Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00274/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00274-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Defendant Rohlfing filed a separate motion for summary judgment, which the court 1

recommended be granted in separately filed findings and recommendations. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MONTE LEE BRIDGES, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-0274 FCD CMK P

vs.

D.L. RUNNELS, et al., 

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, without counsel, prosecuting this civil rights action

against several employees of High Desert State Prison (HDSP). The case is before the

undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c) for findings and recommendations on the motion for

summary judgment filed by defendants Baron, Sandham, Exum and Briddle. Fed. R. Civ. P 1

56(c). 

I. Standard of Review

On a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c), the court must 

accept the evidence of the non-moving party as true and draw all reasonable inferences of fact in

favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Case 2:04-cv-00274-FCD-CMK Document 114 Filed 05/10/07 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there exists no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex

Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P 56(c)). If the moving party

meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to establish that a genuine issue

as to any material fact does actually exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. V. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The party opposing summary judgment may not rest on

conclusory allegations, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of

material fact. See Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 422 (9th Cir. 1978)(involving a pro se

litigant); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 586 n. 11. When the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material

fact for trial. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

On August 25, 2004, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

I. Background

At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was an inmate at HDSP. He filed this

action on February 26, 2004, alleging various civil rights violations against several HDSP

employees. On June 8, 2004, the court ordered service on several defendants, including defendant

Rohlfing, and ordered that the case proceed only on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against

those defendants. Because the instant motion concerns only plaintiff’s claims against defendants

Baron, Sandham, Exum and Briddle, the factual discussion is limited to the allegations against

these defendants. 

 Plainiff alleges that he suffers from pain in his back, hip and legs, which he

believes is due to being forced to wear ill-fitting prison shoes. Plaintiff alleges that he suffers

from severe pain when he walks, often collapses when walking, and needs a cane, crutches, or a

///

Case 2:04-cv-00274-FCD-CMK Document 114 Filed 05/10/07 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

wheelchair in order to move about. Plaintiff further states that he has a venous insufficiency in

his left leg and suffers from foot problems. 

In 2002, plaintiff submitted requests to prison authorities for single-cell status,

cell-feeding, and a permanent soft shoe chrono that would permit him to wear his athletic shoes in

all parts of HDSP. Plaintiff alleges that these requests were denied by HDSP’s chrono

committee. The chrono committee consisted of available staff physicians, who would meet

weekly to decide upon the appropriateness of proposed medical requests, otherwise known as

chronos. Plaintiff admits that he does not know the identities of the chrono committee members

who denied him a soft shoe chrono and a single-cell chrono. (Defs’ Statement of Undisputed

Material Facts at ¶ 13.)

In 2002, defendant Exum was part of a mental health team that assessed plaintiff

and determined that there was no medical necessity for plaintiff to have single-cell status. 

Defendant Briddle, the facility captain, determined in 2002 that there was no custodial necessity

for plaintiff to have single-cell status and deferred to the medical staff who determined that there

was no medical need for plaintiff to have single-cell housing. Defendant Briddle also denied

plaintiff’s requests for cell-feeding, that is being fed his meals in his cell instead of going to the

“chow hall.” 

Plaintiff asserts that defendants’ denial of single-cell status, a permanent soft-shoe

chrono, and cell-feeding constituted deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s medical needs in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

III. Discussion

Defendants Baron, Sandham, Exum, and Briddle move for summary judgment on

the grounds that plaintiff cannot show that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately

indifferent to a prisoner’s medical needs. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir.

Case 2:04-cv-00274-FCD-CMK Document 114 Filed 05/10/07 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

1992) (overruled on other grounds). Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical needs can be

demonstrated in two ways: by prison officials denying, delaying or intentionally interfering with

medical treatment or by the manner in which prison physicians provide medical care. Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Deliberate indifference exists only when prison officials know of and disregard an excessive risk

to inmate health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also, McGuckin,

974 F.2d at1060). “Mere negligence... in treating a medical condition, without more, does not

violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right.” See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th

Cir. 2004). Deliberate indifference may be shown with circumstantial evidence when the facts

are sufficient to show that defendant actually knew of a risk of harm. See Lolli v. County of

Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 421 (9th Cir. 2003). A prisoner who makes a claim of deliberate

indifference to a serious medical condition based on delay must show that the delay resulted in

substantial harm. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990).

Disagreement over the course of treatment, or mere negligence in treatment does

not raise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242

(9th Cir. 1989). To establish that a difference of opinion amounted to deliberate indifference, the

prisoner must “show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable

under the circumstances” and that “they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive

risk to [the prisoner’s] health. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). 

A. Defendants Baron’s And Sandham’s Alleged Denial of Medical Requests

Defendants Baron and Sandham move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claims against them on the grounds that plaintiff cannot link them to the alleged

deprivation of his rights. Defendants Baron and Sandham are Chief Medical Officers at HDSP,

and they argue that plaintiff attempts to hold them liable for his alleged injuries by virtue of their

supervisory positions. 

/// 

Case 2:04-cv-00274-FCD-CMK Document 114 Filed 05/10/07 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

A plaintiff must connect the named defendants clearly with the claimed denial of

his rights. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (official’s liability for deliberate indifference to assault

requires that official know of and disregard an “excessive risk”); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal

participation by the defendant (citation omitted) . . . [t]here is no respondeat superior liability

under section 1983.”); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.3d 740, 743-44 (9 Cir. 1978) (discussing th

“requisite causal connection” in section 1983 cases between the named defendant and claimed

injury); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.

1154 (1999) ("A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual

was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights."). When a named defendant holds a

supervisory position, the casual link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979). 

Here, plaintiff is unable to present any evidence that defendants Baron and

Sandham denied his requests for single-cell status and a permanent soft shoe chrono. Neither

defendant Baron nor defendant Sandham have any recollection of being on the chrono committee

which denied plaintiff’s requests. Plaintiff has only alleged conclusory facts to indicate that these

two defendants were part of the chrono committee which denied his requests, and, he admits that

he does not know the identities of the chrono committee members who denied him a soft shoe

chrono and a single-cell chrono. (Defs’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts at ¶ 13.) 

Although in his opposition to the instant motion for summary judgment, plaintiff states that

defendant Sandham was “action C.M.O. and a high level staff physician. It stands to reason that

he was involved in all important decisions.” (Opp’n (doc. 110-3) at 2:11-14.) However, such

conclusory allegations are not enough to establish a causal link between a defendant and an

alleged constitutional deprivation. See Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194-95; Fayle, 607 F.2d at 862.

///

///

Case 2:04-cv-00274-FCD-CMK Document 114 Filed 05/10/07 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

Plaintiff also argues that defendants Baron and Sandham were personally involved

in the denial of his medical requests in violation of the Eighth Amendment because both

defendants signed first and second level requests denying plaintiff’s requests. (Opp’n (doc. 110-3

at 2:3-6 and 13-18. The Ninth Circuit has stated that inmates have no legitimate claim of

entitlement to a prison grievance procedure. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.

1988). Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff seeks to impose liability on defendants Sandham

and Baron for their roles in the appeal process, plaintiff does not state a cognizable constitutional

claim. The failure of prison officials to properly implement an administrative process within the

prison system does not raise constitutional concerns. See id. at 640; see also, Ramirez v. Galaza,

334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Even assuming arguendo that plaintiff could link defendant Baron and defendant

Sandham to the alleged denial of his medical requests, the refusal to grant plaintiff’s medical

requests did not constitute deliberate indifference. Plaintiff has not established that either

defendant Baron or defendant Sandham acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind—criminal

recklessness, in their alleged participation in the denial of plaintiff’s medical requests. 

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-836; Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057. At most, plaintiff has shown that he

disagreed with the decisions of the chrono committee. Disagreement over the course of

treatment, or mere negligence in treatment does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

violation. See Sanchez, 891 F.2d at 242. To establish that a difference of opinion amounted to

deliberate indifference, the prisoner must “show that the course of treatment the doctors chose

was medically unacceptable under the circumstances” and that “they chose this course in

conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the prisoner’s] health. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d

330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the course of treatment chosen

by the chrono committee was medically unacceptable and chosen in conscious disregard to an

excessive risk to plaintiff’s health. 

///

Case 2:04-cv-00274-FCD-CMK Document 114 Filed 05/10/07 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

The court finds that plaintiff cannot link defendant Baron or defendant Sandham to

the alleged deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and that, even if these defendants could

be linked to the denial of plaintiff’s medical requests, the denials do not form the basis for a

constitutional violation. Accordingly, the court recommends that the motion for summary

judgment be granted as to the claims against defendants Baron and Sandham. 

B. Defendant Exum’s Denial Of Request For Single-Cell Status

Plaintiff claims that defendant Exum violated his Eighth Amendment rights by

denying his request for single-cell status. Dr. Exum was part of a mental health team that

assessed plaintiff in July 2002 and determined that there was no medical necessity for single-cell

housing for plaintiff. (Defs’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts at ¶22.) Although the

single-cell status for plaintiff was denied, the committee recommended an anti-anxiety medication

for plaintiff’s symptoms, but plaintiff declined even a therapeutic trial. (Id.) 

The undisputed facts show that defendant Exum felt that it was within the

appropriate standard of medical care to recommend that plaintiff not be given single-cell status

and that plaintiff disagreed with that conclusion. Plaintiff presents evidence, in the form of

pertinent portions of his deposition testimony, which indicate that other doctors, namely Dr.

Brown and Dr. Bill recommended single-cell status for plaintiff. Specifically, plaintiff alleges

that defendant Exum stated that “[he] could help plaintiff, but [he wouldn’t]. (Opp’n, Ex. F (doc.

110) at *77.) 

As noted above, disagreement over the course of treatment, or mere negligence in

treatment does not raise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Sanchez, 891 F.2d at

242. To establish that a difference of opinion amounted to deliberate indifference, the prisoner

must “show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the

circumstances” and that “they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the

prisoner’s] health. Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332. Here, plaintiff asserts in his opposition that other

physicians felt that he should have been granted single cell status. (Opp’n (doc. 110-3) at 3: 17-

Case 2:04-cv-00274-FCD-CMK Document 114 Filed 05/10/07 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

23.) However, plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating that the course of treatment

chosen by defendant Exum and the mental health committee was medically unacceptable and

chosen in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health. See id. Further, plaintiff

has not shown that he suffered any injury as a result of the denial of single-cell housing, although

he does make conclusory statements about the “resulting stress [of being double-celled] has had

devestating effects on plaintiff’s heart.” (Opp’n (doc. 110-1) at 5 ¶ 12-19. However, this is not

enough to demonstrate a cognizable injury . See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059.) 

Accordingly, the court finds that there is no genuine dispute of material fact

concerning whether defendant Exum was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs. 

The court recommends that summary judgment be granted as to plaintiff’s claim against

defendant Exum.

C. Defendant Briddle’s Denial Of Request For Single-Cell Status

Plaintiff claims that defendant Briddle violated his Eighth Amendment rights by

denying his request for single-cell status. The facts show that defendant Briddle reviewed

plaintiff’s central file on three to five occasions to determine plaintiff’s suitability for single-cell

or double-cell housing, according to case factors set forth in the CDCR policies and procedures,

including the Department Operations Manual (DOM). (Defs’ Statement of Undisputed Material

Facts at ¶ 26.) Based on the review of plaintiff’s central file, the CDCR policies, and the DOM,

defendant Briddle determined that there was no custodial necessity for plaintiff to receive single

cell status. Plaintiff was not a sexual predator toward other inmates, did not have a history of in

cell violence, and there were no enemy concerns that would prevent him from being safely

housed in a double-cell. (Id.) Defendant Briddle deferred to the medical staff with respect to the

issue of plaintiff’s single-cell housing for health related issues. ( Id. at ¶ 27.)

On the issue of cell-feedings, defendant Briddle deferred to medical staff, who

determined that cell-feedings for plaintiff were not medically necessary. (Id. at ¶ 28.) Defendant

Briddle facilitated and attended a meeting between plaintiff and defendant Rohlfing during which

Case 2:04-cv-00274-FCD-CMK Document 114 Filed 05/10/07 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

defendant Rohlfing stated that cell-feedings were not necessary because plaintiff could wear his

tennis shoes instead of his boots to the chow hall. (Id.) 

In his opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues

that defendant Briddle was “largely responsible for many of the lockdowns at HDSP and points

the court to exhibit F of his opposition. (Opp’n (doc. 110-3) at 3:26-28 and 4.) Exhibit F is an

excerpt from plaintiff’s deposition, and a reading of the pertinent portion reveals that plaintiff

discussed his medical requests with defendant Briddle and did not agree with defendant Briddle’s

response. As noted above, disagreement over the course of treatment, or mere negligence in

treatment does not raise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Sanchez, 891 F.2d at

242. To establish that a difference of opinion amounted to deliberate indifference, the prisoner

must “show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the

circumstances” and that “they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the

prisoner’s] health. Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332. Plaintiff has not shown that defendant Briddle

pursued a medically unacceptable course of action or that defendant Briddle’s actions caused

plaintiff harm. Accordingly, the court recommends that summary judgment be granted with

respect to plaintiff’s claims against defendant Briddle. 

D. Lockdowns And Denial Of Out-Of-Cell Exercise

In his complaint and in his opposition to defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, plaintiff makes reference to lockdowns at HDSP and a lack of exercise. Deprivation of

outdoor exercise violates the Eighth Amendment rights of inmates confined to continuous and

long-term segregation. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3rd 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996). A temporary

denial of outdoor exercise with no medical effects is not a substantial deprivation. See May v.

Baldwin, 109 F.2nd 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Here, plaintiff has made only very general conclusory allegations that a denial of

exercise has lead to adverse medical effects. (Complaint at ¶ 46-47.) Further, he has not

adequately linked defendant Briddle to the lockdowns at HDSP; therefore, defendant Briddle

Case 2:04-cv-00274-FCD-CMK Document 114 Filed 05/10/07 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

By separate findings and recommendations, the court recommended that summary 2

judgment be granted in favor of the only other remaining defendant, defendant Rohlfing. 

10

cannot be held liable for the alleged injury due to lockdowns and lack of exercise. See Johnson,

588 F.3d at 743-44 (discussing “requisite causal connection” in section 1983 cases between the

named defendant and claimed injury); Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194-95 ("A plaintiff must allege

facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the

deprivation of his civil rights."). 

Accordingly, the court recommends that summary judgment be granted as to

plaintiff’s claims against defendant Briddle. 

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 102) be granted in its entirety.

2. That this action be dismissed with prejudice . 

2

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 9, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:04-cv-00274-FCD-CMK Document 114 Filed 05/10/07 Page 10 of 10