Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01251/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01251-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

LISA WILMOTH, individually; LISA

WILMOTH and BO WILMOTH on behalf

of their minor daughter EMILY

WILMOTH, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant. 

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 No. CV-05-1251-PHX-FJM

 ORDER

The court now has before it a "Stipulation Regarding Proposed Terms of Form of

Final Judgment" (doc. 82), defendant's memorandum (doc. 83), and plaintiffs' memorandum

(doc. 84). 

The only issue upon which the parties do not agree remains the question of whether

any portion of plaintiffs' counsel's attorney's fees should be attributed to the award of Emily's

future medical expenses and deducted prior to the establishment of the reversionary trust.

Plaintiffs argue that it would be more equitable if each portion of this court's assessment of

damages bore its fair share of attorney's fees. And, in reliance on Robak v. United States,

658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981), plaintiffs contend that we do not have the discretion to relieve

the reversionary trust of its fair share of attorney's fees.

Case 2:05-cv-01251-FJM Document 85 Filed 05/10/07 Page 1 of 3
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The government contends that its interests and those of the minor both point in favor

of funding the reversionary trust for medical expenses in the full amount of the damage

award. In this way, Emily will always have the certainty of coverage for future medical

expenses.

We reject plaintiffs' contention that the Robak case suggests we have no discretion

here. Robak merely stated that the court could not interfere with the plaintiff's 25%

contingent fee. No matter which way we rule on the issue before us now, plaintiffs'

counsel's right to attorney's fees under his agreement with his client is not affected. Robak

does not address the authority of the court to enter final judgment in the proper amount of

the award.

 We are persuaded by the reasoning of Hull v. United States, 971 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir.

1992), that the court has the inherent power to place a money judgment in a reversionary trust

in ways that protect the minor's best interests. As the court there stated "[u]ltimately, the

district court has the inherent power to ensure that [the minor] obtains the maximum benefit

from his award." Id. at 1506. 

Here the parties have stipulated to a reversionary trust. And while plaintiffs will also

be setting up a separate trust for the remainder of the damage award under the supervision

of the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County, the proposed living trust attached to

plaintiffs' memorandum (doc. 84), devotes more attention to Emily's beneficiaries than to

Emily. For example, while the form document is some 54 pages long, only Article IV,

consisting of a page and one-half, addresses the administration of the trust during Emily's

minority. The document appears to be a boilerplate form intended for another purpose, i.e.,

a testamentary purpose rather than for the purpose of administering the affairs of a minor

during her minority. For example, we were unable to find any discussion regarding what

should be a central feature to this trust—the relationship between the trustee and the

conservator to be appointed by the superior court. Counsel for plaintiffs and counsel for

defendant declined to accept the suggestion that a guardian ad litem be appointed under Rule

17(c) to protect those interests of Emily that may be independent of the interests of her

Case 2:05-cv-01251-FJM Document 85 Filed 05/10/07 Page 2 of 3
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parents. Mr. Webb, having assumed a fiduciary responsibility for Emily as well as her

parents, is encouraged to examine the proposed Emily Wilmoth Living Trust to see whether

it is sufficient to protect the interests of Emily. We do not here detail all the issues it raises

but, for illustrative purposes, we note that while Section 3.02(a) designates the Bank of

America as a successor trustee of Wells Fargo, Section 3.02(b) seems not to acknowledge

this and instead permits Bo and Lisa Wilmoth to appoint an individual to serve as her

successor trustee.

More significantly, we note that the award for lost income should not even be

considered for distribution until Emily reaches an employment age. And the award for pain

and suffering should not be available for distribution in amounts greater than each year's

proportionate share of the total up to Emily's life expectancy. The living trust provides no

substantive guidance to the trustee. What protects Emily from improvident distributions

during her minority?

At all events, we think that the more protective provisions of the reversionary medical

care trust as compared to the proposed living trust warrant funding the reversionary trust to

the full extent of Emily's future medical expenses. This will maximize the possibility that

Emily's future medical expenses will always be provided for notwithstanding the

administration of the separate living trust.

Accordingly, we are signing the parties proposed final judgment (doc. 82), paragraph

D of which will fund the reversionary trust in the amount of $1,500,000.00 and we are

signing the order establishing the reversionary trust (doc. 80). 

DATED this 10th day of May, 2007.

Case 2:05-cv-01251-FJM Document 85 Filed 05/10/07 Page 3 of 3