Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01987/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01987-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 -

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jonathan Tommy,

Petitioner

-vsKatrina S. Kane, et al.,

Respondents

CV-09-1987-PHX-DGC (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, incarcerated at the time in the Federal Detention Center, Eloy, Arizona,

filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241on

October 19, 2009 (#5) challenging his continued detention pending removal to Sierra Leone.

On February 2, 2010, Respondents filed their Notice to the Court (#14), reflecting

Petitioner’s release on order of supervision. The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for

consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact,

report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases,

Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local

Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 19, 2009, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(#5), challenging his detention without bond in the

Detention Center in Eloy, Arizona, while awaiting removal to Sierra Leone. Petitioner’s

Petition alleges that he was ordered removed on March 30, 2009, and has been detained more

than 180 days. (Petition, #5 at 4.)

Case 2:09-cv-01987-DGC Document 18 Filed 03/03/10 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

The Service Order, issued December 18, 2009 (#8) warned Petitioner:

Petitioner must file and serve a notice of a change of address in

accordance with Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner must not include a motion for other relief with a notice of

change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

(Order, 12/18/09, #8 at 2.)

On January 11, 2010, Respondents filed a Notice of Release and Suggestion of

Mootness (#13), predicting Petitioner’s release on January 19, 2010. On February 2, 2010,

Respondents filed a Notice to the Court (#14), reflecting Petitioner’s release on an order of

supervision on or about January 19, 2010. Petitioner has not filed a notice of change of

address. 

On February 5, 2010, the undersigned issued an Order (#15) giving Petitioner fourteen

days to either: (1) file a notice of change of address; or (2) show cause why his Petition

should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute in light of his failure to file a Notice of

Change of Address as previously ordered. That Order further gave Petitioner fourteen days

to show cause why his Petition should not be dismissed as moot in light of his apparent

release from custody. Copies of that order were mailed to Petitioner at his address of record

and his release address supplied by Respondents. Both copies have been returned

undeliverable (#16 & 17). Petitioner has not responded, and the time to respond has run.. 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. MOOTNESS OF HABEAS PETITION

“Article III of the Constitution limits federal ‘Judicial Power,’ that is, federal-court

jurisdiction, to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445

U.S. 388, 395, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1208 (1980). This limitation restricts the jurisdiction of the

federal courts to cases where there is a possible judicial resolution. Id. A moot action is not

subject to a judicial resolution.

A moot action is one in which the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the

outcome. The test for mootness is whether the court can give a party any effective relief in

Case 2:09-cv-01987-DGC Document 18 Filed 03/03/10 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

the event that it decides the matter on the merits in their favor. “That is, whether the court

can ‘undo’ the effects of the alleged wrongdoing.” Reimers v. Oregon, 863 F.2d 630, 632

(9th Cir. 1989). 

A habeas petition may be rendered moot following a subsequent release from custody,

absent other, collateral consequences that flow from the complained of imprisonment. Lane

v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982). While the existence of such collateral consequences is

irrebuttably presumed in some habeas challenges to criminal convictions, see e.g., Sibron v.

New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994), no such

presumption applies to habeas petitions challenging deportation orders.

Here, Petitioner does not challenge his underlying removal order, but merely his

continued detention pending the execution of that order. However, although that detention

has terminated, Petitioner remains subject to conditions of supervision. Under those

circumstances, there may yet remain relief which may be granted. Reimers, supra. 

Moreover, Petitioner has not yet been heard from on whether the matter is moot. 

However, in light of Petitioner’s failure to prosecute, the Court need not resolve that

issue to dispose of this matter.

B. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE

“The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally

been considered an ‘inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control

necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and

expeditious disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-631 (1962).

“Accordingly, when circumstances make such action appropriate, a District Court may

dismiss a complaint for failure to prosecute even without affording notice of its intention to

do so or providing an adversary hearing before acting. Whether such an order can stand on

appeal depends not on power but on whether it was within the permissible range of the

court's discretion.” Id. at 633.

In determining whether an abuse of discretion has occurred, a number of factors are

Case 2:09-cv-01987-DGC Document 18 Filed 03/03/10 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

relevant, including the plaintiff's diligence, the trial court's need to manage its docket, the

danger of prejudice to the party suffering the delay, the availability of alternate sanctions, and

the existence of warning to the party occasioning the delay. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Neptune

Orient Lines, Ltd., 811 F.2d 498, 499 (9th Cir.1987).

Despite having twice been given specific notice (Order, #8 at 2) of his obligation to

file a notice of change of address, and an order (#15) specifically directing him to do so,

Petitioner has failed to keep his current address on file with the Court.

It is the duty of a party who has filed a pro se action to keep the Court apprised of his

or her current address and to comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. This Court

does not have an affirmative obligation to locate Petitioner. "A party, not the district court,

bears the burden of keeping the court apprised of any changes in his mailing address." Carey

v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1988). Petitioner’s failure to keep the Court informed

of his new address constitutes failure to prosecute.

Petitioner has failed to prosecute this action, and dismissal is therefore within the

discretion of the Court. Link v. Wabash R. Co.,supra. In the instant case, Petitioner appears

to have abandoned this action upon his release from custody. Petitioner has had over four

weeks since his release to file a notice of change of address. Further delay to the Court and

to Respondent is not warranted. Also, Petitioner has received adequate warning of the

potential of such action, and in light of Petitioner’s refusal to respond to the Court, less

onerous sanctions will be ineffective. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in habeas cases the

"district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order

adverse to the applicant." However, such certificates are only required in cases concerning

detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). This case

arises under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and does not attack a State court detention. Accordingly, no

Case 2:09-cv-01987-DGC Document 18 Filed 03/03/10 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

ruling on a certificate of appealability is required, and no recommendation thereon will be

offered.

V. RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (#5) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to

prosecute.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court forward copies of this

Report & Recommendation to his address of record, and to his apparent release address: 970

Meridan Ave., #1, San Jose, CA 95126.

KVI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to

file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de

novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003)(en banc). 

DATED: March 2, 2010 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\09-1987-005r RR 10 03 01 re Dismiss FTP NCA.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 2:09-cv-01987-DGC Document 18 Filed 03/03/10 Page 5 of 5