Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00368/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00368-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARDELL COWART,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. CHAVEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE No. 1:16-cv-0368-AWI-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF NO. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint is before the Court for screening. 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

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To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

At all relevant times Plaintiff was an inmate housed at California Substance Abuse 

Treatment Facility (“CSATF”) in Corcoran, California. He names the following CSATF 

correctional staff as Defendants: Correctional Officer (“CO”) D. Chavez, Correctional 

Lieutenant (“Lt.”) S. Deathriage, and John Does 1 through 4. 

Plaintiff’s claims can be summarized essentially as follows:

On September 10, 2015, in the middle of a staph infection outbreak at CSATF, 

Plaintiff cleaned the area around his bunk in a shared dorm, including removing sheet 

strips tied to the bunk by another inmate. CO Chavez came to inspect the area and then 

later called Plaintiff into the building’s main office where she directed Plaintiff to sign a 

document authorizing the removal of funds in the amount of $22.11 from plaintiff’s trust 

account for the alleged destruction or damage of certain items, including sheets, a 

laundry bag, and a blue chambray shirt. Plaintiff denies having destroyed or damaged 

any property issued to him, and denies that the items identified by CO Chavez belonged 

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to another inmate. When he refused to sign the document, CO Chavez threatened to 

freeze Plaintiff’s trust account and to issue a Rules Violations Report (“RVR”) for 

destruction of state property. Plaintiff did not sign the document, and an RVR issued.

On September 23, 2015, a hearing was held on the RVR. Plaintiff appeared at the 

hearing, presented testimony, and offered evidence. The hearing officer, Lt. Deathriage,

found Plaintiff guilty after improperly relying on CO Chavez’s statements. Lt. Deathriage 

said, “How do I know you didn’t do it? You inmates think you know everything, you don’t 

know shit." Plaintiff was assessed a 60-day loss of credit, a 90-day loss of privileges, 

and a confiscation of Plaintiff’s appliances.

After receiving a final copy of the RVR on October 28, 2015, Plaintiff filed an 

inmate appeal on November 10, 2015. Due to delays caused by prison staff, this appeal 

was ultimately denied as untimely. 

Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Heck Bar

Plaintiff alleges here that he lost sixty days of good-time credits as a result of the 

disciplinary at issue in this case and seeks their restoration. State prisoners may not 

challenge the fact or duration of their confinement in a section 1983 action and their sole 

remedy lies in habeas corpus relief. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005). Often 

referred to as the favorable termination rule or the Heck bar,1this limitation applies 

whenever state prisoners “seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement—either 

directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial 

determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State's custody.” Id. at 81 

(emphasis in original). Accordingly, “a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent 

prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter 

the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison 

 

1

See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

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proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of 

confinement or its duration.” Id. at 81-82. The favorable termination rule applies to prison 

disciplinary proceedings if those proceedings resulted in the loss of good-time or 

behavior credits. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48 (1997).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that defendant Chavez falsified the RVR against him and 

that Lt. Deathriage improperly found Plaintiff guilty at the RVR hearing by failing to 

properly consider Plaintiff’s testimony and evidence. A favorable finding on these claims 

would necessarily imply the invalidity of the disputed disciplinary finding. There is no 

allegation that Plaintiff's disciplinary conviction has been reversed, expunged, or 

otherwise invalidated. Where the success of the prisoner's action would decrease the 

length of his sentence, which appears to be the case here, a § 1983 claim is not 

cognizable until the disciplinary conviction has been invalidated. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 

648.

It appears that Plaintiff's success in this action on his claims of retaliation arising 

out of the allegedly false RVR and his claims of due process violations arising out of the 

disciplinary proceedings would necessarily invalidate the result of the disciplinary 

hearing. However, Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend the complaint to clarify 

the issue. If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, he must address (1) whether the 

disciplinary conviction at issue has been overturned or invalidated and (2) if it has not 

been overturned or invalidated, whether a decision overturning it would affect the length 

of his sentence. If the disciplinary conviction has not been invalidated and a decision 

overturning it would affect the length of Plaintiff's sentence, or if Plaintiff fails to address 

these issues, the entire complaint is subject to dismissal without leave to amend.

B. Failure to State a Claim

Independent of the Heck bar, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a due process 

claim against the Defendants, but may state a First Amendment retaliation claim against 

CO Chavez. If, in his amended complaint, Plaintiff is able to overcome the Heck bar, he 

must also address the deficiencies set forth below if he is to proceed with his claims.

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a. Linkage

Plaintiff names John Does 1 through 4, but asserts no charging allegations as to 

them. Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009); Simmons 

v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 

588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002). Plaintiff must allege specific facts linking each Defendant to his claim.

b. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiff does not clarify whether he is bringing suit against the Defendants in their 

official capacities. In the event that he is, Plaintiff’s claim for damages is barred. “The 

Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, its 

agencies, and state officials in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dept. of Public Safety, 

488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). However, the Eleventh 

Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages against state officials in their personal 

capacities, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 

(9th Cir. 2003), or suits for declaratory or injunctive relief brought against state officials in 

their official capacities, Austin v. State Indus. Ins. System, 939 F.2d 676, 680 fn.2 (9th 

Cir. 1991). 

c. Due Process

With respect to Plaintiff's claims against defendant CO Chavez, prisoners do not 

have a right to be free from false accusations of misconduct, so the mere falsification of 

a report does not give rise to a claim under § 1983. Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 

452 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Sprouse's claims based on the falsity of the charges and the 

impropriety of Babcock's involvement in the grievance procedure, standing alone, do not 

state constitutional claims.”); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2nd Cir. 1986) 

(“The prison inmate has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or 

wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty 

interest.”); Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[A]n allegation that a 

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prison guard planted false evidence which implicates an inmate in a disciplinary 

infraction fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted where the procedural due 

process protections ... are provided.”). Plaintiff's allegation that defendant CO Chavez 

violated his due process rights by falsifying the RVR therefore fails to state a claim.

As for Plaintiff's claim that the Defendants violated Plaintiff’s due process 

throughout the proceedings on his rules violation, “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are 

not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such 

proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). An inmate 

subject to disciplinary sanctions that include the loss of good time credits must receive 

(1) twenty-four-hour advanced written notice of the charges against him, id. at 563-64; 

(2) a written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for 

the action, id. at 564-65; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary 

evidence where doing so “will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or 

correctional goals,” id. at 566; (4) assistance at the hearing if he is illiterate or if the 

matter is complex, id. at 570; and (5) a sufficiently impartial fact finder, id. at 570-71. A 

finding of guilt must also be “supported by some evidence in the record.” Superintendent 

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). 

Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim for relief. He does not allege that he did 

not receive timely notice of the hearing, that he did not receive a written statement by Lt. 

Deathriage, that he was denied the opportunity to call witnesses or submit evidence, that 

he required but was denied assistance at the hearing, or that Lt. Deathriage was not a 

sufficiently impartial fact finder. Finally, even if the Court assumes that Lt. Deathriage 

violated Plaintiff’s rights by finding him guilty, it appears that there was “some” evidence 

on the record from which the factfinder could have found Plaintiff guilty. 

d. Retaliation

Although Plaintiff cannot state a due process claim, “prisoners may still base 

retaliation claims on harms that would not raise due process concerns.” Hines v. Gomez, 

108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997). Inmates have a right to be free from the filing of false 

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disciplinary charges in retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. 

Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 

806 (9th Cir. 1995). Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights 

to speech or to petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. 

Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806. “Within 

the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate 

(2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the 

inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably 

advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th 

Cir. 2005). Prisoner retaliation claims should be evaluated in light of Sandin v. Conner, 

515 U.S. 472 (1995), in which the Supreme Court expressed disapproval of excessive 

judicial involvement in day-to-day prison management. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807.

Plaintiff accuses CO Chavez of issuing a false RVR in retaliation for Plaintiff’s 

refusal to approve withdrawal of funds from his trust account. Liberally construed, 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim is cognizable because he alleges that CO 

Chavez (1) issued a false RVR (2) because of (3) Plaintiff’s refusal to sign a document2, 

and that this conduct (4) chilled Plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) 

this action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. The Court thus 

concludes Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against CO Chavez may proceed 

if he is able to overcome the Heck-bar referenced supra. 

 

2

The Court notes that there does not appear to be a consensus as to whether an inmate’s refusal to sign 

a document amounts to protected conduct under the First Amendment. See Collins v. Williams, 2012 WL 

3262862, at *6 (D. Nev. Aug. 8. 2012) (holding that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because 

“[I]t was not clearly established at the time of the incident (or now) that refusing to sign the waiver was a 

First Amendment protected act of speech”). Compare Parra v. Hernandez, 2008 WL 5765843, at *4 (S.D. 

Cal. July 22, 2008) (plaintiff’s refusal to sign a double-cell agreement form was not protected conduct) with

McCoy v. Evans, 2011 WL 3878374, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2011) (plaintiff’s retaliation claim based on 

his refusal to sign a form was sufficient to state a claim) and Furnace v. Evans, 2006 WL 3647685 (N.D. 

Cal. Dec. 12, 2006) (plaintiff’s retaliation claim allowed to proceed when based on his refusal to sign a 

form). The Court will error, if at all, in finding this to be protected conduct.

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V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a First Amendment 

retaliation claim against CO Chavez, but that this action appears to be Heck-barred. 

Plaintiff will, however, be granted leave to amend. As noted supra, if Plaintiff chooses to 

amend his complaint, he must address (1) whether the disciplinary conviction at issue 

has been overturned or invalidated and (2) if the disciplinary has not been overturned or 

invalidated, whether a decision overturning the disciplinary would affect the length of his 

sentence. Additionally, a first amended complaint must state what each named 

Defendant did that led to the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

676-77. Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on 

curing the deficiencies set forth above.

Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an 

“amended complaint supersedes the original” complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First 

Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 

under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s March 17, 2016, Complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed for failure to 

state a claim; 

2. Plaintiff shall file a First Amended Complaint within thirty days from the 

date of this Order; and

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3. Plaintiff’s failure to file an amended complaint within thirty days will result in 

a recommendation that this action be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute 

and failure to comply with a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 20, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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