Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02003/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02003-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

David B. Turner Jr.,

Plaintiff,

v.

County of San Diego,

Defendant.

Case No.: 14-cv-02003-JAH-JLB

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF No. 63]

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

John A. Houston pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1 of the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of California. After a thorough review of 

Defendant County of San Diego’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 63), Plaintiff’s 

verified First Amended Complaint and oppositions to summary judgment (ECF Nos. 6, 80, 

83), and Defendant County of San Diego’s reply (ECF No. 84), this Court 

RECOMMENDS Defendant County of San Diego’s motion for summary judgment (ECF 

No. 63) be GRANTED.

I. Procedural History

Defendant County of San Diego is the only remaining defendant in this case.1 

Plaintiff sues the County under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 for alleged violations

of and conspiracies to violate his Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

 

1 On September 14, 2015, the Court dismissed Sheriff William D. Gore, Sergeant Farris, and Deputy 

Hernandez. (ECF No. 48.) On November 2, 2015, the Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss and 

dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the State. (ECF No. 55.)

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Plaintiff also alleges Defendant is liable for Plaintiff’s injuries under California 

Government Code, sections 815.2, 815.6, 820, 844.6, 910, 912(c), and 950.

 On January 15, 2016, the County moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 63). 

On March 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant’s pending motion for 

summary judgment which restated Plaintiff’s allegations, but which was devoid of 

evidence in any form. (ECF No. 80.) On March 25, 2016, Magistrate Judge Jill L. 

Burkhardt issued a Klingele/Rand Notice Warning Order, advising Plaintiff as follows:

This notice is required to be given to you, David B. Turner Jr., 

pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) and 

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988):

The Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment by which it seeks 

to have your case dismissed. (ECF No. 63.) A Motion for Summary 

Judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if 

granted, end your case.

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a Motion for 

Summary Judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when 

there is no genuine issue of material fact and the law – based on those facts –

supports the request for judgment. In other words, if there is no real dispute 

about any fact that would affect the result of your case, and the party who 

asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 

summary judgment will be granted and your case will end. When a party you 

are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported 

by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what 

your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts from 

declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated 

documents, as provided by Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the 

Defendant’s declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine 

issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in 

opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. If 

summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be 

no trial.

On March 14, 2016, you filed an opposition to Defendant’s pending 

motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 80.) Your opposition fails to set 

out specific facts from declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 

or authenticated documents, as provided by Rule 56(e), that contradict the 

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facts shown in the Defendant’s declarations and documents and show that 

there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

Accordingly, on the Court’s own motion, IT IS ORDERED that, on or 

before April 22, 2016, you may file a Supplemental Opposition to 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment that sets out specific facts from 

declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated 

documents, as provided by Rule 56(e), that you contend contradict the facts 

shown in the declarations and documents filed by Defendant in support of its 

motion for summary judgment and that you contend show that there is a 

genuine issue of material fact for trial. Your Opposition (including any 

supporting documents) must be filed and served on all parties by April 22, 

2016. 

(ECF No. 82 (emphasis in original).) 

On April 4, 2016, Plaintiff filed a supplemental opposition to Defendant’s motion 

for summary judgment, to which he attached unauthenticated evidence. (ECF No. 83.) On 

May 12, 2016, Defendant filed its reply. (ECF No. 84.)

II. Factual Background

Plaintiff David B. Turner Jr., a former prisoner proceeding pro se, brought this action 

arising from a December 3, 2013 incident in which Sheriff’s deputies allegedly used 

excessive force against him while he was a prisoner in San Diego County’s George Bailey 

Detention Facility (“GBDF”). A GBDF Incident Report reflects that the incident in 

question occurred during a weekly laundry exchange in Plaintiff’s housing unit. (ECF No. 

83 at 4.) The parties’ accounts diverge on what happened during the laundry exchange. 

Plaintiff’s account (to the extent it diverges from Defendant’s account) is supported by 

allegations in and evidence attached to his verified First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) 

only, whereas Defendant’s account is supported by evidence filed in connection with its 

motion for summary judgment.

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Among Defendant’s evidence is a GBDF Officer Report completed by Corporal 

Gardiner,

2 which reports the following with respect to the December 3, 2013 laundry 

exchange incident:

All inmates were instructed via the intercom to remove all clothing with 

the exception of a blanket wrapped around their waist in order to complete the 

one for one clothing exchange as scheduled.

At approximately 2230 hours, I approached Cell 202 to conduct a 

search of the occupants for extra clothing and contraband. In order to 

complete the search of the inmate’s person, I instructed the inmates to open 

the side of their blanket, so I could assure that there were no hidden items 

under the blanket and to afford the inmate privacy.

The first occupant exited the cell door and complied with all my 

instructions. Turner then came to the cell door and I instructed him to open 

the side of his blanket. To this Turner replied, “Fuck you I ain’t on that gay 

shit!” I instructed Turner that the search was not optional and Turner still 

continued to refuse stating, “I ain’t got nothing on!” I then explained to 

Turner that I could not take his word and I needed to see myself.

Turner continued to refuse to follow my orders and became 

confrontational calling me [] several derogatory terms commonly used [to] 

describe a homosexual. At this point I instructed Turner to face the back of 

the cell. Turner complied and I entered the cell and placed Turner in 

handcuffs. Due to his boisterous behavior, Turner was then escorted out of

the module by Corporal Hernandez (5690), Deputy Bennetts (6285), Deputy 

L. Garcia (3310) and I.

As Turner passed other deputies, Turner looked at Corporal Hernandez 

and stated, “Whatcha looking at? I’m gonna knock you the fuck out.” I 

escorted Turner to GBDF Processing Cell 104.

Once inside the cell, I instructed Turner to face the wall, put his knees

on the bench and cross his ankles, so I could remove the handcuffs while 

Turner was at a position of disadvantage. To this Turner complied. I 

instructed Turner once the handcuffs are removed he need[ed] to place his 

hands high on the wall. To this Turner complied. I told Turner to stay in that 

 

2 Corporal Gardiner’s report was also attached as an exhibit to Plaintiff’s supplemental opposition to 

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

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position until the door is secured. To this Turner replied, “Ok.” As we 

released are grasp of Turner in an attempt to safely exit the cell, Turner 

violently and aggressively turned around without being told to do so and faced 

us. I perceived Turner’s actions as an attempt to assault us. In order to prevent

Turner from assaulting us, I grabbed Turner’s left arm above and below his 

elbow and held it in place. Once I grasped Turner’s arm he immediately sat 

on the bench.

I instructed Turner to stand back up and face the wall. Turner complied, 

but began to scream irrational statements about how we were trying to see his 

“eggs.” I released [m]y grasp of Turner’s arm. Corporal Hernandez and 

Deputy Bennetts forced Turner’s hands to the small of his back and I placed 

handcuffs back on Turner’s wrists.

Once the handcuffs were secured on Turner’s wrists, Turner was 

instructed to go to the back of the cell and face the back wall so we could 

safely exit the cell. Turner again complied and began to walk towards the 

back of the cell. Once Turner approached the toilet partition, Turner violently 

and suddenly turned towards Corporal Hernandez and Deputy Bennetts. As

Turner was turning Turner screamed, “Fuck this!”

At this point Corporal Hernandez took Turner to the ground. See 

Corporal Hernandez’ Deputy’s Report for details. Once on the ground, I 

secured Turner’s upper torso by applying downward body pressure with my 

right and left hand, in belief that Turner may attempt to rise to his feet and 

again attempt to assault a responding deputy. Corporal Hernandez applied

downward pressure to the upper torso of Turner, while Deputy Bennetts 

secured Turner’s legs.

Leg chains were summoned and Deputy Bennetts placed the leg chains 

on Turner’s ankles. While the leg chains were being placed Turner began to 

weep and apologized for not listening to our instructions and for his “stupid”

actions. Once the leg chains were secured, Turner was lifted to a seated 

position on the bench. Turner was instructed to remain on the bench until the 

door was shut. Turner compiled and the cell was secured.

While inside the holding cell you can observe Turner on video 

attempting to break the handcuffs off his wrists by utilizing the holding cell 

sink. See SDSO Training bulletin dated 04/2005 (2). Turner’s actions were 

not successful in freeing his hands, but were successful in causing damage to 

the handcuffs.

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Corporal Hernandez. Deputy Bennetts and I removed Turner from the 

GBDF Processing Cell #4 and escorted him to GBDF Medical for evaluation. 

Turner was treated and evaluated by Nurse [] Rognlien-Hood (7001). Turner 

complained of pain to his neck and wrists. Nurse Rognlien-Hood cleared 

Turner for housing and scheduled him for MDSC at a later date. While in

GBDF Medical, Deputy Bennetts took several photographs of Turner.

Corporal Hernandez, Deputy Bennetts and I then escorted Turner to 

House 5, Cell 139 pending discipline without further incident.

(ECF Nos. 63-4 at 4-6; 83 at 8-10.)

III. Standard of Review

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or 

the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate where the evidence shows “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of 

informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions of the 

pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All reasonable 

inferences from the evidence are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986). Where the moving party does not bear the 

burden of proof at trial, it is entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there 

is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 

325.

If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party 

opposing the motion, who must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 

issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is warranted if a party 

“fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 

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U.S. at 322. A genuine issue of fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A fact is 

material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. “[A] 

party cannot manufacture a genuine issue of material fact merely by making assertions in 

its legal memoranda.” S.A. Empresa, Etc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238

(9th Cir. 1982); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e).

IV. Analysis

1. Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The County moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim 

for municipal liability for the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. The County argues that it cannot be held liable because

there is no evidence of an underlying constitutional violation and there is no evidence that 

a County policy or custom is responsible for any of the alleged constitutional violations. 

(ECF No. 63-1 at 3-5.) In response, Plaintiff argues that he was a victim of sexual abuse

and excessive force by “County of San Diego, and there [sic] decision makers.” (ECF No. 

83 at 1, 2.)3 

A municipality is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if it maintains a policy or custom 

that results in a violation of a plaintiff inmate’s constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep’t of 

Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). As explained by the Ninth 

Circuit:

There are three ways to show a policy or custom of a municipality: (1) by 

showing “a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard 

operating procedure’ of the local government entity;” (2) “by showing that the 

decision-making official was, as a matter of state law, a final policymaking 

authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy in 

 

3

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to sexual harassment and excessive force due to 

deputies’ “conduct [that] conformed to County of San Diego official policy, customs and practices.” 

(See, e.g., ECF No. 6 at 3.) He further alleges that the County “had a policy that amounts to racism, 

deliberate indifference to Turner’s constitutional rights. That policy adopted by Corp. Hernandez and 

other John Does on 12-3-2013 at George Bailey Detention amounted to, cruel and unusual punishment, 

denying equal protection under the law, and unreasonable excessive force.” (Id. at 6.)

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the area of decision;” or (3) “by showing that an official with final 

policymaking authority either delegated that authority to, or ratified the 

decision of, a subordinate.”

Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ulrich v. City and 

Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002)). In reviewing the FAC and 

Plaintiff’s opposition papers, it appears that Plaintiff is proceeding under the first and 

second theories, arguing that the County is liable under Monell because its policies and 

decision makers are supposedly responsible for the allegedly unconstitutional conduct at 

issue. (ECF No. 6 at 3; ECF No. 83 at 1, 2.)

Here, although Plaintiff alleges County policies are at issue, Plaintiff fails to identify

any policy. Instead, the gravamen of Plaintiff’s case is actions taken by individual Sheriff 

deputies against Plaintiff on a particular occasion, December 3, 2013. A plaintiff cannot 

demonstrate the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice based solely on a 

“single occurrence of [allegedly] unconstitutional action by a non-policymaking 

employee.” McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000). And a plaintiff seeking 

to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 must “identify a municipal ‘policy’ or 

‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Board of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 

520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Thus, as to this first theory, 

Plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment because, as the party with the burden of proof, 

he has failed to make a showing sufficient to establish this element. In contrast, Defendant 

submits evidence that “[t]here is no County or Sheriff’s Department policy or custom that 

subjects inmates, including plaintiff, to excessive force, denial of equal protection or 

violation of Title 42 U.S.C. sections 1985 and 1986.” (ECF No. 63-2 at 2, ¶4.) 

With respect to Plaintiff’s second theory – that the allegedly bad actors were 

decision-making officials whose acts may fairly be said to represent official policy –

Plaintiff again fails to submit any evidence in support. The GBDF reports filed in 

connection with both parties’ summary judgment papers identify the following correctional 

deputies as being involved in the use of force against Plaintiff on December 3, 2013: 

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Corporal Francis Gardiner, Corporal Miguel Hernandez, Deputy James Bennetts, and 

Deputy L. Garcia (See ECF Nos. 63-4 at 4-6; 83 at 6-10.) There is no evidence, however, 

from which a jury could reasonably infer that any of these deputies were decision-making 

officials whose acts may fairly be said to represent official policy. Thus, having analyzed 

Plaintiff’s first and second theories of Monell liability, Plaintiff has not met his burden to 

show that there is a genuine issue of material fact from which a jury could reasonably 

conclude that the County maintained a policy, custom, or practice that resulted in the 

alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Because Plaintiff has not put forth any evidence that the conduct at issue was the 

result of a custom, policy, or practice in San Diego County, summary judgment should be 

granted in favor of the County and against Plaintiff on any and all claims presented by the 

FAC under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

4

2. Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1986

Plaintiff seeks to hold the County liable for an alleged conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 19855and for its alleged failure to prevent a known conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1986.

The County moves for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff does not have any factual 

support for the vague conspiracy alleged.6 In opposition, Plaintiff points to § 1985(3), 

 

4

 As a result, the Court need not address the County’s alternative argument that it cannot be held liable 

because there is no evidence of an underlying constitutional violation.

5

 Section 1985 contains discrete substantive clauses. Section 1985(1) concerns preventing an officer of 

the United States from performing his or her duties. The first clause of section 1985(2) concerns 

conspiring to obstruct justice in the federal courts or to intimidate a party, witness, or juror in connection 

therewith. The second clause of § 1985(2) provides a cause of action if: “two or more persons conspire 

for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of 

justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to 

injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or 

class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws.” The first clause of § 1985(3) provides a cause of 

action for a private conspiracy to deny equal protection of the laws. The second clause of § 1985(3) 

provides a cause of action for a conspiracy “for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted 

authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory 

the equal protection of the laws.” The third clause of § 1985(3) provides a cause of action for a 

conspiracy to interfere with federal elections.

6 Defendant also argues that it cannot be a conspirator, but the law cited herein is contrary to this 

argument. See, e.g., Caldeira v. Cty. of Kauai, 866 F.2d 1175, 1181 (9th Cir. 1989).

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references his right to equal protection, and seems to argue that Defendant is part of a 

“conspiracy to interfere with civil rights” and a “conspiracy to lie” related to the GBDF 

reports about the December 3, 2013 incident. (ECF No. 80 at 1, 3; ECF No. 83 at 3.)

To prove a violation under § 1985(3), a plaintiff “must show ‘some racial, or perhaps 

otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’

action.’” Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Griffin v. 

Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). Further, “to prove a section 1985 conspiracy 

between a private party and the government under section 1983, the plaintiff must show an 

agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’ by the defendants to violate his constitutional rights.” 

Caldeira v. Cty. of Kauai, 866 F.2d 1175, 1181 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, Plaintiff has not 

alleged in the FAC or produced evidence that any alleged conspirators were motivated by 

racial or other class-based “invidiously discriminatory animus.” Orin, 272 F.3d at 1217. 

Nor is there any evidence of a meeting of the minds between anyone and the County. Thus, 

Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact from which a jury could reasonably

infer a conspiracy existed. Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted in favor of 

the County and against Plaintiff on any and all claims presented by the FAC under 42 

U.S.C. § 1985.

Finally, “Section 1986 imposes liability on every person who knows of an 

impending violation of section 1985 but neglects or refuses to prevent the violation.” 

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation 

omitted). A plaintiff can only state a claim under § 1986 if he establishes a valid claim 

under § 1985. Id. Here, Plaintiff fails to present evidence to support his § 1985 claim. 

Therefore, summary judgment should be granted in favor of the County and against 

Plaintiff on any and all claims presented by the FAC under 42 U.S.C. § 1986.

3. California Government Code, Sections 815.2, 815.6, 820, 844.6, 910, 

912(c), and 950

Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant 

violated his rights under California Government Code, sections 815.2, 815.6, 820, 844.6, 

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910, 912(c), and 950. The Court is in agreement with Defendant in its assertion that the 

County of San Diego is immune to state law-based claims of injury to prisoners under Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 844.6. Section 844.6 states “notwithstanding any other provision of this part

. . . a public entity is not liable for . . . (2) an injury to any prisoner.” Cal. Gov. Code 

§ 844.6. Defendant has met its burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact concerning Defendant County of San Diego’s immunity from state tort 

liability. Plaintiff fails to rebut this claim. Therefore, summary judgment should be 

granted in favor of the County and against Plaintiff on any and all claims presented by the 

FAC under California state law.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons outlined above, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 63) be GRANTED, and that the assigned District 

Judge issue an Order approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 11, 2016, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than August 18, 2016. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise to 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 445 (9th 

Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 21, 2016

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