Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01133/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01133-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

David Turner Jr. ,

Plaintiff,

v.

San Diego Central Jail; #2-5 John Does, 

San Diego County Sheriffs #1 John Doe,

Defendant.

Case No.: 13cv01133-WQH-BGS

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF U.S. 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE GRANTING 

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

David Turner Jr. (“Plaintiff”) is a former prisoner1 of the San Diego County 

Central Jail, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed a verified Second Amended Complaint2

(“SAC”) on June 13, 2014, which contained three counts of alleged constitutional 

 

1 Plaintiff currently lists his address as 299 17th Street, San Diego, CA 92101.

2 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is verified and signed under penalty of perjury, and therefore, 

can be used as evidence to consider at the summary judgment stage. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 

F.3d 454, 460 & nn. 10-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating plaintiff’s verified complaint as opposing affidavit 

where, even though verification not in conformity with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, plaintiff stated under penalty 

of perjury that contents were true and correct, and allegations were not based purely on his belief but on 

his personal knowledge).

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violations against Defendants San Diego County and Sheriff’s deputies Scott Torres, 

Michael Saunders, Harvey Seeley, Kyle Balay, Karl Warren and Kevin Norie. (ECF No. 

55.) See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a 

complaint or motion duly verified under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 

may be used as an opposing affidavit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.)

Count One alleges violations of Plaintiff’s Eighth, Fourteenth, Fourth and Sixth 

Amendment rights based on an altercation with Defendants wherein Plaintiff sustained an 

injury above his eye. Count two alleges violations of Plaintiff’s “[a]ccess to courts [and] 

freedom from cruel and unusual punishment” arising from time spent in disciplinary 

segregation wherein Plaintiff claims he was denied use of the phone and the shower. (Id.

at 4.) Count Three alleges violations of Plaintiff’s “freedom of religion [and] freedom of 

association,” based on a claim that Plaintiff “was denied the rights (sic) to go to religious 

service.” (Id. at 5.) 

The Court directed the United States Marshal Service to effect service of the SAC 

on July 17, 2014. Defendants filed an answer to Plaintiff’s SAC on September 30, 2014. 

(ECF No. 70.) On August 17, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. (ECF No. 78.)

The Court notified Plaintiff of the requirements for opposing summary judgment, 

pursuant to Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988) and Rand v. Rowland, 

154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). (ECF No. 79.) Plaintiff filed his opposition on 

October 5, 2015. (ECF No. 83.) Given the brevity of Plaintiff’s opposition, the Court 

required no reply brief. (ECF No. 84.)

After considering the briefing3and for the reasons stated below, the Court 

 

3 For purposes of summary judgment, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(3) allows a court to 

consider materials in the record not cited in the briefing. Here, the Court has considered exhibits 

attached to Plaintiff’s SAC as evidence. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled 

on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the 

court may consider documents or exhibits “whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose 

authenticity no party questions.” Moreover, at the summary judgment stage, the Court need not focus 

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RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. March 20, 2013—Plaintiff Arrives at San Diego Central Jail

Plaintiff arrived at the San Diego Central Jail (“Central Jail”) at 6:00 a.m. on 

March 20, 2013, after being arrested on charges of being under the influence of a 

controlled substance. (Def. Ex. A.) The medical examiner at the Central Jail determined 

that Plaintiff could not complete the booking process until he was no longer under the 

influence of what was believed to be a controlled substance. (Def. Exs. A and B.) While 

in the sobering cell, jail staff frequently monitored Plaintiff and recorded their

observations. (Def. Ex. C.) Sheriff’s Deputy Walch filed an incident report which 

described Plaintiff as “verbally aggressive,” and “pounding on the window.” (Def. Ex. 

E.) According to Defendants, Plaintiff resumed the booking process at 3:23 p.m. on 

March 20, 2013. (ECF No. 78 at 3:18.) 

B. March 21, 2013—Altercation 

a. Defendants’ Version of the Altercation

On March 21, 2013, a number of deputies transporting new inmates for processing 

gathered near Plaintiff’s holding cell. (Id. at 3:24-4:1.) Incoming inmates alleged to 

have committed misdemeanor offenses were identified by a purple wristband, signaling 

that they could be released after booking. (Id. at 4:4-5.) As inmates exited the elevator, 

Defendant Seeley ordered those wearing a purple wristband to line up along the wall 

across from the elevator doors. (Id. at 4:1-4; see also Defendants’ Ex. G, Clip No. 2.) At 

the same time, the door to Plaintiff’s holding cell had been opened so the new inmates 

could enter. (ECF No. 78 at 4:6-8.) Plaintiff exited the holding cell, at which point 

Defendant Seeley ordered him to go back into his cell. (Id. at 4:8-12; see also Def. Ex. 

 

on the admissibility of the evidence’s form, but instead should focus on the admissibility of its contents. 

Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 418–19 (9th Cir. 2001) (“To survive summary judgment, a 

party does not necessarily have to produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, as long 

as the party satisfies the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56.”).

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G, Clip No. 1.) Plaintiff responded by striking in the direction of Defendant Seeley. 

(Def. Ex. G, Clip No. 1; Def. Ex. H at 43:15.) Defendant Seeley drew his taser, but did 

not deploy it because Plaintiff had started to retreat back into the cell. (ECF No. 78 at 

4:25-27; Def. Ex. G, Clip No. 1.) 

Moments later, Corporal Riley4(“Riley”) arrived and deployed his taser. (ECF 

No. 78 at 5:3-5; see also ECF No. 78-3 ¶ 5.) According to the declaration submitted by 

Riley, the taser did not make contact with Plaintiff’s skin, which allowed Plaintiff to 

remove the probes from his clothing without being incapacitated. (ECF No. 78-3 ¶¶ 5-8.) 

Riley states that he ordered Plaintiff to stop trying to remove the taser probes, but 

Plaintiff did not comply. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 6.) As a result, Riley activated the taser for a 

second cycle. (Id. at ¶ 6.) 

Plaintiff continued to be combative and resisted efforts to restrain him. (Id. at ¶ 8.) 

Plaintiff was “lying on his back in the cell with his feet facing the cell door when 

Defendant Seeley entered the cell and used both of his hands to grab [Plaintiff]’s feet.” 

(Id.) Defendant Seeley “lifted [Plaintiff]’s lower body off the floor and attempted to roll 

him over onto his stomach[,]” but Plaintiff “began to thrash around violently in an 

attempt to either strike at deputies or get away from their control.” (Id.) According to 

Riley, Defendant Saunders then “entered the cell to assist Defendant Seeley” and 

attempted to turn Plaintiff over, when Plaintiff “swung his arm to strike [Defendant] 

Saunders.” (Id. at ¶ 9.) Defendant Saunders delivered two closed fist strikes with his 

right hand to the right side of Plaintiff’s face, which were ineffective because Plaintiff 

“continued to struggle, kick and attempt to punch” Defendant Saunders. (Id.) Defendant 

Saunders then used his right knee to strike the right side of Plaintiff’s upper chest. (Id.) 

At that point, Defendant Saunders notified the other deputies that Plaintiff had 

 

4 Corporal Riley is a witness and a participant in the events that transpired, but he is not named as a 

Defendant in Plaintiff’s SAC. The Court notes that Riley only identifies himself as deploying a taser, 

which Plaintiff offers no evidence to dispute. Because Riley is not named as a Defendant, the use of the 

taser is not included in the Court’s analysis regarding the use of excessive force. 

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started bleeding. (Id.) Defendant Torres then delivered four knee strikes to the left side 

of Plaintiff’s lower back, at which point Plaintiff rolled onto his stomach. (Id.) 

Defendant Saunders “placed his right knee on [Plaintiff]’s upper back to prevent him 

from attempting to stand up or roll over.” (Id.) Defendant Seeley then placed “leg chains 

on [Plaintiff]’s ankles,” and “Defendant Balay used both of his hands to take cross (sic) 

[Plaintiff]’s legs” to prevent him from “twisting or being able to kick at deputies.” (Id. at 

¶ 10.) Defendant Norie used both of his hands to apply “bodyweight to the back

of [Plaintiff]’s legs” and “placed his right knee on the back of [Plaintiff]’s left shoulder to

prevent him from rolling over and potentially striking a deputy.” (Id. at ¶ 11.) 

Defendant Torres used “both of his hands to force [Plaintiff]’s left arm behind his back” 

while Defendant Saunders did the same with Plaintiff’s right arm. (Id.) 

Defendant Balay “placed a handcuff on [Plaintiff]’s right wrist” and Defendant 

Torres “secured the handcuffs to [Plaintiff]’s left wrist.” (Id.) Defendant Warren 

“applied bodyweight with both of his knees to [Plaintiff]’s lower back area to keep

[Plaintiff] from standing and continuing to fight.” (Id.) Because Plaintiff was bleeding, 

Defendant Norie “placed a spit sock over [Plaintiff]’s head to prevent him from spitting 

or spraying blood on deputies.” (Id.) Once restrained, Defendants escorted Plaintiff to 

the jail medical clinic via gurney. (ECF No. 78-3 ¶ 12.) Plaintiff sustained a laceration 

above his right eye. (Id.) 

b. Plaintiff’s Version of the Altercation

Plaintiff’s SAC states that he “was on the ground being held down by Corp. Seeley 

#3663, Deputy Belay (sic) #0040, Deputy Norie #0132, Deputy Torres #5699, and 

Deputy Warren #7805.” (ECF No. 55 at 3.) Plaintiff states that he was “being tased 

repeatedly, and kicked repeatedly.” (Id.) He continues that “[he] was in hand-cuffs when 

Corp. Saunders #7294 walked in the holding cell, and began punching and kicking 

[Plaintiff] in his head or right eye until [Plaintiff] started to pour blood from his face or 

right eye.” (Id.) Plaintiff also attaches inmate grievances to his SAC, one of which states

in pertinent part that he was “hit in [his] eye by one of the staff with his hand and 

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punched 6-7 times while on the ground handcuffed[.]” (Plaintiff Ex. 2.) Plaintiff’s two

additional grievances generally recount his allegations of excessive force. (See Plaintiff 

Exs. 3 and 7.)

C. Medical Care Following the March 21, 2013 Altercation

Medical records from San Diego Sheriff’s Department on March 21, 2013, indicate 

that Plaintiff initially refused consent to repair the laceration, and would not cooperate for 

the motor examination or assessment of his wound. (Def. Ex. I at 2.) Plaintiff eventually 

received six sutures without complications. (Id. at 2-3.) 

Later on March 21, 2013, employee Desilva reported that Plaintiff’s sutures 

remained intact, the dressing was clean and dry, and there was no active bleeding from 

the wound. (Def. Ex. J at 4.) Jail personnel checked and changed Plaintiff’s dressing on 

March 21, 2013 (Id. at 5); March 23, 2013 (Id. at 6); March 24, 2013 (Id. at 7); and 

March 27, 2013 (Id. at 9). Plaintiff refused consent to change the dressing on his 

laceration on March 22, 2013 (Id. at 5); and March 26, 2013 (Id. at 8). On March 28, 

2013, medical staff removed Plaintiff’s sutures without complications (Id. at 10) and 

checked him again the following day. (Id. at 11.)

D. Plaintiff is Charged for his Conduct on March 20, 2013 and March 21, 2013 and 

Enters Disciplinary Isolation

On March 22, 2013, Deputy Campbell wrote a jail incident report documenting 

Plaintiff’s March 20, 2013 violations of Inmate Rules and Regulations #101 (Inmate shall 

treat facility staff in a civil fashion), #103 (Inmates shall not assault any other inmate or 

staff), #105 (Inmate shall not take part in aggressive or boisterous activity) and #701 

(Inmates shall not delay jail operations), which took place while Plaintiff was housed in 

the sobering cell. (Def. Ex. N.) As a result of these charges, Plaintiff entered security 

lockdown pending a disciplinary hearing. (Def. Ex. P.) A hearing conducted pursuant to 

California Code of Regulations Title 15 Article 7 took place on March 24, 2013. (Def. 

Ex. R.) Plaintiff received eight days disciplinary isolation and was released on April 1, 

2013. (Id.)

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Plaintiff was also charged for violating California Penal Code § 69 (resisting a 

peace officer with violence) and § 243 (c)(1) (battery on a peace officer causing minor 

injury). (Def. Ex. K; ECF No. 78-3 ¶ 12.) On April 20, 2013, Plaintiff pled guilty to 

Penal Code § 69, a felony charge, for violently resisting an executive officer. (Def. Ex. 

M.) The criminal complaint alleged: 

“On or about March 21, 2013, DAVID BRYAN TURNER did unlawfully 

attempt by means of threats and violence to deter and prevent another who was 

then and there an executive officer from performing a duty imposed upon such 

officer by law, and did knowingly resist by use of force and violence said 

executive officer in the performance of his/her duty, in violation of PENAL CODE 

SECTION 69.” 

On April 30, 2013, Plaintiff signed a Plea of Guilty Form under penalty of perjury on 

admitting the following: “[He] did unlawfully prevent an officer from performing his 

duty with means of threats and violence.” 5 (Id.) Subsequent to his guilty plea, in his

statement to his probation officer regarding the altercation, Plaintiff stated: “I was getting 

mad. When they came to the door I was mad. It wasn’t nothing towards them (deputies). 

I was toying with them like they were toying with me. It was spur of the moment. I 

didn’t mean to hit nobody. I was just mad because I was locked up.” (Def. Ex. L at 3.) 

On May 29, 2013, Judge Moring sentenced Plaintiff to the upper term of three years in 

prison. (Def. Ex. M.)

///

 

5 Defendants do not argue that any claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The 

Court nonetheless concludes that Heck is inapplicable on these facts, as Plaintiff’s allegation is that he 

had ceased resisting and had been restrained in handcuffs before the excessive force was employed. See 

Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (Finding that a § 1983 action was not barred, 

despite the prisoner’s guilty plea to resisting arrest “because the excessive force may have been 

employed against him subsequent to the time he engaged in the conduct that constituted the basis for his 

conviction); see also Sanford v. Motts, 258 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f [the officer] used 

excessive force subsequent to the time Sanford interfered with [the officer’s] duty, success in her section 

1983 claim will not invalidate her conviction. Heck is no bar.”); cf. Hooper v. County of San Diego, 629 

F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a conviction for resisting arrest under Cal. Penal Code § 

148(a) (1) does not “bar a § 1983 claim for excessive force under Heck [if] the conviction and the § 

1983 claim are based on different actions during ‘one continuous transaction.’ ”).

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E. Plaintiff’s Grievances

Grievance forms are readily available and provided for all inmates to complete and 

submit, with three successive levels of subsequent review in which facility staff can 

resolve the grievance. (ECF No. 78 at 21.) Each level of review provides the inmate 

with a written response and a resolution or reasons for its denial. (ECF No. 78-4 ¶¶ 1-5; 

Def. Ex. T.)

The first level of review is conducted by a first level supervisor. (ECF No. 78 at 

21.) If an inmate is not satisfied with the proposed resolution of his grievance at the first 

level, he can appeal to an intermediate level of review conducted by a sworn supervising 

officer designated as the jail facility’s grievance review officer. (Id.) If an inmate is 

dissatisfied with the proposed resolution at that level of review, he can appeal the 

decision to the third and final level of review conducted by the Facility Commander. 

(ECF No. 78-4 ¶¶ 4-7; Def. Ex. T.)

Plaintiff attached eight inmate grievances to his SAC, each of which will be 

discussed in the context of the causes of action to which they relate. 

a. Count One: Cruel and Unusual Punishment (Excessive Force)

Plaintiff filed three inmate grievances recounting the altercation that took place on 

March 21, 2013 and alleging the use of unreasonable force. (Plaintiff Exs. 2, 3, 7.) A 

grievance filed on March 30, 2013, states that Plaintiff “was hit in [his] eye by one of the 

staff with his hand and punched 6 or 7 times while on the ground handcuffed[.]” A 

second grievance filed on April 16, 2013, requests an “Internal Affairs form” and “further 

investigation” regarding an “injury to [his] right eye.” (Plaintiff Ex. 7.) Plaintiff filed his 

third grievance relating to Count One on May 1, 2014, stating that he sustained “injuries

to his eye, back, neck” as well as “mental distress” as a result of “unreasonable force.” 

(Plaintiff Ex. 3.) 

An undated lodgment appears to be a response to one of the three grievances, and 

explains that the “force used during your altercation was deemed necessary for the 

circumstances to gain control over you and to protect [the staff] from your violent 

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assault.” (Plaintiff Ex. 1.) Plaintiff also submits a “Notice of Rejection of Claim” from 

San Diego Office of County Counsel dated February 5, 2014. (Plaintiff Ex. 10.) Plaintiff 

did not provide an explanation of this lodgment. According to the notice, it relates to an 

incident that took place on December 3, 2013. (Plaintiff Ex. 10.) The incident at issue in 

this case took place on March 21, 2013, and the Court is not aware of any incidents at 

issue in this matter that took place on December 3, 2013, thus the relevance of this 

lodgment is unclear. 

At the end of April, Plaintiff filed two inmate grievances describing continued 

back pain and headaches and requesting a CAT-scan. (Plaintiff Exs. 8, 9.) According to 

San Diego Sheriff’s Department Medical Chart, an employee referred Plaintiff to 

“MDSC” for back pain (Def. Ex. S at 1.), where he saw Steve Aguilar on May 2, 2013. 

(Id. at 2-4.) 

b. Count Two: Cruel and Unusual Punishment (Access to Courts)

As a result of Plaintiff’s March 24, 2013 disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff received 

eight days isolation and was released on April 1, 2013. (Def. Ex. R.) Plaintiff’s Count 

Two states that this period of isolation impacted his “access to the courts and to [his] 

lawyers.” (ECF No. 55 at 4.) Plaintiff states in an inmate grievance that, during this 

disciplinary isolation, he could not leave his cell for a period of twenty-four hours 

between March 30, 2013 and April 2, 2013, and he was not permitted to shower for “2 or 

3” days. (Plaintiff Ex. 6.) On April 1, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Inmate Grievance stating 

that he had not been given time to call his attorney regarding an upcoming trial. (Plaintiff 

Ex. 5.) 

c. Count Three: Freedom of Religion

On April 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Inmate Grievance stating that he was “denied 

the right for (sic) religious services.” (Plaintiff Ex. 4.) His SAC explains that he needed 

to attend services to help him feel better after the altercation with the officers. (ECF No. 

55 at 5.)

///

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III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Standard Of Review

Summary judgment is properly granted when “there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). Entry of summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s 

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The court shall consider all admissible affidavits and 

supplemental documents submitted on a motion for summary judgment. See Connick v. 

Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 784 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment 

is proper. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). However, to avoid 

summary judgment, the nonmovant cannot rest solely on conclusory allegations. Berg v. 

Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Rather, he must present “specific facts 

showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 256 (1986). The court may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations 

on a motion for summary judgment. Quite the opposite, the inferences to be drawn from 

the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Id. at 255; United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). The nonmovant’s 

evidence need only be such that a “fair minded jury could return a verdict for [him] on 

the evidence presented.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, in determining whether 

the nonmovant has met his burden, the court must consider the evidentiary burden 

imposed upon him by the applicable substantive law. Id.

B. Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action: Use of Excessive Force

1. Parties’ Arguments 

Defendants argue that their use of force against Plaintiff was reasonable and 

justified based on Plaintiff’s assaultive behavior. (ECF No. 78 at 17:26-18:4.) Plaintiff 

admitted in his deposition that he threw punches at the air (Def. Ex. H at 43:15) and tried 

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to remove the taser darts from his clothing. (Id. at 44:13-20.) The video lodged with the 

Court shows the deputies pushing Plaintiff back into the cell and attempting to close the 

cell door, but Plaintiff blocked the door from closing and struck in the direction of the 

deputies. (Def. Ex. G, Clip No. 1.) The Court notes that the video footage is only helpful 

in confirming Plaintiff’s initial combative behavior. The camera angle does not reveal 

anything that took place inside Plaintiff’s cell, where the majority of the altercation took 

place. 

Although Plaintiff makes general allegations that Defendants Seeley, Balay, 

Torres, Warren and Norie used excessive force, Plaintiff presents no evidence that

disputes Defendants’ version of the force they used prior to Plaintiff being handcuffed. 

Plaintiff’s version of events differs from Defendants’ only as to his claim that he had 

already been successfully handcuffed “when Corp. Saunders #7294 walked in the holding 

cell, and began punching and kicking [Plaintiff] in his head or right eye, until [Plaintiff] 

started to pour blood from his face or right eye.” (ECF No. 55 at 3; see also Plaintiff Ex. 

2 (“I was hit in my eye by one of the staff with his hand and punched 6-7 times while on 

the ground handcuffed[.]”)) 

2. Standard

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against the malicious or sadistic use of force, 

see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992), does not apply “until after conviction and 

sentence.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 n.6 (1989). Pretrial detainees, which 

was Plaintiff’s status at the time of the altercation, are instead protected by substantive 

due process, and may also challenge the use of force against them under the Fourteenth 

Amendment if that force is so excessive that it amounts to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 

441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (“[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be 

punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”); see 

also Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The more protective fourteenth 

amendment standards apply to conditions of confinement when detainees . . . have not 

[yet] been convicted of a crime.”) (citation omitted). Thus, pretrial detainees, “retain at 

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least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted prisoners.” 

Bell, 441 U.S. at 545; Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 

1991) (en banc). 

A pretrial detainee must show “that the force purposely or knowingly used against 

him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 

2466, 2473, 192 L. Ed. 2d 416 (2015). “Considerations such as the following may bear 

on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used: the relationship between the 

need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; 

any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of 

the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether 

the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 

109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).) Because this balancing “nearly always 

requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences 

therefrom . . . summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in excessive force cases 

should be granted sparingly.” Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002). “That 

is not to say that every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of 

action.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 

1973) (“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a 

judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.”)). But, where there is no 

need for force, any force used is objectively unreasonable for constitutional purposes. 

See P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303–04 & n. 4 (9th Cir. 1996). 

3. Discussion as to Defendants Seeley, Balay, Torres, Warren and Norie

a. The Relationship Between the Force Needed and the Force 

Used

One factor the Court considers in analyzing an excessive force claim is the 

relationship between the force needed under the circumstances and the force used. 

Plaintiff has conceded, by pleading guilty to Cal. Penal Code § 69, that he “knowingly 

resist[ed] by use of force and violence.” (Def. Ex. M.) In response to Plaintiff’s 

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combative behavior, Riley’s declaration states that Defendant Seeley “used both of his 

hands to grab [Plaintiff]’s feet” (ECF No. 78-3 ¶ 8) and “placed leg chains on [Plaintiff]’s 

ankles.” (Id. at ¶ 10.) Defendant Balay “used both of his hands to take cross (sic)

[Plaintiff]’s legs and applied downward pressure to prevent him from twisting or being 

able to kick at deputies.” (Id.) Defendant Norie “used both of his hands and applied 

bodyweight to the back of [Plaintiff]’s legs,” and “placed his right knee on the back of 

[Plaintiff]’s left shoulder to prevent him from rolling over and potentially striking a 

deputy.” (Id. at ¶ 11.) Defendant Torres “delivered four knee strikes to the left side of 

[Plaintiff’s] lower back.” (ECF No. 78-3 ¶ 9.)

Defendants Seeley, Balay, Torres, Warren and Norie argue that they used only the 

force necessary to protect themselves from injury and maintain institutional security, 

using Riley’s declaration, video footage, and court documents regarding Plaintiff’s guilty 

plea to Cal. Penal Code § 69 as supporting evidence. (ECF No. 78 at 20:7-8.) Plaintiff 

offers no evidence that these Defendants used force outside of their efforts to restrain him 

from conduct he admits was violent. To avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff must present 

“specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Instead, Plaintiff admits that he used force initially, and 

only refers to Defendants Seeley, Balay, Torres, Warren and Norie as “[holding him] 

down.” (ECF No. 55 at 3.) Even though Plaintiff generally asserts that all Defendants 

used excessive force, he cannot rest solely on conclusory allegations. Berg, 794 F.2d at

459. Because Plaintiff does not submit any evidence showing a genuine issue of fact, this 

factor weighs in favor of finding that Defendants Seeley, Balay, Torres, Warren and 

Norie used an appropriate amount of force under the circumstances. 

b. Extent of Injury

Another factor the Court considers is the extent of the injury suffered by Plaintiff. 

It is uncontested that Plaintiff received six stitches above his right eyebrow to close the 

laceration incurred during the incident with Defendants. (See ECF No. 78 at 7:11-13, 

Def. Ex. I.) The uncontested medical evidence supports a finding that Plaintiff’s 

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laceration was more than de minimus and factors against Defendants’ argument that they 

applied force in good faith. Although Plaintiff’s injury was more than de minimus, it is 

undisputed that the force leading to stitches was due to the force employed by Defendant 

Saunders, as discussed below. Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that he sustained 

any other injuries as a result of being held down by Defendants Seeley, Balay, Torres, 

Warren or Norie. Therefore, the extent-of-the-injury factor weighs in favor of

Defendants Seeley, Balay, Warren, Torres, and Norie.

c. Efforts to Temper the Amount of Force

The Court also considers any efforts by Defendants to temper the force used 

against Plaintiff. Here, Defendants submit evidence that they incrementally increased the 

level of force used to restrain Plaintiff. When Plaintiff initially exited the holding cell, 

Defendant Seeley ordered him to go back into his cell. (ECF No. 78 at 4:8-12; see also

Def. Ex. G, Clip No. 1.) Plaintiff responded by striking in the direction of Defendant 

Seeley. (Def. Ex. G, Clip No. 1; Def. Ex. H at 43:15.) Defendant Seeley drew his taser, 

but did not deploy it because Plaintiff had started to retreat back into the cell. (ECF No. 

78 at 4:25-27; Def. Ex. G, Clip No. 1.) Defendant Seeley then placed “leg chains on 

[Plaintiff]’s ankles,” and “Defendant Balay used both of his hands to take cross (sic) 

[Plaintiff]’s legs” to prevent him from “twisting or being able to kick at deputies.” (Id. at 

¶ 10.) Defendant Norie used both of his hands to apply “bodyweight to the back of 

[Plaintiff]’s legs” and “placed his right knee on the back of [Plaintiff]’s left shoulder to

prevent him from rolling over and potentially striking a deputy.” (Id. at ¶ 11.) 

Given that Plaintiff has conceded to violently resisting the officers, the evidence 

supports the conclusion that Defendants Seeley, Balay, Torres, Warren and Norie only 

used the force necessary to gain control over Plaintiff and handcuff him. Again, even 

though Plaintiff generally asserts that all Defendants used excessive force, he cannot rest 

solely on conclusory allegations, Berg, 794 F.2d at 459, without providing some evidence 

to create a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Plaintiff offers no 

such evidence regarding the actions of Defendants Seeley, Balay, Torres, Warren or

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Norie. This further supports a finding that Defendants Seeley, Balay, Warren, Torres, 

and Norie made an effort to temper the amount of force used in response to Plaintiff’s 

resistance. 

d. The Threat Reasonably Perceived by Defendants

The Court also looks at the threat perceived by the responsible officials. 

Defendants argue that it was reasonable for them to perceive Plaintiff’s actions as 

threating because (1) Plaintiff initiated the confrontation with Defendants by challenging 

institutional rules when he refused verbal instructions to return to the holding cell, (2) 

Plaintiff’s actions created the potential to incite other unrestrained inmates to disorder, 

(3) and Plaintiff attacked Defendants Seeley, Warren, and Deputy Lotko6. (ECF No. 78 

at 19:27-20:2.) Defendants further claim that Plaintiff fought with the deputies, and 

resisted their efforts to handcuff him despite being ordered to stop. (ECF No. 78 at 20:2-

5.) Plaintiff’s uncooperative behavior is corroborated by his deposition testimony where 

he admits to punching at the air (Def. Ex. H at 43:15) as well as the video footage that 

shows Plaintiff refusing to re-enter his cell at the request of the deputies. (Def. Ex. G, 

Clip No. 1.) Plaintiff also admitted to the use of “force and violence” in resisting 

Defendants. (Def. Ex. M.) This evidence supports a conclusion that the Defendants’ 

efforts to restrain Plaintiff were made in a good faith effort to restore discipline. 

Because all of the factors support Defendants’ argument that Defendants Seeley, 

Balay, Torres, Warren and Norie’s use of force was objectively reasonable under the 

circumstances, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment as to Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for cruel and unusual punishment against

Defendants Seeley, Balay, Torres, Warren and Norie be GRANTED. 

///

///

 

6 Deputy Lotko is identified by Defendants in their Motion for Summary Judgment as being present 

during the altercation, but he is not named as a Defendant, nor mentioned at all, in Plaintiff’s SAC. 

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4. Discussion as to Defendant Saunders

a. The Relationship between the Force Needed and the Force Used

One factor the Court considers in analyzing a claim of excessive force is the 

relationship between the force needed under the circumstances and the force used. 

Plaintiff has conceded, by pleading guilty to Cal. Penal Code § 69, that he “knowingly 

resist[ed] by use of force and violence.” (Def. Ex. M.) In response to Plaintiff’s 

combative behavior, Riley’s declaration states that Defendant Saunders “deliver[ed] two 

closed first (sic) strikes with his right hand to the right side of [Plaintiff]’s face[, but] the 

strikes were not effective.” (ECF No. 78-3 ¶ 9.) Because Plaintiff continued to 

“struggle, kick and attempt to punch[,]” Saunders delivered a knee strike to Plaintiff’s 

upper chest. (Id.) 

Plaintiff’s SAC states that he “was in handcuffs when Corp. Saunders #7294 

walked in the holding cell, and began punching and kicking [Plaintiff] in his head or right 

eye, until [Plaintiff] started to pour blood from his face or right eye.” (ECF No. 55 at 3.) 

Plaintiff states again in an inmate grievance that he was already in handcuffs when “one 

of the staff” punched him in the head. 7 (Plaintiff Ex. 2.) According to Riley’s 

declaration, however, Defendants only handcuffed Plaintiff after the strikes from 

Defendant Saunders subdued him. (ECF No. 78-3 ¶ 9.) 

Based on the contradictory testimony, the Court finds that genuine issues of 

material fact exist as to whether Defendant Saunders’ use of force under the 

circumstances was justified, or instead, was so excessive that it amounted to punishment. 

Bell, 441 U.S. at 535; Jones, 393 F.3d at 934. A rational trier of fact could believe either 

that Defendant Saunders’s actions were “punitive,” i.e., that they were excessive in

relation to a legitimate need to ensure jail security, id., or that they constituted a 

reasonable and appropriate response to the threat Plaintiff posed. Id.; see also Anderson, 

 

7 Riley’s declaration identifies Defendant Saunders as the only Defendant to strike Plaintiff in the head. 

(See ECF No. 78-3 ¶ 9.)

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477 U.S. at 255 (at summary judgment “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the 

evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not 

those of a judge.”). See also Scott v. Palmer, 2012 WL 396587 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2012), 

report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 930862 (E.D. Cal. March 19, 2012) 

(report and recommendation) (evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment on 

inmate’s excessive force claim alleging that after he was subdued and handcuffed, 

defendant “kicked him four times in the ribs on his left side and stomped his back and 

shoulder three times.”)

b. Extent of Injury

Another factor the Court considers is the extent of the injury suffered by Plaintiff. 

It is uncontested that Plaintiff received six stitches above his right eyebrow to close the 

laceration incurred during the incident with Defendants. (See ECF No. 78 at 7:11-13, 

Def. Ex. I.) The uncontested medical evidence supports a finding that Plaintiff’s 

laceration was more than de minimus and factors against Defendant Saunders’ argument 

that he applied force in good faith. 

c. Efforts to Temper the Amount of Force

The Court also considers any efforts by Defendant to temper the force used against 

Plaintiff. Defendant Saunders, like the other Defendants, argues that he incrementally 

increased the level of forced used to restrain Plaintiff. According to Riley’s declaration, 

Defendant Saunders “deliver[ed] two closed first (sic) strikes with his right hand to the 

right side of [Plaintiff]’s face[, but] the strikes were not effective.” (ECF No. 78-3 ¶ 9.) 

Because Plaintiff continued to “struggle, kick and attempt to punch[,]” Saunders 

delivered a knee strike to Plaintiff’s upper chest. (Id.) 

Plaintiff’s testimony, as discussed above, states that Plaintiff was already 

handcuffed when Defendant Saunders hit him in the head. (ECF No. 55 at 3.) Taking the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party negates any conclusion that 

Defendant Saunders tempered the amount of force used against Plaintiff. Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 255. Indeed, Plaintiff’s version of events describes an escalation of force by 

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Defendant Saunders. Based on the contradictory testimony, the Court finds that genuine 

issues of material fact exist as to the effort made by Defendant Saunders to temper the 

amount of force employed against Plaintiff.

d. The Threat Reasonably Perceived by Defendant

The Court also looks at the threat perceived by the responsible officials. 

Defendant Saunders, like the other Defendants, argues that it was reasonable for him to 

perceive Plaintiff’s actions as threating because (1) Plaintiff initiated the confrontation 

with Defendants by challenging institutional rules when he refused verbal instructions to 

return to the holding cell, (2) Plaintiff’s actions created the potential to incite other 

unrestrained inmates to disorder, (3) and Plaintiff attacked Defendants Seeley, Warren, 

and Deputy Lotko8. (ECF No. 78 at 19:27-20:2.) Defendant Saunders further claims that 

Plaintiff fought with the deputies, and resisted their efforts to handcuff him despite being 

ordered to stop. (ECF No. 78 at 20:2-5.) Plaintiff’s uncooperative behavior is 

corroborated by his deposition testimony where he admits to punching at the air (Def. Ex. 

H at 43:15) as well as the video footage that shows Plaintiff refusing to re-enter his cell at 

the request of the deputies. (Def. Ex. G, Clip No. 1.) Plaintiff also admitted to the use of 

“force and violence” in resisting Defendants in his guilty plea to Cal. Penal Code § 69. 

(Def. Ex. M.) 

Plaintiff’s description of the altercation, however, is that Plaintiff had already been 

restrained “in handcuffs” when Defendant Saunders “walked in the holding cell, and 

began punching and kicking [Plaintiff] in his head or right eye.” (ECF No. 55 at 3.) At 

the summary judgment stage, the court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Based on the 

contradictory testimony, the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the 

threat reasonably perceived by Defendant Saunders when he employed force against 

 

8 Deputy Lotko is identified by Defendants in their Motion for Summary Judgment as being present 

during the altercation, but he is not named as a Defendant, nor mentioned at all, in Plaintiff’s SAC. 

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Plaintiff.

Accordingly, because conflicting factual accounts of the altercation, in particular 

whether the amount of force Defendant Saunders used was commensurate with the force 

required under the circumstances, reveal genuine issues of material fact, IT IS 

RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

as to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant Saunders.

C. Qualified Immunity Regarding Claim of Excessive Force

Because the Court has recommended that summary judgment be granted on 

Plaintiff’s first count as to Defendants Seeley, Balay, Torres, Warren and Norie, qualified 

immunity is analyzed only as to Defendant Saunders. 

1. Parties’ Arguments

Defendant Saunders argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he did 

not use excessive force towards Plaintiff. In the alternative, Defendant Saunders argues

that even if the Court finds Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated, he is still 

entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable person in his position would have 

believed his conduct lawful. (ECF No. 78 at 18:19-19:23.)

2. Standard

Qualified immunity is not merely a defense to liability, but rather a bar to suit, to 

avoid the “burdens of litigation.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 

150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Courts make this determination by asking whether the officer’s 

conduct violated a constitutional right. See id. If no constitutional right is violated, there 

is “no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Id. If a right is 

violated, the court inquires whether that right was clearly established at the time of the 

incident. See id. A constitutional right is clearly established when “it would be clear to a 

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id.

Lower courts may exercise their sound discretion in deciding the order in which to 

address Saucier’s two prongs “in light of circumstances in the particular case at hand.” 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).

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As stated above, the Court recommends a finding that genuine issues of material 

fact exist regarding whether the force used against Plaintiff while he was purportedly

restrained was unreasonable and therefore excessive under the circumstances. The Court 

also recommends a finding that Defendant Saunders’ request for qualified immunity be 

denied, because the contours of the right against excessive force in this context were 

clearly established at the time of the altercation. For example, the Supreme Court in 

Hudson held unconstitutional an unjustified use of physical force upon a non-resistant 

prisoner. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-10 (holding that guards violated Hudson’s Eighth 

Amendment rights when they gratuitously punched and hit him, causing only minor 

injuries, while escorting him between prison facilities). 

The Ninth Circuit has similarly found, in the case of a pre-trial detainee alleging 

excessive force, that “by 1985, the law of this Circuit would have put a reasonable officer

on notice that an ‘unprovoked and unjustified attack” violates clearly established 

constitutional rights. Lolli, 351 F.3d at 421-22 (citing Felix v. McCarthy, 939 F.2d 699, 

701-02 (9th Cir. 1991)). In Lolli, the Ninth Circuit found genuine issues of fact as to the 

amount of force used against a pretrial detainee who claimed to have been “handcuffed 

before the beating stopped and . . . kicked, hit or twisted about 10 times after he was 

cuffed,” which precluded the district court’s finding of qualified immunity. Id. at 412, 

415, 421-22.

Here, there are triable questions of fact as to when Plaintiff was restrained and 

when exactly he was injured. If those facts are taken in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiff, the law is clearly established such that a reasonable officer should have known 

that employing force on a compliant, handcuffed pretrial detainee is a violation of

constitutional rights. Thus, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants motion for 

summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to Defendant Saunders be DENIED. 

///

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///

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D. Exhaustion of Available Administrative Remedies Regarding Plaintiff’s 

Count Two (Cruel and Unusual Punishment) and Count Three (Freedom 

of Religion) 

Plaintiff filed eight inmate grievances involving the issues described in his 

complaint, and attached those grievances to his SAC. (See Plaintiff Exs. 2-6, 8, 9) 

Count Two in Plaintiff’s SAC alleges violations of Plaintiff’s “[a]ccess to courts [and] 

freedom from cruel and unusual punishment” arising from time spent in disciplinary 

segregation wherein Plaintiff claims he was denied use of the phone and the shower. 

(ECF No. 55 at 4.) On April 1, 2013, Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance stating that he 

had not been given time to call his attorney about an upcoming trial. (Plaintiff Ex. 5.) 

In an inmate grievance filed on April 2, 2013, Plaintiff states that, during this disciplinary 

isolation, he could not leave his cell for a period of twenty-four hours between March 30, 

2013 and April 2, 2013, and he was not permitted to shower for “2 or 3” days. (Plaintiff 

Ex. 6.) 

Count Three alleges violations of Plaintiff’s “freedom of religion [and] freedom of 

association,” based on a claim that Plaintiff “was denied the rights to go to religious 

service.” (ECF No. 55 at 5.) On April 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Inmate Grievance that 

he was “denied the right for (sic) religious services.” (Plaintiff Ex. 4.)

Defendants move for summary judgment as to Counts Two and Three on the 

grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies prior to 

bringing this suit as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. It is well established that nonexhaustion of administrative remedies as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) is an 

affirmative defense which defendant jail officials have the burden of raising and proving. 

See Jones v. Bock, 594 U.S. 199, 216 (2007); Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1168-69 

(2014). 

1. Standard

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to 

provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 

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1983 . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “Once 

within the discretion of the district court, exhaustion in cases covered by § 1997e(a) is 

now mandatory.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) has 

been construed broadly to “afford [ ] corrections officials time and opportunity to address 

complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case,” id. at 525, and to 

encompass inmate suits about both general circumstances and particular episodes of 

prison life—including incidents of alleged excessive force. Id. at 532. Finally, “[t]he 

‘available’ ‘remed[y]’ must be ‘exhausted’ before a complaint under § 1983 may be 

entertained,” “regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures.” Booth 

v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738, 741 (2001); see also McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 

1200-01 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that prisoner’s civil rights action must be dismissed 

without prejudice unless prisoner exhausted available administrative remedies before he 

filed suit, even if he fully exhausts while the suit is pending).

The County of San Diego Sheriff’s Department Detention Services provides 

inmates the right to administratively appeal any issue related to “any condition of 

confinement.” (See Def. Ex. T, Policy and Procedure, § N.1, grievance procedure.) In 

order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, an inmate must 

proceed through the following levels: (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal 

on J-22 Inmate Grievance forms or other writing materials, (3) second level appeal to 

Grievance Review officer, and (4) third level of appeal to Facility Commander. Id. 

2. Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative 

remedies as to Counts Two and Three, by only filing grievances at the first level. As 

support, Defendants submit a declaration from County Sheriff’s Sgt. Dorothy Patterson

which describes the administrative grievance procedure in the San Diego County jails by 

which all inmate grievances are addressed. (ECF No. 78 at 21.) According to that 

declaration, grievance forms are readily available and provided for all inmates to 

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complete and submit, with three successive levels of subsequent review in which facility 

staff can resolve the grievance. (Id.) Each level of review provides the inmate with a 

written response and a resolution or reasons for its denial. (ECF No. 78-4 ¶¶ 1-5; Def. 

Ex. T.)

The first level of review is conducted by a first level supervisor. (ECF No. 78 at 

21.) If an inmate is not satisfied with the proposed resolution of his grievance at the first 

level he can appeal to an intermediate level of review conducted by a sworn supervising 

officer designated as the jail facility’s grievance review officer. (Id.) If an inmate is 

dissatisfied with the proposed resolution at that level of review, he can appeal this to the 

third and final level of review conducted by the Facility Commander. (ECF No. 78-4 ¶¶ 

4-7; Def. Ex. T.) 

3. Discussion

Defendants contend Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies 

as to his second and third claims prior to bringing this suit, having failed to appeal the 

related inmate grievances. (See ECF No. 78-4 ¶¶ 10-11.) Defendants have met their 

burden to show that there is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff exhausted the 

administrative remedies as to Counts Two and Three. However, it is also Defendants 

burden to prove that “there was an available remedy.” Williams v. Paramo, __ F.3d __, 

2015 WL 74144 at * 7 (9th Cir. 2015). County Sheriff’s Sgt. Dorothy Patterson’s 

declaration describing the administrative grievance procedure in San Diego County jails 

sufficiently demonstrates that there was an available remedy, and Plaintiff had 

opportunity to know of that remedy. (See ECF No. 78-4.) Once the defendant meets that 

burden, the plaintiff must “come forward with evidence showing that there is something 

in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative 

remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. Plaintiff offers no 

rebuttal to this showing by Defendants. The Court also notes that Plaintiff was able to 

successfully navigate the administrate remedy procedures as to Count One, supporting a 

finding that he knew of the additional levels of review, yet failed to utilize them as to 

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Counts Two and Three. (ECF No. 78 at 21.) 

Plaintiff has failed to rebut Defendants’ showing that he did not properly exhaust 

his administrative remedies regarding his second and third claims prior to bringing this 

action. Thus, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants motion for summary 

judgment based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 

1997e(a) be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s second and third claims. 

E. Viability of Civil Rights Claims Against Defendant San Diego County

1. Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations of constitutional violations involve 

only the individual deputies, and do not mention any involvement by the County or cite 

any purported policy of the County. (ECF No. 78 at 12:6-14.) As to Count One, Plaintiff 

identifies “Corp. Seeley [], Deputy Balay [], Deputy Norie [], Deputy Torres [], Deputy 

Warren []” and “Corp. Saunders []” as using “excessive force.” (ECF No. 55 at 3.) For 

Count Two, Plaintiff states that the “County of San Diego employee’s (sic) actions and 

omissions amounted to deliberate indifference to serious medical needs at Central Jail in 

the scope of their employment.” (Id. at 4.) For Count Three, Plaintiff states that he “was 

denied the rights (sic) to go to religious service, by employee’s (sic) at San Diego 

County, Central Jail in the scope of there (sic) employment.” (Id. at 5.) Neither 

Plaintiff’s SAC nor his opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

identify a policy or practice within San Diego County responsible for the conduct giving 

rise to his claims. 

2. Standard

A plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a county under § 1983 must identify a 

municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused his injury. Bryan County Commis v. Brown, 

520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 

694). Specifically, the plaintiff must allege: (1) the plaintiff “possessed a constitutional 

right of which he was deprived;” (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy 

amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy 

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was the “moving force” behind or cause of the constitutional violation. Dietrich v. John 

Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Van Ort, 92 F.3d at 835). 

Even if there is not an explicit policy, a plaintiff may establish municipal liability 

upon a showing that there is a permanent and well-settled practice by the municipality 

which gave rise to the alleged constitutional violation. See City of St. Louis v.

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988); Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 

1232-33 (9th Cir. 2011). Allegations of random acts, or single instances of misconduct, 

however, are insufficient to establish a municipal custom. See Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 

712, 714.

3. Discussion

In this case, the Court recommended a finding that triable issues of fact exist only 

as to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant Saunders. No evidence in the 

record–nor even any allegation in Plaintiff’s SAC– suggest Defendant Saunders’ actions 

were “caused by” any custom, policy or practice of the County of San Diego. See 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Brown, 520 U.S. at 405 (noting that “[w]here a plaintiff claims 

that the municipality has not directly inflicted injury, but nonetheless has caused an 

employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to 

ensure that the municipality is not held liable for the actions of its employee.”). 

Here, Plaintiff specifically premises the gravamen of this action on the acts of an 

individual Sheriff Deputy’s application of force against him on a particular occasion. For 

example, Plaintiff states that while he was handcuffed, “Corp. Saunders #7294 walked in 

the holding cell, and began punching and kicking [Plaintiff] in his head or right eye, until 

[Plaintiff] started to pour blood from his face or right eye.” (ECF No. 55 at 3.) However, 

a plaintiff cannot demonstrate the existence of a municipal policy or custom based solely 

on a “single occurrence of [allegedly] unconstitutional action by a non-policymaking 

employee.” McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000). Because Plaintiff has 

not put forth any evidence that Defendant Saunders’ alleged actions were the result of a 

custom or policy in San Diego County, IT IS RECOMMENDED that summary 

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judgment as to all claims against San Diego County be GRANTED.

IV. CONCLUSION

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to 

the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 

U.S.C. section 636(b)(1). For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Plaintiff’s First Claim of 

excessive force as to Defendants Seeley, Balay, Torres, Warren and Norie be 

GRANTED.

2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Plaintiff’s First Claim of 

excessive force as to Defendant Saunders be DENIED. 

3) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment regarding qualified immunity for

Plaintiff’s First Claim of excessive force as to Defendant Saunders be DENIED. 

4) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment for failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies regarding Plaintiff’s Second and Third Claims be GRANTED. 

5) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment regarding all claims against San 

Diego County be GRANTED. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 9, 2015 any party to this action 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than December 30, 2015. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

Dated: November 18, 2015

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