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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 23, 2010 Decided June 22, 2010 

No. 09-5172 

WILLIAM H. ARMSTRONG, 

APPELLANT

v. 

TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:07-cv-01963-JR) 

Kevin E. Byrnes argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant. 

Andrea R. Tebbets, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief was 

Steven K. Uejio, Attorney. Carol Barthel, Attorney, and R. 

Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered 

appearances. 

Before: GINSBURG and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

USCA Case #09-5172 Document #1251083 Filed: 06/22/2010 Page 1 of 13
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG. 

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: William Armstrong sued his 

former employer, the Department of the Treasury, and several 

individuals, alleging Treasury employees violated the Privacy 

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, by disclosing the details of an 

investigation into his conduct. The district court entered 

judgment for the defendants because “Armstrong failed to 

establish that the information [disclosed] ... had been 

retrieved from a record held in a system of records,” as 

required in an action for damages under the Privacy Act. 610 

F. Supp. 2d 66, 68 (2009). We agree and affirm the judgment 

of the district court. 

I. Background 

In 2006 Karen Thompson, one of Armstrong’s coworkers 

at the Office of the Treasury Inspector General for Tax 

Administration (TIGTA), filed an anonymous complaint 

against Armstrong. The complaint alleged Armstrong had 

accessed an investigative database without authorization and 

had disclosed confidential information he obtained there. 

Thompson’s complaint triggered an internal 

investigation, at the opening of which Armstrong was 

relieved of his badge and law enforcement credentials, denied 

the use of his government vehicle and computer, and escorted 

out of the building and driven home. The next day he was 

reassigned to the Technical and Firearms Support Division. 

The investigators ultimately concluded Armstrong had 

accessed not just the one database, which he admitted doing, 

but also other databases, without authorization or an official 

purpose. Because the TIGTA did not immediately close the 

investigation and impose a sanction, Armstrong was able to 

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apply for a job at other agencies while still a TIGTA 

employee.

In 2007 Armstrong applied for and accepted a position 

within the Office of the Inspector General at the Department 

of Agriculture; he was to start that September. In mid-August 

one of Armstrong’s coworkers at the TIGTA circulated an 

email message about a going-away party for him, which 

alerted the rest of the office to his impending departure. 

Shortly before Armstrong was to start his new job, 

Thompson sent six USDA employees anonymous letters, 

signed “A Very Concerned Person,” with information about 

the TIGTA’s ongoing investigation of Armstrong. In three of 

those letters, she said hiring Armstrong was “a grave error.” 

Within days the USDA indefinitely postponed Armstrong’s 

start date. He never worked there.*

Armstrong later brought this suit against the Secretary of 

the Treasury, Armstrong’s former supervisor, and several 

unnamed Treasury employees. He alleged various common 

law torts and six violations of the Privacy Act, one for each 

letter Thompson had sent to the USDA. When he filed his 

complaint, however, Armstrong did not know who had 

written the letters. 

Shortly before trial Thompson admitted she had written 

the letters as well as the anonymous complaint that had 

 *

 In December 2007 Armstrong was removed from his position 

at the TIGTA. He appealed the removal to the Merit Systems 

Protection Board, settled for a 30-day suspension instead of 

removal, and then challenged the settlement. See Armstrong v. 

Dep’t of the Treasury, 591 F.3d 1358, 1359–61 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

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caused the TIGTA to investigate Armstrong. 610 F. Supp. 2d 

at 69. At trial she denied, however, getting the information in 

the letters from any of the TIGTA supervisors involved in the 

investigation or from records of the investigation; instead she 

insisted she had based the letters upon independent sources — 

the rumor mill, her original complaint, and her own 

observations, assumptions, and speculation.

After trial the district court dismissed the claim against 

Armstrong’s supervisor and entered judgment for the 

defendants on all other claims. Armstrong appeals only the 

Privacy Act claims, with respect to which the district court 

held “Armstrong failed to establish that the information ... had 

been retrieved from a record held in a system of records—the 

necessary predicate of his Privacy Act claim.” Id. at 68.

II. Analysis 

Subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, the 

Privacy Act prohibits a federal agency from “disclos[ing] any 

record which is contained in a system of records.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552a(b). To be actionable, however, a disclosure generally 

must be the result of someone having actually retrieved the 

“record” from that “system of records”; the disclosure of 

information is not ordinarily a violation “merely because the 

information happens to be contained in the records.” Bartel v. 

FAA, 725 F.2d 1403, 1408 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 

Armstrong’s argument in the district court and on appeal 

is in the form of the common law tort doctrine, res ipsa 

loquitur; he reasons that information about the investigation 

must have come from somewhere, could not have come from 

an unprotected source, and so must have come from a 

protected source. See 610 F. Supp. 2d at 70. Even assuming 

the logic underlying the common law doctrine applies to the 

Privacy Act, Armstrong cannot prevail because he cannot 

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eliminate “other responsible causes.” See Restatement 

(Second) of Torts § 328D(1)(b).

We review the district court’s factual findings for clear 

error and its legal conclusions de novo. See Massachusetts v. 

Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The 

source of any particular bit of information is a question of 

fact; whether that source is a “record which is contained in a 

system of records,” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), is a question of law. 

Armstrong bases his claims upon disclosures of two 

sorts: (1) disclosures made by Thompson in the six letters she 

sent to the USDA and (2) disclosures made by other TIGTA 

employees that indirectly informed Thompson’s letters (a/k/a 

the rumor mill). We review these in turn.*

 *

 Additionally, Armstrong claims Michael Delgado, a 

supervisor involved in the investigation, disclosed information to a 

supervisor at the USDA in violation of the Privacy Act. The 

district court did not address these alleged disclosures because 

“they go well beyond the allegations [in the] complaint.” 610 F. 

Supp. 2d at 69 n.4. Armstrong does not deny that his complaint 

alleges no wrongful disclosure by Delgado and that he never moved 

to amend it to add such allegations. The district court had no 

obligation to address a claim neither mentioned in nor the subject 

of a motion to amend the complaint. See Belizan v. Hershon, 434 

F.3d 579, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (rule providing for leave to amend 

“applies only when the plaintiff actually has moved for leave to 

amend the complaint”). 

Armstrong also suggests in a footnote the district court should 

not have considered certain evidence when reviewing a motion for 

partial judgment under Rule 52(c). We need not address an 

argument raised only cursorily in a footnote. See Hutchins v. 

District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 539–40 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 

(en banc). 

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A. The Six Letters 

The district court held Thompson’s letters do not support 

a claim under the Privacy Act because the information 

contained in them had not been retrieved from a system of 

records. We first consider the district court’s factual finding 

concerning Thompson’s sources and then its legal conclusion 

that no such source was a record retrieved from a system of 

records. 

1. What Were Thompson’s Sources? 

The district court found Thompson composed the letters 

based upon information obtained “from her own complaint, 

from her own observations and speculation and those of 

others, from the rumor-mill ... and from other non-covered 

sources.” 610 F. Supp. 2d at 71. The following table pairs 

the disclosures in three of Thompson’s letters and the sources 

she identified for each; the other three letters contain 

substantially the same information and need not be analyzed 

separately. 

Disclosure Source(s) 

(1) The USDA hired 

“Armstrong to work in the 

Office of Investigations.” 

Observation and speculation: 

That Armstrong was going to 

the USDA was disclosed in an 

email message about a goingaway luncheon. As for the 

specific office, “I presumed 

that Mr. Armstrong, who was a 

law enforcement agent with 

TIGTA, ... would have applied 

for a position in the Office of 

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Investigations because that is 

where law enforcement agents 

are employed” at the USDA. 

(2) Armstrong “was escorted 

out of the building and 

forced to turn in his gun, 

badge, equipment, cell 

phone, computer and 

government car keys.” 

Observation and speculation: “I 

was there the day that he was 

removed. ... I heard him 

leave.” “I surmised that it was 

reasonable to presume that Mr. 

Armstrong was escorted out of 

the building, because when 

individuals are placed under 

investigation and removed from 

their position, they are escorted 

out and driven home.” In 

response to a question about his 

gun, badge, and cell phone, “I 

was present that day in the 

office,” and “the office 

manager, who sits ... outside of 

Mr. Armstrong’s office, ... told 

me that she saw Mr. Armstrong 

retrieve his equipment and turn 

it over.” Also, Armstrong 

parked in the same garage as 

did Thompson and she 

observed his government car 

“never left the parking space.” 

(3) “He was removed from all 

managerial and law 

enforcement duties and 

sent to another office.” 

Observation and speculation: 

Armstrong was Thompson’s 

supervisor “one day and he was 

not the next day.” 

(4) He “was under internal 

investigation for accessing 

sensitive law enforcement 

information through 

Her own complaint and 

speculation: “I made the initial 

anonymous complaint to 

TIGTA regarding Mr. 

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various databases.” Armstrong, and shortly 

thereafter Mr. Armstrong was 

my supervisor on one day and 

on the very next day he was no 

longer my supervisor. I was 

able to conclude that Mr. 

Armstrong was likely under 

investigation for the allegations 

that I had made.” 

(5) “He admitted to looking up 

information on his 

subordinates, co-workers, 

etc.” 

Speculation: “In my experience 

as a federal agent, most people 

admit to wrongdoing when they 

are caught.” 

(6) “At the time the USDA 

offered [Armstrong] a job, 

the investigation on him 

had been completed and 

the allegations ... were 

proven to be true.” 

Speculation: “a sufficient 

amount of time had passed for 

me to reasonably conclude that 

the investigation had been 

completed.” “I believe from 

my experience working there at 

TIGTA that had the allegations 

been disproven, he would have 

been returned as my supervisor. 

But he never came back.” 

(7) “At the time, the Treasury 

Inspector General for Tax 

Administration was 

deciding what disciplinary 

action (I believe 

termination was being 

considered) to take against 

him.” 

Speculation: “Based on the 

seriousness of the allegations 

contained in the initial 

anonymous complaint that I 

made to TIGTA, it was my 

presumption that an agency 

would consider termination. 

Termination is always a 

consideration as a disciplinary 

action.” 

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The district court credited Thompson’s testimony 

regarding her sources and, because Thompson identified a 

reasonable source for each bit of information, we see no clear 

error in the district court’s findings. Although the district 

court characterized her as an evasive and unreliable witness, it 

found no “evidence that Thompson accessed relevant 

protected records ... or that anyone who did have access 

disclosed information to her from those records.” 610 F. 

Supp. 2d at 71. Thompson expressly denied having “see[n] 

any portion of the investigation” or discussed the matter with 

various supervisors involved in the investigation. 

In keeping with his variation of the res ipsa theme, 

Armstrong argues Thompson must have had another source of 

information, either the agency’s “Investigation Records or [] 

one of the five senior [TIGTA] officials tasked with 

conducting and safeguarding the report of investigation.” We 

disagree; Armstrong does no more than speculate about 

another source, whereas each piece of information disclosed 

in the six letters can be traced back to one of the sources 

Thompson identified, including plausible inferences she drew 

from her experience, to the satisfaction of the district court. 

2. Was any Source a Record Under the Act? 

We now turn to whether any of the sources Thompson 

named qualifies as a “record which is contained in a system 

of records.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). The first source, 

Thompson’s own complaint, presents the closest question 

because it became part of the agency’s record of the 

investigation. The district court, however, found she did not 

retrieve her complaint from the agency’s system of records 

when composing her letters to the USDA. 

Relying upon our opinion in Bartel v. FAA, 725 F.2d 

1403 (1984), Armstrong argues once Thompson’s complaint 

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became an agency record the Privacy Act prohibited her from 

repeating its contents. But for the cited decision, this 

argument might seem far-fetched. 

In that case one Bartel, an employee of the Federal 

Aviation Administration, had apparently accessed agency 

records improperly, prompting Vincent, another employee, to 

investigate Bartel’s conduct. Vincent collected documents 

and created a Report of Investigation. Several months later, 

after learning Bartel was seeking reemployment within the 

agency, Vincent sent letters to the persons whose files Bartel 

had accessed, advising them of the investigation and of its 

findings. 725 F.2d at 1405–06. Bartel sued the FAA under 

the Privacy Act, arguing the letters disclosed a “record,” viz., 

the Report of Investigation, “contained in a system of 

records.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). The evidence in the case was 

“entirely silent as to whether Vincent ever examined” — and 

therefore, actually retrieved — the Report of Investigation 

before he composed the letters. 725 F.2d at 1408. 

We proposed an exception to the general rule requiring 

the plaintiff to prove a record was actually retrieved, 

suggesting Vincent may have violated the Privacy Act even if 

he recalled from memory the contents of the report he had 

created for inclusion in the agency’s record. We narrowly 

tethered the exception, however, to the facts of that case, in 

which the disclosing agency employee had “ordered the 

investigation which resulted in the [report], made a putative 

determination of wrongdoing based on the investigation, and 

disclosed that putative determination in letters purporting to 

report an official agency determination.” 725 F.2d at 1411. 

We also explained that, 

in contrast to disclosures of general office knowledge, it 

would hardly seem an “intolerable burden” to restrict an 

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agency official’s discretion to disclose information in a 

record that he may not have read but that he had a 

primary role in creating and using, where it was because 

of that record-related role that he acquired the 

information in the first place. 

Id. Cf. Doe v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 519 F.3d 456, 460–

63 (8th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing Bartel because doctor who 

disclosed information in plaintiff’s medical record had 

“learned the information directly from” plaintiff and not from 

government system for collecting information). 

The exception we suggested in Bartel does not extend to 

this case, in which Thompson neither acquired the 

information contained in her initial complaint in any way 

related to a record, as an investigator might have done, nor 

used the record in her work for the agency. Because 

Armstrong has not shown that Thompson retrieved the record 

containing her complaint before composing the letters to the 

USDA, Thompson’s disclosure in the letters of information 

she had also included in her complaint did not violate the 

Privacy Act. 

Nor does a disclosure from any of the other identified 

sources constitute a violation. There is no evidence 

Thompson’s “observations and speculation” or “those of 

others,” or information “from the rumor-mill,” 610 F. Supp. 

2d at 71, are part of and were retrieved from any “record 

which is contained in a system of records.” 

B. The Rumor Mill 

Concerning the rumor mill, Armstrong states, “The initial 

disclosure of the information from protected Investigation 

Records had to start with someone.” Drawing upon the 

district court’s observation that the rumor mill “apparently 

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goes virtually unchecked at TIGTA,” 610 F. Supp. 2d at 71; 

see also id. at 68 n.3, Armstrong argues that TIGTA 

employees with information from the investigation must have 

unlawfully disclosed that information to other TIGTA 

employees, effectively feeding the rumor mill. To be sure, a 

person who fed the rumor mill the contents of a record that 

had been retrieved from a system of records may have 

violated the Privacy Act. In order to establish such a 

violation, however, Armstrong must prove someone disclosed 

information from a “record,” which he has not done. 

The Tenth Circuit explained as follows the central 

difficulty in allegations concerning office rumor mills: 

[T]he mere fact that information ... was well-known in 

[the] workplace does not give rise to an inference that 

such knowledge was widespread because of a disclosure. 

... [T]he Privacy Act does not prohibit disclosure of 

information or knowledge obtained from sources other 

than ‘records.’ In particular, it does not prevent federal 

employees or officials from talking—even gossiping—

about anything of which they have non-record-based 

knowledge. 

Pippinger v. Rubin, 129 F.3d 519, 530–31 (1997) (citing 

Thomas v. Dep’t of Energy, 719 F.2d 342, 345 (10th Cir. 

1983)). 

Again invoking a version of res ipsa, Armstrong argues 

someone must have violated the Privacy Act because others 

somehow found out information contained in a covered 

record. But his conclusion does not follow logically from his 

premise. First, Armstrong points to no information in the 

rumor mill that is not found in Thompson’s letters to the 

USDA and, as we have seen, Thompson identified noncovered sources for all the information in those letters. 

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Although she did identify the rumor mill as one source of 

information, she also identified another source for each bit of 

information. Because Thompson got all the information she 

disclosed from a lawful source other than the rumor mill, 

Armstrong’s argument fails. 

Second, Armstrong admitted he himself disclosed some 

details of the investigation to others. In addition to his wife, 

he identified five coworkers at the TIGTA and two persons 

outside the TIGTA with whom he spoke about the 

investigation. 

Armstrong’s disclosures to seven professional contacts 

could easily account for certain details finding their way into 

the TIGTA rumor mill. Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social 

Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005) 

(explaining why information disclosed to a coworker 

circulates more widely). Armstrong’s mere assertion that the 

disclosures must have come from a record are not compelling 

in view of the sources Thompson identified and his own 

spilling of the beans. 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district 

court is 

Affirmed. 

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