Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-07006/USCOURTS-caDC-04-07006-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 12, 2004 Decided November 30, 2004

No. 04-7006

KERRY FOX, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv02069)

Joel D. Joseph argued the cause for the appellants.

Ronald G. DeWald argued the cause for the appellee.

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and ROBERTS, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Kerry Fox, his

two sisters, Susan Fox and Janice Sterling, and a niece,

Deirdre Ford–Aikin (appellants), appeal the district court’s

grant of American Airlines’s motion to dismiss their amended

complaint seeking damages and injunctive relief resulting

from the airline’s treatment of them during Kerry Fox’s inflight medical emergency and afterwards. They likewise

appeal the district court’s denial of their motion to vacate its

judgment dismissing their suit. Because the district court

acted within its discretion in both instances, we affirm.

I.

In November 2001, the appellants boarded an American

Airlines, Inc. (American) flight at Baltimore/Washington International Airport destined for Laredo, Texas.1

 During the

flight Kerry Fox (Kerry), a diabetic, lapsed into severe insulin

shock and, when his sisters’ efforts to revive him proved

unsuccessful, the plane made an emergency landing in Nashville, Tennessee. The appellants allege that, during Kerry’s

episode, the flight attendants offered him no medical assistance. They further allege that the entire emergency could

have been avoided had American employees granted their

request either to allow a family member to be seated near

Kerry on the plane or to have the flight attendants monitor

his condition in-flight.

Kerry was revived by emergency personnel on the ground

in Nashville and, after being treated at a hospital, he was

deemed fit to travel on to Laredo. The appellants did not

complete the remainder of their journey, however, without

experiencing further difficulties. They allege that, because of

Kerry’s medical emergency, they were searched ‘‘thoroughly’’

before boarding flights from Nashville to Dallas–Ft. Worth

and from Dallas on to Laredo. Joint Appendix (J.A.) 23,

¶¶ 28–29. The trip home was ‘‘another nightmare.’’ J.A. 23,

1 This factual account is derived from the second amended

complaint. See Gilvin v. Fire, 259 F.3d 749, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (in

reviewing grant of motion to dismiss, court ‘‘treat[s] the complaint’s

factual allegations as true’’).

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¶ 30. They allege that American again targeted them for

thorough searches as a result of the earlier emergency, that

an American employee refused to board them on their Dallas

to Baltimore flight because they again requested that a family

member sit near Kerry and that, as a consequence, they were

forced to take a later flight home.

On October 23, 2002, the appellants filed a four-count

complaint against American, alleging: (I) gross negligence,

(II) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (III) breach of

contract and (IV) violations of the Americans with Disabilities

Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. and accompanying

federal regulations. On November 19, 2002, American filed a

motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing, among other things,

that the appellants’ allegations implicated the Air Carrier

Access Act (ACAA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 41705 et seq., not the ADA.

On November 21, 2002, the district court issued its ‘‘Standing

Order’’ apprising the parties of their obligation to comply

with local and federal rules of procedure, including Local

Rule 7.2

 On December 2, 2002, the appellants took American’s cue and amended their complaint to allege violations of

the ACAA instead of the ADA. They also filed an opposition

to American’s motion to dismiss.

On December 6, 2003, American moved to dismiss the

amended complaint but this time the appellants did not

respond. Instead, on January 14, 2003, they filed a joint

meet and confer statement and proposed scheduling order,

which repeatedly referenced a pending ‘‘motion to dismiss.’’

J.A. 3. On August 5, 2003, the district court granted American’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

Relying on Local Rule 7(b) of the Rules of the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia, see D.D.C.

LOCAL RULE 7(b), the district court explained that ‘‘because

the plaintiffs failed to respond to the defendant’s second

motion, the court treats the motion as conceded and grants

the motion.’’ Mem. Op., Granting Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, at 4, reprinted in J.A. 12. Having dismissed

2 See Judge Urbina’s Standing Order for Civil Cases, Nov. 21,

2002, at 6.

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the amended complaint under Local Rule 7(b), the district

court then noted that the appellants’ opposition to American’s

motion to dismiss the original complaint did challenge American’s contention that count IV failed to state a claim under

the ADA. The district court concluded, however, that even if

it treated the appellants’ opposition as an opposition to American’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint, it would

nonetheless grant that motion with respect to count IV under

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

(FRCP). As the district court saw it, ‘‘because the defendant’s argument that the ACAA does not create a private

right of action is substantively correct, even if the court were

to treat the plaintiffs’ opposition to the defendant’s first

motion as an opposition to the defendant’s second motion, the

court’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss

Count IV would remain the same.’’ J.A. 16.

The appellants subsequently moved under FRCP Rule

59(e) to vacate the district court’s judgment, asserting two

grounds. They claimed that the court’s judgment should be

vacated, first, because their counsel failed to receive electronic notice of American’s second motion to dismiss and, second,

because their amended complaint alleged a claim under the

ACAA, which American was estopped from contesting. The

district court concluded that neither argument required the

court to vacate its judgment to prevent ‘‘manifest injustice,’’

Mem. Op., Denying Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, at

5, reprinted in J.A. 5, and consequently, denied the motion.

As to the appellants’ first contention, the district court

concluded that, despite their counsel’s claimed ignorance, he

should have known that a second motion lay pending. That

the court uses an electronic filing system that automatically

sends the parties e-mail notices when documents are filed, the

district court explained, did not relieve counsel of his independent obligation to monitor the court’s docket. And had he

checked the docket, the court pointed out, he would have

discovered the motion. The court further noted that, on

January 15, 2003, counsel had filed a joint meet and confer

statement and proposed scheduling order, which referred to a

pending motion to dismiss. ‘‘[H]ad [plaintiffs’ counsel]

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checked the docket when filing the joint statement,’’ the court

observed, ‘‘he would have noticed that the defendant had filed

a motion to dismiss the amended complaint approximately

five and a half weeks earlier.’’ J.A. 6. Moreover, said the

district court, counsel should have realized that the pending

motion he referenced in his statement related to the amended

complaint, especially given that he should have been expecting an answer to it.

As to their second argument, the district court concluded

that it did not constitute a proper basis to amend the judgment as it essentially recycled ‘‘claims that the court has

already rejected.’’ J.A. 7. The appellants then appealed

both orders to us.

II.

The appellants seek reversal of the district court’s dismissal of their amended complaint for failing to comply with Local

Rule 7(b). Local Rule 7(b)—as did its predecessor, Local

Rule 108(b)—provides:

Within 11 days of the date of service or at such

other time as the Court may direct, an opposing

party shall serve and file a memorandum of points

and authorities in opposition to the motion. If such a

memorandum is not filed within the prescribed time,

the Court may treat the motion as conceded.

D.D.C. LOCAL RULE 7(b). The Rule is a docket-management

tool that facilitates efficient and effective resolution of motions by requiring the prompt joining of issues, see FDIC v.

Bender, 127 F.3d 58, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1997); cf. Jackson v.

Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, 101 F.3d

145, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (‘‘[Local] Rule 108(h) assists the

district court to maintain docket control and to decide motions for summary judgment efficiently and effectively.’’), and

we review the district court’s application of 7(b) for abuse of

discretion. See Bender, 127 F.3d at 67.

In defending their failure to comply with Local Rule 7(b),

the appellants offer nothing but an updated version of the

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classic ‘‘my dog ate my homework’’ line. They claim that, as

the result of a malfunction in the district court’s CM/ECF

electronic case filing system, their counsel never received an

e-mail notifying him of American’s motion to dismiss their

amended complaint. Imperfect technology may make a better scapegoat than the family dog in today’s world, but not so

here. Their counsel’s effort at explanation, even taken at

face value, is plainly unacceptable. Regardless whether he

received the e-mail notice, he remained obligated to monitor

the court’s docket. See United States ex rel. McAllan v. City

of New York, 248 F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 2001) (‘‘[P]arties have

an obligation to monitor the docket sheet to inform themselves of the entry of ordersTTTT’’), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 929

(2002); cf. Norgaard v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 121 F.3d

1074, 1075 (7th Cir. 1997) (ignorance of other court’s docket

‘‘is nothing but negligence, which does not justify untimely

action’’). Indeed, one would think that, at the very least, his

failure to receive a timely answer to the amended complaint

would have aroused his suspicion, thus prompting him to

check the court’s docket for any recent filings. See FED. R.

CIV. P. 15(a) (‘‘A party shall plead in response to an amended

pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended

pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the

court otherwise orders.’’). Accordingly, it is difficult to understand how counsel did not recognize that the ‘‘pending’’

motion to dismiss he repeatedly referenced in the joint meet

and confer statement and proposed scheduling order—filed

more than one month after American filed its second motion

to dismiss—related to the amended complaint. In dismissing

the appellants’ suit, the district court held that ‘‘because the

plaintiffs failed to respond to the defendant’s second motion,

the court treats the motion as conceded and grants the

motion.’’ Mem. Op., Granting Motion to Dismiss Amended

Complaint, at 4, reprinted in J.A. 12. This court has yet to

deem such a straightforward application of Local Rule 7(b) an

abuse of discretion and, based on the above, we see no reason

for doing so here. See Bender, 127 F.3d at 67–68.

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Last term we held that, before dismissing a bankruptcy

appeal under Rule 8001 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure3

 and Local Bankruptcy Rule 8009–1,4 the district

court must typically ‘‘consider[ ] the circumstances before [it]

and explain[ ] why it is in the interest of justice to dismiss

rather than to proceed to the merits.’’ English–Speaking

Union v. Johnson, 353 F.3d 1013, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

(hereinafter ESU). So that the district court’s inquiry is an

informed one, we also insisted that the appellant be notified

and given an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 1022. We

reasoned that ‘‘[t]his approach’’—which mirrors our own for

evaluating whether to accept late-filed briefs—‘‘not only properly calibrates the importance of deciding cases on the merits

and preserving district courts’ authority to control their dockets, but also ensures that this court is able to exercise its

highly deferential review.’’ Id.

Our holding in ESU, however, did not purport to extend

beyond ‘‘dismissals of bankruptcy appeals for nonjurisdictional procedural violations,’’ see id. at 1021, and with good

reason. A district court reviewing a bankruptcy appeal has a

‘‘completed’’ record before it and thus the procedure we

outlined in ESU tends to strike a proper balance between the

‘‘ ‘strong presumption in favor of adjudications on the mer3 Bankruptcy Rule 8001 provides in pertinent part: ‘‘An appellant’s failure to take any step other than timely filing a notice of

appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only

for such action as the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel

deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal.’’

FED. R. BANKR. P. 8001(a).

4 Local Rule 8009–1 provides:

If, after an appeal has been noted and the appellant has

complied with Bankruptcy Rule 8006, the appellant fails to

serve and file a brief within the time required by Bankruptcy Rule 8009, the District Court may, upon motion of

the appellee filed in the office of the Clerk of the District

Court, or upon its own order, dismiss the appeal for failure

to comply with Bankruptcy Rule 8009.

D.D.C. LOCAL BANKR. RULE 8009–1.

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its,’ ’’ id. at 1021 (quoting Shepherd v. Am. Broad Cos., 62

F.3d 1469, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1995)), and the need for the district

court to have at its disposal ‘‘powerful tools to manage [its]

docket[ ], prevent undue delay, and sanction those who abuse

the system,’’ ESU, 353 F.3d at 1021 (citing Link v. Wabash

R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–30 (1962); Shea v. Donohoe

Constr. Co., 795 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). We

reconcile these competing interests differently in the trial

setting where the district court may well have before it

multiple opposed motions—‘‘any and all’’ of which are subject

to Local Rule 7(b). Bender, 127 F.3d at 67. Requiring it to

provide notice, an opportunity to explain and weigh alternatives before enforcing Rule 7(b) would hinder effective docket

management. See ESU, 353 F.3d at 1021 (‘‘Strictly enforcing

procedural rules ensures both that cases are adjudicated

efficiently and that litigants argue their causes on a level

playing field.’’); see also Bender, 127 F.3d at 67. Accordingly, as we have often observed, ‘‘[w]here the district court

relies on the absence of a response as a basis for treating the

motion as conceded, we honor its enforcement of the rule.’’

Twelve John Does v. Dist. of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 577

(D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Bender, 127 F.3d at 68; Geller v.

Randi, 40 F.3d 1300, 1304–05 (D.C. Cir. 1994). We do so

again here.

The appellants also attempt to revive count IV of their

complaint, first, by invoking non-mutual offensive collateral

estoppel (a.k.a. issue preclusion) to assert that American is

barred from denying the existence of an implied right of

action under the ACAA and, second, by arguing that, in any

event, such an implied right does exist. The district court’s

view that count IV’s allegations failed to state a claim,

however, constitutes dictum. It discussed the issue only to

observe that, had the appellants not conceded American’s

second motion to dismiss by failing to respond timely, it

would have nonetheless dismissed count IV under FRCP

Rule 12(b)(6).

Finally, the appellants question the district court’s denial of

their FRCP Rule 59(e) motion but do not argue the point.

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They allege in their Statement of Issues that the district

court erred in denying their motion but elaborate no further.

Such a conclusory assertion typically does not warrant review. See, e.g., Wash. Legal Clinic for the Homeless v.

Barry, 107 F.3d 32, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (issue not properly

raised where addressed in ‘‘cursory fashion’’ supported only

with ‘‘bare-bones arguments’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). In any event, we think the district court did not abuse

its discretion in denying the motion. See Ciralsky v. CIA,

355 F.3d 661, 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

‘‘A Rule 59(e) motion is discretionary and need not be

granted unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new

evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent

manifest injustice.’’ Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205,

1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks

omitted); accord Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 671. We can hardly

say that the district court abused its discretion in declining to

vacate its judgment of dismissal to prevent ‘‘manifest injustice’’ flowing from the appellants’ failure to receive notice

given that, as discussed above, the dismissal of their suit

might have been avoided through the exercise of due diligence. See Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 673 (‘‘We also cannot find

that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that

manifest injustice does not exist where, as here, a party could

have easily avoided the outcomeTTTT’’ (internal quotation

marks and brackets omitted)). Nor do we find any abuse of

discretion in the district court’s refusal to vacate its judgment

based on their allegedly valid ACAA claim as this argument

was available to them earlier. See id. Cf. Kattan by Thomas

v. Dist. of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

(‘‘Ordinarily Rule 59 motions TTT are not granted by the

District Court where they are used by a losing party to

request the trial judge to reopen proceedings in order to

consider a new defensive theory which could have been raised

during the original proceedings.’’).

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* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

So ordered.

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