Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01339/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01339-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MARILYN DILLARD; STEPHEN

DILLARD individually; ELAINE

GARCIA as guardian ad litem

for CIERA DILLARD and ARIEL

DILLARD,

CIV. NO. 08-1339 FCD/GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

VICTORIA M. MORTON

ENTERPRISES, INC.; VICTORIA M.

MORTON, individually; SUDDENLY

SLENDER; SUDDENLY SLENDER

INTERNATIONAL; PERSONAL BEAUTY

UNLIMITED, INC.; RESEARCH

FOUNDATION FOR BIOCHEMISTRY

AND NUTRITION CORP.; PYRAMID

CONSULTING AND INVESTMENT CO.,

INC.; HOT TICKET ENTERPRISES,

INC.; DOES 1 through 100; and

ROES 101 through 200,

INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on the motion of defendants

Victoria M. Morton Enterprises, Inc., Victoria M. Morton,

Suddenly Slender, Suddenly Slender International, and Pyramid

Consulting and Investment Co., Inc. (“defendants”) to dismiss and

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1 Defendants Personal Beauty Unlimited, Inc., Research

Foundation for Biochemistry and Nutrition Corp., and Hot Ticket

Enterprises, Inc. have been dismissed without prejudice. (Order

for Dismissal of Certain Defs., filed Aug. 12, 2008). 

2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

3 The background facts are derived from plaintiffs’

complaint, filed April 7, 2008 (“Compl.”).

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strike plaintiffs’ complaint, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(f).1 Plaintiffs Marilyn Dillard,

Stephen Dillard, Ciera Dillard, and Ariel Dillard ("plaintiffs")

oppose the motion. For the reasons set forth below, defendants’

motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend in the respects set forth

below.2 

BACKGROUND3

On or about June 18, 2004, plaintiff Marilyn Dillard entered

into a Start-Up License and Distribution Agreement with

defendants to sell their products and to provide body wraps to

clients through her home business. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-13). 

Defendants’ products purportedly aided in weight loss,

anti-aging, and toxin removal. (Id. ¶ 13). For the body wraps,

Marilyn Dillard mixed powders, including the Slender Tone

Solution Powder, Slender Tone with MSM, and Gold Water with

Reverse Osmosis Water, to create solutions to soak in bandages. 

(Id.) When mixing the powders, clouds of dust were present

allowing plaintiffs to inhale the dust particles. (Id.) 

In or about July 2004, defendants represented to Marilyn

Dillard that these products, once mixed with water, were so safe

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to the human body that one could drink them. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14). In

fact, Marilyn Dillard drank some of the liquid mix at the

recommendation of defendants while attending their training in

Florida. (Id. ¶ 14). However, after performing three body

wraps, Marilyn Dillard developed extreme flu-like symptoms. 

(Id.) She subsequently suffered a variety of health problems,

including chronic vaginal yeast infections and a miscarriage in

November 2004. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17). To this day, Marilyn Dillard

alleges that she suffers from chronic flu-like symptoms that

medical professionals have been unable to treat. (Id. ¶¶ 19,

24). As a result, she is unable to perform body wraps and

operate her business other than in a very limited capacity. (Id.

¶ 20).

In or about August 2006, Marilyn Dillard learned for the

first time that the United States Food and Drug Administration

(“FDA”) received complaints about the Slender Tone Solution

Powder, Gold Water, and/or related products causing illnesses in

body wrap customers. (Id. ¶ 21). Additionally, a 2001 Florida

Department of Health Establishment Inspection Report found that

defendants’ creation, manufacture, design, sale and distribution

of its products violated federal regulations. (Id. ¶ 22). Among

the violations were (1) failure to maintain batch records; (2)

failure to maintain adequate manufacturing records; (3) failure

to maintain a distribution system of each product to facilitate a

recall; (4) failure to maintain a written testing program to

assess stability characteristics of products; and (5) failure to

maintain master and control records with a complete list of

components. (Id.) 

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Plaintiff Stephen Dillard was first exposed to defendants’

products in his home. (Id. ¶ 31). Since being exposed to

defendants’ products, he has experienced chronic and acute flulike symptoms, chronic skin lesions, and hypersensitivity, all of

which have not responded to antibiotics. (Id. ¶ 32).

Plaintiff Ciera Dillard was approximately three years old

when her mother Marilyn Dillard first began working with

defendants’ products in their home. (Id. ¶ 25). At times, Ciera

assisted her mother in mixing defendants’ powders and was also

physically present in the preparation of body wrap solutions. 

(Id. ¶ 25). Following exposure to defendants’ products, Ciera

began experiencing extreme flu-like symptoms and empyema. (Id. ¶

26). In October 2004 and September 2005, Ciera was hospitalized

for pneumonia. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27). She continues to suffer from

acute flu-like symptoms, gastrointestinal issues, and

hypersensitivity. (Id. ¶ 28). On average, Ciera sees a

physician on a monthly basis for breathing problems and chest

pain. (Id.)

Plaintiff Ariel Dillard was approximately six years old when

she was first exposed to defendants’ products in her home. (Id.

¶ 29). Since being exposed to defendants’ products, Ariel

experiences chronic and acute flu-like symptoms, extreme throat

irritations, forgetfulness, memory loss, reduced dexterity, and

hypersensitivity, which antibiotics have failed to resolve. 

On April 7, 2008, plaintiffs filed a complaint in Sacramento

County Superior Court alleging the following causes of action:

(1) strict products liability, (2) products liability for

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4 Within the complaint, plaintiffs erroneously cite to

their second cause of action as “Products Liability-Negligence”;

however, this is a typographical error and the second cause of

action should instead be for “Products Liability-Manufacturing

and Design Defect”. (Pls.’ Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss & Mot. to

Strike (“Opp’n”), filed Sept. 5, 2008, 16:2-3).

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manufacturing and design defect,4

 (3) products liability for

failure to warn, (4) fraud, (5) products liability for

negligence, and (6) negligence per se. On June 12, 2008,

defendants removed the case to this court on the basis of

diversity jurisdiction.

Defendants now seek to dismiss plaintiffs’ first, second,

third, fifth, and sixth claims because the two-year statute of

limitations applying to those claims have expired. Defendants

also seek to dismiss plaintiffs’ sixth claim on the ground that

California does not recognize negligence per se as an independent

cause of action. Further, defendants seek to dismiss plaintiffs’

fourth claim because it fails to allege fraud with particularity

as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).

In addition, defendants seek to strike the allegations in

paragraphs 22 and 23 of plaintiffs’ complaint because they do not

constitute proper pleading as the allegations bear no relation to

plaintiffs’ substantive claims. Finally, defendants seek to

strike plaintiffs’ fifth claim as redundant of their second

claim.

STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

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every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that the

plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the

defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not

been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v.

Calif. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Moreover, the court “need not assume the truth of legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United

States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1986).

Ultimately, the court may not dismiss a complaint in which

the plaintiff alleged “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

127 S. Ct. 1955, 1973 (2007). Only where a plaintiff has not

“nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible,” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. “[A] court

may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could

be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent

with the allegations.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.

506, 514 (2002) (quoting Hudson v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

73 (1984)). 

B. Motion to Strike

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) enables the court by

motion of a party or by its own initiative to “order stricken

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from any pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent,

or scandalous matter.” The function of a 12(f) motion is to

avoid the time and expense of litigating spurious issues. 

Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993),

rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994); see also 5A Wright &

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 2d § 1380 (1990). 

Rule 12(f) motions are generally viewed with disfavor and

not ordinarily granted, because they are often used to delay, and

because of the limited importance of the pleadings in federal

practice. Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1478 (C.D.

Cal. 1996). A motion to strike should not be granted “unless it

is clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible

bearing on the litigation.” Lilley v. Charren, 936 F. Supp. 708,

713 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, Inc.,

758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991)).

ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants seek to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint on three

separate grounds: (1) Marilyn and Stephen Dillard’s products

liability and negligence claims are barred by the statute of

limitations; (2) plaintiffs’ negligence per se claim is not

recognized as an independent cause of action under California

law; and (3) plaintiffs have failed to allege their fraud claim

with particularity as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

9(b).

1. Statute of Limitations

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ products liability

and negligence claims because the statute of limitations had

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expired when plaintiffs filed their complaint in April 2008. 

With respect to Marilyn Dillard, defendants argue that the

statute of limitations accrued in July 2004 when Marilyn Dillard

experienced extreme flu-like symptoms after performing three body

wraps. (Defs.’ P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss & Mot. to

Strike (“Motion”), July 18, 2008, 9:5-10; Compl. ¶ 14). As to

Stephen Dillard, defendants argue that there are no facts alleged

in the complaint supporting a date of injury within the two-year

limitations period or supporting delayed accrual of the claims. 

(Motion 10:24-25). As a result, defendants seek to dismiss

Marilyn and Stephen Dillard’s products liability and negligence

claims. 

California Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 provides a

two year statute of limitations period for “an action for . . .

injury to . . . an individual caused by the wrongful act or

neglect of another.” For tort actions, the general rule is that

a cause of action accrues when the wrongful act is done and not

when a plaintiff discovers he or she has a cause of action to

pursue. Moreno v. Sanchez, 106 Cal. App. 4th 1415, 1423 (2003)

(citing Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal.

3d 176, 187 (1971)). Nevertheless, California law also

recognizes the discovery rule, which postpones accrual of a cause

of action until the plaintiff discovers or has reason to discover

the cause of action. Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 40

Cal. 4th 623, 634 (2007). A plaintiff has reason to discover a

cause of action when he or she has reason at least to suspect a

factual basis for its elements. Id. Under the discovery rule,

suspicion of one or more of the elements of a cause of action,

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5 Section 338(d) provides a three year statute of

limitations for “an action for relief on the ground of fraud or

mistake. The cause of action in that case is not deemed to have

accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts

constituting the fraud or mistake.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §

338(d).

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coupled with knowledge of any remaining elements, will generally

trigger the statute of limitations period. Id. (citing Fox v.

Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal. 4th 797, 806-807 (2005)). 

However, the statute of limitations may be tolled when a

defendant makes fraudulent misrepresentations or conceals a cause

of action from a potential plaintiff. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §

338(d).5

When a motion to dismiss is based on the running of the

statute of limitations, it can be granted only if the assertions

of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not

permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled. 

Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980)

(citing Leone v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 599 F.2d 566, 567

(3d Cir. 1979)). With respect to Marilyn Dillard’s claims, the

complaint sets forth sufficient facts to indicate that the

statute of limitations was tolled for her products liability and

negligence claims. Defendants argue that the statute of

limitations began to run in July 2004, after Marilyn Dillard

performed three body wraps and subsequently developed extreme

flu-like symptoms. However, plaintiffs allege facts to establish

that the statute of limitations was tolled due to defendants’

fraudulent misrepresentations concerning the safety of their

products. (See Opp’n 6:21-23). Plaintiffs allege that beginning

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in June 2004, defendants represented their products were

“completely healthy and safe and posed no risk to consumers”. 

(Compl. ¶ 58). Marilyn Dillard alleges she relied on those

misrepresentations, and it was not until August 2006 that she

first learned about FDA complaints regarding defendants’

products. (Opp’n 9:21-24; Compl. ¶¶ 21, 37). These complaints

involved the Slender Tone Solution Powder, Gold Water, and/or

related products causing illnesses in body wrap customers. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 21-22). Thus, viewing the complaint with liberality,

and accepting plaintiffs’ August 2006 date as the time of

discovery as true, plaintiffs have timely filed these claims on

behalf of Marilyn Dillard. Therefore, defendants’ motion to

dismiss Marilyn Dillard’s products liability and negligence

claims is DENIED.

With respect to Stephen Dillard, defendants argue that the

complaint is silent as to when he was first exposed to

defendants’ products, the date of his alleged injuries, or any

other necessary facts to show that the statute of limitations has

not expired. (Motion 11:2-7). Indeed, Stephen Dillard merely

alleges that he was exposed to defendants’ products in his home,

and thereafter experienced “chronic and acute flu-like symptoms,

chronic skin lesions and hypersensitivity.” (Compl. ¶¶ 31-32). 

The complaint gives no further details as to the time of Stephen

Dillard’s exposure to defendants’ products or any injuries

resulting therefrom. Thus, on the face of the complaint, Stephen

Dillard’s allegations are deficient to determine if his claims

are barred by the statute of limitations. Although the court is

bound to give plaintiffs the benefit of every reasonable

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inference on a motion to dismiss, it is not required to assume

that plaintiffs can prove facts that have not been alleged. See

Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, 373 U.S. at 753 and Associated Gen.

Contractors of Calif., Inc., 459 U.S. at 526. Because the

allegations in the complaint are unclear as to the timeliness of

Stephen Dillard’s injuries, the court grants defendants’ motion

to dismiss Stephen Dillard’s products liability and negligence

claims. 

However, the court grants plaintiffs leave to amend their

complaint to correct these deficiencies. Pursuant to Rule 15(a),

“leave [to amend] is to be freely given when justice so

requires.” “[L]eave to amend should be granted unless amendment

would cause prejudice to the opposing party, is sought in bad

faith, is futile, or creates undue delay.” Martinez v. Newport

Beach, 125 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir. 1997). Defendants make no

such showing here. Thus, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff

Stephen Dillard’s products liability and negligence claims as

untimely is GRANTED, but plaintiffs are given leave to amend.

2. Negligence Per Se

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs' negligence per se

claim because it is not an independent cause of action under

California law. Defendants are correct that negligence per se is

an evidentiary doctrine. Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr., 140 Cal.

App. 4th 1256, 1285-86 (2006) (“to apply negligence per se is not

to state an independent cause of action. . . . Instead it

operates to establish a presumption of negligence for which the

statute serves the subsidiary function of providing evidence of

an element of a preexisting common law cause of action”)

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(citations omitted). Therefore, negligence per se establishes a

presumption of negligence only when a viable claim for negligence

exists. Cal. Serv. Station & Auto. Repair Ass'n v. Am. Home

Assurance Co., 62 Cal. App. 4th 1166, 1178 (1998) (citing

Sierra-Bay Fed. Land Bank Ass’n. v. Superior Court, 227 Cal. App.

3d 318, 333 (1991)). 

Negligence per se has been codified in California Evidence

Code section 669, which provides that the failure of a person to

exercise due care is presumed if:

(1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a

public entity; (2) The violation proximately caused death or

injury to person or property; (3) The death or injury

resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute,

ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4)

The person suffering the death or the injury to his person

or property was one of the class of persons for whose

protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was

adopted.

Therefore, Evidence Code section 669 “merely codifies the rule

that a presumption of negligence arises from the violation of a

statute which was enacted to protect a class of persons of which

the plaintiff is a member against the type of harm that the

plaintiff suffered as a result of the violation.” Quiroz, 140

Cal. App. 4th at 1285 (citing Peart v. Ferro, 119 Cal. App. 4th

60, 80 n.11 (2004)). 

Accordingly, a claim for negligence per se cannot stand on

its own. Plaintiffs must present a viable negligence claim in

their complaint before the presumption of negligence may apply. 

Because plaintiffs adequately assert a products liability claim

based on negligence (their fifth cause of action), negligence per

se may be properly alleged, as a theory of liability, in order to

show that defendants failed to exercise due care. However,

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plaintiffs may not separately plead negligence per se as an

independent cause of action. 

Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’

negligence per se claim is GRANTED. However, the court finds

that the substantive allegations supporting the negligence per se

claim shall be treated as incorporated into the fifth cause of

action because negligence per se is a viable theory of liability

relating to plaintiffs’ products liability claim based on

negligence. 

3. Fraud

Defendants argue that plaintiffs fail to specify the alleged

misrepresentations made to Stephen, Ciera, and Ariel Dillard and

their justifiable reliance resulting from any misrepresentations. 

(Motion 6:17-19). In addition, defendants argue that the

particularity requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)

is not satisfied because plaintiffs do not specify which

defendant made the alleged misrepresentations. (Motion 7:17-21). 

As a result, defendants contend the complaint fails to inform

them of the basic nature and grounds of the fraud claim asserted

by plaintiffs Stephen, Ciera, and Ariel Dillard, and thus, the

fraud claim as to these plaintiffs should be dismissed. (Motion

8:5-6). 

Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that “[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances

constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with

particularity.” In order to comply with the requirements of Rule

9(b), the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud “must be

‘specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular

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misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so

that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that

they have done anything wrong.’” Bly-Magee v. California, 236

F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Neubronner v. Milken, 6

F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993)). “Averments of fraud must be

accompanied by ‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ of the

misconduct charged.” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d

1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d

616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997)). The plaintiff “must set forth more

than the neutral facts necessary to identify the transaction. 

The plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about a

statement, and why it is false.” Id. (quoting Decker v. GlenFed,

Inc., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis in original).

In a diversity case, the substantive elements of fraud are

determined by state law. See Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317

F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003). However, those elements must be

pled with particularity as required by Rule 9(b). Id. The

elements of a cause of action for misrepresentation or fraud

under California law are: “1) a misrepresentation (false

representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); 2) knowledge of

falsity (or scienter); 3) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce

reliance; 4) justifiable reliance; and 5) resulting damage.”

Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 979, 990

(2004) (citing Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638

(1996)). 

First, with respect to the fraud claims asserted by Stephen,

Ciera, and Ariel Dillard, these plaintiffs may allege fraud by

virtue of the alleged misrepresentations made by defendants to

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Marilyn Dillard. The California Supreme Court, in Randi W. v.

Muroc Joint Unified School District, 14 Cal. 4th 1066 (1997),

held that a third party could claim fraud for physical harm

resulting from misrepresentations made to another party. In

Randi W., the minor plaintiff was sexually assaulted by her

vice-principal and sued the defendant school districts for, inter

alia, fraud. Randi W., 14 Cal. 4th at 1071, 1073. The plaintiff

alleged that the defendants had written favorable letters of

recommendation for the vice-principal, despite having knowledge

about his past incidents of sexual misconduct and impropriety,

which resulted in the vice-principal's hiring at the plaintiff's

school. Id. at 1071-72. The court determined that the

defendants owed the plaintiff “a duty not to misrepresent the

facts in describing the qualifications and character of a former

employee, if making these misrepresentations would present a

substantial, foreseeable risk of physical injury to the third

persons.” Id. at 1081. In reaching this conclusion, the court

relied on section 310 of the Restatement Second of Torts, which

provides:

An actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to another

for physical harm which results from an act done by the

other or a third person in reliance upon the truth of the

representation, if the actor (a) intends his statement to

induce or should realize that it is likely to induce action

by the other, or a third person, which involves an

unreasonable risk of physical harm to the other, and (b)

knows (i) that the statement is false, or (ii) that he has

not the knowledge he professes.

The court determined that section 310 applied to “cases in which

third persons are endangered by [a] misrepresentation.” Id. at

1084. 

Similarly in this case, Stephen, Ciera, and Ariel Dillard do

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not allege that defendants made any direct misrepresentations to

them. Rather, the complaint alleges only misrepresentations by

defendants to Marilyn Dillard regarding the health and safety of

defendants’ products. Plaintiffs assert that defendant Victoria

Morton, individually and on behalf of other defendants,

represented that defendants' products for "weight loss, inch

loss, ‘toxin’ removal, and skin tightening/firming were so safe

that consumers and licensees could drink the products.” (Compl.

¶ 57). These representations were made to Marilyn Dillard at 

mandatory training sessions and seminars she attended for new

licensees in June 2004. (Id.) However, plaintiffs allege that

defendants knew as far back as 2000 that such statements were

false because of complaints received about their products. (Id.

at ¶¶ 21-22, 62). Pursuant to the decision in Randi W.,

defendants may be liable to third parties, i.e., Stephen, Ciera,

and Ariel Dillard because they were endangered by defendants’

alleged misrepresentations regarding the safety of their

products. Therefore, because plaintiffs allege that defendants’

misrepresentations were false in light of defendants’ knowledge

about the FDA and Department of Health violations, plaintiffs

have adequately pled misrepresentation.

Second, contrary to defendants’ protestations, Stephen,

Ciera, and Ariel Dillard have adequately pled the reliance

element of a fraud claim. In Randi W., the court addressed

whether the plaintiff had adequately pled reliance because she

did not actually rely on the recommendation letters; instead, the

plaintiff’s school had relied on the letters in hiring the

vice-principal. Randi W., 14 Cal. 4th at 1084. The court

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concluded that the defendants had allegedly made

misrepresentations that resulted in physical harm to the

plaintiff by reason of an act done by the plaintiff’s school,

i.e., hiring the vice-principal, in reliance on the truth of the

positive representations included in the recommendation letters. 

Id. Therefore, the court held the plaintiff did not need to

plead her actual reliance on the recommendation letters since her

injuries resulted from “action that the recipient of defendants’

misrepresentations took in reliance on them.” Id. at 1085.

The facts of Randi W. are analogous to the facts of this

case. Defendants argue that Stephen, Ciera, and Ariel Dillard

have failed to demonstrate any justifiable reliance resulting

from defendants’ alleged misrepresentations. As in Randi W.,

these plaintiffs did not actually rely on the defendants’

misrepresentations as to the safety of defendants’ products;

however, Marilyn Dillard allegedly relied on these 

misrepresentations in exposing her family to defendants’ products

in her home. As a result of the exposure, Stephen, Ciera, and

Ariel Dillard claim that they suffered physical harm such as

extreme flu-like symptoms and hypersensitivity to defendants’

products. Therefore, Stephen, Ciera, and Ariel Dillard do not

need to plead actual reliance on defendants’ alleged

misrepresentations because their injuries resulted from action

that Marilyn Dillard took in using and exposing her family to 

defendants’ products in her home, in reliance on the safety of

defendants’ products. Thus, defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiffs' fraud claim with respect to Stephen, Ciera, and Ariel

Dillard is DENIED.

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 In addition, defendants argue that plaintiffs fail to

specify which defendant made the alleged misrepresentations. 

However, plaintiffs have alleged the subject misrepresentations

were made by Victoria M. Morton, individually and on behalf of

each defendant. (Compl. ¶¶ 57-58). Plaintiffs also allege that

misrepresentations were made during defendants' training sessions

and seminars and in their written literature. (See id.) Because

this information is sufficient to give each defendant notice of

the fraud charged, Rule 9(b) is satisfied.

Thus, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ fraud claim

is DENIED.

B. Motion to Strike

Defendants move to strike paragraphs 22 and 23 of

plaintiffs’ complaint, discussing a Florida Department of Health

Establishment Inspection Report and various FDA violations

regarding defendants’ products, because they contain incomplete

and immaterial allegations. Defendants argue that these

paragraphs do not supply background or historical information

relevant to plaintiffs' claims. However, to find a matter

“immaterial” requires that it have no bearing on the claims for

relief being pleaded. See Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d

1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, Fogerty v.

Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 521 (1994). Here, paragraphs 22 and

23 support plaintiffs’ assertion of a presumption of negligence

based on defendants’ alleged violations of federal statutes. As

discussed, the court dismisses plaintiffs’ negligence per se

cause of action; however, the court does not preclude plaintiffs

from relying on a negligence per se theory with regard to their

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negligence claim based on products liability. Because paragraphs

22 and 23 are relevant to establish a presumption of negligence

under a negligence per se theory, the court denies defendants’

motion to strike allegations in the complaint material to that

theory.

Defendants also move to strike plaintiffs’ fifth claim for

“Products Liability-Negligence” as redundant because it mirrors

plaintiffs’ second claim for “Products Liability-Negligence”. A

“redundant” matter is one that consists of allegations that

constitute a needless repetition of other averments or which are

foreign to the issue to be denied. Wilkerson v. Butler, 229

F.R.D. 166, 170 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Gilbert v. Eli Lilly

Co., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 116, 121 (D. P.R. 1972)). In the body of

plaintiffs’ complaint, both the second and fifth claims are

labeled as “Products Liability-Negligence”; however, the content

of the allegations in those claims is not duplicative. Indeed,

the caption of the complaint correctly identifies plaintiffs’

second claim as “Products Liability (Manufacturing and Design

Defect)” and plaintiffs’ fifth claim as “Products Liability

(Negligence)”. Plaintiffs acknowledge the body of the complaint

contains a typographical error and request leave to amend. 

(Opp’n 15:26-27). However, the court recognizes this error here

and does not require plaintiffs to amend their complaint. The

court will read plaintiffs’ second cause of action as pleading a

products liability claim based on manufacturing and design

defect, and plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action as pleading a

products liability claim based on negligence. 

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Therefore, defendants' motion to strike paragraphs 22 and 23

of the complaint and plaintiffs' fifth claim for “Products

Liability-Negligence” is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff Stephen

Dillard’s products liability and negligence claims as

untimely is GRANTED with leave to amend. In all other

respects as to the timeliness of these claims,

defendants’ motion is DENIED.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ negligence

per se claim is GRANTED.

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ fraud claim

is DENIED.

4. Defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 22 and 23 of

plaintiffs’ complaint and plaintiffs’ fifth claim for

products liability based on negligence is DENIED.

Plaintiffs shall file and serve their first amended

complaint within 20 days of the date of this Order. Defendants

shall have 30 days after service thereof to file their response.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 7, 2008 

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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