Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02828/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02828-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SELF-INSURERS’ SECURITY FUND, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC.

Defendant. /

No. C 06-02828 JSW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of a timely motion for

certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) filed by Defendant Gallagher Bassett Services,

Inc. (“Gallagher”). Having considered the parties’ pleadings and relevant legal authority, the

Court finds the matter suitable for disposition without oral argument. See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-

1(b). The hearing set for March 30, 2007 is HEREBY VACATED. For the reasons set forth in

the remainder of this Order, Gallagher’s motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On February 2, 2007, this Court denied Gallagher’s motion to dismiss the fifth claim for

relief asserted by Plaintiff, Self-Insurers’ Security Fund (“SISF”), against Gallagher, which

alleges a violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200. (Docket No. 31.) The

focus of the Court’s Order was on Gallagher’s argument that SISF lacked standing to pursue

that claim for relief, although the Court also denied Gallagher’s motion on other grounds as

well. (See id. at 6 n.2.) Gallagher now asks the Court to certify three questions for appeal: (1) 

Case 3:06-cv-02828-JSW Document 39 Filed 03/13/07 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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do SISF’s allegations establish injury in fact for Article III standing; (2) is SISF required to

plead inadequacy of legal remedy or irreparable harm, and, if so, has it done so; and (3) can

SISF plead inadequacy of legal remedy or irreparable harm when based upon potential future

harm that can be redressed with damages and for which California Labor Code § 3744(c)

provides a specific right of action. 

ANALYSIS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a district court may certify for interlocutory appeal an

otherwise non-appealable order when: (1) the order involves a controlling question of law; (2)

as to which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion; and (3) an immediate appeal

from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. §

1292(b). Certification for interlocutory appeal should be applied sparingly and only granted in

exceptional situations in which allowing an interlocutory appeal would avoid protracted and

expensive litigation. See, e.g., In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir.

1982); United States v. Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784, 788 n.11 (9th Cir. 1959). 

Although standing is a threshold question and, thus, one that could be considered a

controlling question of law in some circumstances or the resolution of which might materially

advance the termination of the litigation, the focus of SISF’s Section 17200 claim is on

Gallagher’s alleged business practices and whether those practices cause it injury. The Court

has considered Gallagher’s arguments and concludes that it has not met its burden to show an

interlocutory appeal is warranted. 

The Court wishes to reiterate to the parties that it resolved the standing question on a

motion to dismiss. Nothing in the Court’s order denying that motion, nor the Court’s resolution

of either the order denying Gallagher’s motion for reconsideration or this motion should be

construed as precluding Gallagher from raising the question of standing on a motion for

summary judgment. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996) (“At the pleading

stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice,

for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts

necessary that are necessary to support the claim. In response to a summary judgment motion

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such mere allegations, but must set forth by

affidavit or other evidence specific facts, which for purposes of the summary judgment motion

will be taken to be true. And at the final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be supported

adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.”) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 561 (1992)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2007 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:06-cv-02828-JSW Document 39 Filed 03/13/07 Page 3 of 3