Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00786/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00786-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

S. STEGLINSKI,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:12-cv-00786-SAB

PRETRIAL ORDER

Motion In Limine Deadlines:

Filing: February 22, 2016

Response: March 14, 2016

Reply: March 21, 2016

Hearing: March 28, 2016, at 11:00 a.m.

in Courtroom 9 (SAB)

Trial Date:

April 19, 2016, at 8:30 a.m. in Courtroom 9 

(SAB); 2 Days

This Court conducted a pretrial conference hearing on January 22, 2016. Plaintiff Gary 

Williams (“Plaintiff”) appeared pro se, and Defendant S. Steglinski (“Defendant”) appeared by 

counsel, Arthur Mark, III. Pursuant to the Court‟s September 15, 2015 trial scheduling order, 

Plaintiff‟s pretrial statement was due on or before January 1, 2016. (ECF No. 76.) To date, 

Plaintiff has not filed his pretrial statement, and on January 14, 2016, the Court directed Plaintiff 

to file his pretrial statement on or before January 20, 2016. (ECF No. 81.) During the January 

22, 2016 pretrial conference, Plaintiff stated that he mailed his pretrial statement on January 20, 

2016. However, over two weeks have now passed since Plaintiff allegedly mailed his pretrial 

statement and the Court has not received it. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(e) 

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and Local Rule 283, the Court issues this final pretrial order. 1

Plaintiff is forewarned that his continued failure to file his documents by the court 

ordered deadlines will result in his documents not being considered by the Court or the

jury. 

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has jurisdiction and venue is proper. This Court has original jurisdiction 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 in that Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

violated his civil rights as guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution by using excessive force against him when he deployed his non-lethal weapon to 

stop inmates who were fighting and assaulting another inmate on the yard at Kern Valley State 

Prison. Venue is proper because a substantial part of the events or omissions on which the claim 

is based occurred in this District.

II. TRIAL

Trial will begin on Tuesday, April 19, 2016, at 8:30 a.m. before United States 

Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone in Courtroom 9 (SAB). The trial will be trial by jury. The 

parties estimate the trial will take 2 days.

III. FACTS AND EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

A. Undisputed Facts

The following facts are undisputed:

1. Plaintiff Gary Williams (CDCR No. K19320) is a convicted felon, and an inmate

of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation currently serving

multiple sentences, including a sentence of life without parole. He has been an 

inmate of CDCR since August 1996.

2. Defendant is a Correctional Officer employed by CDCR.

 

1 As Plaintiff did not submit a pretrial statement, the Court does not have Plaintiff‟s input on many sections of this 

pretrial order, including Plaintiff‟s disputed facts, disputed evidentiary issues, special factual information, witness 

list, and list of exhibits. Plaintiff original statement was due on January 1, 2016 and was late by over two weeks 

when he said he mailed it. (ECF No. 76.). The Court exercised its discretion and gave Plaintiff additional time but 

must now issue the pretrial statement so as to frame the issues and evidence for an impending trial and not cause 

greater prejudice to the defendant. 

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3. Plaintiff was an inmate at Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP) on May 24, 2010. 

4. Defendant was working as a Correctional Officer at KVSP on May 24, 2010.

5. On May 24, 2010, at approximately 2:30 p.m., two fights between several inmates 

erupted on the A Facility yard at KVSP. 

6. Plaintiff was on the yard at the time the fights broke out, and in close proximity to 

one of the fights. 

7. Defendant was working as an Observation Officer for A yard at the time the fights 

broke out.

8. Officers, including Defendant, gave orders for inmates to “get down” and some 

inmates on the yard did not comply with those orders. 

9. Several officers used various types of force in order to stop the fights.

10. Defendant deployed foam rubber rounds in an effort to stop the inmates from 

fighting. 

B. Disputed Facts

Defendant submits the following facts as disputed:

1. Whether Plaintiff was hit by a foam rubber round from Defendant‟s launcher or 

by a round fired by another officer.

2. Whether Defendant used excessive force in deploying foam rubber rounds on 

May 24, 2010.

3. Whether Plaintiff suffered only a contusion or any permanent or on-going injuries 

from being hit by a foam rubber round allegedly fired by Defendant. 

C. Disputed Evidentiary Issues

Defendant submits that the following evidentiary issues as disputed:

1. Whether Plaintiff should be allowed to offer opinion testimony concerning his

medical and mental health conditions, diagnoses, physical injuries, and their 

causes. 

2. Whether the abstracts of judgment for Plaintiff or any incarcerated witnesses are 

admissible for impeachment purposes.

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3. Whether evidence pertaining to any of Plaintiff‟s dismissed claims and dismissed 

Defendants is admissible for any purpose.

4. Whether Plaintiff should be precluded from offering lay testimony regarding the 

ballistic characteristics of foam rubber rounds.

IV. SPECIAL FACTUAL INFORMATION

Defendant contends that the doctrines of strict liability and res ipsa loquitur do not apply. 

Defendant contends that assuming Plaintiff can prove that he was injured by a round fired by 

Defendant, any injuries suffered by Plaintiff were minor or de minimis, in that he sustained no 

permanent or on-going injuries, and that he is not entitled to punitive damages. 

V. RELIEF SOUGHT

Plaintiff‟s complaint seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $50,000.00, nominal 

damages in the amount of $1.00, and punitive damages in the amount of $20,000.00. 

VI. POINTS OF LAW

A. Action Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

This § 1983 action is governed by federal law. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff 

must allege that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). A 

person deprives another of a constitutional right under § 1983 only if he “does an affirmative act, 

participates in another‟s affirmative acts,” or fails to perform a legally required duty which 

“causes the deprivation of which” the plaintiff complains. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 

(9th Cir. 1988). A plaintiff must demonstrate that the official was the “moving force” behind the 

constitutional deprivation. Monell v. Dep‟t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

B. Excessive Force Claim Under the Eighth Amendment 

The relevant inquiry for an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim is “whether force 

was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically 

to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 

320 (1986). In making this determination, the court may evaluate “the need for the application 

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of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, [and] the 

extent of injury inflicted.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321; Marquez v. Gutierrez, 322 F.3d 689, 692 

(9th Cir. 2003). Prison administrators “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the 

adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve 

internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Id. at 321-22 (quoting Bell 

v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1970)). Plaintiff must prove that Defendant‟s use of force “was the 

actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of [his] eighth amendment right to be free from cruel 

and unusual punishment.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Rizzo v. 

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976).

1. More Than De Minimis Injury Required

Plaintiff has to show more than a de minimis injury. Under the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (PLRA), “no federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or

other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a

prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). In other words, Burnett must plead a

physical injury within the meaning of the PLRA in order to recover damages for mental or

emotional injuries. In Siglar v. Hightower, plaintiff alleged that a correctional officer verbally

and physically abused him. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that his ear was bruised and sore for

three days from being twisted by the correctional officer. The Court of Appeals held that

plaintiff's alleged injury was de minimis, and that he had not raised a valid Eighth Amendment

claim for excessive use of force. Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997).

Likewise, in Luong v. Hatt, 979 F.Supp. 481 (N.D. TX 1997), an inmate filed a failure to

protect claim alleging that he suffered injuries including: a bleeding tongue and injured shoulder

which lasted a couple of days; minor abrasions on his right forearm, chest, and a contusion with

slight swelling of his jaw; and red swollen wrists which lasted two or three days. Id. at 485. The

court discussed that “a physical injury is an observable or diagnosable medical condition

requiring treatment by a medical care professional. It is not a sore muscle, an aching back, a

scratch, an abrasion, a bruise, etc., which lasts even up to two or three weeks.” Id. at 486. The

court concluded that plaintiff's injuries were either nonexistent or de minimis. Id. at 485; see 

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also, Spicer v. Collins, 9 F.Supp.2d 673 (E.D. TX 1998) (Plaintiff's injuries of pain in his neck,

arms and hands from being handcuffed were at most de minimis.).

Under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, only extreme deprivations rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find

worthy of treatment, the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual‟s

daily activities, and the existence of chronic and substantial pain are recognized examples of

conditions that rise to the level of an objectively serious deprivation or injury under the Eighth

Amendment. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1991). Minor cuts and

bruises do not constitute serious injury. Hill v. Dekalb Youth Detention Center, 40 F.3d 1176,

1188 (11th Cir. 1994).

Also, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that prisoners bringing actions

must show more than a de minimis physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Oliver v. Edwards, 

289 F.3d 623 (2002); see also Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(allegation that inmate slept without a mattress for one night is insufficient to state Eighth 

Amendment violation and no amendment can alter that deficiency), vacated on other grounds, 

504 U.S. 25 (1992); Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(temporary placement in safety cell that was dirty and smelled bad did not constitute infliction of 

pain); DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 445 (7th Cir. 1988) (correctional officer spitting upon 

prisoner does not rise to level of constitutional violation); Holloway v. Gunnell, 685 F.2d 150 

(5th Cir. 1985) (no claim stated where prisoner forced to spend two days in hot dirty cell with no 

water); Miles v. Konvalenka, 791 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (single instance of finding mouse 

in food not actionable); Vega v. Parsley, 700 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (burned out light 

bulb, promptly replaced, does not violate Eighth Amendment); Evans v. Fogg, 466 F. Supp. 949 

(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (no claim stated by prisoner confined for 24 hours in refuse strewn cell and for 

two days in flooded cell).

2. Deference Should Be Accorded to Prison Officials.

Prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and

execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order 

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and discipline and to maintain institutional security. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979);

Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2010). That deference extends to prison

security measures taken in response to an actual disruption, just as it does to preventive measures

intended to reduce the incidence of these or any other breaches of prison discipline. LeMaire, 12

F.3d at 1453. Prison officials have, and must have, discretion to deal with disruption and they

deserve deference in their exercise of discretion. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 547 and Norwood, 591

F.3d 1062. “These decisions are delicate ones and those charged with them must be given

reasonable leeway.” Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1069-70, citing Hayward, 629 F.2d at 603. Federal

courts should avoid enmeshing themselves in the minutiae of prison operations in the name of 

the Eighth Amendment. Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1981).

C. Damages

1. Compensatory Damages

In order to recover compensatory damages, the Plaintiff must prove that a violation of his 

constitutional rights actually caused him injury. Adam v. Wolff, 624 F.Supp. 1036, 1038 (D. Nevada 

1985).

2. Punitive Damages

Punitive damages are available in a § 1983 action only when a defendant‟s conduct is 

shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent or when it involves reckless or callous 

indifference to the federally protected rights of others. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983). 

It is not enough that a defendant may have acted in an objectively unreasonable manner; his 

subjective state of mind must be assessed. Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 867 (10th Cir. 

1989). Where there is no evidence that a defendant acted with evil intent, there is no legal right 

to punitive damages. Ward v. City of San Jose, 967 F.2d 280, 286 (9th Cir. 1991). The plaintiff 

alleging a § 1983 claim has the burden of proving that punitive damages should be awarded by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 807 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Model 

Civ. Jury Instr. 9th Cir. 7.5 (2004)).

D. Impeachment by Prior Felony Conviction

If Plaintiff or other inmate witnesses testify at trial, the jury is entitled to consider their 

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credibility. For the purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness of a witness, evidence that 

a witness has been convicted of a crime that was punishable by imprisonment in excess of one 

year shall be admitted subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1); see, 

e.g., Untied States v. Murray, 751 F.2d 1528, 1533 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that trial court 

properly determined that probative value of seventeen-year old conviction outweighed its 

prejudicial effect when needed to resolve significant conflict between defendant and the 

government‟s chief witness).

The presumption under Rule 609(a) is that the term “evidence” encompasses the essential 

facts of the conviction, including the statutory name of each offense, the date of conviction, and 

the sentence imposed. United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 615-16 (2d Cir. 2005); United 

States v. Osazuwa, 564 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that impeachment with prior 

convictions is generally limited to the crime charged, the date, and the disposition); see also, 4 

Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein‟s Federal Evidence § 609.20[2] at 609-57 

(2d ed. 2005) (“When a prior conviction is admissible for impeachment, the impeaching party is 

generally limited to establishing that bare facts of the conviction; usually the name of the 

offense, the date of the conviction, and the sentence.”).

E. Qualified Immunity 

The Government officials are “shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their 

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The 

purpose of the rule is to permit officials to undertake their responsibilities without fear that they 

will be held liable in damages for actions that appear reasonable at the time, but are later held to 

violate statutory or constitutional rights. Id. at 819. “The concern of the immunity inquiry is to 

acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made” and that it is “often difficult for an officer to 

determine how the relevant legal doctrine will apply to the factual situation that he faces.” Estate 

of Ford v. Ramirez Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 

194, 205 (2001)). Thus, “regardless of whether the constitutional violation occurred, the 

[official] should prevail if the right asserted by the plaintiff was not „clearly established‟ or the 

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[official] could have reasonably believed that his particular conduct was lawful.” Romero v. 

Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991).

In Saucier, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part inquiry to determine whether the 

immunity exits. The initial inquiry, or first prong, is whether “[t]aken in the light most favorable 

to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show that the officer‟s conduct violated a 

constitutional right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If, and only if, a violation can be made out, the 

next step, or second prong, is to ask whether the “right was clearly established.” Id. If the right 

was clearly established at the time of the alleged incident, the court must then determine 

whether, “under that law, could a reasonable state official have believed his conduct was lawful.” 

Id. at 202; Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Browning v. Vernon, 

44 F.3d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1995)). “The linchpin of qualified immunity is the reasonableness of 

the official‟s conduct.” Rosenbaum v. Washoe County, 654 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of law at the time of the conduct at issue. 

Brouseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999). 

Thus, the reasonableness inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case 

and not as a general, broad proposition. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202; Kennedy v. Ridgefield, 439 

F.3d 1055, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2006). Qualified immunity allows ample room for mistaken 

judgments—regardless of whether the government official‟s error is “a mistake of law, a mistake 

of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact”—and applies even when 

wrongful conduct occurs. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 403 (1997); Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). The court has the discretion, based on the circumstances of 

the particular case at hand, to decide whether the two-part inquiry is worthwhile or if a 

determination can be made by analyzing a single prong of the immunity inquiry. Pearson, 555 

U.S. at 236.

VII. STIPULATIONS

None.

VIII. AMENDMENTS/DISMISSALS

None. 

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IX. SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Defendant does not believe this case could settle, given the amount of restitution owed by 

Plaintiff. 

X. AGREED STATEMENT

None. Defendant does not believe presentation of an Agreed Statement of Facts is

feasible or advisable. 

XI. SEPARATE TRIAL OF ISSUES

As is this Court‟s standard practice, the Court will bifurcate the issue of punitive 

damages. If the jury finds that Defendant is liable for punitive damages, the Court will conduct a 

second phase of trial on the amount of punitive damages.

XII. IMPARTIAL EXPERTS/LIMITATION OF EXPERTS

None.

XIII. PRE TRIAL FILING DEADLINES

A. Motions In Limine and Hearing. 

Any party may file a motion in limine, which is a procedural mechanism to limit in 

advance testimony or evidence in a particular area. United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 

(9th Cir. 2009). In the case of a jury trial, the Court‟s ruling gives Plaintiff and Defendants‟ 

counsel advance notice of the scope of certain evidence so that admissibility is settled before 

attempted use of the evidence before the jury. Id. at 1111-1112. Although the Federal Rules do 

not explicitly provide for the filing of motions in limine, the Court has the inherent power to hear 

and decide such motions as a function of its duty to expeditiously manage trials by eliminating 

evidence that is clearly inadmissible for any purpose. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 

(1984).

This Court further orders the parties to file motions in limine only with respect to 

important, critical issues. Motions in limine on abstract evidentiary issues or issues more 

appropriately addressed by the Court on a case-by-case basis (such as a motion in limine to 

exclude all irrelevant evidence) will be looked upon with disfavor. After satisfying the forgoing,

if a motion in limine still seeks to address the admissibility of a particular trial exhibit, the 

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exhibit in question must be referenced by the trial exhibit number so that the court can review the 

actual exhibit for admissibility. If the exhibit sought to be admitted would not be in the court‟s 

possession one week prior to the motion in limine hearing, then the exhibit in question must be 

included in the motion. Failure to properly reference or attach an exhibit in the motion will 

result in the request being denied.

The parties shall not file separate motions in limine for every issue presented to the 

Court. Rather, each party may file one consolidated motion in limine which is subdivided into 

separate sections for each issue setting for the legal authority and analysis. The responding party 

shall file one opposition in response addressing each motion in limine issue in a separate section.

As set forth at the pretrial conference, the deadline for service and filing of motions in limine

is February 22, 2016. The deadline for service and filing of an opposition, if any, is March 14, 

2016. The deadline for service and filing of a reply, if any, is March 21, 2016. A telephonic motions 

in limine hearing will be held on March 28 2016, at 11:00 a.m. in Courtroom Nine, before the 

undersigned. Counsel for defendants is directed to arrange for telephone contact with Plaintiff and to 

contact the Courtroom Deputy, Mamie Hernandez, at (559) 499-5672, prior to the hearing date, to 

receive instructions regarding the conference call. The parties are directed to the Court previous 

order regarding the format and scope of the motion in limine and such motion and opposition shall 

conform to those requirements. 

B. Trial Witnesses:

No later than February 16, 2016, each party shall file and serve a final witness list, 

including the name of each witness and omitting witnesses listed in the joint pretrial statement 

which the parties no longer intend to call. Only witnesses who are listed in this pretrial order 

may appear on the final witness list. The parties may not call any witness that is not on the 

final witness list unless (1) it is solely for impeachment or rebuttal purposes, (2) the parties 

stipulate, (3) additional witnesses are required in light of the Court’s ruling on a motion in

limine2, or (4) it is necessary to prevent “manifest injustice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e); Local 

 

2 Any party seeking to add additional witnesses beyond those named in the final witness list in light of the Court‟s 

ruling on a motion in limine must file a notice with the Court within two (2) days after the Court‟s order on the 

motion in limine.

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Rule 281(b)(10).

During trial, the parties‟ are obligated to provide the opposing party, by the close of the 

prior business day, the names of the witnesses the party intends to call on the next trial day. If 

evidentiary problems are anticipated, the parties‟ shall immediately notify the Court that a 

hearing will be required.

The following is a list of witnesses that the parties expect to call at trial:

1. Plaintiff Anticipates Calling the Following Witnesses:

a. Gary Williams, Plaintiff

b. Michael Davis3

2. Defendant Anticipates Calling the Following Witnesses:

a. S. Steglinski, Defendant. 

b. R. Dyer, Correctional Officer, Kern Valley State Prison

c. G. Smith, Correctional Officer, Kern Valley State Prison

d. J. Yerena, Correctional Officer, Kern Valley State Prison

e. William Adams, Expert Witness, Correctional Officer, Kern Valley State Prison

f. J. Kohler, Correctional Sergeant, Kern Valley State Prison

g. B. Kirby, Correctional Sergeant, Kern Valley State Prison

h. L. Ortega, Correctional Sergeant, Kern Valley State Prison 

i. Dr. J. Akanno, treating physician, California State Prison, Corcoran

j. Dr. J. Hodges, treating physician, RJ Donovan Correctional Facility

k. E. Frances, Nurse Practitioner, California State Prison, Los Angeles County 

l. Doctor Susan Morris, Expert Witness, treating physician, California State Prison, 

Los Angeles County (LAC) 

m. The custodian of records for Plaintiff‟s central inmate file. 

n. The custodian(s) of records for Plaintiff‟s medical file, including if necessary the 

 

3 During the pretrial conference, Plaintiff indicated that he will be calling Michael Davis, who is a nonincarcerated 

witness. Plaintiff indicated that Mr. Davis is coming voluntarily and he did not subpoena him. Plaintiff indicated 

that he would provide Mr. Davis‟s phone number to defendant‟s counsel. However, as of this date, the Court has 

not received Plaintiff‟s pretrial statement. 

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custodian of records for Delano Regional Medical Center. 

o. The custodians of records who maintain the central files for any inmate witnesses.

The parties are forewarned that every witness they intend to call must appear on 

their own witness list. The mere fact that a witness appears on the opposing party’s 

witness list is not a guarantee that the witness will be called at trial or otherwise be 

available for questioning by other parties. Each party must undertake independent efforts 

to secure the attendance of every witness they intend to call at trial.

C. Exhibits

As noted below, no later than March 29, 2016, the Defendant shall file and serve 

Defendant‟s final exhibit list and pre-marked exhibits for both Plaintiff and Defendant.

1. Pre-Marked Exhibits:

All exhibits must be pre-marked with an exhibit sticker or other legible 

numbering/lettering by the party who seeks to use it. If the individual exhibit includes multiple 

pages and is not easily identified as to each page (i.e., Bates stamp numbering), then the exhibit 

must be page numbered. This requirement that exhibits be pre-marked applies both to evidence 

that will be formally admitted into evidence as well as any other exhibits that will be presented in 

any manner during trial, such as “demonstrative” evidence. Each individual “original” exhibit 

that will be submitted to the jury must be stapled/fastened so that the exhibit does not become 

separated. Further, exhibits submitted to the jury must be pre-marked on the front page only in 

the manner described above. Impeachment or rebuttal evidence need not be pre-marked.

a. Joint Exhibits: Joint exhibits are those exhibits which all parties agree may be 

admitted into evidence without the need for laying a proper foundation under the 

Federal Rules of Evidence. Joint exhibits must be pre-marked with the 

designation “J-[Number]” (e.g., J-1, J-2). Those exhibits may be introduced at 

any time during the course of the trial. However, unless the parties agree 

otherwise on the record, joint exhibits are not “automatically” admitted into 

evidence: at least one of the parties must admit a joint exhibit into evidence. If an 

exhibit is not admitted by any party, the exhibit will not be given to the jury 

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despite its “joint” designation as an exhibit.

b. Plaintiff’s Exhibits: Plaintiff‟s exhibits must be pre-marked using numbers

beginning with 1 (e.g., 1, 2, etc). The Plaintiff must pre-mark his exhibits before 

they are provided to the Defendant(s).

c. Defendant’s Exhibits: Defendant‟s exhibits must be pre-marked using letters

beginning with A (e.g., A, B, C...AA, BB, CC...AAA, BBB, CCC, etc.). 

2. Exchange and Filing of Exhibits List and Exhibits

No later than March 1, the parties shall exchange their proposed exhibits.4 The exhibits 

exchanged shall be pre-marked by each party and corrected exhibited in the format described in 

Part XIII.C.1, above. 

Defendant is required to submit trial exhibits for both parties in binders. As noted above, 

the Defendant shall submit [three (3)] complete, legible and identical sets of exhibits in 

binders on or about April 12, 2016. Within the binders, the pre-marked exhibits must be 

separately tabbed and assembled in sequential order. The three complete binders shall be

delivered to Courtroom Clerk Mamie Hernandez for use (1) by the Court; (2) at the witness stand

for the witnesses; and (3) by the plaintiff at trial.

3. Exhibits

The following is a list of documents or other exhibits that the parties expect to offer at 

trial. As set forth above, exhibits must be pre-marked. See discussion, supra, Part XIII.C.1. No 

exhibit, other than those listed in this section, may be admitted unless the parties stipulate or 

upon a showing that this order should be modified to prevent “manifest injustice.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 16(e); Local Rule 281(b)(11).

a. Defendants’ Exhibits

i. Plaintiff‟s Abstract of Judgment

ii. Bed Assignments for Plaintiff and Inmate M. Davis (T08271)

iii. Portions of Crime/Incident Reports, CDCR 837A, 837A1, 837B, 837C as related 

to Incident Log Number KVSP FAY 10-05-0292 (Bates numbers CDCR 018-

 

4 This date supersedes the dates in any prior orders. 

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CDCR 085)

iv. Incident Photos taken by J. Yerena, and identified in incident reports for Incident 

Log Number KVSP FAY 10-05-0292

v. DVD-Video of interview of Plaintiff June 2010

vi. Additional photographs of KVSP Facility A yard

vii. Plaintiff‟s Inmate Appeal (CDC 602) Log Number KVSP 10-01234

viii. California Code of Regulations, Title 15, section 3268, Use of Force (2009) 

ix. Medical records of Plaintiff, including but not limited to: Delano Regional 

Medical Center Patient Summary dated May 25, 2010; results of CT Scan taken 

May 25, 2010; Primary Care Provider Progress Note June 2, 2010, July 26, 2010, 

September 21, 2010, December 14, 2010 (Akanno); Medical Classification 

Chrono, December 7, 2010; Medical Progress Note May 18, 2012 (Morris); 

Result of x-ray of cervical spine May 22, 2012; Progress Note August 16, 2012, 

March 25, 2013 (Frances); Medical Progress Note December 4, 2015 (Hodges); 

results of x-ray cervical spine November 13, 2014. 

If the parties intend to use copies of exhibits or evidence at trial, those copies must be 

legible. The Court may, on its own motion, exclude illegible copies from evidence.

4. Responses to Discovery Requests

The parties may admit responses to discovery requests5into evidence. The parties shall 

file and serve a list of all responses to discovery requests intended to be used at trial no later than 

April 8, 2016. The list shall identify the responses to discovery requests by title and set number.

If a party seeks to admit a physical copy of the discovery responses into evidence at trial, 

the discovery responses must be pre-marked as an exhibit in the same manner discussed above. 

See discussion, supra, Part XIII.C.1. Alternatively, if the party intends to read relevant portions 

of the discovery responses into evidence, a copy of the discovery responses must be lodged with 

the Court no later than April 8, 2016. The Court will address objections to discovery responses 

 

5 Responses to discovery requests include responses to depositions by written questions (Fed. R. Civ. P. 31), 

interrogatories (Fed. R. Civ. P. 33) and requests for admissions (Fed. R. Civ. P. 36).

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as they arise during trial.

Even though discovery is closed, all parties are reminded of their continuing obligation to 

update their prior discovery responses if they obtain new information or is otherwise made aware 

that a prior discovery response is incomplete or incorrect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1). 

If a party attempts to admit or use for any purpose evidence that (1) was not 

previously disclosed during discovery and (2) should have been disclosed as an initial 

disclosure under Rule 26(a) or as a supplemental disclosure under Rule 26(e), the Court 

will prohibit that party from admitting or using for any purpose that evidence at trial, 

unless the failure was substantially justified or was harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).

5. Deposition Testimony

Deposition testimony shall be designated by page and line number, with such designation 

to be filed and served no later than March 29, 2016. Any counter-designation as to the same 

designation (also set out by page and line number) shall be filed and served no later than April 

8, 2016. The original certified transcript of any deposition identified in a designated or counterdesignation shall be lodged with the clerk's office no later than April 8, 2016, if not previously 

lodged with the Court.

If any party intends to admit relevant portions of deposition testimony into evidence, the 

relevant deposition testimony must be pre-marked as an exhibit in the same manner discussed 

above. See discussion, supra, Part XIII.C.1. However, any party may request that deposition 

testimony offered for any purpose other than impeachment be presented in nontranscript form, if 

available. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(c).

The Court will address objections to deposition testimony as they arise during trial.

6. Duty of the Parties‟ Counsel

The Court respects the jury‟s time and expects issues that must be presented outside the 

jury‟s presence to be raised such that the jury‟s service is not unnecessarily protracted. To the 

extent possible, the parties shall raise issues that must be presented to the Court outside of the 

jury‟s presence (1) in the morning before the jury sits, (2) during breaks, (3) in the afternoon 

after the jury is excused or (4) during any other appropriate time that does not inconvenience the 

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jury. For example, if evidentiary problems can be anticipated, the parties should raise the issue 

with the Court before the jury sits so that there is no delay associated with specially excusing the 

jury. Issues raised for the first time while the jury is sitting when the issue could have been 

raised earlier will be looked upon with disfavor and counsel may be sanctioned for any fees, 

costs or other expenses caused by their failure to raise the issue at a more convenient time.

7. Post-Trial Exhibit Retention

Pursuant to Local Rule 138(f), the Court will order that custody of all exhibits be returned 

to the defendant‟s counsel after completion of the trial. The Defendant‟s counsel shall retrieve 

the original exhibits from the courtroom deputy following the verdict in the case. The 

Defendants‟ counsel shall retain possession of and keep safe all exhibits until final judgment and 

all appeals are exhausted or the time for filing an appeal has passed.

D. Trial Briefs

Trial briefs are not required in this case. However, if the parties chose the file a trial 

brief, it shall be filed and served no later than April 8, 2016.6 The form and content of the trial 

brief must comply with Local Rule 285. Special attention should be given in the trial brief to 

address reasonably anticipated disputes concerning the substantive law, jury instructions and/or 

admissibility of evidence. Local Rule 285(a)(3). The parties need not include in the trial brief 

any issue that is adequately addressed in a motion in limine or in an opposition brief to a motion 

in limine.

E. Jury Instructions

The parties shall filed proposed jury instructions as provided in Local Rule 163 on or 

before than April 8, 2016. The parties are only required to file proposed jury instructions relating 

to the substantive law underlying this action. All proposed jury instructions shall (1) indicate the 

party submitting the instruction (i.e., joint/agreed-on, Plaintiff‟s or Defendants‟), (2) be 

numbered sequentially, (3) include a brief title for the instruction describing the subject matter, 

(4) include the text of the instruction, and (5) cite the legal authority supporting the instruction. If 

the proposed jury instruction is based on the Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instructions, CACI, BAJI 

 

6 The deadline set for trial briefs set in this order shall supersede the deadline set in Local Rule 285(a).

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or other source of jury instructions, the proposed jury instruction shall also include a citation to 

that specific instruction. All proposed jury instructions shall be e-mailed in Word® format to

saborders@caed.uscourts.gov no later than April 8, 2016. Jury Instructions will not be given or 

used unless they are so e-mailed to the Court.

The Court will not accept a mere list of numbers associated with form instructions from 

the Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instructions, CACI, BAJI or other source of jury instructions. The 

proposed jury instructions must be in the form and sequence which the parties desire to be given 

to the jury. Any blank fields in the form instructions must be filled-in before they are submitted 

to the Court. Irrelevant or unnecessary portions of form instructions must be omitted. 

Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instructions shall be used where the subject of the instruction is 

covered by a model instruction. Otherwise CACI or BAJI instructions shall be used where the 

subject of the instruction is covered by CACI or BAJI. All instructions shall be short, concise, 

understandable, and consist of neutral and accurate statements of the law. Argumentative or 

formula instructions will not be considered. 

If any party proposes a jury instruction that departs from the language used in the Ninth 

Circuit Model Jury Instructions, CACI, BAJI or other source of jury instructions, that party shall, 

by italics or underlining, highlight the differences in language and must cite the legal authority 

supporting the modification. 

No later than April 14, 2016, the parties shall file and serve written objections to any 

disputed jury instructions proposed by another party. All objections shall be in writing and (1) 

shall set forth the proposed instruction objected to in its entirety, (2) shall specifically set forth 

the objectionable matter in the proposed instruction, and (3) shall include a citation to legal 

authority to explain the grounds for the objection and why the instruction is improper. A concise 

argument concerning the instruction may be included. Where applicable, the objecting party shall 

submit an alternative proposed instruction covering the subject or issue of law.

F. Proposed Verdict Form

The Court will prepare the verdict form, which the parties will have the opportunity to

review on the morning of trial. If the parties wish to submit a proposed verdict form, they must

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do so on or before [INSERT DATE—Two Mondays before trial] Defense counsel‟s proposed 

verdict form shall also be e-mailed as a Word® attachment to saborders@caed.uscourts.gov no 

later than April 8, 2016. 

G. Proposed Jury Voir Dire

Proposed voir dire questions, if any, shall be filed on or before April 8, 2016, pursuant to 

Local Rule 162.1(a). The parties each are limited to fifteen (15) minutes of jury voir dire, unless 

this Court determines more time is warranted.

H. Statement of the Case

The parties may serve and file a non-argumentative, brief statement of the case which is

suitable for reading to the jury at the outset of jury selection on or before April 8, 2016. The 

Court will consider the parties‟ statements but will draft its own statement. The parties will be 

provided with the opportunity to review the Court‟s prepared statement on the morning of trial.

XIV. ASSESSMENT OF JURY COSTS FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY NOTIFY 

COURT OF SETTLEMENT

The parties must immediately notify the Court of any agreement reached by the parties 

which resolves this litigation in whole or in part. Local Rule 160(a). The parties must advise the 

Court of settlement immediately, but must do so no later than 4:30 p.m. (Pacific Time) on April 

14, 2016. If, for any reason attributable to counsel or parties, including settlement, the Court is 

unable to commence a jury trial as scheduled when a panel of prospective jurors has reported for 

voir dire, the Court may assess against counsel or parties responsible all or part of the cost of the 

panel. Local Rule 272(b). Jury costs will include attendance fees, per diem, mileage, and 

parking. If the parties request a continuance after the jury has been called, the Court may assess 

jury costs as a condition for the continuance.

XV. COMPLIANCE WITH THIS ORDER

Strict compliance with this order and its requirements is mandatory. This Court will 

strictly enforce the requirements of this pretrial order, especially those pertaining to jury 

instructions and verdict forms. Failure to comply with all provisions of this order may be 

grounds for the imposition of sanctions, including possible dismissal of this action or entry of 

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default, on any all counsel as well as on any party who causes non-compliance with this order. 

This order shall be modified “only to prevent manifest injustice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e).

Moreover, this order supersedes the parties‟ pretrial statement and controls the conduct of 

further proceedings irrespective of any purported rights the parties claim to reserve in their 

pretrial statement.

XVI. OBJECTIONS TO PRETRIAL ORDER

Any party may file and serve written objections to any of the provisions of this order on 

or before February 12, 2016. Such objections shall specify the requested modifications, 

corrections, additions or deletions.

XVII. USE OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT IN COURTROOM

Any party wishing to receive an overview or tutorial of the Court‟s electronic equipment 

must contact the Courtroom Deputy Clerk Mamie Hernandez at (559) 499-5672 or 

mhernandez@caed.uscourts.gov at least two (2) weeks before the start of trial in order to 

schedule a tutorial session at a time convenient to the Court‟s Information Technology staff. The 

parties will not be provided any training on the day of or during the course of the trial. 

The electronic equipment and resources available for this trial may differ from the 

equipment and resources available in other courtrooms and may even differ from the equipment 

and resources available in this courtroom at another time. It is the responsibility of the parties to 

familiarize themselves with the equipment and resources available for use in this trial prior to the 

commencement of trial. If any party is unfamiliar with the equipment and resources available for 

use in this trial, that party may be ordered to proceed without the aid of such equipment and 

resources and/or may be sanctioned for any fees, costs or expenses associated with any delay.

Depending upon Court available equipment at the time of trial, the Plaintiff may be 

provided with an electronic overheard projector at his trial table for purposes of showing 

exhibited and admitted exhibits at trial. Accordingly, Plaintiff need not request that he allowed 

to use electronic equipment as Plaintiff may be provided with electronic equipment if available.

XVIII.OTHER INFORMATION

Additional information describing this Court‟s expectations regarding attorney conduct 

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and decorum during all proceedings before United States Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone can 

be found at the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California‟s website 

(http://www.caed.uscourts.gov) under Judges; United States Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone 

(SAB). In the area entitled “Case Management Procedures,” there are links to “Standard 

Information” and “Trial Conduct and Decorum.” All parties and counsel shall comply with the 

guidelines set forth therein. However, in the event that there is a conflict between this order and 

the information on the Court‟s website, this order shall supersede the information on the Court‟s 

website. Furthermore, additional information can be found on the Court‟s link including the 

Court‟s “Jury Selection Procedures” in civil juries.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 5, 2016 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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