Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02141/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02141-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Advocates for American Disabled 

Individuals LLC, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Price Company, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-16-02141-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 On September 1, 2016, this Court issued an Order for the Plaintiffs to Show Cause 

as to why this case should not be dismissed for lack of standing. (Doc. 20.) For the 

following reasons, the Court remands the case to state court. 

BACKGROUND 

 Defendant Price Company (“Costco”) had signs noting which handicapped 

parking spots were “van accessible.” (Doc. 23 at 2.) However, these signs were posted 

lower than 60 inches above the ground. (Doc. 22 at 2.) Therefore, the signs were not in 

compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Id.) The Plaintiffs claim 

that the lower signage made it more difficult to identify which parking spots were van 

accessible. (Id.) On September 14, Costco replaced the defective signs with signs located 

more than 60 inches off of the ground. (Doc. 23 at 10.)

 Plaintiff Advocates for American Disabled Individuals (“Advocates”) does not 

make any allegations in the complaint regarding the nature of its interest in this 

proceeding. (Doc. 1.) In Plaintiff’s Response to the Order to Show Cause, Advocates 

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alleges that it has “several members/principals who are disabled individuals with mobility 

impairments,” including Ms. Shannon Puckett and Mr. David Ritzenthaler. (Doc. 22 at 1-

2.) However, Advocates has yet to allege facts supporting the assertion that either Ms. 

Shannon Puckett or Mr. David Ritzenthaler qualifies as a member of its organization. 

(Doc. 1-2, Doc. 22.) 

 Plaintiff David Ritzenthaler is a legally disabled individual with a state issued 

handicapped license plate. (Doc. 1-2 at 3.) Mr. Ritzenthaler does not allege that he ever 

visited the Defendant’s parking lot. (Doc. 1-2.) Rather, he alleges that he “became aware” 

that its parking lot signage violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 

requirements. (Doc. 1-2 at 1.) Likewise, Ms. Shannon Puckett alleges that at some point 

before September 8, 2016, she was informed that Costco’s signage was defective. (Doc. 

22-1 at 12.) It is unclear whether Ms. Puckett ever personally encountered the defective 

signage. There is a photograph of a receipt from a visit to the Defendant’s store attached 

as an exhibit to the Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of the Response to the Order to Show 

Cause. (Doc. 24-1 at 2.) However, the photograph of the receipt is not accompanied by 

any information that verifies that it belongs to Ms. Puckett or that the signs were 

defective at the time of the trip. (Id.) It is photographed in front of her statement claiming 

that “she has been informed” of defective signage at the Defendant’s parking lot. (Id.) 

 The Plaintiffs’ complaint follows the same format as countless other claims filed 

by the Plaintiffs’ counsel, Mr. Peter Strojnik. There are no specific fact allegations 

regarding the Defendant’s signs in the complaint itself. (Doc. 1-2 at 16.) The vague 

nature of the complaint led the court to issue an Order to Show Cause as to why the 

complaint should not be dismissed for lack of standing, as no injury to the Plaintiffs is 

apparent on the face of the complaint. (Doc. 1-2.) 

DISCUSSION 

I. The Plaintiff Does Not Have Standing to Pursue this Case. 

 “To invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a disabled individual claiming 

discrimination must satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III by 

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demonstrating his standing to sue at each stage of litigation.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports 

(U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). After reviewing Plaintiff’s 

response to the Order to Show Cause, hearing oral arguments, and reviewing the 

supplemental briefings, the Court concludes that neither Advocates nor Mr. Ritzenthaler 

has standing to pursue this suit. 

 To assert standing under Article III, a plaintiff must illustrate three elements: 1) an 

injury-in-fact, 2) causation between the injury and the allegedly wrongful conduct, and 3) 

the injury is likely redressable by the court. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–

561 (1992). The burden is on the plaintiff to establish that standing exists. See id. at 561 

(“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these 

elements.”). 

A. David Ritzenthaler Cannot Pursue this Suit Because He Did Not 

Suffer an Injury-in-Fact. 

 An injury-in-fact must be “(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or 

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S at 560 (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). To show particularity, the “party seeking review must allege facts 

showing that he is himself adversely affected.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 

(1972). To be concrete, an injury must be “real, and not abstract.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 

136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

 The ADA provides a means for disabled individuals to vindicate their right to 

frequent a business with “the full and equal enjoyment” of its facilities. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12182(a). The statute provides that if an individual is denied that right, he is entitled to 

injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a). However, “Article III standing requires a concrete 

injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544. 

 In ADA cases, a plaintiff experiences a concrete injury-in-fact when “a disabled 

person encounters an accessibility barrier violating its provisions.” Chapman v. Pier 1 

Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 947 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). The barrier does 

not need to completely hinder the plaintiff’s ability to enter or use the facility, but it must 

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“interfere with the plaintiff’s ‘full and equal enjoyment’ of the facility.” Id. (quoting 42 

U.S.C. § 12182(a)). 

 Mr. Ritzenthaler cannot assert standing in this case because he never suffered an 

injury-in-fact. Nothing in Mr. Ritzenthaler’s complaint or subsequent pleadings alleges 

that Mr. Ritzenthaler personally encountered the barrier in question. (Doc. 1-2.) The 

complaint merely alleges that “Plaintiff has actual knowledge of at least one barrier 

related to third party disabled individuals” on the Defendant’s property. (Id. at 12.) 

 Contrary to Mr. Ritzenthaler’s assertions, mere knowledge of the Defendant’s lack 

of signage is insufficient to show injury-in-fact. In Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 

the Ninth Circuit found that a plaintiff who had visited the defendant’s grocery store in 

the past had standing to bring an ADA claim based on the barriers he personally 

encountered as well as the barriers that he did not have the chance to encounter during his 

visit. 293 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002). That case did not involve a situation where, as 

here, the plaintiff never frequented the defendant’s establishment prior to filing suit. Id.

B. Advocates Cannot Assert Standing on Behalf of Ms. Shannon 

Puckett or Mr. David Ritzenthaler. 

 Nonprofit organizations may file lawsuits on behalf of their members even if they 

do not have members in the traditional sense. See Sierra Ass'n for Env't v. F.E.R.C., 744 

F.2d 661, 662 (9th Cir. 1984) (allowing a California corporation to file suit as an 

unincorporated association due to the presence of federal question jurisdiction). However, 

in these situations, a nonprofit must still allege sufficient facts to show that a purported 

member “possess[es] many indicia of membership—enough to satisfy the purposes that 

undergird the concept of associational standing: that the organization is sufficiently 

identified with and subject to the influence of those it seeks to represent as to have a 

personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.” Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 

F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

 The Supreme Court provided examples of relevant “indicia of membership” in 

Hunt. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 344–45 (1977). 

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Key factors include whether the proposed constituency maintained control over who was 

elected to leadership of the association, if the proposed constituency was the only group 

that could serve on the leadership board, and whether the proposed constituency financed 

the association’s activities (including litigation). Id. The analysis turns on whether the 

association “provides the means by which they express their collective views and protect 

their collective interests.” Id. 

Mr. Ritzenthaler and Advocates’ complaint does not mention Advocates or a 

single purported member of Advocates by name. (Doc. 1-2.) In fact, Advocates’ basis for 

injury remained unknown to the Court until it asserted associational standing through Mr. 

Ritzenthaler and Ms. Puckett in its Response to the Order to Show Cause. (Doc. 22 at 1.) 

The Response alleges that both individuals live in the Phoenix area, are motorists, and 

have disability-parking plates. (Doc. 22 at 2.) It does not allege that any of the indicia of 

membership listed above are present. (Doc. 22.) 

 Likewise, the supplemental briefing is devoid of any facts that could lead the 

Court to find that Mr. Ritzenthaler or Ms. Puckett is a member of Advocates. (Doc. 27.) 

The fact that Advocates “exists primarily to advance the purposes of the ADA through 

serial litigation,” (Doc. 27 at 5), cannot support a finding of any indicia of membership. 

Additionally, Ms. Puckett’s bare assertion that she is a member of Advocates is 

insufficient to support a finding “that the organization is sufficiently identified with and 

subject to the influence of those it seeks to represent as to have a personal stake in the 

outcome of the controversy.” Oregon Advocacy Ctr., 322 F.3d at 1111 (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

 Advocates had several opportunities to assert facts supporting that Ms. Puckett or 

Mr. Ritzenthaler are members of Advocates. Advocates’ complete failure to assert any 

such facts despite these opportunities leads the Court to assume that no such facts exist. 

Therefore, Advocates cannot assert that it has associational standing to pursue this suit. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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II. Leave to Amend or Supplement the Pleadings 

 Advocates’ Response to the Order to Show Cause states that the “Plaintiff wishes 

to file for leave to amend the Complaint or file a Rule 15(d) supplemental pleading.” 

(Doc. 22 at 3.) As of this moment, Advocates has not yet filed any such motion for leave. 

If Advocates did, this request would be denied. 

 A district court is permitted to deny leave to amend the pleadings when it finds 

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to 

cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing 

party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.” Foman v. 

Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 

 Mr. Strojnik, Advocates’ and Mr. Ritzenthaler’s counsel, has more than 160 ADA 

cases currently pending in this Court, and his litigation tactics suggest an abuse of the 

court system. The complaints are largely identical. None of the complaints contain any 

specific factual allegations. (Doc. 1-2.) Instead, they each contain the same boilerplate 

language and assert vague, conclusory allegations. (Id.) Counsel relies on the use of 

clauses such as “and/or” to ensure that the form complaint may be used in multiple 

situations. (Doc. 1-2 at 3.) Counsel’s decision to flood the court system with these 

vaguely worded form complaints rather than taking the time to fully develop their 

pleadings is incredibly concerning to the Court. 

 Furthermore, the Court allowed Advocates and Mr. Ritzenthaler several 

opportunities to supplement their allegations to show standing. Counsel had no less than 

three opportunities—in addition to the original complaint—to present facts that could 

establish standing. Therefore, any request to amend or file any additional supplemental 

pleadings will be denied. 

III. Remand to State Court is the Proper Cure 

 The removal statute instructs that “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears 

that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Ninth Circuit has implied that where a plaintiff would lack 

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standing in state court as well, a district court may dismiss the entire suit without remand. 

See Bell v. City of Kellogg, 922 F.2d 1418, 1424–25 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Where the remand 

to state court would be futile, however, the desire to have state courts resolve state law 

issues is lacking. We do not believe Congress intended to ignore the interest of efficient 

use of judicial resources.”) However, this should be applied only “where there is absolute 

certainty that remand would prove futile.” Id. at 1425 (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). 

 Arizona law does not impose the same standing requirements on parties that the 

federal Constitution does. Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Cmty. Servs. in 

Ariz., 148 Ariz. 1, 6, 712 P.2d 914, 919 (1985). Arizona’s standing doctrine requires only 

that “each party possess an interest in the outcome” to avoid issuing “mere advisory 

opinions.” Id. Arizona has held that standing can be waived entirely in certain 

circumstances. See Bennett v. Brownlow, 211 Ariz. 193, 196, 119 P.3d 460, 463 (2005) 

(noting that “[w]aiver of the standing requirement is the exception, not the rule.”). 

 Due to Arizona’s flexible standing doctrine, the Court cannot say that there is 

“absolute certainty” that Mr. Ritzenthaler’s or Advocates’ claims would be dismissed if 

they were remanded to state court. Bell, 922 F.2d at 1425. Therefore, remand to the state 

court is the appropriate action in this case. Furthermore, the Court will not dismiss the 

federal claims on remand because the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear the 

claims. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 821 (1990) (“[W]e 

conclude that Congress did not divest the state courts of their concurrent authority to 

adjudicate federal claims.”). 

CONCLUSION 

 The Plaintiffs cannot assert that any individual suffered an injury-in-fact, and thus 

they lack the requisite standing to pursue this claim in federal court. Because there is a 

chance that these claims will be heard in state court, remand is the appropriate remedy. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to remand this 

action back to Maricopa County Superior Court. 

 Dated this 13th day of October, 2016. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge

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