Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-02221/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-02221-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Medical Malpractice

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

E-Filed 7/26/16

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUSSELL KERSHAW,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-02221-HRL 

ORDER REASSIGNING CASE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 7

Plaintiff Russell Kershaw (“Kershaw”) filed a small-claims case against Dr. Rajshree 

Bongale in the Superior Court of California for the County of Santa Clara for “libel, [h]arassment, 

and medical fraud.” Dkt. No. 1 at 6. The United States removed the case to this court under the 

federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, and under the removal provision of the Federal 

Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §2679(d)(2). The U.S. Attorney General certified that Dr. 

Bongale was acting in her capacity as an employee of the U.S. Department of Veteran’s Affairs 

“at all times material to the allegations” against her, Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2; the United States has 

therefore replaced Dr. Bongale as the defendant in this case, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1).

The United States moves to dismiss Kershaw’s claims without prejudice for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). 

Discussion

Federal courts have “limited jurisdiction,” and so they lack the “power” to retain a case 

unless the “Constitution or [a] statute” provides subject-matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A federal court therefore “must” dismiss a case 

when it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A motion to dismiss for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may raise a “facial” challenge based on the allegations or a 

“factual” challenge based on evidence. E.g., Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 

Case 5:16-cv-02221-LHK Document 17 Filed 07/26/16 Page 1 of 3
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(9th Cir. 2004). The non-movant has the burden to show subject-matter jurisdiction exists. E.g., 

Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 793 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 

377).

The United States is “immune from suit save as it consents to be sued,” United States v. 

Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941), and so federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over a 

claim against the United States “if it has not consented to be sued on that claim,” Balser v. Dep’t 

of Justice, Office of U.S. Tr., 327 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McCarthy v. U.S., 850 F.2d 

558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988)). The United States, through the FTCA, consents to be sued on a tort 

claim “for money damages” only after the claimant has “first presented” the claim “to the 

appropriate [f]ederal agency” and that administrative claim has been “finally denied by” that 

agency, either expressly “in writing” or through “six months” of inaction. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). 

Federal courts therefore lack jurisdiction over a tort claim against the United States for money 

damages when that claim has not yet been presented to, and denied by, the appropriate federal 

agency.

The United States raises a factual challenge to jurisdiction here. The declaration of 

Suzanne C. Will (“Will”) asserts: (1) she supervises the lawyers “responsible for the intake, 

investigation, processing, and adjudication” of FTCA claims submitted to the Department of 

Veteran’s Affairs; (2) she has made “a diligent search of all paper and electronic files to determine 

if any administrative tort claim has been filed” against the Department of Veteran’s Affairs on the 

basis of the care Kershaw received; (3) to the best of her “knowledge, information and belief, no 

administrative [sic] has been filed” against the Department of Veteran’s Affairs by Kershaw; and 

(4) Kershaw sent a demand letter to Dr. Bongale, but that letter was “neither addressed . . . nor 

sent” to the Department of Veteran’s Affairs. Dkt. No. 7-1 at 2. The United States therefore 

argues this court lacks jurisdiction over Kershaw’s tort claims for money damages because 

Kershaw has not submitted an administrative claim to the Department of Veteran’s Affairs. 

Kershaw failed to file an opposition to the motion to dismiss and failed to appear for the hearing 

on the motion. 

The undersigned is persuaded the motion to dismiss should be granted for two independent 

Case 5:16-cv-02221-LHK Document 17 Filed 07/26/16 Page 2 of 3
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

reasons: (1) Kershaw failed to carry his burden to show this court has jurisdiction over his claims, 

see, e.g., Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 793; and (2) Will’s uncontradicted declaration shows Kershaw 

has not submitted an administrative claim to the Department of Veteran’s Affairs, see Dkt. No. 7-1 

at 2, and so the uncontradicted evidence before this court shows that the United States has not yet 

consented to be sued on Kershaw’s claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), and this court therefore lacks 

subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims, see, e.g., Balser, 327 F.3d at 907.

Conclusion

The FTCA governs Kershaw’s claims. The undersigned believes: (1) Kershaw has failed 

to carry his burden to show the motion to dismiss should not be granted; and (2) the 

uncontradicted declaration of Will shows that the FTCA does not currently grant this court

subject-matter jurisdiction over Kershaw’s claims, because Kershaw has not yet filed an 

administrative claim with the Department of Veteran’s Affairs.

The undersigned has not, however, received consent to magistrate-judge jurisdiction from 

both parties. The undersigned therefore: (1) orders that this case shall be reassigned to a district 

judge; and (2) recommends that the motion to dismiss Kershaw’s claims without prejudice for lack 

of subject-matter jurisdiction be granted. The court advises Kershaw that he has 14 days to file 

objections to this report and recommendation after he has been served with his copy.

IT IS SO ORDERED, REPORTED, AND RECOMMENDED.

Dated: 7/26/16

HOWARD R. LLOYD

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:16-cv-02221-LHK Document 17 Filed 07/26/16 Page 3 of 3