Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05891/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05891-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 25:640 Indian Tribal Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROSELIND QUAIR and CHARLOTTE )

BERNA, )

)

)

)

Petitioners, )

)

v. )

)

DENA BEGA, et al., )

)

)

Respondents. )

 )

CV F 02 5891 REC DLB

AMENDED ORDER GRANTING SANTA

ROSA RANCHERIA TACHI-YOKUT TRIBE’S

MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION

SUBPOENA

[DOC #177]

On March 29, 2005, the Santa Rosa Rancheria Tachi-Yokut Tribe (“Tribe”) filed the

instant motion to quash a deposition subpoena and subpoena for production of documents issued

by Petitioners on November 23, 2004. The motion was heard on April 22, 2005, before the

Honorable Dennis L. Beck. Laurie L. Quigley and Kirsten Zumwalt appeared on behalf of

Respondents. Robert Rhoan, Patrick Guillory and Leah Castella appeared on behalf of

Petitioners. 

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of the June 1, 2000, disenrollment and banishment of Petitioners

Roselind Quair and Charlotte Berna (“Petitioners”) from the Tribe. On February 3, 2003,

Petitioners, pursuant to Section 1303 of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.,

(“ICRA”), filed amended petitions for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners allege that because the

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proceedings which resulted in their disenrollment as members of the Tribe and banishment from

the Tribe’s Rancheria were in violation of their rights guaranteed under ICRA, these actions

constituted an unlawful detention and restraint of liberty.

On July 26, 2004, the Honorable Robert E. Coyle denied in part and granted in part the

parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Pursuant to the order, the issues remaining in this

action are: (1) whether Petitioners were denied due process; and (2) whether Petitioners were

denied a fair trial.

In August 2004, Petitioners filed a motion to reopen discovery. A hearing was held on

September 24, 2004, before the Honorable Dennis L. Beck. Judge Beck deferred ruling on the

motion pending the outcome of a re-hearing held by the Tribe on Petitioners’ disenrollment and

banishment. A re-hearing was held on October 1, 2004, and the Tribe again voted to disenroll

and banish Petitioners. 

On October 29, 2004, Judge Beck held a scheduling conference to consider Petitioners’

request to re-open discovery. On December 22, 2004, Judge Beck issued an Amended

Scheduling Order allowing the re-opening of discovery. 

Pursuant to the amended scheduling order, Petitioner’s noticed a number of depositions,

including a deposition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) of the Tribe’s person most

knowledgeable (PMK) on seven topics. The PMK notice also included fifteen document

requests.

The Tribe filed the instant motion on March 29, 2005, and argues that the Tribe’s

sovereign immunity shields it from this Court’s process. The Tribe contends there has been no

waiver of tribal immunity under the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) and therefore Petitioners

cannot pursue discovery against the Tribe. On April 19, 2005, the parties filed a joint statement

regarding the discovery dispute. Petitioners argue the Tribe’s sovereign immunity has been

waived under the ICRA for the limited purpose of discovery in a habeas suit. 

DISCUSSION

Tribal immunity from suit remains intact “absent express and unequivocal waiver of

immunity by the tribe or abrogation of tribal immunity by Congress.” Burlington N. R.R. Co.

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v.Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1212, 112 S.Ct. 3013,

120 L.Ed.2d 887 (1992). Petitioners concede that Section 1303 does not provide an "express and

unequivocal waiver of immunity.” Indeed, the Supreme Court has held, “[t]he provisions of

habeas relief in Section 1303 did not constitute a general waiver of sovereign immunity.” Santa

Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). Instead Petitioners urge this Court to find an

implied waiver of tribal immunity in section 1303 for the limited purpose of permitting the

gathering the information necessary to determine whether the procedural protections provided by

the Tribe comport with those required by the ICRA. Petitioners argue that without such implied

waiver, the ICRA is rendered unenforceable. The Court rejects Petitioners argument.

The Court does not find and Petitioner has not cited any binding authority for finding an

implied waiver of tribal immunity under the ICRA. The decisions in this circuit tend to support

the opposite conclusion. See United States v. James, 980 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir, 1992), cert. denied,

510 U.S. 838 (1993) [Tribe was immune from process as they possessed tribal immunity at the

time the subpeona was served, thereby affirming the district’s court’s decision to quash the

subpoena and request for production of documents]; see also Bishop Paiute v. County of Inyo,

291 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2002)[“this court reaffirms James and holds that the Tribe is possessed of

sovereign immunity which bars the execution of the warrant”], vacated and remanded on other

grounds 538 U.S. 701 (2003). Even if the Court were to adopt Petitioner’s argument that in

general, tribal immunity renders ICRA unenforceable, there is no merit to the argument in this

case. The Tribe is not and cannot be a Respondent in an ICRA case. See Santa Clara Pueblo v.

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1 The Court expresses no opinion and this Order in no way modifies Judge Coyle’s Order

regarding this issue. 

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Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). As Judge Coyle stated in his order granting in part cross motions

for summary judgment: 

[P]etitioners contend that the members of the Tribal Council are the proper

respondents because they are empowered to end petitioners’ banishment, asserting 

. . . The court agrees with petitioners. Requiring petitioners to name and sue every

member of the Tribe's General Council as a respondent in a habeas corpus

proceeding pursuant to Section 1303 makes that remedy unavailable for all

practical purposes. It is apparent from the record before the court that the Tribal

Council acts on behalf of and at the behest of the General Council. Therefore, the

members of the Tribal Council are the proper respondents in this matter [citation

omitted].1

The document requests issued to the Tribe with the deposition subpeona are virtually

identical to the document requests issued to the individual Respondents. As the members of the

Tribal Council, Respondents represent that they have “combed through their personal files, and

the files of the Tribal Council so as to produce documents to Petitioners.” Respondents represent

that all documents sensitive to Petitioner’s document requests have been produced. If there are

issues regarding the adequacy of the document production, Petitioners can, as they have done,

seek Court intervention in the discovery process. Petitioners have failed to identify and the Court

cannot conceive of any relevant information Petitioners could obtain from the Tribe that they

cannot obtain from the Respondents. Petitioners’ insistence that obtaining discovery from the

Tribe itself is essential to their case simply has no merit.

Accordingly, because there is no express waiver of immunity by the tribe or abrogation of

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tribal immunity by Congress under the ICRA and there is no support for an implied waiver of

immunity, the Court finds that the Tribe was possessed of tribal immunity at the time the subject

subpeonas were served. The Tribe’s motion to quash the subject subpoenas is therefore

GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 19, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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