Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00183/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00183-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 - Petition for Removal: Securities Fraud

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Wayne Craig, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Worldwide Mixed Martial Arts Sports 

Incorporated, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-14-00183-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)-(5) and on the ground of forum non conveniens. Doc. 6. 

Defendants have also moved to transfer the case to the District of New Jersey pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Id.; Doc. 3. The motion is fully briefed. The Court will grant in 

part and deny in part Defendants’ motion.1

 

I. Background. 

 Defendants Worldwide Mixed Martial Arts Sports (“WMMA”), Worldwide MMA 

USA, Inc. (“WUSA”), WMMA Holdings, Inc. (“WMMAH”), and various corporate 

officers are in the business of organizing and operating mixed martial arts events, fights, 

and promotions. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 15. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he invested $250,000 

with Defendants after learning about their business from a document entitled Confidential 

 

1

 The requests for oral argument are denied because the issues have been fully briefed and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); 

Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Case 2:14-cv-00183-DGC Document 21 Filed 07/08/14 Page 1 of 7
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Private Placement Memorandum (“CPPM”). The parties’ relationship is memorialized in 

a Regional Promoter Agreement (“RPA”). Id., ¶¶ 16-17. The CPPM and RPA allegedly 

contain material representations of fact that are not true. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 20. Instead of 

actually organizing a network of promoters that would stage mixed martial arts 

competitions, Defendants allegedly used investment proceeds acquired from Plaintiff to 

pay pre-existing liabilities. Id., ¶ 23. 

 The RPA contains a forum-selection clause that provides: “Disputes, between the 

Parties that cannot be settled after a 30-day Cure Period will be resolved in a non-jury 

trial in the federal district court in the state where WUSA’s current headquarters resides.” 

Doc. 6-1 at 14, ¶ 20. Plaintiff filed a complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court on 

August 30, 2013, asserting a claim for fraud in connection with the offer and sale of 

securities in violation of A.R.S. § 44-1991 and a claim for rescission. Doc. 1-1 at 2, 12, 

14. The case was removed to federal court on January 30, 2014. Doc. 1. Defendants 

filed their motion to dismiss on February 26, 2014. Doc. 6. Defendants assert lack of 

personal jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficient process, and insufficient service of 

process. Id. at 2. They also assert that the case should be transferred pursuant to the 

forum-selection clause. Doc. 3. Because the Court finds that the forum-selection clause 

should be enforced, it will not address Defendants’ other arguments. 

II. Legal Standard. 

A. Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses. 

 Federal law governs the enforceability and interpretation of forum-selection 

clauses. See Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 513 (9th 

Cir. 1988). Such clauses are presumptively valid, see Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 

1083 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), and should not be set aside unless the party 

challenging enforcement of the provision can show that enforcement would be 

unreasonable, see Argueta v. Banco Mexicano, S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 325 (9th Cir. 1996). 

There are three circumstances where enforcement may be unreasonable: “(1) if the 

inclusion of the clause in the agreement was the product of fraud or overreaching; (2) if 

Case 2:14-cv-00183-DGC Document 21 Filed 07/08/14 Page 2 of 7
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the party wishing to repudiate the clause would effectively be deprived of his day in court 

were the clause enforced; and (3) if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy 

of the forum in which suit is brought.” Murphy v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 

1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-13, 

15, 18 (1972)). The party challenging the clause has a heavy burden of proof. Id. 

B. Motion to Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 

A forum-selection clause may be enforced by a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1404(a). Atlantic Marine Constr. Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. 

Ct. 568, 575 (2013). If a defendant files such a motion, “a district court should transfer 

the case unless extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties 

clearly disfavor a transfer.” Id. 

 District courts may decide motions to transfer according to individualized, caseby-case considerations of convenience and fairness. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 

612, 622 (1964); Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 486 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting 

that the decision to change venue is left to the discretion of the district court). In the 

typical case not involving a forum-selection clause, “a district court considering a 

§ 1404(a) motion must evaluate both the convenience of the parties and various public 

interest considerations.” Atlantic Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581. In such circumstances, “the 

district court would weigh the relevant factors and decide whether, on balance, a transfer 

would serve ‘the convenience of the parties and witnesses’ and otherwise promote ‘the 

interest of justice.’” See id. (citing § 1404(a)). 

 “The calculus changes, however, when the parties’ contract contains a valid 

forum-selection clause, which represents the parties’ agreement as to the most proper 

forum.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The presence of a valid 

forum-selection clause requires the district court to adjust its usual § 1404(a) analysis in 

three ways. First, the plaintiff’s choice of forum merits no weight and the party defying 

the forum-selection clause bears the burden of establishing that transfer to the forum for 

which the parties bargained is unwarranted. Id. Second, a court evaluating a defendant’s 

Case 2:14-cv-00183-DGC Document 21 Filed 07/08/14 Page 3 of 7
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

§ 1404(a) motion to transfer based on a forum-selection clause should not consider 

arguments about the parties’ private interests. “When parties agree to a forum-selection 

clause, they waive the right to challenge the preselected forum as inconvenient or less 

convenient for themselves or their witnesses, or for their pursuit of the litigation.” Id. 

at 582. A court must deem the private-interest factors to weigh entirely in favor of the 

preselected forum and may consider arguments about public interest factors only. Id. 

“[T]hose factors will rarely defeat a transfer motion,” and a “forum-selection clause[] 

should control except in unusual cases.” Id. Third, a § 1404(a) transfer will not carry 

with it the original venue’s choice-of-law rules. Id. 

III. Analysis. 

 Defendants’ principal argument is that the forum-selection clause should be 

enforced as to all claims and all parties and that the case should be dismissed pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3). Doc. 6 at 9. But a forum-selection clause cannot be enforced 

by moving to dismiss under Rule 12(b); it must be enforced by moving to transfer under 

§ 1404(a). Atlantic Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 575. Elsewhere in their briefing, Defendants 

urge the Court to enforce the forum-selection clause by transferring the case to the 

District of New Jersey. Doc. 3 at 1-2; Doc. 6 at 7; Doc. 20 at 2. Plaintiff has responded 

to this request in its reply.2

 

A. Stay of Litigation as to WMMA. 

 Plaintiff has produced an official form indicating that an involuntary bankruptcy 

petition has been filed against WMMA. Doc. 18-1 at 7. Defendants do not challenge the 

authenticity of the form. The case is therefore stayed as to WMMA and this order will 

have no effect on the claims against WMMA. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 

 

2

 Forum-selection clauses are applicable to non-parties who are closely related to the contract relationship. See Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 

450, 456 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 514 n.5). Here, each 

Defendant is being sued in connection with its relationship to the RPA and the allegedly deficient performance by WMMA and WUSA. Plaintiff does not argue that the forum selection clause is inapplicable to some of Defendants. 

Case 2:14-cv-00183-DGC Document 21 Filed 07/08/14 Page 4 of 7
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

B. Enforcement of the Forum-Selection Clause. 

 Plaintiff does not argue that the forum-selection clause was the product of fraud or 

that enforcement of the clause contravenes a strong public policy in Arizona. He argues 

instead that transfer would effectively deny him his day in court because he would be 

required to file a new action in New Jersey even though the applicable statute of 

limitations in New Jersey may have run. Doc. 18 at 10. Plaintiff misunderstands the 

mechanics of transfer under § 1404(a). It has long been the rule that “[a]n order 

transferring [a case] to another district does not end but preserves it as against the running 

of the statute of limitations[.]” Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31 (1955). Transfer 

of the case to New Jersey will not require Plaintiff to file a new action. This case will 

retain its original filing date for purposes of any statute of limitations. The Court 

concludes that transfer will not deny Plaintiff his day in court. Because Plaintiff has 

made no other arguments concerning the enforceability of the forum-selection clause, the 

Court concludes that the clause is enforceable. 

C. Motion to Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 

 Plaintiff does not argue that there are “extraordinary circumstances unrelated to 

the convenience of the parties” or that any other factors clearly disfavor transferring this 

case to the District of New Jersey. Atlantic Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 568. Rather, Plaintiff 

argues that the District of Arizona is the forum designated by the forum-selection clause. 

Doc. 18 at 4. As already noted, the clause provides that all disputes “will be resolved in a 

non-jury trial in the federal district court in the state where WUSA’s current headquarters 

resides.” Doc. 6-1 at 14, ¶ 20. The RPA does not, however, expressly designate the 

location of WUSA’s “current headquarters.” 

 When interpreting forum-selection clauses, the words are given their “common or 

normal meaning . . . unless circumstances show that in a particular case a special meaning 

should be attached to it.” Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 77 

(9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). No circumstances suggest a special meaning here. 

“Headquarters” refers to a place from which something (such as a business) is controlled 

Case 2:14-cv-00183-DGC Document 21 Filed 07/08/14 Page 5 of 7
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

or directed. See Headquarters Definition, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/ 

headquarters (last visited Jun. 10, 2014). 

 Plaintiff asserts that “current headquarters” refers to an office located in 

Scottsdale, Arizona that WUSA maintained in 2011. Doc. 18 at 4. Plaintiff has provided 

a sworn statement asserting that WUSA “maintained headquarters like offices” in 

Scottsdale, Arizona and that WUSA personnel referred to the Scottsdale location as the 

“west coast office” of WUSA. Doc. 18-1, ¶ 7. Plaintiff asserts that Barry Jarrell, 

WUSA’s President in 2011, maintained an office at the Scottsdale location. Id., ¶ 8. 

Even if the Scottsdale location was not WUSA’s official “current headquarters,” Plaintiff 

cites Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (2 H. & C. 906) (1864), for the 

proposition that ambiguous contractual terms should be construed against the drafting 

party. Doc. 18 at 6.3

 

 The evidence presented by the parties persuades the Court that WUSA’s 

headquarters is located in New Jersey and that Plaintiff clearly was on notice of this fact. 

WUSA’s primary employees are residents of New Jersey, and management decisions are 

made at WUSA’s New Jersey office. Doc. 6-1 at 4. Defendants have produced articles 

of incorporation, state filings, and other corporate documents confirming that WUSA is 

headquartered in New Jersey. Id. at 38-43; Doc. 20 at 27, 53-55. This fact was clear in 

the documents Plaintiff reviewed and signed. The first page of the RPA, which Plaintiff 

initialed, states that WUSA’s address is 150 Clove Road, Little Falls, New Jersey. See

Doc. 6-1 at 11. The same address is contained on the last page of the RPA and in 

exhibits to the RPA which were also initialed by Plaintiff. Id. at 15, 22. WMMA leased 

office space in Scottsdale, but WUSA maintained no office there. Id. at 6-7; 20. 

 

3

 In Raffles, the parties contracted for the sale of cotton which was to be shipped from Bombay to Liverpool on the ship “Peerless.” Neither party was aware that there were two ships named “Peerless” carrying cotton from Bombay to Liverpool, one arriving in October and the other in December. The Raffles court concluded that there 

was no meeting of the minds because of the latent ambiguity in the contract. In this case, 

Plaintiff attempts to argue that there was no meeting of the minds because he believed “current headquarters” referred to WUSA’s Arizona office whereas Defendants 

apparently believed that the term referred to WUSA’s New Jersey office. For the reasons 

outlined in the remainder of this order, the Court cannot agree. 

Case 2:14-cv-00183-DGC Document 21 Filed 07/08/14 Page 6 of 7
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Moreover, although Plaintiff now asserts in his affidavit that he considered the 

Scottsdale office to be the headquarters of WMMA and its affiliates (Doc. 18-1 at 4), his 

complaint in this case contradicts that assertion. The verified complaint, which Plaintiff 

swore to be true when this action was commenced, asserted that the WUSA headquarters 

was in Florida, not Arizona. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 3. 

 Employing any reasonable interpretation of the term “current headquarters,” the 

Court concludes that WUSA is headquartered in New Jersey and that Plaintiff was on 

notice of that fact when he signed the RPA. The Court will enforce the forum-selection 

clause and transfer this case to the District of New Jersey. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss/transfer (Doc. 6) is granted as set forth 

above. 

2. The Clerk is directed to transfer this case to the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey, with the exception of claims pending against 

WMMA. Because the claims against WMMA will remain in this Court, the 

Clerk shall not terminate this action as to WMMA. 

3. The parties shall, within 20 days of this order, file a joint report concerning 

the status of the WMMA bankruptcy. The report shall address whether the 

claims asserted in this case against WMMA can be asserted and resolved in 

the bankruptcy court, permitting dismissal of the remaining claims in this 

case. 

Dated this 8th day of July, 2014. 

Case 2:14-cv-00183-DGC Document 21 Filed 07/08/14 Page 7 of 7