Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01778/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01778-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUPERT FLOWERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

B. JOHNSON, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-01778- MJS (PC)

ORDER 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND, 

(2) DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT 

COUNSEL, 

(3) DENYING MOTION FOR 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, AND 

(4) FINDING COGNIZABLE CLAIMS 

AGAINST DEFENDANTS MARTINEZ, 

JOHNSON, AND MARSH IN THEIR 

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES, AND 

DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT 

SERVICE DOCUMENTS

(ECF NOS. 8, 9, and 11)

THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to the 

undersigned’s jurisdiction. (ECF No. 6.)

On February 8, 2016, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and found it to state 

cognizable claims against Defendants Martinez, Johnson, and Marsh in their individual 

capacities. (ECF No. 7.) 

Case 1:15-cv-01778-JLT Document 13 Filed 03/07/16 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Now pending are three motions filed by Plaintiff: (1) a February 16, 2016, motion 

to amend (ECF No. 8), (2) a February 24, 2016, motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 9), 

and (3) a February 25, 2016, motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 11). Also before 

the undersigned is Plaintiff’s lodged First Amended Complaint for screening. (ECF No. 

10.)

I. MOTION TO AMEND

Plaintiff first moves to amend his pleading to correct certain errors and to include 

additional facts. Since Plaintiff’s complaint has not yet been served, he may amend once 

as a matter of course pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s motion will be granted.

II. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

Plaintiff also moves the Court for the appointment of counsel. Plaintiff does not 

have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, Rand v. Rowland, 113 

F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the Court cannot require an attorney to represent 

Plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). However, in certain exceptional 

circumstances the Court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 

section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. 

Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the Court 

will seek volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In 

determining whether “exceptional circumstances exist, the district court must evaluate 

both the likelihood of success of the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate 

his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted).

In the present case, the Court does not find the required exceptional 

circumstances. Even if it is assumed that Plaintiff is not well versed in the law and that 

he has made serious allegations which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, his case is 

Case 1:15-cv-01778-JLT Document 13 Filed 03/07/16 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

not exceptional. This Court is faced with similar cases almost daily. Further, at this early 

stage in the proceedings, the Court cannot make a determination that Plaintiff is likely to 

succeed on the merits, and based on a review of the record in this case, the Court does 

not find that Plaintiff cannot adequately articulate his claims. Id. This motion will therefore 

be denied.

III. SCREENING OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

A. Screening Requirement

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

B. Pleading Standard

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

Case 1:15-cv-01778-JLT Document 13 Filed 03/07/16 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

C. Plaintiff’s Allegations

The acts giving rise to this action occurred while Plaintiff was housed at California 

State Prison in Corcoran, California (“CSP-Corcoran”). Plaintiff names as Defendants 

Correctional Officers (“CO”) B. Johnson and M. Martinez, and Correctional Lieutenant 

(“CL”) T. Marsh. 

Plaintiff’s allegations can be fairly summarized as follows1: 

On December 3, 2014, Defendants CO Martinez and Johnson severely assaulted 

Plaintiff without cause, resulting in a fractured jaw and permanent injuries, including loss 

of taste and smell. Lt. Marsh witnessed the assault but took no action to stop it. Lt. 

Marsh also failed to summon medical care following the attack.

Plaintiff brings this damages suit against the Defendants in their individual and 

official capacities. 

D. Analysis 

1. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 

prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits 

cruel and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer 

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “... embodies broad and 

idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh 

and restrictive. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison 

 

1

The allegations in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint are substantially identical to those asserted in his 

original pleading but for the addition of certain details that do not alter the Court’s analysis on screening.

Case 1:15-cv-01778-JLT Document 13 Filed 03/07/16 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

officials must provide prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and 

personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison 

official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) 

objectively, the official's act or omission must be so serious such that it results in the 

denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities; and (2) subjectively, the 

prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting 

harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 

official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force, the core judicial 

inquiry is “... whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 

1, 6-7 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). The “malicious and 

sadistic” standard, as opposed to the “deliberate indifference” standard applicable to 

most Eighth Amendment claims, is applied to excessive force claims because prison 

officials generally do not have time to reflect on their actions in the face of risk of injury to 

inmates or prison employees. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. In determining whether 

force was excessive, the court considers the following factors: (1) the need for 

application of force; (2) the extent of injuries; (3) the relationship between the need for 

force and the amount of force used; (4) the nature of the threat reasonably perceived by 

prison officers; and (5) efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. See

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The absence of an emergency situation is probative of whether 

force was applied maliciously or sadistically. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 

1528 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). The lack of injuries is also probative. See Hudson, 503 

U.S. at 7-9. Finally, because the use of force relates to the prison's legitimate 

penological interest in maintaining security and order, the court must be deferential to 

the conduct of prison officials. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22.

Case 1:15-cv-01778-JLT Document 13 Filed 03/07/16 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

With these standards in mind, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations against 

COs Johnson and Martinez are sufficient to state a claim for excessive force. He asserts 

that these Defendants assaulted him viciously without cause, resulting in significant and 

permanent injuries. Plaintiff may therefore proceed against these two Defendants on an 

Eighth Amendment excessive force claim.

2. Eighth Amendment Failure to Intervene

Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from 

physical abuse. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833; Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th 

Cir. 2005). A prisoner's rights can be violated by a prison official's deliberate indifference 

by failing to intervene. Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Deliberate indifference occurs where prison officials know of and disregard a substantial 

risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 

1040. However, an officer can only be held liable for failing to intercede if he had a 

realistic opportunity to intercede and failed to do so. Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 

1271, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 2000).

As discussed, Plaintiff states a viable excessive force claim against Defendants 

Johnson and Martinez. In his First Amended Complaint, he also alleges that Lt. Marsh 

witnessed the attack, had the opportunity to intervene, and yet failed to intervene. This is 

sufficient to state a cognizable claim against Lt. Marsh.

3. Eighth Amendment Indifference to Medical Needs 

Plaintiff also brings a claim of medical indifference against Lt. Marsh for allegedly 

failing to summon medical care following the attack. The Eighth Amendment entitles 

prisoners to medical care, and a prison official violates the Amendment when he acts 

with deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 

104 (1976); Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 

680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.

2006). “[A] serious medical need is present whenever the ‘failure to treat a prisoner's 

Case 1:15-cv-01778-JLT Document 13 Filed 03/07/16 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction 

of pain.” Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing McGuckin v. 

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 

1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (a serious medical need exists where inmate has an injury 

that a reasonable doctor would find worthy of comment or treatment or suffers chronic 

and substantial pain.) Even assuming that Lt. Marsh did not summon medical care

following the attack, Plaintiff fails to state a claim since he has not alleged any injury as a 

result of this conduct. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Plaintiff, in fact, avers that he was seen by medical staff just a few hours later. Plaintiff 

thus fails to state a claim against Lt. Marsh for indifference to medical needs.

4. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's claims for damages against the named 

Defendants in their official capacities. See Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab., 131 

F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997); Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1996). 

State officers acting in their official capacities receive the same immunity as the 

government agency that employs them. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991). Thus, a state 

prison officials sued for damages in his or her official capacity is entitled to Eleventh 

Amendment immunity. Plaintiff’s claims for damages against the Defendants in their 

official capacities are therefore dismissed. He may, nonetheless, continue with his claims 

against the Defendants in their individual capacities. Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 749 

(9th Cir. 1995).

IV. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Lastly, Plaintiff filed a motion for an emergency preliminary injunction seeking 

immediate and adequate medical care. Plaintiff seeks an order directing non-party C. 

McCabe, Chief Medical Officer (“CMO”) at CSP-Corcoran, to provide medical care for 

injuries that Plaintiff sustained following the attack by the Defendants. 

Case 1:15-cv-01778-JLT Document 13 Filed 03/07/16 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

The legal principles applicable to requests for injunctive relief, such as a 

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, are well established. To prevail, the 

moving party must show either a likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying 

controversy and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious questions are raised 

and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the movant's favor. See Coalition for 

Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 1997); Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. 

Chronicle Publ'g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985). The two formulations 

represent two points on a sliding scale with the focal point being the degree of 

irreparable injury shown. See Oakland Tribune, 762 F.2d at 1376. Under any formulation 

of the test, however, the moving party must demonstrate that there exists a significant 

threat of irreparable injury. See id. In the absence of a significant showing of possible 

irreparable harm, the court need not reach the issue of likelihood of success on the 

merits. See id. The loss of money, or an injury whose measure of damages can be 

calculated in terms of money, will not be considered irreparable. See id. at 1334-35.

As noted, Plaintiff’s claim arises from the Defendant Correctional Officers’ attack 

and/or failure to intervene in an attack on Plaintiff. In this motion, Plaintiff asserts that he 

received inadequate medical care following the incident, and he moves for an order 

directing CMO McCabe to provide him with quick and adequate care. This claim,

however, was not raised in Plaintiff’s pleading in general and certainly not against this 

individual in particular. Generally, it is appropriate to grant in a preliminary injunction 

“intermediate relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally.” De 

Beers Consol. Mines v. U.S., 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945). A court should not issue an 

injunction when the relief sought is not of the same character, and the injunction deals 

with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the underlying action. Id. Also, as a 

general rule, a court may not enter an injunction against persons who are not parties to 

the case before it absent some substantial relationship, which is absent here. See

Zepeda v. U.S. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1984). Even assuming there is a 

Case 1:15-cv-01778-JLT Document 13 Filed 03/07/16 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

substantial relationship between CMO McCabe and the conduct underlying this action, 

Plaintiff admits that following the attack, he was prescribed pain medication and 

nutritional supplements, he received a neck brace, he received multiple x-rays and two 

CAT scans, and he was seen by an Eye, Note, and Throat specialist. He also states that 

he is currently awaiting another appointment with an Eye, Nose, and Throat specialist. At 

this time, then, the Court cannot say that Plaintiff is under a significant threat of 

irreparable injury. Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff states cognizable claims, as set forth supra, against Defendants Martinez, 

Johnson and Marsh in their individual capacities. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 

that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to amend (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED;

2. The Clerk of the Court shall file the First Amended Complaint, lodged 

February 24, 2016;

3. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 9) is DENIED;

4. Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 11) is DENIED; 

5. Service should be initiated on Defendants Martinez, Johnson and Marsh; 

6. The Clerk of the Court should send Plaintiff three (3) USM-285 form, three 

(3) summons, a Notice of Submission of Documents form, an instruction 

sheet, and a copy of the First Amended Complaint; 

6. Within thirty (30) days from the date of this order, Plaintiff shall complete 

the attached Notice of Submission of Documents and submit the completed Notice to the 

Court with the following documents:

a. Three (3) completed summonses;

b. Three (3) completed USM-285 forms for each Defendant listed 

above; and

c. Four (4) copies of the First Amended Complaint;

Case 1:15-cv-01778-JLT Document 13 Filed 03/07/16 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

7. Plaintiff need not attempt service on the Defendants and need not request 

waiver of service. Upon receipt of the above-described documents, the Court will direct 

the United States Marshal to serve the above-named Defendants pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 4 without payment of costs; and

8. The failure to comply with this order will result in dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 5, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-01778-JLT Document 13 Filed 03/07/16 Page 10 of 10