Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00942/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00942-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHEN GARCIA, Civil No. 12cv0942 LAB (MDD)

Plaintiff, (1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; 

and

(2) DISMISSING ACTION

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR

FAILING TO STATE A 

CLAIM PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)

vs.

GEORGE BAILEY CORRECTIONAL

INSTITUTION; SAN DIEGO COUNTY

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; PUBLIC

DEFENDER’S OFFICE,

Defendants.

Stephen Garcia (“Plaintiff”), a former inmate currently residing in Los Angeles,

California, and proceeding pro se, has submitted a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1983. In addition, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis(“IFP”) pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 1].

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I. Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 1]

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States,

except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if the

party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook,

169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an

affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Based upon

this financial information, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP. 

II. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)

A complaint filed by any person proceeding in forma pauperis is subject to sua sponte

dismissal to the extent it is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that 

“the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a

district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Barren v. Harrington,

152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). However, while liberal construction is “particularly important in 

civil rights cases,” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992), the Court may not 

“supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents

of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The district court should grant

leave to amend, however, unless it determines that “the pleading could not possibly be cured by

the allegation of other facts” and if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the

defect.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31.

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Here, Plaintiff brings this action under “breach of contract” and “discrimination.” 

(Compl. at 1.) The Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint as being brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, along with attempting to state a claim under California state law. Section 1983 imposes

two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state

law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant ofsome right,

privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985)

(en banc).

As an initial matter, Plaintiff alleges the Deputy Public Defender appointed to represent

him during his criminal proceedings was ineffective. (See Compl. at 3-4.) However, a person

“acts under color of state law [for purposes of § 1983] only when exercising power ‘possessed

by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the

authority of state law.’” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981) (quoting United

States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Attorneys appointed to represent a criminal

defendant during trial, do not generally act under color ofstate law because representing a client

“is essentially a private function ... for which state office and authority are not needed.” Polk

County, 454 U.S. at 319; United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1442 n.12 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Thus, when publicly appointed counsel are performing as advocates, i.e., meeting with clients,

investigating possible defenses, presenting evidence at trial and arguing to the jury, they do not

act under color of state law for section 1983 purposes. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42,

53 (1992); Polk County, 454 U.S. at 320-25; Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding that public defender was not a state actor subject to suit under

§ 1983 because, so long as he performs a traditional role of an attorney for a client, “his

function,” no matter how ineffective, is “to represent his client, not the interests of the state or

county.”). 

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Accordingly,Plaintiff’s claims against the DeputyPublic Defender appointed to represent

him in his criminal proceedings must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which

section 1983 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the

alleged ineffectiveness assistance of his trial counsel, his claim amounts to an attack on the

validity of his underlying criminal proceedings, and as such, is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 unless and until he can show that conviction has already been invalidated. Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 855-56 (9th Cir.

2003) (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state

remedies has no cause of action under § 1983....’”) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489), cert. denied,

124 S. Ct. 2388 (2004). Heck holds that “in order to recover damages for allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove

that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. 

A claim challenging the legality of a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is

not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487; Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: 

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983 suit, the

district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or

sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the

plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already

been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the

plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the

invalidityof anyoutstanding criminal judgment againstthe plaintiff,

the action should be allowed to proceed.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). An action that is barred by Heck should be dismissed

for failure to state a claim without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to file a new action if he succeeds

in invalidating his conviction. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649.

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Here, Plaintiff’sineffective assistance of counsel claims “necessarilyimplythe invalidity”

of his criminal proceedings. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Were Plaintiff to succeed in showing that

the Deputy Public Defender appointed to represent him rendered ineffective assistance of

counsel, an award of damages would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his conviction. Id.;

see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (to succeed on ineffective

assistance claim petitioner must show that counsel’s performance fell below objective standard

of reasonableness and that but for counsel’s errors the result of the trial would have been

different); Lozada v. Deeds, 964 F.2d 956, 958-59 (9th Cir. 1992) (remedy for ineffective

assistance of counsel is a conditional writ granting petitioner’s release unless state retries him

or allows him to pursue an appeal with the assistance of counsel within a reasonable time). 

Thus, because Plaintiffseeks damages for an allegedly unconstitutional criminal proceedings in

a criminal case, and because he has not alleged that his conviction has already been invalidated,

a section 1983 claim for damages has not yet accrued. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90. 

Plaintiff also names the Public Defender’s Office and George Bailey Correctional

Institution as Defendants in this matter. An agency or department of a municipal entity is not

a proper defendant under § 1983. Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D.

Cal. 1996). Rather, the county or city itself is the proper defendant. See Id. “[A] municipality

cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor – or, in other words, a municipality

cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for

monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where the constitutional deprivation was caused by

the implementation or execution of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision

officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Board of

the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997); Navarro v.

Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995).

To establish municipal liability, plaintiff must show: (1) he was deprived of a

constitutional right; (2) the city had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate indifference

to plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the “moving force behind the

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constitutional violation.” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996); see

Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S. Ct. at 1388; Trevino v.

Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, in order to state a § 1983 claim against the City

or County of San Diego, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that his injury was caused by

individual officers whose conduct conformed to an official city policy, custom or practice. See

Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 624. 

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a § 1983 claim against the City or

County of San Diego because he has failed to allege that any individual police officer’s conduct

conformed to an official city policy, custom or practice. 

Plaintiff also seeks to bring claims pursuant to California state law against the named

Defendants. (See Compl. at 1.) However, because Plaintiff cannot identity a violation of a

federal law, the Court exercises its discretion to dismiss Plaintiff’s pendent state law claims

without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district court may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ... the district court has dismissed

all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, ... the state claims

should be dismissed as well.”); Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997)

(“[O]nce judicial power exists under § 1367(a), retention ofsupplemental jurisdiction over state

law claims under 1367(c) is discretionary.”)

For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed sua

sponte for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 1] is

GRANTED. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to file the “lodged” Complaint. However, 

Plaintiff’s Complaint is also DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this

Order is “Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of

pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without

reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not named and

all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

DATED: June 1, 2012

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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