Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00605/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00605-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

WILLIAM BRADLEY, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

KATCHKA, et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS PORTIONS OF 

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 

[ECF No. 16] 

 Plaintiff William Bradley (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner incarcerated at Corcoran State 

Prison (“CSP”) in Corcoran, California and proceeding pro se, filed a Civil Rights 

Complaint (“Complaint”) on November 21, 2017, alleging civil rights violations pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims against defendants Katchka, M. Castillo, Alvarez, 

and D. Paramo. (ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).) Defendants Katchka and D. Paramo were sua 

sponte dismissed from the case on May 25, 2018. (ECF No. 12.) Therefore, only 

Defendants Castillo and Alvarez (collectively, “Defendants”) remain. 

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Portions of Plaintiff’s 

Complaint, Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and Defendants’ 

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 23 Filed 11/13/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 11
2 

3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Reply.1

 (ECF Nos. 16, 21, 22). The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to 

United States District Judge Janis L. Sammartino pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and 

Local Civil Rule 72.3 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of California. After a thorough review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, 

the parties’ motion papers, and all supporting documents, and for the reasons discussed 

below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants (ECF 

No. 16) be GRANTED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently confined at CSP. (Compl. at 2, 7.)2

 However, 

at the time of the events set forth in the Complaint, Plaintiff was confined at Richard J. 

Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”). (Id. at 2-3, 7.) The following factual allegations 

are taken from the Complaint: 

 On December 21, 2016, Plaintiff was in his cell at RJD and suffering from chronic 

and severe abdominal pain. (Id. at 8.) He attempted to get the attention of the floor guard 

to notify him or her of his pain and his need for medication. (Id.) During the third watch, 

he finally caught Defendant Castillo’s attention and attempted to hand him a 7362 health 

care services request form, but Defendant Castillo “smiled, and said we don’t do it that 

way here, (just call man down!) and he walked off laughing.” (Id. at 8-9.) 

Ten minutes later, R.N. Jones and Defendant Castillo arrived at Plaintiff’s cell to 

issue his evening medication. (Id.) When they arrived, Plaintiff was on the floor in a fetal 

position, holding his stomach and yelling, “Help” and “Man down.” (Id. at 9.) R.N. Jones 

                                               

1

 In their motion, Defendants do not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim, which would include Plaintiff’s Eight 

Amendment claim against Defendant Alvarez based upon his alleged failure to intervene 

in the alleged beating. (See ECF Nos. 16-1; 1 at 3.) 

2

 All page number citations in this Report and Recommendation refer to the 

page numbers generated by the CM/ECF system. 

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 23 Filed 11/13/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 11
3 

3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

asked Defendant Castillo to open Plaintiff’s cell for emergency care and treatment. (Id.) 

At that time, Defendant Castillo, along with Defendant Alvarez, entered Plaintiff’s cell 

with “extreme force” and a “ramming shield.” (Id.) Defendant Castillo then jumped on 

Plaintiff’s back and spinal region and applied extreme pressure to his neck area. (Id.) 

Defendant Castillo also deliberately placed his knee on Plaintiff’s lower spinal region 

causing extreme pain and discomfort. (Id.) As he did so, Defendant Castillo continuously 

shouted, “Stop resisting!” (Id.) Plaintiff claims he was not resisting at any time. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was frightened and feared for his life. (Id.) He believes that Defendants 

intended to cause as much pain and injury to Plaintiff as humanly possible, including killing 

him. (Id.) He further believes that Defendant Alvarez “orchestrated” the “bulldozer 

assault.” (Id.) 

After the incident, Defendant Katchka deliberately failed to document the injuries 

Plaintiff suffered. (Id. at 10, 17.) She stated that the bruises and discolored areas on 

Plaintiff’s back, spinal region, and upper neck area were not worth documenting. (Id. at 

10.) 

Plaintiff claims Defendants’ acts were “malicious and sadistic” and motivated by 

race. (Id. at 9-11.) Plaintiff, who is African American, claims that the Director of 

Corrections advocates the beating and kicking of “African” prisoners housed at RJD. (Id.

at 10.) Plaintiff further claims that the force was not applied “in a good faith effort to 

maintain or restore discipline,” and not justified by any penological reason. (Id. at 10-11.) 

 On December 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed a California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) 602 Form regarding the alleged assault. (Id. at 23-25.) 

Plaintiff’s appeal was denied at the Third Level of review on August 22, 2017. (Id. at 26-

27.) 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 23 Filed 11/13/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 11
4 

3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 

 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a plaintiff’s complaint must 

provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The pleading standard of Rule 8 does not require detailed factual 

allegations, and the statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . 

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) 

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the 

claims in the complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . 

a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121–22 

(9th Cir. 2008). The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Id.; see Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court does not look at whether 

the plaintiff will “ultimately prevail but whether the [plaintiff] is entitled to offer evidence 

to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The court may 

consider allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and 

documents and matters properly subject to judicial notice. Outdoor Media Grp., Inc. v. 

City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2007). The court must assume the truth of 

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 23 Filed 11/13/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 11
5 

3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the facts presented and construe all inferences from them in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). However, the 

court is “not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if 

those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult 

Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1994). 

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants 

 With respect to an inmate who proceeds pro se, his factual allegations, “however 

inartfully pleaded . . . must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted 

by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also Erickson, 551 U.S. at 

94 (reaffirming that this standard applies to pro se pleadings post-Twombly). Thus, where 

a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case, the Court must construe the pleadings 

liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 

(9th Cir. 2010). However, in giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, 

courts may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. 

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “The plaintiff 

must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged 

in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency of City of L.A., 

733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 

 Before dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, the 

plaintiff should be given a statement of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to 

cure. Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Only if it is 

absolutely clear that the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment should the complaint 

be dismissed without leave to amend. Id.; see also James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 

(9th Cir. 2000). 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 23 Filed 11/13/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 11
6 

3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Due Process 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ unjustified and penologically unnecessary “beating 

and kicking” of him violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. (See Compl. 

at 12.) Defendants note that a Fourteenth Amendment claim can be based upon a 

substantive due process violation or a procedural due process violation. Defendants move 

to dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claim without leave to amend because, as to his 

substantive claim, Plaintiff’s claim can only be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment’s 

Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, and, as to any procedural claim, Plaintiff does not 

allege that any process was due to him. (See ECF Nos. 16-1 at 4; 22 at 2.) 

The gravamen of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim seems to be that his 

alleged beating amounted to excessive force and a violation of his substantive due process 

rights. The Supreme Court has determined that a prisoner’s excessive force claim brought 

under Section 1983 must be judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard that 

governs that right rather than under a substantive Fourteenth Amendment due process 

standard. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392-95 (1989). Thus, when a prisoner 

alleges he was assaulted without justification, the prisoner’s remedy is under the Eighth 

Amendment.3

 See id. at 395 n.10 (“Any protection that ‘substantive due process’ affords 

convicted prisoners against excessive force is, we have held, at best redundant of that 

provided by the Eighth Amendment.”); see also Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 

833, 842-43 (1998) (“[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional 

provision, such as the . . . Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the 

standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due 

/// 

                                               

3

 The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment protects 

prisoners from the use of excessive physical force. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37-

39 (2010); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). 

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 23 Filed 11/13/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 11
7 

3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

process.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

substantive due process claim must fail. 

As mentioned, Plaintiff’s due process claim seems to be a substantive one, and it is 

not clear Plaintiff intends to raise a procedural due process claim. To the extent that 

Plaintiff also alleges a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, the 

Complaint sets forth no facts supporting the existence of such a claim. “To state a 

procedural due process claim, [a plaintiff] must allege ‘(1) a liberty or property interest 

protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] (3) 

lack of process.’” Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Portman 

v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also Ky. Dept. of Corr. v. 

Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1990) (procedural due process violations are examined in 

two steps; “the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been 

interfered with by the State;” and “the second examines whether the procedures attendant 

upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient”). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged a 

lack of process, i.e., that he was denied a hearing, failed to receive notice of the charges, 

or that he did not have an opportunity to present his views regarding the alleged beating. 

See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225-26 (2005) (The Supreme Court’s “procedural 

due process cases have consistently observed that [notice and a fair opportunity to be heard] 

are among the most important procedural mechanisms for purposes of avoiding erroneous 

deprivations.”); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982) (the Fourteenth 

Amendment requires “an opportunity . . . granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 

manner, for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted).4

                                               

4

 In his opposition, Plaintiff cites Sandin in support of his due process claim. 

(See ECF No. 21 at 1-2.) However, the case is inapplicable. In Sandin, the Supreme Court 

addressed the first prong of a procedural due process claim, before concluding that the 

prisoner did not have a protected liberty interest. 515 U.S. at 487. As such, the court did 

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 23 Filed 11/13/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 11
8 

3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not plead a plausible 

substantive or procedural due process claim against Defendants. Accordingly, the Court 

recommends that Plaintiff’s due process claim be dismissed. 

B. California Assault and Battery Claim 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants’ unjustified and penologically unnecessary 

“beating and kicking” of him constituted an intentional assault and battery under California 

law. (See Compl. at 13.) Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s state assault and battery 

claim because he does not allege compliance with the California Government Claims Act 

(“CGCA”), codified at California Government Code section 810, et seq. (ECF No. 16-1 at 

4-5.) For the following reasons, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s state assault and 

battery claim be dismissed. 

Before a person can sue a public entity or public employee for money damages5

 for 

actions taken within the scope of the person’s employment, he or she must first file a 

government claim pursuant to the CGCA. See Cal. Gov’t. Code §§ 905.2, 950.2, 950.6; 

see also Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 627 (plaintiff’s “pendent state law tort claims against 

both the individual and public entity defendants are barred unless he presented them [in 

accordance with the CGCA] before commencing suit.”); Ortega v. O’Connor, 764 F.2d 

703, 707 (9th Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (“failure to comply 

with state-imposed procedural conditions to sue the state bars the maintenance of a cause 

of action based upon . . . pendent state claims”). A claim relating to a cause of action for 

injury to a person must be filed or presented to the public entity no later than six months 

after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2. 

                                               

not address the second prong. See id. The case does not excuse Plaintiff from alleging 

facts sufficient to meet both prongs. 

5

 The government claim filing requirement does not apply to non-pecuniary 

actions, such as those seeking injunctive, specific, or declaratory relief. See Robinson v. 

Alameda Cnty., 875 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Canova v. Trs. of 

Imperial Irrigation Dist. Emp. Pension Plan, 150 Cal. App. 4th 1487, 1493 (2007)). 

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 23 Filed 11/13/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 11
9 

3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In the complaint, a plaintiff “must allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance 

with the claim presentation requirement.” State of Cal. v. Super. Ct. (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 

1234, 1243 (2004); see also Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal. App. 3d 861, 865 (1983) 

(“Where compliance with the [CGCA] is required, the plaintiff must allege compliance or 

circumstances excusing compliance, or the complaint is subject to general demurrer.”). 

The CGCA “must be satisfied even in the face of the public entity’s actual 

knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim.” City of Stockton v. Super. Ct., 42 

Cal. 4th 730, 738 (2007) (citation omitted). “The purpose of the claims statutes is not to 

prevent surprise, but to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to 

adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of 

litigation.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages in his Complaint against 

Defendants, who are state employees, for actions taken within the scope of their 

employment, but does not allege compliance with the CGCA. (See Compl. at 3, 6.) 

Moreover, in his opposition, Plaintiff does not contend that he complied with the CGCA. 

(See ECF No. 21.) Instead, Plaintiff argues that “for federal civil rights suits, there is ‘no’ 

requirement [to file a claim and have it be rejected before a lawsuit can be filed], as there 

is with an action brought under the [CGCA].” (See id. at 3.) 

Plaintiff is partially correct. The CGCA generally has “no applicability to [section] 

1983 actions.” Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Robinson, 875 

F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (“The filing requirement [of the CGCA] does not apply to . . . causes 

of action based upon federal law.”); Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 841-42 (1976) 

(holding that § 911.2 is inapplicable to § 1983 claims and that “the purposes underlying § 

1983 . . . may not be frustrated by state substantive limitations couched in procedural 

language”). 

However, Defendants are not moving to dismiss Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims 

based on his failure to allege compliance with the CGCA. (See ECF No. 16-1 at 4-5.) 

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 23 Filed 11/13/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 11
10 

3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Rather, Defendants are only moving to dismiss Plaintiff’s state assault and battery claim 

on this basis. (See id.) As Plaintiff has failed to allege compliance with the CGCA with 

respect to his state assault and battery claim against Defendants, the Court recommends 

that this claim be dismissed. 

The Court has discretion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law assault and battery claim 

with leave to amend to obtain compliance with the CGCA, unless the claim “could not 

possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” See Robinson, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 

(citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)). Here, Defendants contend 

that Plaintiff’s state assault and battery claim must be dismissed without leave to amend 

because Plaintiff cannot come into compliance with the CGCA. (See ECF Nos. 16-1 at 5-

6, 22 at 2-3.) 

 The incident underlying Plaintiff’s assault and battery claim occurred on December 

21, 2016. (See Compl. at 3, 8, 13.) As more than a year has passed since his cause of 

action for injury accrued, Plaintiff cannot obtain compliance and amend his Complaint. 

See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 911.2 (claim must be presented within six months after accrual), 

911.4(b) (a late claim may be presented within a year after accrual); see also Rubenstein v. 

Doe No. 1, 3 Cal. 5th 903, 906 (2017), as modified on denial of reh’g (Nov. 1, 2017) (“A 

plaintiff may apply for leave to present a late claim, but only if the application is presented 

within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of the cause of action.”) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the only remaining question 

is whether Plaintiff has already complied with the claims presentation requirement but 

failed to allege as such in his Complaint. 

Defendants attach a declaration to their Motion to Dismiss stating that compliance 

with the CGCA has not occurred, see ECF No. 16-2, but they cite no authority that allows 

the Court to take judicial notice of or otherwise consider the declaration submitted on a 

motion to dismiss. The Court refuses to do so here. Accordingly, the Court recommends 

that Plaintiff be given leave to amend his Complaint to allege compliance with the CGCA, 

if possible. 

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 23 Filed 11/13/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 11
11 

3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IV. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss be GRANTED. Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim cannot be cured and 

the Court recommends dismissal of this claim with prejudice. However, because it is not 

clear that the Complaint’s deficiencies with respect to any procedural due process claim 

and Plaintiff’s state law claim cannot be cured by amendment, the Court recommends that 

these claims be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 10, 2018, any party to this action 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than January 4, 2019. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 9, 2018 

Case 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB Document 23 Filed 11/13/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 11