Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03794/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03794-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

PHYLLIS D. EVANS, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

COMMISSIONER OF THE SSA, 

 Defendant. 

Case No: C 07-3794 SBA 

ORDER GRANTING CLAIM FOR 

FEES AND EXPENSES

Docket 24 

 Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action for judicial review of a decision by the 

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner). The parties are 

presently before the Court on Plaintiff’s Claim for Fees and Expenses Under the Equal Access 

to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Having read and considered the papers filed in 

connection with this matter and being fully informed, the Court hereby GRANTS the claim for 

the reasons set forth below. The Court, in its discretion, finds this matter suitable for resolution 

without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b). 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action seeking review of a decision by the Commissioner 

denying her application for supplemental disability income benefits. On September 30, 2008, 

the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The 

Court reversed the Commissioner’s decision and remanded the action for further proceedings 

consistent with the Court’s ruling. Following the Court’s ruling on the summary judgment 

motions, Plaintiff filed a Claim for Fees and Expenses Under the EAJA. 

The Commissioner opposed the motion on the grounds that the billing statements 

submitted by Plaintiff’s Counsel (“Counsel”) in support of the fee request did not adequately 

describe the work performed by him in connection with this case. The Commissioner further 

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argued that a fee award cannot be awarded directly to Counsel absent a written assignment 

signed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a reply which provided additional explanation of the services 

performed. However, Plaintiff also requested the Court to hold the claim for fees and expenses 

in abeyance pending Counsel’s attempt to obtain an assignment from Plaintiff. The Court 

granted Counsel until November 2, 2009 to file proof that Plaintiff has assigned to her right to 

fees to Counsel. The Court allowed the Commissioner until November 9, 2009, to file a 

response to Counsel’s submission. 

On November 2, 2009, Counsel filed a memorandum in which he explained that 

Plaintiff had declined to execute an assignment. (Docket 30.) Nonetheless, Counsel requests 

that the Court award him fees directly on the ground that the instant case began prior to change 

in the EAJA requiring an express assignment and on the ground that an award of fees to 

Plaintiff directly would amount to a windfall because Plaintiff proceeded in forma pauperis and 

did not incur any fees in this action. The Commissioner did not file any response to Counsel’s 

submission. 

II. DISCUSSION

Under the EAJA, a prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2412(d)(1)(A).1 The amount of fees awarded shall be based upon prevailing market rates for 

the kind and quality of the services provided. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(A). Such fees, however, are not 

to exceed $125 per hour “unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a 

special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings 

involved, justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). Here, Counsel seeks the 

following hourly rates: $166.46/hr. for 2007, $172.85/hr. for 2008; and 169.05/hr. for 2009. 

The Commissioner does not dispute that the hourly fee sought by Counsel reflects a prevailing 

 1 This provision states that “a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the 

United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection 

(a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including 

proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any 

court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United 

States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 

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market rate, as adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index. Accordingly, the Court 

approves the rates sought by Counsel. See Irwin v. Astrue, 2010 WL 583658 at *1 (S.D. Cal., 

Feb. 16, 2010) (approving rate of $170 per hour as a reasonable, adjusted CPI rate). 

Although the Commissioner does not challenge Counsel’s hourly rate, he does dispute 

the reasonableness of the requested hours on the ground that certain time entries are described 

by abbreviations for which no definition key has been provided. In his reply, Plaintiff 

acknowledges that certain of these abbreviations are unclear, but has sought to rectify this lack 

of clarity by providing an explanation of each of those abbreviations. But even with these 

definitions, Counsel’s sparse descriptions of the work performed leave much to be desired. 

Nonetheless, the Court finds that Counsel has provided sufficient information (albeit just 

barely) to justify that the time expended was reasonable and appropriate. In addition, the Court 

notes that overall amount of time spent over a three year period (35.9 hours) and fees requested 

($6,648.92) is line with fees awarded in other Social Security cases previously pending before 

this Court. 

The final issue is whether the fees may be paid directly to Counsel in the absence of an 

assignment from Plaintiff. The EAJA expressly authorizes an award of fees “to a prevailing 

party[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Though the Ninth Circuit has yet to address that question, 

several circuits as well as district courts within the Ninth Circuit have found that “both the 

plain language and construction by other courts of the EAJA support defendant’s contention 

that the term ‘prevailing party’ excludes the parties’ counsel.” McCarty v. Astrue, 505 F. 

Supp. 2d 624, 629 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Pulis v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 2008 WL 1899918 at *2 

(E.D. Cal., April 25, 2008) (“absent any evidence of a contract assigning the EAJA award to 

counsel, the court is left with the plain reading of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), which provides 

that the court shall award to a prevailing party, not the party’s attorney, fees and other expenses 

incurred in litigation.”); Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 738 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that 

under EAJA “attorney’s fees are awarded to the prevailing party, not to the prevailing party’s 

attorney”) (citing cases). However, the Eighth Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion and 

held that “EAJA attorneys’ fees are awarded to prevailing parties’ attorneys.” Ratliff v. Astrue, 

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540 F.3d 800, 802 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S.Ct. 48 (Sept. 30, 2009). The Supreme 

Court has granted certiorari in Ratliff. 

Here, Counsel contends that the fees should be paid directly to him because “the case 

began before Defendant changed the check-payee policy to require assignments” and for that 

reason he did not obtain an assignment from Plaintiff at the outset of the case. Counsel further 

contends that it would be unfair not to order payment directly to him because Plaintiff is 

proceeding in forma pauperis and has incurred no fees in this action. Counsel fails to submit 

any evidence or legal authority to support his position. Moreover, the Court notes that the 

possibility that Plaintiff may not tender her EAJA award to Counsel does not provide a legal 

basis upon which disregard the express language of the EAJA. See McCarty, 505 F. Supp. 2d 

at 630 (rejecting argument that absent direct payment to counsel, attorneys may be discouraged 

from representing clients because these clients may not tender the proper EAJA award to their 

counsel). In the absence of an assignment by Plaintiff, the Court concludes that the plain 

language of the EAJA requires that the fee award be made to Plaintiff, not her attorney. 

III. CONCLUSION

The Court concludes, in its discretion, awards Plaintiff the sum of $6,648.92. Said 

amount is to be paid to Plaintiff, as opposed to Counsel. In the event the law regarding the 

payment of EAJA fees should change following the Supreme Court’s decision in Ratliff, 

Counsel may seek appropriate relief, consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff’s Claim for Fees and Expenses Under the 

Equal Access to Justice Act is GRANTED. The Commissioner shall tender payment consistent 

with this Order. This Order terminates Docket No. 24. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 16, 2010 _______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

United States District Judge 

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