Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01019/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01019-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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Unite:! S(W;~ i~4ft: i Attf~~ 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

"'!',...•\h t:fr~·--•· 

JUr~ ~ b 1~91 

ROBERT L lrlO,EC!(~R 

Cle!'k R. M. BELL, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

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No. 90-1019 

(D.C. No. 89-M-1738) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, SETH, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Petitioner Robert Mark Bell appeals from the district court's 

order of dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus, filed 

pursuant to 28 u.s.c. S 2254, in which he sought relief from his 

jury conviction on charges of assault, disturbing the peace, and 

destruction of private property. In his request for habeas 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1019 Document: 010110128192 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 1 
relief, petitioner claims he was denied appointment of counsel and 

was refused a copy of his trial transcript, thereby adversely 

affecting his right to appeal. 

While awaiting sentence, 

corpus with the federal district 

petitioner filed a writ of habeas 

court which was subsequently 

dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. 

Following fifteen days of confinement for psychiatric evaluation, 

petitioner's sentence was deferred providing he comply with 

probation for six months and receive recommended psychiatric 

treatment. He then pursued appeals in the state district court, 

the Colorado Court of Appeals, and the Colorado Supreme Court. 

Following denial of certiorari by the Colorado Supreme Court on 

September 5, 1989, petitioner filed a second petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in the federal district court. The district court 

adopted the recommendation of the United States magistrate that 

petitioner's action be dismissed on the grounds that (1) 

petitioner was not in custody at the time the action was filed, 

and (2) petitioner had failed to exhaust his state remedies. It 

is these grounds for dismissal that petitioner appeals. We 

exercise jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. S 1291 and affirm. 

Jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions is established by 

28 u.s.c. S 2241 which states, "[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall 

not extend to a prisoner unless--. • (3) He is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States. . " 28 u.s.c. S 2241(c)(emphasis added). It is well 

established that custody is determined from the date that a habeas 

petition is filed. Carafas v. Lavallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). 

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Appellate Case: 90-1019 Document: 010110128192 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 2 
The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the petitioner, but 

upon the person who holds him in custody. "'[T]he traditional 

meaning and purpose of habeas corpus [is] to effect release from 

illegal custody.'" Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 

1987)(quoting Freiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 486 n.7 (1973)). 

Although the custody provision does not require actual physical 

restraint, petitioner must be subject to "restraints not shared by 

the public generally." Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 

(1963). 

At the time petitioner filed his second habeas petition on 

October 6, 1989, his probationary period had expired, and he was 

no longer in custody or subject to any other restraints. 

Petitioner contends, however, that because he was in custody when 

he filed his first writ of habeas corpus immediately following his 

conviction, retention of jurisdiction by the district court should 

be implied for purposes of his second writ. 

We concur with the reasoning of the First Circuit, under very 

similar facts, that retention of jurisdiction, pending exhaustion 

of state remedies, is a matter left to the court's discretion. 

Tinder v. Paula, 725 F.2d 801, 805 (1st Cir. 1984). When 

petitioner filed his first action without having exhausted his 

state remedies, the district court had no choice but to dismiss. 

See 28 u.s.c. S 2254(b); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). 

Absent an express intent by the court to retain jurisdiction 

pending state exhaustion, petitioner must "completely begin [his] 

quest for relief anew." Grace v. Butterworth, 635 F.2d 1, 10 (1st 

Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1981). 

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Appellate Case: 90-1019 Document: 010110128192 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 3 
Although we sympathize with petitioner's plight, his 

inability to present his arguments regarding the fairness of his 

trial to a federal court is not the kind of situation which the 

habeas corpus writ was created to address. See Hensley v. 

Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973). We therefore agree 

with the district court's determination. Petitioner's custody had 

unconditionally ended at the time he filed for habeas relief, and 

consequently, the district court was without subject matter 

jurisdiction to consider his petition. 

In light of our determination above that the district court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we need not decide whether 

petitioner exhausted his state remedies. The judgment of the 

United States District Court for the District of Colorado is 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Oliver Seth 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 90-1019 Document: 010110128192 Date Filed: 06/26/1991 Page: 4