Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-06694/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-06694-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARON DOUGLAS CASTLIN,

Petitioner,

v.

GREG LEWIS, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 11-cv-06694-JST (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

GRANTING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Aron Douglass Castlin, a California prisoner, has filed this pro se action for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the deprivation of his credits due to the 

reclassification of his workgroup status from D-1 (credit-earning) to D-2 (non credit-earning). 

Petitioner alleges that his workgroup status reclassification violates the terms of his 2007 plea 

agreement and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Respondent was 

ordered to show cause why the petition should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer, 

and Petitioner has filed a traverse. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

2007 Conviction. Petitioner is incarcerated pursuant to a guilty plea in 2000. Docket #5,

Ex. 2. 1,2 In 2007, while still incarcerated, Petitioner was charged in Humboldt County Case No. 

 

1

Petitioner pleaded guilty to attempted murder along with several enhancements, including a gang 

enhancement. Docket #5, Ex. 2. Petitioner was sentenced to 19 years for his 2000 conviction. 

Id., Ex. 1 at 2. Petitioner alleges that his 2000 negotiated plea agreement required him to serve 19 

years at only 85 percent. Id., Ex. 2 at 16.

2

Petitioner brought similar challenges to his work status reclassification as it related to his 2000 

conviction and plea agreement in habeas petitions filed in the Central District of California. See

Castlin v. Lewis, Nos. CV 11-8636-DSF and CV 12-269-DSF, 2014 WL 897358 (C.D. Cal. 

March 5, 2014). Petitioner argued that the failure to inform him that pleading guilty to a gang 

enhancement would trigger a lifetime registration requirement violated his rights to due process 

and to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at *4. He also argued that applying California Penal 

Code § 2933.6 to him violated his plea agreement and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the federal 

Constitution. Id. at *6. The district court denied his habeas petitions in a reasoned decision.

Case 3:11-cv-06694-JST Document 19 Filed 02/02/15 Page 1 of 15
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

CRPB-065173 with possession of a weapon in prison in violation of California Penal Code section 

4502(a). Docket #1 at 2 & Ex. A. Petitioner pled guilty to the charge on January 11, 2007. 

Docket #1 at 19. Petitioner claims that the 2007 negotiated plea agreement required him to serve 

one year minus 15% credits. Docket #1 at 11. 

Gang Member Status. Petitioner was identified as an active prison gang member in 

2000. Docket #15, Ex. 2. On August 6, 2006, a gang validation/rejection review was conducted 

and Petitioner was revalidated as an active prison gang member. The revalidation was supported 

by a confidential memorandum dated March 29, 2006; a confidential memorandum dated January 

31, 2006; and a California Department of Corrections (“CDC”) Form 128B3dated August 2, 2006. 

Docket #15, Ex. 2. As a result, Petitioner was assessed an indeterminate term in the Security 

Housing Unit (“SHU”) at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”). Docket #15, Ex. 3. 

Petitioner’s status as an active prison gang member is reviewed regularly.4 In January 

2010, Petitioner had a 180-day review before the Unit Classification Committee (“UCC”). 

Petitioner refused to appear for the review. The UCC reviewed and affirmed Petitioner’s 

classification as an active prison gang member. Petitioner was informed that the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)’s “recognized avenues for release from 

SHU are through the debriefing process or through being determined to be an inactive prison gang 

member or associate as delineated in [California Code of Regulations], Title 15, sections 3378(e) 

and 3341.5(c)(4) and (5).” Docket #15, Ex. 4 at 2. 

In February 2011, Petitioner had an annual review of his classification status before the 

Institution Classification Committee (“ICC”). His status as an active prison gang member was 

affirmed, and he was again informed of the “avenues for release from SHU[.]” Docket #15, Ex. 4 

 

3 CDC Form 128B is used to document minor misconduct. Cal. Code Regs. tit.15, § 3326(b) 

(2014).

4

The Operations Manual of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(“CDCR”) requires that the Institution Classification Committee (“ICC”) review all indeterminate 

cases at least annually and refer them to the Classification Staff Representative for alternate 

placement consideration. CDCR Operations Manual § 62050.13.19 (2014).

Case 3:11-cv-06694-JST Document 19 Filed 02/02/15 Page 2 of 15
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

at 3. The ICC asked Petitioner if he was interested in debriefing, and he replied, “No.” Id. The 

ICC continued Petitioner’s SHU housing for an indeterminate term. Id. 

 Petitioner’s classification status was reviewed again in July 2011, January 2012, July 

2012, February 2013, and July 2013. Docket #15, Ex. 4 at 4–10, 12. In each review, prison 

officials affirmed his active prison gang status and therefore retained Petitioner in SHU housing 

for an indeterminate term. In connection with the January 2012, July 2012 and February 2013 

status reviews, Petitioner was advised that he could be released from SHU if he were successfully 

debriefed. Petitioner has not sought to participate in the debriefing process and currently remains 

housed in SHU.

Amendment of California Penal Code Section 2933.6. In January 2010, California 

Penal Code section 2933.6 was amended by Senate Bill 18. In relevant part, the amended section 

2933.6(a) mandates that persons placed in SHU upon validation as a prison gang member or 

associate are no longer eligible to earn credits pursuant to sections 2933 (worktime credits) or 

2933.05 (program credits) of the California Penal Code during the time they are housed in SHU. 

In its entirety, section 2933.6(a) now reads:

Notwithstanding any other law, a person who is placed in a Security 

Housing Unit, Psychiatric Services Unit, Behavioral Management 

Unit, or an Administrative Segregation Unit for misconduct 

described in subdivision (b) or upon validation as a prison gang 

member or associate is ineligible to earn credits pursuant to Section 

2933 or 2933.05 during the time he or she is in the Security Housing 

Unit, Psychiatric Services Unit, Behavioral Management Unit, or the 

Administrative Segregation Unit for that misconduct.

Cal. Penal Code § 2933.6(a) (West 2014). 

Reclassification of Work Status. Pursuant to the changes in California Penal Code 

section 2933.6, Petitioner’s work status was reclassified from D-1 (credit-earning) to D-2 (non

credit-earning) on February 10, 2010. Docket #1 at 6, 11, 14. Petitioner alleges that this 

reclassification deprived him of the credits promised to him as part of his 2007 negotiated plea 

agreement.

State Habeas Petition. On September 24, 2010, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in 

Case 3:11-cv-06694-JST Document 19 Filed 02/02/15 Page 3 of 15
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Del Norte County Superior Court challenging his workgroup classification as it related to his 2007 

conviction and sentence in Del Norte County Case No. HCPB10-5233. Docket #15, Ex. 7. On 

November 24, 2010, the superior court denied his petition in a reasoned decision: 

The Petition is denied because Petitioner has failed to establish sufficient grounds or 

circumstances upon which relief may be granted. 

Credits are not a vested right; they must be earned by the inmate.

Any action to withdraw from the Petitioner’s plea bargain must be taken in the Court 

where the plea was entered.

Id., Ex. 8. The state appellate court and the California Supreme Court summarily denied

Petitioner’s state habeas petitions. Id. at Exs. 11 and 12.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (West 

2014); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). A district court may not grant a petition 

challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits 

in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000).

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it 

“applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases,” or if it 

“confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] 

Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 

405–06. “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if 

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s 

Case 3:11-cv-06694-JST Document 19 Filed 02/02/15 Page 4 of 15
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411.

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to the Supreme Court’s 

jurisprudence. “[C]learly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions 

as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Only Supreme Court holdings that “squarely address[]” the issue presented are 

clearly established precedent. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008). “A federal court 

may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the 

precedent from [the Supreme Court] is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 

(2003).

The state court decision to which section 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of 

the state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 

F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2005). Although Ylst was a procedural default case, the “look 

through” rule announced there has been extended beyond the context of procedural default. 

Barker, 423 F.3d at 1092 n.3 (citing Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 n.17 (9th Cir. 2004), 

and Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2003)). In Petitioner’s case, the last reasoned 

decision is from the Del Norte County Superior Court.

III. DISCUSSION

Since June 2007, Petitioner has been housed in PBSP’s SHU as a result of being validated 

as an active prison gang member. Docket #15, Ex. 3. Prior to the amendment of California Penal 

Code section 2933.6, Petitioner was able to earn time credits that reduced the length of his 

sentence despite being housed in SHU. After section 2933.6 was amended in January 2010, 

Petitioner’s housing in SHU made him ineligible to earn worktime or program credits. 

Accordingly, in February 2010, he was reassigned from a credit-earning workgroup status 

Case 3:11-cv-06694-JST Document 19 Filed 02/02/15 Page 5 of 15
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(Workgroup D-1) to a non credit-earning workgroup status (Workgroup D-2). In the instant 

habeas petition, Petitioner challenges his workgroup reclassification as a breach of his 2007 plea 

agreement and as violating the Ex Post Facto Clause of the federal Constitution.

A. Applicability of California Penal Code § 2933.6

As an initial matter, the Court addresses Petitioner’s argument that California Penal Code 

section 2933.6 does not apply to him because he has not committed any misconduct. Docket #18 

at 10. Petitioner repeatedly emphasizes that he has not suffered any rule violations and that his 

validation as a gang member is solely an administrative, rather than punitive, classification. 

Docket #1 at 15–16 and Docket #18 at 14–17. Petitioner misreads section 2933.6. It does not 

apply only to prisoners placed in SHU for the misconduct specified in section 2933.6(b). It also 

applies to anyone who is placed in SHU due to validation as a prison gang member or associate, 

which is recognized as misconduct by California regulation and courts. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 

15, § 3023(a) (2013) (current version at Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3023(c) (amended October 17, 

2014)) (“Inmates and parolees shall not knowingly promote, further, or assist any gang as defined 

in section 3000); id. at § 3000 (2013) (current version at Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3023(c) 

(amended October 17, 2014)) (“gang” defined);5and In re Lopez, 2011 WL 6329840, *7 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 2011) (unpublished decision). In relevant part, section 2933.6 states: “. . . a person who is

placed in a Security Housing Unit . . . upon validation as a prison gang member or associate is 

ineligible to earn credits pursuant to Section 2933 or 2933.05 during the time he or she is in the 

Security Housing Unit . . . . for that misconduct.” Cal. Penal Code § 2933.6. Section 2933.6 is 

properly applied to Petitioner. 

B. Breach of Plea Agreement

Petitioner claims that the plea agreement guaranteed him 15% credit on his sentence, 

irrespective of his behavior in prison. See Docket No. 1 at 12 (“...this change in Petitioner’s 

credit earning workgroup status has resulted in an increase in punishment and the length of time 

 

5

The newly amended versions of sections 3000 and 3023 of title 15 of the California Code of 

Regulations now use the term “Security Threat Groups” to refer to gangs. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§§ 3000, 3023(c) (2014). 

Case 3:11-cv-06694-JST Document 19 Filed 02/02/15 Page 6 of 15
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Petitioner shall serve in custody. Petitioner shall have to serve the entire One year (1 year) and 

shall not receive the 15% credit he was guaranteed per the plea agreement.”). He argues that his 

workgroup reassignment in 2010 pursuant to California Penal Code section 2933.6 therefore 

violated his due process rights because it breached his plea agreement by depriving him of the 

guaranteed 15% credit. 

The state court rejected these claims, stating that any action to withdraw from Petitioner’s 

plea bargain must be brought in the court where he entered the plea. Since the state court declined 

to decide these claims on the merits, our review is de novo. See Lambert, 393 F.3d at 969 

(constitutional claim has been decided on the merits for the purposes of Section 2254(d) when the 

state court “has decided the petitioner’s right to post conviction relief on the basis of the substance 

of the constitutional claim advanced, rather than denying the claim on the basis of a procedural or 

other rule precluding state court review of the merits”).

Fundamental fairness of due process requires that promises made during plea bargaining 

be respected. See Johnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Santobello v. 

New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). Plea agreements are contractual in nature and subject to 

contract law standards of interpretation. In re Ellis, 356 F.3d 1198, 1207 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 

Fed. R. Crim. P 11(c)). In determining whether a plea agreement has been broken, courts look to 

what was reasonably understood by the parties to be the terms of the agreement. See Brown v. 

Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159–60 (2003). 

The only evidence in the record as to the terms of the plea agreement are the probation 

officer’s report, the judgment, and a declaration from James Fallman, Petitioner’s counsel during 

the 2007 proceedings. None of these documents support Petitioner’s assertion that he was 

guaranteed 15% time credit on his one-year sentence or, in essence, a sentence of 310.25 days. 

The probation officer’s report6and the judgment both reflect a one-year sentence to be served 

 

6

The probation report summarizes the plea agreement as follows: “On January 11, 2007, the 

defendant entered into a negotiated plea bargain with the District Attorney wherein he pled guilty 

to Possession of a Weapon, in violation of Section 4502(a) of the Penal Code, with the 

understanding that he would receive one third the middle term, or one year, to be served 

consecutive to any and all other sentences he is serving.” Docket No. 1, Ex. A.

Case 3:11-cv-06694-JST Document 19 Filed 02/02/15 Page 7 of 15
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

consecutive to any other sentences being served; neither document reflects a guarantee of 15% 

time credit. Docket #1, Ex. A and Docket #15, Ex. 1 at 1. Nor does the declaration from his 

public defender, James Fallman, support Petitioner’s claim. Fallman’s declaration states, in 

relevant part, that 

. . . Petitioner clearly told me he was bargaining for no more than 1 

year minus the 15% credits that he would earn. He told me he 

would not accept the bargain at 1 year if he was not going to be 

eligible for the 15% credits. I told him the law provided the ability 

to earn 15% credits on a strike related conviction even if strikes 

themselves, as here, were dropped for purposes of his guilty plea.

Docket #1 at 25. Fallman’s declaration does not discuss the terms of the plea agreement. Nor 

does Fallman make any statements about what the prosecutor understood to be the terms of the 

plea agreement.7 Fallman’s only declaration supports a finding that Petitioner sought eligibility to 

earn 15% time credit. 

Even putting aside the foregoing concerns, the record supports only a finding that 

Petitioner was bargaining for a one-year sentence and the ability to earn 15% time credits. The 

plea agreement has not been breached because Petitioner still has the ability to earn time credits —

he can be debriefed and released from SHU. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3378.1(a), (d) (current 

version at Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3378.5(a), (d) (amended October 17, 2014)). His current 

inability to earn time credits is not due to the government breaching the terms of his plea 

agreement, but rather a result of Petitioner’s own behavior, which has resulted in his validation as 

a gang member. See, e.g., Loredo v. Gipson, No. 1:13-cv-00250-LJD-BAM (HC) 2013 WL 

1281570 at *4 (E.D. Cal. March 25, 2013). In fact, the record indicates that prison officials have 

offered Petitioner multiple opportunities to debrief, and he has refused. Docket #15, Ex. 4. The 

 

7 A plea agreement is a form of contract. “It is a well-established principle of California contract

law that ‘the law imputes to a person the intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his 

words and acts’ based on ‘his outward expression’ and not ‘his unexpressed intent.’” Brown v. 

DIRECTV, LLC, No. CV 12-08382 DMG EX, 2013 WL 3273811, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 

2013) (citing Edwards v. Comstock Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1164, 1169 (1988). If Petitioner or 

his lawyer wanted to negotiate a plea agreement that guaranteed a certain amount of time credits, 

Petitioner’s lawyer needed to say so. There is no evidence he ever did. 

Case 3:11-cv-06694-JST Document 19 Filed 02/02/15 Page 8 of 15
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Court finds that Petitioner’s plea agreement has not been breached and that his workgroup 

reassignment does not violate his due process rights. 

C. Violation of Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution

Petitioner argues that California Penal Code section 2933.6 violates the Ex Post Facto 

Clause of the United States Constitution because it penalized him for events prior to 2010 (his 

2000 validation and related housing in SHU, and his 2007 revalidation and related SHU housing). 

Docket #1 at 16. Petitioner claims that applying section 2933.6 to him also violates the Ex Post 

Facto Clause because it resulted in the cancellation of previously earned credit. Docket #18 at 10. 

Petitioner also claims that the Classification Committee ordered that credits be restored to him and 

that the application of section 2933.6 either caused these credits to be cancelled or prevented the 

restoration of these credits. Id. There is no evidence in the record that any of Petitioner’s credits 

were cancelled. Docket No. 1, Ex. B at 3. The Court therefore only addresses Petitioner’s first 

argument — that section 2933.6 punishes him retroactively for his gang validation prior to 2010.

1. Clearly established Supreme Court law

Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution prohibits states from passing ex post 

facto laws. An ex post facto law is one that applies to events occurring before the law’s enactment 

and disadvantages the offender by altering the definition of the crime or increasing the punishment 

for the crime. Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997). The Supreme Court rulings discussing 

ex post facto challenges to laws potentially affecting the length of prisoners’ sentences can be 

summarized as follows:

An amendment making mandatory a sentence that was the 

maximum permissible under old law was an impermissible ex post 

facto law when applied to a person who committed his crime before 

the amendment. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937). An 

amendment forbidding prisoners from earning good conduct credits 

for six months after reincarceration following a parole violation was 

an impermissible ex post facto law for a prisoner who violated 

parole after the amendment but had been sentenced under the old 

law. Scafati v. Greenfield, 390 U.S. 713 (1968) (summary 

affirmance). An amendment that reduced the amount of good-time 

credits that could be earned was an impermissible ex post facto law 

when applied to a prisoner whose crime was committed before the 

Case 3:11-cv-06694-JST Document 19 Filed 02/02/15 Page 9 of 15
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

amendment was enacted. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981). 

An amendment that presented at most a speculative potential of a 

longer confinement (by increasing intervals between parole hearings 

for inmates most unlikely to be paroled) did not violate the Ex Post 

Facto Clause. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995). 

An amendment taking away accumulated provisional credits was an 

impermissible ex post facto law because it lengthened a period of 

incarceration for person sentenced under the old law. Lynce v. 

Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997).

Nevarez v. Lewis, No. C 12-1912 SI (PR), 2012 WL 3646895, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2012). 

2. Lower federal courts take differing approaches

The question is whether California Penal Code section 2933.6 is being applied to Petitioner 

for his 2006 gang validation and subsequent SHU housing assignment or whether, as Respondent 

alleges, section 2933.6 is being applied to Petitioner for his current, ongoing, post January 2010 

prison gang membership. Lower federal courts have taken differing approaches in applying 

Supreme Court law when resolving Ex Post Facto Clause claims regarding time credits. 

Some federal courts have considered the relevant date to be the date of the in-prison event. 

This approach generally results in no ex post facto violation being found. Cases that use the inprison event as the relevant date for determining retrospectivity and the punishment include 

Hunter v. Ayers, 336 F.3d 1007, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2003) (using date of prison misconduct as 

relevant date for analysis of amendment to law regarding credit loss and restoration); Ellis v. 

Norris, 232 F.3d 619, 620–21 (8th Cir. 2000) (state court’s decision that repeal of statute that had 

allowed prison officials discretion to award additional good-time credits did not violate Ex Post 

Facto Clause was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 

law—prisoner received all the accrued extra good-time credits and only lost the ability to be 

awarded additional good-time credits); Abed v. Armstrong, 209 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 2000) 

(administrative directive adopted ten years after petitioner was sentenced that disallowed goodtime credits for inmates classified as Security Risk Group Safety Threat Members; “unlike Lynce

and Weaver, the Directive was not applied retroactively” to petitioner because no good-time credit 

earned before the Directive was forfeited and petitioner was not so classified until after the 

Directive was in effect).

Case 3:11-cv-06694-JST Document 19 Filed 02/02/15 Page 10 of 15
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Other federal courts have considered the relevant date to be the date of the criminal 

offense, conviction or sentencing. This approach is more likely to result in a finding of an ex post 

facto violation. Cases that use the date of the criminal offense, conviction or sentence as the 

relevant date for retrospectivity purposes include Moor v. Palmer, 603 F.3d 658, 664 (9th Cir. 

2010) (statute that was amended in 1997 to require a psychological review as a precondition for 

parole for offenses such as petitioner’s “was applied retroactively” to petitioner who had been 

convicted in 1994 at a time when a psychological review was not needed); Ellis v. Norris, 232 

F.3d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 2000) (State “concedes that the repeal of extra good-time credit applies 

retroactively, i.e., it applies to prisoners serving sentences imposed prior to the repeal, as well as to 

those serving sentences imposed afterwards”); Flemming v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 998 F.2d 721, 

724 (9th Cir. 1993) (application of amended parole regulation that was enacted after petitioner’s 

offenses to calculate petitioner’s sentence reduction “gives rise to the Supreme Court’s first 

‘critical element’ for an ex post facto violation”).

The split among the lower federal courts indicates that there is no clearly established 

Supreme Court law on the ex post facto analysis of in-prison events. Accord Nevarez, 2012 WL 

3646895, at *7. 

3. State Court Decision

The state court rejected Petitioner’s ex post facto claim and stated, in relevant part: “[Time 

c]redits are not a vested right; they must be earned by the inmate.” Docket #15, Ex. 8. It cannot

be said that the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s ex post facto claim was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

California Penal Code section 2933.6 is distinct from the legislative amendments at issue 

in the Supreme Court cases discussed above in subsection (1). For section 2933.6 to be 

applicable, a prisoner must actively engage in misconduct. In Lindsey, Greenfield, Weaver and 

Lynce, however, the new laws automatically lengthened the petitioners’ sentences without any 

action taken by the prisoners, either by changing the length of the sentence; limiting the prisoners’ 

Case 3:11-cv-06694-JST Document 19 Filed 02/02/15 Page 11 of 15
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

ability to earn good-time credits; or by cancelling credits. In Lindsey, the amended statute made 

mandatory a 15-year sentence for grand larceny. Under the old statute, 15 years had been the 

maximum sentence possible, but the courts had the discretion to sentence prisoners to a shorter 

term. The Supreme Court found an ex post facto violation when this amended statute was applied 

to a petitioner who had committed his crime before the statute’s amendment. Lindsey, 301 U.S. at 

400. In Greenfield, the amended statute prevented a prisoner from earning good conduct 

deductions for the first six months after his reincarceration following a parole violation. The 

Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s finding of an ex post facto violation when this amended 

statute was applied to a petitioner who had committed his crime before the statute’s enactment. 

Scafati v. Greenfield, 390 U.S. 713. In Weaver, the Florida legislature decreased the rate at which 

good-time credits could be earned. The Supreme Court found an ex post facto violation when this 

was applied to prisoners sentenced before the statute’s amendment because under the amended 

formula, a prisoner who performed satisfactory work and avoided disciplinary violations earned 

fewer good-time credits than he would have under the original formula. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 35. 

In Lynce, the Florida legislature passed a statute that cancelled overcrowding credits and applied 

the statute retroactively. The Supreme Court found an ex post facto violation, noting that the 

impact of the amended statute was not speculative; instead, the amended statute “made ineligible 

for early release a class of prisoners who were previously eligible — including some, like 

petitioner, who had actually been released.” Lynce, 519 U.S. at 446–47.

In Petitioner’s case, it is not his initial validation and placement in SHU that renders him 

ineligible for time credits. Rather, California Penal Code section 2933.6 applies to him because of 

his active and continuing gang membership. See, e.g., Nevarez v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 1124, 1128 

(9th Cir. 2014) (finding that section 2933.6 was triggered because of prisoner’s intervening 

conduct of continued gang affiliation and distinguishing section 2933.6 from the postconviction 

amendments in Weaver and Lynce) and Castlin v. Lewis, 2014 WL 897358, *7 (finding that

prisoner’s inability to earn good-time credits was based on his status as a gang member after 2010 

and distinguishing section 2933.6 from the postconviction amendments in Weaver and Lynce). In 

Case 3:11-cv-06694-JST Document 19 Filed 02/02/15 Page 12 of 15
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Lindsey, Greenfield, Weaver and Lynce, the petitioners could not recover their eligibility for a 

reduced sentence. Here, however, Petitioner can recover his eligibility to earn time credits if he 

successfully participates in the debriefing process. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3378.1(a), (d). 

In his traverse, Petitioner argues for the first time that he is incapable of being successfully 

debriefed because he was incorrectly validated as a prison gang member and therefore “has no 

information which would satisfy the respondents who must approve and/or validate him as a 

dropout . . . . Petitioner’s lack of knowledge about the gang is proven by Petitioner’s most recent 

gang status update of July 25, 2013, where no rule violation for gang participation or specific gang 

association knowledge on Petitioner’s part was used to revalidate/update his validation.” Docket 

#18 at 20–21 (sic). Since Petitioner has declined to be debriefed, Docket #15, Ex. 4 at 3, his 

conclusion that he could not be successfully debriefed is speculative. Moreover, the record 

reflects some evidence of ongoing, post 2010 misconduct by Petitioner. In 2013, prison officials 

relied on a 2012 updated Security Group Validation Review (CDCR Form 128B-2) to conclude 

that Petitioner is still an active prison gang member. Docket #15, Ex. 4 at 9. 

In addition, it appears that Petitioner’s ineligibility for early release is due to his own 

misconduct and not due to the workgroup reassignment. His 2010 sentencing calculation 

worksheet shows that he has been credited for the 446.81 days worth of time credits earned 

through January 25, 2010, but had also lost 630 days of credit, resulting in a net negative credit of 

183.19 days. Docket #1, Ex. B. 

Finally, as the state court decision recognized, California regulations have never created a 

right to time credits. The 2010 amendment of California Penal Code section 2933.6 prohibits 

prisoners placed in SHU upon validation as prison gang members or associates from earning 

sentence reduction credits pursuant to California Penal Code section 2933 (worktime credits)8or 

section 2933.05 (program credits).

9

 California Penal Code § 2933.6(a). Both sections 2933 

 

8 California Penal Code section 2933 provides that for every six months of imprisonment, a 

prisoner shall be awarded credits toward sentence reductions. 

9 California Penal Code section 2933.05 provides for the possibility of credit reductions for 

inmates who successfully complete specific program performance objectives for approved 

Case 3:11-cv-06694-JST Document 19 Filed 02/02/15 Page 13 of 15
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(worktime credits) and 2933.05 (program credits) state that credits are a privilege and not a right. 

Cal. Penal Code §§ 2933(c)10 and 2933.05(b).

11

 These statutes only provide prisoners “a 

reasonable opportunity to participate” in these sentence reduction programs. Cal. Penal Code 

§§ 2933(c) and 2933.05(b). Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, he did not have a vested right to 

time credits prior to the amendment of section 2933.6 pursuant to California law. Nor does the 

record support a finding that his plea agreement guaranteed him time credits, irrespective of his 

behavior in prison.

After carefully reviewing the law and the record, the Court concludes that the state court 

rejection of Petitioner’s ex post facto claim was not contrary to, and did not involve an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Nor was it based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court 

proceedings.

D. Certificate of Appealability

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a).

Petitioner has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and reasonable jurists would find debatable this Court’s assessment of 

Petitioner’s claim that his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause of the federal Constitution were 

violated when the amended version of California Penal Code section 2933.6 was applied to him. 

 

rehabilitative programming. 

10 “Credit is a privilege, not a right. Credit must be earned and may be forfeited pursuant to the 

provisions of Section 2932. Except as provided in subdivision (a) of Section 2932, every eligible 

prisoner shall have a reasonable opportunity to participate.” Cal. Penal Code § 2933(c) (West 

2014).

11 “Program credit is a privilege, not a right. Prisoners shall have a reasonable opportunity to 

participate in program credit qualifying assignments in a manner consistent with institutional 

security and available resources. Assignments made to program credit qualifying programs shall 

be made in accordance with the prisoner’s case plan, when available.” Cal. Penal Code 

§ 2933.05(b) (West 2014).

Case 3:11-cv-06694-JST Document 19 Filed 02/02/15 Page 14 of 15
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is 

GRANTED on Petitioner’s claim that applying the amended version of California Penal Code 

section 2933.6 to him violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause. No certificate of 

appealability is granted for Petitioner’s claim regarding his plea agreement. Petitioner is cautioned 

that the Court’s ruling on the certificate of appealability does not relieve him of the obligation to 

file a timely notice of appeal if he wishes to appeal.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED, and a 

certificate of appealability is GRANTED as to Petitioner’s claim that applying the amended 

version of California Penal Code section 2933.6 to him violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto 

Clause of the United States Constitution.

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 1, 2015

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

Case 3:11-cv-06694-JST Document 19 Filed 02/02/15 Page 15 of 15