Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-00925/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-00925-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENNIFER ADRIANA MENDOZA, 

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL,

Commissioner of Social Security,1

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:18-cv-00925-SKO

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES

PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL ACCESS 

TO JUSTICE ACT

(Doc. 21)

After successfully obtaining reversal of an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision 

denying her application for Social Security disability benefits, Plaintiff filed an application for an 

award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) in the 

amount of $5,948.72. (See Doc. 21.)

On December 23, 2019, Defendant filed an opposition asserting Plaintiff is not entitled to 

fees under the EAJA because Defendant’s position was substantially justified. (See Doc. 23.) 

Alternatively, Defendant contends that the number of hours sought is unreasonable and should be 

reduced accordingly. (Id.) In response, Plaintiff filed a reply brief, in which she requests an 

additional $868.08 in attorney’s fees, for a total of $6,818.78. (See Doc. 24.)

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s application for EAJA fees and expenses is 

 

1 On June 17, 2019, Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. See

https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html (last visited by the court on June 20, 2019). He is therefore substituted 

as the defendant in this action. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (referring to the “Commissioner’s Answer”); 20 C.F.R. § 

422.210(d) (“the person holding the Office of the Commissioner shall, in his official capacity, be the proper defendant”).

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GRANTED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action on July 9, 2018, seeking judicial review of a final administrative 

decision denying her application for Social Security disability benefits. (Doc. 1.) On September 4, 

2019, the Court issued an order reversing the ALJ’s decision and remanding the case for award or 

benefits based on the ALJ’s failure to fully and fairly develop the record. (Doc. 19.)

On November 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for EAJA fees and expenses, contending she 

is the prevailing party in this litigation and seeking a total award of $5,948.72 payable to her attorney 

Melissa Newel. (See Doc. 21 at 7.) Defendant filed an opposition asserting that Plaintiff’s fee 

request should be denied because Defendant’s position was substantially justified. (See Doc. 23 at 

3–6.) Defendant asserts that it was reasonable for the ALJ to have relied on the Medical-Vocational 

Guidelines, 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, appendix 2 (“Grids”) even when Plaintiff had a 

combination of exertional and non-exertional limitations, because the Ninth Circuit has found in 

published cases that non-exertional limitations can be not so significant as to affect the claimant’s 

exertional capabilities. (See id.) Thus, Defendant contends there was a “genuine dispute” as to 

whether an occasional face-to-face interaction limitation could reasonably be seen as not reducing 

significantly the occupational base for unskilled work, such that reliance on the Grids was

appropriate. (Id.)

Alternatively, Defendant contends that Plaintiff spent an unreasonable number of hours on 

this case. (Doc. 23 at 7–9.) Specifically, Defendant asserts the amount of time Plaintiff’s counsel 

time should be reduced because the case “involved a relatively short 423-page record, and Plaintiff 

raised only one issue that had merit.” (See id. at 5–6.) Defendant also contends that the Court 

should order any fees awarded be paid to Plaintiff, rather than her attorney, pursuant to Astrue v. 

Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010). (See id. at 7–8.)

It is Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and expenses under the EAJA that is currently 

pending before the Court.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The EAJA provides that “a court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other expenses 

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. . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United States . . . unless 

the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special 

circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 

535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002). “It is the government’s burden to show that its position was substantially 

justified or that special circumstances exist to make an award unjust.” Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 

F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001).

A “party” under the EAJA is defined as including “an individual whose net worth did not 

exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i). The term 

“fees and other expenses” includes “reasonable attorney fees.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). “The 

statute explicitly permits the court, in its discretion, to reduce the amount awarded to the prevailing 

party to the extent that the party ‘unduly and unreasonably protracted’ the final resolution of the 

case.” Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 987 (9th Cir.1998) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(C) & 

2412(d)(2)(D)).

A party who obtains a remand in a Social Security case is a prevailing party for purposes of 

the EAJA. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993) (“No holding of this Court has ever 

denied prevailing-party status . . . to a plaintiff who won a remand order pursuant to sentence four 

of § 405(g) . . . , which terminates the litigation with victory for the plaintiff”). “An applicant for 

disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for the purposes of the EAJA if the denial of her 

benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of whether disability benefits ultimately are awarded.” 

Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1257.

III. ANALYSIS

There is no dispute Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this litigation. Moreover, the Court 

finds Plaintiff did not unduly delay this litigation, and Plaintiff’s net worth did not exceed two 

million dollars when this action was filed. The Court thus considers below whether Defendant’s 

actions were substantially justified.

A. The Government’s Position was Not Substantially Justified

A position is “substantially justified” if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact. Pierce v. 

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565–66 (1988); United States v. Marolf, 277 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir. 

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2002). Substantially justified has been interpreted to mean “justified to a degree that could satisfy 

a reasonable person” and “more than merely undeserving of sanctions for frivolousness.”

Underwood, 487 U.S. at 565; see also Marolf, 277 F.3d at 161.

In considering whether the position of the government is substantially justified, the position 

of the United States includes “both the government’s litigation position and the underlying agency 

action giving rise to the civil action.” Meier v Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). In the 

social security context, it is the ALJ’s decision that is considered the “action or failure to act” by the 

agency. Id. Under the substantial justification test, the court first considers the ALJ’s decision and 

then considers the government’s litigation position in defending that decision. Id. Where the 

underlying ALJ decision is not substantially justified, a court need not address whether the 

government’s litigation position was justified. Id. at 872 (citing Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 

1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The government’s position must be substantially justified at each stage of 

the proceedings” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The burden of establishing 

substantial justification is on the government. Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 

2001).

Pursuant to Meier, determining whether the agency’s position was substantially justified 

requires first examining the ALJ’s decision for substantial justification. 727 F.3d at 870. Here, the 

Court found that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to demonstrate how a limitation to 

occasional face-to-face interaction with the general public, coworkers, and supervisors would not 

significantly erode the unskilled occupational base of unskilled medium work, and instead relying 

solely on the Grids for the disability determination. (See Doc. 19.) The Court found that this failure 

not only contravened case law from this Court and others, but also ran afoul of Social Security 

Ruling (“SSR”) 85-15—cited by the ALJ in his decision—which states that one of the requirements 

of unskilled work is the ability “to respond appropriately to supervision [and] coworkers” and “a 

substantial loss of ability to meet any of these basic work-related activities would severely limit the 

potential occupational base.” (See id at 19 (quoting TITLES II & XVI: CAPABILITY TO DO OTHER 

WORK–THE MEDICAL-VOCATIONAL RULES AS A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING SOLELY 

NONEXERTIONAL IMPAIRMENTS, SSR 85-15 (S.S.A. 1985), 1985 WL 56857 at *4).) The 

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Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified because the ALJ failed to follow these wellestablished guidelines, about which there is no “genuine dispute.” See Stevens v. Astrue, No. CV 

09-0444-TUC-BPV, 2011 WL 2448342, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 20, 2011) (finding position of 

Commissioner not substantially justified where he ignored VE testimony in contravention of SSR 

85-15). See also Loring v. Astrue, No. 6:10-CV-06273-SI, 2012 WL 1598291, at *2 (D. Or. May 

7, 2012) (concluding that the Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified because the 

ALJ failed to follow well-established precedent, including SSR 96-7p); Kirk v. Berryhill, 244 F. 

Supp. 3d 1077, 1081 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (“[W]hen the government violates its own regulations, fails 

to acknowledge settled circuit case law, or fails to adequately develop the record, its position is not 

substantially justified.”) (emphasis added). 

That the Commissioner believed his litigation position before the Court was substantially 

justified does not vitiate the error at the administrative level. Williams v. Bowen, 966 F.2d 1259, 

1261 (9th Cir. 1991) (government’s position must be “substantially justified” at “each stage of the 

proceedings”). The Commissioner has not satisfied his burden of showing the government’s 

position was substantially justified at each stage of the proceedings. Because the Commissioner’s

position in defending the ALJ’s erroneous conduct was not substantially justified, see Corbin v. 

Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he defense of basic and fundamental errors . . . is 

difficult to justify.”), and there are no other special circumstances that would make an award of 

EAJA fees unjust, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of fees pursuant to the EAJA.

B. Plaintiff’s Fee Request Must Be Modified

Plaintiff seeks a total award of $6,816.78, comprised of 33.40 hours of attorney time, payable 

to her attorney Ms. Newel. (See Docs. 21 & 24.) Defendant does not object to Plaintiff’s hourly 

rate but contends that the hours Plaintiff requests are unreasonable given the “relatively short”

administrative record, the lack of complexity of the case, and the “boilerplate” nature of the postjudgment briefing. (Doc. 23 at 8–9.)

The EAJA provides for an award of “reasonable” attorney fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 

By statute, hourly rates for attorney fees under EAJA are capped at $125 per hour, but district courts 

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are permitted to adjust the rate to compensate for increases in the cost of living.2 28 U.S.C. § 

2412(d)(2)(A); Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1147-49 (9th Cir. 2001); Atkins, 154 F.3d at 987. 

Determining a reasonable fee “requires more inquiry by a district court than finding the ‘product of 

reasonable hours times a reasonable rate.’” Atkins, 154 F.3d 988 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 

461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). The district court must consider “the relationship between the amount 

of the fee awarded and the results obtained.” Id. at 989. Counsel for the prevailing party should 

exercise “billing judgment” to “exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or 

otherwise unnecessary” as a lawyer in private practice would do. Hensley 461 U.S. at 434; see also 

Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The number of hours to be 

compensated is calculated by considering whether, in light of the circumstances, the time could 

reasonably have been billed to a private client.”).

The court must “provide a concise and clear explanation of the reasons” for its attorney 

award calculation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 437; Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 

2001). A court has wide latitude in determining the number of hours reasonably expended and may 

reduce the hours if the time claimed is excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Cunningham 

v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir. 1988). “Hours that are not properly billed to 

one’s client are not properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.” Hensley, 461 

U.S. at 434. The applicant bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the fee request. 

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984).

Plaintiff initially requested compensation for a total of 29.15 hours of attorney time but 

increased that request by 4.25 hours to account for the time required to research and draft a reply to 

the Commissioner’s opposition to her fee request. (See Doc. 21 at 8; Doc. 24 at 9.) The tasks

completed by Plaintiff’s counsel Ms. Newel include reviewing the ALJ’s decision and the 

administrative record that was approximately 423 pages; drafting Plaintiff’s confidential letter brief, 

 

2

In accordance with the formula set forth in Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth 

Circuit maintains a list of the statutory maximum hourly rates authorized under the EAJA, as adjusted annually to 

incorporate increases in the cost of living. The rates are found on that court’s website: 

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000039. Plaintiff requests an hourly rate of $201.60 for 

attorney work performed in 2018 and an hourly rate of $204.25 for attorney work performed in 2019 and 2020. (Doc. 

21 at 8.) These rates are consistent with (and, in the case of the 2019 rate, less than) the statutory maximum rates as set 

forth by the Ninth Circuit.

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opening brief, and reply brief; and preparing the request for EAJA fees now pending before the 

Court. (See id.) 

After independently reviewing the individual time entries on the timesheets submitted by 

Plaintiff’s counsel (see id.), the Court deducts 1.0 hours from the time Plaintiff’s counsel spent 

drafting the EAJA motion at an hourly rate of $204.25. Having now reviewed several EAJA fee 

motions submitted by Ms. Newel, it has become apparent to the Court that these motions and their 

accompanying declarations are substantially similar. Compare, e.g., Doc. 21 with Daily v. Berryhill, 

Case No. 1:16–cv–01419–SKO, Doc. 20 (filed May 8, 2018), and Ondracek v. Commissioner, Case 

No. 1:15-cv-01308-SKO, Doc. 25 (filed May 23, 2017). While Ms. Newel is entitled to 

compensation for preparing her motion and declaration, the repetitive nature of these items warrants 

a reduction in time. She will therefore be allowed .5 hours for this task. See, e.g., Stairs v. Astrue, 

No. 1:10CV0132 DLB, 2011 WL 2946177, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2011) (permitting only .5 hours 

for preparation of “extremely similar” EAJA motion).

In reviewing Plaintiff’s remaining hours, the Court is mindful that, “[b]y and large, the court 

should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time was required to 

spend on the case; after all, [she] won, and might not have, had [she] been more of a slacker.” 

Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). With this deference in mind, 

and considering the circumstances of this case, the Court finds the remaining time expended by 

Plaintiff’s counsel on the various tasks, and the total time of 32.4 hours for which recovery is sought

(including the 1.0 reduction, above), to be reasonable. See, e.g., Kuharski v. Colvin, No. 2:12-cv1055-AC, 2015 WL 1530507, *1-2, 6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2015) (40.80 hours awarded where 

claimant’s attorney required to oppose cross-motions for summary judgment and a motion to amend 

the judgment); Boulanger v. Astrue, No. Civ. S-07-0849 DAD, 2011 WL 4971890, *2 (E.D. Cal. 

Oct. 19, 2011) (58 hours awarded where cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the parties); 

Watkins v. Astrue, No. Civ S-06-1895 DAD, 2011 WL 4889190, *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) 

(awarding 62 hours where cross-motions for summary judgment filed, the administrative record was 

700 pages and opening brief was 55 pages long); Vallejo v. Astrue, No. 2:09-cv-03088 KJN, 2011 

WL 4383686, *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (approving 62.1 hours where case fully briefed); Dean 

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v. Astrue, No. CIV S-07-0529 DAD, 2009 WL 800174, *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2009) (approving 41 

hours, noting it was at the upper end, where remand after filing a motion for summary judgment on 

client’s behalf).

C. Payment of Fees to Plaintiff

Finally, Defendant requests that any fee award be made to Plaintiff. (Doc. 23 at 10.) Astrue 

v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010), requires fees awarded under the EAJA to be paid directly to the 

litigant. However, courts in this district routinely order payment directly to counsel so long as the 

plaintiff does not have a debt that is subject to offset and she assigned her right to EAJA fees to 

counsel. See Young v. Berryhill, No. 2:14–cv–2585–EFB, 2017 WL 4387315, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 

3, 2017) (collecting cases). Here, Plaintiff assigned her right to EAJA fees to her attorney. (Doc. 

21-2.) Accordingly, if Plaintiff does not have a debt that is subject to offset, the award of fees may 

be paid directly to counsel.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel reasonably expended 1.95

hours, at a rate of $201.60 per hour, and 30.45 hours, at a rate of $204.25 per hour, litigating this 

case.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and expenses under the EAJA (Doc. 21) is 

GRANTED IN PART;

2. Plaintiff is awarded attorney’s fees under the EAJA in the amount of $6,612.53; and

3. Pursuant to Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010), any payment shall be made 

payable to Plaintiff and delivered to Plaintiff’s counsel, unless Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt. 

If the United States Department of the Treasury determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal 

debt, the government shall accept Plaintiff’s assignment of EAJA fees and pay fees directly to 

Plaintiff’s counsel.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 24, 2020 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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