Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08078/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08078-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carlton Errol Godwin, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 13-08078 PCT JAT (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about April

5, 2013. Respondents filed a Limited Answer to First Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 17) on

November 7, 2013. Petitioner was granted multiple extensions of

the time allowed to file a reply to the answer to his petition;

the Court’s latest order required Petitioner to docket a reply

to the answer to his petition on or before March 27, 2015. See

Doc. 40. Petitioner has not, as of March 30, 2015, more than

one year and five months after an answer was filed, docketed any

reply to the answer to his petition.

I Procedural History

Petitioner was arrested on July 7, 2006; the arrest

resulted in charges brought in Yavapai County Superior Court

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case number CR2006–000889. See Answer, Exh. A at 1. On July

13, 2006, Petitioner was charged with two counts of driving

while under the influence, theft of a credit card, possession of

a dangerous drug, possession of a narcotic drug, and possession

of drug paraphernalia in CR2006–000889. Id., Exh. B. On July

19, 2007, the state successfully moved to dismiss that case

without prejudice. Id., Exh. C. 

On February 1, 2007, Petitioner was arrested; the arrest

resulted in charges brought in Yavapai County Superior Court

case number CR2007–000204. Id., Exh. A at 1. Respondents aver

they have been unable to locate the charging document in that

case to determine the nature of the allegations against

Petitioner and the case was dismissed on July 17, 2007.

However, the arrest on February 1, 2007, also resulted in

Petitioner being charged in Yavapai County Superior Court case

number CR2007–000205. Id., Exh. D. In that matter Petitioner

was charged with possession of marijuana, possession of a

dangerous drug for sale, two counts of possession of a narcotic

drug for sale, and two counts of possession of drug

paraphernalia. Id., Exh. D. 

Petitioner entered into a plea agreement in CR2007–000205

on August 10, 2007. The plea agreement provided Petitioner

would plead guilty to possession of a dangerous drug, based on

his conduct on July 7, 2006, and to one count of possession of

a dangerous drug for sale, based on his conduct on February 1,

2007. See id., Exh. E. In exchange for Petitioner’s guilty

pleas on these two counts the state agreed to dismiss all other

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charges in CR2007–000205, refrain from re-filing charges in

CR2007–000204, and refrain from re-filing any other charges in

CR2006–000889. Id., Exh. E. The plea agreement also provided

that Petitioner’s sentences for his convictions on possession of

a dangerous drug and possession of a dangerous drug for sale

would total 7.5 years’ imprisonment and would be ordered to be

served concurrently. Id., Exh. E. Although the written plea

agreement contains several hand-written changes to the typed

text, Petitioner initialed each change to the typed text,

initialed all other appropriate places in the document, and

signed the plea agreement. 

At a hearing conducted August 10, 2007, the state trial

court conducted a lengthy colloquy with Petitioner, during which

Petitioner averred he understood the terms of the plea

agreement. Petitioner told the trial court he understood the

rights he was waiving pursuant to the agreement, including his

right to a trial and his right to take a direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. See id., Exh. F at 2–15. At that

time, pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced

Petitioner to a term of 7.5 years imprisonment pursuant to his

conviction for possession of dangerous drugs for sale, i.e.,

methamphetamine, and to a concurrent term of 2.5 years

imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for possession of

dangerous drugs, i.e., methamphetamine, with credit for 188 days

of pre-sentence incarceration. Id., Exh. F at 24–25. 

More than two years later, on December 22, 2009,

Petitioner initiated a state action for post-conviction relief

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pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id.,

Exh. G. Petitioner asserted he did not know CR2006–000889 had

been dismissed and that, had he known about the dismissal, he

would not have agreed to plead guilty to any charges arising

from his conduct on July 7, 2006. Id., Exh. G at 5. Petitioner

asserted that his counsel had been ineffective for failing to

inform him that CR2006–000889 had been dismissed, and further

alleged prosecutorial misconduct warranted vacating his

convictions. Petitioner alleged the prosecutor wrongfully

induced him to sign a “fraudulent” plea agreement, which

Petitioner did not learn about until August 18, 2008; Petitioner

asserted this information was newly-discovered evidence excusing

the untimeliness of the post-conviction action. Id., Exh. G at

3. 

In a decision entered January 5, 2010, the state trial

court dismissed Petitioner’s post-conviction proceedings. Id.,

Exh. H. The trial court determined the proceedings were

untimely and precluded under Arizona procedural law. The state

trial court concluded Petitioner’s allegedly newly-discovered

evidence was not “newly-discovered” because he waited more than

sixteen months after discovering the information to initiate

post-conviction proceedings. The court further determined

relief on any claim regarding the conviction for which

Petitioner received a sentence of 2.5 years imprisonment was

moot because his current incarceration was a result of the

lengthier, concurrent sentence imposed pursuant to his

conviction in CR2007–000205. Id., Exh. H.

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 Petitioner sought review of the trial court’s decision

denying post-conviction relief by the Arizona Court of Appeals,

which denied review on July 8, 2011. Id., Exh. I. Petitioner

sought review of that decision by the Arizona Supreme Court,

which declined review on on March 12, 2012. Id., Exh. J.

In his initial habeas petition (Doc. 1) Petitioner alleges

he is entitled to relief because he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner contends counsel

was ineffective because he allowed Petitioner “to enter an

uninformed guilty plea to a case/charge which was previously

dismissed unbeknownst to the defendant. Counsel failed to

investigate original arrest.” Id. Petitioner also asserts “The

[] criminal case that affected Petitioner’s arrest was absent of

probably cause to issue ‘search warrant’ and subsequent ‘arrest

warrant...” Id. Petitioner alleges he was subjected to

“judicial misconduct/abuse of discretion,” asserting it was an

abuse of judicial discretion to issue an arrest warrant for

Petitioner’s arrest. Id. Petitioner also argues he was

improperly sentenced.

In his first amended habeas petition (Doc. 8) Petitioner

“challenges the lower court’s judgement denying the notice of

post-conviction relief as ‘untimely’”. Id. Petitioner alleges

he was subjected to “invalid warrants,” i.e., that a police

officer was reckless and dishonest in preparing affidavits

affecting Petitioner’s ‘search and seizure’”. Id. Petitioner

further asserts that he was subjected to “selective

prosecution/police misconduct,” with regard to a “no knock day

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time search warrant,” and that he was subjected to “vindictive

prosecution.” Id. Petitioner alleges that his arrest warrant

was signed by the same judge who issued a criminal seizure

complaint and who also presided over and ruled in a civil in rem

forfeiture action against Petitioner’s assets. 

Respondents contend that the habeas petition is barred by

the state of limitations.

The Magistrate Judge notes that Petitioner’s habeas

petition is now arguably moot. On August 10, 2007, Petitioner

was sentenced to a term of 7.5 years imprisonment and given

credit for 188 days of pre-sentence incarceration. Therefore,

Petitioner’s prison term must have expired on or before February

9, 2015. Petitioner was released from prison on August 1, 2014,

and the Arizona Department of Corrections database indicates his

“Max End Date” was August 2, 2015, and that he is not currently

serving a term of supervised release. Petitioner’s current

address is in Prescott, Arizona.

II Analysis

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred by

the applicable statute of limitations found in the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposed a

one-year statute of limitations on state prisoners seeking

federal habeas relief from their state convictions. See, e.g.,

Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir.

2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002). The

one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally

begins to run on “the date on which the judgment became final by

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conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). For an Arizona

non-capital defendant who pleads guilty, the conviction becomes

“final” at the conclusion of the first “of-right”

post-conviction proceeding under Rule 32, Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. “Arizona’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding for

plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct review within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. Schriro, 481

F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is entitled to

tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of a

“properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See also Artuz v. Bennet, 531

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Stewart v. Cate, 757

F.3d 929, 934-35 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 341 (2014);

Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). “The

time during which a properly filed application for State post

conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted

toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A

state post-conviction petition is “clearly pending after it is

filed with a state court, but before that court grants or denies

the petition.” Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir.

2004). However, a state petition that is not filed within the

state’s required time limit is not “properly filed” and,

therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling

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of the federal statute of limitations during the time such a

petition is “pending” in the state courts. See Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1811-12 (2005).

“When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law,

‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”

Id., 544 U.S. at 414, 125 S. Ct. at 1812. 

Accordingly, the one-year statute of limitations on

Petitioner’s federal habeas action began to run on or about

September 7, 2007, when the time expired to take a timely state

action for post-conviction relief from Petitioner’s conviction

and sentence, and expired on September 7, 2008. Petitioner did

not file his federal habeas action until 2013, more than four

years after the statute of limitations expired. Petitioner’s

untimely action for state post-conviction relief was not a

“properly filed” state action for post-conviction relief and,

therefore, the pendency of this action could not re-start nor

toll the state of limitations. 

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas

petition may be equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing on

time. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562

(2010); Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010).

A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15

(2005). See also Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th

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Cir. 2012); Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir.

2010); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011-14 (9th

Cir. 2009). In Holland the Supreme Court eschewed a “mechanical

rule” for determining extraordinary circumstances, while

endorsing a flexible, “case-by-case” approach, drawing “upon

decisions made in other similar cases for guidance.” Bills, 628

F.3d at 1096-97.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d

at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4

(9th Cir. 2008); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir.

2003), modified on other grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.

2006). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account

for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling

is also available if the petitioner establishes their actual

innocence of the crimes of conviction. See Lee v. Lampert, 653

F.3d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2011).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

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Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is inappropriate in most cases

and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were

the cause of [her] untimeliness and that the extraordinary

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959. It is Petitioner’s burden to establish

that equitable tolling is warranted in his case. See, e.g.,

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004); Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

Petitioner has not stated a legitimate basis for equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations. Compare Holland, 130 S.

Ct. at 2564; Porter, 620 F.3d at 961 (noting the circumstances

of cases determined before and after Holland). A petitioner’s

pro se status, ignorance of the law, and lack of legal

representation during the applicable filing period do not

constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling because

such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g., Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14;

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004).

Equitable tolling may be available when a petitioner can

establish they are so mentally ill that they are incompetent.

Compare Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003),

with Bills, 628 F.3d at 1098. However, the vicissitudes of

prison life are not “extraordinary” circumstances that make it

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impossible to file a timely habeas petition. See, e.g., Ramirez

v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a

petitioner is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations

if they can establish that they are actually innocent of the

crimes of conviction. See Lee, 653 F.3d at 934. The petitioner

must show “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 938. Petitioner has not made such a showing.

Because the habeas action was not filed within the statute

of limitations and Petitioner has not stated a proper basis for

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, the Court need

not consider the merits of his claims.

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file the habeas petition within one

year of the date his state conviction became final. Petitioner

has not established that he is entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Godwin’s Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

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Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a

waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration of

the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

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DATED this 30th day of March, 2015.

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