Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02345/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02345-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 It is now called the “Board of Parole Hearings.”

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LANCE GRANT VAN HOOK,

Petitioner,

 vs.

A. P. KANE, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-2345 PJH (PR)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS

This is a habeas case filed pro se by a state prisoner. Petitioner alleges that his

rights were violated when the Board of Prison Terms ("BPT")1 found him not suitable for

parole at a hearing in 2004.

Respondent has moved to dismiss the action. The time to oppose the motion has

expired and petitioner has not filed an opposition, so the motion is ready for decision. 

DISCUSSION

In the petition, petitioner contended that: (1) His due process rights were violated in

the denial of parole; (2) the BPT violated the Americans with Disabilities Act in relying on

his perceived status as a drug abuser to deny parole; and (3) his due process rights were

violated by the makeup of the board. Respondents contend that the petition should be

dismissed because (1) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, because petitioner has no

liberty interest in parole and therefore no federal due process rights in connection with

parole decisions; (2) the ADA claim is not exhausted; and (3) his claim regarding the

makeup of the board presents only a state law issue.

///

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United States District Court

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1. Liberty interest

While there is "no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be

conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence," Greenholtz v. Inmates of

Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), a state's statutory parole scheme,

if it uses mandatory language, may create a presumption that parole release will be granted

when or unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby give rise to a

constitutionally protected liberty interest, see Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376-

78 (1987) (Montana parole statute providing that board "shall" release prisoner, subject to

certain restrictions, creates due process liberty interest in release on parole); Greenholtz,

442 U.S. at 11-12 (Nebraska parole statute providing that board "shall" release prisoner,

subject to certain restrictions, creates due process liberty interest in release on parole). In

such a case, a prisoner has liberty interest in parole that cannot be denied without

adequate procedural due process protections. See Allen, 482 U.S. at 373-81; Greenholtz,

442 U.S. at 11-16. 

California’s parole scheme uses mandatory language and is similar to the schemes

in Allen and Greenholtz which the Supreme Court held gave rise to a protected liberty

interest in release on parole. In California, the panel or board "shall set a release date

unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the

timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that

consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this

individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting." Cal. Penal

Code § 3041(b). Under the clearly established framework of Allen and Greenholtz,

“California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.” 

McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). The scheme presumes that

parole release will be granted unless the statutorily defined determinations (that

considerations of public safety forbid it) are made. Id.; Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910,

915-16 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding initial refusal to set parole date for prisoner with fifteen-to-life

sentence implicated prisoner’s liberty interest). In sum, the structure of California's parole

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scheme -- with its mandatory language and substantive predicates – gives rise to a

federally protected liberty interest in parole such that an inmate has a federal right to due

process in parole proceedings.

Respondent relies on In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (Cal.), cert. denied, 126 S.

Ct. 92 (2005), as authority for his contention that the California statute does not create a

liberty interest in parole. This reliance is misplaced because Dannenberg deals with

subsection (a) of the parole statute, whereas the Ninth Circuit decisions finding that there is

a liberty interest in parole in California rely on subsection (b). Sections 3041(a) and

3041(b) of the California parole statute serve different purposes: subsection (a) provides

when the parole authorities must meet with the inmate, that they should “normally” set a

parole date, and that the parole dates should be calculated to provide uniform terms. 

Subsection (b) provides that the board shall set a release date unless considerations of

public safety forbid it. Dannenberg determined that a prisoner's individual parole suitability

must be determined before the BPT attempts to set a term that would result in uniform

parole dates for similar crimes – in other words, subsection (a)'s term uniformity

requirement is only mandatory after the inmate has been found suitable under subsection

(b). See id. at 1069-70. Dannenberg does not answer the question of whether subsection

(b) creates a liberty interest in the parole suitability determination. Indeed, some language

in Dannenberg seems to recognize such a liberty interest. See id. at 1095 n.16. 

Given that Dannenberg did not address whether a liberty interest is created by

subsection (b), and the Ninth Circuit has held in McQuillion that it does, respondent’s

argument is without merit. This court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

2254 to decide whether petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was

violated by the BPT's determination that he was not suitable for parole.

2. ADA claim

The second of petitioner’s claims, his claim that the board violated his rights under

the ADA by denying parole in part because it perceived him to be a drug abuser, was not

stated as a separate issue in the petition. The other two grounds are clearly delineated as

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Ground 1 and Ground 2 in capital letters and clearly state the issues presented. The ADA

claim, however, is included in the discussion of the first issue. The court, in performance of

its obligation to liberally construe pro se filings, treated this as a separate issue because it

seemed distinct from the due process issue. It may be that petitioner did not intend this to

be a separate issue, particularly given that it would seem not to present any basis for

habeas relief. For this reason, and because the court below concludes that this issue is

unexhausted, petitioner will be afforded an opportunity to amend to delete this issue.

An application for a federal writ of habeas corpus filed by a prisoner who is in state

custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court may not be granted unless the prisoner has

first exhausted state judicial remedies, either by way of a direct appeal or in collateral

proceedings, by presenting the highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule

on the merits of each and every issue he or she seeks to raise in federal court. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b),(c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). Federal courts

must dismiss a habeas petition which contains one or more unexhausted claims. Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). When a district court discovers an unexhausted claim it

is not free to simply ignore that claim; Rose v. Lundy requires dismissal of the entire

habeas petition without reaching the merits of any of its claims if the petition combines

exhausted and unexhausted claims. Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1988).

The dismissal must be with leave to amend to delete the unexhausted claims; if they are

deleted, the court can then consider those which remain. See Anthony v. Cambra, 236

F.3d 568, 574 (9th Cir. 2000). Alternatively, the district court has the power to stay the

petition while petitioner exhausts in state court. Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78

(2005).

Respondent’s materials establish that the ADA claim is not exhausted. Petitioner

will be allowed to choose among the alternatives mentioned above.

3. Composition of the board

The outcome of the motion to dismiss this issue is heavily dependent on how it is

characterized. In his petition, petitioner contends that the board members were not a

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“cross section” of the community, as required by Section 5075 of the California Penal Code. 

Section 5075 requires that board members be a “cross section of the racial, sexual,

economic, and geographic features of the population of the state.” Petitioner contends that

instead the board was made up of members with a law-enforcement background, except

for one victims’ rights advocate. The complication is that he also contends, in what

otherwise is an issue largely about Section 5075 and the cross-section requirement, that

the board members were biased, as shown by their denying parole in ninety-nine percent of

the cases that come before them. As the court reads the issue, petitioner contends that

both these things -- failure to comply with Section 5075 and bias -- violate federal due

process. 

Respondent contends that this issue should be dismissed because it does not

present a federal question. It is true that petitioner’s contention that Section 5075 was

violated is purely a state law claim. Even as a state claim, it seems to be without merit, as

the statute does not require pro-prisoner members, and he does not contend that the board

does not reflect the “racial, sexual, economic, and geographic features of the population of

the state.” A board could consist entirely of retired law enforcement officers and still do

that.

 In any case, whether or not Section 5075 was violated is irrelevant. What matters is

whether petitioner has alleged a violation of the constitution, and petitioner’s contention that

the denial rate shows that the board is not an unbiased decision-maker is sufficient to

allege a due process violation. See O’Bremski v. Maas, 915 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1990). 

In an alternative argument, respondent contends that if the court concludes that

petitioner has stated a federal claim, it still should be dismissed. First, he asserts that there

is no liberty interest in parole, so no due process rights. This claim is rejected in the 

discussion of petitioner’s first ground above. Secondly, he asserts that Section 5075 does

not create a liberty interest entitled to procedural due process protections. Although this is

probably true, it does not negate the fact that petitioner has a liberty interest in parole, and

that among the due process protections for that liberty interest is the right to an unbiased

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2 Options (1) and (3) -- amending to delete the unexhausted issues and proceeding

with those which are exhausted, or voluntarily dismissal -- have disadvantages. If petitioner

chooses to delete the unexhausted issue and proceed now with those which are exhausted

(option number one), a subsequent petition directed to the same conviction might be barred

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decision-maker. Thirdly, respondent contends that this claim is moot because most of the

commissioners have changed since the 2004 hearing at issue. To the extent that

petitioner’s claim is that the commissioners did not meet the Section 5075 requirement that

they be a cross-section of the community, this may be correct; but the court has already

concluded above that any such claim is without merit. However, a change in the makeup of

the board would not moot petitioner’s contention that the particular board which denied him

parole was biased. Finally, respondent again focuses on the Section 5075 claim in

contending that the claim is vague and conclusory. That is not the case, however, with the

bias claim.

The motion to dismiss will be granted to the extent petitioner contends that the

alleged failure to comply with Section 5075 violated due process. It will be denied as to

petitioner’s contention that the board was biased.

CONCLUSION

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (document 4 on the docket) is denied in part

and granted in part. It is DENIED as to respondent’s contention that petitioner has no

liberty interest in parole and as to petitioner’s contention that the board was biased. It is

GRANTED as to petitioner’s contention that the alleged violation of Section 5075 violated

due process, and as to respondent’s contention that the petition is mixed because the ADA

claim is not exhausted. 

2. Because the petition is mixed, that is, contains both exhausted issues and an

unexhausted one, petitioner must choose one of the following: (1) He may file an amended

petition omitting the unexhausted issue; (2) he may ask the court to stay proceedings while

he returns to state court to exhaust the unexhausted issue; or (3) he may dismiss the entire

case with an eye to exhausting the unexhausted issue and then

filing a new federal petition (this choice has serious risks, discussed in the footnote).2

 He

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as second or successive or abusive. See 28 U.S.C. § 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1); Lundy, 455 U.S.

at 521. He also would have to obtain permission from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to file

such a second petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). If he chooses to dismiss this case and

return later with a completely exhausted petition (option number three), that petition would not

be second or successive, see Slack v. McDaniel, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1604-05 (2000); Anthony

v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2000), but it probably would be barred by the one-year

statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state

convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (1)

the judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time for

seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional

state action was removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional

right asserted was recognized by the United States Supreme Court, if the right was newly

recognized and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of

the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1). Time during which a properly filed application for collateral review (such as a state

habeas petition) is pending is excluded from the one-year time limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2).

Depending on when direct review was completed; possible application of another starting date

for the statute of limitations; when any applications for collateral review, such as state habeas

petitions, were filed; and when a new federal petition is filed, a new petition might be barred.

The time a federal petition, such as this one, is pending is not excluded from the one-year limit.

Duncan v. Walker, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2001).

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must do one of these three things within thirty days of the date this order is entered. If he

does not, this case will be dismissed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 29, 2006.

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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