Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01834/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01834-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

---

.. . FILED 

Umtcd Stares Court of Appeals 

Temh Ci!'cuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FEB 2 2 1991 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

LLOYD H. SWEGER, et ux, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

TEXACO, INC.; CHEVRON U.S.A., ) 

INC.; PENNZOIL COMPANY; SUN ) 

OIL COMPANY; MOBIL OIL ) 

CORPORATION; ATLANTIC ) 

RICHFIELD co.; TEXACO REFINING) 

AND MARKETING INC., ) 

Defendants-Appellees, 

SINCLAIR OIL; GULF OIL 

CORPORATION; PHILLIPS OIL 

CORPORATION, 

Defendants. 

LLOYD H. SWEGER, et ux 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

TEXACO, INC.; PENNZOIL ) 

COMPANY; SINCLAIR OIL; GULF ) 

OIL CORPORATION; PHILLIPS OIL) 

CORPORATION; TEXACO REFINING ) 

AND MARKETING INC., ) 

Defendants, 

CHEVRON U.S.A., INC.; SUN 

OIL COMPANY; MOBIL OIL 

CORPORATION; ATLANTIC 

RICHFIELD CO., 

Defendants-Appellants, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 88-1781 

(W.D. Okla. CIV-86-1587-P) 

No. 88-1834 

(W.D. Okla. CIV-86-1587-P) 

Appellate Case: 88-1834 Document: 010110103823 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 1 
LLOYD H. SWEGER, et ux ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

TEXACO, INC.; SINCLAIR OIL; ) 

GULF OIL CORPORATION; PHILLIPS) 

OIL CORPORATION, ) 

) 

Defendants, ) 

) 

CHEVRON U.S.A., INC.; PENNZOIL) 

COMPANY; SUN OIL COMPANY; ) 

MOBIL OIL CORPORATION; ) 

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD co.; TEXACO) 

REFINING AND MARKETING INC., ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees, ) 

) 

No. 88-2745 

(W.D. Okla. CIV-86-1587-P) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and SAM, District 

Judge.** 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** The Honorable David Sam, of the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1834 Document: 010110103823 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 2 
Plaintiffs, Mr. Lloyd H. Sweger and Mrs. Jayn Kennedy Sweger, 

brought this products liability claim in the federal district 

court of the Western District of Oklahoma, alleging that 

Mr. Sweger's exposure to motor oils produced by defendants caused 

his cancer. Because jurisdiction is based on diversity of 

citizenship, Oklahoma's substantive law of products liability 

governs this case. The district court granted summary judgment to 

defendants on the issue of causation and awarded costs to 

defendants as the prevailing parties. However, the district court 

denied the summary judgment motion filed by defendants which 

argued that plaintiffs' claim was barred by the statute of 

limitations. Plaintiffs appeal both the summary judgment order 

and the award of costs. 1 We affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

Mr. Sweger has been a mechanic for the majority of his life, 

and, consequently, he has been exposed to large amounts of new and 

used motor oils. Mr. Sweger alleges that he worked with motor oil 

manufactured by each of the named defendants. 

In 1971, Mr. Sweger was diagnosed as having transitional cell 

cancer of the urinary system. In 1984, Mr. Sweger was diagnosed 

as having cancer of the colon. The greatest risk factor for Mr. 

Sweger's colon cancer was the existence of the first transitional 

1 Four of the defendants cross-appeal the denial of summary 

judgment as to the issue of whether plaintiffs' claim was barred 

by the statute of limitations. (Appeal No. 88-1834) Because we 

find that summary judgment was proper on the issue of causation, 

it is unnecessary for us to consider the statute of limitations 

issue. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1834 Document: 010110103823 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 3 
cell cancer. It was not until 1985, when Mr. Sweger was told by a 

reporter that he might have a cause of action against 

manufacturers of motor oil, that Mr. Sweger took steps to 

determine what caused his cancer. In 1986, plaintiffs filed this 

products liability suit against defendants alleging that 

Mr. Sweger's exposure to defendants' motor oils caused his cancer. 

To show a causal link between the defendants' motor oils and 

Mr. Sweger's cancer, plaintiffs rely on the deposition testimony 

of their expert witness, Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum. Dr. Teitelbaum is 

a proponent of the "one-molecule theory" of cancer formation. 

Under the one-molecule theory, as explained by Dr. Teitelbaum, 

cancer results from the interaction between a single molecule of a 

carcinogen and a single molecule of the recipient deoxyribonucleic 

acid (DNA). For cancer to form, the DNA molecule must first be 

hit by an "initiator" molecule. After the first hit by the 

initiator molecule, if a "promoter" molecule hits the DNA 

molecule, the DNA molecule may begin producing cancer. 

Although Dr. Teitelbaum stated that he believed that 

Mr. Sweger's cancer could have been caused by exposure to a single 

carcinogenic molecule of defendant's motor oils, he could not 

state which of defendants' motor oils acted as the promoter 

molecule or when the interaction of the molecules causing the 

cancer occurred. Defendants Pennzoil and Texaco moved for summary 

judgment arguing that plaintiffs' reliance on Dr. Teitelbaum's 

testimony was insufficient to show that defendants' motor oils 

caused Mr. Sweger's cancer. All defendants moved for summary 

judgment on statute of limitations grounds. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1834 Document: 010110103823 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 4 
The district court denied summary judgment on the issue of 

the statute of limitations. However, because the district court 

found that all defendants were similarly situated, it granted 

summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the issue of 

causation raised by Pennzoil's and Texaco's motion for summary 

judgment. 2 Subsequently, the court awarded aggregate costs of 

over $11,000 to defendants as the prevailing parties. The costs 

covered the expense of taking various depositions. Plaintiffs 

appeal the order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants 

and the award of costs to defendants. 

JURISDICTION 

Two issues have been raised concerning whether we have 

jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The first issue is whether an 

arguably premature notice of appeal later ripened giving us 

2 Plaintiffs' Statement of Issues lists as one issue on appeal 

whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to 

all defendants because it found that all defendants were 

"similarly situated." However, plaintiffs fail to argue clearly 

that issue in the body of their brief. Their failure to do so can 

be construed as a waiver. See In re Texas Mortgage Services 

Corp., 761 F.2d 1068, 1073 (5th Cir. 1985). 

Moreover, a court can grant summary judgment to a nonmoving 

party so long as the losing party had adequate opportunity to show 

whether there exists a genuine issue of fact or whether its 

opponent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See In re 

Caravan Refrigerated Cargo, Inc., 864 F.2d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 

1989); Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 734 

F.2d 1402, 1408 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 

237 (1985); Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure 1 

2720 (2d ed. 1983). There is no evidence of prejudice in this 

case because the plaintiffs had ample opportunity to address the 

issue of causation in response to Texaco's and Pennzoil's motion 

for summary judgment. There is no suggestion in the record or in 

the briefs that plaintiffs would have responded differently to the 

motion for summary judgment had plaintiffs known that all of the 

defendants were seeking summary judgment on the issue of 

causation. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1834 Document: 010110103823 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 5 
jurisdiction. The second issue is whether plaintiffs' notices of 

appeal were adequate in light of Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 

487 U.S. 312 (1988). As discussed below, we hold that plaintiffs' 

notices of appeal were adequate and therefore we have jurisdiction 

to hear these appeals. 

I. Premature Filing of the Notice of Appeal 

On May 11, 1988, Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal from 

the district courts' April 12, 1988 summary judgment order. On 

September 14, 1988, this court issued an Order to Show Cause 

because several defendants listed in plaintiffs complaint were not 

discussed in the district court's April 12, 1988 order and 

therefore it was unclear whether the order was a final judgment as 

to all defendants. Plaintiffs filed in district court a motion to 

clarify the judgment. On October 24, 1988, the district court 

granted the motion and clarified that the April 12, 1988 summary 

judgment order was final as to all claims and all parties. 

Subsequent to the district court's order of clarification, 

plaintiffs did not file a new notice of appeal. 

Plaintiffs' motiori to clarify was not drafted as a tolling 

motion under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) and did not call into 

question the correctness of the decision but only sought a 

clarification of which defendants interests were being 

adjudicated. See Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 879 F.2d 632, 636 

(9th Cir. 1989); ~ also Brown v. United Ins. Co. of America, 807 

F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). Moreover, because the 

motion was filed more than ten days after the summary judgment 

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Appellate Case: 88-1834 Document: 010110103823 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 6 
order was entered, we do not necessarily have to treat it as a 

Rule 59(e) motion. See Dalton v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 

863 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1988). 

When Rule 4(a)(4) is not implicated, the Tenth Circuit has 

adopted the procedure whereby a premature notice of appeal ripens 

if the court notifies "the parties of our observation of the 

apparent jurisdictional defect," and the parties "secure . an 

order or judgment explicitly adjudicating all remaining claims" by 

the date ordered by this court. Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 

F.2d 641, 645 (10th Cir. 1988) (en bane); see also Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(2). Because the procedure adopted in Lewis was properly 

followed, the premature notice of appeal ripened after the 

district court filed its October 24, 1988 order of clarification. 

Therefore, we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 

Defendant Pennzoil argues that Lewis is modified by Torres v. 

Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988). Pennzoil reads Torres 

as holding that jurisdictional flaws are never harmless and can 

never be cured by later corrections. However, Pennzoil's reading 

of Torres is overly broad. Because the Court in Torres was 

primarily concerned with the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) 

and did not address the issue of premature notices of appeal, 

Torres does not require us to alter the procedure set forth in 

Lewis. 

II. Adequacy of the Plaintiffs' Notices of Appeal Under Torres 

We also review plaintiffs' notices of appeal for any 

deficiencies under Torres. The Supreme Court in Torres v. Oakland 

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Appellate Case: 88-1834 Document: 010110103823 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 7 
Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 318 (1988), held that the appellants' 

use of the term "et al." and their failure to list each appellant 

by name in the notice of appeal, was a jurisdictional bar to suit 

by the unnamed appellants, because the notice of appeal deprived 

both the court of appeals and the appellees of fair notice of who 

was filing the appeal. Plaintiffs first argue that Torres should 

not be applied retroactively. However, because we find that the 

notice of appeal is adequate under Torres, we do not consider the 

issue of retroactivity. 

The notices of appeal filed by plaintiffs for appeals 

Nos. 88-1781 and 88-2745 lists "Lloyd H. Sweger, et ux, 

Plaintiffs," as the appellants. R. Docs. 198 & 225. The captions 

of the notices of appeal also list the appellees as "Texaco Inc., 

et al, Defendants." Id. The Court's concerns in Torres of lack 

of notice do not arise with the use of "et ux" because the term 

"et ux," which means "and wife," refers to only one person. See 

Black's Law Dictionary 497 (5th ed. 1979). Therefore, plaintiffs' 

failure to list Mrs. Sweger by name in the notice of appeal does 

not bar this suit. 

Similarly, appellants' use of "et al." to indicate the 

appellees does not deprive us of jurisdiction. Torres is premised 

on the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 3(c), which specifies only 

that the appellants be named. Therefore, Torres does not mandate 

that all appellees be specifically named in the notice of appeal 

in order for the appellate court to have jurisdiction. See 

Chathus v. Smith, 884 F.2d 980, 986 n.3 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. 

denied, 110 S. Ct. 1169 (1990); Appeal of District of Columbia 

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Appellate Case: 88-1834 Document: 010110103823 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 8 
Nurses Assoc., 854 F.2d 1448, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam), 

cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3189 (1989). 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

When reviewing the grant or denial of a summary judgment 

motion, we apply the same standard as that used by the district 

court. Specifically, we determine whether there is a genuine 

issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Osgood v. State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). The 

record is viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing 

party. See Ewing v. Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1432, 1437 (10th Cir. 

1987). Summary judgment may be entered against a party who fails 

to make a sufficient showing of the existence of an essential 

element to its case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

322 (1986). 

In Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 

1974), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that under Oklahoma law in 

order to maintain a product's liability action against a 

manufacturer, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the product caused 

the injury, (2) the defect which caused the injury existed in the 

product at the time that it left the manufacturer's control, and 

(3) that the defect made the product unreasonably dangerous to 

plaintiff or plaintiff's property. Id. at 1363. Because the 

district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on 

the issue of causation, the critical issue on appeal is whether 

plaintiffs made a sufficient showing of the existence of the 

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Appellate Case: 88-1834 Document: 010110103823 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 9 
essential element of causation such that there existed a genuine 

issue of material fact. 

I. Causation 

Under Oklahoma products liability law, a plaintiff must prove 

that the product was the actual cause of the injury; "the mere 

possibility that it might have caused the injury is not enough." 

Id. at 1363; see also McMurray v. Deere and Co., 858 F.2d 1436, 

1439 (10th Cir. 1988); Kirkland, 521 P.2d at 1366. 

In Case v. Fibreboard Corporation, 743 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 

1987), the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the "market share 

theory" of liability when the plaintiff is unable to identify 

specific tortfeasors. Case was a products liability action 

brought against asbestos manufacturers where the plaintiffs were 

unable to identify the "precise products to which [Mr. Case] had 

been exposed or the precise manufacturers of those products." Id. 

at 1063. The court rejected any form of collective liability in 

that situation because collective liability would eliminate the 

necessity of proving a causal link between a plaintiff's injury 

and a particular defendant's product. Case, 743 P.2d at 1064-66. 

The court found a distinction between the market share liability 

involved in DES cases, see Sindel! v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 

P.2d 924, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980), and asbestos cases 

because "DES was produced from a single formula and produced 

injury when used in a singular context •.•• Asbestos, on the other 

hand, is a name applied to a family of minerals, each a member of 

which carries a different degree of risk." Case, 743 P.2d at 1065. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1834 Document: 010110103823 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 10 
To the extent that plaintiffs' case utilizes the market share 

theory of liability, we must interpret and rely upon Case. 

Recently, this court decided a case that is relevant to our 

analysis. In Dillon v. Fibreboard Corp., 919 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. 

1990) the court reversed the lower court's determination that 

there was insufficient causation to link the decedent's cancer to 

the defendants' asbestos products. The court found that because a 

witness "specifically identified defendant's products as present 

at the refinery, and because Mr. Dillon himself testified that he 

physically handled all the kinds of asbestos insulation 

products •.• , Mr. Dillon offered rebuttal evidence which supports a 

'significant probability' that Mr. Dillon's illness was caused by 

defendants' products .... " Id. at 1492. 

Clearly, Mr. Sweger was also able to identify the specific 

products with which he came in contact over the years. To this 

extent, his case is similar to plaintiff's claim in Dillon and 

meets some of the requirements of Case. However, Mr. Sweger's 

situation differs in two significant and decisive ways. 

First, plaintiffs allege that Mr. Sweger's cancer was 

initiated by only one exposure, and they could not identify which, 

if any, of the defendants' products caused the cancer. Plaintiffs 

relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Teitelbaum to establish the 

requisite causal link. Although Dr. Teitelbaum stated that Mr. 

Sweger's use of defendants' motor oils heightened his exposure to 

carcinogens which possibly caused his cancer,

3 Dr. Teitelbaum 

3 For example, Dr. Teitelbaum's testified as follows: 

[Footnote continued • .• ] 

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Appellate Case: 88-1834 Document: 010110103823 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 11 
testified that he could not state which brand of motor oil, if 

any, was the cause of Mr. Sweger's cancer. 

Q. But if I understand correctly, you can't tell 

[ ... footnote continued.] 

Q. "Based upon this history, I believe that it may 

be possible to associate Mr. Sweger's kidney cancer with 

exposure to hydrocarbons including gasoline over a 

prolonged period of time." Explain that. 

A. I think I have over this time. I view this as 

a transitional cell cancer, as it's described, not as a 

kidney parenchymal cancer. There is a considerable 

literature demonstrating that those cancers, the 

transitional cell cancers, are associated with organic 

amines, and that smoking, for instance, is associated 

with it. This is a tumor which has a very high 

likelihood of environmental cause. 

I believe that, as I've indicated to you, 

there are many hydrocarbons to which Mr. Sweger was 

exposed and that those together would have to be looked 

at as contributing causes to his disease. 

R. Doc. 140, Ex. A at 70-71. 

Q. I didn't state that properly. Will you tell me 

what your opinion is of all the causative factors of the 

transitional cell cancer that was discovered in 1971 in 

Mr. Sweger. 

A. Okay, I think I tried this morning to make that 

clear. I believe that the transitional cell cancer 

which developed in Mr. Sweger was the result of a whole 

series of processes, including his carbon tetrachloride 

exposure, his exposure to various solvents, his exposure 

to motor oils, new and used, and their additives, his 

exposure to gasoline, and his genetic makeup, propensity 

to develop cancer. 

Q. Smoking? 

A. Yeah, I included smoking, I think. If I 

didn't, I certainly intended to. That those factors 

coming together resulted in his disease. My reading of 

his exposure says that the -- the extraordinary exposure 

for him, which differentiates him from the rest of the 

population, is his occupational exposure, and I've 

outlined those in some detail in the morning portion of 

this discussion. 

R. Doc. 140, Ex. A at 120-21. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1834 Document: 010110103823 Date Filed: 02/22/1991 Page: 12 
us when that single event occurred in your belief that 

caused Mr. Sweger's cancer; is that correct? 

A. That's correct. 

Q. And you can't tell us which brand of these 

motor oils it was that was responsible for that one 

molecular interaction with the one molecule of DNA, can 

you? 

A. That's correct. I can't single out which one 

would have been the cause -- the cause. 

R. Doc. 176 at 67.4 

Plaintiffs argue that if any conflict exists between the onemolecule theory and Dr. Teitelbaum's testimony that the motor oils 

contributed to the cause of Mr. Sweger's cancer, we should reject 

the one-molecule theory. But it is clear to us that plaintiffs' 

trial allegations must be rejected under Case. Plaintiffs did not 

establish in opposition to the motion for summary judgment 

4 In addition, Dr. Teitelbaum testified as follows: 

Q. Do you have an opinion as to how much exposure 

to whatever the causal factors involved here are before 

you have had it sufficient to cause cancer? 

A. ~-

R. Doc. 140, Ex. A at 125. 

Q. And are you in a position, particularly with 

respect to Mr. Sweger's history, to opine for us as a 

matter of reasonable scientific certainty whether in his 

case it was a single incidence of initiation and 

subsequent promotion or multiple incidences? 

A. I have no opinion about that. 

Q. Is there any way to a degree of reasonable 

scientific certainty you could develop an opinion? Is 

there anything you could do to kind of sort that out and 

figure that out? 

A. I have no of no way to do that. 

R. Doc. 140, Ex. A at 210. 

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anything more than a claim that one of the defendants' products 

possibly caused Mr. Sweger's cancer. Unlike Dillon, where 

plaintiffs demonstrated a significant probability that the 

asbestos-related cancer occurred from repeated and collective 

exposure to all of defendants' products, plaintiffs' attempt to 

rely upon a theory akin to the collective share theory of 

liability, while having to concede that only one unidentified 

product may have caused the cancer. In other words, plaintiffs 

have claimed that of the many products to which Mr. Sweger was 

exposed, one acted as the sudden initiator of his cancer, although 

they cannot identify which one, if any, was responsible. Oklahoma 

has specifically rejected this form of liability. 

The second decisive distinction goes directly to the 

requirement of causation as set fourth in Kirkland. Even if we 

were to disregard Dr. Teitelbaum's one-molecule theory, his 

testimony does not establish a causal link between any of 

defendants' products and Mr. Sweger's cancer with the certainty 

required by Oklahoma law. Dr. Teitelbaum testified that it was 

possible that the motor oils were not a factor in the development 

of Mr. Sweger's cancer.

5 When read in context, Dr. Teitelbaum's 

5 Dr. Teitelbaum testified as follows: 

Q. Is it possible that Mr. Sweger's exposure to 

motor oil was not a factor in the development of 

transitional cell cancer? 

A. It's possible. 

R. Doc. 140, Ex. A at 167-68. 

Q. Can you state in terms of reasonable medical 

certainty in this case whether Mr. Sweger would have 

[Footnote continued ••. ] 

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statements at best merely support a finding that Mr. Sweger's 

exposure made him more vulnerable to cancer.

6 Under Oklahoma law, 

the fact that Dr. Teitelbaum testified that the motor oils may not 

[ .•• footnote continued.] 

developed transitional cell cancer, even in the absence 

of exposure to motor oil? 

A. I think it's unlikely that he would have 

developed it, although it is possible. 

R. Doc. 140, Ex. A at 187; R. Doc. 140, Ex. A at 188 ("it is 

possible he would have had this cancer without his 

exposure"). 

6 For example, Dr. Teitelbaum testified as follows: 

I see a lot of exposure, hand exposure, 

contact over many years, continuing really up to the 

time that I saw him, with oils and oil products -- of 

all sorts. Ranging from air conditioning oils to 

cylinder oils, and so on. I see a mixed solvent 

exposure, carburetor cleaners, paints; I think those are 

contributing causes. 

And that's as I see the things that when I 

come to a summary, I would say that this is a man who 

had an extraordinary exposure over his working career to 

carcinogens. 

R. Doc. 140, Ex. A at 64-65. 

Q. Then, what is it that enables you, with your 

training and skill, to look at the records from 1971, 

and without having had the opportunity to examine 

Mr. Sweger at the time that he had this cancer, to 

arrive at an opinion as to the cause of that cancer? 

A. I think it's very, very straightforward. It's 

a question of quantity of exposure. If you spent the 

rest of your life breathing in wood smoke from creosotetreated wood and you inhaled a lot of polynuclear 

aromatic hydrocarbons, you had never been a smoker, and 

you developed a lung cancer, it would be almost 

impossible to say that the polynuclear aromatic in that 

wood smoke was not either the sole cause or the most 

probable cause or a major contributing cause to that 

cancer. 

As I see Mr. Sweger's history, the thing which 

distinguishes him from most other people is his 

extraordinary exposure over a long working period to 

[Footnote continued •.. ] 

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have been a factor in the development of Mr. Sweger's cancer is 

fatal to plaintiffs' claim. 7 See Kirkland, 521 P.2d at 1363, 

1366. Compared to the facts of Dillon and Canadian Public School 

Dist. No. 2 v. McGraw-Edison Mfg., 634 P.2d 782 (Okla. App. 

8 1981), Dr. Teitelbaum's generalized statements do not provide the 

[ ... footnote continued.] 

materials which contained, among other things, 

polynuclear aromatics. 

That's not the only thing they contained, but 

that's one of the significant things that they 

contained. And that is unusual. Most people do not 

spend their lives with their hands in polynuclear 

aromatic-containing motor oils for 20 years. 

R. Doc. 140, Ex. A at 91-92. 

7 Q. Okay. Now, in Mr. Sweger's case, do you have an 

opinion, sir, as to what the initiator was? 

A. No. 

Q. Do you have an opinion as to what the promoter was? 

A. Some components of one of the material which we've 

discussed today. 

Q. Okay. And by some component of one of the 

materials, you mean some component of the used motor oils? 

A. No, and/or one of the other substances I've 

discussed. The carbon tetrachloride, and so on. I can't 

give you a specific answer to that. 

Q. All right. And as I understand what you've told us 

here today, you don't know when that promoter struck the 

initiated cell and precipitated Mr. Sweger's cancer? 

A. That's correct. 

R. Doc. 140, Ex. A at 206-207. 

8 The Court of Appeals of Oklahoma in Canadian Public School 

Dist. No. 2 v. McGraw-Edison Mfg., 634 P.2d 782 (Okla. App. 1981), 

citing Kirkland, stated that a products liability plaintiff had to 

prove that the "defectiveness caused or contributed to the cause 

of harm to plaintiff." Id. at 785 (emphasis added). In Canadian 

Public School, gas leakage from a room heater manufactured by 

[Footnote continued ... ] 

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necessary certainty under Oklahoma law to establish causation, an 

essential element of plaintiffs' cause of action. 

Therefore, under Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 

(1986), summary judgment in favor of defendants was correctly 

entered. 

II. Award of Costs to Defendants 

Plaintiffs also challenge the district court's decision to 

award to defendants as the prevailing parties, the costs incurred 

in taking depositions. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d) 

states that "costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing 

party unless the court otherwise directs." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d); 

see 28 u.s.c. § 1920. The district court's decision to award 

costs is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See U.S. 

Industries, Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1245 (10th 

Cir. 1988). 

The costs of depositions reasonably necessary to the 

litigation of the case can be awarded by the court under 28 u.s.c. 

§ 1920(2). 9 See Furr v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 824 F.2d 1537, 

1550 (10th Cir. 1987); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 560 (10th Cir. 

[ ... footnote continued.] 

defendant combined with other factors to cause the fire which 

destroyed the plaintiff-school. Although the court recognized 

that the room heater was not the sole cause, it found that it was 

"an essential causational link in the chain of events culminating 

in the [injury]." Id. at 786. 

9 The district court's determination that the depositions were 

necessary expenses is "an issue of fact to be determined by the 

district judge based on ... the existing record." Touche Ross, 

854 F.2d at 1245. Plaintiffs have failed to argue on appeal that 

the depositions were not necessary expenses and therefore we do 

not consider this issue. 

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1983). "[I]f the court finds the costs were for materials or 

services necessarily obtained, the amount of the award requested 

must be reasonable." Touche Ross, 854 F.2d at 1245. Where there 

is a statutory basis for the costs, there is a presumption in 

favor of awarding costs. See Touche Ross, 854 F.2d at 1245; Furr, 

824 F.2d at 1550. The losing party bears the burden of overcoming 

this presumption. See Serna v. Manzano, 616 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th 

Cir. 1980). 

The only reason offered by plaintiffs as to why they should 

not be charged with the costs is that they are of limited 

financial means.

10 Although the district court may consider the 

financial capabilities of a party in deciding whether to award 

costs, it is not an abuse of discretion to award costs even where 

the financial capabilities of the party are limited. See,~, 

Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1233 (6th Cir. 1986); 

McCabe v. City of Chicago, 593 F. Supp. 665, 669 (N.D. Ill. 1984) 

(Although the losing party was "hard-pressed" to pay the costs, 

reasonable costs were charged against the losing party.); American 

Key Corp. v. Cumberland Assoc., 102 F.R.D. 496 (N.D. Ga. 1984). 

Plaintiffs do not argue that they are indigent, but merely 

argue that it would be difficult for them to pay the costs because 

of their limited income. Plaintiffs have failed to carry their 

burden of overcoming the presumption favoring an award of costs. 

10 Plaintiffs also note that they brought the suit in good faith. 

However, good faith alone does not immunize the losing party from 

paying costs. See Muslin v. Frelinghuysen Livestock Managers, 777 

F.2d 1230, 1236 (7th Cir. 1985). 

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.. 

Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in awarding costs to defendants as prevailing parties. 

CONCLUSION 

Because plaintiffs failed to establish a causal link between 

the cancer and defendants' motor oils, the district court's 

April 12, 1988 summary judgment order is AFFIRMED. The taxation 

of costs against the plaintiffs is also AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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