Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01398/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01398-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405rs Review of HHS Decision (RSI)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD FRANK SCHUH,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL, COMMISSIONER 

OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No.: 18-cv-1398-GPC-AGS

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION: 

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; AND

(2) DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

[Dkt Nos. 13, 18]

INTRODUCTION

On June 25, 2018, Plaintiff Richard Schuh (“Plaintiff”), proceeding in forma 

pauperis and with counsel, filed this action pursuant to § 405(g) of the Social Security 

Act (“Act”), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the 

Social Security Administration (“Defendant” or “Commissioner”) in a claim for disability 

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insurance benefits under Title II of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 1 Dkt. No. 1, Compl. 

On October 22, 2018, Defendant filed an answer and lodged the administrative record 

(“AR”). Dkt. Nos. 10, 11. On December 14, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary 

judgment seeking reversal of Defendant’s denial of disability benefits or, alternatively, 

requesting remand for further administrative proceedings. Dkt. No. 13. On April 9, 

2019, Defendant filed a cross motion for summary judgment and an opposition to 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Dkt. Nos. 18 & 19. Plaintiff filed a response 

and a reply on May 8, 2019. Dkt. No. 22. 

On July 29, 2019, Magistrate Judge Andrew G. Schopler issued a report and 

recommendation (“Report”) recommending Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be

granted, that Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment be denied, and that the 

case be remanded for further proceedings. Dkt. No. 26. Magistrate Judge Schopler 

found that the Administrative Law Judge discounted the opinion of claimant’s treating 

doctor without considering various regulatory factors and that the error was not harmless. 

No objections were filed. After careful consideration of the pleadings and supporting 

documents, this Court ADOPTS in full the Magistrate Judge’s report, DENIES

Defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment, and GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment and directs that the case be remanded to the Social Security 

Administrator for further proceedings. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits 

under Title II of the Social Security Act, claiming disability beginning on July 2, 2012.

 

1 Plaintiff’s complaint invoked the Courts jurisdiction to “review a decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security denying Plaintiff's Application for Social Security Disability benefits [Title II] and 

Supplemental Security Income benefits [Title XVI] for lack of disability.” Compl. at 1. However, after 

a careful review of the record, this Court found the Plaintiff never requested Supplemental Security 

Income Benefits. Therefore, this Court focused its review solely on the Commissioner’s decision to 

deny Plaintiff Social Security Disability benefits under Title II of the Act. 

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AR 18, 29, 31, 46. Plaintiff’s claims were denied at the initial level and again upon 

reconsideration. Id. at 18. Plaintiff alleged disability based on low back pain. Id. at 21. 

On March 27, 2017, Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) MaryAnn Lunderman. Id. at 18. On April 21, 2017, 

the ALJ issued a written decision, finding the Plaintiff was not disabled as defined under 

Title II and Title VI of the Act. Id. at 18-25. On August 11, 2017, Plaintiff filed a 

request for appeal of the ALJ’s decision with the Appeals Council. Id. at 209-10. The 

Appeals Council reviewed the record and affirmed the ALJ’s decision, which became the 

final decision of the Commissioner on August 27, 2018. Compl. at 4. 

In his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed 

reversible error by: (1) finding that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to 

perform light work (Dkt. No. 13 at 3-5); 2 (2) failing to properly weigh the medical 

opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician (id. at 5-7); and (3) failing to consider Plaintiff’s 

reduction in productivity (id. at 7-8).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges disability as of July 2, 2012. AR 67, 151. In his application, he

claims disability due to: (1) back pain; and (2) foot pain. Id. at 69, 70, 76. Plaintiff has a 

history of back pain arising from a work-related injury in 2008 with subsequent back 

surgery in 2010. AR 21, 220. After 2010, Plaintiff continued to report significant low 

back pain and in March 2014, physical examination revealed tenderness in the paraspinal 

muscles, but there was no weakness or positive straight leg raise testing. Id. In May 

2014, Plaintiff presented to doctors with complaints of bilateral back pain extending into 

his feet and legs. AR 22, 231. Upon examination, Plaintiff had tenderness to palpation 

and an MRI showed evidence of neural encroachment. However, there was no nerve 

root compromise or stenosis and a normal range of motion in all directions. Plaintiff 

 

2 All citations to the record therein are based upon the pagination imprinted by the CM/ECF system.

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subsequently underwent epidural injections for pain in June 2014, and afterwards 

reported some relief from pain to the right calf and left foot. AR 22, 244. 

In January 2015, Plaintiff underwent a musculoskeletal evaluation, which was 

completed after the date last insured of March 31, 2014. At this examination, Plaintiff 

exhibited a slow gait, decreased range of motion in the cervical spine, and decreased 

range of motion in the lumbar spine. Id. at 22. Plaintiff was unable to heel-walk but had 

a normal range of motion in the lower extremities and strength. Id. During this time, 

there was no other treatment in the record. 

Plaintiff is also obese, with a body mass index ranging from 33.46 – 34.61 kg/m2

. 

I. Personal History

Plaintiff was fifty-six years old when he appeared before the ALJ. AR 24. He has 

a high-school education. Id. From October 1997 to October 2000, Plaintiff delivered 

newspapers; he was a pizza cook and delivery driver from January 2001 to March 2002; 

was a driver removing dead animals from July 2002 to April 2005; he worked as a 

service technician for a trailer supply company from April 2005 to June 2008; and finally 

was a a laborer from June to July 2012. Id. at 156-166, 171. He stopped working on July 

2, 2012 because of his medical condition. Id. at 151, 170.

II. Medical Evidence

a. Treating Physician Evidence

i. Raymond Deters III, D.C.

On March 3, 2012, Plaintiff saw Dr. Raymond Deters, a chiropractor, regarding 

multiple chronic spinal and extremity conditions caused from injuries over the years. AR 

287. Plaintiff complained of constant, severe head pain which occasionally progressed to 

migraines, bilateral severe shoulder pain and stiffness, tingling in the fingers on his right 

hand, constant, severe lower back pain that made sitting nearly impossible, and constant, 

severe pain in the lower thoracic spine. Id.

Dr. Deters noted that Plaintiff had previously undergone multiple surgeries, 

including fusion in the lumbar spine, right wrist surgery, nose surgery, had several 

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lipomas removed, and had cortisone injections for shoulder pain. Id. At that time, 

Plaintiff was taking Gabapentin, Baclofen, Nabunatone, Hydrocodone, and Somatryptan. 

Id. Plaintiff was unable to work or drive due to his severe pain and the medication he 

was required to take. Id. Dr. Deters diagnosed plaintiff with cervical and lumbar 

radiculopathy, multiple subluxations throughout the cervical, thoracis, lumbar and 

sacroiliac regions, spondylosis in multiple spinal levels, muscle spasms, and myalgia 

throughout the spinal muscles and rotator cuffs. Id. He recommended an aggressive 

course of chiropractic care to help restore more normal joint function in order to relieve 

the extreme irritation on his spinal nerves. Id. Dr. Deters also recommended rapid 

release treatments to break up the large amounts of fibrotic scar tissue that had built up in 

Plaintiff’s soft tissues. Id.

ii. William H. Buchner Jr., M.D.

On March 12, 2014, Plaintiff saw Dr. William H. Buchner Jr, a physician

specializing in Family Medicine. ALR 220. Dr. Buchner’s assessment indicated Plaintiff 

was suffering from obesity, chronic back pain, left foot pain, chest pain, and shortness of 

breath. Id. at 224. Plaintiff had a skin biopsy of a mole on his back. Id. Dr. Buchner 

prescribed Plaintiff Celebrex for pain and scheduled a follow-up one week later. Id. 

Plaintiff saw Dr. Buchner again on March 19, 2014. Id. at 226. Dr. Buchner noted that 

the Celebrex did not help with Plaintiff’s pain. Id. 

On January 16, 2015, Plaintiff saw Dr. Buchner for a follow-up visit to assess his 

progress. ALR 294. Plaintiff had been prescribed venlafaxine for depression and pain 

but had not started taking it. Id. Plaintiff was suffering from multiple musculoskeletal 

ailments ranging from right shoulder pain, numbness and tingling in his right hand and 

fingers, low back pain, radiating pain, leg pain, and heel pain. Id. Dr. Buchner’s 

assessment indicated Plaintiff was suffering from chronic back pain, continuous opioid 

dependence, and major depression. Id. at 296. 

iii. Kathlyn R. Ignacio, M.D.

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On April 21, 2014, Plaintiff saw Dr. Kathlyn R. Ignacio, a physician specializing 

in Occupational Medicine. ALR 272. Dr. Ignacio noted Plaintiff’s lumbar vertebral 

fusion, chronic back pain, and opioid dependence. Id. at 276. She ordered an MRI and 

scheduled a follow-up appointment for May 14, 2014. Id. On May 14, 2014, Plaintiff

saw Dr. Ignacio for his follow-up. ALR 231. He presented with low back pain and 

shooting pain and parasthesias in both feet and legs. Dr. Ignacio assessed that Plaintiff 

suffered from chronic back pain and left foot pain. Id. at 236-237. On May 23, 2014, Dr. 

Ignacio administered to plaintiff an epidural steroid injection. Id. at 243. 

iv. Dr. Kenneth Altschuler, M.D.

In May of 2016, Dr. Kenneth Altschuler, a physician specializing in Family 

Medicine, began treating Plaintiff. Id. at 316. Dr. Altschuler’s Evaluation opines that 

Plaintiff cannot sustain long-standing periods of sitting for more than thirty minutes at a 

time due to lumbar radiculopathy and severe lower back pain. Id. In addition, Dr. 

Altschuler observed that Plaintiff required continuous analgesic medication, NSAIDs, 

muscle relaxants, and antidepressants. Id. As his treating physician, Plaintiff saw Dr. 

Altschuler on a monthly basis. Id. 

III. Disability Hearing

a. Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff testified that he was unable to work as of 2014. ALR 54. He stated that 

any bending or twisting causes a great deal of pain, and that he cannot drive because of 

the pain medications he is taking. Id. He also stated that sitting or standing up for 

prolonged periods “causes problems.” Id.

Plaintiff states that, most of the time, he lays on the couch because of the pain. Id.

at 55. Despite his physical limitations, Plaintiff tries to go for walks when he can. Id. He 

states he can walk about a half-mile with breaks. Id. He states that he used to be a very 

active person and he hates not being able to do anything. Id. He has no hobbies anymore 

and is unable to lift anything weighing more than a gallon of milk. Id. 

b. Vocational Expert Testimony

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The ALJ took testimony from Alan Boroskin, a vocational expert (“VE”). AR 56.

Mr. Boroskin testified that he had reviewed the file sufficiently to give an opinion on 

Plaintiff’s vocational ability. Id. Mr. Boroskin asked Plaintiff what percent of the time 

during his employment at Pizza Hut was spent cooking, to which Plaintiff responded, 

“approximately half.” Id. at 58. 

The ALJ asked Mr. Boroskin to classify Plaintiff’s work history. Id. Mr. Boroskin 

stated that Defendant previously worked as: (1) a service technician for a trailer supply 

company, which is a semi-skilled profession with a heavy exertion level, requiring a 

specific vocational preparation (“SVP”) rating of four3 (Id.); (2) a delivery driver, a semiskilled profession with a medium exertion level, SVP 34 (Id.); (3) a pizza cook, a skilled 

profession with a medium exertion level, SVP 55 (Id.); and (4) a cabinet assembler, a 

semi-skilled profession with a light exertion level, SVP 3.

The ALJ then requested the VE to consider a hypothetical individual who is the 

same age with the same vocational and educational background as Plaintiff who is 

limited to light exertional work where standing and walking are limited to no more than 

30 minutes at one time. Id. at 59. The hypothetical individual may occasionally climb 

ramps and stairs but never ladders, ropes or scaffolds. Id. He may occasionally balance, 

stoop, bend at the waist, kneel, crouch, and crawl. Id. The ALJ then asked the VE if this 

hypothetical individual could perform any of the past work of Plaintiff and if other work 

would be available. Id. The VE asked the ALJ if there was a sitting restriction, and the 

ALJ said there was not. Id. The VE responded that the hypothetical individual could not 

 

3 Jobs with an SVP rating of four require over three months of training up to and including six months. 

Social Security Administration, Program Operations Manual, Section DI 25001.001: Quick Reference 

Guide, available at https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0425001001#b79. 4 Jobs with an SVP rating of three require up to three months of training. Social Security 

Administration, Program Operations Manual, Section DI 25001.001: Quick Reference Guide, available 

at https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0425001001#b79. 5 Jobs with an SVP rating of five require over six months of training up to and including one year. 

Social Security Administration, Program Operations Manual, Section DI 25001.001: Quick Reference 

Guide, available at https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0425001001#b79. 

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perform any of Plaintiff’s past work and that any available work would fall into the 

sedentary category. Id.

The ALJ then asked if there would be any light work available. Id. The VE 

replied that no light work would be available due to the standing and walking restriction.

Id. The ALJ then clarified that the standing restriction was to 30 minutes at a time, and 

also added that the hypothetical individual could walk at a light level. The ALJ posed if 

these clarifications would change the VE’s answer. Id. at 60. In response, the VE 

testified that a number of jobs could then accommodate the standing and walking 

restriction because these jobs can be performed effectively while alternating between 

sitting and standing. Id. As examples, he identified jobs in the “highly restricted” range,

such as the “Cashier II position,” which included cashiers in parking garages and minimarts.6 Id. The VE gave Ticket Seller and Information Clerk as additional examples of 

“highly restricted” jobs that could accommodate a 30-minute standing restriction, light 

walking, and would require only light exertion. Id.

IV. The ALJ’s Findings

ALJ Lunderman rendered her decision on April 21, 2017, and found the claimant 

was “not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act.” AR 25. 

ALJ Lunderman performed a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether 

Plaintiff was disabled. Id. at 18. She began the analysis by finding that Plaintiff met the 

insured status requirement for disability benefits on March 31, 2014. Id. at 20. 

At step one, ALJ Lunderman found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since February 28, 2014 through the date last insured of March 31, 2014. 

Id. 

 

6 The Cashier II positions constitute a highly restricted range of the cashier position. Dkt. No. 11-2 at 

61. These positions require only light exertion – only up to 16 percent of the full range of exertion. Id. 

According to the vocational expert, these cashiers are “typically found in parking garages, minimarts, 

and the like.” Id. A Cashier II position was classified as a job with an SVP rating of two. Training for 

these jobs include anything beyond a short demonstration up to and including one month of training. 

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At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was severely impaired by lumbar 

degenerative disease that more than minimally affected the Plaintiff’s ability to perform 

basic work. Id. 

At step three, ALJ Lunderman concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment 

or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the 

listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR 20. 

Before step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) to perform “light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except standing and/or 

walking was limited to 30 minutes continuously and to six hours total during an eight 

hour workday.” Id. at 21. In addition, the ALJ noted restrictions that precluded the 

climbing of ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. Id. Plaintiff could also only climb ramps and 

stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl only occasionally in a work context. Id. 

In coming to this conclusion, the ALJ considered the Plaintiff’s own testimony, all of the 

medical testimony and evidence, and the vocational expert’s testimony. Id. Moreover, 

the ALJ assigned little weight to treating physician Dr. Altschuler’s opinion, little weight 

to Dr. Deter’s opinion, little weight to Dr. Buckner’s opinion, and great weight to the 

opinions of the state agency medical consultants. Id. at 22-24.

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff would be unable to complete his past 

relevant work as the “demands of said past work would exceed the residual functional 

capacity.” Id. at 23. 

At step five, the ALJ, in considering the Plaintiff’s age, high school education, and 

work experience, concluded that Plaintiff’s RFC would enable him to make a successful 

adjustment to jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. at 24. 

Specifically, the ALJ relied on the vocational expert’s testimony that given Plaintiff’s 

age, education, work experience, and RFC, he would be able to perform the requirements 

of representative occupations such as cashier II, ticket seller, and information clerk. Id. at 

24. 

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Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled at any time from 

February 28, 2014, the alleged onset date, through March 31, 2014, the date last insured. 

Id. at 25. 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Standard of Review of Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

In reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation,“[a] judge of the 

court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which 

objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); United States 

v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). However, in the absence of timely 

objection, “the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the 

record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; Advisory 

Committee’s Notes. When no objections are filed, a district court may assume the 

correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations, and decide the 

motion on the applicable law. Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 

1974); Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). 

II. Standard of Review for Commissioner’s Final Agency Decision

Section 205(g) of the Act permits unsuccessful claimants to seek judicial review of 

the Commissioner’s final agency decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may 

enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s decision, and 

may also remand the matter to the Social Security Administrator for further proceedings. 

Id. 

The scope of the reviewing court is limited; it may only “set aside the ALJ’s denial 

of benefits . . . when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported by 

substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere 

scintilla, but less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Robbins v. SSA, 466 F.3d 880, 882 

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(9th Cir. 2006). However, “[e]ven when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported 

by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 

(9th Cir. 2012). 

III. Determination of Disability

In order to qualify for disability benefits under the Act, an applicant must show 

that: (1) she suffers from a medically determinable impairment that can be expected to 

result in death, or which lasted, or can be expected to last, for a continuous period of 

twelve months or more; and (2) the impairments renders the applicant incapable of 

performing the type of work that the applicant previously performed, and incapable of 

performing any other substantially gainful employment within the national economy. 42 

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). “[A] ‘physical or mental impairment’ is an impairment that results 

from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable 

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id. 423(d)(3). 

The ALJ employs a sequential, five-step process to determine whether an applicant 

is disabled under the Act. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014). They 

are set out as follows: 

(i) At the first step, we consider your work activity, if any. If you are doing 

substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled . . .

(ii) At the second step, we consider the medical severity of your impairment(s). 

If you do not have a severe medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment that meets the duration requirement . . . or a combination of 

impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement, we will find 

that you are not disabled . . . 

(iii) At the third step, we also consider the medical severity of your 

impairment(s). If you have an impairment(s) that meets or equals one of our 

listings . . . and meets the duration requirement, we will find that you are 

disabled . . . 

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(iv) At the fourth step, we consider our assessment of your residual function 

capacity and your past relevant work. If you can still do your past relevant 

work, we will find that you are not disabled . . . 

(v) At the fifth and last step, we consider our assessment of your residual 

functional capacity and your age, education, and work experience to see if 

you can make an adjustment to other work. If you can make an adjustment 

to other work, we will find that you are not disabled . . . .

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)

If the ALJ finds that an applicant is not disabled at any step, he may make his 

determination as to that condition and need not proceed to the next step. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4). “The burden of proof is on the claimant at steps one through four, but 

shifts to the Commissioner at step five.” Bray v. Comm’r of SSA, 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 

(9th Cir. 2009). At steps four and five, The ALJ determines a claimant’s residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”), which is the most a claimant can still do considering “all 

relevant medical and physical evidence in [the] case record” and any “limiting effects 

caused by medically determinable impairments.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1011 (9th Cir. 

2014). Additionally, the ALJ may “‘call upon a [VE] to testify as to: (1) what jobs the 

claimant, given his or her [RFC], would be able to do; and (2) the availability of such 

jobs in the national economy.’” Id. (quoting Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th 

Cir. 1999). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment argues that the ALJ erred at step five by 

“giving little to no weight to any of the doctor’s7 opinions provided in this case.” Dkt. 

 

7 Referring to the opinion of Plaintiff’s “treating physician,” Dr. Altschuler. Although Schuh also 

identifies chiropractor Raymond Deters III, D.C., as a “treating physician” (ECF No. 13-1, at 6), Dr. 

Altschuler is the only medical professional to opine on Schuh’s limitations who qualifies as a treating

doctor or “acceptable medical source.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a) (defining an “[a]cceptable medical 

source” to include medical doctors, but not chiropractors). 

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No. 13-1 at 5. Specifically, Plaintiff notes that the ALJ did not provide an adequate basis 

for giving controlling weight to the state reviewer’s opinion over that of Plaintiff’s 

treating physician, Dr. Altschuler. Dkt. No. 22 at 3. Since the ALJ is required to 

consider all of the necessary factors for determining the weight given to a medical 

opinion under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), Plaintiff contends that failure to do so is grounds 

for remand. Id. Finally, Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ did not properly question the 

vocational expert with respect to Plaintiff’s limitations as prescribed by his treating 

physicians. 

Defendant’s cross-motion countered by arguing the ALJ did not err, as: (1) she 

properly considered the opinion of Dr. Altschuler and gave germane reasons for 

according it little weight (Dkt. No. 18-1 at 10); (2) the ALJ properly considered and gave 

great weight to the opinions of non-treating physicians and state agency medical 

consultants (Id. at 11-12); and (3) the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff failed to meet his 

burden of proof that he could not perform light work with the thirty-minute limitation to 

standing or walking. Id. at 17. 

The Magistrate Judge found that the ALJ erred in failing to undertake a sufficient 

regulatory-factor analysis when rejecting Dr. Altschuler’s opinion, and that the error was 

not harmless. Dkt. No. 26 at 4-5. This Court agrees for the reasons set forth below. 

I. The ALJ Improperly Discounted the Opinion of Plaintiff’s Treating

Physician

a. Treating Physician Rule

In social security disability cases, the ALJ must consider all medical opinion 

evidence. See C.F.R. § 404.1527(b), (c). Generally, the opinion of a treating physician is 

entitled to more weight than the opinion of an examining physician, and more weight is 

given to the opinion of an examining physician than a non-examining physician. Russell 

v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 4472630 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2017). 

A treating physician’s opinion is given “controlling weight” so long as it “is wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is 

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not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the claimant’s case record.” 

Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017) (alterations omitted). If the ALJ 

gives a treating physician’s opinion less than controlling weight, the ALJ must comply 

with two requirements. First, the ALJ must consider all of the following factors in 

deciding the weight to give any medical opinion: (1) length and frequency of the 

examining relationship; (2) nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) 

supportability and whether the medical opinion includes supporting explanations and 

relevant evidence such as laboratory findings; (4) consistency with the record as a whole;

(5) physician specialization and; (6) other factors. Id. The failure to consider these 

factors constitutes reversible error. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 676 (9th Cir. 

2017). Next, the ALJ must provide reasons for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion. 

Id. at 675. 

When a treating doctor’s opinion is not controlling, the ALJ must determine the 

appropriate weight to give it after at least some consideration of all the following factors

listed above. See 20 C.F.R § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6). And when a treating doctor’s opinion is 

contradicted by another doctor, as here, the ALJ may only discount the treating 

physician’s opinion “by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by 

substantial evidence.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 675. 

Although ALJs need not engage in a full-blown written analysis of all of these 

regulatory factors, they must show “some indication” that they considered each one. 

Hoffman v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 3641881, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2017), adopted, 2017 

WL 4844545 (Sept. 14, 2017). 

i. Magistrate Judge’s Findings

The Magistrate Judge found that the ALJ offered a specific and legitimate reason –

that physician-patient relationship did not begin until two years after the Plaintiff’s date 

last insured – for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion. However, the Magistrate 

Judge also observed that the ALJ failed to undertake a sufficient regulatory-factor 

analysis. Specifically, the R&R finds that the ALJ’s six-sentence treatment of Dr. 

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Altschuler’s medical assessment fails to consider the consistency of Dr. Altschuler’s 

opinion with the record as a whole. See AR 23. In addition, the ALJ neither mentions 

Dr. Altschuler’s specialty (“Family Medicine”) nor whether Dr. Altschuler’s opinion was 

sufficiently related to his specialty. AR 23, 315. The Magistrate Judge found that the 

failure to consider these regulatory factors “alone constitutes reversible error.” Dkt. No 

26 at p. 3; Quoting Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d at 676.

ii. Analysis and Review

Since the ALJ decided not to afford Dr. Altschuler’s opinion controlling weight,

she was required to analyze the factors under section 404.1527(c)(2). The ALJ cursorily 

addressed some of these factors and noted that Dr. Altschuler did not begin treating the 

patient until two years after his date last insured. However, the ALJ failed to properly 

consider Dr. Altschuler’s medical assessment through the lens of all required factors, 

such as the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, the consistency of Dr. 

Altschuler’s opinion, and Dr. Altschuler’s specialty. Specifically, the ALJ does not 

mention the physician’s specialization or examine the consistency of Dr. Altschler’s 

opinion with the record as a whole. Moreover, the ALJ does not explain how Dr. 

Altschuler’s assessment was unsupported by other medical testimony. 

“The failure to consider these regulatory factors “’alone constitutes reversible legal 

error.’” See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d at 676. The fact that Dr. Altschuler did not 

begin treating the Plaintiff until two years after the date last insured does not obviate the 

need for the ALJ to assess the other relevant factors. See Russell v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 

4472630 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2017) (where the court found that the ALJ was still required 

to address factors for a treating physician who did not begin seeing the claimant until 

several years after her date last insured). Moreover, medical evaluations made after the 

expiration of a claimant’s insured status should not be disregarded solely on the basis that 

they are rendered retrospectively. Smith v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988). 

And even if the ALJ believed that Dr. Altschuler’s conclusions were insufficient 

evidence to form an opinion regarding the Plaintiff’s functional capacity on or before his 

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date last insured, that still does not mean that Dr. Altschuler’s opinion was inconsistent 

with the evidence or contradicted by other medical opinions on the record.

In Russell, the court found that the retrospective nature of the treating physician’s 

opinion alone was not enough to provide a proper basis for discounting that opinion. See 

Russell v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 4472630 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2017). Although the treating 

physician did not begin seeing the Plaintiff until several years after her date last insured, 

the court noted that Plaintiff’s reports of pain and fibromyalgia were consistent with pain 

reported during the adjudicative period. The court found, “where [ . . . ] the retrospective 

opinion of the treating physician is uncontradicted, a higher standard applies: the ALJ 

may disregard that opinion only if he provides clear and convincing reasons that are 

supported as a whole.” Id. at *4. As such, the fact that the doctor did not begin treating 

claimant until after her date last insured “does not, by itself, provide a legitimate basis for 

discounting [the doctor’s] uncontradicted opinion.” Id. 

Here, the Court concludes that the ALJ similarly committed a reversible error by 

failing to address all of the regulatory factors required in discounting a treating 

physician’s opinion. In addition, the Court finds that the retrospective nature of the 

treating physician’s relationship with the Plaintiff – without additional and substantial 

evidence of contradiction in the record – is not enough for the ALJ to disregard the 

treating physician’s opinion. 

Since the retrospective nature of Dr. Altschuler’s opinion is the only reason the 

ALJ gives for discounting his opinion, the Court finds that the ALJ committed a 

reversible error, which the Court finds constitutes grounds for remand.

b. The ALJ’s Error Was Not Harmless

i. Magistrate Judge’s Findings

Next, the Magistrate Judge found that the ALJ’s failure to undertake the required 

regulatory-factor analysis when discounting Dr. Altschuler’s opinion constituted more 

than harmless error. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge noted that during oral argument, 

the Social Security Administration could not articulate any compelling reasons that the 

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error was harmless – even when given an additional minute of argument for that purpose. 

Dkt. No. 26 at 4. The Magistrate Judge also found that the ALJ’s failure to incorporate a 

sitting restriction into her line of questioning of the vocational expert was not an 

inconsequential error when considering the record as a whole. Id.

ii. Analysis and Review

“[A]n ALJ’s error is harmless where it is inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012), 4 

18-cv-1398-GPC-AGS (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court must “look at the 

record as a whole to determine whether the error alters the outcome of the case.” Id. 

This Court likewise cannot find that the procedural error here was inconsequential. 

It is clear from the record that Dr. Altschuler recommended a strict restriction on Schuh’s 

sitting. This sitting restriction had more than a modicum of support in the record from 

testing, medical observations, medical opinions from the adjudicative time period, and 

Schuh’s own testimony. See, e.g., AR 54, 56, 278, 287, 301, 310. Because the ALJ gave 

little weight to Dr. Altschuler’s opinion, the ALJ did not incorporate such a limitation 

into her questioning of the vocational expert or her residual functional capacity analysis. 

As a result, the vocational expert did not consider the need for such a restriction in 

testifying about alternative vocations. AR 21, 59. And finally, it is notable that in the 

moving papers and during ten minutes of oral argument before the Magistrate Judge, the 

Social Security Administration articulated no grounds for harmless error. Even after the 

SSA received an additional minute of oral argument specifically for that purpose, the 

Magistrate Judge found that it was still unable to do so. 

A sitting restriction may well have rendered Schuh unable to find work – including 

in one of the suggested alternative occupations (i.e. ticket seller, cashier, information 

clerk) – and consequently eligible for disability benefits. See SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 

31251, at *5 (1983) (even a “sedentary” worker generally must sit for “approximately 6 

hours of an 8-hour workday”); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, at 201.12 (a 

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“Sedentary” claimant with Schuh’s age and education is presumptively “Disabled”). At a 

minimum, this Court finds that the ALJ should consider the need for such a restriction in 

accordance with the mandatory regulatory factors. 

In addition, the Court’s decision to remand this case for further proceedings is 

bolstered by other factual errors sprinkled in the ALJ’s report. For example, the ALJ 

repeatedly misidentifies physical therapist Tony Sanchez and physical therapist assistant 

Celia Bartman as “William Buc[h]ner, M.D.,” the referring physician. Compare AR 23 

with AR 300, 311. Similarly, the ALJ claims that the opinions of “other providers” are 

“not consistent with the opinions expressed” by the treating physicians (AR 22-23), but 

the record is devoid of such contrary opinions from other providers. And finally, the 

Court notes that it is perplexing that the ALJ’s discounted Dr. Buchner’s opinion in part 

because “Dr. Buchner saw the claimant only once” when the record demonstrates that 

Plaintiff visited Dr. Buchner at least twice during the operative time period prior to the 

date last insured and was subsequently sent for follow-up at a spine clinic. See AR 220, 

226. 

In deciding whether to remand for either further proceedings or an award of 

benefits, the Court is guided by the three-step “credit-as-true” rule. See Treichler v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1100-02 (9th Cir. 2014). The Court must 

first ask whether the ALJ failed to offer “legally sufficient reasons for rejecting 

evidence.” Id. at 1100. If she failed to do so, the Court would next determine whether 

there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determinability of disability 

can be made and if further administrative proceedings would be useful. Id. at 1101. And 

lastly, the Court must analyze if the relevant testimony is credible as a matter of law –

and award benefits, so long as the record of the whole “leaves not the slightest 

uncertainty as to the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. 

Here, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation that further 

administrative proceedings would be useful. Although the ALJ made reversible errors, 

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the Court also finds that there are unresolved conflicts and ambiguities in Dr. Altschuler’s 

testimony. Since Dr. Altschuler’s opinion is “not a model of clarity either,” the Court 

cannot find that the record leaves not the slightest uncertainty as to the outcome. ECF 

No. 26 at 5; see AR 315. The Court finds that the ALJ is in the best position to undertake 

the weight that must be accorded to Dr. Altschuler’s opinion. This is a potentially 

outcome determinative analysis would be best conducted through further administrative 

proceedings. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation of the 

Magistrate Judge and GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and DENIES

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The case shall be remanded to the 

Social Security Administrator for further proceedings. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 26, 2019

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