Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02361/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02361-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MAURICE HILLARD, 

Petitioner,

v. 

SCOTT KERNAN, Secretary of the 

California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 3:15-cv-02361-H-RBB 

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS, ADOPTING 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION, AND 

DENYING MOTION FOR 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

[Doc. No. 1, 16, 20] 

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

[Doc. No. 18] 

(3) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

On October 16, 2015, Petitioner Maurice Hillard, a state prisoner proceeding pro se 

and in forma pauperis, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. No. 1.) Following 

a 2004 jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of sixteen separate offenses, including grand 

theft, conspiracy to commit grand theft, attempted grand theft, burglary, receiving stolen 

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property, unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle, and resisting an officer. (Doc. No. 13-

13 at 75-118; Doc. No. 13-19 at 20-21); see also People v. Maurice Hillard et al., No. 

D045175 (Cal. Ct. App. April 19, 2005) (unpublished). Petitioner’s life sentence rested, 

in part, on sentencing enhancements under California’s Three Strikes Law arising from 

Petitioner’s prior felony convictions for attempted murder and attempted robbery. (Doc. 

No. 13-13 at 117-18; Doc. No. 13-9 at 1440-45.) Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his 

conviction before the California Court of Appeal, People v. Hillard, No. DO45175 (Cal. 

Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2005), as well as the California Supreme Court, People v. Hillard, 

S143767 (Cal. May 26, 2006). 

After exhausting his opportunities for direct appeal, Petitioner filed a state habeas 

petition with the California Superior Court, Hillard v. Felker, HC18820 (Cal. Super. Ct. 

Feb. 26, 2007), the California Court of Appeal, In re Maurice Hillard, D051127 (Cal. Ct. 

App. June 16, 2007), and the California Supreme Court, Hillard v. Scribner, S158679 

(Cal. Nov. 30, 2007). All of Petitioner’s state habeas petitions were denied. Finally, 

Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition in the Southern District of California. Hillard v. 

Small, No. 08-1786-DMS-RBB (S.D. Cal. Sept 30, 2008.) This petition was denied on 

the merits, id., ECF No. 36, and both the district court and the Ninth Circuit denied 

Petitioner a certificate of appealability, id., EFC Nos. 36, 43; Hillard v. Small, No. 10-

56581 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 2010), ECF No. 6. 

In 2012, California voters approved Proposition 36, which retroactively made the 

Three Strikes Law more lenient. See People v. Yearwood, 213 Cal. App. 4th 161, 167-68 

(2013) (describing Proposition 36). However, Proposition 36 did not extend relief to 

certain categories of offenders, including those, like Petitioner, that had been convicted of 

attempted murder. Id.; see also Cal. Penal Code § 1170.126. In 2015, Petitioner filed a 

petition to recall his sentence pursuant to Proposition 36, (Doc. No. 1 at 9-18), but the 

petition was denied, (Doc. No. 13-32 at 92-93). 

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In the present federal habeas petition,1

 Petitioner alleges this refusal to recall his 

sentence violated his due process rights because (1) his two prior convictions arose from 

the same act against the same victim, (2) the state court improperly found his petition for 

recall was untimely, and (3) the state court erred by ignoring his claim his 1986 

conviction for attempted murder was tainted by prosecutorial misconduct. (Doc. No. 1 at 

9-27.) On December 11, 2015, Defendant filed an answer and notice of lodgment. (Doc. 

Nos. 12, 13.) Petitioner filed a traverse on December 28, 2015. (Doc. No. 14.) On 

August 19, 2016, the magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation 

recommending the petition be denied. (Doc. No. 16.) On August 30, 2016, Petitioner 

filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion for an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 

Nos. 18, 20.) Petitioner filed an objection to the Report and Recommendation on 

September 14, 2016. (Doc. No. 21.) 

For the following reasons, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation and 

denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court denies Petitioner’s motion for 

summary judgment on the same grounds as his petition and denies Petitioner’s motion for 

an evidentiary hearing as unnecessary. 

BACKGROUND 

I. FACTUAL HISTORY 

The Court adopts the facts from the California Court of Appeal opinion denying 

Petitioner’s direct appeal and affirming his convictions. See People v. Maurice Hillard et 

al., No. D045175 (Cal. Ct. App. April 19, 2005) (unpublished); (see also Doc. No. 13-

19). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), the Court presumes these facts to be correct and 

                                                                

1

 Although Petitioner previously filed a habeas petition with regard to his 2004 sentence, the present 

petition challenges a different judgment, namely the 2015 denial of his petition to recall. Magwood v. 

Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 333 (2010) (“the phrase ‘second or successive’ must be interpreted with respect 

to the judgment challenged”). The California Superior Court, the California Court of Appeal, and the 

California Supreme Court denied his petition to recall because relief was unavailable for Petitioner, who 

had been previously convicted of attempted murder. (Doc. No. 13-32 at 92-93; Doc. No. 13-35; Doc. 

No. 13-37.) 

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Petitioner has not met his burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing 

evidence. 

Petitioner’s current imprisonment stems from his conviction for sixteen separate 

offenses, including grand theft, conspiracy to commit grand theft, attempted grand theft, 

burglary, receiving stolen property, unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle, and 

resisting an officer. (Doc. No. 13-20 at 2.) Petitioner and his accomplice, Charles 

Calhoun (“Calhoun”), robbed multiple ATMs between July and October 2003. (Id. at 2-

3.) During the same time period, Petitioner and Calhoun also committed burglaries not 

connected to ATMs. (Id.) 

Petitioner and Calhoun were arrested on October 9, 2003, after police were able to 

track their position using a locator system installed in the vehicle they stole. (Id.) 

Calhoun was driving the stolen vehicle at the time and led the police on a high-speed 

chase, using both sides of the road at times in an attempt to evade the officers. (Id. at 3-

4.) At trial, the prosecution presented evidence regarding a large number of criminal 

charges: 

The events of the night of defendants’ arrest formed the evidentiary 

basis for their convictions of conspiracy to commit grand theft (count 1); 

unlawful taking or driving of the United Rentals truck (count 2); unlawful 

taking or driving of the Nissan truck (count 3); resisting a police officer 

(count 8); and (as to Calhoun) evading an officer with reckless driving 

(count 5) and harming or interfering with an officer’s animal (count 7). 

 Evidence supporting the remaining counts of receiving stolen 

property, unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle, burglary, grand theft and 

attempted grand theft arose from the common modus operandi combined 

with various items of circumstantial evidence. We summarize some of this 

evidence. To support receiving stolen property from various victims (count 

6): various stolen license plates were found in the Nissan truck left by 

defendants at the industrial complex. To support the taking of the 

ThyssenKrupp truck (count 9): a ThyssenKrupp hard hat that had been 

stolen in the stolen ThyssenKrupp truck was found in the Nissan truck. To 

support the unlawful taking of the ICI Paints truck (count 10): a license plate 

registered to ICI Paints (that was stolen at the same time as the ICI Paints 

truck) was found in the Nissan truck. To support the Hall of Champions 

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burglary and grand thefts (counts 11 and 12): a rack from the stolen 

ThyssenKrupp truck was found outside the Hall of Champions building the 

morning after the theft. Further, a handwritten list of ATM locations which 

included the Hall of Champions location was found at Hillard’s residence. 

To support the burglary at Dominic’s Deli (count 13): a security guard 

observed a truck leave the parking lot near the deli on the night of the 

burglary that looked like the stolen ThyssenKrupp truck. To support the 

taking of the Sherwin Williams truck and the burglary and theft at the 

Chevron station (count 14, 15, and 16): a surveillance video at the Chevron 

station depicted a truck with the Sherwin Williams logo and showed two 

persons who (the prosecution argued) matched defendants in size and shape. 

To support the taking of the Davies Electric truck and the Beacon Gas 

station burglary and attempted theft (counts 17, 18 and 19): at the time of the 

burglary, a witness saw two males at the gas station and a truck with the 

Davies Electric logo parked in front of the station. A surveillance video 

showed a person who (the prosecution argued) had the same body type as 

Calhoun. 

 The police found various items in the United Rentals truck likely used 

in the ATM thefts, including a metal chain coiled in a bucket, a dolly, and a 

crowbar. When the United Rentals truck was stolen, it had been parked 

behind a locked fence at the Davies Electric yard; the padlock and chain that 

had secured the fence at the Davies Electric yard were found in the Nissan 

truck. [Footnote omitted] In the Nissan the police also found such items as 

bolt cutters and discs for cutting metal, pry bars, a chisel, and metal shavings 

that were similar to those observed around the stolen ATM machines. Items 

found at Hillard’s residence included a lock-picking kit, a police 

communications scanner, and drilling tools including a specialized tool for 

drilling through metal. The police also found instructional materials 

discussing such matters as bypassing burglar alarms and locks, drilling 

through safes, breaking into vehicles, and money laundering. One section of 

the instructional materials described the modus operandi used by defendants; 

i.e., using a heavy chain to wrap around an ATM and pulling the ATM out 

with a stake bed truck. Cell phone records showed 474 phone calls between 

Calhoun’s and Hillard’s cell phones during October 2002 to October 2003. 

(Doc. No. 13-20 at 30-32.) 

II. STATE PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On July 1, 2004, a San Diego County Superior Court jury convicted Hillard and 

Calhoun of one count of conspiracy to commit grand theft, six counts of unlawful taking 

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and driving a vehicle, four counts of burglary, two counts of grand theft, and one count 

each of attempted grand theft, receiving stolen property, and resisting an officer. (Doc. 

No. 13-13 at 75-118; Doc. No. 13-19 at 20-21.) The jury found them not guilty on one 

count of attempted burglary and found Calhoun guilty of evading an officer with reckless 

driving and harming or interfering with an officer’s animal. (Id.) 

The charging document alleged that Petitioner qualified for sentencing 

enhancement under California’s Three Strike Law because of two previous convictions. 

(Doc. No. 13-12 at 32.) In 1986, Petitioner had been convicted of attempted burglary and 

attempted murder. (Id.) According to the Court of Appeal: 

 The two strike prior convictions arose from an incident in November 

1985 when Hillard and two co-defendants attempted to rob a jewelry store. 

One of the co-defendants burst into the store and placed a rifle against the 

store owner’s chest. The owner grabbed the rifle away and the co-defendant 

fled from the store, yelling to Hillard and the other co-defendant to “get 

him.” The owner pulled a pistol from his pocket but before he could fire the 

weapon, Hillard shot the owner in the arm with a rifle and then continued 

shooting. The owner was struck seven more times, three times in the chest, 

three times in the leg, and once on his nose. 

(Doc. No. 13-20 at 47.) 

Petitioner waived his right to a separate jury trial regarding the priors, (Doc. No. 

13-13 at 71; see also Doc. No. 13-8 at 229), and the trial judge found his prior felony 

convictions constituted two prison priors and two strikes under California’s Three Strikes 

Law. (Doc. No. 13-8 at 237-38.) The trial judge found that state law required they be 

treated as separate strikes. (Id. at 238.) Thus, on September 20, 2004, Petitioner was 

sentenced to 15 terms of 25 years to life, three of which were stayed and the rest ordered 

to run consecutively, a one-year concurrent term for the misdemeanor offense of resisting 

an officer, and a one-year consecutive term for each of the prison priors. (Doc. No. 13-13 

at 75-118; Doc. No. 13-19 at 20-21.) 

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal. (Doc. No. 

13-14); see also Appellant’s Opening Brief, People v. Hillard, No. D045175 (Cal. Ct. 

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App. Aug. 26, 2005). He argued that (1) there was insufficient evidence for three of the 

unlawful taking of a vehicle counts, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to 

strike one of the priors because they arose from a single criminal act, (3) remand was 

necessary because the trial court was unaware it had discretion to impose concurrent 

rather than consecutive sentences, (4) the sentence was cruel and unusual, and (5) the 

consecutive sentences were improper because the jury had not found the underlying 

priors occurred on separate occasions. (Id.) The California Court of Appeal rejected 

Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed his conviction. (Doc. No. 13-19.) Regarding 

Petitioner’s two priors, the Court of Appeal concluded “[t]he trial court here could 

reasonably construe the attempted robbery and the attempted murder as arising from 

multiple, distinct acts. The court could conclude that Hillard first committed attempted 

robbery as an accomplice to the co-defendant’s forceful assault on the store owner, and 

then separately committed attempted murder by repeatedly shooting the owner.” (Id. at 

23.) 

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review with the California Supreme 

Court, making the same arguments. (Doc. No. 13-20); see also People v. Hillard, 

S143767 (Cal. filed May 26, 2006). The petition was summarily denied “without 

prejudice to any relief to which defendant might be entitled after the United States 

Supreme Court determines in Cunningham v. California, No. 05-6551, the effect of 

Blakely v. Washington (2004)) 542 U.S. 296 and United States v. Booker (2005) 543 

U.S. 220, on California law.” (Doc. No. 13-22); see also People v. Hillard, S143767 

(Cal. Aug. 18, 2006). 

On February 26, 2007, shortly after Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 

(2007), was decided, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in California 

Superior Court. (Doc. No. 13-23); see also Hillard v. Felker, HC18820 (Cal. Super. Ct. 

filed Feb. 26, 2007). He argued that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

based on trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress evidence, (2) his sentence was cruel 

and unusual, and (3) the consecutive sentences were improper absent a jury finding the 

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crimes occurred on separate occasions. (Id.) The petition was denied on April 25, 2007. 

(Doc. No. 13-24.) 

On June 16, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the 

California Court of Appeal, raising the same arguments as before the Superior Court. 

(Doc. No. 13-25); see also In re Maurice Hillard, D051127 (Cal. Ct. App. Filed June 16, 

2007). The petition was denied on September 6, 2007. (Doc. No. 13-26.) 

On November 30, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Supreme Court raising the same arguments. (Doc. No. 13-27); see also Hillard 

v. Scribner, S158679 (Cal. filed Nov. 30, 2007). The petition was summarily denied on 

May 21, 2008. (Doc. No. 13-28.) 

On September 30, 2008, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition in the Southern 

District of California. Hillard v. Small, No. 08-1786-DMS-RBB (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 

2008). The petition reallaged many of the claims Petitioner raised on direct appeal with 

the state court. The petition was denied on the merits on September 9, 2010. Hillard v. 

Small, No. 08-1786-DMS-RBB (S.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2010), ECF No. 36. Subsequently 

both the district court and the Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner a certificate of 

appealability. Id., EFC Nos. 36, 43. 

On November 6, 2012, California voters approved Proposition 36, which 

substantially amended California’s Three Strike Law. See People v. Yearwood, 213 

Cal.App.4th 161, 167 (2013). The proposition “diluted the three strike law by reserving 

the life sentence for cases where the current crime is a serious or violent felony . . . [and] 

created a postconviction release proceeding whereby a prisoner who is serving an 

indeterminate life sentence imposed pursuant to the three strikes law for a crime that is 

not a serious or violent felony and who is not disqualified, may have his or her sentence 

recalled and be resentenced as a second strike offender.” Id. at 167-68. 

Petitioner filed a petition to recall his sentence pursuant to Proposition 36 on 

January 15, 2015. (Doc. No. 13-32 at 33-65); see also People v. Hillard, SCD178097 

(Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 15, 2015). On January 28, 2015, the Superior Court denied the 

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petition because Proposition 36 excluded relief for persons convicted of attempted 

murder and, in any event, the petition was untimely. (Doc. No. 13-32 at 92-93.) 

Petitioner appealed the Superior Court’s denial to the California Court of Appeal. (Doc. 

No. 13-33.) His appointed counsel filed an Anders brief requesting the court 

independently review the record for arguable issues and pointed out the potential issues 

of whether Petitioner’s sentence should be reconsidered in light of subsequent cases and 

propositions. (Id.) Petitioner filed a supplemental pro se brief, raising the claims 

presented in the current federal habeas petition. (Doc. No. 13-34.) He argued that he had 

timely filed his petition for recall under the mailbox rule of Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 

266 (1988) (holding that a pro se prisoner’s federal notice of appeal is deemed filed when 

it is handed to the prison officials for mailing), and attached supporting exhibits. (Id.) 

Petitioner also argued that he should be resentenced in light of People v. Vargas, 59 Cal. 

4th 635 (2014), which recognized that in rare occasions multiple convictions should not 

count as separate strikes. (Doc. No. 13-34.) Finally, he argued that his conviction for 

attempted murder could not count as a prior because there had been prosecutorial 

misconduct. (Id. at 21-23.) The California Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of 

Petitioner’s petition to recall. (Doc. No. 13-35.) 

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court 

challenging the appellate court’s affirmance. (Doc. No. 13-36); see also People v. 

Hillard, S228218 (Cal. filed Aug. 5, 2015). The California Supreme Court summarily 

denied the petition on September 23, 2015. (Doc. No. 13-37.) 

DISCUSSION 

I. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR § 2254 HABEAS PETITION 

Federal habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996 are governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 

1214. If an applicant challenges the legality of their confinement arising from a state 

court judgment, federal courts may only review whether the confinement violates “the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 2254(a); accord Lewis v. 

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Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (“federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of 

state law”). A writ will only issue if the adjudication of the state judgment “(1) resulted 

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved the unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) 

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). This 

standard is “difficult to meet,” “highly deferential,” and “demands that state-court 

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 

(2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[t]he petitioner 

carries the burden of proof.” Id. Thus, “[h]abeas corpus is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ 

available only to those ‘persons whom society has grievously wronged . . . .’” Juan H. v. 

Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

619, 633-34 (1993)). 

Under § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s 

decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1). Section 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses 

have independent meanings. Bell v. Cone, 353 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). Under the 

“contrary to” clause, a court may issue a writ if “the state court applies a rule different 

from the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case 

differently than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable 

facts.” Id. at 694. In contrast, a court may issue a writ under the “unreasonable 

application” clause if “the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle 

from [the Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of a 

particular case.” Id. To satisfy this unreasonable application prong, the state court’s 

decision must have been more than “just incorrect or erroneous;” it must have been 

“objectively unreasonable.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003); see also 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (“A state court’s determination that a 

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claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could 

disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.”). Under either the “contrary 

to” or “unreasonable application” prong, the “clearly established” phrase refers only to 

“holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of 

the relevant state-court determination.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003) 

(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). Circuit court precedent does not 

satisfy the “clearly established” element. Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 

(2012). In reviewing claims under § 2254(d)(1), a federal court “is limited to the record 

that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181-82 (2011). 

Under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s 

decision “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C 

§ 2254(d)(2). Section 2254(d)(2) “requires that [the federal habeas court] accord the state 

trial court substantial deference.” Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015). “[A] 

state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas 

court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 

558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). So long as reasonable minds reviewing the record could agree 

with the finding in question, the trial court’s determination will stand, id., and a petitioner 

bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence,” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

Under either § 2254(d)(1) or §2254(d)(2), a federal habeas court looks to the last 

reasoned state-court decision. Castellanos v. Small, 766 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2014); 

Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, when there is an 

unexplained decision from the state’s highest court, the federal habeas court “looks 

through” to the last reasoned state court decision and presumes that the unexplained 

opinion rests on the same grounds. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). 

And even if the state court’s decision is entirely void of an explanation, “the habeas 

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petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. 

Finally, federal habeas courts apply a harmless error-standard when reviewing 

constitutional error committed by the state trial court. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

619, 637-38 (1993). A habeas petitioner is only “entitled to habeas relief based on trial 

error [if] they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Id. (quoting United 

States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)). Put another way, petitioner must show there is 

more than a “reasonable possibility” that the trial error had a “substantial and injurious 

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 

U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); accord Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007); Davis v. Ayala, 

135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015) (“There must be more than a ‘reasonable possibility’ that 

the error was harmful.”) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). 

II. ANALYSIS 

Petitioner’s previous federal habeas petition challenging his conviction was denied 

on the merits and both the district court and the Ninth circuit denied certificates of 

appealability. Hillard v. Small, No. 08-1786-DMS-RBB (S.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2010), ECF 

No. 36; Hillard v. Small, No. 10-56581 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 2010), ECF No. 6. Thus, present 

petition only challenges the denial of resentencing under California Penal Code 

§ 1170.126. See Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 331-33 (2010) (“Thus, both 

§ 2254(b)’s text and the relief it provides indicate that the phrase “second or successive” 

must be interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged.”); 28 U.S.C. § 2244 

(generally prohibiting successive habeas petitions). Petitioner argues the state court’s 

failure to resentence him violated his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. The 

Court disagrees. 

A. Three Strikes Priors 

Petitioner argues the state court’s denial of his petition to recall his sentence 

violated his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights because it was founded on 

materially incorrect information concerning his criminal history. (Doc. No. 1 at 9-18.) 

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Prior to sentencing, Petitioner argued that his prior convictions for attempted robbery and 

attempted murder should only count as one strike, for purpose of the Three Strikes Law, 

because they arose from a single event. (Doc. No. 13-9 at 8-13.) The trial court, 

however, rejected this argument and on review the California Court of Appeal affirmed 

the ruling. The Court of Appeal found the trial court: 

“could reasonably construe the attempted robbery and the attempted murder 

as arising from multiple, distinct acts. The court could conclude that Hillard 

first committed attempted robbery as an accomplice to a co-defendant’s 

forceful assault on the store owner, and then separately committed attempted 

murder by repeatedly shooting the owner. . . . The trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in concluding that Hillard’s conduct of escalating the criminal 

conduct by repeatedly shooting the victim justified punishing him on the 

basis of two, rather than one, strike prior conviction.” 

(Doc. No. 13-19 at 22-24.) 

Following the passage of Proposition 36, Petitioner re-raised this argument in his 

motion to recall his sentence, (Doc. No. 13-32 at 33-65), but the court concluded relief 

was categorically unavailable because of Petitioner’s prior conviction for attempted 

murder. (Doc. No. 13-32 at 92-93.) 

Petitioner’s present habeas review is limited to the decision to deny his motion to 

recall. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244. The superior court found relief under People v. Vargas, 59 

Cal.4th 635 (2014), was unavailable because one of Petitioner’s prior convictions was for 

attempted murder. Additionally, the motion was untimely. (Doc. No. 13-32 at 92-93.) 

And the court of appeals affirmed on the same grounds, noting that Petitioner’s Three 

Strikes argument was “[ir]relevant to this appeal from an order denying his petition on 

ineligibility grounds.” (Id. at 5.) Finally, the California Supreme Court summarily 

denied his petition for review. (Doc. No. 13-37.) 

Because the state courts rejected Petitioner’s motion to recall on the grounds he 

was categorically ineligible, Petitioner can find no relief in Burke. In Burke, the United 

States Supreme Court held that a prisoner’s due process is violated when he is sentenced 

“on the basis of assumptions concerning his criminal record which were materially 

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untrue.” 334 U.S. at 741; see also Roberts v. U.S., 445 U.S. 552, 563 (1980) (“As a 

matter of due process, an offender may not be sentenced on the basis of mistaken facts or 

unfounded assumptions.”) (citing Burke, 334 U.S. at 740-41). But Petitioner’s motion to 

recall was denied because he was previously convicted of attempted murder and his 

motion was untimely. Thus, the denial of Petitioner’s motion to recall was not based on 

the assumptions regarding Petitioners criminal record. 

Furthermore, even if we were to reach the merits of Petitioner’s Three Strikes 

argument, it fails because the conclusion that Petitioner’s prior convictions constituted 

two strikes is a matter of state law and the court did not rely on materially incorrect facts 

in applying it. Because none of the courts reviewing the motion to recall addressed 

Petitioner’s Three Strike argument, we “look through” them to the last reasoned state 

court decision, the superior court order denying Hillard’s state habeas petition, which 

stated: 

 Petitioner argues that, like the defendant in Vargas, he received a 

three-strike term due to his two prior strike convictions for different 

crimes—here, attempted murder and attempted robbery—which, he asserts, 

arose from the commission of the same act on the same victim. As a result, 

Petitioner contends, Vargas requires that the court dismiss one of his prior 

strikes and modify his sentence accordingly. 

 When the Fourth District, Division One, heard Petitioner’s appeal in 

2006, it addressed a similar argument. Petitioner had contended that “the 

trial court abused its discretion in refusing his request to dismiss one of his 

two strike prior convictions.” There the court wrote: 

 “The two prior convictions arose from an incident . . . 

when Hillard and two co-defendants attempted to rob a jewelry 

store. One of the co-defendants burst into the store and placed 

a rifle against the store owner’s chest. The owner grabbed the 

rifle away and the co-defendant fled from the store, yelling to 

Hillard and the other co-defendant to “get him.” The owner 

pulled a pistol from his pocket but before he could fire the 

weapon, Hillard shot the owner in the arm with a rifle and then 

continued shooting. The owner was struck seven more times, 

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three times in the chest, three times in the leg, and once on his 

nose. 

 “Hillard requested that the trial court dismiss one of the 

strike prior convictions because the offenses had been 

committed almost 20 years earlier and constituted only one 

event, and his current offenses were property crimes that did 

not involve the use of weapons. The trial court . . . noted that 

although only one victim was involved in the prior offenses 

Hillard fired several shots from the gun, and he thereafter 

committed himself to a life of carefully planned thievery. On 

appeal, Hillard challenges the court’s ruling, contending that his 

two strike priors arose out of a single act. . . .” 

The Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s argument: 

 “The trial court here could reasonably . . . conclude that 

Hillard first committed attempted robbery as an accomplice to a 

co-defendant’s forceful assault on the store owner, and then 

separately committed attempted murder by repeatedly shooting 

the owner. Although Hillard may have been trying to stop the 

store owner from shooting his accomplice, he nevertheless 

made a decision to shoot rather than flee, and further to 

repeatedly shoot rather than to shoot only once. . . . The trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the Hillard’s 

conduct of escalating the criminal conduct by repeatedly 

shooting the victim justified punishing him on the basis of two, 

rather than one, strike prior conviction. 

 “The reasonableness of the trial court’s decision . . . is 

further supported by (Hillard’s) overall record, showing that he 

continued his criminal conduct after being released from prison 

for his 1986 convictions. In 1993, (he) committed a series of 

commercial burglaries . . . . Hillard was released from prison in 

April 1999, and in 2003 he commenced the spree of offenses 

involved in the current case. The fact that his poststrike 

offenses involved commercial burglaries does not detract from 

the fact that he has emerged as a recidivist criminal targeted by 

the Three Strikes law. . . .” 

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Notwithstanding the appellate court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s two 

“strike” priors did not arise from a single act, Petitioner again attempts to 

characterize the 1986 priors as two convictions “based on the commission of 

the same act.” His contention still has not merit. 

 In Vargas the court distinguished Vargas’ “multiple criminal 

convictions stemming from the commission of a single act” from the 

“multiple criminal acts (albeit committed in a single course of conduct)” by 

the defendant in People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24. (Vargas, supra, 59 

Cal.4th at 646, 648, original [emphasis].) Benson had two prior strike 

convictions (for residential burglary and assault with the intent to commit 

murder) based on a single incident. Returning a vacuum cleaner he had 

borrowed from his neighbor, he grabbed her, forced her to the floor, and 

stabbed her multiple times. (Benson, supra, 18 Cal.4th at 30 (prior strikes 

arising from the same course of conduct need not be treated as a single 

strike); see also People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 940 (prior strikes 

arising from the same course of conduct need not be treated as single 

strike).) 

 Here, not only are Petitioner’s two “strike” priors more like Benson’s 

(i.e., two separate acts committed in a single course of conduct) than 

Vargas’s, but the Court of Appeal has already determined that Petitioner’s 

two “strike” priors did not arise out of a single act. Further, given 

Petitioner’s history of recidivism, his case does not fall into that rare 

category where the facts “demonstrate that not reasonable person would 

disagree that defendant fell outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law.” 

(Vargas, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 641-642.) Because the holding in Vargas does 

not apply to Petitioner’s sentence, the petition is denied as to this ground. 

(Doc. No. 13-30 at 3-5) (factual citations omitted) (underlining in original). 

The state court’s lengthy analysis of Petitioner’s argument shows that it was well 

aware of the factual underpinnings of Petitioner’s criminal history. The court accurately 

reviewed the factual events leading to his attempted robbery and attempted murder 

convictions and Petitioner identifies no misstatement of facts. As such, his argument 

under Burke fails because his sentencing was not based on materially false facts. Indeed, 

Petitioner’s situation is not even close to the factual scenario in Burke where the 

defendant was unrepresented and the court assumed, on the record, that defendant was 

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guilty of crimes he was previously found not guilty of. Burke, 334 U.S. at 740-41. Here 

Petitioner was represented, was found guilty of both prior strikes, and his case was 

subjected to detailed legal review on multiple occasions. This violates no wellestablished federal law and the interpretation of state law is not at issue. 

Petitioner relies on Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (holding that a court must 

view the underlying facts of a conviction in the light most favorable to the prosecution) to 

argue that because the jury found he inflicted great bodily injury during the commission 

of the attempted robbery by shooting the shop owner, and also found he committed 

attempted murder by shooting the shop owner, the state court was required to find the 

convictions arose from the same act and its decision otherwise was unreasonable under 

§ 2254(d)(2). (Doc. No. 1 at 12-15.) But this is incorrect. Petitioner has not shown that 

his attempted robbery conviction was predicated on his shooting the victim, only that he 

received an enhancement because of it. Indeed, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, as required by Jackson, Petitioner could have been convicted of attempted 

robbery even if he had not fired his gun. See People v. Watkins, 55 Cal. 4th 999, 1019 

(2012) (listing the elements of attempted robbery as “defendant specifically intended to 

take property from [the victim] by force or fear, and committed a direct act toward that 

goal”). And, alternatively, there was nothing in Jackson, to prevent the state court from 

concluding that Petitioner’s decision to continue shooting the victim after his accomplice 

had escaped was sufficient to constitute a separate criminal act. As such, the state court’s 

conclusion that Petitioner’s priors constituted two strikes is no basis for habeas relief in 

light of the evidence presented. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338-39 (2006). 

Finally, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his first claim because any 

error was harmless. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993) (a habeas 

petitioner must show actual prejudice to be entitled to relief). Petitioner was not entitled 

to resentencing under Proposition 36 because it categorically denies relief for prisoners 

who, like Petitioner, were previously convicted of attempted murder. See Yearwood, 213 

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Cal. App. 4th at 167-68. Thus, any refusal to find his prior convictions only constituted 

one strike, even if error, was harmless at this stage. 

B. Denial of Petition as Untimely 

Petitioner also claims that his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights were 

violated when the state court denied his petition to recall his sentence as untimely. (Doc. 

No. 1 at 19-33.) At the outset, the Court notes that any error regarding the timeliness of 

his petition is harmless because the state concluded Petitioner was independently 

ineligible for relief under Proposition 36 because he had previously been convicted for 

attempted murder. (Doc. No. 13-32 at 93.) Because he was ineligible, he cannot show 

“actual prejudice” resulting from the untimeliness finding. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-

38. 

In any event, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because the state court’s 

findings of fact are presumed correct and Petitioner has not rebutted the presumption. 

The deadline to file a motion to recall under Proposition 36 was November 7, 2014. See 

Yearwood, 213 Cal. App. 4th at 170, 175 n.4; (accord Doc. No. 13-32 at 92-93). The 

superior court found that Petitioner’s motion to recall was filed on January 21, 2015, 

having been signed and mailed to the court on January 15, 2015. (Doc. No. 13-32 at 93.) 

On appeal, Petitioner argued that his petition was timely under the mailbox rule because 

he had actually delivered a motion to recall to prison officials for mailing on September 

30, 2014 even though the superior court never received it. (Doc. No. 13-34 at 19-20.) 

Petitioner claims that after not receiving an answer to his first motion he sent a second 

letter, inquiring about the motion’s status, and was informed that no motion to recall was 

ever received. (Id.) Petitioner then refiled his motion. (Id.) In support of his claim, 

Petitioner filed (1) the prison mail log showing he mailed something to the superior court 

on October 1, 2014, (2) a letter dated January 1, 2015, authored by him and addressed to 

the superior court inquiring as to the status of his motion to recall his sentence, in which 

he states he submitted that petition to the superior court on September 30, 2014, (3) a 

reply from the court dated January 8, 2015, indicating the court had never received the 

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petitions, and (4) a letter dated January 15, 2015, authored by him to the superior court 

resubmitting his motion. Despite the additional documents, the appeals court concluded 

that “[t]he record demonstrates as the trial court found, Hillard did not sign his petition 

and the accompanying documents until January 15, 2015. Thus, regardless of problems 

with the prison’s mail system, there can be no reasonably arguable issue that Hillard’s 

petition was timely.” (Doc. No. 13-35 at 5.) The appeals court also noted that Petitioner 

made no attempt to explain why his prior conviction for attempted murder did not 

disqualify him from relief. (Id.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court denied 

Petitioner’s petition for review. (Doc. No. 13-37.) 

State court findings of fact are presumed to be correct and a habeas petitioner has 

the burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1); accord Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (“[t]he standard is 

demanding but not insatiable”). Here, the appeals court found that Petitioner had not 

signed his motion to recall until January 15, 2015, well after the deadline had passed, and 

Petitioner has not provided clear and convincing evidence to rebut the that finding. 

Petitioner’s evidence shows that he mailed something on October 1, 2014 but fails to 

provide any contemporaneous proof of what was mailed. As such, there is no clear and 

convincing evidence to rebut the court’s conclusion. 

Even assuming the facts are as Petitioner claims they are, however, Petitioner still 

cannot identify any federal due process violation that arose from the denial of his petition 

as untimely. In Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988), the United States Supreme Court 

held that, under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, a pro se prisoner’s notice of appeal is 

deemed “filed at the time petitioner delivered it to the prison authorities for forwarding to 

the court clerk.” Id. at 276. Petitioner, however, points to no Supreme Court cases 

/// 

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extending this mailbox rule to state courts as a constitutional requirement.2

 As such, he is 

not entitled to habeas relief. 

C. Attempted Murder Conviction 

Petitioner’s last claim for relief attempts to attack the merits of his 1986 conviction 

for attempted murder. In his 2015 state motion to recall, Petitioner claimed his 1986 

conviction was tainted by prosecutorial misconduct. (See Doc. No. 13-32 at 40-51.) 

Petitioner claimed a co-conspirator, Cedric Pratt, testified that his guilty plea had not 

been induced by any promise from the prosecutors when in fact it had been. (Id.) 

Without addressing the prosecutorial misconduct argument, the superior court denied his 

motion to recall and concluded that “[t]he petition reveals that [Petitioner] has a 

conviction in consolidated cases CR82551/CR 80021 (May 1, 1987) for attempted 

murder (Penal Code section 664/187). That conviction alone renders him ineligible for a 

hearing on his case under [Proposition 36].” (Doc No. 13-32 at 93.) Petitioner made the 

same argument on appeal. (Doc. No. 13-34 at 22-24.) In beginning its analysis of 

Petitioner’s arguments, the court of appeals noted that “[w]e must keep in mind that the 

mechanism permitting recall of a final judgment in this case is solely the statutory 

scheme created in the reform of the three strikes law. Thus, in searching for reasonably 

arguable issues for reversal, we are not permitted to roam at large through the history of 

the 2004 convictions.” (Doc. No. 13-35 at 2.) Subsequently, the court concluded that 

“Hillard’s brief makes no attempt to dispute the fact of his prior conviction for attempted 

murder. Nor does the brief attempt to show that such prior conviction does not disqualify 

him for relief under the proposition.” (Doc. No. 5.) 

The relief Petitioner seeks under Proposition 36 is a state-law question and a 

federal habeas court cannot review that issue. Bradshaw v.Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 

                                                                

2

 In Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit extended the Houston holding to 

state habeas petitions filed by state prisoners. Id. at 1222. Nevertheless, Ninth Circuit precedent cannot 

satisfy the clearly established requirement of AEDPA. Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S.Ct. 1446, 1450 

(2013). 

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(2005) (“We have repeatedly held that a state court’s interpretation of state law, including 

one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting 

in habeas corpus.”). Furthermore, any habeas relief at present is limited because 

Petitioner’s previous habeas petition, as to the underlying conviction, was denied on the 

merits. Hillard v. Small, No. 08-1786-DMS-RBB (S.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2010), ECF No. 36; 

Hillard v. Small, No. 10-56581 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 2010), ECF No. 6. 

Petitioner attempts to recast the court of appeals decision as a federal constitutional 

issue by arguing the state courts denied him his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 

rights. (Doc. No. 1 at 25.) Petitioner cites to Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003), 

in support of this argument, claiming the case stands for the proposition that state courts 

must give full consideration to evidence present by a petitioner. (Id. at 25-27.) But the 

holding in Miller-El is inapposite. At issue in Miller-El was what “standards AEDPA 

imposes before a court of appeals may issue a [certificate of appealability] to review a 

denial of habeas relief in the district court.” 537 U.S. at 327. And because this issue is 

not presented here, Miller-El cannot serve as a precedential predicate for any relief under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008) (interpreting 

§ 2254(d)’s “clearly established” requirement to mean Supreme Court precedent that 

“squarely addresses the issue in [the] case”). 

Furthermore, Petitioner may not attack the attempted murder conviction used as an 

enhancement because it is a settled conviction. “[O]nce a state conviction is no longer 

open to direct or collateral attack in its own right . . . the conviction may be regarded as 

conclusively valid. If that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the 

defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under 

§ 2254 on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.” 

Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403-04 (2001) (citation 

omitted). Petitioner’s conviction for attempted murder is no longer subject to appeal or 

collateral attack and, thus, cannot be challenged here. As a result, the Court denies the 

petition for habeas corpus and also denies Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing 

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as moot. See Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney, 532 U.S. at 403-04; see also Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 185-86 (“Section 2254(e)(2) imposes a limitation on the 

discretion of federal habeas courts to take new evidence in an evidentiary hearing.”). 

D. Certificate of Appealability 

An appeal cannot be taken from the district court’s denial of a §2254 motion unless 

a certificate of appealability is issued. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). A certificate may be 

issued only if the defendant “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitution right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a district court has rejected 

petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits, petitioner “must demonstrate that 

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims 

debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Petitioner has not shown 

this Court’s conclusion is debatable or wrong and thus, the Court denies Petitioner a 

certificate of appealability. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Petitioner’s §2254 petition for habeas 

corpus, denies his motion for summary judgment, denies his request for an evidentiary 

hearing, and adopts the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation to deny the 

petition for habeas corpus. Finally, the Court denies a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: January 17, 2017 

 Hon. Marilyn L. Huff 

 United States District Judge 

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