Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01237/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01237-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCO BENITEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

RALPH M. DIAZ, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 12-1237-W(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

 I

 INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, Marco Benitez (hereafter “Petitioner”), a state

prisoner proceeding with counsel, has filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (hereafter “Petition”)

challenging his conviction for two counts of robbery, two counts of

carjacking, and the unlawful taking of a vehicle, as well as a true

finding of a gang enhancement. (Petition at 1.) Petitioner

contends that habeas relief is proper because his right to effective

assistance of counsel was violated when his trial counsel failed to

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request a standard jury instruction regarding gang activity

evidence. (Petition at 11-12.) 

This Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s Answer,

Petitioner’s Traverse, and all supporting documents submitted by the

parties. Based on the documents and evidence presented, and for the

reasons set forth below, this Court finds that Petitioner is not

entitled to the relief requested and RECOMMENDS that the Petition be

DENIED.

 II

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact

and presumes them to be correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see

also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of

historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from such

facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). The

facts as found by the state appellate court are substantially set

forth below: (see Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5 at 2-8.)

The crimes in this case occurred in San Marcos, California,

where two rival gangs operate: Varios San Marcos (VSM, also known as

“Ghost Town”) and South Los. Petitioner is a member of the VSM

gang.

On February 18, 2008, a little after midnight, James Novet

was robbed while he was walking home from work (“the Novet robbery”). The robbers jumped out of an older model white car, pointed

a gun at him, and took his cell phone and wallet. As the robbers

went back to the car, they said, “You just got jacked by Ghost

Town.”

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Two hours after Novet was robbed, Julieta Santiago and Mario

Rodriguez were the victims of a carjacking and robbery (“the

Santiago/Rodriguez robbery”). On February 18, 2008, at about 2:00

a.m., Santiago and Rodriguez were in Santiago’s Ford Taurus in the

parking lot of an apartment complex. The perpetrators got out of an

older model white or cream-colored car and pointed a gun at

Santiago.1/ One of them threw a bicycle in front of Santiago’s car,

stating “That’s what you are going to use because we’re going to

take your car.” After Santiago and Rodriguez got out of the car,

one of the robbers placed a sharp object at Rodriguez’s neck and

took his wallet. Two of the perpetrators drove away in Santiago’s

car, and two others left in the white car. After the perpetrators

left, Santiago and Rodriguez called the police.

The victims of the two incidents were unable to identify the

perpetrators.2/ However, as discussed below, the perpetrators were

identified to the police by a 15-year-old male, Juan L., who was

with the perpetrators during the crimes. Juan told the police that

the offenses were committed by Petitioner and two other individuals

(Abraham Ibarra and George Lopez). At trial, Juan recanted his

statements identifying Petitioner, claiming that only Ibarra and

Lopez were with him during the offenses. The jury was presented

1/

The gun used in both the Novet robbery and the Santiago/Rodriguez robbery 

was determined to be a toy gun.

2/

When Novet was interviewed by the police, he stated he might be able to

identify the driver but he was not sure. When Novet was shown a photographic

line-up which included Petitioner’s picture, he was unable to make an

identification. He also was unable to identify Petitioner at the preliminary

hearing. At trial, Novet testified that Petitioner looked “familiar,” but he had

not been “paying that much attention” and could not positively identify him. 

Santiago and Rodriguez were unable to make an identification because the

perpetrators had their faces covered.

The victims did identify a photograph of a gold Cadillac belonging to

Petitioner’s girlfriend as depicting a vehicle that looked the same or similar to

the car used by the perpetrators.

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with Juan’s recorded statements to the police identifying Petitioner

as one of the perpetrators. At trial, the defense theory was that

Juan’s statements identifying Petitioner were not credible, and

although the offenses may have been committed by a group of gang

members, Petitioner was not with the group at the time of the

offenses and was not a perpetrator. 

Juan was apprehended after the driver of Santiago’s stolen

Ford Taurus engaged the police in a vehicular pursuit. On the night

the police received the carjacking report, they spotted Santiago’s

Ford Taurus with four people inside. The Ford Taurus sped away,

followed by police units, until the Ford got stuck in a muddy field

and the occupants fled on foot. The police caught Juan, one of the

occupants. Novet’s cell phone was in Juan’s pocket. Inside the

stolen Ford Taurus, the police found a cell phone belonging to

Petitioner’s girlfriend with photos of Petitioner stored inside the

phone. 

In a recorded interview on February 18, 2008, Juan initially

told the police the carjacking was committed by several of his

friends, including a man named Jose Hernandez. Later, during this

same interview, Juan stated his friend’s name was actually Marcos

Hernandez. On February 21, 2008, Petitioner was arrested after the

police found him sleeping in a van in front of an apartment where

the police were executing a search warrant in an unrelated case. 

After Petitioner’s arrest, on February 26, 2008, Juan was arrested

again, and questioned by the police. In this second recorded

interview, after Juan was told that “everybody” had been arrested

and interviewed about the prior week’s incidents, Juan told the

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police that Marcos Hernandez was, in fact, Petitioner (i.e., Marco

Benitez). 

During the two recorded interviews, Juan described Petitioner’s participation in both the Novet robbery and the

Santiago/Rodriguez robbery. Juan stated that he, Petitioner,

Ibarra, and Lopez were in the Cadillac belonging to Petitioner’s

girlfriend. Petitioner was driving. According to Juan, they were

looking for “gangbangers.” To this effect, Ibarra stated, “Let’s go

look for Sops [i.e., South Los gang members].” They were also

looking for gas money, and they said, “Whoever we see, we’re gonna

jack him.” When they saw Novet walking, they said “Let’s jack this

fool.” Petitioner, Ibarra, and Lopez got out of the car. Petitioner

pointed a fake gun at Novet; Ibarra searched Novet’s pockets; and

Lopez pushed Novet. After robbing Novet, they went to a convenience

store, where Petitioner bought chips and soup. At trial, the

convenience store clerk identified Petitioner as a man who on

February 18, 2008, came into the store at about 1:00 a.m., purchased

beer, chips, and soup, and then left in a gold Cadillac.3/

With respect to the Santiago/Rodriguez robbery, Juan told the

police that when they saw Santiago and Rodriguez in the Ford Taurus,

his friends decided to “get ‘em.” Petitioner told Juan to get in

the driver’s seat of the Cadillac, and Juan complied. Petitioner

and the others got out of the Cadillac. Petitioner put the toy gun

to Santiago’s head. Ibarra dropped the bicycle in front of the Ford

Taurus and put a screwdriver in Rodriguez’s face. Petitioner and

Ibarra drove away in the Ford Taurus, and Juan and Lopez left in the

3/

The jury was shown a surveillance video and photographs of the customer

identified by the clerk as Petitioner.

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Cadillac. Juan and Lopez dropped the Cadillac off at Petitioner’s

girlfriend’s home, and they joined the others in the stolen Ford

Taurus. 

Juan told the police that he and Ibarra were not VSM gang

members, but that Petitioner was, and that Lopez had not yet been

“jumped into the gang” but the gang was testing him. 

Detectives Ricardo Lopez and David Collins testified on

behalf of the prosecution as gang experts. Detectives Lopez and

Collins testified that VSM claims San Marcos as its territory, and

it has a history of committing offenses such as murder, assault with

a deadly weapon, carjacking, robbery, burglary, battery, and

scrawling graffiti. Petitioner has been documented as a VSM member

based on law enforcement criteria, whereas Ibarra, Lopez, and Juan

have not. However, all of them have been associated with the gang. 

In July 2007, Ibarra was shot at by a South Los gang member, and

during this incident, the assailant called Ibarra a VSM member. In

September 2007, the police contacted Ibarra when he was associating

with documented VSM members. Lopez was arrested along with a

documented VSM gang member for a vehicular and residential burglary,

and his moniker “G-Boy” has been observed on graffiti. The current

case was the first police contact with Juan. Juan admittedly grew

up with VSM members, and the police consider him a VSM associate. 

Detectives Lopez and Collins testified at trial that

associates who hang out with gang members and want to join the gang

must prove their worth by committing crimes. This includes the

process of “being tested” to see if the associate is worth being

part of the gang. The associate will typically start with graffiti,

and then progress to violent crimes. To be accepted into the gang,

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the associate must be willing to do the things he is told to do for

the gang. An associate who willingly follows the orders of a gang

leader, especially to commit violent crimes, will easily be accepted

into the gang. 

Detective Collins opined that the Novet robbery was committed

for the benefit of the gang or in association with the gang. To

support this assertion, he cited Juan’s statements that they were

looking for gangbangers and Sops; the fact that the street they were

driving on was an area associated with the South Los gang; the theft

of the cell phone which can be passed around through the gang or

sold; and the statement to the victim that he had just been “jacked

by Ghost Town” which would instill fear in the community. Detective

Collins provided the same opinion for the carjacking/robbery of

Santiago and Rodriguez, stating that these crimes were committed

about two hours after the first crime when they went looking for

gangbangers; the property they gained from the first crime was

“minimal” compared to what they usually acquire; and they took a car

which is “a lot bigger prize to them” and something the gang can

use. 

Detective Collins explained that gang members use stolen cars

to commit other crimes so they are not easily identified by the

police. Collins stated that in this case, when the police spotted

them, they fled in the car and crashed it; that if no one had been

caught, the police would have acquired only a stolen car. Furthermore, Collins explained that because Petitioner was the only

documented gang member, the other perpetrators (who were gang

associates) would have looked to him for direction. The carjacking

permitted the gang associates to show what they acquired for the

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gang, and then let the gang’s members use the stolen car, or “Gride”, to commit other crimes. Collins stated that the fact the

perpetrators did not yell out their gang name during the offense did

not alter his opinion. He testified that sometimes during the

commission of crimes, gang members yell out their gang affiliation

and sometimes they do not. He stated the public in San Marcos knows

about the gangs; the gang members did not need to yell out their

gang name “for the victims to know they just got their car carjacked

by gang members”; and the crime was done to intimidate the community.

 III

 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In San Diego Superior Court case number SCD211986, a jury

found Petitioner guilty of robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 211, counts 1A

& 4A); carjacking [Cal. Penal Code, § 215.5(a); counts 2 & 3]; and

the unlawful taking of a vehicle [Cal. Penal Code § 10851(a); counts

5A & 1B]. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 341-47.) The jury found

true the gang enhancement. [Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1); counts

1A, 4A, & 5A.] (Id.) The trial court found true that Petitioner

had one prior vehicle theft conviction. [Cal. Penal Code §

666.5(a)], (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 348.) Petitioner was

sentenced to a total of twenty-eight years to life in state prison. 

(Id.) 

Petitioner appealed his convictions to the California Court

of Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3.) Respondent also filed an

opposition brief. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 4.) On December 1,

2010, the Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5.) On January 24, 2011, Petitioner

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filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 6.) On March 4, 2012, the California

Supreme Court denied the Petition without comment. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 7.)

On May 22, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in this Court. On August 10, 2012, Respondent filed

an Answer to the Petition. On August 21, 2012, Petitioner filed a

Traverse to Respondent’s Answer. 

 IV

 SCOPE OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by Title 28, United States Code, §

2254, as amended by the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Section 2254(a) sets forth the following

scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or

a district court shall entertain an application for a writ

of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treatises of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings

unless the adjudication of the claim- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2245(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).

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“AEDPA establishes a ‘highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Womack v. Del Papa,

497 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007) [quoting Woodford v. Viscotti,

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)]. To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court has

ruled that the “contrary to” clause of § 2254(d)(1) permits a grant

of habeas relief “if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if

the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 412-13. The

Supreme Court has also interpreted the “unreasonable application”

clause of § 2254(d)(1) to allow a grant of “the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the

facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The Supreme Court has

clarified that under § 2254(d)(2), even an erroneous or incorrect

application of clearly established federal law does not support a

habeas grant, unless the state court’s application was “objectively

unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

When there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). If

the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

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Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th

Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-

76). A state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when

resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). Absent citations to Supreme Court precedent, habeas relief

is not merited if the state court decision neither contradicts the

reasoning nor the result of Supreme Court rulings. Id.

 V

 DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims that his constitutional right to effective

assistance of counsel was violated by his attorney’s failure to

request a standard jury instruction on gang activity evidence. 

(Petition at 11-12.) 

A. Petitioner’s Constitutional Right To Effective Assistance Of Counsel Was Not Violated Because No Reasonable

Probability Exists That Undue Prejudice Was Caused By

Trial Counsel’s Decision To Not Request California’s

Standard Jury Instruction On Gang Activity Evidence.

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated

because his attorney failed to request one of California’s standard 

jury instructions advising jurors that they cannot use gang activity 

evidence as propensity evidence. (Petition at 11-12.) Specifically, Petitioner claims that due to his attorney’s failure to

request CALCRIM No. 1403, the jury felt it was free to convict

Petitioner because he was a person of bad character. (Petition at

12-14.) Respondent argues that the jury was given other proper

instructions as to the use of gang activity evidence, and that there

is no reasonable probability that if CALCRIM No. 1403 had been given

to the jury that the verdict would have been different. (Respondent’s Points and Authorities at 9.) CALCRIM No. 1403 states: 

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You may consider evidence of gang activity only for

the limited purpose of deciding whether: The defendant

acted with the intent, purpose, and knowledge that are

required to prove the gang-related crimes and 

enhancements and special circumstance allegations

charged; OR the defendant had a motive to commit the

crimes charged; OR the defendant actually believed in

the need to defend himself; OR the defendant acted in

the heat of passion; OR [the court may insert another

reason that they admitted the gang evidence].

You may also consider this evidence when you evaluate

the credibility or believability of a witness and when

you consider the facts and information relied on by an

expert witness in reaching his or her opinion.

You may not consider this evidence for any other

purpose. You may not conclude from this evidence that

the defendant is a person of bad character or that he

has a disposition to commit crime.

1-1400 CALCRIM 1403.

In the California Court of Appeal, Petitioner argued that the

judgment should be reversed because of his lawyer’s failure to

request a limiting jury instruction stating that evidence of gang

activity could not be used to conclude that Petitioner had a bad

character or criminal disposition. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5.) 

The California Court of Appeal assumed arguendo that Petitioner’s

counsel’s failure to request instruction in the language of CALCRIM

No. 1403 was an oversight unsupported by a tactical reason. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5 at 18.) Nevertheless, the California

Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s appeal of his conviction based

on a lack of prejudice. (Id.) Thereafter, Petitioner filed a

Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court, which denied

his Petition without comment. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7.) The

last reasoned state court decision which addressed the merits of the

claim is the California Court of Appeal’s opinion affirming

Petitioner’s conviction. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5.) It is to

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that decision this Court must direct its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S.

at 805-06.

Petitioner asserts two arguments as to why the California

Court of Appeal made an unreasonable application of the law when it

failed to find prejudice under Strickland. (Petition at 12-14.) 

First, Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeal unreasonably

applied the law when it presumed that the jurors knew not to use

gang activity testimony as evidence of the Petitioner’s bad

character. (Petition at 16.) Second, he asserts that the Court of

Appeal unreasonably applied the law when it found prejudice lacking

because the Petitioner presented an identity defense. (Petition at

17.) Both of these arguments lack merit.4/

The clearly established United States Supreme Court law

governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d

1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996). In a petition for writ of habeas corpus

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court must consider

two factors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. First, the petitioner

must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. Deficient

performance requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious

that he or she was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by

the Sixth Amendment. Id. The petitioner must show that counsel’s

4/

Petitioner also claims in the Traverse and Memorandum of Points And

Authorities (“Traverse”) that Respondent failed to address the allegations in the

Petition. (Traverse at 5.) Petitioner incorrectly cites Rule 4 of the Rules

Governing section 2254 as requiring more analysis than what was provided in the

Answer. Assuming Petitioner meant Rule 5 of the Rules Governing section 2254,

which states that “[t]he answer must address the allegations in the (continued) 

(continued)

petition,” this Court finds no reason to believe that every single argument must

be addressed, so long as Respondent’s Answer substantially responds to the

allegations asserted in the Petition.

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representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,

and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that were not

the result of reasonable professional judgment considering the

circumstances. Id. at 688; U.S. v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344,

1348 (9th Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is

highly deferential. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A court indulges

a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 687.

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result . . . would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

Petitioner must show that counsel’s errors were so egregious as to

deprive defendant of a fair trial, one whose result is unreliable. 

Id. at 687. The Court must evaluate whether the entire trial was

fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1348.

A court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner

as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697. The court need not address both prongs if a petitioner fails

to make a sufficient showing of either one. Id. at 697. There is

no need to address deficiency of performance if prejudice is

examined first and found lacking. Id. 

Federal habeas courts must defer to “state court findings of

fact made in the course of deciding an ineffectiveness claim.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698. Because “both the performance and

prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed

questions of law and fact,” Section 2254(d)(1)’s “unreasonable

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application of” clause applies. Id.; see Moore v. Calderon, 108

F.3d 261, 265 (9th Cir. 1997).

In response to Petitioner’s challenge to his convictions, the

California Court of Appeal determined that “there is no reasonable

probability [the jury] thought it could use the gang activity

evidence to convict based on an inference that Petitioner had a

criminal predisposition rather than because guilt had been proven

beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5 at 18-19.) 

The California Court of Appeal, for the sake of argument,

conceded the first prong of Strickland. Addressing the issue of

trial counsel’s performance, the Court of Appeal noted,

It is apparent from the record that defense counsel

was concerned about the impact of the gang evidence on

the jury; accordingly, we will assume arguendo that

his failure to request instruction in the language of 

CALCRIM No. 1403 was an oversight unsupported by a

tactical reason.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5 at 18.) 

However, the Court of Appeal determined that Petitioner

failed to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 5 at 18.) The Court of Appeal noted that there was not

a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more

favorable to Petitioner absent the alleged ineffective assistance of

counsel. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5 at 18.) Based on the

instructions and testimony that were given, the Court of Appeal

reasoned that the jury understood that they were not to use the gang

activity evidence as evidence of Petitioner’s propensity to commit

crimes. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5 at 18-19.) The Court of

Appeal reasoned that the jury also knew that they were not to use

the gang activity evidence to decide the element of identity.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5 at 19-20.)

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This Court agrees with the Court of Appeal. This Court will

assume arguendo, like the Court of Appeal, that the failure to

request a jury instruction in the language of CALCRIM No. 1403 was

an error unsupported by a tactical reason. During motions in

limine, defense counsel argued, and the court agreed, that evidence

of gang membership had a high risk of prejudicing the jury. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3 at 26.) During the jury instruction

conference, after the gang activity evidence had been presented,

defense counsel presented jury instructions that did not specifically forbid the jurors from using gang activity evidence to

conclude that the Petitioner was a person of bad character or that

he had a disposition to commit crimes. (Respondent’s Lodgment No.

3 at 27.) Since CALCRIM No. 1403 forbids the use of gang activity

evidence to conclude that a defendant had a propensity to commit

crimes, failure to request a limiting instruction creates a risk of

conviction irrespective of guilt of the crimes charged.

However, this Court also agrees that there was no prejudice. 

The jury was given an instruction, similar to CALCRIM No. 1403, on

the expert gang activity testimony and the evidence regarding

Petitioner’s gang membership. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5 at 18-

19.) 

The jury was instructed on how to evaluate the expert opinion

testimony with the statement: “The opinion of Detective Collins in

this case, when testifying as an expert on gangs, was offered on the

issue of whether or not the crimes alleged were committed for the

benefit of, or in association with, a criminal street gang, and not

on the issue of the identity of the people involved. That is for

you to determine.” The jury also was given a special instruction

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stating: “If you find that the defendant is a member of a criminal

street gang, that fact by itself is insufficient to convict him of

the crimes charged.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5 at 18.) 

The trial court limited the gang activity evidence to general

background information and the elements of the gang enhancement. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5 at 18-19.) There is no evidence in the

record to support the argument that the jury improperly used the

gang activity evidence as proof of Petitioner’s predisposition or

bad character. Additionally, there is no evidence in the record

that the jury used evidence of Petitioner’s gang membership to

establish the issue of identity.

B. The Court Of Appeal Did Not Unreasonably Apply The Law

When It Presumed The Jury Knew Not To Use Gang Testimony

As Propensity Evidence

 First, Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeal unreasonably applied the law when it presumed that the jury knew not to use

gang activity evidence as evidence of Petitioner’s bad character. 

(Petition at 16.) In support of this claim, he contends that the

Court of Appeal used an illogical analysis. (Id.) Further, he

asserts that the jury was never told not use gang activity evidence

as evidence of Petitioner’s bad character. (Id.) As a result,

Petitioner claims this error in instruction caused him prejudice. 

(Id.)

Petitioner fails to raise a federal claim in this regard. 

The role of a federal habeas court is limited to “deciding whether

a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a). The Supreme Court has held

that claims of instructional error to state court juries “generally

may not form the basis for federal habeas relief.” Gilmore v.

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Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1993). Federal habeas relief may only

be had when an erroneous jury instruction has infected the trial

process to the point that the resulting conviction violates due

process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). The Court

must presume jurors followed the instructions given and applied the

proper legal standard. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206

(1987). In order to violate due process, there must be a reasonable

likelihood that the jury applied the erroneous jury instruction in

a way that relieved the prosecution of its burden of proof. See

Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190-91 (2009). In this case,

federal habeas relief is precluded even if there was an erroneous

failure to instruct the jury with the language of CALCRIM No. 1403,

because Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that the

jury applied it in a way to relieve the prosecution of its burden of

proof.

The California Court of Appeal, as the law allows, presumed

that the jury followed the instructions they were given. See

Richardson, 481 U.S. at 206; Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5 at 19-20. 

It held that the given instructions adequately informed the jurors

as to the limited the purpose for which the gang activity evidence

presented could be used. (Id.) Thus, the court reasoned that the

jury knew not to use the gang activity evidence as evidence of

Petitioner’s bad character. (Id.)

Even if this Court were to assume that Petitioner presents a

cognizable federal claim in this regard, the California Court of

Appeal did not unreasonably apply the law by presuming the jury knew

not to use the gang activity evidence as evidence of the Petitioner’s bad character. In fact, the jury was instructed that

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Petitioner could not be convicted of the crimes charged based on

evidence that Petitioner is a member of a criminal street gang. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 655.) The jury was told to use the

gang activity evidence only for deciding the truth of the gang

enhancement, and that it was not to be considered on the issue of

identity. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 645.) The gang activity

testimony that was admitted was directly relevant to the elements of

the gang enhancement. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5 at 19-20.) 

Additionally, both of the instructions that were given to the jury

regarding the gang activity evidence, while not in the exact

language of CALCRIM No. 1403, were given in a way that would make

it easy for a lay person to understand and correctly apply.

Moreover, a reasonable jury would have understood that it had

to separately evaluate the evidentiary support for each element of

the substantive crimes and gang enchantments. The jury was

instructed that the prosecution must prove each element of the

crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5 at

19.) The gang expert’s testimony was limited to general background

information about gangs and the evidence necessary to prove the gang

enhancement. (Id.) The elements for the gang enhancement and the

crimes charged were delineated for the jury. (Id.) Furthermore,

the jury was instructed that it could not convict Petitioner of the

charged offenses merely because he was a gang member. (Id.) 

From these instructions and testimony, it is reasonable to

assume that the jury understood that it should not infer from the

Petitioner’s gang background that he was guilty of the crimes

charged. The presumption that the jury knew not to use the gang

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activity evidence as evidence of the Petitioner’s bad character was

not an unreasonable application of the law.

C. The Court Of Appeal Did Not Unreasonably Apply Federal

Law When It Found That The Jury Understood That It Was

Not To Use Evidence Of Gang Membership To Establish The

Issue Of Identity

In a claim closely related to Petitioner’s first claim,

Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeal unreasonably applied the

law when it found that the jury understood that it was not to use

evidence of gang membership to establish the issue of identity. 

(Petition at 17.) He asserts that the trial judge’s instruction to

the jury gave it permission to convict Petitioner using the gang

activity evidence, because they were told it was permissible as long

it was not used “by itself” to convict him. (Petition at 14.)

Further, he asserts that this instruction was prejudicial. (Id.) 

Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeal implied that the jury

could use evidence of gang membership to prove identity “so long as

something ‘apart from’ it existed too,” and that the Court of

Appeal’s implication is an unreasonable application of the law. 

(Petition at 18.) Additionally, Petitioner claims that the

prosecution’s closing argument invited the jury to use the gang

activity evidence as proof of his criminal disposition; specifically, the fact that the prosecutor referred to Petitioner as a

“predator”, as a “different kind of person,” and questioned

Petitioner’s “character”. (Id.) Petitioner argues that it is only

a “small hop” connecting the prosecutor’s descriptions of Petitioner’s character as a “predator” to using the gang activity

testimony as propensity evidence. (Id.) Petitioner claims that the

jury’s lack of understanding on how to properly use the gang

activity evidence on the issue of identity, combined with the

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prosecutor’s closing argument, established prejudice. (Id.) 

However, as will be discussed below, the trial court’s instructions

to the jury regarding the gang activity evidence, combined with the

prosecutor’s choice of language in closing argument, when analyzed

in its entirety, cannot reasonably be construed as to have given the

jury permission to use the gang activity evidence as propensity

evidence or for any other improper use.

A defendant is not entitled to any particular form of an

instruction, so long as the instructions given fairly and adequately

cover his theories of defense. United States v. Dixon, 201 F.3d

1223, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000). No prejudice results from a court's

attempt to define a concept so as to be “within the comprehension of

the average juror.” Id. Closing arguments are relevant to

determining prejudice. Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 1022 (9th Cir.

2011) (considering closing argument in judging whether constitutional errors were harmless.)

The Court of Appeal found that the jury knew the issue of

identity, and of Petitioner’s guilt on the charges, must have been

decided independently from the gang activity evidence; specifically,

the testimony of the gang expert and the evidence of Petitioner’s

gang membership. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5 at 19.) 

The Court of Appeal’s conclusion that jury understood it was

not to use evidence of gang membership to establish the issue of

identity was not an unreasonable application of federal law. The

jury was given the explicit instruction that it could not determine

the issue of identity using gang activity evidence. (Id.) The jury

was told multiple times, by the judge and by counsel, the limited

purpose for which it could use the evidence of the Petitioner’s gang

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membership. (Id. at 18-20.) Moreover, the jury also was specifically instructed about the prohibited purpose in using the gang

membership evidence. (Id.) During his closing argument, the

prosecutor referred to Petitioner as a “predator,” and posed the

rhetorical question, “[W]hat kind of character and what kind of mind

does it take to think, you know what, I’m going to go hunting

tonight[?]” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 656-57.) The prosecutor posed that rhetorical question several times at the beginning of

his closing argument, describing Petitioner as, “[A] different kind

of person.” (Id. at 656-58.) However, he also told the jury that

the purpose of the gang activity evidence was not to “just dirty

people up,” but rather, was to prove the elements of the gang

enhancement, “which is required to be proved under the law.” (Id.

at 679.) The prosecutor then went on to delineate the elements of

the gang enhancement. (Id. at 679-83.) Not once did the prosecutor

tell the jury to use the gang activity evidence for anything other

than deciding the gang enhancement allegation. Additionally, in

closing argument, Petitioner’s defense counsel told the jury that it

could not base its conclusion that the Petitioner was one of the

perpetrators on the fact that Petitioner was a gang member. (Id.) 

The jury was instructed in plain language, many times, exactly how

and for what purpose the gang activity evidence was to be properly

used. Therefore, the California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply the law when it found that the jury knew it was not to

use evidence of gang membership to establish the issue of identity,

even without the exact language of CALCRIM No. 1403. 

In sum, there is no reasonable probability that the jury

improperly relied on gang activity evidence as propensity evidence. 

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Thus, the Court of Appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s claim was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law. Therefore, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s

claim for habeas relief in this regard be DENIED.

 VI

 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus be DENIED with prejudice. This Report and Recommendation of

the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 3, 2012, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

December 17, 2012. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 30, 2012

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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