Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-03129/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-03129-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOEY LONG,

Plaintiff,

v.

AUTHENTIC ATHLETIX LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-03129-JSC 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 15

This breach of contract action arises out of Plaintiff Joey Long’s alleged oral agreement 

with Defendants sports agents Authentic Athletix LLC (“Authentic Athletix”) and Peter Schaffer 

(“Schaffer,” and together, “Defendants”) to pay Plaintiff for recruiting NFL players to be 

represented by Defendants. Defendants contend that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 

them and have moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). (Dkt. No. 15; 

see also Dkt. No. 38.

1

) After carefully considering the parties’ submissions, and having the 

benefit of oral argument on September 15, 2016, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss.2 

Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing of specific jurisdiction over Defendants as they have

purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in California in 

connection with the oral agreement at issue.

BACKGROUND

In June 2010, during a telephone call with Schaffer, Plaintiff entered into an oral 

agreement with Defendants whereby Plaintiff would recruit NFL players to sign National Football 

League Players Association Standard Representation Agreements with Defendants. (Compl. ¶ 8; 

 

1 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents.

2 All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 8, 40, 41.)

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Dkt. No. 19 ¶ 3.) Under the oral agreement, for each player that Plaintiff recruited to sign with 

Defendants, Defendants would receive a fee totaling 3% of the player’s net proceeds and Plaintiff 

would receive a 33% share of Defendants’ fee, i.e., 1% of the player’s net proceeds. (Compl. ¶ 9; 

Dkt. No. 19 ¶ 11.) Due to Plaintiff’s preexisting relationship with one player in particular, 

Brandon Browner (“Browner”), Plaintiff was to be paid 40% of the 3% fee from Browner, i.e., 

1.2% of Browner’s net proceeds. (Compl. ¶ 9; Dkt. No. 19 ¶ 12.) At Schaffer’s request, the 

parties did not memorialize this agreement in writing; Schaffer indicated he was leaving his 

current company, All Pro Sports and Entertainment, and did not want Plaintiff to be involved in 

any potential litigation. (Compl. ¶ 10; Dkt. No. 19 ¶ 13.)

As a result of Plaintiff’s recruitment efforts, Browner signed with Defendants in June 

2010. (Compl. ¶ 13; Dkt. No. 19 ¶¶ 18-19.) Plaintiff also successfully recruited other Californiabased players to sign NFLPA Standard Representation Agreements with Defendants, including 

California residents Ronald Powell and Jason Hill. (Dkt. No. 19 ¶¶ 22-24.) After Browner’s first 

season playing in the NFL, Schaffer sent Plaintiff an email detailing the amount of money owed to 

Plaintiff based on Browner’s fees. (Compl. ¶ 14.) From that point on, however, Defendants failed 

to provide Plaintiff with any details regarding fees owed to him under the agreement, despite 

numerous verbal requests from Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 15.) On February 14, 2016, Plaintiff received a 

check from Defendants in the amount of $31,000.00—well short of what Plaintiff is entitled to. 

(Id. ¶ 18.) In particular, based on Plaintiff’s investigation, Defendants have received about 

$857,850.00 in fees through Browner’s representation alone, which, under the agreement, entitles 

Plaintiff to around $343,140.00. (Id. ¶ 28.) Defendants have indicated they will not pay Plaintiff 

any additional fees. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22).

Plaintiff asserts that, when he negotiated and entered into the agreement with Defendants, 

he was a resident of and physically present in California (Dkt. No. 19 ¶¶ 4-5); he also asserts that 

Defendants knew that he had moved to California (Dkt. No. 29 ¶¶ 3-4). Because he was living in 

California, Plaintiff believed that any disputes related to the agreement would be litigated in 

California. (Dkt. No. 19 ¶ 6.) Further, the terms and conditions of the parties’ agreement 

mandated that he perform services on Defendants’ behalf in California. (Id. ¶ 7.) According to 

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Plaintiff, the parties agreed that he would focus his recruiting efforts in California because 

Schaffer “wanted to establish a presence in California and he knew that [Plaintiff] resided in 

California at the time the agreement was entered into.” (Id. ¶ 10.) After entering into the 

agreement, Plaintiff successfully recruited several California-based athletes to sign with 

Defendants, including Browner. (Id. ¶¶ 22-25.) At the time Browner signed the NFLPA Standard 

Representation Agreement with Defendants, he was also a resident of and physically present in 

California. (Id. ¶ 25.) Schaffer routinely met with and supported clients at various events in 

California, and all paychecks Plaintiff received from Defendants were sent to the address of one of 

his California residences. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.)

Defendants dispute that the parties ever had an oral agreement as Plaintiff alleges. (See, 

e.g., Dkt. No. 38 at 5.) Schaffer further declares that, for purposes of this case, he has no relevant 

connections to California; Schaffer states, in particular, that he “is not licensed to do business in 

California,” “ha[s] never recruited athletes in California,” and “ha[s] never advertised, marketed, 

or otherwise solicited [his] services in California.” (Dkt. No. 15 at 2; see also Dkt. No. 27 ¶¶ 10-

11.) Rather, Schaffer is a Colorado resident, is only licensed to do business in Colorado, and 

“only did business with Plaintiff when he was a Colorado resident.” (Dkt. No. 15 at 1.) Schaffer 

asserts that Plaintiff did not move to California until after the parties entered into their agreement 

and that Defendants did not request that Plaintiff move out of Colorado for business purposes. 

(Id.; see also Dkt. No. 27 ¶¶ 4-5.) Schaffer believed that the parties’ oral agreement was executed 

in Colorado and governed by Colorado law. (Dkt. No. 15 at 1.) Lastly, Schaffer declares that the 

various trips he made to California, as referenced by Plaintiff, were for vacation purposes and not 

for business. (Dkt. No. 27 ¶¶ 8-9.)

LEGAL STANDARD 

When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the 

burden of demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant. See Harris Rutsky & 

Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2003). “Where, as 

here, the motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need 

only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor 

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Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In such 

cases, “we only inquire into whether [the plaintiff’s] pleadings and affidavits make a prima facie 

showing of personal jurisdiction.” Caruth v. Int’l Psychoanalytical Ass’n, 59 F.3d 126, 128 (9th 

Cir. 1995). Moreover, “for the purpose of this demonstration, the court resolves all disputed facts 

in favor of the plaintiff.” Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, 

“[c]onflicts between the parties over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the 

plaintiff’s favor.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800.

“Where, as here, no federal statute authorizes personal jurisdiction, the district court 

applies the law of the state in which the court sits.” Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 

F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011). California’s long-arm statute has the same due process 

requirements as the federal long-arm statute. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801. The Due 

Process Clause requires that nonresident defendants have “minimum contact” with the forum state 

such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & 

Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). A court may exercise either general or specific jurisdiction 

over an out-of-state defendant. See Daimler AF v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff maintains the Court has specific jurisdiction over Defendants. “A court may 

exercise specific jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if his or her less substantial contacts with 

the forum give rise to the cause of action before the court. The question is whether the cause of 

action arises out of or has a substantial connection with that activity.” Doe v. Unocal, 248 F.3d 

915, 923 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Goodyear 

Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (“[S]pecific jurisdiction is 

confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that 

establishes jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has 

developed a three-prong test for analyzing specific jurisdiction:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his 

activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or 

resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully 

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avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, 

thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the 

defendant’s forum-related activities; and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and 

substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. The plaintiff has the burden of proving the first two prongs; if 

it does so, the defendant must demonstrate that the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction would 

be unreasonable. Id. “If any of the three requirements is not satisfied, jurisdiction in the forum 

would deprive the defendant of due process of law.” Pebble Beach Co., 453 F.3d at 1155 (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted).

I. Purposeful Availment

Under the first prong, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant “either purposefully 

availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in California, or purposefully directed its 

activities toward California.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. A purposeful availment analysis 

“is most often used in suits sounding in contract,” while a purposeful direction analysis “is most 

often used in suits sounding in tort.” Id. Thus, the Court will apply the purposeful availment test. 

“A showing that a defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing 

business in a forum state typically consists of evidence of the defendant’s actions in the forum, 

such as executing or performing a contract there.” Id.; see also Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 

1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Purposeful availment requires that the defendant have performed some type 

of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of business within the forum 

state.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “merely contracting with a resident of the 

forum state is insufficient to confer specific jurisdiction over a nonresident.” Ziegler v. Indian 

River Cnty., 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995). A contract is only an intermediate step that 

connects prior negotiations with future consequences, the real object of a business transaction. 

Therefore, courts consider “prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with 

the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of dealing” to determine “whether the 

defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum.” Burger King Corp. v. 

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985); see also Longyu Int’l Inc. v. E-Lot Elecs. Recycling Inc., 

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No. 2:13-CV-07086-CAS, 2014 WL 1682811, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2014) (“[A] court must 

evaluate four factors to determine whether this prong is met: (1) prior negotiations, (2) 

contemplated future consequences, (3) the terms of the contract, (4) the parties’ actual course of 

dealing.”) (citation omitted). 

A. Prior Negotiations

“If the defendant directly solicits business in the forum state, the resulting transactions will 

probably constitute the deliberate transaction of business invoking the benefits of the forum state’s 

laws.” Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 840 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation 

omitted); see also Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Soliciting 

business in the forum state will generally be considered purposeful availment if that solicitation 

results in contract negotiations or the transaction of business.”), rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 

585 (1991). “Similarly, conducting contract negotiations in the forum state will probably qualify 

as an invocation of the forum law’s benefits and protections.” Decker, 805 F.2d at 840 (citation 

omitted).

Based on the record before the Court, Defendants directly solicited business in California. 

Although it is unclear which party initiated first contact, Plaintiff has provided competent evidence 

that Defendants solicited and negotiated with Plaintiff, a California resident, to perform services 

on their behalf in California and to help them expand their business presence in California. (See, 

e.g., Dkt. No. 19 ¶¶ 3-6, 10.) As a result of the solicitation and negotiations, the parties entered 

into their oral contract. Further, through Plaintiff’s services, Defendants also solicited, and 

received, business from California-based athletes. (See id. ¶¶ 22-25.) Defendants’ direct 

solicitation of business in California weighs strongly in favor of a finding of purposeful availment.

Defendants dispute that Plaintiff resided in California at the time of the alleged 

negotiations and that the recruited athletes were California residents. Such factual disputes, 

however, must be resolved in Plaintiff’s favor. See Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1154. Defendants’

citation to Taylor v. Portland, 383 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1967), for the proposition that a plaintiff 

must produce more than affidavits to support personal jurisdiction when disputed, is misplaced. 

Taylor holds that a plaintiff may not rest on the pleadings, that is, on the allegations in the 

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complaint, to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction; instead, the plaintiff must 

submit supporting affidavits. Id. at 639. Plaintiff has done just that. 

The location of the negotiations does not support purposeful availment because Schaffer

never traveled to California to conduct any negotiations. See McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 

F.2d 802, 816 (9th Cir. 1988). Similarly, that Schaffer contacted Plaintiff in California by 

telephone during the negotiations does not support purposeful availment. See Roth v. Garcia 

Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 622 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[U]se of the mails, telephone, or other international 

communications simply do not qualify as purposeful activity invoking the benefits and protection 

of the [forum] state.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, Defendants’ absence 

from California during negotiations does not defeat personal jurisdiction. See id. (“[T]he physical 

absence of the defendant and the transaction from the forum cannot defeat the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Nor does the fact that Plaintiff entered into the contract in California, by itself, avail 

Defendants of the benefits and protections of California’s laws. “The unilateral activity of those 

who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of 

contact with the forum State.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Accepting as true 

Plaintiff’s statement that he agreed to the oral contract over the phone while in California, this 

conduct constitutes a unilateral activity and does not establish Defendants’ purposeful availment 

of California’s laws. There is no allegation that Schaffer travelled to California to negotiate or 

enter into any contract; even if there were, the execution of the contract in the forum would likely 

be a mere “formality” that would not support a finding of purposeful availment. See McGlinchy, 

845 F.2d at 816. 

In sum, Defendants’ solicitation of Plaintiff’s services and of clients in California weighs

in favor of a finding of purposeful availment, while the location of the negotiations and signing of 

the documents do not.

B. Future Consequences

Under the second factor, “[p]arties who reach out beyond one state and create continuing 

relationships and obligations with citizens of another state are subject to regulation and sanctions 

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in the other State for the consequences of their activities.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “[Burger King] insisted that past and future consequences of the 

contractual arrangement involving a resident of the forum state be evaluated.” Corporate Inv. 

Business Brokers v. Melcher, 824 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Hirsch v. Blue Cross, 

Blue Shield of Kansas City, 800 F.2d 1474, 1478 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The purposeful availment 

prong is satisfied when a defendant takes deliberate actions within the forum state or creates 

continuing obligations to forum residents.”). As noted above, Defendants contracted with 

Plaintiff, a resident of California, to perform services in California and to expand Defendants’ 

presence in California. The contract created continuing obligations whereby Plaintiff recruited on 

Defendants’ behalf in California and Defendants paid Plaintiff, in California, for his services. 

Additionally, the parties’ obligations appear to have extended over a period of several years, as the 

parties entered into the oral contract in June 2010 and Defendants made their last payment of 

$31,000 to Plaintiff in February 2016. (See Compl. ¶¶ 8, 18; Dkt. No. 28-13 at 3 (Ex. M).) The 

parties’ significant continuing obligations to each other under the agreement favor a finding of 

purposeful availment. 

Defendants dispute that they ever did business with Plaintiff in California. But again, this 

dispute of fact must be resolved in Plaintiff’s favor as Plaintiff has submitted a declaration 

attesting to his ongoing business relationship with Defendants for work conducted in California 

while Plaintiff lived in California. (See Dkt. No. 19 ¶¶ 17-20, 22-27.)

C. Terms

Terms that provide fair notice to a defendant that he may possibly be subject to suit in the 

forum state weigh in favor of a purposeful availment finding. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 463;

Doe, 248 F.3d at 924. Here, Plaintiff asserts that the terms of the agreement mandated that he 

perform his services in California. (Dkt. No. 19 ¶ 7.) Further, the terms of the alleged agreement 

provided that Plaintiff would focus his efforts on Defendants’ behalf in California because 

Defendants wanted to establish a presence in California and knew that Plaintiff resided in 

California. (Id. ¶ 10.) While Schaffer states that neither he nor Authentic Athletix asked Plaintiff 

to move out of Colorado for business purposes (Dkt. No. 15 at 1; Dkt. No. 27 ¶¶ 4-5), the Court 

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must resolve any conflicts of fact in Plaintiff’s favor. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800. 

Contract terms requiring Plaintiff to perform services in California and to expand Defendants’ 

business in California provide fair notice that Defendants may be subject to suit in California. 

Accordingly, the terms of the agreement weigh in favor of a finding of purposeful availment.

D. Course of Dealing

The “quality and nature” of Defendants’ relationship with Plaintiff in California, as seen 

through the parties’ course of dealing over several years, “can in no sense be viewed as random, 

fortuitous, or attenuated.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Consistent with the terms of the parties’ agreement, Plaintiff, while residing in California, focused 

his recruiting efforts for Defendants in California and successfully recruited several Californiabased athletes, including Browner and two other California residents, Ronald Powell and Jason 

Hill. (Dkt. No. 19 ¶¶ 7, 10, 17-20, 22-25.) Further, for his services rendered in California, 

Defendants mailed paychecks to Plaintiff at one of his residences in California. (Id. ¶ 28.) 

Schaffer also routinely met with clients, including the California-based clients that Plaintiff 

recruited, in California. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) The parties’ course of dealing thus weighs in favor a 

finding of purposeful availment.

To summarize, each of the four factors weighs in favor of a finding of purposeful 

availment. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the 

protections and benefits of California’s laws.

II. The Claims’ Relation to Defendants’ Forum-Related Activities

“This requirement is met if, but for a defendant’s forum-related activities through which a 

defendant purposely avails itself of the forum, the plaintiff would not have suffered injury.” 

Callaway Golf Corp. v. Royal Canadian Golf Ass’n, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1204 (C.D. Cal. 2000)

(internal quotation marks omitted). If Defendants had not done business with Plaintiff and 

purposefully availed themselves of the forum state, Plaintiff would have no claims against them 

because he would not have suffered an injury that resulted out of the alleged breach of contract. 

See Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995). Defendants do not contest this prong 

of the specific jurisdiction test. The claims are related to Defendants’ forum-related activities.

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III. Reasonableness

Personal jurisdiction over a case must not offend “traditional notions of fair and substantial 

justice.” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. Therefore, it must be reasonable to require the defendant to 

defend himself in the forum state. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 

(1980). Because Plaintiff has satisfied the first two prongs of the Ninth Circuit’s test for specific 

personal jurisdiction, the burden shifts to Defendants to present a compelling case that the exercise 

of personal jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. Seven factors 

are weighed to determine reasonableness, none of which are dispositive:

1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection into the 

forum state’s affairs; 2) the burden on the defendant; 3) conflicts of 

law between the forum and defendant’s home jurisdiction; 4) the 

forum’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; 5) the most efficient 

judicial resolution of the dispute; 6) the plaintiff’s interest in 

convenient and effective relief; and 7) the existence of an alternative 

forum

Roth, 942 F.2d at 623. 

The first factor depends on the same analysis that applies to purposeful availment. See id. 

For the reasons stated above, the parties’ contractual relationship was relatively extensive, 

proceeded over the course of several years, and required Plaintiff to work and focus his services in 

California. The first factor weighs in favor of a finding of reasonableness.

Under the second factor, Defendants correctly note that “[t]he primary concern is for the 

defendant’s burden.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. British-Am. Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). However, “[u]nless such inconvenience [to the defendant] is so 

great as to constitute a deprivation of due process, it will not overcome clear justifications for the 

exercise of jurisdiction.” Hirsch v. Blue Cross, Blue Shield of Kansas City, 800 F.2d 1474, 1481 

(9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Defendants argue that litigating in California would place a 

“heavy burden” on him, but he provides no evidence demonstrating that it would amount to a 

deprivation of due process. (See Dkt. No. 15 at 7.) Therefore, the burden on Defendants is not 

substantial enough to weigh against a finding of reasonableness.

The third factor favors a finding of reasonableness. This factor is a lesser barrier to 

reasonableness when the defendant resides in another state rather than in a foreign nation. See 

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Roth, 942 F.2d at 623; see also Pac. Atl. Trading Co. v. M/V Main Exp., 758 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th 

Cir. 1985) (“[W]hen the nonresident defendant is from a foreign nation, rather than from another 

state in our federal system, the sovereignty barrier is higher, undermining the reasonableness of 

personal jurisdiction.”). While the parties have provided competing declarations as to which 

forum’s contract law applies—California or Colorado—the Court, for purposes of this motion,

must accept Plaintiff’s version of the facts. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800. Thus, there is 

no conflict of laws because a Colorado court would be required to apply California contract law. 

The fourth factor weighs in favor of a finding of reasonableness because “[a] State 

generally has a manifest interest in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing 

injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Here, Plaintiff is a resident of California, and therefore California has an interest in 

providing itself as a forum for resolving the current dispute. 

The fifth factor, regarding efficient judicial resolution, focuses on the location of the 

evidence and witnesses. See Caruth, 59 F.3d at 129. This factor is not weighed heavily given the 

modern advances in communication and transportation. Id. In any event, this case, based on an 

oral agreement, does not appear to require a substantial amount of evidence or a large number of 

witnesses; in fact, neither side has identified any specific non-party witnesses or their locations. 

This factor is neutral.

The sixth factor favors a finding of reasonableness because it will indeed be more 

convenient for Plaintiff to litigate the case in the same state where he resides. 

The seventh factor favors Defendants. The test is not whether the current forum state is 

more convenient for Plaintiff, but rather whether Plaintiff would be precluded from adjudicating 

the dispute in a different forum. See Roth, 942 F.2d at 624-25. The burden is on Plaintiff to 

provide evidence that he would be precluded from doing so. Id. at 624. Plaintiff has provided no 

such evidence.

In determining the reasonableness of litigating this case in California, factors one, two, 

three, four, and six favor Plaintiff. Factor five is neutral, and only factor seven favors Defendants 

and a finding against reasonableness. On balance, it is reasonable to subject Defendants to defend 

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themselves in California. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. The Court will hold a case management conference on November 17, 2016 

at 1:30 p.m. The parties shall submit a joint case management conference statement that includes 

a proposed case schedule at least one week before the conference.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 14, 2016

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:16-cv-03129-JSC Document 42 Filed 10/14/16 Page 12 of 12