Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01846/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01846-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLYDE JOHNSON,

Inmate Booking #17107643,

Plaintiff,

vs.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-01846-LAB-RBB

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) AND § 1915A(b)

I. Procedural History 

On August 7, 2018, Clyde Johnson (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the 

George Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”) located in San Diego, California, and 

proceeding pro se, has filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF 

No. 1.) In addition, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) On August 27, 2018, the Court 

GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and DISMISSED his Complaint for failing 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 3.) On October 15, 2108, 

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 4.) 

/ / /

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II. Sua Sponte Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)

The Court is obligated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) to review 

complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are 

“incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated 

delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, 

pretrial release, or diversionary program,” at the time of filing “as soon as practicable 

after docketing.” See Doc. No. 8 at 4; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under the 

PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are 

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who 

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 

1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

A. Standard of Review

“The purpose of § 1915A is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious 

suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 

n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 

(7th Cir. 2012)). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. 

Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); accord Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the 

familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

Every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “When there are well-pleaded 

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factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine whether they 

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

While a plaintiff’s factual allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to 

indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts “have an 

obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the 

pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 

627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 

(9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially 

pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 

1982). Even before Iqbal, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in 

civil rights violations” were not “sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 

acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cty. of 

Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

C. First Amendment - legal mail claims

Here, the Court finds that while Plaintiff may have alleged facts sufficient to state a 

First Amendment claim as to the opening of his legal mail, he has failed to identify 

specific individuals whom he claims is responsible for these alleged actions. See 

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Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995); Hayes v. Idaho Correctional Center, 

849 F.3d 1204, 1211-1212 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding prisoner who alleged to have had his 

“properly marked legal mail” “arbitrarily and capriciously opened outside his presence on 

two separate occasions” stated a plausible First Amendment claim); cf. Mangiaracina v. 

Penzone, 849 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[P]risoners have a Sixth Amendment 

right to be present when legal mail related to a criminal matter is inspected.”); see also 

Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing requirements for 

an access-to-court claim premised on prison officials’ alleged interference, as opposed to 

failure to affirmatively assist, with any prisoner lawsuit), overruled on other grounds as 

stated by Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015).

The County of San Diego itself may be considered a “person” and therefore, a 

proper defendant under § 1983, see Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 

658, 691 (1978); Hammond v. County of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Moreover, as a municipality, the County may be held liable under § 1983–but only where 

the Plaintiff alleges facts to show that a constitutional deprivation was caused by the 

implementation or execution of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision 

officially adopted and promulgated” by the County, or a “final decision maker” for the 

County. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S.

397, 402-04 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). In other words, 

“respondeat superior and vicarious liability are not cognizable theories of recovery 

against a municipality.” Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 279 F.3d 1102, 1109-10 (9th 

Cir. 2002). “Instead, a Monell claim exists only where the alleged constitutional 

deprivation was inflicted in ‘execution of a government’s policy or custom.’” Id. (quoting 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).

In his FAC, Plaintiff’s allegations defeat any claims he may have against the 

County of San Diego. Plaintiff claims that the “S.D. Sheriff’s Inmate Processing 

Division” is “fail[ing] to follow their manual, procedures.” (FAC at 8-9.) Plaintiff 

alleges that there a procedure that protects his right to have legal mail opened in his 

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presence but he does not identify any specific individual as someone who is failing to 

follow this procedure. The “S.D. Sheriff’s Inmate Processing Division” is not a proper 

Defendant in this matter.

Local law enforcement departments, like the San Diego Sheriff’s Department, 

municipal agencies, or subdivisions of that department or agency, are not proper 

defendants under § 1983. See Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 

(N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Naming a municipal department as a defendant is not an appropriate 

means of pleading a § 1983 action against a municipality.”) (citation omitted); Powell v. 

Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Section 1983 imposes 

liability on any ‘person’ who violates someone’s constitutional rights ‘under color of 

law.’ Cook County Jail is not a ‘person.’”). 

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) because he has failed to allege any facts which “might 

plausibly suggest” that the County itself violated his constitutional rights. See Hernandez 

v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Iqbal’s pleading 

standards to Monell claims); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (42 

U.S.C. § 1983 provides for relief only against those who, through their personal 

involvement as evidenced by affirmative acts, participation in another’s affirmative acts, 

or failure to perform legally required duties, cause the deprivation of plaintiff’s 

constitutionally protected rights).

III. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his pleading to state a claim unless 

it is absolutely clear the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d 

at 1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when a complaint is dismissed under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect”).

Therefore, the Court will grant him a chance to fix the pleading deficiencies 

discussed in this Order. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

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III. Conclusion and Order

For all the reasons discussed, the Court: 

1. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s FAC for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 

relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

2. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave to file a Second Amended 

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. Plaintiff is 

cautioned, however, that should he choose to file a Second Amended Complaint, it must 

be complete by itself, comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that any 

claim not re-alleged will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach 

Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n 

amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 

(9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not realleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

If Plaintiff fails to follow these instructions and/or files a Second Amended 

Complaint that still fails to state a claim, his case may be dismissed without further leave 

to amend. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does 

not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 

dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a court approved form civil 

rights complaint for his use in amending.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 30, 2018

HON. LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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