Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02946/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02946-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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ORDER DISMISSING CASE 14-2946 LB

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco Division

TRIREME MEDICAL, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANGIOSCORE, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-02946-LB 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

[Re: ECF No. 36]

INTRODUCTION

This is a case for correction of patent inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256. (ECF No. 1 at 2, 

¶ 3.)1Plaintiff TriReme Medical, LLC‘s claims involve the alleged inventive contributions that a 

third party, Dr. Chaim Lotan, made to an angioplasty balloon catheter that defendant AngioScore, 

Inc. manufactures. AngioScore contends that Dr. Lotan assigned whatever rights he had in the 

device to AngioScore in 2003; TriReme argues that Dr. Lotan licensed his rights in the device to 

TriReme in 2014. The court concludes that Dr. Lotan assigned whatever rights he had to 

AngioScore under a 2003 consulting agreement. He thus had nothing to license to TriReme in 

2014. TriReme has no interest in the subject patents sufficient to maintain a § 256 claim, and it 

 

1 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (―ECF‖); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the tops of documents.

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thus lacks standing. The court accordingly dismisses TriReme‘s case. See, e.g., Larson v. Correct 

Craft, Inc., 568 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 

1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997).2

STATEMENT

This case concerns three patents issued on a medical device: a balloon catheter used in 

angioplasty to remedy obstructions (such as plaques) in the peripheral vascular system. (The 

relevant patents are: No. 8,080,026; No. 8,454,636; and No. 8,721,667 — all being U.S. patents. 

(ECF No. 1 at 2, ¶ 7; see ECF No. 37 at 10, 13.))

3 AngioScore owns these patents by assignment 

and manufactures the angioplasty balloon catheter to which they relate. The device‘s inventors 

include Dr. Eitan Konstantino (who founded AngioScore and later left to found TriReme) and 

Tanhum Feld. Dr. Chaim Lotan — who is not a party to this suit; and who is not listed as an 

inventor on the patents — is an Israeli cardiologist who claims to have contributed to early work 

on the catheter and so to have inventors‘ rights in the subject patents. Dr. Lotan entered into two 

contracts relevant to this inquiry. In 2003, he entered into a consulting agreement with 

AngioScore; under that agreement, Dr. Lotan assigned to AngioScore all his rights in inventions 

that he worked on, and which related to AngioScore‘s business, during the contract‘s term. (ECF 

No. 36-2 at 2-3.) AngioScore contends that Dr. Lotan thereby assigned to it all his rights in the 

subject patents. In June 2014, one day before TriReme filed this suit, Dr. Lotan granted TriReme 

an exclusive worldwide license to ―exploit‖ his rights in those patents. (ECF No. 36-3 at 2-8.) 

Both contacts are more fully described below. 

I. THE 2003 CONSULTING AGREEMENT

AngioScore entered into a consulting agreement with Dr. Lotan in November 2003, though the 

agreement had a retroactive effective date of May 1, 2003. (See ECF No. 36-2 at 2, 5.) The 

agreement‘s terms are undisputed. Under the contract, in exchange for AngioScore stock options, 

 

2 Because it disposes of this motion on standing, the court does not address the parties‘ 

indispensable-party arguments under Rule 19.

3

The parties have a separate patent-infringement case pending in this district. See AngioScore, 

Inc. v. TriReme Med., Inc., 4:12-cv-3393-YGR

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Dr. Lotan agreed to ―advise [AngioScore] on product design, clinical trial design and 

interpretation of clinical data,‖ as well as ―assist[ing AngioScore] with preclinical and clinical 

testing of the Company‘s products.‖ (Id. at 2, 7.) The contract does not name a particular product. 

(Id., passim.) He also agreed to the following assignment of rights:

Assignment of Inventions. Consultant agrees to promptly disclose 

to the Company and hereby assigns to the Company, or its designee, 

all right, title and interest in and to all inventions, original works of 

authorship, developments, concepts, know-how, improvements or 

trade secrets, whether or not patentable, that Consultant may solely 

or jointly conceive or develop or reduce to practice during the term 

of this Agreement that relate to the Services (collectively referred to 

as ―Inventions‖).

(Id. at 3, ¶ 9(b) (emphases added).) This assignment was subject to an exclusion or ―carve-out‖ 

term, by which Dr. Lotan could identify and retain his interest in preexisting inventions, so that no 

interest in those ―prior inventions‖ would be assigned to AngioScore. The carve-out provided:

Inventions Retained and Licensed. Consultant has attached hereto, 

as part of Exhibit C, a list describing all inventions, original works 

of authorship, developments, improvements, and trade secrets 

which were made by Consultant prior to the date of this Agreement 

(collectively referred to as ―Prior Inventions‖), that belong solely to 

Consultant or belong to Consultant jointly with another and that 

relate to any of the Company‘s current or proposed businesses, 

products or research and development; or if no such list is attached, 

Consultant represents that there are no such Prior Inventions. If, 

in the course of providing the Services, Consultant incorporates into 

a Company product, process or machine or into any Invention (as 

defined below), a Prior Invention owned by Consultant or in which 

Consultant has an interest, the Company is hereby granted and shall 

have a non-exclusive royalty-free, irrevocable, perpetual, worldwide 

license (with the right to sublicense) to make, have made, copy, 

modify, make derivative works of, use, sell and otherwise distribute 

such Prior Inventions as part of or in connection with such product, 

process, machine or Invention.

(Id. at 3, ¶ 9(a) (underlines in original) (italics added).) Dr. Lotan signed Exhibit C but, leaving the 

available space blank, did not list any ―Prior Inventions.‖ (Id. at 8.)

II. DR. LOTAN’S WORK ON THE BALLOON CATHETER

Dr. Lotan‘s early work on the catheter is to a point undisputed. In April 2003, working 

alongside then AngioScore representatives, Dr. Konstantino and Mr. Feld, Dr. Lotan conducted an 

animal study in which he inserted prototype catheters into the blood vessels of an unfortunate pig. 

(E.g., ECF No. 36 at 10-11; ECF No. 37 at 10-13.) For present purposes, the prototype catheter 

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had two salient features: a balloon and a ―metal scoring element‖ that wrapped around the 

balloon‘s outside. (ECF No. 36 at 8-9.) The uninflated device would be ―snaked through‖ a 

patient‘s (or a pig‘s) blood vessels. (Id. at 8.) Once it reached the target plaque inside the vessels, 

―the balloon would be inflated and press itself and the metal on top of the balloon into the plaque, 

thereby moving and compressing the plaque to increase the diameter of the opening in the 

circulatory system and improve blood flow.‖ (Id. at 8.) The balloon would then be deflated, with 

the metal element returning ―to roughly its original configuration,‖ so that it could be safely 

―snaked back out of the circulatory system.‖ (Id. at 9.)

The pig study revealed a problem: in several attempts, in retracting the prototype device, the 

metal element detached from the balloon. This made removing the catheter difficult. (ECF No. 36-

7 at 2-6.) In some cases the metal element was left behind entirely. (Id.) Within the next few days, 

Dr. Lotan‘s lab wrote a report memorializing the results of the pig study. (Id.; see ECF No. 36-4 at 

56-59, 80-83.) The report noted the problem with the metal detaching and made several 

―recommendations‖ — at least some of which Dr. Lotan claims were his. (See ECF No. 36-4 at 

56-59; ECF No. 36-7 at 2-6.) In short, the report suggested that both ends of the metal element be 

fastened to the balloon. (The prototype had featured one fixed and one free-floating end.) At the 

same time, this bond had to be flexible enough to allow the balloon to deflate and the wire to 

return to its original position, thus enabling the device to be removed safely. (See id.; ECF No. 36-

4 at 26.) The study participants (including Dr. Lotan) shared one email and had two meetings 

about the bonding issue, all in April 2003. (Lotan Dep. – ECF No. 37-2 at 57-58; ECF No. 37-8; 

ECF No. 37-15, ¶¶ 9-11.) 

The parties disagree over what, if anything, Dr. Lotan did in connection with the balloon 

catheter after the April 2003 pig study. TriReme contends that Dr. Lotan made no further 

contribution. (See, e.g., ECF No. 37 at 17-21.) With the April 2003 study and report, in TriReme‘s 

view, Dr. Lotan‘s contribution to developing the catheter was ―complete[].‖ (Id.) AngioScore 

responds that Dr. Lotan continued to work on issues related to the catheter, and did so under the 

2003 consulting agreement. (E.g., ECF No. 38 at 13-14.)

The evidence on Dr. Lotan‘s post-April 2003 work is as follows. There is no dispute that, after 

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April 2003, Dr. Lotan did not work on the physical design of the catheter. After that date, as Dr. 

Lotan recounts matters, product design was turned over to AngioScore‘s engineers. (See ECF No. 

36-4 at 20-21, 96-98, 147-48.) Dr. Lotan also testified, though, that after April 2003 he continued 

to work on other catheter-related issues under the terms of his consulting contract with 

AngioScore. (ECF No. 36-4 at 53-56, 74-75, 125-27.) He relates ―talking‖ with AngioScore and 

―plann[ing] on human studies‖ for the catheter in the summer of 2003. (Id. at 75.) Some of these 

studies did not come to pass; some did. (Id. at 74-75.) Dr. Lotan not only helped ―design[]‖ some 

of these human trials (id. at 53-55); he personally conducted some of them (id. at 125-27). He also 

testified that he was involved in the ―interpretation of [this] clinical data‖ under the consulting 

agreement. (Id. at 54.)

III. DR. LOTAN’S 2014 LICENSE TO TRIREME

Over the next decade, Dr. Lotan‘s relationship with AngioScore deteriorated; he could 

describe himself by late 2013 as being ―furious‖ with the company. (Lotan Dep. – ECF No. 36-4 

at 5.) He learned at that time that his AngioScore options had expired; the company‘s board 

reissued them, but at a price that, according to Dr. Lotan, made them ―much less [valuable] than 

they really were.‖ (Id. at 6.) Months later, believing that he had rights in the subject patents, Dr. 

Lotan discussed licensing them with TriReme. (See id. at 28-29.) In June 2014, Dr. Lotan entered 

into a contract with TriReme, under which he granted TriReme a license ―to exploit the Lotan IP 

rights‖ — meaning, whatever rights Dr. Lotan had in the patents in suit. (Id. at 28-29; Licensing 

Agreement – ECF No. 36-3 at 2-3.) Dr. Lotan testified that, as he understands it, he has granted 

TriReme only a license, and that he, Dr. Lotan, continues to own his inventor‘s rights in the 

subject patents. (ECF No. 36-4 at 30.)

GOVERNING LAW

TriReme brings this case under 35 U.S.C. § 256 to add Dr. Lotan as a named inventor of the 

patents in suit. (See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 1, 6.) A party invoking § 256 must satisfy constitutional 

standing requirements. Larson v. Correct Craft, Inc., 568 F.3d 1319, 1325-27 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 

Chou v. Univ. of Chicago, 254 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001). ―That is, the party must 

demonstrate that he has  ̳suffered an injury-in-fact, that the injury is traceable to the conduct 

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complained of, and that the injury is redressable by a favorable decision.‘‖ Informatics 

Applications Grp., Inc. v. Shkolnikov, 836 F. Supp. 2d 400, 411 (E.D. Va. 2011) (citing Chou, 254 

F.3d at 1357) (citing in turn U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 560-61 (1992)). To have standing under § 256, a party must assert either ―expected 

ownership rights in the patent at issue‖ or a ―concrete financial interest in the patent, albeit an 

interest less than ownership.‖ Shkolnikov, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 411 (quoting in part Chou, 254 F.3d 

at 1358-59). One who assigns away his rights in a patent lacks § 256 standing. See Larson, 569 

F.3d at 1326-27; see also Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1571-75 (Fed. 

Cir. 1997) (patent-infringement suit) (discussed in Larson).

ANALYSIS

The court holds that Dr. Lotan assigned whatever rights he had in the subject patents to 

AngioScore in 2003. He had no rights in those patents to license to TriReme in 2014. TriReme 

thus has no actionable interest in those patents and no standing to pursue a § 256 claim to correct 

inventorship on the patents.

I. DR. LOTAN ASSIGNED HIS RIGHTS TO ANGIOSCORE IN 2003

A. Basic Contractual Analysis

The parties‘ primary analytical dispute centers on whether Dr. Lotan completed his inventive 

contributions to the catheter before the May 1, 2003 effective date of his consulting agreement, or 

whether he continued to work after that date. TriReme contends (in sum) that Dr. Lotan‘s work —

consisting of the April 2003 pig study and report — was ―complete‖ before May 1, 2003; that, 

although that work entitles him to inventorship under patent law, it did not constitute a ―Prior 

Invention‖ under the consulting agreement; and thus that he should be added to the subject patents 

as an inventor. AngioScore responds, first, that Dr. Lotan‘s work continued after May 1, 2003, so 

that any rights he had in the catheter were assigned under paragraph 9(b) of his consulting 

agreement. Second, and maybe more operatively, AngioScore argues that it is ultimately 

immaterial whether his work continued after May 1, 2003 or not; either way, because he did not 

list the April 2003 pig study (along with his subsequent report and recommendations) as a ―Prior 

Invention‖ under the consulting agreement, Dr. Lotan failed to retain any rights growing out of 

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that study, and assigned all his interest in the catheter to AngioScore. (See ECF No. 38 at 4-8.) In 

AngioScore‘s view, Dr. Lotan had nothing to license to TriReme in 2014 and TriReme thus lacks 

standing to pursue a § 256 claim.

The court agrees with AngioScore. The question of when Dr. Lotan completed work is 

ultimately immaterial: Even if his work was complete before May 1, 2003, under the express 

terms of the consulting agreement, he assigned all rights in the catheter to AngioScore and 

certified that there were no earlier inventions in which he was retaining an interest.

This conclusion follows from a straightforward application of the consulting agreement. 

Under that agreement, Dr. Lotan agreed to provide AngioScore with consulting ―Services.‖ Those 

services were defined as follows: ―Consultant shall advise Company on product design, clinical 

trial design and interpretation of clinical data. Consultant shall assist company with preclinical and 

clinical testing of the Company‘s products . . . .‖ (ECF No. 36-2 at 2, 6.) There is no dispute that 

the catheter was an AngioScore ―product.‖ In the contract‘s pivotal term, Dr. Lotan assigned to 

AngioScore

all right, title and interest in and to all inventions, original works of 

authorship, developments, concepts, know-how, improvements or 

trade secrets, whether or not patentable, that Consultant may solely 

or jointly conceive or develop or reduce to practice during the term 

of this Agreement that relate to the Services (collectively referred to 

as ―Inventions‖).

(Id. at 3, ¶ 9(b) (underline in original).) The agreement also provided the following ―carve-out,‖ 

under which Dr. Lotan could identify and retain (i.e., not assign to AngioScore) his rights in any 

preexisting work:

Inventions Retained and Licensed. Consultant has attached hereto, 

as part of Exhibit C, a list describing all inventions, original works 

of authorship, developments, improvements, and trade secrets 

which were made by Consultant prior to the date of this Agreement 

(collectively referred to as ―Prior Inventions‖), that belong solely to 

Consultant or belong to Consultant jointly with another and that 

relate to any of the Company‘s current or proposed businesses, 

products or research and development; or if no such list is attached,

Consultant represents that there are no such Prior Inventions. If, 

in the course of providing the Services, Consultant incorporates into 

a Company product, process or machine or into any Invention (as 

defined below), a Prior Invention owned by Consultant or in which 

Consultant has an interest, the Company is hereby granted and shall 

have a non-exclusive royalty-free, irrevocable, perpetual, worldwide 

license (with the right to sublicense) to make, have made, copy, 

modify, make derivative works of, use, sell and otherwise distribute 

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such Prior Inventions as part of or in connection with such product, 

process, machine or Invention.

(Id. at 3, ¶ 9(a) (underlines in original) (boldface and italics added).) Again, Dr. Lotan signed 

Exhibit C but did not list any ―Prior Inventions.‖ (Id. at 8.) He thus ―represent[ed] that there [were] 

no such Prior Inventions.‖

From these undisputed points it would seem to follow that Dr. Lotan assigned whatever rights 

he had in the balloon catheter to AngioScore in 2003, retained nothing through the exclusion

mechanism of paragraph 9(a), and so had nothing to license to TriReme in 2014. This conclusion 

is, as AngioScore rightly observes, independent of whether Dr. Lotan completed his inventive 

contributions to the catheter before or after the consulting agreement‘s effective date of May 1, 

2003. Even if, as TriReme argues, Dr. Lotan completed his work by May 1, 2003, he still 

represented that there were no ―Prior Inventions,‖ as the consulting agreement defined that term, 

in which he was ―retain[ing]‖ an interest.

B. TriReme’s Arguments

TriReme offers several arguments against that conclusion. The court has weighed them all 

carefully, but finds none of them convincing.

1. The exclusion term does not cover only “formal” inventions

First, TriReme argues that by ―Prior Inventions‖ the carve-out meant only complete 

inventions; that is, only ―formal inventions already made, such as patents and patent applications.‖ 

(ECF No. 38 at 19-20.) Dr. Lotan did not consider his April 2003 work to constitute a ―formal 

invention[]‖ and so did not list them in the carve-out‘s Exhibit C. (Id. at 20 and n. 2.) His pre-May 

1, 2003 work entitled him to inventor status under the patent law, TriReme argues, and thus to a 

§ 256 correction; but that work did not itself rise to the level of a ―formal invention‖ and so did 

not need to be listed on Exhibit C to be saved from assignment.

The express language of the consulting agreement precludes this argument. What TriReme 

insists upon, in other words, is not what the contract says. Paragraph 9(a) does not say that Dr. 

Lotan should list only complete and ―formal inventions.‖ It defined ―Prior Inventions‖ as ―all 

inventions, original works of authorship, developments, improvements, and trade secrets which 

were made by Consultant prior to the date of this Agreement . . . .‖ (ECF No. 36-2 at 3, ¶ 9(a) 

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(emphasis added).) The April 2003 study, as well as Dr. Lotan‘s report on that study and his 

―recommendations‖ for addressing the problem with the metal element detaching from the 

prototype catheter: these all fall within the plain meaning of the terms, ―works of authorship, 

developments, [or] improvements.‖ The agreement required Dr. Lotan to list such work in Exhibit 

C, if he was going to retain any rights in them, or (at most) license them to AngioScore for use in 

the catheter. To interpret this language as meaning only complete ―inventions‖ would require the 

court to ignore the other terms — ―works of authorship, developments, improvements‖ — and to 

treat these as surplus nullities. Such interpretations are disfavored. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1641 

(―The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably 

practicable . . . .‖) The agreement further said, again in plain language, that if no such material was 

listed, then Dr. Lotan represented that there was no such work. If Dr. Lotan obtained rights in the 

catheter as a result of his pre-May 1, 2003 work — even if that work did not itself constitute a fullblown ―formal invention‖ — he did not save those rights from being assigned to AngioScore.

2. The “Prior Inventions” term does not merely grant a license

Second, TriReme argues that the carve-out of paragraph 9(a) ―at most . . . conveys to 

AngioScore a non-exclusive license to Prior Inventions . . . .‖ (ECF No. 37 at 19.) TriReme rests 

this argument on the title of the provision (―Inventions Retained and Licensed‖) and on the fact 

that the second segment of this provision grants AngioScore a non-exclusive license in any ―Prior 

Inventions‖ that are incorporated into the company‘s products. (See ECF No. 36-2 at 3, ¶ 9(a).)

But this argument, too, quickens only by mangling the express terms of the consulting 

agreement and unraveling its manifest intent. First, the argument proceeds as if paragraph 9(a) 

addresses only licensing, when by its terms it address ―Prior Inventions‖ that are both ―retained‖ 

and ―licensed.‖ The fact that some Prior Inventions may be licensed does not rule out the 

possibility that some may be retained completely. Perhaps more substantively, TriReme offers an 

unacceptable reading of this contract term. The first part of paragraph 9(a), again, defines ―Prior 

Inventions‖ and directs Dr. Lotan to list these on Exhibit C to retain them. The second part of 

paragraph 9(a) then says that, if any ―Prior Inventions‖ are incorporated into an AngioScore 

product, then the company has a certain license to them. But this depends on there being Prior 

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Inventions in the first place. And, because he did not list any such inventions on Exhibit C, Dr. 

Lotan represented that there were none.

3. The standing analysis is not too “intertwined” with the merits

Third, TriReme contends that the court should not rule on the motion to dismiss because 

―jurisdictional and substantive issues are inextricably intertwined.‖ (ECF No. 37 at 22.) TriReme 

continues: ―Jurisdictional finding of genuinely disputed facts is inappropriate when the 

jurisdictional issue and substantive issues are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is 

dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits of an action.‖ (Id. (quoting Sun 

Valley Gasoline, Inc. v. Ernst Enters., Inc., 711 F.2d 138, 139 (9th Cir. 1983)). TriReme contends 

that the ―nature and timing‖ of Dr. Lotan‘s contribution to the catheter — whether he made an 

inventive contribution before May 1, 2003 that would entitle him to inventor status — is a central 

merits issue that overlaps the jurisdictional determination and thus prevents the court from ruling 

on standing. (ECF No. 37 at 22.) 

The court disagrees. It goes without saying that subject-matter jurisdiction is a fundamental 

concern for a federal court. Without such jurisdiction, the court has no power to proceed. The 

court does not think that this case involves jurisdictional and merits issues that are so 

―intertwined‖ as to prevent the normal, primary resolution of jurisdiction. To the contrary. The 

facts that touch upon jurisdiction — even if they overlap to some degree with merits issues related 

to the nature of Dr. Lotan‘s inventive contribution — are nevertheless so basic that they permit 

resolution of the standing issue now. The jurisdictional decision here requires little more than a 

straightforward reading of the consulting agreement in light of the most preliminary facts. In this 

respect, this case is like the patent-correction and –infringement decisions in, for example, Larson, 

or Jim Arnold, where the Federal Circuit considered contractual assignments in light of equally 

basic facts to decide that plaintiffs lacked standing under either § 256 (Larson) or other parts of 

patent law. See IMATEC, Ltd. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 15 F. App‘x 887, 892 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 

(affirming standing dismissal of infringement claim where jurisdictional holding ―turn[ed] on the 

proper construction of [an] assignment agreement‖).

///

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4. TriReme carves up the contract and so loses its whole purpose

Finally, the court addresses TriReme‘s broadest argument and basic approach to interpreting 

the 2003 consulting agreement. At the hearing on AngioScore‘s motion to dismiss, TriReme‘s 

counsel suggested that the court may be misunderstanding the contract. There are, counsel 

emphasized, two distinct terms in issue: the ―Inventions Retained and Licensed‖ term of paragraph 

9(a); and the main assignment clause of paragraph 9(b). Only the latter deals with assignments. No 

assignment can follow from the ―Inventions Retained‖ provision of paragraph 9(a). Indeed, under 

TriReme‘s view, paragraph 9(a) ultimately has no effect. That paragraph addressed only fullblown, ―formal‖ inventions; because Dr. Lotan‘s pre-May 1, 2003 work did not constitute such a 

complete invention, there was nothing for him to list as a ―Prior Invention‖ under paragraph 9(a). 

In sum — and TriReme surely phrased it better — if we accept the rest of TriReme‘s arguments, 

then Dr. Lotan did no work after May 1, 2003 that could have been assigned to AngioScore under 

paragraph 9(b), and there was no ―Prior Invention‖ for Dr. Lotan to retain under paragraph 9(a). 

Whatever rights Dr. Lotan gained from his April 2003 work remained with him to license to 

TriReme in 2014. Counsel urged that this conclusion followed from a due insistence on closely 

tracking the language of the consulting agreement.

The court has weighed this argument carefully. It concludes, however, that it is TriReme that 

misreads the contract. More precisely, TriReme hyper-parses the contract, walling off terms that 

must be read together. This leads TriReme to betray what the agreement‘s plain language reveals 

to be its objectively apparent purpose.

It will help to recall some rudiments of contract interpretation. The Federal Circuit tells us that 

California law controls the inquiry: ―Construction of patent[-]assignment agreements is a matter of 

state contract law.‖ Preston v. Marathon Oil Co., 684 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Euclid Chem Co. v. Vector Corrosion Techs., Inc., 561 F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1009)). ―The 

fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the 

parties.‖ Align Tech., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 673 F. Supp. 2d 957, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting 

Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1265 (1992)). ―California recognizes the 

objective theory of contracts, under which it is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of 

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the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation.‖ 

Cedars–Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shewry, 137 Cal. App. 4th 964, 980 (2006) (quoted in Spacone v. 

Williamson, 258 F. App‘x 141(9th Cir. 2007) (mem.) (emphasis added)). ―When a contract is 

reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if 

possible . . . .‖ Cal. Civ. Code § 1639. Furthermore: ―The language of a contract is to govern its 

interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.‖ Cal. Civ. 

Code § 1638. ―Words in a contract which are wholly inconsistent with its nature, or with the main 

intention of the parties, are to be rejected.‖ Cal. Civ. Code § 1653 (emphasis added). By short 

extension, and what is more important here, the court must equally reject proposed interpretations

that are ―wholly inconsistent‖ with a contract‘s ―nature,‖ or with the parties‘ (objectively apparent) 

―main intention.‖ A final point will spotlight why TriReme‘s surgical approach does not persuade: 

―The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably 

practical, each clause helping to interpret the other.‖ Navarro v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 729, 734 (9th

Cir. 2008) (applying California law); see also, e.g., 4 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of 

Contracts § 618, at 710 (3d ed. 1961) (―A written contract must be read as a whole and every part 

interpreted with reference to the whole.‖).

Compartmentalizing contract terms that should instead be read together, TriReme‘s suggested 

approach and resulting interpretation parse too much; the plaintiff thereby both ignores the context 

that spawned the contract and thwarts the objectively apparent intent of the whole agreement. 

(Naming each letter, we will fail to read the word.) Consider the parties‘ description of Dr. Lotan‘s 

and AngioScore‘s circumstances in 2003. The parties dispute nothing in this respect. The parties 

who entered this agreement — Dr. Lotan on the one hand and, on the other, the few people who 

constituted AngioScore — were then a handful of people in a medical startup. Their one productto-be — the thing on which they were all focused — was the catheter. The purpose of the 

consulting agreement‘s two salient clauses (paragraphs 9(a) and 9(b)) — and it is well to notice 

that these are subparagraphs of one larger section on ―Inventions‖ — was to identify any 

preexisting work that Dr. Lotan was doing that might compete with the developing catheter, 

license such work to AngioScore if any was incorporated into the catheter, and otherwise to assign 

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to AngioScore whatever rights Dr. Lotan‘s work on the catheter might have given him. That 

purpose is apparent from the contract‘s plain language.4To reach TriReme‘s different conclusion, 

to find that Dr. Lotan somehow retained rights that he could later license to TriReme, goes beyond 

a fair reading of the contract into casuistic over-dissection. If we wall the two salient clauses off 

from one another, as TriReme urges, the intent of the whole contract falls between them and is 

lost. Furthermore, TriReme‘s analysis depends on at least one subsidiary argument that (as 

discussed above) is unacceptable: i.e., the idea that the ―Prior Inventions‖ term of paragraph 9(a) 

applies to only fully finalized, ―formal‖ inventions. For these reasons, the court cannot accept 

TriReme‘s contractual analysis.

II. DR. LOTAN WORKED ON THE CATHETER AFTER MAY 1, 2003

Moreover, the May 1, 2003 consulting agreement is what compensated Dr. Lotan, defined his 

obligations (including confidentiality), and enabled his continued work on the catheter after May 

1, 2003. Whatever rights he had in the catheter were thus assigned to AngioScore, apart from any 

consideration of the ―Prior Inventions‖ exclusion, under the main assignment clause. That term, 

again, assigned to AngioScore ―all right, title and interest in and to all inventions, original works 

of authorship, developments, concepts, know-how, [and] improvements . . . that Consultant may . . 

. conceive or develop or reduce to practice during the term of this Agreement that relate to the 

Services . . . .‖ (ECF No. 36-2 at 3, ¶ 9(b) (emphasis added).) Dr. Lotan testified that after April 

2003 he continued to work on catheter-related issues under the terms of his consulting contract 

with AngioScore. (ECF No. 36-4 at 53-56, 74-75, 125-27.) He recounts ―talking‖ with 

AngioScore and ―plann[ing] on human studies‖ for the catheter in the summer of 2003. (Id. at 75.) 

Some of these studies did not come to pass; some did. (Id. at 74-75.) Dr. Lotan not only helped 

 

4

It is appropriate to consider the surrounding circumstances when assessing the meaning of this 

contract. California looks more readily than most states to ―extrinsic evidence‖ in interpreting 

contracts. See, e.g., Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. Taiwan Sumida Elecs., Inc., 2006 WL 1530073, 

*2 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2006) (―[I]n applying California law to contracts, courts often look to 

extrinsic evidence. California Code of Civil Procedure § 1856 provides that . . . evidence of the 

circumstances under which the agreement was made, or evidence to explain an extrinsic 

ambiguity or otherwise interpret the terms of the agreement, may be considered.‖) (emphases 

added) (internal quotation omitted).

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―design[]‖ some of these human trials (id. at 53-55); he personally conducted some of them (id. at 

125-27). He also testified that he was involved in the ―interpretation of [this] clinical data‖ under 

the consulting agreement. (Id. at 54.) This is exactly the sort of work that his consulting agreement 

anticipates. (See ECF No. 36-2 at 6 (describing consulting services).) Again under the plain 

meaning of section 9(b)‘s terms, this work might have amounted to (among other things) 

―developing,‖ ―improving,‖ or ―reducing to practice‖ the ―recommendations‖ that Dr. Lotan made 

in April 2003 for improving the prototype catheter — and this is accepting TriReme‘s position that 

Dr. Lotan‘s contributions were included in the patented catheter.

At the hearing, TriReme argued that Dr. Lotan‘s work during the consulting agreement 

amounted to collecting regulatory data on a finished device. That may be true, yet it does not 

change the outcome. The court assumes that the inventive contribution was complete by April 

2003 and does not need to consider the issue — which the parties did not fully brief — about 

when an idea penciled into a recommendation becomes an inventive idea. The point is only that 

purpose of the entire consulting agreement was to define the parties‘ obligations, enable Dr. 

Lotan‘s continued work on the only product at issue, and provide for his compensation.

III. ANALOGIES

The court thus concludes that Dr. Lotan assigned whatever interest he had in the balloon 

catheter to AngioScore in 2003. He had no rights in the catheter to license to TriReme in 2014. 

Consequently, TriReme has no interest in the patents-in-suit sufficient to support standing under 

§ 256.

This conclusion is consistent with governing precedent. For example, this case is effectively 

identical to Larson, supra, in which the Federal Circuit held that an assignor-inventor had ―no 

constitutional standing to sue for correction of inventorship‖ under § 256. Larson, 569 F.3d at 

1325-27. The Larson plaintiff had assigned his rights in an invention to his employer under an 

employment contract. Id. at 1322. He later sued to be added as an inventor on the attendant 

patents. Id. at 1321-23. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant and Larson 

appealed. Id. at 1322-23. Bypassing the summary-judgment issue, the Federal Circuit asked 

whether the plaintiff had sufficiently laid federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1323. It held 

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that he had not. Id. at 1325-27. That court wrote: ―Larson has affirmatively transferred title to the 

patents to [the defendant], and he stands to reap no benefit from a preexisting licensing or royalties 

arrangement.‖ Id. at 1326. He thus had ―no concrete financial interest‖ in the patents (id. at 1321); 

and, more precisely, ―no financial interest in the patents sufficient for him to have standing to 

pursue a § 256 claim.‖ Id. at 1326-27. The district court thus ―lacked jurisdiction‖ to hear the 

§ 256 challenge, and the appellate court directed that the case be remanded back to the Florida 

state court from which it had been removed. Id. at 1327-28.

In reaching this decision, the Larson court expressly drew on its ―similar‖ decision in Jim 

Arnold, supra. Larson, 569 F.3d at 1327. In Jim Arnold, an inventor sued for patent infringement. 

Like Dr. Lotan, though, he had already ―assigned away all his . . . rights‖ and thus had ―no 

ownership interest‖ in the subject patents. Id. at 1327 (discussing Jim Arnold, 109 F.3d at 1571-

72). The Jim Arnold court too held, consequently, that ―the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his 

infringement claim.‖ See Jim Arnold, 109 F.3d at 1572. ―Although Jim Arnold involved an 

infringement claim rather than an action to correct inventorship, the reasoning of that case 

nonetheless applies‖ to § 256 claims. Larson, 569 F.3d at 1327.

Finally, the decision in IMATEC, Ltd. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 15 F. App‘x 887 (Fed. Cir. 

2001) further compels the conclusion that TriReme lacks constitutional standing to bring a § 256 

claim. The undisputed inventor of several video-imaging patents there sued Apple for infringing 

on those patents. Id. at 888-90. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, 

based on a lack of constitutional standing, and the Federal Circuit affirmed. Like Dr. Lotan, the 

IMATEC inventor had previously assigned away his rights in the patents to the employer he was 

working for when he developed them. Id. at 889-90. The employment contract in IMATEC had 

provided a place for the plaintiff to exclude specified inventions from the assignment; but the 

district court concluded that the patents-in-suit were not among those that the plaintiff had listed 

for exclusion. Id. The appellate court upheld this determination. It also upheld the follow-on 

jurisdictional conclusion that, because the plaintiff had ―assigned his rights to the patented 

inventions,‖ he ―lacked standing to bring [an] infringement suit.‖ Id. at 893-96. The Federal 

Circuit‘s decision in Preston v. Marathon Oil Co., 684 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2012), though 

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different in details, is to the same ultimate effect.

CONCLUSION

Because Dr. Lotan assigned whatever rights he had in the patents-in-suit to AngioScore under 

the terms of the 2003 consulting agreement, he had no rights in those patents to license to 

TriReme in 2014. TriReme has no interest in the patents sufficient to give it constitutional 

standing to pursue a claim for correction of inventorship on those patents under 35 U.S.C § 256. 

The court therefore grants AngioScore‘s motion to dismiss and dismisses this case with prejudice.

This disposes of ECF No. 36.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 17, 2015

______________________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

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