Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_07-cv-05019/USCOURTS-arwd-5_07-cv-05019-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

DAVID L. DANIELS PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 07-5019

 

BRADLEY L. KARREN;

JUDGE DAVID CLINGER;

KIP WHITTEMORE;

CLAY FOWLKES; NICOLE

BAKER; and the BENTON

COUNTY PROSECUTING

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

David L. Daniels, currently an inmate of the Benton County Detention Center, filed this

civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint was provisionally filed prior to a

determination regarding plaintiff’s status as a pauper and service of process. 

DISCUSSION

Daniels names as defendants Judge David Clinger, Benton County Circuit Court, Bradley

L. Karren, his former attorney, Kip Whittemore and Clay Fowlkes, of the Benton County

Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, Nicole Baker, a public defender, and the Benton County Prosecuting

Attorneys’ Office. In his complaint, Daniels alleges he was railroaded on theft of property and rape

charges. He alleges Judge David Clinger engaged in improper conduct in a number of ways

including illegally sentencing Daniels to a term of imprisonment of fourteen years. Daniels asserts

his attorney, Bradley Karren, provided ineffective assistance of counsel and broke the

confidentiality between a client and his attorney by telling the prosecutors about a crime Daniels

witnessed. 

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Daniels maintains the Benton County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office had him arrested on

the theft of property and rape charges although they knew the date of birth and social security

number on the affidavit of probable cause did not belong to him. Further, he maintains the

Prosecuting Attorney’s Office filed criminal charges of failure to appear, rape, sexual assault, and

theft of property, against him in violation of the Speedy Trial Act and railroaded him on the

charges. 

As part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321,

signed into law on April 26, 1996, section1915, which governs proceedings filed in forma pauperis,

was amended in an effort to address concerns about, and reduce the number of, frivolous prisoner

initiated lawsuits. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Prior to the PLRA's amendments to § 1915, a prisoner who

attained in forma pauperis status was exempted from paying court fees. After the enactment of the

PLRA, prisoners granted IFP status are required to pay the filing fee but are allowed to pay it in

installments. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

The PLRA also added subsection 1915(g) which limits the ability of a prisoner, who has

filed at least three claims that have been dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a

claim, to obtain IFP status. Specifically, § 1915(g) provides that:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action . . . under this section if the prisoner

has, on three or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility,

brought an action . . . in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical

injury. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This provision has commonly become known as the "three strikes rule" or

the "three strikes provision" and has withstood constitutional challenges. See e.g., Medberry v.

Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 1999).

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In Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 1998), the Eighth Circuit held that "an 1

otherwise ineligible prisoner is only eligible to proceed IFP if he is in imminent danger at the

time of the filing. Allegations that the prisoner has faced imminent danger in the past are

insufficient to trigger this exception to § 1915(s) and authorize the prisoner to pay the filing

fee on the installment plan." Id. at 717. 

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The three strikes rule applies to Daniels. He has had three previous actions that qualify as

strikes against him under section 1915(g). See Daniels v. Judge Tom Keith., Civil No. 06-5142

(dismissed as frivolous on 1/3/2007–no appeal filed); Daniels v. VanWinkle, et al., Civil No. 06-

5119 (dismissed as frivolous on 7/27/2006–no appeal filed); Daniels v. Saxton, et al., Civil No. 06-

5104 (dismissed as frivolous on 8/21/2006–no appeal filed). 

In this case, there is no allegation that Danielsis currently under imminent danger of serious

physical injury. Cf. Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding allegations of

ongoing danger sufficient where prisoner specified two incidents where he had suffered harm and

allegations were supported by documentary evidence, including corroborative prisoner disciplinary

reports). Therefore, Daniels is not eligible for IFP status. 

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This case is also subject to dismissal because it is frivolous. David Clinger, a circuit judge,

is immune from suit. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9

(1991)("Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of

damages."). See also Duty v. City of Springdale, 42 F.3d 460, 462 (8th Cir. 1994). "Judges

performing judicial functions enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability." Robinson v. Freeze,

15 F.3d 107, 108 (8th Cir. 1994). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action

he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump v. Sparkman,

435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978). 

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Judicial immunity is overcome in two situations: (1) if the challenged act is non-judicial;

and (2) if the action, although judicial in nature, was taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. It is clear from the allegations of the complaint that neither

situation applies here.

In the past, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief “have been permitted under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against judges acting in their official capacity.” Nollet v. Justices of Trial Court of

Com. of Mass., 83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 210 (D. Mass. 2000), aff’d without op., 248 F.3d 1127 (1st Cir.

2000)(citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 80 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1984)). “However,

in 1996 Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act (“FCIA”), Pub. L. No. 104-317, Title

III § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847, 3853, which legislatively reversed Pulliam in several important

respects.” Nollet, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 210. As amended by the FCIA § 1983 now precludes

injunctive relief against a judicial officer “for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial

capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42

U.S.C. § 1983. 

Daniels does not allege that either of these prerequisites for injunctive relief are met. See

e.g., Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999)(holding injunctive relief against a quasijudicial official is barred if the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of a declaratory decree or the

unavailability of declaratory relief); Fox v. Lee, 99 F. Supp. 2d 573, 575-576 (E.D. Pa. 2000)(claim

for injunctive relief dismissed where plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege that either of the

prerequisites to injunctive relief were met); Ackermann v. Doyle, 43 F. Supp. 2d 265, 273 (E.D.

N.Y. 1999)(dismissing action against judicial officers because plaintiff failed to allege that a

declaratory decree was violated or the declaratory relief was unavailable). Thus, to the extent

Daniels seeks injunctive relief his claims are subject to dismissal.

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Furthermore, to be entitled to equitable relief, “plaintiff must show that he has an inadequate

remedy at law and a serious risk of irreparable harm.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for Dist.

of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir. 1987)(citations omitted). Equitable relief is not

appropriate where an adequate remedy under state law exists. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 542 & n. 22, 104

S. Ct. at 1981 & n. 22. See also Sterling v. Calvin , 874 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir. 1989). An

adequate remedy at law exists when the acts of the judicial officer can be reviewed on appeal or by

extraordinary writ. Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1392 (citation omitted). See also Nelson v. Com, 1997 WL

793060, 2 (E.D. Pa. 1997)(appellate review of conviction provides plaintiff an adequate remedy

under state law). See also J&M Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Hampton, 347 Ark. 126, 60 S.W.3d 481

(2001)(discussing when a writ of prohibition is appropriate). 

Daniels’ complaint as against Kip Whittemore, Clay Fowlkes, and the Benton County

Prosecuting Attorneys’ Office is also subject to dismissal. First, the Benton County Prosecuting

Attorneys’ Office is not subject to suit under § 1983. It is not an entity subject to suit separate

from the individual who is the county prosecutor. See e.g., Hancock v. Washtenaw County

Prosecutor’s Office, 548 F. Supp. 1255, 1256 (E.D. Mich. 1982).

Second, the prosecuting attorneys are immune from suit. The United States Supreme Court,

in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431, 96 S. Ct. 984, 995, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976), established

the absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a civil suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "in

initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case." Id., 424 U.S. at 427. This immunity

extends to all acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”

Id., 424 U.S. at 430. See also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2615, 125

L. Ed. 2d 209 (1993)(Prosecutor acting as an advocate for the state in a criminal prosecution is

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entitled to absolute immunity while a prosecutor acting in an investigatory or administrative

capacity is only entitled to qualified immunity). Based on the allegations of the complaint, it is

clear the defendant prosecuting attorneys are entitled to absolute immunity. See also Brodnicki v.

City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1996)(County prosecutors were entitled to absolute

immunity from suit).

To the extent Daniels’ complaint seeks injunctive relief against the prosecuting attorneys,

we find the claim not cognizable. While the Supreme Court has not held that this immunity

insulates prosecutors from declaratory or injunctive relief, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104

S. Ct. 1970, 80 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1984), a plaintiff must show some substantial likelihood that the past

conduct alleged to be illegal will recur. Daniels can make no such showing here. Further,

injunctive relief is not appropriate where an adequate remedy under state law exists. Id., 466 U.S.

at 542 & n.22. See also Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1336 (8th Cir. 1975).

Finally, Daniels’ claims against Bradley Karren and Nicole Baker are subject to dismissal.

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant, while acting under color

of state law, deprived him of a federal right. An attorney does not act under color of state law

while representing a client. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318, 102 S. Ct. 445, 70 L.

Ed. 2d 509 (1981) (public defender does not act under color of state law when performing

traditional functions as counsel); DuBose v. Kelly, 187 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999)(“[C]onduct of

counsel generally does not constitute action under color of law.”); Dunn v. Hackworth, 628 F.2d

1111, 1112 (8th Cir. 1980)(“The actions of privately retained counsel are not considered state

action and therefore cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim.”). 

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, I recommend that Daniels’ IFP application be denied as he is not eligible to

proceed IFP because of the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). However, having filed this action,

Daniels remains liable for the filing fee. See e.g., In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-530 (8th Cir.

1997)(Even if the petition is dismissed, the full filing fee is still assessed because the Prison

Litigation Reform Act makes prisoners responsible for their filing fees the moment the prisoner

brings a civil action or files an appeal). For this reason, the clerk should be directed to collect the

$350.00 filing fee from the plaintiff. 

Further, I recommend that this case be dismissed on the grounds that the claims are

frivolous, fail to state claims on which relief can be granted, and seek relief against defendants who

are immune from suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii)(IFP action may be dismissed on such

grounds at any time).

Daniels has ten (10) days from receipt of this report and recommendation in which to

file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections

may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. Daniels is reminded that

objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

DATED this 8th day of March 2007.

/s/ J. Marschewski 

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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