Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01089/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01089-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARNULFO M. ACOSTA,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 05-CR-1570 W

ORDER DENYING MOTION

TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR

CORRECT SENTENCE

[DOC. 560]

 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Petitioner Arnulfo M. Acosta (“Petitioner”), a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,

filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (See

Motion [Doc. 560].) The United States of America (“Respondent”) opposes. (See

Opp’n [Doc. 569].) 

The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral

argument. See Civil Local Rule 7.1 (d)(1). For the reasons discussed below, the Court

DENIES Petitioner’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 8, 2005, a federal grand jury indicted Petitioner on one count of

conspiracy to commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and three counts of wire fraud

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under 18 U.S.C. § 134. (Opp’n. Ex. 1-6 [Doc. 569-1] at 4-13.) The indictment alleged

that Petitioner was involved in a massive Ponzi scheme that ultimately defrauded 1700

investors of more than $40 million. (Id.) 

On December 5, 2005, Respondent sent a settlement offer to Petitioner’s

appointed counsel, Kurt Hermansen. (Opp’n Ex. 1-6 at 15-17.) The terms of the offer

stated, in part, that the government would recommend a sentence at the low end of the

guideline range if Petitioner plead guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 371. (Id. at 15.) The

offer then said that “[Petitioner] must provide [Respondent] with a signed plea

agreement by January 4, 2006, and must enter his plea on or before January 9, 2006. 

Otherwise, the offer shall be deemed withdrawn.” (Id. at 16.) Although Hermansen

advised Respondent that he communicated the settlement offer to Petitioner, (Id. at

19), Petitioner did not sign the plea agreement or enter a guilty plea by the January 9

deadline.

On April 20, 2007, Hermansen proposed a plea agreement where Petitioner

would plead guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 371, as well as 26 U.S.C. § 7207. (Opp’n 1

Ex. 1-6 at 21-23.) Respondent counter-offered with a plea agreement requiring

Petitioner to plead to both 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 1001. (Id. at 25-39.) On 2

May 10, 2007, Petitioner accepted the counter-offer. (See Motion Ex. A [Doc. 560-1].) 

On December 11, 2009, this Court sentenced Petitioner to 87 months in custody, and

entered judgment on December 23, 2008. (Opp’n Ex. 1-6 at 41-44.)

On May 2, 2012, Petitioner moved to vacate, set side, or correct his sentence

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that but-for ineffective assistance of counsel,

Petitioner would have accepted Respondent’s first settlement offer, which carried a

lesser maximum sentence than the plea agreement that Petitioner ultimately signed.

//

 The maximum statutory sentence resulting from these counts is six years.

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 The maximum statutory sentence resulting from these counts is ten years.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal sentencing court is authorized to discharge or

re-sentence a defendant if it concludes that “the sentence was imposed in violation of

the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction

to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized

by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. This statute is

intended to alleviate the burden of habeas corpus petitions filed by federal prisoners in

the district of confinement, by providing an equally broad remedy in the more

convenient jurisdiction of the sentencing court. See United States v. Addonizio, 442

U.S. 178, 185 (1979); Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999).

The remedy available under § 2255 is as broad and comprehensive as that

provided by a writ of habeas corpus. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178,

184-85 (1979). But this remedy does not encompass all claimed errors in conviction

and sentencing. Id. at 187. A mere error of law does not provide a basis for collateral

attack unless the claimed error “resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice or in a

proceeding inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” Hamilton

v. United States, 67 F.3d 761, 763-64 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.

Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783-84 (1979)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner’s Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim is Time-Barred

Petitioner arguesthat but-for Hermansen’s failure to effectively communicate the

terms of Respondent’s first settlement offer, Petitioner would have accepted the offer’s

terms before the January 9, 2006 deadline. (Motion at 31.) Petitioner further argues

that his § 2255 motion is timely-filed given the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in

Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 

(See Reply.)

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28 U.S.C. § 2255 imposes a one-year limitation to motions made under the

statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The limitation period runs from the latest of: 

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the

date on which the impediment to making a motion created by

governmental action in the violation of the Constitution or the laws of the

United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a

motion by such governmental action; (3) the date on which the right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; and (4) the date on which the

facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.

Id. Petitioner argues his claim is timely under subsection 3, contending that the

Supreme Court’s decisions in Frye and Lafler constitute new rules of constitutional law. 

(See Reply.) Petitioner’s argument is unavailing.

In Buenrostro v. U.S., 697 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit

held that neither Frye nor Lafler could form the basis for petitioner’s second or

successive motion because neither case decided a new rule of constitutional law. The

Ninth Circuit found that Frye and Lafler “did not break new ground or impose a new

obligation on the State or Federal government,” and joined the Eleventh Circuit in

concluding that neither case decided a new rule of constitutional law. Id.; see also In

re Perez, 682 F.3d 930, 933-34 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Lafler and Frye are not new rules

because they were dictated by Strickland.”).

Although the Buenrostro decision concerned a petitioner’s second or successive

§ 2255 motion, this Courtfinds thatthe Ninth Circuit’s central holding regarding Lafler

and Frye also applies to a petitioner’s first § 2255 motion. As a result, Petitioner’s claim

does not meet the statutory criteria since Lafler and Frye did not announce new rules. 

Moreover, the Court is unconvinced by Petitioner’s argument that his motion is

governed by Geise v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2758 (2012), and not Buenrostro. 

(Traverse [Doc. 577] at 6; Reply [Doc. 580] at 1-2.) Petitioner mistakenly argues that

the Supreme Court granted certiorari to this case, when in fact certiorari was denied. 

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See Geise, 132 S. Ct. 2758. Further, Petitioner fails to explain why this Court should

find Geise, a case from the Second Circuit, more persuasive than Buenrostro, a Ninth

Circuit decision.

Therefore, since neither Frye nor Lafler introduced a new constitutional rule of

law, the Court finds that this ground of Petitioner’s motion lacks merit.

B. Petitioner’s Sentence Was not Prejudiced Because of His Ethnicity

Petitioner also argues that his sentence reflects constitutionally -impermissible

racially disparate treatment. (Motion at 36; Traverse at 7; Reply at 2.)

A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as to invidiously

discriminate on the basis of race. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)

(holding that racially selective enforcement of a facially-neutral law is presumptively

unconstitutional). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, therefore, may not be applied

to federal prisoners “with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical

denial by the State of equal protection.” Id. at 375. However, in Washington v. Davis,

426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976), the Supreme Court stated that “[d]isproportionate impact

. . . is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the

Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule . . . that racial classifications

are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of

considerations.” Rather, the Supreme Court requires that a challenger to official

government action provide evidence that “an invidious discriminatory purpose”

motivated the alleged racial discrimination. Id.; see also Village of Arlington Heights

v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 256 (1977) (“Proof of racially

discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection

Clause.”).

Petitioner argues that although his sentence was shorter than that of two of his

white co-defendants, his sentence was the only one ordered to run consecutively rather

than concurrently. (Motion at 36.) Petitioner contends that the Court’s invidious

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discrimination against Hispanics is the only explanation for the differences between his

sentence and those of his co-defendants. (Id.) 

However, Petitioner fails to produce any evidence that this Court maintained a

racially-discriminatory intent against Petitioner when applying the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines to his case. Petitioner’s bare assertion that the terms of his sentence were

different as a result of his ethnicity falls short of the Supreme Court’s standard for

establishing constitutionally-impermissible racial discrimination.

Further, the circumstances of his sentence contradict the claimed disparate

treatment. Of the four defendants indicted for the fraud, the two defendants listed first

in the indictment (reflecting Respondent’s belief that they had a greater role in the

fraud) received consecutive sentences: Petitioner andDefendant RandallT. Treadwell,

who is Caucasian. And although Defendant Ricky D. Sluder’s sentence of 60 months

and 188 months ran concurrent, his sentence is still 101 months longer than

Petitioner’s consecutive sentence totaling 87 months. These facts belie any disparate

treatment based on race.

Since Petitioner provides no evidence of the Court’s alleged raciallydiscriminatory intent or purpose, Petitioner’s § 2255 motion lacks merit.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s § 2255 motion to

vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. [Doc. 560.]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 24, 2013

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

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