Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-08015/USCOURTS-ca10-91-08015-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 

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T:'l' 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

J:41L£JLJ 

United States Court of Ap~b Teot.'t Circuit 

FEB 18 1992 

KEVIN HEIN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

KERR-McGEE COAL CORPORATION, a 

Delaware corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ROBERT L. HOECKER Clerk . .. ) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 91-8015 

) (D.C. No. 90-CV-0031-B) 

) (D. Wyo.) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, BARRETT, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1 . 9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Appellant Kevin Hein brought this suit against his former 

employer, Kerr-McGee Coal Corp., alleging that he was terminated 

contrary to the terms of Kerr-McGee's employee handbook which, 

Hein asserted, constituted an employment contract. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel . 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-8015 Document: 010110222597 Date Filed: 02/18/1992 Page: 1 
Kerr-McGee moved to dismiss the suit or, in the alternative, 

for summary judgment. Hein moved for partial summary judgment. 

The district court's order granted Kerr-McGee's motion and 

dismissed Hein's motion. Hein moved for reconsideration under 

Rules 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for 

leave to amend his complaint, in light of McDonald v. Mobil Coal 

Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990). The district court 

denied his motion. Hein appeals both district court orders. 

The pertinent facts are few and undisputed. 1 Hein worked as 

an electrician for Kerr-McGee Coal Corp. for just over seven 

years. During his term of employment, Kerr-McGee adopted and 

distributed an employee handbook. The introductory page of the 

handbook says: 

This Employee Handbook outlines policies and procedures 

that affect your working relationship with Kerr-McGee. 

Because one handbook cannot cover all possible 

situations, those not specifically mentioned will be 

handled on a case by case basis. Should you have any 

question regarding the topics in this handbook or 

conditions of your employment, please ask your Supervisor. 

This handbook should not be considered as a contract for 

employment. Any employee may voluntarily leave the 

company. Likewise, the Company retains the right to 

discharge employees or reduce manpower levels. Any oral 

or written statements or promises to the contrary are 

hereby disavowed. This handbook may be revised from 

time to time. 

Exhibit A to Complaint, Appellant's App. at 14. 

1 

As Kerr-McGee correctly noted in its Memorandum opposing 

Hein's motion for reconsideration, Hein at no time has argued a 

dispute of any material facts. Defendant's Memorandum in 

Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion "For Reconsideration, etc.," 

Appellant's App. at 148. 

2 

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The handbook contains a progressive discipline system and 

lists examples of infractions which could result in discipline. 

It does not say that employees will be discharged only for cause. 

The handbook provides that an employee who receives three 

Corrective Action Notices during a 365-day period will be 

discharged. Hein signed a receipt acknowledging the terms of the 

handbook. Hein received three Corrective Action Notices during a 

365-day period and was discharged. 

Our jurisdiction over this appeal arises from 28 u.s.c. 

§ 1291. We construe the district court's Order on Motions, 

applying legal principles to the facts of this case, as a grant of 

summary judgment. 2 "We review the grant or denial of summary 

judgment de novo. We apply the same legal standard used by the 

district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)." Applied Genetics 

Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 

(10th Cir. 1990)(citations omitted). In this case, where the 

facts are undisputed, our review is limited to whether the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Russillo v. 

Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 1991). Wyoming law 

applies to this diversity case. See Budd v. American Excess Ins. 

Co., 928 F.2d 344, 346 (10th Cir. 1991). Hein raises two issues 

on appeal: 1) whether the disclaimer in Kerr-McGee's handbook is 

conspicuous as a matter of law and 2) whether the district court 

erred in denying Hein's motion for leave to amend his complaint to 

conform with McDonald, 789 P.2d 866. We affirm. 

2 The district court's order is ambiguously worded: "the 

defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is granted." 

Order on Motions, Appellant's App. at 123. 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-8015 Document: 010110222597 Date Filed: 02/18/1992 Page: 3 
I 

The district court ruled, as a matter of law, that the 

disclaimer in Kerr-McGee's handbook is conspicuous. Hein 

challenges this determination, arguing that Jimenez v. Colorado 

Interstate Gas Co., 690 F. Supp. 977 (D. Wyo. 1988), requires that 

the disclaimer: 1) be set off from other text such that it 

attracts attention, 2) be capitalized so as to give notice of a 

disclaimer, 3) be printed in a different-sized type from other 

provisions on the page or in the rest of the handbook, and 4) be 

set off by a border from other provisions. 

Hein construes Jimenez too narrowly. In Jimenez, the federal 

district court for Wyoming found a disclaimer in an employee 

handbook not conspicuous and listed the above factors as examples 

of qualities that could have made the disclaimer conspicuous. 690 

F. Supp. at 980. In this case, the same court found Kerr-McGee's 

disclaimer conspicuous, based on other factors: 

There are only two short paragraphs, containing three 

sentences each, on the page containing the disclaimer. 

The disclaimer is contained within the second paragraph. 

The disclaimer is located at the beginning of the 

handbook on page two under the heading "INTRODUCTION." 

It is not buried in some later provision where it could 

easily be missed. Furthermore, material immediately 

following an introduction is generally important reading 

as it usually defines the scope of the material being 

presented. The disclaimer paragraph and the paragraph 

preceding it are surrounded by a lot of white or empty 

space. The two paragraphs only take up one-fourth to 

one-third of the total page. In additional, the only 

subject of the disclaimer paragraph is the disclaimer. 

Admittedly, the disclaimer is not set off with different 

typeface, but it is otherwise conspicuous as indicated 

by the above analysis. 

Order on Motions, Appellant's App. at 122-23. 

4 

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We see nothing in Jimenez that forecloses consideration of 

other factors. Based on our review of the disclaimer, we agree 

with the district court's reasoning and its conclusion that 

Kerr-McGee's disclaimer is conspicuous, as a matter of law. See 

Jimenez, 690 F. Supp. at 980. In light of this determination, 

Hein's further arguments that other provisions contained in 

Kerr-McGee's handbook constitute an employment contract must fail. 

Hein was an employee at will, subject to discharge "at any time 

for any reason or without reason." Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. 

Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 704 (Wyo. 1985) . 

II 

"The determination of whether to grant or deny leave to amend 

is within the discretion of the court and the court's decision 

relative to an amendment is subject to reversal only for abuse of 

that discretion." LeaseAmerica Corp. v. Eckel, 710 F.2d 1470, 

1473 (10th Cir. 1983). The district court denied Hein's motion to 

amend his complaint to conform with McDonald, 789 P.2d 866, ruling 

that 1) McDonald would have no retroactive effect such that it 

could apply to this case and 2) McDonald was an insufficient basis 

for "reopening" this case, because it was unclear whether McDonald 

changed Wyoming's employment law. When the district court entered 

this second order, McDonald was pending before the Wyoming Supreme 

Court on rehearing. During the pendency of this appeal, that 

court authored a second opinion in the case, McDonald v. Mobil 

Coal Producing, Inc., No. 89-146, 1991 WL 239888 (Wyo. Nov. 20, 

1991)(to be reported at 820 P . 2d 986). 

5 

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Without addressing the district 

retroactive effect of McDonald, and 

Supreme Court opinions in that case, 

court's denial of Hein's motion for 

court's ruling on the 

looking at both Wyoming 

we affirm the district 

leave to amend because a 

review of Hein's pleadings reveals no basis for amending such that 

the issues presented in McDonald would apply. See Bath v. 

National Ass'n of Intercollegiate Athletics, 843 F.2d 1315, 1317 

(10th Cir. 1988)(appellate court can affirm on any grounds that 

find support in the record). 

Like this case, McDonald was an appeal from the trial court's 

grant of summary judgment to an employer on an employment contract 

claim. The court's ruling was based, in part, on a disclaimer in 

the employer's handbook. See 789 P.2d at 868. However, unlike 

Hein, McDonald claimed that his former employer's course of 

conduct had changed his at will employment status. The Wyoming 

Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of summary 

judgment, finding "a genuine issue of material fact presented over 

whether the parties altered their contractual relationship." 

McDonald, 1991 WL 239888 at *2. 

Hein's motions do not reveal how the undisputed facts in this 

case could be applied to the estoppel-related theories discussed 

in the McDonald opinions. Hein has provided no basis, either 

before the district court or on appeal, for the determination of 

whether such amendment should be allowed. While leave to amend 

should be granted freely when justice requires, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15, where it appears from a plaintiff's motions that amendment 

would not cure the defects in his complaint, the district court 

6 

Appellate Case: 91-8015 Document: 010110222597 Date Filed: 02/18/1992 Page: 6 
denial is not an abuse of its discretion, and we will affirm. See 

Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1163 (10th Cir. 

1991). 

In light of this disposition, we deny Hein's motions for oral 

argument, certification to the Wyoming Supreme Court, and leave to 

file supplemental briefs. The judgment of the United States 

District Court for the District of Wyoming is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

7 

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