Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06229/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06229-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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TERRY L. 

CLEMENTS 

PUBLISH FILED 

United St.ates Court ~f Appeala Tenth Clrmllt 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

NOV 14 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

GIBBS, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 91-6229 

) 

FOOD COMPANY, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 90-1405-W) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Terry L. Gibbs, Prose Plaintiff-Appellant, Stillwater, Oklahoma. 

John c. Harrington, Jr., of Berry-McKee Law Center, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Chief Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 91-6229 Document: 010110097315 Date Filed: 11/14/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff Terry L. Gibbs appeals from the district court's 

order to pay attorney's fees for the defendant who prevailed in a 

suit under 42 u.s.c. § 2000e et seq. Mr. Gibbs filed a motion for 

leave to object to defendant's statement of costs. After this 

motion was filed, the district court awarded attorney's fees to 

the defendant and denied Mr. Gibbs' motion for leave to object as 

moot. On appeal, Mr. Gibbs objects to the award of attorney's 

fees, complaining that he had no opportunity to challenge 

defendant's statement of costs. 

The Supreme Court has determined that a district court has 

discretion under 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(k) to order a plaintiff to 

pay the reasonable attorney's fees of the prevailing defendant, 

reasoning that such an award will deter plaintiffs from bringing 

actions which are frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. 

Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978). 

Several courts of appeal have found that Christianburg suggests an 

equitable standard under which the plaintiff's financial condition 

is a relevant factor in determining the amount of an award of 

attorney's fees. Miller v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Educ., 827 

F.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[A] district court in cases 

involving 42 u.s.c. §§ 1981, 1983 or Title VII should consider the 

financial resources of the plaintiff in awarding fees to a 

prevailing defendant.") (citations omitted); Alizadeh v. Safeway 

Stores, Inc., 910 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1990); Munson v. Friske, 

754 F.2d 683, 697 (7th Cir. 1985); Arnold v. Burger King Corp., 

719 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1983); Charves v. Western Union Tel., 

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Appellate Case: 91-6229 Document: 010110097315 Date Filed: 11/14/1991 Page: 2 
711 F.2d 462, 465 (1st Cir. 1983); Durrett v. Jenkins Brickyard, 

Inc., 678 F.2d 911, 917 (11th Cir. 1982); Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman 

Co., Inc., 607 F.2d 1025, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1979). No courts of 

appeal have considered the issue and reached a contrary decision. 

Some courts have specifically found that a party's indigence will 

limit, without eliminating, the amount of the award. ~, 

Alizadeh, 910 F.2d at 238; Durrett, 678 F.2d at 917 ("A fee must 

be assessed which will serve the deterrent purpose .•• , and no 

fee will provide no deterrence."). We join the circuits cited in 

finding that the nonprevailing plaintiff's financial condition and 

resources are relevant to a court's equitable decision on the 

amount of attorney's fees to be awarded. Of course, the party 

seeking to reduce the amount of attorney's fees because of limited 

finances has the burden to plead and establish his or her 

financial status. 

After thorough review of the record and pleadings in the 

instant case, we conclude that the district court erred in finding 

moot Mr. Gibbs' motion for leave to object to defendant's 

statement of costs. The docket reveals that petitioner's motion 

was timely filed prior to the court's order granting defendant's 

attorney's fees. 

We therefore REMAND for the district court to rule on Mr. 

Gibbs' motion for leave to object to defendant's statement of 

costs. If the district court grants the motion, it must decide 

whether to award attorney's fees and determine the amount of any 

such award consistent with this opinion. 

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Appellate Case: 91-6229 Document: 010110097315 Date Filed: 11/14/1991 Page: 3