Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00765/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00765-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NUVASIVE, INC.,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11-CV-00765 BEN MDD

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK

OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION;

(2) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS FOR IMPROPER VENUE

IS MOOT; AND

(3) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

TRANSFER VENUE IS MOOT

[Docket Nos. 15, 17.]

vs.

RENAISSANCE SURGICAL CENTER

NORTH, L.P. and K&S CONSULTING

ASC, L.P.,

Defendant.

NuVasive, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint alleging breach of contract, breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and goods sold and delivered at agreed price. 

Renaissance Surgical Center North, L.P. (“Renaissance”) and K&S Consulting ASC, L.P.

(“K&S”), (collectively, “Defendants”), move to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal

jurisdiction and improper venue pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and

12(b)(3) or, in the alternative, to transfer the case to the Southern District of Texas pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1406(a). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for improper venue or

alternatively to transfer venue is therefore deemed MOOT.

Case 3:11-cv-00765-BEN-MDD Document 21 Filed 07/22/11 Page 1 of 7
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This action arises from Renaissance’s alleged failure to pay for Plaintiff’s products

resulting in an outstanding balance of more than $420,000. Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation

with its principal place of business in San Diego, California (Compl. ¶ 10), within the jurisdiction

of the Southern District of California. Renaissance is a Texas limited partnership with its principal

place of business in Humble, Texas (Id. ¶ 11), within the jurisdiction of the Southern District of

Texas. K&S is a Texas limited partnership with its principal place of business in Houston, Texas

(Id. ¶ 12), within the Southern District of Texas. 

Plaintiff is a medical device company that sells products for the surgical treatment of spine

disorders. (Id. ¶ 1.) It employs sales representatives that initiate contact with spinal surgeons who

have a need for its products. (Id. ¶ 13.) If a surgeon wants to utilize Plaintiff’s products, the sales

representatives arrange with the surgeons and hospitals to ensure the surgeons have the products

they need. (Id.) The hospitals are the actual purchasers of the products and are only charged for

the instruments, equipment, and implants used during the surgeries. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 15.) 

Renaissance is an ambulatory surgical center where doctors perform spinal surgeries. (Id.

¶ 2.) In 2008, Plaintiff’s Texas-based sales representative established a business relationship with

several Renaissance neurosurgeons. (Id. ¶ 16.) The sales representative then dealt directly with

Renaissance’s material manager to order the Plaintiff’s products that Renaissance’s neurosurgeons

desired. (See id. ¶ 17; Crimm Decl. ¶¶ 2, 3.) 

Between 2008 and May 2009, Renaissance ordered Plaintiff’s medical and surgical

products and paid more than $925,000 to Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 19.) From May 2009 through April

2010, Renassiance continued to order, and Plaintiff delivered, various medical and surgical

products. (Id. ¶ 20.) Renaissance failed to make payments for those products resulting in an

outstanding balance of more than $420,000 due to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 20.)

K&S is a general partner of Renaissance. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff contends K&S is liable

jointly and severally for Renaissance’s alleged outstanding balance because the acts herein were

Case 3:11-cv-00765-BEN-MDD Document 21 Filed 07/22/11 Page 2 of 7
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Plaintiff contends that Renaissance’s actions are really those of K&S, as general partner,

because K&S is responsible for the management and operation of Renaissance. 

(Opp., p. 3.) Defendants do not argue otherwise. (Mot., Reply.) The Court therefore assumes that

the following analysis in regard to specific personal jurisdiction based on Renaissance’s actions is also

applicable to K&S. 

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done in “the ordinary course of the partnership business.”1 (Id. ¶ 27.) 

On April 13, 2011, Plaintiff initiated this action to recover the outstanding balance due as a

result of Renaissance’s alleged failure to pay for ordered and used products. Specifically, Plaintiff

claims Renaissance, and K&S as Renaissance’s general partner, owe $421,682.24 plus related

interest, finance charges, and attorneys fees. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5.) 

DISCUSSION

A. PERSONAL JURISDICTION 

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the

burden falls upon the Plaintiff to demonstrate that the court may properly exercise personal

jurisdiction over the Defendants. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir.

2006); Ziegler v. Indian River Cnty., 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995). Absent formal discovery or

an evidentiary hearing, as here, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction

exists to survive a 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss. Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1154; Ziegler, 64 F.3d at

473. 

Plaintiff proffers two bases for personal jurisdiction over Defendants. First, Plaintiff

argues the Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants because of a forum selection

clause in the sales agreements. (Compl. ¶ 9; Opp., p. 2.) Second, Plaintiff argues Defendants have

sufficient “minimum contacts” with California to support the exercise of specific personal

jurisdiction over them in this matter. (Opp., p. 5.) 

a. Terms and Conditions of Sale

Plaintiff first argues that personal jurisdiction exists over Defendants based of the forum

selection clause contained in Plaintiff’s T & C. (Compl. ¶ 9; Opp., p. 2.) Specifically, the forum

selection clause provides: 

Any and all suits hereunder shall be brought and resolved solely and exclusively in, and the

parties hereby irrevocably consent to the exclusive jurisdiction and proper venue of, the

state and federal courts located in the County of San Diego, State of California, USA, and

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waive any objections thereto based on any ground including improper venue or Forum

Non-Conveniens. 

(Opp., Ex. A, ¶ 11.)

Plaintiff contends that by accepting its products, Defendants assented to personal

jurisdiction in this Court because the T & C govern all products Plaintiff sold to Defendants. 

(Opp., p. 5.) Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to prove that Defendants agreed, or were

otherwise bound by, the T & C and, thus, the forum selection clause contained therein. (Reply, p.

3.) 

Key to enforcement of any forum selection clause is evidence of an actual agreement

between the parties. See Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 458 (9th

Cir. 2007). In Holland Am. Line, the Ninth Circuit stated:

The fundamental element lacking here is any evidence that [defendants] agreed to the

[forum selection clause in plaintiff’s purchase orders] ... The missing and critical evidence is

telling. [Plaintiff] has not provided ... any evidence of assent to the terms by [defendants] ...

We agree with the district court that it is not enough that plaintiffs alleged to have sent the

terms via email to an unspecified email address or general web address. Such an

unsubstantiated and vague statement does not establish a prima facie case for jurisdiction.

Id. at 458 (citations omitted). 

Here, the Court finds Plaintiff’s have failed to prove at this stage in the case that an actual

agreement existed between Plaintiff and Renaissance. Plaintiff’s assertion that it sent Renaissance

the T & C with its orders, without more, is insufficient to conclude that Renaissance agreed to or is

otherwise bound by it. This allegation does not establish a prima facie case for jurisdiction. The

Court additionally notes there is no language in the T & C suggesting that by Renaissance accepting

Plaintiff’s products, they were bound by the T & C, as Plaintiff argues. Accordingly, the Court

finds the forum selection clause is inapplicable to the instant case. 

b. Specific Personal Jurisdiction 

Alternatively, Plaintiff contends Defendants have sufficient minimum contacts to support

the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants. (Opp., p. 5.) “The general rule is

that personal jurisdiction over [an out of state] defendant is proper if it is permitted by a long arm

statute and if the exercise of that jurisdiction does not violate federal due process.” Pebble Beach,

453 F.3d at 1154-55 (citation omitted); see also Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91

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(1978). California’s long arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction “on any basis not

inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” Cal. Civ. Pro. § 410.10. 

The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause permits courts to exercise personal

jurisdiction over any defendant who has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum such that the

“maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 

Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). A defendant’s contacts must be such that he

should “reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagon v. Woodson,

444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). “A court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction may be general or specific.” 

Doe v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff only asserts Defendants

are subject to specific personal jurisdiction in the instant case. (Opp., p. 5.) 

The Ninth Circuit applies a three prong test to determine whether the exercise of specific

personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is appropriate: 

(1) the non-resident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the

forum or perform some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of

conducting activities in the forum; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or results

from the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) exercise of jurisdiction must be

reasonable. 

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004); Ballard v. Savage,

65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). 

All three prongs of the test must be met to establish specific personal jurisdiction. 

McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 817-18 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff bears the

burden of satisfying the the first two prongs of the test. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. If a

plaintiff satisfies the first two prongs, “the burden then shifts to the defendant to ‘present a

compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. 

1. Purposeful Availment 

In the contract context, plaintiffs must show the defendant “purposefully availed” itself of

the privilege of conducting activities in the forum. Id. Plaintiff argues Defendants purposefully

availed themselves of the privileges of conducting activities in California by engaging in multiple

business transactions with Plaintiff. (Opp., p. 6.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends this prong is met

because Defendants entered a business relationship with a California-based company; mailed

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payments to California for products that were shipped from California; and communicated more

than one hundred times with personnel in California. (Opp., p. 6.) For the following reasons, the

Court disagrees. 

In determining whether purposeful availment exists, a court analyzes the nonresident’s

deliberate activities within the forum in light of the nature of its contract with the forum resident. 

See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985). “Purposeful availment requires

that the defendant engage in some form of affirmative conduct allowing or promoting the

transaction of business within the forum state.” Doe, 112 F.3d at 1051. A court should examine

the circumstances surrounding the contract, including “prior negotiations[,] contemplated future

consequences ... the terms of the contract, and the parties actual course of dealing.” See Burger

King Corp., 471 U.S. at 478. 

It is clear that the existence of a contract between an out of state defendant and a California

plaintiff is insufficient, by itself, to justify personal jurisdiction. Id. Additionally, the mere use of

interstate mail, telephone or wire services is insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. Bowen v.

Lancaster, No. 08-00159, 2008 WL 1986036, at *4 (C.D. Cal. April 30, 2008) (citing Bell Paper

Box, Inc. v. Trans W. Polymers, 53 F.3d 920, 922-23 (8th Cir. 1995)). 

Here, the Court finds the Plaintiff has not established that Renaissance purposefully availed

itself of the privileges of conducting activities in California. First, the parties negotiated and

executed the business arrangement from their respective states, California and Texas. Second,

Renassiance personnel never traveled to California throughout the course of the parties’

relationship. Third, Renaissance’s product orders were all completed through Plaintiff’s Texasbased sales representative. Fourth, the fact that Renaissance entered into a business arrangement

with Plaintiff, a California resident, does not establish purposeful availment. Fifth, Renaissance

telephonically communicating to Plaintiff personnel in California is additionally insufficient to

establish purposeful availment.

Because Plaintiff’s failed to demonstrate that Defendants purposefully availed themselves of

the benefits and protections of this forum, the Court need not address the remaining prongs of the

specific personal jurisdiction test. The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to make a prime facie

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showing of jurisdiction in the instant case. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction is GRANTED. 

B. VENUE 

In light of the above, the Court finds Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for improper venue or,

in the alternative, to transfer the case to the Southern District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1406(a) is MOOT. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

for lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for improper venue or to transfer

venue is therefore MOOT. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to close the file in this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: July 22, 2011

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

Case 3:11-cv-00765-BEN-MDD Document 21 Filed 07/22/11 Page 7 of 7