Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00680/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00680-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARCHIE A. MARTINEZ, No. CIV S-09-0680-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

G. HOOVER, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(c) and no other party has yet been served or appeared in the action. Pending before

the court is plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 19).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “short and plain statement

Case 2:09-cv-00680-KJM-CMK Document 20 Filed 05/05/10 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means

that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,

1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the

complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it

rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the

claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges two separate and unrelated events. First,

Plaintiff claims he has been mis-diagnosed with diabetes for thirteen years, and prescribed

different insulin-containing medication in total disregard for his safety and health. Petitioner

names several medical personnel who have either diagnosed Plaintiff or prescribed such

medication as defendants to this case. 

Second Petitioner alleges he was assaulted by defendant Hoover on or about

August 22, 2006, was improperly placed in administrative segregation by defendant Blim, was

denied release from administrative segregation and medical treatment by defendant Garcia, was

retaliated against by defendant Olivas, and denied medical treatment by defendants Morton,

Standford, and Akintola. As addressed by separate order, the undersigned finds Plaintiff’s

amended complaint sufficient to state a claim against defendants Hoover, Blim, Garcia, Olivas,

Morton, Standford, and Akintola. 

However, as discussed in the court’s previous screening order, Plaintiff’s claims

regarding his diabetes treatment fails to state a cognizable claim. The court previously explained

the standards for stating a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court stated:

Case 2:09-cv-00680-KJM-CMK Document 20 Filed 05/05/10 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the

conditions under which the prisoner is confined are subject to

scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and

unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31

(1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth

Amendment “embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,

civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Conditions of confinement may,

however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide

prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care,

and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107

(9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment

only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s

act or omission must be so serious such that it results in the denial

of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and

wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison official

must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 

. . . 

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or

injury, or risks of serious injury or illness, gives rise to a claim

under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; see

also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as

dental and mental health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d

1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is sufficiently

serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in

further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir.

1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th

Cir. 1994). Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a

reasonable doctor would think that the condition is worthy of

comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the

prisoner’s daily activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic

and accompanied by substantial pain. See Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent

in medical needs cases than in other Eighth Amendment contexts

because the responsibility to provide inmates with medical care

does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. 

See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be

given to the judgment of prison officials as to decisions concerning

medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th

Cir. 1989). The complete denial of medical attention may

constitute deliberate indifference. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801

F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also

constitute deliberate indifference. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. 

Case 2:09-cv-00680-KJM-CMK Document 20 Filed 05/05/10 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also

demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1060.

Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition

does not, however, give rise to a claim under the Eighth

Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a difference

of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning

the appropriate course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth

Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332

(9th Cir. 1996).

The court also found that Plaintiff’s allegations that he was mis-diagnosed with

diabetes was insufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. 

Although Plaintiff contends that all of the medical staff displayed a

total disregard for his safety and health, he fails to show anything

other than a mis-diagnosis. Under the circumstances described in

the complaint, where the doctors provided Plaintiff medical

treatment, and in fact ran tests regarding his diagnosis of diabetes,

it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein

can be cured by amending the complaint. 

The court concluded that Plaintiff’s “claims regarding being misdiagnosed with

diabetes fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted, which does not appear to be

curable.”

III. CONCLUSION

As the court previously stated, because it does not appear possible that the

deficiencies identified herein can be cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to

leave to amend prior to the dismissal of these claims. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126,

1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Therefore, Plaintiff will be required to show cause in writing,

within 30 days of the date of this order, why these claims should not be dismissed for failure to

state a claim. Plaintiff is warned that failure to respond to this order may result in dismissal of

the action for the reasons outlined above, as well as for failure to prosecute and comply with

court rules and orders. See Local Rule 11-110. 

/ / /

Case 2:09-cv-00680-KJM-CMK Document 20 Filed 05/05/10 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff shall show cause in

writing, within 30 days of the date of this order, why these claims should not be dismissed for

failure to state a claim. 

DATED: May 4, 2010

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:09-cv-00680-KJM-CMK Document 20 Filed 05/05/10 Page 5 of 5