Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00505/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00505-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DESHAWN MALONE,

Plaintiff,

v.

V. RANGEL, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:09-cv-00505-SKO PC

ORDER DISMISSINGCOMPLAINT,WITHOUT

LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 1)

Plaintiff Deshawn Malone (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is in the custody of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and is currently incarcerated at

Kern ValleyState Prison in Delano, California. However,Plaintiff was incarcerated at the California

State Prison in Corcoran, California (“CSP-Corcoran”) during the events described in his complaint. 

Plaintiff is suing under section 1983 for the violation of his rights under the First Amendment.

Plaintiff names V. Rangel, Rodriguez, and other unknown property officers as defendants. Plaintiff

has consented to jurisdiction by U.S. Magistrate Judge. (Docs. #6, 8.) Accordingly, all proceedings

in this action are conducted by U.S. Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any claims

upon which relief can be granted under Section 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed

without leave to amend.

I. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading

standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570). “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s

liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must accept as true all factual

allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. 

Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

II. Background

Plaintiff filed his complaint on February 17, 2009. (Doc. #1.) Plaintiff complains that he 1

arrived at CSP-Corcoran’s security housing unit (“SHU”) on December 1, 2008. Plaintiff was told

by an officer that “inmate (SHU) property issuance is (2) two months behind.” (Mot. Requesting

Temporary Injunctive Relief 2:7-12, ECF No. 1.) Later, Plaintiff asked Defendant Rodriguez about

Plaintiff’s “complaint” is entitled “Motion Requesting Temporary Injunctive Relief.” (Mot. Requesting

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Temporary Injunctive Relief 1, ECF No. 1.) However, given the contents of Plaintiff’s “motion” and the fact that

there is no other filing on the docket that could be construed as a complaint, the Court construes Plaintiff’s motion as

a complaint requesting injunctive relief.

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his property and was told that the “property room” was now three (3) months behind. (Mot.

Requesting Temporary Injunctive Relief 2:13-18, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff was told that the delay was

because there was not enough help in the property room.

Plaintiff complains that prison policy requires property to be issued within fifteen (15)

working days. Accordingly, Plaintiff authored a “group inmate appeal” complaining about the

property issue. (Mot. RequestingTemporaryInjunctive Relief 3:9-11, ECF No 1.) Plaintiff’s appeal

was submitted on January 1, 2009. Plaintiff claims that prison policy states that informal responses

to inmate appeals are due within ten working days. Plaintiff did not receive an informal level

response and Plaintiff submitted an “Inmate Request for Interview” form. On January 25, 2009,

Plaintiff attempted to contact Defendant V. Rangel about the appeal. Plaintiff complains that Rangel

never responded to Plaintiff’s requests for an interview.

Plaintiff claims that exhaustion of his administrative remedies is required to bring suit in

federal court. Plaintiff describes Defendants’ failure to respond to his appeals as a “deliberate and

systemic impediment.” (Mot. Requesting Temporary Injunctive Relief 5:14-15, ECF No. 1.) 

Plaintiff concludes that the Defendants’ failure to respond to his appeals as “beared toward the right

of an inmate taken grievance against a state agency” as guaranteed by the First Amendment. (Mot.

RequestingTemporaryInjunctive Relief 6:5-8, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants acted

to suppress Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to file grievances against the government.

III. Discussion

A. First Amendment/Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff claims that Defendants suppressed Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to file

grievances against the government by failing to respond to Plaintiff’s grievance. In the prison

context, allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “[A] viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because

of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his

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First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional

goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). An allegation of retaliation

against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison grievance is sufficient to support a claim

under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for the violation of his First Amendment rights. Plaintiff’s only

allegation against Defendant Rangel is that Rangel failed to respond to Plaintiff’s group complaint. 

The failure to respond to a group complaint cannot fairly be characterized as “retaliation” against

Plaintiff’s right to file grievances. There is nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint that supports the

conclusion that Rangel deliberately ignored Plaintiff’s group complaint “because of” Plaintiff’s

protected conduct. Further, Plaintiff does not allege that Rangel’s action chilled Plaintiff’s exercise

of his First Amendment rights. While the Ninth Circuit has suggested that it is not necessary to

specifically allege a chilling effect when a litigant alleges that he suffered harm that is “more than

minimal,” Plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered harm that is “more than minimal.” Rhodes v.

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 n.11 (9th Cir. 2005). The only “harm” that Plaintiff suffered is the lack

of response from his administrative complaint. Such a frivolous allegation of “harm” is hardly

enough to support the inference that Plaintiff was chilled from exercising his First Amendment

rights.

The Court notes that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires prisoners to exhaust their

administrative remedies prior to filing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Although Plaintiff does not

specifically raise this argument, a prisoner could arguably suffer “harm” by an official’s failure to

respond to a grievance if it prevented that prisoner from exhausting their administrative remedy,

thereby preventing them from filing a federal lawsuit. The Court rejects this argument as it is clear

that a prison official’s failure to respond to a prisoner’s administrative grievance would excuse that

prisoner’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217,

1224 (9th Cir. 2010) (prisoner’s failure to timely exhaust administrative remedies is excused when

prisoner takes reasonable and appropriate steps to exhaust but was precluded from exhausting

through no fault of his own). Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Rangel for retaliation

against Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to file grievances against the government.

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rodriguez was the SHU property officer. Plaintiff’s only

allegation against Rodriguez is that Rodriguez told Plaintiff about the delay in the issuance of

Plaintiff’s property, and that the delay was caused by under-staffing in the property room. It is

unclear how Rodriguez’s actions had any effect on Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to file

grievances. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Rodriguez for retaliation against

Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to file grievances against the government.

B. Due Process Claim

To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to raise a due process challenge to the temporary

deprivation of his propertywhen he arrived in the SHU, the Court notes that such allegations are not

actionable under Section 1983. The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of

property without due process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and prisoners

have a protected interest in their personal property, Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th

Cir.1974). However, Plaintiff’s complaint admits that the delay in receiving his property was not

an authorized deprivation--in fact it violated the prison’s own policy/regulations regarding the time

limits for issuing property. An unauthorized deprivation of a property interest, whether negligent

or intentional, does not violate the Due Process Clause when adequate post-deprivation remedies are

available to compensate Plaintiff. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). California Law

provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any unauthorized property deprivations. Barnett

v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810-895). Therefore,

the delay in the issuance of Plaintiff’s property is not a due process violation actionable under

Section 1983.

IV. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for interference with his First Amendment right to file

grievances against the government. Under the First Amendment, prison officials may not interfere

with Plaintiff’s right to file grievances. However, nothing in the First Amendment requires prison

officials to respond to grievances after they are filed. The Court notes that the Ninth Circuit has held

that prisoners do not have a substantive constitutional right of access to a particular inmate appeal

procedure. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d

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639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)). Thus, Defendants’ failure to respond to Plaintiff’s administrative

complaint is not actionable under Section 1983.

The Court further finds that Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim premised on the

delayed issuance of his property.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are not capable of being cured by granting further

leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing longstanding

rule that leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made unless the court

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts); Noll v.

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or

her complaint unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured

by amendment). Therefore, the Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s claim be dismissed without

leave to amend.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED, without leave to amend; and

2. The Clerk is directed to close this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 28, 2010 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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