Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-02337/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-02337-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

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Case No. 5:15-cv-02337-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MARK DAVIS,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

U.S. BANCORP D/B/A U.S. BANK HOME 

MORTGAGE, et al., 

 Defendants. 

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Case No. 5:15-cv-02337-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

(Re: Docket Nos. 7, 16) 

Defendant U.S. Bank National Association holds the beneficial interest in a deed of trust on 

a residential property in Hollister, California.

1

 The property belongs to Plaintiff Mark Davis,

2 and

Defendant U.S. Bancorp services that deed of trust.3 Defendants foreclosed on the property in 

2011 after Davis defaulted.4 In 2015, Davis filed suit, bringing various claims under California 

state law.5

 Defendants now move to dismiss Davis’ complaint.6 Because Davis has failed to plead 

 

1 See Docket No. 1-1, Ex. A, Complaint, at ¶ 3. 

2 See id. at ¶¶ 3, 9. 

3 See id. at ¶ 2. 

4 See id. at ¶¶ 15-17. 

5 See id. at ¶¶ 31-87. 

6

 Defendant Old Republic National Title Insurance Company moves separately to join in this 

motion to dismiss. See Docket No. 16. Old Republic’s motion is GRANTED. 

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any legally cognizable causes of action, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED, but with leave to 

amend.

I.

Davis’ complaint arises out of an adjustable-rate loan he took out on his property in 2006 

from Downey Savings and Loan Association.7 The deed of trust was eventually assigned to U.S. 

Bancorp, which recorded a notice of default against the property on September 2, 2011.8 No 

Defendant contacted him to explore foreclosure alternatives before recording the notice of default.9 

When Davis applied to modify the loan three years later, U.S. Bancorp did not acknowledge that he 

had submitted a complete application or even respond meaningfully to the application.10 Despite 

his efforts to reach an alternative resolution to foreclosure, U.S. Bancorp continues to pursue the 

foreclosure without giving him the opportunity to modify the loan.11

Davis filed the present suit in state court on April 20, 2015;12 it was removed to this court a 

month later.13

II.

This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. The 

parties further consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). 

As a preliminary matter, Defendants request that the court take judicial notice of various 

documents recorded in the San Benito County Recorder’s office.14 The court may take judicial 

 

7 See Docket No. 1-1, Ex. A, Complaint, at ¶ 10; Docket No. 1-1, Ex. B. 

8 See Docket No. 1-1, Ex. A, Complaint, at ¶¶ 14-15. 

9 See id. at ¶ 19. 

10 See id. at ¶ 20. 

11 See id. at ¶ 21. 

12 See Docket No. 1-1. 

13 See Docket No. 1. 

14 See Docket No. 8-1. 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

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notice of a “fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it is generally known” or “can be 

accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.”15 Davis has not objected to judicial notice of these documents except to note, 

correctly, that the court cannot assume the truth of the assertions these documents contain.16 The 

authenticity of the documents related to the deed of trust is not in dispute and may be verified by 

resort to the public record.17 The court, however, will not rely on facts contained within the 

documents that reasonably may be subject to dispute.18 Defendants’ request for judicial notice 

therefore is GRANTED as to all documents, with the caveats above. 

III.

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief.”19 When a plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face,” the complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted.20 A claim is facially plausible “when the pleaded factual content allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”21 Under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the 

absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”22 Dismissal with prejudice and 

without leave to amend is appropriate if it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by 

amendment.23

 

15 Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

16 See Docket No. 12 at 7. 

17 See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). 

18 See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding the district court erred 

in relying on disputed facts contained within documents that otherwise were the proper subject of 

judicial notice); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

20 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

21 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). 

22 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

23 See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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At this stage of the case, the court must accept all material allegations in the complaint as 

true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.24 The court’s review is 

limited to the face of the complaint, materials incorporated into the complaint by reference and 

matters of which the court may take judicial notice.25 However, the court need not accept as true 

allegations that are conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact or unreasonable inferences.26

Against these standards, none of Davis’ six causes of action survive. 

First, Davis claims that U.S. Bancorp violated Cal. Civ. Code § 1921(b) by failing to 

provide him with descriptive information about adjustable-rate mortgages.27 Defendants raise four 

separate arguments against Davis’ cause of action under Section 1921(b), including that none of 

the Defendants was the original lender, that the statutory provision did not create a private right of 

action, that the statute is preempted and that the statute of limitations has expired. Davis conceded 

this claim in his opposition to the motion to dismiss. 

Second, Davis claims that U.S. Bancorp’s failure to contact him regarding foreclosure 

alternatives before recording the notice of default violated Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2923.5 and 2924.28 

Here, too, Davis has failed to state a claim. As an initial matter, the California Legislature updated 

this provision as part of the Homeowner’s Bill of Rights, which took effect on January 1, 2013.29 

As the court has noted in other cases, HBOR does not apply retroactively,30 and the notice of 

 

24 See Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). 

25 See id.

26 See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 561 (“a wholly conclusory statement of [a] claim” will not survive a motion to 

dismiss).

27 See Docket No. 1-1, Ex. A, Complaint, at ¶¶ 31-37. 

28 See Docket No. 1-1, Ex. A, Complaint, at ¶¶ 38-47. 

29 See Rockridge Trust v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 

30 See Andre v. Bank of America, N.A., Case No. 15-cv-02888, 2014 WL 6895240, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

Dec. 5, 2014). 

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default at issue here was recorded in 2011.31 The court must therefore conclude that Davis intends 

to bring a claim under the previous version of Section 2923.5 that was superseded by HBOR.

Any claim under that version of the statute, however, is now barred by the statute of 

limitations. California law imposes a three-year statute of limitations for causes of action created 

by statute.32 In general, “the statute of limitations begins to run upon a present right to sue.”33 The 

version of Section 2923.5 at issue here required U.S. Bancorp to contact Davis at least 30 days 

before filing a notice of default.34 The statutory provision implicitly created a private right of

action.35 Davis could have sued as soon as U.S. Bancorp violated the statutory right—in other 

words, when U.S. Bancorp recorded the notice of default without contacting him. The statute of 

limitations thus began to run in 2011, more than three years before Davis filed his complaint. 

Davis argues that the statute created an “ongoing” obligation for the lender,36 but he 

misinterprets the precedent that he cites. In Mabry, the California Court of Appeal held that the 

appropriate remedy for a violation of this statutory right was to postpone the foreclosure sale 

indefinitely until the required discussion occurred.37 But the fact that the remedy for a violation is 

the imposition of an indefinite obligation does not imply that the violation itself is ongoing. Davis’

interpretation would effectively render the statute of limitations meaningless for actions under 

Section 2923.5. Other courts in this district have read the statute in the same way.

38

 

31 See Docket No. 1-1, Ex. A, Complaint, at ¶ 15. 

32 See Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 338(a). 

33 Shewry v. Begil, 128 Cal. App. 4th 639, 645 (2005). 

34 See Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.5(a)(1) (effective January 1, 2010). 

35 See Mabry v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 4th 208, 214 (2010). 

36 See Docket No. 12 at 7. 

37 See Mabry, 185 Cal. App. 4th at 225. 

38 See, e.g., Dang v. Residential Credit Sols., Inc., Case No. 14-cv-02587, 2014 WL 5513753, at 

*5-6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2014); Zacharias v. U.S. Bank N.A., Case No. 14-cv-02186, 2014 WL 

4100705, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2014). 

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Third, Davis claims that the Defendants violated Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6 by refusing to 

consider his loan modification application.39 Section 2923.6 bars mortgage servicers, mortgage 

beneficiaries and their agents from recording a notice of sale while a borrower’s “complete” loan 

modification application is pending.40 It further provides that “an application shall be deemed 

‘complete’ when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with all documents required by the 

mortgage servicer within the reasonable timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.”41 In other 

words, the statute contemplates that the mortgage servicer may require documents from the 

applicant, and the application is only complete once the applicant has provided those documents.42 

Contrary to Davis’ assertion, the “reasonable timeframe” language applies only before the 

application is complete and refers to the time the applicant has to respond to the lender’s requests 

for documents.43

Given this legal standard, Davis’ complete application was not pending when the notice of 

sale was recorded. Davis submitted his application on December 3, 2014, the same day that the 

notice of sale was recorded.44 The copy of the application Davis attached to his complaint shows 

that he did not answer every question on the form.45 Moreover, he has not alleged that he attached 

any of the documentation that the servicer required. In the absence of such an allegation, the claim 

fails to meet the standards of Rule 12(b)(6). 

 

39 See Docket No. 1-1, Ex. A, Complaint, at ¶¶ 48-59. 

40 See Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6(c).

41 See id. § 2923.6(h). 

42 Cf. Valbuena v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 237 Cal. App. 4th 1267, 1274-75 (2015) (finding 

that the lender could require a loan applicant to submit additional documents before the application 

was complete, but that there was a triable issue of fact regarding whether the lender had provided a 

“reasonable timeframe” for the applicant to submit these documents).

43 See id.

44 See Docket No. 1-1, Ex. A, Complaint, ¶ 54; id. at Ex. A, Complaint, Ex. B. Defendants observe 

that the court may consider documents attached to the complaint in deciding whether a plaintiff has 

stated a viable claim for relief. See Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 

1987). Davis has not argued otherwise. 

45 See Docket No. 1-1, Ex. A, Complaint, Ex. B. 

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Fourth, Davis claims that U.S. Bancorp has not provided him with a single point of contact 

to discuss his loan modification, in violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.7(a).46 This statute requires 

that “upon request from a borrower who requests a foreclosure prevention alternative, the mortgage 

servicer shall promptly establish a single point of contact.”47 A “single point of contact” may be 

“an individual or team of personnel each of whom has the ability and authority to perform the 

responsibilities described” elsewhere in the statute.48 This provision “is intended to prevent 

borrowers from being given the run around, being told one thing by one bank employee while 

something entirely different is being pursued by another.”49

Davis has failed to plead enough facts to make out a claim under this statute. Davis has 

alleged that he was not “provided with direct means of communications” to a single point of 

contact and that “[a]ny purported SPOC assigned has been unresponsive to [Davis’] attempts at 

communication.”50 Davis further alleges that he “has tried to contact Defendant [U.S. Bancorp] 

and/or a SPOC since December 3, 2014, yet has been unable to do so” and that he “has been unable 

to speak to the same representative twice.”51 As Defendants point out, however, Davis also claims 

that he “has regularly updated the submitted application at all times material and at the specific 

request of Defendant” U.S. Bancorp,52 implying that he had at least some communication with 

Defendants. In any case, to the extent his allegations are consistent, Davis has only provided 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements.”53

 

46 See Docket No. 1-1, Ex. A, Complaint, at ¶¶ 60-66. 

47 Cal. Civ. Code. § 2923.7(a). 

48 Id. § 2923.7(e). 

49 Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 213 Cal. App. 4th 872, 905 (2013). 

50 Docket No. 1-1, Ex. A, Complaint, at ¶¶ 63-64. 

51 Id. at ¶ 65. 

52 Id. at ¶ 62. 

53 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

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Under Twombly and Iqbal, Davis must allege specifically his efforts to reach a single point 

of contact and Defendants’ failures to provide him with one. For example, Davis cites McFarland 

v. JP Morgan Chase, in which the Central District of California denied a motion to dismiss with 

respect to a claim under Section 2923.7.54 The plaintiff in that case alleged that she was transferred 

between multiple representatives and that none of them could perform the responsibilities of a 

single point of contact.55 She also alleged that she had to submit the same documents repeatedly 

and that the people she contacted did not know the status of her application.56 Other courts that 

have denied motions to dismiss claims under this provision have cited similarly specific 

allegations,

57 which are missing here. 

Fifth, Davis claims that he is entitled to an injunction against any foreclosure sale under 

Cal. Civ. Code § 2924.12(a).58 Because Davis has not asserted any viable claims under HBOR, he 

is not entitled to an injunctive remedy.

Sixth, and finally, Davis claims that all of these failures amount to negligence on the part of 

U.S. Bancorp.59 For the most part, California courts have held that a “financial institution owes no 

duty of care to a borrower when the institution’s involvement in the loan transaction does not 

exceed the scope of its conventional role as a mere lender of money.”60 Courts also have generally 

 

54 See Case No. 13-cv-01838, 2014 WL 4119399, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014). 

55 See id.

56 See id.

57 See, e.g., Johnson v. PNC Mortg., 80 F. Supp. 3d 980, 987-88 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (plaintiffs 

alleged being shunted to a hotline and later talking to a specific person who heard their complaints 

and promised to call back but did not); Penermon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 47 F. Supp. 3d 982, 

999 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (plaintiff alleged that a letter assigned him a person as a single point of 

contact, but that person did not answer his calls); Mann v. Bank of America, N.A., Case No. 13-cv02293, 2014 WL 495617, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2014) (plaintiffs alleged, including details of 

specific calls and dates, that they were repeatedly assigned to different single points of contact, had 

to repeat the details of their loans to all of these people and received contradictory information 

from them).

58 See Docket No. 1-1, Ex. A, Complaint, at ¶¶ 67-73. 

59 See id. at ¶¶ 74-87. 

60 Nymark v. Heart Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1096 (1991); see also Lueras 

v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 221 Cal. App. 4th 49, 63 (2013) (citing Nymark, 231 Cal. App. 

3d at 1096). 

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held that a “loan modification . . . falls well within a[n] institution’s conventional money-lending 

role.”61 Davis alleges that U.S. Bancorp has failed to review his complete loan modification 

application.62 The bank could not have acted as more than a conventional moneylender when it 

was doing even less. 

Davis argues that Alvarez v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., a recent case from a 

California appellate court,

63 throws a wrench into the conventional analysis. That court found that 

the HBOR was an example of “a rising trend to require lenders to deal reasonably with borrowers 

in default to try to effectuate a workable loan modification.”64 Accordingly, Alvarez held that 

lenders were bound by a duty “to exercise reasonable care in the review of [borrowers’] loan 

modification applications once [the lenders] had agreed to consider them.”65 Recognizing a split of 

authority, some courts have followed Alvarez and imposed such a duty.66

The court need not grapple with this split because Davis has not alleged that Defendants 

ever agreed to consider his application. All he alleges is that they “[held] themselves out to offer 

loan modification . . . and provid[ed] a means for [Davis] to submit applications and documentation 

for loan modification.”67 By contrast, in Alvarez, the plaintiffs alleged that “defendants ‘undertook 

to review’ plaintiffs’ loans for potential modification . . . and . . . having done so they owed 

 

61 Gonzalez v. Wells Fargo Bank, Case No. 12-cv-03842, 2012 WL 5350035, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 

29, 2012); see, e.g., Carbajal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Case No. 14-cv-07851, 2015 WL 

2454054, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2015); Casault v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 915 F. Supp. 2d 

1113, 1130-31 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Armstrong v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, Case No. 11-cv-05664, 

2012 WL 4747165, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2012); Settle v. World Sav. Bank, F.S.B., Case No. 11-

cv-00800, 2012 WL 1026103, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2012); Dooms v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. 

Corp., 2011 WL 1232989, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2011). 

62 See Docket No. 1-1, Ex. A, Complaint, at ¶¶ 75-78. 

63 228 Cal. App. 4th 941 (2014). 

64 Id. at 950 (quoting Jolley, 213 Cal. App. 4th 872 at 903). 

65 Id. at 944-45. 

66 See, e.g., Hatton v. Bank of Am., N.A., Case No. 15-cv-00187, 2015 WL 4112283, at *9-10 (N.D. 

Cal. July 8, 2015); Rijhwani v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., Case No. 13-cv-05881, 2015 WL 

3466608, at *22 & n.7 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2015). 

67 Docket No. 1-1, Ex. A, Complaint, at ¶ 82. 

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