Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03272/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03272-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Docket No. 209.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MOSTAFA ARAM AZADPOUR,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendant. /

No. C 06-3272 MJJ

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND

GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTIONS FOR LEAVE

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are pro se Plaintiff Mostafa Aram Azadpour’s (“Plaintiff”) Motions for

Leave filed on April 17, 2007.1

 Plaintiff seeks leave to (1) Appeal this Court’s Partial Grant of

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss; (2) Dismiss his Defamation Cause of Action with Prejudice; and (3)

File a Fraud Cause of Action in State Court. Defendant Sun Microsystems, Inc. (“Defendant”)

opposes Plaintiff’s motions, except for Plaintiff’s motion for leave to dismiss a cause of action with

prejudice. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES in part and GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s

Motions for Leave.

On August 15, 2006, the Court ordered Plaintiff to seek leave before filing any further

motions in a related case. The Order was in response to the voluminous number of motions and

notices of motions filed by Plaintiff, many of which lacked grounding in applicable law and the

adjudication of which resulted in the expenditure of considerable judicial resources. The Court will

Case 3:06-cv-03272-MJJ Document 217 Filed 04/27/07 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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A final judgment is necessary before a case becomes appealable; however, dismissal with leave to amend is not

final. See WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 1997).

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address Plaintiff’s requests in turn. 

First, as best as the Court can discern, Plaintiff seeks leave to appeal this Court’s grant of a

partial dismissal within the context of an interlocutory appeal. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

only has jurisdiction over appeals from all “final decisions” of a district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Ordinarily, an order dismissing the complaint only, without dismissal of the action, is not a final

judgment and will not support jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. California v. Harvier, 700 F.2d

1217, 1218 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820 (1983). In order to certify an order for

interlocutory appeal, the district court must find that (1) the order involves a controlling question of

law; (2) there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and (3) an immediate appeal from the

order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The

decision to certify lies within the sound discretion of the district court. Yeager’s Fuel, Inc. v.

Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 162 F.R.D. 482, 489 (E.D. PA. 1995); Brown v. City of Oneonta,

916 F. Supp. 176, 180 (N.D. N.Y. 1996). In addition to the requirements set forth in section

1292(b), courts must keep in mind that section 1292(b) “is to be applied sparingly and only in

exceptional cases.” United States v. Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784, 788 n. 11 (9th Cir. 1959). Indeed, in

United States Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1966), the Ninth Circuit held that the

legislative history of section 1292(b) indicates that it was to be used “only in extraordinary cases

where decision of an interlocutory appeal might avoid protracted and expensive litigation.” Id. at

785. 

This Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, except his claims of defamation

and fraud, based on the doctrine of res judicata. However, the Court gave Plaintiff thirty days to

amend his fraud and defamation claims.2

 Consequently, a final judgment has not been entered for

these two claims. Furthermore, an interlocutory appeal is inappropriate in this case because the

dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims based on the doctrine of res judicata is not a controlling question of

law subject to substantial grounds for a difference of opinion. Further, an immediate appeal will not

materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Therefore, in the interest of avoiding

Case 3:06-cv-03272-MJJ Document 217 Filed 04/27/07 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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See Docket No. 197.

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Docket No. 197. 

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piecemeal litigation, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to appeal this Court’s partial

dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. 

Second, Plaintiff seeks leave to dismiss with prejudice his defamation cause of action against

Defendant Sun Microsystem, Inc. Under Rule 41(a)(1), a plaintiff has an absolute right to

voluntarily dismiss his action prior to service by the defendant of an answer or a motion for

summary judgment. Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1506 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Hamilton v.

Shearson-Lehman American Express, 813 F.2d 1532, 1534 (9th Cir. 1987)). The filing of a notice of

voluntary dismissal with the court automatically terminates the action as to the defendants who are

the subjects of the notice. Concha, 62 F.2d at 1506. Dismissal “‘with prejudice’ is an acceptable

form of shorthand for ‘an adjudication upon the merits.’” 18 Wright and Miller, § 2373, at 396, n. 4. 

See also Goddard v. Security Title Insurance & Guarantee Co., 92 P.2d 804, 808 (1939) (stating that

a dismissal “with prejudice” evinces “the intention of the court to make the dismissal on the

merits.”). Although the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s defamation cause with leave to amend,3

 Plaintiff

has notified the Court and Defendant of his desire to dismiss the defamation cause of action with

prejudice. Defendant does not oppose Plaintiff’s motion. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s

Motion for Leave to Dismiss the defamation cause of action WITH PREJUDICE. 

Third, Plaintiff seeks leave to file a fraud cause of action against Defendant in state court or,

in the alternative, fourteen days to file an amended complaint pertaining to his fraud claim. After

considering the parties arguments, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to file a fraud

claim in state court. Plaintiff’s amended fraud claim, if any, shall be filed within thirty days of the

filing date of this Court’s April 2, 2007 order.4

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Case 3:06-cv-03272-MJJ Document 217 Filed 04/27/07 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to appeal this

Court’s partial dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims; GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to dismiss his

defamation claim with prejudice; and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to file a claim for fraud

in state court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April ___, 2007 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Case 3:06-cv-03272-MJJ Document 217 Filed 04/27/07 Page 4 of 4