Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04661/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04661-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SUMIT ROY, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly 

situated,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 

 Defendant. 

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Case No. 14-cv-04661-SC

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Now before the Court is Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s 

("Wells Fargo") motion to strike class allegations. ECF No. 16. 

The motion is fully briefed.1

 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), 

the Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without 

oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion 

is DENIED. 

/// 

 

1

 ECF Nos. 18 ("Opp'n"), 19 ("Reply"). 

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II. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Sumit Roy lives and works in California. ECF No. 1 

("Compl.") ¶ 11. In February of 2013, Mr. Roy contacted Wells 

Fargo to ask for information about a business line of credit. He 

determined that he was not ready to apply. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. In April 

2014, a Wells Fargo employee emailed Mr. Roy, asking whether Mr. 

Roy was ready to apply for a business credit line. Id. ¶ 25. Mr. 

Roy was still not sure whether he wanted to open a business credit 

line, so he asked for more information. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. He reviewed 

the information and informed Wells Fargo's employee that he didn't 

want to open a new line of credit. Id. ¶ 28. On April 11, 2014, 

Mr. Roy received a credit alert notifying him that Wells Fargo had 

made an inquiry into his credit. Id. ¶ 29. 

Mr. Roy brought this lawsuit on October 20, 2014, alleging 

that Wells Fargo violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). 

15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. FCRA permits consumer reporting agencies 

to "furnish a consumer report under [certain enumerated] 

circumstances and no other . . . ." Id. § 1681b(a). "Any person 

who is negligent in failing to comply with any requirement imposed 

under [FCRA] with respect to any consumer is liable to that 

consumer" for actual damages, as well as costs and attorney's fees. 

Id. § 1681o(a). Mr. Roy claims that Wells Fargo violated Section 

1681b because it requested his consumer report information for 

reasons other than those permitted by that Section.2

 

2

 FCRA defines a "consumer reporting agency" as "any person which, 

for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, 

regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling 

or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on 

consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third 

parties." 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). As discussed above, Section 1681b 

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On December 17, the parties stipulated to extend Wells Fargo's 

time to respond to the complaint to January 20. Wells Fargo filed 

neither an answer nor a motion to dismiss, but instead filed this 

motion on January 20. The motion seeks, pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(f), to strike the class allegations in the 

complaint because Wells Fargo believes those allegations to be 

legally insufficient. See Mot. at 3.

III. DISCUSSION

There is a split in this District as to whether a motion to 

strike class action allegations may be entertained at the motion to 

dismiss stage. Several judges have held that they may not be. See

Tasion Commc'ns, Inc. v. Ubiquiti Networks, Inc., C–13–1803 EMC, 

2014 WL 1048710, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2014) (Chen, J.) 

(denying motion to strike class action allegations because Rule 

12(f) is not the proper vehicle for such a motion); Clerkin v. 

MyLife.Com, C 11–00527 CW, 2011 WL 3809912, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 

29, 2011) (Wilken, J.) ("Defendants fail to identify any authority 

permitting the use of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim to contest the suitability of class certification."); Astiana 

v. Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., C 10–4387 PJH, 2011 WL 2111796, at 

*13–14 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2011) (Hamilton, J.) ("[S]uch a motion 

appears to allow a determination of the suitability of proceeding 

as a class action without actually considering a motion for class 

certification."); Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., C 09–05443 

 

applies to consumer reporting agencies, allowing them to "furnish a 

consumer report" only under certain circumstances. The complaint 

does not allege that Wells Fargo ever furnished any consumer 

reports, only that Wells Fargo requested Mr. Roy's report.

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SBA, 2010 WL 4569889, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2010) (Armstrong, 

J.) (denying motion to strike class action allegations based on 

Ninth Circuit precedent indicating that Rule 12(f) is not the 

proper vehicle for such a motion).

Other judges have held that a motion to strike class action 

allegations may be brought (but granted only rarely) at the motion 

to dismiss stage. See Allagas v. BP Solar Int'l Inc., C 14–00560 

SI, 2014 WL 1618279, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2014) (Illston, J.) 

("A defendant may move to strike class actions prior to discovery 

where the complaint demonstrates a class action cannot be 

maintained on the facts alleged therein."); In re Apple, AT & T 

iPad Unlimited Data Plan Litig., C–10–02553 RMW, 2012 WL 2428248, 

at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2012) (Whyte, J.) (motions to strike 

class action allegations may be brought at the motion to dismiss 

stage but are disfavored); Sanders v. Apple Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 

978, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (Fogel, J.) ("Where the complaint 

demonstrates that a class action cannot be maintained on the facts 

alleged, a defendant may move to strike class allegations prior to 

discovery."). Even these judges, however, have applied a very 

strict standard to motions to strike class allegations on the 

pleadings. Only if the court is "convinced that any questions of 

law are clear and not in dispute, and that under no set of 

circumstances could the claim or defense succeed" may the 

allegations be stricken. In re iPad Unlimited Data Plan Litig., 

2012 WL 2428248 at *2; see also Allagas, 2014 WL 1618279, at *3; 

Sanders, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 990. Of these judges, only Judge Fogel 

actually granted a motion to strike.

The Court agrees with the reasoning from Tasion. Both the 

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text of Rule 12(f) and Ninth Circuit precedent agree that a court 

may strike from a pleading only "an insufficient defense or any 

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(f); see also Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 

F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (district court erred in striking 

claim for damages via Rule 12(f) because "none of the five 

categories [in Rule 12(f)] covers the allegations in the pleading 

sought to be stricken . . . ."). 

The class allegations in Plaintiff's complaint are not an 

insufficient defense, redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 

scandalous. Indeed, Wells Fargo does not claim that the class 

allegations fit any Rule 12(f) category; Wells Fargo argues only 

that the class allegations are legally insufficient. Because Wells 

Fargo's motion is an improper Rule 12(f) motion to strike, it is 

DENIED. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The Court finds that Wells Fargo's motion to strike is an 

improper motion and not permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. The motion is DENIED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 Dated: March , 2015 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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