Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02126/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02126-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Boy White, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 11-02126 PHX GMS (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles Ryan, Arizona Attorney ) 

General, )

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus on August 12, 2011. Respondents filed a

Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”)

(Doc. 19) on January 6, 2012. On January 31, 2012, Petitioner

filed a reply to the answer to his petition. See Doc. 20.

I Procedural History

A grand jury indictment returned July 12, 2006, charged

Petitioner with three counts of fraudulent schemes and

artifices, class 2 felonies (counts 1, 5, and 8 ), seven counts

of burglary in the second degree (counts 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, and

11), and one count of theft (count 3). See Answer, Exh. A.

In a written plea agreement signed by Petitioner on

February 16, 2007, Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to one

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count of theft (count 3), with one prior felony conviction; one

count of burglary in the second degree (count 6); and one count

of burglary in the second degree (count 9). See id., Exh. E.

The plea agreement provided, inter alia, that, with regard to

the sentence to be imposed on count 3, the charge of theft, the

crime carried a “presumptive sentence of 6.5 years; a minimum

sentence of 4.5 years (3.5 years if the Court makes an

exceptional circumstances finding); and a maximum sentence of

13.0 years (16.25 years if the trial court makes an exceptional

circumstances finding)”, and that Petitioner would serve “not

less than 6.5 years in the Department of Corrections.” Id.,

Exh. E. 

At a change of plea proceeding, the trial court

reviewed the plea agreement with Petitioner and advised him of

the range of possible sentences. Id., Exh. F & Exh. G.

Petitioner’s counsel advised the court at the beginning of the

proceeding that Petitioner was illiterate and could not read nor

write English. The court informed Petitioner that the maximum

sentence he could receive based on a guilty plea to count 3 was

13 years imprisonment, which could be increased to a term of 16

years upon a finding of special circumstances. The court noted

that Petitioner would not be sentenced to less than 6.5 years

imprisonment. 

At the change of plea proceeding Petitioner told the

court the plea agreement had been read to him and that his

lawyer had explained the plea agreement to Petitioner.

Petitioner was told he was waiving his right to a jury trial and

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to have a jury find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Petitioner stated that he had not consumed any drugs or alcohol

prior to entering the plea. Petitioner admitted the factual

basis for the crimes to the court.

On April 12, 2007, the trial court entered judgment

pursuant to Petitioner’s guilty plea, and sentenced Petitioner

to an aggravated term of eleven years imprisonment pursuant to

his conviction for theft (count 3). The court suspended

imposition of sentence on the other two counts and ordered that

Petitioner be placed on concurrent terms of probation for four

years upon his discharge from prison. Id., Exh. H & Exh. I at

12–14. 

On May 9, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for

post-conviction relief, seeking a reduction in his sentence, in

which he alleged: 

Defendant was told by his attorney that upon

a plea of guilty, Defendant would receive a

sentence of 6.5 years. When the Court

sentenced Defendant to 11 years and Defendant

asked his counsel why he didn’t get the 6.5

years sentence promised by counsel, counsel

snidely remarked, “Be glad you didn’t get 13

(years).” Defendant signed off on the plea

and initialed each paragraph only because

counsel explained it meant a 6.5 year

sentence. Defendant signed where counsel

indicated—because Defendant is illiterate! A

test administered by the Arizona Dept. of

Corrections 5 days after sentencing indicates

Defendant reads at a sub-first grade level

and that his language skills are at a first

grade level. (See: Exhibit “A”, attached

hereto and made a part hereof.) The words and

language of the plea are far too technical

for a 6 year old (--or first grader) mind to

comprehend. Defendant signed and initialed

where counsel indicated after counsel said it

meant a 6.5 year sentence. Based on the facts

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of this case, it is clear that the Plea was

coerced and/or induced by counsel and that it

was not knowingly and intelligently entered

by Defendant in violation of his

constitutional rights where defendant

received an 11 year sentence after being

promised a 6.5 year sentence. The facts also

appear to raise the argument that Defendant

also was denied effective assistance of

counsel. 

Id., Exh. N. 

Petitioner was appointed counsel to represent him in

his Rule 32 proceedings. See id., Exh. O. On August 10, 2007,

Petitioner’s appointed counsel informed the state court that she

was unable to find any claims for relief to raise on

Petitioner’s behalf. See id., Exh. P. The state Superior Court

ordered counsel to remain in an advisory capacity and granted

Petitioner 45 days in which to file a pro per petition for

post-conviction relief. See id., Exh. Q. 

On October 31, 2007, the state trial court dismissed

Petitioner’s Rule 32 proceedings because Petitioner had failed

to file a petition for post-conviction relief by the deadline

imposed by the court. Id., Exh. R. Petitioner did not seek

review of this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

On July 10, 2008, Petitioner initiated a second action

for state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona

Rules of Civil Procedure. Id., Exh. S & Exh. T. In attempting

to justify the successive and untimely nature of the action

Petitioner claimed “newly-discovered material facts exist which

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence”; “the

defendant’s failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction

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relief ... was without fault on the defendant’s part”; and

“there has been a significant change in the law that would

probably overturn the conviction or sentence.” Id., Exh. S.

See also id., Exh. T.

Petitioner asserted in the second Rule 32 action that:

1. Defendant is illiterate and requires

assistance as he cannot read or write and was

put in solitary confinement with no

assistance when he previously filed a “NOTICE

of POST-CONVICTION Relief.” Defendant

received legal mail from the Court and an

attorney but could not read it and waited

months for legal assistance. Defendant has

recently been moved to a new unit (Santa

Rita) at ASPC Tucson, where help is

available. 

2. Stokes v. Schrio, Apprendi, Blakely, State

v. Honorable Michael J Brown and the

statutory changes to A.R.S. 13-702 prescribe

the factors used by a judge to aggravate his

sentence must be determined by “trier of

fact” (jury) first. 

3. A new witness has been located. 

Id., Exh. S.

On July 25, 2008, the state Superior Court dismissed

Petitioner’s second Rule 32 action because he failed to

demonstrate that he was entitled to an exception under Rule

32.1(f); he failed to demonstrate a significant change in the

law; he had waived his right to a jury determination of

aggravating factors in his plea agreement; and he had not

demonstrated that newly-discovered material facts exist that

would probably have changed the verdict or sentence. Id., Exh.

U. Petitioner did not seek review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals.

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On March 13, 2009, Petitioner filed a third notice of

post-conviction relief, seeking review based on newly-discovered

evidence. Id., Exh. V. The Superior Court found that

Petitioner had sufficiently raised a claim to allow an untimely

filing, and gave Petitioner 60 days in which to file a pro per

petition for post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. W. 

Petitioner’s pro per Rule 32 petition, filed January 4,

2010, alleged:

 The appointed legal advocate, Scott Allen,

requested a mitigation hearing. Theresa

Sanders, the sentencing judge, refused. 

 Petitioner is diagnosed schizophrenic. He

was untreated at the time of the burglary

giving rise to the imprisonment. He was

diagnosed and put on medication while

awaiting trial. 

Id., Exh. Y.

On March 29, 2010, the state trial court dismissed

Petitioner’s third Rule 32 action, determining he had failed to

show any colorable claim for relief pursuant to Rule 32.1 of the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. CC. Petitioner

sought review of this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals,

which rejected the petition as untimely filed. Id., Exhs. DD,

FF, GG, JJ.

On February 25, 2011, Petitioner filed another notice

of post-conviction relief which alleged: 

Defendant is illiterate, and an inmate

reviewing his “plea agreement” saw that the

stipulated sentence was not followed.

Defendant was diagno[s]ed as schizophrenic,

which contributed to his lack of

understanding of the plea and sentencing

process. His counsel was ineffective, and did

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not follow through on the stipulated

sentence, nor did he bring a m[i]tigating

specialist. His Rule 32 counsel was

ineffective, and did not evaluate defendant’s

illiteracy, mental condition, and the

sentence stipulation. Defendant respectfully

requests that a lawyer be appointed to review

this case and represent him in a

post-conviction relief. 

Id., Exh. KK.

On March 28, 2011, the state Superior Court dismissed

Petitioner’s fourth Rule 32 action as untimely, finding that

Petitioner had “failed to state a claim for which relief could

be granted in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding.” Id., Exh. LL.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Court

of Appeals, which dismissed the petition for review as untimely

filed. Id., Exh. NN.

On August 11, 2011, Petitioner filed another notice of

petition for post-conviction, alleging: 

Defendant/Petitioner White was sentenced in

2007. He is illiterate. Another inmate at the

[illegible] unit looked at his time comp,

release date does not compute. He should have

been given credit for more days served in

Maricopa County Jail. Petitioner respectfully

requests that this court appoint an attorney

to help correct this error. 

Id., Exh. OO.

On September 2, 2011, the state Superior Court

dismissed the petition on the merits, stating: “the defendant is

not being held beyond the expiration of his sentence.” Id.,

Exh. PP. Petitioner did not seek review of this decision.

In his federal habeas petition Petitioner asserts he is

entitled to relief because he was denied his right to the

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effective assistance of counsel because his counsel allowed

Petitioner, who is illiterate, to sign a plea agreement

understanding that the agreement provided for a maximum sentence

of 6.5 years and Petitioner received a sentence of eleven years.

Petitioner also alleges counsel was ineffective because he did

not assert Petitioner’s incompetence; Petitioner avers he was

diagnosed as schizophrenic two years after his legal

proceedings. Petitioner contends he did not knowingly and

voluntarily enter the plea agreement. Petitioner alleges he was

heavily medicated at the time the plea agreement was explained

to him by his counsel. Petitioner asks, as relief, that his

sentence be reduced to the 6.5 years specified in the plea

agreement. Attached to the pleadings is a form dated April 17,

2007, and a letter dated September 15, 2008, indicating

Petitioner does not have a GED or high school diploma and that

Petition has learning disabilities as a result of schizophrenia

because his medications interfere with his focus. 

II Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Petitioner’s conviction became final ninety days after

the date the state court entered his conviction and sentenced

Petitioner. Prior to this date, Petitioner filed a timely state

action for post-conviction relief, which tolled the applicable

statute of limitations until October 31, 2007, when the state

trial court dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 proceedings because

Petitioner had failed to file a petition for post-conviction

relief by the deadline imposed by the court. Petitioner did not

seek review of this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Accordingly, the one-year statute of limitations with

regard to Petitioner’s habeas action began on or about November

30, 2007, and expired on November 29, 2008, unless it was tolled

by a “properly filed” application for state post-conviction

relief. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005). See

also Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 5–7 (2007) (holding that the

rule announced in Pace applies even where there are exceptions

to the state-court filing deadlines, and reaffirming that a

state court’s rejection of a petition as untimely is “the end of

the matter” for determining whether a petitioner is entitled to

tolling under § 2244(d)(2)); 

Petitioner’s second state action for post-conviction

relief, filed and dismissed in July of 2008 did not toll the

statute of limitations because they were not “properly filed”.

See Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003);

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003);

Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Webster v.

Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000). See Zepeda v.

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Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting

contention that state must prove that rules concerning time bars

are “firmly established and regularly followed before

noncompliance will render a petition improperly filed for AEDPA

tolling”). See also White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 882 (9th Cir.

2010) (per curiam) (relying on Zepeda to reject petitioner’s

claim that state timeliness requirement was not regularly

applied, stating, “the adequacy analysis used to decide

procedural default issues is inapplicable to the issue of

whether a state petition was ‘properly filed’ for purposes of

section 2244(d)(2)”).

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas

petition may be equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing on

time. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562

(2010); Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010).

A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15

(2005). See also Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008,

1011-14 (9th Cir. 2009).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

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Cir. 2010); Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris v.

Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2008); Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003), modified on other

grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling is

only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely habeas action. See Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49;

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling is also available

if the petitioner establishes their actual innocence of the

crimes of conviction. See Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933-34

(9th Cir. 2011).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is inappropriate in most cases

and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were

the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). It is

Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is

warranted in his case. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v.

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004); Gaston, 417

F.3d at 1034.

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A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and

lack of legal representation during the applicable filing period

do not constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling

because such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g.,

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-

14; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004). Equitable

tolling may be available when a petitioner can establish they

are so mentally ill that they are incompetent. Compare Laws v.

Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003), with Bills, 628

F.3d at 1098. Alleged errors by a petitioner’s appellate

counsel do not per se constitute an “extraordinary circumstance”

warranting equitable tolling. See Randle v. Crawford, 604 F.3d

1047, 1058 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Randle v. Skolnik,

131 S. Ct. 474 (2010); Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th

Cir. 2009). It is not sufficient that counsel was negligent;

only representation that meets the extraordinary misconduct

standard can be a basis for applying equitable tolling.

See Porter, 620 F.3d at 959.

Respondents assert:

In this case, Petitioner has not demonstrated

grounds for equitable tolling. Although

petitioner claims to be “illiterate,” and

claims to have been diagnosed as

“schizophrenic,” he has not demonstrated

either that the foregoing constituted

“extraordinary circumstances,” or that they

made it “impossible” for him to file his

Petition within the statutory period,

notwithstanding his “diligence.” See Steel v.

Ryan, 2011 WL 6093378 (9th Cir. 2011); Bills

v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir.2010)

(condition must be so “severe” that either

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the “petitioner was unable rationally or

factually to personally understand the need

to timely file” or “unable personally to

prepare a habeas petition”). Indeed, the

record reveals that Petitioner—who was

convicted in September 2002—was more than

capable of filing a timely federal petition,

but instead elected to pursue five state

petitions for post-conviction relief, with

the result that the statutory period expired

on November 30, 2008, over 2 1/2 years before

Petitioner filed his federal petition. See

Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034–35 (9th

Cir. 2005). Having failed to demonstrate that

“extraordinary circumstances beyond his

control” made it “impossible” for Petitioner

to file a timely federal petition, equitable

tolling is not available. Lambert, 465 F.3d

at 969; see also United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)

(upholding dismissal of petition filed 1 day

after limitations period expired).

Allowing that Petitioner’s diagnosis of mental illness

and the fact that he diligently pursued post-conviction remedies

warrants equitable tolling, the Magistrate Judge will consider

Respondents’ argument that Petitioner failed to properly exhaust

his federal habeas claims in the state courts. Respondents

contend that the claims for relief are also barred by the

doctrine of exhaustion and procedural default.

B. Exhaustion and procedural default

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

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1

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2010).

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presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose

v.Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).1

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court”

test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932

(D. Ariz. 2007). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

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2 A petitioner must present to the state courts the

“substantial equivalent” of the claim presented in federal court.

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513-14 (1971);

Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). Full and fair

presentation requires a petitioner to present the substance of his

claim to the state courts, including a reference to a federal

constitutional guarantee and a statement of facts that entitle the

petitioner to relief. See Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th

Cir. 2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007).

Although a habeas petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the

federal constitution” to fairly present a claim to the state courts,

Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78, 92 S. Ct. at 512-13, they must do more

than present the facts necessary to support the federal claim. See

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

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specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351.2 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2010). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to

state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s

“procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at

92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

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barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal.

See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005);

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

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convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

C. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong

of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v.

Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal

v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish

prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged error

“worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting

his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.”

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595

(1982). See also Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16

(9th Cir. 1998).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is

not cause to excuse procedural default. See Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986).

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Additionally, allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel does not establish cause for the failure to properly

exhaust a habeas claim in the state courts unless the specific

Sixth Amendment claim providing the basis for cause was itself

properly exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111

S. Ct. at 2567; Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir.

2004). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his criminal proceedings

with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617;

Correll, 137 F.3d at 1415-16. Establishing prejudice requires

a petitioner to prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional

violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have

been convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224

F.3d 1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d

1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice

must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not

examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to

establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43,

102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123

n.10.

D. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

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miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner does not contend that he is actually

innocent of the crimes of conviction, accordingly, no

fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur absent a

consideration of the merits of Petitioner’s habeas claims.

Additionally, even if Petitioner’s mental disabilities

constitute cause for his procedural default of his habeas

claims, Petitioner cannot show prejudice arising from the

procedural default of his claims.

The “clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” at issue in this case is the test for

ineffective assistance of counsel claims set

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, [] (1984), and in Hill

v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, []

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(1985). Under Strickland, to establish a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

the petitioner must show (1) grossly

deficient performance by his counsel, and (2)

resultant prejudice. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.

Ct. 2052. In Hill, the Supreme Court adapted

the two-part Strickland standard to

challenges to guilty pleas based on

ineffective assistance of counsel, holding

that a defendant seeking to challenge the

validity of his guilty plea on the ground of

ineffective assistance of counsel must show

that (1) his “counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of

reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for [his]

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded

guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial.” 474 U.S. at 57-59, 106 S. Ct. 366.

Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007).

To establish deficient performance, a person

challenging a conviction must show that

counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness. A court

considering a claim of ineffective assistance

must apply a strong presumption that

counsel’s representation was within the wide

range’ of reasonable professional assistance.

The challenger’s burden is to show that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the “counsel”

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment.

Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739 (2011) (internal citations

and quotations omitted), citing Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788

(“The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted

to incompetence under ‘prevailing professional norms,’ not

whether it deviated from best practices or most common

custom.”). Counsel’s performance is not deficient nor

prejudicial when counsel “fails” to raise an argument that

counsel reasonably believes would be futile. See Premo, 131 S.

Ct. at 741; Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788.

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Furthermore, to succeed on a claim that his counsel was

constitutionally ineffective regarding a guilty plea, a

petitioner must show that his counsel’s advice as to the

consequences of the plea was not within the range of competence

demanded of criminal attorneys. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart,

474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985). Although the

Court may proceed directly to the prejudice prong when

undertaking the Strickland analysis, the Court may not assume

prejudice solely from counsel’s allegedly deficient performance.

See Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 n.3 (9th Cir.

2000).

Petitioner has not established that his counsel’s

performance was deficient, or that any alleged deficiency

prejudiced Petitioner. The plea agreement was beneficial to

Petitioner and Petitioner indicated both in the written plea

agreement, which was read to him, and at the plea colloquy that

he understood the terms of the plea agreement and was pleading

guilty voluntarily and knowingly. Petitioner has not

demonstrated that, but for counsel’s advice with regard to the

plea agreement, Petitioner would have chosen to go forward to

trial on all of the counts charged in the indictment. Nowhere

in his pleadings does Petitioner contend that he could not be

found guilty of the other charges stated in the indictment and

Petitioner fully understood that, if convicted of the other

charges in the indictment, Petitioner faced a lengthy sentence.

Petitioner’s unsupported statements in his federal

habeas pleadings that his guilty plea was not voluntary do not

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supply the “clear and convincing evidence” standard necessary

for the Court to conclude that Petitioner’s plea was not knowing

or voluntary. Petitioner’s contemporaneous statements regarding

his understanding of the plea agreement carry substantial weight

in determining if his entry of a guilty plea was knowing and

voluntary. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.

Ct. 1621, 1629 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry

a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of

conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to

summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the

record are wholly incredible”); Doe v. Woodford, 508 F.3d 563,

571 (9th Cir. 2007); Restucci v. Spencer, 249 F. Supp. 2d 33, 45

(D. Mass. 2003) (collecting cases so holding).

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s federal habeas petition was not timely.

Petitioner is arguably entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations based on his illiteracy and mental

illness. Petitioner failed to exhaust his federal habeas claims

in the Arizona state courts by fairly presenting them to the

Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally correct manner and is

now barred from doing so by Arizona’s rules regarding waiver and

preclusion. Even if Petitioner has shown cause for his

procedural default, he has not established prejudice arising

from his default of his claims, or that a fundamental

miscarriage of justice will occur absent consideration of the

merits of the claims.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. White’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

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of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 8th day of February, 2012.

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