Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00268/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00268-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

James Prentiss Coghill, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV 13-0268-TUC-DCB (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is James Prentiss Coghill’s (“Coghill”) Amended 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 6) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In 

accordance with the Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the 

Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. As explained below, the 

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of 

the record, dismiss the Petition with prejudice. 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background1

 Following two jury trials, Coghill was found guilty of one count of attempted 

sexual exploitation of a minor under the age of fifteen and acquitted of the remaining 

fourteen counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. Ex. A at 1.2

 

 On direct appeal, Coghill argued that the trial court erred under state law by 

(1) admitting his statement to the sheriff’s deputy that his stack of CDs in his motor 

home contained “pornography,” (2) admitting expert testimony by the forensic 

document examiner relating to handwriting analysis, (3) denying his request for a 

Willits instruction. Id. at 6, 9, and 13. The appellate court denied relief and affirmed 

the conviction and the disposition. Id. at 17. Coghill petitioned the Arizona Supreme 

Court for review but was denied. Exs. E-F. 

 Coghill filed a timely PCR notice and was appointed counsel to represent him. 

Exs. G-H. He later moved and was allowed to represent himself. Exs. I-J. Coghill 

filed his petition claiming that (1) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; 

(2) his conviction was based on false testimony; (3) the prosecutor made improper 

statements during closing arguments; (4) the appellate court erred by finding his 

challenge to the admission of his statement that he possessed pornography to be 

 

1

 The factual summary of the Arizona Court of Appeals is accorded a presumption of 

correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n. 1 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

2

 Unless otherwise indicated, all exhibit references are to the exhibits attached to the 

Respondents’ Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 15). 

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without merit; (5) the offense was based on a non-existent statute; (6) the evidence 

was insufficient to sustain the conviction; and (7) the conviction was inconsistent 

with the verdicts of acquittal on the other charges. Ex. K at 5, 9, 12-13, 15, 17, 19. 

 The trial court found all but arguments 4 and 6 procedurally defaulted and 

precluded because Coghill had failed to raise them earlier. Ex. M at 4-6. With 

respect to argument 4, the erroneous appellate court ruling, the trial court ruled that it 

had no jurisdiction to review a decision of the court of appeals. Id. At 5. With 

respect to item 6, the sufficiency of the evidence claim, the trial court ruled that 

Coghill did not present a colorable claim. Id. At 6.3

 The court denied post-conviction 

relief. Id. at 7. 

 On appeal, Coghill reargued the claims in his PCR petition and reply. Ex. O. 

The appellate court denied relief finding that all of Coghill’s claims, including the 

erroneous appellate court ruling argument and the sufficiency of the evidence claim, 

were procedurally defaulted and precluded for failure to raise them in earlier 

proceedings. Ex. P. The Court also agreed that Coghill’s sufficiency of the evidence 

claim was meritless. Id. Coghill sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court but 

was denied. Ex. Q. 

 Petitioner commenced this action with the filing of his original petition on 

April 18, 2013 (Doc. 1) and later filed the now pending amended petition on August 

22, 2013. (Doc. 6). The Court dismissed without prejudice Grounds One, Two, 

 

3

The court rejected Coghill’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as it was 

raised for the first time in his reply. Id. at 6. 

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Three, Five and Six of the Amended Petition (Doc. 7) and ordered Respondents to 

answer Grounds Four, and Seven through Eleven. 

 Ground Four of Coghill’s petition argues that he did not receive a fair trial as 

required by the 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution and Art. 2, § 4 of the 

Arizona Constitution; Ground Seven asserts that the court erred in denying his 

motion under Rule 20, Ariz.R.Crim.P.; Ground Eight argues that his verdict was 

based in large measure on false testimony from Jacob Franks and cannot stand and 

that he was denied due process of law under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. 

Ground Nine alleges improper statements from the prosecutor during closing. 

Ground Ten asserts ineffective assistance of counsel; and Ground Eleven argues that 

the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try the case due to the fact that the 

indictment is factually deficient as a matter of law and any verdict rendered thereon 

is a nullity. Doc 6. 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Default 

 Respondents contend that Coghill’s inexcusably procedurally defaulted habeas 

claims are precluded from federal review. The Court agrees. 

 A state prisoner must exhaust his available state remedies before a federal 

court may consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). “[A] petitioner 

fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the 

exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through 

the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the 

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claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations 

omitted). 

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these 

claims. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). "To exhaust one's 

state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct 

appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief 

pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then 

present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 Additionally, a state prisoner must not only present the claims to the proper 

court, but must also present them fairly. A claim has been “fairly presented” if the 

petitioner has described the operative facts and federal legal theories on which the 

claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 

F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). “Our rule is that a state prisoner has not ‘fairly 

presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically 

indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law.” Lyons v. 

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 

904 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must alert the state court to the specific federal 

constitutional guaranty upon which his claims are based, Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 

F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001), however, general appeals in state court to broad 

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair 

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trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. 

Lyons, 232 F.3d at 669. Moreover, it is not enough that a petitioner presented to the 

state court all the facts necessary to support an inadequately identified federal claim 

or that a “somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

27, 28 (2004); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (mere similarity 

between a claim of state and federal error insufficient to establish exhaustion). 

“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of 

an underlying federal legal theory.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

 In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts on either direct 

appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review because any 

attempt to return to state court to present them would be futile unless the claims fit 

into a narrow range of exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) 

(precluding claims not raised on direct appeal or in prior post-conviction relief 

petitions), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty 

days of trial court’s decision). Because these rules have been found to be 

consistently and regularly followed, and because they are independent of federal law, 

either their specific application to a claim by an Arizona court, or their operation to 

preclude a return to state court to exhaust a claim, will procedurally bar subsequent 

review of the merits of such a claim by a federal habeas court. Stewart v. Smith, 536 

U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998) (Rule 

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32, Ariz.R.Crim.P. is strictly followed); State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 

1996) (waiver and preclusion rules strictly applied in postconviction proceedings). 

 A federal court may not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim 

unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for his noncompliance and actual 

prejudice, or establish that a miscarriage of justice would result from the lack of 

review. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). To establish cause, a 

petitioner must point to some objective factor external to the defense impeded his 

efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (2004). “[C]ause is an external impediment such as government interference 

or reasonable unavailability of a claims factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 

1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Ignorance of the state’s procedural 

rules or lack of legal training do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for a 

petitioner’s failure to fairly present a claim. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of 

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908-10 (9th Cir. 1986); Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 

1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the 

constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 

1984); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Alternatively, a federal court may review the merits of a procedurally 

defaulted claim where a petitioner can establish that a “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice” would otherwise result. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. at 327. A fundamental 

miscarriage of justice exists when a constitutional violation resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent. Id. 

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 Here, all of Coghill’s claims were raised in his PCR action. The state court 

found that the claims were procedurally defaulted and precluded. Thus, his claims 

are technically exhausted and precluded from federal review under the independent 

and adequate state ground doctrine. Stewart, 536 U.S. at 860. To the extent that 

Coghill is attempting to raise claims that were not presented in the state court, those 

claims are unexhausted. Castillo, 399 F.3d at 998 n.3. Because waiver and 

preclusion rules are strictly applied in postconviction proceedings, any attempt by 

Coghill to return to state court to exhaust his habeas claims would be futile. Mata, 

916 P.2d at 1050-52. Without an available remedy in the state court for his claims, 

all of Coghill’s claims are exhausted and procedurally defaulted. See Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). Coghill does not claim actual innocence or 

cause and prejudice with respect to any of his habeas claims. As such, the merits of 

his claims need not be addressed. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Coghill’s Amended Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 6). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

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 However, the parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a 

copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the 

District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. Replies shall not be filed without first 

obtaining leave to do so from the District Court. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 13-0268-TUC-DCB. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). 

 Dated this 18th day of August, 2015. 

 

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