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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 19, 2011 Decided December 16, 2011

No. 10-5253

AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC.,

APPELLANT

v.

NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Consolidated with 10-5254, 10-5255

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-00804)

Robert A. Siegel argued the cause for appellants. With 

him on the briefs were Walter Dellinger, Micah W.J. Smith, 

John J. Gallagher, Neal D. Mollen, Igor V. Timofeyev,

Mitchell A. Mosvick, Robin S. Conrad, and Glenn M.

Taubman. Stephen D. Brody entered an appearance.

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John S. Koppel, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellee National Mediation Board. With 

him on the brief were Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, 

Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and William Kanter, 

Attorney.

Roland P. Wilder Jr., William R. Wilder, Nicholas Paul 

Granath, and Lucas K. Middlebrook were on the brief for 

appellees International Brotherhood of Teamsters, et al.

James R. Klimaski entered an appearance. 

Carmen R. Parcelli and Jeffrey A. Bartos were on the 

brief for amicus curiae Transportation Trades Department, 

AFL-CIO in support of appellees. 

Before: HENDERSON, TATEL and GRIFFITH, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: The Railway Labor Act provides 

that “[t]he majority of any craft or class of employees shall 

have the right to determine who shall be the representative of 

the craft or class.” 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth. For seventy-five

years, the National Mediation Board counted non-voters as 

voting against union representation, thereby requiring a 

majority of eligible voters to affirmatively vote for 

representation before a union could be certified. In 2010, the 

Board issued a new rule: elections will henceforth be decided 

by a majority of votes cast, and those not voting will be 

understood as acquiescing to the outcome of the election. 

Appellants challenge the new rule, claiming that it violates the 

statute and is arbitrary and capricious. Rejecting these 

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arguments, the district court granted summary judgment to the 

Board. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we agree and 

affirm.

I.

Labor relations in the railroad and airline industries are 

governed by the Railway Labor Act. See 45 U.S.C. § 151 et 

seq. Passed in 1926 and amended several times since, the Act 

seeks to avoid strikes by encouraging bargaining, arbitration, 

and mediation. Its goal is to “avoid any interruption to 

commerce,” 45 U.S.C. § 151a, while protecting the right of 

workers to “organize and bargain collectively through 

representatives of their own choosing,” 45 U.S.C. § 152, 

Fourth. See generally 45 U.S.C. § 151a (describing the 

“[g]eneral purposes” of the Act). 

The Railway Labor Act has little to say about how 

employees are to choose their representatives. In section 2, 

Fourth, the Act provides that “[t]he majority of any craft or 

class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall 

be the representative of the craft or class.” 45 U.S.C. § 152, 

Fourth. The statute also established the National Mediation 

Board, 45 U.S.C. § 154, assigning it the task of recognizing

and certifying the chosen representative, 45 U.S.C. § 152, 

Ninth. “In the conduct of any election[,] . . . the Board shall 

designate who may participate in the election and establish 

the rules to govern the election[.]” Id. If there are “any 

dispute[s] . . . as to who are the representatives of such 

employees,” the Board must investigate. Id.

Until the rulemaking at issue in this case, the only way 

employees could vote against union representation was by not 

voting at all. For example, a ballot might present the option of 

voting for union A, union B, or union C, and those preferring

no union representation would simply abstain. Whichever 

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candidate received a majority of the votes would become the 

elected representative unless, of course, a majority of voters 

abstained.

Last year, after issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 

holding an open meeting, and evaluating public comments,

the Board, with one member dissenting, changed its approach

in several respects. For one thing, ballots will now include a 

“no union” option so that employees can affirmatively vote 

against union representation. Moreover, the Board will no 

longer interpret an abstention as a vote against union 

representation. Instead, the Board will interpret the intent of 

non-voters using “the political principle of majority rule with 

the presumption that those not voting assent to the expressed 

will of the majority voting.” 75 Fed. Reg. 26,062, 26,069 

(May 11, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, 

and setting the stage for this case, the new rule provides that 

“a majority of valid ballots cast will determine the [union] 

representative.” Id. at 26,082 (emphasis added).

In proposing the change, the Board observed that the old 

rule rested not on “legal opinion and precedents, but on what 

seemed to the [1935] Board best from an administration point 

of view.” 74 Fed. Reg. 56,750, 56,751 (Nov. 3, 2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted). And in explaining its rule, 

the Board noted that in the political context non-voters are 

assumed to acquiesce in the outcome of elections on the 

theory that such an assumption better captures what they

intend to convey by abstaining. The Board cited evidence that 

employees may fail to vote for a variety of reasons, including

“travel, illness, or apathy,” or because they would prefer to 

register no opinion on the question. 75 Fed. Reg. at 26,073. 

As to the last point, the Board cited comments, including one 

submitted by thirty-nine U.S. Senators, that employees should 

have an opportunity to truly abstain (of course, under the old 

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rule abstaining meant voting against representation). Id. The 

Board believed that elections conducted under the new rule

would, as in the political context, better reflect the true intent

of non-participants, thus increasing the overall accuracy of 

representation determinations. Id.

The Air Transport Association of America, Inc. (ATA),

an organization comprising major United States airlines, filed 

a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of 

Columbia alleging that the Board’s new rule runs afoul of 

section 2, Fourth’s plain text because it allows a union to be 

certified when less than a majority of all eligible voters vote. 

The complaint also challenged the new rule as arbitrary and 

capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.

And, based largely on a letter sent from the dissenting 

member of the Board to several U.S. Senators, ATA sought

discovery to explore its allegation that the two-member 

majority “predetermined” the outcome and “act[ed] with an 

unalterably closed mind.” Appellants’ Br. 57 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The Chamber of Commerce, along 

with five Delta employees, who made the additional claim 

that the new rule violates their First Amendment right to free 

association, intervened as plaintiffs. The International 

Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal 

Association, and the United States Airline Pilots Association 

intervened as defendants.

Citing the general rule that discovery is typically “not 

available in APA cases,” the district court denied ATA’s 

request for discovery because it had failed to make the 

necessary “significant showing . . . that it will find material in 

the agency’s possession indicative of bad faith or an 

incomplete record.” Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Nat’l 

Mediation Bd., No. 10-0804, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. June 4, 

2010). The district court then granted summary judgment to 

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the Board. It found that “nothing in the statute unambiguously 

requires that a majority of all eligible voters select the 

representative of the employees,” nor “does it even require

that a majority of all eligible employees vote in order for the 

election to be valid.” Air Transp. Ass’n, 719 F. Supp. 2d 26, 

33 (D.D.C. 2010). Having found the statute ambiguous, the 

district court then concluded that the Board’s reading of the 

Railway Labor Act was reasonable. Id. at 39. ATA and the 

other plaintiffs now appeal.

II.

We begin with the key question presented: does section 

2, Fourth require that a majority of eligible voters vote, as 

ATA claims, or does it allow a union to be certified by a 

majority of votes cast even if a majority of eligible voters do 

not participate in the election, as the Board’s new rule allows?

The Supreme Court came close to answering this 

question in Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 

40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). There, two unions competed to 

represent the employees, and although one union won a 

majority of the votes cast, it failed to receive votes from a 

majority of all eligible voters. Interpreting the very provision 

at issue in this case—section 2, Fourth—the Supreme Court 

held that a union could win even without procuring a majority 

of all eligible votes; the union needed only a majority of votes 

cast. The Court reasoned:

Election laws providing for approval . . . by a 

specified majority of an electorate have been 

generally construed as requiring only the consent of 

the specified majority of those participating in the 

election. Those who do not participate are presumed 

to assent to the expressed will of the majority of 

those voting.

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Virginian Ry., 300 U.S. at 560 (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). We say the Court came “close” to 

answering the question because, in the election at issue, a 

majority of eligible voters had in fact voted, meaning that

contrary to the repeated assertions of our dissenting colleague,

the Court had no need to determine whether a majority must 

participate, or in other words, whether a quorum is required.

See id. at 559 (noting that “in the case of the carmen and 

coach cleaners, a majority of the employees eligible to vote 

did not participate in the election” and that “[t]here has been 

no appeal from the ruling of the District Court that the 

designation of the [union] as the representative of the carmen 

and coach cleaners was invalid”). We therefore turn to the 

statute’s language, asking first “whether Congress has directly 

spoken to [this] precise question,” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 

Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).

Insisting that section 2, Fourth resolves the issue in its 

favor, ATA marshals three main points about the provision’s 

text. First, it points out that “the right to determine who shall 

be the representative of the craft or class” belongs to the 

“majority” of a “craft or class”—not to a minority or to those 

who happen to vote. See also Dissenting Op. at 6 (echoing 

this argument and describing section 2, Fourth as “grant[ing] 

the majority . . . the collective right to determine the 

representative”). Second, emphasizing that section 2, Fourth 

grants the majority “the right to determine,” rather than “a

right” to determine and citing the dictionary definition of the 

word “the,” ATA argues that the article “the” confirms that 

the “right to determine” is a singular right that belongs to the 

majority of the craft or class. Given this, ATA reasons, the 

Board may not “transfer the Section 2, Fourth right from the 

majority of the craft or class to a majority of voters.”

Appellants’ Br. 27. Finally, ATA argues that the word 

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“determine” (in the phrase “the right to determine”) 

contemplates “an authoritative pronouncement—a declaration 

rather than mere silence or acquiescence.” Id. at 28. 

Accordingly, “the majority of a craft or class will not have 

exercised its right to ‘determine’ the representative unless it 

declares its preferences—by, for example, authorizing an 

election or sanctioning an election by participating in it.” Id. 

at 30.

All three arguments suffer from a fundamental defect: 

nothing in section 2, Fourth “clearly and unambiguously” 

answers the question before us, as it must under Chevron step 

one. See Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 

1269 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curiam). That is, as the district 

court observed, nothing in the section clearly and 

unambiguously requires that a majority must participate in 

order to have a valid election. Congress, moreover, knows 

how to impose a quorum requirement when it wants to, as it 

did for the Board itself in this very statute. See 45 U.S.C. 

§ 154, First (“Two of the members in office shall constitute a 

quorum for the transaction of the business of the [National 

Mediation] Board.”).

To be sure, as ATA observes, section 2, Fourth says that 

the “majority” has “the” right to “determine” who will 

represent them. Of course, we would never question 

Webster’s definitions of “the” and “determine.” But as the 

Supreme Court stated, “the words of [section 2, Fourth] 

confer the right of determination upon a majority of those 

eligible to vote, but is silent as to the manner in which that 

right shall be exercised.” Virginian Ry., 300 U.S. at 560. The 

Board’s rule allows employees to exercise that right through 

the most traditional of forums—an election. The fact that a

majority of eligible voters decides to abstain—i.e., not 

exercise its right—hardly suggests that the majority was 

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deprived of its right. This is how voting rights work. Citizens

with the right to vote in a presidential election must register,

show up to a polling place on the Tuesday after the first 

Monday in November, wait in line, enter the booth, and pick a 

candidate in order to exercise their right. Those who fail to do 

so have not been deprived of their right. Indeed, under the 

Board’s interpretation of the Railway Labor Act, an

abstaining majority unhappy with the outcome of a labor 

election can simply call for a new election and, by exercising 

its right through actually voting, produce a different result.

See 75 Fed. Reg. at 26,077 (reiterating that decertification is 

allowed when fifty percent of the craft or class shows 

interest).

ATA’s argument stretches section 2, Fourth’s language 

beyond its plain meaning. According to ATA, “the majority 

of a craft or class will not have exercised its right to 

‘determine’ the representative unless it declares its 

preferences—by, for example, authorizing an election or 

sanctioning an election by participating in it.” Appellants’ Br. 

30. But one does not, in ordinary parlance or any parlance 

with which we are familiar, declare a preference merely by 

authorizing an election. Rather, one declares a preference by

affirmatively checking the box next to a candidate’s name.

Consider two hypothetical elections, each with 100 eligible 

voters:

Hypothetical A: 49 vote yes. 2 vote no. 49 are 

indifferent and abstain.

Hypothetical B: 49 vote yes. The same 2 still oppose, 

but this time abstain. The other 49 remain indifferent 

and again abstain. Thus 49 vote yes and 51 abstain.

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Under ATA’s interpretation, the majority affirmatively 

“determines” and “declares” yes in hypothetical A, but fails to 

do so in hypothetical B, even though the same number voted 

yes. In effect, ATA interprets “determine” to mean 

“authorize” so that the only way to run an election is to first 

have a majority authorize it. In ATA’s world, the Railway 

Labor Act actually says: “An election can be authorized only

by a majority of the craft or class.” Of course, the statute does 

not say that, much less say it unambiguously.

Having thus concluded that nothing in section 2, Fourth 

unambiguously resolves the question before us, we turn to the 

second step of Chevron analysis, asking whether the Board’s 

new rule represents a “reasonable” interpretation of the 

statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. In thinking about this 

question, one must remember that even the old rule imposed 

no quorum requirement. The old rule simply assumed that 

everyone participated in the election, and it did so by treating

those who abstained as having affirmatively voted against 

representation. Thus, the difference between the old rule and 

the new rule comes down to how the Board interprets a nonvote: as a vote against unions (old rule) or as acquiescence 

(new rule).

In adopting its new rule, the Board relied on the Supreme 

Court’s analysis in Virginian Railway—that “[t]hose who do 

not participate are presumed to assent to the expressed will of

the majority of those voting” 300 U.S. at 560 (internal 

quotation marks omitted)—and we see nothing unreasonable 

about extending that logic to elections where less than a 

majority of all eligible voters participate. Indeed, political 

elections are often premised on just that reasoning. Id. (citing 

Cass Cnty. v. Johnston, 95 U.S. 360 (1877)). Accordingly, 

even though less than fifty percent of voters turned out in the 

1824, 1920, 1924, and 1996 presidential elections, the nation 

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still accepted John Quincy Adams, Warren G. Harding, 

Calvin Coolidge, and William Jefferson Clinton as 

legitimately elected presidents.

ATA and the dissent emphasize another line from 

Virginian Railway: “If, in addition to participation by a 

majority of a craft, a vote of the majority of those eligible is 

necessary for a choice, an indifferent minority could prevent 

the resolution of a contest.” Id. at 560; see also Dissenting 

Op. at 4. But the Court was not suggesting that a majority of 

the craft must participate. It was simply buttressing the point

it just made—that it makes no sense to require a candidate to 

win a majority of all eligible votes. Imagine an election where 

there are 100 eligible voters, 49 vote yes, 2 vote no, and the 

remaining 49 are indifferent and abstain. The Court was 

merely suggesting that it would be absurd to allow the 

indifferent 49 to “prevent the resolution” of this contest. The

Board likewise reasonably decided that the same problem 

follows from a majority requirement. In our hypothetical, for 

instance, imagine that the 2 no voters abstain rather than vote, 

reducing the total number of votes cast to 49. In that situation, 

a majority requirement would allow the indifferent 49, joined 

by the 2 no voters, to “prevent the resolution” of the contest.

Indeed, citing Virginian Railway, we have held that the

National Labor Relations Board, interpreting similar language 

in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), may certify a 

union even in elections where fewer than a majority of voters 

participate. See NLRB v. Cent. Dispensary & Emergency 

Hosp., 145 F.2d 852, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (approving 

NLRB’s certification of election results despite the fact that 

“the election . . . was carried by a majority of a minority” 

because the “question seems . . . to be settled by the Virginia 

Railway case”); see also NLRB v. Standard Lime & Stone Co., 

149 F.2d 435, 437 (4th Cir. 1945) (“The company seeks to 

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distinguish the Virginian Railway case . . . on the ground that 

a majority of the employees participated in the elections there; 

but nothing in the statute furnishes the basis for such 

distinction.”); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & 

S.S. Clerks, 402 F.2d 196, 204 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (noting 

the same); 75 Fed. Reg. at 26,069 (noting that these cases 

support its reading of Virginian Railway). Comparing the two

statutes, we see no relevant textual difference. Compare 45 

U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (“The majority of any craft or class of 

employees shall have the right to determine[.]”), with 29 

U.S.C. § 159(a) (“Representatives designated or selected for 

the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the 

employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the 

exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for 

the purposes of collective bargaining[.]”). ATA nonetheless 

argues that the NLRA “merely provides that if the majority 

has ‘selected or designated’ a union as its representative, then

that union will represent the entire unit.” Appellants’ Br. 33. 

True enough, but under both statutes a union will represent 

employees if and only if a majority selects the union. To be 

sure, we must avoid placing too much weight on the NLRA.

See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed’n of Flight 

Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 439 (1989). But the “majority” 

rules under both the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act, and

we have held that the NLRA imposes no quorum requirement.

ATA and the dissent also argue that because the NLRA

affords greater judicial review than the Railway Labor Act, 

the Board’s new rule—without “the safeguard provided by 

judicial review available under the NLRA”—can lead to the 

certification of “minority-supported” unions, which in turn 

will produce labor instability. Dissenting Op. at 10. But the 

Board carefully considered this question and concluded that 

its new rule would have little effect on labor stability, a 

judgment to which we owe great deference. See infra at 15.

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III.

ATA offers four independent reasons for why it thinks

the new rule is arbitrary and capricious: (1) the rule is 

unsupported by “compelling reasons,” as, according to ATA,

the Board’s precedent requires, or, for that matter, by the 

reasoned decisionmaking called for by the APA; (2) although

the Board had justified its old rule on the premise that it 

promoted “labor stability,” it now arbitrarily disregards that 

rationale; (3) the Board’s new rule is inconsistent with its

treatment of its decertification and run-off procedures; and (4) 

the Board failed to conduct the evidentiary hearing ATA 

argues Board precedent requires.

As to its first point, ATA contends that the Board failed 

to satisfy its long-standing “compelling reasons” standard for 

changing rules, “under which . . . a proposed rule change 

[must either be] mandated by the [Railway Labor Act] or 

essential to the Board’s administration of representation 

matters.” Appellants’ Br. 40 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). ATA notes that the Board considered changing its 

voting rule in 1948, 1987, and again in 2008, and on all three

occasions was unpersuaded that it needed to change its rules 

to make elections more accurate, i.e., more reflective of nonvoter intent. See Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 1 N.M.B. 454, 455 

(1948); Chamber of Commerce, 14 N.M.B. 347, 360 (1987); 

Delta Air Lines, Inc., 35 N.M.B. 129, 132 (2008). According 

to ATA, the Board neither explained why it now disagrees 

with these prior conclusions nor identified any new 

circumstances that might account for its change of heart. In 

the alternative, ATA argues that the Board’s accuracy theory 

finds no support in “rational and neutral principles.” 

Appellants’ Br. 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). We 

disagree. 

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As an initial matter, the Board has never adopted a 

“compelling reasons” standard. True, in Chamber of 

Commerce, in which the Board considered and rejected the 

very rule it has now adopted—i.e., allowing elections to be 

decided by a majority of votes cast—it did state that the union 

had “not provided the Board with compelling reasons to 

change practices in effect for over fifty years.” Chamber of 

Commerce, 14 N.M.B. at 362. This, however, is a feeble basis 

on which to declare the Board has a formal, established 

practice of requiring “compelling reasons.” In any event, here 

the Board did find “compelling reasons to make this change to 

the representation election procedure at this time.” 75 Fed. 

Reg. at 26,072. As the district court put it, “[t]hroughout the 

Final Rule the Board provides evidence and analysis for why 

the New Rule will better determine employees’ preference 

regarding representation.” Air Transp. Ass’n., 719 F. Supp. 

2d. at 44. The Board determined that its new rule, which 

assumes that non-voters intend to acquiesce rather than to 

affirmatively vote against representation, better captures a 

non-voter’s “true intent” and thus “allow[s] the Board to more 

accurately determine the employees’ true choice.” 75 Fed. 

Reg. at 26,073. Given the Board’s statutory responsibility for 

administering representation elections, we do not see how it 

could be arbitrary and capricious for the Board to believe that

persuasive arguments for how to more accurately measure the 

results of such elections are “compelling.”

ATA makes much of the fact that the old rule was in 

place since 1935 and that the Board declined at least three 

opportunities to change the rule. But the Supreme Court has 

held that the APA allows an agency to adopt an interpretation

of its governing statute that differs from a previous 

interpretation and that such a change is subject to no

heightened judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television 

Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009) (“We find no 

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basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions 

for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more 

searching review. The Act mentions no such heightened 

standard. And our opinion in State Farm neither held nor 

implied that every agency action representing a policy change 

must be justified by reasons more substantial than those 

required to adopt a policy in the first instance.”). Thus, for 

purposes of APA review, the fact that the new rule reflects a 

change in policy matters not at all. We uphold the new rule 

because, for the reasons explained above, the Board 

“articulated a rational connection between the facts found and 

the choice made,” City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 713

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

As to ATA’s second argument, it is true that the Board 

justified its old rule in part on grounds of labor stability. See 

75 Fed. Reg. at 26,076. But as noted above, an agency 

remains free to change its views where its action rests on 

reasoned decisionmaking. In its new rule, the Board devoted 

two full pages to the issue, see id. at 26,076–79, observing

that in its experience, election procedures have had little

effect on labor stability; rather, labor stability “in the 

industries has been attributed over the years to the Act’s 

mediation process, the existence of collective bargaining 

agreements, and the restriction on carrier interference in 

representation matters.” 75 Fed. Reg. at 26,077. The Board 

also noted that its prior statements about the relationship 

between voting procedures and stability were based on 

reasoning from first principles, not empirical evidence, and 

that it no longer finds such reasoning persuasive. Id. at 26,078

(noting the lack of evidence). ATA’s argument—that the old 

rule’s majority quorum requirement contributed to labor 

stability—is certainly plausible. But under the APA, the

question for us is whether the Board considered all the facts 

before it, whether it drew reasonable inferences from those 

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facts, and whether its final decision was rationally related to 

those facts and inferences. Nothing in either the record or 

ATA’s briefs suggests that the Board failed in this task.

Moving on to ATA’s third argument—that the new rule 

conflicts with the Board’s decertification and run-off 

procedures—we begin by pointing out that the Board has no

formal decertification process. To decertify a union, 

employees designate a straw man to run against the union 

representative with the understanding that, if elected, the 

straw man would disclaim any representative status. To 

trigger such an election, over fifty percent of represented 

employees must show interest. See 29 C.F.R. § 1206.2(a)

(“[A] showing of proved authorizations (checked and verified 

as to date, signature, and employment status) from at least a 

majority of the craft or class must be made before the 

National Mediation Board will authorize an election or 

otherwise determine the representation desires of the 

employees[.]”). By contrast, a regular election can be initiated 

by the vote of thirty-five percent of unrepresented employees. 

This has always been the rule. The difference between the old 

rule (favored by ATA) and the new rule (challenged by ATA)

is how non-votes are interpreted once an election is called. 

Under the new rule, once an election is initiated—again, by a 

thirty-five percent showing of interest—a union can be 

certified by winning a majority of the votes cast. But under 

the old rule, once an election was initiated, a union could not 

be certified if a majority of employees abstained (because 

those non-votes were counted as votes against certification). 

Thus, even though thirty-five percent of the employees can 

initiate an election under both rules, a union could be certified 

under the old rule only if a majority of employees voted in 

favor of representation. Because the new rule no longer 

requires such a majority in order to certify a union 

representative, ATA argues that the Board acted arbitrarily 

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and capriciously by continuing to require a fifty percent 

showing of interest for a decertification election—the 

problem being that it is now harder to decertify than to certify.

See also Dissenting Op. at 12.

To reiterate, the Railway Labor Act spells out no 

procedures for either representation or decertification and, for 

that matter, makes no mention of decertification procedures, 

much less requires them. Absent plain statutory language or 

some other evidence of congressional intent to guide us one 

way or the other, we defer to the Board’s reasonable balance 

of the competing interests at stake. See Am. Mar. Ass’n v. 

United States, 766 F.2d 545, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[Courts] 

accord substantial deference to an interpretation of a statute” 

when that interpretation “represents a reasonable 

accommodation of the conflicting policies that were 

committed to the agency’s care by the statute,” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). The Board determined that 

decertification elections, if easy to call, would encourage 

union raiding—i.e., if decertifying a union is easy, unions will 

constantly call for decertification elections to oust the 

incumbent. 75 Fed. Reg. at 26,077–78. Indeed, several

commenters expressed exactly this concern. Id. In response, 

the Board observed that “it is not changing its showing of 

interest requirements” and thus “it is unlikely that there will 

be a great increase in ‘raiding’ among unions.” Id. at 26,077.

Perhaps much can be said both for and against the way the

Board has set up decertification elections, but given its

rational consideration of stability, the least that can be said for 

its new rule is that it survives arbitrary and capricious review.

As to the related question—the Board’s run-off 

procedures—decertification ballots under the old rule

presented three choices: the incumbent union, the straw man, 

and a write-in option. Under the new rule, the decertification 

USCA Case #10-5254 Document #1348010 Filed: 12/16/2011 Page 17 of 38
18

ballot will also contain a “no union” option. ATA complains 

that the Board “acknowledges that the straw-man serves 

solely as the proxy for a ‘no union’ vote, yet it nevertheless 

retains this completely redundant option.” Appellants’ Br. 52

(citation omitted). 

To see how the rule operates and why ATA objects, 

consider a hypothetical: 100 eligible voters, 25 vote for union 

A, 26 vote for the straw man, 30 vote for no union, and the 

remaining 19 abstain. In that situation, because no one option 

received a majority of the 81 votes cast, the Board’s rules 

would require a run-off election. But the run-off would be 

between union A and the straw man, leaving out the “no 

union” option even though that option received a plurality of 

the votes. This is because (1) to win the election, a candidate

needs a majority of the votes cast, (2) if no one candidate gets 

a majority, the election goes to a runoff between the two 

candidates with the most votes, and (3) if no single anti-union

option (the straw man or the actual “no union” option) 

receives a majority in the first round, the Board will treat 

votes cast for the straw man as votes for representation and

then aggregate them with those cast for the union. In our 

hypothetical, the Board will treat the election as having 

produced 51 votes for some sort of representation (25+26), 

and call a runoff between union A and the straw man. Thus, 

the “no union” option can never be in the runoff; it either wins 

a majority of votes the first time or it is eliminated. The 

Board’s reason for doing this rests on an assumption that

given the availability of a “no union” option, those voting for 

the straw man are in fact voting for “some sort of 

representation” that will presumably be different from the no 

union vote. 

This quarrel is inconsequential. In the runoff, all “no 

union” voters should simply vote for the straw man; doing so 

USCA Case #10-5254 Document #1348010 Filed: 12/16/2011 Page 18 of 38
19

will defeat union representation and produce the same result.

This may not be the best system, but potential redundancy is 

insufficient to make it arbitrary and capricious. Cf. Petal Gas 

Storage, LLC v. FERC, 496 F.3d 695, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 

(under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, an 

agency “is not required to choose the best solution, only a 

reasonable one”).

This brings us to ATA’s fourth argument—that the Board 

acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to conduct the 

“robust evidentiary hearing required by its own precedent.”

Appellants’ Br. 54. According to ATA, the Board “made a 

firm commitment that it would change its standards for union 

elections only after engaging in a complete and open 

administrative process including a full evidentiary hearing 

with witnesses subject to cross-examination.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). To support this proposition, ATA 

cites Delta Air Lines, 35 N.M.B. at 132, and Chamber of 

Commerce, 14 N.M.B. at 360–62 and 13 N.M.B. 90, 94 

(1986). But we agree with the Board that neither case makes 

this commitment.

In Chamber of Commerce, the Board held an evidentiary 

hearing in response to a petition requesting a rulemaking 

proceeding because such a hearing was “the most appropriate 

method of gathering the information and evidence” necessary 

to decide whether to initiate rulemaking. Chamber of 

Commerce, 13 N.M.B. at 94. In other words, the Board was 

considering a pre-rulemaking petition and concluded that an 

evidentiary hearing was necessary and appropriate. As the 

district court noted, “the Board never suggested that a full 

evidentiary hearing would be appropriate in proposing a rule 

or engaging in formal or informal rulemaking under the 

APA.” Air Transp. Ass’n, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 43. Thus, we see 

no reason why Chamber of Commerce would apply here, 

USCA Case #10-5254 Document #1348010 Filed: 12/16/2011 Page 19 of 38
20

much less why it would bind the Board. And in Delta Air 

Lines, the Board did nothing more than suggest that “a 

complete and open administrative process” was necessary to 

change its voting rules. 35 N.M.B. at 132. As the Board points 

out, suggesting that notice-and-comment rulemaking under 

the APA constitutes “a complete and open administrative 

process” can hardly be arbitrary and capricious. And in any 

event, an agency may change its procedures so long as the 

new interpretation “is otherwise legally permissible and is 

adequately explained.” Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 

F.2d 1477, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Am. Trucking 

Ass’ns v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 387 U.S. 397, 

416 (1967). Here, notice-and-comment rulemaking, which 

allowed for public participation and enabled the Board to 

gather relevant information, is more than enough to pass 

muster under the APA. 

IV.

We turn to ATA’s final argument: that the district court 

abused its discretion by denying discovery into whether the 

Board majority “predetermined” the outcome and “act[ed]

with an unalterably closed mind.” Appellants’ Br. 57. ATA 

argues that the district court erred in doing so because (1) it 

applied the wrong legal standard, a claim we review de novo,

see FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 713 (D.C. Cir. 

2001), and (2) the publicly available facts adequately support 

its request for discovery, a claim we review for abuse of 

discretion, see In re Sealed Case (Medical Records), 381 F.3d 

1205, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

Decisionmakers violate the Due Process Clause and must 

be disqualified when they act with an “unalterably closed 

mind” and are “unwilling or unable” to rationally consider

arguments. Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 

1151, 1170, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1979). “[A]n individual should 

USCA Case #10-5254 Document #1348010 Filed: 12/16/2011 Page 20 of 38
21

be disqualified from rulemaking only when there has been a 

clear and convincing showing that the . . . member has an 

unalterably closed mind on matters critical to the disposition 

of the proceeding.” C&W Fish Co., Inc. v. Fox, 931 F.2d 

1556, 1564 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

ATA’s concern rests primarily on a letter from dissenting 

Chairman Dougherty to several U.S. Senators reporting that 

“[t]he proposal was completed without my input or 

participation.” Letter from Elizabeth Dougherty, Chairman, 

National Mediation Board, to Nine U.S. Senators 1 (Nov. 2, 

2009). Dougherty wrote that Members Hoglander and Puchala 

informed her not only “that they had prepared a ‘final’ version 

of the proposed rule and intended to send it to the Federal 

Register” that very day, but also that she had only ninety 

minutes to consider the proposed rule and “would not be 

permitted to publish a dissent in the Federal Register.” Id. at 

1–2. When she protested, they gave her an additional twentyfour hours, as well as an opportunity to dissent. But when she 

submitted her dissent, they required her to remove any 

“discussion of . . . process flaws.” Id. at 2. Although

“preferr[ing] not to discuss Board process so publicly,” 

Chairman Dougherty expressed her deep concerns about this 

“sort of exclusionary behavior,” which, to her, “g[ave] the 

impression that the Board has prejudged this issue.” Id. at 2.

In support of its charge against Members Hoglander and 

Puchala, ATA argues that “the publicly-available evidence 

supports the inference that the . . . majority engaged in a 

coordinated effort with two large unions to ensure that 

important representation elections at Delta would be 

processed under a new voting rule.” Appellants’ Br. 59–60. In 

particular, ATA accuses the Board of delaying Delta’s 

elections until it issued the NPRM, noting that on the very day 

USCA Case #10-5254 Document #1348010 Filed: 12/16/2011 Page 21 of 38
22

the Board published the NPRM, the unions withdrew their 

election applications because they preferred to have their 

elections governed by the new rule.

According to ATA, the district court applied the wrong 

standard in denying its motion for discovery. ATA reads the 

district court’s opinion as demanding evidence that 

“ ‘ineluctably require[s] the inference that the majority Board 

members were acting with closed minds, in bad faith, or in 

collusion with outsiders regarding issuance of the New 

Rule.’ ” Appellants’ Br. 57 (quoting Air Transp. Ass’n, No. 

10-0804, slip op. at 6). But as the Board observes, ATA 

cherry-picks from the district court’s analysis. From the very 

outset, the district court clearly announced the correct legal 

standard: “Discovery typically is not available in APA cases. 

But if a party makes a significant showing—variously 

described as a strong, substantial, or prima facie showing—

that it will find material in the agency’s possession indicative 

of bad faith or an incomplete record, it should be granted 

limited discovery.” Air Transp. Ass’n, No. 10-0804, slip op. at 

3; see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 

401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (“[T]here must be a strong showing 

of bad faith or improper behavior before [an inquiry into the 

administrative decisionmaking process] may be made.”).

The district court then carefully reviewed all of the facts 

and determined that ATA had failed to make the required 

showing—a conclusion that easily satisfies our deferential 

standard of review. To be sure, Chairman Dougherty’s letter 

reflects serious intra-agency discord, and Members Hoglander 

and Puchala’s treatment of their colleague fell well short of 

ideal. But as the district court found, the letter—written by a 

dissenting member and saying only that the Board’s behavior 

gave “the impression” of prejudgment—falls short of the 

“strong” evidence of “unalterably closed minds” necessary to 

USCA Case #10-5254 Document #1348010 Filed: 12/16/2011 Page 22 of 38
23

justify discovery into the Board’s decisionmaking process. Cf. 

Dep’t of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective 

Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2001) (noting, in the FOIA context, 

“the obvious realization that officials will not communicate 

candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item 

of discovery and front page news”). This is so even though

Members Hoglander and Puchala may well have had their 

own views about how union elections should be run. See 

C&W Fish Co., 931 F.2d at 1565 (“We would eviscerate the 

proper evolution of policymaking were we to disqualify every 

administrator who has opinions on the correct course of his 

agency’s future actions. Administrators, and even judges, may 

hold policy views on questions of law prior to participating in 

a proceeding.”). Indeed, even where a commission member 

had inappropriately announced “a prediction of [agency] 

action and (implicitly) [announced his] own considered 

position,” we concluded that the Due Process Clause was not 

offended because “that impropriety . . . gives no indication of 

a mind that has been closed to the evidence in the past or that 

would disregard any significant new material subsequently 

introduced.” Consumer Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 801 F.2d 

417, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Finally, the district court found 

that the delays in conducting Delta’s elections could be 

explained by legitimate reasons. Air Transp. Ass’n, No. 10-

0804, slip op. at 8–10. One union’s application to represent 

Delta fleet employees “was delayed because Delta challenged 

the appropriateness of the group [that union] proposed to 

represent.” Id. at 8. That challenge “required further briefing 

which slowed the process.” Id. at 9. According to the district

court, the other union’s application was delayed because the 

Board had been asked to review an issue antecedent to the 

running of the election. Id. “Given the presumption that 

agency members act in good faith, and the lack of concrete 

evidence to the contrary,” the district court concluded that it 

would “not discredit the Board’s stated reasons for the delay 

USCA Case #10-5254 Document #1348010 Filed: 12/16/2011 Page 23 of 38
24

[in these elections].” Id. ATA has given us no reason to think 

that any of the district court’s conclusions amounted to an 

abuse of discretion.

V.

Finally, the five individual appellants argue that the new 

rule violates their First Amendment rights to free association. 

As the Second Circuit explained when faced with the same 

argument: “Not surprisingly, there is little support for such a 

proposition. The First Amendment right of free association 

has never been held to mandate ‘majority rule’ in the labor 

relations sphere.” Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat’l Mediation 

Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1251–52 (2d Cir. 1992).

VI.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

So ordered.

USCA Case #10-5254 Document #1348010 Filed: 12/16/2011 Page 24 of 38
KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Seventeen years ago, this Court had to rein in the 

National Mediation Board (NMB or Board) for “blatantly [] 

exceed[ing] its statutory authority” and, in doing so, it minced 

no words. See Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation 

Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Writing for the en 

banc Court, Judge Edwards vacated a Board procedure 

authorizing both carriers and the Board sua sponte to trigger 

Board investigations of representation disputes under section 

2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act (Act), 45 U.S.C. § 152, 

Ninth. Id. For the previous sixty years, the Board had 

initiated such investigations only on petition of, or on behalf 

of, employees, as section 2, Ninth commands. The Court

assailed the Board’s “gross violation” of section 2, Ninth, 

concluding that the procedure was “not only unprecedented, 

but legally insupportable as well.” Id. at 659, 664.1

Section 2, Fourth provides: “The majority of any craft or 

class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall 

It looks 

to me as though the Board is at it again, only this time my 

colleagues are letting them get away with it. Accordingly, I 

respectfully dissent. 

 1 The vacated panel opinion, written by then-Judge Ruth Bader 

Ginsburg, had likewise invalidated the Board’s procedure, 

concluding that it was “without legislative license,” Ry. Labor 

Execs.’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 988 F.2d 133, 134 (D.C. Cir. 

1993), vacated, 996 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc), and 

reminding the Board that it “may not serve as surrogate legislator.” 

Id. at 141 n.10. The Board plainly needed that reminder, as the 

panel opinion emphasized by relying on, inter alia, Detroit & T.S.L.

R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 158−59 (1969). See 

id. In that case, 25 years earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court had 

declared: “Certainly there is nothing in the [Railway Labor] Act 

which can be interpreted as giving the Mediation Board the power 

to change the plain, literal meaning of the statute.” Detroit & T.S.L.

R.R., 396 U.S. at 159. 

USCA Case #10-5254 Document #1348010 Filed: 12/16/2011 Page 25 of 38
2

be the representative of the craft or class . . . .” 45 U.S.C. 

§ 152, Fourth. Were I writing on a clean slate—that is, 

without knowing the background of section 2, Fourth’s 

enactment, without reading the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Virginian Railway v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 

(1937), and, most important, without using the Chevron2

invention—I would conclude, as urged by Appellant 

American Transport Association of America, Inc. (ATA), that 

section 2, Fourth means the majority of the relevant craft/class

must vote for, or otherwise endorse, unionization. While the 

overlay created by the provision’s background, by the 

Supreme Court’s reading of it and even by the Chevron 

sequence has complicated otherwise straightforward 

language, what it has not done is to replace “majority”3

The 1934 amendment of the Railway Labor Act, of 

which section 2, Fourth is a part, is discussed in Virginian

Railway. The case involved a representation dispute pitting 

the “company union,”

participation with a lesser number. 

4

 2 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 

837, 842−43 (1984).

the Mechanical Department 

Association of the Virginian Railway (Association), against

System Federation No. 40, a local of the American Federation 

of Labor (Federation). The Board subsequently certified the 

Federation as the “duly accredited representative of 

petitioner’s employees in the six shop crafts,” including all

mechanical department employees except for the carmen and 

3 “Majority” means “a number greater than half of a total.” 

Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1363 (1993). 

4 A “company union” was organized and controlled by the railroad 

to, inter alia, counter efforts by employees to organize rival unions. 

Representation Election Procedure, 75 Fed. Reg. 26,062, 26,074 

(May 11, 2010). 

USCA Case #10-5254 Document #1348010 Filed: 12/16/2011 Page 26 of 38
3

coach cleaners.

5

The Supreme Court upheld the certification of the 

Federation, however, and, in so doing, interpreted section 2, 

Fourth—an interpretation that has endured ever since. 

Rejecting the railroad’s reading, the Court noted that section 

2, Fourth “confer[s] the right of determination upon a 

majority of those eligible to vote, but is silent as to the 

manner in which that right shall be exercised.” Virginian Ry., 

300 U.S. at 560. Borrowing from the “general[] 

constru[ction]” of election laws that require for success a 

majority vote of the electorate, the Court stated the majority 

vote of the electorate means “the consent of the specified 

majority of those participating,” while those not participating 

“ ‘are presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority 

 Virginian Ry., 300 U.S. at 539. 

Notwithstanding the Board’s certification, the railroad refused 

to recognize the Federation, even organizing another company 

union. Id. at 539−40 & n.1. The railroad made several 

challenges, including one to the certification of the Federation 

as the blacksmiths’ representative. The blacksmiths’ craft had 

46 members eligible to vote and 30—a majority of the craft—

had participated in the election. Because the Federation had

not received a majority of the votes of the entire craft (23 plus 

1 or more) but instead only 22 votes (the other 8 voting for 

the company union), the railroad maintained the Board’s 

certification of the Federation was invalid. See Sys. Fed’n No. 

40 v. Virginian Ry. Co., 11 F. Supp. 621, 626 n.1 (E.D. Va. 

1935).

 5 The carmen and coach cleaners were not included in the Board’s 

certification because, as the district court held, a majority of that 

craft had not participated in the election. Sys. Fed’n No. 40 v. 

Virginian Ry. Co., 11 F. Supp. 621, 628 (E.D. Va. 1935). No party 

appealed from the district court’s holding. Virginian Ry., 300 U.S. 

at 559.

USCA Case #10-5254 Document #1348010 Filed: 12/16/2011 Page 27 of 38
4

of those voting.’ ” Id. (quoting Cnty. of Cass v. Johnston, 95 

U.S. 360, 369 (1877)). The Court’s next words bear quoting:

We see no reason for supposing that section 2, 

Fourth (45 USCA § 152, subd. 4), was intended to 

adopt a different rule. If, in addition to participation 

by a majority of a craft, a vote of the majority of 

those eligible is necessary for a choice, an 

indifferent minority could prevent the resolution of 

a contest, and thwart the purpose of the act, which is 

dependent for its operation upon the selection of 

representatives.

Id.

6

While Virginian Railway addresses many other issues,

 The Court concluded its discussion by examining the 

congressional intent manifested in the language used in

section 2, Fourth, noting that it was taken from a rule 

promulgated by the former Railroad Labor Board pursuant to 

the Transportation Act of 1920, a predecessor of the Act. The 

Labor Board had construed the language to mean that a 

majority of the votes cast sufficed to select a representative

“where it appeared that a majority of the craft participated in 

the election.” Id. at 561 (emphasis added). 

7

 6 At the time, employees were not allowed to vote for “no 

representation.” Instead, they could select only between competing 

unions. The Board instructed employees who wanted no 

representation to abstain from voting because, at that time (and 

until it promulgated the challenged rule) it considered non-voting 

employees as having voted for “no representation.” 75 Fed. Reg. at 

26,062−63; see e.g., Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 11 F. Supp. at 626 n.1 

(ballot allowed employees to vote for Federation or Association 

only). See infra note 9.

its resolution of the section 2, Fourth issue makes one critical 

7 Indeed, the Court described the railroad’s section 2, Fourth 

challenge as a “minor objection[].” Virginian Ry., 300 U.S. at. 541.

USCA Case #10-5254 Document #1348010 Filed: 12/16/2011 Page 28 of 38
5

point unmistakably clear: the majority of the craft/class must 

participate in any unionization election. That majority 

participation is a condition precedent is manifested by the fact 

that the carmen and coach cleaners election in which the

majority of the craft did not participate was declared invalid 

and, although the declaration was not appealed, the Court saw 

fit to note the declaration in its six-paragraph discussion of

section 2, Fourth. Moreover, in adopting its majority-ofvotes-cast-with-majority participation interpretation, the Court 

expressly described majority participation as “necessary” 

when it declined to make, “in addition,” the majority of those 

eligible to vote necessary to choose a representative. And its 

use of the phrase “indifferent minority” makes clear that 

“majority participation” is required; otherwise the 

“indifferent” (i.e., non-participating) members of the 

craft/class could have just as easily comprised a majority. 

As noted, Virginian Railway’s construction of section 2, 

Fourth has endured for over three-quarters of a century. In 

1943, our Circuit applied Virginian Railway, construing

section 2, Fourth to require for unionization “the majority of 

the votes cast at an election, provided a majority of those 

eligible to vote have participated.” See Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. 

Clerks v. United Transp. Serv. Emps. of Am., 137 F.2d 817, 

819 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (citing Virginian Ry.) rev’d per curiam 

on jurisdictional ground, 320 U.S. 715 (1943) (emphasis 

added); see also Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Ry. Emps.’ Dept. 

Labor, 93 F.2d 340, 343 (6th Cir. 1937) (upholding Board’s 

certification based on majority of votes cast because majority 

of eligible employees voted) (citing Virginian Ry.); NLRB. v. 

Whittier Mills Co., 111 F.2d 474, 477−78 (5th Cir. 1940) 

(interpreting Virginian Railway’s holding as “[w]here with 

fair opportunity to all members of the unit to vote, a majority 

do vote, they are, so to speak, a quorum to settle the matter, 

and the majority of that quorum binds those not voting, and 

suffices to select the bargaining representative of the unit”); 

USCA Case #10-5254 Document #1348010 Filed: 12/16/2011 Page 29 of 38
6

see also Ass’n of Clerical Emps. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 

85 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir. 1936) (pursuant to section 2, 

Fourth, if majority of eligible employees participates in 

election, “the general rule applies that those not voting at an 

election should be considered as assenting to the will of the 

majority there expressed”) (citing Cnty. of Cass v. Johnston, 

95 U.S. 360 (1877)). But see NLRB v. Cent. Dispensary 

& Emergency Hosp., 145 F.2d 852, 853−54 (D.C. Cir. 1944) 

(in election under National Labor Relations Act, Virginian 

Railway construed to apply majority-of-votes-cast rule); Int’l 

Bhd. of Teamsters v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks

(BRAC), 402 F.2d 196, 204 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (same).

Having considered the backdrop against which section 2, 

Fourth was enacted as well as the lone Supreme Court 

decision construing it, I am convinced, as I would have been 

had I not considered the background and Virginian Railway

overlay, that section 2, Fourth unambiguously requires that 

the majority of the craft/class must participate in any 

representation election. Section 2, Fourth grants the majority 

of a craft/class the collective right to determine the 

representative; it does not grant each employee an individual 

right to vote in an election as is the case with popular 

elections.

8

 8 My colleagues’ discussion of presidential elections, Majority Op. 

at 10−11, thus misses the crucial issue. 

While we all agree that every eligible employee is 

entitled to vote, the issue is who determines the 

representative: the majority of those who vote for a 

representative with majority participation or the majority of 

those who vote for a representative without majority 

participation? Section 2, Fourth declares loud and clear that 

the majority—which collectively possesses the right—

necessarily must participate in determining the representative. 

USCA Case #10-5254 Document #1348010 Filed: 12/16/2011 Page 30 of 38
7

The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in 

Virginian Railway, finding section 2, Fourth “silent” (and 

therefore unclear) only “as to the manner” in which the 

majority’s right is to be exercised. While the Court included 

within “manner” whether the majority of the craft/class must 

also vote for a particular union—deciding it did not—it did 

not find section 2, Fourth “silent” as to majority participation. 

This being so, I believe section 2, Fourth in pertinent part 

merits a Chevron one analysis, that is, its requirement that the

majority of the craft/class participate in determining 

unionization vel non is unmistakably plain. 

And so I come to the NMB’s challenged rule, which 

provides in relevant part:

In representation disputes, a majority of valid 

ballots cast will determine the craft or class 

representative.

75 Fed. Reg. at 26,062 (emphasis added).9

 9 The challenged rule effects a change in the Board’s treatment of 

non-voters. Under the old rule, the Board presumed that non-voters 

opposed representation. 75 Fed. Reg. at 26,062−63. Under the new 

rule, the Board presumes that non-voters “acquiesce in the will of 

the voting majority.” Id. at 26,078. The Board’s volte face in this 

case is reminiscent of its ill-fated Merger Procedures which we 

struck down as a violation of section 2, Ninth in Railway Labor 

Executives’ Ass’n, supra. There, we characterized its action as 

“much more than a midstream change in course; [it is] a wholesale 

attempt to rewrite the statute and history.” 29 F.3d at 669. Just as 

section 2, Ninth left the Board without authority to adopt the 

Merger Procedures, id. at 664−71, section 2, Fourth does not 

authorize the Board to presume the acquiescence of non-voters if

the majority of a craft/class has not participated in a representation 

election. The Board does not “possess[] plenary authority to act 

within a given area simply because Congress has endowed it with 

 Because the rule 

jettisons majority participation, it violates section 2, Fourth 

USCA Case #10-5254 Document #1348010 Filed: 12/16/2011 Page 31 of 38
8

and, accordingly, I would invalidate it. U.S. Dep’t of State v. 

Coombs, 482 F.3d 577, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (striking down 

agency regulation “as an impermissible interpretation” of 

statutory language). As Chevron itself emphasizes: “The 

judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory 

construction and must reject administrative constructions 

which are contrary to clear congressional intent.” 467 U.S. at 

843 n.9. In interpreting the plain meaning of section 2, Ninth

in Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, supra, we left no doubt 

as to the limited, if any, applicability of deference to an 

agency’s statutory interpretation if “Congress has directly 

spoken to the precise question at issue” and left “no gap for 

the agency to fill.” Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 29 F.3d at 671 

(internal citation omitted); see also Natural Res. Def. Council 

v. Reilly, 983 F.2d 259, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is only 

legislative intent to delegate such authority that entitles an 

agency to advance its own statutory construction for review 

under the deferential second prong of Chevron.”) (internal 

quotation omitted). Here, the Congress has spoken to the 

precise question at issue—who determines the representative 

of a craft/class—and has left no gap to be filled by a Board 

rule that impermissibly reads “majority” out of section 2, 

Fourth. 

Assuming without concluding that the Board’s 

challenged rule is a permissible interpretation of section 2, 

Fourth, it nonetheless fails at Chevron step two because the 

Board has failed to provide a “reasoned explanation” therefor. 

See Village of Barrington v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 

650, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2011). While under Chevron step two the 

Board is free to reinterpret section 2, Fourth in favor of an 

alternative, permissible interpretation, it must nonetheless 

 

some authority to act in that area.” Id. at 670 (emphases in 

original). 

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explain itself. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 

S. Ct. 1800, 1810−11 (2009) (agency must provide “reasoned 

explanation” for adopting new, permissible interpretation of 

statute). 

The Board relies primarily on judicial interpretations of 

the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 

et seq., to support the challenged rule, Appellee’s Br. at 

26−29, but the fit is far from neat given the Supreme Court’s 

admonition that “the NLRA cannot be imported wholesale 

into the railway labor arena. Even rough analogies must be 

drawn circumspectly with due regard for the many differences 

between the statutory schemes.” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 

Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 439 (1989)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Caution is particularly 

needed here where the statutory schemes provide different 

mechanisms for ascertaining whether a representative has the 

support of the majority of the craft/class it seeks to represent. 

While section 9(a) of the NLRA uses language similar to 

section 2, Fourth to apply the majority-of-votes-cast rule in 

selecting a representative, the NLRA also provides for 

judicial review of elections conducted thereunder. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 159(a);

10

 10 Section 9(a) provides in relevant part: “Representatives 

designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by 

the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such 

purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees 

in such unit . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). 

see Cent. Dispensary & Emergency Hosp., 145 

F.2d at 854 (“While the standards by which the [NLRB] 

determines whether a minority election is truly representative

are necessarily vague, they may still be subject to judicial 

examination and review in case the judgment of the [NLRB] 

is arbitrary.”). The certification vel non resulting from a 

representation election under the Act, however, is subject to 

judicial review only in extraordinary circumstances. 

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Switchmen’s Union of N. Am. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 320 

U.S. 297, 305−06 (1943); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Trans 

World Airlines, Inc., 839 F.2d 809, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 

(“[j]udicial review of NMB decisions is one of the narrowest 

known to the law” and “courts have no authority to review 

NMB certification decisions in the absence of . . . a gross 

violation of the Railway Labor Act”). Thus, the safeguard 

provided by judicial review available under the NLRA is not 

available under the Act. One reason for the unavailability of 

judicial review is that “[t]he Act puts a premium on speed of 

resolution” and section 2, Fourth is intended to ensure that 

representation disputes are not “dragg[ed] out . . . into other 

tribunals of law.” BRAC, 402 F.2d at 204−05 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). By certifying an unstable (i.e., 

minority-supported) representative, the new rule heightens the 

risk of a disruption to interstate commerce, thus undermining 

a key purpose of the Act. 45 U.S.C. § 151a (one purpose of 

Act is “[t]o avoid any interruption to commerce or to the 

operator of any carrier engaged therein”); see infra note 13.

How the Board “reasonably decided,” Majority Op. at 11,

that continuing to require the majority of a craft/class of

employees to participate would allow “an indifferent minority 

to prevent the resolution of a contest” escapes me. Virginian 

Ry., 300 U.S. at 560. As already noted, the “indifferent 

minority” concern in Virginian Railway was that the 16 

blacksmiths who did not vote could prevent the resolution of 

the representation contest in which the majority of 

blacksmiths had voted but had split their votes between two 

representatives, resulting in neither having received the votes 

of the majority of the craft/class. Virginian Ry., 300 U.S. at 

559−60. Accordingly, the Court ensured that the minority, 

indifferent or coerced, id. at 560, could not control the 

outcome by giving effect to section 2, Fourth’s mandate that 

the majority of blacksmiths participate in the election. Id. In 

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contrast, under the new rule, the minority can—and will—

control the outcome because the majority “of valid ballots 

cast” determines representation without regard to the majority 

participation condition.11

Moreover, the Board fails to explain why labor stability 

is no longer a relevant consideration for its new rule but 

remains relevant for its “showing of interest” requirement. 

The Board initiates a representation election for an 

unrepresented craft/class if it obtains authorization from 35% 

of the employees but it requires authorization from a majority 

of the employees to initiate a “decertification” election 

process for a represented craft/class. See 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1206.2.

 

12

 11 As the ATA notes, under the Act, representatives are generally 

certified on a nation-wide or company-wide basis. Appellants’ Br. 

at 35. By contrast, representatives under the NLRA are generally 

certified on a local basis. Because a certified representative under 

the Act represents all of an air carrier’s pilots in the United States, 

the new rule would allow 100 pilots voting in Kansas City to force 

thousands of pilots nation-wide to accept representation. Id. at 35; 

cf. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (certification under NLRA generally by local 

bargaining unit). 

 The Board bases unequal “showing of interest” 

12 The regulation provides that

(a) Where the employees involved in a 

representation dispute are represented by an individual or 

labor organization . . . a showing of proved authorizations 

(checked and verified as to date, signature, and 

employment status) from at least a majority of the craft or 

class must be made before the National Mediation Board 

will authorize an election or otherwise determine the 

representation desires of the employees under the 

provisions of section 2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act.

(b) Where the employees involved in a 

representation dispute are unrepresented, a showing of 

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requirements for represented and unrepresented crafts/classes 

on the promotion of labor stability, namely, the need to 

prevent a rival union from raiding a represented craft/class. 

75 Fed. Reg. at 26,078−79. But the challenged rule, coupled 

with the 35% authorization requirement for an unrepresented 

craft/class, practically ensures labor instability by securing

support from only a minority of eligible employees.13 

Moreover, the elevated showing of interest requirement plus 

the Board’s convoluted decertification process (which the 

majority opinion itself requires three pages to explain, see

Majority Op. at 16−19) belie my colleagues’ prediction that 

the majority of a craft/class “can simply call for a new 

election” if the Board certifies a representative based on

minority determination. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).14

 

proved authorizations from at least thirty-five (35) 

percent of the employees in the craft or class must be 

made before the National Mediation Board will authorize 

an election or otherwise determine the representation 

desires of the employees under the provisions of section 

2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act.

29 C.F.R. § 1206.2.

13 The Board has recognized that

One need look no further than to the area of 

potential strikes to conclude that certification based 

upon majority participation promotes harmonious labor 

relations. A union without majority support cannot be as 

effective in negotiations as a union selected by a process 

which assures that a majority of employees desire 

representation.

Chamber of Commerce, 14 N.M.B. 347, 362 (1987) (emphasis 

added); see also BRAC, 402 F.2d at 203−04.

14 My colleagues also insist on labeling the ATA’s interpretation of 

section 2, Fourth’s majority requirement as a “quorum 

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Finally, it is important to remember the Board’s intended 

role in labor disputes and, once again, our en banc decision in 

Railway Labor Executive’s Ass’n is instructive. Discussing 

the legislative history of the Act, the Court stated that, 

“[b]ecause mediation was considered to be the Board’s 

primary function, Congress sought to delineate the Board’s 

other roles in a manner that would avoid compromising its 

effectiveness as a mediator.” 29 F.3d at 668 (emphasis 

added); see also Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 988 F.2d at 140 

(citing Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402 

U.S. 570, 580−81 & n.13 (1971)) (“suggesting that Congress 

carefully composed RLA’s provisions to preserve employees’ 

confidence in the Board as a detached, impartial mediator”). 

The Board’s challenged rule not only conflicts with section 2, 

Fourth but it also elevates the Board’s rule-making function at 

the expense of its primary function as unbiased mediator. By 

imposing minority rule in representation elections, the Board 

 

requirement.” Majority Op. at 7, 8, 10−12, 16. Although I believe 

their lengthy quorum requirement discussion is a distraction, I 

remind them of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in New Process 

Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010). In determining that 

the NLRB must maintain a membership of at least three to delegate 

its authority, the Court emphasized that “[a] quorum is the number 

of members of a larger body that must participate for the valid 

transaction of business.” New Process Steel, 130 S. Ct. at 2642 

(emphasis added). The “quorum” that “must participate” under 

section 2, Fourth is the majority of a craft/class of employees. Cf. 

id. at 2644 (“The requirement of a quorum is a protection against 

totally unrepresentative action in the name of the body by an 

unduly small number of persons[.]” (quoting Robert’s Rules of 

Order § 3, p.20 (10th ed. 2001))). 

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14

has put itself squarely on the side of representation and 

thereby abandoned its legitimate role.15

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

 15 Because I believe the new rule fails under both steps of Chevron, 

I see no need to address the ATA’s protests regarding the 

deficiencies in the Board’s rule-making process. See Majority Op. 

at 13−24. My silence, however, does not indicate acquiescence in 

that portion of the majority opinion. 

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