Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01895/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01895-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM BREMER,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-01895-JSC 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 33

Plaintiff William Bremer, individually and as successor in interest to the Estate of David 

Bremer, filed this civil rights action alleging violations of state and federal law arising from his 

son’s suicide while being held as a pretrial detainee at the Martinez Detention Facility. Plaintiff 

brings this action against the County of Contra Costa, the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s 

Department, Sheriff’s Deputies Chris Spadaro, Donovan Hays, and Curtis Codey (together, the 

“County Defendants”), as well as the City of Walnut Creek (the “City”), and the Walnut Creek 

Police Department (together, the “City Defendants” and collectively, “Defendants”). The County 

Defendants have answered the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Now pending before the 

Court is the motion to dismiss filed by the City Defendants. (Dkt. No. 33.) The Court finds the 

motion suitable for disposition without oral argument. See N.D. Cal. L.R. 7-1(b). Having 

reviewed the parties’ submissions and the relevant legal authority, the Court GRANTS the motion.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action arises out of the death of Plaintiff’s son, David Bremer (“David Bremer” or the 

“decedent”) on March 20, 2014, while he was being held as a pretrial detainee at the Martinez 

Detention Facility in Contra Costa County following his arrest by the Walnut Creek Police 

Department. (Dkt. No. 32 ¶ 18.) Contra Costa County and the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s 

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Department operate the Martinez Detention Facility. (Id. ¶ 9.)

During the early morning hours of March 20, 2014, Walnut Creek police officers arrested 

the decedent, a mentally ill man in need of psychiatric care, on an outstanding warrant. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 

19.) The decedent attempted to evade arrest by running away from the officers and otherwise 

resisting arrest but the officers ultimately apprehended him using excessive and unnecessary force. 

(Id. ¶ 19.) Walnut Creek police officers then transported the decedent to the Martinez Detention 

Facility to await arraignment on the warrant. (Id. ¶ 20.) During that time, the officers failed to 

identify and address the decedent’s deteriorating mental health. (Id.)

Decedent was interviewed at the Martinez Detention Facility, and he told the intake nurse 

that he might injure himself. (Id. ¶ 21.) “Consequently, he was determined to be suicidal.” (Id.) 

The decedent needed a mental health evaluation, treatment, and placement in an appropriate 

mental health facility, but no such measures were sought or provided. (Id. ¶ 22.) Contra Costa 

County’s policy on suicidal detainees instead required correctional staff to place suicidal detainees 

in “safety cells,” to observe and interact with them every 15 minutes, and to record their 

observations in a log. (Id.) In accordance with this policy, Defendant Codey placed the decedent

in a “safety smock” inside a “safety cell” and began an observation log. (Id. ¶ 23.)

At 3:30 a.m., Defendant Codey fed the decedent a bologna sandwich and a carton of milk. 

(Id. ¶ 24.) Defendant Codey last interacted with the decedent at 4:55 a.m. (Id.) Defendant Hays 

observed the decedent in the safety cell at 6:20 a.m. and 6:35 a.m., standing at the door and pacing 

around the cell. (Id. ¶ 25.) Defendant Spadaro observed and spoke with the decedent at 6:48 a.m. 

(Id. ¶ 26.) Defendant Hays observed the decedent in the cell sitting and alert at 7:16 a.m., then 

again resting on his side at 7:31 a.m., but did not speak with him on either occasion. (Id. ¶ 27.) 

Defendant Spadaro then observed the decedent at 7:34 a.m. lying in his safety cell facedown and 

unresponsive. (Id. ¶ 28.) Defendant Spadaro attempted to resuscitate the decedent and called for 

emergency medical personnel. (Id.) The decedent died in the back of an ambulance en route to 

the Contra Costa County Regional Medical Center. (Id. ¶ 29.) A large quantity of bread was 

removed from the decedent’s throat during the unsuccessful attempts to revive him. (Id.) The 

County coroner performed an autopsy the next day and determined that the decedent had died 

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from asphyxia—i.e., suffocation—due to aspiration of—i.e., choking on—the bread from the 

bologna sandwich that Defendant Codey provided. (Id. ¶ 30.) In short: the decedent committed 

suicide by intentionally aspirating food that the Sheriff’s Department provided. (Id. ¶ 18.) 

Intentional asphyxiation from aspiration of food is well-documented. (Id. ¶ 31.) Law 

enforcement agencies routinely train their corrections personnel, including Defendants here, to 

avoid giving food to suicidal detainees without closely monitoring them “to ensure they do not 

force food down their throats in an effort to kill themselves.” (Id.)

Following the decedent’s death, Plaintiff filed administrative tort claims with the County 

and the City and “has satisfied all conditions precedent to plaintiff’s California state law based 

claims.” (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff initiated this action on his own behalf and on behalf of decedent’s 

estate on April 48, 2015, then filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on June 12, 2015. 

(Dkt. No. 1.) The FAC includes nine causes of action against various groupings of defendants.

The first two causes of action are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants 

Spadaro, Hayes, Codey and Doe Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Spadaro, Hays, and 

Codey are liable to the estate of decedent for violations of decedent’s Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights by being deliberately indifferent to decedent’s mental health needs (id. ¶¶ 39-

46), and for interfering with Plaintiff and decedent’s family relations in violation of the due 

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (id. ¶¶ 47-64). In the third cause of action, Plaintiff 

contends that all Defendants are liable for negligent wrongful death pursuant to Section 377.60 of 

the California Code of Civil Procedure. (Id. ¶¶ 55- 63.) 

The next three causes of action bring claims of municipal liability under Section 1983. In 

the fourth, Plaintiff alleges that the City of Walnut Creek and Walnut Creek Police Department are 

liable for violating the decedent’s civil rights through a policy that resulted in deliberate 

indifference to the decedent’s medical needs and using excessive force in effecting his arrest. (Id.

¶¶ 64-70.) In the fifth, Plaintiff alleges that Contra Costa County and the Contra Costa County 

Sheriff’s Department are liable for having a policy that resulted in deliberate indifference to the 

decedent’s need for medical treatment. (Id. ¶¶ 71-78.) The sixth cause of action alleges that the 

County and the Sheriff’s Department are subject to municipal liability for failing to train 

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employees at the Martinez Detention Facility regarding how to care for and protect detainees with 

mental health problems. (Id. ¶¶ 79-81.)

The seventh cause of action is for general negligence against all Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 82-

91.) The eighth is for medical negligence against the County Defendants only. (Id. ¶¶ 92-94.) 

The final cause of action alleges that all Defendants are liable under California Government Code 

Section 845.6, which imposes a duty to monitor persons in their custody and provide necessary 

medical and mental health care. (Id. ¶¶ 95-98.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, including 

punitive damages, funeral and burial expenses, and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 18.)

The County Defendants answered the FAC, while the City Defendants filed the instant 

motion to dismiss, contending that the FAC fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 

against the City Defendants. (Dkt. Nos. 33, 36.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a complaint as failing to allege 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facial plausibility standard is not a “probability 

requirement” but mandates “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir.

2008). “[D]ismissal may be based on either a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare 

Sys., 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see 

also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a 

claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law”).

Even under the liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), under 

which a party is only required to make “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic 

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recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are 

insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir.

2004); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A]llegations in a complaint 

or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain 

sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to 

defend itself effectively.”). The court must be able to “draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. “Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 663-64.

If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, the “court should grant leave to amend even if no 

request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 

be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Claims Against the Walnut Creek Police Department

Plaintiff brings municipal liability claims against the Walnut Creek Police Department. 

The proper defendant for such a claim is the municipality itself—here, the City of Walnut Creek—

not its sub-agencies or departments. See Walsh v. Am. Med. Response, No. 2:13-cv-2077 MCE 

KJN (PS), 2014 WL 2109946, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2014) (noting that the police department is 

not a municipality, but rather a municipal department or subdivision of the city, and therefore 

claims against the police department should be dismissed); Alston v. Tassone, No. CIV S-11-2078 

JAM GGH PS, 2012 WL 2377015, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 22, 2012), report & recommendation 

adopted by 2012 WL 3070689 (July 27, 2012) (noting that the police department “cannot be held 

liable for damages separate from the” municipality, so it should be “dismissed with prejudice . . . 

as an improper party”); see also Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 2d 993, 996 (N.D. 

Cal. 1996) (noting that the county is the proper defendant in a Section 1983 municipal liability 

claim, not the sheriff’s office).

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The same is not true for the state law statutory tort claims. Municipal police departments 

are ‘public entities’ under California law and therefore can be sued in federal court. See Shaw v. 

Cal. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 605 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Richardson 

v. Benicia Police Dep’t, No. 2:12-cv-1931 FEB AC PS, 2013 WL 5554211, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 

8, 2013) (noting that the local police department is a subdivision of a local public entity). 

Nonetheless, because the Walnut Creek Police Department is a subdivision of the City itself, and 

not a separate legal entity, the Court will refer to the remaining claims against the Police 

Department as claims against the “City” generally.

II. Claims Against the City of Walnut Creek

The City contends that all four of the causes of action brought against it must be dismissed 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In addition, the City insists that the 

request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Section 1988 for the state law claims must be stricken. The 

Court will address each challenge in turn.

A. Third Cause of Action: Wrongful Death

Plaintiff’s third cause of action against all Defendants alleges negligent wrongful death 

pursuant to Section 377.60 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. The City contends that this 

cause of action must be dismissed because (1) Plaintiff has not adequately alleged compliance 

with the exhaustion requirements of the Tort Claims Act, (2) Plaintiff fails to identify a statutory 

basis for the City’s direct liability, and (3) the FAC otherwise fails to state a claim.

1. Compliance with the California Tort Claims Act

California law imposes certain exhaustion requirements before a plaintiff can bring suit 

against a public entity for money damages. Specifically, the California Tort Claims Act 

(“CTCA”) provides that “no suit for money damages may be brought against a public entity on a 

cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefore has 

been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to 

have been rejected by the board[.]” Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.4. The “board” is the governing body 

of a local public entity, including a city or county. Id. §§ 900.2, 900.4. The board must grant or 

deny a claim within 45 days after it is presented or the claim is deemed rejected. Id. § 912.4. 

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Under Section 945.6, if the board delivers written notice of its decision to the complainant, the 

complainant has 6 months to file a civil suit, or, if the board does not provide written notice, the 

complainant has 2 years from the accrual of the cause of action to file suit. Id. § 945.6. These 

timing requirements function as a statute of limitations on state law claims subject to the CTCA. 

See Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal. 4th 201, 209 (2007). The “requirement that a 

plaintiff must affirmatively allege compliance with the CTCA applies in federal court.” Dowell v. 

Contra Costa Cnty., 928 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citation omitted). Put another 

way, failure to allege facts demonstrating, or excusing, compliance with the CTCA’s claims 

presentation requirements warrants dismissal of a cause of action. State of Cal. v. Super. Ct. 

(Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1238-38 (2004).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he “filed administrative tort claims with the County of Contra 

Costa and City of Walnut Creek and has satisfied all conditions precedent to plaintiff’s California 

state law based claims.” (Dkt. No. 32 ¶ 3.) Aside from this assertion, the FAC contains no facts 

regarding the timing of his initial written claim to the board or whether and when the board 

delivered written notice of its decision. Such pleading is insufficient to demonstrate compliance 

with the CTCA. See, e.g., Dowell, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 1152 (dismissing state tort claim for failure 

to plead facts regarding “whether and when” the board delivered written notice of a claim); 

Nnachi v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 13-cv-05582-KAW, 2015 WL 1743454, at *6 (N.D. 

Cal. Apr. 16, 2015) (dismissing state tort claim for failure to plead facts regarding “when he 

submitted such a claim, what he stated in that claim, and when the City denied it”). 

Without citing any authority, Plaintiff avers that his conclusory paragraph alleging 

compliance with “all conditions precedent” to filing state law claims is sufficient. (Dkt. No. 39 at 

5.) But the case law compels the opposite conclusion. Thus, the FAC does not adequately allege 

compliance with the CTCA and the wrongful death claim must be dismissed on this ground.

2. Statutory Basis for Direct Liability

The City next moves to dismiss the wrongful death claim on the grounds that Plaintiff has

not pled a specific statutory basis for direct liability against this public entity, as the California 

Government Code requires. Indeed, Section 815 provides that public entities are not generally 

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liable for injuries caused by their employees, unless otherwise provided by statute. Cal. Gov’t 

Code § 815; see also Mahach-Watkins v. Depee, No. C 05-1143 SI, 2005 WL 1656887, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. July 11, 2005) (“[Section 815] establishes that all governmental tort liability must be 

based on statute, and California courts have held that plaintiffs must plead the statutory basis for 

liability.”).

Here, Plaintiff identifies Government Code § 815.2 as the basis for the City’s liability. 

(Dkt. No. 32 ¶ 62.) Section 815.2 provides that public entities are liable for injuries caused by 

their employees acting within the scope of their employment “if the act or omission would, apart 

from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee.” Cal. Gov’t Code 

§ 815.2; see also Robinson v. Solano Cnty., 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002) (“California . . . 

imposes liability on [public entities] under the doctrine of respondeat superior for acts of county 

employees; it grants immunity to [public entities] only where the public employee would also be 

immune.”) (citation omitted); Scott v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. App. 4th 125, 139-40 (1994) 

(“Under [Section 815.2(b), the [public entity] is immune from liability if, and only if, [the 

employee] is immune.”) (emphasis omitted). The City does not dispute that it could be liable for 

the actions of its officers under a theory of vicarious liability pursuant to Section 815.2(a); to that 

end, the FAC properly alleges that the officers were employed by the city acting within the scope 

of their employment and makes clear that it brings claims against the City pursuant to Section 

815.2 based on the acts of its officers. (Dkt. No. 32 ¶ 62.) 

But the City insists that the FAC alleges direct liability. And indeed, Plaintiff also alleges 

that the “negligent and reckless acts and omissions of all . . . defendants” caused decedent’s 

injuries, which appears to allege direct liability. (Id. ¶ 59.) Plaintiff appears to concede that he 

has only alleged a statutory basis for the City’s vicarious liability, not direct. (See Dkt. No. 39 at 

5.) In fact, in his opposition Plaintiff does not identify a statutory basis for the City’s direct 

liability and nowhere argues that there is such a basis. Thus, the wrongful death count against the 

City may therefore proceed—if it is adequately pleaded—only on a theory of vicarious liability.

3. Sufficiency of Factual Allegations

Turning to whether the FAC alleges facts that would make the individual officers liable—

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and thus, whether there is an adequately pleaded basis for the City’s vicarious liability—California 

Code of Civil Procedure Section 377.60 provides a cause of action for wrongful death caused by 

the “wrongful act or neglect of another[.]” The elements of a wrongful death claim under 

California law are: (1) a “wrongful act or neglect” on the part of one or more persons that (2) 

causes (3) the death of another person.” Mathews v. City of Oakland Police Dep’t, No. 12-cv03235-JCS, 2013 WL 6057689, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013) (citations omitted); see also 

Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr., 140 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1264 (2006) (“The elements of a cause of 

action for wrongful death are the tort (negligence or other wrongful act), the resulting death, and 

the damages, consisting of the pecuniary loss suffered by the heirs.”). Here, Plaintiff’s wrongful 

death claim against the City is premised on the officers’ negligence. (See Dkt. No. 32 ¶¶ 57, 59.) 

To support a claim of negligent wrongful death against law enforcement officers, a plaintiff must 

establish the standard elements of negligence: defendants owed a duty of care; defendants 

breached their duty; and defendants’ breach caused plaintiff’s injury.” Hayes v. Cnty. of San 

Diego, 736 F.3d 1223, 1231 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Wright v. City of Los Angeles, 219 Cal. App. 

3d 318, 344 (1990)).

The basis of Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim against the City is that all Defendants, 

including the City, had a duty to protect and provide service and protection in a professional 

manner” to the decedent. (Dkt. No. 39 ¶ 59.) In the face of that alleged duty, Plaintiff alleges that

Walnut Creek police officers “used excessive and unnecessary force in securing the arrest of 

David Bremer” after “[h]e attempted to evade arrest by running away from the officers and 

otherwise resisting arrest[,]” and also “failed to identify and address David Bremer’s deteriorating 

mental health” when they transported him to the Martinez Detention Facility. (Dkt. No. 39 ¶¶ 19-

20; see also id. ¶ 58 (alleging that the City and Walnut Creek police “used excessive and 

unnecessary force in securing [Bremer’s] arrest”).) This conduct “deprived [decedent] of his 

Constitutional right to life, his Constitutional right to mental health care for his mental illness, as 

well as custodial care and supervision” and deprived Plaintiff of the care, protection, 

companionship, love, solace, affection, and moral support of his loved one[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 34, 36.)

The Court views the claim as alleging two bases for negligent wrongful death: first, the 

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excessive force claim; and second, the failure to identify and address the decedent’s mental health 

issues. With respect to the excessive force claim, “a governmental entity can be held vicariously 

liable when a police officer acting in the course and scope of employment uses excessive force or 

engages in assaultive conduct.” Arres v. City of Fresno, No. CV F 10-1628 LJO SMS, 2011 WL 

284971, at *24 (quoting Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 3d 202, 215 (1991)). But to the 

extent that the arresting officers owed such a duty, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to 

demonstrate a breach—i.e., that they used a level of force that was unreasonable given the totality 

of the circumstances. See Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting 

that an excessive force inquiry requires examination of the totality of the circumstances). The 

conclusory allegation that they did so is not enough to satisfy the pleading standards set forth in 

Twombly and Iqbal. Nor does the FAC allege facts sufficient to plausibly establish that any such 

exercise of excessive force was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s death. Proximate cause has two 

aspects: but-for causation, on the one hand, and public policy considerations that “limit an actor’s 

responsibility for the consequences of his conduct.” State Dep’t of State Hosps. v. Super. Ct., 61 

Cal. 4th 339, 353 (2015). To establish proximate cause between negligent conduct and a suicide, 

the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s negligence caused the suicidal person to suffer an 

“uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 573 (9th Cir. 

2009). No such facts are included in the FAC. Thus, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that any 

use of excessive force—if it were sufficiently pled—was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s death.

With respect to failure to identify and address mental health issues, the FAC is likewise 

deficient of facts sufficient to establish the existence of a legal duty, a breach, or proximate cause. 

The FAC includes the bare allegation that the Walnut Creek police officers “failed to identify and 

address” the decedent’s deteriorating mental health. Even assuming that arresting officers and 

officers who transport an arrestee to a detention facility owe a duty to exercise due care, there are 

no factual allegations that indicate that the decedent demonstrated signs of mental health 

deterioration that would have put a reasonable officer on notice, triggering any duty to obtain 

mental health treatment for the decedent or notify others of his condition. Even if there were, the 

FAC likewise fails to include facts that would plausibly establish proximate cause. To the 

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contrary, the FAC alleges that the decedent actually notified individuals at the Martinez Detention 

Facility that he was going to harm himself, which caused the facility to place him in a safety cell 

due to a suicide risk. The FAC does not include any facts that suggest how the Walnut Creek 

officers’ failure to alert the facility of such a risk would have changed the outcome. Thus, the 

FAC fails to state a claim of wrongful death against the City based on vicarious liability for the 

arresting officers’ negligence in addressing Plaintiff’s mental health condition.

Plaintiff’s opposition merely recites the relevant—and conclusory—allegations in the FAC 

and states without support that the required elements are “thoroughly stated.” (Dkt. No. 39 at 7.) 

But mere recitation of a cause of action’s elements, absent facts to support the allegations, is not 

enough to state a claim. 

While the City further argues that it is not liable because the officers are protected by a 

statutory privilege and thus are immune from liability, see Gilmore v. Super. Ct., 230 Cal. App. 3d 

416, 421 (1991) (“A privileged act is by definition one for which the actor is absolved of any tort 

liability, whether premised on the theory of negligence or of intent.”) (citations omitted), the Court 

disagrees. The City relies on Government Code § 856(a)(1), which prohibits liability for public 

entities or employees acting within the scope of their employment for injuries resulting from 

determining “whether to confine a person for mental illness[.]” Cal. Gov’t Code § 856(a)(1). But 

this provision is inapposite, as it “applies only to detentions, or decisions made in the process of 

detention, which are made . . . in accordance with section 5150 of the California Welfare & 

Institutions Code.” Hall v. City of Fremont, 510 F. App’x 609, 612 (9th Cir. 2013). There are no 

facts alleged in the FAC that indicate that such was the case here. The City also concludes 

without support that the City is also “immune from its officers’ discretionary decisions under 

Gov’t Code §§ 815.2 and 820.2.” (Dkt. No. 33 at 14. n.4.) But Section 820.2 is limited to “basic 

policy decisions,” not “operational decision[s] by the police” in the context of an arrest. Liberal v. 

Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1085 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Gillian v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal. App. 

4th 1033, 1051 (2007)). And where these statutes do not provide immunity to individual officers, 

they likewise do not immunize the City under section 815.2 of the California Government Code. 

Hall, 510 F. App’x at 612 (citing Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 921-

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22 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

B. Fourth Cause of Action: Municipal Liability

The fourth cause of action is a Section 1983 claim against the City for violation of 

decedent’s civil rights. (Dkt. No. 32 ¶¶ 64-70.) The City moves to dismiss this claim on the 

grounds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that show any constitutional violation by Walnut 

Creek police officers or any pattern, policy, or custom of the City amounting to deliberate 

indifference.

To state a claim for municipal liability under Section 1983 for a violation of constitutional 

rights, a plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he 

was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate 

indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy is the moving force 

behind the constitutional violation. Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 

438 (9th Cir. 1997); see also AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 

2012) (“[P]laintiffs must establish that the local government had a deliberate policy, custom, or 

practice that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation they suffered.”) (citations 

omitted). There can be no municipal liability without an underlying constitutional violation. Scott 

v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1994).

The FAC alleges that decedent was deprived of his “constitutional right to life” and 

Plaintiff of his “constitutional right and familial relationship with his son” when Walnut Creek 

police officers “used excessive and unnecessary force” during the decedent’s arrest and “failed to 

identify and address [decedent’s] deteriorating mental health” and “failed to adequately 

communicate” that condition to staff at the Martinez Detention Center. (Dkt. No. 32 ¶¶ 67-68.) In 

his opposition, Plaintiff clarifies that he is alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. (Dkt. No. 39 at 8.) While the FAC nowhere identifies the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments as the predicate constitutional violation for the municipal liability claims (see Dkt. 

No. 32 ¶¶ 64-70), the Court will construe the claims as such.

The excessive force claim is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 

unreasonable seizures. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 294 (1989); accord Young v. Cnty. of 

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Los Angeles, 655 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011). To state an excessive force claim, a plaintiff 

must allege facts showing that the officer’s conduct was “objectively unreasonable in light of the 

facts and circumstances confronting them.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). In determining whether an officer’s conduct is objectively unreasonable, 

courts must “balance the gravity of the intrusion on the individual against the government’s need 

for that intrusion to determine whether it was constitutionally reasonable.” Miller v. Clark Cnty., 

340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to support his 

excessive force claim. In fact, the FAC does not include any facts shedding light on the 

circumstances of the decedent’s arrest or the level of force used aside from the allegation that the 

decedent “attempted to evade arrest” and resisted arrest “but was ultimately apprehended” and the 

conclusory allegation that excessive and unreasonable force was used. (Dkt. No. 32 ¶ 19.) In his 

opposition, Plaintiff insists that he “adequately alleges the circumstances of the arrest” enough to 

state a claim, but Plaintiff cites no authority to support his position. (Dkt. No. 39 at 7-8.) Indeed, 

the FAC falls far short of including the types of facts necessary to give rise to a plausible 

excessive force claim.

The same is true of Plaintiff’s claim that the arresting officers violated the Fourteenth 

Amendment by failing to “address [the decedent’s] well-being” (Dkt. No. 39 at 8)—i.e., to address 

and communicate to jail officials the decedent’s deteriorating mental health. (Dkt. No. 32 ¶ 67.)

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription 

against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); WMX 

Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). “Claims by pretrial 

detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, rather than under 

the Eighth Amendment[,]” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted),

but the same standard applies. Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1241-42 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard applies to 

pretrial detainees’ Fourteenth Amendment rights). The test for “deliberate indifference” consists 

of two parts: the plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need”; and (2) that the defendant’s 

response to the need was deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 

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2006). “Examples of serious medical needs include the existence of an injury that a reasonable 

doctor or patient would find important or worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a 

medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of 

chronic and substantial pain.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Deliberate indifference requires that a defendant be subjectively aware of the serious medical need 

and fail to adequately respond to that need. See Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab., 726 

F.3d 1062, 1082 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 835, 837 (1994) (noting 

that a plaintiff must plead that the defendant was aware of facts from which one could infer a 

substantial risk of an objectively serious medical need, and that defendant actually drew that 

inference but did not act on it). 

Here, the FAC fails to allege facts sufficient to establish either prong of a deliberate 

indifference to medical needs claim. First, aside from the vague allegation that the decedent’s 

mental health condition was “deteriorating,” there are no facts alleged from which such an 

inference could be drawn. There are no facts pertaining to how the decedent acted during the 

arrest or booking, whether he showed signs of having a serious mental health condition requiring 

immediate medical treatment, whether he requested medical attention for his mental health 

condition, or any other facts that might give rise to a plausible inference that the decedent had an 

objectively serious medical need. Likewise, the FAC fails to allege facts showing that the Walnut 

Creek police officers had a subjective awareness of the decedent’s serious medical need. In fact, 

the FAC appears to be at odds with the core of a deliberate indifference claim: while pleading 

deliberate indifference to medical needs requires allegations that the officer actually becomes 

aware that the detainee has a serious medical condition, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, here the FAC 

alleges that the officers “failed to identify” the decedent’s mental health problem. (Dkt. No. 32 

¶ 67.) Absent such facts, there is nothing unconstitutional about the officer’s failure to provide 

mental health treatment or warn officials at the Martinez Detention Facility of the need to do so.

Thus, the FAC fails to allege facts sufficient to support a plausible Fourteenth Amendment 

violation for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. 

In short, the FAC fails to allege a violation of either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments 

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or any other constitutional or federal right. Although Plaintiff has identified a number of City 

policies, they are not actionable in the absence of a cognizable constitutional violation. And 

because Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege a predicate constitutional violation, he fails to 

state a claim for municipal liability against the City. The claim is therefore dismissed.

C. Seventh Cause of Action: General Negligence

The seventh cause of action is a general negligence claim against all Defendants, including 

the City. (Dkt. No. 32 ¶¶ 82-91.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, including the City, 

“negligently, carelessly and unskillfully cared for, attended, handled, controlled, and failed to 

supervise, monitor and attend to [decedent] and/or battered and injured him and/or failed to refer 

him to mental health providers and/or carelessly failed to detect and monitor decedent’s 

deteriorating condition.” (Dkt. No. 32 ¶ 84.) Plaintiff further alleges that the City is liable for 

negligence for failing to supervise and train its subordinates to maintain proper supervision, 

classification, and staffing. (Id.) The City contends that this claim must be dismissed because the 

FAC fails to adequately allege compliance with the CTCA’s presentment requirement and 

otherwise fails to state a claim for negligence. (Dkt. No. 33 at 18-19.)

As discussed above in the context of Plaintiff’s wrongful death cause of action, the FAC 

fails to allege sufficient facts—specifically, regarding when he submitted his claim and when the 

City denied it—to plausibly establish compliance with the claim presentment requirements of the 

CTCA. Plaintiff’s general negligence claim against the City is therefore subject to dismissal.

But even apart from the exhaustion problem, the FAC otherwise fails to state a claim for 

general negligence against the City for the same reasons as the negligent wrongful death claim. 

Specifically, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold the City directly liable, Plaintiff has failed to 

identify a statutory basis for doing so; any claim of the City’s direct liability is therefore 

dismissed. As for a claim for the City’s vicarious liability for its employees’ negligence, Plaintiff 

has not alleged facts from which the Court can draw a plausible inference that any of the Walnut 

Creek officers were negligent in exercising force in their arrest of decedent, or in their failure to 

address decedent’s mental health issues. The negligence claim against the City is therefore 

dismissed.

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D. Ninth Cause of Action: Violation of California Government Code § 845.6

Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action arises under California Government Code Section 845.6, 

which provides in relevant part that:

Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury 

proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or 

obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; but, except as 

otherwise provided by Sections 855.8 and 856, a public employee, 

and the public entity where the employee is acting with the scope of 

his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has reason to 

know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he 

fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care[.]

Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6 (emphasis added). “[T]o state a claim under [Section] 845.6, a [plaintiff] 

must establish three elements: (1) that the public employee knew of or had reason to know of the 

need (2) for immediate medical care, and (3) failed to reasonably summon such care.” Jett, 439 

F.3d at 1099 (citation omitted); Castaneda v. Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab., 212 Cal. App. 4th 1051, 

1070 (2013), review denied (May 2013). Liability under this code provision is “limited to serious 

and obvious medical conditions requiring immediate care.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Lucas 

v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. App. 4th 277, 287-88 (1996); Frary v. Cnty. of Marin, --- F. Supp. 

3d ----, No. 12-cv-03928-MEJ, 2015 WL 858776, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2015) (noting that 

“California courts have narrowly interpreted [S]ection 845.6 to create [only] limited liability”).

This claim fails for the same reason that Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim based on 

deliberate indifference to medical care did: there are no factual allegations in the FAC from which 

the Court can draw a plausible inference that the Walnut Creek police officers knew or had reason 

to know of the decedent’s need for immediate medical care. As the FAC does not state a claim for 

liability for the officers under Section 845.6 or any other statutory basis, the City’s liability is 

likewise barred. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 844.6; see, e.g., Frary v. Cnty. of Marin, No. C 12-3928 

MEJ, 2012 WL 6218196, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2012) (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s Section 

845.6 claim against the City is therefore dismissed.

E. Request for Attorneys’ Fees under § 1988 for State Torts

Lastly, the City Defendants move to strike the request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1988 from the third and seventh state-law causes of action. Under Rule 12(f), the “court 

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may strike from a pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” A 

motion to strike “should be denied unless it can be shown that [the challenged matter] could have 

no possible bearing on the issues in the litigation. Buick v. World Savings Bank, 565 F. Supp. 2d 

1152, 1159 (E.D. Cal. 2008). “Rule 12(f) does not authorize a district court to strike a claim for 

damages on the ground that such damages are precluded as a matter of law.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. 

Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 971 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Here, the City moves to 

strike the request for attorneys’ fees concluding that such relief is precluded as a matter of law, 

which appears to run afoul of the limits of Rule 12(f) as set forth in Whittlestone. 618 F.3d at 971. 

However, in light of the holding in Whittlestone, “courts sometimes construe such deficient 

motions to strike as motions to dismiss and analyze them accordingly[.]” Rhodes v. Placer Cnty., 

No. 2:09-cv-00489 MCE KJN PS, 2011 WL 1302240, at *20 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2011); see, e.g., 

id. at *22 (construing motion to strike claim for Section 1988 attorneys’ fees in state law claims as 

motion to dismiss); Angel v. Golden Valley Transp., LLC, No. 10-cv-890 LJO DLB, 2011 WL 

201465, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2011) (construing motion to strike claim for unavailable statutory 

penalties as a motion to dismiss).

Section 1988 of the Federal Civil Rights Act provides for an award of reasonable 

attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in civil rights cases brought under one of a number of 

enumerated federal statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988; see Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2213 (2011). 

“[S]ome courts have interpreted the Federal Civil Rights Act to provide for an award of attorneys’ 

fees upon successful pendent state law claims even where a federal constitutional claim ultimately 

fails.” Rhodes, 2011 WL 1302240, at *22 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 

122, 132 (1980) (clarifying that attorneys’ fees under Section 1988 are available in cases “in 

which the plaintiff prevails on a wholly statutory, non-civil rights claim pendent to a substantial 

constitutional claim”). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that when a plaintiff in a civil rights 

action prevails on a pendent state law claim that shares a common nucleus of operative facts with 

a federal claim, the court may still award attorneys’ fees under Section 1988. See Carreras v. City 

of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by Los Angeles 

Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 4th 352 (2000). However, where “there has 

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been a decision adverse to plaintiff on the [S]ection 1983 claim, [S]ection 1988 does not authorize 

the award of attorney’s fees” on successful pendent state law claims. Mateyko v. Felix, 924 F.2d 

824, 828 (9th Cir. 1990). Because there are circumstances in which an award of Section 1988 fees 

may still be appropriate for Plaintiff’s state law claims, the Court declines to strike or dismiss the 

fee requests from the fourth or seventh causes of action.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the City’s motion to dismiss. The Section 

1983 claims against the Walnut Creek Police Department are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff 

shall have leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) by September 16, 2015 to amend 

the claims against the City. Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that such claims should only be made 

if Plaintiff can, in good faith and consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, make such 

allegations with sufficient detail. If Plaintiff chooses not to amend the claims against the City 

Defendants by that date, the City Defendants will be dismissed from this action with prejudice. 

As the County Defendants have already answered the FAC, if Plaintiff chooses to file a SAC the 

Court will deem the County Defendants to have constructively answered.

The case management conference scheduled for September 17, 2015 is continued to 

October 1, 2015 at 1:30 p.m.

This Order terminates Docket. No. 33.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 2, 2015

________________________

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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