Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02609/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02609-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FERNANDO F. VELARDE,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 10cv2609 DMS (WMc)

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF

MAGISTRATE JUDGE, DENYING

PETITION, AND DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

vs.

MATTHEW L. CATE, Warden,

Respondent.

Petitioner Fernando F. Velarde, a state prisoner, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 ("Petition"). Petitioner was charged with three counts: (1)

possession/purchase of cocaine base for sale, 14.25 grams of cocaine base; (2) transportation of a

controlled substance; and (3) having a concealed firearm in his vehicle. On September 20, 2007, he

pled guilty to count one and admitted to a firearm enhancement. In exchange, the remaining two

counts were dismissed. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received credit for time served at

sentencing (364 days) and a four year suspended sentence. Because Petitioner was not a United States

citizen and faced deportation, he subsequently attempted to withdraw his guilty plea, but his motion

was denied. He claims his federal constitutional rights were violated because his counsel were

ineffective when they advised him that by pleading guilty his chance of avoiding deportation was

“extremely slim” rather than advising him that the law required his deportation. 

/ / / / /

Case 3:10-cv-02609-DMS-WMC Document 14 Filed 11/08/11 Page 1 of 8
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 The Petition was referred to United States Magistrate Judge William McCurine, Jr. for a report

and recommendation (“R&R”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B) and Civil Local Rule

72.1(d). Although the Magistrate Judge found the state court “unreasonably applied Strickland [v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),] to the facts of Velarde’s case” on the issue whether the counsels’

representation fell below the objective standard of reasonableness (R&R at 12), he also found the state

court “reasonably applied the second prong of Strickland” on the issue of prejudice (Id. at 16). He

recommended denying the Petition. Petitioner filed objections. Respondent did not file a response.

For the reasons which follow, Petitioner’s objections are overruled, the Report and Recommendation

is adopted in part as stated herein, and the Petition is DENIED.

In reviewing a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the district court "shall make

a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made," and "may

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation insofar as it

finds the state court reasonably applied Strickland’s prejudice prong. 

The question raised by the Petition is 

whether the state court's application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable. This

is different from asking whether defense counsel's performance fell below Strickland's

standard. Were that the inquiry, the analysis would be no different than if, for

example, this Court were adjudicating a Strickland claim on direct review of a criminal

conviction in a United States district court. Under [the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act], though, it is a necessary premise that the two questions are

different. For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable application of federal law is

different from an incorrect application of federal law. A state court must be granted

a deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case involves review under

the Strickland standard itself.

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted, emphases in original). “Even under de novo review, the standard for judging counsel's

representation [under Strickland] is a most deferential one.” Id. at 788.

Establishing that a state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable under 

§ 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d)

are both highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.

The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of reasonable applications is

substantial. Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating

unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When 

§ 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The

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question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's

deferential standard.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

To establish the deficient performance prong under Strickland, “a person challenging a

conviction must show that ‘counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a ‘strong

presumption’ that counsel's representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional

assistance. The challenger's burden is to show ‘that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was

not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’” Harrington,

131 S. Ct. at 787, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89. 

The Magistrate Judge concluded, “Given the Ninth Circuit’s advisement against attorneys use

of ‘passive omission’ when counseling their clients, it is recommended the Court find the California

Court of Appeal unreasonably applied Strickland to the facts of Velarde’s case in light of the rule

announced recently by the Supreme Court in Padilla which requires a duty to give correct advice

when immigration consequences are clear.” (R&R at 12 (emphasis omitted), citing Padilla v.

Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010).) The recommendation therefore rests on Padilla and United

States v. Bonilla, which included the advisement against “passive omission of correct advice about

the possibility of deportation,” 637 F.3d 980, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2011).

As pertinent here, 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(1) provides that a state habeas application may

be granted only if the state court adjudication “involved an unreasonable application of[] clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” This occurs when

“the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the United State Supreme]

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies the principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). The “clearly established Federal law” in section 2254(d)(1)

“refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the United States Supreme] Court’s decisions as

of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006).

The Report and Recommendation finding on the deficient performance prong rests largely on

Padilla. Padilla established “that advice regarding deportation was not categorically removed from

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the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” 130 S. Ct. at 1478 at 1482. Prior to Padilla, this

issue had not been addressed by the United States Supreme Court and was the subject of disagreement

among jurisdictions. See id. at 1481 & n.9. Padilla was decided on March 31, 2010, after the relevant

state court decisions were rendered in Petitioner’s case. Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty

plea was denied on June 9, 2008, and the state court issued its last reasoned opinion on December 18,

2009. The principle on which the Report and Recommendation rests therefore was not clearly

established by the United States Supreme Court as of the time of the relevant state-court decision, and

cannot serve as a basis for the finding that the state court decision resulted from an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. See Carey, 549 U.S. at 76. 

For the same reason, the Report and Recommendation cannot rest on Bonilla, which was

decided March 11, 2011. Furthermore, Bonilla is not a United States Supreme Court decision and did

not apply Strickland, but instead relied on the standard for change of plea under Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure. 637 F.3d at 983 (“fair and just reason” for withdrawal under Rule 11(d)(2)(B)).

Even if Padilla had been decided prior to the relevant state court decision in Petitioner’s case,

it does not support a finding that the state court decision involved an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. The counsel in Padilla failed to advise the defendant of the

deportation consequence of his guilty plea and told him not to worry about his immigration status

because he had been in the country for so long. 130 S. Ct. at 1477-78. The Supreme Court ruled that

“a constitutionally competent counsel would have advised [the defendant] that his conviction for drug

distribution made him subject to automatic deportation.” Id. at 1478. Unlike in Padilla, Petitioner

was advised that his chances of avoiding deportation after guilty plea were “extremely slim.” (Lodg.

9 (California Court of Appeal decision) at 6.) 

Authority to issue habeas relief is limited to cases where "there is no possibility fairminded

jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [United States Supreme] Court's

precedents. It goes no farther." Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786. "Even a strong case for relief does not

mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. Based on Padilla’s holding and

the facts of Petitioner’s case, this Court cannot conclude that no fairminded jurists could agree on the

/ / / / /

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1 The appellate court’s reference to this transcript was made in the context of

determining whether the counsels’ performance was deficient, not in the context of prejudice. (Lodg.

9 at 11-12.) 

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correctness of the state court's decision that counsels’ performance in Petitioner’s case did not fall

below the objective standard of reasonableness. 

The Report and Recommendation is based on federal law which was not clearly established

as of the time of the relevant state court decision in Petitioner’s case. In addition, it appears not to

apply the doubly deferential standard applicable to federal habeas review of ineffective assistance

claims. It is therefore rejected insofar as it finds that the state court unreasonably applied the deficient

performance prong of Strickland to the facts of Petitioner’s case. 

With respect to the prejudice prong of Strickland, “a challenger must demonstrate ‘a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.’ It is not enough ‘to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome

of the proceeding.’” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 787, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94; see also

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (whether the outcome would likely be different had the

petitioner gone to trial).

Petitioner points to a “smoking gun” document (Objections at 2), arguing that the state court’s

conclusion of no prejudice was unreasonable. He relies on the trial court transcript where the judge

indicated that sometimes an immigration hold is not placed or, if placed, is lifted, even if only due to

error. (Lodg. 3 at 133.) To the extent the trial judge suggested there was a possibility immigration

hold would not be placed on Petitioner, this was inaccurate because a hold had in fact been placed at

the time of his arrest. (Objections at 2-3; Lodg. 14, Ex. A (immigration hold).) Petitioner argues the

state appellate court’s reference of this statement (Lodg. 9 at 11-12) demonstrates the

unreasonableness of its decision. The Court disagrees. The trial court transcript is from the hearing

on Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and not from his change of plea hearing. (See

Lodg. 3 at 16.) It therefore had no bearing on Petitioner’s decision to plead guilty or its

consequences.1

 Furthermore, as discussed below, independent reasons support the state court

decision.

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/ / / / /

In cases such as this, where the petitioner pled guilty and acknowledged his guilt, it is “often

quite difficult . . . to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong.” Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484 n.12 (discussing

Hill). Petitioner claims that had he known he was subject to mandatory deportation after his guilty

plea, he would have gone to trial. He does not contend he had a defense to the charges, but claims the

jury would have believed him that the drugs and the gun did not belong to him, and that he did not

know the quantity of the cocaine base he was carrying, because he had no criminal history and was

otherwise in good standing. However, according to his own admission, he had “unlawfully possessed

controlled substance in a useable quantity with the knowledge it would be sold and possessed an

unloaded firearm during the commission of a felony.” (Lodg. 1 at 12 (Plea of Guilty); see also Lodg.

3 (Transcript of Proceedings, Sept. 20, 2007 (change of plea colloquy)) at 7-8.) In denying

Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition, the state appellate court applied Strickland (Lodg. 9 at 8) and

reasoned:

We agree with the trial court that if the motion to withdraw the plea was granted and

Velarde went to trial, based on the facts of his case that ‘would be a very, very bad

decision,’ as Velarde most likely would be convicted of violations of Health and

Safety Code section 11351.5 (possession of cocaine base for sale) and Penal Code

section 12022, subsection (c) (possession of a firearm in the commission a violation

of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5), face a lengthy prison term and then be

deported.

(Id. at 12 (footnote omitted), quoting trial court ruling denying motion to withdraw plea; see also id.

at 13-14.) Based on the facts of Petitioner’s case, this conclusion was not unreasonable.

The state court decision was not unreasonable for another independent reason -- even if

Petitioner’s counsel had misinformed him about the immigration consequences of his plea, Petitioner

was not prejudiced “in light of the clear and unequivocal information he independently received from

the trial court and the plea form regarding the immigration consequences.” (Lodg. 9 at 16.) The state

court pointed to the plea form Petitioner signed (id. at 13) and the change of plea colloquy with trial

court (id. at 14), both of which unequivocally informed Petitioner that he would be deported after his

guilty plea.

The “Consequences of Plea of Guilty or No Contest” part of the plea form reads,

[¶] I understand that if I am not a U.S. citizen, this plea of Guilty/No Contest may will

result in my removal/deportation, exclusion from admission to the U.S. and denial of

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naturalization. Additionally, if the plea is to an “Aggravated Felony” listed on the

back of this form, then I will be deported, excluded from admission to the U.S., and

denied naturalization.

(Lodg. 1 at 13 (bold in original, italics added).) On this portion of the form, which Petitioner initialed,

the word “may” on the first line was crossed out and the word “will” was inserted. Moreover, “felony

possession of any controlled substance” was included in the list of aggravated felonies listed on the

back of the form. (Id. at 14A.) Finally, before accepting the guilty plea, the trial court advised

Petitioner:

The Court: . . . [T]he case can be used against you for many purposes. If not

a citizen in the country, it will result in removal, deportation, or exclusion from

admission into the United States and denial of naturalization. Is that understood?

The Defendant: Yes.

(Lodg. 3 at 7 (emphasis added).) 

Petitioner had the burden to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the outcome would have been different. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 787.

This requires more than a showing “that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the

proceeding.” Id. Based on the record before it, the state appellate court could reasonably conclude

Petitioner did not meet this standard. On federal habeas review, this Court cannot conclude that no

fairminded jurists could agree on the correctness of the state court's decision. See id. at 786.

The deferential standard on habeas review is intended to be “difficult to meet” and “reflects

the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice

system, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Petitioner’s claim does not arise from an “extreme

malfunction” of the criminal justice system. 

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s objections are overruled. The Report and

Recommendation is adopted in part and rejected in part as stated herein. The Petition is DENIED,

and the Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly. Certificate of appealability is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 8, 2011

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HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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