Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_04-cv-00184/USCOURTS-almd-1_04-cv-00184-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 38:4311 Uniformed Service Employment/Reemployment Rights Act

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIE BRINKLEY, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 1:04cv184-T

) (WO)

DIALYSIS CLINIC, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

In this lawsuit, plaintiffs Willie Brinkley, Jerome

Cotton, and Kimberly Bush charge defendant Dialysis

Clinic, Inc. (“DCI”) with violating the Civil Rights Act

of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981; more

specifically, they claim that DCI discharged them because

they are African-American, and Cotton further claims that

DCI refused to give him a lateral transfer because of his

race. Brinkley also claims that DCI discharged him

because of his National Guard membership, in violation of

the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights

Act (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C.A. § 4311. Jurisdiction is

Case 1:04-cv-00184-MHT-VPM Document 68 Filed 11/04/05 Page 1 of 33
2

proper under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (civil rights), 38

U.S.C.A. § 4323(b) (USERRA), and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1331

(federal claims).

This case is currently before the court on DCI’s

motion for summary judgment. For the reasons detailed

below, summary judgment is granted as to the race

discrimination claims and denied as to Brinkley’s USERRA

claim.

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under Rule 56,

the party seeking summary judgment must first inform the

court of the basis for the motion, and the burden then

shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate why summary

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3

judgment would not be proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of

Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (11th Cir. 1993)

(discussing burden-shifting under Rule 56). The nonmoving party must affirmatively set forth specific facts

showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon

the mere allegations or denials in the pleadings. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The court's role at the summary-judgment stage is not

to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the

matter, but rather to determine only whether a genuine

issue exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In doing so, the court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Case 1:04-cv-00184-MHT-VPM Document 68 Filed 11/04/05 Page 3 of 33
1. Plaintiffs’ brief in opposition to defendant’s

motion for summary judgment (Doc No. 40), Exhibit 1,

Deposition of Willie Brinkley, pp. 22-23.

2. Id. at p. 89.

4

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

What follow are Brinkley’s, Cotton’s, and Bush’s

versions of the facts regarding their treatment while

employees at DCI’s Dothan, Alabama clinic and their

subsequent discharges during the company’s reduction-inforce beginning in the summer of 2002. 

Brinkley: He was hired by DCI’s technical department

around June 1999 as a part-time technician.1

Subsequently, he worked 40-hour weeks, even though he

simultaneously attended school, maintained another job

during most of his employment with DCI, and was active in

the National Guard, which required that he attend drills

every other weekend. 

While employed at DCI, Brinkley and other black

employees were forced to do most of the patient lifting

while white employees sat and joked about it;2

 white

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3. Id. at p. 96.

4. Id. at pp. 99-100, 109.

5. Id. at pp. 86-88.

5

employees ate their lunches together and refused to

relinquish their seats for Brinkley and other black

employees to eat;3

 and Brinkley inquired about, but was

not allowed to attend, training school before his

discharge.4

In 2002, because of poor financial performance and

overstaffing at the Dothan clinic, DCI initiated layoffs. But prior to any lay-offs, all the technical

employees’ hours were cut. Brinkley’s hours were cut

considerably more than his co-workers.5

Kyle Weaver was tasked with conducting lay-offs in

the technical department, where Brinkley, Cotton, and

five other employees worked. Temporary and part-time

employees were to be terminated first, and, if necessary,

employees with less seniority, ability, and

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6. Id. at p. 72. In his affidavit, Weaver does not

list Brinkley’s military status as one of the factors he

considered in discharging Brinkley. Defendant’s

submission of evidentiary material in support of its

motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 33), Exhibit 8,

Affidavit of Kyle Weaver, p. 5. Nevertheless, at the

summary-judgment stage the court will assume that

Brinkley’s version of his conversation with Weaver is

true. 

6

qualifications to perform the essential functions of the

department were next in line. 

Three employees were discharged in the first round:

Brinkley on February 1, 2003, and two white employees on

February 23 and March 2. This left four employees: two

whites and two blacks, including Cotton. 

Weaver stated that his decision to discharge Brinkley

was because of Brinkley’s school and work commitments and

because of “the world situation with the war and

everything, the fact that [Brinkley] can be called up.”6

Cotton: He took a part-time position in August 2001.

After approximately three or four months he became a

full-time technician. 

Case 1:04-cv-00184-MHT-VPM Document 68 Filed 11/04/05 Page 6 of 33
7. Plaintiffs’ brief in opposition to defendant’s ,

motion for summary judgment (Doc No. 40), Exhibit 2,

Deposition of Jerome Cotton, p. 59. 

8. Id. at p. 66.

7

During Cotton’s tenure at DCI, Weaver did not engage

in pleasantries with black employees.7

 Gill Lawson,

Brinkley and Cotton’s supervisor, referred to Cotton as

“Boy,” “Jethro,” and “Leroy.”8

 Like Brinkley, Cotton

requested and was denied training opportunities. 

In the summer of 2003, a vacancy occurred for a

technician in the nursing department. Jeremy Strickland,

one of the two remaining white employees, transferred to

the position. Thereafter, Cotton had one white and one

black co-worker who had survived the lay-offs. 

On October 24, 2003, Cotton was discharged. 

In February and July 2004, the technical department

hired two new technicians. 

Bush: She joined the DCI’s nursing department as a

technician around July 2001. After approximately a

month, she changed positions to a hybrid placement that

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9. Id., Exhibit 3, Deposition of Kimberly Bush, pp.

13-15.

10. Id. at p. 23.

11. Id. at p. 61

12. Defendant’s submission of evidentiary material

in support of its motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

33), Exhibit 4, Affidavit of Mona Gautney, p. 2; Exhibit

8, Affidavit of Kyle Weaver, p.3.

8

included, among other duties, working as a laboratory

technician, a unit clerk, and a medical records

assistant.9

 

While employed at DCI, she was disciplined for using

her cell phone inside the facilities; some white

employees were not.10 

On or about August 8, 2002, Bush was terminated. A

short time later, DCI put an advertisement in the

newspaper for a laboratory technician position.11 DCI

hired Sandy Ingram, a white person, to cover for a

receptionist who had become ill on August 19, 2002.12 A

DCI patient informed Bush that Ingram was working in the

laboratory where Bush previously worked. 

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III. DISCUSSION

Brinkley, Cotton, and Bush assert that they were

discharged because of their race, in violation of § 1981.

Cotton also asserts a failure-to-transfer claim under

this provision. Finally, Brinkley asserts a USERRA claim

that his military status was an additional improper

motive for his termination. The court will first address

the § 1981 claims and then move on to the USERRA claim.

A. § 1981 Claims

Section 1981 prohibits employers from engaging in

intentional racial discrimination. General Bldg.

Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391

(1982); Brown v. American Honda Motor Co., 939 F.2d 946,

948 (11th Cir. 1991). When, as in this case, the

plaintiffs offer circumstantial evidence to establish a

disparate-treatment claim, the court assesses the

sufficiency of the proffered evidence using the burdenshifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp.

Case 1:04-cv-00184-MHT-VPM Document 68 Filed 11/04/05 Page 9 of 33
10

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 

Under the McDonnell Douglas approach, the plaintiffs

have the initial burden of establishing a prima-facie

case of unlawful discrimination by a preponderance of the

evidence. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. A primafacie case requires "evidence adequate to create an

inference that an employment decision was based on a[n]

[illegal] discriminatory criterion." Int’l Brotherhood

of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977).

A prima-facie case raises a presumption of illegal

discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (1981); Chapman

v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (en

banc). 

However, the establishment of a prima-facie case does

not, in itself, entitle the plaintiffs to defeat a

summary-judgment motion. Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co.,

821 F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir. 1987). If they establish a

prima-facie case, the burden then shifts to DCI to rebut

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11

the presumption by articulating a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action.

Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 (11th Cir. 1997).

"This intermediate burden is 'exceedingly light.'" Id.

(quoting Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 36 F.3d 1057, 1061

(11th Cir. 1994)). DCI has a burden of production, not

persuasion, and does not have to persuade a court that it

was actually motivated by the reason advanced. Burdine,

450 U.S. at 254, 258. 

Once DCI satisfies this burden of production, the

presumption of discrimination is eliminated and the

plaintiffs have the opportunity to come forward with

evidence, including the previously produced evidence

establishing the prima-facie case, sufficient to permit

a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the reasons

given by the employer were not the real reasons for the

adverse employment decision. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024.

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12

(1) Discriminatory-Discharge Claims

One important point needs to be made at the outset.

Brinkley, Cotton, and Bush do not challenge DCI’s

decision to conduct a reduction in force; they admit that

financial circumstance warranted one. Their challenge is

solely to DCI’s decisions to select them for discharge as

a part of that reduction.

There are several ways to establish a prima-facie

case of discrimination. Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d

1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 1999); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall

Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 1984).

All parties agree that one method of establishing a

discriminatory discharge claim during a reduction-inforce is to show that the plaintiffs (1) were members of

a protected class; (2) were discharged; and (3) were

qualified for their own position or to assume another

position at the time of their discharge, along with (4)

some additional evidence that would allow a reasonable

fact finder to conclude that the employer intended to

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13

discriminate in making the discharge decision. Benson v.

Tocco, Inc., 113 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 1997). 

As a general principle, “demonstrating a prima facie

case is not onerous.” Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562.

Neither party disputes that there is sufficient evidence

to establish the first two elements of the prima-facie

test, namely that Brinkley, Cotton, and Bush were

protected African-American employees who were discharged

from DCI. Additionally, because Brinkley, Cotton, and

Bush assert much of the same evidence in the prima-facie

and pretext stages of the burden-shifting framework, this

court will assume that they have presented a prima-facie

case and proceed directly to the second and third prongs

of the McDonnell Douglas test.

Brinkley: DCI has articulated a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for Brinkley’s discharge.

Specifically, DCI asserts that Brinkley was discharged,

as part of a reduction-in-force, because DCI believed him

to be a part-time employee. 

Case 1:04-cv-00184-MHT-VPM Document 68 Filed 11/04/05 Page 13 of 33
13. Plaintiffs’ brief also asserts that Lawson “gave

black people nicknames such as doofus, LeRoy, and boy.”

Plaintiffs’ brief in opposition to defendant’s motion

for summary judgment (Doc No. 40), p. 5. However, this

assertion mischaracterizes Brinkley’s deposition

testimony, which states that Lawson gave “people

nicknames, like Doofus, Jethro, that kind of thing” and

in which Brinkley specifically noted that he did not

recall Lawson ever making any racially offensive or

inappropriate remarks. Id., Exhibit 1, Deposition of

Willie Brinkley, pp. 49-50.

14

Because DCI has meet its burden of production,

Brinkley must show that DCI’s reason is pretextual.

Brinkley provides the following evidence to support his

claim that DCI’s stated reason for discharging him is

pretext: (1) DCI’s refusal to send him to training

school; (2) DCI’s practice of forcing black employees to

do disproportionate patient lifting; (3) DCI’s hiring of

new employees after Brinkley’s discharge; (4) white DCI

employees’ reluctance to eat lunch with black employees;

and (5) DCI’s incorrect characterization of him as a

part-time employee.13

First, Brinkley argues that his lack of training is

indicative of DCI’s intent to discriminate against him

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14. Brinkley does not contend that this lack of

training constitutes an independent failure to train

case. See, e.g. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312

F.3d 645 (4th Cir. 2002). 

15. Plaintiffs’ brief in opposition to defendant’s

motion for summary judgment (Doc No. 40), Exhibit 1,

(continued...)

15

during its reduction-in-force.14 This court has

previously found that the failure to train an employee in

a discriminatory promotion context can give rise to an

inference of discrimination where the defendant has

“purposefully allowed one potential candidate, but not

the other, to be trained in the skills necessary for

advancement.” Floyd v. Elmore County Bd. Of Educ., 322

F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1304 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.).

Here, Brinkley’s African-American co-worker received the

training, belying the contention that race was driving

the training allocation decisions. Additionally, the two

white employees laid-off around the same time as Brinkley

also did not have access to the training in question.

Accordingly, DCI’s refusal to provide Brinkley with

training opportunities afforded some other employees15

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15. (...continued)

Deposition of Willie Brinkley, pp. 88, 109-110. 

16

does not support an inference that DCI purposefully

availed white employees of training denied their AfricanAmerican co-workers, rending the latter group more

vulnerable to discharge. But most importantly, Brinkley

has not shown that the training he was denied

specifically addressed those abilities that were

important in the selection of those for discharge, or, in

other words, that but for his lack of training on certain

abilities he would not have been selected for discharge.

Second, Brinkley’s contention that he, instead of a

white employee, Rodney Brasington, did most of the

patient lifting also fails to support an inference of

discrimination surrounding Brinkley’s discharge. Before

making a comparison of Brinkley’s lifting duties with

those of Brasington, Brinkley must first show that he and

Brasington were “similarly situated in all relevant

respects.” Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562. Brinkley and

Brasington did not have the same jobs. Brasington worked

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16. Id. at pp. 27, 89 

17. Id. at p. 109

18. Id. at pp. 129-130.

17

in reuse,16 a position Brinkley desired but was not

permitted to do.17 But more importantly, Brinkley has not

shown how patient lifting had anything to do, one way or

the other, with his selection for discharge.

Third, Brinkley saw a job advertisement in the

newspaper and was informed by his previous patients that

DCI continued to hire employees following his lay-off.18

There is not “any added burden on employers to ... rehire

laid-off workers in the protected [class] as a matter of

course.” James v. Arrow Co., 75 F.3d 1528, 1532-33 (11th

Cir. 1996). However, a discharged employ “who applies

for a job for which [he] is qualified and which is

available at the time of [his] termination must be

considered for that job along with other candidates, and

cannot be denied the position based on [his protected

status].” Id. at 1533. 

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19. Id.

18

Brinkley does not provide any evidence regarding who

the new employees were, when they were hired, or what

positions they filled.19 DCI admits to hiring two new

employees in the technical department in February and

July 2004. However, this was long after Brinkley was

discharged and there is no evidence that Brinkley applied

for these positions despite their posting in the local

newspapers. Therefore, even assuming that these new

employees were not members of the protected class, which

is not clear from the record, this evidence is

insufficient to draw an inference of discrimination. 

Fourth, Brinkley alleges that Lawson and other white

employees would take their lunch first and refuse to make

room for black employees to join them. Generally, the

words or conduct of non-decisionmakers, or of

decisionmakers unrelated to the decisionmaking process,

will not satisfy the employee’s burden. Steger v. Gen.

Elec. Co, 318 F.3d 1066, 1079 (11th Cir. 2003); Rojas v.

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20. Defendant’s submission of evidentiary material

in support of its motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

33), Addendum to Exhibit 1, Employee Appraisals of Willie

Brinkley.

21. Id., Exhibit 6, Affidavit of Gill Lawson, p. 4.

19

State of Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2002);

Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321, 1323

(11th Cir. 1998). There is no evidence that Lawson was

a decisionmaker with regard to the lay-offs, and to the

extent Lawson may have indirectly influenced Weaver’s

decisions by completing Brinkley’s employee evaluations,

there is no evidence that Weaver actually consulted these

evaluations or that the evaluations rated Brinkley as

anything other than a good or excellent employee.20

Lawson’s actions cannot be attributed to Weaver, the

actual decisionmaker. 

That being said, Lawson did exercise direct input into

the hiring decisions following the lay-offs.21

Nevertheless, this court has previously stated that DCI

had no affirmative duty to rehire laid-off employees as

well as concluded that Brinkley has provided insufficient

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20

evidence regarding the post-lay-off hiring decisions to

draw an inference of discrimination. Furthermore,

Lawson’s choice of lunch companions is not related to his

post-lay-off hiring choices. This court cannot find that

Lawson’s participation in a segregated lunch table, alone,

establishes pretext with regard to Brinkley’s discharge.

Fifth, Brinkley contends that DCI’s belief that he

remained a part-time employee at the time of his discharge

is erroneous. While this court accepts as true Brinkley’s

version of the facts regarding his full-time status, it

must be emphasized that this court is not in the position

to determine whether the criteria DCI used to discharge

Brinkley were “prudent or fair.” Damon v. Flemming

Supermarkets of Florida Inc., 106 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th

Cir. 1999). Rather, this court’s “sole concern is weather

unlawful discriminatory animus motivate[d],” id., DCI’s

determination that Brinkley was a part-time employee.

Brinkley’s subjective belief that DCI’s determination that

he was a part time employee is erroneous is not enough to

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22. Id., Affidavit of Kyle Weaver, p. 7.

21

carry the day, and Brinkley has not shown that the

criteria DCI used in determining he was a part-time

employee were applied differently to a white employee.

DCI is entitled to summary judgment on Brinkley’s

§ 1981 discharge claim. 

Cotton: DCI’s decision to lay-off Cotton rather than

a white employee with necessary skills not possessed by

Cotton or a more senior black employee with a broader

range of abilities and experiences meets DCI’s

intermediate burden of production.22

The burden therefore shifts back to Cotton to provide

evidence indicating that DCI’s asserted reasons are

pretextual. Cotton supplies the following evidence of

racial discrimination to illustrate pretext: (1) DCI’s

failure to provide him with training; (2) Lawson’s use of

“Boy,” “Jethro,” and “Leroy” to refer to him; (3) DCI’s

hiring of non-protected employees after his dismissal; and

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22

(4) Weaver’s refusal to engage in pleasantries with black

employees.

First, the court has already addressed the failure-totrain allegation. The court’s reasoning applies even more

strongly in this instance because one of the employees

Cotton was directly competing against to retain his job

was an African-American employee who had received the

training. Second, the previous analysis finding that

Lawson was not a decisionmaker is applicable here to find

that Lawson’s comments are insufficient to establish

pretext. Third, Cotton has failed to provide the

necessary information regarding the employees hired by DCI

after his discharge to establish an inference of

discrimination. Finally, Cotton’s contention that Weaver

did not engage in pleasantries will not suffice to show

pretext. Cotton has not provided sufficient detail about

this allegation from which this court can draw an

inference that this lack of conversation informed Weaver’s

discharge decisions. 

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23. Id. at 23.

23

DCI’s motion for summary judgment will be granted on

Cotton’s claim.

Bush: DCI’s assertion that Bush’s job was eliminated

for financial reasons satisfies DCI’s burden of

production.

Bush argues that racial discrimination was the true

motivation for DCI’s decision to discharge her because (1)

she was disciplined for using her cell phone when white

employees were not and (2) DCI hired a white employee to

fill a position encompassing some of her former duties. 

First, Bush’s contention that DCI disciplined her for

using her cell phone without disciplining non-protected

employees for the same conduct cannot satisfy Bush’s

burden. Aside from the fact that the two white employees

Bush compares herself to did not even hold Bush’s job

title,23 see Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079,

1091 (11th Cir. 2004) (comparators “must be nearly

identical” to plaintiff “to prevent courts from secondCase 1:04-cv-00184-MHT-VPM Document 68 Filed 11/04/05 Page 23 of 33
24. Id.

24

guessing a reasonable decision by the employer”), Bush

does not know whether the supervisor who disciplined her

was aware that her two alleged comparators had also used

their phones inside.24 But more importantly, Bush has not

shown how her cell-phone use played any role in the

elimination of her job. Bush cannot make out pretext

based on this evidence. 

Second, Bush’s assertion that she was replaced by a

white person cannot establish pretext because Bush has not

produced sufficient evidence to support this claim. Bush

is unaware of the position the non-protected employee,

Sandy Ingram, was hired to fill or if Ingram conducted any

of the non-laboratory tasks Bush performed while at DCI.

Further, Bush cannot show that, for racial reasons,

DCI failed to consider her for the position filled by

Ingram. First, Bush does not provide evidence that she

applied for the position, which DCI advertised in the

paper; she states that she is unsure if she spoke with DCI

Case 1:04-cv-00184-MHT-VPM Document 68 Filed 11/04/05 Page 24 of 33
25. Id. at pp. 55-57. DCI alleges that Bush never

applied for the position. Defendant’s submission of

evidentiary material in support of its motion for summary

judgment (Doc. No. 33), Exhibit 8, Affidavit of Kyle

Weaver, p. 3. 

25

staff about the posting.25 See James v. Arrow Co., 75 F.3d

1528, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1996) (there is not “any added

burden on employers to ... rehire laid-off workers in the

protected [class] as a matter of course”). Second, there

is insufficient information about Ingram’s job to

determine if Bush was qualified for it. DCI alleges that

they hired Ingram to fill in as a receptionist, and there

is no evidence that Bush ever held a receptionist

position. Third, the position Ingram filled was not

available until after Bush’s discharge. 

DCI is also entitled to summary judgment on Bush’s

claim. 

(2) Failure-to-Transfer Claim

Cotton contends that, because of his relative

seniority, he, instead of Jeremy Strickland, should have

Case 1:04-cv-00184-MHT-VPM Document 68 Filed 11/04/05 Page 25 of 33
26. Plaintiffs’ brief in opposition to defendant’s

motion for summary judgment (Doc No. 40), Exhibit 3,

Deposition of Jerome Cotton, pp. 72, 87.

26

been transferred to an open-patient-care position

approximately two months before his discharge.26 Cotton’s

argument is without merit because he has not shown that he

sought the position at issue. See James, 75 F.3d at 1532-

33. 

Cotton argues that he did not express interest in the

position because he was not aware of it until after it was

filled because DCI did not internally post its

availability. Nevertheless, when an employer has

publicized an open position, the onus is on the employee

to apply. DCI placed advertisements for its job openings

in the local newspaper. Therefore, Cotton was provided

with notice of the open position and his failure to show

any interest in the position defeats any inference that

the transfer decision was fueled by racial animus.

DCI’s motion for summary judgment is granted on

Cotton’s failure-to-transfer claim. 

Case 1:04-cv-00184-MHT-VPM Document 68 Filed 11/04/05 Page 26 of 33
27. USERRA states, in pertinent part: 

“(a) A person who is a member of,

applies to be a member of, performs, has

performed, applies to perform, or has an

obligation to perform service in a

uniformed service shall not be denied

initial employment, reemployment,

retention in employment, promotion, or

any benefit of employment by an employer

on the basis of that membership,

application for membership, performance

of service, application for service, or

obligation.

“(b) An employer may not discriminate in

employment against or take any adverse

employment action against any person

because such person (1) has taken an

action to enforce a protection afforded

any person under this chapter, (2) has

testified or otherwise made a statement

in or in connection with any proceeding

under this chapter, (3) has assisted or

otherwise participated in an

investigation under this chapter, or (4)

has exercised a right provided for in

this chapter.

(continued...)

27

B. USERRA

Congress enacted USERRA to prohibit employment

discrimination on the basis of military service.27 Coffman

Case 1:04-cv-00184-MHT-VPM Document 68 Filed 11/04/05 Page 27 of 33
27. (...continued)

“(c) An employer shall be considered to

have engaged in actions prohibited–

“(1) under subsection (a), if the

person's membership, application for

membership, service, application for

service, or obligation for service in

the uniformed services is a motivating

factor in the employer's action, unless

the employer can prove that the action

would have been taken in the absence of

such membership, application for

membership, service, application for

service, or obligation for service; or

“(2) under subsection (b), if the

person's (A) action to enforce a

protection afforded any person under

this chapter, (B) testimony or making of

a statement in or in connection with any

proceeding under this chapter, (C)

assistance or other participation in an

investigation under this chapter, or (D)

exercise of a right provided for in this

chapter, is a motivating factor in the

employer's action, unless the employer

can prove that the action would have

been taken in the absence of such

person's enforcement action, testimony,

statement, assistance, participation, or

exercise of a right.”

38 U.S.C.A. § 4311.

28

v. Chugach Support Servs, Inc., 411 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th

Cir. 2005). To succeed on an USERRA claim, Brinkley must

Case 1:04-cv-00184-MHT-VPM Document 68 Filed 11/04/05 Page 28 of 33
29

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his

military service motivated DCI’s decision to discharge

him. Id. at 1238; see also Harris v. City of Montgomery,

322 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1324 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson,

J.). A motivating factor need not be the sole reason

Brinkley was discharged, but it must be “one of the

factors ‘that a truthful employer would list if asked for

the reasons for its decision.’” Coffman, 411 F.3d at 1238

(quoting Brandsasse v. City of Suffolk, VA, 72 F. Supp. 2d

608, 617 (E.D. Va. 1999)) (citation omitted). Brinkley’s

military status “is a motivating factor if [DCI] relied

on, took into account, considered, or conditioned its

decision on that consideration. Id. Here, Brinkley has

met that burden because he has presented direct evidence

that Weaver considered his military status when

discharging him. 

The burden then shifts to DCI to “prove, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the action would have

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28. This procedural framework is "different from ...

McDonnell Douglas. ... McDonnell Douglas, while

allocating the burden of production of evidence, does not

shift the burden of persuasion to the employer. ... [I]n

USERRA actions there must be an initial showing by the

employee that military status was at least a motivating

or substantial factor in the agency action, upon which

the agency must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence

that the action would have been taken despite the

protected status." Sheehan v. Dept. of Navy, 240 F.3d

1009, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 

29. Defendant’s submission of evidentiary material

in support of its motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

33), Exhibit 8, Affidavit of Kyle Weaver, p. 5. 

30. Plaintiffs’ brief in opposition to defendant’s

(continued...)

30

been taken despite [Brinkley’s] protected status.” Id.28

DCI asserts that Brinkley was discharged as part of the

reduction-in-force because they believed him to be a parttime employee. The evidence indicates that Weaver based

his opinion that Brinkley was a part-time employee on

several factors including that Brinkley: (1) applied and

was hired for a part-time position; (2) attended school;

(3) continued to work elsewhere during most of his

employment at DCI;29 and (4) could be called up for

military service.30 

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30. (...continued)

motion for summary judgment (Doc No. 40), Exhibit 1,

Deposition of Willie Brinkley, p. 72.

31. There is also a question as to whether there are

records to support DCI’s calculations of the hours

Brinkley worked.

31

First, Brinkley hotly disputes that he was a part-time

employee, contending that he worked a full 40-hour week

before DCI initiated its reduction-in-force program.

Moreover, it appears that a critical factor in Weaver’s

characterization of Brinkley as a part-time employee, and,

more importantly, in Weaver’s reduction of Brinkley’s

hours (so as arguably to render him a part-time employee),

was that Brinkley was in the military. And, lastly, there

is the question of whether Weaver chose Brinkley for

discharge earlier than other employees because Brinkley

was in the military.31

There is a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether Brinkley was discharged when he was discharged

because of his military service. 

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32

DCI’s motion for summary judgment will be denied on

Brinkley’s USERRA claim.

For the above reasons, it is therefore ORDERED as

follows:

(1) Defendant Dialysis Clinic, Inc.s' motion for

summary judgment (Doc. No. 31) is granted as to plaintiffs

Willie Brinkley, Jerome Cotton, and Kimberly Bush’s 42

U.S.C.A. § 1981 claims and denied as to plaintiff

Brinkley’s 38 U.S.C.A. § 4311 claim.

(2) Judgment is entered in favor of defendant

Dialysis Clinic, Inc. and against plaintiffs Brinkley,

Cotton, and Bush on their 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 claims, with

plaintiffs Brinkley, Cotton, and Bush taking nothing by

said claims.

It is further ORDERED that this case will proceed to

jury trial solely on plaintiff Brinkley’s 38 U.S.C.A.

§ 4311 claim.

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The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to enter this

document on the civil docket as a final judgment pursuant

to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

DONE, this the 4th day of November, 2005.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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