Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02178/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02178-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC BERNARD JACKSON,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary of

the California Department

of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, and ELVIN

VALENZUELA, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No.12-2178-WQH(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

I 

INTRODUCTION

Eric Bernard Jackson (hereinafter “Petitioner”), a

state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(hereinafter “Petition”) challenging an enhanced sentence

based on an admission of a prior felony conviction.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 50.) Petitioner claims

that habeas relief is proper because the trial court

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failed to advise him of his constitutional right to remain

silent and to confront witnesses before he admitted to a

previous felony conviction that enhanced his sentence

under Cal. Penal Code Sections 667(a)(1) and 668. (Petition at 6.)

The Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s

Answer, and all supporting documents submitted by the

parties. Based on the documents and evidence presented,

and for the reasons set forth below, this Court finds that

Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested and

RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED. 

II 

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings

of fact and presumes them to be correct. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36

(1992). The facts found by the state appellate court are

substantially set forth below: (See Respondent’s Lodgment

No. 5 at 2-4.)

On September 10, 2009, Louis Ayala, an ice cream

vendor, sat on his cart and made a pay phone call.

Petitioner approached Ayala from behind, touched Ayala’s

shoulder, and asked for his name. Petitioner instructed

Ayala to get off the telephone and mumbled a statement

about Tijuana, Border Patrol, and immigration. Petitioner

then pressed a box cutter against Ayala and stuck his hand

in Ayala’s pocket. Petitioner ordered Ayala to empty the

rest of his pockets. 

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Petitioner then took Ayala’s money and told Ayala to

follow him, but Ayala ran across the street to “a group of

kids” and said “Call the police. [He’s] robbing me.” 

The police captured Petitioner. He was prosecuted

for robbery. During Petitioner’s trial, and out of the

presence of the jury, the court asked defense counsel and

Petitioner how Petitioner wanted to proceed with respect

to a prior bank robbery allegation. Petitioner’s counsel

told the court that Petitioner knew of his right to a jury

trial on the allegation and that he could waive that right

and either have the court decide the matter or admit the

allegation. Counsel stated to the court that “there

doesn’t appear to be an issue with [the prior conviction

allegation]” and that Petitioner agreed to “simply admit

the strike prior allegation without prejudice on any legal

issues we have to strike it.”

The court asked Petitioner if he understood his

right to a separate jury trial on the prior conviction

allegation and Petitioner answered, “I understand.”

Petitioner’s counsel interrupted the exchange to inform

the court that Petitioner disputed the date of conviction

contained in the information, but not the conviction

itself. The trial court told Petitioner that the date did

not matter. Petitioner then “admitted to the bank robbery

in 1984" and stated that the previous court sentenced him

on May 5, 1985.

The trial court then asked Petitioner if he wanted

to give up his right to a jury trial and admit to a bank

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robbery conviction in Phoenix, Arizona. Petitioner’s

counsel again intervened and said, “That is incorrect. It

was in San Diego County.”

The trial court again asked Petitioner, “Do you

admit that you were convicted of bank robbery in Court No.

84416098 as alleged in the first serious felony prior and

strike prior?” Petitioner responded, “Yes. I admit that.”

III

 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In San Diego Superior Court case number SCD222834,

a jury found Petitioner guilty of robbery [Cal. Penal Code

§ 211]. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 2.) Petitioner

also admitted to a strike prior for a federal felony bank

robbery conviction. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 2.)

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a total term of

nine years; a base term of two years for the robbery (Cal.

Penal Code § 213(a)(2)), which the court doubled and added

five years because of the prior felony conviction [Cal.

Penal Code §§ 667(a)(1)-(e)(1), 668, 1170.12(c)(1), 1192.7

(c)(1)- (d)].

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of

Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, in case

number D056904. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5.) On April 4,

2011, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment for

robbery and the sentence enhancement for the previous

felony. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5 at 13.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the

California Supreme Court. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 6.)

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On June 8, 2011, the California Supreme Court denied the

Petition without comment in case S192706. (Lodgment No.

7.) 

 On September 5, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. On November 7,

2012, Respondent filed an Answer to the Petition. 

IV

 SCOPE OF REVIEW

The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act (“AEDPA”) governs Petitioner’s claim because Petitioner filed the claim after April 24, 1996. See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997). Under the AEDPA, a

federal court will only entertain a prisoner’s habeas

petition if the “claim was adjudicated on the merits in

state court” and the Petitioner claims he “is in custody 

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treatise of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

Furthermore, a Federal court will only grant an

AEDPA habeas petition if the state court’s decision was

either “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States” (“Supreme Court”)

or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2011) [stating that a

petitioner may satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or §

2254(d)(2)].

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Under the AEDPA, federal courts must be highly

deferential to the state court’s decision and give them

the “benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 527

U.S. 19, 24 (2002). A federal court’s deference to state

court rulings, however, “does not imply abandonment or

abdication of judicial review.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322, 340 (2003). A federal court must engage in its

own analysis, particularly on whether “clearly established

Federal law” exists.

Federal courts may not re-examine state court

decisions on questions of state law and, thus, must first

determine a threshold issue; whether Petitioner’s claim

derives from "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” See 28

U.S. 2254(d)(1); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72

(2003) (deciding if “clearly established Federal law”

existed as a threshold issue); Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (stating that federal courts may not

“reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions”). The Supreme Court of the United States’

holdings in effect at the time of the state court decision

comprise the applicable “clearly established Federal law”.

See Lockyer, 528 U.S. at 71-72; Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412.

Thus, the AEDPA prohibits federal courts from granting

habeas relief without clear Supreme Court precedent on the

issue, based upon Supreme Court dicta, or derived from

non-Supreme Court authority. See Wright v. Van Patten, 552

U.S. 120, 126 (2008) (finding that “because our cases give 

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no clear answer to the question presented... ‘it cannot be

said that the state court unreasonably applied clearly

established Federal law.’”); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S.

70, 77 (2006) (stating that because of “the lack of

holdings from this court... it cannot be said that the

state court ‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established

Federal law.’”); Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155

(2012) (reiterating that they “explained in correcting an

identical error by the Sixth Circuit two terms ago...

circuit precedent does not constitute ‘clearly established

Federal law.’”). However, a court may look to appellate

decisions to determine if “clearly established federal

law” exists and for persuasive authority. See LaJoie v.

Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 (9th Cir. 2000); Duhaime v.

Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). 

After addressing the “clearly established Federal

law” threshold issue, the court must then determine

whether the state court decision is "contrary to" or an

“unreasonable application of” Supreme Court precedent. See

Lockyer,528 U.S. at 71-72. The Supreme Court ruled that

the “contrary to” clause of 2254(d)(1) permits a grant of

habeas relief “if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than

this Court on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts.” Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Additionally, the

“unreasonable application” clause of Section 2254(d)(1)

permits a court to grant a habeas petition “if the state

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court identifies the correct governing principle from this

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

Supreme Court also clarified that under Section

2254(d)(1), even an erroneous or incorrect application of

clearly established federal law does not support granting

a petition, unless the state court’s application was

objectively unreasonable. Id. at 410. 

A federal court “looks through” to the last appellate court decision when the state’s highest court did not

issue a reasoned decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). Lastly, a state court need not

cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas

corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

 V

 DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims that habeas relief is proper

because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his

constitutional rights when he admitted to a prior felony

that enhanced his sentence under the California Three

Strikes Law.1/ (Petition at 6; Respondent’s Lodgement 2 at

13-18, 25.) Petitioner argues that he could not have

knowingly and intelligently waived his rights because the

trial court failed to advise him of his right to remain

silent and to confront witnesses and, in addition,

misstated facts about his prior conviction. (Respondent’s

1/

Petitioner did not raise specific arguments in his Petition. However, the

Court presumes that Petitioner argues the same violations as he presented in the

California Court of Appeal. 

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Lodgment No. 2 at 13-18, 25.) This Court must first decide

the threshold issue of whether Petitioner’s right to these

advisements and an intelligent waiver stems from “clearly

established Federal law.” 

A. “Clearly Established Federal Law” Does Not 

Require Nor Mandate The Same

Advisement Of Petitioner’s Rights For An 

Admission Of A Prior Felony Conviction As It 

Does For A Guilty Plea

Petitioner argues that “clearly established Federal

law” equates an admission to a prior crime with a guilty

plea and, therefore, required him to knowingly and

intelligently waive his right to remain silent and to

confront witnesses before he admitted to the prior

felony.2/ (Petition at 6.) In contrast, Respondent contends

that “clearly established Federal law” does not equate

admissions with guilty pleas, does not include rights

based in California law, and specifically states that the

Constitution does not provide a federal right to a jury

trial for prior crime admissions. (Answer at 11-13.)

1. “Clearly Established Federal Law” Does Not

Correlate Or Equate A Guilty Plea with An

Admission To A Prior Crime

Petitioner cites Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,

242 (1969), to provide “clearly established Federal law”

for his claim to relief. (Petition at 6). In Boykin, the

Supreme Court held that a guilty plea implicates a

defendant’s right to remain silent, to a jury trial, and

to confront those brought against him and requires the

2/

While Petitioner does not explicitly present this argument, his sole

federal case citation is to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).

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record to affirmatively demonstrate that the defendant

“voluntarily and intelligently” waived these rights.

Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242. The Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals further held that “where a defendant's admission

of a prior felony conviction can be used to enhance his

sentence, the admission is the functional equivalent of a

plea of guilty” and, therefore, the same constitutional

rights apply. Bernath v. Craven, 506 F.2d 1244, 1244 (9th

Cir. 1974)[citing Wright v. Craven, 461 F.2d 1109, 1109

(9th Cir. 1972)].

Respondent contends, however, that the Boykin rights

exclusively apply to guilty pleas and Ninth Circuit

appellate precedent does not qualify as “clearly

established Federal law.” (Answer at 11-12.)

This Court finds that “clearly established Federal

law” does not support Petitioner’s claim because no

Supreme Court precedent equates or correlates guilty pleas

with admissions to prior crimes. Only Supreme Court

holdings in effect at the time of the state court decision

comprise the applicable “clearly established Federal law”.

See generally Lockyer, 528 U.S. at 71-72. The Supreme

Court did not hold in Boykin, nor in any other case, that

the same protections and rights advisement afforded an

accused in a guilty plea is required for an admission of

a prior crime. See generally Boykin,395 U.S. at 242.

Furthermore, while the Ninth Circuit found that an

admission to a prior 

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crime is the “functional equivalent” of a guilty plea,

Ninth Circuit precedent does not qualify as “clearly

established Federal law” under Section 2254(d)(1). See

Lockyer 528 U.S. at 71-72; Parker, 132 S. Ct. at 2155.

Thus, Petitioner was not entitled to advisement of his

constitutional rights nor to an intelligent waiver of

those rights, because United States Supreme Court precedent does not equate an admission of a prior crime with a

guilty plea.

2. The Court Did Not Violate Petitioner’s Constitutional Rights Because There Is No Federal Right

To A Jury Trial For An Admission To A Prior

Crime

Petitioner cites In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122, 132

(1969,) and In re Yurko, 10 Cal.3d 857, 861 (1974), to

independently establish his right to a jury trial, to

remain silent, and to confront witnesses on the issue of

his previous conviction before his admission enhanced his

sentence. In California, both the previously cited

California Supreme Court cases and California Penal Code

Section 1025(b) establish and affirm a defendant’s right

to a jury trial on the issue of his previous conviction.

See In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d at 132; In re Yurko, 10 Cal.3d at

861. However, neither the California Constitution nor the

Unites States Constitution enumerate these rights. Western

v. McEwen, 2011 WL 7561574 at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2011).

Respondent contends not only that the basis for

Petitioner’s rights do not qualify as “clearly established

Federal law” under Section 2254(d)(1), but also that the

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Supreme Court specifically eliminated any federal right to

a jury trial on the issue of a prior conviction that

enhances the defendant’s sentence in Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 

The Court finds that Petitioner’s claim is not

derived from “clearly established Federal law” because

California statutory and case law do not create Petitioner’s federal rights. Supreme Court precedent specifically denies Petitioner a federal right to a jury trial on

the issue of his prior conviction. Federal courts may not

re-examine state court rulings on matters of state law

and, furthermore, “clearly established Federal law” does

not include state law and state court decisions. See

Locker, 528 U.S. at 71-72; Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68. Thus,

Petitioner’s reliance on state law is misplaced in this

federal habeas corpus proceeding. 

In addition, the Supreme Court held in Apprendi that

"other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490

(emphasis added). Thus, Apprendi’s rule, does not include

the fact of a previous conviction and, “as sentencing

factors, need not be afforded the same procedural

protections that attach to facts that are construed as

elements of the charged crime.” United States v. Tighe, 

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266 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, “clearly

established Federal law” specifically and unequivocally

denies Petitioner a federal right to a jury trial on the

issue of his previous conviction. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim fails the threshold,

“clearly established federal law” issue because federal

law does not equate the admission of a prior conviction

with a guilty plea, nor independently establish that

right.

B. Even If Boykin Applies, The Trial Court Did Not

Violate Petitioner’s Constitutional Rights

Because Petitioner Voluntarily And Intelligently

Admitted The Prior Conviction

Petitioner claims that he did not intelligently

waive his rights because the trial court did not inform

him of his right to remain silent and to confront witnesses and, furthermore, misstated the facts to Petitioner

when he admitted the prior conviction. (Petition at 6.) 

Respondent contends that Petitioner voluntarily and

intelligently admitted to the prior conviction, even

though the trial court incorrectly stated the year and

location, because Petitioner knew of the conviction and

stated, “I did the conviction. I’m not saying that I

didn’t do the bank robbery because I did. I’m admitting to

the bank robbery in 1984.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 8 at

603).

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because,

under a totality of the circumstances, Petitioner voluntarily and intelligently waived his constitutional rights

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and admitted the conviction. Under federal law, a guilty

plea implicates three constitutional rights: the right to

trial by jury, the right to remain silent, and the right

to confront the witnesses and accusers brought against

you. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243. Any waiver of these

constitutional rights “not only must be voluntary but must

be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States,397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).

While the record “must affirmatively disclose” that the

defendant “understandingly and voluntarily” plea guilty,

the Constitution does not require explicit advisement on

each right and the court must judge the voluntariness

under the totality of the circumstances. See Brady, 395

U.S. at 747, 749; Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761, 763

(9th Cir. 1974).

The California Court of Appeal found that a totality

of the circumstances indicated Petitioner voluntarily and

intelligently waived his rights. (Respondent’s Lodgment 5

at 6.) This Court agrees. When reviewing a state court

decision, a federal court must be deferential and give

“the respect due state courts in our federal system.” See

Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. The California Court of Appeal

found that Petitioner voluntarily and intelligently waived

his rights because the court and defense counsel discussed

his right to a jury trial, Petitioner signed an acknowledgment regarding the rights associated with an admission 

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when Petitioner considered self-representation, and

Petitioner had exercised each of the rights during

previous and current trials. (Respondent’s Lodgement 5 at

6-9.) 

Thus, the Court of Appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law. 

VI

 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the

undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED with prejudice. 

This report and recommendation of the undersigned

Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 22, 2013,

2013, any party to this action may file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all

parties no later than April 5, 2013. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to raise those objec12CV2178 15

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tions on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 25, 2013

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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