Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-01093/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-01093-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

CRYSTAL C. LEWIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:11cv1093-MHT

) (WO)

EUFAULA CITY BOARD OF, )

EDUCATION, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Crystal C. Lewis, an American of African

descent, brings this case charging the defendants with

discrimination (based on her race) and retaliation (based

on her and her father’s protected conduct) with respect

to her employment. She names as defendants the Eufaula

City Board of Education, its five board members, and its

superintendent of education. Lewis charges that the

defendants’ actions violated Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, as amended and codified at 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1981a, 2000e to 2000e–17; the Civil Rights Act of

1866, as amended and codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and

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the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution

as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction is

proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question)

and 1343 (civil rights) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3)

(Title VII). 

This case is currently before the court on the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the reasons

that follow, the motion will be granted in part and

denied in part.

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant[s]

show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant[s] [are] entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The court must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of that party. Matsushita Elec.

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Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986). Here, the defendants are the movants.

II. BACKGROUND

A.

Eufaula is a small city in eastern Alabama with a

history of racial unrest relating to its public education

system. For some time, the public schools operated under

federal court monitoring due to the city schools’ history

of racial segregation. Despite the ending of court

monitoring, many Eufaula residents continue to have

grievances with the school system’s treatment of the

black community. A particular point of contention has

been the numbers of black teachers and administrators

employed by the board. While over half of the students

in the school system are black, the portion of black

teachers is roughly 15 %, which some city residents

contend is far too low. Although members of the city

school board profess that they have been making efforts

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at increasing the ranks of black teachers and

administrators, these residents are skeptical. They

point to a neighboring school system, where teachers are

almost evenly divided between black and white, and they

contend that discriminatory employment practices in the

Eufaula City Schools must account for the difference in

comparative racial percentages.

B.

Lewis grew up in Eufaula and worked as a

physical-education teacher at Eufaula Primary School for

about three years. During her first two years, she

served under Principal Jessie Warren, who is black.

Lewis received, generally, good performance evaluations.

Her career, however, took a turn for the worse in the

third year when Suzann Tibbs, who is white, replaced

Warren as principal.

Because Lewis could obtain tenure only if she were

rehired for a fourth year, the Eufaula City Board of

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Education had to decide at the end of each of these three

academic years whether to renew her contract for the

following year. As a general practice, a school

principal would forward an initial renewal recommendation

to Eufaula City Superintendent Barry R. Sadler; unless he

had particular cause for concern, Sadler would, without

making inquiry, forward the recommendation to the full

board; likewise, unless the board had cause to do

otherwise, it would adopt the principal’s recommendation.

In effect then, renewal decisions were made by

principals. Once Tibbs became principal of Eufaula

Primary School, she recommended that Lewis’s contract not

be renewed and, thus, in effect, that her employment be

terminated. The recommendation was adopted by the board,

and Lewis’s employment contract was not renewed.

Lewis immediately suspected that something was afoul.

Although Principal Tibbs purported to have recommended

non-renewal on the basis of Lewis’s poor performance

(arguing that Lewis was too passive to be an effective

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physical education teacher and too hesitant to engage in

outdoors activities), Lewis believed that Tibbs was not

evaluating her performance in good faith. Lewis

hypothesized that Tibbs wanted her position to open up so

that a personal friend of Tibbs’s, who is white, could be

hired. Lewis felt that her theory was bolstered because

Tibbs had attempted to act on Lewis’s employment at least

once before she became principal; on one occasion, Tibbs

approached then-Principal Warren to discuss the possible

non-renewal of Lewis’s contract, but Warren rebuffed her,

stating that, based on his observations of Lewis’s

performance, he was “not comfortable” with denying

renewal. Regardless of Lewis’s suspicion of Tibbs’s

intent, Tibbs’s friend, ultimately, did not receive the

position; instead, Lewis’s replacement was, like Lewis,

an African-American. Lewis filed a charge with the U.S.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), arguing

that the decision to end her employment was

discriminatorily made on account of her race.

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Lewis began applying for other positions with the

school system, but she had no success. One such position

for which she applied was at her previous school, Eufaula

Primary School, but she was not selected. Instead, Ciara

Culverhouse, who is white, was chosen based on Tibbs’s

recommendation. Although Culverhouse had not yet

obtained the licensing required for the job, she was

hired with the understanding that it would be obtained

sometime soon. Some members of the black community were

outraged that allegedly more qualified black applicants

were passed over in favor of a white applicant who was

without the necessary licensing. A crowd of

approximately 100 people attended a school-board meeting

to protest the decision. Among them was a woman who

vigorously protested that her daughter Andrea Guilford,

who is black and was purportedly highly qualified, was

passed over. Upon this public outpouring of discontent,

the board reversed itself and chose to hire Guilford

instead of Culverhouse.

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Shortly after that public reversal, Lewis’s father

Ronnie Crews attended public meetings of the school board

to express his displeasure with the school system’s

treatment of the black community in general and his

daughter Lewis in particular. He made such appearances

on two separate occasions. According to one board

member, Crews’s presentations were of a substantial

length; he was “quite aggressive”; and he “was acting

like a courtroom lawyer cross-examining a witness.”

Allen N. White Dep. (Doc. No. 29), Exh. K, 27:11-15. In

the opinion of that board member, the presentations were

inappropriate and left a lasting impression with him.

Crew’s presentations to the board were also in line with

those of his wife Earnestine Crews. The Crewses were

well known in the community for their outspoken views and

involvement in issues having to do with race relations;

they regularly criticized the treatment afforded to

African-Americans by the local government.

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Although Lewis was having no luck with her

applications to Eufaula City Schools, a county school

expressed interest in her. But, before it could formally

consider her, it needed a form signed by Lewis’s prior

employer, the Eufaula City Board of Education.

Superintendent Sadler assured Lewis that he would

expeditiously file the form, but he did not. As he

understood the form, he was required to attest that

Lewis’s work had been performed “satisfactorily.” Given

that her contract was not renewed, he was unsure whether

he could make that attestation. His submission of the

form was delayed while he sought permission to state on

the form that he confirms her employment but does not

confirm that her work was satisfactory. By the time he

obtained this permission and submitted the form, the

county school had already denied Lewis’s application and

hired another applicant.

Because Lewis was continuing to have no success with

her job applications with Eufaula schools (and she had

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applied for over 25 different jobs there) and schools

within a reasonable distance, her husband Michael Lewis

approached Superintendent Sadler to ask whether anything

could be done. Sadler responded that he would “never say

never,” but, for the time being, “nobody is going to hire

[Lewis] in Eufaula.” Michael Lewis Aff. (Doc. No. 29),

Exh. G, ¶ 7.

C.

Lewis filed this lawsuit claiming that she was

discriminated against because of her race and retaliated

against because she had filed an EEOC charge and because

of her father’s speeches to the board. She names as

defendants the Eufaula City Board of Education, its five

board members (Allen N. White, Jim S. Calton, Jr., Louise

Conner, Otis Hill, and James A. Lockwood), and Board

Superintendent Sadler.

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III. DISCUSSION

A.

Lewis’s first claim is that the defendants did not

renew her physical-education teaching contract at Eufaula

Primary School because she is African-American. Lewis’s

complaint, which is not a model of clarity, does not

specify the source of law for this claim--whether Title

VII, § 1981, the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, or all of these. The defendants

assert defenses that apply to some, but not all, of those

three legal sources. Nevertheless, it is unnecessary to

know which basis Lewis is relying on, for, whatever the

basis, her claim will be subject to the same standards of

proof and will require the employment of the same

analytical framework. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281,

1296 n.20 (11th Cir. 2009).

Lewis’s discrimination-in-employment claim,

regardless of legal basis, is analyzed under the burdenshifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

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Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See, e.g., Smith v.

Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir.

2011). Under McDonnell Douglas, she must first

demonstrate a prima-facie case, which consists of

“evidence adequate to create an inference that an

employment decision was based on a[n] [illegal]

discriminatory criterion.” Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.

United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977). “The methods of

presenting a prima facie case are flexible and depend on

the particular situation.” Alvarez v. Royal Atl.

Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010).

Once established, a prima-facie case raises a presumption

of illegal discrimination, Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981), and a burden of

production is then put on the employer to rebut the

presumption by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged action. Chapman

v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000).

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If this burden of production is met, the burden is

then on the employee to satisfy her ultimate burden of

establishing that the employer’s proffered reason for the

employment decision was a pretext for racial

discrimination, a burden which she may satisfy “either

directly, by persuading the court that a discriminatory

reason more than likely motivated the employer, or

indirectly, by persuading the court that the proffered

reason for the employment decision is not worthy of

belief.” Hall v. Alabama Ass'n of Sch. Bds., 326 F.3d

1157, 1166 (11th Cir. 2003). “By so persuading the

court, the employee satisfies [her] ultimate burden of

demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that

[she] has been a victim of unlawful discrimination.” Id.

Often, the question whether the plaintiff has made

out a prima-facie case is irrelevant when the district

court considers an employer's motion for summary

judgment. Bailey-Potts v. Ala. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,

2012 WL 566820, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 21, 2012)

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(Thompson, J.). That is because, “[u]nder the McDonnell

Douglas framework, the burden at the first two steps is

light for both the plaintiff and the defendant-employer.”

Id. Thus, “the real question [often] lies in whether the

employer's legitimate non-discriminatory reason is

pretextual,” id. at *4, which, as stated, is the final

inquiry in the McDonnell Douglas analysis. See Hall, 326

F.3d at 1166 (“‘If ... the defendant has succeeded in

carrying its burden of production, the McDonnell Douglas

framework--with its presumptions and burdens--is no

longer relevant. ... The presumption, having fulfilled

its role of forcing the defendant to come forward with

some response, simply drops out of the picture.’”)

(quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

510 (1993)).

In this case, the defendants have come forward with

evidence that Lewis’s employment was not renewed because

of dissatisfaction with her performance. She was, the

defendants state, too passive to be an effective

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physical-education teacher and too hesitant to bring the

students outdoors for activities. Lewis has not come

forward with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that this justification is pretextual

for racial discrimination. Viewed in the light most

favorable to Lewis, her evidence shows that the Eufaula

School System’s governance has a past history of racial

discrimination; when Lewis reported to a black principal,

he found her work satisfactory; when she later reported

to a white principal, that principal unfairly ended her

employment as part of a scheme to provide a job to a

personal friend; and, after that plan went awry, the

white principal hired an African-American to replace

Lewis. Under that scenario, although Lewis’s employer

may have acted unfairly in making the initial employment

decision, that unfairness was based on nepotism and not

race. Lewis’s claim of racial discrimination cannot

stand. See Alexander v. Fulton Cnty., 207 F.3d 1303,

1341 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is not the court's role to

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second-guess the wisdom of an employer's decisions as

long as the decisions are not racially motivated.”),

overruled on other grounds, Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304

(11th Cir. 2003).

If Lewis’s claim rests on a theory of mixed motives,

that is, that Principal Tibbs’s decision to end Lewis’s

employment was driven both by both nepotistic and racist

purposes, Lewis must still show that her race was a

“motivating factor for [her non-renewal], even though

other factors also motivated the [decision].” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e–2(m); see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539

U.S. 90, 94 (2003). Lewis has not presented sufficient

evidence to create a logical inference that her race was

even a motivating factor. Her evidence that the Eufaula

City Schools have a history of racial segregation (which

is undisputed) indicates little about her individual

circumstances: the termination of her employment. While

historical discrimination is often meaningful, see, e.g.,

Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 712 F.2d 1377, 1383

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(11th Cir. 1983), that history must be linked to the

individual circumstances presented, by showing, for

example, that one or more of the decision-makers

responsible for the past discriminatory practices were

one or more of the decision-makers who engaged in the

challenged conduct. As the defendants point out, the

members of the board today are not the same members who

enforced segregation in the past. As for evidence

specific to Lewis’s individual circumstances, she has put

forth nothing that would be sufficient to show that the

defendants’ proffered explanation (dissatisfaction with

her performance) was mere pretext for racial

discrimination. Indeed, after her employment ended, she

was in fact replaced with another African-American. See

Teneyck v. Omni Shoreham Hotel, 365 F.3d 1139, 1150 (D.C.

Cir. 2004) (“The employer's hiring of a person of the

same race ... as the plaintiff might be relevant in

assessing the merits of a plaintiff's claim.”). 

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To be sure, replacement of an African-American with

another African-American will not, conclusively, defeat

an African-American’s claim of racially discriminatory

firing or failure to renew employment contract. Cf.

Howard v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1534–35

(11th Cir. 1984) (holding that a plaintiff had

established a prima-facie failure-to-hire case

notwithstanding evidence that the position sought by the

plaintiff was ultimately filled with a person of the same

race as the plaintiff). But, as stated, such evidence is

relevant, and here, in the absence of other evidence to

support a discrimination claim, the evidence is

particularly condemning of the asserted discrimination

claim.

To the extent that the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment goes to Lewis’s claim of racially discriminatory

non-renewal of her employment contract, the motion will

be granted.

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B.

Lewis’s second claim is that the defendants refused

to rehire her for a new position because of her race.

This claim is also governed by the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework. See, e.g., Walker v.

Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 286 F.3d 1270, 1274

(11th Cir. 2002). The defendants have asserted that

Lewis’s work was unsatisfactory, and Lewis has not come

forward with sufficient evidence to show that that

explanation is a pretext for race discrimination.

Indeed, as for the opening that Lewis applied for and

that was initially given to Culverhouse (thus causing

outrage in the community), it ultimately went to a black

applicant. While there are certainly circumstances in

which a failure-to-hire claim may be supported despite

the position going to a person of the same race as the

plaintiff, see, e.g., Howard, 726 F.2d at 1534–35

(holding that a plaintiff had established a prima-facie

failure-to-hire case notwithstanding evidence that the

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position sought by the plaintiff was ultimately filled

with a person of the same race as the plaintiff), Lewis

has not provided any evidence indicating that this is

such a case. As for the numerous other positions that

Lewis applied for, she offers no evidence that would

support an inference of race discrimination; for example,

there is no indication as to who ultimately filled the

openings for which Lewis was turned down. For those

positions, Lewis has not met her burden of establishing

a prima-facie case, let alone presenting sufficient

evidence to rebut the defendants’ legitimate explanation.

To the extent that the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment goes to Lewis’s claim of racially discriminatory

refusal to rehire her, the motion will be granted.

C.

Lewis’s final claims are for retaliation. She first

claims that, in violation of Title VII, the defendants

refused to rehire her for a new position because she had

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filed an EEOC charge. Second, she claims that the

defendants’ conduct was also motivated by her father’s

speech and, as such, violated the First Amendment. The

court addresses both retaliation claims in turn.

i.

 Under Title VII, employers are prohibited from

“discriminat[ing] against ... [an] applicant[] for

employment ... because [she] has ... made a charge” with

the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). A claim asserting

retaliation in violation of that provision is also

governed by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework. See, e.g., Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse

of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 1186-87 (11th Cir.

2001). For Lewis to establish a prima-facie case of

retaliation, she must show “(1) statutorily protected

expression” (here, that would include that she filed a

charge with the EEOC), “(2) adverse employment action”

(here, that would include the refusal to consider her for

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rehiring), “and (3) a causal link between the protected

expression and the adverse action” (that is, any evidence

suggesting that, in refusing to rehire her, the

defendants were actually motivated by the EEOC charge).

Id. at 1186 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Once

Lewis establishes a prima-facie case, the defendants must

articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

not rehiring her, which, if articulated, would put the

burden on Lewis to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that the reason offered by the defendants is a

pretext for retaliation. Id.

Here, Lewis has established not only a prima-facie

case of retaliation in violation of Title VII, she has

also presented sufficient evidence to raise a factual

question of whether the defendants refused to rehire her

because she had filed an EEOC charge. First, there is the

obvious: At the time the defendants refused to rehire her,

she had filed an EEOC charge. Second, the defendants’

actions must be placed against a backdrop in which Lewis’s

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1. Lewis does not claim that the defendants’ alleged

retaliation against her for her father’s speech violated

Title VII. Rather she claims that, to the extent that

the defendants’ retaliation was motivated by such speech,

the defendants violated the First Amendment, not Title

VII. The Title VII claim addresses only the filing of

the EEOC charge. However, given the intertwined nature

of the EEOC charge and Lewis’s father’s speech (both of

which accused the defendants of racially discriminating

against Lewis), the evidence that, at least, one board

member professed displeasure with her father’s speech is

background supporting an inference that the board had a

retaliatory motive with respect to Lewis’s charge of

discrimination.

2. The defendants argue that the statement is

inadmissible hearsay and cannot be considered.

Superintendent Sadler, however, is one of the defendants

(continued...)

23

father had complained to board members about the board’s

treatment of Lewis, charging them with racial

discrimination, and at least one board member had found

his remarks inappropriate and offensive.1

 Finally, in

responding to an inquiry into whether anything could be

done for Lewis to be rehired, Superintendent Sadler stated

to Lewis’s husband that “nobody is going to hire [Lewis]

in Eufaula.” Michael Lewis Aff. (Doc. No. 29), Exh. G, ¶

7.2

 Depending on the superintendent’s tone and expression

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(...continued)

in this lawsuit and his prior statement was offered into

evidence by Lewis, his opponent in this litigation. A

statement is “not hearsay” if it is “offered against an

opposing party and ... was made by the party.” Fed. R.

Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Therefore, the statement is not

hearsay.

3. Causation may also be established by temporal

proximity between the protected conduct and the adverseemployment action, though, "without more, [the period

between the charge and the adverse action] must be 'very

close.'" Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361,

1363 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). "Three to four

month[s]" is too much time to suffice. Id. A one-month

period is sufficient to show causation. Donnellon v.

(continued...)

24

and the surrounding circumstances when made, this

statement could be viewed as a cryptic comment about

Lewis’s perceived persona non grata status in the school

community due to complaints, including her own, about the

school board’s treatment of black employees. Put together,

and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Lewis,

these allegations are enough to raise a question of fact

as to whether the defendants, in retaliation for being

charged with discrimination, refused to consider Lewis for

possible rehiring.3

Case 2:11-cv-01093-MHT-WC Document 46 Filed 12/04/12 Page 24 of 51
(...continued)

Fruehauf Corp., 794 F.2d 598, 601 (11th Cir. 1986). Here,

the times between Lewis’s EEOC charge and the refusals to

rehire her are too unclear and confusing from the record,

developed so far by the parties, to draw any inferences

one way or the other.

25

Although the court has held that the evidence is

insufficient to find that Lewis’s race was a factor in the

board’s refusal to rehire her, the court cannot say the

same about her EEOC charge. In other words, the evidence

is sufficient to create a “genuine dispute [of] material

fact,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), as to whether Lewis’s EEOC

charge was a substantial factor in the board’s refusal to

rehire her. For that reason, to the extent that the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment goes to Lewis’s

Title VII claim of retaliation, the motion will be denied.

ii.

Lewis claims that defendants’ retaliation was

motivated not only by her EEOC charge, but also, violation

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4. Lewis does not argue that the defendants violated

the First Amendment (rather than Title VII) by

retaliating against her for her filing of the EEOC

charge. As such, the court does not address whether she

would have such a claim under the First Amendment. See

Merriweather v. Alabama Dept. of Pub. Safety, 17 F. Supp.

2d 1260, 1278 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (Albritton, J.)

(discussing whether First Amendment claims may be made

out for retaliation for filing of an EEOC charge), aff'd,

199 F.3d 443 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Badia v. City of

Miami, 133 F.3d 1443, 1446 (11th Cir. 1998) (same).

26

of the First Amendment, by her father’s speech.4

 Under the

First Amendment, governmental actors are prohibited from

“abridging the freedom of speech ... or the right of the

people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the

Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const.

amend. I. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Lewis is afforded a

statutory right of action to recover monetary damages for

the deprivation of her First Amendment rights. See, e.g.,

Akins v. Fulton Cnty., 420 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir.

2005).

The First Amendment prohibits the government from

retaliating against persons for their protected speech.

See, e.g., Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1565

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(11th Cir. 1989). The same general principle applies

where the protected speech was made by an employee of the

government, and the government’s retaliation for that

speech took the form of an adverse-employment action, such

as termination of employment, decreased compensation, or

refusal to consider for hiring or re-hiring. Id.

 Often in First Amendment retaliation cases, the

government is claimed to have retaliated against the

plaintiff for her own speech; but the First Amendment may

also be violated where the speech that invoked the

government’s retaliatory response was not made by the

plaintiff herself, but rather by a person in a close

relationship with the plaintiff, and the government

retaliated against the plaintiff for her perceived

association with the other person and that person’s

speech. See, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 45 (2d

Cir. 1999) (holding that "retaliatory discharge based

solely on [protected speech] by one's spouse is actionable

under the First Amendment"); Talley v. Brentwood Union

Case 2:11-cv-01093-MHT-WC Document 46 Filed 12/04/12 Page 27 of 51
28

Free Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1797627, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 24,

2009) (Hurley, J.) (citing Adler to uphold claim of

retaliation against a daughter for her father’s speech);

Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F. Supp. 2d

1120, 1127 (D. Or. 2003) (Haggerty, C.J.) (upholding claim

that defendant’s retaliatory “conduct was motivated by

[plaintiff’s] association with his parents’ speech”);

Agostino v. Simpson, 2008 WL 4906140, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.

17, 2008) (Seibel, J.) (claim “alleging that Defendants

took adverse action against Plaintiff in retaliation for

[his father’s] First Amendment activities”); Serena H. v.

Kovarie, 209 F. Supp. 2d 453, 458 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (Brody,

J.) (upholding "First Amendment claim [that] [the

plaintiff] was retaliated against based upon her mother's

exercise of free speech"); cf. Thompson v. N. Am.

Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 867 (2011) (“We have little

difficulty concluding that if [plaintiff’s allegations

that the defendant terminated his employment in

retaliation for his fiancée’s filing of a charge with the

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29

EEOC] are true, then [the defendant’s] firing of

[plaintiff] violated Title VII.”).

That is because, “[t]he First Amendment protects not

only a citizen's right to speak freely but also his or her

right” of association. Cain, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 1127.

The First Amendment right of association has two distinct

components. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18

(1984). First, the right of association encompasses the

right to “enter into and maintain certain intimate human

relationships.” Id. at 617-18. “[C]ertain kinds of

personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture

and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and

transmitting shared ideals and beliefs,” and thus, the

right of intimate association is fundamental. Id. at 618-

19. Second, there is the “right to associate for the

purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the

First Amendment--speech, assembly, petition for the

redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.” Id.

at 618. In cases like this one, where the government is

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30

claimed to have retaliated against a daughter for the

speech of her father, and the daughter is allegedly

perceived to share the sentiments expressed by her father,

“freedom of association in both of its forms” are

involved. Id. Lewis has raised a viable question of fact

as to whether she was not rehired because of her

association with her father and his speech.

Lewis has also asserted a viable claim based solely

on free speech. “The First Amendment reflects ‘a profound

national commitment to the principle that debate on public

issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’”

Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (quoting

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).

That principle would be severely frustrated if the First

Amendment did not include within its protective ambit an

employee who bears such a close relationship with a person

who engages in protected speech that there is a legally

recognizable identity between the employee and the

speaker, such as that of immediate family members. Id.

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31

If the government could freely retaliate against such

employees, there would be an “obvious chilling effect on

free speech.” Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521

U.S. 844, 845 (1997). Persons with a family member

employed by the government would have to fear for their

family member’s well being whenever they “engag[ed] in

those activities protected by the First Amendment--speech,

assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the

exercise of religion.” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.

Likewise, a government employee would be placed in the

uncomfortable position of having to police, or attempt to

police, her family’s speech. For these reasons, it is

clear that the First Amendment, as it necessarily must,

protects government employees against retaliation for the

speech of those with whom the employees share intimate

relationships.

Title VII provides a useful analogy. In Burlington

N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006),

the Supreme Court described Title VII’s prohibition

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32

against retaliation as “seek[ing] to secure [the] primary

objective” of Title VII, which is a workplace free from

racial, ethnic, religious, and sex discrimination, “by

preventing an employer from interfering (through

retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or

advance enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees.” Thus,

the Court held, the anti-retaliation provision must be

read broadly. In Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 867, citing that

reasoning, the Court “[had] little difficulty concluding

that” an employer’s retaliation against an employee for

that employee’s fiancée’s filing of an EEOC charge

“violated Title VII.” Similarly, because the primary

objective of the First Amendment is to ensure that “debate

on public issues [is] uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,”

Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215, the amendment must necessarily

be understood to protect claims like Lewis’s, where the

speech at issue is that of her father’s. That, however,

does not mean that the reach of the amendment is endless.

For a plaintiff to bring such a claim under § 1983, that

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33

statute must provide a cause of action to the particular

plaintiff, meaning that the plaintiff must fall within the

constitutional provision and the enforcing statute’s zone

of interests. Cf. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868 (stating

that, while “prohibiting reprisals against third parties

will lead to difficult line-drawing problems concerning

the types of relationships entitled to protection,” “We

expect that firing a close family member will almost

always meet the ... standard, and inflicting a milder

reprisal on a mere acquaintance will almost never do so,”

and “the significance of any given act of retaliation will

often depend upon the particular circumstances”)

(quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Lewis and

her father’s close relationship, both at law and in fact,

fall within that zone of interest, and protection, under

the circumstances presented.

For Lewis to support a First Amendment retaliation

claim, she must show (1) that the speech at issue (in this

case, her father’s presentations to the board) can be

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34

fairly characterized as relating to a matter of public

concern, (2) that her interests as a citizen outweigh the

interests of the governmental entity (here, the school

board) as an employer, and (3) that the protected conduct

(her father’s speech or her association with him) played

a substantial or motivating role in the government's

decision to take an adverse-employment action. Akins, 420

F.3d at 1303. Even if Lewis establishes those elements,

the defendants may escape liability if they prove that,

regardless of Lewis’s father’s protected speech, they

would have refused to hire her even in the absence of the

speech. Id.

Here, as for the first element, that Lewis’s father’s

speech related to a matter of public concern, the evidence

is sufficient to find that it did. “For speech to be

protected as speech on a matter of public concern, ‘it

must relate to a matter of political, social, or other

concern to the community.’” Id. at 1303 (quoting Watkins

v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997)). Lewis’s

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35

father discussed the broad issue of the school board’s

employment of African-Americans, which is a political and

social issue that has been the subject of local newspaper

coverage and has caused at least one sizeable protest.

See, e.g., Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 776 (4th

Cir. 2004) (“We, too, have repeatedly recognized that a

public employee's speech about racially discriminatory

practices, particularly in public schools, involves a

matter of public concern.”). The defendants contend that

the speech should not be deemed a matter of public concern

because Lewis’s father discussed, among other things, the

board’s treatment of his daughter, which is a mere private

matter. But, “[e]ven if [Lewis’s father] discussed

private concerns regarding [his daughter’s] work

environment in the meeting,” which it is clear that he

did, “that does not disqualify [Lewis] from protection.

It is well understood that ‘... speech will rarely be

entirely private or entirely public.’” Akins, 420 F.3d

at 1303-04 (quoting Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 755 (11th

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36

Cir. 1993)). Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to Lewis, as the court must at this stage, it is

apparent that her father’s speech involved not only

private matters but also matters of public concern.

As to whether Lewis’s interests as a citizen outweigh

the government’s interests as an employer, the evidence

here too favors her. “[T]he state interest ... focuses on

the effective functioning of the public employer's

enterprise.” Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388

(1987). Put another way, the school board, as an

employer, has an interest “‘in promoting the efficiency of

the public services it performs through its employees,’”

and it may legitimately refuse to rehire Lewis if its

interests outweigh her father’s interests, as a citizen,

in expressing his views, and Lewis’s interests in

associating with her father and his speech. Id. (quoting

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). In

this case, there is no reason to find that the board’s

interest in the efficient and effective functioning of its

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37

schools justifies excluding Lewis from potential

employment. There has been no evidence or allegation that

Lewis herself at any time engaged in disruptive speech

while employed. There has likewise been no showing that

her father’s speech has disrupted school functions. Cf.

Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388-89 (“While McPherson's statement

was made at the workplace, there is no evidence that it

interfered with the efficient functioning of the

office.”). The only occasion in which Lewis’s father made

the protected speech at issue was at public meetings of

the board, and, because the very purpose of those meetings

is to allow the public to express its concerns, it cannot

be said that the forum was inappropriate. Even if the

tone and form of Lewis’s father’s speech was offensive, as

one member of the board took it to be, there is no reason

why that would justify refusing employment to Lewis. The

balancing test falls in Lewis’s favor.

Third, that Lewis’s father’s speech motivated the

government’s retaliation also presents a disputed issue of

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5. The evidence is somewhat unclear on the precise

time line, and it appears that at least some of Lewis’s

job applications were filed before either of her father’s

speeches to the board. Nevertheless, it also appears

that many of her applications, if not the majority, were

filed after one or both speeches.

38

fact. For essentially the same reasons that a reasonable

fact-finder could infer that Lewis was not rehired because

of her filing of an EEOC charge, the fact-finder could

also infer that the defendants were motivated by her

father’s speech. That is, at the time the defendants

refused to rehire her, Lewis had applied for over 25

openings; her father had made two speeches to the board,

upsetting at least one board member; and, after all of

that, Superintendent Sadler, in a cryptic comment, told

Lewis’s husband that not one of the school system’s

principals would hire Lewis.5

 This factual showing is

enough to survive summary judgment. 

Moreover, as stated above, even if the above elements

are proved, the defendants may still escape liability if

they establish that they would have refused to rehire

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39

Lewis regardless of her father’s speech (for example,

because they were legitimately dissuaded from doing so

because of her demonstrated poor job performance).

Whether that is the case is a factual dispute that must be

resolved at trial and is inappropriate for resolution on

summary judgment.

For that reason, to the extent that the defendants’

motion for summary judgment goes to Lewis’s First

Amendment claim of retaliation, the motion will be denied.

iii.

The court now turns to the defendants’ four defenses

that, if they had merit, would require the court to grant

summary judgment in the defendants’ favor on the

retaliation claims regardless of the sufficiency of

Lewis’s evidence. 

The defendants note that, “in order to obtain judicial

consideration of [a Title VII] claim, a plaintiff must

first file an administrative charge with the EEOC,”

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40

Pijnenburg v. W. Ga. Health Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 1304,

1305 (11th Cir. 2001); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), and

therefore, although Lewis undoubtedly filed an initial

EEOC charge claiming racial discrimination, she never

filed a subsequent EEOC charge claiming retaliation for

the earlier charge, and, as such, she cannot now bring the

retaliation claim this lawsuit. But, contrary to the

defendants’ contention, it is settled law that “it is

unnecessary for a plaintiff to [file a subsequent EEOC

charge before raising in federal court] a retaliation

claim growing out of an earlier charge.” Baker v. Buckeye

Cellulose Corp., 856 F.2d 167, 169 (11th Cir. 1988)

(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Nealon v.

Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding as such

and noting that “[a]ll other circuits that have considered

the issue have determined that a plaintiff may raise the

retaliation claim for the first time in federal court.”);

Houston v. Army Fleet Services, L.L.C., 509 F. Supp. 2d

1033, 1043 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (Fuller, J.) (“[W]hen a

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41

retaliation claim is based on adverse actions taken

against the employee after the initial EEOC charge is

filed, it can be said that the retaliation claim grows out

of a properly filed employment discrimination charge, and

it is not necessary for a plaintiff to file a second

charge specifically alleging retaliation.”) (emphasis in

original). The defendants’ argument, that Lewis’s Title

VII retaliation claim in this court must fail because she

failed to file a retaliation charge with the EEOC, is

without merit.

The second asserted defense is the doctrine of

qualified immunity, which “protects government officials

‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

(2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982)). Qualified immunity, which was once called “goodfaith immunity,” see, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635,

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42

639-40 (1980) (“[A] public official[‘s] position might

entitle him to immunity if he acted in good faith.”);

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (referring to “qualified or goodfaith immunity”), essentially seeks to protect government

officials from monetary liability for unexpected changes

in the law. As such, if the defendants are alleged to

have violated legal rights that were not “clearly

established” in the law at the time of their challenged

conduct, this court will not make them pay for the lack of

foresight.

In addressing whether a legal right was clearly

established in the law, the question before the court is

whether “the state of the law ... gave [the defendants]

fair warning that their alleged treatment of [the

plaintiff] was unconstitutional.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536

U.S. 730, 740 (2002). Put another way, “‘[c]learly

established’ for purposes of qualified immunity means that

the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that

a reasonable official would understand that what he is

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43

doing violates that right. This is not to say that an

official action is protected by qualified immunity unless

the very action in question has previously been held

unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Wilson

v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-15 (1999) (punctuation marks

and citations omitted); see also Hope, 536 U.S. at 741

(“[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct

violates established law even in novel factual

circumstances.”).

As an initial matter, the qualified-immunity doctrine

does not apply to Title VII actions against governmental

employers like the Eufaula City Board of Education. See,

e.g., Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th

Cir. 1991); Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1990).

Therefore, “a qualified immunity analysis is unnecessary

under Title VII,” Busby, 931 F.2d at 772, and the court

accordingly turns to Lewis’s First Amendment retaliation

claim.

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44

The general principle that the government cannot take

adverse-employment action in retaliation for protected

speech has long been a feature of law as declared by the

Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit (which includes

Eufaula in its three-state area). See, e.g., Rankin, 483

U.S. at 383 (“It is clearly established that a State may

not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes that

employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom

of speech.”); Akins, 420 F.3d at 1303 (the elements of a

First Amendment retaliation claim are “well established in

this circuit”); Bryson, 888 F.2d at 1565 (same). This

principle has long been applied where failure to rehire is

the form of retaliation being challenged. See, e.g.,

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596 (1972) (“The first

question presented is whether the respondent's lack of a

contractual or tenure right to re-employment, taken alone,

defeats his claim that the nonrenewal of his contract

violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. We hold

that it does not.”); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of

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45

Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977) (“[Plaintiff]

may ... establish a claim to reinstatement if the decision

not to rehire him was made by reason of his exercise of

constitutionally protected First Amendment freedoms.”).

Additionally, the First Amendment right of intimate

association has long been recognized in numerous

decisions. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18. 

Because the allegations (which the court must take as

true on a motion for summary judgment) undergirding

Lewis’s retaliation claim for violation of her rights to

association and speech go to the core protections of the

First Amendment, the violations, if true, are obvious.

Cf. Hope, 536 U.S. at 738 (“As the facts are alleged by

Hope, the Eighth Amendment violation is obvious.”).

Indeed, apparently deciding that the issue did not merit

discussion, some courts have upheld First Amendment claims

of retaliation for the speech of family members and

entirely passed over that the speech was made by the

plaintiff’s family rather than the plaintiff herself. See

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46

Ward v. Athens City Bd. of Educ., 1999 WL 623730 (6th Cir.

1999) (unpublished) (upholding children’s First Amendment

retaliation claim alleging that the children were punished

for their mother’s speech; holding that “the

impermissibility of retaliation is sufficiently well

established that the defendants are not entitled to

qualified immunity”; and, not discussing the legal

implications of the protected speech at issue being made

by the children’s mother rather than the children); Henley

v. Tullahoma City Sch. Sys., 84 F. App'x 534, 539-40 (6th

Cir. 2003) (unpublished).

In sum, government officials reasonably apprised of

the law and acting in good faith would, if acting as Lewis

has alleged, have had more than “fair warning that their

[conduct] was unconstitutional.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 740.

It cannot be questioned that a reasonable government

official would know that he would violate the First

Amendment’s core protections if he retaliated against an

employee for her own free speech. Knowing as much, it is

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47

clear that no reasonable official could think that he

would be free to retaliate against an employee for her

relationship or association with her father and his

exercise of free speech. Cf. id. at 742-43 (“No

reasonable officer could have concluded that the

constitutional holding of [Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291

(5th Cir. 1974)] turned on the fact that inmates were

handcuffed to fences or the bars of cells, rather than a

specially designed metal bar designated for shackling.”)

(citation omitted). For that reason, the defendants can

find no refuge in the doctrine of qualified immunity.

The third asserted defense is the so-called Monell

doctrine. In Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658,

694 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a municipal agency

(such as the Eufaula City Board of Education) could be

held liable under § 1983 only where the plaintiff’s rights

were violated by a “policy or custom” of the defendant

agency (rather than conduct of an agency employee acting

alone). A typical case in which the Monell defense

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48

applies would be, for example, one in which a city seeks

to avoid being held responsible for an unlawful act of one

of its police officers, arguing that the city itself

committed no wrong and should not be made to pay for the

acts of a rogue officer. See, e.g., City of Oklahoma City

v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985). But this is no such case.

Here, Lewis alleges that the board itself, as controlled

through the board member defendants, unlawfully retaliated

against her, and thus, nothing in Monell exempts the board

from liability here. See Jamieson v. Poughkeepsie City

Sch. Dist., 195 F. Supp. 2d 457, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)

(McMahon, J.) (“Plaintiff need not establish an official

policy or custom of the District if the trier of fact

finds there has been a decision by a municipal policymaker

who possesses final authority to establish municipal

policy with respect to the action ordered.”); Hamilton v.

Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1289

(M.D. Ala. 2000) (DeMent, J.) (“Plaintiff can demonstrate

an official policy or custom by showing that his adverse

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49

employment decision resulted from ... [a] decision

officially adopted and promulgated by board members”).

Finally, the school-board members and the

superintendent are correct that Lewis’s Title VII

retaliation claim does not lie against them in their

“individual capacities.” Busby, 931 F.2d at 772 (“The

relief granted under Title VII is against the employer,

not individual employees whose actions would constitute a

violation of the Act.”) (emphasis in original). They are

also correct that, because Lewis has named the school

board as a defendant on her Title VII retaliation claim,

naming them too as defendants in their “official

capacities” is redundant. See Busby, 931 F.2d at 776

(affirming district court's dismissal of § 1983 claims

against official capacity defendants, stating, “To keep

both the City and the officers sued in their official

capacity as defendants in this case would have been

redundant and possibly confusing to the jury.”); id. at

772 (“We think the proper method for a plaintiff to

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50

recover under Title VII is by suing the employer, either

by naming the supervisory employees as agents of the

employer or by naming the employer directly.”). Lewis’s

Title VII retaliation claim is viable against only the

school board in this case.

At the end of the day, after having assessed all

asserted defenses, there remains standing in this case

only Lewis’s Title VII retaliation claim against the board

and her First Amendment retaliation claim against all

defendants.

***

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendants Eufaula

City Board of Education, Allen N. White, Jim S. Calton,

Jr., Louise Conner, Otis Hill, James A. Lockwood, and

Barry R. Sadler’s motion for summary judgment (Doc.

No. 20) is granted in part and denied in part as follows:

(1) Summary judgment on plaintiff Crystal C. Lewis’s

First Amendment retaliation claim brought under 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983 against all defendants is denied. This claim will

go trial.

(2) Summary judgment on plaintiff Lewis’s Title VII

retaliation claim against defendant Eufaula City Board of

Education is denied. This claim will go trial.

(3) Summary judgment on plaintiff Lewis’s Title VII

retaliation claim against defendants White, Calton,

Conner, Hill, Lockwood, and Sadler is granted, with

plaintiff Lewis taking nothing on this claim against these

defendants.

(4) Summary judgment on plaintiff Lewis’s Title VII

discrimination claims against defendants Eufaula City

Board of Education, White, Calton, Conner, Hill, Lockwood,

and Sadler is granted, with plaintiff Lewis taking nothing

on these claims against these defendants.

DONE, this the 4th day of December, 2012.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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