Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-01123/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-01123-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN RAY PERRIDON,

NO. CIV. 00-1123 LKK/JFM

Petitioner,

v. ORDER

ERNIE ROE, WARDEN,

Respondent.

 /

Pending before the court is petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration of the court’s December 13, 2007 order dismissing

the claims entitled Grounds 2 and 3 in petitioner’s amended

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons stated

herein, the court denies the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted on November 21, 1997 and his

conviction became final of May 12, 1999. On May 22, 2000, he filed

a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

alleging three grounds for relief. On June 3, 2005, he filed an

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amended petition, which alleged two additional grounds for relief

under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). On July 12, 2005, the

court stayed the action pending petitioner’s exhaustion of state

remedies. Petitioner was denied state court relief on May 10, 2006.

On March 21, 2007, the stay was lifted. Shortly thereafter,

respondents moved to dismiss the Batson claims on the grounds that

they were untimely. Adopting the magistrate judge’s Findings and

Recommendations, the court granted the motion in its December 13,

2007 order. It is that order of which the petitioner presently

seeks reconsideration.

II. STANDARD

“Under the ‘law of the case’ doctrine a court is generally

precluded from reconsidering an issue that has already been decided

by the same court, or a higher court in the identical case.” United

States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997)(citing

Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 153, 154 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,

508 U.S. 951 (1993)). Although motions to reconsider are directed

to the sound discretion of the court, see Kern-Tulare Water Dist.

v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986),

aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 824 F.2d 514 (9th

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988), considerations of

judicial economy weigh heavily in the process. Thus, Local Rule

78-230(k) requires that a party seeking reconsideration of a

district court's order must brief the “new or different facts or

circumstances...which... were not shown upon such prior motion, or

what other grounds exist for the motion.” Generally speaking,

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before reconsideration may be granted there must be a change in the

controlling law or facts, the need to correct a clear error, or the

need to prevent manifest injustice. See Alexander, 106 F.3d at 876.

Motions to reconsider are not vehicles permitting the

unsuccessful party to “rehash” arguments previously presented. See

Costello v. United States Government, 765 F. Supp. 1003, 1009 (C.D.

Cal. 1991). Nor is a motion to reconsider justified on the basis

of new evidence available prior to the court's ruling. See Fay

Corp. v. BAT Holdings One, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 307, 309 (W.D. Wash.

1987), aff’d, 896 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1990). Finally, “after

thoughts” or “shifting of ground” do not constitute an appropriate

basis for reconsideration. See id. These relatively restrictive

standards “reflect[] district courts’ concern for preserving

dwindling resources and promoting judicial efficiency.” Costello,

765 F. Supp. at 1009.

III. ANALYSIS

Petitioner moves for reconsideration on the grounds that

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations should have been tolled as

a result of a change in Ninth Circuit precedent regarding the

Batson standard. He analogizes his situation to the petitioner in

Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2008), where the Ninth

Circuit held that the petitioner’s reliance on circuit precedent

regarding whether untimely state post-conviction petitions toll

AEDPA’s statute of limitations, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s

subsequent overruling of that precedent. The Ninth Circuit held

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that the “critical fact” that supported equitable tolling in Harris

was “that Harris relied in good faith on then-binding circuit

precedent in making his tactical decision to delay in filing his

federal habeas corpus petition.” 515 F.3d at 1055. 

Unlike Harris, however, petitioner has not shown that there

was an intervening, unanticipated change in the law that allowed

for his Batson claims, which would warrant equitable tolling. As

the magistrate judge explained in the Findings and Recommendations,

adopted by this court, petitioner’s Batson claims were not created

by Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005) because that case did

not establish a new rule in applying Batson. Instead, Johnson

merely explained Batson and was presaged by a line of circuit

precedent extending at least to 2000. See Finding and

Recommendations, October 22, 2007, at 6-7. Harris, therefore, does

not compel the granting of equitable tolling in this case.

Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration (Doc. No. 49) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 27, 2008.

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