Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-02016/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-02016-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SCOTT PATRICK BOSTON,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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CASE NO. 2:14-CV-2016-SLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is presently pending before the court on plaintiff’s Motion to Remand and

Agreed Upon Motion to Stay Case. (Doc. 15.) For the reasons set forth below, the Motion

to Remand will be granted and this case will be remanded to the Commissioner pursuant to

sentence 6 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for consideration of the opinion evidence first filed in this

court.

Mr. Boston filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance

benefits [DIB] on October 30, 2012. (See doc. 7-3 at R.20.)1 The application was denied

initially on December 14, 2012. (Id.) Thereafter, Mr. Boston requested a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge [ALJ], which was held on December 17, 2013. (Id.) Following

1Reference to a document number, (“Doc. __”), refers to the number assigned to each

document as it is filed in the court’s record. References to page numbers in the

Commissioner’s record are set forth as (“R.__”).

FILED

 2016 Jul-14 PM 12:02

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-02016-SLB Document 20 Filed 07/14/16 Page 1 of 13
the hearing, the ALJ found that Mr. Boston was not disabled; therefore, he denied Mr.

Boston’s application for a period of disability and DIB on February 24, 2014. (Id. at R.30.)

Mr. Boston requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council. (See id.

at R.7.) On August 18, 2014, the Appeals Council denied the request for review, stating that

it had “found no reason under [its] rules to review the [ALJ’s] decision.” (Id. at R.1.) 

Therefore, “the [ALJ’s] decision is the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

in [Mr. Boston’s] case.” (Id.)

Mr. Boston filed an appeal in this court on October 21, 2014. (Doc. 1.) Thereafter,

he filed the instant Motion to Remand and attached a document from his treating physician, 

Patrick Pritchard, M.D., which states:

I treated Mr. Boston from 8/9/2010 to present time.

1) In my opinion as a medical doctor and based on my observation and

treatment of Scott Boston, I believe that the following limitations existed as of

October 2, 2012[,] through the last date of my treatment.

A. Mr. Boston would be expected to miss more than three days of work

each month as a result of his underlying medical condition(s).

Yes T No 

. . . 

B) Mr. Boston would experience symptoms, on a chronic basis, from

his underlying medical condition(s) which could reasonably be

expected to cause distraction from job tasks, or result in a failure to

complete job tasks in a timely manner, for more than two hours during

a typical eight[-]hour workday

Yes T No 

2

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. . . 

C) Mr. Boston could not sustain work for eight (8) hours per day, five

(5) days per week at any kind of job, even one that is seated most of the

day, for the following reasons:

Severe L2 fracture in 2010 has resulted in changes [to his] spine that

limit[ ] his functionality for continued employment.

(Doc. 15-1.) Dr. Pritchard signed this document on October 1, 2015. Mr. Boston argues:

Dr. Pritchard's opinions meet the requirements of new and material

evidence sufficient for a remand, as set forth in Cannon v. Bowen, 858 F.2d

1541, 1546 (11th Cir. 1988) because:

A. The opinions are new and non-cumulative as the record does not

contain a medical opinion as to the ability or inability to sustain work

on a regular and continuing basis.

B. Dr. Pritchard's opinions are material evidence because, if not

discredited by the Commissioner, they could change the administrative

decision.

Dr. Pritchard's opinions are that Mr. Boston could not work eight hours

per day, five days per week, nor sustain work for at least six hours of

an eight hour work day, as of October 2, 2012, which is well before the

administrative decisions in this case. In addition, Dr. Pritchard opines

that as of October 2, 2012, Mr. Boston would miss more than three days

of work per month (i.e., 36 days per year, or more than 7 weeks).

If an individual cannot work eight hours per day, five days per week,

he would generally be found unable to sustain work-related physical

and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing

basis. SSR 96-8p. Therefore, the individual generally would be found

disabled under Social Security rules. Furthermore, as a treating

physician, Dr. Pritchard's opinions are entitled to controlling weight. 

SSR 96-2p.

C. There is good cause for failure to submit this evidence at the

administrative level because this evidence did not exist previously.

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[Mr. Boston] submit[s] that for these reasons the threshold requirements of

Cannon have been satisfied and this case should be remanded so that the

Commissioner can consider the new and material evidence presented by Dr.

Pritchard's opinions.

(Doc. 15 ¶ 3.)

The Commissioner argues that the evidence does not support a sentence six remand

because it is not “material” and because Mr. Boston “has not shown good cause for not

submitting [the evidence] previously.” (Doc. 18 at 2-3.) The court disagrees.

Sentence six of § 405(g) states:

The court . . . may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the

Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new

evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to

incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding; and the

Commissioner of Social Security shall, after the case is remanded, and after

hearing such additional evidence if so ordered, modify or affirm the

Commissioner's findings of fact or the Commissioner's decision, or both, and

shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings of fact and

decision, and, in any case in which the Commissioner has not made a decision

fully favorable to the individual, a transcript of the additional record and

testimony upon which the Commissioner's action in modifying or affirming

was based.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Therefore, a claimant seeking a remand under sentence six must

establish “(1) there is new, noncumulative evidence; (2) the evidence is ‘material,’ that is,

relevant and probative so that there is a reasonable possibility that it would change the

administrative result; and (3) there is good cause for the failure to submit the evidence at the

administrative level.” Milano v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 763, 766 (11th Cir. 1987)(quoting Caulder

v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 872, 877 (11th Cir.1986)); see Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

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496 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2007)(“The sixth sentence of section 405(g) provides a

federal court the power to remand the application for benefits to the Commissioner for the

taking of additional evidence upon a showing ‘that there is new evidence which is material

and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a

prior proceeding.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g))). “Accordingly, sentence six encompasses

only those instances in which ‘the district court learns of evidence not in existence or

available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding that might have

changed the outcome of that proceeding.’” Gordon v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Com'r, 625 Fed.

Appx. 512, 514 (11th Cir. 2015)(quoting Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1267 (quoting Sullivan v.

Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 626 (1990)))(emphasis added).2

A. MATERIALITY

The Commissioner argues, “Plaintiff’s new evidence would not change the result

because the note is not entitled to controlling, or even significant, weight.” (Doc. 18 at 3.) 

While this might be true, this court does not determine the weight of new evidence submitted

for the first time in the district court and not included in the record of the administrative

proceedings.

2Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2 provides, in pertinent part, “An opinion shall be

unpublished unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it. Unpublished opinions are

not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir.

R. 36-2 (emphasis added).

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“To be material, the evidence must be relevant and probative so that there is a

reasonable possibility that it would change the administrative outcome.” Caulder, 791 F.2d

at 877 (citing Wright v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 696 (11th Cir.1984); Chaney v. Schweiker, 659

F.2d 676, 679 (5th Cir. Oct. 21, 1981)). This court has no jurisdiction to evaluate this new

evidence in the first instance. Walters v. Barnhart, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1185 (M.D. Ala.

2001)(citing Caulder v. Bowen, 791 F.2d at 875; Cherry v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1186 (11th

Cir.1985)). “Additionally, the court is not permitted to ‘discount’ the evidence at this stage

of the proceedings – although the ALJ may certainly do so on remand.” Mitchell v. Apfel,

No. CIV.A.98-W-1160-N, 1999 WL 33100499, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 17, 1999)(citing

Cannon v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 1541, 1546 (11th Cir. 1988); Wright v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 696,

697 (11th Cir.1984)).

“[W]hen determining whether to remand a case to the [Commissioner] for

consideration of new evidence, the mere statement by the [Commissioner] that the new

evidence would not ultimately change the decision cannot be accorded any weight since the

statement concerning the materialityofthe evidence not in the certified administrative record

is advisory at best.” Caulder, 791 F.2d at 877 (11th Cir. 1986)(citing Cherry, 760 F.2d at

1194). Therefore, the court must accept as valid the new evidence in deciding whether it is

material. Washington v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Com'r, 806 F.3d 1317, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2015);

Mitchell, 1999 WL 33100499, at *3.

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Notwithstanding the Commissioner’s arguments regarding the materiality of Dr.

Pritchard’s opinions in light of other evidence in the record that could form the basis of

rejecting the treating physician’s opinions, the court finds – for purposes of deciding whether

the evidence is “material” – that Dr. Pritchard’s opinion testimonyis “relevant and probative”

because “it pertains to a condition that [Mr. Boston] listed in his application[ ] at the

administrative level as a source of his disability,” and “[t]he evidence also contains a medical

opinion on the presence of the impairment during the time period for which benefits are

sought.” See Caulder, 791 F.2d at 877-78.

B. GOOD CAUSE

“The sixth sentence of § 405(g) plainly describes [a] kind of remand, appropriate

when the district court learns of evidence not in existence or available to the claimant at the

time of the administrative proceeding that might have changed the outcome of that

proceeding.” Finkelstein, 496 U.S. at 626. “Good cause for failing to present evidence

earlier may exist where, as here, the evidence did not exist at the time of the administrative

proceeding,” Cherry, 760 F.2d at 1192, and nothing before the court “reflects any bad faith

attempt by [the claimant] to manipulate the administrative process,” Lipscomb v.

Commissioner of Soc. Security, 199 Fed. Appx. 903, 907 (11th Cir. 2006).

The Commissioner argues that the good-cause requirement is not satisfied if the

claimant could have taken steps to cause such evidence to be created, even though the

evidence did not exist during the administrative proceedings. See doc. 18 at 7 (“Plaintiff

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Case 2:14-cv-02016-SLB Document 20 Filed 07/14/16 Page 7 of 13
provides no rationale or medical condition changes why Dr. Pritchard’s note could not be

prepared prior to the ALJ decision. The mere fact that Plaintiff had this evidence created

after the Appeal’s Council’s decision does not absolve him from providing good cause for

his failure to seek it previously.”). In support of her contention, the Commissioner cites to

Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998) and Vlamakis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

172 Fed. Appx. 274, 277 (11th Cir. 2006).

The Falge decision is distinguishable from the facts of this case. In that case, the

doctor’s report purported to predate the ALJ’s decision opinion. Falge, 150 F.3d at 1323-24

and n.8.3 The claimant failed to allege or prove that the report at issue did not exist at some

3The Falge court stated:

But, Falge has provided no reason – no good cause – why Dr. Inga’s report

was not made available during proceedings before the ALJ. [Footnote]

[Footnote:] Dr. Inga’s new report is dated 11 May 1994 (before the

hearing), but the report does not seem to have actually been prepared

until December 1994 (after the ALJ decision). The opinions set out in

the report, however, seem to have been based on medical examinations

and tests conducted before the ALJ rendered his decision.

We accept that, if an applicant can show good cause for his failure to

introduce evidence during a hearing before the ALJ (even if the evidence was

available to the applicant before the ALJ's decision) courts may consider that

evidence in deciding whether the case should be remanded for further

administrative proceedings to include the new evidence. But again, that kind

of case is not before us. Falge has neither shown nor alleged good cause for

his failure to introduce Dr. Inga’s May 1994 report during the hearing before

the ALJ.

Falge, 150 F.3d at 1323-24 & n.8 (emphasis added). Although the court noted that the report

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time before the ALJ’s decision. Id. at 1324. Indeed, the Falge court appears to “accept” that

good cause exists for not presenting evidence that did not exist during the administrative

proceedings without any other showing. See id. at 1323-24 (“We accept that, if an applicant

can show good cause for his failure to introduce evidence during a hearing before the ALJ

(even if the evidence was available to the applicant before the ALJ's decision) courts may

consider that evidence in deciding whether the case should be remanded for further

administrative proceedings to include the new evidence.”).

In the unpublished Vlamakis opinion, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit held:

The evidence in this case, which consists of a short statement that Dr. Gaulkin

treated Vlamakis for anxiety, is neither new, nor material. Dr. Gaulkin's notes

already contained statements regarding his treatment of Vlamakis for anxiety. 

Those same notes provide a better description of Vlamakis' condition than the

letter does. The letter adds nothing new to the record and there is no

reasonable possibility it would change the ALJ's decision. Furthermore,

although the letter did not exist at the time of the administrative proceedings,

Vlamakis has not shown good cause for not obtaining a letter fromDr. Gaulkin

at an earlier date. The evidence upon which Dr. Gaulkin'sletter was based had

been available since 1997, several years before the administrative proceedings

began. Accordingly, the district court did not err in declining to remand the

case to the Commissioner on the basis of Dr. Gaulkin's letter.

Vlamakis, 172 Fed. Appx. at 277. This unpublished opinion is not binding on this court. See

11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but theymay

be cited as persuasive authority.”). Regardless, the Vlamakis “holding,” allowing a district

court to consider a claimant’s cause for not having evidence created during the administrative

“seemed” to be created after the administrative proceeding, it treated the report as created

during the administrative proceedings.

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proceedings, is contrary to numerous and long-standing precedents of the Eleventh Circuit,

which this court is required to follow.4

As set forth above, “Good cause for failing to present evidence earlier may exist

where, as here, the evidence did not exist at the time of the administrative proceeding.” 

Cherry, 760 F.2d at 1192 (emphasis added); see also Cannon, 858 F.2d at 1546 (11th Cir.

1988)(“there is good cause for failing to present the evidence because it did not exist at the

time of the administrative hearing or the district court proceedings”)(emphasis added); Hyde

v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 456, 459 (11th Cir. 1987)(“because this new evidence did not exist at the

time of the administrative proceedings Hyde has established good cause for failure to submit

the evidence at the administrative level”)(emphasis added); Smith v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1547,

4According to the Eleventh Circuit – 

Under our prior precedent rule, we are bound to follow a binding precedent in

this Circuit “unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc or by the

Supreme Court.” United States v. Martinez, 606 F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir.

2010)(quoting United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir.

2008)). We inherited this rule from the old Fifth Circuit, which had similarly

deferred to prior precedent. See, e.g., Davis v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 437, 441 (5th

Cir. 1976). Therefore, when faced with an intracircuit split, we look to the

earliest case not abrogated by the Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en

banc. See Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 929 (11th Cir. 2003)

(“[W]hen circuit authority is in conflict, a panel should look to the line of

authority containing the earliest case, because a decision of a prior panel

cannot be overturned by a later panel.)(quoting Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d

1177, 1188 (11th Cir. 1998))).

Offshore of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. Lynch, 741 F.3d 1251, 1256-57 (11th Cir. 2014). This

court must follow binding Circuit precedent. See In re Hubbard, 803 F.3d 1298, 1309 (11th

Cir. 2015)(citing Generali v. D’Amico, 766 F.2d 485, 489 (11th Cir. 1985)).

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1550 (11th Cir. 1986)(“Smith has established good cause for failure to submit the evidence

at the administrative level because it did not exist at that time.”)(emphasis added); Caulder,

791 F.2d at 878 (“Caulder did establish good cause for the failure to submit the evidence at

the administrative level because the evidence did not exist at that time”) (emphasis added);

see also Lipscomb, 199 Fed. Appx. at 907 (“The good cause requirement is also satisfied. 

The [evidence] did not exist at the time of the administrative proceedings.”)(emphasis

added); Archer v. Commissioner of Social Security, 176 Fed. Appx. 80, 82 n.3 (11th Cir.

2006)( noting that “The good cause requirement is satisfied when the evidence did not exist

at the time of the administrative proceedings,” and that “the [district] court [had] stated that

the mere non-existence of the evidence did not amount to good cause,” but that “finding

[was] contrary to this circuit’s standard” (citing Cannon, 858 F.2d at 1546))(other citations

omitted and emphasis added).

The court notes that Dr. Pritchard is a neurosurgeon and has treated Mr. Boston over

a number of years. He opined that Mr. Boston will miss up to the three days per month due

to his back pain. Before the ALJ’s decision, which found Mr. Boston was capable of

sustained work activity, there was no apparent need for a treating physician to offer an

opinion as to Mr. Boston’s limitations with regard to attendance. Under different facts, it

may be appropriate to consider a claimant’s “bad faith” in waiting to seek and submit new

and material physician opinion evidence to the district court until completion of the

administration proceedings. In this case, the court finds no evidence or suggestion that Mr.

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Boston and Dr. Prichard engaged in bad faith or otherwise have attempted to manipulate the

system. 

The court finds that Mr. Boston had “good cause” for not presenting Dr. Pritchard’s

opinion during the administrative proceedings based on the fact that Dr. Pritchard’s opinion

did not exist until after completion of the administrative proceedings.

C. FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

Based on the foregoing the court finds that Mr. Boston has shown that remand to the 

Commissioner to allow her to consider Dr. Pritchard’s opinions is appropriate under sentence

six of § 405(g). On remand – 

the Commissioner of Social Security shall, after the case is remanded, and

after hearing such additional evidence . . . , modify or affirm the

Commissioner’s findings of fact or the Commissioner's decision, or both, and

shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings of fact and

decision, and, in any case in which the Commissioner has not made a decision

fully favorable to the individual, a transcript of the additional record and

testimony upon which the Commissioner's action in modifying or affirming

was based.

42 U.S.C. 405(g).

Therefore, this matter will be stayed pending the Commissioner’s filing of additional

and/or modified findings of fact and decision. “The time for filing an EAJA application, in

a sentence-six remand, runs from that post-remand judgment entry date in the district court.” 

Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1089-90 (11th Cir. 1996).

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CONCLUSION

An Order granting Mr. Boston’s Motion to Remand and Agreed Upon Motion to Stay

Case, (doc. 15), will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.

DONE this 14th day of July, 2016.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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