Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-04951/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-04951-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JOSEPH CUVIELLO,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

FELD ENTERTAINMENT, INC. (dba 

RINGLING BROS. AND BARNUM & 

BAILEY CIRCUS), et al.,

 Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-04951-BLF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS 

FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS 

[Re: ECF 46, 53]

This action arose out of clashes between Plaintiff Joseph Cuviello, an animal rights activist, 

and Defendant Feld Entertainment, Inc., dba Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus (“Feld”). 

For more than twenty years, Plaintiff has been traveling to the sites of Feld’s performances to 

videotape circus animals, distribute leaflets, and organize demonstrations. Following Feld’s 

unsuccessful attempt to obtain a permanent injunction after having obtained a temporary restraining 

order against Plaintiff, Plaintiff filed this pro se action against Feld and two of its employees (“Feld 

Defendants”), and Feld’s attorneys (“Attorney Defendants”), asserting claims for malicious 

prosecution and violation of First Amendment rights. The Feld Defendants and the Attorney 

Defendants separately moved to strike the malicious prosecution claim under California Code of 

Civil Procedure section 425.16 and to dismiss both claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). 

On September 4, 2014, the Court issued an order striking the malicious prosecution claim 

under section 425.16 and dismissing the First Amendment claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court 

determined that section 425.16 contains a mandatory attorneys’ fees provision and directed 

Defendants to file motions for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under that provision. Defendant 

did file those motions, which now are before the Court, having been fully briefed and taken under 

submission without oral argument. For the reasons discussed below, the motions are GRANTED IN 

PART.

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 I. LEGAL STANDARD

Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, section 425.16(c) provides that “a 

prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s 

fees and costs.” Cal. Civ. P. Code § 425.16(c). Although it does not expressly limit the award to 

“reasonable” fees, California courts have construed section 425.16(c) to contain a reasonableness 

limitation. See, e.g., Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez, 230 Cal. App. 4th 459, 488 (2014) (“each fee 

application under section 425.16, subdivision (c) must be assessed on its own merits . . . taking into 

account what is reasonable under the circumstances”) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted); Robertson v. Rodriguez, 36 Cal. App. 4th 347, 362 (1995) (“We readily conclude section 

425.16 similarly authorizes and award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party, 

irrespective of whether the prevailing party is the plaintiff or the defendant.”) (emphasis in original).

When evaluating a motion for reasonable attorneys’ fees under section 425.16, the Court 

begins with a lodestar figure. Lunada, 230 Cal. App. 4th at 806. The lodestar is calculated by 

multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate. PLCM Group 

v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095 (2000). The hours reasonably expended include those spent 

litigating the special motion to strike but not the action as a whole, see Christian Research Institute 

v. Alnor, 165 Cal. App. 4th 1315, 1324-25 (2008), as well as those spent litigating the mandatory fee 

award, see Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1141 (2001). The Court “must carefully review 

attorney documentation of hours expended; ‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts 

is not subject to compensation.” Id. at 1132 (citation omitted). 

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” PLCM 

Group, 22 Cal. 4th at 1095. “Once the lodestar is fixed, the court may increase or decrease that 

amount by applying a positive or negative ‘multiplier’ to take other factors into account.” Rey v. 

Madera Unified School Dist., 203 Cal. App. 4th 1223, 1240 (2012). Those factors “include, but are 

not limited to, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (2) the skill displayed in 

presenting them; (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by 

the attorneys; [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” Id; see also Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 

1132. 

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 II. REASONABLE HOURLY RATES

The Court has broad discretion in setting the reasonable hourly rates used in the lodestar 

calculation. See Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin, 226 Cal. App. 4th 691, 702-03 (2014). In 

determining the prevailing rates in the community for similar work, the Court may find it most 

appropriate to use the actual rates charged or, alternatively, it may determine that application of the 

Laffey Matrix is warranted. See id. In the present case, the Feld Defendants request application of 

the actual rates charged by their attorneys while the Attorney Defendants request application of the 

Laffey Matrix. 

The Feld Defendants were represented by three attorneys at the law firm of Fulbright & 

Jaworski LLP, who customarily charge the following hourly rates: Peter Mason, partner, $725; 

Todd Sorrell, partner, $695; and Tarifa Laddon, senior associate, $455. Sorrell Decl. ¶ 4 and Ex. A., 

ECF 53-2. The customary rates actually were paid for the work done in this case. Id ¶ 4. Mr. 

Sorrell states that, based upon his experience, those are reasonable rates for attorneys in California 

of comparable skill and experience. Id. ¶ 4. All three attorneys have submitted resumes reflecting 

significant relevant litigation experience, expertise and honors. Id. ¶ 7 and Exh. B. John O’Connor, 

an attorneys’ fees expert retained by Plaintiff, acknowledges that “Fulbright & Jaworski is an 

excellent firm, generally of such high reputation that it can charge premium rates.” O’Connor Decl. 

¶ 38, ECF 63. Mr. O’Connor also opines that the rates charged by Fulbright & Jaworski “are in fact 

in line with other premium rates charged in the community by those few select firms able to charge 

them.” Id. ¶ 39. Plaintiff argues, and Mr. O’Connor opines, that the Feld Defendants could have 

hired a less expensive firm to represent them. However, “[p]arties normally have the right to 

counsel of their choice, so long as the counsel satisfy required bar admissions.” Cole v. United 

States Dist. Court, 366 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2004). Feld retained attorneys that have represented 

it for a number of years and currently represent it in other litigation. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff has cited no 

authority suggesting a constraint on Feld’s right to counsel of its choice in this case. The Court 

notes that, as discussed below, it has taken every care to ensure that Plaintiff is required to pay only 

those attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred by Defendants.

The Attorney Defendants were represented by two attorneys at the law firm Murphy, 

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Pearson, Bradley & Feeney, who customarily charge the following hourly rates: Janet Everson, 

partner, $500; and Jennifer Karpinski, associate, $325. It is not clear whether those rates actually 

were paid in this case. The Attorney Defendants do not seek their counsel’s customary hourly rates 

but rather rates calculated under the Laffey Matrix. Application of the Laffey Matrix would result in 

a $50 reduction of Ms. Everson’s billing rate to $450 and a $25 increase in Ms. Karpinski’s billing 

rate to $350. 

Murphy, Pearson specializes in the practice areas of professional liability defense and legal 

malpractice litigation. Everson Decl. ¶ 2, ECF 49; Karpinski Decl. ¶ 2, ECF 50. The firm has been 

recognized by The Recorder, a local legal newspaper, as the preeminent Bay Area firm in those 

practice areas. Id. Both Ms. Everson and Ms. Karpinski have significant relevant experience and, 

in particular, experience litigating under section 425.16. Id. Mr. O’Connor states that Murphy, 

Pearson is a well-known legal malpractice firm. O’Connor Decl. ¶ 33, ECF 63. Having considered 

this record and the relatively minor differences between counsel’s customary billing rates and the 

proposed Laffey rates, the Court concludes that application of the customary billing rates is 

appropriate as to the Attorney Defendants’ motion as well as that of the Feld Defendants. The Court 

is satisfied that rates customarily charged by Ms. Everson and Ms. Karpinski are consistent with 

prevailing rates in the community for similar work. The Court declines to credit Mr. O’Connor’s

suggested rate of $250 rate as pure speculation lacking factual basis. 

 II. FELD DEFENDANTS

The Feld Defendants request fees and costs in the total amount of $76,546.74, representing 

120.5 hours of work by counsel and costs in the amount of $849.24. See Feld Defs.’ Reply at 11, 

ECF 64. In calculating the lodestar for the Feld Defendants, the Court has examined each attorney’s 

billing records and determined whether the hours expended were reasonable. Among other things, 

the Court has considered whether the time spent on particular tasks was reasonable in light of the 

attorney’s level of experience. 

A. Mason

The request for Mr. Mason’s fees is granted in its entirety with respect to the 12.5 hours he 

spent working on this matter. The billing entries reflect a reasonable amount of time spent by a 

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senior partner with thirty-eight years of legal experience overseeing and reviewing the work on the 

case. See Sorrell Decl. Exh. A, ECF 53-2; Sorrel Reply Decl., ECF 64-1. Accordingly, the lodestar 

for Mr. Mason’s work is $9,062.50 (12.5 hours x $725).

B. Sorrell

The Feld Defendants request fees for 73 hours of work done by Mr. Sorrell, who is a senior 

partner with twenty years of legal experience. Plaintiff’s expert, Mr. O’Connor, asserts that certain 

of Mr. Sorrell’s hours should not be credited on the basis of ambiguous billing entries. The Court 

does not find that argument persuasive. However, the hours requested for Mr. Sorrell’s work are 

excessive for other reasons. As set forth in the chart below, the Court has categorized Mr. Sorrell’s 

billing entries for purposes of analysis. The billing entries provided to the Court were not 

numbered, so they are identified herein by date. See Sorrell Decl. Exh. A, ECF 53-2; Sorrel Reply 

Decl., ECF 64-1. Mr. Sorrell billed 39.25 hours for tasks related to research and writing, the bulk of 

which did not need the expertise of a senior partner but could have been done by an associate at a

much lower hourly rate. The Court has reduced the requested 39.25 hours to 15. Mr. Sorrell also 

billed 12 hours to prepare for and attend the hearing on the motions to strike and dismiss. While the 

hours billed for attendance are reasonable, a partner of Mr. Sorrell’s experience should not have 

needed several hours to prepare. The Court has reduced the requested 12 hours to 8. The Court 

concludes that the 3.75 hours requested for miscellaneous conferences, phone calls, and the like are 

reasonable. The Court likewise concludes that the 18 hours requested for working on the present 

fees motion are reasonable given the necessity for a senior attorney’s review of billing records and

the considerable task of responding to the many points raised in Plaintiff’s opposition brief and Mr. 

O’Connor’s expert report. Accordingly, the lodestar for Mr. Sorrell’s work is $31,101.25 (44.75 

hours x $695).

Description Requested Awarded

Research and Writing

 entries dated:

 11/11/13

 1/29/14

 1/30/14

 2/5/14

 2/20/14

39.25 15

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 2/21/14

 2/24/14

 2/26/14

 2/28/14

 3/17/14

 3/18/14

 3/19/14

 3/24/14

Hearing and Preparation

 entries dated:

 9/2/14

 9/3/14

 9/4/14

12 8

Miscellaneous

 entries dated:

 1/28/14

 1/31/14

 2/7/14

 2/11/14

 3/3/14

 4/3/14

 6/11/14 

3.75 3.75

Fees Motion

 entries dated:

 9/5/14

 9/11/14

 9/12/14

 9/15/14

 9/16/14

 9/17/14

 reply decl.

18 18

Total 73 44.75

C. Laddon

The request for Ms. Laddon’s fees is granted in its entirety with respect to the 35 hours she 

spent working on this matter. Ms. Laddon’s billing entries reflect an appropriate amount of time 

and effort for a senior associate with nine years of legal experience to expend on research, writing, 

and miscellaneous tasks in a case of this type. See Sorrell Decl. Exh. A, ECF 53-2. Accordingly, 

the lodestar for Ms. Laddon’s work is $15,925 (35 hours x $455). 

 III. ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS

The Attorney Defendants request fees in the total amount of $41,180, representing 110.1

hours of work by counsel and costs in the amount of $505. As with the Feld Defendants, in 

calculating the lodestar for the Attorney Defendants, the Court has examined each attorney’s billing 

records and determined whether the hours expended were reasonable in light of the attorney’s level 

of experience. 

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A. Everson

The Attorney Defendants request fees for 21.4 hours1of work done by Ms. Everson, who is 

a partner with fourteen years of legal experience. As set forth in the chart below, the Court has 

categorized Ms. Everson’s hours for purposes of analysis. The billing summary provided with Ms. 

Everson’s declaration contains ten unnumbered and undated entries. Everson Decl. Exh. 6, Exh. 49. 

For ease of discussion, the Court refers to those entries as though they had been numbered 1-10 

from top to bottom. Ms. Everson spent 8.2 hours analyzing documents and legal authorities, tasks 

that did not need the expertise of a partner and could have been performed by an associate at a lower 

billing rate. The Court has reduced those hours to 4. She spent 3.2 hours preparing the 

memorandum of points and authorities in support of the anti-SLAPP motion. Again, the initial draft 

could have been performed by an associate at a lower billing rate and then reviewed by a partner. 

The Court has reduced those hours to 2. Ms. Everson spent 2 hours analyzing Plaintiff’s opposition 

to the anti-SLAPP motion and 1.5 hours preparing the reply memorandum in support of the antiSLAPP motion. The Court finds those hours to be excessive in light of the relatively 

straightforward nature of the particular anti-SLAPP motion and Ms. Everson’s expertise in the area. 

She spent 5.3 hours reviewing billing records, preparing her declaration, and otherwise working on 

the present motion for attorneys’ fees. The Court concludes that those hours are reasonable. 

Finally, Ms. Everson spent 1.2 hours on client communication, which is a reasonable amount of 

time for a case of this type. Accordingly, Ms. Everson’s lodestar is $7,125 (14.25 hours x $500 per 

hour). 

Description Requested Awarded

Analyzing Documents and Authorities

 entries 1, 2, 4, 5

8.2 4

Preparing P&A

 entry 3

3.2 2

Analyzing Opposition

 entry 6

2 1

Preparing Reply

 entry 7

1.5 .75

 

1

The Attorney Defendants initially requested fees for 33.2 hours of work by Ms. Everson, but in 

their reply brief they acknowledge a mathematical error in calculating Ms. Everson’s hours and 

clarify that they seek fees for 21.4 hours. Atty Defs.’ Reply at 4, ECF 65.

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Attorneys’ Fees Motion

 entries 9, 10

5.3 5.3

Client Communication

 entry 8

1.2 1.2

Total: 21.4 14.25

B. Karpinski

The Attorney Defendants request fees for 88.7 hours of work done by Ms. Karpinski, who is 

an associate with two years of legal experience. As set forth in the chart below, the Court has 

categorized Ms. Karpinski’s hours for purposes of analysis. The billing summary provided with Ms. 

Karpinski’s declaration contains twenty-seven unnumbered and undated entries. Karpinski Decl. 

Exh. 6, ECF 50. For ease of discussion, the Court refers to those entries as though they had been 

numbered 1-27 from top to bottom.

Ms. Karpinski spent 16 hours analyzing documents and legal authorities and communicating 

with clients in connection with the anti-SLAPP motion, 17.7 hours preparing the memorandum of 

points and authorities and other documents relating to the anti-SLAPP motion, 4.8 hours researching 

the reply, and 6.2 hours preparing the reply brief. Those hours are excessive. Although anti-SLAPP 

motions can be complicated, the issues raised by this particular motion were relatively 

straightforward – in essence, the motion turned on a single case. The Court has reduced the 

requested hours to 10, 15, 3, and 4 respectively. Ms. Karpinski spent 3.2 hours preparing for the 

hearing and communicating with the clients, and 6 hours traveling to and attending the hearing. 

Those hours are reasonable. She spent 22.8 hours preparing the present fees motion. Although the 

Court did request a certain level of detail with respect to the fees motion, the work involved was not 

complex and should not have taken so much time. The Court notes that Ms. Karpinski spent about 

the same number of hours on the fees motion as all three of the Feld Defendants’ attorneys put 

together. The Court has reduced the hours for preparation of the fees motion to 15. Ms. Karpinski

spent 6 hours preparing the reply brief on the fees motion, which is excessive given that the brief is 

modest and does not address complex issues. The Court has awarded 3 hours for that work.

Finally, Ms. Karpinski allocates 6 hours to traveling and attending a hearing on the fees motion; in 

fact, the motion was submitted without oral argument subsequent to Ms. Karpinski’s submission. 

Accordingly, Ms. Karpinski’s lodestar is $19,272.50 (59.3 hours x $325). 

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Description Requested Awarded

Analyzing docs/authorities and client comm

 entries 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 11

16 10

Preparing docs re anti-SLAPP motion

 entries 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12

17.7 15

Researching reply re anti-SLAPP motion

 entries 13, 14

4.8 3

Preparing reply brief re anti-SLAPP motion

 entry 15

6.2 4

Hearing prep and client comm

 entries 16, 17

3.2 3.2

Attending hearing on anti-SLAPP motion

 entry 18

6 6

Preparing attorneys’ fees motion

 entries 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25

22.8 15

Preparing reply re attorneys’ fees motion

 entry 26

6 3

Attending hearing re attorneys’ fees motion

 entry 27

6 0

Total 88.7 59.3

 IV. MULTIPLIER

Based upon the above, the total lodestar for work done by the Feld Defendants’ counsel is 

$56,088.75 ($9,062.50 + $31,101.25 + $15,925) and the total lodestar for work done by the 

Attorney Defendants’ counsel is $26,397.50 ($7,125 + $19,272.50). Having calculated the lodestar

figures, the Court must consider whether to apply a positive or negative multiplier. None of the 

parties has requested application of a multiplier, nor would a multiplier be warranted in this case. 

As noted above, factors to be considered include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions 

involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the 

litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” 

Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132. The questions presented in this anti-SLAPP motion were not 

complex, and the motion turned primarily upon a single case. While all defense counsel litigated 

the matter capably, counsel did not need to call on any extraordinary skill or expertise. The motion 

practice in this case was not so onerous that counsel would have been precluded from other 

employment, and there is no evidence of a contingent fee agreement. Accordingly, the Court 

concludes that application of a multiplier is not warranted.

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 V. COSTS

The Feld Defendants request $849.24 in travel costs incurred by Mr. Sorrell in attending the 

hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion. See Sorrell Decl. ¶ 4 and Exh. A, ECF 53-2. The Attorney 

Defendants request $505 in costs incurred in making chambers copies of documents. Karpinski 

Decl. Exh. 6, ECF 50. A fee shifting provision permitting recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees 

gives the district court discretion to award non-taxable costs to prevailing parties. See Grove v. 

Wells Fargo Fin. Cal., 606 F.3d 577, 580 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court in the exercise of its discretion 

grants both modest cost requests.

 VI. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, 

(1) Attorneys’ fees and costs are awarded to the Feld Defendants in the total amount of 

$56,937.99 ($56,088.75 in fees + $849.24 in costs).

(2) Attorneys’ fees and costs are awarded to the Attorney Defendants in the total amount 

of $26,902.50 ($26,397.50 in fees + $505 in costs). 

Dated: January 12, 2015 __________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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