Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00995/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00995-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUSSELL CLEO CONSTABLE, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. )

)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., ) 

 )

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:07-cv-995-OWW-SMS 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

(DOC. 15)

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with an

action for damages and other relief concerning alleged civil

rights violations. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302 and

72-304.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended

complaint (FAC), filed on December 3, 2007.

I. Screening the Complaint 

In cases wherein the plaintiff is proceeding in forma

pauperis, the Court is required to screen cases and shall dismiss

the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation

of poverty is untrue, or the action or appeal is frivolous or

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malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) provides:

A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,

whether an original claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall contain

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds

upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends,

unless the court already has jurisdiction and 

the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction

to support it, (2) a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for

the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the 

alternative or of several different types 

may be demanded.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement as required

by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a

flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and

state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v.

Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).

Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity

overt acts which the defendants engaged in that support

Plaintiff's claim. Id. Although a complaint need not outline all

elements of a claim, it must be possible to infer from the

allegations that all elements exist and that there is entitlement

to relief under some viable legal theory. Walker v. South Cent.

Bell Telephone Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5 Cir. 1990); Lewis v. th

ACB Business Service, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405-06 (6 Cir. 1998). th

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court must

accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most

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favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447

(9 Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor, th

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a

claim, leave to amend should be granted to the extent that the

deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9 Cir. 2000) (en banc). A th

complaint, or a portion thereof, should only be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it

appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of

facts, consistent with the allegations, in support of the claim

or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners’ Ass’n., Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9 Cir. 1981). th

Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is

proper only where it is obvious that the Plaintiff cannot prevail

on the facts that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend

would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1128.

A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in

law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). A

frivolous claim is based on an inarguable legal conclusion or a

fanciful factual allegation. Id. A federal court may dismiss a

claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless

legal theory or if the factual contentions are clearly baseless.

Id. 

The test for malice is a subjective one that requires the

Court to determine whether the applicant is proceeding in good

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28 Plaintiff assigned letters of the alphabet to identify the Defendants as well, but the Court finds these 1

references to be unnecessarily burdensome and confusing, and thus will refer to the parties by their names.

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faith. Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab. Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46

(1915); see Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 n. 1 (11 Cir. th

1986). A lack of good faith is most commonly found in repetitive

suits filed by plaintiffs who have used the advantage of costfree filing to file a multiplicity of suits. A complaint may be

inferred to be malicious if it suggests an intent to vex the

defendants or abuse the judicial process by relitigating claims

decided in prior cases, Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309

(D.C.Cir. 1981); if it threatens violence or contains

disrespectful references to the Court, id.; or if it contains

untrue material allegations of fact or false statements made with

knowledge and an intent to deceive the Court, Horsey v. Asher,

741 F.2d 209, 212 (8 Cir. 1984). th

Plaintiff names as defendants the state of California;

“C.E.O. Anold Swartzinagger,” which the Court understands to be a

reference to the governor of California; Stanislaus County; James

Brazelton, District Attorney for the County of Stanislaus; Regal

Wilson, Chief Executive Officer of the county; Judges Marie S.

Silvera, Edward Lacey, Terry Cole, David Vander Wall, and Susan

D. Siefkin; individuals described as employees of District 1,

including Pat Paul, Thomas W. Mayfield, Nick W. Blom, Ray Simon,

and Paul W. Caruso; Ray Harder, described as an officer; Bruce

Kirby and Ron Wood, described as court officers; Lisa Constant

Dickson, Plaintiff’s former wife and the mother of the children

in controversy; and attorneys Jeffrey S. Drabin, E. F. Cash

Dudley, and Cheryl K. McSparin. (FAC pp. 1-2, 4.) Plaintiff 1

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indicates that all Defendants are sued in their official and

individual capacities. (FAC p. 3.) Plaintiff’s allegations

concern the state court’s rulings in various civil actions

concerning child custody and support and marital status as well

as related actions of county employees and former spouse

Defendant Lisa Dickson, who has been on AFDC or CalWorks since

April 1999. (FAC p. 10 ¶ 20.) Plaintiff seeks injunctive and

declaratory relief to effectuate the cessation of all actions

against him, and “restitution” (FAC p. 17), which the Court

understands as a prayer for damages. Plaintiff claims that his

constitutional right to be with his children was violated.

Plaintiff purports to state claims for trespass and/or

negligence, and he refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, and 1985.

The Court at this juncture is screening the complaint for the

presence of a federal claim or a basis for jurisdiction in this

Court; the court does not address any state claims that would be

subject to supplemental jurisdiction should a federal claim be

stated.

II. State as Defendant

Plaintiff names the state of California as a Defendant but

does not state any facts concerning the conduct of Defendant

state of California. 

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed

provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law]...

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States... to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution... shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress. 

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a

plaintiff must plead that defendants acted under color of state

law at the time the act complained of was committed and that the

defendants deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9 Cir. th

1986). The statute plainly requires that there be an actual

connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the

deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, (1978);

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held

that "[a] person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he

does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative

acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made."

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff

has not linked this Defendant to any conduct resulting in

deprivation of rights.

More fundamentally, a state is not a person for the purpose

of an action pursuant to § 1983; hence, a section 1983 claim

against a state is legally frivolous. Arizonans for Official

English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997). Further, a state has

immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Brooks v. Sulphur

Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9 Cir. 1991). th

The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff’s claim against

the state must be dismissed without leave to amend.

III. Suit against the Governor

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Plaintiff sues the governor of California. 

It is established that state officials sued in their

official capacity are not persons for purposes of § 1983 with

respect to claims for damages; rather, a suit against a state

official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the

official’s office and, as such, is no different from a suit

against the state itself. Will v. Michigan Department of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

Accordingly, to the extent that the suit is against the

governor in his official capacity for damages, the action should

be dismissed without leave to amend.

Further, although Plaintiff has already been given leave to

amend once, Plaintiff has failed to state any facts concerning

the conduct of the Defendant governor and has failed to link the

Defendant to any conduct resulting in any deprivation of

Plaintiff’s rights. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim

against the governor in any capacity. It does not appear that

Plaintiff could state facts sufficient to state a claim against

the governor. 

In summary, the claim against the governor in both his

official and individual capacities should be dismissed without

leave to amend.

IV. Judicial Immunity of Judges Named as Defendants

Plaintiff names various state judges as defendants, and he

complains of the rulings of various judges of the Superior Court

of Stanislaus County in various cases and their having signed

orders. (FAC 9.) Plaintiff not only alleges erroneous rulings,

but he also alleges constitutional deprivations, such as all the

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judges named in the complaint having brought criminal contempt

charges against Plaintiff and then denied him his right to jury

trial, their having put him in jail, and their having failed to

present court investigators whose reports were relied upon for

cross-examination and instead having required Plaintiff to

subpoena them. (FAC 9, 10.) 

Judges and officers whose functions bear a close association

to the judicial process are entitled to absolute judicial

immunity from damage actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for judicial

acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts. Demoran v.

Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 156 (9 Cir. 1986). A judge loses judicial th

immunity for judicial acts only when the judge acts in the clear

absence of all jurisdiction or performs an act that is not

judicial in nature. Shucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th

Cir. 1988). The factors relevant in determining whether an act is

judicial “relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether

it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the

expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the

judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

356-357, 362 (1978). Judicial immunity is not lost by allegations

that a judge conspired with a third party. As long as the judge’s

ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the court’s

subject matter jurisdiction, immunity applies. Ashelman v. Pope,

793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9 Cir. 1986). th

The allegations of the complaint before the Court establish

that the judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

Plaintiff is complaining of actions or rulings made by the judges

in cases pending before the respective courts. The actions or

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rulings made by the judges in connection with Plaintiff’s cases

to which the judges were assigned were within their jurisdiction.

Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to sue the

judges who made the decisions of which Plaintiff complains,

Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend

because of their absolute judicial immunity.

 V. Stanislaus County as a Defendant

Plaintiff sues the County of Stanislaus.

Although a county is a person to whom § 1983 applies, local

governmental units may not be held responsible financially for

the acts of its employees under a respondeat superior theory of

liability. A county may be financially liable for its own actions

in the nature of policy or customs where an official policy or

custom results in a deprivation of federally protected rights.

Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9 Cir. th

1989); Bd. of County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403

(1997). However, the requirement of a policy or custom does not

apply to suits for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief.

Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates, 995 F.2d 1469,

1472 (9 Cir. 1993); Chaloux v. Killeen, 886 F.2d 247, 251 (9 th th

Cir. 1989) (holding that a suit against county official in his

official capacity was tantamount to a suit against the entity

itself, against which a claim for only prospective injunctive and

declaratory relief could be prosecuted without an allegation of a

deprivation of rights resulting from an official policy or custom

where the official was enforcing a state law). 

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any conduct of the Defendant

County concerning policy of customs pertinent to this case.

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Plaintiff alleges vaguely that the county and state control the

rules of civil procedure in California, the Vehicle Code, and the

state bar; receive financial benefit from their attorney’s

actions and continue to collect child support actions pursuant to

the allegedly fraudulent decree of dissolution; bring products,

services, and licensees into the stream of commerce; and have

unspecified training and testing programs, and certificates of

competency for licensed drivers, all for the purpose of operation

in the stream of commerce; and contract with attorneys Drabin and

Cheryl K. McSparin to collect child support owed. (FAC pp. 7, 10

¶ 20.)

However, these allegations do not amount to an allegation

that a specific official custom or policy resulted in a

deprivation of specific federally protected rights. Accordingly,

Plaintiff has not stated a claim against the County for damages.

Further, it does not appear possible that Plaintiff could allege

such an official policy or custom. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed

without leave to amend to the extent that it prays for monetary

relief against the county. 

VI. Color of Law and Conspiracy 

Some of the actors alleged to have wronged Plaintiff appear

to have been private parties. 

Plaintiff complains of the actions of Plaintiff’s former

wife, Lisa Constance Dickson, who is the mother of the children

who are the subject of the underlying controversy between

Plaintiff and Dickson. Plaintiff alleges by inference that she

breached her duty not to act to injure Plaintiff; in addition,

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she breached a 1992 agreement for joint legal custody. (FAC p.

8.) These claims appear to relate to state law claims. 

Plaintiff also complains of the conduct of E. F. Cash

Dudley, who served as the attorney for Dickson in legal

proceedings in state court. Plaintiff complains that Dudley

tardily and incorrectly drafted orders in the state court

proceedings. (FAC p. 6.) 

It is established that to state a claim under section 1983,

a plaintiff must plead that the defendant acted under color of

state law. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir.

1986). Generally, private parties are not acting under color of

state law. See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir.

1991). However, “[a]ction taken by private individuals may be

‘under color of state law’ where there is ‘significant’ state

involvement in the action.” Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 382

(9th Cir. 1983).

It has been held that a person who resorts to a state’s

statutory mechanism for attaching property before judgment and,

in so doing, acts jointly with a state official by submitting

factual material in order to obtain the attachment, is acting

under color of law. Lugar v.Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S.

922, 927-28 (1982). In Lugar, the court explained that the

deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or

privilege created by the state or by a rule of conduct imposed by

the state or a person for whom the state is responsible; and

further, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person

who may fairly be said to be a state actor because either he is a

state official, has acted together or has obtained significant

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aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise

chargeable to the state. Id. p. 937. These limitations prevent

private parties from facing constitutional litigation whenever

they seek to rely on a state rule that governs their interaction

with the community. Id. The mere operation of a statutory

enforcement scheme that is used or invoked by a private party is

generally not sufficient; rather, there must be something more

with respect to the otherwise private action, either performance

of a public function, state compulsion, nexus with the state,

joint action constituting wilful participation in joint activity

the state or its agents, or other facts. Id. pp. 938-39. In

Lugar, the additional action was the invocation of the aid of

state officials, by means of an ex parte application for prejudgment attachment, to take advantage of state-created

attachment procedures. The private party thereby wilfully

participated in joint activity with the state. See, Sutton v.

Providence St. Joseph Medical Center, 192 F.3d 826, 839 (9 Cir. th

1999). However, this holding extended only to a claim challenging

the constitutionality of the entire statutory mechanism, and not

to a claim concerning private misuse of abuse of the statute; if

the allegation was only that the conduct was unlawful under state

law (i.e., that the law was improperly applied to the

Plaintiffs), then it could not be relied upon to demonstrate that

the injury resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege

having its source in state authority because it could not be said

that the private parties were acting pursuant to relevant state

policy. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. at 940-42. However,

a claim that the state-created procedure itself was procedurally

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defective under the Fourteenth Amendment did demonstrate action

under color of law because it referred to the entire mechanism

sanctioned by the state and thus could be considered to be action

undertaken pursuant to relevant state policy and thus

attributable to the state. Id. pp. 940-41. 

A conspiracy between a private party and a state official to

deprive others of constitutional rights may result in action by a

private party under color of state law, but to prove a conspiracy

between the state and private parties under section 1983, the

Plaintiff must allege an agreement or meeting of the minds to

violate constitutional rights; each participant in the conspiracy

need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant

must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.

United Steelworkers v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41

(9 Cir. 1989) (en banc). The defendants must by some concerted th

action have intended to accomplish some unlawful objective for

the purpose of harming another which results in damage. Mendocino

Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301

(9 Cir. 1999). th

Here, with respect to Defendant Dickson, the allegation that

she fraudulently obtained a divorce (FAC p. 6) amounts to nothing

more than an allegation that she misused the state law and

procedure governing dissolution of marriage; it does not indicate

that Dickson was simply using some right or privilege created by

the state or rule of conduct imposed by the state or a person for

whom the state was responsible. Likewise, the allegations that

there was a petition “from Defendant-A and K” (Dickson and her

attorney, Dudley) to terminate parental rights (FAC 6) does not

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indicate that Plaintiff voluntarily engaged in conduct with

governmental officials or did anything more than proceed pursuant

to a state-created procedure. 

The vague allegations of state licensing and management of

various agencies, including Child Protective Services (FAC 7),

does not render Dickson’s conduct that attributable to the state.

Further, there is no sufficient allegation of any facts

concerning any conspiracy or other significant involvement on the

part of any state actor in the conduct of these purely private

parties. Plaintiff alleges generally that the Defendants are the

agents of each other and performed all acts within the course and

scope of the agency, but Plaintiff has not alleged facts

concerning an agreement.

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Dickson was in a conspiracy

with Ray Harder, a child abduction officer, and other unspecified

state and county employees. (FAC 6, 7.) Plaintiff alleged that

Defendant Harder was “anonymously in a conspiracy with DefendantA, for not re-uniting with their parents according to his job

description and his oath of office.” (Id.)

A conspiracy claim brought under section 1983 requires proof

of “‘an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate

constitutional rights,’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th

Cir. 2001) (quoting United Steel Workers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge

Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation

omitted)), and an actual deprivation of constitutional rights,

Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Woodrum v. Woodward County, Oklahoma, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th

Cir. 1989)). “‘To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy

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need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant

must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.’”

Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (quoting United Steel Workers, 865 F.2d

at 1541).

Plaintiff’s allegations concerning a conspiracy among

Defendant Dickson, Dudley, and Harder (FAC p. 6) are not specific

but rather refer only generally to a conspiracy.

The federal system is one of notice pleading, and the court

may not apply a heightened pleading standard to plaintiff’s

allegations of conspiracy. Empress LLC v. City and County of San

Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005); Galbraith v.

County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (2002). However,

although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level ....” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965

(2007) (citations omitted). A plaintiff must set forth “the

grounds of his entitlement to relief[,]” which “requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action ....” Id. at 1964-65 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). As such, a bare allegation

that defendants conspired to violate plaintiff's constitutional

rights will not suffice to give rise to a conspiracy claim under

section 1983.

 The allegation concerning Harder and Dickson is difficult

to comprehend because of the vague reference to his job

description and the illogical statement of anonymous involvement

in a conspiracy, which requires a meeting of the minds. The Court

concludes that Plaintiff has not alleged facts that permit more

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than speculation. The facts alleged are not sufficient to state a

claim for conspiracy involving Defendant Dickson.

Plaintiff alleges that Dickson failed to appear in hearings

that apparently concerned the action for dissolution of marriage

or setting it aside. (FAC 8.) It is alleged that Defendants

Drabin and McSparin acted in her stead and represented her in the

matter of child custody and dissolution. It is further alleged

that these attorneys became her attorney in a full-fledged

attorney-client relationship, which was illegal under state law,

and they obstructed justice by helping Dickson and Dudley

terminate Plaintiff’s parental rights. These allegations do not

establish a procedure provided by the state, but rather a misuse

of the state’s procedure, and thus it cannot be inferred that the

action was taken under color of state law. Further, it is not

alleged that this was done pursuant to a conspiratorial

agreement. The same may be said with respect to attorney Drabin’s

later efforts to collect child support, which were allegedly

illegal because undertaken pursuant to a void judgment. (FAC 9.)

Plaintiff alleges that the state, the county, Drabin, and

Judge Silveira conspired to deny Plaintiff a jury trial,

apparently with respect to a contempt proceeding. (FAC 10.)

Again, these allegations are too general and devoid of facts to

state a claim for conspiracy or to provide the basis for a

finding of some joint action. 

Further, with respect to attorney Dudley’s actions, it does

not appear that there are allegations sufficient to render the

actions of Dudley those taken under color of state law.

Therefore, the Court concludes that a claim pursuant to §

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1983 against Dickson and Dudley has not been stated, and the

action against them should be dismissed.

VII. Lack of Linkage of Defendants

Plaintiff names Stanislaus County District Attorney James C.

Brazelton (FAC 2); Regal Wilson, the chief executive officer of

the county (FAC 2); and a few individuals referred to only as

employees of District I, including Thomas Mayfield, Pat Paul,

Nick W. Blom, Ray Simon, and Paul W. Causo, who are not alleged

to have engaged in any other conduct other than being the

“responsible parties that represent County as employers of

Defendant [Drabin, McSparin], and others in the County who are

named as Defendants in this suit.” (FAC 2, 11.) He states that

the were either holders of state licenses (licensed attorneys),

state court judges, or officers of the Defendant County who were

in a master-slave relationship. (FAC 8.)

Further, Plaintiff alleges that attorneys Drabin and

McSparin contracted with the county and state to collect child

support pursuant to the judgment or judgments that Plaintiff

claims are void. (FAC p. 10 ¶ 21.) Attorney Drabin learned in the

course of his representation that Defendant Dickson had concealed

the children and had allowed casual acquaintances to babysit them

for a number of years; further, he knew that Defendant Dickson

had expended thousands of dollars in attorney’s fees for

Defendant Dudley’s services in representing her but had not

disclosed this money to the state or county. However, Drabin did

not inform child protective services. (FAC pp. 6-7.) 

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed

provides:

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Every person who, under color of [state law]...

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States... to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution... shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a

plaintiff must plead that defendants acted under color of state

law at the time the act complained of was committed and that the

defendants deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9 Cir. th

1986). The statute plainly requires that there be an actual

connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the

deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, (1978);

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held

that "[a] person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he

does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative

acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made."

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

In order for a person acting under color of state law to be

liable under § 1983, the person must be shown to have personally

participated in the alleged deprivation of rights; there is no

respondeat superior liability. Bell v. Clackamas County, 341 F.3d

858, 867 (9 Cir. 2003). th

Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would render

the district attorney liable as a defendant. 

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With respect to the named county or state employees, whose

status is unclear, and the named county executive officer,

Plaintiff alleges only their status as responsible parties that

represent the county as employers of the other Defendants.

Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts with respect to their

conduct of their office, or with respect to their authority, that

would render them liable as defendants under § 1983. There is no

allegation that the executive officer or the others participated

in any deprivation of rights.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against the county district

attorney Brazelton, executive officer Regal Wilson, and the named

county employees Defendants Thomas Mayfield, Pat Paul, Nick W.

Blom, Ray Simon, and Paul W. Caruso should be dismissed.

Further, with respect to the attorneys Drabin and McSparin,

there is no allegation that any conduct on the part of these

Defendants resulted in any deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights;

rather, the only specific allegation is that Drabin failed to

give information to Child Protective Services (FAC 6-7); they

represented Defendant Dickson and thereby helped terminate

parental rights (FAC 8); and they collected or enforced

previously existing orders for child support pursuant to a void

judgment. (FAC 10). It does not appear that any harm could have

been suffered except with respect to the collection of child

support and termination of parental rights. 

The Court further notes that attorney Dudley is alleged to

have prepared court orders tardily and erroneously, which

resulted in a lingering cloud of suspicion and false accusations

hanging over Plaintiff’s head. (FAC 6, 9.) However, it is not

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shown that any violation of federally protected rights was

effected by this conduct. Thus, Plaintiff has not stated a claim

for a violation of § 1983 with respect to Defendant Dudley. 

VIII. Immunity for Court Investigating Officers

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Harder was a child

abduction officer who failed to do anything to try to reunite

Plaintiff and his children when informed that Defendant Dickson

was concealing the children; he also withheld the location of the

minors from Plaintiff during an unspecified time, probably in the

early 1990's. (FAC 4-5.) This was alleged to have been assistance

provided to Defendant Dickson and a failure to provide Plaintiff

the assistance he desired. (FAC p. 6, ll. 1-4.) Plaintiff alleges

that Harder was in a conspiracy with Defendant Dickson because he

did not re-unite his children with his parents “according to

[Harder’s] job description and his oath of office.” (FAC p. 7,

ll. 8-10.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ron Wood was the

investigating officer for the state court whose report was used

to “end Plaintiff’s duties as a Father to his heirs of his

bloodline.” (FAC p. 5, l. 8-10.) However, Plaintiff also stated

that Defendants Dickson and Dudley lost this case or proceeding,

or lost an order to show cause at least, after being unable to

prove their accusations. (FAC p. 5, l. 9-17.) 

In a subsequent case or proceeding to re-establish his

parental rights, Defendant Wood and Defendant Bruce Kirby

(apparently another officer of the court) were ordered to

investigate allegations of criminal activity at Plaintiff’s

request, but they turned into a background check of both parties.

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(FAC p. 5, ll. 12-15.) Defendant Wood then took his report from

the earlier case, in which allegations of Plaintiff’s molestation

and abuse were allegedly disproved, and used it to cause the

court to put unspecified “impossible orders/requirements” on

Plaintiff, who was unable to perform them, and “thus his parental

rights have technically been terminated.” (FAC p. 5, ll. 15-18.)

It is established that child services workers with

responsibility for initiating dependency proceedings are social

workers who are entitled to absolute immunity in performing

quasi-prosecutorial functions connected with the initiation and

pursuit of child dependency proceedings. Meyers v.Contra Costa

County Dept. of Social Services, 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9 Cir. th

1987). Further, counselors of a family conciliation court whose

duties were to mediate custody and visitation disputes,

investigate matters pertaining to such disputes, and provide

reports to the courts were held entitled to quasi-judicial

immunity for their actions within the scope of their duties

concerning a pending case to which they were assigned because

they were performing a judicial function at the direction of a

court. Id. at 1159. This is consistent with other cases. See,

e.g., Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 157-58 (9 Cir. 1985) th

(holding that probation officers are entitled to complete quasijudicial immunity for their actions in writing a pre-sentence

report pursuant to, and within the scope of, a statutory duty to

do so because they are performing a function integral to the

independent judicial process, engaging in impartial factgathering and reporting the results); Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d

889, 898-99 (9 Cir. 2003) (holding that a social worker and th

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therapist from the Nevada Division of Child and Family Services

could be immune with respect to conduct concerning the decision

to institute proceedings to make a child a ward of the state

because it was functionally similar to the prosecutor’s decision

to institute proceedings); Mabe v. San Bernardino County, Dept.

of Public Social Services, 237 F.3d 1101, (9 Cir. 2001) th

(holding that with respect to social workers’ investigation of a

dependency matter and submission of allegedly false evidence

during juvenile court proceedings, the workers were absolutely

immune); Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 825-26 (9 Cir. 2003) th

(holding that a social worker who allegedly inadequately

investigated allegations of abuse and neglect in connection with

dependency court was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity

for her investigation and presentation of allegedly fabricated

evidence in petitions prepared for the court because in doing so

she was engaging in conduct constituting initiation and pursuit

of child dependency proceedings; thus, the actions had the

requisite connection to the judicial process in order to be

protected by absolute immunity); Beltran v. Santa Clara County,

491 F.3d 1097, 1100-03 (9 Cir. 2007) (holding that the th

submission and swearing of facts and the signing of dependency

and custody petitions by a county social worker was absolutely

immune from suit because it was necessary to the judicial process

and thus functionally analogous to the common law functions of

judges, grand jurors, prosecutors, and witnesses testifying in

court by presenting information to the court that any competent,

non-official witness could not provide); see also, Santos v.

County of Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services,

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299 F.Supp.2d 1070, 1079 (C.D.Cal. 2004) (holding that social

workers were entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from a

suit by a child’s aunt for the social workers’ role in initiating

and pursuing the adoption of a child by the child’s grandparents

because the functions were critical to the judicial process

itself such as initiation and pursuit of dependency proceedings). 

Here, the court officers were apparently acting pursuant to

court direction in the course of a pending proceeding concerning

the custody of the children; this apparently took place either in

the course of a court-ordered review of custody status in a

proceeding for dissolution, in a proceeding to terminate parental

rights, or to obtain child support. It appears that the only

functions of the social workers was to obtain facts and to report

them to the court, whether by way or report or testimony. 

The Court concludes on the authority of Miller and Demoran

that the social workers are entitled to complete quasi-judicial

immunity for their conduct in reviewing the matter and reporting

to the court within the scope of their duties as court officers.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed

to state a claim against officers Harder and Wood. 

IX. Jurisdiction to Review State Court Proceedings

Plaintiff seeks damages as well as declaratory relief and an

injunction stopping all actions against the Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff complains of various rulings made in state court

civil actions and of positions taken by and conduct of various

participants and witnesses involved in the state court actions.

The actions include 1) a proceeding in 1992 whereby Plaintiff and

Defendant Dickson legally separated (action number 278746); 2) a

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proceeding for dissolution of the marriage of Plaintiff and

Defendant Dickson (action number 147021), in which Plaintiff

alleges Defendant Dickson obtained a decree with custody of the

children in 1997 by fraud (i.e., notice was given of the

proceeding solely by publication by Defendant Dickson, who

allegedly knew Plaintiff’s telephone number and/or whereabouts)

after concealing the children for years, and in which Plaintiff

attempted to set aside the divorce decree that Plaintiff alleges

legally should have been set aside once he appeared in court (FAC 

2, 6, 8); 3) a suit to declare the minors free from Plaintiff’s

parental custody (action number 172781) due to allegedly

erroneous allegations of abandonment, molestation, and abuse,

with respect to which Plaintiff alleges Defendant Dickson lost an

order to show cause, which involved an attempt to obtain child

support or a motion proceeding in which child support papers

could be served, and which resulted in the termination of

Plaintiff’s custody and control over the minor children (FAC 5,

6, 8, 9); and 4) a suit or motion by Plaintiff to reestablish

parental rights or to set aside the void dissolution decree (FAC

6 ). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dickson fraudulently

obtained a decree of divorce; the Defendants who were judges or

court officers either enforced these orders or engaged in conduct

that produced reports that were considered by the court in the

various proceedings which ultimately resulted in the termination

of Plaintiff’s marriage and his parental relationships.

Further, Plaintiff alleges misconduct of various persons in

connection with such proceedings, including his former wife, Lisa

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Constable, who allegedly concealed the children and thus obviated

any duty of Plaintiff to pay child support, offered unspecified

false and misleading statements in the case, prevented Plaintiff

from being properly served and thus being present in court to

object to proceedings, and obtained a fraudulent decree of

dissolution; attorney Edith Cash Dudley, who represented

Defendant Dickson in the proceedings and allegedly used

unspecified baseless and unproved molestation accusations at

hearings and erroneously drafted post-hearing findings and orders

upon the trial court’s direction (FAC 6, 9); the state and

county’s attorney, Drabin, who allegedly knew that Defendant

Dickson had paid funds out to attorneys in payment of attorney’s

fees but had not informed child support of those funds, who

further heard testimony of Defendant Dickson that casual

acquaintances had babysat the children from 1992 to 1997 but who

did not perform a duty to inform child protective services of

this information, and who in combination with the state, the

county, and attorney Cheryl K. McSparin (whose precise capacity

and identity are not specified), collected child support and

aided and abetted Dickson and Dudley in terminating Plaintiff’s

parental rights after it was shown in court that there was no

reason to terminate parental rights, and filed a petition to have

the minor children declared free from the father’s parental

custody and control. (FAC 7-8.) 

Plaintiff expressly states that the subject of the present

action is the minor children. (FAC p. 6, l. 22.)

It is established that a federal court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to review final determinations of state courts, as

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well as claims “inextricably intertwined” with final state court

decisions, even if such “inextricably intertwined” claims were

not actually raised in the state court. See District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483-87, 483 n. 16

(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Olson

Farms, Inc. v. Barbosa, 134 F.3d 933, 937 (9 Cir. 1998) th

(holding the “Rooker-Feldman” doctrine is jurisdictional). A

federal district court is a court of original jurisdiction, and

as such has no authority to review the final determinations of a

state court in judicial proceedings. Worldwide Church of God v.

McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9 Cir. 1986); Dubinka v. Judges of th

Superior Court of State of Cal. for County of Los Angeles, 23

F.3d 218, 221 (9 Cir. 1994). “[A] losing party in state court th

is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate

review of the state judgment in a United States District Court,

based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself

violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512

U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). 

Further, the federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear suits

and issue decrees regarding divorce, alimony, and child custody.

Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992). 

Here, Plaintiff is in effect asking this Court to

redetermine his marital status and the state court’s

determination with respect to child custody. Plaintiff seeks to

undo the actions of the various actors and entities because

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief with respect to these actions.

Plaintiff’s claims regarding these civil proceedings are

essentially an invitation to this Court to review the

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determinations of a state court which appear to have been made

over five years ago and which appear to be final. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims regarding the state court

rulings and the inextricably intertwined conduct of the attorneys

and entities involved in the case should be dismissed because

Plaintiff has not stated a basis for this Court’s jurisdiction

and has not stated facts demonstrating subject matter

jurisdiction in this Court.

X. Malicious Prosecution

The FAC also addresses a criminal proceeding or proceedings,

concerning criminal contempt and/or possibly failure to support

his minor children, in which Plaintiff was not able to face his

accusers, and Plaintiff was jailed as a result. (FAC p. 10.) To

the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to state a claim for

malicious prosecution, the Court notes the established legal

principles pertinent to such a claim: 

“In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim of

malicious prosecution, a plaintiff ‘must show that the

defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without

probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of

denying [him] equal protection or another specific

constitutional right.’” Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368

F.3d 1062, 1066 (9 Cir. 2004) (citing to Freeman v. th

City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)).

“Malicious prosecution actions are not limited to suits

against prosecutors but may be brought . . . against

other persons who have wrongfully caused the charges to

be filed.” Id. “An individual seeking to bring a

malicious prosecution claim must generally establish

that the prior proceedings terminated in such a manner

as to indicate his innocence.” Id. at 1068. 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was jailed; it appears that

Plaintiff suffered a criminal conviction, and Plaintiff has not

alleged that the criminal proceeding or proceedings complained of

terminated in a manner as to indicate his innocence. Accordingly,

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to the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to state a claim for

malicious prosecution, Plaintiff’s claim for malicious

prosecution must be dismissed.

XI. Challenge to Criminal Proceedings or Conviction

The allegations of the complaint are ambiguous and

uncertain, but it appears that the complaint concerns allegations

of a wrongful conviction that resulted in Plaintiff’s

incarceration. 

When a prisoner challenges the legality or duration of his

custody, or raises a constitutional challenge which could entitle

him to an earlier release, his sole federal remedy is a writ of

habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Young

v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 11 S.Ct.

1090 (1991). Moreover, when seeking damages for an allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, “a § 1983 plaintiff

must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on

direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a

state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called

into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88

(1994). “A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a

conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not

cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 488. Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477 (1994), a § 1983 action that would call into question

the lawfulness of a plaintiff’s conviction or confinement is not

cognizable and does not, therefore, accrue until and unless the

plaintiff can prove that his conviction or sentence has been

reversed on direct appeal. The Heck principle applies to claims

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that would necessarily imply the invalidity of any conviction

that might have resulted form the prosecution of the dismissed

charge, including pending charges in addition to actual

convictions. Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1013-14 (9 Cir. th

2000). It applies generally to charges of unlawful or false

arrest. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380

(9 Cir. 1998); Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d at 1014-15. th

Again, Plaintiff has not alleged that his apparent

conviction has been invalidated. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim

or claims concerning his conviction should be dismissed.

XII. Section 1985

Plaintiff mentions § 1985. (FAC p. 1.) 

The first part of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 covers the conspiratorial

prevention of an officer from performing his duties. § 1985(1).

This does not appear to be the basis of Plaintiff’s claim.

Section 1985 also covers conspiratorial deterrence of

witnesses by force, intimidation, or threat, and the obstruction

of justice with intent to deny any citizen the equal protection

of the laws. § 1985(2). Section 1985(3) provides for a claim for

damages for a conspiracy to deprive another of equal protection

of the laws.

A claim under § 1985(2) requires either a conspiracy among

two or more persons to injure a party or witness in his person or

property because of attending federal court or testifying in any

manner pending in federal court, and injury or damages to the

claimant; or, with respect to state justice, a conspiracy with

respect to obstruct justice in a state with the intent to deny to

any citizen the equal protection of the laws. Portman v. County

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of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 909 (9 Cir. 1993). Further, with th

respect to protection against obstruction of state justice, it is

established that the “equal protection” language requires an

allegation of animus that is based on membership in a protected

class. Id. 

A required element for a violation of § 1985(3) is a

conspiracy. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1140 (9th

Cir.2000) The United States Supreme Court has held that in a §

1985(3) action, a claimant must show “some racial, or perhaps

otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind

the conspirators' action. The conspiracy, in other words, must

aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by

the law to all.” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91

S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit

has held that “ § 1985(3) extends ‘beyond race only when the

class in question can show that there has been a governmental

determination that its members require and warrant special

federal assistance in protecting their civil rights.’” Orin v.

Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1217 n. 4 (9th Cir.2001).

Plaintiff’s complaint, construed liberally, does not allege

facts showing a conspiracy or any class-based or invidiously

discriminatory animus. The Court concludes that Plaintiff fails

to state a claim under § 1985, and it does not appear that

Plaintiff could allege facts that would constitute a claim under

this section.

XIII. Section 1981

Section 1981 provides that all persons within the

jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right to

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engage in various activities (make and enforce contracts, sue,

etc.) as is enjoyed by white citizens, and such rights shall be

protected against impairment by non-governmental discrimination

and impairment under color of state law. The elements are

membership in a protected class (racial minority), an intent to

discriminate on the basis of race, and discrimination that

concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the

statute. Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp., 7

F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993); Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC,

447 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9 Cir. 2006) (in a case of employment th

discrimination under § 1981, the elements include membership in a

protected class, attempt to contract for services, and denial of

right to contract for those services).

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged the requisite membership in

a protected class or racial animus. Accordingly, Plaintiff has

failed to state a claim pursuant to § 1985. Further, it does not

appear possible that Plaintiff could state facts sufficient to

state a claim.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to §§ 1985 and 1981

should be dismissed without leave to amend.

XIV. Recommendation

In summary, all Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants

should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to state a

cognizable claim against the defendants and has failed to plead

facts demonstrating jurisdiction in this Court.

Accordingly, it IS RECOMMENDED that the complaint BE

DISMISSED in its entirety.

Further, Plaintiff has already had one opportunity to file

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an amended complaint after being informed of the defects in his

original complaint. However, despite Plaintiff’s having been

given leave to state facts anew, Plaintiff has failed to state a

claim against Defendants. In view of Plaintiff’s having

repeatedly alleged essentially the same facts without stating a

claim or a basis for jurisdiction in this Court, it is concluded

that it is obvious that Plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts

that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend would be

futile. 

Accordingly, it IS RECOMMENDED that the dismissal of

Plaintiff’s complaint be WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served

by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff is admonished not to attempt to file an amended

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complaint as Plaintiff’s recourse is to object to these findings

and recommendations. Plaintiff is further admonished that this

Court will strike any amended complaint filed without the Court’s

specific grant of permission to file an amended complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 12, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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