Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-01355/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-01355-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMIE BADDOUR,

Plaintiff,

v.

SEAN HART, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-1355-PJH 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; ORDER DENYING 

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 

SANCTIONS AND TO STRIKE

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment came on for hearing before this court 

on December 16, 2015. Plaintiff appeared by her counsel Patricia Barry; defendant 

Mazen Salfiti appeared by his counsel Glen Belovsky; and defendants City of Daly City 

and Officer Shane Hart (sued as “Sean Hart”) appeared by their counsel Rodrigo Salas. 

Plaintiff also filed a motion to strike and for sanctions, which the court indicated it would 

decide on the papers. Having read the parties’ papers and carefully considered their 

arguments and the relevant legal authority, the court hereby GRANTS defendants’ 

motions, and DENIES plaintiff’s motion to strike and for sanctions.

BACKGROUND

This is a case alleging various civil rights claims, brought by plaintiff Jamie 

Baddour ("Baddour") in connection with an incident that occurred on January 25, 2012. 

Defendants are the City of Daly City, California; Daly City Police Officer Shane Hart 

("Officer Hart"); a Daly City Police Officer "Doe;" and plaintiff's estranged husband Mazen 

G. Salfiti ("Salfiti"), 

At the time of the incident, Baddour and Salfiti were in the process of getting a 

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divorce, and their relationship was acrimonious. They had a custodial arrangement 

whereby they alternated staying at the parental home ("the residence"), so that their four 

children could remain in one location. Baddour alleges that she had contacted the Daly

City Police Department (“DCPD”) on at least three occasions prior to the incidents that 

form the basis of the complaint in this case, and that because of alleged “attacks” by 

Salfiti, she had applied for a domestic violence restraining order on January 24, 2012. 

At 7:00 a.m. on the morning of January 25, 2012, as Salfiti was preparing the 

children for school, Baddour entered the residence. Salfiti asserts that she was in an 

agitated state, and that she began cussing and yelling at him in front of the children. He 

then gathered the two oldest girls and went downstairs to the garage, in preparation for 

taking them to school. He claims that Baddour followed him, continuing to yell and call 

him names. Salfiti asserts that because of Baddour’s past aggressive behavior towards 

him, he decided to record the incident on his cellphone. 

After Salfiti left the residence with the two older girls, Baddour telephoned the 

DCPD to request assistance in connection with alleged verbal and physical abuse 

directed towards her by Salfiti. She stated that Salfiti “split my hand open" and that she 

wanted to make a report, but she also stated she did not want an ambulance. 

Officer Hart responded to the call, arriving at the residence at approximately 7:43 

a.m. He states in his declaration that when he arrived, Baddour was in an "emotional 

state." He noticed a small laceration on the underside of her left thumb. He called 

fire/medical personnel, who responded. However, Baddour declined treatment.

Officer Hart interviewed Baddour, who reported that she and Salfiti had gotten into 

a verbal altercation in front of two of their children, and that she became angry when 

Salfiti began recording her with his phone. According to Officer Hart, Baddour told him 

that she tried to grab the phone away from Salfiti. Baddour denied hitting Salfiti or 

attempting to hit him, but admitted that she took his Rolex watch, which was lying on the 

washing machine, and threw it on the ground. Baddour also admitted that two of the 

children saw her attempt to grab the phone and also saw her throw the watch. 

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Officer Hart states in the police report that Baddour told him that after Salfiti left, 

she noticed her thumb was bleeding. She believed, but was not certain, that she 

sustained the injury when she tried to grab the phone away from Salfiti. She testified that 

both their hands connected and they both squeezed each other’s hands, and she may 

have sustained the laceration by one of his fingernails during the process, but she could 

not be sure.

1

 Officer Hart states that Baddour denied that any physical violence had 

occurred that day, but claimed that in the past, Salfiti had pushed her, slammed doors in 

her face, and used profanity towards her, although he had never hit or slapped her. 

Salfiti has submitted a declaration from his mother, Joy Salfiti, stating that at about 

8:00 a.m. on January 25, 2012, Baddour called her to complain about Salfiti, and when 

she asked Baddour if Salfiti had hit her, she replied "no." He has submitted a similar 

declaration from his sister-in-law, Maritsa Salfiti, stating that at about 8:15 a.m., Baddour 

called her, and she asked Baddour if Salfiti had hit her, and she replied "no." (In her 

October 8, 2015, deposition, Baddour denied having told Joy or Maritsa Salfiti that Salfiti 

did not hit her.)

After Salfiti dropped the children off at school, he drove to the DCPD to report the 

incident. When he arrived, he was advised that Baddour had already called the police, 

and that an officer had been dispatched to the residence. While Officer Hart was at the 

residence, he received a call advising that Salfiti was at the DCPD. He left the residence 

and went to the DCPD to interview Salfiti.

 Prior to the interview, Officer Hart asked permission to view the video on Salfiti's 

phone. He states that when watching the video, he observed Baddour in an angry and 

emotional state, and also saw two children "with frightened looks on their faces." He 

states that the video shows Baddour suddenly charging towards Salfiti, raising her arms 

up and swinging her arms down in a downward motion, and that although the video does 

 

1

 In her October 8, 2015, deposition, Baddour testified that she had told Officer Hart 

during the interview that when she attempted to grab Salfiti’s phone, he used his nails to 

cut her hand, although she also testified that she didn’t know when it happened.

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not show Baddour hitting Salfiti, he could hear the sounds of impacts. 

Officer Hart states that Salfiti reported that during the altercation, he took out his 

cellphone and began recording the incident, and that while he was recording, Baddour 

suddenly ran towards him, yelling and screaming, and began hitting him on top of the 

head. He stated that she also tried to grab the cell phone out of his hand. Salfiti denied 

placing his hands on Baddour during the incident. Officer Hart also states that Salfiti told 

him that Baddour had grabbed his Rolex watch and thrown it, causing it to break into 

pieces. Officer Hart also testified that while he was interviewing Salfiti, he noticed a slight 

redness on the side of Salfiti's head. 

Prior to the interview with Salfiti, Officer Hart briefly exited the interview room, 

leaving his notebook in the room. The notebook contained notes of his investigation into 

the incident, and also unrelated matters, and Officer Hart states that he did not intend to 

leave his notes in the room, and did not intend for Salfiti to read the notes. 

The video of the interview room shows Salfiti looking through Officer Hart's 

notebook. Salfiti testified in his deposition that he read the notes for "a couple of 

minutes," but that he did not recall what they said. He makes the same assertion in his 

declaration. Officer Hart testified in his deposition that he was unaware that Salfiti had 

looked at the notes until some time later, when he viewed the videotape of the 

surveillance camera in the interview room. However, at the time he prepared his report 

of the incident, he was unaware that Salfiti had looked at the notes.

Officer Hart also testified that he had not ever previously spoken with Salfiti and 

that he had no prior relationship with him. For his part, Salfiti asserts that he had no prior 

interaction with Officer Hart until the police interview, that neither he nor any members of 

his family have any relatives that work for the DCPD, that he did not ask Officer Hart to 

arrest Baddour, and that he never sought or made any agreement with any Daly City 

Police Officer to arrest, prosecute, defame, or imprison Baddour.

Baddour testified in her deposition that she was not aware of any relationship 

between Salfiti and Officer Hart prior to the incident. However, she claimed that a "family 

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friend" (she could not recall who) had told her mother that Salfiti's mother had some 

family member in the DCPD (although she could not recall who the family member was). 

She also stated that Salfiti "may know people" in the DCPD. She added that Salfiti was 

an attorney, and "most of the time attorneys know cops, and the cops know attorneys, 

and the City Councils, who's where and what's going on, from my knowledge" (obtained 

through "four years in divorce court"). Because "[e]veryone all kind of works together, . . . 

it wouldn't be farfetched that he knew people in the Daly City city itself as well." 

Officer Hart states in his declaration that based on his interviews with Baddour and 

Salfiti, his review of the video from Salfiti's phone, and the facts known to him at the time, 

he concluded that Baddour was the dominant aggressor. Accordingly, he made the 

decision to arrest Baddour for violating California Penal Code § 273.5 (spousal abuse) 

and § 273A (child endangerment). Baddour was arrested at approximately 11:00 a.m. 

Plaintiff was taken to the DCPD, where she was read her rights. She was then 

transferred to the San Mateo County Jail in Redwood City. She asserts that during the 

ride, Hart telephoned Salfiti and asked if he still wanted to "go through with this." Once at 

the jail, plaintiff was booked and processed. She was held until she was released on bail 

between 8:00-10:00 p.m. 

Approximately two months later, on March 23, 2012, the San Mateo County 

District Attorney's office moved to dismiss the criminal charges after having reviewed the 

video of Salfiti's interview at the DCPD on the day of the incident, which showed him 

looking through Officer Hart's notebook while Hart was out of the room.

Plaintiff filed the original complaint on March 24, 2014, and filed a first amended 

complaint ("FAC") on April 28, 2014. The Daly City defendants filed an answer to the 

FAC on August 13, 2014, and Salfiti filed an answer on August 14, 2014. 

In the FAC, plaintiff asserts (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging conspiracy 

to initiate malicious prosecution against plaintiff in violation of the Fourth Amendment 

(against Hart and Salfiti); (2) a claim under § 1983 alleging conspiracy to falsely arrest 

and imprison plaintiff in violation of the Fourth Amendment (against Hart, Salfiti, and 

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"Doe" Officer 1); (3) a claim under § 1983 alleging conspiracy to defame plaintiff (by false 

arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution) in violation of the Due Process Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment (a "stigma-plus" claim) (against Hart, Salfiti, and "Doe" 

Officer 1); (4) a claim under the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52, 52.1, alleging conspiracy 

to commit false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and "stigma-plus" 

(against Hart, Salfiti, and "Doe" Officer 1); (5) a claim of municipal liability under § 1983 

alleging improper training of police officers (against the City of Daly City); (6) a claim of 

spousal abuse under Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.5 (which plaintiff now claims should have 

been brought under § 1708.6) (against Salfiti); and (7) a claim of intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (against Salfiti). 

The Daly City defendants (the City of Daly City and Officer Hart) filed a motion for 

summary judgment on November 9, 2015, and Salfiti filed a motion for summary 

judgment on November 10, 2015. They seek summary judgment as to all claims 

asserted against them. 

The cut-off date for non-expert discovery was originally set for October 2, 2015. 

Defendants propounded interrogatories and requests for production of documents to 

Baddour on September 1, 2015. Plaintiff filed no responses on October 1, 2015 (the due 

date). On October 16, 2015, defendants filed a motion to compel discovery. While that 

motion was pending, the parties reached an agreement pursuant to which Baddour would 

be allowed until October 29, 2015 to respond to the discovery requests. When Baddour 

was unable to make that deadline, defendants agreed to extend the deadline to October 

30, 2015. Plaintiff did not submit any discovery responses by that final deadline. 

The Daly City defendants filed their summary judgment motion on November 9, 

2015, and a few hours later, Baddour served her responses to discovery. Thus, none of 

the information (if any) produced by Baddour in discovery could be incorporated into the 

Daly City defendants' motion. Salfiti filed his summary judgment motion on November 

10, 2015, but he also was effectively precluded from incorporating any of the information 

in Baddour's responses into his motion. 

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Under the Civil Local Rules, Baddour's opposition to the two motions was due on 

November 23 and 24, 2015, respectively. She did not file a timely opposition. Instead, 

on November 23, 2015, she filed a motion to "strike" the summary judgment motions and 

to "strike" the video of the incident taken by Salfiti on his cellphone ("the Salfiti video"). 

She claims that the video, which defendants have attached as an exhibit to their motions, 

has been tampered with or was forged or fraudulent, because Salfiti stated during the 

interview at the DCPD that he told Baddour he was recording the incident, but the video 

does not include such a statement. In any event, Baddour argues that the video is not 

admissible evidence. 

Also on November 23, 2015, Baddour filed a motion to stay or continue the 

hearing on the summary judgment motions pending resolution of her motion to "strike." 

On November 24, 2015, the court denied that motion, as well as the motion to "strike" the 

summary judgment motions. 

A week later, on November 30, 2015, plaintiff filed a "supplemental" memorandum 

of points and authorities in opposition to the summary judgment motions. On December 

1, 2015, plaintiff filed an "ex parte" request that the court consider the "supplemental" 

memorandum as "part of" her opposition to the summary judgment motions. On 

December 3, 2015, the court issued an order denying that request, on the basis that it 

was filed a week late, on the date the defendants’ reply briefs were due, and that there is 

no provision in the Local Rules for filing a “supplemental” opposition.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

1. Motions for Summary Judgment

A party may move for summary judgment on a “claim or defense” or “part of . . . a 

claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. Id. 

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court 

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of the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery 

responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Material facts are those that might affect the 

outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 

dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable 

jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively 

demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. 

Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). Where the 

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely 

by pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the 

nonmoving party’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25. If the moving party meets its initial 

burden, the opposing party must then set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for 

trial in order to defeat the motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c), (e). When deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its 

favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Hunt v. City of L.A., 638 F.3d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 2011).

2. Motions to Strike

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(f), the court “may order stricken from 

any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 

scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to 

avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues 

by dispensing with those issues prior to trial . . . .” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 

618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation and citation omitted). In order to determine 

whether to grant a motion to strike under Rule 12(f), the court must determine whether 

the matter the moving party seeks to have stricken is (1) an insufficient defense; (2) 

redundant; (3) immaterial; (4) impertinent; or (5) scandalous. Id. at 973-74.

There is no provision in the Federal Rules or the Civil Local Rules for a "motion to 

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strike" evidence submitted in support of an opposing party’s motion. By this motion, 

plaintiff appears to be attempting to object to evidence submitted by defendants in 

support of their summary judgment motions. Such objections to evidence are properly 

presented as part of the opposition to a motion. See Civ. L.R. 7-3(a). 

B. The Parties’ Motions

Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted in their favor 

because Baddour has no evidence to support any of her claims. The Daly City 

defendants assert further that all Baddour's claims are time-barred; that Baddour has no 

admissible evidence of any conspiracy to violate her civil rights; that Officer Hart had 

probable cause to arrest Baddour; that Officer Hart is entitled to qualified immunity; and 

that Baddour has not stated a Monell claim against the City.

In addition, Salfiti argues that the sixth and seventh causes of action must be 

dismissed for lack of evidence; that the sixth cause of action is improperly pled; that the 

seventh cause of action is barred by issue preclusion; and that both the sixth and seventh 

causes of action should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) in the absence of 

any viable federal claim. 

Baddour seeks an order striking the cell phone video taken on January 25, 2012 

by Salfiti, attached as an exhibit to the Salfiti Declaration in support of defendants' 

motions. Baddour claims that the video is not properly authenticated and that it was 

tampered with and thus is "fraudulent." She also seeks monetary sanctions against 

defendants and their counsel, in the form of attorney's fees and costs for the litigation of 

this case. 

1. Defendants’ motions

a. Whether plaintiff’s claims are time-barred

Defendants assert that all Baddour's claims are time-barred, because the 

complaint was filed more than two years after the January 25, 2012 incident. At the 

hearing, plaintiff’s counsel conceded that the second and fourth causes of action are 

time-barred. 

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In California, the limitation period for personal injury actions is two years. Cal. Civ. 

P. Code § 335.1. For claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the most analogous 

limitation period from the forum state – here, that is California's personal injury limitation 

period. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985). 

In federal court, federal law determines when a claim accrues. Lukovsky v. City & 

Cnty. of S.F., 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008). Accrual is the date on which the 

statute of limitations begins to run; under federal law a claim accrues when "the plaintiff 

knows of has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." Id. (citations 

and quotations omitted). For example, under federal law, a claim for false arrest and 

imprisonment accrues when an individual's imprisonment ends or when he becomes 

detained pursuant to legal process, such as when he is arraigned on charges. See

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388-90 (2007). 

Here, all Baddour's § 1983 claims – with the exception of the first cause of action 

for malicious prosecution and the third (“stigma plus”) cause of action to the extent it is 

based on alleged malicious prosecution – accrued on January 25, 2012, the date of the 

incident. Baddour has alleged no facts to show that any equitable tolling is warranted. 

Thus, the second (false arrest), and fifth (Monell) causes of action, and the false arrest 

and false imprisonment portions of the third ("stigma-plus") causes of action, must be 

dismissed as untimely. 

A claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 incorporates the elements of the 

state common law tort of malicious prosecution. See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 

F.3d 1062, 1066-68 (9th Cir. 2004); Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 562 (9th 

Cir. 1987). The elements of malicious prosecution under California law are that a prior 

action was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant, was pursued to a legal 

termination in the plaintiff’s favor, was brought without probable cause, and was initiated 

with malice. See Daniels v. Robbins, 182 Cal. App. 4th 204, 216 (2010); Sagonowsky v. 

More, 64 Cal. App. 4th 122, 128 (1998); see also Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1066-68. 

In federal court, a claim for malicious prosecution accrues only upon “favorable 

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termination” of the underlying criminal proceeding. See Cabrera v. City of Huntington 

Park, 159 F.3d 374, 382 (9th Cir. 1998); see also RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 

F.3d 1045, 1060 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Here, Baddour contends that the date the malicious prosecution claim accrued 

was the date the criminal charges against her were dismissed – March 23, 2012. While 

the complaint was not filed until March 24, 2014, the prior day was a Sunday. Thus, she 

argues, the filing on March 24, 2014, was timely as to the first (malicious prosecution) 

cause of action, and (presumably) as to the malicious prosecution portion of the third 

("stigma-plus") cause of action. 

However, the dismissal of the charges against Baddour cannot be considered a 

“favorable termination.” A "favorable termination" is one that “indicate[s] the innocence of 

the accused.” Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 150 (1941). That is, “the termination must 

reflect the merits of the action and the plaintiff's innocence of the misconduct alleged in 

the lawsuit.” Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun, 32 Cal. 4th 336, 342 (2004) (citation and 

quotation omitted); see also Sycamore Ridge Apartments, LLC v. Naumann, 157 Cal. 

App. 4th 1385, 1399 (2007). If a dismissal is based “on technical grounds, for procedural 

reasons, or for any other reason not inconsistent with his guilt, it does not constitute a 

favorable termination.” Jaffe, 18 Cal.2d at 150; see also Gressett v. Contra Costa Cnty., 

2015 WL 1054975 at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. March 10, 2015). Whether there was a favorable 

termination is a legal issue for the court to decide. See Sierra Club Found. v. Graham, 

72 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1149 (1999). 

It is undisputed that the prosecutor dismissed the criminal charges against

Baddour after having viewed the film recorded in the interview room on the day of the 

incident, which showed Salfiti looking at Officer Hart’s notes. However, there was no 

finding by a court that Baddour was innocent of the charges, and there was no ruling on 

the merits of the case. Because the dismissal of the charges does not reflect on 

plaintiff's innocence or guilt in connection with the underlying charges and cannot be 

considered a favorable termination, the malicious prosecution claims never accrued. 

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More importantly, however, because "favorable termination" is an essential element of a 

claim of malicious prosecution, the malicious prosecution claims fail for lack of evidence.

The two remaining claims – the sixth (spousal abuse) and seventh (intentional 

infliction of emotional distress) causes of action – are asserted against Salfiti only. The 

court accepts that plaintiff intended to assert a violation of Civil Code § 1708.6 rather than 

a violation of § 1708.5 as alleged in the FAC. A § 1708.6 domestic violence claim is 

subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Pugliese v. Sup. Ct., 146 Cal. App. 4th 

1444, 1448-51 (2007). 

The Pugliese court also acknowledged that the statute of limitation for the tort of 

infliction of emotional distress (IIED) is two years (under Civil Code § 335.1) but 

suggested that because infliction of emotional distress is part of the tort of domestic 

violence, a claim of IIED in that context may also be subject to a three-year limitations 

period. Id. at 1450-51. Here, the spousal abuse claim asserted in the complaint appears 

to be based solely on the events of January 25, 2012. Thus, because the complaint was 

filed less than three years after the incident, the court finds that the spousal abuse and 

IIED claims are not time-barred. 

b. Conspiracy claims

As a further basis for dismissing the first four causes of action, defendants argue 

that Baddour has no evidence to support any of her conspiracy claims. As set forth 

above, each of the first four causes of action alleges a conspiracy to violate Baddour’s 

constitutional or civil rights. 

In the first cause of action, Baddour alleges that Hart and Salfiti entered into a 

conspiracy to prosecute her maliciously based on "trumped up felony charges of 

domestic violence and child endangerment." FAC ¶ 42. In the second cause of action, 

Baddour alleges that Hart, Salfiti and “Doe” 1 conspired to falsely arrest and falsely 

imprison her. FAC ¶ 50. In the third cause of action, Baddour alleges that Hart, Salfiti, 

and "Doe" 1 "knew" that Baddour had not hit Salfiti, and conspired to “make a false 

arrest, a false imprisonment, and to defame . . . and to initiate a malicious prosecution of 

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Baddour." FAC ¶ 57. In the fourth cause of action, Baddour alleges that Hart, Salfiti, and 

“Doe” 1 “knew” that Baddour had not hit Salfiti on the head or caused trauma to him or 

endangered her children, and that they conspired “to make a false arrest, a false 

imprisonment, to commit defamation, and, in the case of Hart and Salfiti, a malicious 

prosecution of Baddour.” FAC ¶ 64.

Baddour's conspiracy theory appears to be based on her contention that Officer 

Hart left his notes behind in the interrogation room with the intention that Salfiti read 

them, with the result that Salfiti was able to tailor his statement to the police to wrongfully 

cause her false arrest and related harm. See FAC ¶¶ 31-33. She asserts that when 

Officer Hart returned to the interrogation room, Hart did not "make any acknowledgment" 

that he had left the notes behind, and that this was because he and Salfiti "had entered 

into a conspiracy to make a false arrest, a false imprisonment, and initiate a malicious 

prosecution of Baddour based on Officer Hart's interview of Salfiti." FAC ¶ 32. In her 

motion to strike, Baddour contends that Officer Hart and Salfiti conspired to violate 

Brady/Giglio (Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 

150 (1972)) by suppressing the evidence that Salfiti had looked at Officer Hart’s notes 

when Officer Hart left the room.

Conspiracy is "a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not 

actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common 

plan or design in its perpetration." Applied Eqiuip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 

Cal. 4th 503, 510-11 (1994) (reciting elements of action for civil conspiracy). To 

demonstrate liability for a conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must "demonstrate the 

existence of an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights." 

Mendocino Envt'l Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999). Such an 

agreement "need not be overt, and may be inferred on the basis of circumstantial 

evidence such as the actions of the defendants." Id. 

The Daly City defendants contend that plaintiff has no evidence that Officer Hart –

or anyone else affiliated with the City of Daly City – conspired with Salfiti to violate 

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Baddour’s civil rights, or that Officer Hart or anyone in the City had any prior relationship 

with Salfiti. They note that in her deposition, Baddour admitted she was not aware of any 

relationship between Officer Hart and Salfiti prior to their meeting at the DCPD on 

January 25, 2012, or indeed of any relationship between Salfiti and anyone from the City 

of Daly City. She also testified that she believed it was “possible” that there was a 

conspiracy between the City, Officer Hart, and Salfiti to have her arrested, but conceded 

that she was not certain and claimed that her belief was based solely on the fact that 

when Officer Hart came to her residence (before he meet with Salfiti at the DCPD), he did 

not immediately “help” or “protect” her. 

Defendants contend that this testimony shows that Baddour's conspiracy theory is 

based on speculative and illusory facts, with no connection with the events that led to her 

arrest. Moreover, Salfiti notes, both he and Officer Hart state in declarations that they 

had never met each other before January 25, 2012, and both deny conspiring to violate 

Baddour's civil rights, and Baddour has no evidence to counter that testimony.

In addition, Salfiti argues that his review of Hart's notebook in the interview room is 

wholly insignificant and has no connection or relation to Baddour's legal and factual 

conspiracy allegations. He asserts that Baddour has no evidence that Officer Hart 

deliberately left the notes in the interrogation room, that he deliberately left the notes 

behind for Salfiti, that Salfiti's review of the notes infringed on her civil rights, that Salfiti's 

review of the notes had any effect on his interview with Hart or on Hart's investigation, 

that it negated Salfiti's head injury, or that it had any effect on Hart's probable cause 

determination, which was shared by his supervisor. 

The court finds that Baddour has provided no evidence – even circumstantial 

evidence – to support the existence of a conspiracy between Salfiti and Officer Hart. It is

undisputed that the two men had no prior relationship and had never even met before the 

day of the incident. The fact that Officer Hart inadvertently left his notebook in the 

interview room, and that Salfiti looked at the notes, is not in itself circumstantial evidence 

of a conspiracy. Nor is the fact that Officer Hart made a determination (after consulting 

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with his supervisor) that there was probable cause to arrest Baddour. 

As for Baddour’s arguments with regard to Brady/Giglio, the court notes that the 

rule articulated in those cases is applicable in criminal proceedings – specifically, in 

criminal trials where the defendant can show that the prosecutor has failed to disclose 

potentially exculpatory evidence. Where the defendant is convicted following such a trial, 

a violation of Brady/Giglio results in a violation of due process which in turn requires a 

new trial. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-55; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88. Here, however, the 

criminal charges against Baddour were dismissed after the District Attorney learned that 

Salfiti had looked at Officer Hart’s notes in the interview room. There was no criminal trial 

or conviction in which the Brady/Giglio rules would have any relevance. 

c. Probable cause to arrest

As yet another basis for dismissing the § 1983 malicious prosecution, false arrest, 

and "stigma-plus" claims, the Daly City defendants argue that Officer Hart had probable 

cause to arrest Baddour. The absence of probable cause is a necessary element in a 

§ 1983 malicious prosecution, false arrest, or "stigma-plus" claim. Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 

1066; Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 772-73 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, “a malicious 

prosecution suit may be defended by showing that the underlying action was brought with 

probable cause.” Amwest Mort. Corp. v. Grady, 925 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1991). 

The test for whether probable cause exists is whether “at the moment of arrest the 

facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officers and of which they 

had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in 

believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.” United States 

v. Jensen, 425 F.3d 698, 704 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation and quotation omitted); see also

Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir.2004); Grant v. City of Long 

Beach, 315 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir.2002). Because the probable cause standard is 

objective, probable cause supports an arrest so long as the arresting officer had probable 

cause to arrest the suspect for any criminal offense, regardless of the stated reason for 

the arrest. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153-55 (2004) (arresting officer's state of 

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mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause).

Here, the evidence shows that based on the facts and circumstances known to 

Officer Hart – as further supported by the video of the incident – there was probable 

cause for Baddour's arrest. Both Baddour and Salfiti reported they got into a verbal 

confrontation in front of two of their children; both Baddour and Salfiti told Officer Hart 

that Baddour went up to Salfiti and tried to grab his cellphone out of his hand; Baddour 

denied hitting Salfiti, but admitting throwing his Rolex watch onto the front lawn. In 

addition, prior to the interview with Salfiti, Officer Hart viewed the video of the incident 

Salfiti had taken with his cellphone, and he observed Baddour in an angry and emotional 

state, observed two children, with frightened looks on their faces, and observed Baddour 

charging towards Salfiti with her hands up. He also noted that the video does not show 

Salfiti attempting to physically harm Baddour; and that Salfiti denied placing his hands on 

Baddour or harming her in any way. In addition, while Baddour claimed that the cut on 

her thumb may have resulted from the scuffle over the cellphone, Salfiti reported a red 

area on his head which he claimed resulted from blows from Baddour.

Officer Hart states that he made the decision to arrest Baddour as the dominant 

aggressor based on all the facts known to him at the time, which included the facts listed 

above. Thus, defendants argue, because Officer Hart had probable cause to arrest 

Baddour, the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims fail as a matter of law. 

The court finds, given the totality of the circumstances – the statements made by 

both Baddour and Salfiti, the video evidence, the physical evidence – Officer Hart 

reasonably believed that Baddour had inflicted corporal injury on Salfiti, and that she had 

caused or permitted two of her children to suffer mental suffering. Thus, defendants have 

established that Officer Hart had probable cause to arrest Baddour and charge her with 

domestic violence and child endangerment. Baddour argues in the motion to strike that 

the video was tampered with, and thus that it cannot be considered as evidence, but for 

the reasons explained below with regard to the motion to strike, she has not met her 

burden of showing that the video evidence must be excluded. 

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d. Qualified immunity

The Daly City defendants argue that Officer Hart is entitled to qualified immunity

with regard to the constitutional claims. Qualified immunity is “protects government 

officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known.’" Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). It is "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other 

burdens of litigation." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (quotation and citation 

omitted). An officer with qualified immunity is not liable even when his or her conduct 

resulted from “a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions 

of law and fact.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In the qualified immunity analysis, the court considers (1) whether the officer's 

conduct, viewed in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury, violated a 

constitutional right; and (2) whether the right “was clearly established” such that a 

reasonable officer would have known his conduct violated the right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 

201. It is within the court's discretion to decide which prong to address first in light of the 

circumstances of the case and considerations of judicial economy. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 

236. 

Here, the court need consider only the first of these two prongs. Baddour has 

provided no evidence of any constitutional violation. Accordingly, Officer Hart is entitled 

to qualified immunity. 

e. Monell claim

As a further basis for dismissing the fifth (municipal liability) cause of action,

defendants argue that Baddour has no evidence to support such a claim. In the 

complaint, Baddour alleges that the City of Daly City violated § 1983 by "maintaining a 

practice, custom, and habit whereby police personnel are improperly trained with respect 

to domestic violence victims seeking EPO's and fail repeatedly to provide all the rights 

domestic violence victims are entitled to based on the victim's female gender." FAC ¶ 73.

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Section 1983 allows for a civil action against any person who, under color of law, 

causes the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Municipalities may be held directly liable for 

constitutional violations under § 1983, but the "cannot be held liable . . . on a respondeat 

superior theory." Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A local 

government may be sued under § 1983 “when execution of a government's policy or 

custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be 

said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Id. at 694. However, where there is no 

underlying constitutional violation, there can be no Monell liability. See Villegas v. Gilroy 

Garlic Festival Ass'n, 541 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2008); Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 

916 (9th Cir. 1994); City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).

Defendants argue that Baddour cannot identify a practice, custom, or other pattern 

that would support liability under Monell, and moreover, that no such practice, custom, or 

pattern exists. Moreover, they contend, since Officer Hart's conduct was constitutional, 

there can be no Monell liability. They assert that Baddour's "innuendo" is simply not 

enough to carry her burden of persuasion or her burden of proof on this claim.

The court finds that Baddour has no evidence to support a Monell violation – that 

is, no evidence sufficient to meet her burden of showing that a specific City policy 

resulted in constitutional violations, nor any specific incidents of supervisors' failure to 

discipline for or deliberate indifference to constitutional violations, nor any evidence of a 

policy or practice of failure to train. Monell is clear that the constitutional tort must follow 

from “official municipal policy.” See Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 445-46 

(9th Cir. 2010). More importantly, because Baddour has no viable constitutional claim, 

she cannot assert a claim of municipal liability under Monell. 

f. State tort claims

The two remaining state tort claims are the spousal abuse claim and the IIED 

claim – both asserted only against Salfiti. Salfiti argues that summary judgment should 

be granted as to these claims or that the court should decline to exercise supplemental 

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jurisdiction over the state law claims. 

A federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims “that 

are so related to claims in the action within [the court's] original jurisdiction that they form 

part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, however, 

where it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c)(3). 

In considering whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction, a court should consider 

factors such as “economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Acri v. Varian Assocs., 

Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (quotations omitted). However, “[i]n 

the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of 

factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law 

claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 364 n.7 (1988).

As discussed above, plaintiff has not provided evidence sufficient to prevail on any 

federal cause of action, or even to create a triable issue. And the factors that guide this 

court's decision whether to retain jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining state law causes of 

action for spousal abuse and infliction of emotional distress – economy, convenience, 

fairness, and comity – favor dismissal. 

Most notably, the remaining state law claims are closely related to the dispute 

between Baddour and Salfiti that has been pending for more than four years in the Family 

Law Division of the San Mateo County Superior Court. This court has an interest in 

avoiding needless adjudication of state-law claims, and as the spousal abuse and related 

IIED claims plainly do not belong in federal court, the court declines to continue to 

exercise jurisdiction over them. The dismissal is without prejudice to refiling these two 

claims in state court.

2. Plaintiff's motion

Baddour argues that the City's copy of the cellphone video that Officer Hart 

watched and listened to on January 25, 2012, was lost or destroyed, and that the video 

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now referred to as the "Salfiti video" (which was separately produced by Salfiti) was 

altered and is therefore fraudulent and inadmissible. 

As explained in more detail above, a DCPD Crime Analyst downloaded the video 

from Salfiti’s cellphone on January 25, 2012. Baddour's claim that the Salfiti video is 

fraudulent is based primarily on the fact that Officer Hart states in his police report that 

when he watched the video in the interview room, he could hear Salfiti say that he was 

recording, and could also hear Baddour say something to the effect that she was glad he 

was recording, and that Salfiti also stated several times during the interview (videotaped) 

at the police station that he told Baddour he was recording her, whereas the Salfiti video 

does not include any discussion about the fact that Salfiti was recording. 

Baddour’s claim is also based on the fact that on March 18, 2015, the City 

produced what it claimed was a copy of the 11 videos its Crime Analyst had downloaded 

on January 25, 2015, but that the video of what purported to be the Salfiti video of the 

incident was in fact only a "remnant of a frame of the video," which lasts only a second or 

two, and that the City subsequently admitted during Baddour’s October 9, 2015 

deposition that it could not locate its copy of the video. 

Based on this, Baddour argues that Officer Hart’s statement that the Salfiti video 

appeared to be the same video he had watched on January 25, 2012 was a false 

statement. She claims that because the Salfiti video does not contain the statements 

about Salfiti recording Baddour, Officer Hart "knew" that it was not the same video he had 

viewed on January 25, 2012, and that he "falsely vouched for the authenticity" of video. 

She speculated in her deposition that Salfiti "could have altered" the video by deleting 

some frames (although she conceded that the video depicted the events as they 

happened, and stated that she could not point to any part of the video that appeared to 

have been tampered with). 

Baddour asserts further that Officer Hart committed a Brady/Giglio violation by 

leaving his Baddour interview notes alone in the room with Salfiti for 15 minutes; and that 

he committed a Trombetta violation (California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984)) by 

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destroying the Baddour interview notes when he knew that Salfiti had looked at them and 

thus knew the notes could easily become an issue in the criminal trial and in a civil rights 

trial. 

Baddour argues that the Salfiti video is fraudulent and should be stricken. Here, 

she first asserts that the Hart and Salfiti declarations "attempting to authenticate" the 

Salfiti video are false, and that the video is not properly authenticated as required in 

United States v. McMillan, 508 F.2d 101, 104 (8th Cir. 1975) because it is not "authentic 

or correct" and because changes or deletions have been made to the recording. She

also points to United States of America v. Faurote, 749 F.2d 40, 43-44 (7th Cir. 1984), 

where the court held that in a criminal proceeding, a party attempting to admit an audio 

tape recording must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the tape is a true and 

authentic recording of a conversation, at a given time, between the parties. Finally, she 

notes that in Siegal v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 921 F.2d 15, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1990), a 

wrongful death action alleging defective assembly of a motorcycle handlebar, the court 

excluded evidence of the motorcycle because the handlebar assembly was loose, 

corroded, gouged with tool marks, and appeared to have been altered. 

The Daly City defendants argue that the motion to strike the video should be 

denied. They contend that defendants and their counsel have not altered or destroyed 

any evidence, and that Baddour lacks any proof that they have done so. They assert that 

they did not identify (in initial disclosures or otherwise) the video that was placed into 

evidence (the video downloaded by the City on January 25, 2012), since that particular 

videotape has been lost. Rather, they contend, they have produced the Salfiti video, 

which was provided to them by Salfiti. They assert that the Salfiti video was disclosed to 

Baddour more than 15 months ago, and its authenticity has been established by Salfiti. 

Salfiti states in his declaration that he recorded the January 25, 2012 incident on 

his former cell phone; that he gave the phone to Officer Hart prior to his interview with 

Hart on January 25, 2012; that he made a copy of the video recording onto a disc in 

February 2012; that sometime in late 2012 or early 2013, he recycled his former phone 

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for a new one in the normal course of upgrading his phone; that when Baddour filed this 

action, he gave the disc to his attorney, who then produced it with the August 21, 2014 

initial disclosures; and that the video on the disc produced in August 2014 has never 

been altered in any way. 

Salfiti argues that all the elements required by the Federal Rules of Evidence 

regarding use of a copy in lieu of the original are clearly established – he presented the 

video to Hart; he made a copy of what he presented to Hart; a disc containing that copy 

was produced as part of initial disclosures; he recycled the old phone that was used to 

take the video more than two years before Baddour filed this action, and the recycling of 

the old phone was done in the routine course of upgrading to a new phone. 

The court finds that Baddour has not met her burden of showing that the Salfiti 

video is inadmissible. Rather than explaining why particular rules of evidence require 

exclusion of the Salfiti video, plaintiff has focused on two relatively insignificant facts –

that Officer Hart stated that the video he watched on the day of the incident included a 

statement by Salfiti that he was recording Baddour, but the Salfiti video does not include 

this statement; and that the City admitted it lost or inadvertently destroyed the copy the 

Crime Analyst made on January 25, 2012 (the copy Officer Hart watched on that date). 

However, Baddour cites no rule that would preclude the use of the video under the 

circumstances presented here. 

The court interprets Baddour’s argument as an assertion that without the video 

(which she argues should not be allowed as evidence), defendants cannot show that 

Officer Hart had probable cause to arrest her on January 25, 2012. However, when 

Officer Hart reported that he determined he had probable cause to arrest Baddour after 

viewing the video, that was not the only evidence he considered. His testimony makes 

clear that he considered the totality of the evidence, including the video, when he made 

that determination. Further, lack of probable cause is relevant only to the false arrest and 

malicious prosecution claims. The court has already found that the false arrest claims 

are time-barred, and that the malicious prosecution claims fail because plaintiff has no 

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evidence of a “favorable termination.” 

In addition, Baddour has provided no evidence to support her argument that the 

video was altered or is fraudulent. The fact that the version Hart originally viewed on the 

date of the incident includes a statement by Salfiti that he was recording Baddour, and 

that the copy produced by Salfiti does not, is not an indication that the substantive portion 

of the video was "altered." At most, it shows that a brief portion of the video was cut off 

at the beginning. However, that does not change the fact that the video (which Baddour 

conceded at her deposition was an accurate depiction of the events) clearly shows

Baddour coming after Salfiti, and clearly shows two of the children present and 

witnessing the events. It is true that the video does not show Baddour actually striking 

Salfiti, but there are sounds of impact, and Salfiti later had a red mark on his head. 

The court finds further that the video is adequately authenticated. Federal Rule of 

Evidence 901 provides that “the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a 

finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is” and that the evidence can be in 

the form of testimony of a witness with knowledge that the “item is what it is claimed to 

be.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a), (b)(1). 

The copy of the video that was originally in the possession of the City of Daly City 

was a copy made from Salfiti's cellphone. As Salfiti explains in his declaration in support 

of his opposition to the motion to strike, within a month of the incident, he also copied the 

original video from his cellphone to a disc. Following this, in late 2012 or early 2013, he 

“recycled” his old cellphone – the “smart” phone which he had used to record the video of 

the incident – at which time he “upgraded” to a newer “smart” phone and discarded the 

old “smart” phone. This occurred more than a year prior to the date Baddour filed the 

present lawsuit, and Salfiti had no reason to believe that he had any obligation to keep 

possession of the phone he had used to record the incident.

The City lost the copy of the video that the Crime Analyst made on the day of the 

incident, and thus, defendants later obtained the copy that had been maintained by 

Salfiti. It appears that the City's original copy included the "I am recording you" 

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statement, while the copy provided by Salfiti does not. Nevertheless, Officer Hart states 

in his declaration that the Salfiti video comports with what he recalls seeing in the 

interview room on the date of the incident, and both Salfiti and Baddour have testified that 

the Salfiti video appears to accurately reflect what occurred on January 25, 2012. Salfiti, 

Officer Hart, and Baddour have all confirmed that the video shows the altercation 

between Salfiti and Baddour in the garage of the residence on January 25, 2012. The 

court finds that defendants have sufficiently authenticated the video for purposes of 

supporting their motion for summary judgment and opposing Baddour’s motion to strike. 

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is 

GRANTED as to the first through fifth causes of action; the sixth and seventh causes of 

action are DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling in state court; and plaintiff’s motion to 

strike and for sanctions is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 28, 2016

__________________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:14-cv-01355-PJH Document 82 Filed 01/28/16 Page 24 of 24