Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-01230/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-01230-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

HALEY WRIGHT, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF SANTA CRUZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-01230-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART INDIVIDUAL 

FEDERAL AGENTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS

[Re: ECF No. 91]

Defendants Joshua Singleton (“Singleton”), Anthony Parker (“Parker”), Brendan Omori 

(“Omori”), and John Fernandez (“Fernandez”) (collectively, “the Agents”) move to dismiss the 

second amended complaint (“SAC”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). After 

reviewing the motion, opposition, and reply, the Court vacated the hearing and submitted the 

motion without oral argument. See Order of Jan. 16, 2015, ECF 98. For the reasons discussed 

below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

 I. BACKGROUND

The facts giving rise to this action are well-known to the parties and the Court and need not 

be set forth in full here. In brief, the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) was involved in 

a joint operation with the Santa Cruz Police Department and other local law enforcement agencies 

for the purpose of investigating a Mexican drug cartel. During the investigation, an arrest warrant 

issued for Plaintiff Haley Wright following her indictment by a grand jury. On September 12, 

2011, a SWAT team approached Haley’s home, entered, and executed the warrant. Haley’s father, 

her sisters, and her sisters’ infant children were in the home at the time. Haley was booked and 

held in jail for approximately one month, at which time her bail was reduced to an amount that 

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enabled her family to obtain her release. The charges against Haley were dropped approximately 

one month after her release on bail.

After several rounds of pleading, the only defendants remaining in the action are the City 

of Santa Cruz and the Agents.1 The SAC asserts the following claims on behalf of Haley and her 

two sisters, Emily Wright and Jessica Wright: (1) a § 19832claim for excessive force in violation 

of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) a Bivens3claim for unlawful search and seizure in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment; (3) a Bivens claim for deprivation of due process (liberty 

interest) in violation of the Fifth Amendment; (4) a Bivens claim for deprivation of the right to 

freedom of association in violation of the First Amendment; and (5) a claim for violation of 

California’s Bane Act.4 The Agents seek dismissal of all claims against them on the bases that 

they are entitled to qualified immunity and that the SAC fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted.

 II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Qualified Immunity

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil 

damages ‘unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or 

constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged 

conduct.’” Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2066-67 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.

Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011)). Under the applicable pleading standard, the plaintiff must allege facts 

sufficient to make out a plausible claim that it would have been clear to the defendant officer that 

his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. at 2067. “Because qualified 

immunity is an affirmative defense from suit, not merely from liability, ‘[u]nless the plaintiff’s 

allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified 

 

1

The second amended complaint also names as defendants “Twenty Unknown Individuals 

Employed By Federal And City Agencies.”

2

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

3

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

4 Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1.

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immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.’” Doe By and Through 

Doe v. Petaluma City School Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1449-50 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Mitchell v. 

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

B. Failure to State a Claim

“A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.’” Conservation 

Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 

729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). When determining whether a claim has been stated, the Court accepts 

as true all well-pled factual allegations and construes them in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff. Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 690 (9th Cir. 2011). However, the 

Court need not “accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial 

notice” or “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 

unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). While a complaint need not contain detailed 

factual allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

 III. DISCUSSION

A. Emily and Jessica

The Agents argue, and the opposition concedes, that the SAC does not allege facts 

sufficient to state any claim by Emily or Jessica against the Agents. See Pls.’ Opp. at 10, ECF 95. 

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED as to all claims asserted by Emily and Jessica. The 

remainder of this order addresses Haley’s claims against the Agents, specifically, Claims 2-5 of 

the SAC.5

 

5 Claim 1 is a § 1983 excessive force claim by Emily and Jessica against the City of Santa Cruz.

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B. Official Capacity Allegations

Claims 2, 3 and 4 assert violations of Haley’s federal constitutional rights under Bivens. 

“[A] Bivens action can be maintained against a defendant in his or her individual capacity only, 

and not in his or her official capacity.” Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 

1987). While the earlier-filed first amended complaint alleged that the Agents acted in their 

individual capacities and/or their official capacities, see FAC ¶ 11, ECF 11, the operative SAC 

alleges that the Agents acted at all times “within the scope of their federal employment and 

pursuant to federal law and the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs and usages of the United 

States of America,” see SAC ¶ 6, ECF 90. The Agents argue that in light of these allegations the 

SAC fails to state a Bivens claim against them.

Plaintiffs concede that the omission of individual capacity allegations against the Agents is 

fatal to the Bivens claims, but they assert that the omission was an error that can be corrected 

easily. See Pls.’ Opp. at 8. The Court accepts the representation of error by counsel, as officers of 

the Court. Because the error so easily could be rectified, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND on this basis, but the Court has evaluated Plaintiffs’ claims as though 

the individual capacity allegations had remained in the pleading.

C. Claim 2 – Unlawful Search and Seizure

The arrest warrant for Haley was issued pursuant to a grand jury indictment. SAC ¶ 23. In 

Claim 2, Haley alleges that although they had absolutely no evidence or probable cause to believe 

that she had committed any crime, the Agents “recklessly and with conscious disregard for the 

truth supplied false incriminating information about HALEY to the prosecutor and hence to the 

grand jury insuring that HALEY would be falsely indicted as a member of the drug cartel and 

falsely arrested and incarcerated.” SAC ¶ 41. Haley alleges that the warrant for her arrest was 

issued based on the indictment. Id. ¶ 23.

The SAC does not allege that the Agents actually testified before the grand jury. To the 

extent that they did testify, any claims based upon such testimony are subject to dismissal in light 

of Supreme Court authority holding that grand jury witnesses are entitled to absolute immunity. 

See Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1506 (2012). 

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The law is less clear as to the extent that law enforcement officers may be liable for 

providing false information to a prosecutor. Neither party cites cases directly on point. Haley 

cites Supreme Court authority for the proposition that “an officer whose request for a warrant 

allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest” is entitled to qualified, rather than absolute, immunity 

for claims arising out of the arrest. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986). Qualified 

immunity is sufficient to protect the officer in most cases, because “[o]nly where the warrant 

application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence 

unreasonable . . . will the shield of immunity be lost.” Id. at 344-45. Moreover, a prosecutor’s 

exercise of independent judgment in determining the existence of probable cause for arrest is 

presumed to break the chain of causation and immunize investigating officers for damages 

suffered after a criminal complaint is filed. Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 862 (9th Cir. 

2008). That presumption is rebutted, however, in “situations in which the prosecutor was 

pressured by police or was given false information; the police act[ed] maliciously or with reckless 

disregard for the rights of an arrested person; the prosecutor relied on the police investigation and 

arrest when he filed the complaint instead of making an independent judgment on the existence of 

probable cause for the arrest; or the officers otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct 

that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of legal proceedings.” Id. at 862-63

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original). 

These cases are not a perfect fit here, as Haley does not allege that the Agents were 

involved in a warrant application but rather that they provided false information to the prosecutor

for use in a grand jury proceeding that resulted in an indictment and arrest warrant. However, the 

cases clearly establish that a law enforcement officer may be liable for providing false information 

to a prosecutor when that information leads to the commencement of legal proceedings or issuance 

of an arrest warrant. “For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours must be 

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that 

right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action 

in question has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law 

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the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The 

Court concludes that any officer in the Agents’ position would have understood that it would be a 

violation of Haley’s Fourth Amendment rights to give the prosecutor information tying Haley to 

the cartel if the officer either knew Haley was not actually involved with the cartel or the officer 

had no reasonable basis for believing that Haley was involved.

Haley alleges that Singleton, Parker, Omori, and Fernandez acted as a team to investigate 

the drug cartel; met often to share information about the investigation, including photographs of 

cartel members, audio recordings of telephone calls between cartel members, and information 

about what cars cartel members used. SAC ¶ 23. In particular, the Agents had photographs of a 

person named “Hallie” that looked nothing like Haley; evidence regarding the car Hallie drove; 

evidence regarding Hallie’s cellular telephone; and voice recordings of Hallie. Id. ¶ 25. None of 

the evidence implicated Haley in any way. Id. ¶ 24. The Agents nonetheless gave the prosecutor 

“incriminating information” that led to the indictment and arrest of Haley. ¶¶ 24, 41. The SAC 

does not identify precisely what information the Agents gave the prosecutor, but presumably they 

identified Haley as the “Hallie” who was in fact involved with the cartel.

These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation against 

each of the Agents and to plead around qualified immunity. In essence, Haley alleges that 

although there was absolutely nothing in the evidence generated by the investigation to connect 

her to the cartel, the Agents recklessly and with total disregard to her rights gave her name to the 

prosecutor for the purpose of obtaining an indictment and ultimately and arrest warrant against 

her. 

The Agents argue that the allegations are insufficient because they refer to the Agents as a 

“team” and do not provide sufficient detail as to what each individual did to violate Haley’s 

constitutional rights. The Court previously dismissed Haley’s claims on the ground that the FAC 

impermissibly had lumped together all the defendants to the action, a pleading practice held to be 

inadequate in Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 295 (9th Cir. 1996). The SAC has cured this defect

by alleging specifically that Singleton, Parker, Omori, and Fernandez met frequently to share 

information during the investigation, that they all had access to the entire pool of evidence, that 

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none of the evidence implicated Haley and in fact exculpated her, and that all of the Agents gave 

the prosecutor information that falsely incriminated Haley in reckless disregard of Haley’s rights. 

See SAC ¶¶ 23-24, 41. Accepting these facts as true as the Court must for pleading purposes, 

Haley has stated a Bivens claim against each of the Agents.

The motion to dismiss Claim 2, as asserted by Haley, is DENIED as to all Agents.

D. Claim 3 – Violation of Due Process (Liberty Interest)

In Claim 3, Haley alleges that during her 30-day detention, the Agents acted recklessly and 

with deliberate indifference by ignoring evidence in their possession demonstrating that she was 

not involved in the drug cartel despite her repeated protests of innocence. SAC ¶¶ 45-46. Haley 

asserts that the Agents’ conduct deprived her of liberty without due process of the law in violation 

of the Fifth Amendment. Id.

The Agents argue, and the opposition concedes, that the SAC does not allege that Parker, 

Omori, or Fernandez had any contact with Haley after her arrest. See Pl.’s Opp. at 13. 

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Claim 3, as asserted by Haley, is GRANTED WITHOUT 

LEAVE TO AMEND as to Parker, Omori, and Fernandez.

The SAC does allege that Singleton spoke to Haley shortly after she was placed in a 

holding cell following her arrest. SAC ¶ 21. Singleton allegedly questioned Haley about people 

she did not know, laughed at her denials of involvement, and stated that she was “all over” the 

case and the telephone taps. Id. Singleton met with Haley “during the period of her 

incarceration.” Id. ¶ 25. It is not clear from this allegation how many times Singleton met with 

Haley. Haley told Singleton that she was not a member of the drug cartel and did not know the 

other individuals who had been indicted with her. Id. Other women who had been arrested as 

members of the cartel also told Singleton that Haley was not involved and that they had never seen 

or heard of her before the arrest. Id. Singleton nonetheless failed to check evidence to which he 

had access, including photographs of “Hallie,” which would have proved Haley’s lack of 

involvement. Id. Haley’s defense attorney eventually obtained the evidence, including 

photographs and audio recordings, and met with Singleton. Id. ¶ 27. Defense counsel thought that 

it was clear that Singleton had not checked the evidence to see if it matched Haley. Id. 

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“A police officer’s continuing obligation to disclose highly exculpatory evidence to the 

prosecutors to whom they report is widely recognized.” Tatum v. Moody, 768 F.3d 806, 819 (9th 

Cir. 2014). In Tatum, the defendant police officers knew that a series of distinctive demand-note 

robberies continued after the plaintiff’s arrest and that another man had confessed to some of the 

robberies. Id. at 809. The defendant officers did not disclose that information and in fact falsely 

asserted in police reports that the demand-note robbery crime spree had ceased with the plaintiff’s 

arrest. Id. The plaintiff’s attorney learned of those facts after the plaintiff had spent twenty-seven 

months in pretrial detention. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the officers’ conduct violated the 

plaintiff’s due process rights. The Court expressly restricted its ruling “to detentions of (1) 

unusual length, (2) caused by the investigating officers’ failure to disclose highly significant 

exculpatory evidence to prosecutors, and (3) due to conduct that is culpable in that the officers 

understood the risks to the plaintiff’s rights from withholding the information or were completely 

indifferent to those risks.” Id. at 819-20. 

Singleton points out that the facts of Tatum were more extreme than the facts alleged here, 

in which he is not alleged to have known that Haley was innocent. Singleton cites Rivera v. 

County of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 391 (9th Cir. 2014) for the proposition that “[c]laims of 

innocence are common in jails.” For that reason “a jailor need not independently investigate all 

uncorroborated claims of innocence . . . . Unsupported claims of mistaken identity, by themselves, 

do not trigger a duty to investigate further.” Id. at 391-92. 

The present case falls somewhere between Tatum and Rivera. While Singleton’s alleged 

conduct does not rise to the level of intentional concealment of the officers in Tatum, Haley’s 

allegations go beyond the bare protests of innocence to a jailor discussed in Rivera. Haley’s 

assertions of innocence were made to an investigating officer and were corroborated by other 

women who were arrested as being cartel members. The Court concludes that Haley’s allegations 

are sufficient to state a claim that Singleton acted with complete indifference to the risks to 

Haley’s due process rights by refusing to re-check or disclose readily available evidence that 

ultimately demonstrated Haley’s innocence, and that these allegations are sufficient to plead 

around qualified immunity. 

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The Court notes Haley’s heavy reliance on Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th 

Cir. 2001). The Court previously distinguished Lee on its facts. See Order of Nov. 10, 2014, ECF 

89. However, Lee does support Haley to the extent that it made clear long before Haley’s 

detention that detaining an individual without taking basic steps to verify his identity may rise to 

the level of a constitutional violation. See id. at 684. As the Court noted previously, however, Lee

turned in large part upon the fact that persons with mental disabilities often are misidentified and 

that the defendants failed to compare the plaintiff’s fingerprints or other identifying characteristics 

with those of the fugitive at large, despite the plaintiff’s obvious mental incapacity. See id. Thus 

although it ultimately concludes that Haley has alleged enough to go forward on her claim against 

Singleton, the Court finds unpersuasive Haley’s assertion that Lee and the present case are “as 

close as two cases can be.” See Pl.’s Opp. at 16, ECF 95.

The motion to dismiss Claim 3, as asserted by Haley, is DENIED as to Singleton.

E. Claim 4 – Violation of Right to Freedom of Association

Claim 4 asserts that the Agents’ actions, which caused Haley to be arrested and detained 

for thirty days, violated her right to freedom of association as guaranteed by the First Amendment. 

In her opposition, Haley concedes that the limitations placed on her freedom of association “do not 

rise to the level of a constitutional violation” and that the claim should be dismissed. Accordingly, 

the Agents’ motion is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to Claim 4.

F. Claim 5 – Violation of Bane Act

In Claim 5, Haley claims that the Agents’ conduct violated her rights under the Bane Act.6 

SAC ¶ 55. A defendant is liable under the Bane Act “if he or she interfered with or attempted to 

interfere with the plaintiff’s constitutional rights by . . . threats, intimidation, or coercion.” 

Shoyoye v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 4th 947, 956 (2012); Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a). 

 

6 Haley argues that the Agents should be precluded from challenging the Bane Act claim because 

they did not challenge that claim in their prior Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2) 

(precluding a party from raising a defense or objection that could have been, but was not, raised in 

a prior motion). While it is true that the Agents did not challenge the Bane Act claim expressly in 

their prior motion, the Agents did successfully challenge all of the constitutional claims upon 

which the Bane Act claim is premised, and the Court sua sponte dismissed the Bane Act claim on 

that basis. See Order of Nov. 10, 2014, ECF 89. Under those circumstances, the Court concludes 

that the Agents’ current challenge to the amended Bane Act claim is appropriate. 

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Where the alleged constitutional violation is a wrongful jail detention, the plaintiff must allege 

something more than “the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself.” Shoyoye, 203 Cal. 

App. 4th at 959. Here, Haley does not allege any acts beyond the detention itself other that 

Singleton’s taunts that Haley was “all over” the evidence and that she was “screwed.” See SAC ¶ 

21. Those allegations are insufficient to state a Bane Act claim.7 See Shoyoye, 203 Cal. App. 4th 

at 961-62.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to 

Claim 5.

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) With respect to all claims asserted by Emily Wright and Jessica Wright against the 

Agents, the motion is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

(2) With respect to the claims asserted by Haley Wright against the Agents,

(a) the motion is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as all Bivens claims 

on the basis that Haley has failed to allege that the Agents acted in their 

individual capacities;

(b) the motion otherwise is DENIED as to Claim 2;

(c) the motion is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to Claim 3 

with respect to Parker, Omori, and Fernandez, and otherwise is DENIED as 

to Claim 3 with respect to Singleton;

(d) the motion is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to Claim 4; 

and

(e) the motion is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to Claim 5.

(3) Plaintiffs shall file an amended pleading, on or before February 13, 2014, omitting 

all claims that have been dismissed voluntarily by Plaintiffs or dismissed without 

 

7

In light of its conclusion that Haley has not alleged facts sufficient to make out a Bane Act claim, 

the Court declines to reach the Agents’ argument that federal agents are exempt from liability 

under the Bane Act.

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leave to amend by this Court, and curing the pleading defect with respect to the 

Agents acting in their individual capacities.

(4) The Agents thereafter shall answer the amended pleading.

(5) Nothing in this order shall preclude the Agents from raising the defense of qualified 

immunity in a future motion or at trial, if appropriate.

Dated: January 26, 2015 ______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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