Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-04276/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-04276-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALTER RAY REDMOND,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPT.,

et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________/

No. C 07-04276 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' RENEWED

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO

PROSECUTE AND TERMINATING ALL

PLAINTIFF'S PENDING MOTIONS AS MOOT

INTRODUCTION

On August 20, 2007, Plaintiff Walter Ray Redmond filed this

civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive

force arising from a July 15, 2007 interaction with four narcotics

officers from the San Francisco Police Department. 

Before the Court is Defendants' renewed motion to dismiss for

failure to prosecute based on Plaintiff's repeated refusal to

attend and complete his deposition. Plaintiff opposed the motion

in a series of letters to the Court, and Defendants filed their

reply. 

Having considered the papers filed by the parties, the Court

hereby GRANTS Defendants' renewed motion to dismiss for failure to

prosecute and TERMINATES all Plaintiff's pending motions as moot.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff failed to appear at his deposition duly noticed for

June 17, 2009. (Lee Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff appeared in response to

a second deposition notice for August 7, 2009, but at several

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points refused to answer questions. (Redmond Dep. at 17:20-21,

28:15-19.) Forty-seven minutes after it began, Plaintiff

terminated his deposition, despite being warned by opposing counsel

that by refusing to complete his deposition he was risking

dismissal for failing to prosecute the case. (Redmond Dep. at

43:4-45:7; Margolis Decl. ¶ 2.) 

On August 10, 2009, Defendants filed their first motion to

dismiss for failure to prosecute under Rules 37(d)(1)-(3) and 41(b)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In an Order dated

September 29, 2009, the Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss

and directed the parties to schedule another deposition session for

Plaintiff. (Sept. 29, 2009 Order at 5.) The Court explicitly

ordered Plaintiff to attend Defendants' properly noticed deposition

even if he was not represented by counsel. (Id.) 

Thereafter, Plaintiff failed to appear on April 21, 2010 in

response to the third deposition notice. (Margolis Decl. ¶ 6.) 

Finally, Plaintiff appeared on May 4, 2010 in response to the

fourth deposition notice, after demanding that his bus fare from

Las Vegas be at Defendants' expense. (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff had

previously reassured Defendants' counsel that he "won't walk out

this time." (Id., Ex. F.) Plaintiff brought his brother, a nonlawyer, who prompted him with some answers and disrupted the

deposition by taking Plaintiff out of the room. (Id. ¶ 8.) 

Plaintiff also refused to answer certain questions unless he was

represented by counsel. (Redmond Dep. at 72:1-2, 118:2-11.) 

Defendants' counsel warned Plaintiff that "the absence of counsel

does not excuse [him] from the obligation to prosecute this lawsuit

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and to answer questions at a deposition." (Id. at 66:4-17.) 

Defendants' counsel further stated that if Plaintiff continued to

refuse to answer questions, then he would seek "dismissal of this

action for failure to abide by the court's order." (Id. at 66:17-

20.) Plaintiff again prematurely terminated his deposition after

seventy-six minutes. (Id. at 118:2-120:6; Margolis Decl. ¶ 9.)

On May 6, 2010, Defendants filed their renewed motion to

dismiss for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b), or in the

alternative, under Rule 37(b) and (d)(1)-(3). Defendants claim

that Plaintiff "has repeatedly failed to submit to his duly noticed

deposition, despite repeated orders by this Court requiring his

attendance." (Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) They contend that this

failure has deprived them of the opportunity to question Plaintiff

on relevant subjects, including details of the officers' actions;

what was said during the incident; evidence of municipal liability;

the extent and effects of Plaintiff's injuries; and Plaintiff's

employment, criminal and medical history.

In a letter to the Court dated May 13, 2010, Plaintiff opposes

Defendants' motion, stating, "I told my story twice and it was not

recorded at all!" (Pl.'s May 13, 2010 Letter at 3.) He claims

that the excerpts Defendants attached to their renewed motion to

dismiss do not accurately reflect the deposition as a whole, since

much of his relevant testimony was omitted. (Pl.'s May 15, 2010

Letter at 3.)

In an Order dated June 14, 2010, the Court directed Defendants

to provide it with complete copies of the transcripts of

Plaintiff's August 7, 2009 and May 4, 2010 depositions. (June 14,

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2010 Order at 2.) The transcripts reveal that Plaintiff became

frustrated and terminated both of the deposition sessions that he

did attend, without giving Defendants an opportunity to obtain a

detailed description of the incident. It is clear that Plaintiff

did not terminate his deposition for good reason.

DISCUSSION

A district court may dismiss an action for failure to

prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See

Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962); McKeever v. Block,

932 F.2d 795, 797 (9th Cir. 1991). "[F]ailure to prosecute

diligently is sufficient by itself to justify a dismissal." 

Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). 

"But only unreasonable delay will support a dismissal for lack of

prosecution." Nealey v. Transportacion Maritima Mexicana, S. A.,

662 F.2d 1275, 1280 (9th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added). 

A court should consider five factors before dismissing an

action under Rule 41(b): (1) the public interest in the expeditious

resolution of the litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its

docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the

availability of less drastic sanctions; and (5) the public policy

favoring the disposition of actions on their merits. See Malone v.

U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987); Henderson v.

Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). 

A dismissal for failure to prosecute is generally with

prejudice and operates as an adjudication on the merits for

purposes of preclusion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); In re

Schimmels, 127 F.3d 875, 884 (9th Cir. 1997); Johnson v. U.S. Dep't

of the Treasury, 939 F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 1991). Dismissal with

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prejudice of a complaint under Rule 41(b) is a harsh remedy, and

the district court should first consider less drastic alternatives. 

See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996). When

determining whether the sanction of dismissal is appropriate, the

"reasonable exploration of possible and meaningful alternatives is

all that is required." Anderson, 542 F.2d at 525; see also Von

Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing and Wrestling Commission,

442 F.2d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1971). Further, because the

harshness of a dismissal with prejudice is directly proportionate

to the likelihood that a plaintiff would prevail if permitted to go

forward to trial, the district court should consider the strength

of a plaintiff's case if such information is available before

determining whether dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See

McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178-79. 

A plaintiff must prosecute his case with "reasonable

diligence" to avoid dismissal. Anderson, 542 F.2d at 524. Here,

Plaintiff hindered the progress of his case towards a decision on

the merits by twice failing to respond to deposition notices. 

Although he appeared in response to two other deposition notices,

he refused to answer certain questions by Defendants' counsel, and

he terminated both sessions prematurely. Plaintiff explains that

he did not want to answer certain questions without counsel;

however, the Court had explicitly ordered him to answer questions

even if he did not have counsel. Plaintiff also asserts that he

was "traumatized" by the officers' alleged excessive force and,

when questioned at the deposition about the incident, stated, "It's

getting me emotional. It's making me upset." (Pl.'s May 15, 2010

Letter at 2; Redmond Dep. at 119:15-16.) Plaintiff expresses

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frustration that "the city attys [sic] are masters of linguistics

and are allowed to manipulate" him at his deposition. (Pl.'s May

13, 2010 Letter at 2.)

These justifications do not exempt Plaintiff from his

obligation to sit for a complete deposition. Defendants are

entitled to discover Plaintiff's version of the events in order

properly to evaluate the case, the possibility of a dispositive

motion and/or settlement, and their trial strategy. An examination

of the deposition transcripts shows that, contrary to Plaintiff's

claim, he did not tell his story twice. In fact, Plaintiff

terminated both sessions before he answered specific questions

relating to the July 15, 2007 incident. By repeatedly thwarting

Defendants' legitimate attempts at discovery, Plaintiff has caused

an unreasonable delay in adjudication of his claims that supports

dismissal for failure to prosecute. See Nealey, 662 F.2d at 1280.

Application of the above five factors to this case favors

dismissal. See Malone, 833 F.2d at 128, 130. 

Public interest in the expeditious resolution of litigation

and the Court's need to manage its docket weigh heavily in favor of

dismissal. Plaintiff's complaint was filed August 20, 2007 but has

not progressed past discovery, mainly due to Plaintiff's failure to

sit for his deposition. The Court is attentive to the particular

needs of pro se plaintiffs, but need not endlessly accommodate a

litigant who refuses to obey its orders. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (court's interest in docket

control weighed in favor of dismissal of action where plaintiff

failed to comply with court's order to file an amended complaint). 

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Discovery, in particular, was designed to be managed by the

parties.

The risk of prejudice to Defendants is high, in that the

events alleged in this action occurred on July 15, 2007, nearly

three years ago. As Defendants point out, the longer the suit is

delayed, the more witnesses' memories will fade, and the more

difficult it will be to defend the case. (Mot. to Dismiss at 11.) 

Defendants have also borne the cost of two noticed depositions

where Plaintiff never materialized, and two that were incomplete,

and they have incurred more costs by paying for his bus fare in

order for him to attend the most recent deposition session. 

(Margolis Decl. ¶ 12.)

The public policy favoring disposition of cases on their

merits is the only factor that weighs against dismissal. A police

excessive force claim is a serious one that calls "into question

the manner by which the state exercises its monopoly on the

legitimate use of force. Thus, the public has an interest in

having this case decided on the merits." Dahl v. City of

Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 366 (9th Cir. 1996) (public had an

interest in having case decided on the merits where two arrestees

claimed that in separate incidents and after being restrained, they

were beaten by officers and repeatedly bitten by a police dog and

suffered injuries including deep dog bites on the thighs, groins,

arms, and legs requiring stitches, permanent shoulder damage and

severe bruising). Plaintiff alleges that he was, without cause or

warning, choked unconscious by officers using a "full nelson

sleeper-hold" and that his neck "continues to hurt to this day." 

(Compl. at 3-4; Pl.'s May 15, 2010 Letter at 2.) But, according to

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Plaintiff, he was only unconscious for a "few minutes" and the

officers took him to the hospital to get medical care for his

injuries. (Compl. at 2.) In addition, Plaintiff's pain is not

continuous, and he acknowledges that his medical records state that

he had "no neck pain" and "no urgent medical condition." (Mot. for

Review Thoroughly of Medical Records at 1.) Because Plaintiff

refused to describe the excessive force incident in detail during

his deposition, there is little on the record to indicate that he

is likely to succeed on the merits. While Plaintiff claims the

officers used excessive force against him, he suggests that the

officers believed they were preventing him from swallowing drugs. 

Plaintiff denies swallowing drugs, and alleges the force was

malicious and sadistic. However, it appears that no other

witnesses have stepped forward to confirm Plaintiff's story because

the acquaintance he was speaking with when the incident occurred

has not been located by either party. Furthermore, Plaintiff was

on probation for dealing cocaine at the time of the incident, which

gives credence to the officers' alleged assumption that Plaintiff

was attempting to swallow drugs that could have caused him serious

harm. While no drugs were found, a reasonable officer in

Defendants' position could have believed that the force used on

Plaintiff was justified.

While excessive force is never to be condoned, the force

Plaintiff alleges in this case is not so egregious that the need to

adjudicate his case on its merits outweighs the other four factors

favoring dismissal. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262-63 (even if

ambiguity about prejudice to defendants and "public policy favoring

disposition on the merits both weighed against dismissal, they

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would not outweigh the other three factors that strongly support

dismissal here").

The Court attempted to use less drastic sanctions by denying

Defendants' first motion to dismiss and ordering Plaintiff to sit

for his deposition. (Sept. 29, 2009 Order at 10.) After Plaintiff

failed to attend his third noticed deposition session and

prematurely terminated his fourth, the Court must now consider more

drastic sanctions. Monetary sanctions are inappropriate due to

Plaintiff's in forma pauperis status. Plaintiff proposes the Court

appoint counsel for him and then order another deposition. (Pl.'s

May 13, 2010 Letter at 2-3; Pl.'s May 15, 2010 Letter at 2-4.) The

Court has repeatedly informed Plaintiff that until it can assess

his claims' likelihood of success on the merits -- which it cannot

do if he hampers discovery -- it cannot find exceptional

circumstances entitling him to counsel. (Nov. 14, 2007 Order at 2;

Sept. 17, 2008 Order at 12.) 

Plaintiff has already had four chances to cooperate in giving

his deposition. Giving him another chance would be unfair to

Defendants. Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court's

previous order to cooperate at his deposition. After promising not

to walk out on the most recent deposition, Plaintiff demanded

Defendants pay for his bus fare, was non-responsive to questions

posed by Defendants' counsel, allowed his brother to disrupt the

deposition, and terminated it without describing the excessive

force incident in detail. It is unlikely that Plaintiff would act

differently if given another chance to be deposed.

"There is no warning requirement when dismissal follows a

noticed motion under Rule 41(b)." Morris v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,

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942 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Nealey, 662 F.2d at 1279-

81). Nevertheless, in addition to the four opportunities Plaintiff

was given to sit for a deposition, he was repeatedly warned

throughout the litigation of his obligations as a plaintiff. In

the Court's Order of Service, he was told of his responsibility to

prosecute the case and comply with the Court's orders. (July 17,

2008 Order at 11.) As Plaintiff prepared to leave the August 7,

2009 deposition prematurely, Defendants' counsel reminded him of

these obligations and the risk of dismissal, stating: "We will file

a motion to dismiss for your failure to prosecute the case. 

Because you have a duty, as the plaintiff in this case, to sit for

deposition." (Redmond Dep. at 43:15-17.) Defendants' filing of

the first motion to dismiss served as an additional warning to

Plaintiff. The Court gave Plaintiff another chance by denying the

motion. It ordered him to sit for his deposition and answer

questions even though he did not have counsel. (Sept. 29, 2009

Order at 10.) It also explicitly reiterated that Plaintiff must

comply with the Court's order and prosecute his case. (Id. at 15-

16.) And finally, at the May 4, 2010 deposition, Defendants'

counsel warned Plaintiff once more that by refusing to sit for his

deposition and answer questions, he risked "dismissal of this

action for failure to abide by the Court's order." (Redmond Dep.

at 66:19-20.) Plaintiff was informed by the Court and Defendants'

counsel of his obligations as a litigant, but chose to ignore them.

The Court is well aware of its need to be particularly

sensitive to the challenges faced by pro se litigants unfamiliar

with the judicial process. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dept., 901 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). However, the delay in

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this case is not due to Plaintiff's inexperience with complex

procedures. Plaintiff ignored clear deposition notices and

violated explicit instructions and orders by the Court. He has

exceeded the latitude of the Court's patience by repeatedly and

willfully hindering efficient adjudication of his claims. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants' renewed motion to

dismiss for failure to prosecute. Because the Court grants

Defendants' motion under Rule 41(b), their alternative motion to

dismiss under Rule 37 need not be addressed. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

1. The Court GRANTS Defendants' renewed motion to dismiss

for failure to prosecute (docket no. 213). The complaint is

DISMISSED with prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment, terminate

all Plaintiff's pending motions as moot, and close the file. 

Defendants may recover their costs from Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 6/25/2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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G:\PRO-SE\CW\CR.07\Redmond4276.grantMTD(depo).wpd 12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALTER RAY REDMOND,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPT et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV07-04276 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on June 25, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Walter Ray Redmond

1250 Pierce St #1

San Francisco, CA 94115

Dated: June 25, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Nikki Riley, Deputy Clerk

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