Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00728/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00728-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ORLANDO CAIN FEBLES, )

)

Petitioner, ) No. CV 07-728-PHX-SRB (CRP)

)

vs. )

) REPORT AND

)

) RECOMMENDATION

P. RIDER, et. al., )

)

Respondents. )

__________________________________ )

Orlando Febles (“Petitioner”), presently an inmate at the Arizona State Prison

Complex in Douglas, filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Habeas Petition”) on

April 9, 2007. (Doc 1). Petitioner raises one ground for relief in which he presents five

claims. He argues (1) his right to speedy trial was denied; (2) his attorneys were ineffective

because they spent too much time contesting fees; (3) his trial and appeal counsel were

ineffective, (4) his rights were violated in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakey v.

Washington; and (5) the trial judge aggravated his sentence for no apparent reason. (Doc 1).

Respondents oppose the Habeas Petition, arguing it is an abuse of writ because it is

a second or successive habeas petition challenging the same judgments and sentences

analyzed in Petitioner’s first Habeas Petition. (Doc 16); (See Febles v. Rider, et. al, cv-06-

1414-SRB-CRP). In his Reply, Petitioner contends this Habeas Petition addresses Counts

1 and 2 of his convictions which he argues are separate from Count 4, the focus of his first

Habeas Petition. (Doc 17). 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. DIRECT REVIEW

On November 7, 1996, Petitioner was indicted on six criminal counts. (See Febles

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v. Rider, et. al., cv-06-1414-SRB-CRP, Doc 14, Exhibit A, R.O.A., Item 2). These counts

arose from events in June and September of 1995 when Petitioner participated in two

separate burglaries and assaults. (Id. Doc 14, Exhibit A, R.O.A., Item 2). Petitioner was

eventually brought to trial on the charges arising from the September 1995 event,

referenced as Counts 1 and 2 in the Indictment. On August 1, 2000, a jury found

Petitioner guilty on those counts. (Id. Doc 14, Exhibit F). After the trial, Petitioner pled

guilty to one of the charges arising from the June 1995 event. In exchange for his plea to

Count 4, the Government dropped the other charges arising from that event. On January

26, 2001, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to 15 years for Count 1, 21 years for Count

2, to run concurrently with Count 1, and 10 years for Count 4, to run consecutively to

Counts 1 and 2. (Id. Doc 14, Exhibit A, R.O.A., Item 2). 

Petitioner waived his right to direct review of Count 4 by pleading guilty. Under

Arizona law, however, Petitioner was entitled to file an “of right” post-conviction relief

appeal of Count 4. Petitioner never filed the of-right appeal of Count Four and his

opportunity to file that appeal expired on April 26, 2001, 90 days after the entry of

judgment and sentence in Count 4. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a).

On January 30, 2001, Petitioner filed a direct appeal of Counts 1 and 2. (See

Febles v. Rider, et. al., cv-06-1414-SRB-CRP, Doc 14, Exhibit L, R.O.A., Item 212). On

January 31, 2002, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and

sentences. (Id. Doc 14, Exhibit N, R.O.A., Item 246). Petitioner had 30 days to file a

Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme Court, requesting review of the appellate

court’s decision. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). Petitioner never requested the review and

his direct appeal ended on Monday, March 4, 2002, the day his right to file an appeal with

the Arizona Supreme Court expired. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3.

B. COLLATERAL REVIEW

Petitioner filed his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR Appeal”) on February

22, 2002. (See Febles v. Rider, et. al., cv-06-1414-SRB-CRP, Doc 14, Exhibit O, R.O.A.,

Item 241). When originally filed, this PCR Appeal focused solely on Counts 1 and 2 of

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Petitioner’s sentence. (Id. Doc 14, Exhibit Y). Petitioner supplemented his PCR Appeal

on October 17, 2002 and again on December 30, 2002. (Id. Doc 14, Exhibits Q, R.O.A.,

Item 280; T, R.O.A., Item 290). It was Petitioner’s December 30, 3002 Supplement in

which he first argued his rights were violated under Apprendi v. New Jersey. 530 U.S.

466 (2000). Specifically, Petitioner argued against the trial court’s determination that his

sentence for Count 4 should run consecutively to the sentences imposed for Counts 1 and

2. (See Febles v. Rider, et. al., cv-06-1414-SRB-CRP, Doc 14, Exhibit T, R.O.A., Item

290). Thus, after supplementing his PCR Appeal on December 30, 2002, Petitioner’s

PCR Appeal focused on all counts of his sentence. 

On April 4, 2003, the Trial Court dismissed Petitioner’s PCR Appeal. (Id. Doc

14, Exhibit V, R.O.A., Item 297). Petitioner requested the Arizona Court of Appeals

review the trial court’s dismissal of his PCR Appeal. (Id. Doc 14, Exhibit Y). While his

Petition for Review was pending with the Arizona Court of Appeals, the United States

Supreme Court issued its opinion in Blakely v. Washington. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 

Because Petitioner argued Apprendi issues in his PCR Appeal, he requested permission to

supplement his Petition for Review to include argument of Blakely implications. (See

Febles v. Rider, et. al., cv-06-1414-SRB-CRP, Doc 14, Exhibit BB). The Arizona Court

of Appeals stayed Petitioner’s PCR Appeal and remanded his case back to the trial court,

directing the trial court to consider Petitioner’s claim for relief based on Blakely. (Id. Doc

14, Exhibit CC). 

Once again in front of the trial court, Petitioner argued his sentence on all counts

was unconstitutional under Apprendi as interpreted by Blakely. (Id. Doc 14, Exhibit DD). 

Petitioner contended he was entitled to resentencing because Apprendi was decided

before his conviction was final and Apprendi, as interpreted by Blakely, required

aggravating facts be presented to a jury. The trial court disagreed with Petitioner’s

argument and denied his Motion for Resentencing. (Id. Doc 14, Exhibit GG). The trial

court held Petitioner was properly sentenced under Apprendi as Apprendi was interpreted

prior to Blakely and that Blakely could not be applied retroactively. After filing a Motion

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for Rehearing, which the trial court denied, Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition for

Consideration of Apprendi-Blakely relief with the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id. Doc 14,

Exhibits HH, II, JJ). The appellate court, on July 5, 2005, denied Petitioner relief on all

his claims. (Id. Doc 14, Exhibit KK). Petitioner then requested the Arizona Supreme

Court review the appellate court’s decision on November 18, 2005. (Id. Doc 14, Exhibit

LL). The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on April 20, 2006. (Id. Doc 14, Exhibit

MM).

C. FIRST PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner filed his first Habeas Petition with this Court on May 31, 2006. (Id. Doc 

1). In his first Habeas Petition, Petitioner argued (1) his guilty plea to Count Four was

not knowing or voluntary because he was not informed of his right to have a jury

determine all facts used to aggravate his sentence; (2) his sentence is unconstitutional in

light of Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakey v. Washington; and (3) his trial counsel was

ineffective in failing to advise him of his right to a jury determination of aggravating facts

used at sentencing. (Id. Doc 4). In that Habeas Petition, Petitioner contended he was

only addressing Count 4 of his judgment and sentence. (Id. Doc 4). Petitioner’s claims,

however, necessitated a consideration of all three counts. This Court, like the state courts,

considered Counts 1, 2, and 4 together because all three counts are part of the same

judgment and sentence. This Court issued a Report and Recommendation on February 5,

2008, recommending that the District Judge, after her independent review and analysis,

dismiss the Habeas Petition. (Id. Doc 22). The District Judge adopted the Report and

Recommendation and dismissed with prejudice the Habeas Petition on March 31, 2008 as

procedurally defaulted and because Blakely does not apply retroactively.

D. SECOND PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner filed the pending Habeas Petition with this Court on April 9, 2007.

II. DISCUSSION

A. SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE HABEAS PETITION

Before a second or successive petition is filed in the District Court, the petitioner

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shall move the Court of Appeals for an order authorizing its filing in the district court. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). The Court of Appeals will not issue an order authorizing a

second or successive petition unless petitioner meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b). Absent approval from the Ninth Circuit, the District Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A);

Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 1999 WL 79623 (D.Ariz. February 3, 1999); Burton v. Stewart, 549

U.S. 147 (2007) (rejecting argument that the District Court has jurisdiction to consider the

merits of Petitioner’s claims notwithstanding failure to seek permission to file a

successive petition because petitioner has a “legitimate excuse” for his failure to raise the

claims presented in his second habeas action in his first habeas action.).

It is established that when a first petition was decided and dismissed on the merits,

any later petition is “successive.” Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1002 n.1 (9th

Cir.2000), citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485-486 (2000). A habeas petition

dismissed for procedural default also renders a subsequent petition “second” or

“successive” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). A subsequent habeas

petition is “second” or “successive” because the petitioner “has no further opportunity to

obtain a disposition on the merits of his or her claims in the state courts” and the “interest

underlying the dismissal of the first petition, i.e., federal-state comity, is still present.” 

Henderson v. Lampert, 396 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir.2005).

Because Petitioner’s prior Habeas Petition was dismissed both on the merits and as

procedurally defaulted, his pending Habeas Petition is “successive” or “second.” Green,

223 F.3d at 1002 n.1. Accordingly, before seeking federal habeas corpus review for a

second time, Petitioner must seek from the Ninth Circuit an order authorizing this Court

to consider the second Habeas Petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 

Petitioner argues this Habeas Petition is unrelated to his first Habeas Petition and

therefore is not a second or successive petition. The AEDPA does not define the term

“second or successive.” The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue and stated “[t]he Supreme

Court, the Ninth Circuit, and our sister circuits have interpreted the concept incorporated

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in this term of art as derivative of the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine developed in preADEPA cases.” Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir.2006) (internal citations

omitted). “An abuse of the writ occurs when a petitioner raises a habeas claim that could

have been raised in an earlier petition were it not for inexcusable neglect.” Allen v.

Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir.2006) (internal citations omitted).

In Petitioner’s case, he argues his first Habeas Petition addressed only Count 4 and

that this pending Habeas Petition addresses Counts 1 and 2. To support his position that

the petitions are separate, Petitioner argues Counts 1 and 2 arose from a separate incident

than Count 4 and that the counts were separated for trial. While these facts are true,

Petitioner was charged with all three counts at the same time, the cases progressed

together on all counts, and Petitioner was eventually sentenced on all three counts at the

same time. Also, the state courts and this Court considered all three counts together in

Petitioner’s various appeals because Petitioner’s arguments implicate all three counts. 

Thus in his first Habeas Petition, Petitioner could have and did raise most of the claims

that he now presents in this Habeas Petition. The pending Habeas Petition is a second or

successive petition within the meaning of the AEDPA. This Court, therefore, lacks

jurisdiction over the Habeas Petition because Petitioner failed to comply with the

requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 before seeking habeas corpus review in this Court.

If the District Court finds Petitioner’s second Habeas Petition is not second or

successive within the meaning of the AEDPA, then this Court considers the timeliness,

procedural default, and merits of the Habeas Petition.

B. TIMELINESS OF THIS HABEAS PETITION

The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes

a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners filing federal habeas petitions. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute of limitations begins to run from the latest of: (1) the

date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2) the date on which the impediment to

filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

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United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(3) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

Of these four possible triggering dates for the AEDPA’s statute of limitations, only

the first is relevant to the present action. Petitioner does not allege he was impeded in his

state appeal efforts or that he was unconstitutionally impeded from timely filing the

present Habeas Petition. Also, Petitioner does not allege that his Habeas Petition is

predicated on a newly-recognized constitutional right or newly-discovered evidence that

could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence.

In this case, Petitioner was convicted of Counts 1 and 2 on August 1, 2000. 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal of those counts and on January 31, 2002, the Arizona

Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences. At that point, Petitioner had 30

days to file a Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme Court. Petitioner never

requested the review and his direct appeal ended on Monday, March 4, 2002, the day his

right to file an appeal with the Arizona Supreme Court expired. The ADEPA’s statute of

limitations was triggered the following day on March 5, 2002.

Absent any statutory or equitable tolling periods, Petitioner’s right to file a federal

habeas petition expired on March 5, 2003. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246

(9th Cir.2001) (calculating the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations using the

“anniversary method” of Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Petitioner

did not file the pending Habeas Petition until May 31, 2006, years after the one-year

statute of limitations expired. Petitioner does not argue and this Court does not find that

he is entitled to any equitable tolling. The Habeas Petition is untimely unless statutory

tolling applies and results in a tolling of the limitations period for a sufficient length of

time to bring the Habeas Petition within the one-year limitations period.

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Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of

properly filed state collateral review proceedings challenging either the pertinent

judgment or pertinent claim asserted in the federal habeas petition.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2). The AEDPA’s statute of limitations began to run for Petitioner on March 5,

2002, the day after his right to file an appeal with the Arizona Supreme Court expired. 

The limitations period, however, was immediately tolled because Petitioner had filed his

PCR Appeal on February 22, 2002. The AEDPA’s limitations period was statutorily

tolled from the day Petitioner filed his PCR Appeal on February 22, 2002, until the day

the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of that Appeal on April 20, 2006. The

AEDPA’s limitations period began to run again on April 21, 2006, the day after

Petitioner’s collateral review concluded in the state courts. Because Petitioner filed his

PCR Appeal before his direct review concluded, the AEDPA’s statute of limitations was

immediately tolled and no days expired from the one year limitations period. Thus, after

the conclusion of his PCR Appeal, Petitioner had the full year to file a Habeas Petition. 

Petitioner had until April 21, 2007 to file the Habeas Petition. Petitioner filed the pending

Habeas Petition on April 9, 2007. The Habeas Petition is timely. 

C. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Federal habeas relief is available to state prisoners only after they have exhausted

their claims in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c). The requirement that a state

prisoner exhaust federal claims in state courts before bringing those claims to federal

court is grounded in principles of comity, and reflects a desire to protect state courts' role

in the enforcement of federal law. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (internal

citations omitted). Claims are exhausted when no remedy for the claims remain available

in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). In cases where a petitioner has failed to fairly

present a claim in state court, the federal court must consider whether any available state

remedy remains. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir.1998). If a federal court

determines no state remedies remain, the petitioner’s claim is technically exhausted but

procedurally defaulted. A federal habeas court cannot address the merits of the claim in

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those cases. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-162 (1996).

The Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure constrain when and how a state prisoner

may bring a claim under Rule 32. Under the Rules, a state prisoner cannot seek Rule 32

post-conviction relief in a subsequent Rule 32 appeal if the claim in that subsequent

appeal could have been raised in a prior Rule 32 appeal. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a). 

Additionally, Arizona law permits a Rule 32 appeal only within 90 days after the entry of

judgment and sentence or within 30 days after the issuance of the order and mandate in

the direct appeal. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). The few exceptions to these Rules are not

applicable to the case pending before this Court. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)-(h). Thus,

these Rules are an adequate procedural bar, which prevent a federal court from addressing

the merits of a habeas petition. Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 578 (9th Cir.1999). 

In the case pending before this Court, Petitioner technically exhausted but

procedurally defaulted claim five (trial judge aggravated sentence for no apparent reason). 

Petitioner failed to present this claim to the state courts. Petitioner does not point to any

evidence that shows he presented this claim to the state courts. After review of the

record, this Court has not found any evidence that this claim was presented to the state

courts. This is a new claim presented for the first time in this federal Habeas Petition. 

Petitioner could not now go back to the state courts and present this claim. Ariz. R. Crim.

P. 32.2, 32.4. For these reasons, Petitioner’s fifth claim is procedurally defaulted. This

Court cannot address the merits of that claim, absent a showing of cause and prejudice or

a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

When a petitioner procedurally defaults a claim in state court, a federal court will

not review the claim unless the petitioner shows “cause and prejudice” for the failure to

present the constitutional issue to the state court, or failure to hear the claim would

constitute a miscarriage of justice. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338-339 (1992). 

“‘Cause’ is a legitimate excuse for the default, and ‘prejudice’ is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation.” Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th

Cir.1991) (internal citations omitted). A petitioner has the burden of proving cause and

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prejudice. Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir.1996) (citations omitted), cert.

denied, 516 U.S. 1143 (1996). When a petitioner does not prove cause and prejudice,

courts will consider the merits of a claim only if failure to do so would result in a

miscarriage of justice. Id. “Such injustice occurs where a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Id. at 1159 (internal

citations omitted).

In the case pending before this Court, Petitioner fails to show any cause for his

procedural default on his fifth claim. Petitioner does not offer any evidence of prejudice

and the record does not support a claim of prejudice. Furthermore, dismissing

Petitioner’s fifth claim will not result in a miscarriage of justice. Petitioner’s fifth claim

is procedurally defaulted and should be dismissed.

Petitioner timely presented his first, second, third and fourth claims to the state

courts. The merits of those claims are now addressed.

D. MERITS OF PETITIONER’S REMAINING CLAIMS

Under the AEDPA, when reviewing a state criminal conviction, a federal court

may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if a state court proceeding “(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Federal courts give deference to state courts’ decisions on both the legal and the factual

determinations. A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court

precedent “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth” in

Supreme Court cases or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from” a Supreme Court decision but “nevertheless arrives at a result

different from” that precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). Under the

AEDPA, “state court findings of fact are presumed correct unless rebutted by clear and

convincing evidence.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 903

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(9th Cir.2003). In conducting habeas review, federal courts “presum[e] that state courts

know and follow the law.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). 

In his first claim, Petitioner argues his right to speedy trial was denied by the state

courts. Petitioner does not present any facts in his Habeas Petition or his Reply to support

this argument. Rather, he contends “[p]etitioner’s speedy trial rights were definitely

violated.” (Doc 17). In his state court appeal, Petitioner argued his right to speedy trial

was violated because Arizona allegedly knew of his imprisonment in California as early

as October 1995 but did not initiate return proceedings for the charges at issue until April

1998. (Doc 16, Exhibit N). The state trial court held an evidentiary hearing on this issue

and found Arizona did not know of Petitioner’s incarceration in California until 1998. 

The trial court based its finding on the first record the prosecutor had concerning

Petitioner’s incarceration in California. The record was dated March 1998, not October

1995. Thus, the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to dismiss for a speedy trial right

violation. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals reviewed the evidentiary hearing

records and concluded that trial court did not abuse its discretion. The factual

determination made by the state courts was not based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. Petitioner’s

first claim should be denied.

In his second and third claims, Petitioner argues that counsel spent too much time

contesting their fees and generally that his trial counsel and appellate counsel were

ineffective. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The burden of proof on Petitioner to

show ineffective assistance is two-pronged. First, Petitioner must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient, in that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as “counsel.” Id. at 687. In demonstrating a deficient performance,

Petitioner must show that the representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Id. at 688. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly

deferential, since there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s performance falls within

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the ‘wide range of professional assistance.’” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381

(1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

Second, in proving ineffectiveness, Petitioner must show that counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. To prove prejudice,

Petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors

and omissions, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to prove that counsel was

ineffective. Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir.1989). 

Petitioner’s second claim generally argues that his attorneys were ineffective

because they contested their fees. Petitioner does not offer any evidence to show how the

attorneys’ discussion of fees with the courts impacted their representation of Petitioner. 

Petitioner argued this claim to the state trial court judge who held “[t]here is no evidence

that the compensation issue in any way impacted counsel’s representation of Defendant.” 

(Exhibit V). Petitioner’s second claim arguing ineffective assistance of counsel does not

satisfy the Strickland requirements and should be denied.

Petitioner’s third claim in the pending Habeas Petition makes a general allegation

of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner does not offer any evidence that his

counsels’ assistance was deficient or that any deficient performance effected the outcome

of his case. Petitioner has made numerous detailed claims about ineffective assistance of

counsel in his state PCR Appeal and in his first Habeas Petition. These claims were

previously addressed and denied by the courts. Petitioner’s third claim arguing general

ineffective assistance of counsel does not satisfy the Strickland requirements. Petitioner’s

third claim should be denied.

In his fourth claim, Petitioner argues, as he did in his first Habeas Petition, that his

rights were violated in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington. In

Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held any fact, other than a prior conviction,

which increases the penalty for a crime beyond the legislatively-prescribed “statutory

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maximum” must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S.

at 490. Prior to Blakely, the federal courts interpreted Apprendi to mean that a judge

could not aggravate a sentence beyond the “statutory maximum” proscribed by the state

legislature. Federal circuits unanimously believed that the statutory maximum was the

greatest sentence by the statute of conviction, irrespective of what factfinding the court

conducted to impose that sentence. Allen v. Reed, 427 F.3d 767, 775 (10th Cir.2005),

citing United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 847 (10th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct.

1119 (2007). 

Courts interpretation of Apprendi changed after Blakely was issued. In Blakely,

the United States Supreme Court clarified that the term “statutory maximum,” as used in

Apprendi meant the presumptive sentence given the facts as found by the jury or admitted

by the defendant. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-304; Allen v. Reed, 427 F.3d 767, 772

(10th Cir.2005) (“In other words, [after Blakely] the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not

the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the

maximum he may impose without any additional findings.”). 

While Blakely clarified the meaning of statutory maximum as applied in Apprendi,

courts have held that Blakely is not retroactive. Defendants sentenced in the time

between the Supreme Court’s issuance of Apprendi and Blakely are limited to an

interpretation of Apprendi as it was understood prior to the issuance of Blakely. See, e.g.

Allen v. Reed, 427 F.3d 767, 774 (10th Cir.2005); Brown v. Greiner, 409 F.3d 523, 533-

534 (2nd Cir.2005) (“our appraisal of the reasonableness of the state court interpretations

of Apprendi may not be influenced by the Supreme Court’s subsequent elucidation in

such cases as Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v. Booker,

543 U.S. 220, cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1566 (2006).

In the case pending before this Court, Petitioner’s convictions became final after

the Apprendi decision was issued in 2000 but prior to the date the Blakely decision was

issued in June of 2004. Therefore, the holding of Apprendi applies to Petitioner’s

sentences, only as it was understood at that time, pre-Blakely. When Petitioner

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committed his crimes, the statutory maximum for a dangerous class two felony was 21

years and for a dangerous class three felony, fifteen years. A.R.S. § 13-604(i) (Supp.

1995). In 2001, prior to the decision in Blakely and without violating the decision in

Apprendi, Petitioner could properly be sentenced to 51 years imprisonment pursuant to

his conviction for Counts 1 and 2 and his plea for Count 4. Petitioner received the

statutory maximum for Counts 1 and 2, totaling 36 years, to run concurrent. Petitioner

received only 10 years for his plea to Count 4, to run consecutively to the sentences for

Counts 1 and 2. The trial judge sentenced Petitioner within the allowable statutory

maximums. Petitioner is not entitled to relief from his sentences. 

The application of Apprendi to Petitioner’s claims was not clearly contrary to

federal law. In fact, the state courts followed the law as interpreted in the time between

Apprendi and Blakely. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim should be denied.

III. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court,

after its independent review and analysis, enter an order DISMISSING the Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties are advised that

any objections filed are to be identified with the following case number: cv-07-728-SRB.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to

Petitioner and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 10th day of June, 2008.

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