Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01733/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01733-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN LAMARR ANDRES, Civil

No.

13-CV-01733-DMS (BGS)

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION: GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. No. 82]

v.

C.O. MARSHALL, ET AL.,

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 23, 2015, Kevin Lamarr Andres (“Plaintiff”) filed a First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”)Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging civil rights violations for two

events involving Correctional Officer Marshall. [Doc. No. 65.] Pursuant to Judge

Sabraw’s March 25, 2015 Order, Plaintiff was not permitted to amend his complaint with

respect to Plaintiff’s allegations of excessive force against Marshall stemming from the

events on January 20, 2013. [Doc. No. 87.] Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss

that claim is moot because Plaintiff was not permitted leave to amend the claim. [Id.]

Plaintiff’s FAC also includes an allegation of an illegal strip search involving Defendant

Marshall stemming from an event occurring December 1, 2012. [Doc. No. 65.]

Defendant moves to dismiss the December 1, 2012 claim for failure to exhaust. [Doc.

No. 82.] In addition, Defendants move to dismiss Defendants Olson and Ramirez

1

Case 3:13-cv-01733-DMS-BGS Document 92 Filed 04/09/15 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

because Plaintiff did not allege any claims against them in the FAC. [Doc. No. 82.]

Plaintiff agrees to the dismissal of Olson and Ramirez from this action, therefore, the

Court recommends that they be dismissed. [Doc. No. 85.] Defendants also request that

the Court clarify whether the “Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility” is a Defendant

in the action because Plaintiff lists the entity in the caption of the amended complaint but

has neither made allegations against the entity nor served the facility. [Id.] Plaintiff

agrees that the facility need not be named. [Doc. No. 85 at 7.] Therefore, the only claim

at issue is Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Marshall alleging sexual harassment

through the use of an illegal strip search. 

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and allows a

court to dismiss a complaint upon a finding that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The court may dismiss a complaint as a matter of law for: (1) “lack of a cognizable legal

theory,” or (2) “insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim.” SmileCare Dental

Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 

 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

U.S. 129 S.Ct. at 1949- 1950 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco, Inc., 146 F.3d

1083, (9th Cir. 1998). The court need not, however, accept as true allegations that

contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit. See Mullis v. United

States Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). Nor is the court required to

accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or

2

Case 3:13-cv-01733-DMS-BGS Document 92 Filed 04/09/15 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

unreasonable inferences. See Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55

(9th Cir. 1994). On a motion to dismiss a court can consider exhibits submitted with the

complaint. Van Winkle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1162, n.2 (C.D. Cal.

2003); see also Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453–54 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[D]ocuments

whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party

questions...may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”) 

III. FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

1. The Prison Litigation Reform Act

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner may not bring a

federal action concerning prison conditions “until such available administrative remedies

as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a). Among the purposes of the

PLRA is to allow prison officials a chance to resolve disputes regarding the exercise of

their responsibilities before being haled into court; to reduce the number of prisoner

suits; and to improve the quality of suits that are filed by producing a useful

administrative record. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). To satisfy the

requirements of the PLRA, exhaustion must be “proper.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,

93 (2006). This means that a prisoner must use all steps the prison offers, enabling the

prison to reach the merits of the issue. Id. at 90. Prisoners need only comply with the

prison’s own grievance procedures to properly exhaust. Bock, 549 U.S. at 218

Procedurally, failure to exhaust under the PLRA is an affirmative defense. Bock,

549 U.S. at 216. In Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014), the court clarified the

proper procedural methods for defendants to raise plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust. The

court specified that when failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, a

defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 1166. If a prisoner has not

exhausted his administrative remedies before filing his federal suit, the court must

dismiss the action without prejudice to the prisoner filing a new action after he has

completed his administrative remedies. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01

(9th Cir. 2002). Finally, a prisoner “must complete the administrative review process in

3

Case 3:13-cv-01733-DMS-BGS Document 92 Filed 04/09/15 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

accordance with the applicable rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing

suit in federal court.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88. 

2. California Prisons’ Grievance Procedures

CDCR regulations allow a prisoner to appeal any action or decision by a prison

official that adversely affects the prisoner’s welfare. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.1(a). The

CDCR’s administrative exhaustion procedure was modified by amendment on December

13, 2010, becoming effective on January 28, 2011. See Manning v. Bunnell, No.

2:12-CV-2440, 2014 WL 1338312, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2014) . In order to exhaust

available administrative remedies within the current system, a prisoner must submit his

complaint on a CDCR Form 602 and proceed up to a third formal level of appeal filed

with the CDCR director or designee. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1-3084.7.

Third-level, or “Director’s level,” of review satisfies the administrative remedies

exhaustion requirement under Section 1997e(a). Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235,

1237 (S.D. Cal.1997); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3084.1(b). A cancelled or rejected

grievance, however, is not administratively exhausted. Cal. Code Regs tit. 15 

§ 3084.1(b).

3. Plaintiff’s Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies as to December 1, 2012

Claim Against Defendant Marshall

Plaintiff alleges that on December 1, 2012, Defendant Marshall strip searched him

in front of “everyone in the middle of the floor” following “an inappropriate encounter in

the ‘A’ side shower where Plaintiff was accosted by Defendant Marshall.” [FAC at 7.]

Although Plaintiff claims that he verbally reported the incident at the time, he did not file

a 602 appeal until May 30, 2014. [FAC, Ex.2; Doc. No. 65 at 125. ] The appeal was

cancelled by the Appeals Coordinator because it failed to comply with the time

constraints set forth in the California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Section (CCR)

3084.8(b)(1), which requires inmates to submit an appeal within 30 days of the action

being appealed. Plaintiff did not submit his appeal form until 18 months after the

incident. [Id.] After receiving the Appeals Coordinator’s decision cancelling his appeal,

4

Case 3:13-cv-01733-DMS-BGS Document 92 Filed 04/09/15 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff appealed the cancellation to the second-level-review, arguing that because his

appeal complained of a serious issue, the appeal should not be subject to departmental

time limits. [Id. at 123-124.] The second-level reviewer determined that the institution

complied with all departmental rules and regulations for processing Plaintiff’s appeal

and upheld the cancellation. [Id. at 126.] Thereafter, Plaintiff appealed the second level

denial to the Third Level of Appeals. [Id.] Appeals Examiner K.J. Allen reviewed

Plaintiff’s arguments and the decisions at the first and second levels before concluding

that Plaintiff failed to submit his initial appeal in a timely manner, thereby justifying

cancellation of the grievance. [Id. at 121.] 

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that he exhausted his administrative remedies because he

appealed the cancellation of his grievance to the third level of review, thus completing

the requirement set forth by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. [Opp’n; Doc. No. 85 at

76.] Plaintiff is correct that in order to exhaust an improperly cancelled grievance, a

prisoner must appeal the cancellation to the third level of review. Nonetheless, what

Plaintiff fails to understand is that notwithstanding receiving a third-level-decision,

because the initial cancellation was proper, the decision upholding the cancellation does

not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Exhaustion requires that the prisoner complete

the administrative review process in accordance with applicable procedural rules and

Plaintiff failed to do so. See Woodford, 548 U.S. 81. 

Although Plaintiff rightly points out that it is Defendant’s burden to raise and

supply proof of non-exhaustion, Plaintiff attaches to his amended complaint

documentation confirming his failure to exhaust. [FAC, Ex. 2.] The Court can consider

the exhibits in resolving the motion to dismiss. Branch, 14 F.3d at 453–54. (FAC at Ex.

2, Doc. No. 78 at 25-33.) The documents establish Plaintiff never timely appealed what

Plaintiff refers to as his sexual harassment claim. [Id. ] And Plaintiff himself does not

contest that his 602 grievance was not filed within 30 days of the incident, but instead

argues that the serious nature of his claim should be exempt from the time constraints set

5

Case 3:13-cv-01733-DMS-BGS Document 92 Filed 04/09/15 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

forth in the regulations. [Doc. No. 85 at 8,12.] Plaintiff provides no case law in support

of this contention and the Court is unable to locate any legal authority permitting a

prisoner to ignore the time requirements of California’s prison grievance procedure

based on the nature of the underlying claim. In fact, when appeals are cancelled for

proper reasons, administrative remedies are not effectively unavailable and Plaintiff is

not excused from complying with the prison’s regulations for properly exhausting

administrative remedies. Woodford, 548 U.S. 81. The Ninth Circuit echoed this

sentiment in Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 936 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006), and confirmed that

in Woodford the Supreme Court held the exhaustion requirement is not satisfied if a

grievance is denied as untimely. Thus, Plaintiff is incorrect in his belief that he

presented a “valid excuse to exhaustion” and that the third-level decision provided him

with the right to redress his grievance in court. Because Plaintiff submitted his appeal 18

months after the incident, he did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies and

the cancellation was appropriate.

As such, Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust is plain on the face of the complaint and the

Court recommends that the FAC be dismissed without prejudice, but also without leave

to amend because amendment would be contrary to McKinney, 311 F.3d 1198.

V. CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the matter, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that

Defendant Marshall’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint against

Defendants Olson, Ramirez and R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility should be dismissed

without prejudice.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is

submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

sec. 636(b)(1).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than, May 13, 2015, after receiving a

copy of this Report and Recommendation, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document shall be

6

Case 3:13-cv-01733-DMS-BGS Document 92 Filed 04/09/15 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties by May 29, 2015.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 9, 2015

Hon. Bernard G. Skomal

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

7

Case 3:13-cv-01733-DMS-BGS Document 92 Filed 04/09/15 Page 7 of 7