Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-15-02187/USCOURTS-ca4-15-02187-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2187

TEMESGEN TESHOME ABDISSA,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

UNC CHAPEL HILL,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (5:15-cv-00394-BO)

Submitted: February 29, 2016 Decided: March 3, 2016

Before AGEE, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Temesgen Teshome Abdissa, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Temesgen Teshome Abdissa appeals the district court’s order 

granting his motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissing 

his complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

(2012). Abdissa alleged that his former employer discriminated 

against him based on his race and national origin, in violation 

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A.

§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2012 & Supp. 2015). For the reasons 

that follow, we vacate the district court’s order and remand for 

further proceedings. 

A pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be liberally 

construed. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.

1978). Once construed liberally, however, a federal court must 

dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any time the court 

determines that “the action . . . is frivolous or malicious[,] . 

. . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[,] or 

. . . seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We review 

dismissals of a complaint as frivolous for an abuse of 

discretion. Nagy v. FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 254 (4th Cir.

2004)

It does not appear beyond doubt that Abdissa’s complaint 

“lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. 

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566 

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F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Examples of frivolous claims 

include those whose factual allegations are so nutty, 

delusional, or wholly fanciful as to be simply unbelievable.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, even at the Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) stage, a complaint may proceed “even if it 

strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the alleged] facts 

is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Because the district court dismissed 

the complaint without giving Abdissa an opportunity to clarify 

his claims, see Coleman v. Peyton, 340 F.2d 603, 604 (4th Cir. 

1965) (per curiam) (holding that, if pro se complaint contains 

potentially cognizable claim, plaintiff should be given 

opportunity to particularize allegations), we vacate the 

district court’s order dismissing Abdissa’s complaint as 

frivolous and remand to permit Abdissa to amend his complaint 

and for further proceedings. We express no opinion as to the 

viability of Abdissa’s underlying claims. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED 

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