Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02595/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02595-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARYL WOODS,

CDCR #H-43246,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden; 

VICTOR ACOSTA, Food Services 

Manager; F. HADJADJ, Chaplain, 

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-02595-CAB-WVG

ORDER: 

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

[ECF No. 2] 

AND 

2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO 

EFFECT SERVICE OF SUMMONS 

AND COMPLAINT PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)

DARYL WOODS (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed 

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl., ECF No. 1.

Plaintiff claims several prison officials at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility 

(“RJD”), in San Diego, California, violated his right to free exercise of religion and equal 

protection of the laws by failing to accommodate his religious dietary needs after he was 

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transferred there from Wasco State Prison in August 2017. See id. at 3-5. Plaintiff seeks 

injunctive relief preventing Defendants from “delaying provision of kosher diets upon 

transfer for extensive periods” and damages “to be determined.” Id. at 8.

Plaintiff did not prepay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence 

a civil action at the time he filed suit; instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See ECF No. 2.

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ S. Ct. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 6-

month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); 

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account 

statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits 

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account 

for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner 

then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in 

any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court 

until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

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In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate 

Statement Report, see ECF No. 3 at 2-3, together with a prison certificate completed by an 

accounting official at RJD attesting to his trust account activity. Id. at 1; see also 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These statements show 

that Plaintiff had a zero average monthly balance, no deposits to his account over the 6-

month period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint, and an available balance 

of zero at the time of filing. 

Based on this financial information, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2), and assesses no initial partial filing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be 

prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for 

the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial 

filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based 

solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is 

ordered.”). However, the Court will direct the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to 

collect the full balance of the $350 total fee owed in this case and forward installments to 

the Clerk of the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status or the payment of any filing fees, the PLRA 

also requires the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by 

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, 

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or 

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as 

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any complaint, or any portion of a complaint, 

which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who 

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

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1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 

(9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of 

the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

As currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint contains free exercise of 

religion and equal protection claims sufficient to survive the “low threshold” for 

proceeding past the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 

1915A(b). See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012); Hartmann v. Cal. 

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Dept. of Corr. and Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122-24 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing pleading 

requirements for prisoner’s free exercise of religion and equal protection claims).

Accordingly, the Court will direct the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon the 

Defendants on Plaintiff’s behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall 

issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3) 

(“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal 

. . . if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

III. Conclusion and Orders

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the full $350 filing fee owed in this case in monthly payments in 

an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income, and to forward 

them to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY 

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF 

No. 1) and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each 

Defendant. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order, 

a certified copy of his Complaint, and the summons so that he may serve the Defendants. 

Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete the Form 285s as completely 

and accurately as possible, include an address where each named Defendant may be 

served, see S.D. Cal. CivLR 4.1.c, and return them to the United States Marshal according 

to the instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying his IFP package;

///

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5. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons 

upon Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285 provided to him. All costs 

of that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 4(c)(3);

6. ORDERS Defendants, once served, to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint within 

the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). 

See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be permitted to “waive 

the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 

correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte 

screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus, has made a 

preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a 

“reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” defendant is required to respond); and

7. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 

serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendants’ 

counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the 

Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must include with every 

original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the 

manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been was served on 

Defendants or Defendants’ counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 5.2. 

Any document received by the Court which has not been properly filed with the Clerk, or 

which fails to include a Certificate of Service upon the Defendants, may be disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 15, 2018

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