Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04357/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04357-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED 

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COURT

U

For the Northern District of California

NITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAMIN NIKOOSERESHT

Petitioner,

v.

BEN CURRY, Warden, Correctional Training

Facility, Soledad

Defendant(s).

_____________________________________/

No. C 06-04357 MHP

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Ramin Nikooseresht (“petitioner”), a state prisoner at the Correctional Training Facility in

Soledad, California, brought this petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

section 2254 to challenge his denial of parole. His petition is now before the court for review

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2243 and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Having

considered the arguments presented, and for the reasons stated below, the court enters the following

memorandum and order.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder in violation of California Penal Code 

section 187. On February 10, 1993, following his conviction, petitioner was sentenced in the San

Francisco County Superior Court to fifteen years to life imprisonment. Petitioner does not challenge

his conviction but rather the execution of his sentence. 

Petitioner contends that at the time of his conviction his minimum eligible parole date was

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February 7, 2003.1 At the time he filed his petition, petitioner had served approximately 14.5 years

of his sentence, taking into account pre-conviction credit for good behavior and time served. 

Petitioner contends that he is entitled to five years of additional post-conviction credit under

California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2410. Thus, petitioner claims to have served more

than nineteen years of his sentence.

Petitioner’s initial parole consideration hearing took place on May 16, 2002. The Board of

Prison Terms (now known as the Board of Parole Hearings (“BPH”)) denied petitioner’s request for

a duration of two years, stating that “the [commitment] offense was carried out in an especially cruel

and callous manner . . . demonstrat[ing] an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering” and

that “[petitioner] still needs to develop and enhance his ability to cope with stress in a nondestructive

manner.”

The BPH heard petitioner’s second request for parole on August 23, 2004. Petitioner’s Life

Prisoner Evaluation Report, prepared by a correctional counselor and supported by another

correctional counselor, the facility captain and the classification and parole representative, found

that petitioner would “pose a low degree of threat to the public,” and that he would “have a

successful parole.” Although the staff psychologist characterized petitioner as being in “the lowest

risk category for community release,” the BPH again denied petitioner’s request for parole, noting

that the commitment crime was committed in an “especially violent and brutal manner,”

“dispassionate[ly]” and with “a callous disregard for human suffering.” The BPH also claimed that

the psychological evaluation was “not totally supportive of release.”

The specifics regarding the crime and the circumstances regarding parole suitability are

described later in this order and are only mentioned here in brief. In 1992 petitioner drove from Los

Angeles to San Francisco with his 17-year-old girlfriend. Petitioner claims that after he announced

to his girlfriend that he intended to take his own life, she told him that she would rather die than live

without him. That night, petitioner strangled and suffocated the victim with a pillow, then

submerged her head in water in the sink in order to ensure that she was dead. There was also

evidence that petitioner had head-butted the victim. He then bathed her, dressed her, and put her on

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the bed. Before using a knife to cut his own wrists, petitioner cut one of the victim’s wrists in order

to find out what would happen when he cut his own. Petitioner passed out from the loss of blood

after cutting his wrists but woke up hours later and contacted a friend to call the police.

From the time of his conviction, petitioner has had an exemplary prison record, and his

recent psychological evaluations have been strongly supportive of release. When released from

prison, he plans to move to Iran, where he as a job offer and a place to live. After exhausting his

remedies in the California courts, petitioner filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus,

contending that the failure of the BPH to find him suitable for parole during his second parole

consideration hearing on August 23, 2004 violated his constitutional due process rights. Respondent

filed an answer to the court’s Order to Show Cause, and petitioner filed a traverse. The matter is

now submitted to the court for a decision on the merits.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28 U.S.C.

section 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Although venue is therefore proper in either the district of

confinement or the district of conviction, traditionally California federal courts hear petitions for a

writ of habeas corpus in the district of conviction. Laue v. Nelson, 279 F. Supp. 265, 266 (N.D. Cal.

1968) (Weigel, J.). Venue lies in this district because petitioner was convicted in San Francisco

County Superior Court. 

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas proceedings

either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state judicial remedies,

either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest state court

available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they seek to raise in

federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not dispute that state court remedies

were exhausted for the claims asserted in this petition.

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LEGAL STANDARD

I. Liberty Interest in Parole

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the government from depriving an inmate of

life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. In the parole

context, a violation of an inmate’s due process occurs when (1) the inmate has been deprived of a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole, and (2) the inmate has been denied adequate

procedural protections in the parole process. See, e.g., Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 913 (9th

Cir. 2003). 

There is no cognizable right to parole under the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court

has held, however, that when a state’s parole statute uses mandatory language, the statute “creates a

presumption that parole release will be granted” unless certain findings are made, and thereby gives

rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.

Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377–78 (1987). California

Penal Code section 3041 states that “[t]he panel or board shall set a release date unless it determines

that” statutorily defined determinations are met. Thus, under Greenholtz and Allen, the Ninth

Circuit found “that California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on

parole.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Sass v. Cal. Bd. of

Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding California inmates have a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole); Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658,662 (9th. Cir.

2007). 

The second prong of the due process inquiry—whether the inmate has been afforded an

adequate parole process—is satisfied if two considerations are met. First, the parole procedure itself

must provide an inmate with sufficient safeguards. The inmate must be afforded an opportunity to

be heard before an unbiased decision-maker, and in the case of a denial of parole, must be informed

of the reasons underlying the decision. See Jancsek v. Or. Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th

Cir. 1987). Second, “some evidence” must support the decision to grant or deny parole. Id.

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(adopting the “some evidence” standard established by the Supreme Court in Superintendent v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985)); see also Irons, 479 F.3d at 662 (“The Supreme Court has clearly

established that a parole board’s decision deprives a prisoner of due process with respect to the

[liberty] interest if the board’s decision is not supported by some evidence in the record or is

otherwise arbitrary.”) (internal citations omitted); Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128 (holding the some evidence

standard applies to parole denials). The evidence underlying the grant or denial of parole must have

“some indicia of reliability.” McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904 (quoting Jancsek, 833 F.2d at 1390). Id.

The “some evidence” standard applies equally to the board’s decision and the Governor’s review of

the grant or denial of parole. See, e.g., In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 656, 660–61 (2003). 

II. Habeas Corpus

The court is required to analyze state habeas claims under the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). AEDPA provides that an

application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Accordingly, this court will review the last reasoned state court opinion under the standards

outlined in AEDPA. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). The Supreme Court has

interpreted AEDPA to require a district court to uphold the state court’s decision unless that decision

was an “objectively unreasonable” application of a clearly established federal law. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). Here, the last reasoned state court opinion occurred in the

California Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco. Thus, this court will apply the

deferential AEDPA standard to the Superior Court proceeding to determine whether it was an

“objectively unreasonable” denial of parole.

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DISCUSSION

I. Some Evidence Standard

A California prisoner with a sentence of a term of years to life with the possibility of parole

has a protected liberty interest in release on parole and therefore a right to due process in the parole

suitability hearings. Allen, 482 U.S. at 369; Greenholz, 442 U.S. at 1; Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). 

A parole board’s decision satisfies the requirements of due process if “some evidence” supports the

decision. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454–55; Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128–29. Satisfying the

some evidence standard “does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment

of witnesses’ credibility, or weighing of the evidence, but, instead, the relevant question is whether

there is any evidence in the record to support the disciplinary board’s conclusion.” Hill, 472 U.S. at

455. Although the standard is minimal, it assures that “the record is not so devoid of evidence that

the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Sass, 461 F.3d

at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). The some evidence standard is clearly established law in the

parole context for the purposes of section 2254(d). Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129.

In order to assess whether the parole board’s determination of suitability was supported by

some evidence, the court must look to the criteria established by state law. Irons, 479 F.3d at 662. 

California law dictates that prisoners serving indeterminate sentences for second degree murder may

serve up to life in prison but come up for parole consideration one year before the prisoner’s

minimum eligible release date. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1078. Once the prisoner is eligible

for parole, the BPH “shall normally set a parole release date . . . in a manner that will provide

uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect to their threat to the public.” 

Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a). However, an inmate will be denied parole if in the judgment of the BPH

the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.2 A parole

date shall be set, however, if the prisoner is found suitable for parole.3

The California Supreme Court also has determined that the facts of the crime can alone

constitute some evidence and thus support a sentence longer than the statutory minimum even if

everything else about the prisoner is laudable. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071. However,

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“the Board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime for which the inmate

was committed.” Id.; see also Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 682–83 (“A denial of parole based upon

the nature of the offense alone might rise to the level of a due process violation—for example where

no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more aggravated or violent than the

minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that offense.”).

II. Nikooseresht as a Parole Candidate

In determining whether the denial of habeas corpus was supported by some evidence, the

court looks to the San Francisco County Superior Court’s March 9, 2005 denial of parole as the

state’s last reasoned decision. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804. In the March 9, 2005 denial the Superior Court

relied on two reasons for the BPH’s denial of parole: (1) petitioner’s psychological evaluations,

which the BPH found to be not totally supportive of release on the grounds that there was

insufficient evidence as to petitioner’s propensity for aggressive behavior in an intimate

heterosexual relationship, and (2) petitioner’s commitment offense, which the BPH found to have

been carried out in a violent, brutal and dispassionate manner, with a callous disregard for human

suffering. Answer, Exh. F at 4–5.

A. Psychological Evaluations

Respondent contends that petitioner’s psychological evaluations constitute some evidence

indicating unsuitability for parole, as determined by the BPH. The BPH claimed that petitioner’s

last three psychological evaluations were not totally supportive of release based on risk factors

associated with petitioner’s potential for aggressive behavior in heterosexual relationships. The

BPH cited petitioner’s most recent psychological evaluation, dated August 5, 2004, which stated that

“[a]lthough inmate has been confined to correctional facilities, with no opportunity for heterosexual

relationships available, available psychometric data do not suggest any problems or increased risk

factors in this area.” Answer, Exh. C at 60. Next, the BPH cited the 2001 evaluation indicating that

“it does remain difficult to determine this inmate’s propensity for aggressive behavior in intimate

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heterosexual relationships.” Id. Finally, the BPH referred to the 1996 evaluation, which stated that

“it seems likely that the personality factors which contributed to the crime are still a part of

[petitioner’s] personality make-up.” Id. 

The validity of the BPH’s interpretation of petitioner’s psychological evaluation, however, is

called into question by the evaluating psychologist himself. In a letter responding to the BPH’s

decision, the psychologist who performed the evaluation wrote:

the writer takes strong exception to a statement made by Presiding Commissioner

Risen that the 2004 assessment report is not totally supportive of release. The writer

concluded that, ‘Risk factors in a community environment are likely no greater than

the average citizen. In the absence of any drug or alcohol-related issues, he is an

appropriate candidate for parole release consideration, with no recommendation for

imposed restrictions.’ It is theoretically impossible to assign a lower risk value to

any incarcerated inmate.

Pet.’s Br., Exh. C at 148 (emphasis added). The letter further clarified that petitioner’s current

profile “negates the Board’s concern over possible unresolved psychosexual relationship issues.” Id.

Indeed, contrary to the BPH’s characterization, petitioner’s psychological evaluations are favorable. 

Petitioner’s 2004 evaluation noted that “Nikooseresht’s lack of a juvenile record, absence of mental

health issues, and exemplary programming history during his 12 years of incarceration, place him in

the lowest risk category for community release.” Id. at 150. Furthermore, petitioner’s 2001

evaluation stated that “the bulk of the evidence weighs in favor of his lack of dangerousness ... his

violence potential is considered to be no more than the average citizen in the community generally.” 

Id. at 155–56. Even in the 1996 evaluation, the psychologist stated that “Nikooseresht appears to

exhibit true remorse and comes across quite sincere in his regret for participating in the crime.” Id.

at 159. 

Thus, to the extent that the BPH and the Superior Court relied on petitioner’s psychological

evaluations as constituting some evidence of unsuitability for parole, this reliance was an objectively

unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law and does not support a denial of

petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75; 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1).

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B. Commitment Offense

For the Superior Court’s decision to stand based solely on the commitment offense, there

must be some evidence that the crime was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel

manner under 15 Cal. Code Regs. section 2402(c)(1). In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th. at 682–83. 

Although this is a deferential standard, the BPH must still point to factors that indicate the offense

reasonably could be considered more aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a

conviction for that offense. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071. Furthermore, in order to

determine whether such evidence is sufficient, “[t]he test is not whether some evidence supports the

reasons the Governor cites for denying parole, but whether some evidence indicates a parolee’s

release unreasonably endangers public safety.” In re Lee, 143 Cal. App. 4th 1400, 1408 (2006)

(emphasis in original). The facts of the crime taken from petitioner’s life prisoner evaluation report

are as follows:

Nikooseresht and his 17 year old girlfriend drove from Los Angeles to San Francisco

on the afternoon of 04/23/92 . . . Nikooseresht maintained that they were running

from her family in Los Angeles because they did not approve of her relationship. He

stated that he and the victim had made a suicide pact. Nikooseresht stated that at 1:15

a.m. on 04/25/92, they both decided it was time for him to kill her. He said he

strangled, suffocated, slapped and butted her with his head. He then took her to the

bathroom and held her head underwater in the sink bowl for four minutes. This was

to assure she was dead. He then bathed and dressed the victim. He put her on the

bed lying on her back. He made up his mind to cut his wrists so he would die. First

he cut the victim’s wrist to see what would happen when he cut his wrist. He cut

both of his wrists with a knife. These wounds were described in the preliminary

hearing as major lacerations. At 4:30 a.m., Nikooseresht called a friend in Los

Angeles. He told a friend that he cut his wrists. The police went to the hotel room

and found the victim dead and Nikooseresht bleeding from his self-inflicted wounds. 

He was taken to San Francisco General Hospital for treatment. The coroner’s office

testified that the victim died from multiple traumatic injuries. Postmortem

examination revealed evidence of strangulation and drowning. The cut on her left

wrist appeared to have been made postmortem.

Pet.’s Br., Exh. C at 183. Respondent contends that these facts are sufficient evidence under 15 Cal.

Code Regs. sections 2402(c)(1)(C) and (D), in that the victim was abused after death and that the

offense demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering. Respondent further

argues that petitioner’s stated motivation of severe depression is inconsistent with petitioner’s

previous characterization of his crime as a suicide pact, and that this also justified the denial of

parole. 

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Petitioner has consistently maintained throughout his incarceration that his acts were

committed in a state of severe depression and despair and that he loved his girlfriend. It is not

inconsistent for petitioner to have stated his intention to take his own life and for a suicide pact

subsequently to have been formed. Rather, during his parole hearing petitioner stated that his

girlfriend “was dependent on me and I was dependent on her. I mean, she was really at that point of

my life, my only reason to live.” Answer, Exh. C at 17. This statement is consistent with

petitioner’s statement that “my main concern was to just get it over with as quickly as possible,

because I didn’t want her to suffer.” Id. Petitioner also stated that the reason he drowned the victim

after suffocating her with a pillow was that “I didn’t know how to do this. And I just want to make

sure that she’s gone, that she’s not suffering. So I took her to the sink in the bathroom and put her

under the water to see if there’s any bubbles. All these efforts to make sure that, as I say, she’s

dead.” Id. 

Respondent contends that the BPH adequately pointed to factors beyond the minimum

elements of the crime for which the inmate was committed and that the denial of parole was

therefore justified. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071. For this requirement to have any content,

however, the facts of the crime must demonstrate callousness and cruelty and suggest that the

petitioner remains a danger to public safety. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1098. Because second

degree murder requires an unlawful killing with malice aforethought, all second degree murders will

involve some amount of viciousness or callousness. In re Weider, 145 Cal. App. 4th 570, 587

(2006) (stating further that “[t]he nature of human activity is such that, given its subjective

assessment, the Board could always find some aspect of the crime that exceeds the minimum

elements”). 

This court has seen many egregious murders committed with exceptional brutality and

hatred, and this is not one of them. The standard for determining whether a prisoner is unsuitable

for parole is determined not by abstractly listing the acts involved in the crime, but rather by asking

“whether the crime was committed in a manner that showed exceptionally callous disregard for

human suffering.” In re Weider, 145 Cal. App. 4th at 587 (emphasis in original). The facts of

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petitioner’s crime indicate that he did not want the victim to suffer and would have prevented her

from suffering, had he known how. Further, cutting the victim’s wrist after she was dead did not

evidence petitioner’s cruelty or malice towards the victim; rather, it was evidence of his ignorance

about how to commit suicide. The determination of suitability under California law hinges on

whether the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society. 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2402(a). As such, although petitioner’s act of cutting the victim’s wrist postmortem technically falls

under a section 2402(c) factor indicating unsuitability, it would run contrary to the statutory scheme

to consider this act as some evidence of cruelty or malice that would justify the denial of parole. 

Thus, petitioner’s commitment offense cannot by itself constitute some evidence of unsuitability for

parole because it fails to establish a basis for determining that petitioner continues to pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society.

C. Circumstances Indicating Suitability for Parole

In contrast to the BPH’s cited reasons for denying petitioner parole, the factors supporting

his release under 15 Cal. Code Regs. section 2402(d) are strong. Petitioner has no juvenile record or

criminal history prior to the commission of his commitment offense. Psychological evaluations have

indicated the presence of genuine remorse and acceptance of responsibility for the pain and grief he

has caused the victim’s family. Also, petitioner committed his crime as the result of significant

stress related to his family’s expectations of him as a young man, and his evaluations indicate that he

has matured over his fifteen years in prison and are strongly supportive of release. Furthermore,

petitioner’s institutional behavior is impeccable: he has remained discipline free during his

incarceration, maintained an excellent work record, obtained marketable skills in a range of

vocations and completed an array of self-help programs available to him in prison. Finally,

petitioner plans to leave the country for Iran upon release. As the BPH found, petitioner has viable

parole plans in Iran upon release, including a job offer and a place to live in Iran, as well as the

support of his family.

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III. Biased Decision-Maker Claim

Due process dictates that a decision-maker determining a prisoner’s parole date be unbiased. 

O’Bremski v. Maas, 915 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1990) (an inmate is “entitled to have his release

date considered by a Board that [is] free from bias or prejudice.”); see also Withrow v. Larkin, 421

U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (“Not only is a biased decision-maker constitutionally unacceptable but ‘our

system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.’” (quoting In re

Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). Petitioner asserts that Governors Wilson and Davis had a

blanket no-parole policy in violation of due process. However, this claim fails for a lack of

evidentiary support, as petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to support his allegations that

he was denied individualized, unbiased consideration. Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary

hearing to evaluate the Board’s policies is also denied.

IV. Substantial Evidence Claim

Petitioner asserts again that a “substantial evidence” standard is correct despite the court

having dismissed this claim without leave to amend in its October 30, 2006 Order to Show Cause.

Both this court and the U.S. Supreme Court have been clear that a reviewing court must find that

there was some evidence, not substantial evidence, to support the conclusions of the disciplinary

board. Superintendent v. Hill 472 U.S. at 455–56.

V. Fact Finding Process

Petitioner argues that the state court fact finding process is invalid under Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakley v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), arguing that a judge

may not deny parole based on facts not found by a jury or admitted by a defendant. Petitioner’s

premise for this argument seems to be that a life sentence is not the maximum term of a sentence of

fifteen years to life. Although Apprendi held that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, where the statutory maximum is life in

prison, Apprendi does not apply. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Furthermore, Blakely specifically held

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that Apprendi does not invalidate indeterminate sentencing schemes. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308. 

Thus, petitioner’s argument in this regard also fails.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED. Within thirty

(30) days of the date of this order the Board of Parole Hearings must calculate a term for

Nikooseresht and set a date for his release in keeping with this order and in accordance with the

requirements of California Penal Code section 3041(a). Within forty (40) days of the date of this

order, respondent must file and serve a notice of the date set for Nikooseresht’s release.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 17, 2007 _______________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

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1. This appears to be in error, as the record shows that petitioner was first eligible for parole on

April 25, 2002.

2. The listed circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole are the nature of the

commitment offense, i.e., whether the prisoner committed the offense in “an especially heinous,

atrocious or cruel manner;” the prisoner has a previous record of violence; the prisoner has an

unstable social history, the prisoner has previously engaged in a sadistic sexual offense, the prisoner

has a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense; and negative institutional

behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). 

3. The listed circumstances tending to show suitability for parole are the absence of a juvenile

record, stable social history, signs of remorse, a stressful motivation for the crime, whether the

prisoner suffered from battered women’s syndrome, lack of criminal history, the present age

reducing the probability of recidivism, whether the prisoner has made realistic plans for release or

developed marketable skills, and positive institutional behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs § 2402(d). 

ENDNOTES

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