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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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. FILBO 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Umted Sfate~ O:mrt of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

APR 2 5 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk CLARENCE KIMMET; KARA KIMMET, an 

infant by and through her father, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

and 

RUTH KIMMET, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DAVID RYAN; DIANE DENNISON; and 

ARAPAHOE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 

SERVICES, a department of social 

services for the State of Colorado, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 89-1095 

(D.C. No. 87-B-800) 

( D. Colo.) 

Before BRORBY, EBEL, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON**, District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Alan B. Johnson, District 

District Court for the District of 

designation. 

Judge, 

Wyoming, 

United States 

sitting by 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36. 3. 

Appellate Case: 89-1095 Document: 01019972484 Date Filed: 04/25/1990 Page: 1 
After . examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

This is an appeal from an order of the district court 

adopting the magistrate's recommendation and granting defendants' 

motion for summary judgment on the civil rights claims alleged in 

the complaint. We affirm. 

On May 5, 1986, two month old plaintiff-appellant Kara Kimmet 

stopped breathing, her baby sitter called an ambulance, and Kara 

was hospitalized on an emergency basis. Kara's diagnosis was 

retinal hemorrhages reflecting trauma, or ''shaken baby syndrome." 

Her doctors notified defendants-appellees of the possibility of 

child abuse or neglect. Defendant-appellee David Ryan began a 

child abuse investigation. At the time of discharge from the 

hospital, Kara was placed in a foster home pursuant to a valid 

state court order. After approximately two 

returned to her parents, plaintiff 

plaintiff-appellant Clarence Kimmet. 

months, Kara 

Ruth Kimmet 

was 

and 

In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged (1) defendants failed 

to properly investigate before taking custody of Kara, because 

there was no evidence the Kimmets were a danger to Kara and such 

action would be harmful to Kara, (2) Kara was poorly treated while 

in foster care, and (3) defendants were abusive to the Kimmets. 

Additionally, plaintiffs contended defendants deprived them of 

their liberty interest and right to keep their family together, 

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Appellate Case: 89-1095 Document: 01019972484 Date Filed: 04/25/1990 Page: 2 
right to privacy,- right to due process of- law, right to freedom 

from malicious prosecution, summary judgment and abuse of process, 

and right to reputation. 

The case was referred to the magistrate for disposition of 

plaintiffs' motion to strike two witnesses and for a 

recommendation after defendants filed a motion for summary 

judgment. The magistrate denied the motion to strike the 

witnesses. He determined the two witnesses, doctors who evaluated 

Kara, were not subject to the physician-patient privilege, because 

the privilege had been waived by statute, see Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 19-10-112 (repealed on October 1, 1987, and recodified as Colo. 

Rev. Stat. § 19-3-311), and was not reinstated by the lawsuit. 

Additionally, the magistrate concluded the doctors were fact 

witnesses, not experts. In considering defendants' motion for 

summary judgment, the magistrate recommended the motion be 

granted. After discussing Colorado law regarding child abuse or 

the dependency and neglect of a child, the magistrate determined 

the individual defendants' actions were protected by qualified 

immunity, if not by absolute immunity. The district court 

concluded the magistrate's recommendation was correct, approved 

the recommendation, and granted defendants' motion for summary 

judgment. 

Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we must consider 

a jurisdictional issue, which was briefed by the parties at the 

court's direction. The parties were asked to brief whether the 

notice of appeal is affected by Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 

108 S. Ct. 2405 (1988). The caption of the notice of appeal 

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states -"Clarence Kimmet, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ·· David Ryan, 

et al., Defendants." The text of the body of the notice of appeal 

states, in part, "Notice is hereby given that the plaintiffs 

hereby appeal .... " 

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) requires that the 

notice of appeal specify the parties appealing. Torres, 108 

S. Ct. at 2407 ("The failure to name a party in a notice of appeal 

is a failure of that party to appeal."). The use of et al. is 

insufficient under Rule 3(c) to provide notice of the identity of 

the appellants. Id. at 2409. Stating ''the plaintiffs appeal" is 

also insufficient to provide notice. Cf. Santos-Martinez v. SotoSantiago, 863 F.2d 174, 176 (1st Cir. 1988)("all plaintiffs 

appeal" insufficient under Torres). 

Because Clarence Kimmet is specifically listed in the notice 

of appeal, this court has jurisdiction over his appeal. See 

Johnson v. Trustees of the W. Conference of Teamsters Pension 

Trust Fund, 879 F.2d 651, 653 & n.l (9th Cir. 1989)(only party 

actually named in notice of appeal is appellant when et al. is 

used). There is, however, no jurisdiction over Ruth Kimmet, 

because she is not specifically named in the notice of appeal. 

See Mariani-Giron v. Acevedo-Ruiz, 877 F.2d 1114, 1116 (1st Cir. 

1989)(neither caption nor body of notice of appeal specified two 

of three parties); Meehan v. County of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 

105 (9th Cir. 1988)(use of et al. after one parties' name was not 

sufficient to indicate intent to appeal by two others); cf. Pope 

v. Mississippi Real Estate Comm'n, 872 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 

1989)(distinguishing Torres as referring to a large class of 

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Appellate Case: 89-1095 Document: 01019972484 Date Filed: 04/25/1990 Page: 4 
unnamed _ individuals as well as Torres, whereas in ·this case there 

were only two appellants and et al. could only refer to unnamed 

appellant). 

Even though Kara Kimmet was not specifically named as a party 

in the notice of appeal, we conclude we do have jurisdiction over 

her appeal. Her father and mother had initially sued in their 

individual and representative capacities. Thus, the concern in 

this case is not with the omission of a party from the notice of 

appeal, but with a party's failure to designate all of the 

capacities in which he brought suit. King v. Otasco, Inc., 861 

F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir. 1988). Because Kara was not suing as an 

independent party but instead was represented by her father, we 

have jurisdiction to review her claims. See id. 

On appeal, appellants first argue the district court erred in 

granting summary judgment without considering the basis for their 

claims and without making de novo findings. 28 u.s.c. 

§ 636(b)(l)(B) requires a district court to review de novo a 

magistrate's findings to which there is objection. See United 

States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674-75 (1980); Gee v. Estes, 829 

F.2d 1005, 1008 (10th Cir. 1987). Although the district court did 

not specifically address each of appellants' objections to the 

magistrate's recommendation, § 636(b)(l)(B) does not require it to 

do so. The district court stated it considered appellants' 

objections and approved the magistrate's recommendation. Such 

recitation was sufficient to satisfy§ 636(b)(l)(B). Contrary to 

appellants' suggestion, the district court did not err by failing 

to hold a hearing. 

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Second, appellants argue the district court erred in granting 

summary judgment on the merits. In reviewing a summary judgment 

order, "the appellate court applies the same standard employed by 

the trial court under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure." Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 

141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). Summary judgment may be entered when 

there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

56(c). 

Fed. R. Ci v. P. 

Appellants specifically argue summary judgment was 

inappropriate and the individual appellees were not entitled to 

qualified immunity because (1) the Constitution guarantees, 

through rights of privacy, liberty, and due process, the sanctity 

of the family and (2) the right to be free from coercion, threats, 

and attempts to obtain a confession by separating Kara from her 

parents was established in May, 1986. Also, appellants argue the 

appellee county department of social services is liable for the 

actions of the individual defendants due to an established 

departmental policy. · 

The doctrine of qualified immunity provides that 

government officials "generally are shielded from 

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 

does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 

haye known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 

102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The 

plaintiff has the burden of proving that the law was 

"clearly established." Pueblo Neighborhood Health 

Centers, Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 645 (10th Cir. 

1988); see also Lutz v. Weld County School Dist., 784 

F.2d 340, 342-43 (10th Cir. 1986). In order to satisfy 

this burden, the plaintiff may not merely identify in 

the abstract a clearly established right. "The contours 

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of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 

reasonable official would understand that what he is 

doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 

U.S. 635, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). 

Rozek v. Topolnicki, 865 F.2d 1154, 1157 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Thus, "the relevant question in the present case is whether a 

reasonable social worker could have believed that taking [Kara] 

and holding [her] in ... custody was lawful 'in light of clearly 

established law and the information' the socialworkers' 

possessed." Baker v. Racansky, 887 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 

1989)(quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641). Other than indicating 

there is an interest in family relations, appellants failed to 

prove any clearly established law has been violated. Although 

there is a liberty interest in family relations protected by due 

process, Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & 

Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977); Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 

1377, 1383 (10th Cir. 1989), the interest is limited by the 

government's interest in protecting minors, especially where 

protection from parents may be necessary. Myers v. Morris, 810 

F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987). 

Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say the individual 

defendants violated clearly established law by any of their 

actions. See Baker, 887 F.2d at 185-90 (taking child into 

protective custody); Whitcomb v. Jefferson County Dep't of Social 

Servs., 685 F. Supp. 745, 748 (D. Colo. 1987)(with regard to claim 

of intimidation, court failed to find any allegations of fact 

suggesting defendants prevented plaintiffs from exercising their 

constitutional rights). The district court correctly concluded 

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the individual. appelle.es are entitled to qualified immunity. See 

Watson v. City of Kan. City, 857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 

1988)(presence of fact disputes precludes granting summary 

judgment only if disputes are genuine and concern material facts). 

Appellants' arguments with regard to the appellee county 

department of social services are likewise without merit. 

Although the magistrate and district court did not make findings 

in this regard, appellants failed to prove any established policy 

or custom for threatening or coercing them or violating their 

constitutional rights. See Lux ex rel. Lux v. Hansen, 886 F.2d 

1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 1989). We conclude the district court 

correctly granted summary judgment for appellees. 

Appellants' final argument on appeal is that the district 

court erred in holding that the waiver of the medical privilege in 

the juvenile proceedings continued to this case thereby allowing 

appellees' attorney ex parte contact with the doctors. "The 

privileged communication between patient and physician ... shall 

not be a ground for excluding evidence in any judicial proceeding 

resulting from a report pursuant to this article." Colo. Rev. 

Stat. § 19-10-112 (repealed on October 1, 1987, and recodified as 

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-3ll)(emphasis added). 

conclude this argument is without merit. 

Accordingly, we 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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