Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02578/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02578-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kimberly Peters, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Shamrock Foods Company; 

U.S. Foodservice, Inc., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 03-02578-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Shamrock Foods Company’s (Shamrock)

Motion For Summary Judgment (doc. #41). The Court now rules on the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff filed an administrative charge with the EEOC on January 23, 2002,

alleging that due to her gender she was passed over for several positions in favor of less

qualified male employees. Those positions are: (1) wholesale manager; (2) food services

sales manager; (3) external marketing manager; (4) sales manager, food services and retail;

and (5) sales manager, food services and retail. The male employees allegedly promoted

over the Plaintiff are: (1) Joe Baca; (2) Matt Lewis; (3) Tim Kelly; (4) Stan Westphal; and

(5) Dave Cooper. 

On April 11, 2002, the Plaintiff filed a supplement to the January 23, 2002 EEOC

Charge of Discrimination, adding an allegation that she was passed over for the position of

Case 2:03-cv-02578-JAT Document 50 Filed 01/19/06 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

external marketing representative in favor of a less qualified male employee, Bob Bathey.

The Plaintiff's Amendment to her EEOC Charge of Discrimination also clarified the dates

the other allegedly discriminatory incidents took place. 

Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges: (1) the position of external marketing representative

was filled with a less qualified male employee in September of 2000; (2) the position of

external marketing manager was filled with a less qualified male employee in November of

2001; (3) the position of wholesale manager was filled with a less qualified male employee

in November of 2001; (4) the two sales manager, food services and retail positions were

filled with less qualified male employees in November of 2001; and (5) the position of food

services sales manager was filled with a less qualified male employee sometime in January

of 2002. 

On December 26, 2003, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the Defendants in the

United States District Court of the District of Arizona. On December 12, 2004, the Plaintiff

filed a First Amended Complaint alleging three counts: (1) gender discrimination and

retaliation under Title VII; (2) violations of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); and (3)

blacklisting under Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 23-1362. 

On March 17, 2004, Defendant Shamrock filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment. In its motion, the Defendant sought to have this Court

dismiss the Plaintiff's claims on the grounds that Counts One and Two of the Plaintiff's

Complaint are not timely, and that Count Three is unsubstantiated. However, because the

Defendant conceded in its Reply that Count One of the Complaint was timely, the Court only

considered the motion as it applied to Counts Two and Three. 

On June 18, 2004, the Court denied in part and granted in part Defendant Shamrock's

Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court denied the

Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Count One of the

Plaintiff's Complaint (gender discrimination). It granted summary judgment in favor of

Defendant Shamrock with respect to Counts Two and Three of the Plaintiff's Complaint

Case 2:03-cv-02578-JAT Document 50 Filed 01/19/06 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

(equal pay violations and blacklisting). Subsequently, on August 18, 2004, pursuant to

stipulation of the parties, this Court dismissed Defendant U.S. Foodservice, Inc. 

On August 19, 2004, the Court sent out its Rule 16 Scheduling Order. The scheduling

order states that each party is only allowed one motion for summary judgment. On April 29,

2005, Defendant Shamrock, without leave of court, filed a second Motion for Summary

Judgment on the claims remaining in Count One of the Plaintiff's Complaint. 

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the Defendant does not attempt to re-litigate

issues raised in its prior Motion for Summary Judgment. Additionally, the Plaintiff did not

object to the Defendant's filing of a second Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, in

the interest of limiting the issues for trial, the Court will consider the Defendant's motion on

the merits. 

The standard for summary judgment is set forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Under this rule, summary judgment is properly granted when: (1) no

genuine issues of material fact remain; and (2) after viewing the evidence most favorably to

the non-moving party, the movant is clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1987). The Court must

regard as true the non-moving party’s evidence, if it is supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1289.

However, the non-moving party may not merely rest on its pleadings, it must produce some

significant probative evidence tending to contradict the moving party’s allegations and

thereby creating a material question of fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

256-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14 (1986) (holding that the plaintiff must present affirmative

evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment); First Nat'l

Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592 (1968). 

A. Retaliation and Constructive Discharge

Case 2:03-cv-02578-JAT Document 50 Filed 01/19/06 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Count One of the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendant's

conduct "constitutes sexual discrimination and retaliation as prohibited by Title VII. The

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the claim of retaliation on the grounds that: (1)

the claim has already been dismissed by this Court; and (2) the Plaintiff's Complaint does not

allege a claim of retaliation relating to the denial of benefits. The Defendant also moves for

summary judgment on any gender discrimination claims based on an alleged constructive

discharge. The Defendant argues that: (1) the Plaintiff did not file an EEOC charge alleging

constructive discharge; and (2) there is no evidence in this case amounting to a constructive

discharge. 

The Plaintiff responds to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment by stating:

The First Amended Complaint states a single claim for relief for violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC 2000e et seq., for

employment discrimination by sex, to wit, disparate treatment - failure to

promote, in violation of 42 USC 2000e-2.

Response to Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment p. 3 (emphasis added). The

Plaintiff's Response makes no attempt to refute the Defendant's arguments as to why

judgment should be entered in favor of the Defendant with respect to the retaliation claim.

Similarly, the Plaintiff failed to address what facts in this case support a finding that the

Plaintiff's resignation on July 18, 2002, constitutes a constructive discharge. In fact, the

Plaintiff does not even mention a retaliation claim or a claim of gender discrimination based

on constructive discharge anywhere in her Response to the Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment. 

Because the Plaintiff's Response to the Defendant Motion for Summary Judgment

states that the Plaintiff only alleges a "single claim" of gender discrimination based on failure

to promote, and does not even attempt to argue the viability of any alleged retaliation or

constructive discharge claims, it is unclear to the Court whether the Plaintiff ever intended

to assert a claim of retaliation and/or constructive discharge, or whether the Plaintiff is now

voluntarily abandoning those claims. Regardless, a party opposing summary judgment may

not merely rely on the allegations in its complaint, it must produce some significant probative

Case 2:03-cv-02578-JAT Document 50 Filed 01/19/06 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

evidence tending to contradict the moving party’s allegations and thereby creating a material

question of fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505,

2513-14 (1986) (holding that the plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat

a properly supported motion for summary judgment); First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391

U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592 (1968). Because the Plaintiff has failed to come forward

with any facts or evidence that would indicate a material question of fact exists for trial,

summary judgment is granted in favor of the Defendant on the Plaintiff's claims of retaliation

and/or constructive discharge. 

Based on the above ruling, the Court need not address the Defendant's remaining

arguments with respect to the claims of constructive discharge and retaliation.

B. Discrimination based on gender

The remaining count in the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint alleges that the

Defendant failed to promote her on three separate occasions because she is a woman. The

Defendant moves for summary judgment on this claim on the ground that: (1) the Plaintiff

did not timely file an EEOC charge with respect to one of the three positions; (2) the

positions sought by the were not promotions and do not otherwise constitute an "adverse

employment action" for purposes of Title VII; (3) the Plaintiff was not "rejected" for a

position; (4) assuming the positions do qualify as promotions, the Defendant had a legitimate

non-discriminatory reason for failing to put the Plaintiff in those positions; and (4) the

Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence of pretext to withstand summary judgment.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff failed to timely file an EEOC Charge of

discrimination alleging her claim of failure to promote with respect to the position of external

marketing manager. Specifically, the Defendant contends that the Plaintiff did not file a

charge alleging this claim until approximately 500 days after the alleged promotion took

place. 

The statute of limitations for Title VII actions is 300 days prior to the filing of a state

administrative charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Hernandez v. Spacelabs Medical Inc.,

343 F.3d 1107, 1115 -16 (9th Cir. 2003). The Plaintiff filed an administrative charge with

Case 2:03-cv-02578-JAT Document 50 Filed 01/19/06 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

the EEOC on January 23, 2002. Therefore, incidents occurring prior to March 29, 2001, are

time-barred by Title VII. 

The Plaintiff filed an administrative charge with the EEOC on January 23, 2002,

alleging that, due to her gender, she was passed over for the position of external marketing

manager in favor of a less qualified male employee. In an April 11, 2002, supplement to the

January 23, 2002, EEOC Charge of Discrimination, the Plaintiff alleges that the position of

external marketing manager was given to a male employee, Tim Kelly, sometime in

November of 2001. This incident is within the statute of limitation period. However, the

supplement also states that the Plaintiff was passed over for the position of external

marketing representative, and that this position was given to Bob Bathey in approximately

September of 2000. This incident is outside the 300 day time limitation. Therefore, the

Plaintiff cannot base her claim of failure to promote based on the external marketing

representative given to Bob Bathey in September of 2000. 

Accordingly, the Court holds that the Plaintiff's failure to promote claim is limited to

the following incidents: (1) rejection of the Plaintiff for the position of external marketing

manager, in favor of a male employee, Tim Kelly, sometime in November of 2001; (2)

rejection of the Plaintiff for the position of wholesale manager in favor of a male employee,

Joe Baca, sometime in November of 2001; (3) rejection of the Plaintiff for the position of

sales manager, food services and retail in favor of a male employee, Stan Westphal

sometime in November of 2001; (4) rejection of the Plaintiff for the position of sales

manager, food services and retail in favor of a male employee, Dave Cooper, sometime in

November of 2001; and (5) rejection of the Plaintiff for the position of food services sales

manager, in favor of a male employee, Matt Lewis, sometime in January of 2002.

The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff has not shown an adverse employment

action with respect to the Plaintiff's allegations of lack of a desk and/or office work space,

and the Defendant's failure to provide her with a lap-top computer and to invite her to after

hours non-work related sporting events. The Defendant also states that the Plaintiff has

failed to show that any of the allegations constitute a constructive discharge. The Plaintiff's

Case 2:03-cv-02578-JAT Document 50 Filed 01/19/06 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Response to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment makes it clear that the only

claim that she is proceeding on is one for disparate treatment based on failure to promote. 

The Plaintiff's Response makes no argument that the failure to provide her with a laptop computer, the lack of a desk and/or office space, or the failure to invite her to sporting

events, or other of the acts alleged constitute an adverse employment action. Similarly, she

does not argue that she was constructively discharged. Accordingly, this Court will analyze

the Plaintiff's Complaint with respect to her single remaining claim, disparate treatment

relating to her alleged failure to promote. While the other allegations of discriminatory

conduct in this case may be relevant to showing that the Defendant's actions were a pretext

to discrimination, because the Plaintiff's claim is not predicated on those acts, it is not

necessary that those acts in of themselves constitute "adverse employment actions." 

The parties in this case disagree as to whether or not the positions at issue in this case

were, in fact, "promotions" upon which the Plaintiff can base her Title VII claim. The

Defendant claims that it merely shuffled job responsibilities and argues that it did not create

any additional positions to which the Plaintiff could have applied or been rejected. The

Defendant also argues that the jobs did not provide any additional salary increases or

incentives. Therefore, the Defendant concludes, the alleged failure to place the Plaintiff in

any of these positions does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action.

The Ninth Circuit takes a fairly broad view of the phrase adverse employment action.

Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240-41 (9th Cir. 2000). As a result, a wide array of

disadvantageous changes in the workplace constitute adverse employment actions. Id. at

1240. Not every employment decision amounts to an adverse employment action. Strother

v. Southern Ca. Permanente Medical Group, 79 F.3d 859, 869 (9th Cir. 1996). However,

a denial of a promotion clearly qualifies as an adverse employment action. See, e.g.,

Bergene, 272 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917,

928 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The Defendant, of course, denies that there is any evidence that the Plaintiff was

denied a "promotion" and states that the evidence indicates that at most, she would have been

Case 2:03-cv-02578-JAT Document 50 Filed 01/19/06 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

deprived of a lateral move with no changes in salary, benefits or incentives. The Defendant

presented deposition testimony that indicates that none of the male employees allegedly

promoted over the Plaintiff received raises. However, the evidence also indicates that these

male employees; Stan Westphal (prior distribution and "pre-order sales" manager with

responsibility for supervising dairy drivers), David Cooper (prior manager of "pre-order

writers" and responsibility for managing convenience store sales), and Tim Kelly (prior "C

store sales manager"), were already in supervisory or managerial positions at the time they

were moved into their respective new positions. 

The evidence indicates that the Plaintiff, by contrast, was in a "non-managerial sales

position," and sold dairy products at the time she applied for the managerial positions. The

Plaintiff was not in the same position as the male employees who were ultimately hired. And

the evidence does not support a finding that had the Plaintiff moved from a sales position to

a managerial position, it would have been considered a promotion, and she a would not have

received any increase in salary, benefits, or other tangible advantageous changes in her

employment. 

 In fact, Elliot Begoun testified in his deposition that Matt Lewis moved from his

former position in food sales to the position of food service sales manager because sales

positions necessarily involve a "rough quality of life." According to Mr. Begoun, sales

associates "work all the time" and are "at the beck and call of [their] customers throughout

the weekend." Mr. Begoun testified that the position of sales manager "affords . . . more

normalization" than a general sales position. Additionally, although Matt Lewis apparently

took a decrease in pay to accept the position, Mr. Begoun refers to Matt Lewis' transition into

the sales manager position as a "promotion," and specifically states that "we try to promote

within whenever we can." 

Even assuming that the Plaintiff would not have received any additional compensation

had she been promoted from a sales position to one of the managerial positions, this Court

finds that the Plaintiff's alleged denial of employment opportunities with better working

conditions and an increase in "status" and responsibility is sufficient to constitute an adverse

Case 2:03-cv-02578-JAT Document 50 Filed 01/19/06 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

employment action for purposes of her failure to promote claim. See, e.g., Little, 301 F.3d

at 969 (defining adverse employment action and providing examples of adverse employment

actions); Strother, 79 F.3d at 869 (same). The Plaintiff’s allegations that she was passed over

and remained in a disadvantageous work environment is sufficient under the broad standard

of adverse employment action articulated by the Ninth Circuit. See, Vasquez, 349 F.3d at

645-46; see e.g., Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2268

(1998) (tangible employment action is "a significant change in employment status, such as

hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities,

or a decision causing a significant change in benefits"). 

Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire

an individual because of her sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In responding to a summary

judgment motion in a Title VII disparate treatment case, a plaintiff may produce direct or

circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely than not

motivated the defendant's decision, or alternatively may establish a prima facie case under

the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973). Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dept., 424 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

The Plaintiff can make out a prima facie case of failure to promote, by showing that

(1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she applied for and was qualified for the position she

was denied; (3) she was rejected despite her qualifications; and (4) the employer filled the

position with an employee not of plaintiff's class, or continued to consider other applicants

whose qualifications were comparable to plaintiff's after rejecting plaintiff. McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1037. 

At the summary judgment stage, the degree of proof necessary to establish a prima

facie case is "minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the

evidence." Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1112 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and

citations omitted); Chuang v. Univ. of Ca. Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir.

2000).

Case 2:03-cv-02578-JAT Document 50 Filed 01/19/06 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

Here, it is not in dispute that the Plaintiff: (1) is female; (2) sought employment

opportunities on the above mentioned occasions; and (3) all the positions were filled by male

individuals. The Defendant disagrees that: (1) the employment opportunities were

"promotions; (2) the Plaintiff was qualified for the positions; and (3) the subsequently hired

male employees qualifications were similar or equivalent to the Plaintiff. 

As noted above, the Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to show that the alleged

positions qualify as promotions or adverse employment actions for purposes of withstanding

summary judgment. Additionally, the depositions and affidavits presented by both the

Defendant and the Plaintiff acknowledge the Plaintiff's desire and attempts to move up into

a managerial position. There is significant discussion and conflicting evidence regarding the

Plaintiff's qualifications for a managerial position in general, as well as the qualifications of

the male employees that were actually hired. See, e.g., Aragon v. Republic Silver State

Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 659-60 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasizing the low threshold for a

prima facie case and holding that even an employee's self-assessment is relevant evidence).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has met her initial burden of establishing a

question of fact for trial with respect to her prima facie case. See, e.g., Wallis v. J.R. Simplot

Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994) (the amount of evidence that must be produced in order

to create a prima facie case is "very little."). 

Once a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden shifts

to the defendant to produce evidence that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

its actions. Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996) To

accomplish this, the employer must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible

evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1112. If the employer

meets this burden, the presumption of unlawful discrimination "simply drops out of the

picture," and the burden shifts back to the employee. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).

Here, the Defendant has presented evidence that it had legitimate nondiscriminatory

reasons for its actions, namely that the Plaintiff was less qualified for the positions than the

Case 2:03-cv-02578-JAT Document 50 Filed 01/19/06 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

male employees the Defendant ultimately hired. In support of its argument the Defendant

provides evidence that all of the employees placed in the available positions had prior

management or supervisory experience, while the Plaintiff did not. 

Additionally, the Defendant provides evidence that the Plaintiff received several

reviews which suggested that the Plaintiff lacked the necessary leadership skills to be

promoted to a management position. Specifically, the Plaintiff's March 17, 2000,

performance appraisal indicated that the Plaintiff needed to work on her interpersonal skills.

The evaluation indicates that some of the qualities that made the Plaintiff a good sales

person, hinders her ability to "relate to others interpersonally," and the Plaintiff's March 27,

2001, performance appraisal indicates deficiencies in the Plaintiff's leadership skills. 

The Plaintiff's supervisor, Elliot Begoun, avowed in his affidavit and testified in his

deposition that the Plaintiff had a tendency to become difficult to work with when problems

or challenges arose. He stated that the Plaintiff's aggressive and passionate work habits made

her a great sales person, but made it a challenge for her to interrelate with her coworkers and

be a consensus builder or a team builder. He stated that there were instances when the

Plaintiff "stepped on some toes," and that he could recall numerous employees that had

"issues" or "run-ins" with the Plaintiff. He commented that the Plaintiff did not handle

constructive criticism well, and that she sometimes reacted inappropriately to challenges.

He indicated that when problems arose, the Plaintiff had a tendency to focus on the cause of

problem rather than finding a solution. He felt that while identifying a problem is a sign of

awareness, solving problems is a leadership skill that managers need. He felt that the

Plaintiff lacked this skill, and that she needed to work on this skill, as well as her ability to

relate to people interpersonally, before she would be suitable for a management position. 

 The evidence presented by both the Defendant and the Plaintiff suggests that the

Defendant had legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for passing over the Plaintiff for the

managerial positions at issue in this case, namely, that the Plaintiff's lack of interpersonal and

leadership skills rendered her unsuitability for the available positions. Therefore, the

Plaintiff must now produce sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to

Case 2:03-cv-02578-JAT Document 50 Filed 01/19/06 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

whether the Defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reason is merely a pretext for

discrimination. Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1037; Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d

1271, 1282 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The Plaintiff can show pretext either: (1) by providing direct evidence of

discrimination showing that unlawful discrimination more likely than not motivated the

employer; or (2) indirectly, by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy

of credence because it is inconsistent or otherwise not believable. Dominguez-Curry, 424

F.3d at 1037; Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1113; Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217,

1220-22 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory

animus "without inference or presumption." Coghlan v. American Seafoods Co. L.L.C., 413

F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221

(9th Cir.1998) (internal quotation and citation omitted)). Direct evidence of employment

discrimination is rare. Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 662 (9th

Cir. 2002). This type of evidence consists of openly sexist, racist, or similarly discriminatory

statements or actions by the employer. Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1095.

Circumstantial evidence, by contrast, requires an additional inferential step to

demonstrate discrimination. Id. The distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence

is crucial, because it controls the amount of evidence that the Plaintiff must present in order

to establish a pretext for discrimination. Id. Because direct evidence is so probative, a

plaintiff need offer "very little" direct evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact.

Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221. But when a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, that

evidence must be "specific and substantial" to defeat the employer's motion for summary

judgment. Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1095.

Despite the Plaintiff's contention, the Defendant's statement to the Plaintiff that she

did not get a particular promotion because the job required traveling and the Plaintiff is a

"mom," is not direct evidence of discrimination. Presuming the statement to be true, there

is at most an inference that, as a "mom," the Plaintiff would be unable to travel because she

Case 2:03-cv-02578-JAT Document 50 Filed 01/19/06 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

has children. This inference could apply equally to male or female employees who are

parents and does not directly show animosity for the Plaintiff's gender or an intent to

discriminate based on gender. 

The Plaintiff may still rely on circumstantial evidence to show pretext but must

provide specific and substantial evidence. Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1113. The Plaintiff can meet

this burden of proof in two ways. First, the Plaintiff can make an affirmative case that the

employer is biased. Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1095. For example, statistical evidence is

circumstantial evidence that could, if sufficiently probative, point to bias. Id.; Aragon, 292

F.3d at 663. Second, the Plaintiff can provide evidence showing that the employer's

proffered explanation for the adverse action is "unworthy of credence" and not to be

believed. Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1095. 

Here, the Plaintiff points to the EEOC's Reasonable Cause Finding as evidence of

pretext. Specifically, the Plaintiff argues that the statistical evidence relied upon by the

EEOC shows that the Defendant had a pattern or practice of failing to promote female

employees. The EEOC determination states that "analysis of [the Defendant's] workforce

data indicates a statistically significant shortfall in females in management position as

compared to other employees in [the Defendant's] industry in the Phoenix metropolitan

area." The workforce data relied upon by the EEOC indicated that in 2001, only 13.6 percent

of the Defendant's 169 managers were female. 

The Defendant argues that the statistical evidence relied upon by the EEOC report is

"meaningless" because it does not account for other variables besides gender. The Defendant

points out that while the EEOC statistics show that only 13 percent of female employees are

in managerial positions, 73.9 percent of the Defendant's female employees were employed

in "professional" positions. 

A plaintiff may introduce the EEOC’s finding of reasonable cause into evidence.

Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway, 685 F.2d 1149, 1156, n.4 (9th Cir. 1982).

An EEOC determination can, in some cases, create an issue of fact sufficient to warrant

proceedings beyond summary judgment. Id. at 1156. However, although statistics are often

Case 2:03-cv-02578-JAT Document 50 Filed 01/19/06 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

probative in determining the existence of a pattern or practice of disparate treatment, their

usefulness in proving pretext depends upon their relevance to the specific decision or

decisions affecting the individual plaintiff, and not those that affect plaintiff's protected class

in general. Penk v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 816 F.2d 458, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1987).

The Court agrees with the Defendant that the statistics relied upon by the EEOC and

the Plaintiff are flawed in that they fail to discuss variables that might provide a nondiscriminatory reason for the statistical data. For example, the statistics relied upon by the

EEOC reflect that only 19.9 percent of the Defendant's 1,534 employees in 2001were

women. It seems fairly obvious to this Court that there would be some relationship between

the low number of women employed by the Defendant, and the low number of women in

management positions. Yet the EEOC report does not discuss this variable. It seems to the

Court that all that the Plaintiff has shown is that in general the Defendant has a

disproportionate number of men in its work force. 

The statistical evidence relied upon by the EEOC, and the Plaintiff, is too broad to

provide independent evidence of pretext. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1284

(9th Cir. 2000). While the statistics show that only 13 percent of female employees are in

managerial positions, this does not take into account any variables that might explain the

variation, such as education level, prior work experience with the Defendant, and the overall

percentage of women as compared to men in the relevant data pool. The Plaintiff has failed

to provide any additional evidence, including comparative or statistical evidence, that would

allow this Court to fairly draw an inference of pretext. 

The Court has taken into consideration all of the evidence presented by the Plaintiff.

While the evidence is sufficient to support a prima facie case of discrimination, it is not

specific or substantial enough to overcome the Defendant's evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions and establish a pretext of discrimination. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc.

#41). 

Case 2:03-cv-02578-JAT Document 50 Filed 01/19/06 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Clerk of the Court shall enter Judgment in favor of

Defendant Shamrock Foods Company and terminate this case.

DATED this 17th day of January, 2006.

Case 2:03-cv-02578-JAT Document 50 Filed 01/19/06 Page 15 of 15