Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-23-07052/USCOURTS-caDC-23-07052-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 23-7052 September Term, 2024 FILED ON: OCTOBER 29, 2024 

HEPING LI, ET AL., 

APPELLANTS

v. 

KEQIANG LI, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:20-cv-02008) 

Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, HENDERSON, AND KATSAS, Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT

This appeal was considered on the briefs and the district-court record. The Court has fully 

considered the issues and determined that a published opinion is unwarranted. See Fed. R. App. 

P. 36; D.C. Cir. R. 36(d). It is 

ORDERED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED. 

I 

Three individuals of Chinese origin—Heping Li, Yanlan Huang, and Xiaogang Shi—sued 

various Chinese officials and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd. (ICBC) for 

property seizures, imprisonment, and torture that allegedly occurred in China. The complaint 

alleges the following facts, which we assume are true for purposes of our decision. 

The Chinese government arrested Li in 2002, imprisoned and tortured him, and attempted 

to coerce a confession that he bought real estate with money that he and Huang had embezzled. 

Assisted by the ICBC’s Guilin, China branch, the Chinese government auctioned off these 

properties in 2003 for a fifth of their value. Li was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2004, but 

later exonerated. The Chinese government eventually compensated Li for his wrongful detention, 

but not for the confiscation and sale of his properties. In 2002 and 2018, the Chinese government 

confiscated a real estate company and other property owned by Huang. It also confiscated Shi’s 

USCA Case #23-7052 Document #2082452 Filed: 10/29/2024 Page 1 of 4
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real estate in 2016 and his bank deposits on some unspecified date. Huang became a United States 

citizen in 2020. Shi is also a citizen but does not say when he became one.

Li, Huang, and Shi sued various named and unnamed Chinese government officials, plus

the ICBC, for the seizure or sale of their property in China. Li also sued for his imprisonment and 

alleged torture. Plaintiffs seek prospective relief and damages.

The district court dismissed claims against the Chinese officials as jurisdictionally barred 

by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The ICBC moved to dismiss the claims against it on 

various grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction and the act-of-state doctrine. The district 

court dismissed claims against the ICBC on the latter ground.

II

A

The FSIA generally divests United States courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over suits 

against foreign sovereigns. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. It is unclear when, if ever, the FSIA affords 

immunity for claims against foreign officials as opposed to claims against foreign sovereigns 

themselves. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010). But we need not address that 

question in this case. Claims that a court has jurisdiction, unlike claims that jurisdiction is lacking, 

are subject to forfeiture. See Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Here, 

plaintiffs press only one theory of jurisdiction for their claims against the Chinese officials—that 

FSIA exceptions apply. Accordingly, we consider only that theory.

The district court correctly held that none of the claimed exceptions applies. The terrorism 

exception does not apply because China is not a designated state sponsor of terrorism. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1605A(a); State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://www.state.gov/statesponsors-of-terrorism. The existing-treaty exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1604, does not apply because 

the treaties plaintiffs cite “do not create private rights of action” in United States courts and thus 

do not supersede the FSIA. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 

442 (1989); see Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Convention Against Torture); 

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734–35 (2004) (International Covenant on Civil & 

Political Rights and Universal Declaration of Human Rights); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S 491, 

506 (2008) (United Nations Charter). Moreover, the United States never ratified the forced-labor 

treaty that the plaintiffs invoke. International Labor Organization Convention No. 29 Concerning 

Forced or Compulsory Labor (June 28, 1930), 39 U.N.T.S. 55.

Finally, the expropriation exception does not apply. As relevant here, it requires that (1) 

property was taken in violation of international law, and (2) the property or property exchanged 

for it is present in the United States in connection with a domestic commercial activity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1605(a)(3). Plaintiffs falter on both prongs. First, under the “domestic takings rule,” there is no 

international-law violation when a country takes “property belonging to its own citizens within its

own borders.” Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U.S. 169, 176 (2021). All of the 

disputed takings in this case occurred within China. And although Huang and Shi allege that they 

are currently United States citizens, none of the plaintiffs disclaimed being a Chinese citizen at 

the time of the takings. In any event, plaintiffs nowhere allege that any of their seized property—

or property exchanged for it—is present in the United States in connection with China’s 

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commercial activity. See Schubarth v. Federal Republic of Germany, 891 F.3d 392, 394–95 (D.C. 

Cir. 2018).

B

The district court dismissed claims against the ICBC under the act-of-state doctrine, but 

we affirm based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs “must make a prima facie showing 

of the pertinent jurisdictional facts.” Second Amend. Found. v. U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 274 F.3d 

521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (cleaned up). But here, plaintiffs’ jurisdictional allegations as to the 

ICBC are sparse. Their main allegation is that its Guilin, China branch assisted the Chinese 

government in wrongfully selling plaintiff Li’s property. Plaintiffs also accuse the ICBC of aiding 

or ratifying Li’s false imprisonment and torture, but they allege no specific facts about the ICBC’s 

involvement in those activities.

To contest personal jurisdiction below, the ICBC submitted a declaration from a legal 

officer explaining that it is incorporated and headquartered in China, with only one U.S. branch 

in New York City. These undisputed facts show that the ICBC is not subject to general jurisdiction 

in the District of Columbia. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137–38 (2014). As for 

specific jurisdiction, the District’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction over a 

corporation “as to a claim for relief arising from” its “transacting any business in the District.” 

D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1). But any such claims must arise “from the particular transaction of 

business” in the District. See World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 

1154, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Here, the claims against the ICBC arise from actions that it allegedly 

took in China to sell property in China. And even if we charitably construed the complaint as

alleging that the ICBC conspired with the other defendants, plaintiffs would fare no better. 

Personal jurisdiction is still lacking because plaintiffs do not allege that the ICBC engaged in any 

overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy within the District. See Second Amend. Found., 274 

F.3d at 524.

C

Finally, plaintiffs complain that the district court should have allowed them to amend their 

complaint. But they never moved to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Instead, 

they mentioned amendment only in opposing the ICBC’s motion to dismiss. Because a “bare 

request in an opposition to a motion to dismiss ... does not constitute a motion within the 

contemplation of Rule 15(a),” the district court permissibly denied leave to amend. Confederate 

Mem’l Ass’n, Inc. v. Hines, 995 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

III

For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint. The Clerk is directed to 

withhold issuance of the mandate until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for 

rehearing or rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41(a)(1).

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Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk 

 BY: /s/

Daniel J. Reidy

Deputy Clerk 

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