Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02327/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02327-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Alla Josephine Rosenfield,

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., a Delaware 

corporation; Andrew J. Leto, an Arizona 

citizen and a married man; Jane Doe Leto, 

an Arizona citizen and a married woman; 

Anthony Albanese, a Florida citizen and a 

married man; Jane Doe Albanese, a Florida 

citizen and a married woman; John Does IX; Jane Does I-X; ABC corporations I-X; 

Def Limited Liabilities Company I-X; and 

XYZ Partnerships or LLP, I-X, 

Defendants. 

No. CV 11-02327-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Strike (Doc. 4). Defendants request 

that the Court strike paragraphs 44, 46, 47 and 48 of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1-1) 

because these paragraphs include improperly disclosed attorney-client privileged 

materials. Defendants also request that the Court authorize the filing of a similar motion 

in state court, where this case originated, in order to request that the privileged materials 

be stricken from the complaint on record there. Because Plaintiff restated the privileged 

materials in her response to Defendants’ motion, Defendants also request that the 

privileged materials disclosed in Plaintiff’s response be stricken. 

 

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 The attorney-client privilege “protects confidential communications between 

attorneys and clients[] which are made for the purpose of giving legal advice.” United 

States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 

449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)). The privilege applies to “legal advice of any kind . . . from a 

professional legal adviser in his capacity as such” where “the communications relat[e] to 

that purpose . . . [and are] made in confidence . . . by the client.” United States v. Graf,

610 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 607 

(9th Cir. 2009)). Such privileged materials are “permanently protected . . . from 

disclosure by [the client] or the legal adviser . . . unless the protection be waived.” Id. 

The party asserting the attorney-client privilege has the burden of establishing all the 

elements of the privilege. See Richey, 632 F.3d at 566. Both the substance of 

communications between client and attorney regarding the provision of legal assistance 

as well as the purpose and motivation for seeking legal advice are privileged. See In re 

Grand Jury Witness, 695 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1982) (“As a general proposition, the client’s 

ultimate motive for litigation or for retention of an attorney is privileged.”). 

 Defendants have satisfied their burden of establishing that paragraphs 44, 46, 47, 

and 48 of Plaintiff’s complaint contain attorney-client privileged materials. Plaintiff has 

not challenged whether the attorney client-relationship exists here or whether the 

privilege has otherwise been waived. Rather, Plaintiff simply alleges that the disclosed 

information does not contain “confidential disclosures that rise[] to the level of attorneyclient privileged information” (Doc. 8 at 2) and is otherwise by its nature not properly 

characterized as privileged. However, these paragraphs relate both Defendants’ motive 

for seeking legal advice as well as the substance of Defendants’ attorney’s 

communications in response to the inquiry for legal advice, and thus fall plainly within 

the protection of the attorney-client privilege.1

 This privileged material is therefore 

inadmissible, and may accordingly be stricken as immaterial under Rule 12(f). See Fed. 

 

1

 In order to avoid further disclosure of Defendants’ privileged information, the Court will not discuss specifically the allegations contained in paragraphs 44, 46, 47, and 48. 

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R. Civ. P. 12(f) (authorizing Court to strike from pleading all allegations that are 

“immaterial, impertinent or scandalous.”). 

 Because the Court agrees that paragraphs 44, 46, 47, and 48 contain information 

protected by the attorney-client privilege, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to 

Strike (Doc. 4) and related requests to strike the privileged material from Plaintiff’s 

response (Doc. 8) and from the state court record. The parties shall re-file redacted 

versions of Documents 1 and 8 omitting the privileged materials. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Strike (Doc. 4) is 

granted. The Clerk shall strike from the record the documents containing privileged 

materials (Docs. 1, 8). 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall file replacement documents 

omitting the privileged materials as provided by this order for Documents 1 and 8. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting jurisdiction to Maricopa County Superior 

Court for the limited purpose of striking paragraphs 44, 46, 47, and 48 from the 

Complaint in this matter that remains on file in the Superior Court’s public record. The 

Court requests that the Superior Court strike paragraphs 44, 46, 47, and 48 from the 

Complaint to provide the relief granted by this order. 

 Dated this 27th day of January, 2012. 

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