Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01157/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01157-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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1

The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1157

___________

Arven Malcom, Jr., *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Robert Houston, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: December 10, 2007

Filed: February 26, 2008 (corrected 3/17/08)

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Arven Malcom, Jr., was convicted of first degree sexual assault in 1993. After

exhausting his state appeals, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He sought relief based on the alleged denial of

his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and

to conflict-free representation. The district court1

 denied relief on all claims and

Malcom appealed. We granted a certificate of appealability on the question whether

it was error to analyze Malcom’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim under

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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), rather than under United States v.

Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). We hold that Strickland was the proper standard and

therefore affirm. 

I. Background

The facts underlying Malcom’s conviction are fully set forth in the three

Nebraska Court of Appeals opinions that have dealt with his state appeals. See

Nebraska v. Malcom, No. A-06-524, 2007 WL 2257870 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007)

(Malcom III); Nebraska v. Malcom, 675 N.W.2d 728 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004) (Malcom

II); Nebraska v. Malcom, 583 N.W.2d 45 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998) (Malcom I). For our

purposes, the following facts are relevant. Malcom was convicted of first degree

sexual assault under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319(1)(c). Malcom I, 583 N.W.2d at 49.

Only three elements need to be proved to establish that offense: “(1) sexual

penetration when (2) the actor is 19 years of age or older and (3) the victim is less than

16 years old.” Id. (summarizing § 28-319(1)(c)). At the time of the offense, Malcom

was 49 years old and the victim 15. Id. at 47. There are no lesser included offenses,

and consent and mistake of age are not defenses. Id. 

Malcom’s trial counsel conducted her representation of Malcom as if consent

and mistake of age were valid defenses and lesser included charges existed. Malcom

II, 675 N.W.2d at 732; Malcom I, 583 N.W.2d at 48-49. Malcom I held that trial

counsel’s performance was deficient and ineffective. 583 N.W.2d at 48-49. Malcom

I recognized, however, that under the analysis outlined in Strickland, a defendant must

have suffered prejudice, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would

have been different but for the deficient performance. See id.; see also Malcom II,

675 N.W.2d at 734. Malcom I held that it was unlikely that the deficient performance

affected the outcome because the state had produced, in addition to the victim, two

witnesses who testified that Malcom had claimed to have had sex with the victim.

Malcom I, 583 N.W.2d at 49. Malcom II similarly recognized that Malcom’s trial

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counsel had been deficient, but also recognized that the Malcom I court had already

held that Malcom was not prejudiced by the deficiency and therefore considered the

matter settled. Malcom II, 675 N.W.2d at 735.

An evidentiary hearing was held in the interval between the decisions in

Malcom II and Malcom III. At this hearing, Malcom contended that, inter alia, his

trial counsel had been ineffective in not advising him to accept a plea bargain.

Malcom testified that “he ‘[m]ost definitely’ would have accepted the plea bargain if

he had been informed that ‘there were no defenses of consent or mistake of age’ and

‘no lesser included offenses’” to the charge of first degree sexual assault. Malcom III,

2007 WL 2257870, at *2 (quoting Malcom’s testimony). Trial counsel testified that

she pursued the consent and mistake of age theories only because Malcom insisted,

against her advice, that she pursue them. Id. at *3. In support of trial counsel’s

testimony, the public defender who had represented Malcom in 1992 on an unrelated

sexual assault charge testified that in that case, “Malcom was going to testify

regardless of what I advised him of. I mean, he was going to do it the way he wanted

to do it.” Id. The trial court found that trial counsel’s and the public defender’s

testimony was more credible than Malcom’s, that Malcom would not have accepted

the plea agreement, and that he therefore suffered no prejudice as a result of any

deficient representation. Id. at *4. On appeal from that hearing, Malcom III held that

Malcom’s claim of ineffectual assistance at trial was procedurally barred by the law

of the case doctrine because the issue had already been argued and decided in Malcom

I. Id. at *5. 

II. Analysis

A claim adjudicated on the merits in a state court will form the basis for habeas

relief only if the state decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law” or “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

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proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458 (8th Cir.

2004) (en banc). In habeas cases, we review a district court’s legal conclusions de

novo, and we review its factual findings for clear error. Berkovitz v. Minnesota, 505

F.3d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 2007). 

Generally, representation by counsel is constitutionally deficient only if it falls

“below an objective standard of reasonableness” and the defendant can prove actual

prejudice from the deficiency. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88) (quotation marks omitted). A showing of actual

prejudice requires that there be a reasonable probability that the outcome would have

been different but for the deficiency. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). When

these two requirements are met, the conviction must be reversed because it is a

product of “a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result of the

proceeding unreliable” and unfair. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687)

(quotation marks omitted). 

In rare cases, it is appropriate to presume that the deficient performance resulted

in prejudice without requiring any demonstration that the deficiency prejudiced the

defense. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004). That presumption is

appropriate when there has been a complete denial of counsel or a denial of counsel

at a critical stage, when “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to

meaningful adversarial testing,” or when even competent counsel could not be

expected to be of assistance given the circumstances. Bell, 535 U.S. at 696 (quoting

Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659). The circumstances in such cases “are so likely to prejudice

the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.”

Nixon, 543 U.S. at 190 (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658).

We rarely presume prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel cases. United

States v. White, 341 F.3d 673, 679 (8th Cir. 2003). In White, counsel failed to

conduct any independent investigation of the case. Id. at 678-79. Further, “[c]ounsel

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called no witnesses, offered no exhibits, requested no jury instructions, failed to

submit a trial brief, and participated in trial solely through cross-examinations which

he did not prepare ahead of time.” Id. at 678. Even so, counsel otherwise participated

in the case as an attorney, and therefore the defendant was not completely without

counsel. Id. at 678-79. We did not presume prejudice in White, and we rejected

White’s claim that she was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to call witnesses,

concluding that there was no reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding

would have been different had they been called. Id. at 679-80. 

As in White, trial counsel’s representation in this case was not so inadequate

“as to justify dispensing with the usual requirement that prejudice must be shown.”

See White, 341 F.3d at 679 (internal quotation omitted). It is not insuperably difficult

to assess the effect of trial counsel’s error in pursuing consent and mistake of age

defenses. The question before the Nebraska court was whether the remaining

evidence established a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been

different if Malcom had not testified with respect to those purported defenses. See

Malcom I, 583 N.W.2d at 49-50. As that court noted, two state witnesses testified that

Malcom had told them that he had engaged in consensual sex with the victim. Id.

Trial counsel called several character witnesses for Malcom. The ages of Malcom and

the victim are not disputable. Malcom does not suggest that there is any witness that

could testify truthfully and still cast doubt on Malcom’s age, the victim’s age, or the

fact that Malcom had sex with her. Accordingly, because the effect of the deficiencies

in trial counsel’s representation can be assessed with no great difficulty, there is no

need to presume that prejudice resulted therefrom. 

III. Conclusion

Because Malcom did not suffer a complete denial of counsel at trial, and

because it is possible to assess the effect of the deficiencies in trial counsel’s

representation, it was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, federal

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law to apply the Strickland standard to Malcom’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. 

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

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