Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08032/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08032-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, )

)

Plaintiff/Respondent, )

) CR 10-08001 PCT GMS

v. ) CV 13-08032 PCT GMS MEA

) 

Royce Paul Paddock, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Defendant/Movant. )

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW:

On February 8, 2013, Mr. Royce Paddock (“Movant”),

filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On September 6, 2013, Respondent

filed a Government’s Response to Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate,

Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255

(“Response”) (Doc. 13). Movant filed a reply (Doc. 15) to the

response to his motion, which reply is styled as a motion

seeking to vacate his guilty plea, on October 2, 3013. 

I Procedural History

A redacted criminal complaint docketed December 14,

2009, alleged that, on December 5, 2009, on the Navajo Indian

Reservation, Movant “did assault Jane Doe 1 (a 5 year old Indian

female child) resulting in serious bodily injury.” Criminal

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Doc. 1. Movant is an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation. See

Answer, Exh. A. On December 17, 2009, Movant was ordered

detained pending trial. See Criminal Doc. 18. 

On January 12, 2010, a grand jury returned an

indictment charging Movant and a co-defendant with eight counts

of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 113(a)(6), and six counts of child abuse,

a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153 and Arizona Revised Statutes

13-3623(A)(1). See Criminal Doc. 29. The indictment alleged

Movant did “willfully and recklessly assault Jane Doe, a minor

Indian child...” Id. A redacted information docketed March 2,

2009, charged Movant, “an Indian”, did recklessly and willfully

assault a “minor Indian child”, resulting in serious bodily

injury. Criminal Doc. 161.

On March 2, 2012, pursuant to a written plea agreement,

Movant entered a plea of guilty to “to Count 1 the Infomation

charging the defendant with a violation of Title 18U.S.C.l153,

113(a)(6) and 3559(£)(3) CIR-Assault Resulting in Serious Bodily

Injury, a class A felony offense”. Criminal Doc. 163 & 164 &

186. The plea agreement provided Movant would be subject to a

sentence of between ten and twenty years imprisonment. Criminal

Doc. 186 at 2. In the plea agreement Movant specifically waived

his rights to appeal and to collaterally attack his conviction

or sentence. Id. at 3. 

On June 1, 2012, Movant was sentenced to a term of

twenty years imprisonment. Criminal Doc. 185.

 

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In his section 2255 motion, Movant asks the Court to

set aside his guilty plea and asks to be resentenced to time

served under a lesser included offense of the Navajo Nation.

Movant contends his guilty plea was not knowingly and

voluntarily made and that his counsel failed to explain the

essential elements of the offense to Movant. Movant also

asserts that he is “actually innocent” of the crimes of

conviction. 

Respondents contend Movant’s plea was knowing and

voluntary:

 The Petitioner stated that he understood

the elements of the charged offense and his

right to trial. (Exhibit C p. 13.) Counsel on

at least four separate occasions reviewed the

elements of the offense with the defendant,

including just prior to the change of plea.

(Exhibit B ¶¶ 3, 7, 9, 11 and 14.) Finally,

the Court discussed the facts of the case

supporting his plea of guilty taken from the

plea agreement.

Doc. 13 at 6.

In reply to Respondent’s answer to his motion, Movant

contends that he was improperly convicted because “there is no

federal crime alleged in the information.” Doc. 15. Movant

contends that the victim’s status as an Indian was not alleged

in the information underpinning his conviction. Movant contends

he did not understand the nature of the charge against him.

Movant asserts: “Without the child Indian status there is no

commission of a federal offense” and he argues this requires

invalidation of his guilty plea and conviction. Id.

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II Analysis

Waiver of the right to a collateral attack

Respondent asserts that this section 225 action must be

dismissed because Movant waived his right to collaterally attack

his conviction and sentence in the written plea agreement. The

plea agreement signed by Movant expressly waived his right to

collaterally attack any matter pertaining to Movant’s conviction

and sentence, including a section 2255 suit, if the sentence

imposed was consistent with the written terms of the agreement.

The sentence imposed on Movant was consistent with the terms of

the plea agreement. Because the sentence imposed was in

accordance with the plea agreement, the plea agreement is valid.

Therefore, Movant is bound by the plea agreement’s waiver of his

right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence. 

Because Movant legitimately waived his right to bring

this action, his section 2255 motion may be summarily denied.

See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09, 104 S. Ct. 2543,

2546-47 (1984) (“It is well settled that a voluntary and

intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has

been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally

attacked.”); United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th

Cir. 2005) (reaching this conclusion in the context of a direct

appeal wherein the Movant waived his right to directly appeal or

collaterally attack his conviction and sentence in a plea

agreement); United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480-81 (9th

Cir. 1991). 

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A defendant’s waiver of his right to a direct appeal

and a section 2255 action is enforceable if the language of the

waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the grounds raised,

and the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. See United

States v. Speelman, 431 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2005).

However, a plea agreement which waives the Movant’s right to

collaterally attack their sentence is not enforceable if the

waiver was involuntary. See, e.g., Washington v. Lampert, 422

F.3d 864, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2005). See also United States v.

White, 307 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 2002). A collateral attack

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in negotiating a plea

agreement may be brought notwithstanding a waiver of this right

in a plea agreement if the agreement was involuntary or

unknowing or where the agreement was otherwise unlawful. See

United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir.

2001)(“[A] waiver of appeal may not be enforced against a

section 2255 petitioner who claims that ineffective assistance

of counsel rendered that waiver unknowing or involuntary.”);

Bridgeman v. United States, 229 F.3d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 2000).

Movant asserts his counsel did not understand the

essential elements of the crime of conviction. See Doc. 1 &

Doc. 4. Movant contends that he did not have an intent to harm

the victim and, accordingly, that he is actually innocent of the

crime of conviction and that his counsel erred by not realizing

that Movant was innocent because he lacked intent. Movant

asserts he never admitted the elements of the crime of

conviction. See Doc. 1.

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1

 On April 9, 2010, the Court granted Movant’s amended

motion seeking a competency evaluation. See Criminal Doc. 68. On

December 9, 2010, Movant was found incompetent and ordered into the

custody of the Attorney General:

to determine whether there is a substantial

probability that in the foreseeable future he

will attain the capacity to permit the trial to

proceed; to determine if defendant is competent

to stand trail; and (2) for an additional

reasonable period of time until (A) his mental

condition is so improved that trial may proceed,

if the court finds that there is substantial

probability that within such additional period of

time he will attain the capacity to permit the

trial to proceed; or (B) the pending charges

against him are disposed of according to law

Criminal Doc. 114. On August 25, 2011, the Court, having been

notified that competency had been restored, ordered Movant returned

to the District of Arizona. See Criminal Doc. 133.

-6-

During the plea colloquy, Movant acknowledged that he

had completed schooling beyond high school and that he was not

under the influence of any medication. Doc. 13, Exh. C at 5.

His counsel advised the court that there were no current issues

with competency. Id., Exh. C at 6.1 Movant admitted that he had

read the plea agreement, that he understood the agreement, that

he had sufficient time to discuss it with his attorney, that no

one forced him into the agreement, and that he understood the

charge against him. Id., Exh. C at 6-7. Movant also averred,

under oath, that he was pleading guilty voluntarily because he

was guilty of the crime. Id., Exh. C at 8. 

Movant alleges that, at the time he entered into the

plea agreement, he believed that the potential maximum sentence

was ten years imprisonment. This contention is belied by the

record, including the transcript of the plea colloquy and the

written plea agreement. See id., Exh. A. at 1 & Exh. B & Exh.

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C at 8. 

THE COURT: This crime carries a maximum

prison term of – I’m sorry, a minimum prison

term of 10 years and maximum of life

imprisonment, fine of up to $250,000 could be

imposed, and a term of supervised release

would follow any term of imprisonment and

that term would be five years..... Do you

understand the penalty for this offense? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

Id., Exh. C at 8-9).

THE COURT: and it looks like you have a

sentencing agreement with the Government.

Contained within your plea agreement and that

the sentencing agreement is that you will be

sentenced to somewhere between 10 and 20

years in prison followed by a five-year term

of supervised release. Do you understand this

agreement? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

Id., Exh. C at 10.

The Court then explained to Movant that he had the

right to jury trial, to be represented by an attorney, and that

the government would have to prove all of the elements of the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. (Exhibit C p. 12-13.) Movant

allowed that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation.

Id., Exh. C at 12. The Court delineated for Movant the elements

of the offense as described in the plea agreement: 

THE COURT: The government would have to prove

that on or about the date set forth in the

information, that you willfully and

recklessly assaulted Jane Doe, a child; that

said assault resulted in serious bodily

injury to Jane Doe; that the offense was

committed in Indian country; that you are an

enrolled member of an Indian tribe and that

this happened in the District of Arizona. 

Id., Exh. C at 13. The Court also ascertained that there was a

factual basis for Movant’s guilty plea. Id., Exh. C at 15.

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Movant acknowledged that he had kicked the victim intentionally,

but stated that he had not intended to injure her although he

acknowledge the kick broke the victim’s femur. Id., Exh. C at

15-17. 

 At a sentencing hearing conducted June 1, 2012, the

Court reminded Movant that his plea agreement stipulated a

sentence of between 10 and 20 years and that his crime carried

a statutory minimum of 120 months. Id., Exh. D at 3-5. Movant

acknowledge the potential sentence. Id., Exh. D at 3-5.

Movant’s contemporaneous statements regarding his

understanding of the plea agreement carry substantial weight in

determining if his entry of a guilty plea was knowing and

voluntary. See United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th

Cir. 1991); United States v. Walker, 160 F.3d 1078, 1096 (6th

Cir. 1998) (holding that “a straightforward and simple ‘Yes,

your Honor’ is sufficient to bind a Movant to [the] consequences

[of a plea agreement].”). Additionally, because he was

adequately informed of the consequences of his plea, Movant’s

guilty plea can be considered voluntary and knowing. See Boykin

v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712 (1969).

The undersigned concludes Movant’s guilty plea was voluntary and

made intelligently. See Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562

(9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383

(9th Cir. 1986).

Because Movant does not produce any evidence indicating

he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the agreement,

the undersigned concludes the plea agreement was valid, as was

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Movant’s voluntary waiver of his right to collaterally attack

his sentence. 

To the extent Movant contends that, because he did not

intend to injure his victim when he kicked her, the absence of

a specific intent to injure does not render him “actually

innocent” of the crime of conviction because assault resulting

in serious bodily injury is a general intent crime. See, e.g.,

United States v. Fitzgerald, 882 F.2d 397, 399 (9th Cir. 1989).

Accordingly, the section 2255 petition should be denied and

dismissed. Compare United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433

(9th Cir. 1994).

Movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal

defendants the right to effective assistance

of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984).... To prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner

must show 1) his attorney’s performance was

unreasonable under prevailing professional

standards; and 2) there is a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the results would have

been different. United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064). “Strickland defines a reasonable

probability as ‘a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id.

United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1996).

See also United States v. Thomas, 417 F. 3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir.

2005).

The Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to “a

reasonably competent attorney, whose advice is within the range

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of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” United

States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2044-45

(1984) (internal quotations omitted). In order to find that

Movant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and

grant him relief on this claim pursuant to section 2255 the

Court must conclude counsel’s performance was deficient and that

the deficient performance prejudiced Movant. See United States

v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2011). Movant

bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence from which the

Court can conclude his counsel’s representation was

unconstitutionally ineffective. Id. In the context of a

defendant who pleads guilty, to be entitled to relief, the

movant must establish that, but for his counsel’s allegedly

deficient performance, the movant would have chosen not to plead

guilty but to proceed to trial. See, e.g., Bethel v. United

States, 458 F.3d 711, 718 (9th Cir. 2006).

Counsel’s performance is deficient when it is

unreasonable, or not “within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104

S. Ct. at 2054. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must

be “highly deferential.” Id., 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at

2065. See also Carter v. Lee, 283 F.3d 240, 248-49 (4th Cir.

2002). Movant must overcome a strong presumption that his

counsel’s representation was within a wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See United States v. Ferreira-Alameda,

815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Molina,

934 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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Movant has not established that his counsel’s advice

with regard to the potential sentence he faced if he accepted

the plea was unconstitutionally deficient or prejudicial. Even

if his counsel did not inform Movant that he was likely to

receive the maximum sentence allowed pursuant to the plea

agreement, “[t]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel based on alleged erroneous advice regarding a guilty

plea, a petitioner must demonstrate more than a ‘mere inaccurate

prediction.’” Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 868

(9th Cir. 2004), quoting Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 864-65 (9th

Cir. 1986). Defense counsel’s alleged erroneous predictions as

to the likely sentence following a guilty plea, “are deficient

only if they constitute ‘gross mischaracterization of the likely

outcome’ of a plea bargain ‘combined with ... erroneous advice

on the probable effects of going to trial.’” Id., quoting

United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990).

Furthermore, if the defendant was informed prior to entering his

guilty plea of the potential sentence he could receive, he

cannot establish prejudice from counsel’s incorrect prediction

as to his sentence. See Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998,

1003-4 (9th Cir. 2007). See also United States v. Garcia, 909

F.2d 1346, 1348 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that an erroneous

sentence prediction “does not entitle a defendant to challenge

his guilty plea”); Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1162

(9th Cir. 1989) (finding that an inaccurate sentence prediction

was not prejudicial).

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that, in

the context of a defendant who pleads guilty, an attorney’s

performance may only deemed unconstitutionally deficient when

counsel “grossly” mischaracterizes the likely sentence to be

received when counseling the defendant to plead guilty. See

Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir. 1990).

In cases where the Ninth Circuit has found gross

mischaracterization the sentence received by the defendant was

of a different order of magnitude than what Movant asserts in

this matter as constituting counsel’s deficient performance.

Compare Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994),

superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Morris v.

Woodford, 229 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 2000) (three months

predicted; ten years imposed); Iaea, 800 F.2d at 865.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Paddock’s motion

for relief from his convictions and sentences pursuant to

section 2255 be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

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the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. 

Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil Procedure

for the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to de novo appellate consideration of the issues. See United

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 7th day of October, 2013.

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