Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02591/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02591-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Plaintiffs failed to address Rule 16's good cause

requirement in their moving papers. Although they addressed this

standard in their reply, plaintiffs assert that the 2nd Amended

Pretrial Scheduling Order (“PSO”) does not require compliance

with Rule 16. Plaintiffs are mistaken. The prior Pretrial

Scheduling Order in this case provided that “[N]o further joinder

of parties or amendments to pleadings is permitted without leave

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

AREZOU MANSOURIAN; LAUREN 

MANCUSO; NANCY NIEN-LI

CHIANG; CHRISTINE WING-SI NG;

and all those similarly

situated,

NO. CIV. S-03-2591 FCD EFB

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

at DAVIS; LAWRENCE “LARRY”

VANDERHOEF; GREG WARZECKA;

PAM GILL-FISHER; ROBERT

FRANKS; and LAWRENCE SWANSON,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiffs’ motions to

modify the pretrial scheduling order, pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 16(b),1 and to amend their complaint pursuant to

Case 2:03-cv-02591-KJM-EFB Document 175 Filed 03/20/07 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of court, good cause having been shown.” (Docket #28 (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (b); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975

F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1992)). The 2nd Amended PSO notes plaintiff’s

request for leave to amend and defendant’s objection to that

request. The court set out a briefing schedule for plaintiffs

“to bring the appropriate motions,” noting explicitly that

“Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the Complaint and/or Motion to Amend

the Pretrial Scheduling Order” was to be submitted on or before

February 2, 2007. (Docket #156) (emphasis added). However, the

court will consider the arguments relating to Rule 16 set forth

in plaintiffs’ reply. 

2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

2

Rule 15 to add new plaintiffs and allegations. Defendants oppose

the motion. For the reasons set forth below,2 plaintiffs’ motion

is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This action was filed on December 18, 2003, alleging that

defendants violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972,

20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, and various state statutes “by eliminating

female athletic participation and scholarship opportunities in

wrestling” and that “[d]efendants continue to violate these civil

rights by refusing to reinstate the women’s wrestling program and

by failing to provide equitable athletic participation and

scholarship opportunities for women.” (Pls.’ Compl., filed Dec.

18, 2003, at 2). Two of the plaintiffs, Arezou Mansourian and

Lauren Mancuso, brought the action on behalf of themselves and

“as class representatives on behalf of all those similarly

situated, including all present and future female students at UCDavis who are denied equal athletic participation opportunities

Case 2:03-cv-02591-KJM-EFB Document 175 Filed 03/20/07 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 At this stage in the litigation, the dispositive motion

deadline was August 4, 2006.

3

and scholarships, especially in wrestling, by Defendants’

discriminatory actions.” (Id. at 3). 

The litigation in this case, albeit extended, has been

thorough. In March 2004, defendants filed a motion to dismiss,

which was denied. (See Mem. & Order, Docket #25, filed May 6,

2004). In December 2005, plaintiffs filed a motion to certify

the class and noticed the matter for hearing in February 2006. 

(See Docket #62-70). Between December 2005 and April 2006, the

docket reflects that the parties engaged in discovery, and

various discovery disputes were filed before the magistrate

judge. Subsequently, plaintiffs amended their notice of hearing

for the class certification motion to change the hearing date to

April 21, 2006. (2d Amended Notice of Hearing, Docket #93, filed

Feb. 21, 2006). On April 4, 2004, defendants filed a lengthy

opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for class certification,

accompanied by voluminous attachments, exhibits, and objections. 

(See Docket # 103-07, 121). Further, the docket reflects that

defendants were preparing to file a motion for summary judgment.3

(See Docket # 97-102; 108-110 (relating to defendants’ ex parte

motion to extend page limits for motions for summary judgment)).

Unfortunately, throughout the course of this litigation,

both defendants’ and plaintiffs’ counsel have suffered illnesses. 

In October 2005, both parties stipulated to an extension of

deadlines due to defendants’ lead counsel’s diagnosis with breast

cancer, which would make her unavailable to travel to depositions

over the following two months. (Stipulation, Docket #57, filed

Case 2:03-cv-02591-KJM-EFB Document 175 Filed 03/20/07 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Oct. 28, 2005). On April 14, 2006, one week before plaintiffs’

motion for class certification was to be heard by the court,

plaintiffs’ counsel filed an ex parte motion to stay and extend

scheduling based upon plaintiffs’ counsel’s serious health

issues. (Ex Parte Mot. to Stay, Docket #117, filed Apr. 14,

2006). Defendants opposed the motion. The court granted

plaintiffs’ motion and set a status conference for June 16, 2006. 

(Order, Docket #125, filed Apr. 18, 2006). On June 6, 2006, the

parties stipulated to extend the stay and related scheduling

matters. (Stipulation to Extend Stay and Related Scheduling

Matters, Docket #130, filed June 6, 2006). On July 21, 2006,

plaintiffs moved to extend the stay in order to find new counsel

because of plaintiffs’ counsel’s serious medical condition. 

(Motion to Extend, Docket #134, filed July 21, 2006). The court

granted the extension, directed plaintiffs’ counsel to file

either a motion to withdraw or substitution of counsel by August

18, 2006, and set a status conference for September 8, 2006. 

(Order, Docket # 137, filed July 24, 2006). On August 18, 2006,

Monique Oliver filed a notice of appearance on behalf of

plaintiffs. (Docket # 140, filed Aug. 18, 2006). On August 23,

2006, and October 19, 2006, the parties stipulated to extend the

stay, based upon the appearance of new counsel in this matter. 

(Docket #141, 147). 

Finally, on January 19, 2007, the parties submitted a joint

status report. (Docket # 154). The parties raised issues

relating to plaintiffs’ desire to amend the complaint, further

discovery, and scheduling. On January 24, 2006, the court issued

a 2nd Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order, setting forth the

Case 2:03-cv-02591-KJM-EFB Document 175 Filed 03/20/07 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 To rely solely on Rule 15 after a pretrial scheduling

order has been entered would “render scheduling orders

meaningless and effectively would read Rule 16(b) and its good

cause requirement out of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 

Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1419 (11th Cir.

1998); see also Mammoth Recreations, 975 F.2d at 610 (adopting

Rule 15's standards for amending the complaint would “undermine

the court’s ability to control its docket, disrupt the agreedupon course of the litigation, and reward the indolent and the

cavalier”); Eckert Cold Storage, 943 F. Supp. at 1232 n.3.

5

schedule by which the parties were to file the current motions. 

(2d Am. Pretrial Scheduling Order, Docket # 156, filed Jan. 24,

2006). 

STANDARD

Once the court has entered a pretrial scheduling order

pursuant to Rule 16, the standards of Rule 16 rather than Rule 15

govern amendment of the pleadings. See Johnson v. Mammoth

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992); Eckert

Cold Storage, Inc. v. Behl, 943 F. Supp. 1230, 1232-33 (E.D. Cal.

1996).4 Orders entered before the final pretrial conference may

be modified only “upon a showing of good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

16(b). 

The good cause requirement of Rule 16 primarily considers

the diligence of the party seeking the amendment. The pretrial

scheduling order can only be modified “if it cannot reasonably be

met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” 

Mammoth Recreations, 975 F.2d at 609. When evaluating whether a

party was diligent, the Ninth Circuit has determined that “the

focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for

modification. If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should

end.” Id. at 610; see also Gestetner, 108 F.R.D. at 141. 

Case 2:03-cv-02591-KJM-EFB Document 175 Filed 03/20/07 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

When the proposed modification is an amendment to the

pleadings, the moving party may establish good cause by showing

“(1) that [he or she] was diligent in assisting the court in

creating a workable Rule 16 order; (2) that [his or her]

noncompliance with a rule 16 deadline occurred or will occur,

notwithstanding [his or her] diligent efforts to comply, because

of the development of matters which could not have been

reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16

scheduling conference; and (3) that [he or she] was diligent in

seeking amendment of the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent

that [he or she] could not comply with the order.” Jackson v.

Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 608 (E.D. Cal. 1999)(citations

omitted). 

Only after the moving party has demonstrated diligence under

Rule 16 does the court apply the standard under Rule 15 to

determine whether the amendment was proper. See Mammoth

Recreations, 975 F.2d at 608; Eckert Cold Storage, 943 F. Supp.

at 1232 n.3. Pursuant to Rule 15(a), “leave [to amend] is to be

freely given when justice so requires.” “[L]eave to amend should

be granted unless amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing

party, is sought in bad faith, is futile, or creates undue

delay.” Martinez v. Newport Beach, 125 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir.

1997). 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs seek to add new plaintiffs, who will also be

class representatives, and related allegations. Plaintiffs

assert that the three new plaintiffs and related allegations

“more fully reflect the experiences of current women student

Case 2:03-cv-02591-KJM-EFB Document 175 Filed 03/20/07 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

athletes at UC Davis” and will “clarify certain allegations in

light of the scope of the relief sought, and the continuing

nature of the alleged violations.” (Pls.’ Mot. to Amend, filed

Feb. 2, 2007, at 1 (“Mot. to Amend”)). The proposed plaintiffs

are current UC Davis students, who are interested in varsity

opportunities in wrestling, rugby, and field hockey. (Pl.’s

Proposed 1st. Am. Complaint, filed Feb. 2, 2007, ¶¶ 13-15; 62-

69). Defendants oppose the motion on the grounds that plaintiffs

have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating good cause

under Rule 16 and that leave to amend should not be granted under

Rule 15. (Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot., filed Feb. 23, 2007

(“Opp’n”).

Defendants argue that plaintiffs fail to demonstrate the

requisite diligence under Rule 16 to add new plaintiffs who are

current UC Davis students because plaintiffs and their counsel

were on notice of facts giving rise to their current motion for

leave to amend long before their motion was filed. Plaintiffs

contend that the last remaining active student at UC Davis,

Lauren Mancuso, graduated in June 2006, during the ten-month stay

of this action, and therefore, “it is now proper to add

additional plaintiffs.” (Pls.’ Reply, filed Mar. 2, 2007, at 6). 

As an initial matter, plaintiffs and their counsel were on notice

since 2004 that Arezou Mansourian, one of the two proposed class

representatives, graduated from UC Davis in June 2004 and that

Lauren Mancuso was the only proposed class representative that

currently attended UC Davis. Mancuso testified in her deposition

on January 30, 2006, that she filed to graduate from UC Davis in

late September or early October 2005. (Dep. of Lauren Mancuso,

Case 2:03-cv-02591-KJM-EFB Document 175 Filed 03/20/07 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Ex. 10 to Decl. of Nancy Sheehan in Supp. of Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot.

to Amend (“Sheehan Decl.”), filed Feb. 23, 2007, at 48:15-21). 

Plaintiffs filed their original motion for class certification in

December 2005, after Mancuso had filed to graduate. Soon after

her deposition was taken, however, Mancuso was informed that she

needed another two classes in order to graduate, which she

enrolled in and successfully completed in order to graduate in

June 2006. (Decl. of Lauren Mancuso in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. to

Amend, filed March 2, 2007, ¶ 2). As such, plaintiffs were on

notice (1) that Mancuso had filed to graduate in 2005; and (2)

that in early 2006, she had to take two more classes, which she

enrolled in Spring 2006. Therefore, months prior to the issuance

of the stay in April 2006, plaintiffs knew that Mancuso either

had graduated or would shortly be graduating from UC Davis, and

that none of the class representatives would be current UC Davis

students. 

Plaintiffs’ prior counsel could have brought a motion to

amend the complaint to add new plaintiffs who were current UC

David students. However, she did not do so. Rather, plaintiffs

filed a motion to certify the class in December 2005 and noticed

a hearing date in April 2006. Defendants filed a lengthy

opposition to plaintiffs’ motion, arguing in part that Mansourian

and Mancuso do not have standing to be class representatives

because they had both graduated and exhausted their eligibility

to participate in varsity sports at UC Davis under N.C.A.A.

rules. Now, plaintiffs’ new counsel seeks a “second bite at the

apple,” by proposing new class plaintiffs who are current

students at UC Davis. However, the retention of new counsel does

Case 2:03-cv-02591-KJM-EFB Document 175 Filed 03/20/07 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 Rather, plaintiffs filed their motion for class

certification in December 2005. In their opposition to the

motion, defendants asserted that plaintiffs were not adequate

class representatives of a class consisting of all female

student-athletes because their interests focused on wrestling. 

9

not constitute good cause to amend the pretrial scheduling order

and add new party plaintiffs. The party’s diligence in seeking

the amendment must be demonstrated. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609

(“If [the] party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.”). 

Because plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ counsel was on notice of the

graduation status of the proposed class representatives well

before the stay of this action, plaintiffs have failed to

demonstrate diligence in bringing this motion to amend. 

In regards to plaintiffs additional allegations relating to

field hockey and rugby, defendants contend that plaintiffs knew

as early as April 2004 that women’s sport club teams, such as the

rugby and field hockey club teams, requested elevation to varsity

status. (Sheehan Decl. ¶ 3) (stating that document requests

pertaining to requests from women’s sport club teams to be

elevated to varsity status were disclosed in April 2004 in

defendants’ initial Rule 26 disclosures). At that time, two

years prior to the stay in this action, plaintiffs had notice

that the named plaintiffs in this action only alleged that they

participated or wished to participate in a varsity wrestling

program. Plaintiffs could have moved to amend the complaint to

add proposed class representatives who participated in other

sport club teams at UC Davis. However, plaintiffs failed to do

so.5 Now, almost three years later, plaintiffs’ new counsel

seeks to add new class plaintiffs and new allegations relating to

Case 2:03-cv-02591-KJM-EFB Document 175 Filed 03/20/07 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 For the reasons set forth above in the court’s

discussion of plaintiffs’ diligence in bringing a motion to

amend, plaintiffs’ delay also raises concerns regarding undue

delay. See Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1994)

(holding that the district court did not abuse in denying leave

to amend where the “new” facts and theories had been known to the

party seeking amendment since the inception of the litigation). 

10

rugby and field hockey “in light of the scope of the relief

sought.” (Pls.’ Mot. to Amend at 1). However, because

plaintiffs’ delayed in bringing a motion to amend after they

learned of the underlying facts which are the basis of this

motion, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate good cause under Rule 16.

Further, even if plaintiffs had demonstrated good cause, the

proposed amendments to the complaint would be prejudicial to

defendants.6 See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15; Martinez, 125 F.3d at

785 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[L]eave to amend should be granted unless

amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing party, is sought

in bad faith, is futile, or creates undue delay.”). Prior to the

stay, this case was vigorously litigated by the parties. 

Defendants’ counsel has submitted evidence that, based upon the

allegations in the complaint and the facts relative to the

proposed class representatives, the majority of discovery in this

case has related to the participation of women in the wrestling

program at UC Davis. (See Sheehan Decl. ¶ 6). Defendants also

present evidence that significant resources have been expended in

drafting dispositive motions based upon the allegations in the

complaint. (Sheehan Decl. ¶ 7). Plaintiffs’ amendments would

require defendants to expend these resources again, after

defendants already vigorously litigated this case for over two

Case 2:03-cv-02591-KJM-EFB Document 175 Filed 03/20/07 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

years. See Kaplan, 49 F.3d at 1370 (“Expense, delay, and wear

and tear on individuals and companies count toward prejudice.”). 

Plaintiffs contend that due to an extended discovery

deadline, defendants have “ample opportunity to conduct discovery

with respect to these new plaintiffs and to litigate any issues

arising from these amendments.” (Pls.’ Reply at 8-9). However,

this “opportunity” does not lessen the prejudice to defendants as

to the resources they have already devoted to this litigation

since its inception and up to the point, three years later, when

plaintiffs seek to amend the complaint. Plaintiffs contend that

the new plaintiffs and allegations do not change the scope of the

litigation, and thus, the prejudice is not substantial. The

court disagrees. While plaintiffs may have sought to bring

challenges on behalf of all women athletes at UC Davis, the

plaintiffs only alleged that they had experience and sought

opportunities in wrestling. The factual allegations in the

original complaint related only to the opportunities available

for women to participate in the UC Davis varsity wrestling

program and plaintiffs’ inability to receive the benefits of

being a varsity wrestler. Further, in the class action

allegations, plaintiffs alleged that “Class Plaintiffs seek to

represent the class of all present and future female students at

UC Davis who are denied equal athletic participation

opportunities and scholarships in women’s wrestling by

Defendants’ discriminatory actions.” (Compl. ¶ 108). 

Plaintiffs’ original requested relief also focused on increasing

wrestling opportunities for women athletes at UC Davis. Now

plaintiffs seek to add more claims relating to rugby and field

Case 2:03-cv-02591-KJM-EFB Document 175 Filed 03/20/07 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

hockey. Contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions, these amendments

would substantially broaden the scope of litigation in this

matter. 

Finally, the court is not unaware that the proposed

amendments to plaintiffs’ complaint specifically address

arguments raised by defendants’ in their opposition to

plaintiffs’ previously filed motion for class certification. 

While the court is sympathetic to the situation of plaintiffs’

prior counsel, these circumstances and the appointment of new

counsel does not justify giving plaintiffs a “second bite at the

apple” with the benefit of defendants’ previous filings.

Therefore, because plaintiffs have not demonstrated good

cause to modify the pretrial scheduling order to allow amendments

to the complaint, and because the proposed amendments would be

prejudicial to defendants, plaintiffs’ motion to amend the

complaint is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 20, 2007

Case 2:03-cv-02591-KJM-EFB Document 175 Filed 03/20/07 Page 12 of 12