Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01319/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01319-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Otis Brascom,

Petitioner,

v. 

Lyle Broadhead, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-14-1319-PHX-DGC (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

On June 13, 2014, Otis Brascom (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) (Doc. 1). On October 1, 2014, 

Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 13). Petitioner did not file a Reply. The matter is 

deemed ripe for consideration. 

Petitioner raises three grounds for habeas relief in the Petition. The undersigned 

finds that Grounds One and Three are not cognizable on habeas review and alternatively 

are procedurally defaulted. The undersigned also finds that Ground Two is procedurally 

defaulted. It is therefore recommended that the Petition be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. 

Case 2:14-cv-01319-DGC Document 29 Filed 08/28/15 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. BACKGROUND 

On November 10, 2010, the Maricopa County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner on 

two counts: (i) burglary in the third degree (a class 4 felony) and (ii) possession of 

burglary tools (a class 6 felony). (Doc. 13-1 at 16-17). On January 30, 2012, a jury 

found Petitioner guilty as charged. (Id. at 22-23). The trial court determined that 

Petitioner violated the conditions of his unsupervised probation that was imposed in May 

2010 for a possession of drug paraphernalia (a class 6 felony) conviction.1

 (Id. at 11-13, 

26). On April 19, 2012, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to six years of incarceration 

for the third-degree burglary conviction and 2.25 years of incarceration for the possession 

of burglary tools conviction. (Id. at 29-31). The trial court also revoked Petitioner’s 

unsupervised probation and sentenced Petitioner to one year of incarceration for the May 

2010 possession of drug paraphernalia conviction. (Id. at 35).

After his 2012 convictions and sentencing, Petitioner timely appealed to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id. at 39). On June 20, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Id. at 104-13). Petitioner filed a 

petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied on December 20, 

2013. (Id. at 137). In 2013 and 2014, Petitioner filed two separate petitions for writ of 

certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, both of which were denied. (Id. at 121-32, 139, 

143-56, 162). On June 13, 2014, Petitioner sought federal habeas relief by filing the 

Petition (Doc. 1).

II. FEDERAL HABEAS LAW

Federal law “unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue a writ of 

habeas corpus to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of 

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 

1, 5 (2010) (per curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). Accordingly, in reviewing a 

1 Petitioner pled guilty to the possession of drug paraphernalia charge on April 9, 2010. (Doc. 13-1 at 11). The trial court imposed a two-year term of unsupervised probation commencing on May 7, 2010. (Id. at 12).

- 2 -

 

Case 2:14-cv-01319-DGC Document 29 Filed 08/28/15 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

habeas petition, a federal court cannot reexamine state-court determinations on state-law 

questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991). A federal court is limited to 

deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. Id. at 68; Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860, 861–62 (9th Cir. 1994). 

If a petitioner has presented a cognizable federal habeas claim, there are a number 

of procedural bars that may prevent a federal court from reviewing the merits of the 

claim. Respondents do not argue, and the undersigned does not find, that the Petition is 

barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 1214.2

 The undersigned concurs with 

Respondents’ argument that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred by the following 

doctrines. 

A. Exhaustion-of-State-Remedies Doctrine

For over one hundred years, it has been settled that a “state prisoner must normally 

exhaust available state remedies before a writ of habeas corpus can be granted by the 

federal courts.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981); see also Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“It has been settled since Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S. 

Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886), that a state prisoner must normally exhaust available state 

judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”). 

The rationale for the doctrine relates to the policy of federal-state comity. Picard, 404 

U.S. at 275 (1971). The comity policy is designed to give a state the initial opportunity to 

review and correct alleged federal rights violations of its state prisoners. Id. In the U.S. 

Supreme Court’s words, “it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a 

federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state 

courts to correct a constitutional violation.” Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950); 

see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (“[W]e have long recognized that in some 

circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 

2 The one-year statute of limitations for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas 

petition is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

- 3 -

 

Case 2:14-cv-01319-DGC Document 29 Filed 08/28/15 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

criminal justice require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power.”) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The exhaustion doctrine is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That statute provides that 

a habeas petition may not be granted unless the petitioner has (i) “exhausted” the 

available state court remedies; (ii) shown that there is an “absence of available State 

corrective process”; or (iii) shown that “circumstances exist that render such process 

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

Case law has clarified that in order to “exhaust” state court remedies, a petitioner’s 

federal claims must have been “fully and fairly presented” in state court. Woods v. 

Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014). To “fully and fairly present” a federal 

claim, a petitioner must present both (i) the operative facts and (ii) the federal legal 

theory on which his or her claim is based. This test turns on whether a petitioner 

“explicitly alerted” a state court that he or she was making a federal constitutional claim. 

Galvan v. Alaska Department of Corrections, 397 F.3d 1198, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the 

state courts or that a somewhat similar state law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 

459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (citation omitted); see also Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 

(9th Cir. 2000), as modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal basis of a claim 

must be “explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the 

federal basis is self-evident or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on 

the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds”).

B. Procedural Default Doctrine

If a claim was presented in state court, and the court expressly invoked a state 

procedural rule in denying relief, then the claim is procedurally defaulted in a federal 

habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Even if a claim was not presented in state court, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in 

a federal habeas proceeding if the claim would now be barred in state court under the 

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

- 4 -

Case 2:14-cv-01319-DGC Document 29 Filed 08/28/15 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Similar to the rationale of the exhaustion doctrine, the procedural default doctrine 

is rooted in the general principle that federal courts will not disturb state court judgments 

based on adequate and independent state grounds. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 

(2004). A habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the state’s procedural requirements 

for presenting his or her federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to 

address those claims in the first instance. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32

(1991). 

As alluded to above, a procedural default determination requires a finding that the 

relevant state procedural rule is an adequate and independent rule. See id. at 729-30. An 

adequate and independent state rule is clear, consistently applied, and well-established at 

the time of a petitioner’s purported default. Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 797-98 

(9th Cir. 2011); see also Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Hayes), 103 F.3d 72, 74-75 (9th 

Cir. 1996). An independent state rule cannot be interwoven with federal law. See Ake v. 

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). The ultimate burden of proving the adequacy of a 

state procedural bar is on the state. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-86 (9th Cir. 

2003). If the state meets its burden, a petitioner may overcome a procedural default by 

proving one of two exceptions. 

In the first exception, the petitioner must show cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 

768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014). To demonstrate “cause,” a petitioner must show that some 

objective factor external to the petitioner impeded his or her efforts to comply with the 

state’s procedural rules. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004). To demonstrate “prejudice,” the petitioner 

must show that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 (“Such a 

showing of pervasive actual prejudice can hardly be thought to constitute anything other 

than a showing that the prisoner was denied ‘fundamental fairness’ at trial.”). 

- 5 -

Case 2:14-cv-01319-DGC Document 29 Filed 08/28/15 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In the second exception, a petitioner must show that the failure to consider the 

federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 780. 

This exception is rare and only applied in extraordinary cases. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 

1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). The 

exception occurs where a “constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent of the offense that is the subject of the barred claim.” 

Wood, 693 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

III. ANALYSIS OF THE PETITION

A. Ground One 

In Ground One, Petitioner states that “[b]urglary 3rd degree, is not a Felony under 

13-1506. False indictment, in violation of rule 13.1a.”3

 (Doc. 1 at 6). In the “Supporting 

Facts” section, Petitioner wrote a single sentence: “With intent to commit a Felony, is not 

committing a Felony.” (Id.). The sentence is followed by references to A.R.S. § 13-1506 

and the Arizona Court of Appeals case State v. Bottoni, 643 P.2d 19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

1982). (Id.). 

In Bottoni, the appellant was tried for first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, 

endangerment, and two counts of aggravated assault. 643 P.2d at 20. The jury found the 

appellant guilty of endangerment (a misdemeanor) and not guilty on both counts of 

aggravated assault. The jury could not reach a verdict on the burglary and murder counts. 

Id. On appeal, the appellant argued that since he was acquitted of aggravated assault, 

there was no felony upon which to base a burglary charge and could therefore not be 

retried on the felony murder and burglary charges. Id. The Arizona Court of Appeals 

rejected the appellant’s argument. The Court explained that because Arizona law 

provides that the crime of burglary is complete when entrance to a structure is made with 

the intent to commit a felony, acquittal of an underlying felony charge “does not 

necessitate an acquittal on the separate and distinct charge of burglary.” Id. 

3 Rule 13.1(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure states: “An indictment 

is a written statement charging the commission of a public offense, presented to the court 

by a grand jury, endorsed a “true bill” and signed by the foreman.”

- 6 -

 

Case 2:14-cv-01319-DGC Document 29 Filed 08/28/15 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

As (i) Bottoni was decided solely on state law grounds and (ii) Petitioner does not 

cite any federal law in support of Ground One, the undersigned finds that Petitioner is 

challenging an application of Arizona state law. Ground One is therefore not cognizable 

in this habeas proceeding. See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(“[A]lleged errors in the application of state law are not cognizable in federal habeas 

corpus.”). Even if Ground One is a cognizable federal habeas claim, the Petitioner did 

not fairly present it as a federal law claim in the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

In his Supplemental Brief on direct appeal and Petition for Review in the Arizona 

Supreme Court, Petitioner presented his argument that “burglary is not a felony” as a 

state law issue. (Doc. 13-1 at 97-99, 115-19). Thus, even if Petitioner intended to 

present Ground One as a claim involving a violation of federal law, Petitioner’s failure to 

alert the Arizona state court to the federal nature of the claim amounts to a failure to 

exhaust state remedies. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995). Moreover, because 

Petitioner would be precluded from post-conviction relief on Ground One under Rule 32 

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Ground One is technically exhausted and 

deemed procedurally defaulted.4

 Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (a claim is procedurally 

defaulted “if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the 

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the requirement would 

now find the claims procedurally barred”) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1)). For 

the above reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Ground One.

B. Ground Two

In Ground Two, Petitioner states “I was denied of [sic] a speedy trial, in violation 

4 Rule 32.2 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure precludes a defendant from post-conviction relief based upon any ground (i) raisable on direct appeal under Rule 31 or on post-trial motion under Rule 24; (ii) finally adjudicated on the merits on the appeal or in any previous collateral proceedings; or (iii) that has been waived at trial, on 

appeal, or in any previous collateral proceedings. In addition, Ground One would be 

precluded in a post-conviction relief proceeding as untimely under Rule 32.4 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. See O’Sullivan v. Boerkel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 

(1999) (where habeas petitioner was time-barred from presenting his claims in state court, claims were procedurally defaulted).

- 7 -

 

Case 2:14-cv-01319-DGC Document 29 Filed 08/28/15 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of rule 8.2 and VI amendment.”5 (Doc. 1 at 7). In the “Supporting Facts” section, 

Petitioner states “I was held in county custody for 459 days before tried on 1-24-12.” 

(Id.). Petitioner did not include a speedy trial claim in his direct appeal. Instead, 

Petitioner presented the claim in his petition for review filed in the Arizona State 

Supreme Court. In the “Issues Not Decided by the Court of Appeals” section, Petitioner 

wrote “Violation of rule 8.2” (Doc. 13-1 at 116) and explained that he “was denied of 

[sic] a speedy trial in violation of rule 8.2 . . . .” (Id. at 119). Unlike Ground Two in the 

Petition, Petitioner did not reference the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or 

any other federal law in the petition for review. Petitioner thus did not fairly present the 

claim in Ground Two as a federal claim in Arizona state court. Galvan, 397 F.3d at 

1204–05 (a habeas petitioner must “explicitly alert” a state court that he or she was 

making a federal constitutional claim). 

In addition, Ninth Circuit case law provides that a petitioner cannot exhaust a 

habeas claim by circumventing the applicable state court of appeals and going directly to 

the state supreme court. In Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 915-18 (9th Cir. 2004), the 

Ninth Circuit held that a ground for habeas relief presented by a petitioner convicted by 

the State of Washington was unexhausted because the petitioner did not fairly present the 

claim to the Washington Court of Appeals. The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument 

that the exhaustion requirement was satisfied because he raised it in his petition for 

review in the Washington Supreme Court. After examining case law from other circuits 

and the U.S. Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because the petitioner 

“raised his federal constitutional claims for the first and only time to the state’s highest 

court on discretionary review, he did not fairly present them.” Id. at 918. 

Therefore, under Casey, even if Petitioner did fairly present Ground Two as a 

federal claim in the Arizona Supreme Court, Petitioner failed to exhaust the claim by 

failing to raise it in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Returning to Arizona state court for 

5 Rule 8.2 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the time limits in which every person against whom an indictment, information or complaint is filed shall 

must be tried by the court having jurisdiction of the offense.

- 8 -

 

Case 2:14-cv-01319-DGC Document 29 Filed 08/28/15 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

determination of the issue would be futile as the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 

would preclude relief. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2, 32.4; Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987. Accordingly, 

the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Ground Two of the Petition.

C. Ground Three

Petitioner’s Ground Three states: “There is no threshold amount or a distinct 

Statute that constitute [sic] 13-3408 drug offense, in violation of Rule 13.2.C.”6

 (Doc. 1 

at 8). In the “Supporting Facts” section, Petitioner states “[o]ffense must be specified, to 

determine a reasonable doubt.” (Id.). Ground Three fails for two reasons. First, the 

claim does not allege a violation of federal law and is thus not cognizable in this federal 

habeas proceeding. See Langford, 110 F.3d at 1389. Second, like Ground Two, 

Petitioner presented the claim for the first time in his petition for review in the Arizona 

State Supreme Court. Thus, Ground Three has not been exhausted. Casey, 386 F.3d at 

918. Because Petitioner would be barred from presenting the claim in state court due to 

the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, the claim is procedurally defaulted. Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2, 32.4; Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends 

that the Court dismiss Ground Three of the Petition.

D. Petitioner’s Procedural Default is Not Excused

The merits of a habeas petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claims are to be 

reviewed if Petitioner (i) shows cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of 

the alleged violation of federal law or (ii) shows that the failure to consider the federal 

claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 

903, 913 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Petitioner offers no reason to excuse the above procedural defaults. Although 

Respondents briefed the procedural default issue in their Answer (Doc. 13 at 8-16), 

Petitioner has chosen not to file a reply.

6 Rule 13.2(c) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure states: “Specification of an offense in an indictment, information, or complaint shall constitute a charge of that 

offense and of all offenses necessarily included therein.”

- 9 -

 

Case 2:14-cv-01319-DGC Document 29 Filed 08/28/15 Page 9 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny 

and dismiss the Petition with prejudice. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED and 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

Dated this 28th day of August, 2015. 

- 10 - 

Case 2:14-cv-01319-DGC Document 29 Filed 08/28/15 Page 10 of 10