Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-07000/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-07000-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

KUANG-BAO P. OU-YOUNG,

Plaintiff,

v.

LAWRENCE E. STONE, Santa Clara 

County Assessor; JEANETTE TONINI, 

Senior Assessment Clerk; and COUNTY OF 

SANTA CLARA, 

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-07000-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND AS TO DEFENDANTS 

COUNTY AND STONE; VACATING 

APRIL 2, 2020 HEARING ON 

MOTION; AND DIRECTING 

PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE WHY 

ACTION SHOULD NOT BE

DISMISSED AS TO DEFENDANT 

TONINI BASED ON COUNTY’S 

REPRESENTATION THAT 

DEFENDANT TONINI IS DECEASED

[Re: ECF 29]

Plaintiff Kuang-Bao P. Ou-Young, proceeding pro se, sues Defendants County of Santa 

Clara (“County”), County Assessor Lawrence E. Stone (“Stone”), and Senior Assessment Clerk 

Jeanette Tonini (“Tonini”) for violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution.1 See Compl., Exh. 4 to Notice of Removal, ECF 1. Plaintiff alleges that after 

his spouse transferred her interest in their residence to Plaintiff, the County assessor’s office 

unlawfully terminated Plaintiff’s homeowner’s exemption in order to raise Plaintiff’s property 

taxes and has refused to restore Plaintiff’s homeowner’s exemption. See id. at 2-3. Based on the 

described conduct, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants “conspired to deprive plaintiff of the Fourth 

Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.” Compl. at 3. 

 

1 As discussed in more detail below, Plaintiff also sued District Judge Edward J. Davila, but the 

Court has dismissed Judge Davila from the action without leave to amend. See Order Dismissing 

Plaintiff’s Claims Against Judge Edward J. Davila, ECF 25.

Case 5:19-cv-07000-BLF Document 37 Filed 01/29/20 Page 1 of 8
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On January 7, 2020, Defendants County and Stone filed a motion to dismiss the complaint 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted. See Motion to Dismiss, ECF 29. Plaintiff, who is a registered E-Filer, received email 

service of the motion through the Court’s Electronic Case Filing System on January 7, 2020. 

Pursuant to this Court’s Civil Local Rules, and as reflected in the docket entry for the motion to 

dismiss, the deadline for filing opposition to the motion was January 21, 2020. See Civ. L.R. 7-3 

(“The opposition must be filed and served not more than 14 days after the motion was filed.”); 

Docket Entry at ECF 29. Plaintiff did not filed opposition. On January 28, 2020, Defendants 

County and Stone filed a reply, stating that no opposition had been filed and requesting that the 

Court grant their motion to dismiss without leave to amend.

The Court finds that the motion to dismiss is appropriate for decision without oral 

argument, and it hereby VACATES the hearing set for April 2, 2020. The motion to dismiss filed 

by Defendants County and Stone is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND for the reasons 

discussed below.

Defendant Tonini has not appeared, and there is no indication on the docket that she has 

been served with process. Defendants County and Stone represent in their motion that Ms. Tonini 

is deceased. See Motion to Dismiss at p. 5, n. 2, ECF 29. Plaintiff is ORDERED TO SHOW 

CAUSE, in writing and within fourteen days, why the action should not be dismissed against 

Defendant Tonini.

 I. BACKGROUND

On October 17, 2019, Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action in the Santa Clara County 

Superior Court. See Compl., Exh. 4 to Notice of Removal, ECF 1. The complaint asserts a single 

claim for “Unreasonable Seizures” against the County, Stone, Tonini, and United States District 

Judge Edward J. Davila. See id. On October 25, 2019, the United States of America removed the 

action to federal district court on behalf of Defendant Judge Davila. See Notice of Removal, ECF 

1. The removal was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(3), providing for removal of state court actions 

asserted against “[a]ny officer of the courts of the United States, for or relating to any act under 

color of office or in the performance of his duties.”

Case 5:19-cv-07000-BLF Document 37 Filed 01/29/20 Page 2 of 8
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This Court thereafter issued an order granting the United States’ motion for leave to appear 

as amicus curiae in this action. See Order to Show Cause, ECF 15. The Court also directed 

Plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be dismissed as to Judge Davila on the basis of 

absolute judicial immunity and why the pre-filing screening order regarding Plaintiff should not be 

expanded to include claims against federal judges. See id. After reviewing Plaintiff’s response to 

the Order to Show Cause, the Court dismissed Judge Davila from the action without leave to 

amend and issued an order requiring that Plaintiff obtain leave of court before filing any complaint 

against federal judges. See Order Dismissing Judge Davila, ECF 25; Prefiling Review Order, ECF 

26. The Court also denied Plaintiff’s motion to remand the case to state court. See Order Denying 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, ECF 27. Finally, the Court sua sponte consolidated the present 

action with Case No. 19-cv-07231-BLF, a substantially similar action filed by Plaintiff against the 

County, Stone, and Tonini. See Sua Sponte Order Consolidating Cases, ECF 28. The Court 

directed that the consolidated action proceed under Case No. 19-cv-07000-BLF (this case), and 

that Case No. 19-cv-07231-BLF be closed. See id. 

On January 7, 2020, Defendants County and Stone filed the present motion to dismiss. See

Motion to Dismiss, ECF 29. As noted above, Plaintiff has not filed opposition. 

 II. LEGAL STANDARD

“A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Conservation Force 

v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A 

claim is facially plausible when it “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

“A pro se complaint must be liberally construed, since a pro se complaint, however 

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers.” Entler v. Gregoire, 872 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and 

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citation omitted).

When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the district court must consider the allegations of 

the complaint, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters which are 

subject to judicial notice. Louisiana Mun. Police Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, 829 F.3d 1048, 

1063 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322

(2007)).

 III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s complaint contains a single claim for “Unreasonable Seizures.” Compl. at 2-3, 

Exh. 4 to Notice of Removal, ECF 1. Plaintiff claims that Defendants County, Stone, and Tonini 

unlawfully terminated Plaintiff’s homeowner’s exemption based on an Interspousal Transfer Grant 

Deed by which Plaintiff’s spouse transferred her interest in their residence to Plaintiff. Id. 

According to Plaintiff, Defendants’ conduct violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free 

from unreasonable seizures. Compl. at 3. Although the complaint does not make specific 

reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court liberally construes the complaint to allege a § 1983 claim 

for violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Rights. The Court notes that Case No. 19-cv07231-BLF, which was consolidated into the present case, did expressly state that Plaintiff’s 

Fourth Amendment claim is brought pursuant to § 1983. 

Defendants County and Stone move to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim on the bases that: 

(1) Plaintiff has not alleged that the claimed deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights was 

pursuant to a policy maintained by the County; (2) Plaintiff has not alleged Stone’s personal 

participation in the claimed constitutional violation; and (3) the facts alleged in the complaint do 

not state a federal claim. Defendants’ motion is well-taken.

A. County

“Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments under § 1983 must prove that 

‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused their injury.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 

51, 60-61 (2011) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691

(1978)). “In order to establish liability for governmental entities under Monell, a plaintiff must 

prove (1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which she was deprived; (2) that the 

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municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s 

constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional 

violation.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 

marks, citation, and alterations omitted). Plaintiff has not alleged that the termination of his 

homeowner’s exemption was pursuant to a policy maintained by the County. Plaintiff therefore 

has failed to state a claim for relief against the County.

B. Stone

“Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the 

defendant.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “There is no respondeat superior 

liability under section 1983.” Id. Plaintiff has not alleged any personal participation by Defendant 

Stone in the termination of Plaintiff’s homeowner’s exemption. The sole allegation of personal 

participation is a conclusory statement that Stone “conspired to deprive plaintiff of the Fourth 

Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.” Compl. at 3. “Vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a 

motion to dismiss.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief against Stone. 

C. Tax Injunction Act

Defendants County and Stone also assert that Plaintiff’s claim is barred because he does 

not allege that state remedies are inadequate with respect to his claim for a homeowner’s 

exemption and a tax refund. Defendants rely on California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 

393 (1982), in which the Supreme Court discussed the impact of the Tax Injunction Act on federal 

claims challenging state tax assessments. Based on their citation to Grace Brethren Church, the 

Court understands Defendants to be arguing that even if Plaintiff had alleged the existence of a 

County policy and personal participation by Stone, Plaintiff’s claim would be barred by the Tax 

Injunction Act. The Act provides that “[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the 

assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient 

remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. 

“When applicable, the Act prohibits both declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as § 

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1983 suits for damages.” Lowe v. Washoe Cty., 627 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations 

omitted). In Lowe, landowners brought a § 1983 action against a county, county assessor, and 

county treasurer, challenging the valuation of their real property used to calculate ad valorem 

property taxes. See Lowe, 627 F.3d at 1153. The Ninth Circuit found the action to be barred by 

the Tax Injunction Act after determining that “Nevada’s administrative and judicial review process 

provides an effective and adequate means by which a dissatisfied taxpayer may contest his 

property valuation.” Id. at 1156. The Ninth Circuit noted that “[i]f a ‘plain, speedy and efficient 

remedy’ is not available in state court, a federal district court may exercise jurisdiction over a 

party’s challenge to a state tax.” Lowe, 627 F.3d at 1155. However, federal courts must construe 

that exception to the Act narrowly. See id. “For the Act’s jurisdictional prohibition to apply, the 

state court remedy need only meet certain minimal procedural criteria.” Id. Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). A state court remedy is plain, speedy and efficient “if it 

provides the taxpayer with a full hearing and judicial determination at which she may raise any 

and all constitutional objections to the tax.” Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 413-14. 

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim, based on the termination of his homeowner’s 

exemption and increase in his property taxes, appears to fall squarely within the bar raised by the 

Tax Injunction Act. Defendants point out that the Supreme Court has found California’s refund 

procedures adequate to provide a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy for constitutional challenges 

to certain taxes. See Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 413. Defendants argue, correctly, that 

Plaintiff has not alleged that he lacks a plain, speedy, and efficient state court remedy for his 

Fourth Amendment claim based on termination of his homeowner’s exemption and increase in 

property taxes. Plaintiff’s claim therefore appears to be barred by the Tax Injunction Act.

D. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss brought by Defendants County and Stone

is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

2

 

 

2

In light of the Court’s determination that the complaint is subject to dismissal on the grounds 

discussed above, the Court need not reach Defendants’ additional argument based on cases 

holding that collection of delinquent federal taxes by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) does 

not violate the Fourth Amendment where there is no invasion of the taxpayer’s premises. See, 

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Defendants urge the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint without leave to amend, arguing 

that any amendment would be futile. Leave ordinarily must be granted unless one or more of the 

following factors is present: (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith or dilatory motive, (3) repeated failure 

to cure deficiencies by amendment, (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party, and (5) futility of

amendment. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing Foman factors). 

Most of these factors weigh in favor of allowing leave to amend. Plaintiff has not engaged 

in undue delay in this case (factor 1). The Court has not previously issued an order identifying 

deficiencies in Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants County and Stone, so there has been no 

repeated failure to cure with respect to that claim (factor 3). Granting Plaintiff leave to amend in 

response to a first motion to dismiss would not impose undue prejudice on Defendants County and 

Stone (factor 4). 

With respect to the inquiry into bad faith or dilatory motive (factor 2), Plaintiff has filed 

three separate lawsuits asserting the same claim based on termination of his homeowner’s 

exemption. See Case No. 19-cv-07000-BLF; Case No. 19-cv-07231-BLF (closed); Case No. 20-

cv-00230-BLF. Plaintiff’s conduct has multiplied the proceedings related to his claim and placed 

unnecessary burdens on the Court as well as Defendants County and Stone. While the Court is not 

prepared to make a finding of bad faith at this time, Plaintiff is advised that the Court may make a 

bad faith finding if Plaintiff continues to file duplicative lawsuits or unnecessarily multiplies the 

proceedings in the current suit. 

Finally, while it is highly unlikely that Plaintiff will be able to cure the defects in his 

pleading, the Court is unwilling to make a final determination of futility (factor 5) without giving 

Plaintiff one opportunity to amend, particularly in light of his pro se status.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that leave to amend is appropriate with respect to 

 

e.g., Hutchinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 1322, 1328 (9th Cir. 1982). Defendants acknowledge 

that Hutchinson and other cases cited for that proposition are not directly applicable to the facts of 

this case, but they argue that “[t]he rationale that applies for the federal government’s summary 

collection of taxes should apply with same force to the collection of local taxes.” Motion at 9, 

ECF 29. The Court need not reach that issue because Defendants’ other arguments are dispositive.

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Plaintiff’s existing claim based on termination of his homeowner’s exemption. Plaintiff may not 

add new claims or parties without obtaining express leave of the Court to do so. 

 IV. ORDER

(1) The motion to dismiss brought by Defendants County and Stone is GRANTED 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

(2) Any amended complaint shall be filed on or before February 19, 2020. Failure to 

file an amended pleading by this deadline will result in dismissal of the action. 

(3) Leave to amend is limited to Plaintiff’s existing claim based on termination of his 

homeowner’s exemption. Plaintiff may not add new claims or parties unless and 

until he files a noticed motion for leave to amend and such motion is granted by the 

Court. If Plaintiff files an amended pleading that goes beyond the leave to amend 

granted in this order, such amended pleading will be stricken.

(4) Plaintiff is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE, in writing and on or before February 

12, 2020, why this action should not be dismissed as to Defendant Tonini; and

(5) This order terminates ECF 29.

 

Dated: January 29, 2020

 ______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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