Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01305/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01305-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1345 Foreclosure

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ANITA TAA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK N.A., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-01305-BLF 

ORDER DENYING, WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE, APPLICATION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

[Re: ECF 1]

Plaintiffs Anita and Donato Taa (“Plaintiffs”), proceeding pro se, seek a temporary 

restraining order (“TRO”) against numerous defendants in connection with a mortgage on their 

real property. Pl.’s Mot., ECF 1. Plaintiffs filed their application for TRO on March 20, 2015 and 

averred that they did not serve defendants because “[n]o ‘Certificate of Service’ is required due to 

our ‘Crime Victims’ Rights Claimant’ status.” Certificate of Service, ECF 1-1. The Court 

accordingly treats this application as ex parte and, for the reasons stated herein, DENIES it 

without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit is not entirely clear because their TRO application is 

not accompanied by a complaint. Recognizing that pro se filings are to be liberally construed, 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the Court discerns from Plaintiffs’ TRO application 

and accompanying documents that they own a property in Milpitas secured by a promissory note 

on a loan originally obtained from AmPro Mortgage Corporation. See Pl.’s Mot. Exh. A. 

Plaintiffs appear to contend that both the loan and the note are illegal, either because they were 

Case 5:15-cv-01305-BLF Document 5 Filed 03/23/15 Page 1 of 5
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fraudulently entered or subsequently fraudulently assigned, or both. See Pl.’s Mot. at 2;1see also 

id. Exh. F (Plaintiffs’ letter to California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris requesting criminal 

prosecution of the defendants for violations of “multiple criminal and civil statutes,” including 

forgery, perjury, mail fraud, notary fraud, and criminal conversion). 

Plaintiffs now seek a TRO against the defendants “in order to prevent further financial, 

mental and psychological devastation.” Pl.’s Mot. at 1. Plaintiffs also request that “this Court 

stipulate that Movant receive all ‘Crime Victims’ Rights,’ as required under [18 U.S.C. § 3771].’” 

Id. While it is not clear what exact conduct by the defendants Plaintiffs seek to enjoin, their 

application states that they are seeking relief in the form of:

1. REVERSE the illegally implemented eviction and reverse the 

illegal foreclosure action against Movant; and

2. Immediately implement ALL ‘CRIME VICTIMS RIGHTS’ 

MOVANT is entitled to under 18 USC 3771 CRIME VICTIMS’ 

RIGHTS ACT; CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE 679 & 1102.6 

Crime Victim and Witness Rights Act and the California 

Constitution, Article I, Section 28 (b)-Rights of Victims of 

Crime, in order to make Movant Whole.

3. Based upon the presented evidence and existing Federal/State 

laws “BAR” the named Defendants from securing any type of 

relief, compensation, etc., in regards to Movant as per Per [sic] 

18 USC 3771, (d) (1), which states in part: “A person accused of 

the crime may not obtain any form of relief under this chapter.” 

Id. (emphasis in original). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The substantive standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to the 

standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush 

& Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001); Lockheed Missile & Space Co. v. Hughes Aircraft, 

887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995). An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is 

“an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is 

entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). 

A plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief must establish “[1] that he is likely to 

 

1 Because Plaintiffs’ filing lacks page numbers, references are to the ECF page numbers.

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succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 

relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public 

interest.” Id. at 20. Alternatively, an injunction can issue where “the likelihood of success is such 

that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in 

plaintiff’s favor,” provided that the plaintiff can also demonstrate the other Winter factors. 

Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Under either standard, the plaintiff bears the burden of making 

a clear showing on these elements and on entitlement to this extraordinary remedy. Earth Island 

Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 III. DISCUSSION

An ex parte TRO Application must first satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1), 

which demands “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint” that “clearly show that 

immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse 

party can be heard in opposition,” and a certification describing the “efforts made to give notice 

[to the adverse party] and the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A)-

(B). As previously described, Plaintiffs’ averred that they are not required to give notice to 

defendants because of their “‘Crime Victims’ Rights Claimant’ status.” Certificate of Service, 

ECF 1-1. It is not clear what efforts, if any, Plaintiffs made to contact the defendants. More 

fundamentally, even if the Court were to accept Plaintiff’s averment as sufficient justification for 

the failure to notify the named defendants, Plaintiffs have still failed to satisfy the first prong of 

Rule 65(b)(1) because they have provided no affidavit or verified complaint setting forth specific 

facts showing a likelihood of immediate and irreparable injury. In fact, Plaintiffs’ requested relief 

that this Court “REVERSE the illegally implemented eviction and reverse the illegal foreclosure 

against Movant,” Pl.’s Mot. at 4 (emphasis in original), suggests that Plaintiffs actually seek to 

undo an already-completed eviction and foreclosure, rather than to enjoin it ex ante. Plaintiffs 

have therefore failed to demonstrate a likelihood of immediate and irreparable injury sufficient to 

warrant ex parte injunctive relief.

As to the Winter factors, it bears repeating that Plaintiffs did not file a complaint in 

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conjunction with their application for TRO. There is therefore no operative pleading and no claim

for relief against the named defendants.2 Nor have Plaintiffs alleged any facts about their present 

situation and what they are seeking to enjoin beyond what the Court has been able to deduce from 

their papers. As such, it is impossible to perform a proper analysis of the Winter factors for 

preliminary injunctive relief. Suffice it to say, Plaintiffs have alleged no claims against the 

defendants and have therefore failed to demonstrate any likelihood of success or even serious 

questions going to the merits of any claims. Moreover, absent any factual allegations concerning 

their present circumstance, there is nothing in the record before the Court showing that Plaintiffs 

are likely to suffer irreparable injury, that the balance of equities tips in their favor, or that an 

injunction would be in the public interest.

To the extent Plaintiffs base their request for injunctive relief upon the Crime Victims’ 

Rights Act (“CVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3771, that statute does not entitle Plaintiffs to the relief that 

they seek here. The CVRA was enacted “to make crime victims full participants in the criminal 

justice system.” Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for C.D. Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The Act enumerates rights afforded to crime victims in “[i]n any court proceeding involving an 

offense against a crime victim.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(1). Thought such rights may be asserted “in 

the district court in the district in which the crime occurred” if there is no prosecution underway, 

id. § 3771(d)(3), the CVRA does not appear to confer a private right of action against private 

parties. Nor is the Court convinced that Plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated that they may 

avail themselves of the CVRA’s protections because it is not clear that they are victims of any 

federal crime within the meaning of the CVRA. See id. § 3771(e). Furthermore, there is no 

evidence of a pending criminal investigation or formal criminal charges against the defendants in 

connection with their alleged misconduct sufficient to trigger the rights that Plaintiffs seek to 

 

2

The Court notes that in the absence of an operative pleading, Plaintiffs have also failed to satisfy 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1), which requires that a federal plaintiff set forth “a short an 

plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction.” While it appears that Plaintiffs may 

believe federal jurisdiction can be based on their invocation of the federal Crime Victims’ Rights 

Act, the Court, as explained below, is skeptical that Plaintiffs can maintain a cause of action under 

that Act. In any event, because the Court will afford Plaintiffs an opportunity to plead their 

claim(s), they are also on notice that they must establish the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. 

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invoke under the CVRA. See Does v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1342-43 (S.D. Fla. 

2011) (some CVRA rights may attach before formal charges, but deferring ruling on what rights 

those are); In re Petersen, No. 2:10-CV-298 RM, 2010 WL 5108692, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 8, 

2010) (many CVRA rights only arise after charges brought). 

III. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate their entitlement to a 

temporary restraining order. Plaintiffs’ application for TRO is accordingly DENIED without 

prejudice. To the extent Plaintiffs intend to renew their application, they must first file by April 

13, 2015 a complaint setting forth their claim(s) for relief against the defendants and the basis for 

this Court’s jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Failure to file such a pleading by that date shall 

result in summary dismissal of this action.

The Court advises Plaintiffs that they may wish to contact a Federal Legal Assistance Help 

(“FLASH”) Center. The information for the San Jose FLASH Center is:

United States Courthouse

280 South 1st Street

2nd Floor, Room 2070

San Jose, CA 95113

Phone: 408-998-5298, ext. 311

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 23, 2015

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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