Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-17099/USCOURTS-ca9-13-17099-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EMERENCIANA PETER-PALICAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GOVERNMENT OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN

MARIANA ISLANDS; ELOY S. INOS,

Governor of the Commonwealth of

the Northern Mariana Islands, in his

official capacity,

*

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-17099

D.C. No.

1:07-cv-00022

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of the Northern Mariana Islands

John C. Coughenour, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 23, 2014**

San Francisco, California

Filed September 17, 2014

* Governor Eloy S. Inos is substituted for his predecessor, Governor

Benigno R. Fitial, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 PETER-PALICAN V. CNMI

Before: Alfred T. Goodwin, Stephen S. Trott,

and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

SUMMARY***

Civil Rights

Following a prior remand in Peter-Palican v. Gov’t of N.

Mariana Islands, 695 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2012), the panel

affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of

the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and

Governor Eloy S. Inos in Emerenciana Peter-Palican’s action

arising from her termination from her position as Special

Assistant to the Governor for Women’s Affairs.

The panel held that the district court properly granted

summary judgment on Peter-Palican’s retaliation claim

because she failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether she

did not hold a “policymaking or confidential” position. The

district court properly granted summary judgment on the

breach of contract claim because it was undisputed that PeterPalican held her position by virtue of appointment rather than

by contract.

The panel held that the district court properly granted

summary judgment on Peter-Palican’s estoppel claim, first,

because she failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether

 

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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PETER-PALICAN V. CNMI 3

government officials engaged in any affirmative misconduct

going beyond mere negligence, as required for equitable

estoppel. Second, Peter-Palican failed to raise a triable

dispute as to whether the Commonwealth gained an

advantage by asserting one position, and then later sought an

advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent position, as

required for judicial estoppel.

The panel denied the Commonwealth’s request for

sanctions against Peter-Palican and her attorney.

COUNSEL

Douglas F. Cushnie, Proas Lane, Saipan, Commonwealth of

the Northern Mariana Islands, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Joey P. San Nicolas, Attorney General, David Lochabay,

Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General,

Saipan, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, for

Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Emerenciana Peter-Palican appeals from the district

court’s summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth of

the Northern Mariana Islands and Governor Eloy S. Inos

(collectively, “the Commonwealth”) in Peter-Palican’s

42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from her termination from

her position as Special Assistant to the Governor for

Women’s Affairs. In an earlier appeal, we vacated the district

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4 PETER-PALICAN V. CNMI

court’s judgment in favor of Peter-Palican because the

Commonwealth Supreme Court’s answer to our certified

questions conclusively determined that Peter-Palican did not

have a constitutionally protected interest in continued

employment beyond the term of the governor who appointed

her, and her termination without cause therefore did not

violate the Due Process Clause. Peter-Palican v. Gov’t of N.

Mariana Islands, 695 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2012). We

remanded, however, for the district court to address PeterPalican’s retaliation, breach of contract, and estoppel claims

in the first instance. Id. Peter-Palican now assigns error to

the district court’s grant of summary judgment on those

claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. On de

novo review, Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989,

993 (9th Cir. 1999), we affirm. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on

Peter-Palican’s retaliation claim because Peter-Palican failed

to raise a triable dispute as to whether she did not hold a

“policymaking or confidential” position. See id. at 994–95

(“[A]n employee’s status as a policymaking or confidential

employee [is] dispositive of any First Amendment retaliation

claim.”). 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on

Peter-Palican’s breach of contract claim because it is

undisputed that Peter-Palican held her position by virtue of

appointment rather than by contract. See Riplinger v. United

States, 695 F.2d 1163, 1164 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Though a

distinction between appointment and contract may sound

dissonant . . . , the distinction nevertheless prevails in

government service. The terms of the appointment displace

previous understandings, understandings that in other

contexts might have created a contractual right.”).

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PETER-PALICAN V. CNMI 5

The district court properly granted summary judgment on

Peter-Palican’s estoppel claim, first, because Peter-Palican

failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether government

officials engaged in anyaffirmative misconduct going beyond

mere negligence, as required for equitable estoppel. See

Morgan v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 544, 545 (9th Cir. 1985)

(“[Equitable] estoppel against the government must rest upon

affirmative misconduct going beyond mere negligence.”

(citation omitted)); see also Mukherjee v. I.N.S., 793 F.2d

1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1986) (defining affirmative misconduct

as “a deliberate lie . . . or a pattern of false promises”). 

Second, Peter-Palican failed to raise a triable dispute as to

whether the Commonwealth “gain[ed] an advantage by

asserting one position, and then later [sought] an advantage

by taking a clearly inconsistent position,” as required for

judicial estoppel. Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,

270 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2001).

The Commonwealth’s request for sanctions against PeterPalican and her attorney, raised in its answering brief, is

denied.

AFFIRMED.

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