Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00325/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00325-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 In light of the fact that the underlying facts of these two claims are the same, and for the sake

of clarity, the Court shall address these claims together.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC WILTON BURTON, Civil No. 08cv0325-LAB (POR)

Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITIONER’S FIRST

AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[ECF No. 21]

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary of California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 20, 2008, Petitioner Eric Wilton Burton filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 21.) In Grounds One and Two, Petitioner

contends the trial court’s failure to rule on his Faretta motion violated his 6th Amendment right to

self-representation. Id. at 6-7.1

 In Ground Three, Petitioner contends the prosecution failed to

disclose material exculpatory evidence in violation of the 14th amendment. Id. at 8. In Ground

Four, Petitioner contends a Batson error, in that he was denied his right to a jury of his peers. Id. at

9. 

On December 1, 2010, Respondent filed an Answer. (ECF No. 201.) First, Respondent

contends the state courts’ determination of the Faretta issue is entitled to deference. Id. at 13-17. 

Second, Respondent contends Petitioner cannot establish a Brady violation because he has not

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shown (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, or (2) that he suffered prejudice as a result of the

allegedly suppressed evidence. Id. at 18-20. Third, Respondent contends the state courts’

reasonable denied Petitioner’s Batson claim. Id. at 20-23.

On December 10, 2010, Petitioner filed his Traverse. (ECF No. 202.) Petitioner reasserts

the claims he made in his First Amended Petition. Id.

In consideration of the pleadings, the record, and controlling law, for the reasons set forth

below, the Court hereby RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The procedural history in this case is somewhat complex, and is therefore set forth in listfashion below:

• July 29, 2005, a jury convicted Petitioner of willful and premeditated attempted

murder (Cal. Penal Code §§ 664/187(a)/189), discharging a firearm from a motor

vehicle (Cal. Penal Code § 12034(c))), and assault with a semi-automatic firearm

(Cal. Penal Code § 245(b)). (Lodgment 1 at 278-88.) 

• October 21, 2005, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to state prison for an

indeterminate term of life with parole plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life. 

(Lodgment 1 at 309-312, 388.) 

• July 3, 2006, Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal of the State of

California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One (“Court of Appeal”). (Lodgment

3.)

• November 26, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the

Court of Appeal. (Lodgment 9.)

• December 18, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion for Ex Parte Appointment of Counsel

and a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (Lodgments 10, 11.) 

• December 5, 2006, the Court of Appeal notified Petitioner his writ of habeas corpus

and pending appeal would be considered at the same time. (Lodgment 12.) 

• December 27, 2006, the Court of Appeal informed Petitioner his motions filed on

December 18, 2006 would be considered at the same time as his pending appeal. 

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(Lodgment 13.)

• April 25, 2007, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. (Lodgment 6.)

• April 25, 2007, the Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s habeas petition and his two

motions. (Lodgment 14.)

• May 7, 2007, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. 

(Lodgment 15.) 

• June 4, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. 

(Lodgment 7.)

• June 20, 2007, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s habeas petition. 

(Lodgment 16.) 

• July 11, 2007, the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review. 

(Lodgment 8.)

• February 19, 2008, Petitioner filed a federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and

an application to proceed in forma pauperis in the Southern District of California. 

(Doc. 1.)

• April 18, 2008, the Court granted Petitioner’s application to proceed in forma

pauperis but dismissed the case without prejudice because Petitioner failed to use the

proper form and failed to allege exhaustion of state judicial remedies. (Doc. 4.) 

• June 18, 2008, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition (FAP). (Doc. 21.)

• July 3, 2008, the Court ordered the case reopened and ordered the Respondent

respond to the FAP. (Doc. 22.) 

• September 4, 2008, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 17.) 

• September 22, 2008, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the FAP alleging

Petitioner failed to exhaust Ground 3 of his FAP. (Doc. 41.) 

• October 3, 2008, Petitioner filed a Motion for Stay and Abeyance. (Doc. 47.) 

• December 10, 2008, the Court issued a Report and Recommendation granting

Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance, which was adopted by Judge Burns. 

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(Doc. 65, 89.) Judge Burns also denied Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition

without prejudice. (Doc. 89.) 

• March 11, 2009, the California Supreme Court denied the second petition for writ of

habeas corpus. (Lodgment 18.)

• April 22, 2009, the Court ordered Respondent to file a response to the petition. (Doc.

93.) 

• July 7, 2009, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the FAP, asserting it was a mixed

petition, subject to dismissal, because Petitioner failed to exhaust Ground 3 of his

FAP. (Doc. 101.)

• July 27, 2009, Petitioner filed an opposition, claiming he exhausted Ground 3 in the

California Supreme Court. (Doc. 102.)

• December 11, 2009, the Court filed an Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Without

Prejudice and Order for Petitioner to File Lodgment 17. (Doc. 135.) 

• December 28, 2009, Petitioner filed Lodgment 17 with the Court. (Doc. 138.) 

• February 9, 2010, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Petitioner’s FAP. (Doc.

143.)

• March 10, 2010, Petitioner filed an Opposition. (Doc. 153.)

• June 30, 2010, the Court filed a Report and Recommendation that Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss be denied. (Doc. 168.)

• August 23, 2010, Judge Burns adopted the Court’s Report and Recommendation. 

(Doc. 168.)

• August 30, 2010, the Court ordered Respondent to file an Answer to the First

Amended Petition, which was filed on December 1, 2010. (Doc. 187, 201.)

After a somewhat lengthy history, this matter is now fully briefed and ready for decision.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion in People v.

Burton, No. D047617 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. Div. 1, Apr. 25, 2007). (Lodgement 6 at 2-3.) The

Court presumes these factual determinations are correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1). See

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Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 524-26 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that factual findings of both state trial

and state appellate courts are entitled to presumption of correctness on federal habeas corpus

review); Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26 (1992); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981)

(stating that deference is owed to findings of fact of both state trial and appellate courts).

A. Prosecution Case

Burton is the father of Angela Sanders’s daughter, Dreona. In March

2004 Salinathan Thomas, the victim of Burton’s assault, was in a dating

relationship with Sanders. Burton had filed custody dispute papers and obtained a

restraining order against Thomas.

On March 19, 2004, Thomas was with Sanders and her two daughters at a

friend’s apartment when Burton drove his vehicle into the driveway. Thomas

came out of the apartment as Burton was starting to leave. Thomas told Burton to

leave them alone, and Burton challenged Thomas to “come out 100 yards and say

that.” Burton then drove away. However, a few minutes later, Burton again

drove by the apartment, and Thomas could see a passenger in the vehicle holding

a rifle. Thomas called the police and stepped outside so that if Burton

reappeared, Thomas could record Burton’s license number to give to police. 

Burton’s vehicle reappeared and when approximately 35 feet from

Thomas, Burton pulled out a gun, pointed it at Thomas, and began firing. Burton

fired between 13 and 15 shots, striking Thomas several times. Thomas survived

the shooting.

B. Defense Evidence

Burton’s friend, Mr. McKelvey, was with him. They left a Burger King

and were driving to McKelvey’s grandmother’s house when they heard a woman

shouting. They did not know who was shouting so they drove around the block. 

When they reached the apartment, they saw Sanders. They then saw Thomas,

who looked angry, walking toward them and demanding that Burton get out of the

vehicle. Burton twice warned Thomas to back away before Burton pulled out the

gun and began firing. Dreona told police that, when Burton drove past on the

final occasion, Thomas jumped over a wall to confront Burton and Burton then

pulled out the gun and shot Thomas.

Burton’s mother testified he stated he had been harassed by Thomas and

there were always problems when Burton visited his daughter. Burton’s mother

advised him to get a restraining order against Thomas. 

(Lodgment 6 at 2-3.)

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas

petition will not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court

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unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state

prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the

state court’s determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring

only whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540

U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, the state

court’s factual determinations are presumed correct, and Petitioner carries the burden of rebutting

this presumption with “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006). 

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state court

applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a

case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone,

535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if

the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but

unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the

“unreasonable application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or

erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly established federal law

must be “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through”

to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado

v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-

76); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not

cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o

long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court

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2 People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970).

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precedent,]” Id., the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

Clearly established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), means “the governing principle or

principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Andrade,

538 U.S. at 72.

Where a petitioner alleges a state court decision is based upon an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court, he or she must demonstrate that the

factual findings upon which the state court’s adjudication rests is objectively unreasonable. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

B. Analysis

Petitioner raises four grounds in his Petition. First, in Grounds One and Two, Petitioner

contends the trial court’s failure to rule on his Faretta motion violated his 6th Amendment right to

self-representation. Id. at 6-7. Second, in Ground Three, Petitioner contends the prosecution failed

to disclose material exculpatory evidence in violation of the 14th amendment. Id. at 8. Third, in

Ground Four, Petitioner contends a Batson error, in that he was denied his right to a jury of his

peers. Id. at 9. 

Respondent contends the state courts’ rejection of Petitioner’s claims was not contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence. (ECF No. 201.)

1. Grounds One and Two: Self Representation 

In Ground One of the First Amended Petition, Petitioner claims a “denial of 6th and 14th

Federally guaranteed right to self-representation, failure to rule on fundamentally separately

recognized timely invoked 6th Amendment motion.” (ECF No. 21 at 6.) In support of this claim,

Petitioner contends that on March 6, 2005, he timely invoked his right to self-representation and

requested a Marsden2

 hearing to relieve counsel knowingly and intelligently. Id. Petitioner claims

he proffered two separate motions. Id. In Ground Two, Petitioner contends “failure to rule on [his]

timely filed motion 2 weeks prior to trial on 07-07-08, and 27 May 05.” Id. at 7. In support of this

claim, Petitioner alleges that on July 7, 2008, he filed a timely Faretta motion, and the court refused

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to exercise discretion and rule on the motion. Id. Petitioner also alleges that prior to his trial on

June 1, 2005, Petitioner filed a timely Faretta motion, but Judge Exharos failed to rule after

acknowledging Petitioner introduced a handwritten motion. Id. As stated above, because the

underlying facts of these two claims are the same, the Court shall address them together.

Respondent contends the state courts reasonably denied these claims in a decision that is

entitled to deference. ECF No. 13.)

In support of its analysis, the state appellate court made the following factual findings, to

which this Court must defer under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Moreover, these factual findings are

objectively reasonable and are amply supported by the record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Specifically, the Court of Appeal set forth the relevant background as follows:

On March 24, 2005, on the day of trial, Burton requested a Marsden hearing and

also moved under Faretta to represent himself. However, when defense counsel

requested the court investigate Burton’s competence under section 1368, the court

stated that although it believed Burton was “capable of understanding the nature of

these proceedings,” there was sufficient evidence to raise a substantial doubt as to

Burton’s competence either to assist his counsel or to conduct his own defense in a

rational manner. Accordingly, the court suspended proceedings under section 1368 to

allow an evaluation of Burton’s competence, and told Burton that “[i]f it’s determined

that you’re competent, then you are certainly free to raise a Marsden or a Faretta

motion or whatever else you think is appropriate, and then the court at that time will

evaluate it,” but that it was premature to entertain the motions until the court was

satisfied as to Burton’s competence. [¶] At a May 23, 2005 hearing, the court found

Burton competent to stand trial and resumed the proceedings. On June 1, 2005, at a

hearing to set the trial date, Burton again moved for new counsel under Marsden and

the court held an in camera hearing to address the motion. At the outset of that

hearing, Burton stated he had “some motions and some papers” but the court

instructed Burton they would deal only with the Marsden motion because the

prosecutor was absent. While articulating his complaints against Mr. Adair (his

appointed attorney), Burton stated that when he informed Adair of his intention to

represent himself in March 2005, which motion Burton complained “the court [erred]

in denying,” Adair “retaliated against that [and] placed me under a [section] 1368

hold.” Burton complained that even though the judge “stated that he found me

competent, [and] [f]rom my understanding, if the defendant is competent and he has

made a timely motion to [represent himself,] he has that right to do so,” the “court

and Mr. Adair were overreaching and placed me under a [section] 1368 hold.”

Burton then argued the testing and hearing resulted in a finding of competence, and

stated, “Prior to my Marsden, I had also made a [Faretta] motion. I felt that the court

[erred] and violated my Sixth Amendment rights, the judge also violated my 14th

[Amendment] rights to due process, and when your due process is violated . . . I’d

like to motion the court to release me from custody. I have been unlawfully

detained.” The court then cautioned Burton that “you are drifting off into your other

motions now. We are still here on the Marsden motion, we’re not here on unlawful

detention or [propria persona] rights. The only issue here is whether or not Mr. Adair

should be discharged as your attorney.” Burton then continued his list of complaints

against Mr. Adair, and concluded by asserting, “I would really like to substitute

counsel. Because, at this point, with my disease and illnesses, I feel that I should

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have counsel. And I would like to substitute counsel, your honor.” The court

ultimately denied the Marsden motion. [¶] The next time Burton mentioned Faretta

was on the fourth day of trial, when he made another Marsden motion. Burton

argued counsel had been incompetent in numerous regards, had a conflict of interest,

and there were conflicts between Burton and counsel over trial decisions, in part

because counsel was aware Burton had tried to assert in propria persona rights but did

not pursue them. The court, rejecting the latter claim, noted there “initially had been

an indication that you [wanted] to file [in propria persona], but then you asked to raise

a Marsden motion first[, and] I heard that motion [and] ruled on it . . . [a]nd there was

no renewal of the [propria persona] motion” after the competency issue had been

resolved. Burton later resurrected his claim that his Faretta motion had been timely

and was erroneously denied, but the court rejected that claim, stating, “The [propria

persona] motion – if you had intended or thought you wanted that renewed [after the

section 1368 issue was resolved], you could have done that on the first day of trial.

You did not. Well, now it’s the second week of trial. I find this untimely and raised

for the purpose of delay.” [¶] The final occasion Burton raised Faretta to the trial

court was in connection with his motion for new trial. At that time. Burton asserted

he was entitled to a new trial because a previously filed motion asserting Faretta had

not been ruled on, and because of new evidence. The court, after examining its file,

located a 15-page handwritten document mailed July 7, 2005, which was styled as a

“motion to dismiss”; the motion mentioned the word “Faretta” in the caption and (at

page 13) the right of self-representation was cursorily mentioned. However, the court

noted that, even assuming the issue was a proper ground for a new trial, it would deny

the motion because Burton did not raise the issue at the first court date following July

7, 2005, or at any appropriate time, even though Burton had demonstrated he was

both willing and able to assert issues concerning his representation when he wanted

the court to rule on them, and therefore the court concluded Burton did not assert the

request in a timely or sufficient manner.

(Lodgment 6 at 8-10; see also Lodgment 2 at 210-216, 251-266, 815-825, 1242-1248.)

On direct appeal, Petitioner claimed his convictions should be reversed because the trial

court improperly denied his motion for self-representation. (Lodgment 3 at 19-31.) On April 25,

2007, the Court of Appeal rejected this argument in a reasoned opinion. (Lodgment 6.) Petitioner

also presented this claim to the California Supreme Court in a petition for review, which the court

summarily denied. (Lodgment 7, 8.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the state

appellate court’s opinion denying this claim as the basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803. 

Citing Faretta and California law, the appellate court noted a defendant has a federal constitutional

right to self-representation in a criminal proceeding, but he must make his request “knowingly and

intelligently,” “unequivocally,” and “within a reasonable time before trial.” (Lodgment 6 at 11,

citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819.) Further, the state appellate court noted that where “it is clear from

the record that the defendant never made an unequivocal assertion of his right to selfrepresentation...[a] trial court [does] not err in declining to consider such a request.” (Id., citing

People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 99.) With these authorities in mind, the state appellate court

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concluded as follows:

The only pretrial hearing at which Burton asserted a desire to represent himself was at

the March 24, 2005 hearing, when he both attempted to replace his counsel under

Marsden and expressed a wish to represent himself. However, the court concluded

consideration of his requests was premature considering the potential mental

competence questions, but advised Burton that "[i]f it's determined that you're

competent, then you are certainly free to raise a Marsden or a Faretta motion or

whatever else you think is appropriate, and then the court at that time will evaluate

it." Although Burton subsequently resurrected his Marsden request, he did not

thereafter unequivocally reassert his request to represent himself in propria persona.

To the contrary, in his May 2, 2005 letter to the court, when he provided additional

reasons supporting his Marsden request, Burton stated "I would like to be relieve[d]

of Mr. Adair as my counsel and substituted with another. I believe it isn't in my best

interest to [represent myself]." "I feel with a new attorney [who is] interested in

proving my [innocence] would be the right and proper cure. . . . I am requesting

please, a Marsden ASAP." (Italics added.) Moreover, at the next court hearing,

Burton forcefully pursued his Marsden motion, but mentioned Faretta only in

connection with his complaint against his attorney and as grounds for a motion to

dismiss. As to the latter motion, the court cautioned Burton not to drift off into other

motions because the court was focused "on the Marsden motion, . . . not . . . on

unlawful detention or [propria persona] rights." Burton asserted, echoing his May 2

letter, "I would really like to substitute counsel. Because, at this point, with my

disease and illnesses, I feel that I should have counsel. And I would like to substitute

counsel, your honor." When Burton's June 1, 2005, Marsden motion was denied,

Burton did not articulately and unmistakably reassert a demand to represent himself

in propria persona in a timely fashion.

We conclude the trial court correctly found the only timely motion that articulately

and unmistakably asserted a demand to represent himself in propria persona was Burton's

initial March 24, 2005 motion, and substantial evidence (in the form of Burton's express

words and subsequent inaction) supports the conclusion Burton subsequently abandoned that

motion. Accordingly, the court did not err in declining sua sponte to rule on Burton's

abandoned Faretta motion.

(Lodgment 6 at 12-13.)

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant in a criminal

case the right to be represented by counsel. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807. The Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments also guarantee a defendant the right to represent himself, but in order to invoke this

right, a defendant must waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the waiver must be

“knowing, voluntary and intelligent.” See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88-89 (2004) (citing Faretta,

422 U.S. at 806); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. “When a defendant elects to waive the right to

be represented by trial counsel, ‘[w]arnings of the pitfalls of proceeding to trial without counsel . . .

must be rigorously conveyed.’” Tovar, 541 U.S. at 89. Further, a defendant’s Faretta request must

also be timely, unequivocal and not made for purposes of delay. Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d

765, 774 (9th Cir. 2001). While no formal script is required to invoke the right and obtain the

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waiver, courts should consider “a range of case-specific factors, including the defendant’s education

or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the

proceeding.” Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88-89 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 

The state court cited and applied Faretta and California law consistent with Faretta and did

not decide this case differently than Faretta on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Therefore,

the state court’s decision is not “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529

U.S. at 412-13.

Nor is the state appellate court’s decision an unreasonable application of Faretta. 

Petitioner’s first Faretta request at the March 24, 2005 hearing was unequivocal. However, the trial

court suspended the proceedings in order to allow an evaluation of Petitioner’s competence, thereby

implying that despite the fact the request was unequivocal, it was not “knowing, voluntary and

intelligent.” See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88-89 (2004) (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 806); see also

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. Thereafter, Petitioner failed to unequivocally reassert his request to

represent himself. Conversely, in both his May 2, 2005 letter to the court as well as during a

subsequent court hearing, Petitioner stated he did not believe it was in his best interest to represent

himself. Therefore, as the appellate court found, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude

Petitioner had abandoned his request to represent himself. See Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 774.

For the foregoing reasons, the appellate court’s denial of Petitioner’s Faretta claim is neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams,

529 U.S. at 412-13. It is also not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

2. Ground Three: Brady Claim

In Ground Three of the First Amended Petition, Petitioner claims the prosecution failed to

disclose material exculpatory evidence in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 21 at

8.) In support of this claim, Petitioner contends that on July 4, 2006, his attorney sent an informal

letter of discovery to the deputy district attorney, but the deputy district attorney failed to respond. 

Id. Further, Petitioner contends the judge and her bailiff were witnesses to Thomas, the victim in the

underlying crime, being served with a restraining order, and therefore, the judge and bailiff were

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“witnesses to Burton’s fear.” Id. Petitioner alleges the bailiff, who he identifies as “S. Jones #1031"

was “newly discovered” by him. Id. Although it is difficult to discern exactly what evidence

Petitioner believes was withheld, Petitioner contends the prosecution failed to disclose evidence

about a witness Petitioner eventually discovered was a bailiff at the court in violation of Brady. Id.

Petitioner presented this claim in a habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court on

September 4, 2008. (Lodgment 17.) However, there is no state court opinion addressing the merits

of this claim, as the state supreme denied the claim on procedural grounds. (Lodgment 18.) Because

this claim was not adjudicated on the merits in the state court, AEDPA deference does not apply and

the Court must conduct a de novo review of this claim. Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th

Cir. 2002). Although AEDPA deference does not apply to this claim, the Court must remain

mindful that “judgments of conviction and sentence carry a presumption of finality and legality and

may be set aside only when a state prisoner carries his burden of proving that [his] detention violates

the fundamental liberties of the person, safeguarded against state action by the Federal

Constitution.” Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor must

disclose all material evidence, including impeachment evidence, to the defendant. Brady, 373 U.S.

at 87. In order to establish a Brady violation, Petitioner must prove three elements: (1) the evidence

was suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently, (2) the withheld evidence was

either exculpatory or impeachment material, and (3) the evidence was material to the defense. See

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052-53 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 678 (1985) and United States v. Agurs,

427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976).) Evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. Failure to disclose material evidence violates due process. Id. at 678.

Here, Petitioner has failed to establish a Brady violation. First, Petitioner has not established

the prosecution actually suppressed any evidence, either willfully or inadvertently. Contrary to

Petitioner’s assertion, there is no evidence the bailiff’s identity was kept a secret from Petitioner. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes Petitioner has failed to satisfy the first prong of the Brady test. 

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See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82.

Second, Petitioner cannot demonstrate the withheld evidence was either exculpatory or

impeachment material. Specifically, Petitioner’s assertion the bailiff was a “witness to his fear”

does not establish the bailiff’s testimony would have been “favorable” to him. Strickler, 527 U.S. at

281-82. Accordingly, the Court concludes Petitioner has failed to satisfy the second prong of the

Brady test. Id.

Third, Petitioner is unable to demonstrate the information related to the bailiff’s identity was

material because there is no reasonable probability that the result of Petitioner’s trial would have

been different if the allegedly suppressed evidence had been disclosed to the defense. Bagley, 473

U.S. at 682. A review of the record demonstrates there was other evidence to suggest Petitioner

feared Thomas, the victim. Specifically, Petitioner’s mother testified that Thomas bothered and

threatened Petitioner. (Lodgment 2 at 992-993.) She also testified Petitioner got a restraining order

against Thomas because he was afraid of him. Id. Second, a neighbor testified he saw Petitioner

arguing with Thomas prior to the shooting. Id. at 554-568. Third, Derrell McKelvey, Petitioner’s

friend who was with Petitioner during the shooting, testified Thomas approached Petitioner and told

him to get out of the car to fight. Id. at 546-47, 834-35. Fourth, Angela Sanders testified Petitioner

and Thomas had “exchanged words” and cursed at each other on two or three prior occasions. Id. at

519-521. Finally, Officer Mendoza testified that Petitioner’s daughter told him Thomas became

confrontational with Petitioner and jumped over a wall to confront Petitioner on the day of the

shooting. Id. at 1026-1029. Despite all of this evidence, the jury ultimately rejected the contention

that Petitioner was justified in shooting Thomas. Thus, even if the bailiff had testified that Petitioner

feared Thomas, the result of Petitioner’s trial would have been no different. Accordingly, the Court

concludes Petitioner has failed to satisfy the third prong of the Brady test. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at

281-82

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner is unable to establish a Brady violation. Accordingly,

Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to this claim. 

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 The standard in People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258 (1978) is equivalent to the constitutional

standard enunciated in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

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3. Ground Four: Batson Error

In Ground Four of the First Amended Petition, Petitioner claims “Batson error, denial of

14th U.S. Fed. Guaranteed right to a jury of his peers without race neutral justification.” (ECF No.

21 at 9.) Respondent contends the state court reasonably denied this claim. (ECF No. 201 at 20.) 

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

prevents a prosecutor from systematically eliminating potential jurors on the basis of racial identity. 

Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995), the United States Supreme

Court outlined the steps a court must follow in conducting a Batson analysis:

Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the opponent of a peremptory challenge

has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of

production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral

explanation (step two). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must

then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful

racial discrimination. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-359, 111 S.Ct.

1859, 1865-66, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion); id., at 375, 111 S.Ct. at

1874 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); Batson, supra, at 96-98, 106 S.Ct.,

at 1722-1723. 

Id. at 1170-71; see also Mitleider v. Hall, 391 F.3d 1039, 1047 (9th Cir. 2004). “In deciding

whether the defendant has made the requisite showing [of a prima facie case of racial

discrimination], the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. 

A state court’s determination as to whether a prima facie case has been made is a factual

determination entitled to a presumption of correctness. Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 685 (9th Cir.

1999). 

Petitioner raised his claim regarding Batson error in the petition for review he filed in the

California Supreme Court, which the Court summarily denied. (Lodgments 7, 8.) Accordingly, this

Court must “look through” to the state appellate court’s opinion denying this claim as the basis for

its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803. The appellate court held substantial evidence supported the trial

court’s denial of Petitioner’s Wheeler3

 motion based on a finding that no prima facie case of

discrimination had been made. (Lodgment 6.) Specifically, the Court of Appeal analyzed

Petitioner’s claim as follows:

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Burton did not establish, based on all of the circumstances, that there was a

reasonable inference the juror (Ms. R.) was excused because of her race. (People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1154.) Ms. R., like Burton, was African-American. However,

racial identity between the excused juror and the defendant alone does not suffice to

raise a prima facie showing (People v. Davenport, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1201) and,

because Ms. R. was apparently the only African-American among the jury pool,

Burton cannot show her dismissal was part of a pattern of excusing African-American

jurors. 

Burton appears to argue that, because there were additional facts

suggesting Ms. R. would have been pro-prosecution and her responses to other

questions were consistent with a normal person's responses, he satisfied his burden of

showing facts from which an inference can be drawn that Ms. R. was excused

because of her race. Burton notes Ms. R. had several extended family members

connected to law enforcement, and she stated her prior experience and reaction to

being assaulted would not affect her ability to be fair or to assess the self-defense

issue present in the case. However, there were numerous responses during voir dire

that provide substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion there were "a

variety of non-discriminatory reasons why prosecution may feel she would not be a

good juror for their case," and therefore Burton had not made a prima facie showing

of a reasonable inference Ms. R. was excused because of her race.

During voir dire, defense counsel asked Ms. R.'s opinion about a person's right to

employ deadly force in self-defense, and specifically asked if "somebody who continues to

act violently and make threats and whatever, do you think that someone who's confronted

with a person like that is entitled to act [in self-defense] based on what they'd seen in

the past?" She responded that "[i]f you feel like you're being threatened, then you

have a right to protect yourself." The prosecutor, following that questioning, asked

Ms. R. whether, "if a person seemed to act unreasonably in a situation, would you still

give them the benefit of the doubt that they acted reasonably in that situation?" and

Ms. R. responded, "Yes. It depends on the situation," and then elaborated by giving

examples of what conduct she might consider, and then volunteered that among the

circumstances she was "curious about [was] who had the restraining order? He did or

the other guy?" She then stated she needed to know everything "especially if we have

to sit here and we're going to have to pass judgment . . . we need to see it all, because

I sure would hate to have convicted somebody that--and I didn't do it correctly or I

sent him to jail or something and he shouldn't have been." Ms. R. also told defense

counsel that "[n]ow that I found my way to God, it's--taking a life is hard," and the

prosecutor, inquiring of the entire panel, stated "Ms. [R.] brought up a very good

point. . . [A] lot of people have different religious beliefs . . . . Does anybody have a

problem or conflict with their beliefs that would not allow them to sit in judgment

essentially of another person?" 

The trial court, concluding Burton had not made a prima facie showing that Ms. R.

was excused based solely on race, stated the court could identify "a variety of

non-discriminatory reasons why prosecution may feel she would not be a good juror for their

case," including "concerns . . . about how she might approach the issue of self defense" and

"[h]er expressed views about her religion." The record suggested she might give Burton the

benefit of the doubt even were he acting unreasonably, and her unprompted inquiry about

who obtained the restraining order suggested she might unduly favor Burton's self-defense

claim once she learned it was Burton who had obtained the restraining order against Thomas.

Moreover, her religious views, coupled with her statements expressing concern about

"hav[ing] to pass judgment" and that she would "hate to have convicted somebody

that . . . I didn't do it correctly," could legitimately raise alarms that Ms. R. would be

more reluctant to convict Burton than would other jurors. Under these circumstances,

there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding Burton did not make a

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prima facie showing Ms. R. was excused because of her race, and instead there were

legitimate race-neutral grounds upon which the prosecutor might have excused her.

(People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1155.)

(Lodgment 6 at 5-7; see also Lodgment 2 at 104-105, 112-113, 138-144, 150-157.)

The state court cited and applied Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and California law

consistent with Batson and did not decide this case differently than Batson on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. (See Lodgment 6 at 3-7.) Therefore, the state court’s decision is not

“contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

Nor is the state appellate court’s decision an unreasonable application of Batson. As the

state appellate court noted, the trial court could identify various non-discriminatory reasons why

juror Ms. R. was excused. Specifically, a review of the record demonstrates her particular views on

self-defense as well as her religious views could have led prosecutors to doubt her ability to be an

impartial juror. Therefore, the appellate court’s conclusion that there was substantial evidence to

support the trial court’s finding that Petitioner did not make a prima facie showing that Ms. R. was

excused because of her race is objectively reasonable. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75.

For the foregoing reasons, the appellate court’s denial of Petitioner’s Batson claim is neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams,

529 U.S. at 412-13. It is also not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

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V. CONCLUSION

After thorough review of the record in this case and based on the foregoing, the Court hereby

RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

(1994). Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before July 1, 2011. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before July 15, 2011.

The parties are further advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the

right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 2, 2011

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: The Honorable Larry A. Burns

all parties

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