Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02501/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02501-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEWAYNE RAMON THOMPSON,

Petitioner,

v.

J. MACOMBER,

Respondent.

No. 2:14-cv-2501 JAM KJN P (TEMP)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his August 9, 2014 prison 

disciplinary conviction for battery on a peace officer. He seeks federal habeas relief on the

grounds that his due process rights were violated at the disciplinary hearing. Upon careful 

consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s 

application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

I. Background

Petitioner is serving a prison sentence for robbery, burglary, and assault with a firearm. 

People v. Thompson, No. E029200, 2003 WL 1874796 (4th Dist. Cal. April 14, 2003). On July 

1, 2013, Correctional Officer (C/O) T. Farley wrote a rules violation report (RVR) charging 

petitioner with “battery on peace officer.” (ECF No. 1 at 32.) C/O Farley alleged, in pertinent

part, that:

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On Monday, December 10, 2012, at approximately 0935 hours, 

while working as B6 Floor #1, I was on the B Facility 3 yard 

observing morning yard when I heard the B observation order the 

yard to “get down.” As I responded from the area in front of 

Building 5, I could see two inmates fighting next to the basketball 

court. Both inmates were engaged in striking one another about the 

upper body, head and chest area. Both inmates were also trying to 

grab at each other; I could not make out who was the aggressor and 

who was the victim. The two inmates were identified later using 

their State identification cards as inmates THOMSON, T-12115, 

B8-126L and DAVIS, H-49071, B7-107L.

As I responded I was yelling repeated verbal commands to the 

fighting inmates to stop there [sic] attack on one another and 

assume a prone position. Both inmates ignored mine and other 

staffs verbal commands and continued fighting and went to the 

ground attacking one another. Sergeant R. Basso sprayed the 

involved inmates with a continues [sic] burst from his State issued 

MK-9 Oleoresin Capsicum sprayer (OC), striking both inmates in 

the face and upper body. The (OC) did not have the desired effect 

and both inmates continued their attack on one another. DAVIS 

remained on the ground as THOMPSON separated, got to his feet 

and staggered back approximately ten feet, circled around, 

advanced, and kicked DAVIS in the head. THOMPSON dove on 

top of DAVIS and grabbed DAVIS in a choke hold. Officer 

Contreras sprayed a continues [sic] burst of (OC) striking both 

inmates in the head and upper body. THOMPSON suddenly 

jumped to his feet and rushed towards me and grabbed my chest. 

Fearing for my safety, I used my State issued baton and utilized a 

forward strike, striking THOMPSON in the left shoulder. Do [sic] 

to the threat of great bodily injury to myself, I struck THOMPSON 

a second time in the upper left arm with another forward strike. 

THOMPSON remained on his feet and turned and faced Officer 

Caraway. Fearing for Officer Caraway’s safety, I struck 

THOMSON with a third forward strike, striking THOMPSON on 

the lower torso, but did not have the desired effect. Therefore I 

used a fourth strike, striking THOMPSON on the right leg utilized 

[sic] a forward strike. Officer Caraway drew his baton, utilizing a 

forward strike hit THOMPSON in the upper torso area. 

THOMPSON went to the ground and assumed the prone position 

without further incident.

(Id. at 32-34.)1

The disciplinary hearing on the July 1, 2013 RVR was held on August 8, 2013. (Id. at 

36.) Petitioner appeared at the hearing ready to proceed and stated that he was in good health. 

 

1

 The RVR on this incident was originally written on December 12, 2012, but was ordered

reissued/reheard because “there was no indication that the I.E. screened the prospective 

witnesses,” as required by prison regulations. (ECF No. 1 at 36.) A second RVR was issued on 

April 30, 2013, but this RVR was also ordered reissued/reheard “because witness denial was not 

justified or addressed in the hearing summary.” (Id.) The July 1, 2013 RVR was the third and 

final RVR regarding this incident. 

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(Id.) Petitioner received copies of all applicable reports at least twenty-four hours in advance of 

the hearing. (Id.) Petitioner explained his understanding of those reports and stated he was 

prepared to begin the hearing. (Id.)

A staff assistant was not assigned because petitioner spoke English and was literate, and 

the issues were not complex. (Id.) Petitioner agreed that assignment of a staff assistant was not 

necessary. 

An investigative employee (IE) was assigned after the issuance of the first 

reissued/reheard RVR. (Id. at 30, 36, 40.) The IE interviewed petitioner and wrote a report for 

purposes of the disciplinary hearing on that RVR. At that interview, petitioner told the IE that he 

wanted to have the video of the alleged battery “analyzed and zoomed in,” and he wanted to 

know “the procedure for pulling the video from the camera, downloading it onto the computer 

and copying it onto the compact disc.” (Id. at 40.) When the IE asked petitioner what he thought 

the video would reveal if it was “zoomed in,” petitioner stated, “the technology lies.” (Id.) 

Petitioner also told the IE that C/O Farley was “lying” when he reported in the RVR that 

petitioner grabbed his chest. Petitioner explained that he was simply moving in Farley’s direction 

after being pepper-sprayed. (Id.) A new IE was not assigned after the issuance of the July 1, 

2013 RVR. 

At the August 8, 2013 disciplinary hearing, petitioner stated that he was dissatisfied with 

the IE’s report. He argued that another IE should have been assigned after the issuance of the 

third and final RVR because he had additional questions he wished to ask the IE. (Id.) The 

report of the disciplinary hearing contains the following comments by the Senior Hearing Officer 

(SHO) about the investigative employee:

In the hearing, THOMPSON stated that he is dissatisfied because 

he was not assigned an I.E. for the most recently issued 

disciplinary, stating that he had more questions for the I.E. to 

answer. After careful review of these objections in the hearing, it 

was my conclusion that these objections were without merit for the 

following reasons: THOMPSON asked three (3) additional 

questions that had to do with video evidence. These did not need to 

be evaluated by an I.E. because all videos were reviewed in the 

hearing. An I.E. report was completed by Officer Z. Basnett for the 

first reissued RVR (log number B13-04-0046). The completed I.E. 

report was accomplished with ample screening of witnesses. The 

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CDO determined this report to be satisfactory. Therefore, Officer

Basnett’s I.E. report was issued with this copy (log number B13-07-

0003) and used for this hearing.

(Id. at 36-37.)

Petitioner requested that C/O Farley be called as a witness at the disciplinary hearing. (Id.

at 37.) This request was granted. Petitioner posed five questions to C/O Farley. Those questions, 

and their resolution by the SHO, were as follows:

1. Approximately how many feet away from you was I 

[THOMPSON] when you noticed my innocently advancing in your 

direction? The SHO allowed Officer Farley to answer this question 

and he responded that the distance was approximately ten (10) 

inches. After discussion as to whether the distance was relevant, 

the SHO discovered that THOMPSON was attempting to place 

blame on Officer Farley because he did not move to avoid the 

alleged Battery. The SHO found this question irrelevant to the 

charge. The question at hand is whether THOMPSON committed 

Battery or not. Officer Farley’s awareness has no bearing on the 

issue.

2. Did my advancing toward you look of an assaultive manner? Or 

threatening? The SHO also found this question irrelevant. The 

perception of THOMPSON’s demeanor would have no bearing on 

his guilt or innocence.

3. How come you couldn’t prevent [my] alleged grab? The SHO 

also found this question irrelevant. The physical ability of Officer 

Farley to defend himself is not in question.

4. Have you reviewed frame 3 [channel 3] of the video evidence? 

The SHO also found this question irrelevant. Officer Farley was an 

eye witness to the alleged Battery.

5. How come it shows you stepping to the side, us having much 

distance in between us where the alleged grab suppose to have 

occurred, when I innocently directed towards you when separating 

from combating inmate Davis? The SHO also found this question 

irrelevant. The physical movements or ability of Officer Farley is 

not in question.

(Id.)

Petitioner requested “numerous other witnesses at the hearing;” he had “written questions 

prepared” for those witnesses.2 (Id.) The SHO reviewed all of these questions and determined 

 

2

 According to the second level administrative review of petitioner’s prison appeal, petitioner 

requested eight other correctional officers and “all other Reporting Officers” as witnesses. (ECF 

No. 1 at 30.)

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that they had already been addressed by the IE’s report. Accordingly, “the SHO denied the 

appearance of the additional witnesses as the submitted questions had already been answered or 

deemed irrelevant.” (Id.) 

A videotape of the events related to the battery charge was reviewed by petitioner prior to 

the disciplinary hearing and was also reviewed at the hearing. (Id.) According to the second 

level administrative review of petitioner’s prison appeal, on the videotape petitioner “can be seen 

jumping up after attacking inmate Davis, rushing towards and grabbing or striking Officer T. 

Farley in the chest.” (Id. at 30.)3 

Petitioner pled not guilty to the disciplinary charge, stating:

Video channel 3 shows that I did not grab the officer. The Hearing 

Officer is partial/biased and failed to view the video evidence 

impartially. 

(Id. at 37.) 

Petitioner was found guilty of a violation of 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3005(d)(1); specifically, 

“Battery on a Peace Officer.” (Id. at 38.)4 The guilty finding was based on the preponderance of 

the evidence submitted at the disciplinary hearing. (Id.) This evidence consisted of: (1) the 

 

3

 Petitioner states, on the other hand, that a review of “ch. 3 and 4” of the video reflects that 

petitioner never came into contact with C/O Farley but that Farley stepped to the side and struck 

petitioner with his baton as petitioner was trying to “prone out in a secure location.” (ECF No. 1

at 94.) Petitioner explains that “by my arm crossing Farley’s image on video, it presents an optic 

illusion that contact was made; foremost, on Ch. 9, but a reasonable officer would acknowledge 

that on Ch. 3 and 4 it demonstrates no contact was made which D. Shorts deliberately refused to 

acknowledged.” (Id.) 

4

 The crime was defined as follows:

PC 242 Battery means the deliberate use of force or violence on the 

person of another. If the battery is unintentional, the inmate 

remains responsible if it is the result of reckless indifference. 

Reckless indifference means that any reasonable person committing 

the intended action would understand that battery was probable. 

Penal Code 31 and Title 15 defines a Principle as a person involved 

in the commission of a crime, felony or misdemeanor, whether they 

directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in 

its commission, or not being present, have advised and encouraged 

its commission, or who, by threats menaces, command or coercion, 

compel another to commit any crime.

(Id.) 

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testimony of C/O Farley and the allegations in the RVR of December 10, 2012, including 

allegations that petitioner “got up and rushed toward Farley attempting to grab him by the chest;” 

and (2) the video evidence reviewed during the disciplinary hearing, wherein petitioner “can be 

seen coming in contact with Officer Farley.” (Id.) 

Petitioner was assessed a 150 day time credit forfeiture and was referred to a classification 

committee for placement in a secure housing unit. The credit forfeiture “reaffirm[ed] the 

assessment originally assessed and subsequently dismissed from log number B12-12-0010 then 

again from Log #B13-04-0046 when these disciplinaries were ordered reissued and reheard.” 

(Id.) 

Petitioner appealed his disciplinary conviction in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed 

in the California Superior Court. (ECF Nos. 11-1, 11-2.) Therein, he challenged the SHO’s 

refusal to: (1) appoint a new investigative employee after the third RVR was issued; (2) ask all of 

petitioner’s questions to the witnesses who were not called at the August 8, 2013 disciplinary 

hearing; and (3) “enhance” the videotape of the incident that was played at the disciplinary 

hearing. (Id.) The Superior Court rejected petitioner’s arguments, ruling as follows:

The hearing officer shall make a determination at a disciplinary 

hearing whether a preponderance of the evidence submitted at the 

hearing substantiates the RVR. While an inmate generally has the 

right to be present at the hearing, and may be permitted to present 

documentary evidence, the inmate does not have an automatic right 

to the assistance of an investigative employee, to call any witnesses 

requested by the inmate, and to freely question any witnesses who 

testify at the hearing. (Code of Regs., tit. 15 §§ 3315, 3320).

Judicial review of administrative decisions such as this type of 

disciplinary decision is limited to determining whether the 

“decision is arbitrary, capricious, irrational, or an abuse of the 

discretion . . . [T]he relevant question is whether there is any 

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by 

prison officials.” The Court does not examine the entire record, 

independently assess the credibility of witnesses, or re-weigh the 

evidence. In re Furnace (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 649, 659 (citing 

Superintendent v. Hill (1985) 472 U.S. 445).

Here, some evidence supported the senior hearing officer’s finding 

of guilt against Petitioner.

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is therefore denied.

(ECF No. 11-3.)

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Petitioner subsequently challenged his disciplinary conviction in a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus filed in the California Court of Appeal, in which he raised the same claims that he 

raised before the Superior Court. (ECF No. 11-4.) That petition was summarily denied. (ECF 

No. 11-5.) Petitioner next filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, raising 

essentially the same claims. (ECF No. 11-6.) The Supreme Court denied that petition with a 

citation to People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995) (a habeas petition must “state fully and 

with particularity the facts on which relief is sought”); and In re Dexter, 25 Cal.3d 921, 925-26 

(1979) (habeas relief is not available unless the petitioner has first exhausted available 

administrative remedies). (ECF No. 11-7.)

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court on October 24, 2014. 

Respondent filed an answer on May 20, 2015, and petitioner filed a traverse on June 12, 2015.

II. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.

For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

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Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court precedent “may be 

persuasive in determining what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that 

law unreasonably.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th 

Cir. 2010)). However, circuit precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen a general principle 

of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not 

announced.” Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, 132 

S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012)). Nor may it be used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so 

widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, 

be accepted as correct. Id. Further, where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of 

an issue, it cannot be said that there is “clearly established Federal law” governing that issue. 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006).

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that court 

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

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Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 

If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 

2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering 

de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When a 

federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. This presumption 

may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for the state 

court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 99-100 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 

(1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims but 

does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to 

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 

1088, 1091 (2013). 

Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

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review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. 

A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the 

state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. This court “must determine what arguments or theories . . . could 

have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded 

jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 

decision of [the Supreme] Court.” 562 U.S. at 102. The petitioner bears “the burden to 

demonstrate that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. 

Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 98). 

When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003).

III. Due Process in the Context of Prison Disciplinary Proceedings

It is well established that inmates subjected to prison disciplinary action are entitled to 

certain procedural protections under the Due Process Clause but are not entitled to the full 

panoply of rights afforded to criminal defendants. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 

(1974); see also Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985); United States v. Segal, 549 

F.2d 1293, 1296-99 (9th Cir. 1977) (observing that prison disciplinary proceedings command the 

least amount of due process along the prosecution continuum). An inmate is entitled to advance 

written notice of the charge against him as well as a written statement of the evidence relied upon 

by prison officials and the reasons for any disciplinary action taken. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563. 

In the prison disciplinary hearing context, an inmate does not have a right to counsel, retained or 

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appointed, although illiterate inmates are entitled to assistance. Id. at 570.

An inmate also has a right to a hearing at which he may “call witnesses and present 

documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous 

to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. See also Ponte v. Real, 471 

U.S. 491, 495 (1985). However, as a general rule, inmates “have no constitutional right to 

confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses” in prison disciplinary hearings. Ponte, 471 U.S. 

at 510 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 322-23 (1976)

(“Mandating confrontation and cross-examination, except where prison officials can justify their 

denial on one or more grounds that appeals to judges, effectively preempts the area that Wolff left 

to the sound discretion of prison officials.”) The disciplinary hearing must be conducted by a 

person or body that is “sufficiently impartial to satisfy the Due Process Clause.” Wolff, 418 U.S. 

at 571. 

The decision rendered on a prison disciplinary charge must be supported by “some 

evidence” in the record. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. A finding of guilt on a prison disciplinary charge 

cannot be “without support” or “arbitrary.” Id. at 457. However, the “some evidence” standard is 

“minimally stringent,” and a decision must be upheld if there is any reliable evidence in the 

record that could support the conclusion reached by the fact finder. Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 

40 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56; and Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th 

Cir. 1987)). See also Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771, 773 (9th Cir. 1990); Zimmerlee v. 

Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987). Determining whether this standard is satisfied in a 

particular case does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the 

credibility of witnesses, or the weighing of evidence. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 

1105 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 

(1995). Indeed, in examining the record of a prison disciplinary conviction, a court is not to make 

its own assessment of the credibility of witnesses or re-weigh the evidence. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. 

The question is whether there is any reliable evidence in the record that could support the 

decision reached. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1105.

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Where a protected liberty interest exists, the requirements imposed by the Due Process 

Clause are “dependent upon the particular situation being examined.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 

460, 472 (1983). The process due is such procedural protection as may be “necessary to ensure 

that the decision . . . is neither arbitrary nor erroneous.” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 228 

(1990). In identifying the safeguards required in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings, 

courts must remember “the legitimate institutional needs of assuring the safety of inmates and 

prisoners” and avoid “burdensome administrative requirements that might be susceptible to 

manipulation.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454-55. The requirements of due process in the prison context 

involve a balancing of inmate rights and institutional security concerns, with a recognition that 

broad discretion must be accorded to prison officials. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560-63; see also Baxter, 

425 U.S. at 324. 

IV. Petitioner’s Due Process Claims

Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated at his August 8, 2013 

disciplinary hearing for the following reasons: (1) the SHO improperly failed to assign a new IE 

after the issuance of the third RVR; (2) he was not allowed to call all of his requested witnesses at 

the disciplinary hearing; (3) he was not allowed to ask C/O Farley his prepared questions; (4) the 

SHO refused to carefully view the videotape of the incident due to his personal bias against 

petitioner; and (5) his conviction was not supported by valid evidence. (ECF No. 1 at 15-22.) 

The court evaluates these claims in turn below.

A. Investigative Employee

Petitioner claims that he had a due process right to the assignment of a new investigative 

employee at his third disciplinary hearing on August 8, 2013. He alleges:

Rather than assigning me an I.E. in third rehearing prison official(s) 

adopted the I.E. report conducted by Basnett in second hearing 

process and made it seem as if that report was conducted by I.E. in 

third hearing by changing the dates from when I.E. was assigned in 

second hearing to date when I.E. should have been assigned in third 

hearing.

(Id. at 15.) Petitioner argues that “investigative assistance was fundamental” because he wanted 

to question other officers at the scene about the fact that in their reports of the incident they stated 

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that petitioner moved in C/O Farley’s direction after being pepper-sprayed, but did not state that 

petitioner actually touched Farley. (Id. at 16.) He states, “they omit of seeing me grab him. I 

wanted to know how did they miss such occasion.” (Id.) Petitioner explains that he simply 

moved toward C/O Farley after he was blinded with pepper spray while trying to get away from 

inmate Davis. (Id.) He also explains that he wanted the SHO to view a different “channel” on the 

videotape, because that channel would demonstrate he did not actually touch Farley. (Id.) 

Petitioner has submitted his own affidavit, wherein he states that the video channel shown at the 

evidentiary hearing creates an “optical illusion” that he came into contact with C/O Farley and 

that a closer inspection of the video shows that he simply approached Farley before he got down 

on the ground. (ECF No. 1 at 94.) Petitioner argues that the evidence against him was unreliable 

because he was not allowed to present or gather other evidence which would demonstrate that he 

did not come into physical contact with C/O Farley. (Id. at 17.) 

To the extent petitioner is arguing the SHO violated state law or prison regulations in 

failing to provide him with a new investigative employee, his claim is not cognizable in this 

federal habeas proceeding. The federal writ is not available for alleged error in the application of 

state law, and habeas corpus cannot be utilized in federal court to try state issues de novo. Rather, 

petitioner must show that the decision of the state courts somehow “violated the Constitution, 

laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68. See also Rivera v. Illinois, 556 

U.S. 148, 158 (2009) (“[A] mere error of state law . . . is not a denial of due process”); 

Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 192 n.5 (2009). A habeas petitioner may not “transform a 

state-law issue into a federal one” merely by asserting a violation of the federal constitution. 

Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Wolff instructs that an inmate should be provided assistance from a fellow inmate or staff 

member where the inmate is illiterate or the issue is so complex that it is unlikely the inmate 

could gather and present evidence necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case. Wolff, 

418 U.S. at 470. As set forth above, a staff assistant was not assigned because petitioner spoke 

English and was literate, and the issues were not complex. (ECF No. 1 at 36.) Petitioner agreed 

that assignment of a staff assistant was not necessary. (Id.) 

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Clearly-established federal law does not provide an inmate with a right to an investigative 

employee. See Trujillo v. Vaughn, 269 Fed. Appx. 673, 674 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he assignment 

of an investigative employee under Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3315(d)(1) does not equate to a 

determination that [petitioner] had a federal due process right to such assistance pursuant to 

Wolff.”). Thus, petitioner has not shown that he had a federal constitutional right to any 

investigative employee, much less the right to a new IE after the third RVR was issued or the 

right to have the IE conduct an investigation that petitioner believed was thorough or that met his 

expectations. Under California regulations, an investigative employee is assigned if the “chief 

disciplinary officer or designee” determines that the complexity of the issues require further 

investigation, the inmate’s housing status makes it unlikely that he can collect and present the 

evidence necessary for an adequate defense, or additional information is necessary for a fair 

hearing. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3315(d). An investigate employee acts “as a representative of the 

official who will conduct the disciplinary hearing rather than as a representative of the inmate.” 

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3318(a)(3). Pursuant to these prison regulations, petitioner was assigned an 

investigative employee who gathered evidence and prepared a report that was used for the 

disciplinary hearing. Petitioner received copies of all applicable reports at least twenty-four hours 

in advance of the disciplinary hearing and was allowed to speak in his defense and to call C/O 

Farley as a witness. There is no evidence that petitioner was unable to adequately present a 

defense to the charges against him because a new IE was not assigned after the third RVR was 

issued. 

Accordingly, for all of the reasons set forth above, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his 

claim that the SHO violated his right to due process in failing to assign a new IE after the third 

RVR was issued. 

B. Witnesses

Petitioner claims that the SHO violated his right to due process when he refused to allow 

him to ask C/O Farley his proposed questions and to call other witnesses at the disciplinary 

hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 18-21.) As explained above, the SHO allowed petitioner to call C/O 

Farley as a witness but concluded that four of the five questions he proposed to ask him were 

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irrelevant. Petitioner also requested “numerous” other witnesses at the hearing, but the SHO 

denied this request after determining that the questions petitioner wished to ask those witnesses 

had already been addressed in the IE’s report. Petitioner argues his witnesses might have 

provided evidence that would exonerate him. He explains that he wished to ask his proposed 

witnesses why they did not report seeing him touch C/O Farley. (ECF No. 1 at 19.) He also 

wanted to question C/O Farley on this subject. (Id. at 20.) Petitioner explains again that he 

simply veered in Farley’s direction after being blinded by pepper spray, but that he never actually 

touched Farley. (Id.) Petitioner believes testimony from these witnesses might also have 

“undermined” the video played at the disciplinary hearing, which petitioner “insist[s] is an optic 

illusion.” (Id.) Petitioner alleges that the SHO’s decision with regard to these witnesses was the 

result of “bias.” (Id. at 20.) 

The right to call witnesses at a disciplinary hearing is not absolute. Wolff gives prison 

officials flexibility to keep the hearing within reasonable limits and allows them to refuse to call 

witnesses when doing so would risk reprisal or undermine authority, or when the evidence would 

be irrelevant, unnecessary, or hazardous. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. Given these limitations, the 

Supreme Court has observed that a constitutional challenge to a prison official's refusal to allow 

an inmate to call witnesses may “rarely, if ever, be successful.” Ponte, 471 U.S. at 499. 

Nevertheless, when prison officials refuse to call witnesses requested by a prisoner at a 

disciplinary hearing, they must explain their reasons, either as part of the administrative record or 

by later testimony in court. Id. at 497.

Petitioner has failed to show that the SHO violated his right to due process when he 

denied petitioner’s request to call witnesses or to question C/O Farley. The SHO concluded that 

petitioner’s questions to C/O Farley and his other proposed witnesses had already been answered 

or were irrelevant and he explained this to petitioner when he denied his request to call these 

witnesses. This explanation is all the federal constitution requires. See Pannell v. McBride, 306 

F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[P]risoners do not have the right to call witnesses whose 

testimony would be irrelevant, repetitive, or unnecessary.”) See also Graves v. Knowles, No. 06-

15477, 231 Fed. Appx. 670, 672 (9th Cir. 2007) (hearing officer’s refusal to call witnesses at 

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disciplinary hearing did not violate due process when their testimony was either irrelevant or

would not have supported the inmate's defense; moreover, given the evidence against inmate, any 

error in calling witness was harmless); Baird v. Cate, No. CV 12-5377 GAF (AN), 2012 WL 

3283424, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2012) (rejecting petitioner’s claim that his due process rights 

were violated when he was denied the opportunity to call a witness or introduce photographs 

where the evidence would have been cumulative or irrelevant). Because prison officials 

explained their reasons for refusing petitioner’s request to call or question these witnesses, and 

those reasons are not arbitrary or improper, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on 

this claim. 

C. Biased Decisionmaker

Petitioner claims that the SHO ’s decisions with regard to the playing of the videotape at 

the disciplinary hearing were the result of bias. (ECF No. 1 at 21-22.) Specifically, he claims 

that the SHO “fail[ed] to be impartial by refusing to accept Channel 3 and 4 of video evidence 

demonstrating my innocence, as it shows RVR officer Farley preventing my contacting him, 

which exonerated me of batter [sic] on peace officer.” (Id. at 21.) Petitioner explains that the 

SHO refused “to accept my innocence on video evidence, which a reasonable officer, impartial, 

would not have defied and exonerated me of charges or rendered a favorable outcome.” (Id.) In 

essence, petitioner appears to be claiming that the SHO was biased against him and, for this 

reason, failed to carefully view the videotape evidence to determine whether petitioner actually 

made contact with C/O Farley. 

Inmates are entitled to a fair and impartial decision-maker at disciplinary hearings. 

Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 647 (1997) (“The due process requirements for a prison 

disciplinary hearing are in many respects less demanding than those for criminal prosecution, but 

they are not so lax as to let stand the decision of a biased hearing officer who dishonestly 

suppresses evidence of innocence.”); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[a] fair trial in 

a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process”); White v. Indiana Parole Board, 266 F.3d 

759, 767 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Wolff holds that prisoners are entitled to impartial decisionmakers” 

(citations omitted)). In order to prevail on a claim of judicial bias, a petitioner must overcome a 

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“strong presumption that a judge is not biased or prejudiced.” Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 

924 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

There is no competent evidence before this court that the SHO at petitioner’s disciplinary 

hearing was biased or impartial, that he acted in an arbitrary manner, or that any of his decisions 

were the result of bias. Petitioner has not substantiated his allegations that the SHO’s handling of 

the videotape evidence was improper, that he failed to closely examine the images on the 

videotape, that he viewed the wrong channel on the videotape, or that he harbored any bias 

against petitioner. Petitioner’s conclusory allegations fail to overcome the “strong presumption” 

that the SHO was not biased or prejudiced. Under these circumstances, the California Supreme 

Court’s rejection of petitioner’s claim of bias is not unreasonable, nor is it “so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. Accordingly, 

petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his claim that impartiality or bias on the part of the 

SHO violated his right to due process.

D. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Throughout his petition, petitioner claims that the evidence supporting the guilty finding 

on the disciplinary charge was incomplete and misleading, and therefore insufficient. Petitioner 

requests that this court obtain the video evidence against him and review it “in camera” in order 

to determine whether petitioner was “deprived [of] due process.” (ECF No. 1 at 22.) Petitioner 

also argues that the state courts failed to explain why the evidence against him was “credible.” 

(Id.) He contends that he was denied his right to “impartial fact finding.” (Id.) Petitioner also

argues that the SHO “falsified report in documentation of impartial factfinding by alleging I only 

requested two witnesses to question them [about] video evidence.” (Id. at 23.) Finally, petitioner 

argues that C/O Farley’s RVR is “false” and that the SHO improperly relied on that report to deny 

him the right to call his proposed witnesses at the disciplinary hearing. (Id.) He argues, “[p]rison 

officials had an agenda to deprive me of my due process and find me guilty under the pretext of 

my questions being irrelevant and optic illusion on video tape (Channel 9) to support arbitrary 

findings.” (Id.) 

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After a review of the record, this court concludes that there was “some evidence” 

supporting the hearing officer’s finding that petitioner committed the prison rules violation with 

which he was charged. Specifically, the statements of C/O Farley in his RVR that petitioner 

attempted to grab his chest, and the videotape of the event, in which petitioner was seen “coming 

in contact” with C/O Farley, constitute “some evidence” to support the hearing officer’s finding 

that petitioner was guilty of battery on a peace officer. Indeed, Correctional Officer Farley’s 

statements, standing alone, were sufficient to support petitioner’s disciplinary conviction. See

Ruelas v. Zuercher, No. 07-1140, 2007 WL 1991166, *2 (10th Cir. July 11, 2007) (incident report 

supported the disciplinary hearing officer’s finding of guilt and due process requirements were 

thus satisfied); Rhatigan v. Ward, No. 05-6388, 2006 WL 1851222, *2 (10th Cir. July 6, 2006) 

(investigating officer’s report constituted “some evidence” to support a disciplinary conviction for 

possession of contraband); Ellington v. Salinas Valley State Prison, No. CV 13-1602 ABC (AN), 

2013 WL 1498913, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2013) (“[T]he RVR overwhelmingly establishes the 

SHO’s findings were supported by ‘some evidence in the record.’”); Dunn v. Swarthout, 2:11-cv2731 JAM GGH P, 2013 WL 876410, at *8 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2013) (“Furthermore, some 

evidence is supplied by the RVR which refers to the CDCR 115 wherein petitioner admitted to 

being in a physical altercation with his cellmate[.]”) 

Petitioner argues that C/O Farley “lied” when he reported that petitioner grabbed his 

chest. He also argues that the videotape, if viewed more closely, would show that petitioner 

never actually came into contact with Farley. However, as noted above, in reviewing petitioner’s 

due process claim this court must accept the hearing officer’s assessment of the credibility of 

witnesses and may not make its own assessment or re-weigh the evidence. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. 

The statements in the RVR, along with the videotape evidence, were sufficient under Wolff to 

support petitioner’s disciplinary conviction.

In this case, petitioner was given advance written notice of the disciplinary charges 

brought against him. He was also provided a written statement of the evidence relied upon by 

prison officials and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken against him. In addition, his 

disciplinary conviction was supported by “some evidence” in the record. Petitioner was afforded 

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all the process that was due him under the Constitution in the context of his prison disciplinary 

proceeding. Accordingly, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief with respect to his due process 

claims.5

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s 

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Federal Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it 

enters a final order adverse to the applicant). 

Dated: June 14, 2016

Thompson2501.hc:dmou8(2):du

 

5

 Throughout his petition, petitioner complains that the California courts deprived him of 

“judicial review” or “access to the courts” by failing to specifically address each of his claims. 

See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 21, 23. There is no evidence in the record that petitioner’s First 

Amendment right to access the courts was violated. Petitioner was able to proceed with his 

habeas petitions in all available California Courts and he obtained a decision on all of his claims. 

There is no federal constitutional prohibition preventing state courts from disposing of claims in a 

summary fashion or on procedural grounds, and there is no federal requirement that state courts 

consider claims with a full discussion of the merits. Petitioner simply disagrees with the result 

reached by the California courts. To the extent petitioner’s claims are based on alleged violations 

of state laws, such as the California Penal Code and/or California Rules of Court, they are not 

cognizable in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Rivera, 556 U.S. at 158.

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