Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01097/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01097-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 368
Nature of Suit: Asbestos Personal Injury - Prod.liab.
Cause of Action: 

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OFFICE OP THE CLERK 

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 

C-404 United States Courthouse 

1929 Stout Street 

Denver Colorado 80294 

December 13, 1991 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 89-1097, Miller v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. 

Filed November 26, 1991 by Judge Brorby 

Please be advised that the following corrections have 

been made to the captioned opinion: 

Page 4, first paragraph, sentence "Plaintiff knew that 

Defendant's", should read "Plaintiff knew that Defendants'", 

correcting the apostrophe placement. 

Page 8, certified question, last line "same asbestosis 

exposure." should read "same asbestos exposure." eliminating the 

is in asbestosis. 

Please make these corrections to your copy. 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

By: 

/ 

~ i// ~/ 

Barbara sciie~erhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 89-1097 Document: 010110096990 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 1 
RAYMONDE. MILLER, 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

NOV 2 G 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 89-1097 

ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC. ) 

(successor to Armstrong Cork Company, ) 

a Pennsylvania corp.); ACANDS, INC., ) 

a Delaware corp.; COMBUSTION ) 

ENGINEERING, INC. (successor to M.H. ) 

Detrick Company & Walsh Refractory, a ) 

Delaware corp.); FIBREBOARD CORPORATION) 

(successor to Plant Rubber & Asbestos ) 

Co., a Delaware corp.); GAF CORPORATION ) 

(successor to Ruberoid Corp., a Delaware) 

corp. ) ; NATIONAL GYPSUM COMPANY, a ) 

Delaware corporation (successor to ) 

Keasby & Mattison Corp., a Delaware ) 

corp.); OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLASS ) 

CORPORATION (a Delaware corp.); ) 

PITTSBURGH CORNING CORPORATION ) 

(successor to Unarco Industries, Inc.); ) 

RAYMARK INDUSTRIES, INC. (successor to ) 

Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.); TURNER & ) 

NEWALL, LTD. (successor to Keasby ) 

Mattison Corp.), a public corporation ) 

organized under the laws of the United ) 

Kingdom; and UNITED STATES GYPSUM ) 

COMPANY, a Delaware corp., ) 

Defendants, 

and 

THE CELOTEX CORPORATION (successor to 

Phillip-Carey Manufacturing Corp., a 

Delaware corp.); EAGLE-PICHER 

INDUSTRIES, INC., an Ohio corp.; THE 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Appellate Case: 89-1097 Document: 010110096990 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 2 
KEENE CORPORATION (successor to ) 

Baldwin-Ehert Hill Co. and Corp.); and ) 

OWENS-ILLINOIS, INC. (successor to ) 

Owens-Illinois Glass Co., an Illinois ) 

corp.), ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 87-B-851) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

J. Conard Metcalf, Esq. and Michael A. Patrick, Esq., Williams, 

Trine, Greenstein & Griffith, P.C., Boulder, Colorado, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Michael L. O'Donnell of White & Steele, P.C., Denver, Colorado, 

James D. Hinga of Baker & Hostetler, Denver, Colorado, Peggy S. 

Ball of Pryor, Carney and Johnson, Englewood, Colorado, William G. 

Meyer of Hutchinson, Black, Hill & Cook, Boulder, Colorado, for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff Raymond Miller brought this diversity action in the 

United States District Court for the District of Colorado against 

various manufacturers and distributors of asbestos products 

(together, Defendants) 1 alleging that he developed asbestosis, an 

1 While this appeal was pending, Defendants-appellees 

Eagle-Picher and Celotex filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings 

which remain pending. In re Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., Case 

(continued on next page) 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-1097 Document: 010110096990 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 3 
asbestos-related disease, as a result of his exposure to 

Defendants' products. Plaintiff is presently appealing from an 

Order of the district court granting Defendants' Motion for 

Summary Judgment. See Miller v. Celotex Corp., 708 F. Supp. 306 

2 (D. Colo. 1989). The district court concluded that Plaintiff's 

complaint, filed on June 9, 1987, was untimely under a Colorado 

three-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury 

actions brought against the manufacturer or seller of a product, 

see Colo. Sess. Laws. 1977, ch. 199, § 13-80-127.5(1) at 819, 3 

because Plaintiff's cause of action "probably" accrued in 1981 but 

"certainly no later than April 1984. 11 Miller, 708 F. Supp. at 

309. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand. 

(continued from previous page) 

No. 1-91-00101 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio, filed Jan. 7, 1991); In re The 

Celotex Corp., Consolidated Nos. 90-10016-8Bl and 90-10017-8Bl 

(Bankr. M.D. Fla., filed Oct. 12, 1990). Accordingly, the 

automatic stay provision, 11 u.s.c. § 362, which stays judicial 

action "against the debtor" prohibits us from adjudicating 

Plaintiff's claims against Eagle-Picher and Celotex. Dillion v. 

Fireboard Corp., 919 F.2d 1488, 1498 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1990). We 

hereby order abatement of all proceedings in this appeal as to, 

and only as to, Eagle-Picher and Celotex. We are not enjoined 

from proceeding in this matter as to the remaining 

Defendants-appellees. Id. Plaintiff, Eagle-Picher and Celotex 

shall notify this court forthwith of any termination of the stay 

resulting from the above-described bankruptcies. 

2 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

3 When federal jurisdiction is invoked on the basis of 

diversity of citizenship a federal court is to apply the 

substantive law, including statutes of limitations, which the 

forum's courts would apply to the claims in the suit. Erie R.R. 

v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71-80 (1938); Guaranty Trust Co. v. 

York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945). Here, the parties and the district 

court have assumed that Colorado's substantive law is applicable. 

Our review proceeds on the basis of that assumption. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-1097 Document: 010110096990 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 4 
It is undisputed by the parties that Plaintiff was employed 

as an insulator, at least from 1946 to 1951, and during this time 

he was exposed to asbestos-containing products. Plaintiff knew 

that Defendant's products contained asbestos but, initially, he 

did not know that asbestos was dangerous. Plaintiff became aware 

of the hazards of asbestos from newspaper reports in the late 

1970s. 

The district court, in determining when Plaintiff's cause of 

action accrued and when the statute of limitations began to run, 

relied on Plaintiff's responses to interrogatories and numerous 

medical reports submitted by Defendants. Specifically, the 

district court first focused on Plaintiff's response to a July 

1987 interrogatory which asked when he was first examined by a 

physician for the purpose of determining if he suffered from "any 

type of asbestos-related disease." Plaintiff answered that he was 

"diagnosed" with an unspecified disease by Dr. Bruce Brian in 

1984. The district court coupled the answer to the July 1987 

interrogatory with the only 1984 report in Dr. Brian's file which 

was dated April 10, 1984, and was from Dr. James Brubaker and 

stated the following impression: "pleural thickening with 

associated calcification of posterior aspects of both hemithoraces 

showing no significant change since 10/19/83." 

The district court then looked to three reports in Dr. 

Brian's file from 1981 and 1983. The first of these reports was a 

consultation report from Dr. Stephen A. Holt dated October 13, 

1983, which reflected the impression of "[d]iffuse pleural 

thickening posterior to both hemithoraces which is calcified 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-1097 Document: 010110096990 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 5 
consistent with asbestosis." The second report, dated October 14, 

1981, was from Dr. s. H. Shealy to Dr. Brian and stated that "the 

exam demonstrates pleural thickening and calcification of the 

chest due to asbestosis. The pleural thickening seen on this exam 

is nonspecific, however, a mesothelyoma cannot be excluded." The 

final report relied on by the district court was prepared by Dr. 

Brian and was dated October 2, 1981. This report recounted 

plaintiff's exposure to asbestos from 1945 to 1951 and stated the 

following observations: "pleural fibrosis and pleural 

calcification secondary to asbestos exposure probably." In the 

report Dr. Brian recommended that Plaintiff have a fluoroscopy of 

the pleura with a CT scan of the pleura for future reference and 

routine yearly chest x-rays thereafter with detailed review of the 

films for abnormalities. The report concluded by stating that 

these "recommendations" were discussed with Plaintiff. 

After considering Plaintiff's answer to the July 1987 

interrogatory and the medical data in Dr. Brian's file, the 

district court concluded that: 

In light of his answers to the July 1987 interrogatories 

corroborated by the data in Dr. Brian's file I conclude 

that there is no genuine issue of material fact that 

probably in September 1981, and certainly no later than 

April 1984, plaintiff knew or reasonably should have 

known that he had asbestosis and at least the 

potentially progressive condition of pleural fibrosis 

and pleural calcification caused by exposure to 

defendants' asbestos products. Plaintiff then knew, at 

least generally, of the hazards posed by his exposure to 

asbestos products manufactured by these defendants. 

Although plaintiff may not have become aware of his 

injury and its cause simultaneously, when plaintiff 

learned that his long term exposure to defendants' 

asbestos products caused his diagnosed condition, the 

requisite causal nexus was forged to establish notice of 

his claim. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-1097 Document: 010110096990 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 6 
Miller, 708 F. Supp. at 309. 

In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, 

this court must apply the same standard employed by the trial 

court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Osgood v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co., '848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). Thus, the 

district court's determination can be affirmed only if the 

evidence presented, viewed in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiff, does not reveal any genuine issue of material fact 

concerning the accrual of Plaintiff's cause of action more than 

three years prior to commencement of this suit. 

Plaintiff's theory is that his cause of action did not accrue 

until he discovered, i.e., knew of or should have known of, his 

asbestosis, the injury upon which he premises his claim. 

Plaintiff relies primarily on an affidavit submitted by Dr. 

Lawrence Repsher who examined Plaintiff and Plaintiff's medical 

file after this action was commenced. According to Dr. Repsher, 

asbestosis is not a more fully developed expression of any 

minimally disabling asbestos-related pleural changes such as 

pleural thickening, pleural fibrosis, and pleural calcification. 

Rather, asbestosis, according to Dr. Repsher, is a separate and 

distinct disease process that does not depend on the presence of 

any asbestos-related pleural changes for its development. In the 

opinion of Dr. Repsher, the first time Plaintiff's medical records 

show a diagnostic test that revealed any findings necessary to 

make a diagnosis of asbestosis is 1985, and prior to 1985 the 

diagnostic tests revealed pleural thickening. 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-1097 Document: 010110096990 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 7 
Dr. Repsher's affidavit clearly conflicts with other medical 

evidence in the record. As discussed above, the medical records 

in Dr. Brian's file refer to asbestosis as early as 1981. The 

district court, in granting summary judgment in Defendants' favor, 

did not expressly refer to Dr. Repsher's affidavit, but it did 

acknowledge the conflicting evidence in the record regarding when 

Plaintiff's asbestosis became manifest and dismissed such factual 

dispute as not "material." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)("Only disputes over facts that might 

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will 

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."). According to 

the district court, Plaintiff's asbestos-related pleural changes 

were potentially progressive and, therefore, "although a 

difference of medical opinion may exist whether in fact plaintiff 

had asbestosis by April 1984, and whether pleural fibrosis and 

pleural calcification is a disease, what is material is whether 

plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the general 

nature and extent of his injury." Miller, 708 F. Supp. at 310. 

Our departure from the district court's analysis begins with 

its assumption that Plaintiff's asbestosis can be linked to his 

asbestos-related pleural changes. Because the question of when 

Plaintiff's cause of action accrued is being addressed in the 

context of a summary judgment, it must be assumed, based on Dr. 

Repsher's affidavit, that Plaintiff's asbestosis is not a 

complication of any of his initial asbestos-related pleural 

changes such as pleural thickening and pleural calcification, and 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-1097 Document: 010110096990 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 8 
that Plaintiff's asbestosis became manifest, at the earliest, in 

1985. 4 Given this view of the record, Plaintiff's claim based on 

asbestosis is untimely under the limitation period relied upon by 

Defendants only if Plaintiff's asbestos-related pleural changes 

could trigger the running of a limitation period on his separate, 

distinct, and later-manifested asbestosis. 

At the time this appeal was ready for decision, the Colorado 

Supreme Court had never expressly decided what events can trigger 

the commencement of a limitation period in an asbestos-related 

disease case. Therefore, we elected to certify the following 

question to the Colorado Supreme Court pursuant to Colo. App. R. 

21.1: 

Does discovery of an initial asbestos-related disease 

(in this case asbestos related pleural disease 

manifested by pleural thickening and pleural 

calcification) trigger the running of a statute of 

limitations on a separate, distinct, and later 

manifested disease (here, asbestosis) engendered by the 

same asbestosis exposure. 

The Colorado Supreme Court, in an opinion, the details of which 

need not be set forth here, answered no. Miller v. Armstrong 

World Industries, Inc., __ P.2d __ , No. 90SA423, slip op. at 7 

(Colo. filed Sept. 16, 1991). 

4 Dr. Repsher, in his affidavit, was also of the opinion that 

Plaintiff did not have asbestosis when he commenced this action 

despite the 1985 medical findings in his medical record. However, 

Plaintiff, in an affidavit filed in opposition to Defendants' 

motion for summary judgment and in deposition testimony, asserted 

that he was diagnosed in April 1987 with asbestosis by another 

doctor, Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum. Viewing Dr. Repsher's affidavit 

and Dr. Teitelbaum's diagnosis in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiff, as required when reviewing a summary judgment, we must 

assume that Plaintiff has asbestosis and his asbestosis became 

manifest, at the earliest, in 1985. 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-1097 Document: 010110096990 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 9 
Based on the Colorado Supreme Court's opinion we conclude 

that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's action as 

time barred. Our determination does not preclude a judgment 

against Plaintiff on the basis of a statute of limitations defense 

after further development of the issue at trial or otherwise. We 

speak only based on the assumption that asbestosis is separate and 

distinct from, and not a complication of, asbestos-related pleural 

disease and that Plaintiff's asbestosis became manifest and 

discoverable at the earliest in 1985. We recognize that both the 

relationship between asbestos-related pleural disease and 

asbestosis and when Plaintiff's asbestosis became manifest are 

factual questions. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED 

for further proceedings. 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-1097 Document: 010110096990 Date Filed: 11/26/1991 Page: 10