Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00875/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00875-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Loren Williamson, II, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-16-00875-PHX-ROS (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Loren Williamson, II has filed a pro se Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 8.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

 Petitioner’s convictions became final on January 13, 2011. Petitioner’s postconviction relief proceedings concluded on February 10, 2015. The Petition was due on 

January 24, 2016, but was not filed until March 21, 2016. Equitable tolling is not merited 

because Petitioner’s contention that Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007) was 

wrongly decided did not cause the delay or make it impossible for Petitioner to file a 

timely petition. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claims 

are untimely. Therefore, the Court will recommend that the Petition be denied and 

dismissed with prejudice. 

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II. BACKGROUND

a. Facts and Proceedings

 The Arizona Court of Appeals found the following facts to be true: 

 [Petitioner] was indicted on seven counts of sexual 

conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen years, class 2 

felonies and dangerous crimes against children. [Petitioner] was alleged to have intentionally or knowingly engaged in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with his biological 

daughter, A.W., on seven separate occasions on or between 

January 6, 2001 and June 5, 2007. 

(Doc. 13-1, Ex. A, at 4); State v. Williamson, 2010 WL 5076481, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

Dec. 9, 2010). 

b. Trial and Sentencing

 The jury found Petitioner guilty as charged on six counts. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. A, at 3.) 

The court imposed presumptive, consecutive sentences of 35 years on each count. (Id.) 

c. Direct Appeal

 Petitioner timely appealed his convictions and sentences. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. A, at 3.) 

On December 9, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions 

and sentences. (Id. at 6.) 

d. Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding 

 On February 1, 2011, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 13-1, 

Ex. C, at 21.) On May 22, 2011, counsel for Petitioner submitted a Notice of Completion 

stating “counsel tenders a good faith belief that no basis in fact and/or law for postconviction relief exists on this record.” (Doc. 13-1, Ex. E, at 28.) On April 24, 2012, 

Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. F, at 21.) On 

August 17, 2012, the trial court dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief after 

finding that Petitioner had “failed to state any colorable claim.” (Doc. 13-1, Ex. H, at 42.) 

 On May 14, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted “the petition for review 

but den(ied) relief,” after finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. (Doc. 13-

1, Ex. G, at 39-40); State v. Williamson, 2014 WL 2003097, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 

14, 2014). 

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 On May 27, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Arizona 

Supreme Court. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. I, at 44.) On June 3, 2014, the Arizona Supreme Court 

denied Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. (Id. at 45-47.) On February 10, 2015, 

the Arizona Supreme Court denied a Petition for Further Review. (Id. at 47.) On March 

24, 2015, the Mandate issued. (Id.) 

 On July 18, 2014, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the United 

States Supreme Court. (Id.) On October 5, 2015, the United States Supreme Court denied 

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Williamson v. Arizona, 136 S.Ct. 41 (2015). 

e. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition

 On March 30, 2016, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 

1.) On April 11, 2016, the Court required Petitioner to pay the “filing fee or file a 

complete Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.” (Doc. 3.) On May 25, 2016, the 

Court dismissed the Petition without prejudice because Petitioner “failed to complete all 

sections of the § 2254 form petition” as required. (Doc. 7.) On June 1, 2016, Petitioner 

filed an Amended pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 8.) In the Petition, 

Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief: 

[Petitioner] did not receive a fair trial with an unbiased jury in violation of U.S. Const. Amends. 6, 14, and contrary to or an unreasonable application of Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 46, 

471-72 (1965). Habeas relief is sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(4). 

. . . . 

Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to protect [Petitioner’s] right to a fair trial in violation of U.S. Const. 

Amend. 6, 14, and contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 

(Doc. 8 at 6, 7.) 

 On June 30, 2016, Respondents filed a Response to the Amended Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 13.) On September 27, 2016, Petitioner filed a Reply. (Doc. 20.) 

 

III. THE PETITION 

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 The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

a. THE PETITION IS UNTIMELY.

i. Time Calculation

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

 On December 9, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. A, at 6.) Petitioner then had 35 days to seek 

review in the Arizona Supreme Court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a) (petition for review 

to the Arizona Supreme Court must be filed within 30 days after the filing of the decision 

by the Court of Appeals); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3 (allowing an additional five days). 

Petitioner did not file for direct review with the Arizona Supreme Court. Therefore, his 

convictions became final on January 13, 2011, and Petitioner’s AEDPA clock began 

running on January 14, 2011. 

ii. Statutory Tolling 

 The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Arizona, post-conviction 

review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed. See Isley v. Arizona 

Dep’t of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (“A 

proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the 

court in which the conviction occurred.”). 

 On February 1, 2011, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 13-1, 

Ex. C, at 21.) Petitioner’s filing was 18 days from the date his conviction became final, 

so 18 days of his one-year AEDPA clock had run, leaving 347 days. See Nino v. Galaza, 

183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (“AEDPA’s statute of limitations is not tolled from 

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the time a final decision is issued on direct state appeal and the time the first state 

collateral challenge is filed because there is no case ‘pending’ during the interval.”). On 

February 10, 2015, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. I, at 47.). 

Although the mandate issued on March 24, 2015, the Arizona Supreme Court decision 

ended post-conviction review. See Hemmerle v. Schiro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 

2007) (“We conclude that after the February 20, 2003, denial by the Arizona Supreme 

Court, nothing remained ‘pending’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2). Accordingly, the statute 

of limitations set forth in § 2244(d)(1) began running again on this date.”).1 Petitioner’s 

AEDPA clock restarted on February 11, 2015. The Petition was due 347 days later, on 

January 24, 2016. The Petition was not filed until March 21, 2016.2

 The Court finds, and 

Respondents agree, March 21, 2016 is the appropriate date because that is the date 

Petitioner signed his Petition. (Doc. 1 at 6, 20.) See Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 

770 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[w]hen a prisoner gives prison authorities a habeas petition or 

other pleading to mail to court, the court deems the petition constructively ‘filed’ on the 

date it is signed.”). 

 The Court determines that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari does not 

warrant statutory tolling. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 334, 127 S.Ct. 1079, 

166 L.Ed.2d 924 (2007) (“When the state courts have issued a final judgment on a state 

[post-conviction] application, it is no longer pending even if a prisoner has additional 

time for seeking review of that judgment through a petition for certiorari.”). Petitioner 

“concedes that under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), as currently interpreted by the 5-4 decision 

 

1

 The ruling by the Arizona Supreme Court distinguishes this case from Celaya v. 

Ryan, 497 F. App’x 744, 745 (9th Cir. 2012) (unpublished), where no review by the Arizona Supreme Court was sought. Even if the date of the mandate controlled, the 

Petition would still be late. The mandate issued on March 24, 2015, and 347 days from that date is March 6, 2016. The Petition was signed on March 21, 2016. 

2

 The Court finds that the Amended Petition relates back to the original Petition that was filed on March 21, 2016 because they share a common core of operative facts. (Doc. 1 at 6.) An amended petition may relate back for purposes of the statute of limitations if the amended petition shares a “common core of operative facts” with the 

original petition. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 600 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005). Respondents concede that the Amended Petition relates back to the original Petition. (Doc. 13 at 16.) 

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of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007), this Court is 

duty-bound to find his Petition untimely and subject to dismissal.” (Doc. 20 at 3.) 

 But, Petitioner argues that Lawrence (1) creates a disparity between trial 

defendants and pleadings defendants and (2) thwarts Congressional intent under the 

AEDPA as to unimpeded access and statutory tolling for habeas review....” (Doc. 20 at 

3.) Petitioner cites to the dissent in Lawrence for support of his claim. (Id. at 5-9.) 

Petitioner’s citation to the dissent in Lawrence is unavailing because the Lawrence

decision binds this Court. 

 iii. Equitable Tolling 

 “A petitioner who seeks equitable tolling AEDPA’s 1-year filing deadline must 

show that (1) some ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing on time, and 

(2) he has diligently pursued his rights.” Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th Cir. 

2015) (citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). The Petitioner bears the 

burden of showing that equitable tolling should apply. Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 

432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external 

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely 

habeas action. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010). Equitable tolling 

is to be rarely granted. See, e.g., Waldron–Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th 

Cir. 2009). Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of 

his untimeliness and that the extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to file a 

petition on time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). “Indeed, ‘the 

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(citation omitted). 

 Here, Petitioner argues he is entitled to equitable tolling because he pursued his 

rights diligently and extraordinary circumstances prevented him from timely filing. (Doc. 

20 at 10.) But the only extraordinary circumstance presented by Petitioner is “the 

unintended effect that Lawrence had in thwarting Congressional intent as to equality in 

the procedural Due Process of §§ 2244(d)(1) and (d)(2) being read together without

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creating untenable disparity in Arizona Rule 32 proceedings between trial and pleading 

defendants raising a U.S. Constitutional violation.” (Doc. 20 at 10.) The Supreme Court 

did not grant equitable tolling to petitioner Lawrence, and Lawrence was decided in 

2007. The decision in Lawrence did not prevent Petitioner from filing a timely Petition. 

Petitioner has failed to meet the “very high threshold,” United Sates v. Battles, 362 F.3d 

1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004), of establishing that extraordinary circumstances beyond his 

control made it impossible for him to timely file a habeas petition and that those 

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness. 

V. CONCLUSION

 The Petition was due on January 24, 2016 but was not filed until March 21, 2016. 

The Petition will be dismissed regardless of the margin of untimeliness. See United States 

v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000) (federal habeas petition submitted one 

day late was properly dismissed as untimely under AEDPA, noting that a “missed” 

deadline “is not grounds for equitable tolling”); Hartz v. United States, 419 Fed. Appx. 

782, 783 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (affirming dismissal of federal habeas petition 

where petitioner “simply missed the statute of limitations deadline by one day”). 

 The Court will therefore recommend that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 8) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. The record is sufficiently 

developed and the Court does not find that an evidentiary hearing is necessary for 

resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Doc. 8) be DENIED and DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Amended Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not 

find the procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

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of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 6th day of February, 2017. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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