Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00326/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00326-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN JOSEPH RUIZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

EVERETT W. FISHER; et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-326 MHP (pr)

ORDER OF SERVICE

INTRODUCTION

Ruben Joseph Ruiz, currently incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison, has filed a pro

se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint is now before the court for

review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A. 

BACKGROUND

In his complaint, Ruiz complains about the proceedings used to validate him as an

associate of the EME prison gang and the resultant placement in administrative segregation 

("ad-seg"). The complaint alleges the following:

Ruiz was validated as a gang associate in 2000 when he was incarcerated at High

Desert State Prison. Institutional gang investigators R. S. Johnson and K. Clement sent a

gang validation/classification package to special agent John Harrison. On December 22,

2000, a CDC-128B2 was written by John Harrison and stated that Ruiz was validated as a

Case 3:07-cv-00326-MHP Document 6 Filed 09/21/07 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 prison gang associate. On March 1, 2001, Ruiz was informed that he had been validated as a

gang associate but was not informed of the source items used to validate him as a gang

associate until March 14, 2001. Ruiz alleges he was not given an opportunity to present his

views to the decision-maker who validated him in 2000. 

On April 1, 2001, Ruiz was transferred from High Desert State Prison to Pelican Bay

State Prison for an indeterminate term in the security housing unit ("SHU") based on the

validation.

Ruiz filed an administrative appeal concerning his validation and received a director's

level decision in 2001 denying relief. See Complaint, ¶ 17 and Exh. G. Ruiz then filed

petitions for writ of habeas corpus in state court. Eventually, the Del Norte County Superior

Court ordered a new validation hearing.

On April 8, 2005, institutional gang investigator Devon Hawkes gave Ruiz notice of

the source items that were sought to be used to validate him. Ruiz was interviewed by

Hawkes. After the interview, three of the seven source items were removed from

consideration and four source items were submitted to the LEIU decision maker, Everett W.

Fisher. Ruiz alleges that, at the conclusion of the interview with Hawkes, "an informal

nonadversary hearing was conducted via closed circuit T.V. connection. Ruiz was afforded

the opportunity to present his views to the decision maker, Everett W. Fisher." Complaint, ¶

26. Ruiz alleges that the "re-validation process was nothing more than a formality and an

attempt to appear fair with the guise of several additional source items that were only

introduced for the purpose of rejecting them as insufficient." Complaint, ¶ 27. He

challenges the adequacy of the source items used to validate him as a gang associate. 

Ruiz filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus in state court challenging the 2005

validation. The Del Norte County Superior Court, the California Court of Appeal and the

California Supreme Court all denied habeas relief. He then filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in this court, which was dismissed without prejudice to him filing a civil rights action. 

This action followed. 

Case 3:07-cv-00326-MHP Document 6 Filed 09/21/07 Page 2 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

DISCUSSION

A. Standards Of Review

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental

entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable

claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief. See id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that

a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Placement In Administrative Segregation

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution

protects individuals against governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property without due

process of law. Changes in conditions of confinement may amount to a deprivation of a

constitutionally protected liberty interest, provided that the liberty interest in question is one

of real substance. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477-87 (1995).

When prison officials initially determine whether a prisoner is to be segregated for

administrative reasons and a liberty interest of real substance is implicated, due process

requires that they hold an informal nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time after the

prisoner is segregated, inform the prisoner of the charges against him or the reasons

segregation is being considered, and allow the prisoner to present his views. Toussaint v.

McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100 (9th Cir. 1986). Due process also requires that there be an

evidentiary basis for the prison officials' decision to place an inmate in segregation for

administrative reasons. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Toussaint, 801

F.2d at 1104-05. This standard is met if there is "some evidence" from which the conclusion

Case 3:07-cv-00326-MHP Document 6 Filed 09/21/07 Page 3 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

of the administrative tribunal could be deduced. Id. at 1105. There is some authority for the

proposition that the evidence relied upon to confine an inmate to the SHU for gang affiliation

must have "some indicia of reliability" to satisfy due process requirements. Madrid v.

Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1273-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926

F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1990) (results of polygraph examination may not be considered

"unfailingly accurate" when used as evidence to support placement in administrative

segregation); Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987) (evidence relied upon by a

prison disciplinary board must have "some indicia of reliability").

The complaint, liberally construed, states a claim for relief against defendant Harrison

for a due process violation based on the insufficiency and unreliability of the evidence used

to validate Ruiz in 2000-2001 as a gang associate and the failure to provide Ruiz notice and

an opportunity to be heard. The complaint does not state a claim against defendants Johnson

and Clement; these defendants allegedly provided the information used to validate Ruiz but

are not alleged to have been the actual decision-maker in the validation. It may be that the

claims concerning the 2000-2001 validation are time-barred or barred due to Ruiz's choice to

first pursue state habeas relief, but any such defenses are not complete and certain from the

face of the complaint and must be raised, if at all, by defendants.

The complaint, liberally construed, also states a claim for relief against defendants

Everett W. Fisher and Devon Hawkes for a due process violation based on the insufficiency

and unreliability of the evidence used to validate Ruiz in 2005 as a gang associate. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, 

1. Plaintiff's complaint states claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

defendants John Harrison, Everett W. Fisher and Devon Hawkes for violations of his right to

due process based on the 2000-2001 and 2005 validations of plaintiff as a gang associate. 

All other claims and all other defendants are dismissed.

2. The clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve,

without prepayment of fees, the summons, a copy of the complaint, a copy of this order, and

Case 3:07-cv-00326-MHP Document 6 Filed 09/21/07 Page 4 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

a copy of all the other documents in the case file upon the following three individuals:

• John Harrison, a special agent in the Office of Correctional Safety at the

 California Department of Correction & Rehabilitation, 1515 S. Street, 

 Sacramento, California.

• Everett W. Fisher, a special agent in the Office of Correctional Safety at the

 California Department of Correction & Rehabilitation, 1515 S. Street, 

 Sacramento, California.

• Devon T. Hawkes, a correctional counselor II at Pelican Bay State Prison.

 3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the following briefing schedule

for dispositive motions is set:

a. No later than November 23, 2007, defendants must file and serve a

motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If defendants are of the opinion

that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they must so inform the court prior

to the date the motion is due.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive

motion must be filed with the court and served upon defendants no later than December 28,

2007. Plaintiff must bear in mind the following notice and warning regarding summary

judgment as he prepares his opposition to any summary judgment motion:

The defendants may make a motion for summary judgment by which they seek to

have your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. [¶] Rule 56 tells you what

you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary

judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact -- that is, if there is

no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked

for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. 

When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly

supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your

complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the

facts shown in the defendants' declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine

issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition,

summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is

granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. (See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998). 

c. If defendants wish to file a reply brief, the reply brief must be filed and

served no later than January 18, 2008.

4. All communications by plaintiff with the court must be served on a defendant's

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to defendant's counsel. The court may

Case 3:07-cv-00326-MHP Document 6 Filed 09/21/07 Page 5 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

disregard any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until

a defendant's counsel has been designated, plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document

directly to defendant, but once a defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be

mailed to counsel rather than directly to that defendant. 

5. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local

Rule 16 is required before the parties may conduct discovery.

6. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep

the court informed of any change of address and must comply with the court's orders in a

timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to

prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of

change of address in every pending case every time he is moved to a new facility. 

7. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for

this case on any document he submits to this court for consideration in this case.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 20, 2007 ______________________

 Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-00326-MHP Document 6 Filed 09/21/07 Page 6 of 6