Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08123/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08123-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:405 Fair Housing Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

TOWN OF COLORADO CITY, ARIZONA; ) 

et al., ) No. 3:12-cv-8123-HRH

) (Prescott Division)

Defendants. ) 

__________________________________________) 

O R D E R

Hildale Defendants’ Motion in Limine;

Proposed Testimony of Stephenson and Mann1

Defendants City of Hildale, Twin City Water Authority, and Twin City Power

(collectively the “Hildale Defendants”) move the court for an order excluding theproposed

expert testimony of J. Scott Stephenson and Lyle Mann as unreliable and irrelevant under

Rule 702, Federal Rules of Evidence. The motion is opposed,2and the Hildale Defendants

have replied.3 Defendant Town of Colorado City joins in this motion.4 Oral argument has

not been requested and is not deemed necessary. 

1Docket No. 574. 

2Docket No. 591. 

3Docket No. 598. 

4Docket No. 576. 

Order – Hildale Motion in Limine; 

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Plaintiff proposes to call as expert witnesses Mann who is the director of AZ POST

5

and Stephenson who is the director of UT POST.6 The organizations of which Mann and

Stephenson are directors are charged with the responsibility of certifying or decertifying

peace officers in theirrespective jurisdictions. Plaintiff expects both Mann and Stephenson

to hear trial testimony and then offer opinions about trial testimony having to do with the

operation of the Town of Colorado City’s marshal’s office (“CCMO”). There is no evidence

that either Mann or Stephenson hold themselves out as experts for hire. There is no

evidence that Mann or Stephenson are being paid for their work in connection with this

case. Except as discussed below, there is no evidence that plaintiff provided records or

data of any kind to Mann or Stephenson fortheirreview and forthe formation of opinions

about the operation of the CCMO. 

Although the parties discuss the role of Evidence Rule 702, et seq., in this case, the

defendants’ principal argument is that plaintiff failed to comply with the expert testimony

disclosure requirements of Rule 26, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Pertinent to this case, Rule 26(a)(2)(A) is a general requirement that parties disclose

the identity of expert witnesses. Here, plaintiff has done that. Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires that

a party expecting to call an expert witness who has been “retained or specially employed

to provide expert testimony in the case” must provide a written report containing certain

disclosures enumerated in subpart (2)(B) of the rule. Plaintiff did not comply with this part

of Rule 26(a). Rule 26(a)(2)(C) addresses the subject of expert witnesses who do not

provide a written report. This subpart of Rule 26(a) provides: 

Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, if the

witness is not required to provide a written report, this

disclosure must state: 

5Arizona Peace Officer Standards and Training. 

6Utah Peace Officer Standards and Training. 

Order – Hildale Motion in Limine; 

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(i) the subject matter on which the witness is expected to

present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or

705; and 

(ii) a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness

is expected to testify. 

Plaintiff arguably complied with the requirements of this portion of Rule 26(a). The

question now before the court is whether or not plaintiff was required to provide a written

report with respect to the anticipated testimony of Mann and Stephenson. 

Plaintiff contends that it has neither contracted with, retained, employed, or paid

Mann or Stephenson with respect to their proposed testimony. As already stated, Mann

and Stephenson are public officials in the employ of agencies of the states of Arizona and

Utah. They are plainly not in the business of providing expert testimony. Mann and

Stephenson are not experts for hire, nor have they been hired as experts. But does that

mean that Mann and Stephenson were not “specially employed” to provide expert

testimony in this case? 

There is little helpful authority on the subject of which expert witnesses must write

reports and which are excused from the obligation to provide a written report. In

Goodman v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, 644 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2011), the court of

appeals recognizes the existence of “hybrid expert situation[s]”. Id. at 826. In Goodman,

the circuit court holds that a treating physician is exempt from Rule 26(a)(2)(B) “to the

extent that his opinions were formed during the course of treatment.” Id. However, when

the physician goes beyond the treatment provided – for example, reviewing information

provided by counsel for purposes of forming opinions – Rule 26(a)(2)(B) comes into play

and the reporting process must be adhered to. 

The First Circuit addressed the subject at hand in Downey v. Bob’s Discount

Furniture Holdings, Inc., 633 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011). In Downey, the court dealt with a

situation similar to that in Goodwin, and again focused upon the meaning of “retained or

Order – Hildale Motion in Limine; 

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specially employed.” The court noted that the expert in question did not hold himself out

for hire as an expert and there was no evidence that he was charging or receiving a fee for

his testimony. The court held: 

In order to give the phrase “retained or specially employed”

any real meaning, a court must acknowledge the difference

between a percipient witness who happens to be an expert, and

an expert who without prior knowledge of the facts giving rise

to litigation is recruited to provide expert opinion testimony.

Downey, 633 F.3d at 6. In Downey, the witness was viewed by the court as one whose: 

[O]pinion testimony arises not from his enlistment as an expert

but, rather, from his ground-level involvement in the events

giving rise to the litigation. Thus he falls outside the compass

of Rule 26(a)(2)(B). 

Id.

Returning to our case, there is no indication that Mann or Stephenson are in any

sense percipient witnesses to what was going on with respect to the CCMO. Neither Mann

nor Stephenson were involved in any disciplinary proceedings with regard to any CCMO

personnel. Although, except as noted below, not provided with documents or data to

evaluate for purposes of forming an opinion, as is usually done with an expert witness,

plaintiff expects Mann and Stephenson to simply listen to trial testimony and then form an

opinion. This court is aware of no authority for the proposition that the hybrid situation

described in Goodman, nor the percipient witness who happens to be an expert situation

described in Downey, should be extended to the situation presented by this case. 

What makes evaluating this situation troublesome is the fact that initially plaintiff’s

counsel appears to have provided Mann and Stephenson with no documents or data to

evaluate for purposes of forming an opinion. Rather, as stated above, plaintiff intends to

have Mann and Stephenson listen to trial testimony and then offer an expert opinion. How

could such a witness be expected to write a report when he has not yet heard the trial

testimony upon which his opinions will be based? Under such circumstances, would it not

Order – Hildale Motion in Limine; 

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be appropriate for the plaintiff to comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(C) by disclosing the subject

matter on which the witness is expected to present expert testimony? The answers to these

questions, for purposes of this case, lie in some further discussion of what has actually

transpired with respect to Mann and Stephenson. 

For reasons not entirely clear to the court, plaintiff wrote a letter to Mann and

Stephenson on October 29, 2014.7 The letter was copied to defense counsel. By this letter,

and for the first time so far as the court is aware, plaintiff informed both Mann and

Stephenson (as well as the defendants) “of the CCMO practices and conduct we expect to

come into evidence at a trial in this case, and that we expect would help form the basis for

your expert, testimonial opinion(s).” The letter continues to describe a full page of

practices and conduct, some focused upon the marshal’s office generally and other matters

focused upon the marshal’s officers. It is of course no surprise that counsel have become

aware through discovery (which has been extensive in this case) of the practices and

conduct of marshal’s employees which plaintiff intends to call into question. Moreover,

Mann was deposed by defendants and, in the course of that deposition, was asked:

“[s]itting here today, are you of the opinion that certain practices and past conduct of [the]

Colorado City Marshal’s office are inconsistent with your – with Arizona state law

enforcement standards and training? [Answer:] Yes.”8

Similarly, defendants deposed

Stephenson, and fragments of that deposition which have been provided to the court

suggest that counsel for plaintiff discussed Stephenson’s opinions about hypothetical

7

See attachment to Hildale Defendants’ Daubert Motion in Limine to Exclude

Testimony of Proposed Expert Witnesses J. Scott Stephenson and Lyle Mann, Docket

No. 574-2. 

8United States’ Opposition to Motion in Limine, Exhibit 1 (page 15 of 35), Docket

No. 591-1. 

Order – Hildale Motion in Limine; 

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situations in connection with arranging for him to act as an expert witness for plaintiff.

9

The court concludes that plaintiff had the wherewithal to provide Mann and Stephenson

with information which plaintiff had developed in the course of discovery on the subject

of the operations of the CCMO, on the basis of which Mann and Stephenson could have

formulated their opinions and reduced them to a timely disclosed expert report as

contemplated by Rule 26(a)(2)(B). 

The court further concludes that because Mann and Stephenson are in no sense

percipient witnesses, they do not fall within the “hybrid expert” category of witnesses

recognized by Goodman and Downey. Like the court in Downey, the court construes the

Rule 26(a)(2)(B) term “retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony” to

include witnesses such as Mann and Stephenson who are not percipient witnesses and who

have been “recruited to provide expert opinion testimony.” Downey, 633 F.3d at 6. 

Rule 37(c)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in pertinent part that: “[i]f

a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e),

the party is not allowed to use that information or witness ... at a trial, unless the failure

was substantially justified or is harmless.” Here, what has transpired was neither justified

nor harmless. The court is convinced that plaintiff has known for a very long time the

nature of the police practices which it intended to challenge through expert testimony, and

has deliberately – by means of the tactical device of stating that their experts would form

opinions based upon trial testimony – endeavor to keep defendants in the dark as to what

Mann’s and Stephenson’s opinions would be. The report writing requirements of

Rule 26(a)(2)(B) are intended to prevent the kind of blind-siding that flows from keeping

expert opinions hidden. 

9United States’ Opposition to Motion in Limine, Exhibit 2 (pages 28 and 32 of 35),

Docket No. 591-1. 

Order – Hildale Motion in Limine; 

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The Hildale Defendants’ motion in limine for the exclusion of expert testimony by

Mann and Stephenson is granted for violation of Rule 26(a)(2)(B). In consideration of the

foregoing, the court need not address the parties’ other arguments. 

DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 17th day of March, 2015. 

/s/ H. Russel Holland 

United States District Judge

Order – Hildale Motion in Limine; 

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