Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00217/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00217-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441fr Removal- Fraud

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES FRANCIS, an individual; and 

WILMA FRANCIS, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WYNDHAM VACATION RESORTS, 

INC., a Delaware corporation; and 

PTVO OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., 

a Delaware corporation,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-CV-217 JLS (BLM)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION TO REMAND

(ECF No. 6)

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (“Mot.,” ECF No. 6), to 

which Defendants Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc. and PTVO Owners Association, Inc. 

filed an Opposition (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 9). The Court took this matter under submission 

without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). See ECF No. 7. Having 

considered the parties’ arguments and the law, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed this action in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of 

San Diego, on November 8, 2018, alleging causes of action for: (1) violation of the 

Vacation Ownership and Time-Share Act, California Business and Professions Code 

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§§ 11210 et seq.; (2) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California Welfare 

and Institutions Code §§ 15600 et seq.; (3) fraud; (4) negligent misrepresentation; 

(5) violation of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, California 

Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 15600 et seq.; and (6) unjust enrichment. See generally 

ECF No. 1-2 (“Compl.”). Plaintiffs allege that they purchased an interest in a timeshare 

plan on November 8, 2015. See id. ¶ 10. The total purchase price was $51,202.00, of 

which Plaintiffs made a down payment of $38,167.60 and financed $13,004.40 over a 

period of 120-months at an interest rate of 11.99 percent. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiffs therefore 

allege that “the ‘Total Sales Price[,’] by the end of the loan term, inclusive of down 

payment, principal and finance charges, will be $60,662.80.” Id. Plaintiffs seek treble 

damages and attorneys’ fees under the CLRA. See id. ¶ 33.

Plaintiffs served Defendants on December 31, 2018. See Notice of Removal 

(“Not.”), ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 3–4; see also Not. Exs. B & C. On January 30, 2019, Defendants

answered the Complaint, see Not. Ex. D, and removed to this Court on the basis that there 

exists complete diversity of citizenship between Plaintiffs and Defendants and the amount 

in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Not. ¶ 12 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)). Plaintiffs

filed the instant Motion on February 15, 2019. See generally ECF No. 6.

LEGAL STANDARD

In cases “brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States 

have original jurisdiction,” defendants may remove the action to federal court. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441(a). Section 1441 provides two bases for removal: diversity jurisdiction and federal 

question jurisdiction. Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction “where the amount in 

controversy” exceeds $75,000, and the parties are of “diverse” state citizenship. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332. Federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising 

under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

The party invoking the removal statute bears the burden of establishing that federal 

subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th 

Cir. 1988). Moreover, courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal 

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jurisdiction.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Boggs v. Lewis, 

863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988)); Takeda v. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 818 

(9th Cir. 1985)). Therefore, “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as 

to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (citing Libhart v. Santa 

Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ removal was improper because Defendants have 

failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy 

exceeds $75,000.1

 See Mot. at 4–7. Given that Plaintiffs allege that the total purchase 

price was $51,202 and seek treble damages, Defendants removed on the basis that “the 

potential monetary recovery sought by Plaintiffs in the Complaint is at least in excess of 

$153,606.” Not. ¶ 24 (citing Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 

1046 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000)). The requested “statutory attorney’s fees . . . further push[] the 

amount in controversy above the jurisdictional limit.” Id. ¶ 25. 

Plaintiffs dispute Defendants’ calculation, arguing that “Defendants base this 

amount on the mere assumption that Plaintiffs will not only be successful in rescinding 

their purchase agreement, but also that punitive and/or treble damages may or may not be 

granted.” Mot. at 5. Further, “an award of attorney’s fees rests on the Court’s 

determination on whether or not to grant them,” id., and “Defendant’s Notice of Removal 

is barren of any facts that provide a basis that attorney fees will . . . push the amount in 

controversy above the jurisdictional amount.” Id. at 6 (citing Harris v. Bankers Life & 

Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 2005)).

In essence, the propriety of Defendants’ removal hinges upon whether the treble 

damages Plaintiffs seek in their Complaint properly can be included in the amount in 

controversy. “Although the jurisdiction of the federal courts is strictly construed, it is clear 

 

1 Plaintiffs do not contest that there is complete diversity of citizenship, see Mot. at 4, nor could they: 

Plaintiffs are residents of California, see Not. ¶ 14 (citing Compl. ¶ 1), while Defendants are residents of 

Delaware and Florida. See id. ¶¶ 15–16 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 4–5).

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from the complaint that, with attorney’s fees, treble damages, and punitive damages, 

[Plaintiffs] ask[] for far more than $[50,202].” See Michels v. Geico Ins. Agency, Inc., No. 

12-CV-5609-RBL, 2012 WL 5866448, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 19, 2012); see also 

Chabner, 225 F.3d at 1046 n.3 (authorizing district courts to consider treble damages and 

attorneys’ fees in determining the amount in controversy). Indeed, at a minimum, Plaintiffs 

seek $114,502.80, once their $38,167.60 down payment is trebled, plus attorneys’ fees. 

See Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[W]here an 

underlying statute authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees, either with mandatory or 

discretionary language, such fees may be included in the amount in controversy.”). 

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (ECF No. 

6).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 29, 2019

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