Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05081/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05081-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 24, 2011 Decided April 27, 2012

 Reissued May 3, 2012

No. 11-5081

MASHOUR ABDULLAH MUQBEL ALSABRI,

PETITIONER-APPELLANT

v.

BARACK OBAMA, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:06-cv-01767)

Brian J. Neff argued the cause for appellant. Donald A.

Klein was on the briefs.

Michael P. Abate, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Tony

West, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert M. Loeb,

Attorney.

Before: GARLAND and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

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2

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Petitioner Mashour Abdullah

Muqbel Alsabri, a detainee at the United States Naval Station at

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, appeals the district court’s denial of his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons set forth

below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.1

I

The facts leading to the petitioner’s detention are

extensively chronicled in the district court’s opinion. See

Alsabri v. Obama, 764 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 2011). The

following synopsis relies on the district court’s most significant

findings.

Alsabri is a Yemeni citizen who was born and raised in

Saudi Arabia. He lived in Saudi Arabia until he was deported to

Yemen in 1998, following an arrest for allegedly harboring an

individual wanted for passport forgery. In Yemen, he associated

with veteran jihadist fighters, including members of al Qaeda,

and decided to travel to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban or

al Qaeda. In the summer of 2000, he traveled to Afghanistan by

way of Pakistan, assisted by the Taliban and in the company of

several men who expressed a desire to become martyrs. Once

in Afghanistan, Alsabri stayed at several guesthouses affiliated

with the Taliban and al Qaeda. He actively sought out and

received military training from the Taliban or al Qaeda, and

thereafter -- with the authorization of one of Osama bin Laden’s

lieutenants -- traveled to the front lines of the Taliban’s fight

against the Northern Alliance. 

All descriptions of facts and events are taken from unclassified

1

or declassified documents and briefs that are on the public record in

this case. There are no redactions from the opinion.

USCA Case #11-5081 Document #1372103 Filed: 05/03/2012 Page 2 of 22
3

After leaving the front, Alsabri went to Jalalabad,

Afghanistan. As Coalition forces approached that city in late

2001, following al Qaeda’s September 11, 2001 attacks against

the United States, Alsabri fled eastward to a village near the

border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. There he says he remained

for nearly a month before crossing into Pakistan, where he was

captured by Pakistani authorities in early 2002. The Pakistanis

turned Alsabri over to the custody of the United States military,

and he was subsequently transferred to Guantanamo Bay.

In October 2006, Alsabri filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. The petition was held in abeyance until the Supreme

Court ruled, in Boumediene v. Bush, that aliens detained as

enemy combatants at Guantanamo are “entitled to the privilege

of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention,”

553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008), and that the federal courts have

jurisdiction over such challenges, id. at 791-92. In November

2010, the district court held a four-day habeas hearing. 

Following the hearing, the court concluded, based on a

preponderance of the evidence, that “the petitioner was part of

the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated forces and is therefore

lawfully detained.” Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 62; see id. at 96. 

The court based its conclusion on five findings: (1) that Alsabri

traveled to Afghanistan for the purpose of fighting with the

Taliban or al Qaeda; (2) that once in Afghanistan he stayed at

multiple Taliban and al Qaeda guesthouses; (3) that he sought

and received military training from the Taliban or al Qaeda; (4)

that he traveled to the front lines of the Taliban’s battle against

the Northern Alliance; and (5) that he remained a part of the

Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces at the time of his capture.

On appeal, Alsabri raises several challenges to the district

court’s denial of his habeas petition. First, he disputes certain

factual findings by the district court, as well as its ultimate

conclusion that he was part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or

USCA Case #11-5081 Document #1372103 Filed: 05/03/2012 Page 3 of 22
4

associated forces. Second, he argues that the district court

committed procedural error in admitting certain pieces of

evidence over his objections. Finally, he maintains that the

court’s decision rests on several legal errors. We address

Alsabri’s factual disputes in Part II, his evidentiary objections in

Part III, and his legal arguments in Part IV.

II

Following al Qaeda’s attacks against the United States,

Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force

(AUMF), which provides:

[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and

appropriate force against those nations, organizations,

or persons he determines planned, authorized,

committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred

on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations

or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of

international terrorism against the United States by

such nations, organizations or persons.

Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50

U.S.C. § 1541 note). We have held that the AUMF grants the

President the authority “to detain individuals who are ‘part of

forces associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban.’” Khan v.

Obama, 655 F.3d 20, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Al-Bihani v.

Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). Applying that

standard to the facts of this case, the district court held that “the

petitioner was part of the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated forces

and is therefore lawfully detained.” Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at

62. 

The district court’s decision denying the writ presents a

mixed question of law and fact. See Khan, 655 F.3d at 26; Awad

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v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2010). We review the

court’s specific factual determinations about what happened --

why Alsabri traveled to Afghanistan, where he stayed, and what

he did -- for clear error, see Khan, 655 F.3d at 26; Barhoumi v.

Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2010), which we may find

only if, “‘on the entire evidence,’ we are ‘left with the definite

and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,’”

Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 423 (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City,

470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). The “question whether evidence is

sufficiently reliable to credit is [also] one we review for clear

error.” Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see

Khan, 655 F.3d at 26; Awad, 608 F.3d at 8. The district court’s

overall conclusion as to “whether a detainee’s alleged conduct

is sufficient to make him part of” the Taliban, al Qaeda, or

associated forces for purposes of the AUMF, however, is a

“legal question[] that we review de novo.” Khan, 655 F.3d at 26

(internal quotation marks omitted); see Al Alwi, 653 F.3d at 16;

Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 423.

A

We begin with the district court’s determination that Alsabri

traveled to Afghanistan for the purpose of fighting with the

Taliban or al Qaeda. The court based that determination on four

subsidiary findings regarding: (a) Alsabri’s association with

veteran jihadists while in Yemen; (b) the role of a former

Taliban fighter in encouraging Alsabri to travel to Afghanistan;

(c) the influence of a fatwa issued by two Saudi clerics; and (d)

Alsabri’s travel route and travel companions. Alsabri contests

various individual pieces of evidence underlying these findings,

but he does not dispute the greater part of the evidence on which

the district court relied. Indeed, the court’s findings are

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supported primarily by Alsabri’s own admissions, which he has

not repudiated.2

Alsabri concedes that, at some point before traveling to

Afghanistan, he stayed for approximately two weeks at a

boardinghouse in Sana’a, Yemen with a group of veteran

fighters. At least two of them were members of the Taliban or

al Qaeda; one would go on to become one of the suicide

bombers of the U.S.S. Cole. See Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 63,

72-76; Pet’r Br. 8-9. After leaving the boardinghouse, Alsabri

maintained relationships with several of those individuals and

inquired about the whereabouts of one of them while he was in

Afghanistan. Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (citing GTMO

Intelligence Report at 3 (Jan. 10, 2004) (J.A. 818)). Although

not dispositive, such “evidence of association with other al

Qaeda members is itself probative” of membership in al Qaeda

or associated forces. Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 405

(D.C. Cir. 2011). Alsabri also admits that two of the primary

influences on his decision to travel to Afghanistan were his

discussions with a formerTaliban fighter who told Alsabri about

his military training, and a fatwa issued by two Saudi clerics 3

Alsabri’s admissions were recorded in interrogation reports, as

2

to which the district court found “ample evidence . . . to support their

reliability.” Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 68. The court observed that

the reports were largely based on Alsabri’s personal knowledge, that

they were “replete with specific details,” and that there was “no

evidence that any of the statements were elicited through undue

coercion.” Id. The court also noted that many of the admissions upon

which it relied were “repeated by the petitioner in multiple

interrogations and corroborated by the statements of third-party

detainees.” Id.

Alsabri contends that this individual only encouraged him to go

3

to Afghanistan to find a wife and a job and to enjoy “peace and

security.” Pet’r Br. 48. The district court reasonably discounted that

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who encouraged Islamic men to go to Afghanistan to assist the

Taliban. Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 76-80; see Interrogation

Report at 3 (Feb. 21, 2002) (J.A. 788); Interrogation Report at

5 (May 24, 2002) (J.A. 803).

Alsabri further states that, upon departing Sana’a, he flew

to Karachi, Pakistan, and then traveled on to Quetta, Pakistan,

before finally crossing the border into Afghanistan and arriving

at a guesthouse in Kandahar. Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 81

(citing, inter alia, Interrogation Report at 6 (Feb. 21, 2002) (J.A.

791)); see Interrogation Report at 5-6 (May 24, 2002) (J.A. 803-

04). This is the same route taken by the detainee in the Uthman

case, which we described as “a common al Qaeda route” that

“can be probative evidence that the traveler was part of al

Qaeda.” 637 F.3d at 405-06; see Al Odah v. United States, 611

F.3d 8, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Moreover, while in Quetta, Alsabri

stayed at a guesthouse known as the “Daftar al-Taliban,” which

Alsabri understood was operated by the Taliban. Alsabri, 764

F. Supp. 2d at 83 (citing interrogation reports). The district

court found that Taliban personnel at that house “arranged for

[Alsabri’s] entry into Afghanistan.” Id. 

After spending two or three days at Daftar al-Taliban,

Alsabri traveled by taxi with three other men to the border of

contention, both because there was no credible evidence that Alsabri

ever looked for a job or pursued marriage prospects while in

Afghanistan, and because it was facially implausible to expect that

Afghanistan would provide peace and security in the midst of the

ongoing conflict between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.

Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 77-78. The district court further noted

Alsabri’s admission that he did not tell anyone, including his family,

that he was planning to travel to Afghanistan. See id. at 64. As the

court said, this lends additional support to the conclusion that he did

not travel to Afghanistan for a benign purpose. Id. at 78.

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Afghanistan. Id. at 81. One of them told Alsabri that he was

going to Afghanistan for jihad, and all three told him that they

intended to become martyrs. Id. (citing Interrogation Report at

3 (July 17, 2002) (J.A. 832); Interrogation Report at 2 (July 18,

2002) (J.A. 838)). At the border, the men switched from the taxi

to motorcycles because, Alsabri said, motorcycles “were not

required to stop at the border.” Interrogation Report at 1 (Feb.

27, 2002) (J.A. 808). Then, once inside Afghanistan, the taxi

picked the men up again and took them to a guesthouse in

Kandahar. Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 81. As the district court

noted, “the elaborate arrangements made by the Taliban office

in Quetta to ferry the petitioner across the border without

detection by border patrol calls into question the legitimacy” of

Alsabri’s contention that he was traveling to Afghanistan for a

purpose other than to join the Taliban and/or al Qaeda. Id.

In light of this evidence, considered as a whole, we find no

clear error in the district court’s conclusion “that the petitioner

traveled to Afghanistan in order to fight with the Taliban, alQaida or associated enemy forces.” Id. at 82. Although such an

“intention to fight is inadequate by itself to make someone ‘part

of’” the Taliban or al Qaeda, “it is nonetheless compelling

evidence when . . . it accompanies additional evidence of

conduct consistent with an effectuation of that intent.” Awad,

608 F.3d at 9. As discussed below, the district court properly

found that, after entering Afghanistan, Alsabri took furthersteps

consistent with that intent. 

B

The district court found that “throughout his time in

Afghanistan, the petitioner stayed at multiple guesthouses that

he knew were affiliated with al-Qaida and the Taliban.” Alsabri,

764 F. Supp. 2d at 88. Alsabri does not dispute this finding. See

Oral Arg. Recording at 2:30-2:45. In light of the evidence that

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al Qaeda-associated guesthouses were not generally open to the

public, see Expert Decl. at 3 (Sept. 19, 2008) (J.A. 870), this

court has recognized that staying at such houses can be

“powerful” evidence that a detainee was part of al Qaeda and/or

the Taliban. Uthman, 637 F.3d at 406; see Almerfedi v. Obama,

654 F.3d 1, 6 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642

F.3d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d

1102, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2. 

The Kandahar guesthouse where Alsabri stayed after his

taxi trip from Pakistan was the Haji Habash house. Alsabri, 764

F. Supp. 2d at 83-84. Alsabri concedes that Haji Habash was a

Taliban guesthouse operated by an al Qaeda leader, id. (citing

interrogation reports), and he admits that it served as a staging

ground for “‘people from different nations’” who “‘were there

waiting to go on training missions at either [the] Al Farouq or

Abu Baida’” training camps, Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 84

(quoting GTMO Intelligence Report at 2). Alsabri turned over 4

his passport when he arrived, id., which was consistent with

“‘standard al Qaeda and Taliban operating procedure[]’ when

checking into an al Qaeda guesthouse in Afghanistan,” Uthman,

637 F.3d at 406 (quoting Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 15). He also

admits that, during his stay at Haji Habash, he paid a daily visit

to the al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic Institute across the street. 

Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (citing interrogation reports). As

the district court noted, statements by other Guantanamo

detainees confirmed that the “Institute was headed by Abu Hafs

al-Mauritania, a senior al-Qaida leader who associated with

high-ranking Taliban and al-Qaida leaders.” Id.; see Esmail v.

See also Expert Decl. at 3 (Sept. 19, 2008) (J.A. 870) (describing

4

the Haji Habash guesthouse as “a Taliban-sponsored guesthouse for

Arab mujahedeen in Kandahar”); id. (stating that Haji Habash “was

used as a transition point and in-processing location for individuals

going to train at various training camps, including al-Farouq”).

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Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (describing the

Institute as “al Qaeda-affiliated”).

After leaving the Haji Habash guesthouse, Alsabri’s next

stop was a guesthouse in Kabul run by one of Osama bin

Laden’s lieutenants, Hamza al-Ghamdi. See Alsabri, 764 F.

Supp. 2d at 85 & n.36 (citing statements by several detainees

describing al-Ghamdi’s role in al Qaeda). This was an

important stop for at least two reasons. First, while at this

house, Alsabri observed a visit by Ramsi bin al-Shibh, who has

been identified as a coordinator of the September 11 terrorist

attacks. See Resp’ts Br. 22; Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 86

(citing Interrogation Report at 5; THE 9/11 COMMISSION

REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST

ATTACKSUPON THE UNITED STATES, at 434 (2004)). It is hardly

unreasonable to infer that al-Ghamdi would not have allowed a

non-affiliated guest to stay at the house during a visit by

someone as important to al Qaeda as bin al-Shibh. Second,

al-Ghamdi himself played an important role in determining who

was to receive military training and in arranging the travel of

fighters to the front lines. See Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 85 &

n.36 (citing detainee statements). As we have recognized, a

detainee’s “voluntary decision to move to an al-Qaida

guesthouse, a staging area for recruits heading for a military

training camp, makes it more likely -- indeed, very likely -- that

[the detainee] was himself a recruit.” Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at

1108. Moreover, as discussed below, Alsabri admitted that he

repeatedly sought al-Ghamdi’s permission to go to the battle

lines and eventually succeeded in obtaining his permission

during a return visit to al-Ghamdi’s house. Alsabri, 764 F.

Supp. 2d at 85-86. 

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11

Taken together, this evidence regarding Alsabri’s stays at

the Haji Habash and al-Ghamdi guesthouses provides powerful 5

support for the district court’s conclusion that Alsabri was “part

of” the Taliban or al Qaeda.

C

Alsabri’s associations with the Taliban and al Qaeda were

not limited to interacting with their members and staying at their

guesthouses. Rather, the district court found that Alsabri also

actively “sought out and received military-style training from

the Taliban or al-Qaida” during his time in Afghanistan. 

Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 62. Those findings are not clearly

erroneous. 

To begin with, the government introduced an English

translation of a document appearing to be Alsabri’s application

to attend an al Qaeda training camp. Id. at 89; see J.A. 945. 

According to a March 2002 FBI memorandum, the document

was one of several “applications for training at Al Qaeda camps”

that Coalition forces recovered from an “‘Arab’ office in

Kandahar, Afghanistan” in December 2001. Alsabri, 764 F.

Supp. 2d at 89 (citing FBI Memorandum at 1). The document

includes an entry listing one of the kunyas, or aliases, that

Alsabri used while in Afghanistan, along with biographical

details consistent with those of Alsabri’s life. Id.; see J.A. 945. 

The document also states that the applicant was “referred to the

camp” by two individuals, one of whom Alsabri acknowledges

was an al Qaeda member he met in Sana’a. Alsabri, 764 F.

Supp. 2d at 89 (citing J.A. 945). At the conclusion of this entry,

The district court also found that, after departing the al-Ghamdi

5

guesthouse for the second time, Alsabri “stayed in at least one other

Taliban and al-Qaida guesthouse near the front.” Alsabri, 764 F.

Supp. 2d at 88.

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the applicant lists his “‘[p]lans after training’” as: “‘Jihad.’” Id.

(quoting J.A. 945). 

Alsabri does not dispute that he is the individual referenced

in that document. Instead, he argues only that “[t]here was no

evidence in the record that the [document] was filled out by

[Alsabri], rather than by [a Taliban] recruiter or someone else

using information that Alsabri provided.” Pet’r Br. 49 n.7. But

it is immaterial whether Alsabri filled out the application

himself, or simply provided his biographical information to

someone who then transcribed it. The important point is that

Alsabri provided detailed personal information about himself on

a document that indicates his desire to obtain military training

for the purpose of engaging in jihad.

In addition to the application document, the government

introduced evidence that Alsabri did in fact receive weapons

training. The principal evidence was an English-language

translation of a 92-page collection of documents that the

government maintains were internal Taliban or al Qaeda

records. A Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) record, which

the government submitted as a supplemental exhibit, indicates

that the documents were captured by Coalition forces from the

“Director of Al–Qa’ida Security Training Office,” and are

“similar to other materials recovered from enemy forces.” 

Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 90-91 (internal quotation marks

omitted). The DIA, which prepared the translation of the

documents, describes them as “contain[ing] [t]he names of the

students admitted to the training in the tactics of [a]rtillery,

communication, infantry and their distribution,” as well as the

“training starting times, programs, [and] instructions about the

subject matters.” Id. at 91.

The documents include multiple entries that appear to be

references to Alsabri: his kunya, for example, appears on a list

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13

of “arriving brothers” in September 2000, along with

biographical information that matches the information provided

in the application document that Alsabri does not deny refers to

him. See id. at 91-92; J.A. 989; Resp’ts Br. 34-35. Indeed, at

oral argument, counsel for Alsabri conceded that the entry on

the “arriving brothers” list also refers to him. Oral Arg.

Recording at 15:45-16:15. 

6

The same kunya that appears on the “arriving brothers” list

-- or another transliteration thereof -- also appears on a roster of

individuals scheduled to attend a “communications class” in

February 2001. Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 91-92; see J.A. 975. 

Another page of the document collection shows that as of

August 2001, that individual had “‘graduated from Anti Air

Missiles’” class. Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (quoting J.A.

1018). As a consequence, he was to be given “‘priorit[y] in

joining the Artillery Session[]’” scheduled for the next day. Id.

Alsabri contends that the district court erred in concluding

that the records of scheduled and completed training refer to

him, arguing that the “names that comprise his alleged kunya --

‘Salman’ (meaning ‘peaceful’) and ‘al Makki’ (‘from Mecca’)--

are extremely common -- essentially, the Arabic equivalent of

‘Bob, from New York.’” Pet’r Br. 50. But the district court did

not clearly err in finding that the documents refer to Alsabri. 

The court carefully canvassed the evidence, noting that the

Alsabri does take issue with the district court’s reference to this

6

“arriving brothers” list as a “training roster.” Pet’r Br. 42. Given the

context provided by the remainder of the documents, however, the

district court’s characterization of the list is not clearly erroneous. But

even if the document is “merely a list of guesthouse residents,” as

Alsabri contends, id., that would not render the district court’s finding

that he received military training clearly erroneous, for the reasons

discussed in the balance of this section.

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internal corroboration of the names, dates, and biographical

information in the various records “provides substantial

evidence of their authenticity and reliability,” and that the

significant overlap between the documents and Alsabri’s

statements to interrogators -- including his statements regarding

his travel companions, several of whose names or aliases also

appear in the training records -- “provide[s] furthersupport” for

the government’s assertions. Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 91-92;

cf. Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 428 (assessing the reliability of a

translated diary “by evaluating the diary’s internal coherence as

well as its consistency with uncontested record evidence,

including [the detainee’s] own statements”).

To buttress its conclusion that Alsabri received military

training, the district court also properly relied on the sequence

of Alsabri’s requests to travel to the front lines. Alsabri, 764 F.

Supp. 2d at 92-93. Alsabri told his interrogators that he asked

al-Ghamdi for permission to go to the Taliban battle lines at

least twice. Id. The first time, “Al-Ghamdi denied that request

‘since he did not have any weapons training.’” Id. at 93

(quoting Interrogation Report at 4). Alsabri then traveled to

Jalalabad. After several months there, he “‘decided to return to

Al Ghamdi’s Arab house in Kabul to try and get to the fighting

at the front line.’” Id. (quoting Interrogation Report at 5). This

time, al-Ghamdi “‘finally authorized [him] to go to the 2nd line

of defense near Bagram.’” Id. at 86 (quoting Interrogation

Report at 6). In light of this evidence, the district court was not

unreasonable in inferring “that between his first and second

stays at al-Ghamdi’s guesthouse, [Alsabri] remedied the

deficiency identified by al-Ghamdi by obtaining weapons

training.” Id. at 93. And, as we have held before, “training at 7

Noting that only one of several interrogation reports mentions

7

the first request to travel to the front, Alsabri’s counsel suggests that

the report may have been inaccurate -- perhaps “due to a translation

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. . . al Qaeda training camps is compelling evidence that the

trainee was part of al Qaeda.” Esmail, 639 F.3d at 1076; see AlMadhwani, 642 F.3d at 1075; Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1108;

Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2.

D

Alsabri’s admission that, with al-Ghamdi’s authorization,

he traveled to the battle lines of the Taliban’s fight against the

Northern Alliance just months before his capture also weighs

heavily in favor of the conclusion that he was part of the Taliban

or al Qaeda. Alsabri “admitted in two separate interrogations

that he went to the front to assist Taliban fighters.” Alsabri, 764

F. Supp. 2d at 94 (emphasis added); see Interrogation Report at

3 (Feb. 27, 2002) (J.A. 810) (“During the later part of the year,

Al-Sabri began traveling to Bagram to assist Taliban fighters in

their efforts against the Northern Alliance fighters.”);

Interrogation Report at 6 (July 17, 2002) (J.A. 835) (stating that

he went to the front “to support the Taliban who were positioned

to fight [Massoud’s] Northern Alliance troops”). Although 8

Alsabri did not admit to actively participating in the fighting, he

conceded that “there was fighting going on there,” and that he

error, or because the interrogators misunderstood what Alsabri said,

or because they misread their own notes from the interrogation.” Pet’r

Br. 26-27. But counsel’s speculation cannot alone render reliance on

the report unreasonable, particularly given the absence of any

declaration by Alsabri himself that he did not make the initial request.

Alsabri’s counsel suggests that these admissions of his purpose

8

to assist Taliban fighters may merely “have been the interrogators’

gloss on what Alsabri said.” Pet’r Br. 53. But as we have just noted,

supra note 7, Alsabri never filed a declaration denying that he made

the statements or suggesting they were untrue, and counsel’s

speculation is insufficient to render the district court’s reliance on the

statements unreasonable.

USCA Case #11-5081 Document #1372103 Filed: 05/03/2012 Page 15 of 22
16

was “always armed.” Interrogation Report at 6 (May 24, 2002)

(J.A. 804). 

Alsabri now maintains that he traveled to the front lines

solely “out of curiosity and to visit a friend,” Pet’r Br. 53, an

explanation that the district court was entitled to discredit in

light of his previous admissions. As the district court further

noted, it is difficult to believe that “Taliban fighters would allow

an individual to infiltrate their posts near a battle zone unless

that person was understood to be a part of the Taliban.” Alsabri,

764 F. Supp. 2d at 94 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In response to the latter point, Alsabri calls our attention “to

an expert report explaining that there was a long history” of the

Taliban permitting individuals who were not “member[s] of

their forces (or of al-Qaida) to visit” the battle lines. Pet’r Br.

43-44. The expert described this kind of travel as a “jihad

tour[]” for “so-called ‘Gucci jihad[i]s.’” Decl. of Dr. Brian

Williams ¶ 10 (Jan. 1, 2009) (J.A. 1496). But even if his

expert’s report is correct, Alsabri admits that he was never a

“Gucci jihadi.” See Pet’r Br. 44; Oral Arg. Recording at 17:45-

17:50. Nor could he have claimed to be, given that Gucci

jihadis -- as the name suggests -- were usually “wealthy (at least

byAfghan standards),” Pet’r Br. 43, while Alsabri was indigent. 

Moreover, as the district court properly found, the fact that

Alsabri sought and received authorization to travel to the battle

lines from al-Ghamdi, a senior al Qaeda leader, indicates that he

was not acting as an independent “freelancer,” but rather as a

part of the Taliban or al Qaeda. Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 94;

cf. Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

E

Finally, although Alsabri does not specifically challenge it,

the district court’s further finding that he remained a part of the

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17

Taliban or al Qaeda at the time of his capture, “just months”

after he left the front lines, Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 95, is also

not clearly erroneous. Alsabri proffers no evidence that he took

steps to dissociate himself from those groups in the months

between his departure from the battle lines and his capture. Nor

did the district court commit clear error in rejecting as

implausible Alsabri’s story concerning his whereabouts during

that period: that he first went to Jalalabad, and then fled to a

village near the Pakistan border, where he spent a month waiting

patiently for a friend to return his passport. The district court

reasonably concluded that it was “not credible” that Alsabri

“would have waited a month in a hostile war zone simply to

retrieve his passport, given that he had entered the country

surreptitiously in the first place.” Id. Alsabri’s inability to

recall the name of the village where he said he waited, despite

his “demonstrated ability to recall specific details about names

and locations” in other contexts, casts further doubt on that

story. Id. Indeed, as the district court found, Alsabri’s

“descriptions of his time” in the period before his capture were

“strikingly vague when compared to his accounts of other

periods in Yemen and Afghanistan.” Id. at 96. Moreover, he

“provided no evidence that he established contacts with anyone

in Afghanistan outside the Taliban/al–Qaida network, that he

took any steps to obtain employment or that he took any other

affirmative actions inconsistent with being ‘part of’ al-Qaida” or

the Taliban. Id.

-----------------------

In sum, we discern no clear error in the district court’s

findings “that the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan to fight with

the Taliban or al-Qaida, stayed at Taliban or al-Qaida

guesthouses, received military training at [an] al-Qaida facility,

traveled to the battle lines” of the Taliban’s fight against the

Northern Alliance, and did not “dissociate[ from] these enemy

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18

forces at any point prior to his capture.” 764 F. Supp. 2d at 96.

And like the district court, we conclude that “[e]ven if none of

these findings would independentlyjustifyhis detention, viewed

as a whole, they plainly establish that the petitioner was ‘part of’

the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated enemy” forces, so as to

render his detention lawful under the AUMF. Id.9

III

Alsabri also contends that the district court erred by

considering two pieces of evidence over his objections: the DIA

document the government offered to authenticate the 92-page

collection of training records; and the text of a fatwa authored

by Sheikh Hammoud al Aqla, one of the two Saudi religious

scholars who issued the fatwa that Alsabri said influenced his

decision to travel to Afghanistan. Pet’r Br. 30-37; see Alsabri,

764 F. Supp. 2d at 79-80, 90-91 & n.40. We review the district

court’s evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion. See Khan,

655 F.3d at 25; Al Alwi, 653 F.3d at 15.

Alsabri objects to the district court’s consideration of the

DIA document on the ground that it was not in the record prior

to the merits hearing. Rather, the government offered the

document on rebuttal in response to Alsabri’s challenge to the

92-page collection as unreliable. In permitting the government

to respond, the district court did not abuse its “broad discretion

in determining whether to admit or exclude rebuttal evidence.” 

United States v. Fench, 470 F.2d 1234, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 

To the contrary, we have previously held it “proper[ to] afford[]

the government an opportunity to submit ‘sufficient additional

By the same token, “we do not imply that all of the evidence in

9

this case is necessary to find someone part of” al Qaeda or the

Taliban; “we hold only that the evidence in this case is sufficient” for

such a finding. Uthman, 637 F.3d at 407 n.8.

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information . . . permit[ting the factfinder] to assess [the]

reliability’” of a document that, “standing alone, lacked

adequate indicia of reliability.” Khan, 655 F.3d at 27 (quoting

Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725-26). Moreover, although Alsabri

protests that he “had no meaningful opportunity to respond to

the . . . document,” Pet’r Br. 35, the district court told Alsabri’s

counsel that he would “have an opportunity to examine” the

exhibit and that, “if something arises after you examine it that

prompts you to believe that you should be heard or that the

record should be supplemented, you will be permitted [to] do

that,” Hr’g Tr. at 39 (Nov. 15, 2010) (J.A. 754). Alsabri did not

take advantage of that opportunity.

10

Alsabri objects to the court’s consideration of the fatwa on

the ground that there was no evidence that the al Aqla fatwa that

was read into the record was the same one that influenced his

decision to travel to Afghanistan: the fatwa he read, he says,

urged believers to go to Afghanistan “to assist” the Taliban,

Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 79 (quoting Interrogation Report at

5 (May 24, 2002) (J.A. 803)), while the one the government read

into the record urged them “‘to assist the Taliban Regime and to

make Jihad,’” in a context indicating that the call was to take up

arms in the Taliban’s war against the Northern Alliance, id.

(emphasis added) (quoting Gov’t’s Mot. for Judgment on the

Record at 12-13 (June 4, 2010) (J.A. 297-98)). Although the 11

Although Alsabri also challenges the court’s consideration of

10

the document on the ground that it was never entered into evidence,

Pet’r Br. 36 n.3, the record reveals otherwise, see Hr’g Tr. at 39 (Nov.

15, 2010) (J.A. 754).

Alsabri also objects on the ground that the fatwa was not

11

included as an exhibit to the government’s factual return. Although

this might have given the district court discretion to exclude it, the

court’s contrary decision was not an abuse of discretion because as

early as June 2010, the government had provided Alsabri with a

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20

district court acknowledged that the fatwa proffered by the

government might not have been “the exact fatwa that

influenced the petitioner,” 764 F. Supp. 2d at 79, the court

concluded that it was still probative because it was “written by

the same cleric[] about the same conflict during roughly the

same time period” and was consistent with al Aqla fatwas

described by other detainees, id. at 80 n.30; see id. at 79 & n.28. 

Moreover, the court noted, “given the petitioner’s documented

awareness of the conflict in Afghanistan, it is not plausible that

the petitioner could have understood the . . . call to ‘assist the

Taliban’ as anything other than a call to take up arms.” Id. at

80. In any event, even if the admission of the fatwa were error,

it was harmless: the fatwa was plainly the least significant of at

least four factors that amply support the court’s finding that

Alsabri traveled to Afghanistan for the purpose of fighting with

the Taliban or al Qaeda. See supra Part II.A.12

translation of the fatwa’s text and the archived internet address where

it could be found. See Gov’t’s Mot. for Judgment on the Record at

12-13 (June 4, 2010) (J.A. 297-98).

Alsabri further objects to the district court’s reliance on

12

statements by Humud Dakhil al-Jadani, another detainee at

Guantanamo Bay, whom Alsabri characterizes as an “admitted liar.”

Pet’r Br. 27-28. But the court closely scrutinized al-Jadani’s

statements, relying only on those that were sufficiently corroborated

by other evidence in the record. See, e.g., Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at

79 n.28, 84 nn.34-35, 85 n.36. In any event, the only statements by

al-Jadani that Alsabri contends should not have been admitted -- that

the Haji Habash guesthouse was guarded by a Taliban guard and that

the Islamic Institute was headed by a member of al Qaeda, see Pet’r

Br. 27-28 -- are not seriously in dispute. Alsabri himself

acknowledged that Haji Habash was a “Taliban guesthouse,” Alsabri,

764 F. Supp. 2d at 83 (citing GTMO Intelligence Report at 2), and

statements by another Guantanamo detainee who worked at the

Islamic Institute confirm that the Institute was run by a senior alUSCA Case #11-5081 Document #1372103 Filed: 05/03/2012 Page 20 of 22
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IV

Finally, Alsabri charges that the district court committed a

number of legal errors that denied him a fair hearing. 

First, he contends that the district court’s Case Management

Order placed improper limitations on his discovery from the

government, an argument we rejected in the Al Alwi, AlMadhwani, and Bensayah cases. See Al Alwi, 653 F.3d at 25-26;

Al-Madhwani, 642 F.3d at 1077; Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 723-24. 

Second, he maintains that the court’s admission of hearsay

evidence, particularly reports of Alsabri’s own statements, was

error. We have repeatedly held, however, “that hearsay

evidence is admissible in this type of habeas proceeding if the

hearsay is reliable.” Awad, 608 F.3d at 7; see Khan, 655 F.3d at

26; Al Alwi, 653 F.3d at 19; Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 422, 432-33;

Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879. The question of whether evidence

is sufficiently reliable to credit is one we review for clear error,

Al Alwi, 653 F.3d at 19, and Alsabri offers no grounds for

finding clear error here, see, e.g., supra notes 2, 12. Third,

Alsabri maintains that the district court erred in applying a

preponderance-of-the-evidence rather than clear-andconvincing-evidence standard. But it “‘is now well-settled law

that a preponderance of the evidence standard is constitutional

in considering a habeas petition from an individual detained

pursuant to authority granted by the AUMF.’” Khan, 655 F.3d

at 26 (quoting Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 13); see Almerfedi, 654 F.3d

Qaeda leader, see Interrogation Report at 1 (Dec. 3, 2002) (J.A. 820);

see also Esmail, 639 F.3d at 1076 (describing the Islamic Institute as

“al Qaeda-affiliated”).

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22

at 5; Al-Madhwani, 642 F.3d at 1078; Awad, 608 F.3d at 10-

11.13

As is apparent, all of Alsabri’s legal arguments are

foreclosed by Circuit precedent, a point his counsel forthrightly

acknowledges. See Pet’r Br. 60 n.10. As is appropriate, counsel

notes his disagreement with our rulings and includes the

arguments in order to preserve the issues. Id.

V

For the foregoing reasons, we reject Alsabri’s challenge to

the district court’s conclusion that he was “part of” the Taliban

or al Qaeda. We therefore affirm the court’s determination that

Alsabri is lawfully detained pursuant to the AUMF.

So ordered.

Alsabri also argues that the district court improperly shifted the

13

preponderance burden from the government to him on two subsidiary

factual issues, one involving the fatwa he saw in Yemen and the other

involving the training documents that contained his kunya. Pet’r Br.

62. As was true in Al-Bihani, we believe this argument is “based on

a strained reading” of the district court’s decision. 590 F.3d at 881.

The district court did not require Alsabri to prove anything. It simply

found that the government’s evidence on these matters was sufficient

in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.

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