Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-07203/USCOURTS-caDC-04-07203-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 15, 2005 Decided March 28, 2006

No. 04-7203

JOHN A. BOEHNER,

APPELLEE

v.

JAMES A. MCDERMOTT,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv00594)

Frank Cicero, Jr. argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Christopher Landau.

Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. and Thomas H. Dupree, Jr. were

on the brief of amici curiae Dow Jones & Company, Inc., et al.

in support of appellant.

Michael A. Carvin argued the cause for appellee. With him

on the brief was Louis K. Fisher.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and SENTELLE and

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 1 of 23
2

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE. 

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: After the Supreme Court

vacated our decision in Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (Boehner I), and returned the case to us for

further consideration in light of Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S.

514 (2001), see 532 U.S. 1050 (2001), we remanded the case to

the district court; the parties engaged in discovery; and, on cross

motions, the district court granted summary judgment in favor

of Representative John A. Boehner, awarding him $10,000 in

statutory damages, see 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2), $50,000 in

punitive damages, and reasonable attorney fees and costs. The

issue on appeal is whether undisputed facts prove that

Representative James A. McDermott “unlawfully” obtained the

tape recording of an illegally-intercepted conversation in which

Representative Boehner participated. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at

532 n.19. 

Plaintiff John A. Boehner represents Ohio’s Eighth District;

defendant James A. McDermott represents Washington’s

Seventh District. The complaint alleged that Representative

McDermott violated 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) when he disclosed

an illegally-intercepted conversation in which Representative

Boehner participated. The record developed in discovery

showed the following.

On December 21, 1996, Representative Boehner

participated in a conference call with members of the

Republican Party leadership, including then-Speaker of the

House Newt Gingrich. At the time of the conversation Gingrich

was the subject of an investigation by the House Committee on

Standards of Official Conduct, commonly known as the House

Ethics Committee. Representative Boehner was chairman of the

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 2 of 23
3

House Republican Conference. The participants discussed

various strategies regarding how to deal with an expected Ethics

Subcommittee announcement of Gingrich’s agreement to accept

a reprimand and to pay a fine in exchange for the Committee’s

promise not to hold a hearing.

Representative Boehner was driving through Florida when

he joined the conference call. He spoke from a cellular

telephone in his car. John and Alice Martin, who lived in

Florida, used a police radio scanner to eavesdrop on the

conversation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). They

recorded the call and delivered a tape of the conversation in a

sealed envelope to the Florida office of then-Representative

Karen Thurman. The tape was forwarded to Thurman’s

Washington office. Thurman’s chief of staff learned from her,

on January 8, 1997, that the Martins would be visiting her office

in Washington. Both Thurman and her chief of staff sought

legal advice about accepting the tape. At some point they

consulted then-Representative David Bonior’s chief of staff and

legislative director. Stan Brand, former General Counsel to the

House of Representatives, advised that the tape should not be

accepted under any circumstances and that it should be turned

over to the Ethics Committee or other appropriate authorities.

When the Martins arrived at Thurman’s office, her chief of staff

returned the tape in its unopened envelope and suggested that

they turn it over to the Ethics Committee.

At about 5 p.m. on January 8, 1997, in a small anteroom

adjacent to the Ethics Committee hearing room, the Martins

delivered the tape to Representative McDermott in a sealed 8-

1/2" by 11" envelope. At the time, Representative McDermott

was the ranking Democrat on the Ethics Committee. A

conversation between the Martins and Representative

McDermott ensued, of which more hereafter. With the envelope

the Martins also delivered a business card and a typed letter,

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 3 of 23
4

dated January 8, 1997, and addressed to “Committee on

Standards of Official Conduct . . . Jim McDermott, Ranking

Member.” The letter stated:

Enclosed in the envelope you will find a tape of a

conversation heard December 21, 1996 at about 9:45

a.m. The call was a conference call heard over a

scanner. We felt the information included were of

importance to the committee. We live in the 5th.

Congressional District and attempted to give the tape to

Congresswoman Karen Thurman. We were advised by

her to turn the tape directly over to you. We also

understand that we will be granted immunity.

My husband and I work for Columbia County Schools in

Columbia County Florida. We pray that committee will

consider our sincerity in placing it in your hands. 

We will return to our home today. 

Thank you for your consideration.

John and Alice Martin

Representative McDermott then returned to the Ethics

Committee hearing room.

Later that evening, during a recess, Representative

McDermott left the Ethics Committee hearing room and went to

his office. There he opened the Martins’ envelope, dumped out

the contents, and listened to the tape. Still later, he called two

reporters: Jeanne Cummings of the Atlanta JournalConstitution, for whom he left a message, and Adam Clymer of

the New York Times, whom he reached. Clymer went to

Representative McDermott’s office, listened to the tape, and

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 4 of 23
5

made a recording of it. After Cummings returned

Representative McDermott’s call the next day, he invited her to

his office and shared the tape with her.

On January 10, 1997, Clymer published a front-page article

in the New York Times entitled “Gingrich Is Heard Urging

Tactics in Ethics Case.” The article, which included lengthy

excerpts of the taped conversation, reported the circumstances

leading to disclosure of the tape:

The call was taped by people in Florida who were

unsympathetic to Mr. Gingrich and who said they heard

it on a police scanner that happened to pick up the

cellular telephone transmission of one of the

participants. It was given to a Democratic Congressman,

who made the tape available to the New York

Times. . . ..

. . . .

Mr. Gingrich, Mr. Bethune and the others discussed

their tactics in a conference call, a transcript of which

was made available by a Democratic Congressman

hostile to Mr. Gingrich who insisted that he not be

identified further.

The Congressman said the tape had been given to

him on Wednesday by a couple who said they were from

northern Florida. He quoted them as saying it had been

recorded off a radio scanner, suggesting that one

participant was using a cellular telephone. They said it

was recorded about 9:45 A.M. on Dec. 21.

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 5 of 23
6

1

 The Court also held that for the First Amendment to shield

disclosure, the conversation must contain information of “public

concern.” 532 U.S. at 535. But see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418

U.S. 323 (1974), in which the Court refused to make the First

Amendment turn on such a consideration in light of the “difficulty of

forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which

publications address issues of ‘general or public interest’ and which

do not . . .. We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the

Adam Clymer, Gingrich Is Heard Urging Tactics in Ethics

Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1997, at A1, A20. The Atlanta

Journal-Constitution ran a similar story on January 11th.

On January 13, 1997, the Martins held a press conference

and identified Representative McDermott as the Congressman

to whom they delivered the tape. Representative McDermott

then sent copies of the tape to the offices of the House Ethics

Committee and resigned from the Committee. The Committee

Chairman, Representative Nancy Johnson, forwarded the tape to

the Justice Department. The government prosecuted the Martins

for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), the provision forbidding

unauthorized interception of “wire, oral, or electronic

communication.” The Martins pled guilty and were fined $500.

On cross-motions for summary judgment the district court

held that Representative McDermott violated 18 U.S.C.

§ 2511(1)(c) when he disclosed the tape to the reporters.

Boehner v. McDermott, 332 F. Supp. 2d 149, 158 (D.D.C. 2004)

(Boehner II). Section 2511(1)(c) makes intentional disclosure

of any illegally-intercepted conversation a criminal offense if

the person disclosing the communication knew or had “reason

to know” that it was so acquired. The Bartnicki Court held that

under the First Amendment, § 2511(1)(c) was invalid as applied

to individuals who lawfully obtained a tape of such a

conversation and then disclosed it, 532 U.S. at 5351

; the Court

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 6 of 23
7

conscience of judges.” Id. at 346. 

added that its holding did not apply to those who obtain the

information unlawfully, id. at 532 n.19. The district court

therefore viewed the crucial issue to be whether Representative

McDermott lawfully obtained the tape from the Martins. See

Boehner II, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 163-64. The court held that there

was no genuine issue of material fact that the Martins’ letter to

Representative McDermott was on the outside of the envelope

containing the tape and that he must have read it. Id. at 166-67,

169. This established Representative McDermott’s knowledge

of the Martins’ illegal interception at the time he received the

tape. It followed that he had not lawfully obtained the tape. Id.

at 165-66, 169.

According to Representative McDermott, the district court

misinterpreted Bartnicki. As he reads the Supreme Court’s

opinion, any individual who did not participate in the illegal

interception of a conversation has a First Amendment right to

disclose it.

It is true that in Bartnicki the defendants had no connection

to the illegal interception. The tape of the conversation wound

up in Yocum’s mailbox, placed there by some unknown person.

532 U.S. at 519, 525. Neither Yocum nor the radio broadcaster

who played the tape on his program after Yocum gave it to him

knew who had done the intercepting. The Court mentioned the

anonymity of the interceptor several times, id. at 525, 530 &

n.15, 531, 535, and distinguished this case on that ground:

In the Boehner case, as in this suit, a conversation

over a car cell phone was intercepted, but in that case the

defendant knew both who was responsible for

intercepting the conversation and how they had done it.

191 F. 3d, at 465. In the opinion of the majority, the

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 7 of 23
8

defendant acted unlawfully in accepting the tape in order

to provide it to the media. Id., at 476.

532 U.S. at 522 n.5. We do not want to read too much into the

Court’s “but” in the first sentence, yet one must wonder why the

Court drew this distinction if it meant to adopt the rule

Representative McDermott urges on us. Elsewhere in the

Bartnicki opinion the Court stressed that it had before it only an

“as applied” challenge to the federal statute, id. at 524, 525; that

in light of the facts of the case, the question presented was

“narrow,” id. at 517, 528, 529; and that it was deciding only that

those who lawfully obtain information have a First Amendment

right to disclose it to the public, id. at 525, 528 (quoting Smith

v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979), and Florida

Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 n.8 (1989)). The Court also

stated that its “holding, of course, does not apply to punishing

parties for obtaining the relevant information unlawfully.” Id.

at 532 n.19. 

Representative McDermott’s reading of these and other

statements of the Court is quite implausible. By his logic, if he

stole the tape from the Martins he would have lawfully obtained

it because he did not participate in the initial illegal interception.

Among other statements in the majority opinion, footnote 19 –

which we have just quoted – clearly stands for the opposite

proposition. Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion, in which

Justice O’Connor joined, understood as much. Citing footnote

19, he distinguished cases in which the person who disclosed the

conversation “aided or abetted . . . the later delivery of the tape

by the interceptor to an intermediary, or the tape’s still later

delivery by the intermediary to the media.” Id. at 538 (Breyer,

J., concurring) (citing the federal aiding and abetting statute, 18

U.S.C. § 2). 

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 8 of 23
9

2

 The Court added that “[i]n the opinion of the majority, the

defendant [Representative McDermott] acted unlawfully in accepting

the tape in order to provide it to the media.” 532 U.S. at 522 n.5.

(The case came to us on appeal from the dismissal of a complaint; our

conclusion was based on a construction of the complaint. See Boehner

I, 191 F.3d at 464 & n.1).

The eavesdropping statute may not itself make receiving a

tape of an illegally-intercepted conversation illegal. See id. at

525, 528; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1). But it does not follow

that anyone who receives a copy of such a conversation has

obtained it legally and has a First Amendment right to disclose

it. If that were the case, then the holding in Bartnicki is not

“narrow” as the Court stressed, but very broad indeed. On the

other hand, to hold that a person who knowingly receives a tape

from an illegal interceptor either aids and abets the interceptor’s

second violation (the disclosure), or participates in an illegal

transaction would be to take the Court at its word. It also helps

explain why the Court thought it so significant that the illegal

interceptor in Bartnicki was unknown, see 532 U.S. at 519, 522

n.5, 525, 530 & n.15, 531, and why the Court distinguished this

case on that ground, see id. at 522 n.5.2

As to the evidence, the district court stated that if

Representative McDermott 

read the cover letter or the Martins related its relevant

contents to him at the time [he] received the tape, he

would have possessed sufficient knowledge of the illegal

transaction to have unlawfully obtained the tape . . .. On

the other hand, if [Representative McDermott] learned

of the contents of the letter at some later time after

taking possession of the tape, . . . the case more closely

resembles Bartnicki . . ..

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 9 of 23
10

3

 The Martins apparently were not deposed.

Boehner II, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 165-66. The court then reached

two conclusions: the Martins’ cover letter was outside the

envelope containing the tape and Representative McDermott

read it when the Martins’ handed it to him, not when he later

returned to his office to listen to the tape. Id. at 166-67, 169.

Representative McDermott objects that both of the court’s

conclusions rested on material facts that were genuinely in

dispute and that summary judgment was therefore improper.

Our de novo review of the judgment, see, e.g., Branch Ministries

v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2000), supports his

position. 

The cover letter stated: “Enclosed in the envelope you will

find a tape.” But this does not prove that the letter was outside

the envelope containing the tape. The tape was in fact

“enclosed” regardless where the Martins placed the letter.3

 And

even if the letter was outside the envelope, this does not prove

that Representative McDermott read it at the time he received

the tape. “[C]ommon sense” may indicate, as the district court

wrote, “that one who accepts from strangers a package with a

short accompanying letter is likely to read the letter . . ..”

Boehner II, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 166. But at the summary

judgment stage, the nonmoving party is entitled to “all

justifiable inferences” from the evidence. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); see, e.g., Matsuhita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986);

Salazar v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 401 F.3d 504, 507

(D.C. Cir. 2005). Here Representative McDermott did not

simply rest on “allegations or denials of the adverse party’s

pleading.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). As Rule 56 requires, he

adduced evidence – his deposition testimony – in which he

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 10 of 23
11

4

 Representative McDermott also makes much of his

testimony that he did not know what was on the tape when he received

it. But this is not evidence tending to show his failure to read the letter

when the Martins handed him the tape. Even if he read the cover letter

he would not have known what the tape contained. As to the contents

of the tape, the letter said only that it would be “of importance to the

committee.”

denied ever having seen the letter. A justifiable inference from

that evidence is that he did not read it.4

While there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding

Representative McDermott’s knowledge of the cover letter, we

nevertheless conclude that Representative Boehner was “entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see

Teamsters Local Union No. 61 v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 272

F.3d 600, 603-04 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Samii v. Billington, 195 F.3d

1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1316, 1322 (D.C.

Cir. 1993). We start with the New York Times article. Clymer

reported that a certain Congressman, later identified as

Representative McDermott, “quoted” the interceptors (the

Martins) as saying that the conversation was “recorded off a

radio scanner.” The evidence shows that there were only two

ways Representative McDermott could have known this – from

the cover letter or from his conversation with the Martins in the

anteroom when they handed him the tape. We may eliminate

the cover letter. As we have just said, Representative

McDermott denied having read it. His denials were unequivocal

– they were not of the I-do-not-recall-one-way-or-the-other

variety. This leaves only the oral conversation. Unlike his

unequivocal denial of ever having read the cover letter,

Representative McDermott does not deny that the Martins told

him they used a scanner to intercept the conversation. He

testified only that he could “not remember one way or another.”

Nor does Representative McDermott deny telling Clymer, the

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 11 of 23
12

5 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

§ 13.2(a) (2d ed. 2003); id. § 13.2(b), at 344 (“Generally, it may be

said that accomplice liability exists when the accomplice intentionally

encourages or assists, in the sense that his purpose is to encourage or

assist another in the commission of a crime as to which the accomplice

has the requisite mental state.”); United States v. Walker, 99 F.3d 439,

442 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining the “shared intent” standard for

aiding and abetting as an “overlap with (but not necessarily match) the

criminal intent of the principal”); see also United States v. Yakou, 428

New York Times reporter, that the Martins told him they

recorded the conversation over a scanner. He testified only that

“I wouldn’t say I didn’t say it. I just don’t recall it.” This is

insufficient to draw into dispute Representative Boehner’s

statement of undisputed facts that Representative McDermott

told Clymer “that [the Martins] had heard and recorded the

conversation over a police scanner on December 21, 1996 at

9:45 a.m.” See FEC v. Toledano, 317 F.3d 939, 949-50 (9th Cir.

2002); FDIC v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 205

F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 2000). While a court should draw all

justifiable evidentiary inferences in favor of the non-moving

party, there is no such inference to draw in Representative

McDermott’s favor. See Lusk v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 129

F.3d 773, 779-80 (5th Cir. 1997); Crabbs v. Copperweld Tubing

Prods. Co., 114 F.3d 85, 88 (6th Cir. 1997); DeLuca v. Winer

Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 1995). 

Because there was no genuine dispute that Representative

McDermott knew the Martins had illegally intercepted the

conversation, he did not lawfully obtain the tape from them.

The Martins violated § 2511 not once, but twice – first when

they intercepted the call and second when they disclosed it to

Representative McDermott. It is of little moment whether

Representative McDermott’s complicity constituted aiding and

abetting their criminal act,5

 or the formation of a conspiracy with

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 12 of 23
13

F.3d 241, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating the “long . . . established

[principle] that a person can be convicted of aiding and abetting

another person’s violation of a statute even if it would be impossible

to convict the aider and abettor as a principal”). 

6

 As Chief Judge Ginsburg wrote in the original appeal: “One

who obtains information in an illegal transaction, with full knowledge

the transaction is illegal, has not ‘lawfully obtain[ed]’ that information

in any meaningful sense.” Boehner I, 191 F.3d at 479 (Ginsburg, J.,

concurring) (alteration in original). 

7

 Our dissenting colleague believes that the Supreme Court’s

resolution of the conflict between Boehner I and Bartnicki v. Vopper,

200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999), in favor of the Third Circuit’s decision

implicitly means that Representative McDermott had a First

Amendment right to disclose the tape. Dissenting Op. at 2; see also

id. at 5. If the Court had agreed with our colleague, it would have

reversed our decision; instead, it vacated and remanded for

reconsideration. Furthermore, one must pay close attention to the

nature of the conflict between Boehner I and the Third Circuit’s

decision. We held that the statute was content neutral and that it was

constitutional as applied, because it survived intermediate scrutiny.

Boehner I, 191 F.3d at 467-70. The Third Circuit held that the statute

was content neutral but did not survive intermediate scrutiny as

applied. Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 123-29. In resolving that conflict the

Court held only that someone who lawfully obtains an illegallyintercepted conversation may disclose it, which still leaves the

question we face in this case: whether Representative McDermott

lawfully obtained the tape from the Martins. 

Our colleague also thinks it matters little that the Supreme

Court distinguished Boehner I on the ground that McDermott may

have participated in an illegal transaction. Dissenting Op. at 7-8. It

matters little, he writes, because the Court did the distinguishing in the

factual portion of the opinion. Id. But that makes our point. As we

them, or amounted to participating in an illegal transaction.6

The difference between this case and Bartnicki is plain to see.7

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 13 of 23
14

have explained, the facts of this case are, in important respects, quite

different than those in Bartnicki. 

8

 We do not understand Representative McDermott to be

arguing that even if he unlawfully obtained the illegally-intercepted

conversation, he had a First Amendment right to disclose the tape. See

generally Boehner I, 191 F.3d 463; id. at 479 (Ginsburg, J.,

concurring). 

It is the difference between someone who discovers a bag

containing a diamond ring on the sidewalk and someone who

accepts the same bag from a thief, knowing the ring inside to

have been stolen. The former has committed no offense; the

latter is guilty of receiving stolen property, even if the ring was

intended only as a gift.8 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.6(1)

(1962); D.C. CODE § 22-3232; see also Williams v. United

States, 281 A.2d 293, 294 (D.C. 1971) (citing Rugendorf v.

United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964); Wilson v. United States, 162

U.S. 613, 619 (1896)) (explaining a prior version of § 22-3232).

Affirmed.

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 14 of 23
SENTELLE,J., dissenting: In the first eight paragraphs of its

opinion, the majority accurately lays out the somewhat extended

history of this case. Two persons not parties to the case

unlawfully intercepted communications of the appellee and gave

a tape of the communications to the appellant in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) and (1)(c). Appellee brought the present

action, which the district court dismissed, reasoning this

application of the statute violated the First Amendment

guarantee to the right of free speech.

The defendant appealed. In a split decision, a panel of this

court (identical to the present panel) reversed the dismissal,

holding that the application of section 2511(1)(c) and a parallel

Florida statute “are not unconstitutional as applied in this case.”

Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see

also id. at 480 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). I disagreed with the

majority’s opinion then, as I do today. As I perceived the case

then, and as I perceive it now, the issue is: “Where the punished

publisher of information has obtained the information in

question in a manner lawful in itself but from a source who has

obtained it unlawfully, may the government punish the ensuing

publication of that information based on the defect in a chain?”

Id. at 484-85 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (quoted in Bartnicki v.

Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2000)). I would have answered that

question in the negative. While I thought the appropriate test to

be a strict scrutiny applicable to content-based limitation on the

exercise of free speech, see id. at 481 (Sentelle, J., dissenting),

a proposition ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court in

Bartnicki, I nonetheless would reach the same conclusion today

under tests applicable to “content-neutral law[s] of general

applicability.” Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526. Moreover, I would

reach such a conclusion with confidence, based on the Supreme

Court’s decision adjudicating the constitutionality of a similar

application of this same statement in Bartnicki. 

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 15 of 23
2

At approximately the same time that our prior decision was

making its way to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court

granted certiorari in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.

1999), to answer precisely the issue before us in Boehner. See

Bartnicki v. Vopper, 530 U.S. 1260 (2000) (granting certiorari).

In Bartnicki, the Third Circuit had concluded that the application

of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) to prevent disclosure of information

obtained by the disclosing person from a tape of unlawfully

intercepted communications was constitutionally “invalid”

because it “deterred significantly more speech than necessary to

protect the privacy interests at stake.” 532 U.S. at 522. The

Supreme Court expressly granted certiorari “to resolve the

conflict,” between Bartnicki and our decision in Boehner. Id.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit,

id. at 535, and thereby resolved the conflict in favor of the Third

Circuit’s decision, not our decision in Boehner.

In Bartnicki, the chief negotiator for a Union Local, which

was then engaged in negotiations on behalf of teachers with a

local school board, used a cellular phone to call the president of

the Union “and engage in a lengthy conversation about the status

of the negotiations.” Id. at 518. At one point in the

conversation, referring to the school board’s “intransigence,”

she said “‘we’re gonna have to go to their . . . homes . . . [t]o

blow off their front porches . . . .’” Id. at 518-19. A local radio

commentator, respondent in the Supreme Court, broadcast a tape

of the conversation on a radio show. All parties agreed that the

tape, like the tape of Boehner’s conversation released by

McDermott, was the result of an unlawful interception. The

identity of the interceptor remained undisclosed throughout the

litigation. The Union officers, like Boehner in the instant case,

sued the publishers of the contents of the tape. In that case, the

defendants included the broadcaster, the radio stations over

which he made his broadcast, and the person who furnished the

broadcaster with the tape, himself the head of a local citizens’

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 16 of 23
3

group who testified that he had obtained the tape when it was

left anonymously in his mailbox. Like Boehner in the case

before us, plaintiffs relied on section 2511(1)(c) and a state

statute of similar import. The district court granted summary

judgment for the plaintiffs, rejecting the defendant’s First

Amendment defense. As noted above, the Third Circuit, in a

divided opinion, disagreed, reversed the trial court, and

remanded with directions to the district court to grant the

summary judgment motions of the defendants on the basis of the

First Amendment defense. Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 129. 

On certiorari the Supreme Court, as had the Third Circuit,

ruled that the statute was content neutral and subjected the

statute to review under the “intermediate scrutiny” standard.

532 U.S. at 521, 526. While that standard is less stringent than

the one I would have erroneously applied to the case before us,

the result was nonetheless the one that I contended should have

prevailed in Boehner. That is, the Supreme Court ruled that the

statute was unconstitutional as applied. 

In addressing the issue, the Supreme Court adopted my

formulation: 

Where the punished publisher of information has obtained

the information in question in a manner lawful in itself but

from a source who has obtained it unlawfully, may the

government punish the ensuing publication of that

information based on the defect in a chain?

Id. at 528 (quoting Boehner, 191 F.3d at 484-85) (Sentelle, J.,

dissenting)). In analyzing the law on that subject, the Supreme

Court first noted that “[a]s a general matter, ‘state action to

punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy

constitutional standards.’” Id. at 527 (quoting Smith v. Daily

Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979)). The Supreme Court

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 17 of 23
4

then expressed its continuing belief “that the sensitivity and

significance of the interests presented in clashes between [the]

First Amendment and privacy rights counsel relying on limited

principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate

context of the instant case.” Id. at 529 (quoting Florida Star v.

B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532-33 (1989)) (alteration in original). In

applying that balance to the facts before it, the Court observed

that the United States, appearing in the case to defend the

constitutionality of the statute, had identified “two interests

served by the statute.” Id. The first of those interests was the

removal of “an incentive for parties to intercept private

conversations,” and the second, to “minimiz[e] the harm to

persons whose conversations have been illegally intercepted.”

Id. While the Court was willing to “assume that those interests

adequately justify the prohibition in § 2511(1)(d) against the

interceptor’s own use of information . . . acquired by violating

§ 2511(1)(a),” the Court explicitly stated that “it by no means

follows that punishing disclosures of lawfully obtained

information of public interest by one not involved in the initial

illegality is an acceptable means of serving those ends.” Id. 

The Court easily dispensed with the first justification,

opining that “[t]he normal method of deterring unlawful conduct

is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person who

engages in it.” Id. The Court concluded, however, that “it

would be quite remarkable to hold that speech by a law-abiding

possessor of information can be suppressed in order to deter

conduct by a non-law-abiding third party.” Id. at 529-30. It

further noted that “there is no basis for assuming that imposing

sanctions” on the communicating possessor of conversations

illegally taped by another “will deter the unidentified scanner

from continuing to engage in surreptitious interceptions.” Id. at

531. Thus, the Court held that “the Government’s first

suggested justification for applying § 2511(1)(c) to an otherwise

innocent disclosure of public information is plainly

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 18 of 23
5

insufficient.” Id. at 532. 

However, the Court found the government’s second

justification, that is, the protection of privacy, “considerably

stronger.” Id. It noted the importance of privacy of

communication and the legitimacy of the argument that “fear of

public disclosure of private conversations might well have a

chilling effect on private speech.” Id. at 533. Nonetheless, the

Court was convinced that the enforcement of section 2511(1)(c)

on the facts before it, “implicat[ed] the core purposes of the First

Amendment because it imposes sanctions on the publication of

truthful information of public concern.” Id. at 533-34. In

concluding that this second interest did not have sufficient

strength to warrant the limitation on publication of truthful

information of public concern, the Court reiterated the classic

principle that “‘[t]he right of privacy does not prohibit any

publication of matter which is of public or general interest.’” Id.

at 534 (quoting SAMUEL D.WARREN &LOUIS D.BRANDEIS, The

Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214 (1890)).

In the light of the Supreme Court’s resolution of the conflict

between our Boehner decision and the Third Circuit’s decision

in its Bartnicki opinion, there is no justification for us to hold

otherwise on the facts before us. There is no distinction of legal

let alone constitutional significance between our facts and those

before the Court in Bartnicki. As the majority admits, “[t]he

Bartnicki Court held that under the First Amendment, §

2511(1)(c) was invalid as applied to individuals who lawfully

obtained a tape of such a conversation and then disclosed it, 532

U.S. at 535.” Maj. Op. at 6. That said, the majority is unable to

produce a distinction between this case and Bartnicki. Granted,

the majority states: 

The difference between this case and Bartnicki is plain to

see. It is the difference between someone who discovers a

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 19 of 23
6

bag containing a diamond ring on the sidewalk and

someone who accepts the same bag from a thief, knowing

the ring inside to have been stolen. The former has

committed no offense; the latter is guilty of receiving stolen

property, even if the ring was intended only as a gift.

Maj. Op. at 13-14 (footnotes omitted). In fact, the difference is

not plain at all. In Bartnicki the Supreme Court expressly stated:

The suit at hand involves the repeated intentional disclosure

of an illegally intercepted cellular telephone conversation

about a public issue. The persons who made the disclosures

did not participate in the interception, but they did know--or

at least had reason to know--that the interception was

unlawful.

532 U.S. at 517-18. The majority apparently would make the

distinction between the two cases based on an analogy between

a person who buys a diamond ring from a thief, and one who

obtains a stolen diamond ring knowing it to be stolen or having

at least good reason to know that it was stolen. I see no such

distinction, let alone a plain one of constitutional significance.

The Supreme Court underlined the lack of constitutional

significance of the communicator’s knowledge that the

interception had been unlawfully conducted. It stated that “[w]e

accept petitioners’ submission that the interception was

intentional, and therefore unlawful, and that, at a minimum,

respondents ‘had reason to know’ that it was unlawful.” Id. at

525. The majority, apparently attempting to shore up its

artificial distinction, states: 

As Chief Judge Ginsburg wrote in the original appeal: “One

who obtains information in an illegal transaction, with full

knowledge the transaction is illegal, has not ‘lawfully

obtain[ed]’ that information in any meaningful sense.”

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 20 of 23
7

Maj. Op. at 13 n.6 (quoting Boehner, 191 F.3d at 479 (Ginsburg,

J., concurring)) (alteration in original). 

The Supreme Court has directly dispelled that notion both

in Bartnicki itself and previously. The Supreme Court in

Bartnicki expressly stated, “[respondents’] access to the

information on the tapes was obtained lawfully, even though the

information itself was intercepted unlawfully by someone else.”

532 U.S. at 525. In support of this proposition the court cites

and quotes Florida Star, which stated “[e]ven assuming the

Constitution permitted a State to proscribe receipt of

information, Florida has not taken this step.” 491 U.S. at 536

(emphasis in original). Florida still has not taken that step, nor

has Congress. Therefore, the otherwise-lawful receipt of

unlawfully obtained information remains in itself lawful, even

where the receiver knows or has reason to know that the source

has obtained the information unlawfully.

Even less convincing is the majority’s assertion that the

Court mentioned the anonymity of the interceptor in Bartnicki

several times and “distinguished this case on that ground.” Maj.

Op. at 7. The so-called distinguishing of the case occurred in a

footnote stating as follows:

In the Boehner case, as in this suit, a conversation over a

car cell phone was intercepted, but in that case the

defendant knew both who was responsible for intercepting

the conversation and how they had done it. In the opinion

of the majority [of the D.C. Circuit], the defendant acted

unlawfully in accepting the tape in order to provide it to the

media. 

532 U.S. at 522 n.5 (quoted at Maj. Op. at 7-8) (internal

citations omitted). Today’s majority hastens to say “[w]e do not

want to read too much into the Court’s ‘but’ in the first sentence,

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 21 of 23
8

yet one must wonder why the Court drew this distinction if it

meant to adopt the rule Representative McDermott urges on us.”

Maj. Op. at 8. The referenced footnote occurs in the Court’s

statement of the facts of the case and is never referenced in the

legal analysis. Indeed, the footnote is subscribed to a textual

sentence stating “[i]n so doing, [the Third Circuit dissenter]

agreed with the majority opinion in a similar case decided by the

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Boehner v.

McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999).” 532 U.S. at 522.

If the Supreme Court in fact thought that the “distinction” was

of constitutional significance, one must wonder why it thought

the different results in the two circuit cases constituted a

disagreement. This wonderment must be greatly enhanced upon

reading the next sentence, which reads “[w]e granted certiorari

to resolve the conflict.” Id. The Supreme Court then goes on to

resolve the conflict without making any further mention of any

factual difference between the cases. To paraphrase the

majority, one must wonder why the Court so easily dispensed

with the distinction between one who knows who unlawfully

intercepted a conversation and one who knows or has reason to

know it was unlawfully intercepted. Indeed, the Supreme

Court’s disposition of the case lays to rest any distinction even

between the one who knows and the one who has reason to

know. The Court reversed and remanded, directing entry of

judgment for the defense on the constitutional theory. The

record before the Court did not establish whether the defendants

knew or only had reason to know of the unlawful obtaining of

the conversations. If there were any such distinction in the High

Court’s view, the disposition would have been a vacatur and

remand for the lower courts to establish upon which side of the

“distinction” their case fell – that is, to determine whether the

respondents knew or only had reason to know. As the Court

made no such disposition, there is plainly no such distinction of

constitutional magnitude.

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 22 of 23
9

The Supreme Court having decided the very issue of this

case, that is, whether the United States (or Florida) can

constitutionally bar the publication of information originally

obtained by unlawful interception but otherwise lawfully

received by the communicator, my opinion on whether that

decision is correct or incorrect matters little. Nonetheless, I will

venture to say that an opposite rule would be fraught with

danger. Just as Representative McDermott knew that the

information had been unlawfully intercepted, so did the

newspapers to whom he passed the information. I see no

distinction, nor has Representative Boehner suggested one,

between the constitutionality of regulating communication of the

contents of the tape by McDermott or by The Washington Post

or The New York Times or any other media resource. For that

matter, every reader of the information in the newspapers also

learned that it had been obtained by unlawful intercept. Under

the rule proposed by Representative Boehner, no one in the

United States could communicate on this topic of public interest

because of the defect in the chain of title. I do not believe the

First Amendment permits this interdiction of public information

either at the stage of the newspaper-reading public, of the

newspaper-publishing communicators, or at the stage of

Representative McDermott’s disclosure to the news media. Lest

someone draw a distinction between the First Amendment rights

of the press and the First Amendment speech rights of

nonprofessional communicators, I would note that one of the

communicators in Bartnicki was himself a news commentator,

and the Supreme Court placed no reliance on that fact.

In sum, I respectfully dissent.

USCA Case #04-7203 Document #958774 Filed: 03/28/2006 Page 23 of 23