Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05151/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05151-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 12, 1997 Decided November 12, 1997 

No. 96-5151

PAUL D. HALVERSON, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

RODNEY E. SLATER, SECRETARY,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cv00028)

John Longstreth argued the cause for the appellants. Donald A. Kaplan was on brief.

Cynthia A. Schnedar, Assistant United States Attorney, 

argued the cause for the appellee. Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and R. 

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Craig Lawrence and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant United 

States Attorneys, were on brief.

Before: WALD, SENTELLE and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: This appeal 

turns on the authority of the Secretary of the Department of 

Transportation (Secretary) to delegate certain responsibilities 

under the Great Lakes Pilotage Act of 1960, 46 U.S.C.A. 

§§ 9301 et seq. (West Supp. 1997) (GLPA), to the Saint 

Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (Corporation). 

The appellants, two Great Lakes ship pilots and two Great 

Lakes shipping pilots' associations, challenge the Secretary's 

delegation of GLPA responsibilities to the Corporation on the 

grounds that the delegation (1) exceeds the Secretary's authority under 46 U.S.C.A. § 2104(a) (West Supp. 1997), (2) 

lodges with the Corporation duties it has no authority to 

discharge and (3) violates the Administrative Procedure Act, 

5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (APA). The appellee, the Secretary, 

responds that delegation to the Corporation is proper: (1) an 

alternative source of delegation power, 49 U.S.C. § 322(b), 

supports the delegation; (2) the Corporation has authority to 

accept and discharge the "essentially economic" responsibilities it has been delegated because they relate to its broader 

mission of regulating commerce on the Saint Lawrence Seaway; and (3) the delegation does not contravene applicable 

APA requirements. The district court agreed with the Secretary in all respects and granted his motion for summary 

judgment. Halverson v. Peña, No. 96-CV-0028, 1996 WL 

217885, at *11 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1996).

We now reverse. Pursuant to the first step of the familiar 

Chevron analysis, we conclude that the plain meaning of 

section 2104(a) limits delegation of GLPA functions to the 

United States Coast Guard and that section 322(b) cannot 

fairly be construed to expand the limitation. See Chevron 

USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 

U.S. 837 (1984). We do not reach the other grounds asserted 

for reversal except to the extent they may bear on the 

question of the Secretary's authority, whether under section 

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322(b) or section 2104(a), to delegate GLPA responsibilities to 

the Corporation.

I. BACKGROUND

The Corporation was established in 1954 by an Act of the 

Congress, Pub. L. No. 83-558, 68 Stat. 93 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 981 et seq.). Its congressional charter set 

forth the Corporation's specific (and limited) functions in 

some detail. See 33 U.S.C. § 983; 1 S. Rep. No. 83-441, at 2, 

6-14 (1953) (describing limited purposes for which Corporation was created); H.R. Rep. No. 83-1215 (1954) (similar), 

reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2197, 2224-42. The narrowness of the Corporation's mission was further reflected in the 

statutory enumeration of the Corporation's powers. See 33 

U.S.C. § 984(a).2 When first established, the Corporation 

__________

1 Section 983(a), in relevant part, provides:

The Corporation is authorized and directed to construct, in 

United States territory, deep-water navigation works substantially in accordance with the "Controlled single stage project, 

238-242" ... together with necessary dredging in the Thousand Islands section; and to operate and maintain such works 

in coordination with the Saint Lawrence Seaway Authority of 

Canada....

33 U.S.C. § 983(a).

2 Section 984(a), in relevant part, provides:

For the purpose of carrying out its functions under this chapter 

the Corporation

...

(5) may make and carry out such contracts or agreements as 

are necessary or advisable in the conduct of its business;

...

(7) may appoint and fix the compensation, in accordance with 

the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of 

Title 5, of such officers, attorneys, and employees as may be 

necessary for the conduct of its business, define their authority 

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was "subject to the direction and supervision of the President, 

or the head of such agency as he may designate." 33 U.S.C. 

§ 981 (1954). Through fiscal year 1966, the Department of 

Commerce was the agency designated to supervise the Corporation. In fiscal year 1967, however, the Congress amended section 981, replacing the "President, or the head of such 

agency as he may designate" language with the "Secretary of 

Transportation." 33 U.S.C. § 981 (1966).

Construction of the Saint Lawrence Seaway was completed 

in 1959, opening the Great Lakes to international shipping. 

Not surprisingly, opening of the Seaway brought with it a 

marked increase in the volume of both domestic and international marine traffic navigating the Great Lakes, their tributaries and their outlets. As a result, one year later the 

Congress enacted GLPA. See Pub. L. No. 86-555, 74 Stat. 

259 (1960) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 9301 et seq.

(West Supp. 1997)). Among other things, GLPA required 

commercial ships to employ a registered United States or 

Canadian pilot to steer them (or advise them how to steer) 

safely and efficiently through certain portions of the Great 

Lakes, their tributaries and outlets, and the approaches to 

the Sault Sainte Marie Locks. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 9302 & 

Note (West Supp. 1997).

As noted, in 1967 the Department of Transportation took 

over supervision of the Corporation. That same fiscal year, 

__________

and duties, and delegate to them such of the powers vested in 

the Corporation as the Administrator may determine;

...

(9) shall determine the character of and the necessity for its 

obligations and expenditures, and the manner in which they 

shall be incurred, allowed and paid, subject to provisions of law 

specifically applicable to Government corporations;

...

(11) may provide services and facilities necessary in the maintenance and operation of the seaway....

33 U.S.C. § 984(a).

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administrative responsibility for the United States Coast 

Guard was transferred from the Department of the Treasury 

to the Transportation Department.3See Pub. L. No. 89-670, 

§ 6(b)(1), 80 Stat. 931 (1966) (codified as amended at 14 

U.S.C. § 1). The Transportation Secretary subsequently delegated his GLPA responsibilities to the Commandant of the 

Coast Guard, with whom they remained until December 1995. 

See Delegations to Commandant of the Coast Guard, 49 

C.F.R. § 1.46(a) (1994).

In December 1995, the Secretary published a final rule that 

rescinded the standing delegation of GLPA functions to the 

Coast Guard and redelegated eleven "essentially economic" 

functions to the Corporation. See Organization and Delegation of Powers and Duties; Transfer of Great Lakes Pilotage 

Authority From the Coast Guard to the Saint Lawrence 

Seaway Development Corporation, 60 Fed. Reg. 63,444 (1995) 

(codified at 49 C.F.R. § 1.52(d)-(e) (1997)).4 Shortly thereafter, the appellants filed suit and moved for a preliminary 

injunction or summary judgment. The Secretary crossmoved for summary judgment and a hearing on the motions 

was held on March 8, 1996. At its conclusion, the district 

court denied the appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction and reserved decision on the parties' summary judgment 

motions.

__________

3 When the Department of Transportation was established in 

1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 2(b)(1), 80 Stat. 931 (1966), the Congress transferred to it various functions and administrative responsibilities of other agencies, including responsibility for the Coast 

Guard and the Corporation as well as GLPA powers and duties.

4 The eleven functions include:

(1) Investigation and prosecution of violations of [GLPA]; (2) 

registration, qualification, and training of registered pilots; (3) 

association working rules and dispatching procedures; (4) pilot 

working conditions; (5) selection of pilots; (6) number of pilots; 

(7) availability of pilots; (8) number of pilotage pools; (9) 

articles of association; (10) auditing; and (11) ratemaking.

60 Fed. Reg. 63,444 (1995).

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By Memorandum Opinion and Order dated April 23, 1996 

the district court granted the Secretary's cross-motion for 

summary judgment, finding that both the first and second 

steps of the analysis set forth in Chevron compelled a holding 

in his favor. Halverson, 1996 WL 217885, at *4-*6. The 

lower court first applied Chevron step one to section 322(b), 

whose provisions principally authorize the Secretary to delegate his Title 49 powers and duties to any Transportation 

officer or employee. The trial court, however, failed to 

construe section 322(b) in light of section 2104(a)a specific 

grant of delegation authority of Title 46 powers and duties 

(including GLPA powers and duties) to Coast Guard officials 

only. Nor did the court below otherwise attempt to interpret 

section 2104(a) according to Chevron step one, id. at *4-*5, 

deciding instead to construe it pursuant to Chevron step two. 

While the district court concluded that its step-one analysis of 

section 322(b) resolved the delegation issue in the Secretary's 

favor, it further found that even if section 322(b) was not 

unambiguous, the Secretary's interpretation of section 2104(a) 

was reasonable and therefore entitled to deference under 

Chevron step two. Id. at *5-*6. Thus, the lower court 

applied Chevron step one to section 322(b) and Chevron step 

two to section 2104(a).

II. DISCUSSION

We review the district court's award of summary judgment 

de novo. See Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C. 

Cir. 1995). The parties' arguments regarding the Secretary's 

authority to delegate GLPA functions to non-Coast Guard 

officials center on the proper interpretation of (and relationship between) 49 U.S.C. § 322(b) and 46 U.S.C.A. § 2104(a) 

(West Supp. 1997). Section 322(b), in relevant part, provides:

The [Transportation] Secretary may delegate, and authorize successive delegations of, duties and powers of the 

Secretary to an officer or employee of the Department.

49 U.S.C. § 322(b). As the Secretary reads this provision, it 

gives him largely unfettered discretion to delegate duties and 

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powers to agency officers and employees.5Indeed, he appears to have succeeded in convincing the district judge that 

only an express statutory prohibition could foreclose exercise 

of his section 322(b) authority. See Halverson, 1996 WL 

217885, at *6 ("Had Congress intended the Great Lakes 

pilotage functions to remain solely with the Coast Guard, it 

could have explicitly provided so.") (emphasis added). The 

appellants read the Secretary's section 322(b) authority a 

good deal more narrowly. They contend, in effect, that the 

scope of section 322(b) cannot be determined without reference to the specific power being delegated, the authority of 

the delegatee to exercise the power and any limitations that 

may be imposed by other, more specific statutory provisions 

such as 46 U.S.C.A. § 2104(a) (West Supp. 1997).

Section 2104(a), in turn, provides that:

The Secretary may delegate the duties and powers conferred by this subtitle [Subtitle II entitled "Vessels and 

Seamen"] to any officer, employee, or member of the 

Coast Guard, and may provide for the subdelegation of 

those duties and powers.

46 U.S.C.A. § 2104(a) (West Supp. 1997).6 The appellants 

read section 2104(a) to authorize the Secretary to exercise 

__________

5 Both parties apparently assume that the Administrator of the 

Corporation is "an officer or employee of the Department" for the 

purpose of section 322(b). While we assume the same in deciding 

this appeal, we express no opinion as to the correctness of the 

assumption.

6 Section 2104(a) applies here because GLPA responsibilities are 

among the Secretary's Title 46, Subtitle II powers and duties. 

Section 2104(a) is found in Part A ("General Provisions") and GLPA 

is found in Part F ("Manning of Vessels") of Subtitle II. See 

generally 46 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1997). Section 2104(b) appears 

to authorize, in circumstances not applicable here, delegation of 

Subtitle II powers and duties to a designated Customs Service 

officer or employee serving in the stead of a Coast Guard official. 

See 46 U.S.C.A. § 2104(b) (West Supp. 1997) ("When this subtitle 

authorizes an officer or employee of the Customs Service to act in 

place of a Coast Guard official, the Secretary may designate that 

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GLPA duties and powers himself or to delegate them to a 

Coast Guard official. They believe that section 2104(a) unambiguously proscribes delegation of GLPA responsibilities outside the Coast Guard and thwarts the Secretary's attempt to 

effect such a delegation pursuant to his general section 322(b) 

authority. The Secretary, unsurprisingly, construes section 

2104(a) quite differently. He reasons that because section 

2104(a) does not expressly proscribe a section 322(b) delegation, he may delegate Subtitle II powers and duties pursuant 

to the latter provision. The Secretary thus construes section 

2104(a) merely to clarify that "any officer, employee, or 

member of the Coast Guard" is an "officer or employee of the 

Department" to whom he may otherwise delegate Subtitle II 

responsibilities pursuant to section 322(b).

The Chevron framework governs our interpretation of sections 322(b) and 2104(a):

Under this analysis, the court must first exhaust the 

traditional tools of statutory construction to determine 

whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at 

issue. ... If the court can determine congressional 

intent, then that interpretation must be given effect. ... 

If, on the other hand, the statute is silent or ambiguous 

with respect to the specific issue, then the court will 

defer to a permissible agency construction of the statute.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Browner, 57 F.3d 

1122, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation 

marks omitted; emphasis added) [hereinafter NRDC]. Thus, 

"[i]f employment of an accepted canon of construction illustrates that Congress had a specific intent on the issue in 

question, then the case can be disposed of under the first 

prong of Chevron." Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v. 

Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1292-93 (D.C. Cir.) (emphasis 

original), aff'd by equally divided Court, 493 U.S. 38 (1989) 

[hereinafter Michigan Citizens]. If, however, the statute is 

ambiguous, then Chevron step two "implicitly precludes 

__________

officer or employee subject to the approval of the Secretary of the 

Treasury.").

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courts picking and choosing among various canons of construction to reject reasonable agency interpretations." Id. at 

1292 (emphasis original).

We believe the lower court erred by failing to "exhaust the 

traditional tools of statutory construction," NRDC, 57 F.3d at 

1125, with respect to both section 322(b) and section 2104(a). 

See Horsehead Resource Dev. Co. v. Browner, 16 F.3d 1246, 

1262 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (applying Chevron step one to two 

different RCRA provisions and concluding that, when read 

together, their plain meaning favored EPA's construction as 

embodied in regulation); cf. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,

486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) ("In ascertaining the plain meaning 

of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory 

language at issue, as well as the language and design of the 

statute as a whole.") (emphasis added); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,

51 F.3d 1053, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying Chevron step 

one to "find that the language of section 211(f)(4), standing 

alone, and standing in contrast to section 211(c)(1), is dispositive of this case") (emphasis added). After examining both 

section 2104(a) and section 322(b) according to Chevron step 

one, as we must, we believe that the language of section 

2104(a) compels the conclusion that the Congress did not 

intend to authorize the delegation of GLPA functions to a 

non-Coast Guard official. Our conclusion is supported by the 

limited statutory purposes of the Corporation.

A. The Language of Section 2104(a)

The Secretary's interpretation of section 2104(a) runs afoul 

of the cardinal canon of statutory construction that "[w]e 

must read the statutes to give effect to each if we can do so 

while preserving their sense and purpose." Watt v. Alaska,

451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981); cf. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 

U.S. 330, 339 (1979) ("In construing a statute we are obliged 

to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used."). As 

the Secretary reads section 2104(a), it does not (other than in 

times of war) provide any delegation authority beyond what 

he already possesses under section 322(b), and thus, at most, 

merely confirms his section 322(b) authority. This reading 

plainly violates the familiar doctrine that the Congress cannot 

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be presumed to do a futile thing. See Ramah Navajo Sch. 

Bd., Inc. v. Babbitt, 87 F.3d 1338, 1344-45 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 

("We will not ... assume that Congress intended for that 

jurisdiction[al] [provision] to be meaningless."); Benavides v. 

DEA, 968 F.2d 1243, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (rejecting Attorney 

General's interpretation of statutory provision because it 

would make provision "either superfluous or meaningless"); 

RCA Global Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 758 F.2d 722, 733 

(D.C. Cir. 1985) (rejecting interpretation that "would deprive 

[the provision] of all substantive effect, a result self evidently 

contrary to Congress' intent").

Perhaps recognizing the weakness of such an interpretation 

of section 2104(a), the Secretary attempts to ascribe a wartime significance to section 2104(a). His attempt fails. The 

Secretary asserts that section 2104(a) is needed simply to 

preserve his ability to delegate Subtitle II powers and duties 

to Coast Guard officials in time of war, when the Coast Guard 

reverts to the administrative control of the Department of the 

Navy. This assertion is patently erroneous. Another provision of Subtitle II explicitly directs that when the Coast 

Guard operates as part of the Navy, the "Secretary" referred 

to in various sections of Title 46 (including section 2104(a)) is 

not the Transportation Secretary but the Secretary of the 

Navy.7See 46 U.S.C.A. § 2101(34) (West Supp. 1997) ("'Secretary', except in Part H, means the head of the department 

in which the Coast Guard is operating."); accord S. Rep. No. 

98-56, at 8 (1983) ("This bill universally vests all authority in 

the 'Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is 

operating,' and provides authority to the Secretary to delegate and allow for subdelegation."). Accordingly, when the 

Coast Guard operates as part of the Navy, only the Secretary 

of the Navy can delegate Subtitle II responsibilities pursuant 

to section 2104(a). The provision cannot be interpreted, then, 

merely to preserve the Transportation Secretary's Subtitle II 

delegation authority in time of war.

__________

7 Structurally, it would also be strange for the Congress to 

address this matter in a portion of Subtitle II that does not refer 

even indirectly to the Coast Guard's transfer to Navy control.

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The Secretary's view of section 2104(a) is also irreconcilable 

with the statutory construction principle, expressio unius est 

exclusio alterius, that is, the "mention of one thing implies 

the exclusion of another thing." Ethyl, 51 F.3d at 1061 

(internal quotation omitted). That section 2104(a) authorizes 

delegations to Coast Guard officials only cannot be disregarded. According to the expressio unius canon, the Congress, in 

drafting section 2104(a) this way, intended to exclude delegations to non-Coast Guard officials.8 And to the extent section 

2104(a) may be deemed to conflict with section 322(b) (itself a 

disfavored construction, see Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop 

Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 879 (1994) ("[W]hen possible, courts 

should construe statutes ... to foster harmony with other 

statutory and constitutional law.")), the former as the more 

specific provision controls, again according to the traditional 

tools of statutory construction. See Edmond v. United 

States, 117 S. Ct. 1573, 1578 (1997) ("Ordinarily, where a 

specific provision conflicts with a general one, the specific 

governs.").

The Secretary next argues that because the Congress did 

not expressly prohibit delegation of Subtitle II powers and 

duties to a non-Coast Guard official in section 2104(a), yet 

elsewhere did so proscribe, the former omission indicates a 

legislative intent consistent with the Secretary's reading of 

section 2104(a).9 This rule of statutory interpretation, howev-

__________

8 The trial court found (and the Secretary argues) that expressio 

unius cannot be applied unless the statute possesses some undefined measure of specificity that section 2104(a) lacks. While the 

cases cited as authority for this proposition do not appear to 

establish such a requirementsee, e.g., Michigan Citizens, 868 F.2d 

at 1293 (applying expressio unius at Chevron step one without 

mentioning specificity requirement)any specificity that may be 

required to invoke the canon is easily met here: section 2104(a) 

delineates the class of permissible delegatees as officers, employees 

and members of the Coast Guard, or, in special circumstances, 

certain Customs Service officers or employees.

9 The canon of construction here urged by the Secretarynamely, that we should infer a legislative intent to permit delegation 

where Congress has not expressly proscribed it, having proscribed 

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er, has force only if the two provisions in question are 

included within the same legislative enactment. See Russello 

v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (" '[W]here Congress 

includes particular language in one section of a statute but 

omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally 

presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in 

the disparate inclusion or exclusion.' ") (quoting, as authoritative, United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th 

Cir. 1972)) (brackets original; emphasis added); cf. Pure Oil 

Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 206 (1966) (legislative intent 

cannot fairly be inferred from different language in two 

sections of different enactments). The express delegation 

proscriptions to which the Secretary refersthe Port and 

Tanker Safety Act of 1978, codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1229, and a 

__________

it elsewhere, differs from the expressio unius canon. Expressio 

unius has been described as follows:

Although the expressio unius maxim has had widespread legal 

application, there is nothing peculiarly legal about it. It is a 

product of logic and common sense. It acts merely as an aid to 

determine legislative intent and does not constitute a rule of 

law. It expresses the learning of common experience that 

when people say one thing they do not mean something else.

2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Stat. Const. § 47.24 (5th ed. 

1992) (internal quotation marks and notes omitted). The canon 

relied on by the Secretary, however, according to the same commentator, works differently:

Caution must be exercised in applying the rule that one statute 

will be interpreted to correspond to analogous but unrelated 

statutes for the reason that by way of contrast an inclusion or 

exclusion may show an intent or convey a meaning exactly 

contrary to that expressed by analogous legislation. Therefore, the rule tends to be of greater value where analogy is 

made to several statutes or a general course of legislation.

Id. vol. 2B, § 53.05 (notes omitted). But there is no course of 

legislation expressly proscribing delegation of Subtitle II powers 

and duties. Instead, the Secretary points only to a provision of the 

Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, codified as amended at 33 

U.S.C. § 1229, and a 1984 amendment to Subtitle II, codified as 

amended at 46 U.S.C.A. § 8503(c) (West Supp. 1997).

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1984 amendment to Subtitle II, 46 U.S.C.A. § 8503(c) (West 

Supp. 1997)are plainly not part of the 1983 Act containing 

section 2104(a).

Even if the proscriptions were in the same enactment as 

section 2104(a), it would not support the inference that the 

Congress intended section 322(b) to override the limiting 

language of section 2104(a). This is so because section 

2104(a) was enacted as part of the recodification of Title 46 

and, as such, is a manifestly inappropriate legislative vehicle 

to which to apply the rule because any inconsistency arising 

from the earlier enactment (like section 322(b)) is, absent a 

contemporaneous revision, merely carried forward by the 

recodification. Cf. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra, 353 U.S. 

222, 227 (1957) ("[I]t will not be inferred that Congress, in 

revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their 

effect unless such intention is clearly expressed.").

Most significantly,

[t]o suggest, ... that Chevron step two is implicated any 

time a statute does not expressly negate the existence of 

a claimed administrative power (i.e. when the statute is 

not written in 'thou shalt not' terms), is both flatly 

unfaithful to the principles of administrative law ... and 

refuted by precedent. ... Were courts to presume a 

delegation of power absent an express withholding of 

such power, agencies would enjoy virtually limitless hegemony, a result plainly out of keeping with Chevron and 

quite likely with the Constitution as well."

Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd.,

29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1032 

(1995); accord Ethyl, 51 F.3d at 1060 ("We refuse, once again, 

to presume a delegation of power merely because Congress 

has not expressly withheld such power."); cf. Engine Mfrs. 

Ass'n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[I]f [the 

text] clearly requires a particular outcome, then the mere fact 

that it does so implicitly rather than expressly does not mean 

that it is 'silent' in the Chevron sense."); Girouard v. United 

States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946) ("It is at best treacherous to 

find in [such] congressional silence alone the adoption of a 

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controlling rule of law."). Accordingly, the absence of an 

express proscriptionwhether in section 2104(a), section 

322(b), GLPA, or the Corporation's statutory charterprovides no green light to ignore the proscription necessarily 

implied by the limiting language of section 2104(a).

B. The Legislative History of Section 2104(a)

The Secretary's attempts to overcome the plain meaning of 

section 2104(a) by reference to its legislative history are 

equally unsuccessful.10 The relevant committee reports make 

clear that section 2104(a) is intended to be an affirmative 

grant of authority, not a clarification of the Secretary's existing authority under section 322(b): "Section 2104 provides 

the Secretary with authority to delegate duties and powers[.]" 

H.R. Rep. No. 98-338, at 131 (1983), reprinted in 46 U.S.C.A. 

Legislative History App. at 541 (West Supp. 1997); accord

S. Rep. No. 98-56, at 8 (1983) ("This bill ... provides 

authority to the Secretary to delegate and allow for subdelegation."). If the Secretary's view of section 2104(a) were 

correct, the Congress would have no need to "provide[ ] the 

__________

10 While ordinarily we have no need to refer to legislative history 

at Chevron step one, "[r]eference to statutory design and pertinent 

legislative history may often shed new light on congressional intent, 

notwithstanding statutory language that appears superficially 

clear." NRDC, 57 F.3d at 1127 (internal quotation marks omitted); 

accord Ethyl, 51 F.3d at 1062-63 (reviewing legislative history 

under Chevron step one and concluding that "[a]t best, the legislative history is cryptic, and this surely is not enough to overcome the 

plain meaning of the statute"); City of Cleveland v. Nuclear 

Regulatory Comm'n, 68 F.3d 1361, 1366 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("[W]e 

may consider a provision's legislative history in the first step of 

Chevron analysis to determine whether Congress' intent is clear 

from the plain language of the statute."). We consider legislative 

history here only because the Secretary argues that it evinces a 

congressional intent at odds with what the language of section 

2104(a) otherwise manifests.

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Secretary with authority" he already possessed under section 

322(b).

Nevertheless, the Secretary refers to language in the 

House Report accompanying the 1983 recodification of Subtitle II, which, in relevant part, recites:

The word "shall" is used in the mandatory and imperative sense. The word "may" is used in the permissive 

sense, as "is permitted to" and "is authorized". The 

words "may not" are used in a prohibitory sense, as "is 

not authorized to" and "is not permitted to".

H.R. Rep. No. 98-338, at 121 (1983), reprinted in 46 U.S.C.A. 

Legislative History App. at 529 (West Supp. 1997) (emphasis 

added). The Secretary thus argues that reading the "may" 

language in section 2104(a) as implicitly prohibiting delegation to a non-Coast Guard official would in fact transform 

"may" into "may not".

To say that "may" is permissive does not lead to the 

conclusion that it permits everything, irrespective of other 

unambiguous words of limitation included in the sentence in 

which the term is used. Cf. Ethyl, 51 F.3d at 1059 (although 

statute provided that Administrator "may" consider certain 

factors in determining whether to waive statutory prohibition, 

"Congress's use of the word 'may' does not ... open the door 

for the Administrator to consider any factor she deems 'in the 

public interest' before granting or denying a ... waiver."). 

Rather, the word "may" in section 2104(a) merely grants 

discretion to the Secretary, the limits of which are ascertained by reference to the section's other language, its structure and its purpose.11 Accordingly, the quoted House Report language does not support the Secretary's interpretation 

of section 2104(a) and it cannot be deemed inconsistent with 

the plain meaning of the language of section 2104(a)i.e., to 

give the Secretary authority either to retain Subtitle II 

__________

11 Indeed, if the Secretary relied on the same "permissive" definition of "may" in construing section 322(b), the provision would 

authorize him to delegate "duties and powers of the Secretary to an 

officer or employee of the Department"or to an officer or employee not of the Department. This construction would ignore the 

limitation imposed by section 322(b)'s key prepositional phrase

"officer or employee of the Department."

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powers and duties or to delegate them to a Coast Guard 

official.

The other item of legislative history the Secretary points to 

is a portion of the Senate Report accompanying the 1983 

recodification of Subtitle II, which states in relevant part:

Section 2104 sets forth broad delegation authority for the 

Secretary, including the authority to delegate duties and 

powers under subtitle II to any Coast Guard official.

S. Rep. No. 98-56, at 12 (1983) (emphasis added). The 

Secretary contends that "including" means that the Congress 

intended to empower the Secretary to delegate Subtitle II 

powers and duties to non-Coast Guard officials or employees. 

While this is one possible interpretation of the "including" 

language, the non-Coast Guard officials suggested by "including" are more likely the designated Customs Service officials 

who can act for Coast Guard officials pursuant to section 

2104(b). See note 6, supra.

C. Implied Limits on the Secretary's 

Section 322(b) Authority

The conclusion that section 2104(a) necessarily limits the 

Secretary's section 322(b) delegation authority is also buttressed by the holding in United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 

505, 514 (1974). In Giordano, a pre-Chevron case, the Supreme Court faced a question much like the one presented 

here: How to construe two grants of delegation authoritya 

broad one and a specific oneso as to give effect to the 

Congress's intent in enacting each. The Court held that 

although the Attorney General possesses general delegation 

authority under 28 U.S.C. § 510, that section does not authorize him to expand the specific delegation permitted by 18 

U.S.C. § 2516(1), providing that "[t]he Attorney General, or 

any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the 

Attorney General, may authorize" an application for wiretap 

authority. 416 U.S. at 513-14. In other words, the Court 

held that although section 2516(1) does not expressly proscribe delegation of the wiretap authority to the Attorney 

General's Executive Assistant, "it appears wholly at odds with 

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the scheme and history of the Act to construe § 2516(1) to 

permit the Attorney General to delegate his authority at will, 

whether it be to his Executive Assistant or to any officer in 

the Department other than an Assistant Attorney General." 

Id. at 523.

Like the provisions at issue in Giordano, section 2104(a) is 

more specific than section 322(b) and, although it does not 

expressly prohibit use of the Secretary's section 322(b) authority, its language and legislative history manifest the 

Congress's intent to limit the individuals to whom Subtitle II 

powers and dutieswhich involve primarily maritime safety 

and commercemay be delegated. Accordingly, we reach 

the same conclusion here that the Supreme Court reached in 

Giordano: section 2104(a), the more specific (and limited) 

delegation authority, precludes the use of section 322(b) to 

delegate Subtitle II duties and powers to non-Coast Guard 

officials.

Finally, construing section 322(b) in this fashion also gives 

effect to the Congress's evident intent to circumscribe the 

Corporation's operations within narrow geographic and functional boundaries. In other words, the Corporation's charterrelating to the "construct[ion] ... operat[ion] and 

maint[enance]" of "deep-water navigation works" in specified 

portions of the Saint Lawrence Rivernecessarily limits the 

Secretary's section 322(b) authority. See Ashwood Manor 

Civic Ass'n v. Dole, 619 F. Supp. 52, 65-69 (E.D. Pa.) 

(concluding that even though section 322(b) gives Secretary 

broad authority to delegate agency powers and duties, scope 

may be limited by nature of power delegated as well as by 

delegatee's ability to exercise such authority), aff'd without 

pub. op., 779 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 

1082 (1986); cf. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 

(1989) ("When a statute creates an office to which it assigns 

specific duties, those duties outline the attributes of the office. 

Any additional duties performed pursuant to a general authorization in the statute reasonably should bear some relation to 

the specified duties.").

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While the trial court erred in not applying Chevron step 

one to both sections, we do not mean to suggest that the 

error lies in not using the identical Chevron step with respect 

to both. Rather, we conclude that Chevron step one requires 

that the plain language of sections 2104(a) and 322(b) be read 

together so as to give effect to the Congress's evident intent 

in enacting both. See Engine Mfrs. Ass'n, 88 F.3d at 1088 

("[If] scope of the authorization ... is clear in the statute, the 

scope of the implied preemption can be resolved at Chevron

step one."). Both the Secretary and the district court failed 

to so read them. And even if section 322(b)'s scope is 

ambiguous, requiring recourse to Chevron step two, we would 

be compelled to reject the Secretary's interpretation as unreasonable because it "would deprive [section 2104(a)] of 

virtually all effect." American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. 

FLRA, 798 F.2d 1525, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1986). If no "legislative history of exceptional clarity" exists to support such a 

construction, we have consistently refused to do so. Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons we conclude that the Secretary 

lacks authority to delegate GLPA powers and duties to the 

Corporation. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary 

judgment and remand to the district court with instructions 

to vacate the Secretary's December 1995 final ruleOrganization and Delegation of Powers and Duties; Transfer of 

Great Lakes Pilotage Authority From the Coast Guard to the 

Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, 60 Fed. 

Reg. 63,444 (1995) (codified at 49 C.F.R. § 1.52(d)-(e) (1997)).

So ordered.

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