Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01318/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01318-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Luis Gutierrez-Valencia, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-12-01318-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before this Court is Petitioner’s amended petition for writ of habeas 

corpus (“Petition”). Magistrate Judge Duncan issued a Report and Recommendation 

(“R&R”) recommending that the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 

28) because it is barred by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s 

(“AEDPA”) statute of limitations. 

I. Factual Background

 The R&R summarized the factual background and procedural history and 

Petitioner did not object to this history. (Doc. 28 at 1-3; Doc. 29). The Court adopts the 

R&R’s history in this case. 

 Specifically, on October 29, 2002, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of 

sexual conduct with a minor and one count of attempted sexual conduct with a minor. 

(Doc. 28, Ex. A at 1-2). The trial court imposed consecutive terms of imprisonment 

totaling 89 years. (Doc. 28, Ex. B at 1-3). As the R&R further recounted: 

Following the September 18, 2003 Arizona State Court of 

Case 2:12-cv-01318-JAT Document 31 Filed 05/05/14 Page 1 of 8
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Appeals memorandum decision affirming his convictions and sentences, and the issuance of a mandate on November 3, 

2003, Gutierrez-Valencia petitioned for review on December 

19, 2003 (Doc. 20, Exh F, G). On January 22, 2004, the court of appeals vacated the mandate (Id., Exh H). On April 16, 2004, the court of appeals revisited jurisdiction in the superior court for an evidentiary hearing to explain “a typographical error and/or omission in the record” regarding the polling of 

the jury (Id., Exh I). Although the minute entry stated that all twelve jurors were polled, the transcript indicated that only 

eleven jurors had been polled (Id.). 

 On April 21, 2004, the court of appeals directed the superior court to take such action “as may be necessary to enable it to determine whether all twelve jurors were polled as to their concurrence in the verdict at trial” (Id., Exh J). On 

June 11, 2004, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing, and on August 2, 2004, issued a detailed minute entry, with findings of fact and conclusions of law. Specifically, the trial court found that “the jury stated (en masse) that these were 

their true verdicts, one and all” (Id., Exh K, L, M). Following supplemental briefing, the court of appeals issued a 

supplemental memorandum decision on December 16, 2004 

affirming the convictions and sentences (Id., Exh N-R). 

 On January 28, 2005, Gutierrez-Valencia petitioned 

for review; on September 27, 2005 the supreme court denied review (Id., Exh S, T). On November 1, 2005, the court of 

appeals issued its mandate (Id., Exh V, W). On October 31, 

2005, Gutierrez-Valencia filed a Notice of Post-Conviction 

Relief; on November 4, 2005, the trial court dismissed the 

notice as untimely (Id., Exh V, W). On September 13, 2006, Gutierrez-Valencia filed a subsequent Notice of Post- Conviction Relief (Id., Exh X). On April 4, 2007, appointed counsel filed a Notice of Completion of Post-Conviction 

Review, informing the trial court that he had reviewed the 

record and was unable to find any claims for relief to raise in a post-conviction proceedings (Id., Exh Y). On May 25, 2007, Gutierrez-Valencia filed a supplemental Rule 32 

memorandum (Id., Exh Z). On October 4, 2007, the trial 

court summarily dismissed Gutierrez-Valencia’s petition, 

finding that he had failed to state a colorable claim (Id., Exh 

BB). On October 31, 2007, he petitioned for review; on September 26, 2008, the court of appeals denied review (Id., Exh CC, DD). On March 7, 2009, Gutierrez-Valencia filed a 

motion for reconsideration in the court of appeals (Id., Exh 

EE). In response, the Clerk of the Court at Arizona Court of 

Appeals sent him a letter informing him that his case had 

been terminated on November 17, 2008, and that the Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure did not permit a motion seeking 

reconsideration of the denial of a petition for review (Id., Exh 

FF). Gutierrez-Valencia filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus on June 19, 2012, and his Amended Petition on November 20, 

2012 (Doc. 19). 

Case 2:12-cv-01318-JAT Document 31 Filed 05/05/14 Page 2 of 8
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(Doc. 28 at 2-3). 

II. R&R

 On October 16, 2013, the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R recommending that 

this Court deny the Petition as barred by the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. (Id. at 1-6). 

The AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. (Id. at 3 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2))). “For 

a state prisoner in Arizona who does not seek review through a petition for writ of 

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, the judgment becomes final 90 days 

from the date on which the Arizona Supreme Court denies review, the date that the time 

for seeking such review expires, ‘whether or not a petitioner actually files a petition.’” 

(Id. (citing Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999))). 

 Starting with statutory tolling, the Magistrate Judge explained that on December 

26, 2005, 90 days after the Arizona Supreme Court denied review, Petitioner’s conviction 

became final. (Id. at 4 (citing Bowen, 188 F.3d at 1158-59)). Therefore, the one-year 

limitations period began to run on that date and concluded on December 26, 2006. (Id.). 

The Magistrate Judge then noted, absent any statutory or equitable tolling, the Petition, 

filed nearly six years later, is untimely. (Id.). 

 In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner is entitled to statutory 

tolling while his October 31, 2005 Notice of Post-Conviction Relief was pending 

(October 31, 2005 – November 4, 2005). However, because that filing was denied by the 

state court as untimely, it was not properly filed and did not cause the AEDPA’s statute 

of limitations to be tolled. See Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 6 (2007). 

 Next, in the R&R, the Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner is entitled to 

statutory tolling for the time his second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief was pending 

(September 13, 2006 – September 26, 2008). It appears the state courts resolved this 

petition on the merits; therefore, the Court accepts the recommendation of the R&R that 

Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling for this time period. Even giving Petitioner an 

extra 6 days of tolling, the Magistrate Judge then concluded that Petitioner waited four 

Case 2:12-cv-01318-JAT Document 31 Filed 05/05/14 Page 3 of 8
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

additional years before filing his federal petition, which is well beyond the one-year 

limitations period. (Id.). 

 Turning to equitable tolling, the Magistrate Judge explained that Petitioner is 

entitled to equitable tolling only if he: (1) establishes that he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and (2) some extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a timely 

petition. (Id. (citing Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010))). The Magistrate 

Judge determined that Petitioner failed the first prong of the test because he initially 

waited “almost one year before filing a subsequent post-conviction petition, citing his 

need for assistance because of post-surgical limitations with his hand and a need for legal 

assistance.” (Id.). Once those proceedings were completed, he “waited four more years 

before filing his federal petition.” Id.

 Petitioner’s Petition states his federal habeas petition is untimely because: (1) 

medical conditions barred him from writing, (2) he required the use of a typewriter, (3) 

the paralegal was unwilling to assist him, and (4) he was locked down 24 hours a day 

with no access to legal materials. (Id. at 5). The Magistrate Judge notes the Petition was 

both hand written and typed, signifying his medical condition did not bar his preparation 

of the Petition. (Id.). Second, the Magistrate Judge cites a Ninth Circuit opinion stating, 

as an inmate, Petitioner has no federal right to the use of a typewriter. (Id. (citing 

Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. Of Corr., 776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1985))). The 

Magistrate Judge then addresses the third claim by stating the Rules of the Arizona 

Department of Corrections forbid paralegals from giving legal advice. (Id.). Finally, the 

Magistrate Judge finds that Petitioner’s lockdown status alone is not sufficient grounds 

for equitable tolling. (Id. (citing Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009))). 

As a result, the Magistrate Judge concludes Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

(Id.). 

III. Review of an R&R

 This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that 

Case 2:12-cv-01318-JAT Document 31 Filed 05/05/14 Page 4 of 8
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de 

novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). District courts are not required to conduct “any 

review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 

U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (emphasis added); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“the court shall make 

a de novo determination of those portions of the [report and recommendation] to which 

objection is made.”). 

 Petitioner has included additional evidence regarding his attempts to access legal 

materials and receive assistance from a paralegal in his objection to the R&R. The Court 

“has discretion, but is not required, to consider evidence presented for the first time in a 

party’s objection to a Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.” U.S. v. Howell, 231 F.3d 

615, 621 (9th Cir. 2000). However, “in making a decision on whether to consider newly 

offered evidence, the district court must actually exercise its discretion, rather than 

summarily accepting or denying the motion.” Id. at 622. Additionally, “in certain 

circumstances a district court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider new 

arguments or evidence proffered by a pro se habeas petitioner.” Sossa v. Diaz, 729 F.3d 

1225, 1231 (9th Cir. 2013). In this case, Petitioner filed objections to the R&R and 

submits additional evidence for consideration. The Court will exercise its discretion and 

consider Petitioner’s additional evidence. 

IV. The Petitioner’s Objections

 Petitioner claims he is entitled to an equitable exception from AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations because he was denied access to his legal files. (Doc. 29 at 1-4). In his 

objection to the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, Petitioner presents additional evidence that he 

was barred from filing a timely habeas petition. 

 Petitioner admits his one-year statute of limitations period began September 9, 

2008 and expired September 9, 2009 in the absence of a recognized exception. (Doc. 29 

at 2). He then argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling that would render his petition 

timely filed. 

Case 2:12-cv-01318-JAT Document 31 Filed 05/05/14 Page 5 of 8
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 To receive equitable tolling, “‘[t]he petitioner must establish two elements: (1) that 

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances 

stood in his way.’” Bryant v. Arizona Atty. Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(quoting Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006)). Additionally, 

Petitioner must show that ‘“the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of the 

untimeliness.”’ Id. (quoting Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

‘“[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest 

the exceptions swallow the rule.”’ Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799 (quoting Miranda v. Castro, 

292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

 Petitioner argues that he was deprived of his legal materials and was consequently 

unable to develop his habeas petition. (Doc. 29 at 3). However, Petitioner must bear the 

burden of showing his own diligence and that the hardship caused by lack of access to his 

materials was an extraordinary circumstance that caused him to file his petition late. 

Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005)). 

 While Petitioner provides copies of his numerous attempts to contact employees of 

the Arizona Department of Corrections in order to obtain his legal materials, his due 

diligence requirement is still not met. The Court will first summarize Petitioner’s 

relevant exhibits submitted with his objection to the R&R. 

 Petitioner first formally requested his legal materials in a December 29, 2008 

grievance to the Property Sergeant. (Doc 29 at 14-15). A day later the response from the 

Property Sergeant explained that all of Petitioner’s legal materials were not lost, as 

alleged, and were properly accounted for. (Id. at 15). His next request for materials took 

place on April 26, 2009; the Court cannot locate a response to that request in the record. 

Id.

The next exhibit relating to Petitioner’s legal materials is a response from the 

Maricopa County Clerk’s Office in which they explained they could not provide some or 

all of the legal materials requested but that Petitioner may contact an attorney for more 

Case 2:12-cv-01318-JAT Document 31 Filed 05/05/14 Page 6 of 8
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

information. (Id. at 21). On May 1, 2011, Petitioner requested legal materials from the 

prison warden; Petitioner has not submitted the response to that request to the Court. (Id. 

at 23). It appears sometime between the aforementioned request to the warden and a 

2012 order to show cause from the Maricopa County Superior Court, Petitioner was 

given his legal files on a compact disc (“CD”). There is no evidence in the record as to 

the outcome of the order to show cause. On March 23, 2012, Petitioner wrote a letter to a 

Legal Access Monitor requesting a way to view the CD that contained his legal files. (Id. 

at 27). The May 5, 2012 response states Petitioner was “approved to obtain a (“Lab 

Top”) [Sic.] at your own expense so you may review your CDs/DVDs.” (Id. at 29). 

 While Petitioner has been active in his pursuit of legal materials, he has not met 

his burden to show an extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing. The alleged 

lack of access to legal materials did not prevent a timely filing. To the contrary, 

Petitioner acknowledges he was able to draft the currently pending petition despite never 

having received the legal materials in a readable format. (Doc. 29 at 4). Thus, Petitioner 

could have filed the habeas petition at any point during the one-year statute of limitations. 

He makes no claim stating he is privy to more legal materials at the time he filed his 

objection to the R&R than he was in 2008. 

 Further, Petitioner does not allege a complete lack of access to his legal file, only 

his being housed in lock down status in a maximum security facility. (Doc. 28 at 5). 

Petitioner has not provided this Court with any specific details regarding what legal 

materials he was seeking and how they would be of assistance in his habeas filing. 

Additionally, Petitioner does not dispute that his lock down status is an ordinary prison 

limitation. “‘Ordinary prison limitations on [an inmate’s] access to the law library’ are 

‘neither extraordinary’ nor ma[k]e it ‘impossible’ for an inmate to file his petition in a 

timely manner.” (Id. (citing Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 998)). 

 Petitioner also contends some of the broad purposes and policies behind the writ 

of habeas corpus and the one-year limitation period of the AEDPA are applicable. (Id. at 

4-5)). The United States Supreme Court requires that equitable tolling be used only to 

Case 2:12-cv-01318-JAT Document 31 Filed 05/05/14 Page 7 of 8
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

protect diligent petitioners facing extraordinary circumstances that prevent them from 

timely filing habeas petitions. Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 559 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). Petitioner’s policy 

based assertions are not necessarily incorrect but the Court is not persuaded by the overly 

broad nature of such claims.1

 Thus, Petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to 

equitable tolling. As a result, the Court concludes that the Petition in this case is barred 

by the statute of limitations. 

V. Conclusion

 Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation is accepted and adopted 

(Doc. 28), the objections are overruled (Doc. 29), the Petition in this case is denied with 

prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, and 

pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court denies 

issuance of a certificate of appealability because dismissal of the Petition is based on a 

plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find this Court’s decision debatable 

or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

 Dated this 5th day of May, 2014. 

 

1

 For example, Petitioner states a purpose for a procedural bar is to ensure an 

inmate does not file successive and abusive petitions. (Doc. 29 at 5). Petitioner then 

argues that for the Court to rely mostly on the procedural bar not only would violate Petitioner’s right to file the petition but also allow the constitutional claims within the 

petition to go uncorrected. (Id.). 

Case 2:12-cv-01318-JAT Document 31 Filed 05/05/14 Page 8 of 8