Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08067/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08067-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

William Westley Duncan, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-11-08067-PCT-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) issued by 

the Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned recommending that Petitioner’s 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) be denied. (Doc. 89). Both sides have 

filed objections to the R&R (Docs. 93 and 96). Petitioner filed a reply to Respondent’s 

objections. (Doc. 97). Also pending are three motions of Petitioner: a motion for 

evidentiary hearing (Doc. 82); a motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 83); and a 

motion for a certificate of appealability (Doc. 94). 

 Preliminarily, the Court notes Petitioner also filed a notice of appeal (Doc. 95). 

However, because the issuance of an R&R is not an immediately appealable order, the 

Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. See (Doc. 100) 

I. Review 

 A. Review of R&R 

This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that 

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the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de 

novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original); Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 

F.Supp.2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“Following Reyna-Tapia, this Court concludes 

that de novo review of factual and legal issues is required if objections are made, ‘but not 

otherwise.’”); Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 589 F.3d 

1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 2009) (the district court “must review de novo the portions of the 

[Magistrate Judge’s] recommendations to which the parties object.”). District courts are 

not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an 

objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (emphasis added); see also 28 

U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1) (“the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of 

the [report and recommendation] to which objection is made.”). 

 In this case, both parties have filed numerous objections. The Court will review 

all issues to which there is an objection de novo. 

B. Review of State Court Decisions 

The Petition in this case was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because Petitioner is 

incarcerated based on a state conviction. With respect to any claims that Petitioner 

exhausted before the state courts, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2) this Court must 

deny the Petition on those claims unless “a state court decision is contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law”1

 or was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). 

Further, this Court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings 

regarding a petitioner’s claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 

936 (9th Cir. 1998). Additionally, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be 

denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies 

available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

 1

 Further, in applying “Federal law” the state courts only need to act in 

accordance with Supreme Court case law. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 

(2006). 

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II. Factual Background 

At pages 2-20, the R&R recounts the factual and procedural background of this 

case. Other than in the context of specific legal arguments discussed below, neither party 

objects generally to this recounting; accordingly, the Court accepts and adopts it. 

III. Petition 

The Petition in this case raises 20 claims.2

 (Doc. 1). The supplemental petition 

raises an additional 14 claims. (Doc. 78). The Court will address each claim in turn, and 

will follow the numbering system used by the parties. 

Claim 1 (original Petition) 

In this claim, Petitioner argues his confrontation clause rights were violated 

because of limitations placed on alleged impeachment evidence by the state court. The 

R&R concludes that the state court’s decision on this issue was not contrary to nor an 

unreasonable application of federal law. (R&R at 229). Further, the R&R concludes that 

the state court’s decision on a matter of state law was not such a “gross abuse of 

discretion” that it rose to the level of a due process violation under the constitution. 

(R&R at 223, 227-28). 

 Petitioner’s objection that the state court decision is “so wrong” (Doc. 93 at 9) 

does not dissuade this Court from agreeing with the findings and conclusions in the R&R. 

Accordingly, the objections are overruled, the R&R is accepted and adopted on Claim 1 

and relief is denied on this claim. 

Claim 2 (original Petition) 

Petitioner claims there was a due process violation due to the failure of the state 

court to give a Willits instruction regarding lost evidence. The R&R concludes that this 

claim was not exhausted before the state courts (R&R at 104) and that Petitioner cannot 

overcome this failure to exhaust (R&R at 214).3

 The Court agrees and denies habeas 

 2

 The R&R concludes that the entire original petition is timely under the Anti- Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s statute of limitations. R&R at 91. Neither 

party really objects to this conclusion, although both sets of objections take issue with the 

date the conviction became final (Petitioner’s objections (Doc. 93 at 5); Respondent’s objections (Doc. 96 at 3-5)). The Court finds the original Petition timely. 3

 Included in R&R’s conclusion that Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice to 

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relief based on this procedural bar. 

 Alternatively, the R&R concludes that this claim also fails on the merits because 

there was no allegation by Petitioner of bad faith at the state court level; and bad faith is 

required to justify a Willits instruction. (R&R at 233). In his Objections, Petitioner 

makes a global assertion that losing evidence simply is bad faith. (Doc. 93 at 9). The 

Court overrules this objection; not every lost piece of evidence automatically rises to the 

level of bad faith. Accordingly, the R&R is accepted and adopted on Claim 2 and relief 

is denied on this claim. 

Claim 3 (original Petition) 

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct that rose 

to the level of a due process violation. More specifically Petitioner claims the prosecutor 

 overcome his failure to exhaust is also the R&R’s conclusion that Petitioner cannot show 

the actual innocence gateway around the failure to exhaust. R&R at 385-86. 

Specifically, “[u]nder Schlup, a procedural default is excused if the facts underlying the petitioner’s claim, more likely than not, would have resulted in any reasonable jury being unable to convict the petitioner.” Gage v. Chappell, 793 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Petitioner’s objection (Doc. 93 at 15-16) that Issacs’ testimony would show he is actually innocent is overruled for all of the reasons discussed in the R&R that Issacs 

would not be believed. R&R at 369-70. 

Therefore, Petitioner’s objection that he can show procedural actual innocence to overcome this failure to exhaust is overruled. Further, upon de novo review, the Court 

finds that the R&R contains a typographical error when it states: 

As discussed hereinabove, the undersigned has found that Petitioner has failed to provide reliable new evidence of his actual innocence. For this 

reason alone, Petitioner’s assertions of actual innocence must be rejected. Even if Petitioner’s new evidence could be deemed reliable, after 

taking into account all of the evidence, including the evidence at trial 

tending to show Petitioner’s innocence, the undersigned concludes that a 

reasonable juror, properly instructed and following those instructions, could find Petitioner not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. At best, to 

overcome the evidence that Petitioner was the shooter, and confessed to 

shooting the victim while participating in disposing of the weapon[,] Petitioner provides insignificant discrepancies in testimony, questionable and controverted alibi testimony, purported confessions by a prisoner motivated to lie, and Petitioner’s own testimony. 

R&R at 385 (emphasis added). In the context of the surrounding sentences and conclusions, it is clear to the Court 

that the bolded text above should read: “concludes that a reasonable juror, properly instructed and following those instructions, could not find Petitioner not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Thus, to the extent Petitioner relies on this statement to form the basis 

of his objections, that objection is misplaced and overruled. 

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made inappropriate arguments about the lost evidence. The R&R concludes that the state 

court’s determination that the prosecutor did not make arguments about the lost evidence 

was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law, nor an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. (R&R at 239). Therefore, this Court must defer to the state 

court’s conclusion. 

 Petitioner objects and factually disputes the prosecutor’s theory of the case. (Doc. 

93 at 9). Such objection does not show that the state court’s determination was 

unreasonable and is overruled. Thus, the R&R is accepted and adopted on Claim 3 and 

relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 4 (original Petition) 

Petitioner claims that the line-up identification procedures were suggestive. This 

claim was exhausted with the state court and the court found the procedures were not 

unduly suggestive. (See R&R at 246). The state court’s decision was not contrary to nor 

an unreasonable application of federal law, nor an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. (Id.) Thus, the Court will defer to the state court’s decision on this claim. 

 Petitioner objects by stating the legal conclusion that the line-up was unduly 

suggestive. (Doc. 93 at 10). This legal conclusion is not a basis to set aside the state 

court decision. Thus, the R&R is accepted and adopted on Claim 4 and relief is denied 

on this claim. 

Claim 5 (original Petition) 

Petitioner claims that the prosecution suggesting that it would impeach Petitioner 

with his prior felonies if he chose to testify was a due process violation. This claim is 

barred on state law procedural grounds. (R&R at 126-27, 247). 

 Petitioner’s only objection on this claim is that he is actually innocent. (Doc. 93 at 

10). The Court will address Petitioner’s actual innocence claim below. As to Claim 5, 

the R&R is accepted and adopted and relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 6 (original Petition) 

In Claim 6, Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him. 

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This claim was presented to the state court, which denied relief on the claim. (R&R at 

251). The state court’s decision was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 

federal law, nor was it an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Id.) 

 Petitioner objects and points out what he claims to be various conflicting 

testimony from his trial. (Doc. 93 at 10). Assuming conflicting testimony was admitted, 

that does not mean the evidence, as a whole, was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. 

Therefore, this objection does not overcome the state court’s determination. Thus, the 

R&R is accepted and adopted on Claim 6 and relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 7 (original Petition) 

Petitioner claims his Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights were violated when the state court failed to allow cross-examination 

on what Petitioner argues would have been exculpatory evidence. Petitioner exhausted 

this as a state law hearsay claim. (R&R at 254). Habeas relief is not available for errors 

of state law (assuming one occurred). Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). As to 

the merits of the state law theory, Petitioner has failed to show that the state court’s 

evidentiary ruling was in error, must less that it was arbitrary and fundamentally unfair 

such that it would violate the due process clause of the constitution. (R&R at 256). 

Accordingly, relief is denied on this basis as to the state law theory. 

 To the extent Petitioner also asserts this claim on habeas as a federal constitutional 

violation, Petitioner failed to exhaust this claim in state court (R&R at 106) and cannot 

overcome this failure to exhaust such that this Court could reach the merits of this claim 

(R&R at 214); see also footnote 3 above. Thus, any federal version of Claim 7 is denied 

for this reason. 

 Petitioner objects by stating the legal conclusion that this claim is exhausted. 

(Doc. 93 at 10). This objection does not overcome either of the conclusions above 

regarding why Claim 7 is denied. Accordingly, the R&R is accepted and adopted on 

Claim 7 and relief is denied on this claim. 

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Claim 8 (original Petition) 

Petitioner argues that his rights were violated when the state court denied him 

funding for an investigator in his first post-conviction relief proceeding. Petitioner 

attempted to take a special action of this denial of funds, which the Arizona Court of 

Appeals denied. There is no habeas relief for the denial of a special action. (R&R at 

271). 

 Petitioner failed to exhaust the denial of funding claim in state court (R&R at 

108), and cannot overcome this failure to exhaust such that this Court could reach the 

merits of this claim. (R&R at 214); see also footnote 3 above. Accordingly, relief on this 

claim is denied. 

 Alternatively, on the merits, the R&R concludes that there was no constitutional 

violation for the failure of the state court to appoint an investigator in this initial postconviction relief proceeding. (R&R at 271). Notably, on appeal the Arizona Court of 

Appeals ordered the superior court to appoint an investigator for Petitioner. (R&R at 

267). Thus, Petitioner ultimately received this relief. This Court agrees with the R&R 

that the initial failure to provide funding for an investigator was not constitutional 

violation which would justify habeas relief. 

 Both parties object to the R&R as to this claim. Petitioner argues that he did not 

receive funding for an investigator. (Doc 93 at 11.) However, he ultimately did. (R&R 

at 267). Accordingly, this objection is without merit. Respondents argue that states are 

not required to provide any sort of post-conviction relief to convicted defendants; thus no 

alleged error in the post-conviction relief process could ever provide the basis for habeas 

relief. (Doc. 96 at 15.) Because this Court is denying relief on this claim, the Court need 

not reach the merits of this objection. 

 Based on the foregoing, the R&R is accepted and adopted on Claim 8 and relief is 

denied on this claim. 

Claim 9 (original Petition) 

Claim 9 encompasses nine theories of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court 

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will consider each theory separately. 

 Claim 9A 

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel failed to make a reasonable investigation. 

The R&R concludes that this claim was exhausted in state court as part of Petitioner’s 

post-conviction relief petition. (R&R at 277) (quoting the state court’s ruling). The 

holding of the state court was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal 

law.4

 Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

 Alternatively, the R&R reached the merits of this claim and determined that trial 

counsel was not ineffective. (R&R at 282). For the reasons stated in the R&R, this Court 

concludes that on the merits trial counsel was not ineffective on this theory. 

 Petitioner objects and argues that counsel has a duty to make a reasonable 

investigation. (Doc. 93 at 12). While Petitioner may be correct as to this general 

proposition, Petitioner fails to show that either counsel failed to make a reasonable 

investigation in this case, or that Petitioner was prejudiced. Thus, this objection is 

overruled. Accordingly, the R&R is accepted, rejected or modified on Claim 9A as set 

forth above, and relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 9B 

Next Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective in selecting a jury. The 

R&R concludes that Petitioner exhausted this claim in state court in his post-conviction 

relief proceeding. (R&R at 285) (quoting the state court’s ruling). The holding of the 

state court was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. See footnote 4 

herein. 

 Alternatively, the R&R reaches the merits of this claim and determined that trial 

 

4

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counsel are not entitled to the deference normally given to state court holdings under AEDPA. R&R at 141-42. While the Court acknowledges that Martinez allows the Court 

to, in some circumstances, consider unexhausted theories, the Court does not find that 

Martinez has any impact on AEDPA deference when the state court actually reached the merits of a claim. Therefore, this portion of the R&R is rejected. 

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counsel was not ineffective in selecting a jury. (R&R at 299). Both sides object to the 

R&R on this point. 

 Petitioner objects and argues that he had a conviction-prone jury. (Doc. 93 at 12). 

For the reasons stated in the R&R (at 282-299), this Court finds that, on the merits, the 

voir dire process and qualification of the jury did not rise to the level of a constitutional 

violation. Thus, counsel was not ineffective and relief on this claim will be denied. 

 Respondents object and argue that counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise 

issues that were unsettled at the time of trial. (Doc. 96 at 16). For this further alternative 

reason, the Court agrees that trial counsel was not ineffective in selecting a jury in 

Petitioner’s trial. 

 Based on the foregoing, Respondents’ objection is sustained and Petitioner’s 

objection is overruled. Further, the R&R is accepted, modified or rejected on Claim 9B 

as set forth above and relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 9C 

Petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective for not more thoroughly 

impeaching the testimony of witness Hernandez. The R&R concludes that to the extent 

witness Hernandez’s testimony could have been contradicted by the testimony of the Cox 

sisters, this Court must give deference under AEDPA to the state court’s determination 

that the Cox sisters were not credible. (R&R at 304, 306). The R&R also concludes that 

that this Court must give AEDPA deference to the state court’s determination that the 

conflicting evidence of the amount of drug and alcohol use would not have impacted the 

effect of Hernandez’s testimony on the jury. (R&R at 306-07). Thus, the R&R 

concludes that this Court must give AEDPA deference to the state court’s determination 

that all potential conflicting evidence would not have impacted the outcome of this case 

because the state court’s determination was not contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of federal law. (R&R at 313). This Court agrees. 

 Petitioner objects and argues that witness Hernandez himself made inconsistent 

statements to various people and statements that were inconsistent with other witnesses’ 

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accounts. (Doc. 93 at 13). Alternative to the application of AEDPA deference to this 

theory of ineffective assistance of counsel, the R&R considered the merits of all of 

Petitioner’s alleged inconsistency arguments. (R&R at 307-313). The R&R concluded 

that these claims failed on the merits. The Court has reviewed the R&R’s conclusions on 

this theory and agrees that even considering Petitioner’s merits objections, he has failed 

to show deficient performance by counsel, nor prejudice. Accordingly, the objection is 

overruled, the R&R is accepted and adopted on Claim 9C, and relief is denied on this 

claim. 

 Claim 9D 

Petitioner argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach witness 

Franz with his prior inconsistent statements. Petitioner exhausted this claim in the state 

court, and the state post-conviction relief court rejected this claim. (R&R at 313; 316) 

(quoting the state court’s decision). The Court finds that the state court decision was not 

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law; accordingly, habeas relief on 

this theory will be denied. See footnote 4 herein. 

 Petitioner objects and states that there were inconsistencies with witness Franz’s 

statements. Doc. 93 at 13. However, these inconsistencies were brought out in trial. 

(R&R at 317). Thus, even if this Court were to reach the merits of this claim; Petitioner 

has not shown deficient performance by counsel nor prejudice from counsel’s alleged 

failure to call witnesses who might have presented cumulative testimony of these 

inconsistencies. (R&R at 317-18). Accordingly, the objection is overruled because this 

claim alternatively fails on the merits. 

 Thus, the R&R is rejected or accepted as specified above on Claim 9D and relief is 

denied on this claim. 

 Claim 9E 

Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call 10 allegedly 

exculpatory witnesses. Petitioner did not exhaust this claim in state court. (R&R at 110). 

Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice to overcome his failure to exhaust this claim 

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as to witness Kristina Cox. (R&R at 318); see also footnote 3 above. Accordingly, 

relief will be denied as to whether the failure of trial counsel to use the testimony of 

Kristina Cox was ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner’s objection that this Court 

should deem this theory exhausted because he raised ineffective assistance of counsel 

generally, even if he did not verbatim raise this particular theory of ineffective assistance 

(Doc. 93 at 11), is overruled because for a claim to be considered exhausted in state court 

it must be exhausted on the same factual predicate as the claim raised in federal court on 

habeas. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)(A); Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 

2001). 

 Assuming without deciding that Petitioner could overcome his default of his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to the remaining 9 witnesses, this claim fails on 

the merits. (R&R at 318-319). Petitioner objects to this conclusion and argues that 2 of 

the 10 witnesses would have provided alibi testimony for him; thus his counsel was 

ineffective for not eliciting this testimony. (Doc. 93 at 14). Petitioner’s objection is 

inconsistent with the state court record regarding whether any witnesses would offer alibi 

testimony. Further, Petitioner offers no evidence beyond his own allegations that any 

witness would testify in a way that would alibi him. Accordingly, Petitioner has provided 

no evidence to support this objection and it is overruled. 

 Based on the foregoing, the R&R is accepted and adopted on Claim 9E and relief 

is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 9F 

Petitioner next claims his trial counsel’s closing argument amounted to ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Petitioner failed to exhaust this claim in state court. (R&R at 110). 

Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice or procedural actual innocence to overcome 

this default. (R&R at 214, 319); see also footnote 3 above. 

 Like Claim 9E, Petitioner’s objection that this Court should deem this theory 

exhausted because he raised ineffective assistance of counsel generally, even if he did not 

verbatim raise this particular theory of ineffective assistance (Doc. 93 at 11), is overruled 

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because for a claim to be considered exhausted in state court it must be exhausted on the 

same factual predicate as the claim raised in federal court on habeas. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 (b)(1)(A); Wildman, 261 F.3d at 840. 

 Alternatively, this claim fails on the merits. (R&R at 339-341). For all of these 

reasons, the R&R is accepted and adopted on Claim 9F and relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 9G 

Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective at sentencing. Petitioner failed 

to exhaust this claim in state court. (R&R at 111). Petitioner cannot show cause and 

prejudice or procedural actual innocence to overcome this default. (R&R at 214, 319); 

see also footnote 3 above. 

 Like Claim 9E, Petitioner’s objection that this Court should deem this theory 

exhausted because he raised ineffective assistance of counsel generally, even if he did not 

verbatim raise this particular theory of ineffective assistance (Doc. 93 at 11), is overruled 

because for a claim to be considered exhausted in state court it must be exhausted on the 

same factual predicate as the claim raised in federal court on habeas. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 (b)(1)(A); Wildman, 261 F.3d at 840. 

 Alternatively, this claim fails on the merits. (R&R at 341-342). For all of these 

reasons, the R&R is accepted and adopted on Claim 9G and relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 9H 

Petitioner argues his appellate counsel was also ineffective. Petitioner failed to 

exhaust this claim in state court. (R&R at 111). Petitioner cannot show cause and 

prejudice or procedural actual innocence to overcome this default. (R&R at 214, 319); 

see also footnote 3 above. 

 Like Claim 9E, Petitioner’s objection that this Court should deem this theory 

exhausted because he raised ineffective assistance of counsel generally, even if he did not 

verbatim raise this particular theory of ineffective assistance (Doc. 93 at 11), is overruled 

because for a claim to be considered exhausted in state court it must be exhausted on the 

same factual predicate as the claim raised in federal court on habeas. See 28 U.S.C. § 

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2254 (b)(1)(A); Wildman, 261 F.3d at 840. 

 Alternatively, this claim fails on the merits. (R&R at 342-43). For all of these 

reasons, the R&R is accepted and adopted on Claim 9H and relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 9I 

Finally, Petitioner argues that all of the errors of counsel, taken cumulatively, rise 

to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner failed to exhaust this claim in 

state court. (R&R at 112). Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice or procedural 

actual innocence to overcome this default. (R&R at 214, 319); see also footnote 3 above. 

 Like Claim 9E, Petitioner’s objection that this Court should deem this theory 

exhausted because he raised ineffective assistance of counsel generally, even if he did not 

verbatim raise this particular theory of ineffective assistance (Doc. 93 at 11), is overruled 

because for a claim to be considered exhausted in state court it must be exhausted on the 

same factual predicate as the claim raised in federal court on habeas. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 (b)(1)(A); Wildman, 261 F.3d at 840. 

 Alternatively, this claim fails on the merits. (R&R at 343-44). For all of these 

reasons, the R&R is accepted and adopted on Claim 9I and relief is denied on this claim. 

Claim 10 (original Petition) 

Petitioner argues that the trial court applied improper aggravators when sentencing 

him. The R&R concludes that there was no violation of state law; and, accordingly, no 

due process violation. (R&R at 322). Additionally, the R&R concludes that Petitioner’s 

claim based on Blakely is without merit. (R&R at 324). The Court agrees that this claim 

is without merit. 

 Petitioner objects to a life sentence. (Doc. 93 at 14). Because there were no 

errors, the Court overrules this objection. Thus, the R&R is accepted and adopted on 

Claim 10 and relief is denied on this claim. 

Claim 11 (original Petition) 

Petitioner argues that the state court erred in not recognizing his substantive actual 

innocence claim as a free standing claim under state law. As the R&R notes, generally, 

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habeas relief is not available for errors of state law. (R&R at 389). Moreover, the R&R 

considered the actual innocence claim on the merits and determined that it did not 

warrant habeas relief. (R&R at 392). This Court agrees with the R&R that Petitioner has 

not established a substantive claim of actual innocence that would entitled him to habeas 

relief; therefore, relief on this claim will be denied. 

 Petitioner objects and argues that a substantive claim of actual innocence should 

be recognized as a basis for habeas relief. (Doc. 93 at 16). Because the R&R assumed 

such a claim existed for purposes of determining whether any such claim would have 

merit, this objection does not change the outcome of this case and is accordingly, 

overruled. As a result of the foregoing, the R&R is accepted and adopted on Claim 11 

and relief is denied on this claim. 

Claim 12 (original Petition) 

 Claim 12 is another version of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

premised on the errors of trial counsel, as a whole. The R&R concluded that this claim 

was not exhausted in the state court (R&R at 120) and that Petitioner cannot show cause 

and prejudice or procedural actual innocence to overcome this default (R&R at 214); 

footnote 3 above. The R&R is accepted and adopted on Claim 12 and relief is denied on 

this claim. 

Claim 1 (supplemental petition) 

Claim 1 of the supplemental petition is a free standing actual innocence claim. 

The R&R concludes that this claim of the supplemental petition is timely because the 

factual predicate of the claim did not become available to Petitioner until July 23, 2012. 

(R&R at 69, 88). The Court accepts this conclusion and finds this claim of the 

supplemental petition to be timely. 

 By way of background, Petitioner’s free standing actual innocence claim is 

premised on the theory that Issacs has confessed to killing the victim in this case. In 

2008, Petitioner presented this theory to the state court in a second post-conviction relief 

petition based on the testimony of Roinuse and Allen (who would allegedly testify that 

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Issacs confessed this to them). In 2012, Petitioner presented this theory to the state court 

in a third post-conviction relief petition based on the testimony of Ellis and Gains (who 

would allegedly testify that Issacs confessed this to them). 

 The R&R discusses the merits of Petitioner’s substantive actual innocence claim at 

pages 387-393. Petitioner exhausted part of the factual predicate of this claim (Roinuse’s 

and Allen’s testimony) in the state court, and the state court denied relief on this claim. 

(R&R at 388 quoting the state court’s ruling). The state court’s findings were not 

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law, nor an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. Accordingly, under AEDPA deference, relief on this factual 

predicate of this claim is denied. 

 Petitioner also presented a further factual predicate to this claim to the state court 

(Ellis’ and Gaines’ testimony), which the state court found to be untimely. (R&R at 388-

89 quoting the state court’s ruling). More specifically, the state court found that 

Petitioner’s theory that Issacs was the true killer was already presented to the state court 

in 2008 and that additional people saying Issacs had confessed did not in any way change 

the state court’s 2008 determination that Issacs alleged “confession” was not credible and 

would not have changed the outcome of Petitioner’s trial. (Id.) Thus, as to the 2012 

post-conviction relief petition, the state court found that this was not newly discovered 

evidence which would allow a successive and untimely post-conviction relief petition. 

(Id.) 

As to the 2012 post-conviction relief petition and the testimony of Ellis and 

Gaines, because the state court found the petition to be untimely, this claim has not been 

exhausted in state court. Therefore, for this Court to consider the merits of this claim, 

Petitioner must be able to establish either cause and prejudice or actual innocence to 

overcome his failure to exhaust this claim.5

 Petitioner has not shown cause and 

 

5

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court may have erred in not treating Ellis’ and Gaines’ testimony as newly discovered evidence, habeas relief is not available for errors of state law, such as the application of Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(h). (R&R at 389). 

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prejudice. Further Petitioner has not shown actual innocence via the Schlup gateway 

around the exhaustion requirement (a procedural actual innocence claim). See footnote 3 

above. Therefore, the Court cannot reach the merits of Petitioner’s free standing actual 

innocence claim. 

 Alternatively, this Court can deny a claim on the merits even if it has not been 

exhausted in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). The R&R addressed the merits of 

Petitioner’s free standing actual innocence claim. (R&R at 391-93). 

 Assuming without deciding whether a freestanding claim of actual innocence 

exists, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that such a claim would require a 

higher showing than the Schlup gateway, and would require Petitioner to go beyond 

showing doubt about his guilt. (R&R at 391). Petitioner would have to “affirmatively 

prove he is probably innocent.” (R&R at 391, quoting Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 

476 (9th Cir. 1997)). Here, for the reasons stated above, Petitioner cannot meet the 

Schlup procedural actual innocence test; much less the higher freestanding actual 

innocence test. Therefore, alternatively, this claim fails on the merits. As a result, the 

R&R is accepted and adopted on Claim 1 of the supplemental petition and relief is denied 

on this claim. 

Claim 2 (supplemental petition) 

Claim 2 of the supplemental petition contains 12 theories of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. The Court will consider each theory in turn. 

 Claim 2A 

Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to impeach 

witness Hernandez. The R&R concludes that this portion of the supplemental petition is 

barred by AEDPA’s statute of limitations. (R&R at 88, 92, 96). Petitioner objects and 

argues that this portion of the supplemental petition is timely because it relates back to 

the original petition. (Doc. 93 at 6). This Court finds that the theory of impeachment of 

Hernandez advanced in Claim 2A is a new factual predict of ineffective assistance of 

counsel as to how counsel should have impeached witness Hernandez. Therefore, this 

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claim does not relate back to the original Petition, and Petitioner’s objection is 

overruled.6

 Accordingly, Claim 2A is barred by the statute of limitations. 

 Alternatively, assuming Claim 2A was not barred by the statute of limitations, 

Petitioner failed to fairly present this claim to the state courts. (R&R at 114, 120). The 

R&R further concludes that Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice or actual 

innocence to overcome this failure to fairly present the claim which ultimately resulted in 

the claim being procedurally defaulted. (R&R at 124; 214). Finally, the R&R concludes 

that Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012) does not provide a gateway to excuse 

Petitioner’s procedural default of this claim. (R&R at 146-160). For all of these reasons, 

this Court cannot reach the merits of this claim and it must be dismissed. 

 Petitioner objects and states that “Every part of Supp Ground 2 was fairly 

presented to the Az Court of Appeals + was properly exhausted.” (Doc. 93 at 6). The 

R&R addressed this issue of presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals and concluded 

that Petitioner did not fairly present any of Supplemental Ground 2 to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (R&R at 114, 127-29). First, Petitioner does not offer any evidence to 

dispute the R&R’s conclusion that he did not present any facts supporting this ineffective 

assistance of counsel theory to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (R&R at 114, citing 

Petitioner’s Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 67-1 at 5)). 

Second, this Court has reviewed the Arizona Court of Appeals decision (Doc. 67-1 at 59) 

and agrees with Respondents that the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to consider the 

merits of Supplemental Ground 2A on state law procedural grounds. The Court finds that 

the state procedural bar was adequate and independent and; thus relief is also denied for 

this alternative reason.7

 Accordingly, the objection is overruled. 

 

6

 Respondents agree that this claim is barred by the statute of limitations, but argue that for purposes of calculating the statute of limitations, the R&R erred by using the date of the mandate, rather that the date of the appellate court’s decision. (Doc. 96 at 3-5). For purposes of this Order, this claim is barred by the statute of limitations using either date so the Court need not resolve this objection. 

7

At page 128, the R&R appears to reach a difference conclusion regarding whether Supplemental Claim 2 is barred on this alternative procedural basis. It does not appear Respondent objected to this recommendation. However, Petitioner objected to the 

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 Finally, the R&R also considered the merits of this time barred, procedurally 

defaulted (without exception) claim, and determined that it failed on the merits (because 

counsel made a reasonable tactical decision).8

 (R&R at 326) (considering the merits of 

each claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether Martinez provided 

relief). The Court agrees with the R&R that this claim fails on the merits. As a result, 

the R&R is accepted, modified and adopted as specified above on Claim 2A of the 

supplemental petition and relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 2B 

Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to call Isaacs. The R&R 

concludes that this portion of the supplemental petition is barred by AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. (R&R at 88, 92, 96). Petitioner objects and argues that this portion of the 

supplemental petition is timely because it relates back to the original petition. (Doc. 93 at 

6). This Court finds that the theory of ineffective assistance of counsel advanced in 

Claim 2B is a new factual predict to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Therefore, this claim does not relate back to the original Petition, and Petitioner’s 

objection is overruled.9

 Accordingly, Claim 2B is barred by the statute of limitations. 

 Alternatively, assuming Claim 2B was not barred by the statute of limitations, 

Petitioner failed to fairly present this claim to the state courts. (R&R at 114, 120). The 

R&R further concludes that Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice or actual 

innocence to overcome this failure to fairly present the claim which ultimately resulted in 

the claim being procedurally defaulted. (R&R at 124; 214). Finally, the R&R concludes 

that Martinez does not provide a gateway to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default of this 

claim. (R&R at 160-165). For all of these reasons, this Court cannot reach the merits of 

 R&R’s entire exhaustion and default analysis, causing this Court to do a de novo review, and the Court modifies the R&R on this point. 

8

See Guam v. Santos, 741 F.2d 1167, 1169 (9th Cir. 1984) (“tactical decisions by counsel with which the defendant disagrees cannot form the basis of a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel”). 

9

See footnote 6 herein. 

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this claim and it must be dismissed. 

 Petitioner objects and states that “Every part of Supp Ground 2 was fairly 

presented to the Az Court of Appeals + was properly exhausted.” (Doc. 93 at 6). The 

R&R addressed this issue of presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals and concluded 

that Petitioner did not fairly present any of Supplemental Ground 2 to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (R&R at 114, 127-29). First, Petitioner does not offer any evidence to 

dispute the R&R’s conclusion that he did not present any facts supporting this ineffective 

assistance of counsel theory to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (R&R at 114, citing 

Petitioner’s Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 67-1 at 5)). 

Second, this Court has reviewed the Arizona Court of Appeals decision (Doc. 67-1 at 59) 

and agrees with Respondents that the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to consider the 

merits of Supplemental Ground 2B on state law procedural grounds. The Court finds that 

the state procedural bar was adequate and independent and; thus relief is also denied for 

this alternative reason.10 Accordingly, the objection is overruled. 

 Finally, the R&R also considered the merits of this time barred, procedurally 

defaulted (without exception) claim, and determined that it failed on the merits (because 

Petitioner’s arguments are inconsistent with the record). (R&R at 326, 164) (considering 

the merits of each claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether 

Martinez provided relief). The Court agrees with the R&R that this claim fails on the 

merits. As a result, the R&R is accepted, modified and adopted as specified above on 

Claim 2B of the supplemental petition and relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 2C 

Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to call Britton. The R&R 

concludes that this portion of the supplemental petition is barred by AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. (R&R at 88, 92, 96). Petitioner objects and argues that this portion of the 

supplemental petition is timely because it relates back to the original petition. (Doc. 93 at 

6). This Court finds that the theory of ineffective assistance of counsel advanced in 

 

10See footnote 7 herein. 

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Claim 2C is a new factual predict to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Therefore, this claim does not relate back to the original Petition, and Petitioner’s 

objection is overruled.11 Accordingly, Claim 2C is barred by the statute of limitations. 

 Alternatively, assuming Claim 2C was not barred by the statute of limitations, 

Petitioner failed to fairly present this claim to the state courts. (R&R at 114, 120). The 

R&R further concludes that Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice or actual 

innocence to overcome this failure to fairly present the claim which ultimately resulted in 

the claim being procedurally defaulted. (R&R at 124; 214). Finally, the R&R concludes 

that Martinez does not provide a gateway to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default of this 

claim. (R&R at 165-171). For all of these reasons, this Court cannot reach the merits of 

this claim and it must be dismissed. 

 Petitioner objects and states that “Every part of Supp Ground 2 was fairly 

presented to the Az Court of Appeals + was properly exhausted.” (Doc. 93 at 6). The 

R&R addressed this issue of presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals and concluded 

that Petitioner did not fairly present any of Supplemental Ground 2 to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (R&R at 114, 127-29). First, Petitioner does not offer any evidence to 

dispute the R&R’s conclusion that he did not present any facts supporting this ineffective 

assistance of counsel theory to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (R&R at 114, citing 

Petitioner’s Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 67-1 at 5)). 

Second, this Court has reviewed the Arizona Court of Appeals decision (Doc. 67-1 at 59) 

and agrees with Respondents that the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to consider the 

merits of Supplemental Ground 2C on state law procedural grounds. The Court finds that 

the state procedural bar was adequate and independent and; thus relief is also denied for 

this alternative reason.12 Accordingly, the objection is overruled. 

 Finally, the R&R also considered the merits of this time barred, procedurally 

defaulted (without exception) claim, and determined that it failed on the merits (because 

 

11See footnote 6 herein. 

12See footnote 7 herein. 

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counsel made a reasonable tactical decision). (R&R at 326, 169) (considering the merits 

of each claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether Martinez 

provided relief). The Court agrees with the R&R that this claim fails on the merits. As a 

result, the R&R is accepted, modified and adopted as specified above on Claim 2C of the 

supplemental petition and relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 2D 

Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to call Greenwood. The 

R&R concludes that this portion of the supplemental petition is barred by AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations. (R&R at 88, 92, 96). Petitioner objects and argues that this portion 

of the supplemental petition is timely because it relates back to the original petition. 

(Doc. 93 at 6). This Court finds that the theory of ineffective assistance of counsel 

advanced in Claim 2D is a new factual predict to the claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Therefore, this claim does not relate back to the original Petition, and 

Petitioner’s objection is overruled.13 Accordingly, Claim 2D is barred by the statute of 

limitations. 

 Alternatively, assuming Claim 2D was not barred by the statute of limitations, 

Petitioner failed to fairly present this claim to the state courts. (R&R at 114, 120). The 

R&R further concludes that Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice or actual 

innocence to overcome this failure to fairly present the claim which ultimately resulted in 

the claim being procedurally defaulted. (R&R at 124; 214). Finally, the R&R concludes 

that Martinez does not provide a gateway to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default of this 

claim. (R&R at 171-176). For all of these reasons, this Court cannot reach the merits of 

this claim and it must be dismissed. 

 Petitioner objects and states that “Every part of Supp Ground 2 was fairly 

presented to the Az Court of Appeals + was properly exhausted.” (Doc. 93 at 6). The 

R&R addressed this issue of presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals and concluded 

that Petitioner did not fairly present any of Supplemental Ground 2 to the Arizona Court 

 

13See footnote 6 herein. 

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of Appeals. (R&R at 114, 127-29). First, Petitioner does not offer any evidence to 

dispute the R&R’s conclusion that he did not present any facts supporting this ineffective 

assistance of counsel theory to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (R&R at 114, citing 

Petitioner’s Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 67-1 at 5)). 

Second, this Court has reviewed the Arizona Court of Appeals decision (Doc. 67-1 at 59) 

and agrees with Respondents that the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to consider the 

merits of Supplemental Ground 2D on state law procedural grounds. The Court finds that 

the state procedural bar was adequate and independent and; thus relief is also denied for 

this alternative reason.14 Accordingly, the objection is overruled. 

 Finally, the R&R also considered the merits of this time barred, procedurally 

defaulted (without exception) claim, and determined that it failed on the merits (because 

counsel made a reasonable tactical decision). (R&R at 326, 174) (considering the merits 

of each claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether Martinez 

provided relief). The Court agrees with the R&R that this claim fails on the merits. As a 

result, the R&R is accepted, modified and adopted as specified above on Claim 2D of the 

supplemental petition and relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 2E 

Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to call a forensic expert. 

The R&R concludes that this portion of the supplemental petition is barred by AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations. (R&R at 88, 92, 96). Petitioner objects and argues that this portion 

of the supplemental petition is timely because it relates back to the original petition. 

(Doc. 93 at 6). This Court finds that the theory of ineffective assistance of counsel 

advanced in Claim 2E is a new factual predict to the claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Therefore, this claim does not relate back to the original Petition, and 

Petitioner’s objection is overruled.15 Accordingly, Claim 2E is barred by the statute of 

limitations. 

 

14See footnote 7 herein. 

15See footnote 6 herein. 

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 Alternatively, assuming Claim 2E was not barred by the statute of limitations, 

Petitioner failed to fairly present this claim to the state courts. (R&R at 114, 120). The 

R&R further concludes that Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice or actual 

innocence to overcome this failure to fairly present the claim which ultimately resulted in 

the claim being procedurally defaulted. (R&R at 124; 214). Finally, the R&R concludes 

that Martinez does not provide a gateway to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default of this 

claim. (R&R at 176-179). For all of these reasons, this Court cannot reach the merits of 

this claim and it must be dismissed. 

 Petitioner objects and states that “Every part of Supp Ground 2 was fairly 

presented to the Az Court of Appeals + was properly exhausted.” (Doc. 93 at 6). The 

R&R addressed this issue of presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals and concluded 

that Petitioner did not fairly present any of Supplemental Ground 2 to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (R&R at 114, 127-29). First, Petitioner does not offer any evidence to 

dispute the R&R’s conclusion that he did not present any facts supporting this ineffective 

assistance of counsel theory to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (R&R at 114, citing 

Petitioner’s Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 67-1 at 5)). 

Second, this Court has reviewed the Arizona Court of Appeals decision (Doc. 67-1 at 59) 

and agrees with Respondents that the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to consider the 

merits of Supplemental Ground 2E on state law procedural grounds. The Court finds that 

the state procedural bar was adequate and independent and; thus relief is also denied for 

this alternative reason.16 Accordingly, the objection is overruled. 

 Finally, the R&R also considered the merits of this time barred, procedurally 

defaulted (without exception) claim, and determined that it failed on the merits (because, 

based on Petitioner’s own story, a tire track expert might have hurt his case; thus the 

failure to obtain such an expert was reasonable). (R&R at 326, 178) (considering the 

merits of each claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether Martinez 

provided relief). The Court agrees with the R&R that this claim fails on the merits. As a 

 

16See footnote 7 herein. 

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result, the R&R is accepted, modified and adopted as specified above on Claim 2E of the 

supplemental petition and relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 2F 

Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Franz. The 

R&R concludes that this claim relates back to the filing of the original Petition (R&R at 

80, 83-84), and is therefore timely (R&R at 92). Respondents object to this conclusion. 

(Doc. 96 at 5). Respondents make the argument that the basis for Petitioner’s theory of 

ineffective assistance of counsel in this claim is not premised on the “same core of 

operative facts” as Ground 9D of the original petition; therefore it should not relate back. 

Id. The Court has reviewed this argument de novo and finds that while this is a very 

close call, the Court will overrule Respondents’ objection and accept and adopt the R&R 

that the totality of the argument that counsel did not do enough to impeach Franz relates 

back to the original petition. 

 Notwithstanding the fact that the R&R concludes that Claim 2F of the 

supplemental petition relates back to Claim 9D of the original petition for AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations analysis; the R&R concludes that Claim 2F was not fairly presented 

to the state courts because the Petition for Review of the denial of the third petition for 

post-conviction relief to the Arizona Court of Appeals did not contain any factual 

predicates for the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (R&R at 114). The R&R 

further concludes that Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice or actual innocence to 

overcome this failure to fairly present the claim which ultimately resulted in the claim 

being procedurally defaulted. (R&R at 124; 214). Finally, the R&R concludes that 

Martinez does not provide a gateway to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default of this 

claim. (R&R at 179-183). For all of these reasons, this Court cannot reach the merits of 

this claim and it must be dismissed. 

 Petitioner objects and states that “Every part of Supp Ground 2 was fairly 

presented to the Az Court of Appeals + was properly exhausted.” (Doc. 93 at 6). The 

R&R addressed this issue of presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals and concluded 

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that Petitioner did not fairly present any of Supplemental Ground 2 to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (R&R at 114, 127-29). First, Petitioner does not offer any evidence to 

dispute the R&R’s conclusion that he did not present any facts supporting this ineffective 

assistance of counsel theory to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (R&R at 114, citing 

Petitioner’s Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 67-1 at 5)). 

Second, this Court has reviewed the Arizona Court of Appeals decision (Doc. 67-1 at 59) 

and agrees with Respondents that the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to consider the 

merits of Supplemental Ground 2F on state law procedural grounds. The Court finds that 

the state procedural bar was adequate and independent and; thus relief is also denied for 

this alternative reason.17 Accordingly, the objection is overruled. 

 Finally, the R&R also considered the merits of this time barred, procedurally 

defaulted (without exception) claim, and determined that it failed on the merits (because 

it was a reasonable tactical decision by counsel). (R&R at 326, 182) (considering the 

merits of each claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether Martinez 

provided relief). The Court agrees with the R&R that this claim fails on the merits. As a 

result, the R&R is accepted, modified and adopted as specified above on Claim 2F of the 

supplemental petition and relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 2G 

Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to call Boston. The R&R 

concludes that this portion of the supplemental petition is barred by AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. (R&R at 88, 92, 96). Petitioner objects and argues that this portion of the 

supplemental petition is timely because it relates back to the original petition. (Doc. 93 at 

6). This Court finds that the theory of ineffective assistance of counsel advanced in 

Claim 2G is a new factual predict to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Therefore, this claim does not relate back to the original Petition, and Petitioner’s 

objection is overruled.18 Accordingly, Claim 2G is barred by the statute of limitations. 

 

17See footnote 7 herein. 

18See footnote 6 herein. 

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 Alternatively, assuming Claim 2G was not barred by the statute of limitations, 

Petitioner failed to fairly present this claim to the state courts. (R&R at 114, 120). The 

R&R further concludes that Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice or actual 

innocence to overcome this failure to fairly present the claim which ultimately resulted in 

the claim being procedurally defaulted. (R&R at 124; 214). Finally, the R&R concludes 

that Martinez does not provide a gateway to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default of this 

claim. (R&R at 184-190). For all of these reasons, this Court cannot reach the merits of 

this claim and it must be dismissed. 

 Petitioner objects and states that “Every part of Supp Ground 2 was fairly 

presented to the Az Court of Appeals + was properly exhausted.” (Doc. 93 at 6). The 

R&R addressed this issue of presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals and concluded 

that Petitioner did not fairly present any of Supplemental Ground 2 to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (R&R at 114, 127-29). First, Petitioner does not offer any evidence to 

dispute the R&R’s conclusion that he did not present any facts supporting this ineffective 

assistance of counsel theory to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (R&R at 114, citing 

Petitioner’s Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 67-1 at 5)). 

Second, this Court has reviewed the Arizona Court of Appeals decision (Doc. 67-1 at 59) 

and agrees with Respondents that the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to consider the 

merits of Supplemental Ground 2G on state law procedural grounds. The Court finds that 

the state procedural bar was adequate and independent and; thus relief is also denied for 

this alternative reason.19 Accordingly, the objection is overruled. 

 Finally, the R&R also considered the merits of this time barred, procedurally 

defaulted (without exception) claim, and determined that it failed on the merits (because 

it was a reasonable tactical decision). (R&R at 326, 188) (considering the merits of each 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether Martinez provided relief). 

The Court agrees with the R&R that this claim fails on the merits. As a result, the R&R 

is accepted, modified and adopted as specified above on Claim 2G of the supplemental 

 

19See footnote 7 herein. 

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petition and relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 2H 

Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective regarding “Brady material.” The 

R&R concludes that this portion of the supplemental petition is barred by AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations. (R&R at 88, 92, 96). Petitioner objects and argues that this portion 

of the supplemental petition is timely because it relates back to the original petition. 

(Doc. 93 at 6). This Court finds that the theory of ineffective assistance of counsel 

advanced in Claim 2H is a new factual predict to the claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Therefore, this claim does not relate back to the original Petition, and 

Petitioner’s objection is overruled.20 Accordingly, Claim 2H is barred by the statute of 

limitations. 

 Alternatively, assuming Claim 2H was not barred by the statute of limitations, 

Petitioner failed to fairly present this claim to the state courts. (R&R at 114, 120). The 

R&R further concludes that Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice or actual 

innocence to overcome this failure to fairly present the claim which ultimately resulted in 

the claim being procedurally defaulted. (R&R at 124; 214). Finally, the R&R concludes 

that Martinez does not provide a gateway to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default of this 

claim. (R&R at 190-197). For all of these reasons, this Court cannot reach the merits of 

this claim and it must be dismissed. 

 Petitioner objects and states that “Every part of Supp Ground 2 was fairly 

presented to the Az Court of Appeals + was properly exhausted.” (Doc. 93 at 6). The 

R&R addressed this issue of presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals and concluded 

that Petitioner did not fairly present any of Supplemental Ground 2 to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (R&R at 114, 127-29). First, Petitioner does not offer any evidence to 

dispute the R&R’s conclusion that he did not present any facts supporting this ineffective 

assistance of counsel theory to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (R&R at 114, citing 

Petitioner’s Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 67-1 at 5)). 

 

20 See footnote 6 herein. 

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Second, this Court has reviewed the Arizona Court of Appeals decision (Doc. 67-1 at 59) 

and agrees with Respondents that the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to consider the 

merits of Supplemental Ground 2H on state law procedural grounds. The Court finds that 

the state procedural bar was adequate and independent and; thus relief is also denied for 

this alternative reason.21 Accordingly, the objection is overruled. 

 Finally, the R&R also considered the merits of this time barred, procedurally 

defaulted (without exception) claim, and determined that it failed on the merits (because 

there is no evidence that any Brady material existed, or that, if it existed, it would have 

been helpful). (R&R at 326, 193, 196) (considering the merits of each claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether Martinez provided relief). The 

Court agrees with the R&R that this claim fails on the merits. As a result, the R&R is 

accepted, modified and adopted as specified above on Claim 2H of the supplemental 

petition and relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 2I 

Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue Rivera.22 The 

R&R concludes that this portion of the supplemental petition is barred by AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations. (R&R at 74, 88, 92, 96). Petitioner objects and argues that this 

portion of the supplemental petition is timely because it relates back to the original 

petition. (Doc. 93 at 6). This Court finds that the theory of ineffective assistance of 

counsel advanced in Claim 2I is a new factual predict to the claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Therefore, this claim does not relate back to the original Petition, 

and Petitioner’s objection is overruled.23 Accordingly, Claim 2I is barred by the statute 

of limitations. 

 Alternatively, assuming Claim 2I was not barred by the statute of limitations, 

Petitioner failed to fairly present this claim to the state courts. (R&R at 114, 120). The 

 

21See footnote 7 herein. 

22Various spellings are listed in footnote 17 of the R&R. 

23See footnote 6 herein. 

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R&R further concludes that Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice or actual 

innocence to overcome this failure to fairly present the claim which ultimately resulted in 

the claim being procedurally defaulted. (R&R at 124; 214). Finally, the R&R concludes 

that Martinez does not provide a gateway to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default of this 

claim. (R&R at 197-200). For all of these reasons, this Court cannot reach the merits of 

this claim and it must be dismissed. 

 Petitioner objects and states that “Every part of Supp Ground 2 was fairly 

presented to the Az Court of Appeals + was properly exhausted.” (Doc. 93 at 6). The 

R&R addressed this issue of presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals and concluded 

that Petitioner did not fairly present any of Supplemental Ground 2 to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (R&R at 114, 127-29). First, Petitioner does not offer any evidence to 

dispute the R&R’s conclusion that he did not present any facts supporting this ineffective 

assistance of counsel theory to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (R&R at 114, citing 

Petitioner’s Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 67-1 at 5)). 

Second, this Court has reviewed the Arizona Court of Appeals decision (Doc. 67-1 at 59) 

and agrees with Respondents that the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to consider the 

merits of Supplemental Ground 2I on state law procedural grounds. The Court finds that 

the state procedural bar was adequate and independent and; thus relief is also denied for 

this alternative reason.24 Accordingly, the objection is overruled. 

 Finally, the R&R also considered the merits of this time barred, procedurally 

defaulted (without exception) claim, and determined that it failed on the merits (because 

it was a reasonable tactical decision). (R&R at 326, 199) (considering the merits of each 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether Martinez provided relief). 

The Court agrees with the R&R that this claim fails on the merits. As a result, the R&R 

is accepted, modified and adopted as specified above on Claim 2I of the supplemental 

petition and relief is denied on this claim. 

 

24See footnote 7 herein. 

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 Claim 2J 

Petitioner argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competency 

evaluation of Petitioner under Ariz. R. Crim. Pro. 11. The R&R concludes that this 

portion of the supplemental petition is barred by AEDPA’s statute of limitations. (R&R 

at 88, 92, 96). Petitioner objects and argues that this portion of the supplemental petition 

is timely because it relates back to the original petition. (Doc. 93 at 6). This Court finds 

that the theory of ineffective assistance of counsel advanced in Claim 2J is a new factual 

predict to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, this claim does not 

relate back to the original Petition, and Petitioner’s objection is overruled.25 

Accordingly, Claim 2J is barred by the statute of limitations. 

 Alternatively, assuming Claim 2J was not barred by the statute of limitations, 

Petitioner failed to fairly present this claim to the state courts. (R&R at 114, 120). The 

R&R further concludes that Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice or actual 

innocence to overcome this failure to fairly present the claim which ultimately resulted in 

the claim being procedurally defaulted. (R&R at 124; 214). Finally, the R&R concludes 

that Martinez does not provide a gateway to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default of this 

claim. (R&R at 200-207). For all of these reasons, this Court cannot reach the merits of 

this claim and it must be dismissed. 

 Petitioner objects and states that “Every part of Supp Ground 2 was fairly 

presented to the Az Court of Appeals + was properly exhausted.” (Doc. 93 at 6). The 

R&R addressed this issue of presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals and concluded 

that Petitioner did not fairly present any of Supplemental Ground 2 to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (R&R at 114, 127-29). First, Petitioner does not offer any evidence to 

dispute the R&R’s conclusion that he did not present any facts supporting this ineffective 

assistance of counsel theory to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (R&R at 114, citing 

Petitioner’s Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 67-1 at 5)). 

Second, this Court has reviewed the Arizona Court of Appeals decision (Doc. 67-1 at 59) 

 

25See footnote 6 herein. 

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and agrees with Respondents that the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to consider the 

merits of Supplemental Ground 2J on state law procedural grounds. The Court finds that 

the state procedural bar was adequate and independent and; thus relief is also denied for 

this alternative reason.26 Accordingly, the objection is overruled. 

 Finally, the R&R also considered the merits of this time barred, procedurally 

defaulted (without exception) claim, and determined that it failed on the merits (because 

Petitioner is legally incorrect about the when a competency hearing is require to present 

capacity evidence, and because counsel made a reasonable tactical decision). (R&R at 

326, 205-06) (considering the merits of each claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to 

determine whether Martinez provided relief). The Court agrees with the R&R that this 

claim fails on the merits. As a result, the R&R is accepted, modified and adopted as 

specified above on Claim 2J of the supplemental petition and relief is denied on this 

claim. 

 Claim 2K 

Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call other 

neighborhood witnesses. The R&R concludes that this portion of the supplemental 

petition is barred by AEDPA’s statute of limitations. (R&R at 88, 92, 96). Petitioner 

objects and argues that this portion of the supplemental petition is timely because it 

relates back to the original petition. (Doc. 93 at 6). This Court finds that the theory of 

ineffective assistance of counsel advanced in Claim 2K is a new factual predict to the 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, this claim does not relate back to 

the original Petition, and Petitioner’s objection is overruled.27 Accordingly, Claim 2K is 

barred by the statute of limitations. 

 Alternatively, assuming Claim 2K was not barred by the statute of limitations, 

Petitioner failed to fairly present this claim to the state courts. (R&R at 114, 120). The 

R&R further concludes that Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice or actual 

 

26See footnote 7 herein. 

27See footnote 6 herein. 

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innocence to overcome this failure to fairly present the claim which ultimately resulted in 

the claim being procedurally defaulted. (R&R at 124; 214). Finally, the R&R concludes 

that Martinez does not provide a gateway to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default of this 

claim. (R&R at 207-209). For all of these reasons, this Court cannot reach the merits of 

this claim and it must be dismissed. 

 Petitioner objects and states that “Every part of Supp Ground 2 was fairly 

presented to the Az Court of Appeals + was properly exhausted.” (Doc. 93 at 6). The 

R&R addressed this issue of presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals and concluded 

that Petitioner did not fairly present any of Supplemental Ground 2 to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (R&R at 114, 127-29). First, Petitioner does not offer any evidence to 

dispute the R&R’s conclusion that he did not present any facts supporting this ineffective 

assistance of counsel theory to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (R&R at 114, citing 

Petitioner’s Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 67-1 at 5)). 

Second, this Court has reviewed the Arizona Court of Appeals decision (Doc. 67-1 at 59) 

and agrees with Respondents that the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to consider the 

merits of Supplemental Ground 2K on state law procedural grounds. The Court finds that 

the state procedural bar was adequate and independent and; thus relief is also denied for 

this alternative reason.28 Accordingly, the objection is overruled. 

 Finally, the R&R also considered the merits of this time barred, procedurally 

defaulted (without exception) claim, and determined that it failed on the merits (because 

it was a reasonable tactical decision). (R&R at 326, 208) (considering the merits of each 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether Martinez provided relief). 

The Court agrees with the R&R that this claim fails on the merits. As a result, the R&R 

is accepted, modified and adopted as specified above on Claim 2K of the supplemental 

petition and relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 2L 

Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an aiding 

 

28See footnote 7 herein. 

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and abetting instruction. The R&R concludes that this portion of the supplemental 

petition is barred by AEDPA’s statute of limitations. (R&R at 88, 92, 96). Petitioner 

objects and argues that this portion of the supplemental petition is timely because it 

relates back to the original petition. (Doc. 93 at 6). This Court finds that the theory of 

ineffective assistance of counsel advanced in Claim 2L is a new factual predict to the 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, this claim does not relate back to 

the original Petition, and Petitioner’s objection is overruled.29 Accordingly, Claim 2L is 

barred by the statute of limitations. 

 Alternatively, assuming Claim 2L was not barred by the statute of limitations, 

Petitioner failed to fairly present this claim to the state courts. (R&R at 114, 120). The 

R&R further concludes that Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice or actual 

innocence to overcome this failure to fairly present the claim which ultimately resulted in 

the claim being procedurally defaulted. (R&R at 124; 214). Finally, the R&R concludes 

that Martinez does not provide a gateway to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default of this 

claim. (R&R at 209-212). For all of these reasons, this Court cannot reach the merits of 

this claim and it must be dismissed. 

 Petitioner objects and states that “Every part of Supp Ground 2 was fairly 

presented to the Az Court of Appeals + was properly exhausted.” (Doc. 93 at 6). The 

R&R addressed this issue of presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals and concluded 

that Petitioner did not fairly present any of Supplemental Ground 2 to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (R&R at 114, 127-29). First, Petitioner does not offer any evidence to 

dispute the R&R’s conclusion that he did not present any facts supporting this ineffective 

assistance of counsel theory to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (R&R at 114, citing 

Petitioner’s Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 67-1 at 5)). 

Second, this Court has reviewed the Arizona Court of Appeals decision (Doc. 67-1 at 59) 

and agrees with Respondents that the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to consider the 

merits of Supplemental Ground 2L on state law procedural grounds. The Court finds that 

 

29See footnote 6 herein. 

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the state procedural bar was adequate and independent and; thus relief is also denied for 

this alternative reason.30 Accordingly, the objection is overruled. 

 Finally, the R&R also considered the merits of this time barred, procedurally 

defaulted (without exception) claim, and determined that it failed on the merits (because 

Petitioner misunderstands the law, and alternatively, counsel made a reasonable tactical 

decision). (R&R at 326, 210-11) (considering the merits of each claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel to determine whether Martinez provided relief). The Court agrees 

with the R&R that this claim fails on the merits. As a result, the R&R is accepted, 

modified and adopted as specified above on Claim 2L of the supplemental petition and 

relief is denied on this claim. 

 Claim 3 (supplemental petition) 

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to habeas relief on a theory of cumulative error 

in his trial. The R&R concludes that this claim is barred by AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations (R&R at 88, 92, 96). The Court agrees that this claim is barred by the statute 

of limitations. 

 Alternatively, even if the claim was not barred, Petitioner did not fairly present 

this claim to the state court. (R&R at 120). However, the R&R also concluded that 

because Arizona does not recognize a claim of cumulative error, there was no state 

remedy available. (R&R at 327). Thus, the R&R determined that all available state 

remedies were exhausted, so this claim was exhausted under the “futility doctrine.” 

(R&R at 116) (citing Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 236 (9th Cir. 1981)). 

 Respondents object to the R&R on this point and argue that Sweet’s “futility 

doctrine” has been rejected by the Supreme Court in this circumstance and, therefore, 

does not excuse exhaustion in state court even if the state court does not recognize the 

claim. (Doc. 96 at 7-8) (citing Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107, 130 (1982)).31 Petitioner 

 

30See footnote 7 herein. 

31Respondents acknowledge that the futility doctrine may excuse exhaustion if the state corrective process as a whole is clearly deficient. (Doc. 96 at 8). However, here 

they note that Petitioner makes no such global argument. 

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responded to Respondents’ objections and argued that futility should be a basis to excuse 

exhaustion. (Doc. 97 at 7-8). 

 Based on the cases in Respondents’ objections, it appears that the other circuits 

that have addressed this issue have determined that the futility doctrine does not excuse 

exhaustion when the only basis for not raising the claim in state court is the prisoner’s 

belief that the state court would reject the argument. (Doc. 96 at 7-8). Further, the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals questioned whether Sweet survived Engle. Noltie v. Peterson, 9 

F.3d 802, 805-06 (9th 1993). Another panel of the Ninth Circuit in an unpublished 

opinion also questioned whether Sweet survived the passage of the AEDPA. 

 Against this framework, the Court agrees with Respondents that Sweet no longer 

provides a merits based futility exception to exhaustion. Thus, to the extent the R&R 

concluded (R&R at 327) that a futility exception to a state law based cumulatively error 

argument existed, that conclusion is rejected. As a result, Petitioner was required to 

exhaust this theory (which would not have been cognizable on habeas regardless if it was 

a purely state law claim). The R&R further concluded that a federal law based claim of 

cumulative error was not fairly presented to the state court, and that no futility exception 

would have applied to such a federal claim. (R&R at 120). Therefore, that version of the 

cumulative error theory was also not exhausted. The R&R further concludes that 

Petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice or actual innocence to overcome this failure 

to exhaust which resulted in the claim being procedurally defaulted. (R&R at 120, 124; 

214). For all of these reasons, no relief is available on this claim. 

 Regardless of all these bars to the Court considering the merits of this claim, 

additionally, and alternatively, this claim fails on the merits. (R&R at 331). Specifically, 

the R&R concluded that Petitioner has failed to specify exactly what the errors were that, 

cumulatively, should entitle him to relief. (R&R at 331). Petitioner objects to this 

conclusion, but still fails to identify the exact errors at issue. (Doc. 93 at 15). 

Accordingly, for this alternative reason, relief is denied. As to this claim the R&R is 

accepted, rejected or modified as specified above; Respondents’ objection is sustained; 

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Petitioner’s objections are overruled. 

IV. Other Pending Motions 

Also pending before the Court are Petitioner’s motion for evidentiary hearing 

(Doc. 82), motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 83), and motion for a certificate of 

appealability (Doc. 94). The R&R made a recommendation as to each of these motions. 

Motion for Evidentiary 

 The R&R discusses and summarizes Petitioner various requests for an evidentiary 

hearing. (R&R at 26-27, 28-29). The R&R also summarizes Respondents’ opposition to 

an evidentiary hearing. (R&R at 27-28). The R&R recounts the law governing when an 

evidentiary hearing in a habeas case is appropriate (R&R at 29-38) and though Petitioner 

objects to the denial of the evidentiary hearing, he does not object to this recounting of 

the governing law and the Court accepts and adopts it. 

 Notably, in his objections, Petitioner states, “Petitioner should be granted the 

requested evidentiary hearing and request to conduct discovery.” However, conducting 

discovery and holding an evidentiary hearing are not a single event. As this Court has 

previously held, an evidentiary hearing cannot be used as a fishing expedition to 

determine if any witnesses are in existence who may have relevant testimony. See United 

States v. Fuentes, 2009 WL 4730733, *5 (D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 2009) aff=d United States v. 

Fuentes, 457 Fed.Appx 687 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Further, because Fuentes has failed to 

provide any indication of how the additional testimony would affect his right to relief, the 

district court did not err in declining to appoint counsel to assist in investigating these 

four witnesses or to hold an evidentiary hearing.”). 

 The R&R recommended that this Court deny the request for discovery because it 

is a fishing expedition (R&R at 30) and the request for hearing on “all claims” because 

Petitioner was not specific as to what evidence he intended to offer at the evidentiary 

hearing (R&R at 38). Petitioner objects to this latter recommendation and lists 8 

witnesses he intends to call at the hearing. (Doc. 93 at 3). However, Petitioner still fails 

to state what these witnesses would say that would entitle him to relief. See United States 

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v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981) 

(conclusory allegations are insufficient to require a habeas evidentiary hearing). 

Accordingly, to the extent Petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing on all claims, that 

request is denied. 

 The R&R also discusses the four specific pieces of evidence Petitioner identified 

that he intends to offer at an evidentiary hearing. (R&R at 38-54). The specific items 

are: 1) Issacs’ testimony; 2) Ellis’ and Gains’ testimony; 3) an unknown expert to testify 

about prison life; and 4) PCR counsel Goldberg’s testimony. (R&R at 38). 

 Issacs’ Testimony 

Petitioner seems to premise his first basis for seeking an evidentiary hearing (for 

the Court to hear Issacs’ testimony) on Petitioner’s hope or belief that Issacs will confess 

to the murder of which Petitioner was convicted. (R&R at 38). However, Petitioner has 

no evidence that, if called, Issacs would so testify. Further, the record from the state 

court, which includes Issacs’ refusal to testify at Petitioner’s trial and the absence of 

Issacs’ testimony from any of Petitioner’s post-conviction relief attempts, strongly 

suggests Issacs would not so testify. (R&R at 38-39, 41). For this reason, the request for 

an evidentiary hearing to call Issacs is denied. 

 Alternatively, the R&R did an extensive analysis of whether an evidentiary 

hearing would be necessary assuming Issacs would so confess. (R&R at 39-46). The 

R&R concluded that, even with such confession in federal court, Petitioner would not be 

entitled to relief due to the state court’s presumptively correct (under AEDPA) factual 

findings about the reasons Issacs’ would make a false confession; accordingly, an 

evidentiary hearing is not necessary for this alternative reason. (R&R at 46); see also

United States v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1991). Petitioner’s 

objections seeking an evidentiary hearing (Doc. 93 at 2-4) are overruled. As a result, the 

R&R is accepted and adopted and the request for an evidentiary hearing regarding Issacs’ 

testimony is denied. 

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 Testimony of Ellis and Gains 

Next Petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing to solicit the testimony of Ellis and 

Gains. (R&R at 46-48). For the same reasons that Issacs’ presumed confession would 

not be believable, Ellis’ and Gains’ recounting of any such confession would not be 

believable; and this Court will presume the correctness of the state court’s factual 

findings on this point. (R&R at 47). Petitioner’s objections seeking an evidentiary 

hearing (Doc. 93 at 2-4) are overruled. As a result, the R&R is accepted and adopted and 

the request for an evidentiary hearing regarding Ellis and Gains is denied. 

 Testimony Regarding Prison Life 

As the R&R recounts, “[t]he next category of evidence Petitioner proffers for an 

evidentiary hearing concerns the relevant motivations of a prisoner like Issacs to lie about 

having killed a snitch.” (R&R at 48). The R&R concludes that no evidentiary hearing is 

necessary regarding this topic. (R&R at 48-51). This Court agrees with the R&R that 

given the presumption of correctness of the state court’s factual findings regarding this 

topic, Petitioner cannot use further evidence on this topic to meet his burden on a claim 

of actual innocence. (R&R at 51); see also United States v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 

818, 822 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 Thus, Petitioner’s objections seeking an evidentiary hearing (Doc. 93 at 2-4) are 

overruled. Further, the R&R is accepted and adopted and the request for an evidentiary 

hearing regarding prison life is denied. 

 Testimony of PCR Counsel Goldberg 

Petitioner seeks to call counsel Goldberg to have him admit he “missed” several 

claims, and was therefore ineffective. (R&R at 51). Like Issacs’ supposed testimony, 

Petitioner offers no evidence that counsel Goldberg would testify as Petitioner hopes. 

(R&R at 52-53). Because evidentiary hearings are not fishing expeditions, the request for 

an evidentiary hearing on this topic is denied for this reason. 

 Alternatively, even accepting Petitioner’s hoped for testimony as true, that counsel 

Goldberg “missed” some claims, such an admission would not rise to the level of 

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ineffective assistance of counsel. (R&R at 53-54); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984). Accordingly, even if these facts were proven at an evidentiary hearing, they 

would not entitled Petitioner to relief; thus, so no hearing is required. See United States 

v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 Thus, for both reasons stated above, Petitioner’s motion and objections seeking an 

evidentiary hearing (Doc. 93 at 2-4) are denied. Further, the R&R is accepted and 

adopted and the request for an evidentiary hearing regarding prison life is denied. 

Motion for Appointment of Counsel

 Petitioner seeks appointment of counsel. (R&R at 55-58). In deciding whether to 

appoint counsel, this Court considers the complexity of the factual and legal issues 

involved, Petitioner’s ability to articulate his claims pro se, and whether Petitioner’s 

claims have merit. (R&R at 56). The Court finds that Petitioner has articulated his 

claims very well pro se and that ultimately, his claims do not have merit. Accordingly, 

Petitioner’s request for appointment of counsel will be denied. 

Request for a Certificate of Appealability 

 A judge may issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has 

rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) 

is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas 

petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional 

claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would 

find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was 

correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. 

 The R&R recommends this Court grant a certificate of appealability on two 

specific procedural bars to Petitioner’s claims. (R&R at 396-397). Both parties objected 

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to this portion of the R&R. (Doc. 93 at 18 (referencing a separately filed motion for 

certificate of appealability filed at Doc. 94); (Doc. 96 at 17-20). Petitioner seeks a 

certificate of appealability on 20 separate issues. (Doc. 94 at 2-5). Respondents argue 

that because the two issues on which the R&R recommends a certificate of appealability 

on are procedural bars arising out of state court fair presentment issues on claims that are 

also barred by the AEDPA’s statute of limitations and, alternatively, fail on the merits, 

any opinion from the Court of Appeals would be advisory. (Doc. 96 at 17-20). 

 Respondents are correct that both items on which the R&R recommends the grant 

of a certificate of appealability are barred by an alternative procedural basis (statute of 

limitations) and fail on the merits. Further, as to all claims on which Petitioner seeks a 

certificate of appealability, this Court has alternatively considered the merits of the 

claims and found that they do not entitle Petitioner to relief. As to the merits of all 

claims, the Court finds that jurists of reason would not find this Court’s merits 

conclusions debatable or wrong. For this reason, under Slack, the certificate of 

appealability is denied. Thus, Respondents objections are sustained and Petitioner’s 

objections are overruled. 

 Additionally, to the extent Petitioner may argue that his request for discovery and 

an evidentiary hearing, if granted, would have changed the merits analysis of his 

unexhausted ineffective assistance trial counsel claims, the Court notes that an 

evidentiary hearing would not have impacted the analysis. Specifically, in his objections, 

Petitioner cites to Martinez as a basis for why he should be entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing. (Doc. 93 at 3). As the R&R discusses at length, Martinez can excuse a 

Petitioner’s failure to exhaust the merits of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim 

in state court in certain circumstances. (R&R at 135-141). What Petitioner appears to 

seek via an evidentiary hearing is not to gateway around his procedural default of his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims, but instead to litigate the merits of his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims de novo in this Court; including receiving appointed counsel 

and doing a fact finding investigation regarding counsel’s performance. This Court does 

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not read Martinez as converting this Court to a “first post-conviction relief court” to 

create a record on all claims Petitioner failed to exhaust in state court.32 Indeed, such a 

result would incentivize defendants who would prefer a de novo review in federal court 

to intentionally not exhaust in state court and in no way be limited by the state court 

record. Such a result would run contrary to any theory of comity or AEDPA deference. 

Accordingly, to the extent Petitioner is seeking a Martinez evidentiary hearing on this 

basis, that objection is overruled. 

V. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Evidentiary Hearing (Doc. 82) is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 

83) is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 89) is 

rejected, modified, or accepted as specified above; the objections of each party (Docs. 93 

and 96) are sustained or overruled as specified above; the Petition is denied, with 

prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Motion for a Certificate of Appealability 

(Doc. 94) is denied. 

 Dated this 26th day of January, 2016. 

 32Mr. Martinez himself exhausted his claim of ineffective assistance of first postconviction relief counsel via a second petition for post-conviction relief in state court 

(and within that record argued all the alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel not raised by 

first post-conviction relief counsel), not in this Court. Martinez v. Schriro, 2008 WL 

5220909, *3 (D. Ariz. 2008) (holding that ineffective assistance of First PCR counsel was 

presented/exhausted) (rev'd on other grounds, - - - U.S. - - -, 132 S.Ct. 1309); Martinez v. 

Ryan, 2012 WL 5936566, n.5 (November 27, 2012). 

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