Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01132/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01132-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAWN JAMES ALLEN WOODALL,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary,

Respondent. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS [DOC. NO. 1]

Petitioner Shawn James Allen Woodall, a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on

June 24, 2008 [doc. no. 1]. Petitioner asserts that his due

process rights were violated when his probation was (1) summarily

revoked without a probable cause hearing and (2) subsequently

reinstated and extended without a formal revocation hearing. 

(Pet. 6-7, 10.)

On August 28, 2008, Respondent filed an Answer [doc. no. 10]

asserting that (1) a preliminary revocation hearing was not

necessary; (2) the state court’s finding of waiver was not

unreasonable; and (3) Woodall’s current incarceration has no

relation to his claim. (Answer 6, 10, 12.) Petitioner filed a

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 1 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

Traverse [doc. no. 12] on September 10, 2008. The Court has

reviewed the Petition and supporting memorandum, Respondent’s

Answer, Petitioner’s Traverse, and the lodgments. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court recommends that Woodall’s Petition be

DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 15, 2003, Woodall pleaded guilty to charges based

on an August 4, 2003, incident in which he “drove a vehicle in a

reckless manner and failed to stop after police indicated they

wanted him to pull over by operating the flashing lights and

sirens on the police vehicle [case no. SCD176528].” (Lodgment No.

7, People v. Woodall, No. D050136, slip op. at 1-2 (Cal. Ct. App.

Dec. 5, 2007).) The trial court, on September 15, 2003, placed

him on probation for three years on the condition that he serve

240 days in jail and suspended imposition of the sentence. (Id.

at 2.) This probation is the subject of the current Petition. 

On April 9, 2004, a two-count complaint was filed against

Woodall in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego,

for possession of a controlled substance and driving under the

influence (case no. SCD181833). (See Lodgment No. 2, United

States v. Woodall, 00-CR-1768-001 H (S.D. Cal. May 13, 2004)

(violation summary at 1); Lodgment No. 3, United States v.

Woodall, 02-CR-2402 W (S.D. Cal. May 13, 2004) (violation summary

at 1).) Petitioner asserts that his probation in SCD176528 was

terminated; however “[t]he record shows that probation [in

SCD176528] had not been terminated in 2004; rather, at that time,

the court changed it to summary probation rather than formal

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 2 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

probation.” (Lodgment No. 7, People v. Woodall, No. D050136, slip

op. at 8, n.3.)

Petitioner’s third state case (SCD200201) was based on an

incident on July 12, 2006. “[A]n undercover police officer

approached Woodall and asked, ‘Anybody up bro?’ Woodall replied,

‘Yeah, What’s up?’ The officer said he was looking for a

‘twenty.’ Woodall sold the officer two small pieces of rock

cocaine, which weighed .19 grams, for $20.00. Police subsequently

arrested Woodall.” (Id. at 2.)

Two days later, on July 14, 2006, a complaint was filed. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1, 0001-04, July 14, 2006

(complaint-felony).) It advises all defendants on criminal

probation that “the evidence presented to the court at the

preliminary hearing on this complaint is presented for a dual

purpose: the People are seeking . . . a revocation of the

defendant’s probation, on any and all such probation grants,

utilizing the same evidence, at the preliminary hearing.” (Id. at

00003.) An evidentiary hearing on the probation violation was set

for July 25, 2006, to be heard with the preliminary hearing. (Id.

at 00142, July 14, 2006 (mins.).) The court also summarily

revoked Woodall’s probation on his evading police case, no.

SCD176528. (Lodgment No. 7, People v. Woodall, No. D050136, slip

op. at 2. The evidentiary hearing on the probation violation was

continued to August 8, 22, 25, and 30, 2006. (Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr. 00143-46, July 25, Aug. 8, 22, 25, 2006 (mins.).) 

On August 30, 2006, Woodall pleaded guilty to possession and

sale of cocaine in case no. SCD200201 and admitted he had a prior

prison conviction in federal court for smuggling illegal

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 3 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

immigrants. (Id. at 1, 2-3 n.2.) The state court suspended

execution of a five-year prison sentence and granted Woodall five

years’ probation with a condition that he spend one year in jail

with an option to spend up to half of that year in a residential

drug treatment facility. (Id. at 3.) “The court also reinstated

the probation in case No. SCD176528 and modified it to extend

three more years (until September 27, 2009).” (Id.) 

On November 15, 2006, Petitioner appeared for another

probation violation proceeding; his probation was summarily

revoked, and an evidentiary hearing was set for November 20, 2006,

to trail a new case, no. SCD202824. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.,

vol. 1, 00150, Nov. 15, 2006 (mins.).) The new case and

revocation hearings in SCD176528 and SCD200201 were continued. 

(Id. at 00151-52, Nov. 20, 28, 2006 (mins.).) Finally, on

November 30, 2006, Woodall pleaded guilty in SCD202824 and

admitted the probation violation, and his probation was formally

revoked. (Id. at 153, Nov. 30, 2006 (mins.).) Sentencing in

SCD202824 and in Woodall’s probation matters was continued

multiple times. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1, 00153-57,

Nov. 30, 2006, Jan. 8, Feb. 7, Mar. 15, Apr. 17, 2007 (mins.).) 

Woodall’s probation in SCD176528 and SCD200201 was revoked on July

13, 2007. (Id. at 153.) On October 19, 2007, he was sentenced. 

(Lodgment No. 11, People v. Woodall, No. SCD176528 (mins.);

Lodgment No. 10, People v. Woodall, No. SCD200201 (mins.).) 

Petitioner had pleaded guilty in case no. SCD202824; in probation

case no. SCD176528, he was sentenced to two years to run

concurrent with his sentence in case no. SCD202824. (Lodgment 11,

People v. Woodall, No. SCD176528 (mins.).) On the same date, in

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 4 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

probation case no. SCD200201, Woodall was also sentenced to four

years to run concurrent with his sentence in case no. SCD202824. 

(Lodgment No. 10, People v. Woodall, No. SCD200201 (mins.).)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Woodall appealed from the judgment in case nos. SCD176528 and

SCD200201 to the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment No. 7,

People v. Woodall, No. D050136, slip op. at 1.) Appellate counsel

presented no argument but asked the court to review the record to

determine “(1) whether Woodall was entitled to a prerevocation

hearing prior to probation in case No. SCD176528 being summarily

revoked; and (2) whether Woodall validly waived his right to an

evidentiary hearing on the probation revocation.” (Id. at 3.) 

Woodall filed a brief on his own behalf arguing that his due

process rights were violated. (Id.) The court of appeal affirmed

the lower court’s judgment in an unpublished opinion. (Id. at

10.) 

The California Supreme Court denied Woodall’s petition for

review. (Lodgment No. 9, People v. Woodall, No. S160485, order

(Cal. Mar. 17, 2008).) The Supreme Court of the United States

denied his petition for writ of certiorari on June 9, 2008. (Pet.

Ex. 4.) 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”),

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 1994 & Supp. 2008), applies to all

federal habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996. Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204 (2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521

U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA sets forth the scope of review for

federal habeas corpus claims:

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 5 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 2008); see also Reed v.

Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714,

719 (9th Cir. 1991). Because Woodall’s Petition was filed on June

24, 2008, AEDPA applies to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at

204. 

In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the law of 

habeas corpus.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim

--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West Supp. 2008). 

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained “in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege that the

state court violated his federal constitutional rights. 

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 6 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

Hernandez, 930 F.2d at 719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885

(9th Cir. 1990); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir.

1988).

A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state

supreme court” with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court’s application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(explaining that federal courts have no authority to review a

state’s application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of

state law unless they rise to level of a constitutional

violation). 

The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63

(2003), stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court

to adopt any one methodology in deciding the only question that

matters under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law.” Id. at 71 (citation omitted). In other

words, a federal court is not required to review the state court

decision de novo. Id. Rather, a federal court can proceed

directly to the reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id. 

The “novelty” in § 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to ‘Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 7 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (emphasis added). Section

2254(d)(1) “explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the

font of ‘clearly established’ rules.” Id. “[A] state court

decision may not be overturned on habeas corpus review, for

example, because of a conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law.” 

Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. “[A] writ may issue only when the state

court decision is ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of,’ an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court.” 

Id.; see also Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir.

1996); Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997);

Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996).

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the

trial court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (West Supp. 2008).

IV. DISCUSSION

Prior to revocation of probation, “a probationer, like a

parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation

hearing . . . .” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973);

see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485, 487 (1972). There are

some exceptions.

[W]here petitioner has already been convicted of and

incarcerated on a subsequent offense, there is no need

for the preliminary hearing . . . . [T]he subsequent

conviction obviously gives the [probation] authority

“probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the

. . . [probationer] has committed acts that would

constitute a violation of [probation]

conditions” . . . .

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 8 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 86 n.7 (1976) (citation omitted). 

Probation cannot be revoked without providing the minimum

requirements of due process, including the following: 

“(a) written notice of the claimed violations of

(probation or) parole; (b) disclosure to the

(probationer or) parolee of evidence against him; (c)

opportunity to be heard in person and to present

witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to

confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the

hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not

allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’

hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members

of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and

(f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the

evidence relied on and reasons for revoking (probation

or) parole.” 

Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489).

Where the probationer has admitted he violated probation or

has been convicted of a crime, he is still entitled to a

revocation hearing. Moody, 429 U.S. at 86 n.8. At the hearing,

however, he may not relitigate facts constituting the violation

but may present evidence to justify his continued probation. Id.

“A violation alone does not automatically trigger a

revocation. Probation or parole authorities generally have two

options: modify or extend the conditions of supervision, or

revoke.” United States v. Ramirez, 347 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir.

2003 (citation omitted). But before a court can revoke probation

or parole, the requirements of Morrissey must be satisfied. Id.

Nevertheless, a probationer may knowingly and intelligently waive

these rights under the Due Process Clause. See McCarthy v. United

States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304

U.S. 458, 464 (1938).)

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 9 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

A. Woodall’s Probation Proceedings

On April 9, 2004, Woodall was informed of his rights and the

charges against him in case no. SCD181833, and his probation in

case no. SCD176528 was summarily revoked. (Compare Lodgment No.

4, Rep.’s Tr. on Appeal, vol. 3, 401, People v. Woodall, No.

D050136 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2004), with Lodgment No. 2, United

States v. Woodall, 00-CR-1768-01-H (violation summary at 1).) He

pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and

expressly waived his right to an evidentiary hearing to determine

if he was in violation of his probation in case no. SCD176528. 

(Lodgment 4, Rep.’s Tr. on Appeal, vol. 4, 602, 605-06, People v.

Woodall, No. D050136 (Cal. Ct. App. May 13, 2004).) Based on his

waiver and admission, the trial court formally revoked and

reinstated Woodall’s probation on the same terms and conditions. 

(Id. at 606.) 

Several months later, on October 22, 2004, Woodall appeared

in superior court and verbally withdrew a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in case no. SCD176528; the court continued his

summary probation on the same terms and conditions. (Lodgment 4,

Rep.’s Tr. on Appeal, vol. 5, 804-05, People v. Woodall, No.

D050136 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2004).) 

On July 14, 2006, almost two years later, Petitioner was

arraigned on a new charge, case no. SCD200201, and the court

summarily revoked his felony probation. (Lodgment No. 4, Rep.’s

Tr., vol. 6, 1001, People v. Woodall, No. D050136 (Cal. Ct. App.

July 14, 2006).) At the change of plea hearing on August 30,

2006, Woodall’s attorney stated, “We’ve submitted a change of plea

form, which will also incorporate a waiver of hearing vis-a-vis

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 10 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

the two trailing probation violations.” (Lodgment No. 7, People

v. Woodall, No. D050136, slip op. at 8.) “Also at the hearing,

the court directly told Woodall that he had the right to a hearing

on whether he violated his probation in case No. SCD176528 and

inquired whether he wanted the hearing or wanted to waive it. 

Woodall responded that he wanted to waive the hearing.” (Id.)

At the sentencing on September 28, 2006, in case no.

SCD200201, Petitioner was sentenced to five years in state prison,

which was suspended on the condition that Woodall complete five

years of formal probation. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1,

50, Sept. 28, 2006 (order granting probation at 1).) He was

committed to custody for 365 days. (Id.) After 180 days of

actual time in custody, Woodall would serve the remaining days in

a residential treatment facility followed by formal probation. 

(Id.) The court reinstated probation in case no. SCD176528 on the

same terms and conditions and extended it three years to end on

September 27, 2009. (Lodgment No. 7, People v. Woodall, D050136,

slip op. at 3.)

1. A Preliminary Hearing

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated

because his probation was revoked without a prior probable cause

hearing. (Pet. 6.) He cites Valdivia v. Davis, 206 F. Supp. 2d

1068 (E.D. Cal. 2002), to support his claim that California’s

“unitary parole revocation process [is] unconstitutional” because

it “does not provide for a preliminary revocation hearing to

determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a

parolee committed a parole violation.” (Pet. Mem. P. & A. 5

(citing Valdivia, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 1075-78.) Woodall argues

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 11 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

that the California Supreme Court has applied Morrissey to

California parole proceedings and held that a prerevocation

hearing is required. (Id. at 7-8 (citing In re Valrie, 12 Cal. 3d

139, 524 P.2d 812, 115 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1974).) He contends that

he should receive the same protections.

As explained above, probationers are generally entitled to a

preliminary hearing prior to the revocation of probation. Gagnon,

411 U.S. at 782; see Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485, 487. Morrissey

explains that the requirements of due process are flexible and

“not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the

same kind of procedure.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481. Morrissey

and Gagnon require a probable cause determination before probation

is revoked, but the individual states may implement different

procedures and still satisfy due process. See generally id. at

481, 485, 487; Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782. 

“The right to a preliminary hearing is not absolute . . . .” 

Zach v. Stacey, No. 07-C-426-C, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *7 (W.D.

Wis. Oct. 24, 2007). In Zach, the court pointed out that a

preliminary probation revocation hearing is not required in

several situations. Id. (citing United States v. Saykally, 777

F.2d 1286, 1287 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Sciuto, 531

F.2d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 1976). For example, the right to a

preliminary hearing while awaiting a final probation revocation

hearing does not extend to noncustodial probationers. United

States v. West, No. 90-50677, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 2162, at 4 (9th

Cir. Feb. 5, 1992). If a probationer is being held on a new

criminal charge or sentence imposed for a subsequent offense, a

preliminary revocation hearing is not required. United States v.

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 12 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

Saykally, 777 F.2d at 1287 n.2. In Hall v. Kamin, No. 08-CV-258-

slc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45137, at 5-6 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2008),

the court applied Saykally and found that “a preliminary hearing

is not required when a parolee is being detained pursuant to

another criminal charge, and not on the ground that he violated

his parole.” The same rationale applies to Woodall.

On July 14, 2006, when Woodall’s probation in case no.

SCD176528 was summarily revoked, he was charged in a state court

complaint with the sale of cocaine base and the unlawful

possession of cocaine base for sale. (Compare Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1, 001-4 (complaint-felony) 005, July 14, 2006

(acknowledgment of constitutional rights), with Lodgment No. 7,

People v. Woodall, D050136, slip op. at 2.) Consequently,

Morrissey and its progeny did not require a preliminary probation

or prerevocation hearing.

The California Supreme Court has come to the same conclusion. 

People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 894, 533 P.2d 1024, 1045, 120

Cal. Rptr. 384, 406 (1975). In California, “[g]enerally it is not

necessary . . . to afford a probationer faced with revocation

proceedings a ‘prerevocation’ or ‘probable cause’ hearing . . . .” 

Id. at 894, 533 P.2d at 1045, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 405 (internal

citations omitted). Probation revocation proceedings in

California are judicial proceedings with “concomitant procedural

benefits.” Id., 533 P.2d at 1045, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 405; see also

People v. Buford, 42 Cal. App. 3d 975, 980-81, 117 Cal. Rptr. 333,

337 (Ct. App. 1974) (explaining that the Morrissey requirement for

a prerevocation hearing is satisfied by a unitary system in

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 13 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

California where the determination of probable cause is promptly

made in a judicial proceeding). 

Neither the Due Process Clause, nor Morrissey, nor California

law required that Woodall be given a probation prerevocation

hearing prior to his guilty plea and sentencing in case no.

SCD200201 on August 30, 2006. And once Petitioner pleaded guilty

to those charges, there was no need for a preliminary hearing

before revoking Woodall’s probation in case no. SCD176528. 

Petitioner’s guilty plea and sentencing in the later case provided

probable cause that he violated his probation. Moody, 429 U.S. at

86 n.7.

Even Valdivia, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1068, relied upon by Woodall,

does not entitle Petitioner to habeas relief. In Valdivia, the

district court found that the “current California parole

revocation system violates the plaintiffs’ due process rights.” 

Id. at 1078. The decision, however, explicitly did not resolve

whether “a prompt unitary hearing would meet constitutional muster

. . . .” Id. Valdivia acknowledged that in Pierre v. Wash. St.

Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 699 F.2d 471, 472-73 (9th Cir.

1983), the Ninth Circuit “opined that the Supreme Court did not

intend to require two hearings in every case, but only in cases

with a fact pattern similar to the one before it in Morrissey.” 

Valdivia, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 1076. “Under the facts of Morrissey,

the two-hearing requirement was just one way to satisfy minimum

due process; it is not the only way in every case.” Pierre, 699

F.2d at 473.

The California Court of Appeal, the state court to last

provide a reasoned analysis of Petitioner’s claim, discussed

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 14 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

Morrissey and concluded that “Woodall’s complaint that his due

process rights were violated because he did not receive a prerevocation hearing is without merit.” (Lodgment No. 7, People v.

Woodall, No. D050136, slip op. at 6.) The state court

distinguished another case relied on by Petitioner, In re Valrie,

12 Cal. 3d 139, 524 P.2d 812, 115 Cal. Rptr. 340. Valrie predated

People v. Coleman, which stated that generally a prerevocation or

probable cause hearing is not required. People v. Coleman, 13

Cal. 3d at 894, 533 P.2d at 1045, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 406.

In light of existing case law, the state court decision was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established United States Supreme Court law. For this reason,

ground one in his Petition does not entitle Woodall to habeas

relief, and this claim should be DENIED.

2. A Formal Revocation Hearing

In his second ground for habeas relief, Woodall maintains

that his due process rights were violated because his probation

was revoked and extended three years without a final, formal

revocation hearing. (Pet. 1, 10.) Supreme Court law provides

that probationers are entitled to a final revocation hearing prior

to revocation of their felony probation. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782;

see Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485, 487. The Court explained in Black

v. Romano that “the final revocation of probation must be preceded

by a hearing, although the factfinding body need not be composed

of judges or lawyers.” Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611-12

(1985). Because he pleaded guilty and was sentenced in case no.

SCD200201, Woodall was not entitled to present evidence refuting

his conviction of that offense, which also constituted a probation

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 15 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

violation, but he was entitled to present evidence to show that

his continued probation was justified. See Moody, 429 U.S. at 86

ns. 7, 8, 89.

a. Waiver

On August 30, 2006, Woodall’s counsel stated, “We’ve

submitted a change of plea form, which will also incorporate a

waiver of hearing vis-a-vis the two trailing probation

violations[,]” referring in part to Petitioner’s probation in case

no. SCD176528. (Lodgment No. 7, People v. Woodall, No. D050136,

slip op. at 8.) The judge informed Woodall of his right to a

hearing on his probation violation and asked whether he wanted

that hearing. (Id.) “Woodall responded that he wanted to waive

the hearing.” (Id.) The evidentiary hearing was continued to

September 28, 2006, trailing case no. SCD200201. (Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1, 00147, Aug. 30, 2006 (mins).)

The California Court of Appeal found that Petitioner waived

his right to a formal revocation hearing. (Lodgment No. 7, People

v. Woodall, No. D050136, slip op. at 8.) Woodall contends that he

“did not make any waiver of his federal constitutional right to a

formal revocation hearing.” (Pet. 8.) Assuming the August 30,

2006, waiver was defective, the state appellate court still found

that based on the entire record, Woodall waived his right to a

formal revocation hearing. (Lodgment No. 7, People v. Woodall,

No. D050136, slip op. at 8 (citing People v. Martin, 3 Cal. App.

4th 482, 486-87, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 550 (Ct. App. 1992)).)

At the sentencing hearing in case no. SCD200201, on August

30, 2006, Petitioner did not object that he was not given a formal

revocation hearing or protest the procedure used to revoke,

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 16 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

reinstate, and extend his probation. (Lodgment No. 7, People v.

Woodall, No. D050136, slip op. at 9.) The state appellate court

found the circumstances in Martin analogous to those here.

Finally, we observe that Woodall had ample reason

not to object at the sentencing hearing. Woodall pled

guilty to the charges in case No. SCD200201 with the

understanding that the court would “strongly consider”

placing him on probation for five years. That is

essentially what took place at the sentencing hearing. 

Further, instead of revoking Woodall’s probation in case

No. SCD176528 and sentencing Woodall to prison for the

evasion of police conviction in that case, the court

revoked the probation, reinstated it and then modified

it. Even if there was error in not conducting a formal

revocation hearing, we are convinced beyond a reasonable

doubt that such error was harmless; Woodall would have

received the same result if there had been a formal

revocation hearing. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386

U.S. 18, 24.)

(Id.)

A person may waive his rights under the Due Process Clause. 

McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466 (citing Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464). Even

so, the voluntariness of Woodall’s waiver is a mixed question of

law and fact reviewed de novo. See Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d

411, 415 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing a Miranda waiver). 

“[C]hallenges to mixed questions of law and fact receive similarly

mixed review; the state court’s ultimate conclusion is reviewed

under § 2254(d)(1), but its underlying factual findings supporting

that conclusion are clothed with all the deferential protection

ordinarily afforded factual findings under §§ 2254(d)(2) and

(e)(1).” Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004).

Here, the trial court arguably found that on August 30, 2006,

Woodall waived his right to a final probation revocation hearing. 

(Lodgment No. 7, People v. Woodall, No. D050136, slip op. at 8.) 

But the court still scheduled a probation revocation evidentiary

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 17 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The sealed transcripts of the proceedings on August 30,

2006, and September 28, 2006, buttress this conclusion. The

transcripts of the change of plea and sentencing in SCD200201 and

18 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

hearing for September 28, 2006. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.,

vol. 1, 00147, (mins.).) Although the court minutes for August

30, and September 28, 2006, contain other entries relating to

Woodall’s probation, neither set of minutes is marked to show that

the probationer “waives hearing.” (Id. at 00147-48.)

At best, the appellate court found that Woodall waived a

formal revocation hearing based on the entire record. (Lodgment

No. 7, People v. Woodall, D050136, slip op. at 8.) On habeas

review, federal courts defer to subsidiary factual conclusions

made by a state appellate court. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434,

1444 (9th Cir. 1996) (deferring to Washington Supreme Court’s

conclusion that challenged statements were not threats, but merely

“psychological appeals”). Even giving the California Court of

Appeal’s factual findings due deference, this Court cannot

conclude that Woodall waived his right to a formal probation

revocation hearing. 

On September 28, 2006, Petitioner did not object to the

failure to hold a formal revocation hearing or to the process used

to rule on his probation matter. (Lodgment No. 7, People v.

Woodall, D050136, slip op. at 9.) But the mere failure to object

does not constitute the knowing and intelligent waiver of

fundamental rights that due process requires. See McCarthy, 394

U.S. at 466; see also United States ex rel. Brown v. Warden,

Pontiac State Corr. Ctr., 417 F. Supp. 970, 973 (N.D. Ill. 1976). 

The record as a whole does not support a finding that Woodall

waived his right to a revocation hearing.1 

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 18 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the probation revocation for case no. SCD176528 were filed under

seal by Respondent. Woodall v. Cate, No. 08cv1132-BTM (S.D. Cal.

filed Aug. 28, 2008) (reporter’s sealed appeal transcripts for

Aug. 30, and Sept. 28, 2006).

19 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

b. Harmless Error

The California Court of Appeal explained that if the failure

to conduct a formal revocation hearing was error, it was

“convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that such error was harmless;

Woodall would have received the same result if there had been a

formal revocation hearing.” (Lodgment No. 7, People v. Woodall,

No. D050136, slip op. at 8-9 (citing Chapman v. California, 386

U.S. at 24).) Petitioner does not contend that he would have

offered more or different evidence at a formal revocation hearing;

instead, he maintains his Petition should be granted simply

because he was entitled a formal revocation hearing and did not

knowingly and intelligently waiver it. (Pet. 10; Traverse 4.) 

Because Woodall pleaded pled guilty and was sentenced in the

later case, the need for a preliminary hearing to determine if

there was probable cause to show a probation violation was

satisfied. Moody, 429 U.S. at 86 n.7. Additionally, Woodall’s

guilty plea and conviction were with written notice of the new

criminal charge resulting in the probation violation. He also had

an opportunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence, and

he had the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses

which he waived by pleading guilty. Much of the substance of

Gagnon and Morrissey was satisfied during Woodall’s change of plea

hearing where he pleaded guilty to the offense that established

the probation violation. See generally Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782;

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. 

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 19 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

Petitioner was not provided with a formal probation

revocation hearing, but he was able to introduce mitigating

factors to the court during sentencing in case no. SCD200201,

which occurred immediately before his probation was reinstated and

extended. (Lodgment No. 7, People v. Woodall, No. D050136, slip

op. at 9.)

Woodall pled guilty to the changes in case No. SCD200201

with the understanding that the court would “strongly

consider” placing him on probation for five years. That

is essentially what took place at the sentencing

hearing. Further, instead of revoking Woodall’s

probation in case No. SCD176528 and sentencing Woodall

to prison for the evasion of police conviction in that

case, the court revoked the probation, reinstated it and

then modified it.

(Id.)

At the sentencing hearing, although his probation was

revoked, Woodall was able to convince the court that probation

should be reinstated on the same terms and conditions; but the

court also extended it three years. (Id. at 3.)

3. Woodall’s Current Incarceration

The failure to hold a final revocation hearing prior to

revoking and extending Woodall’s probation in case no. SCD176528

has no relation to his current incarceration. As noted above, on

September 28, 2006, Woodall’s probation was reinstated and

extended to September 27, 2009. (Lodgment No. 7, People v.

Woodall, No. D050136, slip op. at 3.) He was also placed on five

years’ probation in case no. SCD200201. (Id.) While on probation

in these two matters, Woodall had additional criminal charges

brought against him.

Regardless of his failure to receive a formal probation

revocation hearing in case no. SCD176528, Petitioner is in custody

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 20 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

due to his probation violation in case no. SCD200201 and sentence

in case no. SCD202824. Even if Woodall’s Petition is granted, his

remedy is a remand for a formal probation revocation hearing. See

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 791; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408

U.S. at 490.

To succeed on his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Woodall

must challenge his current incarceration. See 28 U.S.C.A. §

2254(d). Petitioner is not in custody due to the failure to

conduct a preliminary or final revocation hearing in case no.

SCD176528. As a result of his guilty plea in case no. SCD200201,

his probation was reinstated and extended. Woodall is currently

in custody serving multiple concurrent sentences in case nos.

SCD176528, SCD200201, and SCD202824. 

In Frye v. Pliler, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2327, 2328 (2007),

the Court held that federal habeas review requires the courts to

evaluate the effect of “constitutional error in a state-court

criminal trial under the ‘substantial and injurious effect’

standard set forth in Brecht [v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993)],

whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and

reviewed it for harmlessness under the ‘harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt’ standard set forth in Chapman.” Petitioner’s

claim that his probation was revoked without a final revocation

hearing will only entitle him to habeas relief if the failure had

a substantial and injurious effect on the revocation and extension

of his probationary term. In light of Woodall’s contemporaneous

guilty plea in case no. SCD200201, it did not. Because of his

subsequent guilty plea in case no. SCD202824 and the revocation of

his probation in SCD200201, it still does not.

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 21 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

A harmless error analysis is appropriate unless the failure

to hold a formal revocation hearing is a “structural” error. See

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 291 (1991). “A structural

error is a ‘defect affecting the framework within which the trial

proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process

itself.’” United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211, 219 (9th Cir.

2005) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310). It deprives the

defendant of “‘basic protections [without which] a criminal trial

cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination

of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded

as fundamentally fair.’” Id. (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S.

570, 577-78 (1986)). 

“Probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage

of a criminal prosecution . . . .” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.

at 782. Both are imposed after the criminal prosecution. See id.

at 781. Structural errors generally “infect the entire trial

process.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. at 630.

Arguably, the failure to hold a formal probation revocation

hearing could be categorized a “structural error,” but there is

contrary authority. See e.g. United States v. Cameron, 2006 U.S.

App. LEXIS 16858, at *4-5 (9th Cir. June 30, 2006) (rejecting

claim that at the time of sentencing, the failure to specify the

maximum number of drug tests imposed constitutes structural

error); United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d at 219 (same). In

Padilla, the court stated, “[T]he type [of error] at issue here

affects only a single phase of a criminal proceeding -- and a

tangential aspect at that. This is hardly the stuff of structural

error.” Padilla, 415 F.3d at 219. Similarly, the Eleventh

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 22 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

Circuit, in United States v. Kravitsky, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS

21806, at *9-12 (11th Cir. Oct. 6, 2005), held that the district

court’s failure to personally question the defendant about

admitting that he violated a condition of probation was not plain

error. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes,

282 F.3d 664, 670 (9th Cir. 2002), stated, “We only review for

plain error or assess whether an error is harmless when the error

is not structural . . . .” Accord Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724,

735 n.13 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that structural error is not

subject to harmless error review on direct appeal or in habeas

proceedings).

The weight of authority supports this Court’s conclusion that

the failure to hold a final revocation hearing was not a

structural error. As a consequence, Brecht applies, and Woodall

is not entitled to habeas relief on claim two in his Petition.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court recommends that

Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the

United States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant

to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties

on or before December 19, 2008. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before January 9, 2009. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 23 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\HABEAS\WOODALL1132\R&R01.wpd 24 08cv1132 BTM (RBB)

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: November 17, 2008 _____________________________ 

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Moskowitz

All parties of record 

Case 3:08-cv-01132-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 11/17/08 Page 24 of 24