Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_05-cv-01291/USCOURTS-alnd-5_05-cv-01291-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

JERRY TUCKER, et al., ]

]

Plaintiffs, ]

]

v. ] CASE NO.: CV-05-1291-VEH

]

CITY OF DECATUR, et al., ]

]

Defendants. ]

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Introduction

This is a civil action filed under 42 U.S.C. §§1983 and 1985, and Alabama

state claims of conversion, interference with contractual relations/business, false

arrest, detention and imprisonment, and personal injury/battery. The case arises out

of the allegedly wrongful execution of a search warrant at the property of Plaintiff

Jerry Tucker and the allegedly wrongful subsequent arrests of numerous persons on

drug and other charges at or near Tucker’s property. Also at issue is the decision by

the Community Development Department of the City of Decatur to condemn, as

uninhabitable and unsafe, a mobile home and structure allegedly owned by Plaintiff

Tucker at one of the locations involved in the allegedly wrongful execution of the

search warrant. 

FILED

 2005 Nov-07 PM 01:13

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:05-cv-01291-VEH Document 13 Filed 11/07/05 Page 1 of 14
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There are fifteen named plaintiffs and the Defendants are the City of Decatur,

Alabama; Joel Gilliam, Police Chief of City of Decatur; three named police officers

for the City of Decatur; and David Lee and Michelle Jordan of the Community

Development Department for the City of Decatur. This case is presently before the

Court on the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 2). 

Standard of Review

A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it appears beyond

a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which

would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In deciding

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in

the complaint as true and construe the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Dacosta v. Nwachukwa, 304 F.3d 1045, 1047 (11 Cir. 2002)(citing th

GJR Invs., Inc. V. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11 Cir. 1998)). th

“[U]nsupported conclusions of law or of mixed fact and law have long been

recognized not to prevent a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d

991, 996 (11 Cir. 2003)(quoting Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n. 16 th

(11 Cir. 2001)). Furthermore, “[a] complaint may not be dismissed because the th

Plaintiff’s claims do not support the legal theory he relies upon since the court must

determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.” Brooks v. Blue

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Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11 Cir. 1997)(emphasis th

in original)(citing Robertson v. Johnston, 376 F.2d 43 (5 Cir. 1967)). “The th

threshold of sufficiency that a complaint must meet to survive a Motion to Dismiss

for failure to state a claim is . . . ‘exceedingly low.’” Ancata v. Prison Health Serv.,

Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11 Cir. 1985)(quoting Quality Foods de Centro America, th

S.A. v. Latin American Agribusiness Dev., 711 F.2d 989, 995 (11 Cir. 1983)). th

Allegations of the Complaint

The Complaint alleges that:

8. On or about May 4, 2005, the Decatur Police Department,

executed a search at 1212 22 Avenue SW, Decatur, Alabama. nd

The alleged target of the search was a person believed to be a

person by the name of “Victor Kirby”, and described in the

warrant was simply a black male known as “Vic”. The affidavit

for a search warrant was proffered to the Honorable Billy Cook,

Municipal Court Judge for the City of Decatur, Alabama and

signed by him @ 6:43 pm May 4 , 2005. The search is believed th

to have commenced at 2020 mt and concluded at 2145 mt. The

search warrant return for this property indicates locating some

“marijuana roaches”. (A true and accurate Copy of that Warrant

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and Affidavit is attached to this complaint as Exhibit A)

9. Notwithstanding the the [sic] directivesin the search warrant, the

Decatur Police Department, through its officers or persons

involved in the search, did enter the adjacent property, a

manufactured home, located at 1214 22 Avenue SW, Decatur, nd

Alabama without the benefit of a search warrant and searched the

adjacent premises and structures or buildings. This search

apparently commenced at 2020 mt as well. (A true and accurate

copy of the “Evidence Log” is attached as Exhibit B)

10. As a result of the searches, the Decatur Police Department did

summon or contact the Community Development Department for

the City of Decatur, Alabama for alleged inspection and

condemnation of both properties, in which David Lee, did come

to the scene and place placards on the manufactured home

declaring it unsafe for occupancy. A deficiency notice was also

placed on the manufactured home. (A sample/copy of the placard

and deficiency notice is attached herein as Exhibits C and D) It is

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alleged herein that theCity of Decatur and through its agents have

no authority or jurisdiction over the manufactured home, and such

condemnation at the request of the Decatur Police Department is

part of an unlawful practice and procedure to deprive and impair

the use and benefit of property. It is further alleged, that if such

authority or jurisdiction exists, the defendants cannot restrain or

impair correction of defects alleged or impair access or other

lawful uses of the property or its structures not otherwise

condemned for lawful purposes, all of which the defendants are

doing at the time of this complaint.

11. As a result of the search of the target residence, 1 plaintiff was

arrested, to wit: Victor Kirby (Loitering). As a result of the

warrantless searched property there were three (3) of the plaintiffs

arrested, to wit: George Hodges (Loitering, Paraphernalia and

Possession of Marijuana 2); Andre Cater (Loitering) and Thomas

Tucker, III (Loitering) and two other individuals whom [sic] is

presently unknown. The plaintiff at the time of arrest where [sic]

call vile names and including black MF (a racial slur) and

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excessive forces [sic] were used against the person of Andre

Cater, personally injuring him, and personal property of Jerry

Tucker was stolen converted or damaged.

12. The following day, on or about May 5, 2005, the Decatur Police

Department, did arrest, 11 plaintiffs for “Criminal Trespassing

Third Degree” (13A-7-4 Alabama Code) and 2 plaintiffs for

“Failure of Disorderly Persons to Disburse [sic]” (13A-11-6

Alabama Code). The Plaintiffs at the time of arrests were

committing no public offenses nor violating any laws, were not

occupying any structure or building. They were doing innocuous

things such as playing dominoes and socializing. In fact, two of

the plaintiffs were in the parking lot of a church simply observing

events transpiring. During the arrest, the plaintiffs were called

names, including niggers, blacks MF’s (racial slurs), and drug

dealers, cursed, had weapons branished [sic] placing the plaintiffs

in great fear of their safety, were accused of being drug dealers or

users in a public media (someone apparently summoned the news

media), defamed in their reputations and community status.

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Complaint, at 2-3.

Analysis

A. Claims of Plaintiff Dennis Allen

Plaintiff Dennis Allen voluntarily consentsto all of his claims being dismissed.

Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion will be GRANTED as to the claims of Dennis

Allen. All claims of said Plaintiff will be DISMISSED, with prejudice.

B. Official Capacity Suits

All Defendants are sued both individually and in their official capacity. In

addition, the City of Decatur is sued. All of the named Defendants are officers or

employees of the City of Decatur. “[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only

another way of pleading an action against the entity of which the officer is an agent.”

Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472 n. 21 (1985). See Monell v. Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978). Such suits are “in actuality, suits directly

against [the governmental entity] that the officer represents.” Busby v. City of

Orlando, 931 F. 2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991), citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 165-66 (1985). Because the City of Decatur is a separately named defendant in

this action, Plaintiffs’ official capacity claims against the Defendants are superfluous

and redundant. Busby, 931 at 776. (“Because suits against a municipal officer sued

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The Plaintiffs do not dispute this contention in their brief. 1

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in his official capacity and direct suits against municipalities are functionally

equivalent, there no longer exists the need to bring official-capacity actions against

local governmental officials, because local government units can be sued directly .

. .”). 

1

The Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED as to all Counts as brought against

all individual Defendants to the extent the Complaint is brought against the

Defendants in their official capacities.

C. Count Two [Conspiracy to Violate the Plaintiffs’ Constitutional

Rights In Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985]

In Count Two of their complaint in this case, Plaintiffs assert claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1985 alleging that the Defendants jointly conspired to deprive the Plaintiffs

of their federal constitutional rights. The individual Defendants are all either officers

or employees of the City of Decatur, Alabama. Because such is the case, the

Plaintiffs’ § 1985 conspiracy claims are barred by the intracorporate conspiracy

doctrine. In Dickerson v. Alachua County Commission, 200 F. 3d 761 (11th Cir.

2000), the Eleventh Circuit considered the application of the intracorporate

conspiracy doctrine to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The Eleventh Circuit

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held that a § 1985 claim was barred because all of the alleged co-conspirators were

officers or employees of a single governmental unit. The Eleventh Circuit stated:

Under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, a corporation’s

employees, acting as agents of the corporation, are deemed incapable of

conspiring among themselves or with the corporation. This doctrine

stems from basic agency principles that “attribute the acts of agents of

a corporation to the corporation, so that all of their acts are considered

to be those of a single legal actor.” Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp.,

660 F.2d 594, 603 (5th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Hartley, 678

F.2d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 1982). The reasoning behind the intracorporate

conspiracy doctrine is that it is not possible for a single legal entity

consisting of the corporation and its agents to conspire with itself, just

as it is not possible for an individual person to conspire with himself.

See Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 603 (explaining that “the multiplicity of actors

necessary to conspiracy” is negated when the agents’ acts are attributed

to the corporation and the corporation and its agents are viewed as a

single legal actor); Nelson Radio & Supply Co., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,

200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952) (stating that “[a] corporation cannot

conspire with itself any more than a private individual can”). This

doctrine has been applied not only to private corporations but also to

public, government entities. See Chambliss v. Foote, 562 F.2d 1015 (5th

Cir. 1977), aff’g, 421 F. Supp. 12, 15 (E.D.La. 1976) (applying the

intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to bar a § 1985(3) claim against a

public university and its officials); see also Wright v. Illinois Dept. of

Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1508 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding

that intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies not just to private entities

but also to government agenciessuch asthe Department of Children and

Family Services); Runs After v. United States, 766 F.2d 347, 354 (8th

Cir. 1985) (“The Tribal Council as an entity or governmental body

cannot conspire with itself.”) [footnotes omitted.] 

Id. at 767.

The Eleventh Circuit has also recently considered this issue in Denney v. City

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of Albany, 247 F. 3d 1172 (11th Cir. 2001). The Eleventh Circuit in Denney

reaffirmed its prior holding in Dickerson that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine

bars claims under § 1985. The Eleventh Circuit stated: 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim fails under the intracorporate

conspiracy doctrine. “The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine holds that

acts of corporate agents are attributed to the corporation itself, thereby

negating the multiplicity of actors necessary for the formation of a

conspiracy. Simply put, under the doctrine, a corporation cannot

conspire with its employees, and its employees, when acting in the scope

of their employment, cannot conspire among themselves.” McAndrew

v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F. 3d 1031, 1036 (11th Cir. 2000) (en

banc). The doctrine applies to public entities such as the City and its

personnel. See Dickerson v. Alachua County Comm’n, 200 F. 3d 761,

768 (11th Cir. 2000) (rejecting employee’s § 1985(3) claim on that basis

where employee alleged civil conspiracy among solely County

employees); Chambliss v. Foote, 562 F. 2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1977), aff’g,

421 F. Supp. 12, 15 (E.D. La. 1976) (applying intracorporate conspiracy

doctrine to shield the public university from § 1985(3) liability in a civil

conspiracy claim); compare McAndrew, 206 F. 3d at 1038-39 (doctrine

inapplicable to criminal conspiracy allegations under § 1985(2)). Here,

the only two conspirators identified by Plaintiffs – Fields and Jackson

– are both City employees; no outsiders are alleged to be involved. The

alleged subject of their conspiracy – non-criminal manipulation of the

promotion process to deprive white employees of promotional

opportunities – relates to their performance of their official, not

personal, duties. Accordingly, because Fields and Jackson were both

effectively acting as the City itself when they entered into their alleged

illicit agreement, there can be no claim against them under § 1985, and

the district court’s rejection of that claim, like its rejection of the Title

VII claim, must be affirmed. (footnote omitted). 

Id. at 1190-91. 

Because all of the individual Defendants in this action are officers or

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employees of the City of Decatur, Alabama, there can be no actionable conspiracy §

1985 claim in this case as a matter of law. Any such claim is barred by the

intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. The Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED as

to the Section 1985 claims.

D. Count One [Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983]

1. Against the Individual Defendants

On September 15, 2005, this Court entered an Order (doc. 12) giving Plaintiffs

30 days from the date of the order to file an amended Complaint setting forth the

required factual detail to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements for the § 1983

claim as to the alleged specific conduct of each individual Defendant and to set forth

applicable case law to satisfy their burden as it pertains to qualified immunity. The

period to file has passed and Plaintiffs have failed to file an amended Complaint.

Therefore, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED as to the § 1983

claims against all Defendants in their individual capacities. 

2. City of Decatur

A municipality is not subject to § 1983 liability under the doctrine of

respondeat superior based upon the alleged unconstitutional conduct of its employees.

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978) (“In particular,

we conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a

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The Plaintiffs do not dispute this argument in their submission. 2

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tortfeasor – or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under 1983 on a

respondeat superior theory.”; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)

(“respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under 1983.”); see also

Busby v.City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991). Rather, it is only “when

execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by

those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the

injury, that the government as an entity is responsible under 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S.

at 694. Consequently, in the absence of any allegation that a “policy” or “custom” of

the municipality caused the injuries or damages alleged, a § 1983 plaintiff’s

complaint fails to state a viable claim of liability against a municipality. See, e.g.,

Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 563 (11th Cir. 1984).

The Complaint in this case solely alleges that the City is subject to § 1983

liability premised upon the allegedly unconstitutional conduct of the Police Chief,

City police officers and employees of the City’s Community Development

Department. None of the Defendants are alleged to be policymakers of the City. The 2

Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED regarding the § 1983 claims against the City

of Decatur.

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E. Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8

Under § 11-47-190 Code of Alabama (1975), municipal liability in Alabama

is limited to two classes. The first is liability for street defects. The second is

respondeat superior liability resulting from the allegedly wrongful conduct of a

municipality’s agents, employees or officers. See City of Lanett v. Tomlinson, 659

So. 2d 68, 70 (Ala. 1995). 

Section 11-47-190, Code of Alabama (1975), limits the respondeat superior

liability of municipalities to claims arising out of the “neglect, carelessness or

unskillfulness of some agent, officer or employee of a municipality engaged in work

therefor and while acting in the line of his or her duty.” This limitation of liability

contained in § 11-47-190 limits the vicarious liability of Alabama municipalities to

negligence-based claims only. See Roberts v. City of Geneva, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1199,

1213 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (“[Under § 11-47-190], a city’s liability is limited to

negligence-based claims only.”); City of Prattville v. Post, 831 So. 2d 622, 627, n.7

(Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (“Section 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, limits monetary damages

against a municipality to those claims alleging negligence.”). 

Accordingly, as to the City, the Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED as to

Counts 3, 4, 5, and 6, except to the extent that these Counts limit the respondeat

superior liability of the City to claims arising out of the “neglect, carelessness or

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unskillfulness of some agent, officer or employee of a municipality.” All claims

against the City contained in Count 8 will be DISMISSED.

DONE, this 7 day of November, 2005. th

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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