Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-02216/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-02216-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 462
Nature of Suit: Naturalization, Petition For Hearing of Denial
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

XIAOKE TAO,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, as Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security; EMILIO

GONZALEZ, Director of the U.S. Citizenship &

Immigration Services; GERARD HEINAUER,

Director of Nebraska Service Center, U.S.

Citizenship & Immigration Services,

Defendants. 

Case No. C07-02216 HRL

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Re: Docket No. 9]

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se plaintiff, Xiaoke Tao, sues to compel the processing of her I-485 application for

adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident. She alleges that the government has

unreasonably delayed the adjudication of her application, which was submitted to the United

States Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) over two and a half years ago. 

According to defendants, the application remains pending due to an FBI name check.

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedures 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), defendants move to

dismiss the complaint. They contend that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s claims because the pace at which her I-485 application is processed is left

*E-FILED: 8.17.2007*

Case 5:07-cv-02216-HRL Document 17 Filed 08/17/07 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Pursuant to the court’s Civil Local Rule 7-3, Tao was obliged to file either an

opposition or a statement of nonopposition no later than July 17, 2007. See CIV. L.R. 7-3. 

Her belated “Response and Opposition” was not filed until some three weeks later on the eve

of the motion hearing. Plaintiff is advised that, although she is representing herself, she is

responsible for diligently prosecuting her case and for adhering to rules that all litigants must

follow. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that pro per litigants

must follow the same procedural rules as represented parties). The court has accepted and

considered Tao’s belated opposition. However, this court does not condone the failure to

make timely filings and warns plaintiff against future non-compliance.

2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, all parties have

expressly consented that all proceedings in this matter may be heard and finally adjudicated

by the undersigned.

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entirely to agency discretion as a matter of law.

Tao failed to timely file her opposition to the motion.1

 There being no appearance by

either side at the August 7, 2007 motion hearing, this court took the matter under submission

without oral argument. Upon consideration of the moving and responding papers, the court

denies the motion.2

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (FED. R. CIV. P.

12(b)(1))

At issue is whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s complaint

under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. and mandamus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. 

Defendants argue that jurisdiction does not lie under either statute.

1. Jurisdiction under the APA

Under the APA, “[t]o the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the

reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed . .

..” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Additionally, “[w]ith due regard for the convenience and necessity of the

parties or their representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to

conclude a matter presented to it.” Id., § 555(b). To invoke jurisdiction under the APA,

plaintiff must show that defendants (1) had a nondiscretionary duty to act and (2) unreasonably

delayed in acting on that duty. See Gelfer v. Chertoff, C06-06724, 2007 WL 902382, *1 (N.D.

Cal., Mar. 22, 2007) (citing Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63-65 (2004)).

Case 5:07-cv-02216-HRL Document 17 Filed 08/17/07 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Defendants contend that there is no jurisdiction because the APA precludes judicial

review where “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 

Here, they argue that the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1255, commits

adjustment of status to agency discretion.

The USCIS has considerable discretion over the determination of applications for status

adjustment. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). However, “there is a difference between the [USCIS’s]

discretion over how to resolve an application and the [USCIS]’s discretion over whether it

resolves an application.” Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp.2d 1064, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2006); see also

Yu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp.2d 922, 931 (D.N.M. 1999) (“Thus, regardless of the ultimate decision,

[USCIS] has a non-discretionary, mandatory duty to act on Plaintiff’s application.”).

Defendants nevertheless contend that the pace of processing for an I-485 application is

discretionary. Here, they point out that, under the APA, “agency action” also includes a failure

to act (see 5 U.S.C. § 551(13)) and further, that there is no statutory time frame in which such

applications must be adjudicated. As such, defendants argue that the court cannot, and should

not, impose one. See Heckler v. Cheney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985) (“[R]eview is not to be had

if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge

the agency’s exercise of discretion.”).

District courts are split over the question whether the pace of processing is discretionary

in nature. Some courts have concluded that the INA gives the government complete discretion

over the adjudication of applications, including the pace at which the applications are

processed. See e.g., Safadi v. Howard, 466 F. Supp.2d 696 (E.D. Va. 2006); Zheng v. Reno, 166

F.Supp.2d 875 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

Other courts, including those in this district, have found that the USCIS has a

nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate immigration applications within a reasonable time. This

court agrees that the better rule permits judicial review on unreasonably delayed petitions

because the APA expressly requires agency actions to occur “within a reasonable time.” See 5

U.S.C. § 555(b)); see also, e.g., Gelfer v. Chertoff, C06-06724, 2007 WL 902382, *2 (N.D. Cal.

Mar. 22, 2007); Razaq v. Poulos, C06-02461, 2007 WL 61884, *3 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 8, 2007);

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Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp.2d 1064, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Aboushan v. Mueller, C06-01280,

2006 WL 3041086, *2 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 24, 2006); Paunescu v. Immigration & Naturalization

Service, 76 F. Supp.2d 896, 901 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Yu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp.2d 922, 932 (D.N.M.

1999). Indeed, “[a] contrary position would permit the [USCIS] to delay indefinitely. Congress

could not have intended to authorize potentially interminable delays.” Yu, 36 F. Supp.2d at

931-32.

Defendants nonetheless maintain that there has been no unreasonable delay. “What

constitutes an unreasonable delay in the context of immigration applications depends to a great

extent on the facts of the particular case.” Yu, 36 F. Supp.2d at 934. Plaintiff’s application has

been pending for over two and a half years (from the filing date of December 27, 2004), and for

some two years and five months since her first fingerprinting on March 13, 2005. Defendants

point out that a name check was submitted to the FBI on January 13, 2005 (approximately two

weeks after Tao’s I-485 application was filed), but say that her application remains pending

because that name check has yet to be completed. (See Heinauer Decl., ¶ 15). They contend

that any processing delays are warranted because (a) the requisite background check is

necessary for national security and public safety; and (b) there is a large volume of submitted

petitions and applications.

This does not adequately explain, however, why plaintiff’s application has not been

processed for over two years. While this court appreciates that the FBI name check implicates

national security, this does not render agency delay reasonable per se. Moreover, “delays of a

significant magnitude, particularly when they occur over uncomplicated matters of great

importance to the individuals involved, may not be justified merely by assertions of overwork.” 

Yu, 36 F. Supp.2d at 934 (citations omitted). Here, as in Singh, there is nothing on the record to

indicate that the delay has been due to any fault of plaintiff. See Singh, 470 F. Supp.2d at 1068. 

Nor is there indication that her application is especially complex or presents any particular

matters for heightened concern. See id. Accordingly, on the record presently before the court,

delay of over two years in the processing of plaintiff’s application is sufficiently unreasonable

to establish jurisdiction under the APA. See Gelfer, 2007 WL 902382 at *2 (delay of over two

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For the Northern District of California

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years is unreasonable as a matter of law); see also, Yu, 36 F.Supp.2d at 935 (declining to find

that two and a half-year processing delay is reasonable).

2. Mandamus Jurisdiction

“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of

mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to

perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. This relief is “available to compel a

federal official to perform a duty if: (1) the individual’s claim is clear and certain; (2) the

official’s duty is nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as to be free from

doubt, and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.” Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931 (9th

Cir.1998).

For the reasons stated above, this court finds that plaintiff’s claim is clear and certain

and the USCIS has a nondiscretionary, ministerial duty to adjudicate plaintiff’s I-485

application within a reasonable time. Further, plaintiff must show that no other adequate

remedy exists. This is a “condition designed to ensure that the writ will not be used as a

substitute for the regular appeals process.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Columbia, 542

U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004). Here, there is no apparent dispute that plaintiff has exhausted all

administrative remedies. Thus, the court concludes that plaintiff has no adequate alternative

remedy other than to seek judicial relief in the form of a writ of mandate.

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests

the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. In such a motion, all material allegations in

the complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the claimant. 

See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Dismissal is

appropriate only when it “‘appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Id. at 699 (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants unreasonably delayed processing her I-485 application

for lawful permanent residency status. As noted above, proof of defendants’ delay, if

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For the Northern District of California

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unreasonable, would entitle plaintiff to an order directing adjudication of that application. 

Therefore, the complaint sufficiently states a claim upon which relief can be granted.

III. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT defendants’ motion to dismiss

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) is DENIED.

Dated: _________________________________

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

August 17, 2007

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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5:07-cv-2216 Notice electronically mailed to: 

Ila Casy Deiss ila.deiss@usdoj.gov, tiffani.chiu@usdoj.gov 

Counsel are responsible for delivering copies of this document to co-counsel who have not

registered for e-filing under the court’s CM/ECF program.

5:07-cv-2216 Notice mailed to: 

Xiaoke Tao

861 Brent Drive

Cupertino, CA 95014

Case 5:07-cv-02216-HRL Document 17 Filed 08/17/07 Page 7 of 7