Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01715/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01715-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JONATHAN MADRID, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COUNTY OF MONO, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-01715-MCE-KJN 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

Through this action, Plaintiff Jonathan Madrid (“Plaintiff”) seeks relief under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged violation of his First Amendment rights arising from his 

employment with the Defendant County of Mono Sheriff’s Department pursuant to 

42 US.C. § 1983. Plaintiff also seeks relief for retaliation pursuant to California Labor 

Code section 1102.5. On October 18, 2013, Defendant Ralph Obenberger 

(“Obenberger”) moved to dismiss the claim against him pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6).1

 ECF No. 12. The motion was stayed, pending service of 

Defendants County of Mono (“the County”), Richard Scholl (“Scholl”), and David O’Hara 

(“O’Hara”) (collectively, with Obenberger, “Defendants”). 

/// 

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 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise noted. 

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Defendant Obenberger’s motion was then set for hearing on February 20, 2014, along 

with a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants County of Mono, 

Scholl, and O’Hara. ECF No. 26. 

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Obenberger’s Motion is DENIED and 

Defendants O’Hara, Scholl, and County of Mono’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART and 

DENIED IN PART.2

BACKGROUND3

In 2001, Defendant County of Mono Sheriff’s Department hired Plaintiff as a 

deputy sheriff. At all times relevant to the complaint, Defendant Scholl served as the 

County’s Sheriff; Defendant Obenberger was the County’s Undersheriff, and Defendant 

O’Hara was a Lieutenant for the County. 

In 2008, Plaintiff spoke out about the mishandling of medications for jail inmates. 

Plaintiff notified non-parties Lieutenant Weber, Sergeant Minder, and Sergeant Nelson 

that the Sheriff’s Department’s practice violated the law. According to Plaintiff, this 

report and disclosure was not part of Plaintiff’s normal work duties, and Plaintiff was 

never assigned the task of investigating or reporting wrongdoing by Sheriff’s Department 

employees. Rather, Plaintiff alleges he spoke up because of his “genuine concern for 

the health of the inmates.” Plaintiff also disclosed information about another Sheriff’s 

Department employee, who Plaintiff claims falsified a report. By way of response, 

Defendant O’Hara issued a written directive to Plaintiff, ordering that Plaintiff not report 

crimes or emergencies, or personally assist those in need, while Plaintiff was off duty. 

/// 

/// 

 2

 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered these matters 

submitted on the briefs pursuant to E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g). 

3

 The following recitation of facts is taken, at times verbatim, from Plaintiff’s First Amended 

Complaint. Compl., Oct. 16, 2013, ECF No. 10. 

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendants then retaliated against him for this protected 

conduct in numerous ways. First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants unreasonably denied 

him his Advanced P.O.S.T. Certificate and attendant pay increase. Later, in about 

March 2009, Lieutenant O’Hara was overheard saying that his goal was to have 

Plaintiff’s employment terminated. Plaintiff reported this incident to Undersheriff 

Obenberger, who took no action. O’Hara was overheard making similar remarks in 2010 

and 2011. 

Plaintiff also alleges that from 2008 to the date of Plaintiff’s termination, 

Defendants gradually stopped giving Plaintiff special assignments, such as explosives 

and fire death investigations. Throughout this period, Defendants also called Plaintiff 

into their offices and questioned him about his personal life (e.g., the status of his 

divorce, his finances, and his personal relationships). Defendants later tried to use this 

information against Plaintiff in his administrative appeal hearing. 

Later, in 2011, Defendants purportedly began to discipline Plaintiff for wholly 

pretextual reasons. First, Defendant Obenberger “initiated a sham investigation” against 

Plaintiff based on Plaintiff’s alleged theft of County gasoline. The allegations turned out 

to be unfounded, but Defendants nonetheless used the investigation to embarrass 

Plaintiff. Later that year, Defendants served Plaintiff with a notice of proposed discipline, 

proposing termination of his employment for his alleged failure to account for ten hours 

on his time card. Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave, and, on November 9, 

2011, he received a written notice of final disciplinary action imposing employment 

termination. 

Then, on April 25, 2012, while Plaintiff was still home on administrative leave, 

Defendants ordered Plaintiff to report to the Sheriff’s Department station in Bridgeport by 

May 1, 2012. Upon reporting, Plaintiff was forced to sit a in a chair in the front lobby 

behind a counter and greet individuals who walked in. Plaintiff alleges he was made to 

“be seated in a chair like a child for nine hours a day,” for the purpose of intimidating, 

harassing, and retaliating against him. 

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In June 2012, Defendants initiated an additional sham investigation against Plaintiff for 

allegedly sleeping while on duty. 

Later that same month, Plaintiff’s treating doctor ordered Plaintiff taken off work. 

Plaintiff was forced to use his sick time, and when his sick time ran out, Plaintiff chose to 

remain home from work unpaid rather than return to work. In September 2012, Plaintiff 

began drawing on long term disability benefits he held through the California Law 

Enforcement Association. Defendants then contacted the California Law Enforcement 

Association in an attempt to stop Plaintiff from receiving these benefits. 

Finally, when Defendants realized that Plaintiff was going to win his administrative 

appeal, and despite the fact Plaintiff’s doctor had ordered him off work, Defendants 

claimed that Plaintiff had instead abandoned his job. On January 10, 2013, Defendant 

Obenberger sent Plaintiff a letter accusing him of the same because Plaintiff had 

allegedly failed to provide a doctor’s note for his absence. 

On February 7, 2013, the Arbitrator issued a written decision in Plaintiff’s favor in 

his administrative appeal and ordered full reinstatement. The arbitrator found that 

“Management acted in a discriminatory and capricious manner which was unreasonable 

under the circumstances.” Compl. at 10. Defendants nonetheless refuse to reinstate 

Plaintiff. 

STANDARD 

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and 

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 

Co., 80 F.3d 336,337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 

47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require 

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detailed factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of 

his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right 

to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan 

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating 

that the pleading must contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely 

creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.”)). 

 Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket 

assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard 

to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of 

the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 Charles 

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, supra, at § 1202). A pleading must contain “only enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . 

have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their 

complaint must be dismissed.” Id. However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed 

even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a 

recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 

232, 236 (1974)). 

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no 

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the 

amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to 

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be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors 

merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . 

carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 

185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that 

“the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, 

Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 

1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 

1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . 

constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)). 

ANALYSIS 

Presently before the Court are motions to dismiss by all Defendants. The Court 

will first address the merits of the motions by the individual Defendants, and then 

address the merits of the motion by the County of Mono. 

A. Individual Defendants 

1. Official Capacity Claims 

Defendants each assert that they may only be sued in their individual capacities, 

not their official capacities. Plaintiff amended the caption of his First Amended 

Complaint, ECF No. 10, to reflect that Defendants O’Hara, Obenberger and Scholl are 

sued only in their individual capacities. Plaintiff also clearly states that he has no 

opposition to removing language in the body of the complaint referencing the individual 

defendants acting within the course and scope of their employment to clarify that 

Defendants are sued only individually. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the First Amended Complaint contains claims 

against Defendants Obenberger, O’Hara and Scholl in their official capacities, those 

claims are dismissed. 

/// 

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2. Individual Capacity Claims 

It is well settled that the state may not abuse its position as employer to stifle “the 

First Amendment rights [its employees] would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on 

matters of public interest.” Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). Acknowledging the limits on the 

state's ability to silence its employees, the Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he 

problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [public 

employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest 

of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 

through its employees.” Id. (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). 

Courts “follow a sequential five-step inquiry to determine whether an employer 

impermissibly retaliated against an employee for engaging in protected speech.” 

Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Eng, 552 F.3d 

at 1070). “First, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing: (1) whether the plaintiff spoke 

on a matter of public concern; (2) whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public 

employee; and (3) whether the plaintiff's protected speech was a substantial or 

motivating factor in the adverse employment action.” Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 

822 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Eng, 552 F.3d at 

1070. “Next, if the plaintiff has satisfied the first three steps, the burden shifts to the 

government to show: (4) whether the state had an adequate justification for treating the 

employee differently from other members of the general public; and (5) whether the state 

would have taken the adverse employment action even absent the protected speech.” 

Id. 

Here, Defendants Obenberger, Scholl, and O’Hara challenge only the third 

element—that is, they contend that Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to show that 

Plaintiff’s protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse 

employment action. More specifically, Defendants contend that the allegations are 

insufficient to show that any of them is individually linked to any adverse employment 

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action, and that the allegations do not reveal that any action at all was taken against 

Plaintiff as a result of his allegedly protected speech. 

It is Plaintiff’s burden to plead facts sufficient to meet this third step. Eng, 

552 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 543 (9th Cir. 2006). “This 

third step is purely a question of fact.” Id. Plaintiff must allege that “Defendants were 

aware of [Plaintiff’s] instances of protected speech.” Dowell v. Contra Costa Cnty., 

928 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Alpha Energy Savers v. Hansen, 

381 F.3d 917, 929 (9th Cir. 2004)). Additionally, “Plaintiff must . . . plead at least one of 

the following to sufficiently allege that the protected speech substantially motivated 

Defendants to undertake the adverse actions: (i) proximity in time between her 

expressive conduct and the allegedly retaliatory actions; (ii) that the defendants 

expressed opposition to her protected speech, either to her or others; or (iii) that 

Defendants' proffered explanations for their adverse actions were false and pretextual.” 

Id. (citing Alpha Energy Savers, 381 F.3d 917, 929 (9th Cir. 2004); Chaffee v. Chiu, 

No. C–11–05118–YGR, 2012 WL 1110012, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2012)). In 

assessing whether a plaintiff has made an adequate claim of retaliatory motive, a district 

court is justified in deciding the question based on the “totality of the facts.” Id. (quoting 

Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 978 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

Defendants in the present case take far too narrow a view of Rule 8’s pleading 

requirements. Defendants are correct that very few allegations are made specifically 

about Defendants as individuals. That is, Plaintiff makes only a handful of allegations 

specifically about “Defendant Obenberger,” “Defendant Scholl,” or “Defendant O’Hara.” 

However, the majority of Plaintiff’s allegations are about “Defendants,” and these 

allegations make clear that Defendants’ actions “were a pretext for retaliation,” Compl. at 

6, “intended to intimidate, harass[,] and retaliate against Plaintiff for his protected 

speech,” Compl. at 7. It is clear that Defendants Obenberger, O’Hara, and Scholl—as 

Defendants named in this suit—are each included in Plaintiff’s allegations about 

“Defendants.” 

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For example, while the paragraph alleging that Defendant Obenberger “sent a 

letter to Plaintiff accusing Plaintiff of ‘abandoning’ his job because Plaintiff allegedly 

failed to provide a doctor’s note for his absence” from work does not contain the specific 

allegation that Defendant Obenberger retaliated against Plaintiff, the previous allegations 

contained in the Complaint clearly allege that Defendants “conjured up another way to 

fire Plaintiff” by accusing Plaintiff of abandoning his job, and Defendants’ desire to have 

Plaintiff fired was their chosen manner of retaliation against Plaintiff. Compl. at 9. 

Similarly, Plaintiff specifically alleges that “[i]n or about March 2009, Lieutenant O’Hara 

was overheard publicly stating his goal was to have Plaintiff’s employment terminated.” 

Compl. at 5. The Court reads this specific allegation together with the allegations 

contained in the rest of the complaint, which state that Defendants took adverse actions 

against Plaintiff and ultimately terminated him for his protected conduct. 

Although Plaintiff at one point makes the conclusory allegation that “Defendants 

have taken the aforementioned actions against Plaintiff in direct retaliation for, and in 

response to the various protected activities of Plaintiff,” Plaintiff’s prior factual allegations 

serve to flesh out these conclusory statements, and are adequate to give each 

Defendant notice of the claims against him and the grounds therefor. 

Thus, when viewing the “totality of the facts” in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, 

it is apparent that Defendants knew about Plaintiff’s protected speech and “Defendants' 

proffered explanations for their adverse actions were false and pretextual.” Dowell, 928 

F. Supp. 2d at 1150 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the pleadings sufficiently allege that 

Plaintiff’s protected speech, in raising issues regarding the inmates’ medications and a 

false report by an officer, was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse 

employment actions against him. 

Because Defendants’ challenge to the third element of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is 

without merit, Defendants’ Obenberger, Scholl and O’Hara’s Motions are DENIED. 

/// 

/// 

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B. Defendant County of Mono’s Motion to Dismiss 

Local governments are “persons” subject to suit for “constitutional tort[s]” under 

§ 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). The County of 

Mono, as a local government, is therefore subject to suit under § 1983. “A local 

government entity is liable under § 1983 when ‘action pursuant to official municipal 

policy of some nature cause[s] a constitutional tort.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 

250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1473-74 

(9th Cir. 1992)). “In addition, a local governmental entity may be liable if it has a ‘policy 

of inaction and such inaction amounts to a failure to protect constitutional rights.’” Id. 

(quoting Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1474) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). “The custom or 

policy of inaction, however, must be the result of a conscious or deliberate choice to 

follow a course of action made from among various alternatives by the official or officials 

responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” 

Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Thus, to prevail on his § 1983 claim against the County of Mono, Plaintiff must 

sufficiently allege that: (1) he was deprived of his constitutional rights by the County of 

Mono and its employees acting under color of state law; (2) that the County of Mono has 

customs or policies which “amount[ ] to deliberate indifference” to Plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights; and (3) that these policies are the “moving force behind the constitutional 

violation[s].’” Id. at 681-82 (quoting Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1473, 1477). 

There are three ways to show a policy or custom of a 

municipality: (1) [b]y showing a longstanding practice or 

custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of 

the local government entity; (2) [b]y showing that the 

decision-making official was, as a matter of state law, a final 

policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said 

to represent official policy in the area of decision or (3) [b]y 

showing that an official with final policymaking authority either 

delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a 

subordinate. 

Garcia v. City of Merced, 637 F. Supp. 2d 731, 761 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Menotti v. 

City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005)). “A municipal policy may be 

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inferred from widespread practices or evidence of repeated constitutional violations for 

which the errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded.” Id. 

Municipalities can be held liable “if its deliberate policy caused the constitutional violation 

alleged.” Id. (citing Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

“In this circuit, a claim of municipal liability under Section 1983 is sufficient to withstand a 

motion to dismiss ‘even if based on nothing more than a bare allegation that the 

individual officers' conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice.’” Karim–

Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Shah v. County of 

Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Here, Plaintiff fails to identify the specific customs or policies which amount to 

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Although Plaintiff summarily 

pleads that the County delegated its final policy-making authority to Defendants Scholl 

and Obenberger, and that the County adopted and ratified each of the decisions of 

Defendants Scholl and Obenberger as its own policies, customs, practices, or decisions, 

these pleadings are conclusory, and fail to put forward specific facts showing that the 

County is liable for the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Accordingly, Defendant County of Mono’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons just stated, it is HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. Defendant Obenberger’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 12, is DENIED; and 

2. Defendants County of Mono, O’Hara, and Scholl’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF 

No. 26, is GRANTED as to Defendant County of Mono and DENIED as to 

Defendants O’Hara and Scholl. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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Plaintiff may, but is not required to, file an amended complaint. If no amended 

complaint is filed within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order, the causes of action 

dismissed by this Order shall be dismissed without leave to amend and without further 

notice to the parties. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 27, 2014 

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