Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02974/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02974-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2974

ANASTAZIA SCHMID,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

STEVEN MCCAULEY, Superintendent, Indiana Women’s Prison,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:14-cv-200-WTL-TAB — William T. Lawrence, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 10, 2015 — DECIDED JUNE 8, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, EASTERBROOK, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Anastazia Schmid was convicted in Indiana of murdering her boyfriend. She testified 

that she had heard a voice telling her that she is the Messiah 

and that the boyfriend had to die because he had sexually 

abused her daughter. The jury found her guilty but mentally 

ill. This spared her any risk of capital punishment but did 

Case: 14-2974 Document: 46 Filed: 06/08/2016 Pages: 4
2 No. 14-2974

not avoid a long term in prison; the sentence is 55 years, with 

the final five suspended in favor of probation. See Schmid v. 

State, 804 N.E.2d 174 (Ind. App. 2004) (affirming the conviction and sentence).

After her conviction became final, Schmid sought collateral review in state court. The process took eight years and 

was unavailing. See Schmid v. State, 972 N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 

App. 2012). Schmid filed her petition without counsel, but 

her mental problems led the state judiciary to appoint counsel for her. After the state collateral proceedings ended, 

counsel stopped representing her.

Federal law gives state prisoners one year to commence 

proceedings under 28 U.S.C. §2254. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(d). 

That time is suspended while collateral proceedings are under way in state court. The parties agree that, when Schmid 

asked the state court for collateral review, 178 days remained 

in the period allowed by §2244(d). They also agree that the 

state collateral proceedings ended on November 8, 2012, 

when the Supreme Court of Indiana declined to hear her 

case. Schmid filed a federal petition on February 7, 2014, 15 

months later. Given the time that had elapsed before state 

collateral review began, it was 278 days late. Schmid, representing herself, contended that equitable tolling justified the 

late filing. She gave two principal reasons: first, her mental 

problems (including post-traumatic stress disorder caused 

by her boyfriend’s abuse of her and her daughter); second, 

delay by former counsel in turning over legal papers that she 

needed. Schmid contended that counsel did not produce 

these papers until October 2013, five months after the time 

set by §2244(d) had expired.

Case: 14-2974 Document: 46 Filed: 06/08/2016 Pages: 4
No. 14-2974 3

The district court recognized that the deadline in 

§2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances” prevent timely filing. See Holland v. Florida, 560 

U.S. 631, 649 (2010); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418

(2005). Abandonment by counsel is one potentially extenuating circumstance, see Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012), 

and inability to access vital papers is another, see Socha v. 

Boughton, 763 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2014); Estremera v. United

States, 724 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 2013). The Supreme Court 

observed in Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891 (2015), that a 

prisoner’s mental disability in conjunction with abandonment by counsel may justify the appointment of new counsel 

to explore the question whether the disability tolls the period of limitations. Nonetheless the district court denied 

Schmid’s petition as untimely. 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85571 

(S.D. Ind. June 24, 2014). The judge stated that Schmid had 

failed to explain which particular documents she needed in 

order to file a petition under §2254 or why she needed them. 

With respect to Schmid’s claim of mental disability, the court 

said nothing at all.

We must assume for the purpose of this appeal that 

Schmid is afflicted by some mental disability—perhaps 

schizophrenic delusions (her defense at trial), perhaps posttraumatic stress disorder, perhaps both, or perhaps something else. Counsel representing Indiana was unable to tell 

us at oral argument what a verdict of “guilty but mentally 

ill” means under that state’s practice. But the fact that 

Schmid has some kind of mental problem—her substantive 

constitutional argument is that she was not competent to 

stand trial in the first place—colors everything else in the 

case. Schmid could not explain to the district judge’s satisfaction either the nature of her disability (and how it impeded

Case: 14-2974 Document: 46 Filed: 06/08/2016 Pages: 4
4 No. 14-2974

timely filing) or why she needed the papers that former 

counsel did not turn over until October 2013. Yet a mental 

disability might itself prevent an unrepresented prisoner 

from elucidating such matters.

As in Christeson this suggests that the district court’s first 

step should have been to appoint counsel for Schmid under 

18 U.S.C. §3006A(a)(2)(B). (Christeson dealt with 18 U.S.C. 

§3599, which uses the same standard as §3006A(a)(2)(B).) 

Counsel could have investigated Schmid’s mental condition

and explored the contents of prior counsel’s files, formulating an explanation for delay satisfactory to the district judge. 

We remand this case with directions to appoint counsel and, 

if appropriate, hold an evidentiary hearing.

Decisions about equitable tolling under §2244(d) are reviewed deferentially on appeal, whether the district court 

finds tolling warranted or unwarranted. See Simms v. Acevedo, 595 F.3d 774, 781 (7th Cir. 2010); Tucker v. Kingston, 538 

F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir. 2008). We have not applied that deferential standard here, however, because the district court did 

not gather the evidence needed for decision. Nor did the 

court consider whether a hearing is necessary. Once counsel 

has had a chance to present the best arguments from 

Schmid’s perspective, the district court should apply the approach of decisions such as Estremera, 724 F.3d at 775–76; 

Davis v. Humphreys, 747 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2014); and Weddington v. Zatecky, 721 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2013), to determine whether a hearing is in order.

VACATED AND REMANDED

Case: 14-2974 Document: 46 Filed: 06/08/2016 Pages: 4