Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00059/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00059-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Cameron Riley filed a “Writ of Mandamus” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, asserting 

the Court should “compel an officer of the United States to perform his duty.” (Doc. 1) Because 

Plaintiff is unable to state claim upon which relief may be granted by this Court, it is recommended 

that Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis be DENIED and the matter be DISMISSED 

without prejudice.

I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

As a general rule, all parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a United States 

District Court must pay a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the Court may authorize the 

commencement of an action “without prepayment of fees and costs of security therefor, by a person 

who submits an affidavit that . . . the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, an action may proceed despite a failure to prepay the filing fee only if 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) is granted by the Court. See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 

CAMERON RILEY,

 Plaintiff,

v.

JUDGE BRIAN LAMB, et al.,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 1:16-cv-0059 - DAD - JLT 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING THE 

MATTER WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Case 1:16-cv-00059-DAD-JLT Document 5 Filed 01/22/16 Page 1 of 6
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1178, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The Ninth Circuit has held “permission to proceed in forma pauperis is itself a matter of 

privilege and not a right; denial of an informa pauperis status does not violate the applicant’s right to 

due process.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Weller v. Dickson, 314 

F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1963)). In addition, the Court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion to 

proceed IFP. O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990); Weller, 314 F.2d at 600-01. In 

making a determination, the court “must be careful to avoid construing the statute so narrowly that a 

litigant is presented with a Hobson’s choice between eschewing a potentially meritorious claim or 

foregoing life’s plain necessities.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F.Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984).

Here, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP be denied because, as 

discussed below, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2).

II. Screening Requirement

When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the Court is required to review the complaint, and 

shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue, or the 

action or appeal is “frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . 

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2). A 

claim is frivolous “when the facts alleged arise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, 

whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 

504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).

III. Pleading Standards

General rules for pleading complaints are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A 

pleading stating a claim for relief must include a statement affirming the court’s jurisdiction, “a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief 

sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

The Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, and pro se pleadings are held to “less stringent 

standards” than pleadings by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521-21 (1972).

A complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the plaintiff’s claim in a plain and 

Case 1:16-cv-00059-DAD-JLT Document 5 Filed 01/22/16 Page 2 of 6
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

succinct manner. Jones v. Cmty Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Further, a 

plaintiff must identify the grounds upon which the complaint stands. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The Supreme Court noted,

Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers 

labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further 

factual enhancement.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Conclusory and vague allegations do not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court clarified further,

[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” [Citation]. A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. [Citation]. The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. [Citation]. Where a complaint pleads 

facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line 

between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). When factual allegations are well-pled, a court should 

assume their truth and determine whether the facts would make the plaintiff entitled to relief; legal 

conclusions in the pleading are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. Id. 

The Court has a duty to dismiss a case at any time it determines an action fails to state a claim, 

“notwithstanding any filing fee that may have been paid.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915e(2). Accordingly, a court 

“may act on its own initiative to note the inadequacy of a complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a 

claim.” See Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 

Practice and Procedure, § 1357 at 593 (1963)). However, leave to amend a complaint may be granted 

to the extent deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by an amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

IV. Discussion and Analysis

Plaintiff asserts Judge Brian Lamb and Pamela Foster, Executive Office of the Inyo County 

Court, have made errors related to Case No. SICVDV 14-57536. (See generally Doc. 1) Plaintiff 

contends the court lacked jurisdiction over his case, and Judge Lamb erroneously determined the state 

Case 1:16-cv-00059-DAD-JLT Document 5 Filed 01/22/16 Page 3 of 6
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

court had jurisdiction. (Id. at 17-18) Further, Plaintiff contends Judge Lamb failed to give him due 

process by giving him “less than 5 minutes to refute the claims” presented against him. According to 

Plaintiff, Judge Lamb changed a domestic violence temporary restraining order “to a permanent 3 

year” restraining order “without a proper hearing or trial” (Id. at 18) Plaintiff contends he attempted 

to serve a document entitled “Writ of error; Challenge of Jurisdiction; Demand for Immediate 

Dismissal/Vacate of Void Judgment” upon Judge Lamb but was unable to do so. (Id. at 7-8) Ms. 

Foster, the Clerk indicated the document was “FILED” on October 25, 2015. (Id. at 16)

Plaintiff requests that this Court vacate his criminal record, order the return of his property, and 

restore his parental rights. (Doc. 1 at 12-13)

A. Writ of Mandamus 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, the Court has “original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of 

mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a 

duty owed to the plaintiff.” The Ninth Circuit has determined Section 1361 does not provide an 

independent ground for jurisdiction or overrides other grounds for dismissal based upon jurisdictional 

defects. See Drake v. Obama, 664 F.3d 774, 785 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) 

In this case, Plaintiff does not identify any officer or employee of the United States, or one of 

its agencies. Rather, the defendants appear to be individuals, including the judge, involved in 

decisions issued by the state court. Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges that the defendants “are on the 

payroll of the State of California.” (Doc. 1 at 7) Accordingly, his request for a writ of mandamus fails.

B. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Plaintiff challenges the rulings of the state court related to his parental rights, a restraining 

order, and Judge Lamb’s determination that the state had jurisdiction over the matter. Importantly, 

however, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a party may not seek appellate review in federal court 

of a decision made by a state court. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court 

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The Ninth Circuit explained,

Typically, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from exercising subjectmatter jurisdiction over a proceeding in which a party losing in state court seeks what in 

substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district 

court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the losers’

federal rights.

Case 1:16-cv-00059-DAD-JLT Document 5 Filed 01/22/16 Page 4 of 6
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic 

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a district court from 

appellate review of “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court 

judgments rendered before the district court proceeding commenced . . .”). Accordingly, the district 

court lacks jurisdiction over “claims . . . ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s decision such 

that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling.” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 

F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, 485)).

In this case, Plaintiff’s request that the Court “vacate” the family court order and child support 

debt owed clearly is a forbidden de facto appeal of the state court’s order directing Plaintiff to pay child 

support. Indeed, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal review of state court decisions regarding 

proceedings in family court. See, e.g., Moore v. County of Butte, 547 Fed. Appx. 826, 829 (9th Cir. 

2013) (finding a plaintiff’s claims challenging the outcome of her child custody proceedings were 

properly dismissed); Ignacio v. Judges of U.S. Court of Appeals, 453 F.3d 1160, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 

2006) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of the case “because the complaint is nothing more than 

another attack on the California superior court’s determination in [the plaintiff’s] domestic case”); see 

also Oliver v. Owens, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159259 at *8-9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013) (finding the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibited review of “multiple improprieties related to a restraining order” 

issued by the state) Accordingly, the Court is unable to grant Plaintiff the relief requested under the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

V. Findings and Recommendations

In light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Plaintiff is unable to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted by this Court. Consequently, leave to amend to amend would be futile. Lopez, 203 

F.3d at 1130 (dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper where it is obvious 

that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts alleged). 

Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) be DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandamus be DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

AMEND; and

Case 1:16-cv-00059-DAD-JLT Document 5 Filed 01/22/16 Page 5 of 6
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3. The matter be DISMISSED without prejudice; 

4. The remaining motion be terminated as moot; and

5. The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to close the action.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned 

to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of 

Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within fourteen days after 

being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the 

Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 22, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:16-cv-00059-DAD-JLT Document 5 Filed 01/22/16 Page 6 of 6