Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03698/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03698-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUANG-KUI DONG,

Plaintiff,

 v.

APPLIED FUSION INC., JEFF MUSGROVE,

PATRICK DAVIS, MOHAMMED ANSARI,

GEORGE SILVA, GREGORY GEDDIS, CITY

OF SAN LEANDRO, OFFICER RICK LOPEZ

and DOES 1 through 5, inclusive, 

Defendants.

 /

No. C 03-03698 SI

ORDER RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOTIONS AND MOTION FOR

SANCTIONS

On June 10, 2005, the Court heard argument on cross-motions forsummary judgment and on a motion

forsanctions bydefendantsCityofSanLeandro and Officer Lopez. Having carefully considered the arguments

of counsel and the papers submitted, the Court hereby GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendants

Applied Fusion, Inc. and Jeff Musgrove;GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART summary judgment in

favor of Mohammed Ansari and Gregory Geddis;GRANTS summary judgment in favor of the City of San

Leandro and Officer Lopez; DENIES plaintiff’s motion for partialsummaryjudgment; and DENIES the motion

for sanctions.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Guang-Kui Dong was born in Signapore and raised in China. He immigrated to the United

States in 1986, and has been employed as a machinistsince then. He was hired by defendant Applied Fusion,

Inc. in April, 2000. On October 4, 2002, plaintiff spoke with his manager, George Silva, about Frank

Levering. Apparently, plaintiff believed that Levering, a co-worker, was having trouble operating the machinery

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despite the fact that he had been employed at Applied Fusion for seven years. Based on this belief, plaintiff

said: “I [Dong] told George that in seven years [Levering] still needed someone to teach him. If I had seven

years and I still needed someone to teach me I would rather die.” Boltuch Decl., Ex. D at 174-175.

On October 7, 2002, Mohammed Ansari and Gregory Geddis, two ofplaintiff’sco-workers, informed

Silva that plaintiff had told themboth separately that he was going to shoot other employees at Applied Fusion,

and then himself. Ansari and Geddis reported this information to Silva that same day. In response, Silva

notified Jeff Musgrove, the President of Applied Fusion, that plaintiff made threats to Ansari and Geddis and

that plaintiff made a suicide reference to Silva on October 4.

Afterreceivingthisinformation, Musgrove spoke with Ansari, Geddis and plaintiff. After speaking with

the three employees, Musgrove contacted the San Leandro Police Department to report plaintiff’s alleged

threats. Officer Rick Lopez of the San Leandro Police Department responded to the call. After arriving at

Applied Fusion, Officer Lopez spoke with Musgrove, Ansari and Geddis. Ansari and Geddis again told

Officer Lopez that plaintiffthreatened to shootothers and himself. Officer Lopez then spoke with plaintiff, who

denied making threats to Geddis and Ansari. 

Officer Lopez determined that plaintiffshould be detained and evaluated bymedicalpersonnelpursuant

to California Welfare and Institutions Code § 5150. In order to detain plaintiff, Officer Lopez requested an

ambulance and completed an Application for Emergency Psychiatric Detention Form. See Lopez Decl., Ex,

A. Officer Lopez explained in the form that “due to the subject’s open hostilities and threats to kill employees

and himself, although the subject denies making the threats it is safer for all parties to have subject evaluated.”

Id. 

Plaintiffwastakento Alameda County MedicalCenter, where he was evaluated. The next day, he was

transferred to Fremont Psychiatric Hospital, where he remained until October 10, 2002. On October 10,

2002, Applied Fusion terminated plaintiff from his employment. The termination was effective October 7,

2002, according to the notice of termination. Parker Decl., Ex. D. The stated reason for termination was

“unlawful behavior.”

As a result of his termination and detention, plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court against Applied

Fusion, Inc., various employees of Applied Fusion, the City of San Leandro and Officer Lopez asserting

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1The parties bring various evidentiary objections. The Court will address these objections to the extent

it relies on evidence under objection in its Order. Plaintiff objects to the attachments to the Addams

Declaration because the deposition transcripts do not contain a certification page. Defendants provided the

certification pages in the Supplemental Addams Declaration; therefore, the Court OVERRULES plaintiff’s

objection.

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numerous causes of action, including:1) racialdiscrimination; 2) breach of contract of continued employment;

3) termination in violationofpublic policy; 4) retaliationin violation of Title VII; 5) violation of the LantermanPetris-Short Act; 6) various state tort claims; 7) illegalseizure and arrest in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and

8) municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Previously, the Court granted the parties’ stipulationto dismissthe First and Second Causes ofAction

for racial discrimination and breach of contract of continued employment. [Docket # 51] The Court also

dismissed defendants Patrick Davis and George Silva based on the parties’ stipulation. [Docket # 52] Now

before the Court are motions for summary judgment brought by 1) plaintiff; 2) the City of San Leandro and

Officer Lopez; and 3) Applied Fusion, Inc. and the employee defendants. The City of San Leandro has also

brought a motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and California Code of Civil

Procedure § 1038.1 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The

moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party, however, has no burden to

negate or disprove matters on which the non-moving party will have the burden of proof at trial. The

moving party need only point out to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. See id. at 325.

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To carry this burden, the non-moving

party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 

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Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “The mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to

the non-moving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Id. at 255. “Credibility

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury

functions, not those of a judge [when she] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s concessions

In plaintiff’s various pleadings for the current motions for summary judgment, plaintiff concedes that

dismissal is proper for several causes of action asserted against defendants. Plaintiff states that it “never

intended to allege any state claims against defendant City ofSan Leandro or defendant Officer Ricky Lopez.”

Pl.’s Opp’n to City’s Mot. at 1. Plaintiff states that the Seventh Cause of Action, which asserts a claim against

all defendants, is “an obvious typographical error.” Based on plaintiff’s representation, the Court GRANTS

summary judgment in favor of defendants City ofSan Leandro and Officer Lopez for plaintiff’s seventh cause

of action.

Plaintiff also states in its opposition to Applied Fusion’s motion for summary judgment that he wants

to dismiss his negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against Applied Fusion.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Applied Fusion’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the Seventh

and Twelfth Causes of Action.

II. Applied Fusion, Inc., Jeff Musgrove, Mohammed Ansari and Gregory Geddis

Defendants Jeff Musgrove,MohammedAnsari, and Gregory Geddis (the “employee defendants”) and

Applied Fusion, Inc. assert that they are entitled to summary judgment for all claims asserted against them by

plaintiff. Plaintiff, in his opposition, addresses some of the causes of action discussed by defendants. The

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Court will address each in turn.

A. Termination in violation of public policy

Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action asserts that his termination was in violation of public policy because

it was based on a fabricated story that plaintiff had threatened to kill other employees and himself. Plaintiff

asserts that this course of action violates Welfare and Institutions Code § 5150 and is therefore a violation of

public policy. Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 35. Plaintiff asserts this cause of action against Applied

Fusion. 

In a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, the “basis of the discharge [must]

contravene a fundamental public policy,” Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 91 (1990), that “inures to the public

at large rather than to a particular employer or employee.” Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654,

669-70 (1988). The public policy at issue must also be clearly delineated in a constitutional or statutory

provision. Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 1095 (1992) (overruled on other grounds by Green v. Ralee

Engineering Co., 19 Cal. 4th 66, 71 (1998)). There are four categories of employee conduct that are

protected under a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy: “1)refusing to violate a statute; 2)

performing a statutory obligation; 3) exercising a statutory rightorprivilege;and 4) reporting an alleged violation

of a statute of public importance.” Id. at 1090-91. 

Defendant contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim because plaintiff has

admitted that it did not fabricate the story of plaintiff’s threats against employers. In plaintiff’s response to

Geddis’ firstset ofinterrogatories, plaintiffstated that he “is not contending thatApplied Fusion, Inc. fabricated

any story. Plaintiff believes that employees of Applied Fusion were not truthful when they spoke to police.”

Boltuch Decl., Ex. N at 8. Because plaintiff’s allegation that Applied Fusion fabricated the story of October

7 in order to terminate plaintiff is the basis for his claim of termination in violation of public policy, defendant

asserts that judgment is proper.

Plaintiff, in a futile attempt to avoid summary judgment in favor of defendant, presents new arguments

in his opposition that diverge greatly fromthe claims in his complaint. Specifically, plaintiff now argues that “he

was discharged because his employer perceived him as suffering from a mental illness for which it forced him

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to undergo treatment.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Applied Fusion’s Mot. at 20. Plaintiff also claims that “a jury could

easily draw aninference” that defendant believed that “plaintiffsuffered an on the job psychologicalinjurywhich

required him to undergo medical treatment,” leading to his termination in order “to avoid paying the claim and

to avoid the Worker’s Compensation Action.” Id. Tellingly, plaintiff presents no evidence in support ofthese

new allegations.

Plaintiff’s new allegations directly conflict with the allegations in the complaint. The complaint

specifically alleges that defendant fabricated the story ofplaintiff’sthreats; however, the new claims state that

defendant believed he had a mental illness and discriminated against him as a result. Plaintiff cannot reverse

course at this stage in the litigation through an unsupported allegation in an opposition. Additionally, plaintiff

has failed to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56(e). 

The Court finds that defendant has presented evidence that plaintiff no longer alleges the factualbasis

for his Third Cause ofAction. Plaintiff’s new allegations lack evidentiary support and directly conflict with his

Complaint. Therefore, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the

Third Cause of Action.

B. Retaliation

Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action asserts that he was terminated by Applied Fusion in retaliation for

his complaints of racial discrimination, which is a violation of Title VII and FEHA. To establish a prima facie

case ofretaliationunder Title VII, plaintiff mustshow that(1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) his employer

subjected him to an adverse employment action; and (3) the employer’s action is causally linked to the

protected activity. EEOC v. Dinuba MedicalClinic, 222 F.3d 580, 586 (9th Cir. 2000). Once a plaintiff has

made out a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason forits adverse employment action. Once the defendant articulatessuch a reason, the plaintiff must then

offer evidence to show that the defendant’s proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination or retaliation for

protected activity. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-804; Wallis, 26 F.3d at 891.

The parties do not dispute that Dong’s employer subjected him to an adverse employment action.

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However, defendant argues that Dong did not engage in a protective activity and that, even if he did, his

terminationwas not causally linked to any protected activity. Plaintiff only references one event that could be

considered a protective activity. On October 4, 2002, plaintiff spoke with Silva about Frank Levering, another

Applied Fusion employee. Plaintiff says that he told Silva that Levering “had been discriminating against me”

and “teasing and harassing me.” Dong Decl. at ¶ 7. Additionally, plaintiff “told Mr. Silva that Frank appeared

to dislike me because I am Chinese and he does not like yellow people.” Id. However, these allegations arose

fromactions months before, as plaintiff had not spoken with Levering for at least three months. Boltuch Decl.,

Ex. D at 147-148. After plaintiff made these allegations, Silva offered to talk to plaintiff and Levering to resolve

any problems. Silva also said that plaintiff should “let [him] know when something happened” and he would

“put an end to it.” Boltuch Decl., Ex. E at 14-15. Silva spoke with Levering on October 7 and “told Frank

not to do anything that would cause any more issues.” Id. at 18. 

Assuming that plaintiff’s complaint on October 4 constitutes a protective activity, plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate that his termination was causally related to the protected activity. In fact, plaintiff fails to provide

any evidence or argumentinsupport ofthis requirement for a prima facie retaliationclaim, aside fromboilerplate

legalstandards. Instead of ignoring plaintiff’s complaint, Silva acted to rectify any problems caused by Levering

against plaintiff. Additionally, plaintiff does notpresent any evidence that either Silva or Levering was involved

in the decision to terminate plaintiff. 

The decision to terminate was made by Ron and Jeff Musgrove. Ron Musgrove Decl. at ¶ 15. Jeff

Musgrove Decl. at ¶ 14. They made the decision to terminate plaintiff based on his comments that he was

considering killing himself and others on October 4 and October 7. Id. When making the decision, theywere

not aware that Dong had made any complaints regarding racial discrimination. Ron Musgrove Decl. at ¶ 13.

Plaintiff presents no evidence that either Ron or Jeff Musgrove was aware of plaintiff’s alleged discrimination

complaint. Therefore, based on the evidence presented to the Court, plaintiff has failed to meet his burden by

proving that plaintiff’s termination was causally related to plaintiff’s complaints of racial discrimination. All of

the evidence supports defendant’s assertion that plaintiff was terminated because of the alleged threats made

by plaintiff on October 7 and plaintiff’s reference to suicide on October 4.

Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to present evidence in support of a prima facie case

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2 Defendants object to the Dong Declaration in Opposition to Applied Fusion’s motion for Summary

Judgment on the basis that it does not contain any indication that it was translated for plaintiff. At the Court’s

request, plaintiff has provided the Declaration of Yan Ge, which asserts that she translated the Declaration for

plaintiff. Therefore, the Court OVERRULES this objection. 

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of retaliation under Title VII and GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the

Fourth Cause of Action.

C. Lanterman-Petris-Short Act

Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause ofAction asserts a violation of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act against Applied

Fusion, Inc., Jeff Musgrove, Geddis and Ansari because they intentionally made false statements that plaintiff

made threats on October 7, 2002. Under Welfare and Institutions Code § 5150, police officers and other

designated professionals can detain a person “who is a danger to others, or to himself” as a “result of mental

disorder.” The statute authorizes a 72-hour hold of such a person at a county-designated facility for treatment

and evaluation. The statute also subjects an individual, other than the officials described above, to civil liability

for “intentionally giving a statement which he or she knows to be false,” if probable cause for the detention is

based on that statement.

Plaintiff has already acknowledged that defendant Applied Fusion did notfabricate the allegations that

plaintiff threatened two employees on October 7. See Boltuch Decl., Ex. N at 8. Thus, plaintiff has not

presented any evidence thatApplied Fusion intentionally gave a false story and the Court GRANTS summary

judgment on this claim for Applied Fusion. The Court also GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Jeff

Musgrove. The record is undisputed that Musgrove was told by Silva that Geddis and Ansari reported that

plaintiff made threats on October 7. Musgrove merely relayed this information to Officer Lopez. Plaintiff

presents no evidence that Musgrove knew the information was false. Therefore, summary judgment in favor

of Musgrove is proper.

Ansari and Geddis present a more difficult question. Plaintiff has presented evidence that he did not

make any threats to Ansari and Geddis on October 7. See Dong Decl. at ¶ 9-13.2 Defendants Ansari and

Geddis have stated that plaintiff did make threats on that date. See AnsariDeclaration and Geddis Declaration.

It is undisputed thatAnsari and Geddis then told Silva, and later Musgrove and Officer Lopez, that plaintiff had

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3 At oral argument, defense counsel suggested that if only state law claims remain after summary

judgment, the Court, in its discretion, should dismissthe federal case in favor of re-filing in state court. Under

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if

it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. The Court will not dismiss the pending state

law claims at this time because ofthe late stage of these proceedings, which make beginning the process anew

in state court inefficient and costly. 

4 Plaintiff does address defendants’ argument that the intentional infliction of emotional distress and

assault and battery claims are preempted by workers’ compensation, which is another basis for summary

judgment in favor of defendants.

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threatened them. Additionally, Officer Lopez’s decision to take plaintiff into custody under section 5150 was

clearly influenced by the allegations made by Ansari and Geddis. Therefore, the Court finds that a material

dispute offact existsregarding whether Ansari and Geddis intentionally made statements that they knew to be

false and that probable cause was based on these statements. Defendants argue that plaintiff has not presented

evidence that defendants “intentionally” gave a false statement. However, if the Court accepts plaintiff’s

assertions as true, a jury could conclude that defendants conjured up the story and intentionally shared it with

Silva, Musgrove and Officer Lopez, which led to plaintiff’s detention. Therefore, the Court DENIES summary

judgment with respect to defendants Ansari and Geddis and GRANTS judgment in favor ofJeff Musgrave and

Applied Fusion, for plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action.3

D. Common law state claims

Plaintiff also brings a series of common law state claims:1) invasionofprivacy; 2) intentional infliction

of emotional distress; 3) false imprisonment; 4) assault and battery; and 5) negligence. Defendants presents

a series of arguments in support of their motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff does not address these

arguments in his opposition.4

1. Defendants Applied Fusion, Inc. and Jeff Musgrove

These claims are all based upon the premise that the defendants acted unreasonably on October 7,

2002. As discussed above, plaintiff has not presented any evidence that defendants Musgrove and Applied

Fusion acted in an improper manner based on the information received by them on that day. Plaintiff has not

presented any evidence that defendants Musgrove and Applied Fusion intended to harm plaintiff or intended

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5 The Court has already GRANTED summary judgment in favor of Applied Fusion for the Sixth and

Twelfth Cause of Action. See Section I. 

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to manufacture a story in order to have plaintiff detained. In fact, the decision to detain plaintiff was made by

Officer Lopez. Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendants were negligent because they failed to conduct an

investigationbefore contacting the police. Plaintiff provides no basis for this assertion, and the Court finds that

one does not exist. Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendant Jeff Musgrove

with respect to the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Twelfth Causes of Action. The Court GRANTS

summary judgment in favor ofdefendant Applied Fusion, Inc. for plaintiff’s Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Causes of

Action.5

2. Defendants Ansari and Geddis

PlaintiffarguesthatdefendantsAnsari and Geddis are liable forinvasionofprivacybecause their actions

“force[d] plaintiff to have to undergo the intrusive events of psychotherapy and the ingestion of psychotropic

drugs.” SAC at ¶ 51. However, any actions taken by the medical staff were the result of their own

determinations and plaintiff does not present any evidence that defendants’ actions forced plaintiff to ingest

medications of any kind. Plaintiff does not present any evidence that plaintiff was forced to ingest medication

or that the medicationwas prescribed based ondefendants’ allegedly false statements. In fact, plaintiff presents

no argument or evidence in support of this cause of action against these defendants. Therefore, the Court

GRANTS summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action.

Plaintiff argues that defendants Ansari and Geddis are liable for intentional infliction of emotional

distress. To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show: “1) outrageous conduct

by the defendant, 2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress,

3) severe emotional suffering and 4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress.” Agarwal v.

Johnson, 25 Cal.3d 932, 946 (1979). Outrageous conduct is that which exceeds “all bounds usually tolerated

by a decent society, [and is] of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental

distress.” Id. 

As discussed above, plaintiffprovides no discussion about this claim in his opposition. Defendants also

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do not discuss this cause of action with respect to Geddis and Ansari. The Court has found that a dispute of

fact exists between plaintiff’s version of events and Geddis’ and Ansari’s testimony. Given this factualdispute,

plaintiff could prove a set of facts under which a jury could find in his favor on the claim of intentional infliction

ofemotionaldistress. Therefore, the Court DENIES the motion by defendants Ansari and Geddis for summary

judgment on plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action. 

Plaintiff allegesthat defendants Ansariand Geddis are liable forfalse imprisonmentbecause their actions

led to his detention under section 5150. However, to prove false imprisonment, plaintiff must show that

defendants intended to confine plaintiff unlawfully, without privilege, for an appreciable length oftime. Hagberg

v. California FederalBank FSB, 32 Cal.4th 350, 372-73 (2004). Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that

defendants intended to confine plaintiff through the allegedly false statements. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to

“designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue fortrial,” and summary judgment is appropriate.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The Court GRANTS summary judgment with

respect to plaintiff’s Eighth Cause of Action.

Plaintiff alleges a claim of assault and battery against defendants. Plaintiff does not provide any

explanation forthis claim. Plaintiff’s claim must be that he considers the alleged therapy and forced medication

during the detention to constitute an assault and battery. However, for reasons discussed above, the Court

finds that there is no factualbasis for plaintiff’s allegationthat defendants were responsible for any medications

ingested by plaintiff during his detention. In fact, plaintiff presents no evidence in support of his claim that he

ingested psychotropic medication. Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendants

for plaintiff’s assault and battery claim.

Plaintiff’s Twelfth Cause of Action asserts a negligence claim against defendants. However, the

allegations do notinvolve Ansari and Geddis and plaintiff provides no explanation as to how these defendants

are involved in this claim; therefore, the Court GRANTS summary judgment on plaintiff’s Twelfth Cause of

Action.

III. City of San Leandro and Officer Rick Lopez

Plaintiff asserts claims against the City of San Leandro and San Leandro Police Officer Rick Lopez

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that Officer Lopez detained him in violation of his Fourth

Amendment rights on October 7, 2002. Plaintiff also alleges that the City of San Leandro failed to train officers

in the legal standard for detaining individuals under California Welfare & Institutions Code § 5150.

A. Officer Lopez

As discussed above, Section 5150 authorizes police officers to detain a person who “as a result of

mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself.” Officers should apply the probable cause standard in

section 5150 detentions, and probable cause is determined based upon an objective standard. See Maag v.

Wessler, 960 F.2d 773, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the seizure of a mentally ill person “is analogous

to a criminal arrest and must therefore be supported by probable cause”); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.

806, 813 (1996) (holding that “subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth

Amendment analysis”). 

In addition to his argument that probable cause existed for the detention of the plaintiff, defendant

Lopez asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity. The defense of qualified immunity protects "government

officials . . . fromliability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutionalrights of which a reasonable person would have known."Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982). Qualified immunity "'provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent

or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494-95, 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991)

(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S. Ct. 1092 (1986)). "Therefore, regardless of whether

the constitutional violation occurred, the [official] should prevail if the right asserted by the plaintiff was not

'clearly established' or the [official] could have reasonably believed that his particular conduct was lawful."

Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the

existence of a "clearly established"right at the time of the allegedly impermissible conduct. See Maraziti v. First

Interstate Bank, 953 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1992). If plaintiff meets this burden, defendant assumes the

burden of establishing that, even if he violated plaintiff's constitutional rights, his actions were reasonable. Doe

v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995); Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th

Cir. 1995); Maraziti, 953 F.2d at 523.

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Plaintiff correctly asserts that there is a clearly established right, as the Ninth Circuit held in 1991 that

probable cause is required to detain a mentally ill person. Maag, 960 F.3d at 775-76. Additionally, probable

cause is the proper standard for a Section 5150 detention, under California law, and probable cause must be

evaluated by analyzing the totality of the circumstances, including the “past conduct, character, and reputation

of the detainee.” People v. Triplett, 144 Cal.App.3d 283, 288 (1983). 

Therefore, the Court must determine whether a reasonable officer in defendant’s position could have

believed that probable cause existed. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993).

Although the parties dispute the validity of Officer Lopez’s decision, they do not dispute the facts before him

when he decided to detain plaintiff. Officer Lopez responded to a call from Applied Fusion on October 7,

2002. Addams Decl., Ex. F (“Lopez Depo.”) at 27-28. He first spoke with Jeff Musgrove, then Ansari and

Geddis. Id. at 28-30. Both Ansari and Geddies told Officer Lopez that plaintiff threatened to shoot other

employees and himself. Id. at 30, 32. Officer Lopez then spoke with plaintiff, who denied making any threats

that day. Id. at 37.

After conducting his investigation, Officer Lopez determined that he had probable cause to believe that

plaintiff had a mental disorder and was a danger to himself and others. Parker Decl., Ex. H at 52. As a result,

Officer Lopez completed an Application for Emergency Psychiatric Detention and placed plaintiff in an

ambulance for transport to a county medical facility. Parker Decl., Ex. B.

Plaintiff argues that defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity because it was unreasonable for

defendant to detain plaintiff without conducting a sufficient inquiry to determine whether plaintiff was suffering

from a mental illness. According to plaintiff, an officer must have probable cause to believe that a detainee is

both mentally ill and a danger to himself or others in order to detain someone under Section 5150. Plaintiff

argues that he did not display any outward symptoms of mental illness and that defendant failed to consider

plaintiff’s past conduct, character and reputation, all which point in favor of not detaining him.

Plaintiff also asserts that “the facts necessary to decide the issue of qualified immunity are in dispute.”

Pl.’s Opp’n at 21. This is incorrect. Plaintiff does not dispute the facts before Officer Lopez at the time he

detained plaintiff; instead, plaintiff disagrees with Officer Lopez’s decision and his failure to conduct a more

extensive inquiry. This is a dispute over whether Officer Lopez acted reasonably, which is not a factual dispute.

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The Court finds that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because, based on the facts before

OfficerLopez at the time, it cannotfind that defendant was “plainly incompetent” or knowingly violated the law.

While a more thorough investigation could have been beneficial, defendant’s decision to detain plaintiff after

learning that plaintifftwice threatened to kill his co-workers and then himself was reasonable. Plaintiff presents

no case law to the contrary. Additionally, plaintiff has not presented any evidence, aside from his denials,

demonstrating that defendant should not have relied on the statements from Ansari and Geddis. 

Officer Lopez was reasonable in finding that plaintiff was a danger to himself or others because of a

“metal disorder.” Courts have recognized that a “mental disorder might be exhibited if a person's thought

processes, as evidenced by words or actions or emotional affect, are bizarre or inappropriate for the

circumstances.” Triplett, 144 Cal.App.3d at 287-88. Certainly, making repeated verbal threats to shoot and

kill co-workers and oneself constitutes behavior that is “bizarre and inappropriate for the circumstances.” 

Plaintiff relies on a single case in support of his argument that there exists a material dispute of fact in

defendant’s qualifiedimmunitydefense:Begzad v.City ofHayward, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4891 (N.D. Cal.).

In Begzad, the plaintiff was taken into custody under Section 5150 after the police responded to a call from

a third party. The Court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

However, in that case, the court found that “the disputed facts are numerous.” Id. at * 15. Viewing the facts

in a light most favorable to the plaintiff led the court to determine that the police officer was not told by a third

party that plaintiffthreatened to kill himself and his family severaltimes, plaintiff did not tell the police officer that

he was going to kill himself, and plaintiff became agitated “because the officers were attacking his religion,

calling him names, and shoving him around, not because he was mentally unstable.” Id. at * 21. These three

disputed facts directly contradicted defendant’s evidence that was vital to the defense of qualified immunity,

making summary judgment in favor of defendant inappropriate. 

The current case does not have a material dispute of fact. Plaintiff only disagrees with the decision

made by Officer Lopez, not the facts surrounding the decision. Therefore, the Court finds that this issue is

suitable for resolution on summary judgment. Based on the undisputed facts, Officer Lopez is entitled to

qualified immunity because his decision to detain plaintiff cannot be considered “plainly incompetent” or a

“knowing violationofthe law,” giventhe severity and repetition ofthreats allegedly made by plaintiff. Thus, the

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Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendant, and DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment.

Plaintiff also brings a motion forsummary judgment claiming that his toolbox was searched in violation

of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff presents no evidence in support of his argument that Officer Lopez

searched plaintiff’s toolbox only after plaintiff was placed in the ambulance. Pl.’s Mot. at 15. Defendant

discusses plaintiff’s failure to present any evidence; however, plaintiff inexplicably does not discuss this claim

in his reply. Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff has not presented any evidence that a search of plaintiff’s

toolbox occurred, or that any search was “remote in time or place from the arrest.” Chimel v. California, 395

U.S. 752, 763 (1969). The Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. 

B. City of San Leandro

Plaintiff asserts that the City of San Leandro is liable because it has failed to establish or implement a

policy for determining what criteria an officer should use when deciding whether to detain someone under

Section 5150. A plaintiff may state a § 1983 claim against a state entity under the framework established in

Monell v. Dept. ofSocialServ., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monell, the Supreme Court held thatfour conditions

must be satisfied to establish municipal liability for failing to act to preserve constitutional rights: (1) that the

plaintiff possessed a constitutionalright ofwhich he was deprived;(2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that

this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the

moving force behind the constitutional violation. Id. at 694; Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th

Cir.1992). 

A local government may be liable for constitutional violations resulting from its failure to supervise,

monitor or train, but only where the inadequacy ofthe supervision, monitoring or training amountsto deliberate

indifference. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92

F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996); Mackinney v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, the

plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged deficiency in supervision and training actually caused the requisite

indifference. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 391. The appropriate inquiry is thus whether the injury would have been

avoided "had the employee been trained under a program that was not deficient in the identified respect." Id.

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6 Plaintiff argues that this bulletin is irrelevant because it applies to Section 5150.05, not Section 5150.

This argument has no merit, because Section 5150.05 provides a change in the probable cause standard for

detention applied in Section 5150. Section 5150.5 begins: “When determining if probable cause exists to take

a person into custody, or cause a person to be taken into custody, pursuant to Section 5150 . . .”

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Plaintiff makes a series ofsweeping statements alleging that the City of San Leandro failed to establish

any policy for determining when someone should be taken into custody under Section 5150. Plaintiff then

argues that none ofthe training courses address Section 5150 and that the PoliceDepartment has not produced

any general orders or bulletins regarding these detentions. This is contrary to the evidence produced in this

case. During field training, officers receive training onwhen individuals can be detained under the Welfare &

Institutions Code. See Addams Decl., Ex. I (including field training manual as Exhibit 4 to Spirou Depo.).

Officer Lopez testified that this topic was covered when he completed field training. See Addams Decl., Ex.

F at 8-9. Additionally, the Police Department provided a training bulletin for officers in February 4, 2002

regarding the standard for detention ofmentally illindividuals. See Id. (including bulletin as Exhibit 3 to Spirou

Depo.).6 Sergeant Spirou also provides testimony that probable cause is the proper standard for determining

whether to detain the individual in question. Id. at 59.

Plaintiff provides misleading summaries of the deposition testimony by Officer Lopez and Sergeant

Spirou in support ofhis arguments. However, when the evidence is examined, it is clear that officers are guided

by the relevantstatutes, their training, and any training bulletins they receive. The Court finds as a matter of law

that this cannot be considered “deliberate indifference” on the part of the San Leandro Police Department.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment and DENIES plaintiff’s motion.

 

IV. Motion for sanctions

Defendants City of San Leandro and Officer Lopez move for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 11 and California Code of Civil Procedure § 1038. Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed against an

attorney, law firm, or party when a pleading is filed for an improper purpose such as harassment or delay, when

the claims, defenses or contentions are unwarranted under the either the existing law or a non-frivolous

argument for the extension of the law, or when the allegations or factual contentious are without evidentiary

support and unlikely to have evidentiary support after further investigation and discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11

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(1999). Rule 11 sanctions are discretionary and the court is not required to impose sanctions. 

The Court finds that sanctions under Rule 11 are not appropriate at this time. Although plaintiff was

unsuccessfulin his federalclaims against the City of San Leandro and Officer Lopez, the Court findsthat these

claims were not frivolous. 

Defendants also argue that sanctions are appropriate under California CCP § 1038. Courts have

cautioned that sanctions “should be used most sparingly to deter only the most egregious conduct.” In re

Marriage of Flaherty 31 Cal.3d 637, 651 (1982). See also Knight v. City of Capitola , 4 Cal.App.4th 918,

941 (1992) (applying egregious conduct standard to sanctions under CCP § 1038). Courts also have

discretion in awarding sanctions. Knight, 4 Cal.App.4th at 941. Plaintiff’s counselwrongfully brought a claim

ofintentionalinflictionof emotionaldistress against defendants City ofSan Leandro and Officer Lopez. In fact,

counsel never attempted to argue that the claim was valid; instead, he said the claim was an “obvious

typographicalerror.” Counsel was informed of this typographical error by defendants in December 2004. See

Addams Decl., Ex. H. However, counsel did not withdraw the claim until defendants brought a summary

judgment motion. Although the state law claim was invalid, plaintiff did assert valid, albeit unsuccessful, federal

claims against defendants. Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff’s counsel should have been more responsive

to defendant’s proper requests, but refuses to find that his conduct was “egregious” and DENIES defendants’

motion for sanctions.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS summary judgment

in favor of defendants Applied Fusion, Inc. and Jeff Musgrove; DENIES IN PART summary judgment for

Mohammed Ansari and Gregory Geddis with respect to plaintiff’s Fifth and Seventh Causes of Action and

GRANTS IN PART summary judgment withrespectto all other claims; GRANTS summary judgment in favor

of the City of San Leandro and Officer Lopez; DENIES plaintiff’s motion for partialsummary judgment; and

DENIES the motion for sanctions. (Docket ##54, 61, 64 and 72)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 20, 2005 S/Susan Illston 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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