Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01483/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01483-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENJAMIN ELLIS, No. CIV S-04-1483-LKK-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ALBONICO, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court are defendants’ motion for summary judgment

(Doc. 45) and motion to dismiss (Doc. 46). On May 10, 2005, the court advised plaintiff of the

requirements for opposing a motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss. See Rand

v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th

Cir. 1988); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff has filed oppositions to

both motions. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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I. BACKGROUND

Defendants recite the following facts:

Plaintiff Ellis was a wheel-chair confined prisoner incarcerated at

High Desert State Prison. On April 14 2003, Ellis was wheeled into the

B-Yard Clinic. Ellis wheeled his chair to the clinic door and stopped six

inches from Defendant Correctional Officer Albonico. Albonico ordered

Ellis to move his chair. Ellis refused and said “Fuck you.” Albonico

asked to borrow handcuffs from Defendant Medical Technical Assistant

Bates.

Albonico ordered Ellis to cuff up. Ellis refused to comply and

again responded “Fuck you.” As Albonico reached across Ellis to place

handcuffs on him, Ellis hit Albonico in the head and body with his fist. 

Ellis then reached up and grabbed Albonico. Albonico grabbed Ellis’

shoulders and took him to the ground. Ellis continued to fight. Ellis

pulled Albonico’s left arm and hand close to his mouth and bit three

fingers on Albonico’s left hand. Ellis has hepatitis C. Bates yelled for

help.

Defendant Correctional Officers Coe and Weaver rushed to the

scene. They saw Albonico struggle to remove his hand from Ellis’ mouth. 

Coe placed his thumb behind Ellis’ ear to get him to release Albonico. 

Albonico forced Ellis’ mouth open and pulled his fingers out.

Bates used his body to cover Ellis to restrain him. Weaver placed

cuffs on Ellis’ left hand. While Weaver was cuffing Ellis, Coe ordered

Ellis to put his right hand behind his back. Ellis refused Coe’s order. 

Ellis grabbed his right wrist with his left hand and resisted Coe’s efforts to

cuff him. Ellis released his grip and began swinging his right arm. He

then placed his right arm under his body to prevent from being cuffed. 

Coe pulled Ellis’ right arm from under his body and placed him in a wrist

lock. Weaver secured cuffs on Ellis’ right wrist. After Ellis was cuffed,

Coe and Weaver lifted and transported him to the B-Clinic Facility floor

approximately five to ten feet away.

Ellis sustained scrapes to his right cheek, right forehead, and left

thumb, a swollen lower lip, black left eye, and a cut along his left gum.

In his “Separate Statement of Disputed Facts,” plaintiff challenges several aspects

of defendants’ story. Plaintiff states that he was wheeled to the B-Yard Clinic by another inmate

and that he was stopped and questioned by Albonico upon entering. He also states that he “was

accosted again by Albonico” after the other inmate went to the pill line. Plaintiff states that he

did not stop six inches from Albonico but, rather, that Albonico stopped him and asked where he

was going. According to plaintiff, he did not say “Fuck you” to Albonico but, rather, Albonico

asked why Ellis was sitting in front of his door. He also claims that he was never ordered to cuff

up but, rather, that Albonico “without cause or warning vigorously grasped Plaintiff’s wrist.” As

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to the struggle, plaintiff disputes defendants’ characterization of him as the aggressor. Rather, he

asserts that Albonico was the aggressor. With respect to the finger bite, plaintiff states that

Albonico put his fingers in plaintiff’s mouth to force it open. Plaintiff denies that Albonico ever

yelled out for help. Plaintiff admits that defendant Coe ordered him to bring his right arm from

under his body to be cuffed, but states that he attempted to inform defendant Coe that his arm

was injured and that he could not comply. Finally, plaintiff states that he was dragged over 55

feet across a concrete floor to the clinic, not the five to ten claimed by defendants. 

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

. . . always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of

the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be

entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

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judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and

that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

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produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Exhaustion

A motion to dismiss for lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies is properly

the subject of a motion to dismiss as an unenumerated motion under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b). See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). “In deciding a

motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust non-judicial remedies, the court may look beyond the

pleading and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id. at 1119-20. If the court concludes that

administrative remedies have not been exhausted, the unexhausted claim should be dismissed

without prejudice. See id. at 1120. 

III. DISCUSSION

The court will begin with an analysis of the parties’ versions of the events of

April 14, 2003. As revealed by plaintiff’s own discovery requests propounded to defendants,

plaintiff concedes the following:

1. He was six inches from defendant Albonico and defendant Albonico

ordered plaintiff to back up;

2. Plaintiff refused and said “Fuck you;”

3. Defendant Albonico asked defendant Bates for his handcuffs and

defendant Bates followed defendant Albonico back to plaintiff;

4. Plaintiff was ordered to submit to handcuffs;

5. When plaintiff was ordered to cuff up, plaintiff responded: “Fuck you;”

/ / /

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6. Defendant Albonico reached across plaintiff in an attempt to place

plaintiff in handcuffs and that, during this process, plaintiff attacked

defendant Albonico, striking him multiple times in the head and upper

torso area with closed fist;

7. Plaintiff struck defendant Albonico with a closed fist by swinging his arms

above his head;

8. Plaintiff continued to struggle even after being taken to the ground;

9. After plaintiff was on the ground, he forced defendant Albonico’s arm

down and bit thee of his fingers;

10 Defendant Albonico forced plaintiff’s mouth open in an attempt to

dislodge his fingers;

11. Defendant Bates assisted defendant Albonico in controlling plaintiff;

12. Defendant Coe placed his thumb behind plaintiff’s ear and applied

pressure to get plaintiff to release defendant Albonico’s fingers;

13. Defendant Weaver rolled plaintiff onto his back and placed his left hand in

cuffs; and

14. Defendant Coe ordered plaintiff to put his arm behind his back and

plaintiff refused to comply.

In essence, plaintiff concedes the facts as outlined by defendants. Specifically, the parties do

not dispute that plaintiff refused to comply with direct orders given by defendant correctional

officers and then became belligerent and physically aggressive. 

In their motion for summary judgment, defendants argue that judgment in their

favor as a matter of law is appropriate because there can be no dispute that the force used was

reasonable under the circumstances. The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the

conditions under which the prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth

Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts of

dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

(1976). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met:

(1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such that it results in the denial

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of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) subjectively, the prison official

must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511

U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must have a “sufficiently

culpable mind.” See id.

When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force, the core judicial

inquiry is “. . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,

or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992);

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). The “malicious and sadistic” standard, as

opposed to the “deliberate indifference” standard applicable to most Eighth Amendment claims,

is applied to excessive force claims because prison officials generally do not have time to reflect

on their actions in the face of risk of injury to inmates or prison employees. See Whitley, 475

U.S. at 320-21. In determining whether force was excessive, the court considers the following

factors: (1) the need for application of force; (2) the extent of injuries; (3) the relationship

between the need for force and the amount of force used; (4) the nature of the threat reasonably

perceived by prison officers; and (5) efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. 

See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The absence of an emergency situation is probative of whether force

was applied maliciously or sadistically. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1528 (9th Cir.

1993) (en banc). The lack of injuries is also probative. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-9. Finally,

because the use of force relates to the prison’s legitimate penological interest in maintaining

security and order, the court must be deferential to the conduct of prison officials. See Whitley,

475 U.S. at 321-22. 

As an essential element of his Eighth Amendment claim, plaintiff must establish

that force was not used in a good-faith effort to maintain prison order but, rather, was used

maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing him harm. Defendants have presented

evidence – in the form of plaintiff’s own discovery requests – which shows that they acted

reasonably and for the purpose of maintaining prison discipline in the face of plaintiff’s refusal

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to comply with correctional officers’ orders. 

The burden thus shifts to plaintiff to present evidence which establishes that a

genuine dispute of fact exists as to this essential element. Plaintiff can meet this burden by

presenting evidence that force was not used to restore order but was used solely to cause plaintiff

harm. The essence of plaintiff’s version is that the incident began when defendant “Albonico

approached Plaintiff and without cause or warning vigorously grasped Plaintiff’s left wrist.” 

Plaintiff submits the prison incident report, which shows that both he and

defendant Albonico sustained light injuries. He also submits prison medical records showing his

paraplegia and diagnosis for hepatitis C. These records also show that, at the time of the

incident, plaintiff was undergoing interferon treatment which made him sick. The medical

record also demonstrates that plaintiff was experiencing wrist and shoulder pain which made it

difficult for him to move his wheelchair and that he was attending physical therapy. 

Plaintiff also submits documents showing that he was found guilty of a serious

rules violation as a result of the April 2003 incident. According to these documents, plaintiff

recited the following version of events to the investigating officer:

I was sent over to see the MTA for treatment. Correctional Officer

Albonico didn’t seem to believe me, or thought I was trying to cut in line

or something. He asked me to the holding tank, I was sick from side

effects and could not push myself, he got MTA Bates handcuffs and tried

to put cuffs on me, he grabbed my hand unexpectedly and hurt my left

wrist. I tried to protect my wrist with my other hand; that’s when he hit

me in the eye, then the throat and tipped me over backward, and MTA

Bates threw his body over me. Correctional Sergeant Coe and

Correctional Officer Weaver rolled me over on my stomach. Correctional

Officer Weaver had my left hand cuffed and his knee on my back. The

way he rolled me over put my already injured right arm under me. 

Correctional Sergeant Coe told me to put my arm out from under me, but I

couldn’t because it was injured, and Correctional Officer Weaver’s knee

was on my back. Correctional Sergeant Coe thought I was resisting, I

wasn’t. After I was cuffed, Correctional Sergeant Coe grabbed my right

arm, and Correctional Officer Weaver grabbed my left, and they dragged

me to the Clinic and put me on the floor. 

At the time of the prison disciplinary investigation, plaintiff listed four inmate witnesses –

Turner, Brown, Jackson and Crummie. Turner and Brown told investigating officers that they

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did not see the incident. In particular, Brown said that he didn’t see what started the incident. 

Jackson told investigators that he pushed plaintiff to the clinic that day and that, as he was

entering the clinic, a correctional officer stopped plaintiff and asked where he was going. 

According to Jackson, plaintiff said he was getting his medications and the correctional officer

responded that he first needed to make sure plaintiff was supposed to be there. Jackson stated

that the correctional officer placed a hand on plaintiff’s wheelchair to try to maneuver it away. 

What is clear and undisputed from the evidence currently before the court is that

plaintiff refused correctional officers’ orders and that plaintiff physically resisted the officers’

attempts to subdue him. It is also clear and undisputed that defendants used only such force as

was necessary to subdue plaintiff and restore order at the clinic. While plaintiff repeatedly

asserts that defendant Albonico was the aggressor, approaching him without warning or cause,

there is no evidence to support this contention. In fact, plaintiff’s own exhibits show that

defendant Albonico was attempting to ascertain why plaintiff was in the clinic. 

Based on the current record, the court concludes that there is no genuine dispute

as to the purpose of defendants’ actions. Specifically, the evidence establishes that force was

used reasonably for the purpose of restoring order. Plaintiff has not presented evidence to show

otherwise. Therefore, because plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of his Eighth

Amendment claim, summary judgment in favor of defendants is appropriate. 

Defendants also assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Government

officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In general, qualified immunity protects “all but

the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

335, 341 (1986). In ruling upon the issue of qualified immunity, the initial inquiry is whether,

taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the

defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

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(2001). If, and only if, a violation can be made out, the next step is to ask whether the right was

clearly established. See id. This inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of

the case, not as a broad general proposition . . . .” Id. “[T]he right the official is alleged to have

violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant,

sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 202 (citation omitted). Thus, the

final step in the analysis is to determine whether a reasonable officer in similar circumstances

would have thought his conduct violated the alleged right. See id. at 205. 

When identifying the right allegedly violated, the court must define the right more

narrowly than the constitutional provision guaranteeing the right, but more broadly than the

factual circumstances surrounding the alleged violation. See Kelly v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 667

(9th Cir. 1995). For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand [that] what [the official] is doing

violates the right.” See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Ordinarily, once the

court concludes that a right was clearly established, an officer is not entitled to qualified

immunity because a reasonably competent public official is charged with knowing the law

governing his conduct. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982). However, even

if the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established right, the government official is

entitled to qualified immunity if he could have “. . . reasonably but mistakenly believed that 

his . . . conduct did not violate the right.” Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th

Cir. 2001); see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. 

The first two steps in the qualified immunity analysis involve purely legal

questions. See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 1996). The third inquiry involves a

legal determination based on a prior factual finding as to the government official’s conduct. See

Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995). In resolving these issues, the court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and resolve all material factual disputes

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in favor of plaintiff. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In this case, viewing the facts as alleged in the light most favorable to plaintiff,

the court must conclude that the plaintiff has made a prime facie case of an Eighth Amendment

violation. The court rejects defendants’ assertion that the undisputed facts measure whether

there is a prima facie constitutional violation. This is not correct. The existence of a

constitutional violation is gauged by the allegations viewed in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, not the undisputed facts of the case. 

The next question in the qualified immunity analysis is whether the Eighth

Amendment right allegedly violated is clearly established. Assuming for the moment that it is

for qualified immunity purposes, the court turns to the final question of whether defendants

reasonably believed that their conduct did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Under the

undisputed facts of this case, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court concludes

that defendants reasonably (and correctly) believed that their conduct was constitutionally

permissible. Specifically, the facts reveal that plaintiff refused to comply with direct orders to be

handcuffed, that plaintiff resisted, and that defendants used such force as was necessary to

subdue plaintiff and restore order. Under these circumstances, a reasonable officer would have

believed that his conduct was lawful. Therefore, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Because the court concludes that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on

the merits of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, it is not necessary to address defendants’

motion to dismiss based on lack of exhaustion. 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 45) be granted;

2. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of

defendants and close this file; and

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3. All other pending motions be denied as moot. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 10 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 6, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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