Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02258/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02258-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH EVERETT JOHNSON, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

Deputy HENSEL; et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-2258 SI (pr)

ORDER OF SERVICE

INTRODUCTION

Joseph Everett Johnson, Jr., apparently a pretrial detainee at the San Mateo County Jail in

Redwood City, California, has filed a pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His

complaint is now before the court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A. 

BACKGROUND

Johnson alleges the following about his conditions of confinement at the San Mateo County

Jail. On April 4, 2005, deputy Hensel uttered a racial slur against Johnson and his cellmate during

the course of an argument. Shortly thereafter, Johnson's cellmate was extracted from the cell and

moved to another cell. Several minutes later, Johnson asked deputy Hensel for a grievance form

to file a grievance about the "verbal assault." Complaint, Attachment, p. 3.

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Although his request was initially refused, Johnson was given a grievance form an hour later. Later

that day, Johnson was moved to another cell in a less desirable part of the jail by deputy Hensel

and deputy Passmore. Johnson filed a grievance about deputy Hensel and deputy Passmore.

Johnson complained to a classification officer who oversees all inmate movement within the

county jail; the officer told Johnson he should have been moved to another program dormitory

rather than 3-East and he would be moved there as soon as possible. Johnson was moved to the

program dormitory on April 7, 2005. 

On April 20, 2005, sergeant Southward told Johnson that he had talked to his deputies and

believed that the inmate grievance Johnson filed was a lie. Later that day, a classification

representative told Johnson that sergeant Southward was very upset that Johnson and his former

cellmate, Charles Brooks, were once again cellmates and therefore Johnson was going to be

moved again. On April 21, 2005, Johnson was moved to 5-East. Deputy Hensel worked in that

cell area. Deputy Hensel made derogatory comments concerning Johnson's April 5 inmate

grievance and has otherwise repeatedly harassed him. 

Johnson claims he was subjected to a retaliatory transfer to less desirable housing after he

began the process of filing an administrative grievance. He also claims that the failure of

defendants Southward and Schumaker to take disciplinary and/or administrative actions against

deputy Hensel and deputy Passmore to curb their misbehavior also makes them liable for the

constitutional violations. He further alleges that on April 28, 2005, Johnson was taken to the

booking area and was interrogated, intimidated and threatened by sergeant Schumaker, who asked

him multiple times to change his statement in his April 5 grievance, threatened him with criminal

charges, and reminded him that it was two months until his pending criminal trial and that his

existence could be made unpleasant until then. These comments allegedly were made in retaliation

for his grievances. Sergeant Southward stood by and did not stop sergeant Schumaker. Schumaker

stated that the jail staff had intercepted a kite from Johnson's cellmate, Charles Brooks, that

indicated they were planning to make false charges against deputies. Johnson filed a grievance

about the April 28 incident. 

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Johnson also alleges that "San Mateo County Jail officials have conspired to place him in

direct contact with deputy Hensel on an ongoing basis." Complaint, p. 5. He further alleges that

this amounted to "deliberate indifference," although he does not identify to what the actor was

deliberately indifferent. Id. 

DISCUSSION

A. Review of Complaint

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss

any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at

1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. The Claims

1. Verbal Harassment

The racial slur uttered by deputy Hensel that allegedly started all the problems described

in the complaint is not actionable in a section 1983 action. Allegations of verbal harassment and

abuse fail to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d

732, 738 (9th Cir. 1997); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir.

1981), aff'd sub nom. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983); see, e.g., Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d

1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996), amended 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (disrespectful and assaultive

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comments by prison guard not enough to implicate 8th Amendment); Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830

F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (directing vulgar language at prisoner does not state constitutional

claim); Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 99 (8th Cir. 1986) ("mere words, without more, do not

invade a federally protected right"); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1252 (9th Cir. 1982) (federal

court cannot order guards to refrain from using racial slurs to harass prisoners). The verbal

harassment claim is dismissed without leave to amend. 

2. Access To The Courts

Johnson alleges that he has been denied access to the courts based on the failure of jail

officials to return his April 5, 2005 grievance. He alleges that he filed the grievance to "exhaust

his administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief in this court." Complaint, p. 3. This

claim must be dismissed because Johnson has not yet suffered an actual injury as a result of the

alleged interference with his right of access to the courts. 

A constitutional right of access to the courts does exist, but to establish a claim for any

violation of the right of access to the courts, the prisoner must show that there was an inadequacy

in the prison's legal access program that caused him an actual injury. See Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 350-51 (1996). To prove an actual injury, the prisoner must show that the inadequacy

hindered him in presenting a non-frivolous claim concerning his conviction or conditions of

confinement. See id. at 355. Examples of impermissible hindrances include: a prisoner whose

complaint was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of

deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have known; and a prisoner who

had "suffered arguably actionable harm" that he wished to bring to the attention of the court, but

was so stymied by the inadequacies of the prison's services that he was unable even to file a

complaint. See id. at 351. Mere delay in filing papers would not be enough, for example, if they

were nevertheless timely filed or accepted and considered by the court. See Hudson v. Robinson,

678 F.2d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 1982). 

Here, no actual injury has occurred. Johnson's complaint has been filed and has not yet

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been dismissed due to any failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. His cause of action for

denial of access to the courts will not arise unless and until this action is dismissed due to his

delay in filing this action (a rather unlikely event in light of the fact that this action was filed less

than two months after the alleged misconduct) or due to the failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. Even if this action is dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it is not

clear that a cause of action for denial of access to the courts will arise, as Johnson may not have

given the grievance process sufficient time to work. The claim for denial of access to the courts

is dismissed without prejudice to Johnson asserting the claim in a new action if the defendants'

refusal to process the grievance ever results in an actual injury. 

3. Retaliation

"Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)

because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate

correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote

omitted). Accord Pratt v. Rowland , 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (prisoner suing prison

officials under § 1983 for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his

constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action did not advance legitimate penological goals,

such as preserving institutional order and discipline); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th

Cir. 1994) (same). Retaliation is actionable in a Section 1983 claim not because there is text in

the constitution protecting against retaliation, but because retaliation can chill the exercise of

First Amendment rights. 

Liberally construed, the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state a § 1983 claim

for relief against deputy Hensel, deputy Passmore, sergeant Schumaker and sergeant Southward

for retaliating against Johnson for his inmate grievance activity. 

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4. Other Issues In Complaint

Johnson's complaint also alleges that he was subjected to a conspiracy to put him in a

housing situation where he would encounter deputy Hensel. That kind of conspiracy, assuming it

exists, is not actionable under § 1983, or under any other civil rights statutes. 

Johnson further alleges that defendants engaged in "deliberate indifference" by placing him

with deputy Hensel after the racial slur. He also claims defendant had a duty to take action against

a misbehaving guard. The allegations under the "deliberate indifference" heading in the complaint

do not state a claim for relief under § 1983. Deliberate indifference is not a separate claim for

relief. Generally, the phrase "deliberate indifference" most commonly is used in § 1983 litigation

to refer to the state of mind necessary in certain Eighth Amendment claims, e.g., deliberate

indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs or to his safety, but that does not appear to be

what Johnson is alleging.

Finally, Johnson has not state a claim against the county or the county sheriff, both of

whom apparently were included as defendants because they are ultimately in charge and employed

the jail personnel who violated Johnson's rights. Such a theory of liability would be respondeat

superior liability, i.e., liability simply because they have employed the wrongdoers, but that is not

allowed under § 1983. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Ybarra v. Reno

Thunderbird Mobile Home Village , 723 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1984); accord Monell v. Dep't

of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (local governments cannot be liable under § 1983

under respondeat superior theory).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, 

1. Plaintiff's complaint states a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation

by deputy Hensel, deputy Passmore, sergeant Schumaker and sergeant Southward. All other

defendants and all other claims are dismissed without leave to amend. 

2. The clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without

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prepayment of fees, the summons, a copy of the complaint, a copy of this order, and a copy of all

the other documents in the case file upon the following four persons, all of whom apparently are

employed by the county sheriff at the San Mateo County Jail in Redwood City, California: deputy

Hensel, deputy Passmore, sergeant Schumaker, and sergeant Southward

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the following briefing schedule for

dispositive motions is set:

a. No later than December 1, 2005, defendants must file and serve a motion

for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If defendants are of the opinion that this case

cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they must so inform the court prior to the date the

motion is due.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion

must be filed with the court and served upon defendants no later than January 6, 2006. Plaintiff

must bear in mind the following notice and warning regarding summary judgment as he prepares

his opposition to any summary judgment motion:

The defendants may make a motion for summary judgment by which they

seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. [¶] Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment.

Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact --

that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party

who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your

case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly

supported by decla rations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your

complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts

shown in the defendants' declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of

material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment,

if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will be

dismissed and there will be no trial. (See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998).

c. If defendants wish to file a reply brief, they must file and serve the reply brief

no later than January 20, 2006.

4. All communications by plaintiff with the court must be served on a defendant's

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to defendant's counsel. The court may disregard

any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until a defendant's

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counsel has been designated, plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to defendant,

but once a defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to counsel rather

than directly to that defendant. 

5. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is

required before the parties may conduct discovery.

6. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the

court informed of any change of address and must comply with the court's orders in a timely

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of

address in every pending case every time he is moved to a new facility.

7. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this

case on any document he submits to this court for consideration in this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 27___, 2005 _______________________

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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