Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00191/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00191-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR PARRA, Jr.,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08cv0191 - H (CAB)

ORDER 

(1) ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

vs.

R. HERNANDEZ, et al.,

Defendant.

On June 17, 2009, Plaintiff Victor Parra, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se,

filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and named as defendants R.

Limon, W. Liles, P. Cowan, R. Hernandez, and A.L. Cota (collectively “Defendants”), all of whom

are employees of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations at R.J. Donovan State

Prison. (Doc. No. 52.) Plaintiff alleged Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment as well as state law

violations. (Id.) On June 26, 2009, Defendants moved to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment and

state law claims. (Doc. No. 53.) Plaintiff did not oppose the motion to dismiss. On September 11,

2009, the magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending the Court

grant in part and deny in part the motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 54.) On October 5, 2009, Plaintiff

filed objections to the R&R pursuant to 28 U.S.C. (b)(1)(C). (Doc. No. 55.)

For the following reasons, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and GRANTS in part and DENIES

in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Case 3:08-cv-00191-H-CAB Document 56 Filed 11/13/09 Page 1 of 6
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Background

Plaintiff, a state prisoner incarcerated at R.J. Donavan State Prison, alleges that he has an

anxiety disorder and at the time of the incident was classified as having safety concerns and housed

in administrative segregation. (FAC at ¶19; Plaintiff’s Exhibit C.) On or about September 28, 2006,

Plaintiff was ordered by Defendants Limon and Liles to double-cell with Duran, a general population

inmate. (FAC at ¶¶18, 20.) Plaintiff informed Limon and Liles that, according to prison policies, he

and Duran were not appropriate cellmates. (FAC at ¶19.) Limon and Liles then warned Plaintiff that

he would be issued a Rule Violation Report (“RVR”) and placed on yard-hold unless he double-celled

with Duran and signed a corresponding double-cell agreement. (FAC at ¶23.) Plaintiff agreed to

double-cell with Duran but refused to sign the agreement. (FAC at ¶27.) Plaintiff was then placed

on yard-hold. (FAC at ¶35.) 

On October 4, 2006, Plaintiff was formerly issued a RVR for “refusing an order to double

cell.” (FAC at Exhibit D.) On November 3, 2006, Plaintiff appeared for a hearing on the RVR. (FAC

at ¶36.) The reviewing officer found Plaintiff not guilty of refusing to obey an order and determined

that further disciplinary action against Plaintiff was unnecessary. (Id.) On January 1, 2007, the yardhold restrictions were lifted. (FAC ¶38.) Plaintiff alleges he was denied outdoor exercise and reading

materials from September 28, 2006, through January 1, 2007, a total of about 95 days. (Id.)

Discussion

Plaintiff alleges seven causes of action for violations under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as violations of California Penal Code section

673, Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations sections 3343 and 3322, and California Civil Code

section 52.1. Defendants move to dismiss all but the Eighth Amendment claims. The magistrate

judge recommends the Court grant the motion to dismiss with the exception of the claim based on

California Civil Code section 52.1. Plaintiff objects to this recommendation on the grounds that the

motion to dismiss his Title 15 claims should also be denied.

After a de novo review, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and GRANTS Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the claims brought pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, California Penal Code section 673,

and Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations sections 3343 and 3322. The Court DENIES the

Case 3:08-cv-00191-H-CAB Document 56 Filed 11/13/09 Page 2 of 6
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1

Section 3343 addresses conditions of segregated housing in California prisons. The FAC

alleges violations of sections 3343(h) and 3343(i) relating to inmate exercise and availability of

reading material, respectively. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 3343 (West 2009).

2

The FAC alleges violations of section 3322(c). Section 3322(c) addresses the denial of

exercise as a disciplinary measure. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 3322(c) (West 2009).

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motion to dismiss the claim brought pursuant to California Civil Code section 52.1, but Defendants

may move for summary judgment on the claim if appropriate.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) can

be granted when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support his claim. Holley v.

Crank, 400 F.3d 667, 674 (9th Cir. 2005). While courts must exercise liberal interpretation when

reviewing pro se complaints alleging civil rights violations, a court’s interpretation may not supply

essential elements of a claim not contained in the complaint. Bretz v. Kellman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027

(9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). Moreover, courts do not assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are

cast in the form of factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.

1981).

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations” made by a magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party objects to any

portion of a magistrate judge’s report, the court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions

of the report . . . to which objection is made.” Id.

A. Plaintiff’s Title 15 Claims and Objections to the R&R

The magistrate judge recommends the Court grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims

brought pursuant to Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations sections 33431

 and 33222 on the

grounds that Plaintiff lacks standing to either enforce the regulations or receive damages under Title

15. (Doc. No. 54 at 6.) In his objections to the R&R, Plaintiff claims that sections 3343 and 3322 list

mandatory duties governing the actions of prison officials, and that California Government Code

section 815.6 grants him standing when Defendants breached these mandatory duties. (Doc. No. 55

at 4-6.) After a de novo review of the matter, the Court concludes that California Government Code

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California Government Code section 820(a), also cited by Plaintiff, is only applicable when

the plaintiff is suing a public employee in the official capacity. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 820(a) (West

2009).

4

On March 24, 2009, Plaintiff’s claims against the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitations, and employees thereof, were dismissed with prejudice on grounds of immunity

pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Doc. No. 48 at 12.) Plaintiff

has named no other public entities as defendants. (Doc. No. 52.) 

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section 815.6 does not grant Plaintiff a private cause of action, nor do California Code of Regulations

sections 3343 and 3322.

Pursuant to California Government Code section 815.6, “a public entity under a mandatory

duty imposed by an enactment...is liable for an injury...caused by its failure to discharge that duty.”

Section 815.6 is applicable only when the plaintiff is suing a public entity.3 See CAL. GOV’T CODE §

815.6 (West 2009); See also Aubry v. Tri City, 2 Cal.4th 962, 968 (Cal. 1992). Plaintiff here is not

suing a public entity. (Doc. No. 52 at 2.) All Defendants are sued in their individual capacities only.4

(Id.) 

Furthermore, only mandatory duties are actionable under section 815.6. Pierce v. County of

Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1208 (9th Cir. 2008). The regulation at issue must be “obligatory, rather than

discretionary or permissive.” Id. As evident in the text of sections 3343 and 3322, prison officials

are granted leeway to dismiss the duties outlined in the sections. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 §§

3322(c), 3343(h), and 3342(i) (West 2009). Moreover, as prison officials, the Court must grant

Defendants wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies needed to ensure

institutional order and inmate safety. Norwood v. Vance, 572 F.3d 626, 629 (9th Cir. 2009).

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the claims brought pursuant to Title 15 of the

California Code of Regulations sections 3343 and 3322.

B. Plaintiff’s Claim Brought Pursuant to California Penal Code Section 673

Plaintiff claims that California Penal Code section 673 imposes a mandatory duty on

Defendants to not “inflict any punishment that would impair the health of the prisoner.” (Doc. No.

52 at 16.) Section 673 is a criminal statute designed to create criminal liability for those who inflict

cruel, corporal, or unusual punishment on inmates. CAL. PENAL CODE § 673 (West 2009). Statutes

establishing criminal liability for certain deprivations of civil rights do not give rise to civil liability.

Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006). Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

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provides Plaintiff with a civil remedy for the type of conduct protected against by section 673, and he

is properly pursuing that remedy through his section 1983 claims. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

the motion to dismiss the claims brought pursuant to California Penal Code section 673.

C. Plaintiff’s Claim Brought Pursuant to California Civil Code Section 52.1

Plaintiff includes a cause of action pursuant to California Civil Code sections 52.1(a) and

52.1(b), premised on violations of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. No. 52 at 18.)

Section 52.1 establishes a private right of action for an “individual whose exercise of enjoyment of

rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the Constitution

or laws of [California], has been interfered with” by “threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts

to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1(a) (West 2009). Defendants

move to dismiss this claim solely on the basis that it is identical to Plaintiff’s federal claims and is

therefore unnecessary. (Doc. No. 53 at 7.)

Plaintiff’s claim under section 52.1 is allowed to proceed as long as the claim relies on a proper

constitutional claim. See Harper v. Poway Unified School District, 345 F. Supp 2d 1096, 1115 (S.D.

Cal. 2004). The FAC contains claims properly alleging Eighth Amendment violations. (Doc. No. 52

at 2.) Defendants’ sole objection is that the claim is redundant, but Plaintiff is allowed to proceed on

multiple theories of liability. In the absence of an alternative challenge to the claim, the Court

DENIES without prejudice the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim brought pursuant to California Civil

Code section 52.1.

D. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims

In his fourth and fifth causes of action, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights when they denied him access to outdoor exercise and reading

materials. (Doc. No. 52 at 11-15.) Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that the alleged

violations are not grounded in a substantive due process claim. (Doc. No. 53 at 5-6.) The Court

agrees with Defendants.

Under the law, Plaintiff’s claims are more appropriately governed by the Eighth Amendment

and should not be analyzed “under the rubric of substantive due process.” See Lanier v. United States,

520 U.S. 259, 272 n. 7 (1997). A prisoner ordinarily does not suffer a due process violation when he

is placed in disciplinary segregation for a short period of time pending a disciplinary hearing. May

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v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir.1997). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims.

Conclusion

For the above reasons, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation and ORDERS the

following:

(1) The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims set

forth in his fourth and fifth causes of action.

(2) The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims set forth in his sixth

cause of action and brought pursuant to Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations sections 3343

and 3322 and California Penal Code section 673.

(3) The Court DENIES without prejudice the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claim set

forth in his seventh cause of action and brought pursuant to California Civil Code section 52.1. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 13, 2009

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

All parties of record.

Case 3:08-cv-00191-H-CAB Document 56 Filed 11/13/09 Page 6 of 6