Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02061/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02061-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE LUIS MAGANA,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-03-2061 DFL KJM P

vs.

SACRAMENTO COUNTY

MAIN JAIL, ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a former county jail inmate proceeding pro se with a civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants County of Sacramento, Ilaga, Iwasa, Wiedman and

Ackerman have filed a motion for partial summary judgment; plaintiff has filed an opposition

and, more recently, a “notice of claim of overt acts.” These matters are before the court.

I. The Motion For Summary Judgment

In his verified amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants Ilaga and

Weidman, acting on defendants Ackerman’s and Iwasa’s orders, took plaintiff’s “medical

prescribed supporting shoes.” He alleges these actions were taken in response to a jail policy,

which requires an inmate to get a “court order” for orthopedic shoes. Am. Compl. at 4-5. He

also appears to allege that he is being discriminated against because two other inmates were

allowed to wear orthopedic shoes without a court order. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and

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damages. Id. at 5. 

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because the orthopedic

shoes were never prescribed, but rather only recommended, and because plaintiff admitted in his

deposition that he is not challenging jail policies. Def’ts’ Mem. P. & A. in Supp. Partial Summ.

J. (MSJ) at 4-8. Defendants rely on plaintiff’s “Affidavit, Statements And New Exhibits In

Support of Amended Complaint And/Or Deposition,” filed on February 24, 2005, as well as

portions of plaintiff’s deposition, and the declarations of Dr. Sandra M. Hand and defendant

Mark Iwasa.

A. Summary Judgment Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates there

exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

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judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

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Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

On May 25, 2004, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d

952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

B. Defendants Ilaga, Wiedman, Ackerman and County of Sacramento

To the extent the motion for summary judgment is brought by the defendants

identified above, they argue essentially that it is undisputed there was no medical necessity for

the shoes; therefore, they could not be found to have violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

rights by taking them away from plaintiff. These defendants rely on unauthenticated portions of

plaintiff’s deposition, an unsupported declaration from a supervising doctor at the jail, and a

document of plaintiff’s that was stricken from the record of this case. 

A court may consider only admissible evidence in support of a motion for

summary judgment. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002).

Authentication is a “condition precedent to admissibility,” and this

condition is satisfied by “evidence sufficient to support a finding

that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Fed. R. 

Evid. 901(a) . . . [U]nauthenticated documents cannot be

considered in a motion for summary judgment.

Id.; Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner and Company, Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 

1990). 

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 Defendants also have not complied with Local Rule 5-133(j), which requires a party to

provide a courtesy copy of the complete deposition to chambers. 

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A deposition or an extract therefrom is authenticated in a motion

for summary judgment when it identifies the names of the

deponent and the action and includes the reporter's certification

that the deposition is a true record of the testimony of the

deponent. Ordinarily, this would have to be accomplished by

attaching the cover page of the deposition and the reporter's

certification to every deposition extract submitted. It is insufficient

for a party to submit, without more, an affidavit from her counsel

identifying the names of the deponent, the reporter, and the action

and stating that the deposition is a "true and correct copy." 

Orr, 285 F.3d at 774 (internal citations omitted). Defendants have submitted portions of

plaintiff’s deposition without the certification from the court reporter and have attempted to

authenticate it with counsel’s declaration, averring that she has provided true and correct copies

of portions of the transcript. Declaration of Molly M. Ryan in Supp. MSJ at 1. This is not

sufficient for admissibility.1

The defendants also rely on the declaration of Sandra M. Hand, the Medical

Director for Sacramento County Jail, among other facilities. Declaration of Sandra Hand (Hand

Decl.) ¶ 2. Dr. Hand states that her review of plaintiff’s medical records, documenting treatment

provided by other doctors, shows that “no shoes of any kind have been prescribed or found

medically necessary.” Id. ¶ 5. She describes an orthopedic recommendation that plaintiff be

allowed to wear his own shoes and reviews the course of treatment plaintiff received for the

problems with his ankle. Id. ¶¶ 8-15. She does not, however, attach the medical records upon

which she bases her conclusions. 

Rule 56(e) provides in part that “sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts

thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.” Without the

records upon which Dr. Hand relies, her declaration is not competent evidence in support of

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Cermetek, Inc. v. Butler Avpak, Inc., 573 F.2d 1370,

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 Plaintiff does provide what appear to be pages from his medical records as exhibits to

his opposition, Opp’n to MSJ, Exs. A35-A41, but has not established any basis for their

admissibility nor authenticated them. These documents also will not be considered. 

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1377 (9th Cir. 1978)2 ; see also Smith v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90, 93 (8th Cir. 1990) (suggesting the

problems with granting a motion for summary judgment when the inmate’s medical records have

not been provided to the court). 

Finally, defendants rely on a pleading of plaintiff’s, filed on February 24, 2005. 

In an order filed May 4, 2005, the court directed this document to be stricken from the record and

disregarded. While a court may itself rely on matters outside the motion in resolving a motion

for summary judgment, those matters “must both be in the district court file and set forth in the

response.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School District, 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 

2001) (emphasis in original). Although defendants have brought the pleading to the court’s

attention, the court has directed that it not be considered, essentially removing it from the court’s

file. This document also cannot support defendants’ motion.

In sum, no admissible evidence supports the motion of the foregoing four

defendants, meaning they have not met their initial responsibility of demonstrating there is a

basis for the court’s considering summary judgment.

C. Defendant Iwasa

To the extent defendant Iwasa, a jail commander, moves for summary judgment,

he avers that unless prescribed or medically necessary, inmates are not entitled to wear shoes

other than the standard-issued deck shoes. Declaration of Mark Iwasa in Supp. MSJ (Iwasa

Decl.) ¶¶ 2, 4-5. He says he was not aware that orthopedic shoes had been prescribed or found to

be medically necessary for plaintiff. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff says only that it is his belief that defendant

Iwasa knew of the doctor’s order for orthopedic shoes. Am. Compl. at 5; Opp’n at 4-5.

In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), the Supreme Court held that

inadequate medical care did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment cognizable under

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section 1983 unless the mistreatment rose to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” To establish deliberate indifference, plaintiff must show that defendants knew

of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

837 (1994). A prison official must "both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. 

The nature of a defendant's responses must be such that the defendant purposefully ignores or

fails to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need in order for "deliberate indifference"

to be established. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled in part on

other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Deliberate indifference may occur when prison officials deny, delay, or intentionally interfere

with medical treatment, or may be demonstrated by the way in which prison officials provide

medical care. Id. at 1059-60. 

In this case, defendant Iwasa has submitted a declaration showing he was unaware

of any order or prescription for orthopedic shoes. In his verified complaint, however, plaintiff

also claims that defendant Iwasa changed jail policy to require an inmate to secure a court order

for orthopedic shoes “no matter what medical necessity or prescribed . . . crono [sic].” Am.

Compl. at 5; cf. Opp’n at 5 (Iwasa “in control of the jail and jail procedures”). Defendant Iwasa

does not address this claim and does not otherwise attach a copy of jail policy on orthopedic

shoes. He has not borne his burden of showing the material facts about jail policy and medical

needs are undisputed. 

D. Injunctive Relief

It appears from plaintiff’s opposition to the pending motion that on March 20,

2005, he was given the shoes earlier confiscated. See Opp’n at 3. Moreover, it appears from his

change of address that plaintiff has been sentenced to federal prison and is no longer housed at

the Sacramento County Jail. See, e.g., Docket No. 69 (change of address notice). 

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When an inmate seeks injunctive or declaratory relief concerning his place of

incarceration, his claims for such relief become moot when he is no longer subjected to those

conditions. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365,

1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate as to plaintiff’s request

for injunctive relief. 

II. Plaintiff’s October 24, 2005 “Notice Of Claim”

Although the purpose of this pleading is not entirely clear, it appears plaintiff is

attempting to amend his complaint to add new claims based on an alleged failure to treat an

injury to his right wrist and to document that injury in his medical records. Plaintiff has not filed

a proposed amended complaint. 

Once an answer has been filed, a party may amend a pleading only by leave of

court or by written consent of the adverse party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). An answer was filed

on July 30, 2004. Plaintiff has filed neither a motion to amend nor a stipulation to amend the

complaint signed by all parties. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s October 24, 2005 “notice of claim,”

construed as an attempt to amend the complaint, is denied.

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for summary

judgment be granted as to plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief but denied in all other respects. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: February 9, 2006.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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maga2061.57

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