Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00684/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00684-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentenc

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

LUKE LEWIS MELTON III, )

)

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 2:12cv684-WHA

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The petitioner, Luke Lewis Melton III (“Melton”), is before this court on a pro se

motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After consideration

of Melton’s § 2255 motion, the supporting and opposing submissions, and the record in this

case, the court concludes that an evidentiary hearing is not required and that, under Rule

8(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United States District Courts, the

§ 2255 motion should be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 20, 2009, Melton pled guilty under a plea agreement to possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon, possession of marijuana, and possession of crack cocaine. See

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). After a sentencing hearing on October 28, 2009,

the district court sentenced him to 60 months in prison. Melton appealed, arguing that the

district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the drug evidence found during the

search of his car. On August 9, 2010, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued an

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opinion affirming his conviction and sentence. United States v. Melton, 391 Fed. App’x 799

(11 Cir. 2010). The EleventhCircuit subsequentlydenied rehearing and rehearing en banc. th

United States v. Melton, 409 Fed. App’x 315 (11 Cir. Oct. 8, 2010) (Table, No.

th

09-15608-DD). On June 27, 2011, the United States Supreme Court denied Melton’s

petition for certiorari review. Melton v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 3058 (2011)

(No. 10-8321).

On June 27, 2012, Melton filed this motion under§ 2255 motion (Doc. No. 1)

arguing, as he did on direct appeal, that the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress the drug evidence found during the search of his car.

The government answers (Doc. No. 7 at 13) that Melton’s claim – his sole claim –

is procedurally barred from this court’s review because it was raised and decided adversely

to him on direct appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. The government also argues that Melton’s

§ 2255 motion should be dismissed based on his voluntary waiver, in the plea agreement,

of his right to collaterally attack his sentence. Because the fist rationale is dispositive of

Melton’s § 2255 motion, the court pretermits discussion of the effect, if any, of the waiver

provision in the plea agreement. 

II. DISCUSSION

Melton contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the

drug evidence found during the search of his car. Specifically, he argues that the search

1

The district court denied Melton’s motion to suppress on the basis of the inventory-search 1

(continued...)

2

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violated his Fourth Amendment rights recognized by the United States Supreme Court in

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).

Melton presented this argument on direct appeal, and here it is beneficial to quote 2

at length from the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion:

... On appeal, Melton argues that the district court erred in failing to

suppress the drug evidence found during the search of his car. Melton further

argues that the district court’s ruling that the search was a permissible

inventory search was clear error and contrary to the evidence introduced at the

suppression hearing. Although the district court denied Melton’s motion to

suppress on the basis of the inventory search exception, we affirm on other

grounds.

....

In New York v. Belton, the Supreme Court held that “when a policeman

has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may,

as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger

compartment of that automobile.” 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864,

69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981). Until recently, we applied an expansive view of

Belton and read that case to mean that police could search a vehicle incident

to an arrest regardless of whether the arrestee had control over the passenger

compartment at the time of the search. Davis, 598 F.3d at 1262 (citing United

States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 825 (11 Cir. 1996)). However, in Arizona

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v. Gant, the Supreme Court rejected our view of Belton, permitting such a

search only where the arrestee can reach the passenger compartment at the

time of the search, or where the officer has a reasonable belief that the vehicle

contains evidence of the crime of arrest. 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1723,

173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). Furthermore, the Court has held that “a decision ...

construing the Fourth Amendment is to be applied retroactively to all

convictions that were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered.”

Griffith v. Ky., 479 U.S. 314, 324, 107 S.Ct. 708, 713, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987).

(...continued) 1

exception to the warrant requirement. See Gov. Exs. 6 & 7.

See Gov. Ex. 13, “Initial Brief of Defendant-Appellant Luke Lewis Melton III.” 2

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In Davis we applied the announced rule in Gant and held that a search

incident to arrest conducted for neither evidentiarynor officer-safetyconcerns

violated the Fourth Amendment. Davis, 598 F.3d at 1263. However, we

[1]

also held “that the exclusionary rule does not apply when the police conduct

a search in objectively reasonable reliance on our well-settled precedent, even

if that precedent is subsequently overturned.” Id. at 1264.

[n1. Davis was pending on appeal when Gant was decided by the Supreme Court. 

Davis, 598 F.3d at 1263.]

Here, the district court did not err in denying Melton’s motion to

suppress the drug evidence. First, the search limitations announced in Gant

apply because Melton’s case was pending on appeal when Gant was decided

by the Supreme Court. See Griffith, 479 U.S. at 324, 107 S.Ct. at 713. 

However, it is unnecessary that we discuss the constitutionality of the search

because the government has conceded that the search of Melton’s vehicle

violated the search incident to arrest exception established in Gant. Brief of

[2]

Appellee at 15 n.8. Accordingly, the search of Melton’s vehicle incident to

arrest violates the Fourth Amendment.

[n2. “The United States concedes that [the officer’s] search of Melton's vehicle

does not fit within either of the two narrow situations to satisfy the

search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement established in Gant;

thus, under Gant, the search of Melton’s vehicle was not a proper search incident

to arrest.” Brief of Appellee at 15 n.8.]

Next, applying our recent holding in Davis, the drug evidence [3]

discovered in the search of Melton’s glove compartment incident to his arrest

should not be suppressed. See Davis, 598 F.3d at 1268. While Melton argues

that the exclusionary rule should apply in this case, we recognize that the

exclusionary rule is inappropriate “when the offending officer reasonably

relied on well-settled precedent.” Id. at 1266. In this case, the offending

officer conducted a search of the glove compartment of Melton’s vehicle

incident to his arrest on a weapons charge. Under our then-binding precedent,

this search was objectively reasonable and would have been permitted in this

Circuit pre-Gant. See Gonzalez, 71 F.3d at 825. Therefore, the good-faith

exception to the exclusionary rule applies, and the drug evidence discovered

in Melton’s vehicle in the search incident to his arrest should not be

suppressed.

[n.3. At the time of briefing, the parties did not have the benefit of our recent Davis

decision that controls the disposition of this appeal.]

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Though the district court’s decision not to suppress the evidence was

based on the inventory exception, we nonetheless affirm that ruling based on

the good-faith exception as the applicability of this exception is fully

supported by the record. See Caraballo, 595 F.3d at 1222.

[4] 

[n.4. In evaluating the district court's ruling, “we are not strictly bound by the legal

analysis relied upon below, and may affirm as long as the district court’s decision

is correct as a matter of law.” Gonzalez, 71 F.3d at 825 n.15.]

United States v. Melton, 391 Fed. App’x 799, 800-02 (11 Cir. 2010). th 3

“The district court is not required to reconsider claims of error that were raised and

disposed of on direct appeal.” United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11 Cir. 2000); th

see also United States v. Rowan, 663 F.2d 1034, 1035 (11 Cir. 1981). If a claim has been th

raised on direct appeal and decided adversely to a defendant, it cannot be relitigated in a

collateral attack under § 2255. See Nyhuis, 211 F.3d at 1343. Furthermore, “[a] rejected

claim does not merit rehearing on a different, but previously available, legal theory.” Id.

Melton’s argument that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the

drug evidence found during the search of his car was squarely presented to the Eleventh

Circuit on direct appeal. The Eleventh Circuit decided the claim adversely to Melton. 

Because the claim was raised and resolved in Melton’s direct appeal, this court will not

reconsider the claim here. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d at 1343.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari review in Davis and subsequently 3

issued an opinion affirming the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply

to searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent. Davis v.

United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2419 (2011).

5

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III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the 28

U.S.C. § 2255 motion filed by Melton be DENIED and this case dismissed with prejudice,

as the claim in the § 2255 motion entitles Melton to no relief.

It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on or

before October 13, 2014. A party must specifically identify the findings in the

Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections

will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed

findings and recommendations shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on

appeal factual findings accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of

plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See th

Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of

th

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc). th

Done this 29 day of September, 2014.

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 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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