Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03679/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03679-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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14-cv-03679-RMW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FAC

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENIZ BOLBOL, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JERRY BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-03679-RMW 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 27

Plaintiffs Deniz Bolbol and Joseph Cuviello filed this action against defendants Jerry 

Brown, the Governor of California, and Kamala Harris, the Attorney General of California, 

challenging the statutory procedures used by a California state court to issue restraining orders and 

an injunction against them under California’s Workplace Violence Safety Act. Dkt. No. 16. 

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (“FAC”) on several grounds, 

including sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, that the action is untimely, the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the doctrine of abstention. Dkt. No. 27, at 2. For the reasons set 

forth below, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Workplace Violence Safety Act

California’s Workplace Violence Safety Act (“WVSA”) provides a mechanism for an 

employer to seek a temporary restraining order and an injunction on behalf of an employee who 

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“has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from any individual,” and that 

violence or threat of violence “can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been 

carried out at the workplace.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527.8(a). Upon filing a petition for an 

injunction, an employer may obtain an interim temporary restraining order (“TRO”) if the 

employer “also files a declaration that, to the satisfaction of the court, shows reasonable proof that 

an employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence by the respondent, and 

that great or irreparable harm would result to an employee.” Id. § 527.8(e).

A hearing must be held on the employer’s petition for an injunction within 21 days, or 25 

days if the court finds good cause, and the TRO under Section 527.8(e) remains in effect until the 

hearing. Id. § 527.8(g), (h). The respondent may file a response, and may appear at the hearing on 

his or her own behalf, or elect to be represented by counsel. Id. § 527.8(i), (l). At the hearing, “the 

judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant and may make an independent inquiry.” Id. 

§ 527.8(j). “If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in 

unlawful violence or made a credible threat of violence, an injunction shall issue prohibiting 

further unlawful violence or threats of violence.” Id. The injunction may last for up to three years, 

and may be renewed for three more years upon the request of a party. Id. § 527.8(k)(1).

The statutory process for seeking a restraining order and injunction under Section 527.8 is 

“intended to parallel [the process] under section 527.6, which [is] procedurally truncated, 

expedited, and intended to provide quick relief to victims of civil harassment.” Kaiser Found. 

Hospitals v. Wilson, 201 Cal. App. 4th 550, 557 (2011). Section 527.6 provides a person who has 

suffered harassment the right to seek an injunction. Under both Section 527.6 and 527.8, “ the 

court must hold a hearing, receive relevant testimony, and issue the injunction if it finds, by clear 

and convincing evidence, that harassment exists.” Nora v. Kaddo, 116 Cal. App. 4th 1026, 1028 

(2004) (citations omitted). “[A]lthough the procedures set forth in [527.6] are expedited, they 

contain certain important due process standards. Most notably, a person charged with harassment 

is given a full opportunity to present his or her case, with the judge required to receive relevant 

testimony and to find the existence of harassment by ‘clear and convincing’ proof.” Id. The 

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proceedings required by the Workplace Violence Safety Act in Section 527.8 are similar, and 

contain the same due process standards. Kaiser Found. Hospitals, 201 Cal. App. 4th at 557–58.

B. Factual Background

Plaintiffs are animal rights activists. FAC ¶ 2. Plaintiffs have for many years clashed with 

Ringling Brothers Circus over their use of animals in their shows. FAC ¶¶ 17–24. The events that 

gave rise to the WVSA restraining order at issue in this case took place in August, 2012.

On August 7, 2012 plaintiffs, with several associates, were involved in several physical 

altercations with employees of Feld Entertainment, Inc. (“Feld Entertainment”), doing business as 

Ringling Brothers and Barnum and Bailey Circus, as the employees led circus elephants from the 

train station in Oakland, California to the arena where the circus was scheduled to perform. FAC 

¶¶ 29–32.

The Circus travelled to San Jose, California the following week, and plaintiffs videotaped 

Feld Entertainment employees on August 13, 2012 as they handled elephants in the parking lot of 

an arena in San Jose. FAC ¶¶ 34, 35, 41. Plaintiffs also travelled to a train station in Milpitas, 

California, where Feld Entertainment employees unloaded elephants for transport on trucks to San 

Jose. FAC ¶ 36–39. Plaintiffs coordinated with several associates during the day, including 

Sherisa Anderson and Shannon Campbell. Id. At some point on August 13, 2012, while in 

Milpitas, both Andersen and Campbell were detained by the Milpitas police “based on a claim 

from Circus Assistant General Manager David Bailey that Ms. Andersen and Ms. Campbell had 

attempted to run the Circus trucks off the road on the way over from San Jose.” FAC ¶ 39.

C. State Court Proceedings

Later on August 13, 2012, Feld Entertainment filed an ex-parte petition for a restraining 

order against Bolbol, Cuviello, and Anderson under Section 527.8. FAC ¶ 11. Plaintiffs learned of 

the petition the following morning through plaintiff Bolbol’s attorney. FAC ¶ 46. The petition

alleged claims based on the events of both August 7 and 13, 2012. FAC ¶¶ 47, 49. The petition 

was set for a hearing at 9:00 a.m. that same day, August 14, 2012. FAC ¶ 46. Plaintiffs attended 

the hearing at the Superior Court in San Jose, California. FAC ¶ 37.

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At the hearing, the court issued a TRO against both plaintiffs and Ms. Anderson. FAC 

¶ 49. The court based its decision on declarations submitted by Feld Entertainment employees, and 

did not take testimony from plaintiffs or Ms. Anderson. Id. The TRO required plaintiffs and Ms. 

Anderson to maintain a distance of fifteen feet from Feld Entertainment personnel, workplaces, 

homes, families, and vehicles. FAC ¶¶ 49, 50. Later that day, plaintiffs filed a “motion to dissolve

[Feld Entertainment’s] petition,” which was heard and denied the following day, August 15, 2012.

FAC ¶ 53.

The Section 527.8 hearing on the petition for an injunction took place on September 4, 5,

6, 12, 17, and 18, 2012. Dkt. No. 28, Ex. A (“Superior Court Order”), at 3.1 The court found 

sufficient evidence supported an injunction against Bolbol, but that the evidence submitted was 

insufficient evidence to support an injunction against Cuviello or Andersen. Id. The court set a 

briefing schedule to consider a variety of motions and objections to the restraining order raised by 

plaintiffs. Id. These motions and objections included: (1) a motion to strike under California’s 

Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) Statute (Code Civil Procedure 

Section 425.16), filed by Bolbol, Cuviello, and Andersen; (2) a brief filed by Bolbol objecting on 

constitutional grounds to the issuance of the restraining order against her; and (3) a motion for a 

new trial or hearing under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 657. Id.

The court held a hearing on these motions and objections on January 14, 2013. After the 

hearing, the court issued a three-year injunction against Bolbol. Id. at 3–4. The court explained 

that plaintiffs’ motions “were taken under submission with the understanding that the rulings of 

[the] Court could impact the continued viability of the restraining order against Respondent 

Bolbol.” Id. at 4.

 1 Defendants request judicial notice of a state court order and the dockets of three appeals taken by 

plaintiffs’ to the restraining order entered against Bolbol. Dkt. No. 28. These documents are 

judicially noticeable. See Fed R. Evid. 201(b) (court may take judicial notice of documents 

capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned); see also Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 866 (9th Cir. 2002) (court 

documents already in the public record or documents filed in another court are proper subjects of 

judicial notice). Additionally, plaintiffs do not dispute that these documents are properly subject to 

judicial notice. The court therefore GRANTS defendants’ request for judicial notice.

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The state court issued its ruling on plaintiffs’ various motions on April 10, 2013. See id. In 

its order, the court stated that Bolbol’s motion for a new trial was “based on 1) ‘newly discovered’ 

video evidence obtained in discovery taken in a federal action involving the same parties, and 2) 

insufficiency of the evidence to support the issuance of a restraining order.” Id. The court found 

that the video evidence was insufficient to support a motion for a new trial. Id. at 4. The court also 

rejected the argument that the injunction against Bolbol violated her First Amendment rights, and 

rejected Bolbol’s arguments against issuance of the restraining order “based on theories of 

Petitioner’s wrongdoing (including ‘unclean hands,’ lack of authority, the absence of a permit, 

blockage of public walkways and areas).” Id. at 5. The court also denied the anti-SLAPP motion, 

finding that “the actions which Petitioner sought to enjoin were not acts in furtherance of the

Respondents’ right of free speech or petition.” Id. The court concluded that Feld Entertainment’s 

petition “was supported by a prima facie showing of facts sufficient to sustain a favorable 

judgment or outcome. Although the Court ultimately determined that Petitioner failed to present 

clear and convincing evidence to support the issuance of the requested restraining orders against 

Respondents Andersen and Cuviello, the Court did so only after a careful consideration of 

conflicting video and testimonial evidence after several days of hearings.” Id. at 6. Furthermore, 

“[t]he Court spent significant time reviewing the videotape evidence before concluding that the 

evidence was not clear and convincing that Respondent Cuviello committed a battery. The Court 

found that Respondent Bolbol did commit a battery against Feld employees,” and “did not act in 

self defense.” Id.

Bolbol, Cuviello, and Andersen all filed notices of appeal, which the Court of Appeal

consolidated for briefing, oral argument and disposition. See Dkt. No. 28, Exs. B–D; Cal. Ct. 

App. 6th Dist. Nos. H039543, H039661, and H039662 (Oct. 2, 2013). Plaintiffs’ appeals are 

pending.

D. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this action on August 14, 2014, and named the 

State of California as the sole defendant. Dkt. No. 2. After the State of California moved to 

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dismiss the complaint, see Dkt. No. 11, plaintiffs filed their FAC on January 20, 2015, naming the 

current defendants, the Governor and Attorney General of California, see Dkt. No. 16.

The FAC challenges the procedures set forth in Section 527.8 under the due process 

provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and under 

the due process provision of Article 1, Section 7 of the California Constitution. FAC ¶¶ 92, 97, 

102. Plaintiffs base their federal Constitutional claims on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs contend that 

Section 527.8 is facially unconstitutional because “it does not provide proper and fair due process 

for a respondent to meaningfully defend against allegations” because the statute does not provide 

respondent the opportunity to conduct discovery, the result of which is respondents have no “fair 

opportunity to learn the identities of the witnesses against [the respondent] or even the specific 

allegations.” FAC ¶ 84. According to the FAC, “[t]he procedures foster an environment that 

allows and encourages parties to exploit the procedures to avoid resolution of matters on the 

merits and, as in the underlying case, to perpetrate frauds on the court.” FAC ¶¶ 94, 99, 104.

Plaintiffs also mount an as-applied challenge to Section 527.8. See FAC ¶ 86. Plaintiffs 

argue that “[b]y filing under [Section] 527.8 [Feld Entertainment] could control the evidence they 

had to produce, present witnesses that could perjure themselves without Plaintiffs’ knowledge and 

keep Plaintiffs from obtaining documents and information that would have helped them defend 

and exonerate themselves against the baseless allegations.” Id. As a result, plaintiffs “(1) had no 

opportunity to obtain [Feld Entertainment’s] full videos of the August 7 animal walk, (2) had no 

knowledge of the witnesses who would testify against them (and thus no opportunity to depose the 

witnesses), and (3) had no knowledge of what the actual allegations were until [Feld 

Entertainment’s] employees testified against them.” FAC ¶ 58. The FAC alleges that plaintiffs 

obtained a police report through discovery in separate case which includes statements by Feld 

Entertainment employees that are inconsistent with their testimony against plaintiffs. FAC ¶¶ 65, 

69-72. While these witnesses had testified that Bolbol had been involved in several physical 

altercations, plaintiffs allege that the police report indicates that the witnesses attributed this 

conduct to Andersen, not Bolbol. Id.

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II. ANALYSIS

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In considering 

whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, the court must accept as true all of the factual 

allegations contained in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, the 

Court need not accept as true “allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice 

or by exhibit” or “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 

unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). 

While a complaint need not allege detailed factual allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible 

when it “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

The FAC recites three claims for relief: two federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 

violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of 

the Fifth Amendment, and a state claim for violation of the Due Process Clause of Article 1, 

Section 7 of the California Constitution. FAC ¶¶ 91–105.

Defendants move to dismiss the FAC on the grounds that: (1) the claims are barred by 

sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; (2) the action in untimely; (3) the action is 

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and (4) the court should abstain from adjudicating the 

claims to avoid interfering with the pending appeals in state court. Because the court finds that 

sovereign immunity bars plaintiffs’ claims against both defendants, the court does not address 

defendants’ other arguments.

A. Plaintiffs Concede Sovereign Immunity Bars Plaintiffs’ State Law Claim

Plaintiffs concede in their opposition that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars 

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their state law claim. Dkt. No. 34, at 1. Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to 

dismiss this claim with prejudice.

B. Sovereign Immunity Bars Plaintiffs’ Federal Claims

“States are protected by the Eleventh Amendment from suits brought by citizens in federal 

court.” Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 817, amended by, 271 F.3d 910 (9th 

Cir. 2001); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Section 1983 

did not abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 

(1979), and the State of California has not waived that immunity with respect to claims brought 

under Section 1983 in federal court, Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985). 

“The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state officials when the state is the real, substantial 

party in interest.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The 

“general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the 

decree would operate against the latter.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A]s when the State itself is named 

as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred 

regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.” Id. at 101–02 (citation omitted).

An exception under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), however, allows citizens to sue 

state officers in their official capacities “for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief . . . for 

their alleged violations of federal law.” Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 

1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012). The state official “‘must have some connection with the enforcement 

of the act.’” Id. (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157). Such connection “must be fairly direct; 

a generalized duty to enforce state law or general supervisory power over the persons responsible 

for enforcing the challenged provision will not subject an official to suit.” Id. (quoting L.A. Cnty. 

Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992)).

Here, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity applies to plaintiffs’ federal claims 

against the Governor and Attorney General of California. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Section 

527.8 is unconstitutional, as well as injunctive relief and damages. FAC, at 21. Plaintiffs’ 

requested declaration and injunctive relief are targeted at the application of Section 527.8 in the 

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State of California generally, not by the particular defendants in this case. It is clear that plaintiffs’ 

claims seek relief that is directed against the State of California, and such claims are barred under 

the Eleventh Amendment. That plaintiffs seek damages in addition to injunctive and declaratory 

relief does not change this conclusion. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101–2 (“[A]s when the State itself is 

named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred 

regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.”).

Plaintiffs resist this conclusion by arguing that the limited exception to Eleventh 

Amendment immunity recognized by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Young applies to rescue 

plaintiffs’ claims. Dkt. No. 34, at 5–9. Plaintiffs’ arguments are largely based on their incorrect 

assertion that no “fairly direct” connection is required for Ex parte Young to apply, and that their 

claims may proceed so long as they can show the Governor and Attorney General have “some 

connection” to the enforcement of Section 527.8 Id. at 6. However, Ninth Circuit law is clear that 

a “fairly direct” connection is required. See Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. 

Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 398 (2014). 

The FAC contains no factual allegations from which the court could plausibly conclude 

defendants have a “fairly direct” connection with the enforcement of Section 527.8. The FAC 

alleges that defendant Brown, as Governor of the State of California, is responsible for “ensur[ing]

that laws of the State are properly enforced.” FAC ¶ 8. The FAC also alleges that the Attorney 

General, is the State of California’s chief legal officer, has a “duty to see that the laws of the State 

are uniformly and adequately enforced.” FAC ¶ 9. Finally, the FAC alleges generally that 

“[d]efendants, and those subject to their supervision, direction, and control, are responsible for the 

enforcement” of Section 527.8.2 FAC ¶ 10. A “general duty to enforce California law” is plainly 

insufficient to invoke the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Harris, 

729 F.3d at 943.

 2 Plaintiffs appear to have inadvertently omitted from paragraph 10 of the FAC exactly what 

defendants and their subordinates are responsible for enforcing, but in light of the substance of the 

remainder of the FAC, the court presumes that paragraph 10 is intended to refer to Section 527.8.

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Furthermore, while the Attorney General is the chief legal officer of California, and is 

therefore the direct supervisor of the State’s district attorneys and law enforcement officials and 

ultimately responsible for the enforcement of California law and is, her connection to the 

enforcement of Section 527.8 is a general one and is not “fairly direct.” As the defendants point 

out, Section 527.8 provides a mechanism for a private party to obtain a restraining order and 

injunction, and does not contemplate any role for state executive officers in enforcing the Statute. 

See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527.8(a) (“Any employer . . . may seek a temporary restraining order 

and an injunction on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of the court . . . .”) (emphasis 

added).3

This case contrasts with the fact of Harris, where the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district 

court’s denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity to the Attorney General in a case involving a 

challenge to California Health and Safety Code Section 25983. Harris, 729 F.3d at 942. California 

Health and Safety Code Section 25983 banned the sale of products that are the result of force 

feeding birds to enlarge their livers beyond normal size, such as foie gras. Id. Unlike Section 

527.8, which provides a process by which a private party may seek a restraining order or 

injunction, the challenged statute in Harris “expressly authorize[d] enforcement of the statute by 

district attorneys and city attorneys.” Id. at 943. Under the California Constitution the Attorney 

General not only has “direct supervision over every district attorney,” but also has the duty “to 

prosecute any violations of law . . . [and] shall have all the powers of a district attorney,” 

whenever she believes that the law is not being adequately enforced. Id. (alterations in original).

The Ninth Circuit found that the Attorney General was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment 

immunity because the combination of the statutory provision of enforcement power to district 

attorneys and the Attorney General’s duty to prosecute as a district attorney established sufficient 

enforcement power for Ex parte Young. Id. at 943–944. Here, Section 527.8 does not empower 

 3 While Section 527.8 provides that the definition of “employer” includes federal and state 

officials, see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527.8(b)(3), no federal or state officials are alleged to have 

sought a restraining order or injunction against plaintiffs in this case. 

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district attorneys to enforce the law, and accordingly the Attorney General’s enforcement power is 

limited to her general duty to enforce California law. Because such a general duty is insufficient 

under Ex parte Young, the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiffs’ claims against the Attorney 

General.

Finally, plaintiffs note that Section 527.8 requires transmission of a restraining order or 

injunction relating to workplace violence issued under the Statute to be transmitted either to the 

law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the residence of the petitioner, or to the 

Department of Justice, of which the Attorney General is the head. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 

527.8(q). According to plaintiffs, this involvement establishes a sufficient connection to deny 

Eleventh Amendment immunity to the Attorney General. Dkt. No. 34, at 6. However, Section 

527.8(q) simply provides the mechanism by which a restraining order or injunction is provided to 

local law enforcement whose responsibility it will be to ensure the respondent complies with its 

terms. Section 527.8(q) provides that the restraining order or injunction shall be: (1) transmitted to 

petitioner’s local law enforcement agency, see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527.8(q)(2); or, alternatively 

(2) to a local law enforcement agency to enter into the California Law Enforcement 

Telecommunications System (CLETS), or, with the approval of the Department of Justice, entered 

directly into CLETS, see id. § 527.8(q)(3)(A)–(B). The Department of Justice (and by extension, 

the Attorney General) is therefore only incidentally involved in the enforcement of Section 527.8, 

by virtue of its authority over the CLETS system. This involvement does not rise to the level of 

direct enforcement powers such as in Harris, and is insufficient to nullify the Attorney General’s 

Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Accordingly, because the FAC contains no factual allegations from which the court could 

plausibly conclude defendants have a “fairly direct” connection with the enforcement of Section 

527.8, sovereign immunity bars the federal Section 1983 claims against both defendants. 

C. Amendment Could Not Cure the FAC’s Deficiencies

If the Court determines that the complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide 

whether to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave 

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to amend “should be freely granted when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying 

purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or 

technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotation 

marks and alterations omitted). When dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, “‘a 

district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, 

unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” 

Id. at 1130 (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Nonetheless, a court 

“may exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend due to ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory 

motive on part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party . . ., [and] futility of amendment.’” Carvalho v. 

Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (quoting 

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). If amendment would be futile, a dismissal may be 

ordered with prejudice. Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 593 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2014); Dumas v. 

Kipp, 90 F.3d 386, 393 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The only connection between defendants and the enforcement of Section 527.8 is the 

defendants’ general duty to enforce and uphold California state law. Neither the Attorney General 

nor the Governor has a “fairly direct” connection with the enforcement of Section 527.8. Because 

the court can conceive of no facts which plaintiffs might allege to surmount defendants’ sovereign 

immunity, the court finds that amendment would be futile. The court therefore dismisses the FAC

with prejudice.

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC 

without leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 14, 2015

______________________________________

Ronald M. Whyte

United States District Judge

Case 5:14-cv-03679-RMW Document 45 Filed 08/14/15 Page 12 of 12