Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-02436/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-02436-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Armando Lopez, Jr., 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV 15-02436-PHX-SPL (DMF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Armando Lopez, Jr. (“Petitioner” or “Lopez”), is currently incarcerated 

in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Douglas in Douglas, Arizona, serving an 

imprisonment sentence totaling forty two (42) years arising from convictions in the Pinal 

County Superior Court, case #CR200601641, for two counts of attempted murder and 

one count of burglary. Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”) (Doc. 1) on December 1, 2015. In a December 

29, 2015, Order (Doc. 4), the Court required an answer to the Petition. Respondents filed 

a Limited Answer (Doc. 10) asserting that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely 

under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), and in any event, 

Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Petitioner filed a Reply 

(Doc. 11) as well as a supplement to his Petition (Doc. 12) consisting of several state 

court documents, and the matter is fully briefed. For the reasons below, the Court 

recommends that the Petition be denied as untimely because it was filed on November 

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24, 2015—several years after AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations expired. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Proceedings Leading to Conviction and Sentence 

On September 28, 2006, in the Pinal County Superior Court, case #CR200601641, 

a grand jury charged Lopez with two counts of attempted first degree murder and one 

count of first-degree burglary from events on September 25, 2006 (Doc. 1 at p. 20). The 

Arizona Court of Appeals summed up the remaining trial court proceedings: 

The state additionally alleged fourteen aggravating factors and that 

the charged offenses were dangerous because they involved the use of a 

dangerous weapon—the machete—and the intentional or knowing 

infliction of serious injury. After a four-day trial, the jury found Lopez 

guilty of attempted first-degree murder of R., attempted second-degree 

murder of J. as a lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree murder, 

and first-degree burglary. Additionally, the jury found the offenses were 

dangerous and the state had proven seven of the alleged aggravating 

factors. At sentencing, the trial court found an additional aggravating 

factor—that the crimes were “committed in a very cruel manner.” The 

court sentenced Lopez to enhanced, aggravated prison terms of twenty-one 

years for each conviction, with the sentence for attempted first-degree 

murder to be served consecutively to Lopez’s sentence for attempted 

second-degree murder and concurrently with his sentence for burglary. 

(Exhibit C, Doc. 10-1 at p. 74, 76-77).1

 (internal marks omitted). 

 B. The Convicted Conduct/Crimes 

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized Petitioner’s crimes as follows:2

Lopez separated from his wife, R., in May 2006. In early September 

of that year, R. began dating J., who occasionally spent nights at R.’s home, 

where she lived with her and Lopez’s three-year old son and her six-yearold daughter from a previous relationship. On one occasion, after Lopez 

 

1

 The referenced alphabetical exhibits were submitted with Respondents’ Limited Answer, Doc. 10. The document and page references herein are to this Court’s electronic 

record. 

2

 The appellate court’s stated facts are entitled to the presumption of correctness. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam) (“In habeas proceedings in federal court, the factual findings of state courts are presumed to be correct.”); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 763, n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument that the statement of facts in an Arizona Supreme Court opinion should not be afforded the presumption of correctness). 

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had returned their son to R.’s home, R. noticed that one of the remotecontrol devices for her garage door was missing. In early September, on a 

night when J. was staying at R.’s home, Lopez telephoned R. at about 3:00 

a.m., demanding to know whose car was parked outside her house. In midSeptember, J.’s car was vandalized while parked outside R.’s house. On 

another occasion, Lopez telephoned R. and “described to her what she was 

doing in her own house.” 

On September 24, J. and R. returned to R.’s house from a weekend 

trip and put the children to bed. They locked the home’s exterior doors but 

left the door from the garage unlocked. Early the next morning, J. and R. 

heard a “light knocking” on the master bedroom door but attributed the 

noise to R.’s dog. Approximately half an hour later, R. got up and went to 

her daughter’s bedroom to awaken her for school. As her daughter opened 

her eyes, she got a “terrified look on her face” and said, “Oh, no, Mommy. 

Daddy.” When R. turned, she saw Lopez standing behind her, holding a 

machete, with which he then attacked her, hitting her in the back of her 

head. She fell to the floor, but Lopez continued to strike her with the 

machete, wounding her arms, hands, and torso. Hearing R. and her daughter 

screaming, J. ran to the bedroom and saw Lopez “laying into R. viciously” 

with the machete. J. knocked Lopez away from R., and Lopez then struck J. 

twice on the head with the machete. After a struggle, J. wrested the machete 

from Lopez and hit him with it. Lopez fled the house through the door to 

the garage and began to drive away in R.’s car. After the car became “hung 

up on a rock” in the front yard, Lopez fled on foot. 

Law enforcement officers found duct tape and the missing remotecontrol device in R.’s garage and discovered R.’s telephone line had been 

cut. Officers arrested Lopez two days later after finding his truck, bearing a 

license plate from another vehicle, parked at a resort. During a search of 

Lopez’s residence, they found the license plate for Lopez’s truck and a 

receipt showing he recently had purchased a machete and duct tape. Lopez 

also had attempted to obtain a handgun from a former wife several days 

before attacking R. and J. 

(Exhibit C, Doc. 10-1 at p. 74, 75-76). 

C. Appeal and PCR Proceedings 

Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

arguing: (1) insufficient evidence supported his conviction for attempted second-degree 

murder; and (2) the trial court relied on improper aggravating factors at sentencing 

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(Exhibit A, Doc. 10-1 at p. 2). The court of appeals rejected Petitioner’s claims and 

affirmed his convictions and sentences in a memorandum decision filed June 24, 2010. 

(Exhibit C, Doc. 10-1 at p. 74-90). Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the 

Arizona Supreme Court despite having been granted a continuance to do so until 

November 8, 2010 (Doc. 1 at p. 3; Exh. S, Doc. 10-2 at p. 210), and the court of appeals 

issued an order and mandate on December 13, 2010 (Exh. C, Doc. 10-1 at p. 71; Exh. S, 

Doc. 10-2 at p. 210). 

Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief on January 13, 2011 (Exhibit D, 

Doc. 10-1 at p. 91-96). The superior court appointed post-conviction counsel, who filed a 

notice stating that she thoroughly reviewed the record and could not find any colorable 

claims to raise in the proceeding (Exhibit E, Doc. 10-1 at p. 97-100). Accordingly, postconviction counsel requested an extension of time for Petitioner to file a pro se petition 

for post-conviction relief (id.), which the superior court granted (Exhibit F, Doc. 10-1 at 

p. 118-119). Petitioner filed a “Request for Change of Counsel Due to Irreconcilable 

[sic] Conflicts of Representation” (Exhibit G, Doc. 10-1 at p. 120-126). The superior 

court appointed a different attorney to be advisory counsel for Petitioner and informed 

Petitioner that he could “present any issues he wishes” in his pro se petition (Exhibit H, 

Doc. 10-1 at p. 127-129; Doc. 12 at p. 3). The superior court also granted Petitioner an 

additional extension of time to file a proper pro se petition (Id.). However, Petitioner 

chose not to file a pro se petition, and the superior court dismissed the post-convictionrelief proceeding on March 16, 2012 (Exhibit I, Doc. 10-1 at p. 130-132; Exhibit L, Doc. 

10-1 at p. 142-144). Despite Petitioner’s assertion in the Petition that he appealed this to 

the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 1 at p. 5), the record reflects that Petitioner did not 

timely appeal, and, as a result, the dismissal was affirmed. (See Exhibits J–O, Doc. 10-1 

at p. 133-151). 

Petitioner’s supplement to his Petition in this matter indicates that on September 3, 

2014, he filed another petition for post-conviction relief with the Pinal County Superior 

Court, claiming newly discovered evidence, and before that, he filed one or more 

untimely petitions and/or pleadings (Doc. 12 at p. 2; Exhibit L, Doc. 10-1 at p. 142-144; 

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Exhibit T, Doc. 10-2 at p. 211-213). The purported newly discovered evidence for the 

untimely September 3, 2014, petition was a crime committed by one of Petitioner’s 

victims years after Petitioner’s convictions (Doc. 12 at p. 2). This crime by the alleged 

victim had received press in Arizona in May, 2012 (Doc. 1 at p. 14-15). On September 

19, 2014, the superior court dismissed Petitioner’s untimely petition for post-conviction 

relief finding “that no newly discovered evidence exists that would provide a basis to 

overturn his convictions and July 2009 sentence” (Doc. 12 at p. 2). 

II. PETITIONER’S HABEAS CLAIMS 

On November 24, 20153

, Petitioner filed the present habeas petition (Doc. 1). On 

December 29, 2015, this Court ordered Respondents to answer the Petition, but it 

permitted Respondents to file an answer limited to affirmative defenses (Doc. 4.) In 

Ground One, Petitioner alleges that his Sixth Amendment right and his due process right 

to a fair trial was violated based on his possible incompetence at the time of the crime or 

at the time of trial (Doc. 1 at p. 6). In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that his due 

process rights to a fair trial were violated by prosecutorial misconduct of vouching and 

vindictive prosecution (Doc. 1 at p. 7). In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that the 

indictment was multiplicitous in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 

Amendment (Doc. 1 at p. 8). 

Respondent’s assert that the Petition should be dismissed because: 

(1) Lopez untimely filed the petition, more than 3 years after the statute of 

limitations period from the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (“AEDPA”) had expired; and (2) Lopez failed to properly exhaust 

any of his claims in the state courts, and, as a result, all three grounds are 

procedurally defaulted, without excuse. 

(Doc. 10 at 2). Petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 11) and a supplement to his Petition 

consisting of several state court documents (Doc. 12). 

 

3

 This is the date Lopez delivered the Petition to prison officials (Doc. 1 at p. 11), as indicated by the date he inscribed next to his signature, see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 

266, 270-71 (1988) (stating a legal document is deemed filed on the date a petitioner delivers it to the prison authorities for filing by mail); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 

1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying the mailbox rule in the context of a habeas petition). 

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III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

A. AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations and Statutory Tolling

A threshold issue for the Court is whether the habeas petition is time-barred by the 

statute of limitations. The time-bar issue must be resolved before considering other 

procedural issues or the merits of any habeas claim. See White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 

921–22 (9th Cir. 2002). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”) governs Petitioner’s habeas petition because he filed it after April 24, 1996, 

the effective date of the AEDPA. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 267 n.3 (2000)). 

 1. One Year Limitations Period 

Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court 

conviction is required to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the 

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

Petitioner filed a timely direct appeal, and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed 

his convictions and sentences on June 24, 2010 (Exhibit C, Doc. 10-1 at p. 74). Lopez 

did not file a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court despite having been 

granted an extension of time to do so through November 8, 2010 (Exhibit S, Doc. 10-2 at 

p. 210). Consequently, Lopez’s convictions became final on November 8, 2010, the date 

he could no longer seek review in the state supreme court. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 

U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 641, 653–54 (2011) (“Because [the petitioner] did not appeal to the 

State’s highest court, his judgment became final when his time for seeking review with 

the State’s highest court expired.”); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a) (requiring a petition for 

review to the Arizona Supreme Court to be filed within 30 days); State v. Savage, 573 

P.2d 1388, 1389 (Ariz. 1978) (holding that Rule 1.3 from the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure allows 5 additional days for mailing). AEDPA’s one-year statute of 

limitations period, therefore, started running on the next day, November 9, 2010, and 

expired one year later unless a timely PCR proceeding was filed, which would have 

tolled the limitations period. See section III(A)(2), infra. 

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 2. Statutory Tolling 

 Under the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time that a 

“properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also 

Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A state petition that is not filed 

within the state’s required time limit, however, is not “properly filed,” and is thus not 

entitled to statutory tolling. Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 6–7 (2007) (finding that 

inmate’s untimely state post-conviction petition was not “properly filed” under AEDPA 

tolling provision); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for 

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”). 

On January 13, 2011, which was the 66th day after AEDPA’s one year statute of 

limitations period began running on November 9, 2010, Petitioner filed a notice of postconviction relief in state court (Exhibit D, Doc. 10-1 at p. 91-96). Petitioner’s notice was 

timely under Arizona law. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a); Savage, 573 P.2d at 1389. 

Thus, AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations began tolling as an operation of statute on 

January 13, 2011. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Isley v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corrections, 383 

F.3d 1054, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that statutory tolling for Arizona cases 

begins on the date the notice of post-conviction relief is filed). Petitioner’s postconviction-relief proceeding remained pending in state court and continued tolling 

AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. On March 16, 2012, the superior court filed its 

order dismissing the proceeding (Exhibit I, Doc. 10-1 at p. 130-132). 

Petitioner did not timely appeal the dismissal (see Exhibits J–O, Doc. 10-1 at p. 

133-151). Therefore, the date the superior court dismissed the proceeding is the proper 

end date for purposes of statutory tolling. See Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1074 

& n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a post-conviction relief proceeding, which occurred 

after petitioner “was entitled to, and had, a full round of direct review,” would toll 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations until the petition was summarily dismissed by the 

superior court); cf. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191 (2006) (“The time that an 

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application for state post-conviction review is ‘pending’ includes the period between (1) a 

lower court’s adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a notice of appeal, 

provided that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state law.”); but see Celaya 

v. Stewart, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1053 (D. Ariz. 2010) (which can be construed to add an 

additional 35 days in which Petitioner could have sought relief from the Arizona Court of 

Appeals pertaining to the trial court’s dismissal of his pcr proceeding). AEDPA’s 

limitations period began running again on the following day, March 17, 2012 and expired 

300 days later on January 11, 2013.4 Petitioner did not file his Petition in this Court until 

November 24, 2015, which was several years later. 

 Petitioner’s untimely PCR petitions (see Doc. 12 at p. 2; Exhibit L, Doc. 10-1 at p. 

142-144; Exhibit T, Doc. 10-2 at p. 211-213) did not statutorily toll the running of the 

limitations period because an untimely petition is not a “properly-filed” application, and 

does not toll the running of the statute. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 

(2005) (“When a post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of 

the matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2)”) (internal quotation omitted); Bonner v. Carey, 

425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, because the limitations period had 

already expired, Petitioner could not restart the clock by filing a subsequent PCR 

application. “A state-court petition . . . that is filed following the expiration of the 

limitations period cannot toll that period because there is no period remaining to be 

tolled.” Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). Further, a second PCR proceeding that is 

deemed untimely does not toll the time between the first and second PCR proceedings. 

Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, Petitioner was 

required to file his federal habeas petition by January 11, 2013, absent any equitable 

tolling. See section III(A)(3), infra. 

 

4

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 3. Equitable Tolling 

 The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of 

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645–46 

(2010). However, for equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in 

his way” to prevent him from timely filing a federal habeas petition. Id. at 649 (quoting 

Pace v. DiGuglielma, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). “The diligence required for equitable 

tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” Holland, 560 

U.S. at 653 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Whether to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and 

[the petitioner] ‘bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” 

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations 

omitted); see also Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that 

equitable tolling is “unavailable in most cases,” and “the threshold necessary to trigger 

equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) 

(citations and internal emphasis omitted). Petitioner must also establish a “causal 

connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file a timely 

petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Petitioner argues he should be excused from AEPDA’s one-year statute of 

limitations period based on information that he claims he “recently” learned “about the 

lead detective” in his case (Doc. 1 at p. 11). Yet, Petitioner does not identify the 

information, attempt to explain its relevance to his case, or say when he became aware of 

the information. Instead, Petitioner attaches an apparent news article dated January 7, 

2007, regarding allegations of sexual misconduct between the investigator and a witness 

in an investigation unrelated to Petitioner (Doc. 1 at p. 16-17). Petitioner was convicted 

and sentenced in 2009; accordingly, it is unclear how the news article could constitute 

recent information justifying equitable tolling. Further, the record shows that on April 9, 

2009, trial counsel questioned the new case investigator at the jury trial and the new 

investigator testified that the original investigator was no longer with the department 

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(Doc. 1 at p. 12-13; Doc. 10-2 at p. 178). Thus, Petitioner had adequate information to 

timely raise any issue related to the original investigator in the original trial court 

proceedings and well before even the state court appeal and post-conviction proceedings. 

Petitioner also states that he is entitled to equitable tolling because his “legal work 

was in transit” (Doc. 1 at 11). Attached to the Petition is a letter dated September 13, 

2013, about a lockdown and other circumstances that made paperwork and legal help 

unavailable for several weeks in 2013 (Doc. 1 at p. 34). This does not comprise 

sufficient basis for equitable tolling in this habeas proceeding. 

 A petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of the 

law, or lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute 

extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 

448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication 

is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”); see also

Ballesteros v. Schriro, CIV-06-675-PHX-EHC (MEA), 2007 WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. 

Feb. 26, 2007) (a petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation 

during the applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not constitute 

extraordinary circumstances). Further, a prisoner’s “proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and 

exceptional’ circumstance because it is typical of those bringing a § 2254 claim.” Felder 

v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000). 

In Ramirez v. Yates, the petitioner argued that he had limited access to the law 

library and copy machine during the period in which he remained in administrative 

segregation. Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009). In denying equitable 

tolling for that period of time, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “[o]rdinary prison 

limitations on [petitioner’s] access to the law library and copier (quite unlike the denial 

altogether of access to his personal legal papers) were neither ‘extraordinary’ nor made it 

‘impossible’ for him to file his petition in a timely manner. Given even the most 

common day-to-day security restrictions in prison, concluding otherwise would permit 

the exception to swallow the rule—according to [petitioner’s] theory, AEDPA’s 

limitations period would be tolled for the duration of any and every prisoner’s stay in 

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administrative segregation, and likely under a far broader range of circumstances as 

well.” Id.; see also Gutierrez-Valencia v. Ryan, No. CV-12-01318-PHX-JAT, 2014 WL 

1762978, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2014) (where petitioner did not allege a complete lack of 

access to his legal file, only his being housed in lock down status in a maximum security 

facility, court held that “Petitioner has not provided this Court with any specific details 

regarding what legal materials he was seeking and how they would be of assistance in his 

habeas filing . . . [and] Petitioner does not dispute that his lock down status is an ordinary 

prison limitation.”). Cf. Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that 

lack of access to Spanish language legal materials or assistance could entitle habeas 

petitioner to equitable tolling). 

As acknowledged by Respondent, Petitioner has also attached documents 

referencing that one of his victims was convicted of and sentenced for child molestation 

of Petitioner’s child in 2012 (Doc. 1 at p. 14-15, 18-19, 27-28). The Court agrees with 

Respondent that: 

This fact, however, does not entitle Lopez to equitable tolling. At best, it 

might constitute an event that triggered a separate limitations period. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (stating that AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period 

runs from “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence”). But the victim’s molestation conviction is not the factual 

predicate of any claim presented by Lopez in the instant petition. (See Doc. 

1, at 6-8.) Thus, it is irrelevant. 

(Doc. 10 at p. 11).5

 

 Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. 

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 

1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of 

limitations on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that 

 

5 See also Doc. 10 at p. 11, footnote 10, which reasoning the Court also adopts: “Lopez may be attempting to argue the victim’s molestation conviction would somehow 

support an ‘extreme emotional defense.’ (See Doc. 1, at 6, 18-19, 27.) Lopez, however, pursued an ‘extreme emotional defense’ at trial based on proffered facts that were completely unrelated to the victim’s eventual conviction for molestation (id. at 22-26); 

thus, the victim’s subsequent conviction is immaterial.” 

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equitable tolling is appropriate.”). 

Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of showing extraordinary circumstances or 

reasonable diligence that would justify equitable tolling. Additionally, the record does 

not reveal any extraordinary circumstances that prevented Petitioner from filing a timely 

federal habeas corpus petition. Because Petitioner has not presented circumstances and 

met his burden that would justify equitably tolling the AEDPA statute of limitations and 

there is no extraordinary circumstance reflected in the record which prevented the timely 

filing of a federal habeas corpus petition, the Petition is untimely and the Court will not 

consider Respondents’ alternative grounds for denying habeas corpus relief. See White v. 

Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921–22 (9th Cir. 2002) (whether a petition is barred by the statute 

of limitations is a threshold issue that must be resolved before considering other 

procedural issues or the merits of individual claims). 

IV. CONCLUSION

 Petitioner filed the pending Petition several years after the expiration of the 

AEDPA statute of limitations, and statutory and equitable tolling do not render the 

petition timely. Accordingly, the Petition is untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Because the Petition is untimely, the Court does not consider Respondents’ 

alternative grounds for denying habeas corpus relief. The Court will therefore 

recommend that the petition be denied and dismissed. 

Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the District Judge’s 

judgment, the District Judge’s decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the 

reasoning set forth herein, reasonable jurists would not find it debatable whether the 

District Court was correct in its procedural ruling. Accordingly, to the extent the Court 

adopts this Report and Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability 

should be denied. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

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leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within 

which to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72. 

 Dated this 14th day of November, 2016. 

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

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