Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00292/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00292-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MARK GABRIELE; JEN-FANG LEE; 

STACY PENNING; CHARLES 

FRIEDRICHS, as individuals, and 

on behalf of all others 

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL 

UNION, LOCAL 1000; SERVICE 

EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 

LOCAL 1020; NATIONAL EDUCATION 

ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED 

STATES; CALIFORNIA TEACHERS 

ASSOCIATION; CALIFORNIA FACULTY 

ASSOCIATION,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-00292 WBS KJN

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs bring this action against Service Employees 

International Union, Local 1000 (“Local 1000” or “union 

defendant”), Service Employees International Union, Local 1020, 

the National Education Association of the United States, the 

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California Teachers Association, and the California Faculty 

Association, alleging that defendants unlawfully deducted agency 

fees from their paychecks prior to the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal

Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). Before the court 

is defendant Local 1000’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 89).

I. Relevant Allegations

The court previously dismissed the claims of all but 

plaintiffs Mark Gabriele and Jen-Fang Lee against Local 1000. 

(Docket No. 30.) Gabriele and Lee were at all relevant times 

employees of the State of California. (First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”) ¶¶ 1, 2 (Docket No. 17).) Local 1000 is plaintiffs’ 

exclusive collective bargaining representative. (Id. ¶ 5.) 

Although plaintiffs chose not to be members of Local 1000, prior 

to the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus, plaintiffs’ employers 

withheld fair-share fees from their wages and paid those fees to 

union defendant Local 1000. (Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 15.) 

On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Janus and 

held that payment to a union may not be collected from an 

employee without the employee’s affirmative consent. 138 S. Ct. 

at 2486. Plaintiffs then filed suit alleging the following 

causes of action: (1) violation of plaintiffs First Amendment 

right, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) conversion; and (3) restitution. 

(See generally FAC.) Plaintiffs request a refund of fees 

collected, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id. ¶ 

45.) Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint.

II. Discussion

A. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief

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Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment providing that the 

collection of agency fees, and any state statute or collective 

bargaining agreement that provides for such a collection, is 

unconstitutional under the First Amendment. (Id. ¶ 45(B).) 

Plaintiffs also ask the court to enjoin defendants from 

collecting or receiving agency fees. (Id. ¶ 45(C).) 

For the following reasons, the court finds that 

plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot 

because the Supreme Court in Janus already declared all 

collections of agency fees to be unconstitutional and because the 

collection of agency fees permanently ended immediately after 

Janus.

1. Legal Standard

Article III grants federal courts authority to 

adjudicate cases and controversies. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 

568 U.S. 85, 90 (2013). “A case becomes moot—-and therefore no 

longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III—-

‘when the issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties 

lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’” Rosebrock 

v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 971–72 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Already, 

568 U.S. at 91). The party asserting mootness must show that the 

“allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to 

recur.” Already, 568 U.S. at 91 (quoting Friends of the Earth, 

Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 

(2000)). 

2. Injunctive Relief

At the outset, the court notes that “every other 

district court to consider this issue has found claims for 

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prospective relief moot after Janus.” See Babb v. Cal. Teachers 

Ass’n, 378 F. Supp. 3d 857, 871 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Cook v. 

Brown, 364 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1188 (D. Or. 2019); Carey v. Inslee, 

364 F. Supp. 3d 1220, 1225-27 (W.D. Wash. 2019); Danielson v. 

Inslee, 345 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1339-40 (W.D. Wash. 2018)); see 

also Penning v. Service Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1021, No. 19-cv03624-YGR, 2020 WL 256126, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2020); 

Seidemann v. Prof’l Staff Congress Local 2334, 432 F. Supp. 3d 

367 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Lee v. Ohio Educ. Ass’n, 366 F. Supp. 3d 

980, 981-82 (N.D. Ohio 2019); Crockett v. NEAAlaska, 367 F. Supp. 

3d 996, 1002-03 (D. Alaska 2019); Lamberty v. Conn. State Police 

Union, No. 3:15-cv-378 (VAB), 2018 WL 5115559 at *6-9 (D. Conn. 

Oct. 19, 2018); Danielson v. AFSCME Council 28, 340 F. Supp. 3d 

1083, 1084 (W.D. Wash. 2018), aff’d, 945 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 

2019); Yohn v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 17-cv-202-JLS-DFM, 2018 WL 

5264076, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2018).

This court agrees that because it cannot reasonably be 

expected that the union defendants will resume withholding agency 

fees in contravention of Janus, plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive 

relief is moot. The Janus court held that states and publicsector unions cannot compel the payment of agency fees from 

nonconsenting employees because such a practice violates the 

First Amendment. 138 S. Ct. at 2486. On June 28, 2018, the day 

after Janus was decided, the California State Controller’s Office 

cancelled the deduction of agency fees in compliance with Janus. 

(Ex. 3 (Docket No. 42-2).) The Controller’s Office also said 

that it would refund all June 2018 agency fees. (Id.) The 

California Attorney General then issued an advisory statement 

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concerning the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus, explaining that 

the state “may no longer automatically deduct a mandatory agency 

fee from the salary or wages of a non-member public employee who 

does not affirmatively choose to financially support the union.” 

(Ex. 4 (Docket No. 42-2).)

Similarly, in-house counsel for Local 1000 has filed an 

affidavit stating that the union ceased the collection agency 

fees following Janus. (See Decl. of Anne M. Giese (“Giese 

Decl.”) ¶¶ 3, 9 (Docket No. 42-2).) Union counsel agrees that 

the entire practice is unconstitutional in light of Janus and 

that this determination binds the union. (Giese Decl. ¶ 9.) And 

even if the union decided to withdraw fees in violation of Janus, 

the union would be incapable of doing so because only the State 

Controller’s Office actually deducts the fees. (Id. ¶ 10.) 

These circumstances demonstrate that defendant Local 1000 is not 

likely to withdraw agency fees from nonconsenting employees. 

Plaintiffs point out that the California statutes 

authorizing the deduction of agency fees have not been repealed. 

(Opp’n at 1 (Docket No. 46).) However, this court has previously

found, under identical circumstances, that the repeal of the 

California statutes is not a requirement for this court to 

declare this case moot. See Hamidi v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union 

Local 1000, 386 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1297 (E.D. Cal. 2019). “The 

mere presence on the statute books of an unconstitutional 

statute, in the absence of enforcement or credible threat of 

enforcement, does not entitle anyone to sue.” Id. (quoting 

Winsness v. Yocom, 433 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 2006)). For the 

reasons above, the court finds that such a threat does not exist, 

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and plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief is moot.1

3. Declaratory Relief

“The test for mootness is ‘not relaxed in the 

declaratory judgment context.’” Id. at 1295 (quoting Gator.com 

Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 398 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2005) (en 

banc)). Plaintiffs must demonstrate that “a substantial 

controversy . . . of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant 

the issuance of a declaratory judgment” exists. Id. (quoting 

Gator.com, 398 F.3d at 1129).

Applying this standard here, the court finds that 

plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief is also moot. The 

complaint requests declaratory judgment providing that it is 

“unconstitutional under the First Amendment . . . to withhold or 

require payment of fair share service fees or agency fees from 

[p]laintiffs”; that the state statutes “that allow the imposition 

of fair share service fees are unconstitutional under the First 

Amendment [and] null and void]”; and that “any collective 

bargaining agreement provision imposing fair share service fees 

or agency fees against [p]laintiffs . . . is unconstitutional 

under the First Amendment [and] null and void.” (FAC ¶ 45(B).) 

The action plaintiffs object to –- the nonconsensual deduction of 

1 To the extent that plaintiffs are relying on the 

voluntary cessation exception to mootness, that exception does 

not apply here. “Under Ninth Circuit precedent, ‘voluntary 

cessation must have arisen because of the litigation’ for this 

exception to mootness to apply.” Hamidi, 386 F. Supp. 3d at 

1295–96 (quoting Pub. Utilities Comm’n of State of Cal. v. 

F.E.R.C., 100 F.3d 1451, 1460 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in 

original)). Here, plaintiffs filed suit months after defendants 

ceased the collection of agency fees, so defendant’s voluntary 

cessation was not a result of this litigation.

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agency fees –- ceased months before plaintiffs filed suit, 

however. At this point, the controversy is neither sufficiently 

immediate nor real enough to warrant a declaratory judgment. 

Plaintiffs argue that neither the unions nor the Public 

Employment Relations Board (“PERB”) has declared anything 

unconstitutional and that Janus did not address the California 

statutes, specifically. Again, however, given the circumstances 

described above, it cannot reasonably be expected that these 

statutes will be used to collect fees in contravention of Janus

in the future. “[T]he existence of potentially problematic 

agreements and laws is not sufficient to overcome mootness.” Cf.

Cook, 364 F. Supp. 3d at 1190 (finding request for declaratory 

relief moot despite Janus not addressing Oregon statutes and 

bargaining agreements, specifically). The court will therefore 

dismiss plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief as moot.

B. Good Faith Defense

In requesting a refund for agency fees collected from 

plaintiffs in violation of Janus, plaintiffs ask the court to 

apply Janus retroactively. The Ninth Circuit, however, recently 

held that, where the union defendant “relied on presumptivelyvalid state law and then-binding Supreme Court precedent,” the 

union defendant is entitled to a good-faith defense and “is not 

retrospectively liable” for pre-Janus collection of agency fees. 

Danielson v. Inslee, 945 F.3d 1096, 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 2019). 

Danielson is the law of the circuit and binds this court.

Here, it is undisputed that the union defendants relied 

on presumptively valid state statutes and then-applicable Supreme 

Court precedent. Accordingly, the good faith defense applies and 

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the court will dismiss plaintiffs’ claim for a refund of fees

collected.

All of plaintiffs’ arguments in response merely 

disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Danielson. (Opp’n

at 4 (“Plaintiffs disagree with almost every part of Danielson

related to the good-faith defense.”); id. at 6 (“Danielson

wrongly rejects the most analogous tort analysis.”); compare id.

at 10 (“Owen [v. City of Independence, Mo., 455 U.S. 622, 654-55 

(1980)] shows that the Unions are not entitled to a good-faith 

defense.”), with Danielson, 945 F.3d at 1103 (“The good faith 

defense applies to the Union as a matter of law.”).) Ninth 

Circuit precedent, however, is binding on this court, and because 

plaintiffs fail to identify any meaningful distinction between 

this case and Danielson, the court will follow the Ninth Circuit. 

Accordingly, union defendants here are entitled to the good faith 

defense and, as a matter of law, cannot be liable for agency fees 

collected prior to Janus. 

C. State Law Claims

Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ state law claims are 

preempted by the Dills Act, Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 3512-3524, and 

that PERB has exclusive jurisdiction over these claims. The 

court agrees and finds that plaintiff’s state law claims for 

conversion and restitution are preempted by the Dills Act. See

Babb, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 877-78; Penning v. Service Emps. Int’l 

Union, Local 1021, 424 F. Supp. 3d 684, 686 (N.D. Cal. 2020).

Plaintiffs’ allegations under the state law claims 

identify conduct expressly permitted by the Dills Act, and 

therefore that conduct cannot form the basis for common law 

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claims. Plaintiffs’ employment is governed by the Dills Act.

(See Complaint ¶¶ 1-2; Cal. Gov’t Code §3513(c).) The Act 

expressly permits the collection of fair-share fees. (See Cal. 

Gov’t Code §§ 3512, 3515, 3515.7.) Because the common law is 

necessarily displaced by a statute, the collection of fair-share 

fees is not a violation of state common law. See Babb, 378 F. 

Supp. 3d at 877 (“‘Janus does not change the fact that [the 

state’s public employee collective-bargaining statute] displaced 

any state common law tort claims that could have been brought 

with regard to [fair-share fees] collected prior to Janus.’” 

(quoting Crockett, 367 F. Supp. 3d at 1009; substitutions 

altered)); Cal. Civ. Code § 22.2 (“The common law . . . so far as 

it is not . . . inconsistent with . . . laws of this State, is 

the rule of decision in all the courts of this State.”).

Further, PERB possesses “exclusive jurisdiction” over 

matters covered by the Act, subject to appeal to the California 

Courts of Appeal. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 3514.5. Pursuant to 

Section 3514.5, that “exclusive jurisdiction” extends to “[t]he 

initial determination as to whether the charges of unfair 

practices are justified, and, if so, what remedy is necessary to 

effectuate the purposes of this chapter,” i.e., whether a 

violation of the Act has occurred and, if so, what remedy should 

be ordered. Cal. Gov’t Code § 3514.5. Noting ”the broad powers 

expressly conferred upon PERB,” El Rancho Unified School District

v. National Education Association, 33 Cal. 3d 946, 953 (1983), 

the California Supreme Court has held that identical language2 in 

2 Compare EERA, Cal. Gov’t Code § 3541.5 (“The initial 

determination as to whether the charges of unfair practices are 

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California’s Educational Employment Relations Act (“EERA”) 

“broadly preempts state tort claims that allege conduct that is 

even ‘arguably protected or prohibited under EERA.’” Babb, 378 

F. Supp. 3d at 877 (quoting El Rancho, 33 Cal.3d at 960). The 

Dills Act therefore strips the courts’ jurisdiction not only to 

adjudicate claims arising from conduct that is prohibited or 

protected by the Act, but also to determine whether conduct is in 

fact prohibited or protected by the Act, as long as it is 

arguably prohibited or protected. Because plaintiffs’ claims 

depend on whether the unions are entitled to keep the fair share 

fees that the Dills Act arguably permitted the unions to collect, 

PERB has exclusive jurisdiction over these claims.

Plaintiffs assert that their common law claims are not 

preempted because those claims do not arise from conduct 

constituting “unfair practices” under the Dills Act but, at most, 

conduct that is protected or prohibited by the Act. (Opp’n at 

18.) But the courts have rejected the argument that preemption 

is limited to claims arising from conduct that would constitute 

an “unfair practice,” as opposed to some other violation of the 

Dills Act. See Babb, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 877-78; Leek v. Wash.

Unified Sch. Dist., 124 Cal. App. 3d 43, 48-49 (Third Dist. 

1981); accord Link v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 142 Cal. App.

3d 765, 768-69 (1st Dist. 1983). Indeed, the very case 

justified, and, if so, what remedy is necessary to effectuate the 

purposes of this chapter, shall be a matter within the exclusive 

jurisdiction of the board.”), with Dills Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 

3514.5 (“The initial determination as to whether the charges of 

unfair practices are justified, and, if so, what remedy is 

necessary to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, shall be a 

matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the board.”).

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plaintiffs ask the court to rely on for their proposition that 

PERB has limited jurisdiction (Opp’n. at 18) explicitly declines 

to limit PERB’s jurisdiction only to claims alleging unfair 

practices under the Act. See Hott v. Coll. of Sequoias Cmty. 

Coll. Dist., 3 Cal. App. 5th 84, 94 (5th Dist. 2016) (“PERB’s 

exclusive jurisdiction extends to all alleged violations of [the 

Act], not just those which constitute unfair practices.”). PERB 

instead has jurisdiction to adjudicate both unfair practices and 

whether conduct is protected or prohibited by the Act. See id.

Next, plaintiffs argue that their complaint does not 

allege a violation of the Dills Act. (Opp’n at 18-19.)

Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the Dills Act is 

“irrelevant” to their claims because, regardless of what the 

Dills Act provides, the unions’ receipt of any agency fees 

constituted conversion. Id. Plaintiffs, however, are not 

permitted to “plead around” preemption by not alleging Dills Act 

violations. Instead, “what matters is whether the underlying 

conduct on which the suit is based –- however described in the 

complaint –- may fall within PERB’s exclusive jurisdiction.” El 

Rancho, 33 Cal. 3d at 954 n.13.; cf. Link, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 

769 (finding that claims fall under PERB’s exclusive jurisdiction 

where plaintiffs alleged only constitutional challenges). The 

preemption question therefore turns on whether plaintiffs’ claims 

arise from conduct that is protected, prohibited, or arguably 

protected or prohibited under the Dills Act, regardless of the 

legal labels they assign to their claims. Because the Dills Act 

expressly authorizes the collection of agency fees, Cal. Gov. 

Code §§ 3513(k), “[c]hallenges to agency fees, even on 

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constitutional grounds, are subject to [PERB’s] exclusive 

jurisdiction.” Babb, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 877. Accordingly, the 

court lacks jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s state law claims.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 

dismiss (Docket No. 89) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. All 

claims against defendants are DISMISSED. Because all of 

plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed as a matter of law, any 

amendment would be futile, and no leave to amend is granted. 

The Clerk of Clerk shall enter final judgment in favor 

of defendants.

Dated: June 11, 2020

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