Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-01427/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-01427-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James L. Gagan, )

 )

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 99-1427 PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

The Estate of Victor E. )

Sharar, and James A. Monroe, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. ) )

This matter is before the court on defendant James A. Monroe's

expedited motion to quash a Writ of General Execution issued on

August 25, 2006. That Writ was issued to satisfy a nearly $1.7

million dollar judgment rendered in plaintiff James L. Gagan's

favor and against defendant Monroe, among others. Pursuant to that

Writ, on September 25, 2006, the U.S. Marshal issued a "Notice of 

. . . Sale" for real property located in Maricopa County, defendant

Monroe's home. See Doc. 315, exh. A thereto. Primarily because

the public auction of this property is scheduled for October 26,

2006, at 10:00 a.m., the court granted defendants' request for an 

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expedited hearing, which was held on October 13, 2006. Doc. 316. 

Introduction

This motion to quash is the latest in a long series of

attempts by defendant Monroe to thwart plaintiff's efforts to

enforce the judgment which plaintiff obtained against Monroe in

1994. Although defendant frames his arguments in terms of

collateral estoppel and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this most

recent motion to quash is essentially a rehash of an argument which

this court has rejected at least twice before. Namely, defendant

is once again arguing that this court's 2005 rulings that the

judgment was timely renewed, and thus enforceable, is at odds with

what he believes the state court decided, i.e. that the judgment is

not enforceable. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's

arguments gain nothing by recasting them in terms of the 

collateral estoppel and Rooker-Feldman doctrines. 

Background

This action is not unfamiliar to this court. In fact, prior

to filing the present motion to quash, defendant Monroe filed at

least two remarkably similar motions, both of which the court

denied. See Doc. 317, exhs. 1 and 2 thereto. 

Plaintiff obtained the judgment which is the subject of this

motion in the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Indiana on November 23, 1994. On March 1, 1995,

plaintiff recorded that judgment in Maricopa County. Less than a

month later, on March 28, 1995, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §

1963, plaintiff registered the Indiana judgment by filing a

certified copy of that judgment in this district court. Section

1963 provides in relevant part that "[a] judgment so registered

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shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of

the district where registered and may be enforced in like manner." 

Several days later, on March 31, 1995, plaintiff re-recorded the

judgment in Maricopa County. Then, on June 9, 2002, plaintiff "refiled the Indiana judgment . . . in th[is] District Court[.]" Doc.

317, exh. 1 thereto at 2. 

I. Arizona Superior Court Action

In 1999, defendant Monroe's wife commenced an action in

Arizona Superior Court seeking a declaration that the "Gagan

Judgment created by filing the Indiana Judgment in the District

Court of Arizona and recording on March 31, 1995 [was] a 'wrongful

lien[.]'" Doc. 318, exh. AA thereto at 2. Eventually, the state

court dismissed Ms. Monroe's action. 

As part of that wrongful lien action, defendant Monroe filed a

counterclaim seeking "a declaration that the judgment and judgment

lien [we]re unenforceable under Arizona law[.]" Id. at 3, ¶ A. 

Addressing that counterclaim, in a minute entry, the Superior

Court found "invalid" plaintiff's "real property lien arising out

of the November 23, 1994 [Indiana] judgment[.] Doc. 313, exh. A

thereto at 1 (emphasis added). In reaching that conclusion, the

Superior Court explained that in accordance with ARIZ. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 33-964(A) (West 2000), upon recording, the judgment

"bec[a]me a lien for a period of five years from the date it [wa]s

given," i.e. until November 23, 1999. Id. Immediately thereafter

the Superior Court noted, "[t]he record is undisputed that the

judgment was not renewed until June 9, 2000, nearly . . . 7 . . .

months after it expired." Id. Because "the record d[id] not

indicate that the judgment itself was renewed following its . . . 5

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1

This statute allows for renewal of judgments "by action

thereon at any time within five years after the date of the

judgment." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1611 (West 2003).

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year expiration[,]" the Superior Court opined that plaintiff's

"effort to renew the lien" by refiling the judgment in this

District Court on June 9, 2000, was "of no moment." See id.

(citations omitted). The court concluded by explicitly finding

"that [plaintiff's] real property lien arising out of the November

23, 1994 judgment from the Northern District Court of Indiana is

invalid." Id. (emphasis added). 

In the Declaratory Judgment embodying that minute entry, the

Superior Court unequivocally "f[ou]nd[] that [plaintiff] Gagan's

"real property lien of March 1, 1995 and June 9, 2000[,] arising

out of the recording of [his] November 23, 1994 [Indiana] judgment

against [defendant] Monroe . . . was not timely renewed in

accordance with the requirements of A.R.S. §12-1611, et seq., and

is therefore invalid." Id., exh. B thereto at 2 (emphasis added) 

Consequently, the Superior Court "grant[ed] Monroe Declaratory

Judgment that [plaintiff's] lien arising out of the recording of

the November 23, 1994 [Indiana] judgment . . . is invalid and

unenforceable as a matter of law." Id. (emphasis added). 

II. Arizona Court of Appeals Decision

Plaintiff Gagan appealed. Consistent with the Superior Court's

Declaratory Judgment, as the Court of Appeals framed it, the issue

on appeal was whether plaintiff's "judgment lien against

[defendant] Monroe was invalid for failure to renew it pursuant to

. . . A.R.S. section 12-1611[.]"1 Doc. 313, exh. C thereto at ¶1

(emphasis added). The Court of Appeals addressed two narrow

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issues: (1) whether there was a justiciable issue as to the

validity of the lien before the trial court; and (2) the validity

of the "re-recorded" lien. See id. at 9. As to the former, the

Court rejected plaintiff's argument that "a justiciable issue as to

the validity of the lien did not exist and that the trial court

erred by ruling that the re-recorded lien was invalid." Id. at 5,

¶ 10. 

Insofar as the "validity of the re-recorded lien" was

concerned, the Court of Appeals recognized that plaintiff was not

arguing "that the original lien remained valid[.]" Id. at 9, ¶ 18. 

"[N]or d[id] he argue that he properly renewed the lien by rerecording it." Id. Instead, on appeal plaintiff "argue[d] that he

created an entirely new valid lien by re-recording the original

judgment, which he asserts remained valid under Indiana law and

A.R.S. § 12-549 [governing foreign judgments.]" Id. (emphasis

added). The Court of Appeals also rejected this argument

"conclud[ing] that [plaintiff's] re-recording of the original

judgment did not create a new valid lien under Arizona law." Id.

at 14, ¶ 25 (emphasis added). Thus the Court affirmed the Superior

Court's Declaratory Judgment. See id. 

III. District Court Motions to Quash

On September 13, 2004, defendant moved in this court to quash

the second writ of garnishment and summons, to quash the filing of

the foreign judgment, and to have this court take judicial notice

of the Arizona Court of Appeals Decision. Doc. 217. 

Approximately seven months later, on April 6, 2005, defendant

Monroe filed a "Motion to Quash the Writ of Garnishment NonEarnings) and Second Motion to Quash Filing of Foreign Judgment[.]"

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Doc. 236 at 1 (emphasis added). Again, Monroe asked this court to

take judicial notice of that 2003 Arizona Court of Appeals

decision. See id. at 2. 

On July 25, 2006, this court denied both of those motions to

quash. (Doc. 317, exh. 1 thereto). In so doing, the court

explicitly denied Monroe's request to take judicial notice of the

January 21, 2003, Arizona Court of Appeals decision. Id. at 3. 

Monroe had asked this court to take judicial notice of that

decision based upon his belief that the state court had found

plaintiff's judgment to be unenforceable. This court gave two

reasons for denying Monroe's request to take judicial notice. 

First, it faulted Monroe for not identifying the specific facts of

which he wanted the court to take judicial notice. Second,

distinguishing between a judgment and a judgment lien, this court

found that the Arizona Court of Appeals held that plaintiff's

"judgment lien was unenforceable, not the judgment itself." Id. at

3 (emphasis added). In this regard, the court pointed out that the

Court of Appeals specifically noted that plaintiff did "not argue

that he renewed the judgment." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis

added). In light of the foregoing, this court found plaintiff's

"interpretation" of the Court of Appeals decision "misplaced." Id.

at 3-4. 

Having declined to take judicial notice of the Court of

Appeals decision, this court went on to address defendant Monroes's

argument that plaintiff "did not effectively renew the judgment in

accordance with Arizona law," thus rendering "the judgment

unenforceable." Id. at 4 (citations omitted). Under Arizona law,

there are two ways to renew a judgment. The first is "by action

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thereon at any time within five years after the date of the

judgment." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1611 (West 2003). The second

way to renew a judgment is by affidavit. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

§12-1612 (West 2003). Plaintiff admitted that he did not file a

renewal affidavit. Instead, he argued that "he renewed the

judgment by bringing 'an action[,]'" as section 12-1611 allows. 

Doc. 317, exh. 1 thereto at 4 (citations omitted). The lack of a

statutorily or judicially created definition of "action" required

this court to wrestle with the issue of how to define "action"

for section 12-1611 purposes. Not surprisingly, plaintiff argued

for a broad definition, whereas defendant argued that an "action"

under section 12-1611 refers strictly to the filing of a lawsuit.

Noting that the purpose of section 12-1611 is "to give notice

to the judgment debtor and other interested parties of the identity

of the judgment to be renewed[,]" this court held that "any action

upon a judgment" which gives such notice "and is within five years

of the date of the judgment was entered, may effectuate a renewal

of the judgment." Id. at 6. Thus, because plaintiff had "filed

numerous applications for writs of garnishment and motions in this

matter within five years of the date the judgment was entered, the

Court f[ound] that the judgment ha[d] been appropriately renewed

and is enforceable." Id. at 607. Further, this court found that

because "such renewal actions ha[d] occurred within the five years

prior to the contested writs of garnishment and motions," those

"writs and motions had the effect of timely renewal of the

judgment." Id. at 7. On the basis of the foregoing, the court

denied defendant's motions to quash.

Following those denials, plaintiff "filed a request for entry

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of the contested judgement against [a] garnishee[.]" Id., exh. 2

thereto at 2 (citations omitted). Defendant responded by filing a 

motion for a stay pending appeal and for waiver of the

discretionary bond. Defendant took the position that he could meet

the first criteria for the granting of a stay pending appeal, i.e.,

a showing of "likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal[,]"

because Arizona courts had decided that the judgment was not

enforceable under Arizona law. Id. at 3. As it had in connection

with his motions to quash, this court rejected that argument,

reiterating its view that "the Arizona Court of Appeals . . .

determined [plaintiff's] judgment lien to be unenforceable, not the

judgment itself." Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The

court added that in any event its order denying defendant's motion

to quash the writs of garnishment was not an appealable order. Id.

at 4.

Summary of Arguments

As defendant reads the Superior Court's minute entry, it "made

a specific finding that plaintiff's Indiana judgment is no longer

enforceable in Arizona[,]" a finding which defendant contends the

Court of Appeals did not disturb on appeal. Doc. 313 at 3 and 10

(emphasis added). Invoking collateral estoppel and the RookerFeldman doctrines, defendant contends that this court "is precluded

from determining that the Indiana Judgment is enforceable, and more

specifically that th[at] . . . Judgment was timely renewed[.]" Id.

at 10. "Collateral estoppel, or, . . . issue preclusion, means

simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined

by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated

between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Schiro v. Farley,

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510 U.S. 222, 232 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Rooker/Feldman "stands for the proposition that a

federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to

hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court,"

Manufactured Home Communities v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022,

1029 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). That is so because "[o]nly the Supreme Court has

original jurisdiction to review '[f]inal judgments or decrees

rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could

be had.'" In re Sasson, 424 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2005)(quoting

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2890 (2006). 

 In addition to challenging the applicability of the collateral

estoppel and Rooker-Feldman doctrines, plaintiff responds that 

"res judicata has been established in this [federal] court by way

of th[is] [court's] two [2005] Orders . . . regarding judgment

renewal and enforceability." Doc. 317 at 6. Thus plaintiff

reasons, if any preclusive effect should be given here, it is with

respect to this court's prior determination that the judgment is

enforceable. Almost as an afterthought, plaintiff adds that

defendant cannot rely upon the Superior Court's minute entry to

disturb this court's prior 2005 orders because those orders are 

"the law of th[e] case." Id.

Discussion

The court will first address the Rooker-Feldman argument

because unlike the preclusion doctrines of collateral estoppel and 

res judicata, Rooker-Feldman is jurisdictional. See Sasson, 424

F.3d at 872; see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544

U.S. 280, 293 (2005) (citation omitted) ("Preclusion, of course, is

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2

"The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from the only

two cases in which [the Supreme Court] ha[s] applied this rule

to find that a federal district court lacked jurisdiction."

Lance v. Dennis, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 1201 (2006). 

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not a jurisdictional matter."). Therefore, if defendant Monroe

prevails on his Rooker-Feldman argument, this court would be

divested of subject matter jurisdiction. 

I. Rooker-Feldman

As noted above, "under what has come to be known as the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine,2 lower federal courts are precluded from

exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court

judgments." Lance, 126 S.Ct. at 1201 (footnote added). In Lance,

the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on Rooker-Feldman,

the Court reiterated its view that that doctrine is a "narrow" one,

"confined to 'cases brought by state-court losers complaining of

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the

district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court

review and rejection of those judgments.'" Id. (quoting Exxon, 544

U.S. at 283). More succinctly, the Supreme Court in Lance stressed

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine "applies only in limited

circumstances, . . . , where a party in effect seeks to take an

appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal

court." Id. at 1202 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted) (emphasis added). 

Defendant interprets the Superior Court's minute entry as

holding that plaintiff's judgment is unenforceable. From there

defendant goes on to argue that because that was a ruling "adverse"

to plaintiff, and plaintiff did not "pursue appellate review" of

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that issue, Rooker-Feldman "bar[s] [plaintiff] from seeking a

review" of that ruling in this district court. See Doc. 313 at 10.

Plaintiff counters that this Rooker-Feldman argument "misses the

point" because he is not "'appeal[ing]' the State Court ruling in

this Court." Doc. 317 at 6. The court agrees. 

 On the face of it, clearly plaintiff Gagan is not seeking a

review of the Arizona Superior Court's decision. Rather, by

registering the Indiana judgment in this court, which is how this

proceeding began, and eventually obtaining a writ of general

execution, plaintiff is seeking to enforce a judgment which this

court has previously held is "enforceable[]" -- nothing more. See

Doc. 317, exh. 1 thereto at 7. 

Defendant Monroe tries to bring this case within the ambit of

Rooker-Feldman by asserting that under that doctrine this court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the issue of the validity

of the lien and the issue of the enforceability of the judgment are

"inextricably intertwined." To be sure, the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine" prohibits a federal district court from . . .

adjudicat[ing] claims that are 'inextricably intertwined' with the

merits of a judgment rendered in a state court proceeding." G.C.

and K.B. Investments, Inc. v. Wilson, 326 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir.

2003) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16). This prohibition

against hearing an "inextricably intertwined" claim arises out of a

concern that "the District Court is in essence being called upon to

review the state court decision.'" Id. 

Here, defendant Monroe asserts that the issues of the validity

of the lien and the enforceability of the judgment are

"inextricably intertwined" because if this court "allows

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[plaintiff] to enforce the Indiana judgment by refusing to quash

the Writ of General Execution and Notice of Levy, it must

effectively overrule [the Superior Court's] un-appealed and

unambiguous decision which found the very same Indiana judgment to

be unenforceable in the State of Arizona." Dco. 313 at 10. To

support this argument defendant relies upon Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco

Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987), and Fontana Empire Center, LLC v. City of

Fontana, 307 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2002). 

What defendant Monroe fails to take into account is that in

2003 the Ninth Circuit "clarifie[d] the narrow scope and

application" of Rooker-Feldman, Manufactured Home Communities, 420

F.3d at 1029, "and in so doing significantly limited [its] reach"

in terms of the "inextricably intertwined" element of that

doctrine. See Lahey v. Contra Costa County Department of Children

and Family Services, No. C01-1075, 2004 WL 2055716, at *9 (N.D.Cal.

Sept. 2, 2004). More specifically, in Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148

(9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that "[t]he 'inextricably

intertwined analysis of Feldman applies to defeat federal district

court subject matter jurisdiction only when a plaintiff's suit in

federal district court is at least in part a forbidden de facto

appeal of a state court judgment, and an issue in that federal suit

is 'inextricably intertwined' with an issue resolved by the state

court judicial decision from which the forbidden de facto appeal is

taken." Id. at 1165 (emphasis added). In so holding, the Noel

Court emphasized that it has "never held that when there are

simultaneous suits in state and federal court, in which related or

'inextricably intertwined' claims are being litigated, the federal

suit must be dismissed under Rooker-Feldman." Id. "Indeed," the

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Court explained, it "could not so hold without violating the rule

that permits simultaneous state and federal suits involving not

only inextricably intertwined, but even identical, claims." Id.

The Noel Court concluded its "inextricably intertwined" discussion

by pointing out that "[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly stated

that simultaneous state and federal litigation of overlapping, and

even identical, issues is an important feature of our federal

system," and it would "not interpret the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to

destroy that feature." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

As the foregoing demonstrates, after Noel "[t]he premise for

the operation of the 'inextricably intertwined' test . . . is that

the federal plaintiff is seeking to bring a forbidden de facto

appeal." Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 2004)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A federal

plaintiff brings a "forbidden de facto appeal . . . when []he . . .

complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court,

and seeks relief from the judgment of that court." Noel, 341 F.3d

at 1163. Plainly, the relief which plaintiff Gagan is seeking

(execution of a writ to enforce a foreign judgment) does not

constitute a "forbidden de facto appeal" because he "is not

alleging as a legal wrong an erroneous decision from the state

court." See Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 950 (citation omitted). 

Instead, as noted earlier, plaintiff Gagan is attempting to enforce

a judgment which this court has previously held is enforceable. 

Thus, despite defendant Monroe's assertion to the contrary, "the

'inextricably intertwined' test does not come into play here[]"

because "the premise" for its "operation," a "forbidden de facto

appeal," is missing. See id.

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The court finds defendant's Rooker-Feldman doctrine

unpersuasive for several other reasons. First of all, the Pennzoil

language upon which defendant is relying is in a concurrence by

Justice Marshall and did not control the outcome there. Second,

Pennzoil does not advance defendant's Rooker-Feldman argument any

because there, in an action challenging Texas procedures for

enforcement of judgments, the Supreme Court held that rather than

dismissing under Rooker-Feldman, the district court should have

abstained under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See

Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 6-10. Both of these factors significantly

undermine defendant Monroe's reliance upon Pennzoil.

Nor does Fontana, another case which defendant cites, mandate

a different result here. In fact, recognizing that the "Fontana

case can be misleading[,]" subsequently the Ninth Circuit in

Maldonado essentially cautioned litigants about reading Fontana

"out of context." See Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 950. Yet that is

precisely what defendant Monroe did. For these reasons,

defendant's reliance upon Pennzoil and Fontana is misplaced.

In Lance, decided just last term, the Supreme Court repeated

its "warn[ing] that the lower courts have at times extended RookerFeldman 'far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases,

overriding Congress' conferral of federal-court jurisdiction

concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state courts, and

superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1738.'" Lance, 126 S.Ct. at 1201 (quoting Exxon Mobil,

544 U.S. at 283). Adopting defendant Monroe's argument would be

just such an impermissible extension of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court in Exxon Mobil

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recognized, "neither Rooker nor Feldman supports the notion that

properly invoked concurrent jurisdiction vanishes if a state court

reaches judgment on the same or related question while the case

remains sub judice in federal court." Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at

292. Applying that reasoning to the present case, the Court of

Appeal's judgment on the "related question" of the validity of the

lien does not deprive this court of subject matter jurisdiction to

decide the judgment enforceability issue. 

Finally, this court declines to find that Rooker-Feldman is a

bar to this enforcement proceeding because even if "plaintiff

present[]s some independent claims, albeit one that denies a legal

conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was

a party . . . , then there is jurisdiction and state law determines

whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion." 

Id. at 293 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing, inter alia,

Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163-64). In other words, "[e]ven though a

favorable decision in federal court [may] undermine the credibility

of the state court decision, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as

recently explained by the Ninth Circuit in Noel, does not bar

jurisdiction in this case." See Lahey, 2004 WL 2055716, at *9. In

short, because plaintiff Gagan does not allege any legal errors by

the Arizona state court as a basis for relief herein, RookerFeldman does not bar this action. Accordingly, the court DENIES

defendant's motion to quash the Writ of General Execution and

Notice of Levy issued on August 25, 2006 (Doc. 306), insofar as it

is premised upon the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

II. Collateral Estoppel

Having determined that Rooker-Feldman does not apply here, the

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issue becomes whether, as defendant urges, under Arizona collateral

estoppel law the "Court must honor [the Superior court's]

determination and must find that the Indiana Judgment is

unenforceable and must quash [plaintiff's] pending Writ of General

Execution and Notice of Levy." Doc. 313 at 8.

Under the Full Faith and Credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the

court must "give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive

effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State

in which the judgment was rendered." See Migra v. Warren City

Sch. Dist., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). Thus, to determine the

preclusive effect, if any, of the state court decision this court

must look to Arizona collateral estoppel law. To establish

collateral estoppel under Arizona law, the following five elements

must be shown: 

"[T]he issue [wa]s actually litigated in 

the previous proceeding, there [wa]s a 

full and fair opportunity to litigate 

the issue, resolution of such issue [wa]s 

essential to the decision, there [wa]s a 

valid and final decision on the merits, 

and there is a common identity of the parties.

Matter of Lockard, 884 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation

omitted). 

As defendant reads the Superior Court's decision, "it

determined that [the Indiana judgment] was not timely renewed and

that it is not enforceable." Doc. 313 at 5. Premised upon that

reading, defendant contends that each of the elements of collateral

estoppel is "undeniably satisfied" here. Id. at 6. Hence,

defendant contends that collateral estoppel "preclude[s] [this

court] from determining that the Indiana Judgment is enforceable,

and more specifically that th[a]t . . . Judgment was timely

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renewed[.]" Id. at 5. 

Plaintiff counters that there is no need to address each of

the five collateral estoppel elements because defendant cannot

satisfy the first element given that "the issue in question" here,

enforceability of the judgment, was not "actually litigated" in

state court. Doc. 317 at 5. Defendant cannot make such a showing

because, as plaintiff reads the state court's decisions, the issue

which was "actually litigated" there was whether plaintiff properly

renewed his judgment lien – not whether the judgment itself was

enforceable. 

The court agrees with plaintiff that there is no need to

analyze each of the five collateral estoppel elements. The court

has a different reason than does plaintiff for finding such an

analysis unnecessary, however. Both parties overlook the fact that

under Arizona collateral estoppel law the issue which a party is

seeking to have relitigated must be the "same[,]" Pima County v.

Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 127 P.3d 64, 69 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006)

(citation omitted), "precisely the same[,]" State v. Whelan, 91

P.3d 1011, 1015 (Az. Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v. Stauffer, 536

P.2d 1044, 1047(Ariz. 1975)), or"identical[,]" Better Homes

Construction, Inc. v. Goldwater, 53 P.3d 1139, 1143 (Ariz. Ct. App.

2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)(emphasis

added), to the issue actually addressed in the previous

litigation.

Here, the issue which defendant is seeking to preclude, the

enforceability of the judgment, is not the "same," "precisely the

same," or "identical" to the issue actually litigated in state

court. Rather, as this court has explicitly found on two prior

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 That statute reads as follows:

The party in whose favor a judgment is given, 

at any time within five years after entry of 

the judgment and within five years after any 

renewal of the judgment either by affidavit 

or by an action brought on it, may have 

a writ of execution or other process issued 

for its enforcement.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1551(A) (West Supp. 2005). 

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occasions, the issue which was "actually litigated" in state court

was whether the judgment lien was timely renewed, and not, as in

this federal action, "whether the judgment was appropriately and

timely renewed under Arizona law." See Doc. 317, exh. 1 thereto at

3 (citation omitted)("[I]n the Court of Appeals['] opinion . .. ,

the Arizona court concluded that [plaintiff's] judgment lien was

unenforceable, not the judgment itself."); and Doc. 317, exh. 2

thereto at 3 (same). 

The court continues to have a fundamental disagreement with

defendant's reading of the state court decisions. The Declaratory

Judgment could not have been more clear: The issue which was

"actually litigated" was the validity of the lien, and the Court of

Appeals affirmed, agreeing that plaintiff's "re-recording of the

original judgment did not create a new valid lien under Arizona

law." See Doc. 313, exh. C thereto at 14. Distinguishing between

a judgment and a judgment lien, is compatible with the notion that

"judgment liens are a separate and independent creditor's

remedy[.]" See Boone v. Grier, 688 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ariz. Ct. App.

1984). Thus, "there is no legal requirement that there be a

judgment lien prior to execution [of a judgment] pursuant to A.R.S.

§ 12-1553(1)."3 Id. Of course, "[t]he judgment creditor who

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attempts to execute against real property without a lien, . . . ,

is open to potential loss of his rights to a bona fide purchaser by

failing to record his interests in such property." Id. (citation

omitted). But the fact remains that such a creditor may still seek

to execute his judgment against real property even in the absence

of a judgment lien. For these reasons, the court finds no merit to

defendant's collateral estoppel argument and thus DENIES his motion

to quash the Writ of General Execution and Notice of Levy (Doc.

306) on that basis. 

Because the court is denying defendant's motion to quash, and

in turn refusing to revisit the issue of the Indiana judgment's

enforceability, there is no need to address plaintiff's counterarguments that res judicata and the law of the case doctrines bar

this court from reconsidering that issue. 

III. Sanctions, Attorney's Fees and Costs

Although, arguably, there may be some merit in the request by

plaintiff to make an application for an award of sanctions,

attorney's fees and costs, the court will deny that request at this

time. Any future effort to re-litigate these issues will result in

a different ruling. 

Conclusion

IT IS ORDERED that defendant James A. Monroe's motion to quash

the Writ of General Execution and Notice of Levy (Doc. 313) is

denied. Rooker-Feldman is an extremely narrow jurisdictional

doctrine, which courts rarely invoke, and defendant has failed to

adequately support his argument that this court should rely upon

that doctrine and find that it has no subject matter jurisdiction. 

Further, defendant is improperly relying upon the doctrine of

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collateral estoppel to establish the preclusive effect of the state

court decisions because he cannot show that the identical issue of

the enforceability of the judgment was "actually litigated" in

state court – an element essential to establish preclusive effect

under Arizona law. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff James L. Gagan's request

to make an application for an award of sanctions, attorney's fees

and costs is denied, without prejudice.

DATED this 17th day of October, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record

 

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