Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-02207/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-02207-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

KENDRALIA KRETZSCHMAR,

Plaintiff,

v.

BIRMINGHAM NURSING AND 

REHABILITATION CENTER EAST, 

LLC,

Defendant. 

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Case No. 2:14-cv-02207-JEO

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this action, plaintiff Kendralia Kretzschmar has asserted a variety of

employment-related claims against her former employer, defendant Birmingham 

Nursing and Rehabilitation Center East, LLC (“Birmingham East”). Before the 

court is Birmingham East’s motion to dismiss Kretzschmar’s amended complaint. 

(Doc.1 7). For the reasons set forth below, Birmingham East’s motion to dismiss is 

due to be granted in part and denied in part.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Kretzschmar initially filed this action against Birmingham East and its 

Executive Director, Melody Burch. (Doc. 1). In Kretzschmar’s original 

 1 References to “Doc. __” are to the document numbers assigned by the Clerk of the Court to the 

pleadings, motions, and other materials in the court file, as reflected on the docket sheet in the 

court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) system.

FILED

 2015 Oct-27 PM 03:44

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-02207-JEO Document 32 Filed 10/27/15 Page 1 of 24
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complaint, she cited a litany of federal employment law statutes: Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., as amended 

(including 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)); the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”); 42 U.S.C. § 

1981a; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”); the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 626 et seq.; and the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 1). She did not 

state her claims in separate counts, but rather lumped all of her claims into a single 

paragraph that accused Birmingham East and Burch of discriminating and 

retaliating against her with respect to “job duties, and assignments, job evaluations, 

pay, working conditions, hiring, promotion, hostile work environment, discipline, 

and other terms and conditions of employment” in violation of all of the statutes 

she had cited. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 20).

Birmingham East and Burch filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for 

insufficiency of service of process under Rule 12(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 

Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 7). Kretzschmar filed an opposition to the motion to 

dismiss, which included a request for an extension of time to perfect service of 

process on both Birmingham East and Burch. (Doc. 15 at 5-6). 

Case 2:14-cv-02207-JEO Document 32 Filed 10/27/15 Page 2 of 24
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Kretzschmar also filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. 

(Doc. 16). The motion included a proposed amended complaint that named 

Birmingham East as the only defendant. (Doc. 16 at 5-14). In the opening 

sentence of her proposed amended complaint, Kretzschmar again cited Title VII, 

the ADA, Section 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, the ADEA, and the FLSA.2 (Id. at ¶ 

1). Unlike her original complaint, however, her proposed amended complaint was

divided into four counts, none of which referenced the ADA, the ADEA, or the 

FLSA. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-50). 

Birmingham East and Burch replied to Kretzschmar’s opposition to their 

motion to dismiss and opposed her motion for leave to file an amended complaint. 

(Doc. 17). In the reply, Birmingham East acknowledged that, subsequent to the 

filing of Kretzschmar’s opposition to the motion to dismiss, she effected proper 

service on Birmingham East. (Doc. 17 at 3 n.2). Consequently, Birmingham East 

withdrew its argument that the complaint should be dismissed for insufficiency of

service of process, while arguing that the complaint should still be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim. (Id.) Burch, on the other hand, continued to contest 

service and continued to assert both grounds for dismissal of the complaint as to 

her. She also noted that Kretzschmar’s proposed amended complaint identified 

Birmingham East as the sole defendant, making it unclear whether Kretzschmar 

 2 The proposed amended complaint did not reference Section 1983.

Case 2:14-cv-02207-JEO Document 32 Filed 10/27/15 Page 3 of 24
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intended to continue to pursue any claims against her. (Doc. 17 at 3 n.3). 

Birmingham East and Burch also opposed Kretzschmar’s motion to file her 

proposed amended complaint, asserting that the proposed amended complaint 

contained many of the same defects as her original complaint and raised new 

claims, including a termination claim. (Doc. 17 at 9-10).

In light of the uncertainty as to whether Kretzschmar intended to pursue her 

action against Burch, the court held a telephone conference with the parties. Based 

on Kretzschmar’s representation that she did not intend to pursue any claims 

against Burch as reflected in her proposed amended complaint, the court granted 

Kretzschmar’s motion to file the amended complaint and noted that Burch was no 

longer a defendant. (Doc. 26). The court also advised the parties that the pending 

motion to dismiss would be taken under submission and would be treated as a 

motion to dismiss the claims in Kretzschmar’s amended complaint against 

Birmingham East, based on the parties’ representations that the motion to dismiss

had been fully briefed, that they had no additional arguments to submit with 

respect to the amended complaint, and that the motion to dismiss was ripe for 

decision as to the amended complaint. (Id.)

Nearly one month later, Kretzschmar filed her amended complaint (the 

“Amended Complaint”). (Doc. 28). Although the Amended Complaint is 

substantially similar to the proposed amended complaint Kretzschmar attached to 

Case 2:14-cv-02207-JEO Document 32 Filed 10/27/15 Page 4 of 24
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her motion, it differs from her proposed amended complaint (and her original 

complaint) in one significant respect: whereas Kretzschmar’s proposed amended 

complaint (and original complaint) referenced a single charge of discrimination 

filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the 

Amended Complaint references both an “individual” EEOC charge and an 

“amended” EEOC charge. (Doc. 28 at ¶ 5). Consequently, the court held a second 

telephone conference with the parties. During the call, Kretzschmar’s counsel 

admitted that she was unsure whether Kretzschmar had, in fact, filed an amended 

EEOC charge. The court directed Kretzschmar’s counsel to clear up the matter 

and to file a notice confirming whether an amended charge had or had not been 

filed. (Doc. 30). The court also asked Kretzschmar’s counsel whether 

Kretzschmar had abandoned her claims based on the ADA, the ADEA, and the 

FLSA, as her Amended Complaint did not appear to state any claims for relief 

under those statutes. Kretzschmar’s counsel confirmed that Kretzschmar is not 

asserting any claims under the ADA, the ADEA, or the FLSA. (See id.). As 

directed, Kretzschmar’s counsel subsequently filed a notice affirming that 

Kretzschmar never filed an amended EEOC charge. (Doc. 31). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted challenges the sufficiency of the claim(s) set out in the 

Case 2:14-cv-02207-JEO Document 32 Filed 10/27/15 Page 5 of 24
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plaintiff’s pleadings. Harris v. Proctor & Gamble Cellulose Co., 73 F.3d 321, 324 

(11th Cir. 1996). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion need not contain 

“detailed factual allegations,” but “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’

of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, a 

complaint must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Id. at 570. A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 

Human Servs., 623 F.3d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must 

accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Speaker, 623 F.3d at 1379.

FACTS AS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

Kretzschmar, an African-American female, began working at Birmingham 

East in June 2012 as “MDS Coordinator.”3

 On June 13, 2013, she was promoted 

to the position of Assistant Director of Nursing and was asked to perform the 

duties of Director of Nursing on an interim basis.

 3

The Amended Complaint provides no information regarding the MDS Coordinator position. 

Case 2:14-cv-02207-JEO Document 32 Filed 10/27/15 Page 6 of 24
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The following month, Kretzschmar was accused of creating a racially hostile 

work environment at Birmingham East, an accusation that she denies. On July 11, 

2013, Burch, a white female, placed Kretzschmar on administrative leave without 

pay for five days and advised Kretzschmar that she was being demoted to her prior 

position of MDS Coordinator. Kretzschmar went to Birmingham East’s Human 

Resources Department and filed a “verbal complaint” of discriminatory treatment 

against Burch. Kretzschmar alleged that Burch demoted her because of her race.

According to Kretzschmar, after she filed her complaint against Burch, “the 

office became unbearable. ... Burch was constantly telling [her] that she had an 

attitude, [and] constantly trying to find reasons to write her up. [She] was 

scrutinized constantly and denied her much earned vacation.” (Doc. 28 at ¶ 22).

On August 28, 2013, Kretzschmar filed a charge of discrimination with the 

EEOC against Birmingham East.

4

 In her EEOC charge, Kretzschmar checked the 

box for discrimination based on “race” and stated as follows:

I am a Black female. I was hired as the MDS Coordinator for the 

above named employer in July of 2012. I performed my job in an 

exemplary manner. In June of 2013, I was asked to perform the duties 

of interim Director of Nursing until a permanent replacement was 

found for the previous Director of Nursing. I was told that once the 

permanent position was filled, I would be placed in the position of 

Assistant Director of Nursing. I moved into the office and began 

performing the duties as the Director of Nursing. In or about July of 

 4

Kretzschmar filed a copy of her EEOC charge along with her original complaint. (Doc. 1-2 at 

3).

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2013, I received an unfavorable text message from a co-worker 

concerning my placement in the interim position. I responded to the 

text message; however, my response was not received as I intended. I 

was told by the Executive Director, Melody Burch that I was creating 

a racially hostile work environment and I was being suspended 

pending an investigation. Prior to my suspension, my personal 

belongings were moved from my office without any regard to their 

importance. When I returned to work, I was placed in the position 

that I originally occupied and my pay was reduced. I am aware that 

Amanda Galliot, White, was suspended for making racially motivated 

statements and unlike me, received a promotion after she returned to 

work.

I believe that I have been discriminated against and subjected to 

different terms and conditions because of my race, Black in violation 

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

(Doc. 1-2 at 3).

Birmingham East terminated Kretzschmar’s employment in September 

2013. In November 2013, Birmingham East promoted a white female employee to 

the position of Assistant Director of Nursing. Kretzschmar alleges that the white 

employee was “fresh out of nursing school” and had less experience than she had. 

(Doc. 28 at ¶¶ 16, 18). 

On August 13, 2014, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights 

with respect to Kretzschmar’s charge of discrimination. (Doc. 1-2 at 1). 

Kretzschmar filed this action on November 13, 2014.

Case 2:14-cv-02207-JEO Document 32 Filed 10/27/15 Page 8 of 24
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DISCUSSION

A. The Amended Complaint Does Not State any Claims for Relief Under

the ADA, the ADEA, or the FLSA

The opening sentence of Kretzschmar’s Amended Complaint references 

Title VII, the ADA, Section 1981, 42 U.S.C. §1981a, the ADEA, and the FLSA.5

 

(Doc. 28 at ¶ 1). Her statement of facts, however, does not allege any facts that 

would give rise to a claim under the ADA, the ADEA, or the FLSA. Kretzschmar

does not allege that she is a person with a disability entitled to the protections of 

the ADA. She does not allege that she is age 40 or over so as to come within the 

class of individuals protected under the ADEA.

6

 See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). And she 

does not allege that Birmingham East failed to pay her minimum wage or overtime 

so as to give rise to an FLSA claim. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 & 207. Moreover, 

none of the four counts of the Amended Complaint references the ADA, ADEA, or 

the FLSA, and Kretzschmar’s counsel has represented to the court that 

Kretzschmar is not pursuing any claims under those statutes. Accordingly, the 

court finds that the Amended Complaint does not state any claims for relief under 

the ADA, the ADEA, or the FLSA.

 5 Like her proposed amended complaint, the Amended Complaint does not reference Section 

1983.

6 Indeed, it appears from Kretzschmar’s EEOC charge that she is under age 40. (Doc. 1-2 at 3). 

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B. Kretzschmar’s Claims for Violation of Title VII and Section 1981

As noted, Kretzschmar’s Amended Complaint is divided into four counts. 

Count One alleges race discrimination, Count Two alleges retaliatory discharge, 

Count Three alleges reprisal, and Count Four alleges a hostile and abusive work 

environment. Although each count references only Title VII, Kretzschmar’s 

“Prayer for Relief” requests the court to issue a declaratory judgment that 

Birmingham East’s “policies, practices, procedures, conditions and customs” were 

violative of her rights as secured by both Title VII and Section 1981.7

 (Doc. 28 at 

9). In addition, in the section of the Amended Complaint titled “Administrative 

Exhaustion,” Kretzschmar cites Section 1981 and states that “[u]nder [42] U.S.C. 

Section 1981, there is no[ ] requirement that a Plaintiff first file a charge of 

discrimination with an administrative agency before commencing the lawsuit as 

long as the lawsuit is brought with[in] the four years from the violation of a 

protected activity.” (Id. at ¶ 7). Therefore, despite Kretzschmar’s failure to 

specifically cite Section 1981in any of her four counts, the court is satisfied that 

she intends to pursue her claims under both Title VII and Section 1981 and will 

construe her claims accordingly. See Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 571 n.3 

(2d Cir. 1988) (“The failure in a complaint to cite a statute, or to cite the correct 

 7 The Prayer for Relief also references the ADA, but, as noted, Kretzschmar has alleged no facts 

that would support a claim under the ADA and her counsel has confirmed that she is not 

pursuing an ADA claim. 

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one, in no way affects the merits of a claim. Factual allegations alone are what 

matters.”); Garrett v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1161 

(M.D. Ga. 2005) (citing Albert). 

1. Title VII and Section 1981 claims in general

a. Title VII 

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination against any individual with 

respect to his or her “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). It is well-settled that before an individual 

may pursue a Title VII discrimination claim, she must first exhaust her 

administrative remedies with the EEOC. Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 

1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001). “The first step down this path is filing a timely 

charge of discrimination with the EEOC.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) 

(1994)). “To be timely within a non-deferral state, such as Alabama, it must be 

filed within 180 days of the last discriminatory act.” Gray v. Vestavia Hills Bd. of 

Educ., 317 F. App’x 898, 902 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1)). 

The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to allow the EEOC “the first 

opportunity to investigate the alleged discriminatory or retaliatory practices, and a 

plaintiff’s judicial complaint is thereby limited by the scope of the investigation 

that can reasonably be expected to grow out of the administrative charge of 

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discrimination or retaliation.” Basel v. Sec’y of Defense, 507 F. App’x 873, 875 

(11th Cir. 2013) (citing Gregory v. Georgia Dep’t of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 

1279-80 (11th Cir. 2004)). “The proper inquiry is, therefore, whether the plaintiff's 

judicial complaint was like or related to, or grew out of, the administrative 

allegations. Judicial claims are allowed if they ‘amplify, clarify, or more clearly 

focus’ the charges made before the agency ....” Basel, 507 F. App’x at 575-76 

(citations omitted). While a plaintiff’s Title VII complaint need not mirror her 

earlier EEOC charge, “allegations of new acts of discrimination that are offered as 

the essential basis for judicial review must nonetheless be presented to the 

agency.” Id. at 576 (citing Ray v. Freeman, 626 F.2d 439, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1980)). 

Therefore, “[d]iscrete acts of discrimination that occur after an administrative 

filing must first be administratively reviewed before a plaintiff may obtain judicial 

review of those same acts.” Id. Termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, 

and refusal to hire are examples of discrete discriminatory acts that are “easy to 

identify.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002).

b. Section 1981

Section 1981 provides that all persons “shall have the same right ... to make 

and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal 

benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is 

enjoyed by white citizens ....” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). The elements of a cause of 

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action under § 1981 are: “(1) that the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) 

that the defendant intended to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) that the 

discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute.” 

Kinnon v. Arcoub, Gopman & Assocs., Inc., 490 F.3d 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 

F.3d 1250, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004)).

Unlike Title VII claims, “[t]here are no administrative prerequisites to the 

maintenance of a § 1981 claim.” Caetio v. Spirit Coach, LLC, 992 F. Supp. 2d 

1199, 1209 (N.D. Ala. 2014). “Neither the filing of an EEOC charge of 

discrimination within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment as required by 

Title VII ..., nor ‘resort to Title VII’s administrative machinery are ... 

prerequisites for the institution of a § 1981 claim.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Ry. 

Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975)). 

2. Race Discrimination 

In Count One of her Amended Complaint, Kretzschmar alleges that she was 

“denied promotional [sic] opportunity and higher wages while less qualified and 

less senior Caucasian employees were promoted and paid higher wages” and that 

Birmingham East “implemented and executed a system that was meant to promote 

Caucasian employees and pay Caucasian employees higher wages while denying 

African American employees promotion and higher wages.” (Doc. 28 at ¶¶ 31-32). 

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She alleges that as a consequence of Birmingham East’s “unlawful conduct and 

practices” she has been deprived of “employment, benefits and other terms and 

conditions of employment based on her race.” (Id. at ¶ 33).

In Birmingham East’s reply brief in support of its motion to dismiss, 

Birmingham East concedes that Kretzschmar has satisfied the Iqbal/Twombly 

pleading standards and exhausted her Title VII administrative remedies to the 

extent she is asserting a claim for race discrimination based on her suspension, 

demotion, and pay cut in July 2013.8

 (Doc. 17. at 6, 8, 11). However, to the 

extent that Kretzschmar is attempting to assert a race discrimination claim based 

on any other alleged adverse employment actions, Birmingham East disputes that 

Kretzschmar has satisfied the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standards or exhausted her 

Title VII administrative remedies. (Doc. 8 at 19-20; Doc. 17 at 11). Birmingham 

East specifically argues that Kretzschmar did not exhaust her Title VII remedies 

with respect to her allegations of discriminatory pay and promotion practices. 

(Doc. 17 at 10). Kretzschmar responds that the issues she has raised in her 

complaint are “reasonably related” to her EEOC charge with “no material 

 8 Birmingham East’s briefs were submitted before Kretzschmar filed her Amended Complaint. 

Consequently, the briefs do not address the separate counts of the Amended Complaint, but 

rather Kretzschmar’s claims as stated in her original complaint.

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differences.”9 (Doc. 15 at 10). She also notes that her claims are filed under 

Section 1981 as well as Title VII. (Id. at 11).

The court agrees with Birmingham East that to the extent Kretzschmar is 

attempting to assert a race discrimination claim based on discriminatory pay and 

promotion practices, the claim is due to be dismissed. Even construing the factual 

allegations in the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Kretzschmar, 

she has not alleged any adverse pay or promotion practices by Birmingham East. 

Indeed, her own allegations belie her assertion that she was denied “promotional 

opportunity and higher wages.” (Doc. 28 at ¶ 31). According to her very own 

pleading, Birmingham East “promoted” her to the Assistant Director of Nursing 

Position. (Id. at ¶ 13). Her race discrimination claim is based on her subsequent 

suspension and demotion from that position, not on her failure to receive the 

promotion in the first place. Simply put, the Amended Complaint contains no 

factual allegations that support Kretzschmar’s contention that Birmingham East 

engaged in discriminatory pay and promotion practices. She does not identify any 

promotion (with corresponding higher wages) that she—or any other AfricanAmerican employee at Birmingham East—was denied, much less any promotion

that was awarded to a less-qualified white employee. She has failed to plead any 

 9 Like Birmingham East’s briefs, Kretzschmar’s brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss 

discusses her claims as stated in her original complaint and not as repleaded in the Amended 

Complaint.

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“factual content” that would allow the court to draw the “reasonable inference” 

that Birmingham East is liable for engaging in discriminatory pay and promotion 

practices. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Likewise, Kretzschmar’s EEOC charge says nothing about discriminatory 

pay and promotion practices by Birmingham East. The “particulars” of her EEOC 

charge are limited to her suspension, demotion, and pay reduction in July 2013; 

there is no allegation in the charge that she was denied any desired promotion 

because of her race. The allegation in her Amended Complaint that Birmingham 

East denied her opportunities for promotion and higher wages is not “like or 

related to” the allegations in her EEOC charge. Basel, 507 F. App’x at 875-76. 

Therefore, Kretzschmar failed to exhaust her administrative remedies to the extent 

she now seeks to bring a Title VII claim premised upon alleged discriminatory pay 

and promotion practices by Birmingham East.

Based on the foregoing, Birmingham East’s motion to dismiss is due to be

granted as to Count One of the Amended Complaint to the extent that Count One 

alleges a Title VII or Section 1981 claim for race discrimination based on alleged 

discriminatory pay or promotion practices by Birmingham East. The motion is due 

to be denied to the extent that Count One alleges a Title VII or Section 1981 race

discrimination claim premised upon Kretzschmar’s suspension, demotion, and pay 

reduction in July 2013. Kretzschmar may pursue both a Title VII claim and a 

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Section 1981 claim for race discrimination arising out of her suspension, demotion, 

and pay reduction, but may not pursue any such claims based on any other alleged 

discriminatory employment actions by Birmingham East. 

3. Retaliatory Discharge 

In Count Two of her Amended Complaint, Kretzschmar alleges that “[her] 

employment was terminated in retaliation for her having complained about racial 

discrimination in violation of Title VII ....” (Doc. 28 at ¶ 39). Birmingham East 

argues that the claim is due to be dismissed because Kretzschmar did not exhaust 

her administrative remedies. (Doc. 17 at 10). The court disagrees.

As previously noted, a Title VII claim is limited by the scope of the 

administrative investigation that could “reasonably be expected to grow out of” the 

plaintiff’s EEOC charge. Basel, 507 F. App’x at 875. “[A] claim of retaliation 

could reasonably be expected to grow out of [an] original charge of 

discrimination.” Baker v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 856 F.2d 167, 169 (11th Cir. 

1988). As a consequence,

it is unnecessary for a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies 

prior to urging a retaliation claim growing out of an earlier charge; the 

district court has ancillary jurisdiction to hear such a claim when it 

grows out of an administrative charge that is properly before the court.

 There are strong practical reasons and policy justifications for this 

conclusion. It is the nature of retaliation claims that they arise after 

the filing of the EEOC charge. Requiring prior resort to the EEOC 

would mean that two charges would have to be filed in a retaliation 

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case—a double filing that would serve no purpose except to create 

additional procedural technicalities when a single filing would comply 

with the intent of Title VII.

Gupta v. East Texas State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Held v. 

Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 373 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (S.D. Tex. 1974), and Nat’l 

Org. for Women v. Sperry Rand Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1338, 1344 (D. Conn. 1978)); 

see also Thomas v. Miami Dade Pub. Health Trust, 369 F. App’x 19, 23 (11th Cir. 

2010) (citing Gupta). 

Here, Kretzschmar’s retaliatory discharge claim “grew out of” her EEOC 

charge; she alleges that she was terminated in retaliation for having filed the 

charge. Therefore, it was not necessary for her to file a second charge in order to 

pursue a retaliatory discharge claim under Title VII. See Caetio, 992 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1212 (“Because Caetio alleges that defendant retaliated against her ... for filing 

an EEOC discrimination charge, her retaliation claim ‘grew out of’ that charge. 

Thus, Caetio was under no obligation to file a separate EEOC charge in order to 

maintain a retaliation action in compliance with Title VII.”).

In addition, as noted above, Kretzschmar is pursuing the claims in her 

Amended Complaint under Section 1981 as well as Title VII, and there are no 

administrative prerequisites to the maintenance of a Section 1981 claim. 

Therefore, Kretzschmar may pursue her retaliatory discharge claim under both 

Title VII and Section 1981. Birmingham East’s motion to dismiss is due to be 

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denied as to Count Two of the Amended Complaint.

4. Reprisal 

Although titled “Reprisal,” Count Three of the Amended Complaint appears 

to be asserting another retaliation claim. In Count Three, which incorporates the 

preceding paragraphs of the Amended Complaint by reference, Kretzschmar 

alleges that Birmingham East’s “conduct as alleged above constitutes retaliation 

against [her] because she engaged in activities protected by Title VII.” (Doc. 28 at 

¶ 48). Kretzschmar does not specify what particular “conduct as alleged above” 

was retaliatory. To the extent that the “conduct as described above” includes her 

termination, Birmingham East’s motion to dismiss is due to be denied for the 

reasons discussed above with respect to Count Two. 

However, to the extent that Birmingham East’s “conduct as described 

above” includes alleged retaliatory acts commencing before Kretzschmar filed her 

EEOC charge, the court agrees with Birmingham East that Kretzschmar is 

precluded from pursuing a Title VII retaliation claim because she failed to exhaust 

her administrative remedies. Kretzschmar filed her EEOC charge on August 28, 

2013, more than a month after she filed her “verbal complaint” against Burch with 

Birmingham East’s Human Resources Department. (Doc. 1-2 at 3; Doc. 28 at ¶ 

17). She did not check the box for “retaliation” on her EEOC charge and the word 

“retaliation” does not appear anywhere in her description of the particulars of her 

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charge. Nowhere in her EEOC charge does she even suggest that Burch (or 

anyone else at Birmingham East) retaliated against her for reporting alleged 

discriminatory treatment. Consequently, to the extent that Kretzschmar seeks to 

pursue a retaliation claim under Title VII based on acts commencing before she 

filed her EEOC charge, the claims are due to be dismissed for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. 

Kretzschmar may, however, pursue such a retaliation claim under Section 

1981. Despite Kretzschmar’s failure to specify the particular “conduct as 

described above” that she claims was retaliatory, the court is satisfied that she has 

alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible Section 1981 retaliation claim 

encompassing more than just her termination. She alleges that after she reported 

Burch’s alleged acts of discrimination, her employment at Birmingham East 

became unbearable, she was scrutinized constantly, and she was denied earned 

vacation. (Doc. 28 at ¶ 22). Accepting these allegations as true and construing 

them in the light most favorable to Kretzschmar, she has adequately pleaded a 

retaliation claim under Section 1981 to survive Birmingham East’s motion to 

dismiss. 

Based on the foregoing, Birmingham East’s motion to dismiss is due to be 

granted to the extent that the retaliation claim in Count Three is brought pursuant 

to Title VII and is based on alleged retaliatory acts commencing before 

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Kretzschmar filed her EEOC charge. The motion to dismiss is otherwise due to be 

denied as to Count Three. 

5. Hostile Work Environment

In Count Four, which incorporates all of the preceding paragraphs of the 

Amended Complaint by reference, Kretzschmar alleges that Birmingham East’s 

“conduct as described above constitutes [a] hostile and abusive working 

environment in violation of Title VII.” (Doc. 28 at 49). Again, she does not 

specify what particular “conduct as described above” created the alleged hostile 

work environment. Birmingham East argues that the hostile work environment 

claim should be dismissed because, once again, Kretzschmar failed to exhaust her 

Title VII administrative remedies and because she has failed to satisfy the 

Iqbal/Twombly pleading standards. (Doc. 17 at 10). As before, Kretzschmar 

asserts that the issues in her complaint are “reasonably related” to her EEOC 

charge with “no material differences,” and notes that her claims have been brought 

pursuant to Section 1981 as well as Title VII. (Doc. 15 at 10-11). She also argues 

that “the complaint gives rise to a reasonable inference that [she] was 

discriminated against, and retaliated against and exposed by those means to a 

hostile work environment thus satisfying [a] prima facie case ‘post Twombly.’” 

(Id. at 10). 

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The court agrees with Birmingham East that Kretzschmar failed to exhaust 

her administrative remedies with respect to her hostile work environment claim. A 

hostile work environment claim is materially different from a claim that 

Kretzschmar was suspended and demoted (with a corresponding reduction in pay) 

in July 2013 because of her race, which is all her EEOC charge alleges. See 

McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2008) (“As opposed to 

‘[d]iscrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal 

to hire,’ a hostile work environment claim addresses acts ‘different in kind’ whose 

‘very nature involves repeated conduct,’ such as ‘ “discriminatory intimidation, 

ridicule, and insult.” ’ ”) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114-16). Nowhere in her 

EEOC charge does Kretzschmar state that she was subjected to repeated 

intimidation, ridicule, and insult or that “the office became unbearable” after she 

reported her allegations of discrimination to Human Resources, as she alleges in 

the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 28 at ¶ 22). Nothing in her EEOC charge suggests 

or even implies that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. Therefore, 

to the extent that Kretzschmar now seeks to bring a hostile work environment 

claim pursuant to Title VII, she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and 

the claim is due to be dismissed.

To the extent that Kretzschmar’s hostile work environment claim has been 

brought pursuant to Section 1981, however, the court will allow the claim to 

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proceed. In her Amended Complaint, Kretzschmar alleges more than just the 

discrete acts of her suspension, demotion, pay reduction, and ultimate termination; 

she also alleges that once she reported Burch’s alleged discrimination, her 

employment was made “unbearable.” (Doc. 28 at ¶¶ 22, 26). She allege that she 

was “treated differently” and “scrutinized constantly” and that Burch was 

“constantly telling [her] that she had an attitude” and “constantly trying to find 

reasons to write her up.” (Id.). Although it is a close call, the court is satisfied that 

these allegations of repeated conduct, which suggest at least a degree of 

intimidation, are sufficient to state a plausible hostile work environment claim 

under Section 1981. Of course, whether the allegations are borne out in discovery 

remains to be seen. 

Accordingly, Birmingham East’s motion to dismiss is due to be granted as to 

Count Four to the extent that Kretzschmar’s hostile work environment claim arises 

under Title VII, but denied to the extend the claim arises under Section 1983.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Birmingham East’s motion to dismiss (doc. 7) is 

due to be granted in part and denied in part. The motion is due to be granted as to

(1) any claims asserted under the ADA, the ADEA, or the FLSA; (2) any race 

discrimination claims in Count One based on any alleged discriminatory 

employment actions by Birmingham East other than Kretzschmar’s suspension, 

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demotion, and pay reduction in July 2013; (3) any Title VII retaliation claims in 

Count Three based on alleged retaliatory acts commencing before Kretzschmar 

filed her EEOC charge on August 28, 2013; and (4) any Title VII hostile work 

environment claims in Count Four. The motion is due to be denied to the extent 

that (1) Count One asserts a claim under Title VII and Section 1981 for race

discrimination arising out of Kretzschmar’s suspension, demotion, and pay 

reduction in July 2013; (2) Counts Two and Three assert a claim under Title VII 

and Section 1981 for retaliatory discharge; (3) Count Three asserts a claim under 

Section 1981 (but not Title VII) for retaliatory acts other than discharge; and (4) 

Count Four asserts a hostile work environment claim under Section 1981 (but not 

Title VII).

An appropriate order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

DATED this 27th day of October, 2015.

_________________________________

JOHN E. OTT

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

 

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