Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_22-cv-00870/USCOURTS-ared-4_22-cv-00870-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

BRITTANY CRAIG, et al. PLAINTIFFS

v. CASE NO. 4:22-CV-00870-BSM

TERRY FLEMING, et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Terry Fleming’s motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 52] is granted in part and denied in part. 

The motions to dismiss of PerfectVision Manufacturing, Inc. [Doc. No. 53], and Bella Casa,

LLC [Doc. No. 59] are granted. Plaintiffs’ motion to certify [Doc. No. 66] and motion for

partial summary judgment [Doc. No. 71] are denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs BrittanyCraig and Kaylee Cathcart bring this putative class action alleging

that Terry Fleming, along with his companies PerfectVision and Bella Casa, coerced them

to engage in commercial sex acts over several years. 

Craig alleges that she met Fleming in 2012 when she was nineteen. Second Amended

Complaint (“SAC”) ¶ 57. She flew with him to Key West in September 2012 and, on the

flight, Fleming gave her alcohol. Id. ¶ 61. Craig went with Fleming to his house, where she

drank until she blacked out. Id. ¶ 62. She alleges that she woke up to learn that she and

Fleming had sex, but she was too drunk to remember it. Id. At some time in 2012, Fleming

bought her a phone and gave her money. Id. ¶¶ 117–119, 123. Craig alleges that when she

flew with Fleming to China on PerfectVision’s private jet, she was given alcohol and woke

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up realizing she had had sex with Fleming. Id. ¶ 124–128. After returning from China,

Fleming bought Craig a car. Id. ¶ 153. She signed a promissory note requiring payments to

be sent to PerfectVision’s address. Id. ¶ 211. Craig was required to log each trip she took

with Fleming on a ledger, and her debt on the car was reduced by each trip’s value. Id. ¶¶

213–215. Craig alleges the value of the trip was based on whether she complied with

Fleming’s sexual demands. Id. ¶ 215. On one occasion, Fleming tackled Craig and tried to

seize her phone. Id. ¶ 174. Craig moved into Fleming’s home in 2016. Id. ¶ 148. She

alleges that when she wanted to leave the relationship, Fleming threatened to take away the

credit cards, car, clothing, and gifts that he had given her. Id. ¶ 162. Craig left Fleming in

2017 and has not had any contact with him since. Id. ¶¶ 190–191, 200. 

Cathcart alleges that she met Fleming in 2012 when she was eighteen. Id. ¶ 212. She 

went to Fleming’s house, drank until she blacked out, and woke up to find Fleming had had

sex with her. Id. ¶ 217. Fleming gave her money to buy illegal drugs to give to other

women. Id. ¶ 221. Fleming promised her marriage and gifts when she wanted to leave him. 

Id. ¶ 226. Fleming proposed to her in 2019. Id. ¶ 227. Cathcart alleges that Fleming told

her healthcare providers not to treat her. Id. ¶ 230. She alleges that defendants arranged to

lease an apartment for her and that she either lived in the apartment or with Fleming. Id. ¶¶

231–232. At some unspecified time, she attempted to leave Fleming’s yacht, but Fleming

instructed his yacht crew to threaten and intimidate her so she would not leave. Id. ¶ 234. 

When she wanted to leave Fleming in 2020, Fleming promised to pay for her education,

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housing, car, and medical bills. Id. ¶ 238. She alleges that Fleming contacted law

enforcement to arrest her. Id. ¶ 239. Fleming sued Cathcart, alleging that she stole from

him, and when she counterclaimed, Fleming’s lawyers repeatedly refused to produce him for

a deposition. Id. ¶¶ 241, 246–249. Fleming voluntarily dismissed his suit. Id. ¶ 250.

Both Craig and Cathcart brought similar sex-trafficking claims against defendants in

state court. Doc. Nos. 52-1, 52-2, 52-4, and 52-7. Craig’s claims, including her civil cause

of action under the Arkansas Human Trafficking Act of 2013 (“AHTA”), Ark. Code Ann.

§ 5-18-101 et seq., against Fleming, PerfectVision, and Bella Casa were dismissed without

prejudice on September 21, 2021. Order Granting MTD in Doe v. Fleming, Pulaski County

Circuit Court Case No. 60CV-21-1526, Doc. No. 52-8. The state court concluded that the

AHTA claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Craig did not appeal or plead further

in state court. Cathcart’s claims—brought as counterclaims in the suit filed against her by

Fleming—were dismissed without prejudice on January 6, 2022. Order Granting MTD

Counterclaims in Fleming v. Cathcart, Pulaski County Circuit Court Case No. 60CV-20-

6562, Doc. No. 52-3. The state court determined that Cathcart’s claims under the AHTA and

Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1595, along

with her civil conspiracy and malicious prosecution claims, failed to state facts upon which

relief could be granted. The state court also determined that Cathcart failed to identify

specific acts within the limitations period that could give rise to claims for outrage and

second-degree sexual assault. Cathcart did not appeal or plead further in state court. 

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Cathcart also sued Fleming’s lawyers for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Those

claims were dismissed with prejudice on October 18, 2022. Order Granting MTD in

Cathcart v. Davidson, Pulaski CountyCircuit Court CaseNo. 60CV-21-7349, Doc. No. 52-5. 

Cathcart’s appeal is pending in the Arkansas Court of Appeals. Cathcart v. Davidson, Case

No. CV-22-819.

In the second amended complaint, Craig and Cathcart bring claims under the TVPRA

against all defendants. Cathcart also brings claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of

process; civil action by a crime victim; outrage; and civil conspiracy. All defendants move

to dismiss plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. Plaintiffs move for partial summary

judgment and to certify a question to the Arkansas Supreme Court. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal when a plaintiff fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To meet the 12(b)(6) standard, the facts

alleged in the complaint must create a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although detailed

factual allegations are not required, threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, are insufficient. Id. All allegations contained in

the complaint are considered true, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in the plaintiff’s

favor. Rydholm v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, 44 F.4th 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 2022).

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Certify

Plaintiffs’ motion to certify to the Arkansas Supreme Court is denied because

certification is not warranted when, as here, the state court’s dismissal without prejudice is

“sufficiently firm” so that it must be given “conclusive effect.” See Germain Real Est. Co.,

LLC v. HCH Toyota, LLC, 778 F.3d 692, 696 (8th Cir. 2015). Although the question

plaintiffs seek to certify is unclear, it appears to be along these lines: when an Arkansas state

court dismisses a complaint without prejudice under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), is that dismissal considered a final judgment for purposes of issue preclusion? This

question, however, has already been answered by the Supreme Court’s precedent. When a

complaint is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state facts upon which relief can be

granted, the dismissal should be without prejudice so that the plaintiff may elect whether to

plead further or appeal. Blackburn v. Lonoke Cnty. Bd. of Election Commissioners, 2022

Ark. 176, at 9, 652 S.W.3d 574, 581. A party can bring a new suit within one year of a

dismissal without prejudice when the statute oflimitations would otherwise bar the suit. Ark.

Code Ann. § 16-56-126; See Rettig v. Ballard, 2009 Ark. 629, at 5, 362 S.W.3d 260, 263. 

The Eighth Circuit has held that a state-court dismissal without prejudice “was sufficiently

firm to be accorded conclusive effect” for issue-preclusion purposes when the transcript of

the state-court hearing made clear that the parties were fully heard and the court was familiar

with the case, and the plaintiff did not appeal or refile in state court. Germain Real Est. Co.,

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778 F.3d at 696. Therefore, certification is not necessary.

B. Motions to Dismiss

Fleming’s motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. The motions to

dismiss of PerfectVision and Bella Vista are granted. Because these motions are considered

before class certification, only the claims of Craig and Cathcart are considered. See Browe

v. Evenflo Co., Inc., No. CIV. 14-4690 ADM/JJK, 2015 WL 3915868, at *4 n. 1 (D. Minn.

June 25, 2015). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court may

consider materials that are part of the public record and are necessarily embraced by the

pleadings. Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999).

1. Preclusion

This court must give Arkansas state-court judgments the same preclusive effect that

the State of Arkansas would give them. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,

465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). For this reason, the doctrine of res judicata bars Cathcart’s

malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims but not plaintiffs’ other claims. See

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining res judicata and explaining when acts

of a court create an absolute bar to subsequent claims).

There are two facets to res judicata: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Gulley v.

State ex rel. Jegley, 2023 Ark. 70, at 6, 664 S.W.3d 421, 426. Claim preclusion does not bar

Cathcart’s claims because her claims in state court were dismissed without prejudice. See

id. (claim preclusion applies only when the first suit results in a final judgment on the

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merits); Percefull v. Claybaker, 312 F. App’x 827 (8th Cir. 2008) (dismissal without

prejudice is not a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes).

Cathcart’s claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process are, however, barred

by issue preclusion. This is true because her claims were initially dismissed without

prejudice, but she brought another case involving the same issues—the conduct of Fleming’s

lawyers. Those claims were dismissed with prejudice. Doc. No. 52-5. She then appealed the

dismissal, so she is precluded from bringing claims based on the same issues here. See

Arkansas Dep’t of Env’t Quality v. Brighton Corp., 352 Ark. 396, 411, 102 S.W.3d 458, 468

(2003) (“When the plaintiff chooses to appeal, he or she waives the right to plead further, and

the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.”).

Craig’s TVPRA claim—her sole claim—is not precluded. Craig did not bring a

TVPRA claim in state court, and her AHTA claim was dismissed because it was barred by

the three-year statute of limitations. TVPRA’s statute of limitations is ten years. The state

court dismissal of Craig’s AHTA claim as time-barred is not sufficiently firm to preclude her

from filing a different claim under a different statute of limitations.

2. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act

a. Fleming

Considering the allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable

inferences in the plaintiffs favor, Fleming’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ TVPRA claims is

denied. The TVPRA provides sex-trafficking victims a civil remedy “against the perpetrator

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(or whoever knowingly benefits, or attempts or conspires to benefit, financially or by

receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should

have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter).” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). To

state a claim under the TVPRA, plaintiffs must plead that Fleming knowingly and in

interstate or foreign commerce (1) recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, or

maintained by any means a person (2) “knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that

means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion...or any combination ofsuch means” will be

used (3) to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act. 18 U.S.C. § 1591. 

When the complaint is given a fairly broad reading, both Craig and Cathcart have

adequately pleaded that commercial sex acts occurred between them and Fleming. Section

1591(e)(3) defines “commercial sex act” as “any sex act, on account of which anything of

value is given to or received by any person.” There must be “a causal relationship between

the sex act and an exchange of an item of value.” Kolbek v. Twenty First Century Holiness

Tabernacle Church, Inc., No. 10-CV-4124, 2013 WL 6816174, at *16 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 24,

2013) (citation omitted). Craig’s allegation that the amount of debt she owed on her car was

based on whether she complied with Fleming’s sexual demands sufficiently pleads a causal

relationship between a sex act and debt repayment, which is something of value. Cathcart’s

allegations that Fleming gave her gifts and arranged for a lease on her apartment also

sufficiently plead a causal relationship between a sex act and the exchange of these items.

Plaintiffs have also alleged a causal relationship between coercion from Fleming and

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commercial sex. The complaint must allege a causal relationship between this conduct and

the sex act’s occurrence. Noble v. Weinstein, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 

Fleming “must have intended, or been aware, that the fraud and force would cause a sex act

to take place.” Id. “Statements made incidental to the sex act—made for a reason other than

to bring about the act—are not enough.” Id. 

While plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded that Fleming used force, threat of force,

or fraud, they have sufficiently pleaded that Fleming used coercion to cause them to engage

in commercial sex. Under the TVPRA, “coercion” includes “(A) threats of serious harm to

or physical restraint against any person; (B) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause

a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical

restraint against any person; or (C) the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process.”

18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(2). Serious harm is “any harm, whether physical or nonphysical,

including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all

the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and

in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing commercial sexual activity

in order to avoid incurring that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(5). Drawing all reasonable

inferences in plaintiffs’ favor, allegations that Fleming threatened to take awayCraig’s credit

cards, car, clothing and gifts and to stop paying for Cathcart’s education, housing, car and

medical bills if plaintiffs ended their sexual relationship with Fleming are sufficient to

survive Fleming’s motion to dismiss. 

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b. PerfectVision

Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claims against PerfectVision are dismissed because neither

plaintiff has stated a plausible claim against the company. To state a claim for beneficiary

liability under the TVPRA, Craig must plead that PerfectVision (1) “knowingly benefitted,

financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture” which has

recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, or maintained by any means a

person (2) “knowing, . . . or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of

force, fraud, coercion. . . or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person

to engage in a commercial sex act.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a).

Plaintiffs’ allegations fall short. They allege that PerfectVision paid for the private

jet operation and that its crew knew that the jet was used to traffic women. SAC ¶ 262. They

also allege that PerfectVision knew about the flow of money associated with trafficking

activity. Id. ¶ 264, and that it was not entitled to receive benefits from its contracts with

AT&T. Id. ¶ 274. But allegations that PerfectVision knew that Fleming traveled with

women and made payments to them are not allegations that PerfectVision knowingly

benefitted from participating in a venture knowing, or recklessly disregarding, that Fleming

engaged in force or coercion to cause women to engage in commercial sex. These

allegations are insufficient to state a TVPRA claim against PerfectVision.

c. Bella Casa

Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claims against Bella Casa are also dismissed because they have

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failed to sufficiently plead that Bella Casa knowingly benefitted from a commercial sex

trafficking venture, while knowing (or recklessly disregarding) that means of force, fraud,

or coercion would be sued to cause them to engage in a commercial sex act. Plaintiffs allege

that Bella Casa benefitted financially from its leasing its real property, where the alleged

trafficking occurred, to PerfectVision. SAC ¶¶ 293, 296. That allegation is not sufficient to

state a TVPRA claim against Bella Casa.

3. Civil Action by Crime Victim

Fleming’s motion to dismiss is granted on Cathcart’s civil action by crime victim

claims as to first-degree sexual assault and denied as to second-degree sexual assault and

AHTA. Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-118-107 provides a civil cause of action to

“[a]ny person injured or damaged by reason of conduct of another person that would

constitute a felony under Arkansas law,” while section 16-118-109 provides a civil action for

victims of human trafficking. Cathcart alleges three felonies as grounds for her claim: firstdegree sexual assault, second-degree sexual assault, and violations of the AHTA.

Sexual assault. Cathcart cannot state a claim for first-degree sexual assault because

she was not a minor during her relationship with Fleming, and she does not allege Fleming

was employed by a school. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-124(a). She does, however, establish a

claim for second-degree sexual assault. To establish second-degree sexual assault claim,

Cathcart must allege that Fleming engaged in sexual contact with her by forcible compulsion

or when she was incapable of consent because she was physically helpless, mentally

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defective, or mentally incapacitated. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-125(a)(1)–(2). Cathcart’s

allegations that Fleming had sex with her while she had been determined medically disabled

and was unable to give legal consent are sufficient to state a claim. SAC ¶ 342. 

AHTA. Cathcart has adequately pleaded her AHTA claim. To state an AHTA claim,

Cathcart must adequately plead that defendants (1) recruited, enticed, solicited, isolated,

harbored, transported, provided, maintained her knowing she would be subjected to

involuntary servitude; (2) benefitted financially or by receiving anything of value from

participation in a venture that engaged in those activities, or (3) subjected her to involuntary

servitude. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-18-103(a). Involuntary servitude means the inducement or

compulsion of a person to engage in labor, services, or commercial sexual activity by means

of:

(A) A scheme, plan, or pattern of behavior with a purpose to cause a person to

believe that if he or she does not engage in labor, services, or commercial

sexual activity, he or she or another person will suffer serious physical injury

or physical restraint;

(B) Abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process;

(C) The causing of or the threat to cause serious harm to a person;

(D) Physically restraining or threatening to physically restrain another person;

(E) The kidnapping of or threat to kidnap a person;

(F) The taking of another person’s personal property or real property;

(G) The knowing destruction, concealment, removal, confiscation, or possession

of an actual or purported passport, other immigration document, or other actual

or purported government identification document of another person;

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(H) Extortion or blackmail;

(I) Deception or fraud;

(J) Coercion, duress, or menace;

(K) Debt bondage;

(L) Peonage; or

(M) The facilitation or control of a victim’s access to an addictive controlled

substance.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-18-102(7). “Critical to a claim of involuntary servitude is an absence

of choice.” Fochtman v. Darp, Inc., No. 5:18-CV-5047, 2018 WL 3148113, at *4 (W.D.

Ark. June 27, 2018) (citing United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 953 (1988)).

Drawing all reasonable inferences in Cathcart’s favor, she has adequatelypleaded that

Fleming subjected her to involuntaryservitude. Cathcart has adequatelyalleged thatFleming

compelled her to engage in commercial sex her by threatening to stop paying for Cathcart’s

education, housing, car, and medical bills if she ended her sexual relationship with Fleming

and by suing her and threatening to have her arrested. That is enough to survive the motion

to dismiss.

4. Outrage

Cathcart’s outrage claim is dismissed because she does not specify what conduct she

alleges as the basis for this claim. To establish a claim for outrage, Cathcart must adequately

plead the following elements: (1) the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or

should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) the

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conduct was “extreme and outrageous,” was “beyond all possible bounds of decency,” and

was “utterly intolerable in a civilized community”; (3) the actions of the defendant were the

cause of the her distress; and (4) the emotional distress sustained by her was so severe that

no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Kiersey v. Jeffrey, 369 Ark. 220, 222,

253 S.W.3d 438, 441 (2007). Cathcart generally alleges that each defendant “willfully and

wantonly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct” but does not identify any acts by any

defendants that would support an outrage claim. “Merely describing the conduct as

outrageous does not make it so.” Crockett v. Essex, 341 Ark. 558, 564, 19 S.W.3d 585, 589

(2000). Accordingly, Cathcart’s outrage claim is dismissed.

5. Civil Conspiracy

Cathcart’s civil conspiracy claim is also dismissed. To prove a civil conspiracy,

Cathcart must show that “two or more persons have combined to accomplish a purpose that

is unlawful or oppressive or to accomplish some purpose, not in itself unlawful, oppressive

or immoral, but by unlawful, oppressive or immoral means, to the injury of another.” Ballard

Grp., Inc. v. BP Lubricants USA, Inc., 2014 Ark. 276, at 17, 436 S.W.3d 445, 455. A civil

conspiracy is an intentional tort which requires a specific intent to accomplish the

contemplated wrong. Id. at 18, 436 S.W.3d at 455. Cathcart alleges that “[o]ne or more

defendants” committed “one or more overt acts” in furtherance of the conspiracy with the

specific intent to harm her, but she does not allege who acted, what actions they took, or how

they intended to harm her. These allegations are insufficient to survive the motion to

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dismiss. 

C. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on their TVPRA claims is denied

without prejudice because it is premature. No discovery has been done, and the facts as

pleaded in the complaint do not entitle plaintiffs to summary judgment. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Fleming’s motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied

in part. Both plaintiffs’ TVPRA claims and Cathcart’s second-degree sexual assault and

AHTA claims against Fleming can proceed. Cathcart’s claims for malicious prosecution,

abuse of process, first-degree sexual assault, outrage, and civil conspiracy are dismissed with

prejudice. The motions to dismiss of PerfectVision and Bella Casa are granted, and all

claims against PerfectVision Manufacturing, Inc., d/b/a PV10 Wireless, Perfect 10 Antenna

Company, Perfect 10 Satellite Distributing, Perfect 10 Satellite Distributing Co., Perfect 10

Wireless, PerfectVision, and PerfectVision Manufacturing; and Bella Casa, LLC are

dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ motion to certify and motion for partial summary

judgment are denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 29th day of February, 2024.

 ________________________________

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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