Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00889/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00889-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:1334 Bankruptcy Appeal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY BRIAN JOHNSON,

Appellant,

v.

IRMA C. EDMONDS and OFFICE OF 

THE U.S. TRUSTEE (SACRAMENTO),

Appellees.

No. 2:14-cv-00889-TLN

ORDER

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Jeffrey Brian Johnson’s (“Appellant”) appeal 

from the denial of his motion to set aside judgment. (Brief in Supp. of Appeal, ECF No. 11.) For 

the reasons set forth below, the Court vacates the order denying Appellant’s motion to set aside 

judgment and remands to the United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of California 

(“bankruptcy court”) for reconsideration consistent with this opinion.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 24, 2014, Appellant moved to have his Chapter 7 bankruptcy converted to 

Chapter 13 on the grounds that liens and fines, which made up most of Appellant’s debt, were not 

dischargeable under his pending Chapter 7 bankruptcy. (Statement of Facts (“SOF”), ECF No. 11 

at 10.)1 On February 24, 2014, the motion was denied without prejudice for Appellant’s failure to 

 

1 Appellant’s brief (ECF No. 11) includes legal argument and numerous attachments without exhibit designations. 

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properly serve creditors, to support the motion with evidence, and for violation of a separate 

notice of hearing. (SOF, ECF No. 11 at 10.) Appellant maintains that he filed a corrected motion 

on March 4, 2014, that was not entered until March 5, 2014. (SOF, ECF No. 11 at 10.) Prior to 

the entry of his corrected motion, the bankruptcy court issued an order discharging Appellant’s 

debt under Chapter 7 on March 4, 2014, making Appellant’s motion moot. (SOF, ECF No. 11 at 

10.) As a result, Appellant moved the bankruptcy court to set aside its order of Chapter 7 

discharge on March 13, 2014. (Mot. to Set Aside, ECF No. 11 at 55.) In his motion, Appellant 

argued that the bankruptcy court should apply Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(a) (“FRCP 60(a)”) and 60(b)

(“FRCP 60(b)”), as required by Fed. R. of Bankruptcy Pro. 9024 (“FRBP 9024”). (Mem. in 

Supp. of Mot. to Set Aside (“Mem.”), ECF No. 11 at 62 and 65.) The bankruptcy court issued 

an order denying his motion on March 24, 2014. (Order, ECF No. 11 at 84.) Appellant filed a 

notice of appeal with this Court contesting the bankruptcy court’s order on April 8, 2014. (ECF 

No. 11 at 11.) 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

District courts have appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, orders, and decrees of 

bankruptcy courts. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). “When reviewing a bankruptcy court’s decision ..., a 

district court functions as an appellate court and applies the standard of review generally applied 

in federal court appeals.” In re Crystal Properties, Ltd., L.P., 268 F.3d 743, 755 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(quoting In re Webb, 954 F.2d 1102, 1103–04 (5th Cir.1992)). The district court “may affirm, 

modify, or reverse a bankruptcy judge’s judgment, order, or decree or remand with instructions 

for further proceedings.” Fed. R. Bank. P. 8013. 

The Court finds that the instant appeal is based upon a mixed question of law and fact. “A 

mixed question of law and fact occurs when the historical facts are established; the rule of law is 

undisputed ... and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the legal rule.” Id. (citing PullmanStandard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n. 19 (1982)). Where a court is presented with a mixed 

question of law and fact, a de novo standard of review applies. In re Bammer, 131 F.3d 788, 792 

 

For clarity, the Court will refer to the individual titles of each document within the filing when referencing ECF No. 

11.

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(9th Cir. 1997). 

III. ANALYSIS

In his appeal to this Court, Appellant makes three arguments. First, Appellant alleges that 

the bankruptcy court committed prejudicial error when it failed to address Appellant’s argument 

that a clerical error under FRCP 60(a) provided sufficient cause to set aside the discharge order. 

(Argument, ECF No. 11 at 13.) Second, Appellant argues that the bankruptcy court misapplied 

the law to the facts under FRCP 60(b)(1) when it failed to address Appellant’s argument that his 

circumstances met the “excusable neglect” requirement. (Argument, ECF No. 11 at 14–15.) 

Finally, Appellant alleges that the bankruptcy court erroneously applied the requirements of 11 

U.S.C. § 727 to Appellant’s motion. (SOF, ECF No. 11 at 11–12.)

a. FRCP 60(a)

Pursuant to FRBP 9024, Relief from Judgment or Order, a court should apply FRCP 60

when a party seeks relief from judgment. FRCP 60(a) states that the “court may correct a clerical 

mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, 

order, or other part of the record.” In Appellant’s motion before the bankruptcy court, he argues 

that his motion requesting conversion from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 was incorrectly marked as 

filed on March 5, 2014, when Appellant actually filed it on March 4, 2014. (Mem., ECF No. 11 

at 63–64.) Appellant further argues that his motion was submitted before the bankruptcy court’s 

discharge was issued, although he provides no evidence to support this contention. (Mem., ECF 

No. 11 at 63–64.) Appellant’s motion argues that the bankruptcy court failed to address this 

issue. (Argument, ECF No. 11 at 13.)

The Court has reviewed the bankruptcy court’s order denying Appellant’s motion and 

finds that the bankruptcy court did not address Appellant’s contention that a clerical error resulted 

in improper dismissal of his motion to convert his proceedings. (Order, ECF No. 84–85.) This 

Court further determines that a mistake under FRCP 60(a) could form the basis for vacating the 

Chapter 7 discharge. “Errors correctable under FRCP 60(a) include those where what is written 

or recorded is not what the court intended to write or record.” Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 

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1574, 1577 (9th Cir. 1987).

2 A court has discretion to determine if correction of a clerical error is 

appropriate under FRCP 60(a). Id. Because the bankruptcy court is in the best position to assess 

the possibility of its own clerical error, the Court hereby remands this case to the bankruptcy 

court to determine if clerical error occurred under FRCP 60(a).

b. FRCP 60(b)

FRCP 60(b)(1) also allows for relief from judgment when a party demonstrates “mistake, 

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Appellant argued in the motion that his late filing 

of his motion for conversion could be considered “excusable neglect” due to a medical 

emergency occurring between the time his first motion for conversion was dismissed without 

prejudice, February 24, 2014, and March 4, 2014. (Mem., ECF No. 11 at 67.) Appellant 

submitted a declaration and documentation of his injury to the bankruptcy court along with his 

motion for relief from judgment. (Decl. of J. Johnson, ECF No. 11 at 71–77.) Appellant argues 

that the bankruptcy court failed to address this issue. (Argument, ECF No. 11 at 13.)

The Court has reviewed the bankruptcy court’s order denying Appellant’s motion and 

finds that the bankruptcy court did not address Appellant’s contention that his emergency medical 

condition constituted excusable neglect under FRCP 60(b)(1). (Order, ECF No. 84–85.) 

However, the Court notes that relief under FRCP 60(b) is to be “‘used sparingly as an equitable 

remedy to prevent manifest injustice and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances 

prevented a party from taking timely action.’” Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 

2008) (quoting United States v. Washington, 394 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005)). Courts have 

“considerable discretion” in applying FRCP 60(b) as a remedy. Mazalin v. Safeway, Inc., No. 

CIV S-10-1445 KJM, 2012 WL 5387704, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012). Because the 

bankruptcy court is most familiar with the circumstances of this case, the Court hereby remands 

this case to the bankruptcy court to use its discretion to determine if excusable neglect occurred 

under FRCP 60(b)(1).

/ / /

 

2 Compare Re v. United States, No. C 13-03518 WHA, 2014 WL 296046, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2014) (denying 

plaintiff’s motion for FRCP 60(a) relief where the alleged mistake was based on substantive legal or factual mistakes 

within the order).

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c. 11 U.S.C. § 727

Finally, in his appeal to this Court, Appellant argues that the bankruptcy court’s 

application of 11 U.S.C. § 727 to his motion for relief from judgment was incorrect. (SOF, ECF 

No. 11 at 11.) This Court agrees. FRBP 9024 specifies the FRCP 60 should apply in cases where 

relief from judgment is sought. FRBP 9024 indicates that, in order to revoke a discharge of a 

Chapter 7 case, the court must apply 11 U.S.C. § 727(e) in determining the timeline in which the 

motion for discharge is filed, providing one year from the entry of discharge. However, the 

bankruptcy court’s order dismissing Appellant’s motion for discharge discusses the four factors 

under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d). (Order, ECF No. 11 at 85.) Rule 9024 gives no indication that 11 

U.S.C. § 727(d) is applicable in this instance and the text of § 727(d) itself indicates that the 

subsection is only appropriate in adversarial proceedings, not a motion of this nature.

The Court finds that 11 U.S.C. § 727(d) is not the correct standard to apply to Appellant’s 

motion for discharge. However, the Court does not find this error to be prejudicial. The 

bankruptcy court’s order simply indicates that 11 U.S.C § 727(d) does not provide grounds for 

revocation, which is correct. The bankruptcy court’s determination with respect to 11 U.S.C. § 

727(d) should not prevent a determination that revocation is permissible under FRCP 60 if the 

bankruptcy court finds, using its discretion, that revocation is appropriate on the grounds of 

clerical error or excusable neglect. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The order of the bankruptcy court denying Appellant’s motion to set aside his Chapter 7 

discharge is vacated. This case is remanded to the bankruptcy court for a determination of 

whether the bankruptcy court committed a clerical error under FRCP 60(a) and whether 

Appellant’s medical treatment between February 24, 2014 and March 4, 2014 constitutes 

excusable neglect under FRCP 60(b).

IT IS ORDERED.

Dated: January 30, 2015

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