Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00052/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00052-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 08:1158 Immigration &amp; Nationality Act, Section 208 (Asylum)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ISSAM LAJIN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DAVID M. RADEL, et al., 

Defendants. 

 Case No.: 19cv52-MMA (BLM) 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

[Doc. No. 3] 

 Defendants David M. Radel, Kevin K. McAleenan, and William P. Barr1

(collectively, “Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiff Issam Lajin’s (“Plaintiff”) 

Complaint for mandamus relief filed under the U.S. Citizen and Immigration Service 

statute pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Doc. No. 3-1 

(“Mtn.”). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition [Doc. No. 5 (“Oppo.”)], to which 

Defendants replied [Doc. No. 7 (“Reply”)]. The Court found the matter suitable for 

determination on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 

7.1.d.1. Doc. No. 6. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss. 

                                               

1

 Kevin K. McAleenan is substituted for Kirstjen Nielson and William P. Barr is substituted for Matthew 

G. Whitaker, who were named in the Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 

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BACKGROUND2

 Plaintiff Issam Lajin came to the United States from Syria as an F-1 student on 

June 11, 2013. Compl. ¶ 5. On December 24, 2015, Plaintiff filed an application for 

asylum and withholding of removal, asserting a fear of returning to Syria due to his 

religious sect and religious beliefs, political opinion, and membership in a particular 

social group as a medical doctor. Compl. ¶ 6. Since then, Plaintiff has not received an 

asylum interview and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) has not 

adjudicated his application. Compl. ¶ 12. 

 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants for violations of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and the Administrative Procedure Act 

(“APA”), and asserts that he is entitled to relief under the Mandamus Act. Compl. ¶ 18. 

Plaintiff also contends the USCIS policy that prioritizes interviewing applicants with 

newer filings and working back towards older filings is arbitrary, capricious and 

inherently unfair, and violates Plaintiff’s due process rights. Compl. ¶¶ 10-16. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(1) 

 Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a party may seek dismissal of an action for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction “either on the face of the pleadings or by presenting extrinsic 

evidence.” Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003); 

see also White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). A jurisdictional attack

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may be facial or factual. White, 227 F.3d at 1242. “In a facial 

attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in the complaint are 

insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack, 

the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves would otherwise 

                                               

2

 Because this matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the 

allegations set forth in the complaint. See Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 

(1976). 

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invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 2004). “If the challenge to jurisdiction is a facial attack . . . the plaintiff is entitled to 

the safeguards similar to those applicable when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is made.” San 

Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 905 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 

1167 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (internal citation and quotation omitted). 

B. Rule 12(b)(6) 

 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro 

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A pleading must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). However, plaintiffs must also plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(6). The plausibility standard thus demands more than a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual 

enhancement. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Instead, the complaint “must 

contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the 

opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 

2011). 

 In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assume the truth 

of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The court need not take legal conclusions as true merely because they are cast in the form 

of factual allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Similarly, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to 

defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 

 Where dismissal is appropriate, a court should grant leave to amend unless the 

plaintiff could not possibly cure the defects in the pleading. Knappenberger v. City of 

Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2009). 

// 

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DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint on five grounds: (1) the Court 

lacks subject matter jurisdiction; (2) Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the APA; (3) 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Mandamus Act; (4) Plaintiff fails to state a due 

process claim; and (5) Plaintiff presents a non-justiciable political question. See

generally, Mtn. The Court declines to analyze the political question argument in light of 

its rulings on the first four arguments. 

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

 Defendants contend this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the INA 

“creates no substantive or procedural right upon which Plaintiff can base his action.” 

Mtn. at 17. The INA contains two provisions establishing timing guidelines for the 

adjudication of asylum applications. First, “in the absence of exceptional circumstances, 

the initial interview or hearing on the asylum application shall commence not later than 

45 days after the date an application is filed[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii). Second, 

“in the absence of exceptional circumstances, final administrative adjudication of the 

asylum application, not including administrative appeal, shall be completed within 180 

days after the date an application is filed.” Id. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii). 

 Here, it appears that Plaintiff’s primary theory of relief is based on Defendants’ 

violation of § 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii) by not conducting an initial interview in the 

approximately three and a half years his application has been pending. However, the 

INA provides that “[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to create any 

substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party against 

the United States or its agencies or officers or any other person. Id. § 1158(d)(7). 

Plaintiff avers that this “merely points out that, given that asylum is discretionary in 

nature, no applicant can compel the granting of the benefit.” Oppo. at 15. Courts in the 

Ninth Circuit that have addressed § 1158(d)(7) have declined to conclude that a private 

right of action exists. Ms. L. v. United States Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 302 

F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (“Absent any authority that a private right of 

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action exists [under § 1158(d)(7)], the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss this 

claim.”); Liuqing Zhu v. Cissna, No. CV 18-9698 PA (JPRx), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

68043, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2019) (collecting cases in the Central District of 

California that have held that asylum applicants lack a private right of action to enforce 

the timing requirements of § 1158(d)(5)(A)); Ou v. Johnson, No. 15-cv-03936-BLF, 2016 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191685, at * 3-5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (“Under § 1158, there is no 

private right of action.”). Courts outside the Ninth Circuit have likewise concluded that 

no private right of action exists under § 1158(d)(7). Ivantchouk v. United States Attorney 

General, 417 F. App’x 918, 921-22 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Nothing in § 1158(d) creates a 

private right of action against the government.”); L.M. v. Johnson, 150 F. Supp. 3d 202, 

209-10 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting that § 1158(d)(7) “does make clear that Plaintiffs do not 

have a private right of action under the INA itself”). 

Accordingly, § 1158(d)(7) “states that the asylum-related timeframes contained 

within the INA are not legally enforceable rights. In other words, while Section 

1158(d)(7) does not strip this court of subject matter jurisdiction or preclude judicial 

review, it does make clear that Plaintiff[] do[es] not have a private right of action under 

the INA itself.” L.M., 150 F. Supp. 3d at 210. Thus, Plaintiff may raise his claim in this 

court, “but the INA provides [him] no relief[.]” Id.

B. Failure to State A Claim

 Even without the statutory bar to private rights of action to enforce the timing 

guidelines of § 1158(d)(5)(A), Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the APA, the 

Mandamus Act, and the due process clause.3

// 

                                               

3

 Defendants submit a declaration from the Chief of the Asylum Division within the USCIS, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, to support their motion. Doc. No. 3-2. The Court does not rely on 

the declaration because “[i]n ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may generally consider only 

allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to 

judicial notice.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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1. Administrative Procedures Act 

 The APA requires an administrative agency to adjudicate “a matter presented to it” 

within a “reasonable time.” 5 U.S.C. § 555(b). Where an agency fails to do so, a 

“reviewing court shall compel agency action unlawfully or unreasonably delayed.” 

5 U.S.C. § 706(1). “A court can compel agency action under [5 U.S.C. § 706(1)] only if 

there is ‘a specific, unequivocal command’ placed on the agency to take a ‘discrete 

agency action,’ and the agency has failed to take that action.” Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. 

Cent. Intelligence Agency, 811 F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Norton v. S. 

Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63-64 (2004)). 

Assuming without deciding that the 45-day rule is a specific, unequivocal 

command, the Court finds that Defendants have not unreasonably delayed in complying 

with the command. Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply the following six factors set forth in 

Telecomms. Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (the “TRAC

factors”) to determine whether an agency’s delay is unreasonable: (1) the time agencies 

take to make decisions must be governed by a rule or reason; (2) where Congress has 

provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to 

proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of 

reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less 

tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the 

effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; 

(5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests 

prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind 

agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed. TRAC, 750 

F.2d at 80; see also Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In considering the first and second factors, the Court looks to USCIS’s policy 

regarding asylum interview scheduling. According to the Complaint, since January 2018, 

the priority for reviewing asylum applications is based on a last in, first out basis. 

Compl. ¶ 10. In other words, the most recently filed applications are adjudicated before 

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earlier filed applications. Id. While Congress has specified that the initial interview 

should commence within 45 days, and a final adjudication shall be completed within 180 

days, the plain language of § 1158(d)(5)(A) clarifies that the timing requirements are not 

mandatory. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A). Moreover, the last in, first out policy sets forth a 

“rule of reason” for the adjudication of asylum applications. Thus, the first and second 

factors favor Defendants even though Plaintiff’s application has been pending for roughly 

three and a half years. 

The third and fifth factors also favor Defendants. Here, the Complaint is 

completely devoid of any facts establishing a risk to human health and welfare or 

prejudice to Plaintiff. Plaintiff only makes the bare allegation that he “has been greatly 

damaged by the failure of . . . each Defendant to act in accord with his or her respective 

duties under the law.” Compl. ¶ 17. In opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff 

contends he will be subjected to “further anxiety, worry, [and] psychological depression” 

while waiting for his application to be adjudicated. Oppo. at 16. He further contends 

waiting will “outlast[] his bona fide, compelling reasons for seeking asylum in the first 

place (the repressive, corrupt dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad will soon enter its 19th year 

in Syria).” Id. This may render his application “‘stale’ and ‘remote.’” Id. at 19. 

Defendants counter that “[t]here is no statutory or regulatory provision that calls for the 

denial of a pending application based on the passage of time” and that “[a]t the time of 

adjudication, an asylum officer does not consider whether country conditions have 

changed such that the applicant no longer has a basis to fear the persecution.” Reply at 5 

(citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)). Plaintiff also explains that even though he is a 

medical doctor, he has been unable to obtain admittance to a hospital residency program 

in the United States because “he does not possess permanent . . . status in the United 

States.” Oppo. at 16. Instead, Plaintiff works as a “clinical documentation education 

specialist under the supervision of a registered nurse at a local medical center.” Id. Thus, 

he contends he cannot “secure tenured employment as a medical doctor, . . . secure credit 

and loans for further education, home purchase, automobile purchase, etc.” Id. at 19. 

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The Court notes that Plaintiff is permitted to live in the United States without fear of 

being removed to his home country before the final adjudication of his asylum 

application and can apply for employment authorization during the pendency of the 

application. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a); MTD at 11-12. Plaintiff 

contends this is irrelevant, but the Court finds that Plaintiff is able to live his life during 

the delay without the additional concern of removal or inability to work. See Oppo. at 

20. Although Plaintiff may not be able to work in his desired profession or make certain 

purchases, the risk to human health and welfare and potential prejudice to Plaintiff 

resulting from delay in the processing of his asylum application favors denying relief. 

Under the fourth factor, the D.C. Circuit has stated that a judicial order compelling 

agency action is improper where “‘putting [an individual] at the head of the queue 

[would] simply move[] all others back one space and produce[] no net gain.’” Mashpee 

Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 

(quoting In re Barr Laboratories, Inc., 930 F.3d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). Here, Plaintiff 

seeks to expedite the review of his asylum application. See generally, Compl. Plaintiff 

has not alleged the relief requested could result in a “net gain” among USCIS’s other 

activities of competing priorities. See id.; see also Oppo. at 20 (conceding that this factor 

“may slightly favor Defendants”). Were the Court to grant the relief Plaintiff requests, it 

would merely prioritize his application over those of others who have not, or could not, 

file their own petitions for mandamus relief. See MTD at 21 (arguing judicial 

intervention would “increase the likelihood that only applicants with the means to hire 

counsel will obtain preferential treatment in the adjudication process.”). As indicated by 

the last in, first out policy, the delay which Plaintiff has experienced in the processing of 

his application is common among all similarly situated applicants. See Compl. ¶¶ 10-11. 

Thus, this factor weighs against granting relief, and in favor of dismissing the Complaint. 

Finally, the Court considers whether there is any impropriety in the delay of 

Plaintiff’s application. Plaintiff avers that this factor weighs in his favor because 

“Defendants cannot realistically project when or if the Agency will adjudicate the asylum 

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application.” Oppo. at 20. However, Plaintiff concedes that there is a substantial backlog 

of affirmative asylum applications that is stretching the agency’s resources. Id. at 7-9; 

see also Compl. ¶ 14 (“[T]he nationwide backlog has grown . . . .”). In response, USCIS 

has purportedly increased hiring to adjudicate these applications. Oppo. at 10. Thus, it 

does not appear that there is any impropriety in the delay of Plaintiff’s application. 

Weighing the TRAC factors, the agency’s delay is not unreasonable. See TRAC, 750 F.2d 

at 79-80 (noting that the Court weighs six factors to determine whether an agency’s delay 

is unreasonable). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a 

claim under the APA. 

 2. Mandamus Act 

 The Mandamus Act provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original 

jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of 

the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1361. “For mandamus relief, three elements must be satisfied: ‘(1) the 

plaintiff’s claim is clear and certain; (2) the [defendant official’s] duty is ministerial and 

so plainly prescribed to be free from doubt; and (3) no other adequate remedy is 

available.’” Johnson v. Reilly, 349 F.3d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting R.T. 

Vanderbilt Co. v. Babbitt, 113 F.3d 1061, 1065 n.5 (9th Cir. 1997)). Mandamus is an 

extraordinary remedy which is within a district court’s discretion to deny even if the test 

is met. Id.

 Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to satisfy the first prong of the test. As 

discussed above, the INA precludes the possibility of a private right of action based on 

the timing requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A) and in interpreting other provisions 

of the INA with similar bars against private rights of action, the Ninth Circuit has held 

that mandamus relief is unavailable. See Campos v. INS, 62 F.3d 311, 313-14 (9th Cir. 

1995); see also Liuqing Zhu, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68043, at *12; Pesantez v. Johnson, 

No. 15 Civ. 1155 (BMC), 2015 WL 5475655, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015) (“It is 

beyond serious dispute that mandamus . . . is unavailable to compel compliance with a 

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statutory obligation when the underlying statute expressly disclaims a private right of 

action.”). As such, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Mandamus Act. 

3. Due Process 

 Plaintiff alleges that USCIS’s last in, first out policy denies asylum seekers due 

process. The Constitution protects everyone within the territory of the United states, 

regardless of citizenship. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); see also Ms. L, 

302 F. Supp. 3d at 1161. They must be afforded “the opportunity to be heard ‘at a 

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 

(1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Additionally, a 

cognizable liberty or property interest must exist in the first instance for a procedural due 

process claim to lie. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-71 

(1972). 

 The Sixth Circuit has squarely rejected a due process challenge to a delay in 

adjudicating an asylum proceeding. Vang v. Gonzales, 237 F. App’x 24 (6th Cir. 2007). 

In Vang, the court considered the argument that the government’s 14-year delay in 

completing the plaintiffs’ asylum proceedings deprived them of due process. Id. at 31. 

The Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on the 45-day timeframe set out in 

§ 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii), noting that the plain language of § 1158(d)(7) clarifies that 

“‘[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to create any substant[ive] or procedural 

right or benefit . . . .’” Id. at 31. The Eastern District of New York has likewise 

considered lengthy delays and due process questions in adjudicating an asylum 

proceeding. L.M., 150 F. Supp. 3d at 216-17. There, the court concluded that the 

plaintiffs failed to adequately allege a due process violation because § 1158(d)(7) 

“explicitly disclaims the creation of any enforceable ‘substantive or procedural right or 

benefit’” and courts considering delays in the immigration context had found delays of 

longer than 2 years were not due process violations. Id. at 217. 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to adequately 

allege a due process violation because § 1158(d)(7) explains that the INA does not create 

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a “substantive or procedural right or benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(7). Thus, Plaintiff has 

not suffered a cognizable deprivation of rights. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls., 408 

U.S. at 569. Additionally, courts have found longer delays than Plaintiff’s in the 

immigration context did not constitute a deprivation of due process rights. Arostegui v. 

Holder, 368 F. App’x 169, 172 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that a five-year delay in initiating 

removal proceedings did not violate the petitioner’s due process rights); Vang, 237 F. 

App’x at 31 (finding a fourteen-year delay in adjudicating the plaintiff’s asylum 

application did not violate due process); Mudric v. AG of the United States, 469 F.3d 94, 

99 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding no due process violation for a four-year delay in processing an 

asylum application because “federal immigration laws do not vest in aliens a 

constitutional right to have their immigration matters adjudicated in the most expeditious 

manner possible”); Elia v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 268, 275-76 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding a 

five-year delay in scheduling a deportation hearing did not violate due process). 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion and 

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice and without leave to amend. See 

Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Although there is 

a general rule that parties are allowed to amend their pleadings, it does not extend to 

cases in which any amendment would be an exercise in futility or where the amended 

complaint would also be subject to dismissal.”). The Clerk of Court is instructed to enter 

judgment accordingly and close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 26, 2019 

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