Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00305/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00305-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332fr Diversity-Fraud

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18-CV-305 JLS (JLB)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GRACE SANDOVAL,

Plaintiff,

v.

SHIFT TRANSMISSIONS,

Defendant.

Case No.: 18-CV-305 JLS (JLB)

ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION 

TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS; (2) DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT; (3) DENYING 

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 

COUNSEL

(ECF Nos. 2, 3)

Presently before the Court are Plaintiff Grace Sandoval’s Motion to Proceed In 

Forma Pauperis (“IFP”), (“IFP Mot.,” ECF No. 2), and Motion for Appointment of 

Counsel, (“Counsel Mot.,” ECF No. 3).

IFP MOTION

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). A 

federal court may authorize the commencement of an action without the prepayment of 

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fees if the party submits an affidavit, including a statement of assets, showing that he is 

unable to pay the required filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

In the present case, Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit indicating her average

monthly income was $2,000 for the past year, but that she is currently unemployed and 

does not expect income next month. (IFP Mot. 2–4, 6.)1 Plaintiff indicates her total 

monthly expenses are $846.00. (Id. at 6.) Although it appears Plaintiff could presently 

pay the fees and costs, the fact that she is currently unemployed indicates paying the filing 

fees would pose an undue financial burden on her. Thus, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Proceed IFP.

Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The Court must screen every civil action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

and dismiss any case it finds “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief 

may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from relief.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 

“not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint 

that fails to state a claim”).

As amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of § 1915 

make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing the Marshal to effect service 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3); Navarette 

v. Pioneer Med. Ctr., No. 12-cv-0629-WQH (DHB), 2013 WL 139925, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 

Jan. 9, 2013).

All complaints must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

 

1 For ease of reference, page numbers to docketed materials refer to the CM/ECF page number.

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not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). “[D]etermining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw 

on its experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663–64 (citing Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 556). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court 

must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see 

also Andrews v. King, 393 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005); Barren v. Harrington, 152 

F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the 

language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”).

“While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not.” Hoagland 

v. Astrue, No. 1:12-cv-00973-SMS, 2012 WL 2521753, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) 

(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Courts cannot accept legal conclusions set forth in a 

complaint if the plaintiff has not supported her contentions with facts. Id. (citing Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679).

In the present case, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Shift Transmissions for 

causing damage to her car. (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges the owners of Shift 

Transmissions are involved in “grand theft auto.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff then goes on for 

seven pages listing names of a multitude of people. Plaintiff alleges these people are 

involved in fraud, grand theft auto, vandalizing vehicles, false identification, stealing, rape,

and more. Plaintiff does not indicate the relevance of these allegations, nor how they relate 

to the initial allegation of damage to her car. Plaintiff also does not indicate why this case 

is properly in federal court, and the Court is unable to ascertain from Plaintiff’s lengthy 

Complaint any basis for jurisdiction. It is also unclear if Plaintiff intends to include as 

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Defendants the multitude of people listed in the Complaint. In sum, Plaintiff’s Complaint 

in no way contains a “short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” 

nor a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Plaintiff also does not indicate what relief she is seeking, and against 

who. Therefore, Plaintiff has not met the screening standards of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) 

& 1915A(b). The Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint, 

(ECF No. 1).

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. (Counsel Mot.) However, it 

is unclear what Plaintiff is requesting because she indicates, “I agree to pay attorney [sic] 

to represent me in court.” (Id. at 4.) The Court analyzes the Motion assuming Plaintiff is 

requesting the Court appoint counsel.

The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case unless 

an indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. Lassiter v. Dept. 

of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district 

courts have the discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion, however, 

may be exercised only under “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 

1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation 

of both the ‘likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate 

his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these 

issues is dispositive and both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id.

(quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

The Court finds Plaintiff has not satisfied the standards for appointment of counsel 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). As described above, Plaintiff has failed to file a complaint 

that explains, through factual allegations, exactly what happened in the case. The Court 

cannot evaluate Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel without an operative complaint. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff's Motion has no reason whatsoever why her situation merits 

appointment of counsel. Therefore, the Court finds that neither the interests of justice nor 

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any exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time and DENIES

Plaintiff's motion, (ECF No. 3).

CONCLUSION

In sum, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, (ECF No. 2), and 

DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel, (ECF No. 3). Pursuant to the screening 

requirements of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b), the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint, (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff may file an amended 

complaint to cure the deficiencies in her Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 12, 2018

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