Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_19-cv-00997/USCOURTS-alnd-2_19-cv-00997-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL BLANCHER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:19-CV-00997-KOB

)

CITY OF BIRMINGHAM, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case comes before the court on Defendant City of Birmingham’s “Partial Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint,” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 5.)

For the reasons explained below, the court will GRANT the City’s motion. 

A. Background

 Plaintiff Michael Blancher, a white male and nine-year veteran of the Birmingham Police 

Department, filed suit against the City of Birmingham on June 25, 2019, alleging (1) racial 

discrimination and (2) retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. To 

support his two-count complaint, Mr. Blancher alleges that on January 6, 2018, he was called to 

the scene of a traffic accident featuring a pickup truck, driven by a white male, that collided with 

two other vehicles, including a car driven by a black female (the “victim”). (Doc. 1 at 4.) Mr. 

Blancher, the officer in charge of the scene, was accompanied by three other officers: one white 

male and two black females. (Id.)

According to the Complaint, while the victim was trapped in her vehicle and required 

assistance from paramedics to escape, “some witnesses” reported seeing the driver of the pickup

truck throwing items off a nearby bridge, and “conflicting reports” existed as to whether

FILED

 2020 Jan-15 PM 02:19

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:19-cv-00997-AMM Document 13 Filed 01/15/20 Page 1 of 5
someone found bags of heroin at the scene. (Id.) Mr. Blancher alleges that he investigated the 

scene and, finding no indication that the truck driver was impaired, did not charge the truck

driver with driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. (Id.)

In the days that followed, according to the Complaint, one of the black female officers 

who was at the scene of the accident discovered that she personally knew the victim’s mother. 

The officer told the victim’s mother that the truck driver was intoxicated when his truck collided 

with the victim’s car and that he threw items off a bridge immediately following the accident; 

she also told the victim’s mother that someone found bags of heroin at the scene. (Id. at 5.)

Based on this information, the victim’s mother filed a complaint against Mr. Blancher with the 

City of Birmingham, and the victim’s uncle sent an email to the mayor of Birmingham 

suggesting that racial bias influenced Mr. Blancher’s decision to not criminally charge the truck 

driver. (Id.) 

In March of 2018, about two months after the accident, a black female internal affairs

officer interviewed both black female police officers who were present at the scene of the 

accident, as well as three witnesses at the scene, all of whom were also black and female. The 

internal affairs officer also interviewed Mr. Blancher, who denied knowledge of any drugs or 

alcohol at the scene of the accident. (Id.)

The internal affairs officer then submitted a “purposefully misleading” report to 

Birmingham Chief of Police (and black male) Orlando Wilson, who fired Mr. Blancher on 

March 21, 2018. (Id. at 6.) A series of bureaucratic reversals and appeals followed, culminating 

with Mr. Blancher’s filing of a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission on September 18, 2018 and the instant case on June 25, 2019. (Id.)

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Mr. Blancher brings two claims against the City of Birmingham: race discrimination and 

retaliation, both in violation of Title VII. The City’s “Partial Motion to Dismiss,” filed on August 

26, 2019, seeks only to dismiss the retaliation claim. (Doc. 5.) 

B. Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint. 

Generally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide “‘a short 

and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s 

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

C. Analysis

Although Mr. Blancher brings two claims against the City of Birmingham—race 

discrimination and retaliation—the City’s short, ten-paragraph motion seeks only to dismiss the 

retaliation claim. (Doc. 5.) The City essentially argues that Mr. Blancher cannot allege retaliation 

because he did nothing the City could retaliate against. The City is correct. 

Title VII prohibits retaliation when an employee “oppos[es] any practice made an 

unlawful employment practice by [Title VII]” or “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 

participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

The Eleventh Circuit has broken this statutory language into two distinct categories: the 

participation clause and the opposition clause. “The participation clause includes activity done in 

connection with proceedings conducted by the federal government and its agencies.” EEOC v. 

Total Sys. Servs., 221 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2000). Because this clause protects a plaintiff’s 

Case 2:19-cv-00997-AMM Document 13 Filed 01/15/20 Page 3 of 5
“participation” pursuant to an EEOC complaint, an EEOC complaint must exist before a 

plaintiff’s activity is protected by the participation clause. Parker v. Econ. Opportunity for 

Savannah-Chatham Cty. Area, Inc., 587 F. App’x 631, 634 (11th Cir. 2014). On the other hand,

the opposition clause comes into play when a plaintiff engages in an “act” that is “directed at an 

unlawful employment practice of an employer,” such complaining to a human resources 

department manager on behalf of one’s self or someone else. Little v. United Techs., Carrier 

Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1997); King v. Piggly Wiggly Ala. Distribution 

Co., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1225 (N.D. Ala. 2013).

Under either clause, a plaintiff who asserts a retaliation claim must show that (1) he 

engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) a 

causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action. Goldsmith v. 

Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008).

In this case, Mr. Blancher’s allegations fall within neither the participation clause nor the 

opposition clause. The participation clause does not apply because Mr. Blancher does not allege 

that he participated in any EEOC complaint—whether his own or someone else’s—prior to his 

termination. The opposition clause does not apply because Mr. Blancher has only alleged one of 

the three required elements of the cause of action. Although Mr. Blancher can illustrate the 

second element—the materially adverse action of being fired—he has not alleged that he 

engaged in statutorily protected conduct or that causation existed between his conduct and his 

termination of employment. 

An employee engages in statutorily protected conduct when he either formally or

informally complains to his superiors or otherwise uses his employer’s grievance procedures to 

draw attention to prohibited discrimination. Rollins v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Law Enforcement, 

Case 2:19-cv-00997-AMM Document 13 Filed 01/15/20 Page 4 of 5
868 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1989). In the instant Complaint, the only actions attributed to Mr. 

Blancher before his dismissal in March of 2018 are that he (a) was present at the scene of a 

vehicular accident, (b) declined to charge a truck driver with any crime, and (c) fielded questions 

from the police department’s internal affairs officer. (Doc. 1 at 3–6.) Mr. Blancher does not 

allege that he complained to any of his superiors, formally or otherwise, about any discrimination 

prohibited by Title VII. Without such an allegation, Mr. Blancher cannot support either the 

protected conduct or causation elements of his claim, and his entire retaliation count fails as a 

matter of law. 

D. Conclusion

Because Mr. Blancher has not alleged that he engaged in statutorily protected activity 

under Title VII, his retaliation claim cannot stand. The court WILL GRANT the City’s motion 

(Doc. 5) and DISMISS Mr. Blancher’s retaliation claim (Count II) without prejudice. Mr. 

Blancher’s race discrimination claim (Count I) remains. The court will enter a separate order 

accompanying this opinion. 

DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of January, 2020.

____________________________________

KARON OWEN BOWDRE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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