Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01578/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01578-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 

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1

The Honorable Ralph R. Erickson, United States District Judge for the District

of North Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1578

___________

Douglas F. Longie, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the

* District of North Dakota.

Spirit Lake Tribe; Spirit Lake Health *

Administration; Spirit Lake Tribe *

Refuse Control Services, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: December 13, 2004

Filed: March 7, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, LAY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Douglas L. Longie appeals the district court’s1

 dismissal of his case for lack of

federal jurisdiction and, alternatively, for his failure to exhaust tribal court remedies.

We affirm.

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I.

This appeal involves a dispute between the Spirit Lake Tribe and one of its

members over two tracts of land within the Spirit Lake Nation Indian Reservation.

Longie, an enrolled tribal member, submitted a request for a land exchange to the

tribe in 1976, seeking to trade his family’s 40-acre allotment (No. DLS-888) for the

80-acre Devils Lake Sioux Allotment No. SL-0878. Congress originally allotted the

40-acre plot to Longie’s family members; the 80 acres are tribal lands. The United

States holds both land parcels in trust. In negotiating the transfer, both parties

acknowledged that they would transfer only their existing interests in the land and

that the land would retain its associated restrictions and conditions. The transfer,

once complete, would be subject to the approval of the Bureau of Indian Affairs of

the Department of the Interior, as is required for all exchanges of Indian trust land.

See 25 U.S.C. § 464.

Believing that the agreement would soon be finalized, Longie made

improvements on the 80-acre parcel, including a road and a well. The tribal council

passed Resolution No. A05-86-069, authorizing the transfer, and Longie signed the

deed to transfer title to his land. The transfer remained incomplete, however, because

the tribal council members did not sign the deed authorizing the formal transfer of

title. Longie began living on the land and made additional improvements over the

years. He continues to receive rent income from his family’s 40-acre allotment,

which was never formally transferred to the tribe.

Longie received a letter in May 2001 from the Bureau of Indian Affairs

(charged with management of the leasing of Indian lands), stating that the land

transfer had never occurred, that Longie owed $12,075 for unauthorized use of the

land, and that Longie needed to obtain leases from the tribe in order to continue to use

the property. In December 2002, the Spirit Lake Tribe began to build a mini satellite

solid waste transfer station on a portion of the 80-acre plot where Longie resides. 

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Longie had been elected in 1997 by the members of the tribe as Chief Judge

for the Spirit Lake Nation. The tribal council adopted resolutions in 1999 allowing

its members to remove and appoint judges and promptly acted to remove Longie from

his position as Chief Judge. Longie filed suit in the Northern Plains Intertribal Court

of Appeals and in federal court, both of which suits were dismissed for failure to

exhaust tribal remedies. We affirmed the dismissal of the federal court action.

Longie v. Pearson, No. 99-4142, 2000 WL 427630 (8th Cir. Apr. 21, 2000)

(unpublished per curiam). Longie’s subsequently filed tribal court action was

unsuccessful, as was his appeal to the Intertribal Court of Appeals.

3

As a preliminary matter, Longie argues that the district court abused its

discretion in not granting his request to amend his complaint. His argument is

immaterial if the urged bases for subject matter jurisdiction in the amended complaint

would nevertheless result in dismissal. We have held that amended complaints,

although liberally permitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), may be denied if there has

been undue delay, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, the

amendment would be futile, or unfair prejudice would result. See Roberson v. Hayti

Police Dep’t, 241 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2001). Here, the district court evaluated the

amended complaint and, concluding that it would be futile, dismissed the case

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Longie filed this action in federal district court in August 2003 seeking quiet

title, an injunction against the waste transfer station, and other equitable relief. He

believed that he would face prejudice and unfair treatment if he tried to proceed in

tribal court because of a prior dispute with tribal council members.2

 Longie sought

to amend his complaint to add bases for federal jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1361

and 1362) and to add the United States as a party (based on its belief that it is an

indispensable party), along with other government agencies. The tribe moved to

dismiss on numerous grounds. The district court dismissed the case, finding that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the case did not raise a federal question and

the other jurisdictional provisions were inapplicable.

II.

Longie argues on appeal that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over his

case under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1361.3

 We review questions of subject matter

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without formally accepting the amended complaint. Its decision to do so was

appropriate and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

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jurisdiction de novo. Prince v. Ark. Bd. of Examiners in Psychology, 380 F.3d 337,

340 (8th Cir. 2004). We conclude that the district court properly held that it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to resolve this dispute.

Federal courts have consistently affirmed the principle that it is important to

guard “the authority of Indian governments over their reservations.” Williams v. Lee,

358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959); see also Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 387-88 (1976)

(per curiam) (finding no state court jurisdiction over adoption of child member of the

tribe because such jurisdiction “would interfere with the powers of [tribal] selfgovernment” and “would cause a corresponding decline in the authority of the Tribal

Court”). In light of the fact that “Indian tribes retain attributes of sovereignty over

both their members and their territory,” and out of our obligation to avoid impairing

“the authority of the tribal courts,” United States ex rel. Kishell v. Turtle Mountain

Housing Auth., 816 F.2d 1273, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987), we will exercise our section

1331 jurisdiction in cases involving reservation affairs only in those cases in which

federal law is determinative of the issues involved. See Smith v. McCullough, 270

U.S. 456, 459 (1926) (stating that either the suit “was one arising under the [federal]

legislation relating to Quapaw allotments, or was one where there was an absence of

federal jurisdiction”). This is particularly true when, as here, the case involves an

intra-tribal dispute.

This case is not one “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Longie argues that his claim

raises a federal question because it implicates the tribe’s possessory interest in the

land, protected by the United States in trust. Section 1331 jurisdiction, however, does

not broadly incorporate every case that indirectly implicates an interest that is

grounded in the laws of the United States. See Schulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561,

569-70 (1912). A case does not “arise under” the laws of the United States “unless

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it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity,

construction or effect of such a law, upon the determination of which the result

depends.” Id. (finding no jurisdiction even though the title to the land at issue had

originally been granted under an act of Congress creating allotments for individual

Indians); see also Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 114 (1936) (finding

that “[t]here is no necessary connection between the enforcement of [ ] a contract

according to its terms and the existence of a controversy arising under federal law”

just because the contract implicated federal statutory obligations).

We therefore ask whether federal law or local/tribal law controls the existence

and enforceability of Longie’s asserted right. See Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala

Sioux Housing Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 672 (8th Cir. 1986). We agree with our sister

circuits that a federal question exists if the outcome is “controlled or conditioned by

Federal law,” Prairie Band of the Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians v. Puckkee, 321 F.2d

767, 770 (10th Cir. 1963), but does not exist if “the ‘real substance of the

controversy’ centers upon” something other than the construction of federal law.

Littel v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486, 488 (9th Cir. 1965) (citation omitted) (noting that a

retainer contract dispute “center[ed] upon the contract and its construction,” not the

fact that federal law required approval of the contract by federal officials before it

was enforceable). If an interpretation of tribal or local law is necessary to establish

or clarify a right sought to be enforced based on a contract, then jurisdiction under

section 1331 does not exist, even if the subject of the contract is Indian trust property.

Weeks Constr., 797 F.2d at 672. Similarly, if the dispute centers on discretionary

tribal action that affects tribal members, it is not a federal question, even if the

discretionary act was taken pursuant to a federal statute and with the approval of the

Secretary of the Interior. See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 273 F.2d 731, 732-34

(10th Cir. 1959) (finding that the district court did not have jurisdiction to issue a

declaration that Martinez was a member of the tribe and should have received per

capita payments designated by the tribe to its members because the dispute centered

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Even when an Indian law case involves a federal question, other

jurisprudential considerations may nevertheless prevent it from proceeding in federal

district court. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855-56. For example, with very few

exceptions we require that the parties exhaust tribal court remedies so that the tribal

court may first consider the limits of its own sovereignty and may develop a full

record. Id. at 856; see also Reservation Tel. Coop. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 76 F.3d

181, 184 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding exhaustion necessary in case involving tribal

authority to tax telephone lines and rights of way on reservation land).

5

We agree with Judge Hazel’s conclusion in United States v. Seneca Nation of

New York Indians, 274 F. 946, 951 (W.D.N.Y. 1921):

[I]n the absence of congressional action bestowing upon the individual

Indians the right to litigate internal questions relating to their property

rights in the federal courts, and conferring jurisdiction upon this court

to determine such controversies, this court should not assume

jurisdiction.

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on the tribe’s exercise of discretionary authority, not the federal statute authorizing

the tribe to make such designations).

The interpretation of federal law is central, however, to the resolution of cases

that involve the question whether a tribal court has exceeded its jurisdiction. National

Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985) (finding

jurisdiction under section 1331 because federal common law establishes the limits of

tribal sovereignty).4

 It is also central to cases that involve whether a federal agency

action is unlawful. See Goodface v. Grassrope, 708 F.2d 335, 338 (8th Cir. 1983)

(finding jurisdiction to review a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) officer’s refusal to

recognize a newly elected tribal council due to a tribal election dispute). Yet agency

action is reviewable only after it has occurred. The fact that the Secretary of the

Interior must approve every land transfer within a reservation does not establish that

every dispute related to a transfer of land involves a federal question.5

 See Id.; see

also Conroy v. Conroy, 369 F. Supp. 179, 180 (D. S.D. 1973) (stating that “[i]t is well

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settled that merely because there is some federal involvement—because the land is

trust property—does not create a federal question”).

Longie’s right to ownership of the 80-acre plot is contingent upon whether the

tribe legally consented to and effectuated the transfer, i.e., whether there was an

express or implied contract or other legal basis to force the tribe to honor its

resolution consenting to the transfer. This intra-tribal matter is contingent upon tribal

law, not federal law. Longie contends that the federal courts may order the land

transfer as part of the remedy he seeks. We disagree. Neither the federal courts nor

the Secretary of the Interior has authority to determine in the first instance that a land

transfer should occur between a tribe and a member of that tribe. The Secretary’s

authority is limited to the choice of whether to approve or deny a completed and

voluntary land transfer agreement by the parties involved. 25 U.S.C. § 464. That

limited statutory authority, grounded in the trust responsibility of the United States

and its fee interest in Indian lands, is the only federal law concept implicated in this

case, and it is insufficient to provide jurisdiction under section 1331.

Longie also argues that the federal district court has jurisdiction over his case

under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. He claims to be seeking a writ of mandamus against the

United States and contends that the United States has a duty to honor the previously

agreed-upon land exchange. His claim fails, however, because he has not named a

federal officer as a defendant and because he has not identified a legal basis for the

duty he claims exists. For section 1361 to apply, the plaintiff must seek “to compel

an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty

owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Mandamus may issue under section 1361

against an officer of the United States “only when the plaintiff has a clear right to

relief, the defendant has a clear duty to perform the act in question, and the plaintiff

has no adequate alternative remedy.” Borntrager v. Stevas, 772 F.2d 419, 420 (8th

Cir. 1985).

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Even if Longie had identified the federal officer who is responsible for

approving land transfers within the reservation, that officer would not have a duty to

act—and in fact, as detailed above, would lack authority to act—on a land transfer

until it has been established that the transfer was voluntary and complete in every

other respect. Longie cannot claim that the Secretary of the Interior refused to

approve a land transfer that was never presented to him for approval because the

predicate steps never took place. See, e.g., Martinez, 273 F.2d at 734.

Our holding does not preclude Longie from seeking relief in tribal court. The

tribal court is well suited to determine whether a binding agreement existed between

Longie and the tribe regarding the land exchange and whether any obligations still

exist under that agreement.

The order of dismissal is affirmed.

______________________________

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