Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02518/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02518-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JACKY BROWN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

D. COX, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-2518-EFB P 

ORDER GRANTING IFP AND SCREENING 

COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. He has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915 and a request for appointment of counsel. 

I. Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

 Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). 

Accordingly, by separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect 

and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1) and (2). 

II. Request for Appointment of Counsel 

Plaintiff requests the appointment of counsel. District courts lack authority to require 

counsel to represent indigent prisoners in section 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. 

Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In exceptional circumstances, the court may request an attorney 

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to voluntarily to represent such a plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 

F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). 

When determining whether “exceptional circumstances” exist, the court must consider the 

likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro 

se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 

(9th Cir. 2009). Having considered those factors, the court finds there are no exceptional 

circumstances in this case. 

III. Screening Requirement and Standards 

 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion 

of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). 

 A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the 

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 

While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8, 

its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

 To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked 

assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. 

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 Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a 

claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 

IV. Screening Order 

Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) alleges the following: (1) that defendant Cox violated 

plaintiff’s First Amendment right to speech when he told plaintiff to refrain from shouting 

“Omaha!” along with the other inmates in the welding shop; (2) that defendant Cox retaliated 

against plaintiff and violated plaintiff’s due process rights when he issued a rules violation report 

against plaintiff for battery on a peace officer even though defendant Cox could not identify the 

inmates responsible for the battery; (3) that defendants Martines and Davis violated plaintiff’s 

Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when they interviewed plaintiff as part of their 

investigation of the rules violation report; (4) that defendants McVey and Shirley violated 

plaintiff’s due process rights when they deferred the Institutional Classification Committee’s 

review of the rules violation report; and (5) that defendant Mahoney violated plaintiff’s First 

Amendment right to exercise freedom of religion when he denied plaintiff access to his religious 

beads and cross while temporarily housed in administrative segregation. Under the applicable 

standards discussed below, these allegations are either not sufficient to state a proper claim for 

relief or are improperly joined. To proceed, plaintiff must file an amended complaint. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). An individual defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the 

facts establish the defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal 

connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. 

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See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 

(9th Cir. 1978). That is, plaintiff may not sue any official on the theory that the official is liable 

for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 

(2009). 

To state a First Amendment free speech claim, plaintiff must plead that his speech was 

constitutionally protected, that defendant’s actions would chill an ordinary person from 

continuing with the speech, and that defendant’s actions were motivated by the speech. 

Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300-1301 (9th Cir. 

1999). Protests and complaints that involve a direct confrontation with prison officials enjoy 

limited constitutional protection because such behavior may present the danger of a disturbance. 

See, e.g., Lockett v. Suardini, 526 F.3d 866, 874 (6th Cir. 2008) (prisoner’s act of calling hearing 

officer a “foul and corrupted bitch” not protected speech); Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1277 

(11th Cir. 2008) (prisoner's “false and insubordinate remarks” not protected speech). A 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation regulation explicitly prohibits such 

potentially disruptive behavior and/or speech: 

Inmates, parolees and employees will not openly display disrespect or contempt 

for others in any manner intended to or reasonably likely to disrupt orderly 

operations within the institutions or to incite or provoke violence. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3004(b). “When a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ 

constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological 

interests.” Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. at 89 (1987); see also Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-

16 (9th Cir. 1994) (prison officials have a strong interest in “preserving institutional order and 

discipline.”). 

Here, plaintiff claims that defendant Cox violated his First Amendment right to speech 

when Cox told him not to say “Omaha!” in the welding shop. ECF No. 1 at 3, 19 (Ex. A). The 

incident report (which is attached to the complaint) and is referenced by plaintiff in his allegations 

demonstrates that the inmates’ shouting of “Omaha!” was part of a larger disturbance in the 

welding shop. According to the report, about twenty inmates shouted “Omaha!” in unison when 

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Cox entered the welding area. When Cox inquired as to its meaning, an inmate told him it was 

“none of [his] business.” Thereafter, one of the inmates intentionally bumped into Cox, and the 

other inmates in the classroom began laughing and yelling out derogatory comments directed at 

Cox. Under these circumstances, plaintiff has not shown that he was engaged in protected speech 

or that Cox’s instructions to plaintiff were not reasonably related to a legitimate penological 

purpose. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a First Amendment free speech claim. 

To state a viable First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must allege five elements: 

“(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) 

that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First 

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). If plaintiff intends to assert a 

retaliation claim, he must specifically identify the protected conduct at issue, name the defendant 

who took adverse action against him, and plead that the allegedly adverse action was taken 

“because of” plaintiff’s protected conduct. In this case, the complaint does not show that plaintiff 

was engaged in protected conduct or that Cox took any adverse action against plaintiff because of 

any protected conduct. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Cox’s issuance of the rules violation report, and defendants 

McVey and Shirley’s response to the rules violation report, deprived him of due process. To state 

a claim for violation of the right to procedural due process, plaintiff must allege facts showing: 

“(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of 

adequate procedural protections.” Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003). In the 

context of a disciplinary proceeding where a liberty interest is at stake, due process requires that 

“some evidence” support the disciplinary decision. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 

(1985). The inmate must also receive: “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) 

an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses 

and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of 

the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Id. at 454 (citing Wolff v. 

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974). The complaint fails to state a due process claim 

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because the allegations do not show that plaintiff was deprived of any constitutionally guaranteed 

procedural protections in connection with the rules violation report. 

Plaintiff also claims that his right against self-incrimination was violated. The Fifth 

Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 

witness against himself.” U.S. CONST., amend. V. The Fifth Amendment “can be asserted in any 

proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it 

protects against any disclosures which the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal 

or could lead to other evidence that might be so used.” United States v. Bodwell, 66 F.3d 1000, 

1001 (9th Cir. 1995) (quotations and citation omitted). Plaintiff’s allegations do not show that his 

right against self-incrimination was implicated, or that any statements of his were used against 

him in a criminal proceeding. 

Plaintiff also claims that defendant Mahoney violated his First Amendment right to the 

free exercise of his religion. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides, 

“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. U.S. CONST., amend. I. 

Only those beliefs that are sincerely held and religious in nature are entitled to constitutional 

protection. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff must show that 

the activity is both “sincerely held” and “rooted in religious belief”). An inmate’s right to exercise 

religious practices, “may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to 

maintain prison security.” McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). 

Four factors are relevant in determining whether a prison regulation impermissibly infringes on 

an inmate’s constitutional rights: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection between the 

prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it”; (2) “whether 

there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates”; (3) “the 

impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates 

and on the allocation of prison resources generally”; and (4) the “absence of ready alternatives.” 

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987) (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff’s vague and 

conclusory allegations fail to state a claim for relief under these standards. Such a claim is also 

not sufficiently related to the other claims asserted in this action, as they involve discrete events 

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that do not arise out the same occurrence and involve a common question of law or fact.1 See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Unrelated claims must be pursued in separate actions. 

For these reasons, the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff will be 

granted leave to file an amended complaint, if he can allege a cognizable legal theory against a 

proper defendant and sufficient facts in support of that cognizable legal theory. Lopez v. Smith, 

203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (district courts must afford pro se litigants an 

opportunity to amend to correct any deficiency in their complaints). Should plaintiff choose to 

file an amended complaint, the amended complaint shall clearly set forth the claims and 

allegations against each defendant. Any amended complaint must cure the deficiencies identified 

above and also adhere to the following requirements: 

Any amended complaint must identify as a defendant only persons who personally 

participated in a substantial way in depriving him of a federal constitutional right. Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act he is 

legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). 

It must also contain a caption including the names of all defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). 

Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging new, unrelated claims. George 

v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it so that it is complete in itself 

without reference to any earlier filed complaint. E.D. Cal. L.R. 220. This is because an amended 

complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is filed, the 

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 A plaintiff may properly assert multiple claims against a single defendant. Fed. Rule 

Civ. P. 18. In addition, a plaintiff may join multiple defendants in one action where “any right to 

relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out 

of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences” and “any question 

of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). 

Unrelated claims against different defendants must be pursued in separate lawsuits. See George v. 

Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). This rule is intended “not only to prevent the sort of 

morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners 

pay the required filing fees – for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of 

frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g).” Id.

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earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Forsyth v. Humana, 114 

F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (the “‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter 

being treated thereafter as non-existent.’”) (quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967)). 

The court cautions plaintiff that failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, this court’s Local Rules, or any court order may result in this action being dismissed. 

See E.D. Cal. L.R. 110. 

V. Summary of Order 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 6) is granted. 

2. Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 2) is denied. 

3. Plaintiff shall pay the statutory filing fee of $350. All payments shall be collected 

in accordance with the notice to the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith. 

4. The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend within 30 days. The amended 

complaint must bear the docket number assigned to this case and be titled “Third 

Amended Complaint.” Failure to comply with this order will result in dismissal of 

this action for failure to prosecute. 

Dated: August 18, 2016. 

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