Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02099/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02099-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Terell Adam Gray,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondent.

No. CV-19-02099-PHX-GMS (MTM)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, CHIEF UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Terell Adam Gray has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1).

I. Summary of Conclusion.

On November 27, 2012, in the Superior Court of Arizona, Petitioner entered into a 

plea agreement and was sentenced on January 3, 2013. Petitioner filed a timely notice for 

post-conviction relief on January 31, 2013, which was dismissed on January 29, 2014. 

Petitioner did not appeal. On December 31, 2018, Petitioner filed a second notice for postconviction relief, which was dismissed on January 30, 2019, as untimely and successive. 

Petitioner did not appeal. On February 8, 2019, Petitioner filed a motion to release inmate 

with time served. This was denied on February 25, 2019; Petitioner did not appeal. On 

March 28, 2019, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition. Petitioner was released from 

Case 2:19-cv-02099-GMS Document 15 Filed 03/09/20 Page 1 of 6
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

custody on December 12, 2019. As Petitioner is no longer in custody, the Court will 

recommend that the Petition be denied as moot. The petition is also procedurally defaulted 

as Petitioner did not exhaust his state remedies prior to filing the federal petition.

II. Background.

a. Facts and Procedural History.

On November 27, 2012, Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of forgery, one count 

of burglary, and one count of aggravated assault. (Doc. 12-1, Exs. G-I). On January 3, 

2013, the Superior Court of Arizona sentenced the Petitioner to two-and-a-half years for 

forgery, two-and-a-half years for burglary, and seven years for aggravated assault. (Doc. 

12-1, Exs. J-L).

b. Petitioner’s State Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding.

On January 31, 2013, Petitioner filed his first notice for post-conviction relief

(“PCR”). (Doc. 12-1, Ex. M). After a completion of post-conviction review by counsel on 

June 6, 2013 (Doc. 12-1, Ex. N) finding no colorable claims to present, Petitioner filed his 

pro per petition on October 7, 2013. (Doc. 12-1, Ex. O). On January 29, 2014, the Superior 

Court of Arizona dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 12-1, Ex. Q). 

Petitioner did not appeal this decision.

c. Petitioner’s Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding.

On December 31, 2018, Petitioner filed his second notice for post-conviction relief 

with the Superior Court of Arizona (Doc. 12-1, Ex. R). On January 30, 2019, the court 

dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief as untimely and successive. (Doc. 12-1, 

Ex. S). Petitioner did not appeal this decision.

d. Petitioner’s Motion to Release Inmate with Time Served.

On February 8, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion to Release Inmate with Time Served. 

(Doc. 12-1, Ex. T). On February 25, 2019, the Superior Court of Arizona denied the motion, 

finding that petitioner was serving additional time resulting from his action in absconding 

from Community Supervision in July 2018. (Doc. 12-1, Ex. U).

Case 2:19-cv-02099-GMS Document 15 Filed 03/09/20 Page 2 of 6
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

e. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition.

On March 28, 2019, Petitioner filed this habeas corpus petition (“Petition”). (Doc. 

1). In the Petition, he requests immediate release from state custody, credit for time served, 

and vacatur of his parole violation. Petitioner argues that (1) being held beyond his sentence 

date violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment; (2) being held beyond his 

sentence date violates the Eighth Amendment bar on cruel and unusual punishment; and 

(3) his sentence is unconstitutional because additional time should not have been imposed 

as a result of his parole violation. On June 25, 2019, the Government filed a limited 

response. (Doc. 12).1

Petitioner was in state custody when he filed the petition. According to the Petition, 

Petitioner’s release date was set for December 12, 2019. (Doc. 1 at 10). It appears Petitioner 

was released from state custody; the release date was corroborated upon review of the 

Petitioner’s Arizona Department of Corrections record.2

III. The Petition.

a. Mootness.

Petitioner is no longer in state custody; therefore, his Petition is moot. “A case 

becomes moot when ‘it no longer presents a case or controversy under Article III, § 2, of 

the Constitution.’” Wilson v. Terhune, 319 F.3d 477, 479 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Spencer 

v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). The requirement of a current case or controversy “subsists 

through all stages of federal judicial proceedings” and “the parties must continue to have a 

‘personal stake in the outcome’ of the lawsuit.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7 (quoting Lewis v. 

Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990)). “An incarcerated convict’s (or a 

parolee’s) challenge to the validity of his conviction always satisfies the case-orcontroversy requirement, because the incarceration (or the restriction imposed by the terms 

of the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by 

1 This case was referred to Magistrate Judge Michael T. Morrissey on February 13, 2020. 

(Doc. 14).

2 The Petitioner’s status is listed as inactive with a release date of December 12, 2019. This 

is a public record available at: https://corrections.az.gov/public-resources/inmatedatasearch. If the Petitioner disputes his custody status, he may file his objection to the 

Report and Recommendation on the record.

Case 2:19-cv-02099-GMS Document 15 Filed 03/09/20 Page 3 of 6
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

invalidation of the conviction.” Id. Once the incarceration has ended, however, there must 

be some other “concrete and continuing injury” or “some ‘collateral consequence’ of the 

conviction” for the suit to be maintained. Id. (quoting Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 

238 (1968)).

In this case, Petitioner does not attack his conviction on substantive or procedural 

grounds. The Petition sought his immediate release from custody. Petitioner was released 

from custody on December 12, 2019. He has obtained the relief he sought in his petition 

“[t]hrough the mere passage of time.” Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 633 (1982). As such, 

“no live controversy remains,” and his petition is moot. Id.

b. Procedural Default.

Even if Petitioner’s claim was not moot, it is procedurally defaulted. A federal court 

may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless a petitioner has exhausted 

available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must 

afford the state courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly 

presenting” them to the state’s “highest” court in a procedurally appropriate manner. 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (“[t]o provide the State with the necessary

‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . 

. . thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim”).

Here, in state court, Petitioner filed two notices for post-conviction relief and a 

motion to release inmate with time served. The notices and motion were denied, and 

Petitioner did not appeal. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims were not exhausted at the state 

level, depriving the state courts of the first opportunity to address the alleged violations of 

his rights. As of this date, Petitioner cannot return to state court to appeal his motions 

because the Court of Appeals of Arizona lacks jurisdiction to hear an untimely appeal. 

State v. Berry, 650 P.2d 1246, 1248 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). Petitioner’s claim that he was 

not aware that the denial of his notices for post-conviction relief and his motion to release 

inmate were appealable does not constitute cause for his procedural default. See Hughes 

v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (“When a pro se petitioner 

Case 2:19-cv-02099-GMS Document 15 Filed 03/09/20 Page 4 of 6
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

is able to apply for post-conviction relief to a state court, the petitioner must be held 

accountable for failure to timely pursue his remedy to the state supreme court.”). As 

Petitioner does not establish cause for his procedural default, and does not allege actual 

innocence, his procedural default is not excused, and his Petition should be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural 

ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

///

///

///

///

Case 2:19-cv-02099-GMS Document 15 Filed 03/09/20 Page 5 of 6
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 9th day of March, 2020.

Honorable Michael T. Morrissey

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:19-cv-02099-GMS Document 15 Filed 03/09/20 Page 6 of 6