Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00351/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00351-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

SIERRA NEVADA FOREST

PROTECTION CAMPAIGN, SIERRA

CLUB, and LASSEN FOREST

PRESERVATION GROUP, 

Plaintiffs,

NO. CIV. S-06-00351 FCD DAD

v.

LAURIE TIPPIN, in her official

capacity as Forest Supervisor

of the Lassen National Forest,

BERNARD WEINGARDT, in his

official capacity as Regional

Forester; and UNITED STATES

FOREST SERVICE, 

Defendants.

__________________________/

Sierra Pacific Industries,

Proposed Defendant/

Intervenor

__________________________/

----oo0oo----

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1 Defendants have not filed a response to applicant’s

motion to intervene.

2 Because oral argument will not be of material 

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

See E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

3 The facts provided are for considered only for the

purposes of applicant’s motion to intervene.

2

This matter is before the court on a motion to

intervene filed by applicant Sierra Pacific Industries (“SPI” or

“applicant”). Plaintiffs oppose applicant’s intervention in the

liability portion of the litigation.1 For the reason’s set forth

below,2 applicant’s motion to intervene as a defendant is GRANTED

in part and DENIED in part. 

BACKGROUND3

On February 17, 2006, plaintiffs filed a complaint in this

court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based upon

alleged procedural violations of the National Environmental

Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the National Forest Management Act

(“NFMA”) in the Forest Service’s decision to approve the Creeks

Forest Health Recovery Project. (Compl., filed Feb. 17, 2006, ¶

1). On April 6, 2006, applicant SPI filed a motion to intervene

as a defendant in the action. (Applicant’s Mot. to Intervene,

filed Apr. 6, 2006 (“Mot. to Intervene”)).

SPI is a California corporation that has been awarded three

contracts by defendants United States Forest Service (“USFS”) in

relation to the Creeks Forest Health Recovery Project (the

“Project”) and is the high bidder on the fourth contract. (Decl.

of Mark Bosetti in Supp. of Applicant’s Mot. to Intervene

(“Bosetti Decl.”), filed May 12, 2006, ¶ 2). SPI seeks to

intervene in this matter because it asserts that it has a

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concrete interest in this case because it is a contractor on the

Project and because it has expended payments in the of $397,000

and bonds totaling over $116,800 in order to secure the timber

contracts. (Id. ¶ 3). SPI argues that it, its employees, and

its employees’ families will suffer enormous economic detriment

if the project is cancelled or delayed even temporarily. (Mot.

to Intervene at 2). SPI also seeks to intervene on the basis

that it owns approximately 2,040 acres that are within the

Project’s boundary, and many harvest units for the Project are

share a border with SPI timberlands. (Bosetti Decl. ¶ 4). SPI

argues that if the Project is cancelled or delayed, SPI

timberlands will be at increased risk of fire, disease, and

insects due to the close proximity. (Id. ¶ 5). Therefore, SPI

brings this motion for intervention as of right or,

alternatively, for permissive intervention. 

Plaintiffs do not object to SPI’s limited participation in

the case to address the appropriate remedy if plaintiffs prevail

on the merits. (Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. to Intervene

(“Opp’n”), filed May 2, 2006 at 2). However, plaintiffs oppose

SPI’s motion to intervene for all other purposes. (Id.) 

STANDARD

Rule 24 provides two grounds for intervention in federal

court: intervention as of right and permissive intervention. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (West 2006). 

Rule 24(a)(2) governs applications for intervention as of

right and provides: 

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to

intervene in an action . . . when the applicant claims

an interest relating to the property or transaction

which is the subject of the action and the applicant is

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so situated that the disposition of the action may as a

practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s

ability to protect that interest, unless the

applicant’s interest is adequately represented by

existing parties.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). In the absence of a statute conferring an

unconditional right to intervene, the applicant must demonstrate

that: (1) the application is timely; (2) the applicant has an

interest in the subject matter of the litigation; (3) absent

intervention, applicant’s interest will be impaired; and (4) the

existing parties inadequately represent the applicant’s

interests. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131

F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997). The focus of the court’s

inquiry should be the effect on the applicant, not on other

parties to the litigation. See 6 William Moore’s Federal Practice

3d Ed. § 24.03(1)(c) (2003). The rule is construed broadly in

favor of the applicants. Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58

F.3d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1995).

Applicants also may seek permissive intervention under Rule

24(b), which provides:

Upon timely application, anyone may be permitted to

intervene in an action . . . when an applicant’s claim

or defense and the main action have a question of law

or fact in common. . . . In exercising it discretion,

the court shall consider whether the intervention will

unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the

rights of the original parties. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). A court may grant permissive intervention

where the applicant demonstrates (1) independent grounds for

jurisdiction; (2) the motion is timely; and (3) the applicant’s

claim or defense, and the main action, have a common question of

law or fact. Wilson, 131 F.3d at 1308 (quotations and citation

omitted). Even if the applicant satisfies these requirements,

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the court has discretion to deny intervention based upon other

considerations relevant to the individual circumstances of the

case before it. See Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th

Cir. 1998); Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Unlike intervention as of right, permissive intervention focuses

on possible prejudice to the original parties to the litigation,

not the intervenor. See Moore’s Federal Practice 3d Ed. §

24.10(1)(2003).

In reviewing a motion to intervene, the court generally

should accept as true the allegations and evidence submitted by

the applicant. Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg,

268 F.3d 810, 819-20 (9th Cir. 2001). 

ANALYSIS

I. Intervention as of Right 

Plaintiff first asserts that it should be permitted to

intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

24(a). 

A. Timeliness

Timeliness is "the threshold requirement" for intervention

as of right. United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 588 (9th

Cir. 1990). If the court finds “that the motion to intervene was

not timely, [it] need not reach any of the remaining elements of

Rule 24.” Wilson, 131 F.3d at 1302 quoting United States v.

Washington, 86 F.3d 1499, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996). In determining

whether a motion is timely, the court considers: (1) the stage of

the proceedings; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the

reason for and length of the delay. United States ex rel.

McGough v. Covington Techs., 967 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1992). 

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“[A]ny substantial delay weighs heavily against intervention.” 

Wilson, 131 F.3d at 1302. (citations omitted). 

Here, the action was filed on February 17, 2006, and the

motion to intervene was filed on April 6, 2006. This motion was

brought at the outset of litigation, prior to the filing of any

response by the named defendants and prior to the issuance of a

pretrial scheduling order. See Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A., 995

F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding trial court’s finding

that application was timely where filed before defendant had

filed its answer). There is no evidence that intervention by

applicant will prejudice any existing party. Accordingly, the

court finds that applicant’s motion to intervene was timely

filed.

B. Interest in the Subject Matter

In addition to filing a timely motion, applicant must show

that it has an interest in the subject matter of the litigation.

Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir.

1983). 

Plaintiffs argue that applicant does not have a significant

protectable interest in its claims alleging violations of NEPA. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a]s a general rule, ‘the

federal government is the only proper defendant in an action to

compel compliance with NEPA.’” Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v.

Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Wetlands

Action Network v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 222 F.3d

1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000)). The rationale behind this rule is

that “because NEPA requires action only by the government, only

the government can be liable under NEPA. Because a private party

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can not violate NEPA, it can not be a defendant in a NEPA

compliance action.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). In

Wetlands, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that the general rule

prohibiting intervention applies in situations where the proposed

intervenor has been issued a permit or contract. 222 F.3d at

1114; see also Churchill County v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, 1083. 

However, where “injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs will have

direct, immediate, and harmful effects upon a third party’s

legally protectable interests,” that party demonstrates that it

has a significant protectable interest in the action. Forest

Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489,

1494 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit has explained that in

such cases, the appropriate course is to limit the private

party’s intervention to the remedial phase of the litigation. 

Wetlands, 222 F.3d at 1114; Churchill County, 150 F.3d at 1083. 

Plaintiffs’ first and second claims for relief allege

procedural violations of NEPA. Specifically, plaintiffs allege

that federal defendants failed to consider reasonable

alternatives and failed to take a hard look at the Project’s

environmental impact as required by NEPA. Because SPI is a

private party, it cannot intervene as a defendant in plaintiffs’

claims relating to the federal government’s alleged failure to

comply with NEPA.

However, SPI asserts that it has been awarded three

contracts relating to the Project and is the highest bidder on

the fourth contract. (Mot. to Intervene at 2). The Ninth

Circuit has explicitly held that ownership of projects that are

involved in various stages of planning and implementation are

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sufficient to constitute legally protectable interests for the

purpose of intervention as of right. Berg, 268 F.3d at 820

(“Contract rights are traditionally protectable interests.”). 

Because the Project’s implementation is threatened by plaintiffs’

claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, there is a clear

connection between applicant’s protectable interest in its

contracts and the relief sought by plaintiffs in the action. See

id. Thus, applicant has demonstrated a protectable interest that

could be affected by the remedial portion of the current

litigation. 

Plaintiffs also argue that applicant cannot intervene in its

claims for violations of NFMA for the same reasons that it cannot

intervene under NEPA. Plaintiffs’ NFMA claims allege that

federal defendants failed to ensure the viability and

distribution of wildlife that inhabit old forests and failed to

monitor wildlife populations and trends as required by NFMA. 

Like NEPA, NFMA requires only action by the government. 

Kootenai, 313 F.3d at 1108. As such, under the Ninth Circuit’s

rationale, only the government can be a defendant in a NFMA

compliance action. Therefore, applicant cannot intervene as a

defendant in plaintiff’s NFMA compliance claims. See Forest

Conservation, 66 F.3d at 1496. However, as addressed by the

court in relation to plaintiffs’ NEPA claims, SPI has asserted a

protectable interest in its contracts that could be affected by

the relief sought by plaintiffs. See id. 

C. Impairment of Applicant’s Interest

Applicant next must demonstrate that, absent intervention,

its interests in the litigation will be impaired. Id. at 822. 

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“If an absentee would be substantially affected in a practical

sense by the determination made in an action, he should, as a

general rule be entitled to intervene.” Id. (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 24 advisory committee’s notes). Applicant asserts that

if it is not allowed to harvest the timber this summer and fall,

SPI will face a severe shortage in it Quincy Mill, potentially

resulting in layoffs. (Mot. to Intervene at 5). As such, the

declaratory and injunctive relief requested by plaintiffs would

affect applicant’s interests. If the Project is not implemented

or even postponed, applicant’s interest in performing on the

awarded contracts with be both legally and practically affected. 

See Berg, 268 F.3d at 822. Thus, applicant has demonstrated that

its interests could be impaired by the remedial portion of the

current litigation. 

D. Adequacy of Representation

Finally, the applicant must demonstrate that the party on

whose side it seeks to intervene is not capable or willing to

make the intervenor’s arguments. See Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n, 58

F.3d at 1398. “The burden of making this showing is minimal.” 

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1025

(N.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 528). 

Applicant may satisfy this burden by demonstrating that the

representation of their interests may be inadequate. Trbovich v.

United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1971). The Ninth

Circuit 

considers three factors in determining the adequacy of

representation: (1) whether the interest of a present

party is such that it will undoubtedly make all of a

proposed intervenor’s arguments; (2) whether the

present party is capable and willing to make such

arguments; and (3) whether a proposed intervenor would

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offer any necessary elements to the proceeding that

other parties would neglect.

Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing

California v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 792 F.2d 775, 778 (9th

Cir. 1986)).

The named defendants in this action are government entities

and officials. These defendants do not have the same type of

vested economic interest in the litigation as SPI. (Mot. to

Intervene at 7). Therefore, because the named defendants have

different interests than SPI, if plaintiffs prevail, it is likely

that defendants will not advance the same arguments as applicants

in regards to potential remedies. See Berg, 268 F.3d at 824. 

Therefore, there is sufficient doubt about the adequacy of

representation to warrant intervention in the remedial portion of

the litigation. See id. (citations and quotations omitted). 

Because private parties are not proper defendants in actions

to compel compliance with NEPA or NFMA, to the extent that

applicants seek to intervene in the merits portion of the

litigation, applicant’s motion to intervene is DENIED. However,

because the four factor analysis under Rule 24(a) has been

satisfied as it relates to the injunctive relief sought by

plaintiffs, applicant is entitled to intervene as of right in the

remedial portion of the current litigation. Therefore,

applicant’s motion to intervene as of right, pursuant to Rule

24(a), is GRANTED in part. 

II. Permissive Intervention

Applicant also seeks permissive intervention pursuant to

Rule 24(b). In order to intervene permissively, applicant must

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prove that it meets three threshold requirements: (1) the court

has an independent basis for jurisdiction; (2) the motion is

timely; and (3) applicant shares a common question of law or fact

with the main action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Applicants have

satisfied the threshold requirements for permissive intervention. 

However, intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b) is within the trial

court’s discretion and must take into account the prejudice to

the original parties, including the potential for undue delay.

Applicant argues that, in the event that plaintiffs are

successful, there are issues of contractual remedies which

applicant should be heard on and which would be more fully

developed by its participation. (Applicant’s Reply, filed May

12, 2006, at 6). Applicant also argues that potential claims

could arise in the event that the sales are not cancelled, but

modified, through the disposition of this litigation and that the

court should have the benefit of SPI’s view. (Id.) These

arguments address applicant’s right to participate in the

remedial portion of the litigation, but do not address how

applicant’s participation would aid in the liability portion of

the litigation. Further, the gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaint

is that government defendants failed to meet their statutory

duties. Applicant does not contend, despite plaintiffs’

assertion to the contrary, that it was involved in the

administrative procedures that are the basis of plaintiffs’

claims. As such, SPI’s participation in the lawsuit would not

add any further clarity or insight into the liability portion of

the plaintiffs’ suit. 

/////

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Further, if applicant was allowed to address liability

issues under these circumstances, an absurd result could follow. 

See Western Watersheds Project v. United States Forest Serv.,

2005 WL 3244253, *1 (D. Idaho, Nov. 4, 2005). For example, if

the government defendants concede inadequacies in its management

of the Lassen National Forest or preparation of the Environmental

Impact Statement, SPI could argue to the contrary. See id.

However, the government defendants must make the final decision

as to whether to defend its own conduct, and if so, how that

defense will be made. See id. Applicant’s participation in the

liability portion of the litigation could potentially upset the

government defendants’ proper role in this case as well as

contribute to undue delay. Therefore, applicant’s motion to

permissively intervene in the merits portion of the litigation is

DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, applicant’s motion to

intervene is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Applicant’s

motion is GRANTED to the extent it seeks intervention limited

solely to the issues of remedy, and not for purposes of

liability. It is DENIED in all other respects. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 15, 2006.

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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