Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04579/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04579-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kayoya Issa,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondent.

No. CV-19-04579-PHX-DWL (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DOMINIC W. LANZA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Petitioner Kayoya Issa has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and a Motion to Expand the Record under Rule 6 (Doc. 15).

I. Summary of Conclusion.

Petitioner raises three grounds for relief in his Petition. Petitioner’s Fourth 

Amendment claim in Ground One is not cognizable. Petitioner’s Miranda and perjury 

claims in Ground Two are procedurally defaulted without excuse. Petitioner’s allegations 

of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel in Ground Three fail or 

are procedurally defaulted without excuse. Therefore, the Court will recommend that the 

Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. Petitioner also filed a motion to expand 

the record (doc. 15), which requests the Court order additional Brady disclosure and

DNA/fingerprint testing of a firearm. Petitioner fails to satisfy the standard required for 

additional discovery.

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II. Background.

A. Procedural Background.

The Court of Appeals of Arizona summarized the facts and trial proceedings:

Phoenix police executed a traffic stop of a raised sport utility vehicle Issa 

was driving. After officers activated their colored lights to signal Issa to stop, 

he continued driving for an eighth to a tenth of a mile before he pulled into a 

strip mall. As officers followed Issa’s vehicle, they saw him leaning over to 

the right, reaching toward the passenger side three or four times—suggesting 

he might be attempting to access the glove box of the car. After Issa’s SUV 

came to a stop, officers saw him make another similar motion toward the 

right side of the passenger compartment.

When an officer approached and asked Issa if any weapons were in the 

vehicle, Issa at first changed the subject. Asked a second time, Issa glanced 

toward the right side of the vehicle before denying there were any weapons 

in the vehicle. When Issa would not provide identification, the officer 

removed him from the SUV and walked with him to the rear of the vehicle. 

Issa then told the officer that his identification was in the car’s driver’s-side 

door panel. Leaving Issa with the other officer, the first officer then 

approached the driver’s side of the SUV again. With the driver’s-side door 

open, the officer saw the grip and the top (the “slide”) of a handgun sticking 

out from beneath the front-left side of the front-passenger seat cushion, 

which was completely detached from the seat frame and raised three to four 

inches. A records check later revealed that Issa was a convicted felon and 

prohibited possessor.

At trial, Issa’s defense was that he had not put the gun in the vehicle and did 

not know it was there. Issa’s live-in girlfriend testified the handgun was hers, 

and said she had taken it from a locked box in her closet in their home and 

put it under the front-passenger seat cushion of the SUV because a 

rambunctious young nephew was visiting their home. She testified she had 

forgotten to tell Issa she had hidden the gun in the vehicle before she asked 

him to pick up something at the store. She testified she placed the gun under 

the side of the front-passenger seat cushion closer to the driver. She further 

stated the gun did not cause the cushion to bulge.

Issa’s first trial ended in a hung jury. In his second trial, the jury convicted 

him of misconduct involving weapons. The court sentenced Issa to a 

presumptive term of 4.5 years in prison. Issa filed a timely notice of appeal.

(Doc. 13-13, Ex. M, at 2-3.) Petitioner was sentenced on August 26, 2016 to 4.5 years in 

prison. (Doc. 13-8, Ex. H, at 2-3.) 

B. Direct Appeal.

On September 21, 2016, Petitioner appealed his conviction. (Doc. 13-9, Ex. I, at 1.)

Petitioner argued two issues on appeal. First, he claimed the prosecutor misinformed the 

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jury regarding constructive possession of a weapon. (Doc. 13-10, Ex. J, at 2.) Second, he 

claimed that the court should have granted a mistrial when a police officer testified to gang 

violence in the area of the traffic stop. (Doc. 13-10, Ex. J, at 2.) On November 14, 2017, 

the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentencing. (Doc. 13-13, Ex. M, 

at 10.)

On January 11, 2018, Petitioner appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 

13-14, Ex. N.) On May 29, 2018, the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review. 

(Doc. 13-15, Ex. O.) On June 29, 2018, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate. 

(Doc. 13-16, Ex. P.)

C. Post-Conviction Review Proceedings.

On June 15, 2018, Petitioner filed a notice for post-conviction relief (“PCR”). 

(Doc. 13-17, Ex. Q.) Petitioner filed his PCR petition on February 15, 2019. (Doc. 13-18, 

Ex. R.) In his PCR petition, he asserted two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

(“IAC”), one against his trial counsel for failing to request the appropriate jury instruction 

at trial, and one against his appellate counsel for failing to argue the trial court’s error on 

appeal. (Doc. 13-18, Ex. R, at 5-7.) The PCR court dismissed the PCR petition on April 

26, 2019. (Doc. 13-21, Ex. U, at 1-2.)

Petitioner did not seek further review of the dismissal.

D. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition.

On June 26, 2019, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner 

raises three broad grounds for relief. In Ground One, he argues that the “trial court 

committed fundamental error when it allowed evidence, apparently obtained during a 

warrantless search of Petitioner’s girlfriend’s car, to be admitted at trial,” and he alleges a 

violation of his Miranda rights. (Doc. 10, at 2; Doc. 1). In Ground Two, he claims that “the 

trial court committed fundamental error when it allowed officers to present perjured 

testimony at trial.” (Id.) In Ground Three, he argues he “received ineffective assistance of 

trial and post-conviction counsel.” (Id.) On December 6, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion 

for Discovery and to Expand the Record.

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III. Standard of Review.

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default.

Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless 

a petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To exhaust state 

remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits 

of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” court in a 

procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (“[t]o provide 

the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly present’ his claim in 

each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the 

claim”).

A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See id. at 33. A “state prisoner 

does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or 

brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, 

such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 31-32. Thus, “a petitioner 

fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion 

requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum . . . (2) through the proper 

vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the claim.”

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).

The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also require 

federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. See

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32. Under these principles, a habeas petitioner’s claims may be 

precluded from federal review in two situations.

First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus 

review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but returning 

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to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such as waiver 

or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See Teague v. 

Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). If 

no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, but procedurally 

defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1.

Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in state 

court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See Beard v. 

Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 59 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the State’s 

procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state courts of an 

opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32. In 

this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court opinion relies “on 

a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an 

‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989).

A procedurally defaulted claim may not be barred from federal review, however, “if 

the petitioner can demonstrate either (1) ‘cause for the default and actual prejudice as a 

result of the alleged violation of federal law,’ or (2) ‘that failure to consider the claims will 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732). See also Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 

1126-27 (9th Cir. 1998) (the cause and prejudice standard applies to pro se petitioners and 

to those represented by counsel). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some 

objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s 

procedural rules. Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1027 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1986)). “‘[P]rejudice’ is actual harm resulting from the 

constitutional violation or error.” Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). 

To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual 

and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 

1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). Where a petitioner fails to establish either cause or prejudice, 

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the Court need not reach the other requirement. See Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1105 

n.6 (9th Cir. 1999); Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 n.13.

B. Merits.

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision 

which was contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court decision was an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Davis 

v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198-99 (2015); Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th 

Cir. 2009). The AEDPA requires that the habeas court review the “last reasoned decision”

from the state court, “which means that when the final state court decision contains no 

reasoning, we may look to the last decision from the state court that provides a reasoned 

explanation of the issue.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 441 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only 

the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions. And an 

unreasonable application of those holdings must be objectively 

unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice. Rather, as 

a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal 

court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood 

and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair minded 

disagreement.

White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

See also Arrendondo v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2014).

Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to adjudicate 

claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal 

habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court. 

AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show that the state court’s ruling on 

the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that 

there was an error . . . beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement.”

Harrington v. Richter, [] 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-787, [] (2011). “If this standard 

is difficult to meet”—and it is—” that is because it was meant to be.” [] 131 

S. Ct. at 786. We will not lightly conclude that a State’s criminal justice 

system has experienced the “extreme malfunctio[n]” for which federal 

habeas relief is the remedy. Id., at ––––, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15-16 (2013).

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A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it applied a rule contradicting the 

governing law as stated in United States Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a set of 

facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches 

a different result. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005).

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law if it correctly identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in a

way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly established 

legal principle to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. See McNeal 

v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 2010). The state court’s determination of a 

habeas claim may be set aside under the unreasonable application prong if, under clearly 

established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in refusing to extend [a] 

governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should have controlled.”

Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166 (2000). However, the state court’s decision is an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only if it can be considered 

objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010). An 

unreasonable application of law is different from an incorrect one. See id.; Cooks v. 

Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). “That test is an objective one and does not 

permit a court to grant relief simply because the state court might have incorrectly applied 

federal law to the facts of a certain case.” Adamson v. Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d 

Cir. 2011). See also Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2010).

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed by 

a federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented with clear and convincing 

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015). 

The “presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate court, as 

opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 

593 (1982). See also Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168, 1202 n.13 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that, with regard to claims 

adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the 

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record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). See also Murray, 745 F.3d at 998. Pursuant 

to § 2254(d)(2), the “unreasonable determination” clause, “a state-court’s factual 

determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have 

reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 724-25 

(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 15).

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, the 

Court must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the state’s 

ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the state court’s decision that the AEDPA 

otherwise requires. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 

953-54 (2007). Additionally, the petitioner must show the error was not harmless: “For 

reasons of finality, comity, and federalism, habeas petitioners are not entitled to habeas 

relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’”

Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2197.

IV. Ground One – Warrantless Search.

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that a “warrantless search of his girlfriend[‘s] car 

[was] a violation of due process . . . .” (Doc. 1 at 6.)1 Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable 

on habeas review.

The Fourth Amendment provides: “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 

be violated . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. As a result, federal courts developed an 

“exclusionary rule” that prohibits evidence obtained through an illegal search or seizure of 

a defendant from being introduced in a prosecution to incriminate them. Stone v. Powell, 

429 U.S. 465, 481-87 (1976). In the context of a federal habeas corpus petition, however, 

the Supreme Court determined that the “contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the 

effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal, and the substantial societal costs of 

1 Petitioner all asserts that he “invoke[d]” his “right not to speak with police without an 

attorney present.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) This claim is raised, and addressed, in Ground Two.

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application of the rule persist with special force.” Id. at 494-95. Thus, “where the State has 

provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state 

prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence 

obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Id. at 494. 

Here, Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable because he had the ability to litigate this 

Fourth Amendment claim in the state courts. Petitioner had the ability to file a motion to 

suppress prior to trial, and he could have included this claim on direct appeal or in postconviction relief proceedings. Whether Petitioner actually litigated this issue in the state 

courts is of no moment. “The relevant inquiry is whether petitioner had the opportunity to 

litigate his claim, not whether he did in fact do so or even whether the claim was correctly 

decided.” Newman v. Wengler, 790 F.3d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ortiz-Sandoval 

v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996)). “All Stone v. Powell requires is the initial 

opportunity for a fair hearing. Such an opportunity for a fair hearing forecloses this court’s 

inquiry, upon habeas corpus petition, into the trial court’s subsequent course of action, 

including whether or not the trial court has made express findings of fact.” Id. at 881 

(quoting Caldwell v. Cupp, 781 F.2d 714, 714 (9th Cir. 1986)). Petitioner does not argue 

he was denied the opportunity to present this claim in the state courts. Petitioner’s claim is 

not cognizable.

V. Ground Two – Miranda Violation and Perjury Allegations.

In Ground Two, Petitioner presents two connected arguments. He appears to allege

that a police officer violated his Miranda rights and committed perjury regarding a search 

of the vehicle he was driving. He argues that “fundamental constitutional error resulted 

[when] Officer Hurt and Detective Sylvestre of the Phoenix Police Department had 

violated [Petitioner’s] Miranda right violation of due process.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) Petitioner

asserts that a “fundamental error resulted from the state introduction of evidence that 

[Petitioner] attempted to invoke his right against a warrantless [search].” (Id.) In his Brief 

in Support of Petition, Petitioner argues that “prior to the search Officer David Hurt [] lied 

and [made a] false declaration before grand jury or court.” (Doc. 4 at 15.) Liberally 

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construing Petitioner’s claim, the Court concludes that Petitioner is arguing that the police 

officer committed a Miranda violation when the officer commented on Petitioner’s silence 

during the vehicle search.2 The Court further concludes that Petitioner is arguing the officer 

lied about the search under oath before a grand jury or during trial.

Petitioner’s claims in Ground Two are unexhausted because he did not raise them 

on direct appeal or in PCR proceedings. As Petitioner did not raise these claims in the state 

courts, they are procedurally defaulted. Petitioner is now precluded from bringing these 

claims in state court. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (“A defendant is precluded from relief 

under Rule 32.1(a) based on any ground . . . waived at trial or on appeal, or in any previous 

post-conviction proceeding . . . .”); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)(3)(A) (“A defendant must file 

the notice for a claim under Rule 32.1(a) within 90 days after the oral pronouncement of 

sentence or within 30 days after the issuance of the mandate in the direct appeal, whichever 

is later.”). Petitioner fails to establish cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default 

because he does not allege any “external factor” that prevented him from complying with 

the procedural rules of the state courts. Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1027 (9th Cir. 

2008).

Petitioner repeatedly asserts that he is innocent because his girlfriend testified that 

“she took the gun out of her home and placed it under the passenger seat” of the vehicle. 

(Doc. 1 at 7.) Petitioner could excuse the procedural default of this claim if he presented 

evidence of actual innocence. Petitioner must present “new reliable evidence—whether it 

be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). “It is 

important to note in this regard that ‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere 

legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). “Without any new 

evidence of innocence, even the existence of a concededly meritorious constitutional 

2

In his supporting brief, Petitioner appears to quote the testimony of an officer. “I really 

don’t know whether he wasn’t responding because he didn’t understand his right or wasn’t 

responding because is refugee from Africa[]. Is immigrant from Africa – and does not 

understand.” (Doc. 4 at 18.) The Court did not find this testimony in any of the submitted 

exhibits. This quote may not be connected to Petitioner’s argument. 

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violation is not in itself sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice that would allow a 

habeas court to reach the merits of a barred claim.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. The testimony 

from Petitioner’s girlfriend was presented to the jury and is not new evidence. As Petitioner 

has failed to show cause or actual innocence, Petitioner is barred from federal habeas 

corpus review regarding Ground Two. Id. at 1028 n.13.

VI. Ground Three – Misconduct/Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

In Ground Three, Petitioner presents three arguments. He alleges that during closing 

argument “the prosecutor misinformed the jury about the law” of constructive possession.

(Doc. 1 at 8.) Petitioner also argues trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing 

to request a “mere presence” jury instruction. (Doc. 4 at 3.) Petitioner also presents a vague 

claim relating to perjury and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

A. Improper Closing Argument.

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing 

argument when he “repeatedly told the jury that they could convict [Petitioner] for 

prohibited possession if he merely saw a handgun within his reach.” (Doc. 4 at 8.)3 At the 

scene of the offense, the “officer saw the grip and the top (the ‘slide’) of a handgun sticking 

out from beneath the front-left side of the front-passenger seat cushion, which was 

completely detached from the seat frame and raised three to four inches.” State v. Issa, 

2017 WL 5339228, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). Petitioner’s girlfriend testified that she 

alone possessed the weapon in the vehicle. During the closing argument, the prosecutor 

made the following statements: 

The next question that comes to your mind . . . is probably going to 

be, okay, at what point does the defendant have to knowingly possess the gun 

for me to vote guilty? How long does he have to knowingly possess a 

firearm? Does it matter when, over the course of his trip in the Expedition, 

he realizes it’s there?

Is there a legal difference between, for example, the defendant 

climbing into the car, noticing the gun as he gets in, and driving around with 

it anyway? Or a difference between that or seeing the red-and-blues come on 

behind him, glancing over as he is trying to pick up a fuse in the center 

console of the car and realizing there is a gun stuck under the passenger’s 

seat, lying to the cops about it in a moment of panic? And the answer to that 

3 This claim is listed as “Issue 1” in Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief. (Doc. 4 at 8.)

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question is no.

The two are legally indistinguishable because knowing possession 

happens the instant that you combine those two things: control over the gun, 

being in a place in which it’s within your grasp, within your reach, you can 

reach over [ ] and grab it and use it if you wanted to, and knowledge that it’s 

there. It doesn’t have to happen for any length of time.

And so, legally, it doesn’t really matter if—whether you believe the 

defendant climbed into the car with the gun on his hip and tried to stash it 

after the cops pulled him over or whether he climbed in, [his girlfriend] 

having, unbeknownst to him, put it there earlier, but realizing at some point 

during his trip that it was in fact there, and lying to the police about it to try 

not to get caught.

Id. at *2-3.

Petitioner’s counsel did not object to this argument, so the Arizona Court of Appeals 

reviewed the claim for fundamental error. The court found that “the prosecutor incorrectly 

stated the law when he told the jury that it could convict Issa if it found he was aware that 

the gun was within his reach in the car for even a brief moment.” Id. at *4. But the court 

further found that the improper argument did not constitute fundamental error.

Although improper, the argument Issa now challenges did not go to 

the foundation of Issa’s case, take from him a right essential to his defense 

or deny him a fair trial. This is because, as noted, Issa’s defense was that “he 

did not know at any point that the gun was in the car.” During closing 

argument, Issa’s lawyer argued the gun tucked under the seat cushion was 

not easily visible and questioned the suggestion in the officers’ testimony 

that they saw Issa reach over toward the gun after the officers activated the 

patrol car’s flashing lights. (Defense counsel argued the prosecution’s theory 

that Issa leaned over the armrest to stuff the gun under the seat as police 

approached was inconsistent with the testimony that although the officers 

saw him lean toward the passenger side, they did not see his shoulders dip 

down and did not see him bend forward.) During closing, Issa’s lawyer 

further challenged the officer’s statement that the passenger seat cushion was 

raised as high as three or four inches, and, more fundamentally, argued that 

if the officer could not spot the gun until he approached the car after Issa had 

stepped out of the front seat, then “how was [Issa] able to see it from where 

he was sitting?”

In addition, and consistent with his defense that he never saw the gun, 

Issa did not request, and the court did not give, an instruction on mere 

presence, and defense counsel mentioned that “[m]ere presence is not 

enough” only once in passing in his closing argument.

Finally, we note that the superior court’s instructions that possession 

required that Issa “knowingly . . . exercise . . . control over” the gun, that the 

jury must follow its instructions on the law, and that the State had the burden 

of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense minimized 

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any prejudice from the prosecutor’s erroneous argument.

On this record, the prosecutor’s argument did not constitute 

fundamental, reversible error. Exercise of dominion or control may be 

proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. . . . Here, there was ample 

circumstantial evidence that Issa exerted control over the gun by, at a 

minimum, reaching over toward the passenger seat where police found the 

gun shoved under the cushion.

Id. at *3-4.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to a fair 

trial, and prosecutors have a “duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce 

a wrongful conviction.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Relief is 

warranted only if the misconduct “‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the 

resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180 

(1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). The Court 

considers “the prominence of the erroneous comments in the entire trial, whether the 

prosecution misstated the evidence, whether the judge instructed the jury to disregard the 

comments, whether the comment was invited by defense counsel in summation, and 

whether defense counsel had an adequate opportunity to rebut the comments.” Trillo v. 

Biter, 769 F.3d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 2014). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court shall 

not grant relief unless the decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). To establish that 

a state court’s decision was unreasonable, Petitioner must show that the decision “‘was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Parker v. Matthews, 

567 U.S. 37, 47 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 103).

Here, Petitioner fails to demonstrate the decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals 

was unreasonable beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. The court decided 

that the physical location of the weapon, Petitioner’s defense theory, and the jury 

instructions outweighed the error of the prosecution’s argument on fundamental error 

review. Issa, 2017 WL 5339228 at *3-4. This decision is not beyond disagreement. Two 

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of the Trillo factors (the prosecutor did not misstate the evidence/counsel had the 

opportunity to rebut the comments) favor a finding of less prejudice. Two of the other Trillo

factors (no curative instruction, whether the argument was invited) favor a finding of more 

prejudice. The final Trillo factor (the prominence of the comments in the trial) is debatable. 

The prosecutor made the improper comment twice during his closing argument.4 But the 

prosecutor also spent most of closing and rebuttal argument focused on Petitioner’s actual 

possession of the weapon. The prosecutor argued that the testimony of Petitioner’s

girlfriend was not credible and that Petitioner actually possessed the weapon.5 Finally, the 

court found that the proper jury instruction mitigated the prejudice to Petitioner, which was 

a reasonable conclusion. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384 (1990) (finding that 

“arguments of counsel generally carry less weight with a jury than do instructions from 

court”); Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 898 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The arguments of 

counsel are generally accorded less weight by the jury than the court’s instructions and 

must be judged in the context of the entire argument and the instructions.”)(citing Boyde,

at 384). In light of all of the competing factors, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the 

decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals was unjustified beyond any fairminded 

disagreement. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel- Lack of Mere Presence Instruction.

In the Petition, Petitioner argues that trial counsel “deprived Petitioner of effective 

assistance of counsel” for reasons presented in his Brief. (Doc. 1 at 8.) In the Brief, 

Petitioner “contends that the Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a 

mere presence instruction and his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue 

on appeal.” (Doc. 4 at 3.) Petitioner raised this claim in the trial court, but did not request 

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. The trial court denied Petitioner’s claim.

Defendant Koyoya Issa filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The State

responded, and the Defendant filed a reply. The petition contends that the

Defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a mere presence 

instruction and his appellate counsel was ineffective in not raising the issue 

on appeal. The petition fails to establish either that counsel (trial and 

4 See Doc. 13-3, Ex. C, at 72-73, 81.

5 See Doc. 13-3, Ex. C, at 69-82 (closing argument) and 94-103 (rebuttal argument).

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appellate) failed to meet an objective standard of reasonableness or that he 

was prejudiced. There was no prejudice in the lack of a mere presence 

instruction. In the instructions on the elements of the offense and the 

definition of possession, the jury received the exact direction that a mere 

presence instruction would give, just in different words. The mere presence 

instruction tells the jury that a Defendant is merely present if the Defendant 

is a passive observer who lacked criminal intent and did not participate in the 

crime. The jury was instructed that the State had to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the Defendant knowingly possessed a deadly weapon. 

Coupled with the definition of possession, the jury was instructed that to 

convict the Defendant the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

Defendant knowingly had physical possession or exercised dominion or 

control over the deadly weapon. A mere presence instruction adds nothing 

under the evidence of this case and the arguments of the Defendant.

(Doc. 13-21, Ex. U, at 2-3.)

Petitioner’s claim is unexhausted because he did not raise this claim in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. For a claim to be considered exhausted, the petitioner must “fairly 

present” them to the state’s highest court in the PCR proceeding. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29.

“A claim is procedurally defaulted . . . if it is unexhausted and ‘state procedural rules would 

now bar the petitioner from bringing the claim in state court.’” Rodney v. Filson, 916 F.3d 

1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1317 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(en banc)). Petitioner’s claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claim against trial counsel may fall into the 

exception discussed in Martinez v. Ryan, where the Supreme Court held that 

[w]here, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must 

be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will 

not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective 

assistance at trial if, in the initial review collateral proceeding, there was no 

counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.

566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012).

As such, to establish “cause” to overcome procedural default under Martinez,

a petitioner must show: (1) the underlying ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claim is “substantial”; (2) the petitioner was not represented or had 

ineffective counsel during the PCR proceeding; (3) the state PCR proceeding 

was the initial review proceeding; and (4) state law required (or forced as a 

practical matter) the petitioner to bring the claim in the initial review 

collateral proceeding.

Dickens, 740 F.3d at 1319 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 423 

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(2013)). 

Assuming arguendo that Martinez would excuse the procedural default of this claim, 

Petitioner fails to prove that he was prejudiced because the jury instruction did not 

materially affect the jury’s decision. A jury instruction violates due process if it fails to 

give effect to the requirement that “the State must prove every element of the offense.”

Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004). “[N]ot every ambiguity, inconsistency, or 

deficiency in a jury instruction rises to the level of a due process violation. The question is 

whether the ailing instruction . . . so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction 

violates due process.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). A “single instruction 

to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the 

overall charge.” Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973).

Here, the jury was required to decide whether Petitioner exercised “dominion and

control” over the firearm. The trial judge issued the following instructions:

“Possess” means knowingly to have physical possession or otherwise 

exercise dominion or control over property. The law recognizes two different 

types of possession. “Actual possession” means the defendant knowingly had 

a direct physical control over an object.

“Constructive possession” means the defendant, although not actually 

possessing an object, knowingly exercised dominion or control over it either 

by action alone or through another person. “Dominion or control” means 

either actual ownership of the object or power over it.

Constructive possession may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. 

Both actual and constructive possession may be sole or joint.

“Sole possession” means that the defendant acted alone, had actual or 

constructive possession of an object.

“Joint possession” means the defendant and one or more persons shared 

actual or constructive possession of an object.

You may find that the element of possession as this term is used in the 

instructions is present if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant had actual or constructive possession, either acting alone or with 

another person.

(Doc. 13-3, Ex. C, at 68.)

Under Arizona law, a standard mere presence instruction contains the following 

language:

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Guilt cannot be established by the defendant’s mere presence at a crime 

scene, mere association with another person at a crime scene or mere 

knowledge that a crime is being committed. The fact that the defendant may 

have been present, or knew that a crime was being committed, does not in 

and of itself make the defendant guilty of the crime charged. One who is 

merely present is a passive observer who lacked criminal intent and did not 

participate in the crime.

State v. Hafen, 2015 WL 4747889, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).

Petitioner’s jury was required to determine if Petitioner had “dominion and control”

of the firearm in the vehicle. The prosecutor did not argue that Petitioner’s girlfriend was 

committing a crime and that Petitioner was merely present. The mere presence instruction 

presumes there is a crime scene, but there was no crime scene for Petitioner if he was not 

guilty. The mere presence instruction does not fit the facts of the case. Instead, both parties 

argued whether Petitioner possessed the weapon. In the context of the overall charge, the 

jury instructions were sufficient to instruct the jury on the definition of possession. The 

absence of a mere presence instruction did not so infect the entire trial as to violate due 

process. See United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1996) (a defendant is 

not entitled to a specific instruction “if other instructions, in their entirety, adequately cover 

that defense theory”).

Petitioner was not prejudiced by the lack of a mere presence instruction. Petitioner’s 

counsel therefore did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to request a “mere 

presence” jury instruction. Petitioner therefore fails to establish “cause” under Martinez to 

overcome the procedural default of this claim. 

C. Perjury/Brady Claim.

Petitioner submits general claims of “perjury tampering with evidence or witnesses 

[] falsifying reports.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) In the Brief, Petitioner alleges “various errors by the 

trial court constitutes abuse of discretion and habeas relief is warranted.” (Doc. 4 at 15.) 

He submits that the “prosecutor’s failure to disclose impeachment evidence violated 

Brady.” (Id. at 17.) Petitioner argues the “state also had an obligation to produce the 

documents for gun and car for Jessica Wilson showing Saldate6false and misleading 

6

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statement in court and before grand juries ....” (Id. at 18.) 

Petitioner’s vague claims do not warrant habeas relief. The Court has reviewed the 

Petition, Answer, Reply, and trial transcripts. Petitioner fails to present a specific factual 

allegation in these general claims and how he suffered prejudice. Petitioner alleges a Brady

violation, but fails to specifically identify the information that was allegedly withheld in 

his case. “Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts 

do not warrant habeas relief.” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994).

VII. Motion to Expand the Record.

On December 6, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Expand the 

Record. (Doc. 15.) Petitioner requests the Court order Respondents to obtain “the DNAfingerprints” from the firearm and “to disclose said file, supra, to the court and the 

Petitioner.” (Id. at 5.) The Court assumes that Petitioner is requesting 1) additional tests for 

DNA and fingerprinting be ordered by this Court, and 2) any documents that relate to 

potential perjury by the officers in the case. 

“A habeas petitioner does not enjoy the presumptive entitlement to discovery of a 

traditional civil litigant.” Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 

Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 903-05 (1997)). “Rather, discovery is available only in 

the discretion of the court and for good cause shown.” Id. (citing Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, Rule 6(a) 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254). Good cause is shown “‘where 

specific allegations . . . show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully 

developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief.” Bracy, 520 U.S. 

at 908-09.

Here, Petitioner has not established there is reason to believe that Brady material 

was withheld from him. Petitioner points to no specific evidence that Brady material exists 

in his case. Petitioner argues that Ms. Simpson testified the firearm was hers, but her 

credibility was a matter for the jury to determine. Her testimony does not provide good 

witnesses. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. A, at 26.) The name “Saldate” did not appear in the trial 

transcripts. (Doc. 13-3, Ex. C, at 146.) Officers David Hurt and Beau Sylvestre were the 

two Phoenix Police Department officers present at the traffic stop. (Doc. 13-2, Ex. B, at 

15.)

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cause to believe Brady material exists. 

Regarding DNA or fingerprint testing, Petitioner fails to establish that the firearm 

is still possessed by the prosecution or that there is a likelihood that fingerprint/DNA 

evidence would be present on the weapon. Petitioner did not make a request for additional 

testing on direct appeal or in post-conviction review proceedings. Petitioner had the 

opportunity to substantiate his claim in the state court and was not diligent in doing so. In 

habeas proceedings, “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be 

presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption 

of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Where the

petitioner has “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the 

court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant” can at least 

show the claim relies on “a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered 

through the exercise of due diligence.” See 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii); Holland v. 

Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652-53 (2004) (per curiam) (holding that new evidence can be 

considered so long as the petitioner “was not at fault in failing to develop that evidence in 

state court”). Even if Petitioner were previously diligent, he fails to present “specific 

allegations” to warrant this discovery request. Petitioner’s general allegation that DNA or 

fingerprint testing might assist him is insufficiently specific. See Calderon v. U.S. Dist. 

Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 98 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[C]ourts should not 

allow prisoners to use federal discovery for fishing expeditions to investigate mere 

speculation.”). Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s Motion for 

Discovery and Leave to Expand the Record be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1) and the Motion for Discovery and Leave to 

Expand the Record (doc. 15) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural 

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ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 28th day of February, 2020.

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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