Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-14-01173/USCOURTS-ca3-14-01173-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 14-1173

_____________

WILLIAM J. WILLSON

Appellant

v.

THOMAS YERKE,

Covington Township Supervisor, in his personal capacity;

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF TOWNSHIP OF COVINGTON;

LACKAWANNA COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA;

DAVID PETROSKY; MARLENE BEAVERS; CHARLES LINDER

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (Civil Action No. 3-10-cv-01376)

District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani

_______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

December 12, 2014

Before: FUENTES, FISHER, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: March 11, 2015)

_______________

OPINION

_______________

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

 

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 

not constitute binding precedent.

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Appellant William Willson, a former member of the Board of Supervisors of the 

Township of Covington in Lackawanna County (the “Board”), contests the District 

Court’s decision to grant summary judgment on his First Amendment retaliation and 

Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims against several of his then-fellow 

Board members.

1 Because we conclude that the District Court did not err, we will affirm. 

On October 14, 2010, Willson filed a complaint in the District Court for the 

Middle District of Pennsylvania alleging that Appellee Thomas Yerke, then the chairman 

of the Board, violated his constitutional rights by insulting him and directing obscene 

gestures at him, and that David Petrosky, Marlene Beavers, and Charles Linder, fellow 

members of the Board, also violated his constitutional rights by condoning and covering 

up Yerke’s actions. Willson asserted a variety of claims against his former colleagues, 

most of which were dismissed by the District Court. The District Court subsequently

granted summary judgment on Willson’s remaining claims for First Amendment 

retaliation, violations of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process, and false light 

invasion of privacy. Because the District Court held that neither Willson’s substantive 

due process nor First Amendment rights were violated and that the false light invasion of 

privacy claim was time-barred, it did not reach Defendants’ argument that they were 

entitled to qualified immunity. 2 

 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and 

we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

2 On appeal, Willson does not contest that his false light invasion of privacy claim 

was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5253(1).

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Willson brought his First and Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983, under which he must show: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a 

person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of 

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.3 

Because some of Yerke’s alleged conduct occurred while he was presiding over township 

meetings, we reject Appellees’ argument that none of their alleged conduct occurred 

under color of state law.4 

As government officials, Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 

claims for damages unless the facts alleged by the plaintiff show the violation of a 

constitutional right, and the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged 

misconduct.5 Here, the facts alleged by Willson show neither the violation of a 

constitutional right nor that the right was clearly established. 

In order to plead a claim for First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must allege: 

“(1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person 

of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link 

 

3 Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011). 

4 See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49, 50 (1988) (“State employment is generally 

sufficient to render the defendant a state actor . . . . [G]enerally, a public employee acts 

under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his 

responsibilities pursuant to state law.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

5 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle,

622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010). 

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between the constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory action.”6 To be 

actionable as a general matter, the alleged retaliatory conduct must have had more than a 

de minimis impact on the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.

7

 

Where the alleged misconduct relates to the statements or actions of elected 

officials, the threshold is particularly high. As the Supreme Court observed in Bond v. 

Floyd, “[t]he manifest function of the First Amendment in a representative government 

requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to express their views on issues of 

policy.”8 We very recently observed in Werkheiser v. Pocono Township that “nothing in 

Bond . . . suggests the Court intended for the First Amendment to guard against every 

form of political backlash that might arise out of the everyday squabbles of hardball 

politics” and that “the First Amendment may well prohibit retaliation against elected 

officials for speech pursuant to their official duties only when the retaliation interferes 

with their ability to adequately perform their elected duties.”9 Willson’s allegations that 

 

6 Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Mitchell 

v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003)).

7 McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006); Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 

399, 419 (3d Cir. 2003).

8 385 U.S. 116, 135-36 (1966).

9 No. 13-3646, slip op. at 19 (3d Cir. March 6, 2015); see also Camacho v. 

Brandon, 317 F.3d 153, 166 (2d Cir. 2003) (Walker, J., concurring) (“[C]ourts should 

intervene in only the most severe cases of legislative retaliation for the exercise of First 

Amendment rights, thereby allowing ample room for the hurly burly of legislative 

decisionmaking.”); cf. Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding 

sufficient evidence to support a First Amendment retaliation claim where the City 

Council President had a Council member arrested and removed from a meeting for 

speaking out against the Council President).

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Yerke called him “a coward” and “a homo who licks Van Fleet’s ball bag,” threatened to 

“kick his ass,” and made obscene gestures at him do not amount to punitive conduct that 

would “deter a person of ordinary firmness” from exercising free speech rights even 

when examined in the light most favorable to Willson.

10

Willson’s other allegations that Yerke changed the locks on the township garage 

and denied Willson access to the township solicitor occurred outside § 1983’s two-year 

statute of limitations for actions arising in Pennsylvania.

11 Thus, Willson failed to allege 

the violation of his First Amendment rights.

In light of Werkheiser, Appellees are also entitled to qualified immunity under the 

second prong of our qualified immunity analysis.

12

 Appellees argue that Willson’s 

speech is not protected by the First Amendment under the Supreme Court’s holding in 

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), because the speech that forms the basis for his 

 

10 Thomas, 463 F.3d at 296. For the first time in his reply brief, Willson advances 

the argument that Yerke threatened his personal safety by swerving his vehicle at Willson 

and his family. Willson waived this argument by failing to raise it in his opening brief. 

See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993). 

11 See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5524(1); Montanez v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 2014 WL 

5155040, at *4 (3d Cir. Aug. 15, 2014); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) 

(“The length of the statute of the limitations for a § 1983 claim is governed by the 

personal injury tort law of the state where the cause of action arose.”) (citing Wallace v. 

Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007)). Willson’s complaint was filed on July 2, 2010, so any 

claim based on an event that occurred before July 2, 2008 is statutorily barred. Willson 

referenced Yerke’s changing the locks and denying his access to the township solicitor in 

a letter to the Covington Township Supervisors on January 13, 2008. The District Court 

found that these events were time-barred, and Willson does not contest its ruling on 

appeal. 

12 No. 13-3646, slip op. at 8-9. 

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First Amendment retaliation claim was performed within the scope of his employment as 

a public employee. Werkheiser did not definitively answer the question whether Garcetti 

is applicable to elected officials’ speech, but it did hold that the law was not clearly 

established on this issue.

13 Appellees thus are entitled to qualified immunity on this 

basis as well.

Willson next asserts that the District Court erred by granting summary judgment 

on his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim. Executive action violates

due process “only when it shocks the conscience, which encompasses only the most 

egregious official conduct.”14 Even extreme verbal harassment typically does not rise to 

the level of a constitutional violation in this context.

15

 None of the conduct alleged 

against Yerke meets this high threshold. 

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.

 

13 Id. at 9. 

14 Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 219 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United Artists 

Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 400 (3d Cir. 2003)).

15 See, e.g., Hawkins v. Holloway, 316 F.3d 777, 781-86 (8th Cir. 2003) 

(substantive due process violation where a sheriff repeatedly fondled one employee’s 

breasts and where he threatened deadly force by pointing loaded weapons at his 

employees, but no substantive due process violations where he groped other employees 

while making sexually suggestive comments); Costello v. Mitchell Pub. Sch. Dist., 266 

F.3d 916, 921 (8th Cir. 2001) (no substantive due process violation where a teacher 

called a student “retarded,” “stupid,” and “dumb,” and threw a notebook at her, which hit 

her in the face); Abeyta v. Chama Valley Ind. Sch. Dist., No. 19, 77 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th 

Cir. 1996) (no substantive due process violation where a teacher called a twelve-year-old 

student a prostitute). 

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