Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01320/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01320-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sean Patrick Husband,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, Arizona Attorney General,

Respondents.

No. CV 13-01320 PHX DLR (MEA)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. RAYES:

Petitioner, who is pro se in this matter, docketed a petition seeking a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 1, 2013. In an order issued 

September 16, 2013, the Court granted Petitioner’s motion for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis and ordered Respondents to answer the petition. See Doc. 7. On December 18, 

2013, Petitioner docketed an amended petition. See Doc. 15. On December 20, 2013, 

Respondents were ordered to answer the amended petition. Respondents docketed an 

answer to the amended petition for habeas corpus relief on February 25, 2014. See Doc. 

25 & Doc. 26. The matter was reassigned on May 15, 2014. Petitioner docketed a reply 

(Doc. 40) to the response to his amended habeas petition on July 21, 2014.

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I Procedural background

A Maricopa County grand jury indictment returned November 28, 2005, charged 

Petitioner with three counts of sexual assault (Counts 1, 4, and 5), and three counts of 

sexual abuse (Counts 2, 3, and 6). See Answer, Exh. A. The indictment alleged that 

Petitioner committed Counts 1, 2, and 3 against Meagan D. on or about August 17 and 

18, 2004; Counts 4 and 5 against Stephanie K. on November 21, 2002; and Count 6 

against Melissa A. on July 12, 2001. Id., Exh. A. On December 3, 2005, Petitioner 

informed the state court that he was not indigent and retained counsel entered an 

appearance on behalf of Petitioner. Petitioner’s retained counsel filed numerous pretrial 

motions on Petitioner’s behalf.1

Respondents aver:

During the final pretrial conference, the [state trial court judge]: (1) 

conducted an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion to sever counts

[see Answer, Exh. E] and denied the request for a separate trial for each 

victim...; (2) heard argument on and denied Petitioner’s motion to dismiss 

Count 6 on due process grounds...; (3) denied the State’s request to 

consolidate the instant case with CR 2006-106928, wherein Petitioner was 

charged with influencing a witness, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-2801 and 

13-28022...and (4) granted the State’s motion in limine to preclude evidence 

 

1 Respondents represent these motions as:

(1) a motion for release of the grand jury transcript for trial preparation purposes 

[]; (2) a motion to sever counts...[]; (3) a motion for production of results of the 

forensic tests performed on biological evidence taken from all three victims, as 

well as any recordings and transcripts of their police interviews []; (4) a motion to 

dismiss Count 6 (the sexual abuse charge involving Melissa A.) with prejudice, 

pursuant to the due process clauses of the United States and Arizona 

Constitutions, because “the State has destroyed the physical evidence...including 

clothes with possible trace evidence, a handwritten statement of the accuser, and 

the taped statement of the accuser,” allegedly “after the police and prosecutors 

determined no crime had occurred” []; and (5) a motion “to release all physical 

evidence for testing,” namely trace biological evidence that Sexual Assault Nurse 

Examiner (“SANE”) [] had obtained from Meagan D.’s back [].

Answer at 3 (internal citations omitted).

2 Respondents aver:

 Although Petitioner initially posted a bond of $180,000 to secure his release on 

the instant charges, the trial court subsequently revoked his pretrial release status 

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of the victims’ sexual histories, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1421...

Id. at 3.

On November 28, 2006, the date set for Petitioner’s trial, Petitioner moved, pro 

per, to replace his retained counsel and to continue his trial pending his retention of new 

counsel. Id., Exh. B at Bates Stamp Number 00060. A hearing on the motion was 

conducted that same day (id., Exh. F), during which Petitioner’s trial counsel allowed that 

he had not acted as Petitioner had desired, that there was an “ongoing antagonistic 

relationship between what he thinks should be done, and what I believe should be done. 

Some of it is material. It doesn’t go to ethical....If Mr. Husband wants to terminate me, 

that’s fine with me. I think in some ways that’s to his advantage...” Id., Exh. F at 4. 

Counsel stated that he could represent Petitioner “to the best of my ability, but there are 

major differences that we have. I think another attorney could represent Mr. Husband’s 

interests better.” Id., Exh. F at 5. Counsel stated that counsel and Petitioner had differed 

over the advisability of presenting additional witnesses and other strategic matters, and 

counsel indicated that Petitioner wanted further investigation before going to trial. Id., 

Exh. F at 5. Petitioner stated that he wished to retain different counsel, but that he had 

not identified who he wished to retain to represent him. The motion to change counsel 

and to continue the trial was denied at the conclusion of the hearing. Id., Exh. F.

Petitioner’s jury trial began November 28, 2006. All three victims testified at 

Petitioner’s trial. Id., Exh. H & I, Exh. J, Exh. K, Exh. M. The jury was allowed to 

submit questions at the conclusion of each witness’ testimony. Petitioner testified as to 

his service in the United States military for eight years, including attending Officer 

Training School and an honorable discharge. Id., Exh. M at 96-98. Petitioner testified at 

 

and ordered Petitioner held without bond after finding the “proof is evident and 

the presumption great” that Petitioner attempted to influence Meagan D’s 

testimony by sending two men to her house to convey the threatening message 

that she should “forget what happened at the In and Out Burger,” the scene of the 

misconduct underlying Counts 1-3 of the indictment. (Exhibit A: P.I., Item 20; 

Exhibit B: Items 21, 23, 24; Exhibit D: R.T. 3/23/06, at 27, 33-34.) Consequently, 

Petitioner remained incarcerated at the Maricopa County Jail during the remainder 

of the pretrial proceedings.

Answer at 4 n.1. See also id., Exh. D (transcript of hearing regarding revocation of bond). 

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his trial that any sexual contact between Petitioner and the victims was consensual. Id., 

Exh. M at 100-04, 109-115, 116-21 & Exh. N. Petitioner testified that he had received 

what was referred to as a “confrontation call” from Melissa, which he later learned had 

been arranged by Detective Hall, who had also listened to the call. Id., Exh. M at 113-15. 

The confrontation call was played for the jury and Petitioner acknowledged that a policeprepared transcript of the call appeared to be an accurate rendition of the call. Id., Exh. N 

at 27-28. All of the jury’s questions at the conclusion of Petitioner’s testimony involved 

the charges and testimony regarding Stephanie. Id., Exh. N. In addition to testifying, in 

his defense Petitioner presented character witnesses who testified on his behalf, including 

his sister-in-law, a friend who served with him in the military and was involved in a 

business venture with Petitioner, and a family friend who had known him since 

childhood. Id., Exh. M at 72-96. Each of these witnesses testified that Petitioner was an

honest person and that Petitioner was respectful towards women. 

The jury began deliberations on December 13, 2006, and the verdicts were 

returned on December 14, 2006. Id., Exh. B & Exh. O. On December 14, 2006, a 

hearing was conducted regarding questions submitted by the jury, which hearing was in 

the presence of the trial judge, Mr. Peterson for Mr. Freeman, Petitioner’s trial counsel, 

and Mr. Trudgian for Ms. Baker, the prosecutor. Mr. Peterson waived Petitioner’s 

presence at the conference regarding the questions from the jury. Id., Exh. O. The first 

question was a request from the jury to see transcripts of a victim’s statement and police 

reports—counsel agreed the only thing the jury could see while deliberating were the 

items already introduced into evidence. Id. at 3-4. The jury also asked if it could 

consider guilt based “solely on the description [of the crime] given when the charges 

were read,” or if it could consider other physical acts which were testified to by the 

victims—the jury represented that it was “stuck” with regard to the charges concerning 

Melissa. Id. at 5. Mr. Peterson noted that the jury appeared to be adding specificity to 

the charges in the indictment, which was read to the jury, when in fact the indictment did 

not contain that level of specificity. Mr. Peterson agreed with the trial judge that the most 

appropriate way to answer the jury’s question was to provide them with a copy of the 

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indictment with the class of crimes redacted. Id. at 6-7. The parties agreed that the 

appropriate answer to this question was to direct the jury to consider the evidence, the 

testimony, and their instructions, and that the jury would be provided a copy of the 

indictment. Id. at 7.

The jury convicted Petitioner on the counts involving Meagan (Counts 1, 2 and 3) 

and Melissa (Count 6), and acquitted him on both charges involving Stephanie (Counts 4 

and 5). Id., Exh. A & Exh. B. On February 2, 2007, after a hearing (id., Exh. P),

Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive term of seven years imprisonment pursuant 

to his conviction on Count 1 and to three concurrent terms of lifetime probation pursuant 

to his conviction on Counts 2, 3, and 6. Id., Exh. A & Exh. B.3

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his convictions and sentences. Petitioner 

retained private counsel to represent him in his direct appeal, in which he asserted:

1. The trial court committed structural error when it deprived [Petitioner] of 

his 6th and 14th Amendment right to counsel of choice.

2. The trial court deprived [Petitioner] of his right to a fair trial in violation 

of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment when it denied his 

motion to sever counts.

3. The court deprived [Petitioner] of his right to a fair trial in violation of 

the Due Process Clause when it gave a [Rule] 404(c) instruction not for 

“other acts” but for the actual charges in the indictment.

4. Unauthorized and prejudicial [Rule] 404(c) evidence was improperly 

admitted and resulted in an unfair trial in violation of the 5th and 6th 

Amendments and the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.

5. The jury was never instructed on clear and convincing evidence, 

allowing it to consider evidence of actual charged crimes without guidance 

of the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments.

6. The reasonable doubt instruction lowered the State’s burden of proof in 

violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments, deprived [Petitioner] of his right 

to due process of law in violation of the 14th Amendment and Article II, § 

4 of the Arizona Constitution, and his right to trial by jury in violation of 

the 6th and 14th Amendments and Article II, §§ 23 & 24 of the Arizona 

Constitution..

7. The trial court deprived [Petitioner] of his right to due process of law in 

violation of the 14th Amendment and Article II, § 4 of the Arizona 

 

3

Petitioner is still in custody pursuant to his conviction on the charge of witness 

tampering, for which he received a sentence of two years and three months imprisonment.

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Constitution by failing to give the jury a Willits4instruction.

Id., Exh. Q.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences in a 

decision issued September 4, 2008. Id., Exh. T. See also 2008 WL 4152841. The 

Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review on February 10, 2009. Id. Exh. W.

Petitioner initiated a timely action for state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 

32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. In his Rule 32 action, in which he was 

represented by counsel, Petitioner argued that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance of counsel “in violation of the 6th and 14th Amendments [of the United States 

Constitution] and Article II, § 24 of the Arizona Constitution....” Id., Exh. Y. Petitioner 

alleged his rights were violated because his counsel admitted he had not met with 

Petitioner although he had conferred with him by phone, that he and Petitioner disagreed 

about trial strategy, and that counsel stated another attorney could better represent 

Petitioner. Petitioner also argued his counsel’s performance was deficient because 

counsel failed to object to the trial court’s Rule 404 “lack of finding”, because counsel 

“failed” to renew the motion to sever counts, because counsel “delegated” the 

interviewing of witnesses and because counsel did not interview Detective Hall; because 

counsel failed to object to the “clear and convincing” jury instruction; because counsel 

failed to object to the “reasonable doubt” instruction; because counsel “failed to secure a 

Willits instruction”; because counsel failed to “secure” a jury instruction with regard to 

the weight to be afforded a police officer’s testimony; because counsel was 

simultaneously trying a case in Gila County and because counsel traveled to New York 

before the jury returned a verdict and counsel was not present for the verdict (“counsel 

jammed the presentation of the defense case” and “the verdict was taken” by substitute 

counsel); and because counsel “failed to secure” the attendance of character witnesses. 

Id., Exh. Y.

 

4

See Arizona v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184, 393 P.2d 274 (1964) (involving the proper 

instruction to the jury when the defendant contends that the prosecution has lost or destroyed 

exculpatory evidence, allowing the jury to presume the evidence was exculpatory).

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In a supplemental pleading Petitioner argued that he was denied his right to 

confront the witnesses against him because Petitioner’s counsel was not allowed to crossexamine a victim-witness regarding a prior experience of alleged sexual assault. The 

state filed a response brief. The state trial court denied relief on May 21, 2010, 

summarily finding that Petitioner had failed to establish a colorable claim for relief based 

on the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that Petitioner’s claim regarding the 

cross-examination of a witness was precluded by the failure to raise the issue in his direct 

appeal. Id., Exh. CC.

Petitioner appealed the trial court’s decision regarding his ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims but did not seek review of the trial court’s ruling that his confrontationclause claim was precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3), Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. On March 28, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review

of the trial court’s decision denying state post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. GG. The 

Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review on September 25, 2012. Id., Exh. JJ

In his amended federal habeas petition Petitioner alleges the following bases for 

relief:

“Ground I Ineffective assistance of counsel: Cumulative prejudice” Petitioner 

contends that he was “denied his counsel of choice” and that he was “forced to trial with 

admittedly deficient counsel,” in violation of his 6th and 14th Amendment rights.

“Ground II Ineffective assistance of counsel. Failure to interview or secure 

witnesses”.

“Ground III Counsel chose to be absent at a critical stage due to a conflict”.

“Ground IV Ineffective assistance of counsel Acquiescence to prosecutorial 

misconduct”.

“Ground V Prosecutorial misconduct”.

“Ground VI Counsel of choice violation”.

“Ground VII Improper joinder Cumulative error”.

“Ground 8 Jury instructions Lowered burden of proof”.

Doc. 15 (Amended Petition).

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Respondents contend that Petitioner did not properly exhaust some of his federal 

habeas claims in the state courts. Respondents contend that Petitioner is not entitled to 

habeas relief on the merits of the claims which were properly exhausted.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default

Absent specific circumstances, the District Court may only grant federal habeas 

relief on the merits of a claim which has been “properly” exhausted in the state courts. 

See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman 

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554–55 (1991). To properly 

exhaust a federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity 

to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly presenting” the claim to the state’s 

“highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 

346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 

2005). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital cases 

arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the 

habeas petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either in a direct 

appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Date v. Schriro, 619 F. Supp. 2d 736, 762-63 (D. Ariz. 

2008); Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz. 2007).

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the exhaustion requirement, the 

petitioner must present “both the operative facts and the legal principles that control each 

claim to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 2001). See

also Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014). In Baldwin v. Reese, the 

Supreme Court reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states the 

opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 

124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004). Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal 

habeas claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a specific federal 

constitutional right, as opposed to violation of a state law or a state procedural rule, the 

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federal habeas claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g., id., 541 U.S. 

at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351. See also Arrendondo v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 

2014).

In order to fulfill exhaustion requirements, a petitioner must present to the state 

courts the “substantial equivalent” of the claim presented in federal court. Picard v. 

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513–14 (1971); Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 

1302, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 2014); Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Full and fair presentation requires a petitioner to present the substance of his claim to the 

state courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement of 

facts that entitle the petitioner to relief. See Arrendondo, 763 F.3d at 1138; Scott v. 

Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th 

Cir. 2007). Although a habeas petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal 

constitution” to fairly present a claim to the state courts, Picard, 404 U.S. at 277–78, 92 

S. Ct. at 512–13, they must do more than present the facts necessary to support the 

federal claim. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

In order to “fairly present” an issue to a state court, a petitioner must 

“present the substance of his claim to the state courts, including a reference 

to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement of facts that entitle the 

petitioner to relief.” Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir.2009). As 

a general matter, each “unrelated alleged instance [ ] of counsel’s 

ineffectiveness” is a separate claim for purposes of exhaustion. Moormann 

v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005). In Moormann, for 

example, we held that petitioner’s claim that “counsel was ineffective for 

failing to investigate and present a viable defense” did not fairly present the 

more specific claim that counsel was ineffective in “presenting the insanity 

defense.” Id. Thus, we recognized that while a petitioner who “presented a 

particular claim” would not be barred from later “develop[ing] additional 

facts supporting that particular claim,” it did not mean that “a petitioner 

who presented any ineffective assistance of counsel claim below can later 

add unrelated alleged instances of counsel’s ineffectiveness to [that] claim.” 

Id. at 1056; see also Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(en banc) (holding that an ineffective assistance claim for failure to 

vigorously cross-examine a witness did not exhaust ineffective assistance 

claims directed to other independent omissions by counsel).

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Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2013).

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal habeas claim if he still has 

the right to raise the claim “by any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(c). Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to remedies still available to the 

petitioner at the time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is satisfied if the 

petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in the state courts. See

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92–93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the 

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is 

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 

548 U.S. at 92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387.

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never presented a federal habeas 

claim in state court and is now barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, 

including rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 

351–52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural default also occurs when a petitioner did present 

a claim to the state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of the claim 

because the petitioner failed to follow a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594–95 (1991); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 727–28, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553–57(1991); Szabo v. Walls, 313 

F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by ‘violating a 

state procedural rule which would constitute adequate and independent grounds to bar 

direct review ... he may not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause 

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 

2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts in either a direct 

appeal or on collateral review in a Rule 32 action are generally barred from federal 

review because an attempt to return to state court to present them is futile unless the 

claims fit in a narrow category of claims for which a successive Rule 32 action is 

permitted. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)–(h), 32.2(a) & (b) (successive petitions are 

limited to claims of being held in custody beyond sentence expiration, newly-discovered 

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material facts, requests for delayed appeal, significant change in the law retroactively 

applicable that would probably overturn conviction or sentence, and actual innocence); 

Spreitz v. Ryan, 617 F. Supp. 2d 887, 899–900 (D. Ariz. 2009) (describing Arizona’s 

preclusion rule).

For the procedural default rule to apply, “the application of the state 

procedural rule must provide an adequate and independent state law basis 

on which the state court can deny relief.” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 

580 (9th Cir. 2003) (amended) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). Arizona’s waiver rules are independent and adequate bases for 

denying relief. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 859–60, 122 S.Ct. 2578, []

(2002) (per curiam) (holding denials pursuant to Arizona waiver rules are 

independent of federal law); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931–32 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (finding Arizona waiver rule consistently and regularly applied).

Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 

3139 (No. 14-191 ) (Aug. 15, 2014).

To constitute an adequate and independent state procedural ground sufficient to 

support a state court’s finding of procedural default, “a state rule must be clear, 

consistently applied, and well-established at the time of [the] petitioner’s purported 

default.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Murray v.

Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2014) A state rule is considered consistently 

applied and well-established if the state courts follow it in the “vast majority of cases.” 

Scott, 567 F.3d at 580, quoting Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 417 n.6, 109 S. Ct. 

1211, 1221 n.6 (1989). Additionally, for the proffered state procedural bar to preclude 

the consideration of a habeas claim “the state court must actually have relied on the 

procedural bar as an independent basis for its disposition of the case.” Caldwell v. 

Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2638–39 (1985). See also Harris v. 

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261–62, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1042 (1989).

“[A] procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on 

either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a 

judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a 

state procedural bar.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 263, 109 S.Ct. 1038, [ ].... Sanders 

v. Cotton, 398 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2005) (where the state appellate 

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court’s discussion of waiver is intertwined with its merits analysis, the state 

court’s decision does not rest on an independent and adequate state law 

ground) ....

Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 937 (7th Cir. 2009) (some internal citations and 

quotations omitted). See also Scott, 567 F.3d at 581–82.

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding timeliness, waiver, 

and the preclusion of claims, which have been found to be consistently applied and wellestablished, bar Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any 

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but procedurally defaulted, 

any claim not fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal or in 

his Rule 32 action. See Hurles, 752 F.3d at 780; Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 

665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002) (holding Arizona’s 

state rules regarding the waiver and procedural default of claims raised in attacks on 

criminal convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for affirming a 

conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the grounds of a procedural bar.

B. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner establishes cause for their procedural default and prejudice arising from that 

default. “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural default of the claim 

and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See

Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 375 (9th Cir. 2014); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of 

establishing that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his compliance 

with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 

2005); Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez–Villareal v. 

Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must 

show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting 

his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 

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152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982). See also Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 

1415–16 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also stated that 

prejudice is established by a petitioner’s “actual innocence.” See Vosgien v. Persson, 

742 F.3d 1131, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2014). Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise 

is not cause to excuse procedural default. See, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 

800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged constitutional 

error worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his criminal 

proceedings with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617; Correll, 137 

F.3d at 1415–16. Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to prove that, “but for” the 

alleged constitutional violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have been 

convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 

2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and 

prejudice must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine the 

existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 

U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

A state criminal defendant does not have a federal constitutional right to the 

effective assistance of counsel during state post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g., 

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1993 (1987); Graves v. 

McEwen, 731 F.3d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the general rule is that errors 

of counsel during a state post-conviction action cannot constitute “cause” to excuse the

procedural default of a federal habeas claim. See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752, 111 S. 

Ct. at 2565; Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 374. However, the Supreme Court’s opinion in 

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), established a limited exception to this general 

rule, which exception applies only to Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims. Martinez held that inadequate assistance of post conviction counsel or lack of 

counsel “at initial-review collateral review proceedings may establish cause for a 

prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Id. at 1315. In 

Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1293 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth Circuit 

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expanded Martinez, holding that this doctrine can also apply to excuse the procedural 

default of claims asserting ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel.

In Trevino v. Thaler, the Supreme Court delineated the Martinez analysis as 

consisting of four prongs:

We consequently read Coleman as containing an exception, allowing a 

federal habeas court to find “cause,” thereby excusing a defendant’s 

procedural default, where (1) the claim of “ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel” was a “substantial” claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of there being 

“no counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the state collateral review 

proceeding; (3) the state collateral review proceeding was the “initial” 

review proceeding in respect to the “ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 

claim”; and (4) state law requires that an “ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel [claim] ... be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding.”

133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013), citing Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318–19, 1320–21 

(alterations in original).

The first prong of this test requires a petitioner seeking to rely on Martinez to 

bring forward facts demonstrating that his underlying ineffective assistance of trial or 

appellate counsel claim is substantial. The Supreme Court has defined “substantial” as a 

claim that “has some merit.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. Stated inversely, a claim is 

“insubstantial” if “it does not have any merit or ... is wholly without factual support.” Id.

at 1319. Determining whether an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is substantial 

requires the Court to examine the claim under the standard stated in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). A petitioner asserting ineffective 

assistance of counsel must show that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 

not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” and 

that counsel’s errors “deprive[d] the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 

reliable.” Id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Additionally, not just any error or 

omission of counsel will be deemed “deficient performance” that will satisfy Martinez; if 

post-conviction counsel “in the initial-review collateral proceeding did not perform below 

constitutional standards,” that attorney’s performance does not constitute “cause.” 132 S. 

Ct. at 1319. Most notably, counsel “is not necessarily ineffective for failing to raise even 

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a non-frivolous claim,” much less a frivolous claim. Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 

1157 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). 

C. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is required if the 

petitioner demonstrates review of the merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393, 124 S. Ct. 

1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485–86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental 

miscarriage of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has probably resulted in 

the conviction of one who is factually innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485–86, 106 S. 

Ct. at 2649; Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing of factual 

innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice relief). To satisfy the “fundamental 

miscarriage of justice” standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him guilty of the offenses 

charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 

832, 842–43 (9th Cir. 2001).

D. Standard of review of exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court reached a 

decision contrary to clearly established federal law or the state court decision was an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque, 

555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). “Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court’s adjudication on the merits was 

‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 

1376, 1390 (2012), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

A state court applies a clearly established standard unreasonably only if no 

“reasonable interpretation of the controlling [Supreme Court] standard” can 

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“support [the state court’s] legal ruling.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 

930, 953, 127 S.Ct. 2842, [] (2007). So, when evaluating the reasonableness 

of a state court’s application of a general standard, we must defer to any 

“principled reason for the state court to distinguish between the case before 

it and Supreme Court precedent.” Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 992 

(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Moreover, § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court 

recently explained,

does not require state courts to extend [a Supreme Court] 

precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as 

error. Thus, “if a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can 

apply to the facts at hand,” then by definition the rationale was not 

“clearly established at the time of the state-court decision.” 

AEDPA’s carefully constructed framework “would be undermined 

if habeas courts introduced rules not clearly established under the 

guise of extensions to existing law.”

White, 134 S.Ct. at 1706 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Yarborough, 

541 U.S. at 666, 124 S.Ct. 2140).

Arrendondo, 763 F.3d at 1133-34.

Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to adjudicate 

claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to 

federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in 

state court. AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show that the state 

court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking 

in justification that there was an error ... beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, [] 131 S.Ct. 770, 786–

787, [] (2011). “If this standard is difficult to meet”—and it is—“that is 

because it was meant to be.” Id., at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 786. We will not 

lightly conclude that a State’s criminal justice system has experienced the 

“extreme malfunctio[n]” for which federal habeas relief is the remedy. Id., 

at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15-16 (2013).

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it applied a rule contradicting 

the governing law as stated in United States Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a 

set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. See, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 

1432, 1438 (2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 

(2004); Soto v. Ryan, 760 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2014); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 

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758, 785 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2766 (2013). 

The “only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 

AEDPA is the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as 

of the time of the state court decision.” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 

1069 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 

538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, [] (2003). If Supreme Court “cases give no 

clear answer to the question presented, ... it cannot be said that the state 

court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.” Wright v. Van 

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126, 128 S.Ct. 743, [] (2008) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In other words, “‘[i]t is not an unreasonable application of 

clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a 

specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme 

Court].’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 

U.S. 111, 122, 129 S.Ct. 1411, [] (2009)).

McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2013).

To satisfy the “unreasonable application” portion of the first prong, the 

petitioner must demonstrate that the state court’s application of Supreme 

Court precedent to the facts of his case was not only incorrect but 

“objectively unreasonable.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S.Ct. 

357, 360 (2002). “While Supreme Court precedent is the only authority that 

is controlling under AEDPA, we look to Ninth Circuit case law as 

‘persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state 

court decision is an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court law.’” 

Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Van Tran v. 

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000)...[] 

Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 637-38 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Woods, 764 F.3d at 

1121.

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law if it correctly identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in 

a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly 

established legal principle to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. 

See McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010). The state court’s 

determination of a habeas claim may be set aside under the unreasonable application 

prong if, under clearly established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in 

refusing to extend [a] governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should 

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have controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2120 

(2000). See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2010). However, 

the state court’s decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law 

only if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 

766, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785. An unreasonable 

application of law is different from an incorrect one. See Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; 

Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). “That test is an objective one 

and does not permit a court to grant relief simply because the state court might have 

incorrectly applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.” Adamson v. Cathel, 633 

F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2011). See also Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567–68 (9th 

Cir. 2010).

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed by 

a federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented with clear and convincing 

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller–El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240–41, 125 S. 

Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 

(2003); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 763 n.1; Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 950 (9th 

Cir. 2010); Stenson, 504 F.3d at 881; Anderson v. Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th 

Cir. 2006). The “presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate 

court, as opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 

U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303, 1304–05 (1982). Additionally, the United States 

Supreme Court has held that, with regard to claims adjudicated on the merits in the state 

courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court 

that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 

(2011). See also Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d at 998.

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, 

the Court must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the 

state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the state court’s decision that the 

Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise requires. See

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Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953–54, 127 S. Ct. 

2842, 2858–59 (2007); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785-86; Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 

790, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2011).

E. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner’s first and sixth habeas claims assert that his federal 

constitutional rights were violated by the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion 

seeking to postpone his trial while he obtained different retained counsel because 

Petitioner felt his current retained could not adequately represent him due, inter 

alia, to counsel’s concurrent trial in a different county.

In his direct appeal Petitioner asserted that the trial court committed structural 

error when it deprived him of his 6th and 14th Amendment right to the defense counsel of 

his choice, citing United States v. Gonzalez Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 

2561 (2006). The Arizona Court of Appeals denied this claim, finding the trial court had 

properly balanced Petitioner’s desire to counsel of his choosing and the fair and 

expedient administration of justice. Distinguishing Gonzalez Lopez, the Arizona Court 

of Appeals noted Petitioner made the request to change counsel at the time set for trial

when the witnesses were present and prepared to testify and a jury voir dire panel was 

waiting outside chambers. The appellate court further noted that Petitioner had not 

retained or identified alternative counsel, that Petitioner’s counsel had represented 

Petitioner in pretrial proceedings, and that Petitioner’s counsel represented to the trial 

court that he was prepared to proceed to trial and counsel felt that he could adequately 

represent Petitioner. See Answer, Exh. T.

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision denying this claim was not clearly 

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. See, e.g., Miller v. Blacketter, 

525 F.3d 890, 896-97 (9th Cir. 2008)5.

 

5

First, at the time [defense counsel] moved to withdraw and to postpone trial, [the 

defendant] had not yet retained another attorney to take her place. In GonzalezLopez, the Supreme Court accepted the government’s concession that a trial court 

wrongfully denied a defendant the right to counsel of choice where the court 

refused to grant pro hac vice admission to an attorney the defendant hired who 

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The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 

the accused shall enjoy the right...to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 

defence.” We have previously held that an element of this right is the right 

of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will 

represent him.... The Government here agrees, as it has previously, that “the 

Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to be represented by an 

otherwise qualified attorney whom that defendant can afford to hire, or who 

is willing to represent the defendant even though he is without funds”.... To 

be sure, the right to counsel of choice “is circumscribed in several 

important respects.” Wheat, supra, at 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692.

Gonzalez Lopez, 548 U.S. at 144, 126 S.Ct. at 2561 (some internal citations and 

quotations omitted).

A defendant does not have a right to retained counsel of their choosing regardless 

of the surrounding circumstances. To establish a Sixth Amendment violation based on 

the denial of a motion to continue predicated on a desire to change counsel, a petitioner 

must show that the trial court abused its discretion by an “unreasoning and arbitrary 

‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.’” Morris v. 

Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1616 (1983), quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 

U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 849 (1964).

Petitioner’s reason for wishing to change counsel, i.e., that counsel had not 

consulted with Petitioner to the extent Petitioner desired and that counsel and Petitioner 

differed as to strategic choices in offering Petitioner’s defense, were not appropriate 

bases for staying the trial to allow Petitioner to find new counsel. Additionally, counsel 

 

was willing and prepared to begin representation immediately....

In this case, however, [the defendant] sought a thirty-day continuance during 

which he hoped to search for and to retain a new lawyer with the funds his father 

had belatedly offered to provide. At the time of the motions, no such attorney had 

been retained....Moreover, it was unclear how much time a new attorney, once 

hired, would have needed to prepare for...trial....

Second, the trial judge reasonably concluded that [defense counsel] was 

sufficiently prepared for trial. Under our precedents, the trial judge had a duty to 

inquire into the problems between [counsel and defendant] when they were first 

raised. [] The judge conducted such an inquiry, affording both...an opportunity to 

explain the cause of [the defendant’s] dissatisfaction. 

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filed and argued numerous pre-trial motions and ably defended Petitioner at trial, 

including thorough cross-examination of witnesses—there is no indication from the 

record in this matter that counsel was unprepared or that Petitioner was actually 

prejudiced by counsel’s performance. The Court notes that Petitioner was acquitted of 

the charges involving one of the victims. Even allowing that counsel agreed that 

Petitioner and counsel did not have a good relationship:

Not every restriction on counsel’s time or opportunity to investigate or to 

consult with his client or otherwise to prepare for trial violates a 

defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Chambers v. Maroney, 

399 U.S. 42, 53–54, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1982–1983[] (1970). Trial judges 

necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least 

of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at 

the same place at the same time, and this burden counsels against 

continuances except for compelling reasons. Consequently, broad 

discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an 

unreasoning and arbitrary “insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a 

justifiable request for delay” violates the right to the assistance of counsel. 

Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 849, [](1964).

Morris, 461 U.S. at 11-12, 103 S. Ct. at 1616.

The federal courts have consistently limited the conclusion in Gonzalez Lopez to 

its facts, including the fact that, in that matter, the trial court had erroneously disqualified 

the defendant’s preferred counsel. 

A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a continuance is a matter of 

discretion. ...As we held in Powell v. Collins, “[a]bsent proof of a violation 

of a specific constitutional protection, a habeas petitioner must show that a 

trial error was so egregious as to deprive him of a fundamentally fair 

adjudication, thus violating constitutional principles of due process.” 332 

F.3d 376, 396 (6th Cir. 2003) ...The denial of a continuance constitutes a 

constitutional violation only when there is “an unreasoning and arbitrary 

‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for 

delay’....” Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610, [] (1983) 

(quoting Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589, 84 S.Ct. 841). As Morris and Ungar

indicate, the denial of a continuance will rarely give rise to a constitutional 

violation and “[t]he circumstances of a particular case determine whether 

the denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process.” Burton 

v. Renico, 391 F.3d 764, 773 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Ungar, 376 U.S. at 

589, 84 S.Ct. 841). In addition, “[t]o demonstrate reversible error, the 

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defendant must show that the denial resulted in actual prejudice to his 

defense.” United States v. King, 127 F.3d 483, 487 (6th Cir. 1997) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “Actual prejudice may be 

demonstrated by showing that additional time would have made relevant 

witnesses available or otherwise benefited the defense.” Powell, 332 F.3d at 

396.

 The relevant factors in determining whether a continuance was properly 

denied include: (1) the length of the requested delay; (2) whether other 

continuances had been requested and granted; (3) whether the delay was for 

legitimate reasons; (4) the inconvenience to the parties, witnesses, counsel, 

and the court; (5) whether the defendant contributed to the circumstances 

giving rise to the request; (6) whether denying the continuance resulted in 

prejudice to the defendant; and (7) the complexity of the case. 

Landrum v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 905, 927-28 (6th Cir. 2010) (some internal citations 

omitted)

The record supports the state court’s conclusion that the trial judge acted 

within his broad discretion in denying [the petitioner’s] motion for a 

continuance to retain counsel. Specifically, he confirmed that counsel was 

able to proceed to trial, evaluated [the petitioner’s] diligence in timely 

retaining private counsel, and weighed the potential impact a continuance 

may have had on the victims and witnesses. The continuance was sought 

just four days before trial was scheduled to begin. See Slappy, 461 U.S. at 

13-15, 103 S.Ct. 1610 (acknowledging that appropriate factors to consider 

include administration of justice, difficulty in assembling witnesses, bad 

faith delaying tactics, victims’ concerns). Moreover, the motion to continue 

was based solely on [the petitioner’s] desire to retain counsel because he 

was unsatisfied with his public defender’s preparation for trial, not on any 

potential conflict of interest. Indeed, the potential conflict was not 

discovered until after the motion to continue was denied. Accordingly, the 

Nevada Supreme Court’s application of Slappy and denial of relief on this 

claim was not “objectively unreasonable.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); 

Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166.

Houston v. Schomig 533 F.3d 1076, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2008).

Because the state courts’ determination that Petitioner’s federal constitutional 

rights were not violated by the denial of Petitioner’s motion to continue his trial to retain 

different counsel was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal 

law, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

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2. Petitioner contends he was denied his right to the effective assistance of 

counsel (Amended Petition at 8-9)

Petitioner’s second, third, and fourth claims for federal habeas relief are claims 

that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel:

Petitioner raised numerous ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his state 

action for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. The state responded to each claim on the merits. The state trial court

summarily denied relief and the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review of 

the trial court’s decision. In denying relief in Petitioner’s Rule 32 action, the state trial 

court found: “With respect to claim (1), ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court has 

considered each of the Defendant’s arguments and the State’s responses. The Court finds 

that none of Defendant’s arguments raise a colorable claim for relief.” Answer, Exh. CC. 

The state court’s conclusion was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 

federal law.

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must 

show both that his attorney’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency 

prejudiced the outcome of his criminal proceedings. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must overcome the strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the range of reasonable professional 

assistance required of attorneys in that circumstance. See id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. 

at 2064. Counsel’s performance will be held constitutionally deficient only if the habeas 

petitioner proves counsel’s actions “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 

as measured by “prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. 

at 2064-65. See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994–95 (9th Cir. 2010).

 To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a conviction 

must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must 

apply a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was within the 

wide range of reasonable professional assistance. The challenger’s burden 

is to show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

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Amendment.

Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739 (2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted), 

citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011).

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must establish that there is “a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. See also, 

e.g., Cheney, 614 F.3d at 994. To succeed on an assertion his counsel’s performance was 

deficient because counsel failed to raise a particular argument, the petitioner must 

establish the argument was likely to be successful, thereby establishing that he was 

prejudiced by his counsel’s omission. See Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th 

Cir. 2007); Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, 

counsel’s performance is not deficient nor prejudicial when counsel “fails” to raise an 

argument that counsel reasonably believes would be futile. See Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 741; 

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788. 

Additionally, it is Petitioner’s burden to establish both that his counsel’s 

performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced thereby. See, e.g., Wong v. 

Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 16-17, 130 S. Ct. 383, 384-85 (2009). “It is not enough for the 

defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the 

proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. “Surmounting Strickland’s 

high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 555 U.S. 356, 371-72, 130 S. Ct.

1473, 1485 (2010), quoted in Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788.

Counsel is constitutionally deficient if the representation “fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness” such that it was outside “the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 687–88, 104 

S.Ct. 2052 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Judicial scrutiny of 

counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,” and we must guard 

against the temptation “to second-guess counsel’s assistance after 

conviction or adverse sentence.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Instead, we 

must make every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to 

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to 

evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id.; see also

Harrington v. Richter, [] 131 S.Ct. 770, 789, [] (2011). Because of the 

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difficulties inherent in fairly evaluating counsel’s performance, courts must 

“indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 

104 S.Ct. 2052. This presumption of reasonableness means that not only do 

we “give the attorneys the benefit of the doubt,” we must also 

“affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons [defense] counsel may 

have had for proceeding as they did.” Cullen v. Pinholster, [] 131 S.Ct. 

1388, 1407, [] (2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

 To establish prejudice, the defendant must show “a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 

Under this standard, we ask “whether it is ‘reasonably likely’ the result 

would have been different.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 792 (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052). That is, only when “[t]he 

likelihood of a different result [is] substantial, not just conceivable,” id., has 

the defendant met Strickland’s demand that defense errors were “so serious 

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,” id. at 787–88 (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052).

 Under AEDPA, we do not apply the Strickland standard de novo. Rather, 

“[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the 

Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 785. “A 

state court must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation 

when the case involves review under the Strickland standard itself.” Id.

“[B]ecause the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has 

even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not 

satisfied that standard.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123, 129 

S.Ct. 1411, [] (2009). Deference to a state court’s determination that 

counsel's performance was not deficient requires us to ask “whether there 

is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential 

standard.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 788. Deference to a state court’s 

conclusion that any deficiency did not result in prejudice requires us to ask 

whether such a determination by the state court “would be unreasonable.”

Premo v. Moore, [] 131 S.Ct. 733, 744, [] (2011); see also Harrington, 131 

S.Ct. at 792 (holding that “[i]t would not have been unreasonable” for the 

state court to conclude that the petitioner's evidence of prejudice did not 

make it “reasonably likely” that the result would have been different).

Gulbrandson, 738 F.3d at 988-89.

With regard to Petitioner’s claim that his counsel’s performance was 

unconstitutionally ineffective because counsel was not present and substitute counsel 

waived Petitioner’s presence when questions from the deliberating jury were submitted, 

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Respondents assert Petitioner raised this claim, i.e. counsel’s “absence” during jury 

deliberations, which responsibility was “turned over” to a deputy public defender, at page 

22 of Petitioner’s Rule 32 memorandum at Exhibit Y to the Answer to the petition.

Petitioner was represented by counsel in his Rule 32 proceeding. At page 22 of 

Exhibit Y, the memorandum discusses Petitioner’s trial counsel’s ineffectiveness because 

counsel “jamm[ed]” the defense and because counsel traveled back and forth to Globe

during Petitioner’s trial, and asserts that counsel’s performance was also deficient and 

Petitioner’s defense was compromised because counsel was not present when the verdict 

was read and because substitute counsel took the verdict—this section of the 

memorandum does not discuss or mention that counsel was not present when the 

deliberating jury submitted questions or when the appropriate resolution of the jury 

questions was discussed. In the Rule 32 memorandum Petitioner’s counsel cites Exhibit 

14 to that memorandum with regard to the allegation of ineffective assistance—which

exhibit is a transcript of a trial conference between counsel and the trial judge about 

length of time defense counsel required to present the defense, including counsel’s 

statement that he did not expect Petitioner to testify. During this conference defense 

counsel indicated he had to be in New York on Saturday and that he was unable to travel 

on Friday and, accordingly, that he would be unavailable after the jury retired to 

deliberate on Thursday afternoon. The memorandum does not attach any portion of the 

transcript dealing with the jury questions. Accordingly, it is arguable if the precise 

question regarding counsel’s unavailability at the time of the jury questions was indeed 

exhausted in the state courts.

With regard the merits of the claim, the two questions submitted by the jury, 

resulting in a conference at which Petitioner’s presence was waived by his counsel, i.e., 

trial counsel’s substitute, the two questions were answered by the jury being referred to 

the exhibits, testimony, and jury instructions, and did not result in the jury being given 

substantive information or instructions as to questions of law or how to proceed in 

deliberations. Accordingly, to the extent this issue can be considered properly exhausted 

in the state courts, the state court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s counsel was not 

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unconstitutionally ineffective was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application 

of federal law. To the extent the issue was not exhausted, there is no prejudice arising 

from any procedural default of the claim because Petitioner’s constitutional right to the 

effective assistance of counsel, throughout his trial and with regard to the answering of 

the jury question, was not violated.

Petitioner was not deprived of counsel altogether, i.e., a “Cronic” violation, nor 

was he denied the effective assistance of counsel at the time the trial court considered the 

jury questions. There is no Supreme Court authority establishing that a judge’s 

communication with a jury during deliberations constitutes a “critical stage.” Musladin v. 

Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit has rejected the argument that 

“answering a jury question or request without first consulting defendant’s counsel is 

structural error always requiring reversal.” United States v. Mohsen, 587 F.3d 1028, 1031 

(9th Cir. 2009). Instead, harmless error review applies. See United States v. Rosales–

Rodriguez, 289 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying harmless error analysis to a 

trial judge’s ex parte unsolicited note to the jury with a supplemental instruction 

regarding the substitution of an alternate juror). In applying the harmless error test, the 

Ninth Circuit in United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1470-71 (9th Cir. 1986)

identified three relevant factors: the probable effect of the message actually sent, the 

likelihood that the court would have sent a different message had it consulted with 

defense counsel beforehand, and whether any changes in the message that appellants 

might have obtained would have affected the verdict in any way. Based on these factors it 

is clear that Petitioner was not harmed by substitute counsel’s presence, rather than trial 

counsel’s presence, at this stage in the proceeding. The only response to the jury 

question was to refer the jurors back to the instructions. There is no reasonable 

probability that defense counsel, if present, could have offered a different response to the 

question, let alone a response that would have affected the verdict.

Having thoroughly reviewed Petitioner’s allegations regarding his counsel’s 

performance at trial and sentencing and the transcripts provided by Respondents and 

having thoroughly considered Respondents’ very thorough arguments with regard to 

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Petitioner’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the state court did not err in 

determining that Petitioner’s counsel’s performance was not deficient and that Petitioner 

was not prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to 

relief on the merits of this claim.

3. Petitioner contends his right to due process of law was violated by 

prosecutorial misconduct.

In his Amended Petition (Doc. 15), Petitioner contends the Maricopa County 

Attorney’s office violated his right to an impartial tribunal by removing a judge, by 

charging him under a racketeering statute, and by charging him with multiple felonies. 

Petitioner also alleges prosecutorial misconduct in the form of destruction of evidence, 

the late disclosure and suppression of relevant evidence, and material misrepresentations 

to the judge and jury by the prosecutor. Petitioner also asserts the prosecutor engaged in 

misconduct by testifying to the jury that Petitioner was a liar, and that the prosecutor 

repeated hearsay evidence that Petitioner had raped an under-age girl. Petitioner also 

contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by allowing questions asked by the 

deliberating jury to be answered without Petitioner present and by refusing to allow a 

“Willits” instruction.

A prosecutor’s actions constitute misconduct if they “so infected the trial 

with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 

process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, []

(1986) ... The “appropriate standard of review for such a claim on writ of 

habeas corpus is ‘the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise 

of supervisory power.’” Id.... On habeas review, constitutional errors of the 

“trial type,” including prosecutorial misconduct, warrant relief only if they 

“had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 

verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, []

(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (some internal citations omitted). 

“Even when separately alleged incidents of prosecutorial misconduct do not 

independently rise to the level of reversible error, the cumulative effect of multiple errors 

can violate due process. Id. at 1116-17 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

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During the severance hearing, Melissa stated that part of why she was afraid of 

Petitioner prior to the alleged assault was because Petitioner told her that his roommate 

had told others Petitioner had raped a sixteen-year-old girl and “pulled a knife” on 

someone. During the prosecutor’s opening statement at Petitioner’s trial the prosecutor 

stated: “defendant was making comments to [Melissa] about how his roommate would 

tell other people that he had raped someone.” Answer, Exh. T at 24. Defense counsel 

objected, a bench conference ensued, and defense counsel argued for a mistrial, which 

motion was denied. When the prosecutor resumed opening argument, they stated that,

when Melissa and Petitioner were together, Petitioner told Melissa that his roommate had 

been “saying things” about Petitioner to others, and that this statement by Petitioner had 

put Melissa “a little on edge.” Id. at 24-25. After opening statements, the prosecution

never introduced testimony regarding this statement by Petitioner at trial, and the 

statement was not mentioned again during the trial.

In Petitioner’s direct appeal he asserted that this constituted prosecutorial 

misconduct. The Arizona Court of Appeals found that the prosecution’s mention of this 

hearsay was “brief” and did not so infect Petitioner’s trial with error and prejudice to 

warrant reversal. The state appellate court’s decision was not clearly contrary to nor an 

unreasonable application of law. See Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1106 (9th Cir. 

2012), citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947 (1982); 

Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 781-82. Compare Dow v. Virga, 729 F.3d 1041, 1051-52 

(9th Cir. 2013); Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). 

With regard to Petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 

allowing a jury question to be answered without Petitioner present, Petitioner did not 

properly exhaust this claim by raising it in his direct appeal and, accordingly, the claim is 

procedurally defaulted. Petitioner did assert in his Rule 32 action that he was denied his 

right to the effective assistance of counsel because his counsel was not present during the 

jury deliberations. Petitioner has not shown cause for any procedural default of this 

prosecutorial misconduct claim nor prejudice arising from the claim. Prejudice cannot be 

shown because the legal underpinning of the claim is without merit.

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This claim is without merit because substitute defense counsel was present at the 

time the trial judge and the prosecutor discussed the questions submitted by the jury 

during deliberations and substitute defense counsel waived Petitioner’s presence at the 

conference where the jury questions were discussed. Because Petitioner was represented 

at the hearing by counsel and counsel could legitimately waive Petitioner’s presence, 

there was no misconduct on the part of the prosecutor or trial court. Neither was 

Petitioner’s right to due process violated by his absence from the conference wherein the 

jury questions were discussed. 

[W]e hold that defendant was not deprived of due process by his absence 

from the jury instruction conference. The jury instruction conference 

traditionally encompasses purely legal issues and, as such, it will be a rare 

case where a defendant can establish that his presence was essential to his 

opportunity to present his defense. Typically, the jury instruction 

conference is attended only by the judge and counsel. Normally the parties 

are not present. In the instant appeal, petitioner's absence at the jury 

instruction conference did not violate due process.

Larson v. Tansy, 911 F.2d 392, 395 (10th Cir. 1990). See also United States v. Sherman, 

821 F.2d 1337, 1339 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that the right of criminal defendants to be 

present at all critical stages of trial does not extend to conferences dealing only with the 

legal questions involved in formulating proper jury instructions).

There is no Supreme Court precedent which supports the proposition that a 

defendant has a “fundamental right” to be present when the trial court responds to a 

jury’s question, which would require a criminal defendant to himself publically 

acknowledge its waiver. See New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114–15, 120 S. Ct. 659, 

663-64 (2000) (identifying only right to plead not guilty and right to counsel among 

fundamental rights that cannot be waived by counsel absent defendant's public 

acknowledgment of waiver); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187-88, 125 S.Ct. 551, 560 

(2004). See also Crockett v. Hulick, 542 F.3d 1183, 1189 (7th Cir. 2008). Compare

United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526-27, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 1484-85 (1985) (finding 

no constitutional error where defense counsel was not present for in camera examination 

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of juror); United States v. Rosales-Rodriguez, 289 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(finding harmless error where defense counsel was not present for preparation and 

delivery of supplemental jury instruction); United States v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1528 

(10th Cir. 1995).

The state court’s decision that Petitioner was not subjected to prosecutorial 

misconduct was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

4. Petitioner asserts that his right to a fair trial, his right to confront 

witnesses, and his right to due process of law were violated by the trial court’s 

denial of his motion to sever the counts against him into separate trials (Ground 7). 

Petitioner maintains, “[T]he combined effect of the errors which arose from the 

severance denial and subsequent treatment of the charges as ‘other acts,’ rendered the 

trial fundamentally unfair and the defense less persuasive than it otherwise would have 

been.” 

The state trial court denied the motion to sever counts after a hearing at which all 

three victims testified but Petitioner did not testify. In Petitioner’s direct appeal he 

argued that the denial of the motion to sever counts violated Arizona state criminal rules 

and his federal constitutional rights. The Arizona appellate court concluded that the 

denial of the motion was not in violation of any state rule and that Petitioner had waived 

a federal constitutional claim by not presenting it to the state court prior to trial or at the 

close of evidence. See Answer, Exh. T. Accordingly, the state court determined,

Petitioner was not entitled to relief on this claim unless the court found “fundamental 

error”. After examining the proceedings and the trial court’s decision denying the motion 

to sever, the appellate court found the trial court did not err in denying the motion. 

It is arguable if it could be determined that the state court’s decision was clearly 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, inter alia, because the United 

States Supreme Court has never squarely held that a trial court’s failure to provide 

separate trials on different charges implicates the defendant’s right to due process of law.

Cf. Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the petitioner’s 

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argument that United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 106 S.Ct. 725 (1986), provides 

“clearly established federal law” governing a state court’s denial of a motion to sever the 

trials of defendants).6“[I]t cannot be said that a state court unreasonably applied clearly 

established Federal law” when Supreme Court precedent “give[s] no clear answer to the 

question presented.” Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126, 128 S.Ct. 743, 747 (2008) 

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

This series of cases tells us that in order to determine whether a state court 

failed to apply “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court” for purposes of § 2254(d)(1), we must distinguish between 

situations where a legal principle established by a Supreme Court decision 

clearly extends to a new factual context (as in Panetti) and where it does not 

(as in Musladin and Van Patten). When engaging in this line-drawing 

exercise, we have noted that a state court must apply legal principles 

established by a Supreme Court decision when the case “falls squarely 

within” those principles, but not in cases where there is a “structural 

difference” between the prior precedent and the case at issue, or when the 

prior precedent requires “tailoring or modification” to apply to the new 

situation. Smith v. Patrick, 508 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (9th Cir. 2007). We 

have acknowledged that this series of Supreme Court cases “underscores 

that § 2254(d)(1) tightly circumscribes the granting of habeas relief.” 

Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir.2007).

In light of Musladin, Panetti, and Van Patten, we conclude that when a 

Supreme Court decision does not “squarely address[ ] the issue in th[e] 

case” or establish a legal principle that “clearly extend[s]” to a new context 

to the extent required by the Supreme Court in these recent decisions, Van 

Patten, 128 S.Ct. at 746, 745, it cannot be said, under AEDPA, there is 

“clearly established” Supreme Court precedent addressing the issue before 

us, and so we must defer to the state court’s decision. If the Court’s 

decisions do provide a “controlling legal standard,” Panetti, 127 S.Ct. at 

2858, that is applicable to the claims raised by a habeas petitioner without 

“tailoring or modification” of the standard, Patrick, 508 F.3d at 1260, the 

question is then whether the application of that standard was objectively 

unreasonable, even if the facts of the case at issue are not identical to the 

Supreme Court precedent. See Panetti, 127 S.Ct. at 2858. 

 

6

 The Supreme Court suggested in dicta in Lane that misjoinder could rise “to the level of a 

constitutional violation only if it results in prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his Fifth 

Amendment right to a fair trial.” A federal court has concluded that “no Supreme Court cases 

hold[] that a defendant ... has a constitutional right to a separate trial on each of the charges 

against him.” Rodriguez v. Jones, 625 F. Supp. 2d 552, 560–61 (E.D. Mich. 2009).

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Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 753-54 (9th Cir. 2009).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:

We may grant habeas relief on a joinder challenge only “if the joinder 

resulted in an unfair trial. There is no prejudicial constitutional violation 

unless ‘simultaneous trial of more than one offense ... actually render[ed] 

petitioner’s state trial fundamentally unfair and hence, violative of due 

process.’” Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 771-72 (9th Cir. 2001),.... 

The requisite level of prejudice is reached only “if the impermissible 

joinder had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury's verdict.” Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 772 (citing Bean v. Calderon, 163 

F.3d 1073, 1086 (9th Cir.1998)). In evaluating prejudice, the Ninth Circuit 

focuses particularly on cross-admissibility of evidence and the danger of 

“spillover” from one charge to another, especially where one charge or set 

of charges is weaker than another. See, e.g., Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 772; 

Bean, 163 F.3d at 1084.

Davis v. Woodford 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004) (some internal citations omitted). 

See also Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 771–72 (9th Cir. 2001) (“On habeas review 

of a prisoner’s challenge to a trial court's failure to sever trial of some counts in an 

indictment, we may only grant the writ if the joinder resulted in an unfair trial.”); Coley 

v. Bagley, 706 F.3d 741, 753 (6th Cir. 2013)7.

Additionally, a petitioner who argues that simultaneous trial on one count had an 

inflammatory influence on the jury’s ability to handle the other count must show that the 

jury was actually inflamed. See Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Petitioner’s allegation that the jury was actually inflamed is belied by the jury’s finding 

of not guilty on the counts involving one of the victims. 

 

7 Misjoinder is not per se unconstitutional, but rises to that level if it results in 

prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his due process right to a fair trial. See

United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8, 106 S.Ct. 725, [] (1986). The 

harmless-error rule governs. See id. at 446, 106 S.Ct. 725. In federal habeas 

proceedings, we ask whether the error had “substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 

623, 113 S.Ct. 1710, [] (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fry v. 

Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121–22, 127 S.Ct. 2321, [] (2007). “[A] risk of undue 

prejudice exists whenever joinder of counts permits introduction of evidence of 

other crimes that would otherwise be inadmissible.” Davis v. Coyle, 475 F.3d 

761, 777 (6th Cir. 2007). 

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Because the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision that denial of the motion to sever 

counts was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law, 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief this claim.

5. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with 

regard to the state’s burden of proof (Ground 8)

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s reasonable-doubt instruction “lowered the 

State’s burden of proof in violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments” and deprived him 

of “Due Process, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and his right to trial by 

jury in violation of the 6th and 14th Amendments,” because, he asserts, “the court 

defined reasonable doubt using language describing clear and convincing evidence.” Doc. 

15 (amended petition) at 49.

The challenged reasonable-doubt instruction states:

 The state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. In civil cases, it is only necessary to prove that a fact is 

more likely true than not or that its truth is highly probable. In criminal 

cases such as this, the state’s proof must be more powerful than that. It 

must be beyond a reasonable doubt.

 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced 

of the defendant’s guilt. There are very few things in this world that we 

know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require 

proof that overcomes every doubt.

 If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced 

that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find the 

defendant guilty. If, on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility 

that the defendant is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt 

and find the defendant not guilty.

Answer, Exh. N at 39-40.

In his direct appeal, Petitioner argued that these instructions reduced the 

reasonable-doubt standard to a “clear and convincing” evidence standard, because the 

Arizona Supreme Court had previously stated that “a ‘firm belief or conviction’ is truer to 

the clear and convincing evidence standard than a definition equating clear and 

convincing with ‘certain, plain, [and] unambiguous’ evidence.” Answer, Exh. Q at 35-36.

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When reviewing a jury instruction regarding reasonable doubt, a habeas court 

must determine “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury [ ] applied the 

challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 482 (1991). See Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 818 (9th Cir.

2004). “[T]he Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in 

advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof. Rather, taken as a whole, the 

instructions must correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.” Victor v. 

Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1243 (1994). The Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals has instructed the reviewing habeas court to “determine whether there was a 

reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to allow a conviction 

predicated on proof that was insufficient to meet the requirements of due process.” 

Lisenbee v. Henry, 166 F.3d 997, 999 (9th Cir. 1999).

In evaluating the constitutionality of the jury charge, we must determine 

“whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the 

instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet” the 

requirements of due process. Victor, 511 U.S. at 6, 114 S.Ct. at 1243. If we 

find such a likelihood, then we must grant [the] writ of habeas corpus; there 

can be no harmless error in this context. ...’

Ramirez v. Hatcher, 136 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998)

A jury instruction cannot relieve the state of the burden of proving beyond 

a reasonable doubt a crucial element of the criminal offense. In Sandstrom 

v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521, 99 S.Ct. 2450, [] (1979), the Supreme 

Court held the proper inquiry to be “whether the challenged jury instruction 

had the effect of relieving the State of the burden of proof ... on the critical 

question of petitioner's state of mind.” If a “reasonable juror could have 

given the presumption conclusive or persuasion-shifting effect,” the 

instruction is unconstitutional. Id. at 519. In Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 

307, 325, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985), the Supreme Court held 

that an instruction was unconstitutional “[b]ecause a reasonable juror could 

have understood the challenged portions of the jury instruction in this case 

as creating a mandatory presumption that shifted to the defendant the 

burden of persuasion on the crucial element of intent[.]” We have held that 

to determine whether a jury instruction unconstitutionally shifts the burden 

of proof, we must inquire “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that 

the jury has applied the challenged instruction’ in an unconstitutional 

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manner.” Houston, 177 F.3d at 909 (citations and quotations omitted).

 In both Sandstrom and Francis, the Supreme Court held jury instructions 

invalid for unconstitutionally shifting the burden of proof. In Sandstrom, 

the defendant admitted killing the victim but contended that he did not have 

the required mental state. If the defendant had acted “purposely or 

knowingly,” he would have been guilty of “deliberate homicide” under 

Montana law; but if he had acted without that mental state, he would have 

been guilty of a lesser degree of homicide. After having been instructed that 

“[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his 

voluntary acts,” the jury convicted defendant of “deliberate homicide.” 

Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 513, 99 S.Ct. 2450. The Supreme Court held that 

the instruction violated due process.

Patterson v. Gomez, 223 F.3d 959, 962-63 (9th Cir. 2000). “All challenged instructions”, 

however, must be “considered in light of all of the jury instructions and the trial record as 

a whole.” Mendez v. Knowles, 556 F.3d 757, 768 (9th Cir. 2009), citing Cupp v. 

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146–47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400 (1973).

Petitioner argues that “[t]he jury was never instructed on [the definition of] clear 

and convincing evidence, allowing it to consider the evidence of actual charged crimes 

without guidance in violation of the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments.” Doc. 15 at 46. 

However, as noted by Respondents, the term “clear and convincing evidence” appeared 

in a single jury instruction, which provided:

Evidence of sexual misconduct has been presented. [Evidence to rebut this 

has also been presented.] You may consider this evidence in determining 

whether the defendant had a character trait that predisposed him to commit 

the crimes charged. You may determine that the defendant had a character 

trait that predisposed him to commit the crimes charged only if you decide 

that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that:

1. The defendant committed these acts; and

2. These acts show the defendant’s character predisposed him to commit 

abnormal or unnatural acts.

You may not convict the defendant of the crimes charged simply because 

you find that he committed these acts, or that he had a character trait that 

predisposed him to commit the crimes charged. Evidence of these acts does 

not lessen the State’s burden to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

Answer, Exh. A at 15 & Exh. N at 42-43.

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Before defining the governing reasonable-doubt standard, the court charged the 

jury:

The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. This means that the State must prove each element of 

each charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

In civil cases, it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true 

than not or that its truth is highly probable. In a criminal case such as this, 

the State’s proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

Id., Exh. N at 39.

The trial court’s voluntary-act instruction stated, “Before you may convict the 

defendant of the charged crimes, you must find that the State proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the defendant committed a voluntary act.” Id., Exh. N at 41 (emphasis added.) 

Regarding the legal effect of Petitioner’s not-guilty plea, the court stated, “This plea of 

not guilty means that the State must prove each element of the charges beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Id., Exh. N at 41 (emphasis added). Before reciting the elements of 

Petitioner’s charged offenses, the court told the jury, “You may find that the State has 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt all, some, or none of the charged offenses.” Id., Exh. 

N at 43 (emphasis added). The last paragraph of the limiting instruction referencing the 

“clear and convincing evidence” standard admonished the jury:

You may not convict the defendant of the crimes charged simply because 

you find that he committed these acts, or that he had a character trait that 

predisposed him to commit the crimes charged. Evidence of these acts does 

not lessen the State’s burden to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.”

Id., Exh. N at (emphasis added).

In denying relief on this claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals stated:

Defendant maintains that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by 

instructing the jury on “reasonable doubt” according to State v. Portillo, 

182 Ariz. 592, 596, 898 P.2d 970, 974 (1995). Our supreme court recently 

reaffirmed that instruction in State v. Garza, 216 Ariz. 56, 66-67, ¶ 45, 163 

P.3d 1006, 1016-17 (2007). The courts of this state are bound by the 

decisions of our supreme court and have no authority to overrule those 

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decisions. State v. Foster, 199 Ariz. 39, 41 n.1, ¶ 9, 13 P.3d 781, 783 n.1 

(App. 2000). Defendant has failed to prove that the trial court committed 

any error in its reasonable doubt instruction, let alone fundamental error.

Answer, Exh. T at 28-29.

Because the challenged instruction, in the context of all of the instructions given to 

the jury did not have the effect of relieving the state of the burden of proof, the state 

appellate court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s right to due process and a fair trial were not

violated by the jury instructions was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of federal law. See Schultz v. Tilton, 659 F.3d 941, 943-44 (9th Cir. 2011); 

Rhoads v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 2011). Compare Dixon v. Williams, 

750 F.3d 1027, 1031-33 (9th Cir. 2014) .

III Conclusion

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ determination that Petitioner was not denied his 

federal constitutional rights based on the denial of his motion to sever counts, based on 

prosecutorial misconduct, and based on his contention that the jury instructions 

improperly shifted the burden of proof, were not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of federal law. The Arizona courts’ conclusion that Petitioner was not denied 

his right to the effective assistance of counsel was not clearly contrary to nor an 

unreasonable application of federal law because, inter alia, Petitioner has not established 

prejudice arising from any alleged error of counsel. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Husband’s Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

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fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) 

pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should 

be denied because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.

Dated this 4th day of November, 2014.

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