Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01139/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01139-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES HENRY CARR, JR., No. CIV S-05-1139-LKK-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

MARGARITA PEREZ, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,

84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are

satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds

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The court’s docket incorrectly indicates that the California Board of Prison Terms 1

is also a named defendant. It is not.

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upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff names as defendants to this action Margarita Perez and Susan Fisher,

both of whom are members of California’s parole board. Plaintiff alleges various procedural

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defects in his parole determination hearings and asserts:

I am suffering irreparable harm in the form of continued mental pain and

suffering due to the Defendants’ improper findings and decisions at my

Aug. 11, 2004, parole hearing, which resulted in the de facto conversion

of my sentence of life with parole to life without parole.

 Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from two fatal defects. First, the complaint names

defendants who enjoy absolute immunity. Second, the complaint’s substantive allegations are

not cognizable under § 1983.

A. Absolute Immunity

Because “. . . parole board officials perform functionally comparable to tasks to

judges when they decide to grant, deny, or revoke parole,” parole board officials are entitled to

absolute immunity from suits by prisoners for actions taken when processing parole applications. 

See Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Bermudez v. Duenas,

936 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). Therefore, all named defendants are entitled

to absolute immunity and this action should be dismissed in its entirety for this reason alone.

B. Cognizability of Claims

When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks

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is a determination that he is entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is not

cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the prisoner’s sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Neal v. Shimoda,

131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir.

1995) (per curiam). Similarly, where a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages or declaratory

relief alleges constitutional violations which would necessarily imply the invalidity of the

prisoner’s underlying conviction or sentence, such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983 unless

the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated on appeal, by habeas petition, or through

some similar proceeding. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1987) (holding that §

1983 claim not cognizable because allegations of procedural defects and a biased hearing officer

implied the invalidity of the underlying prison disciplinary sanction); Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477, 483-84 (1994) (concluding that § 1983 not cognizable because allegations were akin to

malicious prosecution action which includes as an element a finding that the criminal proceeding

was concluded in plaintiff’s favor); Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1997)

(concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations of procedural defects were an

attempt to challenge substantive result in parole hearing); see also Neal, 131 F.3d at 824

(concluding that § 1983 claim was cognizable because challenge was to conditions for parole

eligibility and not to any particular parole determination). 

If a § 1983 complaint states claims which sound in habeas, the court should not

convert the complaint into a habeas petition. See Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir.

1997); Trimble, 49 F.3d at 586. Rather, such claims must be dismissed without prejudice and

the complaint should proceed on any remaining cognizable § 1983 claims. See Balisok, 520

U.S. at 649; Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; Trimble, 49 F.3d at 585.

Here, plaintiff essentially alleges that defendants’ conduct has resulted in

improper continued confinement. In particular, plaintiff states that defendants’ conduct resulted

in his term being converted from one with the possibility of parole to one without any such

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possibility. Moreover, plaintiff challenges defendants’ alleged “improper findings and

decisions.” If plaintiff were to prevail in this action, such a result would necessarily imply that,

in fact, the parole determination was invalid.. Thus, plaintiff’s allegations of procedural defects

in his parole hearings are an attempt to challenge the substantive denial of parole and plaintiff’s

resulting continued incarceration. Therefore, the claims as against all defendants are not

cognizable under § 1983. 

III. CONCLUSION

Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be

cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of

the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that this action be

dismissed without prejudice.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: November 2, 2005.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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