Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01671/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01671-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALVIN RUSSELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security

Defendant.

1:13-cv-01671-GSA

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S 

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Calvin Russell (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision by the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying his application for 

supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act. 

The matter is currently before the Court on the parties‟ briefs, which were submitted without oral 

argument to the Honorable Gary S. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge.1

II. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS2

Plaintiff is currently 47 years old and was born in Meridian, Mississippi. AR 32. He 

 

1 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. ECF Nos. 7, 8.

2 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page number.

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attended high school in Whitman, Mississippi and advanced up to the 11th grade. AR 36. While 

living in Mississippi, he worked for two years as a cloth handler, which involved lifting rolls of 

cloth of up to 20 pounds and sorting the rolls into bins. AR 37, 139. He last held this job in 1995 

and has not worked since then. Id. From 2001 until 2009, Plaintiff was incarcerated for selling 

cocaine. AR 44. After his release, Plaintiff entered a sober living environment and received food 

stamps. AR 33. Plaintiff reports symptoms of depression, paranoia, irritability, impulsivity, mood 

swings, and episodic hallucinations. AR 278, 290. He also suffers from seizure disorder as the 

result of a head injury he sustained when he was a child. Plaintiff takes Dilantin to control his 

seizures. AR 239, 271. He has also been treated for knee and chest pain, although neither is cited 

as a reason why Plaintiff cannot work. AR 42, 150, 232. 

On March 16, 2010, Plaintiff filed his first application for SSI. AR 120-126. The claim 

was initially denied on October 23, 2010. AR 68-72. Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing which 

was dismissed as untimely on April 15, 2011. AR 62-66. Plaintiff then filed a request for review 

with the Appeals Council, which was granted on August 4, 2011. AR 58-61. A hearing on the 

claim was then conducted before Administrative Law Judge Alexander Weir III (the “ALJ”) on 

April 24, 2012. AR 28-53. On May 18, 2012, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision and 

determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. AR 10-23. Plaintiff filed an appeal of this decision 

with the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council denied his appeal, rendering the order the final 

decision of the Commissioner. AR 8, 4-6. 

III. THE DISABILITY DETERMINATION PROCESS

To qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act, Plaintiff must establish that he or 

she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less 

than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual shall be considered to have a 

disability only if:

. . . his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he 

is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age, 

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful 

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work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work 

exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy 

exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

To achieve uniformity in the decision-making process, the Commissioner has established 

a sequential five-step process for evaluating a claimant‟s alleged disability. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)-(f). The ALJ proceeds step by step in order and stops upon reaching a dispositive 

finding that the claimant is or is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ must consider 

objective medical evidence and opinion testimony. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927, 416.929. 

Specifically, the ALJ is required to determine: (1) whether a claimant engaged in 

substantial gainful activity during the period of alleged disability, (2) whether the claimant had 

medically-determinable “severe” impairments,

3

(3) whether these impairments meet or are 

medically equivalent to one of the listed impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1, (4) whether the claimant retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to 

perform his past relevant work,

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and (5) whether the claimant had the ability to perform other jobs 

existing in significant numbers at the regional and national level. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f).

Using the Social Security Administration‟s five-step sequential evaluation process, the 

ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not meet the disability standard. AR 10-23. In particular, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 16, 2010, the 

date of his application. AR 16. Further, the ALJ identified mental depression, substance abuse, 

and seizure disorder as severe impairments. AR 16. Nonetheless, the ALJ determined that the 

severity of Plaintiff‟s impairments did not meet or exceed any of the listed impairments. AR 17-

18. 

Based on a review of the entire record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the RFC to 

 

3

“Severe” simply means that the impairment significantly limits the claimant‟s physical or mental ability to do basic 

work activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

4 Residual functional capacity captures what a claimant “can still do despite [his] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. 

“Between steps three and four of the five-step evaluation, the ALJ must proceed to an intermediate step in which the

ALJ assesses the claimant‟s residual functional capacity.” Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1151 n. 2 (9th Cir. 

2007).

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lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally, and 10 pounds frequently; to stand and walk 6 hours in an 

8-hour day; to sit for six hours in an eight hour day; and to perform light work. AR 19. The ALJ 

further determined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in: performing detailed or complex 

tasks; dealing appropriately with co-workers, supervisors, and the general public; and in 

maintaining concentration and attention. Id. Although the Plaintiff had no past relevant work, he 

could perform other work that exists in national economy. AR 22.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine 

whether: (1) it is supported by substantial evidence; and (2) it applies the correct legal standards. 

See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 

1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). 

“Substantial evidence means more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). It is “relevant evidence which, 

considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Id. Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of 

which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.” Id.

V. DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Medical Evidence

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly considered the medical evidence and thus 

erroneously determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. Specifically at issue is the ALJ‟s 

consideration of the opinion of Vinod Sodha, M.D., a psychiatrist who treated Plaintiff. Dr. Sodha

treated Plaintiff at the Parole Outpatient Clinic on two occasions in 2010 and 2011. AR 289. On 

April 18, 2012, Dr. Sodha completed a “Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do WorkRelated Activities” checklist in which he indicated that Plaintiff had: moderate limitations in 

understanding and carrying out simple instructions; marked limitations in understanding and 

carrying out complex work-related instructions; and marked limitations in interacting 

appropriately with the public, supervisors, and co-workers. AR 297-298. He further indicated that 

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Plaintiff would have marked limitations in responding appropriately to usual work situations and 

to changes in a routine work setting. AR 298. Finally, he included a short handwritten note at the 

end of the checklist form stating that Plaintiff “remains extremely paranoid around authority 

figures; withdraws with pacing / and agitation.” AR 298.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to give specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting 

Dr. Sodha‟s opinion.

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In particular, Plaintiff argues that: (1) two visits to Dr. Sodha are enough to 

make Dr. Sodha a “treating physician”; (2) the ALJ incorrectly disregarded Dr. Sodha‟s opinion 

merely because he used a checkbox form; and (3) the ALJ ignored the handwritten note at the 

bottom of Dr. Sodha‟s checkbox form, suggesting that the ALJ‟s reasons for rejecting the form 

were not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff‟s Opening Brief 12-13, ECF No. 12. 

Plaintiff also briefly argues that Dr. Sodha‟s opinion is consistent with other opinions in the 

record, particularly that of Mary Bridges, M.D., a consultative examining psychiatrist. Id. at 14-

15.

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff‟s mental impairment 

by considering the history of Plaintiff‟s treatment and thoroughly reviewing Dr. Sodha‟s report. 

Moreover, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for the conclusions he formulated 

regarding Dr. Sodha‟s opinion. Specifically, the Commissioner argues that: (1) Dr. Sodha‟s 

opinion was contradicted by two consultative examiners, including Dr. Bridges, and at least one 

non-examining physician; and (2) it is entirely appropriate to disregard a treating physician‟s 

opinion when that opinion is contained in a “check-mark form, it did not include an explanation, 

and the sparse medical records failed to support his conclusion.” Defendant‟s Responsive Brief 

6:1-4, ECF No. 13. Finally, the Commissioner notes that Plaintiff‟s condition appears to be stable 

and well-controlled over time. Id. at 6:15-26.

B. Legal Standards

Cases in this circuit distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those 

who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant 

 

5 The ALJ credited Dr. Sodha‟s opinion “to the extent that he has not entirely ruled out the claimant‟s ability to 

perform simple and repetitive tasks.” AR 22. Only Dr. Sodha‟s findings of marked limitations were rejected.

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(examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (non-examining 

physicians). As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source 

than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant. Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 

(9th Cir. 1987). However, a “treating physician‟s opinion is not . . . necessarily conclusive as to 

either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 

747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (“the ALJ need not accept a treating physician‟s opinion which is „brief 

and conclusionary in form with little in the way of clinical findings to support [its] conclusion”). 

When the treating doctor‟s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it can be rejected 

for “clear and convincing” reasons. Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991). If 

the treating doctor‟s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the Commissioner may reject it by

providing “specific and legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the record for the 

rejection. Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983).

The opinion of a non-examining physician cannot, by itself, constitute substantial 

evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a treating 

physician. Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1990); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 

1456 (9th Cir. 1984). It can, however, support the rejection of the opinion of a treating or 

examining physician. See, e.g., Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751-55; Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995); Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179 (9th Cir. 1995). For example, in 

Magallanes, “the ALJ did not rely on [the non-examining physician‟s] testimony alone to reject 

the opinions of Magallanes‟s treating physicians . . . .” Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 752. Rather, 

there was other evidence that supported the ALJ‟s decision: the ALJ also relied on laboratory test 

results, contrary reports from examining physicians, and testimony from the claimant that 

conflicted with her treating physician‟s opinion. Id. at 751-52. Thus, the opinions of non-treating 

or non-examining physicians may serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent 

with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F. 3d 

947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may also 

serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings 

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or other evidence in the record”). Where medical reports are inconclusive, “questions of 

credibility and resolution of conflicts in the testimony are functions solely of the Secretary.” 

Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d at 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982) quoting Waters v. Gardner, 452 F.2d 

855, 858 n. 7 (9th Cir.1971).

C. Analysis

The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff‟s impairments and found that Plaintiff had mild restrictions in 

daily living and social functioning; mild restrictions in maintaining concentration, persistence, 

and pace; and moderate difficulties in social functioning. AR 18. The ALJ summarized Plaintiff‟s 

psychological history and noted that Plaintiff‟s mental impairments appeared to respond to 

medication. AR 20. He noted that although Plaintiff claimed that he could not concentrate or pay 

attention, clinical tests seemed to indicate otherwise. AR 20, 278. The ALJ also pointed out that a 

consultative examination could not rule out malingering and that Plaintiff had apparently engaged 

in criminal activity shortly before the period for which he alleges disability.

6 AR 20, 256, 277.

The ALJ reviewed a mental residual functional capacity assessment conducted by M. 

Salib, M.D., a reviewing physician, who determined that Plaintiff had mild limitations in 

activities of daily living and maintaining social functioning and moderate limitations in 

maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. AR 215-217. He also found that Plaintiff had 

moderate limitations in the ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions. 

AR 226. Dr. Salib concluded that the Plaintiff “retains the ability to sustain simple and repetitive 

work over a normal work day/week.” AR 217.

The ALJ considered Paulette Harar, M.D.‟s assessment of Plaintiff‟s records, which 

occurred after Dr. Salib‟s assessment. Dr. Harar, a reviewing physician, found that Plaintiff could 

lift or carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently; stand or walk for at least 6 hours in an 

8 hour work day; sit for 6 hours in an 8 hour work day; push or pull unlimited amounts, other 

than as shown for lifting or carrying; frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; and climb ramps 

and stairs. He should, however, avoid even moderate exposure to heavy machinery or heights. AR 

 

6

In fact, he appears to have been incarcerated as recently as June 2011. AR 277.

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238-242. She concluded by concurring with Dr. Salib‟s analysis, saying that “the RFC of light 

with seizure precautions appears entirely medically reasonable.” AR 231.

The ALJ also noted Plaintiff was evaluated by Mary Bridges, M.D., a psychiatric 

consultative examiner, on January 5, 2012. AR 21. Dr. Bridges determined that Plaintiff would 

not have any limitations performing simple and repetitive tasks, but would have mild limitations 

completing detailed and complex tasks. AR 279. He would have mild limitations performing

work activities on a consistent basis without special or additional supervision and moderate 

limitations in completing a normal workday or workweek. While he would have moderate 

limitations in accepting instructions from supervisors and interacting with coworkers and the 

public, he “would be able to handle the usual stresses, changes and demands of gainful 

employment.” AR 279. 

The ALJ also made brief mention of a consultative examination conducted by Ahmad R. 

Riahinejad, Ph.D. on July 20, 2010. Dr. Riahinejad determined that Plaintiff “was able to relate 

with other people and accept supervision,” but cautioned that Plaintiff‟s “records are needed to 

corroborate” this finding. Id.

The ALJ considered Plaintiff‟s more recent mental health treatment dating back to 2009. 

AR 260-262. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was receiving medications including Celexa, Benadryl, 

and Seroquel during this period and later on was alternatively prescribed Geodon and Dilantin. 

AR 17, 260, 277. A number of reports during this period report that Plaintiff‟s condition was 

stable with these medications. AR 17, 49, 171, 180-182, 203, 231, 260-262, 291. 

With respect to Dr. Sodha‟s opinion, the ALJ noted the following:

Accordingly, weight is given to Dr. Sodha‟s opinion to the extent that he has not 

entirely ruled out the claimant‟s ability to perform simple and repetitive tasks. No 

weight is given to the remainder of the opinion since it is in check-mark form, 

inconsistent with other medical observations of less than marked social 

functioning (Ex. 3F/5; 16F/5) and conclusions regarding the claimant‟s social 

functioning, and explanation is lacking from the sparse medical record and the 2 

time examination history as shown in the record.

AR 22.

Thus, the ALJ rejected some of the limitations outlined in Dr. Sodha‟s form because: (1) 

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the limitations were offered on only a check-mark form; (2) they were inconsistent with the other 

medical observations contained in the record; and (3) Dr. Sodha had only seen the Plaintiff twice. 

Because it does appear that Dr. Sodha‟s opinion with respect to Plaintiff‟s social functioning is 

contradicted by other opinions within the administrative record, the ALJ need only have offered 

“specific and legitimate reasons” which are supported by substantial evidence to reject Dr. 

Sodha‟s opinion. Murray, 722 F.2d at 502. All of the above listed reasons offer specific and 

legitimate bases to reject a treating doctor‟s opinion. Batson v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 

359 F. 3d 1196-1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The ALJ discounted the [treating physician‟s] view 

because it was in the form of a checklist, did not have supportive objective evidence, was 

contradicted by other statements and assessments of the [the plaintiff‟s] medical condition”). 

Moreover, the ALJ is permitted to use the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of 

visits, and the nature and extent of the treatment received in deciding how much weight to give 

even a treating physician‟s opinion.720 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i), (ii). 

The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff‟s argument that the ALJ ignored the short 

handwritten note at the end of Dr. Sodha‟s analysis. The note, which explains that the Plaintiff 

seemed extremely paranoid around authority figures, is still inconsistent with the bulk of the 

evidence in the record and does not explain Dr. Sodha‟s opinion that the Plaintiff has marked 

limitations with respect to understanding and carrying out complex or detailed instructions. AR 

297. Although it could be generously construed to explain the opinion that Plaintiff has marked 

limitations in taking instructions from supervisors, it does not explain Dr. Sodha‟s belief that 

Plaintiff would experience marked limitations in interacting with co-workers or the general 

public. As aptly pointed out by the Commissioner, Plaintiff has had no difficulty interacting with 

medical authorities in the past. AR 211 (“The claimant was generally pleasant and cooperative”), 

279 (“The claimant exhibits no difficulty interacting with the clinic staff or myself”). Finally, the 

 

7 The Court thus need not address Plaintiff‟s argument that two visits are enough to qualify a physician as a “treating 

physician”—even as a treating physician, Dr. Sodha‟s opinions are only entitled to minimal weight if unsupported by 

explanation. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (“When confronted with conflicting medical 

opinions, an ALJ need not accept a treating physician‟s opinion that is conclusory and brief and unsupported by 

clinical findings”).

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ALJ does not appear to have entirely disregarded Dr. Sodha‟s opinion—he did find that “the 

overall record suggests greater than mild limitations in social functioning” and incorporated that 

information into the residual functional capacity assessment. AR 22. Thus, the ALJ did give some 

weight to Dr. Sodha‟s opinion.

In contrast, the consultative examination conducted by Dr. Bridges, to which the ALJ 

accorded great weight, contains a wealth of information and explanations justifying the ultimate 

conclusions about Plaintiff‟s capabilities. It is also largely consistent with the opinions rendered 

by Drs. Salib and Harar, to whom the ALJ gave some weight and great weight, respectively.

8

Thus, the ALJ‟s analysis in rejecting portions of Dr. Sodha‟s opinion was supported by 

substantial evidence. Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1202 (“[T]he regulations give more weight to opinions 

that are explained than to those that are not”). 

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ‟s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court 

DENIES Plaintiff‟s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant,

Carolyn W. Colvin, and Commissioner of Social Security and against Plaintiff, Calvin Russell.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 18, 2015 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

8

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ acted in an “arbitrary and capricious” manner by failing to give weight to Dr. Sodha‟s 

checkbox form but crediting Dr. Salib‟s checkbox form. Plaintiff‟s Opening Brief 13:9-22, ECF No. 12. But the 

consideration of these two forms does not occur in a vacuum--Dr. Sodha‟s form is contradicted by at least three other 

physicians, while Dr. Salib‟s is supported by two. Dr. Salib‟s form thus does not need to be granted controlling 

weight for the opinions he espouses to prevail in the eyes of the ALJ. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 

2005) (“Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ‟s conclusion that must 

be upheld”).

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