Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00416/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00416-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REGENIAL WARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

K. MENDOZA-POWERS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-00416-AWI-LJO P

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Regenial Ward (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on April

11, 2006.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

///

Case 1:06-cv-00416-AWI-LJO Document 11 Filed 12/15/06 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may

appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the

test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a

plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

The claims in this action stem from an incident in which defendant McFarlin slammed

plaintiff to the ground. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Romero thereafter questioned plaintiff

regarding the lawsuits he had filed and told plaintiff that in the old days he would have been beaten

to death. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Romero coerced defendants McFarlin and Calistro to write

false disciplinary reports to cover up McFarlin’s action and that Romero told plaintiff he did not

want plaintiff on his yard.

Plaintiff names Warden K. Mendoza-Powers, Lieutenants C. Romero and J. Haley, and

Correctional Officers Jim McFarlin and A. Calistro as defendants. Plaintiff is seeking both monetary

and equitable relief, and although plaintiff does not specify what his legal claims are, it appears that

Case 1:06-cv-00416-AWI-LJO Document 11 Filed 12/15/06 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

plaintiff is attempting to pursue claims based on the use of excessive force, retaliation, and the denial

of due process.

1. Excessive Force Claim

Plaintiff alleges that on April 17, 2005, defendant McFarlin viciously slammed him to the

ground.

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . .

. contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates

contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Id.

at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002)(Eighth Amendment excessive force

standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis injuries)). However, not “every

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional

recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort

repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal quotations marks and citations

omitted). 

The court finds that plaintiff’s allegation he was slammed to the ground falls short of

supporting a claim that defendant McFarlin’s action rose to the level of an Eighth Amendment

violation. Id. Plaintiff will be provided with an opportunity to file an amended complaint, in the

event that plaintiff is able, in good faith, to cure the deficiencies in his claim. 

2. Retaliation Claim

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

Case 1:06-cv-00416-AWI-LJO Document 11 Filed 12/15/06 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance

a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff has a protected First Amendment right to file lawsuits. However, although plaintiff

alleges that he suffered reprisals from staff, plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a

claim that defendant Romero, McFarlin, and Calistro took adverse actions against him because of

the exercise of his First Amendment rights. Indeed, although plaintiff alleges that Romero

questioned him about his lawsuits, plaintiff’s allegations indicate that defendants falsified reports

to cover up the incident in which McFarlin slammed plaintiff to the ground. As such, plaintiff’s

allegations do not support any retaliation claims under section 1983. 

3. Due Process Claim

Plaintiff alleges that on June 15, 2003, defendant Haley refused to allow him any witnesses

at his disciplinary hearing and then falsified the hearing report by stating that witnesses were present

but plaintiff refused to question them. 

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of

law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to invoke the protection of the Due

Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the

protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state

law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). The Due Process Clause

itself does not confer on plaintiff a liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of

confinement.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221, 125 S.Ct. at 2393 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.

215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532 (1976)). Understate law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison

regulations is determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

472, 481-84 (1995). Such interests are limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical

and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484.

Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any facts supporting the existence of a protected liberty

interest. Without alleging sufficient facts to establish the existence of a liberty interest entitling him

to procedural due process protections, plaintiff may not pursue any claims for relief for violation of

Case 1:06-cv-00416-AWI-LJO Document 11 Filed 12/15/06 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a 1

defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). With respect to

prison disciplinary proceedings, the minimum procedural requirements that must be met are: (1) written notice of the

charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the time the prisoner receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so

that the prisoner may prepare his defense; (3) a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence they rely on and

reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his defense, when permitting

him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; and (5) legal assistance to

the prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the issues presented are legally complex. Id. at 563-71. As long as the

five minimum Wolff requirements are met, due process has been satisfied. Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420

(9th Cir. 1994). 

5

the Due Process Clause. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended 1

complaint curing this deficiency. 

4. Supervisory Liability Claim

Plaintiff names Warden Mendoza-Powers as a defendant. Plaintiff alleges that she failed to

act upon inmates’ complaints of staff abuse and must be held accountable.

Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions

of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation

must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for

relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the

defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient

that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards

are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v.

Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts linking defendant Mendoza-Powers to any violations of

his constitutional rights. The general allegation that defendant ignores staff misconduct is

insufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983. 

Case 1:06-cv-00416-AWI-LJO Document 11 Filed 12/15/06 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

C. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any claims upon which relief may

be granted under section 1983. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this order.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained

of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state any claims

upon which relief may be granted under section 1983;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; and

///

///

///

///

///

Case 1:06-cv-00416-AWI-LJO Document 11 Filed 12/15/06 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

4. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the court

will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 13, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00416-AWI-LJO Document 11 Filed 12/15/06 Page 7 of 7