Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cv-02598/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cv-02598-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JENNIFER LANDEROS, individually 

and as successor in interest to 

DANIEL LANDEROS, Deceased; DEJA 

LANDEROS, individually and as

successor in interest to DANIEL 

LANDEROS, Deceased; B.M.L., 

individually and as successor in

interest to DANIEL LANDEROS, 

Deceased, by and through 

JENNIFER LANDEROS, as Guardian

ad Litem; J.J.L., individually 

and as successor in interest to 

DANIEL LANDEROS, Deceased, by

and through JENNIFER LANDEROS, 

as Guardian ad Litem; D.F.L., 

individually and as successor in

interest to DANIEL LANDEROS, 

Deceased, by and through 

JENNIFER LANDEROS, as Guardian

ad Litem; and T.D.L., 

individually and as successor in 

interest to DANIEL LANDEROS, 

Deceased, by and through 

JENNIFER LANDEROS, as Guardian

ad Litem,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAMUEL SCHAFER; STEVEN HOLSTAD;

JUSTIN PARKER; PATRICK SCOTT; 

JEREMY BANKS; and CITY OF ELK 

No. 2:17-cv-02598 WBS CKD

ORDER RE: BILL OF COSTS

Case 2:17-cv-02598-WBS-CKD Document 147 Filed 11/21/22 Page 1 of 6
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GROVE,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Defendants have filed a bill of costs, and plaintiffs 

have filed objections. (Docket Nos. 116, 118.)1 

Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

and Local Civil Rule 54.1 govern the taxation of costs, which are 

generally subject to limits set under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1920 (enumerating taxable costs); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

54(d)(1) (“Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court 

order provides otherwise, costs--other than attorney’s fees--

should be allowed to the prevailing party.”); Crawford Fitting 

Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 440-45 (1987) (limiting 

taxable costs to those enumerated in § 1920).

The court exercises its discretion in determining 

whether to allow certain costs. See Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 

1494, 1523 (9th Cir. 1996) (district court has discretion to 

determine what constitutes a taxable cost within the meaning of § 

1920). The losing party has the burden of overcoming the 

presumption in favor of awarding costs to the prevailing party. 

See Russian River Watershed Prot. Comm. v. City of Santa Rosa, 

142 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the presumption 

“may only be overcome by pointing to some impropriety on the part 

of the prevailing party”); Amarel, 102 F.3d at 1523.

I. Plaintiffs’ Request to Deny All Costs

1 Defendants have also filed a reply withdrawing their 

request for certain costs. (Docket No. 119.)

Case 2:17-cv-02598-WBS-CKD Document 147 Filed 11/21/22 Page 2 of 6
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Plaintiffs argue that the court should exercise its 

discretion to deny all costs because of (1) the “important 

constitutional protections” presented by the case and the fact 

that it was litigated in good faith; (2) the financial disparity 

between the parties and plaintiffs’ limited financial means, and 

(3) the potential chilling effect on future litigation if costs 

are granted. 

The court first notes that financial disparity alone is 

insufficient to deny costs, given that even plaintiffs proceeding 

in forma pauperis are not per se protected from taxation of 

costs. See Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 

1994). The court recognizes that plaintiff Jennifer Landeros is 

a single mother supporting her five children, who are also 

plaintiffs in this case. However, plaintiffs provide only a bare 

assertion that Ms. Landeros earns less than $1,000 a month and 

“can barely support herself and her children with her limited 

income and limited Social Security,” without any supporting 

documentation. Thus, the financial disparity between the parties 

and plaintiffs’ alleged limited financial means are not 

sufficient to disallow costs in this case. See, e.g., Fletes v. 

City of San Diego, No. 13-cv-2279-JAH(JMA), 2016 WL 6804434, at 

*2-3 (S.D. Cal. July 1, 2016) (requiring plaintiff to prove 

indigence through documentation because “mere assertions are 

inadequate to demonstrate indigence that would warrant relief 

from Plaintiff’s obligation to pay costs”); Ritchie v. Haw. Dep’t 

of Pub. Safety, No. 14-46 LEK-KJM, 2017 WL 4172500, at *3-6 (D. 

Haw. Aug. 23, 2017) (plaintiff’s representations regarding her 

employment status, current salary, and state of finances were 

Case 2:17-cv-02598-WBS-CKD Document 147 Filed 11/21/22 Page 3 of 6
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insufficient, without detailed information regarding her assets, 

to establish indigency for purposes of bill of costs). 

The court also rejects as a ground to deny costs 

plaintiffs’ argument that this case presented important 

constitutional protections and was litigated in good faith and 

with a reasonable basis. The rules and case law make it clear 

that prevailing parties are normally entitled to their costs, 

even though most cases are litigated in good faith, and there is 

no blanket exception for civil rights cases. 

The court further rejects plaintiffs’ argument that 

granting costs will chill future civil rights litigation. It is 

true that courts may consider that factor in deciding whether to 

award costs. See, e.g., Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 

1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he imposition of such high costs 

on losing civil rights plaintiffs of modest means may chill civil 

rights litigation . . . .”); Ass’n of Mexican-American Educators 

v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 593 (9th Cir. 2000), (discussing 

Stanley). However, in the court’s opinion, awarding the 

requested costs in this case would not have a significant 

chilling effect on civil rights litigation of this type, where 

the requested costs are relatively low, less than $10,000, but 

the requested recovery was several millions of dollars.2 

Overall, plaintiffs have not met their burden of 

showing that costs should not be awarded in this case, and the 

court finds that “the reasons for denying costs are not 

2 Indeed, it seems likely that defendants’ Bill of 

Costs pales in comparison to both sides’ legal fees, expert 

witness fees, and other expenses incurred during the litigation 

of this case before and during trial. 

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sufficiently persuasive to overcome the presumption in favor of 

an award.” See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 

945 (9th Cir. 2003) (district court must provide reasons for 

denying costs but need not do so if it grants costs, as “[t]he 

presumption itself provides all the reason a court needs for 

awarding costs”). Accordingly, the court will not deny all costs

and will proceed to examine plaintiffs’ specific challenges to 

certain items on defendant’s Bill of Costs. 

II. Specific Objections

The court notes that in response to plaintiffs’ 

objections, defendants have reduced the requested witness fee for 

Dr. Jason Tovar to the statutory $40 witness fee, and have 

withdrawn their request for $810 for deposition preparation time 

for defense expert George Williams. Accordingly, the court need 

not address plaintiffs’ objections to those requested costs. 

The parties continue to dispute whether defendants may 

recover $315.60 for Mr. Williams’ deposition transcript. While 

it is true that defendants did not call Mr. Williams at trial, 

“[w]hether a transcript or deposition is ‘necessary’ must be 

determined in light of the facts known at the time the expense 

was incurred.” Sunstone Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Alameda Cty. 

Med. Ctr., 646 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1219 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (Shubb, 

J.) (citation omitted). Here, obtaining the transcript of Mr. 

Williams before trial was reasonable because he was a potential

witness and it was not clear that he would not be called at

trial. See Robinson v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., No. 2:10-cv-3187 

SOM, 2016 WL 4474505, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. 2016). Accordingly, the 

court will not disallow this cost. 

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After reviewing the bill, plaintiffs’ objections and 

defendants’ reply, the court finds the requested costs, as 

reduced by defendants’ reply, to be reasonable. Accordingly, 

costs of $6,804.10 will be allowed for defendants and are taxed 

against plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2022

 

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