Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-00101/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-00101-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANNAMARIA M, a minor,

by her next friend,

ANTOINETTE M,

Plaintiff,

v

NAPA VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT, et al,

Defendants. /

No C 03-0101 VRW

ORDER

Plaintiff Annamaria M, through her mother, Antoinette M,

brings this federal civil rights action with supplemental state law

claims for relief from defendants’ alleged failure to protect

plaintiff from the harassment of her school classmates. 

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (SAC) names as defendants the

Napa Valley Unified School District (NVUSD) and David Brown, Ron

Goldberg, Karen Chase, Kathleen Kernberger, Kathleen Daugherty and

Mary Myers (collectively, the “individual defendants”. Doc #21

(SAC). Defendants move to dismiss the SAC pursuant to FRCP

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 The SAC also names as defendants the two alleged harassers,

Gerardo M and Oscar S, both minors; they are not parties to the

present motions. All references herein to “defendants” encompass only

NVUSD and the individual defendants but not Gerardo or Oscar.

2

12(b)(6).1

 Doc #35 (MTD). In the alternative, defendants move for

a more definite statement pursuant to FRCP 12(e). Further,

defendants move to strike certain allegations pursuant to FRCP

12(f). For reasons discussed below, defendants’ motion is GRANTED

IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I

The court accepts the following allegations as true for

purposes of defendants’ motion: 

Annamaria was home-schooled until September 2001, when,

at Annamaria’s request, her parents reluctantly agreed to enroll

her in the eighth grade at Redwood Middle School (“Redwood”). SAC

¶¶16-17. Not long thereafter it became apparent that Annamaria was

unable to keep up with her classmates academically. Id ¶19. On

November 13, 2001, at a “Pupil Study Team Meeting,” defendants

Daugherty (Redwood’s principal), Kernberger, Goldberg, Chase and

Myers (all of whom were teachers at Redwood) convinced Annamaria

and her parents that Annamaria should be transferred into “special

classes” that better suited her academic level and provided more

individualized attention. Id ¶¶20-25. 

The students in Annamaria’s new class were unmotivated,

inattentive and disruptive. Id ¶¶28-29. They frequently acted out

and the teachers just ignored them. Id ¶29. Thus, despite

assurances that the classes were “safe” Annamaria had been

transferred to a class for “difficult students” with “behavioral

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problems.” Id ¶¶23, 28, 30. 

Among the students in Annamaria’s new classes were

Gerardo M and Oscar S. Within one week of Annamaria’s arrival,

Gerardo and Oscar began to harass Annamaria sexually. Gerardo and

Oscar repeatedly rubbed Annamaria’s buttocks with their feet while

they made lewd comments such as “you are a slut,” “you want to fuck

me?,” “give me head” and “let me touch your ass.” Id ¶¶34-35. 

They would gesture that they wanted sexual favors from Annamaria

by, for example, grabbing their crotches and asking Annamaria to

have sex with them. Id ¶¶36-37. The harassing conduct “would

occur each and every day” during “almost all class periods” and

throughout “the school grounds.” Id ¶32. Although the harassing

conduct occurred on the school campus generally, the in-class

harassment occurred in the classrooms of Mrs Kernberger and Mrs

Meyers. Id ¶31.

“During the months preceding” January 2001, Annamaria

brought Oscar and Gerardo’s misconduct to the attention of Mrs

Kernberger and Mrs Myers “on several occasions.” Id ¶38. Although

Mrs Kernberger initially (but “on several occasions”) told

Annamaria simply to “ignore it,” she later moved Annamaria to the

front of the class to separate her from Gerardo and Oscar. Id. 

When Gerardo and Oscar continued to harass Annamaria, Mrs

Kernberger began sending them to Principal Daugherty’s office. Id

¶39. Similarly, Mrs Myers sent Gerardo and Oscar to Principal

Daugherty’s office when she observed them harassing Annamaria. Id

¶42. The repeated trips to the principal’s office, however, did

not curb Gerardo and Oscar’s misbehavior. Id ¶¶40, 43.

// 

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4

 Antoinette “called the schools repeatedly over several

weeks” hoping to stimulate an investigation. Id ¶44. Antoinette

was “shuttled from person to person in the schools.” Id ¶50. 

Eventually, Antoinette wrote a letter to “the schools” on January

14, 2002, describing the situation. Id ¶46. The harassment took

its toll on Annamaria, who lost 22 pounds in two months, became

“fearful of school and afraid in general” and attempted suicide on

one occasion. Id ¶¶45, 61. At some point, Annamaria stopped going

to school because of Gerardo and Oscar. Principal Daugherty called

Antoinette, demanded that Annamaria return to school and offered to

place Annamaria in another class. Id ¶¶54, 56. On January 16,

2002, “the schools” called the police and Gerardo and Oscar were

detained. Id ¶59.

II

 Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss essentially “test

whether a cognizable claim has been pleaded in the complaint.” 

Scheid v Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc, 859 F2d 434, 436 (6th Cir

1988). Although a plaintiff is not held to a “heightened pleading

standard,” the plaintiff must provide more than mere “conclusory

allegations.” Swierkiewicz v Sorema NA, 534 US 506, 515 (2002)

(rejecting heightened pleading standards); see also Schmier v

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F3d 817,

820 (9th Cir 2002) (rejecting conclusory allegations).

The court must construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, taking the allegations as true and

drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. 

Knievel v ESPN, 393 F3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir 2005). But “the court

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[is not] required to accept as true allegations that are merely

conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable

inferences.” Sprewell v Golden State Warriors, 266 F3d 979, 988

(9th Cir 2001) (citing Clegg v Cult Awareness Network, 18 F3d 752,

754-55 (9th Cir 1994)). An action may be dismissed for failure to

state a claim only if it “appears beyond a doubt that plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief.” Doe v United States, 419 F3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir

2005). 

III

Title IX

Annamaria’s first claim alleges sexual discrimination and

harassment in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of

1972, 20 USC § 1681 et seq, which in pertinent part provides: “No

person * * * shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under any education program or activity receiving

Federal financial assistance,” id § 1681(a). 

The Supreme Court has held that educational institutions

that receive federal funding “may be liable for subjecting their

students to discrimination where the recipient is deliberately

indifferent to known acts of student-on-student sexual harassment

and the harasser is under the school’s disciplinary authority.” 

Davis v Monroe County Bd of Educ, 526 US 629, 646-47 (1999). A

recipient’s liability for peer harassment under Title IX is limited

to circumstances where (1) the student is subjected to harassment

that is “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it

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denies its victims the equal access to education that Title IX is

designed to protect,” (2) a person with authority to take steps to

remedy the harassment has actual notice or knowledge of harassment

and (3) that person is deliberately indifferent to the harassment. 

Id at 652; see also Gebser v Lago Vista Indep Sch Dist, 524 US 274,

290 (1998).

Although the SAC asserts the Title IX claim against all

defendants, Annamaria now concedes that the Title IX claim can be

asserted only against NVUSD. Accordingly, Annamaria’s first claim

is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to the individual defendants. The

court turns to NVUSD’s arguments for dismissal.

A

NVUSD first argues that the SAC does not allege that

Annamaria was subjected to harassment so severe that it effectively

denied her equal access to education. The court is unpersuaded. 

The SAC alleges that Annamaria was harassed by Oscar and

Gerardo throughout “almost all of the school class periods,” “each

and every day,” for a period beginning no earlier than November 13,

2001 (the date of the “Pupil Study Team Meeting”), and January 16,

2002 (the date that Gerardo and Oscar were detained). It is

appropriate to take judicial notice of public schools’ adjournment

for approximately two weeks during the winter holidays. Thus,

drawing all reasonable inferences in Annamaria’s favor, the alleged

harassment took place for a period of approximately 6-7 weeks. The

harassment so affected Annamaria that she lost 22 pounds, dropped

out of school and attempted suicide. These are not the “simple

acts of teasing and name-calling” that are insufficient to subject

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a school district to Title IX liability. Davis, 526 US at 652. 

Annamaria has sufficiently alleged peer harassment of the severity

and pervasiveness against which Title IX seeks to protect.

B

NVUSD next argues that Annamaria has not alleged

deliberate indifference, but rather that defendants took reasonable

measures to curtail Gerardo and Oscar’s harassing conduct. 

1

As an initial matter, the parties disagree whether

teachers’ acts or omissions can trigger Title IX liability. 

Annamaria argues that the inaction of a teacher can give rise to

Title IX liability, relying primarily upon Nicole M v Martinez

Unified School District, 964 F Supp 1369 (ND Cal 1997). 

In Nicole M, Judge Patel decided —— as a matter of first

impression in the Ninth Circuit and in the pre-Gebser/Davis Title

IX landscape —— that peer harassment is actionable under Title IX. 

As one basis for her decision, Judge Patel reasoned that a “teacher

whose agency status is sufficient to hold the district liable for

her harassment of a student * * * stands in no different position

when she knows * * * of peer sexual harassment.” Id at 1378. 

Significantly, no teacher was named as a defendant in Nicole M,

which relegates this language to the status of obiter dicta. 

Of more fundamental importance, however, Judge Patel’s

rationale was explicitly based on agency principles. Intervening

Supreme Court authority makes clear that Title IX liability cannot

be imputed to a school district merely on the basis of agency

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principles. See Gebser, 524 US at 283; see also Davis, 526 US at

640, 642. Rather, Title IX liability can be predicated only upon

the acts or omissions of “an official who at a minimum has

authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute

corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge

of the discrimination.” Gebser, 524 US at 290. 

Unsurprisingly, then, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized

that it is “an open question” whether a teacher’s deliberate

indifference can trigger Title IX liability after Davis. Hawkins v

Sarasota County Sch Bd, 322 F3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir 2003). The

Tenth Circuit has opined that when peer harassment occurs on school

grounds, “teachers may well possess the requisite control necessary

to take corrective action to end the discrimination.” Murell v Sch

Dist No 1, 186 F3d 1238, 1248 (10th Cir 1999). Still, the Tenth

Circuit acknowledged that “[b]ecause officials’ roles vary among

school districts, deciding who exercises substantial control for

the purposes of Title IX liability is necessarily a fact-based

inquiry.” Id at 1247. “In order to answer the question, it would

be necessary to examine how [California] law organizes its public

schools, the authority and responsibility granted by state law to

* * * teachers, the school district’s discrimination policies and

procedures, and the facts and circumstances of the particular

case.” Hawkins, 322 F3d at 1286. 

Although later in these proceedings it might be

established that Mrs Kernberger and Mrs Myers lacked authority

meaningfully to address Gerardo and Oscar’s harassing conduct, the

court concludes that, read in the light most favorable to

Annamaria, the SAC alleges the teachers had such authority.

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2

Once school officials have actual notice of sexual

harassment, they are under a duty to act to curtail the harassment. 

Davis, 526 US at 652. But this “does not mean that recipients can

avoid liability only by purging their schools of actionable peer

harassment or that administrators must engage in particular

disciplinary actions.” Id at 648. On the contrary, courts should

find deliberate indifference “only where the recipient’s response

to the harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light

of the known circumstances.” Id. 

Still, one of the “known circumstances” that must be

considered when addressing the reasonableness of the recipient’s

action is the known effectiveness of the chosen remedial action. 

“Where a school district has actual knowledge that its efforts to

remediate are ineffective, and it continues to use those same

methods to no avail, such district has failed to act reasonably in

light of the known circumstances.” Vance v Spencer County Pub Sch

Dist, 231 F3d 253, 260-61 (6th Cir 2000); see also Flores v Morgan

Hill Unif Sch Dist, 324 F3d 1130, 1135-36 (9th Cir 2003) (relying

upon Vance); Wills v Brown University, 184 F3d 20, 25 (1st Cir

1999) (“If the institution takes timely and reasonable measures to

end the harassment, it is not liable under Title IX for prior

harassment. Of course, if it learns that its measures have proved

inadequate, it may be required to take further steps to avoid new

liability.” (citation omitted)); Jones v Indiana Area Sch Dist, 397

F Supp 2d 628, 645-46 (WD Pa 2005) (denying summary judgment where

the district continued simply “talking to” the perpetrating student

long after it became apparent that such action was ineffective). 

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In this regard, the SAC alleges that Gerardo and Oscar

were sent to Principal Daugherty’s office for the same harassing

conduct on multiple occasions. It can thus reasonably be inferred

that although Principal Daugherty was aware that whatever she was

doing was not working, she nonetheless continued on the same course

of action (or inaction) for some time. To be sure, further action

(referring the matter to law enforcement) was later taken. But

that does not mean any deliberate indifference on her part in the

meantime could not give rise to Title IX liability. 

3

NVUSD contends that the time period during which

Annamaria was harassed was simply too short to establish deliberate

indifference and that because school authorities eventually called

the police, defendants’ actions must be deemed reasonable. 

The relatively short period of time in which the events

giving rise to this action took place no doubt bears upon

Annamaria’s ability to prove a violation of Title IX. First, the

harassment must have occurred over a sufficient period of time to

be pervasive. Second, after the harassment became pervasive and

defendants became aware of it, defendants’ ineffective responses

must have been repeated over a sufficient period of time that they

became clearly unreasonable under the circumstances —— assuming

those responses were not clearly unreasonable at the outset. But

the gestation period for a Title IX violation is shorter when the

alleged harassment and ineffective responses occur with relatively

high frequency. Here, the SAC alleges that the harassment occurred

daily (and throughout each school day) and that ineffective

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responses were rendered on multiple occasions. Under these

circumstances, the court cannot say that it is a legal

impossibility that a Title IX violation could have occurred in a

period of approximately six or seven weeks. 

Further, the fact that effective action was eventually

taken does not absolve NVUSD of liability for a Title IX violation

that occurred in the meantime. Rather, “whether the school’s

belatedly stepped up efforts were ‘too little, too late’ is a

question [of fact].” Theno v Tonganoxie Unif Sch Dist, 377 F Supp

2d 952, 966 (D Kan 2005).

The factual record to be developed in this case might

show that defendants’ actions were not clearly unreasonable. But

the court cannot conclude that, construed in the light most

favorable to Annamaria, the SAC does not allege deliberate

indifference on the part of a school official empowered to take

corrective action. NVUSD’s motion to dismiss Annamaria’s Title IX

claim must therefore be DENIED. 

IV

Eleventh Amendment

Before proceeding to the remainder of Annamaria’s claims

and defendants’ arguments for dismissing the same, it is

appropriate first to address the effect of the Eleventh Amendment. 

The Eleventh Amendment bars claims in federal court

against non-consenting states and their agencies. Pennhurst State

Sch & Hosp v Halderman, 465 US 89, 100-02 (1984). As a school

district, NVUSD is a state agency for purposes of the Eleventh

Amendment. Belanger v Madera Unif Sch Dist, 963 F2d 248, 250-54

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(9th Cir 1992). Further, “[t]he Eleventh Amendment bars suits

against state officials in their official capacities when” as in

this case, “the relief sought is retrospective or compensatory in

nature * * *.” Han v Department of Justice, 45 F3d 333, 338 (9th

Cir 2000). Accordingly, defendants are correct that the Eleventh

Amendment bars Annamaria’s seventh claim, which arises under 42 USC

§ 1983, against NVUSD and the individual defendants in their

official capacities. 

Although defendants have not clearly invoked the Eleventh

Amendment against Annamaria’s state law claims, the court finds it

appropriate to address the issue sua sponte. See In re Jackson,

184 F3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir 1999) (“Eleventh Amendment sovereign

immunity limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts and can be

raised by a party at any time during judicial proceedings or by the

court sua sponte.”). The Eleventh Amendment “precludes the

adjudication of pendent state law claims against nonconsenting

state defendants in federal courts.” Cholla Ready Mix, Inc v

Civish, 382 F3d 969, 973 (9th Cir 2004). The State of California

has not consented to suit in federal court on Annamaria’s tort

claims. See Riggle v California, 577 F2d 579, 585-86 (9th Cir

1978) (holding that the California Tort Claims Act, Cal Gov’t Code

§ 810 et seq, does not “contain a waiver of immunity which extends

further than the California state courts”). Nor is the court aware

of any enactment or pronouncement whereby the State of California

has consented to suit in federal court on Annamaria’s claims

arising under California statutory law.

In sum, because they are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment, Annamaria’s second through twelfth claims against NVUSD

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and the individual defendants in their official capacities are 

DISMISSED. See Cole v Oroville Union High Sch Dist, 228 F3d 1092,

1100 n 4 (9th Cir 2000) (“The district court correctly concluded it

did not have jurisdiction over the appellant’s damage claims

against the District and District officials in their official

capacities, because California school districts are state agencies

and thus immune from damage suits under the Eleventh Amendment.”). 

Such dismissal is WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Annamaria’s ability to file

in a court of competent jurisdiction. See Freeman v Oakland Unif

Sch Dist, 179 F3d 846, 846-47 (9th Cir 1999). 

V

Section 1983

Annamaria’s seventh claim arises under 42 USC § 1983 and

alleges that defendants deprived Annamaria of (1) her right to be

free from gender discrimination in violation of Title IX and the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) her

right to be free from racial discrimination in violation the Equal

Protection Clause. SAC ¶124.

A

The court first briefly addresses defendants’ suggestion

that a heightened pleading standard applies to Annamaria’s claims

against them in their individual capacities. The Ninth Circuit has

expressly rejected the use of a heightened pleading standard in

§ 1983 claims. See Galbraith v County of Santa Clara, 307 F3d

1119, 1125 (9th Cir 2002) (recognizing that Branch v Tunnel, 937

F2d 1382 (9th Cir 1991), was effectively overruled by Crawford-El v

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Britton, 523 US 574 (1998), and Swierkiewicz v Sorema NA, 534 US

506 (2002)).

B

Gender Discrimination

Annamaria alleges that by allowing a hostile educational

environment to develop, the individual defendants deprived

Annamaria of her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX

to be free from gender discrimination. SAC ¶124. The individual

defendants assert qualified immunity. 

Qualified immunity shields state actors from liability

for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US

800, 818 (1982). At the pleadings stage, qualified immunity

analysis entails three steps. First, the court must determine

whether, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the

facts alleged show a violation of the plaintiff’s statutory or

constitutional rights. Saucier v Katz, 533 US 194, 201 (2001). If

a violation has been alleged, the court next determines whether the

right infringed was clearly established at the time of the alleged

violation. Finally, the court assesses whether it would be clear

to a reasonable person in the defendant’s position that her conduct

was unlawful in the situation she confronted, for even if the

defendant violated clearly established law, immunity is nonetheless

available if she made a reasonable mistake with regard to what the

law requires. Id at 202, 205; see also Frederick v Morse, 439 F3d

1114, 1123 (9th Cir 2006) (characterizing this final inquiry as a

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discrete third step in qualified immunity analysis). “This is not

to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity

unless the very action in question has previously been held

unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law

the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Hope v Pelzer, 536 US 730, 739

(2002) (citing Anderson, 483 US at 640).

Accordingly, the court first addresses whether

Annamaria’s complaint alleges a violation of her rights under Title

IX or the Fourteenth Amendment.

1

As an initial matter, the court notes that the Ninth

Circuit has expressly declined to address whether school officials

and employees can be sued under § 1983 for a violation of Title IX. 

See Doe v Petaluma City Sch Dist, 54 F3d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir 1995);

see also Oona R-S ex rel Kate S v McCaffrey, 143 F3d 473, 475 (9th

Cir 1998). Courts in this district, however, have concluded that

school officials may be sued under § 1983 for violations of rights

protected by Title IX. See Oona R-S ex rel Kate S v Santa Rosa

City Schools, 890 F Supp 1452, 1459-62 (ND Cal 1995) (Henderson);

Nicole M, 964 F Supp at 1379-81. As defendants have not challenged

the viability of Annamaria’s § 1983 claim on this basis, the

undersigned perceives no need to depart from the well-reasoned

conclusions of his colleagues.

Further, it is clear that deliberate indifference to peer

sexual harassment can violate rights protected by the Equal

Protection Clause and enforceable against school officials through

§ 1983. See Flores, 324 F3d 1135 (recognizing that deliberate

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indifference permits a conclusion that defendants acted with an

unconstitutional state of mind); Murrell, 186 F3d 1238, 1251 n 8

(“A state actor’s acquiescence in sex discrimination is

independently actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment regardless

of the dictates of Title IX * * *”); Nicole M, 964 F Supp at 1383

(“Particularly in the context of sexual harassment, [a school

principal]’s failure to act is significant because it may

constitute evidence of her intent to discriminate on the basis of

sex.”) (citing Bohen v City of East Chicago, 799 F2d 1180, 1190

(7th Cir 1986) (Posner concurring) (suggesting that an equal

protection claim may be sustained for an employer’s complacency

toward sexual harassment without a showing of differential

treatment because “sexual harassment of men by women is extremely

rare”)); cf Jackson v Birmingham Bd of Educ, 125 S Ct 1497, 1504

(2005) (stating in the Title IX context that “deliberate

indifference to sexual harassment of a student by another student

squarely constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex”).

As already discussed, the SAC alleges deliberate

indifference on the part of Principal Daugherty sufficient to state

a Title IX claim against NVUSD. That conclusion also applies to

the § 1983 claim against Principal Daugherty individually.

With regard to Mrs Kernberger, Annamaria told Mrs

Kernberger that Gerardo and Oscar had touched her inappropriately

and asked her if she wanted to “fuck” them, to which Mrs Kernberger

responded “on several occasions” by instructing Annamaria to

“ignore it.” SAC ¶38. In their reply memorandum, defendants

attempt to characterize Mrs Kernberger’s instruction as a step

calculated to end the harassment. See Doc #40 (Reply) at 2. The

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court disagrees with this characterization. Mrs Kernberger’s

instruction was, in essence, no action at all. To be sure, the SAC

alleges that Mrs Kernberger later moved Annamaria to the front of

the classroom and began sending the Gerardo and Oscar to the

principal’s office. A more developed record might ultimately

demonstrate that Mrs Kernberger was not deliberately indifferent in

light of all the circumstances. But construed in the light most

favorable to Annamaria, the SAC alleges deliberate indifference on

the part of Mrs Kernberger.

In contrast, the SAC does not allege that Mrs Myers

delayed in sending Gerardo and Oscar to Principal Daugherty’s

office upon being made aware of their conduct toward Annamaria. 

Thus, the SAC cannot be read to allege that Mrs Myers ever

consciously declined to take action when the need for action was

indicated. Read in the light most favorable to Annamaria, however,

the SAC alleges that Mrs Myers mechanically repeated the step of

sending Gerardo and Oscar to the principal’s office, even after it

would have become apparent that the boys’ harassing conduct was

continuing unabated. 

The court is sensitive to the challenges classroom

teachers face. Further, teachers’ authority to take disciplinary

or other direct measures likely to curb persistent peer sexual

harassment might be quite limited. But teachers surely have the

ability to ensure that school administrators are aware of peer

harassment for which schools receiving federal funding are legally

accountable. In the normal course, sending harassers such as

Gerardo and Oscar to the principal’s office could reasonably be

expected to communicate the problem to school administrators. But

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when the circumstances are such that a reasonable teacher would

seriously question whether school administrators appreciate the

severity of a particular problem, it is incumbent upon that teacher

to take additional steps to apprise school administrators of the

situation.

Again construing the SAC in the light most favorable to

Annamaria, the court concludes that the SAC alleges that Mrs Myers

failed to take extra steps when their necessity was indicated.

2

“[T]he duty to take reasonable steps to remedy a known

hostile environment created by a peer [was] clearly established” in

the Ninth Circuit no later than 1998. Oona R-S, 143 F3d at 477

(holding “that the defendants [were] not entitled to immunity for

their failure to take steps to remedy the hostile environment

created by the male students in [plaintiff]’s class”).

3

Finally, the court determines whether it would have been

clear to a reasonable person in the defendants’ position that their

acts or omissions violated clearly established law. Because the

SAC alleges that Principal Daugherty and Mrs Kernberger initially

(but repeatedly) took essentially no action in response known

harassment, the court cannot conclude at this juncture that they

mistakenly but reasonably believed they were acting within the

bounds of the law.

Significantly, however, the SAC does not allege inaction

on the part of Mrs Myers. In light of all the circumstances, the

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court concludes that Mrs Myers could have reasonably believed that

sending Gerardo and Oscar to the principal’s office was an adequate

response to Annamaria’s complaints. Accordingly, Mrs Myers is

entitled to qualified immunity and Annamaria’s seventh claim

against Mrs Myers is accordingly DISMISSED.

B

Racial Discrimination

Annamaria argues that her racial discrimination claim is

sufficient because she has alleged that she, Gerardo and Oscar are

Hispanic while all the individual defendants are Caucasian. Doc

#39 (Opp) at 14. Based on these allegations, Annamaria posits that

it can be inferred “that the district’s lack of adequate response

[sic] and tolerance of the sexual harassment is due to racial

discrimination, translated ‘That’s what Mexicans do.’” Id at 15. 

This will not do.

“To state a claim under 42 USC § 1983 for a violation of

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or

purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership

in a protected class.” Barren v Harrington, 152 F3d 1193, 1194

(9th Cir 1998). In the usual case, this requires a plaintiff to

allege that similarly situated persons who are not in the same

protected class as the plaintiff were treated differently. See

Ventura Mobile Home Communities Owners Ass’n v City of San Buena

Ventura, 371 F3d 1046, 1055 (9th Cir 2004); Lee v City of Los

Angeles, 250 F3d 668, 687 (9th Cir 2001); see also Olmstead v L C

ex rel Zimring, 527 US 581, 614 (1999) (Kennedy concurring in

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judgment) (stating that the “normal definition of discrimination”

is “differential treatment”); City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living

Center, 473 US 432, 439 (1985) (stating that the Equal Protection

Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly

situated should be treated alike”). 

The allegation that Annamaria is a member of a protected

class alone is not sufficient to state a claim of discrimination. 

See Sherman v Yakahi, 549 F2d 1287, 1291-92 (9th Cir 1977) (holding

that the allegation that plaintiff was Jewish and was the only

person denied permanent employment was insufficient to state a

claim of religious discrimination). Nor are the allegations that

Annamaria and the individual defendants are members of different

protected groups sufficient. See Thornton v City of St Helens, 425

F3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir 2005) (“[T]he fact that Mrs Thornton is

Native American and certain City council members and administrators

are not, standing alone, does not mean that Defendants have

discriminated on the basis of race.”). Finally, the allegations

that (1) Annamaria is a member of a protected class, (2) the

individual defendants are members of a different class and (3) the

individual defendants acted unreasonably do not cumulatively

establish either a racially discriminatory intent or differential

treatment and thus fail to state an equal protection claim. See

Bingham v City of Manhattan Beach, 341 F3d 939, 948-49 (9th Cir

2003) (holding that an African-American plaintiff’s allegations

that he and the Caucasian police officer disagreed about the

reasonableness of the traffic stop were insufficient to raise an

inference of racial discrimination).

//

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Again, Annamaria has alleged nothing more than that she

has a Spanish surname and is Hispanic while the individual

defendants are all Caucasian. SAC ¶¶47, 53. In the absence of an

allegation that defendants responded more favorably to similar acts

of peer harassment directed at students outside the protected group

of which Annamaria is a member, discriminatory intent cannot

reasonably be inferred from the allegations in the SAC. 

Annamaria’s claim for racial discrimination is therefore DISMISSED. 

Further, it being clear that Annamaria does not plan to proceed on

a theory of disparate treatment, but rather a “That’s what Mexicans

do” theory unrecognized by the law, such dismissal is WITH

PREJUDICE. 

IV

State Law Claims

A

Sexual Battery

Annamaria’s second claim alleges “sexual

battery/harassment.” SAC ¶82. To state a claim of sexual battery,

a plaintiff must allege that (1) defendant intended to cause

“harmful or offensive” contact and (2) plaintiff batteree suffered

“sexually offensive contact.” Cal Civ Code § 1708.5; see also

Angie M v Superior Court, 37 Cal App 4th 1217, 1225 (1995).

Defendants argue that dismissal is required in the

absence of any allegation that any individual defendant actually

touched Annamaria. Annamaria argues that the allegations that

defendants breached their duty to protect Annamaria from harms such

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as sexual battery while she was at school are sufficient to state a

claim for sexual battery, relying primarily upon M W v Panama Buena

Vista Union Sch Dist, 110 Cal App 4th, 508, 517 (2003). 

As Annamaria correctly observes, Panama Buena holds that

a school district has an “affirmative duty to take all reasonable

steps to protect its students.” Id. Panama Buena, however, did

not approve of liability for sexual assault, but rather for the

school’s negligent failure to protect the student from a third

party’s sexual assault. Id at 518. 

An essential element of sexual battery is that the

defendant touched the plaintiff in a “sexually offensive” manner. 

Annamaria’s allegations that the individual defendants breached

their duty to prevent Gerardo and Oscar from touching her does not

establish that the district defendants sexually battered Annamaria

are no substitute. The failure to allege that any of the

individual defendants themselves ever touched Annamaria is fatal to

a claim of sexual battery. Further, it is clear this deficiency

cannot be remedied by amendment. Accordingly, Annamaria’s second

claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

B

California Education Code

Annamaria’s eleventh claim alleges that NVUSD and the

individual defendants failed to discharged their statutory duties

under California Education Code §§ 220 and 231.5. Section 220

provides that “[n]o person shall be subjected to discrimination on

the basis of sex * * * in any program or activity conducted by an

educational institution.” Section 231.5 provides that “each

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educational institution in the State of California shall have a

written policy on sexual harassment * * * [which] shall be

displayed in a prominent location * * * [and] shall be provided as

part of any orientation program conduct for new students.” 

 Defendants argues that §§ 220 and 231.5 do not provide a

private right of action. Doc #35 at 13. NVUSD relies on Nicole M,

964 F Supp at 1390. But significantly, Nicole M was decided before

California Education Code § 262.4 was enacted in 1998. See Stats

1998, c 914 (AB 499) § 38. 

Section 262.4 provides: “This chapter may be enforced

through a civil action.” Other courts have concluded that § 262.4

affords a private right of action under California Education Code

without any requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted. 

See C N v Wolf, 410 F Supp 2d 894, 903-04 (CD Cal 2005) (declining

to follow Nicole M and holding that § 262.4 “explicitly” provides a

private right of action under the California Education Code). For

the reasons that follow, the undersigned disagrees with this

interpretation. 

 Section 262.4 is contained in Article 9 of the

California Education Code, which encompasses Education Code §§

260-262.4. When read in conjunction with § 262.3, the language of

§ 262.4 becomes ambiguous. Section 262.3(c) states that “[n]othing

in this chapter shall be construed to require an exhaustion of the

administrative complaint process before civil law remedies may be

pursued.” Next, § 262.3(d) declares that “[n]otwithstanding any

other provision of law, a person who alleges that * * * she is a

victim of discrimination may not seek civil remedies pursuant to

this section until at least 60 days have elapsed from the filing of

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an appeal to the State Department of Education * * *.” Although

there is some tension between subsections (c) and (d) of § 262.3

inasmuch as the former explicitly eschews exhaustion of

administrative remedies as a prerequisite to judicial remedies and

the latter explicitly requires parties to pursue administrative

remedies, this ambiguity is reconcilable: Although parties need

not exhaust the administrative complaint process, they must at

least pursue administrative remedies to the point of having filed

an appeal with the California Department of Education and waiting

60 days. But the following textual wrinkle is not so easy to

straighten out: Although on its face the statute requires parties

to pursue administrative remedies only before seeking civil

remedies pursuant to § 262.3, it is § 262.4, not § 262.3, that

authorizes civil remedies. 

A letter of legislative intent authored by the sponsor of

Assembly Bill 499, which amended § 262.3 and added § 262.4,

resolves this ambiguity:

Prior to the passage of AB 499 (1997-98), the

Education Code’s prohibition of discrimination

against students was enforceable through a civil

action for legal and equitable relief. It was the

legislature’s express intent in enacting AB 499 to

limit that private right of action under the

Education Code, by requiring students to go through

an administrative grievance process prior to the

pursuit of civil remedies other than injunctive

relief.

Letter from Assembly Member Keul (April 6, 1999) (published in the

Assembly Daily Journal, 1998-1999 Regular Session, at 1381). 

Generally, California courts do not consider the motive

or understanding of individual legislators when construing the

meaning of a statute. Roberts v City of Palmdale, 5 Cal 4th 363,

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377 (1993). A letter of intent, however, can be considered where

it evidences more than “merely the personal view of the proponent

of the bill.” Id; see also In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal 3d

583, 589 (1976). Such is the case here because a motion to print a

letter in the Assembly Daily Journal “shall require a majority

vote.” Assembly Rule 42(c), available at

http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/rules/assembly_rules.html. 

Accordingly, the court concludes that § 262.4 must be

read with the limitations detailed in § 262.3 such that aggrieved

parties may not pursue claims for damages in court “until at least

60 days have elapsed from the filing of an appeal to the State

Department of Education.” The SAC alleges that Annamaria “has

complied with the applicable tort claims statutes by filing

government tort claims with” NVUSD, which were rejected on July 15,

2002. SAC ¶62. Because Annamaria has not pursued her

administrative remedies to the point required by § 262.3(d), the

court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her

claim under the California Education Code. Accordingly,

Annamaria’s eleventh claim is DISMISSED.

C

Unruh Civil Rights Act

Annamaria’s twelfth claim alleges that NVUSD violated the

Unruh Civil Rights Act (the “Unruh Act”), Cal Civ Code § 51 et seq. 

Section 51 provides: “All persons * * * no matter what their sex

* * * are entitled to the full and equal accommodations,

advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business

establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Section 51.5 provides: 

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2

 The Unruh Act consists only of § 51. See Stamps v Superior

Court, 136 Cal App 4th 1441, 1449-52 (2006); Alch v Superior Court, 122 Cal App 4th 339, 395 (2004); Gatto v County of Sonoma, 98 Cal App

4th 744, 757-58 (2002). Thus, § 51.5 is not technically part of the

Unruh Act. But both provisions are enforceable through § 52(a) and

any distinction between the two sections is not implicated by the

present motion. “To avoid any confusion, all references to the Unruh

Act in this opinion mean California Civil Code § 51.” Goldman v

Standard Ins Co, 341 F3d 1023, 1027 n 4 (9th Cir 2003).

26

“No business establishment of any kind whatsoever shall

discriminate against * * * any person in this state * * * on

account of” sex.2

 Section 52(a) makes the foregoing statutory

rights enforceable through a civil action. 

As an initial matter, it appears that California courts

have yet to address specifically whether a school district is a

“business establishment” within the meaning of the Unruh Act. But

see Ibister v Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc, 40 Cal 3d 72, 79

(1985) (discussing the original version of the bill that became the

Unruh Act, which included “schools” within its scope, and

concluding that the California legislature intended to include all

groups enumerated in the original bill). Several federal courts

have concluded that public schools are “business establishments”

within the meaning of the Unruh Act. See Nicole M, 964 F Supp at

1388; Doe v Petaluma City Sch Dist, 830 F Supp 1560, 1581-82 (ND

Cal 1993); Sullivan v Vallejo City Unif Sch Dist, 731 F Supp 947,

952 (ED Cal 1990). Defendants do not argue the contrary here.

Rather, defendants argue that sexual harassment is not

actionable under the Unruh Act, relying exclusively upon Brown v

Smith, 55 Cal App 4th 767 (1997). The Unruh Act claim in Brown

arose from repeated, offensive sexual advances toward the plaintiff

by her landlord. Plaintiff postulated “that the sexual harassment

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* * * she endured amounted to denial of ongoing access to her

housing accommodations on the basis of her sex, since she was

deprived of the quiet enjoyment of her home.” Id at 786. In the

court’s view, however, plaintiff had “effectively alleged an

intentional tort in the guise of a statutory [Unruh Act] cause of

action.” Id at 787. The court was guided by the California

Supreme Court’s recognition that the California legislature

intended the Unruh Act to encompass only the categories of

discrimination enumerated therein and admonition that expansion of

those categories should be consistent with that intent. See id

(relying upon Harris v Capital Growth Investors XIV, 52 Cal 3d 1142

(1991) (holding that the Unruh Act does not encompass economic

discrimination and discrimination based on a theory of disparate

impact)). The Brown court concluded that “expand[ing] the

protected categories in the [Unruh] Act to include victims of

sexual harassment” would be inconsistent with legislative intent.

The court’s conclusion was reinforced by California Civil

Code § 51.9, which imposes liability for sexual harassment in

business, service and professional relationships, and which the

California legislature understood as creating a cause of action

where none existed before. Id at 787-88. At the time of the Brown

decision, § 51.9 implicitly defined “sexual harassment” as “sexual

advances, solicitations, sexual requests, or demands for sexual

compliance * * * that [are] unwelcome and persistent or severe.” 

See Cal Civ Code § 51.9(a)(2). 

Given the facts of the case and the court’s reliance upon

§ 51.9, Brown stands for nothing more than the proposition that

sexual harassment in the form of unwanted sexual advances are not

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actionable under the Unruh Act. If the SAC had alleged that

defendants themselves had harassed Annamaria with unwelome sexual

comments or conduct, defendants’ reliance upon Brown would be

better placed. But defendants are not alleged to have engaged in

sexual harassment; rather, the court construes Annamaria’s Unruh

Act claim to allege that defendants’ “inadequate response to

complaints of sexual harassment,” Nicole M, 964 F Supp at 1389,

constituted intentional discrimination on the basis of sex. Brown

is thus distinguishable and therefore does not control. 

Defendants have not presented any other argument why the

court should not follow the lead of other federal courts that have

found a cognizable Unruh Act claim on similar allegations, see

Nicole M, 964 F Supp at 1388-89; Davison ex rel Sims v Santa

Barbara High Sch Dist, 48 F Supp 2d 1225, 1232-33 (CD Cal 1998)

(following Nicole M). Accordingly, the individual defendants’

motion to dismiss Annamaria’s twelfth claim is DENIED.

D

Negligence Claims

Annamaria asserts an assortment of claims sounding in

negligence: failure to protect (third claim), negligent

supervision (fourth claim), negligent placement (fifth claim),

negligent failure to protect (sixth claim), general negligence

(ninth claim) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (tenth

claim).

Defendants present several arguments for dismissing the

negligence-based claims: First, defendants contend they cannot be

liable in negligence absent a statutory basis. Next, defendants

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contend they are entitled to governmental immunity because they

were performing discretionary functions. Further, defendants

appear to deny the existence of any duty to protect Annamaria from

Gerardo and Oscar. Finally, defendants maintain that these claims

are duplicative of each other. 

1

“[A] public employee is liable for injury caused by his

act or omission to the same extent as a private person,” Cal Gov’t

Code § 820, except that “a public employee is not liable for an

injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission

was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him [or

her], whether or not such discretion is abused,” id § 820.2. Thus,

the individual defendants can be held liable only for injuries

caused by non-discretionary acts of the individual defendants but

are immune from suit for acts or omissions within the individual

defendants’ discretion. 

To the extent defendants maintain they cannot be liable

in tort absent some additional statutory basis, defendants

misunderstand the above-quoted provisions of the California Tort

Claims Act, Cal Gov’t Code § 810 et seq. “Under the California

Tort Claims Act, public employees are liable for their torts unless

a statute provides otherwise.” Barner v Leeds, 24 Cal 4th 676, 682

(2000) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Contrary to

defendants’ suggestion, then, there is a statutory basis for

liability based on common law theories.

//

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2

Defendants argue they are immune from suit because the

acts or omissions challenged in the SAC were discretionary within

the meaning of California Government Code § 820.2. 

“[N]ot all acts requiring a public employee to choose

among alternatives entail the use of ‘discretion’ within the

meaning of [§ 820.2].” Barner, 24 Cal 4th at 684-85. Rather,

“immunity applies only to deliberate and considered policy

decisions, in which a ‘conscious balancing of risks and advantages

took place.’” Caldwell v Montoya, 10 Cal 4th 972, 981 (1995)

(quoting Johnson v California, 69 Cal 2d 782, 795 (1968))

(alterations omitted). 

a

Principal Daugherty’s decision to take a particular (or

no) disciplinary action involved the exercise of discretion within

the meaning of § 820.2. See Kemmerer v County of Fresno, 200 Cal

App 3d 1426, 1437-39 (1988) (holding that county officials’

decision to institute disciplinary proceedings against a civil

service employee “was a policy decision involving the exercise of

discretion” entitling them to immunity under § 820.2); see also

Nicole M, 964 F Supp at 1389-90 (relying upon Kemmerer and

concluding that “[d]ecisions by a school principal or

superintendent to impose discipline on students and conduct

investigations of complaints necessarily require the exercise of

judgment or choice, and accordingly are discretionary, rather than

ministerial, acts”); Petaluma, 830 F Supp at 1583 (relying upon

Kemmerer and holding that high school counselor was entitled to

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immunity based on his alleged failure to respond adequately to

known peer sexual harassment). It is not appear that this

conclusion, by itself, requires dismissal of any claims against

Principal Daugherty. But Principal Daugherty’s alleged failure to

take disciplinary measures to curb the harassment is clearly one

factual predicate for Annamaria’s claims. This cannot be a basis

for liability under any common law theory in this suit.

b

Annamaria’s fifth claim for negligent placement alleges

that defendants breached their duty to place Annamaria in an

appropriate class. The decision where to place a student new to

public education clearly involves the balancing of various

considerations such as the student’s social needs and academic

preparedness. Such balancing necessarily involves the exercise of

discretion and, accordingly, cannot be a predicate for liability. 

Cf Thompson v County of Alameda, 27 Cal 3d 741, 748-49 (1980)

(holding that county’s selection of a custodian for juvenile

offender was a discretionary act within the meaning of § 820.2);

Becerra v County of Santa Cruz, 68 Cal App 4th 1450, 1462-64 (1999)

(holding that social workers’ selection of a foster home for a

dependent child was a discretionary decision within meaning of

§ 820.2); Ronald S v County of San Diego, 16 Cal App 4th 887, 897

(1993) (“The nature of the investigation to be conducted and the

ultimate determination of suitability of adoptive parents bear the

hallmarks of uniquely discretionary activity.”). 

Similarly, to the extent Annamaria’s fifth claim purports

to predicate liability on the decision to entrust Mrs Kernberger

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with a classroom that she was allegedly “unable to control,” SAC

¶108, that decision also involved the exercise of discretion for

which the district defendants are immune from liability. Because

all the actions giving rise to Annamaria’s fifth claim are

immunized, that claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

c

California case law makes clear that defendants are not

entitled to immunity for their alleged failures to protect or warn. 

See Lopez v S Cal Rapid Transit Dist, 40 Cal 3d 780, 793-95 (1985)

(denying immunity to public common carrier for alleged failure of

bus driver to protect passenger); Peterson v San Francisco

Commmunity College Dist, 36 Cal 3d 799, 815 (1984) (denying

immunity to community college district and its agents for alleged

failure to warn student of known danger); Tarasoff v Regents of

Univ of California, 17 Cal 3d 425, 444-47 (1976) (denying

therapists immunity for alleged failure to warn decedent of

danger); Johnson, 69 Cal 2d at 793-97 (denying immunity to State of

California for parole officer’s alleged failure to warn foster

family of foster child’s dangerous propensities). 

With regard to the alleged failure of individual

defendants adequately to train or supervise the teachers, due to

the lack of briefing on the issue and the apparent lack of

California case law addressing the question, the court declines at

this time to grant immunity for these alleged instances of

malfeasance. If at a later point in these proceedings defendants

show that training and supervision of teachers at Redwood entailed

discretion within the meaning of § 820.2, the court will grant

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immunity as appropriate. 

3

Defendants suggest in passing that they did not owe a

duty to protect Annamaria from Gerardo and Oscar. See MTD at 8-9.

Although “neither school districts nor their employees

are the insurers of the safety of their students,” they do owe “a

duty to use the degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence,

charged with comparable duties, would exercise in the same

circumstances.” Leger v Stockton Unif Sch Dist, 202 Cal App 3d

1448, 1459 (1988) (citing Dailey v Los Angeles Unif Sch Dist, 2 Cal

3d 741, 747 (1970)). In general, one owes no duty to warn of or

control the conduct of another. “Such a duty may arise, however,

if (a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third

person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third

person’s conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the

actor and the other which gives the other a right to protection.” 

Id at 1458 (quoting Davidson v City of Westminster, 32 Cal 3d 197,

203 (1982) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965)))

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

“A special relationship is formed between a school

district and its students resulting in the imposition of an

affirmative duty on the school district to take all reasonable

steps to protect its students. This affirmative duty arises, in

part, based on the compulsory nature of education.” Panama Buena,

110 Cal App 4th at 517. But this special relationship does not by

itself impose on defendants a duty to protect Annamaria from sexual

battery by Gerardo and Oscar, for “[s]tudents are not at risk

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merely because they are at school.” Panama Buena, 110 Cal App 4th

at 519. Rather, defendants’ duty to protect Annamaria from the

particular harm alleged depends on whether that harm was reasonably

foreseeable.” Id at 518; Leger, 202 Cal App 3d at 1459.

The SAC alleges that defendants knew or should have known

that Gerardo and Oscar “were engaging in similar acts in class on

numerous occasions” and “were a hazard to fellow students.” SAC

¶¶91-92. These allegations are sufficient to allege a duty to warn

and/or protect Annamaria from Gerardo and Oscar.

Finally, contrary to defendants’ contention, the SAC

sufficiently alleges breach and proximate causation. See, e g,

¶¶93-95. 

4

Defendants move to dismiss Annamaria’s fourth, sixth,

ninth and tenth claims on the ground that they are duplicative of

her third claim, which the court construes as a motion to strike

these claims as redundant pursuant to FRCP 12(f). Because it is

readily apparent that Annamaria’s ninth claim (general negligence)

adds nothing to the SAC, defendants’ motion to strike Annamaria’s

ninth claim is GRANTED. The court declines defendants’ invitation

to groom the pleadings any further.

E

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Annamaria’s eighth claim alleges intentional infliction

of emotional distress (IIED). SAC ¶127. “The elements of [IIED]

are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the

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intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of

causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe

or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate

causation fo the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous

conduct.” Christensen v Superior Court, 54 Cal 3d 868, 903 (1991)

(internal quotations omitted). Further, “[i]t is not enough that

the conduct be intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct

directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff

of whom the defendant is aware.” Id. 

Defendants maintain that their conduct was not extreme

and outrageous. “The standard set for measuring outrageous conduct

indicates the qualifying conduct must be so outrageous in character

and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in

a civilized community.” Davidson v City of Westminster, 32 Cal 3d

197, 209 (1982). 

The court first notes that immunity for defendants’

decision to place (or recommend placing) Annamaria in the so-called

“special classes” extends to this claim, as does immunity for

Principal Daugherty’s alleged failure to take adequate disciplinary

action. See supra IV(D)(2). The only remaining averments that

could plausibly support an IIED claim against Principal Daugherty

are the allegations that (1) she repeatedly telephoned Antoinette

to demand that Annamaria return to school, insinuating that it was

unlawful for Annamaria to not attend school and (2) she did not

allow Annamaria to attend the final school dance, telling Annamaria

that she was “unwelcome.” SAC ¶¶54-55, 113-14. 

//

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Although defendants did not so argue, telephone calls to

Antoinette cannot give rise to an IIED claim for Annamaria because

the conduct was neither directed at Annamaria nor did it occur in

her presence, physical or telephonic. See Christensen, 54 Cal 3d

at 902-06; see also Ochoa v Superior Court, 39 Cal 3d 159, 165 n 5

(1985) (holding that parents could not state IIED claim based on

conduct directed at their child). In any event, it simply is not

beyond the realm of civil decency for a school principal sternly to

demand the attendance of an enrolled student.

With regard to the school dance, the court first notes

that, although the SAC does not specifically so allege, the

allegations suggest that Annamaria was no longer attending Redwood. 

See SAC ¶113 (alleging that Principal Daugherty would not let

Annamaria attend the dance “either as an independent study student

of [Redwood] or as a guest of Annamaria’s closest friends who

attended [Redwood]”). The court further notes that the parties

have not briefed whether the decision not to allow Annamaria attend

the dance was discretionary within the meaning of California

Government Code § 820.2. In any event, given Annamaria’s young age

and connection with Redwood, the court cannot conclude at this

juncture that refusing to allow Annamaria to attend the dance and

telling her she was “unwelcome” could not prove to have been

extreme or outrageous. Whether this proves to be so will depend

upon the particulars of the communications between Annamaria and

Principal Daugherty. 

Neither Mrs Myers’ alleged conduct (sending Gerardo and

Oscar to Principal Daugherty’s office) nor Mrs Kernberger’s alleged

conduct (initially instructing Annamaria to ignore Gerardo and

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Oscar and later sending the boys to the principal’s office) is

extreme and outrageous. 

The SAC alleges no facts indicating that Superintendent

Brown directed any action toward Annamaria, much less action that

was extreme or outrageous with intent to cause emotional distress.

Annamaria’s eighth claim is DISMISSED as to defendants

Myers, Kernberger and Brown.

V

Motion to Strike

Defendants move to strike all claims against defendants 

Goldberg and Chase based on their limited involvement in the events

giving rise to this action and the fact that the SAC does not pray

for relief against these two defendants. Annamaria appears to

concede that Goldberg and Chase are subjects of the SAC only to the

extent they “were involved in making the decision to place

[Annamaria] in a class that was neither appropriate for her skill

level nor safe for her personal well being.” Opp at 21. Because

the court has concluded that Annamaria’s claim for negligent

placement should be dismissed, the court further concludes that all

claims against defendants Goldberg and Chase should be DISMISSED.

Defendants also move to strike Annamaria’s prayer for

punitive damages. “It is well established that a jury may award

punitive damages under section 1983 either when a defendant’s

conduct was driven by evil motive or intent, or when it involved a

reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of

others.” Morgan v Woessner, 997 F2d 1244, 1255 (9th Cir 1993)

(quotations omitted); see also generally Dang v Cross, 422 F3d 800

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(9th Cir 2005). Dismissal of all state law claims against NVUSD

moots defendants’ argument that punitive damages cannot be

recovered against a public entity pursuant to California Government

Code § 818. Annamaria cites no authority for the proposition that

a state actor must be acting outside the scope of her employment in

order to be sued in her individual capacity.

Annamaria’s motion to strike the prayer for punitive

damages is DENIED.

VII

In sum, defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED

IN PART as follows: Annamaria’s first claim (Title IX) is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to the individual defendants.

Annamaria’s second through twelfth claims, inasmuch as they are

asserted against NVUSD and the individual defendants in their

official capacities, are jurisdictionally barred by the Eleventh

Amendment and are accordingly DISMISSED as to NVUSD and the

individual defendants in their official capacities WITHOUT

PREJUDICE to Annamaria’s ability to assert these claims in a court

of competent jurisdiction. Defendant Myers is entitled to

qualified immunity on Annamaria’s § 1983 claim; accordingly,

Annamaria’s seventh claim against Mrs Myers is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. As to all individual defendants named in their

individual capacities, Annamaria’s claim for racial discrimination

is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; Annamaria’s second, fifth and tenth

claims (sexual battery, negligent placement and violation of the

California Education Code, respectively) are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE; and Annamaria’s ninth claim (general negligence) is

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STRICKEN as redundant. Annamaria’s eighth claim is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE as to defendants Myers, Kernberger and Brown. Finally,

any remaining claims against defendants Goldberg and Chase are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Annamaria may file an amended pleading consistent with

this order within thirty days of the filing of this order.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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