Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00082/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00082-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEAN E. BRAZIL,

Petitioner,

v.

BEN CURRY, Warden, et al., 

 

Respondents. 

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Civil No. 07cv0082 L(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS [DOC. NO. 9]

Sean E. Brazil, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed 

a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court on January 11,

2007 [doc. no. 1]. On January 22, 2007, the Court dismissed the

Petition without prejudice due to Petitioner’s failure to name a

proper respondent. (Order Dismissing Case [doc. no. 2].) Brazil

was instructed to file a First Amended Petition by March 26, 2007.

(Id.) He filed the pending First Amended Petition [doc. no. 4] on

February 5, 2007.

Petitioner alleges nine grounds for relief: (1) He was denied

effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to

timely obtain affidavits from jurors regarding their misconduct;

(2) Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel because

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his appellate counsel failed to have an investigator interview the

jurors, as promised; (3) he was denied due process of law when he

was convicted on insufficient evidence; (4) Petitioner was denied

due process because the prosecutor improperly “vouched” for her

witness; (5) he was denied due process of law because the

prosecution utilized an “illegal” jury instruction; (6) Petitioner

was denied due process because the prosecution shifted the burden

of proof to Brazil; (7) he was denied due process of law because

the jury based their verdicts on false and extraneous information;

(8) Petitioner was denied due process because the prosecutor

withheld exculpatory evidence; and (9) he was denied due process of

the law because the trial court imposed an unduly harsh sentence. 

(Am. Pet. 6-14.) 

On May 17, 2007, Respondent Ben Curry filed a Motion to

Dismiss [doc. no. 6] and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of Motion. Respondent argues that Brazil’s First Amended

Petition is time-barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act’s (AEDPA’s) statute of limitations. (Resp’t’s Mem. P.

& A. 7.) Brazil submitted his Opposition to and Motion to Deny

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

[doc. no. 8] and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support

of his Opposition, which was filed nunc pro tunc to June 11, 2007.

This Court has reviewed the First Amended Petition and

supporting brief, Respondent’s Motion and Memorandum in Support of

the Motion, Petitioner’s Opposition to Respondent’s Motion and

Memorandum in Support of the Opposition, and the lodgments. For

the reasons expressed below, the Court recommends that Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. 

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 The California Court of Appeal did not discuss the facts

relating to Brazil’s conviction for unlawful sexual intercourse or

lewd conduct with a fourteen- or fifteen-year-old because he did

not challenge those convictions. (Lodgment No. 1, People v.

Brazil, Case No. D033218, slip op. 2 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 16,

1999).) Here, Respondent argues that Brazil’s Petition is barred

by the statute of limitations. (Resp’t’s Mem. P. & A. 7.) For

that reason, this Court refers to Respondent’s brief for the

factual history for these two convictions as general background for

the habeas Petition.

3 07-00082 L (RBB)

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 On April 17, 1998, Brazil and a friend met two girls, ages

fourteen and fifteen, at a shopping mall.1 (Resp’t’s Mem. P. & A.

4.) Petitioner bought alcohol and the four of them drove around

drinking. (Id.) The fifteen-year-old girl “felt drunk” and was

unable to walk straight. (Id.) They went to a hotel where

Petitioner had sexual intercourse with the fifteen-year-old until

she made him stop. She left the room crying; her friend left with

her. (Id.) The two girls found their youth pastor across the

street and told him what happened. (Id.) He called the police,

who came to investigate. (Id.) The officers discovered a condom

wrapper in one of the two beds in the hotel room. (Id.)

Three months later, during the afternoon of July 17, 1998,

Brazil called the mother of his children, Rebecca, who was staying

at his mother’s house with the children. (Lodgment 1, People v.

Brazil, Case No. D033218, slip op. 2.) Brazil demanded the

telephone number of a man she was seeing. (Id.) Rebecca refused. 

(Id.) Petitioner called again at midnight demanding the same

number and asserting that he would bring a gun to the house and

force the number out of her. (Id.) At approximately 1:50 a.m.,

Rebecca awoke to Brazil pointing a gun at her, again demanding the

telephone number. (Id.) When she refused to give him the number

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he stated, “‘[G]ive me the phone number or I’ll blow you and your

kids away.’” (Id.) Brazil’s mother told him to leave; he

struggled with his mother over the gun; and he left after Rebecca

gave him a telephone number. (Id. at 2-3.)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 14, 1998, the San Diego County District Attorney

filed a five-count information charging Petitioner with assault

with a firearm, see Cal. Penal Code § 244(a)(2), residential

burglary, see Cal. Penal Code § 459, making a terrorist threat, see

Cal. Penal Code § 422, unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor

under the age of sixteen, see Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(d), and

committing a lewd act on a child fourteen or fifteen years of age,

see Cal. Penal Code § 288(c)(1). (Resp’t’s Mem. P. & A. 1-2.) The

information also alleged that Brazil had previously been convicted

of a serious felony, see Cal. Penal Code § 661(a)(1), and that he

had been previously convicted of a “strike” offense, see Cal. Penal

Code §§ 667(b)-(i). Finally, the information alleged that Brazil

personally used a firearm in the commission of counts one through

three, see Cal. Penal Code §§ 1192(c)(8), 12022(a)(1). (Resp’t’s

Mem. P. & A. 1-2.) 

On January 25, 1999, a jury convicted Petitioner of all counts

charged, finding that both the firearm allegation and the prior

“strike” allegation were true. (Id. at 2.) On March 24, 1999,

Brazil was sentenced to sixteen years in state prison. (Id.) 

Petitioner received four years for the residential burglary, which

was doubled based on the prior “strike” conviction. Additionally,

he received two years for the sex offense, a five-year enhancement

for the serious felony prior, and one additional year for the

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personal use of a firearm. (Lodgment 1, People v. Brazil, Case No.

SCD138587, slip op. 3.) 

Petitioner appealed the conviction, asserting that the trial

court erred in admitting evidence regarding the amount of financial

support Petitioner provided for his children. (Id. at 3.) His

conviction was affirmed by the court of appeal on December 16,

1999. (Id. at 4.) Brazil filed a petition for rehearing of the

decision which was denied on January 7, 2000. (Pet’r’s Opp’n Mem.

P. & A. Ex. A.) He did not file a petition for review with the

California Supreme Court. (Resp’t’s Mem. P. & A. 6.) 

 Brazil, acting pro se, filed his first habeas corpus petition

on December 21, 2000, with the San Diego Superior Court. 

(Lodgment 2 Attach., In re Brazil, No. HC16533, Pet. 3-14 (Cal.

Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2001).) His petition was denied on January 18,

2001. (Lodgment 2, In re Brazil, No. HC16533, Order 4 (Cal. Super.

Ct. Jan 18, 2001).) On September 20, 2001, he filed a habeas

corpus petition with the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment 3

Attach., In re Brazil, No. D038775, Pet. 3-10 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov.

28, 2001).) The court denied the petition on November 28, 2001.

(Lodgment 3, In re Brazil, No. D038775, slip op. 2 (Cal. Ct. App.

Nov. 28, 2001).) Almost a year later, on November 18, 2002, Brazil

filed a second habeas corpus petition in the superior court

alleging miscalculation of his post-sentence credits, an issue not

raised in his previous petitions. (Lodgment 4, In re Brazil, No.

HC16533 Order Denying Second Pet. 1-3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 5,

2002).) The petition was denied December 5, 2002. (Id.) Brazil

then filed a habeas corpus petition with the California Supreme

Court on June 30, 2005. (Lodgment 5 Attach., In re Brazil, No.

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S134859, Pet. 1 (Cal. May 24, 2006).) The petition was summarily

denied on May 24, 2006. (Lodgment 5, In re Brazil, No. S134859,

Order 1 (Cal. May 24, 2006).) 

On January 11, 2007, Brazil filed his first federal Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court [doc. no. 1]. The Court

dismissed the Petition without prejudice for Petitioner’s failure

to name a proper respondent. (Order Dismissing Case 1.) 

Petitioner timely filed the pending First Amended Petition [doc.

no. 4] on February 5, 2007. In his Amended Petition, Petitioner

properly names a respondent and alleges nine grounds for relief. 

(Pet. 1, 6-14.)

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 17, 2007, claiming

that the Petition is time-barred under AEDPA’s statute of

limitations. (Resp’t’s Mem. P. & A. 7.) 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Brazil filed his Petition after April 24, 1996, it is

subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA) of 1996. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006). AEDPA sets forth

the scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see also Hernandez v. Ylst, 930

F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1991).

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained “in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

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U.S.C. § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege that the state court

violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930 F.2d at

719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990); Mannhalt

v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1988).

In 1996, Congress "worked substantial changes to the law of 

habeas corpus." Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim --

(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006).

IV. DISCUSSION

The statute of limitations for habeas corpus petitions is set

forth in AEDPA. As amended by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –-

(A) the date on which the judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing

an application created by State action in violation

of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action; 

(C) the date one which the constitutional

right asserted was initially recognized by the

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Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of

the claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1) (West Supp. 2007). Petitioner has not

asserted that subsections (B)-(D) of § 2244(d)(1) apply to his

case, so § 2244(d)(1)(A) provides the applicable date on which the

limitations period began to run. 

The California Court of Appeal affirmed Brazil’s conviction on

December 16, 1999. (Lodgment 1, People v. Brazil, No. SCD138581,

slip op. 3.) The appellate court denied Petitioner’s petition for

rehearing on January 7, 2000. (Pet’r’s Opp’n Mem. P. & A. Ex. A.) 

Brazil did not file a petition for review with the California

Supreme Court. For purposes of AEDPA, the time for direct review

includes the period during which the petitioner could have sought

direct review from the California Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A); Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 813 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Petitioner’s judgment therefore became final forty days after

the California Court of Appeal denied his petition for rehearing.

See People v. Jackson, 67 Cal. 2d 96, 98, 429 P.2d 600, 602, 60

Cal. Rptr. 248, 250 (1967) (stating the petitioner’s “availability

of appeal” was exhausted when his petition for rehearing was

denied); Duncan, 297 F.3d at 813; see also Cal. R. Ct. 8.264

(formerly Rule 24); Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(e) (formerly Rule 28).) The

statute of limitations for Petitioner’s federal habeas corpus claim

began to run on February 17, 2000, and, absent statutory or

equitable tolling, would have expired on February 16, 2001. See

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Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 6(a)) (“In computing any amount of time

prescribed or allowed . . . by any applicable statute, the day of

the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time

runs shall not be included.”). 

Petitioner filed his federal Petition on January 11, 2007,

nearly seven years after his conviction became final. Brazil’s

Amended Petition, filed on February 5, 2007, relates back to the

filing of his original Petition, because the amended pleading

asserts the same grounds for relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c); 28

U.S.C.A. § 2242 (West 2006). Nevertheless, unless Petitioner is

entitled to sufficient statutory or equitable tolling, this action

is barred by AEDPA’s statute of limitations.

1. Statutory Tolling

Under AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during

periods when a petitioner has a properly filed application for

collateral review pending in state court. Specifically, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2) states: 

The time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation

under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (West Supp. 2007).

Additionally, the interval between the disposition of one

state petition and the filing of another may be tolled under

“interval tolling.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). 

For purposes of interval tolling, an application for state

collateral review is pending “as long as the ordinary state

collateral review process is ‘in continuance’. . . . In other

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words, until the application has achieved final resolution through

the State’s post-conviction procedures, by definition it remains

‘pending.’” Carey, 536 U.S. at 219-20. 

Respondent concedes that interval tolling applies to several

of the time delays in this case because Petitioner was properly

pursuing his state remedies. (Resp’t’s Mem. P. & A. 6-7); see also

Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). Respondent

asserts, however, that interval tolling should not apply to delays

between lower court decisions and the filing of new petitions in a

higher court that were “unreasonable” under California law.

(Resp’t’s Mem. P. & A. 6-7); see also Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S.

189, 198 (2006) (stating that “the federal court must decide

whether the filing of the request for appellate review in state

collateral review proceedings was made within what California would

consider a ‘reasonable time[]’”). 

The statute of limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas

corpus claim began running on February 17, 2000. Brazil filed his

first petition in the San Diego Superior Court on December 21,

2000, after 309 days of the statute of limitations had run. This

309 day period is not tolled. See Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006 (stating

that AEDPA’s limitations period is not tolled before the first

state collateral challenge is filed). Statutory tolling began on

December 21, 2000, because Brazil’s state habeas corpus petition

was a “properly filed application for . . . state collateral

review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). It is uncontested that under

“interval tolling” the statute of limitations was tolled through

November 28, 2001, when the California Court of Appeal denied

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Brazil’s habeas petition. (Resp’t’s Mem. P. & A. 6); see also

Carey, 536 U.S. at 219-21. 

Petitioner subsequently wrote a letter to his sentencing judge

and explained that he believed his sentencing credits were

miscalculated. (Lodgment 4 Attach., In re Brazil, No. HC16533,

Pet. 2.) The court construed this letter to be a second habeas

corpus petition, and it was filed on November 18, 2002. (Lodgment

4, In re Brazil, No. HC16533 Order Denying Second Pet. 2.) The

letter contested the calculation of Brazil’s post-sentence credits. 

(Id.) This allegation was not contained in any prior or subsequent

petitions. Respondent asserts that the 355 days between the filing

of the court of appeal decision on November 28, 2001, and the

filing of Brazil’s second superior court petition on November 18,

2002, constitutes an unreasonable delay and, therefore, this time

is not subject to statutory tolling. (Resp’t’s Mem. P. & A. 6-7

(citing Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1167 (9th Cir. 2006)).) 

The warden also argues that the delay of two years, six months and

fifteen days between the denial of the second petition on December

5, 2002, and the filing of a petition with the California Supreme

Court on June 20, 2005, is another unreasonable delay that does not

toll the statute of limitations. (Id. at 7.)

Brazil’s second superior court petition alleged a claim

unrelated to the claims asserted in his other state petitions or

his federal habeas petition. (See Lodgment 4, In re Brazil, No.

HC16533, Order Denying Second Pet. 2.) Therefore, the statute of

limitations is not tolled for the time period this second petition

was pending. See Gaston, 447 F.3d at 1166 (disregarding Gaston’s

third habeas corpus petition for purposes of statutory tolling

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because it asserted claims unrelated to those pending in his

federal petition); Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (9th Cir.

2003) (stating that a state habeas petition asserting different

claims from a previous petition begins a new “round” of collateral

review for tolling purposes). 

The delay between the California Court of Appeal’s denial on

November 28, 2001, and the filing of Brazil’s habeas corpus

petition with the Supreme Court of California on June 30, 2005, was

four years, five months and two days. (See Lodgment 3, In re

Brazil, No. D038775, slip op. 1; Lodgment 5 Attach., In re Brazil,

No. S134859, Pet. 1.) In order for a petition to be “properly

filed” for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations, the

petition must have been timely filed. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 410 (2005). A petition is timely filed under California

law if it is filed within a “reasonable time.” See Evans, 546 U.S.

at 192 (quoting In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th 813, 828 n.7, 855 P.2d

391, 398 n.7, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 373, 380 n.7 (1993)). When the

California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus,

it did not indicate whether the petition had been timely filed. 

(Lodgment 5, In re Brazil, No. S134859, Order 1.) Accordingly,

this Court must determine whether that state supreme court would

have found Brazil’s petition timely filed.

The Supreme Court of the State of California would not

conclude that a delay of nearly four and a half years was

reasonable and would not find Brazil’s petition timely. See Carey,

536 U.S. at 219 (stating that the reasonableness determination

should be considered in light of the fact that most states allow

approximately thirty to sixty days “for filing an appeal to the

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state supreme court”); Evans, 546 U.S. at 201 (holding that an

unexplained delay of six months was unreasonable); Gaston, 447 F.3d

at 1167 (holding unexplained delays of fifteen, eighteen, and ten

months unreasonable); Culver v. Dir. of Corr., 450 F. Supp. 2d

1135, 1140-41 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (finding delays of ninety-seven and

seventy-one days unreasonable); see also Forrister v. Woodford, No.

1:05-CV-00170, 2007 WL 809991, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2007)

(finding delay of eighty-eight days unreasonable); Jackson v.

Ollison, No. 06CV1123, 2007 WL 433188 at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 23,

2007) (holding an eight month delay unreasonable). 

Assuming that Brazil’s state petition was “pending” and

therefore tolled for over four years from November 28, 2001,

through May 24, 2006, his federal Petition was still filed after

the one-year statute of limitations had lalpsed. By the time

Petitioner filed his first state habeas corpus petition, 309 days

of AEDPA’s one-year period had already run. (See Pet’r’s Mem. P. &

A. Ex. A.; Lodgment 2, In re Brazil, No. HC16533, Order 2.) 

Additionally, 232 days passed after Brazil’s California Supreme

Court habeas corpus petition was denied on May 24, 2006, and before

he filed his first federal habeas corpus Petition in this Court on

January 11, 2007. (Pet. 1.) These two delays total 541 days,

which is 175 days beyond the one-year limitation established by

AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Hence, unless Brazil is entitled to

equitable tolling for 175 days, his federal habeas corpus petition

must be denied as untimely. 

2. Equitable Tolling

Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is appropriate

when “‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make

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it impossible’” for the petitioner to file a timely petition. 

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Brambles v. Duncan, 330 F.3d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003)); Stillman

v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003); Miles v. Prunty,

187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). “[A]

litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing

two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.” 

Pace, 544 U.S. at 418 (citations omitted). “[T]he threshold

necessary to trigger equitable tolling (under AEDPA) is very high,

lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d

1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). Further, Petitioner carries the burden

of proving that the statute of limitations should be equitably

tolled. Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

Brazil asserts two reasons to justify his untimeliness and

argues they warrant equitable tolling. First, the San Diego

Superior Court failed to provide him with requested transcripts

and, second, he relied on the California Supreme Court Clerk’s

December 31, 2001, letter stating, “There is no time limit . . . in

which you may file an original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

with the Supreme Court.” (Pet’r’s Opp’n Mem. P. & A. 5, Ex. C.)

a. Inability to Obtain Court Transcripts

Without any specificity, Petitioner asserts that he was

“begging” the superior court to provide him with transcripts of a

pretrial hearing “for years.” (Id. at 5.) According to Brazil,

his inability to obtain these documents justifies his delay. (Id.) 

In order for the missing documents to equitably toll the statute of

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2 Additionally, Brazil submitted two letters received from his

appellate counsel, Michael Earl, discussing trial transcripts. 

(Am. Pet. Exs. E, F.) The first letter, dated June 16, 1999,

stated, “the transcript of your trial is being copied and will be

sent to my office shortly.” (Am. Pet. Ex. E.) The second letter,

dated November 9, 2000, reiterated that the trial transcripts were

at Earl’s office and could be picked up by anyone Brazil

designated. (Am. Pet. Ex. F.) 

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limitations, Brazil must show that his inability to obtain the

documents constituted an extraordinary circumstance beyond his

control that prevented him from timely filing his Petition and that

he made diligent efforts to obtain the documents. See Pace, 544

U.S. at 418; Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006)

(citations omitted) (stating the “extraordinary circumstances” must

be beyond the petitioner’s control). 

According to Petitioner, he has been told since 1999 that his

file is on an “outboard” and therefore he has been unable to

receive the transcripts. (Pet’r’s Opp’n Mem. P. & A. 5.) Brazil

asserts that he has requested the documents but has not received

them. (Id.) It appears that his inability to obtain the documents

was beyond his control. But there is no basis for concluding that

the pretrial hearing referred to by Brazil is even relevant to the

claims raised here. Petitioner’s claims all relate to events

occurring during trial or later. (Pet. 6-14.) Brazil has not

shown that a transcript of a pretrial hearing has any bearing on

the nine claims he raises in his Petition. Trial transcripts,

which may be relevant to Brazil’s claims, were always available to

him.2

 

Brazil has not sufficiently demonstrated that it was

impossible to file his federal Petition without the pretrial

transcripts, that they are relevant, or that he acted with

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diligence in attempting to obtain them. The habeas petition was

filed although Brazil had not yet secured these documents. (See

Pet’r’s Opp’n Mem. P. & A. 5.) Brazil also filed habeas corpus

petitions in the San Diego Superior Court, the California Court of

Appeal, and the California Supreme Court, all without the

transcripts. (See Lodgment 2, In re Brazil Case No. HC16533 Order;

Lodgment 3, In re Brazil No. D038775, slip op.; Lodgment 5, In re

Brazil No. S134859, Order)

In United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir.

2004), the Ninth Circuit noted that it would be difficult for a

petitioner to assert it was impossible to file a habeas petition

without trial transcripts when the petition was filed without them. 

Battles alleged that his attorney was “improperly withholding”

trial transcripts and “refusing to cooperate.” Id. at 1196. 

Relying on Ford v. Hubbard, 330 F.3d 1086, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2003),

overruled on other grounds by Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004),

the appellate court remanded the case for the district court to

further develop the evidentiary record regarding whether the

petitioner’s attorney’s “behavior was sufficient to cause delays in

the filing of the petition and, thus, entitled Battles to equitable

tolling, if, indeed, that kind of behavior ever can . . . .”

Battles, 362 F.3d at 1197-98. 

As explained by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals: 

[W]e understand petitioner’s desire to have a

transcript before filing for post-conviction

relief. Possession of a transcript, however, is

not a condition precedent to the filing of such

proceedings. A petition seeking collateral

relief could have been filed, following which, if

necessary for decisions of the issue raised, the

court could have ordered production of the

transcript.

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Gassler v. Bruton, 255 F.3d 492, 495 (8th Cir. 2001); See also Joe

v. Mitchell, No. CV F 06-00739, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35408 at *15-

16 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2007) (quoting Gassler). Brazil does not

have a constitutional right to transcripts for purposes of

preparing his habeas corpus petition; transcripts need only be

provided once a court finds they are necessary to determine the

issue. United States v. Van Poyck, 980 F. Supp 1108, 1111 n.2

(C.D. Cal. 1997) (citing United States v. Lewis, 605 F.2d 379 (8th

Cir. 1979)). Petitioner has failed to establish that the lack of

pretrial transcripts was the cause of his untimeliness. See Allen

v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001); Valverde v. Stinson,

224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000).

Presumably, Brazil was present at the hearing for which the

transcripts were requested, and he is fully capable of presenting

his recollection of the events on that date. See Battles, 362 F.3d

at 1198 (stating that due diligence requires petitioner to “consult

his own memory of the trial proceedings”). Indeed, the Amended

Petition contains a detailed statement of his claims. (Am. Pet. 6-

14.)

Petitioner also has not presented the Court with evidence that

he acted diligently to obtain these documents. Brazil’s assertion

that he had been “begging” for the transcripts “for years” is

insufficient to establish diligence. (Pet’r’s Opp’n Mem. P. & A.

5.) Petitioner has not presented any evidence of steps he took to

obtain the transcripts. He did submit a record of his “outgoing

confidential and legal mail” between August 21, 2002, and June 7,

2004. (Am. Pet. Ex. C.) Without further information, however, the

Court cannot determine what mailings show diligence in further

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pursuit of this claim. Because it is Petitioner’s burden to

present sufficient evidence, the inability to obtain pretrial

transcripts is not a basis for equitable tolling.

b. Statement of California Supreme Court Clerk

Brazil’s second argument for equitable tolling is that a

letter he received from the Clerk of the California Supreme Court

led him to believe he could continue to attempt to obtain the

pretrial transcripts without concern for a habeas filing deadline. 

(Pet’r’s Opp’n Mem. P. & A. 5.) The letter states, “There is no

time limit, however, in which you may file an original Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court.” (Pet’r’s Opp’n Mem.

P. & A. Ex. C.) It appears that Brazil was unaware of the separate

statute of limitations in AEDPA for federal habeas petitions. But,

“a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by

itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable

tolling.” Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.

2006). 

Nevertheless, Brazil contends he is entitled to equitable

tolling because he was misled by the state court with regard to any

applicable time limit. For this statement to constitute an

extraordinary circumstance that supports equitable tolling, it must

have been “actively” or “affirmatively” misleading. Brambles v.

Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066, 1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002). In Brambles,

the court held that the petitioner was not affirmatively misled

when the district judge told him that he could either dismiss

unexhausted claims or dismiss his entire petition without prejudice

and file a new petition after exhausting his state court remedies. 

Id. at 1067. The court also warned Brambles that 28 U.S.C. § 2244,

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“limited the time within which a petition may be filed[,]” but at

the time of the court’s order, the federal statute of limitations

had already run. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the

court’s instructions “were not affirmatively misleading. They

presented accurate options available to Brambles.” Id. at 1070. 

Although the district judge had failed to advise the petitioner of

the likely consequences of dismissing his petition, he had not been

affirmatively misled. Id.

In Brazil’s case, the statement of the Deputy Clerk of the

California Supreme Court cannot be considered affirmatively

misleading; it was an accurate response to Petitioner’s concerns

about filing a timely petition with the California Supreme Court. 

See Cal. Const. Art. 6 § 10 (giving the California Supreme Court

original jurisdiction over a habeas corpus claim); Cal. Penal Code

§ 1502 (West 2007) (stating that a writ of habeas corpus may be

issued and served at any time); Carey, 536 U.S. at 221-23

(discussing California’s “indeterminate” timeliness rule which is

based on “reasonableness” rather than precise time limits). 

Because the letter from the deputy clerk contained an accurate

statement of California law, it cannot be considered affirmatively

misleading. Likewise, it does not entitle Brazil to equitable

tolling.

3. Waiver of Untimeliness

Brazil further asserts that the state has waived its right to

move to dismiss his Amended Petition as untimely. (Pet’r’s Opp’n

Mem. P. & A. 6.) For this assertion Petitioner cites a district

court case from the northern district of Illinois holding that the

state must raise a § 2244(d) claim or it is considered to have

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waived it. United States ex rel. Galvan v. Gilmore, 977 F. Supp.

1019, 1026 (N.D. Ill. 1998). This argument, however, is unavailing

because Respondent promptly filed its motion to dismiss alleging

untimeliness on May 17, 2007, (see Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss 1),

twelve days prior to the deadline for filing a motion to dismiss. 

(Order Reopening Case and Setting Briefing Schedule 2.) It appears

Petitioner believes that the government should have made this

assertion in the state courts. (Pet’r’s Opp’n Mem. P. & A. 6.) 

Since § 2244(d) is a federal statute that only applies to federal

petitions, an argument based on AEDPA could not have been raised at

an earlier time with regards to a state court petition. Respondent

has not waived its untimeliness argument. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Respondent’s Motion to 

Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be GRANTED. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before December 28, 2007. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before January 15, 2008. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

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K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\HABEAS\BRAZIL0082\R&R.wpd 21 07-00082 L (RBB)

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: November 29, 2007 _____________________________ 

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Lorenz

All parties of record

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