Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-02437/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-02437-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KRL, a California General

Partnership, ROLAND WOMACK, et

al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RUSSELL MOORE, et al.,

Defendants. 

 CIV-S-99-2437 DFL DAD

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND

ORDER

On July 6, 2006, defendants filed an appeal of the court’s

March 3, 2006 order denying their motions for summary judgment

based on qualified immunity and the court’s June 28, 2006 order

denying their motion to reconsider. They now move to stay this

action. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED. 

When an “interlocutory claim is immediately appealable, its

filing divests the district court of jurisdiction to proceed with

trial.” Chuman v. Wright, 960 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1992). A

district court’s order denying summary judgment of a qualified

Case 2:99-cv-02437-JAM-DAD Document 531 Filed 07/26/06 Page 1 of 4
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immunity defense is immediately appealable when the question

involves a matter of law. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530

(1985). However, trial may proceed if the district court finds

and certifies in writing that defendants’ claim is frivolous. 

Chuman, 960 F.2d at 105. 

Defendants’ appeal argues that the court erred in denying 

them qualified immunity for the January 11 warrant on the basis

of their potential status as lead investigators. (Application

for Stay at 7.) Defendants assert that there is not a

“different, higher, objective standard of reasonableness for a

lead investigator reviewing a warrant for probable cause than for

the District Attorney performing the same function.” (Id.) This

is a question of law, appealable under Mitchell. 

Plaintiffs argue that trial should nevertheless proceed

because this claim is frivolous. Although the court has agreed

with plaintiffs that the Ninth Circuit opinion, fairly read,

finds that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity as

to the January 11 warrant, the opinion is not crystal clear in

the critical portion that addresses this issue. The opinion

states that, if Hall was the lead investigator, he “would have

greater responsibility for ensuring that the warrant was not

defective.” KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). 

However, the court did not expressly indicate whether it was

referring to both warrants executed on January 13, or only the

supplemental, and more questionable, warrant that extended the

search to 1990. For the reasons explained in greater length in

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 Candor requires that the court acknowledge two further 1

considerations that have affected its view of whether a stay

should issue. First, the decision of the Ninth Circuit seems to

create a distinction, in civil liability actions, between the

District Attorney who approved the warrant and the lead

investigators who prepared it. When the sole question is whether

there are sufficient facts in the affidavit to support probable

cause, this distinction seems problematic. The lead investigator

concept seems most valuable when the comparison is between the

investigator who is in charge of an investigation and the many

law enforcement support personnel who assist at searches in

defined roles and who are not otherwise part of the overall

investigation. Of course, where the issue is not facial validity

but, for example, whether the affiant withheld material

information, a distinction might properly be drawn between the

investigator and the reviewing prosecutor. Second, the opinion

of the Ninth Circuit found that it was error for the district

court to defer ruling on Moore’s motion on the judicial deception

claim even though Moore had been unavailable for deposition. 

Whether or not a plaintiff is entitled to discovery to develop

facts in support of a claim, or whether plaintiff should be

confined to the knowledge that the plaintiff has upon filing the

complaint, poses a question of case management made more

difficult when an immunity defense is available. The approach

taken by the Court of Appeals seems to suggest a commitment to

resolving as many immunity issues as possible on interlocutory

appeal. The district court will welcome the further guidance

prior to trying the case. 

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previous rulings, the court understands the Ninth Circuit opinion

as imposing a higher standard on Hall and other lead

investigators for both warrants. Had the Court of Appeals found

that Hall was entitled to qualified immunity for the January 11

warrant, it would have said so. Nonetheless, it is possible that

the Court of Appeals may have treated the searches as a single

event, perhaps overlooking the distinction between the two

warrants. While this seems unlikely, the court is not prepared

to find that the defendants’ argument is frivolous. 

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Because defendants’ qualified immunity claim is appealable

and not frivolous, the court stays this action pending resolution

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of the appeal. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 26, 2006

 

/s/ David F. Levi 

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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