Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-00472/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-00472-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

KRISTAL S. EATMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFERSON COUNTY

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

Defendant.

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CASE No. 2:14-cv-00472-KOB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the court on Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss or, in the

Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement.” (Doc. 9). Plaintiff Kristal Eatman brings

claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 1983, and § 1981, alleging racial

discrimination and retaliation arising out of Eatman’s employment at Jefferson County

Department of Health (“JCDH”). (Doc. 1). Defendant’s motion, brought pursuant to Rules

12(b)(6) and 12(e), presents a variety of arguments for why this court should dismiss the

complaint or, alternatively, enter an order directing Eatman to file a more definite statement.1

(Doc. 9). For the following reasons, the court finds that the motion to dismiss is due to be

granted as to some claims, and that the alternative motion for a more definite statement is due to

be granted as to the remaining claims. 

 Defendant’s motion addresses claims asserted by Eatman against both JCDH and Dr.

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Teri Chafin. However, Dr. Chafin was dismissed as a defendant in this case, and all claims

against her were dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. 16). Therefore, the court finds Defendant’s

motion moot to the extent that it addresses claims against Dr. Chafin. 

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FILED

 2014 Oct-15 AM 09:03

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-00472-KOB Document 18 Filed 10/15/14 Page 1 of 8
I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Plaintiff Kristal Eatman, a black female, was hired by Defendant Jefferson County

Department of Health as a medical clerk on April 9, 2007. (Doc. 1). On January 28, 2012,

Eatman was promoted to the position of Administrative Assistant III. Eatman alleges that

following her promotion, she began to experience “racial hostility” from her supervisor, Dr. Teri

Chafin, a white female. At the time of the alleged discriminatory actions, Dr. Chafin was the

Director of Dental and Community Health for the Jefferson County Department of Health. 

During February 2012, Eatman complained to the JCDH Director of Human Resources,

Delores Johnson, about what she believed to be Dr. Chafin’s disparate treatment of black and

white employees. Johnson never responded to Eatman’s complaint, and Eatman states that she

began to suffer increased discriminatory treatment from Dr. Chafin after lodging her complaint. 

Specifically, Eatman states that Dr. Chafin refused to allow her to be trained for her position as

an Administrative Assistant III, restricted her job duties, and threatened her with termination. 

In July 2012, Eatman filed another complaint with JCDH, this time with Rodney Holmes,

a JCDH official. Eatman alleges that following her filing of the second complaint, Dr. Chafin

approached her and stated, “training you is going to be like training a monkey.” Eatman further

alleges that Dr. Chafin continued to retaliate against her by continuing to deny her training,

belittling her in private and in public, and refusing to assign her work, which stunted her

professional growth and adversely affected her suitability for other employment positions within

JCDH. On November 16, 2012, Eatman was involuntarily assigned work at the Clinical Services

Department of JCDH. As a result, Eatman is required to travel to two different JCDH job sites

and has had to bear the financial costs of paying for her own fuel.

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Eatman filed a claim with the EEOC on November 14, 2012, and received a right to sue

letter on December 19, 2013. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) 

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint. 

Generally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide “‘a short

and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). A plaintiff must provide the grounds of her entitlement, but Rule

8 generally does not require “detailed factual allegations.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47). It does, however, “demand[ ] more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009). Pleadings that contain nothing more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action” do not meet Rule 8 standards nor do pleadings suffice that are based merely

upon “labels or conclusions” or “naked assertions” without supporting factual allegations. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. 

The Supreme Court explained that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting and explaining its decision in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

To be plausible on its face, the claim must contain enough facts that “allow[ ] the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. Although “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’” the

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complaint must demonstrate “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s

liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” 

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

The Supreme Court has recently identified “two working principles” for the district court

to use in applying the facial plausibility standard. The first principle is that, in evaluating

motions to dismiss, the court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations;

however, the court does not have to accept as true legal conclusions even when “couched as []

factual allegation[s]” or “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The second principle is that “only a

complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 679. Thus,

under prong one, the court determines the factual allegations that are well-pleaded and assumes

their veracity, and then proceeds, under prong two, to determine the claim’s plausibility given the

well-pleaded facts. That task is “context-specific” and, to survive the motion, the allegations

must permit the court based on its “judicial experience and common sense. . . to infer more than

the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. If the court determines that well-pleaded facts, accepted

as true, do not state a claim that is plausible, the claim must be dismissed. Id.

B. “Shotgun” Pleadings and Rules 8(a)(2) and 8(d)(1)

JCDH asserts in its motion to dismiss that Plaintiff’s complaint is a “shotgun pleading”

that is too vague to allow for the Defendant to prepare a response. The Eleventh Circuit has

frequently condemned shotgun pleadings for violating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See,

e.g., Chapman v. Al Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1027 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Rule 8(a)(2)

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requires a pleading to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim” that shows that the

pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of this requirement is to “give

the defendants fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rule 8(d) also demands that “[e]ach

allegation [in a pleading] must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Shotgun

pleadings, however, are neither “short and plain,” nor “simple, concise, and direct.” A shotgun

pleading requires a defendant, as well as a court, to “sift through the facts presented and decide

for [itself] which were material to the particular cause of action asserted.” Pelletier v. Zweifel,

921 F.2d 1465, 1518 (11th Cir. 1991). Such pleadings fall short of the pleading requirements of

Rule 8. Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284–85 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a shotgun

pleading is “in no sense the ‘short plain statement of a claim’ required by Rule 8 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure”).

III. DISCUSSION 

Eatman’s complaint does not satisfy the pleading standards of Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule

8(d)(1) because it lacks the details necessary to discern the factual support of each of Eatman’s

claims. Eatman’s complaint contains two counts. In her first count, Eatman combines claims for

race discrimination under Title VII, § 1983, and §1981. In her second count, Eatman combines

claims for retaliation under Tile VII, § 1983, and § 1981. Under each count, Eatman presents a

“formulaic recitation of elements,” but fails to cite any specific facts supporting her claims. See

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The bulk of facts contained in

Eatman’s complaint are contained in the “Statement of Facts” section, and Eatman simply “realleges and incorporates by reference” all of the proceeding paragraphs into each of her two

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counts. This approach to pleading is a quintessential example of “shotgun pleading” and requires

the Defendant to divine the nature of and facts supporting each of Eatman’s claims. See

Anderson v. District Bd. Of Trs. Of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996)

(Plaintiff’s “complaint is a perfect example of ‘shotgun’ pleading in that it is virtually impossible

to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.”) (internal

citation omitted). Because Eatman’s complaint does not provide sufficient notice of the factual

basis for each claim, this court will GRANT JCDH’s motion for a more definite statement. 

Although this court will grant JCDH’s motion for a more definite statement, because

Eatman cannot state claims against JCDH under § 1983 or § 1981, the court finds that these

claims are due to be DISMISSED. 

i. Section 1983 Claims 

In her complaint, Eatman asserts claims of race discrimination and retaliation against the

JCDH under § 1983. Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights, but only creates a

remedy for violation of a separate federal law. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441

U.S. 600, 617–18 (1979). To obtain relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must show both that she was

deprived of a federal right and that the deprivation was caused by a person who was a state actor. 

Patrick v. Floyd Med. Ctr., 201 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). State

agencies, such as the JCDH, are not “persons” for the purposes of § 1983. See Will v. Mich.

Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Taylor v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 142 F. App’x 373,

374–75 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding “state agencies . . . are not ‘persons’ for the purposes of § 1983

and . . . enjoy the same Eleventh Amendment immunity as [a state]”). Therefore, this court will

DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Eatman’s claims against JCDH for race discrimination and

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retaliation under § 1983.

ii. Section 1983

Eatman’s complaint also asserts claims of race discrimination and retaliation against the

JCDH under § 1981. Section 1981 prohibits race discrimination in making and enforcing

contracts and is a statutory remedy available in both the private and public sectors. 42 U.S.C. §

1981; Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1975). However, as

Eatman concedes in her response to the JCDH’s motion to dismiss, (Doc. 14, ¶ 8), Section 1981

suits against states agencies, such as JCDH, are barred by a state’s Eleventh Amendment

immunity. See Sessions v. Rusk State Hosp., 648 F.2d 1066, 1069 (11th Cir. 1981). Therefore,

this court will DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Eatman’s claim against JCDH for race

discrimination and retaliation under § 1981.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the court finds that Defendant JCDH’s motion to

dismiss will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The court will GRANT the

motion as to the § 1983 and § 1981 claims against JCDH for race discrimination in Count I and

retaliation in Count II. The court will DENY the motion to dismiss as to the Title VII claims

against JCDH for race discrimination in Count I and retaliation in Count II. The court will also

GRANT the motion for a more definite statement as to the remaining claims.

DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of October, 2014. 

 

 ____________________________________

 KARON OWEN BOWDRE

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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