Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_01-cv-00226/USCOURTS-azd-4_01-cv-00226-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

FLORENTINO REYES SANTANA, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

TERRY STEWART, ET AL., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-01-0226-TUC-DCB (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On May 16, 2001, Florentino Reyes Santana, (“Petitioner”), an inmate confined

by the State of Arizona, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person

in State Custody, pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"). Named as

Respondent in the Petition is Terry L. Stewart. The Attorney General of the State of

Arizona is named as an additional Respondent. Respondents filed an Answer

(“Answer”) to the Petition on November 5, 2001, with exhibits A through AA attached.

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. 

On April 30, 2002, Petitioner filed a motion to stay the Petition pending review

of a new constitutional claim by the state court. This Court, noting that the Petitioner

had alleged that the trial court judge had already made a prima facie finding that his

new claim was cognizable as a significant change in the law and had appointed counsel,

directed the Attorney General to provide the Court with a copy of the new state petition

and the trial court's minute entry. The Attorney General did not submit the documents

and this Court granted the stay over objections by Respondents. 

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The stay was lifted on April 20, 2005, and supplemental briefing was completed

on the Petitioner's most recent claim presented to the state courts on June 8, 2005.

On July 11, 2005, the Petitioner filed a motion to amend the complaint, which

this Court grants in a separate order filed contemporaneously with this report and

recommendation.

 The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent

review of the record, enter an order dismissing the Petition. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 21, 1985, Petitioner was tried before a jury on one count of First

Degree Murder, a Class One Felony, in the Superior Court for the State of Arizona,

Pima County. (Answer, Ex. C.) Petitioner was found guilty of first-degree murder and

the jury found the offense to be of a dangerous nature. (Answer, Ex. E, p.92) On

December 20, 1985, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to life without possibility of

parole for twenty-five years. (Answer, Ex. F, p. 11.)

Pre-trial motions

Prior to trial, the trial court granted the State's motion in limine as to drug use

prior to the day in question by any of the witnesses. Petitioner argued against this

motion asserting that this evidence was relevant to his theory of the case, specifically,

that Robert Pintado killed the victim over a drug deal. (Answer, Ex. C, p.3-6.)

Petitioner also argued that he should be allowed to argue that Pintado had a drugs-forsex business relationship with some of the witnesses in this case, and that those

witnesses were prostitutes who had a motive to lie for Pintado. (Answer, Ex. C, p.6-9.)

The court granted the State's motion in limine as to prior acts of prostitution as to the

witnesses. (Answer, Ex. C, p.9.) Petitioner also argued that he should be allowed to

demonstrate the prior bad acts of the victim, including convictions for drugs and for

assault with a deadly weapon, in an effort to show that the victim had previously

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possessed a weapon, and had been involved in dealing drugs. (Answer, Ex. C, p.11-

12.) The trial court ruled that he would not allow the evidence of prior bad acts, but

allowed that an offer of proof could be made when Petitioner's witnesses showed up at

trial. (Answer, Ex. C, p.15.) The trial court also denied Petitioner's request to present

evidence that at the time of autopsy, there was evidence of marijuana in the victim's

blood or urine. (Answer, Ex. C, p.16-18.) 

Testimony

Petitioner was tried for the first degree murder of his godson following the

godson's baptismal party. The facts as elicited at trial are as follows:

Robert Pintado testified on behalf of the state. (Answer, Ex. C, p.189.) Pintado,

of Cuban ancestry, originally became acquainted with Petitioner after Petitioner arrived

on the Cuban boatlifts and was transferred to Tucson. (Answer, Ex. C, p.191.) Pintado

and Petitioner were well acquainted, Petitioner having worked for Pintado for a year,

and having lived with Pintado for several months. (Answer, Ex. C, p.191-193.)

Pintado was not well acquainted with the victim. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 194.) Pintado did

not go to the victim's baptism, but did go to the parties afterward. (Answer, Ex. C,

p.195.) 

Following a baptismal party at a friend's house, Pintado, Petitioner, the victim,

and Petitioner's wife ended up at a bar called "The Stop." (Answer, Ex. C, p.197-198.)

Petitioner drove his wife home, and came back to The Stop. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 198.)

Pintado danced with a woman nicknamed Cookie that night, but didn't remember

buying her a drink. (Answer, Ex. C, p.199.) Cookie asked if he had cocaine, to which

he replied affirmatively, and she invited him to her apartment. (Answer, Ex. C, p.199.)

Pintado testified that the cocaine belonged to Petitioner, but Pintado carried it because

Petitioner believed that Pintado was less prone to being stopped by police than

Petitioner, because Petitioner was black. (Answer, Ex. C, p.200.) 

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Pintado left the bar with Cookie and some girls in Petitioner's car, with Petitioner

driving and the victim sitting in front. (Answer, Ex. C, p.202.) Petitioner and the

victim were arguing in an agitated manner in the car. (Answer, Ex. C, p.203.) When

they arrived at the apartment, Petitioner pulled a gun out from under the front seat of

the car. (Answer, Ex. C, p.204.) Pintado heard the victim pushing Petitioner to fight

him. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 205.) Pintado convinced Petitioner to put the gun away and

get back in the car. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 206.) Petitioner was planning on leaving the

victim there, but he dashed back into the car. (Answer, Ex. C, p.207.) 

Leaving the apartments, Petitioner turned right on Craycroft Rd., and Petitioner

and the victim started arguing again. (Answer, Ex. C, p.207.) The victim was very

drunk. (Answer, Ex. C, p.207.) After a while, Petitioner pulled the car over, and the

victim got out. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 208.) Petitioner got the gun out of the car and shot

the victim. (Answer, Ex. C, p.208.) Petitioner got back in the car, and drove away.

(Answer, Ex. C, p.211.) 

Petitioner and Pintado went to a woman's house and dropped off the gun.

(Answer, Ex. C, p.212.) Pintado knew the woman, named Barbara, but she was not a

friend of his. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 212.) Pintado described her as Petitioner's "part-time

mistress." (Answer, Ex. C, p.213.) Petitioner then drove Pintado to Pintado's house.

(Answer, Ex. C, p.214.) The next day, Pintado went to Petitioner's house to pick up his

car, and Petitioner told Pintado that he was taking the victim's car to San Francisco.

(Answer, Ex. C, p.216.) 

Later, Petitioner told Pintado to pick up the gun and take it to Lazaro. (Answer,

Ex. C, p. 217-218.) At some point, Petitioner had Pintado get the gun from Lazaro and

keep it himself. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 219.) Pintado didn't want to have the gun at his

house, so he gave it to a friend at work, Mark Rhoudybush. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 219.)

Pintado wired Petitioner six hundred dollars in San Francisco. (Answer, Ex. C,

p.220.) The money was Petitioner's, but Pintado kept it because Petitioner would spend

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it too fast otherwise. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 220.) Pintado picked up Petitioner, his wife,

and two other people he had never met before, and took them to the house where the

baptismal party had taken place. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 221.) In conversation, Petitioner

implied that the victim got what he deserved and implied that if anybody would say

anything, he would take car of them, too. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 221.) 

After Petitioner was arrested, Pintado agreed to try to fix an alibi for him.

(Answer, Ex. C, p. 223.) Petitioner's wife called Pintado over to her apartment so he

could review the police reports. (Answer, Ex. C, p.224.) Pintado spoke with Petitioner

on the phone, and was told that Pintado's name "had been already mentioned."

(Answer, Ex. C, p. 225.) Because his name was already out, Pintado decided to call

Detective Pantke the next day. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 226.) 

Pintado testified at the preliminary hearing, but admitted during trial that he lied

about having drugs on him, and didn't mention anything about taking the gun to

Barbara's house. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 227.) Pintado later agreed to tell the truth if the

prosecutor's would agree to not prosecute him for the drugs, or for perjury during the

preliminary hearing. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 228-229.) 

Dewanna Lawson, known as "Cookie," testified that she was out with her two

friends and her sister on the evening of March 3, 1985, and ended up at a bar called The

Stop. (Answer, Ex. C, p.57-62.) Lawson met Petitioner, his wife, the victim and

Pintado at the bar. (Answer, Ex. C, p.62-63.) Lawson danced with Pintado, and later

asked him for some cocaine and for a ride home. (Answer, Ex. C, p.64-67.) Outside

the bar, Lawson saw Santana drive up, get something from the trunk of the car, and put

it in the front. (Answer, Ex. C, p.68.) Lawson and her friends, Pintado, Petitioner and

the victim all got in the car. (Answer, Ex. C, p.69.) Petitioner drove to Lawson's

apartment complex at Craycroft and 22nd Street. (Answer, Ex. C, p.70-72.)

When they arrived at Lawson's apartment complex, Lawson went inside her

apartment to see if her brother, who had been baby-sitting the various children of

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Lawson's party that evening, had returned with the children. (Answer, Ex. C, p.73.)

When she turned around and went back to the car, her friends looked scared, and told

her that Petitioner had a machine gun. (Answer, Ex. C, p.73.) Lawson saw Petitioner

inside the car, with the door open, putting a clip in the bottom of the gun. (Answer, Ex.

C, p.74.) Lawson pleaded with Pintado and the victim to calm Petitioner down and to

keep Petitioner out of her apartment where the children were. (Answer, Ex. C, p.74,76.)

The victim grabbed Petitioner by the arm, and was trying to grab the gun. (Answer, Ex.

C, p.78.) Petitioner pointed the gun at the victim. (Answer, Ex. C, p.80.) Pintado

pulled at Petitioner, and finally the confrontation broke up, and Pintado and Petitioner

walked toward the car. (Answer, Ex. C, p.81.) Petitioner drove the car, Pintado got up

front, and the victim jumped into the car as it was moving through the parking lot.

(Answer, Ex. C, p.81-82.) Lawson saw the car leave the parking lot and travel south

on Craycroft towards Golf Links, opposite the direction from which they arrived.

(Answer, Ex. C, p.86-87.) Five or six days later, Lawson saw the victims picture on a

poster at The Stop and at some point called the 88-CRIME number to report what had

happened. (Answer, Ex. C, p.91-94.) Lawson received $1,000 for her report. (Answer,

Ex. C, p.129.) 

Carmen Bushe, a probation officer in San Francisco, testified as an offer of

proof, on behalf of the Petitioner. (Answer, Ex. C, p.101.) Bushe testified that the

victim had been assigned to her following a conviction for assault with a deadly

weapon. (Answer, Ex. C, p.102.) Bushe agreed that the conviction was the result of

the victim's allegedly stabbing a woman seventeen times. (Answer, Ex. C, p.102-103.)

The victim also had a conviction of possession for sale of marijuana, a misdemeanor.

(Answer, Ex. C, p.103.) Ms. Bushe believed the victim to have a problem with alcohol,

and had not given the victim permission to travel to Tucson. (Answer, Ex. C, p.104-

105.) 

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Inspector Clark of the homicide unit of the San Francisco Police Department also

testified as an offer of proof on behalf of Petitioner. (Answer, Ex. C, p.110.) Inspector

Clark testified that in addition to the two convictions, the victim had other arrests that

did not result in conviction. (Answer, Ex. C, p.112.) 

The offers of proof did not sway the trial court's earlier rulings. (Answer, Ex.

C, p. 114.) 

Vivian Whitted testified that on the evening of March 3, 1985, she went out with

her sister Carol, and her friends Cookie and Docia, and ended up at The Stop. (Answer,

Ex. C, p. 136-139.) Carol left with a friend before they got to The Stop, although later

Carol returned, and Docia left. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 141, 146.) Vivian had two drinks

and danced with the victim, who later introduced her to the Petitioner. (Answer, Ex.

C, p. 142-143.) Vivian, Carol and Cookie left with Petitioner, the victim, and another

person, and returned to Cookie's apartment. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 148.) At the apartment,

Cookie went in to check on the children, and the Petitioner began to get angry referring

to "these bitches" and "I'll kill these bitches" and arguing with the victim. (Answer, Ex.

C, p. 149-150.) Petitioner reached under his seat and pulled out a gun and loaded a clip

in the weapon. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 150-151.) When Cookie returned to the car, Vivian

told Cookie that Petitioner had a gun, and went with her sister back to her house.

(Answer, Ex. C, p. 153.) Vivian saw the victim standing in the way of Petitioner and

heard Petitioner say something to the victim like "move, I"ll shoot you." (Answer, Ex.

C, p. 155.) Vivian did not see the Petitioner pointing a gun at the victim. (Answer, Ex.

C, p. 156.) Vivian locked the door to the apartment, and, later, Cookie came back and

said that they were gone. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 158.) After Vivian found out about the

victim's death, Vivian testified that Cookie told her not to mention anything about the

gun. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 173.) 

Jeanne Segar testified that after arriving home from work one night in March,

1985, she heard gunshots and looked at her clock to see that it was twelve-twenty in the

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morning. (Answer, Ex. C, p.184-185.) Segar lived in the area of Golf Links and

Houghton. (Answer, Ex. C, p.184.) She heard three shots in succession, then two

more. (Answer, Ex. C, p. 186.) 

Barbara Arndt testified that she had known the Petitioner for about five years,

having been neighbors with Petitioner for about six months. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 65.)

Arndt testified that on a night in March, Petitioner and Pintado came to her house and

left her a package containing a gun, although she didn't remember specifically which

of the two men handed her the gun, she did remember that it was Petitioner who asked

her to keep it. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 66-67, 77-78.) They told her they were going

downtown to drink and didn't want the gun with them. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 68.) Arndt

had the gun for two days, and, after she heard there might have been trouble, phoned

Petitioner to come pick up the gun. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 69.) Petitioner wasn't home, but

Arndt spoke with Petitioner's wife, and the next day Pintado came and picked up the

gun. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 69.) Arndt initially denied having a conversation with

Petitioner, after his arrest, where he told her that it would be best for her not to say

anything about the gun. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 70.) Arndt did agree that she had spoken

with Detective Lough, and told him that Petitioner had told her it would be a good idea

if she didn't say anything about the gun, and that she was afraid of Petitioner. (Answer,

Ex. D, p. 73, 79.) Arndt did clarify that the reason she was afraid of getting into trouble

about the gun was because she was a prostitute and had already had three children

removed from her custody, and that she was not afraid of Petitioner. (Answer, Ex. D,

p. 83.) After her interview with the detective, she spoke on the phone with Petitioner

again. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 75.) The Petitioner asked her what she had told the

detective. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 75.) 

David Fine testified on behalf of the Petitioner. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 90.) After

Petitioner was arrested, Petitioner's wife asked Fine to see him at the jail. (Answer, Ex.

D, p. 100.) Petitioner thought that Fine already had the gun, but he did not. (Answer,

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Ex. D, p. 100.) Petitioner told Fine that he needed to find the gun for him, and

afterwards, Fine asked around at work and found out that Mark Rhoudybush had the

weapon. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 100.) Fine took the gun and kept it for a week, and, not

wanting to hand it over directly to the defense lawyers in this case, gave the gun to

Petitioner's wife. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 92, 100.) Fine described the gun as a .30 caliber

carbine, with a sawed off stock and barrel, with a 30-shot clip. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 91,

101.) When Pintado expressed concern to Fine over his involvement in the matter, Fine

informed Pintado that he no longer had the gun, and that he should not be talking to

Pintado about the case. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 94-95.) 

Nona Henry testified for the State. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 107.) Henry was a

bartender at The Stop, on March 3, 1985. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 108.) She remembered

that night specifically, because it was the owner's birthday. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 108.)

Henry had seen the Petitioner a couple times before, and knew Petitioner was at The

Stop that night. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 108-109.) Henry saw Petitioner, and the "short

guy" he was with outside arguing. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 110.) Later, she saw them

outside arguing again. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 112.) Petitioner was trying to get the guy to

go with him, and was holding him by the arm, and the guy was shaking his head "no."

(Answer, Ex. D, p. 112.) Henry testified that although the fighting did not involve

weapons, Petitioner dropped a gun in the bar. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 115.) Later, police

came by with a photograph of the guy and she found out he was dead. (Answer, Ex.D,

p. 113.) 

Detective Petropoulos with the Pima County Sheriff's Department testified that

he was the first detective at the scene of the homicide on Monday, March 4th. (Answer,

Ex. D, p. 124.) Detective Petropoulos, along with Detective Dahmer, processed the

scene. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 124.) A casing and a fired bullet had already been found at

the scene when he arrived, and he found four more spent casings of the same type, a .30

caliber carbine. (Answer, Ex. D, p. 129.) 

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Richard Miller, the Reverend who performed the baptism of the victim, testified

that the day after the baptism, he phoned the Petitioner in an attempt to obtain the name

of the victim's parents for purposes of the baptismal certificate. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 4-

6.) Petitioner informed Reverend Miller that he hadn't seen the victim since the night

before, but that he would be coming to the Petitioner's apartment later that afternoon

because they were going together to San Francisco. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 5-6.) Reverend

Miller testified that he stopped by the house around six o'clock in the evening, but no

one was there. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 6.) He called three or four times during the week, but

no one was home. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 6-7.) 

Reverend Miller, after discussing the events later with Petitioner, attempted to

contact a Roberto Pintado, having the belief that he would be an alibi witness to clear

the defendant. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 7-8.) Reverend Miller, together with Petitioner's

counsel, attempted to contact Pintado. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 7-8.) Pintado returned

Reverend Miller's calls and Reverend Miller agreed to stop by his house. (Answer, Ex.

A, p. 8-9) At Pintado's house, Pintado confessed to Reverend Miller that he was a

witness to the shooting. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 9.) Reverend Miller suggested he call the

police, and Pintado, although concerned about what others in the Cuban community in

Tucson might do to him or his family, did so. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 11.) 

After the state rested, Petitioner moved for a directed verdict of acquittal, and

was denied. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 22-23.) Petitioner also made an offer of proof as to the

testimony of Justo Barriero, and two other witnesses. Barriero was sworn in and

testified that on the day before the victim's baptism, the victim was at his house when

a man arrived and began arguing with the victim. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 28-29.) The man

told Barriero that the victim wouldn't return the money Barriero had given him for

drugs, but the drugs weren't any good. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 29.) The man and the victim

continued to argue, and the man took out a gun. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 29.) Barriero got

between them and told the man he needed to leave. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 29.) The man

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left but told the victim that he was going to have to give him back the money. (Answer,

Ex. A, p. 29.) Barriero testified that he personally knew the victim to be involved in

selling drugs. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 29-32.) The trial court allowed Barriero's testimony.

Petitioner's counsel also made an offer of proof as to two other witnesses,

Roberto Benavidez and Cecelio Estudes, who would testify that Roberto Pintado was

involved in drug deals and had tried unsuccessfully to get them each involved as well.

(Answer, Ex. A, p. 36.) Another witness, Larry Price, would testify to essentially the

same thing. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 37.) The trial court precluded these witnesses

testimony. 

After Barriero took the stand, he was cross-examined regarding an interview he

gave to a detective after the murder. Throughout the cross-examination, the State

brought out numerous instances where Barriero's testimony before the court differed or

was contradictory to an interview he provided in April after the murder to the State's

detective. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 47.)

Mark Rhoudybush testified on behalf of Petitioner. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 69.) 

Rhoudybush testified that he knew Pintado, but not Petitioner. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 70)

He testified that, the second or third week in March, Pintado came to him and asked

him if he would keep a gun for him. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 70.) Pintado agreed. (Answer,

Ex. A, p. 70.) Later, when Pintado did not return for the gun, Rhoudybush gave the gun

to a person he worked with, David Fine. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 71-72.) 

Petitioner's wife testified that on the date of the baptism, the relationship between

herself, Petitioner and the victim was really good. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 77.) 

Following the baptism, the baptismal party at a friends house, and going to the Elks

Club, Petitioner, his wife, Pintado, and the victim went to a bar called the "Stop."

(Answer, Ex. A, p 78-80.) Petitioner drove his wife home at 10:30, stayed at her house

until 11:00, and then he left to go pick up the victim. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 80-81.) 

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When the Petitioner's wife later woke up around 2:30, Petitioner was at her house

watching TV. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 81.) 

The next day, noticing the victim's absence, Petitioner's wife called the jail and

several hospitals to see if he was there. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 82.) Late Monday night,

Petitioner and his wife drove a car that was left at their house by the vicitm back to San

Francisco. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 82-83.) The car belonged to a friend of the victim's, and

the friend wanted the car back. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 83-84.) Petitioner and his wife

flew back with airline tickets paid for by Pintado. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 84.) 

Prior to the preliminary hearing, Pintado had an opportunity to read through the

police reports. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 87-89.) Pintado read the reports at Petitioner's

house, and, after he finished reading them stated he was "going to clear himself."

(Answer, Ex. A, p. 88.) 

Petitioner's wife testified that she had received a phone call from David Fine

about the location of the gun. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 90.) Fine told her he had the gun, and

had received it from Pintado. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 90.) Petitioner's wife went with her

sister, Rosie Moreno, to pick up the gun. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 90.) Instead of bringing

it to Petitioner's attorney, Petitioner's wife and Moreno refused to deliver it because

there was a security guard standing outside the building. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 90.)

Moreno then got rid of the gun. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 91.) 

Moreno testified that she knew Petitioner's attorney's really needed the gun, but

after the security guard incident, she never brought them the gun, throwing it away,

instead, at the city dump. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 110-111.) More than a month later,

investigators were unable to recover the gun from the dump. (Answer, Ex. A, p. 118.)

Moreno testified that she used to buy drugs from Pintado, and the victim used to sell

drugs for Pintado. (Answer, Ex. A., p. 130-131.) 

Petitioner testified that after the baptism, he went with the victim and Pintado

to Lazaro's house for a party. (Answer, Ex. B, p. 6.) After the party at Lazaro's,

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Petitioner, Pintado and the victim drove another person home, and, at Pintado's request,

stopped off at Petitioner's house to drop off Pintado's car. (Answer, Ex. B, p. 7.) After

that, the three went to the Elks Club. (Answer, Ex. B, p. 7.) After the Elk's club, the

three went to a bar called The Stop. (Answer, Ex., B, p. 8.) Petitioner testified that at

The Stop, the victim danced with his wife. (Answer, Ex. B, p. 8.) Petitioner drove his

wife home at 10:20 p.m., and returned to the Stop where he had left Pintado and the

victim. (Answer, Ex. B, p. 9.) Pintado was outside the bar, and asked Petitioner to take

him to "Cookie's house" because Cookie had talked to him about getting some cocaine.

(Answer, Ex. B, p. 10.) The victim was inside the bar with Carole Dears. (Answer, Ex.

B, p. 10.) Before he left, Petitioner woke up the victim, who was sleeping at a table in

the bar, and brought the victim, Carole, and another women, Vivian, along with them

to Cookie's house. (Answer, Ex. B, p. 11.) 

At Cookie's apartment, everyone got out of the car. (Answer, Ex. B, p. 12.)

Cookie went into her apartment, and Petitioner and Pintado argued because Pintado

wanted Petitioner to stay, and Petitioner wanted to leave. (Answer, Ex. B, p. 13.)

Petitioner got in the car to go, backed the car up, and Pintado and the victim both got

into the car, the victim riding in the back. (Answer, Ex. B, p. 14.) Pintado wanted to

go to his home, and the victim wanted to go to a motel. (Answer, Ex. B, p. 15.)

Petitioner drove the victim where he wanted to go, and at that point the victim asked

Pintado for some cocaine. (Answer, Ex. B, p.16.) Petitioner thought this was a bad

idea on the victim's part, because the business between the victim and Pintado had not

been going well. (Answer, Ex. B, p. 16.) 

After dropping the victim off, Petitioner drove Pintado to Pintado's house,

dropped him off, and went home. (Answer, Ex. B, p.17.) Petitioner arrived at his home

before midnight, and stayed up and had a beer and watched a movie. (Answer, Ex. B,

p.18.) 

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The next day Petitioner received a phone call from a man asking for the victim.

(Answer, Ex. B, p.19.) The man said something to the Petitioner about a woman who

was worried because she had lent the victim a car. (Answer, Ex B, p. 19.) Petitioner

didn't worry over the absence of the victim until around six o'clock in the evening, when

he became convinced that the victim was probably in jail. (Answer, Ex B, p. 20.) By

seven-thirty or eight o' clock, Petitioner began driving around looking for the victim.

(Answer, Ex B, p. 22.) 

Petitioner decided to return the victim's car to San Francisco, because, after

discussions with a man in San Francisco, he understood that the owner of the car was

very worried about the car, and he felt it was his duty to return it. (Answer, Ex B, p.

22-23.) After stopping first at Lazaro's house, and then at Pintado's house, Petitioner

left for San Francisco. (Answer, Ex B, p. 23-24.) 

While in San Francisco, Petitioner received news through his wife that the victim

was dead. (Answer, Ex B, p. 26.) Petitioner called Pintado to verify the news.

(Answer, Ex B, p. 26.) Pintado confirmed the victim's death, and wired Petitioner six

hundred dollars in order for Petitioner to bring some drugs back to Tucson from San

Francisco. (Answer, Ex B, p. 27.) Petitioner used the money to fly back to Tucson.

(Answer, Ex B, p. 27.) 

Back in Tucson, Petitioner accused Pintado of killing the victim. (Answer, Ex

B, p. 28.) Pintado denied killing the victim, and Petitioner believed him. (Answer, Ex

B, p. 29.) Over the next several days Petitioner attempted to obtain information about

what had happened to the victim. (Answer, Ex B, p. 29.) Petitioner was interviewed

by Detective Pantke at his house, with his wife acting as interpreter, and he did not tell

the detective about going to Cookie's apartment. (Answer, Ex B, p. 31.) Petitioner also

denied driving the victim's car to San Francisco, and told the detective that the victim

had already left by the time he got to the bar. (Answer, Ex B, p. 35.) Petitioner also

admitted lying to Detective Pantke about the $600 being wired to him in San Francisco,

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and lying to Detective Pantke that the victim was not involved in drugs. (Answer, Ex.

B, p. 46, 77.) 

Following closing arguments, the jury was instructed and retired to deliberate.

After deliberations, the jury found Petitioner guilty of first-degree murder as charged

in the information, and found the offense to be of a dangerous nature involving the use

or exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, to-wit: A gun. (Answer, Ex.

E, p. 92.) 

Appeal

Petitioner, through counsel, presented three issues in his direct appeal to the

Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. G.) The issues in the appeal were: (1) Was the Petitioner

denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to

raise the issues of self-defense and diminished capacity? (2) Did the trial court

improperly exclude evidence regarding the victim's violent past? (3) Alternatively, was

trial counsel ineffective for allowing the trial court to preclude evidence concerning the

victim's history for violence and drug use? (Answer, Ex. G.) 

On March 4, 1987, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. (Answer, Ex.

H.) A Motion for Rehearing in Pro Se to the Supreme Court was denied on May 13,

1987. (Answer, Ex. H.) 

First Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On August 25, 1988, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the

trial court. (Answer, Ex. I.) Petitioner raised ten claims in his petition, all claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Answer, Ex. I.) In a supplement submitted by

appointed counsel, Petitioner argued that he was eligible for relief because of

ineffective assistance of counsel and because his rights to due process were violated.

(Answer, Ex. J.) The trial court denied the petition, finding that all issues raised in the

petition could have been or had been raised on appeal. (Answer, Ex. K.) 

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Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing, which was denied by the trial court on

June 27, 1989. (Answer, Ex. L, M.) On June 29, 1989, Petitioner filed a Petition for

Review of Post Conviction Relief. (Answer, Ex. N.) The Petition for Review was

denied by the Arizona Supreme Court on April 18, 1990. (Answer, Ex. O.) 

First Federal Habeas

On September 14, 1990, Petitioner filed a pro se habeas in District Court

raising four claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel: (1) that trial counsel

failed to object to an erroneous jury instruction on premeditation; (2) that trial

counsel allowed the prosecutor to present a "coerced witness [Barbara Arndt];" (3)

that trial counsel allowed the State to present perjured testimony by Pintado; and (4)

that his trial counsel did not adequately cross-examine the State's witnesses to reveal

inconsistencies or bring forth important evidence on Petitioner's behalf. The District

Court found that only the first claim had been properly exhausted, and dismissed the

petition, without prejudice, as a mixed petition. 

Second Federal Habeas

On September 19, 1991, Petitioner filed a pro se habeas in District Court raising

three issues: (1) the trial court committed fundamental error in instructing the jurors on

first- and second-degree murder; (2) trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object

to the trial court's alleged erroneous jury instructions; and (3) appellate counsel was

ineffective by failing to raise the jury instruction issue on appeal. (Answer, Ex. P.) The

district court found that the Petitioner had procedurally defaulted his claims by failing

to raise them on direct appeal or in the post-conviction relief process. (Answer, Ex. P.)

The district court further found that the Petitioner had failed to demonstrate cause for

the default. (Answer, Ex. P.) 

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First Federal Appeal

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Petitioner had

procedurally defaulted his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and trial court

error in jury instructions. (Answer, Ex. P.) 

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's finding that Petitioner procedurally

defaulted his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and remanded the

claim to the district court to determine the merits of the claim. (Answer, Ex. P.)

On remand, the district court dismissed the habeas petition, without prejudice,

so that Petitioner could pursue any available state remedies. 

Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On July 31, 1995, Petitioner filed a second notice of post conviction relief.

(Answer, Ex. Q.) On November 12, 1997, Petitioner, through counsel, filed the second

petition, submitting new claims of: (1) new evidence that would demonstrate that

Pintado had threatened Lawson to fabricate her testimony; (2) a change in the law that

would establish that the jury was improperly instructed on premeditation. Petitioner

reasserted his claims that (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object and

preserve the record regarding the faulty jury instructions on premeditation and first

versus second degree murder; (2) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel

for the fault required to overcome preclusion of his claim of ineffective trial counsel,

and (3) fundamental error by the court in the faulty jury instructions. (Answer, Ex. R.)

Petitioner also reasserted his prior post-conviction petition issues and asserted issues

in a supplemental pro se petition.

The trial court denied the claim of new evidence, finding that the affidavit relied

upon to support the claim was double hearsay. (Answer, Ex. S, p. 4.) The court also

found that, while the affidavit might have been admissible as a prior statement by a

witness, the rules do not allow newly discovered evidence for impeachment purposes,

unless the evidence undermines the testimony which was of critical significance at trial

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such that the evidence probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. (Answer,

Ex. S, p. 4.) The trial court found that even if all of Lawson's testimony was

disregarded, it would not have changed the verdict. (Answer, Ex. S, p. 4.) 

The trial court denied the change in law claim, distinguishing the facts of the

present case from the facts of the case relied upon by Petitioner for his claim. (Answer,

Ex. S, p. 6-9.) 

The trial court again found the issue of erroneous jury instructions regarding

second degree murder, the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to object to

the instruction and appellate counsel for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal,

precluded. (Answer, Ex. 9.) The trial court, however, "in an effort to put this matter

to rest" ruled on the merits of the issue. (Answer, Ex. S, p. 9.) The trial court found

that Petitioner's assertion that the trial court should have instructed that second degree

murder is a killing "without premeditation" to be logically inconsistent, requiring the

state to prove the lack of premeditation, and; in this case, made clear by the language

of the first and second degree murder instructions combined. (Answer, Ex. 10.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals raising

three issues: (1) Is the affidavit of Lawson's brother newly discovered evidence, and if

such facts were introduced at Petitioner's trial would it have probably changed the

verdict? (2) Is the Court of Appeals ruling clarifying the premeditation instruction in

first degree murder cases a significant change in law, that if determined to apply to the

Petitioner's case could probably overturn his conviction? and (3) Did the trial court

commit fundamental error in failing to properly instruct the jury on the elements of first

degree murder and second degree murder and denied the defendant a fair trial in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in that the

instructions relieved the State of the burden of proving every element of the offense

beyond a reasonable doubt? 

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The court of appeals denied review, and, after the Arizona Supreme Court also

denied review (Answer, Ex. W), the mandate affirming the conviction issued on June

9, 2000. (Answer, Ex. U.) 

Third Petition for Post Conviction Relief

On May 25, 2000, Petitioner filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the trial court

claiming manifest injustice and actual innocence, specifically (1) the State knowingly

used perjury to obtain a conviction against the Petitioner; (2) the State denied the

Petitioner the right to confront state witnesses and to present witness in Petitioner's

behalf; (3) the State used a false witness against the Petitioner; (4) the State used a

coerced witness to falsely accuse Petitioner; (5) the State used false testimony in the

opening and closing arguments; and (6) the agreement between the State and the State's

key witnesses violated the Petitioner's due process. (Answer, Ex. X.) 

The trial court treated the petition as a petition for post conviction relief and

denied the petition for failure to file a notice of post conviction relief, and, finding that

even if a proper notice had been filed, the exceptions for filing an untimely notice of

post conviction relief, pursuant to Rules 32.1(d) (e) (f) or (g) had not been met in this

case. (Answer, Ex. Y.) 

The court of appeals denied a petition for review, finding that the trial court did

not abuse its discretions and that the issues were precluded for failure to raise them on

appeal. (Answer, Ex. Z.) The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on December 7,

2000. (Answer, Ex. AA) 

Third Federal Habeas

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the District Court on May 16,

2001. The petition raises the following four claims: (1) that federal due process was

violated because the trial court gave "fundamentally flawed instructions on first and

second degree murder" and that appellate counsel was ineffective in not challenging

them on appeal" (2) that federal due process was violated because Lawson perjured

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herself at trial after Pintado had threatened her; (3) that federal due process was violated

because the prosecutor used perjured testimony and vouched for witnesses; and (4) that

federal due process was violated by the State's plea agreement with Pintado. 

Respondents filed an answer to the Petition on November 5, 2001. On July 30,

2002, this Court stayed Petitioner's case to allow Petitioner to return to state court to

exhaust a claim that Petitioner argued was made available due to a significant change

in the law. The state trial court denied relief on Petitioner's claim on May 15, 2003.

The court of appeals granted review, but denied relief on July 9, 2004, and denied a pro

se motion for reconsideration on August 12, 2004. A petition for review to the Arizona

Supreme Court was filed and was denied on January 4, 2005. The Arizona Court of

Appeals issued the mandate on February 10, 2005, and this Court lifted the stay in this

case on April 20, 2005, and set a briefing schedule for the newly exhausted state claim.

Petitioner requested that the stay continue because Petitioner was seeking a writ

of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Petitioner also argued that the

provisions of the AEDPA should not apply to the newly exhausted claim. This Court

denied the request to continue the stay, and granted the Petitioner's request to reconsider

application of the AEDPA, allowing both parties to fully brief the issue. 

Petitioner submitted a supplemental briefing on May 20, 2005, and Respondents

filled a response in opposition, further arguing that Petitioner's claim should not be

considered because Petitioner had made no motion to supplement or amend the original

Petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus. This Court acknowledged the response, and

allowed Petitioner additional time to file a motion to amend or supplement the petition.

Petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend or supplement the petition on July 11, 2005.

Respondents did not file an opposition to the motion. In a separate order, this Court

granted Petitioner's request to amend the petition. 

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DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

Do the provisions of the AEDPA govern this case?

The present petition was filed on May 16, 2001. The AEDPA was enacted on

April 23, 1996. Petitioner argues that this petition was originally filed in 1991, before

the enactment of the AEDPA, and was erroneously dismissed by Judge Roll in 1995.

Erroneous or not, Petitioner did not appeal the dismissal of his second federal habeas,

CV 91-521-TUC-JMR. A petition does not relate back to an earlier petition which is

dismissed in order to allow a petitioner to exhaust state remedies. Green v. White, 223

F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th

Cir. 2000). There is no petition to which the new petition can relate back or amend.

See Green, 223 F.3d at 1003 (citing Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.

1999)). See also Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, although an

exception was carved out by the Ninth Circuit in Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568 (9th

Cir. 2000), for cases in which a petitioner does not accept dismissal of a mixed petition

and elects to resubmit a petition with only exhausted claims, the exception does not

apply in this case because Petitioner accepted the dismissal of his petition and returned

to file a new petition after exhausting state remedies. Furthermore, it is not enough for

petitioner to now argue that the District Court erred, failure to appeal the District

Court's decision prevents this Court from considering it now. See Henderson v.

Lampert, 396 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge

recommends that the provisions of the AEDPA apply to all aspects of this petition.

Standard of Review

The writ of habeas corpus is available to “a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

District Courts’s standard of review is described as follows:

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An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in

State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Timeliness

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1).

Exhaustion

An application for writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted unless the applicant

has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, there is an absence of

available State corrective process, or circumstances exist that render such process

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). This

requirement of exhaustion is designed to give the State an initial opportunity to pass

upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights. Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971). 

Generally, there are two methods by which a petitioner may satisfy the

exhaustion requirement. First, a petitioner may actually exhaust his claims by

providing the state court with an opportunity to review the facts and legal theories in

a procedurally appropriate manner. In order to actually exhaust his or her claims, a

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petitioner must fairly present the federal claims to the state courts; this means that a

petitioner is required to present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the

federal courts. Id., 404 U.S. at 275-276, 92 S.Ct. at 512. A state court must be alerted

to the fact that a petitioner is asserting a claim under the United States Constitution.

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995). It is not enough

to present the state court with only the facts necessary to state a claim for relief, nor to

make a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee as broad as due process. Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163, 117 S.Ct. 2074, 2081 (1996). Mere similarity between

claims of state and federal error is also insufficient to establish exhaustion. Shumway

v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106

(9th Cir. 1999)). A petitioner must make the federal basis of a claim explicit either by

citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the federal basis is "selfevident," or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Lyons v.

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), as modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th

Cir.2001) (quoting Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999)).

A second form of exhaustion, "technical exhaustion" can be demonstrated by

showing either that a state court found a claim defaulted on procedural grounds, or, if

the claim was never presented in any forum, that no state remedies remain available to

the petitioner. Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to remedies still

available at the time of the federal petition, if a petitioner failed to present his claims

in state court and can no longer raise them through any state procedure, state remedies

are no longer available, and are thus exhausted. Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-62, 117 S.Ct.

at 2080 (1996); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1231 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Engle

v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 n.28, 102 S.Ct. 1558 (1982)); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526

U.S. 838, 848, 119 S.Ct. 1728 (1999). The procedural bar which gives rise to

exhaustion provides an independent and adequate state-law ground for the conviction

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1 Although the Ninth Circuit has recently suggested that under

Rule 32.2(a)(3), there are exceptions to the rule that a District

Court can make such a determination for claims which require

a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver, see Cassett, v.

Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, (9th Cir. 2005), this Court does not

address such waiver because it has not been affirmatively raised

by the petitioner. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 & n.5

(9th Cir. 2002). 

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and sentence, and thus prevents federal habeas corpus review of the claim, unless the

petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice for failing to raise the claims in earlier

proceedings. Gray, 518 U.S. at 162, 116 S.Ct. at 2080 (citations omitted). 

If a claim has never been presented to the state court, a federal habeas court may

determine whether state remedies remain available1

. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

269-70 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99. 

Rule 32.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a defendant to seek

post-conviction relief on the ground that his conviction was in violation of the

Constitution of the United States. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a). Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, however, governs when a petitioner may seek relief in post-conviction

proceedings and raise federal constitutional challenges to their convictions or sentences

in state court. Under Rule 32.2, relief is barred on any claim which could have been

raised in a prior Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief, with the exception of certain

claims which fall under sub-sections (d) through (h) of Rule 32.1, and which were

justifiably omitted from a prior petition.

Furthermore, Rule 32.4 (a) requires that a petition for post-conviction relief must

be filed within 90 days of the entry of judgment and sentence or 30 days after the

issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later. See Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). Again, the exceptions to this requirement are claims asserted under

subsections (d) through (h) of Rule 32.1. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a).

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Thus, in situations where a petitioner might otherwise attempt to revive an

unexhausted federal claim in state court, and the state court might invoke the procedural

bars of Rule 32.2 and 32.4(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, in rejecting such

an attempt, there is an adequate and independent state ground barring Petitioner from

raising these claims in state court proceedings thereby creating a procedural default for

purposes of federal habeas review. 

Procedural Default

A state court's adequate and independent finding of procedural default will bar

federal habeas review of a federal claim unless the habeas petitioner can show "cause"

for the default and "prejudice attributable thereto," or demonstrate that failure to

consider the federal claim will result in a "'fundamental miscarriage of justice.'" Harris

v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 109 S.Ct. 1038 (1989). A procedural default does not bar

consideration of a federal claim, however, unless the last state court rendering a

judgment in the case "clearly and expressly" states that its judgment rests on a state

procedural bar. Harris, 489 U.S. at 263, 109 S.Ct. at 1043, quoting Caldwell v.

Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2638 (1985). 

Cause and Prejudice

A petitioner may be relieved from a procedural default on a showing of cause

and prejudice. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85-87, 97 S.Ct. 2497 (1977). “[T]he

existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner

can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts

to comply with the State's procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106

S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986).

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ANALYSIS

Timeliness

Respondents do not contest the timeliness of the habeas petition. A review of

the petition suggests that it is timely. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Petition

is timely.

Ground One

Petitioner argues that the state conviction violates his constitutional right to due

process of law because appellate counsel failed to: (1) argue the jury instructions as

flawed; and (2) failed to argue the trial counsel's failure to object to either the

instructions or the prosecutor's arguments on the flawed jury instructions. 

Respondents construed this as an argument having three sub-claims: (1) that the

trial court gave flawed instructions on first and second-degree murder; (2) that trial

counsel was ineffective for not objecting to these instructions; and (3) that appellate

counsel was ineffective for not making an issue of these instructions on appeal.

Respondents then countered these sub-claims asserting that: (1) the first claim is not

specific enough to merit review; (2) two of the sub-claims are procedurally barred; (3)

claim one was not raised as a federal claim ; (4) all three sub-claims are barred under

Teague; and (5) Petitioner cannot show ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

because the underlying claim is meritless.

This Court does not construe Petitioner's argument as having three sub-claims.

From this Court's review of the Petition, it appears that the Petitioner is only claiming

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. This claim was remanded by the Ninth

Circuit to the district court for a determination of this claim, and is properly before the

Court, as noted below. To the extent that the District Court finds that there are three

sub-claims presented as construed by Respondents, this Court agrees that the first two

such sub-claims would be procedurally defaulted. This alternative analysis follows.

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2 While the exhibit to the supplemental brief is not included in this

record, the outline of Petitioner's argument was summarized by the

Ninth Circuit in its unreported opinion, Santana v. Schriner, 42 F.3d

1402 (9th Cir. 1994) (Answer, Exhibit P).

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Procedural Bar

Petitioner first raised these issues, through counsel, in a supplement to his pro

se Rule 32 motion2

. The trial court found, as a matter of fact, that all issues raised by

the defendant on Rule 32 could have been or had been raised on appeal. (Answer,

Exhibit K.) The Arizona Supreme Court denied a petition for review without an

opinion. (Answer, Ex. O.) The district court found that Petitioner had procedurally

defaulted his claims by failing to raise them on direct appeal or in the post-conviction

relief petition. The district court further found that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate

cause for his default. 

The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, finding that the district court clearly erred

because the claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue on direct

appeal was raised in Petitioner's supplemental petition and in the motion for a rehearing,

and, logically, Petitioner could not have raised such a claim on appeal. The Ninth

Circuit remanded to the district court for a determination of the merits of this claim. 

The Ninth Circuit further found that Petitioner had procedurally defaulted his

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions

because the trial court denied relief finding that Petitioner should have raised the claim

on direct appeal, and such decision was "clearly and expressly" based on a state

procedural bar. 

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found that Petitioner had procedurally defaulted his

claim that the trial court committed fundamental error in instructing the jurors on firstand second- degree murder because, again, the trial court's decision was "clearly and

expressly" based on a state procedural bar.

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The Ninth Circuit found that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate cause for the

procedural default. 

The "law of the case" doctrine requires courts to follow the decision of an

appellate court on a legal issue in all subsequent proceedings in the same case unless:

(1) the decision is clearly erroneous and its enforcement would work a manifest

injustice, (2) intervening controlling authority makes reconsideration appropriate, or (3)

substantially different evidence was adduced at a subsequent trial. In re Rainbow

Magazine, Inc., 77 F.3d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Herrington v. County of

Sonoma, 12 F.3d 901, 904 (9th Cir.1993)). 

This Court finds that no exceptions to the "law of the case" rule have been

demonstrated in this case. 

Thus, this Court recommends that should the District Court construe Ground

One of the Petition as having three sub-claims, as presented by Respondents, that the

District Court find that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted the first two sub-claims

in Ground One of the Petition, (error by the trial court and ineffective assistance of trial

counsel) having been previously found to be procedurally defaulted by the Ninth Circuit

and no new factual or legal issues regarding these claims demonstrated by Petitioner.

Failure to raise Claim One as a federal claim in state court.

Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to raise the underlying issue of error

regarding the instructions as a federal claim in state court. As noted above, a petitioner

must make the federal basis of a claim explicit either by citing federal law or the

decisions of federal courts. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), as

modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir.2001),quoting Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889

(9th Cir. 1999). Respondents claim that Petitioner failed to raise the issue of the

erroneous jury instructions as a federal claim in his state proceedings. Petitioner,

however, argued in his pro se petition for review of his second petition for postconviction relief to the appellate court that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury

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3 Because the Ninth Circuit remanded the ineffective assistance

claim to the district court for review, and respondents have

addressed the issues as framed in the Petitioners 1991 federal

habeas petition, and because pro se petitioners are to be allowed

a certain amount of liberality in the construction of their

documents, this Court considers Petitioner's first claim as

presented in the present Petition and as argued in the second

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that any second degree murder is a killing without premeditation denied him a fair trial

"in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the instruction and his appellate

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal in violation of the

Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution." (Answer, Exhibit T.) Thus, both

the underlying claim that the jury instructions were erroneous, and the reliant claim, that

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue, were raised in state court as

federal issues. 

Teague Analysis

Respondents argue that, under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060

(1989), Petitioner cannot benefit from a rule that is adopted after his conviction

becomes final. Respondent argues that, in this case, it would be a new rule to declare

on federal habeas review that it is a due process violation for a State not to draw a

"meaningful distinction" between first and second-degree murder. 

A case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent at the

time the defendant's conviction became final, or, in other words, the decision announces

a rule that "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal

Government." Teague, 109 S.Ct. at 1070, 489 U.S. at 301 (citations omitted). 

Petitioner argued in his second federal habeas petition that the trial court

committed fundamental error by failing to instruct the jury that second degree murder

is a killing without premeditation.3

 Petitioner also argued that the trial court's error was

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federal habeas petition, CV 91-521-TUC JMR. 

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further compounded because the jury instructions minimized the "reflective" nature of

the intent or knowledge which "premeditation" requires. 

A Teague analysis, however, is not appropriate in this case. Petitioner now

raises his claim as an ineffective counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment and the

Supreme Court’s test for ineffective assistance formulated in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). While the “prejudice” component of the

Strickland test focuses on the question whether counsel’s deficient performance renders

the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair by depriving a

defendant of a substantive or procedural right to which the defendant is entitled under

the law, a contemporary assessment of counsel’s conduct is used when determining the

deficient performance component of the Strickland test. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506

U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838 (1993). Thus, this Court is bound to determine whether the

state court erred in rejecting Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim by assessing

counsel’s performance based on the state of the law at the time of counsel’s

performance. Thus, Petitioner did not, and could not, argue for a new rule through his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and a Teague analysis is not suitable here.

Accordingly, this Court addresses Petitioner's first claim on the merits.

Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that

second-degree murder is a killing without premeditation, and counsel failed to raise this

issue on appeal. 

The jury was instructed as to first and second degree murder, and premeditation,

as follows:

The crime of first-degree murder requires proof of the following three

things:

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Number One. The defendant caused the death of another person; and

Number Two. The defendant intended or knew that he would cause the

death of another person; and 

Number Three. The defendant acted with premeditation.

Premeditation means:

Number One. That person either intends or knows that his conduct will

result in death to another person; and

Number Two. His intent or knowledge exists before the killing long

enough to permit reflection.

An act is not done with premeditation if it is the instant effect of a

sudden quarrel or heat of passion. But no appreciable length of time must

elapse between the formation of the intent to kill and the act. They may be as

instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind.

The crime of first-degree murder includes the less serious crime of

second-degree murder. If you do not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant is guilty of first-degree murder, you may consider whether or not the

defendant is guilty of second-degree murder.

The crime of second-degree murder requires proof that:

Number One. The defendant intentionally caused the death of another

person; or

Number Two. The defendant caused the death of another person by

conduct which he knew would cause death or serious physical injury; or

Number Three. Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference

to human life, such person engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of

death and thereby causes the death of another person.

If you determine that the defendant is guilty of either first-degree

murder or second-degree murder, but you have a reasonable doubt as to which

it is, you must find the defendant guilty of second-degree murder.

(Answer, Ex. E, p. 82-83)

The trial court rejected Petitioner’s argument, analyzing the requisite claim, that

the trial court erred in the first instance, finding that (1) interpreting the statues and

caselaw as the petitioner requests would create a logical inconsistency, and (2)

factually, the distinction in these instructions between first and second degree murder

was clear. Implicit in the state court’s opinion is the finding that counsel could not be

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ineffective for failing to argue such error on appeal, if the trial court did not err in the

first instance. The appellate court adopted the trial court’s findings on appeal under

State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 866 P.2d 1358 (App. 1993), and the Arizona Supreme

Court denied review. 

Petitioner is entitled to relief if the state court's decision rejecting his

ineffective-assistance claim was either "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of," established law. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000).

Neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court of Arizona articulated a rationale

for affirming the trial court's decision, thus, this Court, adopts the “look through”

approach to determining whether the state court applied the correct federal law in a

reasonable manner. This approach maintains that “[w]here there has been one reasoned

state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that

judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground. If an earlier opinion

"fairly appear[s] to rest primarily upon federal law,”[] we will presume that no

procedural default has been invoked by a subsequent unexplained order that leaves the

judgment or its consequences in place.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803, 111

S.Ct. 2590, 2594, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991). 

The established law governing the merits of an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim is expressed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The general

standard for attorney performance is that of “reasonably effective assistance.”

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Strickland test requires Petitioner

establish deficient performance by counsel and prejudice resulting from that

performance to obtain relief. See Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2002),

amended, 311 F.3d 928. 

In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the two

pronged standard applies that was set forth in Strickland. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d

1428, 1433-34 (9th Cir. 1989). Petitioner must show that counsel's advice fell below an

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objective standard of reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel's unprofessional errors, he would have prevailed on appeal. Miller v. Keeney

882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Strickland 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at

2068; United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 849, FN9 (9th Cir.1986)).

The state trial court made a reasonable determination of the law and facts.

Looking at the trial instructions as a whole, it is clear that the jury could distinguish

between the elements of first and second-degree murder. Furthermore, it was clear that

the element of premeditation was a requisite element of a finding of first degree murder,

and that, if there was a reasonable doubt as to whether it was first or second degree

murder, the jury was to make a finding of second degree murder. Thus, the trial court

found the argument meritless, and, failure to raise a meritless argument does not

constitute ineffective assistance. See Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1985)

(citing Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977)). 

Both Petitioner and Respondents make much of Petitioner's argument that, in

addition to the failure to instruct that second-degree murder is a killing without

premeditation, that the definition of premeditation was erroneous, resulting in the

effects of the error being compounded. This, however, did not become part of

Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim until he combined this issue with his

ineffectiveness claim in his federal habeas. Prior to that, he had argued to the state

courts that the jury instruction on premeditation constituted reversible error due to a

significant change in the law. This argument, standing on its own, was rejected by the

state courts. 

This Court finds that Petitioner's argument as to the definition of premeditation

was unexhausted as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Petitioner would now

be barred from returning to state court to raise this issue pursuant to Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure, Rules 32.2(a)(3), 32.2(b) and 32.4(a). Thus, the claim is

technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted, and the District Court should not

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consider the claim on the merits absent a showing of cause and prejudice, or a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

Because this issue was not raised by Respondents as a defense regarding this

issue, however, Petitioner has not had an opportunity to attempt to persuade this Court

of the cause for the default and any prejudice that my have flowed from the alleged

constitutional deprivation, nor has he been made aware that he could present facts to

demonstrate that he has suffered a miscarriage of justice. 

Accordingly, this Court now informs Petitioner that pursuant to this Court's

recommendation to the District Court that this claim be dismissed as procedurally

defaulted, Petitioner is entitled to submit any facts or argument to the District Court to

demonstrate cause for the default and any prejudice that may have flowed from the

alleged constitutional deprivation, and/or present facts to demonstrate that he has

suffered a miscarriage of justice. Petitioner may argue cause and prejudice or

fundamental miscarriage of justice to the District Court in any objections raised to this

report and recommendation.

Alternatively, having found that counsel's performance was not deficient, under

the first prong of Strickland, as to the absence of a "lack of premeditation" instruction,

this Court, would also recommend a finding that counsel's performance was not

deficient for failing to raise an issue that Petitioner himself asserted in his Rule 32

petition and petition for review to the state appellate court is based on a significant

change in the law. As Respondents amply argue, at the time of Petitioner's appeal, this

issue was not the "dead bang winner" required to demonstrate that counsel's failure to

raise the issue on appeal was ineffective. 

Recommendation: Ground One

To clarify, this Court recommends that the District Court, after its independent

review, find that the only issue properly before the court is the claim that Petitioner's

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that second-degree murder should

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have been defined as a killing "without premeditation." This Court recommends

dismissing this claim as the state court made a reasonable determination of the law and

facts, finding that the argument was meritless. Failure to raise a meritless argument

does not constitute ineffective assistance. This Court further recommends a finding that

Petitioner has defaulted his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to the jury instructions as to premeditation. 

In the alternative, should the District Court find the claim that Petitioner's

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the definition of premeditation

was erroneous fully exhausted, this Court recommends dismissing this claim as it was

not the "dead-bang winner" required to meet the first prong of the Strickland standard.

Ground Two

Petitioner argues that newly discovered evidence establishes that a state's witness

perjured herself at trial because the state's chief witness had threatened her and her

families lives in violation of Petitioner's right to due process of law under the

constitution.

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s second claim was not raised in the state

court’s as a federal constitutional claim. Respondent is correct. (See Answer, Ex. R,

p. 9-19, Ex. T, p. 11-16, Ex. V. p. 9-13.) Petitioner raised the claim as a claim of new

evidence, arguing state law only on the issue, and the trial court analyzed the claim as

such. (See Answer, Ex. S.) 

To exhaust his Arizona remedies, Petitioner needed to give the Arizona courts

a “fair opportunity” to act on his federal due process claim before presenting it to the

federal courts. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144

L.Ed.2d 1 (1999); Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1155-56, 1159 (9th Cir.2003)

(en banc). It is not clear whether the appropriate brief to consider is the brief to the

appellate court, or the brief to the Arizona Supreme Court. See Castillo v. McFadden

399 F.3d 993, 998 FN3 (9th Cir. 2005). In this case, however, it is irrelevant as

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Petitioner did not raise a federal constitutional issue as to this claim in any of his

petitions. 

In order to fully exhaust his claim, Petitioner needed to apprise the state courts

that he was making a claim under the U.S. Constitution by describing both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based in order to allow the state

courts a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon

his constitutional claim. See Castillo, Id. at 999 (citations omitted). Petitioner failed

to fully exhaust this claim because he did not reference specific provisions of the

federal constitution or cite to federal or state cases involving the legal standard for a

federal constitutional violation. See Castillo, Id.

The state courts have never had an opportunity to address the legal theories

presented in Petitioner's federal habeas because they were not argued in petitioner's

state petition for post-conviction relief or subsequent petitions for review. Petitioner

has failed to present the issues raised in Ground Two to the state court in a manner

which would alert the state court to the explicit federal nature of his claim. Petitioner

would be barred from returning to state court to raise this claim, pursuant to Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules 32.2(a)(3), 32.2(b) and 32.4(a). The exceptions to

the state's procedural bar are narrow, and the issue raised by petitioner falls outside of

this narrow classification. 

Recommendation: Ground Two

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice for this procedural

default, and federal habeas review is precluded as a matter of law on this ground for

relief raised by Petitioner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Accordingly, this Court

recommends that the District Court find that Petitioner is precluded from obtaining

federal habeas relief on this claim. 

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Ground Three

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor in his case knowingly used perjured

testimony and vouched for witnesses, in violation of Petitoner's right to due process of

law under the constitution.

Respondents argue that Petitioner's third claim is 1) vague and conclusory; and,

2) procedurally defaulted.

This Court finds that Petitioner has failed to raise this claim with the requisite

specificity required to support a federal habeas claim. Petitioner does not identify the

basis for his factual claim, nor does he identify any decision by the Arizona courts that

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Accordingly, this Court recommends dismissal of this claim.

Alternatively, the Court recognizes that Petitioner alleges that this claim was

exhausted in his "State Habeas Corpus," construed by the state courts as a third petition

for post conviction relief. The trial court denied the petition for failure to file a notice

of post conviction relief, and further finding that if a notice had been filed, it would

have been untimely. The court of appeals denied review, finding the issues precluded

pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim P. 32.2(a)(3). 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice for this procedural

default, and federal habeas review is precluded as a matter of law on this ground for

relief raised by Petitioner. Accordingly, this Court recommends that the District Court

find that Petitioner is precluded from obtaining federal habeas relief on this claim. 

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Ground Four

Petitioner argues that the state's plea agreement with Pintado violated his rights

to due process of law by preventing him from properly exercising his right to confront

witnesses. 

Respondents argue that Petitioner's fourth claim is 1) not sufficiently specific to

permit habeas review; and 2) procedurally defaulted.

This Court finds that Petitioner has failed to raise this claim with the requisite

specificity required to support a federal habeas claim. Petitioner does not identify the

basis for his factual claim, nor does he identify any decision by the Arizona courts that

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Accordingly, this Court recommends dismissal of this claim.

Alternatively, the Court recognizes that Petitioner alleges that this claim was

exhausted in his "State Habeas Corpus," construed by the state courts as a third petition

for post conviction relief. The trial court denied the petition for failure to file a notice

of post conviction relief, and further finding that if a notice had been filed, it would

have been untimely. The court of appeals denied review, finding the issues precluded

pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim P. 32.2(a)(3). 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice for this procedural

default, and federal habeas review is precluded as a matter of law on this ground for

relief raised by Petitioner. Accordingly, this Court recommends that the District Court

find that Petitioner is precluded from obtaining federal habeas relief on this claim. 

Ground Five (Supplemental Brief)

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of

the state's offer to allow him to plead guilty to manslaughter. 

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Respondents argue that Petitioner's fifth claim is without merit under the

appropriate standard of review.

In Petitioner’s supplemental claim, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to communicate to him the state’s offer to allow him to plead

guilty to manslaughter. 

As Respondents note, this claim is not procedurally defaulted. The state trial

court found the claim precluded under Rule 32.3(a)(3), and alternatively rejected the

claim on the merits. The Arizona Court of Appeals, however, did not address the

preclusion finding, but addressed and rejected the claim on its merits. 

Petitioner has failed to submit copies of his petition for post conviction relief to

the state court, nor has he submitted a copy of his petition for review to the court of

appeals or the Arizona Supreme Court. The essential facts and argument presented to

the state courts, however, can be gleaned from the trial court's and the Arizona Court

of Appeals' opinions on Petitioner's Petition for Post Conviction Relief and Petition for

Review. (Petitioner's Supplemental Brief, Appendix A and B.) While Petitioner

objects generally to the court's interpretation, and the basic factual dispute about

whether or not he was informed of the plea offer, he does not object to the courts'

synopsis of facts presented to the state courts. 

Petitioner asserted in an affidavit that he had been unaware that the state had

offered him a plea to manslaughter until 1992, seven years after his trial. (Id., p. 1.)

The trial court considered the relevant evidence as follows: (1) Petitioner's counsel,

Carol Wittels, wrote in a letter, dated January 21, 1992 that "Sadly, Florentino passed

up a plea for Manslaughter, where he would have faced a sentence of 5-15 years in

prison"; (2) the sentencing transcript demonstrated that Petitioner's counsel stated

during his sentencing "[h]e passed up all plea offers and he would not say what we

thought was the most logical defense..." (3) Ms. Wittels stated in her affidavit that

"[t]hroughout my representation of the defendant, he maintained his innocence" and

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"[a]lthough I do not recall the specific discussion with my client at present, it was and

is my practice to discuss the terms of all plea offers along with the merits of the offer

relative to the risks at trial" and "[t]ogether we decided to take the case to trial rather

than accept the plea offered." (Id., Appendix A, p. 6) 

The trial court found that Petitioner did not raise a colorable claim that he did not

know about the plea offer. The trial court stated that the letter implied that Petitioner

was the one that decided not to take the plea, nor did he meet his burden of proving that

he did not know of the offer until the 1992 letter. (Id., Appendix A, p. 6) 

The Court of Appeals stated that the record before the court supported the trial

court's finding that Petitioner's counsel had, in fact, discussed all potential plea offers

with him before trial, pointing to the sentencing transcript from 1985 that stated that

Petitioner's counsel had advised the court that Petitioner had "passed up all plea offers."

The court of appeals also found that the letter itself was "substantial evidence that trial

counsel advised Santana of the manslaughter offer." (Id., Appendix B, p.2) 

Petitioner argues that the state court should have granted him a hearing on the

issue pursuant to a state court ruling, State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 10 P.3d 1193

(App. 2000). The state court, however, found Petitioner had failed to present a

colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

The established law governing the merits of an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim is expressed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The general

standard for attorney performance is that of “reasonably effective assistance.”

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Strickland test requires Petitioner

establish deficient performance by counsel and prejudice resulting from that

performance to obtain relief. See Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2002),

amended, 311 F.3d 928. 

In this case, Petitioner failed to convince the state courts that, factually, he was

not presented with the manslaughter plea. 

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In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual

issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have

the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1) (2003).

Under the AEDPA, “[f]actual determinations by state courts are presumed

correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a

decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding, § 2254(d)(2).” Lambert v. Blodgett,

393 F.3d 943, 971 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029;

see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003))

(“The ‘unreasonable application’ clause requires the state court decision to be more

than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application of clearly established law must

be objectively unreasonable.”); Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.2004) (“a

federal court may not second-guess a state court's fact-finding process unless, after

review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not merely wrong,

but actually unreasonable”); Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1160 n. 2 (9th Cir.2003)

(“We would indeed defer to all factual findings of the state court that are reasonable ‘in

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings.’ ”) (quoting Greene v.

Henry, 302 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir.2002))).

In this case, the state court's fact-finding was neither wrong nor unreasonable.

Petitioner asserts that at the time of sentencing counsel's statement that Petitioner had

passed up all plea offers "proves nothing more than what Petitioner had already

admitted, viz., that Wittels had made him aware of the state's offer to allow him to plead

to second degree intentional murder, which he rejected." (Petitioner's Supplemental

Brief, p 10.)

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Petitioner further argues that the Court of Appeals' finding that Wittels' 1992

letter was substantial evidence is specious, and would result in a disputed material issue

of fact that would preclude summary judgment in a civil proceeding. 

Petitioner's arguments fail for several reasons. First, applying this Court's

deferential review, Petitioner has not presented clear and convincing evidence

contradicting the state court's findings. Second, Petitioner does not assert nor submit

an affidavit that he understood counsel's statements at sentencing to refer only to the

offer of second degree murder, only that it could be interpreted that way. Third, the

statement could not be interpreted that way because the statement referred to multiple

plea offers, presumably the second-degree and manslaughter offers, and there is no

evidence that there were any other offers. Fourth, the standard in this case is not the

same as a standard for motion for summary judgment; the trial court acts as a fact-finder

in a Rule 32 proceeding, and the state court adopted those findings.

This Court finds that the state court factual findings are not unreasonable. The

court of appeals found that the trial court's factual findings were supported by the record

before the court and that Petitioner did not state a colorable claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel for failure to communicate a plea offer based on those findings.

This Court finds no factual or legal error in the state's determination.

Accordingly, this Court recommends dismissal of the claim raised in Petitioner's

Supplemental Brief. 

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RECOMMENDATION

This Court recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, dismiss this action in its entirety. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, any party may serve and file written objections

within 10 days of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed

the parties should use the following case number: CIV 01-0226-TUC-DCB.

The Clerk is directed to deliver a copy of this Report and Recommendation to

Petitioner and Respondents.

DATED this 2nd day of September, 2005.

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