Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00207/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00207-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CHRIS WERNER, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 10-00207 PHX GMS (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

CHARLES L. RYAN, TERRY GODDARD, ) 

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW:

On or about January 28, 2010, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 10) on March 16, 2010.

Respondents contend the action for habeas relief should be

denied and dismissed because Petitioner failed to file his

action within the applicable statute of limitations. 

I Procedural History

On March 10, 2005, in an indictment issued by a Pinal

County grand jury, Petitioner was charged with two counts of

sexual abuse and four counts of sexual contact with a minor, the

offenses occurring in 2002 and 2003. See Answer, Exh. A & Exh.

B. On July 12, 2005, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement

with the state in which the state agreed to withdraw some of the

Case 2:10-cv-00207-GMS Document 12 Filed 04/23/10 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -2-

charges against Petitioner. The plea agreement further provided

Petitioner would plead guilty to one count of attempted sexual

conduct with a minor and one count of attempted child

molestation, both dangerous crimes against children for

sentencing purposes under a section of the Arizona Revised

Statutes then enumerated as section 13–604.01.1. See id., Exh.

C. 

On October 25, 2005, the state trial court sentenced

Petitioner to an aggravated term of fifteen years imprisonment

pursuant to his guilty plea on the charge of attempted sexual

conduct with a minor. Id., Exh. B. Petitioner was sentenced to

a consecutive term of lifetime probation on the attempted child

molestation conviction. Id., Exh. B, Exh. D, Exh. E at 2-3. 

The plea agreement provided that Petitioner was waiving

his right to take a direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences by entering into the plea agreement. Id., Exh. C.

Accordingly, Petitioner did not take a direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. Additionally, Petitioner did not

file a timely action for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule

32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. See id., Exh. B.

However, in April of 2006 the state trial court allowed

Petitioner to initiate an untimely Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. B.

The state trial court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner

in that action. Petitioner’s appointed counsel found no

colorable claims to raise on Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. B.

The state trial court then granted Petitioner leave to file a

pro se Rule 32 petition. See id., Exh. B & Exh. D. However,

Case 2:10-cv-00207-GMS Document 12 Filed 04/23/10 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -3-

Petitioner did not file a pro se petition within the time

established by the state trial court. Accordingly, the Rule 32

action was dismissed by the state trial court on February 2,

2007. Id., Exh. B & Exh. D. Petitioner did not seek review of

the trial court’s dismissal of his Rule 32 action.

 On September 10, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition in the state trial court asserting he was entitled to

relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Id., Exh. B & Exh. D. Petitioner alleged that Arizona’s

dangerous crimes against children statute was unconstitutionally

vague because it provided insufficient legal notice that it

applied to attempted, rather than completed, crimes against

children. Id., Exh. B. Petitioner also argued his trial

counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally ineffective because

counsel failed to challenge the statute during Petitioner’s plea

proceedings. Id., Exh. F. The state trial court appointed

counsel to represent Petitioner in his second Rule 32 action.

Id., Exh. B.

The state trial court dismissed Petitioner’s second

Rule 32 action expressly finding the action was not timely

filed. The trial court further stated Petitioner had failed to

raise any colorable claim for post-conviction relief. Id., Exh.

G. Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona

Court of Appeals. In his petition for review Petitioner

asserted only that the dangerous crimes against children statute

provided insufficient legal notice that it applied to attempted

crimes. See id., Exh. H. 

Case 2:10-cv-00207-GMS Document 12 Filed 04/23/10 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -4-

The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review of the

trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition, but

denied relief on his claims in a memorandum decision issued on

November 18, 2009. Id., Exh. D. In that decision the state

appellate court agreed with the trial court that Petitioner’s

claim was untimely and precluded by Petitioner’s failure to

raise the claim in his first PCR action. The appellate court

also found that, even were Petitioner’s constitutional challenge

to the dangerous crimes against children statute not precluded,

it was otherwise meritless. Id., Exh. D. 

. . . . Although § 13–604.01 does not use the

term “attempt” in defining offenses, it

clearly provides that “preparatory offenses”

involving sexual conduct with a child and

molestation are to be considered dangerous

crimes against children in the second degree,

§ 13–604.01(L), and punished according to the

provisions of § 13–604.01(I). And, as Werner

tacitly acknowledges, preparatory offenses

include crimes of attempt. See A.R.S. title

13, chapter 10 (generally governing

classification of preparatory offenses

including attempt, A.R.S. § 13–1001 [as well

as solicitation, conspiracy, and

facilitation]; see also § 13–604.01(J)

(providing penalties for preparatory offenses

involving dangerous crimes against children

“notwithstanding” provisions of title 13,

chapter 10); State v. Peek, 219 Ariz. 182, ¶¶

7, 19, 195 P.3d 641, 642, 644 (2008)

(reference in § 13–604.01 to second-degree

(preparatory) dangerous crimes against

children is “clear language subjecting

attempt offenses” to its provisions). 

Id., Exh. D.

Petitioner did not seek review of the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision by the Arizona Supreme Court.

Case 2:10-cv-00207-GMS Document 12 Filed 04/23/10 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -5-

In his federal habeas action Petitioner asserts

Arizona’s dangerous crimes against children statute provides

insufficient legal notice that it applies to attempted crimes.

Petitioner also alleges he was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel because his defense counsel had “become so

indoctrinated in the push the case through attitude, he was

deficient in his representation to a point that counsel’s errors

prejudiced defendant.”

II Analysis

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is

entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations during the

pendency of a “properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(2006 &

Supp. 2009). See also Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S.

Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053

(9th Cir. 2008). 

Because Petitioner pled guilty and thereby waived his

right to a direct appeal, Petitioner’s convictions and sentences

became final at the conclusion of his first action for state

Case 2:10-cv-00207-GMS Document 12 Filed 04/23/10 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -6-

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711

(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that, in Arizona, the statute of

limitations began to run upon “the conclusion of the Rule 32

of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or [upon] the

expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.”).

The state trial court dismissed Petitioner’s first

action for state post-conviction relief on February 1, 2007.

See Answer, Exh. B. Petitioner did not seek review of that

decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, although the Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure allowed him thirty days to appeal

the trial court’s decision. Accordingly, the statute of

limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas action began to run

on or about March 4, 2007, and expired on March 5, 2008. See

Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner did not file his federal habeas action until January

28, 2010, more than twenty months after the statute of

limitations expired. 

Petitioner’s second action seeking state postconviction relief could not and did not restart the alreadyexpired statute of limitations for filing Petitioner’s federal

habeas action. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823

(9th Cir. 2003), citing Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333

(11th Cir. 2001); Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th

Cir. 2000). A state-court petition that is filed after the

expiration of the statute of limitations under the AEDPA does

not revive the running of the limitations period. See Jiminez

Case 2:10-cv-00207-GMS Document 12 Filed 04/23/10 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -7-

v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Fisher v. Gibson,

262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2001); Payton v. Brigano, 256

F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner has not filed a reply to the answer to his

petition asserting that he is entitled to equitable tolling to

the statute of limitations. Petitioner is not entitled to the

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. A petitioner

seeking equitable tolling must establish two elements: “(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15 (2005).

See also Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011-14 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 244 (2009).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris,

515 F.3d at 1054-55 & n.4; Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034

(9th Cir. 2003), modified on other grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th

Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account

for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Case 2:10-cv-00207-GMS Document 12 Filed 04/23/10 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -8-

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000) (holding this remedy is “typically applied

sparingly”). The petitioner must establish a causal connection

between the alleged roadblock to their timely filing of their

federal habeas petition and the actual failure to file the

petition on time. See Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034; Lawrence v.

Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 2005). It is

Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is

warranted in his case. See Espinoza Matthews, 432 F.3d at 1026;

Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and

lack of representation during the applicable filing period do

not constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling

because such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g.,

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-

14; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004).

Additionally, a federal habeas petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must also act with “reasonable” diligence “throughout

the period he seeks to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111,

113 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1049; Roy v.

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Morton, 195

F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999). 

Case 2:10-cv-00207-GMS Document 12 Filed 04/23/10 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -9-

III Conclusion

The federal habeas petition was not filed within the

one-year statute of limitations and Petitioner has not provided

a basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Werner’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

Case 2:10-cv-00207-GMS Document 12 Filed 04/23/10 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -10-

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 22nd day of April, 2010.

Case 2:10-cv-00207-GMS Document 12 Filed 04/23/10 Page 10 of 10