Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01310/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01310-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADRIAN SOLIS, on behalf of 

himself and all others similarly 

situated,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 15-cv-01310-BAS(DHB)

ORDER OVERRULING 

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO 

THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S 

RULING REGARDING 

REIMBURSEMENT OF TRAVEL 

EXPENSES

[ECF No. 32]

v.

AMERI-FORCE MANAGEMENT 

SERVICES, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

On March 1, 2016, Plaintiff and his counsel failed to appear at the Early 

Neutral Evaluation Conference (“ENE”) scheduled for this case. (ECF No. 15.) As a 

result, United States Magistrate Judge David H. Bartick ultimately ordered Plaintiff’s 

counsel to reimburse Defendants for $3,868.40 in expenses. (ECF No. 31.)

Defendants incurred these expenses to travel from the East Coast of the United States

to attend the ENE, which had been previously continued to accommodate Plaintiff’s 

counsel’s availability. (ECF Nos. 16, 31.) Plaintiff now objects to Judge Bartick’s 

ruling under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). (ECF No. 32.) For the following 

reasons, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objection.

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I. BACKGROUND

On March 1, 2016, Judge Bartick issued an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”)

based on Plaintiff Adrian Solis’s and his counsel’s failure to appear at the ENE that 

was held on the same day. (ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff responded to the OSC on March 

16, 2016, and his counsel offered to pay the reasonable travel expenses incurred by 

Defendants’ appearance at the ENE. (ECF No. 17.) Defendants replied on March 23, 

2016, seeking reimbursement of travel costs and attorneys’ fees incurred as a result 

of attending and preparing for the ENE. (ECF No. 21.) In support of their 

reimbursement request, Defendants submitted receipts for airfare and two nights of 

lodging, transportation, and meals. (ECF Nos. 21-2, 21-3.) 

On March 25, 2016, having reviewed the parties’ submissions and the 

supporting documentation, Judge Bartick found it appropriate to order Plaintiff’s 

counsel to reimburse Defendants’ representatives for their travel costs to San Diego 

to attend the ENE, but he declined to order reimbursement of Defendants’ attorneys’ 

fees. (ECF No. 22.) Specifically, Judge Bartick ordered Plaintiff’s counsel to 

reimburse Defendant Ameri-Force Management Services, Inc. in the amount of 

$1,503.90 and Defendant International Marine and Industrial Applicators, LLC 

(“IMIA”) in the amount of $2,887.92 by April 29, 2016. (Id.) Plaintiff then filed a 

motion requesting Judge Bartick modify his ruling. (ECF No. 23.) He argued it was 

not reasonable for Defendants to rent cars and stay in a hotel for two nights in San 

Diego to attend the ENE. (Id.) Plaintiff also disputed one of the Defendant’s request 

for reimbursement of first-class airfare. (Id.)

Judge Bartick granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion. (ECF No. 

31.) He reasoned it was reasonable for Defendants’ representatives to stay in a hotel 

for two nights given (i) the distance they traveled from the East Coast to attend the 

ENE and (ii) the scheduled time of the ENE—10:00 a.m. (See id. at 3.) Judge Bartick 

also concluded that it was “not unreasonable for Defendants’ representatives to 

choose to use rental cars for their transportation needs.” (Id. at 3–4.) Thus, he denied 

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Plaintiff’s request to modify the order requiring Plaintiff’s counsel to reimburse 

Defendants for these expenses. (Id. at 4.) 

Regarding airfare, however, Judge Bartick found that reimbursement for firstclass airfare was inappropriate. (ECF No. 32 at 2.) After a thorough search and 

analysis of first-class tickets and coach tickets on Delta Airlines flights from 

Pensacola, Florida, to San Diego, California, Judge Bartick concluded that first-class 

airfare cost approximately 25% more than a coach ticket. (Id. at 2–3.) Thus, Judge 

Bartick granted in part Plaintiff’s motion and amended the initial reimbursement 

order by reducing the amount of reimbursement to IMIA to $2,374.50, which 

represented a 25% reduction in reimbursement for IMIA’s airfare. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff 

now objects to Judge Bartick’s order. (ECF No. 32.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A party may object to a non-dispositive pretrial order of a magistrate judge 

within fourteen days after service of the order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The magistrate 

judge’s order will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Id.; 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The “clearly erroneous” standard applies to factual findings 

and discretionary decisions made in connection with non-dispositive pretrial matters.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Review under this standard is “significantly deferential, 

requiring a ‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” 

Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. of S. Cal., 508 

U.S. 602, 623 (1993).

On the other hand, the “contrary to law” standard permits independent review 

of purely legal determinations by a magistrate judge. See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett 

Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he phrase ‘contrary to law’ indicates 

plenary review as to matters of law.”); Gandee v. Glaser, 785 F. Supp. 684, 686 (S.D. 

Ohio 1992), aff’d, 19 F.3d 1432 (6th Cir. 1994); 12 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 3069 (2d ed., 2010 update). “Thus, [the district court] must 

exercise its independent judgment with respect to a magistrate judge’s legal 

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conclusions.” Gandee, 785 F. Supp. at 686. “A decision is contrary to law if it fails 

to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” United 

States v. Cathcart, No. C 07-4762 PJH, 2009 WL 1764642, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 

2009).

III. ANALYSIS

Judge Bartick’s determination of whether Defendants’ travel expenses were 

reasonable was discretionary and made in connection with a non-dispositive pretrial

matter. Thus, the Court applies the clearly erroneous standard to Plaintiff’s Objection 

to Judge Bartick’s May 6, 2016, Order (ECF No. 31). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

In objecting to Judge Bartick’s Order, Plaintiff makes a series of arguments based on 

the well-established rule that a court may reduce costs that are unreasonably large or 

not supported by adequate documentation. (Obj. at 4–9.)

First, Plaintiff argues Defendants’ expenses for two nights of lodging and 

meals were unreasonable because it was only necessary for Defendants to stay in San 

Diego for one night to attend the ENE. (Obj. at 5.) The Court disagrees. Although 

staying in a hotel for two nights might not have been necessary, it was not 

unreasonable. Defendants’ representatives had to travel from the East Coast of the 

United States to attend an ENE scheduled early in the morning, and it was unclear 

how long the ENE would last. Thus, Defendants’ decision to not attempt to squeeze 

in one or two cross-country flights on the day of the ENE was reasonable.

Consequently, Judge Bartick’s conclusion regarding reimbursement for two nights of 

lodging and meals was not clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(A). 

Second, Plaintiff argues that he should not be required to reimburse Defendants

for car rental expenses because it was unreasonable for Defendants to rent cars given 

the fact that the courthouse is only 2.2 miles away from the airport. (Obj. 6–7.) 

Plaintiff also takes issue with the fact that IMIA’s representative drove 172 miles in 

his rental car. (Id.) However, as Judge Bartick noted, there is no indication based on 

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the receipts for the rental cars that the number of miles driven affected the cost of the 

rentals. (See ECF No. 21-2, Ex. C at 10, ECF No. 21-3, Ex. B. at 10.) Plaintiff merely 

provides maps indicating (1) the number of miles between the airport and the 

courthouse and (2) the number of miles between the courthouse and Defendants’ 

hotels. (Obj. nn. 1–3.) Plaintiff does not provide any support to suggest that the

increased mileage led to higher rental fees. Again, although it may not have been 

necessary for Defendants to rent cars to travel to their hotels and the ENE, it was not 

unreasonable for Defendants to do so. Accordingly, Judge Bartick’s Order requiring 

Plaintiff to reimburse Defendants for their rental car expenses was not clearly 

erroneous. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 

Third, Plaintiff argues that Judge Bartick’s 25% reduction in airfare 

reimbursement to IMIA was not significant enough to counteract the price differential 

between first-class tickets and coach tickets for weekday flights from Pensacola, 

Florida, to San Diego, California. (Obj. 7.) Plaintiff requests that the airfare be 

reduced to $700.00. (Id. 8.) However, Plaintiff does not provide any relevant 

documentary support to show that $700.00 is a reasonable value of a coach ticket at 

the time IMIA’s representative flew to San Diego from Pensacola.

1

In other words, 

Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that Judge Bartick’s analysis comparing the 

costs of first-class tickets and coach tickets on Delta Airlines from Pensacola, Florida, 

to San Diego, California, was clearly incorrect. Consequently, Judge Bartick’s 

decision to reduce the amount Plaintiff’s counsel must reimburse IMIA for airfare by 

25%—as opposed to a greater percentage—was not clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 72; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 

 

1 To support his argument regarding airfare, Plaintiff provides evidence that a roundtrip 

ticket from Los Angeles, California, to Rome, Italy, or Paris, France, costs less than the reduced 

airfare cost ordered by Judge Bartick. (Obj. Exs. A, B, ECF No. 32-2.) Plaintiff also provides 

evidence of airfare prices between Los Angeles and San Diego. (Id. Ex. C.) This evidence, however, 

does not demonstrate what the reasonable cost of a roundtrip coach ticket from Pensacola, Florida,

to San Diego, California, would have been at the time IMIA’s representative booked his flight. 

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Fourth, Plaintiff argues that the reduced reimbursement amount should be 

further prorated by two-thirds because Defendants conducted other business while in 

San Diego. (Obj. 4.) This argument lacks merit. Judge Bartick already limited the 

reimbursement amount to those expenses incurred as a result of attending the ENE. 

Further prorating those expenses by two-thirds is not warranted. Accordingly, Judge 

Bartick’s decision was not clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(A). 

In closing, the Court highlights that Defendants did not accrue these travel 

expenses knowing that they would be reimbursed by Plaintiff’s counsel. Rather, 

Plaintiff’s counsel offered to reimburse Defendants for their reasonable travel 

expenses only after such expenses had accrued—several days after Plaintiff and his 

counsel failed to appear for the ENE that was rescheduled according to Plaintiff’s 

counsel’s availability. Judge Bartick’s discretionary determination of the amount 

Plaintiff’s counsel should reimburse Defendants was well-reasoned and based on 

adequate documentation submitted by Defendants. (See ECF Nos. 22, 31.) Therefore, 

the Court finds Judge Bartick’s May 6, 2016, Order was not clearly erroneous. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 

IV. CONCLUSION

Because Plaintiff fails to demonstrate clear error, the Court OVERRULES his 

Objection (ECF No. 32) to Judge Bartick’s May 6, 2016, Order (ECF No. 31). If 

Plaintiff’s counsel has not already done so, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff’s counsel 

to comply with Judge Bartick’s Order (ECF No. 31) within fourteen days of the date 

of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 22, 2016

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