Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-03648/USCOURTS-ca2-14-03648-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 850
Nature of Suit: Securities, Commodities, Exchange
Cause of Action: 

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14‐3648

FDIC v. First Horizon Asset Securities, Inc.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                               

August Term, 2015

(Argued: October 8, 2015       Decided: May 19, 2016)

Docket No. 14‐3648‐cv

                                  

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as Receiver for Colonial Bank,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

— v. —

FIRST HORIZON ASSET SECURITIES, INC., FIRST HORIZON HOME LOAN CORPORATION,

CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC, DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES INC., FTN

FINANCIAL SECURITIES CORP., HSBC SECURITIES (USA) INC., RBS SECURITIES INC.,

UBS SECURITIES LLC, and WELLS FARGO ASSET SECURITIES CORPORATION,

Defendants‐Appellees,

CHASE MORTGAGE FINANCE CORP., JP MORGAN CHASE & CO., JP MORGAN

SECURITIES LLC, CITICORP MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC., CITIMORTGAGE, INC.,

CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC., ALLY SECURITIES LLC, and MERRILL LYNCH,

PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH INCORPORATED,

Defendants.

                                   

Case 14-3648, Document 171-1, 05/19/2016, 1775443, Page1 of 22
B e f o r e:

PARKER, LYNCH, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

__________________

Plaintiff‐Appellant Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)

appeals from a decision of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Louis L. Stanton, Judge) dismissing its complaint, which

asserts claims under the Securities Act of 1933, as untimely.  The FDIC brought

this action within the limitations period provided by the FDIC Extender Statute,

12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14), but outside the Securities Act’s three‐year statute of

repose.  In Federal Housing Finance Agency v. UBS Americas Inc., 712 F.3d 136

(2d Cir. 2013), we held that a materially identical extender statute for actions

brought by the Federal Housing Finance Agency displaced the Securities Act’s

statute of repose.  We now further hold that the Supreme Court’s decision in CTS

Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014), did not abrogate our holding in UBS,

which remains good law.  Accordingly, the FDIC’s complaint was timely.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

Judge Parker dissents in a separate opinion.

                             

JAMES SCOTT WATSON, Counsel (Colleen J. Boles, Assistant General

Counsel, Kathryn R. Norcross, Senior Counsel, Jaclyn C. Taner,

Counsel, on the brief), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,

Arlington, Virginia, for Plaintiff‐Appellant.

ROBERT J. GIUFFRA,JR.(Bruce E. Clark, David B. Tulchin, Amanda Flug

Davidoff, Jeffrey B. Wall, on the brief), Sullivan & Cromwell LLP,

New York, New York, for Defendants‐Appellees First Horizon Asset

Securities,Inc., FirstHorizonHome LoanCorporation, FTNFinancial

Securities Corp., and UBS Securities, LLC.

2

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Richard W. Clary, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, New York, New

York, for Defendant‐Appellee Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC.

Thomas C. Rice, Andrew T. Frankel, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP,

New York, New York, for Defendants‐Appellees Deutsche Bank

Securities Inc. and RBS Securities Inc.

Marc T.G. Dworsky, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, Los Angeles,

California, for Defendant‐Appellee Wells Fargo Asset Securities

Corporation.

Michael O. Ware, Mayer Brown LLP, New York, New York, for

Defendant‐Appellee HSBC Securities (USA) Inc.

KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP,

New York, New York (PhilippeZ. Selendy, AdamM. Abensohn,

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, New York, New

York, David C. Frederick, Wan J. Kim, Gregory G. Rapawy,

Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, P.L.L.C.,

Washington, District of Columbia, on the brief), for Amici Curiae

Federal Housing Finance Agency and National Credit Union

Administration Board in Support of Plaintiff‐Appellant.

Michael J. Dell, Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, New York, New

York,IraD. Hammerman,Kevin Carroll, Securities Industry and

Financial Markets Association, Washington, District of

Columbia, Thomas Pinder, American Bankers Association,

Washington, District of Columbia, for Amici Curiae Securities

Industry and Financial Markets Association, The American Bankers

Association, and The Clearing House LLC in Support of Appellees and

Affirmance.

William M. Jay, Goodwin Procter LLP, Washington, District of

Columbia, Joshua M. Daniels, Goodwin Procter LLP, Boston,

Massachusetts, for Amicus Curiae The Business Roundtable in

Support of Defendants‐Appellees.

3

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GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff‐Appellant Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)

brought this action under the Securities Act of 1933 as receiver for Colonial Bank

(“Colonial”).  Because the complaint was filed less than three years after the FDIC

was appointed receiver, it was timely under the terms of the FDIC Extender

Statute, which provides “the applicable statute of limitations with regard to any

action brought by the [FDIC] as conservator or receiver.”  12 U.S.C.

§ 1821(d)(14)(A).  But because the complaint was filed more than three years after

the securities at issue were offered to the public, it would be untimely under the

terms of the Securities Act’s statute of repose, 15 U.S.C. § 77m.  Although they

recognize that the FDIC Extender Statute displaces otherwise applicable statutes

of limitations, the defendants argue that it does not displace the Securities Act’s

statute of repose, and that the complaint should be dismissed as untimely.  

We do not consider this argument on a blank slate.  In Federal Housing

Finance Agency v. UBS Americas Inc., 712 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2013), we held that a

materially identical extender statute for actions brought by the Federal Housing

4

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Finance Authority (“FHFA”) did displace the Securities Act’s statute of repose.

The defendants do not argue that the FDIC Extender Statute is in any way

distinguishable from the one at issue in UBS; rather, they assert that our UBS

holding was abrogated by the subsequent Supreme Court decision in CTS Corp.

v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014), which construed yet another, somewhat

different federal limitations‐extending provision – 42 U.S.C. § 9658, enacted as an

amendment to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”) – to preempt only state statutes of limitations,

and not state statutes of repose.  The district court agreed, and dismissed the

complaint.  We conclude, to the contrary, that UBS remains good law and that,

under UBS, the FDIC’s complaint was timely.  Accordingly, the judgment of the

district court is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

Between June 5 and October 19, 2007, Colonial, a federally insured bank

headquartered in Montgomery, Alabama, invested approximately $300 million in

nine residential mortgage‐backed securities (“RMBS”) issued or underwritten by

the defendants.  In a now‐familiar turn of events, Colonial suffered heavy losses

5

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on those RMBS, and on August 14, 2009, the Alabama State Banking Department

closed Colonial and appointed the FDIC as receiver.

On August 10, 2012 – within three years of its appointment as receiver, but

more than three years after the RMBS had been offered to the public – the FDIC

brought this action in the Southern District of New York, asserting claims under

§§ 11 and 15 of the Securities Act, which render several classes of persons liable

for material misstatements or omissions in securities registration statements.  15

U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77o.  Specifically, the complaint alleges that prospectus

supplements for the RMBS at issue misrepresented the loan‐to‐value ratios of the

mortgage loans backing the RMBS, the occupancy status of the properties that

secured the mortgage loans, and the underwriting standards used to originate

those loans.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds,

including that it was barred by the Securities Act’s statute of repose, which, the

defendants argued, was not displaced by the FDIC Extender Statute.  While that

motion was pending, this Court decided UBS.  One of the issues in that case,

which was brought by the FHFA and also involved claims under §§ 11 and 15 of

the Securities Act, was whether those claims’ timeliness was governed by the

6

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Securities Act’s statute of repose or by the FHFA Extender Statute, 12 U.S.C.

§ 4617(b)(12).  Examining the text and legislative history of the FHFA Extender

Statute, we concluded that Congress intended for it to supplant “any other time

limitations that otherwise might have applied.”  UBS, 712 F.3d at 143–44.  We

emphasized that the statute by its terms established “the applicable statute of

limitations with regard to any action brought by [FHFA] as conservator or

receiver.”  Id. at 141, quoting 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(12)(A) (emphasis and alteration

in UBS).  And we rejected the argument that the Extender Statute’s use of the

term “statute of limitations” meant that it left in place otherwise applicable

statutes of repose, observing that Congress frequently uses the term “statute of

limitations” to refer to what might more precisely be designated as statutes of

repose.  Id. at 143.

The FHFA Extender Statute was modeled on, and is materially identical to,

the FDIC Extender Statute.1

  Recognizing that UBS controlled, the defendants in

this case withdrew their Securities Act statute of repose argument (reserving the

right to reassert it at a later date), and the district court (Louis L. Stanton, J.)

denied the rest of the motion to dismiss.

1 A third materially identical extender statute governs actions brought by the

National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”).  12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14).

7

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The following year, the Supreme Court decided CTS, in which the

plaintiffs alleged injury and damage from contaminants on land on which the

defendant had previously operated an electronics plant.  The plaintiffs argued

that their claims were timely under § 9658, the CERCLA amendment, which

creates an “[e]xception” to state statutes of limitations for state‐law toxic tort

actions.  42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1).  The Supreme Court, however, held that CERCLA

preempted state statutes of limitations but left state statutes of repose in place,

and that the applicable statute of repose barred the action.  CTS, 134 S. Ct. at 2180.

It chided the court below, which had come to the opposite conclusion, for using

“the proposition that remedial statutes should be interpreted in a liberal manner”

as a “substitute for a conclusion grounded in the statute’s text and structure.”  Id.

at 2185.

Armed with the CTS decision, the defendants here reasserted their

argument that this action is barred by the Securities Act’s statute of repose, in a

motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).  They claimed

that UBS was inconsistent with CTS, because it failed to give weight to the textual

markers that the CTS Court found instructive in its analysis of § 9658, and instead

put too much emphasis on the FDIC Extender Statute’s remedial purpose.  The

8

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district court agreed, holding that, after CTS, the FDIC Extender Statute could not

be read to displace the Securities Act’s statute of repose.  Accordingly, it granted

judgment in favor of the defendants.  The FDIC timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

“In general, a panel of this Court is bound by the decisions of prior panels

until such time as they are overruled either by an en banc panel of our Court or

by the Supreme Court.”  Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395,

405 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The defendants make no

attempt to distinguish the FDIC Extender Statute from the FHFA Extender

Statute at issue in UBS.  Consequently, the outcome here is controlled by UBS,

unless the defendants can show that its “rationale [was] overruled, implicitly or

expressly, by the Supreme Court” in CTS.  United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d

184, 190 (2d Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Indelicato,

865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1989).2

  For the following reasons, the defendants have not

2 Thus, we need not determine whether we would reach the same result as the

UBS panel did if we were not bound by that precedent.  We note, however, that

both federal Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue since CTS have

concluded, even in the absence of binding circuit precedent, that the Extender

Statutes displace otherwise applicable statutes of repose.  See FDIC v. RBS Secs.

Inc., 798 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that the FDIC Extender Statute

preempts the Texas Securities Act’s statute of repose); Nat’l Credit Union Admin.

Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., 764 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding

that the NCUA Extender Statute displaces the federal Securities Act’s statute of

repose).

9

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made that showing.

CTS held that § 9658, although it preempted state‐law statutes of

limitations, left in place applicable state‐law statutes of repose.  Significantly,

however, CTS did not hold that a federal statute extending “statutes of

limitations” must always be read to leave in place existing statutes of repose.

Instead, the Supreme Court explained that § 9658’s use of the term “statute of

limitations” “is instructive, but it is not dispositive.”  CTS, 134 S. Ct. at 2185.  The

Court acknowledged that “Congress has used the term ‘statute of limitations’

when enacting statutes of repose,” id., citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u‐6(h)(1)(B)(iii)(I)(aa)

and 42 U.S.C. § 2278, and that only a few years before § 9658 was enacted, one

scholar “described multiple usages of the terms, including both a usage in which

the terms are equivalent and also the modern, more precise usage.”  Id. at 2186,

citing Francis E. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product

Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 Am. U. L. Rev. 579, 584 (1981).  Accordingly, CTS

instructs, a court must consider “other features of the statutory text,” id., before

determining whether a statute displaces otherwise applicable statutes of repose.

Nor did the CTS opinion purport to lay out a novel framework for

analyzing that question, which might cast doubt on the validity of the analysis

10

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used in UBS.

3

  Instead, the Supreme Court reiterated the uncontroversial

principle that “[c]ongressional intent is discerned primarily from the statutory

text.”  Id. at 2185.  While it did state that “invoking the proposition that remedial

statutes should be interpreted in a liberal manner” was no “substitute for a

conclusion grounded in the statute’s text and structure,” id., it did not direct

courts never to use that canon as an interpretative aid.  Nor did it rule out resort

to legislative history in interpreting federal statutes that alter existing statutes of

limitations.  In fact, CTS itself relied on § 9658’s legislative history, citing a report

that was before Congress at the time § 9658 was enacted that explicitly noted the

distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose.  Id. at 2186.  The

defendants have pointed us to no materials making the same distinction in the

FDIC Extender Statute’s legislative history.

3 The dissent suggests that the novel ingredient supplied by CTS is its “focus on

the central distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose.”

Dissent at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).  But the UBS court was fully

aware of the import of that distinction.  See UBS, 712 F.3d at 140 (explaining that

the two types of statutes “are distinct,” that “statutes of repose affect the

underlying right, not just the remedy,” and that “a statute of repose may bar a

claim even before the plaintiff suffers injury, leaving her without any remedy”).

Even before UBS, several of our cases drew the distinction, along much the same

lines as CTS.  See, e.g., Ma v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 597 F.3d

84, 88 n.4 (2d Cir. 2010); P. Stolz Family P’ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102–03

(2d Cir. 2004); Stuart v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 158 F.3d 622, 627 (2d Cir. 1998).

CTS’s restatement of the differences between the two types of statute thus does

not constitute a change in controlling precedent that would allow us to revisit

UBS.

11

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Indeed, it is precisely because CTS’s holding is firmly rooted in a close

analysis of § 9658’s text, structure, and legislative history that it has limited

bearing on this case.  Although they both have the effect of extending the time to

file certain types of claims, the FDIC Extender Statute and § 9658 are structured

and worded in fundamentally different ways.  Section 9658 reads, in relevant

part:

(a) State statutes of limitations for hazardous substance

cases

(1) Exception to State statutes

In the case of any [toxic tort] action brought under

State law . . . , if the applicable limitations period for

such action (as specified in the State statute of

limitations or under common law) provides a

commencement date which is earlier than the

federally required commencement date, such period

shall commence at the federally required

commencement date in lieu of the date specified in

such State statute.

(2) State law generally applicable

Except as provided in paragraph (1), the statute of

limitations established under State law shall apply in

all [toxic tort] actions brought under State law . . . .

. . . .

(b) Definitions

As used in this section –

. . . .

(2) Applicable limitations period

The term “applicable limitations period” means the

period specified in a statute of limitations during

which a civil action referred to in subsection (a)(1) of

12

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this section may be brought.

(3) Commencement date

The term “commencement date” means the date

specified in a statute of limitations as the beginning

of the applicable limitations period.

(4) Federally required commencement date

(A) In general

Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term

“federally required commencement date” means

the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should

have known) that the personal injury or property

damages referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this

section were caused or contributed to by the

hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant

concerned.

(B) Special rules

In the case of a minor or incompetent plaintiff, the

term “federally required commencement date”

means the later of the date referred to in

subparagraph (A) or the following:

(i) In the case of a minor, the date on which the

minor reaches the age of majority, as

determined by State law, or has a legal

representative appointed.

(ii) In the case of an incompetent individual,

the date on which such individual becomes

competent or has had a legal representative

appointed.

42 U.S.C. § 9658.  Section 9658 does not purport to create an entirely new statute

of limitations framework for state toxic tort actions; instead, it provides a limited

“[e]xception to State statutes,” id. § 9658(a)(1), which otherwise remain

13

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“generally applicable.”  Id. § 9658(a)(2); see also CTS, 134 S. Ct. at 2185 (“Under

this structure, state law is not pre‐empted unless it fits into the precise terms of

the exception.”).  The exception applies only if the state statute “provides a

commencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement

date,” 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1), which is defined as “the date the plaintiff knew (or

reasonably should have known)” that the injury complained of was “caused or

contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant

concerned.”  Id. § 9658(b)(4)(A).  Thus, § 9658’s “exception” does not change the

length of the applicable limitations period; it simply modifies the time at which

the limitations period begins to run, requiring states that do not already do so to

apply the “discovery rule.”

By contrast, the Extender Statute establishes “the applicable statute of

limitations with regard to any action brought by the [FDIC] as conservator or

receiver.”  12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A).  That limitations period (six years for “any

contract claim” and three years for “any tort claim”) applies unless “the period

applicable under State law” is longer.  Id.  And the Extender Statute further

provides that

the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run

on any claim described in [the previous] subparagraph

shall be the later of –

14

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(i) the date of the appointment of the [FDIC] as

conservator or receiver; or

(ii) the date on which the cause of action accrues.

12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(B).4

  Rather than creating a limited exception, the Extender

Statute thus establishes, for “any” action brought by the FDIC as conservator or

receiver, the length of the limitations period, as well as the time at which the

period begins to run.  As we concluded in UBS, this structure suggests that

Congress intended the Extender Statute to supersede any and all other time

limitations, including statutes of repose.

Because of the differences in the statutes, much of CTS’s reasoning is

simply inapplicable to the Extender Statute.  For instance, the CTS Court relied

on § 9658’s definition of “applicable limitations period” to mean “the period . . .

during which a civil action . . . may be brought.”  42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(2).  It

explained that, technically speaking, only statutes of limitations “limit the time in

which a civil action ‘may be brought,’” whereas statutes of repose “can prohibit a

4 In the most common scenario, this provision will operate literally to extend the

time to file a claim that is not yet time‐barred.  The Extender Statute also

addresses the situation in which the otherwise‐applicable limitations period has

already caused a claim to expire before the FDIC’s appointment as receiver.  In

that situation, the Extender Statute operates to revive the claim, in a limited

category of cases, see 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(C)(ii), in which the limitations

period had expired “not more than 5 years before the appointment of the [FDIC]

as conservator or receiver,” id. § 1821(d)(14)(C)(i).

15

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cause of action from coming into existence” in the first place.  CTS, 134 S. Ct. at

2187.  The Extender Statute, however, contains no such definition of “applicable

limitations period.”  Similarly, the CTS Court observed that § 9658 includes an

equitable tolling provision for minors and incompetents, 42 U.S.C.

§ 9658(b)(4)(B), a feature that is typical of statutes of limitations but not of statutes

of repose.  CTS, 134 S. Ct. at 2187–88.  But there is no similar tolling provision in

the Extender Statute.

The defendants and the dissent make much of the fact that the Extender

Statute uses the term “statute of limitations” (rather than “statute of repose”),

and uses it in the singular.  In CTS, the Supreme Court noted that § 9658

“includes language describing the covered period in the singular,” and observed:

“This would be an awkward way to mandate the pre‐emption of two different

time periods with two different purposes.”  Id. at 2186–87.  But first, as we have

explained, the Extender Statute’s mere use of the term “statute of limitations”

does not settle the issue.  As counsel for the defendants conceded at oral

argument, Congress has never used the expression “statute of repose” in a statute

codified in the United States Code.  Indeed, the very statute of repose on which

the defendants rely here is located in a section of the Code entitled “Limitation of

actions.”  See 15 U.S.C. § 77m.

16

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Further, when § 9658 uses the term “statute of limitations,” and similarly

refers to “the applicable limitations period” in the singular, it is describing the

existing period that is modified by § 9658 and otherwise remains “generally

applicable.”  The Supreme Court thus took the use of the singular as an

indication that § 9658 was intended to modify only one limitations period per

claim – the period provided by the statute of limitations – and to leave in place

the second period provided by the applicable statute of repose.  By contrast,

when the Extender Statute refers to “the applicable statute of limitations,” it is

referring to the new limitations period that is created by the Extender Statute.5

  The

fact that the Extender Statute purports to create only one limitations period –

rather than a dual statute of limitations/statute of repose framework such as that

which ordinarily governs Securities Act claims – does not, standing alone, tell us

anything about the number of limitations periods it was intended to displace.

The defendants and the dissent also emphasize that the Extender Statute’s

5 Thus, we do not hold, as the dissent suggests, that “when Congress said ‘statute

of limitations’ it also meant ‘statute of repose.’”  Dissent at 4.  For that reason, the

dissent’s discussion of evidence that Congress knew the difference between the

two types of statutes when it enacted the Extender Statute is beside the point.  See

id. at 2–4.  But we note that even on its own terms, the dissent’s argument is

unpersuasive.  Congress has continued to enact statutes of repose under the label

“statute of limitations,” despite the fact that it has been aware of the distinction

since at least the 1980s.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u‐6(h)(1)(B)(iii)(I)(aa) & (II), enacted in

2010 as part of the Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,

Pub. L. No. 111‐203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1846.

17

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limitations period is tied to the concept of “accrual” of a claim.  In CTS, the

Supreme Court explained: “A statute of repose . . . is not related to the accrual of

any cause of action[, but instead] mandates that there shall be no cause of action

beyond a certain point, even if no cause of action has yet accrued.”  Id. at 2187

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  A statute of repose typically

measures that cutoff point “from the date of the last culpable act or omission of

the defendant.”  Id. at 2182.  The limitations period established by the Extender

Statute, however, runs from “the later of (i) the date of the appointment of the

[FDIC] as conservator or receiver; or (ii) the date on which the cause of action

accrues.”  12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(B).  But this tells us only that the Extender

Statute is itself a statute of limitations, and not a statute of repose.  Cf. Nat’l Credit

Union Admin. Bd. v. Barclays Capital Inc., 785 F.3d 387, 395 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2015)

(holding that the NCUA Extender Statute is a statute of limitations that can be

waived, and collecting cases so holding).  It provides no guidance on the question

whether the Extender Statute displaces otherwise applicable statutes of repose – a

question on which we must thus defer to our binding UBS precedent.6

6 We thus disagree with the dissent that superficially similar “textual markers” in

§ 9658 and the Extender Statute require us to read the latter as the Supreme Court

read the former.  Dissent at 7.  The dissent errs, in our view, by focusing on those

markers in isolation, without considering their place within the larger statutory

structure.  Instead, “we follow the cardinal rule that statutory language must be

read in context since a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it.”  Hibbs

18

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Finally, the defendants take aim at what they perceive to be UBS’s

overreliance on the Extender Statute’s legislative history and remedial purpose.

As noted above, the Supreme Court in CTS directed courts not to treat “the

proposition that remedial statutes should be interpreted in a liberal manner . . .

as a substitute for a conclusion grounded in the statute’s text and structure.”

CTS, 134 S. Ct. at 2185.  The UBS opinion, however, does no such thing.  Rather, it

begins with two paragraphs of textual analysis, which conclude that “[b]y using

these words, Congress precluded the possibility that some other limitations

period might apply to claims brought by FHFA as conservator.”  UBS, 712 F.3d at

142.  Only then does it turn to the legislative history, which it considers relevant

only “[t]o the extent there is any ambiguity in the words of the extender statute.”

Id.  The UBS panel based its holding on what it determined to be “[t]he more

natural reading of the provision, the one that is both inline with everyday usage

and consistent with the objectives of the statute overall.”  Id. at 143, quoting Fed.

Hous. Fin. Agency v. UBS Ams., Inc., 858 F. Supp. 2d 306, 316–17 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

It thus used the Extender Statute’s legislative history and purpose as a

complement to textual analysis, not as a substitute.  Accordingly, we perceive

v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

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nothing in CTS that undercuts the UBS opinion’s analysis of the Extender

Statute.7

We can dispose of the defendants’ other arguments, which are not based

on the holding or reasoning of CTS, more briefly.  The defendants assert, for

instance, that the FDIC Extender Statute does not apply to claims under the

Securities Act, and instead applies only to state‐law contract and tort claims.  The

textual basis for this argument is that the Extender Statute sets out limitations

periods for “any contract claim” and “any tort claim,” without specifically

mentioning other types of claims or claims under federal law.  12 U.S.C.

§ 1821(d)(14)(A).  In UBS, however, we squarely rejected that argument with

respect to the FHFA Extender Statute, concluding that “a reasonable reader could

only understand [that statute] to apply to both the federal and state claims in

[that] case.”  UBS, 712 F.3d at 142.  We relied on Congress’s “explicit[] stat[ement]

that ‘the’ statute of limitations for ‘any action’ brought by FHFA as conservator

‘shall be’ as specified in [the Extender Statute].”  Id. at 141, quoting 12 U.S.C.

§ 4617(b)(12) (emphases in UBS).  Because no issue was presented in CTS about

the types of claims to which § 9658 applied, CTS has no relevance to that part of

UBS’s holding.

7 As noted above, see note 2, our conclusion that CTS does not undermine the

displacement of statutes of repose by the various Extender statutes is shared by

both of the other Courts of Appeals that have considered the question.

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Similarly, the defendants and the dissent argue that reading the Extender

Statute to displace the Securities Act’s statute of repose violates the presumption

against repeals by implication, see Auburn Hous. Auth v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 138,

144 (2d Cir. 2002) (acknowledging “the important principle that repeals by

implication are not favored”), contending that, under the FDIC’s position, the

Extender Statute in effect repeals the statute of repose for a class of cases (those

brought by the FDIC as conservator or receiver).  The dissent further explains

that the presumption takes on added importance when it applies to the Securities

Act’s statute of repose, “a prominent and conspicuous provision in this nation’s

securities regulation regime” over the past eight decades.  Dissent at 8.  But the

CTS opinion does not even mention the presumption, and the policy arguments

raised by the dissent would have applied with equal force in UBS, which also

dealt with the Securities Act’s statute of repose, but which nevertheless held it to

be superseded by the Extender Statute.  The presumption against repeals by

implication thus does not provide us with any basis for holding that CTS

undermines the authority of UBS.

CONCLUSION

The defendants have not identified any aspect of the Supreme Court’s

decision in CTS that requires us to revisit our UBS holding.  Accordingly, that

holding controls this case, and mandates the conclusion that the FDIC’s

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complaint was timely.  The judgment of the district court is vacated, and the case

is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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