Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00457/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00457-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER BRANDON DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

M. PORTILLO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 1:22-cv-00457 ADA-CDB (PC)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

(Doc. 26)

Plaintiff Christopher Brandon Davis is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this 

civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff filed a second motion for the appointment of counsel on August 2, 2023. (Doc. 

26.) He asserts the following as the bases for his request: (1) the previously assigned magistrate 

judge denied his earlier motion without prejudice;1(2) the Court has ordered this action proceed 

on claims arising under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) Plaintiff is unable to 

afford counsel and is proceeding in forma pauperis; (4) his imprisonment greatly impacts his 

ability to litigate, the issues are complex and will require significant research and investigation; 

(5) a trial would involve conflicting testimony and counsel would be better able to present 

1 Magistrate Judge Helena Barch-Kuchta denied Plaintiff’s earlier request in an order issued June 15, 2022. 

(Doc. 15.) 

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evidence and call and cross-examine witnesses; (6) the case involves multiple defendants, spans 

several months in time, and involves investigation by outside agencies; and (7) Plaintiff has made 

repeated efforts to obtain legal assistance without success. (Doc. 26.) 

II. DISCUSSION

As Plaintiff has been previously advised (Doc. 15 p. 2), plaintiffs do not have a 

constitutional right to appointed counsel in section 1983 actions. Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 

1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds, 154 F.3d 952, 954 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Nor can the Court require an attorney to represent a party under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See 

Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1989). However, in “exceptional 

circumstances,” the Court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to section 

1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525.

Given that the Court has no reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the 

Court will seek volunteer counsel only in extraordinary cases. In determining whether 

“exceptional circumstances exist, a district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on

the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 

complexity of the legal issues involved.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (internal quotation marks &

citations omitted).

A. Analysis

The Court must evaluate the likelihood of Plaintiff’s success on the merits of his claims. 

Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. Here, while Plaintiff’s first amended complaint was screened as required 

by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) (see Doc. 19) and service of process of Defendants Brown, Molina and 

Portillo is ongoing, it is premature to determine whether there is a likelihood of success on the 

merits. See, e.g., Porter v. Rivas, No. 1:22-cv-00105-ADA-CDB (PC), 2023 WL 4765492, at *1 

(E.D. Cal. July 26, 2023) (premature to determine likelihood of success on the merits where 

complaint was screened and service is ongoing) (citing Scally v. Velasquez, No. 22-CV-140 JLS 

(MDD), 2022 WL 3325916, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2022)). A likelihood of success on the 

merits determination is not the same as that required at screening; at screening, the Court is tasked 

with determining whether a plaintiff has sufficiently and plausibly alleged a cause of action or 

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claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. The merits of the allegations are not tested, for the Court is to 

consider factual allegations to be true for purposes of screening. 

The Court must also evaluate Plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims pro se in light of 

the complexity of the legal issues involved. Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. Here, the Court finds 

Plaintiff able to articulate his claims in light of their complexity. More specifically, the Court 

found Plaintiff plausibly alleged First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendant Portillo 

and Defendant Brown, an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Portillo, 

an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendant Molina, and a due process 

clause violation against Defendant Brown. (See Doc. 19 at 5-20.) LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 

626 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming district court’s denial of request for appointment of counsel where 

pleadings demonstrated petitioner had “a good understanding of the issues and the ability to 

present forcefully and coherently his contentions”).

Further, the claims are not complex. Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 428–29 (9th Cir. 

1993) (while Plaintiff may have limited knowledge of the law, the Court does not find the issues 

in this case “so complex that due process violations will occur absent the presence of counsel”); 

Andre-Gollihar v. County of San Joaquin, No. 2:09-cv-03313 MCE KJN PS, 2010 WL 2925358, 

at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 26, 2010) (“plaintiff’s claims of excessive force and wrongful death are not

complex”); see also Crawford v. Hughes, No. 13-CV-6638-FPG, 2017 WL 130273, at *3 

(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2017) (“the issues in this case—namely, the alleged use of excessive force, 

discrimination, and denial of due process at a disciplinary hearing—are not complex”); Headley v 

Fisher, No. 06 Civ. 6331 (PAC) (KNF), 2008 WL 2676601, at *2 (July 7, 2008) (“the factual 

issues concerning Headley’s retaliation and due process claims is straightforward and not 

complex”); Williams v. Whitehurst, No. 4:08CV21-SPM/AK, 2008 WL 1766570, at *1 (N.D. Fla. 

Apr. 11, 2008) (“Although Plaintiff’s claims are serious, they are not complex nor will he be 

required to do legal research since the court is familiar with the law on claims of excessive force 

and failure to protect”). 

//

//

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Prior Motion Denied Without Prejudice

On June 15, 2022, the previously assigned magistrate judge denied Plaintiff’s earlier 

motion for the appointment of counsel. (Doc. 15.) In the order, Plaintiff was advised the Court 

found no exceptional circumstances existed warranting the appointment of counsel. (Id.) This 

Court notes Plaintiff’s earlier motion includes many of the same arguments as those asserted in 

the instant motion. Nevertheless, this Court has considered them anew.

Inability to Afford Counsel

Concerning Plaintiff’s inability to afford to hire counsel, that circumstance does not 

qualify as an exceptional circumstance warranting the appointment of counsel. See Dijkstra v. 

Campos, No. 1:21-cv-01223-HBK, 2022 WL 222518, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2022) (“Plaintiff’s 

indigence does not qualify ‘as an exceptional circumstance in a prisoner civil rights case’”);

Gipbsin v. Kernan, No. 2:12-cv-0556 KJM DB P, 2021 WL 242570, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 

2021) (“Plaintiff’s inability to afford counsel has no bearing on either his likelihood of success on 

the merits or his ability to articulate his claims pro se”); Callender v. Ramm, No. 2:16-cv-0694 

JAM AC P, 2018 WL 6448536, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018) (“The law is clear: neither 

plaintiff’s indigence, nor his lack of education, nor his lack of legal expertise warrant the 

appointment of counsel”); Montano v. Solomon, No. 2:07-cv-0800 KJN P, 2010 WL 2403389, at 

*2 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2010) (“Neither indigence nor lack of facility in English qualifies as an 

exceptional circumstance in a prisoner civil rights case”). 

Imprisonment 

While the Court recognizes that Plaintiff is at a disadvantage due to his pro se status and 

his incarceration, the test is not whether Plaintiff would benefit from the appointment of counsel. 

See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). The test is whether exceptional 

circumstances exist; here, they do not. There is little doubt most pro se litigants “find it difficult 

to articulate [their] claims,” and would be better served with the assistance of counsel. Id. For this 

reason, in the absence of counsel, federal courts employ procedures which are highly protective 

of a pro se litigant's rights. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holding pro se

complaint to less stringent standard) (per curiam). In fact, where a plaintiff appears pro se in a 

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civil rights case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any 

benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.

1988). The rule of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, where a pro se litigant can “articulate his 

claims” in light of the relative complexity of the matter, the “exceptional circumstances” which 

might require the appointment of counsel do not exist. Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331; accord Palmer 

v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Robinson v. Cryer, No. 1:20-cv-00622-

HBK (PC), 2021 WL 9541411, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2021) (“Although Plaintiff is proceeding 

pro se and is incarcerated, he faces the same obstacles all pro se prisoners face”). 

Conflicting Testimony & Examination of Witnesses at Trial

Plaintiff is further advised the fact an attorney may be better able to perform research, 

investigate, and represent Plaintiff during discovery and at trial does not amount to an exceptional 

circumstance. Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (finding no abuse of discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 

when district court denied appointment of counsel despite fact that pro se prisoner “may well 

have fared better-particularly in the realm of discovery and the securing of expert testimony”); 

Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331 (same); Courtney v. Kandel, No. 2:18-CV-2052-KJM-DMC-P, 2020 

WL 1432991, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2020) (challenges conducting discovery and preparing for 

trial “are ordinary for prisoners pursuing civil rights claim” and cannot form the basis for 

appointment of counsel); Ricks v. Austria, No. 1:15-cv-01147-BAM (PC), 2016 WL 1734326, at 

*2 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2016) (while a pro se litigant may be better served with the assistance of 

counsel were the case to proceed to trial, the court need not appoint counsel if plaintiff can 

articulate his claims and exceptional circumstances do not exist); Thornton v. Schwarzenegger, 

No. 10CV01583 BTM RBB, 2011 WL 90320, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2011) (explaining that 

“[f]actual disputes and anticipated cross-examination of witnesses do not indicate the presence of 

complex legal issues warranting a finding of exceptional circumstances”). 

Multiple Defendants/Span of Time

An action involving multiple defendants and/or conduct spanning a period of time are not 

unusual or exceptional circumstances in a prisoner civil rights action. Prisoner complaints often 

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involve multiple defendants and assert allegations involving conduct spanning months or even 

years. Normal challenges faced by pro se litigants do not warrant appointment of counsel. See

Siglar v. Hopkins, 822 F. App'x 610, 612 (9th Cir. 2020) (denying appointment of counsel 

because the plaintiff's “circumstances were not exceptionally different from the majority of the 

challenges faced by pro se litigants”); see also Dickerson v. Adams, No. 1:17-CV-121 (LJATQL), 2017 WL 11518001, *1 (M.D. Geo. Aug. 9, 2017) (multiple defendants, credibility issues 

and plaintiff’s limited mobility are not exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of 

counsel); Brittain v. Clemons, No. 4:09CV-P123-M, 2010 WL 1257700, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 

26, 2010) (incarceration, inability to afford counsel and suit involving multiple defendants are not 

exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel).

Unsuccessful Efforts to Obtain Counsel 

While the Court appreciates Plaintiff's efforts to secure counsel, his inability to find 

counsel is not “a proper factor for the Court to consider in determining whether to request 

counsel. Howard v. Hedgpeth, No. 08cv0859 RTB (PCL), 2010 WL 1641087, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 

Apr. 20, 2010) (an inability to find counsel is not a proper factor for the Court to consider). 

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

In sum, as explained above, the Court finds that exceptional circumstances do not exist 

warranting the appointment of counsel in this action. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

that Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel (Doc. 26) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 3, 2023 ___________________ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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