Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02519/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02519-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDRE L. HART,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. CELAYA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 06-02519 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Docket nos. 34, 81)

Plaintiff Andre L. Hart is a state prisoner, incarcerated at

Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP) when he filed this pro se civil

rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that, on March

10, 2005, Defendants Alfred Aguirre, Frank Colburn, Joseph Celaya,

Ernie Camarena and Christopher Salopek were involved in an incident

in which they (1) used excessive force against Plaintiff and 

(2) were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. 

The incident entailed Plaintiff’s placement in a holding cell,

exposure to pepper spray, and subsequent decontamination.

All Defendants move for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes

Defendants’ motions. For the reasons discussed below, the Court

GRANTS Defendants’ motions.

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 11, 2006, Plaintiff filed his complaint against

Defendants Aguirre, Colburn, Celaya, Camarena, Salopek, E. Pulido

and Does. On November 1, 2006, the Court issued a screening order

finding that Plaintiff had alleged a cognizable claim of excessive

force against Defendants Celaya, Colburn, Camarena, Salopek and

Aguirre; and that he had alleged a cognizable claim of deliberate

indifference to his medical needs against Defendants Colburn,

Camarena, Salopek and Aguirre. The Court dismissed without

prejudice Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Pulido and Does,

and dismissed his official capacity claims. The Court ordered the

complaint served on Defendants.

Defendants Celaya, Camarena and Salopek moved for summary

judgment (docket no. 34). Later, Defendants Aguirre and Colburn

moved for summary judgment (docket no. 81). Plaintiff opposed both

motions. Defendants Celaya, Camarena and Salopek replied.

On July 12, 2007, the Court referred the case to a magistrate

judge for discovery purposes. The magistrate judge ordered

Defendants to produce Plaintiff’s medical and central file for

Plaintiff’s review. The magistrate judge also ordered Defendants

to produce several documents for in camera review, as follows: 

(1) any complaints claiming any Defendant used improper or

excessive force from January 1, 2001 to January 1, 2006; (2) SVSP

policies and operational procedures related to the use of force;

(3) Use of Force Critique for the incident, number SVP-FC7-05-03-

0136; and (4) Modification Order, corresponding memorandum, and

Confidential Supplement for the inmate appeal, log number SVSP-DCase 4:06-cv-02519-CW Document 92 Filed 04/11/08 Page 2 of 34
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

Indecent exposure, while in prison, constitutes a misdemeanor

offense under the California Code of Regulations and is subject to

possible criminal prosecution. (Celaya Decl. ¶ 8.) See 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 3007 (“Inmates may not participate in illegal sexual

acts”). 

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05-01465. Because the magistrate judge determined that the

submitted documents would qualify for an “attorneys’ eyes only”

protective order, and because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the

Court has reviewed the documents and has taken into consideration

any information supporting Plaintiff’s claims.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. SVSP Policies

According to SVSP policy, “if an inmate is accused of exposing

himself or masturbating in the presence of a prison official or

medical professional, then he is promptly rehoused to

Administrative Segregation [ad seg] and will be issued a Rules

Violation Report for sexual harassment.”1 (Celaya Decl. ¶ 8;

Mensing Decl. ¶ 3.)

Prior to being placed in ad seg, inmates are placed in holding

cells. In order to check for contraband items in their body

cavities and clothing, inmates must submit to an unclothed body

search. (Camarena Decl. ¶ 5.) An unclothed body search entails

“stripping out of all your clothes, run[ning] your fingers through

your hair, through your mouth, lifting your genitals, turning

around, coughing, lifting up the heel [sic] of your feet, totally

naked, while [prison officials] stand there and observe you and

shine a flashlight.” (Pl.’s Depo. 127.) Once an inmate is secured

in a holding cell, prison officials must complete a holding cell

log where they document the inmate’s welfare every thirty minutes. 

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2

One day prior, on March 9, 2005, Plaintiff had pressed a note

to the window of his cell door and told the nurse that if she did

not read it, he would “be acting like [he] did on B-Yard.” (SVPFC7-05-03-0136 Incident Report at 2.) While housed in Facility B,

Plaintiff had masturbated in the nurse’s presence. (Id.)

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(Camarena Decl. ¶ 5.) Even if an inmate’s hands have been exposed

to Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) pepper spray, he must still submit to an

unclothed body search for contraband. (Salopek Decl. ¶ 6.)

The OC solution used at SVSP is called MK-9 Magnum Aerosol

Pepper Projector. (Gifford Decl. ¶ 2.) The decontamination

procedure listed on the label reads as follows:

Remove subject from contaminated area and

position subject in an area of fresh air. . . .

[C]ontinue to monitor subject throughout the

decontamination process. When available, allow

the subject to flush their eyes with copious

amounts of fresh running water.

(Id. ¶ 3.)

II. Plaintiff’s March 10, 2005 Placement in Administrative 

Segregation and Related Incidents

While at SVSP, Plaintiff received at least three Rules

Violation Reports related to sexual misconduct. On July 24, 2004,

Plaintiff was found guilty of indecent exposure for masturbating

naked in front of an SVSP Medical Technical Assistant (MTA) on June

24, 2004. On April 26, 2005, Plaintiff was found guilty of sexual

harassment, related to indecent exposure, for exposing himself to

an SVSP nurse on March 10, 2005. On November 28, 2005, Plaintiff

received a Rules Violation Report for masturbating in front of an

SVSP medical technician. Plaintiff’s March 10, 2005 violation gave

rise to the alleged incidents for which he asserts this claim.

On March 10, 2005, at about 10:00 am, Plaintiff exposed

himself to a nurse,2 while she was distributing medications to

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inmates. The nurse informed Sergeant Joshua Mensing, the

supervising officer for the facility in which Plaintiff was housed. 

(Ugaz Decl. Ex. D, Rules Violation Report SVP-FC7-05-03-0136.) At

about 11:00 am, Sgt. Mensing ordered Defendant Camarena to escort

Plaintiff from his cell to the Program Office, in preparation for

placing Plaintiff in ad seg. (Mensing Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendant

Camarena told Plaintiff that he was escorting him to the Program

Office. Plaintiff complied with the instructions from Defendant

Camarena, who placed him in a holding cell in the health services

annex. (Camarena Decl. ¶ 6.) At 11:30 am, once Plaintiff was

secured in a holding cell, MTA Pulido completed a preliminary

medical evaluation; she found that he had no injuries and told him

that he was to be placed in administrative segregation. (Pl.’s

Depo. 97; Lee Decl. Ex. A.) Shortly thereafter, Defendant Camarena

ordered Plaintiff to submit to an unclothed body search, and

Plaintiff refused. (Pl.’s Depo. 99-101.) Defendant Camarena

explained that all inmates in holding cells must submit to an

unclothed body search, and Plaintiff again refused, demanding to

speak to a superior officer. (Id.) 

Defendant Camarena then left the holding area to inform Sgt.

Mensing that Plaintiff was secured in a holding cell, but that he

refused to submit to the body search. Defendant Camarena and Sgt.

Mensing returned to the holding cell area, and Sgt. Mensing ordered

Plaintiff to comply with the search. (Mensing Decl. ¶ 5.) 

Plaintiff became “progressively more defiant, agitated, and loud.” 

(Id.) He refused to comply until he could speak with Defendant

Celaya. (Pl.’s Depo. 104.) Sgt. Mensing then left the holding

area to inform Defendant Celaya, the supervising facility

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lieutenant, that Plaintiff refused to submit to the search. 

(Mensing Decl. ¶ 5.) 

At approximately 1:00 pm, Defendants Celaya and Salopek and

Sgt. Mensing joined Defendant Camarena in the holding cell area. 

(Celaya Decl. ¶ 4; Salopek Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendant Celaya ordered

Plaintiff to submit to the unclothed body search, and Plaintiff

refused. (Pl.’s Depo. 116.) Plaintiff and Defendant Celaya were

yelling back and forth with Plaintiff demanding to see the facility

captain, while pushing up against and shaking the door of his cell. 

(Pl.’s Depo. 115; Celaya Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff testifies that he

was “irate,” and “yelling” at Defendant Celaya. (Pl.’s Depo. 100-

13.) Defendant Celaya refused to retrieve the facility captain,

and Plaintiff continued to rattle the door of his holding cell. 

(Ugaz Decl. Ex. F, Incident Report.) Defendants demanded that he

stop. Plaintiff testifies that Defendant Celaya yelled, “I’m

giving you a direct order to strip out, if you don’t I’ll spray you

with a chemical agent and strip you out.” (Pl.’s Depo. 112.) 

Plaintiff shouted, “I don’t give a fuck about your program. Spray

me, because I am not going to strip out.” (Id. at 115.) 

Defendants believed that Plaintiff might “seriously hurt himself.” 

(Camarena Decl. ¶ 8; Celaya Decl. ¶ 4; Salopek Decl. ¶ 4.) Sgt.

Mensing was also concerned that Plaintiff might break the cell door

and pose a danger to others. (Mensing Decl. ¶ 6.) 

Plaintiff testifies that Defendant Celaya ordered that

Plaintiff be pepper sprayed. (Pl.’s Depo. 113.) Shortly

thereafter, for thirty to sixty seconds, Sgt. Mensing sprayed

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3

The record refers to two canisters of OC. Plaintiff

testifies that Defendant Celaya sprayed him for about three seconds

through the cuff port in the cell door, but that his body was

blocking it; whereas Sgt. Mensing declares that he first attempted

to use one canister of OC that was too depleted. However, both

sides agree that Sgt. Mensing sprayed the effective canister of OC

through the top of Plaintiff’s cell door.

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Plaintiff with a canister3 of OC, through the top of Plaintiff’s

cell door. (Pl.’s Depo. 118; Mensing Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff admits

that neither Defendant Salopek nor Defendant Celaya sprayed him

with OC. (Pl.’s Depo. 122.) At the time he was sprayed, Plaintiff

was wearing jeans, a “state blue” shirt, a t-shirt, tennis shoes,

socks and a head covering, and he was standing in the corner of his

cell with his back to the spray. (Id. at 119.) Plaintiff was

sprayed at approximately 12:45 pm. (Pl.’s Decl. Ex. N.)

Plaintiff testifies that, after he was sprayed, Sgt. Mensing

and Defendants Celaya, Camarena and Salopek left the holding cell

area and closed the door. (Id. at 125.) Before they left,

Defendant Celaya said, “[L]et me know when you are ready to strip

out.” (Id.) Plaintiff testifies that he was trying to be “macho”

by not coughing, but “eventually it got the better of” him and he

started to cough and choke. (Id.) He states that he yelled that

he was ready to strip out, but that Defendant Celaya tormented him

by twice asking him to yell louder. (Id. at 125-26.) Plaintiff

testifies that three times he had to yell that he would strip out

before Defendant Celaya said, “Okay do it.” (Id. at 126.) Then,

Defendants Camarena and Salopek re-entered the holding cell room to

conduct the strip search. (Id.) Plaintiff testifies that

approximately five minutes elapsed between the time he was sprayed

with OC and the time Defendants Camarena and Salopek opened the

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4Defendants declare that, after Plaintiff was sprayed, they

stepped into an annex outside of the holding cell area for a minute

or two, until they heard Plaintiff cough and say that he was ready

to comply with an unclothed body search; then, they immediately reentered the holding cell area. (Camarena Decl. ¶¶ 9-10; Celaya

Decl. ¶ 6; Salopek Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.)

5

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Celaya

directed Defendants Camarena and Salopek to put leg restraints on

Plaintiff. In his deposition, Plaintiff states, instead, that

Defendant Salopek directed Defendant Camarena to “grab the leg

irons.” (Pl.’s Depo. 133.)

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door of his cell.4 (Id. at 125.)

Plaintiff then submitted to an unclothed body search in

compliance with orders from Defendants Camarena and Salopek. In

his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, because his hands were

saturated with chemical spray, his genitals burned when he lifted

them for the body search. The entire body search lasted two to

three minutes. (Id. at 127.)

After the body search, Plaintiff complied with instructions

from Defendant Salopek, who placed him in handcuffs, opened the

cell door and ordered him to kneel. Plaintiff testifies that,

before he was able to kneel, Defendant Camarena twisted his right

wrist unnecessarily and attempted to trip him, after which he went

down on his knees. (Id. at 128-31.) Plaintiff also testifies

that, once he was kneeling, Defendant Camarena pushed him into the

corner of a holding cell for ten to fifteen seconds, causing him to

injure his shoulder. (Id. at 131-34.) While Plaintiff was down,

Defendants Camarena and Salopek placed leg restraints on him.5

Plaintiff testifies that, as Defendants Camarena and Salopek

escorted him to an outdoor area for decontamination, Defendant

Camarena continued to subject him to “rough handling” by twisting

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6Sgt. Mensing observed Defendants Camarena and Salopek while

they placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and leg irons, and he followed

them as they escorted Plaintiff outside, but he did not assist in

the decontamination process. (Mensing Decl. ¶ 7.) He declares

that Defendant Camarena did not attempt to trip Plaintiff, push him

into the side of a cell, twist his arms, or taunt him. (Id.)

7Plaintiff testifies that the surface was “asphalt.” (Pl.’s

Depo. 145.) Defendant Camarena declares that it was “light

colored” cement. (Camarena Decl. ¶ 11.) Photographs of the

outdoor area indicate that at least three feet of light colored

cement abut the wall of the health services annex. (Salao Decl.

Exs. H-I.)

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his wrist and jerking his arm.6 (Id. at 138.) Plaintiff admits

that Defendant Salopek, who was holding his left arm, did not

subject him to rough handling. (Id. at 139.) According to the

holding cell log, Plaintiff spent a total of one and a half hours

in the holding cell. (Pl.’s Decl. Ex. I.)

Once outside, Defendants Camarena and Salopek ordered

Plaintiff to kneel in a corner area about three feet from the wall

of the health services annex. (Id. at 138, 144.) Plaintiff was

wearing boxer shorts. Plaintiff recalls that it was close to

ninety degrees outside, and that he was forced to kneel on a hot

surface7 with his back exposed to the heat of the sun. (Pl.’s

Depo. 142-45.) Defendants state that they asked Plaintiff to

kneel, rather than stand, because he had been agitated earlier and

they felt they needed more control over him. (Salopek Decl. ¶ 8;

Camarena Decl. ¶ 11.) Further, they did not take Plaintiff to a

shower, because there was not one in the building, and because

decontamination is achieved with “copious amounts of air,” whereas

water provides only temporary relief. (Id.) Also, Plaintiff might

have refused to exit a locked shower stall. (Mensing Decl. ¶ 8.)

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Defendants declare that they do not recall Plaintiff

requesting something to put under his knees. (Camarena Decl. ¶ 11;

Salopek Decl. ¶ 8.) 

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Defendants Camarena and Salopek declare that, “at no point

during the decontamination process did [Plaintiff] complain of any

injury or need for medical attention.” (Camarena Decl. ¶ 11;

Salopek Decl. ¶ 8.) Defendant Colburn also declares that Plaintiff

did not request medical attention. (Colburn Decl. ¶ 4.) 

10Other than providing Plaintiff with water, Defendant Colburn

declares that he was not involved in, nor did he observe, any other

portion of the incident. (Colburn Decl. ¶ 6.) He also declares

that he has never trapped or cooked lobsters and he did not joke

about or compare Plaintiff to a lobster. (Id. ¶ 7.)

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Plaintiff testifies that his knees began to blister, but

Defendants refused his request for something to put under his

knees.8 (Pl.’s Depo. 145.) He testifies that he felt like he was

going to “pass out,” but that Defendants Salopek, Colburn, Camarena

and two other prison officials, who were standing in a group making

“snide remarks,” refused his request to see an MTA,9

 telling him

that it was just the effects of the spray. (Id. at 148.) 

Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Colburn told a story about

trapping and cooking lobster and that he compared Plaintiff to a

lobster.10 (Id. at 150-51.) Defendant Camarena recalled Plaintiff

stating that he was “burning,” but he believed Plaintiff was

referring to the effects of the pepper spray. (Camarena Decl. 

¶ 11.) Defendant Salopek also recalled that Plaintiff complained

that he was “burning,” but that he did not indicate that he was in

severe pain. (Salopek Decl. ¶ 8.)

At approximately 1:00 pm, Defendant Celaya asked Defendant

Colburn to retrieve a five-gallon bucket from the Work Crew Office. 

(Colburn Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendant Colburn filled the bucket with

water and brought it outside to Plaintiff, who was kneeling between

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11Defendant Colburn declares that, at Plaintiff’s request, he

refilled the five-gallon bucket twice and poured an estimated

fifteen gallons of water over his body. (Colburn Decl. ¶ 5.)

12Defendant Salopek and Sgt. Mensing declare that Plaintiff was

on his knees for decontamination for ten to fifteen minutes. 

(Salopek Decl. ¶ 8; Mensing Decl. ¶ 8.) Defendant Camarena

declares that Plaintiff was decontaminated for twenty to thirty

minutes. (Camarena Decl. ¶ 11.)

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Defendants Camarena and Salopek and did not exhibit signs of

distress. (Id. ¶ 4.) Defendant Colburn advised Plaintiff that

fresh air is the best way to decontaminate and that water provides

only temporary relief from OC and might not stop the burning, but

Plaintiff insisted that he wanted the water poured over his body. 

(Id.) Plaintiff testifies that he had been kneeling for about

forty minutes when Defendant Colburn brought a bucket of water

outside and slowly poured three gallons over his head in order to

“bring [him] back into consciousness.” (Pl.’s Depo. 148-49, 153.) 

Defendant Colburn then went back inside and came out with another

bucket of water, but Plaintiff told him not to pour it over his

head because he thought it was just reactivating the chemicals.11

(Id. at 150.) Plaintiff requested some water to drink, so

Defendant Colburn “poured a little in [his] mouth and he left it at

that.” (Id.) Defendant Colburn declares that he decontaminated

Plaintiff with water for about ten minutes, until Plaintiff

indicated that he did not need any more water. (Id. ¶ 5.) 

Plaintiff recalls being outside for between forty-five minutes and

one hour.12 (Pl.’s Depo. 153.)

Plaintiff testifies that, for the duration of his

decontamination, Defendant Aguirre was standing by the rear exit

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13Defendants Camarena and Salopek do not remember Defendant

Aguirre being present during the spraying of OC or subsequent

decontamination. (Camarena Decl. ¶ 11; Salopek Decl. ¶ 8.) 

Defendant Aguirre declares that he was neither involved in, nor did

he witness, the incident on March 10, 2005. (Aguirre Decl. ¶ 7.) 

Furthermore, if he had been involved, or witnessed the release of

OC, he would have been required to fill out a Rules Violation

Report or an Incident Report. (Id. ¶ 8.) He declares that he did

not draft or assist in drafting any such report. (Id.) He declares

that he never interacted with Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 5.)

14Plaintiff alleges that this document was falsified. The

Court dismissed Plaintiff’s original claim of fraud against MTA

Pulido. Plaintiff provides no evidence that the document is false.

12

door, observing.13 (Pl.’s Depo. 142, 147.) Plaintiff admits that

Defendants Colburn, Salopek, and Aguirre did not use any physical

force against him on March 10, 2005. (Id. at 186-87.)

After decontamination, Plaintiff was escorted inside the

health services annex and placed into a holding cell for about

fifteen more minutes. (Pl.’s Depo. 159.) At approximately 1:00

pm, MTA Pulido completed another medical evaluation of Plaintiff,

in order to clear him for release to ad seg; MTA Pulido found no

injuries, and documented his exposure to and decontamination from

OC.14 (Pl.’s Decl. Ex. N; Salopek Decl. ¶ 9; Camarena Decl. ¶ 12.) 

Plaintiff was then taken to ad seg by Defendants Salopek and

Camarena. (Pl.’s Depo. 159.) In ad seg, Plaintiff’s cell mate was

Otis Moran. (Id. 160.)

A processing report, which was updated “at or near the time of

the event,” indicates that Plaintiff was placed in ad seg at 2:05

pm on March 10, 2005. (Pl.’s Decl. Ex. J.) At approximately 2:20,

Plaintiff received a notice informing him that his ad seg placement

was due to sexual harassment. (Id. at 162.) Later that day, in ad

seg, Plaintiff was observed hitting the door of the cell and

hitting himself on the shoulders. (Parin Decl. ¶ 5.)

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On March 11, 2005, Plaintiff complained of shoulder pain, skin

damage and blistered knees, and he was evaluated by MTA Garcia who

found a scratch on Plaintiff’s left shoulder, but no redness or

swelling and no other injuries. (Lee Decl. Ex. C; Pl.’s Decl. Ex.

C-D.) MTA Garcia notified an SVSP nurse about Plaintiff’s scratch. 

On March 16, 2005, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Bowman who found

that his skin, back and shoulder looked normal. (Pl.’s Decl. Ex.

D.) Plaintiff also received an X-ray of his left shoulder, and on

March 18, 2005, he received the results, which indicated “[n]ormal

bone and joint structures.” (Lee Decl. Ex. D.) Plaintiff

testifies that the pain in his knees subsided within two days and

he was never diagnosed with skin cancer. (Pl.’s Depo. 176.)

On June 15, 2007, SVSP Chief Medical Officer Charles Lee,

M.D., conducted a physical examination of Plaintiff. (Lee Decl. 

¶ 4.) Dr. Lee found no medical evidence of any significant,

residual or permanent injury to Plaintiff’s shoulder, knees, skin

or genitals. (Id.) Dr. Lee observed that Plaintiff was able to

move his shoulders normally and had no damage or scarring, and that

he did not indicate that he was experiencing pain. (Id. ¶ 4a.) 

Plaintiff was also able to move his knees normally without pain,

and Dr. Lee did not observe any scarring or abnormal coloration on

Plaintiff’s knees. (Id. ¶ 4b.) Dr. Lee found no evidence of skin

damage or skin cancer related to sunburn, nor did he find any

residual injury to Plaintiff’s genitals from the pepper spray. 

(Id. ¶¶ 4c-4d.) Dr. Lee also reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records

and found that the “most serious injury that [Plaintiff] suffered

as a result of the March 10, 2005 incident was exposure to the

fleeting effects of pepper spray.” (Id. ¶ 5.)

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LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The

moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no material

factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true the

opposing party’s evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Id. at 324. The court must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary

judgment is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident &

Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). Material facts

which would preclude entry of summary judgment are those which,

under applicable substantive law, may affect the outcome of the

case. The substantive law will identify which facts are material. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.

2000). The moving party may produce evidence negating an essential

element of the non-moving party’s case, or, after suitable

discovery, the moving party may show that the non-moving party does

not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim or

defense to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. Id.

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an absence of

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evidence to support an essential element of a claim or defense, it

is not required to produce evidence showing the absence of a

material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party’s claim. Id. If the moving

party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” Bhan v. NME

Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991).

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of

production by either method, the non-moving party is under no

obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.

DISCUSSION

I. Defendant Celaya, Camarena and Salopek’s Motion for Summary

Judgment

Defendants Celaya, Camarena and Salopek move for summary

judgment (docket no. 34) on the grounds that there is no genuine

issue of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s claims of excessive

force and deliberate indifference, and that they are entitled to

qualified immunity.

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A. Excessive Force Claim

The following allegations form the basis of Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim against Defendants Celaya, Camarena and

Salopek: (1) Defendants dispersed chemical agents into the holding

cell where Plaintiff was located, unprovoked; (2) Defendants

Camarena and Salopek forced him to touch his genitals with his OC

saturated hands during an unclothed body search; (3) Defendant

Camarena twisted Plaintiff’s wrist and pushed him into a holding

cell; and (4) Defendants Camarena and Salopek forced Plaintiff to

kneel on asphalt for an hour under the extreme heat of the sun. 

In order to state a claim for the use of excessive force in

violation of the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff must allege facts

that, if proven, would establish that prison officials applied

force “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,” rather than in

a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). The extent of injury suffered

by an inmate is one of the factors to be considered in determining

whether the use of force is wanton and unnecessary. Id. Not every

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of

action; the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual

punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de

minimis uses of physical force. Id. at 9-10. Guards may use force

only in proportion to the need in each situation. Spain v.

Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir. 1979).

In determining whether the use of force was for the purpose of

maintaining or restoring discipline or, rather, for the malicious

and sadistic purpose of causing harm, a court may evaluate the need

for application of force, the relationship between that need and

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the amount of force used, the extent of any injury inflicted, the

threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any

efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. However, courts must accord prison

administrators wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution

of polices and practices to further institutional order and

security. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979); Jeffers v.

Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 917 (9th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he did not provoke the use

of OC. However, he testifies that he refused to obey orders from

three different prison officials and that he was rattling his cell

door, “irate,” and “yelling” at Defendant Celaya prior to being

sprayed with OC. Defendant Camarena ordered Plaintiff to submit to

an unclothed body search and Plaintiff refused. Defendant Camarena

repeated the order with an explanation that all inmates are

required to submit to an unclothed body search. Plaintiff refused

again, demanding to speak to a superior officer. When this

officer, Sgt. Mensing, arrived and repeated the order, Plaintiff

refused and demanded to speak to Defendant Celaya. Sgt. Mensing

retrieved Defendant Celaya, who repeated the order to submit to an

unclothed body search. At this point, Plaintiff began yelling and

pushing up against his cell door, causing it to shake and rattle. 

Defendants were concerned that Plaintiff would either harm himself

or break out of his cell and endanger others. Plaintiff provides

no evidence that Defendants applied force maliciously, for the

purpose of causing harm.

In the context of Plaintiff’s refusal to comply with the

direct orders of three SVSP officials, his disorderly behavior, and

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the warning that he received, Defendants have demonstrated that

Sgt. Mensing released OC into Plaintiff’s cell for the purpose of

maintaining order and discipline. Regardless of Defendants’ role

in Sgt. Mensing’s action, they were complying with SVSP policy,

which required them to use pepper spray, the lowest level of force,

to keep Plaintiff from hurting himself or others. See Spain v.

Procunier, 600 F. 2d 189, 195 (9th Cir. 1979) (where, “after

adequate warning,” a prisoner acts in such a way to present “a

reasonable possibility that slight force will be required,” use of

chemical spray “may be a legitimate means for preventing small

disturbances from becoming dangerous”).

In his opposition, Plaintiff no longer contends that the use

of pepper spray was unprovoked, but rather, that it was unwarranted

because he was not allowed to speak to a prison official of higher

authority. Aside from the fact that Plaintiff was warned that he

would be sprayed with OC, to which he replied, “Spray me, because I

am not going to strip out,” Sgt. Mensing only resorted to use of

force--the release the OC chemical spray into Plaintiff’s cell--

after Plaintiff refused to comply with the direct orders of three

different SVSP officials. Plaintiff refused an order from

Defendant Camarena, a correctional officer, then from Sgt. Mensing,

the facility supervisor, then from Defendant Celaya, the

supervising facility lieutenant. Plaintiff specifically requested

to speak to Defendant Celaya, but when he did not get what he

wanted from Defendant Celaya, he became belligerent and requested

an audience with a higher prison official. Although prison

officials are not required to negotiate with inmates who refuse to

comply with direct orders, Plaintiff was afforded the opportunity

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to speak with two officials of higher authority. Thus, his

argument is unavailing.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ order to touch his genitals

during the unclothed body search, after his hands were “saturated

in chemical agents,” amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. At

his deposition, Plaintiff did not testify to this fact, and he

explained that the standard procedure for an unclothed body search

entails lifting ones genitals. Defendant Salopek stated that,

because of the danger posed by contraband hidden in body cavities,

inmates must submit to such a search, even if they have been

exposed to OC. The entire search, which included a search of

Plaintiff’s hair, mouth and feet, took approximately two to three

minutes. Plaintiff does not allege that he informed Defendants

that he was in pain. Further, he fails to show that Defendants

intended to cause him harm by ordering him to submit to an

unclothed body search. Defendants ordered the search in compliance

with SVSP policy, in order to maintain institutional security.

Plaintiff alleges that, after he was handcuffed and complying

with orders, Defendant Camarena used excessive force by attempting

to trip him, pushing him into the frame of a holding cell door, and

twisting and pulling his wrists. Plaintiff testifies that, after

being ordered to kneel, he went down on his knees before being

tripped and that Defendant Camarena pushed him into the cell door

for no more than fifteen seconds while he was putting on

Plaintiff’s leg restraints. He also testifies that he was escorted

outside by Defendants Camarena and Salopek, but that only Defendant

Camarena, who was holding Plaintiff’s right arm, twisted his wrist

and jerked his arm. Plaintiff admits that Defendant Salopek did

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15Defendants cite Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776

(2007), for the proposition that, “[w]hen opposing parties tell

different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the

record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should

not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a

motion for summary judgment.” In Scott, the Court held that a

police officer was entitled to summary judgment, based on qualified

immunity, in light of video evidence that utterly discredited the

plaintiff’s claim. Id. The photographs in the instant case

provide such uncontrovertible evidence about the surface on which

Plaintiff was asked to kneel.

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not apply any force that day. Plaintiff’s medical evaluations,

prior to, and after the incident indicate the Plaintiff did not

sustain any injuries, such as cuts, abrasions, swelling or bruises. 

Construing Plaintiff’s allegations as true, that Defendant Camarena

subjected him to “rough handling,” the Eighth Amendment does not

protect against such de minimis use of physical force.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Camarena and Salopek

subjected him to torture by forcing him to kneel, for forty-five

minutes, on hot asphalt, under the “extreme heat” of the sun. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants refused his requests for a cloth

to put under his knees, resulting in blisters. The photographic

evidence indicates that Plaintiff was kneeling on light colored

cement,15 not asphalt, and Plaintiff testifies that he was kneeling

for approximately forty-five minutes. Defendants declare that they

asked Plaintiff to kneel as a safety precaution, based on his

previous behavior. SVSP policy states that forty-five minutes is

the amount of time necessary for dissipation of all effects of OC

exposure. Both SVSP policy and the instructions on the canister of

OC specify that decontamination is best achieved by exposing the

individual to fresh air. Defendants decontaminated Plaintiff in

the manner that they did for the purpose of safely alleviating the

effects of the OC spray, in compliance with SVSP policy, and not

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for the malicious or sadistic purpose of causing harm.

As with his previous allegations, Plaintiff presents no

evidence that he sustained anything more than de minimis injury to

his skin or knees as a result of either the “extreme heat” of the

sun or the heat of the surface on which he was kneeling. MTA

Pulido’s post-decontamination assessment found no injury to

Plaintiff’s knees or skin. MTA Garcia, who examined Plaintiff the

next day, found no blisters, swelling or redness on his knees, back

or shoulder. Dr. Lee’s subsequent physical examination and review

of Plaintiff’s medical records revealed no lasting injury. 

Plaintiff’s only evidence of injury arising from hot weather is a

declaration from Mr. Moran, another inmate, who looked at

Plaintiff’s back on March 10, 2005, and saw some discoloration of

the skin and evidence of sunburn. (Moran Decl. at 2.) Further,

Plaintiff testified that the pain in his knees subsided after two

days and that he was never diagnosed with skin cancer or other skin

problems. 

Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendants Celaya, Camarena

or Salopek applied force in a malicious or sadistic manner or that

he suffered more than de minimis injury. Accordingly, these

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the excessive force

claims as a matter of law. 

B. Deliberate Indifference Claim 

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Defendants

Camarena and Salopek stems from the following allegations: 

(1) they were deliberately indifferent to his needs by not 

promptly releasing him from the holding cell area to decontaminate

him from the effects of OC and by not allowing him to shower after

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being sprayed with OC; (2) they refused medical treatment for his

shoulder, which was bruised after he was pushed into the side of a

holding cell; and (3) they refused medical treatment for his knees,

which blistered when he was forced to kneel during the outdoor

decontamination process.

The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but

neither does it permit inhumane ones. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 832 (1994). The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and

the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny

under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31

(1993).

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of “deliberate indifference”

involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the

prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response

to that need. Id.

A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or

the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

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indications that a prisoner has a “serious” need for medical

treatment. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she

knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate

it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The prison official must not only

“be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but “must also draw the

inference.” Id. If a prison official should have been aware of

the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the

Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. Gibson v. County

of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002).

In order for deliberate indifference to be established,

therefore, there must be a purposeful act or failure to act on the

part of the defendant and resulting harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at

1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404,

407 (9th Cir.1985). A finding that the defendant’s activities

resulted in “substantial” harm to the prisoner is not necessary,

however. Neither a finding that a defendant’s actions are

egregious nor that they resulted in significant injury to a

prisoner is required to establish a violation of the prisoner’s

federal constitutional rights, McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060, 1061,

but the existence of serious harm tends to support an inmate’s

deliberate indifference claims, Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096

(9th Cir. 2006).

Once the prerequisites are met, it is up to the fact-finder to

determine whether the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference. 

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Such indifference may appear when prison officials deny, delay or

intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown

in the way in which prison officials provide medical care. 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062 (delay of seven months in providing

medical care during which medical condition was left virtually

untreated and plaintiff was forced to endure “unnecessary pain”

sufficient to present colorable § 1983 claim).

Plaintiff asserts that the effects of exposure to OC, a

bruised shoulder, and blistered knees amounted to serious medical

needs. After Plaintiff was decontaminated, he was examined by MTA

Pulido, who listed no evidence of injury, and who documented

Plaintiff’s decontamination from OC spray. Dr. Lee’s 2007 physical

examination found no long-term or lasting skin, knee, shoulder or

OC related injuries. The only medical evidence of an injury is a

March 11, 2005 report of a scratch on Plaintiff’s shoulder,

unaccompanied by bruising or swelling. An X-ray of Plaintiff’s

shoulder, taken on March 12, 2005, two days after the incident,

revealed no bone or joint injury. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed

to show that he suffered from a serious medical need within the

meaning of the Eighth Amendment. However, had Plaintiff’s medical

needs been serious, he would need to show that Defendants were

deliberately indifferent.

Plaintiff argues that he was subjected to a period of

deliberate delay in addressing his medical needs after he was

exposed to OC, because Defendants Salopek and Camarena did not

immediately release him from his holding cell. Five minutes

elapsed between the time Plaintiff was sprayed and the time

Defendants opened his cell door to perform a strip search. 

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Plaintiff claims that, while coughing and choking, he had to twice

repeat the affirmation that he was ready to comply with the

unclothed body search, before he was released. However, he also

testifies that he was trying to be “macho” so purposely did not

indicate that he would comply, until he succumbed to coughing. 

Immediately after the search, Defendants Salopek and Camarena took

Plaintiff outside to be decontaminated from the effects of the OC

spray. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, and assuming that it took five minutes to release him

from the cell, Defendants’ delay does not amount to deliberate

indifference to his medical need.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Salopek and Camarena were

deliberately indifferent to his need to be decontaminated from the

effects of the OC spray by taking him outside, rather than allowing

him to shower. Defendants placed Plaintiff outside to

decontaminate from the effects of the spray based on both SVSP

policy and the OC manufacturer’s instructions for decontamination

that prescribe exposure to fresh air as the best method for

decontamination. Plaintiff complained that he was “burning” and

admits that he received a gentle dousing with water. He admits

that he then refused a second dousing because the water only

reactivated the “chemical agents” in the OC spray. Plaintiff does

not say that he requested a shower. The holding cell facility did

not have a shower, and Defendants were concerned that placing

Plaintiff in a locked shower would only re-instigate his previous

disruptive behavior. The evidence indicates that Defendants were

not deliberately indifferent by decontaminating Plaintiff by

exposing him to fresh air in an outdoor area.

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Plaintiff asserts that Defendants were deliberately

indifferent by denying access to medical care for his bruised

shoulder. Accepting, for the purposes of this motion, that

Plaintiff asked to see an MTA, and Defendants did not retrieve one

while Plaintiff was undergoing decontamination in the outdoor area,

he received a follow up examination after decontamination. MTA

Pulido conducted a medical evaluation of Plaintiff at approximately

1:00 pm, medically clearing him to enter ad seg. Another MTA

examined Plaintiff on March 11, 2005, noting a “small abrasion” on

Plaintiff’s right shoulder, but no redness or swelling. As a

precaution, however, Plaintiff received an X-ray on March 16, 2005,

which found nothing wrong with his shoulder. The undisputed

evidence indicates that Plaintiff was provided ample access to

medical care for his shoulder.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants were deliberately indifferent

to his blistered knees by not providing him a cloth to kneel on. 

MTA Pulado, who conducted a medical evaluation after Plaintiff’s

decontamination, did not document any blisters. Plaintiff does not

claim that he requested, or was denied, medical assistance

regarding his knees. He also testifies that any pain in his knees

subsided after two days. That he was not given a cloth to kneel

on, and as a result may have experienced some discomfort, does not

rise to the level of deliberate indifference.

 Consequently, Defendants Salopek and Camarena are entitled to

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim.

C. Qualified Immunity Defense

In the alternative, Defendants Celaya, Salopek and Camarena

assert that they are entitled to summary judgment based on

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qualified immunity.

The defense of qualified immunity protects “government

officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule

of qualified immunity protects “‘all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.’” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 202 (2001) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986)). A defendant may have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief

about the facts or about what the law requires in any given

situation. Id. “Therefore, regardless of whether the

constitutional violation occurred, the [official] should prevail if

the right asserted by the plaintiff was not ‘clearly established’

or the [official] could have reasonably believed that his

particular conduct was lawful.” Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d

624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991).

To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity, the court must engage in the following inquiries. At the

outset, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged

the deprivation of an actual constitutional right. Conn v.

Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). In other words, the court must

ask, “Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right?” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197

(2004); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If this inquiry yields a

positive answer, then the court proceeds to determine if the right

was “clearly established.” Id.

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The inquiry as to whether the right at issue was clearly

established must be made in light of the specific context of the

case, not as a broad general proposition. Saucier, 533 U.S. at

202. “Although earlier cases involving ‘fundamentally similar’

facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion that

the law is clearly established, they are not necessary to such a

finding.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). As the

Supreme Court has explained, “officials can still be on notice that

their conduct violates established law even in novel factual

circumstances.” Id. at 753. The plaintiff bears the burden of

proving the existence of a clearly established right at the time of

the allegedly impermissible conduct. Maraziti v. First Interstate

Bank, 953 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1992).

If the law is determined to be clearly established, the next

question is whether, under that law, a reasonable official could

have believed his or her conduct was lawful in the situation

confronted. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th

Cir. 1993). If the law did not put the officer on notice that his

or her conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on

qualified immunity is appropriate. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. 

Therefore, qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when he

or she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient,

reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances he or

she confronted. Id. at 206. The defendant bears the burden of

establishing that his or her actions were reasonable, even though

he or she violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Doe v.

Petaluma City School Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995).

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Construing the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court has

found that Defendants’ actions did not amount to cruel and unusual

punishment. Even if Defendants had violated Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment rights, though, they are entitled to qualified immunity

because they have produced sufficient evidence to show that they

could have believed that their actions were reasonable under the

circumstances of each claim as outlined below.

Defendants Celaya, Salopek and Camarena did not act

unreasonably in condoning Sgt. Mensing’s act of spraying Plaintiff

with a canister of OC. Plaintiff has a history of sexual

misconduct at SVSP, and on the morning of the incident, he sexually

harassed an SVSP nurse. In accord with SVSP policy, Sgt. Mensing

ordered Defendant Camarena to escort Plaintiff from his cell to the

Program Office, in preparation for placing Plaintiff in ad seg,

pending a review of the incident. Defendant Camarena also followed

SVSP policy by placing Plaintiff in a holding cell, in order to

process him into the ad seg facility. Defendants Celaya and

Camarena and Sgt. Mensing then followed procedure by ordering

Plaintiff to submit to an unclothed body search. Based on

Plaintiff’s ensuing disruptive and physically harmful behavior,

reasonable prison officials could have believed that the decision

to release OC spray was warranted.

Defendant Camarena did not act unreasonably during the process

of shackling Plaintiff and moving him from the holding cell to the

outside area for decontamination. Even if Defendant Camarena

subjected Plaintiff to rough handling, the circumstances were such

that a reasonably prudent officer could have acted similarly. Just

minutes before, Plaintiff had been yelling and throwing himself

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against his cell wall while refusing to comply with orders. 

Defendant Camarena’s possible de minimis application of force, in

placing Plaintiff in leg restraints and escorting him outside, was

not clearly unlawful. Plaintiff provides no evidence that he

sustained any injury to his wrist or more than a minor scratch on

his shoulder.

Lastly, Defendants Camarena and Salopek acted reasonably by

bringing Plaintiff to an outdoor area to decontaminate from the

effects of OC spray and by having him kneel. Defendants followed

SVSP’s decontamination policy by exposing Plaintiff to fresh air. 

The holding cell area did not have a shower and it was contaminated

with OC. Reasonable officers in Defendants’ position would have

decided to take Plaintiff outside to decontaminate. Defendants’

decision to have Plaintiff kneel was not unreasonable, based on his

previous combative behavior. Both Defendants also acted reasonably

in construing Plaintiff’s complaints of “burning” as stemming from

the effects of the OC. Even if a constitutional violation had

occurred, it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer in

Defendants’ position that the conduct violated the prohibition

against excessive force or deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need.

Consequently, Defendants Celaya, Camarena and Salopek are

entitled to qualified immunity. For this and the foregoing

reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

II. Defendant Colburn and Aguirre’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants Colburn and Aguirre move for summary judgment

(docket no. 81) on the grounds that there is no genuine issue of

material fact and they are entitled to qualified immunity.

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A. Excessive Force Claim

Plaintiff’s sole allegation against Defendant Aguirre is that

he was standing by a rear exit door in the outdoor area where

Plaintiff was decontaminated. Plaintiff does not allege that

Defendant Aguirre engaged in unlawful conduct, and thus, he fails

to state a claim against him.

Plaintiff’s only allegation against Defendant Colburn is that

he offered him water during the decontamination process. Plaintiff

complained that he was “burning,” so Defendant Colburn slowly

poured approximately three gallons of water over Plaintiff’s head. 

After the first bucket was empty, he retrieved another and offered

to pour it over Plaintiff’s head. Plaintiff refused, asking

instead for a drink of water, and Defendant Colburn gave him one.

Plaintiff admits that neither Defendant Colburn nor Aguirre

applied force against him on March 10, 2005. Thus, Defendants

Aguirre and Colburn are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim.

B. Deliberate Indifference Claim

Plaintiff does not allege any purposeful act or failure to act

by Defendant Aguirre and thus, he fails to state a deliberate

indifference claim against him. Plaintiff argues that Defendant

Colburn was deliberately indifferent because he poured some water

on his head, in order to prolong his pain by reactivating the

“chemical agents” in the OC spray. 

As explained above, Plaintiff suffered no lasting injury from

the effects of OC spray. The effects of OC spray are fully

alleviated in forty-five minutes. Forty-five minutes is the amount

of time that Plaintiff testifies he was placed outside for the

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decontamination process. Plaintiff states that he asked for water. 

Even if the water that Defendant Colburn subsequently poured over

Plaintiff’s head did renew the burning sensation caused by the OC

spray, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant Colburn acted

with the intent of causing pain. Plaintiff does not allege that he

requested medical assistance from Defendant Colburn. Further, the

fact that Defendant Colburn did not continue to pour water over

Plaintiff’s head, after Plaintiff informed him to stop, indicates

that he did not intend to purposefully prolong Plaintiff’s pain.

Accordingly, Defendants Aguirre and Colburn are entitled to

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim.

C. Qualified Immunity Defense

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Aguirre,

and he has not established that Defendant Colburn’s conduct

amounted to a violation of the constitutional prohibition on cruel

and unusual punishment. Even if an Eighth Amendment violation had

occurred, Defendant Colburn acted reasonably under the

circumstances, as discussed above.

Accordingly, Defendants Colburn and Aguirre are entitled to

qualified immunity. For the reasons discussed above, the Court

GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. The motion for summary judgment brought by Defendants

Celaya, Camarena and Salopek (docket no. 34) is GRANTED.

2. The motion for summary judgment brought by Defendants

Colburn and Aguirre (docket no. 81) is GRANTED.

3. This Order terminates Docket nos. 34 and 81.

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4. The Court shall enter judgment and close the file. Each 

party shall bear his own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 4/11/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDRE L. HART,

Plaintiff,

 v.

J. CELAYA et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-02519 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on April 11, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Andre L. Hart #:D-18158

Substance Abuse Treatment Facility

C6-124

P.O. Box 7100

Corcoran, CA 93212

Jonathan Lloyd Wolff

CA State Attorney General’s Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue Ste 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Dated: April 11, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:06-cv-02519-CW Document 92 Filed 04/11/08 Page 34 of 34