Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-02172/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-02172-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAMMY MARSHALL,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

BROOKDALE PROVIDENT MANAGEMENT, LLC,

 Defendant.

 /

No. C08-02172 CW

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO REMAND

Plaintiff moves to remand this action to San Mateo County

Superior Court. Defendant opposes the motion. The motion is

decided on the papers; the July 10, 2008 hearing is vacated. 

Having considered all the papers filed by the parties, the Court

denies Plaintiff’s motion.

BACKGROUND

On March 27, 2008, Plaintiff Tammy Marshall filed a complaint

in San Mateo County Superior Court. The complaint names Brookdale

Provident Management, LLC, as Defendant. The complaint alleges

retaliation, sexual harassment, failure to prevent discrimination

and harassment, and tortious constructive discharge in violation of

public policy.

Case 3:08-cv-02172-MEJ Document 22 Filed 07/09/08 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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On April 28, 2008, Defendant filed a notice of removal in

which it argued that there is complete diversity of citizenship

between itself and Plaintiff, who is a California resident, and

that the $75,000 jurisdictional limit is satisfied. Plaintiff does

not contest the amount in controversy requirement. 

Defendant is a limited liability company. Its sole member is

Brookdale Living Communities, Inc., which is incorporated in

Delaware, with its principal place of business in Illinois at the

time complaint was filed. The principal place of business for both

Defendant and Brookdale Living Communities, Inc., is now Tennessee. 

Plaintiff does not contest these facts, or the diversity of the

parties.

LEGAL STANDARD

A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to

federal district court so long as the district court could have

exercised original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(a). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1447 provides that if at any time

before judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over a case previously removed from state

court, the case must be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). On a

motion to remand, the scope of the removal statute must be strictly

construed. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.

1992). “The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction

means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that

removal is proper.” Id. Courts should resolve doubts as to

removability in favor of remanding the case to state court. Id.

District courts have original jurisdiction over all civil

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actions “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value

of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . 

citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). When federal

subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of

citizenship, complete diversity must exist between the opposing

parties. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365,

373-74 (1978). “Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be

amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate courts.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1653.

DISCUSSION

The issue here is procedural: Defendant failed to list the

citizenship of its sole member in its notice of removal, although

it did list that information in its disclosure statement. Limited

liability companies are required to list the citizenship of each

member in a notice of removal because, “like a partnership, an LLC

is a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are

citizens.” Johnson v. Columbia Properties Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d

894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). Amendment would clearly cure the defect,

but Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s proposed amendment. Citing

Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(b) and 1447(c), Plaintiff argues that

Defendant should not be allowed to amend because “the thirty day

time limit to remove has expired,” and Plaintiff filed her motion

to remand within thirty days of the notice of removal. Motion to

Remand at 4-5. Defendant contends that “there was no omission of

an allegation” in its notice of removal, “but only a defect as to

form, if at all,” and that “[t]he pleading correctly stated the

fact that complete diversity existed both at the time the Complaint

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was filed and at the time of the removal.” Opposition at 5.

The Supreme Court has held that amendment to show diversity of

citizenship is proper where a removal petition contains “a

technical defect and there are averments sufficient to show

jurisdiction.” Kinney v. Columbia Savings and Loan, 191 U.S. 78,

83 (1903); see also Southern Pacific Co. v. Stewart, 245 U.S. 359,

363 (1917) (noting that “amendments have been permitted so as to

make the allegations of the removal petition more accurate and

certain when the amendment is intended to set forth in proper form

the ground of removal already imperfectly stated”).

Plaintiff argues that by enacting Title 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c),

“the legislature made it clear that parties have thirty days to

object to removal based on ‘any defect’ by filing a motion to

remand,” Reply at 3, and that § 1447(c) trumps the broader language

in Title 28 U.S.C. § 1653. Plaintiff misinterprets § 1447(c). It

provides:

A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect

other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be

made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of

removal. . . . If at any time before final judgment it

appears that the district court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.

This does not suggest, as Plaintiff implies, that remand is proper

and amendment improper whenever there is “any defect” in the

removal notice and a party objects to that defect within thirty

days. Plaintiff cites no case, from this circuit or any other,

that supports her argument that a timely objection to “any defect”

in a removal notice is a sufficient basis for denying a proposed

amendment to cure a technical defect and remanding to state court.

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Plaintiff also relies on the thirty-day amendment period

established by Title 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), which provides, “If the

case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of

removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the

defendant . . . of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or

other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is

one which is or has become removable. . . .” However, § 1446(b) is

not applicable to this case, which has been removable since its

inception. Indeed, Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent weigh

in favor of allowing an amendment to cure a technical defect in an

allegation of jurisdiction. See Kinney, 191 U.S. at 83; Barrow

Dev. Co. v. Fulton Ins. Co., 418 F.2d 316, 317-18 (9th Cir. 1969);

Kacludis v. GTE Sprint Communications Corp., 806 F. Supp. 866, 869

(N.D. Cal. 1992).

In Kacludis, the court noted, “In this circuit, as in every

circuit court that has dealt with the question elsewhere, defects

in form of a removal petition are amendable at any time, not just

within the original 30-day period for removal. . . . This is

particularly true where, as here, the requisite jurisdictional

allegations are not omitted entirely, but rather are merely

defective in form.” Id. Plaintiff attempts to distinguish

Kacludis and Barrow from the instant case by pointing out that, in

both of those cases, the plaintiffs “did not object to the defects

in the removal petition by filing a § 1447(c) motion to remand”

within thirty days, and that, in Kacludis, the defendant filed a

motion for leave to amend the removal petition, which Defendant in

the instant case has not done. Reply at 3-6. However, these

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factors do not fundamentally alter the underlying reasons for

allowing amendment to cure a technical defect, nor do they undercut

the two cases’ broad holdings.

The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion representative of an emerging

national consensus on this issue, has held that, even in situations

where the thirty-day removal deadline has passed, it is “[b]etter,

if the jurisdiction in fact exists, to permit the petition for

removal to be amended to reflect it.” Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co.,

997 F.2d 150, 164 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Stanley Elec.

Contractors, Inc. v. Darin & Armstrong Co., 486 F. Supp. 769, 772-

73 (E.D. Ky. 1980)). The court noted that

the time has come to apply the principles of modern

pleading relating to amendments to removal petitions,

and that amendments should be permitted, to implement

the spirit of the statute and rules cited herein, where

the jurisdictional facts do indeed exist, and the

parties are in law entitled to invoke the jurisdiction

of the federal court.

Id. (quoting Stanley, 486 F. Supp. at 772-73) (emphasis in

original); see also Giangola v. Walt Disney World Co., 753 F. Supp.

148, 153 n.5 (D.N.J. 1990); Barrow, 418 F.2d at 18; Riehl v. Nat’l

Mut. Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 1967); Jackson v.

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 707, 709 (E.D. Ky. 1977);

Hendrix v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 390 F.2d 299, 300-02 (10th

Cir. 1968) (cautioning against “exalt[ing] form over substance and

legal flaw-picking over the orderly disposition of cases properly

committed to federal courts”).

In the instant case, jurisdictional facts exist to establish

complete diversity, and Plaintiff had sufficient notice of these

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facts because they were listed in Defendant’s disclosure statement. 

Defendant has met its burden to demonstrate “that removal is

proper.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. Because Plaintiff does not

actually contest diversity of citizenship, and because Defendant is

not seeking to make any new allegation, Defendant’s failure--for

whatever reason--to list the citizenship of its sole member

explicitly in the notice of removal can easily be cured by

amendment. Such amendment is therefore permitted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to remand is

DENIED. (Docket No. 12.) Defendant is granted three days to

submit an amended notice of removal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/9/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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