Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01610/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01610-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CINDY ADAMS, individually and as 

Personal Representative to the Estate of 

JESSE ADAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF REDDING; KYLE CORRIGAN, 

CHRISTOPHER STAUP, EDWARD 

MCGINNIS, and DOES 4 through 10,

Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-01610-TLN-DMC

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of Redding’s (“Defendant”) Motion to 

Dismiss.1 (ECF No. 22.) Plaintiff Cindy Adams (“Plaintiff”) opposed Defendant’s motion. 

(ECF No. 23.) Defendant filed a Reply. (ECF No. 24.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court 

GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 22.) 

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1 Plaintiff alleges claims against multiple Defendants, but City of Redding is the only 

Defendant bringing the instant Motion to Dismiss.

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s claims arise from the death of Jesse Adams (“Decedent”). On December 22, 

2019, Decedent was stopped by police while traveling through the City of Redding. (ECF No. 15 

at 4.) During the traffic stop, Defendant Officer Corrigan asked Decedent for identification and 

instructed him to put his hands in plain sight. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Corrigan shattered 

Decedent’s vehicle window and sprayed pepper spray or mace inside the vehicle. (Id.) This 

event caused Decedent to lose control of the vehicle and collide into a police vehicle blocking his

path. (Id.) After the collision, Defendant Officer Staup allegedly discharged his firearm, 

instantly killing Decedent. (Id.) 

Decedent’s mother, on behalf of herself and Decedent’s estate, filed the instant action on 

August 11, 2020. (ECF No. 1.) In the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiff

asserts various federal and state claims, including two claims for Monell liability under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 (“§ 1983”) (Claims Two and Five). (See generally ECF No. 15.) Defendant moves to 

dismiss Claims Two and Five for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 22.) 

II. STANDARD OF LAW

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. 

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a 

pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal (Iqbal), 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). Under notice pleading in 

federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim . . . is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly (Twombly), 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 

(internal quotations omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal 

discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose 

of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).

On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every 

reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 

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Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 

“‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 

relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 

factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 

1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 

unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 

pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.”) Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the plaintiff “can prove facts 

that [he] has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not 

been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 

U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. at 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability 

requirement, it demands more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 

Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 

amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 484, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)).

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III. ANALYSIS

Claims Two and Five of the FAC are Monell claims asserted pursuant to § 1983. (ECF

No. 15 at 5–11.) See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691–92

(1978). Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated Decedent’s constitutional rights by “maintaining an 

unconstitutional custom and practice of using excessive force” (Claim Two) and “failing to 

adequately train its officers in the use of force” (Claim Five). (ECF No. 15 at 6–8, 10–11.) 

Defendant moves to dismiss these claims as “unsupported legal conclusions,” arguing Plaintiff 

has “allege[d] no facts to support a Monell claim under any theory.” (ECF No. 22-1 at 3–4.) 

A local governmental entity is liable under § 1983 when an “action pursuant to official

municipal policy of some nature causes a constitutional tort.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 

Alternatively, a local governmental entity may be held liable for a “longstanding practice or 

custom.” Thomas v. Cty. of Riverside, 763 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014). Such circumstances 

may arise when, for instance, the public entity “fail[s] to implement procedural safeguards to 

prevent constitutional violations” or when it fails to adequately train its employees. Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1143 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 

1477 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 (1989). 

Monell claims “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain 

sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to 

defend itself effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citing Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)); see also Estate of Osuna v. 

Cty. of Stanislaus, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1174–75 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (policy or custom may be 

asserted in a general fashion, but complaint must “include[s] a sufficient quantum of factual 

material to plausibly suggest the existence of a policy or custom.”).

To bring a Monell claim, Plaintiff must show: (1) he possessed a constitutional right of 

which he was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounts to deliberate 

indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind 

the constitutional violation. Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 

Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1474; City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389–91). There must also be a “direct 

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causal link” between the policy or custom and the injury. Id. (citing McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 

1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Absent a formal governmental policy, [Plaintiff] must show a

“longstanding practice or custom” that essentially constitutes a “standard operating procedure of 

the local government entity . . . so persistent and widespread that it constitutes a permanent and 

well settled city policy.” See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). Thus, a single incident will typically not suffice to demonstrate 

existence of a policy. McDade, 223 F.3d at 1141. 

A failure to train or supervise can also amount to a “policy or custom” sufficient to 

impose liability under § 1983 “where a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant 

respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants.” City of Canton, 489 

U.S. at 389. The Ninth Circuit specifically addressed the circumstances under which a Monell

failure to train claim could be asserted: 

The first is a deficient training program, intended to apply over time 

to multiple employees. The continued adherence by policymakers to 

an approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent 

tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard 

for the consequences of their action — the “deliberate indifference” 

— necessary to trigger municipal liability. Further, the existence of 

a pattern of tortious conduct by inadequately trained employees may 

tend to show that the lack of proper training, rather than a one-time 

negligent administration of the program or factors peculiar to the 

officer involved in a particular incident, is the “moving force” behind 

the plaintiff’s injury. 

Long v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of 

Byran Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407–08 (1997)). 

Here, despite Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant maintained “an unconstitutional custom 

and practice of using excessive force” (ECF No. 15 at 7 (Claim Two)), Plaintiff does not describe 

or identify any formal, official policy that was either wrongful or wrongfully ignored by the 

police officers. (See generally id.); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Further, with respect to 

both Monell claims (Claims Two and Five), Plaintiff asserts no allegations suggesting Plaintiff’s 

case amounts to something more than a “single occurrence of unconstitutional action by a nonpolicymaking employee.” (See generally ECF No. 15); see also McDade, 223 F.3d at 1141. 

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Rather, Plaintiff’s claims appear to be based on the one alleged incident that occurred on 

December 22, 2019. (See generally ECF No. 15); see also Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918 (“Liability for 

improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded 

upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a 

traditional method of carrying out policy.”); Meehan v. Los Angeles County, 856 F.2d 102 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (two incidents not sufficient to establish custom). Without more — such as identifying 

an actual custom, policy, or practice of the City of Redding, or including past incidents of 

excessive force — Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how the alleged injury resulted from a 

“permanent and well settled practice.” Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918. 

Similarly, Plaintiff neglects to allege sufficient facts to connect the Defendant Officers’ 

actions to any policy or “possible inadequate training or supervision.” Anderson, 451 F.3d at 

1070. Therefore, the Court cannot discern any “direct causal link” between the alleged policy and 

Plaintiff’s purported deprivation. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to 

show the existence of a policy (or deficiencies in training amounting to a policy) reflecting

“deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” See id. 

Lastly, Plaintiff seemingly concedes the inadequacy of the Monell claims by requesting 

leave to amend in order to add further factual allegations against Defendant, such as prior 

instances of alleged misconduct by the City of Redding and the Redding Police Department.

(ECF No. 23 at 7–8.) For these reasons, the Court concludes Plaintiff’s allegations are 

insufficient to state a Monell claim. Nevertheless, the Court finds Plaintiff may cure the 

identified defects through amendment. Thus, leave to amend is warranted. Lopez, 203 F.3d at

1130. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

The Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Claims Two and Five of the 

First Amended Complaint with leave to amend. (ECF No. 22.) Plaintiff may file an amended

complaint not later than thirty (30) days after the electronic filing of this Order. Defendants shall

file a responsive pleading pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 17, 2021

Troy L. Nunley

United States District Judge

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