Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00785/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00785-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 46:0688 Marine-Jones Act

---

1 Plaintiff’s Motion was filed early in the lifecycle of this litigation. Indeed, the

operative Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order (doc. 35) reflects a discovery cutoff date of September

14, 2007, with a dispositive motions filing deadline of October 4, 2007. The general rule in this

Circuit is that “summary judgment should not be granted until the party opposing the motion has

had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.” Reflectone, Inc. v. Farrand Optical Co., 862

F.2d 841, 843 (11th Cir. 1989). Here, defendants have not argued that the Motion was filed

prematurely or that they have had an inadequate opportunity to conduct discovery relating to

same; therefore, the Motion will be considered at this time, notwithstanding the relatively

embryonic stage of this action.

2 The Court is mindful of its obligation under Rule 56 to construe the record,

including all evidence and factual inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

See Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 

2004); Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1217 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus,

inasmuch as this Rule 56 motion was filed by plaintiff, defendants’ evidence is taken as true and

all justifiable inferences are drawn in their favor.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROBERT C. BAUCOM, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0785-WS-B

 )

SISCO STEVEDORING, LLC, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the

Issue of Maintenance and Cure (doc. 36). The Motion has been briefed and is ripe for

disposition at this time.1

I. Background.2

This case arises from a pair of incidents in which plaintiff, Robert C. Baucom, sustained

injuries while working as a crane operator aboard a barge. As a result of these incidents,

plaintiff has sued defendants under a variety of theories, including the ancient maritime doctrine

of maintenance and cure, pursuant to which he seeks recovery of per diem food and lodging

Case 1:06-cv-00785-WS-B Document 57 Filed 06/15/07 Page 1 of 17
3 Review of the First Amended Complaint (doc. 31) reveals that Baucom asserts

claims against each defendant on theories of maintenance and cure, Jones Act negligence, and

unseaworthiness. Because plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment addresses solely the

maintenance and cure claims, this Order will not examine the Jones Act negligence and

unseaworthiness claims (Counts Five, Six, Eight, Nine, Ten and Twelve), which remain in play

irrespective of the outcome of plaintiff’s Motion.

4 The timing of this Motion appears driven, at least in part, by Baucom’s desire to

proceed with spinal surgery proposed by his treating physician, and his apparent inability to do

so until such time as the maintenance and cure issue has been resolved. For example, a Clinic

Note by Tim S. Revels, M.D., one of Baucom’s doctors, discusses the possibility of back surgery

and also states, “There is an issue today of who will cover the cost of his surgery .... Therefore,

there is current bickering between the companies as to who should own up and cover the current

symptoms.” (Plaintiff’s Exh. 11.) This “bickering” appears to lie at the heart of both this

lawsuit and Baucom’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

5 In its opposition brief, Sisco questions at some length whether plaintiff has

identified defendant Pinnacle by the correct name. (Sisco Brief (doc. 48), at 5.) Be that as it

may, neither plaintiff nor Pinnacle has raised this issue, and there appears to be neither a need

for, nor any benefit from, this Court attempting to resolve at this time and on this record the

proper name of the Pinnacle defendant. The undersigned has every expectation that the parties

will work together in good faith during the discovery process to ascertain whether the

appropriate Pinnacle entity has been named and to take any action reasonably necessary to

resolve this collateral question of the parties’ proper names well in advance of trial.

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expenses and medical expenses relating to said injuries.3

 Baucom seeks entry of summary

judgment in his favor at this time on the maintenance and cure causes of action.4

A. The December 2003 Incident.

It is undisputed that on December 8, 2003, Baucom was injured while working aboard a

floating crane barge, the SISCO I, which was owned and operated by defendant Sisco

Stevedoring, LLC (“Sisco”). Baucom was employed as a crane operator on the SISCO I, whose

primary mission was to load and unload cargo to and from other vessels. (Baucom Dep., at 45.) 

On the day in question, Baucom was pulling on a cable onboard the SISCO I when “there was a

pop in [his] back.” (Id. at 40.) Baucom received medical treatment at the Springhill Memorial

Hospital Emergency Room in Mobile, Alabama, and received ongoing care for the back injury

for some time thereafter. (Id. at 40, 42, 46.)

 At the time of the December 2003 injury, Baucom was employed by defendant Pinnacle

Marine Employee Management d/b/a Pinnacle Management Services (“Pinnacle”)5

, and not by

Case 1:06-cv-00785-WS-B Document 57 Filed 06/15/07 Page 2 of 17
6 In light of the universal concurrence by the parties on these points, it is

unnecessary to parse the terms of the contractual arrangements between Pinnacle and Sisco for

confirmation of Baucom’s status vis a vis those entities.

7 This conclusion is reinforced by the deposition testimony of Russell Hudgens,

M.D., another of plaintiff’s treating physicians, that Baucom has a diagnosis of degenerative disc

disease in the lumbar spine and that it is a “probability” that such condition is long-standing. 

(Hudgens Dep., at 14.)

8 Again, this determination was echoed by Dr. Hudgens, who testified to his

understanding, “based on the record, that [Baucom] was placed at maximum medical

improvement with the 2003 injury.” (Hudgens Dep., at 33.)

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Sisco. (Baucom Aff., ¶ 2.) Pinnacle is a temporary employment agency which provides

temporary laborers to various employers, but which does not own, maintain, control or have

custody of any vessel in navigation. (Harvey Aff., ¶¶ 2-3.) Simply put, Baucom was a Pinnacle

employee on temporary assignment on the SISCO I when he hurt his back. All parties are in full

agreement that, although Baucom was working on a Sisco barge and under the direction of Sisco

at the time of the December 2003 injury, he was an employee of Pinnacle at that time. 

(Plaintiff’s Brief (doc. 37), at 6 ¶¶ 1, 2; Pinnacle Brief (doc. 47), at 2; Sisco Brief (doc. 48), at 1-

2; Kinder Brief (doc. 46), at 5.)6

Tim S. Revels, M.D., one of Baucom’s treating physicians, opined in a Clinic Note

following an April 13, 2004 visit that the back injury sustained by Baucom in December 2003

was not an entirely new ailment, but rather constituted a “pulling and twisting injury of the back

that has aggravated his lumbar degenerative disc disease which is a pre-existing finding but has

been aggravated with the above injury.” (Sisco Exh. F, at 1.)7 Dr. Revels diagnosed plaintiff at

that time with lumbar sprain/strain, lumbar degenerative disc disease, lumbar radiculopathy, and

lumbar low back pain. (Id. at 2.)

On May 12, 2004, a Functional Capacity Evaluation performed on Baucom yielded

medical recommendations that he could “return to work within his demonstrated performance if

approved by attending physician.” (Plaintiff’s Exh. 4, at 2.) Based on that evaluation and his

own clinical observations, another of Baucom’s doctors, Christopher Patton, M.D., opined on

May 19, 2004 that “Baucom has reached maximum improvement,” with “follow-up as needed”

and immediate clearance to “return to work regular duty.” (Plaintiff’s Exh. 5.)8

 Dr. Patton

Case 1:06-cv-00785-WS-B Document 57 Filed 06/15/07 Page 3 of 17
9 In his deposition, plaintiff testified that the nature of his work was intermittent,

and that it was not unusual for him to work for several weeks then take two or three months off. 

(Baucom Dep., at 27.) According to Baucom, he had worked “off and on” for Sisco for “many

years through different companies and all.” (Id. at 31.)

10 Although not directly relevant to any issues presented in the Motion for Summary

Judgment, Dr. Patton’s April 15 clinic note also contains a statement expressing skepticism (or at

least heightened attentiveness) that Baucom was complaining of back pain after a beach trip in

which he had been quite active. (Id.)

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further declared that Baucom’s low back strain, lumbar spine strain and lumbar radiculopathy all

were fully and completely “resolved,” leaving him exclusively with a pre-existing degenerative

disc disease of the lumbar spine. (Id.) Thus, Baucom was released to full duty by Dr. Patton,

and returned to work as a crane operator beginning on May 20, 2004. (Baucom Aff., ¶ 5.)9

Dr. Patton’s May 2004 findings did not put an end to Baucom’s medical treatment for

back problems. For example, Baucom reported to Dr. Patton for a follow-up visit on January 18,

2005, complaining of “severe stiffness” and demonstrating “[m]ild soreness to the lower lumbar

spine.” (Plaintiff’s Exh. 7.) Plaintiff sought medical care again on April 15, 2005, complaining

of lower back pain, neck pain and headaches after an excursion to the beach. Dr. Patton’s Clinic

Note of that visit reflects an impression of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine (i.e.,

Baucom’s pre-existing back condition), and further indicates that Dr. Patton prescribed

medication and physical therapy for plaintiff’s lower back pain. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 8.)10 In

general, however, Baucom’s testimony was that “[a]s long as [he] took the anti-inflammatories,

they pretty well kept everything in check” with regard to his back condition as of early 2005,

although this pre-existing condition was gradually worsening over time. (Baucom Dep., at 56.)

Baucom received compensation and medical benefits from Pinnacle’s insurance company

following the December 2003 injury, covering the cost of his treatment by Dr. Patton. (Baucom

Aff., ¶ 4.) These benefits continued until Baucom reached maximum medical improvement and

was released to return to unrestricted full duty in May 2004.

B. The April 2005 Incident.

After May 2004, when plaintiff was released to return to work, he resumed his duties as a

crane operator, working for a series of employers. Despite his return to full duty, Baucom

Case 1:06-cv-00785-WS-B Document 57 Filed 06/15/07 Page 4 of 17
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testified, he continued to have “a lot of problems ... [r]elated to the original injury.” (Baucom

Dep., at 62.) That said, he acknowledged that, notwithstanding those “problems,” he was able to

continue performing crane operator duties until April 2005. (Id. at 63.)

As of April 21, 2005, Baucom was employed by defendant Kinder Morgan Bulk

Terminals, Inc. (“Kinder”) as a crane operator on a floating crane barge in Tampa, Florida. 

(Baucom Aff., ¶ 3.) That evening marked plaintiff’s first night on the job, assigned to that

particular barge, and he had no work restrictions of any kind. (Baucom Dep., at 64, 103.) At

that time, Baucom was attempting to shorten and tighten a cable onboard the barge when he felt

a pop in his back, his hands began shaking, and he felt shooting pains and a burning sensation

inside of his leg, prompting him to limp off the crane to seek medical care at Brandon Regional

Hospital in Tampa. (Id. at 62, 72.) Baucom testified that the pain after the April 2005 incident

was different than any he had experienced before because he felt a burning in the lower, outside

part of his right leg, such that “it just felt like somebody was taking a frying pan and putting it up

beside my leg; and I never had that before.” (Id. at 103.) Ultimately, Baucom returned home to

Mobile, Alabama, where he was placed under the care of several physicians for his ongoing back

ailment.

On May 3, 2006, Dr. Revels (who had also examined Baucom after the December 2003

incident) wrote in a Clinic Note that Baucom suffered from lumbar degenerative disc disease,

lumbar radiculopathy and lumbar low back pain, and that surgery was an option to address his

symptoms. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 11.) Dr. Revels opined in another Clinic Note that Baucom’s need

for surgery stems from, and is related to, the December 2003 incident; further, he specifically

testified that it is more likely than not that the spinal surgery he now recommends for Baucom

“is related to his 2003 accident and not related to the 2005 accident.” (Revels Dep., at 6, 10.) 

According to Dr. Revels, the April 2005 incident aggravated pre-existing symptoms that Baucom

had been experiencing, and was not a new injury. (Id. at 7-8, 13.) When asked point-blank in

his deposition about causation, Dr. Revels testified, “I believe the 2003 injury is the ultimate

injury that brought on the initial complex of symptoms. Even though he was rated and released

... and then had a subsequent injury that aggravated the primary subset of symptoms, it may have

been to a worsening subjective state; but the symptoms were the same. The MRI findings were

extremely similar. There were no objective changes found; therefore, these are aggravations of

Case 1:06-cv-00785-WS-B Document 57 Filed 06/15/07 Page 5 of 17
11 Dr. Revels’ deposition testimony on these points echoes his Clinic Note dated

May 3, 2006, wherein he characterized Baucom’s condition as “the aggravation and his

recurrence of symptoms which appear to be very similar in type of symptoms and grade and

placement, etc. to his initial symptoms from his first injury. ... [H]e left his medical coverage

open from his first injury, and this appears to be an aggravation of that subset of symptoms.” 

(Plaintiff’s Exh. 11.)

12 Records reflect that Kinder (by and through its insurance carrier) paid Baucom

the sum of $1,000 per week in temporary total disability benefits during that time. (Plaintiff’s

Exh. 1.)

13 Plaintiff does not quarrel with Kinder’s assessment that he is a Jones Act seaman

and therefore ineligible for benefits under the LHWCA. See, e.g., Bundens v. J.E. Brenneman

Co., 46 F.3d 292, 300 (3rd Cir. 1995) (“a conclusion that a worker is a seaman necessarily

precludes recovery under the LHWCA”); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. McKinnon, 10 F.3d

1352, 1354 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that, as a matter of law, Jones Act provides exclusive remedy

for injuries to seaman in dredge accident, and that such injuries are not compensable under

workers’ compensation law); 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G) (excluding from LHWCA coverage “a

master or member of a crew of any vessel,” which would plainly encompass all seamen).

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the initial December 2003 injury.” (Id. at 21.)11 Dr. Revels further testified that it is possible

that any aggravation in Baucom’s condition caused by the April 2005 incident has now resolved

itself, such that Baucom’s present condition is simply a natural progression of the back injury

sustained in 2003. (Id. at 10.)

Kinder’s insurer paid for medical treatment and weekly compensation for Baucom from

the time of the April 2005 incident until November 4, 2006, when all benefits were halted. 

(Baucom Aff., ¶¶ 5-6.)12 Kinder suspended these benefits on grounds of jurisdiction after

determining based on discovery designed to allocate workers’ compensation responsibilities

among the various players (Kinder, Sisco, Pinnacle) that Baucom “has been deemed a Jones Act

Seaman,” rendering him ineligible for coverage under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’

Compensation Act. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 1.)13 Kinder having determined that Baucom was a seaman

to whom LHWCA benefits do not attach, Baucom initiated this lawsuit under the Jones Act and

general maritime law seeking compensation and relief for his injuries.

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no issue as to any material fact

and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The

Case 1:06-cv-00785-WS-B Document 57 Filed 06/15/07 Page 6 of 17
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party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the district court, by reference

to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at

trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party

has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show the existence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to make 'a sufficient showing

on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,' the

moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). “In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden,

the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the

truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable

inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999

(11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Summary judgment is justified only

for those cases devoid of any need for factual determinations.” Offshore Aviation v. Transcon

Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

III. Analysis.

A. Overview of the Law of Maintenance and Cure.

Although Baucom’s Complaint is a multi-faceted affair, the only causes of action at issue

for purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment are those for maintenance and cure against

each of the three defendants. “Under general maritime law, seamen are entitled to bring an

action for ‘maintenance and cure,’ a remedy available to compensate seamen who fall ill or

become injured during their term of employment.” Cabrera Espinal v. Royal Caribbean

Cruises, Ltd., 253 F.3d 629, 630-31 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see generally Garay v.

Carnival Cruise Line, Inc., 904 F.2d 1527, 1533 & n.7 (11th Cir. 1990) (pointing out that

seaman’s right to maintenance and cure dates back to ancient codes of the sea promulgated as far

back as 1200 A.D.). “Maintenance” is “a living allowance” paid on a per diem basis, while

“cure” is intended to “cover[] nursing and medical expenses.” Cabrera Espinal, 253 F.3d at 631

(citation omitted); see also Kasprik v. United States, 87 F.3d 462, 464 (11th Cir. 1996) (“It is a

well recognized rule in admiralty that when a seaman is injured or becomes ill while employed

aboard a vessel, he is entitled to daily subsistence and medical treatment until his maximum cure

Case 1:06-cv-00785-WS-B Document 57 Filed 06/15/07 Page 7 of 17
14 Of no small significance, “a shipowner’s duty to pay maintenance and cure

encompasses a duty to guarantee payment prior to treatment for all reasonable medical

expenses.” Sullivan v. Tropical Tuna, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 42, 45 (D. Mass. 1997).

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has been reached.”).14 Additionally, “it is settled law that wages is a basic component of an

award of maintenance and cure.” Flores v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 47 F.3d 1120, 1122 (11th Cir.

1995) (citation omitted). The obligation to pay maintenance and cure continues until such time

as the seaman has reached the point of maximum cure. See Nichols v. Barwick, 792 F.2d 1520,

1523 (11th Cir. 1986); Gooden v. Sinclair Refining Co., 378 F.2d 576, 579 (3rd Cir. 1967) (“The

obligation to provide maintenance and cure continues until maximum medical recovery has in

fact been achieved.”).

The maintenance and cure remedy has been construed expansively in light of its remedial

purposes of protecting the safety and health of “poor and friendless” seamen, and inducing

seamen to accept sea duty despite its many intrinsic perils. Flores, 47 F.3d at 1123 (noting the

“traditional breadth of the remedy” and that any ambiguities and doubts are resolved in favor of

the seaman); see also Cabrera Espinal, 253 F.3d at 631 (observing that “a ship owner’s liability

for maintenance and cure is among the most pervasive and should not be defeated by narrow or

restrictive distinctions”). “The duty to provide maintenance attaches once the seaman enters the

service of the ship.” Terrebonne v. K-Sea Transp. Corp., 477 F.3d 271, 279 (5th Cir. 2007)

(citation omitted). Where they are owed, “[m]aintenance and cure are due without regard to the

negligence of the employer or the unseaworthiness of the ship.” Kasprik, 87 F.3d at 464

(citation omitted); see also Adams v. Texaco, Inc., 640 F.2d 618, 620 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The

shipowner’s obligation to pay maintenance and cure to an injured seaman is not based on fault

but results from the relationship of ship and seaman.”). “Even if the seaman is injured through

his own negligence, he does not forfeit his right to maintenance and cure,” as long as the injury

is not the product of the seaman’s wilful misconduct. Garay, 904 F.2d at 1529. In the ordinary

case, all a seaman must prove in order to establish a right to maintenance and cure is “that the

injury or illness arose during his employment; no causal connection to his duties need be

shown.” Liner v. J.B. Talley and Co., 618 F.2d 327, 332 (5th Cir. 1980). Such a light burden is

consistent with the notion that this doctrine was crafted so that a seaman’s right to maintenance

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15 In his Reply Memorandum (doc. 52), plaintiff characterizes the opposition briefs

as essentially agreeing that he is entitled to maintenance and cure, but simply debating which

defendant bears financial responsibility. Indeed, plaintiff writes that “a reading of the

oppositions will reveal that the defendants do not genuinely challenge his entitlement to

maintenance and cure.” (Reply, at 1.) This is not correct. For example, Pinnacle and Sisco both

assert that no maintenance and cure obligations could arise from the 2003 incident because

Baucom was not a seaman and the SISCO I was not a vessel in navigation. (Pinnacle Brief, at 5-

10; Sisco Brief, at 2.) Moreover, Kinder denied that Baucom was owed maintenance and cure at

all. (Kinder Brief, at 5, 9, 10.) Kinder filed a Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply (doc. 54) for

the sole purpose of reiterating that point. Although such reiteration is unnecessary because

Kinder’s position is clear from its original brief, the Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply (doc.

54) is granted in the Court’s discretion. Kinder’s Sur-Reply attached as an exhibit to document

54 will be considered for whatever marginal value it may have.

16 An initial concern with this view of the case is that Kinder has failed to assert

cross-claims against Pinnacle for contribution. To be sure, courts generally recognize a right to

contribution in the maintenance and cure context. The Eleventh Circuit has explained, albeit in a

fact situation different from the case at bar, that “the only way to apportion the cost of

maintenance and cure among all tortfeasors responsible for the harm to seamen is to allow claims

for contribution.” Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt Miller, 92 F.3d

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and cure “is so inclusive as to be relatively simple, and can be understood and administered

without technical considerations.” Flores, 47 F.3d at 1123 (citation omitted).

It is exceedingly clear from these authorities that the duty of a ship owner to pay

maintenance and cure to an injured seaman who has not reached maximum medical

improvement is virtually automatic. That said, each of the three defendants has propounded a

host of individual-specific arguments in support of its position that, whatever maintenance and

cure obligations may or may not be owed by other defendants, that defendant owes no such

liability to Baucom.15

B. Maintenance and Cure Obligations of Kinder.

As mentioned, the Amended Complaint identifies separate causes of action against each

defendant for maintenance and cure. (See Amended Complaint (doc. 31), at Counts One, Two,

and Four.) While Baucom seeks summary judgment from all defendants on this issue, his Rule

56 submissions are primarily directed at Kinder. Indeed, Baucom’s Motion sets forth his

contention “that Kinder is responsible for maintenance and cure with a right of contribution

against Pinnacle.” (Motion, at 2.)16 It is unclear from the Motion how Baucom contends that

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1102, 1107 (11th Cir. 1996) (recognizing “binding precedent allowing contribution claims based

on maintenance and cure expenses”); see also Adams, 640 F.2d at 621 (“Under the

‘commonsense principle’ that a party whose neglect has in part contributed to the need for

maintenance and cure payments, that party should reimburse the costs of those payments to the

extent occasioned by its fault.”). But Kinder’s Answer (doc. 23) is devoid of any claims for

contribution, and the deadline for amending pleadings expired on April 16, 2007. (Scheduling

Order (doc. 35), at ¶ 5.) As such, no contribution claim by Kinder against Sisco and/or Pinnacle

has been joined in this litigation, and any attempt to do so now would be violative of the

Scheduling Order.

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SISCO (which apparently was not plaintiff’s employer in December 2003) fits into the

maintenance and cure relief he seeks.

In response, Kinder does not argue that Baucom did not qualify as a seaman as of April

2005, that the Kinder vessel on which the second accident occurred was not a vessel in

navigation, that Baucom’s injuries were caused by his own wilful misconduct, or the like. 

Indeed, Kinder does not contest the existence of any of these prerequisites for maintenance and

cure; rather Kinder’s defense to the Motion for Summary Judgment hinges on two arguments

regarding the back injuries sustained by Baucom. First, Kinder maintains, Baucom is not

entitled to summary judgment on the maintenance and cure claim because there are genuine

issues of fact as to whether the condition for which he seeks maintenance and cure benefits is a

pre-existing condition that did not arise from his employment with Kinder. Second, Kinder

argues that Baucom’s Rule 56 Motion should be denied because there are genuine issues of fact

as to whether Baucom has reached maximum medical improvement from the April 2005 injury.

Upon careful review of the parties’ submissions, the undersigned agrees that the record is

not sufficiently developed to support entry of summary judgment against Kinder on the

maintenance and cure question. To be sure, there is no disagreement that Baucom strained his

back on April 21, 2005 while working aboard the Kinder vessel; and that this occurrence

aggravated a previous condition. The problem, however, is that Baucom would apparently have

this Court assume that the proposed back surgery which forms the impetus for these maintenance

and cure claims arises from or is otherwise related to the April 2005 incident, rather than the

December 2003 incident. The evidence of record does not warrant any such assumption; indeed,

Dr. Revels, the orthopedic surgeon who is actually recommending this surgery, testified to his

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opinion that the surgery Baucom now needs “is related to his 2003 accident and not related to

the 2005 accident.” (Revels Dep., at 10 (emphasis added).) Where, then, is plaintiff’s evidence

that his need for back surgery, which apparently precipitated his claims for maintenance and

cure, arises from or is in any way related to the April 2005 accident? It is not in the record for

summary judgment. Contrary to Baucom’s apparent view, the maintenance and cure duty does

not obligate Kinder to pay for any back treatment he may ever need for the rest of his life

irrespective of its connection (or lack thereof) to the events of April 2005.

The shortcomings in plaintiff’s Rule 56 Motion against Kinder do not end there. The law

is clear that the obligation to provide maintenance and cure “is not an open-ended duty,” but

rather expires “at the point of maximum cure.” Belcher Towing Co. v. Howard, 638 F. Supp.

242, 243 (S.D. Fla. 1986); see also Norfolk Dredging Co. v. Wiley, 450 F. Supp.2d 620, 622

(E.D. Va. 2006) (“The shipowner’s obligation lasts until such time as the seaman reaches

maximum medical improvement.”); Whitman v. Miles, 294 F. Supp.2d 117, 123 (D. Me. 2003)

(opining that maintenance and cure does not hold a ship to permanent liability for a pension, and

that obligation ceases once disabling condition has been deemed incapable of being improved,

irrespective of need for continuing medical treatment and care). “‘Maximum medical cure’ is

reached when the seaman recovers from the injury, the condition permanently stabilizes or

cannot be improved further.” McMillan v. Tug Jane A. Bouchard, 885 F. Supp. 452, 459

(E.D.N.Y. 1995). “[I]f the seaman thereafter needs attention to maintain his improvement at the

maximum, to assist him in recovery from relapses, or to restrain the progress of the disease, the

shipowner is not bound to provide that.” Id. at 461 (citation omitted); see also Pelotto v. L & N

Towing Co., 604 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 1979) (“The accepted legal standard holds that

maximum cure is achieved when it appears probable that further treatment will result in no

betterment of the seaman’s condition.”); Saco v. Tug Tucana Corp., --- F. Supp.2d ----, 2007 WL

1054721, *6 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2007) (distinguishing between treatment that actually improves

the medical condition, which is covered by maintenance and cure, and simply palliative care,

which is not, but allowing that the boundary separating those categories is often “fuzzy”). Thus,

if further treatment would merely relieve pain and suffering but not improve the seaman’s

underlying physical condition, the point of maximum cure has been reached. See In re RJF Int’l

Corp. for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability, 354 F.3d 104, 106 n.1 (1st Cir. 2004).

Case 1:06-cv-00785-WS-B Document 57 Filed 06/15/07 Page 11 of 17
17 In addressing whether Baucom has reached maximum medical improvement with

regard to the April 2005 injury, Kinder bears the burden of demonstrating that maximum cure

has been reached. After all, “[o]nce the seaman establishes his right to maintenance and cure,

the burden of persuasion shifts to the shipowner to prove that the seaman has reached the point

of maximum medical improvement.” Costa Crociere, S.p.A. v. Rose, 939 F. Supp. 1538, 1548

(S.D. Fla. 1996); see also Smith v. Delaware Bay Launch Service, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 836, 848

(D. Del. 1997); McMillan, 885 F. Supp. at 459.

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In light of these authorities, if Baucom has attained maximum medical cure with respect

to the April 2005 incident, then Kinder owes him no duty of maintenance and cure.17 The

summary judgment record raises considerable questions as to whether maximum medical cure

has been reached with respect to that event. In particular, Dr. Hudgens testified that as of

November 22, 2005, Baucom “had reached maximum medical improvement as of the April 2005

injury, concerning my treatment.” (Hudgens Dep., at 33.) Similarly, Dr. Revels testified that it

is possible that any aggravation of Baucom’s back condition arising from the April 2005 incident

has resolved itself, such that his current condition is simply a natural progression of his back

ailments that predated the April 2005 incident. (Revels Dep., at 10.) Against this medical

testimony by his own physicians, plaintiff simply states in conclusory terms, with no record

citations, that “Mr. Baucom has not reached maximum cure following the April 21, 2005,

incident.” (Plaintiff’s Brief, at 11.) But on what evidence is that blanket statement based? To

be sure, the record reflects that Baucom continues to experience back pain and that Dr. Revels is

recommending surgery. But the concepts of maximum medical improvement and continued

back discomfort are in no way mutually exclusive. The Court cannot blithely assume that

maximum cure as to the April 2005 incident has not been reached simply because plaintiff

continues to experience back problems. Further, as already pointed out above, no medical

evidence or physician testimony in the record links Baucom’s back pain today and his need for

surgery today to the April 2005 incident, as opposed to his longstanding degenerative disc

disease or his December 2003 back injury.

If the Court understands plaintiff’s position correctly, it is that Baucom is entitled to

maintenance and cure from Kinder because he hurt his back on Kinder’s vessel, Kinder’s vessel

was the “last ship” on which his back injuries occurred, and he continues to have back pain

Case 1:06-cv-00785-WS-B Document 57 Filed 06/15/07 Page 12 of 17
18 It is difficult to ascertain precisely what plaintiff’s position is on this point,

inasmuch as plaintiff elected not to address Kinder’s substantive arguments in his reply brief. 

Hence, the Court has the benefit of neither argument nor evidence that Baucom might use to

rebut Kinder’s showing concerning maximum medical improvement and the relationship

between the April 2005 accident and the contemplated surgery.

19 See also Stevens v. McGinnis, Inc., 82 F.3d 1353, 1357 (6th Cir. 1996) (where

seaman suffers from disease manifested during his employment, but not caused by employment,

shipowner has no obligation to support the ill seaman for life, but need only expend such funds

as necessary to put seaman in such condition as reasonably may be expected to result from

nursing, care and medical treatment); Boudreau v. S/V Shere Khan C, 27 F. Supp.2d 72, 83 (D.

Me. 1998) (noting that a “sailor unable to make a full recovery does not receive a lifetime’s

maintenance and cure”); Smith, 972 F. Supp. at 848 (injured seaman is not entitled to

maintenance for the rest of his life); Bonneau v. Guidance Fishing Corp., 919 F. Supp. 46, 48

(D. Mass. 1996) (maintenance and cure does not hold a ship to permanent liability for a

pension); Tran v. Captain Glyn, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 727, 733 (D. Haw. 1995) (observing that even

the broad liability imposed by maintenance and cure doctrine must have a temporal and spacial

limit, without creating indefinite obligation to shipowner).

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today.18 But the fact that Baucom aggravated his back condition on Kinder’s vessel does not

transform Kinder into a lifetime guarantor for all medical expenses relating to treatment of

Baucom’s back for time immemorial. If the treatment being sought is unrelated to the April

2005 incident, as competent medical testimony in the record suggests, then Kinder’s

maintenance and cure obligations do not reach it. If Baucom has reached maximum medical

improvement from the April 2005 incident, as competent medical testimony in the record also

suggests, then Kinder’s maintenance and cure obligations have terminated altogether,

irrespective of any ongoing back problems that plaintiff may experience. To rule otherwise

would be to reinterpret the doctrine of maintenance and cure as a mandatory lifetime health

insurance policy for injured seamen. Courts have emphatically, consistently rejected such

overreaching of this hoary maritime doctrine. See, e.g., Norfolk Dredging, 450 F. Supp.2d at 626

(“Maintenance and cure was not intended as a pension or disability plan.”).19

In short, then, the summary judgment record is rife with genuine questions of material

fact as to whether Baucom has reached maximum cure with respect to the back strain incurred in

the April 2005 incident, whether the contemplated treatment relates to the April 2005 incident,

and whether the contemplated treatment is mere palliative care outside the realm of any

Case 1:06-cv-00785-WS-B Document 57 Filed 06/15/07 Page 13 of 17
20 On this last point, even if plaintiff has not reached maximum medical

improvement with respect to the April 2005 accident, and even if the contemplated surgery is

related to the April 2005 incident, it is unclear whether that treatment is merely palliative care

designed to reduce pain and suffering (and therefore beyond the scope of any cure obligation) or

whether it is actually likely to better his physical condition (so as to be compensable under the

cure obligation). See, e.g., Pelotto, 604 F.2d at 400 (treatment that will merely relieve pain and

suffering without otherwise improving seaman’s physical condition is not compensable under

maintenance and cure framework). Without a showing from plaintiff concerning the purpose and

likely effect of the contemplated surgery, the Court cannot find that payment for same lies within

any cure obligation that Kinder might otherwise be found to have. Courts scrutinize medical

expenses carefully to assess whether they are both bona fide and reasonable, inasmuch as seamen

are not entitled by maintenance and cure principles to reimbursement for overly expensive or

unnecessary medical services. See Matter of Cooper / T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 942 F. Supp.

267, 269 (E.D. La. 1996) (finding that plaintiff was entitled to payment of medical expenses by

shipowner for treatment procedures, only where evidence showed that contemplated treatments

would increase his capabilities and improve his physical condition).

21 For example, Pinnacle argues (and Sisco at least tacitly joins the argument) that

Baucom cannot be considered a seaman for maintenance and cure purposes. “The right to

maintenance and cure is ... limited to seamen.” Stokes v. B.T. Oilfield Services, Inc., 617 F.2d

1205, 1206 (5th Cir. 1980). To qualify as a “seaman” who may be eligible for maintenance and

cure, a claimant must satisfy the following elements: (1) the employee’s duties must contribute

to the function of the vessel or accomplishment of its mission; and (2) the seaman must have a

connection to a vessel in navigation that is substantial in terms of both duration and nature. See,

e.g., Scheuring v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 476 F.3d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 2007); Holmes v. Atlantic

Sounding Co., 437 F.3d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 2006). In response to the contention that Baucom was

not a seaman because he was a “land based worker” with mere “transitory” duties on the SISCO

I (Pinnacle Brief, at 9), plaintiff presents uncontroverted deposition testimony that he had been

assigned to the SISCO I for a period of six months at the time of his injury; that he was working,

eating, sleeping and generally living on the barge during that time period; and that the vessel

sailed from Mobile to New Orleans and back again from time to time to perform its function of

loading and offloading cargo. (Baucom Dep., at 44-45.) Pinnacle’s characterization of

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maintenance and cure duty the employer might have.20 For these reasons, plaintiff is not entitled

to entry of summary judgment in his favor with respect to his maintenance and cure claim

posited against defendant Kinder.

C. Maintenance and Cure Obligations of Sisco and Pinnacle.

Defendants Sisco and Pinnacle also proffer a host of arguments to support their

respective positions that they are not responsible for any ongoing maintenance and cure

obligations to Baucom. These arguments vary widely in persuasiveness.21 

Case 1:06-cv-00785-WS-B Document 57 Filed 06/15/07 Page 14 of 17
Baucom’s status with respect to SISCO I is difficult to fathom, and appears directly contrary to

the evidence of record. The same applies to Pinnacle’s contention that the SISCO I should not

be deemed a “vessel” for Jones Act purposes. Absent some evidentiary showing that has not

been made here, these kinds of arguments border on frivolity and serve only to distract scarce

judicial resources from the bona fide issues in dispute.

22 Such arguments might or might not exist. For example, certain courts have found

that a determination of maximum cure is not necessarily the cutoff of all possible recourse for

maintenance and cure, but that a seaman “can try again and recover further benefits if he can

persuade judge or jury that, because of changes in his own condition or advances in the medical

art, there is now a possibility of further improvement.” Bonneau, 919 F. Supp. at 48 (citation

omitted); see also Pelotto, 604 F.2d at 401 (“seamen have always been accorded the right to

bring serial suits to collect maintenance payments as they come due”). But Baucom has never

contended (much less presented evidence) that his May 2004 maximum medical improvement

determination was incorrect, or that it has been superseded by subsequent changes in his

condition, such that he is not at maximum cure from the December 2003 incident today.

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In order to resolve the pending Motion for Summary Judgment, it suffices to consider

plaintiff’s Uncontested Fact #7, to-wit: “Mr. Baucom reached maximum medical improvement

for the December 8, 2003, injury on May 19, 2004.” (Plaintiff’s Brief (doc. 37), at 6.) As set

forth above, the law is clear that a shipowner’s obligation to pay maintenance and cure

terminates when a seaman reaches maximum cure. See, e.g., Nichols, 792 F.2d at 1523; Norfolk

Dredging, 450 F. Supp.2d at 622; Whitman, 294 F. Supp.2d at 123. Given Baucom’s concession

in his Motion that he reached maximum cure from the December 2003 incident in May 2004,

Pinnacle and Sisco convincingly argue that they can have no maintenance and cure obligations

following May 2004 because the maximum cure date marks the terminus of that obligation. As

it further appears undisputed that Pinnacle and/or Sisco did pay benefits to Baucom through May

2004, and as Baucom is not apparently contending that those payments were inadequate in any

way, it is difficult to understand how he would extend the maintenance and cure duty past that

acknowledged maximum cure date. Moreover, Baucom undermines his own cause by failing to

respond to this argument in his reply brief, leaving the Court to guess what legal basis Baucom

might invoke for attempting to prolong any maintenance and cure obligations that Pinnacle or

Sisco might have had past the admitted May 2004 maximum cure date.22 The Court will neither

make plaintiff’s arguments for him nor grant summary judgment based on unarticulated theories

that have not been properly developed in the briefs and the record in this case.

Case 1:06-cv-00785-WS-B Document 57 Filed 06/15/07 Page 15 of 17
23 In so concluding, the Court recognizes that Sisco has filed a Motion (doc. 53)

seeking leave to file a sur-reply, the general thrust of which is that Baucom’s reply fails

adequately to respond to Sisco’s arguments against summary judgment. Although that

clarification is unnecessary, given that the Court can readily perceive the deficiencies in

plaintiff’s reply simply by reading said reply, in its discretion the Court grants the Motion and

will consider the Sur-Reply for whatever marginal value it may have.

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Simply put, then, because Baucom states as an undisputed fact that he reached maximum

cure from the December 2003 incident in May 2004, it appears unlikely that any maintenance

and cure obligations of Pinnacle and Sisco can survive to the present time. For that reason,

plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied as to defendants Pinnacle and Sisco.23

IV. Conclusion.

The Court understands and appreciates Baucom’s predicament. He needs back surgery,

which apparently will not happen until or unless one or more defendants pays for it, either

voluntarily or by court order. But his summary judgment showing is inadequate to establish a

duty on the part of any defendant to pay for that procedure as part of a maintenance and cure

obligation. If Baucom wants Kinder to bear legal responsibility for it, then he must make a

showing that he has not reached maximum medical improvement from the April 2005 incident

and that the contemplated surgery arises from or relates to the April 2005 incident in some way. 

He has done neither; rather, extant medical testimony is that Baucom’s need for surgery is not

related to the April 2005 incident at all, but is instead a result of a previous back problem. If

Baucom wants Sisco and/or Pinnacle to bear legal responsibility for this surgery, then he must

make a showing that he has not reached maximum medical improvement from the December

2003 incident. He has not done so, but instead has acknowledged that he reached maximum cure

from that incident in May 2004, which has the legal effect of terminating his right to

maintenance and cure from those defendants. If, however, the contemplated back surgery is

required to ameliorate a long-standing, pre-existing condition of degenerative disc disease in the

spine, not related to either the December 2003 incident or the April 2005 incident, and if the

December 2003 and April 2005 conditions have resolved (as at least some record evidence

suggests), then the proposed surgery is not a proper subject for maintenance and cure at all.

Further factual development is needed before a definitive ruling may be made on these issues.

Case 1:06-cv-00785-WS-B Document 57 Filed 06/15/07 Page 16 of 17
24 Of course, nothing here forecloses the possibility that Baucom may recover

further damages for wrongful denial of maintenance and cure benefits if it is ultimately

determined that one or more defendants in fact are legally responsible to pay maintenance and

cure. See Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187, 1190 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Seamen have a

claim for compensation for the suffering and for the physical injury which follow when the

failure to give maintenance and cure aggravates the illness.”); In re Complaint of J.A.R. Barge

Lines, L.P., 307 F. Supp.2d 668, 670 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (similar); Sullivan, 963 F. Supp. at 46 (“It

is well-settled that a seaman may recover compensatory damages such as pain and suffering

stemming from a shipowner’s unreasonable failure to pay maintenance and cure.”). 

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For all of these reasons, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Maintenance and Cure

(doc. 36) is denied.

24

2. Sisco’s Motion to File Response to Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum (doc. 53) and

Kinder’s Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply Memorandum (doc. 54) are

granted.

 DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of June, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00785-WS-B Document 57 Filed 06/15/07 Page 17 of 17