Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07812/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07812-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMON ALLEN CURTIS,

Petitioner,

v.

KEN GARCIA, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-7812 MHP (pr)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

INTRODUCTION

Raymon Allen Curtis, currently on parole in Mendocino County, California, filed this

pro se action seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is now

before the court for consideration of the merits of the pro se habeas petition. For the reasons

discussed below, the petition will be denied. 

BACKGROUND

On April 2, 2004, Curtis pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance for sale

and admitted that he was armed with a firearm during the commission of the offense. See

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11378; Cal. Penal Code § 12022. Three weeks later, on April

23, 2004, Curtis was temporarily allowed out of jail to visit his sick father in a hospital. 

After excusing himself to use the restroom at the hospital, he absconded. After being

apprehended again, Curtis pled guilty to escaping from jail. See Cal. Penal Code §

4532(b)(1). 6/3/04 RT 5.

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On July 1, 2004, he was sentenced to a total of four years and eight months in prison. 

The term consisted of the upper term of three years on the drug offense, plus a consecutive

one-year term for the firearm enhancement, plus eight months for the escape. As Curtis'

challenge focuses on the upper term sentence he received for the drug offense, that too will

be the focus of the court's attention. 

In choosing the upper term sentence for the drug offense, the sentencing court found

the following aggravating circumstances: (1) the “defendant’s prior convictions are both

numerous and of increasing seriousness,” (2) the defendant “was on three separate grants of

probation when he committed this offense,” (3) the defendant’s “prior performance on

probation was unsatisfactory,” and (4) the crime involved “an enormous amount of

controlled substance.” 7/1/04 RT 28; see Cal. Rule of Court 4.421(b)(2), (4), (5), (10). The

court then balanced the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances and

found that Curtis' attempt to escape outweighed the mitigating circumstances that Curtis

“suffered from drug addiction and chronic mood disorder” and had admitted “wrongdoing at

an early stage of the criminal process.” 7/1/04 RT 28; see Cal. Rule of Court 4.423(b)(2),

(3). A mentioned earlier, the court then imposed the sentence of three years on the drug

offense, plus one year for the firearm enhancement, plus eight months for the escape

conviction. 

Curtis appealed. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction on July 22,

2005, and the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review on September 28,

2005. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged

conviction occurred in Mendocino County, California, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C.

§§ 84, 2241(d).

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EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every

claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not

dispute that state court remedies were exhausted for the claim asserted in the petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). 

 “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at

413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” 

Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask

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whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

DISCUSSION

Curtis claims that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a jury trial and to due

process were violated when the upper term of three years for the drug offense was imposed. 

Curtis argues that he had the right to have the aggravating circumstances that supported the

upper term sentence found by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt, instead of by a judge. 

In his case, the aggravating circumstances were found by the sentencing judge. Thus, Curtis

contends he is entitled to habeas relief.

A. Federal Constitutional Law

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal

defendant the right to a trial by jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right to a jury trial has

been made applicable to state criminal proceedings via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due

Process Clause. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968). The Supreme Court’s

Sixth Amendment jurisprudence was significantly expanded by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny, which extended a defendant’s right to trial by jury to the

fact finding used to make enhanced sentencing determinations as well as the actual elements

of the crime. “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for

a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 488-90 (2000). The “statutory maximum” for Apprendi

purposes is the maximum sentence a judge could impose based solely on the facts reflected

in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant; that is, the relevant “statutory maximum” is

not the sentence the judge could impose after finding additional facts, but rather is the

maximum he or she could impose without any additional findings. Blakely v. Washington,

542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004). The Court reaffirmed this basic principle when it determined

that the federal sentencing guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment because they imposed

mandatory sentencing ranges based on factual findings made by the sentencing court. See

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233-38 (2005). The sentencing guidelines were

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unconstitutional because they required the court to impose an enhanced sentence based on

factual determinations not made by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 243-245. 

In Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007), the Court held that California's

determinate sentencing law (“DSL”) violated the Sixth Amendment because it allowed the

sentencing court to impose an elevated sentence based on aggravating facts that it found to

exist by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 860, 870-71. The sentencing court was

directed under the DSL to start with a “middle term” and then move to an “upper term” only

if it found aggravating factual circumstances beyond the elements of the charged offense. Id.

at 862. Concluding that the middle term was the relevant statutory maximum, and noting

that aggravating facts were found by a judge and not the jury, the Supreme Court held that

the California sentencing law violated the rule set out in Apprendi. Id. at 871. Although the

DSL gave judges broad discretion to identify aggravating factors, this discretion did not

make the upper term the statutory maximum because the jury verdict alone did not authorize

the sentence and judges did not have the discretion to choose the upper term unless it was

justified by additional facts. Id. at 868-69.

B. Retroactivity of Cunningham

Cunningham had not yet been decided when Curtis’ sentence became final. 

Respondent argues that granting relief under Cunningham would violate Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288 (1989). In Teague, the Supreme Court held that a federal court generally may not

grant habeas corpus relief to a prisoner based on a new constitutional rule of criminal

procedure announced after his conviction and sentence became final. Id. at 310. The Ninth

Circuit recently determined that Cunningham is not a new rule as to which Teague applies. 

Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624 (9th Cir. 2008). In Butler, the Ninth Circuit determined that

the Supreme Court’s decision in Cunningham was compelled by existing Sixth Amendment

case law – including Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker – at the time Butler’s conviction became

final. Id. at 635. Due to the fact that Cunningham is not a new constitutional rule, Teague

does not bar its application here. Cunningham's holding that upper term sentences may only

be imposed when juries, not judges, find circumstances in aggravation beyond a reasonable

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doubt applies to Curtis’ sentence even though Cunningham was decided a few years after his

conviction became final.

C. Analysis

To determine whether to impose the lower, middle or upper term sentence for a crime

under California's DSL, the sentencing judge considers the aggravating circumstances and

mitigating circumstances relating to the crime and defendant. See Cal. Rule of Court 4.420,

4.421, 4.423.

Curtis’ upper term sentence was based, in part, on his prior convictions. 7/1/04 RT

28. Prior convictions represent a narrow exception to the constitutional right to a jury

determination of sentencing factors. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,

244 (1998). In Almendarez-Torres, the United States Supreme Court carved out a “prior

conviction exception” that has been consistently recognized. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490

(“In sum, our reexamination of our cases in this area, and of the history upon which they rely

confirms” that the right to a jury applies to all sentencing factors, “[o]ther than the fact of a

prior conviction.”) Recidivism “is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a

sentencing court’s increasing an offender’s sentence.” Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244. 

“[T]o hold that the Constitution requires that recidivism be deemed an ‘element’ of

petitioner’s offense would mark an abrupt departure from a longstanding tradition of treating

recidivism as ‘going to punishment only.’” Id. at 244.

Consistent with Almendarez-Torres, the trial court was allowed to find that Curtis had

prior convictions. His prior convictions allowed the imposition of the upper sentence. 

Butler, 528 F.3d at 643 (noting that “under California law, only one aggravating factor is

necessary to set the upper term as the maximum sentence,” and that is permissible under the

Constitution). The Sixth Amendment allows trial courts to exercise discretion and take “into

consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender” when “imposing a

judgment within the range prescribed by statute.” Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481). 

The Ninth Circuit concluded that “if at least one of the aggravating factors on which the

judge relied in sentencing [petitioner] was established in a manner consistent with the Sixth

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Amendment, [petitioner’s] sentence does not violate the Constitution.” Id. Therefore, as it

was within the trial court’s discretion to sentence Curtis to the aggravated term based solely

upon his prior convictions, Curtis’ sentence is constitutional regardless of “[a]ny additional

factfinding. . . [for the] section of a sentence within the statutory range.” Id. The fact that

the trial court also found three other aggravating circumstances and two mitigating

circumstances, and then balanced them to determine whether to impose the upper term

sentence on Curtis does not invalidate the sentence because the finding of the prior

convictions legally allowed the sentence to be an upper term sentence. See Butler, 528 F.3d

at 649 (“[w]ith regard to a Sixth Amendment sentencing violation,. . . the relevant question is

not what the trial court would have done, but what it legally could have done.”) “That the

judge might not have done so in absence of an additional factor does not implicate the Sixth

Amendment.” Id. at 649. 

There was no violation of Curtis’ right to a jury trial or proof beyond a reasonable

doubt when the judge sentenced him to an upper term sentence. Although Curtis had a right

to a jury trial to find factors in aggravation of his sentence, this right did not apply to the fact

of a prior conviction. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244. Because the sentencing

judge was able to find prior convictions in in the record, he was legally able to sentence

Curtis’ to the upper term regardless of what other factors could have been found by a jury. 

See Butler, 528 F.3d at 643. 

Even if there was error, it was harmless. An Apprendi error is subject to harmless

error analysis. See Washington v. Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. 2546 (2006). The proper framework

for the harmless error analysis is found in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). 

See Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. at 2551-53; United States v. Zepeda-Martinez, 470 F.3d 909, 910

(9th Cir. 2006):

Under Recuenco and Neder, an error is harmless if the court finds beyond a

reasonable doubt that the result "would have been the same absent the error." Neder, 527 U.S. at 19. Neder explained that where the record contains "overwhelming" and

"uncontroverted" evidence supporting an element of the crime, the error is harmless. 

id. at 17, 18. Conversely, the error is not harmless if "the defendant contested the

omitted element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding." Id. at

19. 

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Zepeda-Martinez, 470 F.3d at 913 (parallel citations omitted). Zepeda-Martinez and Neder

were direct appeal cases and therefore articulated a standard slightly differently than that

applicable in a habeas action where relief is not available unless the trial error “‘had

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.’” Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,

776 (1946)). Under the framework identified in Neder and Zepeda-Martinez, this court looks

at the record to consider the state of the evidence in support of the sentencing factor to

determine whether the error was harmless.

The trial court found, as an aggravating circumstance, that Curtis had prior

convictions that were “numerous or of increasing seriousness.” Cal. Rule of Court

4.421(b)(2). The record contains overwhelming support for this finding. Most importantly,

the probation officer’s report listed fifteen prior convictions Curtis had suffered. CT 45;

see People v. Towne, No. S125677, 2008 WL 2521718, at *5, *9 (Cal. June 26, 2008)

(probation report reciting information about defendant's convictions used to prove

aggravating circumstances for sentencing purposes). The probation officer's report was

corroborated by statements by Curtis' attorney and Curtis that agreed he had a prior criminal

history. In Curtis’ sentencing memorandum, his attorney described Curtis as a person with

“various misdemeanor offenses which he is presently on probation for.” CT 26. Even in his

own words, in a letter written to the trial court, Curtis acknowledged his past troubles with

probation in a letter to the judge. CT 57. His admission of probationary status impliedly

admitted an underlying conviction because “probation” by definition is a “court-imposed

criminal sentence that, subject to stated conditions, releases a convicted person into the

community instead of sending the criminal to jail or prison.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1240

(8th ed. 2004). Butler does not preclude reliance on the probation information in Curtis' case

because the probation information was used for a different purpose in this case. Here, Curtis'

admission that he had failed on probation was probative of the existence of a prior conviction

rather than, as in Butler, the defendant's probationary status at the time of commission of the

current crime. See Butler, 528 F.3d at 645-46 (the fact of the defendant’s probationary status

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at the time of the crime could not be found by a trial judge because “[t]he fact that a

defendant was on probation at the moment of the current crime. . . is not reflected in the

documents of a prior conviction, nor, for that matter, may it be conclusively inferred from

those documents.”) In summary, even if there was an Apprendi error in the judge rather than

the jury making the determination, it was harmless error because there was overwhelming

evidence supporting the finding of numerous prior convictions.

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the sentence in reliance on a case that later

was vacated in connection with the Cunningham decision, i.e., People v. Black, 35 Cal. 4th

1238 (Cal. 2005), vacated and remanded, Black v. California, 127 S. Ct. 1210 (2007), on

remand, People v. Black, 41 Cal. 4th 799 (Cal. 2007). Even though the California Court of

Appeal reached a different conclusion on an issue of law than the U.S. Supreme Court, that

would at most require that this court not defer to the decision under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

However, there still must be a violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights for habeas

relief to be granted. Here, there was not. Curtis is not entitled to the writ. 

CONCLUSION

Curtis has failed to show any violation of his federal constitutional rights in the

underlying state criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 14, 2008 

Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

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