Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-01173/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-01173-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN DOE SUBSCRIBER ASSIGNED IP 

ADDRESS 73.223.103.234,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-01173-TSH 

ORDER FOR REASSIGNMENT WITH

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION RE: 

MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

FILED UNDER SEAL

Re: Dkt. No. 29

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Strike 3 Holdings, LLC (“Strike 3”), seeks entry of default judgment against 

Defendant [REDACTED] for failure to plead or otherwise defend against Strike 3’s First 

Amended Complaint (“FAC”). In its motion, as revised in supplemental briefing, Strike 3 

requests an award of statutory damages of $9,000.00, an award of $1,263.66 in costs, and a 

permanent injunction. Defendant has neither appeared nor opposed the motion. Because no 

consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction has been filed by Defendant, the Clerk of Court shall 

REASSIGN this case to a district judge for disposition. After carefully reviewing the motion and 

controlling authorities, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the District Court GRANT the motion 

for the following reasons. 

II. BACKGROUND

On February 22, 2018, Strike 3 filed the Complaint alleging that Defendant used the 

BitTorrent file network to illegally download and distribute Strike 3’s copyrighted motion 

pictures. Compl., ECF No. ¶ 23. The Complaint alleged that Defendant had infringed 27 

copyrighted works, 12 of which had been registered with the Copyright Office and 15 of which 

had pending applications. Id., Ex. A; see also ECF No. 34 at 3-4 (explaining that the works in Ex. 

A that had a CRO number beginning with “PA” were registered and the rest were pending 

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applications).

BitTorrent is a system designed to quickly distribute large files over the Internet. Id. ¶ 17. 

Instead of downloading a file, such as a movie, from a single source, BitTorrent users are able to 

connect to the computers of other BitTorrent users in order to simultaneously download and 

upload pieces of the file from and to other users. Id. Every digital file has one single possible 

cryptographic hash value correlating to it. Id. ¶ 20. 

Strike 3’s investigator, IPP International U.G. (“IPP”) established direct TCP/IP 

connections with Defendant’s IP address while he was using the BitTorrent file distribution 

network. Id. ¶ 24. IPP downloaded a full copy of each digital media file from the BitTorrent file 

distribution network, and was allegedly able to confirm “through independent calculation that the 

file hash, correlating to each file matched the file hash downloaded” by Defendant. Id. ¶ 26. 

While Defendant was infringing, IPP downloaded from him 27 digital media files containing 

Strike 3’s motion pictures. Exh. A, Compl., ECF No. 1-1. 

The digital media files were verified to contain a digital copy of a motion picture that is 

identical (or alternatively, strikingly similar or substantially similar) to Strike 3’s corresponding 

original copyrighted motion pictures. Id. ¶ 29. At no point did Strike 3 authorize, permit or 

consent to Defendant’s distribution of its works, expressly or otherwise. Id. ¶ 28.

The Complaint alleges the following violations by Defendant: reproducing its motion 

pictures in copies, in violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1) and 501; distributing copies of its motion 

pictures to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending, in 

violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(3) and 501; performing the copyrighted motion pictures, in violation 

of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4) and 501, by showing the motion pictures’ images in any sequence and/or 

by making the sounds accompanying the motion pictures audible and transmitting said 

performance of the work, by means of a device or process, to members of the public capable of 

receiving the display; and, displaying the motion pictures, in violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(5) and 

501, by showing individual images of the them non-sequentially and transmitting said display by 

means of a device or process to members of the public capable of receiving the display (as set 

forth in 17 U.S.C. § 101’s definition of “publicly” display).

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Because the subscriber’s identity was initially unknown to Strike 3, it filed an Ex Parte 

Application for Leave to Serve a Third Party Subpoena Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference. ECF 

No. 7. In its application Strike 3 requested the Court’s authorization to serve discovery on the 

Defendant’s Internet Service Provider (“ISP”). Id. The Court granted this motion on March 7, 

2018. ECF No. 8. Pursuant to the issuance of a third-party subpoena, Defendant’s ISP disclosed 

the subscriber’s identity. Decl. of Lincoln D. Bandlow (“Bandlow Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 29-1. 

Defendant was the renter listed at the address provided by his ISP, Comcast. First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 33, ECF No. 17. 

On July 12, 2018, Strike 3 filed its FAC against Defendant to include his identity. ECF 

No. 16.1 Strike 3 served Defendant with a Summons and the FAC on July 24, 2018. Certificate of 

Service, ECF No. 23. Defendant failed to plead or defend against the FAC. On October 3, 2018, 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), Strike 3 filed and served an application for the entry of default

against Defendant. ECF No. 21. On October 23, 2018 the Clerk entered default as to Defendant. 

ECF No. 24. With no appearance from Defendant, Strike 3 filed the present motion, ECF No. 29, 

and served it on Defendant, ECF No. 30-2. Consistent with Ninth Circuit law at the time, see 

Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 606 F.3d 612, 621 (9th Cir. 2010), Strike 3 moved 

for default judgment on both the copyrights that had been registered with the Copyright Office and 

the copyrights whose applications were pending at the time the Complaint was filed. See ECF No. 

29 at 5 (motion seeking the statutory minimum of $750 per infringed work) & ECF No. 28-2 at 3 

(proposed order seeking $20,250 in statutory damages, which is $750 x 27). 

On March 4, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. WallStreet.com, LLC, No. 17-571, 2019 WL 1005829 (U.S. March 4, 2019), holding that a copyright 

owner may sue for infringement only after the Copyright Office registers a copyright, rejecting the 

Ninth Circuit’s previous holding that submitting the application was sufficient. That day this 

Court issued an order requiring Strike 3 to “identif[y] which of the applications were registered by 

 

1 Because of the adult nature of Strike 3’s motion pictures, all references to the Defendant’s name 

and address have been filed under seal. The Court similarly redacts that information in the public 

version of this report and recommendation.

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the Copyright Office at the time this lawsuit was filed.” ECF No. 33. Strike 3’s response 

identified the 12 that had been registered at the time the Complaint was filed. ECF No. 34 at 3. 

The concluding sentence of Strike 3’s response states: “For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff 

respectfully requests that the Court grant default as to the twelve registered copyrights in the 

works listed in the first list set forth above.” Id. at 5 (emphasis added). The Court interprets this 

statement to mean that Strike 3 has narrowed its request for the entry of default judgment to just 

those 12 registered copyrights and is no longer seeking entry of default judgment as to all 27 

works.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) permits a court, following default by a defendant, 

to enter default judgment in a case. “The district court’s decision whether to enter default 

judgment is a discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). 

At the default judgment stage, the factual allegations of the complaint, except those 

concerning damages, “together with other competent evidence submitted” are deemed admitted by 

the non-responding parties. Shanghai Automation Instrument Co. v. Kuei, 194 F. Supp. 2d 995, 

1000 (N.D. Cal. 2001); see also Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). 

“However, a defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions 

of law.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation 

omitted)). Therefore, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally 

insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 

1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978)); accord 

DIRECTV, 503 F.3d at 854. Further, the scope of relief is limited by Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(c), which states that a “default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in 

amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” 

In determining whether default judgment is appropriate, the Ninth Circuit has enumerated 

the following factors for courts to consider: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 

plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) 

the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute 

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concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to 

excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction and Service of Process

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are presumptively without jurisdiction. 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A federal court may 

dismiss an action on its own motion if it finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fiedler v. 

Clark, 714 F.2d 77, 78-79 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court 

determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the 

action.”). 

Here, Strike 3 brought its claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 28 

U.S.C. § 1338 (jurisdiction over copyright actions). These claims arise under federal law; thus, 

the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. 

2. Personal Jurisdiction

a. Basis for Personal Jurisdiction

To enter default judgment, the Court must have a basis for the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over the defendant in default. In re Tuli, 172 F.3d at 712. “Without a proper basis for 

[personal] jurisdiction, or in the absence of proper service of process, the district court has no 

power to render any judgment against the defendant’s person or property unless the defendant has 

consented to jurisdiction or waived the lack of process.” S.E.C. v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138-39 

(9th Cir. 2007). Traditional bases for conferring a court with personal jurisdiction include a 

defendant’s consent to jurisdiction, personal service of the defendant within the forum state, or a 

defendant’s citizenship or domicile in the forum state. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 

U.S. 873, 880 (2011). The party seeking to invoke jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that 

jurisdiction is proper. Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1392 (9th Cir. 1984). “[M]ere 

‘bare bones’ assertions of minimum contacts with the forum or legal conclusions unsupported by 

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specific factual allegations will not satisfy a plaintiff’s pleading burden.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 

476 F.3d 756, 766 (9th Cir. 2007).

Defendant resides within this District at [REDACTED]. FAC ¶ 11. Because Defendant is

domiciled within the state, the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 

b. Service of Process

Personal jurisdiction also requires notice that is “reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 

opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 

314 (1950). “A federal court does not have jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has 

been served properly under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4].” Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. 

Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988).

Here, Strike 3 served Defendant with the Summons and FAC at his residence on July 24, 

2018. See Certificate of Service, ECF No. 22. Moreover, Defendant is not a minor or an 

otherwise incompetent person, so no exemption to personal service applies. Thus, service under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) was proper.

B. Eitel Factors 

Applying the seven Eitel factors, the undersigned finds default judgment is warranted in 

favor of Strike 3.

1. The Possibility of Prejudice

The first factor the Court considers is the possibility of prejudice if a default judgment is 

not entered. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. Courts have held that prejudice exists where denying the 

requested default judgment would leave the plaintiff without a proper remedy. See, e.g., IO Grp., 

Inc. v. Jordon, 708 F. Supp. 2d 989, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 

This factor favors Strike 3 because absent entry of a default judgment, Strike 3 has no 

other means to stop Defendant’s infringement or obtain compensation for violations of its

copyrights. “If [Plaintiff’s] motion for default judgment is not granted, Plaintiffs will likely be 

without other recourse for recovery.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 

1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Accordingly, this factor weighs in Strike 3’s favor. 

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2. Substantive Claims and the Sufficiency of the Complaint

The second and third Eitel factors focus on the merits of the substantive claims and the 

sufficiency of the complaint. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. “Together, these factors require that 

plaintiff assert claims upon which it may recover.” IO Grp., 708 F. Supp. 2d at 989 (citing Philip 

Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 500 (C.D. Cal. 2003)).

Strike 3’s allegations in the First Amended Complaint support its copyright infringement 

claim. It is well-settled that “[t]o establish infringement, two elements must be proven: (1) 

ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are 

original.” Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). In 

addition, direct infringement requires the plaintiff to show causation (also referred to as ‘volitional 

conduct’) by the defendant.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(citation omitted). Strike 3’s FAC alleges that it has registered copyrights in the 12 motion 

pictures now at issue in this motion. ECF No. 17-1. Additionally, Strike 3 alleges that Defendant

willfully copied and distributed the constituent elements of Strike 3’s works using the BitTorrent 

protocol, which it established through IPP’s investigation. ECF No 17-1; FAC ¶ 23. These 

allegations are taken as true where Defendant has failed to respond to them. See TeleVideo Sys.,

826 F.2d at 917–18.

This Court has previously accepted similar claims in default judgment actions. In Cobbler 

Nevada, LLC v. Inglesias, where the plaintiff made similar allegations as Strike 3, the Court held 

that the rightsholder had made its prima facie case for copyright infringement over the BitTorrent 

network. Cobbler Nevada, LLC v. Inglesias, No. 15-CV-05313-EDL, 2016 WL 8453643, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 15-CV-5313 CRB, 2017 WL 

878039 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2017). 

Strike 3’s substantive claim is meritorious, and its complaint is sufficient. Therefore, these 

factors weigh in favor of entry of default judgment.

3. The Sum of Money at Stake in the Action

Under the fourth Eitel factor, “the Court must consider the amount of money at stake in 

relation to the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” Dr. JKL Ltd., v. HPC IT Educ. Ctr., 749 F. 

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Supp. 2d 1038, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). When the amount 

at stake is substantial or unreasonable in light of the allegations in the complaint, default judgment 

is disfavored. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472 (affirming the denial of default judgment where the 

plaintiff sought $3 million in damages and the parties disputed material facts in the pleadings). 

“However, when the sum of money at stake is tailored to the specific misconduct of the defendant, 

default judgment may be appropriate.” Yelp Inc. v. Catron, 70 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 

2014). 

Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504, a copyright owner may elect to recover an award of statutory 

damages in an amount “not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just,” per 

infringed work. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). Moreover, “[i]n a case where the copyright owner 

sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the 

court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than 

$150,000.” Id. (c)(2). Strike 3’s FAC seeks statutory damages under the Copyright Act’s 

statutory damages provision, and the amount at issue therefore consists of discretionary awards 

bounded by statutory minimums and maximums. Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Wong, No. CV 09-1889 

SC, 2010 WL 476685, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)). “The 

discretionary nature of the amount at issue favors default judgment.” Id. (citing Elektra Entm't 

Group, Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005)).

Courts have routinely held that an award of minimum statutory damages is reasonable and 

appropriate. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sanchez, No. C 06-03457JSW, 2007 WL 485955, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007) (“Because plaintiffs seek only the minimum statutory damages available 

under the statute, the request is ascertainable and reasonable.”); Elektra Entm't Grp., Inc. v. Keys, 

No. C 006-2047 SBA, 2007 WL 81912, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2007) (same); Criminal Prods., 

Inc. v. Gunderman, No. C16-1177-RAJ, 2017 WL 3297518, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2017) 

(“[T]he Court remains convinced that the statutory minimum of $750 is the appropriate award in 

this case as to each Defendant.”); Priority Records LLC v. Rodriguez, No. CVF060484AWILJO, 

2007 WL 120033, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2007), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV F 

06-0484AWILJO, 2007 WL 416093 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2007) (“As plaintiffs seek minimum 

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statutory damages [...], their statutory damages request is reasonable and proper.”). “Here, 

[Plaintiff] [is] seeking only the minimum statutory damages. Accordingly, [Plaintiff’s] request for 

statutory damages is reasonable and appropriate in this case.” LaFace Records v. Khan, No. C 08-

1043 PJH (JL), 2008 WL 11395481, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2008), report and recommendation 

adopted, Laface Records, LLC v. Khan, No. C 08-1043 PJH, 2008 WL 11395482 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 

5, 2008). 

Given that Strike 3 seeks only the statutory minimum of $750 per infringed work, this 

factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment. 

4. The Possibility of Dispute Concerning Material Facts

The fifth Eitel factor examines the likelihood of dispute between the parties regarding the 

material facts surrounding the case. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. However, upon entry of default, 

the defendant is “deemed to have admitted all well-pleaded factual allegations” in the complaint. 

DirecTV, 503 F.3d at 851 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)). 

“As explained above, plaintiff has adequately pleaded its claim for copyright infringement. 

Defendant has failed to appear. Thus, the Court accepts the allegations as true. Because 

[Plaintiff’s] factual allegations are presumed true, no factual disputes exist that would preclude the 

entry of default judgment.” Minx Int'l, Inc. v. Rue 21 Inc., No. 215CV05645CASPLAX, 2017 WL 

2961546, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2017); Elektra Entm’t Grp. Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 

393 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Because all allegations in a well-pleaded complaint are taken as true after 

the court clerk enters default judgment, there is no likelihood that any genuine issue of material 

fact exists.”); see Adobe Sys. Inc, No CV. 5:14-02140-RMW, 2016 WL 4728119 at *5 (“There is 

no genuine issue of material fact because the allegations in the complaint are taken as true.”). 

Because the well-pleaded FAC makes a claim for copyright infringement, this factor favors entry 

of default judgment.

5. Whether Default was Due to Excusable Neglect

The sixth Eitel factor examines whether the defendant’s failure to respond to the complaint 

was the result of excusable neglect. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. Here, Strike 3 provided adequate 

notice of this action, see ECF No. 22, yet Defendant made no appearance and failed to respond to 

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the present motion. See S.E.C. v. Internet Sols. for Bus. Inc., 509 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(“A signed return of service constitutes prima facie evidence of valid service which can be 

overcome only by strong and convincing evidence.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Further, there is nothing in the record suggesting this failure is based on excusable neglect. See 

Shanghai Automation, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 1005 (default after proper service was not excusable 

neglect). Thus, this factor supports default judgment.

Indeed, when a Defendant has more than enough time to respond and fails to file an answer 

or appear in the action, it becomes apparent that he is deliberately choosing to not answer. See 

Hearst Holdings, Inc. v. Kim, No. CV074642GAFJWJX, 2008 WL 11336137, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 

Aug. 17, 2008). Accordingly, this factor favors entry of default judgment.

6. Policy Favoring Deciding a Case on its Merits

The last Eitel factor examines whether the policy of deciding a case based on the merits 

precludes entry of default judgment. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. In Eitel, the Ninth Circuit 

admonished that “[c]ases should be decided on their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Id. 

“The existence of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b), however, shows that this policy is not 

dispositive.” McMillan Data Commc’ns, Inc. v. AmeriCom Automation Servs., Inc., 2015 WL 

4380965, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2015) (citing Kloepping v. Fireman’s Fund, 1996 WL 75314, 

at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 1996)). And a defendant’s failure to appear makes a decision on the 

merits impracticable, if not impossible. Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 

1039, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Given Defendant’s failure to respond to service of process or appear in this action, a 

decision on the merits is impracticable. In situations such as this, Rule 55(b) allows the court to 

grant default judgment. 

7. Summary of the Eitel Factors

Based on the analysis above, the undersigned finds each of the Eitel factors weighs in 

favor of granting default judgment. Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the District 

Court GRANT the motion and enter default judgment against Defendant. 

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C. Relief Sought

Once liability is established, the plaintiff seeking default judgment must then establish that 

the requested relief is appropriate. Bay Area Painters v. Alta Specialty, 2008 WL 114931, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008) (citing Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). 

Strike 3 seeks: statutory damages in the amount of $9,000.00, a permanent injunction against 

Defendant downloading or distributing Strike 3’s copyrighted works without a license or express 

grant of permission from Strike 3, and recovery of costs.

1. Damages

The moving party has the burden to “prove up” the amount of damages. United States v. 

Sundberg, 2011 WL 3667458, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011) (citation omitted). Where the 

amount of damages “is liquid or capable of ascertainment from definite figures contained in 

documentary evidence or detailed affidavits, the Court may enter default judgment without a 

hearing on damages.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Pope v. United 

States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944) (“It is a familiar practice and an exercise of judicial power for a court 

upon default, by taking evidence when necessary or by computation from facts of record, to fix the 

amount which the plaintiff is entitled to recover and to give judgment accordingly.”). Similarly, if 

the plaintiff can meet its burden of proving an amount of damages “capable of mathematical 

calculation” through evidence, testimony, or written affidavit, there is no need for an evidentiary 

hearing on damages. Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 1981); Bd. of Trs. of the 

Boilermaker Vacation Trust v. Shelly, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1226 (N.D. Cal. 2005).

It is well-established that under the Copyright Act, “awards of statutory damages serve 

both compensatory and punitive purposes . . . .” Sanrio, Inc. v. Jay Yoon, No. CV 5:10-05930 

EJD, 2012 WL 610451, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2012) (quoting L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters 

Television Intern., Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 1998)). In particular, “[s]tatutory damages are 

particularly appropriate in a case . . . in which defendant has failed to mount any defense or to 

participate in discovery, thereby increasing the difficulty of ascertaining plaintiff's actual 

damages.” Jackson v. Sturkie, 255 F.Supp.2d 1096, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2003). The Copyright Act 

states that, “an infringer of copyright is liable for . . . statutory damages, as provided by subsection 

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(c).” 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2). Subsection (c) goes on to state that a plaintiff may recover “with 

respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually, [. . .] in a sum of not 

less than $750 or more than $30,000” and, if that “infringement was committed willfully, the court 

in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than 

$150,000.” Id. §§ 504(c)(1)–(2).

In regard to allegations of willfulness, they are “deemed to be true on default.” Cobbler 

Nevada, No. CV 15-05313-EDL, 2016 WL 8453643 at *4 (citing Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof 

Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2008)). When it is alleged that a defendant willfully 

infringed a copyrighted work, “the Court must take these allegations as true.” Id. “[A]vailable 

statutory damages range from $750 to $150,000.” Id. In this case, Strike 3 is requesting the 

minimum statutory amount permitted under the Copyright Act - $750 for each work infringed, for 

a total of $9,000.00. Thus, the recovery sought is reasonable.

2. Permanent Injunctive Relief

The Copyright Act authorizes courts to issues permanent injunctions to “prevent or restrain 

infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must 

demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such 

as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 

balance of hardships between plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that 

the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. eBay, Inc. v. 

MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). “As in numerous other BitTorrent cases . . . the 

four elements are established here.” Dallas Buyers Club, LLC v. Bui, No. CV 14-1926-RAJ, 2016 

WL 1242089, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 30, 2016) (citation omitted). 

First, Strike 3 has suffered irreparable harm. Not only has Defendant downloaded Strike 

3’s works, but he has also distributed the works through the BitTorrent network. And, due to the 

nature of BitTorrent, tracing the extent and magnitude of the damage is impossible. There is also 

no way for Strike 3 to know if Defendant continues to distribute Strike 3’s copyrighted motion 

pictures. Cf. Microsoft Corp. v. Big Boy Distribution LLC, 589 F.Supp.2d 1308, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 

2008) (“Generally, a showing of copyright infringement liability and threat of future violations is 

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sufficient to warrant entry of a permanent injunction.”). To that end, monetary relief is inadequate 

because the scope of the damage is far-reaching and ongoing.

Furthermore, Defendant will not suffer a hardship if this permanent injunction is entered 

against him. Strike 3’s injunction seeks to stop Defendant from continuing to download and 

distribute its works without Strike 3’s permission. Since Defendant never had permission or a 

right to do this, he suffers no hardship by entry of a permanent injunction. The injunction does not 

prohibit Defendant from obtaining access to expressive works – it simply requires him to do so 

lawfully. On the other hand, Strike 3’s hardship absent an injunction is significant. Specifically, 

Strike 3 risks having more of its motion pictures distributed over the BitTorrent network wherein 

additional peers download and distribute Strike 3’s motion pictures to additional peers who 

subsequently join. See ME2 Prods., Inc. v. Pagaduan, No. CV 17-00130 SOM-KJM, 2017 WL 

8786920, at *5 (D. Haw. Dec. 29, 2017), report and recommendation adopted as modified, No. 

CV 17-000130 SOM/KJM, 2018 WL 1069463 (D. Haw. Feb. 27, 2018) (“[W]ithout an injunction, 

Defendant will likely be the source for others to repeatedly download the Works.”). 

Finally, the public interest is served by a permanent injunction because Strike 3’s statutory 

right to enforce its copyrights outweighs Defendant’s interest in unlawfully distributing the 

content for free. See e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 

1197, 1222 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (citation omitted) (“The public interest in receiving copyrighted 

content for free is outweighed by the need to incentivize the creation of original works.”); UMG 

Recordings, Inc. v. Blake, No. CV 5:06-00120-BR, 2007 WL 1853956, at *3 (E.D.N.C. June 26, 

2007) (“[T]here is a substantial public interest in preserving a copyright holder's exclusive rights 

and no public interest will be disserved by enjoining Defendant from continuing this activity.”). 

Accordingly, all the foregoing factors make a permanent injunction against Defendant appropriate 

and warranted.

3. Costs 

Under the Copyright Act, “the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs 

by or against any party[.]” 17 U.S.C.A. § 505. The filing fee and service of process fee are 

considered reasonable costs in court cases. Nat’l Photo Grp., LLC v. Pier Corp., No. 

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SACV131165DOCJPRX, 2014 WL 12576641, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2014) (holding that $400 

for the filing fee and $65 for service of process is a reasonable cost). Here, Strike 3 seeks to 

recover only its filing fee in the amount of $400.00 and the cost of $863.66 for service of process. 

These costs are reasonable and should be awarded.2

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the above analysis, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the District Court

GRANT Plaintiff Strike 3 Holdings, LLC’s Motion for Default Judgment and enter judgment 

against [REDACTED]. The undersigned further RECOMMENDS the court issue a permanent 

injunction against [REDACTED]’s downloading or distributing Strike 3’s copyrighted works 

without a license or express grant of permission from Strike 3. The undersigned further 

RECOMMENDS the Court award Strike 3:

(1) Statutory damages in the amount of $9,000.00; 

(3) Court filing fee in the amount of $400.00; and

(4) Service of process cost in the amount of $863.66.

Strike 3 shall serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon [REDACTED] and 

file proof of service thereafter. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 72(b)(2), a party may serve and file any objections within 14 days after being served. 

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

Dated: March 20, 2019

______________________________________

THOMAS S. HIXSON

United States Magistrate Judge

 

2 Strike 3’s proposed order submitted with its motion for default judgment also requests an order 

under 17 U.S.C. § 503(b) requiring Defendant to destroy all copies of Strike 3’s works that he has 

downloaded or transferred to any physical medium or device. ECF No. 29-2. However, Strike 3’s 

memorandum of points and authorities in support of its motion for entry of default judgment 

contains no discussion of the proposed § 503(b) order and no argument concerning why such relief 

is appropriate. Given the lack of any argument in favor of that remedy, the undersigned does not 

recommend issuing a destruction order.

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