Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-07057/USCOURTS-caDC-15-07057-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 20, 2015 Decided December 15, 2015

No. 15-7057

BRIAN WRENN, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND CATHY L. LANIER,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:15-cv-00162)

Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause

for appellants. With her on the briefs were Karl A. Racine,

Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Holly M.

Johnson, Assistant Attorney General. 

Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney

General for the State of Maryland, Joshua N. Auerbach,

Assistant Attorney General, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General,

Office of the Attorney General for the State of Illinois, Maura

Healy, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Eric T. Schneiderman,

Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State

of New York, Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Office of

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the Attorney General for the State of California, George Jepsen,

Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State

of Connecticut, and Douglas S. Chin, Attorney General, Office

of the Attorney General for the State of Hawaii, were on the

brief for amici curiae States of Maryland, et al. in support of

appellants.

Adam K. Levin and Jonathan Lowy were on the brief for

amici curiae Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, et al. in

support of appellants. 

Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Francesco Valentini, and Walter A.

Smith Jr. were on the brief for amici curiae DC Appleseed

Center for Law & Justice, et al. in support of appellants.

Deepak Gupta was on the brief for amicus curiae

Everytown for Gun Safety in support of appellants. 

Alan Gura argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellees. 

Charles J. Cooper, David H. Thompson, and Peter A.

Patterson were on the brief for amicus curiae National Rifle

Association of America, Inc. in support of appellees.

Stephen P. Halbrook, Dan M. Peterson, and C.D. Michel

were on the brief for amici curiae Historians, Legal Scholars,

and CRPA Foundation in support of appellees.

Before: PILLARD, Circuit Judge, and SILBERMAN and

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

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SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellants District of

Columbia and the District’s Police Chief appeal from the grant

of a preliminary injunction restraining enforcement of a “good

reason” standard in the D.C. Code provision governing the

issuance of licenses for the carrying of concealed weapons. 

D.C. Law 20-279, § 3(b).

Although the parties fully briefed the case on the merits, we

will not reach the substantive issues raised in their original

submissions, as we must dispose of the matter on jurisdictional

grounds. The controlling fact in this case is the identity of the

judge who decided it in the district court – The Honorable

Senior United States District Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., of

the Northern District of New York. The difficulty in this case

is evident from the office of the deciding judge. Judge Scullin

is a Judge of the Northern District of New York, not of the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Under

the Constitution and the statutes, the President, with the advice

and consent of the Senate, appoints a judge to the district court

of a particular district, where he exercises the jurisdiction of the

court. 

It is possible for a district judge, including a senior judge,

to lawfully adjudicate matters in another district. However, in

order for a judge to exercise this judicial authority in a district

located outside the circuit of his home district, the judge must be

“designated and assigned by the Chief Justice.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 294(c)-(d). See also 28 U.S.C. § 294(e) (“No retired [i.e.,

senior] . . . judge shall perform judicial duties except when

designated and assigned.”).

Before the visiting judge may be designated and assigned

by the Chief Justice, the chief judge of the receiving district

must “present[] . . . a certificate of necessity.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 294(d). Then, and only then, may the Chief Justice of the

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United States “designate[] and assign[]” the judge duties in the

receiving district. Id. Although Judge Scullin had served under

a properly issued designation, the difficulty in the present case

is that designation was limited to specific and enumerated cases.

The present litigation is not one of those cases.

The error in this case is quite understandable. The calendar

committee of the district court assigned the matter to Judge

Scullin because it deemed the case to be related to another case

over which Judge Scullin presided. The difficulty is, while the

earlier case was within the Chief Justice’s designation, the

present one is not.

Although we are satisfied the statutes clearly determine on

their face that Judge Scullin had no authority to decide this

matter, there is also clear precedent compelling that result. In

Frad v. Kelly, 302 U.S. 312 (1937), a district judge sat as a

visiting judge under a designation for a specified period of time. 

After the expiration of that time, he issued an order in a case

which he had previously heard in the visited district. Id. at 313. 

The Supreme Court concluded that the order was “null” because

the judge by that time had no authority in the district in which he

issued the order. Id. at 316.

The Court explained that while a visiting judge could

“perform the functions which are incidental and supplementary

to the duties performed by him while present and acting in the

designated district,” neither the statute nor the designation

empowered him to act beyond the temporal limitations under

which he was designated. Id. at 316-17. In explaining its

holding, the Court noted that the statutory limitations on the

authority of visiting judges are jurisdictional. See id. at 319.

We conclude that Frad controls this case. Like the

designated judge in Frad, Judge Scullin had a limited

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designation that did not extend beyond the specifications of that

designation. In Frad, the breached limitation was temporal; in

this case, it is case designation. In either case, a judge acting

beyond his designation acts without jurisdiction. Appellees

argue that the de facto officer doctrine supports Judge Scullin’s

jurisdiction, but that doctrine does not apply. The de facto

officer doctrine applies in the context of technical defects and

confers validity upon acts performed by a person acting under

color of official title, even if it is later determined that the title

is deficient. Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 77-78

(2003). The designation for specific cases is not a technical

matter. It is in fact jurisdictional.

We realize that we are undoing the work of litigation to

date, but we have no choice. As the Supreme Court noted in

Frad, an order entered by a judge without jurisdiction is “null.” 

Of course in Frad, the Supreme Court caused the undoing of

litigation which had gone far beyond the stage we address today. 

Similarly, in United States v. American-Foreign Steamship, 363

U.S. 685 (1960), the Supreme Court vacated an en banc decision

of a court of appeals when a senior judge sat with the en banc

court, in violation of the statute. There, as here, no party

challenged the judge’s authority until after the decision issued. 

Nonetheless, because the mere participation of one of a group of

judges was beyond the statutory limits of that judge’s authority,

the judgment was undone. Id. at 691. 

CONCLUSION

We have no choice but to vacate the order entered, as it was

beyond the jurisdiction of the issuing judge. 

So ordered.

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