Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00009/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00009-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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MD 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael Dean Davis, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Richard Albrect, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 14-00009-PHX-DGC (MEA) 

ORDER 

On November 1, 2013, Plaintiff Michael Dean Davis, who is confined in the 

Maricopa County Fourth Avenue Jail, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint in Maricopa 

County Superior Court, case number CV2013-013518 (Doc. 1, Exhibit 1). In his 

Complaint, Plaintiff alleges violations of his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as claims under the Arizona 

Constitution and Arizona state law. Plaintiff named as Defendants Commissioner 

Richard Albrecht, Maricopa County Superior Court Judges Susanna Pineda and Teresa 

Sanders, MCAO1

 Jennifer Hanson, MCAO Jeffrey Duvenback, and OPDS2 Attorneys 

Marvin Davis and Amy Bain. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

 

1

 Plaintiff is apparently referring to the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office. 

2

 Plaintiff is apparently referring to the Maricopa County Office of Public Defense Services. 

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On January 2, 2014, Defendants Jennifer Hanson, Jeffery Hanson,3 and Albrecht 

removed the case to federal court based on federal subject matter jurisdiction, stating that 

they were served with the Complaint on December 17, 2013. On January 9, 2014, 

Defendants Albrecht, Pineda and Sanders filed a Motion to Dismiss based on absolute 

judicial immunity, or, alternatively, Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Arizona’s notice of 

claim statute. (Doc. 3.) Also on January 9, 2014, Defendants Duvenback and Jennifer 

Hanson filed a Motion to Dismiss based on prosecutorial immunity, or, alternatively, 

failure to state a claim against them. (Doc. 4.) 

The Court will dismiss the Motions to Dismiss as moot. The Court is already 

statutorily required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity.4

 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will dismiss this action. 

I. Removal to Federal Court was Proper 

The Complaint facially shows that subject matter jurisdiction is proper in federal 

court and that the case was timely removed. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 

A defendant may remove any civil action brought in state court over which the 

federal court would have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §1441(a). That is, a civil action 

that could have originally been brought in federal court may be removed from state to 

federal court. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). A federal court has 

original jurisdiction “of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

 

3

 Although Defendants wrote Jeffery “Hanson” in the Notice of Removal, they apparently meant to write Jeffrey Duvenback, the only “Jeffery” named in the Complaint. 

4

 Plaintiff is a “prisoner” within the meaning of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Under the PLRA, a “prisoner” is a “person incarcerated or detained in any facility” who has been charged or convicted and sentenced for violations of criminal law. 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(h), 1915A(c); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). Consequently, this case is subject to PLRA requirements, including screening of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(h), 1915A. 

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The Complaint in this case alleges violations of his federal constitutional rights. 

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Further, the case was timely removed. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

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stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 

facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 

of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, without leave to 

amend because the defects cannot be corrected. 

III. Complaint 

 In Count One,5

 labeled “Lack of Jurisdiction,” Plaintiff alleges that he was 

arrested on August 9, 2012 but was not given a “probable [cause] hearing” within the 

statutory time frame. Plaintiff was taken to his “I.A. court on August 9, 2012,” and he 

contends that he should have been given a preliminary hearing on August 19, 2012. 

Plaintiff alleges that “this didn’t happen, because of this the court lacks jurisdiction.” 

Plaintiff further alleges that the “defendants knew or should ha[ve] known that the 

defendant did not receive a grand jury indictment.” Plaintiff argues that “a person cannot 

be prosecuted by information in the event that a conviction amounts to more than (1) year 

and thereby constitutes an infamous crime within the meaning of the [F]ifth Amendment 

to the Constitution of the United States.” 

 In Count Two, labeled “Treason,” Plaintiff alleges that “the commissioner, trial 

judges, and the county attorney’(s) knew or should have known that their [sic] was not 

jurisdiction to proceed. The defendant’(s) fundamental rights to due process has been 

violated[;] he is entitled to dismissal of the charges for failure to find probable cause to 

proceed with this prosecution.” “When a judge acts where he or she do[es] not have 

jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act, or acts of treason.” 

. . . . 

 

5

 Plaintiff did not separate his various claims into separate counts. For clarity, the Court will assign numbers to each claim. 

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 In Count Three, labeled “Malic[i]ous Prosecution,” Plaintiff alleges that “the 

commissioner, trial judges, and county attorneys commit[] malicious prosecution when 

the[re is] a lack of jurisdiction, and the county attorney attempts to prosecute you 

anyway, and the commissioners, judges al[l]ow it to take place.” 

 In Count Four, labeled “Fraud,” Plaintiff alleges that the “County Attorney 

Jennifer Hanson, and Marvin L. Davis on Aug. 30th 2012 had committed fraud by means 

of hav[]ing me sign a waiver of probable cause . . . when my probable cause hearing had 

already lapsed by [11 days].” Defendant Davis “had purposely deceived the defendant on 

Aug. 30th 2012. Marvin L. Davis and prosecutor Jennifer Hanson conspired to commit[] 

fraud against me by fraudulently dup[]ing me into signing the waiver of probable cause 

when the [preliminary hearing] had already lapsed the statutory time frame of [10 days] 

by [11 days].” 

 In Count Five, labeled “Abuse of Discretion,” Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 

Pineda and Sanders “abused their d[i]secretion when they den[i]ed [Plaintiff] the right to 

be heard, and, or rul[]ing [on Plaintiff’s motions] without answers from the state.” 

 In Count Six, labeled “Legal Malpractice,” Plaintiff alleges that he notified his 

attorney of his concerns about the lack of jurisdiction, but his attorney failed to “appress 

[sic] those concerns,” thereby violating her duty as a legal criminal defender and 

breaching the attorney-client relationship. Plaintiff had to file his own motions because 

his attorney would not and his attorney told him it would be unethical to do so. 

 Plaintiff appears to allege in the section labeled “Argument” that he has been 

denied equal protection of the law and due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. 

 Plaintiff seeks the dismissal of all charges against him with prejudice, immediate 

release from custody, the filing of judicial and bar complaints, and $1,000,000 from each 

Defendant. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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IV. Failure to State a Claim

 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the 

conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of 

state law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. 

Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). A plaintiff must also allege that 

he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he 

must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

 A. Defendants Albrecht, Pineda and Sanders 

 Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for damages for their judicial acts 

except when they are taken “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 

435 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1978); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). 

An act is “judicial” when it is a function normally performed by a judge and the parties 

dealt with the judge in his or her judicial capacity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; Crooks v. 

Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 This immunity attaches even if the judge is accused of acting maliciously and 

corruptly, Peirson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967), or of making grave errors of law 

or procedure, Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988); see also

Ammons v. Baldwin, 705 F.2d 1445, 1446-48 (11th Cir. 1983) (judge entitled to 

immunity from a claim that he verbally abused and humiliated plaintiff); Tanner v. Heise, 

879 F.2d 572, 577-78 (9th Cir. 1989). 

 Regardless of the judge’s status in the judicial hierarchy, a judge has absolute 

immunity for acts performed in the judge’s official capacity. O’Neill v. City of Lake 

Oswego, 642 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1981) (pro tem municipal judge); Tanner, 879 F.2d at 

577-78 (magistrate); Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 396 (11th Cir. 1982) (justice of 

the peace). 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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 Although Plaintiff alleges that the state court was without jurisdiction, he has not 

alleged any facts to even suggest that the state court did not have jurisdiction over his 

criminal case.6

 See, e.g., Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-357, n.7 (noting, for example, that a 

probate judge with jurisdiction over only wills and estates who tries a criminal case 

would be acting in the absence of jurisdiction; whereas a criminal court judge who 

convicts a defendant of a nonexistent crime would merely be acting in excess of his 

jurisdiction and would be immune from liability for his action). Accordingly, Defendants 

Albrecht, Pineda and Sanders are absolutely immune from suit and will be dismissed. 

 B. Defendants Davis and Bain 

 Plaintiff sues criminal defense attorneys Davis and Bain. A prerequisite for any 

relief under § 1983 are allegations to support that a defendant acted under the color of 

state law. The “under color of state law” component is the equivalent of the “state 

action” requirement under the Constitution. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co, Inc., 457 U.S. 

922, 928 (1982); Jensen v. Lane County, 222 F.3d 570, 574 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing West 

v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982)). 

“Acting under color of state law is ‘a jurisdictional requisite for a § 1983 action.’” 

Gritchen v. Collier, 254 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting West, 487 U.S. at 46). 

Whether an attorney representing a criminal defendant is privately retained, a public 

defender, or court-appointed counsel, he or she does not act under color of state law. See 

Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981); Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 

319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). For this reason, Plaintiff fails to state a 

claim against Davis and Bain and they will be dismissed as Defendants. 

. . . . 

 

6

 Plaintiff apparently believes the state court lacked jurisdiction because a 

preliminary hearing was not held within ten days of his arrest. Court records available 

on-line, however, reflect that Plaintiff signed a waiver of a probable cause hearing and 

the court accepted the waiver of a preliminary hearing. See Maricopa County Superior 

Court Minute Entry dated August 30, 2012, at http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/

docs/Criminal/092012/m5401861.pdf (last visited May 8, 2014). 

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C. Defendants Hanson and Duvenback 

 Plaintiff sues prosecutors Hanson and Duvenback. A prosecutor is absolutely 

immune from liability under § 1983 for conduct in “‘initiating a prosecution and in 

presenting the State’s case’” insofar as that conduct is “‘intimately associated with the 

judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 270 

(1993) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); see also Burns v. Reed, 

500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986). That 

is, “[a] prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity from liability for damages under 

§ 1983 ‘when performing the traditional functions of an advocate.’” Genzler v. 

Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 

118, 131 (1997)). Absolute immunity extends to a prosecutor “eliciting false or 

defamatory testimony from witnesses” or making false or defamatory statements during, 

and related to judicial proceedings. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 270 (citations omitted). 

“However, ‘the actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely immune merely because they 

are performed by a prosecutor.’” Genzler, 410 F.3d at 636 (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 

273). Rather, prosecutorial immunity depends on “‘the nature of the function performed, 

not the identity of the actor who performed it.’” Id. (quoting Kalina, 522 U.S. at 127). A 

prosecutor is only entitled to qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, when 

she performs administrative or investigative functions. Id. 

 Plaintiff’s allegations against Hanson and Duvenback concern their prosecution of 

Plaintiff. Such conduct is intimately associated with the judicial phase of criminal 

proceedings against Plaintiff and is entitled to absolute immunity. As discussed herein, 

such allegations are not a basis for liability under § 1983. For this reason, Plaintiff fails 

to state a claim against Hanson and Duvenback and they will be dismissed.7

 

 

7

 Although Plaintiff labels Count Three as a “malicious prosecution” claim, he fails to state any facts supporting a claim of malicious prosecution. To state a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that a defendant prosecuted him with malice and without probable cause for the purpose of denying equal protection or another specific constitutional right. Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1068 

(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 

1995)). 

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 Because Plaintiff has failed to name a proper Defendant, and the defects cannot be 

corrected, his Complaint and this action will be dismissed. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) The Complaint (Doc. 1, Exhibit 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 (2) Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 3, 4) are denied as moot. 

(3) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the 

dismissal for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

(4) The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of 

this decision would not be taken in good faith. 

Dated this 9th day of May, 2014. 

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