Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01450/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01450-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACQUELINE GAINES and OLYMPIA 

MORRIS1

Plaintiffs,

v.

SACRAMENTO COUNTY CHILD 

PROTECTIVE SERVICES AGENCY, 

an agency of the County of 

Sacramento; ANN EDWARDS, in 

her individual and 

professional capacities; 

SANDRA THOMPSON, in her 

individual and professional 

capacities; SHAUNTE DERRICK, 

in her individual and 

professional capacities; and

SANTRICE DAVIS, in her 

individual and professional 

capacities,

Defendants.

No. 2:12-cv-01450-GEB-EFB

ORDER GRANTING EACH DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Each Defendant moves for summary judgment on each claim 

alleged against the movant.2 Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint 

the following claims under California law: negligence, 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy. 

 

1 The caption has been modified because Olympia Morris, referred to as 

“O.M.” when this suit was filed, turned 18 on March 20, 2012. Therefore, the 

use of her initials is no longer required under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure (“Rule”) 5.2. (See Compl. ¶ 4.)

2 Defendant Santrice Davis filed a separate summary judgment motion. (See

Mem. P.&A. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Davis Mot.”), ECF No. 30.) Since both motions 

raise similar arguments, they are considered together.

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(Compl. ¶¶ 17, 28-37.) Plaintiffs allege the following claims 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: due process, equal protection, familial 

association, and conspiracy. (Id. ¶ 22.) The factual allegations 

underlying the claims are the following: Defendants wrongfully

removed Plaintiff Olympia Morris (“Morris”) from the custody of 

her mother, Plaintiff Jacqueline Gaines (“Gaines”), falsified

investigative reports, gave false testimony during Juvenile Court 

dependency proceedings, made unfounded recommendations to the 

Juvenile Court on visits Gaines and Morris should have with each 

other, and failed to ensure Morris’ well-being while she was in 

foster care. (See id. ¶¶ 4, 6-13.)

Plaintiffs’ attorneys filed a Notice of Non-Opposition 

to the pending motions on March 24, 2015. (ECF No. 38.) However, 

on April 17, 2015, Gaines filed an unverified response to the 

motions in propia persona. (ECF No. 43.)3

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A party is entitled to summary judgment if 

“the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” . . . The moving party has the burden 

of establishing the absence of a genuine 

dispute of material fact. 

City of Pomona v. SQM North Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)) (citing Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “A fact is ‘material’ when 

. . . it could affect the outcome of the case.” Thrifty Oil Co. 

v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

 

3 Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a Motion to be Relieved as Counsel on March 26, 

2015, which was denied on May 6, 2015.

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242, 248 (1986)). “A[] [dispute] of material fact is “genuine” 

when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is 

genuinely disputed must support the assertion 

by . . . citing to particular parts of 

materials in the record . . . or . . . 

showing that the materials cited do not 

establish the absence or presence of a 

genuine dispute, or that an adverse party 

cannot produce admissible evidence to support 

the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). 

Local Rule 260(b) prescribes:

Any party opposing a motion for summary 

judgment . . . [must] reproduce the itemized 

facts in the [moving party’s] Statement of 

Undisputed Facts and admit those facts that 

are undisputed and deny those that are 

disputed, including with each denial a 

citation to the particular portions of any 

pleading, affidavit, deposition, 

interrogatory answer, admission, or other 

document relied upon in support of that 

denial.

If the nonmovant does not “specifically . . . 

[controvert duly supported] facts identified in the [movant’s] 

statement of undisputed facts,” the nonmovant “is deemed to have 

admitted the validity of the facts contained in the [movant’s] 

statement.” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 527 (2006).

Because a district court has no independent duty “to 

scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact,” 

and may “rely on the nonmoving party to identify with reasonable 

particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment,” 

. . . the district court . . . [is] under no obligation to 

undertake a cumbersome review of the record on the [nonmoving 

party’s] behalf. Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 

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1017 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 

(9th Cir. 1996)).

II. UNCONTROVERTED FACTS

Each motion is supported with the following 

uncontroverted facts.

“On November 18, 2008, while at school, [Morris] 

entered [Vice Principal and Counselor Michele Gorman’s] office, 

and told Gorman that she was afraid to go home out of concern 

over a bad progress report. [Morris] also informed Ms. Gorman 

that her mother had hit her before.” (Statement of Undisputed 

Material Facts Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J (“SUF”) No. 2, ECF No. 

29-3.) Specifically, Morris “told . . . Gorman that her mother . 

. . [had previously] hit her across the face . . . because of her 

cellphone bill.” (Id. No. 3.) Gorman, a “mandated child abuse 

reporter . . . . completed a suspected child abuse report” on 

November 18, 2008, which detailed Morris’ account of alleged 

abuse, stating: “[Morris] is fearful that her mom will hit her 

again.” (Id. Nos. 4-6.) Gorman also “telephoned [CPS]” and “spoke 

with Leslie Green at CPS and told her exactly what she had 

written on the child abuse report.” (Id. Nos. 7-8.) “Ms. Green 

indicated that they would not be able to get a CPS worker out to 

the school that afternoon, and suggested that Gorman call law 

enforcement.” (Id. No. 9.) That same day, Gorman “called the 

Sacramento City Police and made the same report of suspected 

child abuse.” (Id. No. 10.) “[F]ollowing . . . Gorman’s call 

. . . two police officers responded to [Morris’] school” and 

“escorted [her] to her home,” where they “spoke to both Gaines 

and [Morris.]” (Id. Nos. 11-13.) The officers left, and Morris 

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“slept at home that night.” (Id. No. 15.) 

On December 9, 2008, Defendant Sandra Thompson 

conducted a home visit with Morris and Gaines regarding the 

November 18, 2008 child abuse allegations, and “reported her 

interaction with the family to a CPS supervisor” on December 10, 

2008. (Id. Nos. 16-17; Dep. Sandra Thompson 19:20-20:4, Ex. C to 

Decl. Mark P. O’Dea (“O’Dea Decl.”), ECF No. 29-5.) Thompson 

stated in that report:

[Morris] disclosed that she was afraid and 

that her mom hit her in the eye a few weeks 

before. She disclosed that she had blurred 

vision and was still experiencing some pain. 

She was crying. Her mother was pointing her 

finger in her face. [I] could not calm Ms. 

Gaines down, nor was [I] able to establish a 

safety plan with Ms. Gaines.

(SUF No. 18.) 

“On December 11, 2008 . . . Thompson interviewed 

[Morris] at her school. [Morris] indicated that she was fearful 

of returning home and she reported that her mother had been 

verbally and physically abusive toward her and she was afraid of 

going to sleep at night.” (Id. No. 20.) “Thompson made a decision 

not to detain [Morris at that time] because she did not have 

enough information . . . and did not believe that exigent 

circumstances existed. She also did not believe that [Morris] was 

in imminent danger while she was at school.” (Id. No. 21.) That 

same day, “[Morris] reported to the school principal and vice 

principal/counselor that she did not want to go home,” and 

“school staff [then] called the Sacramento Police Department for 

assistance, and Officer Christopher Shippen responded.” (Id. Nos. 

22-23.) Subsequently, Officer Shippen spoke to Morris at school, 

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after which he transported her home, where he “made contact with 

. . . Gaines.” (Id. Nos. 25-26.) Shippen spoke with with Morris 

and Gaines, and “at one point during the conversation the 

interaction between [Plaintiffs] became very, very heated, with 

both participants raising their voice and yelling at each other.” 

(Id. No. 27.) As a result, Officer Shippen “became concerned” and 

“decided to intervene and formulate a plan to take [Morris] into 

protective custody and transport her to the children’s receiving 

home to ensure that both parties were separated and that the 

situation would not deteriorate any further.” (Id. No. 28.) 

“[N]o one from CPS was present at the family residence 

during the time that Officer Shippen interacted with Gaines and 

[Morris] and [when he] made the decision to take [Morris] into 

protective custody.” (Id. No. 29.) Further, “[o]n December 11, 

2008, Officer Shippen did not contact CPS . . . in connection 

with his decision to take [Morris] into protective custody.” (Id.

No. 30.) 

“On December 16, 2008, the . . . Juvenile Court 

conducted a . . . hearing” at which Gaines was represented by 

counsel. (Id. No. 34.) “At the hearing, the [Juvenile Court]

found that . . . [living] . . . in [Gaines’] home was contrary to 

[Morris’] welfare . . . [and ordered that Morris] be detained by 

the Department of Health and Human Services.” (Id. No. 35.) The 

Juvenile Court also scheduled a status hearing on January 8, 

2009, which was continued to January 29, 2009. (Id. Nos. 36-37.) 

In connection with the Juvenile Court proceedings, 

Defendant Shaunte Derrick interviewed Gaines on January 21, 2009, 

and Morris on January 22, 2009. (Id. Nos. 38-39.) Derrick 

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subsequently “prepared a summary of the interview[s] and entered 

[them] into the CPS [c]omputer system.” (Id. No. 38.) 

On or about January 27, 2009 [Derrick] 

prepared [a report] for the [January 29, 

2009] hearing . . . . In preparing the 

[report], [Derrick] included, verbatim, her 

summaries of her interviews with [Gaines and 

Morris]. In particular, [Derrick] included 

all of [Gaines’] statements denying and 

disputing the allegations of abuse made by 

[Morris].

(Id. No. 40.)

The January 29, 2009 status hearing was continued to

April 30, 2009, at which time the Juvenile Court also scheduled a 

jurisdiction/disposition hearing. (Id. Nos. 41-44.) The Juvenile 

Court held jurisdiction/disposition hearings on multiple dates in 

June and July 2009, including on June 10, 2009 and June 11, 2009, 

at which time Defendant Thompson testified. (SUF Nos. 47-48.) On 

July 21, 2009, the Juvenile Court issued an order that Morris 

“should be adjudged a dependent child of the court.” (Id. No. 

87.) The order specified that Gaines “shall have regular 

visitation with [Morris] consistent with [Morris’] wellbeing[,]” 

and that “[t]he Department of Health and Human Services shall 

determine the time, place and manner of visitation, including the 

frequency of visits, length of visits and whether the visits are 

supervised and who supervises them.” (Statement of Undisputed 

Material Facts Supp. Davis Mot. Summ. J. (“Davis SUF”) No. 3, ECF 

No. 32.)

“Defendant Davis was assigned as Plaintiffs’ family 

reunification social worker” in June 2009, while Gaines’ custody 

of Morris was being contested in Juvenile Court. (Id. No. 2.) “At 

the time . . . Davis was assigned to the case[,] visitation 

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[between Gaines and Morris] was supervised . . . . [Davis] . . . 

met with [Plaintiffs] about once a month.” (Id. No. 4.) 

The supervised visits [between Plaintiffs] 

changed to unsupervised in April of 2010 

after a meeting . . . between Defendant 

Davis, Plaintiffs and [Morris’] siblings and 

her grandmother. They all met and had dinner 

. . . during which time Defendant Davis 

witnessed an interaction between the 

Plaintiffs that she had never seen throughout 

the case. Her understanding was that . . . 

Plaintiff Gaines and [Morris], both wanted to 

reunify. During this meeting, she saw 

affection between them . . . [that] she had 

not seen before.

(Id. No. 9.) 

Following the meeting, “[i]n April 2010, Defendant 

Davis submitted a report to the [Juvenile] Court that Plaintiff 

Gaines and [Morris] had expressed a desire to reunify and 

indicated to the court that she was changing her recommendation 

from terminating Family Reunification to allowing Plaintiffs 

. . . [to reunite].” (Id. No. 10.) However, in May 2010 Davis 

“recommended the court grant restricted or supervised visitation 

again.” (Id. No. 11.) 

Defendant Davis testified she recalls . . . 

that the basis for requesting the court . . . 

[restrict] visitation again [in May 2010] was 

because she could not assess the quality of 

the interaction between Plaintiffs. There was 

no feedback from Plaintiff[s] Gaines or 

[Morris on this issue]. [Further, Morris] had 

been observed to increase opposition toward 

participating in [county] services following 

the change in visitation from supervised to 

unsupervised. Plaintiff Gaines testified that 

she disagreed with this change of visits. 

[She] felt she had no control over Defendant 

[Davis’] interactions with her daughter.

(Id. Nos. 11-12.) 

While Morris was in foster care she “did not have any 

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complaints about her care . . . . She never felt unsafe.” (Id. 

No. 13; Dep. Olympia Morris 62:15-64:11, Ex. E to Decl. Carol 

Wieckowski Supp. Davis Mot. Summ J., ECF No. 31.) When Defendant 

Davis saw Morris “within the [foster] home and . . . at school or 

in other capacities such as visitation with Plaintiff Gaines, 

[Morris] never expressed any concerns to . . . Davis about 

residing with [her foster mother.]” (Davis SUF No. 13.) “[Morris] 

testified that she was having regular visits with a social worker 

[from CPS] the whole time she lived [with her foster mother.]”

(Id. No. 8.) 

[Morris] asserts that [in September of 2010, 

after Davis was no longer her social worker] 

she was sexually assaulted in the home of two 

acquaintances, ‘Robert’ and ‘Anthony’.

[Morris] was at the home of ‘Robert and 

Anthony’ without the permission of [her 

foster mother]. The foster [mother] had 

notified the police that she suspected that 

[Morris] was at [Robert and Anthony’s house], 

and the police responded . . . . However, 

[Morris] hid from the police and [Robert] 

persuaded them that [Morris] was not there. 

(SUF Nos. 106-108; Dep. Olympia Morris 90:6-96:25, Ex. A to O’Dea 

Decl.; Davis SUF No. 14)

“On March 10, 2011 the Juvenile Court ordered that the 

dependency of [Morris] be terminated and that sole physical and 

legal custody be awarded to [Gaines].” (SUF No. 109.) 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue the motions should be granted because 

“[n]o Defendant . . . removed [Morris] from [Gaines’] house or 

participated in [her] removal,” and Defendants “acted 

appropriately, professionally, responsibly, and in good faith in 

investigating [Gaines’ alleged abusive treatment of Morris] and 

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presenting . . . information to the [J]uvenile [C]ourt.” (Defs.’ 

Mot. Summ J. (“Mot.”) 3:21-24, 47:13-15, ECF No. 29.) Further, 

Defendants argue “there is no evidence that any . . . [Defendant]

engaged in the falsification of reports or facts submitted to the 

[Juvenile] [C]ourt [or] . . . [was] negligent in the selection or 

supervision of [Morris’] foster care placement.” (Mot. 38:21-23, 

45:22-25.) These arguments are adequately supported by the 

uncontroverted facts.

Plaintiff Gaines responds to the motions with the 

conclusory assertions that CPS investigators “ignored” 

information that was helpful to Gaines’ case in the Juvenile 

Court dependency proceedings, and that “[d]uring the [dependency

hearings] . . . [Defendants] lied under oath and hid evidence 

from the court.” (Gaines’ Response 1-2.)

However, Plaintiffs “cannot establish a disputed 

question of material fact, and thereby avoid summary judgment, by 

making . . . ‘bare assertion[s]’ that [are] devoid of ‘any legal 

or factual support.’” Kitchens v. Pierce, 565 F. App'x 590, 591 

(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting DeNieva v. Reyes, 966 F.2d 480, 486 (9th 

Cir. 1992)). Further, “[m]ere argument does not establish a 

genuine [dispute] of material fact to defeat summary judgment.” 

MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th 

Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994); see generally

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

587 (1986) (stating the “purpose of summary judgment is to 

‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see 

whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”) (quoting Rule 

56(e)’s Advisory Committee Note on the 1963 Amendments to the 

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Rule). “In the absence of specific facts . . . showing the 

existence of a genuine [dispute] for trial, a properly supported 

summary judgment motion should be granted.” Nilsson, Robbins, 

Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 

1538, 1545 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding the district court properly 

granted the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion where “the 

defendants against whom summary judgment was entered made no 

showing of specific facts in their opposition.”) 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, each Defendant’s summary 

judgment motion is granted, and judgment shall be entered in each 

Defendant’s favor. 

Dated: May 8, 2015

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