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Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-2344 

LARRY HOOPER, M.D., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

PROCTOR HEALTH CARE INC., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois, Peoria Division. 

No. 12 C 1005 — James E. Shadid, Chief Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MAY 18, 2015 — DECIDED OCTOBER 26, 2015 

____________________ 

Before KANNE and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and ELLIS, District Judge.

*

ELLIS, District Judge. Proctor Health Care, Inc. (“Proctor”) 

terminated Larry Hooper, M.D. in response to Hooper’s nonaction after he was cleared by a psychiatrist to return to 

 

*The Honorable Sara L. Ellis, of the United States District Court for 

the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

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2 No. 14-2344 

work, repeatedly told that the psychiatrist had cleared him, 

and warned that if he did not contact Proctor by a certain 

date regarding his return to work, he would be fired. Hooper sued Proctor under the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the district court 

granted summary judgment to Proctor, finding that Hooper 

had not asserted a failure to accommodate claim in his complaint and that there was no genuine issue of fact on his disability discrimination claim. Hooper appeals, arguing that 

the district court should have considered his failure to accommodate claim on the merits and that it ignored disputed 

facts in the evidence on his discrimination claim. But Hooper’s complaint failed to mention any facts to put Proctor on 

notice that he was pursuing a failure to accommodate claim, 

which fails even when considered on the merits because 

Hooper did not require accommodations. Additionally, the 

district court properly granted summary judgment on the 

disability discrimination claim regardless of the method under which the claim is examined, because Hooper failed to 

create an issue of fact that would raise an inference of disability discrimination. Accordingly, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Because this is an appeal of the district court’s summary 

judgment decision, we summarize the facts in the light most 

favorable to Hooper, who was the non-moving party, and 

draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Malin v. Hospira, 

Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Hooper, a family practice physician, received a diagnosis 

of bipolar disorder in 2000. He must regularly see a psychologist to maintain his medical license in Illinois. In 2009, 

Proctor hired Hooper to work in its First Care outpatient 

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No. 14-2344 3

clinics in Peoria, which provide urgent and primary care to 

walk-in patients and those with appointments. 

On April 16, 2010, Hooper arranged to meet with Mandy 

Carballido, Proctor’s Director of Human Resources. The 

meeting was prompted by an incident Hooper had with a 

neighbor about where he had parked his car, during which 

Hooper made derogatory comments and yelled at the police. 

Because he did not want a similar incident to occur at work, 

Hooper thought he needed time off from work. In the meeting, Hooper revealed his bipolar disorder for the first time to 

anyone at Proctor. According to Hooper, Carballido remarked in response that she had a contentious relationship 

with her bipolar mother-in-law. Hooper inquired about 

Proctor’s long term disability benefit, and the two discussed 

the possibility of a medical leave of absence. 

After meeting with Hooper, Carballido informed her supervisor, Linda Buck, Proctor’s Vice President of Human Resources, of the conversation. Carballido and Buck decided to 

place Hooper on an immediate paid medical leave of absence and to help him apply for long term disability benefits. 

Carballido immediately told Hooper of the decision. Hooper 

determined he was not eligible for long term disability, 

however, because his condition was a preexisting one. 

On April 20, 2010, Hooper met with his psychiatrist, Dr. 

Karen Kyle. She agreed that Hooper should be placed on 

leave and wrote him a note to be off work for medical reasons. On May 14, 2010, Dr. Kyle determined that Hooper 

could return to work and wrote him another note to that 

end. But Proctor determined that Hooper should continue 

on paid leave until an independent medical examination 

confirmed Hooper was fit to return to work. Dr. James 

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4 No. 14-2344 

Cavanaugh, a psychiatrist at Rush University Medical Center, conducted that examination on August 2 and 3, 2010. 

Hooper left the examination believing he would not be able 

to return to work until Proctor received Dr. Cavanaugh’s report, which Hooper thought would take three or four weeks. 

But on August 4, Dr. Cavanaugh orally informed Carballido 

that Hooper could return to work, indicating that a written 

report would be issued by August 19. Dr. Cavanaugh completed his report on August 18. Although Dr. Cavanaugh 

found Hooper fit to return to work without any specific restrictions, he also suggested Proctor could make certain accommodations to decrease Hooper’s stress level and potentially improve Hooper’s performance in the workplace. 

These included modifying Hooper’s work hours to include 

more regular weekday hours so that Hooper did not feel as 

isolated, allowing Hooper to establish continuous contact 

with patients instead of only assigning him to walk-in patients, establishing regular evaluation sessions to provide 

Hooper with feedback on his performance, allowing Hooper 

to take sick days as medically indicated in a way that did not 

make him feel ostracized, and ensuring that Hooper had a 

supportive supervisor. 

Upon receiving Dr. Cavanaugh’s oral report that Hooper 

was fit to return to work, Diane Kurtz, Proctor First Care’s 

administrative assistant, left Hooper two messages on August 4 or 5 indicating he should return to work the following 

day. Kurtz left him an additional message and tried to leave 

a fourth message but Hooper’s voicemail box was full by 

that time. Proctor also tried contacting Hooper by phone the 

week of August 9. Hooper did not respond or report for 

work despite being in the Peoria area from August 4 through 

13. Hooper’s mother died on August 12, and so Hooper 

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No. 14-2344 5

traveled to Marquette, Michigan on August 13 to attend the 

funeral and to her affairs, remaining there until August 18. 

Hooper testified that he thought he left a message that his 

mother had passed away and he was out of town attending 

the funeral with Kurtz or Todd Baker, Proctor’s Executive 

Director of Ambulatory Care Services, but he acknowledged 

that he was not sure whether that call actually occurred. 

Hooper did not introduce any concrete evidence to substantiate this call. 

On August 16, Baker sent Hooper a letter stating that 

Hooper had been cleared for work as of August 5, that human resources had been contacting him since then but had 

not heard from him, and that his employment would be 

terminated if he did not contact Proctor by the close of business on Friday, August 20. Because Proctor had not heard 

from Hooper by August 20, Proctor terminated Hooper’s 

employment on August 23, effective August 20, and sent 

him a termination notice to that effect. 

Despite having returned to Peoria on August 18, Hooper 

only retrieved Baker’s August 16 letter on August 24. He 

then tried to contact Baker and Kurtz. Kurtz passed Hooper’s message on to Proctor’s Human Resources Department. 

On October 7, 2010, Hooper filed a request that his termination be reviewed. But that request was denied on October 12 

because it was not made within seven days of his termination, as required by Proctor policy. 

After filing an administrative charge alleging disability 

discrimination and retaliation, Hooper filed suit against 

Proctor in the Central District of Illinois. In his complaint, 

Hooper claimed that the August 16, 2010 letter was pretext 

to terminate his employment because he was a qualified inCase: 14-2344 Document: 33 Filed: 10/26/2015 Pages: 15
6 No. 14-2344 

dividual with a disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) and the 

Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”), 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-

102. The district court granted summary judgment for Proctor, finding that Hooper’s disability discrimination claim 

failed, that his IHRA claim was waived, and that he had not 

asserted a failure to accommodate claim in his complaint. 

Hooper does not challenge the decision with respect to the 

IHRA claim. 

II. ANALYSIS 

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo. Taylor-Novotny v. Health All. Med. Plans, Inc., 772 F.3d 

478, 488 (7th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate 

when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

A. Failure to Accommodate Claim 

In his complaint, Hooper generally alleged disability discrimination under the ADA. Then, in response to Proctor’s 

motion for summary judgment, Hooper argued that Proctor 

failed to reasonably accommodate his disability, citing 42 

U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). He claimed that Proctor should have 

discussed with him Dr. Cavanaugh’s suggestions of accommodations that would improve Hooper’s work environment 

rather than terminating him. The district court found that 

Hooper had not raised a failure to accommodate claim in his 

complaint, having failed to cite to 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) or 

allege any facts that would give rise to such a claim. The 

court further stated that even if Proctor was required to 

make the accommodations recommended by Dr. 

Cavanaugh, Proctor could not because Hooper never reportCase: 14-2344 Document: 33 Filed: 10/26/2015 Pages: 15
No. 14-2344 7

ed to work after those recommendations were made. Thus, 

regardless of whether Hooper waived the claim, the court 

would have found for Proctor. 

On appeal, Hooper argues that the district court erred in 

finding the claim waived. He contends that the complaint 

alleged that he was a qualified individual with a disability 

and therefore included a failure to accommodate claim because the definition of a qualified individual is one who, 

“with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 

essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added). 

Although Hooper need not have pleaded legal theories in 

his complaint, he was required to plead sufficient facts to 

put Proctor on notice of his claim. Reeves ex rel. Reeves v. Jewel 

Food Stores, Inc., 759 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2014); Hatmaker v. 

Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2010). Hooper 

generally pleaded a claim for ADA discrimination. Failure to 

accommodate is a form of ADA discrimination. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112(b)(5)(A); Reeves, 759 F.3d at 701. But nowhere in 

Hooper’s complaint are there facts to put Proctor on notice 

that Hooper was alleging failure to accommodate. Cf. Reeves, 

759 F.3d at 701 (finding failure to accommodate claim was 

not waived where plaintiff included facts in his complaint 

that were relevant to a failure to accommodate claim). 

Hooper’s complaint does not mention Dr. Cavanaugh’s suggested accommodations or any other purported need or request for accommodations. Without such allegations, Hooper’s mere invocation of ADA discrimination and the inclusion of the word “accommodation” in the cited definition of 

qualified individual did not provide Proctor with adequate 

notice. See Def. Sec. Co. v. First Mercury Ins. Co.,—F.3d—, 2015 

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8 No. 14-2344 

WL 5692516, at *6–7 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that if plaintiff 

“eventually needed to prove that publication occurred, it 

should have pled sufficient facts to make that showing” in 

the complaint); Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 

2011) (Rules 8 and 10 are intended “to give defendants fair 

notice of the claims against them and the grounds supporting the claims”). 

But even a properly preserved failure to accommodate 

claim would fail under the circumstances here. To establish 

failure to accommodate, Hooper had to present evidence 

that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability, (2) Proctor was aware of his disability, and (3) Proctor failed to reasonably accommodate his disability. Reeves, 759 F.3d at 701. 

Although a “qualified individual” is an individual who 

“with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform 

the essential functions of the employment position that such 

individual holds or desires,” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8), only those 

individuals with “physical or mental limitations” who are 

“otherwise qualified” for the job at issue are entitled to reasonable accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2013). A 

plaintiff cannot state a failure to accommodate claim if “she 

was able to perform all essential functions of her job without 

regard to her physical or mental limitations.” Brumfield, 735 

F.3d at 632. Thus, “an employer’s accommodation duty is 

triggered only in situations where an individual who is qualified on paper requires an accommodation in order to be 

able to perform the essential functions of the job.” Id.

Here, Dr. Cavanaugh cleared Hooper to return to work 

without accommodations. See R330 (“Dr. Hooper is fit to return to full-time practice without any specific medical or 

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No. 14-2344 9

psychiatric restrictions.”). Dr. Cavanaugh did recommend 

certain accommodations that he thought could “result in Dr. 

Hooper’s experiencing less stress in the workplace and an 

even improved level of medical practice.” Id. But these recommendations cannot form the basis of a failure to accommodate claim because Dr. Cavanaugh specifically found that 

Hooper was qualified for his position without accommodations. See Brumfield, 735 F.3d at 633 (“A disabled employee 

who is capable of performing the essential functions of a job 

in spite of her physical or mental limitations is qualified for 

the job, and the ADA prevents the employer from discriminating against her on the basis of her irrelevant disability. 

But since the employee’s limitations do not affect her ability 

to perform those essential functions, the employer’s duty to 

accommodate is not implicated.”). Hooper’s failure to accommodate claim thus would fail if considered on the merits.1

B. ADA Discrimination Claim 

Under the ADA, Proctor was prohibited from discriminating against Hooper “on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112(a). Hooper could proceed under either the direct or 

indirect method of proof to establish his claim. TaylorNovotny, 772 F.3d at 489. Under the direct method, he must 

show that (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, 

 1 Although the district court did not consider this alternative 

ground, on appeal we can address any ground that was preserved and is 

supported by the record. See Hester v. Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 726 F.3d 

942, 946 (7th Cir. 2013). Proctor properly raised this argument in its reply 

brief below, after Hooper argued for the first time in response to Proctor’s summary judgment motion that Proctor had failed to accommodate 

his bipolar disorder. 

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10 No. 14-2344 

(2) he was qualified to perform the essential functions of the 

job with or without accommodation, and (3) he was terminated because of his disability. Bunn v. Khoury Enters., Inc., 

753 F.3d 676, 683 (7th Cir. 2014). To establish the third prong, 

Hooper must show that his disability was a “but for” cause 

of his termination, Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 

F.3d 957, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2010),2 which can be demonstrated 

through direct or circumstantial evidence, with circumstantial evidence encompassing, among other things, suspicious 

timing and pretext for the adverse employment action. Bunn, 

753 F.3d at 684. Under the indirect method, Hooper must 

first establish that (1) he is disabled within the meaning of 

the ADA, (2) he was meeting Proctor’s legitimate expectations, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) 

Proctor treated similarly situated, non-disabled employees 

more favorably. Id. at 685. If Hooper establishes a prima facie

case, Proctor must present evidence showing a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. Id.

Hooper must then present evidence showing that Proctor’s 

stated reason is pretextual. Id.

Although we have recently questioned the continued 

utility of the direct and indirect methods of proof in analyzing discrimination claims, we have continued to separately 

consider them when reviewing the grant of summary judg-

 2 We have not yet addressed whether the 2008 amendments to the 

ADA, which changed the statutory language from prohibiting discrimination “because of” a disability to prohibiting discrimination “on the 

basis of” a disability, affects the standard required to prove causation. 

See Silk v. Bd. of Trs., Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll., Dist. No. 524, 795 F.3d 

698, 705–06 (7th Cir. 2015). The question has not been presented in this 

case, the answer would not affect the outcome, and so we decline to resolve the issue here. 

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No. 14-2344 11

ment. See Simpson v. Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps., Inc., 780 F.3d 

784, 789–90 (7th Cir. 2015). Nonetheless, the ultimate question under both methods, and that which is relevant here, is 

“whether a reasonable jury could find prohibited discrimination.” Bass v. Joliet Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 86, 746 F.3d 835, 840 

(7th Cir. 2014). 

Indeed, Hooper’s arguments do not neatly fit into either 

the direct or indirect method here or before the district court. 

Although he set forth the legal standard for each method in 

his brief below, he never specified under which method he 

was proceeding and instead generally argued that Proctor 

sought a reason to fire him as soon as it learned of his bipolar disorder. The district court analyzed his claim under the 

indirect method only. On appeal, Hooper does not directly 

address why the district court’s decision in granting summary judgment based on his failure to meet the indirect 

method of proof was wrong. Regardless of how Hooper’s 

claim is analyzed, however, he has not established that a 

reasonable juror could find that Proctor discriminated 

against him on the basis of his disability. 

Under the indirect method, Hooper presented no evidence of similarly situated individuals. Indeed, he does not 

even mention this element of the prima facie case on appeal. 

Lack of evidence on this element is sufficient to end the inquiry under the indirect method, as it is Hooper’s responsibility to identify and present evidence of a comparator at the 

summary judgment stage. Bunn, 753 F.3d at 685; Chaib v. Indiana, 744 F.3d 974, 984 (7th Cir. 2014). But going further, 

there is no issue of fact as to pretext. Proctor claims that 

Hooper was terminated for not meeting legitimate job expectations because he did not return to work as instructed in 

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12 No. 14-2344 

August 2010. While Hooper attempts to create a dispute as 

to when he was cleared to return to work, Hooper’s subjective understanding that he could not return to work until Dr. 

Cavanaugh completed his written report is immaterial. The 

record reflects that Dr. Cavanaugh informed Carballido that 

Hooper could return to work on August 4, that Proctor decided to recall Hooper to work that day, and that Proctor repeatedly told Hooper to return to work beginning on August 4 or 5 even though the written report was not yet completed. Hooper ignored his employer’s directions at his own 

peril, as the relevant question here is the employer’s—not 

the employee’s—honest belief. See Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 

F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2013) (“An inquiry into pretext requires that we evaluate the honesty of the employer’s explanation, rather than its validity or reasonableness[.]”). 

Proctor undertook numerous efforts to notify Hooper 

that he was cleared to return to work and, ultimately when it 

did not hear from him, told him by letter that if he did not 

contact Proctor by a certain date, it would terminate his employment. Hooper has not presented any evidence to undermine the fact that Proctor believed that Hooper could return to work on August 4 and that Hooper’s failure to return 

to work or contact Proctor as directed justified termination. 

See Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 141 F.3d 290, 296 (7th Cir. 

1998) (absenteeism is legitimate reason to terminate employee); Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1115 (7th Cir. 

1992) (employer has legitimate interest in employee’s attendance and reliability). Although Hooper asks us to speculate about the reasons for Proctor’s actions, we do not sit as a 

“super personnel department” with the ability to do so. 

Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1181 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); see also Widmar v. Sun Chem. Corp., 772 F.3d 

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No. 14-2344 13

457, 465 (7th Cir. 2014) (employee failed to show pretext 

where he only offered speculation instead of identifying inconsistencies in employer’s reasons for termination). With 

only Hooper’s speculation, we cannot find sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether Proctor’s 

proffered reason for Hooper’s termination was pretextual. 

Alternatively, to the extent Hooper’s claim could be considered under the direct method, it fails under that analysis 

as well. Hooper argues that Proctor was biased against him 

because of his bipolar disorder, as evidenced by Carballido’s 

remark in April 2010 that she had a contentious relationship 

with her bipolar mother-in-law and the fact that his personnel file grew after he met with Carballido. He argues that 

this bias caused Proctor to seek a reason to discharge him in 

August 2010 and make Proctor unwilling to work with him 

when he inquired about his work status on August 24. 

But Carballido’s comment was a stray remark and is insufficient to support a discrimination claim. See Fleishman v. 

Cont’l Cas. Co., 698 F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[I]solated 

comments are not probative of discrimination unless they 

are ‘contemporaneous with the discharge or causally related 

to the discharge decision-making process.’” (quoting Gleason 

v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1140 (7th Cir. 1997))). The 

comment was made four months before the termination decision, and Hooper has not pointed to a causal connection 

between it and his termination. See Markel v. Bd. of Regents of 

Univ. of Wis. Sys., 276 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 2002) (comments 

made two months before termination decision were not contemporaneous to adverse action). The fact that Hooper’s personnel file may have increased in size after he disclosed his 

bipolar disorder, which coincides with the decision to place 

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14 No. 14-2344 

him on paid medical leave and the paperwork that would 

have accompanied that action, does little, as Hooper has not 

provided us with any information about the actual contents 

of the file. Any inferences Hooper asks us to draw based on 

the size of his personnel file are based on speculation and 

thus insufficient to withstand summary judgment. See Herzog v. Graphic Packaging Int’l, Inc., 742 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 

2014) (“[I]nferences that are supported by only speculation 

or conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion.” 

(citation omitted)). And as already discussed, Hooper has no 

evidence of pretext. 

Further, Hooper has failed to show any type of connection between any alleged discriminatory animus by Proctor 

and the termination decision. See Good v. Univ. of Chicago 

Med. Ctr., 673 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2012) (the direct method 

of proof “requires evidence leading directly to the conclusion 

that an employer was illegally motivated, without reliance 

on speculation”). If anything, the evidence shows that Proctor acted quickly to bring Hooper back to work once it 

learned his bipolar disorder did not pose any harm to Hooper, Proctor staff, or patients, and only terminated him when 

he failed to return to work after numerous efforts to contact 

him. This does not suggest discriminatory motive. 

Ultimately, because no reasonable juror could find prohibited discrimination under any circumstances in the record, we conclude that the district court properly granted 

summary judgment for Proctor on Hooper’s ADA discrimination claim. 

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No. 14-2344 15

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED. 

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