Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06071/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06071-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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.. FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals ORITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Cirruit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT /l.UG 7 1991 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

MARVIN DAVIS, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

MAJOR GENERAL DONALD F. FERRELL, ) 

Adjutant General; GREGORY AMZI, ) 

Assistant Aircraft Maintenance ) 

Office, Oklahoma Air National ) 

Guard; COLONEL JAMES R. MCKINNEY, ) 

Air CoDDDander, Oklahoma Air ) 

National Guard, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

No. 91-6071 

(O.C. No. CIV-90-1535-A) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

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" 

The sole question to be answered in this appeal is which 

Oklahoma statute of limitations is applicable to an action filed 

under 42 u.s.c. § 1983. 

According to his complaint, Appellant was terminated from his 

employment on February 10, 1988. This action was filed on 

September 18, 1990, approximately two years and seven months after 

the alleged wrongful act. The complaint contained three counts: 

the first was for "Deprivation of Property Without Due Process of 

Law," the second for "Deprivation of Freedom of Speech," and the 

third for "Violation of 42 u.s.c. 1983." 

In response to Defendants' motion the district court held 

this action was time-barred and dismissed the complaint. The 

district court, sitting in Oklahoma, reasoned that as Appellant 

had alleged an injury to his personal rights, Oklahoma's residual 

statute of limitations for personal injuries should be applied. 

The district court determined the residual statute was Oklahoma's 

two-year statute. 

Appellant argues Oklahoma's two-year statute of limitations 

is not Oklahoma's residual statute and asserts the residual 

statute is Oklahoma's five-year statute. 

As we are deciding a question of law, our standard of review 

is de nova. We give no deference to the district court's 

interpretation of Oklahoma law. 

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Congress has failed to provide a specific statute of 

limitation that governs § 1983 actions. The Supreme Court for 

many years urged courts to select the state statute of limitation 

"most analogous" and "most appropriate" to the particular§ 1983 

action. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239 (1989). In Wilson v. 

Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), the Supreme Court decided"§ 1983 

claims are best characterized as personal injury actions," id. at 

280, and held that a state's personal injury statute of 

limitations should be applied to all§ 1983 claims, id. at 280. 

In Owens, when confronted with a one-year statute covering 

intentional torts, the Supreme Court applied New York's three-year 

residual personal injury statute. Owens, 488 U.S. at 251. The 

Supreme Court reasoned that, as every state has one general or 

residual statute of limitations governing personal injury, 

confusion would be eliminated by adopting the rule that "where 

state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal 

injury actions, courts considering S 1983 claims should borrow the 

general or residual statute for personal injury actions." Id. at 

249-50. 

Oklahoma's applicable statute of limitations (Okla. Stat. 

tit. 12, S 95) reads in pertinent part: 

Civil actions 

property can 

periods ... : 

other than for 

only be brought 

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the recovery of real 

within the following 

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Third. Within two (2) years: ... an action for 

injury to the rights of another, not arising on 

contract, and not hereinafter enumerated; ... 

Fourth. Within one (1) year: An action for libel, 

slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, or 

false imprisonment; ... 

Sixth. An action for relief, not hereinbefore 

provided for, can only be brought within five (5) years 

Appellant argues the two-year statute does not apply by its 

own terms as this cause of action arose on a contract and then 

asserts that the five-year statute is the residual statute of 

limitations that should be applied in this case. 

persuaded. 

We are not 

The Supreme Court in Wilson clearly held an action based upon 

S 1983 is to be treated as a personal injury action for purposes 

of determining the appropriate statute of limitations. 471 U.S. 

at 280. Appellant misreads Owens. Owens teaches us to apply the 

residual statute of limitations "only where state law provides 

multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions and 

the residual one embraces unspecified personal injury 

actions." 488 U.S. at 250 n.12 (emphasis added). In the case 

before us, the action clearly does not arise from contract. The 

action is based upon the alleged violation of Appellant's due 

process and free speech rights. We therefore apply the Oklahoma 

statute embracing unspecified personal injury actions (Okla. Stat. 

tit. 12, S 95), which provides a two-year limit on unenumerated 

actions for injury to the rights of another. 

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Appellant's action 

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.. 

is time-barred under this statute, and the judgment of the 

district court should be affirmed. 

This result is bolstered by our decision in Meade v. Grubbs, 

841 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988), where we held that Oklahoma's twoyear statute of limitations for "injury to rights of another, not 

arising out of contract, and not hereinafter enumerated," applies 

to claims under S 1983. Id. at 1522. The Supreme Court tacitly 

approved Meade's holding in Owens by citing Meade as an example of 

the favored "second approach" to selecting the proper statute of 

limitations for S 1983 actions that of using the general 

personal injury statute rather than the intentional torts statute. 

See Owens, 488 U.S. at 242 n.6. The Court also mentioned Oklahoma 

in its discussion of states having multiple personal injury 

statutes of limitations and, we think significantly, listed 

Oklahoma's one-year intentional torts statute and its two-year 

"injury to rights of another" statute -- not the five-year statute 

that Appellant prefers. See id. at 247 n.8. A reading of the 

entire Oklahoma statute reveals the two-year limit applies to all 

personal injuries, as we held in Meade, 841 F.2d at 1522, and the 

five-year limit applies to many other situations not involving 

personal injury. 

Appellant next contends the action of the trial court should 

be reversed as his complaint supported another possible theory, 

and on that basis he alleges he pleaded a claim of tortious breach 

of contract. Even if we were to agree with Appellant, such a 

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construction of the complaint would result in the federal court 

having no jurisdiction. We find no merit to this contention now 

raised by Appellant. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

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