Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00508/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00508-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JULIE KRUNOSKY, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0508-WS-C

 )

GENESIS GROUP RESTAURANTS, )

LLC, etc., )

 )

Defendant. )

ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on the defendant’s motion in limine concerning

“me, too” evidence. (Doc. 57). The plaintiff has filed a response and the defendant a

reply, (Docs. 61, 64), and the motion is ripe for resolution.

The plaintiff’s sole surviving claim is that she was subjected to a racially hostile

work environment, which resulted in her constructive discharge. At the time of her

separation from employment on or about November 11, 2005, she was employed as first

assistant manager of the defendant’s Highland Avenue store. The plaintiff, who is white,

seeks to introduce evidence that white store manager Stephen Chance was terminated by

the defendant because of his race in late September 2005 and that white second assistant

manager Patricia Carter was transferred to the defendant’s Wal-Mart store because of her

race in mid-September 2005. (Doc. 61 at 2-3). 

One means of proving a case of purposeful discrimination is by showing a “pattern

and practice” of discrimination. To do so, “the plaintiff must show that intentional

discrimination was the employer’s standard operating procedure.” Cooper v. Southern

Co., 390 F.3d 695, 716 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotes omitted). The plaintiff can make

this showing “through a combination of statistics and anecdotes.” Id. (internal quotes

omitted). The plaintiff has no statistics, and she has only two anecdotes to add to her own

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story. One of those is facially irrelevant to her theory that the defendant’s actions “were

ultimately directed at terminating, discharging and/or disciplining” these three white

employees, (Doc. 61 at 4, ¶ 17), since Carter was neither discharged nor disciplined but

merely transferred to a comparable position at another store. The plaintiff’s proposed

evidence is thus inadequate to support a claim of pattern and practice.

The plaintiff argues that her evidence is nevertheless admissible pursuant to Busby

v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1991). The Busby Court held that a lower

court abused its discretion by excluding evidence that a co-worker had been racially

harassed and discriminated against, because such evidence supported the plaintiff’s claim

that the defendant had a policy of racial discrimination. Id. at 786. In Busby, however,

the plaintiff also relied on statistical evidence to show the existence of a policy of

discrimination. Id. at 782-84. Thus, Busby does not support the proposition that any

single anecdotal tale of discrimination against another member of the plaintiff’s

classification is admissible.

Finally, the plaintiff suggests that the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) in

order to show the defendant’s motive, intent or plan. (Doc. 61 at 1, 3 ¶ 13). “More

generally, courts are reluctant to consider ‘prior bad acts’ in this [employment

discrimination] context where those acts do not relate directly to the plaintiffs.” Denney

v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1189 (11th Cir. 2001). When the evidence involves a

kind of alleged discrimination different from that alleged by the plaintiff, “the evidence

[may be] likely to confuse the issues for the jury and unfairly prejudice the defendants.” 

Lewis v. Department of Transportation, 187 Fed. Appx. 961, 961-62 (11th Cir. 2006)

(upholding the exclusion of prior instances of discrimination against others, in part

because the plaintiff claimed failure to promote, not retaliation or hostile work

environment); accord Chavis v. Clayton County School District, 147 Fed. Appx. 865,

866-68 (11th Cir. 2005) (upholding the exclusion of other instances of discrimination

against others, because the plaintiff claimed retaliation and the other instances involved

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failure to promote). In line with these authorities, the Court concludes that any probative

value the plaintiff’s proffered evidence may have in showing the defendant’s motive,

intent or plan to “terminat[e], discharg[e] and/or disciplin[e]” these three white employees

is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice and juror confusion and

therefore should be excluded pursuant to Rule 403. 

For the reasons set forth above, the defendant’s motion in limine is granted. 

DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of November, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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