Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01240/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01240-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GREGORY FRANKLIN, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

J. JIMINEZ, et. al., 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 11cv01240 JAH - BGS 

ORDER ADOPTING THE 

REPORTS; OVERRULING 

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS; 

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO AMEND; AND 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR A PRELIMINRY INJUNCTION 

[Doc. Nos. 43, 52, 57, 58, 60, 61] 

INTRODUCTION

 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 

43), Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction (Doc No. 52), Defendants’ crossmotion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 57), and Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend 

(Doc. No. 60). The Honorable Bernard G. Skomal, United States Magistrate Judge, issued 

a report and recommendation (“Report”) recommending the Court deny the motion for a 

preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 58), and a separate Report recommending the Court grant 

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Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 

and deny Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend (Doc. No. 61). After careful consideration 

of the pleadings and the parties’ submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, this Court 

ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s Reports, and GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment, DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, DENIES Plaintiff’s motion 

for leave to amend and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction,. 

BACKGROUND 

 On June 6, 2011, Plaintiff, a state prisoner appearing pro se, filed a complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Finding the complaint failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted, the Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C section 

1915, granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and provided Plaintiff 45 

days to file a First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on 

November 21, 2011. Finding Plaintiff again failed to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted, the Court, in an order dated January 27, 2012, dismissed the First Amended 

Complaint and provided Plaintiff 45 days to file a Second Amended Complaint which 

cured the deficiencies noted. Plaintiff did not file a Second Amended Complaint and the 

Court dismissed the action. 

 On February 21, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion to reopen his case which this Court 

denied. Plaintiff appealed the order, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal and 

remanded the action to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to file a Second Amended Complaint. 

Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on March 20, 2015. In his 

complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants (1) violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights when they forced him to use an upper bunk which caused him unnecessary pain and 

suffering; (2) Officer Maciel violated his First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

by failing to deliver a package to Plaintiff; and (3) Lieutenant Jimenez violated Plaintiff’s 

First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when he found Plaintiff guilty of a rules violation. 

He names J. Jimenez, S. Garcia, T. Molina, S. Ramos, L. Hugley and C. Maciel as 

defendants. 

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 On August 7, 2015, Defendants filed a motion seeking dismissal of count 3 of the 

Second Amended Complaint. On December 10, 2015, the Honorable Bernard G. Skomal, 

United States Magistrate Judge, issued a Report recommending this Court deny 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. This Court adopted the Report and denied Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss. Defendant filed an answer to the SAC on March 4, 2016. 

 On March 18, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and filed a 

request for a preliminary injunction on May 31, 2016. Defendants filed an opposition to 

the request for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff did not file a reply. Judge Skomal issued 

a Report recommending this Court deny Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. 

No objections were filed. 

 On August 5, 2016, Defendants file an opposition and cross motion for summary 

judgment. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend on August 29, 2016. Judge Skomal 

issued a Report recommending the Court deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 

and Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend and grant Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a reply to the motion for summary judgment and 

objections to the Report. Defendants’ filed a reply to Plaintiff’s objection. 

LEGAL STANDARD

 The district court’s role in reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under this statute, the court “shall 

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report...to which objection is made,” 

and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations 

made by the magistrate [judge].” Id. The party objecting to the magistrate judge’s findings 

and recommendation bears the responsibility of specifically setting forth which of the 

magistrate judge’s findings the party contests. See Fed.R.Civ. P. 72(b). It is well-settled, 

under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that a district court may adopt 

those parts of a magistrate judge’s report to which no specific objection is made, provided 

they are not clearly erroneous. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 153-55 (1985). 

// 

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DISCUSSION

I. Motions for Summary Judgment 

Plaintiff argues the uncontested facts show Defendants violated his First, Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

 Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on all Plaintiff’s causes of 

action. 

A. Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation

 In the Report, Judge Skomal addressed the parties’ proffered evidence as to 

Plaintiff’s causes of action, and provided a thorough analysis as to each cause of action. 

With regard to the first cause of action, in which Plaintiff seeks relief under the First 

Amendment for retaliation, Judge Skomal found Plaintiff did not proffer evidence 

demonstrating an adverse action or a causal link between the bunk assignment in 

September 2009, and the complaint Plaintiff filed two years earlier. Judge Skomal 

determined the evidence submitted by the parties demonstrates Defendants Hughey and 

Molina had a legitimate correctional purpose in switching Plaintiff’s bunk assignment upon 

the arrival of another inmate with a medical accommodation chrono for a lower bunk, and, 

therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim 

under the First Amendment. 

 Plaintiff also asserts an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim in his first 

cause of action. Judge Skomal determined the evidence did not demonstrate knowledge of 

a serious or excessive health risk on behalf of Defendants or disregard of a risk. The Report 

recommends this Court grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference against Defendants Hughey and 

Molina. 

 Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges Defendant Maciel violated Plaintiff’s rights 

when he failed to deliver Plaintiff’s quarterly package. Judge Skomal found Plaintiff 

submitted no evidence showing the exercise of his First Amendment right, the filing of the 

July 2007 complaint, was a motivating factor behind Defendant’s Maciel’s conduct, rather 

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than Plaintiff’s ineligibility to receive quarterly packages based upon his C-status privilege 

group. Judge Skomal recommends the Court grant Defendants’ motion as to the retaliation 

claim against Defendant Maciel. Additionally, Judge Skomal found Plaintiff failed to show 

a serious deprivation to support his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim and 

failed to show Defendant Maciel acted with deliberate indifference when Plaintiff received 

the package within a month after he was taken off of C-status. Judge Skomal also 

determined Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 

Amendment claim, as a matter of law, because there is no evidence Plaintiff pursued the 

state law remedy available to him before asserting his constitutional claim. Furthermore, 

Judge Skomal found the evidence demonstrated the return and reshipment of Plaintiff’s 

quarterly package resulted in a temporary deprivation of personal property which is not a 

cognizable due process violation, and therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment on the second cause of action. 

 Judge Skomal also determined Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to 

Plaintiff’s third cause of action in which he alleges Defendant Jimenez violated his First 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Judge Skomal found the evidence failed to show 

Defendant Jimenez’s conduct in finding Plaintiff guilty for a rules violation was 

substantially motivated by Plaintiff’s July 2007 complaint, and not the discovery of 

contraband in Plaintiff’s shared cell. Additionally, Judge Skomal found evidence 

introduced at the hearing supported Defendant Jimenez’s guilty finding despite testimony 

that Plaintiff had no knowledge of the contraband. Judge Skomal recommends the Court 

grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to this cause of action. 

 Finally, Relying on Columbia Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Ahlstrom Rcovery, 44 F.3d 

800 (9th Cir. 1995), Judge Skomal found the controlling issues for unserved Defendants 

Garcia and Ramos are the same as Defendants Molina and Hughey addressed in the Report, 

and therefore, Judge Skomal recommends the Court find the unserved Defendants are 

entitled to summary judgment. 

// 

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B. Objections 

 Plaintiff filed objections to the Report. He contends the magistrate judge was not 

provided all the facts and he objects to the findings and recommendations. Defendants 

filed a reply to Plaintiff’s objections in which they argue, with the exception of the 

objection to the retaliation claim in the first cause of action, Plaintiff’s objections are the 

same arguments he made in his motion and opposition to their motion. 

1. First Cause of Action 

 Plaintiff maintains the inmate who had the bottom bunk chrono requiring his move 

to the top bunk, Rideau, was not new but had been at the facility for a year and there was 

no evidence that Plaintiff had no cellmate at the time Rideau was moved into his cell. He 

maintains he submitted a grievance in which he was told his cellmate had to be moved to 

place Rideau in the cell with him. He argues Defendant Hughey’s self-serving declaration 

is the only evidence submitted by Defendants that Plaintiff had an empty bed in his cell. 

Additionally, Plaintiff maintains he demonstrated he suffered from a severe shoulder injury 

that later required surgery and the prison’s Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono 

requires a bottom bunk chrono when there is severe weakness of upper or lower body 

extremities and severe orthopedic conditions which are unduly painful. Plaintiff further 

maintains Defendant Molina’s sworn statement that she did not examine Plaintiff is not 

true. 

 Defendants argue the fact Rideau was not a new inmate is a nonissue because the 

failure of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is not predicated on Rideau’s history but Plaintiff's 

lack of entitlement to a lower bunk. 

 Although there is a dispute as to the facts surrounding the retaliation claim, namely, 

whether Plaintiff had a cellmate when they moved Rideau into his cell and whether 

Defendant Molina examined him, the disputed facts are not material to the issue of whether 

Defendants engaged in retaliation. The undisputed facts demonstrate Plaintiff filed a 

complaint against numerous employees of Calipatria State Prison which was served on the 

defendants named in that complaint throughout the month of July 2007. Plaintiff was the 

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subject of a rules violation for covering his light in his cell on July 16, 2007, for which he 

was assessed sanctions, when others were permitted to cover their lights. He was the 

subject of another rules violation report on August 11, 2007. in which he was ultimately 

found not guilty. Plaintiff was seen by medical personnel on August 19, 2009, complaining 

of pain to his shoulder, and it was noted he needed a visit with a doctor before getting a 

lower bunk chrono. On September 4, 2009, Plaintiff was again seen by medical personnel 

complaining of an injured shoulder and ankle for which he was provided medication but 

no lower bunk chrono. On September 5, 2009, when Rideau was moved into his cell, 

Plaintiff was told to take the upper bunk despite complaining about his shoulder and ankle. 

Upon moving to the upper bunk, he fell and injured himself. After being evaluated by 

medical staff, Plaintiff was returned to the cell and forced to use the upper bunk until he 

later received his lower bunk chrono. 

 To prevail on a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a state actor 

took some adverse action against him or her; (2) because of (3) the prisoner’s protected 

conduct and such action (4) chilled the prisoner’s exercise of his or her First Amendment 

rights and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes 

v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2004). To satisfy the causation element of a 

First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiff must show that “his protected conduct was the 

substantial or motivating factor behind the defendant’s conduct.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 

F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 The Court finds there may be a question of fact as to whether Defendants took an 

adverse action when they moved Rideau to Plaintiff’s cell even though there were other 

cells available to move Rideau given Plaintiff’s medical complaints. However, Plaintiff 

fails to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating Defendants’ conduct was in retaliation 

for the filing of a lawsuit two years prior. The Court agrees with Judge Skomal’s finding 

that the evidence demonstrates Defendants had a legitimate purpose in moving Plaintiff to 

the top bunk. 

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 The Court also agrees with Judge Skomal’s determination that Defendants Hughey 

and Molina were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. The 

undisputed evidence demonstrates Plaintiff did not have a lower bunk chrono on September 

5, 2009, and although he was seen for an injured shoulder and ankle on September 4, 2009, 

the records did not indicate a lower bunk chrono was recommended or that Plaintiff was 

referred to a doctor. Additionally, as noted by Judge Skomal, Defendant Hughey called 

the prison’s medical facility to investigate whether Plaintiff had a lower bunk chrono and 

was informed by Defendant Molina that he did not. The undisputed evidence does not 

demonstrate Defendants deliberately disregarded a known risk of harm to Plaintiff. 

 Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections to the first cause of 

action and adopts the magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions. 

2. Second Cause of Action 

 In his objection to the magistrate judge’s findings as to his second cause of action, 

Plaintiff contends he provided sufficient evidence contradicting Defendant Maciel’s 

account of the taking of Plaintiff’s package and argues Defendant Maciel’s conduct was 

motivated by retaliation. The undisputed evidence demonstrates Plaintiff was placed on 

C-status from September 18, 2007 through October 16, 2007, during which he was unable 

to receive quarterly packages. A quarterly package arrived on September 19, 2007, that 

Plaintiff did not receive. As part of his duties, Defendant Maciel distributed and returned 

packages to and from the A-yard to the prison mail room, but was not responsible for 

mailing return packages. In response to Plaintiffs’ 602 form dated October 10, 2007, in 

which he requests his package, Defendant Maciel states it was delivered to A yard but he 

cannot explain what happened to the package. Defendant Maciel completed an 

unauthorized package form and provided it to Plaintiff on October 14, 2007. 

 Plaintiff also presents a typed written notice purportedly from the vendor noting it 

sent a replacement package to Plaintiff on October 16, 2007, but the package was returned. 

Neither Defendants nor Judge Skomal address this disputed evidence. However, even 

assuming a package was received after Plaintiff was no longer on C-status, Plaintiff still 

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fails to demonstrate that Defendant Maciel was the individual who returned the package 

and, more significantly, fails to demonstrate Plaintiff’s July 2007 complaint was a 

substantial motivating factor causing Defendant Maciel to fail to deliver the package in 

October 2007. 

 Plaintiff does not specifically object to the magistrate judge’s findings and 

conclusions as to the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim and Fourteenth 

Amendment due process claim surrounding the quarterly package. Upon a review of the 

record, the Court finds Judge Skomal presents a cogent analysis of the claims. Specifically, 

the Court agrees that Plaintiff fails to show a serious deprivation when he received his 

package a month later. The Court also agrees Plaintiff fails to demonstrate he pursued the 

state law remedy available to him before asserting his due process claim. Additionally, the 

Court agrees the evidence demonstrate the deprivation resulting from the return and 

reshipment of Plaintiff’s package constituted a temporary deprivation which is not a 

cognizable due process violation. 

 Therefore, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections and adopts the findings 

and conclusions as to this cause of action. 

3. Third Cause of Action 

 Plaintiff objects to Judge Skomal’s findings and recommendation addressing his 

third cause of action. He argues the evidence demonstrates Defendant Jimenez’s findings 

for the rules violations were retaliatory when Defendant made a comment about Plaintiff’s 

lawsuit, and the guilty finding was arbitrary because the cell phone battery was found with 

Plaintiff’s cellmate’s belongings, and the cellmate admitted the battery was his and 

explained Plaintiff did not know about the battery. Plaintiff essentially disagrees with the 

magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions. 

 The record supports the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation as to this 

cause of action. The Court agrees with Judge Skomal’s finding that Plaintiff fails to show 

Defendant Jimenez’s guilty finding was substantially motivated by Plaintiff’s complaint 

filed two years earlier in which Defendant Jimenez was not a named defendant. The Court 

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also agrees with Judge Skomal’s determination that Plaintiff received advanced written 

notice of the disciplinary proceedings, he had an opportunity to call witnesses and did call 

a witness, and Defendant Jimenez added his findings to his report. Additionally, the Court 

agrees there was evidence introduced at the hearing to support Defendant Jimenez’s 

findings. As such, Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED and the Court adopts the 

magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions. 

 The Court also agrees with Judge Skomal’s determination that the controlling issues 

for the unserved defendants are the same as those for Molina and Hughey addressed above. 

Accordingly, the Court finds the unserved defendants are entitled to summary judgment. 

II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend

 Judge Skomal recommends the Court deny Plaintiff’s request to amend his 

complaint to provide for the proper defendant he mistakenly named as S. Ramos based 

upon futility of amendment and undue prejudice. In light of the Court’s determination that 

Defendants are entitled to judgment on all Plaintiff’s causes of action, amendment would 

be futile. Accordingly, the Court adopts Judge Skomal’s recommendation and DENIES 

Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend. 

III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

 Plaintiff seeks an order enjoining Defendants from delaying or destroying his legal 

mail, taking and withholding his legal property and directing “mental physical harm.” 

Motion at 2. Defendants oppose the motion. 

 Finding Plaintiff seeks to enjoin parties over which the Court lacks jurisdiction, the 

California State Prison in Lancaster, and Plaintiff fails to establish a likelihood of success 

on the merits of his claims, Judge Skomal recommends the motion be denied. 

 This Court received no objections to the Report. The Court conducted a de novo

review, independently reviewing the Report and all relevant papers submitted by the 

parties, and finds the Report provides a cogent analysis of the issues presented in the 

motion. The Court adopts the findings and conclusions and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for 

a preliminary injunction. 

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

 1. Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED; 

 2. The report and recommendation (Doc. No. 61) is ADOPTED in its entirety; 

 3. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 57) is GRANTED; 

 4. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 43) is DENIED; 

 5. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend (Doc. No. 60) is DENIED; 

 6. The report and recommendation (Doc. No. 58) is ADOPTED in its entirety; 

 7. Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc No. 52) is DENIED; 

 8. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants and terminate 

 the action. 

 DATED: March 22, 2017 

 

 _________________________________ 

 JOHN A. HOUSTON 

 United States District Judge 

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