Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00285/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00285-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEAVON PIERCE, 

 

Plaintiff, 

 

vs. 

 

FERNANDO GONZALES, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 1:10-cv-00285 JLT (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

(Doc. 25)

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By order filed February 18, 2011, the Court dismissed 

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint with leave to amend. (Doc. 24) Now pending before the 

Court is Plaintiff’s third amended complaint filed March 17, 2011. (Doc. 25) 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to review a case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a 

governmental entity or officer. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must review the complaint and 

dismiss any portion thereof that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief 

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b). If the Court determines the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend 

should be granted to the extent that the deficiencies in the pleading can be cured by amendment. 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides a cause of action against 

any “person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizens of 

the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States.]” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. To prove a violation of § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant deprived 

him of a constitutional or federal right, and (2) the defendant acted under color of state law. West 

v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1989). 

“A person deprives another of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he 

does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act 

which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].” 

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 

(9th Cir. 1978)). In other words, there must be an actual causal connection between the actions of 

each defendant and the alleged deprivation. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). 

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a ‘short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1975)). Nevertheless, a 

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of entitlement to relief under Rule 8(a)(2) requires 

more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions,” or “formulaic recitation[s] of the 

elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57. The complaint “must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 239 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868, 883 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 570) (emphasis added).

II. THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff identifies Tehachapi State Prison (“TSP”) Warden Fernando Gonzales, the TSP 

mailroom staff on the dates in question, the State Director of Corrections, and the State Office of 

Internal Affairs as the defendants to this action. (Doc. 25 at 5-6.) Plaintiff seeks an investigative 

hearing, appointment of counsel, criminal prosecution of defendants, and “$275,000.00 for each 

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book/manuscript including separate royalties,” apparently in the amount of “$10,000,000 for each 

book/manuscript screen play.” (Doc. 25 at 7.) His claims are based upon the following 

allegations: 

I sent out multiple letters to different organizations which also employ 

legal clerks, attorneys, and assist inmates in seeking legal help by providing 

addresses to other organizations that may be able to help bring attention to the 

continuos [sic] human violations being ignored and carried out by prison officials.

...

The envelope left my door sealed with proper postage to be delivered to the 

address located on the envelope. When the envelope reached an unknown at this 

time individual located in the mailroom (or individuals which can only be 

discovered through discovery and/or deposition). My mail was opened and its full 

contents removed out of my presence.

After removing these contents which were manuscripts, the contents were 

never returned. I sent this manuscript out for legal purposes, which included legal 

editing, copyrights and all the legal meaning connected to the process of 

publishing this material. Regardless of the contents, the manuscripts weather [sic] 

not legal/ [sic] or confidential in nature, weather [sic] it was illegal, was still 

personal property of the inmate that was taken without due process. 

(Doc. 25 at 8.)

Plaintiff contends his mail was stolen or returned unsent in retaliation for complaints 

about illegal conduct on the part of correctional officers, TSP staff, and CDCR officials. Much of 

the third amended complaint is devoted to allegations detailing the illegal conduct, including 

denial of access to an adequate law library, the ignoring of Plaintiff’s inmate grievances and 

appeals, transfer to administrative segregation and illegitimate lockdowns of the general inmate 

population and the planting of a weapon by Correctional Officer Razo. (Doc. 25 at 9, 10, 13-15.) 

III. DISCUSSION

In its order dismissing Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, this Court admonished 

Plaintiff against proffering a “laundry list” of unrelated claims against different defendants. (Doc. 

24 at 17.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff persists in alleging broad and vague violations of the First, 

Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 25 at 7.) 

A. Law Library Access

The Constitution guarantees prisoners the right of meaningful access to the courts. 

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824, 828 (1977), overruled in part by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 

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343 (1996); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969). This right of access imposes an 

affirmative duty on prison officials to help inmates prepare and file legal papers either by 

establishing an adequate law library or by providing adequate assistance from persons trained in 

the law. Phillips v. Hust, 477 D.3d 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated and remanded on other 

grounds, 129 S. Ct. 1036 (2009); Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 776 F.2d 851, 851-56 (9th 

Cir. 1985). Denial of access to legal materials for a short period of time is not necessarily a 

constitutional violation, and some restrictions on a prisoner’s access to legal resources are 

allowed to accommodate legitimate administrative concerns. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1523 

(9th Cir. 1993). Prisoners must demonstrate actual injury resulting from a denial of access to the 

courts to support a claim alleging a constitutional violation. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 

(1996); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004). In addition, the right of access to 

courts does not provide an independent right for an inmate to assist fellow inmates on legal 

matters. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 230-31 (2001). 

Plaintiff reiterates his complaints about the inadequacy of the TSP law library addressed 

in the Court’s order dismissing the second amended complaint. (Doc. 24 at 6.) Plaintiff’s third 

amended complaint fails to allege that Plaintiff suffered “actual injury” due to the law library’s 

outdated materials. Plaintiff states, “Because I dont/didnt [sic] know the law, part of my federal 

petition has been denied as second or suceesive [sic] possibly barring me forever in federal court 

with me losing the rest of my liufe [sic] based upon an inadequate law library. (Doc. 25 at 10.) 

However, there remains no clear indication that Plaintiff was prevented from presenting and 

pursuing a non-frivolous constitutional claim in court due to inadequacies regarding the law 

library. It continues to appear that Plaintiff’s complaint regarding the law library at TSP is more 

abstract and that the law library is inadequate for general purposes. (Id.) This is insufficient to 

state a cognizable access to the courts claim. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (“[A]n inmate cannot 

establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison’s law library or legal 

assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.”).

B. Inmate Appeals

Plaintiff persists in his allegation that Defendant Gonzales, the Director of the CDCR, the 

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Inspector General, and the Internal Affairs Office ignore his inmate grievances and appeals. It is 

well-established that “inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison 

grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann v. 

Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)). When a prison official fails to process or respond to 

an inmate’s grievance, he does not, without more, commit a constitutional violation. See Buckley 

v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (prison grievance system is procedural and does not 

afford an inmate separate substantive rights). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his 

inmate appeals do not state a cognizable claim under § 1983.

C. Administrative Segregation 

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, state action may not deprive 

a person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. A 

plaintiff alleging a due process violation must first demonstrate that he was deprived of a liberty 

of property interest protected by the Due Process Clause and then show that the procedures 

attendant upon the deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. 

Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 

2002); Brewster v. Bd. of Educ., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998).

A protected liberty interest may arise under the Due Process Clause itself or under a state 

statute or regulation. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22 (2005). The Due Process 

Clause in of itself protects only those interest that are implicit in the word “liberty.” See, e.g., 

Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980). A state statute or regulation, however, gives rise to a 

protected liberty interest if it imposes conditions of confinement constituting an “atypical and 

significant hardship [on the prisoner] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin 

v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). See, e.g., Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223-24 (finding that the 

placement of prisoners in a highly restrictive “supermax” prison implicated a protected liberty 

interest). 

Formally imposed punishment is cruel and unsual if it involves the “unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain,” such as punishment “totally without penological justification” or 

“grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183 

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(1976). The Supreme Court has stated, however, that harsh conditions and rough disciplinary 

treatment are part of the price that convicted individuals must pay for their offenses against 

society. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-49 (1981); May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565-

66 (9th Cir. 1997).

A prisoner challenging official conduct that is not part of the formal penalty for a crime 

must demonstrate: (1) a “sufficiently serious deprivation; and (2) that officials acted with a 

“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). “[O]nly those 

deprivations denying ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’ . . . are sufficiently 

grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. at 298 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. 

at 347 (citation omitted)). 

Plaintiff’s third amended complaint ignores this Court’s direction with regard to his 

claims concerning administrative segregation and general population lockdown in that Plaintiff 

persists in his failure to demonstrate subjection to an atypical or significant hardship or to show a 

causal nexus between these adverse actions and a specific exercise of protected conduct. 

Confinement in administrative segregation, even if based upon allegedly false information, is 

neither atypical nor significant. See May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(“[A]dministrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a 

sentence.”) (citing Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

In sum, Plaintiff fails to remedy the deficiencies outlined in the Court’s order dismissing 

the second amended complaint with regard to the aforementioned allegations. It seems Plaintiff 

persists in detailing the above contentions not as claims in and of themselves, but as indications of 

the perceived basis for and as evidence of his actual claim—the retaliatory censorship of his 

outgoing mail.1

D. Mail Service

As described above and in previous orders, Plaintiff suggests the TSP mailroom staff are 

members of the “Green Wall Staff Prison Gang” who improperly regulate inmate mail at TSP by 

 

1

If he claims otherwise, he has, clearly, refused this Court’s invitation to so clarify.

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opening and confiscating mail containing complaints of prison official misconduct, including that 

labeled as “legal” or “confidential” mail. (Doc. 24 at 4; Doc. 25 at 8, 15.) 

Prison officials may not interfere with prisoners’ exercise of First Amendment rights 

unless the interference is reasonably related to a legitimate penal interest. Overton v. Bazzetta, 

539 U.S. 126, 133-35 (2003); Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999). Similarly, 

prison officials may not retaliate against a prisoner for exercising his First Amendment rights. 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005). Inmates have the right to send and 

receive information, subject to limits “reasonably related” to legitimate penal interests. 

Thornburgh v. Abbot, 490 U.S. 401 414-15 (1989); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 574-77 

(1974). Incoming correspondence from either other inmates or non-inmates may be prohibited if 

it is “detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or . . . might facilitate 

criminal activity” (Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 416; see also 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b). However, 

because outgoing correspondence is less likely to pose a threat to internal prison security, any 

regulation or censorship of outgoing correspondence must “further an important or substantial 

governmental interest” and be “no greater than is necessary” to achieve that penological interest. 

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-16 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh, 

490 U.S. at 411. 

As with the above reiterations of his prior claims, Plaintiff fails to respond to the guidance 

offered in this Court’s order dismissing the second amended complaint. Although Plaintiff was 

cautioned that his third amended complaint was required to be complete in itself without 

reference to prior superseded pleadings, the complaint names TSP “mailroom staff on dates in 

question” yet makes no mention of the dates on which the tampering is alleged to have occurred. 

(Doc. 25 at 2.) Nevertheless, the Court refers to previous pleadings and notes that Plaintiff 

indicated he attempted to send legal/confidential mail to various legal aid centers and clinics on 

July 20, 2009 and October 14, 2009. (Doc. 19 at 11.) The reference to staff “on dates in 

question” and the addition of the word “sergeant” (Doc. 25 at 2) constitute Plaintiff’s sole 

attempts to comply with the Court’s direction. This form of identification remains too vague. 

Plaintiff was admonished that he “must name specific defendants; naming ‘all mailroom staff 

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members’ will not do.” (Doc. 24 at 8.) As with his other allegations, Plaintiff merely reiterates, 

with slight and vague modification, the claims in his second amended complaint previously 

addressed. 

Furthermore, as detailed in this Court’s order dismissing the second amended complaint, 

the Court need not reach the issue of whether legal mail must be opened and read in the prisoner’s 

presence since there is no indication any of the intended recipient organizations in question 

represented Plaintiff in an active civil or criminal case and it appears Plaintiff was simply 

soliciting help. (Doc. 25 at 8.) “Legal mail” in the context of the First Amendment generally 

applies to correspondence between a prisoner and his attorney. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 

U.S. 539, 575-76 (1974); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996). In this case, 

Plaintiff does not allege that he was sending mail to his attorney. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that 

prison officials opened and read his grievances that were sent to (1) the Prison Focus; (2) the 

Habeas Corpus Resource Center; (3) the Sentencing Project; (4) the Prison Activist Resource 

Center; (5) the Fortune Society; and (6) the Partnership for Safety and Justice. (Doc. 25 at 8, 18.) 

Thus, while Plaintiff’s grievance mail may have been labeled “legal” and/or “confidential” 

pursuant to prison regulations, it did not enjoy the same protection afforded to “legal mail” within 

the meaning of the First Amendment. See O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 323-27 (9th 

Cir. 1996).” Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegation that his grievance mail was opened outside his 

presence fails to state a cognizable claim under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Johnson v. 

Rawers, 2008 WL 2219307 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2008) (prison officials may open and read a 

prisoner’s grievance mail without violating the First Amendment because such a practice furthers 

legitimate penological interests) (citing O’Keefe, 82 F.3d at 325-27).

In addition, although Plaintiff seems to believe his mail is being tampered with due, at 

least in part, to his complaints about the conduct of Correctional Officer Razo (Doc. 25 at 9), he 

continues to fail to allege facts demonstrating an affirmative causal link between the actions of 

Officer Razo and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 

(9th Cir. 1978). As previously noted, the general fact that Plaintiff has filed inmate grievances 

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regarding prison official misconduct does not suddenly convert all adverse actions taken against 

Plaintiff into retaliatory acts. (Doc. 24 at 14.) 

The Court declines to afford Plaintiff the opportunity to file a fourth amended complaint. 

In two prior screening orders the Court has advised Plaintiff of the legal standards that govern the 

claims he attempts to present. Specifically, the Court has advised Plaintiff that he may not pursue 

unrelated claims against different defendants in the same action and, where appropriate, outlined 

the modifications necessary to state cognizable claims. (Doc. 24 at 17.) Plaintiff has repeatedly 

failed to respond to the Court’s guidance in these regards.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. This action is DISMISSED for Plaintiff’s failure to state a cognizable claim;

2. This dismissal shall count as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 30, 2012 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

9j7khijed

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