Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00113/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00113-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LONNIE WILLIAMS,

CDCR #T-54378,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DANIEL PARAMO; R. OLSON;

E. MARRERO,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 

PLEADINGS

[ECF No. 67]

I. Procedural History

Lonnie Williams (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the California State 

Prison - Sacramento (“CSP-SAC”) located in Represa, California, is proceeding in pro se 

and in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Currently pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). (ECF No. 67.) Plaintiff has filed an Opposition to 

Case 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB Document 121 Filed 11/27/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of

 16
2

3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendants’ Motion. (ECF No. 69.) The Court has determined that Defendants’ Motion 

is suitable for disposition upon the papers without oral argument and that no Report and 

Recommendation from Magistrate Judge Ruben B. Brooks is necessary. See S.D. Cal. 

CivLR 7.1(d)(1), 72.3(e).

Defendants have also filed a “Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion for 

Judgment on the Pleadings.” (ECF No. 67-1.) Specifically, Defendants request that the 

Court take judicial notice of the records from the “Victim Compensation and Government 

Claims Board” relating to claims presented by Plaintiff. (Id.) Federal Rules of Evidence 

201 provides, in part, that the Court may take judicial notice of facts that are “capable of 

accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably 

be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(2). While Plaintiff appears to object to the relevancy 

of these documents, she does not dispute the accuracy of these records in her Opposition. 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice.

II. Factual Background

In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Daniel Paramo, R. Olson and E. 

Marrero entered into a conspiracy on January 5, 2012 by placing an “R” suffix in 

Plaintiff’s file. (See Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff contends that she was “never convicted of 

sexual battery” and that there was an error made in court records from a previous 

criminal conviction when she was a juvenile. (Id.) On January 5, 2012, Plaintiff 

contends that she informed Defendants that another correctional officer “told several 

inmates (in my presence) that I was/am a convicted sex offender.” (Id. at 4.) As a result, 

Plaintiff alleges she began “receiving threats of harm” from prison gang members. (Id.)

In response to Plaintiff’s attempt to “inform Daniel Paramo that I am in imminent 

danger,” she claims Defendant Paramo stated “So what! That is not my problem! That is 

your problem!” (Id.) On this same day, January 5, 2012, Plaintiff alleges that she 

“attempted to file a grievance as to all allegations raised in this civil action” but 

Correctional Counselor Cobb “rejected the appeal and refused to file the grievance.” (Id. 

at 5.) She further alleges that Cobb “refused to allow plaintiff to grievance the “R” suffix 

Case 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB Document 121 Filed 11/27/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of

 16
3

3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

or the defendants actions.” (Id.) Five days later, on January 10, 2012, Plaintiff filed this 

action.

III. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c)

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim is moot; (2) Plaintiff has failed to state a 

cognizable claim; (3) Plaintiff failed to comply with the California Government Claims 

Act; (4) Defendants do not have authority to change Plaintiff’s past criminal records; and 

(5) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (Defs. Ps & As In Supp. of Mtn. for 

Judg. on the Pldgs at 8.)

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides: “[a]fter the pleadings are closed -

but early enough not to delay trial - a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” 

Fed.R.Cvi.P. 12(c). Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly 

establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be 

resolved. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th 

Cir. 1990). 

“A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the allegations 

in the pleading as true, the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Smith v. National Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 125 F.3d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1997); George v. 

Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Yanez v. United 

States, 63 F.3d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

B. Eighth Amendment claims

Plaintiff alleges she informed Defendants Paramo, Olson, and Marrero that 

Correctional Officer Marquez “told several inmates (in my presence) that I was/am a 

convicted sex offender.” (Compl. at 4.) As a result, Plaintiff claims to receive “threats of 

harm from two-five gang members and taunts, harassments, and safety concerns.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff further claims that she specifically informed Defendant Paramo that she was “in 

imminent danger of irreparable harm, injuries and death by the two-five gang members.” 

Case 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB Document 121 Filed 11/27/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of

 16
4

3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Id.) Plaintiff claims to have been threatened and was told “they will get” her for “being 

allegedly a sex offender.” (Id.) In response, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Paramo stated 

“So what! That is not my problem! That is your problem!.” (Id.) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff was never physically harmed while housed at RJD 

and is “no longer in danger from inmates who may have threatened her” at RJD. (Defs. 

Ps & As In Supp. of Mtn. for Judg. on the Pldgs at 9.) Plaintiff notified the Court on 

April 17, 2012 that she had been transferred to California State Prison - Sacramento

(“CSP - SAC”).

1

 Plaintiff is currently housed at CSP-SAC2and a review of the docket 

indicates that she has not notified the Court of being housed at any other location since 

April 17, 2017.

Defendants argue that she has not alleged that she was physically harmed at RJD 

and therefore, her Eighth Amendment claim should be deemed moot because it has “lost 

its character as a present, live controversy.” (Defs. Ps & As In Supp. of Mtn. for Judg. on 

the Pldgs at 9 citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).) Because Plaintiff has not 

alleged that she suffered actual harm while at RJD, she cannot meet a “necessary element 

of deliberate indifference.” (Id.; citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).)

Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to avoid excessive risks

to inmate safety. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To state a claim 

under the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff must allege Defendants were “deliberate[ly] 

indifferen[t]” to “conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. Deliberate 

indifference is more than mere negligence, but less than purpose or knowledge. See id. at 

836. 

/ / /

/ / /

 

1

 Plaintiff filed a Notice of Change of Address in Williams v. Paramo, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 

3:12-cv-0025-AJB-WMc (ECF No. 8).

2

 See http://inmatelocator.cdcr.ca.gov/search.aspx (website last visited September 20, 2017)

Case 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB Document 121 Filed 11/27/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of

 16
5

3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if he “knows of and 

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must both be aware 

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.

The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief 

against RJD Defendants are moot in light of her transfer to a different institution. See 

Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3rd 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995) (An inmate’s transfer to a different 

prison while conditions of confinement claims are pending moot any claims for 

injunctive relief.)

In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Marquez told other inmates that 

she was a “convicted sex offender” which led to “threats of harm from two-five gang 

members.” (Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff does not provide any factual allegations of suffering 

a physical injury while incarcerated at RJD. Plaintiff cannot recover monetary damages 

for a “mental or emotional injury” without a “prior showing of physical injury or the 

commission of a sexual act.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). While Plaintiff does not allege in 

her Complaint that she suffered any physical harm while housed at RJD, she claims in her 

Opposition that due to the actions by RJD officials, she has been “raped by inmates, 

sexually harassed/sexually assaulted by CSP-SAC officials,” along with being “called a 

child molester by inmates and CSP-SAC, RJDCF officials.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.) 

However, these claims of physical harm following her transfer from RJD are found 

in her Opposition and are not alleged in her Complaint. Therefore, the Court will 

GRANT Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claims but will permit Plaintiff leave to file an amended pleading.

Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that she must provide plausible factual allegations 

that demonstrate a direct causal connection between the RJD Defendants and the physical 

harm she alleges that has suffered while housed at her current place of incarceration. 

Plaintiff is further cautioned that she may not add any additional Defendants nor may she 

allege facts or claims that she has already presented in the twenty two (22) civil rights 

Case 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB Document 121 Filed 11/27/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of

 16
6

3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

actions that she has filed since April of 2012, the date she was transferred back to CSPSAC.3

In addition, in this action filed by Plaintiff in 2012, she claims that Defendants at 

RJD caused her to be threatened by “two-five gang members.” (Compl. at 4.) However, 

Plaintiff previously alleged in 2009, while housed at CSP-SAC, that a “hit” had been 

“placed on the Plaintiff by the disruptive groups, ‘Two-Five’ and ‘Independent Riders.’” 

See Williams v. Rodriguez, et al., E.D. Civil Case No. 1:09-cv-01882-LJO-GSA, ECF 

No. 5 at 14. It appears that Plaintiff has claimed to suffer harassment from this alleged 

gang years prior to filing this action. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, 

she would have to allege specific facts linking the RJD Defendants to the threats of harm 

by prison gang members whom she claims have been threatening her since 2009. 

In her Opposition to Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff claims that her food is being 

poisoned by CSP-SAC officials with “arsenic, nitrite, nitrous acids,” and other poisons. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 5.) The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has already filed at least 

ten (10) actions in the Eastern District of California, since April of 2012, raising these 

identical claims.4

/ / /

/ / /

 

3 A Court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal 

judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 

F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 

2002)).

4

 See Williams v. Wedell, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:12-cv-01438-GEB-GGH; Williams v. 

Nappi, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:12-cv-01604-GEB-CMK; Williams v. CDCR, et al., E.D. Cal. 

Civil Case No. 2:12-cv-01616-JAM-EFB; Williams v. Brennan, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:12-cv02155-KJM-AC; Williams v. D. Bauer, et al. E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:12-cv-02158-MCE-EFB; 

Williams v. Norton, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:12-cv-02889-CKD, Williams v. Murillo, et al., 

E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:12-cv-03066-MCS-KJN; Williams v. Roberts, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 

2:14-cv-00728-KJM-DAD; Williams v. Harris, E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:14-cv-01191-WBS-AC; 

Williams v. Lopez, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:16-cv-00131-KJM-KJN

Case 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB Document 121 Filed 11/27/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of

 16
7

3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff has also filed at least four (4) actions since April of 2012 alleging that she 

has been sexually assaulted by CSP-SAC officials.5 Plaintiff may not bring claims of 

food poisoning or sexual assault by CSP-SAC officials in this action that she has 

previously raised in all the Eastern District matters filed since 2012.

C. Fourteenth Amendment claims

Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that Defendants violated her due process rights 

when she was given an “R” suffix based on a conviction she claims does not exist. (See

Compl. at 3.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege a “liberty interest” and 

thus, has failed to properly allege a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. (Defs. Ps 

& As In Supp. of Mtn. for Judg. on the Pldgs at 10-12.)

“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of 

interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and 

property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison 

regulations may grant prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due process 

protections. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, the Supreme 

Court has significantly limited the instances in which due process can be invoked. 

Pursuant to Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995), a prisoner can show a liberty 

interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges a 

change in confinement that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation 

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 

131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The Sandin test requires a case-by-case examination of both the conditions of the 

prisoner’s confinement and the duration of the deprivation at issue. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 

486. In short, Plaintiff must allege facts to show “a dramatic departure from the basic 

 

5

 See Williams v. Agredano, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:15-cv-01767-JAM-KJN; See Williams v. 

Faris, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:14-cv-01434-EFB; Williams v. Kaiser, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil 

Case No. 2:14-cv-01218-MCE-CKD; Williams v. Jinkerson, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:14-cv00838-MCE-EFB.

Case 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB Document 121 Filed 11/27/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of

 16
8

3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

conditions” of his confinement before he can state a procedural due process claim. Id. at 

485; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended by 135 

F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to receive a particular security 

classification. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-50 (1983); Moody v. Daggett, 

429 U.S. 78, 87 n.9 (1976). However, the Ninth Circuit has applied Sandin’s procedural 

due process analysis to a claim similar to Plaintiff’s. In Neal, the Court considered a due 

process challenge to Hawai’i’s Sex Offender Treatment Program (“SOTP”), which 

labeled all persons in state custody convicted of specified sex crimes as “sex offenders” 

and compelled their participation in a psychoeducational treatment program as a prerequisite to parole eligibility. Neal, 131 F.3d at 821-22. Applying Sandin, the district 

court concluded that the “labeling of [Neal] as a sex offender and any resultant impact on 

[his] custody level or eligibility for parole . . . [did] not impose ‘atypical and significant’ 

hardship” upon him. Neal, 131 F.3d at 828. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, however, 

finding that the “stigmatizing consequences of the attachment of the ‘sex offender’ label 

coupled with the subjection of the targeted inmate to a mandatory treatment program 

whose successful completion is a precondition for parole eligibility create the kind of 

deprivations of liberty that require procedural protections.” Id. at 830 (emphasis added). 

Here, while Plaintiff alleges that she has been given the “R” suffix, that 

classification alone does not “impose[] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in 

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, Neal, 131 F.3d 

at 830, Cooper v. Garcia, 55 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999.) Plaintiff does not 

allege that any of the named Defendants, who are members of the classification 

committee, imposed any other restrictions on her that could implicate a liberty interest. 

Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 

Amendment due process claim is GRANTED with leave to amend.

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB Document 121 Filed 11/27/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of

 16
9

3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

D. Conspiracy claims

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims. 

(Defs. Ps & As In Supp. of Mtn. for Judg. on the Pldgs at 15-18.) In her Complaint, 

Plaintiff claims Warden Paramo “conspired with Defendants R. Olson, E. Marrero, Los 

Angeles County and the District Attorney by placing [an] “R” suffix upon the plaintiff.” 

(Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff does not indicate whether she is bringing a claim of conspiracy 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

Under § 1985, a conspiracy to interfere with civil rights falls can fall under one of 

the following three possibilities: (1) preventing an officer from performing their duties; 

(2) obstructing justice by intimidating a party, witness, or juror; or (3) depriving persons 

of rights or privileges. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Here, Plaintiff’s claims would fall under 

§ 1985(3) and to properly state a claim pursuant to §1985(3) “a complaint must allege (1) 

a conspiracy, (2) to deprive any person or a class of persons of the equal protection of the 

laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) an act by one of the 

conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) a personal injury, property damage 

or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Gillespie v. 

Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980). “[T]he language requiring intent to deprive 

equal protection . . . means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise classbased, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Griffin v. 

Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 

1536 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no facts to plausibly suggest 

that she was given an “R suffix” based on any “racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, 

invidiously discriminatory animus.” RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 

1056 (9th Cir. 2002).

To state a claim for conspiracy pursuant to § 1983, Plaintiff must allege specific 

facts showing two or more persons intended to accomplish an unlawful objective of 

causing him harm and took some concerted action in furtherance of that goal. Gilbrook 

v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856–57 (9th Cir. 1999). In other words, Plaintiff 

Case 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB Document 121 Filed 11/27/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of

 16
10

3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“must show ‘an agreement or “meeting of the minds” to violate constitutional rights.’” 

Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 

441 (9th Cir. 2002)). Conclusory allegations of wide-spread conspiracy, however, are 

insufficient to state a valid § 1983 claim. Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 

(9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaints offers no specific factual allegations regarding the 

alleged conspiracy. Instead, there is just one conclusory statement that RJD Defendants 

conspired with an unnamed District Attorney and “Los Angeles County” to place an “’R’ 

suffix upon the plaintiff.” (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff’s Complaint offers no other 

allegations regarding this alleged conspiracy. Plaintiff must plead specific facts when 

alleging a conspiracy. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 937 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(“The conclusory conspiracy allegations in the original complaint do not define the scope 

of any conspiracy involving [the defendant], what role he had, or when or how the 

conspiracy operated.”).

Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiff’s 

conspiracy claim is GRANTED with leave to amend.

E. State law claims

1. Slander

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s slander claims on 

the ground she “failed to adequately allege slander” as she has purportedly not alleged 

that any Defendants made an oral statement about her. (Defs. Ps & As In Supp. of Mtn. 

for Judg. on the Pldgs at 17.) Under California law slander is, in part, the “false and 

unprivileged publication, orally uttered, and also communications by radio or any 

mechanical or other means which: (1) Charges any person with crime, or have been 

indicted, convicted, or punished for crime.” Cal. Civil Code § 46 (West 2017). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB Document 121 Filed 11/27/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 16
11

3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she “informed Defendants Daniel Paramo, 

R. Olson, and E. Marrero that Correctional Officer (c/o) I. Marquez, (while attending 

ICC), told several inmates (in my presence) that I was/am a convicted sex offender.” 

(Compl. at 4.) While Plaintiff does allege this oral statement was made and if proven 

could be potentially slanderous, Marquez is not a named Defendant. Defendants are 

correct that Plaintiff does not identify any oral statement by the named Defendants that 

could state a claim for slander under California law. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiff’s 

slander claims is GRANTED.

2. Libel

Defendants also move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that Plaintiff 

has failed to adequately allege a claim for libel. (Defs. Ps & As In Supp. of Mtn. for 

Judg. on the Pldgs at 17.) Under California law, libel is a “false and unprivileged 

publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, 

which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him 

to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.” Cal. 

Civil Code § 45 (West 2017). 

Defendants argue that the only claim for libel would be the documents written by 

Defendants “reflecting their classification of her as a sex offender.” (Defs. Ps & As In 

Supp. of Mtn. for Judg. on the Pldgs at 17.) However, Defendants assert that their 

“alleged acts of wrongly classifying Williams occurred under circumstances that fall 

squarely within the statutory definition of ‘privilege.’” (Id.) 

Under California law applicable to the facts alleged in this matter, a “privileged 

publication or broadcast is one made” in “proper discharge of any official duty” and “in 

any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official 

proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding 

authorized by law.” Cal. Civil Code § 47(a) & (b) (West 2017). Defendants maintain 

that Plaintiff alleges that the decision to place an “R” suffix on Plaintiff’s classification 

Case 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB Document 121 Filed 11/27/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 16
12

3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

was conducted at an Institutional Classification Committee (“ICC”) hearing which is an 

official proceeding. Under California regulations, “[t]he classification committee at each 

institution must assign a custodial classification to each inmate, in accordance with the 

custodial classifications prescribed by the department.” CAL CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3272.

In her Complaint, Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendants placed the “R” suffix in 

her file at her ICC hearing conducted on January 5, 2012. (See Compl. at 3-4.) Thus, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged facts to show that the decision to place the “R” 

suffix on her file was “unprivileged” and thus, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings as to Plaintiff’s libel claims is GRANTED.

3. Failure to comply with California Government Claims Act

Even if Plaintiff adequately alleged a slander or libel claim against Defendants, the 

Court agrees that Defendants have shown Plaintiff has not adequately complied with the 

California Government Claims Act. (Defs. Ps & As In Supp. of Mtn. for Judg. on the 

Pldgs at 17.) 

When defendants are public employees acting within the scope of their 

employment, as all the Defendants named in this action are alleged to be, a plaintiff must 

first submit a written claim to the public entity that employs them before filing a lawsuit 

seeking monetary damages for violations of California law. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 945.4, 

950.2. Under California law, these claims procedures apply to prisoners. See Cal. Gov’t 

Code § 945.6(c). The prisoner must file his tort claim with the governmental entity as a 

condition precedent to the maintenance of an action under state law, even if it arises as a 

pendent claim in a civil rights suit filed in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). The 

complaint must allege compliance with the claims procedure, and failure to make this 

allegation provides a basis for dismissal. Id.

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint provides no allegation that she 

complied with this Act. In support of their argument, Defendants have filed a “Request 

for Judicial Notice.” (ECF No. 67-2.) Defendants are requesting that this Court take 

Case 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB Document 121 Filed 11/27/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 16
13

3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

judicial notice of “[r]ecords of the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board 

[“VCGCB”] showing all claims presented by Plaintiff Lonnie Williams, encompassing 

the date January 5, 2012.” (Id. at 1.) Federal Rules of Evidence 201 provides, in part, 

that the Court may take judicial notice of facts that “can be accurately and readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 

201(b)(2).

The specific record that Defendants are asking that this Court take judicial notice is 

a “certification” signed under penalty of perjury by Eric Rivera, Custodian of Records for 

the Government Claims Program, along with the claim submitted by Plaintiff. (ECF No. 

67-2. at 4-8.) Plaintiff does not challenge the veracity of these documents but rather 

argues that she does not have to comply with the requirement to submit a claim to the 

VCGCB. (ECF No. 69 at 4.) Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ request of 

judicial notice on the grounds that the validity of these documents are “not subject to 

reasonable dispute.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b).

Attached to the certification of Eric Rivera is one “Government Claims Form” 

submitted by Plaintiff on June 11, 2012. (ECF No. 67-2 at 6-7.) Plaintiff purportedly 

sought to bring this claim against “California State Prison - Sacramento, Richard J. 

Donovan Correctional Facility, C/O F. Wong, C/O J.J. Eustice, C/O Terrell, C/O Hultz,

Sgt. C. Ramos, C/O Jackson, C/O E. Laxamana, C/O Taylor, Lt. T. Glover, LTA E. 

Simon.” (Id. at 6.) Other than naming RJD,6 Plaintiff does not name any of the 

Defendants before this Court in this claim. Moreover, this claim does not include any of 

the facts alleged in the Complaint currently before the Court or allegations of libel and 

slander. Therefore, the record before this Court shows that Plaintiff did not properly file 

his claim relating to his state law claims before filing this action. 

/ / /

 

6

 RJD is not a defendant in this matter.

Case 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB Document 121 Filed 11/27/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 16
14

3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Thus, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiff’s libel and 

slander claims is GRANTED with prejudice and without leave to amend. The Court 

finds that any amendment as to the California state law claims would be futile as the time 

to properly file a claim for an event that occurred in 2012 has long since passed. See 

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of leave to 

amend is not an abuse of discretion where further amendment would be futile).

F. Injunctive Relief

In her Complaint, Plaintiff seeks an injunction from this Court “removing the “R” 

suffix and removing the sexual battery from Plaintiff’s CLETS and criminal records.” 

(Compl. at 7.) Defendants maintain that they do not have the authority to change these 

records and neither does this Court in the context of this action. 

The term “CLETS” is an acronym for California Law Enforcement 

Telecommunications system. See People v. Martinez, 22 Cal.4th 106, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 

687, 990 P.2d 563 (2000). Defendants maintain that the CDCR does not compile the 

criminal records found in “CLETS” and the only information provided by the CDCR to 

“CLETS” is the “information about an individual’s admission to or release from a 

detention facility in the Department of Corrections.” ((Defs. Ps & As In Supp. of Mtn. 

for Judg. on the Pldgs at 21 citing Cal. Penal Code § 13152.) 

Plaintiff argues, without citation to any legal authority, that this Court “can order 

the Plaintiff’s records expunged, which contain inflammatory, unconstitutional, unlawful 

information.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 5.) “Federal courts have inherent authority to expunge 

criminal records in appropriate and extraordinary cases.” United States v. Crowell, 374 

F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 2004). However, the Ninth Circuit has also made clear that 

Plaintiff “must first obtain a judgment that her conviction was unlawful” before seeking 

expungement. Id. at 796. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she has such a 

judgment, and therefore, the Court DENIES this request for injunctive relief. 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB Document 121 Filed 11/27/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 16
15

3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

G. Qualified Immunity

Finally, Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that they 

are entitled to qualified immunity. (Defs. Ps & As In Supp. of Mtn. for Judg. on the 

Pldgs at 22-23.) Because the Court has found that all of Plaintiff’s claims should be 

dismissed, it need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. See Saucier v. 

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were 

the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified 

immunity.”); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (“[The better 

approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to 

determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at 

all.”).

IV. Conclusion and Order

For all the reasons explained, the Court:

1) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 

67); 

2) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s California state law libel and slander claims with 

prejudice and without leave to amend; and

3) GRANTS Plaintiff thirty (30) days leave in which to file an Amended 

Complaint that addresses the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and 

conspiracy claims only. Plaintiff is cautioned that should she choose to file an Amended 

Complaint, it must be complete by itself, comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

8(a), and that any claim not re-alleged will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR

15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey, 693 F.3d at 928 

(noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”). If Plaintiff fails to follow 

these instructions and/or files an Amended Complaint that still fails to state a claim, her

case may be dismissed without further leave to amend. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 

Case 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB Document 121 Filed 11/27/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

 16
16

3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity to 

fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into 

dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 27, 2017

Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB Document 121 Filed 11/27/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

 16