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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued August 3, 2010

Decided August 6, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 09-3886

MIKEAL WOODEN-OUSLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 1:08-cv-03381

Charles P. Kocoras,

Judge.

O R D E R

Mikeal Wooden-Ousley claims that Julie Mendez, a detective with the Chicago Police

Department, committed a constitutional tort when she falsely arrested him for carjacking. See

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court reasoned that Detective Mendez had probable cause to

arrest Wooden-Ousley and granted summary judgment against him. On appeal WoodenOusley argues that Detective Mendez conducted an inadequate investigation. But two

eyewitnesses fingered him as their assailant, and those identifications are sufficient to establish

probable cause to make an arrest. We affirm the district court’s judgment.

Wooden-Ousley was arrested for carjacking Jorge Palomino and Christina Salgado.

Palomino was driving a van when a car pulled up alongside honking its horn. One of the car’s

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09-3886 Page 2

passengers stepped out, pointed a gun at Palomino and Salgado, and declared that the van

belonged to him. The gunman then climbed into the van and drove off.

Detective Mendez began her investigation of the carjacking by speaking to Maria

Gutierrez, Salgado’s sister. Gutierrez explained that she and her husband previously owned

the van but sold it to a man whose name she could not recall. Gutierrez told Detective Mendez

that, a few weeks before the carjacking, she received a notice in the mail that the van had been

towed. She was not able to get in touch with the buyer, she said, so she retrieved the van from

the impound lot herself and gave it to Salgado.

Detective Mendez decided to investigate why the van had been towed. She pulled the

report and learned that a man who identified himself as Wooden-Ousley was sitting in the

passenger seat of the parked van when a police officer, suspecting that the vehicle had been

stolen, ordered it towed. Before approaching, the officer had observed that the van had no

license plate and that its steering column was “peeled,” which is a sign of theft. The man inside

the van produced a driver’s license identifying himself as Wooden-Ousley, and the officer

matched the photograph on the license with the occupant’s face.

At this point Detective Mendez wondered whether Wooden-Ousley might have

committed the carjacking. To test the theory she showed his photograph to Gutierrez, who

confirmed that he was the man to whom she had sold the van. Next Detective Mendez

assembled an array that included Wooden-Ousley’s photograph as well as photographs of five

similar-looking men. Both Palomino and Salgado identified Wooden-Ousley as the man who

had stolen the van from them at gunpoint. Detective Mendez then had Wooden-Ousley

arrested, placed him in a lineup, and summoned Gutierrez, Palomino, and Salgado. Gutierrez

quickly identified him as the purchaser of her van, and Palomino and Salgado each fingered

him as the carjacker. Detective Mendez then handed over the case to an assistant state’s

attorney, who approved several charges against Wooden-Ousley, including aggravated

vehicular hijacking with a weapon. A jury, however, acquitted him of all charges arising from

the incident.

Wooden-Ousley then filed this lawsuit under § 1983, claiming that Detective Mendez

deprived him of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure by arresting him

without probable cause. In addition, he asserted a state-law claim for malicious prosecution

against the City of Chicago. But the district court granted summary judgment against him on

both claims, reasoning that the facts known to Detective Mendez at the time of the arrest were

sufficient to allow a reasonable person to conclude that Wooden-Ousley had committed an

offense.

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The sole issue raised by Wooden-Ousley on appeal is whether Detective Mendez had

probable cause to arrest him. If she did, then he cannot prevail on his false-arrest claim. See

Stokes v. Bd. of Educ., 599 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 2010). But Wooden-Ousley argues that the

evidence he presented at summary judgment is sufficient to reach a jury on the question

whether Detective Mendez “overlooked, ignored, fabricated, and disregarded crucial

evidence.”

The thoroughness of Detective Mendez’s investigation does not matter, however, so long

as a reasonable person would conclude that the information she had before her established

probable cause to arrest Wooden-Ousley. See, e.g., Stokes, 599 F.3d at 624; McBride v. Grice, 576

F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2009); Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2006). And

the problem for Wooden-Ousley is that “it does not take much to establish probable cause. The

officers must have more than a bare suspicion that they have the right guy, but they need not

have enough evidence to support a conviction or even to show that their belief is more likely

true than false.” Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819, 833 (7th Cir. 2010).

Wooden-Ousley identifies no reason to disturb the district court’s conclusion that the

information Detective Mendez had before her established probable cause to arrest him for

carjacking. It is undisputed that two eyewitnesses—Palomino and Salgado—identified him as

the man who pointed a gun at them and drove off in their van. See, e.g., Askew v. City of Chicago,

440 F.3d 894, 895 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that eyewitness identification provides probable

cause to arrest); Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 996 (7th Cir. 2000) (same); Tangwall v.

Stuckey, 135 F.3d 510, 520 (7th Cir. 1998) (same); Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th

Cir. 1986) (same). The parties also agree that the assailant claimed to own the van and that

Gutierrez identified Wooden-Ousley as the man to whom she had sold the van. In addition,

a police report marked him as the sole occupant of the van immediately before it was towed.

Under these circumstances a reasonable officer would be justified to conclude that WoodenOusley had committed the carjacking.

Instead of addressing the district court’s reasoning head-on, Wooden-Ousley points to

supposed shortcomings in Detective Mendez’s police work. First he takes issue with her

identification procedures, insisting that she should have shown Gutierrez an array of

photographs instead of just a single photograph of him. He also says that she should have

separated Palomino and Salgado before showing them the array. Plus, he continues, it was

improper for her to allow all three witnesses to view the physical lineup at the same time. But

he does not cite any authority for his proposition that an identification obtained by these

procedures falls short of establishing probable cause to make an arrest; nor does he explain how

these circumstances might have tainted the identifications. In any event mere “inconsistencies

and glitches” are common in police investigations and “do not disentitle police to rely on

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eyewitness statements.” Askew, 440 F.3d at 897. It is true that Wooden-Ousley was 10 inches

taller and 55 pounds heavier than the description of the carjacker that Palomino and Salgado

gave at the crime scene. But at most the discrepancy suggests that, during a brief encounter at

gunpoint, the victims of a violent crime may have trouble accurately estimating their assailant’s

height and weight; it does not suggest that Detective Mendez manipulated the identification

procedures. See id. at 896-97; Tangwall, 135 F.3d at 516-17 & n.11 (citing Gramenos, 797 F.2d at

437-38).

Wooden-Ousley also argues that Detective Mendez should not have accepted either the

tow report or Gutierrez’s story at face value; if she had investigated further, he suggests, she

would have discovered unspecified information absolving him of the crime. But, as explained

above, Palomino and Salgado’s identification of Wooden-Ousley as their assailant was

sufficient, on its own, to give Detective Mendez probable cause to arrest him. And once

probable cause was established, Detective Mendez was not required to conduct further

investigation before actually making the arrest. See, e.g., Stokes, 599 F.3d at 624; McBride, 576

F.3d at 707; Mustafa, 442 F.3d at 548. In any event, Wooden-Ousley has not specified what

exculpatory evidence he thinks Detective Mendez would have found if her investigation had

unfolded along the lines he suggests in his brief.

Wooden-Ousley’s state-law claim for malicious prosecution is also doomed. An

essential element is lack of probable cause to institute criminal proceedings. See Swick v.

Liautaud, 662 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ill. 1996); see also Johnson v. Saville, 575 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir.

2009) (applying Illinois law). But Detective Mendez had probable cause to arrest WoodenOusley, and he has not pointed to any exculpatory information that came to light in the short

time between his being arrested and being charged. See Porter v. City of Chicago, 912 N.E.2d

1262, 1273 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

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