Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00629/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00629-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SIXTO Q. NAVARETTE, 

BOP #20463-298 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

PIONEER MEDICAL CENTER; U.S. 

MARSHAL'S SERVICE; FEDERAL 

BUREAU OF PRISON; DR. MARK 

WHITE, 

Defendants. 

Civil No. 12cv0629 WQH (DHB) 

ORDER: 

(1) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING 

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b); 

AND 

(2) DENYING DEFENDANT 

WHITE'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

[ECF Nos. 10, 11] AS MOOT 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On March 12, 2012, Plaintiff, Sixto Q. Navarette, a federal inmate currently incarcerated 

at Victorville Federal Corrections Institution located in Adelanto, California, filed a civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Plaintiff filed aMotion to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No.5]. 

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The Court granted Plaintiff s Motion to Proceed IFP and sua sponte dismissed his 

Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 19l5( e )(2). [ECF No.7.] Plaintiff 

was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct the deficiencies ofpleading 

identified by the Court. Id. On August 16, 2012, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint 

("FAC"). [ECF No.8.] On September 6, 2012, Defendant White prematurely filed a Motion 

and Amended Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint before the Court could 

conduct the required sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 19l5(e)(2). [ECF Nos. 10, 

11.] Thus, the Court DENIES Defendant White's Motions as moot in light ofthe Court's Order 

below. 

II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A 

A. Standard 

As the Court stated in its previous Order, the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") 

obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like 

Plaintiff, who are "incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or 

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, 

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program," "as soon as practicable after docketing." 

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915( e )(2) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte 

dismiss any IFP orprisoner complaint, or any portion thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails 

to state a claim, or which seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1915(e)(2)(B) and 19l5A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000)(en banc)(§ 

19 I 5(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443,446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A). 

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.c. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte 

dismissal ofonly frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is 

frivolous ifit lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 

324(1989). However28U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now mandate thatthe court reviewing 

an IFP or prisoner's suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting service of 

the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.Clv.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 ("[S]ection 

1915( e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint 

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that fails to state a claim."); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). 

"[W]hen detennining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff." Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2) 

"parallels the language of Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6)"). In addition, the Court's 

duty to liberally construe a pro se's pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is "particularly important in civil rights cases." Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

A. Claims brought pursuant to § 1983 

Once again, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants Pioneers Memorial Hospital and 

Defendant White liable pursuantto 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof 

requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the 

conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or 

immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 

Parrattv. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 

474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygoodv. Younger, 769F.2d 1350, 1354 (9thCir. 1985)(enbanc). 

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold either ofthese Defendants liable pursuant to § 1983, 

his First Amended Complaint fails to allege any facts sufficient to show that a private entity or 

their employee acted "under color ofstate law." Franklin, 312 F.3d at 444; see also Kirtley v. 

Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003) ("While generally not applicable to private parties, 

a § 1983 action can lie against a private party" only ifhe is alleged to be "a willful participant 

in joint action with the State or its agents.") (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

The Court infonned Plaintiff in its previous Order, that Plaintiff must clarifY whether or 

not he was incarcerated at the time he was provided medical treatment by Pioneers Memorial 

Hospital and Defendant White. (See July 10,2012 Order at 3.) Plaintiff has failed to do so and 

in fact, Plaintiffs allegations suggest that he was not incarcerated when he sought medical 

treatment. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he chose to have the surgery perfonned at Pioneer 

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Hospital because he "relied on Pioneer's credentials and prior personal experiences." (FAC at 

3.) If Plaintiff was not incarcerated at the time, he cannot maintain a § 1983 action against 

private entities or individuals. Thus, the claims against Defendants Pioneer Medical Center and 

Dr. White cannot be maintained in this action and must be dismissed. 

B. Eighth Amendment claims 

Even ifPlaintiff were incarcerated at the time these claims arose, he has failed to state 

an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical need claim against Defendant 

White. In order to assert a claim for inadequate medical care, Plaintiff must allege facts which 

are sufficient to show that each person sued was "deliberately indifferent to his serious medical 

needs." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 

(1976). Prison officials must purposefully ignore or fail to respond to Plaintiff s pain or medical 

needs; neither an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care, nor mere negligence or 

medical malpractice constitutes a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. 

Thus, to state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show both: (1) an 

objectively "serious" medical need, i.e., one that a reasonable doctor would think worthy of 

comment, one which significantly affects his daily activities, or one which is chronic and 

accompanied by substantial pain, see Doty v. County o/Lassen, 37 F 3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994); 

and (2) a subjective, and "sufficiently culpable" state of mind on the part of each individual 

Defendant. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,302 (1991). 

Plaintiff s allegations as to Defendant White sound in negligence. As stated above, 

inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a 

constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 

(9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff claims Defendant White delayed his surgery by initially providing him 

with pain medication. (See F AC at 4-5.) Plaintiff also claims that Defendant White should have 

performed a second surgery. (ld.) However, a mere difference ofopinion between an inmate 

and prison medical personnel regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment are not 

enough to establish a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vi/d, 891 F .2d 240,242 (9th Cir. 

1989). 

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Accordingly, Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims are dismissed for failing to state a 

§ 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted. 

C. Bivens Action 

In addition, the Court notes that while Plaintiff purportedly brings this action under 

§ 1983, the Court will liberally construe some ofhis claims to arise under Bivens v. Six Unknown 

Named Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) because Plaintiff claims violations of his 

civil rights by a federal actors. Bivens established that "compensable injury to a constitutionally 

protected interest [by federal officials alleged to have acted under color offederal law ] could be 

vindicated by a suit for damages invoking the general federal question jurisdiction ofthe federal 

courts [pursuantto 28 U.S.C. § 1331]." Butzv. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 486 (1978). "Actions 

under § 1983 and those under Bivens are identical save for the replacement ofa state actor under 

§ 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens." Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F .2d 406,409 (9th Cir. 1991). 

To state a private cause of action under Bivens, Plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right 

secured by the Constitution of the United States was violated, and (2) that the violation was 

committed by a federal actor. Id.; Karim-Panahiv. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621,624 

(9th Cir. 1988). Bivens provides that "federal courts have the inherent authority to award 

damages against federal officials to compensate plaintiffs for violations of their constitutional 

rights." Western Center for Journalism v. Cederquist, 235 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, a Bivens action may only be brought against the responsible federal official in his or 

her individual capacity. Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348,355 (9th Cir. 1988). In his 

Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to sue the United States Marshal Service and the Federal Bureau of 

Prison which are agencies of the government. (See Compl. at 1.) However, Bivens does not 

authorize a suit against the government or its agencies for monetary relief. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 

U.S. 471, 486 (1994); Thomas-Lazear v. FBI, 851 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1988); DalyMurphy, 837 F .2d at 355. Accordingly, the Court must DISMISS the claims against the Bureau 

of Prisons for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

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Plaintiff now raises new claims as to Defendant U.S. Marshal "Mark" whom he claims 

"ignored his medical condition." (FAC at 4.) Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Mark 

"intentionally inflicted pain by rising my right leg." (Id.) The Court construes these claims as 

an attempt by Plaintiff to allege an excessive force claim as to Defendant Mark. 

The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is designed to 

protect those convicted of crimes. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977). In this 

portion of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, it appears that he is alleging he was a pretrial 

detainee at the time Defendant Mark conducted the search. (See FAC at 4.) However, pretrial 

detainees, like plaintiff, are not protected by the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel 

and unusual punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.l6 (1979); Graham v. Connor, 

490 U.S. 386, 395 n.lO (1989). Instead, pretrial detainees are protected from cruel and unusual 

punishment by the Due Process Clause. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47 (1987). 

The Supreme Court has held that under that clause, "'a detainee may not be punished prior to an 

adjudication ofguilt in accordance with due process oflaw." Bell, 441 U.S. at 536. However, 

a pretrial detainee may be subjected to "restrictions and conditions ... so long as those conditions 

and restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the constitution." Id. at 

537-38. 

Because Plaintiff alleges the use of excessive force by federal officials, his claims arise 

under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; however, courts look to Eighth 

Amendment principles when reviewing excessive force claims ofpretrial detainees. See Gary 

H. v. Heggstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (the Due Process Clause "implicitly 

incorporates the cruel and unusual punishments clause standards"); White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 

1501, 1507 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that courts should examine cases which set the standard for 

violation ofthe Eighth Amendment when determining whether a pretrial detainee's due process 

rights are violated.). 

Any physical application offorce against a person in custody, whether it be through brute 

strength, chemical or other weaponry, or mechanical restraint, may not be excessive. See 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (prison shooting); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 

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(1992) (prison beating); LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1450-53, 1457, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993) 

(prison's use of in-shower and in-cell leg and waist restraints). "That is not to say that every 

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action." Hudson, 503 U.S. 

at 10 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Not every push or shove, 

even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's 

constitutional rights"). In order to violate the Eighth Amendment, the Defendant must use force 

which is "unnecessary" and "wanton." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. "It is obduracy and 

wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by 

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with 

establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control 

over a tumultuous cellblock." Id. 

Thus, a constitutional violation can only be established ifforce was used "maliciously and 

sadistically for the purpose of causing harm." Id.; see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 

(1991) (claims that an official has inflicted cruel and unusual punishment contain both an 

objective component as well as a subjective "inquiry into the prison official's state of mind"). 

The Supreme Court has also clearly stated that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition ofcruel and 

unusual punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimus uses of 

physical force, provided that the use of force is not the sort "repugnant to the conscience of 

mankind." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10. 

The Court must evaluate the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials as 

compared to the amount offorce which was used. Id. Thus, to determine whether an excessive 

force claim arises under either the Eighth Amendment or the Due Process Clause, courts 

consider four factors: (1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between the 

need to use force and the amount of force used; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted; and (4) 

whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or to 

maliciously and sadistically cause harm. Id. at 7; White, 901 F.2d at 1507. 

Here, Plaintiff provides insufficient facts from which the Court could adequately evaluate 

his claim under any ofthe above stated factors. Plaintiff alleges facts which indicate Defendant 

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Mark was conducting a search for contraband prior to Plaintiff appearing in court. (See F AC 

at 4.) While not entirely clear, it appears that Plaintiff requested Defendant Mark "to be careful 

while searching" him for contraband. (ld.) Defendant Mark is alleged to have raised Plaintiff's 

leg causing him pain during the search. (ld.) After Plaintiff expressed his level of pain, 

Defendant Mark "apologized for his action, but the damage was done." (ld.) There are no 

allegations that Defendant Mark acted "maliciously or sadistically" to cause Plaintiff harm. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff's excessive force claims are dismissed for failing to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff's entire First Amended Complaint must be dismissed for failing 

to state a claim upon which section 1983 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A(b). 

III. 	 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 

§ 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is further GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date 

this Order is filed in which to file a Second Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies 

ofpleading noted above. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without 

reference to his previous pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIvLR 15.1. Defendants not named and all 

claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 

814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 

Defendant White's Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (ECF Nos. 

10, 11) are DENIED as moot. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: -1¥-f~---4;~f-I-~---Z"",,- ... __

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