Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01205/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01205-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

SARA M. FRANKLIN, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

DOUGLAS COUNTY DISTRICT 

COURT; TOWN OF CASTLE 

ROCK; DOUGLAS COUNTY, CO; 

CASTLE ROCK POLICE DEPT.; 

DOUGLAS COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

OFC; LITTLE POLICE 

DEPARTMENT; ARAPAHOE 

COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFC; 

DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL 

SYSTEM; STATE OF COLORADO; 

JUDGE CHRISTOPHER CROSS; JUDGE 

DONALD MARSHALL; JUDGE 

THERESA SLADE; JUDGE MITCHELL 

SPEAR; JUDGE NATALIE CHASE; 

MAGISTRATE FRANK MOSCHETTI; 

MAGISTRATE REBECCA MOSS, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 15-1205 

(D.C. No. 1:15-CV-00847-LTB) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

 

*

 The parties do not request oral argument, and the Court has 

determined that oral argument would not materially aid our consideration 

of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Thus, we 

have decided the appeal based on the briefs. 

 Our order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except 

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

December 30, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 15-1205 Document: 01019546622 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 1 
2 

Before KELLY, BACHARACH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 Ms. Sara Franklin filed two suits in federal court. The first one was 

dismissed without prejudice because she had related proceedings pending 

in state court. When the state-court proceedings ended, Ms. Franklin filed 

a new suit in federal court. Even though the prior dismissal was without 

prejudice, the federal district court dismissed the new federal suit on the 

ground that it was repetitious with the first suit. We reverse. 

I. In the first federal suit, the district court dismissed without 

prejudice based on Younger abstention. 

In the first suit, Ms. Franklin claimed constitutional violations during 

her divorce proceedings. Because the divorce proceedings were ongoing at 

the time, the federal district court abstained under Younger v. Harris and 

ordered dismissal without prejudice. Hartmann v. Douglas Cty., No. 12-cv03309-LTB, order at 3-4 (D. Colo. Feb. 7, 2013); see Younger v. Harris, 

401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (describing the general rule that federal courts 

should not interfere with ongoing state cases). 

II. Even though the first dismissal was without prejudice, the district 

court ordered dismissal of the second suit on the ground that it 

was repetitious with the first suit. 

After Ms. Franklin’s divorce became final, she brought a second 

federal suit against many of the same parties. The next day, the district 

court ordered Ms. Franklin to show cause why the second suit should not 

Appellate Case: 15-1205 Document: 01019546622 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 2 
3 

be dismissed as repetitious. When Ms. Franklin failed to timely respond, 

the court dismissed the action with prejudice on the ground that the claims 

were repetitious. Hartmann v. Douglas Cty. Dist. Ct., No. 15-cv-00847-

GPG, order at 2 (D. Colo. May 28, 2015). 

Ms. Franklin argues in part that the district court erred when it 

dismissed the claims as repetitious, pointing out that the prior dismissal 

had been without prejudice.1

III. Even though Ms. Franklin failed to respond to the show-cause 

order, we address the merits of her appeal point. 

 By failing to respond to the district court’s show-cause order,2

 Ms. 

Franklin may have forfeited her argument that the district court erred by 

dismissing her claims as repetitious. See Richison v. Ernest Group, Inc., 

634 F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011) (a party forfeits an appeal point by 

failing to raise it in district court). But even if she otherwise committed a 

forfeiture, we would consider the merits for two reasons. 

 

1

 Because Ms. Franklin filed her brief pro se, we liberally construe her 

arguments. United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009). 

2

 The defendants state that the district court dismissed the second suit 

as a sanction “for failure to timely respond” to the show-cause order. 

Appellees’ Answer Br. at 14-18. According to the defendants, this sanction 

was proper under the four-factor test in Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 

916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992). This characterization is incorrect. After noting 

Ms. Franklin’s failure to respond to the show-cause order, the district court 

stated that it would dismiss the action as repetitious, not as a sanction for 

failing to respond to the show-cause order. Hartmann v. Douglas Cty. Dist. 

Ct., No. 15-cv-00847-GPG, order at 2 (D. Colo. May 28, 2015). 

Appellate Case: 15-1205 Document: 01019546622 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 3 
4 

First, we have discretion to consider forfeited arguments when they 

involve pure matters of law and their resolution is certain. See Cox v. 

Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1244, 1246 n.7 (10th Cir. 2015); United States v. 

Jarvis, 499 F.3d 1196, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2007). These requirements are 

satisfied here, as discussed below. 

Second, the defendants waived the possible forfeiture. In this appeal, 

they had an opportunity to argue forfeiture, but did not. Thus, the 

defendants waived any possible forfeiture. See United States v. Rodebaugh, 

798 F.3d 1281, 1314 (10th Cir. 2015); Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 618 

F.3d 1127, 1138-39 (10th Cir. 2010). 

For both reasons, we would consider the merits even if Ms. Franklin 

had forfeited her appeal point in district court. 

IV. The district court erred when it dismissed Ms. Franklin’s claims 

as repetitious. 

The district court reasoned that Ms. Franklin’s claims were 

repetitious. Many of them were. But Ms. Franklin was free to refile the 

claims because the first dismissal had been without prejudice. 

We would ordinarily review the dismissal for an abuse of discretion. 

Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 2006). But the dismissal 

turned on an issue of law: whether the second suit could be dismissed as 

repetitious when the prior dismissal was without prejudice. On that issue, 

we engage in de novo review. Id. 

Appellate Case: 15-1205 Document: 01019546622 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 4 
5 

The court erred as a matter of law in ordering dismissal based on 

repetition of the claims. Because the court dismissed the prior claims 

without prejudice, Ms. Franklin was free to refile the claims. See Semtek 

Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001) (a dismissal 

without prejudice allows the plaintiff to return and bring the same claim to 

the same court). 

That is what Ms. Franklin did. After the state divorce proceedings 

ended, she brought this action to pursue the claims she had been unable to 

litigate earlier. In the first federal suit, the court dismissed the action 

without prejudice, allowing Ms. Franklin to bring the same claims through 

a new suit when the divorce case ended. 

The defendants argue that the jurisdictional impediment remained 

because the second federal suit (like the first suit) arose out of the state 

divorce proceedings. According to the defendants, the district court had 

“already determined in the prior proceeding that [Ms. Franklin] may not 

pursue her constitutional claims arising out of state court proceedings.” 

Appellees’ Answer Br. at 12. This characterization is incorrect. The 

district court dismissed the first action under Younger because Ms. 

Franklin had alleged the state divorce proceedings were still pending. 

Hartmann v. Douglas Cty., No. 12-cv-03309-LTB, order at 3 (D. Colo. 

Feb. 7, 2013). In the second federal suit, Ms. Franklin alleged that the state 

divorce proceedings had ended. Compl. at 2. Once the state divorce 

Appellate Case: 15-1205 Document: 01019546622 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 5 
6 

proceedings ended, Younger would no longer support dismissal. See Myers 

v. Garff, 876 F.2d 79, 81 n.3 (10th Cir. 1989). 

The defendants’ justification for the ruling does not match the 

district court’s explanation for the first dismissal. In dismissing the second 

federal suit, the court effectively treated the first dismissal as a permanent 

obstacle to relief. It wasn’t: it prevented relief only while the state divorce 

proceedings were pending, and Ms. Franklin alleged that they had ended 

before she filed the second suit. Under these circumstances, we conclude 

the court erred by dismissing the second suit as repetitious. 

V. Disposition of the Appeal 

We reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings. 

VI. Leave to Proceed Without Prepayment of the Filing Fee 

We grant Ms. Franklin’s request to proceed on appeal without 

prepayment of the filing fee. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Robert E. Bacharach 

 Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 15-1205 Document: 01019546622 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 6