Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01137/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01137-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALAN G. GIMENEZ, Civil No. 12-1137 LAB (BLM)

Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE: GRANTING MOTION

TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

J. TIM OCHOA, et al.,

Respondents.

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 28, 1999, Petitioner Alan G. Gimenez, a state prisoner proceeding with

counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. 

(See Gimenez v. Early, 99cv1133 JM (JFS) (S.D. Cal. 1999), doc. no. 1.) In that petition, he

challenged his April 10, 1992 conviction in San Diego Superior Court case number CR127737

for the second degree murder of his infant daughter Priscilla. (Id.) This Court denied the

petition on October 24, 2003. (See id., doc. no. 56.) Gimenez appealed his case to the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the denial on May 27, 2005. (Id., doc. no.

65.)

Gimenez has now filed in this Court a successive Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b) and 2254, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has

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granted Gimenez’s request for permission to file a such a petition. (ECF Nos. 1, 4.)

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition for failing to meet the standards of 28

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) and (2). (ECF No. 18.) Respondent also contends the petition is

untimely. (Id.) 

The Court has reviewed the petition, the motion to dismiss, Gimenez’s opposition to

the motion to dismiss, Respondent’s reply, the record, and all the lodgments and exhibits

submitted by the parties. For the reasons discussed below, it is recommended that the

Motion to Dismiss the Petition be GRANTED.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Gimenez was convicted of the second degree murder of his six-week-old daughter

Priscilla on April 10, 1992. (Lodgment No. 12, vol. 4 at 997-99.) He was sentenced to

fifteen years-to-life in prison on May 21, 1992. (Id. at 1019-21.) 

Gimenez appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth

District, which affirmed his conviction on June 15, 1993. (Lodgment No. 16.) Gimenez then

filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court on July 19, 1993, which summarily

denied it without citation of authority on September 15, 1993. (Lodgment Nos. 17-18.) 

Gimenez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this

Court on March 21, 1995, which was assigned case number 95cv0352 E (RBB). In that case,

the Court granted Gimenez’s motion to withdraw the petition on November 1, 1995, when

it became clear he had failed to exhaust his state court remedies. (See S.D. Cal. case no.

95cv0352 E (RBB), doc. no. 19.) 

After exhausting claims in state court, Gimenez filed a second petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this court, which was assigned case number

96cv3457 K (JFS). (See S.D. Cal. case no. 96cv3457 K (JFS), doc. no 1.) That petition was

denied without prejudice on April 6, 1999. (See id., doc. no. 41.)

Following another return to state court to exhaust state court remedies, Gimenez filed

a third petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court on May

28, 1999. (See S.D. Cal. case no. 99cv1133 JM (JFS).) The Court denied the petition on the

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merits on October 24, 2003. (See id., doc. no. 56.) The district judge also denied a

certificate of appealability. (Id., doc. no. 59.)

Gimenez appealed the Court’s denial of the petition to the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals. The Ninth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on the question of whether

counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to obtain all of the

victim’s medical records. (See id., doc. no. 61.) The Ninth Circuit ultimately upheld the

denial of that petition. (Lodgment No. 24.)

On August 24, 2009, Gimenez began a new round of collateral review in state court

by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment

No. 3, vol. 2 at Lodgment No. 25.) The superior court issued an Order to Show Cause, and

the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed a lengthy return and exhibits. 

(Lodgment No. 3 at 66-253; Lodgment No. 6.) In a fourteen-page written opinion, the

superior court denied the petition. (Lodgment No. 1.)

Gimenez then filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of

Appeal. (Lodgment Nos. 2-4.) Respondent filed a response and exhibits. (Lodgment No.

5.) The appellate court denied the petition on November 21, 2011, adopting the reasoning

of the superior court and stating Gimenez did not present a prima facie case for relief. 

(Lodgment No. 8.) 

Gimenez filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No.

9.) The California Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review without citation of authority

on February 15, 2012. (Lodgment No. 10.)

On May 9, 2012, Gimenez filed a successive petition in this Court, and on May 11,

2012, he filed an Application for Leave to File a Successive Habeas Corpus Petition under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal. (See ECF No. 1; Lodgment No. 25.)1

 The

Ninth Circuit granted the application on October 18, 2012. (ECF No. 4.) Respondent filed

1

 Petitioner filed a Motion for Stay on May 10, 2012, pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision on

the Application for Leave to File a Successive Petition in order to stop 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s statute

of limitations from running. (ECF No. 2.) The motion was denied on October 24, 2012, after the

Ninth Circuit granted Gimenez permission to file this petition. (ECF No. 7.)

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a motion to dismiss and accompanying lodgments on May 10, 2013. (ECF No. 18-19.)

Gimenez filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on July 9, 2013. (ECF No. 26.) 

Respondent filed a Reply on August 5, 2013. (ECF No. 30.)

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); see also Parke v. Raley, 506

U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn

from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). Respondent recounts

in his Motion to Dismiss the lengthy facts as found by the California Court of Appeal, and

thus the Court will not repeat them here. (See Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 9-

29, ECF No. 18).2

 The Court defers to the facts as found by the state court and as recounted

by Respondent.

IV. DISCUSSION

When a Petitioner seeks permission from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) to proceed with a successive petition in the district court, the

Ninth Circuit must determine whether he has made a prima facie showing that he has

satisfied the requirements of the statute. The Supreme Court has noted that once a court

of appeal has determined a petitioner has made such a showing, which is the case here, “to

survive dismissal in district court, the applicant must actually ‘sho[w]’ that the claim satisfies

the standard.” Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 661, n. 3 (2001). Although the nature of this

showing is not specifically defined in the statute or by case law, it is clear it must be more

than the “prima facie” showing needed to simply authorize the filing of the successive

petition in the district court, and must include a more detailed and searching inquiry. See

Bible v. Schriro, 651 F.3d 1060, 1064, n. 1 (9th Cir. 2011). The district court is required to

/ / /

2 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to

those imprinted by the Court's electronic case filing system.

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dismiss any claim that does not satisfy the provision. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4). Section

2244(b) states as follows:

(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus

application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall

be dismissed.

(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus

application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application

shall be dismissed unless — 

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of

constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review

by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been

discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light

of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by

clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error,

no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty

of the underlying offense. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (West 2006).

Gimenez does not allege his claims “rel[y] on a new rule of constitutional law, made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Rather, he seeks to proceed under

§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). Respondent alleges all of Gimenez’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claims should be dismissed because they are barred by § 2244(b)(1), and his

remaining claims do not satisfy § 2244(2)(B)(i) and (ii).

A. The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims (claims 8-15) and Subdivision (b)(1) 

Respondent argues all of Gimenez’s new ineffective assistance of counsel claims,

claims eight through fifteen, are barred by § 2244(b)(1) because they seek to relitigate

claims he raised in his prior petition. (Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 37-39, ECF

No. 18.) Respondent notes that in his prior petition, Gimenez claimed trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to obtain and use a report by Dr. Lewis from Children’s Hospital, failing

to obtain all of Priscilla’s medical records, in particular Priscilla’s lab reports, and by failing

to retain and consult with a hematologist who could evaluate the lab reports and render an

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opinion as to the cause of her death. (See Pet. in case no. 99cv1133 JM (JFS) doc. no. 1

at 3-6; Traverse in case no. 99cv1133 JM (JFS), doc. no. 39 at 6-11; Supplemental Traverse

in case no. 99cv1133 JM (JFS), doc. no. 42 at 1-2; Add. Supp. Traverse in case no.

99cv1133 JM (JFS), doc. no. 50 at 1-12.) In the current petition, Gimenez argues counsel

was ineffective for hiring an incompetent pathologist as an expert witness (claim eight),

failing to hire a radiologist to interpret Priscilla’s x-rays and CT scans (claim nine), calling

radiologist Dr. Lee Harvey as an expert witness who testified favorably for the prosecution

(claim ten), failing to provide defense expert witness Dr. Tiznado-Garcia with Priscilla’s CT

scans before trial (claim eleven), failing to secure credible expert witnesses to present an

alternative cause of death (claim twelve), failing to subpoena all of Priscilla’s medical records

(claim thirteen), failing to properly prepare and interview Dr. Kerley, the doctor who

delivered Priscilla (claim fourteen), and failing to “meaningfully challenge the prosecution’s

medical evidence with available favorable forensic evidence” (claim fifteen). (Pet. at 15-18,

ECF No. 1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 34-57, ECF No. 11.)

As Respondent notes, the Ninth Circuit has held that “a ‘ground is successive if the

basic thrust or gravaman of the legal claim is the same, regardless of whether the basic

claim is supported by new and different legal arguments . . . . Identical grounds may often

be proved by different factual allegations . . . .’” Babbit v. Woodford, 177 F.3d 744, 746 (9th

Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Allen, 157 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 1998).) The Ninth

Circuit noted the breadth of this prohibition in Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870 (9th Cir.

2007):

If Petitioner has previously adjudicated a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel in this Court, his pending claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). New factual grounds in support of

a legal claim that has already been presented, i.e., ineffective assistance, are

not sufficient to evade the mandatory dismissal requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). See Babbitt, 177 F.3d at 746. Petitioner already complained about

his defense trial counsel’s performance in a myriad of claims of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel in his first habeas corpus petition, Cooper I, 92–CV–427, Suppl. Pet. at 63–147, all of which were denied on the merits by

this Court. Cooper I, 92–CV–427, Aug. 25, 1997 Order at 7–33. The

gravamen of the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is the same,

/ / /

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regardless of whether Petitioner presents new and different legal arguments

or different factual allegations. See Babbitt, 177 F.3d at 746. 

Cooper, 510 F.3d at 931.

In Babbit, petitioner raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his first

petition and alleged counsel had failed to sufficiently present a post traumatic stress disorder

defense; the Ninth Circuit rejected that argument. Id. In support of a new allegation of

ineffective assistance of counsel in his successive petition, Babbit alleged trial counsel was

ineffective because of his alcohol abuse. By the time of Babbit’s second petition, he had

discovered counsel had resigned from the state bar due to his drinking during a trial, and

had learned from counsel’s legal staff that counsel had drank “three or four drinks” on a

“number of occasions” during Babbit’s trial. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded the new

ineffective assistance of counsel claims contained in Babbit’s successive petition were

absolutely barred by § 2244(b)(1):

Although Babbit asserts new factual explanations for his counsel’s

ineffectiveness at trial, the gravaman of his legal argument is essentially the

same. Because we have already determined that trial counsel’s performance 

during the guilt, sanity and penalty phases was not constitutionally deficient,

we will not consider new factual grounds in support of the same legal claim

that was previously presented.

Babbit, 177 F.3d at 764.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Gimenez’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claims are barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). Gimenez raised ineffective assistance of

counsel claims in his first petition which was decided on the merits, and the gravaman of the

ineffective assistance of counsel claims he currently raises are the same as those claims he

previously raised. Thus, the Court RECOMMENDS all of Gimenez’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claims, claims eight through fifteen, be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(1).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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B. The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims (claims 8-15) and 

Subdivisions (b)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) 

In the alternative, if the ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not barred by 28

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), they must satisfy the standards set forth in § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).

In order to survive dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims under those

provisions, Gimenez must show “the factual predicate for the claim[s] could not have been

discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence,” and that “the facts underlying

the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable

factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). 

Gimenez has not met the standard outlined in § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) with regard to his

ineffective assistance of counsel claims because he has not shown the factual predicate of

those claims could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due

diligence. In claim eight, Gimenez claims counsel should not have used Dr. Guard as an

expert because he could not read the autopsy slides properly, could not date the brain bleed

slides, was not familiar with the symptoms of shaken baby syndrome and thus could not

properly refute the prosecution’s theory, and had been fired from the San Diego County

Medical Examiner’s Office for incompetence. (Pet. at 15, ECF No. 1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp.

Pet. at 42-43, ECF No. 11.) All of this information, however, has been available to Gimenez

since the 1992 trial in his case. Indeed, Dr. Guard was cross-examined about these

shortcomings during the trial. (Lodgment 12, vol. 3 at 568-71, 594-96.) 

 In claim nine, Gimenez argues counsel was ineffective for failing to hire a radiologist

to interpret the x-rays and CT scans. (Pet. at 15, ECF No. 1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at

43-44.) According to Gimenez, this failure resulted in no witnesses testifying that Priscilla’s

rib fracture was present at birth, that a “stroke-like clot” was present in Priscilla’s brain

before she died and was likely the cause of death, and that CT scans alone do not prove a

child was the victim of shaken baby syndrome. (Pet. at 15, ECF No. 1; Mem. of P. & A.

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Supp. Pet. at 43-44.) The record reflects, however, that Dr. Harvey, a radiologist called by

the defense, testified that an x-ray taken shortly after Priscilla’s birth on June 26 showed a

possible rib fracture of the seventh rib, the same rib which appeared to have a healing

fracture on August 11. (Lodgment No. 12, vol. 2 at 441-42.) Dr. Tiznado-Garcia testified

he believed Priscilla died from a sagittal sinus thrombosis, the “stroke-like clot.” (Lodgment

No. 12, vol. 4 at 800, 879, 883.) Dr. Eisele testified that the pattern of injuries — the

subdural hematomas, the rib fracture and the retinal hemorrhages — not the CT scans

alone, led him to conclude that Priscilla died from shaken baby syndrome. (Lodgment No.

12, vol. 1 at 109-12, 115-17.) Dr. Alexander also testified that in his opinion, Priscilla’s

injuries as a whole, including the subdural hematomas, rib fracture, and retinal

hemorrhages, strongly suggested she was victim of shaken baby syndrome. (Lodgment No.

12, vol. 2 at 338, 353-54, 370.) In any event, Gimenez has been aware of the alleged

failure of counsel to have a radiologist testify to these matters since his trial in 1992. 

In apparent contradiction to claim nine, Gimenez contends in claim ten that counsel

was ineffective for calling a radiologist, Dr. Harvey, because he testified favorably for the

prosecution, and because the sole purpose of his direct testimony was simply to establish

doctors inaccurately read Priscilla’s August 7, 1991 CT scan which showed bleeding in her

brain, not to read Priscilla’s x-rays or CT scans and render an opinion favorable to the

defense. (Pet. at 16, ECF No. 1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 44-45.) Dr. Harvey read

Priscilla’s bone survey from August 11, 1991, and found no abnormalities, but later corrected

his report and concluded the films showed a healing rib fracture about one to two weeks old. 

(Lodgment No. 12, vol. 2 at 430-33.) He also testified he conducted a second review of

Priscilla’s August 7, 1991 CT scan, which had been read by another physician. Dr. Harvey

concluded that, contrary to the original doctor who read it as normal, the scan revealed fresh

blood on the surface of Priscilla’s brain. (Id. at 436-39.) As noted above, Dr. Harvey also

testified an x-ray taken at birth showed a possible rib fracture. (Id. at 441.) As Gimenez

points out, Dr. Harvey testified the presence of blood around the brain and a healing rib

fracture made him concerned Priscilla was a victim of shaken baby syndrome. (Id. at 443.) 

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This testimony was certainly damaging. It is clear, however, Gimenez has been aware of

this damaging testimony, and counsel’s role in presenting Dr. Harvey’s testimony to the jury,

since his 1992 trial, and he has therefore not satisfied § 2244(b)(2)(B)(1).

Grounds eleven through fifteen are similarly based on factual predicates that have

been known to Gimenez since his 1992 trial. In grounds eleven and fourteen, Gimenez

complains counsel did not properly prepare Dr. Tiznado-Garcia or Dr. Kerley for their

testimony. Specifically, he claims counsel did not provide Dr. Tiznado-Garcia with Priscilla’s

CT scans until trial, whereupon Tiznado-Garcia testified he believed Priscilla’s CT scan

showed a blood clot which caused her death. (Pet. at 16-17, ECF No. 1; Mem. of P. & A.

Supp. Pet. at 45-46, ECF No. 11.) On cross-examination, Tiznado-Garcia stated he relied on

the radiologist’s reading of the CT scan to render his opinion. (Lodgment No. 12, vol. 4 at

844.) Gimenez contends if counsel had provided the CT scans to Tiznado-Garcia earlier, the

doctor would have told counsel he needed to hire a radiologist to read the scans and testify

for the defense. (Pet. at 16-17, ECF No. 1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 45-46, ECF No.

11.) 

As to Dr. Kerley, Gimenez claims that had counsel properly prepared him for his

testimony, Kerley would have reviewed his medical notes and testified Priscilla’s birth was

not without complications and that Priscilla had “considerable molding” of her head due to

being stuck in the birth canal prior to the Cesarean section which could have caused a brain

bleed beginning at birth. (Pet. at 17-18, ECF No. 1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 48-49,

ECF No. 11.) In ground thirteen, Gimenez argues counsel was ineffective for failing to

subpoena all of Priscilla’s medical records. (Pet. at 17, ECF No. 1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp.

Pet. at 47-48, ECF No. 11.) And in grounds twelve and fifteen, Gimenez complains generally

that counsel did not present any credible medical evidence to counter the prosecution’s case

or meaningfully challenge the prosecution’s evidence. (Pet. at 17-18, ECF No. 1; Mem. of

P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 46-47, 49-51, ECF No.11.) 

These claims all relate to events that occurred at trial; Gimenez has been aware of

these alleged shortcomings and alleged instances of ineffective assistance of counsel since

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his 1992 trial. Accordingly, he has not shown he has satisfied § 2244 (b)(2)(B)(i). The

Court therefore RECOMMENDS the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, claims eight

through fifteen, be DISMISSED.

C. The False Evidence and Actual Innocence Claims (claims 1-7 and 16-26)

and § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)

In claims one through seven, Gimenez contends his conviction is based on false

evidence. (Pet. at 1-14, ECF No. 1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 22-33, 58-77, ECF No.

11.) These claims are based on new evidence Gimenez has submitted which consists of

evaluations of the medical evidence in this case by new experts, new opinions by those

experts about what the evidence shows, and scholarly medical journal articles questioning

the validity of shaken baby syndrome as a mechanism of injury and how shaken baby

syndrome, or abusive head trauma as it is now known, is diagnosed. These new experts

have rendered opinions that Priscilla did not die from shaken baby syndrome/abusive head

trauma, but rather from a brain hemorrhage that occurred at birth, possibly as a result of

being stuck in the birth canal for hours, which continued to bleed and re-bleed over her

short life, or a cortical venous thrombosis/saggital sinus thrombosis (referred to at times as

a “stroke-like clot”). The new experts also contend new scientific evidence casts doubt on

the theory that shaking alone can cause the types of injuries seen in Priscilla, and certainly

not without the presence of neck damage. In addition, the new experts opine the medical

evidence establishes Priscilla’s retinal hemorrhaging occurred while she was in the hospital

in the days before she died and was caused by intercranial pressure from the chronic brain

bleed or stroke-like clot, not shaking. Finally, the new experts contend the rib fracture can

be seen on an x-ray taken just after Priscilla’s birth and was likely a result of birth trauma

during the Cesarean section, not being grasped during a shaking incident. (See generally,

Pet’rs Lodgments, ECF No. 12; Lodgment No. 4, vol. 1-3.) 

These claims satisfy § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) because they are based on new scientific

understanding of the mechanism of injury, methods of diagnosis, and possible over

diagnosis, of shaken baby syndrome/abusive head trauma, and thus the factual predicate

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for the claims could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due

diligence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). They must also, however, satisfy

§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii), which requires Gimenez to establish the new facts, “if proven and

viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). 

Respondent contends § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) requires Gimenez to show constitutional

error occurred at his trial, and that Gimenez’s claim of “false evidence” does not state a valid

federal legal theory because a due process violation based on false evidence requires that

a witness commit perjury at trial. Because Gimenez has not shown any witness perjured

themselves at his trial, Respondent argues he does not satisfy the statute’s requirements. 

(Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 39-44, ECF No. 18.) Gimenez argues neither the statute nor

case law sufficiently describe whether a petitioner must establish constitutional error before

proceeding to determine whether that error affected the jury’s determination of guilt. (Mem.

of P. & A. Supp. Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 13-18, ECF No. 26.) Because the determination

of whether constitutional error has occurred is essentially a merits decision and thus

inappropriate to decide on a motion to dismiss, Gimenez urges the Court to “accept the

defendant’s characterization of the error as being unconstitutional and simply . . . evaluate

the impact of that error on a reasonable fact finder.” (Id. at 14.)

Gimenez’s interpretation, as Respondent points out, would simply eliminate from the

statute the requirement that a petitioner show constitutional error was the source of his

wrongful conviction, which is the essential basis for federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. As

previously noted, while the standard this Court must apply to evaluate whether Gimenez’s

claims satisfy § 2244(b)(2)(B) is not entirely clear, the statute does clearly state Gimenez

must, at a minimum, allege a constitutional error that occurred at his trial. As Respondent

notes, although the Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed this issue, the Eleventh Circuit

/ / /

/ / /

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has. In In re Boshears, 110 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1997), the Court stated the inquiry under

§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) involved three steps: 

First, we must identify “the facts underlying the [applicant’s] claim” and accept

them as true for purposes of evaluation the application. We next must decide

whether these facts establish a constitutional error. Finally, we evaluate these

facts in light of the evidence as a whole to determine whether, had the

applicant known these facts at the time of his or her trial, the application

clearly proves that the applicant could not have been convicted. In other

words, the application must be denied if “any rational trier of fact could have

found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 [citations omitted] (1979) . . . . This is a very

difficult standard to meet.

Boshears, 110 F.3d at 1541; see also Woratzeck v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 648, 653 (9th Cir.

1997) (concluding a petitioner did not meet the § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) standard by alleging a

conflict of interest with regard to his clemency petition because there is no federal

constitutional right to clemency, and thus no constitutional error was stated). 

Even the case cited by Gimenez in support of his position finds a petitioner must show

constitutional error to satisfy § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). In Quezada v. Smith, 624 F.3d 514 (2nd

Cir. 2010), the Second Circuit addressed the showing a petitioner must make to obtain

permission to file a successive petition, stating that “[o]nce newly discovered evidence has

been presented, the gate-keeping issues are whether Quezada has identified a constitutional

error and, if so, whether he has shown by clear and convincing evidence that but for that

error no reasonable jury would have found him guilty.” Quezada, 624 F.3d at 521. Given

the plain wording of the statute, and the authorities cited above, the Court concludes that

in order to survive a motion to dismiss, Gimenez must show constitutional error occurred.

Gimenez argues the presentation of false evidence states a valid federal constitutional

error, and that due process is violated by a conviction which rests on such false evidence. 

In every case the Court has reviewed, however, the alleged due process violation was based

on a witness’s perjury. See e.g., Dow v. Virga, 729 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2013); Henry v.

Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2013); Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2013); Jones

v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2012); Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2012);

Quezada, 624 F.3d at 520 (stating the recantation of trial testimony by a prosecution witness

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satisfies a petitioner’s prima facie burden to show constitutional error under

§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)); Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 520 (9th Cir. 2011); Maxwell v. Roe, 628

F.3d 486, 501 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that “it is undisputed that [the informant] Storch told

numerous lies at Maxwell’s trial). Gimenez has provided no case, Ninth Circuit or otherwise,

which holds due process is violated when testimony, given truthfully at the time, is later

determined to be unwittingly false; nor has the Court located any such case. Gimenez has

also provided no evidence the medical experts at his trial perjured themselves or lied about

their expert opinions in any way.

Even assuming a conviction based on false evidence, as opposed to perjury, is

constitutional error, Gimenez has not established the expert testimony presented at his trial

was false. He has only established that his new experts interpret the medical evidence

differently than the experts at his trial did and that those new experts have different

opinions about what the evidence shows. Ground one alleges Dr. Eisele falsely testified the

neomembranes on the autopsy slides indicated the subdural bleeding was at most four

weeks old and therefore could not have come from a birth injury. He testified as follows:

A. Most of [the subdural hematoma] — the vast majority of it was

fresh, within a matter of days, certainly less than a week. There were a few 

small areas where I did see some neomembrane formation, which would

indicate to me that there had been something there, probably very small in

extent, for a period of time. Again the neomembrane I saw varied from

something like two weeks or so, possibly two and a half weeks, down to a

week.

. . .

Again, I think most of the hematoma probably occurred around the time

she was admitted to the hospital . . . . On the 10th, or about three days

before she died. I think there was some injury there, as I say, probably two

weeks or so before she died, which would take her back to the last part of

July, the first part of August.

There may have been some injury — some additional injury in the

interim. Again, with these small microscopic areas it’s difficult to tell whether

I’m seeing a continuum in time or I’m just seeing incomplete formation of

something that may be a little bit older.

. . .

As a chronic subdural, yes, birth injuries can cause subdural hematomas. So

if you want to talk about something that occurred six weeks ago, yes, I would

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include birth injuries . . . . Once I saw the miscroscopics and realized there

was an older hematoma there, I considered it, but my — well, there were two

or three things that led me to eliminate it. One, again, was the fact that the

baby was born by c-section or cesarean section, which would make birth injury

much less likely.

The second was my aging of the older hematoma, which didn’t appear

to be anywhere close to six weeks. As I say, I think I felt two weeks, possibly

three weeks, four weeks at the absolute outside.

. . . 

The stage of healing that I saw — well, okay. I did see neomembrane,

small areas of neomembranes. I saw them only with the microscope. You

could not see them with the naked eye. I felt, one, that the amount of

hematoma to the amount of neomembrane was totally disproportionate. In

other words, I’m seeing a few little microscopic threats of membrane and yet

I’m seeing a hematoma that covers half the baby’s brain.

. . .

So, I felt that the recent hematoma, the one that was about three days

old when I did the autopsy, was a result of a new trauma, not rebleeding from

a neomembrane.

(Lodgment No. 12, vol. 1 at 108-09, 129-30, 141-42.)

According to Gimenez, his new experts, Drs. Leetsma, Wolfe, and Plunkett, opine the

slides show the subdural “bleeding began at or shortly after birth and was chronic.” (Mem.

of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 24, ECF No. 11.) The new evidence does not establish, however,

that Dr. Eisele’s testimony was false at the time given or false now. 

In his declaration, Dr. Leetsma states that “the oldest component of the subdural

hematoma(s) is consistent with an age of a month or so. The younger components are

found in the range of 2 weeks or so from death, to a few days from death, to any period

within two days of death.” (Pet’rs Lodgment at 8, ECF No. 12.) This opinion does not differ

in any significant way from Eisele’s estimation that the older hematoma was two or three

weeks old, “four weeks old at the absolute outside,” and that the “vast majority” of the

hematoma “was fresh, within a matter of days, certainly less than a week.” Dr. Plunkett

states he reviewed the slides from the autopsy, but does not date the subdural hematomas. 

(Id. at 29-30.) He only provides scientific evidence and information about how infant head

trauma is currently understood, how the science has changed over the years, other

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conditions that can mimic infant head trauma and his opinion that “[c]ortical venous

thrombosis (CVT), not trauma, caused Priscilla’s death.” (Id. at 29.) Dr. Wolfe also does

not specifically date the neomembranes, stating only that “[t]he subdural hematomas are

‘mixed,’ in that they contain fresh blood without neomembranes and also regions with much

older neomembranes, stainable iron, and macrophages.” (Id. at 38.) He also states that,

in his opinion, the medical evidence supports his conclusion that “the underlying

neuropathological process in Priscilla’s case is many days or weeks old, and quite likely

originated during birth,” and that the cause of death was “[p]rimary cerebral venous

infarction due to progressive intradural sinus and cortical vein thrombosis.” (Id. at 40.) 

Thus, the only basis for Gimenez’s claim that Eisele’s testimony was false is new and

different interpretations of the medical evidence and new and different opinions about what

that evidence shows by new and different experts. These differing expert opinions do not

establish Dr. Eisele’s testimony was false.

Ground two alleges Dr. Eisele falsely testified the “stroke-like clot” found during the

autopsy was formed after Priscilla’s death, while Gimenez’s new experts – Drs. Leetsma,

Wolfe, Plunkett and Bonnell – state the clot was formed before death, probably as a result

of a cortical venous thrombosis or saggital sinus thrombosis, which caused her death. (Pet.

at 11, ECF No. 1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 24, ECF No. 11.) Although there is a

notation about the saggital sinus clot being formed postmortem in the autopsy report, Dr.

Eisele did not testify about the clot at trial. (See Lodgment No. 4, vol. 2, Ex. Q at 10;

Lodgment No. 12, vol. 1 at 87-165.) Dr. Leetsma states that, in his opinion, the saggital

sinus contained an antemortem clot. (Pet’rs Lodgments, Ex. A at 9.) Dr. Plunkett states

Priscilla died from a cortical venous thrombosis, as does Dr. Wolfe and Dr. Bonnell. (Id., Ex.

C at 29, Ex. D at 38, 40, Ex. F at 48.) Dr. Bonnell states the clot is antemortem as well. 

(Id., Ex. F at 48.) Another of Gimenez’s experts, Dr. Barnes, also believes the CT scans

show the cause of death to be something other than infant head trauma, and states the

differential diagnoses include “cerebral venous thrombosis, coagulopathy, hypoxia-ischemia,

and infection.” (Id., Ex. B at 1.) As with claim one, however, Gimenez has not established

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Eisele’s testimony was false or perjurious, only that experts disagree on the interpretation

of the medical evidence in his case. Indeed, Dr. Stanley, a Chief Deputy Medical Examiner

for the County of San Diego, states in her declaration it is possible the clot was formed both

antemortem and postmortem: 

While the portion of the thrombus in the superior saggital sinus

examined microscopically by Dr. Eisele appears to have formed postmortem,

the sections of sinus submitted for microscopic examination by Dr. Guard show

antemortem thrombus, some of which could have begun to form a few days

before death. I believe that this thrombus is secondary to the injuries and is

not the primary cause of the brain swelling as I find no description or evidence

of venous infarcts.3

 

(Lodgment No. 6, Ex. 3 [Decl. of Dr. Christina Stanley].)4

As with the preceding ground, Gimenez seeks to characterize the new medical

opinions as “true,” and the medical opinions of the trial experts as “false.” The opinions are,

however, simply different expert opinions based on the evaluation of the same medical

evidence. Gimenez has not shown Dr. Eisele’s testimony was false, only that it differs from

his current experts.

In ground three, Gimenez claims Dr. Alexander’s testimony that Priscilla’s retinal

hemorrhages were a result of shaken baby syndrome was false. (Pet. at 12, ECF No. 12;

Mem. of P. & A. at 25, ECF No. 11.) In support, Gimenez cites declarations from Drs. Wolfe,

Bonnell, and Cohen, which state the lack of stainable iron on the autopsy slides indicates the

injury occurred during Priscilla’s ultimate hospitalization and as a result of her cerebral

hemorrhaging, not from injuries inflicted by Gimenez. (Pet. at 12, ECF No. 1; Mem. of P. &

A. Supp. Pet. at 35, ECF No. 11.) Specifically, Dr. Wolfe states they are “recent,” Dr. Bonnell

states the injury was less than 72 hours old, and Dr. Cohen states they were “two to three

3 Dr. Whitlock also states in his declaration that he saw a lack of infarction. (See Pet’rs

Lodgments, Ex. E at 2, ECF No. 12.)

4

 Declarations by Dr. Stanley and Dr. Levin were submitted to the Superior Court by the

District Attorney as support for Return to Order to Show Cause. (See Lodgment No. 5 at 66-253;

Lodgment No. 6, Exs. 3-5.) The state appellate court specifically adopted the reasoning of the state

superior court in its denial of Gimenez’s habeas corpus petition, and the state supreme court denied

the petition without citation of authority. (See Lodgment Nos. 8, 10.) Accordingly, the declarations 

were before the state courts when they decided Gimenez’s petitions, and they may be relied upon

by this Court as well. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803, 806 (1991).

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days old.”5 (Pet’rs Lodgments, Exs. D at 3-4, F at 2, G at 3, ECF No. 12.) In a declaration

submitted by the District Attorney in support of their return in state court, however, Dr. Alex

Levin states that “[d]ating by hemosiderin [staining] is highly controversial and very

variable.” (Lodgment No. 6, Decl. of Dr. Alex Levin at 3.) The absence of universal or near

universal acceptance of a method of dating a retinal hemorrhage necessarily means Dr.

Alexander’s testimony was not false. Moreover, Priscilla was in the hospital for 67 hours

before she died. (See Peter’s Lodgments, Ex. F at 2.) According to Gimenez’s new experts,

the hemorrhages could have been as old as 72 hours, and thus could have occurred while

Priscilla was out of the hospital and in Gimenez’s care. In any event, as with Gimenez’s

preceding claims, his new experts’ opinions are simply different than those put forth by the

trial experts.

Claim four alleges Dr. Eisele falsely testified Priscilla did not have coagulopathy or a

blood clotting disorder. Gimenez, with support from his new experts, claims the records

show Priscilla did have such a disorder, and coagulopathy, not shaking, resulted in her

death. (Pet. at 13, ECF No. 1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 25, ECF No. 11.) Specifically,

Dr. Whitlock and Dr. Bonnell both state Priscilla’s medical records indicate she had clotting

and coagulation problems. (Pet’rs Lodgments, Ex. E at 2, Ex. F at 3, ECF No. 12.) Dr.

Whitlock, however, states that while the lab reports indicate coagulation abnormalities, the

cause of the coagulation and clotting problems was “uncertain,” that there were no other

indications of a clotting disorder — such as bruising or internal bleeding other than the

subdural hematoma — and that “head trauma, in and of itself may lead to subsequent

abnormal coagulation studies, rendering it impossible to determine which of the two findings

precedes the other, . . . which appears to be the case in this particular case.” (Pet’rs

Lodgments, Ex. E at 2, ECF No. 12.) Gimenez’s own expert’s uncertainty renders his claim

that Dr. Eisele’s

/ / /

5

 Dr. Cohen did not look at the autopsy slides, she only reviewed the autopsy report. (See

Pet’rs Lodgments, Ex. G at 1, ECF No. 12.)

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/ / /

testimony was false without foundation. Moreover, Dr. Eisele’s testimony was essentially in

line with much of Dr. Whitlock’s analysis regarding any clotting problems:

Q. Doctor, if there were some sort of congenital problem or problem

with the coagulation or the clotting of the blood, could that — could a

rebleeding from an old injury continue to grow and grow and get as massive

as you’ve described?

A. Could it? Yes, it could. I don’t think that’s what happened in this

case.

Q. Dr. Eisele, can you tell us what a protein-C deficiency is?

A. Protein-C is a — it’s a component of the blood that affects blood

clotting and causes individuals to bleed more easily. The mechanism is fairly

complex. I think Protein-C, I believe, is an inhibitor of an enzyme that — I’m

trying to remember the sequence. It inhibits an enzyme that takes part in

blood coagulation.

Q. Do you know if Priscilla was tested for Protein-C deficiency?

A. I don’t believe so. There was no reason to test her. There was no

evidence that she had any bleeding tendency.

Q. But you felt — you felt there was a reason to test her for, say

Leukemia. What reason did you have to test her for that?

A. I didn’t test her for Leukemia as part of my autopsy. I ruled it out.

Q. You considered Leukemia?

A. I considered it.

Q. Did you consider Protein-C deficiency?

A. I considered clotting deficiencies in general. I did not consider just

Protein-C deficiency. To my knowledge, that cannot be assayed postmortem. 

The reason I didn’t consider it is there was no evidence of a bleeding

tendency. There was no hemorrhage other than the subdural hematoma. 

There was no bruises. There was no history of bruises. There was no

bleeding into any of the other organs. There nothing to indicate bleeding into

the joints.

Q. So you ruled that out initially?

A. So I think on a clinical basis there was not basis to think there was

a clotting deficiency. And again, as part of my autopsy I saw no evidence of

a clotting deficiency. But we did not do the specific chemical tests for ProteinC deficiency or hemophilia or any of the other clotting problems.

(Lodgment No. 12, vol. 1 at 142-43.)

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/ / /

Claim five alleges the evidence presented at trial about a healing rib fracture of

Priscilla’s seventh rib was false. (Pet. at 14, ECF No. 1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 25-26,

ECF No. 11.) Gimenez claims the rib fracture was present at birth, and in support provides

the declaration of Dr. Barnes, who Gimenez claims viewed more birth x-rays than the

prosecution’s trial experts. Dr. Barnes states the rib fracture was present in one of the xrays taken after Priscilla’s birth. (Pet’rs Lodgments, Ex. B at 1, ECF No. 12.) At trial, Dr.

Sascha Hilton testified the x-rays from Priscilla’s August 8 and 11 admission to the hospital

show a rib fracture that had been healing for 20 to 30 days. (Lodgment No. 12, vol. 1 at

234.) She did not see a fracture in the x-rays taken of Priscilla at birth. (Id. at 222-23.) 

Contrary to Gimenez’s claim, however, Dr. Barnes states only that he saw a “possible right

seventh rib abnormality, . . . present on the two chest films at birth, although more readily

apparent on the very first chest film.” (Pet’rs Lodgments, Ex. B at 1.) He does not state the

rib was fractured, only “possibly abnormal.” This does not establish Dr. Hilton’s testimony

was false. It is certainly possible the “abnormality” was present at birth, and that the rib

was actually fractured later.

In claim six, Gimenez contends Dr. Eisele falsely testified Priscilla suffered no birth

trauma, which supported a later diagnosis of shaken baby syndrome. (Pet. at 14, ECF No.

1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 26, ECF No. 11.) Gimenez contends new evidence shows

Priscilla had “extensive coning (molding) of her head during the more than 29 hours of

attempted natural birth, . . . and x-rays taken the day of birth show a rib abnormality or

injury . . . .” This supports Gimenez’s theory that Priscilla had a rib fracture and brain bleed

at birth, the latter of which worsened over time and ultimately led to her death by natural

causes. (Pet. at 14, ECF No. 1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 26, ECF No. 11.) 

As support for his contentions, Gimenez presents medical records he states show

Teresa Gimenez was given an emergency C-section when it became clear her labor was not

progressing and the baby might have been exposed to infection. (See Lodgment No. 4, vol.

2 at 6, 7, 19, 37, 39.) The records also show the baby’s head had begun molding due to her

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prolonged presence in the birth canal. (Id. at 37.) Dr. Kerley, Teresa’s physician has also

submitted a declaration, in which he states Teresa was in active labor 12 hours (not 29), and

“the baby’s head was well impacted in the pelvis with considerable molding (skull deformity)

which was still evident after delivery.” (Pet’rs Lodgments, Ex. I at 2, ECF No. 12.) Gimenez

also submits Dr. Leetsma’s declaration, which states that subdural hematomas can occur as

a result of the birthing process, and that these may continue to bleed over time and lead to

more serious medical conditions and even death. (Pet’rs Lodgments, Ex. A at 5, ECF No.

12.) 

Finally, Gimenez submits medical journal articles supporting his theory of Priscilla’s death. 

(See Lodgment No. 4, vol. 3, Ex. EE at 5, Ex. NN at 2.)

A trial, Dr. Eisele was asked his opinion as to whether Priscilla’s rib fracture and

subdural hematoma were birth injuries. (Lodgment No. 12, vol. 1 at 115.) He stated he did

not believe they were because she was delivered via Cesarean section, and thus would not

have had the trauma of being forced through the birth canal; he also stated the x-rays taken

at birth did not show a rib fracture. (Id. at 116.) In addition, he testified the autopsy did

not show any evidence of a subdural hematoma earlier than two to three weeks before her

death, and no evidence of a subdural hematoma at the time of birth. (Id.)

Although Dr. Eisele’s opinion was partially based on his belief that Priscilla did not

spend an appreciable amount of time in the birth canal, Petitioner’s experts can only theorize

Priscilla had an undiagnosed brain injury at birth. According to his experts and the medical

journals he has submitted, subdural hematomas sometimes, but not always, occur during

birth. (See Pet’rs Lodgments, Ex. A at 2, ECF No. 12; Lodgment 4, vol. 3 at Exs. EE, NN.)

Moreover, there is significant medical evidence supporting the conclusion that none of

Priscilla’s head injuries were from birth. Indeed, even Dr. Leetsma states in his declaration

that “the oldest component of the subdural hematoma(s) is consistent with an age of a

month or so,” not with birth. As such, Gimenez has not established Eisele’s testimony was

false.

Ground seven is Gimenez’s final false evidence claim. In it, he contends Dr.

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Alexander falsely testified Priscilla’s CT scans which show the pattern of injuries suffered by

Priscilla “proves” she was shaken. (Pet. at 14, ECF No. 1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 26,

ECF No. 11.) Gimenez contends Dr. Alexander has repudiated this belief in a recent

textbook he co-authored. (Pet. at 14, ECF No. 1; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 26, ECF No.

11.) 

At trial, Dr. Alexander testified that “many people say” the kind of cerebral

hemorrhaging visible on Priscilla’s CT scans is “basically diagnostic of a shaken baby.” 

(Lodgment No. 12, vol. 2 at 350.) He also stated that the condition is seen in shaken babies

“and really nothing else” because “it just seems to be an area that’s susceptible to shaking,

that when you have shaking effects that’s an area that gets affected as opposed to just

being other areas of the brain.” (Id.) Later, he testified that the pattern of injuries in

Priscilla’s case are ones that are seen in shaken babies and not in a child who had problems

from birth. (Id. at 354.)

The textbook excerpts cited by Gimenez as support for his claim that Dr. Alexander

no longer believes his own trial testimony is from a book co-authored, or perhaps co-edited,

by Dr. Alexander. (See Lodgment No. 4, vol. 3, Ex. AA at 2 [article authored by Dr. Andrew

P. Sirotnak and Dr. Lori D. Frasier].) However, the excerpts from Dr. Alexander’s book also

state:

— “[Retinal hemorrhages], [subdural hematomas], and rib fractures form a

common triad of injury seen in abusive head trauma.” (Id. at 15.)

— “[T]he cause of subdural hemorrhages in infants is most often related to

trauma, and of those causes, [abusive head trauma] is most common.” (Id.

at 7.)

— “Except in cases of abusive injury, spontaneous subdural hemorrhages are

rarely seen in young infants.” (Id. at 10.)

— “Acute subdural hematomas are readily identifiable by CT due to the

hyperattenuating appearance of freshly clotted blood.” (Id.)

Given this, Dr. Alexander’s book excerpts cannot reasonably be taken as a repudiation

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by Dr. Alexander of his trial testimony. Interestingly, Gimenez has not secured a declaration

from Dr. Alexander himself regarding how, if at all, his current opinions vary from his

testimony at trial.

As support for this claim, Gimenez also submits a declaration and a medical journal

article, both authored by Dr. Barnes. Based on his research, Dr. Barnes believes accidental

trauma cannot be distinguished from non-accidental trauma solely on radiological images. 

Dr. Barnes states in his declaration that he believes Priscilla’s CT scans “require a differential

diagnosis which includes cerebral venous thrombosis, coagulopathy, hypoxia-ischemia, and

infection . . .,” and that “[t]here are no imaging findings that are characteristic of, or specific

for, trauma, including nonaccidental injury.” (Pet’rs Lodgments, Ex. B at 1, Ex. KK at 1-9.) 

Dr. Barnes’ article and declaration simply express a different medical opinion about the

medical evidence in this case. There is no substantial evidence that Dr. Alexander’s opinion

is “false” or wrong, or that Dr. Alexander or other experts do not currently believe Priscilla’s

injuries were caused by non-accidental trauma, such as shaking. Thus, Gimenez’s claim that

Dr. Alexander’s testimony was false is without foundation. 

Gimenez’s attempt to argue in claims sixteen through twenty-six that his actual

innocence is a separate constitutional error which satisfies § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) also fails. As

Respondent notes, whether actual innocence is itself constitutional error is an open question. 

See District Att’ys Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 71-72 (2009). 

Indeed, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have read § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) as requiring an

independent constitutional violation to be shown in addition to actual innocence. See In re

Davis, 565 F3d 810, 832-24 (11th Cir. 2009); Case v. Hatch, 731 F.3d 1015, 1037 (10th Cir.

2013). But even assuming a free standing actual innocence claim can satisfy

§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii), Gimenez has not established he is actually innocent because he has not

shown that even with the new expert testimony, no reasonable fact finder would have found

him guilty. A reasonable jury could credit the prosecution’s experts’ medical opinions about

the cause of Priscilla’s death over Gimenez’s experts.

In sum, Gimenez seeks to establish constitutional error occurred at his trial, either via

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false evidence or actual innocence, with evidence of an ongoing and spirited debate within

the medical community as to the mechanics of injury, symptoms, methods of diagnosis, and

scientific bases for what was formerly referred to as shaken baby syndrome and is now

termed abusive head trauma. The varying medical opinions of the experts submitted by the

parties themselves indicate there are many conflicting views held by medical professionals

about this topic. (See Pet’rs Lodgments, ECF No. 12; Lodgment No. 4 vols. 1-3; Lodgment

No 6, Exh. 3-5 [declarations of Dr. Christina Stanley and Dr. Alex Levin].) Even a brief

investigation yields current articles that illustrate the depth and breadth of this debate. 

(See, e.g., Sandeep Narang, M.D., J.D., John D. Melville, M.D., Christopher S. Greely, M.D.,

James D. Anderst, M.D., Shannon L Carpenter, M.D., Betty Spivack, M.D., A Daubert Analysis

of Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome — Part II: An Examination of the

Differential Diagnosis (not finalized or published) (July 1, 2013); Sandeep Narang, M.D.,

J.D., A Daubert Analysis of Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome, 11 Hous. J.

Health L. & Pol’y 505-633 (2011).) 

This is not a case where the science upon which Gimenez was convicted is now

considered “junk science,” nor is it a case where current scientific methods, such as DNA

analysis, definitively exclude Gimenez as the agent of Priscilla’s death. Rather, it is a case

which involves scientific and medical judgment and a forceful debate among experts in the

field. Although medical opinion as to the mechanics of injury in infant head trauma and how

to diagnose shaken baby syndrome/abusive head trauma has evolved over time, such a

diagnosis was not false at the time, nor has Gimenez established it is currently false as

opposed to simply being a matter of controversy and judgment. Gimenez has not satisfied

§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) by establishing constitutional error occurred at his trial.

Even assuming constitutional error did occur, Gimenez has not established that, but

for that error, no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). This standard is the same as that announced in Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307 (1979), which requires the Court to deny such a finding if “any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

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Boshears, 110 F.3d at 1541 (applying the Jackson standard to an application to file a

successive petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).) As discussed above, contrary to his

claims that the medical community has wholly rejected the diagnosis of shaken baby

syndrome/abusive head trauma based on the symptoms and injuries exhibited by Priscilla,

Gimenez has only presented evidence that there exists a spirited and forceful debate among

medical professionals as to the symptoms, mechanism of injury and diagnosis of abusive

head trauma. There are respected medical and academic professionals who continue to hold

the opinion that the injuries Priscilla sustained — a particular type of subdural hematoma

and retinal hemorrhaging, combined with a rib fracture — are indicative of shaken baby

syndrome/abusive head trauma, including some of the experts Gimenez cites to or argues

have changed their position. (See Pet’rs Lodgments, Ex. AA at 7, 10, 12, 15, Ex. EE at 7.)

A jury could rationally believe those medical experts over Gimenez’s experts. As such, he

has not shown that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty. 

For all the foregoing reasons, Gimenez has not shown constitutional error occurred

at his trial, either in the form of false evidence or that he is actually innocent of the murder

of Priscilla Gimenez, or that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would

have found him guilty. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS claims one through seven

and sixteen through twenty-six be DISMISSED. 

D. The Cumulative Error Claim (claim 27) and § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) and (ii)

In claim twenty-seven, Gimenez argues the cumulative effect of the ineffective

assistance of counsel errors, the false evidence errors, and his actual innocence violated his

Sixth Amendment right to counsel and federal due process rights. (Pet. at 24, ECF No. 1;

Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 77-78.) 

Gimenez’s claim regarding the cumulative effect of the ineffective assistance of

counsel errors must be dismissed for the same reasons his individual ineffective assistance

of counsel claims must be dismissed. First, they are barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(1). See Cooper, 510 F.3d at 931; Babbit, 177 F.3d at 764. Second, if they are

not barred by § 2244(b)(1), they must be dismissed because Gimenez has not satisfied

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§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) in that the factual predicate for the claim has been known to Gimenez

since his 1992 trial.

/ / /

Gimenez’s claim regarding the cumulative effect of the false evidence claims also fails. 

“Cumulative error applies where, ‘although no single trial error examined in isolation is

sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of multiple errors may still

prejudice a defendant.’” Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 958 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir.1996). The Court has concluded in

section IV(C) of this Report and Recommendation (R&R) that the presentation of false

evidence, as opposed to perjury, is not a federal constitutional violation, and, in any event,

the evidence presented at trial was not false. Because the Court has concluded no errors

occurred, no cumulative error occurred. Nor has Gimenez established he is actually innocent

of Priscilla’s murder, as he has not established that no reasonable factfinder could have

found him guilty even if his new evidence was presented.

 E. Timeliness

Respondent contends the petition is untimely because it was filed more than a year

after the factual predicate for his claims became known to Gimenez in November of 2008

and there is not sufficient statutory tolling to make the petition timely. (Mem. of P. & A.

Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 53-62, ECF No. 18.) Gimenez argues first that the one-year statute

of limitations may not apply to successive petitions; second, if it does apply he may be

excused from the statute of limitations by his actual innocence; and third, the factual

predicate of his claims became known to him on August 24, 2009, when he filed his first

state habeas petition, he has been diligently pursuing his claims since then, and thus the

petition is timely. (Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 37-46, ECF No. 26.)

i. Whether the One-Year Statute of Limitations Applies

First, the Court concludes Gimenez’s argument that the one-year statute of limitations

of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) may not apply to a successive petitions is incorrect. Gimenez cites

no case that so holds, and the Court has not located one either. The statute states that “[a]

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1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Gimenez’s petition is very clearly an “application for writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” In the absence of any contrary

authority, and given the clear wording of the statute, the Court concludes the one-year

statute of limitations applies.

ii. Commencement of the Statute of Limitations

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides several dates for the commencement of the one-year

statute of limitations. The only provision applicable to Gimenez’s case is § 2244(d)(1)(D),

which states “the limitation period shall run from . . . “the date on which factual predicate

of [Gimenez’s claims] could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). The statute specifically provides for the Court to determine

timeliness on a claim by claim basis when, as here, the statute of limitations is to be

calculated pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(D) (stating that “[t]he limitation period shall run from

the latest of . . . (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence”). 

The Court concluded above in section IV(A) of this Report and Recommendation that

Gimenez had not met the standard for proceeding with a successive petition as stated in

§ 2244(b)(2)(b)(i) — that “the factual predicate for the claim could not have been

discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence” — as to all of his ineffective

assistance of counsel claims because they relate entirely to matters which occurred at trial

and about which he has known since that time. His inability to satisfy that provision

necessarily means he has not satisfied 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) either, because the factual

predicate for the ineffective assistance of counsel claims could have been discovered through

the exercise of due diligence at the time of his conviction in 1992, or certainly by the time

of his first federal habeas corpus petition in 1999. His successive federal petition was filed

on May 9, 2012, thirteen years after his first federal habeas corpus petition and twenty years

after his trial. Accordingly, Gimenez’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, claims eight

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through fifteen, are untimely.

As to Gimenez’s false evidence and actual innocence claims, the question is when

Gimenez could have discovered, through the exercise of due diligence, the factual predicate

underlying those claims, namely, that the medical community’s view of shaken baby

syndrome/abusive head trauma, had sufficiently changed and evolved such that there was

significant debate over the diagnosis, method of injury, and injuries related to it. The

answer can be discerned from the Gimenez’s experts themselves. 

Other than the declarations submitted by Dr. Bonnell and Dr. Cohen, all of Gimenez’s

experts’ declarations were signed in 2007 or 2008; the latest of those declarations was

signed on July 22, 2008. (See Pet’rs Lodgments, Ex. D, ECF No. 12.) Dr. Bonnell’s

declaration includes his opinion that: (1) the retinal hemorrhaging in Priscilla’s eyes was less

than 72 hours old and thus occurred in the hospital as a result of cranial pressure; (2) the

superior saggital sinus cavity contains an antemortem clot; (3) Priscilla likely had a clotting

problem; and (4) Priscilla suffered from gastroesophageal reflux disease, or GERD, which

could have resulted in hypoxia, thus causing the subdural hematoma. (See Pet’rs

Lodgments, Ex. F.) Dr. Cohen’s declaration contains her opinion that Priscilla was infected

with chorioamnionitis and suffered from GERD, both of which could have contributed to or

caused Priscilla’s death; Dr. Cohen also indicated the retinal hemorrhages occurred while

Priscilla was in the hospital. (See id. at Ex. G.) Drs. Leetsma, Barnes, Plunkett, Wolfe and

Whitlock, however, also indicated in their declarations the same opinions regarding the

cause of Priscilla’s retinal hemorrhages and subdural hematoma, and advanced the theory

that cortical venous thrombosis or saggital sinus thrombosis likely caused her death. Thus,

Gimenez was certainly aware of the factual predicate for those claims with at the time Drs.

Leetsma, Barnes, Plunkett, Wolfe and Whitlock provided their declarations. 

The only information contained in the declarations from Drs. Bonnell and Cohen not

contained in the declarations from Gimenez’s other experts is their theory that GERD or

chorioamnionitis caused or contributed to Priscilla’s death. The medical records do not

clearly show Priscilla suffered from chrorioamnionitis. While she was placed on an antibiotic

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as a precaution due to the circumstances of her birth and tests showing the placenta was

infected, her lab tests were eventually negative for infection. (See Lodgment No. 6, Ex. 15

at 3-8.) In any event, the medical records show the possibility that Priscilla did suffer from

chorioamnionitis was known to Gimenez in 1991. Gimenez was also aware that Priscilla had

been diagnosed with GERD while she was in the hospital on August 7 and 10, 1991. (See id.

at Exs. 8 at 1, 9 at 1.)

In addition, all but two of the medical journal articles submitted by Gimenez which

discuss the controversy over the diagnosis of shaken baby syndrome/abusive head trauma

or which support his experts’ analysis of the cause of Priscilla’s death are dated between

August of 2001 and August of 2008. (See Lodgment No. 4, vol. 3, Exs. AA-BB, DD-EE, HHNN, QQ, RR.) Significantly, “The Goudge Report,” which Petitioner’s attorney states “found

that [shaken baby syndrome] was no longer accepted by the majority of forensic

pathologists when determining the cause of death” was released on October 1, 2008. (See

Lodgment No. 4, vol. 1, Ex. L; see also, vol. 4 at Ex. O [declaration of Janeen D’Angelo].) 

Gimenez’s attorney, Janeen D’Angelo, states in her declaration that she submitted “a

comprehensive analysis of [Gimenez’s] case on September 19, 2008,” and “[o]n November

26, 2008 [she] provided [the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office] with a ‘Draft

Petition’ based on the new scientific advances made in the area of head trauma and SBS,

and relying on the just released Goudge Report out of Canada which found that SBS was no

longer accepted by the majority of pathologists when determining the cause of death.” 

(Lodgment No. 4, vol. 2, Ex. O at 4-5.)

 The only two articles which are dated after August of 2008 are “Neonatal Cerebral

Sinovenous Thrombosis: Sifting the Evidence for a Diagnostic Plan and Treatment Strategy,”

by Janet Yang, Anthony Chan, David Callen and Bosco Paes (2010) and “Imaging

Nonaccidental Injury and the Mimics: Issues and Controversies in the Era of Evidence-Based

Medicine,” by Dr. Patrick Barnes (2011), one of Gimenez’s new experts. (See Lodgment No.

4, vol. 3 at Ex. JJ, KK.) Having reviewed these articles, the Court concludes the information

contained in the article by Yang, Chan, Callen and Paes is also contained in Exhibits AA, II,

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and MM. (See id. at Exs. AA [“Abusive Head Trauma in Infants and Children,” by Dr. Randall

Alexander (2006)] at 6, II [“Cerebral Venus Thrombosis in Children,” by Gabrielle DeVeber,

M.D., Maureen Andrew, M.D., Colleen Adams, M.B., Bruse Bjornson, M.D., Frances Booth,

M.D., David J. Buckley, M.D., Ch.B., Carol S. Camfield, M.D., Michele David, M.D., Peter

Humphreys, M.D., Pierre Langevin, M.D. E. Athen MacDonald, M.D. and Jane Gillett, M.D.

(Aug. 9, 2001)], MM [“Cerebral Venous Sinus Thrombosis in Children: Risk Factors,

Presentation, Diagnosis and Outcome,” by G. Sebire, B. Tabarki, D.E. Saunders, I. Leroy, R.

Liesner, C. Saint-Martin, B. Husson, A.N. Williams, A. Wade, and F.J. Kirkham (2005)].) As

to Dr. Barnes, he provided a declaration to Gimenez in April of 2008. The views expressed

in his 2011 article concern the biomechanics of head injuries in infants and young children,

and he questions the general underpinnings of the assumption that a “triad” of injuries —

subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage and encephalopathy — characterizes shaken baby

syndrome. (See Lodgment No 4, vol. 3, Ex. KK.) The same essential information was

contained, however, in an article written by Dr. Barnes and Dr. Michael Krasnokutsky in

2007, entitled “Imaging of the Central Nervous System in Suspected or Alleged

Nonaccidental Injury, Including the Mimics.” (See id., Ex. BB.)

Although a precise date is difficult to discern, it seems clear to the Court from the 

preceding review of Gimenez’s evidence that Gimenez could have discovered, and in fact did

discover, the factual predicate for his false evidence and actual innocence claims by, at the

latest, the fall of 2008 when attorney D’Angelo presented the “comprehensive analysis” of

Gimenez’s case and the draft petition to the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office. The

Court agrees that the presentation of the draft petition to the District Attorney’s Office on

November 26, 2008, appears to be the latest date from which the one-year statute of

limitations can be calculated. Absent any statutory or equitable tolling, Gimenez’s federal

habeas corpus petition was due on November 26, 2009.

iii. Statutory Tolling

Gimenez filed his first state habeas corpus petition on August 24, 2009. (Lodgment

No. 3, vol. 2 at Lodgment No. 25.) By that time, 271 days of the 365 days permitted by the

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statute had elapsed, and he had 94 days within which to timely file his federal habeas corpus

petition. The statute of limitations was tolled while the Superior Court considered Gimenez’s

petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The Superior Court denied his petition on October 18,

2010. The statute began running again the next day and expired on January 20, 2011, 94

days later. He did not file his next state habeas corpus petition until May 9, 2011, and by

that time the statute of limitations had expired. (See Lodgment No. 2.) His federal petition

is therefore untimely unless Gimenez is entitled to either tolling for the period between state

court filings (gap tolling) or equitable tolling. Gimenez concedes he is not entitled to any

gap tolling. (See Pet’rs Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 39, ECF No. 26.) The federal petition is

therefore untimely unless Gimenez is entitled to sufficient equitable tolling to make it timely.

iv. Equitable Tolling

Gimenez argues he is entitled to be excused from the expiration of the statute of

limitations because he is actually innocent. (Pet’rs Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 42-46, ECF

No. 26.) The Supreme Court recently held in McQuiggin v. Perkins, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct.

1924 (2013) as follows:

We hold that actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through

which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar, as

it was in Schlup and House, or, as in this case, expiration of the statute of

limitations. We caution, however, that tenable actual-innocence gateway

pleas are rare: “[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless

he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror,

acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S., at 329 [citations omitted]; see House, 547 U.S., at

538 [citations omitted] (emphasizing that the Schlup standard is “demanding”

and seldom met.

McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928.

As discussed above, Gimenez has not persuaded the Court that, even considering the

new evidence, no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Although there are experts who now believe shaken baby syndrome/abusive head trauma

cannot be diagnosed from the injuries suffered by Priscilla or that Priscilla died from abusive

head trauma, there are also experts who remain convinced about the continuing viability of

shaken baby syndrome and that the injuries suffered by Priscilla were caused by Gimenez

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shaking or otherwise assaulting Priscilla, causing her death. A reasonable juror could accept

the opinion of those experts and conclude that Gimenez murdered his daughter. Thus,

Gimenez is not entitled to any equitable tolling.

v. The Petition is Untimely

The one-year statute of limitations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) commenced

on November 26, 2008. Absent any statutory or equitable tolling, Gimenez had until

November 26, 2009, to file his federal habeas corpus petition. Gimenez filed his first state

habeas corpus petition on August 24, 2009. By that time, 271 days of the 365 days

permitted by the statute had elapsed, and he had 94 days within which to timely file his

federal habeas corpus petition. The statute of limitations was tolled while the Superior Court

considered Gimenez’s petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The Superior Court denied his

petition on October 18, 2010. The statute began running again the next day and expired

on January 20, 2011, 94 days later. He did not file his next state habeas corpus petition in

the California appellate court until May 9, 2012, and, because he is not entitled to any

further statutory or equitable tolling, the one-year statute of limitations had expired by that

time. (Lodgment No. 2.) Accordingly, his petition is untimely. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge

Larry Alan Burns under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California. For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS

HEREBY RECOMMENDED the Motion to Dismiss the Petition be GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED the Court issue an Order (1) approving and

adopting this Report and Recommendation, (2) directing that judgment be entered granting

the motion to dismiss the Petition.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED no later than December 13, 2013, any party to this

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation."

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with the Court

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and served on all parties no later than January 3, 2014. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 22, 2013

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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