Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00790/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00790-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Fair Credit Reporting Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES M. MANSAPIT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DELUXE CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-00790-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

REMAND

Re: Dkt. No. 14

On January 14, 2019, Plaintiff James M. Mansapit brought suit against Defendants Deluxe 

Corporation and Deluxe Check Printers (collectively “Deluxe”) in Santa Clara County Superior 

Court on behalf of himself and three putative classes. See Dkt. No. 1-1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff’s

federal claims are for alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) in connection 

with a background check Deluxe procured as part of Plaintiff’s employment. Id. ¶¶ 25–58. 

Plaintiff asserts analogous state law claims under California’s Investigative Consumer Reporting 

Agencies Act, Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act and unfair competition law (“UCL”). Id.

¶¶ 59–102. Deluxe timely removed the action to federal court based on federal question 

jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 1. 

Now pending is Plaintiff’s motion to remand, briefing for which is complete. See Dkt. 

Nos. 14 (“Mot.”), 16 (“Opp.”), 19 (“Reply”). Plaintiff contends that the lack of Article III 

standing for his FCRA claims renders improper Defendant’s removal based on federal question 

jurisdiction. The Court agrees and GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

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United States District Court

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I. LEGAL STANDARD

A defendant may remove a civil action in state court to the federal court “for the district 

and division embracing the place where such action is pending” if the federal court has subject 

matter jurisdiction over the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “If a case is improperly removed, 

the federal court must remand the action because it has no subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the 

case.” ARCO Envtl. Remediation, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality of Mont., 213 F.3d 

1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000). On a motion to remand, federal courts must presume that a cause of 

action lies beyond its subject matter jurisdiction, Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 

1042 (9th Cir. 2009), and must reject federal jurisdiction “if there is any doubt as to the right of 

removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The 

removing party bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See id. at 566–67.

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual “cases” 

and “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. One element of this case-or-controversy 

requirement is that the plaintiff must have standing to bring a claim. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 

S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must have: “(1) suffered an 

injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is 

likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. at 1547. “To establish injury in fact, a 

plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is 

‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 

1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).

II. DISCUSSION

The complaint does not adequately allege Article III standing with respect to the federal 

claims. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548–50. The only allegations Deluxe identifies to the contrary 

are bare references to the invasion of “privacy and statutory rights” and references under 

Plaintiff’s UCL cause of action to “lost money or property.” See Opp. at 2; see also Compl. ¶¶ 44, 

73, 90, 93. Courts have largely found such unexplained passing references insufficient to serve as 

the sort of concrete and particularized harm necessary for Article III standing. See, e.g., Moore v. 

United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 18-cv-07600-VC, 2019 WL 2172706 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2019);

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United States District Court

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Williams v. Nichols Demos, Inc., No. 5:17-cv-07101-EJD, 2018 WL 3046507 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 

2018). And contrary to Defendants’ arguments, the complaint does not contain allegations of 

confusion, error, or other harm from the alleged violations which might give rise to standing. Cf. 

Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 499–500 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding more than a “bare procedural 

violation” of the FCRA where the complaint included allegations from which one could infer

Plaintiff’s confusion).

III. CONCLUSION

Because the Court lacks jurisdiction, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1447(c). The Clerk is DIRECTED to remand this case to Santa Clara County Superior Court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

 6/10/2019

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