Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01609/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01609-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 560
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID ALLEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

NORM KRAMER, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE No. 1:15-cv-01609-DAD-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF NO. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in a civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint is before the Court for 

screening.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised 

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief 

may be granted,” or that “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 

such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

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determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Individuals like Plaintiff who are detained pursuant to California Welfare and 

Institutions Code § 6600 et seq. are civil detainees and are not prisoners within the 

meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th 

Cir. 2000). Although certain portions of the PLRA are not applicable to Plaintiff as a civil 

detainee, section 1915(e)(2)(B) applies to all persons proceeding in forma pauperis. See

Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

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possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff, an African-American male, is a civil detainee housed at Coalinga State 

Hospital (“CSH”) in Coalinga, California. He names as Defendants Norm Kramer, exDirector of CSH; Pam Ahlin, Executive Director of California Department of State 

Hospitals (“CDSH”); Cliff Allenby, ex-Executive Director of CDSH; Stephen Mayberg, exExecutive Director of CDSH; Jerry Brown, Governor of California; and Fresno County 

Board of Supervisors. 

Plaintiff’s claim arises from the construction of a facility and subsequent housing 

of inmates in a location allegedly known by all Defendants to cause significant risk to 

health due to the presence of Coccidioidomycosis (“Valley Fever”) spores. Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendants’ failure to comply with generally accepted and prudent risk 

management practices of care have resulted in a higher risk for inmates, particularly 

those who have greater susceptibility to the illness, such as African-Americans like 

Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff brings claims for: (1) negligence; (2) failure to provide adequate facility 

equipment and personnel; (3) abuse of a dependent adult; and (4) deliberate 

indifference in violation of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

IV. ANALYSIS

1. Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

The gravamen of Plaintiff’s claims is Defendants’ alleged violation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights when they built and housed inmates like him in a facility located in 

an area hyper-endemic for contraction of Valley Fever and then failed to take steps to 

protect him from the disease.

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As a civil detainee, Plaintiff is entitled to protection under the Fourteenth 

Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment. Fisher v. Bryant, 2:10-cv-2311-KJM 

DAD, 2012 WL 3276968 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012) (applying the Fourteenth Amendment 

due process standard to a claim of the excessive force brought by a civil detainee, rather 

than the standard set forth under the Eighth Amendment). The Ninth Circuit has, 

however, recognized that the Eighth Amendment rights guaranteed for prisoners “set a 

floor for those that must be afforded to” civil detainees. Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 

989 (9th Cir. 2007) summarily reversed on other grounds by Hunter v. Hydrick, 556 U.S. 

1256 (2009).

Under the Eighth Amendment, “prison officials are ... prohibited from being 

deliberately indifferent to policies and practices that expose inmates to a substantial risk 

of serious harm.” Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 677 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Helling v. 

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) (prison 

official violates Eighth Amendment if he or she knows of a substantial risk of serious 

harm to an inmate and fails to take reasonable measures to avoid the harm). “Deliberate 

indifference occurs when ‘[an] official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a 

substantial risk of serious harm.’“ Solis v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 514 F.3d 946, 957 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (emphasis added) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841). Thus, a prisoner may 

state “a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment by alleging that [prison officials] 

have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to [environmental conditions] that pose 

an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health,” Helling, 509 U.S. at 35.

“The second step, showing ‘deliberate indifference,’ involves a two part inquiry.” 

Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). “First, the inmate must show 

that the prison officials were aware of a ‘substantial risk of serious harm’ to an inmate's 

health or safety.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “This part of [the] inquiry may be 

satisfied if the inmate shows that the risk posed by the deprivation is obvious.” Id.

(citation omitted). “Second, the inmate must show that the prison officials had no 

‘reasonable’ justification for the deprivation, in spite of that risk.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 

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U.S. at 844 (“[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or 

safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably.”) (footnote omitted).

There is some question whether, after the decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 

135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015), a pre-trial detainee alleging a Fourteenth Amendment conditions 

of confinement claim must specifically allege deliberate indifference. See Hatter v. Dyer, 

No. 2:14-cv-616-AG (GJS), 2015 WL 9613769 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2015) (discussing 

Kingsley and concluding that pre-trial detainees still must allege deliberate indifference). 

Kingsley addressed a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim, and held that such 

a claim requires a showing that the force used was “objectively unreasonable,” rather 

than a showing of the officer’s subjective state of mind. Courts thus far have declined to 

extend Kingsley beyond the excessive force context. See, e.g., Hatter, 2015 WL 

9613769 (declining to extend to conditions of confinement claims); Castro v. Cnty. of Los 

Angeles, 797 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2015) (declining to extend to failure to protect claims). 

Nevertheless, the effect of Kingsley in this context remains an open question. The Court 

need not resolve the applicable standard at this juncture because, as noted below, the 

Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

For the reasons set forth in the next section of this Order, namely because the 

Court recommends that this action be dismissed on grounds of qualified immunity, the 

Court will not undertake an analysis of whether it otherwise includes sufficient allegations 

to state a claim against the Defendants. 

2. Qualified Immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability 

where “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 

of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 

231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To determine if an 

official is entitled to qualified immunity the court uses a two part inquiry. Saucier v. Katz, 

533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). The Court determines if the facts as alleged state a violation 

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of a constitutional right and if the right is clearly established so that a reasonable official 

would have known that his conduct was unlawful. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200.

The district court is “permitted to exercise [its] sound discretion in deciding which 

of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of 

the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. The inquiry 

as to whether the right was clearly established is “solely a question of law for the judge.” 

Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. 

Police Dep’t, 556 F.3d 1075, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009)). In deciding whether officials are 

entitled to qualified immunity, the court is to view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the plaintiff and resolve all material disputes in the favor of the plaintiff. Martinez v. 

Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003).

Defendants cannot be held liable for a violation of a right that is not clearly 

established at the time the violation occurred. Brown v. Oregon Dep’ẗ of Corrections, 

751 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2014). It is the Plaintiff who bears the burden of 

demonstrating that the right was clearly established at the time that the defendants 

acted. May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1997). A constitutional right is clearly 

established when its contours are “sufficiently clear [so] that a reasonable official would 

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 

(2002). The court is to look to the state of the law at the time the defendants acted to see 

if it gave fair warning that the alleged conduct was unconstitutional. Hope, 536 U.S. at 

741. The unlawfulness of the official’s act must be apparent in light of the preexisting 

law. Id, at 739. The Supreme Court has emphasized that it is often difficult for an official 

to determine how relevant legal doctrine will apply to the specific situation that is faced 

and that is why qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who 

knowingly violate the law[.]” Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th 

Cir. 2002).

The Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded us that we are not to define “clearly 

established” at a high level of generality. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 

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(2011). The qualified immunity inquiry is to be taken in light of the specific context of the 

case, not as a broad general proposition, Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 

(2004), but “must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity[,]” Wilson v. Layne, 

526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999).

Qualified immunity shields an official from personal liability where he reasonably 

believes that his conduct complies with the law. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244. “’Qualified 

immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken 

judgments,’ and ‘protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate 

the law.’” Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013) (citations omitted). In determining 

whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the court is to determine if “a 

reasonable officer would have had fair notice that [the action] was unlawful, and that any 

mistake to the contrary would have been unreasonable.” Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 

F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of 

Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2003)).

In determining if the law is clearly established, the Court first looks to binding

precedent. Chappell, 706 F.3d at 1056. If there is none on point, the Court will then look 

to other decisional law, including the law of other circuits and district courts. Id. at 1056; 

Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court finds no Supreme Court 

or published Ninth Circuit case determining whether an inmate’s environmental exposure 

to Valley Fever or other environmental organism would be a violation of the Eighth 

Amendment.

Turning to other decisional law, the Court is guided by the reasoning and holding 

of a recent case issued out of this district, Jackson v. Brown (“Jackson I”), No. 1:13-cv01055-LJO-SAB, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2015 WL 5732826 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2015), 

modified by Jackson v. Brown (“Jackson II”), ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2015 WL 5732826 

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2015). There, the Honorable Lawrence J. O’Neill held that, under 

circumstances substantially identical to those asserted here, Defendants are entitled to 

qualified immunity on the ground that law was not “clearly established” that inmates have 

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a constitution right to not be housed in facilities located in areas hyper endemic for 

contraction of Valley Fever. 

In Jackson I, the plaintiffs brought a class action1consisting of current and former 

prisoners who contracted Valley Fever while incarcerated at Pleasant Valley State 

Prison (“PVSP”) in Coalinga, California, and Avenal State Prison (“ASP”) in Avenal, 

California, both of which, like CSH, are located in the San Joaquin Valley. The plaintiffs 

named as Defendants Governor Brown; Matthew Cate, Secretary of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) from 2008 to 2012; Jeffrey 

Beard, the current Secretary of CDCR; P.D. Brazelton, the warden of PVSP; and James 

Hartley, the warden of ASP. Plaintiffs claimed (1) violations of the Eighth Amendment; 

(2) deprivation of equal protection; (3) racial discrimination; and (4) negligence. As to 

their Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants exposed them to a 

substantial risk of serious harm with deliberate indifference by (1) incarcerating them at 

PVSP and ASP, both of which are in areas that are hyperendemic for Valley Fever, and 

(2) knowingly refusing to take reasonable measures to (a) abate the level of risk posed 

by Valley Fever at the prisons and (b) protect Plaintiffs from that risk.

Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing, inter alia, that they are 

entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim. In considering 

Defendants’ motion, Judge O’Neill first turned to defining the constitutional right at issue. 

Jackson I, 2015 WL 5522088, at *16. Acknowledging that the right can be framed in 

multiple ways, the court explicitly rejected both the Defendants’ framing of it (“the right to 

be entirely free from the risk of exposure to [Valley Fever spores],” id.) and the Plaintiffs’ 

 

1

Per the operative pleading in that case, proposed subclass 1 is composed of “[a]ll African-Americans 

who are, or were, incarcerated at [Pleasant Valley State Prison (“PVSP”) ] or [Avenal State Prison 

(“ASP”)], at any time from July 8, 2009 to the present, and who have contracted Disseminated Valley 

Fever ... during, and as a result of, their incarceration at PVSP or ASP.” Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 20 Proposed 

subclass 2 is “[a]ll persons over the age of 55 who are or were incarcerated at PVSP or ASP, at any time 

from July 8, 2009 to the present, and who had contracted Disseminated Valley Fever during, and as a 

result of, their incarceration at PVSP or ASP.” Id. Proposed subclass 3 is “[a]ll persons who have been 

determined by the [California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (‘CDCR’) ] to be in an immunecompromised state and who are, or were, incarcerated at PVSP or ASP, at any time from July 8, 009 to 

the present, and who have contracted Disseminated Valley Fever during, and as a result of, their 

incarceration at PVSP or ASP.” Id.

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framing (the right to be free from incarceration in an area with “colossally elevated risks 

of contracting Valley Fever” that is far greater than elsewhere in California, id.). The 

court then considered how the constitutional right was framed in other conditions of 

confinement cases involving exposure to second-hand smoke, asbestos, inadequate 

ventilation, inadequate drinking water, and excessive heat. See id. at **17-23. Due to 

the interrelatedness of multiple case-specific factors, the court concluded that “Whether 

an inmate's complained-of exposure to cocci violates the Eighth Amendment ... requires 

an assessment of (1) the level of exposure; (2) the health risks presented by that 

exposure; (3) whether that exposure is a risk society is willing to tolerate; (4) whether the 

appropriate prison officials know of and understand the health risks posed by that 

exposure; and (5) the reasonableness of the prison officials' response to those risks, if 

any.” Id. at * 23. 

Ultimately, however, Judge O’Neill decided that he need not determine the full 

contours of the Eighth Amendment in the Valley Fever context because “[the] varying 

iterations of the constitutional right at issue in this case are distinctions without any 

practical difference.” Jackson II, 2015 WL 5732826, at * 1. This was because, “under any

definition of the constitutional right at issue in this case, the substantial and unsettled 

case law concerning Valley Fever within this district establishes that Defendants are 

entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim.” Id. (emphasis in 

original).

Turning to the unsettled case law in Valley Fever cases, Judge O’Neill observed 

that, “whether the Court looks only to the state of the law as it existed in July 2009 or as 

it exists today, the Court would still conclude that the right at issue was not clearly 

established.” Jackson I, 2015 WL 5522088, at * 24. Jones v. Hartley, Case No. 1:13-cv01590-AWI-GSA, 2015 WL 1276708 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015). As has been noted often, 

there remain differences of opinion as to whether the allegation of increasing risk of 

contracting Valley Fever is sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Smith v. 

State of California, Case No. 1:13-cv-0869-AWI-SKO, 2016 WL 398766 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 

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1, 2016). In Gregge v. Kate, 2015 WL 2448679, at *10 (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2015), the 

court collected multiple cases demonstrating just how unsettled the law was:

Courts within this district have differed on whether an inmate 

who is subject to a risk factor can state a claim for deliberate 

indifference. See Smith v. Brown, No. 1:12–cv–0238–AWI–

JLT (PC), 2012 WL 1999858, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 4, 2012) 

(allegation of increased risk of Valley Fever due to asthma 

insufficient to state a claim); Jones v. Igbinosa, No., at *3–4 

(E.D. Cal. July 19, 2010) (allegation that African–American 

inmate at greater risk of contracting Valley Fever is 

insufficient to state a claim); Gilbert v. Yates, No. 

1:09CV02050 AWI DLB, 2010 WL 5113116, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 

Dec. 9, 2010) subsequently aff'd, 479 F. App'x 93 (9th Cir.

2012) (inmate alleging risk factors for Valley Fever did not 

state a claim for deliberate indifference for failure to transfer 

him from PVSP); Hunter v. Yates, No. 1:07–cv–00151–AWI–

SMS–PC, 2009 WL 233791, at *3 (E.D. Cal. January 30, 

2009) (inmate alleging high risk of contracting Valley Fever 

states a claim under the low pleading standard); Humphrey v. 

Yates, No. 1:09–cv–00075–LJO–DLB (PC), 2009 WL 

3620556, at *3 (E.D. Cal. October 28, 2009) (finding 

allegation that inmate caught Valley Fever twice due to

preexisting respiratory conditions is sufficient to state a 

claim); Barnhardt v. Tilton, No. 1:07–cv–00539–LJO–DLB 

(PC), 2009 WL 56004, at *4 (E.D. Cal. January 7, 2009) 

(inmate's allegation that his diabetes placed him at increased 

risk of contracting Valley Fever is insufficient to show a 

serious risk of harm to inmate's health).

More recent cases have found that an inmate claiming to be 

at an increased risk of contracting Valley Fever could state an 

Eighth Amendment claim. See Lua v. Smith, No. 1:14–cv–

00019–LJO–MJS, 2014 WL 1308605, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 

31, 2014) (first prong of deliberate indifference claim is 

satisfied where plaintiff identifies a factor responsible for 

increasing the risk of contraction or severity of infection); 

Sparkman v. California Dep't of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation, No. 1:12–cv–01444–AWI–MJS (PC), 2013 WL 

1326218, at *3 (E.D. Cal. March 29, 2013) (inmate with 

chronic lung disease meets first prong of Eighth Amendment 

standard); Holley v. Scott, No. 1:12–cv–01090–MJS (PC), 

2013 WL 3992129, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2013) (collecting 

cases). But many courts have found that the allegation of 

increased risk of contracting Valley Fever is insufficient to 

state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment. Smith v. 

Brown, No. 1:12–cv–0238–AWI–JLT (PC), 2012 WL 

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1574651, at *4 (May 3, 2012) (allegation that inmate was 

African-American is insufficient to state a claim); Harvey v. 

Gonzalez, No. CV 10–4803–VAP (SP), 2011 WL 4625710, at 

*3 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2011) (even if inmate alleged that he 

was at high risk of contracting Valley Fever and defendants 

were aware of his risk that would be insufficient to state a 

claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment); Clark v. 

Igbinosa, No. 1:10–cv–01336–DLB PC, 2011 WL 1043868, at 

*2 (E.D. Cal. March 21, 2011) (allegation that African–

American inmate at greater risk of contracting Valley Fever is 

insufficient to state a claim); Schroeder v. Yates, No. 1:10–

cv–00433–OWW–GSA PC, 2011 WL 23094, at *1, (E.D. Cal. 

January 4, 2011) (inmate alleging COPD and emphysema 

fails to state a claim); James v. Yates, No. 1:08–cv–01706–

DLB (PC), 2010 WL 2465407, at * 4 (E.D. Cal. June 15, 

2010) (allegation of higher risk due to medical conditions is 

not sufficient to state a claim where prison officials found 

inmate did not meet criteria for transfer).

Based on this state of the law, Judge O’Neill held that Defendants were entitled to 

qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim.

In this case, the Court also finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity 

on the facts alleged, namely that Defendants built and housed inmates like Plaintiff in a 

facility located in an area that was hyper-endemic for contraction of Valley Fever. Plaintiff 

will, however, be given leave to amend. Any amendment should allege facts (not mere 

assumption or speculation) reflecting that one or more Defendants was aware that 

Plaintiff, because of his age, race or other personal characteristic, was at high risk of 

contracting Valley Fever; that CHS was constructed, situated and managed so as to 

expose its inmates to excessively high or dangerous levels of Valley Fever spores, and 

yet said Defendant(s) ignored that risk to Plaintiff and failed to take steps available to 

protect from that risk.

3. State Law Claims

In light of the above finding that Plaintiff’s complaint, as plead, does not state a 

cognizable federal claim, the Court declines to analyze at this time whether Plaintiff 

states a claim under state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 

999, 1000 (9th Cir.), as supplemented by 121 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Satey v. 

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JPMorgan Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The decision whether to 

continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after all federal 

claims have been dismissed lies within the district court's discretion.” (citation omitted)).

However, assuming Plaintiff will amend his complaint, the Court will discuss briefly his 

state-law claims (negligence, failure to provide adequate facility equipment and 

personnel, and abuse of a dependent adult): 

a. Negligence

A state-law claim of negligence requires a showing that the defendant owed the 

plaintiff a legal duty, that the defendant breached the duty, and that the breach was a 

proximate or legal cause of injuries suffered by the plaintiff. United States Liab. Ins. Co. 

v. Haidinger–Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 586, 594 (1970); see also 6 Witkin, Summary of 

California Law § 835, p. 52 (10th ed. 2010 and Supp. 2015). Part of a claim for 

negligence is harm, but under the facts of this case, Plaintiff has not contracted Valley

Fever, and the Court thus funds that he has not demonstrated harm. 

b. Failure to Provide Adequate Facility Equipment and Personnel

Plaintiff also cites California Government Code section 855, which provides for 

liability of a public entity “for injury proximately caused by the failure of the public entity to 

provide adequate or sufficient equipment, personnel or facilities required by any statute 

or any regulation of the State Department of Health Services, Social Services, 

Developmental Services, or Mental Health prescribing minimum standards for 

equipment, personnel or facilities, unless the public entity establishes that it exercised 

reasonable diligence to comply with the applicable statute or regulation.” Here, too, 

however, even assuming that Plaintiff’s allegations would fall within actions required by 

statute or regulation, Plaintiff must establish an injury in the first instance. As he has not 

contracted Valley Fever, the Court finds that he cannot state a claim under section 855.

c. Abuse of Dependent Adult

The Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (“Elder Abuse Act”), 

California Welfare & Institutions Code § 15600 et seq., provides that the “‘Abuse of an 

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elder or a dependent adult’ means ... [p]hysical abuse, neglect, financial abuse, 

abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with resulting physical harm or 

pain or mental suffering.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.07. A dependent adult, in turn, 

is defined, inter alia, as “any person between the ages of 18 and 64 years who resides in 

this state and who has physical or mental limitations that restrict his or her ability to carry 

out normal activities or to protect his or her rights, including, but not limited to, persons 

who have physical or developmental disabilities, or whose physical or mental abilities 

have diminished because of age.” Id. § 15610.23. Plaintiff is informed that, should he 

decide to amend his complaint, courts have held that a person detained in a prison or 

similar facility is not, without the assertion of additional facts, a “dependent adult” within 

the meaning of this statute. See, e.g., Cabral v. County of Glenn, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 

1194-95 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that a pretrial detainee has not alleged that he is a 

“dependent adult” under Section 15610.23). 

d. California Tort Claims Act

The Court also notes that Plaintiff has not pled compliance with the California Tort 

Claims Act, which requires filing a claim with the California Victim's Compensation 

Government Claim Board prior to filing a lawsuit against a state employee or entity. Cal. 

Gov. Code §§ 905.2, 911.2, 945.4, 950.2; Munoz v. California, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1767, 

1776 (1995). Timely claim presentation is not merely a procedural requirement but “a 

condition precedent to plaintiff's maintaining an action against [a state employee or 

entity] defendant.” California v. Super. Ct. (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1240 (2004).

Failure to file a timely claim with the VCGCB is fatal to a cause of action for negligence 

or other state tort. See Hacienda La Puente Unified Sch. Dist. of Los Angeles v. Honig, 

976 F.2d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing City of San Jose v.Super. Ct. (Lands Unlimited), 

12 Cal. 3d 447, 454 (1974)).

V. CONCLUSION

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Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court will 

grant Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 

1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff opts to amend, he must demonstrate that the 

alleged acts resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-

78. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible 

on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must also 

demonstrate that each named Defendant personally participated in a deprivation of his 

rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it 

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th 

Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on 

curing the deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, 

an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First 

Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 

under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights complaint form 

and (2) a copy of her Complaint, filed October 22, 2015; 

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2. Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted;

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, 

the Court will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state 

a claim and failure to comply with a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 25, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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