Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01860/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01860-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RENEE L. MARTIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, 

INC., and BARRETT DAFFIN FRAPPIER 

TURNER & ENGEL, LLP, as Trustee and 

Acting as a Debt Collector,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-01860-TLN-KJN

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Renee L. Martin’s (“Plaintiff”) Application for 

Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 2.) The Court has carefully considered Plaintiff’s

motion. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s application is hereby DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff is the owner of a property at 931 Oakbrook Drive, Fairfield, California

94534 (hereinafter “the Property”), acquired by a grant deed in 1988. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 

6, 13.) On or about December 9, 2004, Plaintiff refinanced the Property through WMC and “the 

loan was to be securitized in a trust known as Certificateholders of Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I 

Inc. Trust 2005-WMC3, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate Series 2005-WMC3.” (ECF No. 1 at 

¶¶ 3, 14.) At some point “during the financial crisis” the Plaintiff got behind in her mortgage 

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payments. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 3.) On or about September 1, 2012, a representative from Defendant 

Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (hereinafter “SPS”) contacted Plaintiff and informed her that SPS 

would be “taking over the loan.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 18.) Plaintiff advised the SPS representative 

that she was seeking a modification. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges that she was advised 

by SPS to submit a “complete financial loan package for the modification,” and that she did as 

requested. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 18.) 

On October 19, 2012, a representative from SPS named Megan Koontz contacted Plaintiff 

to inform her that “a new (Department of Justice)” loan modification was available and 

recommended that Plaintiff apply for this program. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 22.) Plaintiff was also 

informed that three trial payments would be required and that if she successfully made all three 

trial payments the loan would be permanently modified. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 23.) On or about 

November 19, 2012, Plaintiff received a call from SPS notifying her that her loan modification 

request had been approved and her first of three trial payments in the amount of $1,093.56 was 

due on December 1, 2012. Plaintiff claims she received a letter from SPS, dated November 15, 

2012, confirming the three payments of $1,093.56 under the modification and stating that she 

could receive a principal reduction of $172,828.37.

1

 (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 24.) Plaintiff claims to have 

made all three payments on time. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 23.) 

On January 8, 2013, after making the three required payments, Plaintiff contacted SPS “to 

determine the exact amount of the remaining principal on the loan.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 25.) 

Plaintiff was told to contact “BAC2for that information.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 25.) Plaintiff did 

contact BAC and was informed that as of August 12, 2012, the remaining principal balance of the 

loan was $278,155. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 25.) Plaintiff was also informed that “[the loan] was 

transfer[ed] to the new servicer, SPS[,] for $278,155 and that was the entire balance owed.” 

(ECF No. 1 at ¶ 25.) On February 8, 2013, Plaintiff contacted Megan Koontz at SPS and was 

advised that “she [would] be receiving the permanent modification any day now.” (ECF No. 1 at 

¶ 27.) 

 

1

Plaintiff makes reference to “EXHIBIT 1” for a copy of this letter, however no such exhibit was attached to 

the Complaint. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 24.)

2 BAC is undefined in the Complaint and the Court is unsure who this party is.

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On March 4, 2013, Plaintiff again contacted SPS to inquire as to the status of her 

modification. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 29.) Plaintiff spoke with SPS representative Jerison Sanchez who, 

according to Plaintiff, “attempted to misle[a]d Plaintiff and said that ‘since all of your three 

payments have been made timely, don’t do anything else, you don’t have to make any more 

payments, because we SPS will adjust everything to permanent status any day now.’” (ECF No. 

1 at ¶ 29.) Plaintiff spoke to another SPS representative later in March and yet still no 

modification occurred. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 30.) Plaintiff then received a letter from SPS dated June 

24, 2013, stating that her home loan was not eligible for modification because “After being 

offered Modification, you did not return the permanent modification documents by the requested 

deadline.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 31; Exhibit 2 at 31.) 

Plaintiff contacted SPS within the required 30 days to object to the decision stating that 

she had never received a copy of any paperwork to sign. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 32, 33.) At some 

point during this time, Plaintiff requested SPS provide her with a “Qualified Written Report” 

(QWR) because she was concerned about why her principal balance “kept dramatically increasing 

instead of decreasing[] when payments were made.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 35.) When the Plaintiff 

received a package of information regarding the QWR from SPS, Plaintiff noticed among the 

papers a letter from SPS dated July 25, 2013. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 36; Exhibit 3 at 32.) The July 25, 

2013, letter informed Plaintiff that she was “approved for a principal reduction loan modification 

under the U.S. Department of Justice and State Attorneys General national mortgage settlement.” 

(ECF No. 1 at 32.) Plaintiff alleges that she never received this document prior to her QWR 

request. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 36.) Plaintiff further alleges that “In the Loan Modification Agreement, 

[a] paragraph on the first page[] identifies SPS as (“Lender”) instead of servicer.” (ECF No. 1 at 

¶ 37.) Plaintiff states that she “never entered into an agreement with SPS as lender, therefore, the 

lender of said loan, if any is WMC, not SPS.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 37.) Plaintiff believes that “SPS []

negligently misrepresented to Plaintiff that they are the lender and not the servicer of the loan.” 

(ECF No. 1 at ¶ 37.) Plaintiff alleges

there were gross deceptions in the modification, which Plaintiff did 

not agree to[,] for instance: (a) ‘I acknowledge that I have been 

advised that I am eligible for evaluation for a modification under 

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the U.S. Treasury Department’s Home Affordable Modification 

Program but I have voluntarily elected to proceed with this 

modification.’ This is false, as Plaintiff had met all criteria for the 

U.S. Treasury and had performed all the terms and conditions. (b) 

SPS, as servicer wrote themselves into the agreement as the Lender. 

In the chain of title, SPS is not or never had been in the chain as 

lender [(c)] Additionally, SPS wanted to deceive[] Plaintiff with a 

balloon payment after end in the amount of $24,390.39. Balloon 

payments are contrary to any government modification plans. 

(ECF No. 1 at ¶ 38.) 

Plaintiff alleges “SPS has been deceitful and moving forward to quickly foreclose because 

none of the defendants [] have any lawful right to the property, there is no debt owning on the 

subject property, which has been paid off through credits from government programs and by 

Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 39.) Plaintiff states that she continued to make her monthly payments 

in the amount of $1,093.56 since December 1, 2012 to present, “even though SPS never fulfilled 

their agreement.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 28, 29.) Plaintiff claims her monthly loan payments for the 

months of May through October 2015 have all been returned by SPS and that SPS has sent 

regular correspondence requesting higher mortgage payments. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 44, 46.) 

Plaintiff contends that neither SPS nor Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss, LLP3(“Barrett”) 

are the lawful parties to conduct a trustee sale because the “chain of title is broken and there is no 

lender, the property is not in default and there is no debt owning on the subject property.” (ECF 

No. 1 at ¶ 47.) 

On August 5, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court alleging nine causes of action: 

(1) Violation of the Servicing of Mortgage Loans Procedures Act (12 U.S.C. § 2605); (2) 

violations of the U.S. Department of Justice and/or U.S. Department of Treasury (Modifications); 

(3) Wrongful Foreclosure (Commenced); (4) Violations of California Homeowners Bill of Rights; 

(5) Quiet Title to Real Property; (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (7) Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act; (8) Violations of (Pooling Service Agreement); and (9) Negligent 

Misrepresentation. (ECF No. 1.) Also, on August 5, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant application 

 

3 The ECF docket sheet captions the Defendant as “Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, LLP as Trustee 

and Acting as a Debt Collector,” however the Plaintiff refers to this Defendant as Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & 

Weiss, LLP. The latter is the supported by the Exhibit 5 (Notice of Trustee’s Sale) submitted as Exhibit 5 to 

Plaintiff’s motion. (ECF No. 2 at 3.) 

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for temporary restraining order to prevent foreclosure of the Property. (ECF No. 2.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary and temporary “fix” that the court may 

issue without notice to the adverse party if, in an affidavit or verified complaint, the movant 

“clearly show[s] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant 

before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). The purpose of 

a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo pending a fuller hearing. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 65. It is the practice of this district to construe a motion for temporary restraining order as 

a motion for preliminary injunction. Local Rule 231(a); see also Aiello v. One West Bank, No. 

2:10–cv–0227–GEB–EFB, 2010 WL 406092 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010) (“Temporary 

restraining orders are governed by the same standard applicable to preliminary injunctions.”) 

(internal quotation and citations omitted).

Therefore, the party requesting injunctive relief must show that “he is likely to succeed on 

the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. 

Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Although pro se pleadings are liberally 

construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), they are not immune from the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995). The 

propriety of a request for injunctive relief hinges on a significant threat of irreparable injury that 

must be imminent in nature. Caribbean Marine Serv. Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th 

Cir. 1988). 

Alternatively, under the so-called sliding scale approach, as long as the plaintiff 

demonstrates the requisite likelihood of irreparable harm and can show that an injunction is in the 

public interest, a preliminary injunction may issue so long as serious questions going to the merits 

of the case are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in plaintiff’s favor. Alliance for 

Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131–36 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the “serious 

questions” version of the sliding scale test for preliminary injunctions remains viable after 

Winter).

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III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff moves the court ex parte for a temporary restraining order preventing the 

foreclosure sale of her home, currently scheduled for August 10, 2016. Plaintiff alleges

“violations of the Servicing of Mortgage Loans Procedures Act,” but does not state a specific 

statutory violation. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 49.) Plaintiff’s cover sheet references 12 U.S.C. §2605. 

(ECF No. 2 at 1.) This statute requires that “Each person who makes a federally related mortgage 

loan [] disclose to each person who applies for the loan, at the time of application for the loan, 

whether the servicing of the loan may be assigned, sold, or transferred to any other person at any 

time while the loan is outstanding.” 12 U.S.C. §2605(a). It furthers requires notice by transferor 

of loan servicing at the time of transfer and sets forth the timing and contents of such notice. 12 

U.S.C. §2605(b), (c). 

On close inspection of the facts alleged within the Complaint, Plaintiff has not alleged 

facts that support a violation of these provisions. Plaintiff does not state anywhere in her 

Complaint that the original lender failed at that time of the loan application to disclose whether 

the loan could be assigned, sold, or transferred to any other person at any time while the loan is 

outstanding. Plaintiff also does not allege that the transferor of her loan servicing did not contact 

her as required by the statute. To the contrary, the Plaintiff alleges that on or about September 1, 

2012, SPS representative Karma Henday contacted Plaintiff and advised her that SPS would be 

“taking over the loan.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 18.) Accordingly, it appears that the provisions of 12 

U.S.C. §2605 were followed in Plaintiff’s case.

Plaintiff also alleges non-specific violations of the U.S. Department of Justice and/or U.S. 

Department of Treasury, the California Homeowner’s Bill of Rights, and Pooling Services 

Agreements. These allegations are too vague for the Court to assess. The Court cannot guess 

what statutory provisions the Plaintiff alleges Defendants have violated. The Plaintiff must state 

with more specificity the grounds on which she seeks relief. Nevertheless, even if Plaintiff were 

to clarify the grounds on which she seeks relief, the Court is not convinced that Plaintiff is likely 

to succeed on the merits of her case. Plaintiff’s main contention seems to be that SPS and Barrett 

do not have legal authority as a servicer, lender or legal trustee to foreclose upon the Property. 

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(ECF No. 1 at ¶ 5.) However, Plaintiff provides no facts, supporting documentation, or legal 

authority to support this contention. While Plaintiff’s factual background contains a detailed 

accounting of events up through her receipt of the June 25, 2013, SPS letter approving her 

modification, the details thereafter are unclear. Plaintiff does not state anywhere in her 

Complaint that she signed the approved loan modification paperwork. Plaintiff does not state that 

she engaged in a dialogue with SPS about ownership of the original loan as described in the loan 

modification agreement. Plaintiff provides no facts or statements to demonstrate that SPS or 

Barnett have unlawfully become the lenders of her loan or are fraudulently misrepresenting their 

position to the Plaintiff. Rather, the Plaintiff only states that “month after month” she continued 

to receive “all types of threatening letters from SPS that they will commence a foreclosure action 

against Plaintiff if the amounts of a monthly loan payment[] were not paid off.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 

45.) But again, Plaintiff makes no allegation that she signed the loan modification paperwork and 

has offered no facts to support that she is entitled to the reduced payment amount she is 

continuing to make. Given these shortcomings in the Plaintiff’s pleading, the Court is not 

convinced that Plaintiff could survive a motion to dismiss, let alone succeed on the merits of this 

case. In addition, Plaintiff’s motion fails to address the “likelihood of success” factor in her 

request for injunctive relief. (See ECF No. 2) As such, this Court cannot find that Plaintiff is 

likely to succeed on the merits of this case, and this factor weighs in favor of denying injunctive 

relief.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met her burden of showing a 

likelihood of success on the merits of this case. Because Plaintiff cannot meet the first prong, the 

Court need not address the rest of the prongs. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Alliance for the Wild 

Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135 (Winter requires a plaintiff to make a showing on all of the Winter 

factors).

//

//

//

//

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IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF 

No. 2) is hereby DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 9, 2016

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