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Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐2380

DEBORA GHISELLI,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting  

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 13‐CV‐00354 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 9, 2015 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 16, 2016

____________________

Before ROVNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and WOOD,

District Judge.

*

WOOD, District Judge. Debora Ghiselli applied for disabil‐

ity insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, claiming

that she was unable to work due to a combination of health

                                                 

* Of the Northern District of Illinois sitting by designation.

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2 No. 14‐2380

problems that included degenerative disc disease, asthma,

and obesity. After her initial application and her request for

reconsideration were denied, an administrative law judge

(“ALJ”) found that she was not disabled despite her impair‐

ments. The district court, reviewing the ALJ’s decision pursu‐

ant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), held that the decision was supported

by substantial evidence and thus affirmed it. Ghiselli has now

appealed that ruling to this Court, arguing that the ALJ erred

by crediting the opinions of state agency medical consultants

over that of her treating physician, by improperly determin‐

ing without adequate explanation that she had the residual

functional capacity to perform a range of light work with lim‐

itations, and by finding that she lacked credibility based on

certain purportedly inconsistent statements.  

We agree that the ALJ erred in his consideration of Ghis‐

elli’s credibility and therefore her case must be remanded for

further proceedings.

I.

Ghiselli applied for disability benefits on June 16, 2010, al‐

leging disability beginning on October 1, 2007. She asserted

that she had been employed as a retail customer service man‐

ager, a position she later described as including responsibility

for handling customer inquiries and supervising cashiers. She

claimed that she was disabled by injuries she suffered at her

job on August 6, 2007, when a customer struck her in the back

with a shopping cart. Ghiselli’s claim for disability benefits

was initially denied in October 2010 and, upon her request for

reconsideration, denied again in April 2011. She then re‐

quested and received a hearing before an ALJ.

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No. 14‐2380 3

The ALJ found that Ghiselli was not disabled after evalu‐

ating her claim under the five‐step sequential evaluation pro‐

cess detailed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). At the first step, the

ALJ determined that Ghiselli had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity from the claimed start of her disability of Oc‐

tober 1, 2007 through her last insured date of September 30,

2011. As a result, the ALJ proceeded to the second step, where

he was required to determine whether Ghiselli had a severe

medically‐determinable impairment or combination of im‐

pairments. He found that she did suffer from severe impair‐

ments, including degenerative disc disease of the lumbar

spine with stenosis and facet arthropathy, asthma, and obe‐

sity. These impairments, he concluded, limited her ability to

perform work activities. Ghiselli’s claimed mental impair‐

ment of depression, however, was not found not to be severe,

as it “did not cause more than minimal limitation in [her] abil‐

ity to perform basic mental work activities.” At step three, the

ALJ found that Ghiselli’s severe impairments did not meet the

criteria for presumptive disability. Thus, he proceeded to the

fourth step: assessing whether she was capable of performing

her past relevant work.

At this stage, an ALJ must determine a claimant’s residual

functional capacity, which is her “ability to do physical and

mental work activities on a regular basis despite limitations

from her impairments.” Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1121

(7th Cir. 2014). To determine Ghiselli’s residual functional

capacity, the ALJ considered the reports and

recommendations of Dr. Marjorie Delo, who began treating

Ghiselli shortly after her workplace accident and examined

her more than a dozen times between August 2007 and

September 2010. When Ghiselli returned to work in

September 2007 but reported that pain limited her activity, Dr.

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Delo recommended that she limit her work to shifts of no

more than four hours. Dr. Delo repeated this recommendation

after many of Ghiselli’s subsequent treatment visits. Although

Dr. Delo observed some deterioration in Ghiselli’s back

condition from its initial appearance in 2007, she also saw

positive signs. In July 2010, she noted that Ghiselli had not

been treated for back problems since January 2009 and that

she had been successful in using home exercises to “keep her

pain at bay.” In August 2010, she reported that Ghiselli had

“no more than mild lower lumbar tenderness,” that she had

normal muscle tone, and that her gait showed no signs that

she was compensating for pain.

The ALJ also considered reports prepared by Dr. Syd

Foster and Dr. Philip Cohen, two state agency medical

consultants “trained and familiar with” medical standards

underthe Social Security Act, who reviewed Ghiselli’s records

to assess her residual functional capacity. In his report, Dr.

Foster observed that Ghiselli reported “severe pain and

limited mobility” and impaired ability to sit, stand, or walk

for prolonged periods. He further noted that she did have

“medically determinable impairments that could cause pain

and limited mobility” but nonetheless concluded that “the

medical evidence does not support such extreme limitations.”

For his part, Dr. Cohen found “no indication in the medical

records that claimant’s functioning is limited by asthma, high

blood pressure, or hip pain,” and that her statements about

her limitations “are not consistent with the medical evidence

and are found partially credible.”

The ALJ also reviewed the reports of two physicians who

examined Ghiselli in 2010 and 2011. Dr. Ronald Garcia

conducted an electrodiagnostic examination of Ghiselli in

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No. 14‐2380 5

September 2010 and found her to have normal strength,

sensation, muscle tone, range of motion, and reflexes in her

legs. Dr. Harry Tagalakis administered a magnetic resonance

imaging, or MRI, scan of Ghiselli’s lumbar spine in August

2011 and characterized her spinal impairments as mild to

moderate.

In summarizing his assessment of the various doctors’

reports, the ALJ assigned “significant weight” to the opinions

of Dr. Foster, Dr. Cohen, Dr. Garcia, and Dr. Tagalakis. As to

Ghiselli’s treating physician, the ALJ stated: “I generally give

weight to Dr. Delo’s opinions, but find that her continued

restriction to 4‐hour work days stems from an unsuccessful

attempt to return the claimant to work in September 2007 one

month after the initial injury (citation omitted) and there is no

medical basis in 2011, four years later, to continue that

restriction.”  

The ALJ’s assessment of Ghiselli’s residual functional

capacity also relied upon her own statements regarding her

ability to work, which the ALJ found to lack credibility. He

noted that Ghiselli had reported that, among other basic

activities, she could do light housework, read, take care of her

pets, perform personal care activities, drive her car, and shop

for groceries. From this, he concluded that Ghiselli’s “ability

to perform significant activities of daily living is strong

evidence that she is capable of performing work activities,

undermining her claims in this case.”

The ALJ also felt that Ghiselli’s credibility was damaged

by what he considered inconsistent statements. For example,

he noted that Ghiselli had stated in her January 2010 written

“Function Report” that Dr. Delo had restricted her to lifting

no more than fifteen pounds and would not clear herto return

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6 No. 14‐2380

to work until that restriction was lifted; meanwhile, Dr. Delo’s

restriction actually permitted Ghiselli to lift up to twenty‐five

pounds and allowed her to work under that restriction for

shifts of up to four hours. The ALJ was also particularly vexed

by the fact that in November 2008, Ghiselli had advised Dr.

Delo that she was looking for a new job, which the ALJ

considered “contrary to her contentions in this case that she

could not work.”

After consideration of this record, the ALJ concluded that

Ghiselli had the residual functional capacity to perform a

range of light work, if she were provided a sit‐stand option

that allowed herto be off‐task for up to ten percent of the time,

required no more than occasional stooping, crouching,

balancing, kneeling, or crawling, and subjected herto no more

than moderate exposure to extreme cold. He further found

that Ghiselli had the residual functional capacity to perform

past relevant work. While the past work that she could

perform did not include her most recent customer service

manager job, the ALJ determined that she did retain the

capacity to perform some of her previous jobs, including

telephone receptionist and data entry clerk.

Finally, at the fifth and final step in the sequential review

process, the ALJ determined that Ghiselli could perform a

number of other jobs in the regional economy that constituted

substantial gainful activity, such as survey worker, automatic

car wash attendant, and ticket taker.  

In sum, the ALJ concluded that Ghiselli was not disabled

as defined in the Social Security Act at any time during the

time period October 1, 2007 and September 30, 2011, and

affirmed the denial of her application for benefits. Ghiselli’s

request for review of the decision by the Social Security

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No. 14‐2380 7

Administration’s Appeals Council was denied, making the

ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. See

Loveless v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 502, 506 (7th Cir. 2016). She sought

judicial review in the district court, which affirmed the ALJ’s

decision. This appeal followed.

II.

An ALJ determination not reviewed by the Appeals

Council and affirmed by the district court receives direct

review in this Court. Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 361 (7th

Cir. 2013). The ALJ’s decision must be upheld if it is

supported by substantial evidence, which has been defined as

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 361–62.

As detailed above, in conducting its disability analysis, the

ALJ considered five main inquiries: (1) whether Ghiselli was

unemployed; (2) whether she had a severe impairment; (3)

whether the impairment met or medically equaled one of a

list of specific impairments in the regulations accompanying

the Social Security Act; (4) whether she was unable to perform

her former occupation; and (5) whether she was unable to

perform any other work. As the claimant, Ghiselli had the

burden of proof for the first four inquiries; the Commissioner

had the burden of proof for the fifth. See Butera v. Apfel, 173

F.3d 1049, 1054 (7th Cir. 1999). The ALJ found that Ghiselli

was not employed, that she had severe impairments, and that

those impairments did not meet or equal those listed in the

applicable regulations. The parties do not dispute the findings

on those first three inquiries. With respect to the remaining

two, Ghiselli contends that the ALJ erred in several ways.  

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8 No. 14‐2380

Ghiselli contends that the ALJ should have afforded

conclusive weight to the opinion from Dr. Delo, her treating

physician. She claims that Dr. Delo restricted her to a work

shift of no more than four hours, and a person who cannot

work eight hours a day, five days a week, or the equivalent,

is disabled. See Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir.

2013). Indeed, a treating physician’s medical opinion is

entitled to controlling weight in the disability analysis if it is

“well supported by objective medical evidence and consistent

with other substantial evidence in the record.” Id.; see also

Loveless, 810 F.3d at 507 (“A treating physician’s opinion is

entitled to controlling weight unless it is inconsistent with the

other substantial evidence.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(c)(2)). A treating doctor’s opinion may be properly

discounted, however, if it is based upon the claimant’s

subjective complaints rather than objective medical evidence.

Ketelboeter v. Astrue, 550 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2008); White v.

Barnhart, 415 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2005).

The notes of Ghiselli’s initial post‐accident treatments do

not suggest that a medical diagnosis of her condition

mandated a restriction from full‐time work. She was first

examined by Dr. David Madenburg on August 9, 2007. His

notes show that she was cleared to return to work on the same

day with the restrictions that she alternate between sitting

and standing every two hours, that she stand for no more than

twenty percent of her shift, that she walk for no more than

thirty minutes, and that she lift no more than ten pounds. Dr.

Madenburg’s notes do not recommend any restriction on the

duration of her shift.  

Dr. Delo saw Ghiselli less than a week later on August 13,

2007. Her treatment notes reflect a plan that Ghiselli return to

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No. 14‐2380 9

work on “light duty,” with a lifting restriction of no more than

ten pounds and a prohibition on squatting and bending. Like

Dr. Madenburg’s notes, the notes from Dr. Delo’s initial

treatment of Ghiselli make no reference to any restriction on

the length of her shift upon her return to work. After a

September 28, 2007 examination, Dr. Delo reported that

Ghiselli’s sacroiliitis and lumbar degenerative disc disease

were improving, but “[t]he patient does not feel she is able to

work. She did do a trial of 4 hour return to work previously

and the patient’s symptoms restarted, so this time we will

keep her out of work for the next 7 to 10 days and re‐evaluate

at that time. I hope to return her at that time to a 4‐hour shift.”

Ghiselli visited Dr. Delo again on October 11, 2007. The

treatment notes from that date state that “[t]he patient

previously seemed to improve; however, at this time she

states that she is no longer getting improvement and does not

feel that she is able to return to work.” At that time, Dr. Delo

decided that Ghiselli could not be cleared to return to work

until after she was evaluated by a pain management

specialist, Dr. Randall Nemerovski. Ghiselli saw Dr.

Nemerovski in December 2007 but, for non‐medical reasons,

elected to delay the treatment he suggested. Thereafter, Dr.

Delo began recommending a four‐hour shift limit. She

examined Ghiselli on January 3, 2008 and her report of the

visit, in a section headed “Return To Work Capabilities,”

included “4 hr shift” along with the directive that Ghiselli

alternate sitting and standing and refrain from lifting more

than twenty pounds or walking more than fifteen minutes at

a time. The notes do not link the restrictions to any medical

diagnosis. Subsequent notes regarding restrictions are

similarly unaccompanied by any reference to objective

medical evidence.  

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10 No. 14‐2380

On this record, Dr. Delo’s routinely‐repeated restriction to

a four‐hour shift does not constitute an opinion well‐

supported by objective medical evidence that Ghiselli’s

medical condition prevented her from working on a full‐time

basis. The record reveals little support for the effects from

which Ghiselli claimed to suffer other than her own subjective

complaints. And the other medical opinions reviewed by the

ALJ did not find an objective medical basis for the debilitating

effects she reported. Thus, we cannot find that the ALJ erred

in declining to give Dr. Delo’s shift restrictions conclusive

weight on the question of Ghiselli’s disability. Ketelboeter, 550

F.3d at 625.  

But the absence of objective medical corroboration for a

complainant’s subjective accounts of pain does not permit an

ALJ to disregard those accounts. To the contrary, an ALJ

“must consider subjective complaints of pain if a claimant has

established a medically determined impairment that could

reasonably be expected to produce the pain.” Moore, 743 F.3d

at 1125; see also Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir.

2009).

The ALJ considered Ghiselli’s subjective accounts of her

pain and found them not credible. His credibility

determination was based in part on his conclusion that

Ghiselli could successfully perform numerous life activities.

But without acknowledging the differences between the

demands of such activities and those of a full‐time job, the ALJ

was not entitled to use Ghiselli’s successful performance of

life activities as a basis to determine that her claims of a

disabling condition were not credible. See Moore, 743 F.3d at

1126; Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012). As

this Court has previously explained, “the critical differences

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No. 14‐2380 11

between activities of daily living and activities in a full‐time

job are that a person has more flexibility in scheduling the

former than the latter, can get help from other persons ... and

is not held to a minimum standard of performance, as she

would be by an employer.” Bjornson, 671 F.3d at 647 (also

collecting cases); see also Stage v. Colvin, 812 F.3d 1121, 1126

(7th Cir. 2016) (finding that the ALJ improperly based his

adverse credibility determination on, among other things, the

claimant’s ability to care for herself and her grandchildren);

Roddy, 705 F.3d at 639 (observing that “[w]e have repeatedly

cautioned that a person’s ability to perform daily activities,

especially if that can be done only with significant limitations,

does not necessarily translate to an ability to work full‐time”).

The ALJ failed to acknowledge and account for those crucial

differences with respect to Ghiselli, or at least there is no

indication in the record that he did. Nor did he identify a basis

for his conclusion that the life activities Ghiselli reported were

inconsistent with the physical impairments she claimed.

The ALJ’s focus on the inconsistency he perceived

between Ghiselli’s claim of disability and her November 2008

statement to Dr. Delo that she was looking for another job,

which he described as the most significant of her inconsistent

statements, suffers from a similar logical defect. There is no

inherent inconsistency in being both employed and disabled.

See Wilder v. Chater, 64 F.3d 335, 337–38 (7th Cir. 1995) (‘The

fact that someone is employed is not proof positive that he is

not disabled, for he may be desperate and exerting himself

beyond his capacity, or his employer may be law or

altruistic.”). And here, Ghiselli was not actually working but

merely said that she was looking for work. While a claimant’s

statements in applying for work following a disability claim

might be relevant to her credibility when the statements

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12 No. 14‐2380

undermine the basis for her claim, such is not the case here.

Persisting in looking for employment even while claiming to

suffer from a painful disability might simply indicate a strong

work ethic or overly‐optimistic outlook rather than an

exaggerated condition. In any case, the ALJ here provided no

support for his conclusion that looking for a new job was

inconsistent with Ghiselli’s disability claim. This is not a

situation where the claimant told prospective employers that

her pain issues were in the past or otherwise denied suffering

from the symptoms that formed the basis for her disability

claim. See, e.g., Knox v. Astrue, 327 Fed. Appx. 652, 656 (7th Cir.

2009).

Although an ALJ’s credibility determinations are

generally entitled to deference, this Court has “greater

freedom to review credibility determinations based upon

objective factors or fundamental implausibilities, rather than

subjective considerations” such as the claimant’s demeanor.

Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 354 (7th Cir.

2005). The ALJ’s unsupported judgments regarding Ghiselli’s

ability to perform the activities of daily living and her

statement that she was looking for a new job are not the sort

of credibility determinations entitled to deference.

As the main factors identified by the ALJ as informing his

negative assessment of Ghiselli’s credibility were either

improperly analyzed or unsupported by substantial

evidence, the determination itself must be considered

patently wrong. See Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 680 (7th Cir.

2008). We cannot deem the error harmless, as it informed

several aspects of the ALJ’s findings with respect to Ghiselli’s

residual functional capacity and consequently her ability to

perform past relevant work or to adjust to other work.

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No. 14‐2380 13

Ghiselli’s case must therefore be remanded to the agency for

further proceedings.

In light of the remand, one additional argument raised by

Ghiselli merits brief attention. She faults the ALJ for failing to

explain how he determined that she would be off‐task for no

more than ten percent of the workday while changing

positions as frequently as required by her work limitations.

While we tend to agree with the district court that any such

deficiency in the ALJ’s decision was a harmless error, on

remand the agency should take care to ensure that it builds a

logical bridge from the medical evidence to its conclusions,

see Pepper, 712 F.3d at 362, regarding this (and any other)

limitation attendant to its residual functional capacity

determinations.  

III.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district

court is VACATED and the case REMANDED with instructions

to remand the case to the Social Security Administration for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  

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