Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02355/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02355-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1330 Breach of Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLA HILL,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 14cv2355 BTM(BLM)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS,

DISMISSING COMPLAINT,

STRIKING PAGE 4 OF THE

COMPLAINT, AND DENYING

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL

v.

RONALD S. HILL, et al.,

Defendants.

On October 3, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in addition to a Motion to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Motion”) and a Request for Appointment of

Counsel. For the reasons discussed below, the IFP Motion is granted, the

Complaint is dismissed, page 4 of the Complaint is stricken, and the Request

for Appointment of Counsel is denied.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

Upon review of Plaintiff’s affidavit in support of her IFP Motion, the Court

finds that Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing of inability to pay the filing fees

required to prosecute this action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is

GRANTED. 

1 14cv2355 BTM(BLM)

Case 3:14-cv-02355-BTM-BLM Document 4 Filed 10/10/14 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Although the Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed IFP, Plaintiff’s Complaint

must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court is under

a continuing duty to dismiss an IFP case whenever the Court determines that

the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint suffers from several defects. First of all,

although Plaintiff alleges that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this

action, it is unclear that there is diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff names as

defendants Ronald S. Hill, her ex-husband, as well as two limited liability

companies and a partnership in which he holds interests. However, it is

unclear whether the defendants are citizens of California, a circumstance which

would destroy diversity.

Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Hill’s principal residence is in Montana even

though he has a California residence in Canyon Lake, California. (Compl. ¶ 2.) 

An individual’s state citizenship is determined by his state of domicile, not his

state of residence. Kanter v. Warner-Pamber Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir.

2001). A person’s domicile is his permanent home, where he resides with the

intention to remain or to which he intends to return. Id. “A person residing in

a given state is not necessarily domiciled there, and thus is not necessarily a

citizen of that state.” Id. It is unclear from the Complaint where Mr. Hill is

domiciled.

It is also uncertain of which state(s) the two limited liability companies and

the partnership are citizens. The Ninth Circuit has held that a limited liability

company, like a partnership, is a citizen of every state of which its

owners/members are citizens. Johnson v. Columbia Properties Anchorage, LP,

437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). There are no allegations regarding the

citizenship of the members or partners of the limited liability companies and

2 14cv2355 BTM(BLM)

Case 3:14-cv-02355-BTM-BLM Document 4 Filed 10/10/14 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

partnership.

Even assuming diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to

dismissal on other grounds. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Hill breached a settlement

agreement that formed the basis of stipulated judgment in her marital

dissolution proceedings. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Hill failed to pay

her a $50,000 equalization payment. Plaintiff also alleges that Mr. Hill did not

disclose the value of certain properties, making the settlement agreement and

stipulated judgment unfair. Plaintiff seeks damages from the alleged breach

of contract and alleged fraud and also seeks a judgment declaring the

stipulated judgment to be void and subject to rescission by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to the extent

that Plaintiff seeks to set aside the state court judgment. This court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction to void any of the decisions or judgments entered in

the state court action. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts are

barred from hearing de facto appeals from state-court judgments. Bianchi v.

Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). Simply stated, a United States

District Court lacks the authority to disrupt or “undo” a decision of a state court,

regardless of whether the state court’s decision was correct or whether the

state court fully and fairly adjudicated the claim. Id. at 898-900. 

The Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action under the

“domestic relations exception,” which “divests the federal courts of power to

issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards,

504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992). In McLaughlin v. Cotner, 193 F.3d 410 (6th Cir.

1999), the Sixth Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the

“domestic relations exception” to hear a dispute regarding a claim for damages

based on a breach of a separation agreement. The Sixth Circuit explained that

because the separation agreement was incorporated into the divorce decree,

the suit was seeking a declaration of rights and obligations arising from marital

3 14cv2355 BTM(BLM)

Case 3:14-cv-02355-BTM-BLM Document 4 Filed 10/10/14 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

status. Id. at 414. Similarly, here, the terms of the settlement agreement were

incorporated into the stipulated judgment. Furthermore, the stipulated

judgment specifically provides that the state court reserves jurisdiction to

supervise the payment of any obligation ordered paid or allocated in the

stipulated judgment. 

III. Striking Portion of Complaint

Plaintiff has made irrelevant and scandalous allegations regarding Mr. Hill

on page 4 of the Complaint. The Court orders page 4 of the Complaint to be

stricken.

IV. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

In light of the dismissal of this action, Plaintiff’s motion for appointment

of counsel is denied as moot.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma

pauperis is GRANTED, her motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED, the

Complaint is DISMISSED, and page 4 of the Complaint is ordered STRICKEN. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 9, 2014

BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

 

4 14cv2355 BTM(BLM)

Case 3:14-cv-02355-BTM-BLM Document 4 Filed 10/10/14 Page 4 of 4