Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08101/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08101-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Atdom Mikels Patsalis, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

David Shinn, Director of the Arizona

Department of Corrections, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV-18-08101-PCT-JAT (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

On May 14, 2018, Petitioner Atdom Mikels Patsalis, an inmate confined in the

Arizona Department of Corrections, Winchester Facility, Tucson, Arizona, filed a Petition

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody

(hereinafter “habeas petition”). (Doc. 1.) On October 19, 2019, Respondents filed an

Answer. (Doc. 9.) On January 3, 2019, attorney Jordan Green of Perkins Coie LLP, and

attorney Lindsay Herf, of the Arizona Justice Project, entered a notice of appearance,

appearing pro bono on behalf of Petitioner. (Doc. 13.) On March 8, 2019, Petitioner,

through counsel, filed a Reply. (Doc. 18.) This Court held oral argument on procedural

issues in the case on December 19, 2019 (Doc. 24), and heard oral argument on the substance

of the habeas claims on February 18, 2020.

Background

Petitioner was indicted by a Mohave County Grand Jury on March 6, 2014, on twelve

counts of Burglary in the Second Degree, ten counts of Burglary in the Third Degree, one

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count of Theft of a Credit Card, one count of Unlawful Means of Transportation, and one

count of Attempted Unlawful Means of Transportation. (Doc. 9-1 at 3-15.) The offenses

were non-violent, and took place during an approximate two-month period, between

November 13, 2013, and January 26, 2014. (Id.) Petitioner had just turned 21 years old at

the time of the first offense. (Id. at 1, 12.) Out of twenty two burglaries, only four involved

entry into the interior of a personal residence - most involved entry into a garage, a yard, a

vehicle, or a detached structure. Petitioner acted alone. Petitioner did not target any

particular property, but stole items randomly, e.g., a drill, purse, flashlight, battery charger,

bicycle, clothes, telescope, hose, electrical cord, skateboard, baseball glove, computer. (Id.

at 52-64.) Petitioner would sell some items and give others to friends. The total loss

incurred from the thefts was approximately $5,000.00. (Id. at 44.) Law enforcement

identified Petitioner as a suspect, and during a search of the home where Petitioner was

staying, Petitioner walked in, sat down and confessed to all of the offenses. (Doc. 22-1 at

25.) Without his confession, most of the crimes would not have been solved. (Doc. 9-2 at

65.) 

 In May of 2014, Petitioner was offered a plea agreement, that stipulated to a sentence

of between 10 and 20 years in prison. (Docs. 1-1 at 45; 9-2 at 44.) Petitioner rejected the

offer. Petitioner proceeded to trial before Mohave County Judge Pro Tempora Billy Sipe,

and after a 3-day trial, Petitioner was convicted on all charges. (Doc. 22 at 30-520.) Two

months later Petitioner appeared for sentencing. (Doc. 9-1 at 31.) No sentencing

memorandums were submitted by either defense counsel or the prosecutor, and, although

victims testified at trial, none weighed in or appeared to speak to the Court regarding the

sentence. (Docs. 9-2 at 9-11; 22-1 at 27.)

The prosecutor presented 3 exhibits to the court to prove Petitioner’s prior felony

convictions, and noted that it did not have available a “person from the crime lab” to

establish Petitioner’s fingerprint identification. (Doc. 9-2 at 60.) In response to a request by

the court for argument from Petitioner’s counsel, he stated that “I think they really need to

cross their t’s and dot their i’s in proving identification through testimony, fingerprint

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No medical/mental health records or diagnosis was provided to the court to support

this conclusion.

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analysis.” (Id.) The court reviewed the exhibits and, despite the lack of fingerprint

identification, determined that the prosecutor had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that

Petitioner had been convicted of two historical priors, criminal trespass in the first degree,

a class 6 felony, and burglary in the third degree (a vehicle), a class four felony. (Id. at 61;

Doc. 22-1 at 11.) Petitioner’s counsel made the following argument for leniency:

Your Honor, as a mitigating circumstance [Petitioner]’s cooperation

with the investigation. There’s no question about 90 percent of these

burglaries would not have been resolved but for his cooperation with the police

in the investigation.

This was a spree of offenses rather than individual burglaries separated

by time, geographical location.

And [Petitioner] is only 21 years old.

The Court does have the power to impose a just sentence in this case

that is something other than a natural life sentence.

(Doc. 9-2 at 65).

The prosecutor asked for maximum sentences on the counts for which the jury found

2 or more aggravating circumstances (applicable to all but counts 25 and 2), and that the

separate offense convictions should run consecutively, as “all but a few of the counts”

involved “separate victims with a separate harm.” (Id. at 10.) In all, the prosecutor requested

aggravated consecutive sentences on all but two of the counts. (Id.) Before pronouncing

sentence, the court opined that Petitioner is a sociopath1

 who will continue to be a criminal.

(Id. at 72.) The court then addressed Petitioner:

Mr. Patsalis, whether or not you spend the rest of your life in prison

depends on whether I order these sentences to be run concurrently, or whether

I order these sentences to be run consecutively.

If I order these sentences to be run consecutively, you’ll spend the rest

of your life in prison, which seems to be a fairly harsh, if not

incomprehensible sentence for these types of offenses; but I’m going to

follow the law as I believe the law dictates.

 And each of these offenses, except for maybe two, were offenses that

occurred on different occasions, different locations, different victims.

(Doc. 9-2 at 73) (emphasis added).

After rejecting Petitioner’s argument that the offenses were part of a spree, the court

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A.R.S. § 13-701(E) requires the court to consider the age of the defendant as a

mitigating factor.

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concluded:

And I believe, Mr. Patsalis, that the law dictates that I impose

consecutive sentences when, again, you burglarized one home in one location

and a different home in another location, regardless whether it’s the same day

or not.

Because, Mr. Patsalis, one of the hopes of the criminal justice system

is deterrents (sic); that other people look to - - other people see what happens

to the people that are caught and convicted and sentenced, and don’t want that

to happen to them so they won’t engage in that same behavior.

And Mr. Patsalis, if I impose concurrent sentences for 25 offenses - -

again, most of these separate burglary offenses, I’m sending the message to

people that if you’re going to burglarize a house in a neighborhood, you should

just burglarize all of the houses because you are only going to get one

sentence. Or if you’re going to burglarize this house on one particular

occasion, if you come back a week later and break into the same house you can

do that because you’ll (sic) only going to get one sentence.

And Mr. Patsalis, I cannot send the message to the community that you

can burglarize multiple houses and victimize multiple people on multiple

occasions and you’ll simply get one sentence for it. There has to be

accountability and responsibility for each separate offense that you commit

and have been convicted of.

And under those circumstances, Mr. Patsalis, what, again, I believe the

law dictates me to do, all but two of these sentences are going to run

consecutive.

The Court declines to find the age of the defendant as a mitigating

circumstance.2

 The defendant is very young. He’s only 22 years of age.

However, he has three felony convictions as an adult. Two, again, are

historical. He has a juvenile record. This is very sophisticated conduct he

engaged in. There’s nothing about his young age that the Court finds that

mitigates his conduct or his sentence in this case.

The Court has already addressed the fact that these are not spree

offenses, or the Court is not going to consider these spree offenses for the

reasons indicated.

The Court declines to find the defendant’s cooperation as a mitigating

circumstance, and the main reason is, again, when I think of the defendant’s

conduct in this case, the lack of empathy and the fact that if he wasn’t caught

he probably would still be burglarizing this neighborhood, the Court can’t find

that after he got caught and he confessed to a certain extent that, again, that

should somehow minimize the conduct he got involved in, or it should

minimize his sentence.

And the Court is also considering and declining to find that as an

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Count two involved the use of a credit card stolen in the burglary that was the basis

for count one, and count 25 involved the unlawful use of a vehicle obtained during the

burglary that was the basis for count 12. As such, counts 1 and 2, and counts 12 and 25 were

ordered to be served concurrently. 

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aggravating factor that, again, because of his criminal history, it just seems to

this Court that he is just simply a career criminal and is going to continue to

victimize people for as long as he can, and there is just nothing about talking

to the police that the Court finds mitigates any sentence in this case. 

(Doc. 9-2 at 74-77) (emphasis added).

The court found as aggravating circumstances that the offenses involved the taking

or damaging of property, the value of the property taken or damaged, that Petitioner

committed the offense for the receipt of anything of pecuniary value, and that some of the

victims were at least 65 years of age. (Id. at 78.) The court did not find any mitigating

circumstances, and concluded that “[o]bviously the aggravating circumstances control.” (Id.)

The court proceeded to impose aggravated, consecutive sentences on all but two counts.3

 At

the conclusion, the court stated: “Mr. Patsalis, I don’t know if you were doing the math, but

I have sentenced you to 292 years in prison.” (Id. at 103.) The court continued in its

justification for the sentence imposed:

And Mr. Patsalis, I realize that the sentence that I just imposed is a very harsh

sentence. It’s, quite frankly, the Court even agrees, it’s an incomprehensible

sentence, but this is the sentence the Court feels is necessary and appropriate

based on all of the offenses you’ve been convicted of based on the aggravating

circumstances that the Jury has found and based on the fact that all but two of

these offenses are required to be served consecutively. . . .

And again, Mr. Patsalis, I agree this is an extremely harsh sentence, and

seems completely incomprehensible for these type of offenses.

But again, I believe this is the sentence that’s mandated by law based on all

of the offenses you were convicted of, based on the fact that you have two

historical prior felony convictions, and based on all of the aggravating

circumstances that the Jury found in your case.

(Id. at 106-107) (emphasis added).

The court also imposed a restitution amount of $5,404.78. (Doc. 9-2 at 64).

The court repeatedly indicated the law dictated that it impose consecutive sentences,

but did not cite the provision of law upon which it relied. Presumably the court was referring

to A.R.S. § 13-711(A), which at the time read that: “multiple sentences of imprisonment []

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imposed on a person at the same time shall run consecutively, unless the court expressly

directs otherwise.” That section was amended by the Arizona Legislature in 2019 to read

that such sentences: “may run consecutively or concurrently, as determined by the court.

A.R.S. § 13-711(A), Amended by Laws 2019, Ch. 179, §1.

Petitioner, through appointed counsel, filed an appeal to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Doc. 9-1 at 46.) In his opening brief, Petitioner raised the following issues:

• One: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s corpus delicti motion

causing prejudice as Appellant’s incriminating statements were introduced to the jury?

• Two: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s request for a corpus

delicti jury instruction?

• Three: Did the trial court commit fundamental error by not granting a motion for directed

verdict for counts where there was no evidence the property taken was without lawful

authority?

• Four: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in holding it was required, or dictated by

law, to find consecutive sentences be imposed?

• Five: Did the trial court commit fundamental error in sentencing the Appellant to 292

years in prison for property crimes in violation of the cruel and unusual sentencing

clauses of both United States and Arizona Constitutions?

(Doc. 9-1 at 47.) 

As to Issue One, Petitioner argued that his confession should not have been admitted,

as none of the victims identified Petitioner, and three of the victims did not precisely know

how their missing property had been taken. As to Issue Two, Petitioner argued that the trial

court erred in refusing to give the jury a copus delicti instruction, that the jury could not

convict Petitioner of any count solely upon his uncorroborated statement or admission. As

to Issue Three, that the trial court committed fundamental error in not granting a motion for

directed verdict, when there was no evidence presented as to 14 of the burglary counts that

the property taken was done so without permission or without lawful authority, an element

of the burglary statute. 

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As to Issue Four, Petitioner argued that the trial court had abused its discretion in

ordering all of two of the sentence to run consecutive, as Arizona law gives the court

discretion to do so, citing to Judge Pro Tempora Sipe’s statements made during the

sentencing. As to Issue Five, Petitioner argued that the trial court committed fundamental

error by sentencing Appellant to 292 years in prison for property crimes in violation of the

cruel and unusual clauses of the Arizona and United States Constitutions. As to Issues Four

and Five, Petitioner requested “fundamental error” review, as opposed to “abuse of

discretion” review, as Petitioner’s trial counsel did not object to his sentence. Appellee

agreed that “fundamental error review” was applicable, as Appellant “failed to raise this issue

in the trial court,” and “made no objection during the sentencing hearing.” (Doc. 9-1 at 138,

144.) 

In a Memorandum Decision, issued on June 2, 2016, the court affirmed Petitioner’s

convictions and sentence. (Doc. 9-1 at 160.) As to Issue One, the appellate court held that

the state had presented sufficient evidence of corpus delicti on all three disputed counts. (Id.

at 161.) As to Issue Two, the appellate court held that the sufficiency of the corpus delicti

is a legal issue decided by the court, not the jury. (Id. at 162.) As to Issue Three, the

appellate court held that sufficient evidence was presented to warrant conviction, and thus

the trial court did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion for a directed verdict. As to Issue

Four, the appellate court applied fundamental error review “[b]ecause Patsalis did not raise

this issue in the superior court.” (Id. a 164.) The trial court rejected Petitioner’s argument,

finding that “the record reflects the superior court understood it had discretion to impose

concurrent sentences.” (Id. at 165.) 

As to Issue Five, the appellate court stated that, because Petitioner argued, “for the

first time on appeal, that his 292-year sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment,”

it would review the claim for fundamental error, “while reviewing constitutional issues de

novo.” (Id. at 166.) The appellate court then determined that Petitioner’s sentence did not

constitute cruel and unusual punishment, but declined to determine the proportionality of

Petitioner’s entire sentence, finding it precluded under state court precedent: “As a general

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To support his IAC claim, Petitioner “attempted to ascertain an Affidavit from Trial

Counsel Alex Bolobonoff to no avail.” (Id. at 21.)

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rule, this court will not consider the imposition of consecutive sentences in a proportionality

inquiry,” citing State v. Berger, 212 Ariz. 473, 134 P.3d 378 (2006). (Id. at 167.)

Petitioner filed a timely Notice of Post-Conviction Proceedings (“PCR”). Petitioner

did not request the appointment of counsel, and the trial court did not appoint counsel or

advisory counsel. In his pro se PCR Petition, Petitioner raised the following two claims:

1. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel by:

“(A) informing Petitioner of Corpus Delicti defense upon Petitioner’s admission of

guilt to crimes investigated;

(B) Informing Petitioner to proceed with trial and to lose would be facing 2-7 years

in prison;

(C) failing to object to the imposition of 292 years in prison at the penalty phase;

(D) failing to object to trial court declining any mitigating factors that were not

applied;

(E) refused to withdraw from the case upon Petitioner’s expressed position to do so.

[]

2. Is the Petitioner’s 292 year prison sentence grossly disproportionate, arbitrary and

capricious, to disparate sentencing, constituting an independent Due Process, Equal

Protection of the Laws, as cruel and unusual punishment[.]”

(Doc. 9-2 at 9.)

Petitioner argued that, although the prosecutor offered a plea bargain with a stipulated

sentence of 10-20 years, his trial counsel assured him that the majority of charges would not

reach the jury based upon the corpus delicti rule, and that he would be looking at a sentence

of between 2 and 7 years.4

 (Doc. 9-2 at 11, 13.) Petitioner argued that his counsel’s advise

with respect to the proffered plea agreement and his “optimism and inaccurate predictions

of prevailing” fell below “the Strickland standard.” Petitioner also asserted that his trial

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Petitioner had filed a request for new counsel before his trial, and the matter was set

for a hearing on January 22, 2015. (Doc. 1-1 at 43, 44.) Petitioner attached a copy of those

documents to his PCR petition, as it appears from his filing with this Court. (Id. at 23-38,

39.) These documents are not attached to the copy of Petitioner’s PCR proceeding provided

by Respondent. The record does not reflect the outcome of Petitioner’s request for new

counsel, or even if it was heard.

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counsel was ineffective in not objecting to his sentence, failing to argue “all mitigators,” and

failed to object to the prosecutor’s late (day of sentencing) filing of an allegation of repetitive

offenses pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703. (Id. at 11-15.) Petitioner did not elaborate on his

claim that his trial counsel refused to withdraw from his case.5

 Petitioner also asserted that

his sentence violated the Equal Protection Clause, constituted double punishment, was

arbitrary and capricious, was cruel and unusual, and did not take into account mitigating

circumstances. (Id. at 16-20.)

On April 24, 2017, the prosecutor filed a 3 page response, first asserting that

Petitioner’s PCR petition should be dismissed as it was untimely by one day, and also that

it should be denied summarily, as his sentencing claims were decided on appeal, and his IAC

claim lacked merit. (Doc. 9-2 at 27-30.) The prosecutor did not address Petitioner’s claim

that his trial counsel refused to withdraw from his case. The trial court issued its decision

on May 22, 2017, ruling as follows:

 The defendant claims that trial counsel, Alex Bolobonoff, rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel because he told the defendant he would be

facing anywhere from 2-7 years in prison. However, a Donald Hearing was

held on July 10, 2014, at which time formerly assigned Honorable Derek

Carlisle advised the defendant of the range of sentencing should he be

convicted at trial. Judge Carlisle advised the defendant that if convicted, and

based on the sentencing enhancements, “So, that’s 490 - just over 490 years

in prison would be the maximum”. The defendant responded “Do I have to do

al 490 years?” Clearly, the defendant was made aware of the range of

sentencing if convicted at trial. Judge Carlisle also explained the terms of the

plea offer from the State. Plead guilty of Burglary, five (5) counts, each a

class 32 felony, and receive a prison sentence between ten (10) and twenty

(20) years, or stipulate to seventeen and one-half (17.5) years in prison. The

defendant was thoroughly advised of his options and advised by his attorney

he would be facing “2 to 7 years in prison” if convicted at trial. The record

clearly shows that the defendant was aware of the range of sentencing if

convicted on all counts.

 Mr. Bolobonoff attempted to negotiate a more favorable plea offer and

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The trial courts’ determination in this regard is contrary to the appellate court’s

decision to review Petitioner’s sentencing claims for fundamental error, rather than the less

stringent abuse-of-discretion standard, because trial counsel had not objected to the sentence

after it was imposed.

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advised the State that “corpus delicti” could be raised as a defense. The State

was unwilling to make a better plea offer. Mr. Bolobonoff did present a

“corpus delicti” defense at trial and requested a corresponding jury instruction

which the Court denied. The defendant has presented nothing to the Court to

convince the Court that he was advised he would prevail at trial on a “corpus

delicti” defense. The defendant further alleges that Mr. Bolobonoff did not

object to the Court’s imposition of 292 years in prison and did not object to the

Court not finding any mitigating circumstances at the judgment and sentencing

hearing. However, the Court found mitigation did not exist and there was no

reason for Mr. Bolobonoff make an objection. 

 Further, after the Court imposed 292 years in prison there was no

procedural reason for Bolobonoff to object.

6

 Had he done so the Court

would not have changed the defendant’s sentence. The defendant has failed

to present a colorable claim that Mr. Bolobonoff rendered ineffective

assistance of counsel.

 The defendant further alleges that the sentence imposed by the Court was

grossly disproportionate, arbitrary and capricious and a denial of equal

protection. However, pursuant to Rule 32.2(a), this issue is precluded because

it was an issue raisable on appeal and it was an issue finally adjudicated on

appeal. Consequently, the defendant is precluded from raising this issue in a

petition for post-conviction relief. The defendant has failed to state a colorable

claim which will allow him relief under Rule 32 and no purpose will be served

by any further proceedings.

(emphasis added) (Doc. 9-2 at 51-56.)

The trial court never addressed Petitioner’s PCR claim that his counsel refused to

recuse from his case. The record provided by Respondent does not indicate that Petitioner

made any attempt to seek review of the trial judge’s decision in the Arizona Court of

Appeals.

HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, timely filed his habeas petition on May 14, 2018. In it,

he raised the following claims:

Ground One: Violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments when the

trial court denied Petitioner’s corpus delicti motion.

Ground Two: Violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments when the

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trial court denied Petitioner’s request for a corpus delicti jury instruction.

Ground Three: Violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments when the

trial court denied a directed verdict motion on some of the burglary counts when there was

no evidence presented that the property was taken without lawful authority.

Ground Four: Violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments when the

trial court held that it was required by law to impose consecutive sentences for the separate

offenses.

Ground Five: Violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments when the

trial court committed fundamental error by imposing a sentence that was in violation of the

cruel and unusual clause of the United States Constitution.

Ground Six: Violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments when

Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective by (1) informing Petitioner of the corpus delicti

defense, (2) informing Petitioner he was likely facing a 2-7 year prison sentence, (3) failing

to object to Petitioner’s sentence and the failure of the trial court to find mitigating factors,

and (4) failing to withdraw from the case upon Petitioner’s express request.

Ground Seven: Violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments when the

trial court imposed a grossly disproportionate, arbitrary, capricious, and cruel and unusual

sentence.

(Doc. 1 at 1-10.)

On October 19, 2018, Respondent filed a response, asserting that claim five of

Petitioner’s habeas petition fails on the merits, that the remaining claims are procedurally

defaulted, and that claims one through four are additionally not cognizable in habeas. (Doc.

9.) Petitioner, through counsel filed a reply, that only addressed claims five and seven of

Petitioner’s habeas petition, regarding them as one claim. (Doc. 18.) Petitioner, in open

Court, abandoned claim six of his habeas petition. (Doc. 18 at 19-25.)

GROUNDS ONE, TWO, THREE, AND FOUR

Respondent asserts that Grounds One, Two and Three of Petitioner’s habeas petition

are procedurally defaulted and not cognizable in habeas. 

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A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default.

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To

properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state’s

highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 839-46 (1999). In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona

Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or

through appropriate post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th

Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994).

Proper exhaustion requires a petitioner to have “fairly presented” to the state courts

the exact federal claim he raises on habeas by describing the operative facts and federal legal

theory upon which the claim is based. See, e.g., Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-78

(1971) (“[W]e have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim

he urges upon the federal courts.”). A claim is only “fairly presented” to the state courts

when a petitioner has “alert[ed] the state courts to the fact that [he] was asserting a claim

under the United States Constitution.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quotations omitted); see Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If a petitioner

fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his

federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court.”).

A “general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” such as due process, is insufficient

to achieve fair presentation. Shumway, 223 F.3d at 987 (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518

U.S. 152, 163 (1996)); see Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of an

underlying federal legal theory.”). Similarly, a federal claim is not exhausted merely because

its factual basis was presented to the state courts on state law grounds – a “mere similarity

between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to establish exhaustion.” Shumway,

223 F.3d at 988 (quotations omitted); see Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-77.

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Even when a claim’s federal basis is “self-evident,” or the claim would have been

decided on the same considerations under state or federal law, a petitioner must still present

the federal claim to the state courts explicitly, “either by citing federal law or the decisions

of federal courts.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations

omitted), amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32

(2004) (claim not fairly presented when state court “must read beyond a petition or a brief

... that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim” to discover implicit federal claim).

Additionally, a federal habeas court generally may not review a claim if the state

court’s denial of relief rests upon an independent and adequate state ground. See Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). The United States Supreme Court has explained:

In the habeas context, the application of the independent and adequate state

ground doctrine is grounded in concerns of comity and federalism. Without the

rule, a federal district court would be able to do in habeas what this Court

could not do on direct review; habeas would offer state prisoners whose

custody was supported by independent and adequate state grounds an end run

around the limits of this Court’s jurisdiction and a means to undermine the

State’s interest in enforcing its laws.

Id. at 730-31. 

A procedural bar may also be applied to unexhausted claims where state procedural

rules make a return to state court futile. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (claims are barred

from habeas review when not first raised before state courts and those courts “would now

find the claims procedurally barred”); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (9th Cir.

2002) (“[T]he procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal claim ‘applies only

when a state court has been presented with the federal claim,’ but declined to reach the issue

for procedural reasons, or ‘if it is clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally

barred.’”) (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 263 n.9).

Specifically, in Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts via either

direct appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review because an attempt

to return to state court to present them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow category of

claims for which a successive petition is permitted. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a)

(precluding claims not raised on appeal or in prior petitions for post-conviction relief),

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32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s

decision). Arizona courts have consistently applied Arizona’s procedural rules to bar further

review of claims that were not raised on direct appeal or in prior Rule 32 post-conviction

proceedings. See, e.g., Stewart, 536 U.S. at 860 (determinations made under Arizona’s

procedural default rule are “independent” of federal law); Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191,

1195 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We have held that Arizona’s procedural default rule is regularly

followed [“adequate”] in several cases.”) (citations omitted), reversed on other grounds,

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002); see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th

Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that Arizona courts have not “strictly or regularly followed”

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 334-36,

916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996) (waiver and preclusion rules strictly applied in postconviction proceedings).

Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, federal

courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. See Reed v.

Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). The federal court will not consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim unless a petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result,

or establish cause for his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.

298, 321 (1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51; Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96. Pursuant to the

“cause and prejudice” test, a petitioner must point to some external cause that prevented him

from following the procedural rules of the state court and fairly presenting his claim. “A

showing of cause must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective

factor external to the defense impeded [the prisoner’s] efforts to comply with the State’s

procedural rule. Thus, cause is an external impediment such as government interference or

reasonable unavailability of a claim’s factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044,

1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Ignorance of the State’s

procedural rules or other forms of general inadvertence or lack of legal training and a

petitioner’s mental condition do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for a petitioner’s

failure to fairly present his claim. Regarding the “miscarriage of justice,” the Supreme Court

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has made clear that a fundamental miscarriage of justice exists when a Constitutional

violation has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. See Murray, 477

U.S. at 495-96. Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss

plainly meritless claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state

court. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate

in federal court to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal

under § 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”).

B. AEDPA Standard of Review on the Merits.

Pursuant to the AEDPA, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect

to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state

court decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)

(O’Connor, J., concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard

of review). This standard is “difficult to meet.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102

(2011). It is also a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings, which

demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “When

applying these standards, the federal court should review the ‘last reasoned decision’ by a

state court ... .” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,”

or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05. “A state court’s decision can involve an

‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule

but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2)

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extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that

is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).

C. Grounds One, Two, Three and Four. 

Although Respondent asserts that Petitioner did not present Ground One as a

constitutional claim when he raised the claim on appeal, he did cite United States Supreme

Court authority in arguing that the rule of corpus delicti has been “consistently applied in the

federal and state courts.” (Doc. 9-1 at 68.) He also argued that a conviction based upon a

false confession was a conviction lacking in fundamental fairness. Petitioner’s claim

however, was only confined to counts one, fourteen and seventeen. This Court finds that

claim one, as to those counts, is exhausted and should be analyzed on the merits. 

The corpus delicti rule provides that proof of the existence of a crime must first be

established before an accused’s otherwise uncorroborated incriminatory statements may be

admitted. Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 154 (1954). The Arizona Court of Appeals

found that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence of corpus delicti on counts one,

fourteen and seventeen, setting forth the facts presented at trial that established that each

crime had been committed - and finding that therefore, the admission of Petitioner’s

confession was proper. (Doc. 9-1 at 161-62.) Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits, as

Petitioner does not establish that the state court decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme

Court, or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding. This Court will recommend denial of this claim.

Although Respondent asserts that Petitioner did not present Ground Two as a

constitutional claim, he did cite Supreme Court precedent in arguing that “a defendant’s

extrajudicial, post-offense statements must be corroborated with independent evidence in

order to assure reliability and truthfulness.” (Doc. 9-1 at 72.) Petitioner did not, however

cite federal constitutional authority for his assertion that failure to give a corpus delicti jury

instruction was error. Thus, this claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, as any

attempt to return to state court to present this claim as a federal constitutional claim would

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be futile. Petitioner has not presented, and has not argued cause for his procedural default,

or that a miscarriage of justice would result from the failure to consider this claim. This

Court will recommend denial of this claim.

As to Ground Three, Petitioner did not cite any Constitutional provisions or Supreme

Court authority in state proceedings, but raised the claim as purely a state law and procedure

issue. Thus, this claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, as any attempt to return

to state court to present this claim as a federal constitutional claim would be futile. Petitioner

has not presented, or argued cause for his procedural default, or that a miscarriage of justice

would result from the failure to consider this claim. This Court will recommend denial of this

claim.

As to Ground Four, Petitioner did not cite any Constitutional provisions or Supreme

Court authority, but raised the claim as a purely state law issue. Thus, this claim is

unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, as any attempt to return to state court to present this

claim as a federal constitutional claim would be futile. Petitioner has not presented, or

argued cause for his procedural default, or that a miscarriage of justice would result from the

failure to consider this claim. This Court will recommend denial of this claim.

D. Grounds Five and Seven.

Respondent asserts that Ground Seven is procedurally defaulted as Petitioner did not

previously raise as an issue that he was sentenced to 292 years in prison for “property crimes

with no supporting evidence.” Within Ground Seven however, Petitioner asserted more

generally that his sentence was constitutionally disproportionate and constituted cruel and

unusual punishment. (Doc. 1 at 12.) In his Reply, Petitioner does nor elaborate on his earlier

assertion that there no evidence supported his conviction, but treats Grounds Five and Seven

of Petitioner’s habeas petition as one claim. Petitioner’s counsel also stated at the December

19, 2019, hearing before the Court that Grounds Five and Seven are consolidated in

Petitioner’s Reply. To the extent Petitioner is still advancing a claim no evidence supported

his conviction, this claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.

This Court will address Grounds Five and Seven of Petitioner’s habeas petition

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together as one claim, as asserted more fully in Petitioner’s Reply. Respondent argues that

the claim should be denied on the merits.

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

Petitioner asserts that the Arizona Court of Appeals adjudication of Petitioner’s Eighth

Amendment claim on the merits was contrary to clearly established precedent. Petitioner

states that “[a] court reviewing the proportionality of a defendant’s sentence must

comprehensively evaluate the entire sentence when weighing the gravity of the offense with

the harshness of the penalty.” Petitioner cites an early Supreme Court proportionality cases,

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 

The Supreme Court in Weems, in addressing the issue, examined the history of the

framer’s insertion of the cruel and unusual clause into the Constitution, noting that the phrase

was not confined to “bodily pain and mutilation,” or past practices of cruelty and torture. Id.

at 372-73. The Court restated that “it was believed that power might be tempted to cruelty.”

Id. The Court also expressed its belief in the fluidity in the clause, in that it “may acquire

meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.” Id. at 378 (discussing

the history of the whipping of slaves and wife beaters as punishment). 

The defendant in Weems was sentenced to fifteen years of cadena, “carry[ing] a chain

at the ankle, hanging from the wrists [and] be employed at hard and painful labor,” and

subject to lifelong surveillance. Weems, 217 U.S. at 364. The Weems Court, after noting

that “[t]here are degrees of homicide that are not punished so severely,” determined that the

defendant’s sentence was disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on

cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 380-383. The Court considered the “accessory”

penalties, not just the total number of years imposed, in the proportionality analysis.

Whether or not a defendant is eligible for parole is also a factor the Supreme Court has

considered in evaluating proportionality. See e.g., Lockyear v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 74

(2003) (noting Andrade retained the possibility of parole); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297

(1983) (defendant sentenced to life without parole); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 281

(1980) (defendant sentenced to life eligible for parole within 12 years of his confinement).

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7

Although Andrade was sentenced for minor theft crimes, he had “been in and out of

state and federal prison” for 13 years, he had previously received a ten-year sentence, an

eight-year sentence, and a seven-year sentence for multiple first-degree burglary convictions,

theft convictions, and two separate transportation of marijuana convictions, and was

additionally arrested “for a state parole violation-escape” offense. Id. at 66-67.

8

Davis had previously been convicted of selling drugs (LSD), and the instant sale of

marijuana involved selling marijuana, and providing LSD to inmates in a state prison camp.

Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153 (1979) (dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc).

9

In fact, this Court has done so. See, Berger v. Ryan, No. CV-09-2689-PHX-DGC

(MHB), 2011 WL 2690436 (D. Ariz. Sept. 2, 2011) (Report and Recommendation). 

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The Supreme Court has considered whether consecutive terms of imprisonment can

result in a disproportionate sentence. In Andrade7

, a defendant had received two consecutive

twenty-five to life sentences for petty theft; the Court determined that the California Court’s

affirmance of the sentence was not an unreasonable application of clearly established

Supreme Court precedent, the gross disproportionality principle. 538 U.S. at 77. In Hutto

v. Davis8, the Supreme Court also reviewed a defendant’s consecutive twenty-year sentences

for proportionality, holding that the sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Hutto,

454 U.S. 370, 371, 374 (per curiam) (holding that the appellate court, on remand, “failed to

heed our decision in Rummel”); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72 (“Through [the] thicket of Eighth

Amendment jurisprudence, one governing legal principle emerges as ‘clearly established’

under § 2254(d)(1): A gross disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms

of years.”).

Petitioner distinguishes, in his Reply, a Second Circuit case often cited by lower

courts in support of an argument that a proportionality analysis does not apply to the

cumulation of sentences. See, United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257 (2nd Cir. 1988).9

 The

quote often repeated by that Court is that the “Eighth [A]mendment analysis focuses on the

sentence imposed for each specific crime, not on the cumulative sentence.” Id. at 265. The

Aiello court, however, mistakenly attributed that principle to the Supreme Court decision in

O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331 (1892). The Aiello Court, in support of its reference

to the Eighth Amendment’s “focus,” attributed the following sentence to the Supreme Court:

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10Although the Aiello Court summarily dismissed defendant’s proportionality claim,

it noted that defendant’s offense was a “grave one.” 864 U.S. at 265. Defendant was a large

“kingpin” supplier of heroin and cocaine wholesale over an extended period of time, as part

of a continuing criminal enterprise run out of defendant’s pizzeria in Harlem. Id. at 260.

11The Vermont Court did state, in conceding “the proposition [] so earnestly urged on

behalf of the Plaintiff,” that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids arbitrarily deprivations of

a defendant’s life, liberty, or property, and “no different or higher punishment shall be

imposed on one than is imposed on all like offenses.” Id. at 272-73.

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“[i]f he has subjected himself to a severe penalty, it is simply because he has committed a

great many such offenses.” 864 F.2d at 265 (defendant in O’Neil had been convicted of 307

liquor offenses). That was not a Supreme Court statement. It was a sentence originally in

the opinion written by the Vermont Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not cite the

sentence for precedential import, but merely in its recitation of the procedural history,

thereafter dismissing the writ of habeas corpus for want of a federal question.10 O’Neil, 144

U.S. at 331. 

Other lower courts have acknowledged that the Supreme Court in O’Neill did not

address a federal question. See, Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 U.S. 262 (1897) (the O’Neill

Court did not disclose a federal question)11; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Sims, 191 U.S. 441,

448 (1903); Weems, 217 U.S. at 371; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 290 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting);

Solem, 463 U.S. at 287 n. 11 (the Court did not consider the constitutionality of O’Neill’s

sentence). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals decided that it would not consider Petitioner’s

consecutive sentences in conducting a proportionality analysis, citing an Arizona Supreme

Court case, State v. Berger, 212 Ariz. 473, 479 (2006) (“[A]s a general rule, this court will

not consider the imposition of consecutive sentences in a proportionality inquiry.”). The

Court did not address or decide the issue on the basis of the Eighth Amendment.

The state court erred in not determining whether Petitioner’s consecutive sentences

violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Thus, this Court will

review his claim de novo. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (court is not

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“circumscribed by a state court conclusion with respect to [the] prejudice [prong of

Strickland],” as the state court did not address it); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 376

(2005) (court conducts de novo review of prejudice prong under Strickland when state court

did not address it); Quintana v. Chandler, 723 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2013) (“2254(d)

deference applies only to those issues the state court explicitly addressed.”); Brewster v.

Hetzel, 913 F.3d 1042, 1051 (11th Cir. 2019) (court “cannot defer to the decisions of the

state court[s]” when state court did not rule on the actual claim).

A. Proportionality: objective factors.

The gross proportionality principle is clearly established law, but the “the precise

contours” are “unclear.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 73. In reviewing whether a sentence is

proportional to the crime(s) committed, courts are guided by objective factors. Solem, 463

U.S. at 291. First, the court examines the “gravity of the offense and the harshness of the

penalty.” Id. If that analysis “leads to an inference of gross disproportionality,” Harmelin

v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991), the federal court turns to “(ii) the sentences imposed

on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission

of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.

Petitioner is serving a 292 year sentence, essentially a life sentence without parole.

The offenses were committed over an approximate two-month period of time when Petitioner

had just turned 21. His offenses were non-violent. His offenses could best be described as

impulsive intrusions (mostly into vehicles, garages, yards), during which Petitioner stole

random objects that were in plain sight, giving many items to friends. The total amount of

restitution was approximately $5,000.00. Although a few of the victims were over 65 years

old, no evidence was presented that Petitioner knew that or targeted homes of elderly

residents. Petitioner initiated contact with law enforcement officers during their

investigation, and confessed to all of the crimes. Without his confession, most of the crimes

would have remained unsolved. Petitioner’s prior offenses were also non-violent property

offenses. None of the victims of Petitioner’s offenses weighed in on Petitioner’s sentence.

The sentencing judge made clear his view that the sentence he imposed was

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12The court’s comments during sentencing could fairly be interpreted to mean that the

court did not believe it could impose concurrent sentences, which is contrary to Arizona law,

but this error was raised and rejected by the Arizona Court of Appeals on purely state law

grounds. At the very least, the court’s comments could fairly be interpreted to mean that it

did not believe it had the authority to run at least some of the separate burglary counts

concurrently, but this issue was not addressed in state court proceedings. 

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“extremely harsh,” stating three times that it was “incomprehensible” for these type of

offenses. The court also stated four times that it was imposing consecutive sentences because

it believed that is what “the law dictates,” never identifying what “law” it was referencing.12

To the extent the court read A.R.S. § 13-711 to create a presumption of consecutive

sentences, it was wrong. See, State v. Cota, 229 Ariz. 136, 151, 272 P.3d 1027, 1042 (Ariz.

2012) (the statute “creates no presumption in favor of consecutive sentences.”). The court

rejected age and cooperation with authorities as mitigating factors, despite Petitioner’s clear

youth and cooperation that was so substantial that most of the offenses could not otherwise

have been prosecuted. 

Petitioner’s life sentence is the harshest sentence short of death. See Solem, 463 U.S.

at 297 (comparing Rummel, who was “likely to be eligible for parole within 12 years of his

initial confinement”). The Arizona Court of Appeals vacated a similar sentence for nonviolent property offenses when the sentencing judge, while acknowledging that a consecutive

sentence “per victim” approach resulted in an “extravagant” sentence, “proceeded as if this

extravagant sentence were the consequence of the State’s charges, not the court’s own

choice.” State v. Fillmore, 187 Ariz. 174, 185, 927 P.2dt 1303, 1314 (1996). The defendant

in Fillmore was convicted of one count of illegally conducting an enterprise, twenty-eight

counts of theft, six counts of trafficking in stolen property, and four counts of burglary, and

sentenced to 298 years in prison. Id. Petitioner was later allowed to plead guilty to one

felony count and was sentenced fifteen years and nine months in prison. (Doc. 18-1 at 3-5.)

While Judge Sipe did not refer to Petitioner’s sentence as extravagant, he did refer to

it as incomprehensible, three times. Incomprehensible is defined as “that [which] cannot be

grasped by the understanding; beyond the reach of intellect or research; unfathomable by the

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mind.” Oxford English Dictionary (2nd Edition 1989). Considering the objective factors

identified in this case, as set forth above, this Court finds that Petitioner’s sentence leads to

an inference of disproportionality.

B. Proportionality: comparable Arizona crimes.

Petitioner cites several examples of Arizona criminal statutes that impose lesser

sentences for more serious offenses: (1) second degree murder, A.R.S. § 13-710(A),

punishable by a minimum sentence of ten years, a presumptive sentence of sixteen years, and

a maximum sentence of twenty-five years, (2) armed robbery, a dangerous offense, A.R.S.

§§ 13-1904, 13-704, punishable by a minimum sentence of seven years, a presumptive

sentence of ten and one-half years, and a maximum sentence of twenty-one years, (3) sexual

assault, A.R.S. § 13-1406(B), punishable by a minimum sentence of five and one-quarter

years, a presumptive sentence of seven years, and a maximum sentence of fourteen years, (4)

sexual conduct with a minor that is twelve, thirteen, or fourteen years old, A.R.S. § 13-705,

punishable by a minimum sentence of thirteen years, a presumptive sentence of twenty years,

and a maximum sentence of twenty-seven years, and (5) sexual assault of a child under

twelve, A.R.S. § 13-705(B), punishable by life with the possibility of release after thirty-five

years. It should also be noted that, under Arizona law, three convictions of first-degree

burglary, which are residential burglaries involving a deadly weapon, not committed on the

same occasion, shall result in a sentence of 25 years, with eligibility for release after 25

years. See, A.R.S. §§ 13-1508, 706.

For crimes that cause extreme harm to persons or society, Petitioner cites as examples

of natural life sentences; first degree murder, violent sexual assault and terrorism. See,

A.R.S. §§ 13-1105, 752, 13-1423, 13-2308.01(c). Petitioner also cites examples of Arizona

cases in which defendants convicted of similar offenses were sentenced to much shorter

sentences:

State v. Neese, 239 Ariz. 84, 366 P.3d 561 (Ct. App. 2016). Defendant

convicted of fifteen counts at trial, including one count of first degree burglary,

seven counts of second degree burglary, and seven counts of theft sentenced

to 22.75 years.

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State v. Eisenmann, Nos. 1 CA-CR 17-0144, -0155, 2018 WL 5116524, at *1

(Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2018). Defendant convicted of eighty-one criminal

offenses at trial, including theft, burglary, and misconduct involving weapons,

and was sentenced to multiple concurrent sentences, the longest of which was

25 years in prison.

State v. Rodriguez, CR2016-160844-001 (Maricopa Cty. Super. Ct. Dec. 4,

2018). Defendant convicted of seven counts of armed robbery, nine counts of

aggravated assault, seven counts of kidnaping, and two counts of attempted

armed robbery, and sentenced for each count for sentences ranging from 7.5

to thirty-three years, all to run concurrently. (Doc. 18-1 at 12-23.)

State v. Snider, 233 Ariz. 243, 311 P.3d 656 (Ct. App. 2013). Defendant

convicted of nine counts of first-degree burglary, ten counts of armed robbery,

and one count each of aggravated assault and attempted armed robbery, all of

which were dangerous offenses arising from a series of nine bank robberies.

Defendant was sentenced to a “7.5 year prison term on count two, burglary;

fifteen years on count four, burglary; twenty years on count eleven, attempted

armed robbery; and, life in prison with the possibility of release after twentyfive years on the eighteen remaining counts,” all to be served concurrently. Id.

At 244, 311 P.3d at 657. The court of appeals vacated his life sentences and

remanded for resentencing, after which he was resentenced to multiple

concurrent sentences, the longest of which was 10.5 years. (Doc. 18-1 at 26-

34.)

(Doc. 18 at 17.)

Perhaps the most factually analogous case is Fillmore. In Fillmore, the defendant was

convicted at trial of one count of illegally conducting an enterprise, a class 3 felony; twentyseven counts of theft, class 3 felonies; six counts of trafficking in stolen property, class 2 and

3 felonies; four counts of third degree burglary, class 4 felonies; and one count of theft, a

class 5 felony. 187 Ariz. at 177, 927 P.2d at 1306. Defendant’s sentence was enhanced with

a prior felony conviction, and for committing the offenses while on probation. Id. The

longest sentence the court imposed on the counts of conviction was 15.75 years, and the court

ordered consecutive terms on all counts except for counts involving the same victim. Id. In

all, the court sentenced defendant to 298.25 years in prison. Id.

The trial court made similar comments to the comments made by Judge Pro Tempora

Sipe at sentencing: “imposing consecutive sentences results in a very extravagant number

of years by application of the criminal code,” and “[t]he victims testified and they have been

damaged, and I think each one is entitled to separate treatment.” 187 Ariz. at 182, 927 P. 2d

at 1311. The trial court also stated that A.R.S. § 13-708 “expresses a presumption that

sentences should be pronounced consecutively.” Id. On review, the Arizona appellate court

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noted that:

[a]lthough trial courts possess broad discretion to sentence defendants within

statutory limits, a reviewing court may find abuse of discretion when the

sentencing decision is arbitrary or capricious, or when the court fails to

conduct an adequate investigation into the facts relevant to sentencing. [ ] Six

federal circuits have found abuse of discretion when lower courts have

imposed sentences determined by inflexible mechanical processes.

187 Ariz. at 184, 927 P. 2d at 1313.

The court’s application of the premise that each victim was entitled to a

separate, consecutive sentence resembles in its rigidity the disfavored approach

of imposing maximum sentences for certain classes of crimes. [] The court’s

unbending application of this premise, even in the face of an admittedly

extravagant sentence, was a clear abuse of discretion.

187 Ariz. at 185, 927 P. 2d at 1314.

The appellate court ordered defendant’s case remanded for resentencing, and defendant was

thereafter allowed to plead guilty to one felony count and was sentenced to fifteen years and

nine months in prison. (Doc. 18-1 at 3-5.) 

Additionally, the Arizona Court of Appeals, in affirming Petitioner’s sentence, cited

as authority State v. Davis, 206 Ariz. 377 (2003). In that case, the Arizona Supreme Court

found that a 52-year sentence imposed on an adult male defendant who was convicted of four

separate counts of having sex with a minor (13 years of age) was cruel and unusual. Davis’s

offenses arguably are far more serious than burglary offenses. 

This Court concludes that Petitioner’s sentence is disproportionate to other,

comparable Arizona crimes.

C. Proportionality: comparable crimes from other jurisdictions.

Petitioner cites several cases from other jurisdictions illustrating the disproportionality

of Petitioner’s sentence:

State v. Dioneff, No. 2006-A-0063, 2007 WL 1884584 (Ohio Ct. App., June

29, 2007). Defendant charged with thirty-one counts of engaging in a pattern

of corrupt activity, burglary, grand theft, theft, breaking and entering, and

conspiracy to commit burglary, convicted on several counts and sentenced to

twenty-seven years of imprisonment.

State v. Snow, 144 P.3d 729 (Kan. 2006). Defendant charged with six counts

of burglary, seven counts of theft, two counts of felony criminal damage to

property, and four counts of misdemeanor criminal damage to property.

Although he was sentenced to almost 15.5 years of imprisonment, under

Kansas Law, he was not required to serve the entire sentence.

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Wright v. Crawford, 294 F. App’x 274 (2008). Defendant was indicted on

fifty counts of burglary and had six prior felonies. He was convicted of six

felonies and sentenced to serve six life sentences, but was eligible for parole

after 10 or, alternatively, 30 years under Nevada law.

State v. Ciresi, 151 A.3d 750 (R.I. 2017). Defendant was convicted of nine

counts, including burglary, conspiracy to commit burglary, use of a firearm

when committing a crime of violence, attempted larceny, receiving stolen

goods, harboring a criminal, and obstructing justice. His aggregate sentences

“totaled thirty-five years, with twenty years to serve and fifteen years

suspended with probation, to run concurrently, and a ten-year suspended

sentence to run consecutively.” Id.

(Doc. 18 at 17-18.)

Petitioner’s sentence is disproportionate to other, comparable crimes in other

jurisdictions.

“To determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, courts must look beyond

historical conceptions to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a

maturing society.’” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97 (1976)). Determining whether a sentence is cruel and unusual involves a “moral

judgment,” the applicability of such “must change as the basic mores of society change. Id.

(citation omitted). In measuring what is cruel and unusual, the Eighth Amendment “must

draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a

maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 

In 2019, the Arizona Legislature amended its A.R.S. § 13-711 to no longer read that

multiple sentences of imprisonment SHALL run consecutive, noting in the legislative history

that many Arizona offenses are required to run consecutively, such as dangerous and serious

offenses, which do not include any of Petitioner’s offenses. (emphasis added) AZ H.R. B.

Summ., 2019 Reg. Sess. H.B. 2602 (May 5, 2019). A recent bill introduced by a bipartisan

group of United States Senators would make sweeping reforms relating to federal sentences.

Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015 (“SRCA”), S. 2123, 114th Congress (2015-

2016). Among other reforms, the SRCA would reduce mandatory minimum sentences for

defendants convicted of more than three drug crimes from life without parole to 25 years,

reduce mandatory minimum sentences for armed career criminals and violent firearms

offenses from a 15 year minimum down to 10, and reduce mandatory sentences for drug

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crimes from 14 to 10 years. 

Recently Arizona Governor Doug Ducey signed legislation expanding the Second

Chance Program, that allows non-violent felony criminals to undergo treatment programs as

an alternative to prosecution, stating that “[t]his is another reform to ensure our corrections

system is truly about corrections.” Governor Ducey Signs Legislation Expanding Second

Chance Program, https://azgovernor.gov/governor/news/2017. 

Although this Court concludes that Petitioner’s sentence is cruel and unusual in a

proportionality analysis, the current societal tendency toward sentencing reform further

supports the more general notion that the sentence at issue here, 292-years, is far outside the

norm and not grounded in precedent or proportionality. As this Court has determined that

Petitioner’s sentence is unconstitutional in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel

and unusual punishment, this Court will recommend that Petitioner’s habeas petition be

granted, and that his case be remanded for resentencing before a different judge.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s consolidated claims five and seven of his habeas

petition are meritorious, this Court will recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be granted, and that Petitioner’s case be remanded to the state court

for a resentencing before a different state court judge.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be GRANTED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

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to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 24th day of February, 2020.

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