Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01146/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01146-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAO YING SUN,

Plaintiff,

v.

IKEA US WEST, INC,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-01146-MEJ 

DISCOVERY ORDER

Re: Dkt. No. 17

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Shao Ying Sun (“Plaintiff”) seeks production of an incident report prepared by 

Defendant Ikea US West, Inc. (“Defendant”) after a shopping cart on Defendant’s premises struck 

her. Dkt. No. 17. Having considered the parties’ positions, relevant legal authority, and the record 

in this case, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on September 7, 2013, while standing at the check-out counter at 

Defendant’s Emeryville location, an employee negligently set a “low-pallet-type cart” in motion. 

Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6, Dkt. No. 1-1. Plaintiff contends the cart struck her, causing serious injuries. Id. ¶

6.

On April 24, 2015, Plaintiff served a Request for Production of Documents (“RPD”) on 

Defendant for “[a]ny and all DOCUMENTS pertaining to the INCIDENT, including any 

investigation of the INCIDENT.” Jt. Ltr. at 1. On May 29, 2015, Defendant initially objected to 

the request in its entirety as “vague and ambiguous,” but agreed to produce responsive documents 

Case 3:15-cv-01146-MEJ Document 18 Filed 11/04/15 Page 1 of 8
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in its possession. Resp. to RPD at 3.1 Subsequently, Defendant’s counsel informed Plaintiff that 

Defendant was unable to locate the incident report but would continue its search. Jt. Ltr. at 2. On 

July 22, Defendant served an amended response, objecting to production of the incident report “to 

the extent it calls for information under attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product 

doctrine.” Am. Resp. to RPD at 2.

After attempting to resolve their dispute informally, the parties filed the present letter on 

September 17, 2015. Plaintiff argues Defendant failed to raise a timely objection to the request for 

production of documents and therefore waived any objections. Jt. Ltr. at 4. Alternatively, 

Plaintiff argues Defendant failed to meet its burden of proving the incident report is protected 

under attorney work-product doctrine and attorney-client privilege. Id. In response, Defendant 

maintains its objections are timely since it did not know the incident report existed “after 

performing a reasonable and diligent search.” Id. at 5. Defendant claims to have acted in good 

faith by immediately notifying Plaintiff’s counsel once it located the document. Id. Defendant 

also maintains the incident report is protected by attorney work-product doctrine and attorneyclient privilege because it was “submitted to Defendant’s counsel and risk management 

department for the purpose of evaluating the potential litigation claim.” Id.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides that a party may obtain discovery “regarding 

any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(1). “Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears 

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id. A court “must limit 

the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by [the Federal] rules” if “(i) the discovery 

sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that 

is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had 

ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the burden or 

 

1

The parties filed the joint letter and Defendant’s responses as one docket entry at Docket Number 

17. For citation purposes and ease of reference, the parties are encouraged to file exhibits in future 

filings as separate attachments in the ECF system. 

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expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, 

the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the 

action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 

“The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from 

annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” including by (1) prohibiting 

disclosure or discovery; (2) conditioning disclosure or discovery on specified terms; (3) 

preventing inquiry into certain matters; or (4) limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to 

certain matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “Rule 26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court to 

decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.” Seattle 

Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984).

DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness of Objection

As a threshold matter, the Court must determine whether Defendant waived its right to 

object to Plaintiff’s request. Any party served with a request for production “must respond in 

writing within thirty days after being served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A). “It is well established 

that a failure to object to discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of any 

objection.” Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992). 

A privilege, however, is not waived “per se” if a party fails to assert the privilege in its initial 

response. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. D. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005).

“Although Rule 34 does not contain an express provision that untimely objections are waived, the 

courts have interpreted the rule regarding waiver consistent with Rule 33.” Liguori v. Hansen, 

2012 WL 760747, at *11 (D. Nev. Mar. 6, 2012) (internal quotation and citation omitted); see Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (“Any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for 

good cause, excuses the failure.”)

Accordingly, courts have broad discretion to excuse an untimely response based on a caseby-case determination. Burlington, 408 F.3d at 1149. Factors that establish good cause include

“(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the existence of bad faith; (4) the 

prejudice to the party seeking the disclosure; (5) the nature of the request; and (6) the harshness of 

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imposing the waiver.” Lam v. City & Cty. of S.F., 2015 WL 4498747, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 

2015). “Minor procedural violations, good faith attempts at compliance, and other such mitigating 

circumstances militate against finding waiver.” Bess v. Cate, 2008 WL 5100203, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 

Nov. 26, 2008) (citations omitted).

In this case, the Court finds good cause to excuse Defendant’s failure to respond in a 

timely manner. Although Defendant was five days late in its initial response to Plaintiff’s request 

for the incident report, it explained it was unable to locate the report “after performing a 

reasonable and diligent search,” but would continue to search. Jt. Ltr. at 2, 5. Once Defendant 

located the incident report, Defendant’s counsel informed Plaintiff “that an amended . . . response 

would be sent, including additional objections.” Id. at 2. Defendant served an amended response

thirty-three days after Plaintiff first alerted it that the incident report was not included in the initial

request. Id. Based on its initial response and subsequent communications with Plaintiff, the Court 

finds Defendant made a good faith effort to respond in a timely manner. See Jumping Turtle Bar 

& Grill v. San Marcos, 2010 WL 4687805, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2010) (finding defendant’s 

untimely response—approximately one and one half months after the initial response was due—

reasonable given the parties’ constant communication clarifying the scope of discovery and 

reviewing the documents responsive to the requests for production).

Plaintiff rejects Defendant’s explanation, arguing “Defendant produced extensive 

documentation of [company] policies and procedures regarding the preparation of incident 

reports.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff adds Defendant’s “employee manual provides eight pages on the 

[company’s] Incident Reporting System, as well as a sample incident report.” Id. Plaintiff argues 

these policies, along with the fact that Plaintiff remained on the store floor after the incident until 

paramedics arrived, make it reasonably apparent that an incident report likely existed. Id. at 3-4. 

However, while Defendant did produce general policy documents responsive to Plaintiff’s request, 

it maintains it was unable to locate the specific incident report, and there is no evidence Defendant 

did so in bad faith. See Moe v. Sys. Transp., Inc., 270 F.R.D. 613, 623 (D. Mont. 2010) (“Waiver 

of [a] privilege . . . is a harsh sanction reserved generally for unjustified, inexcusable, or bad faith 

conduct . . . .”); see also E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Store, Inc., 2002 WL 31947153, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

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Sept. 16, 2002) (“Finding that a party has waived its right to assert a privilege objection due to its 

conduct (or lack thereof) is a harsh sanction utilized where that party has unjustifiably delayed 

discovery.” (citation omitted)).

Further, Plaintiff does not argue she suffered prejudice as a result of the delay, and given 

that this case is in the early stages of litigation, the Court finds the slight delay does not prejudice 

her. See Karr v. Napolitano, 2012 WL 1965855, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2012) (“Perhaps most 

significantly, [plaintiff] has not expressed that he has been prejudiced in any way by the delay, and 

the court does not see how he would have been. And without any prejudice, the court believes that 

a complete waiver of Defendant’s objections would be a disproportionately harsh result.”). 

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds good cause to excuse 

Defendant’s untimely objections.

B. Attorney Work-Product Doctrine

Defendant asserts the incident report is privileged under attorney work-product doctrine

since it was prepared for anticipated litigation. Jt. Ltr. at 5. Plaintiff argues the incident report is

not protected because it is a business record created in the normal course of business, before any 

counsel was engaged, and pursuant to Defendant’s own policies and procedures. Id. at 4.

Although this is a personal injury case brought under the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, 

“issues concerning the work-product doctrine are procedural and thus governed by Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 26(b).” Great Am. Assurance Co. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 2d 

1084, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Bozzuto v. Cox, 255 F.R.D. 673, 677 (C.D. Cal. 2009)). The 

work-product doctrine “shelters the mental processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area 

within which he can analyze and prepare his client’s case.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 357 F.3d 

900, 907 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975)). The

doctrine prohibits discovery of “documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of 

litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); 

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947). However, materials prepared in the “ordinary 

course of business” are not considered attorney work product. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory 

committee’s note.

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Defendant fails to show it created the incident report outside the normal course of business. 

As noted above, Defendant provided extensive documentation detailing its Incident Reporting 

System, which indicates the incident report is a business record created in the normal course of 

business. Defendant offers no evidence to support its assertion that the report was created in 

anticipation of litigation. See Garcia v. El Centro, 214 F.R.D. 587, 593 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (“A more 

or less routine investigation of a possibly resistible claim is not sufficient to immunize [under the 

work product rule] an investigative report developed in the ordinary course of business.” (internal 

quotation and citation omitted)). Defendant’s policies require such a report regardless of whether 

Plaintiff brought this lawsuit. See United States v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 

1083 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (withholding work-product protection from any document “‘that would 

have been created in essentially similar form irrespective of the litigation.’” (quoting United States 

v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998))). Therefore, the Court finds the incident report is 

not protected by the attorney work-product doctrine.

C. Attorney-Client Privilege

Defendant argues the dominant and primary purpose for preparing incident reports such as 

the one at issue here is to evaluate potential litigation claims. Jt. Ltr. at 5. In support, Defendant 

offers that after the report was written, it was “submitted to Defendant’s counsel and risk 

management department.” Id.

In this diversity action, California law governs claims of attorney-client privilege. E-Pass 

Techs., Inc. v. Moses & Singer, LLP, 2011 WL 3794889, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2011) (citing 

Kaufman & Broad Monterey Bay v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 2011 WL 2181692, at *5 

(N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011)). Under California law, “the client . . . has a privilege to refuse to 

disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing,” any confidential “information transmitted 

between a client and his or her lawyer in the course of that relationship.” Cal. Evid. Code §§ 952, 

954. 

Corporations, limited liability companies, associations, and other such groups and entities 

who retain the legal services of an attorney are “clients” protected by the privilege. Id. §§ 175, 

951. Further, a communication between a company’s employee and its attorney may be privileged 

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if it is within the scope of the employee’s responsibilities to the company. D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. 

v. Superior Ct., 60 Cal. 2d 723, 737 (1964). If an employer requires an employee to give a report 

or statement in the ordinary course of business, the employer’s purpose determines whether the 

privilege applies. Id. (“If . . . the employer requires . . . that the employee make a report, the 

privilege of that report is to be determined by the employer’s purpose in requiring the same; that is 

to say, if the employer directs the making of the report for confidential transmittal to its attorney, 

the communication may be privileged.”). The party asserting the privilege has the burden of 

establishing the confidential communication was made in the course of the attorney-client 

relationship. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Ct., 47 Cal. 4th 725, 733 (2009). Such

“evidentiary privileges should be narrowly construed because they prevent the admission of 

relevant and otherwise admissible evidence.” McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 115 Cal. 

App. 4th 1229, 1236 (2004).

As discussed above, Defendant’s Incident Reporting System indicates the report was 

prepared in the normal course of business, within the scope of the employee’s responsibilities to 

the company. Thus, Defendant’s purpose in creating these incident reports determines whether the 

privilege applies. D.I. Chadbourne, 60 Cal. 2d at 737; see also Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Superior

Ct., 155 Cal. App. 4th 1485, 1497-98 (2007) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege may extend to 

communications involving middle- and lower-level employees . . . . [because] ‘employees can, by 

actions within the scope of their employment, embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties, 

and it is only natural that these employees would have the relevant information needed by 

corporate counsel if he is adequately to advise the client with respect to such actual or potential 

difficulties.’” (citation omitted)). Defendant argues generally that the report was “submitted to

Defendant’s counsel and risk management department for the purpose of evaluating the potential

litigation claim. That is the primary and dominant purpose for the document in question.” Jt. Ltr. 

at 5. However, this statement alone is not enough to establish Defendant’s dominant purpose in 

preparing incident reports. Costco, 47 Cal. 4th at 735 (“a client cannot protect unprivileged 

information from discovery by transmitting it to an attorney”). 

Given the narrow construction courts apply to the privilege, Defendant must do more to 

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establish the report was intended to be confidential. See Sierra Vista Hosp. v. Superior Ct., 248 

Cal. App. 2d 359, 368 (1967) (finding attorney client privilege applied where (1) employee gave 

testimony of his knowledge “that the report was sought by the insurance company on a 

confidential basis,” and (2) the phrase “CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF INCIDENT (NOT A 

PART OF MEDICAL RECORD)” was printed on the top of the report). Here, Defendant offers 

no such evidence, such as a redacted copy of the report showing it is labeled “confidential,” or a 

declaration from someone with personal knowledge that the report was intended to be confidential, 

or a declaration from the employee stating that he knew the report was confidential at the time it 

was made. Compare Payless Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal. App. 3d 988, 990 (1976) 

(although incident report was not labeled “confidential,” attaching four separate declarations 

asserting the reports were intended to be confidential was enough to establish the company’s 

purpose). Without more evidentiary support, the Court finds Defendant has failed to meet its 

burden of establishing the incident report was a confidential communication made in the course of 

an attorney-client relationship.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above analysis, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to compel production 

of the incident report.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 4, 2015

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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