Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-02875/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-02875-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES LIGON,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOE LAFUACI, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-02875-RMW 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 8

Re: Dkt. Nos. 78, 86

I. DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 8: to preclude plaintiff from offering any 

evidence that he was unarmed at the time he was shot. 

GRANTED with reservation. The evidence is not relevant. Fed. R. Evid. 402. Defendant

moves for an order excluding evidence that plaintiff was actually unarmed at the time he was shot. 

Defendant argues that because the standard which applies to the constitutional propriety of a 

police use of force is “objective reasonableness” which turns upon a determination based upon the 

totality of the circumstances which were known to the officers at the time of the use of force, and 

here defendant did not learn that plaintiff was actually unarmed until after the fact, this evidence is 

not relevant and inadmissible, absent circumstances at trial which would permit admission for 

some other reason.

Defendant cites the Seventh Circuit case Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 807 (7th Cir. 

1988), which the court agrees is on point. In Sherrod, the Seventh Circuit held that admission of 

evidence that a plaintiff was unarmed at the time he was shot by a police officer defendant was 

erroneous because it was information not available to the officer at the time of the shooting. Id. at 

805. Sherrod had made a “quick movement with his hand into his coat” and the officer testified 

that “there was no doubt in my mind when he started to move, he was going to reach for a weapon 

Case 5:13-cv-02875-RMW Document 92 Filed 01/30/15 Page 1 of 2
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

of some type.” Id. Officer Berry never claimed that he actually saw a weapon, but stated that he 

simply reacted to what a reasonable person would consider to be a life-threatening and imminently 

dangerous situation. Id.

Likewise, Officer Lafauci, at the time he shot plaintiff, did not know whether plaintiff was 

armed or not. Like the officer in Sherrod, Officer Lafauci has never claimed that he saw a weapon, 

and has only asserted that he was fearful based on plaintiff’s actions that plaintiff could reach a 

weapon concealed in his waistband. Accordingly, the court concludes that the evidence is not 

relevant to the question of whether Officer Lafauci’s use of force was “objectively reasonable in 

light of the facts and circumstances confronting [him].” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 

(1989). 

However, the Seventh Circuit in Sherrod cautioned that its holding was not a “black-letter 

rule” and that after-the-fact evidence could be used to test a witness’s credibility, namely the 

ability of the witness to “observe, remember, or narrate,” and could also be used to impeach a 

witness. Id. at 806. The court therefore reserves the right to admit evidence that plaintiff was 

unarmed if: (1) it becomes relevant to some issue of consequence in the case; (2) it becomes 

relevant to test the question of a witness’s credibility; or (3) if a witness testifies in such a way that 

the evidence is necessary for impeachment purposes, see, e.g., Sherrod, 856 F.2d at 806 (“For 

example, if an officer testifies that ‘I saw a shiny, metallic object similar to a gun or a dangerous 

weapon in the suspect’s hand,’ then proof that the suspect had neither gun nor knife would be 

material and admissible to the officer’s credibility on the question of whether the officer saw any 

such thing (and therefore had a reasonable belief of imminent harm).”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 30, 2015

______________________________________

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

Case 5:13-cv-02875-RMW Document 92 Filed 01/30/15 Page 2 of 2