Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00198/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00198-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dorothy O’Connell, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

David R. Smith, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-0198-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Dorothy O’Connell’s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment on her declaratory judgment claim (the “Motion”). (Dkt. 6.) Defendant

Maricopa County requests an extension of the time to respond to Plaintiff’s Motion on the

grounds that “[t]his case is in its relative infancy, the pleadings have not closed, and

discovery has yet to commence.” (Dkt. 1-10 at 2.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court

will deny Plaintiff’s Motion without prejudice to re-filing at a later time. 

I. Procedural Background

On September 29, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory Relief

against County Manager David Smith, Maricopa County, the Board of Supervisors, and all

five members of the Board of Supervisors. (Dkt. 1, Ex. 4.) On January 12, 2007, Plaintiff

filed a First Amended Complaint alleging eight additional claims, termination/no legal

authority; wrongful termination/whistleblower; civil rights violation (§1983); tortious

interference with contract; false light invasion of privacy; intentional infliction of emotional

Case 2:07-cv-00198-SMM Document 16 Filed 03/16/07 Page 1 of 5
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 1 Defendant’s response relies on Ariz.R.Civ.P. 56(f) because it was filed in state court

in response to a substantively identical request for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff

on December 20, 2006. See Dkt. 1, Exs. 7-8, 10. Apparently there is some confusion as to

whether Plaintiff and Defendants are required to re-file Motions and Responses filed in state

court with this Court. See dkt. 14. Section 1446(a) of Title 28, United States Code, requires

the removing defendant to file “a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such

defendant” the action, which Defendants have done in the instant case. See Dkt. 1. Although

all existing orders and other proceedings had in state court “shall remain in full force and effect

until dissolved or modified by the district court” (28 U.S.C. §1450), it is not clear whether

motions and responses pending at the time of removal must be re-filed in this Court. This issue

is not important here because Ariz.R.Civ.P. 56(f), cited in Defendant’s response, is identical to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f); 16 A.R.S. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(f).

 

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distress; civil conspiracy; and punitive damages. (Dkt. 1, Ex. 9.) In addition, Plaintiff added

the following defendants, Deputy County Manager Sandi Wilson, Deputy Budget Director

of the County’s Office of Management and Budget Christopher Bradley, and six County

employees (collectively, “Defendants”). 

After Defendants removed the case to this Court, on January 26, 2007, Plaintiff filed

a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on her declaratory judgment claim, to which

Defendant Maricopa County responded by requesting an extension of the time pursuant to

Rule 56(f).1

 (Dkts. 1, Ex. 10; 6.) Plaintiff asks this Court to declare, as a matter of law, that

“[D]efendant Smith, with or without the approval of the [D]efendant Maricopa County Board

of Supervisors, was not legally authorized to terminate [her] employment” as Deputy

Director of the Office of Medical Examiner of Maricopa County. (Id. at 5.)

II. Background Facts 

On February 3, 1997, Dorothy O’Connell (“Plaintiff”) was hired by Dr. Phillip Keen,

the duly authorized Maricopa County Medical Examiner, as the Deputy Director of the

Office of Medical Examiner of Maricopa County. (Dkt. 7, ¶1.) On February 12, 1997,

Plaintiff’s appointment by Dr. Keen as Deputy Director of the Office of Medical Examiner

was approved by the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors. (Id., ¶2.) On October 27,

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2005, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave by Defendant Smith, County Manager, and

terminated effective June 30, 2006, as part of the reorganization of the Office of Medical

Examiner. (Id., ¶3.) Plaintiff’s termination as Deputy Director of the Office of Medical

Examiner was “against [the] wishes” of Dr. Keen. (Id., ¶4 and Ex. 2, ¶6.)

III. Legal Analysis

Relying on A.R.S. § 11-594(B)(1), Plaintiff argues that only one County officer – the

duly authorized Medical Examiner (Dr. Keen) – was legally authorized to terminate her

employment. (Dkt. 6 at 5.) Section 11-594 provides only that “[t]he county medical

examiner may: . . . [a]ppoint qualified professional, technical and clerical personnel as

necessary for the administration of the office, subject to approval of the board of

supervisors.” A.R.S. § 11-594(B)(1), emphasis added. Plaintiff further argues that, since

1975, “it has uniformly been the practice of the medical examiners and the boards of

supervisors advised by successive county attorneys that the medical examiner had control of

the hiring and firing of the staff of the office of the medical examiner, subject to the

‘approval of the board of supervisors.’” (Dkt. 6 at 7.) Relying on Powers v. Isley, 66 Ariz.

94, 183 P.2d 880 (1947), Plaintiff contends the phrase “subject to the approval of the board

of supervisors,” “was uniformly interpreted to mean the [M]edical [E]xaminer hired and fired

and the [B]oard of [S]upervisors approved or disapproved” the hiring and firing decisions of

the Medical Examiner. (Dkt. 6 at 7.) Thus, Plaintiff posits, the Board of Supervisors may

not make the hiring and firing decisions in the first instance. 

The problem with Plaintiff’s argument is that there is no legal or factual support for

her assertion that, since 1975, when A.R.S. §11-594 was enacted, “it has uniformly been the

practice of the medical examiners and the boards of supervisors advised by successive county

attorneys that the medical examiner had control of the . . . firing of the staff of the office of

the medical examiner, subject to the ‘approval of the board of supervisors.’” (Dkt. 6 at 7,

emphasis added.) Plaintiff’s Motion fails to cite to any legal authority in support of this

assertion, and § 11-594 refers only to the County Medical Examiner’s ability to appoint – not

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terminate, dismiss or “fire” – certain personnel. See A.R.S. §11-594(B)(1). Moreover,

Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Facts lists this assertion as a material, undisputed fact, based

solely on the affidavit of Dr. Keen. See Dkt. 7, ¶5. Dr. Keen’s affidavit, however, neither

states nor implies that, since 1975, the County Medical Examiner “had control of the . . .

firing of the staff of the office of the medical examiner, subject to the ‘approval of the board

of supervisors.” See Dkt. 6, Ex. 2, emphasis added. Because Plaintiff has failed to submit

any legal or factual authority for her assertion that the uniform practice of the County was

to allow the Medical Examiner to control the “firing of the staff of the office,” an essential

component of her argument in support of partial summary judgment is lacking. Accordingly,

the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion without prejudice.

At a status conference in this case held on March 14, 2007, counsel for all parties and

the Court discussed the possibility of certifying to the Arizona Supreme Court the issue on

which Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment. Upon closer examination, however, the Court

has determined that this issue is not ripe for certification. Rather, because Plaintiff’s

argument lacks both legal and factual support, the issue is not clearly framed, and

Defendant’s request that certain discovery be completed before it is required to substantively

respond to Plaintiff’s Motion is well-taken. See Dkt. 1, Ex. 10. Accordingly, the Court will

order the parties to attend a Rule 16 Preliminary Pretrial Conference to discuss, inter alia,

whether bifurcated discovery and briefing should take place to determine who had the legal

authority to terminate the employment of Plaintiff.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED DENYING the Motions for Partial Summary Judgment

filed by Plaintiff Dorothy O’Connell. (Dkt. 1, Ex. 7; Dkt. 6.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYINGAS MOOT Defendants’ Motion to Strike

Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Filed for the Second Time on February 8,

2007. (Dkt. 14.)

/ / / 

/ / /

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court Deputy shall schedule a Rule 16

Preliminary Pretrial Conference in this case and send out an appropriate Rule 16 Order.

DATED this 16th day of March, 2007.

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