Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02261/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02261-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 Plaintiff also filed two motions for relief. (Doc. 40, 41.) In the motions, Plaintiff

appears to seek to supplement his Second Amended Complaint. Rule 15(d) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part that, “the court may, on just terms, permit

a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that

happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Rather than seeking to

supplement his Second Amended Complaint concerning intervening events, Plaintiff seeks

to repeat claims already made. His motions for relief will therefore be denied. 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Leonard O’Dell, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Detention Officer Abbott, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 11-2261-PHX-RCB (MHB)

ORDER

Plaintiff Leonard O’Dell, who is confined in the Fourth Avenue Jail, filed a pro se

civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which the Court dismissed with leave

to amend. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, which the Court also dismissed for

failure to state a claim with leave to amend. (Doc. 30, 35.) Plaintiff has filed a Second

Amended Complaint.1

 (Doc. 38.) The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint and this action. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

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a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951.

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts

must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th

Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam)).

II. Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff alleges six counts concerning conditions of confinement, denial of

constitutionally adequate medical care, unconstitutional disciplinary proceedings, excessive

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2

 See http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/012012/m5045615.pdf

(last visited February 6, 2012). 

3

 On January 12, 2011, Plaintiff was sentenced to 3.5 years in prison for aggravated

assault. See http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/012011/m4555472.pdf

(last visited February 6, 2012). In the three pending cases, Plaintiff is charged with

promotion of prison contraband, aggravated assault, and destruction or injury to jail property.

See http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CriminalCourtCases/caseInfo.asp?case

Number=CR2011-007699;http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CriminalCourt

Cases/caseInfo.asp?caseNumber=CR2011-101449; http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov

/docket/CriminalCourtCases/caseInfo.asp?caseNumber=CR2011-146392; http://www.

superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CriminalCourtCases/caseInfo.asp?case

Number=CR2010-048132 (last visited February 6, 2012).

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force, deprivation of property, and search and seizure. Plaintiff sues the following current

or former employees of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO): Detention Officers

Abbott, Delatorre, Kanar, Papp, Richardson, Baker, Dunn, Looning, McCuller; Sergeants

Rose, Curtis, and Hayes; and medical staff-member, Yolanda. Plaintiff seeks compensatory

relief. 

Background

Plaintiff is charged in three criminal cases in Maricopa County Superior Court, case#

CR2011-146392, CR2011-101449, and CR2011-007699.2

 The charges in all three cases

appear to stem from incidents while Plaintiff was incarcerated in connection with an earlier

case, CR2010-048132.3

III. Failure to State a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the

conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v.

Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, to state a valid constitutional

claim, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of

a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the

conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

A. Conditions of Confinement

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Plaintiff designates Count I as a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

A pretrial detainee’s claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement arises under the

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, while a convicted inmate’s claim arises under

the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Bell v. Wolfish,

441 U.S. 520, 535 and n.16 (1979). Nevertheless, the same standards are applied. See Frost

v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). To state a constitutional claim for

unconstitutional conditions of confinement, an inmate must allege facts to support that he

was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of harm and that jail officials

were “deliberately indifferent” to those risks. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33

(1994); Redman v. County of Los Angeles, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).

Thus, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that he is incarcerated under conditions posing

a substantial risk of harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Only deprivations denying the minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to violate the Eighth Amendment.

Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). These are “deprivations of essential

food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.”

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981). Whether a condition of confinement rises

to the level of a constitutional violation may depend, in part, on the duration of an inmate’s

exposure to that condition. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Hutto

v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978)). “The more basic the need, the shorter the time it

can be withheld.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1287, 1259 (9th Cir. 1982). 

A plaintiff must also allege facts to support that a defendant had a “sufficiently

culpable state of mind,” i.e., that the official acted with deliberate indifference to inmate

health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. In defining “deliberate indifference” in the

confinement context, the Supreme Court has imposed a subjective test: “the official must

both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. A plaintiff must also allege

how he was injured by the alleged unconstitutional conditions. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (doctrine of standing requires that claimant have suffered or will

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imminently suffer actual harm).

Plaintiff alleges in part that he has been verbally harassed. However, “[v]erbal

harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation[.]’” Oltarzewski

v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827

(10th Cir. 1979)); Machin v. Costas, No. Civ. 09-444, 2009 WL 3839325, at *15 (S.D. Cal.

Nov. 16, 2009). Plaintiff also complains of a one-time fifteen minute delay in access to a

toilet. A one-time delay in access to a toilet does not rise to the level of an unconstitutional

condition of confinement. These portions of Count I will be dismissed.

Plaintiff also alleges that he was denied recreation. The long-term denial of outdoor

recreation and exercise can rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Keenan, 83

F.3d at 1089-90. Plaintiff alleges that he was not offered recreation on October 29, 30, 31,

and November 1, and 3, 2011, “and dates in between.” (Doc. 38 at 6.) He also alleges that

he spent 30 days in a cell without recreation. Plaintiff otherwise alleges that Officer Starks

refused recreation on two days, Richardson refused recreation on one day, and Abbott and

Delatorre either denied recreation or otherwise somehow caused Plaintiff problems.

However, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that any Defendant denied him recreation

for a prolonged period. He also fails to allege facts to support that any Defendant enacted

or enforced a policy, custom, or practice that resulted in the denial of Plaintiff’s

constitutional right to recreation or facts to support that any Defendant directly denied his

right to recreation on anything more than an occasional basis and despite knowledge that

such denial posed an excessive risk to Plaintiff. For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a

claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement in Count I and it will be dismissed.

B. Medical Care

Plaintiff designates Count II as a claim for denial of constitutionally adequate medical

care. Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a

violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429

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U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating

that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent.

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted).

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both know

of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate indifference in the

medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain

or possible medical need and harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a prison official intentionally denies,

delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to the

prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due

care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor gross

negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of

Corrections, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter

Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion does

not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez v.

Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, without more, is

insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference. See Shapley

v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). The indifference

must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from asthma and sometimes needs to use an inhaler.

He further alleges the following: on June 6, 2011, he asked an unidentified person for an

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inhaler, but did not receive it. On July 19, 2011, an unidentified person refused to bring his

inhaler or summon medical assistance when Plaintiff was in “bad shape.” (Doc. 38 at 9.)

On July 24, 2011, Plaintiff asked an unidentified person for his inhaler, three hours later,

Officer Coles brought it. On August 15, 2011, an unidentified person refused to bring

Plaintiff’s inhaler or summon medical assistance. On November 2, 2011, Plaintiff was

requesting assistance over the intercom when music began playing and then the intercom was

turned off. On September 18, 2011, Plaintiff pushed the intercom to request his inhaler but

was told by an unidentified person to wait while that person notified the floor officer.

Officer Kanar came with Plaintiff’s inhaler, but did not hand the inhaler to his partner so as

to avoid a confrontation with Plaintiff. Plaintiff asked Kanar to give his inhaler to another

officer, but Kanar did not. Kanar left without summoning a nurse or doctor to “look over

[Plaintiff’s] pain.” (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff alleges that he was having difficulty breathing.

Apparently on March 9 and 10, 2012, Plaintiff’s cell and window were covered with

bedding material. Kanar and Nurse Yolanda passed Plaintiff’s cell without distributing

Plaintiff’s medications to him and ignored his yells. On another occasion, Plaintiff requested

his inhaler from Officer Rosario, while Rogers and Papp were present. According to

Plaintiff, Papp refused to move so that Plaintiff could receive his inhaler and Plaintiff waited

until the next day to receive the inhaler, while in “severe shape.” (Id. at 11.) Papp also

turned off water on occasion when there was no flooding or other harm and Plaintiff was

unable to shower to breathe. 

Plaintiff indicates that he has asthma and sometimes requires an inhaler. Assuming

that Plaintiff’s asthma rises to the level of a serious medical need, Plaintiff fails to describe

the severity of his symptoms when he requested his inhaler, or other medical attention, on

the relevant dates. Further, Plaintiff generally fails to allege facts to support that named

Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Plaintiff

complains of delays in receiving his inhaler or other medications, and that Kanar failed to

meet him half-way to resolve their differences, but these allegations do not support that

Kanar or any other Defendant denied or delayed access to medications despite knowledge

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4

 Thus:

Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention amounts to

“punishment” in the constitutional sense, however. Once the Government has

exercised its conceded authority to detain a person pending trial, it obviously

is entitled to employ devices that are calculated to effectuate this detention.

Traditionally, this has meant confinement in a facility which, no matter how

modern or how antiquated, results in restricting the movement of a detainee in

a manner in which he would not be restricted if he simply were free to walk

the streets pending trial. Whether it be called a jail, a prison, or a custodial

center, the purpose of the facility is to detain. Loss of freedom of choice and

privacy are inherent incidents of confinement in such a facility. And the fact

that such detention interferes with the detainee’s understandable desire to live

as comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible during

confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into

“punishment.” 

Bell, 441 U.S. at 537.

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of a serious risk to Plaintiff’s health, i.e., that they acted with deliberate indifference to

Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Accordingly, Count II will be dismissed for failure to state

a claim.

C. Disciplinary Proceedings

Plaintiff designates Count III as a claim for denial of due process in connection with

Jail disciplinary proceedings. A pretrial detainee has a substantive due process right against

restrictions that amount to punishment for a criminal offense. Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302

F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987);

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Redman, 942 F.2d at 1440-41. This right is

violated if restrictions are “imposed for the purpose of punishment.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 535.

But jail officials are entitled to impose restrictions to effect confinement, and detention

necessarily affects a detainee’s ability to live as comfortably as he might like; a de minimis

level of imposition is permissible.4

 Id. at 539 n.21. Thus, no unconstitutional punishment

occurs when the government imposes restrictions as part of legitimate operational concerns

to ensure security and order. Id. at 540. Nevertheless, imposition of punishment for

violation of rules does require the procedural protections described by the Supreme Court in

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565-66 (1974). Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 524

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(9th Cir. 1996). These safeguards are: (1) written notice of the charges at least twenty-four

hours prior to the hearing; (2) a written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied

on and reasons for the disciplinary action; and (3) a limited right to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence when it would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or

correctional goals to allow the inmate to do so. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565-66. Thus, to assert

a claim for denial of due process in connection with disciplinary proceedings, a plaintiff must

allege the circumstances surrounding the disciplinary charge, the safeguard(s) he was

allegedly denied, and the punishment imposed.

In Count III, Plaintiff generally alleges that Abbott, Kanar, McCuller, Delatorre, Papp,

Baker, Looning, Dunn, and Richardson, and Sergeants Curtis, Rose and Hayes have

sanctioned him with more than 200 days for rule infractions. He contends that because he

has quarreled with staff in the past, staff now look for reasons to charge him with infractions.

Plaintiff claims that Curtis “denied” or “chilled” his free speech rights, without alleging

when, where, or how. He also asserts that he has been denied the right to compel witnesses

to appear at disciplinary proceedings. 

Plaintiff fails to allege when and with what disciplinary infractions he was charged

or to allege how he was denied due process. Instead, his allegations are vague and

conclusory. Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action.

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further,

a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the

claim that were not initially pled. Id. Because Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that

he was denied due process in connection with any disciplinary proceeding, including when,

where, how, and by whom, he fails to state a claim in Count III. 

D. Compulsory Process & Attorney Access

Plaintiff characterizes Count IV as a claim for denial of the right to compulsory

process and the assistance of counsel. Plaintiff alleges the following: on October 8, 2011,

he was housed in the maximum security unit (SMU) at the Fourth Avenue Jail. At some

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point, Plaintiff submitted a request for a legal call 24-hours in advance. As Plaintiff was

conversing with a sergeant about acts of one of the sergeant’s subordinates, Abbott, Plaintiff

sought to be fed something other than “the loaf.” (Doc. 38 at 13.) The sergeant brought up

that something he believed to be urine had been thrown on him. Plaintiff told him that water,

rather than urine, had been thrown. Sergeant Rose overheard part of this discussion and

walked out to the run and asked “who throws urine on my officers?” Plaintiff contends Rose

thereby breached confidentiality. A Security Response Team (SRT) was called and

demolished a cell, which Plaintiff speculates was to get back at him for having allegedly

assaulted an employee. While on disciplinary confinement, Plaintiff was denied visits and

access to the telephone. On November 28, 2011, Plaintiff had a legal visit and then needed

to make a legal call. During the legal visit, Abbott walked back and forth “dogging”

Plaintiff’s attorney. (Id. at 14.) After making his legal call, Plaintiff was “rapping” in his

cell when Abbott walked by. (Id.) Abbott asked why Plaintiff was rapping and not making

his call. Plaintiff responded that he had just finished his call. Abbott told Plaintiff that it

would be the last legal call Plaintiff would ever enjoy. Officer Delatorre then called Plaintiff

a “bitch.” (Id.) At that point, a supervisor intervened and Plaintiff was locked down.

Sergeant Tobler brought Plaintiff his meal tray, but never retrieved it as he had promised.

Plaintiff claims that Abbott and Delatorre placed themselves in harm’s way.

As discussed elsewhere, verbal abuse or harassment does not, absent more, rise to the

level of a constitutional violation. Otherwise, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to state a violation

of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff acknowledges that he was allowed to make a legal call.

Plaintiff’s allegation that Sergeant Rose asked who had thrown urine does not, absent any

additional facts, support that Plaintiff’s safety was jeopardized. Plaintiff’s remaining

allegations are vague and conclusory. For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a

constitutional claim in Count IV. 

E. Search and Seizure

Plaintiff characterizes Count V as a claim for violation of his Fourth Amendment

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5

 The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure against

unreasonable searches, and its protections are not extinguished upon incarceration.

Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 322-33 (9th Cir. 1988). However, the Fourth

Amendment “proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines

of the jail cell. The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply

cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and needs and objectives of penal

institutions.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (l984). The searches of Plaintiff’s

cell, absent more, do not state a constitutional violation.

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rights5 and deprivation of property. Plaintiff alleges the following: on September 7, 2010,

he returned from court to find his cell had been “demolished.” (Doc. 38 at 17.) Missing

from his cell were magazines, a medical splint, and two honey buns. On May 17, 2011,

Plaintiff returned to his cell from court to again find his cell had been searched and items

were missing. 

Plaintiff fails to allege the involvement by any named Defendant in the cell searches

or deprivation of property. Thus, he fails to state a claim for relief in Count V and it will be

dismissed. 

F. Excessive Force

In Count VI, Plaintiff appears to be attempting to assert a claim for use of excessive

force. The Fourth Amendment applies to excessive force claims by pretrial detainees. See

Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2003). Officials acting under color

of state law may not maliciously and sadistically use force for the purpose of causing harm.

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); Watts v. McKinney, 394 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir.

2005). To state a claim for excessive force, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that an

official used or caused to be used objectively unreasonable force against him. See Brosseau

v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197 (2004). Analysis of an excessive force claim requires

“balancing the ‘nature and quality of the intrusion’ on a person’s liberty with the

‘countervailing governmental interest at stake’ to determine whether the use of force was

objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d

1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395

(1989).

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Plaintiff alleges the following facts: on July 19, 2011, Plaintiff was involved in an

incident during which someone was hurt. On September 2, 2011, Plaintiff was assaulted by

an unidentified person. Since these events, Plaintiff claims that he has been subject to

retaliation. Plaintiff claims that unidentified individuals twice placed themselves in harm’s

way. He also alleges that he was shot with pepper balls and with a taser by Sergeant Hayes,

apparently after Plaintiff refused to comply with orders. Plaintiff also asserts that he asked

that Kanar not deal with him so that there would be no further incidents between them. He

contends that Sergeant Hayes and Kanar and Dunn should have called SRT to deal with him

when he was disruptive, instead of trying to handle the situation themselves. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was shot with pepper balls and a taser by Sergeant Hayes.

However, the facts alleged by Plaintiff do not support that the amount of force used was

unreasonable under the circumstances. Indeed, Plaintiff’s allegations, albeit vague,

ambiguous, and confusing, reflect that force was used after Plaintiff failed to comply with

orders and/or assaulted another employee. Plaintiff’s allegations do not support that the use

of force was unreasonable under the circumstances. To the extent that Plaintiff complains

of retaliation, his allegations are vague and conclusory. For these reasons, Count VI will be

dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

G. Grievance Process

In Count VII, Plaintiff complains about grievance procedures and asserts extreme

abuse or corruptness of power. He alleges that between July 2011 to March 1, 2012, he has

had difficulties obtaining what he considers the proper resolution of his grievances. Plaintiff

complains that Sergeant Stock has done nothing to rectify Plaintiff’s grievances on Stock’s

shift. McCuller, who was the victim of an alleged assault, continues to work on Plaintiff’s

run and incites problems. Plaintiff asked for relief from Dunn and Hayes, without success.

Plaintiff asserts that he has been charged for commissary purchases that he did not make and

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has not received requested medical attention.6 

“There is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a jail grievance procedure.” Mann v.

Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). But if there is an established grievance

procedure, the denial of access to the grievance process may state a constitutional violation.

Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Shaw v.

Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir.

1989). The “government” to which the First Amendment guarantees a right to petition for

redress of grievances includes jail authorities. Hall, 64 F.3d at 1279 (citing Soranno’s Gasco,

Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir.1989)). 

Plaintiff does not allege facts to support that he was denied access to an available jail

grievance procedure. Instead, he complains about the responses to his grievances. That,

absent more, does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Accordingly, Plaintiff

fails to state a claim for violation of his right to petition for redress of grievances.

IV. Dismissal without Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in his Second Amended Complaint, the

Court will dismiss his Second Amended Complaint. “Leave to amend need not be given if

a complaint, as amended, is subject to dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc.,

885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is

particularly broad where Plaintiff has previously been permitted to amend his complaint.

Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). Repeated

failure to cure deficiencies is one of the factors to be considered in deciding whether justice

requires granting leave to amend. Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. 

Plaintiff has made three efforts at crafting a viable complaint and appears unable to

do so despite specific instructions from the Court. The Court finds that further opportunities

to amend would be futile. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, will dismiss Plaintiff’s

Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend.

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IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim.

(Doc. 38)

(2) Plaintiff’s motions for relief are denied. (Doc. 40, 41.) 

(3) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment of dismissal with prejudice. 

(4) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the dismissal

for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

(5) The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of this

decision would not be taken in good faith.

DATED this 15th day of July, 2012.

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