Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02038/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02038-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 375
Nature of Suit: False Claims Act
Cause of Action: 31:3729 False Claims Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel.

BANISHA EVANS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PHLEBXPRESS, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-02038-DAD-SCR

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE

PLAINTIFF EVANS’ MOTION TO STAY

(Doc. No. 70)

On July 26, 2018, relator-plaintiff Banisha Evans filed a qui tam complaint in this court 

pursuant to the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733. (Doc. No. 1.) On August 7, 2024, 

the United States and relator entered into a settlement agreement with defendants Veni-Express, 

Inc. and Myrna Steinbaum. (Doc. No. 70 at 1.) On September 6, 2024, the United States 

declined to intervene in this case as to the remaining defendants. (Doc. No. 65.) On October 15, 

2024, the State of California also declined to intervene in this case. (Doc. No. 66.) On October 

22, 2024, this court lifted the previously ordered sealing of this action, set an initial scheduling 

conference, and issued a summons. (Doc. Nos. 67, 68, 69.) The summons has not been returned 

executed.

On December 23, 2024, relator-plaintiff filed a motion for administrative relief seeking a 

stay of this action pending settlement discussions. (Doc. No. 70 at 1–2.) Relator-plaintiff states 

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that “the United States of America has informed Relator’s counsel that it is in discussions to settle 

this case” and “Relator does not wish to unnecessarily litigate this case if settlement is pending, as 

that would be a waste of judicial resources as well as attorney time and money.” (Id. at 1.) 

Relator-plaintiff notes that “the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power 

inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time 

and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 

(1936); accord Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 411 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have long 

recognized that courts have inherent power to stay proceedings and ‘to control the disposition of 

the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for 

litigants.’”) (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 254); Ernest Bock, LLC v. Steelman, 76 F.4th 827, 842 

(9th Cir. 2023). Deciding whether to grant a stay “calls for the exercise of judgment, which must 

weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55. In 

considering whether to grant a stay, this court must weigh several factors, including “[1] the 

possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, [2] the hardship or inequity which 

a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and [3] the orderly course of justice measured 

in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be 

expected to result from a stay.” CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing 

Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55); see also Ernest Bock, LLC, 76 F.4th at 842. 

Relator-plaintiff’s pending motion does not explicitly address any of the three CMAX

factors. The court could construe relator-plaintiff’s argument that the failure to grant a stay 

would cause “a waste of . . . attorney time and money” as an issue of hardship pursuant to the 

second CMAX factor. (Id.) The court could also construe relator-plaintiff’s argument that it 

would be unnecessary to “litigate this case if settlement is pending” as one addressing the orderly 

course of justice pursuant to the third CMAX factor. (Id.) However, relator-plaintiff’s motion is 

devoid of any discussion regarding possible damage that could result from the granting of a stay

pursuant to the first CMAX factor. 

Further, Local Rule 233(a)(5) states that a motion for administrative relief such as this one 

“must include a statement setting forth the position of all parties affected by the motion, or a 

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statement explaining why such position could not be ascertained.” The court observes that 

relator-plaintiff’s motion does not comply with Local Rule 233(a)(5), because while her motion 

indicates that the “United States of America does not oppose this motion,” she does not set forth 

the positions of the defendants or indicate why their positions could not be ascertained. (Doc. No. 

70 at 1.) In light of the fact that this action has been pending before the court for over six years 

now, the court would expect relator-plaintiff’s counsel to be in a position to readily make a more 

robust showing in support of their motion for a stay of this action. 

In light of the deficiencies noted above, relator-plaintiff’s motion is hereby denied without 

prejudice to a refiling that complies with Local Rule 233(a)(5) and invokes the appropriate factors 

a court must consider in granting a stay under the Supreme Court’s decision in Landis.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 13, 2025 

DALE A. DROZD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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