Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01124/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01124-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FIL~ D 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United Stat,:,s Court of Appeals T~·;L~ 8i-i•-.11i~ 

MAR2 61992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

GREEN MOUNTAIN BOWLING CENTER, LTD.,) 

a Colorado limited partnership; and) 

GREEN MOUNTAIN BOWL, INC., a ) 

Colorado corporation, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

BRUNSWICK CORPORATION, a Delaware 

corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 91-1124 

(D.C. No. 87-N-1722) 

{ D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and COOK, Senior 

District Judge.* 

Plaintiffs-appellants Green Mountain Bowling Center, Ltd. and 

Green Mountain Bowl, Inc. (collectively referred to as Green 

Mountain) appeal from two judgments entered by different district 

judges. The first judgment was in the form of an order, dated 

November 23, 1988, that granted defendant's motion for summary 

judgment on plaintiffs' claims of fraud, negligent 

misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. The second 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

* The Honorable H. Dale Cook, Senior District Judge for the 

United States District Court for the Northern District of 

Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-1124 Document: 010110239064 Date Filed: 03/26/1992 Page: 1 
judgment was in the form of a directed verdict dismissing 

plaintiffs' remaining claims for breach of contract. We affirm. 

We review summary judgment orders de novo, using the same 

standards the district court applies. Osgood~ State Farm Mut . 

Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988) . Summary 

judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, 

if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any materi al 

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c): see Anderson~ Liberty 

Lobby, Inc . , 477 U. S. 242, 247-48 (1986). We review d i rected 

verdicts under essentially the same "genuine issue" standard 

applied in the summary judgment context, including the principle 

that the court's inquiry must be guided by the subsidiary 

evidentiary standards that apply to the case. Id . at 251-52, 254-

55. 

On April 14, 1983, plaintiffs and defendant entered into a 

contract referred to as the Equipment Order. Pursuant to this 

contract, defendant agreed to deliver, and plaintiffs agreed to 

buy, equipment necessary to construct a bowling center. In 

addition, defendant agreed to perform a market survey to determine 

the feasibility of the project. The contract provided that "[i]f 

the bowling center fails to materialize, all except $1,500.00 (for 

the Market Survey) of the deposit moneys will be returned. " 

Later, pursuant to the contract, defendant provided the equipment 

for the bowling center. Defendant also performed the market 

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Appellate Case: 91-1124 Document: 010110239064 Date Filed: 03/26/1992 Page: 2 
survey and provided plaintiffs with financial projections on three 

different occasions. 

In 1984 and 1985, the parties had a dispute regarding the 

adequacy of the bowling equipment provided by defendant. After 

negotiating a settlement in which plaintiffs received a sum of 

money, parts, and supplies, the parties executed a Release 

Agreement dated October 2, 1985. The Agreement provided, in part, 

as follows: 

Green Mountain, for itself, its successors and assigns, 

does hereby release and forever discharge Brunswick, its 

successors, assigns and its directors, officers, agents 

and employees from all claims, demands and causes of 

action that Green Mountain may now have arising out of, 

directly or indirectly, the [Equipment] Order. 

In 1987, after being disappointed with the performance of 

their bowling center, plaintiffs brought this lawsuit. All of 

their claims stem from the financial projections provided by 

defendant . Defendant contends that these claims are barred by the 

Release Agreement. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, claim that the 

Release does not bar their claims because defendant performed the 

financial projections pursuant to a separate oral agreement, and 

not pursuant to the Equipment Order. Therefore, we must first 

determine whether -- when viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to plaintiffs -- the projections were part of a contract 

separate from the Equipment Order. We conclude that the 

projections were not performed as part of a separate contract. 

Plaintiffs contend that they presented sufficient evidence of 

a separate contract to justify making the question one for the 

jury. We are unable to find such evidence in the record. In 

fact, Green Mountain representative Tom Hartley -- testifying on 

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Appellate Case: 91-1124 Document: 010110239064 Date Filed: 03/26/1992 Page: 3 
Green Mountain's behalf -- clearly stated that any right to have 

defendant perform financial projections arose from the signing of 

the Equipment Order. In addition, counsel for plaintiffs -- in 

responding to questions from the district court -- conceded that 

the financial projections were part of the Market Survey and, 

thus, were part of the entire package received by plaintiffs 

pursuant to the Equipment Order. In short, we conclude that none 

of the evidence plaintiffs point to raises a genuine factual 

issue. 

Having concluded that the financial projections were part of 

the Equipment Order, we must determine whether the Release 

Agreement applies to bar plaintiffs' claims related to the 

financial projections. We agree with the district court's legal 

conclusion, based on Colorado law, that the broad release language 

applies to bar plaintiffs' claims even if those claims were not 

known at the time the parties executed the Release Agreement. See 

Goff~ Boma Inv. Co., 181 P.2d 459, 462 (Colo. 1947); Mountain 

Stone Co.~ H.W. Hammond Co., 564 P.2d 958, 961 (Colo. App. 

1977). Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's entry of a 

directed verdict on plaintiffs' breach of contract claims. In 

addition, we AFFIRM the district court's earlier grant of summary 

judgment dismissing plaintiffs' tort claims, albeit on different 

grounds. See Griess~ Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1047 (10th Cir. 

1988) ("we are 'free to affirm a district court decision on any 

grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit 

conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district 

court'") (quoting Alfaro Motors, Inc.~ Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 

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Appellate Case: 91-1124 Document: 010110239064 Date Filed: 03/26/1992 Page: 4 
(2d Cir. 1987)); Hayes Y..!.. Phoenix-Talent Sch. Dist. No.!, 893 

F.2d 235, 236 (9th Cir. 1990) (appellate court may affirm district 

court's grant of summary judgment on different grounds which are 

supported by the record). 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 91-1124 Document: 010110239064 Date Filed: 03/26/1992 Page: 5