Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00792/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00792-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 08CV792-BTM (CAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM J. TUMA, doing business as,

TUMA AND ASSOCIATES

Plaintiff,

Case No. 08CV792-BTM (CAB)

ORDER RE MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

v.

EATON CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the Court’s May 23, 2011 order granting partial

summary judgment to Defendant. One of the grounds raised in Plaintiff’s motion is that the

Court should have granted Plaintiff’s request for oral argument. Plaintiff is correct that a

party opposing summary judgment is entitled to oral argument, upon request, if the summary

judgment motion is granted. Jasinski v. Showboat Operating Co., 644 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th

Cir. 1981). Accordingly, the Court heard oral argument on the motion for reconsideration

and reviews the motion for summary judgment de novo. Having conducted a de novo review

of the motion papers and the relevant record, the Court REAFFIRMS the May 23, 2011

summary judgment order, but modifies some of the supporting reasoning, as set forth below.

Case 3:08-cv-00792-BTM-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/25/11 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 08CV792-BTM (CAB)

I. DISCUSSION

A. Procuring Cause Doctrine

In the Court’s summary judgment order, the Court held that the procuring cause

doctrine was inapplicable because the contract to which Plaintiff is a “procuring cause” is

a pricing agreement, upon which commissions would not be owed under the operative

contract. Order at 6 n.3 At oral argument for the motion for reconsideration, Defendant

stated that the first order on the Watkins Agreement was placed one month after it was

signed (approximately four and a half months after the effective date of Plaintiff’s

termination) and that had Plaintiff not been terminated, Plaintiff would have received an

apportioned commission on that order pursuant to Section 9(c) of the contract. Under the

premise that Plaintiff is seeking commissions on that first order (as well as subsequent

ones), as opposed to a commission for the Watkins Agreement, the Court now

addresses Plaintiff’s procuring cause doctrine arguments.

 Plaintiff points to evidence that he contends shows that he worked for four years

before finally convincing Watkins to consider switching to Defendant’s products and that

both Watkins and Defendant recognized the role Plaintiff played in setting up their

business arrangement. See Pl. Statement of Facts 22-31, 37, 43. The Court assumes

that such evidence is sufficient to demonstrate a disputed factual issue as to whether

Plaintiff was the procuring cause, under California law, of the first order placed under the

Watkins Agreement. See Rose v. Hunter, 155 Cal. App. 2d 319, 323 (1st Dist. 1957)

(“Procuring cause has been defined as the cause originating a series of events that,

without break in their continuity, result in the accomplishment of the prime object of the

employment.”) (quotations and citation omitted).

Nevertheless, the procuring cause doctrine does not provide a basis for Plaintiff to

recover commissions in this case. For this theory to apply, the governing contract must

either provide that a commission is earned by “procuring” a sale or not contain contrary

Case 3:08-cv-00792-BTM-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/25/11 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 08CV792-BTM (CAB)

provisions. See Zinn v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 149 P.2d 177, 180-181 (1944); Drumm v.

Morningstar, Inc., NO. C08-3362 THE, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94358, at *2-5 (N.D. Cal.

Oct. 8, 2009) (noting lack of support for proposition that “the procuring cause theory may

be relied on to circumvent written contractual conditions”); Schuman v. Ikon Office

Solutions, Inc., 232 Fed. Appx. 659, 662 (9th Cir. Cal. 2007) (procuring cause doctrine

cannot be used “to contradict the express provisions of the Plan”). 

Here, the parties did not provide for accrual of commissions where Plaintiff is the

procuring cause of orders placed after termination. Instead, unambiguous contract

language provides that commissions are owed only upon the final acts of sales that occur

prior to thirty days after the effective date of termination. Where commissions have not

accrued as of the time of a contractual post-termination cut-off date, the procuring cause

doctrine cannot be used to effectively rewrite the contract to allow a salesperson to

recover post-termination commissions. See Drumm, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94358, at

*2-5.

B. Prevention/Bad Faith Termination

Plaintiff also asserts that he can recover commissions on the Watkins Agreement

under the theories of prevention of performance and the implied covenant of good faith. 

Plaintiff asserts that because he was not paid a salary or expenses and cost Defendant

nothing other than commissions that he had earned, a reasonable jury could conclude

that Plaintiff was fired for the purpose of depriving him of commissions on future orders

placed by Watkins. The Court assumes that such circumstantial evidence is sufficient to

create a disputed factual issue of whether he was terminated in bad faith. Nevertheless,

as a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot recover commissions because of the unambiguous

terms of his contract.

As an initial matter, contrary to Plaintiff’s position, the mere termination of an atwill employee and the denial of commission payments after his termination does not

Case 3:08-cv-00792-BTM-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/25/11 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 As noted in the summary judgment order, the California Supreme Court has stated 1

in dicta that “the covenant might be violated if termination of an at-will employee was a mere

pretext to cheat the worker out of another contract benefit to which the employee was clearly

entitled, such as compensation already earned.” Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th

317, 353 n.18 (2000). However, the California Supreme Court has not addressed the

situation presented in the instant case: when an express provision of the contract authorizes

termination of an employee prior to payment of commissions for future orders that he is

arguably a procuring cause.

4 08CV792-BTM (CAB)

provide Plaintiff with a basis of recovery under either the prevention doctrine or the

implied covenant of good faith. See Drumm, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94358, at * 9

(quoting Kline v. Johnson, 121 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 851 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1953))

(“[T]he prevention doctrine is inapplicable where ‘the preventing action is allowed under

the contract.’”); Nein v. HostPro, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 4th 833, 852 (2d Dist. 2009)

(“Because the express terms of the agreement thus permitted defendant to deny plaintiff

further commissions after his termination, doing so cannot violate the implied covenant.”). 

However, neither of these cases – nor any other case cited by the parties or uncovered in

the Court’s research – squarely addresses whether, under California law, a salesperson,

who is terminated in bad faith, may recover commissions on post-termination sales when

recovery contradicts the express terms of an employment contract that is neither

unconscionable nor illegal. Accordingly, it is the Court’s task to best predict how the 1

California Supreme Court would resolve this issue. See Giles v. GMAC, 494 F.3d 865,

872 (9th Cir. 2007).

The Ninth Circuit has twice addressed this issue under the laws of other states

and once certified it to the Washington Supreme Court. See Balzer/Wolf Associates, Inc.

v. Parlex Corp., 753 F.2d 771, 774-775 (9th Cir. 1985); Hendry v. Exide Elec. Corp., Nos.

90-15964, 90-16148, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 21804, 21-22 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 1992); Willis

v. Champlain Cable Corp., 842 F.2d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 1988). All three of these

decisions deny recovery of commissions, in situations substantially similar to the case at

bar.

In Balzer/Wolf, the plaintiff entered into a sales representative agreement that

provided for commission payments on sales made pursuant to the contract. Balzer/Wolf

Case 3:08-cv-00792-BTM-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/25/11 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 08CV792-BTM (CAB)

Associates, Inc., 753 F.2d at 771-772. The agreement could be terminated without

cause and provided that in the event of termination, commissions on orders accepted by

the defendant prior to termination but delivered thereafter, would be paid pursuant to a

schedule set forth in the contract. Id. at 772. The plaintiff alleged that the agreement

was terminated in order to avoid paying commissions on orders placed after termination

and sought recovery on this basis. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit, interpreting Massachusetts law, did not find the defendant’s

motivation in terminating the agreement to be material to whether the plaintiff was entitled

to extra-contractual post-termination commissions. See id. at 774. The Ninth Circuit

held:

[W]ithout regard to whether Massachusetts law implies a covenant of good faith

and fair dealing in contracts other than employment, . . . the contract

unambiguously provides for the contingency that gives rise to this case and that, in

the absence of unconscionability or illegality, Massachusetts law requires the

enforcement of the contract as written.

Id. The court’s reasoning fully applies here:

The bargain as struck should be enforced. Only by doing so can we be certain that

the balance of advantages and disadvantages struck by each party in the bargain

they reached is implemented. Not to implement this balance would deprive the

parties of their bargain and impair their freedom to contract as they wish.

Bargains, of course, sometimes rest on assumptions about the future that prove to

be fundamentally incorrect. In those instances relief derived from principles not

imbedded in the language of the contract, such as impossibility of performance,

commercial frustration, or implied covenants, is available. In effect, Balzer/Wolf

insists this is such a case. We disagree. While it cannot be said that the parties

foresaw the Hughes Aircraft orders, it is clear they foresaw the type of situation of

which the Hughes Aircraft orders is an example. Perfect foresight is not required

to assure enforcement of the written word. A general provision which deals with

the type of situation which does in fact occur should be enough. Clearly and

unambiguously the parties here agreed to that much.

Id. at 774-75.

Similarly, Willis involved a sales representative agreement that provided that the

agreement could be terminated without cause and that commissions would be paid on

certain post-termination sales. Willis v. Champlain Cable Corp., 109 Wn.2d 747, 748-749

(1988). The plaintiff alleged that he was terminated in bad faith in order to avoid payment

of commissions. Id. at 751.

Case 3:08-cv-00792-BTM-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/25/11 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 This section provides: “An agent to whom the principal has made a revocable offer 2

of compensation if he accomplishes a specified result is entitled to the promised amount if

the principal, in order to avoid payment of it, revokes the offer and thereafter the result is

accomplished as the result of the agent’s prior efforts.”

6 08CV792-BTM (CAB)

Because the governing contract expressly foreclosed payment of all posttermination commissions, the Washington Supreme Court reviewed two possible bases

for recovery, the procuring cause doctrine and section 454 of the Restatement (Second)

of Agency. Id. at 754-55. The court concluded that neither was applicable “when, as 2

here, a written contract provides the manner by which termination can be effected as well

as how commissions will be awarded when an employee or agent is terminated.” Id. at

755. 

Finally, in Hendry, the Ninth Circuit, applying North Carolina law held that an at-will

sales representative could not rely on a theory that he was terminated in bad faith in

order recover post-termination commissions. Hendry, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 21804, at

*21-22. The court explained that “our reading of the procuring cause rule is that it only

implies a requirement of good faith in termination if the parties’ contract fails to specify

when the agent is entitled to receive commissions.” Id. at *22 n.13 (emphasis in original).

In light of decisions discussed above interpreting California law to preclude use of

the procuring cause doctrine to circumvent written contractual conditions, the California

Supreme Court would likely find the reasoning of these Ninth Circuit cases persuasive. 

The Court thus predicts that the California Supreme Court would hold that in the absence

of unconscionability or illegality, where a contract unambiguously limits commissions

upon termination, an at-will salesperson may not recover post-termination commissions,

even if the employer terminated the salesperson in bad faith. 

Applying this rule to the instant case, Plaintiff’s bad faith cause of action fails as a

matter of law. Regardless of whether Plaintiff was hired for the purpose of winning

Watkins’ business in the form of a “long term multi-year purchase contract rather than

just a single order or a few orders” (mem. at 5-6) or signed a “standard form contract

used with ‘ordinary’ sales people” (mem. at 7), the express language of the contract

Case 3:08-cv-00792-BTM-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/25/11 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 08CV792-BTM (CAB)

provides for a cutoff of sales commissions thirty days after the effective date of

termination. Plaintiff is an experienced salesman who should have understood that this

clear and unambiguous provision could be applied to deprive him of commissions on

orders that he procured that were placed after this cutoff date. Moreover, assuming the

truth of Plaintiff’s assertion that Plaintiff was hired to create a long-term business

relationship with Watkins, Defendant would have good reason to establish a commission

cut-off date. Unlike an order of a single unique item, the Watkins Agreement was a

pricing and preferred vender agreement that did not obligate Watkins to make any

purchases. C.f. Willis, Wn.2d at 751. Future orders would depend on the performance

of Defendant in terms of the quality of its product, timeliness of delivery, and attitude and

responsiveness of its customer service and sales representatives. In such

circumstances, companies have to be concerned about having a finite point upon which

commission payments are cutoff. Indeed, here, Plaintiff asserted at oral argument that

he is indefinitely entitled to commission payments, so long as Watkins purchases

products from Defendant. To reform the contract now to accomplish what Plaintiff wants

would be improper because Defendant may never have agreed to such a commission

provision. In the absence of illegality or unconscionability, it is not the Court’s role to

rewrite the contract retroactively to create a different bargain.

Cases relied upon by Plaintiff do not compel a different conclusion and are largely

distinguishable on the grounds that they involve contracts that are silent as to whether a

salesperson is entitled to commissions after termination, see Poggi v. Tool Research &

Eng'g Corp., 75 Wn.2d 356, 366-367 (1969); Wise v. Reeve Electronics, Inc., 183 Cal.

App. 2d 4, 7 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1960); expressly contain assurances that the employer

will act in good faith in payment of post-termination commissions, Watson v. Wood

Dimension, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1359, 1361 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1989); or provide for

payment of commissions that are “earned . . . prior to termination.” See Fiberchem, Inc.

Case 3:08-cv-00792-BTM-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/25/11 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The Fiberchem court interpreted commissions “earned” to include commissions on 3

sales upon which the plaintiff was the procuring cause. 495 F.2d at 739. Here, unlike in

Fiberchem, there is no language in provisions governing when commission payments accrue

that can be fairly read to allow for commissions on future orders that are procured by

Plaintiff.

8 08CV792-BTM (CAB)

v. General Plastics Corp., 495 F.2d 737, 739 (9th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added) . Two 3

cases, however, bear closer consideration: McCollum v. Xcare.net, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d

1142 (N.D. Cal. 2002) and Stiglich v. Jani-King of Cal., 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS

9390 (4th Dist. Oct. 28, 2008).

The Court addressed McCollum in the summary judgment order. For the reasons

stated in that order, this case can be distinguished on its facts. Additionally, the

McCollum court found contract provisions dealing with the allocation of post-termination

commissions to be ambiguous as to whether they applied to a termination without cause. 

McCollum, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1151. Thus, the McCollum court was not presented with

the issue of whether allegations of bad faith termination can provide a basis for recovery

when the express and unambiguous contractual provisions limit recovery of

post-termination commissions.

In Stiglich, an at-will salesperson successfully argued that he was entitled to

commissions on sales that he procured. The contract at issue provided that the

salesperson was entitled to commissions only after completing conditions that related to

the servicing of his sales accounts. Stiglich, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9390, at *3-6. 

The Stiglich court held that the doctrine of prevention of performance conferred the

plaintiff with a right to commissions on sales he procured because his termination

prevented him from performing his post-procurement contractual duties. Id. at *24-25. 

The contract in Stiglich also contained a provision that required plaintiff to

“relinquish all rights to commissions which have not been paid to date to Employee” upon

termination. Id. at *27 n.5. It is unclear the extent to which this provision factored into

the court’s decision regarding prevention of performance, as the Stiglich court noted that

it had not been referenced in the defendant’s opening or reply brief and this provision is

not discussed in the body of the first half of the opinion. Id. 

Case 3:08-cv-00792-BTM-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/25/11 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 08CV792-BTM (CAB)

Regardless, Stiglich does not run counter to the rule derived from Balzer/Wolf, and

other precedent discussed above, because the Stiglich court held that the contract

provisions governing payment of post-termination commissions and commissions after

fulfillment of post-procurement conditions are unconscionable. Id. at *28. For the

reasons discussed in the summary judgment order, setting an end date on commission

payments on all orders - including post-termination orders arguably procured by Plaintiff -

is not substantively unconscionable. Thus, Stiglich is distinguishable from the instant

case and is not contrary to the Court’s holding that in the absence of illegality and

unconscionability, express contractual provisions limiting payment of post-termination

commissions foreclose Plaintiff from sustaining his implied covenant cause of action.

C. Remaining Arguments

i. Contract Interpretation

Plaintiff asserts that the Court should have addressed deposition testimony stating

that Plaintiff was hired for the purpose of winning Watkins’ business and that an

agreement with Watkins would likely be in the form of a “long term multi-year purchase

contract rather than just a single order or a few orders.” Mem. at 5-6. Plaintiff contends

that this evidence demonstrates that the Court's interpretation renders the contract

“illusory or absurd.” Id. at 6.

However, neither of these facts provides an alternative meaning for contractual

language that requires commissions to be paid after acceptance of the order by

Defendant and delivery. The Court held that Plaintiff must be paid for all orders by

Watkins during Plaintiff’s employment. Order at 9-10. Moreover, as discussed in the

summary judgment order, an “order” can be a single purchase at a negotiated price or

one placed pursuant to a long-term pricing agreement. Thus, the contract signed by

Plaintiff covers an engagement to procure “orders” from Watkins. Whether or not Plaintiff

Case 3:08-cv-00792-BTM-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/25/11 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 08CV792-BTM (CAB)

was hired to obtain a long-term contract with Watkins does nothing to alter this analysis.

ii. Forfeiture

Plaintiff asserts that the contractual provision cutting off commission payments

thirty days after the effective day of termination acted as a forfeiture because once he

brought Watkins to the table, “Plaintiff's job was done, 100%, he had earned his

commission through four years of persistent work.” Mem. at 8.

As noted in the summary judgment order, the Court concludes that a forfeiture did

not take place here. Under the operative contract, Plaintiff had not earned any right to

commissions on the Watkins Agreement because he was only entitled to commissions

when orders were actually accepted and shipped. However, assuming that the

post-termination cutoff date caused Plaintiff to forfeit commissions on all orders upon

which he was a procuring cause, the Court’s interpretation of the contract still would not

change. “A contract is not to be construed to provide a forfeiture unless no other

interpretation is reasonably possible.” Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co.,

20 Cal. 2d 751, 771 (1942) (emphasis added). Here, Section 15(b) of the contract

unambiguously bars commission payments on all orders accepted more than thirty days

after the effective day of the termination, and Sections 4 and 9(a) make clear that an

order constitutes the final acts of a sale. Irrespective of Plaintiff’s arguments that these

provisions caused a forfeiture, the contract is not susceptible to any interpretation other

than that Plaintiff is not entitled to commissions on orders placed pursuant to the Watkins

agreement. 

iii. Retroactive Changes To Compensation

Plaintiff asserts that under the Court’s interpretation of the contract, Defendant has

the right to retroactively change Plaintiff's commission after his work is complete and that

Case 3:08-cv-00792-BTM-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/25/11 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The Court inadvertently cited to the California Labor Code sections 1738.15 and 4

1738.13 in the summary judgment order. The proper citations are to the California Civil

Code. Additionally, the next to last sentence of the conclusion of the summary judgment

order twice references section 1738.15. The second reference should be to 1738.13.

11 08CV792-BTM (CAB)

“[n]umerous cases consistently and uniformly hold that changes to commission and

compensation terms cannot be done retroactively.” Mem. at 12. However, unlike the

cases cited by Plaintiff, the instant case does not involve retroactive adjustment of

compensation (or an employment right) that had already vested pursuant to the

governing contract. C.f. Kempf v. Barrett Bus. Servs., Inc., 336 Fed. Appx. 658, 662 (9th

Cir. 2009) (employee entitled to bonus where he “performed adequately under the terms

of Barrett's bonus plan”); McCaskey v. California State Automobile Assn., 189 Cal. App.

4th 947, 952-953, 963 (6th Dist. 2010) (triable issue of fact as to whether employer

brought about sales agents' discharges by breaching a promise to permit senior sales

agents to continue in its employ under relaxed sales quotas, which “gave rise to a

contractual duty toward plaintiffs”). Here, there were no orders placed pursuant to the

Watkins agreement during Plaintiff's employment. Thus, Plaintiff had not accrued any

rights to compensation under the contract that could have been retroactively adjusted. 

Moreover, contractual language expressly prevents Defendant from taking action to

retroactively change commission rates, as Section 9(a) provides that any changes to

commission rates “will only be applicable to orders which are mailed or delivered to

Cutler-Hammer 30 days after notice of such change in rate is given to the

Representative.” The Court has not been presented with any facts showing that

Defendant directly violated this provision.

iv. Wholesale Sales Representative Contractual Relations Act

In the Court’s summary judgment order, the Court held that Defendant was not

entitled to summary judgment on a claim that Defendant violated Cal. Civ. Code §

1738.15 by not paying Plaintiff a commission on the field test order. The court also held 4

Case 3:08-cv-00792-BTM-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/25/11 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 08CV792-BTM (CAB)

that Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Section 1738.13 claim

because a contractual provision providing Defendant with sole right to apportion

commissions on sales made with the cooperation of a sales representative and a

distributor failed to set forth the rate or method of computation of commission. 

At oral argument, Plaintiff took the position that a violation of Section 1738.13

would entitle him to commissions on orders made pursuant to the Watkins Agreement. 

The Court disagrees. Plaintiff was denied commissions on Watkins Agreement orders

because of the contract provision cutting off commissions thirty days after the effective

day of termination, not because of Defendant’s purported right to apportion commissions.

The field test order was the only order placed prior to the expiration of this tail period, and

thus, the provision governing the apportionment of commissions played no role in the

denial of commissions for all other orders. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to damages

under section 1738.13 only for the field test order and not for any orders placed pursuant

to the Watkins Agreement.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 

After a de novo review, the Court REAFFIRMS its summary judgment order with the

modification of some of the supporting reasoning, as set forth above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 25, 2011

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-00792-BTM-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/25/11 Page 12 of 12