Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02003/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02003-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Charles L. Brown III 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Clyde L. Reese III et al. 

Defendants. 

No. CV12-2003 PHX DGC

ORDER 

Defendants Arizona Department of Economic Security (“Arizona DES”), Georgia 

Department of Human Services (“Georgia DHS”), Clarence H. Carter, Clyde L. Reese 

III, Melissa Waddell, and Linda Register have filed three separate motions to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s complaint. Docs. 8, 9, 13. Defendant Nina Ware has not joined these motions, 

but has filed an answer. Doc. 12. The motions have been fully briefed and no party has 

requested oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant 

Defendants’ motions. 

I. Background. 

In California, Plaintiff met and conceived a child with Defendant Nina Ware. 

Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 25, 26, 28. The Santa Clara County Superior Court issued an order for the 

support and visitation of the child, declaring Nina Ware to be the custodial parent and 

Plaintiff the non-custodial parent. Id., ¶¶ 29, 30, 31. Nina Ware later moved to Georgia 

without approval of the Santa Clara court and without informing Plaintiff. Id., ¶¶ 30, 31. 

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In 2002, Plaintiff visited the offices of Georgia DHS to notify them of a lost job and to 

request a modification of existing child support. Id., ¶ 33. Plaintiff was also obtaining a 

doctoral degree from Arizona State University, which prevented him from working. Id., 

¶¶ 34, 35. A representative of Georgia DHS assured Plaintiff that a modification of the 

child support order would proceed within a month, but ultimately failed to take any 

action (id., ¶ 37; Doc. 1-2), apparently because of confusion about whether Georgia or 

California had jurisdiction to modify the order (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 38). 

On January 14, 2003, Arizona DES forwarded Plaintiff’s request for child support 

modification to Defendant Melissa Waddell, an employee of Georgia DHS. Id., ¶ 39; 

Doc. 1-3. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Waddell “then failed [under Georgia law] to 

act on her administrative and legal duty to process” the request. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 40. 

Furthermore, at a meeting with Plaintiff, Defendant Waddell commented on Plaintiff’s 

race and his pursuit of a doctoral degree by wondering “why you people seek advanced 

training.” Id., ¶ 73.1

 Not giving up, Plaintiff again submitted, with the help of Arizona 

DES, financial documents to Georgia DHS in 2004 to modify his child support order; 

Georgia DHS denies receiving these documents. Id., ¶ 42; Docs. 1-4, 1-5. Shortly 

thereafter, Defendant Linda Register granted a request to give Georgia authority to 

modify the child support order. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 43. Georgia DHS obtained approximately 

$30,000 from Plaintiff’s bank and retirement funds in the years 2004, 2006, and 2007. 

Id., ¶¶ 43, 44. A Georgia Court also found Plaintiff guilty of child abandonment, 

apparently at the instigation of Defendant Nina Ware. Id., ¶ 45. 

On March 3, 2009, Plaintiff obtained a modification of his child support 

obligations from a Georgia court, although the court refused to correct the calculation of 

arrears due to Plaintiff’s “lack of merit.” Id., ¶ 46. Finally, on December 22, 2011, 

Georgia DHS sent a letter to Plaintiff clarifying that in 2005 it decided not to modify 

 

1

 In another part of the complaint, Plaintiff states that “Defendants” told him that “Niggaz had no need for a doctoral degree.” Doc. 1-1, ¶ 90. It is unclear whether this is what 

Defendant Waddell actually said, or came from a separate meeting. 

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Plaintiff’s child support order due to his failure to provide financial information. Id., 

¶ 47; Doc. 1-10. Georgia DHS and Arizona DES have also reported negative credit 

information to credit reporting agencies and Plaintiff’s employer. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 50. 

Plaintiff has paid over $85,000 in child support to Nina Ware. Id., ¶ 54. Plaintiff filed 

this complaint on September 20, 2012. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants discriminatorily denied his repeated requests to 

modify his child support order due to his race, age, and sex, thereby depriving him of 

constitutional rights and causing financial and emotional harm. While far from a model 

of clarity, the following charges can be gleaned from the complaint. Under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, Plaintiff claims that Defendants have violated his 14th Amendment equal 

protection and due process rights (Counts 1, 3, 4, 5). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, Plaintiff 

claims that Defendants conspired to interfere with his right to equal protection of the laws 

(Count 6). Under Title VI § 2000(d), Plaintiff claims that Defendants have excluded him 

from a federally funded aid program on the basis of race (Counts 2, 7). Finally, Plaintiff 

alleges defamation by “publishing false reports of arrears or unpaid child support to third 

party consumer credit bureaus” (Count 8). Plaintiff seeks a variety of remedies, 

including a declaratory judgment, a temporary restraining order, a preliminary and 

permanent injunction, and damages. Id., ¶¶ A–D. Defendants raise numerous arguments 

in their motions to dismiss. Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a 

claim against Defendants in Arizona, and that it lacks personal jurisdiction over 

Defendants in Georgia, the Court will not address the other arguments. 

II. Discussion. 

A. Failure to State a Claim. 

 When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim to relief under 

Rule 12(b)(6), the well-pled factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not 

entitled to the assumption of truth, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009), and 

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therefore are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, In re 

Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal, the complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This plausibility 

standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to 

infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has 

not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2)). 

 The complaint fails to allege any facts that would make Arizona DES or Carter 

liable. Plaintiff’s complaint provides no facts about Carter’s actions. The complaint 

alleges the following facts regarding Arizona DES: (1) it forwarded financial documents 

to Georgia DES; (2) it incorrectly stated to Plaintiff that his arrears matter had already 

been adjudicated; and (3) it helped Georgia garnish Plaintiff’s wages and reported 

negative credit information. None of these actions show that Arizona DES participated in 

the decision to deny Plaintiff’s child support modification request. At most, Arizona 

DES acted as an intermediary, forwarding documents given it by Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s 

complaint alleges that Georgia failed to modify his child support order, thereby resulting 

in a violation of his rights, but fails to allege any facts showing that the Arizona 

Defendants participated in Georgia’s decision. Plaintiff fails to assert a plausible claim 

for relief against Arizona DES and Carter. 

B. Personal Jurisdiction. 

 Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. See Ziegler v. 

Indian River Cnty., 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995). Because the Court is resolving the 

motion to dismiss without an evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff “need make only a prima facie 

showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion.” Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 

1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). That is, Plaintiff “need only demonstrate facts that if true 

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would support jurisdiction over [Defendants].” Id. at 1498; see Bancroft & Masters, Inc. 

v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 2000). In considering whether 

Plaintiff has satisfied this standard, the Court must apply Arizona's long-arm statute, 

which permits an exercise of personal jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by 

due process. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); see Terracom v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 559 

(9th Cir. 1995). Therefore, absent traditional bases for personal jurisdiction (i.e., physical 

presence, domicile, and consent), the Court must consider whether the nonresident 

defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with Arizona such that the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 

 If a defendant’s contacts with Arizona are substantial, or continuous and 

systematic, the Court may assert general jurisdiction over the defendant even if Plaintiff’s 

claims are unrelated to those activities. See Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement 

Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986); Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. 

Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. 

Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446–47 (1952)). Alternatively, the Court may assert specific 

jurisdiction over a defendant if Plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the defendant purposefully 

availed himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking 

the benefits and protections of its laws, or purposely directed conduct at the forum that 

has effects in the forum, (2) the claims arise out of or result from the defendant’s forumrelated activities, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. See Bancroft, 223 

F.3d at 1086; Brainerd v. Governors of Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 

1989). The parties agree that the test for specific jurisdiction applies to this case. 

Applying that test, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show that an exercise of 

jurisdiction is reasonable. 

 1. Purposeful Availment. 

In discussing specific jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court has 

emphasized that “it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant 

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purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, 

thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 

253 (1958). More recently, the Supreme Court held that a court may also have specific 

jurisdiction over a defendant where the intended effects of the defendant’s non-forum 

conduct were purposely directed at and caused harm in the forum state. Calder v. Jones, 

465 U.S. 783, 788–90 (1984) (adopting “effects test” for libel, invasion of privacy, and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress claims where defendant’s Florida conduct had 

“effects” in California, the forum state); see Sinatra v. Nat’l Enquirer, 854 F.2d 1191, 

1195 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he decisions of this court have interpreted the holdings of 

Calder and Burger King as modifying the purposeful availment rubric to allow ‘the 

exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant whose only ‘contact’ with the forum is the 

‘purposeful direction’ of a foreign act having effect in the forum state.’”) (quoting 

Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1397) (emphasis in original). 

 Consistent with this precedent, the Ninth Circuit has held that a district court 

should apply different jurisdictional tests to contract and tort cases. See Ziegler, 64 F.3d 

at 473; Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that in 

determining whether court has specific jurisdiction over defendant, “[i]t is important to 

distinguish contract from tort actions”). In cases involving certain types of torts, the 

Ninth Circuit has held that courts should apply the “effects test” and that jurisdiction 

should attach if there is an (1) intentional action; (2) aimed at the forum state; and (3) 

causing harm that the defendant should have anticipated would be suffered in the forum 

state. Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 576 (9th Cir. 2012); Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 474; see 

Caruth v. Int’l Psychoanalytical Ass’n, 59 F.3d 126, 128 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying effects 

test to defamation, tortious interference with business relations, and intentional infliction 

of emotional distress claims); Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 

1486 (9th Cir. 1993) (libel). A “section 1983 claim for deprivation of a constitutional 

right is more akin to a tort claim than a contract claim.” Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 474 (9th Cir. 

1995). As Plaintiff is primarily asserting deprivations of constitutional rights, including 

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claims under § 1983, this case is more akin to a tort case and therefore the effects test 

should apply. 

In arguing for a finding of personal jurisdiction over the Georgia Defendants, 

Plaintiff emphasizes the following evidence: “liens against Plaintiffs [sic] Arizona bank 

accounts, use of Arizona Department of Economic Security – Division of Child Support 

Enforcement under false pretenses, Arizona state tax offsets, Defendant’s claim against 

Plaintiff’s personal injury award in Arizona.” Doc. 18-2. Plaintiff also argues that by 

reporting his child support arrears to credit reporting agencies, Defendants had a negative 

impact on his credit rating in Arizona. In essence, Plaintiff argues that by using 

Arizona’s legal and financial institutions to collect child support, Defendants have 

intentionally caused effects in Arizona sufficient to subject them to Arizona jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff does not claim Defendants have contacts with Arizona beyond miscellaneous 

communications. 

Following the reasoning of Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2012), the 

Court concludes that the Georgia Defendants’ actions can satisfy the effects test. In 

Fiore, DEA Agent Walden seized approximately $97,000 from two travelers in an airport 

in Atlanta, Georgia. Id. at 571. Walden believed the money came from drug 

transactions. Id. The travelers returned to their home in Nevada without the money, and 

sent documents to Walden showing that the money was legitimately earned from 

gambling. Id. at 571–72. Walden nevertheless filed an affidavit for forfeiture of the 

money, which was still being held in Georgia. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that a Nevada 

court could assert personal jurisdiction over Walden because he knew the travelers lived 

in Nevada and “individually targeted” them by filing an affidavit for forfeiture. Id. at 

581–82. The court emphasized: 

[T]he difference between those cases in which harm is merely foreseeable 

in the forum [and insufficient for personal jurisdiction] and those in which 

conduct is “expressly aimed” at the forum is often the difference between 

an intended impact that is either local or undifferentiated, and an intended

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impact that is targeted at a known individual who has a substantial, ongoing 

connection to the forum. 

Id. at 578. 

In this case, the Georgia Defendants met with Plaintiff about his child support 

order and later communicated with him by letter. Plaintiff submitted financial documents 

to them as well. Plaintiff has made a plausible showing that the Georgia Defendants 

knew Plaintiff lived in Arizona. Furthermore, the Georgia Defendants failed to modify 

Plaintiff’s child support order, which eventually led to liens on Plaintiff’s accounts in 

Arizona. This also caused negative credit reports that negatively impacted Plaintiff in 

Arizona. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show that the Georgia Defendants 

intentionally targeted Plaintiff, knowing that he had a “substantial, ongoing connection to 

[Arizona].” Id. Defendants’ alleged conduct is sufficient to satisfy the effects test and 

the purposeful availment requirement. 

2. “Arising Out Of” Requirement. 

The Ninth Circuit has adopted a “but for” test for determining whether a plaintiff’s 

cause of action arises out of a defendant’s forum-related activities. See Omeluk v. 

Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 1995). The “arising out of” 

requirement is met if, but for the contacts between the defendant and the forum state, the 

cause of action would not have arisen. See Terracom, 49 F.3d at 561. Defendants argue 

that Plaintiff’s cause of action arises solely out of their failure to reduce Plaintiff’s child 

support and that their collection of overdue payments from Arizona bank accounts is 

irrelevant for this jurisdictional analysis. The Court does not agree. Defendants’ refusal 

to reduce child support payments enabled Georgia to collect overdue payments from 

Plaintiff’s accounts, and, but for their collection of overdue payments, Plaintiff’s cause of 

action would not have arisen. 

3. “Reasonableness” Requirement.

 An unreasonable exercise of jurisdiction violates the Due Process Clause even if 

the “purposeful availment” and “arising out of” requirements of the specific jurisdiction 

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test are satisfied. See Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316; Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 474-75. A 

district court presumes, however, that its exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant is 

reasonable if the first two requirements of the specific jurisdiction test are met. See 

Ballard, 65 F.3d at 1500. The burden of proof then shifts and the defendant must 

“‘present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render 

jurisdiction unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 

477 (1985)); see also Core-Vent Corp., 11 F.3d at 1495 (finding personal jurisdiction 

unreasonable even though “purposeful availment” and “arising out of” requirements were 

arguably satisfied). 

The Ninth Circuit considers seven factors to determine whether the exercise of 

specific jurisdiction is reasonable: (1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful 

interjection into the forum state; (2) the burden on the defendant of litigating in the 

forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the 

forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution 

of the dispute; (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and 

effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum. See Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 475 

(citing Terracom, 49 F.3d at 561); see also Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 

444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (listing several of the seven factors). None of these seven 

factors is dispositive; each must be weighed in the balance. Terracom, 49 F.3d at 561. 

The first factor – the extent of the Georgia Defendants’ purposeful interjection into 

the forum state – weighs slightly in favor of Plaintiff. “Even if there is sufficient 

‘interjection’ into the state to satisfy the [purposeful availment prong], the degree of 

interjection is a factor to be weighed in assessing the overall reasonableness of 

jurisdiction under the [reasonableness prong].” Core-Vent Corp., 11 F.3d at 1488 

(brackets in original) (quoting Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 

1271 (9th Cir.1981)); but see Roth, 942 F.2d at 623 (degree of interjection analysis and 

purposeful availment inquiry redundant). The Georgia Defendants did no more than 

process liens on Plaintiff’s Arizona bank account. Their actions were limited to 

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enforcing legal obligations under Georgia law and did not exceed the narrow scope of 

activities necessary to accomplish that objective. Their actions nonetheless caused 

effects in Arizona, and the Court therefore concludes that this factor weighs slightly in 

Plaintiff’s favor.

The second factor – the burden on Defendants of litigating in Arizona – weighs 

strongly in favor of the Georgia Defendants. They are located more than 1,900 miles 

from Arizona, Plaintiff presents no evidence that they have ever visited this State, and the 

evidence related to their actions is likely to be located almost entirely in Georgia. Even 

where the litigation burdens are equal, this factor “tips in favor of the defendants because 

the law of personal jurisdiction is ‘primarily concerned with the defendant’s burden.’” 

Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 475 (quoting Terracom, 49 F.3d at 561). 

The third factor – the extent of conflict with Georgia sovereignty – also weighs 

heavily in favor of the Georgia Defendants. Three are Georgia state officials and one is a 

Georgia state agency. The outcome of this case could have significant consequences for 

the enforcement of Georgia’s child support laws. Moreover, should the Court exercise 

personal jurisdiction in this case, Georgia officials could be amenable to suit in any state 

where they seek to enforce a child support order. This factor weighs heavily against the 

Plaintiff. 

The fourth factor – the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute – weighs 

in favor of Plaintiff. Arizona maintains a strong interest in providing an “effective means 

of redress for its residents who are tortuously injured.” Core-Vent Corp., 11 F.3d at 

1489. 

The fifth factor – the most efficient judicial resolution of the dispute – weighs in 

favor of the Georgia Defendants. While the parties have not identified where witnesses 

and evidence are likely to be located, a majority of the parties are located in Georgia and 

the official actions at issue in this case originated in and were managed from Georgia. 

This case primarily involves events occurring in Georgia, and the relevant evidence is 

most likely to be located there. 

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The sixth factor – the importance of the forum to Plaintiff’s interest in convenient 

relief – weighs slightly in favor of Plaintiff. Litigating in Georgia would surely be 

inconvenient for an Arizona resident. Nonetheless, “neither the Supreme Court nor our 

court has given much weight to inconvenience to the plaintiff. . . . A mere preference on 

the part of the plaintiff for its home forum does not affect the balancing; indeed, this 

factor is insignificant in this case.” Id. at 1490. 

The final factor is the availability of an alternate forum, which weighs in favor of 

the Defendants. Plaintiff has proven his ability to travel to Georgia in order to deal with 

his child support order. 

In summary, the second, third, fifth, and seventh factors weigh in favor of the 

Georgia Defendants, with the second and third weighing strongly in their favor, while the 

first and fourth factors weigh in favor of Plaintiff. The sixth factor is essentially a wash. 

Although claims that satisfy the first and second prongs of the personal jurisdiction test 

are presumptively reasonable, the presumption can be overcome by a compelling case 

that exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 476. The Court 

finds this to be a compelling case. Not only have Defendants been sued for acting to 

enforce Georgia law, but there is also a grave potential of conflict with Georgia’s 

sovereignty. Exercising personal jurisdiction over the Georgia Defendants in this case 

would be unreasonable. The Court therefore holds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over 

Defendants Georgia DHS, Clyde L. Reese III, Melissa Waddell, and Linda Register. 

C. Leave to Amend.

The Court must decide whether Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his 

claims with respect to any Defendant. If the Court determines that a pleading could be 

cured by the allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to 

amend a complaint before final dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court should not, however, advise the litigant how 

to cure the defects. This type of advice “would undermine district judges’ role as 

impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 

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F.3d at 1131 n. 13. 

The defect in the claims against the Georgia Defendants cannot be cured by 

amendment. The Court has concluded that exercising personal jurisdiction over them 

would be unreasonable, a problem that cannot be remedied by re-pleading. 

The claims against Defendants Arizona DES and Carter have failed for lack of 

factual detail and arguably could be corrected by amendment. The Court therefore will 

grant Plaintiff leave to amend with respect to these Defendants only. The deadline for 

filing an amended complaint will be March 1, 2013. 

Plaintiff must become familiar with and follow the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure and the Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona 

(“Local Rules”). See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Pro se litigants 

must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.”); Jacobsen v. Filler, 

790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (pro se litigants “should not be treated more 

favorably than parties with attorneys of record”). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

are available at the following Internet website: http:// www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/. A 

copy of the Court’s Local Rules may be obtained from the Court’s website. 

For purposes of the amended complaint, Plaintiff is directed to Rule 8 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a) provides that a complaint “shall contain (1) a 

short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, . . . 

(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, 

and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

These pleading requirements shall be set forth in separate and discrete paragraphs. The 

paragraphs must be numbered in consecutive order. 

To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the amended complaint must plead 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570. “The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully,” demanding instead sufficient factual allegations to allow “the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

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alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

Plaintiff is warned that if he fails to file an amended complaint by the March 1, 

2013 deadline, the original complaint may be stricken and the case dismissed. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(e). Plaintiff is further warned that if he fails to prosecute this action, or if 

he fails to comply with the rules or any Court order, the Court may dismiss the action 

with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. See 

Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 

1260 (9th Cir. 1992).

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. The motions to dismiss (Docs. 8, 9, 13) are granted. 

2. Leave to amend is not granted with respect to Defendants Georgia 

Department of Human Services, Clyde L. Reese III, Melissa Waddell, and Linda 

Register, but is granted with respect to Defendants Arizona Department of Economic 

Security and Clarence H. Carter. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint by 

March 1, 2013. 

Dated this 11th day of February, 2013. 

Case 2:12-cv-02003-DGC Document 40 Filed 02/11/13 Page 13 of 13