Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00629/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00629-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 16:1538 Endangered Species Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOME BUILDERS ASSOCIATION OF

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, et al.,

NO. CIV. S-05-629 LKK/GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. O R D E R

UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE

SERVICE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

DEFENDERS OF THE WILDLIFE, et al.,

Intervenors.

 /

Tsakopoulos Investments, George Tsakopoulos and Drosoula

Tsakopoulos, Trustees of the Tsakopoulos Family Trust (hereinafter

referred to as Tsakopoulos) are seeking to intervene as plaintiffs

in the suit filed by Home Builders Association of Northern

California, Building Industry Legal Defense Foundation, California

Building Industry Association, California State Grange and

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1 The court also recently granted a motion to intervene as

plaintiffs by the City of Suisun.

2 The facts are taken from the papers of Tsakopoulos and are

assumed to be true only for the purposes of this motion. Southwest

Center for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 820 (9th

Cir. 2001)(holding that the court is to take facts alleged in the

pleadings, motion, and supporting declarations as true for purposes

of the motion to intervene).

2

Greenhorn Grange (hereinafter Home Builders).1 The suit was

brought against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS),

with Defenders of Wildlife, Butte Environmental Council and the

California Native Plant Society participating as defendant

intervenors (hereinafter environmental groups). The current Home

Builders complaint alleges that the FWS violated the Endangered

Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act when it

designated critical habitat for fifteen different species. 

The Federal Defendants have filed a statement of nonopposition. The environmental groups have filed an opposition to

the requested intervention. Tsakopoulos seeks intervention both

as a matter of right under Rule 24(a) and/or by permissive

intervention under Rule 24(b)(2), and agrees to intervention

limited to involvement with issues related to their direct

interests. 

I.

FACTS2

Tsakopoulos owns approximately 865 acres of property in

Sacramento County. The property had been excluded from critical

habitat in 2003, but was designated as critical habitat in 2005 for

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two plant species, Sacramento Orcutt Grass and Slender Orcutt

Grass, and one species of vernal pool crustaceans, vernal pool

tadpole shrimp. 

After the August 6, 2003 Rule established economic exclusions

from critical habitat in Sacramento County, and in partial reliance

on it, Tsakopoulos initiated various steps towards developing their

land. See Declaration of John M. Taylor at ¶¶ 2, 3. These

preparations included purchasing 645 of the 865 acres currently

owned, hiring an engineering and planning firm to design the layout

of the housing and commercial development community, meeting with

County of Sacramento planning staff regarding a development

application for Excelsior Estates, meeting with representatives of

Elk Grove Unified School District to plan the locations of required

new schools, and hiring an economic planning firm to evaluate the

fiscal impact to the County of Sacramento as a result of this

development. 

These plans anticipate the ultimate construction of

approximately 2,800 new single family homes, with an anticipated

average occupancy of five persons per household, and anticipated

new home prices ranging from $325,000 to $500,000, approximately

30 acres of commercial development, high density residential,

elementary and high schools, and parks and open space.

Tsakopoulos alleges that the economic development projected

for the property is consistent with regional projections and plans

for growth. On December 16, 2004, the Sacramento Area Council of

Governments (“SACOG”) adopted a land use concept for the Sacramento

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region known as the “Regional Blueprint.” The Blueprint’s

Preferred Scenario Map designates the Excelsior Estates property

for single family residential, high-density mixed residential and

industrial uses, all of which are consistent with Plaintiffs’

development plans. SACOG requested that FWS use information from

its Blueprint as the basis for the economic exclusions in the

August 2005 Final Rule, but the FWS declined to do so. See Taylor

Dec. at ¶¶ 4, 6.

Tsakopoulos claims that FWS’ designation of this property as

critical habitat will severely inhibit the planned development of

its property. They argue that they were not aware of the

designation of these lands as critical habitat until after the

August 2005 Final Rule, and that they promptly contacted the FWS

to provide information explaining why they believe Excelsior

Estates was not appropriate as critical habitat. Tsakopoulos has

pending before FWS a formal Petition for Reconsideration of the

designation of this property. 

II.

ANALYSIS

A. INTERVENTION AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

An order granting intervention as of right is appropriate if

the party seeking to intervene can demonstrate that (1) it has a

‘significant protectable interest’ relating to the property or

transaction that is the subject of the action; (2) the disposition

of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the

applicant's ability to protect its interest; (3) the application

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is timely; and (4) the existing parties may not adequately

represent the applicant's interest.” Donnelly v. Glickman, 159

F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1998); County of Orange v. Air California,

799 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946

(1987). The party seeking to intervene “bears the burden of

showing that all the requirements for intervention have been met.”

United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir.

2004).

The Ninth Circuit has held, often in the context of

environmental disputes, that “Rule 24 is broadly construed in favor

of intervention.” United States v. Washington, 86 F.3d 1499, 1503

(9th Cir. 1996); Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir.

1998)(“In determining whether intervention is appropriate, we are

guided primarily by practical and equitable considerations. We

generally interpret the requirements broadly in favor of

intervention.”). Courts are to “take all well-pleaded

nonconclusory allegations in the motion to intervene, proposed

complaint or answer in intervention, and declarations supporting

the motion as true absent sham, frivolity or other objections.”

Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810,

820 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The test for intervention should be applied with an eye on

practical consideration. United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d

821, 826 (9th Cir. 1986)(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) advisory

note 9)(“if an [applicant] would be substantially affected in a

practical sense by the determination made in an action, [the

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3 This is the same argument that the City made, but they

still managed to get their application in sooner. It also appears

from looking at the complaint that the final rule was issued on

August 11, 2005 but Tsakopoulos did not send a letter to FWS until

November 15, 2005. 

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applicant] should, as a general rule, be entitled to

intervene . . . .”)). 

1. Timeliness

In determining whether a motion to intervene is timely, the

Ninth Circuit has set out the following three considerations: (1)

the stage of the proceedings; (2) whether the parties would be

prejudiced; and (3) the reason for any delay in moving to

intervene. Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d

825, 836 (9th Cir. 1996). This court has just reviewed a similar

motion to intervene for the City of Suisun in which the court found

that the motion was just barely in time. Here, Tsakopoulos argues

that they are also in time, despite the fact that the opening

motions for summary judgment were to be filed on March 20, 2006.

They filed their motion on that date, anticipating that the court

might grant their motion to intervene, but it is not clear whether

the defendants will have also made the same assumption in preparing

their responding papers. Tsakopoulos states that they waited to

file the motion until now because they have been working with FWS

to resolve their concerns out of court, but they provide no

evidence to support this.3 Tsakopoulos’ showing is less than fully

convincing in light of the time frame and the knowledge that this

court had set a briefing schedule in January. Nonetheless, none

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of the parties have asserted that they would be prejudiced by the

timing of the intervention and thus the court will not deny the

motion on this ground. 

2. Significantly Protectable Interest Relating to the Action

A significantly protectable interest can be shown if the

proposed intervenor (1) “asserts an interest that is protected

under some law, and (2) there is a ‘relationship’ between its

legally protected interest and the plaintiff's claims.” Donnelly

v. Glickman, 159 F.3d at 409 (emphasis added); Southern California

Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2002); United

States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 2002).

The “interest test is not a clear-cut or bright-line rule, because

no specific legal or equitable interest need be established.

Instead, the interest test directs courts to make a practical,

threshold inquiry, and is primarily a practical guide to disposing

of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as

is compatible with efficiency and due process.” United States v.

City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 2002); Southern

California Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d at 803; Southwest Center

for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 818 (9th Cir.

2001). 

Here, Tsakopoulos owns land which is within the area

designated as the critical habitat which is being challenged in

this action. They allege that they have due process and economic

interests which are protectable and are connected to this action.

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Tsakopoulos’ asserted economic interests are related to their plans

for development of the land they own within the critical habitat

area. Although there is some dispute about the exact development

restrictions which exist on the land, it is reasonable to conclude

that direct land owners have some significant economic interests

in the restrictions which may be placed on their land as result of

an Endangered Species Act designation. Cases have found that real

property rights constitute “concrete” economic interests. See

Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993);

Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakama Indian Nation v. Baldrige,

95 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1996). While the Ninth Circuit has held

that “[a] mere interest in property that may be implicated by

litigation is not a passport to participate in the litigation

itself” that was in a case where the interests being discussed were

more indirect than that of the actual land owner. United States v.

Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 920 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004)(“To hold

otherwise would create a slippery slope where anyone with an

interest in the property of a party to a lawsuit could bootstrap

that stake into an interest in the litigation itself.”). 

This court found that the City of Suisun did not have a

significantly protectable interest in this litigation. The instant

motion for intervention differs from the City’s because Tsakopoulos

actually owns the land that they are seeking to protect from

critical habitat designation. As the earlier order pointed out,

a bare expectation is not a strong enough economic interest to

justify intervention as of right. Southwest Center for Biological

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4 Having found that the Tsakopoulos have significant enough

interest in their real property, the court need not reach the due

process argument. 

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Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 819 (9th Cir. 2001); Southern

California Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2002).

In the case of the City, the question was more speculative, because

it hinged upon the actions of many outside actors and other factors

since the City did not have control over the land. Here, while it

is unclear what the exact extent of the economic impact will be,

it is not overly speculative to assume that the designation as

critical habitat will have some effect on the profitability of the

Tsakopoulos land.4

3. Impairment of Interests

To meet the impairment prong, applicants need only demonstrate

that “disposition of the lawsuit may adversely affect the

applicant’s interest if intervention is not granted.” United

States v. State of Washington, 86 F.3d 1499, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996).

The Advisory Committee Notes for the 1966 amendments to Rule 24(a)

explain, “[i]f an absentee would be substantially affected in a

practical sense by the determination made in an action, he should,

as a general rule, be entitled to intervene.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24

Advisory Committee’s Note to 1966 Amendments. 

Issue preclusion and stare decisis have been held to prevent

an applicant from being able to protect its interests. United

States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated

on other grounds sub nom Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in

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Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987). This court’s resolution of the

validity of the FWS critical habitat designation would likely have

some preclusive effect on later challenges to that same FWS

designation. If Tsakopoulos continues to pursue resolution with

the FWS, the agency would likely be constrained by any decision

made in this case. Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A., 995 F.2d at 1486.

Additionally, the determination made in this case regarding the

validity of the designation will have a practical regulatory effect

on the Tsakopoulos land. 

4. Adequate Representation of Interests

The final factor asks whether the interests of the party

seeking to intervene are adequately represented by other parties

in the litigation. The factors governing whether existing parties

represent intervenor’s interests include “(1) whether the interest

of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all the

intervenor’s arguments; (2) whether the present party is capable

and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether the would-be

intervenor would offer any necessary elements to the proceedings

that other parties would neglect.” Northwest Forest Resources

Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 838 (9th Cir. 1996). An

applicant for intervention has the burden of demonstrating that its

interests may not be adequately represented by the existing parties

to the suit. Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 1977);

Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir.

1983). The Supreme Court has explained that this burden is

“minimal.” Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.

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5 The environmental groups note that the City of Suisun,

after asserting that they had different interests, ended up simply

filing a “notice of joinder” to the motion for summary judgment

which was filed by Home Builders. 

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10 (1972). “[T]he Rule is satisfied if the applicant shows that

the representation of his interest ‘may be’ inadequate.” Id. 

Here, the environmental groups argue that the interests

Tsakopoulos seeks to protect are adequately represented by Home

Builders.5 They argue that they both share the same objective in

the litigation and that Home Builders is an organization formed to

protect the interests of developers like Tsakopoulos. It is

established that where the party seeking to intervene has “the same

ultimate objective” in the litigation that “there is a presumption

of adequacy of representation.” League of United Latin American

Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1305 (9th Cir. 1997)(quoting

Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 838

(9th Cir. 1996)). It has also been held that mere variations in

strategy, “are not enough to justify intervention as a matter of

right.” United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 402

(9th Cir. 2002). 

Tsakopoulos argues that the Home Builders will not adequately

represent Tsakopoulos’ interests because the objective of the Home

Builders covers many species and locations, and lacks the ability

to attest to relevant events regarding Excelsior Estates. 

Additionally, the Home Builders failed to plead the claim that the

FWS failed to provide adequate public notice and comment. 

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The argument by the environmental groups is not without merit.

On the other hand, it is possible that the greater organization may

have to make trade-offs in strategy which could compromise the

specific interests of Tsakopoulos. 

In the cases which emphasize that a shared ultimate objective

defeats intervention by right, the objective is usually framed by

the court as a narrow one where the specific interests would be

properly protected because the nuance may not be as significant.

See, e.g., United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 402

(court found that the intervenors did “not contest any portion of

the consent decree. Rather, they [sought] to intervene merely to

ensure that it [was] strictly enforced.); Northwest Forest Resource

Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d at 838 (the goal was “seeking the same

limited interpretation of Section 2001(k)(1)); Oregon Environmental

Council v. Oregon Dept. of Environmental Quality, 775 F.Supp. 353,

359 (D. Or. 1991)(the issue was “whether the DEQ is interpreting

and applying the terms of the implementation plan for the State of

Oregon in the manner that is required by the Clean Air Act.”).

In the matter at bar, the basic claims asserted are the same

and the ultimate result will probably not vary. Nonetheless, the

proposed complaint makes specific allegations regarding the land

owned by Tsakopoulos and they have demonstrated a more specific

goal for their involvement in the case. This factor is a close

call, but since the standard is to be applied liberally the court

finds that the Tsakopoulos have shown that their interests are

specific enough that they may not be adequately represented by the

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Home Builders or the City of Suisun. The complaint that they have

filed does vary somewhat from the Home Builders’ by making specific

requests about the Tsakopoulos land, and they have filed their own

motion for summary judgment (in contrast to the City of Suisun

which ended up just joining that of the Home Builders). 

B. RESTRICTIONS

The Tsakopoulos’ request for intervention provides that they

seek to intervene under similar restrictions to those which the

court placed on the City of Suisun, namely that it be restricted

to raising arguments which relate to the issues concerning the

species on the land that the company owns, and that it will not

raise any arguments connected with the related case. In light of

the court’s concern that Home Builders are already adequately

representing the general interests of the Tsakopoulos, this

restriction will be adopted.

III. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The motion to intervene by Tsakopoulos is GRANTED with the

restrictions noted above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: April 19, 2006.

/s/Lawrence K. Karlton 

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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