Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01245/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01245-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Sex Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIANE GOINS, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF MERCED, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:13-cv-01245-DAD-SKO

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

DISCOVERY TO PROCEED WITH 

DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT HUTTON

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 20, 2015, the fact discovery cutoff, Plaintiffs Diane Goins and Wesley 

Rentfrow filed a motion for discovery “to proceed with [the] deposition of Defendant Hutton.”1 

(Docs. 77 (original motion, terminated by Plaintiffs); 79 (refiled motion).) Plaintiffs contend that 

their former counsel, William Smith, Esq., “was not feeling well” and was therefore unable to 

complete the deposition of Defendant Hutton on May 21, 2015. (See Doc. 79, p. 2.) 

On November 24, 2015, the Court issued its tentative order on Plaintiffs’ motion, noting 

that Plaintiffs had not demonstrated good cause to warrant a second deposition of Defendant 

Hutton based on the information provided. (Doc. 81.) Plaintiffs, however, did not withdraw their 

 

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 Plaintiffs initially filed their motion on November 20, 2015, and set a hearing before the undersigned on 

November 24, 2015. (Doc. 77.) Apparently recognizing that such a hearing date would not comply with the Local 

Rules, Plaintiffs’ counsel contacted the Clerk of Court and requested the motion be terminated on November 23, 2015. 

(Doc. 78.) Plaintiffs then refiled the instant motion on November 23, 2015, with a hearing set for December 23, 2105. 

(Doc. 79.) Defendants argue the motion was therefore filed after the close of fact discovery. (Docs. 84-86.) Though 

the motion would be untimely as filed on November 23, 2015, it appears clear that the November 23, 2015, filing is 

merely a re-noticing of the motion timely filed – if barely – on the November 20, 2015, fact discovery deadline. 

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motion or file supplemental briefing to demonstrate that good cause did indeed exist to reopen the 

deposition of Defendant Hutton. (See Docket.) Defendants opposed the motion on December 17, 

2015.2 (See Docs. 84-86) Plaintiffs did not file a reply. (See Docket.) Having reviewed the 

motion and all supporting materials, the matter was found suitable for decision without oral 

argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), and the December 23, 2015, hearing was vacated. 

Because the undersigned concludes that Plaintiffs have not established good cause for a 

second deposition of Defendant Hutton, the Court’s tentative ruling is AFFIRMED and Plaintiffs’

motion is DENIED. 

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Deposition of Merle Wayne Hutton

On May 21, 2015, Mr. Smith took the deposition of Merle Wayne Hutton. (See Doc. 77, 

Exh. A (Transcript of the Deposition of Merle Wayne Hutton, “Depo. Trans.”).) A review of the 

transcript reflects that while Mr. Smith apologized to Defendant Hutton at one point for his 

“suppressed” voice due to his “not feeling as well as [he] should,” (Depo. Trans., 25:12-17), Mr. 

Smith made no statement indicating that he was too ill to finish the deposition, nor did he request 

to continue the deposition to a later date due to his illness. Two breaks were taken, one at 

Defendant Hutton’s request, (21:16-19), and one at Mr. Smith’s request, to “wrap [his line of 

questioning] up[,]” (Depo. Trans., 73:15-17 (Mr. Smith asked opposing counsel to “Give me 

about five minutes because I’m going to wrap it up.”).) In calling the deposition to a close, Mr. 

Smith stated, “I don’t have any other questions at this point[,]” and the deposition was 

“adjourned” after approximately two hours of questioning. (Depo. Trans., 76:13-14.) Mr. Smith 

made no statement indicating that he was ill and needed to suspend the deposition for the day, and 

no discussion or agreement between counsel to set a second day to continue the deposition was

made on the record. (See Depo. Trans.) 

//

//

 

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 Despite that Defendants’ oppositions were not timely filed, the Court has exercised its discretion to consider the 

arguments set forth in Defendants’ opposition briefs and will not strike them from the docket as untimely. 

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B. Procedural Background

Mr. Smith conducted the Hutton deposition on May 21, 2015, during a period when his 

health was declining. Ultimately, Mr. Smith passed away within two months of the deposition, on 

July 21, 2015, due to advanced pancreatic cancer. On August 20, 2015, Plaintiffs’ counsel Kay 

Parker assumed Mr. Smith’s case load, including Plaintiffs’ action. (See Doc. 67, pp. 2-3.) 

On September 22, 2015, the Court issued an order vacating the scheduling order and 

granting Plaintiffs’ ex parte application to continue all deadlines. (Doc. 70.) On October 16, 

2015, the Court extended the fact discovery deadline to November 20, 2015, to permit Plaintiffs to 

conclude any discovery which Plaintiffs’ former counsel Mr. Smith “either planned to do and 

disclosed to Defendants prior to his passing, or began and left unfinished due to his passing.” 

(Doc. 76; see also Doc. 70 (noting that because Mr. Smith had been “essentially medically 

incapacitated from late June 2015 to his death in late July 2015, extensive discovery has occurred 

but is incomplete” an extension of time to conclude discovery was warranted).) Plaintiffs did not 

raise the issue of redeposing Defendant Hutton with the Court. The parties were instructed that 

“non-expert discovery is not being opened for an unlimited purpose” and “[d]iscovery previously 

competed will not be reopened.” (Doc. 76 (emphases in original).) The parties were also

cautioned that “[n]o further extensions of the fact discovery cutoff will be entertained by the 

Court.” (Doc. 76.) 

On November 20, 2015, the non-expert discovery cutoff set in the Court’s amended 

scheduling order, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion “to continue with the deposition of Merle 

Wayne Hutton,” along with a single-page “background and facts,” a single-page “points and 

authorities,” and copies of the deposition transcript and meet and confer communications between 

the parties. (Doc. 77.) On November 24, 2015, the Court issued its tentative order on Plaintiffs’ 

motion, noting that Plaintiffs had not demonstrated good cause to warrant a second deposition of 

Defendant Hutton based on the information provided. (Doc. 81.) Plaintiffs did not withdraw their 

motion, nor did they file any supplemental briefing to demonstrate that good cause did indeed 

exist for reopening the deposition of Defendant Hutton. (See Docket.) Defendants filed untimely

oppositions to the motion. (See Docs. 84-86.) 

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III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the taking of depositions by oral 

examination. A party must obtain leave of the Court to conduct a deposition “if the parties have 

not stipulated to the deposition” and “the deponent has already been deposed in the case.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(ii). The Court shall grant such leave “to the extent consistent with the 

principles stated in Rule 26(b)(2),” which allows courts to limit discovery in instances in which 

the court determines that

(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained 

from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less 

expensive;

(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by 

discovery in the action; or

(iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Whether to reopen a deposition is a matter committed to the Court’s 

discretion. Archer v. City of Taft, No. 1:12-cv-00261-AWI-JLT, 2014 WL 5216653, at *1 (E.D. 

Cal. Oct. 14, 2014); Couch v. Wan, No. CV-F-08-1621-LJO-DLB, 2012 WL 4433470, at *3 (E.D. 

Cal. Sept. 24, 2012). Without a showing of need or good reason, courts generally will not require 

a deponent’s reopened deposition. Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

A review of the Hutton Deposition reveals that, despite any infirmity from which Mr. 

Smith was suffering, the interaction between the deponent, opposing counsel, and Mr. Smith was 

“lively[,] with both parties explaining in full the[ir] questions and the[ir] answers.” Archer, 2014 

WL 5216653, at *2. (See Depo. Trans.) Further, at the conclusion of the deposition, Mr. Smith 

“did not comment about any difficulty experienced at the deposition and, from the face of the 

transcript, the Court sees no substantive factual area not addressed.” Id. 

Plaintiffs nonetheless claim a second deposition is necessary to obtain further information 

from Defendant Hutton. Plaintiffs do not specify what further information is sought, despite that 

Plaintiffs describe Defendant Hutton as “the alleged perpetrator” whose “deposition is 

unquestionably key discovery[,]” thus leaving the Court to speculate as to what additional 

questions Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks from Defendant Hutton. (See Doc. 77, pp. 2-3.) In addition to 

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failing to specify upon what additional topics Plaintiffs seek to depose Defendant Hutton, 

Plaintiffs fail to explain in even general terms how Mr. Smith’s deposition of Defendant Hutton 

was inadequate or insufficient. (See Doc. 77, pp. 2-3.) 

Mr. Smith was an experienced, competent attorney, and despite that the deposition lasted 

nearly two hours, the fact that Mr. Smith did not depose Defendant Hutton the full seven hours 

permitted under the Federal Rules does not de facto demonstrate that the deposition was not 

comprehensive or efficient. While Plaintiffs emphasize that Mr. Smith “adjourned” the deposition 

by stating “I don’t have any other questions at this point,” rather than using language 

“concluding” or “ending” the deposition (Doc. 77, p. 2 (italics added), this language does not

indicate that the deposition was to remain open and continue on another day. Mr. Smith did not 

make any statement on the record that the deposition was to be continued at another time had he 

planned to do so or needed to suspend the deposition for the day. Instead, before taking a break at 

the end of the deposition, Mr. Smith asked opposing counsel to “Give me about five minutes 

because I’m going to wrap it up.” (Depo. Trans., 73:15-17 (italics added).) This language does 

not indicate that Mr. Smith believed he was unfinished or needed more time to finish the 

deposition at a later date. 

In calling the deposition to a close, Mr. Smith also stated, “I don’t have any other questions 

at this point.” (Depo. Trans., 76:13-14.) The use of “at this point” does not indicate that Mr. 

Smith intended to continue the deposition at another time, given that he made no statement on the 

record indicating any meet and confer with opposing counsel or discussion of the parties’ 

availability for a second deposition date. (See Depo. Trans.) Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, the 

duration of the deposition is not dipositive. Mr. Smith was competent to state, on the record, 

whether he was indeed finished, and whether he needed to suspend any further questioning due to 

his illness. 

Plaintiffs also note that defense counsel interposed several objections of “vague” and/or 

“ambiguous” during the deposition, repeatedly asking for clarification of the questions posed by 

Mr. Smith. (Doc. 77, p. 2 (stating opposing counsel had articulated forty objections on the record 

within a two hour period).) However, objections to “vagueness” or requests for clarification alone 

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do not demonstrate that “more than half of the deposition questions were objectionable” or that 

Mr. Smith was incompetent. (Doc. 77, p. 2.) A review of the record reveals that most of the 

objections and conferring between counsel centered around clarifying the context of certain 

conversations (see, e.g., Doc. 77, Exh. A, at pp. 18:22-25, 25:25-26:8, 28:10-15 (clarifying that the 

deponent was being asked about conversations specifically regarding Plaintiff Goins’ sexual 

harassment claims)), the meaning of certain terms Mr. Smith used in his question (see, e.g., id. at 

pp. 24:18-19, 38:10-13), or admonishing Defendant Hutton to only answer to those matters within 

his knowledge or recollection (see, e.g., id. at pp. 30:23-24; 35:25-36:6). Contrary to Plaintiffs’ 

contention, the interposing of routine objections during a deposition by experienced counsel does 

not undermine Mr. Smith’s competence in deposing Defendant Hutton. 

The factors of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) also weigh against reopening the deposition. Any 

information now claimed to be missing could have been obtained through written discovery by 

Mr. Smith following the deposition, as the parties had previously stipulated to extend fact 

discovery through June 1, 2015. (Doc. 50.) The fact that Mr. Smith did not seek to propound 

further written discovery, or even indicate in meet and confer communications with the defense 

that he intended to do so, indicates that Mr. Smith believed that discovery regarding Defendant 

Hutton had been completed. Nothing in the record before the Court indicates otherwise.

Ms. Parker substituted as Plaintiffs’ counsel on August 14, 2015. At the scheduling 

conference two months later, Ms. Parker was cautioned that the Court would not entertain further 

extensions absent a showing of cause. Significantly, despite that admonition, Plaintiffs’ motion to 

reopen Defendant Hutton’s deposition fails to identify what further information Plaintiffs seek in 

even the most general terms, the importance of that information to the issues presented in the case, 

or to address the burden and expense of reopening the deposition. (See Doc. 77, p. 2 (noting only 

that Defendant Hutton’s “deposition is unquestionably key discovery”).) The Court cannot 

speculate about what Plaintiffs would seek in a further deposition of Defendant Hutton, and 

therefore is unable to find that reopening the deposition of Defendant Hutton is warranted. 

Archer, 2014 WL 5216654 at *3.

//

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The undersigned is sympathetic to the difficulty of accepting a new case midway through 

the litigation – it is both possible and likely that had Ms. Parker taken the deposition of Defendant 

Hutton herself, she may have asked different or additional questions or taken longer than two 

hours. However, Ms. Parker’s second-guessing of Mr. Smith’s deposition style is not sufficient to 

demonstrate good cause that Defendant Hutton’s deposition be reopened. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(2)(C). Although there is no specific limit on the number of times a person or party may be 

deposed, repeat depositions are disfavored, except in certain circumstances. Graebner v. James 

River Corp., 130 F.R.D. 440, 441 (N.D. Cal. 1990). Absent a sufficient showing of need or good 

reason to justify the second deposition, such as the “long passage of time with new evidence or 

new theories added to the complaint,” a court generally will not order a reopening of a deposition. 

Archer, 2014 WL 5216653 at *3; Couch, 2012 WL 4433470 at *3; Graebner, 130 F.R.D. at 441;

Dixon v. Certainteed Corp., 164 F.R.D. 685, 690 (D. Kan. 1996.). Likewise, the Rule 26(b)(2)(C) 

factors weigh against reopening the deposition. Plaintiffs have failed to show sufficient 

justification to reopen the deposition of Defendant Hutton, and therefore the Court exercises its 

discretion to decline to reopen the deposition of Defendant Hutton. Archer, 2014 WL 5216653 at 

*3; Couch, 2012 WL 4433470 at *3; Dixon, 164 F.R.D. at 690. 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion to reopen the deposition of Defendant Merle 

Wayne Hutton is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 22, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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