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Nature of Suit Code: 850
Nature of Suit: Securities, Commodities, Exchange
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

.FILED 

Umt.ed St.ates Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

CAROL MILLER AND ROBERT MILLER, 

et al., individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly 

situated, 

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Plaintiffs, 

RONALD B. HOPKINS, 

Class Member-Appellant, 

vs. 

THE WOODMOOR CORPORATION, et 

Defendants, 

DAVIS, BARNHILL & GALLAND and 

ARTHUR L. FINE, 

Class Counsel-Appellees. 

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FEB O 81989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 86-2239 

(D.C. No. 74-F-988) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Franklin A. Nachman of Semple & Jackson, Denver, Colorado (G. 

Alexander McTavish of Ruddy, Myler, Ruddy & Fabian, Aurora, 

Illinois, with him on the briefs), for Class Member and Judgment 

Debtor-Appellant. 

George F. Galland, Jr. of Davis, Barnhill & Galland, Chicago, 

Illinois (Arthur L. Fine, Arthur L. Fine, P.C., Denver, Colorado 

with him on the briefs), for Class Counsel-Appellees. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, MOORE, Circuit Judge, and RUSSELL, 

District Judge*. 

*Honorable David L. Russell, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the Western, Northern and Eastern Districts of 

Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 86-2239 Document: 01019962678 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 1 
This appeal was perfected from an order of the district court 

entered on July 22, 1986 denying the motion of Ronald B. Hopkins, 

a class member and judgment debtor, for relief from a judgment1 

for attorneys' fees entered against him and in favor of class 

counsel on September 7, 1979. 

Appellant asserts that the district court erred in refusing 

to vacate the fee judgment because the judgment was entered 

without in personam jurisdiction over him, in violation of due 

process and is, therefore, void. Appellant asserts that the 

district court erred in concluding that class members against whom 

judgments for attorneys' fees were entered had notice that 

personal judgments could be entered against them, had an 

opportunity to be heard on such issues and were adequately 

represented by trustees of the Stagecoach Development Fund. 

1. After class counsel registered the Colorado district court's 

judgment in Illinois and obtained a garnishment order against the 

company of which Hopkins is president in the federal district 

court for the Northern District of Illinois, Hopkins filed a 

motion for relief from judgment in that proceeding. The Illinois 

district court denied the motion, ruling that it should be heard 

by the Colorado district court. Hopkins then refiled his Rule 60 

motion in the United States District Court for the District of 

Colorado. 

In addition to relief from the judgment, in the Colorado 

district court Hopkins sought certification of the class against 

whom the trial court entered attorneys' fee judgments on September 

6, 1979, vacation of those judgments against the class members, 

injunctive relief from enforcement of the judgments and 

restitution. See R. Vol. I at 36. The trial court concluded that 

it had personar-jurisdiction over Hopkins to enter an attorneys' 

fee judgment on September 28, 1978; that its order of September 6, 

1979 and judgment of September 7, 1979 did not alter Hopkins' 

obligation for attorneys' fees under the prior judgment and thus 

did not deprive him of any property interest; and that Hopkins was 

adequately represented by court-appointed independent trustees at 

a hearing prior to entry of the order of September 6, 1979 and 

therefore accorded procedural due process. The trial court thus 

concluded that the other aspects of Hopkins' motion were moot. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2239 Document: 01019962678 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 2 
Appellees argue that notice was given Appellant and other 

members of the class that they would be obligated to pay 

attorneys' fees from any recovery for the benefit of the class by 

the "Notice of Pendency of Class Action" 2 mailed on January 28, 

1977 and a Notice of Proposed Settlement3 mailed May 31, 1978 and 

2. This notice informed members of the class of Plaintiffs of 

arrangements for paying costs and expenses of the lawsuit and for 

awarding attorneys' fees and costs: 

By remaining in the class you will not 

subject yourself to any personal liability to 

defray the costs of the litigation. 

Plaintiffs have agreed to advance the costs 

and expenses of the litigation, but in the 

event recovery is obtained by the class, 

plaintiffs will seek reimbursement of costs 

and expenses. Your pro rata portion of such 

costs and expenses is a charge solely against 

the recovery, if any, obtained in your behalf. 

You should be aware that recovery, if 

any, for the benefit of the class will be 

first subject to deduction for the necessary 

and reasonable expenses of the litigation, 

including such attorneys' fees as may be 

approved by the Court, and subject to pro rata 

share of court costs. 

Notice of Pendency of Class Action 

~~ VIII (Costs of Litigation) & IX 

(Effect of Recovery on Award of 

Attorney Fees and Court Costs) (R. 

Vol. I at 2). 

3. This notice informed class members who were purchasers of 

interests in the Stagecoach Development that pursuant to the 

proposed settlement of their claims, Westinghouse Credit 

Corporation would transfer its rights in plaintiffs' notes for the 

Stagecoach Development to the Stagecoach Development Fund to be 

administered jointly by the Stagecoach Property Owners Association 

and its court-approved trustee for the development of Stagecoach, 

if practicable, and if such were impracticable, the money in the 

fund would be returned to class members pro rata. Notice of 

Proposed Settlement, Exhibit "B" to Memorandum of Class Counsel in 

Opposition to Ronald B. Hopkins' "Motion for Relief from Judgment 

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Appellate Case: 86-2239 Document: 01019962678 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 3 
that the class members, including Hopkins, had an opportunity to 

object to the award of attorneys' fees contemplated therein and 

did not, after which the Court entered an order and judgment on 

September 28, 1978 granting class counsel attorneys fees. 4 

and Other Relief" (R. Vol. I at 38) at p. 10. It told class 

members that they would be bound by a court order that reaffirmed 

their obligation to pay their notes in full and that decreed the 

Stagecoach Development Fund to be a holder in due course of the 

notes. Id. at 11. This notice also informed class members of 

proposedarrangements for fees and costs: 

Petition for counsel fees not exceeding 20% of 

the proceeds of the settlement and expenses 

with supporting material will be filed with 

the Court by May 1, 1978, and will be 

available for inspection by any interested 

party. For purposes of determining the amount 

of the attorneys' fee award, counsel for the 

plaintiffs will ask that the proceeds of the 

settlement be deemed to include the value of 

the promissory notes and deeds of trust to be 

transferred, the guarantee of the loan at 

Roxborough Park, and the cash to be paid over 

by wee. No fees for plaintiffs' attorneys 

will be assessed directly against wee or class 

members. Plaintiffs' counsel will petition 

for fees on a project-by-project basis based 

upon a set percentage not to exceed 20% of the 

amount recovered for each project. 

Plaintiffs' counsel generally intend to 

request that fees be awarded over time to 

conform with the date that the actual benefits 

are received by the class. Thus, plaintiffs' 

counsel will not ask that all fees awarded be 

paid immediately. 

Id. at 15. 

The notice informed class members that a hearing would be held on 

May 31, 1978 at 8:15 a.m. at which time the court would consider 

an award of attorneys' fees to counsel for the class and an 

allowance of out-of-pocket expenses, id. at 14-15, and that any 

member of the class could appear at this hearing and be heard 

concerning such matter, provided the court and class counsel 

received notice by May 12, 1978 of their intent to be heard. Id. 

at 15-16. 

4. This 

relation 

order and judgment 

to settlement of 

for attorneys' fees and costs in 

claims concerning the Stagecoach 

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Appellate Case: 86-2239 Document: 01019962678 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 4 
Appellees assert that since the district court had in personam 

jurisdiction over Hopkins when it entered its order of September 

28, 1978, and because the subsequent order of September 6, 1979 

and judgment of September 7, 19795 did no more than what was 

called for in the prior order, which was unchallenged by Hopkins, 

either the court had in personam jurisdiction over Hopkins at the 

time of entry of the subsequent fee judgment or that Appellant 

cannot collaterally attack the prior judgment. In a similar vein, 

Appellees argue, and the district court held, that the fee 

judgment of September 7, 1979 did not deprive Hopkins of any 

property because it did not alter the amount for which Hopkins was 

liable by virtue of the order of September 28, 1978. 

Alternatively, Appellees assert that representation of Hopkins' 

and class members' interests by the trustees of the Stagecoach 

Development provided that class counsel were entitled to 20% of 

all past and future payments on the Stagecoach notes; however, 

should any notes received by the Stagecoach Development Fund from 

Westinghouse Credit Corporation be forgiven in full or in part, 

class counsel were entitled to 20% of the amount forgiven with 

payment of this amount to be a condition to forgiveness. Order 

1978-21 (R. Vol. I at 10) at p.2. The court certified this order 

as a final judgment in accordance with F.R.Civ. P. 54(b). Id. at 

3. 

5. When the court entered an order approving, adopting and 

affirming the Magistrate and Special Master's order determining 

that further development of the Stagecoach subdivisions was not 

feasible, Order 1979-19, approving Order 1979-10 (R. Vol. I at 30 

& 18) and the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate and 

Special Master that the notes were void and unenforceable and 

should be returned to their makers, Order 1979-19, approving Order 

1979-12 (R. Vol. I at 30 & 21), it entered an "Order for Judgment 

Implementing Order 1978-21 Regarding Attorneys' Fees with Respect 

to the Stagecoach Development" directing that judgment be entered 

in favor of class counsel against those class member whose notes 

were extinguished on May 25, 1979 in the amount of twenty percent 

of the principal and interest outstanding on each such note as of 

that date, Order 1979-20 (R. Vol. I at 31), on which judgment was 

entered on September 7, 1979 (R. Vol. I at 33). 

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Appellate Case: 86-2239 Document: 01019962678 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 5 
Development Fund at a hearing prior to entry of the fee judgment 6 

was adequate to provide the court with in personam jurisdiction 

over Hopkins to enter the fee award. Finally, Appellees urge that 

the district court's order denying relief from the fee judgment 

should be affirmed on two grounds not urged in, or addressed by, 

the district court: 1) Hopkins is estopped from attacking the fee 

judgment as void, having accepted and retained the benefits of 

such judgment; and 2) Hopkins' motion for relief is untimely 

because it was not brought within a "reasonable time," F.R.Civ. P 

60 (b) . 

Because we conclude that Appellant is estopped from attacking 

the fee judgment on grounds of being void, we find it unnecessary 

to reach the other issues raised by this appeal. 

The district court awarded class counsel attorneys' fees 

pursuant to the federal "equitable fund" doctrine. Order 1978-20 

at p. 5 (R. Vol. I at 9) . See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 

396 u.s. 375, 391-97, 90 s.ct. 616, , 24 L.Ed.2d 593, 606-09 

(1970); Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 59 S.Ct. 

777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1938). Moreover, whether the fee judgment is 

6. The Trustees of the Stagecoach Development Fund objected to 

class counsel's proposal that the notes be returned to them to be 

cancelled and returned to the makers, subject to payment of 20% of 

the outstanding principal and interest on them, taking the 

position that the provision in order 1978-21 for payment of 

attorneys' fees upon forgiveness or partial forgiveness of the 

notes was not applicable to the situation in which the notes were 

deemed extinguished by a finding that further development of 

Stagecoach was not feasible and, in any event, did not authorize 

delivery or assignment of the notes to class counsel. See Reply 

of the Trustees of Stagecoach Development Fund to the Motion and 

Explanation of Class Counsel for an Order Implementing Return of 

Westinghouse Notes to Lot Purchasers at Stagecoach (R. Vol. I at 

20). See also Order 1979-12 (R. Vol. I at 21). 

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Appellate Case: 86-2239 Document: 01019962678 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 6 
void for lack of in personam jurisdiction is, in this case, a 

question exclusively of federal law, no state long arm statute or 

other state law having been invoked. See F.R.Civ. P. 60(b) (4) and 

11 c. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 2862 at 

p. 198 (1973). We conclude, therefore, that the corollary issue 

of whether a party's conduct may estop him from asserting the 

invalidity of a judgment on the ground that it is void for lack of 

personal jurisdiction over him must be determined by federal law. 

Cf. The Petromanagement Corp. v. Acme-Thomas Joint Venture, 835 

F.2d 1329, 1332-33 (10th Cir. 1988) (as a general rule, federal law 

determines the res judicata effect of a federal court's judgment). 

As a matter of federal common law, one who accepts and retains the 

benefits of a void judgment, invalid for lack of in personam 

jurisdiction, is es topped to assert its invalidity. Burgess v. 

Nail, 103 F.2d 37, 44 (10th Cir. 1939). Appellant accepted and 

retained the benefit of cancellation of his note more than six 

years prior to seeking relief from the judgment for attorneys' 

fees. See Order 1979-19, approving Orders 1979-10 & 1979-12 (R. 

Vol. I at 30, 18 & 21). See also Deposition of Robert B. Hopkins 

at pp. 70-71, Exhibit "E" to Memorandum of Class Counsel in 

Opposition to Ronald B. Hopkins' "Motion for Relief from Judgment 

and Other Relief" (R. Vol. I at 38). He is therefore estopped to 

attack that judgment on the ground that it is void for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. Accord, Burgess v. Nail, 103 F.2d at 44. 

Were we to apply Colorado law to determine the effect of 

Appellant's acceptance and retention of benefits of a judgment 

asserted to be void for lack of personal jurisdiction, the result 

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Appellate Case: 86-2239 Document: 01019962678 Date Filed: 02/08/1989 Page: 7 
would be the same. See People ex rel. Kuiper v. Winden, 580 P.2d 

1238, 1240-41 (Colo. 1978) (en bane); In re Estate of Lee, 170 

Colo. 419, 462 P.2d 492 (1969); Wilson v. Automobile owners 

Association Insurance Co., 152 Colo. 431, 382 P.2d 815 (1963) (en 

bane). 

The order of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado denying class member and judgment debtor 

Ronald B. Hopkins' Rule 60(b) (4) motion from relief from the fee 

judgment is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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