Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02864/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02864-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 FLOYD ANTHONY RODGERS,

Patient #067265-9,

Case No.: 3:16-cv-02864-BEN-JMA

12 ORDER: Plaintiff,

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(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS;

and

vs. 14

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO,

Defendants.

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16 (2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE

GRANTED PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

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21 Floyd Anthony Rodgers (“Plaintiff’), proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights

complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while he was civilly detained at

Atascadero State Hospital (“ASH”) in Atascadero, California.1 (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff

did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead he filed a

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27 It appears Plaintiffis no longer civilly detained; on October 12,2016, he filed a Notice ofChange of

Address indicating he has been released from custody and is now residing in Chula Vista, California.

(Doc. No. 4.) 28

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Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (Doc.

No. 2.)

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3 Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court ofthe

United States, except an application for writ ofhabeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$400.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiffs failure to

prepay the entire fee only ifhe is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v.

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999).

“Unlike other indigent litigants, prisoners proceeding IFP must pay the full amount

offiling fees in civil actions and appeals pursuant to the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform

Act].” Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2002). As defined by the PLRA, a

“prisoner” is “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of,

convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or

the terms and conditions ofparole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(h).

A “civil detainee” is not a “prisoner” within the meaning ofthe PLRA. Andrews v.

King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir 2005); Agyeman, 296 F.3d at 886 (holding that INS

detainee not also facing criminal charges is not a “prisoner” under § 1915); see also Page

v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000) (person confined under California’s

Sexually Violent Predator Law, while a “a ‘prisoner’ within the meaning ofthe PLRA

when he served time for his conviction,... ceased being a ‘prisoner’ when he was

released from the custody ofthe Department ofCorrections.”); Mullen v. Surtshin, 590 F.

I.

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2 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of$50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule ofFees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff.

June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed

IFP. Id.

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Supp. 2d 1233, 1240 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding plaintiff “adjudicated NGI [not guilty by

reason ofinsanity] and committed to [Napa State Hospital] as a result ofthat

adjudication” was “not a prisoner as defined by the PLRA.”).

As alleged in his Complaint, Plaintiffwas a civilly committed patient at ASH, and

not a “prisoner” as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h) when he filed this action. (Doc. No.

I.) Therefore, the filing fee provisions of28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) do not apply. Andrews,

398 F.3d at 1122. Accordingly, the Court has reviewed Plaintiffs affidavit of assets as it

would for any other non-prisoner litigant seeking IFP status, and finds it is sufficient to

show that he is unable to pay the fees or post securities required to maintain this action.

See S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2(d). Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a) is therefore GRANTED. (Doc. No. 2.)

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

A. Standard ofReview

A complaint filed by any person proceeding in forma pauperis is subject to sua

sponte dismissal ifit is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or seek[s] monetary relieffrom a defendant immune from such relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per

curiam) (holding that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to

prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection

1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis

complaint that fails to state a claim.”).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement ofthe claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Crv. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals ofthe elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009)

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is]... a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on itsjudicial experience and common sense.” Id.

3:16-cv-02864-BEN-JMA

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The “mere possibility ofmisconduct” falls short ofmeeting this plausibility standard. Id.;

see also Moss v. US. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Gir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations ofmaterial fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language ofFederal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se,

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir.

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026,1027 n.l (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of

Regents ofthe University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Plaintiffs Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that he was criminally convicted of charges of“serious great

bodily injury” on November 22, 2002, in a San Diego Superior Court. (Compl. at 3.)

Plaintiff claims his sentence resulted in “double jeopardy,” as well as “cruel and unusual

punishment,” in violation ofhis constitutional rights. (Id.) Plaintiffwas then housed in

the custody ofthe California Department ofCorrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) for

fifteen years. (Id.)

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16 B.

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23 C. Statute ofLimitations

24 Plaintiffs claims arose when he was sentenced in 2002. (Doc. No. 1 at 1, 3-4.) “A

claim may be dismissed [for failing to state a claim] on the ground that it is barred by the

applicable statute oflimitations only when ‘the running ofthe statute is apparent on the

face ofthe complaint.”’ Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum ofArt at Pasadena, 592

F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992,

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997 (9th Cir. 2006)). ‘“A complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt

that the plaintiff can prove no set offacts that would establish the timeliness ofthe

claim.’” Id. (quoting Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. U.S., 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995));

see also Cervantes v. City ofSan Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1993) (where the

running ofthe statute oflimitations is apparent on the face of a complaint, dismissal for

failure to state a claim is proper, so long as Plaintiffis provided an opportunity to amend

in order to allege facts which, ifproved, might support tolling); see also Tahoe-Sierra

Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 788 (9th Cir. 2000)

(court may raise the defense ofstatute oflimitations sua sponte); Hughes v. Lott, 350

F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) ofprisoner’s time-barred complaint).

Because section 1983 contains no specific statute oflimitation, federal courts apply

the forum state’s statute oflimitations for personal injury actions. Jones v. Blanas, 393

F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004);

Finkv. Shedler, 192 F.3d911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). Before 2003, California’s statute of

limitations was one year. Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. Effective January 1, 2003, the

limitations period was extended to two years. Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1).

The law ofthe forum state also governs tolling. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394

(2007) (citing Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1989)); Jones, 393 F.3d at 927

(noting that in actions where the federal court borrows the state statute oflimitation, the

federal court also borrows all applicable provisions for tolling the limitations period

found in state law).

Under California law, the statute oflimitations for prisoners serving less than a life

sentence is tolled for two years. Cal. Crv. Proc. Code § 352.1(a); Johnson v. California,

207 F.3d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).

Accordingly, the effective statute oflimitations for most California prisoners is three

years for claims accruing before January 1, 2003 (one year limitations period plus two

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year statutory tolling), and four years for claims accruing thereafter (two year limitations

period plus two years statutory tolling).

Unlike the length ofthe limitations period, however, “the accrual date of a § 1983

cause of action is a question offederal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.”

Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388; Hardin, 490 U.S. at 543-44 (federal law governs when a

§ 1983 cause of action accrues). “Under the traditional rule ofaccrual... the tort cause of

action accrues, and the statute oflimitation begins to run, when the wrongful act or

omission results in damages.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391. Put another way, “[u]nder

federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiffknows or has reason to know ofthe injury

which is the basis ofthe action.” Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955; TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174

F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999).

In this case, the “wrongful act” which is alleged to have caused Plaintiffharm

occurred almost fifteen years before Plaintifffiled his Complaint in this action, and far

outside California’s statute oflimitations, even including all presumed periods oftolling

provided by statute, or pending the exhaustion of any administrative remedies. Wallace,

591 U.S. at 391; see also Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955; Cal. Code Crv. Proc. § 335.1

(tolling statute oflimitations “for a maximum of 2 years” during a prisoner’s

incarceration); Jones, 393 F.3d at 927; Brown v. Valojf, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005)

(finding that “the applicable statute oflimitations must be tolled while a prisoner

completes the mandatory exhaustion process” required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)).3

Specifically, Plaintiff claims he was denied his constitutional rights when he was

sentenced in 2002. (See Compl. at 1, 3-4.) Therefore, he had “reason to know” the basis

ofhis cause of action in 2002, but did not file this case until November 21, 2016— more

than a decade after the limitations period elapsed. See Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955.

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3 In fact, Plaintiff concedes that he did not exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing suit.

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Plaintiffs claims could be considered timely if, in his Complaint, he alleges facts

sufficient to show the limitations period may be equitably tolled. See Cervantes, 5 F.3d

at 1276-77. Generally, federal courts also apply the forum state’s law regarding equitable

tolling. Fink, 192 F.3d at 914; Bacon v. City of Los Angeles, 843 F.2d 372, 374 (9th

Cir.1988). Under California law, Plaintiffmust meet three conditions to equitably toll the

statute oflimitations: (1) he must have diligently pursued his claim; (2) his situation must

be the product offorces beyond his control; and (3) Defendants must not be prejudiced

by the application of equitable tolling. See Hull v. Central Pathology Serv. Med Clinic,

28 Cal. App. 4th 1328, 1335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Addison v. State ofCalifornia, 21

Cal.3d 313, 316-17 (Cal. 1978); Fink, 192 F.3d at 916.

The Court finds Plaintiffs Complaint lacks any factual allegations that, ifproven,

would support any plausible claim for equitable tolling. See Cervantes, 5 F.3d at 1277;

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs claims are barred by the

statute oflimitations, and his entire Complaint must be dismissed for failing to state a

claim upon which section 1983 reliefmay be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii);

Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194.

Criminal Proceedings

To the extent that Plaintiffseeks damages based on an allegedly unconstitutional

criminal conviction and sentence, he may not pursue those claims in a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without first showing that his conviction has already been

invalidated. See Heck v. Humphry, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held:

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by

actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or

sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiffmust prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ ofhabeas

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corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that

relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

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4 Id. at 486-87.

“Suits challenging the validity ofthe prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within

‘the heart ofhabeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state

prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions ofhis prison life, but

not to the fact or length ofhis custody.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir.

2003), quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-99 (1973) (holding that a writ of

habeas corpus is “explicitly and historically designed” to provide a state prisoner with the

“exclusive” means to “attack the validity ofhis confinement” in federal court).

Plaintiffs claims amount to an attack on the validity ofhis underlying criminal

conviction and sentence, and may not proceed pursuant to § 1983, unless his conviction

has already been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 855-56

(“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state

remedies has no cause of action under § 1983.’”), quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489. Such

claims “necessarily imply the invalidity” ofhis conviction and continued incarceration.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. The Court takesjudicial notice that Plaintiffhas challenged,

unsuccessfully, his criminal conviction and sentence on more than one occasion by way

ofpetitions for writ ofhabeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254: Rodgers v. San

Diego County, etal., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:05-cv001814-BEN-BLM; Rodgers v.

Kernan, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:06-cv-01384-L-POR. Both ofthose petitions

have been dismissed.

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24 E. Immune Defendants

While Plaintiffnames the “Superior Court of San Diego” as a Defendant, the Court

will constme this as a claim against the unnamed judicial officer who imposed Plaintiffs

criminal sentence following his conviction. However, these claims are legally frivolous,

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1 for “[jJudges are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their

official capacities.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986).

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

(Doc. No. 2); and

2. DISMISSES Plaintiffs Complaint for failing to state a claim and as

frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Because the

Court finds further amendment futile, leave to amend is DENIED. See Cahill v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an

abuse of discretion where further amendment would be futile).

3. The Court further CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order of

dismissal would not be taken “in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548,

550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if

appeal would not be frivolous).

The Clerk shall enterjudgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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20 Dated: 2017 %

21 ^iON. R0Ger ^Benitez

Unitea StafesTMstrict Judge

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