Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00600/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00600-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELVIN BROWN, II, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO; et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-00600-H-WVG

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT

SMITH’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

[Doc. No. 33]

On September 7, 2018, Defendant George Smith (“Defendant Smith”) filed a 

motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 33.) Plaintiff Melvin Brown, II (“Plaintiff”) 

filed his opposition on October 1, 2018. (Doc. No. 42.) Defendant Smith filed his reply 

on October 5, 2018. (Doc. No. 43.) The Court held a hearing on October 29, 2018. Seetal 

Tejura appeared for Defendant Smith, and Douglas Gilliland appeared for Plaintiff. For 

the reasons below, the Court denies Defendant Smith’s motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

In the present action, Plaintiff alleges a claim against Defendant Smith under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.1 (Doc. No. 1 

¶¶ 29–32.) On November 24, 2016, Plaintiff had an argument with his girlfriend,

 

1 On September 5, 2017, the Court granted the parties’ joint motion to dismiss all Defendants and claims 

except for Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant Smith. (Doc. No. 17.)

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Georgina Flores (“Flores”), during which both individuals threw a plastic cereal bowl at 

each other and Plaintiff broke a plate. (Doc. No. 42-3, Plaintiff Decl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff then 

left Flores’s apartment with a bag containing personal belongings. (Id.) Flores called San 

Diego Police Department (“SDPD”), and SDPD dispatched Defendant Smith, Officer 

Cassandra Heil, and Officer Radford Pajita (collectively, “the Officers”) “for a report of 

domestic violence where the victim’s boyfriend was breaking things in the apartment.” 

(Doc. Nos. 33-8; 33-4, Smith Decl. ¶ 8; 33-5, Pajita Decl. ¶ 7.) Each Officer was wearing 

a body-worn camera, of which Defendant Smith has submitted the video recordings in 

support of his motion for summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 37, Smith body-worn camera 

(“BWC”); 37-1, Pajita BWC; 37-2, Heil BWC.)2 Upon arriving, the Officers entered the 

apartment and Defendant Smith locked the door to prevent Plaintiff from returning 

unannounced. (Smith Decl. ¶ 10.) Flores stated to the Officers that Plaintiff “went crazy,” 

“assaulted” her and “threatened” her. (Heil BWC at 1:15–1:31.)3 When asked whether 

Plaintiff “put his hands” on her, Flores said: “He did. He threw that bowl at me. Threw 

me on the bed. He’s hit me before.” (Heil BWC at 1:54–2:04.) She then provided the 

Officers with a description of Plaintiff and stated that she did not know whether Plaintiff

had any weapons with him. (Pajita BWC at 2:38–2:55.)

From nearby, Plaintiff saw the police cars arrive and returned to the apartment. 

(Plaintiff Decl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff knocked on the door, and Defendant Smith answered, 

noticing that Plaintiff matched the description provided by Flores. (Smith BWC at 6:30–

6:40; Smith Decl. ¶ 11.) When Plaintiff tried to enter the apartment, Defendant Smith 

said “well, hi” and told Plaintiff to “step on out,” to which Plaintiff replied “for what?”

and Defendant Smith said “because I told you.” (Smith BWC at 6:40–6:44.) Plaintiff then 

said “man, fuck you” and removed his bag from his shoulder while continuing to push 

 

2 The authenticity of the body-worn camera video recordings has not been challenged by Plaintiff. 

Further, Defendant Smith has submitted the declaration of Officer Stephen Thorn to support the 

authenticity of the videos. (Doc. No. 33-7.)

3 Time stamps refer to the time in the media player, not the time provided in the upper right-hand corner 

of the videos.

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forward in the doorway, yelling “really?” three times past the Officers towards Flores. 

(Id. at 6:44–6:49.) Meanwhile, Defendant Smith placed an open hand on Plaintiff’s chest 

and asked him twice to step into the hallway. (Id.)

Once Plaintiff backed into the hallway, Defendant Smith moved to Plaintiff’s right, 

and Officer Pajita blocked Plaintiff from the apartment doorway. (Id. at 6:50.) Defendant 

Smith instructed Plaintiff to drop his bag and put his hands behind his back. (Id. at 6:49–

6:51.) Defendant Smith reached for Plaintiff’s right wrist, to which Plaintiff asked “what 

the fuck are you going to do?” (Pajita BWC at 3:09–3:11.) Officer Pajita then instructed 

Plaintiff to drop the bag while attempting to grab Plaintiff’s left arm. (Id. at 3:11.) 

Plaintiff pulled his right arm away from Defendant Smith and towards Officer Pajita. (Id.

at 3:11–3:12; Doc. No. 37-7 (still frames of Pajita BWC).) Defendant Smith believed that 

Plaintiff was going to hit Officer Pajita. (Smith Decl. ¶ 13.) Officer Pajita pushed 

Plaintiff back against the hallway wall. (Smith BWC at 6:51–6:53.) 

As Plaintiff and Officer Pajita struggled, Defendant Smith drew his expandable 

baton and struck Plaintiff on his right arm and leg while yelling “get down on the ground, 

put your hands behind your back.” (Heil BWC at 3:16–3:26.) Defendant Smith struck 

Plaintiff a total of eight times, during which he repeatedly instructed Plaintiff to “get 

down.” (Id.) The first two strikes occurred while Plaintiff was still standing, and for the 

remaining strikes Plaintiff was between crouching and laying on the ground. (Id.) During 

the final two strikes, Plaintiff shouted “alright” three times. (Id. at 3:24–3:26.) Once 

secured on the ground, Plaintiff yelled “fuck, my head’s busted open.” (Smith BWC at 

7:04–7:06.) One strike had hit Plaintiff on the head and caused him to bleed. (Id. at 7:35–

7:38; Smith Decl. ¶¶ 14–15.) 

After Plaintiff was secured with handcuffs, paramedics were called to the scene.

(Smith Decl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff continued to yell profanities while Officer Pajita searched 

him. (Smith BWC at 8:00–11:25.) Paramedics then arrived and treated Plaintiff. (Id. at 

16:55–21:24.) The Officers and paramedics struggled with Plaintiff until he was strapped 

into the paramedics’ chair. (Id. at 21:24–29:20.) Defendant Smith has also submitted in 

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support of his motion for summary judgment video from the body-worn camera of 

Officer Eric Skyhar, who interviewed Plaintiff in the hospital following the incident. 

(Doc. No. 37-3, Skyhar BWC.) During the interview, when asked about the 

confrontation, Plaintiff said that he was “protecting [him]self” because he “did not want 

to be touched.” (Id. at 7:07–7:13.)

On March 24, 2017, Plaintiff filed this suit against Defendant Smith, the City of 

San Diego, Officer Pajita, and Officer Heil asserting claims for excessive force, false 

arrest, deliberate fabrication of evidence, malicious prosecution, Monell liability, assault, 

battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false arrest. (Doc. No. 1.) On 

September 5, 2017, the Court granted the parties’ joint motion to dismiss with prejudice 

Defendants City of San Diego, Officer Pajita, and Officer Heil, and all claims except 

Plaintiff’s first cause of action. (Doc. No. 17.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s only remaining 

claim is under § 1983 for excessive force against Defendant Smith. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 29–

32.) On September 11, 2017, the Court denied Defendant Smith’s motion for judgment 

on the pleadings, stating that the issues in this case would be better addressed on 

summary judgment when the record would be more fully developed. (Doc. No. 20 at 4.)

DISCUSSION

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 if the 

moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, 

it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248 (1986); Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 

F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Fortune Dynamic, 618 F.3d at 1031 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 

accord Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not 

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preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors 

Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving 

party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the 

nonmoving party failed to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case 

that the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving at trial. Id. at 322–23; Jones v. 

Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2015). Once the moving party establishes the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to 

“set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, ‘specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630 (quoting former Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(e)); accord Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 

2007). To carry this burden, the non-moving party “may not rest upon mere allegation or 

denials of his pleadings.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 

U.S. 299, 309 (1996) (“On summary judgment, . . . the plaintiff can no longer rest on the 

pleadings.”). Rather, the nonmoving party “must present affirmative evidence . . . from 

which a jury might return a verdict in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Questions of 

law are well-suited to disposition via summary judgment. See, e.g., Pulte Home Corp. v. 

Am. Safety Indem. Co., 264 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1077 (S.D. Cal. 2017).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the facts and 

draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott 

v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). A court should not weigh the evidence or make 

credibility determinations. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed.” Id. Further, the Court may consider other materials in the 

record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c)(3); Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

/ / /

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II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Smith violated his Fourth Amendment rights by 

using excessive force in the course of arrest. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 29–32.) In the present motion 

for summary judgment, Defendant Smith argues that he is shielded from liability by 

qualified immunity. (Doc. No. 33-1 at 10.) Defendant Smith argues that: (1) he did not 

violate Plaintiff’s rights because his actions were objectively reasonable given the 

circumstances; and (2) even if his actions were constitutionally unreasonable, qualified 

immunity still applies because Plaintiff’s right at issue was not clearly established at the 

time. (Id. at 11–21.) Defendant Smith also argues that punitive damages are not available 

to Plaintiff. (Id. at 25–26.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that: (1) Defendant’s conduct 

was unreasonable because the intrusion on Plaintiff’s rights outweighs the government’s 

interest in this instance; and (2) it was clearly established that use of excessive force 

would violate his rights. (Doc. No. 42 at 9–20.) Plaintiff also argues that punitive 

damages are available because a jury could find that Defendant Smith acted with reckless 

indifference towards Plaintiff’s rights. (Id. at 20–21.) The Court acknowledges that police 

are “often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, 

uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a 

particular situation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). This is particularly 

true when officers are responding to domestic violence situations, which are often 

dangerous due to their volatility. Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 450 (9th Cir. 2011).

However, here, the Court concludes that triable issues of material fact remain and denies 

summary judgment.

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States 

. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 

and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

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known.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 

S.Ct. 548, 551 (2017)). Qualified immunity protects a governmental official from suit 

“regardless of whether the government official’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of 

fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 

U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004)). “Because the 

excessive force inquiry nearly always requires a jury to sift through disputed factual 

contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom, [the Ninth Circuit has] held on many 

occasions that summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in excessive force cases 

should be granted sparingly.” Avina v. United States, 681 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Glenn v. Washington Cty., 673 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2011)).

“In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary judgment, courts 

engage in a two-pronged inquiry. The first asks whether the facts, taken in the light most 

favorable to the party asserting the injury, show the officer’s conduct violated a federal

right.” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1865 (2014) (internal quotation marks and

alteration notations omitted). “The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis asks 

whether the right in question was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Id. at 

1866 (internal quotation marks omitted). When a court analyzes the two prongs of the 

qualified immunity doctrine, “if the answer to either is ‘no,’ then the officers cannot be 

held liable for damages.” Glenn, 673 F.3d at 870 (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). When 

considering these two prongs, “courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of 

the party seeking summary judgment.” Tolan, 134 S.Ct. at 1866. 

A. Whether Plaintiff’s Constitutional Rights Were Violated

Defendant Smith argues that the force he used was reasonable as a matter of law 

because Plaintiff was assaultive, Officer Pajita’s safety was at stake, Plaintiff struggled 

with the Officers while ignoring their commands, and Defendant Smith made efforts to 

temper the situation prior to resorting to a use of force. (Doc. No. 33-1 at 17–24.) In 

response, Plaintiff argues that the nature of Defendant Smith’s intrusion on Plaintiff’s 

rights outweighs the governmental interests or alternatively, that triable issues of material 

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fact remain on the question of reasonableness. (Doc. No. 42 at 9–18.) The Court

concludes that triable issues of fact remain on the question of reasonableness.

“Objectively unreasonable uses of force violate the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee 

against unreasonable seizures.” Lowry v. City of San Diego, 818 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 

2016). The reasonableness of a use of force is determined based on whether the 

defendant’s actions were “objectively reasonable” in light of all facts and circumstances. 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. “The operative question in excessive force cases is whether the 

totality of the circumstances justifies a particular sort of search or seizure.” Cty. of Los 

Angeles, Calif. v. Mendez, 137 S.Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 

471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985)). The reasonableness of a use of force “must be judged from the 

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of 

hindsight.” Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular 

seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the 

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests

against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has “held repeatedly that the 

reasonableness of force used is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.” Liston v. Cty. 

of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 976 n.10 (9th Cir. 1997).

1. Gravity of Intrusion on Plaintiff’s Rights

“[T]he gravity of the particular intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests” is 

evaluated by assessing “the type and amount of force inflicted.” Miller v. Clark Cty., 340 

F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the body-worn camera video recordings show that 

Defendant Smith struck Plaintiff with his baton eight times. (Heil BWC at 3:16–3:26.)

One blow hit Plaintiff on the head. (Smith Decl. ¶ 14.) Looking to the type of force, use 

of a baton is a form of force “capable of inflicting significant pain and causing serious 

injury.” Young v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d 1156, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Therefore, it is “regarded as ‘intermediate force’ that, while less severe than deadly force, 

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nonetheless present a significant intrusion upon an individual’s liberty interests.” Id.

(citing Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701–02 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. 

Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 623 (4th Cir. 2003)). Courts have recognized that baton strikes to an 

individual’s head can amount to deadly force. See id. (citing Thompson v. City of 

Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 451 & nn. 18–19 (7th Cir. 2006)). Consistent with this, SDPD 

Procedure prohibits officers from directing intentional strikes with an impact weapon “at 

the head, face or throat of the subject unless the subject’s actions and behavior pose an 

imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others.” (Doc. No. 33-9 

at 4.) Here, there are factual disputes as to whether Defendant Smith intentionally or 

accidentally hit Plaintiff’s head, and whether Plaintiff’s actions amounted to imminent 

threat of serious bodily injury to Officer Pajita. (Smith Decl. ¶ 14; Doc. Nos. 33-1 at 22;

42-1 ¶ 46.)

When analyzing the amount of force, a court considers “the severity of injuries in 

evaluating the amount of force used.” Felarca v. Birgeneau, 891 F.3d 809, 817 (9th Cir. 

2018) (citing Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 855 (9th Cir. 2002)). Injuries are expected 

from a forceful use of baton blows. Id. (citing Young, 655 F.3d at 1162) (emphasizing the 

difference in severity of blows by a baton when compared with poking by a baton). Here, 

Plaintiff suffered bleeding from his head while at the scene. (Smith BWC at 7:35–7:38; 

Smith Decl. ¶¶ 14–15.) Plaintiff was examined at University of California, San Diego 

Medical Center, where it was found that he sustained a one-inch laceration on the back of 

his head, for which he received seven stitches. (Doc. No. 33-13 at 3, 11.) Plaintiff also 

sustained a half-inch laceration to his right shin. (Doc. No. 33-12 at 4.) Considering the 

type and amount of force used here, Defendant Smith’s use of force against Plaintiff “is a 

sufficiently serious intrusion upon liberty that must be justified with commensurately 

serious state interest.” Young, 655 F.3d at 1162–63.

2. Government Interests at Stake

“[T]he importance of the government interests at stake” is evaluated according to 

“(1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat 

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to the safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting 

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Miller, 340 F.3d at 964 (citing Graham, 

490 U.S. at 396). Additionally, “[i]n evaluating objective reasonableness, [a court] often 

must look beyond Graham’s enumerated factors and consider other elements relevant to 

the totality of the circumstances.” Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th 

Cir. 2013).

First, the Court will look to the severity of the crime at issue. “The government has 

an undeniable legitimate interest in apprehending criminal suspects[.]” Id. (citing United 

States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985)). There is a dispute between the parties 

regarding what the crime at issue can be categorized as. Plaintiff asserts that crime 

involved was a 415DV. (Doc. No. 42 at 11.) When the Officers were called to the scene, 

the dispatch was for a 415DV, which under California Penal Code § 415 consists of 

misdemeanor disturbing the peace, punishable by fine and up to 90 days jail time. (Doc. 

No. 33-8 at 2.) However, the dispatcher also indicated that the call was for domestic 

violence. (Id.) Defendant Smith characterizes this as a violation of California Penal Code 

§§ 243, 245(a)(1), a felony punishable by fine or up to one year jail time. (Doc. No. 43-2 

at 2.) The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized “that the volatility of situations 

involving domestic violence makes them particularly dangerous” for officers and the 

public. Mattos, 661 F.3d at 450 (quoting United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1164 

(9th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). From both the initial dispatch and

Flores’s description of the preceding events, the Officers knew that this was domestic 

dispute involving minor violence. (Doc. No. 42 at 11; Heil BWC at 1:15–2:00.)

Second, “the most important factor under Graham is whether the suspect posed an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others[.]” C.V. by & through Villegas v. 

City of Anaheim, 823 F.3d 1252, 1255 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting George v. Morris, 736 

F.3d 829, 838 (9th Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant Smith 

alleges that Plaintiff was acting aggressively, giving rise to Defendant Smith’s belief that 

Officer Pajita’s safety was immediately at stake. (Doc. No. 33-1 at 20–23.) However, “[a]

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simple statement by an officer that he fears for his safety or the safety of others is not 

enough; there must be objective factors to justify such a concern.” Deorle v. Rutherford, 

272 F.3d 1272, 1281 (9th Cir. 2001). Throughout the encounter, Plaintiff was using 

profanities and raising his voice both towards the Officers and Flores. (Smith BWC at 

6:40–6:50.) To demonstrate the immediacy of the threat that Plaintiff posed, Defendant

Smith provides still frames from Officer Pajita’s body-worn camera allegedly showing 

that Plaintiff had his hand balled in a fist and was moving it in the direction of Officer 

Pajita. (Doc. Nos. 33-1 at 22; 37-2.) Given the factual disputes, whether Defendant 

Smith’s actions were objectively reasonable given the circumstances is a question for the 

jury. See Liston, 120 F.3d at 976 n. 10.

The third factor is “whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting 

to evade arrest by flight.” Miller, 340 F.3d at 964. Defendant Smith contends that 

Plaintiff was actively resisting arrest by failing to comply with the Officer’s commands 

and by jerking his hand away from Defendant Smith. (Doc. No. 33-1 at 22.) However, 

when Defendant Smith instructed Plaintiff to step into the hallway, he did so. (Smith 

BWC at 6:44-6:49.) The Officers’ subsequent commands were concurrent with the 

altercation, and it is unclear whether Plaintiff would have had opportunity to comply 

before Defendant Smith’s use of force began. (Id. at 6:49–7:00.) Further, mere 

noncompliance is considered to be passive resistance, which the Ninth Circuit has 

repeatedly held may not be met with significant force. See e.g., Young, 655 F.3d at 1165; 

Glenn, 673 F.3d at 875.

Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s actions may have risen to a level of active resistance when 

he pulled his arm away from Defendant Smith towards Officer Pajita. (Pajita BWC at

3:11–3:12.) SDPD Procedure 1.04 defines “active resistance” as “behavior that consists 

of a refusal to comply with verbal commands and conveys a threat to the officer or 

another person, or consists of physical opposition to attempts of control by the officer.”

(Doc. No. 33-9 at 3.) Plaintiff may not have had opportunity to comply with verbal 

commands before acting in a manner that the Officers categorize as threatening. 

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However, Plaintiff may have engaged in “active resistance” under the latter portion of 

this definition when he physically opposed the Officers’ control by pulling his arm away 

from Defendant Smith and in the subsequent struggle with Officer Pajita.

The Court also looks to other factors that are relevant here in the totality of the 

circumstances. See Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1092. “[T]he absence of a warning of 

the imminent use of force, when giving such a warning is plausible, weighs in favor of 

finding a constitutional violation.” Id. Here, there was no warning provided by Defendant

Smith, but it is a factual inquiry as to whether any warning would have been plausible. 

Additionally, it is relevant if an officer could have used less forceful means, “although 

the government need not show in every case that it attempted less forceful means of 

apprehension before applying the force that is challenged.” Miller, 340 F.3d at 966.

Again, it is unclear here as to whether any less forceful means would have been feasible 

for Defendant Smith given the circumstances. Because the altercation quickly escalated 

over the span of less than 20 seconds, Defendant Smith may not have been able to either 

warn Plaintiff or use less forceful means.

3. Balancing

The Court must “balance the gravity of the intrusion on the individual against the 

government’s need for that intrusion to determine whether it was constitutionally 

reasonable.” Miller, 340 F.3d at 964. Here, the intrusion consists of the use of 

intermediate force resulting in Plaintiff’s head injury. The government’s need is based on 

Defendant Smith’s belief that Plaintiff posed an immediate threat to Officer Pajita and

Plaintiff’s active resistance in a domestic violence situation. Still remaining in this case 

are genuine issues of material fact, which the Court may not resolve in favor of 

Defendant Smith. See Tolan, 134 S.Ct. at 1866. Therefore, taking the evidence in the 

light most favorable to Plaintiff, questions of fact remain for the jury to resolve. See

Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1092. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of 

Defendant Smith on this prong of the test for qualified immunity is inappropriate. See

Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2018). 

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B. Whether Plaintiff’s Constitutional Right Was Clearly Established

Defendant Smith argues that even if his conduct was not constitutionally 

reasonable, he is still not liable under the qualified immunity doctrine because Plaintiff’s 

right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. (Doc. No. 33-1 at 24.) 

In contrast, Plaintiff argues that his rights on November 24, 2016 were clearly established 

by the Ninth Circuit in Young; Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 

2007); and England v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 473 Fed. Appx. 538 (9th Cir. 

2012) (unpublished).

4 (Doc. No. 42. at 19.) The Court concludes that triable issues of fact 

remain and denies Defendant Smith qualified immunity.

Under the second prong of the test for qualified immunity, the Court must 

determine whether Plaintiff’s right against excessive force “was clearly established at the 

time of the officer’s alleged misconduct.” S.B. v. Cty. of San Diego, 864 F.3d 1010, 1015 

(9th Cir. 2017) (quoting C.V., 823 F.3d at 1255). “An officer cannot be said to have 

violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite 

that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was 

violating it.” Kisela, 138 S.Ct. at 1153 (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 

2023 (2014)). To find that the law is clearly established, the Ninth Circuit does “not 

require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or 

constitutional question beyond debate.” S.B., 864 F.3d at 1015 (quoting Mullenix v. 

Luna, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308 (2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The Supreme 

Court has explained that, ‘officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates 

established law even in novel factual circumstances,’ and has rejected, ‘a requirement 

that previous cases be fundamentally similar’ to the facts at issue in a suit.” Young, 655 

 

4 England is an unpublished decision and therefore not binding. See Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. However, 

“unpublished opinions can be considered in determining whether the law was clearly established,” 

Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 775 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 

969, 977 (9th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “it will be a rare instance in 

which, absent any published opinions on point or overwhelming obviousness of illegality, we can 

conclude that the law was clearly established on the basis of unpublished decisions only.” Sorrels v. 

McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2002).

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F.3d at 1167 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).

Here, although there is no case precisely on point, “the relevant inquiry is whether 

the state of the law at the time of the official conduct complained of was such as to give 

the defendants ‘fair warning’ that their conduct was unconstitutional—that a fair 

application of well-established legal principles would warrant such a conclusion.” Id. At 

the time of this incident, “the law was clearly established that, as a general matter, police

use of force must be carefully calibrated to respond to the particulars of a case, including 

the wrongdoing at issue, the safety threat posed by the suspect, and the risk of flight.” 

C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1030 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 

396). In Blankenhorn, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Court “need look no further than 

Graham’s holding that force is only justified when there is a need for force.” 

Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481.

The relevant question is whether Defendant Smith’s use of force was excessive. A 

number of factual ambiguities remain in this case and preclude summary judgment. 

Avina, 681 F.3d at 1130. For example, Defendant Smith alleges that his use of force was 

motivated by a fear for Officer Pajita’s safety. (Doc. No. 33-1 at 20–23.) However, the 

reasonableness of that fear is a factual inquiry relevant in determining whether Defendant 

Smith’s use of force was excessive. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Additionally, the 

factual issue of whether Plaintiff was actively resisting the Officers remains. The officers 

in Young and Blankenhorn were denied qualified immunity in part because the suspects 

in those cases only engaged in passive resistance by failing to comply with the officers’ 

commands. See Young, 655 F.3d at 1168; Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 479. Here, Plaintiff 

complied with Defendant Smith’s commands to back out of the apartment, and factual 

inquiries remain as to whether he had sufficient opportunity to comply with the other 

commands or if his arm movement warranted the force applied.

Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, Tolan, 134 S.Ct. at 1866, 

there is a remaining triable issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff’s rights were clearly 

established because that inquiry hinges on whether Defendant Smith’s use of force under 

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these circumstances was excessive. Accordingly, the Court declines to extend qualified 

immunity to Defendant Smith.

C. Punitive Damages 

In Plaintiff’s complaint, he asks for punitive damages for the alleged § 1983 

violation. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 32.) Defendant Smith argues that punitive damages are not 

available here because there is no evidence showing that Defendant was motivated by 

evil intent or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of others. (Doc. No. 

33-1 at 26.) Plaintiff argues that punitive damages are available because a jury could find 

that Defendant Smith acted with reckless indifference or oppressively towards Plaintiff’s 

rights. (Doc. No. 42 at 20.) The Court denies summary judgment on the issue of punitive 

damages because genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether Defendant Smith 

acted with reckless indifference.

The Supreme Court has relied on common law tort liability to hold that “a jury 

may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the 

defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it 

involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” 

Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly 

emphasized that this standard does not require actual malicious conduct, but rather, 

permits punitive damages in instances of reckless or callous indifference to the 

constitutional rights of a defendant. See Binkovich v. Barthelemy, 672 F. App’x 648, 

650–51 (9th Cir. 2016); Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 807; Davis v. Mason Cty., 927 

F.2d 1473, 1485 (9th Cir. 1991).

Factual issues remain as to whether Defendant Smith’s use of force was excessive

under the circumstances. For the same reasons, factual issues remain as to whether 

Defendant Smith’s conduct rose to a level of reckless indifference. Accordingly, the 

Court denies Defendant Smith’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of punitive 

damages. 

/ / /

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendant Smith’s motion for 

summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 30, 2018

 

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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