Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01831/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01831-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KHAWAJA M. SIDIQI

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 14-cv-1831-H (BGS)

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

E. VALENZUELA, Warden,

Respondent.

On August 4, 2014, Petitioner Khawaja M. Sidiqi (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) On October 17, 2014, Respondent filed a response to the petition.

(Doc. No. 7-1.) On February 12, 2015, Petitioner filed a traverse. (Doc. No. 12.) On

February 17, 2015, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation to deny

the petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. No. 13.) On March 26, 2015, Petitioner

filed an objection to the report and recommendation. (Doc. No. 14.) After careful

consideration, the Court denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus, overrules

Petitioner’s objection, and adopts the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. 

/ / /

/ / /

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Background

I. Procedural History

On April 22, 2010, the San Diego District Attorney’s Office filed an information

charging Petitioner with one count of carjacking in violation of California Penal Code

(PenalCode) § 215(a). (Doc. No. 8-1 at 74.) The District Attorney’s Office also alleged

that Petitioner used a deadly and dangerous weapon during the commission of the

carjacking in violation of Penal Code § 12022(b)(1) and § 1192.7(c)(23). (Id.) Before

trial, Petitioner rejected the District Attorney’s offer for a plea bargain that would have

resulted in a three-year sentence. (Doc. No. 8-29 at 52.)

On September 22, 2010, a jury in San Diego Superior Court convicted Petitioner

of carjacking. (Id. at 52.) The jury also found that Petitioner used a deadly weapon in

the commission of a felony. (Id.) The superior court sentenced Petitioner to an

aggregate prison term ofsix years, consisting of a five-year sentence for the carjacking

conviction plus a consecutive one-year term for use of a deadly weapon during the

commission of a felony. (Id. at 69, Doc. No. 8-10 at 2.) Petitioner appealed his

conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One.

(Doc. No. 8-7.) The state appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. (Doc. No.

8-10.) 

On December 27, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in San

Diego Superior Court. (Doc. No. 8-13.) Petitioner contended that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to inform him that the prosecution allegedly offered Petitioner

a plea bargain that would have resulted in a two-year sentence. (Doc. No. 8-13 at 4.)

On December 6, 2013, the San Diego Superior Court held a post-conviction evidentiary

hearing to determine whether the District Attorney’s Office made Petitioner a plea offer

for a two-year sentence. (Doc. No. 8-29.) After hearing testimony, the superior court

concluded that the District Attorney’s Office did not make a plea offer for a two-year

sentence. (Id. at 52.) On December 6, 2013, the San Diego Superior Court denied

Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Id. at 54.) 

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On March 4, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

state appellate court. (Doc. No. 8-34.) On April 8, 2014, the state appellate court denied

the petition. In a reasoned opinion, the state appellate court took judicial notice of the

evidentiary hearing and concluded that the prosecution never offered Petitioner a plea

bargain for a two-year sentence. (Doc. No. 8-35.) On April 21, 2014, Petitioner filed

a habeas corpus petition with the California Supreme Court. On June 18, 2014, the

California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition. (Doc. No. 8-37). 

On July 2, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpusin this Court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner again asserts that his trial

counsel wasineffective for failing to informhimthat the prosecution offered Petitioner

a plea bargain that would have resulted in a two-year sentence. (Id. at 6.) 

II. Factual History

The Court summarizes the following relevant facts from the California Court of

Appeal opinion affirming Petitioner’s direct appeal of his conviction. (See Doc. No.

8-10.) This Court, pursuant to § 2254(e)(1), presumesthe following facts to be correct. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Petitioner was 24 years old at the time of the offense. Petitioner legally

immigrated fromAfghanistan to the United Statesin 2000. Around 10:30 p.m. on April

5, 2010, Petitioner entered a cab. During the initial encounter with the cab driver,

Petitioner hid his left hand behind his back. The cab driver twice asked Petitioner what

was behind his back. Eventually, Petitioner lifted his shirt. A 10 to 12-inch bladed

knife slid onto the street. The cab driver identified the knife in a photograph at trial. 

The cab driver exited the cab. He stood outside of the left rear passenger door

where Petitioner remained seated. The cab driver asked Petitioner what he was

planning to do with the knife. Petitioner suddenly exited the cab, picked up the knife,

and “raged” at the cab driver who was standing five feet away from Petitioner.

Petitioner held his left hand “up in an attack.” As the cab driver retreated, Petitioner

told him he had “better run” because the cab driver “[didn’t] want to be a part of what

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was going on tonight.” 

Petitioner ran back to the cab and sat in the driver’s seat. The cab driver watched

from less than 20 feet away as Petitioner drove off in the cab. The cab driver’s

backpack, paper work, cell phone, and wallet remained in the cab with Petitioner.

After Petitioner drove away, the cab driver borrowed a phone to call 911. A San

Diego County Sheriff’s Deputy responded to the reported carjacking. After

interviewing the cab driver, the deputy put out a broadcast describing the suspect and

the stolen cab. About 30 to 40 minutes later, a police officer located the suspect and

cab. The deputy drove the cab driver to Petitioner’s location, where he identified

Petitioner as the man who stole his cab. A search of the cab revealed a knife.

At trial, Petitioner did not testify on his own behalf or present any evidence.

(Doc. No. 8-10 at 6.) A jury in San Diego Superior Court convicted Petitioner of one

count of carjacking and found true allegations that he personally used a deadly and

dangerous weapon. (Id. at 2.) The superior court sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate

prison termofsix years, consisting of a five-year sentence for the carjacking conviction

plus a consecutive one-year term for use of a deadly weapon during the commission of

a felony. (Id.)

Discussion

I. Standard of Review

A federal court may review a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to a state court judgment “only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(a); accord Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000). Habeas corpus

is an “extraordinary remedy” available only to those “persons whom society has

grievously wronged . . . .” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633-34 (1993)). Because Petitioner

filed this petition after April 24, 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs the petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327

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(1997); Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). “When a

federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief,

it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the

absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Id. 

Federal habeas relief is available only if the result reached by the state court on the

merits is “contrary to,” or “an unreasonable application” of United States Supreme

Court precedent, or if the adjudication is “an unreasonable determination” based on the

facts and evidence. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(d)(2).

A federal court may grant habeas relief under the “contrary to” clause of

§ 2254(d)(1) if a state court either “applies a rule that contradictsthe governing law set

forth in [the United States Supreme Court’s] cases” or “confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at

a result different from [the Court’s] precedent.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002);

see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06 (distinguishing the “contrary to” and the

“unreasonable application” standards). “[R]eview under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is

limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the

merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).

A federal court may grant habeas relief under the “unreasonable application”

clause of § 2254(d)(1) if the state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from

[the Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular

state prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. A federal court may also grant

habeas relief “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from

[Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where itshould not apply or unreasonably

refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id. The state

court’s “unreasonable application” of binding precedent must be objectively

unreasonable to the extent that the state court decision is more than merely incorrect

or erroneous. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (citation omitted); see

also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003).

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Additionally, even if a state court decision is “contrary to” United States

Supreme Court precedent or rests on an “unreasonable determination” of facts in light

of the evidence, the petitioner must show thatsuch error caused substantial or injurious

prejudice. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at

637-38); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d

964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000). AEDPA creates a highly deferential standard toward state

court rulings. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).

In determining whether a state court decision is contrary to clearly established

federal law, the district court looks to the state’s last reasoned decision. Avila v.

Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where there is an unexplained decision

from the state’s highest court, the district court “looks through” to the last reasoned

state judgment and presumesthat the unexplained opinion rests upon the same ground.

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). 

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party objects

to any portion of the magistrate’s report, the district court reviews de novo those

portions of the report. Id.

II. Analysis

Petitioner contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by

failing to inform him of a plea bargain that would have resulted in a two-year sentence. 

(Doc. No. 1 at 6.) Respondent asserts that Petitioner’s claim lacks merit because the

superior court held an evidentiary hearing and determined that the District Attorney’s

office never made Petitioner an offer for a plea deal that would have resulted in a twoyear sentence. (Doc. No. 7-1 at 10.)

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to effective

assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-86 (1984). To

establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show his attorney’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688. He must

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also show that the errors caused him prejudice. Id. at 694. To establish prejudice, a

petitioner must demonstrate that the attorney’s error rendered the result unreliable or

the trial fundamentally unfair. Id.; see also Fretwell v. Lockhart, 506 U.S. 364, 372

(1993). The Court need not address both the deficiency prong and the prejudice prong

if the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing of either one. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 697.

The Strickland test applies to claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel

stemming from a defense counsel’s failure to communicate a formal plea offer to a

defendant. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408-09 (2012) (holding that defense

counsel has a duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution). To prove

deficiency, a petitioner must show that defense counsel failed to make a meaningful

attempt to inform him of a plea offer before the offer expires. Id. at 1410. To prove

prejudice, a petitioner must “demonstrate a reasonable probability [he] would have

accepted the earlier plea offer had [he] been afforded effective assistance of counsel.” 

Id. at 1409. 

Petitioner claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him that

the prosecution supposedly offered Petitioner a plea offer that would have resulted in

a two-year sentence. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) Petitioner raised this claim in his habeas corpus

petition filed in San Diego Superior Court. (Doc. No. 8-13.) The superior court held an

evidentiary hearing to determine if the prosecution ever offered Petitioner a plea deal

that would have resulted in a two-year sentence. (Doc. No. 8-29.) 

At the evidentiary hearing, the superior court heard testimony from Petitioner

and his trial counsel. (Id.) Trial counsel testified that during a conference on April 19,

2010, the prosecutor offered to drop the use of a weapon allegation in exchange for

Petitioner pleading guilty to carjacking and accepting a three-year sentence. (Id. at 20.) 

Trial counsel testified that he made a counter-offer for Petitioner to plead guilty to

robbery and receive the low term for that charge of two years. (Id. at 20-21.) Trial

counsel also testified that Petitioner refused to plead guilty to the offer of a three-year

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sentence (Id. at 23.) 

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the superior court found that trial

counsel informed Petitioner of the three-year plea deal on April 19, 2010. (Id. at 52.) 

The superior court also found that trial counsel informed Petitioner about counsel’s

counter-offer for a two-year sentence. (Id.) Finally, the superior court concluded that

the prosecution never made a two-year offer to Petitioner, and denied the petition. (Id.

at 51-54)

On January 31, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with

the California Court of Appeal. (Doc. No. 8-32.) The state appellate court applied the

standard from In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal.4th 924, 937 (1992), and held that Petitioner’s

“counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for not informing [him] of a nonexistent offer.”

(Doc. No. 8-35 at 3.) 

On June 18, 2014, the California Supreme Court denied the petition in an

unexplained opinion. (Doc. No. 8-37 at 2.) Therefore, this Court “look[s] through” to

the last reasoned state opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 806. The state appellate court’s

denial was not contrary to clearly established federal law, an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law, or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in superior court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(d)(2). The state

appellate court applied the legal standard from Alvernaz. (Doc. No. 8-35.) Alvernaz

provides the same standard as Strickland for evaluating ineffective assistance of

counsel claims with respect to plea deals. Compare Alvernaz, 2 Cal.4th at 937, with

Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408-1409, and Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Thus, the state appellate

court applied the correct legal standard to Petitioner’s claim. Moreover, the state

appellate court correctly deferred to the superior court’s finding that the prosecution

did not offer Petitioner a plea deal that would have resulted in a two-year sentence. See

In re Burton, 40 Cal.4th 205, 214 (2006). Under Strickland, Petitioner’s trial counsel

had no responsibility to inform petitioner of a non-existent plea deal. See Frye, 132 S.

Ct. at 1408-1409; See 2254(e)(1). Therefore, the state appellate court’s opinion was not

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contrary to clearly established federal law, an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law, or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in superior court. Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner’s

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Petitioner’s petition for habeas

corpus, overrules his objection, and adopts the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation. Additionally, the Court denies a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 3, 2015

 

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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