Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01255/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01255-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert D. Maguire, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Cathleen A. Coltrell, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-01255-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Defendant John Carmichael has filed a motion for final judgment and a motion for 

attorneys’ fees. Docs. 63, 64. The motions are fully briefed, and neither party has 

requested oral argument. The Court will deny the motion for final judgment and grant 

the motion for attorneys’ fees. 

I. Background. 

 In May 2014, Plaintiff Robert Maguire brought suit against Defendants John 

Carmichael and Kathleen Coltrell, husband and wife, for breach of an alleged oral 

partnership agreement formed between Maguire and Coltrell during their relationship. 

Doc. 1-1. On April 30, 2015, the Court dismissed Carmichael for lack of personal 

jurisdiction, finding that he lacked minimum contacts with Arizona and that he was not 

subject to personal jurisdiction simply due to his marriage to Coltrell. Doc. 60 at 7. 

Plaintiff’s claims against Coltrell for breach of contract, an accounting, breach of 

fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment remain pending, and a final pretrial conference has 

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been set. Doc. 62. Carmichael now moves for entry of a final judgment in his favor and 

for the attorneys’ fees he incurred in defending himself in this action. Docs. 63, 64. 

II. Motion for Final Judgment. 

 Rule 54(b) provides that when more than one claim for relief is presented in an 

action, or when multiple parties are involved, the district court may direct the entry of a 

final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties “only if the 

court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 

The entry of such judgments “must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs 

and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate 

docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate 

judgment as to some claims or parties.” Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 

962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981). 

 Carmichael argues that entry of a final judgment is appropriate because he has 

been dismissed from the case and “it does not make sense for [him] to be burdened with 

waiting for an eventual final order, monitoring this case further or incurring the expenses 

to do so, especially since he lives in Colorado and has no contacts with Arizona.” 

Doc. 63 at 2. Carmichael also asserts this will aid the “expeditious decision” of the case. 

 The Court finds that this is not the “unusual case” where the pressing needs of a 

litigant outweigh the need to avoid multiple proceedings. See Archer, 655 F.2d at 965; 

see also Sanchez v. Maricopa Cnty., No. CV 07-1244-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 2774528, at 

*1 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008) (“The Court finds that this is not the rare case that justifies 

sending up piecemeal appeals to the Circuit Court. Plaintiff has not shown the sort of 

pressing needs contemplated by a grant of a 54(b) motion, and denial of his motion will 

not lead to a harsh or unjust result.”). This case has progressed through the summary 

judgment stage, trial likely will commence in the next few months, and Carmichael does 

not identify any hardship he will suffer as a result. Refraining from entering judgment 

until after trial will ensure that piecemeal appeals are avoided. See Blair v. Shanahan, 38 

F.3d 1514, 1522 (9th Cir. 1994). 

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III. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. 

 “In any contested action arising out of a contract, express or implied, the court 

may award the successful party reasonable attorney fees.” A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A). The 

trial court has discretion regarding an award of attorneys’ fees. See Wilcox v. Waldman, 

744 P.2d 444, 450 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). Carmichael seeks $18,639.88 in fees under 

§ 12-341.01(A). 

A. Does § 12-341.01 Apply? 

 Plaintiff argues that fees cannot be awarded under § 12-341.01 because 

(1) Carmichael is not the prevailing party, (2) no contract claims were alleged against 

Carmichael, and (3) Plaintiff did not assert any claims against Carmichael, but instead 

included him only as a procedural technicality. Carmichael asserts that the case involved 

claims arising out of a breach of an oral partnership agreement and that he was the 

prevailing party because he was dismissed from the case. The Court agrees. 

 First, Carmichael prevailed for purposes of the Arizona statute because the Court 

dismissed him from the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. That Carmichael did not 

prevail on the merits of the claims is not controlling. See Britt v. Steffen, 205 P.3d 357, 

359 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that “the defendant is still considered a ‘successful 

party’ for purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) even though such a dismissal does not 

operate as an adjudication upon the merits”). The case upon which Plaintiff relies, Harris 

v. Stonecrest Care Auto Center, LLC, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (S.D. Cal. 2008), is 

inapposite because it involved attorneys’ fees sought under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Ninth Circuit case law holds that a defendant cannot be a 

prevailing party under the ADA if the suit is dismissed for jurisdictional reasons. Id. 

Arizona law provides otherwise with respect to § 12-341.01. 

 Second, this case arises out of contract. The crux of Plaintiff’s complaint is that 

Coltrell breached an implied-in-fact partnership agreement formed during their 

relationship, which sounds in contract under Arizona law. See Barmat v. John & Jane 

Doe Partners A-D, 747 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Ariz. 1987) (“Where, however, the duty 

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breached is not imposed by law, but is a duty created by the contractual relationship, and 

would not exist ‘but for’ the contract, then breach of either express covenants or those 

necessarily implied from them sounds in contract.”). Had Plaintiff established the 

existence of the alleged agreement, Carmichael would have been subject to liability even 

though he is not alleged to have actually breached the agreement himself. “But for” the 

underlying partnership agreement, no cause of action would exist. See In re Larry’s 

Apartment, L.L.C., 249 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 Third, contrary to Plaintiff’s claim, the complaint directly implicates Carmichael. 

The complaint alleges that Coltrell breached the contract while she was married to 

Carmichael and that the breach was “for the benefit of Coltrell and her marital 

community.” Doc. 1-1, ¶ 5. Plaintiff’s complaint sought to hold Carmichael liable as 

part of the marital community; Plaintiff did not include him merely as a technicality. 

B. Analysis of Factors. 

 To determine whether to award attorneys’ fees, courts consider the merits of the 

unsuccessful party’s claim, whether the successful party’s efforts were completely 

superfluous in achieving the ultimate result, whether assessing fees against the 

unsuccessful party would cause extreme hardship, whether the successful party prevailed 

with respect to all relief sought, whether the legal question presented was novel or had 

been previously adjudicated, and whether a fee award would discourage other parties 

with tenable claims from litigating. Am. Const. Corp. v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 

667 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1106-07 (D. Ariz. 2009) (citing Assoc. Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 

694 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Ariz. 1985)). No single factor is determinative. See Velarde v. 

PACE Membership Warehouse, Inc., 105 F.3d 1313, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 1997).

 Carmichael argues that each factor weighs in favor of an award of attorneys’ fees. 

Plaintiff addresses only the hardship factor. He claims that he has not fully recovered 

financially from losing the approximately $220,000 he paid to Coltrell under the alleged 

partnership agreement. Doc. 65-1, ¶ 4. Plaintiff does not dispute any of the factors, and 

the Court finds they weigh in favor of an award of attorneys’ fees. 

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 First, Plaintiff was unsuccessful in demonstrating that the Court could exercise 

personal jurisdiction over Carmichael. Carmichael was a Colorado resident with no 

contacts to Arizona, and the Court rejected each of Plaintiff’s arguments. Second, there 

is no evidence that Carmichael could have avoided the litigation; Plaintiff chose to sue 

him. Third, although Plaintiff claims he will suffer financial hardship, he provides no 

evidence of his current financial situation. The Court is therefore unable to conclude that 

this factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff. Fourth, Carmichael achieved all of the relief 

sought in his motion to dismiss, and the issues involved were straightforward. Fifth, a fee 

award will not deter future litigants from pursuing similar claims, as a reasonable 

investigation should have shown that Carmichael was not subject to jurisdiction in 

Arizona. 

C. Reasonableness of Fees. 

 In analyzing whether attorney’s fees are reasonable, the Court looks to whether the 

hourly rate is reasonable and whether the hours expended on the case are reasonable. 

Schweiger v. China Doll Rest., Inc., 673 P.2d 927, 931-32 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). “Once 

a party establishes its entitlement to fees and meets the minimum requirements in its 

application and affidavit for fees, the burden shifts to the party opposing the fee award to 

demonstrate the impropriety or unreasonableness of the requested fees.” Nolan v. 

Starlight Pines Homeowners Ass’n, 167 P.3d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 

 Carmichael argues that a fee award of $18,629.88 is reasonable. In support, 

counsel submitted a copy of the fee agreement executed between counsel and Carmichael 

(Doc. 64-2), a task-based itemized statement of fees and expenses (Doc. 64-3), and an 

affidavit prepared by counsel attesting to the work performed in connection with the case 

(Doc. 64-4). The documents show that counsel charged an hourly rate of $320 and 

worked 150 hours on this matter. Doc. 64-2 at 7. Counsel then discounted the fees and 

split them in half between Carmichael and Coltrell. Doc. 64 at 2. 

 The Court finds that the fees are reasonable given the hourly rate and time 

expended in the matter. Plaintiff does not challenge the reasonableness of the fees or take 

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issue with any of Carmichael’s calculations, and thus has failed to meet his burden under 

Nolan. Accordingly, the Court will exercise its discretion and award Carmichael 

attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $18,639.88. 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for final judgment (Doc. 63) is 

denied, and his motion for attorneys’ fees (Doc. 64) is granted. Defendant Carmichael 

is awarded attorneys’ fees and costs of $18,639.88. 

 Dated this 1st day of July, 2015. 

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