Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01987/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01987-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

Ryan Wick, 

Plaintiff,

 v. 

Nancy Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of 

the Social Security Administration, 

Defendant.

Case No.: 16-cv-1987-JM-AGS 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

MOTIONS (ECF Nos. 13 & 14) 

In 1996, Congress amended the Social Security Act to make it much more difficult 

for drug abusers to obtain disability benefits. Under that amendment, when drug addiction 

contributes significantly to a disability, benefits are strictly prohibited. See Parra v. Astrue, 

481 F.3d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 2007). The claimant “bears the burden of proving that his 

substance abuse is not a material contributing factor to his disability.” Id. at 744-45. 

In this case, a psychiatric expert concluded that plaintiff’s drug abuse caused his 

schizophrenia to develop and worsen. Based on this, a judge denied plaintiff’s disabilitybenefits application. On appeal, plaintiff claims that substance abuse was not a material 

contributing factor to his disability. After all, the expert conceded it was “possible” that 

some schizophrenics—whether sober or drug-addicted—might be doomed to permanent 

disability. But such hypotheticals do not carry plaintiff’s burden. Even if theoretical 

schizophrenics can prove that drug abuse played no part in their disability, plaintiff has not. 

Thus, the judge’s ruling must be upheld. 

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BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Ryan Wick suffers from schizophrenia and a drug addiction disorder. 

(AR 14.) He reports that “things started messing up in my mind” around age 15, and that 

he began using marijuana at 17. (AR 262.) At 19, he used cocaine, LSD, and marijuana 

during the summer, and months later was hospitalized for his first psychotic episode. 

(AR 17, 262; see AR 40.) Shortly before he turned 20, he began using a combination of 

marijuana and the psychoactive plant Salvia divinorum, and was later hospitalized for 

another psychotic episode. (AR 17, 272.) His condition steadily declined until age 22 when 

he attempted suicide and was hospitalized for two weeks for psychotic symptoms. (AR 19, 

60, 288.) Since age 22, he denies using drugs or alcohol and has produced a negative drug 

screen. (AR 288, 321.) Although he is now on a more aggressive medication regimen, his 

condition still leaves him unable to work. (AR 59, 68-69, 112.)

The Social Security Administration granted Wick adult disability benefits starting at 

age 22. (AR 112.) But Wick claims that he became totally disabled at age 20 and seeks 

disabled child’s benefits for the intervening two years. (AR 11); see 42 U.S.C. 

§ 402(d)(1)(B) (Social Security child’s insurance benefits require that any disability “began 

before [the claimant] attained the age of 22”). 

At the hearing on his application for child’s benefits, the main issue was whether 

Wick’s drug abuse before age 22 was a material contributing factor to his disability, which 

would be disqualifying. A psychiatric expert, Nathan Strahl, M.D., testified that “some 

adverse event” related to Wick’s substance abuse likely triggered his descent into 

schizophrenia. (AR 60.) In Dr. Strahl’s opinion, if Wick had stayed on his medications and 

not abused drugs, his condition would not have deteriorated so badly and he “likely would 

not be disabled.” (AR 60; see AR 19-20, 62.) The ALJ adopted Dr. Stahl’s opinion, found 

that substance abuse was “a contributing factor material to the determination of disability” 

before age 22, and denied Wick’s application. (AR 12, 21, 23.) 

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DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

A court “may set aside a denial of benefits only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence or is based on legal error.” Garcia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 768 F.3d 925, 929 

(9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence means 

more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 

F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 

B. Drug Abuse Was a Material Contributing Factor to Disability 

If drug addiction is “a contributing factor material to the Commissioner’s 

determination that the individual is disabled,” then benefits are prohibited. Parra, 481 F.3d 

at 744 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C)). When drug abuse evidence arises, “the claimant 

bears the burden of proving that his substance abuse is not a material contributing factor to 

his disability.” Parra, 481 F.3d at 744-45. The “key factor” in this inquiry is whether the 

claimant would still be “disabled if [the claimant] stopped using drugs[.]” Ball v. 

Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b)(1)). 

Wick does not contest the finding that he abused drugs. (See ECF No. 13-1, at 4-7; 

AR 18, 40.) He argues instead that the ALJ erred in concluding that his substance abuse 

was a material contributing factor to his disability. But this finding is supported by 

substantial record evidence. Specifically, Dr. Strahl testified that if Wick had stopped using 

drugs and complied with his treatment course, his mental health issues would have been 

stable enough to permit gainful work. (AR 18-20, 60-65.) And although it was Wick’s 

burden to prove otherwise, he offered no other medical evidence to the contrary. 

Rather, Wick selectively reads Dr. Strahl’s testimony as supporting his claim that, 

even if he stopped using drugs, he would have still been disabled. Wick asserts that—

regardless of any substance abuse—his mental health issues made him totally unable to 

comply with his prescribed treatment, rendering him incurably disabled. And he claims 

that Dr. Strahl supports this view because he “opined that the issue here is with 

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compliance,” and that it is “possible” that someone with Wick’s impairments might be 

incapable of “seek[ing] further treatment” or doing “what is correct.” (ECF No. 13-1, at 6 

(citing AR 67).) 

This argument has two fatal flaws: the facts and the law. First, the law: “Where the 

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the 

ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 

954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Thus, even if Wick’s somewhat strained take on 

Dr. Strahl’s testimony were fair, it would not matter, because that testimony is also 

susceptible to the ALJ’s rational interpretation. 

Next, the facts: Dr. Strahl testified that Wick’s drug abuse likely caused his 

schizophrenia. (AR 19, 60 (The “disorder was probably initiated by some adverse event 

due to the drugs he was taking[.]”).) And the reason the schizophrenia intensified, 

according to the doctor, was not that his disease made compliance impossible, but because 

Wick voluntarily chose to stop treatment. In fact, he thought Wick’s situation was “[n]o 

different than a diabetic who doesn’t take his medicine or a hypertensive who doesn’t take 

their medicine.” (AR 61.) Dr. Strahl returned to this theme of voluntary non-compliance 

repeatedly. (See, e.g., AR 59 (“What [Wick] has done, unfortunately to his own demise, is 

let the disorder progress basically untreated[.]”); AR 60-61 (Wick “really did himself 

damage” by not “continu[ing] on treatment.”); AR 61 (“[W]ith medicine he was acting 

more normal but he refused to do [treatment] and has suffered really irreparable harm[.]”); 

AR 67 (Wick “refused to take the medication,” which is what is “causing the demise.”); 

AR 68 (Even when “he gets better, he’ll stop his medication once again, which has 

happened multiple times in the past.”).) 

If Wick had contrary evidence, he had the burden to produce it. For example, if 

medical records reflected that voices in his head forced him to refuse his medications, 

perhaps an ALJ could find that recovery was impossible, regardless of any drug abuse. But, 

as the ALJ points out, the medical records show the opposite. On one occasion, Wick 

reported that “he was not taking the [antipsychotic medication] Zyprexa prescribed by the 

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doctor” because “it made him sleepy and he did not feel that it was effective[.]” (AR 17, 

272.) And even his mother testified that he took Zyprexa “for nine months but after nine 

months, when he was about 20, he quit taking it. . . . [A]nd that’s when I saw him get 

progressively worse.” (AR 49.) 

Thus, Wick failed to meet his burden. And substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s 

conclusion that Wick’s drug abuse was a material contributing factor to his disability. 

C. Suzanne Brown’s Letter 

Finally, Wick faults the ALJ for finding that his mother’s letter to the court included 

inaccurate information about his drug-abuse history and therefore giving it less weight. 

“An ALJ need only give germane reasons for discrediting the testimony of lay witnesses.” 

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In the letter, 

Wick’s mother, Suzanne Brown, stated that her son “has never self medicated with drugs 

or alcohol[.]” (AR 255.) The ALJ found that this statement was “not accurate” based on 

the “medical records” and Wick’s own admissions. (AR 18.) And he concluded that the 

letter was entitled to “less weight” because Brown “may not be as aware of the claimant’s 

activities and symptoms as she may believe she is.” (Id.) 

Wick complains that the ALJ took this statement out of context. Although his mother 

wrote that he never “self medicated,” Wick argues that she was not implying that he never 

“experimented” with drugs. He contends it is a matter of degree: “[s]elf medicating” is a 

“much bigger problem” than “experimenting.” (ECF No. 13-1, at 8.) But even so, his 

mother was still misinformed. Wick had a “much bigger problem” with drug use than mere 

experimentation. He abused drugs, according to the ALJ’s unchallenged finding. 

Furthermore, if we read her letter in context, as Wick requests, Brown is saying this: while 

she worries about her son’s significant psychiatric problems, she is thankful that he “never” 

had a drug problem. (See AR 18, 255.) In fact, her hearing testimony makes clear that she 

did not know of her son’s drug problem. She testified that she had no “direct knowledge of 

his abusing LSD or marijuana” and “no” memories of her son using any drugs. (AR 42.) 

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So, the ALJ appropriately found that she “may not be as aware” of Wick’s activities as she 

might think, which was a germane reason for giving her comments less weight. 

CONCLUSION 

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that drug abuse was a material 

contributing factor in Wick’s disability, and Wick failed to carry his burden to prove 

otherwise. Thus, this Court recommends that Wick’s summary judgment motion (ECF 

No. 13) be DENIED and defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14)

be GRANTED. The parties must file any objections to this report by August 24, 2017. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A party may respond to any such objection within 14 days of 

being served with it. See id. 

Dated: August 10, 2017 

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