Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00416/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00416-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY DEWAYNE LEE TURNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

SACRAMENTO CITY FIRE DEPT., et 

al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-0416 DB P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. On November 18, 2019, the Court screened plaintiff’s complaint and found that it 

failed to state a claim for relief. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff then filed a motion for voluntary dismissal 

of two state law claims (ECF No. 10) and a first amended complaint (ECF No. 11). Shortly 

thereafter, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. (ECF No. 13.) Because the second 

amended complaint supersedes any earlier-filed pleadings, Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th 

Cir. 1967), the Court will screen this most recently-filed complaint.

I. Screening Requirements

“[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action or 

appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or 

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

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1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). This provision applies to all actions filed in forma pauperis, whether or not 

the plaintiff is incarcerated. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000); see also

Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).

II. Pleading Standard

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. 

Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred 

elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial 

plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, 

while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff brings this action against the City of Sacramento, Mayor Darrell Steinberg, 

Police Officer Guibord, Police Officer White Bear, Police Officer Waggoner, Store Cashier Clerk 

Wiggins, and Phlebotomist T. Hopkins. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and 

damages.

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Plaintiff’s allegations may be fairly summarized as follows:

On August 24, 2016, plaintiff entered the ARCO am/pm gas station where Mr. Wiggins 

was working as a store cashier clerk. Upon entering, plaintiff handed Mr. Wiggins a one-hundreddollar bill and said that he would be shopping. Mr. Wiggins, in turn, phoned the police dispatch to 

say that plaintiff was in the store acting strange. 

Several police officers arrived at the gas station in response to Mr. Wiggins’s call, 

including Officers Guibord, White Bear, and Waggoner. A fire truck and ambulance also arrived. 

Suspecting that plaintiff was on drugs, the officers questioned plaintiff about how he got to the 

gas station and whether he drove a car in the parking lot. Plaintiff accuses these defendants of 

arresting him without a warrant and with excessive force by forcefully strapping him to a gurney 

while Mr. Hopkins, the paramedic, administered a tranquilizer to subdue plaintiff. When plaintiff 

regained consciousness, Mr. Hopkins was reaching for a syringe to draw plaintiff’s blood. 

Plaintiff objected strenuously, but Officer Guibord said they did not need plaintiff’s permission

since he was a suspected drug addict. Officer Guibord held plaintiff’s arm while Mr. Hopkins 

drew blood. At some point, plaintiff was read his Miranda rights and told that he was driving 

under the influence of a controlled substance, but he was not arrested or issued a citation or ticket. 

Plaintiff was taken to the Mercy San Juan Medical Center emergency room in Carmichael, 

California. He was released an hour later after the medical staff determined that they could not 

take a blood test because plaintiff was struggling or twisting around too much. 

Plaintiff brings claims for violations of his federal constitutional rights, including due 

process, free speech, freedom of association, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. He 

also brings suit for wrongful imprisonment, wrongful or malicious prosecution, false arrest, 

retaliatory prosecution, fabrication of evidence, suggestive eyewitness identification procedures, 

coerced confessions, and ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that he was prosecuted for Driving Under the Influence. It 

appears that he may have appealed his conviction and/or sentence because he notes that he is 

presently awaiting a judgment from the California Court of Appeals, Third Appellate District. See

Sec. Am. Compl. at 2.

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IV. Discussion

A. Linkage

Under § 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77 Simmons v. Navajo 

County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 

(9th Cir. 2009). Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of 

respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. Supervisory personnel may only be held liable if 

they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to 

prevent them,” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 

F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012).

Plaintiff names the Mayor Darrell Steinberg as a defendant, but he has not included any 

allegations tying this defendant to any alleged violation of plaintiff’s rights. There are also no 

allegations linked to the store clerk, Mr. Wiggins. 

Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a claim against these two defendants. 

C. Liability for Entity Defendants

In addition, plaintiff’s claims against the City of Sacramento is not cognizable as pled. 

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under color of state 

law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 

(9th Cir. 2001). “Persons” who may be sued under Section 1983 are state and local officials sued 

in their individual capacities, private individuals and entities which act under color of state law, 

and/or the local governmental entity itself. Vance v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 995-

96 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 

A local government is liable for an injury under § 1983 under three possible theories. See

Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1249 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on other 

grounds by Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)). First, a local 

government may be liable if “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its 

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, 

inflict[ed] the injury.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 

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(1978). Second, a local government can fail to train employees in a manner that amounts to 

“deliberate indifference” to a constitutional right, such that “the need for more or different 

training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional 

rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately 

indifferent to the need.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). Third, a local 

government may be held liable if “the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an 

official with final policy-making authority or such an official ratified a subordinate’s 

unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 

1086, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff invokes none of the three grounds for liability against the City of Sacramento. 

Accordingly, plaintiff also fails to state a claim against this defendant.

C. The Fourth Amendment and Heck v. Humphrey

The crux of plaintiff’s allegations is that he was arrested without a warrant and his blood 

was drawn over his objection. His allegations also suggest that he was prosecuted on a charge of 

Driving Under the Influence and sentenced thereon (“The malicious prosecution of wrongful 

imprisonment and wrongful arrest...,” Sec. Am. Compl. at 5; “wrongful imprisonment wrongful 

or malicious prosecution, ... retaliatory prosecution, fabrication of evidence, ... ineffective 

assistance of counsel...”, id. at 6). 

The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Reasonableness 

is generally assessed by carefully weighing “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the 

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests 

alleged to justify the intrusion.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985).

To recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or term of imprisonment, 

or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence 

invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed 

on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 

make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas 

corpus. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–487 (1994). A claim for damages based upon 

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a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. See id. at 

487. Based on plaintiff’s allegations, it appears that he was convicted for Driving Under the 

Influence. Because he is claiming that he was arrested without probable cause, his claim is barred 

by Heck. See Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding Heck bars plaintiff’s 

claims that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him and brought unfounded charges against 

him); see also Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding 

Heck generally bars claims challenging the validity of an arrest, prosecution or conviction). 

D. Excessive Force

Plaintiff also asserts an excessive force claim that appears to be premised on the use of 

force needed to secure him onto a gurney. These allegations, however, cannot proceed because 

they are not properly asserted against any individual, only “the police and ambulance attendant.”

Should plaintiff decide to amend his complaint to assert an excessive force claim that is 

appropriately linked to one or more defendants, he is hereby informed that “[a] person is seized 

by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government’s action under the Fourth Amendment 

when the officer, ‘by means of physical force or show of authority,’ terminates or restrains his 

freedom of movement, ‘through means intentionally applied.’” Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 

249, 254 (2007) (citations and emphasis omitted). Thus, the issue is whether the force used during 

the seizure was objectively reasonable. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 

912, 921 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).) A court must 

balance “‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ 

against the countervailing government interests at stake.” Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting 

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). A court should judge the reasonableness of 

force from “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision 

of hindsight.” Id.

While an excessive force claim is not necessarily barred by Heck, Simpson v. Thomas, 

528 F.3d 685, 691 (9th Cir. 2008), plaintiff is forewarned that, by his own account, the force used 

appears to have been necessary to subdue him since he “struggle[d]” with the police and “was 

screaming and hollering” about the medical test. 

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F. Habeas v. Civil Rights

Finally, because plaintiff again suggests he is confined on false charges stemming from 

the August 24, 2016, incident, he is once again informed that federal law opens two main avenues 

to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus and a civil rights 

complaint. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004). “[H]abeas is the exclusive 

vehicle for claims brought by state prisoners that fall within the core of habeas corpus, and such 

claims may not be brought in a § 1983 [civil rights] action.” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 

927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Nettles further sets forth “the correlative rule that a § 1983 action is 

the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state prisoners that are not within the core of habeas 

corpus.” Id. That is, claims challenging “the fact or duration of the conviction or sentence” are 

within the core of habeas, while claims challenging “any other aspect of prison life” are properly 

brought as civil rights actions. Id. at 934. If success on a habeas petitioner’s claim would not 

necessarily lead to his immediate or earlier release from confinement, the claim does not fall 

within “the core of habeas corpus” and thus, is not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. at 935 

(citing Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2012)). Therefore, insofar as plaintiff seeks speedier 

release as a result of the defendants’ alleged constitutional violations and his claims are not 

otherwise barred by Heck, he must proceed through a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

V. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint again fails to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted. The Court will grant plaintiff an opportunity to file a third amended complaint. Noll v. 

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If plaintiff does not wish to amend, he may instead 

file a notice of voluntary dismissal, and the action then will be terminated by operation of law. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Alternatively, plaintiff may forego amendment and notify the Court that 

he wishes to stand on his second amended complaint. See Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 

1058, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2004) (plaintiff may elect to forego amendment). If the last option is 

chosen, the undersigned will issue findings and recommendations to dismiss the second amended 

complaint, plaintiff will have an opportunity to object, and the matter will be decided by a District 

Judge. 

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If plaintiff opts to amend, he must demonstrate that the alleged acts resulted in a deprivation 

of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 

matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555 (2007)). Plaintiff should note that although he has been granted the opportunity to amend his 

complaint, it is not for the purposes of adding new and unrelated claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 

605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully review this screening order and focus his efforts 

on curing the deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint 

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an 

amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer serves a function in the case. Id.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement 

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly titled, in 

bold font, “Third Amended Complaint,” reference the appropriate case number, and be an original 

signed under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal of claims identified in a previous pleading 

is DENIED as moot in light of the second amended complaint; 

2. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must file either a 

third amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order, 

a notice of voluntary dismissal, or a notice of election to stand on the second 

amended complaint; and 

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3. If plaintiff fails to file a third amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal, 

the Court will recommend the action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to 

obey a court order and failure to state a claim.

Dated: April 10, 2020

/DLB7;

DB/Inbox/Substantive/turn0416.scrn 2AC

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