Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00148/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00148-31/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELVIN JONES, JR., )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

JOHN J. HOLLENBACK, JR., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-05-148 OWW/DLB 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

(Doc. 376); DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL MOTION

TO STRIKE COUNTER-MOTION

FOR SANCTIONS UNDER RULE 11

(Doc. 395); STRIKING DOCS.

380, 384, 386, 387, 388,

397, 400, 405, 406; AND

DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF'S

MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS (Docs.

397, 400, 405, 406) 

On June 12, 2007, Defendant John Hollenback timely moved for

an award of attorneys' fees against Plaintiff, Melvin Jones, Jr.,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in the amount of $92,975.50. 

Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees was heard on February 11,

2008 and taken under submission.

A. PLAINTIFF’S WITHDRAWAL OF VARIOUS OPPOSITIONS AND/OR

COUNTER-MOTIONS.

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Plaintiff filed the following described oppositions and/or

counter-motions in connection with Defendant’s motion for

attorney’s fees:

1. July 19, 2007: Plaintiff’s “Response in Opposition

to defendant’s Motion for FEES” (Doc. 380);

2. September 5, 2007: “Plaintiff’s Counter-Motion as

to Defendant’s Motion for FEES” (Doc. 384);

3. September 19, 2007: “Plaintiff’s: Supplemented

Motion (Doc # 384)” (Doc. 386);

4. September 24, 2007: “Plaintiff’s Additional CROSSMOTION in opposition to Defendant’s FEE MOTION” (Doc. 387);

5. September 27, 2007: “PLAINTIFF’S: Final Response in

opposition to FEE MOTION, and Request Per FRCP 59(d)” (Doc. 388);

6. October 9, 2007: “Plaintiff’s: Rule 18, 19, 20 and

22 CROSS-MOTION in opposition to defendants FEE MOTION as to

SILVERIA” (Doc. 389);

7. October 9, 2007: “Plaintiff’s supplement to Doc #

387, and Doc # 388 (Rule 54(d)(2)(8) Request and other requests

and notices” (Doc. 390);

8. October 17, 2007: “Plaintiff’s: counter-motion in

opposition to defendant’s MOTION FOR FEES (Request under Rule 21,

20, 19 & 18)” (Doc. 391);

9. November 5, 2007: “Plaintiff’s (1.) counter-motion

for costs in opposition to defendants post judgment fee motion.

[¶](2.) SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE. [¶] (3.) counter-motion for

sanctions as to material misrepresentations made to the Court.

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[¶] (4.) and/or in alternative to opposition to defendant Post

judgment fee motion, request for limited discovery as to ANY/ALL

fee or cost agreements as to defendant. [¶] (5.) and/or in the

alternative, opposition to defendant’s post judgment fee motion,

as NOT being proper per S. 1988, as to the S. 1988 prevailing

party-rule. [¶] (6.) and/or in the alternative, opposition to

defendant’s post judgment fee motion as Pro Se Jones being

technically the prevailing party. [¶] (7.) and/or in the

alternative, opposition to defendant’s post judgment fee motion

due to defendant having WAIVED proper assertion of the

prevailing-party rule. [¶] (8.) and or in the alterative,

opposition to defendant’s post judgment fee motion as said claim

NOT having been tried at trial, and/or DOES NOT arise from common

nucleus of operative fact with any claims tried at trial.” (Doc.

395). Doc. 395 states: “This Counter-Motion/Opposition as to

post-Judgment FEE MOTION SUPERSEDES Plaintiff’s previous filings

Regarding opposition to said FEE MOTION”;

10. November 5, 2007: “Plaintiff’s: Additional 

Evidence to support Request(s) in Plaintiff’s DOC # (Sanctions

Motion).” (Doc. 397);

11. November 26, 2007: “Plaintiff’s: (Counter-Motion)

Request for Sanctions against Defense Counsel Daniel Wainwright,

in opposition/response to Defendant’s Motion FOR FEES.” (Doc.

400);

12. January 2, 2008: “Plaintiff’s: Separate Motion for

Sanctions, in Response/Opposition to Defendant’s fee motion.”

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(Doc. 405);

13. January 2, 2008: “Plaintiff’s: Rule 26 REQUESTS

FOR SANCTIONS DUE TO ‘IMPROPER CERTIFICATION” In Opposition to

DEFENDANTs MOTION FOR FEES (Response in Opposition to defendant’s

FEE MOTION).” (Doc. 406);

14. February 7, 2007: “PLAINTIFF’s: request for

JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ATTACHMENT ‘A’ AND NOTICE OF REQUEST.” (Doc.

413).

Because of Plaintiff’s representation in Doc. 395 filed on

November 5, 2007 that he intends Doc. 395 to supersede all

previous filings in connection with Defendant’s motion for

attorney’s fees, Docs. 380, 384, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, and 391

are ORDERED STRICKEN.

By email to Mr. Wainwright dated February 6, 2007 (forwarded

to Courtroom Deputy Timken), Plaintiff stated that on February

11, 2008 “Plaintiff Jones will supplement and re-notice his

pending Rule 60 motion set to be heard on 3/3/2008 as an

independent action for fraud upon the court. [¶] Also, I will

present NO ARGUMENT, etc. as to the pending Rule 60 motion, and

will withdraw any request(s) that said Rule 60 motion be

considered on 2/11/2008. [¶] Hearing date for said re-noticed

Rule 60 motion will be set (re-set) for APRIL 28, 2008.”

On February 7, 2008, Plaintiff filed "PLAINTIFF's request

for JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ATTACHMENT 'A' AND NOTICE OF REQUEST." 

Plaintiff asserts that, at the February 11, 2008 hearing on

Defendant's motion for attorney's fees, he will request "to have

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his pending motions (any/all) which relate to Defense

misconduct/FRAUD to BE TREATED as motions brought under Rule 60,

or in the alternative Jones withdraws (will on 2/11/2008) at oral

argument any/ALL Requests/Motions pertaining to/Related to

defense misconduct DUE to the FACT, Jones will File (on/about

2/12/2008) a complaint/ACTION FOR Independent Relief [See

Attachment 'A' affixed hereto - a true copy of said independent

ACTION]." 

At the hearing on February 11, 2008, Plaintiff withdrew all

oppositions, motions or counter-motions to Defendant’s motion for

attorney’s fees except Doc. 395. Consequently, the motions for

sanctions set forth in Docs. 397, 400, 405, 406 are DENIED AS

MOOT. 

B. GOVERNING STANDARDS.

Rule 54-293, Local Rules of Practice, governs the award of

attorneys’ fees in the Eastern District. The motion for

attorneys’ fees must include an affidavit of counsel showing:

(1) that the moving party was a prevailing

party, in whole or in part;

(2) the moving party is eligible to receive

an award of attorneys’ fees, and the basis

for such eligibility;

(3) the amount of attorneys’ fees sought;

(4) the information pertaining to each of the

criteria set forth in subsection (c) of this

Rule; and 

(5) such other matters as are required under

the statute under which the fee award is

claimed.

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Id.. 

The district court has discretion to award reasonable

attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party in a civil rights action. 

42 U.S.C. § 1988. A prevailing defendant in a civil rights

action is not entitled to attorney fees under § 1988 merely

because the defendant prevails on the merits of the suit. Vernon

v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1402 (9 Cir.1994). th

“District courts are authorized to award attorneys’ fees to a

prevailing defendant in civil rights cases only in those

exceptional cases when the action is unreasonable, frivolous,

meritless, or without foundation, or when the plaintiff continues

to litigate after it clearly becomes so.” Herb Hallman

Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash, 169 F.3d 636, 645 (9 Cir.1999) (citing th

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978)). 

“[I]f a plaintiff is found to have brought or continued such a

claim in bad faith, there will be an even stronger basis for

charging him with the attorney’s fees incurred by the defense.” 

Christiansburg, id. “In determining whether this standard has

been met, a district court must assess the claim at the time the

complaint was filed, and must avoid ‘post hoc reasoning by

concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail,

his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation.’”

Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th

Cir.2006). This standard is applied with special force when the

plaintiff is proceeding pro se and may not be able to recognize

the “subtle factual or legal deficiencies in his claims.” Hughes

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v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15 (1980). The Christiansburg Garment court

reasoned:

This kind of hindsight logic could discourage

all but the most airtight claims, for seldom

can a prospective plaintiff be sure of

ultimate success. No matter how honest one’s

belief that he has been the victim of

discrimination, no matter how meritorious

one’s claim may appear at the outset, the

course of litigation is rarely predictable. 

Decisive facts may not emerge until discovery

or trial. The law may change or clarify in

the midst of litigation. Even when the law

or facts appear questionable or unfavorable

at the outset, a party may have an entirely

reasonable ground for bringing suit.

Id. at 422. A Defendant seeking attorneys’ fees has the burden

of establishing that the action is frivolous or vexatious. Klotz

v. United States, 602 F.2d 920, 924 (9 Cir.1979). Where each th

claim involved complex constitutional questions which were not

easily resolved, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying attorneys’ fees. See Park v. Watson, 716 F.3d 646, 664

(9 Cir.1983). th

In E.E.O.C. v. Bruno’s Restaurant, 13 F.3d 285, 288 (9th

Cir.1993), the Ninth Circuit rejected application of the test set

forth in EEOC V. Kip’s Big Boy, Inc., 424 F.Supp. 500, 503

(N.D.Tex.1977): 

which invites consideration of the

credibility of the plaintiff’s witnesses and

whether the defendant came forth with

convincing and highly credible evidence to

rebut each individual charge of

discrimination. Such an inquiry potentially

invites the court to engage in the kind of

post-hoc reasoning condemned by Christianburg

....

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B. MERITLESS OR FRIVOLOUS NATURE OF PLAINTIFF’S ACTION.

In contending that this lawsuit was frivolous and vexatious,

Defendant submits the Declaration of Daniel L. Wainwright, his

attorney in this litigation. Mr. Wainwright avers in pertinent

part:

7. At the conclusion of the May 10, 2007

jury trial, I had a chance to speak with 4 or

5 of the jurors. Each expressed disbelief

that this matter even went to trial because

Plaintiff had no evidence, made ridiculous

and unbelievable accusations, and the jurors

had absolutely no questions, whatsoever, that

my client had done nothing wrong and that he

was a victim of a frivolous lawsuit. In

fact, one or more of the jurors even

apologized to my client for the fact that he

had to subjected [sic] to such a baseless

lawsuit.

8. The above entitled action was brought by

Plaintiff to seek damages under 42 U.S.C. §§

1985 and 1986. This litigation initially

began in February 2005. I was only retained

in this case in December 2005. This lawsuit

has now been resolved, by way of a defense

jury verdict, on May 10, 2007 ....

9. My client did not have any insurance

coverage for Plaintiff’s claims. Thus, I

have been billing him directly for the legal

fees and costs incurred in this case. Each

and every dollar billed in this case is to be

paid by my client and not some deep-pocket

insurance company. As such, my client has

incurred a huge financial set-back by having

to pay for the defense of his good name and

professional reputation.

...

11. This litigation has involved numerous

Court hearings, numerous filings and

pleadings (in excess of 370 documents, and

counting), complex legal issue, ever changing

factual allegations, numerous witnesses and a

great deal of my professional time. 

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Plaintiff’s behavior made the litigation of

this matter much more difficult since my

client consistently had numerous filings and

Motions to respond to all of which carried

sensitive deadlines. This required constant

attention to this matter and excluded my

acceptance of other work.

12. During the time that Plaintiff was

claiming a § 1981 violation and various state

court claims, I filed a Motion to Dismiss and

Anti-SLAPP Motion. This Motion to Dismiss

was granted and Plaintiff filed the subject

Complaint.

13. Thereafter, I brought a Motion for

Summary Judgment. The Court deferred ruling

on this Motion in order to allow Plaintiff

time to conduct discovery. The Court granted

portions of theist [sic] Motion and allowed

Plaintiff more time to complete more

discovery.

14. Extensive written discovery (consisting

of hundreds and hundreds of request for

admission) was propounded by Plaintiff and

responded to by Defendant.

15. Thereafter, I caused to be filed a

Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. In

response to this Motion, Plaintiff created

and invented new facts. Ultimately, the

Court denied our motion and said that this

matter must be adjudicated by a jury after

trial.

16. In February 2007, I took Plaintiff’s

deposition.

17. Thereafter, I prepared this matter for

trial. This involved numerous hearings,

numerous pre-trial documents and extensive

time and efforts. Because of the numerous

witnesses in this case, I spent a great deal

of time interviewing witnesses and preparing

for their trial testimony. Plaintiff even

failed to attend the pre-trial document

exchange conference in Modesto, as had been

set forth in the Pretrial order.

This case arose out of a child custody dispute between

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Plaintiff and Kea Chhay, the mother of Plaintiff’s minor child. 

The child custody dispute appears to have been first filed in the

Santa Clara County Superior Court. During a hearing held on

November 15, 2001, the presiding judge in Santa Clara warned

Plaintiff that he would be declared a vexatious litigant if he

filed additional motions in that case. The child custody dispute

was subsequently transferred to the Stanislaus County Superior

Court. Plaintiff’s allegations of race-based conspiracy arose

following Plaintiff’s defeat in the family law matter in the

Stanislaus County Superior Court and during two hearings in the

Stanislaus County Superior Court, the first on April 15, 2004 for

contempt and the second on April 22, 2004 for child support. The

record of Plaintiff’s filings in this Court in other actions

related to the family law proceedings in the Stanislaus County

Superior Court as well as in this action detailed below

establishes Plaintiff’s penchant for meritless, vexatious, everevolving theories and charging factual allegations. 

1. PLAINTIFF’S RELATED ACTIONS.

a. Melvin Jones, Jr. v. State of California, No.

CV-F-04-6566 OWW/DLB. 

On September 9, 2004, Plaintiff filed Melvin Jones, Jr. v.

State of California, in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division. Plaintiff

filed four Amended Complaints in this action before the action

was transferred to this Court and assigned Case No. CV-F-04-6566

OWW/DLB. Plaintiff never requested leave to file, and rather,

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simply filed the second, third and fourth amended complaints. 

The last amended complaint was filed on October 18, 2004 and

named only the State of California as defendant. The October 18,

2004 amended complaint alleged that Judge Sovey-Silveria, Judge

Mayhew, Judge Siefkin, Judge Vanderwall, Judge Ritchey, and Judge

Jack Jacobsen of the Stanislaus County Superior Court, Stanislaus

County Superior Court Commissioner Richard Allen, and Michael

Tozzi, Executive Officer of the Stanislaus County Superior Court

failed to comply with various California Rules of Court and

California statutes during child custody proceedings in 2002-

2004, thereby violating Plaintiff’s rights to due process and

equal protection under the law and the California Constitution;

and alleged that Stanislaus County Superior Court mediator Don

Strangio had conflicts of interest with Stanislaus County

Superior Court custody evaluator Steven Carmichael and Attorney

Leslie Jensen, prior counsel for the mother of Plaintiff’s child,

Ms. Chhay, who was the adverse parent party in the family law

dispute against Plaintiff. Paragraph 28 of the Amended Complaint

alleged:

28. On 01/22/04 A hearing took place in

dept. 16 of the Superior Court of Stanislaus

County; Commissioner, Richard Allen

presiding. During said hearing, John

Hollenback, the attorney for the Respondent

(a high level employee of the same Superior

Court) was allowed to threaten the Plaintiff. 

Said threat is in violation of CCP 128.5 and

CCP 128.6 as said threat was a deliberate

attempt to harass Plaintiff and in direct

violation of the Plaintiff’s XIV amendment

rights. Plaintiff has ordered a tape of said

proceedings from said Superior Court and will

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provide transcription of said tape as

evidence at trial.

The Amended Complaint prayed for damages in the amount of

$4,100,000, and specified injunctive relief. When Plaintiff

moved for a preliminary injunction nullifying the Stanislaus

Court’s October 2, 2003 order regarding child custody, and

requiring the withdrawal of Penny Lane, the minor child’s courtappointed counselor, from the family law case, this Court ruled

that it had no jurisdiction to issue any type of injunctive order

against the family law proceeding in the Stanislaus Superior

Court and denied the motion for preliminary injunction. (Order

filed on January 18, 2005, Doc. 27, No. CV-F-04-6566 OWW/DLB). 

Plaintiff then moved for “voluntary discontinuance and voluntary

non-suit” and the case was dismissed without prejudice by Order

filed on August 4, 2005. (Doc.29, No. CV-F-04-6566 OWW/DLB). 

On June 21, 2007, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in

this action, naming as defendants the Stanislaus County Superior

Court, Leslie Jensen, and Sandra Lucas. (Doc. 30) The Amended

Complaint was stricken by Order filed on June 27, 2007 (Doc. 31).

b. Melvin Jones, Jr. v. Don Strangio and Steven

Carmichael, No. CV-F-04-6567 OWW/SMS.

On September 7, 2004, Plaintiff filed Melvin Jones, Jr. v.

Don Strangio and Steven Carmichael, in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of California, Sacramento

Division. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on September 27,

2004. The amended complaint alleged that court-appointed

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mediator Strangio and custody evaluator Carmichael had conflicts

of interest; that failure to disclose these conflicts of interest

deprived Plaintiff of his rights to due process and equal

protection; and sought $800,000 damages and specified injunctive

relief. The action was transferred to this Court on November 17,

2004 and assigned Case No. CV-F-04-6567 OWW/SMS. Plaintiff’s

motion for injunction to compel Strangio and Carmichael to

withdraw from Plaintiff’s family law case immediately, was denied

by Order filed on January 14, 2005, because no federal

jurisdiction existed to issue any type of injunctive order

against the Stanislaus County Superior Court family law 

proceeding. (Doc. 41, p.4). The Court granted summary judgment

for the defendants because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the

allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, because the defendants

enjoy absolute immunity from suit, and because Plaintiff could

not establish a constitutional violation. (Order filed on March

16, 2005, Doc. 72, No. CV-F-04-6567 OWW/SMS). This summary

judgment was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on December 7, 2006.

c. Melvin Jones, Jr. v. Don Strangio, No. CV-F05-410 OWW/DLB.

Melvin Jones, Jr. v. Don Strangio, No. CV-F-05-410 OWW/DLB,

was commenced on March 28, 2005, against Don Strangio. The

Complaint alleged:

6. ... [D]efendant and co-conspirators

Michael Tozzi, Marie Sovey-Silveria, Leslie

Jensen, and John Hollenback did corruptly

conspire (out of court) ... with the

mediator/evaluator of Plaintiff’s family law

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case to suppress, and conceal defendant

Strangio, and Leslie Jensen’s OMISSION of the

fact that defendant Strangio and (Leslie

Jensen) Attorney for the opposing party in

Plaintiff’s family law case DO HAVE A

PSYCHOLOGIST-PATIENT relationship. And did

conspire (out-of-court) with personal, and

class-based animus. And is so doing, did

deprive Plaintiff of his Civil Rights. 

Further, defendant and fore mentioned [sic]

co-conspirators did conspire (out-of-court)

... for the purpose of impeding, hindering,

obstructing, and defeating the due course of

justice, with the intent to deny Plaintiff

equal protection of the law(s). And did so

by intimidation, threat, and retaliation, and

did so with personal, and class-based animus.

The Complaint was dismissed with prejudice because the March 16,

2005 Order in No. CV-F-04-6567 concluded that Strangio was

absolutely immune from liability and on the ground of res

judicata. Plaintiff was cautioned “that the filing of meritless

or vexatious claims is not permissible.” (Order filed on April

20, 2005, Doc. 4, No. CV-F-05-410 OWW/DLB). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s “pattern of vindictive

retaliatory litigation evidences improper motivation on the part

of the Plaintiff designed to burden and harass the Defendant and

is of the type which Congress intended to discourage by awarding

attorney fees to the Defendant.” Defendant contends:

The evidence is undisputed that Plaintiff

filed numerous different claims and

allegations against innocent defendants,

including suits against attorneys, bailiffs,

and judges following his repeated unfavorable

results in the family law actions in which he

was involved. Even in this case, he

initially alleged a § 1983 claim, then §

1981, then state tort claims, and then

finally in his tenth version of this

Complaint, he alleged a § 1985/1986 claim.

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Plaintiff is a litigious man who continues to

emphasize this characteristic via

multiplicious groundless lawsuits where the

only thing he can ultimately prove is that he

has the power to cause an amazing amount of

inconvenience, hassle and embarrassment

through abuse of the legal system. 

Plaintiff’s vexatious litigiousness has

subjected and will continue to subject

innocent defendants to considerable expenses

in preparation for essentially useless

trials. Plaintiff must accept responsibility

for the burden which he imposes and pay for

Defendant’s reasonable attorney fees.

Defendant argues that he has been forced to incur substantial

costs in defending Plaintiff’s meritless claims and that “[i]f

this Court does not punish Plaintiff with paying the defense

legal fees for his repeated abuse of the court system, many more

innocent people will surely fall victim to his bad faith bullying

tactics.” Defendant asserts:

During closing argument on May 10, 2007,

Plaintiff displayed his litigious nature by

claiming he was going to make complaints

against two trial witnesses, namely Leslie

Jensen and Sandra Lucas. Since the defense

verdict Plaintiff continues to make claims

that he will bring civil actions and/or other

types of claims against all of those

individuals involved in the underlying family

law case. 

Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s claims lacked

evidentiary foundation. Although Plaintiff was able to create a

triable issue of fact in defeating summary judgment motions,

Defendant argues that this does not render Plaintiff’s claims

meritorious:

Instead, it means that Plaintiff is able to

lie, misstate facts, jump to ridiculous

conclusions and invent further alleged bad

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acts. In short, it means that Plaintiff is

able to create fiction and change his story

in order to meet his needs. Plaintiff was

only ably [sic] to defeat the two Motions for

Summary Judgment (even though portions of the

Motions were granted as was Defendant’s

earlier Motion to Strike), he was only able

to do this because Plaintiff was willing to

perjure himself without any fear of

punishment or financial repercussions.

Defendant argues that the record shows that all of the claims

remaining at the time of trial lacked evidentiary foundation:

Plaintiff created his own evidence, relied on

hearsay evidence, repeatedly revised his

testimony to overcome dispositive motions,

and generally invented testimony. In sum,

Plaintiff’s ever changing evidence was

implausible and unbelievable. Plaintiff had

absolutely no supporting evidence of his

claims. Instead, he merely relied on his own

testimony and a few self-serving and

immaterial documents.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not carried his burden

of demonstrating that Plaintiff’s action was frivolous or

vexatious. Plaintiff points to the denials of Defendant’s

motions for summary judgment.

2. PLAINTIFF’S FILINGS IN THIS ACTION.

Plaintiff commenced this action by Complaint filed on

February 3, 2005 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985

(conspiracy to interfere with civil rights), and 42 U.S.C. § 1986

(action for neglect to prevent interference with civil rights).

Defendants were Stanislaus County Superior Court Executive

Officer Michael Tozzi, Stanislaus County Superior Court Judge

Marie Sovey-Silveria, Leslie Jensen, and John Hollenback. The

Complaint alleged an undisclosed conflict of interest between

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court-appointed mediator Strangio and custody evaluator

Carmichael in violation of Plaintiff’s “fundamental Fourteenth

Amendment rights”; that Judge Sovey-Silveria and Leslie Jensen,

John Hollenback and Michael Tozzi failed to comply with

California Rules of Court, California Rules of Professional

Conduct, and the California Code of Civil Procedure during

proceedings in the Stanislaus County Superior Court involving

Plaintiff’s family law matter on October 8, 2002, December 10,

2002, April 22, 2003, May 15, 2003, May 27, 2003, June 3, 2003,

September 24, 2003, January 22, 2004, March 2, 2004, March 15,

2004, and March 29, 2004. The only specific allegations against 

Defendant Hollenback were:

27. On 01/22/04 A hearing took place in

dept. 16 of the Superior Court of Stanislaus

County; During hearing, John Hollenback,

attorney for the Respondent in Plaintiff’s

family law case (and high level employee of

the same Superior Court) threatened

Plaintiff. Said threat is in violation of:

CCP 128.5, CCP 128.6, applicable CA. State

Bar Ethical Codes, and the principal of

fundamental fairness, said harassment

violates Plaintiff’s 14 amendment rights. th

Plaintiff has ordered a tape of said

proceedings, which will be presented at

evidence at trial. 

28. On or about 02/2004 - Attorney Leslie

Jensen appeared at a hearing in dept. 16 on

behalf of Attorney John Hollenback. Both

Attorney’s Jensen and Hollenback failed to

comply with CA. rule of Court 5.210, 5.220,

applicable CA. State Bar Ethical Standards,

and applicable Civil Code of Procedure

related to Attorney Jensen’s conflicted

status with Mediator Strangio.

29. On 03/02/04 - A hearing was held in

dept. 13 of the Superior Court of Stanislaus. 

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Attorney Hollenback failed to comply with CA.

rule of Court 5.210, 5.220, applicable CA.

State Bar Ethical Standards, and applicable

Civil Code of Procedure related to Attorney

Jensen’s conflicted status with Mediator

Strangio.

32. On or about 03/29/04 - Attorney

Hollenback unduly interfered with Plaintiff’s

Job Search with the Stanislaus County Housing

Department, which is harassment and violates

Plaintiff’s fundamental XIV Amendment Rights. 

Attorney Hollenback failed to comply with CA.

rule of Court 5.210, 5.220, applicable CA.

State Bar Ethical Standards, and applicable

Civil Code of Procedure related to Attorney

Jensen’s conflicted status with Mediator

Strangio.

The Complaint prayed for $1,500,000.00 damages and $4,100,000.00

punitive damages and the following injunctive relief:

1.) This Honorable Federal Court initiate a

Federal investigation into All relevant

departments, judicial functions, and court

personnel of Stanislaus Superior Court as

this Court deems in the interest of justice.

2.) Defendant Michael Tozzi disclose to this

Honorable Court any/all cases referred from

the Probate department of Stanislaus County

Superior Court for custody evaluation and/or

mediation to 706 13 Street - Modesto, Ca. th

within the past 36 months.

3.) Defendant Leslie Jensen disclose to this

Honorable Federal Court any/all Stanislaus

County family law probate cases within the

past 36 months wherein she acted as the

Attorney, and note the specific probate

investigator.

4.) Defendant John Hollenback disclose to

the Honorable Federal Court any/all

Stanislaus County family law probate cases

within the past 36 months wherein he acted as

the Attorney, and not the specific probate

investigator.

On March 3, 2005, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint

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against the same Defendants (Doc. 7). The First Amended

Complaint is essentially identical to the Complaint, except that

it alleges: 

33. On 4/15/2004 - during a trial

in dept. 13 of said Superior Court

(wherein Respondent of Plaintiff’s

family law case [and employee of

the same Superior Court] faced

numerous contempt charges), Marie

Silveria interrupted the trial

(Judge Jack Jacobsen was presiding)

- Silveria’s non-verbal gestures,

and conduct were sensed and

observed by Plaintiff to be

harassment, reprisal/retaliatory,

and a furtherance of conspiracy. 

Silveria was not presiding in the

case at hand, her comments were at

best administrative actions, non

judicial in nature; thereby not

shielded by judicial immunity. A

tape of the proceeding has been

ordered by Plaintiff, and will be

provided at trial as further

evidence.

34. On or about 2/2005 - Michael Tozzi

issued a declaration in support of Mediator

Don Strangio. Said declaration authenticates

Plaintiff’s correspondence with, and from

Tozzi, and is furtherance of conspiracy.

Defendants Tozzi and Sovey-Silveria filed a motion to dismiss

(Doc. 8). Plaintiff filed a motion to enter default judgment

against Defendants Hollenback and Jensen (Doc. 14). Plaintiff

filed a counter-motion in opposition to the motion to dismiss and

a motion to file a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 16). Without

obtaining leave of Court, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended

Complaint on March 28, 2005 (Doc. 19). On March 29, 2005, an

Order to Show Cause was issued:

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In light of the March 16, 2005 order

dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint in Jones v.

Strangio, Plaintiff is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE

in writing ... why the complaint in this case

should not also be dismissed as to all

defendants for failure to state a federal

claims and/or is barred for the reasons

stated in the March 16, 2005 decision issued

in Jones v. Strangio ....

....

Various joint motions to dismiss were then filed as well as

Defendant Hollenback’s response to Plaintiff’s motion for default

judgment against him. At the hearing on these matters on May 3,

2005, Plaintiff’s improperly filed second amended complaint was

stricken (Doc. 42). On May 9, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion for

sanctions (Doc. 43). On May 10, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion

to strike Defendants’ joint motion to dismiss the Complaint. On

May 11, 2005, in a 22-page Memorandum Decision (Doc. 47), the

Court noted:

This case arises out of a child custody

dispute between Plaintiff and Kea Chhay, the

mother of Plaintiff’s minor child. Although

the record contains limited information about

the underlying child custody case, it appears

to have first been filed in Santa Clara

Superior Court. During a hearing held on

November 15, 2001, the presiding judge in

Santa Clara warned Plaintiff that he would be

declared a vexatious litigant if he filed

additional motions in that case. The case

was subsequently transferred to Stanislaus

County.

(Doc. 47, 5:6-14). In the May 11, 2005 Memorandum Decision, the

Order to Show Cause was discharged; Defendants Tozzi and

Silveria’s motion to dismiss was granted with prejudice on the

grounds that Plaintiff failed to allege a procedural due process

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claim by failing to plead any facts that he exhausted state

remedies, that the domestic relations exception barred

Plaintiff’s substantive due process claims, on the ground of

absolute and quasi-judicial immunity; Plaintiff’s motion for

default judgment was denied, and Plaintiff was ordered not to

file any amended complaint until the pending motion to dismiss

(Doc. 32) was decided. 

On June 22, 2005, a Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting

Defendants’ Jensen and Hollenback’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 61)

issued. As it pertains to Defendant Hollenback the June 22, 2005

Opinion and Order stated:

... Hollenback’s ... motion to dismiss raises

the same legal issues as Defendants Tozzi and

Silveria’s previous motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiff has already been informed in the

decision granting Tozzi and Silveria’s

motion, Doc. 47, that his claims are not

viable under federal law. For the reasons

set forth below, the first amended complaint

(doc. 7, the currently operative complaint in

this case) also fails to properly state any

claims under federal law against Defendant[]

... Hollenback. Rather than order Plaintiff

to defend a complaint that must be dismissed

for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff will

instead by given one last opportunity to

amend his complaint to set forth viable

claims under federal law against Defendant[]

... Hollenback.

C. Plaintiff’s Claims

In the first amended complaint, Plaintiff

makes the following allegations:

(1) There existed potential conflicts of

interest between several of the Defendants. 

The failure to Defendants to disclose those

conflicts violated Plaintiff’s procedural due

process rights. Id. at ¶ 15.

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(2) Defendants’ conduct throughout the family

law proceedings interfered with Plaintiff’s

liberty interests and/or rights as a parent. 

Id. at ¶ 7.

(2) [sic] Defendants’ conduct violated

various provisions of the California Rules of

Court, State Bar Ethical Standards, and

provisions of the California Code of Civil

Procedure. As a result, Plaintiff’s due

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment

were violated. Id. at ¶¶ 16-33. 

(Doc. 61, 7:17-8:13). The June 22, 2005 Order ruled that

Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims alleged in the First

Amended Complaint fail as a matter of law:

As explained in previous memorandum opinions

in this case and related cases, Plaintiff has

attempted to set forth procedural due process

claims twice before. Specifically, he

alleges that conflicts of interests existed

between Defendants and that those conflicts

interfered with the fair adjudication of his

family law case. These allegations are

strikingly similar, if not identical, to

those alleged and dismissed in his

Plaintiff’s [sic] prior lawsuits. ...

Plaintiff has again failed to state a

procedural due process claim. He has utterly

failed to plead any facts that suggest he

exhausted his state remedies. As such,

Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims, if

any are stated, are DISMISSED for failure to

state a claim. 

(Doc. 61, 8:16-9:16). The June 22, 2005 Order ruled that

Plaintiff’s claims concerning his liberty interests and/or rights

as a parent are barred by the domestic relations exception, “[a]s

was explained in the May 11, 2005 memorandum opinion and order.” 

(Doc. 61, 9:2). The June 22, 2005 Order dismissed Plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claims against Defendant Hollenback that he violated

Plaintiff’s right to equal protection by impeding Plaintiff’s

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access to the judicial system because of his race on the ground

that Defendant Hollenback was a private individual, not a state

actor. (Doc. 61, 11:12-23). The June 22, 2005 Order then

stated:

Plaintiff has established a pattern of filing

multiple complaints without leave to amend

and without providing justification for the

amendment. Plaintiff has attempted to evade

dismissal by set [sic] forth additional

claims, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985 and

1986. The May 11, 2005 memorandum opinion

and order denied Plaintiff leave to amend on

the grounds that these claims, as presented

in his several proposed amended complaints,

would fail to properly state a claim under

any federal law.

Defendant[] ... Hollenback correctly point[s]

out that participants in the court process

are immune from civil liability for damages

in the context of a § 1983 claim ... However,

such immunity would not protect them from

liability in the context of a properly

alleged claim that they conspired with a

judge to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights

....

A district court shall grant leave to amend

freely ‘when justice so requires,’ unless the

amendment (1) would be futile, (2) is

proposed in bad faith, or would result in (3)

undue delay or (4) prejudice to the opposing

party ....

In this case, Plaintiff has filed numerous

proposed amended complaints aimed at evading

dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Although

Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § [sic]

1981, 1985, and 1986 are of dubious merit, he

will be afforded one final opportunity to

amend to properly allege claims under §§

1981, 1985, and 1986. 

(Doc. 61, 12:3-13:7). By Order filed on June 29, 2005 (Doc. 65), 

Plaintiff’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Defendant

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Hollenback in the amount of $144,500.00, “a figure based in part

upon Plaintiff’s ‘earnings capacity’”, because counsel for

Defendant had one digit wrong in Plaintiff’s address for service,

was denied, the Court further commenting:

Based on the excessive and unjustified burden

placed on the court by Plaintiff’s serial and

meritless filings, it is Plaintiff who more

appropriately could be subject to Rule 11

sanctions.

(Doc. 65, 3:10-13).

On 6, 2005, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal

of Defendant Leslie Jensen (Doc. 66). 

Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint against Defendant

Hollenback on July 6, 2005 (Doc. 67). The second amended

complaint was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and alleged in

pertinent part:

10. At all times relevant hereto

Hollenback’s threats and statements to Mr.

Jones were made OUT OF COURT; literally not

within the actual court building.

11. At all times relevant hereto Defendants

Hollenbcak’ [sic] threats and statements to

Mr. Jones were made after the child support

trial of 4/22/2004.

...

44. On or about 12/2003, defendant

Hollenback became involved with Mr. Jones’

family law case as counsel for the opposing

party.

45. On or about 1/2004 Mr. Jones filed

contempt charges against the opposing party

in his family law case.

...

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47. On 4/22/2004 defendant Hollenback made

statements to Mr. Jones that, ‘he called the

Stanislaus County Housing Authority and told

them what a lazy low-life black piece of shit

you are ... you get nigger justice.’

48. On 4/22/2004 defendant Hollenback

threatened Mr. Jones that, ‘he would knock

the teeth out of his black greasy face ...

and rattle them out of his jive-monkey ass if

he showed up for the contempt hearings.’

...

50. As a direct and proximate cause of the

defendant’s threats, Mr. Jones feared for his

safety, if he were to attend the pending

contempt proceedings.

51. As a direct and proximate result of the

defendant’s threats, Mr. Jones withdrew the

contempt Charges against the opposing party

in his family law case on 5/7/2004 and

6/7/2004.

52. As a direct and proximate cause of the

defendant’s threats, Mr. Jones did not attend

the contempt proceedings on 5/10/2004 and

6/10/2204.

...

54. On or about 7/2004 the Statute of

Limitations for the withdrawn contempt

charges ran/expired.

55. As a direct and proximate cause of the

defendant’s threats, Mr. Jones’ access to the

judicial system was deprived.

The Second Amended Complaint alleged that Defendant’s actions

deprived Plaintiff of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981 because they deprived Plaintiff of: (1) his “federal right

to sue on account of his race and ethnicity”; (2) his “federal

right to enforce contracts on account of his race and ethnicity”;

(3) his “federal right to be a party to proceedings on account of

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his race and ethnicity; (4) his “federal right to give evidence

at proceedings on account of his race and ethnicity”; (5) his

“federal right to full benefit of proceedings on account of his

race and ethnicity”; (6) his “federal right to equal benefit of

all proceedings on account of his race and ethnicity”; and (7)

his “federal right to equal benefit of all laws on account of his

race and ethnicity.” 

Defendant moved to dismiss the second amended complaint. By

Memorandum Opinion and Order filed on October 21, 2005 (Doc.

103), Defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied. The Court

rejected Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s “Notice of

Withdrawal [of] Contempt Without Prejudice” filed by Plaintiff in

the family law case estops Plaintiff from alleging that he

withdrew the pending contempt charges because of Defendant

Hollenback’s alleged derogatory statements:

Accepted as true, the Notice is not

inconsistent with the allegation in the

second amended complaint that Plaintiff

withdrew the contempt charges because of

Hollenback’s threats. Specifically, the

Notice acknowledges that among the reasons

for Plaintiff’s withdrawal of the contempt

claims are his ‘overwhelming concern for the

safety of [himself], and [his] perspective

witness ...’ and his ‘concern that further

violation(s) of [his] Civil and

Constitutional rights will occur.’ This

general statement of reasons is arguably a

reference to the alleged comments/threats

made by Mr. Hollenback. Although the Notice

presented by Defendants [sic] is relevant to

the weight a finder of fact might afforded

[sic] Plaintiff’s allegations, it does not on

its own require dismissal.4

...

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This conclusion is not an endorsement of the 4

veracity or plausibility of Plaintiff’s

claims. As the district court has stated in

the past, this Plaintiff has exhibited a

tendency to change or supplement his factual

submissions over time with previously

unasserted matters in an apparent effort to

evade dismissal.

(Doc. 103, 6-8). The Memorandum Decision denied dismissal of

Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim:

‘Section 1981 cannot be construed as a

general proscription of racial discrimination

... for it expressly prohibits discrimination

only in the making and enforcement of

contracts.’ ....

Here, Plaintiff suggests that bringing a

contempt proceeding in state court against

Ms. Chhay was an effort to enforce the family

law visitation agreement he and Ms. Chhay

signed. Neither party offers legal authority

supporting or refuting the proposition that

such a contract is covered by section 1981. 

Legal authority applicable to this issue

suggests that a wide range of contracts are

covered by the provision. See Runyon v.

McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (section 1981)

reached discrimination in private education

where private schools denied admission to

minority children thereby interfering with

parents’ right to contract for educational

services).

(Doc. 103, 8-10). 

On October 31, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary

judgment (Doc. 104). On January 24, 2006, Plaintiff filed a

motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (Doc. 166). 

These motions, among others, were heard on January 30, 2006 and

taken under submission (Doc. 172). On February 8, 2006,

Plaintiff filed a “second amended complaint.” 

By Memorandum Opinion and Order filed on February 15, 2006

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(Doc. 185), Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was denied. 

The Court noted:

The Court has been unable to locate any cases

imposing liability under § 1981 in

circumstances that are even remotely

comparable to the facts of this case. 

Nevertheless, for the purposes of this

motion, § 1981 is applied to a private party

accused of interfering with an individual’s

efforts access [sic] a state court to enforce

a private child custody settlement contract.

(Doc. 185, 11:22-28). Summary judgment for Plaintiff was

nonetheless denied because Defendant denied making any racially

derogatory statements to Plaintiff, thereby creating a factual

dispute as to the racial animus element of Plaintiff’s Section

1981 claims. (Doc. 185, 14:4-8). Plaintiff’s motion for leave

to amend to add 21 state law tort claims (five counts of

intentional interference with a contractual relationship, 15

counts of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and one

count of slander) was granted. (Doc. 185, 14-15). 

On February 16, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to

file a third amended complaint (Doc. 187) and filed a third

amended complaint on February 22, 2006 (Doc. 190), before

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to do so had been heard. On

February 28, 2006, Defendant moved to dismiss the second amended

complaint filed by Plaintiff on February 1, 2006 (Doc. 191). On

March 8, 2006, Plaintiff filed an “Anti SLAPP Special Motion to

Strike and Motion for Fees” (Doc. 204). Before any of these

motions were heard, on April 25, 2006, Plaintiff filed a third

amended complaint against Michael Tozzi, Marie Sovey-Silveria,

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Leslie Jensen and Defendant Hollenback. (Doc. 217). These

various motions were heard on May 1, 2006 (Doc. 219). Before any

rulings were issued, on May 4, 2006, Plaintiff filed without

leave a fourth amended complaint against Michael Tozzi, Marie

Sovey-Silveria, Leslie Jensen and Defendant Hollenback. (Doc.

221). On May 6, 2006, Defendant filed a motion to strike the

fourth amended complaint (Doc. 223). By Memorandum Decision and

Order filed on June 2, 2006 (Doc. 227), Defendant’s motion to

strike the fourth amended complaint was granted and the fourth

amended complaint filed on May 4, 2006 was stricken:

Plaintiff has been previously warned that his

practice of filing amended complaints without

leave to amend unnecessarily confuses the

docket and prevents the parties from

receiving the court’s analysis and decision

on the pending motions addressing the

operative complaint. Plaintiff must wait for

a written decision and order on motions

submitted for decision that actually grants

him leave before filing any amended

complaint. To protect the integrity of the

judicial process, Plaintiff’s unauthorized

fourth amended complaint must be stricken.

By Memorandum Decision and Order filed on June 2, 2006 (Doc.

228), the court addressed: (1) Plaintiff’s motion to recuse

Magistrate Judge Beck; (2) Plaintiff’s motion to file a third

amended complaint; (3) Defendant’s motion to dismiss the

operative second amended complaint; (4) Defendant’s motion to

strike state law claims from the second amended complaint

pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute; (5) previously

dismissed defendant Leslie Jensen’s motion to strike state law

claims from the second amended complaint pursuant to California’s

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anti-SLAPP statute; and (6) Plaintiff’s motion to strike pursuant

to California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The Court granted previously

dismissed Defendant Leslie Jensen’s motion to strike her status

as a defendant:

Here, Plaintiff now seeks to assert (for the

first time) that Jensen also made racially

derogatory remarks toward Plaintiff, an

allegation he has never mentioned in the

almost two years that this dispute has been

pending. It is inconceivable that Plaintiff

has not had full knowledge of any such facts

for over two years. Plaintiff has been

afforded multiple opportunities to amend the

complaint ... Unjustified delay, unjustified

failure to even mention this purported claim,

unjustified failure to allege the claim while

Jensen was a party to the case are all

grounds to deny leave to rejoin Jensen as a

defendant.

(Doc. 228, 12). Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a third

amended complaint was denied:

Plaintiff has been warned in the past that

his practice of filing multiple complaints

unfairly creates a moving target for opposing

parties and necessary [sic] burdens on an

overtaxed court. Defendants are entitled to

have their motions to dismiss and to strike

heard as to the second amended complaint. 

Plaintiff has provided no explanation as to

why he could not have included information

contained in the third amended complaint in

the previously-filed second amended

complaint. This is in substance the fifth

time Plaintiff has endeavored to alter the

facts of his lawsuit.

The Court dismissed with prejudice the claims against Defendant

for violation of Section 1981 because the “visitation and custody

order is not a contract” and “Plaintiff’s efforts to ‘enforce’

the order are not protected by section 1981.” (Doc. 228, 18:17-

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20):

In order to establish a claim under § 1981, a

plaintiff must establish that (1) he or she

is a member of a racial minority; (2) the

defendant intended to discriminate against

the plaintiff on the basis of race; and (3)

the discrimination concerned one or more of

the activities enumerated in the statute

(i.e., the right to make and enforce

contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence,

etc.).’ ....

Plaintiff continues to suggest that his

section 1981 claim may rest on deprivations

separate and distinct from those founded on

contract. For example, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant Hollenback’s actions deprived

him of his federal ‘right to sue,’ ‘to be a

party to proceedings,’‘to give evidence at

proceedings’ ‘to full benefit of

proceedings,’ ‘to equal benefit of all

proceedings,’ and ‘to equal benefit of all

laws on account of Plaintiff’s race and

ethnicity. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 64-77.) But,

section 1981 has not been construed as a

‘general proscription of racial

discrimination ....’ Patterson v. McClean

Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176 (1989). Its

reach has been limited and interpreted to

prohibit discrimination ‘only in the making

and enforcement of contracts.’ Id. .... The

Supreme Court recently reiterated that ‘a

plaintiff cannot state a claim under § 1981

unless he has (or would have) rights under

[an] existing (or proposed) contract that he

wishes “to make and enforce.”’ Domino’s

Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 126 S.Ct. 1246, 1252

(2006). 

Plaintiff continues to insist that bringing

the contempt proceeding in state court

against Ms. Chhay was an effort to enforce a

family law visitation ‘contract’ between

Plaintiff and Ms. Chhay. Doubt has

previously been expressed as to whether

imposing liability under section 1981 is

appropriate in this case. The legal issue

has not been squarely raised or adequately

addressed by any party in any prior

proceeding. Defendant now challenges the 2

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sufficiency of the complaint on the ground

that the family law visitation agreement is

not a contract.

In California, a contract is defined as an

agreement to do or not to do a particular

thing. Cal. Civ. Code § 1549. In order for

a contract to exit [sic], (1) there must be

two or more parties capable of contracting,

(2) they must consent, (3) to a lawful

object, and (4) there must be ‘sufficient

cause or consideration.’ Cal. Civ. Code §

1550. 

The header for the document in question

provides as follows:

Melvin Jones, Jr. vs. Kea Chhay

Petitioner Respondent

Case # 285954 Hearing Date: December 10, 2002

This order applies to the following minor

child:

Lauren Jones DOB 9/01-97

(Doc. 193-2 at 3) (page 1 of 5 of the

document). The first paragraph provides:

1. The following custody and

visitation orders are imposed by

the Court based upon the agreement

of the parties. This order shall

supersede all prior orders.

(Id.) The subsequent five pages of text

contain various provisions pertaining to the

custody and visitation arrangement. 

Plaintiff relies heavily on the fact that the

first paragraph contains the language ‘based

upon the agreement of the parties.’ This,

Plaintiff suggests, is evidence that the

document is a contract. Hollenback objects

that the ‘findings and order’ that

constituted the custody/visitation agreement

in no way depends on the parties’ mutual

consent to the custody arrangement and its

related provisions. 

Even assuming the truth of Plaintiff’s

assertion that the order was based upon an

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agreement between Plaintiff and Chhay, that

agreement was reduced to an order of the

family court. Once the order was entered,

any agreement merged in the order and a party

can no longer bring a breach of contract

action to enforce the agreement. The only

remedy is by way of a contempt proceeding ...

Under the doctrine of merger, the ‘contract’

has been merged into the order which governs

the parties’ rights and obligations.

Plaintiff’s conduct admits this, as he was in

the process of prosecuting a contempt action

when the alleged racially derogatory remarks

were purportedly made. As additional support

for his contention that the custody and

visitation order is not a contract,

Hollenback points out that such orders are

modifiable at any time by the court if such

modification would serve the best interest of

the child.

The visitation and custody order is not a

contract. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s efforts

to ‘enforce’ the order are not protected by

section 1981. 

...

Plaintiff argues that the merits of the 2

section 1981 claim have been addressed by the

district court and suggests that this motion

to dismiss is therefore not properly before

the court. This is incorrect for two

reasons. First, although Defendants did

previously challenge the sufficiency of the §

1981 claim, they did so in response to a

previously-filed complaint. Plaintiff

subsequently moved for and was granted leave

to amend. Upon the filing of any amended

complaint, Defendant is entitled to file new

Rule 12 motions. Second, the sufficiency of

the § 1981 claim was never completely

resolved by the district court. Specific

questions were raised as to whether the

custody and visitation document constituted a

contract covered by § 1981. (See Doc. 185 at

11.)

The Court ruled that the second amended complaint did not

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adequately allege specific facts from which a conspiracy to

violate 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) could be inferred (i.e., which

defendants conspired, how they conspired and how the conspiracy

led to a deprivation of his constitutional rights), but that

“Plaintiff will be afforded one final opportunity to amend to

assert section 1985 and 1986 claims against Defendant

Hollenback.” (Doc. 228, 21:10-11). The Court dismissed with

prejudice all of the state law claims against Defendant

Hollenback pursuant to the litigation privilege set forth in

California Civil Code § 47(b). (Doc. 228, 27:6-7). The Court

dismissed with prejudice the slander per se state law cause of

action as barred by the statute of limitations; dismissed with

prejudice the state law claims for intentional interference with

contractual relations because the visitation and custody order is

not a contract; and dismissed with prejudice the state law claims

for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. 228, 27-

30). The Court dismissed the state law claims of negligent

infliction of emotional distress because Plaintiff had not

pleaded the elements of a claim for negligence and the

intentional conduct alleged was wholly inconsistent with a

negligence claim. (Doc. 228, 30). 

Because of these rulings, Defendant’s motion to strike

pursuant to California’s Anti-SLAPP statute was denied as moot. 

(Doc. 228, 32). The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to strike

pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP statute because the Ninth Circuit has

specifically ruled that California’s anti-SLAPP statute is not

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preempted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is

applicable in federal cases where supplemental claims are pled

under California law, because Defendant has not asserted any

federal or state claims against Plaintiff, and because California

Code of Civil Procedure § 425.6(e)(2) does not require as “issue

of public interest.” (Doc. 228, 37-39). Plaintiff was given

“one final opportunity to frame a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §§

1985 and 1986 in accordance with this decision.” (Doc. 228, 40).

Plaintiff filed a fifth amended complaint against Defendant

on June 13, 2006 (Doc. 230). As described in the Memorandum

Decision and Order filed on August 24, 2006 (Doc. 234):

Plaintiff’s FAC appears to allege that

Defendant Hollenback participated in four

separate conspiracies, along with various

other individuals, to deprive Plaintiff of

his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§

1985 and 1986. Three of the alleged

conspiracies are at least tangentially

related to Plaintiff’s efforts to litigate in

state court (the ‘state court conspiracies’;

[sic] the fourth is distinct, in that it

alleges a conspiracy to impede access to

federal court (the ‘federal court

conspiracy’).

First, Plaintiff describes an alleged

conspiracy between Hollenback and Leslie

Jensen. (FAC, ¶¶ 45-58.) It is not easy to 

determine the nature of the conspiracy from

the text of the complaint, but it appears

that Plaintiff is asserting that, together,

Jensen and Hollenback through threats and

intimidation: (a) impeded Plaintiff’s access

to state court, (b) impeded his ability to

pursue his rights under the custody order

issued by the Stanislaus Court, and (c)

impeded his ability to apply for employment

with the Stanislaus County Housing Authority. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that

Hollenback told Plaintiff that ‘[Hollenback]

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called the Stanislaus County Housing

Authority,’ where plaintiff had recently

applied for employment ‘and told them what a

lazy low life black piece of shit [Plaintiff

is]’ and exclaimed ‘you get nigger justice.’ 

(FAC at ¶ 47.) Plaintiff further alleges

that Hollenback threatened that ‘he would

knock the teeth out of his black greasy fact

... and rattle them out of his jive-monkey

ass if he showed up for the contempt

hearings.’ (Id.). Separately, Plaintiff

alleges that Ms. Jensen threatened that

Plaintiff would ‘get his black ass kicked if

he continued to make trouble for the court

and if Plaintiff continued with the contempt

proceedings.’ (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that

there is circumstantial evidence that

Hollenback and Jensen conspired with one

another to intimidate him. Specifically,

Plaintiff notes that Hollenback and Jensen

have been colleagues practicing before the

Stanislaus Superior Court for many years. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Hollenback and

Jensen contracted with one other to cover

each other’s court appearances.

Next, Plaintiff alleges that Hollenback

conspired with state courtroom bailiff Jane

Doe. (Id. at ¶ 52.) Specifically, Plaintiff

asserts that he heard Hollenback tell the

bailiff that Plaintiff was a ‘low life

black.’ The bailiff apparently became

agitated as a result. However, Jones asserts

that he continued with his scheduled hearing

after reassuring the bailiff that he was ‘not

a low life black.’

In the final purported state court

conspiracy, Plaintiff names as coconspirators various individuals who were

previously named as Defendants in this case. 

He alleges that Michael Tozzi (the Executive

Officer of the Stanislaus County Superior

Court), Steven Carmichael (the Court

appointed Evaluator), Don Strangio (the Court

appointed Family Law Mediator), Ms. Jensen,

the ‘Jane Doe’ bailiff from the April 22,

2004 hearing, and Marie Sovey-Silveria (the

Family Law Judge who issued the December 10,

2002 cusody [sic] order), agreed to deprive

Plaintiff of the opportunity to access state

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court and to pursue his rights under a

custody order entered by the Stanislaus

court. Plaintiff also alleges a separate

conspiracy involving all of these individuals

to retaliate against him. Plaintiff alleges

that Tozzi, Silveria, Strangio, and

Carmichael all conspired to aid in planning

this conspiracy and in concealing the

existence of the conspiracy. (Id. at ¶ 81.) 

More specifically, Plaintiff alleges (a) that

Carmichael acted in furtherance of the

conspiracy when he commented that Whites and

Asians are ‘better at education than Blacks;’

and (b) that Tozzi contributed to the

conspiracy by failing to comply with a

subpoena sent to him by Plaintiff. No

specific factual allegations are made with

regard to Silveria or Strangio.

Finally, Plaintiff describes a conspiracy

between Hollenback, Leslie Jensen, and Lonnie

Ashlock to impede Plaintiff’s ability to

access federal court. (Id. at ¶ [sic] 59-

68.) Apparently, Plaintiff and Lonnie

Ashlock were parties to several real estate

agreements, including an a [sic] rental

agreement and an agreement pursuant to which

Plaintiff sold a house to Ashlock. Leslie

Jensen admits that she has served as Lonnie

Ashlock’s attorney on many occasions. 

Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Ashlock threatened

Plaintiff that if Plaintiff did not drop his

litigation against Jensen he would ‘not pay

him one cent’ pursuant to the house sale. 

Plaintiff was later evicted from his

residence and now asserts that this eviction

was in retaliation for Plaintiff’s legal

actions and in furtherance of the

‘conspiracy.’ Plaintiff claims that Ms.

Jensen made misrepresentations to the Court

in an effort to ‘conceal’ this perceived

‘conspiracy.’ The Complaint does not clearly

explain how Hollenback was involved in this

conspiracy and the only stated explanation of

Hollenback’s wrongful conduct was ‘his

apparent silence’ about the alleged

conspiracy.’ (Id. at ¶ 67).

(Doc. 253, 7:25-11-3). The fifth amended complaint prayed for

$1,700,000.00 damages. The majority of the racially charged

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allegations had never been pleaded in any prior complaint. 

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the fifth amended complaint

or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. (Doc. 234). By

Memorandum Decision and Order filed on August 24, 2006 (Doc.

253), Defendant’s motion to dismiss on statute of limitations

grounds was denied; his motion to dismiss with respect to the

conspiracy claim based on alleged threats to dissuade Plaintiff

from participating in the contempt proceeding was denied; and the

motion to dismiss as to all of the other, related conspiracy

claims was granted as those claims were dismissed because

Plaintiff failed to specifically state how the alleged

conspiracies harmed him. 

Defendant’s alternative motion for summary judgment was

continued based on Plaintiff’s representations that he had not

had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery “on his new

legal theory, based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, in part

because he has not possessed adequate funds to conduct thorough

discovery.” (Doc. 253, 32-33). Thereafter, the parties filed

cross-motions for summary judgment which were heard on January

22, 2007 (Doc. 287). The Memorandum Decision and Order filed on

February 7, 2007, (Doc. 293), set forth summaries of Plaintiff’s

and Defendant’s factual positions:

1. Summary of Plaintiff’s Evidence

Plaintiff presents his own declaration and

various amendments thereto, which provide a

detailed chronology of the events from his

point of view. 

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The custody dispute between Plaintiff and Ms.

Chhay began in May 2002 and was litigated in

Stanislaus County Superior Court. (Doc. 255

at 4.) At that time, Plaintiff maintains

that Ms. Chhay was employed as a Family Law

Investigator with the Stanislaus Superior

Court. (Id.)

It is undisputed that Judge SILVERIA became

the presiding family law judge; Donald

Strangio was appointed by the state court as

a mediator in the dispute; Steven Carmichael

became the court-appointed custody evaluator

in the case; and Michael Tozzi served as the

Executive Officer of the Stanislaus Superior

Court during the relevant time period. 

It is also undisputed that Leslie Jensen

associated as counsel for Ms. Chhay in 2002. 

In 2003, Defendant Hollenback replaced Ms.

Jensen as counsel for Ms. Chhay, but, in

2004, Ms. Jensen appeared for Defendant

Hollenback at a hearing on behalf of Ms.

Chhay. Plaintiff maintains that Hollenback

and Jensen maintained an association

throughout the relevant time period,

conspiring together, and with other alleged

co-conspirators, to dissuade Plaintiff,

through threats of violence, from pursuing

his legal rights in state court.

Plaintiff next details various racist or

impliedly racist remarks that were allegedly

directed at Plaintiff by the alleged coconspirators. For example, Plaintiff avers

that, in October 2002, Carmichael indicated

that “Blacks [are] inferior to Whites and

Asians in learning/education.” (Id. at 5.) 

Plaintiff then sent a letter to Carmichael

expressing concern that Carmichael’s ability

to participate in his custody dispute was

compromised because Carmichael was biased

against Plaintiff. Soon thereafter,

according to Plaintiff, Jensen called

Plaintiff and said “were going to shut you

down boy...[W]hen we get finished with

you...you’ll wish you stayed in San Jose.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff claims that he responded by

asking: "Who is we?" Jensen allegedly

replied: “You'll find out soon enough....Dr

Carmichael, and Dr. Strangio have assured me

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that you won’t know what hit you....we have

something for your black ass?.... Don

Strangio is my friend...he and I have spoken

to Judge SILVERIA...you just wait and see.” 

(Id. at 5-6.)

In addition, at various times in or around

2002, Plaintiff alleges that Judge SILVERIA,

Mr. Strangio, and Ms. Jensen made racially

offensive remarks regarding Plaintiff’s

desire to spend Martin Luther King day with

his daughter. For example, in a December

2002 hearing when Plaintiff attempted to

discuss that visitation issue with Judge

SILVERIA, she allegedly told Plaintiff “shut

up and go sit down.” A few months later in

April 2003, Plaintiff tried to raise the

concern again with Judge SILVERIA, but

Plaintiff avers that she told him to “shut up

and stop playing the race card.” (Id. at 6-

7.) After that hearing, Plaintiff asserts

that he asked Mr. Strangio directly about

spending Martin Luther King day with his

daughter, to which Strangio allegedly

responded: “Martin Luther King was the

biggest trouble maker of them all... if you

continue your trouble making you will be

stopped in your tracks.” (Id. at 7.)

Also in May 2003, Jensen served Plaintiff

with a document. Plaintiff alleges that

Jensen threw the document on the ground and

stated: “Your ignorant trouble making black

ass has been served.” When Plaintiff asked

why she threw the document on the ground, she

stated: “I did not want to touch your filthy

ape hands.” She then allegedly stated; “if

you know what is good for your stinky black

ass, you'll knock it off... you trouble

making black bastard...you're going down,

you'll be celebrating Rodney King Day.” When

Plaintiff responded “You mean Dr. King

Holiday?”, Jensen replied “No, idiot, you

will never have that day added to the custody

order...poor tar baby your crying to County

Counsel did not help you did it?” 

In late 2003, after another family court

hearing, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant

Hollenback called him “an unkempt lazy

lowlife black.” When Plaintiff stated “I

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have never even met you before...what is your

problem...,” Hollenback allegedly responded:

“my problem is you... you stupid porch

monkey...I know that you're a trouble making

black sambo.” Later during that

conversation, Plaintiff asserts that

Hollenback warned: “[L]isten lazy nigger boy,

I am going to show you how to make

trouble...if you know what is good for you,

you will stop your bullshit...do me a favor

and take your dead beat black ass back to San

Jose...You only want Martin Luther King day

so that you have an excuse to have a day off

work...that day is for nigger lovers...you'll

never get that day added to your visitation

in this court.”

In February 2004, Jensen appeared on behalf

of Mr. Hollenback. Plaintiff claims that,

outside the hearing, Ms. Jensen stated: “Mr.

Hollenback and I are known in this

court...you’re going to get yours if you keep

it up...[Y]ou just wait[,] Mr. Hollenback and

I have something planned for you boy...we’re

going to put your black ass down...payback is

going to be hell.” In addition, Plaintiff

asserts that Jensen made other racially

derogatory statements to him regarding the

Dr. Martin Luther King Holiday. (Id. at 10.) 

Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that

Jensen told him to “stay tuned you black

ape...you’re fucking with the wrong

people...you’re going down...I don’t care

about your damn nigger holiday or what facts

you want on record, you lazy black troublemaking asshole.” Finally, although

Plaintiff does not specify when this

statement was made, he asserts that Jensen

threatened him that he “would get my black

ass kicked if [he] continued to make trouble

for the court and if [he] continued with the

contempt proceedings.” (Id. at 11.)

Plaintiff then discusses certain events

surrounding a hearing on March 29, 2004, at

which Defendant Hollenback insisted that

Plaintiff be ordered to disclose the name of

the Stanislaus County Agency with which

Plaintiff was seeking employment. (Id. at

12.) Plaintiff objected, but was apparently

ordered to disclose the information. 

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Hollenback allegedly then threatened to tell

that particular agency (the Housing

Authority) that he was a “low life black dead

beat dad....” (Id. at 13.) 

It is undisputed that in 2004, Plaintiff

filed two sets of contempt charges against

Ms. Chhay in the family law case. The first

set of charges was set for trial on May 15,

2004. The second set of charges were set for

hearings on May 10 and June 10, 2004,

respectively.

At the trial on the first set of charges,

presided over by Judge Jacobsen, Plaintiff

alleges that Judge SILVERIA interrupted the

proceedings and communicated with Judge

Jacobson. Plaintiff conclusorily describes

Judge SILVERIA’s conduct as “retaliatory” but

does not describe how.

Before the second set of contempt charges

came to trial, a trial was held on April 22,

2004, regarding the issue of Child Support. 

Defendant Hollenback was present, as was a

bailiff whom Plaintiff refers to as Jane Doe

(her actual name is Vivian Holliday). 

Plaintiff observed Hollenback conversing with

the bailiff and claims to have heard

Hollenback explain to the bailiff that

Plaintiff was a “low life black.” The

bailiff then pointed at Plaintiff and “became

unduly excited towards [him].” (Id. at 14.) 

Although Plaintiff was concerned by this

conduct, he proceeded with the trial after

“reassuring the bailiff” that he was not a

“low life black.” 

After the April 22, 2004 hearing, Plaintiff

asserts that Defendant Hollenback claimed to

have “called the Stanislaus County Housing

Authority and told them what a lazy low life

black piece of shit you are...you get nigger

justice.” In addition, Plaintiff claims that

Defendant Hollenback threatened that “he

would knock the teeth out of my black greasy

face...and rattle them out of my jive-monkey

ass if I showed up for the contempt

hearings.” Plaintiff believed that

Hollenback was “angry” and Plaintiff

“fear[ed] for [his] safety if [he] were to

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continue with the contempt hearings on May 10

and June 10, 2004.” (Id. at 15-16.) 

Plaintiff claims that, as a result of this

fear, he withdrew the pending contempt

charges. Plaintiff maintains that he remains

in fear today, and that, as a result, he did

not attend a separate state court proceeding

in a different matter.

2. Defendant’s Evidence.

Defendant presents his own declarations,

along with supporting declarations from

Leslie Jensen, Michael Tozzi, and Vivian

Holliday. Defendant also requests that

judicial notice be taken of declarations

filed by Donald Strangio and other alleged

co-conspirators in other related cases filed

by Plaintiff in federal court.

In sum, Defendant and all of the alleged coconspirators deny ever having made racially

derogatory remarks to Plaintiff, and deny

having participated in or having knowledge of

any kind of conspiracy to deny Plaintiff

access to court. 

More specifically, Defendant denies having

had any involvement with Plaintiff’s child

support case prior to his first contact with

Ms. Chhay on December 24, 2003. In fact,

Hollenback asserts that he and Ms. Jensen

never represented Ms. Chhay on the same

issue. Jensen was retained pursuant to a

“limited scope representation” only on the

child custody and visitation issues. 

Hollenback claims that during the time he

represented Ms. Chhay, he had no

communications with Leslie Jensen about

“anything related to what happened previously

in the Jones v. Chhay [matter]....At no time

was there an ‘overlap’ of the representation

of Ms Jensen and myself.” The one time

Jensen made a special appearance on

Hollenback’s behalf because Hollenback had a

scheduling conflict, this was done as a

customary courtesy and involved no direct

contact between them. Hollenback further

asserts that, in connection with the defense

of this lawsuit, “there were no

communications, direct or indirect, between

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Ms. Jensen and [Hollenback] that went beyond

the necessary and proper matters connected

with defending against this lawsuit.” (Doc.

260 at ¶48.)

Defendant also asserts that, because he only

represented Ms. Chhay in regards to the child

support issue, he was never involved in the

dispute over the custody and visitation

orders, so he had absolutely no contact with

either Mr. Strangio or Mr. Carmichael. 

Moreover, Defendant claims not to have had

contact with Judge SILVERIA concerning the

underlying custody dispute. As a result,

Defendant asserts that he had no involvement

in any conversations concerning Plaintiff’s

requests to spend Martin Luther King Holiday

with his daughter, a custody issue.

Defendant claims to have had no knowledge of

any of the allegedly threatening/derogatory

remarks made by any of the co-conspirators

(except to the extent that he learned of

Plaintiff’s allegations during his

involvement in this lawsuit). For example,

Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Jensen made

threatening remarks to Jones in April 2003. 

Those statements, if they were made, would

have occurred many months before Hollenback

became an attorney in the case.

(Doc. 293, 6:2-12:23). Although the Court denied the crossmotion for summary judgment, the Memorandum Decision and Order

did state:

Defendant raises essentially identical

objections to numerous other factual

allegations, including statements allegedly

made or actions allegedly taken by all of the

alleged co-conspirators, including Ms.

Jensen, Judge SILVERIA, Mr. Tozzi, Mr.

Carmichael, Mr. Strangio, and the bailiff. 

Defendant argues that many of these alleged

acts and/or statements are simply

“mind-boggling and delusional.” 

The type of information put forth

by plaintiff is so remarkable,

unreliable and unthinkable that it

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cannot serve as an "inference" of

the existence of a conspiracy. 

This is not a situation where

plaintiff has repeatedly made

general allegations of racist,

threatening and improper

communications between HOLLENBACK

and plaintiff in late December 2003

and is only now providing us with

the specifics. Plaintiff never

once made any such allegation of

any improper conduct between

HOLLENBACK and Jensen in late 2003

until the filing of this Renewed

Affidavit. It is not included in

any of the Complaints, to and

including the operative pleading. 

As such, it should not be

considered whatsoever by this

Court.

(Doc. 258 at 34-35.) This is not an

unreasonable description of some of the

outrageous language and conduct described in

Plaintiff’s affidavits. However, apart from

limited circumstances described in the cases

discussed below, whether a party’s affidavits

are “mind-boggling” and/or “delusional” are

issues that a jury must determine.

(Doc. 293, 27:19-28:13). 

A three day jury trial was conducted on May 8, 9 and 10,

2007. The jury was instructed on May 10 and returned a defense

verdict after 15 minutes of deliberation.

3. ANALYSIS.

Although Defendant’s burden is high, this is a case that

cries out for the imposition of attorneys in favor of Defendant

pursuant to Section 1988. The record in this action makes 

inescapable the conclusion that this action was frivolous and

vexatious and that Plaintiff is, as Defendant asserts, pursuing

any and all persons even remotely involved in the underlying

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Examples of Plaintiff’s continuing compulsive pursuit of any 1

persons involved in the underlying family law dispute is the filing

of an Amended Complaint in Melvin Jones, Jr. v. State of

California, No. CV-F-04-6566 OWW/DLB, on June 21, 2007, almost two

years after this action was dismissed. In this action, on January

15, 2008, Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the judgment

pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) and (b)(3), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, based on alleged fraud on the Court because of

Defendant’s and Defendant’s counsel’s alleged mischaracterization

of one of Plaintiff’s prior convictions (Doc. 409). Plaintiff’s

motion was noticed for hearing on March 3, 2008. Plaintiff

withdrew this motion at the hearing on February 11, 2008, advising

that he intended to file an independent action to set aside the

judgment. On March 5, 2008, Plaintiff filed Melvin Jones, Jr. v.

Daniel Wainwright, No. CV-F-08-318 OWW/DLB, based on the same

allegations of fraud on the court and seeking to set aside the

verdict, a new trial, a fine in the amount of $800,000.00 or of the

costs incurred “for BOTH TRIALS and ANY/ALL Hearings as to the

same” payable to Plaintiff, fees in the amount of $25,000.00, 

and/or preclusion of the impeachment evidence, all against

Defendant’s counsel, Mr. Wainwright. 

46

family law dispute for the purpose of harassment and revenge.1

Although the fact that Plaintiff was proceeding in pro per must

be taken into account and although resolution of this motion for

attorneys’ fees cannot be based on post hoc reasoning, the record

establishes that Plaintiff’s ever-changing allegations and

theories of relief against this Defendant and the many other

Defendants named in this and the other related actions were a

figment of Plaintiff’s imagination from the outset and asserted

every time a claim was eliminated by dispositive motion and

Plaintiff was advised of the governing law by the Court. As

Defendant argued on summary judgment, Plaintiff’s claims appear 

delusional and ever more lurid. The inference is well-supported

by the evidence that Plaintiff simply made up whatever

allegation he believed would suffice to survive, under the

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standards governing motions to dismiss for failure to state a

claim and for summary judgment, Defendant’s dispositive motions. 

Plaintiff’s evidence at trial in no way substantiated, and often

contradicted, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant. The state

judge in Santa Clara warned Plaintiff about the meritless and

vexatious nature of Plaintiff’s claims. 

C. Amount of Award of Attorney’s Fees.

Rule 54-293, Local Rules of Practice, governs the award of

attorneys’ fees in the Eastern District. Rule 54-293(b) provides

in pertinent part that the motion for attorneys’ fees must

include an affidavit of counsel, showing, inter alia:

(3) the amount of attorneys’ fees sought;

(4) the information pertaining to each of the

criteria set forth in subsection (c) of this

Rule; and 

(5) such other matters as are required under

the statute under which the fee award is

claimed.

“‘In determining what a reasonable attorneys’ fee entails,

the district court must apply the hybrid approach adopted in

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 423 ... (1983).’ ... ‘The

most useful starting point for determining the amount of a

reasonable fee is (1) the number of hours reasonably expended on

the litigation (2) multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.’ ...

The resulting figure is known as the ‘Lodestar.’” Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F.Supp.2d 1023, 1040

(E.D.Cal.2007). Although there is a strong presumption that the

lodestar represents a reasonable fee, Burlington v. Dague, 505

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U.S. 557, 562 (1992), the district court has the discretion to

exclude from the initial fee calculation hours that were not

reasonably expended, for example, cases that are overstaffed. 

Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Hensley held:

Counsel for the prevailing party should make

a good faith effort to exclude from a fee

request hours that are excessive, redundant,

or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in

private practice ethically is obligated to

exclude such hours from his fee submission. 

'In the private sector, "billing judgment" is

an important component in fee setting. It is

no less important here. Hours that are not

properly billed to one's client also are not

properly billed to one's adversary pursuant

to statutory authority.' ....

Id. at 434. As explained in Wood v. Sunn, 865 F.2d 982, 991 (9th

Cir.1988):

Many factors previously identified by courts

as probative on the issue of ‘reasonableness’

of a fee award, see e.g., Kerr v. Screen

Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th

Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 ...

(1976), are now subsumed within the initial

calculation of the lodestar amount. Blum v.

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-900 ...

(1984)(‘the novelty and complexity of the

issues,’ ‘the special skill and experience of

counsel,’ the ‘quality of the

representation,’ and the ‘results obtained’

are subsumed within the lodestar);

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen’s

Council, 478 U.S. 546 ... (1986), rev’d after

rehearing on other grounds, 483 U.S. 711 ...

(1987)(an attorney’s ‘superior performance’

is subsumed).

See also Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 987, 990 & n.3

(9 Cir.1986). As the Clark court explained: th

[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that

adjustments, both upward and downward to the

lodestar amount are sometimes appropriate,

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albeit in ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ cases ...

Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-901 ... The possibility

of adjustments to the lodestar amount

necessitates an analysis of various factors

that could justify an adjustment. In this

circuit, the relevant factors were identified

in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526

F.2d 67, 70 (9 Cir.1975). Although several th

of these factors are now considered to be

subsumed within the calculation of the

lodestar figure ..., review of the Kerr

factors remains the appropriate procedure for

considering a request for a fee-award

adjustment.

Id. The Kerr factors, as modified by Stewart v. Gates, 987 F.2d

1450, 1453 (9 Cir.1993), are: th

(1) the time and labor required of the

attorney(s);

(2) the novelty and difficulty of the

questions presented;

(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal

service properly;

(4) the preclusion of other employment by the

attorney(s) because of the acceptance of the

action;

(5) the customary fee charged in matters of

the type involved;

(6) any time limitations imposed by the

client or the circumstances;

(7) the amount of money, or the value of the

rights involved, and the results obtained;

(8) the experience, reputation and ability of

the attorney(s);

(9) the ‘undesireability of the action;

(10) the nature and length of the

professional relationship between the

attorney and the client;

(12) awards in similar actions.

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Id.; see also Rule 54-293(c), Local Rules of Practice.

a. LODESTAR.

The fee applicant bears the burden of documenting the

appropriate hours expended in the litigation and must submit

evidence in support of those hours worked. Hensley, supra, 461

U.S. at 433, 437. The party opposing the fee application has a

burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the

district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the

hours charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in

its submitted affidavits. Blum v. Stenson, supra, 465 U.S. at

892 n.5 (1984); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 826 F.2d 901, 904 (9th

Cir. 1987).

i. Hours Expended and Supporting

Documentation.

Daniel Wainwright has detailed the hours incurred by himself

and members of his law firm in defending this action. Attached

to Mr. Wainwright’s declaration are detailed copies of billing

statements with descriptions of the tasks performed, by whom, and

the time incurred. The billing statements set forth numerous

entries of “no charge”. Mr. Wainwright avers in pertinent part:

11. This litigation has involved numerous

Court hearings, numerous filings and

pleadings (in excess of 370 documents, and

counting), complex legal issues, ever

changing factual allegations, numerous

witnesses and a great deal of my professional

time. Plaintiff’s behavior made the

litigation of this matter much difficult

since my client consistently had numerous

filings and Motions to respond to all of

which carried sensitive deadlines. This

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required constant attention to this matter

and excluded my acceptance of other work.

12. During the time that Plaintiff was

claiming a §1981 violation and various state

court claims, I filed a Motion to Dismiss and

Anti-SLAPP Motion. This Motion to Dismiss was

granted and Plaintiff filed the subject

Complaint.

13. Thereafter, I brought a Motion for

Summary Judgment. The Court deferred ruling

on this Motion in order to allow Plaintiff

time to conduct discovery. The Court granted

portions of this Motion and allowed Plaintiff

time to complete more discovery.

14. Extensive written discovery (consisting

of hundreds and hundreds of request for

admissions) was propounded by Plaintiff and

responded to by Defendant. 

15. Thereafter, I caused to be filed a

Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. In

response to this Motion, Plaintiff created

and invented new facts. Ultimately, the Court

denied our Motion and said that this matter

must be adjudicated by a jury after trial.

16. In February 2007, I took Plaintiff’s

deposition.

17. Thereafter, I prepared this matter for

trial. This involved numerous hearings,

numerous pre-trial documents and extensive

time and efforts. Because of the numerous

witnesses in this case, I spent a great deal

of time interviewing witnesses and preparing

for their trial testimony. Plaintiff even

failed to attend the pre-trial document

exchange conference in Modesto, as had been

set forth in the Pretrial order.

...

19. All told, this firm devoted over 548

hours to this litigation. Pursuant to our Fee

Agreement, my client was to pay for hourly

services. This was not a contingency fee

relationship.

20. From December 2005 through May 2007, I

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expended 475.90 hours on behalf of Defendant

in the subject action. In December 2005 I

billed 24.3 hours at $160 per hour, or

$3,888. Once I became a partner in this firm

my billing rate increased to $195.00 an hour.

According to the bills submitted I billed

422.40 hours at $195 per hour from January

2006 through May 2007, or $82,368.00.

21. In addition, more time has been incurred

by myself and others in my office in June

2007 (through June 8, 2007). I have incurred

3 hours in June 2007 or $585.00.

22. My law clerk, Alison Laird incurred 24.8

hours of legal time at a billing rate of $120

per hour or $2,976.00 through June 8, 2007.

23. Thus, as of Friday, June 8, 2007, an

additional $3034.50 in fees have been

incurred. Again, I reserve the right to file

a supplemental Affidavit setting for the

additional fees and costs that have been and

will be incurred in handling the continued

legal issues of this case and dealing the

extremely litigious plaintiff.

24. Therefore, as of the closing of business

on Friday, June 8, 2007, the total sum of

$92,975.50 has been incurred by my client as

a direct and proximate result of my office’s

legal representation of JOHN J. HOLLENBACK,

JR., in this civil rights case.

25. Note that according to the billing

records, my paralegal, Diana Thompson,

expended 11 hours on behalf of the Defendant

in the subject action billed at $95 per hour,

therefore totaling $1,045.00.

26. Associate, Alice Dostalova, expended 3.8

hours on behalf of the Defendant in the

subject action billed at $160 per hour,

therefore totaling $608.00.

27. Associate, Kurt Wendlenner at this firm

expended 12.7 hours on behalf of the

Defendant in the subject action billed at

$160 per hour, therefore totaling $2,032.00. 

28. The billing rates of $195.00 for

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partners, $160.00 for associates and $95.00

for paralegals is extremely reasonable. Based

on my experience in the legal community most

civil rights attorneys in San Francisco and

Los Angeles bill at rates closer to $300.00

to $400.00 per hours. Even in Fresno, the

average billing rate for civil rights defense

attorneys is well above the rate that I

charged in this case. In fact, other partners

within my firm bill over $250.00 per hour for

defense of similar cases. Obviously, this was

an extremely reasonable billing rate and well

below what others would charge for similar

professional services.

29. The amount of time spent defending this

case is reasonable and appropriate. Plaintiff

is extremely litigious and has filed hundreds

and hundreds of pleadings. Plaintiff’s

lawsuit has been ever changing and has

continually been morphing between December

2005 and today. Thus, I was forced to

research and investigate numerous different

claims and allegations. At first it involved

a §1981 claim, then numerous state tort

claims were added. Each of these claims were

successfully attacked by the pleadings that I

filed in this case. Plaintiff’s claim that

his December 2002 Family Law

custody/visitation Order actually was a

“contract” and falls under §1981 was a

unique argument that had never been addressed

by this (or any other) Court. Thus, new and

persuasive arguments had to be researched and

crafted to refute these claims. Ultimately,

the Court agreed with our analysis and

dismissed any such contention.

30. Later, when Plaintiff created the

§§1985/1986 claims, new work, research and

investigation was required. Furthermore,

since Plaintiff’s factual claims were ever

changing additional work was needed to

investigate his new claims after they were

invested by Plaintiff.

31. Plaintiff has called my office numerous

times. On some days I would get three or four

calls from Plaintiff and he would ramble on

for lengthy conversations. For the most part

there was absolutely no reason for Plaintiff

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to call me other than harass, annoy and

inconvenience me, to my clients expense.

32. Because Plaintiff was representing

himself additional fees and costs were

incurred in dealing with him. Typically, when

dealing with another attorney one would

expect certain professional courtesies,

conduct, etc. Here, nothing like this

existed. Plaintiff was actively trying to do

whatever he could to cause the legal fees to

increase in this case. This resulted in

numerous filings, Motions and other actions

by Plaintiff that served no legal purpose

other than to cause the fees incurred to

increase. I was unable to rely upon any

agreement or other informal arrangement ever

reached with Plaintiff. He would continue to

change his position on requests, continually

seek favors from me, all the while working as

diligently as possible to run up the fees and

costs associated with the defense of these

bogus claims.

33. One example of this wrongful,

unprofessional and costly conduct was the

fact that Plaintiff elected to NOT attend the

Court Ordered April 19, 2007 document

exchange conference.

34. My client’s professional and personal

reputation was being attacked by Plaintiff. 

The type of language and conduct attributed

to my client by Plaintiff was egregious,

racist in nature and, if true, substantially

undesirable. Obviously the claims were false.

However, it was imperative to my client that

his good name be cleared and that he be

exonerated of any racist or other wrongful

conduct by a jury of his peers. My client’s

livelihood was premised on the fact that he

was an honest, fair, reasonable,

knowledgeable and non-racist attorney in the

Modesto legal community. Thus, his good

reputation was imperative to defend as any

smearing by Plaintiff would result in a

substantial financial drop off.

35. Plaintiff had sought millions and

millions of dollars for the alleged damages

in both general, special and punitive

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damages. Thus, if Plaintiff were successful

then my client would have likely been

responsible for an extremely substantial

monetary judgment. Obviously, since we were

able to successfully defend these conspiracy

claims, I was able to obtain for my client

the best possible result, after trial.

36. I have reviewed the referenced fees and

find them to be reasonable in light of the

substantial amount of time and labor required

to litigate this matter and the customary fee

charged

in matters of the type involved. Furthermore,

as can be seen, a great deal of time has been

“written-off” and not billed to my client. In

addition, there has been numerous billing

entries at

1/10th of an hour increments. These billing

practices have actually resulted in a

reduction of the actual amount of legal fees

incurred, even when the work was performed. 

Plaintiff requests that he be allowed limited discovery

under “Rule 59" because the documentation provided by Defendant

“appears questionable”:

Specifically, the copies of checks show being

drawn on Hollenback’s now dissolved LAW-FIRM

PARTNERSHIP, which was apparently dissolved

at/around MAY 2007 ....

Also, there appears to be a copy of a check

purportedly paid to ‘defense witness Don

Strangio’ - However said ‘witness’ did not

testify at trial.

Plaintiff requests that the Court allow Jones

to review satisfactory copies of all

cancelled checks [Front and back] to support

Hollenback’s fee claim, and that Jones be

allowed to review satisfactory copies of all

fee/cost agreements and/or arrangement

pertaining to Hollenback’s purported fees,

and costs.

Plaintiff is not referring to Mr. Wainwright’s declaration

and attached documentation in support of the motion for

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attorney’s fees; rather, Plaintiff is referring to Bill of Costs

submitted by Defendant on May 21, 2007 (Docs. 366 & 367). Costs

were taxed by the Clerk on June 21, 2007 (Doc. 379). 

Plaintiff’s own exhibit establishes that Mr. Hollenback’s law

firm dissolved on May 31, 2007, approximately ten days after the

Bill of Costs was filed. No check drawn on Mr. Hollenback’s now

dissolved law firm is dated after May 31, 2007. The Bill of

Costs does request taxation of a $40.00 subsistence fee and

$38.00 charge for mileage for Donald Strangio. The sole

opposition to Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees upon which

Plaintiff relies, Doc. 395, was not filed until November 5, 2007. 

Pursuant to Rule 54-292(c), Local Rules of Practice, specific 

objections to items in the Bill of Costs must be filed within 10

days from service of the Bill of Costs. Pursuant to Rule 54-

292(d), if no objections are filed, “the Clerk shall proceed to

tax and enter costs.” Rule 54-292(e) provides: “On motion filed

and served within five (5) court days after notice of the taxing

of costs has been served, the action of the Clerk may be reviewed

by the Court as provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d).” Plaintiff

did not file any objections to the Bill of Costs or move the

Court to review the taxed costs within the times set forth in

Rule 54-292. Plaintiff’s objections to the Bill of Costs set

forth in Doc. 395 are untimely.

This constitutes Plaintiff’s sole objection challenging the

attorney fee documentation submitted by Defendant. Plaintiff has

not submitted any evidence challenging the accuracy and

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reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted by the

prevailing party in its submitted affidavits. From the Court’s

independent review of Mr. Wainwright’s billing statements, 

this aspect of the lodestar is established.

ii. Reasonable Hourly Rate.

The reasonable hourly rate corresponds to the prevailing

market rate in the relevant community, considering the

experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney in question. 

Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th

Cir.1985). The community where the court sits is the relevant

market for determining reasonable fees. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987

F.2d 1392, 1405 (9 Cir.1992). “[T]he determination of a th

reasonable hourly rate ‘is not made by reference to the rates

actually charged the prevailing party..” Welch v. Metropolitan

Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 946 (9 Cir.2007). “Rather, th

billing rates ‘should be established by reference to the fees

that private attorneys of an ability and reputation comparable to

that of prevailing counsel charge their paying clients for legal

work of similar complexity.’” Id. 

Plaintiff poses no objection to the hourly rates set forth

in Mr. Wainwright’s declaration and the supporting billing

documents. The hourly rates of $195, $160 and $95 are reasonable

in this community, given that awards based on higher hourly rates

($250 - $285) for attorneys and paralegals of similar competence

and reputation for business litigation prevailing in this legal

community have been affirmed.

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D. Plaintiff’s “Special Motion to Strike”.

Plaintiff characterizes Defendant’s motion for attorney’s

fees as a SLAPP claim governed by California law. Plaintiff

reaches this conclusion by selective mis-citation of case law. 

Plaintiff cites Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395

(1990). In Cooter & Gell, the Supreme Court held that a district

court could impose Rule 11 sanctions after a plaintiff

voluntarily dismissed the action. The Supreme Court stated:

It is well established that a federal court

may consider collateral issues after an

action is no longer pending ... This Court

has indicated that motions for costs or

attorney’s fees are ‘independent

proceeding[s] supplemental to the original

proceeding and not a request for a

modification of the original decree.

Plaintiff then refers to Carnes v. Zamani, 400 F.3d 1057 (9th

Cir. 2007). Zamani involved a diversity action arising out of a

commercial real estate transaction. The Ninth Circuit held that

a motion for attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing a judgment

constituted a supplementary proceeding to, and in aid of,

judgment, and that California’s Enforcement of Judgments Law

applied to the motion in federal court in California for

attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing the judgment in a diversity

case. Plaintiff argues that Rule 69(a), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, pertaining to process to enforce a judgment, requires

this Court to apply California law:

Accordingly, Pro Se Plaintiff Jones, under

California state law, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

Section 425.16 [Special Motion to Strike] -

respectfully requests the Honorable District

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Court to STRIKE defendendant’s [sic] postjudgment claim for fees and costs.

Here, Hollenback (is the plaintiff), and Pro

Se Jones (is the defendant) - as to said

SLAPP claim (post judgment claim for

fees/costs).

Simply put, Hollenback’s claim is a SLAPP,

aimed at interfering with Jones’ Legitimate

First Amendment Rights.

Therefore, the Honorable District Court must

apply section 425.16 [California anti-SLAPP

statute - C.C.P. S. 425.16] - as mandated by

42 U.S.C. S. 1988(a).

Plaintiff’s contention is frivolous. Defendant is not

seeking to enforce a judgment; he is seeking an award of

attorney’s fees pursuant to a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988,

because he prevailed against Plaintiff in federal court with

regard to Plaintiff’s claims of civil rights violations. 

California law, and specifically California Code of Civil

Procedure § 425.16, has no application to Defendant’s motion for

attorneys’ fees.

Plaintiff’s Special Motion to Strike is DENIED.

E. Plaintiff’s Counter-Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 11,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In opposing Defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees,

Plaintiff moves for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and/or Rule 26,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against defense counsel Daniel

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Although Plaintiff withdrew the motions for sanctions set 2

forth in Docs. 397, 400, 405 and 406, Doc. 395, the sole pleading

upon which Plaintiff now relies in opposing Defendant’s motion for

attorneys’ fees, includes a counter-motion for sanctions under Rule

11. 

60

Wainwright and/or Defendant John Hollenback.2

Plaintiff’s scenario that Defendants violated Rule 11 is

complicated. Plaintiff contends that Defendant violated Rule 11

when Defendant characterized Plaintiff’s prior criminal

conviction in Case No. #E9488120 as a misdemeanor offense of

forgery related to documents related to Ms. Chhay in violation of

California Penal Code § 476(a). 

Plaintiff refers to his Motion in Limine filed on February

7, 2007 (Doc. 295), wherein Plaintiff moved to exclude evidence

pertaining to three criminal cases against Plaintiff on the

ground that “[a]ll three cases were misdemeanor pleasnegotiations and all are now cleared (record clearance) pursuant

to 1203.4 PC.” Plaintiff’s motion listed the three cases as:

(i) #8465500 (plea date 11-01-1984) - record

clearance on or about 11/1985 ....

(ii) #E9488120 (plea date 12/13/95) - record

clearance on or about 12/6/1996 ....

(iii) #CC066134 (plea date 8/23/2000) -

record clearance on or about 2/20/2004 ....

Conviction C8465500 is described in Attachment A to this Motion

in Limine as a violation of California Penal Code §§ 484-487

(generally theft of property). Conviction #E9488120 is described

in Attachment B to this Motion in Limine as a misdemeanor

violation of California Penal Code § 476A (forgery and

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counterfeiting). Conviction #CC066134 is described in Attachment

C to this Motion in Limine as a violation of California Penal

Code § 273.5(a)(infliction of corporal injury on spouse). 

Plaintiff then refers to the Pretrial Statement filed on March

22, 2007 (Doc. 301) as indicating Defendant’s “awareness of

Jones’ DOC # 295, and also indicates the defense’s knowledge of

criminal case #E9488120 involving Jones.” Specifically,

Plaintiff refers to the section of Defendant’s Pretrial Statement

captioned “(11) Exhibits - Schedules and Summaries”, where

Defendant states he expects to offer the following

documents/exhibits at trial: “All documents from the Santa Clara

County Judicial District involving the case of The People of the

State of California vs. Melvin Jones (Case No. E9488120).” 

Plaintiff refers to Defendant’s opposition to his Motion in

Limine (Doc. 295) filed on April 23, 2007 (Doc. 315). Plaintiff

states that “the defense stated that said case #E9488120 was

connected to [involved plaintiff committing a crime against Ms.

Chhay] Domestic violence re: Ms. Chhay.” Defendant’s opposition

to the Motion in Limine states:

There are three prior misdemeanor convictions

that may potentially be used to impeach

plaintiff during his trial testimony.

The first occurred on or about November 1,

1984 when he plead nolo contendere to charges

that he committed theft via fraud and

wrongfully appropriated property. (Cal.

Penal Code §§ 484-487.) The second, occurred

on December 13, 1995 when plaintiff was

convicted of the misdemeanor offense of

forgery related to documents related to Ms.

Chhay. (Cal. Penal Code § 476(a).) The third

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incident took place on August 23, 2000, when

plaintiff was convicted of the misdemeanor

offense of willfully inflicting onto the

mother (Ms. Chhay) of his, [sic] corporal

injury resulting in a traumatic condition.

(Cal. Penal Code § 273.5(a).)

Plaintiff asserts that, during the hearing on the parties’

motions in limine conducted on May 1, 2007:

[D]efense counsel repeated/ [sic] (defended

Jones’ motion by making) statement to Court

that Case #E9488120, was a conviction as to

fraud upon Ms. Chhay ... [T]he District Court

relied upon defense counsel’s representations

as to CASE #E9488120. The District Court

indicated that because Case #E948812, and

case # CC066134 involve Domestic violence

(pattern) - that both cases would be

admissible. Defense counsel reassured the

Court that Case #E9488120 involved Plaintiff

committing Fraud against Ms. Chhay.

Plaintiff then refers to the “Order of the Court Regarding the

Parties’ Motions In Limine” filed on May 8, 2007 (Doc. 352):

1. The Court GRANTS plaintiff’s Motion

regarding the exclusion of evidence of

plaintiff’s November 1, 1984 Cal. Penal Code

§§ 488-487 conviction. 

2. The Court DENIES plaintiff’s Motion

regarding the exclusion of evidence

pertaining to plaintiff’s December 13, 1995

fraud conviction pursuant to Cal. Penal Code

§ 476(a). The dismissal shall be attached.

3. The Court DENIES, in part, plaintiff’s

Motion regarding the exclusion of evidence

pertaining to the domestic violence

conviction of plaintiff, for the purpose of

establishing a possible bias on the part of

plaintiff and the victim of said domestic

violence, Kea Chhay. The dismissal shall be

attached.

Plaintiff then asserts that, during the October 29, 2007 hearing

on Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial:

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Relying upon Defense Counsel’s previous

representation as to CASE #E9488120 being

Fraud against Ms. Chhay (Domestic Violence)

as to ‘forging a check of Ms. Chhay - as

defense counsel has represented to the

District Court - the district court verbally

referenced said representation by defense

counsel - relying upon said representation to

be true [WHICH IS NOT TRUE].

Plaintiff argues that his conviction in Case #E9488120 did

not involve Ms. Chhay but “involved a business dispute with an

automobile dealer in Sunnyvale, CA. [Larry Hopkins].” Plaintiff

submits documentary evidence substantiating this fact. 

Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s requests for sanctions,

contending they “are not based on fact, law or other evidence.” 

Defendant contends that these motions “are nothing more than

Plaintiff’s continued claims that he was somehow wronged or

harmed during the three day jury trial [and] that the Motions are

nothing more than renewed arguments and claims that Plaintiff is

entitled to a new trial.” Defendant asserts that the Court has

summarily rejected Plaintiff’s claims in denying his motion for a

new trial. 

In the Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff’s

Motion for New Trial filed on November 9, 2007 (Doc. 398),

Plaintiff’s claim was rejected that he was entitled to a new

trial because of defense misconduct that “‘defense counsel

attempted to use the trust of the Court during the final

evidentiary hearing(s) PRIOR TO TRIAL ... [by] FLAT OUT LIED to

the Court verbally and in written pleading regarding Jones’ “no

contest” plea in 1994 [sic] - [which was subsequently dismissed

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in 1995 pursuant to CA Statute] - the FLAT OUT LIE was that said

misdemeanor plea was related to defense witness, Ms. Chhay, which

is unequivocally a TOTAL LIE.’” In rejecting Plaintiff’s claim

for a new trial on this ground, the Court ruled:

The Court will not consider grounds for a new

trial not raised in the initial papers in

support of the motion. Further, a new trial

may only be granted when discovery misconduct

is alleged and the movant can: (1) prove by

clear and convincing evidence that the

verdict was obtained through fraud,

misrepresentation, or other misconduct; and

(2) establish that the conduct complained of

prevented the losing party from fully and

fairly presenting his case or defense. Wharf

v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 60 F.3d 631,

637 (9 Cir.1995); Jones v. Aero/Chem Corp.,

th

921 F.2d 875, 878-879 (9 Cir.1990). The th

examples asserted by Plaintiff do not raise

any issues that impacted the trial. 

Plaintiff has not made the showing required

to obtain a new trial based on alleged

discovery abuse.

(Doc. 398, p. 14:12-24). The Court also rejected Plaintiff’s

claim he was entitled to a new trial because of judicial error in

Jury Instruction No. 6:

Jury Instruction No. 6 states:

The evidence that plaintiff has

been convicted of the crime of

fraudulently passing a bad check

may be considered only as it may

affect the believability of

plaintiff as a witness and for no

other purpose.

The evidence that plaintiff has

been convicted of the crime of

domestic violence may be considered

only as it may affect the motive or

the bias of plaintiff and the

victim, Ms. Chhay, as it bears on

their believability and for no

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other purpose.

Plaintiff filed motions in limine to exclude

evidence of these two convictions. In the

Order resolving the motions in limine (Doc.

352), the Court ruled in pertinent part:

2. The Court DENIES plaintiff’s

Motion regarding the exclusion of

evidence pertaining to plaintiff’s

December 13, 1995 fraud conviction

pursuant to Cal. Penal Code §

476(a). The dismissal shall be

attached.

3. The Court DENIES, in part,

plaintiff’s Motion regarding the

exclusion of evidence pertaining to

the domestic violence conviction of

plaintiff, for purpose of

establishing possible bias on the

part of plaintiff and the victim of

said domestic violence, Kea Chhay. 

The dismissal shall be attached.

Plaintiff argues that “because this

information was not set forth with the FACT

that both ‘convictions’ have been dismissed

per CA law [it] is fundamentally unjust to

Pro Se Plaintiff, as the Jury would be

confused re: Plaintiff’s direct testimony re:

dismissal.” Plaintiff further asserts that

Jury Instruction No. 6, when combined with

Jury Instruction No. 7 (Witness Materially

False), “have the force and effect of a

DIRECTING A VERDICT, As Jury Instruction # 6

... is contrary to the Courts Order on MIL,

and Plaintiff’s testimony as TO THE SAME.” 

Plaintiff contends that his 1995 fraud

conviction by plea of no contest, “which has

been withdrawn/dismissed per California

statute, should not, and is not admissible

Due to an unrebutted Presumption of

Rehabilitation due to No conviction since of

a crime of dishonesty/FRAUD.” Plaintiff

argues that “defendant has provided NO

evidence prior or during 1 trial of st

Plaintiff’s presumption of Rehabilitation -

being disproven.” Plaintiff makes similar

arguments with regard to his domestic

violence conviction.

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Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial on

this ground. As Defendant avers in his

Declaration in opposition to the motion for

new trial: 

37. At trial, Plaintiff chose to

introduce evidence of his prior

convictions for check fraud and

battery against a spouse or

domestic partner. He also

introduced evidence, through his

testimony, that following

successful completion of probation,

he had been permitted to withdraw

his ‘nolo contendere’ pleas to

these charges and to enter ‘not

guilty’ pleas with the charges

being dismissed. Plaintiff choose

[sic] not to introduce any

documentary evidence of his change

of pleas. Furthermore, it should

be noted that the defense never

introduced any documents regarding

the convictions in the first place.

38. Plaintiff, not the defense,

raised these matters during Jury

voir dire, in his Opening

Statement, in his case-in-chief and

again in his closing statements.

39. The jury was properly

instructed by this Court that it

could consider the ‘domestic

violence’ charge as possibly

diminishing the credibility of Kea

Chhay, since it gave her a motive

for testifying against Plaintiff

and vice versa. As to the

fraudulent check charge, the jury

[was] properly instructed that

Plaintiff being convicted of a

crime involving moral turpitude

could be considered as adversely

affecting Plaintiff’s credibility. 

There had never been a factual

finding of innocence on the part of

Plaintiff with respect to either of

his criminal convictions,

notwithstanding the fact that he

had been permitted to withdraw his

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‘nolo contendere’ pleas upon

completion of his probation in each

instance. More important,

Plaintiff did not deny committing

the underlying criminal acts

particularly the fraudulent check

offense in his testimony at trial.

Plaintiff himself introduced the subject of

his prior convictions; it was up to him

introduce the documents demonstrating that

these convictions had been dismissed. 

Plaintiff’s claimed errors were invited by

his introduction of these subjects without

presenting any documentary evidence of the

dismissal of these convictions. Instruction

No. 2 [sic] correctly stated the law. 

(Doc. 398, 19:19-22:7).

For purposes of this Memorandum Decision, the Court accepts

Plaintiff’s assertions that Defendant stated to the Court that

Case #E9488120 involved Plaintiff’s forgery relating to Ms.

Chhay. Plaintiff does not represent and the Court has no

recollection that Plaintiff ever advised Defendant or the Court

that Case #E9488120 did not involve forgery relating to Ms. Chhay

during pretrial proceedings or the trial itself. It was not

until August 28, 2007, when Plaintiff filed his “Objections and

Requests as to Pending Motion for Fees and Motion for New Trial”

filed on August 28, 2007 (Doc. 383), a pleading deemed by the

Court to be Plaintiff’s reply brief in support of his motion for

a new trial, that Plaintiff contended that this conviction did

not involve Ms. Chhay. Any misrepresentation to the Court was

caused by Plaintiff’s lack of candor concerning the actual facts

underlying this prior conviction. Plaintiff essentially laid in

the weeds to ambush the verdict against him based on information

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of which he was aware from Day One. There is no basis for

imposition of sanctions against Defendant on this ground and

certainly no basis to deny the motion for attorney’s fees on this

ground. The error, if it be such, is nonetheless harmless as the

forgery conviction, a crime adversely reflecting on truth-telling

ability, was independently admissible. 

Plaintiff’s Counter-Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 11,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is DENIED.

F. Plaintiff’s Grounds for Denial of Motion for

Attorney’s Fees.

Plaintiff asserts a number of grounds in opposition to

Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees.

1. Jury Trial.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees

is “defective” because the fee claim was not tried to the jury

during trial.

Plaintiff’s contention is without merit. “It is the trial

court, not the jury, that has the responsibility of determining

attorney’s fees awards pursuant to statute.” Bingham v. Zolt, 66

F.3d 553, 565 (2 Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1134 (1996); nd

see also Gagne v. Town of Enfield, 734 F.2d 902, 904 (2nd

Cir.1984).

2. Common Nucleus of Operative Fact.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s motion is “defective”

because the motion for attorney’s fees does not arise from a

common nucleus of operative fact with any of the claims tried to

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the jury.

The cases relied upon by Plaintiff do not stand for this

proposition. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725

(1966), involved pendent jurisdiction over a state law claim

coupled with a federal claim:

The federal claim must have substance

sufficient to confer subject matter

jurisdiction on the court ... The state and

federal claims must derive from a common

nucleus of operative fact. But if,

considered without regard to their federal ro

state character, a plaintiff’s claims are

such that he would ordinarily be expected to

try them all in one judicial proceeding,

then, assuming substantiality of the federal

issues, there is power in federal courts to

hear the whole.

In Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980), the Supreme Court ruled

that Section 1988 applies to all civil rights actions, including

actions based solely on Social Security Act violations; that the

fact the recipient prevailed through a settlement rather than

litigation did not preclude a claim for attorney’s fees as the

prevailing party; and, where the recipient alleged constitutional

violations which were sufficiently substantial to support federal

jurisdiction, and the constitutional claims remained in the case

until the consent decree was entered, the award of attorney’s

fees was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In Gerling Global

Reinsurance Corp. of America v. Garamendi, 400 F.3d 803, opinion

amended on denial of rehearing, 410 F.3d 531 (9 Cir.), cert. th

denied, 546 U.S. 978 (2005), the Ninth Circuit held that

insurance companies and a trade organization of insurance 

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companies doing business in California who sued the California

Commissioner of Insurance for declaratory and injunctive relief

to bar enforcement of the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act,

were prevailing parties under Section 1988 due to having obtained

injunctive relief.

None of these cases stand for the proposition that a motion

for attorney’s fees under Section 1988 must be denied merely

because the issues involving an award of Section 1988 fees do not

arise out of the same facts tried to the jury. If that were the

case, no award of attorney’s fees under Section 1988 could be

considered by the district court. This is not the law.

3. Plaintiff “Prevailing Party”. 

Plaintiff further argues that “technically” he can be viewed

as “ostensibly the prevailing party”. Plaintiff cites Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983): 

A plaintiff must be a ‘prevailing party’ to

recover an attorney’s fee under § 1988. The

standard for making this threshold

determination has been framed in various

ways. A typical formulation is that

‘plaintiffs may be considered “prevailing

parties” for attorney’s fees purposes if they

succeed on any significant issue in

litigation which achieves some of the benefit

the parties sought in brining suit.’

Plaintiff asserts that “Hollenback testified at trial that

Jones’ letter(s) to his law partner(s) as potential ‘trouble’ as

to the same, (i.e. law partners not happy with Hollenback’s

conduct as set forth by Jones in said correspondence).” 

Plaintiff submits as Exhibit L to Doc. 395 a copy of a formal

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printed notice advising that the Law Firm of Jones, Cochrane,

Hollenback, Nelson & Zumwalt, LLP will be dissolving its

partnership on May 31, 2007. Plaintiff contends:

Plaintiff’s Exhibit ‘L’ ... evidencing

dissolution of Hollenbeck’s [now previous]

law firm partnership - significantly changes

the legal relationship/behavior of Hollenback

- which directly benefits Jones. Also, very

telling as to this issue is NONE of

Hollenback’s law partners [previous]

testified on his behalf.

ALSO, AT TRIAL THE IDENTITY OF A MAJOR-PLAYER

ACTING AGAINST JONES AS TO HIS CIVIL RIGHTS

(CHHAY’S SUPERVISOR) - LUCAS WAS FINALLY

FLUSHED OUT, WHICH IS A GOAL SOUGHT BY JONES

IN BRINGING HIS CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION.

Plaintiff’s contention is utterly baseless and verges on

outrageous. In Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 759-760, 764

(1987), a case surprisingly cited by Plaintiff, the Supreme Court

held:

In order to be eligible for attorney’s fees

under § 1988, a litigant must be a

‘prevailing party.’ ... Respect for ordinary

language requires that a plaintiff receive at

least some relief on the merits of his claim

before he can be said to prevail ... Helms

obtained no relief. Because of the

defendants’ official immunity he received no

damages award. No injunction or declaratory

judgment was entered in his favor. Nor did

Helms obtain relief without benefit of a

formal judgment - for example, through a

consent decree or settlement ... The most

that he obtained was an interlocutory ruling

that his complaint should not have been

dismissed for failure to state a

constitutional claim. That is not the stuff

of which legal victories are made. 

Plaintiff was in no way a “prevailing party” in this action. The

jury rejected his claims and returned a defense verdict for

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Defendant.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant “has waived proper assertion

of prevailing party rule.” Plaintiff contends that “Hollenback’s

fee motion (claim) is frivolous, lacks merit, and is baseless -

further it has no foundation in law or fact.” Plaintiff asserts

that “said conduct by defendant [frivolous filing] can be

considered constructive waiver of the defendant’s assertion

(timely) of the prevailing party rule.” 

Again, Plaintiff’s contention is unfounded. Defendant

timely filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Section

1988, which expressly authorizes recovery of attorney’s fees by a

defendant upon the requisite showing. The merits of Defendant’s

motion are at issue and have been determined by the Court. 

4. Indigent Plaintiff.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees

“places undue burden upon Pro Se Plaintiff Jones (including undue

cost) to indigent Pro Se Civil Rights Plaintiff Jones).” 

“Although the district court should consider the plaintiff’s

ability to pay ..., a district court should not refuse to award

attorney’s fees solely on the ground of the plaintiff’s financial

situation.” Zimmerman v. Bishop Estate, 25 F.3d 784, 790 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1043 (1994), citing Miller v. Los

Angeles County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 621 n.5 (9th

Cir.1987). “While an award of attorney’s fees for a frivolous

lawsuit may be necessary to fulfill the deterrent purposes of 42

U.S.C. § 1988 ..., the award should not subject the plaintiff to

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In Kulas v. Arizona, 156 Fed.Appx. 29 (9 Cir.2005), the 3 th

Ninth Circuit affirmed an award of attorney’s fees against a pro se

plaintiff:

The district court also properly considered

Kulas’ financial resources ..., finding that

Kulas’ ‘lack of resources has not deterred

[him] in the least.’ The district court

further found that ‘any “financial ruin” which

may potentially befall [Kulas] is due to

frivolous suits such as this, a situation

entirely of [Kulas’] own making. Thus, the

district court was within its discretion in

deciding to award attorney’s fees to Arizona.

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financial ruin.” Miller, id. “We have never and do not now

require a separate hearing on the question of ability to pay ...

[but] a district court should consider the financial resources of

the plaintiff in determining the amount of attorney’s fees to

award to a prevailing defendant in a § 1983 action.” Patton v.

County of Kings, 857 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9 Cir.1988). th 3

In opposing Defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees, 

Plaintiff presented no evidence by way of declaration or other

documentary evidence establishing his inability to pay any amount

of attorney’s fees. However, in support of his motion for

transcripts at government expense filed on November 28, 2007

(Doc. 401), Plaintiff submitted an affidavit under penalty of

perjury:

I do not have enough money or other assets to

pay the pending Appeal FEES ($455.00) I have

NO CAR, NO SAVINGS; I own NO real estate, or

any other asset(s) for that matter. I also

am currently unemployed, and have no other

monthly income by which to pay said FEES.

An award of $92,975.50 is substantial and Plaintiff has

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limited means. An award of the total amount of attorney’s fees

sought by Defendant could lead to Plaintiff’s financial ruin.

However, Plaintiff himself requested sanctions against Defendant

for his costs, which he estimated to range from $1,000.00 to

$25,000.00. Assuming the truth of Plaintiff’s estimation of the

expenses he paid in litigating this action, his protestations of

present indigency ring hollow and clearly were caused, as in

Kulas, by Plaintiff’s compulsive penchant for continuously filing

and litigating frivolous and vexations claims in more than one

lawsuit. An award of attorney’s fees under Section 1988 in this

action is necessary to fulfill the deterrent purposes of Section

1988. There must be an end to this litigation. It appears

nothing else will influence Plaintiff as he continues raising

meritless claims, undeterred by any court ruling.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. Documents No. 380, 384, 386, 387, 388, 397, 400, 405,

and 406 are STRICKEN;

2. Plaintiff’s motions for sanctions (Docs. 397, 400, 405

and 406) are DENIED AS MOOT;

3. Plaintiff’s “Special Motion to Strike” is DENIED;

4. Plaintiff’s Counter-Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is DENIED;

5. Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1988 is GRANTED and Defendant is awarded attorney’s fees

in the amount of $30,000.00.

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6. Defendant’s counsel shall prepare and lodge a form of

order reciting the rulings set forth in this Memorandum Decision

within five (5) days following the date of service of this

decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 417 Filed 03/20/08 Page 75 of 75