Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05235/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05235-165/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

POWER INTEGRATIONS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

FAIRCHILD SEMICONDUCTOR 

INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 09-cv-05235-MMC 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR RELIEF AND TO 

VACATE JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 1019

Before the Court is defendants Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc., 

Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation, and Fairchild (Taiwan) Corporation’s (collectively 

“Fairchild”) Motion for Relief and to Vacate Judgment, filed January 6, 2017. Plaintiff 

Power Integrations, Inc. (“Power Integrations”) has filed opposition, to which Fairchild has 

replied. Having considered the parties’ respective written submissions, the Court rules as 

follows.1

BACKGROUND

The parties are familiar with the procedural background of the case. As relevant to 

the instant motion, suffice it to say that two jury trials were conducted, the first on the 

issues of liability and damages, after which the Court granted Fairchild’s motion for a new 

trial on the issue of damages, and the second on the issue of damages alone, after which 

the Clerk of Court entered judgment. 

On December 12, 2016, Fairchild filed a Statement of Recent Decision, requesting 

a status conference as to the effect of the Federal Circuit’s opinion in a case brought by 

 

1 By order filed February 7, 2016, the Court took the matter under submission.

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Power Integrations against Fairchild in the District of Delaware. See Power Integrations, 

Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 843 F.3d 1315 (2016) (hereinafter “Fairchild II”).

The Court conducted a telephonic status conference and granted Fairchild leave to file 

the instant motion, which Fairchild brings under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure and, alternatively, under Rule 60(b)(6). 

DISCUSSION

In support of the instant motion, Fairchild makes several arguments, which the 

Court addresses in turn and, as discussed below, finds unpersuasive. 

First, as to the Seventh Amendment, the Court, contrary to Fairchild’s argument,

finds there has been no violation. In particular, the “second (damages) jury” was not 

“asked to find damages based on additional acts of liability beyond those determined by 

the first (liability) jury.” (See Mot. at 8:11-13). At whatever point one may draw the 

dividing line between liability and damages in a case where a plaintiff seeks damages in 

the form of lost profits, where, as here, a plaintiff seeks damages in the form of a 

reasonable royalty, that line is drawn immediately after the jury finds “at least one”

instance of induced infringement. See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 

F.3d 1301, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Thereafter, the jury, in considering how the parties to 

the hypothetical negotiation would have arrived at the amount of a royalty, may look, for 

example, to a defendant’s infringing sales; even at that stage, however, there is no 

“requirement” that such damages be “limited to specific instances of infringement.” See

id. at 1334 (noting, while jury may find it “helpful” to consider “evidence of usage,” 

companies “in the high-tech computer industry often strike licensing deals in which the 

amount paid . . . is not necessarily limited to the number of times a patented feature is 

used by a consumer”).

Next, contrary to Fairchild’s argument, the Court finds Power Integrations 

submitted “sufficient evidence showing successful inducing communication between 

Fairchild and the identified third party direct infringers.” (See Mot. at 14:10-14.) Indeed,

in Fairchild II, the Federal Circuit held “it was sufficient to allow the jury to find,” as the 

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Court did here, “that Fairchild had induced its customers . . . to infringe as a class,” see

Fairchild II, 843 F.3d at 1334, and that, based on essentially the same type of evidence 

as submitted in the instant case, Power Integrations had “provided the jury substantial 

evidence upon which to find inducement,” see Fairchild II, 843 F.3d at 1334 (listing 

evidence on which Power Integrations relied).

Lastly, contrary to Fairchild’s argument, the Court’s jury instructions did not 

“misstate[] the law of inducement.” (See Mot. at 17:24-25.) In contrast to the instruction 

in Fairchild II, which improperly told the jury it could find liability based on what was, in 

essence, attempted inducement, the instruction given in the instant case correctly 

informed the jury that Fairchild’s acts must in fact have resulted in direct infringement. 

Compare Fairchild II, 843 F.3d at 1330-32 (finding reversible error where district court 

instructed jury: “[I]n order to find inducement . . . , infringement need not have been 

actually caused by the party’s actions; [a]ll that is required is that the party took steps to 

encourage or assist that infringement, regardless of whether that encouragement 

succeeded, or was even received.”), with Power Integrations v. Fairchild Semiconductor 

Int’l, Inc., No. 09-5235-MMC, Doc. No. 552 (Trial I Jury Instructions), at 26 (instructing 

jury: “In order to be liable for inducement of infringement, the party accused of the 

infringement must . . . have intentionally taken action that actually induced infringement 

by another.”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Fairchild’s motion is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2017

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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