Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02081/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02081-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CONSTANCE MELKONIAN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06cv2081 BTM(BLM)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO

DISMISS

v.

U.S. GOVERNMENT AND JO ANNE B.

BARNHART,

Defendants.

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. For

the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that she has been disabled since her birth on May 28, 1986, due to

a heart defect. The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) granted Supplemental Security

Income (“SSI”) benefits to Plaintiff on May 31, 1989, with an onset date of May 28, 1986. 

In 1998, the SSA notified Plaintiff that pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.994a(a), her case

would be reviewed to determine whether she continued to be under a “disability,” as defined

by the Social Security Act. When Plaintiff failed to appear for a pediatric consultative

examination scheduled by the SSA, the SSA determined that there was insufficient evidence

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to establish continuing disability. Plaintiff’s benefits were terminated on September 1, 2003.

Plaintiff’s eighteenth birthday was on May 26, 2004. Administrative Law Judge

Edward Steinman held a hearing on February 1, 2005, to determine whether the cessation

of Plaintiff’s SSI benefits was proper, and whether Plaintiff was disabled as of her eighteenth

birthday. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s heart condition no long met or equaled any listed

impairment and that her eligibility for childhood SSI benefits ceased in May, 2000. In a

separate decision, the ALJ also found that Plaintiff was not disabled as of her eighteenth

birthday because she retained the residual functional capacity to perform a variety of jobs

in the national economy. 

Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s decisions. However, in a decision dated May 25,

2006, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review.

Plaintiff commenced this action on September 25, 2006.

II. DISCUSSION

In her First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that SSA officials improperly denied

her “disability/SSI benefits” and “healthcare insurance benefits.” Plaintiff also alleges

violations of her constitutional and civil rights in connection with the denial of her benefits.

Plaintiff seeks relief including (1) interim mandamus relief for all DIB/SSI benefit claims; (2)

injunctive, declaratory, and mandamus relief for the payment of $3,000,000, representing

“the exact sum certain of private sector insurance policies with coverage of $1,000,000 per

each person and per each occurrence”; and (3) reimbursement to Plaintiff for all

medical/surgical costs and expenses rendered over the past nineteen years in the amount

of $3,500,000 or more. 

Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for challenging the SSA’s denial of her SSI benefits and

cessation of her SSI benefits is the review procedure set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “No

findings of fact or decision of the Commissioner of Social Security shall be reviewed by any

person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(h).

The Court lacks jurisdiction to grant mandamus relief with respect to Plaintiff’s claim

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1

 Plaintiff’s Complaint does not specifically ask for judicial review under section

405(g). However, the Complaint cites the statute and alleges that the SSA’s denial of

benefits was not supported by substantial evidence. In addition, on the Civil Cover Sheet,

Plaintiff indicated that she was filing suit under section 405(g) and described the cause of

action as “SHH and Appeals Council denial of DIB/SSI and health care benefits.”

2

 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

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for SSI benefits. As explained in Hironymous v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1986), where

a plaintiff seeks substantive review of a decision of the Secretary, jurisdiction under the

Mandamus Act is unavailable unless the plaintiff has exhausted his or her remedies under

section 405(g). Plaintiff has not exhausted her remedies under section 405(g). Construing

Plaintiff’s Complaint liberally, Plaintiff currently seeks judicial review of the SSA’s final

decision.1 Therefore, Plaintiff is still pursuing her remedies under section 405(g).

Plaintiff seeks damages and other relief based on the theory that Defendants acted

tortiously or in violation of the constitution by denying her benefits. However, section 405(h)

provides: “No action against the United States, the Commissioner of Social Security, or any

officer of employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of Title 28 to recover

on any claim arising under this subchapter.” Plaintiff’s claims for damages and other relief

require the Court to adjudicate whether Plaintiff is indeed disabled or continued to be

disabled. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims “arise under” the Social Security Act and are barred

by section 405(h). See Hooker v. United States Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 858

F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1988); Marin v. HEW, Health Care Financing, 769 F.2d 590, 592 (1985)

(explaining that allowing lawsuits under the FTCA “for greater damages than the statute

provides would render meaningless the jurisdiction restriction of § 405(h).”). 

Furthermore, a plaintiff may not maintain a Bivens2 action for officials’ unconstitutional

conduct resulting in the wrongful denial of benefits. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412

(1988). The Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain claims that Plaintiff’s due process or other

constitutional rights were violated in connection with the denial of benefits. Hooker, 858 F.2d

at 530.

Plaintiff also seeks relief in connection with insurance benefits she believes she is

owed under insurance policies issued by “private sector insurers.” Plaintiff believes that the

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3

 The order was entered in Case No. 97-56176, an appeal from Melkonian v. Truck

Insurance Exchange, 97cv1410 BTM, a case that was previously before this Court. In that

case, Plaintiff and her parents sued insurance companies, state agencies, and health care

providers. Plaintiffs alleged that they were defrauded of benefits under a number of

insurance policies and that they suffered damages as a result of medical malpractice. This

action was dismissed. 

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Ninth Circuit issued a “fully favorable mandamus order” on February 9, 1998 with respect to

the insurance policies. However, the order, which is attached to the First Amended

Complaint, did not grant any relief to Plaintiff.3

 The order states that the court sua sponte

dismisses the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and that “[t]he mandate shall be issue in due

course.” It appears that Plaintiff misunderstood the meaning of the word “mandate.” A

mandate is not a mandamus order, but, rather, is a method of communicating the judgment

of the appeals court to the district court. The mandate consists of “a certified copy of the

judgment, a copy of the court’s opinion, if any, and any direction about costs.” Fed. R. App.

P. 41(a).

At any rate, Plaintiff does not provide any legal basis for holding the Commissioner

or the United States responsible for any benefits owed under the insurance policies. The

Court fails to see the relevance of the insurance policies to the determination of Plaintiff’s

entitlement to SSI benefits. 

In sum, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to all of Plaintiff’s claims

except her claim for judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision under 42 U.S.C. §

405(g).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendants’ motion is DENIED without prejudice as to

Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the Commissioner’s final

decision affirming the cessation of SSI benefits (before the age of eighteen) and denying SSI

benefits (as of Plaintiff’s eighteenth birthday). Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to the

remainder of Plaintiff’s claims in the First Amended Complaint. Defendants shall respond

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to the complaint for § 405(g) review of denial of benefits within 30 days of the entry of this

order. The administrative record shall be filed within 60 days of the filing of an answer.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 11, 2007

Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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