Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01617/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01617-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SACRAMENTO DIVISION

JOHNNIE RAY HAIRSTON,

Petitioner,

v.

TOM CAREY, Warden,

Respondent.

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Case No. 2:07-CV-01617-MMS

ORDER

Pro se Petitioner Johnnie Hairston, an inmate at California State

Prison, Solano, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging

the August 25, 2005 decision of the California Board of Parole Hearings (“BPH”)

denying him parole. Petitioner alleges the denial of parole violated his rights under

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Having considered the

arguments of the parties, the Court DENIES the petition for the reasons stated

below.

BACKGROUND

Hairston is currently serving a sentence of 27 years to life for First Degree

Murder. In 1982, Hairston and an associate participated in a series of violent

robberies and kidnapings that culminated with Hairston murdering a cook at a Los

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Angeles Kentucky Fried Chicken. Hairston ordered his victim to lie down on the

floor, and then shot him as he attempted to do so.

The BPH denied Hairston parole in 2005, finding that he was “on the right

track” but that he was not yet ready for release. The BPH first focused on the

nature of the murder and the surrounding circumstances, noting that Hairston’s

motive for the murder and other robberies was trivial. The Board further found

that Hairston had yet to take responsibility for his actions, pointing to his version

of the murder in which he portrayed himself as an unwilling participant in the

crime. The Board next determined that parole was inappropriate given Hairston’s

history of violence, gang involvement, failure to participate in self-help programs,

and history of unstable personal relationships. 

Hairston then filed a state habeas petition in California Superior Court

challenging the BPH’s suitability determination. The Superior Court affirmed the

BPH’s decision, finding that Hairston’s record of violence, unstable social history,

failure to seek self-help in prison, along with the violent nature of the commitment

offense provided sufficient grounds to support the denial of parole. 

Hairston filed a timely federal habeas petition.

DISCUSSION

Under California law, prisoners serving indeterminate life sentences become

eligible for parole after serving a minimum term of confinement. In re

Dannenberg, 104 P.3d 783, 785-86 (Cal. 2005). California regulations state that “a

life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of

the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if

released from prison.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(a). In making this

suitability determination, the BPH looks to factors such as the nature of the

commitment offense, the prisoner’s record of violence, social history, behavior in

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prison, and any other information relevant to whether the prisoner poses an

unreasonable risk to society. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 2402(b)-(d). 

If the prisoner files a state habeas petition, the state court reviews the

decision of the BPH to determine whether “some evidence” supports the

unsuitability determination. See In re Shaputis, 190 P.3d 573, 580-81 (Cal. 2008). 

California has defined “some evidence” to mean that the BPH’s determination

“must have some indicia of reliability.” In re Scott, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 52 (2004)

(internal quotation marks omitted). A decision is not supported by “some

evidence” where the BPH denies parole solely on the basis of facts of the

commitment offense. See In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 549 (Cal. 2008). 

In Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), the Ninth

Circuit explained the standard federal courts are to apply in reviewing a state

court’s denial of parole. The court held that a court reviewing a denial of parole

may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the “decision rejecting parole was an

‘unreasonable application’ of the California ‘some evidence’ requirement, or was

‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.’” Id.

at 562-63. The Court here must therefore decide whether the California Superior

Court’s decision upholding the BPH’s denial of parole unreasonably applied

California’s “some evidence” standard. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

805-06 (1991). Petitioner argues that it does not, contending the BPH

impermissibly relied on unchanging factors such as the violent nature of the crime

of commitment. 

Petitioner is correct that a state court cannot rely solely on the facts of the

murder in denying him parole. See Cooke v. Solis, 606 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir.

2010). The state court did not do this however; it also pointed to Hairston’s violent

past, unstable social history, and failure to seek sufficient counseling while in

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prison in finding that “some evidence” supported the parole denial. All of these

factors are relevant considerations as stated in state regulations and have support in

the record. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c). 

Hairston had prior convictions for robbery, and had been arrested on

multiple occasions for violent altercations. During one robbery, he injured his

victim. The record also supports the determination that Hairston has an unstable

social history. He has been married three times, and does not remain in contact

with his stepchildren. Finally, the state court reasonably determined that Hairston

had failed to seek sufficient counseling while in prison. The record before the

BPH indicated that Hairston had reduced his involvement in rehabilitative

programs after he was denied parole in 2003. And although not by itself

dispositive, the commitment offense further supports the state court determination. 

Hairston shot an unarmed man as he attempted to lie on the floor during a robbery. 

There was no apparent motive for the murder. Given all of the above, the state

court had more than a reasonable basis for concluding that Hairston still posed a

current threat to the community.

Petitioner’s remaining claims are without merit. His indeterminate life

sentence for murder does not run afoul of Eighth Amendment. See Harris v.

Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 584-85 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a life sentence for

murder does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment). Hairston’s claims

rooted in state law violations are not properly before this court because he has

failed to show how these alleged violations raise a federal issue. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is

limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties

of the United States.”). Petitioner is finally incorrect that the standards used by the

BPH are unconstitutionally vague. States have considerable “flexibility in

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deciding what procedures are needed in the context of postconviction relief,” and

California’s procedures for granting parole are within what is permitted by federal

law. Hayward, 603 F.3d at 564.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

A certificate of appealability is also DENIED because Petitioner has failed to show

his claims are “debatable among reasonable jurists.” See id. at 555.

DATED: August 12, 2010

/s/ Mary M. Schroeder

MARY M. SCHROEDER,

United States Circuit Judge

Sitting by designation

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