Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01166/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01166-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

E.H.,

Petitioner,

v.

BILL DICKINSON,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:24-cv-01166-JLT-EPG-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

RECOMMENDING DENIAL OF PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner E.H. is proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned recommends denial of the 

petition for writ of habeas corpus.

I.

BACKGROUND1

On June 8, 2022, the Kern County District Attorney filed an 

amended juvenile wardship petition, pursuant to Welfare & 

Institutions Code section 602, alleging that minor had committed 

sexual battery (Pen. Code, § 243.4, subd. (e)(1);2count 1), and 

annoying or molesting a child (§ 647.6, subd. (a)(1); count 2). 

On July 8, 2022, a contested jurisdictional hearing was held. On 

July 8, 2022, the juvenile court found both allegations true.

1 The Court relies on the California Court of Appeal’s April 20, 2023 opinion for this summary of the 

relevant facts and procedural history. See Vasquez v. Kirkland, 572 F.3d 1029, 1031 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009).

2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.

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On August 10, 2022, minor was adjudged a ward of the court and 

granted probation with various terms and conditions, including that 

minor serve five days in custody at a youth detention center.

(LD39 at 2 (footnote in original).) On April 20, 2023, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth 

Appellate District, affirmed the disposition order. (LD 9 at 11; ECF No. 10 at 2.) On June 28, 

2023, the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review. (LD 11.) 

On September 20, 2024, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in the Sacramento Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

California. (ECF No. 1.) On October 2, 2024, the petition was transferred to the Fresno Division. 

(ECF No. 4.) In the petition, Petitioner asserts that there was insufficient evidence to find the two 

juvenile wardship allegations true. (ECF No. 1 at 4.

4

) On October 29, 2024, Respondent filed an 

answer. (ECF No. 10.) To date, no traverse has been filed, and the time for doing so has passed. 

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On October 24, 2021, A.R. (15 years old at the time), J.H. (14 years old at the 

time), and minor (17 years old at the time), attended their school’s homecoming 

dance. A.R. and J.H. were friends. Minor is J.H.’s older brother. 

A.R.’s mother, Grace R., drove the three teenagers to the dance. A.R.’s younger 

sister, B.R. (12 years old at the time), accompanied them for the drive. B.R. had 

known minor as an acquaintance for the prior month, as she began attending the 

same school as A.R., J.H., and minor at the beginning of the school year, and her 

older sister, A.R., was friends with minor’s younger sister, J.H. 

Later that evening, A.R. and B.R.’s father, Alexander R., picked the teenagers up 

from the dance in his large SUV. B.R. again accompanied them for the drive, as 

did her younger sister L.R. (11 years old at the time), and their small lap dog. 

Alexander sat in the driver’s seat, A.R. sat in the front passenger seat, J.H. sat on 

the left side of the middle row bench seat, minor sat in the middle seat of the 

middle row bench seat, B.R. sat on the right side of the middle row bench seat, 

and L.R. sat behind B.R. in the third row by herself with the dog. During the 

approximately 40- to 45-minute drive home, it was “dim” in the car, but not 

“pitch black.”

Alexander brought pizza when he picked the teenagers up, which everyone passed 

around and ate in the car. After eating the pizza, B.R. took the dog from her sister, 

L.R., and put it on her lap so that she could show it to minor and his sister, J.H. 

Minor pet the dog on the head “every now and then” while it was in B.R.’s lap as 

3

“LD” refers to the documents lodged by Respondent on October 29, 2024. (ECF No. 9.)

4 Page numbers refer to the ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page.

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he and B.R. talked. Minor told B.R. he was “in a bad spot mentally.” She told him 

she “was there if he ever needed anything.”5

As they drove, minor was turned towards B.R., petting the dog on her lap with his 

left hand. B.R. then felt minor touch her left breast with his left hand. B.R. 

showed the trial court where on her body he touched her, described by the 

prosecutor as the “left chest area above the top of the breast.” He started 

“groping” her with the same hand, which B.R. demonstrated to the court. The 

prosecutor described her demonstration, stating, “[T]he witness just had her hand 

out and closed her fingers in kind of a grabbing movement.”

B.R. testified that at first, she thought that minor misplaced his hand when trying 

to pet the dog, but stated that he “just kept ... grabbing [her].” B.R. asked him 

whether he wanted to pet the dog and, even though he said he did not want to 

anymore, B.R. pushed the dog “in front of” the area where minor was groping her 

so that he could no longer touch her there.

Minor pet the dog but then touched B.R.’s breast again, this time by reaching his 

hand under the dog’s neck and then rubbing, rather than grabbing, her breast. B.R. 

then pushed the dog into minor’s lap and he stopped touching her breast. In total, 

minor touched B.R.’s breast for about five minutes.

L.R. and Alexander both testified that they saw B.R. push the dog to minor. 

Alexander also stated that he heard B.R. say to minor several times, “[H]old my 

dog.” L.R. testified that B.R. then turned to L.R. and had a “funny” look on her 

face, but B.R. did not say anything to her.

The day after the car ride, B.R. stated to police that when minor could no longer 

touch her left breast because of where she moved the dog, he reached his right 

arm over the back of her head and top of her seat and moved his right arm in such 

a way that she thought he was going to touch her right breast. To prevent him 

from doing so, B.R. moved her own arm so that minor could not reach her breast. 

L.R. saw minor put his right arm around the back of B.R.’s seat. L.R. could hear 

B.R. and minor laughing. At the jurisdictional hearing, B.R. stated she could not 

remember what minor did with his right hand and arm, which was closest to her.

While minor was touching her breast, B.R. was “[s]cared” and “didn’t really 

know why it was happening.” As a result, she did not tell anyone right away. At 

first, she thought minor’s hand was misplaced, but the area where he was 

touching was covered by her thick wool jacket that did not feel “fuzzy like [her] 

dog.”

Thirty seconds after minor and his sister, J.H., were dropped off at their home, 

B.R. felt like she “was going to throw up.” B.R. asked her father, Alexander, in a 

panicked way, to stop their car. Alexander saw B.R. become “increasingly 

frantic.” He immediately pulled over and B.R. got out of the car and cried. 

Alexander got out of the car and saw B.R. “trembling and shaking” and “[h]er 

voice was kind of broken and panicky.” She was “struggling to get her words 

out.” B.R. told him that minor had grabbed her breast and showed him where 

minor had touched her. According to L.R., once back inside the car, B.R. told her 

sisters, A.R. and L.R., that minor had touched her.

5 L.R. and Alexander testified that they could both hear minor and B.R. talking on the drive, but neither 

could make out the conversation.

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Alexander immediately drove back to minor’s home to confront him. Grace called 

the police the following morning.

Defense Case 

Minor’s Testimony 

Minor testified that he sat between his sister, J.H., and B.R. on the middle row 

bench seat on the drive home from the dance. He stated it was “light enough” for 

him to see inside the car. He stated he had no relationship with B.R. and that she 

was a “stranger” to him. He testified that he pet the dog in B.R.’s lap almost the 

entire car ride home and that the dog was resting against B.R.’s chest, at her 

“breast level.” He used his left hand to pet the dog and only pet the dog’s head. 

He testified that he moved his right arm to the back of B.R.’s seat because there 

was no room for his right arm beside him, but that his right arm never fell down 

onto or touched B.R. He denied ever inappropriately touching B.R. because she is 

“fat and ugly.”

When police questioned minor, he stated to them that “it may have been an 

accident if [his hand] did touch” B.R, but that he “did not grab her.”

Minor testified that he understood that touching a female’s breast area without 

consent was inappropriate.

J.H.’s Testimony 

Minor sister, J.H., testified that she was falling in and out of sleep on the drive 

home, but that when she was awake, she did not see J.H. touch B.R. 

inappropriately. She stated that minor was facing towards B.R. when B.R. asked 

minor if he wanted to pet the dog and that minor pet the dog’s head for only a few 

seconds.

(LD 9 at 2–5 (footnote in original).)

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws 

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed 

by the United States Constitution. The challenged findings arise out of the juvenile court in Kern

County, which is located within the Eastern District of California. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 

U.S.C. § 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its 

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enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (en banc). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of AEDPA and is 

therefore governed by its provisions.

Under AEDPA, relitigation of any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court is barred 

unless a petitioner can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 268–69 (2015); Harrington v. Richter, 562 

U.S. 86, 97–98 (2011); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Thus, if a petitioner’s claim has been 

“adjudicated on the merits” in state court, “AEDPA’s highly deferential standards” apply. Ayala, 

576 U.S. at 269. However, if the state court did not reach the merits of the claim, the claim is 

reviewed de novo. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009).

In ascertaining what is “clearly established Federal law,” this Court must look to the 

“holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s] decisions as of the time of the 

relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. In addition, the Supreme Court 

decision must “‘squarely address[] the issue in th[e] case’ or establish a legal principle that 

‘clearly extend[s]’ to a new context to the extent required by the Supreme Court in . . . recent 

decisions”; otherwise, there is no clearly established Federal law for purposes of review under 

AEDPA and the Court must defer to the state court’s decision. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 

754 (9th Cir. 2008) (alterations in original) (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125, 

123 (2008)).

If the Court determines there is clearly established Federal law governing the issue, the 

Court then must consider whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, [the] clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A 

state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it “arrives at 

a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state 

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court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A state court decision involves “an 

unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law” if “there is no possibility 

fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [the Supreme 

Court’s] precedents.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. That is, a petitioner “must show that the state 

court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that 

there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103.

If the Court determines that the state court decision was “contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” and the error is not structural, 

habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable unless it is established that the error “had substantial and 

injurious effect or influence” on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) 

(internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 

(1946)).

AEDPA requires considerable deference to the state courts. Generally, federal courts 

“look through” unexplained decisions and review “the last related state-court decision that does 

provide a relevant rationale,” employing a rebuttable presumption “that the unexplained decision 

adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018). This presumption 

may be rebutted “by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on 

different grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as alternative grounds for affirmance 

that were briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed.” Id.

“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court[,] the state court has denied 

relief,” and there is no reasoned lower-court opinion to look through to, “it may be presumed that 

the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law 

procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. Where the state court reaches a 

decision on the merits and there is no reasoned lower-court opinion, a federal court 

independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under 

§ 2254(d). Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013). “Independent review of the 

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record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we 

can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). The federal court must review the state court 

record and “must determine what arguments or theories . . . could have supported, the state 

court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that 

those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] 

Court.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.

IV.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner asserts that there was insufficient evidence to find the two juvenile wardship 

allegations (sexual battery and annoying or molesting a child) true. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Respondent 

argues that there was sufficient evidence to support the factual findings against Petitioner 

because the victim’s testimony was competent, substantial evidence and the state court’s 

rejection of Petitioner’s claims was not objectively unreasonable. (ECF No. 10 at 1, 6.) These

claims were raised on direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, 

which denied the claims in a reasoned decision. The claims were also raised in the petition for 

review, which the California Supreme Court summarily denied. As federal courts “look through” 

summary denials and review “the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant 

rationale,” Wilson, 584 U.S. at 125, this Court will examine the decision of the California Court 

of Appeal. 

In denying Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claims, the California Court of Appeal 

stated:

Minor contends the juvenile court abused its discretion because there is not 

substantial evidence on the record to support the court’s findings that minor 

committed the offenses of sexual battery and annoying or molesting a child. We 

disagree.

A. Background 

The juvenile court found true both allegations against minor: sexual battery (§ 

243.4, subd. (e)(1); count 1), and annoying or molesting a child (§ 647.6, subd. 

(a)(1); count 2). It explained at the jurisdictional hearing that it found B.R. to be 

credible, while minor was not.

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B. Law 

We review the minor’s contentions using the same standard of review that applies 

in adult criminal cases. (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026.)

“Specifically, we determine whether substantial evidence—‘evidence that is 

reasonable, credible, and of solid value’—supports the juvenile court’s findings.” 

(In re I.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 767, 778 (I.A.).) Substantial evidence includes 

circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. 

(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 943.)

“We view the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the prosecution and 

presume in support of the [findings] the existence of every fact the [court] could 

reasonably have deduced from the evidence.’ [Citation.] We ‘accept [all] logical 

inferences that the [court] might have drawn from the ... evidence’ [citation], but 

reject inferences ‘ “based on suspicion alone or on imagination, speculation, 

supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work.” ’ [Citations.]” (I.A., supra, 48 

Cal.App.5th at p. 778.)

When the circumstances reasonably support the court’s findings, the reviewing 

court’s opinion that the circumstances might also reasonably point to a contrary 

finding does not warrant reversal. (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 631.) 

“[O]n appeal all conflicts in the evidence and attendant reasonable inferences are 

resolved in favor of the judgment.” (In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5, 

fn. omitted.) “We will reverse only if ‘ “it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis 

whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” the [court’s 

findings].’ ” (I.A., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 778.)

The testimony of a single witness, if believed by the factfinder, is sufficient to 

support a conviction, unless that testimony is physically impossible or inherently 

improbable. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)

C. Analysis 

Here, there is sufficient evidence on the record to support the juvenile court’s 

findings that minor committed both the offense of sexual battery and annoying 

and molesting a child.

1. Sexual Battery (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1); count 1) 

Here, there is sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that minor 

committed sexual battery by touching B.R.’s breast during the car ride home from 

the dance.

“Any person who touches an intimate part of another person, if the touching is 

against the will of the person touched, and is for the specific purpose of sexual 

arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse,” commits misdemeanor sexual 

battery. (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1).) One “ ‘touches’ ” under the statute by causing 

“physical contact with another person, whether accomplished directly, through the 

clothing of the person committing the offense, or through the clothing of the 

victim.” (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(2).) An “intimate part” refers to “the sexual organ, 

anus, groin, or buttocks of any person, and the breast of a female.” (§ 243.4, subd. 

(g)(1).) In contrast to simple or felony battery, “[s]exual battery is a specific intent 

crime.” (People v. Chavez (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 25, 29.) One’s purpose “can be 

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inferred from the act itself together with its surrounding circumstances.” (In re 

Shannon T. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 618, 622.)

B.R. testified that minor touched her breast over her jacket while they were in the 

car. Her breast is an intimate part of her body. (§ 243.4, subd. (g)(1).) She 

testified that she did not want him to do so and that she had attempted to stop him 

by telling him to pet her dog and pushing the dog into his lap.

The juvenile court stated that it found B.R.’s testimony on where and how minor 

touched her to be credible. It also stated that it found her testimony that she did 

not want minor to touch her breast and had tried to stop him by pushing her dog 

onto his lap to be credible. The court also stated that it did not believe minor to be 

credible based on the inconsistencies in his testimony. As the factfinder, the 

juvenile court was entitled to find B.R.’s testimony to be credible, as nothing B.R. 

alleged was either physically impossible or inherently improbable.

Last, the evidence supports the inference that minor touched B.R.’s breast with 

the specific purpose of sexual arousal or sexual gratification. He testified that 

B.R. was only an acquaintance and that he knew she was only 12 years old at the 

time. He also stated that he knew the difference between “appropriate” and 

“inappropriate” touching and that he knew it was inappropriate to touch females’ 

breasts against their will.

Minor contends that he believed he was touching the dog, rather than B.R.’s 

breast. However, minor testified that, while it was dark outside, it was still light 

enough to see inside the car. Further, B.R. testified that minor touched her breast 

over her wool jacket, which felt different than the dog’s fur, and that he reached 

under the dog’s neck to continue touching her breast and only finally stopped 

touching her breast once she pushed the dog into his lap.

Based on this evidence, the juvenile court was entitled to make the reasonable 

inference that minor’s touching was accordingly for the specific purpose of sexual 

arousal or sexual gratification and was not accidental.

Minor last argues that B.R. consented to him touching her breast, and accordingly, 

he could not commit sexual battery because of her consent. However, there is no 

evidence on the record that she consented. She testified, as outlined above, that 

she tried to push the dog in the way of his hand to prevent him from reaching her 

breast, and when he continued to touch her breast by reaching his hand under the 

dog’s neck, she finally pushed the dog into his lap so he could not touch her any 

longer. Further, minor testified at trial that he did not touch her breast. He also 

testified that, if he did touch her breast, it was only by accident while he was 

trying to pet the dog. Accordingly, there is no evidence to support minor’s 

contention that B.R. consented to him touching her breast.

Accordingly, as we must resolve all conflicts in the evidence and the juvenile 

court’s attendant reasonable inferences in favor of the judgment, we find there is 

sufficient evidence on the record supporting the court’s finding that minor 

committed sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1); count 1).

2. Annoying or Molesting a Child (§ 647.6, subd. (a)(1); count 2) 

Here, there is also sufficient evidence on the record to support the juvenile court’s 

finding that minor committed the offense of annoying or molesting a child.

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To convict a defendant of violating section 647.6, the prosecution must prove: (1) 

the defendant engaged in conduct directed at a child; (2) a normal person, without 

hesitation, would have been disturbed, irritated, offended, or injured by the 

defendant’s conduct; (3) the defendant’s conduct was motivated by an unnatural 

or abnormal sexual interest in the child; and (4) the child was under the age of 18 

years old at the time of the conduct. (§ 647.6, subd. (a)(1).) It is not necessary that 

the child actually be irritated or disturbed or that the child actually be touched. 

(People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 289.) In determining “whether the 

defendant’s conduct would unhesitatingly irritate or disturb a normal person, we 

employ an objective test not dependent on whether the child was in fact irritated 

or disturbed.” (Id. at p. 290.)

Here, the evidence is undisputed that B.R. was a child under the age of 18: she 

was only 12 years old at the time of the incident. Also, as discussed above, there 

is sufficient evidence of minor’s conduct directed at B.R. of touching her breast 

against her will. Further, there is sufficient evidence supporting the court’s 

reasonable inference that minor’s conduct was motivated by an unnatural or 

abnormal sexual interest in the child, as he testified that he knew it was wrong to 

touch females inappropriately without permission, and that he did not have a 

relationship with B.R.

Last, the evidence supports the court’s finding that a normal person, without 

hesitation, would have been disturbed, irritated, offended, or injured by minor’s 

conduct. The age difference between a 12 year old and 17 year old is great and 

being touched inappropriately and without consent by someone with whom a 

person has no prior relationship would be offensive, irritating, disturbing or 

injurious to a reasonable person.

Minor contends that any sexual interest he had in B.R. could not be deemed “ 

‘unnatural’ ” or “ ‘abnormal’ ” because he and B.R. were relatively close in age. 

Minor contends that B.R. was “already” 12 years old and attended the same 

school as minor and their respective sisters, A.R. and J.H, arguing that they were 

in the same age group and thus, their age difference did not make his conduct 

objectively offensive or any sexual interest he had in B.R. “ ‘abnormal.’ ”

However, the juvenile court stated that it found B.R. and minor’s age difference 

and lack of a prior relationship to be significant. B.R. and minor attended a 

“Junior-Senior” high school, which B.R. had only just begun attending one month 

prior as a 12 year old, while minor was 17 years old and in the 12th grade, 

preparing to graduate. B.R. did not attend the dance with the teenagers A.R., J.H., 

and minor, and B.R. testified that she only knew minor as an acquaintance 

because their sisters, A.R. and J.H., were friends, not because she and minor were 

friends. Further, as discussed above, minor testified that he knew touching a 

female’s breast without consent was “inappropriate.” Accordingly, sufficient 

evidence supports the court’s finding that minor’s conduct was motivated by an 

abnormal or unnatural sexual interest in B.R.

Reviewing the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below, it 

does not appear that “ ‘ “ ‘upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient 

substantial evidence to support’ ” ’ ” the court’s findings, although the 

circumstances might also reasonably point to a contrary finding. (I.A., supra, 48 

Cal.App.5th at p. 778.)

///

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Accordingly, as we must resolve all conflicts in the evidence and the juvenile 

court’s attendant reasonable inferences in favor of the judgment, we affirm.

(LD 9 at 6–11.)

The Supreme Court has held that when reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, a 

court must determine whether, viewing the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). A 

reviewing court “faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must 

presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved 

any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Id. at 326. State 

law provides “for ‘the substantive elements of the criminal offense,’ but the minimum amount of 

evidence that the Due Process Clause requires to prove the offense is purely a matter of federal 

law.” Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 655 (2012) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).

Jackson “makes clear that it is the responsibility of the [trier of fact]—not the [reviewing]

court—to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing 

court may set aside the . . . verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier 

of fact could have agreed . . . .” Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011). No “particular form of 

evidence is required to support the Court of Appeal’s reasoning or the . . . verdict.” Lucero v.

Holland, 902 F.3d 979, 992 (9th Cir. 2018). “Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from 

it may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Ngo v. Giurbino, 651 F.3d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 

2011) (quoting Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995)). A federal court’s “job 

under AEDPA is to avoid a ‘type of fine-grained factual parsing’ that does not accord deference 

to either [triers of fact] or state courts, and instead to survey any possible fact in the record that 

could support, directly or circumstantially, the . . . conviction.” Lucero, 902 F.3d at 992 (citing 

Coleman, 566 U.S. at 655). “[A] federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a 

sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state 

court. The federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision was ‘objectively 

unreasonable.’” Cavazos, 565 U.S. at 2. “Because rational people can sometimes disagree, the 

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inevitable consequence of this settled law is that judges will sometimes encounter convictions 

that they believe to be mistaken, but that they must nonetheless uphold.” Id.

Petitioner asserts that there was insufficient evidence to find that he committed sexual 

battery. Petitioner contends that in the process of petting the dog, he accidentally touched the 

victim’s breast. Petitioner also argues that “the victim never objected to the touching or in any 

way communicated to petitioner that she objected to the touching.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.) B.R. 

testified that Petitioner groped, grabbed, and touched her breast area while Petitioner testified 

that he never touched B.R. inappropriately or touched her breast or any other part of B.R.’s body.

In light of the disposition order, the juvenile court necessarily found B.R.’s testimony to be 

credible and Petitioner’s testimony to be not credible. “[U]nder Jackson, the assessment of 

credibility of witnesses is generally beyond the scope of review.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 

330 (1995). See also Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A [factfinder]’s 

credibility determinations are therefore entitled to near-total deference under Jackson.”). 

Petitioner argues that there was no evidence presented that any touching amounted to an 

unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in a child. Petitioner contends that the “victim was twelve 

years old and the petition[er] was seventeen years told and they attended the same school and 

traveled in the same social circles as peers.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.) However, “B.R. and [Petitioner] 

attended a ‘Junior-Senior’ high school, which B.R. had only just begun attending one month 

prior as a 12 year old, while [Petitioner] was 17 years old and in the 12th grade, preparing to 

graduate.” (LD 9 at 10.) Additionally, “B.R. testified that she only knew [Petitioner] as an 

acquaintance because their sisters, A.R. and J.H., were friends, not because she and [Petitioner] 

were friends.” (Id.) Petitioner also testified that he “didn’t really [have] any interaction with 

[B.R.] because I had nothing to do with her.” (2 RT6216.) The “juvenile court stated that it 

found B.R. and minor’s age difference and lack of a prior relationship to be significant,” and the 

appellate court noted that Petitioner “testified that he knew touching a female’s breast without 

consent was ‘inappropriate.’” (LD 9 at 10.)

6

“RT” refers to the Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal lodged by Respondent on October 29, 2024. (ECF 

No. 9.)

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“Although the evidence presented at trial could yield an alternative inference, we ‘must 

respect the exclusive province of the [factfinder] to determine the credibility of witnesses, 

resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts.’” Long v.

Johnson, 736 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Archdale, 229 F.3d 861, 

867 (9th Cir. 2000)). “The [factfinder] in this case was convinced, and the only question under 

Jackson is whether that finding was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare 

rationality.” Coleman, 566 U.S. at 656. Moreover, “after AEDPA, we apply the standards of 

Jackson with an additional layer of deference to state court findings.” Ngo, 651 F.3d at 1115 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, under this “double dose of deference that 

can rarely be surmounted,” Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2011), the state 

court’s denial of Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claims was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable 

determination of fact. The decision was not “so lacking in justification that there was an error 

well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief 

on his sufficiency of the evidence claims.

V.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition for 

writ of habeas corpus be DENIED.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 

THIRTY (30) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 

written objections, no longer than fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits, with the Court and 

serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 

Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed 

within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The assigned United States District 

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Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the District Court’s order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 16, 2025 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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