Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05283/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05283-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 4, 2002 Decided November 5, 2002

No. 01-5283

National Association of Home Builders,

Appellant

v.

Gale A. Norton, Secretary of Interior, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv01923)

Rafe Petersen argued the cause for appellant. With him on

the briefs was Lawrence R. Liebesman. Duane J. Desiderio

entered an appearance.

David J. Ball, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

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Before: Edwards, Rogers and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: The principal issue in this appeal is

whether Exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act

("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(6) (2000), applies to site-specific

information about the location of an endangered species

where disclosure might identify individuals' private property.

The National Association of Home Builders ("NAHB") appeals the grant of summary judgment to the Secretary of the

Interior on NAHB's request for release of information on the

location of nesting sites of the cactus ferruginous pygmy owl

in Arizona. The Secretary provided NAHB with numerous

documents on the location of the owl, but, invoking several

FOIA exemptions, the Secretary redacted the documents to

conceal most of the site-specific location that NAHB sought.

Assuming that the requested files are "similar files" under

Exemption 6, we hold, upon de novo review, that the public

interest in disclosure outweighs the privacy interests reflected in the Secretary's evidence. Accordingly, because

Exemptions 3, 4, and 5 do not bar release of the requested

documents, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and

remand the case with instructions to order the Secretary to

release the site-specific information without revealing individual property owners' names, which NAHB no longer requests.

I.

In 1997 the Secretary of the Interior designated the pygmy

owl as an endangered species and two years later exercised

authority under the Endangered Species Act to designate

critical habitats for the pygmy owl in Arizona. 16 U.S.C.

s 1533(a) (2000); Determination of Endangered Status for

the Cactus Ferruginous Pygmy-Owl in Arizona, 62 Fed. Reg.

10,730 (Mar. 10, 1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17);

Designation of Critical Habitat for the Cactus Ferruginous

Pygmy-Owl, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,419, 37,423-25 (July 12, 1999)

(to be codified as 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) ("1999 Final Rule"). As a

result, large tracts of land in southwest Arizona--over

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731,000 acres--were set aside as critical habitat for the owl,

alerting "the public as well as land-managing agencies to the

importance of these areas." 64 Fed. Reg. at 37,419, 37,422.

In the Final Rule, the Secretary explained that he "used data

on known pygmy-owl locations"--the site-specific information

that NAHB now seeks--initially to identify "important areas"

for the owl. Id. at 37,423. The Secretary then used biological information to connect these "important areas" to determine the owl's likely habitats. Id.

In 1998, NAHB filed a FOIA request seeking "previously

documented, site-specific locations, with appropriate addresses, identified landmarks, parcel or subdivision maps, polygons, or other points of reference sufficient to allow an

average person to locate the property where members of the

species are known or believed to exist." The Secretary,

acting through the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS"), responded to the request by producing hundreds of documents

related to the location of pygmy owls. The Secretary redacted these documents, however, to conceal most of the sitespecific locations that NAHB sought. Specifically, the Secretary redacted all section information, site directions, site

names, and the names and addresses of owners of private

lands on which the pygmy owls and their nests have been

located.

Dissatisfied with the Secretary's response, NAHB filed this

lawsuit to compel disclosure of the owl-sighting information

on the grounds that NAHB was entitled to the data as a

matter of law under FOIA. The Secretary defended the

withholding of information under four FOIA Exemptions:

Exemption 3, for information "specifically exempted from

disclosure" by another statute; Exemption 4, for "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a

person and privileged or confidential"; Exemption 5, for

"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which

would not be available by law to a party other than an agency

in litigation with the agency"; and Exemption 6, for "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which

would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy...." 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(3)-(6). The Secretary preUSCA Case #01-5283 Document #711984 Filed: 11/05/2002 Page 3 of 17
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sented the affidavit of FWS Director Jamie Rappaport Clark,

which recounted, in pertinent part, experiences in Texas and

Arizona, where bird enthusiasts traveled to the location of

pygmy owl sightings and adversely affected both the pygmy

owls and the private property owners. In Clark's opinion,

such incidents have created in landowners a "well founded"

fear that birdwatchers, in the hopes of glimpsing the owl, will

unlawfully invade the landowners' private property.

The district court granted summary judgment for the

Secretary, ruling that the Secretary properly redacted the

information under Exemption 6, but that Exemptions 3, 4,

and 5 did not apply. The court, relying on the observations

in Texas and the Arizona incident, concluded that "releasing

the pygmy owl data would result in an unwarranted invasion

of privacy." The court recognized that withholding the information would deny the public information that would enable it

to locate the pygmy owl's nesting sites, and that the public

would therefore be unable to determine whether the Secretary had properly designated critical habitats for the owl.

Still, the district court was satisfied that the Secretary's

disclosure in the 1999 Final Rule of the method by which

critical habitats are designated was sufficient to render the

decisionmaking process clear, "even though the ultimate decisions remain secret."

II.

The Endangered Species Act instructs the Secretary to

"determine whether any species is an endangered species or a

threatened species because of" a range of enumerated factors,

including "the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range...." 16 U.S.C.

s 1533(a)(1). Once the Secretary identifies a species as

endangered, the Act imposes penalties upon "any person"

who engages in certain prohibited actions with respect to the

species. Id. s 1538(a). The Act also provides that the

Secretary, "to the maximum extent prudent and determinable," shall "designate any habitat of [an endangered or

threatened species] which is then considered to be a critical

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habitat...." Id. s 1533(a)(3). The Act specifies that the

Secretary should base the critical habitat designation on "the

best scientific data available" and should consider "the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of specifying

any particular area as a critical habitat." s 1533(b)(2). In

the 1999 Final Rule, the Secretary explained that, in making

critical habitat designations, the information about the location of an endangered species is used to form "an interconnected system of suitable and potential habitat areas...."

64 Fed. Reg. at 37,423. "[W]ithin the delineated critical

habitat boundaries," the Secretary noted, "only lands containing, or ... likely to develop, those habitat components that

are essential for the primary biological needs of the pygmyowl are considered critical habitat." Id.

The purpose of the Freedom of Information Act, as the

Supreme Court instructed in Department of the Air Force v.

Rose, is " 'to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and

open agency action to the light of public scrutiny....' " 425

U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (citation omitted). FOIA reflects " 'a

general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language.' " Id. at 360-61 (quoting S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong.,

1st Sess., 3 (1965)). Although Congress enumerated nine

exemptions from the disclosure requirement, "these limited

exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure,

not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act." Id. at 361;

see also United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173

(1991); United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for

Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989). At all times

courts must bear in mind that FOIA mandates a "strong

presumption in favor of disclosure," Ray, 502 U.S. at 173, and

that the statutory exemptions, which are exclusive, are to be

"narrowly construed," Rose, 425 U.S. at 361. In reviewing de

novo a grant of summary judgment for the government in a

FOIA case, the court therefore remains "mindful that the

'burden is on the agency' to show that requested material

falls within a FOIA exemption." Petroleum Info. Corp. v.

United States Dep't of the Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1433 (D.C.

Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

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A.

Under Exemption 6, a federal agency may withhold "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of

which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of

personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(6). Thus, the threshold

question is whether the requested information is contained in

a personnel, medical, or similar file. United States Dep't of

State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 598 (1982); N.Y. Times

Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc).

If it is, then the court must determine whether the information is of such a nature that its disclosure would constitute a

clearly unwarranted privacy invasion. Dep't of State v. Wash.

Post, 456 U.S. at 498; N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d at

1004. This second inquiry requires the court "to balance 'the

individual's right of privacy' against the basic policy of opening 'agency action to the light of public scrutiny'...." Ray,

502 U.S. at 175 (quoting Rose, 425 U.S. at 372). In undertaking this analysis, the court is guided by the instruction that,

"under Exemption 6, the presumption in favor of disclosure is

as strong as can be found anywhere in the Act." Wash. Post

Co. v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 690

F.2d 252, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

In considering the scope of the "similar files" language in

Exemption 6, the Supreme Court has made clear that information that "applies to a particular individual" may qualify

for protection. Dep't of State v. Wash. Post, 456 U.S. at 602.

The Court explained in Washington Post that Congress intended the phrase "similar files" to have "a broad, rather

than a narrow, meaning." Id. at 600. This court accordingly

has observed that Exemption 6 "is designed to protect personal information in public records, even if it is not embarrassing or of an intimate nature...." Nat'l Ass'n of Retired

Fed. Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

To date, courts interpreting the phrase have considered primarily government files that were maintained on a specific

individual or group. For example, Reporters Committee, 489

U.S. at 749, involved a request for FBI "rap sheets"--

criminal records that identified particular individuals--and

Ray, 502 U.S. at 166, involved a request for "information

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about Haitian nationals who had attempted to emigrate illegally to the United States and were involuntarily returned to

Haiti." Also, in New York Times Co. v. NASA, this court

broadly interpreted the phrase to encompass a recording of a

person's "voice inflection at a particular moment," which the

court viewed as highly "personal information" pertaining to

specific individuals. 920 F.2d at 1005.

The files that NAHB seeks are not files that would normally be described as "detailed Government records on an individual." Dep't of State v. Wash. Post, 456 U.S. at 602. The

Secretary does not suggest that the files contain information

on a person's date or place of birth, marriage or employment

history, or other intimate details or "damaging information."

Id. at 601. Rather, NAHB seeks only the government's files

showing where pygmy owls and their nests had been sighted

in Arizona. Exemption 6's "similar files" do not include this

geographic information, NAHB contends, because such an

expansive reading would mean that any government document referring to an individual in some manner as to identify

that individual would fall within the exemption. At oral

argument NAHB clarified that it does not seek release of any

individual property owners' names; instead, it requests only

the site information, such as the square and lot number where

the owls were sighted. However, to the extent that square

and lot information can lead to identification of individual

property owners through a search of state records, the information is at least arguably personal information that falls

within the category of "similar files," for the inquiry turns on

"whether the information in the file 'applies to a particular

individual,' " not " 'the nature of the file[ ] in which the

information [is] contained'...." N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA,

920 F.2d at 1007 (quoting Dep't of State v. Wash. Post, 456

U.S. at 599, 602).

The court need not resolve whether the pygmy owl records

constitute "similar files" under Exemption 6. The Supreme

Court has embraced the legislative history stating that " 'the

balancing of private against public interests, not the nature of

the files in which the information was contained, should limit

the scope of the exemption.' " Dep't of State v. Wash. Post,

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456 U.S. at 599 (quoting S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st

Sess., 9 (1965)). Accordingly, we turn to those interests,

assuming without deciding that the requested pygmy owl

records are "similar files" under Exemption 6.

To establish that the release of information contained in

government files would result in a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, the court first asks whether disclosure "would

compromise a substantial, as opposed to a de minimis, privacy interest." Horner, 879 F.2d at 874. If a significant

privacy interest is at stake, the court then must weigh that

interest "against the public interest in the release of the

records in order to determine whether, on balance, disclosure

would work a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Id. (citations omitted). The public interest to be

weighed against the privacy interest in this balancing test is

"the extent to which disclosure would serve the 'core purposes of the FOIA' " by " 'contribut[ing] significantly to public

understanding of the operations or activities of the government.' " United States Dep't of Def. v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487,

495 (1994) (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 775).

Thus, unless a FOIA request advances "the citizens' right to

be informed about 'what their government is up to,' " Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773, no relevant public interest is at

issue.

The Secretary relies on the declaration of FWS Director

Clark to show that disclosure of private landowners' names

and addresses would constitute an unwarranted invasion of

those individuals' privacy because birdwatchers and other

persons intensely interested in the location of pygmy owls will

unlawfully trespass upon the private lands. Clark described

an incident in Arizona in which the Audubon Society placed

the location of a pygmy owl sighting on its website and

telephone hotline: "On the same day the information was

placed on the Audubon hotlines several car loads of birders

were observed in the area of the reported location. The

following day birding groups included at least two out-of-state

vehicles." Clark noted that "property owners indicated displeasure at the number of people on and around their properties" during the Arizona incident. She added that, in light of

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these prior experiences, "several landowners have already

discussed their fears of disclosure of the information...."

Clark also referred ambiguously to adverse effects from

birders on pygmy owls in Texas, but at oral argument the

Secretary disavowed any reliance on incidents in Texas as

evidence of trespass by birdwatchers.

NAHB contends that the district court erred in relying on

what it characterizes as Director Clark's speculative and

internally inconsistent declaration. Essentially, NAHB maintains that the single Arizona incident cited by Clark is

insufficient to support the speculation that birdwatchers

would not only seek out this information in order to locate the

owls but would then go to the location and unlawfully trespass

on private property. Although it is true that Clark noted

that landowners "indicated displeasure at the number of

people on and around their properties," it is also true that

Clark did not affirmatively state that illegal trespass was a

problem during the Arizona incident. And in the 1974 study

on which Clark based her conclusion regarding adverse effects on the Texas pygmy owl population, the author stated

that the birds were located on "privately owned land," and

thus "harassment may not be a problem." Further, the

Clark affidavit included as an exhibit an advertisement by a

private ranch proclaiming the presence of pygmy owls on its

property, but the Secretary offered no evidence that this

establishment has been overrun by lawless birdwatchers, as

feared by the Secretary and the district court.

The Secretary's evidentiary support for unlawful trespass,

therefore, is weak. One incident in which there is no claim

that unlawful trespass occurred hardly demonstrates a general problem, and there is nothing to suggest that property

owners cannot be protected against unlawful trespassers.

Even if property owners have expressed displeasure about

birdwatchers' presence on and around their properties, those

statements bear little weight in light of the landowners'

awareness that the owl information could be disclosed. Before allowing the Arizona Game and Fish Department ("State

agency") to survey on their land for pygmy owls, the property

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though the information will be held confidential, it is subject

to public disclosure laws and court orders. As the Secretary

rightly notes, this court has stated that where "a substantial

probability that disclosure will cause an interference with

personal privacy" exists, "it matters not that there may be

two or three links in the causal chain." Horner, 879 F.2d at

878. Here, however, the problem is one of likelihood, not

causation, for the Secretary has failed to show that unlawful

trespass is likely to occur. Although we do not question

either the expertise of the FWS Director, who is familiar with

the "tenacity" of birdwatchers, or other indications that birdwatching and other forms of ecotourism are growing substantially in popularity, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or

Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain Search for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1127, 1146 (1999), our conclusion

recognizes the paucity of evidence from which a reasonable

factfinder could find that disclosure of site information will

result in unlawful trespass on private property. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

NAHB contends, somewhat less persuasively, that "minimal privacy interest" exists in the "unfocused information"

that would be disclosed in this case. It suggests that the data

is of dubious reliability for the purposes for which the Secretary speculates it will be used, because it is too voluminous

and too old, and because it includes both active and inactive

sightings. The Secretary's privacy claim holds some merit,

however, because the address of a private landowner on

whose property an endangered species has been spotted is

not necessarily "unfocused information." Knowing the

square and lot numbers of a parcel of land is only a step from

being able to identify from state records the name of the

individual property owner. In the context of an individual

residence, the court has recognized that "the privacy interest

of an individual in avoiding the unlimited disclosure of his or

her name and address is significant.... In our society,

individuals generally have a large measure of control over the

disclosure of their own identities and whereabouts." Horner,

879 F.2d at 875 (citations omitted). Likewise, the Supreme

Court has evinced a reluctance in the FOIA context "to

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disparage the privacy of the home, which is accorded special

consideration in our Constitution, laws, and traditions."

Dep't of Def. v. FLRA, 510 U.S. at 501 (citations omitted). As

in Horner, "disclosure of the information requested here

could interfere with the subjects' reasonable expectations of

undisturbed enjoyment in the solitude and seclusion of their

own homes." 879 F.2d at 876 (emphasis added). But Horner

is not entirely analogous. There the court was confronted

with the concern that former federal government employees

would be subject to " 'an unwanted barrage of mailings and

personal solicitations' " from entities targeting retired or disabled persons. Id. at 876 (citation omitted). Here, the

private property owners are similarly concerned that disclosure will result in unwanted contact from strangers. Insofar

as the pygmy owl is concerned, however, the property owners

already have divulged information about the sightings to the

State agency with the understanding that the information,

although confidential, might be subject to release under disclosure laws.

Viewing the asserted privacy interests as involving more

than minimal invasions of individual privacy, the court must

still address the question whether the public interest in

disclosure outweighs the individual privacy concerns. As

noted, our inquiry is limited to the question whether disclosure will shed light on the "agency's performance of its

statutory duties." Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n, 519

U.S. 355, 356 (1997) (per curiam) (citations omitted). We are

unpersuaded that knowledge of the Secretary's method is

either the same as disclosing site information or sufficient to

reveal what the Secretary "is up to" in designating habitats in

particular areas. If the information about owl sightings is

erroneous or otherwise deficient, or if the habitat designation

is unrelated to the sightings, the method described in the

1999 Final Rule cannot alone save the Secretary from reaching a flawed result.

NAHB asserts several "public" interests in disclosure. The

first fails because the " 'purposes for which the request for

information is made' " have "no bearing on whether information must be disclosed under FOIA." Bibles, 519 U.S. at 356

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(quoting Dep't of Def. v. FLRA, 510 U.S. at 496). Thus,

NAHB contends that the pygmy owl data is "vital to NAHB's

effective participation" in the Interior Department's reconsideration of the critical habitat designations. Viewed narrowly,

as merely enhancing NAHB's lobbying efforts, this purpose

does not relate to "the only relevant public interest in the

FOIA balancing analysis"--the extent to which disclosure

would shed light on the "agency's performance of its statutory

duties." Id.. at 355-56 (citations omitted). To the extent

NAHB maintains that property owners need to know whether

pygmy owls have been spotted on their property in order to

assess their potential liabilities under the Endangered Species Act, the Secretary points out that "landowners are

informed when pygmy owls are located on their property."

Appellees' Br. at 25.

But NAHB also points to the public interest in examining

the FWS's use of the owl data in the 1999 critical habitat

designation and "on a day-to-day basis ... in a broad array of

other contexts." Appellant's Br. at 23. This interest in

exploring how the Secretary and the FWS are using the

information is distinct from NAHB's more limited interest in

itself using the information to advance its lobbying efforts.

The former relates to "citizens' right to be informed about

'what their government is up to,' " Reporters Comm., 489 U.S.

at 773; the latter does not. The Secretary's method set forth

in the 1999 Final Rule for designating habitats affords, as the

district court recognized, only a partial understanding of why

particular areas are designated as habitats. Because disclosure of site-specific information about the pygmy owls could

contribute "to public understanding of the operations or

activities of the government," Dep't of Def. v. FLRA, 510 U.S.

at 495, it constitutes a cognizable public interest under FOIA.

Upon balancing the privacy interest against the public

interest, we conclude that the privacy interest is relatively

weak. As the court's reasoning in Horner indicates, disclosure of site specific information is not "inherently and always

a significant threat" to privacy. 879 F.2d at 877. Rather, the

privacy threat depends on the individual characteristics that

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the disclosure reveals and the consequences that are likely to

ensue. Here, to disclose that a pygmy owl has been sighted

on an individual's property does not disclose any information

about that individual, other than that the individual owns

property where an owl has been sighted. Although NAHB

has clarified on appeal that it no longer seeks the names of

individual property owners, such information can be obtained

from state records, and, accordingly, the clarification does not

affect our analysis. In Horner, by contrast, the requested

disclosure would have revealed not only names and addresses

but also the additional fact that the individuals on the list

were retired or disabled and received assistance from the

federal government. Id. at 874. Moreover, Horner was

concerned about the privacy of the home, whereas the Secretary here sweeps more broadly to protect names and addresses of commercial and residential property.

The other reasons put forth by the Secretary do not lend

weight to the asserted privacy interest. The Secretary has

established only the speculative potential of a privacy invasion

without any degree of likelihood. The access agreement

between private landowners and the State agency neither

significantly supports the privacy interest asserted nor bars

disclosure, as the agreement expressly provides that the

information is subject to public disclosure. Given the strong

public interest in knowing "what the government is up to," we

hold that the Secretary has failed to rebut the presumption

favoring disclosure, which is at its zenith under Exemption 6,

Wash. Post v. HHS, 690 F.2d at 261, by demonstrating that

disclosure would be "clearly unwarranted" so as to "tilt the

balance" against disclosure. Id. (citations omitted).

B.

The Secretary additionally relies on Exemptions 3, 4, and 5

to justify withholding the information NAHB requests. We

agree with the district court that these exemptions do not

preclude disclosure.

Exemption 3 covers data "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute ... provided that such statute (A) reUSCA Case #01-5283 Document #711984 Filed: 11/05/2002 Page 13 of 17
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quires that the matters be withheld from the public in such

a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld." 5 U.S.C.

s 552(b)(3). Consistent with congressional intent that exemptions to disclosure be narrowly construed, the court has

identified nondisclosure statutes as those that are "the product of congressional appreciation of the dangers inherent in

airing particular data" and that "incorporate[ ] a formula

whereby the administrator may determine precisely whether

the disclosure in any instance would pose the hazard that

Congress foresaw." Am. Jewish Cong. v. Kreps, 574 F.2d

624, 628-29 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Thus, "only explicit nondisclosure statutes that evidence a congressional determination

that certain materials ought to be kept in confidence will be

sufficient to qualify under the exemption." Irons and Sears

v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

The Secretary's reliance on the Endangered Species Act as

a statute that establishes particular criteria for withholding

particular types of matters is misplaced. Looking first to

"the plain language of the statute," Ass'n of Retired R.R.

Workers, Inc. v. United States R.R. Ret. Bd., 830 F.2d 331,

334 (D.C. Cir. 1987), there is nothing in the Endangered

Species Act that refers to withholding information. The

Secretary points to s 1533(a)(3), which requires the Secretary, to "the maximum extent prudent and determinable," to

"designate" by regulation "any habitat of such species which

is then considered to be critical habitat." The Secretary also

points to s 1533(b)(2), which provides that "[t]he Secretary

may exclude any area from critical habitat if [s]he determines

that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of

specifying such area as part of the critical habitat...." But

nothing in this language refers to nondisclosure of information.

Contending that s 1533 supplies criteria for determining

whether it would be "prudent" to include or withhold particular location information in the critical habitat designation, the

Secretary also points to legislative history that, in her view,

suggests that Congress contemplated permitting the SecreUSCA Case #01-5283 Document #711984 Filed: 11/05/2002 Page 14 of 17
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tary to withhold information in the critical habitat designation. The cited committee reports indicate that the Secretary

should act in "the best interest of the species" and note

approvingly the interpretation of "prudent" to refer to situations "where the designation of critical habitat would inform

those who would take a species illegally...." H.R. Rep. No.

95-1625, at 16 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453,

9466; H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 20 (1982), reprinted in 1982

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2820. However, for purposes of qualifying as a withholding statute under Exemption 3, a statute

"must on its face exempt matters from disclosure. We must

find a congressional purpose for exempt matters from disclosure in the actual words of the statute (or at least in the

legislative history of FOIA)--not in the legislative history of

the claimed withholding statute, nor in an agency's interpretation of the statute." United States Dep't of Justice v.

Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 816 F.2d 730, 735

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (citation omitted) (emphasis added), modified, 831 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds,

489 U.S. 749 (1989). As the court stated in Reporters Committee, "legislative history will not avail if the language of the

statute itself does not explicitly deal with public disclosure,"

816 F.2d at 736, and the language of the Endangered Species

does not. Cf. Am. Jewish Cong., 574 F.2d at 631.

Exemption 4 protects "trade secrets and commercial or

financial information obtained from a person and privileged or

confidential." 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(4). The terms in Exemption

4 are to be given their "ordinary meanings," Pub. Citizen

Health Research Group v. Food and Drug Admin., 704 F.2d

1280, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citations omitted), and information is "commercial" under this exemption if, "in and of itself,"

it serves a "commercial function" or is of a "commercial

nature." Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 588 F.2d

863, 870 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670,

673 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).

The Secretary contends that Exemption 4 applies because

the withheld information is confidential commercial information. The Secretary points to a cooperative agreement between the FWS and the State agency, which initially collects

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the site-specific information after obtaining permission from

the landowner and promising to hold the information in

confidence (subject to certain exceptions). The agreement

generally describes the programs and relationships between

the parties and also provides that FWS will supply, upon

application, "available financial assistance for the implementation of acceptable projects," and that the parties will "exchange biological and other data...." Because the State

agency provides access to its database in return for money,

the Secretary maintains that this relationship falls within the

ordinary meaning of a commercial transaction.

We are unpersuaded that owl-sighting information qualifies

as "commercial or financial" information simply because it

was provided pursuant to a government-to-government cooperative agreement. The FWS stated in an internal memorandum (from the Regional Director in Albuquerque, New Mexico) that the State agency is forbidden by statute to sell the

owl-sighting data, and it noted that the State agency would be

reluctant to do so even if permitted. Instead, the FWS

memorandum stated, the State agency provides federal agencies with access to the data only as a condition to the receipt

under Section 6 of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.

s 1535 (2000), of funds that it uses to assist in maintaining its

data-collection system. Such a quid-pro-quo exchange between governmental entities does not constitute a commercial

transaction in the ordinary sense. No "business information"

is involved, see Wash. Post v. HHS, 690 F.2d at 266, and the

owl-sighting data itself is commercial neither by its nature

(having been created by the government rather than in

connection with a commercial enterprise) nor in its function

(as there is no evidence that the parties who supplied the owlsighting information have a commercial interest at stake in its

disclosure), see Am. Airlines, 588 F.2d at 870; Bd. of Trade v.

Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 627 F.2d 392, 404

(D.C. Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds, United States

Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982); Getman, 450 F.2d at 673.

Exemption 5 covers "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a

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party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." 5

U.S.C. s 552(b)(5). Otherwise known as the "deliberative

process privilege," Exemption 5 "shelters documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations

comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions

and policies are formulated." Petroleum Info., 976 F.2d at

1433. Information is exempt only if it is both "predecisional"

and "deliberative." Id. at 1434. "A document is predecisional if it was 'prepared in order to assist an agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision,' rather than to support a

decision already made. Material is deliberative if it 'reflects

the give-and-take of the consultative process.' " Id. (citations

omitted).

The site-specific information that NAHB seeks is predecisional, because the State agency prepared it in part to assist

the FWS in making its determinations under the Endangered

Species Act. It is not, however, "deliberative." This court

has drawn a distinction between factual information, which

"generally must be disclosed," and "materials embodying

officials' opinions," which are "ordinarily exempt." Id. Although the "fact/opinion distinction ... is not always dispositive," id., it is here. The privilege is designed to protect

agency policy-oriented judgments and the processes by which

policies are formulated, rather than "purely factual, investigative matters." Id. at 1435 (citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73,

89 (1973)). Nothing in the requested site-specific information

"reflect[s] an agency's preliminary positions or ruminations"

about a particular policy judgment. Id. Because the material cannot "reasonably be said to reveal an agency's or official's mode of formulating or exercising policy-implicating

judgment, the deliberative process privilege is inapplicable."

Id.

For these reasons, we hold that Exemptions 3, 4, 5, and 6

do not permit withholding the requested site-specific information. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment insofar as the district court ruled that Exemption 6

applied, and we remand the case with instructions to order

the Secretary to release the site-specific information while

withholding the individual property owners' names, which

NAHB no longer seeks.

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