Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01141/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01141-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Respondent argued that the claims were not exhausted. 1

As outlined in the court’s May 25, 2007, order, this document does not address 2

the merits of any of petitioner’s claims. Rather, respondent asserts for the first time the

affirmative defense of procedural default. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUGENE RAMAC No. CIV S-06-1141-MCE-CMK-P

CASTRONUEVO,

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

THOMAS LONG,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a prisoner proceeding with counsel, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), filed on May 25, 2006. Following denial of respondent’s

motion to dismiss on September 11, 2006, respondent filed an “answer” (Doc. 16) on October 1 2

11, 2006, and petitioner filed a traverse (Doc. 18) on February 20, 2007. On May 25, 2007, the

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court directed respondent to file a supplemental answer pursuant to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases which addressed the merits of the claims raised in the petition. 

The court specifically directed respondent not to raise any additional procedural defenses given

that respondent already had ample opportunity to do so in its initial motion to dismiss and

October 11, 2006, filing. On June 22, 2007, respondent filed a supplemental answer (Doc. 21)

addressing the merits. Also on June 22, 2007, respondent sought leave to file a motion to

dismiss asserting a statute of limitations defense (Doc. 20). On June 27, 2007, the court issued

an order noting that affirmative defenses not raised in respondent’s initial responsive pleading

were likely waived and construed the filing as a motion for relief from this waiver. Petitioner

was given an opportunity to file a supplemental traverse in response to respondent’s June 22,

2007, filings. Petitioner filed his supplemental traverse (Doc. 23) on July 26, 2007. 

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner, who is a legal permanent resident currently in federal custody facing

removal proceedings, was convicted following a jury trial of seven misdemeanor counts arising

from his secretly videotaping a 15-year-old girl while she undressed and slept. On January 11,

2002, petitioner was sentenced to 3 years probation with a requirement that he serve 365 days of 

electronic monitoring. After completing the electronic monitoring portion of his sentence,

petitioner was taken into federal custody in November 2003 pending removal proceedings

resulting from his misdemeanor convictions. 

On December 6, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a late notice of

appeal challenging his convictions. In petitioner’s motion, he argued that his trial counsel – who

had subsequently been suspended from the practice of law in connection with a disciplinary

matter – incorrectly advised petitioner that there were no immigration consequences to his

convictions because they were for misdemeanors. Petitioner also argued that he did not know

that he had a right to appeal the convictions. On December 14, 2004, the Sacramento County

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Superior Court issued an order denying petitioner’s motion to file a late notice of appeal. 

Petitioner then sought relief in the California Court of Appeal on March 9, 2005,

by way of an application for a petition for writ of mandate directing the Superior Court to allow

him to file a late appeal. The Court of Appeal denied relief on March 17, 2005. Petitioner filed a

petition for review in the California Supreme Court on March 28, 2005. On April 13, 2005, the

California Supreme Court granted the petition for review and ordered as follows:

The matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate

District, with directions to vacate its order denying mandate and to issue

an alternative writ to be heard before that court when the proceedings is

ordered on calendar. 

The government informed the Court of Appeal that, in lieu of filing a return it

would concede that petitioner should be granted leave to file a late appeal. The Court of Appeal,

however, did not accept the concession. Instead, it summarily denied leave to file a late appeal. 

In its September 15, 2005, decision, the Court of Appeal concluded:

Here, Castronuevo delayed over three years in filing a notice of appeal. 

He contends the delay was excusable because he did not know of his right

to appeal, and he had difficulty in finding a lawyer to represent him

without a retainer. While the delay for the period Castronuevo was

ignorant of his right to appeal may be excusable, his reply to the Supreme

Court indicates he learned of his right to appeal when he faced permanent

removal from the United States. That occurred at least a year before he

filed his ex part motion. He explains the delay . . . first by his need to

obtain a transcript, and then his search for a lawyer, a search he declared

took “many weeks,” and that his attorney claimed took “many months.” 

However long the search took, present counsel had all the documents by

September 2004, but the motion was not filed until December. 

Castronuevo offers no explanation for this further delay. Given that the

time limit for filing a notice of appeal from a misdemeanor conviction is

only 30 days . . . , good cause for relief from default cannot be established

where there is an unexplained delay of over 60 days. 

Petitioner filed a second petition for review in the California Supreme Court on October 21,

2005. While Justice Kennard was of the opinion that the petition should be granted, the

California Supreme Court denied review without comment or citation on November 30, 2005. 

/ / /

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Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme

Court on July 27, 2006, which was denied on August 2, 2006, without comment or citation. 

Justice Kennard was of the opinion that an order to show cause should issue. This court has

concluded that petitioner’s claims are exhausted. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. When it is clear that a state court has not reached

the merits of a petitioner’s claim, because it was not raised in state court or because the court

denied it on procedural grounds, the AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal

habeas court must review the claim de novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to reach

petitioner’s claim under its “relitigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208

(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on

perjury claim, AEDPA did not apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the

evidentiary hearing in federal court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing

petition de novo where state court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the

claim alleged by petitioner). When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, 

“concerns about comity and federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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Where AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is

not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F. 3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is available where the state court’s decision

is “contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. In

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a majority of the

Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A state court

decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by the Supreme

Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently than the

Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state court

decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the governing

law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate that

Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the wrong

legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases

to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See id. at 406. 

If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to determine first

whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 293 F.3d 1040, 1052 n.6 (9th

Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which case federal

habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question is whether

the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

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State court decisions are reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See id.; see also Wiggins v. Smith,

123 S.Ct. 252 (2003). While declining to rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams,

suggested that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an erroneous

or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct.

1166, 1175 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot necessarily be

found even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision is clearly

erroneous. See Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175. This is because “. . . the gloss of clear error fails to

give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with

unreasonableness.” Id. As with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal

law, where a state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal

habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn,

283 F.3d at 1052 n.6. 

The “unreasonable application of” standard also applies where the state court

denies a claim without providing any reasoning whatsoever. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 233 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). Such decisions

are considered adjudications on the merits and are, therefore, entitled to deference under the

AEDPA. See Green v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982.

The federal habeas court assumes that state court applied the correct law and analyzes whether

the state court’s summary denial was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that

law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. 

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26 Respondent concedes that Claim 3 is timely. 

3

7

III. DISCUSSION

This case is the latest stop in petitioner’s quest to be able to challenge his

convictions in an appeal to the state courts. Petitioner raises two substantive claims in the instant

federal petition. In his Claim 1 and Claim 2, petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal on his behalf and for failing to correctly advise

him of the immigration consequences of his misdemeanor convictions. In petitioner’s Claim 3,

he asserts that the California Court of Appeal violated his federal constitutional right to due

process by ending his appeal after the California Supreme Court had ordered that an alternative

writ be issued and after the government conceded that the appeal should be allowed to proceed.

Respondent has addressed these claims on the merits, in addition to asserting various affirmative

defenses. 

A. Respondent’s Affirmative Defenses

As noted above, respondent has asserted the affirmative defenses of procedural

default and the statute of limitations, in addition to responding to the merits of petitioner’s

claims. Specifically, respondent argues that all the claims are procedurally barred by petitioner’s

“. . . dilatory inaction in waiting nearly three years before seeking to file a belated notice of

appeal.” Respondent also argues that Claims 1 and 2 are time-barred. In his supplemental 3

traverse, petitioner argues, among other things, that respondent waived the statute of limitations

defense. 

1. Statute of Limitations

Respondent’s argument, in its entirety, is as follows:

Generally, a state prisoner challenging his custody has one year to

file his federal petition from the date on which his conviction became final

by the conclusion of direct review, or the expiration of the time for seeking

such review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). In this case, Petitioner was

originally sentenced on January 11, 2002. Petitioner claims that he first

learned that he faced removal from the United States as a result of his

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misdemeanor convictions in November 2003. Petitioner then waited over

a year, until December 6, 2004, to file an ex parte motion in the

Sacramento County Superior Court requesting leave to file a belated notice

of appeal. Assuming that the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations

began to run from November of 2003, the time Petitioner learned that he

faced deportation problems from his misdemeanor convictions, the oneyear filing period expired in November of 2004. Under this analysis, the

claims Petitioner raises in Grounds One and Two of the petition would be

time-barred. 

Respondent’s statute of limitations argument is raised for the first time in his brief filed on June

22, 2007. Respondent did not raise this defense in his first responsive pleading filed on June 26,

2006, or even in his second responsive pleading filed on October 11, 2006. All the facts relevant

to respondent’s statute of limitations argument were available to respondent before his first

responsive pleading was filed, and respondent has not offered any explanation for his failure to

raise it, along with his exhaustion argument, in his first responsive pleading. Because respondent

did not raise the statute of limitations argument in his first responsive pleading, the court

concludes that respondent has waived this defense. See Nardi v. Stewart, 354 F.3d 1134, 1141

(9th Cir. 2004). 

Assuming that the district judge will not agree that respondent waived the statute

of limitations defense, the court addresses the merits of respondent’s argument. As to the period

between November 2003 – when, according to respondent, petitioner first learned about this

claims – and December 6, 2004 – when petitioner filed his motion for leave to file a late appeal –

the court agrees with respondent that the entire one-year limitations period expired. In his

supplemental traverse, petitioner argues:

. . . [T]he clock should start to run only when Mr. Castronuevo

knew that he had a right to appeal, and knew that he should challenge the

denial of that right. This occurred, at the very earliest, when present

counsel asked him, in early November 2004, so swear out a declaration

regarding his trial attorney’s misadvice that cost him the appeal.

/ / /

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Here, petitioner admitted in his state court briefs that he learned of his right to

appeal when he was taken into federal immigration custody in November 2003. The court does

not agree with petitioner, however, that the limitations period began to run only when he also

knew he could challenge the denial of his right to appeal, and petitioner does not cite any authority

in support of this rather creative argument. Essentially, petitioner is arguing that the clock started

to run when he realized the legal significance of the factual predicate to his claims, not when he

first knew the important facts. The Ninth Circuit has rejected this argument. See Hasan v.

Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001). To the extent petitioner argues that he did not

know of the prejudice resulting from his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness until November 2004, the

court does not agree. It should have been obvious that he had been prejudiced by trial counsel’s

“misadvice” at the time he was taken into immigration custody and faced removal proceedings as

a result of the misdemeanor convictions. See id. at 1154. 

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that respondent waived the statute of

limitations defense by not raising it in his first responsive pleading. Absent that waiver, however,

Claim 1 and Claim 2 should be denied as untimely. 

2. Procedural Default

In his second responsive pleading filed on October 11, 2006, respondent argues

that all of petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred. Specifically, respondent asserts that the

California Court of Appeal’s September 15, 2005, decision denied relief based on a state

procedural default – the failure to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of judgment, as required

by former California Rule of Court 182(a). As with respondent’s statute of limitations defense,

the court finds that respondent has waived the procedural default argument because it was not

raised in his first responsive pleading. See Nardi, 354 F.3d at 1141.

/ / /

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However, assuming again that the district judge will not agree that waiver applies,

the court addresses the merits of respondent’s argument. Based on concerns of comity and

federalism, federal courts will not review a habeas petitioner's claims if the state court decision

denying relief rests on a state law ground that is independent of federal law and adequate to

support the judgment. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.

255, 260-62 (1989). Generally, the only state law grounds meeting these requirements are state

procedural rules. Even if there is an independent and adequate state ground for the decision, the

federal court may still consider the claim if the petitioner can demonstrate: (1) cause for the

default and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged violation of federal law, or (2) a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 262 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477

U.S. 478, 485, 495 (1986)). 

A prerequisite for application of a state procedural default to bar a federal habeas

claim is that the default be adequate. For a state procedural default to be adequate, it must be

clear, well-established, and consistently applied. See Bennet v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9th

Cir. 2003). In Morales v. Calderon, the Ninth Circuit concluded that California’s rule allowing

late habeas petitions to be filed if there is “good cause” for delay was not clear because it was

vague. See 85 F.3d 1387, 1390-92 (9th Cir. 1996). The rule applied in this case is similarly

vague in that a showing of good cause would excuse the default. The Court of Appeal noted the

following in its September 15, 2005, decision:

It may be that relief is available in a misdemeanor case where the

defendant is not advised of his appeal rights by either the court or his

attorney and therefore fails to file a notice of appeal on a timely basis. We

need not determine the scope of relief available or what showing is

necessary to qualify for relief. Whatever the basis for granting relief,

Castronuevo is seeking relief from default. In granting such relief, courts

have always required good cause. (citations to California cases omitted). 

The Court of Appeal then concluded that petitioner had not demonstrated good cause. As in

Morales, the court concludes that the default applied in this case is too vague to bar federal

review. In other words, a discretionary state rule – such as the one applied in this case – cannot

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bar federal habeas corpus review. See Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Respondent has cited no authority to meet his burden of establishing otherwise. 

Nor does the procedural default under former California Rule of Court 182 appear

to have been consistently applied. In People v. Djekich, the California Court of Appeal concluded

that a notice of appeal was late under Rule 182, but nonetheless allowed the case to proceed as a

habeas petition. See 229 Cal.App.3d 1213, 1219 (4th Dist. 1991). In this case, however, the

Court of Appeal made no allowance for petitioner’s claim to proceed as a habeas case. In

Isenberg v. Superior Court, the court flatly concluded that no relief was available if a notice of

appeal was not timely filed. See 39 Cal.App.2d 106 (2nd Dist. 1940). In this case, however, the

Court of Appeal made clear that relief was available on a showing of good cause. See also In re

Hernandez, 40 Cal.App.3d 893 (1st Dist. 1974) (applying a due diligence standard to allow an

appeal which was late due to “lawyer dereliction”). As with the clarity of this procedural default,

respondent has cited no authority to meet his burden of establishing consistency. 

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the claims are not procedurally barred,

either because respondent waived the defense or because the procedural default at issue is not

adequate. 

B. The Merits

Assuming the district judge will agree that no affirmative defenses apply to

preclude federal habeas review, the court next addresses the merits of petitioner’s claims. 

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his supplemental answer filed on June 22, 2007, respondent concedes that

petitioner has established ineffective assistance of counsel as claimed in Claims 1 and 2. 

Therefore, the parties agree that petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated by his trial

counsel’s incorrect advice regarding the immigration consequences of his misdemeanor

convictions and counsel’s failure to advise petitioner regarding his appeal rights. If no procedural

defenses apply, relief should be granted on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.

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2. State Court Denial of Opportunity to Appeal

Petitioner contends that the state court violated his “federal constitutional rights”

when the Court of Appeal ultimately denied his request to file a late appeal even after the

government had conceded that he should be allowed to do so. Petitioner further elaborates upon

this claim in his first traverse, filed on February 20, 2007. Specifically, petitioner argues:

The [Court of Appeal] violated California writ procedure by

refusing to accept the attorney general’s concession, by never allowing the

matter to be briefed, and by never holding an evidentiary hearing. Because

the attorney general’s concession was rejected and then no briefing and no

hearing was held, there were no disputed facts before the [Court of Appeal]. 

The court then created its own facts from the record. They are wrong.

The [Court of Appeal’s] handling of this claim was inherently

inconsistent and unfair. It was without precedent and violated California

writ procedure. . . . [¶] An alternative writ gives the respondent an

opportunity to oppose relief, or to concede. It is not a court’s chance to

decide facts without a hearing, or to rule on legal issues not raised and

briefed. 

After discussing California case law, petitioner added:

. . . Here the . . . Attorney General conceded. That was the end of the case. 

The petition became moot. The [Court of Appeal] was not entitled at that

point to file an opinion or to deny relief. It acted ultra vires in so doing. 

The application of this rule, if it is a rule at all, is wholly inconsistent with

writ procedure. 

Respondent argues that this claim is not cognizable because it involves purely state law issues.

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of a

transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083,

1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is not available

for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085; see

also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378,

1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. See Milton v.

Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). 

/ / /

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Petitioner’s claim in that petition is identical to the claim raised in the instant 4

federal petition. 

13

However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact

violates the defendant’s right to due process.” Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir.

1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1980)); see also Lisenba v. California, 314

U.S. 219, 236 (1941). In order to raise such a claim in a federal habeas corpus petition, the “error

alleged must have resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S.

424, 428 (1962); Crisafi v. Oliver, 396 F.2d 293, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1968); Chavez v. Dickson, 280

F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1960). 

In his supplemental traverse, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeal’s action

violated his federal right to due process. Citing Cooks v. Spalding, 660 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1981),

he asserts that “[w]here a state court action is arbitrary or fundamentally unfair, the violation of

state law also violates federal due process.” Petitioner concludes that, because the Court of

Appeal’s action was inconsistent with state writ procedures and deprived him an opportunity to

brief the issue and present oral argument, it was arbitrary and unfair. The court finds that

petitioner has raised a colorable due process claim and, therefore, rejects respondent’s contention

that the claim is not cognizable. 

As a preliminary matter, the court addresses the appropriate standard of review to

be applied to this claim. Because this claim is based on the contention that the California Court of

Appeal’s September 15, 2005, decision was arbitrary and unfair, this claim could not have been

raised any sooner than July 27, 2006 – the date petitioner filed his exhaustion habeas petition in

the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court – the first and only state court to 4

consider this claim – denied relief on August 2, 2006, without comment or citation. Therefore,

this court must apply the “unreasonable application of” standard of review. See, 336 F.3d at 853;

Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. In applying this standard, the court will assume the state court applied

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the correct law. See id. Relief is only available if the state court’s decision was objectively

unreasonable. See id.

The central point of petitioner’s due process claim is that the Court of Appeal

failed to follow California writ procedure and, as a result, rendered a decision that was arbitrary

and unfair. Thus, it is appropriate to examine California writ procedure. In particular, because

the California Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeal to vacate its earlier decision and,

instead, to “. . . issue an alternative writ to be heard before that court . . .,” this court will examine

the alternative writ procedures to be used in the Court of Appeal. 

Before doing so, it bears noting that the California Supreme Court did not provide

the Court of Appeal with a list of options when it granted the petition for review. Rather, the

California Supreme Court specifically directed the Court of Appeal to issue an alternative writ to

be heard by that court. No other options – such as summarily denying relief – were open to the

Court of Appeal by the plain language of the California Supreme Court’s directive. Nor was the

Court of Appeal free to consider whether to issue an alternative writ because the California

Supreme Court directed that the court of appeal shall issue an alternative writ. 

Under California law, once an alternative writ is issued the matter becomes a

“cause” entitling the parties to oral argument and a written opinion on the merits. See

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.App.4th 828, 832 (4th Dist. 1997). In

addition, where the California Supreme Court orders the Court of Appeal to issue an alternative

writ, the appropriateness of extraordinary relief is conclusively established. See San Diego

Service Authority for Freeway Emergencies v. Superior Court, 198 Cal.App.3d 1466, 1468 n.2

(4th Dist. 1988). Such an order is not, however, an indication that the California Supreme Court

has concluded the petitioner is entitled to relief on the merits. See TRW, Inc. v. Superior Court,

25 Cal.App.4th 1834, 1843 n.4 (2nd Dist. 1994); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 68081. An

alternative writ commands the respondent (in this case the Sacramento County Superior Court) to

either: (1) do the act requested to be performed, in which case the cause becomes moot; or (2) file

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a written return setting forth the factual and legal bases which justify the respondent’s refusal to

do the act requested. See Kernes v. Superior Court, 77 Cal.App.4th 525, 529 n.1 (4th Dist. 2000).

Petitioner argues: (1) the Court of Appeal had no power to reject the California

Attorney General’s concession; and (2) the Court of Appeal violated California Government Code

§ 68081 and his right to due process by issuing a written opinion without providing petitioner an

opportunity to be heard via briefing and oral argument. Petitioner’s first argument is

unpersuasive. As outlined above, issuance of an alternative writ permits the respondent to

concede the issue by doing the act requested. In this case, the respondent was the Sacramento

County Superior Court, not the California Attorney General. Thus, the cause would only have

become moot if the Superior Court had elected to allow the late notice of appeal to be filed, which

it did not do. The California Attorney’s General’s concession was of no legal consequence. 

Petitioner’s second argument, however, is compelling in that it touches on the

hallmark of due process and fairness – an opportunity to be heard. It is clear that the California

Court of Appeal failed to follow the procedures outlined above in at least two key respects. First,

the Court of Appeal did not issue an alternative writ as directed. Instead, by summarily denying

relief, it considered whether to issue such a writ and decided not to. Second, and most troubling

to this court, the Court of Appeal did not provide petitioner any opportunity to be heard before

issuing its decision. This is particularly arbitrary given that the Court of Appeal concluded that

petitioner had not shown good cause because of an “unexplained delay of over 60 days.” Had the

Court of Appeal permitted petitioner to be heard on this point, he may have been able to explain

the delay which formed the basis of the state court’s decision. Moreover, the Court of Appeal did

not provide any rationale for its deviation from the required writ procedures. 

This court concludes that, because the Court of Appeal failed to follow state law

writ procedures, the California Supreme Court’s ultimate denial of relief was objectively

unreasonable. In particular, by depriving petitioner an opportunity to be heard, the state courts

deprived petitioner the fundamental hallmark of due process. 

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As to an appropriate remedy, the court finds that petitioner should be put in the

position he would be in had the state court not violated his constitutional rights. In other words,

based on the conclusion reached above that petitioner was denied an opportunity to be heard in the

California Court of Appeal with respect to the alternative writ which the California Supreme

Court directed the Court of Appeal to issue, it would seem that petitioner should be allowed such

an opportunity. It is unclear, however, whether this court has the power to direct the California

Court of Appeal to do what it should have done in the first place – issue an alternative writ and

provide the parties an opportunity to brief the case and be heard at oral argument. 

Another possible solution would be to issue judgment along the lines suggested by

petitioner. Specifically, this court could issue a conditional order directing that respondent – the

warden at the federal immigration detention facility and over whom this court has jurisdiction – to

release petitioner within a certain period of time unless the Court of Appeal issues the alternative

writ and provides petitioner an opportunity to be heard. This would leave the state courts free to

act – or not to act – as they see fit. This approach is somewhat troubling, however, given that it

tends to penalize the federal government, which has an interest in ongoing removal proceedings,

even though it has done nothing to violate petitioner’s constitutional rights. 

Should the district judge agree that federal habeas relief is warranted in this case,

the court finds that further proceedings to determine an appropriate remedy would be appropriate.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus be granted; and

2. This matter be referred back to the magistrate judge for further proceedings

to determine an appropriate remedy.

/ / /

/ / /

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings

and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right

to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 4, 2007

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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