Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-1_05-cv-01110/USCOURTS-arwd-1_05-cv-01110-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on January 20, 2007. 1

Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has been

substituted for acting Commissioner Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

CHARLES TOWNSEND PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 05-1110

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,1

Commissioner, Social 

Security Administration DEFENDANT

 MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Charles Townsend (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial

review of the Commissioner’s denial of his request for

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq., as amended,

and for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II

of the Act. Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative

remedies, and, pursuant to Section 1631(c)(3) of the Act and

42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), judicial review is now appropriate.

After reviewing the record, the Court hereby REMANDS the

decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and AWARDS

BENEFITS to Plaintiff. 

I. Background

Plaintiff filed his application for SSI and DIB on May 5,

2003. (TR 36). He quit high school with an eleventh grade

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education and joined the Army. (TR 37). Plaintiff is a

Veteran of the Korean War where he served as a truck driver

for the Army. (TR 37). Following his military service,

Plaintiff provided elder care for seventeen years. (TR 37).

Plaintiff’s last employment was with a cemetery services crew

where his work was primarily lawn care. (TR 38). Plaintiff

reported using riding lawn mowers for that work, but still

struggled with pain. (TR 38-39). He last worked in July

2002. (TR 39). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had past

relevant work experience as landscape-lawn care laborer and

grounds keeper (cemetery). (TR 14). In his May 2003

application, Plaintiff complained of neck and back pain, and

severe anal pain (status post surgical incision and drainageFebruary 2003). 

Plaintiff’s concurrent applications for DIB and SSI were

denied initially and upon reconsideration, and this request

was timely filed. At age 45, Plaintiff appeared, represented

by counsel, and testified at a hearing before ALJ Don Curdie

on April 5, 2005, via video teleconferencing between the

Office of Hearings and Appeals in Little Rock, Arkansas, and

the remote hearing site in El Dorado, Arkansas (TR 33).

Carolyn Cobb, friend of Plaintiff, was present at the hearing

but did not testify. William D. Elmore, Vocational Expert,

was present and testified at the hearing. 

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II. Standard of Review

The Court’s review is limited to determining whether the

Commissioner applied the correct standard of law and whether

the Commissioner’s findings of fact were supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C.

§§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3); Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047,

1050 (8th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is relevant

evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as sufficient to

support the Commissioner’s conclusion. See Warburton, 188

F.3d at 1050. In making this determination, the Court

considers evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s

decision as well as evidence that supports it. See id. The

Court may not reverse the Commissioner’s decision merely

because substantial evidence supports a different result. See

Pierce v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1999). This is

true even if the Court might have weighed the evidence

differently and reached a different result if a de novo review

were applied. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1219 (8th

Cir. 2001).

To receive disability benefits, a claimant must show: (1)

a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that

has lasted, or can be expected to last, for not less than

twelve months; (2) an inability to engage in any substantial

gainful activity; and (3) the inability results from the

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impairment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (d)(1)(A), (d)(2); see also

Timmerman v. Weinberger, 510 F.2d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 1975).

The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision to determine whether the

ALJ followed the Commissioner’s implementing regulations,

which set out a five-step, burden-shifting process for

determining whether the claimant has a “disability” within the

meaning of the Social Security Act.

The five steps are (1) whether the claimant is currently

engaging in “substantial gainful activity;” (2) whether the

claimant is severely impaired; (3) whether the severe

impairment is, or is comparable to, a listed impairment

precluding substantial gainful activity as a matter of law;

(4) whether the claimant, with his current Residual Functional

Capacity (“RFC”) can meet the demands of his past work, and if

not; (5) whether the claimant retains the capacity to perform

any other work that exists in significant numbers in the

economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2004); Bowen v.

Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42, 107 S. Ct. 2287, 96 L. Ed. 2d

119 (1987) (discussing the five-step analysis). 

In the first four steps, the burden is on the claimant to

prove that he or she is disabled. If the claimant is not able

to perform his or her past work, the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to prove there are jobs in the national economy

the claimant can perform, although the ultimate burden of

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persuasion remains with the claimant. See Harris v. Barnhart,

356 F.3d 926, 931 n.2 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Barnhart v.

Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24, 28 (2003) (noting that the existence

of jobs in the national economy must be proved only at step

five).

III. Analysis 

Plaintiff alleges three points of error by the ALJ.

First, the ALJ inappropriately determined Plaintiff’s

credibility. Second, the ALJ erred by not deciding the case

on the substantial evidence of the record as a whole. Third,

the ALJ erred by presenting an improper hypothetical to the

vocational expert at Plaintiff’s hearing.

Plaintiff alleges the ALJ inappropriately determined his

credibility and failed to consider the substantial evidence of

the record as a whole. To determine a Plaintiff’s credibility

for subjective complaints, the ALJ must consider the

following: Plaintiff’s daily activities; duration, frequency,

and intensity of pain or other symptoms; precipitating and

aggravating factors; dosage, effectiveness and side effects of

any medications; and functional restrictions. Polaski v.

Heckler, 729 F.2d 1320, 1320-22 (8th Cir. 1984). In the

present case, the ALJ improperly disregarded Plaintiff’s

complaints and the overwhelming evidence within the record

that showed Plaintiff to be disabled. See Ghant v. Bowen, 930

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F.2d 633, 637 (8th Cir. 1991). (TR 10-24, 33-62). 

The record reveals a long list of medical problems

supported by evidence. Plaintiff alleged the following: use

of a cane (prescription) for approximately three years prior

to his disability hearing; left leg numbness; carpal tunnel -

left with numbness; difficulty using left hand; severe pain in

the left leg; intolerance for prolonged standing or sitting;

some minor heart problems; chronic low back problems supported

by MRI evidence; depression; and chronic cervical neck problem

supported by MRI evidence. (TR 40-56, 193-212, 485). 

The ALJ found Plaintiff had a history of anal fistulaperirectal abscess; hepatitis-B and elevated liver enzymes;

small disc protrusion at C3-C4 and C6-C7 with left neural

foraminal narrowing; mild neural foraminal narrowing at C4-C5

and C5-C6 with findings of chronic active left C7

radiculopathy; moderate paracentral disc protrusion at L4-L5

with effacement of the thecal sac and mild spondylosis in the

lumbar spine, especially at the facet joint; mild posterior

disc bulge at L3-L4 with mild facet and ligamentous

hypertrophy and partial degenerative disc desiccation at L4-

L5. (TR 17). The ALJ found these problems would impose

significant restrictions in the ability to perform basic work

activities and would thus be “severe” within the meaning of

the Regulations. (TR 17). 

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However, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s credibility as to

subjective complaints. This finding was unsupported by the

record as a whole. See Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817,

821 (8th Cir. 1992) (“We will not disturb the decision of an

ALJ who seriously considers, but for good reasons explicitly

discredits, a claimant’s testimony of disabling pain.”). The

ALJ may not disregard the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints

solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully

support them. Harris v. Shalala, 45 F.3d at 1193 (8th Cir.

1995). The ALJ failed to properly weigh the medical evidence

and the medical opinions of the treating physicians in making

his decision. 

The ALJ also improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s testimony

regarding his daily activities. The ALJ found that Plaintiff

carried groceries, shopped with friends, and performed light

housekeeping chores. (TR 19). However, Plaintiff’s testimony

and his Disability Supplemental Interview Outline (“DSIO”)(TR

111) explained that Plaintiff would ride in the car to the

grocery store with his friend but he would “sit out in the car

and kind of sit and wait for a few minutes for her to come

out.” (TR 50). Plaintiff stated he would ride with his

friend to the store, “just to get out of the house.” (TR 51).

As to carrying groceries into the house, Plaintiff stated, “I

take like light bread and ...light things like that.” (TR

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51). 

Plaintiff’s testimony was consistent with his answers in

the DSIO. (TR 111). He indicated he did not go grocery

shopping because “it is [sic] hard for him to be on his feet.”

He did not do dishes, change sheets, iron, vacuum, or sweep,

but he did wash some laundry and take out the trash. (Tr

111). He reported he did not wash the car or maintain the

lawn. Plaintiff did report he could drive short distances.

(TR 12). 

Plaintiff indicated he needed to lie down twice a day for

approximately two hours because of “severe pain and back

pain.” (TR 113). As for social activities outside the home,

Plaintiff testified he tried to get out occasionally but that

this made his conditions worse. (TR 47). Although Plaintiff

stated he attended church on his DSIO, frequency of his

attendance was not asked. (TR 112). At Plaintiff’s

disability hearing, he testified “I be trying [sic] sometime

to go, but I, like I say, I have, you know, I don’t have good

days and ... it gets worse when I just try to walk and

stand.” (43-44). The ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff’s

credibility concerning his subjective assertions of pain and

impairment. 

The ALJ also failed to properly credit the duration,

frequency, and intensity of the pain. Plaintiff testified

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that he is never free of pain. (TR 48). He stated he had to

lie down twice or more a day for two hours. Plaintiff had

severe anal pain and back pain. (TR 113). In January, 2005,

plaintiff was taking Amitriptyline, Aspirin, Cyclobenzaprine,

Gabapentin, Naproxen, and Tramadol (TR 487). These drugs help

control pain, relax muscles, and soft tissue injuries, and

muscuskeletal disorders. These drugs cause various side 2

effects to include drowsiness. Plaintiff testified he

continuously took pain medicine or muscle relaxers for his

back since he stopped working. (TR 42). The ALJ determined

Plaintiff failed to perform his home therapy exercises.

However, this was based upon Plaintiff’s condition of being

drowsy at one of his therapy sessions and his poor ability to

perform the exercises for the therapist. (TR 17).

Plaintiff’s drowsy condition obviates from a record replete

with prescription drug use to control pain - drugs that cause

drowsiness. The Court finds the ALJ erred in finding

Plaintiff refused his treatment plan. 

Further, the record indicates Plaintiff is very

restricted in his functional ability. He walks with a

prescription cane, stays close to home, has difficulty getting

in or out of chairs, and has difficulty using his left leg.

(TR 48-50). He reported that he slept downstairs most of the

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time because he was unable to climb the stairs. (TR 14-15).

The Court finds the evidence supportive of the Plaintiff’s

claims. The ALJ erred in finding “numerous contradictions

between the claimant’s allegations an testimony regarding the

severity of his impairment and other substantial evidence in

the claim.” (TR 20). 

Plaintiff’s third point of error alleges the ALJ relied

upon an improper hypothetical question posed to the vocational

expert at the Plaintiff’s hearing. In denying Plaintiff

benefits, the ALJ considered testimony from a vocational

expert (“VE”) who suggested that Plaintiff could perform work

in the national economy. (TR 10-24). However, the VE based

his testimony on hypothetical scenarios posed by the ALJ which

did not include all of Plaintiff’s impairments, particularly

his severe pain while standing and sitting, his drowsiness as

a side-effect of his pain medications, and his loss of

function and sensation in his left arm and leg. The ALJ’s

first hypothetical was posed as follows:

Q: All right. Assume an individual the same age with

the same education background and the work experience

of the claimant. Assume an individual who will

experience mild to moderate pain. Further assume an

individual with the ability to perform work within

the full range of the light classification

exertionally. Assume this individual would have the

ability to occasionally climb, balance, stoop, bend,

crouch, kneel and crawl. Could this individual

perform any of the claimant’s past relevant work?

 

A: No, sir. 

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Q: If not, could this person perform other jobs that

exist in the local and regional or national

economies? 

A: Yes, sir. 

(TR 60). The VE went on to identify two jobs Plaintiff could

perform. Then, the ALJ posed a hypothetical question that

considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of chronic pain

and effects of his medication, and it was answered by the VE

as follows: 

Q: Okay. Now hypothetical question number two

would assume an individual the same age, education

and background work experience of the claimant.

Assume an individual with the ability to perform

work as follows, due to the inability to be

relieved of chronic pain and the effect of

medication, this person cannot sustain

concentration, persistence and pace on a routine,

continuous basis to complete the required tasks of

a job in an eight-hour day, 40-hour per week

position. Could this person perform any of the

claimant’s past relevant work? 

A: No, sir. 

Q: If no, would there by other jobs this person

could perform in the local, regional or national

economy?

A: No, sir. 

(TR 61). 

The ALJ failed to give the proper hypothetical controlling

weight in reaching his conclusion. The Court finds the

evidence supports a finding of disability. Plaintiff’s

complaints are credible as they are supported by medical

evidence and opinions, Plaintiff’s vocational factors which

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render him unable to perform any job within the national

economy, and Plaintiff’s subjective complaints relating to

exertional and nonexertional activities and impairments

supported by the record and by third parties. See Buckner v.

Apfel, 213 F.3d 1006, 1011 (8th Cir. 2000)(concluding the court

may reverse the Commissioner’s denial and award benefits

outright if overwhelming evidence proves the plaintiff is

disabled). 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds the

substantial evidence on the record as a whole overwhelmingly

supports a finding that Plaintiff is disabled. Accordingly, it

is ordered that the decision of the ALJ is REMANDED and

Plaintiff is to be AWARDED BENEFITS. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of February, 2007. 

/s/ Robert T. Dawson 

ROBERT T. DAWSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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