Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01528/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01528-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MARGARET LUETHJE, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

FILED 

United Stat-es Court cf Appeals 'T'·'l!\th 0.:r,.·•it 

APR 141989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 87-1528 

} 

THE PEAVINE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ADAIR COUNTY,) 

RICHARD ACORN, President of the Peavine ) 

Board of Eduction; LONNIE MARTIN, Vice ) 

President and Member of the Peavine Board ) 

of Eduction; JOHN KESTER, Clerk and Member ) 

of the Peavine Board of Eduction; WILLIE ) 

MEANS, Principal of Peavine School; and ) 

BURL BIGBEE, County Superintendent of ) 

Schools for Adair County, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 85-666-C) 

Louis w. Bullock of Bullock & Bullock, TulsaF Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Gene L. Mortensen of Rosenstein, Fist & Ringold, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 

for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before LOGAN, McWILLIAMS, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-1528 Document: 01019595736 Date Filed: 04/14/1989 Page: 1 
Plaintiff Margaret Luethje was a cafeteria employee from 

1984-86 at a school operated by defendant school district. During 

that time she complained to the principal, school board, and state 

and county health' departments about what she considered unsanitary 

practices in the cafeteria, which included the serving of spoiled 

food to children, and the school's refusal to do anything about 

them. On October 15, 1985, the school board ·adopted and 

disseminated the following rule for lunchroom personnel: "If you 

have any problems, consult [the principal]. Don't take any school 

problems other places, or discuss it [sicl with others." Brief of 

Appellant, app. B., exh. 1. The notice additionally stated that 

if employees "can't accept our wishes and work together agreeably 

••• other measures will need to be taken.» Id. Defendants 

concede that, the policy was enacted "to address both the external 

and internal problems reported by [plaintiff) Luethje." Brief of 

Appellees at 15. 

Ten days later plaintiff filed suit and alleged that the 

quoted rule infringed upon her First Amendment right to speak out 

on issues of public importance. On November 19, 1985, eight days 

before a hearing was scheduled on plaintiff's motion for a 

preliminary injunction, the school board removed from the rule the 

language prohibiting cafeteria employees from discussing school 

problems with others. Plaintiff then moved to withdraw her 

request for an injunction on the ground that the board's action 

effectively gave her the relief she desired. Later, after 

resigning from her employment with the school district, she 

dismissed her suit. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1528 Document: 01019595736 Date Filed: 04/14/1989 Page: 2 
The question presented is whether plaintiff is entitled to 

attorney's fees as a "prevailing party" under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. A 

civil rights plaintiff who does not receive a judicial 

determination on the merits but who obtains relief from a 

defendant qualifies as a "prevailing party" if she shows "(1) that 

[her} lawsuit is causally linked to securing the relief obtained 

and (2) that the defendant's conduct in response to the lawsuit 

was required by law." J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie, 767 

F~2d 1469, 1473, 1475 (lOth Cir. 1985). In this case, there is no 

question but that the school board's revision of its rule gave 

plaintiff the relief she desired. The district court denied 

attorney's fees, however, finding that plaintiff's suit did not 

cause the change and that the change was not required by law. The 

first of these findings we review under the clearly erroneous 

standard and the second we review de novo. See Supre v. Ricketts, 

792 F.2d 958, 962 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

We conclude that the district court's causation finding was 

clearly erroneous. The plaintiff's suit need not have been the 

sole reason for the defendants' action; it is enough that 

plaintiff's actions were a significant catalyst or a substantial 

factor in causing defendants to act. Id.; ~also Posada v. Lamb 

County, Tex., 716 F.2d 1066, 1072 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1983). Here, 

the sequence of events detailed above strongly indicates that 

plaintiff's suit was, at the very least, a significant catalyst or 

substantial factor in causing defendants to change their policy. 

See Ortiz De Arroyo v. Barcelo, 765 F.2d 275, 282 (lst Cir. 1985) 

(chronology of events is 11 an important factor" in deciding 

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Appellate Case: 87-1528 Document: 01019595736 Date Filed: 04/14/1989 Page: 3 
causation); Posada, 716 F.2d at 1072 (same). In addition, and 

more importantly, defendants conceded both here and in the trial 

court that their change in policy was to quell the disharmony 

caused by plaintiff's complaints. R. Doc. 5 at 10; Brief of 

Appellees at 15. Indeed, defendants admitted that they challenged 

plaintiff's fee request in the district court only on the grounds 

that her claim was meritless. ·such a challenge addresses the 

"required by law" prong of our required analysis, not the 

causation prong. Plaintiff's failure to introduce further 

evidence of causation, about which defendants now complain, is 

excusable in light of defendants' concession of causation, the 

strong evidence from the sequence of events, and defendants' 

failure to introduce any evidence about what might have been an 

alternative cause of defendants' change in policy. Thus, we have 

a definite and firm conviction that plaintiff's actions caused the 

school board to act, and we hold that the district court's finding 

of no causation was clearly erroneous. 

There is very little in the record or the briefs regarding 

whether defendants' November 19 change of the rule's language was 

required by law. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that, reasonably 

construed in light of the events that gave rise to it, the rule 

was intended to be a prior restraint on plaintiff's complaints, 

which we hold were speech of public concern, and was broad enough 

to prohibit other speech of public concern. It prohibited the 

cafeteria employees from talking to anyone but the principal about 

"school problems," 

action for breach. 

and impliedly threatened adverse employment 

It is unnecessary for plaintiff to establish 

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Appellate Case: 87-1528 Document: 01019595736 Date Filed: 04/14/1989 Page: 4 
that no court would have given a sufficiently narrowing 

construction to the rule to render it constitutional. Cf. Grayned 

v. City of Rockford, 408 u.s. 104, 110 (1972) (not within federal 

court's power to construe and narrow state laws}. Finally, we 

hold that defendants' interest in efficient functioning of the 

school did not override plaintiff's First Amendment rights to the 

extent necessary to justify the rule the board adopted. 

In the context of deciding what speech may subject an 

employee to disciplinary action, the Supreme Court has held that 

government employees cannot be compelled to give up their First 

Amendment right to ''comment on matters of public interest in 

connection with the operation of the public schools in which they 

work ... Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). At 

the same time, of course, a governmental body also has an interest 

in performing its work efficiently and effectively. Id.i Connick 

v. Myers, 461 u.s. 138, 142 (1983). Thus, whether the board's 

policy was unconstitutional depends on whether it potentially 

stifled speech of public concern, and, if so, whether the policy 

was permissible in any event, considering the interests of both 

the employee and the district. See Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 

789, 795-96 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff's complaints about unsanitary practices in the 

school's cafeteria and the administration's refusal to address 

them clearly dealt with matters of public concern. This speech 

can be "fairly considered as relating to (a] matter of political, 

social or other concern to the community," Connick, 461 u.s. at 

146,. especially since it concerned a government body's negligent 

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Appellate Case: 87-1528 Document: 01019595736 Date Filed: 04/14/1989 Page: 5 
or wrongful behavior. See Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 

1436, 1446 n.l7 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 262 (1988); 

see also Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (speech 

regarding university's violations of athletic rules, which might 

indicate mismanagement by administration, was of public concern). 

This conclusion is bolstered by the Supreme Court's broad 

definition of what constitutes speech of public concern. See, 

~, Rankin v. McPherson, 107 s. Ct. 2891, 2898 (1987) (state 

employee's remark that she hoped next assassination attempt on 

President Reagan would be successful, made in context of political 

discussion, was protected speech of public concern); Pickering, 

391 u.s. at 572 (teacher's expression of opinion on merits of bond 

issue was speech of public concern). Thus, the board could not, 

without overriding justification, attempt to stifle plaintiff's 

complaints. 

Our next inquiry must be whether the school's interest in 

efficient functioning sufficiently outweighed plaintiff's First 

Amendment rights so as to justify the board's prohibition on 

public speech by cafeteria employees. See Conaway, 853 F.2d at 

795-96. Specifically, once we find that the rule prohibits 

protected speech, we must find the rule unconstitutional unless 

the board shows that it is necessary to the effective performance 

of the school or of the employee. Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 

1313, 1318 (lOth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987). 

We conclude that the defendants have not met their burden. In 

balancing competing government and employee interests, we must 

look at all the facts, including the employer's actions, the 

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Appellate Case: 87-1528 Document: 01019595736 Date Filed: 04/14/1989 Page: 6 
affected employees, and the affected speech. Rankin, 107 s. Ct. 

at 2899. Plaintiff held no "confidential, policymaking, or public 

contact role" that might justify greater restrictions on her 

speech, Koch, 847 F.2d at 1452 (citation omitted); ~also 

Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2900, nor did the plaintiff's complaints 

bear negatively on her ability to do her job. Cf. Koch, 847 F.2d 

at 1449-52. In addition, although plaintiff's complaints 

apparently created a community controversy, the district 

introduced no evidence that her speech impaired the discipline and 

effective operation of the school. ~Conaway, 853 F . 2d at 797; 

~also Piver v. Pender County Bd. of Educ., 835 F.2d 1076, 1081 

(4th Cir. 1987} (though school board has legitimate interest in 

maintaining harmony among school employees, threat of "turmoil," 

without other evidence regarding impairment of school's function, 

cannot justify restrictions on speech of public concern}, cert. 

denied, 108 S. Ct. 2847 (1988). Guidelines for school employees ' 

public comments might in some circumstances be permissible, but 

the broadly worded rule here covered more ground than was 

necessary to satisfy the school's interest in functioning 

efficiently. 

We conclude that plaintiff's actions were a substantial 

factor in causing the school board's change in policy and that t he 

change was required by law. Thus, having "obtained the substance 

of what [she] sought," Hewitt v. Helms, 107 s. Ct. 2672, 2676 

(1987), plaintiff is a "prevailing party" under 42 u.s.c. 1988. 

As such, and because defendants do not argue that an award of fees 

would be an injustice to them, plaintiff is entitled to her 

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Appellate Case: 87-1528 Document: 01019595736 Date Filed: 04/14/1989 Page: 7 
attorney's fees in the instant action . See Chicano Police 

Officer's Ass•n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127, 129-30 (lOth Cir. 1980) 

{though 42 u.s.c. § 1988 says court "may" award fees to prevailing 

party, discretion 

would be unjust). 

to deny them limited to cases in which award 

We remand to the district court for such 

hearings as it may find necessary to establish a reasonable fee 

fo·r the time plaintiff's attorney spent both in the trial court 

and on this appeal. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1528 Document: 01019595736 Date Filed: 04/14/1989 Page: 8