Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01132/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01132-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 871
Nature of Suit: IRS 3rd Party Suits 26 USC 7609 (U.S. plaintiff)
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH FILED 

United States Court of Appeals T~nth Ci.rcuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FEB 1 01989 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DONALD ATKINSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

AGENT WILLIAM O'NEILL; 

APPEALS OFFICER, JUDY DORSCH; 

DISTRICT COUNCIL JAMES FINLEN, JR.; 

OFFICER BETTY HUNTER, of Internal 

Revenue Service, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-1132 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 87-2152) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Donald Atkinson, pro se. 

William S. Rose, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Gary R. Allen, 

Jonathan S. Cohen, and Howard M. Soloman, Attorneys, Tax Division, 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Benjamin L. Burgess, Jr., 

United States Attorney, Wichita, Kansas, of Counsel) for the 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before BALDOCK, BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and BURCIAGA, District 

Judge.* 

*The Honorable Juan G. Burciaga, 

District Court for the District 

designation. 

District Judge, United States 

of New Mexico, sitting by 

Appellate Case: 88-1132 Document: 01019740022 Date Filed: 02/10/1989 Page: 1 
PER CURIAM. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the district court 

granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. The district 

court granted summary judgment on the ground that defendants were 

entitled to absolute and qualified immunity. 

The district court treated this action as against defendants 

in their individual capacities. Careful examination of 

plaintiff's pleadings and briefs on appeal reveals that plaintiff 

was not suing defendants in their individual capacities, but 

rather was suing them in their official capacities. Plaintiff 

stated in his response to the motion for summary judgment that he 

was not suing defendants in their individual capacities. 

Therefore, he was suing them in their official capacities as 

employees of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and United States. 

In his reply brief on appeal, he states that he intended to bring 

suit against the United States and it was not his intent "to bring 

suit against the individuals, their names were included for 

investagative (sic) purposes only." 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-1132 Document: 01019740022 Date Filed: 02/10/1989 Page: 2 
When an action is one against named individual defendants, 

but the acts complained of consist of actions taken by defendants 

in their official capacity as agents of the United States, the 

action is in fact one against the United States. Burgos v. 

Milton, 709 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1983); see also Hawaii v. Gordon, 

373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963)(relief sought nominally agairist an officer 

is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate 

against the latter); Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th 

Cir. 1985)(suit against IRS employees in their official capacities 

is a suit against the United States). Plaintiff essentially was 

suing the United States, even though the United States was not 

actually named as a party. 

It is well settled that the United States and its employees, 

sued in their official capacities, are immune from suit, unless 

sovereign immunity has been waived. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 

U.S. 159, 165-67 (1985); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 

399 (1976). The United States has not waived sovereign immunity 

in circumstances such as those alleged by plaintiff. Accordingly, 

this action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 

In addition, this action was an impermissible attempt to 

attack the Tax Court's decision. 

Although we disagree with the district court's reasons for 

granting summary judgment, upon consideration of the briefs, 

record on appeal, and relevant case law, we conclude the district 

court correctly granted summary judgment. See Wiggins v. New 

Mexico State Supreme Court Clerk, 664 F.2d 812, 816 (10th Cir. 

198l)(court of appeals may affirm district court on any grounds 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-1132 Document: 01019740022 Date Filed: 02/10/1989 Page: 3 
supported by the record), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 840 ('1982). We 

.further conclude that the district court did not err by not 

holding a jury trial. 

Defendants request that we impose sanctions of $1,500 in lieu 

of attorney's fees and costs on plaintiff for bringing a legally 

frivolous appeal. Plaintiff has had an opportunity to respond to 

the request. 

Courts have the inherent power to impose a variety of 

sanctions on .•. litigants •.• in order to regulate 

their docket, promote judicial efficiency, and deter 

frivolous filings. See, ~, Roadway Express, Inc.· v. 

Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67 ... (1980); Link v. Wabash 

R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 632 ... (1962); Whitney v. Cook, 

99 U.S. (9 Otto.) 607 ... (1878). In addition, 

Fed. R. App. P. 38 and 28 u.s.c. § 1912 provide that a 

court of appeals may award just damages and single or 

double costs if the court "determine[s] that an appeal 

is frivolous" or brought for purposes of delay. This 

court has imposed attorney's fees and double costs for 

the taking of frivolous appeals in other contexts. See, 

~' United States v. Rayco, Inc., 616 F.2d 462, 464 

(10th Cir. 1980). 

Stafford v. Commissioner, 805 F.2d 895, 896 (10th Cir. 1986); 

Stafford v. Commissioner, 805 F.2d 893, 894-95 (10th Cir. 1986). 

In light of plaintiff's legally frivolous appeal, an award of 

damages and double costs is justified. Rather than impose a set 

sanction amount as requested by defendants, we remand to the 

district court to make a determination. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED, and the case is REMANDED to the 

district court to determine the amount of the sanction to be 

awarded for taking a legally frivolous appeal. The district court 

may "look to the principles that have evolved in the 

interpretation of Rule 11" in assessing the amount of the sanction 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-1132 Document: 01019740022 Date Filed: 02/10/1989 Page: 4 
awarded pursuant to Rule 38 and § 1912. See Coghlan v. Starkey, 

852 F.2d 806, 817 n.21 (5th Cir. 1988)(quoting Sparks v. National 

Labor Relations Bd., 835 F.2d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1987)). 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-1132 Document: 01019740022 Date Filed: 02/10/1989 Page: 5