Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01327/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01327-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY HILL,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 09cv1327-LAB (CAB)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION, AND

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

DOMINGO URIBE, Warden,

Respondent.

Anthony Hill, a prisoner in state custody, proceeding pro se, filed his petition for writ

of habeas corpus in this Court on June 18, 2009. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72, the petition was referred to Magistrate Judge Cathy Bencivengo for a report and

recommendation.

After receiving briefing, Judge Bencivengo on May 18, 2010 issued her report and

recommendation (the “R&R”), noting that the petition was possibly time-barred but

recommending the simpler approach of denying it on the merits. Hill then filed objections

to the R&R.

I. Legal Standards

A district court has jurisdiction to review a Magistrate Judge's report and

recommendation on dispositive matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). "The district judge must

determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly

objected to." Id. "A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

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 Apparently, this was because Hill brings an “actual innocence” claim. At the time 1

the R&R was issued, it was unclear whether such a claim could rescue otherwise timebarred claims based on alleged constitutional violations. After the R&R was issued,

however, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Lee v. Lampert, 610 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.

2010), holding that claims of actual innocence could not serve as a gateway through which

otherwise time-barred claims could be brought. Furthermore, actual innocence claims

themselves are subject to AEDPA’s time limits. Souliotes v. Evans, 622 F.3d 1173, 1177

(9th Cir. 2010); see especially id. at 1181–82 (remanding petitioner’s actual innocence claim

for evidentiary hearing to determine the triggering date under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D)).

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findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The

Court reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to which specific written objection is made.

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). "The statute

makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge's findings and

recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise." Id.

II. Discussion

In the early morning hours of July 14, 2002, two male Swedish tourists were robbed

in a restroom in the boardwalk area in San Diego’s Mission Beach neighborhood. The

evidence showed a man matching Hill’s description approached the two tourists, asking them

to buy sexual favors from two women he was with. The tourists then went into a public

restroom, where the man robbed them at gunpoint, forced them to undress, and shot one

in the knee. After dressing, the victims made their way across the street to an open

restaurant, where a youth called police.

At trial, both victims identified Hill as the robber. Hill challenged the reliability of these

identifications. Hill’s uncle had been called as an alibi witness, but his testimony left a 4- to

5-hour window in which Hill could have committed the crime. While on the stand, Hill’s uncle

also identified one of the two women as Hill’s wife.

A. Timeliness

Although Respondent raised untimeliness as a defense, the R&R recommended

deciding the petition on the merits, finding the merits more easily resolved than the question

of timeliness. Pough v. United States, 442 F.3d 959, 965 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that a 1

federal court may deny a habeas petition on the merits if the timeliness issue is complex).

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But in view of later Ninth Circuit rulings clarifying the law, the Court believes the timeliness

issue is more easily resolved than before, and reaches it now. Hill didn’t object to the R&R’s

findings concerning the procedural history, and the Court finds them to be consistent with

the lodgments. The R&R’s recitation of the procedural history is therefore ADOPTED.

Hill’s conviction became final on April 20, 2005, when the California Supreme Court,

en banc, denied appellate review. He then embarked on a series of successive habeas

petitions in the California courts. The first two of these raised the “actual innocence” claim

(based on the discovery of three witnesses whose testimony he now argues would exonerate

him). In this process, he filed a petition in the California Court of Appeal, but on June 19,

2006 he filed a request to withdraw it. The Court of Appeal granted that request on June 29,

2006, and the petition was dismissed. (Lodgment 13.) Hill then waited over 17 months

before filing his next petition on December 3, 2007. (Lodgment 14.) That petition was

denied in a relatively brief order finding no merit. (Lodgment 16.) 

A month after that denial, he began his third round of state habeas review by filing a

petition in the California Court of Appeals. That petition, was denied both on the merits and

as untimely. (Lodgment 18 at 2.) The California Supreme Court denied his next petition,

apparently without comment. (Lodgment 20.) He then embarked on his fourth round of state

habeas review by filing a petition in the California Court of Appeals. This again was denied

both on the merits and as untimely. (Lodgment 22 at 1.)

Because Hill didn’t file his petition in this Court until June 18, 2009, it is late by over

three years unless tolling applies. Under AEDPA, the limitations period is tolled for “[t]he

time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending . . . .“ 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2). From June 29, 2006 to December 3, 2007, Hill had no petition pending in state

court. Petitioners who pursue their habeas petitions in the California courts are entitled to

“gap tolling” (also known as “interval tolling”) between the denial of relief by a lower court and

the filing of a petition in a higher court, but only if the later petition is filed within a

“reasonable time.” Maxwell v. Roe, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 4925429 at *5 (9th Cir., Nov.

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30, 2010) (citing, inter alia, Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 192–93 (2006)). Although

California has not specified what a “reasonable time” is, Evans at 198, far shorter delays

have been determined to be unreasonable. See, e.g., Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 969

(9th Cir.2010) (holding that a petitioner's delay of 146 days between filing of petitions was

“plainly” unreasonable). Hill’s delay of over a year and five months is plainly unreasonable.

Even if AEDPA’s limitations period was tolled up to that point, it expired during that 17-month

interval.

It is also clear that in permitting Hill to withdraw his petition, the Court of Appeals was

not tolling, staying, or extending time in any way. Compare Rogers v. Giurbino, 2007 WL

2873712 at *3–*4 (S.D.Cal., Sept. 28, 2007) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that he was

entitled to tolling between rounds of habeas review after he voluntarily withdraw his first

petition). Later rulings by the state courts finding the petition untimely confirm this. Hill’s

petition is therefore time-barred and must be denied for this reason.

Although Ninth Circuit precedent requires that the petition be denied on this basis, it

is possible that jurists of reason might disagree that claims of actual innocence can be timebarred. See Pringle v. Runnels, 2011 WL 291181 at *3 (S.D.Cal., Jan. 25, 2011) (citing In

re Davis, 130 S.Ct. 1, 1 (2009) and Osborne v. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 521 F.3d 1118, 1140

(9th Cir. 2008)). The Court will therefore also address the merits of Hill’s actual innocence

claim. If that claim clearly lacks merit, reasonable jurists would agree the petition as a whole

is also time-barred.

B. Actual Innocence Claim

As discussed in the R&R, this claim was presented to the California Court of Appeals

and the California Supreme Court, and rejected by both, although only the Court of Appeals

issued an order accompanied by reasoning. (R&R, 28:3–6.) That court considered and

rejected Hill’s claim of actual innocence, finding the new evidence “might have weakened

the prosecution case or presented a more difficult question for the jury,” but didn’t show he

was innocent. (Lodgment 18 at 5.) That decision also found the three witnesses’

declarations “facially defective.” (Id. at 4.) 

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 Although these declarations are paginated, they are not in the correct order. The 2

declaration of Kenneth Bess (“Bess Decl.”) is first at B-37 to B-41. This is followed by the

joint declaration of Adam Nuno and Bianca Towne (“Nuno/Towne Decl.”) at B-25 to B-28.

Not all pages in Exhibit B are numbered.

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The Court is required to accept the determination of a factual issue made by a state

court, unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Here, Hill hasn’t provided any additional

evidence, but has simply argued the state court’s assessment was unreasonable. (Obj. to

R&R, 6:11–7:4.) Specifically, he argues that the three witnesses could logically have known

who actually committed the shooting and robbery (id., 6:14–17); that the witnesses saw

every possible suspect leave the restroom after the shooting and robbery, none of whom

was Hill (id., 6:16–20); and that all three witnesses had a conversation with a man in a white

jumpsuit (not Hill), whom they would testify committed the shooting and robbery. (Id.,

6:21–24.) 

Hill hasn’t included the proposed evidence, but he did attach it to many of his state

court pleadings. Not all of these are complete or paginated, so for convenience and clarity,

the Court will refer to the declarations found in Lodgment 10 (Pet. for Reconsideration filed

Oct. 19, 2005), Ex. B, from B-27 to B-30, B-37 to B-41, and B-25 to B28.2

The three proposed witnesses, Kenneth Bess, Adam Nuno, and Bianca Towne, were

friends of a witness who in turn was a friend of Hill and his wife. (Bess Decl., ¶ 8;

Nuno/Towne Decl., ¶ 5; Lodgment 2 (trial transcript) at 10:27–11:3, 12:4–11.) The

declaration of Hill’s attorney merely characterizes Bess’s testimony, which she was proffering

to the court. While the declaration of Bess himself might be admissible, Hill’s attorney’s is

clearly not.

All three witnesses claim to have seen and even talked with a man generally similar

to Hill at the adjacent beach that day, whom they believed was looking for opportunities to

rob people. All three witnesses also say they saw this man, not Hill, running out of the

restroom after the shooting. Their helpfulness to Hill ends there, however.

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 Specifically, the declaration says “. . . I saw this same guy [the man they believed 3

was the shooter] go into the bathroom, with his friend and 2 (two) black girls . . . prior to the

shooting . . . .” This sounds as if the shooter, his friend, and two women went in. But later,

the declaration says “I only saw the . . . victims go into the restroom . . . .” Apparently he

means he only saw the victims, the two women, and one (or two) men go in.

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Bess’s declaration doesn’t say what Hill claims it does. Its factual statements are

somewhat contradictory: Although he declares he saw “the guy coming out of the restroom”

and knew he was someone who looked like Hill but wasn’t, (Bess Decl., ¶ 14), he also says

he was at a nearby restaurant when he heard the shot fired. (Id., ¶ 12.) Later, at an

unidentified time sometime before October 13, 2003, he says he met Hill for the first time

while in a holding tank and, while discussing Hill’s case, realized Hill wasn’t the shooter that

night. (Id., ¶¶ 5, 10.) The declaration doesn’t say how much time elapsed between the

shooting and the time Bess first met Hill and concluded he wasn’t the shooter. 

The joint declaration of Nuno and Towne also doesn’t say what Hill claims it does.

Instead, these witnesses say they saw the man who earlier had been wearing a white

jumpsuit enter the restroom with a friend (or with the two victims) and also with two women. 3

(Nuno/Towne Decl., ¶¶ 9, 11.) Then they mention the shooting, after which the man they

believed to be the shooter ran out the back door of the restroom. (Id., ¶ 10.) They say

nothing about seeing anyone else leaving the restroom, which presumably would have

included the two women, the other man (if there was a second man), and a little later the

victims. The declaration also gives a description of the shooting victim with no explanation

of how the witnesses knew which of the two men had been shot. (Id., ¶ 11.) Though they

declare they were “right there when the shooting happened,” (Id., ¶ 10), it is unclear how

close they were and what opportunity they had to observe events. As with Bess’s proposed

testimony, the best this testimony can show is that Nuno and Towne believed that someone

besides Hill was the shooter. 

Neither declaration gives basic foundational information, such as how where in

relation to the restroom the declarants were, or whether the restrooms were always in their

view so that they would have seen everyone who entered or left. This is an important

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 The three witnesses’ accounts suggest the shooting and the fleeing man were 4

obvious to everyone around. But the record contradicts this. The victims’ testimony at trial

shows the area was generally deserted, and when they had to walk across the street to the

only open restaurant nearby (apparently the same one the witnesses were in) to ask for help.

(Lodgment 2 at 76:20–77:5; 147:7–149:10.) They also testified about trying to convince a

skeptical restaurant worker there really had been a shooting and they needed the police and

an ambulance. (Id.)

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omission, because Bess says he was at a restaurant across the street from the restroom

with his friends when a shot was heard. (Bess Decl., ¶¶ 8, 9, 12, 20.) It is unclear whether

Nuno and Towne were also at the restaurant, but he implies they were (id., ¶¶ 2, 8,9) and

they are silent on this point.

Both declarations omit information about as how and when the victims left the

restroom. Nuno’s and Towne’s statement that the women also entered the restroom 4

(Nuno/Towne Decl., ¶ 9), is omitted by Bess and contradicts the record. (See, e.g.,

Lodgment 2 (trial transcript) at 76:6–7.). Because the declarants’ beliefs about the shooter’s

identity were based on who they saw entering and leaving the restroom, this information

would show whether their conclusions were well-founded.

It is also worth noting the declarations appear to disagree on important details. By

way of example, both Bess and Nuno declared they had repeatedly met the other man

during the day. Bess declared the man looked like Hill but was not Hill. (Bess Decl., ¶ 10.)

Nuno and Towne declared the man did not look like Hill. (Nuno/Towne Decl., ¶ 3.) Nuno

and Towne also say the unknown man had earlier been wearing a white jumpsuit but had

put on a bomber jacket before going into the restroom. (Id., ¶ 9.) Bess merely says the man

had on a white jumpsuit. (Bess Decl., ¶ 14.) 

The state courts didn’t discuss the declarations in detail, except to conclude they were

insufficient. In view of the problems with the declarations, this is not an unreasonable

finding. Hill makes other arguments based on the evidence presented at trial, but the state

courts also took this into account and concluded it didn’t show he was innocent or even

entitled to a new trial. If the proffered testimony in some way other interlocks with evidence

produced at trial to support Hill’s claim of actual innocence, he hasn’t explained how. On the

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basis of this evidence, the Court cannot say Hill has rebutted the state courts’ factual

determinations, and is therefore required to accept their determinations as correct. 

C. Other Objections

Because Hill cannot show he is actually innocent, his remaining claims are timebarred. His objections concerning these other claims are therefore OVERRULED as moot.

III. Conclusion and Order

Hill’s objections are OVERRULED. With the modifications mentioned above, the

Court ADOPTS the R&R. The petition is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 4, 2011

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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