Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00670/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00670-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Allan K. Morgal, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV-07-0670-PHX-RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Maricopa County Board of, )

Supervisors, )

)

)

Defendant. ) )

On July 9, 2012, plaintiff filed a “Request for

Discovery[.]” Mot. (Doc. 161). Construing that “Request” as a

motion, this court allowed the defendant to file a response.

Ord. (Doc. 163) at 2:19-22. The defendant timely filed a

response on August 1, 2012 (Doc. 165). Thus, in accordance

with this court’s prior order, plaintiff had “seven (7) days

after service of [that] response, . . . , to file a reply if

he so desire[d][,]” Ord. (Doc. 163) at 2:23-24, or until

August 13, 2012 in computing the time in accordance with

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Plaintiff has not filed a reply and the time

Case 2:07-cv-00670-RCB Document 173 Filed 08/20/12 Page 1 of 4
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to do so has passed. Plaintiff’s discovery motion is thus

ripe for consideration.

The discovery deadline was March 26, 2008 - more than

four years ago. In seeking to re-open discovery after

remand, in September 2011, plaintiff sought, among other

things, to depose Dr. Todd Wilcox, a Medical Director for

Correctional Health Services during the relevant time frame. 

Denying that motion, Magistrate Judge Edward C. Voss,

explained that “[d]epositions of the individuals identified

in Plaintiff’s motion would have been just as relevant early

on in the case as Plaintiff claims they are now.” Ord. (Doc.

133) at 2:12-14. Despite the foregoing, now plaintiff is

seeking to obtain the 2008 deposition of Dr. Todd Wilcox

taken in Graves v. Arpaio, 2:77-cv00479-NVW. Plaintiff

generically refers to a “continuing duty to disclose[,]” but

he offers no specific reason whatsoever as to why he needs to

obtain this deposition. Mot. (doc. 161) at 1. 

 In light of the foregoing, not surprisingly, defendant

responds that plaintiff has not shown good cause for

modification of the scheduling order as Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(4)

requires. See El-Hakem v. BJY Inc., 415 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th

Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)(“A

pretrial order controls the subsequent course of the action

unless modified upon a showing of good cause.”) Under that

Rule, “[t]he focus of inquiry is upon the moving party’s

reasons for seeking modification[]” of the scheduling order. 

C.F. ex rel. Farnan v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 654

F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation

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1 [R]ule 16(b)’s “good cause” standard primarily considers the

diligence of the party seeking the amendment. . . .

Courts within this Circuit have articulated and undertaken [a]

three-step inquiry in resolving the question of ‘diligence’ in the context

of determining good cause under Rule 16[.] . . . Under that inquiry:

[T]o demonstrate diligence under Rule 16's

“good cause” standard, the movant may be 

required to show the following: (1) that 

[ ]he was diligent in assisting the [c]ourt 

in creating a workable Rule 16 order; 

(2) that h[is] noncompliance with a 

Rule 16 deadline occurred or will occur, 

notwithstanding h[is] diligent efforts to 

comply, because of the development of matters 

which could not have been reasonably 

foreseen or anticipated at the time of 

the Rule 16 scheduling conference; and (3) 

that [ ]he was diligent in seeking amendment of 

the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent that 

[ ]he could not comply with the order.

. . . The diligence obligation is ongoing. Parties must diligently attempt

to adhere to that schedule throughout the subsequent course of the

litigation. . . . 

The Ninth Circuit has also recognized that, [t]he district court may

modify the pretrial schedule if it cannot reasonably be met despite the

diligence of the party seeking the extension. . . . By the same token

though, carelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and

offers no reason for a grant of relief. . . . Finally, while the existence

or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification might supply

additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the

moving party's reasons for seeking modification. . . . If that party was not

diligent, the inquiry should end. . . .

Morgal, 2012 WL 2029719, at *6-*7 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).

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marks omitted), cert. denied sub nom. C.F. v. Corbett, ___

U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1566, 182 L.Ed.2d 168 (U.S. Feb. 21,

2012). This court thoroughly discussed the necessary Rule 16

good cause showing in a recent order in this case. See

Morgal v. Maricopa County Bd. of Sup’rs, 2012 WL 2029719, at

*5-*6 (D.Ariz. June 6, 2012). That discussion is

incorporated by reference and set forth below for convenience

sake.1 

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Plaintiff filed the pending discovery motion on July 9,

2012, after this court’s thorough discussion of good cause in

Morgal, 2012 WL 2029719. Ignoring or perhaps overlooking

that discussion, plaintiff makes no attempt at all to satisfy

the legal standards for good cause, and more specifically for

diligence, outlined therein. The only basis for seeking to

obtain Dr. Wilcox’s prior deposition is that he “was the

medical director during the time of the complaint up until

2008.” Mot. (Doc. 161) at 1. Clearly that statement does 

not even come close to satisfying Rule 16(b)(4)’s good cause

standard. Especially after Morgal, 2012 WL 2029719,

plaintiff was fully aware of the legal standards which he

needed to satisfy to obtain relief under Rule 16(b)(4), yet

he made no attempt whatsoever to satisfy those standards. 

Given plaintiff’s complete failure to show diligence so

as to meet the Rule 16(b)(4) good cause standard, and because

the time for discovery in this case has long since passed, 

The court hereby DENIES plaintiff’s “Request for

Discovery” (Doc. 161).

DATED this 20th day of August, 2012.

Copies to counsel of record and plaintiff pro se

Case 2:07-cv-00670-RCB Document 173 Filed 08/20/12 Page 4 of 4