Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04541/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04541-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNESTO ABORDO, et al,

Plaintiffs,

v

JOHN E POTTER, United States

Postmaster General,

Defendant. /

No C 04-4541 VRW

ORDER

This case involves claims of employment discrimination

and retaliation brought by twenty-eight former “special delivery”

mail carriers in the San Francisco branch of the United States

Postal Service (USPS). Defendant John Potter (the “Postmaster”)

moves for partial summary judgment on plantiffs’ claims for age

discrimination and retaliation. Doc #22 (MSJ). For reasons

discussed below, the Postmaster’s motion is GRANTED.

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I

A

In 1885, Congress provided

[t]hat a special stamp of the face valuation of ten

cents may be provided and issued, * * * which, when

attached to a letter, in addition to the lawful

postage thereon, * * * shall be regarded as

entitling such letter to immediate delivery within

the carrier limit of any free delivery office which

may be designated by the Postmaster-General as a

special delivery office * * *.

Act of March 3, 1885, 48th Cong, 2d Sess, 23 Stat 385, 387-88.

Thus began “special delivery” mail (SDM). At the time SDM was

introduced, mail arrived at post offices throughout the day, often

after letter carriers had departed for routine deliveries. Doc

#19, Ex C at 138. If a customer chose SDM service, SDM messengers

delivered the item to its ultimate destination on the same day it

arrived at the local post office, regardless whether the regular

letter carriers had already begun their routes. Id at 138-39. 

Plaintiffs are SDM messengers who comprised the single SDM unit

that existed in San Francisco prior to 1991. Doc #41, Ex 10 at 9.

In 1991, USPS decentralized the San Francisco SDM unit

into four separate units, which provoked a flurry of Equal

Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints for retaliation and various

types of discrimination (the “EEO actions”). Doc #19, Ex A at 2. 

These individual claims, however, were stayed pending arbitration

of a “class action” grievance (the “class arbitration”) brought by

the American Postal Workers Union (APWU) before arbitrator William

Eaton. Id at 3. Although none of the aforementioned proceedings

shares a procedural connection with the instant suit, plaintiffs’

participation in them does form one basis for the retaliation

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claims at bar.

By FY 1996, demand for the SDM service had fallen to

208,000 items delivered from a peak of 110 million items delivered

in FY 1970. Id, Ex C at 139, 140-41, 1463. This decline coincided

with the rise in popularity of other services, such as express

mail, as well as improvements in the first-class and priority mail

services. Id at 140. Due to these improvements, by the 1990s

regular letter carriers were often delivering SDM items in the

normal course of their routes. Id, Ex D at 122.

In 1997, citing the decline in SDM volume, USPS

recommended to the Postal Rate Commission (PRC) that SDM service be

eliminated. See id, Ex C. In a report issued on April 2, 1997,

the PRC found that, under established cost attribution methods, SDM

revenues for FY 1996 covered only 94.3% of SDM costs. Id, Ex C at

138. Using cost methods proposed by USPS, however, it found that

SDM revenues exceeded attributable costs with a cost coverage of

119%. Id. But the PRC also found that eliminating the SDM service

would result in a net gain of $400,000 per year, as approximately

one-half of SDM customers would switch to the more-efficient

express mail service. Id at 142-43. 

The PRC therefore recommended that SDM be eliminated. Id

at 149. On May 5, 1997, the USPS Board of Governors approved the

PRC’s recommendation, setting an implementation date of June 8,

1997. Doc #20 (Leon Decl), Ex B at 8, 10. USPS announced the

elimination of SDM in its May 22, 1997, bulletin. Id.

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B

The process of eliminating the SDM service in the San

Francisco units, which began in June 1997, coincided with events in

the 1991 class arbitration and EEO actions so as to give rise to

plaintiffs’ present retaliation claim.

First, on June 2, 1997, William Leon, then-manager of

customer service for USPS in San Francisco, began coordinating the

annual SDM unit review at the direction of San Francisco Postmaster

George Kikuchi. Leon Decl ¶¶1, 4-5. Leon found that, since the

elimination of the SDM service, San Francisco’s thirty full-time

and seven part-time SDM messengers were mainly delivering express

mail and some international mail. Id ¶¶7-8. But because regular

letter carriers were primarily responsible for delivering express

mail, there was very little express mail for the SDM messengers to

deliver. Id ¶¶11-14; id, Ex H. For example, Leon found that “the

average total daily mail volume for all four special delivery units

on a weekday or Saturday was only 428 pieces of mail.” Id ¶11. 

This volume amounted to seventeen pieces of mail per full-time

employee per workday, or 3.52 pieces per hour. Id ¶¶11-12. Leon

calculated that USPS could save approximately $220,000 in annual

vehicle costs and $583,917 in annual labor costs by having regular

letter carriers deliver the express mail that the SDM messengers

were then delivering. Id ¶¶18-19. Moreover, USPS domestic mail

manual DM-201 states that regular mail carriers are to deliver

express mail in the course of their normal routes, and that SDM

messengers should only deliver express mail if they do so in the

course of delivering SDM items. Id ¶21; Doc #41, Ex 9-23 at 23.

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5

On June 8, 1997, the same day that the elimination of SDM

took effect, USPS declared a national moratorium on abolishing the

SDM “craft” pending the outcome of negotiations between USPS and

the APWU concerning the merger of the SDM craft into the clerk

craft. Doc #41, Ex 10 at 11-12. Linda Shumate, of the USPS

Pacific Area Labor Relations Office learned of this moratorium in

June of 1997 and informed the various districts in the Pacific Area

of it, including the San Francisco district. Id at 12.

C

On June 10, 1997 —— eight days after Leon began

conducting the SDM unit review and two days after SDM was abolished

—— Eaton issued his award in the class arbitration (the “Eaton

award”). Eaton found that USPS violated sections of the collective

bargaining agreement by failing to perform a “unit review” and to

provide sufficient “analytical justification” for the

decentralization. Doc #19, Ex B at 50, 52-53. But he refused to

order a reconsolidation of the San Francisco SDM unit, having found

that the decentralization itself was a legitimate operation. Id,

Ex A at 3.

Apparently dissatisfied with the Eaton award, on June 23,

1997, in a letter copied to George Kikuchi, the individual EEO

complainants notified USPS labor relations manager Stephen

Bushelman of their intent to reinstate the 1991 EEO actions, Doc

#24, Ex 4, which, as noted, had been stayed pending the class

arbitration. Twenty of those complainants are plaintiffs in the

present action. 

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On July 9, 1999, the EEOC administrative judges concluded

that the complainants could not establish claims for

discrimination. Doc #19, Ex A at 3. Those complainants sought

review in federal court in this district, Black v Henderson, C-99-

4806 SBA (ND Cal), and on September 23, 2002, Judge Armstrong

granted the Postmaster’s motion for summary judgment, concluding

that (1) USPS had offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory

justifications for decentralization (decreasing messengers’ travel

time and increasing efficiency), (2) plaintiffs had presented

insufficient statistical evidence to show disparate impact and (3)

plaintiffs had failed to make a prima facie case for disability

discrimination, racial discrimination and retaliation. Id at 12-

14, 19, 20-22. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished

disposition. See Doc #127 (99-4806). 

D

Meanwhile, three weeks after the EEO complainants

expressed their intent to reinstate the EEO actions, on July 16,

1997, the San Francisco SDM unit was abolished and all SDM

messengers, including plaintiffs, were sent to perform mail

processing duties at the San Francisco processing and distribution

center (P&DC). Doc #41, Ex 10 at 14. The following day,

plaintiffs received letters stating that they would remain in the

SDM craft pending ongoing discussions between USPS and the APWU but

that they would remain detailed to the P&DC until their

reassignment to the clerk craft was official. Id.

Plaintiffs were not satisfied with their reassignment to

the P&DC. In their first amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that

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their new jobs were “menial” and “required no skill” and that the

P&DC was the “least desirable facility in San Francisco” with

“absolutely filthy” restrooms. Doc #14 (FAC) ¶¶54-55. Plaintiffs

further allege that they had difficulty breathing “because of the

extraordinary amount of dust in the air.” Id ¶55.

Plaintiffs in this action filed formal discrimination

complaints with USPS on October 7, 1997, alleging that their July

1997 reassignment to the P&DC was (1) due to discrimination based

on age, sex, race and disability discrimination and (2) in

retaliation for participating in the 1991 EEO actions challenging

decentralization of the SDM unit. On June 16, 2000, the

administrative judge determined that defendant’s reassignment of

plaintiffs was in retaliation for their participation in the 1991

EEO actions. Doc #41, Ex 10 at 47. The administrative judge also

found that removing plaintiffs from their messenger duties resulted

in massive service disruptions, cost increases, late delivery of

express mail and the necessity of other employees’ working

substantial overtime. Id at 35.

On November 12, 2003, the EEOC Office of Federal

Operation (OFO) reversed the administrative judge’s decision. Doc

#19, Ex E at 1, 7. On the retaliation claims, OFO concluded that

plaintiffs failed to establish a causal link between their

participation in the 1991 EEO actions and their reassignment in

1997. Id at 5. On the claims for disability discrimination, OFO

concluded that the administrative judge’s findings were not

supported by substantial evidence. Id.

Plaintiffs filed suit in this court on October 27, 2004,

alleging retaliation and discrimination in employment arising from

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their July 1997 reassignment to the P&DC. The first amended

complaint alleges that plaintiffs were reassigned to the PD&C in

retaliation for their participation in the 1991 EEO actions and

class arbitration, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 USC § 2000e et seq, the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act (ADEA), 29 USC § 633a, and the Rehabilitation Act of

1973, 29 USC § 791. FAC ¶¶58-62. All plaintiffs also allege that

the reassignment constituted age discrimination in violation of the

ADEA. Id ¶¶74-76. Seven plaintiffs further allege disability

discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as

amended by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42

USC § 12101 et seq. Id ¶¶63-73.

The Postmaster moves for partial summary judgment on the

age discrimination and retaliation claims. 

II

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court

must determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist,

resolving any doubt in favor of the party opposing the motion. 

“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment.” Anderson v Liberty Lobby, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). 

Further, the dispute over a material fact must be “genuine,” that

is, the evidence must be such “that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. And the burden of

establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact lies

with the moving party. Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317, 322-23

(1986). Summary judgment is granted only if the moving party is

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entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCP 56(c).

The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings, 

but must produce significant probative evidence, by affidavit or as

otherwise provided in FRCP 56, supporting its claim that a genuine

issue of material fact exists. TW Elec Serv v Pacific Elec

Contractors Ass’n, 809 F2d 626, 630 (9th Cir 1987). The evidence

presented by the nonmoving party “is to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson,

477 US at 255. “[T]he judge’s function is not himself to weigh the

evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine

whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id at 249.

The evidence presented by both parties must be

admissible. FRCP 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in

affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine

issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publishing

Co, Inc v GTE Corp, 594 F2d 730, 738 (9th Cir 1979). Hearsay

statements in affidavits are inadmissible. Japan Telecom, Inc v

Japan Telecom America Inc, 287 F3d 866, 875 n 1 (9th Cir 2004).

III

Retaliation

In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation

under Title VII, plaintiffs must adduce evidence that (1) they were

engaged in a protected activity, (2) they were thereafter subjected

to an adverse employment action and (3) a causal link exists

between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. 

Wallis v J R Simplot Co, 26 F3d 885, 891 (9th Cir 1994). If

plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, the “burden of production,

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but not persuasion, then shifts to the employer to articulate some

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.” 

Chuang v University of California Davis, Bd of Trustees, 225 F3d

1115, 1123 (9th Cir 2000). If the employer meets this burden, the

plaintiff must show “that the articulated reason is pretextual

either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory

reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing

that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” 

Id at 1124 (citation omitted).

A

Employees engage in protected activity when they act to

protect their rights under Title VII. See Steiner v Showboat

Operating Co, 25 F3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir 1994). The Postmaster

contends that the eight plaintiffs who did not file EEO complaints

in 1991 cannot show that they were engaged in protected activity. 

In response, plaintiffs appear to argue that, as members of the

class in the class arbitration, these eight individuals engaged in

protected activity. In reply, the Postmaster contends that the

class arbitration did not concern Title VII protections and

therefore could not qualify as protected activity.

In Learned v Bellevue, 860 F2d 928 (9th Cir 1988), the

Ninth Circuit explained that the anti-retaliation provisions of

Title VII protect “only those employees who oppose what they

reasonably perceive as discrimination under the Act.” Id at 932. 

The Learned plaintiff alleged retaliation in violation of Title VII

based on a state-law discrimination complaint he had filed with the

Washington Human Rights Commission (HRC). Id at 930. Affirming

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summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Ninth Circuit held

that, for Title VII retaliation purposes, “the HRC filing does not

fall within the protection of [Title VII] * * * because [plaintiff]

did not allege discrimination prohibited by Title VII.” Id at 932.

The same reasoning applies with greater force to the 1991

class arbitration initiated by the APWU, where the issue was

whether USPS had violated various, primarily procedural, aspects of

a collective bargaining agreement. Doc #19, Ex B at 1-5. 

Specifically, the arbitrator framed the issue as follows: “Did the

Postal Service violate Articles 19, 40 and the Special Delivery

Craft Memorandum of Understanding of the 1987-1990 Collective

Bargaining Agreement? If so, what is the appropriate remedy?” Doc

#19, Ex B at 1. The Eaton award addressed only those issues and

not any alleged discrimination. Id. Moreover, the Learned

plaintiff filed the prior complaint on his own behalf. Here,

plaintiffs’ only connection to the class arbitration was their

membership in APWU, which filed the grievance on their behalf. Id. 

The court notes that the Tenth Circuit has concluded that

asserting rights under a collective bargaining agreement does not

constitute protected activity for purposes of a Title VII

retaliation claim. See Kendrick v Penske Transp Servs, Inc, 220

F3d 1220, 1235 n 13 (10th Cir 2000); McKenzie v Renberg’s, Inc, 94

F3d 1478, 1486 (10th Cir 1996). 

For these reasons, the court finds that plaintiffs’

indirect participation in the class arbitration was not protected

activity for Title VII purposes. Accordingly, the retaliation

claims of the eight plaintiffs who did not participate in the 1991

EEO actions must fail.

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B

The Postmaster does not dispute that plaintiffs’ filing

of the 1991 EEO complaints constituted protected activity under

Title VII and that plaintiffs’ reassignment to the P&DC constitutes

an adverse employment action. Rather, the Postmaster argues that

plaintiffs cannot show a causal link between the protected activity

and the adverse employment action. MSJ at 10-12.

In order to establish causation, plaintiffs must show “by

a preponderance of the evidence that engaging in the protected

activity was one of the reasons for [the adverse employment action]

and that but for such activity” they would not have been subjected

to the adverse employment action. Villiarimo v Aloha Island Air,

Inc, 281 F3d 1054, 1064-65 (9th Cir 2002). Plaintiffs may submit

direct or circumstantial evidence of causation. See Manatt v Bank

of America, 339 F3d 792, 802 (9th Cir 2003). 

Causation may be inferred from timing alone “where an

adverse employment action follows on the heels of protected

activity.” Villiarimo, 281 F3d at 1065. But the adverse

employment action must have occurred “fairly soon after the

employee’s protected activity.” Id (internal quotation omitted). 

For example, in Villiarimo, an eighteen-month lapse between the

protected activity and the adverse employment action was too long

for a court to infer causation. Id. On the other hand, an

intervening period of two or three months can be short enough for a

court to infer causation. See Yartzoff v Thomas, 809 F2d 1371,

1376 (9th Cir 1987); Miller v Fairchild Indus, Inc, 797 F2d 727,

731-32 (9th Cir 1986).

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The crux of the parties’ dispute is whether the June 23,

1997, letter in which plaintiffs expressed their intent to

reinstate the EEO actions is a relevant event for purposes of

timing. Plaintiffs maintain that it is and that because

plaintiffs’ reassignment occurred just three weeks later, causation

can be readily inferred. The Postmaster argues that the relevant

event is the filing of the complaints in 1991, six years before

plaintiffs’ reassignment to the P&DC. The Postmaster relies on

Clark County School Dist v Breeden, 532 US 268 (2001), for the

proposition that the clock for inferring causation begins ticking

when a plaintiff first files an EEO complaint —— and not at any

subsequent point in the proceedings triggered by the complaint. 

In Breeden, the Supreme Court held that issuance of a

right-to-sue letter at the close of an EEOC investigation was not

the relevant event for inferring causation for two reasons. First,

there was no indication that the employer knew about the right-tosue letter before taking the allegedly adverse action. Id at 273. 

Second and more important for present purposes, if the employer did

know about the letter, then the employer also must have known about

the filing of the initial complaint in that investigation. Id. 

The Postmaster argues that here, too, the supervisors who

reassigned plaintiffs knew about the filing of the initial

complaint, which therefore must be the relevant event for inferring

time-based causation.

Plaintiffs argue that “Breeden is inapplicable to the

extent that it involves the EEOC private sector procedures, rather

than [EEOC governmental procedures].” But even assuming that

Breeden involves “private sector procedures” (which is far from

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clear given that the plaintiff there was a state employee suing a

public school district), plaintiffs fail to explain, and the court

is at a loss to understand, why this distinction renders Breeden

inapplicable.

Plaintiffs also maintain that “unlike the facts in

Breeden, there were no separate events” between 1991 and 1997, “but

rather a continuous process, litigating overlapping issues.” Doc

#28 (Opp) at 16. To be sure, the facts of Breeden are

distinguishable. There, the Court assumed that if the employer was

aware of the right-to-sue letter, it would also have been aware of

the initial EEO complaint. Here, there is no need for assumptions. 

Taking the uncharacteristic step of citing to the extensive

administrative record they submitted, cf Doc #19, Ex A at 16 (Judge

Armstrong emphasizing that plaintiffs in Black v Henderson,

represented by plaintiffs’ counsel in this case, “fail[ed] to

provide any citations to the record”), plaintiffs dedicate several

pages of their opposing memorandum to quoting the testimony of

Scott Tucker, Bill Leon, George Kikuchi and Linda Shumate and

explaining why it is beyond cavil that these individuals had long

been aware of the EEO actions. Opp at 11-14. The court agrees

that the portions of the record cited by plaintiffs leave little

room for doubt that the relevant decisionmakers were aware of the

EEO actions well before June 23, 1997. Under these circumstances,

and as in Breeden, it is questionable that the June 23, 1997,

letter is the relevant event for inferring causation based on

temporal proximity.

Breeden is distinguishable in another way that, at first

blush, favors plaintiffs. Unlike the right-to-sue letter in

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Breeden, plaintiffs’ letter almost certainly constitutes protected

activity in which plaintiffs clearly took part. And one could

infer —— perhaps reasonably, perhaps not —— that notwithstanding

their knowledge of the EEO actions, the relevant decisionmakers

might have believed that the EEO actions would never be revived in

light of the class arbitration and Eaton award. In that sense,

plaintiffs’ June 23, 1997, letter might have been the functional

equivalent of initial notice of protected activity and,

accordingly, the basis for a new retaliatory motive.

But even under this theory, plaintiffs cannot make out a

prima facie case. The uncontested evidence shows that the

Postmaster began the process of eliminating the SDM service and the

San Francisco SDM units weeks before June 23, 1997. Leon Decl,

¶¶1, 4-5; id, Ex B at 8, 10. “Employers need not suspend

previously planned transfers upon discovering that a Title VII suit

has been filed, and their proceeding along lines previously

contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no

evidence whatever of causality.” Breeden, 532 US at 272. 

In sum, plaintiffs’ attempt to establish a causal nexus

based on temporal proximity fails and, for that reason, so does

their prima facie case.

C

Even assuming plaintiffs could establish a prima facie

case, the Postmaster has articulated a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for reassigning plaintiffs in 1997.

The Postmaster tenders three interrelated, legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for plaintiffs’ reassignment to the P&DC: 

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(1) the elimination of SDM service nationwide; (2) the numerous

inefficiencies resulting from the low volume of mail the San

Francisco SDM messengers were delivering and (3) nationwide postal

rules preventing SDM messengers from delivering express mail, which

had become plaintiffs’ main job after the decline in SDM’s

popularity. In other words, there were no more SDM items to

deliver, and plaintiffs’ delivery of non-SDM items was both

inefficient and discouraged by USPS rules. Their reassignment to

the P&DC thus resulted from a reduction in workforce.

A general reduction in workforce is a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory business justification evidence of which is by

itself sufficient to rebut a prima facie case. See, for example,

Coleman v Quaker Oats Co, 232 F3d 1271, 1282 (9th Cir 2000). Cf

Nidds v Schindler Elevator Corp, 113 F3d 912, 918 (9th Cir 1996)

(finding that evidence of general workforce reduction was

sufficient to rebut prima facie case of discrimination under

California Fair Employment and Housing Act). The Postmaster has

more than satisfied the burden of producing such evidence. See

supra I(B).

D

The burden thus shifts back to plaintiffs to produce

evidence sufficient to raise a genuine material fact regarding

whether the Postmaster’s proffered justification is merely a

pretext for discrimination. Coleman, 232 F3d at 1282. Plaintiffs

may rely on the same evidence used to establish the prima facie

case or may offer new evidence, but they must do more than merely

deny the Postmaster’s justification. Id. Instead, they must offer

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“specific, substantial evidence of pretext.” Wallis, 26 F3d at 890

(quoting Steckl v Motorola, Inc, 703 F2d 392, 393 (9th Cir 1983)). 

Specifically, plaintiffs must produce evidence from which the

finder of fact could reasonably conclude that either (1) the

alleged reason for the adverse employment action was false or (2)

the true reason for the action was a discriminatory one. Nidds,

113 F3d at 918.

Plaintiffs fail to satisfy this burden. Indeed,

plaintiffs do not present any argument for pretext, at least not

explicitly. But the court can infer from plaintiffs’ opposing

memorandum that they are relying on the administrative judge’s

finding of numerous inefficiencies and substantial costs resulting

from plaintiffs’ unavailability to deliver express mail after their

reassignment. See Opp at 4-5. In addition, plaintiffs assert that

USPS hired new employees and assigned existing employees to deliver

express mail following plaintiffs’ reassignment. Id at 4.

Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, these

contentions would not reasonably support the conclusion that the

Postmaster’s given reason for plaintiffs’ reassignment was false or

that the Postmaster’s true reason was discriminatory. It is simply

unrealistic that USPS abolished the SDM service nationwide and

implemented a nationwide rule discouraging SDM messengers from

delivering express mail simply to retaliate against twenty-eight

SDM messengers in San Francisco. Further, a failure on the part of

the Postmaster to manage optimally the delivery of express mail

does not undermine the credibility of his legitimate,

nondiscriminatory justification. See Coleman, 232 F3d at 1285

(holding that unwise business judgments or use of a faulty

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evaluation system does not support an inference of discrimination). 

Finally, the fact that the Postmaster assigned other employees to

deliver express mail reinforces his legitimate justification for

plaintiffs’ reassignment: USPS had eliminated plaintiffs’ primary

function and needed other employees to perform plaintiffs’

secondary duties. See Wallis, 26 F3d at 892.

In sum, even if plaintiffs established a prima facie case

of retaliation, they failed to rebut the Postmaster’s legitimate,

nondiscriminatory justification for the adverse employment action. 

The Postmaster’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims

for retaliation is accordingly GRANTED.

IV

Age Discrimination

A prima facie case of age discrimination under Title VII

and the ADEA may be based either on direct evidence of

discriminatory intent or on a presumption arising from the factors

set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792 (1973). 

Wallis, 26 F3d at 889. Plaintiffs attempt both routes.

A

In short, plaintiffs have not produced direct evidence of

discriminatory intent. Plaintiffs refer to “numerous instances of

direct evidence of discrimination including ageist remarks made by

USPS managers and supervisors indicating that the reason for

abolishing the [SDM] unit was to get rid of older and disabled

Messengers.” Opp at 18. But plaintiffs do not draw the court’s

attention to any such “instances of direct evidence” in the record. 

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In opposing a motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs must specify

and cite to the evidence supporting their argument, rather than

hope that the court, reviewing a voluminous record, somehow manages

to find it. See, for example, Carmen v San Francisco Unif Sch

Dist, 237 F3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir 2001).

In any event, it appears that plaintiffs are referring to

remarks submitted as evidence in Black v Henderson, C-99-4806 SBA

(ND Cal), the case arising from the 1991 decentralization. See Doc

#35 (Reply) at 5. Judge Armstrong found the remarks insufficient

to establish a causal relationship between discriminatory intent

and the adverse employment action, primarily because they were made

by “first line supervisors” who were “not involved with the

decision to decentralize the [SDM] unit.” Doc #19, Ex A at 17. 

The court agrees with Judge Armstrong. Further, tenuous as the

connection between the remarks and the 1991 decentralization may

be, the connection between those remarks and plaintiffs’

reassignment to the P&DC six years later is weaker still.

B

To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination

under a McDonnell Douglas-type presumption, plaintiffs must

demonstrate that they were “(1) members of the protected class (at

least age 40); (2) performing their jobs satisfactorily; (3)

discharged; and (4) replaced by substantially younger employees

with equal or inferior qualifications.” Coleman, 232 F3d at 1281. 

But “[w]here, as here, the [adverse employment action] in question

results from a general reduction in workforce, [plaintiffs] need

not show that they were replaced; rather they need show ‘through

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circumstantial, statistical, or direct evidence that the [adverse

employment action] occurred under circumstances giving rise to an

inference of age discrimination.’” Id (quoting Rose v Wells Fargo

& Co, 902 F2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir 1990)). Plaintiffs can raise

this inference by showing that the employer had a continuing need

for their services (in that their various duties were still being

performed) or that others not in their protected class were treated

more favorably. Wallis, 26 F3d at 891 (citing Washington v

Garrett, 10 F3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir 1993)).

1

Whether USPS had a continuing need for plaintiffs’

services turns on the definition of plaintiffs’ services. The

Postmaster contends that plaintiffs’ services consisted of

delivering SDM items along with any express mail that they could

deliver in the course of their SDM routes —— and only in the course

of their SDM routes. See Doc #22 at 15. In the Postmaster’s view,

once the SDM service had been eliminated, there were no more SDM

routes and thus no continuing need for plaintiffs’ services. 

Plaintiffs appear to take the position that their primary duty was

to deliver express mail simply because that is what they had been

doing since the decline in SDM’s popularity. See Opp at 4. See

also Leon Decl ¶¶7-8. Under this theory, the assignment of express

mail to other employees was the assignment of plaintiff’s own

services, thus raising an inference of discrimination.

The court is not persuaded by plaintiffs’ apparent

theory. As their very job title indicates, and as they allege in

their complaint, plaintiffs were special delivery messengers. FAC

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¶¶4-32. Moreover, plaintiffs do not contest that postal

regulations permit SDM messengers to deliver express mail only in

the course of their SDM routes, and that regular letter carriers

are to deliver express mail items. See Doc #23, Ex 9-23 at 23. 

Plaintiffs have failed to show that USPS had a continuing need for

their services and that the transfer of express mail delivery to

other employees represented a transfer of plaintiffs’ duties.

2

Plaintiffs also fail to persuade the court that others

not in their protected class were treated more favorably. 

Plaintiffs baldly state that USPS “hired new, untrained employees,

many of whom were younger than plaintiffs * * * to deliver the

Express Mail.” Opp at 4. But once again, plaintiffs do not cite

any evidence for this contention, much less evidence establishing

that these employees were younger than 40 years old (that is,

outside the protected class). 

Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence

showing that their reassignment to the P&DC occurred under

circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, and

they have thus failed to establish a prima facie case of age

discrimination under Title VII.

C

Even if plaintiffs had proffered evidence suggesting that

the employees who were assigned to deliver express mail were not

members of plaintiffs’ protected class, thus enabling plaintiffs to

establish a minimal prima facie case based on a McDonnell Douglas

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presumption, “the burden of production, but not persuasion, then

shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.” Chuang, 225

F3d at 1123. 

As already discussed, the Postmaster advances a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiffs’ reassignment: 

a reduction in workforce. See supra III(C). And once again,

plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact

regarding whether the Postmaster’s proffered justification is

merely a pretext for discrimination. Specifically, plaintiffs do

not offer any evidence of pretext beyond what the court already

found to be insufficient in the context of their retaliation

claims: express mail service disruptions and the assignment of

other employees to deliver express mail.

D

In sum, plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case

of age discrimination. Even assuming the contrary, plaintiffs

failed to rebut the Postmaster’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory

justification for the adverse employment action.

//

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V

The Postmaster’s motion for partial summary judgment on

plaintiffs’ claims for retaliation and age discrimination is hereby

GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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