Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02488/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02488-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alfredo Camargo,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-13-2488-PHX-NVW (JFM)

Amended1 Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Tucson, 

Arizona, filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 on April 2, 2014 (Doc. 6). On August 1, 2014 Respondents filed their Answer 

(Doc. 14). Petitioner filed a Reply on August 15, 2014 (Doc. 15).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Presentence Investigation reflected the following summary from police 

reports:

On July 11, 2007, the defendant, armed with a handgun, 

kidnapped [YM] from inside the garage of her residence. The 

 

1 Only as to basis for denying a certificate of appealability in section IV.

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defendant forced her inside an awaiting vehicle that was being 

driven by another suspect. The suspects drove in [a] North bound 

direction and subsequently stopped in the parking lot of a business 

complex. When they exited the vehicle, [YM] called 9-1-1. [YM] 

exited the vehicle when she observed a police officer drive by, and 

she reported what had happened to her. Police chased the suspects, 

but only apprehended the defendant with the assistance of a K·9 

police dog. The handgun used in the kidnapping was recovered near 

by, which officers observed the defendant throw as he fled on foot. 

A search of the suspect's vehicle revealed a rifle, a scarf, gloves, 

tape, and ammunition.

When interviewed, [YM] stated she, her husband [AM}, and 

her three nieces had just arrived to their home, and they were in the 

process of closing the garage when the suspect opened the other 

garage door and stated, "Where is Marquis?" When she stated she 

did not know a Marquis, the suspected grabbed her by the hand and 

forced her into a vehicle that was parked in front of her residence. 

While they were driving, the defendant gave her a cell phone, and 

the person on the other end asked where Marquis was, and if she 

was his sister. She indicated she did not know who Marquis was and 

that she was not related to him. The defendant took the phone back 

and told the driver to stop in the parking lot where both suspects 

exited from the vehicle. [YM] stated she feared for her life and 

believed she might never see her family again.

(Exhibit B, Present. Invest. At 1.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 14, are referenced 

herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On July 18, 2007, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court on 

charges of burglary, aggravated assault (two counts, one for YM and one for YM’s 

husband, AM), kidnapping, and weapons misconduct. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) 

Counsel was appointed, and the case proceeded through a series of failed 

settlement conferences and plea negotiations, with Petitioner seeking to have new 

counsel appointed because of perceptions that trial counsel was attempting to bully him 

into taking a plea offer, and failing to adequately investigate the case and prepare for 

trial. Counsel consistently responded that the promising avenues of investigation had 

been pursued and that he had indeed advised his client to accept the favorable plea 

offers. The final plea offer included a prison sentence cap of 15 years, but was rejected 

(See Exhibit C, Mot. Dismiss Counsel; Exhibit D, R.T. 11/13/07; Exhibit CC, R.T. 

2/11/08; Exhibit E, Mot. Dismiss Counsel; and Exhibit F, R.T. 3/20/08.)

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Change of Plea - On April 8, 2008, Petitioner appeared for trial, but asked to 

change his plea to a plea of guilty to the charges. (Exhibit I, R.T. 4/8/08 at 1-8.) The 

trial court reviewed the charges and the potential sentences, as well as allegations of 

prior convictions, and commission while on probation. Petitioner admitted the prior 

convictions and that he was on probation. (Id. at 8-10.) Counsel provided a factual 

basis, with which Petitioner agreed. (Id.at 10-16.) The plea was accepted and Petitioner 

was found guilty of the offenses and the matter was set for sentencing. (Id. at 16-19.)

Sentencing – On May 30, 2008, Petitioner appeared for sentencing, which was 

continued to and completed on July 22, 2008. (Exhibit DD, R.T. 5/30/08; Exhibit J, R.T. 

7/22/08.) Petitioner was sentenced to 25 years in prison, followed by community 

supervision. (Id. at 25; Exhibit H, Amend. Order Conf.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Amend. Petition, Doc. 6 at 2.)

Moreover, as a pleading Arizona defendant, Petitioner had no right to file a direct 

appeal. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e); and Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258, 889 

P.2d 614, 616 (1995).

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

First PCR Proceeding - On August 16, 2008, Petitioner filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief (Exhibit K). Counsel was appointed who ultimately filed a Notice of 

Completion of Review (Exhibit L), evidencing an inability to find an issue for review.

On August 11, 2009, Petitioner filed his PCR Petition (Exhibit M), arguing that 

his rights to counsel had been denied when his request for new counsel was denied and 

because he was required to proceed with counsel under a breakdown in communication, 

and his right to counsel on appeal was denied when PCR counsel failed to find an issue 

for review. The state responded (Exhibit N) that any challenge to Petitioner’s right to 

pre-conviction counsel was waived by Petitioner’s guilty plea, and that Petitioner had no 

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right to counsel in his PCR Proceeding. The PCR Court summarily dismissed the 

Petition “[f]or the reasons stated in the Response to the Petition.” (Exhibit P, Order 

7/7/10.) 

On July 26, 2010, Petitioner filed, through counsel, a motion for a 30 day

extension of time to seek reconsideration or review. (Exhibit Q, Motion.) On the same 

date, Petitioner filed a pro per Motion to Extend, seeking an extension through 

September 30, 2010 (Exhibit S). On July 28, 2010, the PCR court summarily granted 

“defense counsel’s Request for Extension of Time.” (Exhibit R, Order 7/28/10, 

emphasis added.)

On August 9, 2010, Petitioner submitted a petition for review to the Arizona 

Supreme Court. That filing was rejected on August 10, 2010 as properly submitted only 

to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Exhibit EE, at Notice 8/10/10.) 

On August 30, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (Exhibit EE.) (See Exhibit T, Order 9/3/10 at 1.) The petition was dated 

August 24, 2010. (Exhibit EE, Petition at 3.) On September 3, 2010 the Arizona Court 

of Appeals denied the Petition as untimely (Exhibit T).

Second PCR Proceeding – On September 30, 2010, Petitioner filed his second 

Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit U). On October 25, 2010, the PCR court 

summarily dismissed the proceeding as untimely. (Exhibit V, Order 10/25/10.) 

On January 18, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona 

Court of Appeals (Exhibit W). On December 4, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarily denied review. (Exhibit Z, Order 12/4/12.) 

On January 14, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona 

Supreme Court (Exhibit AA). On March 27, 2013, the Arizona Supreme Court 

summarily denied review. (Exhibit BB, Order 3/27/13.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current proceeding by filing his original 

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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on December 6, 2013 

(Doc. 1). On March 12, 2014, the Court dismissed that Petition with leave to amend as 

improperly challenging the denial of his second PCR petition, rather than his conviction.

On April 2, 2014, Petitioner filed his First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 6). Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following 

three grounds for relief:

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the “constructive 

denial of the right to counsel.” Petitioner asserts that the trial court 

constructively denied him the right to counsel when it denied his

motion for change of counsel, in which Petitioner explained that he 

had an irreconcilable conflict with his defense counsel.

In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because Petitioner was 

denied effective assistance of post-conviction relief counsel. 

Specifically, Petitioner alleges that his post-conviction relief 

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the trial court’s 

constructive denial of Petitioner’s right to counsel in a Rule 32 

Petition.

In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the actions of 

counsel as described in Grounds One and Two.

(Order 5/5/14, Doc. 7 at 2.) Service and a response was ordered on May 5, 2014. (Id.)

Response - On August 1, 2014, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 14). Respondents argue the Petition is untimely, Ground 1 is procedurally 

defaulted, and all the claims are without merit. 

Reply - On August 15, 2014, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 15). Petitioner argues 

that he did not waive any claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his second 

PCR notice, that his petition for review in his first PCR proceeding was timely filed, his 

second PCR proceeding was filed within 30 days of the dismissal of his petition for 

review in his first proceeding and only raised issues properly asserted in a second PCR 

petition, and that the dismissals in both proceedings were erroneous. He argues this 

federal habeas Court is, for purposes of the habeas statute of limitations, free to ignore 

erroneous state court rulings, citing Upshaw v. Singletary, 70 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 1995) 

and Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707 (3rd Cir. 2008). He asserts that to the extent there 

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is a dispute on these issues, remand is appropriate. He argues that such errors not only 

render his federal filing timely, but justifies equitable tolling. Petitioner further argues 

the merits of his claims.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

Conviction Final - The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions 

generally begins to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A).2 

For an Arizona noncapital pleading defendant, the conviction becomes “final” at 

the conclusion of the first “of-right” post-conviction proceeding under Rule 32. 

“Arizona's Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct 

review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. Schriro, 481 

F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). “To bring an of-right proceeding under Rule 32, a pleaconvicted defendant must provide to the Arizona Superior Court, within 90 days of 

 

2

Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly 

recognized constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Except as discussed hereinafter, Petitioner proffers no 

argument that any of these apply.

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conviction and sentencing in that court, notice of his or her intent to file a Petition for 

Post-Conviction Review.” Id. at 715 (citing Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(a)). 

Here, Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding was commenced within 90 days of his 

conviction and sentencing, and thus constituted direct appeal for purposes of § 2244.

On July 28, 2010, the PCR court summarily granted “defense counsel’s Request 

for Extension of Time” to file a petition for review. (Exhibit R, Order 7/28/10.) That 

motion sought a 30 day extension of time to seek reconsideration or review. (Exhibit Q, 

Motion.) Construing the order in Petitioner’s favor, Petitioner had through Friday, 

August 27, 2010 to file his petition for review. 

Although Petitioner promptly submitted a petition for review to the Arizona 

Supreme Court, that filing was rejected on August 10, 2010 as properly submitted only 

to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Exhibit EE, at Notice 8/10/10.) Accordingly, this 

failed filing did not continue his direct review.

Petitioner filed his petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals on 

August 30, 2010 (Exhibit EE). (See Exhibit T, Order 9/3/10 at 1.) However, that petition 

was dismissed as untimely (Exhibit T). An untimely attempt at direct review does not 

alter the finality of the conviction. Cf. Jimez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 121 (2009) 

(finality of conviction extended “where a state court grants a criminal defendant the right 

to file an out-of-time direct appeal”). 

It is true that this Petition for Review was dated August 24, 2010. (Exhibit EE, 

Petition at 3.) In their Answer, Respondents “assume” that Petitioner’s filings were 

“filed” on the date they were signed. (Answer, Doc. 14 at 9, n. 3.) Petitioner argues that 

this “presumption” renders his Petition for Review timely. (Reply, Doc. 15 at 9.) To the 

contrary, the mailbox rule (assuming it applies to the state proceeding) treats documents 

as “filed” when they are placed in the prison mailbox. See e.g. Porter v. Ollison, 620 

F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010) (“petition is considered to be filed on the date a prisoner 

hands the petition to prison officials for mailing.”). Petitioner proffers nothing to show 

that he handed his petition to prison officials on any date sooner than August 30, 2010. 

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The filing itself does not reflect such delivery.

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the Petition for Review in the first PCR 

was filed August 30, 2010, and was untimely, and thus Petitioner’s time for review 

expired on the deadline set by the PCR court, August 27, 2010. Thus, Petitioner’s 

conviction became final by conclusion of “direct review” on August 27, 2010. 

Conclusion re Commencement and Timeliness - Therefore, Petitioner’s one 

year began running no later than Saturday, August 28, 2010, and without any tolling 

expired on Monday, August 29, 2011. 

Plaintiff’s amended habeas petition (Doc. 6) was not filed until April 2, 2014, 

claims in an amended petition “relate back to the date of the original pleading when the 

claim[s] asserted in the amended [petition] arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original [petition].” Mayle v. Felix, 

545 U.S. 644, 656 (2005) (internal quotation marksomitted); accord Ha Van Nguyen v. 

Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1297 (9th Cir. 2013). Respondents concede that Petitioner’s First 

Amended Petition was on the same operative facts as his original Petition, and thus the 

amendment relates back to the filing of his original Petition. (Answer, Doc. 14 at 16, n. 

8.) Petitioner’s original Petition filed December 6, 2013 (Doc. 1). Even related back to 

that date, Petitioner’s habeas petition was over two years delinquent.

3

3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This provision only applies to 

state proceedings, not to federal proceedings. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

Petitioner’s limitations period commenced running no later than August 28, 2010. 

 

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Petitioner’s original habeas Petition is dated December 3, 2013. (Orig. Petition, Doc. 1 

at 11.) Even if this Court were to find that the Petition should be deemed filed as of that 

date rather than December 6, 2013, the difference of three days would not be sufficient 

to make Petitioner’s Petition timely.

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Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding was commenced on September 30, 2010, just 33 

days after his limitations period began running. However, that petition was dismissed as 

untimely. (Exhibit V, Order 10/25/10.) Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any 

statutory tolling for the pendency of his second PCR proceeding. 

Petitioner argues that dismissal was in error. 

Authority to Reject State Court Determination of Timeliness - As argued by 

Respondents, whether a state petition is untimely is a question of state law. “What we 

intimated in [Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002)] we now hold: ‘When a 

postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for 

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005). In Zepeda 

v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013 (2009), the Ninth Circuit held that the “adequacy” analysis 

applied to state procedural bars in the procedural default realm has no application in the 

context of § 2244(d)(2), and thus it was irrelevant whether a state time limitation was 

firmly established and regularly followed. See also White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 882 (9th

Cir. 2010). 

But, the undersigned is not convinced that the language of Pace or the holding of 

Zepeda precludes the federal habeas court from analyzing whether a state court’s 

rejection of a PCR petition as untimely was correct under state law in the context of 

applying statutory tolling. By its own terms, Pace only precludes tolling for a state 

petition which “is untimely under state law,” 544 U.S. at 414, not for state petitions 

which have merely been treated as untimely. Cf. Evans v. Chavis , 546 U.S. 189 (2006) 

(requiring habeas court to evaluate whether a summary decision was on timeliness 

grounds by deciding for itself whether the state petition was timely). Similarly, the 

undersigned is not convinced that importation of an “adequacy” standard is necessary to 

conclude that for purposes of the application of § 2244(d)(2) the state court simply 

wrongly held, under state law, that a state petition was untimely. 

The undersigned notes that Petitioner references Upshaw v. Singletary, 70 F.3d 

576 (1995) as holding that tolling not prevented by improper application of state bar. 

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Reply, Doc. 15 at 11. Upshaw, however, dealt not with tolling, but failure to properly 

exhaust state remedies because of a procedural default.

Petitioner also relies upon Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707 (3rd Cir. 2008). 

Holloway similarly dealt with issues of exhaustion, and simply held that a claim was not 

unexhausted where the state court had failed to apply a state procedural bar that might 

have barred consideration of the federal claim. Id. at 713-714.

Nonetheless, for the following reasons the undersigned concludes that state law 

supported the rejection of Petitioner’s second PCR petition as untimely. Therefore, the 

authority of the habeas court to reject a wrong timeliness determination need not be 

reached.

Dismissal as Untimely was Proper - Petitioner argues that the PCR court 

misread his petition as asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel, when he actually 

asserted a claim of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel, and thus improperly dismissed 

his petition as untimely. (Reply, Doc. 15 at 10.) Indeed, the PCR court seems to have 

done so, describing the second proceeding as “claiming ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel.” (Exhibit V, Order 10/25/10 at 1.) Conversely, Petitioner’s second Notice of 

Post Conviction Relief plainly referenced “a subsequent Rule 32 to challenge 

ineffectiveness in the first Rule 32 by a pleading defendant.” (Exhibit U, 2nd PCR Not.) 

In support of that assertion, Petitioner cited “State v. Pruett, 912 P.2d 1357 (1995).” (Id.)

In Pruett, Arizona held that in the context of a pleading defendant, “a second 

notice of post-conviction relief for a claim of ineffectiveness of previous Rule 32 counsel 

is timely if filed within 30 days of the order and mandate affirming the trial court's denial 

of the petitioner's first petition for post-conviction relief.” State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 

131, 912 P.2d 1357, 1360 (Ct. App. 1995). Thus, Petitioner was entitled to bring a claim 

of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel in a second PCR proceeding. Conversely, a 

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel would have been untimely. Confusing the 

two could have resulted in the erroneous dismissal as untimely of a prompt 2nd PCR 

petition asserting ineffectiveness of PCR counsel.

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Indeed, Respondents half-heartedly recognize such error in addressing anticipated 

claims for equitable tolling. (Answer, Doc. 14 at 17.) 

Here, however, Petitioner’s second PCR petition was untimely even under the 

holding of Pruett because it was filed more than 35 days (providing for service by mail 

under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3) after the culmination of his first PCR proceeding. The 

second PCR notice (Exhibit U) was filed no earlier than September 24, 2010, while his 

first PCR petition culminated some 79 days earlier, on July 7, 2010, when the PCR court 

dismissed the petition. (See Exhibit P, Order 7/7/10.) 

Arguably, had Petitioner timely sought review of the dismissal of his first PCR 

petition, the time for filing his second PCR proceeding would have been extended until 

culmination of those review proceedings. Here, however Petitioner did not timely seek 

review, and thus his first PCR proceedings ended with the PCR court’s order. 

It is true that the language of Pruett speaks in terms of an “order and mandate 

affirming the trial court's denial.” 185 Ariz. at 131, 912 P.2d at 1360. However, 

Pruett’s formulation of the deadline was founded on the existence in that case of a 

petition for review of the denial of the first PCR proceeding. Here, because Petitioner’s 

petition for review in his first PCR proceeding was deemed untimely, there was no order 

and mandate affirming the trial court’s order. 

Pruett’s analysis was based upon the application of the pre-2000 amendments 

version of Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4(a). Under that rule, a second PCR 

proceeding was due “within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the 

direct appeal.” Under the 2000 Amendments to the rule, however, the second petition is 

due “within thirty days after the issuance of the final order or mandate by the appellate 

court in the petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction relief proceeding.” Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.4(a). Cf. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.23(a) (providing for issuance of mandates 

only by Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court.) Where no review is 

sought in the first PCR proceeding, the “final order” is that by the PCR court. While the 

rule speaks in terms of action “by the appellate court,” that limitation can rationally be 

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read to apply only to the mandate on review, such mandates only being issued by the 

appellate courts. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.23(a) (providing for issuance of mandates 

only by Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court). This is consistent with 

the Comments to the 2000 Amendments to Rule 32.4 adopted in response to Pruett and 

related cases, indicating the “rule is amended to allow the pleading defendant thirty days 

within which to file a second notice if the defendant seeks to challenge counsel's 

effectiveness in the Rule 32 of-right proceeding.” Where no review is sought, that thirty 

days could only be calculated to run from the PCR court’s order. See e.g. State v. 

Valenzuela, 2014 WL 1569499, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2014) (unpublished 

decision calculating Rule 32.4(a) deadline from unreviewed PCR court order); 

Thus, having not properly sought further review of his first PCR proceeding, 

Petitioner’s second PCR notice was due within 35 days (including the five days for 

mailing under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3(a)) after the trial court’s ruling on July 7, 2010. 

Thus, Petitioner had through Wednesday, August 11, 2010 to commence his second PCR 

proceeding. Even if treated as filed as of its signature date of September 24, 2010, 

Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding was too late to timely assert a claim of ineffective 

assistance of PCR counsel in his first PCR proceeding.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for the pendency of his 

second PCR proceeding.

4. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

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petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations 

on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling 

is appropriate.”).

Petitioner argues in his Reply that he is untrained in the law, is reliant upon other 

inmates, had no access to case law or other assistance, and speaks no English. (Reply, 

Doc. 15 at 2.) He further argues that the misapplication of the state time limit on PCR 

petitions justifies equitable tolling. (Id. at 10-13.) 

Pro Se Status - “It is clear that pro se status, on its own, is not enough to warrant 

equitable tolling.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). A prisoner's 

“proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and exceptional’ circumstance because it is typical of 

those bringing a § 2254 claim.” Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000). 

See also Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“a pro se petitioner's 

lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting 

equitable tolling”).

Ineffective Assistance – To the extent that Petitioner might suggest that his 

situation was altered because of PCR counsel’s failure to raise his claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel in his first PCR proceeding, such ineffectiveness would not 

constitute grounds for equitable tolling.

Although an attorney's behavior can establish the extraordinary circumstances 

required for equitable tolling, mere negligence or professional malpractice is insufficient. 

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Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.2001). For example, a “garden variety 

claim of excusable neglect,’ such as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss 

a filing deadline does not warrant equitable tolling.’ ” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 

651-652 (2010). Rather, the attorney’s misconduct must rise to the level of extraordinary 

circumstances. Id. See e.g. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(allowing equitable tolling where petitioner's counsel was hired almost a year in advance, 

failed to do anything to prepare the petition or to respond to numerous letters and phone 

calls, and withheld petitioner's file for over two months after the limitations period 

expired); Holland, supra (discussing potential for finding of extraordinary circumstances 

where counsel misinformed petitioner about filing deadline, failed to communicate 

conclusion of state appeals, and failed to communicate with petitioner at all over a period 

of years, all despite repeated requests by petitioner). 

Here, Petitioner suggests no such level of abandonment, but simply complains 

that PCR counsel failed to pursue claims Petitioner believed had merit but which counsel 

did not. Even assuming Petitioner’s proposed claims had merit, counsel’s refusal to 

bring them based upon a determination that they were without merit was at best routine 

malpractice. 

The Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012) is 

inapplicable to this equitable tolling determination. In Martinez, the Court held that 

ineffective assistance of PCR counsel in failing to bring a claim of ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel could, in some circumstances, constitute cause to excuse a procedural 

default and failure to properly exhaust such a claim. Martinez was founded upon the 

recognition that in many states a PCR proceeding was the first opportunity to assert a 

claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel, and thus despite the existence of a constitutional 

right to PCR counsel the ineffectiveness of such counsel could justify a failure to exhaust 

state remedies on such a claim. 

Here, Petitioner is not being faulted for failing to exhaust his state remedies, but 

for filing too late. The issue is not whether Petitioner properly exhausted his state 

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remedies, but whether extraordinary circumstances precluded him from filing a timely 

federal habeas petition. A petitioner may be dependent upon PCR counsel to exhaust his 

state remedies on such a claim, but is not dependent upon PCR counsel for filing a 

timely federal petition. 

And, while Petitioner was required to exhaust his state remedies, the failing of 

PCR counsel did not preclude a timely habeas filing. Indeed, in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 

544 U.S. 408 (2005), the Supreme Court analyzed the potential catch-22 between the 

habeas limitations period and the exhaustion requirement, where a state petitioner has 

filed a state post-conviction relief proceeding which may ultimately be deemed untimely, 

thus not properly filed, and resulting in the expiration of his habeas limitations period. 

“A prisoner seeking state postconviction relief might avoid this predicament, however, 

by filing a ‘protective’ petition in federal court and asking the federal court to stay and 

abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are exhausted.” Id. at 416. 

Petitioner proffers no reason why this avenue was not available to him once PCR counsel 

refused to raise his claims.

Moreover, Petitioner did (at least to some extent) assert his claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel in his pro per PCR petition (Exhibit M). 

Further, any ineffectiveness of PCR counsel would not justify equitable tolling 

because, under the assumptions and analysis applied herein, Petitioner’s statute of 

limitations did not begin to run until after the completion of his first PCR proceeding. 

Thus, any ineffectiveness of PCR counsel would not have been the cause of Petitioner’s 

failure to timely file within the ensuing one year.

Finally, to the extent that Petitioner might rely upon Martinez as justification for 

his delaying to pursue his second PCR proceeding to assert PCR counsel’s 

ineffectiveness, Martinez would be inapposite. Martinez explicitly declined to find that 

the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel constituted an independent constitutional violation. 

132 S.Ct. at 1315 (“This is not the case, however, to resolve whether that exception 

exists as a constitutional matter.”). Thus, Martinez provided no authority for asserting 

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such a claim other than as cause to excuse a procedural default. Moreover, such right 

would not justify Petitioner’s failure to pursue those proceedings on a timely basis, or to 

promptly pursue his federal petition upon discovering that he had been untimely.

Reliance on Inmates - Petitioner’s reliance upon other inmates suggests not that 

he was unable to file on a timely basis, but that with their assistance, he could have done 

so. Petitioner does not, for example, suggest that he was dependent upon such assistance 

but was denied it at a time that rendered a timely federal filing impossible. To the 

contrary, he continued to file in the state courts through the running of his habeas 

limitations period. 

Limited Legal Resources - This circuit has found that a lack of access to legal 

resources may be an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. See e.g. 

Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (finding that 

unavailability of a copy of the AEDPA in a prison law library could be grounds for 

equitable tolling). However, in cases where courts have found that an extraordinary 

circumstance might exist, the petitioner always pointed to specific materials to which he 

did not have access. See e.g. Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 974 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding 

that lack of access to AEDPA materials and Oregon law books may be an extraordinary 

circumstance). Here, Petitioner simply offers the conclusory complaint that he had no 

(or limited) access to case law, but does not suggest how that kept him from filing a 

timely habeas petition. Further, the state filings show that Petitioner had long possessed 

the legal resources necessary to assert the claims he raises in this habeas proceeding.

Language - “Lack of English proficiency can constitute an extraordinary 

circumstance for equitable tolling purposes, but only when the petitioner is unable to 

procure legal materials in his own language or to obtain translation assistance.” Yow 

Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir.) cert. denied sub nom. Yow Ming Yeh 

v. Biter, 135 S. Ct. 486 (2014). The Ninth Circuit has held that “a non-English-speaking 

petitioner seeking equitable tolling must, at a minimum, demonstrate that during the 

running of the AEDPA time limitation, he was unable, despite diligent efforts, to procure 

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either legal materials in his own language or translation assistance from an inmate, 

library personnel, or other source.” Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 

2006) (emphasis added). Indeed, without the specific showing mandated in Mendoza, a 

large percentage of the prison population in Arizona would be entitled to automatic 

equitable tolling. Here, Petitioner makes no suggestion that he was unable to obtain 

translation assistance, whatever his language limitations may be. Moreover, the record 

of Petitioner’s post-conviction filings suggests that he has regularly had substantial 

assistance in his filings.

Error in Dismissing Petition for Review – Petitioner argues that he is entitled to 

equitable tolling because his Petition for Review in his first PCR proceeding was 

erroneously dismissed as untimely. As discussed hereinabove, the undersigned has 

concluded that the dismissal was not in error.

Assuming arguendo that the dismissal was erroneous, Petitioner fails to show 

how this error resulted in his untimely habeas petition. Petitioner was aware of the 

dismissal soon enough after the dismissal to file his 2nd PCR proceeding. Instead of 

promptly pursuing his federal petition, Petitioner pressed on with his second PCR 

proceeding, and continued to do so even after that proceeding was dismissed as 

untimely.

Even if extraordinary circumstances prevent a petitioner from filing for a time, 

equitable tolling will not apply if he does not continue to diligently pursue filing 

afterwards. “If the person seeking equitable tolling has not exercised reasonable 

diligence in attempting to file after the extraordinary circumstances began, the link of 

causation between the extraordinary circumstances and the failure to file is broken, and 

the extraordinary circumstances therefore did not prevent timely filing.” Valverde v. 

Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2nd Cir. 2000). 

Here, Petitioner was not duped into wasting away his one year limitations period 

by a delayed and erroneous ruling. Rather, that ruling was issued less than a month after 

Petitioner filed his Petition for review, and only days after his limitations period began to 

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run. Further, Petitioner has known since September, 2010 of such error and yet delayed 

bringing his federal habeas petition for over three years.

Error in Dismissal of 2nd PCR - Finally, for the reasons discussed hereinabove 

in connection with statutory tolling, Petitioner fails to show that his second PCR 

proceeding was timely. Arguably, the PCR court did misapprehend Petitioner’s claim as 

asserting solely a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, rather than a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel in his first PCR proceeding, and misapplied the normal 

limitations period which would have functionally required such claims have been 

brought in his first PCR proceeding.

However, even if such a misapplication had occurred, Petitioner fails to show why 

he could not have timely filed his federal petition upon learning of such error. As with 

the purportedly erroneous dismissal of his Petition for Review in his first PCR 

proceeding, Petitioner’s failure to promptly pursue his federal habeas petition after 

learning of the erroneous ruling showed a lack of diligence, and breaks the causation 

between the erroneous ruling and the untimeliness of the instant petition. In this 

instance, Petitioner had known of the dismissal as untimely of his second PCR 

proceeding since October, 2010, and yet he did not commence his federal habeas until 

over three years later, in December 2013.

It is true that Petitioner was obligated to exhaust his state remedies on his habeas 

claims. But he could have filed his federal habeas petition and sought to stay it while he 

continued to challenge the dismissal of his second PCR proceeding in the state courts to 

complete the exhaustion of his state remedies. Indeed, in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 

408 (2005), the Supreme Court analyzed the potential catch-22 between the habeas 

limitations period and the exhaustion requirement, where a state petitioner has filed a 

state post-conviction relief proceeding which may ultimately be deemed untimely, thus 

not properly filed, and resulting in the expiration of his habeas limitations period. “A 

prisoner seeking state postconviction relief might avoid this predicament, however, by 

filing a ‘protective’ petition in federal court and asking the federal court to stay and abey 

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the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are exhausted.” Id. at 416. 

Petitioner proffers no reason why this avenue was not available to him.

Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to proffer a basis for equitable tolling.

5. Actual Innocence

To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the habeas statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude “a court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 

S.Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013). To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a 

petitioner “’must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’” Id. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). This exception, referred to as the “Schlup gateway,” applies 

“only when a petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was 

free of nonharmless constitutional error.’ ” Id. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

316). 

Petitioner makes no such claim of actual innocence in this proceeding. To the 

extent that Petitioner has previously argued his innocence, he makes no offering in this 

proceeding of new evidence to support that claim.

6. Summary re Statute of Limitations

Proceeding under the assumption that his petition for review in his first PCR 

proceeding was timely and delayed the finality of his judgment, and taking into account 

the available statutory tolling (albeit there was none), Petitioner’s one year habeas 

limitations period commenced running no later than October 9, 2010, and expired no 

later than October 11, 2011, making even his original Petition filed December 6, 2013 

(Doc. 1) over two years delinquent and his First Amended Petition filed April 2, 2014 

(Doc. 6) over two and one half years delinquent. Petitioner has shown no basis for 

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equitable tolling or actual innocence to avoid the effects of his delay. Consequently, the 

Petition must be dismissed with prejudice.

B. OTHER DEFENSES

Respondents also assert defenses of procedural default, and lack of merit. 

(Answer, Doc. 14 at 20, et seq.) Because the undersigned finds the Petition plainly 

barred by the habeas limitations period, these other defenses are not reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

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debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the 

reasoning set forth herein, reasonable jurists would not find it debatable whether the 

district court was correct in its procedural ruling.

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's First Amended 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed April 2, 2014 (Doc. 6) be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

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party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: January 14, 2015

13-2488r RR 14 12 11 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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