Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01980/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01980-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 42:11603(b) Int'l. Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) - Judicial Remedies

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SALVATORE ALBANI,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIKA ALBANI,

Respondent.

Case No.: 15cv1980 BTM

ORDER 

On January 12, 2016, the Court granted Petitioner Salvatore Albani’s 

(“Salvo”) verified petition for the return of his daughter I.A. to Singapore. (ECF 

No. 67.) The Court subsequently ordered that Respondent Erika Albani (“Erika”)

return I.A. to Singapore within thirty days of the Court’s decision. Currently before 

the Court is Erika’s motion to stay the Court’s return order pending appeal and

for undertakings, (ECF No. 87), and the parties’ joint motion regarding 

undertakings (ECF No. 99). The Court also requested supplemental briefing on 

Petitioner’s prior request that the Court take judicial notice of a partial transcript 

from a state court proceeding. (ECF No. 90.) For the reasons discussed below,

the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s request for judicial notice and DENIES

Respondent’s motion to stay. Furthermore, the Court GRANTS the parties’ joint

motion regarding undertakings, but DENIES Erika’s motion for additional 

undertakings.

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I. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Prior to the Court’s decision in January, Salvo requested that the Court 

take judicial notice of a partial transcript from a state court proceeding. (See

Partial Tr., attached as Ex. 3 to Pet’r’s Resp. in Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot., ECF No. 

93.) In the state court proceeding, Erika requested a restraining order following 

an altercation with Salvo that took place during this proceeding. San Diego 

Superior Court Judge Pamela Parker denied Erika’s request, finding that the 

evidence presented after a four day trial did not meet the preponderance of the 

evidence standard required for a restraining order. (Partial Tr. 48:28-49:3.)

Although this Court declined to take judicial notice of the partial transcript 

as it pertained to the Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court 

finds the transcript relevant to Erika’s motion to stay the court’s return order for 

the reasons discussed below. See infra section II.B.4. Therefore, the Court 

GRANTS Salvo’s request.

II. MOTION TO STAY

A. Standard of Review

Courts are instructed to apply the four traditional stay factors when

considering whether to grant a motion to stay. Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 

1027 (2013). Courts must determine: (1) “whether the applicant has made a 

strong showing that [s]he is likely to succeed on the merits”; (2) “whether the 

applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay”; (3) “whether issuance of the 

stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding”; and 

(4) “where the public interest lies.” Id. (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434

(2009)). 

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B. Discussion

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Erika argues that she has a likelihood of succeeding on appeal. The Court 

disagrees. Some of the merit issues she raises are addressed below. 

(a) Domicile

At closing arguments, Erika’s attorney argued that Salvo’s domicile was 

San Diego, not Singapore, and that returning I.A. to Singapore was therefore

improper. 

In Hague Convention cases, if the “petitioner moves permanently to the 

same country as the abductor, the petition is moot because no effective relief 

remains for [the court] to grant.” Gaudin v. Remis, 379 F.3d 631, 636-37 (9th Cir. 

2004). In Gaudin, the court approved the use of domicile to determine whether or 

not a petitioner moved permanently to the United States. Id. at 637. The court 

defined domicile as a person’s “permanent home, where she resides with the 

intention to remain or to which she intends to return.” Id. at 636. The court also 

noted that, “domicile may be changed by being physically present in a new 

jurisdiction with the intent to remain there.” Id. at 636-37. Because the court 

found that the petitioner was not domiciled in the United States, the court held 

that the petitioner’s Hague petition was not moot. Id. at 638.

Here, the Court found that Salvo moved to Singapore with the intent to 

remain in Singapore for an indefinite period of time. See Factual Findings, 27-28. 

Salvo did not move permanently to San Diego at any time during the 

proceedings. In finding that Salvo moved to Singapore with the intent to remain in 

Singapore, the Court implicitly determined that Salvo’s domicile changed from 

San Diego to Singapore. Therefore, his petition is not moot.

(b) Habitual Residence

Erika argues that the Court mischaracterized or omitted evidence and 

erroneously found that the parties intended to move to Singapore when in fact 

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their intention was to return to San Diego after three to five years. Specifically, 

Erika argues that the statements she made to her family members and her 

employer, the conditions surrounding the move, and Salvo’s job status prior to 

the move present facts that point to the couple’s intent of returning to San 

Diego—not a settled intent to remain in Singapore indefinitely. 

The Court found as a fact that Salvo and Erika intended and understood 

that the move to Singapore would be long-term. Although Salvo’s initial 

employment status in Singapore was not tenured, the Court found that Salvo 

discussed tenure with his future (and now current) employer in Singapore, and 

relayed these discussions to Erika. The university and hospital in Singapore 

invested significant resources into moving Salvo’s practice, which the Court 

found as indicative of intent that the move be long-term. 

Moreover, although Erika told her former employer in San Diego that she 

would be returning in three to five years, the Court found that she was in fact

hedging her bets in the event that Salvo grew unhappy with his position in 

Singapore. Regardless of what she may have said, the Court found that her

intention and her understanding was that the move to Singapore was meant to 

be long-term. 

Finally, Erika argues that because the Albanis retained ties to the United 

States, their intention was to return. It is true that the Court found as fact that 

both Salvo and Erika retained personal and professional ties to the United 

States. See Factual Findings, 12-15. However, the Court concluded that these 

ties did not overcome the parties’ intention to move to Singapore for the indefinite 

future. Rather, any ties demonstrated the possibility that the parties might retire 

to San Diego at a later date. Id. at 30-31; see also Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 

1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Being habitually resident in a place must mean that 

you are, in some sense, ‘settled’ there—but it need not mean that’s where you 

plan to leave your bones.”).

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Erika questions how the Court could find that her intentions were different 

than her words. As the Court noted in its decision, the Court did not find much of 

Erika’s testimony credible. Rather, the Court relied on witness testimony that the 

Court deemed credible. The Court understands that other witnesses testified on 

behalf of Erika at trial and that a description of their testimony is absent from the 

Court’s decision. However, the Court considered all of the testimony and 

ultimately determined that testimony from many of Erika’s witnesses was either 

cumulative or not credible.

(c) Alleged Errors in the Court’s Factual Findings

On page 13 of the Factual Findings, the Court stated that the Albanis 

purchased a car in Singapore. However, according to Erika, the car was not 

purchased but leased. On pages 34 and 35 of the Factual Findings, the Court 

stated that, “[I.A.] spent formidable years in Singapore, where she lived a full and 

active life.” Erika is correct in pointing out that the Court meant “formative”, not 

“formidable”. 

Although the Court wishes to correct this error, the Court’s ultimate 

decision is not changed by the fact that the Albanis leased—not purchased—a 

car in Singapore. The Court concludes that Erika has not shown a likelihood of 

success on appeal.

2. Irreparable Injury to Erika

Erika argues that denying the stay will cause her irreparable injury because 

she is unable to return to Singapore on anything more than a tourist visa, she 

has no means of living and working in Singapore, and she has been I.A.’s 

primary caregiver.

As an initial matter, should Erika prevail on appeal, this Court will continue 

to have personal jurisdiction over Salvo. Thus, the Court may command Salvo to 

take action outside the United States, including returning I.A. for further 

proceedings. See Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1025. For the reasons set forth on the 

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record at the hearing on February 9, 2016, the Court finds that Salvo would obey 

an order to return I.A.

The Court recognizes that it will not be easy for Erika to move back to 

Singapore. However, given the Court’s ultimate conclusion—that Erika wrongfully 

removed I.A. from her habitual residence—the Court does not find that Erika’s 

potential financial difficulties amount to irreparable injury in light of the available 

judicial remedies to compel I.A.’s return should Erika succeed on appeal. See

Rehder v. Rehder, No. C14-1242RAJ, 2014 WL 7240662, at *7 (W.D. Wash. 

Dec. 19, 2014); see also Mendoza v. Silva, 987 F. Supp. 2d 883, 908 (N.D. Iowa 

2013). Furthermore, Salvo has agreed to honor the terms of the Deed of 

Separation should Erika return to Singapore—meaning Salvo will again pay Erika 

S$4,000 a month and agree to continue sharing equal custody. 

Proceedings brought under the Hague Convention are not custody 

proceedings, and the Court refuses to engage in a determination of whether 

Erika or Salvo is more fit as a parent. See Rehder, 2014 WL 7240662, at *7.

While Erika was likely I.A.’s primary caregiver during these proceedings, the 

parties shared custody of I.A. in Singapore, and Erika did not raise the grave risk 

defense at trial. Denying the motion to stay will not cause Erika irreparable injury.

3. Substantial Injury to I.A. and Salvo

Ultimately, “in every case under the Hague Convention, the well-being of a 

child is at stake . . . .” Chafin, 123 S. Ct. at 1027. Here, I.A. was removed from 

Singapore in July, the Court rendered its decision in January, and it is now 

February. Since July of last year, I.A. has been living with Erika in San Diego. 

The Court understands that I.A. has undoubtedly adjusted to living in the United 

States and that, should Erika succeed on appeal, I.A. will again be forced to 

move back across the Pacific Ocean. However, the harm caused by further 

delaying her return to Singapore outweighs any potential harm should she be 

required to return to the United States in the future.

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Likewise, Salvo has been away from his daughter for over six months. 

Staying the return order will substantially harm his ability to reconnect with his 

young daughter. Although Salvo has greater financial means than Erika to travel 

from Singapore to the United States, he has already been forced to take 

numerous trans-Pacific trips in order to be physically present at the proceeding 

before this Court and the multiple actions filed by Erika in San Diego Superior 

Court.

Granting a stay pending Erika’s appeal would cause substantial harm to 

Salvo and I.A.

4. Public Interest

The purpose of the Hague Convention is to prevent the use of international 

borders to obtain custody during domestic disputes by securing the prompt return 

of children wrongfully removed from their State of habitual residence. See Hague 

Convention, Oct. 24, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-11 (“Treaty 

Doc”), art. 1, § a. “The Convention and ICARA demonstrate a public interest in 

expeditious resolution of petitions for return of children, ‘for the sake of the 

children who find themselves in such an unfortunate situation.’” Mendoza, 987 F. 

Supp. 2d at 909 (quoting Chafin, 133 S. Ct at 1027). 

As noted above, the Court takes judicial notice of a partial transcript from a 

state court proceeding before San Diego Superior Court Judge Pamela Parker. 

In denying Erika’s request for a restraining order, Judge Parker questioned 

Erika’s credibility. Specifically, Judge Parker noted that Erika’s testimony alleging

physical violence from Salvo changed over the course of the proceedings. 

(Partial Tr. 46:8-13.) Moreover, Judge Parker opined that Erika’s previous 

request for a domestic violence restraining order was both not credible and a 

“possible strategic move to keep the child away from the father.” (Partial Tr. 

46:16-20.) 

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Just as Judge Parker viewed Erika’s requests for a restraining order as 

both not credible and an attempt to manipulate the proceedings in order to keep 

Salvo away from I.A., the Court is convinced that her actions here demonstrate a 

similar pattern. The Court did not find much of Erika’s testimony credible. 

Furthermore, the Court is concerned that, in seeking an appeal, Erika is

manipulating the judicial system in order to prolong her time with I.A. 

Granting a stay in this case would be adverse to the purpose of the Hague 

Convention in securing the prompt return of children wrongfully removed from 

their habitual residence. The public interest in upholding the purpose of the 

Hague Convention favors denying Erika’s request for a stay.

C. Conclusion

Applying the factors to this case, Erika’s motion to stay must be denied. 

First, Erika has not made a showing that she is likely to succeed on the merits of 

her appeal. Second, Erika would not suffer irreparable harm absent a stay 

because this Court will continue to have personal jurisdiction over Salvo. Third, 

further delay will only frustrate I.A.’s ability to adjust back to her life in Singapore, 

and would continue to prevent Salvo from exercising his rights as a father. 

Finally, the purpose of the Hague Convention—securing the prompt return of 

children wrongfully removed—supports denying the stay. Because the factors 

favor returning I.A. to Singapore during the appeal, Erika’s motion to stay the 

Court’s return order pending appeal is DENIED.

III. MOTION FOR UNDERTAKINGS

The parties filed a joint motion for undertakings stipulating that, when Erika 

returns I.A. to Singapore, the parties will comply with the Deed of Separation. 

Erika’s motion also requested additional undertakings for attorneys’ fees for the

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custody proceedings in Singapore, and that Salvo post a bond to ensure 

compliance.

Additional undertakings are not proper in this case because Erika did not 

raise a grave risk defense at trial. Undertakings allow “courts to conduct an 

evaluation of the placement option and legal safeguards in the country of habitual 

residence to preserve the child’s safety while the courts of that country have the 

opportunity to determine custody of the children within the physical boundaries of 

their jurisdiction.” Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 219 (1st Cir. 2000). As such, 

undertakings provide courts with a tool “to comply with the Convention’s strong 

presumption of a safe and speedy return of the wrongfully removed child.” 

Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2002).

Erika did not argue the grave risk defense at trial. The Court has not 

received any evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, see 22 U.S.C. § 

9003(e)(2)(A), that returning I.A. to Singapore will result in a grave risk of harm to 

her well-being. As such, it would be improper to impose additional undertakings 

on Salvo following the Court’s determination that I.A. was wrongfully removed 

from his custody. See also Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 21 (“The court entertaining the 

petition must recognize the limits of its authority and must focus on the particular 

situation of the child in question in order to determine if the undertakings will 

suffice to protect the child.”).

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the parties’ joint motion stipulating 

that the parties comply with the terms of the Deed of Separation, but DENIES

Erika’s motion for additional undertakings.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court ORDERS as follows: 

(1) Petitioner’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED; 

(2) Respondent’s motion to stay the Court’s return order is DENIED; 

(3) Respondent’s motion for additional undertakings and bond is 

DENIED;

(4) the parties’ joint motion regarding undertakings is GRANTED.

The Court is aware that Erika has filed a notice of appeal. Although the 

Court denies Erika’s motion to stay, the Court is inclined to delay the return order 

in order to provide the Ninth Circuit with an opportunity to review this decision 

while I.A. remains in San Diego. However, Erika must act immediately to 

minimize any harm to I.A. caused by further delaying her return to Singapore.

Therefore, Erika must request a stay from the Ninth Circuit by 12:00 p.m.

on Tuesday, February 16, 2016. Assuming she complies, the Court will extend 

the return order until February 26, 2016. On that date, unless ordered otherwise

by the Ninth Circuit, the Court ORDERS that Erika return I.A. to Singapore.

Should Erika fail to meet the filing deadline, she must return I.A. to 

Singapore forthwith. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 11, 2016

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