Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05425/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05425-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 26, 1996 Decided January 7, 1997

No. 94-5104

Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, et al.,

Appellants

v.

Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, et al.,

Appellees

Consolidated with

Nos. 95-5425 & 96-5058

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cv00361)

(No. 95cv00989)

Daniel Wolf argued the cause for appellants, with whom William R. Stein, M. Kathleen

O'Connor and Robert B. Jobe were on the briefs.

Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, argued the cause for appellees pro hac vice,

with whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States

Attorney, Michael J. Singer, Assistant Director, United States Department of Justice, and Robert

M. Loeb, Attorney, were on the brief. Catherine W. Brown, Attorney, United States Department

of State, entered an appearance.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SENTELLE and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

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SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: These consolidated cases present challenges to the Department

of States consular venue policy. Plaintiffs assert that the policy discriminates on the basis of

nationality in violation of Section 202 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §

1152(a)(1). Plaintiffs also claim that the policy is arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of

the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a), and that it violates the equal protection

component of the Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause. We conclude that under a recent

amendment to the INA, plaintiffs statutory and APA claims are unreviewable. We also hold that

the constitutional claim has no merit.

I. 

Because we discuss the background of the State Department policy at issue and this

litigation in some detail in our opinion in Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v.

Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, 45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995), rehg denied, 74

F.3d 1308 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 117 S.Ct. 378 (1996) [hereinafter LAVAS], we present an

abbreviated version here. During the 1980s an overwhelming number of migrants from Vietnam

and Laos fled their home countries seeking refuge in other countries in Southeast Asia. To deal

with the migration crisis some 50 countries, including the United States, entered into an

international agreement known as the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA). Under the CPA,

Vietnamese and Laotian migrants who land in other countries are screened by local officials to

determine refugee status. Those migrants who are screened-out, that is determined not to be

refugees, are repatriated. A repatriated migrant may then apply for an immigrant visa from his

home country. Until 1993, the United States Consulate General in Hong Kong processed the visa

applications of migrants before, and sometimes after, they were screened-out as nonrefugees. 

Other nations party to the CPA objected that this practice encouraged further migration, so the

State Department adopted a policy against processing visa applications of screened-out

Vietnamese or Laotian migrants in Hong Kong. Under current State Department policy, the

migrant is repatriated and his visa application is processed in his home country. 

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In 1994, two Vietnamese migrants, the migrants sponsors in the United States, and a nonprofit legal-rights organization challenged the State Department policy under Section 202 of the

INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a), which prohibits United States consular officials from discriminating on

the basis of nationality in the issuance of immigrant visas. The plaintiffs also claimed that the

policy was arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act

(APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a), and that it violated the equal protection component of the Fifth

Amendments Due Process Clause. The district court granted the State Departments motion for

summary judgment. In LAVAS, a divided panel of this Court reversed, holding that the consular

venue policy violated 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1) because the State Department had drawn a

distinction between Vietnamese and Laotian nationals and nationals of other countries. 45 F.3d at

473. We did not reach plaintiffs remaining APA or constitutional claims. The government filed

a petition for rehearing and suggestion of rehearing en banc. In the meantime, on remand, the

district court held that the case had become moot. 909 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995). The panel

reversed as to mootness and held that rehearing was unwarranted. 74 F.3d 1308 (D.C. Cir.

1996). 

While the governments rehearing petition in LAVAS was pending, a separate action, Le v.

United States Dept. of State, was filed in United States District Court. The district court, relying

on this Courts opinion in LAVAS, granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and enjoined the

Government from implementing its policy of declining to process the applications of screened-out

migrants in Hong Kong. 919 F. Supp. 27 (D.D.C. 1996). The Government appealed the

injunction, and this Court granted initial hearing en banc. In the meantime, the Supreme Court

granted certiorari in LAVAS. 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996). We then suspended en banc proceedings

in Le pending the Supreme Courts decision. 

On September 30, 1996, shortly before the Supreme Court was to hear oral argument in

LAVAS, the President signed into law the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRA) (enacted as Division C of the Department of Defense

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Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996)). Section 633 of the

IIRA amends the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by adding the following to 8 U.S.C. §

1152(a)(1): (B) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the authority of the

Secretary of State to determine the procedures for the processing of immigrant visa applications

or the locations where such applications will be processed. After requesting supplemental

briefing on the effects of section 633, the Supreme Court vacated our judgment in LAVAS and

remanded the case to us for further consideration in light of Section 633. 117 S. Ct. 378

(1996) (per curiam). We then consolidated LAVAS and Le. 

The State Department argues that section 633 applies to plaintiffs claim. Although

section 633 was not in effect at the time the State Department enacted the new policy, the State

Department asserts that Congress intended section 633 to be retroactive from its enactment. The

State Department further argues that section 633 applies because the plaintiffs are seeking only

prospective relief. 

We need not determine whether Congress intended section 633 to apply retroactively

because we hold that application of the amendment does not raise retroactivity concerns. 

Plaintiffs claim raises a procedural right and is governed by the INA as amended by section 633. 

We also hold that this case concerns prospective relief and so does not raise problems of

retroactivity. Applying section 633, we hold that the Secretarys actions are unreviewable

because there is no law to apply. We therefore reject plaintiffs claims under the statute and the

APA. Finally, we hold that plaintiffs constitutional claim is without merit. 

II. 

Plaintiffs statutory claim raises the question of whether the case is governed by the law in

effect at the time the Secretary enacted the new consular venue policy or the law as amended by

section 633. The Supreme Court set out the principles for determining whether a newly enacted

provision is applicable to a pending case in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 

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In Landgraf, the Court considered whether provisions of the 1991 Civil Rights Act permitting

compensatory and punitive damages in a Title VII case would apply to a case that was pending on

appeal when the statute was enacted. Id. at 247. In concluding that the provisions would not

govern retroactively, the Court noted that application of a statute is not retroactive merely

because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statutes enactment or upsets

expectations based in prior law. Id. at 269 (citation omitted). Rather, the statute has a

retroactive effect if it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a partys

liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. 

Id. at 280. It is therefore necessary for the Court to examine the temporal relationship between

the statute and the activity the statute is meant to govern. 

In Landgraf, the Supreme Court observed that changes in procedural rules will often not

raise problems of retroactivity. Id. at 275. The Court stated that [b]ecause rules of procedure

regulate secondary rather than primary conduct, the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted

after the conduct giving rise to the suit does not make application of the rule . . . retroactive. Id. 

The Court also noted that an intervening statute conferring or ousting jurisdiction may apply

without operating retroactively. Id. at 274. The Court stated that [a]pplication of a new

jurisdictional rule usually takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is

to hear the case. Id. (quoting Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 (1916)). Finally, the

Court stated that, because relief by injunction operates in futuro, a case seeking only

prospective relief is governed by the law in effect at the time of decision. Id. at 273-74 (quoting

American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 201 (1921)).

Applying the principles of Landgraf to this case, we conclude that application of section

633 would not raise retroactivity concerns. First, plaintiffs are asserting a procedural right. The

challenged State Department action merely enacts a change in the procedure by which plaintiffs

visa applications are considered. This policy does not upset any substantive right. As we held in

our earlier consideration of this case, plaintiffs do not have a substantive right to any particular

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process for having their applications considered. See LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 472. The Supreme

Court has stated that such procedural claims do not raise retroactivity concerns. Landgraf, 511

U.S. at 275. 

Moreover, plaintiffs are seeking only prospective relief. Plaintiffs characterize the remedy

sought as a reparative injunction, i.e., an injunction to compel the State Department to process

the application of plaintiffs in a way that would remedy the effects of the Departments past 

illegal conduct. However, the sole purpose and effect of the injunction would be to direct the

Secretary of State not to apply the consular venue policy in the future. It is true that an

injunction may be considered retroactive relief when the injunction is tantamount to an award for

damages. Cf. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986) (distinguishing between prospective

and retrospective relief in the context of the Eleventh Amendment). In Beverly Hosp. v. Bowen,

872 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam), for instance, we overturned a district courts refusal

to consider granting an order that would require a hospital to consider claims for reimbursement

of photocopying costs. We characterized the claim as a matter of retrospective relief. Id. at

485. However, in this case the injunction would not serve as a remedy commensurate with

damages for past wrongs. Instead, the injunction would serve to prevent what would allegedly be

a continuing violation of the statute. The Supreme Court has made clear that in such cases the

law in effect at the time of decision is to govern the availability of the relief. Landgraf, 511 U.S.

at 273-74. 

Having concluded that section 633 applies, we agree with the State Department that

plaintiffs statutory and APA claims are unreviewable because consular venue determinations are

entrusted to the discretion of the State Department. Under the APA, a person adversely affected

or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute is entitled to judicial

review. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Judicial review is not available, however, if the statute precludes judicial

review or the agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. §701(a).

Although there is a strong presumption of reviewability under the APA, Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,

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387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967), agency action is deemed to be committed to agency discretion when

statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply, Citizens to

Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (internal quotations omitted), or

there is no meaningful standard against which to judge the agencys exercise of discretion,

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). As the Supreme Court has stated, if no judicially

manageable standards are available for judging how and when an agency should exercise its

discretion, then it is impossible to evaluate agency action. Id. After reviewing the text of the

statute and the nature of the agency action at issue we conclude that the consular venue policy

falls within this category of unreviewable agency discretion. 

First, the broad language of the statute suggests that the State Department policy is

unreviewable. Congress has determined that [e]very alien applying for an immigrant visa and for

alien registration shall make application therefor in such form and manner and at such place as

shall be by regulations prescribed. 8 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (emphasis added). This section grants to

the Secretary discretion to prescribe the place at which aliens apply for immigrant visas without

providing substantive standards against which the Secretarys determination could be measured. 

Plaintiffs argue that there is a standard against which to measure the Secretarys decision in the

prohibition against nationality discrimination contained in 8 U.S.C. §1152. That argument is

untenable after the adoption of section 633. That enactment made clear that the prohibition

against nationality discrimination does not apply to decisions of where to process visa

applications. These determinations are left entirely to the discretion of the Secretary of State

In addition, the nature of the administrative action counsels against review of plaintiffs

claim. By way of comparison, the Supreme Court has held that the Food and Drug

Administrations refusal to take enforcement action is unreviewable because it involves a

complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within [the agencys] expertise. 

Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831. Similarly, in this case the agency is entrusted by a broadly worded

statute with balancing complex concerns involving security and diplomacy, State Department

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resources and the relative demand for visa applications. However, in this case the argument for

executive branch discretion is even stronger. By long-standing tradition, courts have been wary

of second-guessing executive branch decision involving complicated foreign policy matters. See,

e.g, Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 415, 420 (1839); Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. 511, 517-18,

520-21 (1838); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 307-310 (1829). As we noted in another context,

where the President acted under a congressional grant of discretion as broadly worded as any we

are likely to see, and where the exercise of that discretion occurs in the area of foreign affairs, we

cannot disturb his decision simply because some might find it unwise or because it differs from the

policies pursued by previous administrations. DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Intl

Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In light of the lack of guidance provided by the statute

and the complicated factors involved in consular venue determinations, we hold that plaintiffs

claims under both the statute and the APA are unreviewable because there is no law to apply. 

We likewise reject plaintiffs claim that the State Departments consular venue policy

violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs

concede that the migrants, as aliens, may not assert a Fifth Amendment right in challenging the

procedures for granting immigrant visas. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,

269 (1990). The equal protection claim must be asserted, if at all, by the citizen sponsors of the

migrants. However, the State Departments policy does not depend on the national origin of the

sponsor. Under the INA, a United States citizen or a permanent resident alien may sponsor an

alien by filing a petition stating that the alien is an immediate relative and is eligible for an

immigration preference. 8 U.S.C. §1154(a). Employment-based immigration preferences are

also available when a citizen desiring to employ an alien files a petition. 8 U.S.C. §

1154(a)(1)(D). While we can assume that a sponsor who is asserting a familial relationship to the

migrant will more often than not be of Vietnamese or Laotian origins, the State Department does

not require this to be the case. We have no reason to think that the nationality of an employersponsor at all corresponds to that of the migrant. Moreover, the substantive rights of the citizen

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sponsor to a particular process cannot be greater than the right of the applicant himself, and we

have concluded that the applicants have no substantive right to have their visa applications

processed in any particular venue. 

For the foregoing reasons, we remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with

this opinion. 

So ordered. 

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