Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02887/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02887-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW OAKDEN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BLIESNER, et al., 

Defendants ________________________________ 

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No. C 05-2887 MMC (PR) 

ORDER OF SERVICE; DENYING

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

(Docket No. 9)

On July 15, 2005, plaintiff, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at Pelican

Bay State Prison (“PBSP”), filed the above-titled civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

By order filed October 19, 2005, the Court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. 

Plaintiff filed a timely amended complaint on November 17, 2005. On November 30, 2005,

plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction,

seeking to require numerous prison officials to furnish him with special meals in accordance

with his religion. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any

cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be

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liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1988). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the

color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claim

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants Chaplain Bliesner,

Supervising Correctional Cook M. Gomez, Correctional Counselor Somera, and Warden

Kirkland, all PBSP officials, have denied his requests for a “religious diet” of only uncooked

foods. Inmates "have the right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good

health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion." McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196,

198 (9th Cir. 1987). Allegations that prison officials refuse to provide a healthy diet

conforming to sincere religious beliefs states a cognizable claim under § 1983 for denial of

the right to exercise religious practices and beliefs. See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th

Cir. 1993) (discussing factors to be considered where Jewish inmate claimed denial of kosher

diet). In order to establish such violation, a prisoner must show the defendant burdened the

practice of the prisoner’s religion, by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by

his faith, without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See

Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997). To reach the level of a constitutional

violation, "the interference with one's practice of religion 'must be more than an

inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that

is central to religious doctrine.'" Id. at 737. A prisoner may be inconvenienced in the

practice of his or her faith, provided the governmental conduct does not prohibit the prisoner

from "participating in the mandates of his religion." See id.

Plaintiff’s original complaint was dismissed because it did not allege the name or

nature of plaintiff’s religion, that he has a sincerely held belief in that religion, or that the

religion mandates the raw-foods diet he seeks. See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025

(3d Cir. 1981) (holding no constitutional violation committed where prison denied prisoner’s

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request for diet of only raw foods; finding prisoner’s beliefs, although sincerely held, did not

constitute “religion” within First Amendment); see also McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196,

198 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding prison authorities’ denial of special religious diet appropriate if

inmate not sincere in religious beliefs). In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges he is a

minister in the “Church of the Creator,” whose religion, called “Creativity,” mandates that

members adhere to a lifestyle known as “Salubrious Living,” which includes, inter alia, a

raw-foods diet. 

These allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable claim for the violation of his right

to exercise his religious beliefs, but only provided that the “Church of the Creator” qualifies

as a “religion” entitled to First Amendment protection. The First Amendment protects

unfamiliar and idiosyncratic as well as commonly recognized religions. See Alvarado v. City

of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996). Defining “religion” for First Amendment

purposes is notoriously difficult, if not impossible. See id. at 1227. It is clear, however, that

a definition of religion that encompasses any symbol or belief to which an individual ascribes

serious spiritual significance is unworkably broad. See id. at 1230. The Ninth Circuit has

applied a three-part test, devised by the Third Circuit, to guide its determination of whether a

belief or movement invokes constitutionally cognizable religious interests:

First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions having to do

with deep and imponderable matters. Second, a religion is comprehensive in

nature; it consists of a belief-system as opposed to an isolated teaching. Third,

a religion often can be recognized by the presence of certain formal and

external signs.

Id. at 1229-30 (quoting Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981)) (holding 

New Age beliefs emphasizing subjectivity and individuality and lacking organization,

membership, moral and behavioral obligations, comprehensive creed, specific texts, rituals

and guidelines, particular objects of worship and requirement of religious exclusivity do not

qualify as religion for purposes of First Amendment). 

Here, plaintiff alleges his church is based on published texts, that it received a

“charter” from the State of Florida in 1973 and tax exempt status in 1974, and that it certified

plaintiff as a minister in 2004. Plaintiff further alleges Chaplain Bleisner is in charge of

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certifying inmates for approval for special religious meals, but that the approval plaintiff

received from Chaplain Bliesner, specifically, a “Special Religious Diet Chrono,” did not

conform to plaintiff’s belief of eating only uncooked foods. Plaintiff alleges that Supervising

Correctional Cook M. Gomez, after informing plaintiff that plaintiff needed to write Chaplain

Bleisner, denied plaintiff’s First Formal Level administrative appeal for a raw-foods diet. 

Plaintiff alleges Correctional Counselor Somera and Warden Kirkland denied his

administrative appeal for a raw-foods diet at the Second Formal Level of review. 

The foregoing allegations, when liberally construed, are sufficient under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1915A to state a cognizable § 1983 claim that defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s request for a

raw-foods diet violates his First Amendment rights. 

CONCLUSION

1. The Clerk of the Court shall issue summons and the United States Marshall

shall serve, without prepayment of fees, a copy of the amended complaint in this matter,

all attachments thereto, and a copy of this order upon Chaplain Bliesner, Correctional

Cook M. Gomez, Correctional Counselor Somera, and Warden Kirkland at Pelican Bay

State Prison. The Clerk shall also mail a courtesy copy of this order and the amended

complaint to the California Attorney General’s Office. 

2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date of this order, defendants

shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. Defendants may

refile the motion filed in plaintiff’s previous case, or they may supplement or augment that

motion. The motion shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall

conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

Defendants are advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor qualified

immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If any defendant is of the opinion that

this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, he shall so inform the Court prior

to the date the summary judgment motion is due. 

All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on plaintiff.

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b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the

Court and served on defendants no later than thirty (30) days from the date defendants’

motion is filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should be given to

plaintiffs:

The defendants have made a motion for summary 

judgment by which they seek to have your case dismissed. A

motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a

motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment

must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact-

-that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would

affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary

judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will

end your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for

summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations

(or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what

your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in

declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or

authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that

contradict the facts shown in the defendants’ declarations and

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material

fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in

opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered

against you. If summary judgment is granted in favor of

defendants, your case will be dismissed and there will be no

trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986) (holding

party opposing summary judgment must come forward with evidence showing triable

issues of material fact on every essential element of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that

failure to file an opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment may be deemed

to be a consent by plaintiff to the granting of the motion, and granting of judgment against

plaintiff without a trial. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per

curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1994). 

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days after

plaintiff's opposition is filed. 

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is

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due. No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

3. All communications by the plaintiff with the Court must be served on

defendants, or defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true

copy of the document to defendants or defendants’ counsel.

4. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local

Rule 16-1 is required before the parties may conduct discovery.

5. It is plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the court's orders in a

timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to

prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

6. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be

granted. However, the party making the motion for an extension of time is not relieved from

his or her duty to comply with the deadlines set by the Court merely by having made a

motion for an extension of time. The party making the motion must still meet the deadlines

set by the Court until an order addressing the motion for an extension of time is received. 

Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought to be

extended.

7. With respect to plaintiff’s motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction,

plaintiff has neither complied with the notice requirement of Rule 65(a)(1) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, nor certified the reasons for his not having provided such notice, as

required by Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, plaintiff’s

request for a TRO and/or a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

This order terminates Docket No. 9

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 12, 2006 _________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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