Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-04-06204/USCOURTS-ca10-04-06204-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

PUBLISH APR 12005 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LANCE B. WATSON, 

Petitioner - Appellant, 

V. 

RON WARD, Director of the 

Oklahoma Department of Corrections; 

ST A TE OF OKLAHOMA, 

Respondents - Appellees. 

No. 04-6204 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

D.C. No. 03-CV-00598-R 

Lance B. Watson, pro se. 

William R. Holmes, Assistant Attorney General, and W.A. Drew Edmondson, 

Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondents. 

Before KELLY, HENRY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.• 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

• After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material 

assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th 

Cir. R. 34.1 (G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 04-6204 Document: 010110533790 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 1
Petitioner-Appellant Lance B. Watson appeals from a judgment in favor of 

Respondents-Appellees denying relief on his habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

The judgment appealed from purported to supercede an earlier judgment granting 

him a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U .S.C. § 2241, ordering certain misconduct points 

removed from his record, and ordering recalculation of class level and earned 

credits from October 2001. We reverse. 

Mr. Watson is currently serving five concurrent thirty-year sentences for 

robbery by force after previous conviction of two or more felonies and a 

concurrent thirty-year sentence for burglary in the second degree after previous 

conviction of two or more felonies. The judgments of conviction were entered on 

September 14, 1987. Mr. Watson claimed that the DOC, in violation of the ex 

post facto clause, retroactively applied its policy OP-060107, effective July 17, 

2000, to "reactivate" security points for his 1988 disciplinary misconduct for 

"'group disruption." See R. Doc. 1, Ex. E (DOC policy OP-060107 (07/01/2001); 

R. Doc. 13 at 2. Pursuant to an earlier policy and the warden's directive, Mr. 

Watson's misconduct points for that incident had been dropped (DOC Policy OP060213 (11/01/1990), R. Doc. 1, Ex. C). After exhausting his claim in a state 

mandamus action, Mr. Watson filed this action. The magistrate judge 

- 2 -

Appellate Case: 04-6204 Document: 010110533790 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 2
recommended denial of the petition. R. Doc. 13 . The district court disagreed. R. 

Doc. 15 . Respondents successfully sought reconsideration and j udgment was 

entered in their favor. R. Doc. 23. 

A brief chronology is necessary. Judgment in favor of Mr. Watson granting 

his request for habeas relief was entered on February 17, 2004. R. Doc . 16. He 

then filed various post-judgment motions for costs and enforcement of the 

judgment. R. Docs. 17 & 19. In an April 28, 2004 , order, the district court 

indicated that it appeared that Respondents-Appellees had not received copies of 

the order and judgment granting Petitioner relief and ordered the clerk to provide 

copies. R. Doc. 20. Respondents-Appellees did not seek an extension of time to 

appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d). See Clark v. 

Lavallie, 204 F.3d 1038, 1041 (10th Cir. 2000). Instead, on May 11 , 2004, the 

Respondents-Appellees filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), urging that (although the judgment was entered on February 

17, 2004) the Rule 59 ten-day deadline should not begin to run until the issuance 

of the court's April 28th order. R. Doc. 21 at 1-2. On June 15 , 2004, the district 

court granted the Rule 59 motion and entered a new judgment in favor of 

Respondents-Appellees. R. Docs. 22 & 23. 

We granted a certificate of appealability ("COA" ) on the following issue: 

Whether the district court had jurisdiction to grant Respondents' Rule 59 motion 

- 3 -

Appellate Case: 04-6204 Document: 010110533790 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 3
to alter or amend judgment? See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b); Brock v. Citizen's Bank of 

Clovis, 841 F.2d 344, 347 (10th Cir. 1988) (court lacks jurisdiction over untimely 

Rule 59(e) motion). With admirable candor, Respondents concede that the district 

court lacked jurisdiction. They urge that we uphold the district court's second 

judgment as one entered pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b ), though it plainly was 

issued pursuant to Rule 59(e) upon reconsideration. See Jennings v. Rivers, 394 

F.3d 850, 854 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting the difference between Rule 59(e) motions 

and Rule 60(b) motions). Although we have at times construed untimely Rule 

59( e) motions as arising under Rule 60(b ), our recent cases make it clear that Rule 

60(b) is not to be used to circumvent the limitations and requirements of Fed. R. 

App. P. 4(a)(6), including the filing of a motion to reopen the time to file an 

appeal within the earlier of 180 days after entry of the judgment or seven days 

after the movant receives notice of the judgment. Clark, 204 F .3d at 1040-41; 

Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 2000). Even 

were we to construe the Rule 59( e) motion as a motion to reopen the time to file 

an appeal, it would be untimely because it was not filed within seven days after 

Respondents received notice of the judgment. Though it is regrettable that 

Respondents did not receive notice of that first judgment entered in mid-February 

until late-April, to construe the untimely Rule 59( e) motion as one made pursuant 

to Rule 60(b) would be an end-run around Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). Moreover, a 

- 4 -

Appellate Case: 04-6204 Document: 010110533790 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 4
Rule 60(b) motion should not be a substitute for an appeal, but applying it here 

would work that result. 

The district court's judgment is REVERSED, and the case is remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment, including 

reinstatement of the first judgment. We GRANT Mr. Watson's motion for IFP 

status. 

- 5 -

Appellate Case: 04-6204 Document: 010110533790 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 5
Appellate Case: 04-6204 Document: 010110533790 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 6