Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_00-cv-00945/USCOURTS-azd-2_00-cv-00945-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Injunctive/Declaratory Relief

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Taser International, Inc., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Hennigan International, Inc., et al.

Defendants. 

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No. CV-00-945-PHX-ROS

OPINION AND ORDER

The only issue remaining is Hennigan's claim regarding unpaid commissions allegedly

earned prior to February 21, 2000, the date the parties' relationship ended. For the following

reasons, the Court will award Hennigan $9,591.26.

I. Commissions Due

Because Hennigan did not prove the existence of a contract, his claim for preFebruary 21, 2000 commissions must be based on quantum meruit. To recover pursuant to

that theory, Hennigan had to prove "(1) that he [was] entitled to restitution, i.e., that [Taser]

was 'unjustly enriched at [his] expense' . . . ; (2) that he rendered services which benefitted

[Taser]; and (3) that he conferred this benefit under circumstances which would render

[Taser's] retention of the value without payment inequitable." Landi v. Arkules, 835 P.2d

458, 467 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Restatment (First) of Restitution §§ 1, 40)). In the

Joint Revised Proposed Pretrial Order, Taser made a number of statements establishing these

elements for Hennigan's pre-February 21, 2000 activities. These statements are binding on

Case 2:00-cv-00945-ROS Document 185 Filed 09/28/06 Page 1 of 4
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1

 Taser claims that these statements should be considered "statements of a legal

theory" rather than admissions of fact. (Response p.7) The Court does not agree. Read in

the context of the entire case, the statements are factual acknowledgments that Taser owed

Hennigan for his activities prior to termination. 

2

 Taser also claims that Hennigan is not entitled to compensation for any pre-February

21, 2000 activity because he has not proven that Taser received payment prior to his

termination. But it would be unfair to allow Taser to avoid paying Hennigan commissions

for pre-February 21, 2000 sales simply because payment was not received prior to

termination. See Wakefield v. N. Telecom, Inc., 769 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1985) (observing

employers have incentive to avoid payment of commissions by terminating employees).

Taser could have come forward with evidence that payment was never received on

Hennigan's sales but did not.

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Taser.1

 American Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988)

("Factual assertions in pleadings and pretrial orders, unless amended, are considered judicial

admissions conclusively binding on the party who made them."). 

According to the Joint Revised Proposed Pretrial Order, after learning of Hennigan's

inability to stock inventory, Taser agreed to "drop-ship" certain products directly to

Hennigan's customers. After the products were shipped, "Hennigan would receive the

difference between the price to distributors and the price Taser charged to the customer from

which Hennigan procured an order but only when Taser received the customer's payment."

(Joint Revised Proposed Pretrial Order p.12) Taser also stated that it was "only obligated to

pay commissions to Hennigan on account of receipts from sales of products shipped and

invoiced prior to February 21, 2000" and that Hennigan had a claim for compensation for

"receipts from sales of products shipped and invoiced prior to February 21, 2000." (Id. pp.4-

5) Accepting these statements, Taser has admitted that Hennigan rendered valuable services,

Hennigan is entitled to restitution, and it would be unjust for Taser not to compensate

Hennigan. See Arkules, 835 P.2d at 467 (setting forth elements of quantum meruit).2

Hennigan had to present "a reasonable basis in the evidence for the trier of fact to fix

compensation." Short v. Riley, 724 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). But quantum

meruit is a "a flexible, equitable remedy," and a court is "free to fashion a remedy wherever

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circumstances and equity require." Murdock-Bryant Const., Inc. v. Pearson, 703 P.2d 1197,

1202 (Ariz. 1985). Unlike his quantum meruit claims for post-February 21, 2000 activity,

Hennigan presented sufficient evidence regarding his pre-termination activities. Hennigan

has claimed three different figures for pre-February 21, 2000 activities: $9,600.26, $9,591.26,

and $16,667.77. (Doc. 168,176, 182) The only explanation for these shifting figures is that

"further review of the numbers and data" led to revisions. (Doc. 182) The "circumstances

and equity require" awarding Hennigan $9,591.26, the revised amount presented by

Hennigan in his post-trial briefing. Id.

Relatively early in the case the Court determined that Hennigan and Taser did not

have an employee-employer relationship. (Doc. 40) That determination was based on

Hennigan's own claim that he entered into a "joint venture," rather than an employment

relationship, with Taser. (Doc. 40) Hennigan did not argue that he was an employee in the

Joint Revised Proposed Pretrial Order nor did he present sufficient evidence of such a

relationship at trial. Because there was insufficient evidence that Hennigan and Taser were

employee-employer, the commissions owed to Hennigan should not be trebled. See Arizona

Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 23-355 (stating employee is entitled to recover "treble

the amount of the unpaid wages"). 

II. Attorneys' Fees

Pursuant to Arizona law, "a party prevailing on a quantum meruit claim . . . may

recover attorney's fees under [A.R.S.] § 12-341.01." Pelletier v. Johnson, 937 P.2d 668, 672-

73 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). An award of attorney's fees is, however, "permissive, rather than

mandatory." AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 445 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th

Cir. 2006). When determining if a party is entitled to attorney's fees, a court should consider

a variety of factors. See id. (quoting Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l. Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025,

1049 (Ariz. 1985) (listing factors)). Having considered the relevant factors, an award of

attorney's fees would not be appropriate in this action. 

Accordingly,

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IT IS ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment against Taser in the

amount of $9,591.26. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

DATED this 28th day of September, 2006.

Case 2:00-cv-00945-ROS Document 185 Filed 09/28/06 Page 4 of 4