Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00531/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00531-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mark D. Crawford, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 13-00531 PHX PGR (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about

March 13, 2013, and he filed an amended petition seeking habeas

relief on September 13, 2013. Respondents filed a Limited

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc.

12) on July 9, 2014. Any reply to the answer to the petition

was due on or about August 9, 2014.

I Procedural History

An indictment returned by a Maricopa County grand jury

on April 5, 2005, charged Petitioner with six counts of sexual

exploitation of a minor under 15 years of age, class 2 felonies

and dangerous crimes against children. See Answer, Exh. A. The

charges were based on Petitioner’s possession of six

pornographic images “in which a minor under fifteen years of age

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is engaged in exploitive exhibition or other sexual conduct.”

Id., Exh. A. On September 12, 2005, pursuant to a written plea

agreement, Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to two counts of

attempted sexual exploitation of a minor “a class 3 felony, a

Dangerous Crime Against Children in the 2nd degree,” in exchange

for the dismissal of the remaining charges. Id., Exh. B & Exh.

C. On October 7, 2005, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of

five years imprisonment pursuant to the first count of

conviction and to a term of lifetime probation on the second

count of conviction. Id., Exh. D.

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a timely “of-right”

petition for state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, in which he challenged a

condition of his lifetime probation. Id., Exh. F & Exh. G. In

a decision entered July 24, 2006, the state trial court denied

relief, finding that Petitioner was aware of and agreed to the

challenged provision of his plea agreement. Id., Exh. H.

Petitioner did not seek review of this decision by the Arizona

Court of Appeals.

On March 27, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se Rule 32

petition, in which he argued a change of law required reversal

of his convictions, challenged the law under which he was

convicted as vague and overbroad, and asserted a claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id., Exh. I & Exh. J.

In a decision entered April 11, 2008, the state trial court

explained that any change in the law did not apply to

Petitioner’s case. The state trial court found his other claims

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untimely under Rule 32.4(a) and precluded under Rule 32.2(a).

Id., Exh. K. Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied review on September 1,

2009. Id., Exh. N. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on

December 29, 2009. Id., Exh. O. 

Petitioner filed a third Rule 32 action on October 12,

2010, asserting a change in Arizona law required his convictions

be vacated, challenging the trial court’s imposition of lifetime

probation, and arguing that the statute under which he was

convicted was “void for vagueness and in violation of

multiplicity.” Id., Exh. P & Exh. Q at 2. In a decision issued

October 29, 2010, the trial court concluded that Petitioner had

failed to cite “any new law that would likely result in [his]

conviction or sentence being overturned,” and that he had

“failed to present a claim that can be raised in an untimely

Rule 32 proceeding.” Id., Exh. R at 1–2. The Arizona Court of

Appeals denied Petitioner’s request for review of the trial

court’s denial of relief on November 14, 2012. Id., Exh. U. 

In his fourth state Rule 32 action, initiated

September 27, 2011, Petitioner asserted a claim that his right

to be free of double jeopardy was violated. Id., Exh. V & Exh.

W at 2. Petitioner also argued that the trial court abused its

discretion by enhancing his sentences under the statute

applicable to dangerous crimes against children. Id., Exh. W.

In a decision issued September 30, 2011, the state trial court

found Petitioner’s claims untimely pursuant to Rule 32.4(a) and

procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(2). Id., Exh. X.

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In his petition for review of this decision by the Arizona Court

of Appeals, Petitioner argued his double jeopardy rights were

violated, that the trial court abused its discretion by

enhancing his sentences under the statute applicable to

dangerous crimes against children, that the statute under which

he was convicted was vague and overbroad, and that his trial

counsel was ineffective. Id., Exh. AA. In a decision issued

September 25, 2013, the appellate court agreed with the trial

court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s claims were precluded.

Id., Exh. CC.

In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner

asserts he was denied his right to be free of double jeopardy

and that he was denied his right to confront the witnesses

against him. Petitioner also maintains that the statute under

which he was convicted is vague and overbroad. Respondents

assert that Petitioner’s habeas action is not timely and that

his claims are procedurally barred. 

II Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). The one-year statute of limitations on

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habeas petitions generally begins to run on “the date on which

the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). 

The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is entitled to

tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of a

“properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See also Artuz v. Bennet, 531

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Harris v. Carter, 515

F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). “The time during which a

properly filed application for State postconviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations

period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

A state post-conviction petition is “clearly pending

after it is filed with a state court, but before that court

grants or denies the petition.” Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d

921, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). However, a state petition that is not

filed within the state’s required time limit is not “properly

filed” and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to

statutory tolling of the federal statute of limitations during

the time such a petition is “pending” in the state courts. See

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1811-12

(2005). “When a postconviction petition is untimely under state

law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of §

2244(d)(2).” Id., 544 U.S. at 414, 125 S. Ct. at 1812.

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In Arizona, an action for post-conviction relief is

pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed, even

though the actual petition delineating the defendant’s specific

claims is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Dep’t of

Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for

post-conviction relief is also pending during the intervals

between a lower court decision and a review by a higher court.

See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003).

However, the time between a first and second application for

post-conviction relief is not tolled because no application is

“pending” during that period. See id.

Petitioner’s conviction became final at the conclusion

of his first Rule 32 proceedings, when the time expired to seek

review of the trial court’s July 24, 2006, decision denying

relief expired, i.e., on or about August 24, 2006. Therefore,

the one-year statute of limitations on Petitioner’s federal

habeas action expired on or about August 24, 2007, and,

accordingly, Petitioner’s federal habeas action was not filed

within the applicable statute of limitations. 

None of Petitioner’s subsequent state actions for postconviction relief tolled the statute of limitations because none

of these Rule 32 actions were “properly filed”. Additionally,

none of Petitioner’s successive petitions for state postconviction relief could revive the statute of limitations with

regard to Petitioner’s federal habeas action after that statute

of limitations expired. See, e.g., Larsen v. Soto, 742 F.3d

1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2013); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820,

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823 (9th Cir. 2003).

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas

petition may be equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing on

time. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562

(2010); Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010).

A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace, 544 U.S. at 418, 125 S. Ct. at 1814-15. See also Ford v.

Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th Cir. 2012); Porter v.

Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010); Waldron-Ramsey v.

Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011-14 (9th Cir. 2009). In Holland

the Supreme Court eschewed a “mechanical rule” for determining

extraordinary circumstances, while endorsing a flexible,

“case-by-case” approach, drawing “upon decisions made in other

similar cases for guidance.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1096-97.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d

at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris, 515 F.3d at 1054-55 & n.4; Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003), modified on other

grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling is

only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

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petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely habeas action. See Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49;

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling is also available

if the petitioner establishes their actual innocence of the

crimes of conviction. See Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933-34

(9th Cir. 2011).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is inappropriate in most cases

and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were

the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959. It is Petitioner’s burden to establish

that equitable tolling is warranted in his case. See, e.g.,

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004); Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

Petitioner has not replied to the answer to his

petition, which answer argues the petition is time-barred.

Petitioner has not stated an adequate basis for equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations. Compare Holland, 130 S.

Ct. at 2564; Porter, 620 F.3d at 961 (noting the circumstances

of cases determined before and after Holland). A petitioner’s

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pro se status, ignorance of the law, and lack of legal

representation during the applicable filing period do not

constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling because

such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g., Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14;

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004). The

vicissitudes of prison life are not “extraordinary”

circumstances that make it impossible to file a timely habeas

petition. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th

Cir. 2009).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a

petitioner is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations

if they can establish that they are actually innocent of the

crimes of conviction. See Lee, 653 F.3d at 934. 

“Actual innocence, if proved, serves as a

gateway through which a petitioner may pass

whether the impediment is a procedural bar

...[or] expiration of the statute of

limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins,[], 133

S.Ct. 1924, 1928,[] (2013). When an otherwise

time-barred habeas petitioner “presents

evidence of innocence so strong that a court

cannot have confidence in the outcome of the

trial unless the court is also satisfied that

the trial was free of non-harmless

constitutional error,” the Court may consider

the petition on the merits. See Schlup v.

Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, [] (1995).

The Supreme Court has recently cautioned,

however, that “tenable actual-innocence

gateway pleas are rare.” McQuiggin, 133 S.

Ct. at 1928. “[A] petitioner does not meet

the threshold requirement unless he persuades

the district court that, in light of the new

evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would

have voted to find him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id.

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Stewart v. Cate, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 1707033, at *6 (9th Cir.

May 1, 2014), petition for cert. filed (No. 14-5456 July 25,

2014).

Petitioner has not made a showing of any new evidence.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling of the

statute of limitations based on the theory of actual innocence.

Because the habeas action was not filed within the

statute of limitations and Petitioner has not stated a proper

basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, the

Court need not consider the merits of his claims.

B. Exhaustion and procedural default

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

729–30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554–55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 489

U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.Palmateer,

395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court”

test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

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relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932

(D. Ariz. 2007) (providing a thorough discussion of what

constitutes the “highest court” in Arizona for purposes of

exhausting a habeas claim in the context of a conviction

resulting in a non-capital sentence).

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c). Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to

remedies still available to the petitioner at the time they file

their action for federal habeas relief, it is satisfied if the

petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in

the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92–93, 126

S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s

claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of

the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at 92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387.

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351–52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

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802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594–95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at

727–28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553–57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review...he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his first Rule 32

action. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir.

2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See

also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931–32 (9th Cir. 1998).

C. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

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procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong of

this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that some

objective factor external to the defense impeded his compliance

with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v. Schriro, 426

F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d

613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez–Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d

1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish prejudice, the

petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial

with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v.

Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982). See

also Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415–16 (9th Cir. 1998).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is not cause

to excuse procedural default. See, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho State

Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his criminal proceedings

with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617;

Correll, 137 F.3d at 1415–16. Establishing prejudice requires

a petitioner to prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional

violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have

been convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224

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F.3d 1129, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d

1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice

must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not

examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to

establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43,

102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123

n.10.

Petitioner has not replied to the answer to his

petition arguing that his claims are procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner has not asserted cause for nor prejudice arising from

his procedural default of his federal habeas claims. 

D. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485–86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485–86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

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guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842–43

(9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner does not assert his actual innocence of the

crimes of conviction.

E. Adequate and independent state-law basis

To constitute an adequate and independent state

procedural ground sufficient to support a state court’s finding

of procedural default, “a state rule must be clear, consistently

applied, and well-established at the time of [the] petitioner’s

purported default.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203

(9th Cir. 2001). A state rule is considered consistently

applied and well-established if the state courts follow it in

the “vast majority of cases.” Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573,

580 (9th Cir. 2009), quoting Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 417

n.6, 109 S. Ct. 1211, 1221 n. 6 (1989). Additionally, for the

proffered state procedural bar to preclude the consideration of

a habeas claim “the state court must actually have relied on the

procedural bar as an independent basis for its disposition of

the case.” Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327, 105 S.

Ct. 2633, 2638–39 (1985). See also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.

255, 261–62, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1042 (1989).

“[A] procedural default does not bar

consideration of a federal claim on either

direct or habeas review unless the last state

court rendering a judgment in the case

clearly and expressly states that its

judgment rests on a state procedural bar.”

Harris, 489 U.S. at 263, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103

L.Ed.2d 308 [ ].... Sanders v. Cotton, 398

F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2005) (where the

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state appellate court’s discussion of waiver

is intertwined with its merits analysis, the

state court’s decision does not rest on an

independent and adequate state law ground)

....

Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 937 (7th Cir. 2009) (some

internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Scott, 567

F.3d at 581–82.

In his federal habeas petition Petitioner asserts he

was denied his right to be free of double jeopardy and that he

was denied his right to confront the witnesses against him.

Petitioner also maintains that the statute under which he was

convicted is vague and overbroad.

Petitioner raised a double jeopardy claim in his fourth

state action for post-conviction relief, and the state courts

found the claim precluded. Petitioner raised a claim regarding

the relevant’s statute being vague and overbroad in his second,

third, and fourth state actions for post-conviction relief and

the state courts found the claim precluded by Petitioner’s

failure to raise the claim in his first Rule 32 action.

Petitioner did not raise a claim regarding confrontation of

witnesses, which was waived in his plea agreement, in his state

court proceedings and, accordingly, the claim is procedurally

defaulted. Petitioner did not raise the same claims presented

in his federal habeas petition to the Arizona Court of Appeals

in a procedurally correct manner, i.e., in his first Rule 32

action. When the claims were presented to the state courts in

Petitioner’s subsequent Rule 32 actions the state courts found

the claims precluded by Petitioner’s failure to timely raise the

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issues. Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of his federal habeas

claims, nor has Petitioner shown that he is factually innocent

of the crimes of conviction. Accordingly, relief may not be

granted on the basis of Petitioner’s procedurally defaulted

claims.

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file the habeas petition within one

year of the date his state conviction became final. Petitioner

has not established that he is entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. Additionally, Petitioner

procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claims in the state

courts. Petitioner has not shown cause for nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of his claims nor has he

established that he is actually innocent of the crimes of

conviction such that the Court may grant relief on the merits of

those claims.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Crawford’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

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Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

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DATED this 28th day of August, 2014.

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