Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02416/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02416-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Mayra Serna, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-02416-PHX-JZB

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees 

Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. (Doc. 38.) For the reasons below, the Court 

will grant Plaintiff’s Motion. 

I. Background 

On December 10, 2010, Plaintiff Mayra Serna filed an application for 

Supplemental Security Income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act on 

behalf of her minor child R.S.S. (Doc. 34 at 1.) Following the initial denial and denial 

upon reconsideration, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision finding 

R.S.S. not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff 

appealed this decision to the Appeals Council, which denied review. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff 

then filed an action for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the 

Social Security Administration (SSA). (Id. at 1.) 

 On March 31, 2015, the Court vacated the SSA’s decision and remanded to the 

SSA for further proceedings. (Id. at 16.) More specifically, the Court found that the ALJ 

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erred in weighing the opinions of Dr. Guzman, R.S.S.’s treating psychiatrist, for three 

reasons. (Id. at 9-11.) First, the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons 

supported by substantial evidence for not giving Dr. Guzman’s opinions controlling 

weight. (Id. at 9-10.) Second, the ALJ erred in affording substantial weight to the 

opinions of non-examining sources because those opinions did not consider all of the 

relevant evidence. (Id. at 10.) Third, the Court found the ALJ erred in failing to 

determine whether Dr. Guzman’s opinions were nonetheless entitled to some deference 

even if not entitled to controlling weight. (Id. at 10-11.) Separately, the Court also held 

that the ALJ erred by failing to obtain a complete case evaluation from a qualified 

specialist based on the entire record. (Id. at 12-14.) 

 Plaintiff now moves for an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Equal Access 

to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Plaintiff seeks a total of $6,963.65 in fees 

and argues that Defendant’s position was not substantially justified. (Doc. 42 at 2.) 

Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s Motion, arguing that the Court should not award fees 

because “a reasonable person could think that the government’s position—both the ALJ’s 

decision and the Commissioner’s litigation position—was correct as it had a reasonable 

basis in fact and law.” (Doc. 41 at 4.) 

II. Legal Standard

 The EAJA provides that the Court: 

shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other 

expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the 

court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). An order from the Court reversing the decision of the SSA 

and remanding for further proceedings, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), 

makes the claimant a “prevailing party” for purposes of the EAJA. Shalala v. Schaefer, 

509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); see also Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 

2001) (“An applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for the purposes 

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of the EAJA if the denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of whether 

disability benefits ultimately are awarded.”). 

 Because the EAJA creates a presumption that a prevailing party is entitled to fees, 

the government bears the burden of showing that its position was “substantially 

justified.” Tobeler v. Colvin, 749 F.3d 830, 832 (9th Cir. 2014). “Substantial justification 

means ‘justified in substance or in the main—that is, justified to a degree that could 

satisfy a reasonable person.’” Id. (quoting Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2013)). 

The government’s position “must have a reasonable basis both in law and fact.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). The “position of the United States” within the 

meaning of the EAJA statute includes “both the government’s litigation position and the 

underlying agency action giving rise to the civil action.” Id. “Where . . . the ALJ’s 

decision was reversed on the basis of procedural errors, the question is not whether 

[Defendant’s] position as to the merits of [Plaintiff’s] disability claim was substantially 

justified. Rather, the relevant question is whether [Defendant’s] decision to defend on 

appeal the procedural errors committed by the ALJ was substantially justified.” Shafer v. 

Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008). (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 

III. Analysis

 Defendant does not contest the amount of fees requested, but instead argues that 

its and the ALJ’s positions were substantially justified. (Docs. 41 at 3-6.) The Court 

disagrees. As the Court explained in its March 31, 2015 Order, the ALJ erred in failing 

to offer specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for not giving 

Dr. Guzman’s opinions controlling weight, based on a longstanding legal standard. See 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). The Court finds that Defendant’s decision to defend the 

ALJ’s failure to support his weighing of Dr. Guzman’s opinions was not substantially 

justified. See Shafer, 518 F.3d at 1072 (“The ALJ rejected a treating physician’s opinion 

in favor of a non-treating physician’s opinion without providing clear and convincing 

reasons, and committed several errors in assessing [Plaintiff’s] residual functional 

capacity. It follows a fortiori the government’s defense of the ALJ’s procedural errors 

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was not substantially justified, and [Plaintiff] is entitled to attorney’s fees under the 

EAJA.”); Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 570 n.11 (9th Cir. 1995) (expressing doubt that 

“the government’s decision to defend its actions in court would be substantially justified 

[when] the underlying administrative decision would not [be substantially justified]”). 

 Furthermore, with respect to the ALJ’s failure to have a medical expert evaluate 

Plaintiff’s case based on the entire record, the ALJ had a statutory duty to obtain such an 

evaluation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(I). As the Court noted in its March 31, 

2015 Order, at the time of the ALJ’s decision, the state agency consultants’ evaluations 

were more than eight months old and “a significant amount of relevant evidence [had 

been] added to the record.” (Doc. 34 at 13.) Although Defendant asserts that its defense 

of the ALJ on this point was substantially justified because “the subsequent record 

contained normal mental status examinations . . . and records from educational 

professionals establishing that R.S.[S] was at age and grade level and that they had no 

concerns about R.S.[S]’s communication, physical development, behavior, or social 

emotional functioning,” Defendant concedes that “the state agency consultants did not 

have the benefit of reviewing the whole record.” (Doc. 41 at 6.) Therefore, the Court 

finds that Defendant’s defense of the ALJ’s failure to have a medical expert evaluate 

Plaintiff’s case based on the entire record was not substantially justified. Because 

Defendant’s position was not substantially justified and Plaintiff is the prevailing party, 

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees. 

 Plaintiff is seeking $6,963.65 in attorneys’ fees. Defendant has not challenged the 

total amount of fees requested, the hourly rate, or the time expended for the work 

performed. The Court has reviewed the Itemization of Services attached to Plaintiff’s 

Motion and the work and fees discussed in her Reply, and finds the amounts are 

reasonable for this case. 

 Lastly, the check for EAJA fees shall be made payable to Plaintiff. See Astrue v. 

Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 589 (2010) (holding that a § 2412(d) fees award is payable to the 

litigant, not his attorney). The Court will order the check, payable to Plaintiff, be mailed 

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to Plaintiff’s counsel’s office. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees Pursuant 

to the Equal Access to Justice Act (Doc. 38) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded $6,963.65 in attorneys’ 

fees. This award shall be payable to Plaintiff and mailed to Plaintiff’s attorney. 

 Dated this 30th day of October, 2015. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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