Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07239/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07239-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 8, 1997 Decided May 22, 1998

No. 96-7239

Tiana Hutchins, a minor, by Julia C. Owens,

her grandmother, et al.,

Appellees

v.

District of Columbia,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv02050)

Steven J. Rosenbaum argued the cause for appellant, with

whom Jo Anne Robinson, Interim Corporation Counsel,

Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, Donna M.

Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, and Jason A. Levine were on the briefs.

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 1 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Robert S. Plotkin argued the cause for appellees, with

whom Jay A. Morrison, Patricia L. Hurst, and Arthur B.

Spitzer were on the brief.

Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was

filed, R. Craig Lawrence and Kimberly N. Tarver, Assistant

U.S. Attorneys, were on the brief for the United States of

America as amicus curiae.

Before: Silberman, Rogers and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Opinion concurring in the judgment filed by Circuit Judge

Tatel.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Silberman.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: Confronted with evidence of increasing juvenile violence and victimization in the District of

Columbia, and informed about the success of other cities in

reducing such problems through the enforcement of juvenile

curfews, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted the

Juvenile Curfew Act of 1995. The Council modeled the Act

on a Dallas, Texas, ordinance that the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had held was constitutional.

See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 496 (5th Cir. 1993). The

main provision of the D.C. Act bars unmarried and unemancipated persons 1 under seventeen years old from being in

__________

1 Although the curfew law is entitled the "Juvenile Curfew Act

of 1995," the law does not apply to "juveniles," but rather to

"minors" who are defined in the law as unmarried and unemancipated persons under the age of seventeen. See D.C. Code

s 6-2182(5) (Supp. 1997). The term "juvenile" is not defined in the

curfew law nor in the D.C. statutes governing delinquency, which

instead pertain to "child[ren]," who are persons under age eighteen

not charged with crimes that lead to prosecution as adults. See id.

s 16-2301(3) (Repl. Vol. 1997). Nevertheless, the common definition of "juvenile" is that defined in federal law as a person under

the age of eighteen. See 18 U.S.C. s 5031 (1994); Hutchins v.

District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665, 666 n.1 (D.D.C. 1996). For

the sake of clarity, references to "minors" in this opinion refer to

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 2 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

public unaccompanied by a parent or equivalent adult supervisor from 11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. on Sunday through Thursday nights or from 12:01 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. on Friday and

Saturday nights, with certain enumerated "defenses." See

D.C. Code ss 6-05 2182(1), -2183(a)(1), (b)(1) (Supp. 1997).

Thirteen months after the Act took effect, the district court

enjoined its enforcement, ruling in light of evidentiary deficiencies that the Act violated the minor appellees' equal

protection and due process rights and violated the appellee

parents' right to due process. See Hutchins v. District of

Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665, 668 (D.D.C. 1996). The District

of Columbia, joined by the United States as amicus, appeals

the grant of summary judgment to appellees. We affirm,

albeit with different analyses. While the court is unanimous

that the case is not moot, see infra Part II, we apply different

tests to evaluate the constitutionality of the Act. I apply an

intermediate scrutiny test in light of competing individual and

governmental interests, while Judge Tatel applies strict scrutiny and Judge Silberman applies a rational basis test. Judge

Tatel and I agree that the Act fails to survive under intermediate or strict scrutiny review; Judge Silberman dissents,

concluding that the Act survives rational basis review.

I.

Appellees, nine persons under the age of seventeen at the

time 2 and four parents, all residents of the District of Columbia ("the District"), and a movie theater corporation sued the

__________

persons under seventeen years old; the term "juveniles" refers to

persons under eighteen years old; the phrase "juvenile curfews"

refers to curfew laws affecting any class of young people.

2 Seven minor plaintiffs were residents of Northwest Washington, D.C., and one minor plaintiff resided in each of Southwest and

Southeast Washington, D.C. During the pendency of this appeal, all

of the minor plaintiffs passed their seventeenth birthdays, and thus

they are no longer subject to the provisions of the Act governing

the behavior of minors under the age of seventeen. This fact does

not make this appeal moot, however, as discussed below. See infra

Part II.

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 3 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

District to enjoin enforcement of the Juvenile Curfew Act of

1995 ("the Act"). They sought a declaration that the Act

violates rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth, and Fifth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and exceeds

the police powers of the District of Columbia. Their principal

allegations were that the Act violates the minors' Fifth

Amendment equal protection and due process rights by impinging upon their fundamental right to free movement; the

Act violates their First Amendment rights to free speech and

association and is both overbroad and unconstitutionally

vague; and the Act violates their Fourth Amendment rights

to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures in that it

allows the police to stop minors and take them into custody

based only on a reasonable belief that the Act has been

violated. In addition, appellees alleged that the Act violates

the parents' Fifth Amendment due process rights because, by

removing parents' discretion to allow children to be in public

places during curfew hours unaccompanied by a person at

least twenty-one years old, the Act impinges upon parents'

fundamental right to autonomy in raising children. Finally,

appellees alleged that the Act exceeds the District's police

powers by criminalizing minors' participation in legitimate

educational, cultural, vocational, athletic, social, and familyrelated activities during curfew hours. Appellees argued

that, because the Act infringes on both the minors' and

parents' fundamental rights, it is subject to strict scrutiny

review, which, they asserted, it fails to satisfy.

Upon considering the parties' cross motions for summary

judgment, the district court granted judgment for appellees

and enjoined enforcement of the Act. See Hutchins,

942 F. Supp. at 684. The court agreed that minors have a

fundamental right to free movement, reasoning from the

Supreme Court's acknowledgments that minors have constitutional rights and that adults have a fundamental right to free

movement to the conclusion that, in the context of a curfew

law, there is no reason to treat minors' right to free movement differently from that of adults. See id. at 670-74.

Then, concluding that the Act infringes minors' fundamental

right to free movement as well as parents' fundamental right

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 4 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

to direct their children's upbringing, the court applied a strict

scrutiny test and found that while the District had demonstrated a compelling need for the curfew, it had failed to

demonstrate that the Act is narrowly tailored to serve that

need. See id. at 674-80. Based on deficiencies in the District's evidentiary justification for a nexus between the curfew

and a future reduction in juvenile victimization and crime, the

court concluded that the Act affects too many minors engaged

in legitimate activities. See id. at 680. The court further

ruled that four of the Act's curfew "defenses" are unconstitutionally vague, see id. at 679, but did not reach the minor

appellees' First and Fourth Amendment challenges, see id. at

680 n.19. Because the Act also affects parents exercising

appropriate supervision of their children, the court ruled that

the Act infringes upon parents' fundamental rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 680.

On appeal, the District of Columbia contends that the Act

is constitutional, curtailing only limited late night activities of

unsupervised minors and thereby interposing only a minor

interference with parental autonomy. The District maintains,

first, that the district court erred in applying a strict scrutiny

standard in the face of authority rejecting any fundamental

right of minors to wander unsupervised at night, Supreme

Court precedent regarding more general limitations on minors' rights and parental autonomy, and the Supreme Court's

stringent guidelines for the identification of new fundamental

rights. Alternatively, the District maintains that even if

strict scrutiny is the proper standard, the Act still should be

upheld: the district court's finding that the District has a

compelling interest in preventing juvenile crime and protecting juveniles against victimization is supported by abundant

evidence and the Act is narrowly tailored to that interest, as

demonstrated by evidence that the district court rejected.

Finally, the District maintains that the Act does not violate

appellees' First or Fourth Amendment rights, and that the

district court erred in ruling that four of the curfew exceptions in the Act are unconstitutionally vague without offering

either an explanation or a saving construction as required by

Supreme Court precedent.

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 5 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The constitutionality of a juvenile curfew statute is a question of first impression in this court, and our review is de

novo.3 See Wilson v. Pe¤a, 79 F.3d 154, 160 & n.1 (D.C. Cir.

1996); Propert v. District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1331

(D.C. Cir. 1991).

The Act establishes a curfew from 11:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m.

the next day for Sunday night through Thursday night, and

between 12:01 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. on Friday and Saturday

nights and daily throughout July and August. See D.C. Code

s 6-2182(1) (reprinted in the Appendix to this opinion). The

curfew applies only to "minors," who are defined as persons

under age seventeen who are neither emancipated nor married. See id. s 6-2182(5). During curfew hours, a minor

may not be "in any public place or on the premises of any

establishment within the District of Columbia" without appropriate adult supervision. Id. s 6-2183(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). An

"adult" is defined as a parent or any person twenty-one years

or older whom the minor's parent has authorized to be a

caretaker. See id. ss 6-2182(8). The Act also provides that

a person under age eighteen shall not operate a motor vehicle

in the District after midnight, except when authorized under

the Act. See id. s 40-301(g) (Supp. 1997). A police officer

who "reasonably believes" that a curfew violation has occurred may inquire of the minor about the minor's age and

__________

3 Notwithstanding the large number of cities having juvenile

curfew laws, see William Ruefle & Kenneth Mike Reynolds, Curfews

and Delinquency in Major American Cities, 41 Crime & Delinq.

347, 353 (1995), few circuit courts have ruled on such laws' constitutionality. Although the Fifth Circuit struck down one juvenile

curfew law as unconstitutionally overbroad, see Johnson v. City of

Opelousas, 685 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981), the

court upheld a later juvenile curfew, see Qutb, 11 F.3d at 496, as did

the Third Circuit, see Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401

F. Supp. 1242, 1266 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.

1976). Recently, the Ninth Circuit held unconstitutional a juvenile

curfew lacking sufficient exceptions for legitimate activities. See

Nunz v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 947-51 (9th Cir. 1997).

Also, the Second Circuit held a curfew unconstitutionally void for

vagueness because it failed to provide an hour at which the curfew

reasons for being in public and, upon determining that the

minor is violating the curfew, may hold the minor in custody

until the minor's parent arrives or 6:00 a.m. the following

morning, whichever occurs first. Id. s 6-2183(c).

A minor who violates the Act can be required by a court to

perform up to twenty-five hours of community service for

each violation. See id. s 6-2183(d)(4). Violation of the driving restriction can result in suspension of one's driver's

license for up to one year. See id. s 40-301(g). Both a

parent or guardian of a minor who either knowingly permits

or, because of insufficient control, allows the minor to violate

the Act and the owner, operator, or any employee of an

establishment who violates the Act by knowingly allowing a

minor to remain on its premises during curfew hours may be

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 6 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

fined up to $500 or ordered to perform community service.

See id. s 6-2183(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1). A parent (and persons in

loco parentis) may also be required to attend parenting

classes. See id. s 6-2183(d)(2).

The Act provides eight "defenses" to a curfew violation.

Thus, a minor does not violate the Act if: (1) accompanied by

a parent, guardian, or any other person twenty-one years or

older authorized by a parent to care for the minor; (2) on an

errand for the parent, guardian, or anyone twenty-one years

or older authorized by a parent to care for the minor; (3) in a

vehicle traveling interstate; (4) engaged in employment or

commuting to or from employment; (5) involved in an emergency situation; (6) on the sidewalk abutting the minor's or a

next-door neighbor's residence, if the neighbor has not complained to police; (7) attending an official school, religious, or

other activity sponsored by the District, a civic organization,

or a similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor; or

(8) exercising First Amendment rights, including the freedoms of religion and speech and the right of assembly. See

id. ss 6-2182(8), -2183(b)(1)(A)-(H).

The Act originally also included a sunset clause whereby

the curfew regime would expire after two years. See D.C.

Act 11-90, s 6(b) (July 6, 1995). At least ninety days prior to

the date of expiration, the Mayor was required to report to

__________

ended. See Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir.

1976).

the Council of the District of Columbia ("D.C. Council") on

the effectiveness of the curfew restrictions and to recommend

whether the Act should be extended. See D.C. Code

s 6-2183(e)(1). Prior to expiration of the two-year period,

and without a report from the Mayor, however, the D.C.

Council extended the Act indefinitely.4

In view of the recent seventeenth birthdays of all the minor

appellees, see supra note 2, we first address, in Part II,

whether their challenges to the Act are moot and not otherwise before the court. Although the District is appealing the

district court's judgment and order, upon review of the grant

of summary judgment the case appears in this court in the

same posture as it did in the district court and, therefore, this

court must determine whether the minors' challenges to the

Act remain "alive." See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,

316 (1974). Concluding in Part II that the minor appellees'

claims are presented to this court in a representative capacity

by the appellee parent of a child under the age of seventeen,

we address in our separate opinions the minor appellees'

challenges to the Act. As Judge Tatel and I conclude that

the Act violates the equal protection and due process rights of

the minor appellees, we do not reach appellees' other challenges.

II.

While this appeal was pending, the last of the named minor

appellees became age seventeen, and hence they all are no

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 7 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

longer subject to the Act, except the motor vehicle restriction,

which applies to those not yet age eighteen. Thus, their

principal challenges to the Act are moot because the minor

__________

4 The Act was due to expire, pursuant to the sunset provision,

two weeks after oral argument in this court. The D.C. Council

enacted emergency legislation, D.C. Act 12-148, s 2 (Sept. 12,

1997), and temporary legislation, D.C. Act 12-160, s 2 (Oct. 3,

1997), to extend the Act through May 3, 1998. Thereafter, the D.C.

Council enacted legislation permanently repealing the sunset provision. D.C. Act 12-331 (Apr. 20, 1998); see Appendix to this opinion.

As a result of the district court's injunction, the curfew regime had

not been in effect for the two-year trial period originally contemplated in the sunset provision when the D.C. Council extended the

Act.

appellees were not certified as representatives of a class

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. See United

States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 398, 400 n.7,

404 (1980); Board of Sch. Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128,

129 (1975). Indeed, they expressly declined to pursue class

certification in the district court. Of the remaining named

appellees, however, at least one is a parent with a child under

age seventeen.5 The question, therefore, is whether this

parent can raise the claims of his minor child, claims that are

the same as those of the appellees who were subject to the

curfew when the complaint was filed, or whether instead

those claims are moot except to the extent they relate to the

motor vehicle restriction.6

This is not a case in which the familiar exception to the

mootness doctrine for issues "capable of repetition yet evading review" is applicable. That exception is confined to

situations in which there is a reasonable expectation that the

same complaining party would be subjected to the same

action again. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317-20 (1988);

Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 148-49 (1975); Sosna v.

Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399-400 (1975); Burlington N. R.R. v.

Surface Transp. Bd., 75 F.3d 685, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Doe v.

Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1378 & n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Bois v.

Marsh, 801 F.2d 462, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Because the

minor appellees have reached age seventeen, they are no

longer subject to the curfew restrictions (except the motor

vehicle restriction) and will never again be subject to the

curfew restrictions for persons under age seventeen.

Instead, the third party (or jus tertii) standing doctrine of

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and its progeny applies

__________

5 Two adult appellees have children under the age of seventeen

as of the writing of this opinion. Clearly one child will still be

younger than seventeen when this opinion issues; the second child,

however, may have turned seventeen by that time.

6 Another mootness aspect of the instant case of which we take

judicial notice, see Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), (c); Nantucket Investors II

v. California Fed. Bank (In re Indian Palms Assocs., Ltd.), 61 F.3d

197, 205 (3d Cir. 1995), arises as a result of the cessation of

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 8 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

operations of the Biograph Theatre Corporation, which joined as a

named plaintiff in challenging the Act.

and provides the basis for our conclusion that the minor

appellees' challenges to the Act remain before this court.

"Ordinarily, one may not claim standing ... to vindicate the

constitutional rights of some third party." Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953); see United States v. Raines,

362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960). The Supreme Court observed in

Craig, however, that its limitations on the right to raise the

interests of third parties, where the interests of the litigant

and the proposed third party are "in no way mutually interdependent," Craig, 429 U.S. at 195 n.4, are "not constitutionally

mandated, but rather stem from a salutary 'rule of selfrestraint' designed to minimize unwarranted intervention into

controversies where the applicable constitutional questions

are ill-defined and speculative," id. at 193. Acknowledging

that the reasons for such limitations are not furthered where

the lower court has already addressed the relevant constitutional challenge and the parties have never resisted an authoritative constitutional determination, the Court concluded

that forgoing consideration of the merits in order to wait for a

new challenge by injured third parties "would be impermissibly to foster repetitive and time-consuming litigation under

the guise of caution and prudence." Id. at 193-94.

This is just such a case. Under the Act, parents can be

sanctioned for allowing their minor children to violate the

curfew. See D.C. Code s 6-2183(a)(2), (d)(1)-(2). In comparable circumstances in Craig, the Supreme Court held that,

because a bartender could be sanctioned under a statute

barring sale of beer to males under age twenty-one and

females under age eighteen, the bartender had standing to

raise the equal protection claims of a male plaintiff who had

reached age twenty-one during the appeal and whose claims

had thus become moot. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 195. Furthermore, the other relevant considerations underlying the third

party standing doctrine, articulated in cases following Craig,

all point toward the conclusion that the court should proceed

to address the minor appellees' claims.

As further elaborated by the courts, the third party standing doctrine involves the consideration of four factors, one

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 9 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

constitutional and three prudential. First, the litigant asserting the third party's claims must himself or herself suffer an

Article III injury-in-fact. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered

v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989). The alleged

infringement of the parent's own rights, coupled with the

parental sanctions under the Act, are sufficient to establish

that the appellee parent meets this requirement. See Lujan

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Second,

the court will look for the presence of three prudential

considerations: (1) a close relationship between the litigant

and the third party whose rights are being asserted; (2) a

barrier keeping this third party from asserting such rights

himself or herself; and (3) an impact of the litigation on the

rights of the third party. See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at

623 n.3; see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1991).

The first of these prudential considerations is clearly satisfied in the instant case. At least two circuits, which we join,

have held that the parent-child relationship is sufficiently

close to meet prudential standing requirements. In a case

directly on point, the Fifth Circuit held in Johnson v. City of

Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981), that the

mother of children still subject to a juvenile curfew could

raise her son's claims despite their becoming moot when her

son became seventeen. See id. at 1069. In Lindley ex rel.

Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1989), the Seventh

Circuit held that an adopted child receiving disability benefits

had standing to assert his parents' equal protection claims

regarding denial of child insurance benefits, on the observation that the parent-child relationship was "much closer than

[the relationship] in leading cases where standing has been

found to exist, as between a physician and a patient or

between a beer vendor and a class of potential purchasers of

the product." Id. at 129 (citations omitted).

The third prudential consideration also militates in favor of

allowing third party standing. The parent has explicitly

referred to the direct impact of the curfew on the rights

asserted by the minor appellee. A decision based on the

parent's third party standing would definitely have a significant impact upon those rights.

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 10 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The only prudential factor not clearly evident in the instant

case is the second, since a very young plaintiff undoubtedly

could be found to bring a lawsuit challenging the curfew

(although even a plaintiff who is quite young at the beginning

of the litigation might turn seventeen by the end). Yet in

Caplin & Drysdale, the failure to satisfy the second prudential factor did not defeat third party standing. See Caplin &

Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 624 n.3; cf. Department of Labor v.

Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1990). Indeed, in Craig itself,

the Supreme Court allowed third party standing even though

there was no barrier to would-be beer-drinkers' pressing

their own claims. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 192-97. Similarly,

this circuit has repeatedly found that the absence of the

second prudential factor may not outweigh the other factors

in evaluating whether a litigant has third party standing. See

FAIC Secs., Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 360-61 (D.C.

Cir. 1985); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d

1189, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1980).7 In the instant case, we conclude

that the closeness of the relationship between parents and

children and the magnitude of the potential impact of our

decision on children's rights outweigh the absence of the

second prudential factor. Cf. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at

624 n.3.8

Indeed, the proposition that parents who satisfy Article III

standing requirements to raise their own claims may have

standing to raise their children's claims as well, even without

__________

7 Compare Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 809-

10 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (denying third party standing to raise Fourth

Amendment rights), with National Cottonseed Prods. Ass'n v.

Brock, 825 F.2d 482, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (confining the Haitian

Refugee holding to the Fourth Amendment context and "conclud[ing] that FAIC Securities continues to state law of the circuit").

8 Moreover, in Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), the

Supreme Court suggested that imminent mootness of a claim

presents a judicially recognized obstacle to the assertion of rights

on one's own behalf. See id. at 117-18. To the extent that this is

true, it reinforces the notion that the second prudential factor does

not prevent parents from possessing third party standing in cases

such as Johnson and the instant case.

an actual barrier preventing children from doing so themselves, also follows from Smith v. Organization of Foster

Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), and

like cases. In that case, the Supreme Court held that foster

parents had standing to challenge the deprivation of foster

children's right not to be removed from their foster homes

without due process. See id. at 841 n.44; cf. Bender v.

Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546-49 (1986).

Prudential standing principles have not barred suits by parents raising equal protection and First Amendment claims on

behalf of themselves and their children in school desegregation and school prayer cases, although the cases have not

explicitly addressed standing. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ.

v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 408 n.1 (1977); Engel v. Vitale,

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 11 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

370 U.S. 421, 423 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,

309 & n.4 (1952). This court has similarly allowed parental

challenges to violations of their children's equal protection

rights in school. See, e.g., Bulluck v. Washington, 468 F.2d

1096, 1109 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Robinson, J., dissenting).

Furthermore, this result accords with the rationale for

third party standing as articulated by the Supreme Court in

Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), even if there is no

actual barrier preventing children from raising their own

claims. In Singleton, the Court instructed that third party

standing is appropriate where "the enjoyment of the right [of

the third party] is inextricably bound up with the activity the

litigant wishes to pursue," and "the litigant ... is fully, or

very nearly, as effective a proponent of the right [as the party

whose right is being asserted]." Id. at 114-15. The appellee

parent with the minor child under age seventeen asserts that

the curfew interferes not only with his parental right to allow

his child to stay out, without adult supervision, after curfew

hours, but also with his minor son's rights to engage in

legitimate social activities and interests during times when

the curfew is in effect, the very claims raised by the minor

appellees. The instant case falls neatly within the rationale

for third party standing.

Therefore, in light of Craig and its progeny, we hold that

the appellee parent with a child under age seventeen who

remains subject to the curfew has standing to raise the

challenges to the curfew presented by the minor appellees

whose claims have become moot as a result of the passage of

time. The parent has suffered an injury-in-fact sufficient to

confer Article III standing. Regarding the rights of his

minor child, the appellee parent voices the same objections

reflected in the minor appellees' challenges to the Act. The

nature of the parent-child relationship suffices to ensure that

the parent is an effective advocate for the minor appellees'

interests, and disposition of the parent's claims will have a

direct impact on the rights asserted by the minor appellees.

Under the circumstances, it would be a waste of judicial

resources at this late stage of the proceedings to abandon

consideration of minor appellees' claims when the Act applies

to other District of Columbia minors.

III.

The minor appellees contend that the Act restricts their

fundamental right to free movement in violation of their due

process and equal protection rights. In addition, they maintain that the Act violates their First Amendment rights of

speech and association and their Fourth Amendment right to

be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. First, I

address in section III.A, the standard of review appropriate

for analysis of minor appellees' due process and equal protection contentions; in section III.B, the District's purpose in

enacting the Act; and in section III.C, the data offered to

show the required connection between the problem and the

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 12 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

solution.

A.

The District contends, and the United States agrees, that

the district court erred in ruling that minors enjoy a fundamental constitutional right of free movement, that hence the

Act must be reviewed under a rational basis test, and that the

Act easily meets this standard. Appellees contend that the

Act fails both a rational basis test as well as a strict scrutiny

test, and that, in any event, because minors have a fundamental right to free movement upon which the Act impinges, the

appropriate standard is strict scrutiny.

To date, the Supreme Court has not spoken on the precise

issue and the lower federal courts have identified three

standards of review with regard to juvenile curfews: rational

basis, strict scrutiny, and intermediate scrutiny. Under the

rational basis standard, no fundamental right is at issue and

the District would only need to show a rational relationship

between a juvenile curfew and any legitimate governmental

interest: for instance, the need to stem juvenile violence and

victimization in the District. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin,

490 U.S. 19, 25-28 & n.4 (1989). The rational basis standard

is "true to the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment

gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the States

their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy." Id. at 27 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,

486 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast,

under a strict scrutiny standard, a fundamental right is

implicated and the District would have to show that the Act is

narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982). To be

narrowly tailored, there must be a sufficient nexus between

the compelling governmental interest and the provisions of

the Act, see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.

469, 493 (1989), and the Act must use the least restrictive

reasonable means to achieve its goals, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). A third standard, intermediate scrutiny, also acknowledges the existence of a fundamental right but gives recognition as well to the existence of

important governmental interests where minors are involved;

it requires a showing that the Act serves "important governmental objectives" and that the means employed are "substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."

Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724

(1982) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S.

142, 150 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (gender);

see Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225-30 (illegal immigrant minors);

Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (plurality opinion of

Powell, J.) (illegitimate children); Carey v. Population Servs.

Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 & n.15 (1977) (plurality opinion of

Brennan, J.) (minor's right to obtain contraceptives). Described by one federal district court as a way to acknowledge

both minors' claim to a fundamental right of free movement

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 13 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

and the heightened interest of the government in protecting

and fostering the development of its youth, see Schleifer v.

City of Charlottesville, 963 F. Supp. 534, 540-42 (W.D. Va.

1997) (denying preliminary injunction), intermediate scrutiny

requires a showing of a "substantial" or "important" rather

than a "compelling" governmental interest, see Hogan, 458

U.S. at 724; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217-18, 224, 230; and of a

substantial fit between means and ends rather than narrow

tailoring, see Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724; Lalli, 439 U.S. at 265,

268. The first question, then, is which standard is appropriate for the evaluation of the Act, and as our separate opinions

indicate, there is more than one reasoned answer to this

question.

Generally, legislation that treats one class of persons differently from others who are similarly situated is presumed to

meet the equal protection requirements of the Fifth Amendment 9 if the classification drawn by the legislation is "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." City of Cleburne

v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985). If

the classification disadvantages a "suspect class" or burdens

one group's exercise of a "fundamental right," the legislation

is subject to strict scrutiny review. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-

17. Likewise, if a statute impinges upon a fundamental right,

the substantive due process component of the Fifth Amendment requires that it satisfy strict scrutiny review.10 See

Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267-68 (1997).

Because age does not determine a suspect class, see Gregory

v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991), the court must examine

__________

9 Although the Equal Protection Clause, which provides that

"[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws," U.S. Const. amend. XIV, s 1, is in

the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment contains an equal protection component, see Bolling v.

Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).

10 The requirements of the Fifth Amendment Due Process

Clause apply to the District of Columbia. See Bolling, 347 U.S. at

499.

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 14 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

whether the Act threatens the minors' exercise of a fundamental right, thus demanding strict scrutiny review.

The Supreme Court has held that adults have a fundamental right to free movement,11 and that minors have some

fundamental rights entitled to constitutional protection.12 At

the same time, the Supreme Court recognizes the state's

heightened interest in the protection of children, see Prince v.

Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944); Bellotti v. Baird,

443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.), and

acknowledges that "if parental control falters, the State must

play its part as parens patriae," Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.

253, 265 (1984). There is obvious tension between the propositions that there is a fundamental right to free movement

and that minors possess some fundamental rights, and the

proposition that the state has a greater interest in protecting

minors than adults. So far, the Supreme Court has not

explained how the tension is to be resolved with regard to

juvenile curfews. Indeed, the Court has acknowledged that

"[t]he question of the extent of state power to regulate

conduct of minors not constitutionally regulable when committed by adults is a vexing one, perhaps not susceptible of

precise answer." Carey, 431 U.S. at 692 (plurality opinion of

Brennan, J.). Further, the Supreme Court has emphasized

that courts must be "reluctant to expand the concept of

substantive due process because guideposts for responsible

decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and openended." Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125

(1992).

__________

11 See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983);

Dunn, 405 U.S. at 338; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405

U.S. 156, 164 (1972); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,

520 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,

125 (1958); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920).

12 See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 315-16 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 434-35

(1990); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.

52, 74 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975); Tinker v.

Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 511

(1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).

It is instructive that in a variety of contexts, the Supreme

Court has distinguished between minors' and adults' constitutional rights. For instance, in Prince, while rejecting a

challenge under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to a

state statute prohibiting minors from selling merchandise on

public streets, the Supreme Court explained:

The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults. This is peculiarly

true of public activities and in matters of employment. A

democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the

healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full

maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure

this against impeding restraints and dangers within a

broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 15 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

for such action are the ... possible harms arising from

... activities subject to all the diverse influences of the

street. It is too late now to doubt that legislation

appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the

state's police power, whether against the parent's claim

to control of the child or one that religious scruples

dictate contrary action.

It is true children have rights, in common with older

people, in the primary use of highways. But even in

such use streets afford dangers for them not affecting

adults. And in other uses ... this difference may be

magnified. This is so not only when children are unaccompanied but certainly to some extent when they are

with their parents. What may be wholly permissible for

adults therefore may not be so for children, either with

or without their parents' presence.

Prince, 321 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).

The state's greater authority over minors' conduct is similarly reflected in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968),

where the Court, applying a rational basis standard to uphold

a state statute banning the sale to minors of obscene materials, allowed New York to adjust the definition of obscenity for

minor readers. See id. at 637-38. The same approach is

reflected in the lines that the Court has drawn between

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 16 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

adults' and minors' due process rights: while the government's burden of proof remains the same for both adult

prosecutions and juvenile delinquency proceedings, see In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970), and a minor has a right to

counsel, a right to cross-examine witnesses, and a privilege

against self-incrimination, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37,

55-57 (1967), a minor does not have a right to a jury trial in

juvenile delinquency proceedings analogous to an adult's right

in a criminal prosecution, see Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.

541, 555 (1966). Similarly, although a state may not impose a

blanket parental consent requirement for a minor to obtain an

abortion, the Court has emphasized that this conclusion does

"not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity,

may give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy,"

despite adults' possession of such a right. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo., 428 U.S. at 74-75. Generally, the linedrawing reflects the analysis of the plurality in Bellotti; in

striking down a parental-consent statute as unduly burdensome on a minor's constitutional right to have an abortion, the

plurality identified three factors, any one of which would

suffice, justifying state action treating minors differently from

adults in regard to constitutional protections: (1) "the peculiar vulnerability of children"; (2) children's "inability to make

critical decisions in an informed, mature manner"; and (3)

"the importance of the parental role in child rearing." 13

Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634 (plurality opinion of Powell, J.).

Further, the Supreme Court has concluded that the distinction between adults' and minors' constitutional rights applies

with regard to certain rights to free movement. In Vernonia

__________

13 These factors have not proven decisive, however, as courts

have differed about their meaning and application. Compare

Schleifer, 963 F. Supp. at 542 ("[T]he Bellotti factors justify a less

stringent standard of review in this case."), and City of Panora v.

Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 368-69 (Iowa 1989) (en banc) (same),

with Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1073 (concluding that the Bellotti factors

did not justify a lessened standard of review); Nunz, 114 F.3d at

945-46 (same); and Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1136-37

(D.D.C. 1989) (same). This difference is reflected in my opinion

and that of Judge Tatel.

School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), the Court

upheld a random urinalysis requirement for high school athletes against a Fourth Amendment challenge because the

requirement was reasonable in light of the minimal legitimate

expectations of privacy of students committed to the temporary custody of a schoolmaster, in particular those who join a

school sports team and agree to change and shower in public

locker rooms, to submit to preseason physical exams, to sign

insurance waivers, to maintain minimum grades, and to comply with rules of conduct, dress, and training hours. See id.

at 654-57, 664-65; cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). In so doing, the

Court observed:

Traditionally at common law, and still today, unemanciUSCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 17 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

pated minors lack some of the most fundamental rights

of self-determination--including even the right of liberty

in its narrow sense, i.e., the right to come and go at will.

They are subject, even as to their physical freedom, to

the control of their parents or guardians. When parents

place minor children in private schools for their education, the teachers and administrators of those schools

stand in loco parentis over the children entrusted to

them.

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 654 (citation omitted)

(emphasis added). Likewise, in Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292

(1993), the Court upheld an Immigration and Naturalization

Service regulation allowing juvenile aliens detained pending

deportation hearings to be released only to the custody of

their parents, close relatives, or legal guardians, with the

observation that " 'juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some

form of custody,' and where the custody of the parent or legal

guardian fails, the government may (indeed, we have said

must) either exercise custody itself or appoint someone else

to do so." Id. at 302 (quoting Schall, 467 U.S. at 265)

(citation omitted). Under these precedents, were the Supreme Court to hold that minors have the same fundamental

right of movement as adults, it would have to jettison longsettled views on the distinct and yet at times concurrent roles

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 18 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

of parents and the state, views that render some types of

interference with free movement constitutionally permissible

for minors even if not for adults.

Faced with the dilemma of what standard of scrutiny to

employ in reviewing statutes that affect minors' privacy

rights, the Supreme Court recognized the fundamental right

of privacy that minors have in decisions affecting procreation

while nonetheless applying a less rigorous test than strict

scrutiny in examining whether a "significant state interest"

justified the parental consent provision at issue. Planned

Parenthood of Central Mo., 428 U.S. at 75. Soon thereafter a

Supreme Court plurality explained that intermediate scrutiny

"is appropriate both because of the States' greater latitude to

regulate the conduct of children and because the right of

privacy implicated here is 'the interest in independence in

making certain kinds of important decisions,' and the law has

generally regarded minors as having a lesser capability for

making important decisions." Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 n.15

(plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429

U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)) (citations omitted). The approach

reflected in the intermediate scrutiny test fits comfortably in

examining the rights affected by juvenile curfews. That

minors have a fundamental right of movement in some regard, the nature of which admittedly is not precisely defined,

is necessarily implied in the Court's decisions explaining

circumstances in which that right is properly restricted. An

intermediate scrutiny standard thus recognizes that in some

circumstances, courts are compelled to equate the constitutional rights of minors and adults, and in other instances they

are not. Compare Gault, 387 U.S. at 36-37, 55-57, with Kent,

383 U.S. at 555. Viewed in light of factors deemed to be

significant in both Carey and Bellotti, juvenile curfews arise

in a context in which children are more vulnerable than

adults, see Prince, 321 U.S. at 168-69, and in which children's

lesser ability to make important decisions wisely could cause

them harm. As the district court in Schleifer explained, "[o]f

course, on an isolated night, a decision to go out after curfew

hours may not be a critical decision, but rather one of

minimal importance; but that decision, made night after

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 19 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

night, might have an adverse effect on a child's life." Schleifer, 963 F. Supp. at 542.

Consequently, because minors have certain constitutional

rights that may include a right of movement under some

circumstances, but the government also has interests that

may override or infringe upon those rights, and because

minors are generally more vulnerable on the street at night

than adults, but might not be as able to make intelligent

decisions about their outdoor late-night activities, an intermediate scrutiny standard should apply in examining the minor

appellees' challenges to the Act. While Judge Tatel expresses concern that such a standard may impinge unnecessarily

on minors' right of movement, see concurring opinion, infra at

1-2, he agrees that the government's special interest in and

authority over children cannot be ignored, see id. at 1, 3.

Consequently, his strict scrutiny test must give way in some

respect in order to give effect and meaning to the governmental interest. In the end, he would redefine the strict scrutiny

test to give special emphasis to the importance of minors'

right of movement, and this is already accomplished by the

intermediate scrutiny standard. Certainly in the instant case,

where all agree that the District has demonstrated a compelling interest in reducing juvenile crime and victimization, the

only question is whether the means are sufficiently tailored to

respect minor's rights and to remedy the problems. Yet

were the bar placed so high that virtual scientific certainty

would be required to demonstrate that all other alternatives

have proved insufficient, as is implied in Judge Tatel's analysis, see infra concurring opinion at 4 (calling for curfew laws

that are "more effective" than other alternatives), the government would be stymied in its efforts to protect juveniles from

serious or even deadly harm notwithstanding evidence that

other communities have successfully implemented juvenile

curfews. Such an approach appears inconsistent with Supreme Court teaching that when parental control fails to

provide adequate protection or is absent, the government may

intervene, as for example, in Prince, where even though a

parent had given permission to a child to act in a certain

manner, the government could preclude such action, and in

Flores, where the government could restrict minors' release

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 20 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

to certain persons, and in Vernonia, where parents were

deemed to have designated school officials to act in loco

parentis where their children's Fourth Amendment rights

were at stake.

The intermediate scrutiny standard, properly understood,

does not diminish the importance of the rights at issue, but

does acknowledge that the government may have important

interests as well, and thus the analysis under intermediate

scrutiny will be demanding in its requirement that the means

are "substantially related" to achievement of the identified

objectives. The instant case illustrates the point. Under the

intermediate scrutiny standard, a statute "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Craig, 429 U.S.

at 197. As described in sections III.B & C, although the Act

undoubtedly serves an important governmental goal, its "relation to the state interests it is intended to promote is so

tenuous that it lacks the rationality contemplated by the

[requirement of equal protection]," Lalli, 439 U.S. at 273,

causing it to fail the intermediate scrutiny test.

B.

The first prong of the intermediate scrutiny test is not at

issue because the District has doubtless shown an important

interest in reducing juvenile crime and victimization sufficient

to satisfy an intermediate scrutiny review. The District's

interest in enacting a juvenile curfew, as stated in the Act, is

to reduce juvenile crime and victimization and to aid parents

or guardians "in carrying out their responsibility to exercise

reasonable supervision of minors." D.C. Code

s 6-2181(e)(1)-(3) (Supp. 1997). The Supreme Court has

recognized that the state has a "legitimate and compelling"

interest in protecting the entire community, including juveniles, from crime. Schall, 467 U.S. at 264 (quoting DeVeau v.

Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). It has further recognized that the state "has a

strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of its young

citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their

rights wisely." Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444

(1990). Every federal court to reach this issue in the context

of a juvenile curfew statute has found or assumed there to be

a compelling state interest in protecting the safety and wellbeing of children and in reducing juvenile crime.14

If ever there were a place with an important need to reduce

juvenile crime and victimization, it is the District of Columbia.

The district court considered the 1995 Kids Count Data

Book,15 which indicates that in 1992, the District of Columbia's violent crime arrest rate for youths aged ten to seventeen was the worst in the nation, and more than three times

the national average, at 1,487 violent crime arrests per

100,000 youths. See id. at 49. The District of Columbia also

had the worst violent death rate in the nation for teens aged

fifteen to nineteen; the District's rate of 269 violent deaths

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 21 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

per 100,000 teens was more than four times the national

average. See id. Moreover, the problem was worsening:

according to statistics from the Juvenile Division of the Office

of the Corporation Counsel, between 1987 and 1995, juvenile

arrests for aggravated assault increased by 89.8%, for murder

by 157%, and for carrying a dangerous weapon by 282.7%.

Also, the number of referrals to court for juveniles "in need of

supervision" 16 increased by 181.9% between 1990 and 1994.

In addition to statistical evidence prepared by the executive

and judicial branches of the District government, the D.C.

__________

14 See Nun‚z, 114 F.3d at 946-47 (9th Cir.); Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492

(5th Cir.); Schleifer, 963 F. Supp. at 543 (W.D. Va.); Hutchins, 942

F. Supp. at 674 (D.D.C.); Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1139 (D.D.C.).

15 Annie E. Casey Foundation, Kids Count Data Book: State

Profiles of Child Well-Being (1995).

16 The term "child in need of supervision" means a [person

under the age of eighteen] who--

(A)(i) subject to compulsory school attendance and habitually

truant from school without justification;

(ii) has committed an offense committable only by children;

or

(iii) is habitually disobedient of the reasonable and lawful

commands of his parent, guardian, or other custodian and is

ungovernable; and

Council received statistics from an opponent of the curfew

legislation that showed an alarming number of murders,

shootings, and assaults during curfew hours in areas covered

by the curfew, although the ages of the perpetrators are not

identified and most of the incidents involving minor victims

did not occur during curfew hours. Further, elected representatives of Advisory Neighborhood Commissions ("ANCs")

and other District residents testified before the D.C. Council

about violence plaguing the streets, gunfire from early evening through early morning, children counting the new bullet

holes every morning in the doors to their kindergartens, the

worsening of teen violence, the gang victimization of youths,

and murder becoming sport.17 Finally, upon removing the

sunset provision of the Act, see supra note 4, the D.C. Council

had new evidence that juvenile violence was "ever-increasing"

and juvenile victimization was "skyrocketing." 18

__________

(B) is in need of care or rehabilitation.

D.C. Code s 16-2301(8).

17 Observing that the findings and purpose in the bill as introduced are "vague and unclear," one ANC Commissioner implored

the D.C. Council to:

Please state what the increase in juvenile violence was over a

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 22 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

two or three year period. Please state the number of known

gangs that are "raping" lives in the District of Columbia.

Please state the type of violent, criminal activity these gangs

partake in. State the crimes, state the atrocities. Include in

this statement the measurable impact to the District of Columbia, i.e., has incidence of teen pregnancy, welfare dependency,

school truancy, alcoholism, sexually transmitted diseases increased proportionately. If so, state this. The cost of these

social ills is a burden on all the residents of the District of

Columbia. The findings and purpose must be depicted with

candor. Make it clear that we are fighting a "war." No one

should be able to question the grave need for this legislation.

18 At the D.C. Council Legislative Meeting of September 22,

1997, Councilmember Brazil stated:

Although the evidence upon which the D.C. Council relied

was flawed, see infra subsection III.C., it nevertheless reflects a serious problem with juvenile crime and victimization

in the District of Columbia. A district court in a neighboring

jurisdiction observed that "the crime rate by juveniles in the

__________

The 1997 Kids Count Data Book reports that as of 1994, the

District of Columbia's teen violent-death rate was higher than

any other state, was nearly five times higher than the national

average and was more than triple the next-worst states.

Between 1985 and 1994, the District's teen violent-death rate

increased by 669 percent.

Further report indicates that as of 1994, the District's juvenile

violent-crime arrest rate was also higher than any other state's,

was more than triple the national average and was over 50

percent higher than the next-worst states.

The report also reflects that the District ranks last, below

every state, in the overall measure of children's well being.

Further, the report indicates that the District of Columbia

courts, in their report, shows that juvenile criminal activity ...

increased in the District by nearly 47 percent between the

years 1994 and 1995.

And, finally, the 1995 Juvenile Arrests Bulletin from the U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention[,] reports that in 1995 the District's juvenile

violent-crime index was nearly triple the national average and

was nearly 50 percent higher than the next-worst states.

See Annie E. Casey Foundation, Kids Count Data Book: State

Profiles of Child Well-Being (1997). We take judicial notice, see

Nantucket Investors II, 61 F.3d at 205, of a recent press report, in

which a 1997 Kids Count demographer described the juvenile

victimization situation in the District by observing that, while the

violent death rate for young people nationwide tends to reflect

many more accidents than homicides, "D.C. is different.... Not

that many kids drive. On the other hand, a lot more die in

homicides." DeNeen L. Brown, Death Rates for Children Rise in

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 23 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

D.C., Wash. Post, May 5, 1997, at B01 (quoting demographer

William P. O'Hare).

District of Columbia is staggering by any definition."

Schleifer, 963 F. Supp. at 546. Because the District presented ample evidence that juvenile crime and victimization are

crushing problems for the District of Columbia, it has demonstrated an important government interest sufficient to meet

the first prong of intermediate scrutiny review.19

C.

Whether the District has demonstrated that the Act survives the second prong of the intermediate scrutiny standard

is more problematic. Under intermediate scrutiny, the Act

must be "substantially related" to the goals of reducing

juvenile crime and victimization. By requiring a very close

relationship between purpose and remedy, the court ensures

that the legislature enacted its juvenile curfew on the basis of

reasoned analysis rather than assumptions. See Hogan, 458

U.S. at 725-26; cf. Wengler, 446 U.S. at 151-52; Carey, 431

U.S. at 696 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.). The Supreme

Court instructs that the court must conduct a "searching

analysis" in order to make sure that the legislature has

provided sufficient justification for the statute's key provisions. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728. At this point, the District has

failed to provide the necessary justification and the Act thus

fails intermediate scrutiny analysis.

Were the rational basis test applied, the Act would undoubtedly pass muster because the District's curfew regime is

unquestionably rationally related to its goals of reducing

juvenile crime and violence. By requiring that minors in

public during curfew hours be accompanied by an adult, the

D.C. Council reasonably assumed that adults will normally

protect minors in their care and prevent them from victimizing others.20 In addition, the experience of other jurisdictions

__________

19 Appellees conceded in the district court and in their briefs on

appeal and the district court found that the District had demonstrated a compelling interest under the more stringent strict scrutiny standard. See Hutchins, 942 F. Supp. at 674.

20 Notwithstanding local court statistics indicating an increase

in the number of child abuse cases from 1984 to 1991, see District

facing increases in juvenile crime and victimization indicated

to the D.C. Council that a curfew can be a useful tool in

fighting such problems. Reports on the specific experiences

of Dallas and San Antonio, Texas, and New Orleans, Louisiana, showed that after a juvenile curfew became effective, the

number of juvenile arrests for violent offenses decreased, and

the Dallas and San Antonio reports also showed reductions in

juvenile victimization. The D.C. Council could properly rely

on studies by other cities so long as there was a reasonable

basis on which to conclude that the studies were relevant.

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 24 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,

51-52 (1986).

Testimony before the D.C. Council further confirms that

the Act is rationally related to the governmental interest in

reducing juvenile crime and victimization. From the law

enforcement community, the D.C. Council heard, through a

representative of the Community Branch of Community Policing who has taken "ride-alongs" with the Metropolitan

Police Department, that the juvenile curfew is "an important

tool," although "not an all-inclusive cure," because "it disrupts

the gang activity, the drug trade, the hanging out waiting for

the right opportunity to commit the crime. It also removes

potential drive-by victims from public places where they can

be targets." The D.C. Council also received statistical information and reports from the Police Chief on the anticipated

effect of a curfew statute. Following enactment of the curfew

regime, in one of several reports on implementation of the

Act, the Police Chief emphasized the value of the curfew in

__________

of Columbia Courts, 1991 Annual Report tbl. 22 (1991), the D.C.

Council could reasonably proceed on the assumption that a child is

protected from physical dangers while at home during the late night

and early morning hours. See People v. Chambers, 360 N.E.2d 55,

57 (Ill. 1976). To conclude otherwise would leave the District in a

never-never-land in which, to responsibly protect District youth, it

would have to confine them until they reached maturity. Such a

conclusion would be both preposterous and unnecessary given other

laws protecting juveniles, including the criminal law and the laws

against child abuse and neglect. See D.C. Code ss 6-2101 to -2138,

22-101 to -4124 (Repl. Vols. 1995 & 1996 & Supp. 1997).

addressing the problems of truancy and runaways--early

indicia of later criminal activity and victimization--and reported on juvenile arrests for violent offenses during curfew

hours. In addition, an expert testified in the district court on

the nature of peer pressure, opining that the large majority of

delinquent acts committed by minors occur when minors are

in the company of other minors, without adult supervision,

and that, consequently, a curfew would reduce the number of

such acts both by decreasing the amount of time minors are

unsupervised and by encouraging parental supervision. The

Act would certainly pass rational basis review.

Just as certainly, however, the evidence offered by the

District to demonstrate that the curfew regime would accomplish its purposes is inadequate to survive strict scrutiny

review. As the district court found, the District provided

"only scant statistical information on crime in the District

committed by and against minors under the age of seventeen." Hutchins, 942 F. Supp. at 675 (emphasis omitted).

Such information as it provided was further flawed both

because the statistics included persons up to age eighteen and

because they did not show the time when incidents occurred,

or the ages of the perpetrators or victims, or the places where

incidents occurred. See id. at 675-76. As the district court

noted, a chart of juvenile arrests during curfew hours preUSCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 25 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

pared by the Metropolitan Police Department was overinclusive because it contained data on minors over age seventeen,

was undated, and lacked corroboration from either its author,

who was unidentified, or someone familiar with the methodology used to prepare the report. See id. at 677. The legislature did not act on evidence sufficient to withstand strict

scrutiny review.

So too, the District failed to provide evidence of sufficient

quality to support the Act under intermediate scrutiny review. Although the inquiry into the evidentiary basis for a

legislature's impingement of constitutional rights may be

somewhat less probing under intermediate scrutiny than under strict scrutiny to the extent that recognition must be

given of the heightened governmental interest, the inquiry is

still a serious one for a "substantial relat[ion]" must be

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 26 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

demonstrated between means and purposes. Where statistical data is employed to justify the salient features of a

statute, the court must ensure that the data shows that the

"fit" between the statute and its goals is clear, and not

"unduly tenuous." Craig, 429 U.S. at 200-03. Statistics

establishing broad propositions may not suffice under the

intermediate scrutiny test. Thus, in Craig, the Supreme

Court held that flawed or only slightly relevant statistical

studies could not form the basis for the use of gender as a

classifying device. See id. at 200-04. In that case, the Court

concluded that the statistical studies offered by the state,

while graphically documenting the problem of underage driving while intoxicated, related little to the statute's key provisions, which barred consumption of alcohol by men but not

women aged eighteen to twenty. See id. at 191-92, 202-03.

Although courts must acknowledge that "matters of practical

judgment and empirical calculation are for" the executive and

legislative branches of government, since "the precise accuracy of [the state's] calculations is not a matter of specialized

judicial competence," the court still must insist on "consistency and substantiality" in the evidentiary data relied on by the

state to establish a sufficient fit between its means and goals.

Lalli, 439 U.S. at 274 (plurality opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting

Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 516 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Admittedly, it may not always be clear how closely a court

engaging in intermediate scrutiny should probe the legislature's evidentiary findings. Most of the Supreme Court's

decisions involving this standard outside of the First Amendment context have involved statutes or other state actions

that have discriminated on the basis of gender rather than

age; moreover, one Justice has questioned whether the Court

is applying intermediate scrutiny according to its original

terms in gender cases.21 See United States v. Virginia, 116

__________

21 Applying intermediate scrutiny in the context of a parental

consent provision in an abortion statute, the Court did consider the

legislature's contention that this provision was likely to serve the

interest of "safeguarding of the family unit and of parental authoriUSCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 27 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

S. Ct. 2264, 2293-96, 2305-06 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).22

Even without direct Supreme Court guidance, however, in the

instant case it is clear that wherever the precise boundaries

of the evidentiary nexus test under intermediate scrutiny are

set, the evidentiary record supporting the Act does not satisfy

them.

The evidentiary flaws identified by the district court illustrate how the District failed to show that the Act is "substantially related" to the District's goals. The first statistical

problem is age-related, age being a key part of the curfew

regime. The District's statistics on juvenile arrests and

referrals to court for juveniles "in need of supervision," while

indicating disturbing trends for all youths, are flawed in that

they include youths aged seventeen. See id. at 675; see also

D.C. Code s 16-2301(3). As the annual reports of the D.C.

courts show, youths aged seventeen and older were responsible for 42% of juvenile referrals for the years 1990 through

1994; 23 a curfew excluding this group lacks a close fit to the

goal of reducing juvenile crime.24 Further, although the

__________

ty." Planned Parenthood of Central Mo., 428 U.S. at 75. The

Court refused to conclude that the means of the parental consent

provision were related closely enough to the ends of family unity

and parental authority, see id., but the brief analysis in this opinion

provides little guidance.

22 See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term--

Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 75, 77-

78 (1996).

23 See District of Columbia Courts, 1994 Annual Report tbl. 31

(1994); District of Columbia Courts, 1993 Annual Report tbl. 31

(1993); District of Columbia Courts, 1992 Annual Report tbl. 29

(1992); District of Columbia Courts, 1991 Annual Report tbl. 24

(1991); District of Columbia Courts, 1990 Annual Report tbl. 27

(1990).

24 The 42% statistic understates the percentage of older youths

responsible for violent juvenile crime because the D.C. Court's

juvenile referral statistics do not even include youths prosecuted as

adults because they are sixteen years of age or older and are

"charged by the United States attorney with ... murder, first

District's statistics indicate that its teen violent death rate

was skyrocketing, those statistics pertain to youths aged

fifteen to nineteen, see supra section III.B; because these

statistics do not indicate what percentage of those dying are

youths aged seventeen to nineteen, and thus unaffected by

the curfew, the statistics offer only weak evidence that the

curfew will much reduce the teen violent death rate.

The second statistical problem is temporal, time also being

a key provision of the curfew regime. While the District's

data on teen violent death demonstrate a devastating trend,

neither they, nor the District's national teen victimization

data,25 indicate what time of day or night minors are victimized. Uncontested evidence in the record indicates that most

juvenile victimization nationwide occurs shortly after school,

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 28 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

around 3:00 or 4:00 p.m.26 In addition, recent data from the

Federal Bureau of Investigation shows that juvenile crime

peaks between 3:00 and 8:00 p.m.27 The only chart before the

D.C. Council addressing the time of day juvenile crime occurs, which indicates that half of juvenile arrests occur during

curfew hours, was contradicted by other evidence before the

district court and, even taken on its own terms, is flawed in

that it also includes seventeen-year-olds, who will not be

affected by the curfew. See Hutchins, 942 F. Supp. at 677.

Further, the District's data do not indicate where juveniles

__________

degree sexual abuse, burglary in the first degree, robbery while

armed, or assault with intent to commit any such offense." D.C.

Code s 16-2301(3)(A)(i).

25 See Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet No. 17, Juvenile Victimization: 1987-1992 (1994).

26 See Deposition of Jeffrey A. Butts.

27 See James Alan Fox & Sanford A. Newman, Fight Crime:

Invest in Kids, After-School Crime or After-School Programs

(visited Mar. 4, 1998) <http://fightcrime.org/CrimeReportF15.html>. President Clinton referred to this conclusion in his

most recent State of the Union address. See This Is Not a Time to

Rest. It Is a Time to Build, Wash. Post, Jan. 28, 1998, at A24 (text

of State of the Union address).

are victimized or where juvenile crime occurs. If a substantial percentage of juvenile victimization and crime occurs

within schools, homes, or youth recreation centers, a curfew

that does not pertain to those locations will be of little

assistance.

The faults in the District's juvenile crime and victimization

data are not cured by other record evidence. The Police

Chief's report that juvenile arrests for violent offenses declined during three of the months when the curfew was in

effect 28 is weakened by evidence that during those three

months, the police budget and the size of the force were

reduced, and limitations were placed on police overtime,

which would logically suggest an alternate cause for the

reduction in arrests. See id. at 676. No contrary conclusion

was suggested in the record, as the District did not present

expert testimony on this point. Cf. Schleifer, 963 F. Supp. at

545. Although properly gathered statistics might show that

juvenile crime decreased even while police resources were,

hypothetically, held constant, no such statistics are in the

record. While the D.C. Council could properly rely on the

experiences of other jurisdictions as evidence of the efficacy

of juvenile curfews in general, see Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52,

the District presented no evidence that those other jurisdictions are sufficiently similar to the District of Columbia that a

curfew designed like theirs will produce similar results here;

indeed, specialized programs elsewhere may have also been a

cause for other curfews' success, but the District offered no

evidence either that the District has similar programs or that

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 29 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the absence of similar programs is insignificant.29 Without

some evidentiary explanation for discrepancies, the District is

__________

28 After the Act had been in effect for three months, the Police

Chief informed the D.C. Council that "[t]he juvenile curfew has

made a significant impact on the District's youth arrest rate,"

noting a decrease of 39% in the arrest rate for more serious

offenses and a 34% decrease over all.

29 For example, a study showed that juvenile crime in Dallas

dropped 26% following expansion of recreational opportunities for

young people. See Eric Lotke & Vincent Schiraldi, An Analysis of

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 30 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

impermissibly relying on bare assumptions. Cf. Hogan, 458

U.S. at 725-26; Wengler, 446 U.S. at 151-52; Carey, 431 U.S.

at 696 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.). Because the flaws

in the legislative record pertain to such fundamental features

of the curfew--the age of those covered and the hours of

coverage--the court has no choice but to conclude that it

cannot presume that the D.C. Council was acting in a sufficiently precise and reasoned fashion to withstand intermediate scrutiny.30

Courts upholding similar curfews, albeit under a strict

scrutiny standard, were not confronted with evidentiary deficiencies of this dimension. As the district court pointed out,

the city of Dallas offered, in support of its curfew, evidence

that juvenile crime increases proportionally with age between

ten years old and sixteen years old, and evidence of the times

of day and the places in which violent crime by all perpetrators occurs. See Hutchins, 942 F. Supp. at 679 (citing Qutb,

11 F.3d at 493). Although the city of Dallas was unable to

provide data concerning the precise number of juveniles

arrested or victimized during curfew hours, its data demonstrated a closer fit between its curfew and its goals because it

at least included specific statistics concerning the age group

affected by the curfew and about the times and places in

which minors, as well as other victims, most commonly fall

prey to violent crimes. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493 & n.7.

Similarly, the city of Charlottesville, Virginia, presented

expert evidence describing national trends in juvenile crime

and victimization, and confirming that Charlottesville's trends

mirrored the national data and that the curfew law in Charlottesville was among the most modest and lenient nationwide. See Schleifer, 963 F. Supp. at 544. The Charlottesville

Commonwealth Attorney supported the expert's testimony

with data on juvenile crime in Charlottesville showing that

__________

Juvenile Homicides 14 (visited Mar. 4, 1998) <http://www.ncianet.org/ncia/waiver.html>.

30 None of the supplementary material in the Report of the

Judiciary Committee of the D.C. Council on the Juvenile Curfew

Amendment Act of 1998 (Feb. 25, 1998) alters this conclusion.

the most serious crimes occur during nighttime hours, and

explaining the link between the national statistics and juvenile

crime and victimization in Charlottesville. See id. at 544-45.

The Commonwealth Attorney also explained at a public hearing why the inclusion of seventeen-year-olds in crime and

victimization data did not distort the statistics. See id. at 545.

In addition, the city offered evidence comparing the incidents

of violent crime during curfew and non-curfew hours and

expert testimony that juveniles face more dangers during

curfew hours than during the day. See Schleifer v. City of

Charlottesville, No. Civ. A. 97-0021-C, 1997 WL 375542, at *2

(W.D. Va. May 20, 1997) (denying permanent injunctive relief). The city further demonstrated, to the satisfaction of the

district court, that there was "considerable and careful delibUSCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 31 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

eration and extensive research" underlying the enactment of

the curfew. Id.

By contrast, the District offered no expert testimony explaining why the inclusion of seventeen-year-olds in crime

data did not distort the data's relevance to a curfew applying

to youths under the age of seventeen. Nor did the District

offer an explanation for plainly contradictory statistics; although reasonable explanations of the discrepancies might

exist, in their absence, the statistics appear largely meaningless.31 Unlike either Dallas or Charlottesville, the District

also did not provide evidence of the places where violent

__________

31 The chart of juvenile arrests statistics from Fiscal Years

1994 and 1995 provided by the Police Chief indicated 1,320 serious

("part I") offenses committed by juveniles in FY 1994, during all

hours combined. See Letter from Larry D. Soulsby, Chief of the

Metropolitan Police Department, to William P. Lightfoot, Chairperson of the Committee on the Judiciary of the D.C. Council 1

(undated). A chart of juvenile arrest statistics provided by the

Police Chief, however, indicated that there were 1,466 "part I"

offenses committed by juveniles in FY 1994 during curfew hours

alone. See Letter from Fred Thomas, Chief of the Metropolitan

Police Department, to William P. Lightfoot, Councilmember-AtLarge of the D.C. Council 6 (Mar. 22, 1995). As the district court

aptly noted, the District has not explained this "mathematical

impossibility." Hutchins, 942 F. Supp. at 677-78.

crimes are likely to occur. Nor did the District provide

expert testimony to explain the link between national and

local statistics, or to explain the enhanced risks youths face in

public at night.

Crafting a constitutional curfew is not an easy task. The

tensions between minors' rights and governmental interests

are interwoven and complex. Some of the "defenses" in the

Act cause gaps that would appear to undermine achievement

of the results sought by the District: a juvenile can be

attacked even while running errands without detour or stop,

exercising First Amendment rights, returning home from

city-sponsored events, or, for that matter, being married.

Yet filling these gaps would place greater restraints on

movement than the Act imposes, and such "defenses" or

exceptions have proven important to courts analyzing a curfew's constitutionality.32 In one sense, this paradox might

lead to the conclusion that the close-fit requirement for

curfews may always prove insufficiently precise. But even if

the problem is vexing, courts have not suggested that a

"sufficiently related" nexus cannot be achieved in a statute,

much less that, under strict scrutiny, a "narrowly tailored"

statute is impossible. In any event, the paradox is not

presented here. The District may be able to present sufficient evidence to explain why the contradictions and underand overinclusiveness do not matter. For now, the Act is

impaled on unexplained evidence suggesting that seventeenyear-olds are committing a large percentage of juvenile crime

and that much crime involving juveniles occurs before 8 p.m.

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 32 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The Act would do virtually nothing to address these law

violations. Although well-crafted defenses may minimize the

intrusive effect of a curfew regime, see Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493-

95, the statistical and other data deficiencies going to the

heart of the District's curfew regime force the conclusion that

__________

32 See, e.g., Nunez, 114 F.3d at 940 & n.2; Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493-

94; McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1385 (D.N.H.

1984).

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 33 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the Act may be overinclusive despite the ameliorative effect

of its defenses.

Given the deficiencies in key evidence before the D.C.

Council and the district court, the Act does not survive

intermediate scrutiny as it affects minor appellees' equal

protection and due process rights.33 This is not to say that

the D.C. Council is precluded from relying on the experiences

of other cities in formulating curfew policy choices, cf. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52, or that it must produce "scientifically

certain criteria of legislation," Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642-43

(quoting Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110

(1911)) (internal quotation marks omitted), or that it is not to

be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to serious problems, see Renton, 475 U.S. at 52. Neither is it to suggest other than that it is for the District

government and not the courts to weigh alternative policies in

light of supporting data. See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 274. But

when a statute impinges upon minors' constitutionally protected rights, there must be persuasive evidence that the

problem will be addressed by the legislative solution. See

Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731; Lalli, 439 U.S. at 274. Otherwise,

the statute has no more than a tenuous connection to the

problem it seeks to address and the legislature has acted in

an insufficiently reasoned fashion. Hence, notwithstanding

any greater latitude afforded a legislature under an intermediate standard than under strict scrutiny, the loose ends--

especially those relating to the age group that is most often

victimized or arrested, and the time and place most juvenile

crime and victimization occurs--leave a court to speculate

that the curfew regime would likely achieve its goals. Intermediate scrutiny requires more.

Accordingly, in light of Judge Tatel's concurrence in the

judgment upon concluding that the Act fails to survive strict

scrutiny, we affirm the judgment of the district court holding

the Act unconstitutional.

__________

33 Consequently, there is no need to reach appellees' other

contentions.

[Appendix not available electronically.]

Tatel, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: The

Supreme Court has long recognized that juveniles' constitutional rights can be as robust as adults'. See Reno v. Flores,

507 U.S. 292, 315-16 (1993) (children have core liberty interest no narrower than that of adults in remaining free from

institutional confinement) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Tinker

v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,

506, 511 (1969) ("Students in school as well as out ... are

possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect...."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 36-37, 55-57 (1967)

(finding no material differences between juvenile and adult

rights to counsel and against self-incrimination); Brown v.

Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (applying same

equal protection standards to African American children as to

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 34 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

adults). The Court has also recognized that society has

legitimate reasons for limiting the constitutional rights of

juveniles. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,

693 & n.15 (1977) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (sustaining ban on sale of contraceptives to minors because of "the

States' greater latitude to regulate the conduct of children,

and because the right to privacy implicated here is the

interest in independence in making certain kinds of important

decisions" (quotation marks and citations omitted)); Ginsberg

v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-37 (1968) (permitting state to

adjust its definition of obscenity as applied to minors); Kent

v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966) (juveniles tried in

juvenile court system lack right to jury trial). A majority of

Justices, however, has yet to agree on a rule governing the

level of judicial scrutiny applicable to juvenile constitutional

rights, leaving circuit courts to devise approaches consistent

with the Supreme Court's various pluralities, the need to

protect juvenile constitutional rights, and the commonsense

understanding that the state can regulate children more

intrusively than adults.

Judge Rogers' thoughtful opinion strikes the balance between juvenile constitutional rights and society's authority

over minors by employing intermediate scrutiny. Although

this approach has intuitive appeal--it acknowledges the real

differences between children and adults--I fear that intermeUSCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 35 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

diate scrutiny risks reducing protection for juvenile rights

more than necessary to accommodate society's special interest in and authority over children. Requiring only a "substantial" relationship between legislative means and ends,

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 (1982), intermediate scrutiny

normally applies where less than full-fledged constitutional

protection is warranted. See id. at 223-24 (no fundamental

right at stake); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117

S. Ct. 1174, 1189 (1997) (content-neutral regulation of speech

warrants only intermediate scrutiny protection); Kahn v.

Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974) (upholding gender-based

property tax exemption because it rested on a "reasonable

distinction" between widows and widowers). The District's

curfew, however, directly burdens a fundamental constitutional right--the right to freedom of movement. See Kolender v.

Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (stop-and-identify statute

"implicates consideration of the constitutional right to freedom of movement").

My colleagues rest their respective positions on the proposition that minors are "always in some form of custody,"

Rogers' Op. at 20 and Silberman Dissent at 2 (both quoting

Flores, 507 U.S. at 302 (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.

253, 265 (1984))). While this is obviously true in schools and

other juvenile institutions, see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.

Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995); Flores, 507 U.S. at 302, the

curfew applies to all minors out after 11:00 p.m. The state

has no custody over these minors, nor has parental supervision necessarily failed, cf. Schall, 467 U.S. at 265. In this

circumstance, the juvenile right to freedom of movement is at

its most robust. To be sure, the District may be able to

articulate a compelling interest in controlling the movement

of juveniles, but that neither abrogates nor weakens the

fundamental right. See Flores, 507 U.S. at 315-16 (O'Connor,

J., concurring). This was Justice Powell's message in Bellotti

v. Baird: "[C]hildren generally are protected by the same

constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations

as are adults [but] the State is entitled to adjust its legal

system to account for children's vulnerability and [ ]

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 36 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

needs...." 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opinion of

Powell, J.).

Because fundamental rights are at stake in this case, I

would apply strict scrutiny. See Nunez v. City of San Diego,

114 F.3d 935, 946-49 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting intermediate

scrutiny and striking down juvenile curfew under strict scrutiny). Strict scrutiny accommodates the government's legitimate need to regulate minors--in Bellotti's words, to "adjust

its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and [ ]

needs," 443 U.S. at 635--by recognizing that legislatures may

have compelling reasons to limit fundamental juvenile freedoms in situations where adults could never be restricted. In

this case, evidence of serious juvenile crime and victimization

furnishes a compelling interest in heightened protection for

minors, possibly even in the form of a juvenile curfew.

While thus accommodating the state's need to regulate

juveniles, strict scrutiny's requirement that "presumptively

invidious" laws, Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17, be necessary,

narrowly tailored, and the least restrictive means of achieving

their result, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.

200, 237-38 (1995), ensures the demanding level of judicial

review necessary to protect fundamental rights. Unlike intermediate scrutiny's lighter standard, strict scrutiny's

searching inquiry requires that legislatures carefully and

rigorously craft suspect laws to ensure that they limit fundamental rights no more than necessary to accomplish compelling goals. Notwithstanding the city's compelling interest in

reducing juvenile crime and victimization, because the curfew

implicates fundamental constitutional rights, the District has

no legitimate reason to adopt a constitutionally suspect law

that is only substantially related to its ends (intermediate

scrutiny), rather than the least restrictive means of accomplishing those ends (strict scrutiny), merely because the

objects of that law happen to be under eighteen.

The differences between strict and intermediate scrutiny

have concrete consequences. For example, because the District relies on evidence from Dallas, San Antonio, and New

Orleans to limit the constitutional rights of its own citizens, I

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 37 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

think it should be required to demonstrate (strict scrutiny),

not just reasonably assume (intermediate scrutiny), why the

experiences of those cities are relevant to Washington, D.C.

Compare City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,

505 (1989) (under strict scrutiny, Richmond City Council

could not rely on evidence of discrimination in other jurisdictions to support local set-aside), with City of Renton v.

Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986) (under

intermediate scrutiny, Renton could use evidence from Seattle regarding effects of adult theaters as long as the data

was "reasonably believed to be relevant"). Otherwise, the

District may limit the fundamental rights of its juvenile

residents more than necessary to protect them. Likewise,

while I agree with Judge Rogers that the curfew is not

substantially related to its ends (intermediate scrutiny), strict

scrutiny would require the District to meet the heavier

burden of demonstrating that the curfew is a less restrictive,

more effective means of reducing juvenile crime and victimization than other alternatives, such as after-school programs.

Strict scrutiny would require the District actually to consider

alternative means for protecting juveniles. Nothing in the

record indicates that the City Council did so before promulgating the curfew. Far from requiring "scientific certainty,"

Rogers' Op. at 22, these strict scrutiny inquiries merely

ensure that the City Council acts with great care when

fundamental rights are at stake.

Applying intermediate scrutiny has implications beyond the

rights of juveniles subject to the curfew. The curfew also

infringes parents' rights to raise children free from state

interference, rights undoubtedly entitled to strict scrutiny.

See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)

(public school education requirement infringed parental right

to direct children's upbringing and education); see also Reno

v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2341,

2348 (1997) (striking down Internet indecency ban in part

because it did not permit parents to authorize their children

to access banned material). Testing the curfew under intermediate scrutiny, moreover, opens the door to legislative

infringement of other juvenile constitutional rights. Would it

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 38 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

mean, for example, that a law limiting juvenile participation in

midnight vigils in front of the White House need only be

substantially related to some important governmental interest? What about a law curtailing interstate travel by juveniles? In such cases, I think strict scrutiny more effectively

reconciles the state's interests with the fundamental rights of

juveniles.

I write separately for a second reason. Under either strict

or intermediate scrutiny, the way in which the D.C. City

Council converted the curfew from a temporary emergency

measure into permanent law further demonstrates its unconstitutionality. As originally enacted, the curfew contained a

sunset provision under which it would have expired on September 20, 1997, just twelve days after oral argument in this

case. Responding to our inquiry about the possibility of

mootness and using its emergency legislative authority, the

City Council excised the sunset provision. See D.C. Council

Res. 12-452 (Apr. 7, 1998) ("The Council adopted emergency

and temporary legislation in order to prevent the Court of

Appeals from declining to decide the appeal on mootness

grounds."). The Council did subsequently accept additional

materials into the record from a curfew supporter, but those

materials consisted of nothing more than excerpts from the

original record in this case, some updated crime and victimization statistics, and several articles on curfews. When the

Council then permanently repealed the sunset provision,

moreover, it explained that its purpose was legislative convenience. See D.C. Council Comm. on the Judiciary Report at 2

(Feb. 25, 1998) ("Permanent legislation is necessary at this

point in order to avoid having to use temporary, gap-filling

measures as the Council has done thus far."). The District

thus created a permanent curfew not because the Council

determined that juvenile crime and victimization required

one, but in order to avoid mooting this litigation and the

legislative inconvenience of passing temporary measures. I

doubt anyone would suggest that mootness and inconvenience

amount to substantial, much less compelling, governmental

interests that could ever justify limiting a fundamental constitutional right.

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 39 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Deleting the sunset provision undermined the curfew's

constitutionality in other ways. Not only was the original

curfew ordinance temporary, but it directed the Mayor to

produce a report ninety days prior to its expiration detailing

the number of minors detained, "[t]he number of criminal

homicides and other [sic] narcotic trafficking related crimes of

violence" by age and time of day, and the number of minors

injured during curfew hours as a result of crime, D.C. Code

Ann. s 6-2183(e) (Supp. 1997), precisely the sort of information needed to determine whether the curfew is narrowly

tailored or even substantially related to its purposes, or what

changes might make it so. These provisions demonstrated

that even with the curfew's many defects, see Rogers' Op. at

29-33, the City Council was at least willing to reevaluate its

continuing need, a critical element of both strict and intermediate scrutiny. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 238 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 513 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)). But when the District made the curfew permanent

without demonstrating the need for permanence, it not only

further loosened the fit between its means and ends, but it

also denied itself the information it would need to fashion a

curfew that might pass constitutional muster.

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 40 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Silberman, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Because I do not

read either Supreme Court precedent or the history and

tradition of this country as giving minors a fundamental right

to be unaccompanied on the streets at night, I would apply

rational basis review and uphold the curfew. The Supreme

Court has instructed that " '[s]ubstantive due process' analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted right,

for '[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to

exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new

ground in this field.' " Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302

(1993) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125

(1992)). Appellees have described the right at stake as "the

fundamental right to free movement." But this puts it at too

high a level of generality. The basic definition of the word

"liberty," from which our due process rights emanate, is

"freedom from physical restraint." To some degree, then,

the "freedom to move" must be included in our fundamental

rights. It does not follow, however, that "movement" itself is

the operative right. Such a broad assertion would lead to

somewhat ridiculous results--for example, installing a traffic

light would trigger strict scrutiny. See Townes v. City of St.

Louis, 949 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Mo. 1996), aff'd 112 F.3d 514

(8th Cir.), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 235 (1997) (applying heightened scrutiny when resident claimed that city's placement of

large flower pots across the entry to her block infringed her

fundamental right to intrastate travel); Lutz v. City of York,

899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying strict scrutiny to

"cruising" ordinance, which prohibited repeatedly driving

around loop of certain major roads). And despite appellees'

assertion that the Supreme Court has recognized such a

right, the Court has not been so clear. To be sure, in cases

dealing with travel interstate and abroad, the Court has

suggested in dicta that a "right to movement" may exist.

Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1958); United States v.

Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281(1920). The Court's discussion is in the

context of crossing borders, however, which seems a different

matter than unlimited access to the streets. Appellee also

cites cases holding vagrancy statutes void for vagueness;

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 41 of 42
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

although the Court does at one point quote from Walt Whitman's "Song of the Open Road," the legal analysis in these

cases did not deal with a liberty interest at all. Papachristou

v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972); see Kolender

v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).

I am thus left to define the interest as it appears in the

case before me, mindful that substantive due process encompasses only those rights deeply rooted in the history and

tradition of our society. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.

110, 122 (1989) (plurality opinion). While appellees frame

their interest as "freedom of movement," I think that the

appropriate articulation is "the right of minors to be unaccompanied on the streets at night." I am aware of no such

tradition, and, if anything, Supreme Court precedent cuts

against the start of one. When a group of juvenile aliens

detained before a deportation hearing challenged INS regulations allowing them to be released only to certain adults, the

Court said that their claimed fundamental right surely could

not be "a right to come and go at will, since, as have said

elsewhere, 'juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form

of custody.' " Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. at 302 (quoting Schall

v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984)). If children are "always

in some form of custody," it is anomalous to say that they

have a "fundamental right to be unaccompanied." The Supreme Court has jealously guarded its prerogative to be the

promulgator of new fundamental rights, and since it has not

gone this far, neither would I.

USCA Case #96-7239 Document #356173 Filed: 05/22/1998 Page 42 of 42