Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01541/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01541-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Earl Kroncke, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro and Arizona Attorney

General,

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 07-01541-PHX-MHM (MEA)

ORDER

 On August 8, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 (Dkt. # 1). The matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Mark

E. Aspey, who issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the Court dismiss

this matter with prejudice (Dkt. # 12). Plaintiff has filed (1) a written Objection to the Report

and Recommendation (Dkt. # 14) and (2) an Affidavit and Motion for disqualification (Dkt.

# 15). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews the legal analysis in the Report and Recommendation de novo and

the factual analysis de novo for those facts to which objections are filed, and for clear error

for those facts to which no objections are filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc).

Case 2:07-cv-01541-MHM Document 16 Filed 11/26/08 Page 1 of 7
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On May 7, 1996, Petitioner was convicted of twenty charges of sexual assault, sexual abuse,

kidnaping, aggravated assault, attempted kidnaping, and child molestation. (Answer, Exhibit D). 

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 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1994, Petitioner was charged with three counts of theft and one count of burglary

in the third degree. The State alleged Petitioner had previously been convicted of a

nondangerous felony. (Dkt. #8). 

Petitioner entered into a plea agreement on June 14, 1996, which provided that he

would plead guilty to one count of theft in exchange for a dismissal of the other four counts

in the indictment and the allegation of a prior conviction. (Dkt. #8). Under the plea

agreement Petitioner would be sentenced to the presumptive term on the charge of theft. The

plea agreement also provided that the term of imprisonment would be served concurrently

with any sentence imposed in CR 94-90617,1 and Petitioner would pay restitution in the

amount of $5,672.00. The Plea agreement waived Petitioner’s right of appeal. (Dkt. #8).

Accordingly, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of five years imprisonment. Petitioner was

awarded credit for 698 days of presentence incarceration and the sentence was imposed

concurrently with the sentence imposed in CR 94-90617. (Dkt. #8).

Petitioner had ninety days, which would expire on September 11, 1996, to file an “ofright” petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. See Ariz. R. Crim P. 32.1 & 32.4(a). However, Petitioner only filed a

notice of PCR in the Arizona Superior Court on April 29, 1998. The court dismissed the

action for PCR as untimely on May 28, 1998. (Dkt. #8). Petitioner sought reconsideration

of this decision, asserting he had not been of “a sound state of mind when entering said plea

and remained of unsound mind until well after the time for filing his notice had run out.”

(Dkt. #8). Petitioner also claimed he had not been informed, nor was he aware, of his right

to seek any form of PCR. (Dkt. #8). 

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On July 15, 1998, the state court denied Petitioner’s motion forreconsideration, noting

Petitioner had been informed both orally and in writing, of his rights pursuant to Rule 32.

Petitioner did notseek appellate review of the trial court’s dismissal of his action or the denial

of his motion for reconsideration by the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Dkt. #8). 

Then, on January 18, 2006, Petitioner filed a second state action seeking PCR. (Dkt.

#8). The Arizona Superior Court dismissed this new action on February 22, 2006, finding it

untimely. Petitioner sought reconsideration of this decision, which was denied on March 29,

2006. Petitioner then sought review of the dismissal by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which

ultimately upheld the lower court determination. (Dkt. #8). 

On August 8, 2007, Petitioner filed the instant action for federal habeas relief. (Dkt.

#1). Petitioner asserts he is entitled to habeas relief because: (1) he was denied his

constitutional right to the effective assistance of trial counsel; (2) his guilty plea was

involuntary due to mental incompetence and because he was coerced; (3) the trial judge was

biased against him; (4) he was deprived of hisright to accessthe courts; and (5) the trial court

did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Petitioner’s guilt orinnocence. (Dkt. #1). Furthermore,

on March 21, 2008, Petitioner filed a Motion to Disqualify this Court. (Dkt. #15). 

DISCUSSION

I. Mootness of Petition

The Magistrate Judge is his Report and Recommendation, states that the petition is

“arguably moot,” because Petitioner has already served the sentence on the conviction he is

challenging in his current habeas petition. (Dkt. #12, 8). Petitioner disagrees, arguing that

he is currently “in custody” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Petitioner recognizes

that he has already served the five-year prison sentence imposed in the challenged conviction.

(Dkt. #11). However, Petitioner states he is “currently serving ‘hard labor’ slave servitude

in the state prison to pay off the $5,672.00 restitution [] portion of the sentence.” (Id.)

(Emphasis in original). As such, Petitioner defines himself as in custody. 

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The relevant authority is as follows. The Court may “entertain an application for a

writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgement of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994 & Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).

Under Article III of the United States Constitution, the federal judiciary is authorized to hear

only actual, ongoing cases or controversies. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472,

477-78 (1990). 

Assuch, an incarcerated petitioner’s challenge to the validity of his conviction satisfies

the case-or-controversy requirement when the incarceration constitutes a concrete injury

caused by the conviction, which is redressable by invalidation of conviction. See Spencer v.

Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); Picrin-Peron v. Rison, 930 F.2d 773, 775 (9th Cir. 1991). If it

appearsthat the Court is without the powerto grant the reliefrequested by a habeas petitioner,

the case is moot. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7 (stating a habeas petition is moot upon the

petitioner’srelease from custody unless “some concrete and continuing injury” or “collateral

consequence” of the challenged decision exists). It is well-established that once a sentence

imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of the

conviction are not always sufficient to render an individual “in custody” for the purposes of

a habeas attack. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491-92 (1989).

The meaning of “in custody” has been broadened so that it is no longer limited in the

2254(a) context to physical custody alone, but also applies where individuals are subject to

both a “significant restraint on liberty. . .which were not shared by the public generally,”

along with “some type of continuing governmental supervision.” Obado v. New Jersey, 328

F.3d 718 (3d Cir. 2003). Thus, a petitioner may be held “in custody” “for purposes of the

statute [when he is] subject to restraints not shared by the public generally” or because of “an

obligation to appear at all times and places as ordered by. . . [the] competent jurisdiction.”

Hensley v. Municipal Court, San Jose Milpitas Judicial Dist., 411 U.S. 345, 351-53 (1973);

Barry v. Bergen County Probation Department, 128 F.3d 152, 160-61 (3d Cir. 1997). 

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Ordinarily, the imposition of restitution or a fine does not by itself constitute “custody”

for purposes of federal habeas jurisdiction. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491-92; Dremann v. Francis,

828 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1987); Obado v. New Jersey, 328 F.3d 718 (3d Cir. 2003). The Ninth

Circuit concluded that while every criminal fine raises the possibility of confinement if not

paid, such potential confinement is considered too speculative to warrant federal habeas

protection. Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang, 509 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1975). 

The question presented for this decision is a narrow one: namely, whether the fact that

Petitioner works in the state prison to pay off the restitution portion of his challenged

conviction satisfies the “in custody” requirement of the habeas corpus statute. Essentially,

it must be determined if payment of restitution, by way of state prison labor, imposes a

significant enough restraint on individual liberty to meet the custody requirement of the

habeas statute. 

In the instant case, the Magistrate Judge asserted that Petitioner may not “come and go

as he pleases” and “his freedom of movement rests in the hands of state judicial officers”

while paying off his restitution. Thus, according to Petitioner, he is arguably in custody

because he suffers a greater restraint on his liberty than would otherwise be suffered by the

public at large. Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351-53; Barry, 128 F.3d at 160-61. After reviewing the

cases, none of which concern restitution, this court does not find the argument or evidence

presented compelling enough to find Petitioner in custody under the meaning of the federal

habeas statute. 

While case law demonstrates that restraints other than incarceration may satisfy the

custody requirement, these cases do not apply to Petitioner’ssituation. Hensley v. Municipal

Court, San Jose MilpitasJudicial Dist concerned a petitioner who wassentenced to serve one

year in jail and pay a fine. 411 U.S. at 351-53. In Hensley, however, the petitioner was

released on his own recognizance after having been granted a stay of execution on his

sentence. Significantly, unlike the present case, the challenged conviction had not yet

expired. In Hensley, the petitioner’s incarceration was not a speculative possibility that would

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According to the Arizona Department of Corrections’ inmate information sheet. 

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have depended on contingencies over which he had no control. Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351-53;

Edmunds, 509 F.2d at 41. 

The second case, Barry v. Bergen County Probation Department, did not concern a

payment of restitution, but performance of community service. 128 F.3d at 160-61.

Essentially, the sentence of the challenged conviction required petitioner to be in certain

places at certain times, which subjected him to restraints not shared by the public generally.

Barry, 128 F.3d at 160-61. Barry is distinguished from the present case because the

challenged conviction placed restraints on the petitioner sufficient enough to satisfy the

custody requirement. Here, Petitioner’s current restraint does not emanate from the

challenged conviction. In fact, the challenged conviction no longer subjects Petitioner to

restraints on his liberty. Although Petitioner is now serving a 326.5 year sentence for 20

convictions arising out of Maricopa County Superior Court case number CR 94-90617,

Petitioner’s 5 year prison sentence arising out of the challenged conviction expired on July

16, 1999.2

 (Dkt. #8, Exhibit P). Thus, if Petitioner had not been convicted on separate

crimes, then he would have been released and merely required to pay off the restitution

portion of his sentence on his own time. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491-92. 

Essentially, Petitioner’s individual liberty is currently restrained more than the public

in that he may not “go and come as he pleases,” because he isserving time for other unrelated

convictions. The Court does not agree with Petitioner that his current prison labor to pay off

the restitution is an additional punishment under the challenged conviction. (Dkt. #14).

Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to indicate that additional conditions or restraints

would have been imposed on Petitioner had he been released in 1999, which further indicates

that any current restraint does not relate to the challenged conviction. 

Because Petitioner is not being held “in custody” pursuant to the challenged

conviction, this Court finds that the current petition is moot, and must therefore be denied.

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Having determined that the petition is moot, the Court finds it unnecessary to address

Petitioner’s remaining claims. 

II. Motion to Disqualify

A judge shall will disqualify itself when their impartiality might reasonably be

questioned or the judge has a personal bias or prejudice against a litigant. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)-

(b); 28 U.S.C. § 144. After reviewing the record, this Court finds disqualification

inappropriate. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED adopting the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation in its entirety as the Order of the Court (Dkt. #12). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied

as moot and dismissed with prejudice (Dkt. #1). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED overruling Petitioner’s Objections to the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendation. (Dkt. #14). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Affidavit and Motion for

Disqualification is inappropriate (Dkt. #15). 

 DATED this 24th day of November, 2008.

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