I’m a career criminal anyway.” Id. As Kyzar and Gieslin

were leaving, Cropper said, “You guys need to get off the

yard,” an expression that was not defined at trial. The entire

conversation between Cropper and Kyzar lasted about two

minutes.

As Joshua Brice was returning from lunch, Gieslin,

Kyzar, and Long approached him near a picnic table in the B

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 7 of 22
8 KYZAR V. RYAN

pod. Kyzar instructed Brice to “[s]how Eugene [Long] where

the shank is.” Brice responded that he did not know exactly

where to find a knife. Kyzar replied, “Just show him the

general area.” Id. Brice complied because of the respect

Kyzar commanded among the white inmates.

Brice indicated to Long a dirt area in the B pod where

another inmate had buried a knife about one month earlier. 

Brice watched for guards while Long started digging in that

area. As Long was digging, Clifford Settle, an inmate who

lived on the B pod’s bottom tier near where Long was

digging, asked Brice if he was looking for a knife. Brice said

no, but indicated that Long was trying to find a shank. After

Brice summoned Long, Settle told them a knife was hidden

between two concrete slabs outside his cell. Long straddled

the concrete slabs, pulled out a knife, and concealed it in his

pants. Brice and Long then walked back to their respective

cells.

Meanwhile, Kyzar and Gieslin encountered Dave Fipps

in the yard as they were heading to the administration

building. Gieslin cryptically instructed Fipps to go to Long’s

cell to see if everything had been handled. When Fipps

arrived at Cell No. 257, Howell was standing outside keeping

watch while Long and Brice were inside the cell. Fipps

reported that Kyzar and Gieslin wanted to know if everything

was being handled. Brice said yes.

According to Brice, Fipps held two flyswatters that Long

had taped together while Long taped the knife he had

retrieved to the flyswatters. Long stood on the toilet in his

cell and called through the vent, “Hey, Padlock,” which was

Cropper’s nickname. Elkins heard Long tell Cropper, “I got

it,” to which Cropper responded, “Let me see it.” After Long

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 8 of 22
KYZAR V. RYAN 9

showed Cropper the knife, Cropper said, “That ain’t the good

one. Fuck it. Send it through.” Id. Elkins testified that Long

used the flyswatters to pass the knife to Cropper through the

vent between their cells. Cropper also asked for a righthanded glove, which Long passed through the vent using the

same technique. After wrapping a boot lace around the

bottom of the knife, Cropper asked Long to spin the lock on

his cell. Long complied. Elkins then heard either Long or

Howell say, “It’s open. Go, go, go.”

Landsperger, who had just finished writing a report in the

control room for the C and D pods about the items

confiscated from Cropper that morning, saw Long playing

with the lock on Cropper’s cell. When Landsperger heard

Long say, “Oh shit,” she ordered him to come down and talk

with her. As Long was talking to Landsperger, whose back

was turned to the control room where Lumley was writing his

own report, Cropper escaped from his cell. Cropper went

directly to the control room and stabbed Lumley to death with

the knife Long had passed to him only a few minutes earlier. 

All four pods in Building 26 were immediately placed on

lockdown.

Brice was in the administration building when the

lockdown was ordered. As Brice was walking back to

Building 26, Gieslin and Kyzar approached him in the main

recreation yard. All three men were detained in a fenced in

area outside Building 26 along with other inmates. As Brice,

Gieslin, and Kyzar were waiting to reenter the building, they

saw Howell, Long, Cropper, and Elkins escorted across the

yard in restraints. The guards were yelling at Cropper and

crying as they brought him out of Building 26. Brice,

Gieslin, and Kyzar also saw an ambulance and helicopter

arrive and then leave. Shortly before Brice was removed

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 9 of 22
10 KYZAR V. RYAN

from the fenced in area, Kyzar told him to keep his mouth

shut.

B. Procedural History

The State of Arizona charged Kyzar with conspiring to

commit a deadly or dangerous assault by a prisoner (Count I);

aiding a dangerous or deadly assault by a prisoner (Count II);

and promoting prison contraband (Count III).

On September 13, 1999, a Maricopa County jury found

Kyzar guilty on Count I, but acquitted him on Counts II and

III. After denying Kyzar’s motion for a new trial, the trial

judge sentenced him to twenty-one years in prison. Kyzar’s

arguments on direct appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals

were unsuccessful. The Arizona Supreme Court denied

Kyzar’s petition for review on November 1, 2001.

About one year later, in October 2002, Kyzar filed a pro

se petition for post-conviction relief arguing, inter alia, that

the State had not introduced sufficient evidence to convict

him of conspiring to commit a dangerous or deadly assault on

a prison guard under the standard recently announced in

Evanchyk v. Stewart, 47 P.3d 1114 (Ariz. 2002). In denying

Kyzar’s post-conviction petition, the trial court held that

Evanchyk was “inapposite” to his case. Kyzar renewed his

argument based on Evanchyk before both the Arizona Court

of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court, which summarily

denied Kyzar’s petitions for review on March 24, 2004 and

November 9, 2004, respectively. Kyzar’s subsequent motion

in state court is irrelevant to his sufficiency of the evidence

claim.

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 10 of 22
KYZAR V. RYAN 11

On August 21, 2006, Kyzar filed a pro se federal habeas

petition arguing, as its third ground for relief, that the

evidence admitted at trial was constitutionally insufficient to

support his conviction. The district court, adopting a

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, denied

Kyzar’s habeas petition in its entirety in February 2008. 

After issuing a certificate of appealability on Kyzar’s

challenge to the trial court’s denial of his motion to sever and

his sufficiency of the evidence claim, we vacated in part and

remanded only on the latter issue. See Kyzar v. Ryan, 430 F.

App’x 630 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 431.

On remand, the district court rejected Kyzar’s sufficiency

of the evidence claim. See Kyzar v. Ryan, No. CV 06-2015-

PHX-SRB, 2012 WL 5497805 (D. Ariz. Nov. 13, 2012). We

granted a certificate of appealability on this issue. See

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

II. Exhaustion of Remedies

Respondent’s first argument on appeal is that Kyzar failed

to exhaust available state remedies because he did not fairly

present his sufficiency of the evidence claim to the Arizona

courts in a timely fashion. Our review is de novo. See

Chambers v. McDaniel, 549 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2008).

Kyzar’s claim is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which

requires petitioners to exhaust the remedies available to them

in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). “[T]he exhaustion

doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair

opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before

those claims are presented to the federal courts.” O’Sullivan

v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). In practical terms,

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 11 of 22
12 KYZAR V. RYAN

“state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity

to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete

round of the State’s established appellate review process.” 

Id. A habeas claim is procedurally defaulted if it was not

fairly presented to the state courts in a timely fashion. Id. at

848.

“[E]xcept in habeas petitions in life-sentence or capital

cases, claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for

purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals

has ruled on them.” Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010

(9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Kyzar was charged with three

class 2 felonies under Arizona law: conspiracy to commit a

dangerous or deadly assault by a prisoner; aiding a dangerous

or deadly assault by a prisoner; and promoting prison

contraband.1 The statutory maximum sentence for a class 2

felony in Arizona is thirty-five years. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 13-704(E). Because Kyzar did not face a possible life

sentence or the death penalty, our exhaustion analysis focuses

on whether he fairly presented his sufficiency of the evidence

claim to the Arizona trial court and the Arizona Court of

Appeals. See O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845 (holding that

petitioners must “invoke[e] one complete round of the State’s

established appellate review process” (emphasis added)).

1

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-1206 (categorizing “dangerous or

deadly assault by a prisoner” as a class 2 felony), 13-2505(F)

(categorizing “promoting prison contraband” as a class 2 felony if

contraband is a “deadly weapon” or “dangerous instrument”); see also id.

at §§ 13-303(B) (subject to qualifications not relevant here, aiding an

offense is treated the same as committing the underlying substantive

offense), 13-1003(D) (except for class 1 felonies, “conspiracy is an

offense of the same class as the most serious offense which is the object

of or result of the conspiracy”).

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 12 of 22
KYZAR V. RYAN 13

“In order to ‘fairly present’ an issue to a state court, a

[habeas] petitioner must ‘present the substance of his claim

to the state courts, including a reference to a federal

constitutional guarantee and a statement of facts that entitle

the petitioner to relief.’” Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976,

992 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573,

582 (9th Cir. 2009)). “[F]or the purposes of exhaustion, pro

se petitions are held to a more lenient standard than counseled

petitions.” Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir.

2003) (citing Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc)); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 487 (2000) (“[T]he complete exhaustion rule is not to

‘trap the unwary pro se prisoner.’” (quoting Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982))).

Applying these principles, we conclude that Kyzar’s pro

se filings before the Arizona trial court and Arizona Court of

Appeals fairly presented his sufficiency of the evidence

claim. In his petition for post-conviction relief, Kyzar argued

that Evanchyk constituted a significant change in Arizona

conspiracy law insofar as it required the State to prove “both

that the perpetrator ha[d] an intent to promote or aid

commission of a specific offense and that he agree[d] with

another person that the offense be committed.” 47 P.3d at

1117. In Kyzar’s view, the State failed to prove at trial that

he “premeditated an agreement to conspire [sic] dangerous or

deadly assault [on] Officer Lumley inside of the prison

officers control room or any other officer or person(s) before

or on March 7, 1999.” Kyzar argued that the absence of

evidence showing an agreement violated his due process

rights. Id.

As a pro se filing, Kyzar’s post-conviction petition was

adequate to alert the district court to the “substance of his

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 13 of 22
14 KYZAR V. RYAN

claim,” including its constitutional basis. Scott, 567 F.3d at

582. The essence of Kyzar’s argument was that the State had

failed to prove the elements of his alleged crime. Although

Kyzar did not cite In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), or

Jackson for the proposition that the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment protects him from being convicted

unless the State proves every element of the charged offense

beyond a reasonable doubt, the substance of Kyzar’s claim

was apparent from his attempt to articulate the legal elements

for the crime of conviction and his explicit reference to due

process. Indeed, Kyzar’s citation to an Arizona Supreme

Court case was entirely consistent with fair presentation of a

Jackson claim, which necessarily turns on how crimes are

defined under state law. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16

(“[T]he standard [of review] must be applied with explicit

reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense

as defined by state law.”). The merits of Kyzar’s Evanchyk

claim are irrelevant to the fair presentation issue. Kyzar’s pro

se filing in the Arizona trial court plainly did enough to

“alert[] that court to the federal nature of [his] claim.” 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).

The same is true of Kyzar’s petition for review in the

Arizona Court of Appeals. Kyzar argued that “the State

never established the grounds and rules outlined in

Evanchyk...establishing petitioner’s agreement to aid or

counsel with Leroy Cropper in the assault and murder of

Officer Brent Lumley on March 7, 1997.” Kyzar conceded

that the crime at issue in Evanchyk was conspiracy to commit

premeditated murder, but characterized the decision as

“reinforce[ing]” the “foundational grounds” or elements for

the crime of conspiracy under Arizona law. Id. Although

Kyzar did not mention due process, he cited State v. Mincey,

687 P.2d 1180 (Ariz. 1984), in which the Arizona Supreme

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 14 of 22
KYZAR V. RYAN 15

Court, citing Jackson, held that there was sufficient evidence

to support the defendant’s second-degree murder conviction. 

Id. at 1187, 1190. Kyzar’s citation to Mincey, read in

conjunction with his attempt to articulate the legal elements

for the crime of conviction, fairly apprised the Arizona Court

of Appeals that he was raising a federal constitutional

sufficiency of the evidence claim. See Peterson, 319 F.3d at

1158 (holding that “for purposes of exhaustion, a citation to

a state case analyzing a federal constitutional issue serves the

same purpose as a citation to a federal case analyzing such an

issue”).

In sum, Kyzar fairly presented his sufficiency of the

evidence claim to the Arizona courts, which was sufficient to

exhaust his state remedies and avoid a procedural default of

that claim.

III. Analysis

We review the district court’s rejection of Kyzar’s habeas

petition claim de novo. See Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978,

982 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). We apply AEDPA deference

to the Arizona Court of Appeals’s decision if the Jackson

claim was “adjudicated on the merits.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

“When a federal claim has been [fairly] presented to a state

court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed

that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the

absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles

to the contrary.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770,

784–85 (2011). Kyzar has not attempted to overcome the

presumption that his claim was adjudicated on the merits in

state court, so AEDPA’s deferential standards of review

govern this case.

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 15 of 22
16 KYZAR V. RYAN

Under AEDPA, Kyzar’s sufficiencyof the evidence claim

“face[s] a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because [it

is] subject to two layers of judicial deference.” Coleman v.

Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012) (per curiam). First, the

Arizona courts were required to view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution and ask whether “any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S.

at 319. Second, under AEDPA, we may grant habeas relief

only if the Arizona courts “unreasonabl[y] appli[ed]” the

already deferential Jackson standard, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),

meaning that their application of law to facts was “objectively

unreasonable,” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000). 

A state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent is

objectively unreasonable when it is “so lacking in

justification that there was an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786–87.

Under AEDPA, “when a state court does not explain the

reason for its decision, we ‘look through’ to the last statecourt decision that provides a reasoned explanation capable

of review.” Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir.

2014) (quoting Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079

n.2 (9th Cir. 2000)). The Arizona Court of Appeals

summarily denied Kyzar’s petition for discretionary review,

so the only possible candidate for a reasoned state court

decision capable of review is the Arizona trial court’s holding

that Evanchyk was inapposite to Kyzar’s sufficiency of the

evidence claim.

The Arizona trial court presumably found Evanchyk

inapposite because that case defined the elements of

conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, whereas Kyzar

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 16 of 22
KYZAR V. RYAN 17

was convicted of conspiracy to commit a dangerous or deadly

assault by a prisoner. However, Evanchyk also underscored

that “the crime of conspiracy requires both that the

perpetrator have an intent to promote or aid commission of a

specific offense and that he agrees with another person that

the offense be committed.” 47 P.3d at 1117. After citing

Evanchyk, Kyzar argued that the State had not established

that he “premeditated an agreement to conspire [sic]

dangerous or deadly assault [on] Officer Lumley inside of the

prison officers control room or any other officer or

person(s).” In other words, Kyzar used Evanchyk to argue

that the State had failed to prove an essential element of any

conspiracy crime: an agreement with another person that a

specific offense—here, a dangerous or deadly assault by a

prisoner—be committed.

The trial court rejected Kyzar’s Evanchyk argument,

thereby rejecting his fairly presented Jackson claim at the

same time, but did so without discussing whether the

evidence against Kyzar was constitutionally sufficient to

support his conviction. Without a “reasoned explanation” for

the trial court’s rejection of Kyzar’s sufficiency of the

evidence claim, we must “‘engage in an independent review

of the record and ascertain whether the state court’s decision

was objectively unreasonable.’” Murray, 745 F.3d at 996

(quoting Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir.

2013)). “Crucially, this [independent review] is not a de novo

review of the constitutional question.” Id (same). The

ultimate question under AEDPA is still whether the Arizona

trial court’s rejection of Kyzar’s claim was an objectively

unreasonable application of the Jackson standard.

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 17 of 22
18 KYZAR V. RYAN

A. The Evidence Against Kyzar

Our independent review of the record, viewed in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, establishes the following. 

Kyzar and Gieslin shared a cell at Perryville prison and

exercised authority over the other white inmates. In fact,

Kyzar and Gieslin were the people to see if a white inmate

needed a knife, as evidenced by the fact that Kyzar had given

Cropper a knife in the past.

On the day of the murder, Cropper threw a tantrum while

various items of contraband—including a serrated

knife—were confiscated from his cell. After Cropper was

placed on lockdown, he asked Long to summon Kyzar and

Gieslin. When Kyzar arrived at Cropper’s cell, Cropper said

he wanted “the good one,” meaning a knife with a handle,

while making a stabbing motion. After a short discussion

about whether Cropper already had the specific knife he was

asking Kyzar to obtain for him, Kyzar asked, “Well, are you

sure about this? How much time you got, homeboy?” 

Cropper said, “It don’t fucking matter. I’m a career criminal

anyway.” Id. As Kyzar and Gieslin were leaving, Cropper

told them to “get off the yard.” Kyzar then instructed Brice

to show Long, who lived in the cell right next to Cropper,

where to find a specific knife that he referred to as “the

shank.” Kyzar was also present when Gieslin instructed

Fipps to go to Long’s cell and see if everything was being

handled.

After the murder, Kyzar was standing with Gieslin and

Brice while they saw Cropper taken out of Building 26 in

restraints. The guards who were escorting Cropper were

crying and yelling at him. Kyzar turned to Brice and told him

to keep his mouth shut.

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 18 of 22
KYZAR V. RYAN 19

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The ultimate question is whether, on the facts recounted

above, it was objectively unreasonable for the Arizona trial

court to deny Kyzar’s sufficiency of the evidence claim. We

think not.

Kyzar was convicted of conspiracy to commit a

dangerous or deadly assault by a prisoner in violation of Ariz.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1206.2 The elements of this crime come,

in part, from Arizona’s criminal conspiracy statute, which

provides:

A person commits conspiracy if, with the

intent to promote or aid the commission of an

offense, such person agrees with one or more

persons that at least one of them or another

person will engage in conduct constituting the

offense and one of the parties commits an

overt act in furtherance of the offense, except

that an overt act shall not be required if the

object of the conspiracy was to commit any

felony upon the person of another, or to

commit an offense under § 13-1508 [firstdegree burglary] or 13-1704 [arson].

 

2

 Kyzar’s acquittal on two other counts—aiding a dangerous or deadly

assault by a prisoner and promoting prison contraband—proves nothing

about whether the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support his

conviction for a different crime. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57,

67 (1984) (holding that sufficiency of the evidence review “should be

independent of the jury’s determination that evidence on another count

was insufficient”).

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 19 of 22
20 KYZAR V. RYAN

A.R.S. § 13-1003(A). The object of the alleged conspiracy in

this case—i.e., a dangerous or deadly assault—constitutes a

“felony upon the person of another,” so the State was not

required to prove that Cropper, Kyzar, or any other coconspirator took an overt act in furtherance of their unlawful

objective.

Kyzar’s habeas claim boils down to whether there was

sufficient evidence to find that he: (1) “inten[ded] to promote

or aid the commission of [the assault]” and (2) “agree[d] with

one or more persons that at least one of them or another

person [would commit the assault].” Id. The most damaging

evidence on these elements is Kyzar’s conversation with

Cropper about obtaining a knife. The Arizona trial court

could reasonably find that the combination of Cropper’s

stabbing motion and Kyzar’s questions—“Well, are you sure

about this? How much time you got, homeboy?”—

demonstrated that Kyzar knew Cropper intended to assault

someone with the knife rather than keep it for possible selfdefense. There was also evidence that Kyzar had given

Cropper a knife in the past. In light of this history, Kyzar’s

questions to Cropper could reasonably be construed to

suggest that he was concerned about something more serious

than Cropper possibly getting caught with prison contraband. 

Further, Long, whom Cropper sent to summon Kyzar, knew

of Cropper’s tirade and had said that there needed to be a

“fallout.” The jury could infer that Long communicated that

background to Kyzar before the latter arrived at Cropper’s

cell and heard his request.3

3 As for Cropper’s warning that Kyzar and Gieslin needed to “get off

the yard,” the most we can say about this ambiguous expression is that it

does not suggest that Cropper was seeking to obtain a knife for purposes

of self-defense.

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 20 of 22
KYZAR V. RYAN 21

Knowing that Cropper wanted a knife to assault someone,

Kyzar used his authority over the other white inmates to enlist

Brice in the effort to help Cropper obtain a specific

knife—i.e., a shank that Cropper and Kyzar understood to be

“the good one” because it had a handle. Kyzar was also

present when Gieslin asked Fipps to see if everything in

Long’s cell was being handled. A jury could reasonably find

that Kyzar knew what was supposed to be happening in

Long’s cell. After all, Kyzar had set in motion a plan for

Long to obtain a knife shortly after Cropper said he wanted

one and, the jury could infer, had an opportunity to hear the

background circumstances from Long.

Kyzar’s comment to Brice while they were waiting to

reenter Building 26 after the murder also provides evidence

from which the jury could infer that Kyzar knew Cropper

wanted a knife to harm someone rather than simply for selfdefense. Guards who were crying and yelling at Cropper as

he and three other inmates were taken out of Building 26 in

restraints. Kyzar reacted to these events by telling Brice to

keep his mouth shut. The jury could infer from Kyzar’s

statement that he knew his earlier instruction to Brice to help

Long find a knife was part of a larger plan connected to

Cropper that had come to fruition.

On these facts, the Arizona trial court did not apply

Jackson in an objectively unreasonable fashion when it

rejected Kyzar’s sufficiency of the evidence claim. The State

presented evidence at trial suggesting that Kyzar knew

Cropper intended to attack someone, agreed to help him

obtain a knife, and even took an overt act in furtherance of

this conspiracy. Kyzar was more than merely present while

other inmates engaged in criminal activity, so his reliance on

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 21 of 22
22 KYZAR V. RYAN

Piaskowski v. Bett, 256 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2001), is

misplaced.

After reviewing the full trial record, we cannot say that

Kyzar’s sufficiency of the evidence claim was so meritorious

that, by rejecting it, the Arizona trial court committed “an

error well understood and comprehended in existing law

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786–87; see also Williams, 529 U.S. at

410 (emphasizing that “an unreasonable application of

federal law” is a more serious error than “an incorrect

application of federal law”). Therefore, under AEDPA,

Kyzar is not entitled to habeas relief.

* * * * *

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 12-17564, 03/12/2015, ID: 9454445, DktEntry: 50-1, Page 22 of 22