Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00060/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00060-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DR. FA’AFOUINA AFATO and SHARI

AFATO, a married couple, and 

P.A., S.A., L.A., K.A., N.A.

AND N.A., their six minor

children,

NO. CIV. S-10-0060 FCD/EFB

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HILLARY CLINTON, Secretary of

the Department of State, JOHN

DOE, Chief of the Waiver

Review Division, Department of

State, JIM PRITCHETT, Chief of

the Office of Legislation,

Regulations and Advisory

Assistance, et al.,

Defendants.

____________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on (1) the motion of the

government to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, or alternatively, under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders these matters submitted on the

briefs. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g).

2 The magistrate judge previously denied plaintiffs’

motion to compel without prejudice in light of the pending motion

to dismiss before the undersigned. The magistrate judge

indicated that if the motion to compel was not ultimately

relevant to the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs could re-notice the

motion before him, following this court’s ruling on the motion to

dismiss. (Docket #20.) As this court finds jurisdiction over

plaintiffs’ complaint, at least in some respects, plaintiffs may

seek to compel the subject discovery via a renewed motion to the

magistrate judge.

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to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and 

(2) plaintiffs’ motion to compel production and filing of the 

administrative records, pertaining to the adjudication of his

immigration waiver application, maintained by the Department of

State (“DOS”) and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).1

Because consideration of the administrative records is not

necessary to resolve the government’s motion to dismiss, the

court denies plaintiffs’ motion to compel as moot and directs

plaintiffs to re-notice the motion before the assigned magistrate

judge.2 E.D. Cal. L.R. 302(c)(1) (directing that magistrate

judges shall hear all discovery motions). As to the government’s

motion to dismiss, for the reasons set forth below, the motion is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dr. Fa’afouina Afato is a citizen of Samoa. 

(Compl., filed Jan. 8, 2010, ¶ 3.) He first entered the United

States in 1982 as a nonimmigrant exchange visitor pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(16)(J), a “J visa,” in order to attend a masters

degree program in botany at the University of Hawaii. (Id.

¶ 18.) He later transferred to a new J visa program to study

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3 Said section provides in pertinent part: “[n]o person

admitted under . . . this title . . . shall be eligible to apply

. . . for permanent residence, or for a nonimmigrant visa . . .

until it is established that such person has resided and been

physically present in the country of his nationality or his last

residence for an aggregate of at least two years following

departure from the United States.”

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medicine at the University of Hawaii, where he earned his Doctor

of Medicine degree in May of 1991. (Id. ¶ 19.) Persons who

receive J visas are required to return to their home country for

a period of two years before they can be granted an immigrant

visa or permanent residence within the United States. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(e).3 Dr. Afato never complied with this requirement, as

after completing his residency program in 1994, he began working

at a medical clinic located in Yuba County, California. (Compl.

¶¶ 20-21.) In 1996, Dr. Afato started his own private practice,

serving a traditionally underserved population as recognized by

the United States Department of Health and Human Services. (Id.

¶¶ 26-28.) Subsequently, Dr. Afato married a United States

citizen. (Id. ¶ 32.) Together they have six children, two

adopted and four biological, who are all United States citizens. 

(Id. ¶¶ 33, 35.) 

On April 16, 2009, Dr. Afato filed an Application to Waive

the Foreign Residency Requirement, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e)

and its supporting regulations. (Id. ¶ 38.) Receiving a waiver

of the two-year residency requirement is a complicated process. 

See 22 C.F.R. § 41.63(b)(2). Succinctly stated, first, the

Director of the DHS must determine that “compliance with the

two-year home-country residence and physical presence requirement

would impose exceptional hardship upon the spouse or child of the

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exchange visitor.” 22 C.F.R. § 41.63(b)(2)(i). Then, DHS must

transmit the application to the DOS, which gives a favorable or

unfavorable recommendation to DHS after “review[ing] the program,

policy, and foreign relations aspects of the case.” 22 C.F.R. 

§ 41.63(b)(2)(ii). 

Here, the DHS determined that forcing Dr. Afato to return to

Samoa for two years would impose exceptional hardship upon Dr.

Afato’s family; however, the DOS recommended denying the waiver,

and DHS, in turn, ultimately denied Dr. Afato’s waiver

application on December 16, 2009. (Compl. ¶¶ 38, 42, 47, 50.) 

Plaintiffs then filed the instant action, alleging

violations of the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C.

§ 701 et seq., violation of plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and violation of “Customary

International Law.” 

STANDARDS

A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

Subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental and cannot be

waived. The party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the

court has the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists. 

Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986). The court

is under a continuing duty to dismiss an action whenever it

appears that the court lacks jurisdiction. Billingsley v.

C.I.R., 868 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989).

The standards that must be applied in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion

vary according to the nature of the jurisdictional challenge. 

If, as here, the challenge is a facial attack--one contesting

jurisdiction solely on the allegations of the complaint--the

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factual allegations of the complaint are presumed to be true, and

the motion is granted only if the plaintiff fails to allege an

element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. See Thornhill

Pub. v. Gen'l Telephone & Electronics, 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th

Cir. 1979). A complaint will be dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction if (1) the cause does not “arise under” any

federal law or the United States Constitution, (2) there is no

case or controversy within the meaning of that constitutional

term, or (3) the cause is not one described by any jurisdictional

statute. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).

B. Failure to State Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a pleading must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal

court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what

the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations

omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on

liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define

disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious

claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).

On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the

complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,

322 (1972). The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit

of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not

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allege “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his

claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 

Nevertheless, the court “need not assume the truth of legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United

States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual

allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. A

pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at

1950 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). 

Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can

prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have

violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” 

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council

of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Ultimately, the court may not dismiss a complaint in which

the plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff has

failed to “nudge [his or her] claims across the line from

conceivable to plausible,” is the complaint properly dismissed. 

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Id. at 1952. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a

probability requirement, it demands more than “a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 1949. 

This plausibility inquiry is “a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense.” Id. at 1950.

ANALYSIS

A. APA

Plaintiffs’ first claim for relief is based on the APA which

provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency

action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action . . .

is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. In

reviewing agency action, the court is granted power to “hold

unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions

found to be,” inter alia, arbitrary, capricious, contrary to

constitutional right, or without observance of procedure required

by law. Id. § 706. One important caveat of the APA, however, is

that a court lacks the authority to review agency decisions when

“agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” Id.

§ 701(a)(2). Plaintiffs allege that the government’s denial of

his waiver was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of

regulatory and statutory requirements, and seek a declaratory

judgment from the court that Dr. Afato is eligible for, and

should be granted, a waiver pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e). The

government maintains that the determination of whether such a

waiver should be granted is left entirely to the discretion of

the Executive Branch, and therefore, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 

§ 701(a)(2), the court lacks jurisdiction to determine the

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controversy. 

For this proposition, the government relies on the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Abdelhamid v. Ilchert, 774 F.2d 1447 (9th

Cir. 1985). Abdelhamid involved nearly identical facts to this

case. Plaintiff Abdelhamid was an Egyptian citizen, a medical

doctor employed by the Egyptian Ministry of Health, who entered

the United States as a nonimmigrant exchange visitor on a J visa

to pursue a masters degree in public health. Id. at 1448. Like

Dr. Afato, by statute, Abdelhamid was required to return to his

home country for a minimum of two years after finishing his

academic pursuits before he could be granted an immigrant visa or

permanent residence. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e). Also like Dr.

Afato, Abdelhamid sought, and was denied, a waiver of the twoyear residency requirement. Abdelhamid, 774 F.2d at 1449. 

Thereafter, Abdelhamid filed suit seeking to obtain the waiver

through the judicial process. Id. 

In Abdelhamid, the Ninth Circuit held that the district

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Abdelhamid’s

claim. Id. at 1450. The “failure to make a favorable

recommendation for a waiver under Section 1182(e) was ‘agency

action committed to agency discretion by law’” and, therefore,

the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s claim under

the APA. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)). Thus, under

Abdelhamid, this court clearly lacks subject matter jurisdiction

to hear plaintiffs’ complaint to the extent plaintiffs seek a

determination that the waiver should have been granted. Section

1182(e) leaves the determination of whether a hardship waiver

should be granted entirely within the discretion of an agency,

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and therefore such decision is unreviewable by this court

pursuant to Section 701(a)(2) of the APA. 

However, contrary to the government’s protestations, the

court’s inquiry does not end there. To the extent plaintiffs do

not challenge the specific denial of Dr. Afato’s waiver

application but rather the agencies’ failure to follow the

requisite procedures established by statute or regulation for

review of waiver applications, plaintiffs can state such a claim

for relief. In Abdelhamid, the Ninth Circuit stated: 

Where an agency action in a given case is found to have

been committed to agency discretion, federal courts

have jurisdiction to review that action “when the

alleged abuse of discretion involves violation by the

agency of constitutional, statutory, regulatory or

other legal mandates or restrictions” but do not have

jurisdiction to review such an action “when the alleged

abuse of discretion consists only of the making of an

informed judgment by the agency.”

Id. (quoting Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467, 471 (9th Cir.

1975)); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401

U.S. 402 (1971), overruled on other grounds by Califano v.

Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977) (strictly interpreting § 701(a)(2) of

the APA, drastically limiting and confining that section’s

applicability). In addition to challenging the waiver decision

itself, plaintiffs make several allegations that the agencies

involved in making the determination failed to follow their own

procedures set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations.

For example, plaintiffs allege DHS failed to transmit a

required copy to the Secretary of State of its determination that 

Dr. Afato would face extreme hardship if forced to leave the

United States for two years and return to his home country. More

specifically, plaintiffs allege that “the summary of the hardship

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was incomplete, lacking in detail and otherwise insufficient to

convey the depth of hardship that will be suffered absent a

waiver,” and that DHS “failed to transmit a complete copy of the

I-612 waiver application and all supporting materials” to the

DOS. (Compl. ¶¶ 44-45.) Plaintiffs assert that in doing so, 

DHS violated its own regulations which provide that:

If the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary of

DHS) determines that compliance with the two-year

home-country residence and physical presence

requirement would impose exceptional hardship upon the

spouse or child of the exchange visitor . . . the

Secretary of DHS shall transmit a copy of his [sic]

determination together with a summary of the details of

the expected hardship . . . to the Waiver Review

Division, in the Department of State’s Bureau of

Consular Affairs.

22 C.F.R. § 41.63(b)(2)(i) (emphasis added). To the extent 

plaintiffs allege that the Secretary of DHS failed to complete a

mandatory, not discretionary, task, plaintiffs state a cognizable

claim under the APA. See Strickland, 519 F.2d at 470.

Second, plaintiffs challenge the DOS’ actions in denying the

waiver on two separate grounds: (1) the DOS failed to consider

all evidence in the record before rendering a decision, ignoring

substantial evidence in the record without any rational basis and

failing to balance the hardship and policy objectives; and (2)

the DOS failed to state a reason for its denial of the waiver. 

Unlike the claims against DHS, neither of these allegations state

a claim which is reviewable under the APA. The DOS’ obligations

regarding the review of a waiver application are set forth in 22

C.F.R. § 41.63(b)(2)(ii):

With respect to those cases in which the Secretary of

DHS has determined that compliance with the two-year

home-country residence and physical presence

requirement would impose exceptional hardship upon the

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spouse or child of the exchange visitor, the Waiver

Review Division [of the DOS] shall review the program,

policy, and foreign relations aspects of the case, make

a recommendation, and forward it to the appropriate

office at DHS. 

22 C.F.R. § 41.63(b)(2)(ii). As set forth above, the DOS’

review of the program, policy, and foreign relations aspects

of Dr. Afato’s case is unreviewable under the APA. 

Abdelhamid, 774 F.2d at 1450 (“We note that 22 C.F.R. 

§ 514.32 [now § 41.63(b)(2)(ii)] directs the USIA Director

to review ‘the policy, program, and foreign relations

aspects of the case’ before transmitting a recommendation to

the Attorney General; however, this regulation raises no

legal issues for review.”). As to plaintiffs’ second

allegation, they have not directed the court to any statute

or regulation which requires the DOS to explain its

reasoning in denying a waiver. DHS regulations require the

DHS to “explain in writing the specific reasons for denial,”

8 C.F.R. § 103.3; however, no regulation places a similar

requirement on the DOS.

Lastly, plaintiffs claim that DHS failed to properly

“explain in writing the specific reasons for denial.” 8

C.F.R. § 103.3. In response to Dr. Afato’s waiver request,

he received a copy of his waiver application which included

a stamp stating “DENIED.” At the bottom of the form, in an

area designated for “remarks,” “Denied DOS 12/4/09” is

written. (Government’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket # 17],

filed March 24, 2010, Ex. E.) In Abdelhamid, the Ninth

Circuit held that district courts have jurisdiction over

such a claim; however, the court found that a short, oneCase 2:10-cv-00060-MCE-EFB Document 28 Filed 06/02/10 Page 11 of 16
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sentence statement of the reason for denying the waiver was

adequate under the then governing regulations which required

the applicant, if denied, to be notified of the “reasons

therefor.” 774 F.2d at 1450. Here, the government argues

that the “concededly sparse” information provided to Dr.

Afato sufficiently “explain[ed] in writing the specific

reasons for denial,” as held in Abdelhamid. 

This court disagrees. Viewing the facts plead in the

complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the

court cannot find, as a matter of law, that a response 

stating simply, “Denied DOS 12/4/09,” meets the requirements

of 8 C.F.R. § 103.3, a regulation which was not in effect at

the time of Abdelhamid. By a plain reading of the

regulation, Dr. Afato was entitled to an explanation in

writing of the specific reasons for the denial. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 103.3. Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state

a claim that the agency did not provide that explanation in

this case in violation of the governing standards.

In sum, to the extent plaintiffs seek by their

complaint to have this court determine whether Dr. Afato

should be granted a waiver pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e),

or a ruling that the DOS inadequately reviewed the program,

policy, and foreign relations aspects of Dr. Afato’s case,

as established in Abdelhamid, the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to hear such claims under the APA. 

Accordingly, the government’s motion to dismiss these claims

is GRANTED. However, to the extent plaintiffs allege that

DHS failed to follow its own regulations in transmitting a

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copy of its determination of hardship together with a

summary of the details of the expected hardship to the DOS,

and failed to give adequate written explanation of the

reasons for its denial of the waiver application to Dr.

Afato, plaintiffs have stated a claim for relief under the

APA, and the government’s motion to dismiss as to these

issues is, therefore, DENIED. 

B. Due Process

The government also moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ third

claim for relief, alleging a due process violation, on the

ground it fails to state a cognizable claim. In its

entirety, plaintiffs’ third claim for relief states: “The

Defendant’s denial of Dr. Afato’s waiver application without

any rational basis violates Plaintiffs’ right to due process

of law under the 5th Amendment to the United States

Constitution.” (Compl. ¶ 75.) Though not clear from the

complaint, based on plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion to

dismiss, it appears plaintiffs are claiming violations of

both procedural and substantive due process.

1. Procedural Due Process

In order to state a claim for a violation of procedural

due process, a plaintiff must show that he or she has a

legitimate claim of entitlement to the benefit claimed. 

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). A

unilateral expectation of a benefit is not enough to bring

denial of that benefit within the Due Process Clause. Id.

Here, plaintiffs have made no showing that Dr. Afato is

entitled by any source of law to a Section 1182(e) waiver. 

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Indeed, plaintiffs cannot make this showing because the

granting of a waiver is given to the discretion of the

Executive Branch. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (“the Attorney General

may waive the requirement of [a] two-year foreign residence

abroad in the case of any alien whose admission to the

United States is found by the Attorney General to be in the

public interest”) (emphasis added). Because plaintiffs

cannot show that Dr. Afato is legally entitled to a waiver

of the two-year residency requirement, the government’s

motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim

is GRANTED.

2. Substantive Due Process

Plaintiffs also argue that forcing Dr. Afato to leave

his family for two years to return to his home country

violates his substantive due process rights. It is well

recognized that familial association is a fundamental

interest protected by the substantive component of the Due

Process Clause. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland,

431 U.S. 494 (1977). However, challenges to immigration

statutes on this basis have been generally unsuccessful. 

See Munoz v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2003). “In

the immigration context, courts have ‘long recognized the

power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign

attribute exercised by the Government’s political

departments largely immune from judicial control.’” Id. at

954 quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345

U.S. 206, 210 (1953). For example, in Munoz the Ninth

Circuit upheld the deportation of a twenty-four-year-old who

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had been in the United States since he was one, had strong

familial and other connections within the United States, and

had no connections with his native country. Id. “Since

discretionary relief is a privilege created by Congress,

denial of such relief cannot violate a substantive interest

protected by the Due Process clause.” Id. citing INS v.

Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 30 (1996)) (recognizing the Attorney

General's “unfettered discretion” to award suspension of

deportation). Therefore, plaintiffs cannot state a claim

based on a theory of substantive due process and,

accordingly, the government’s motion to dismiss this claim

is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the government’s motion to

dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. To the

extent plaintiffs request that the court determine whether

Dr. Afato should be granted a waiver pursuant to Section

1182(e), or a ruling that the DOS inadequately reviewed the

program, policy, and foreign relations aspects of Dr.

Afato’s case, the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED. To the extent

plaintiffs allege the DHS failed to follow its own

regulations in transmitting a copy of its determination of

hardship together with a summary of the details of the

expected hardship to the DOS, and failed to give adequate

written explanation of the reasons for the denial of Dr.

Afato’s waiver application, the government’s motion to

dismiss is DENIED. Because plaintiffs cannot state a claim

Case 2:10-cv-00060-MCE-EFB Document 28 Filed 06/02/10 Page 15 of 16
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4 The government’s motion to dismiss makes no mention of

plaintiffs’ fourth claim for relief for violation of “Customary

International Law.” As such, the court renders no ruling

regarding that claim. 

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under either the procedural or substantive components of the

Due Process Clause, the government’s motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ third claim for relief is GRANTED.4

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 2, 2010

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:10-cv-00060-MCE-EFB Document 28 Filed 06/02/10 Page 16 of 16