Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-03425/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-03425-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GRAEBEL COMMERCIAL SERVICES, 

INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

OYSTER POINT HOTELS, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-03425-KAW 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 22

Plaintiff Graebel Commercial Services, Inc. filed the instant case against Defendants

Oyster Point Hotels, LLC ("Oyster Point"), OTO Development, LLC ("OTO"), Johnstone Moyer, 

Inc. ("Johnstone Moyer"), and Arch Insurance Company, asserting breach of contract. (First 

Amended Compl. ("FAC"), Dkt. No. 20.) On July 31, 2018, Defendants moved to dismiss the 

case on the ground that the contract at issue contained a forum selection clause that requires 

disputes to be resolved in San Mateo County. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 1, Dkt. No. 22.)

Having considered the papers filed by the parties, the relevant legal authority, and the 

arguments advanced by counsel at the September 20, 2018 hearing, the Court DENIES 

Defendant's motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 2, 2015, Defendant Oyster Point entered into the "Prime Contract" with 

Defendant Johnstone Moyer, in which Defendant Johnstone Moyer agreed to act as the general 

contractor for the construction of a Marriot hotel in South San Francisco ("Project"). (FAC ¶¶ 1,

17.) On January 12, 2017, Plaintiff and Defendant Johnson Moyer entered into a Construction 

Subcontract ("Subcontract"), in which Plaintiff would provide furniture, fixture, and equipment 

("FF&E") installation services for the Project. (FAC ¶ 18.) The Subcontract stated that "[t]he 

Case 4:18-cv-03425-KAW Document 31 Filed 10/05/18 Page 1 of 11
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Subcontract Documents consist of (1) this agreement; (2) the Prime Contract, consisting of the 

Agreement between the Owner and Contractor, General Conditions, any Supplementary 

Conditions and the other Contract Documents enumerated in those documents," as well as other 

modifications and documents. (Compl., Exh. 2 ("Subcontract") § 1.1, Dkt. No. 1.) "All of these 

documents form and constitute the 'Subcontract', and are as fully a part of this Agreement as if 

attached to this Agreement or repeated herein." (Subcontract § 1.1.) Further, the Subcontract 

stated that "[t]he Prime contract is incorporated in this Subcontract by reference, insofar as it 

relates in any way, directly or indirectly, to the Work. Subcontractor agrees to be bound to 

Contractor in the same manner and to the same extent as Contractor is bound to Owner under the 

Prime Contract . . . ." (Subcontract § 1.2.) If, however, there is "any conflict between the various 

documents that constitute the Subcontract . . . the more stringent shall govern." (Subcontract § 

1.3.)

With respect to dispute resolution, the Subcontract states that "[a]ny lawsuits arising out of 

or related to the Subcontract, the Project, or the Work, to the extent they are not subject to binding 

arbitration, must be brought in the county where the Project is located, unless otherwise provided 

under the Prime contract." (Subcontract § 6.6.) The Prime Contract, in turn, states: "For any 

Claim subject to, but not resolved by mediation pursuant to Section 15.2 of AIA Document A201-

2007, the method of binding dispute resolution shall be as follows: . . . Litigation in a court of 

competent jurisdiction." (Compl., Exh. 1 ("Prime Contract") § 13.2.)

AIA Document A201-2007 ("AIA Document") defines a "Claim" as "a demand or 

assertion by one of the parties seeking, as a matter of right . . . payment of money . . . or other 

relief with respect to the terms of the Contract." (Sorenson Decl., Exh. Z ("AIA Document") § 

15.1.1.) The AIA Document requires that if a claim is not resolved during a required "Cool Down 

Period," the parties would agree to mediating that claim in the county where the project is located. 

(AIA Document § 15.2.1.2.)

Plaintiff alleges that pursuant to the Subcontract, it commenced work on the Project on 

May 17, 2017. (FAC ¶ 38.) The Project, however, was not ready for Plaintiff to begin its FF&E 

installation services. (Id.) Plaintiff was also not provided with the conditions necessary to 

Case 4:18-cv-03425-KAW Document 31 Filed 10/05/18 Page 2 of 11
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

complete its work. (FAC ¶¶ 40-48.) As a result, Plaintiff was delayed, causing Plaintiff to incur 

additional costs and expenses totaling $118,507.80. (FAC ¶¶ 49, 56-58.) Plaintiff also asserts that 

it is still owed $39,431 under the Subcontract. (FAC ¶ 58.)

Plaintiff then filed the instant suit against Defendants, bringing claims for: (1) intentional 

misrepresentation, (2) breach of contract, (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fear 

dealing, (4) unfair competition, (5) recovery on payment bond, (6) common count: open book 

account, and (7) services rendered. (FAC at 22-27.) Defendants now move to dismiss under 

forum non conveniens.

1

 On August 14, 2018, Plaintiff filed its opposition. (Plf.'s Opp'n, Dkt. No. 

25.) On August 21, 2018, Defendants filed their reply. (Defs.' Reply, Dkt. No. 26.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"[T]he appropriate way to enforce a forum-selection clause pointing to a state or foreign

forum is through the doctrine of forum non conveniens." Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. 

Court, 571 U.S. 49, 60 (2013). Federal law applies to the interpretation of a forum selection 

clause, and courts look to general principles of contract interpretation for guidance. ManettiFarrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1988). "Contract terms are to be 

given their ordinary meaning, and when the terms of a contract are clear, the intent of the parties 

must be ascertained from the contract itself. Whenever possible, the plain language of the contract 

should be considered first." Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 

1210 (9th Cir. 1999). "The fact that the parties dispute a contract's meaning does not render the 

contract ambiguous; it is only ambiguous if reasonable people could find its terms susceptible to 

more than one interpretation." Id.

 

1 Originally, Defendants also brought their motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3), 28 U.S.C. § 

1404, and 28 U.S.C. § 1406. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) As Plaintiff pointed out, these are not 

appropriate grounds for dismissal. (Plf.'s Opp'n at 4-5, Dkt. No. 25.) In Atlantic Marine 

Construction Co. v. United States District Court, the Supreme Court explained that "a forumselection clause does not render venue in a court 'wrong or improper' within the meaning of § 

1406(a) or Rule 12(b)(3)." 571 U.S. 49, 59 (2013). Further, § 1404 applies only "for the subset of 

cases in which the transferee forum is within the federal court system; in such cases, Congress has 

replaced the traditional remedy of outright dismissal with transfer." Id. at 60. Defendants do not 

seem to dispute this. (See Defs.' Reply at 6, Dkt. No. 26 (requesting dismissal under forum non 

conveniens only).)

Case 4:18-cv-03425-KAW Document 31 Filed 10/05/18 Page 3 of 11
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

III. DISCUSSION

The primary dispute between the parties is not whether the Subcontract's forum selection 

clause is enforceable, but whether the forum selection clause requires that the instant case be 

brought in San Mateo County. Again, the Subcontract states in relevant part that "[a]ny lawsuits 

arising out of or related to the Subcontract, the Project, or the Work, to the extent they are not 

subject to binding arbitration, must be brought in the county where the Project is located, unless 

otherwise provided under the Prime contract." (Subcontract § 6.6 (emphasis added).) The issue, 

therefore, is whether the Prime contract provides an alternative.

Based on the plain language, the Court finds that the Prime Contract provides an 

alternative to the Subcontract's requirement that a lawsuit be brought in the county where the 

Project is located. The Prime Contract states that any claim subject to but not resolved by 

mediation pursuant to the AIA Document shall be resolved by "[l]itigation in a court of competent 

jurisdiction." (Prime Contract § 13.2.) Per the AIA Document, a claim includes a demand for 

payment of money, and requires that such claims be mediated prior to litigation. (AIA Document 

§§ 15.1.1, 15.2.1.2.) Here, Plaintiff is demanding payment for services performed on the Project, 

and such claims are required to go through mediation pursuant to the AIA Document. Under the 

Prime Contract, Plaintiff's claim may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, the

Prime Contract "otherwise provide[s]" an alternative to the Subcontract's requirement that any suit 

be brought in the county where the Project is located.

Defendants make several arguments for why the Prime Contract does not provide an 

additional forum for litigation of this action.

A. "Provided Under"

First, Defendants contend that the Prime Contract does not "provide" for an additional 

forum because the Prime Contract does not put any restrictions on where litigation can take place. 

(Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 4.) Defendants rely on the Merriam-Webster.com dictionary definition 

of "provide" as "To have as a condition; to stipulate; as, the contract provides that certain 

deadlines will be kept." (Id.) Thus, Defendants argue that because the Prime Contract "does not 

stipulate any requirements on a [c]ourt's jurisdiction over future claims . . . this dispute section 

Case 4:18-cv-03425-KAW Document 31 Filed 10/05/18 Page 4 of 11
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

does not 'provide' an alternative forum." (Id.)

The Court finds Defendants' proffered definition to be too narrow. A more common 

understanding of "provide" is to simply offer or state something. One can, for example, "provide"

an answer to a question, or "provide" a definition that may expand the meaning of a term. A 

provision of something does not necessarily require that the "something" be a restriction. Here, as 

read, the question is does the Prime Contract offer or state an additional forum; by stating that 

litigation can take place in a court of competent jurisdiction, the Prime Contract provides an 

alternative, even if that alternative is not as restrictive.

This broader reading is in line with Black's Law Dictionary, which defines "provided" as 

"[o]n the condition or understanding that." Provided, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 

(emphasis added).2 Again, an understanding does not necessarily require a restriction; a contract 

could easily state that a term will apply "with the understanding" that there are no other terms that 

provide an alternative, as is the case is here.

B. Application of the "More Stringent" Procedures

Next, Defendants argue that the Subcontract's forum selection clause is meant to require 

that a lawsuit must be filed in the county the Project unless the Prime Contract requires a more 

stringent forum selection. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 5; Defs.' Reply at 3.) Defendants rely on § 

6.3 of the Subcontract, which states: "If the dispute procedures in this Article 6 conflict with any 

dispute procedures in the Prime Contract, the shorter deadlines in regard to the submission of 

Claims, and the more stringent in regards to the compliance with Claim procedures, shall govern."

Section 6.3, however, requires that there is a conflict between the dispute procedures. As 

written, there is no conflict between the Subcontract's forum selection clause and the Prime 

Contract's provision of an additional forum. This is not a case where the Subcontract states that a 

lawsuit can be brought only in one forum while the Prime Contract states that a lawsuit must be 

brought in a different forum; instead, the Subcontract explicitly states that the lawsuit must be 

 

2

Likewise, Merriam-Webster defines "provided" as "on condition that : with the understanding : 

IF." Provided, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/provided (last 

visited Sept. 7, 2018).

Case 4:18-cv-03425-KAW Document 31 Filed 10/05/18 Page 5 of 11
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

brought in the county where the Project is located unless the Prime Contract otherwise provides. 

In short, the Subcontract itself prioritizes the Prime Contract's dispute resolution requirements 

over the Subcontract's selection of a forum in the county where the Project is located.

Defendants argue that such an interpretation would always render the Subcontract's 

selection of a forum meaningless. (Defs.' Reply at 3.) The Court disagrees. If the Prime Contract 

was silent as to where a lawsuit could be brought, then the Subcontract's selection of a forum 

would be binding. It is only because the Prime Contract does permit a case to be brought in any 

court of competent jurisdiction, that the Subcontract's selection of a forum is superseded, as is 

required by the Subcontract's forum selection clause itself.

C. "Claim"

Third, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not bringing a "claim" as defined by the AIA 

Document because the AIA Document only recognizes a claim as "a demand or assertion by one 

of the parties." (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 7.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff is not a party to 

the Prime Contract, and therefore the Prime Contract's dispute resolution procedures do not apply 

to this suit. (Id.) Plaintiff responds that the Prime Contract is incorporated into the Subcontract, 

such that the agreements should be considered and construed as one, relying on Scott Co. of 

California v. U.S. Engineering Co., Case No. C 94-1963 FMS, 1994 WL 519493 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 

19, 1994). (Plf.'s Opp'n at 7.)

In Scott Co., the district court applied the California principle that there is incorporation by 

reference where "[t]he reference to the incorporated document is clear and unequivocal, and the 

terms of the incorporated document are known or easily available to the contracting parties," in 

considering whether the subcontract incorporated the forum selection clause from the main 

construction contract (the "Owner's Contract"). Scott Co., 1994 WL 519493, at *2 (quoting 

Slaught v. Bencomo Roofing Co., 25 Cal. App. 4th 744, 748 (1994) (internal modifications and 

italics omitted)). The subcontract required the subcontractor to perform its work in accordance 

with the subcontract and the Owner's Contract, and further stated that the subcontract, first-tier 

subcontract, and the Owner's Contract were "incorporated herein and made a part of this 

Subcontract and are hereinafter referred to as the 'Contract Documents.'" Id. at *2. The Owner's 

Case 4:18-cv-03425-KAW Document 31 Filed 10/05/18 Page 6 of 11
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Contract also stated that the subcontractor would be bound to the contractor by the same terms and 

conditions by which the contractor was bound to the prime contractor. Id. The district court 

found that this language was a clear and unequivocal reference to the Owner's Contract, and 

sufficient to incorporate all of the Contract Documents into the subcontract. Id.

Significantly, the subcontractor then argued that the Owner's Contract's forum selection 

clause was not incorporated into the subcontract because the forum selection clause stated that it 

applied only to "any legal dispute arising hereunder" and "matters arising under or in connection 

with this Agreement," and that "this language restricts application of the forum selection clause to 

disputes arising under the prime contract." Scott Co., 1994 WL 519493, at *4. The district court 

rejected this argument, explaining that "[u]nder California law, when one contract is incorporated 

into another, 'the original agreement and those referred to must be considered and construed as 

one.'" Id. (quoting Holbrook v. Fazio, 84 Cal. App. 2d 700, 701 (1948)). Thus, "[w]hen the forum 

selection clause is read as a part of the [s]ubcontract, 'This Agreement' refers to the [s]ubcontract," 

such that the forum selection clause applied." Id.

In their reply, Defendants do not appear to challenge the principles of Scott Co., or its 

conclusion that where a contract is incorporated into another, both agreements should be construed 

as one such that the dispute resolution clause of a prime contract would apply to the parties who 

signed a subcontract. Instead, Defendants argue that in the instant case, there is no incorporation 

of the entire Prime Contract because the integration is limited by § 1.2 of the Subcontract, which 

states: "The Prime contract is incorporated in this Subcontract by reference, insofar as it relates in 

any way, directly or indirectly, to the Work." (Defs.' Reply at 4.) Defendants interpret "Work" as 

referring to the "scope of work" only. (Id.) Based on that limited integration, Defendants point to 

John W. Johnson, Inc. v. Basic Construction Co., in which the D.C. Court of Appeals found that 

the subcontractor was not required to follow the prime contract's dispute procedures because the 

subcontract did not fully integrate the terms and conditions of the prime contract. 429 F.2d 764, 

772 (D.C. Cir. 1970). There, the subcontract only stated that the subcontractor agreed to perform 

all work required by the prime contract for furnishing and painting, in accordance with the 

requirements of the prime contract documents. Id. at 774-75. The Court of Appeals explained 

Case 4:18-cv-03425-KAW Document 31 Filed 10/05/18 Page 7 of 11
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

that while such terms incorporated the prime contract into the subcontract by reference, it was "for 

the limited purpose of specifying 'the work' to be performed." Id. at 775. The Court of Appeals 

further noted that the subcontractor had no rights under the prime contract. Id.

The Court finds that the instant case is distinguishable from John W. Johnson, Inc. because 

the Subcontract fully incorporates the Prime Contract beyond defining the scope of the work to be 

performed. Especially instructive is Dynamic Drywall, Inc. v. Walton Construction Co., No. 06-

1280-JTM, 2007 WL 164351 (D. Kan. Jan. 19, 2007). There, the district court found that the 

subcontract fully incorporated the prime contract, pointing out that § 1.1 of the subcontract 

"identifies as 'Subcontract Documents' both the subcontract itself and 'the Prime Contract, 

consisting of the Owner and Contractor and other Contract Documents enumerated therein;' and 

provides that those Subcontract Documents 'are fully a part of the Subcontract.'" Id. at *1. The 

subcontract also stated that the Subcontract Documents "'are as fully a part of the Subcontract as if 

attached to this Agreement or repeated herein. The Subcontract represents the entire and 

integrated agreement between the parties hereto . . . ." Id. Section 2.1 of the subcontract also 

stated that "[t]he Contractor shall have the benefit of all rights, remedies and redress against the 

Subcontractor which the Owner, under such documents, has against the Contractor, and the 

Subcontractor shall have the benefit of all rights, remedies and redress against the Contractor 

which the Contractor, under such documents, has against the Owner, insofar as applicable to this 

Subcontract." Id. After reviewing those terms, the district court concluded that such language 

was very broad and represented a "complete incorporation and adoption by the subcontract of 'all 

rights, remedies and redress' provided in the Prime Contract." Id. at *2. While the subcontractor 

argued that the subcontract included language incorporating the duties only "insofar as applicable 

to this Subcontract," the district court found that "this language fails to restrict the general 

language of the agreement which incorporates all of the documents together [and] provides that 

[the contractor] shall have the same rights against [the subcontractor] as the Owner of the project 

should have against [the contractor]." Thus, the district court held that the incorporating language 

was very broad, comparing the case to Scott Co. to conclude that the prime contract's forum 

selection clause applied to the subcontractor.

Case 4:18-cv-03425-KAW Document 31 Filed 10/05/18 Page 8 of 11
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Here, the Subcontract contains language that is precisely the same as that in Dynamic 

Drywall, Inc. Section 1.1 states that "[t]he Subcontract Documents consist of (1) this Agreement; 

(2) the Prime Contract," and other documents listed. Further, like Dynamic Drywall, § 1.1 goes on 

to state: "All of these documents form and constitute the 'Subcontract', and are as fully a part of 

this Agreement as if attached to this Agreement or repeated herein. The Subcontract represents 

the entire and integrated agreement between the Parties . . . ." Section 2.1 likewise provides that 

"[t]he Contractor shall have the benefit of all rights, remedies and redress against the 

Subcontractor which the Owner, under such documents, has against the Contractor, and the 

Subcontractor shall have the benefit of all rights, remedies and redress against the Contractor 

which the Contractor, under such documents, has against the Owner, insofar as applicable to this 

Subcontract." Compare with Dynamic Drywall, 2007 WL 164351, at *1; Scott Co., 1994 WL 

519493, at *2. Such language clearly shows that the Subcontract intended that the dispute 

provisions of the Prime Contract would apply between the subcontractor and the general 

contractor, as such provisions would fall under the "rights, remedies, and redress" that the 

subcontract expressly reserves for the parties.

Section 1.2 of the Subcontract, which Defendants rely on, is not contrary, nor does it limit 

the incorporation of the Prime Contract to the scope of work only. Notably, § 1.2 states that the 

term "Work" is further defined in Exhibit B. Exhibit B, in turn, discusses the "Scope of Work," 

which is shorthanded as "Scope," not "Work." (Subcontract, Exh. B ¶ I.) This demonstrates that 

the term "Work" is broader than just the scope of the work. 

Because the Subcontract fully integrates and incorporates the Prime Contract, such that 

both must be "considered and construed as one," the Court finds that the Prime Contract's dispute 

resolution procedures would apply to the claim at issue, even if Plaintiff was not a signatory to the 

Prime Contract. See Scott Co., 1994 WL 519493, at *4; see also Boys Club of San Fernando 

Valley, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 6 Cal. App. 4th 1266, 1271-73 (1992) (concluding that "by 

the language in its bond incorporating the contract Fidelity intended, and agreed, to be bound by 

the arbitration provision in the contract even though it was not a party to the contract" where the 

bond had "expressly declare[d] that the contract is made a part of the bond and the terms of the 

Case 4:18-cv-03425-KAW Document 31 Filed 10/05/18 Page 9 of 11
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

contract are incorporated into the bond").

D. Mediation Requirement

Finally, Defendants argue that the Prime Contract's dispute resolution provision does not 

apply because the parties have not satisfied the mediation requirement. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 

7; Defs.' Reply at 5.) Again, the Prime Contract sets out the manner of dispute resolution "[f]or 

any Claim subject to, but not resolved by mediation pursuant to Section 15.2 of AIA Document 

A201-2007." (Prime Contract § 13.2.) Section 15.2 of the AIA Document, in turn, states that 

where any Claim still exists following a Cool Down Period, "the parties agree to mediate such 

claim, dispute or other controversy, with such mediation to be held in the county where the Project 

is located, with the Parties sharing the cost of the mediator equally." Section 15.2 further states 

that "mediation shall be a condition precedent to litigation or arbitration."

Defendants contend that the Prime Contract's dispute resolution provision only applies if 

the parties satisfy the mediation requirement. (Defs.' Reply at 5.) The Court disagrees. Whether 

or not a claim is subject to mediation, as stated by the Prime Contract, is separate from whether 

the parties actually went to mediation before being able to file a lawsuit in any jurisdiction, as 

required by the AIA Document. Mediation is a condition precedent to litigating the case; it is not 

a condition precedent to whether the Prime Contract's dispute resolution applies in the first place. 

The fact that the claim at issue should have been mediated satisfies the Prime Contract's 

requirement that the claim is subject to mediation, and thus the Prime Contract provides an 

alternative forum to the Subcontract's selection of the county in which the Project is located.

3

///

///

///

///

///

///

 

3

This finding, however, would not necessarily preclude Defendants from moving to require that 

the case be mediated before it can proceed, as required by the AIA Document.

Case 4:18-cv-03425-KAW Document 31 Filed 10/05/18 Page 10 of 11
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the Prime Contract's dispute resolution 

procedure applies to the instant case, and DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 5, 2018

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 4:18-cv-03425-KAW Document 31 Filed 10/05/18 Page 11 of 11