Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02714/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02714-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 At the time that he filed the original Complaint, Plaintiff was confined in the Maricopa

County Jail.

WO SVK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Arthur Jerry Manning, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Sheriff Joe Arpaio, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 04-2714-PHX-SMM (DKD)

ORDER

Plaintiff Arthur Jerry Manning, confined in the Arizona State Prison ComplexFlorence,1

 filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On October

27, 2005 the Court dismissed the action with leave to amend. (Doc. # 5). Plaintiff filed an

Amended Complaint (Doc. # 9) on January 13, 2006. The Court will dismiss the Amended

Complaint with prejudice.

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the

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allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint

before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000)

(en banc). The Court is required to grant leave to amend “if a complaint can possibly be

saved” but not if a complaint “lacks merit entirely.” Id. at 1129. The Court therefore should

grant leave to amend if the pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts or if it

appears at all possible that the defect can be corrected. Id. at 1130. On October 27, 2005 this

Court dismissed the original Complaint, which also named Defendant Arpaio, with leave to

amend. (Doc. # 5). Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint will be dismissed without leave to

amend because defects in the original Complaint were not corrected.

III. Complaint

Plaintiff names Sheriff Joe Arpaio as Defendant.

Plaintiff alleges three grounds for relief all arising out of an injury to his ankle and

several medical appointments: (1) he was denied medical care and excessive force was used

because he refused to go to the medical appointment after he was told that both his hands and

his ankles would have to be cuffed; (2) a nurse sent him back to his pod when a wheelchair

was not provided to transport him to his medical appointment and this constituted excessive

force; and (3) his safety was threatened and medical care implicated because he was cuffed

to crutches and made to walk a distance to the medical appointment, and white inmates who

were not injured were not shackled. 

For relief, Plaintiff requests an attorney to represent him and damages. 

IV. Failure to State a Claim

To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a specific

injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link between the

injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).

To state a claim against a supervisory official, the civil rights complainant must allege that

the supervisory official personally participated in the constitutional deprivation or that the

supervisory official was aware of widespread abuses and, with deliberate indifference to the

inmate’s constitutional rights, failed to take action to prevent further misconduct. See Ortez

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v. Washington County, Or., 88 F.3d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Monell v.

New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). There is no

respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and, therefore, a defendant’s position as the

supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose

liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.

Plaintiff was advised of this requirement by this Court’s Order of October 27, 2005

(Doc. # 5 at 6). The original Complaint also named Joe Arpaio as a Defendant. Nevertheless,

Plaintiff names only Defendant Arpaio in the Amended Complaint and fails to affirmatively

link the alleged harms to Defendant Arpaio. He fails to allege that Defendant Arpaio

personally participated in the constitutional deprivation or that he was aware of widespread

abuses and, with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s constitutional rights, failed to take

action to prevent further misconduct. Plaintiff names no other Defendants. The Amended

Complaint fails to state a claim against Defendant Arpaio.

In addition, Count I fails to state a claim regarding excessive force or medical care.

Although use of excessive force can raise a constitutional claim, see Hudson v. McMillian,

503 U.S. 1, 6-7(1992) (the relevant inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good-faith

effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm”), Count

I does not allege the use of force by anyone. Plaintiff alleges that, on one day, he was told

that both his hands and his ankles would have to be cuffed in order to keep his medical

appointment; apparently, his hands and ankles were not cuffed because Plaintiff refused to

keep the appointment.

To state a § 1983 medical claim under the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff must show

that Defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.” Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Deliberate indifference may occur if “prison officials

deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment.” Hutchinson v. United States,

838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must

allege that a specific defendant, despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm

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to the plaintiff, failed to take reasonable measures to abate the harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, (1994). The alleged constitutional deprivation must be, “objectively, ‘sufficiently

serious’” i.e., the official’s act or omission must result in the denial of “the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities.” Id. at 834. Further, the prison official must have a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., he must act with deliberate indifference to inmate

health or safety. Id.

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that prison officials had arranged for Plaintiff to go to a

medical appointment, but Plaintiff refused to go. Thus, Count I does not a state claim for

denial of medical care.

In Count II, Plaintiff alleges excessive use of force but states no facts showing that

anyone used any force on him; instead, Plaintiff alleges that someone would not provide a

wheelchair. Count II does not state a claim for excessive use of force.

In Count III, Plaintiff alleges a threat to his safety and “medical care.” Prison officials

have a duty to protect inmates from violence by other inmates, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833,

but Plaintiff alleges no facts to explain how his safety was threatened. Moreover, Plaintiff

alleges that he was being taken to his medical appointment at the time of the events. Thus,

Count III does not state claims for threats to safety or denial of medical care. 

Plaintiff, who is black, also alleges in Count III that he was shackled at the ankle

although white inmates who were not injured were not shackled. Equal protection requires

that “all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216

(1982); Gilbrook v. City of Westminister, 177 F. 3d 839, 871 (9th Cir. 1999) (in order to

state an equal protection claim, Petitioner must allege “unequal treatment of people similarly

situated”). Although Plaintiff alleges that he was treated differently than others similarly

situated and that he is a member of a suspect class, he does not connect the claim to the only

named Defendant -- Joe Arpaio.

Because Plaintiff was advised by this Court’s Order of October 27, 2005 of the

requirement to affirmatively link the named Defendant to the harm alleged, and because the

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Plaintiff has again failed to allege any facts to affirmatively link the alleged harms to

Defendant Arpaio, the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint without leave to amend.

V. Request for Attorney

In the body of his pleading, Petitioner requests an attorney to represent him. The

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide in relevant part that “an application to the court for

an order shall be made by motion, which unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made

in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth relief or order

sought.” Rule 7(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. 

Plaintiff’s request will be denied because the request was not properly made and

because it is moot.

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) The First Amended Complaint ( Doc. # 9) and this action are dismissed for failure

to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and the Clerk of Court must enter

judgment accordingly. 

(2) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the dismissal

for failure to state a claim counts as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

DATED this 21st day of July, 2006.

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