Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01741/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01741-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

Case No. 15-cr-1837-BAS 

 16-cv-1741-BAS 

ORDER DENYING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

VACATE SENTENCE UNDER 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 

[ECF No. 34] 

 v. 

JORGE CISNEROS-CUEVAS, 

 Defendant. 

Defendant Jorge Cisneros-Cuevas’ motion to vacate presents the question of 

whether his prior felony conviction for assault with great bodily injury, pursuant to 

California Penal Code §§ 245(a)(1) and 12022.7, constitutes a “crime of violence” 

under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provision governing sentences for unlawful 

reentry into the United States. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (2002). 

Because the Court finds Defendant waived his right to collaterally attack his 

sentence and procedurally defaulted the issue, the Court DENIES the motion to 

vacate. (ECF No. 34.) Furthermore, the Court finds Johnson v. United States, 135 S. 

Ct. 2552 (2015) inapplicable to Defendant’s situation. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

On June 16, 2015, Defendant was arrested for attempted reentry after 

deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. (ECF No. 1.) On July 30, 2015, 

Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. (ECF Nos. 14, 15.) 

Pursuant to the “Pre-Indictment Fast Track Program” plea, the Government 

agreed to recommend a -2 departure for “fast track” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1. 

(Plea Agreement § X(A).) In exchange, Defendant waived “to the full extent of the 

law” any right to appeal or collaterally attack the conviction or sentence, if the Court 

imposed a custodial sentence below the high end of the guideline range recommended 

by the Government pursuant to the plea agreement. (Plea Agreement § XI.) 

On May 24, 2016, the Court calculated Defendant’s guideline range, adding 

+16 under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) for a prior “crime of violence” because 

Defendant had been convicted of assault with great bodily injury pursuant to 

California Penal Code § 245(a)(1), with an enhancement for personally inflicting 

great bodily injury on the person of another under California Penal Code § 12022.7.1

The Court then sentenced Defendant to 57 months in custody, which was below the 

high end of the guideline range recommended by the Government pursuant to the 

plea agreement. (ECF No. 33.) Defendant neither objected to the 16-point 

enhancement at the time of sentencing, nor appealed the conviction or sentence. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal court may vacate, set aside or correct a 

sentence “upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction 

to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum 

 

1 Defendant also had three prior convictions for felony illegal entry: one for which he was 

sentenced to 24 months, the second for which he was sentenced to 30 months, and the third for 

which he was sentenced to 48 months. (ECF No. 21.) 

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authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 

Pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings “[t]he judge 

who receives the motion must promptly examine it[,]” and “[i]f it plainly appears 

from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the records from the prior proceedings 

that the [defendant] is not entitled to relief the judge must dismiss the action and 

direct the clerk to notify the moving party.” 

To warrant relief, the defendant must demonstrate the existence of an error of 

constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on 

the guilty plea or the jury’s verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); 

see also United States v. Montalvo, 331 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We hold 

now that Brecht’s harmless error standard applies to habeas cases under section 2255, 

just as it does to those under section 2254.”) Relief is warranted only where a 

defendant has shown “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete 

miscarriage of justice.” Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974); see also 

United States v. Gianelli, 543 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2008). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Waiver of Appeal 

A plea agreement in which a defendant relinquishes his right to seek relief, 

direct or collateral, from his conviction or sentence is enforceable. United States v. 

Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993). “The fact that [a defendant] did not 

foresee the specific issue that he now seeks to appeal does not place the issue outside 

the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Johnson, 67 F.3d 200, 202 (9th Cir. 1995). 

In this case, Defendant agreed to waive his right to attack the conviction or 

sentence if the Court imposed a sentence contemplated by the plea agreement. (See 

Plea Agreement ¶ XI.) The Court did so. Thus, Defendant has waived his right to file 

this collateral attack on his sentence. 

// 

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B. Procedural Default 

Claims that should have been raised on appeal, but were not, are procedurally 

defaulted. See United States v. Bousley, 523 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1998) (“Habeas 

review is an extraordinary remedy and ‘will not be allowed to service for an 

appeal.’”). “Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise 

it on direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the defendant can first 

demonstrate either ‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice’ . . . or that he is ‘actually innocent.’” 

Id. at 622 (citations omitted). 

In this case, Defendant does not argue that he is actually innocent. Instead, he 

argues that his sentence was unconstitutional pursuant to Johnson v. United States, 

135 S. Ct. 2552 (2015), a case that was decided before Defendant pled guilty in this 

case. He failed to raise the issue in his negotiated plea agreement. He failed to raise 

the issue at sentencing and he failed to raise the issue on appeal. Defendant provides 

no cause for this failure. Thus, the issue is procedurally defaulted. Furthermore, as 

discussed below, he cannot show actual prejudice from this failure. 

C. Merits 

Defendant argues that the increase of his guideline range 16 points because of 

his prior “crime of violence” is unconstitutional after Johnson v. United States, 135 

S. Ct. 2552 (2015). In Johnson, the Supreme Court found that the “residual clause” 

of the Armed Career Criminal Act, which enhanced a sentence if a defendant had a 

prior conviction for a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 

potential risk of physical injury to another” was unconstitutionally vague. 

In Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015), the Ninth Circuit extended 

this holding to find the definition of “aggravated felony” in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) to also 

be unconstitutionally vague. In the context of an immigration hearing, a non-citizen 

was removable if he had a prior “aggravated felony” defined, in part, as an offense 

that “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person 

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or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 18 

U.S.C. §16(b). Like the statute in Johnson, the Ninth Circuit found this definition 

“combine[d] indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime with 

indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a crime of 

violence.” Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1117 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Unlike the two statutes discussed above, the Guidelines section applied in this 

case required no such calculation of risk. Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) enhances a 

defendant’s sentence 16 points if he has a prior conviction for a “crime of violence,” 

which is defined as an “aggravated assault . . . or any other offense under federal, 

state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1), Application 

Notes 2 (2002). The Guidelines enhancement does not require a court or defendant 

to speculate as to whether the prior conviction poses “a serious potential risk of 

physical injury” or “involves a substantial risk that physical force . . . may be used.” 

This court, in Rodriguez v. United States, No. 16-cv-1052-JM, 15-cr-1292-JM, 

2016 WL 6124501 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2016), dealt with this exact issue. The 

Rodriguez Court concluded that “the ACCA definition of ‘violent felony’ is not 

sufficiently analogous to the provision in § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) to support a finding that 

the 16-level enhancement provision is unconstitutionally vague.” Id. at *2. The court 

concluded that, since the petitioner’s conviction for assault by means likely to 

produce great bodily injury in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) is 

enumerated as a crime of violence in the Application Notes to § 2L1.2, “it does not 

raise the same vagueness issues as in Johnson [or Dimaya].” Id. at *3. 

Defendant’s conviction for “assault with great bodily injury” under California 

Penal Code § 245(a)(1) is an “aggravated assault” which is an enumerated offense 

under the “crime of violence” definition. A conviction under California Penal Code 

§§ 245(a)(1) and 12022.7 also required that Defendant “commit[] an assault upon the 

person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm” and that 

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Defendant “personally inflict[ed] great bodily injury” on another during this assault. 

Therefore, the conviction had, as an element, the “use of physical force against the 

person of another.” Thus, the prior conviction was a “crime of violence” under § 

2L1.2(b)(1). For the reasons stated in Rodriguez, this conclusion does not run afoul 

of Johnson or Dimaya. 

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER 

Because this Court finds Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2552 (2015), is 

inapplicable to Defendant’s circumstances, and because Defendant waived his right 

to appeal or collaterally attack his sentence and procedurally defaulted the issue by 

failing to appeal, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to vacate. (ECF No. 34.) 

Because reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s assessment of the claims 

debatable or wrong, the Court DECLINES to issue Defendant a certificate of 

appealability. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 31, 2017 

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