Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_13-cv-00034/USCOURTS-akd-3_13-cv-00034-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

WALTER KURKA,

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

JOHN PROBST, et al.,

Defendants. 

Case No. 3:13-cv-00034-SLG

ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is an action by Walter Kurka, a self-represented litigant, asserting federal 

constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as state law defamation and 

malicious prosecution claims against Alaska State Trooper John Probst and Assistant 

District Attorney Benjamin Jaffa.

1 At Docket 45 is Defendant Probst’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment. At Docket 47 is Defendant Jaffa’s Motion to Dismiss. Kurka filed 

an opposition to both motions at Docket 58. Defendants filed a combined Reply at Docket 

65. Oral argument on both motions was held on August 4, 2014. For the following 

reasons, the Court will grant each of the Defendants’ motions. 

BACKGROUND

This litigation arises out of Trooper Probst’s investigation of a report filed by Kurka

and the subsequent filing of criminal charges against Kurka. Kurka was charged with two

1 Docket 1-1 (Amended Compl.). 

 

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counts of Making A False Report in violation of AS 11.56.800(a)(1) and (2) on May 23, 

2011.

2 On August 9, 2011, Jaffa, the Assistant District Attorney assigned to the case, 

filed a dismissal of the charges pursuant to Alaska Criminal Rule 43(a).3

While the criminal case was still pending, on June 20, 2011, Kurka filed a complaint 

in Alaska Superior Court against the State of Alaska, asserting constitutional violations 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as a defamation claim.

4 The state moved to dismiss. 

In an Order dated October 10, 2011, the trial court granted the state’s motion, holding 

that the state was immune from the defamation claim and not a “person” subject to suit 

under § 1983. The trial court also denied Kurka’s motion to amend his complaint to raise 

claims against Probst and Jaffa, holding that “[a]llowing the amendment would be futile 

as Trooper Probst and Assistant District Attorney Jaffa enjoy official immunity.”5 Kurka 

appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court. That Court reversed and remanded as to Kurka’s 

claims against Probst and Jaffa. The Supreme Court held that Kurka should have been 

permitted to amend his complaint to add a claim for malicious prosecution and that the 

trial court should not have found qualified immunity for Probst or Jaffa from the face of 

the proposed amended complaint on a motion to dismiss.6 On remand, Kurka filed an 

2 Docket 45-2 (Misdemeanor Compl.); Docket 45-1 (Courtview Docket).

3 Docket 45-4 (Dismissal).

4 Docket 9-1 at 1-5 (Summons and Complaint).

5 Docket 9-2 at 45 (Order).

6 Kurka v. State of Alaska, No. S-14522, 2012 WL 5883277 (Alaska Nov. 21, 2012). The Alaska 

Supreme Court noted that there were other reasons the complaint may fail, including absolute 

immunity for prosecutors, an absolute defamation privilege for statements made during judicial 

proceedings, and because “it is unclear what specific federal constitutional provision Kurka claims 

was violated for his § 1983 claim or what federal immunities might apply.” Id. at *2.

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amended complaint in state court against Jaffa and Probst alleging federal constitutional 

violations pursuant to § 1983, as well as state law defamation and malicious prosecution

claims.

7 On February 19, 2013, Jaffa and Probst filed a Notice of Removal to this Court

based on federal question jurisdiction in light of the § 1983 claims.8

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

II. Assistant District Attorney Benjamin Jaffa’s Motion to Dismiss

Jaffa moves to dismiss Kurka’s claims against him pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits a party to seek dismissal of an action for failure 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, a court must “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the 

pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”9 To survive a motion to 

dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”10 “Plausibility requires pleading facts, as 

opposed to conclusory allegations or the formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action, and must rise above the mere conceivability or possibility of unlawful conduct 

7 Docket 1-1 (Am. Compl.).

8 Docket 1 (Notice of Removal) at 2.

9 Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008).

10 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007)).

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that entitles the pleader to relief.”11 All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of 

the non-moving party.12 A court should not look to “whether a plaintiff will ultimately 

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”13 

A. Federal Claims

In his motion, Jaffa asserts that he is entitled to absolute immunity for the § 1983 

claims pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Imbler v. Pachtman

and its progeny. In Imbler, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor was absolutely 

immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when initiating a prosecution or prosecuting 

the state’s case.

14 The Supreme Court found that these “activities were intimately 

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, and thus were functions to 

which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force.”15 The Supreme Court also 

held in Imbler that absolute immunity extends to suits for malicious prosecution brought 

under federal law.16 More recently, in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, the Supreme Court held

that “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings 

or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are 

11 Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

12 Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992).

13 Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997).

14 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 

15 Id. at 430.

16 Id.

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entitled to the protection of absolute immunity.”17 Courts in this circuit have observed that 

even an alleged “improper motive” does not negate absolute immunity for prosecutors.18 

Jaffa maintains that “filing a criminal complaint and prosecuting the case are actions 

performed by Jaffa in his role as an advocate for the State of Alaska” and are thus acts 

for which he is entitled to absolute immunity.19 

Kurka’s opposition primarily reiterates and expands on the allegations in his 

Amended Complaint. His main arguments against Jaffa’s assertion of absolute immunity 

appear to be that (1) “Jaffa willfully and with intent did not bother to understand the 

evidence presented to him,”20 and (2) there is an exception to absolute immunity for 

malicious prosecution.21 

Defendants’ combined Reply acknowledges Kurka’s allegations that Jaffa “willfully 

and with intent did not bother to understand the evidence.”22 Nonetheless, pursuant to 

established Supreme Court precedent, even if Kurka were to prove that Jaffa acted 

willfully or maliciously, the prosecutor’s immunity is absolute. Moreover, absolute 

prosecutorial immunity extends to Kurka’s claims that Jaffa failed to adequately 

17 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).

18 Anderson v. City of Bellevue, 862 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1102 (W.D. Wa. 2012).

19 Docket 47 (MTD Br.) at 12 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976)). 

20 Docket 58 (Opp’n) at 20.

21 Docket 58 (Opp’n) at 23-24. Kurka references the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the

U.S. Constitution. However, as noted by the Defendants, the Supreme Court has indicated in a 

plurality opinion that the Fourth Amendment, rather than a right to substantive due process, is a 

more appropriate vehicle for a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983. See Docket 47 (Mot.)

at 8 (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994), rehearing denied 510 U.S. 1215 (1994)).

22 Docket 65 (Reply) at 2.

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investigate the evidence against Kurka because that investigation is “intimately 

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”23 

The Court therefore grants Jaffa’s motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims on the basis 

of absolute immunity.

24 To the extent that Kurka is making a defamation or malicious

prosecution claim under § 1983, absolutely immunity extends to such claims pursuant to

the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Imbler.

25 Likewise, absolute immunity 

would extend to Kurka’s passing reference to alleged Brady violations in his opposition.

26

As the Supreme Court recognized, “this immunity does leave the genuinely 

wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or 

dishonest action deprives him of liberty. But the alternative of qualifying a prosecutor’s 

immunity would disserve the broader public interest.”27

23 Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 

1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for failure to 

investigate the accusations against a defendant before filing charges.”).

24 The Alaska Supreme Court stated that it could not “see how the superior court could make a 

qualified immunity determination from the face of Kurka’s complaint.” Kurka, 2012 WL 5883277 

at *2. But the Alaska Supreme Court expressly did not consider whether Jaffa would be protected 

by absolute immunity. Id.

25 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422-23, 427 (holding that prosecutor enjoys same absolute immunity under 

§ 1983 as at common law, which included immunity based on indictment and prosecution). See 

also Borg v. Boas, 231 F.2d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 1956) (“[A] written charge or information filed with 

the prosecutor or the court is not libelous although proved to be false and unfounded.”). 

26 Docket 58 (Opp’n) at 16. See Broam, 320 F.3d at 1030 (“A prosecutor’s decision not to preserve 

or turn over exculpatory material before trial, during trial, or after conviction . . . is . . . an exercise 

of the prosecutorial function and entitles the prosecutor to absolute immunity from a civil suit for 

damages . . . .”).

27 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. Yet the Supreme Court recognized that “the immunity of prosecutors 

from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to 

punish that which occurs. This Court has never suggested that the policy considerations which 

compel civil immunity for certain governmental officials also place them beyond the reach of the 

criminal law.” Id. at 428. 

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B. State Claims

Jaffa maintains that “Kurka’s state constitutional claims should also be dismissed 

[because] Alaska has no statutory equivalent to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Alaska 

Supreme Court has never recognized a state-law tort claim for alleged violation of the 

Alaska Constitution.”28 But the Court does not read Kurka’s Amended Complaint to allege

any state constitutional claims, nor does Kurka pursue or clarify any such claims in his 

opposition. 

Kurka does plead a state law defamation claim against Jaffa, which appears to be 

based on the fact that a notice of the criminal charge filed against him was published in a 

newspaper.

29 However, Alaska recognizes a defamation privilege for statements made 

during a judicial proceeding.

30 Therefore, the act of charging someone with a crime, 

which results in that public record being reported in a newspaper, cannot be the basis for 

a defamation claim under state law against the charging Assistant District Attorney. 

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Kurka’s state law defamation claim against Jaffa.

To the extent that Kurka seeks to maintain a malicious prosecution claim under 

state law against Jaffa, the Court finds that the Alaska Supreme Court would likely adopt 

and apply absolute immunity to prosecutors for such a claim. While the Alaska Supreme 

28 Docket 47 (MTD Br.) at 12-13.

29 See Docket 1-1 (Am. Compl.) at 2 (“[T]hanks to the false affidavit of Probst and no verifying by 

Jaffa, Kurka’s name was printed in the papers and branded a liar in his community . . . .”). See 

also Docket 58 (Opp’n) at 47 (pointing to Docket 55-24).

30 See Kurka, 2012 WL 5883277 at *2 (citing MacDonald v. Riggs, 166 P.3d 12, 17 (Alaska 2007) 

(finding that statements were “not made in the course of any judicial proceeding and therefore 

were not privileged.”)). 

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Court has not directly ruled on whether absolute immunity applies to prosecutors in a 

malicious prosecution claim under state law,31 its adoption of federal precedent in 

applying qualified immunity strongly suggests that it would similarly extend absolute 

immunity to prosecutors for malicious prosecution claims.

32 Additionally, Kurka has not 

alleged any facts that would support an assertion that Jaffa proceeded with the case 

against Kurka out of “malice or a primary purpose other than that of bringing an offender 

to justice.”33 Rather, Kurka’s principal claim against Jaffa appears to be that Jaffa “did 

not study the evidence presented to him.”34 Accordingly, Jaffa is entitled to dismissal of 

the state law malicious prosecution claim against him.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Jaffa’s Motion to Dismiss. When 

granting a motion to dismiss, “[a] district court should grant the plaintiff leave to amend if 

the complaint can possibly be cured by additional factual allegations.”35 “Although leave 

to amend should be given freely, a district court may dismiss without leave where a 

plaintiff’s proposed amendments would fail to cure the pleading deficiencies and 

amendment would be futile.”36 

31 Kurka, 2012 WL 5883277 at *2 n.14 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986) for 

“common law rule that prosecutors are absolutely immune from malicious prosecution claims.”).

32 See Maness v. Daily, 307 P.3d 894 (Alaska 2013) (Alaska “chose to follow federal precedent 

for determining whether qualified immunity should be conferred for official acts alleged to 

contravene a statutory or constitutional mandate.” (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted)).

33 Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1241 (Alaska 2007). 

34 Docket 58 (Opp’n) at 23. 

35 Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013).

36 Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011).

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Under the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Imbler, absolute immunity

protects Jaffa from all claims brought by Kurka under § 1983,37 such that any amendment 

with respect to those claims would be futile. Likewise, Alaska’s defamation privilege for 

statements made during judicial proceedings also renders any amendment of that state 

law claim futile.

The only remaining claim for which the Court could possibly grant Kurka leave to 

amend as to Jaffa is a malicious prosecution claim under state law. But, as noted above, 

although the Alaska Supreme Court has not directly ruled on whether absolute immunity 

applies to prosecutors, the Court finds that the Alaska Supreme Court would be quite

likely to extend absolute immunity to Jaffa for such a claim such that it would therefore be 

futile to allow an amended complaint that presented facts that might support such a claim. 

Accordingly, complete dismissal of Jaffa from this case is warranted.

III. Alaska State Trooper John Probst’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Probst has moved for summary judgment, asserting that he has qualified immunity. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs a court to “grant summary judgment if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “The moving party initially bears the burden of 

proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”38 In cases where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party “need only prove that 

37 424 U.S. at 416-31.

38 In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).

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there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.”39 If the moving 

party meets this burden, then the non-moving party must present specific evidence 

demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial, i.e., “evidence from which a jury 

could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party’s favor.”40 The non-moving 

party may not rely on mere allegations or denials.41 

When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must accept as true all 

evidence presented by the non-moving party and draw “all justifiable inferences” in the 

non-moving party’s favor.42 If the evidence provided by the non-moving party is “merely 

colorable” or “not significantly probative,” summary judgment is appropriate.43 Unlike a 

motion to dismiss, “a party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must 

support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including 

depositions, documents . . . affidavits or declarations . . . or other materials . . . .”44

39 Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325).

40 Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). 

41 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The non-moving party may rely on any of the evidentiary materials 

listed in Rule 56(c). Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. This includes depositions, documents, affidavits, 

stipulations, and discovery materials. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

42 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

43 Id. at 249–50.

44 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). See also Docket 49 (Order/Notice) (informing Kurka of the 

requirements for opposing a summary judgment motion).

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A. Federal Claims

Probst’s motion for summary judgment asserts that Kurka’s claims against him are 

barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity.45 Qualified immunity, when applicable, 

protects government officials from liability for civil damages.46 The purpose of qualified 

immunity is to “balance[ ] two important interests—the need to hold public officials 

accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from 

harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”47

“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but 

mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 

violate the law.”48 “[I]n order to determine whether qualified immunity protects a 

government official, a court must decide, first, whether a plaintiff has produced evidence 

showing that the official violated a constitutional right and, second, whether that right was 

‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged misconduct.”49 “[L]ower courts have 

discretion to decide which of the two prongs of qualified-immunity to tackle first.”50 A 

plaintiff must establish both prongs of the analysis, so that if a court determines that one 

prong is not met, then qualified immunity applies. 

45 Docket 45 (MTD Br.) at 14-20.

46 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).

47 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.

48 Messerschmidt v. Millender, --- U.S. ---, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2012) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted).

49 Conner v. Heiman, 672 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012). 

50 Ashcroft v. Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011).

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“Because qualified immunity is ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense 

to liability[,] it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.’”51 

Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court “repeatedly [has] stressed the importance 

of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”52 The Ninth 

Circuit has held that 

a district court should decide the issue of qualified immunity as a 

matter of law when “the material, historical facts are not in dispute, 

and the only disputes involve what inferences properly may be drawn 

from those historical facts.”53

The Ninth Circuit has held that, “‘[e]ven absent probable cause, qualified immunity is 

available if a reasonable police officer could have believed that his or her conduct was 

lawful, in light of the clearly established law and the information the searching officers 

possessed.’”54 

In Messerschmidt v. Millender, the United States Supreme Court considered the 

application of qualified immunity to officers who had obtained a warrant authorizing the 

search of a home for firearms and gang-related material.55 The homeowners sued the 

officers, among others, alleging that the search warrant was invalid. On the defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment, the District Court found that the authorization in the 

51 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

52 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (2009) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per 

curiam)).

53 Conner v. Heiman, 672 F.3d at 1131 (quoting Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 970-80 

(9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1218 (2004)).

54 Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 492 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Peng v. Mei Chin 

Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 980 (9th Cir. 2003)) (emphasis added).

55 Messerschmidt v. Millender, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1242 (2012).

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warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad because the crime at issue was assault with a 

specific weapon (a black sawed-off shotgun) “negating any need to ‘search for all 

firearms.’”56 The Court also found that the warrant was overbroad in authorizing a search 

for all gang-related materials because there was no evidence that the assault was gang 

related.57 On review, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the officers 

were “entitled to immunity from damages, even assuming that the warrant should not 

have been issued.”58 Taking into consideration that the warrant had been approved by a 

supervising officer, a deputy district attorney, and the issuing magistrate, the Supreme 

Court held that “it cannot be said that no officer of reasonable competence would have 

requested the warrant. Indeed, a contrary conclusion would mean not only that [the 

officers] were plainly incompetent, but that their supervisor, the deputy district attorney, 

and the magistrate were as well.”59 The Supreme Court thus held that even if the warrant 

was constitutionally invalid, “it was not so obviously lacking in probable cause that the 

officers can be considered plainly incompetent for concluding otherwise,” and held the 

officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

60

The Ninth Circuit has applied qualified immunity to shield from civil liability 

investigating officers who have incorrectly assessed the facts of a particular case. In 

56 Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1243 (quoting the district court).

57 Id. at 1243.

58 Id. at 1244.

59 Id. at 1249 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

60 Id. at 1250-51 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

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Rodis v. City & County of San Francisco, officers arrested a man they believed had 

attempted to use a counterfeit bill. After it was subsequently determined that the bill was 

genuine, the arrestee brought a lawsuit pursuant to § 1983. The District Court denied the 

officers’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit 

initially affirmed that ruling,

61 but the United States Supreme Court reversed and 

remanded. On remand, the Ninth Circuit found the officers were entitled to qualified 

immunity. The circuit court, quoting the United States Supreme Court, observed that “it 

is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly 

conclude that probable cause is present. . . . In such cases those officials . . . should not 

be held personally liable.”62 “The qualified immunity standard gives ample room for 

mistaken judgments . . . .”63 The Ninth Circuit concluded that, “[a]lthough the arrest was 

unfortunate, we cannot say that the Defendants’ belief that [the bill] was fake was plainly 

incompetent.”64

Here, when this case was first considered by the state trial court, it was on a motion 

to dismiss Kurka’s complaint on its face. Now, in support of his motion for summary 

judgment, Probst has submitted a detailed affidavit, which describes Kurka’s report and 

Probst’s follow-up investigation, culminating in Probst’s decision to file the Misdemeanor 

61 499 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated 555 U.S. 1151 (2009).

62 558 F.3d 964, 970-71 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987))

cert. denied 558 U.S. 1110 (2010).

63 558 F.3d at 970 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)).

64 Rodis, 558 F.3d at 971.

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Complaint against Kurka for false reporting.

65 Probst’s affidavit states that Kurka reported 

the theft of artwork, office equipment, and payroll records from his business. Kurka 

identified a former employee as responsible for the thefts. Probst’s affidavit indicates that 

after interviewing Kurka on several occasions and “itemiz[ing] the items that were 

allegedly stolen,” Probst obtained a search warrant for the former employee’s home and 

seized certain items there that were similar to those that Kurka had described.66

However, the former employee claimed the items were hers and later produced receipts

for them. Probst avers in his affidavit that during his investigation he learned that the 

former employee had filed a sexual harassment claim against Kurka with the Alaska State 

Commission for Human Rights and had also filed a wage claim against Kurka with the 

Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development. Probst’s affidavit also states 

that he went to Kurka’s business office and found the employee records that Kurka had 

claimed had been stolen by the former employee. 

Probst asserts that he then asked the Court for a summons. He adds that he had 

no further involvement in the case once Kurka was charged.

67 In this regard, Probst

asserts that law enforcement officers have a rebuttable presumption of absolute immunity 

65 Docket 50-1 (Probst Aff.).

66 Docket 50-1 (Probst Aff.) at ¶¶ 4-14.

67 Docket 45 (MSJ Br.) at 17. Docket 50-1 (Probst Aff.) at ¶¶ 20-21. But see Docket 45-1 

(Courtview Docket) at 2 reflecting that the Misdemeanor Complaint was filed on May 23, 2011 

and Docket 50-1 (Probst. Aff.) at ¶ 23, which details Probst’s contact with the son of Kurka’s 

former employee on June 9, 2011, after Kurka was charged. 

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once a criminal complaint has been filed and that that presumption applies to him once 

the complaint was filed.

68 

Kurka attaches 34 exhibits to his opposition, including business records, 

investigation documents, records connected with related proceedings, correspondence, 

and the newspaper notice of his charge.

69 Kurka’s primary focus in his opposition is that 

Probst intentionally failed to investigate Kurka’s report and was biased against Kurka in 

the investigation prior to filing the Misdemeanor Complaint against him.

70 Kurka 

maintains that his numerous exhibits demonstrate that Probst was misled by Kurka’s

former employee in the investigation and ignored relevant information. A primary fact that 

Kurka disputes is Probst’s assertion that when he visited Kurka’s business office on May 

13, 2011, he found the employee records that Kurka had stated were stolen. Kurka 

asserts that these records were not, in fact, the employee records that he had reported 

missing and that the three records Probst purportedly discovered were far fewer than the 

35 records that Kurka had reported stolen.

71 Kurka asserts that this should have been 

obvious to Probst.72 Kurka also alleges that the artwork receipts produced by the former 

68 Docket 45 (MSJ Br.) at 20 (relying on Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1981), 

cert. denied 459 U.S. 829 (1982), overruled on other grounds by Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 

853 (9th Cir. 2008)).

69 Docket 55-1—34 (Exhibits).

70 Docket 58 (Opp’n) at 32-38.

71 Docket 58 (Opp’n) at 9-11, 43. 

72 See Docket 58 (Opp’n) at 35 (arguing that Probst should have compared the number of files he 

found to the number Kurka reported stolen and that “any reasonable person would have 

recognized that 3 files does not equal 35 employee files, even John Probst which shows he was 

with malice this is not a mistake a reasonable person would make.”).

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employee were falsified and points to several exhibits that he claims so demonstrate.73

Kurka’s position appears to be based on Kurka’s handwriting analysis comparing a 

document written by his former employee with an artwork receipt produced by that 

employee.74 Kurka asserts that he “took his plates and real receipts into the [Alaska State 

Troopers] office” but they “were rejected.”75 Because the Court accepts all of the 

evidence presented by the non-moving party as true and draws all justifiable inferences 

in the non-moving party’s favor in determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court 

assumes that Probst did err in concluding that the employee files he found were the same 

files that Kurka had reported missing and erred in concluding that Kurka’s former 

employee had produced accurate receipts demonstrating her ownership of the artwork.

As discussed above, qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or 

those who knowingly violate the law. . . . Whether an official protected by qualified 

immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally 

turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal 

rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.”76 The Ninth Circuit has held 

that there is a clearly established right “not to be subjected to criminal charges on the 

basis of false evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the government.”77 This would 

73 Docket 58 (Opp’n) at 6-7. 

74 Docket 58 (Opp’n) at 67 (citing Docket 55-14 and 55-16).

75 Docket 58 (Opp’n) at 39.

76 Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1244-45 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

77 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

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also appear to extend to include a right not to be subject to criminal charges that arise 

from a plainly incompetent investigation.78 

Kurka’s argument merges accusations that Probst deliberately “falsified evidence” 

with allegations that Probst’s investigation was incompetent. His assertions against 

Probst generally fall in between these two concepts but appear to fall more on the side of 

alleged incompetence rather than a deliberate falsification of evidence. For although 

Kurka alleges that Probst “falsified evidence,”79 he makes no showing that Probst’s 

conduct in this regard was deliberate.

80

In asserting that Probst is not entitled to qualified immunity, Kurka states that “any 

reasonable person would have recognized that 3 files does not equal 35 employee files . 

. . .”81 Likewise, he maintains that Probst should have recognized that the artwork 

belonged to Kurka.

82 Kurka maintains, therefore, that “Probst’s conduct did violate clearly 

established statutory and constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known.”83 But even assuming, for summary judgment purposes, that Probst negligently 

and incorrectly concluded that the employee files found in his investigation were those 

reported missing and that the former employee had produced valid receipts 

78 Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1249-50.

79 Docket 58 (Opp’n) at 3.

80 See, e.g., Docket 58 (Opp’n) at 12 (stating that Probst is misstating the facts to the Court in his 

affidavit instead of admitting “he made a mistake.”). 

81 Docket 58 (Opp’n) at 35.

82 Docket 58 (Opp’n) at 14-15.

83 Docket 58 (Opp’n) at 35.

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demonstrating ownership of the artwork, such a conclusion is not so plainly incompetent 

or in knowing violation of the law so as to be actionable under federal law.84 In short,

even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Kurka, “it cannot be said that no officer 

of reasonable competence” would have filed the complaint against Kurka.85 

Additionally, while Kurka asserts a due process requirement that the prosecution 

disclose favorable evidence,86 it is not clear what evidence Kurka is maintaining was not 

disclosed. Nor does Kurka point to any case law indicating that a police officer’s alleged 

failure to disclose evidence is actionable in a civil proceeding.

87

Based on the above, the Court finds that Probst is protected by qualified immunity 

for his investigation and grants summary judgment in his favor on all of the § 1983 claims, 

including any federally-based claims for malicious prosecution or defamation.

88 

B. State Law Claims

To the extent Kurka’s claims against Probst, such as malicious prosecution or 

making a false report,

89 may arise under state law, Alaska’s qualified immunity doctrine 

84 See Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1244.

85 See id. at 1249 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

86 Docket 58 (Opp’n) at 35.

87 Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “suppression by the prosecution of 

evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 

material either to guilt or punishment . . . .” (emphasis added)).

88 To the extent Kurka is making a claim that his substantive due process rights were violated by

Probst’s investigation, the Court finds that this claim also fails and qualified immunity applies 

because the investigation cannot be said to “shock the conscience.” See Amrine v. Brooks, 522 

F.3d 823, 833-34 (8th Cir. 2008).

89 Kurka’s Amended Complaint states that “Defendants did unlawfully commit the offence of 

Making a False Report” but this claim is not pursued in his opposition to the Defendants’ motions.

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follows the same analysis as that described in the cases under § 1983, such that Probst 

is also entitled to qualified immunity on all such state law claims.

90

Finally, for the same reasons set forth in Part II of this opinion with respect to Jaffa, 

Kurka’s state law defamation claim against Probst is also dismissed with prejudice.

91 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant John Probst’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment at Docket 45 and Defendant Benjamin Jaffa’s Motion to Dismiss

at Docket 47 are both GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter final 

judgment for Defendants Benjamin Jaffa and John Probst dismissing this action with 

prejudice.

DATED this 2nd day of February, at Anchorage, Alaska.

/s/ Sharon L. Gleason 

United States District Judge

90 See Maness v. Daily, 307 P.3d 894 (Alaska 2013) (Alaska “chose to follow federal precedent 

for determining whether qualified immunity should be conferred for official acts alleged to 

contravene a statutory or constitutional mandate.” (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted)). See also Russell ex rel J.N. v. Virg-In, 258 P.3d 795, 802 (Alaska 2011) (discussing 

and applying qualified immunity standard). 

91 Unlike Jaffa’s Motion to Dismiss, here the Court is granting summary judgment in favor of Probst 

and each side has been given ample opportunity to present all the facts he believes are relevant. 

Accordingly, the Court will not grant Kurka an opportunity to file an amended complaint.

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