Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02400/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02400-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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NA 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Armand Andreozzi, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Unknown Ricotta, et al., 

Defendants. 

 No. CV 18-02400-PHX-DGC (BSB) 

ORDER 

On July 30, 3018, Plaintiff Armand Andreozzi, who is confined in the United 

States Penitentiary (USP)-Marion in Marion, Illinois, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint 

(Doc. 1) and paid the filing fee. On August 24, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Service 

(Doc. 3). The Court will order Defendants Ricotta, Asberry, Smith 1, Briggs, Ackley, 

Tracy, Mitchell, and Connors to answer Count One of the Complaint, will order 

Defendants Ricotta, Asberry, Tracy, Mitchell, and Connors to answer Count Two, will 

dismiss the remaining claims and Defendants without prejudice, and will deny the 

Motion for Service as moot.1

 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

 

1

 The Court will deny this Motion as moot because it will order service on 

Defendants Ricotta, Asberry, Smith 1, Briggs, Ackley, Tracy, Mitchell, and Connors. 

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has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

II. Complaint 

 In his six-count Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the Court has jurisdiction pursuant 

to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 

(1971); 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and the Administrative Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq) 

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(“the APA”). Plaintiff has named several Defendants, who work or worked at various 

federal correctional facilities, and numerous fictitiously identified Defendants, Jane/John 

Does 1-54. 

 Plaintiff sues the following Defendants: Federal Correctional Institution (FCI)-

Phoenix Health Services Clinical Director Doctor Ricotta; FCI-Phoenix Health Services 

Administrator Trainee Asberry; FCI-Phoenix Health Services Associate Warden Smith 

(“Smith 1”); FCI-Phoenix Health Services Nurse Practitioner Briggs; FCI-Phoenix 

Health Services Administrator Ackley; FCI-Phoenix Warden Kathryn Tracy ; Western 

Regional Director Mary Mitchell; National Inmate Appeals Administrator Ian Connors; 

USP-Lewisburg E Unit Case Manager Giordani; USP-Lewisburg E Unit Manager 

Childress; USP-Lewisburg Warden Williamson; USP-Victorville Warden Norwood; 

Federal Medical Center (FMC)-Devens GA-Unit Manager Hutton; FMC-Devens Warden 

Grondolsky; FCI-McKean BB Unit Counselor Smith (“Smith 2”); FCI-McKean BB Unit 

Manager Wilson; FCI-McKean Warden Bobby Meeks; FCI-Big Spring Sunrise Unit 

Case Manager Jones; FCI-Big Spring Warden Batts; FCI-Mendota Warden Raphael 

Zuniga; FCI-Phoenix Navajo Unit Counselor Powell; FCI-Phoenix Navajo Unit Case 

Manager Jefferson; FCI-Phoenix Navajo Unit Manager Dosanj; FCI-Phoenix Case 

Manager Coordinator Wastell; FCI-Phoenix Associate Warden Jones; USP-Marion L 

Unit Counselor Dooley; USP-Marion L Unit Case Manager Clark; USP-Marion N Unit 

Counselor Basler; USP-Marion N Unit Case Manager Murphy (“Murphy 1”); USPMarion L and N Unit Manager Byrum; USP-Marion Case Manager Coordinator Daun; 

USP-Marion Associate Warden Powers; USP-Marion Warden True; North Central 

Regional Director Sara M. Revell; the United States of America; the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons; FMC-Devens Discipline Hearing Officer Anthony Amico; FCI-McKean 

Discipline Hearing Officer Schnieder; Northeast Regional Director Norwood; FCIMcKean Special Investigations Officer Michael Murphy (“Murphy 2”); and National 

Inmate Appeals Administrator Rodgers. 

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 In Count One, Plaintiff asserts a medical care claim and alleges that he was 

diagnosed with bilateral Morton’s neuroma,2

 which is documented. (Doc. 1 at 9.)3 On 

November 15, 2015, Plaintiff was transferred to FCI-Phoenix and had a Chronic Care 

appointment with Defendant Ricotta on November 19, 2015. (Id.) Plaintiff informed 

Ricotta that prior to his transfer from FCI-McKean to FCI-Phoenix, a new pair of 

orthotics had been ordered on his behalf. (Id.) On November 29, 2015, Plaintiff emailed 

Ricotta to inquire about the orthotics. (Id.) Plaintiff received a response to the email, but 

it did not address the orthotics. (Id.) On December 22, 2015, Plaintiff sent another email 

to Ricotta requesting new orthotics, but he did not receive a response. (Id.) On 

January 11, 2016, Plaintiff spoke to Defendant Asberry, and Asberry told Plaintiff that 

orthotics had not been ordered and to report to sick call because the orthopedic surgeon’s 

recommendations from FCI-McKean “would not be accepted at [FCI-] Phoenix.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff was told that “an orthopedic referral was made,” but he contends that “a referral 

was not made.” (Id.) On February 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed a “BP-8.” (Id.) On 

February 18, 2016, Plaintiff sent a third email requesting orthotics. Ricotta responded, 

but failed to address Plaintiff’s request for orthotics. (Id.) On February 29, 2016, 

Plaintiff sent a fourth email outlining “the entire situation,” but he did not receive a 

response. (Id.) 

 On March 1, 2016, Defendant Asberry offered Plaintiff “Spenco arch supports,” 

but Plaintiff told Asberry the supports would not suffice because the same supports had 

not alleviated his condition in 2011. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff also demonstrated why the arch 

supports “were not the proper medical device.” (Id.) On March 2, 2016, Plaintiff 

showed Asberry his “Medical Duty Status sheet,” which showed that Plaintiff had the 

arch supports in 2011. (Id.) Asberry threatened Plaintiff with “treatment refusal.” (Id.) 

 

2

 Morton’s Neuroma is “an injury to the nerve between the toes that causes 

thickening and pain.” See https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/007286.htm (last visited 

Sept. 25, 2018). 

3

 The citation refers to the document and page number generated by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing system. 

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On March 4, 2016, Asberry asked Plaintiff to try the supports, so Plaintiff accepted the 

arch supports “on a trial basis.” (Id.) Asberry did not tell Plaintiff that he would need to 

start at “square one” and return to sick call if the supports were again ineffective. (Id.) 

 On March 11, 2016, Plaintiff received a response from Asberry to his BP-8, which 

incorrectly stated that the supports could be trimmed to the appropriate length. (Id.) 

Even when the supports are trimmed down “all the way,” they were still too long for 

Plaintiff, and the “plastic plate puts pressure on the exact point of the inflamed nerve.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff claims that Asberry was aware of that issue on March 2, 2016. Asberry 

then encouraged Plaintiff to return to sick call “for further evaluation . . . .” (Id.) 

 On March 14, 2016, Plaintiff spoke to Defendant Smith 1 and asked Smith 1 if 

Asberry “put together the packet of medical issues Asberry was ordered to do in January 

2016.” (Id.) Smith 1 told Plaintiff that Asberry had not done so, and Plaintiff asserted 

the failure was a “violation of the Standards of Employee Conduct.” (Id.) Smith 1 

summoned Asberry to discuss the issues, and when Plaintiff asked Asberry about his 

directive to Plaintiff to return to sick call for an orthopedic referral, Asberry stated that he 

“thought [Plaintiff] was talking about orthopedic boots.” (Id.) Plaintiff denied ever 

mentioning orthopedic boots and asserted that Asberry was intentionally lying to Smith 1. 

(Id.) Plaintiff also claims that Smith 1 was aware that Asberry had lied and “stood there 

staring at the sky with his hands in his pockets.” (Id.) Smith 1 then told Plaintiff to 

return to the sick call “as his and Asberry’s way out.” (Id.) 

 On March 31, 2016, Plaintiff filed another BP-8 complaining about Ricotta, 

Asberry, and Smith 1 and requested an investigation. (Id.) The BP-8 was directed to 

Special Investigation Agent Kline, but Plaintiff contends that Kline failed to investigate 

or process the BP-8 or to forward the complaint to the Federal Bureau of Prison’s (BOP) 

Internal Affairs Division, as requested. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Internal 

Affairs Division, but he “did not receive so much as an acknowledgement letter.” (Id.) 

 On March 15, 2016, Plaintiff returned to sick call. (Id.) Having received no status 

updates regarding his request for an orthopedic referral or orthotics, Plaintiff returned to 

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sick call on April 11, 2016. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff told Defendant Briggs that his condition 

had worsened, he had two numb toes, and he had severe pain in the ball of his foot. (Id.) 

Briggs told Plaintiff there was “nothing she could do.” (Id.) Plaintiff asked Briggs to 

document his worsened condition in his records. (Id.) Briggs “then became angry and 

refused [the] request for documentation.” (Id.) The same day, Plaintiff emailed 

Defendant Ackley, but he did not receive a response. (Id.) 

 On April 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed another BP-8 and attached four witness 

statements to corroborate his assertion that the April 11 sick call visit was “five minutes 

or less.” (Id.) Defendant Dosanj “ignored the issue and witness statements in her 

response.” (Id.) Dosanj stated that Briggs had submitted a request for Plaintiff to be seen 

by a specialist on April 11. (Id.) However, Defendant Tracy stated in a response to a 

BP-9 that the consult request was submitted on March 15. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that 

Tracy and Dosanj’s responses were contradictory and that “staff stated anything in an 

attempt to cover their tracks . . . .” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that “862764-Fl response 

explains every issue regarding Health Services and is used as a smoke screen to ignore 

the refusal of treatment and sick call, failure to document [Plaintiff’s] worsening 

condition, request for investigation, and the formal staff complaint.” (Id.) 

 On June 13, 2016, Plaintiff filed a BP-10, appealing Tracy’s denial of “862764-

Fl.” (Id.) Defendant Mitchell responded, but failed to address the alleged “refusal to 

treat at sick call and/or the staff complaint.” (Id.) Plaintiff reported Ricotta’s refusal to 

treat him during his Chronic Care visit, the ignored emails, the “mandated repeat visits to 

sick call,” the threat of “treatment refusal,” the refusal to accept the documentation of 

Plaintiff’s diagnosed condition, and the mandated referral to another orthopedist. (Id. at 

11-12.) Mitchell stated that Plaintiff’s condition was “self-reported” and directed 

Plaintiff to report to sick call for further evaluation if he experienced new or worsening 

symptoms. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff appealed Mitchell’s denial to BOP’s Central Office, but 

he did not receive a response. (Id.) 

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 On June 15, 2016, Plaintiff was evaluated by an orthotics technician and informed 

that it would take thirty days to receive an approval for the orthotics, and following 

approval, Plaintiff would be fitted for the orthotics. (Id.) Plaintiff was not seen by a 

doctor or specialist, and he did not receive any treatment for his numb toes or severe pain. 

(Id.) On June 28, 2016, Plaintiff received Mitchell’s response to the BP-10, which 

allegedly misstated many facts regarding Plaintiff’s medical history and again stated that 

Plaintiff’s Morton’s neuroma was self-reported, even though Plaintiff had attached his 

medical records contradicting that assertion. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that Mitchell and 

Tracy “ignored all issues” and concluded that no one had acted with deliberate 

indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. (Id.) 

 Fifty days after his June 15 appointment, Plaintiff emailed Defendant Ackley and 

“outlined the situation and requested status.” (Id.) On August 5, 2016, Plaintiff received 

a response from Ackley, which stated that the “shoes and inserts were ordered” and that 

Ackley had sent a request inquiring about the status of those items. (Id.) Plaintiff 

contends that Ackley’s response “ignored the bulk of the e-mail.” (Id.) On August 17, 

2016, Ackley emailed Plaintiff asking what size shoe he wore because the order for the 

custom orthotics was missing that information. (Id.) Plaintiff contends, therefore, that as 

of August 5, 2016, the shoes and inserts had not been ordered. (Id.) “They were not 

signed off and approved by [Defendant] Ricotta until 9/8/2016.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims 

that Ackley’s assertion that he did not have Plaintiff’s shoe size was “a bald-face[d] 

lie[,]” as his shoe size was “clearly identified on the Consultation Care Form,” which was 

delivered to Ackley and Ricotta on June 15, 2016. (Id.) Mitchell also had access to the 

form. (Id.) 

 On August 15, 2016, Plaintiff again reported to sick call because his condition had 

worsened, and he had sciatica in his left side because of trying to keep weight off of his 

right foot. (Id. at 12-13.) Plaintiff requested treatment “for everything,” but he did not 

receive any treatment. (Id. at 13.) On August 16 and 26, Plaintiff submitted a Request to 

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Staff form requesting treatment for his numb toes, severe pain, and sciatica. Plaintiff did 

not receive a response or treatment. (Id.) 

 Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a BP-11 appealing Mitchell’s denial of the BP-10. 

(Id.) Defendant Connors “ignored the issues” and stated that the final fitting of the 

orthotics would be scheduled, that there was no evidence to suggest that anyone had 

acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, that Plaintiff had 

received adequate medical care, and that Plaintiff should comply with the treatment plan. 

(Id.) Plaintiff claims that Connors was aware that the request for orthotics was signed 

and approved only five days prior to his response. (Id.) 

 As his injury, Plaintiff alleges he suffered two numb toes, severe pain, and 

psychological trauma. (Id. at 9.) 

 In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that he was diagnosed with reflux esophagitis in 

2002, which is documented. (Id. at 16.) Previously, Plaintiff was prescribed ranitidine 

aciphex and omeprazole. (Id.) On November 19, 2015, Plaintiff had a Chronic Care 

appointment with Defendant Ricotta. Plaintiff told Ricotta that his reflux esophagitis had 

been diagnosed thirteen years prior and that he was properly enrolled in Gastrointestinal 

Chronic Care (“GI CC”). (Id.) Ricotta stated that he would only write a 30-day 

prescription for omeprazole, and when that prescription expired, Ricotta refused to renew 

the prescription. (Id.) On January 13, 2016, Plaintiff reported to sick call because his 

condition had worsened, and he was experiencing severe pain. (Id.) Plaintiff requested a 

new prescription, further treatment, and referral to a gastrointestinal specialist. (Id.) 

Plaintiff contends that “[n]o action was taken on any of those requests.” (Id.) 

 On January 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed a BP-8 based on a denial of medication. (Id.) 

On January 21, 2016, Defendant Asberry responded that Defendant Ricotta had 

discontinued Plaintiff’s GI CC because “acid reflux as the lone diagnosis does not meet 

the criteria for a GI CC.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Asberry failed to thoroughly review 

Plaintiff’s medical records and “used the fall-back-crutch,” by telling Plaintiff to return to 

sick call if he needed further evaluation or if his conditions worsened. (Id.) Plaintiff 

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claims that Asberry’s response “conceded [Plaintiff] was enrolled in the proper CC for GI 

and arbitrarily removed.” (Id. at 17.) 

 Plaintiff then filed a BP-9, and Defendant Tracy responded on February 21, 2016. 

(Id.) The response “regurgitated Asberry’s BP-8 response” and stated that Plaintiff “had 

not been diagnosed with any of the conditions listed by Asberry.” (Id.) Tracy further 

stated that Ricotta told Plaintiff that indigent prisoners could request over-the-counter 

medications from the pharmacy. (Id.) Tracy then outlined the procedure for requesting 

over-the-counter medications and directed Plaintiff to report to sick call if his conditions 

worsened. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Ricotta did not tell Plaintiff that he could request 

over-the-counter medications from the pharmacy because “that subject matter was not at 

issue . . . .” (Id.) Plaintiff further claims that Defendants Tracy, Ricotta, and Asberry 

would have known that he had not been diagnosed with acid reflux if they had reviewed 

his medical records. (Id.) Plaintiff also contends that medical staff failed to document 

his complaints about his condition worsening after his sick call visit on January 13, 2016. 

(Id.) 

 On February 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed a BP-10, appealing Tracy’s denial of the BP9. Plaintiff claimed that Tracy ignored “the issues” and made false statements. (Id.) 

Plaintiff also noted the January 13 sick call in which he reported his worsening condition. 

(Id.) On May 2, 2016, Defendant Mitchell responded and focused on Plaintiff’s trust 

fund account balance, indigency status, and over-the-counter-medications and failed to 

address “the medical issue.” (Id.) Mitchell also stated that “there was an ‘examination’ 

for GI CC” scheduled on November 19, 2015, but the appointment had been cancelled 

“due to criteria not being met.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Mitchell then contradicted this 

statement in a subsequent response by stating that Plaintiff was enrolled in GI CC.4

 (Id.) 

Mitchell also stated that Plaintiff had gone to sick call twice, but did not report worsening 

GI issues. (Id.) Plaintiff appears to assert that he had complained of worsening GI 

 

4

 According to Plaintiff, Defendant Ricotta had not examined him on 

November 19, 2015 to assess his eligibility for GI CC, but had simply told Plaintiff that 

his GI medication would be terminated after thirty days. (Id.) 

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issues, but medical staff failed to document those complaints. (Id.) Plaintiff contends 

that Defendants Mitchell, Tracy, Ricotta, and Asberry would have known that Plaintiff 

met the criteria for enrollment in GI CC if they had thoroughly reviewed his records, as 

they claimed. (Id.) 

 On May 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed a BP-11, appealing Mitchell’s denial of the BP10. (Id.) In the appeal, Plaintiff complained of Mitchell “ignoring the issues”; Mitchell 

“targeting [his] account balance,” over-the-counter medications, and indigency; the 

examination on November 19, 2015; and medical staff’s failure to document Plaintiff’s 

conditions during sick calls. (Id.) Plaintiff also attached a May 25, 2012 medical record 

showing that he had been diagnosed with reflux esophagitis. (Id.) On July 18, 2016, 

Defendant Connors responded to the BP-11 and stated that “there was no evidence to 

suggest [Plaintiff] was not receiving appropriate treatment for the condition” and that 

“there was ‘insufficient diagnostic data’ to make a clinical determination of the need for 

re-enrollment into GI CC.” (Id. at 17-18.) Plaintiff claims that Connors made these 

statements despite admitting that “there [was] a condition,” that Plaintiff was not 

receiving any treatment for the condition, and that the medical records clearly showed 

“sufficient diagnostic data.” (Id. at 18.) Connors “gave the ‘form letter’ conclusion,” 

stating that the record reflected that Plaintiff had received medical care and encouraged 

Plaintiff to comply with the proposed medical treatment plan. (Id.) However, Plaintiff 

contends that “[a]ll treatment had been denied,” so there was no treatment plan with 

which to comply. (Id.) 

 As his injury, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered “constant and consistent severe pain 

in the GI and esophagus[,]” psychological trauma, and possible permanent damage and 

was later forced to undergo an unnecessary medical procedure. (Id. at 16.) 

 In Count Three, Plaintiff asserts a violation of his due process rights and 10 

U.S.C. § 812, i.e., Article 12.5

 Plaintiff, a “military prisoner in the ‘legal’ custody of the 

 5

 Article 12 states that “[n]o members of the armed forces may be placed in 

confinement in immediate association with enemy prisoners or other foreign nationals not 

members of the armed forces.” Article 12 “applies to members of the armed forces when 

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U.S. Army,”6 was transferred to Defendant BOP’s physical custody in January 2006 

pursuant to a May 27, 1994 Memorandum of Agreement between the United States Army 

and BOP.7

 (Id. at 20.) Since January 2006, Plaintiff claims that he has been housed with 

“foreign nationals” in violation of Article 12, 10 U.S.C. § 812, at USP-Lewisburg, USPVictorville, USP-Lompoc, FMC-Devens, FCI-McKean, FCI-Big Spring, FCI-Mendota, 

FCI-Phoenix, and FCI-Marion. (Id.) 

 On November 23, 2016, Plaintiff filed a BP-8, apparently claiming that he was 

being housed with foreign nationals. (Id.) Plaintiff received a response from a unit 

manager stating that Plaintiff was appropriately housed under Program Statement (PS) 

5110.16, entitled Administration of Sentence for Military Inmates.8

 (Id. at 21.) On 

December 30, 2016, Plaintiff filed a BP-9, and received a response from Defendant True 

on January 18, 2016. (Id.) In the response, True discussed Plaintiff’s convictions and 

sentences and cited statutes, but “ignored[] and refused to respond to the issue.” (Id.) 

 

placed in confinement in a state or federal facility within the continental United States 

due to an adjudged court-martial sentence.” United States v. Wilson, 73 M.J. 529, 531 

(A.F. Ct. Crim. App.), aff’d 73 M.J. 404 (C.A.A.F. 2014). 

6

 Plaintiff was convicted by court martial of violating the Uniform Code of 

Military Justice and received a lengthy sentence. See Andreozzi v. Dep’t of Defense, No. 

02-1847 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2003), Doc. 54 at 1. 

7

 In Coder v. O’Brien, 719 F.Supp.2d 655, 657 n.1 (W.D. Va. 2010), the court 

explained that, 

The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that “a sentence of confinement adjudged by a court martial or other military tribunal ... may be carried into execution by confinement in any place of confinement under the control of any of the armed forces or in any penal or correctional institution under the control of the United States....” 10 U.S.C. § 858(a). 

Pursuant to this authority, the Department of the Army and the BOP 

entered into a memorandum of agreement “establish[ing] the policies and procedures governing the transfer of military prisoners in the custody of [the] Department of the Army to the Federal Bureau of Prisons.” 

(Respondent's Ex. 3 at pg. 1). Under this agreement, the BOP promised to house up to 500 military prisoners for the Army's convenience. 

8

 PS 5110.16 addresses computation of a sentence, good time, clemency, and release and supervision. See https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5110_016.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2018). 

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Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a BP-10 appealing True’s denial and stating that “accepting 

[Plaintiff] as a military prisoner does not give the authority to violate a congressional 

mandate and break the law.” (Id.) Defendant Revell responded on February 17, 2017, 

stating the length of Plaintiff’s sentence and “the congressional mandate of 10 U.S.C.[§] 

812 [wa]s an issue between [Plaintiff] and the U.S. Army.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that 

the Memorandum of Understanding only gave BOP physical custody of Plaintiff and that 

Article 12, 10 U.S.C. § 812, applies to military prisoners held in military or federal 

prisons. (Id.) On March 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed a BP-11, “re-establishing all the issues 

ignored by the Def.” Plaintiff maintains that because the timeframe for a response passed 

without a response, the lack of response constituted a denial. (Id.) Plaintiff names 

several Defendants as responsible for approving Plaintiff’s transfer to BOP custody, his 

housing assignments, and his “redesignation to a subsequent BOP facility,” and for 

failing to respond to Plaintiff’s BP-11 appeal. (Id.) Plaintiff further claims that all 

Defendants named in Count Three are aware that BOP staff must recognize military 

prisoners and that the Memorandum of Agreement between the U.S. Army and BOP does 

not allow BOP to violate Article 12 by housing Plaintiff with foreign nationals. (Id.) 

 As his injury, Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered “physical injury” and 

“psychological trauma.” (Id. at 20.) 

 In Count Four, Plaintiff asserts a due process claim and a violation of BOP 

regulation. (Id. at 23.) Prior to Plaintiff’s November 2015 transfer to FCI-Phoenix, 

Plaintiff’s Public Safety Factor (PSF) for Serious Escape (SE)9

 was assessed, resulting in 

 

9

 PS 5100.08 is entitled “Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification.” See https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5100_008.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2018). PS 5100.08 provides in part that: 

PUBLIC SAFETY FACTOR. There are certain demonstrated behaviors 

which require increased security measures to ensure the protection of society. There are nine Public Safety Factors (PSFs) which are applied to 

inmates who are not appropriate for placement at an institution which would permit inmate access to the community (i.e., MINIMUM security). The application of a PSF overrides security point scores to ensure the 

appropriate security level is assigned to an inmate, based in his or her 

demonstrated current or prior behavior. 

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placement in higher security facilities based on a record of serious escape. (Id.) Plaintiff 

“requested removal” and asked to be transferred to a low security facility. (Id.) The 

requests were denied. (Id.) On January 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed a BP-8, and on April 4, 

2016, Defendant Wastell denied the BP-8 “based on incorrect information.” (Id.) On 

April 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed a BP-9, and Defendant Tracy responded on April 25, 2016. 

Tracy stated that Plaintiff was appropriately classified, but failed to explain “‘how’ 

[Plaintiff] was appropriately classified with a PSF for SE . . . .” (Id.) On May 3, 2016, 

Plaintiff filed a BP-10, and Defendant Mitchell responded on May 20, 2016. (Id.) 

Mitchell discussed the severity of Plaintiff’s offenses, how their severity was assessed, 

and the discretion of the Unit Team and administration concerning his classification. 

(Id.) Plaintiff claims that “Mitchell used incorrect information” and “failed to cite 

authority within [PS] 5100.08” or “BOP policy that grants ‘discretion’ to violate BOP 

regulations.” (Id.) On June 27, 2016, Plaintiff filed a BP-11, and Defendant Connors 

responded on January 18, 2017. (Id.) Connors stated that “the PSF was proper,” but 

Plaintiff claims that Connors failed to identify “the method 5100.08 was applied to 

qualify the assessment.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Defendants Wastell, Tracy, Mitchell, 

and Connors “refused to apply [PS] 5100.08 and the element(s) required to assess a PSF 

for SE.” (Id.) 

 According to Plaintiff, to assess a prisoner with a PSF for SE, the inmate must 

have “escaped from a secure facility (prior or instant offense) with or without the threat 

of violence, or an open institution or program (i.e. minimum security facility, work 

release, furlough) with the threat of violence” and, consequently, “will be housed in at 

least a Medium Security Facility.” (Id. at 24.) Plaintiff claims that he escaped from a 

hospital, which is neither a secure facility, nor an open institution or program, and that his 

 

The PSF for Serious Escape provides in relevant part that: 

A male inmate who has escaped from a secure facility (prior or instant 

offense) with or without the threat of violence or who escapes from an open institution or program with a threat of violence will be housed in at least a 

Medium security level institution, unless the PSF has been waived. 

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escape was not a prior or instant offense. (Id.) Therefore, Plaintiff contends that he is not 

subject to PS 5100.08 and that under the APA, “the agency action is not committed to 

agency discretion by law.” (Id.) 

 As his injury, Plaintiff states that he was placed in “an unnecessary and incorrect 

greater security hardship causing actual injury” because Defendants Wastell, Tracy, 

Mitchell, and Connors’ failure to properly apply PS 5100.08 to classify him. (Id. at 23.) 

In Count Five, Plaintiff asserts a due process claim concerning disciplinary 

proceedings and alleges that on February 9, 2012, he received an Incident Report (IR) for 

allegedly threatening another with bodily harm (“Code 203”). (Id. at 25.) Plaintiff 

claims that he did not threaten anyone or make the statements “fabricated in the IR.” 

(Id.) The Code 203 was dismissed, but Defendant Amico found Plaintiff guilty of 

insolence. (Id.) Despite it being dismissed, the United States Parole Commission 

considered the Code 203 in rescinding Plaintiff’s parole date. (Id.) 

 On February 9, 2012, Plaintiff was placed in the Special Housing Unit (SHU), and 

Lieutenant Allred told Plaintiff he was “‘suspending’ the IR” because the author, 

Caverly, failed to sign the document. (Id.) Allred sent a memorandum to Defendant 

Amico and Caverly, stating that the IR had been suspended because Caverly failed to 

sign it. (Id.) Allred also told Caverly he needed a memorandum from Caverly to 

“justify[] the suspension.” (Id.) Allred stated that the IR would be signed on February 

10, 2012, but it was not. (Id.) On February 15, 2012, Lieutenant Hancock told Plaintiff 

he had the IR. (Id.) Plaintiff asked why it took six days to execute the IR, but Hancock 

did not have an answer. (Id.) Plaintiff received a copy of the IR with “2/9/2012 as the 

‘dated delivered,” which was “six days after-the-fact.” (Id.) Caverly admitted that he 

failed to sign the IR, but signed it on his next work day, which was February 15, 2012. 

(Id.) 

 On February 22, 2012, Plaintiff had a disciplinary hearing, and he “raised the fact 

that the IR had been suspended for an invalid reason.” (Id. at 26.) Plaintiff told 

Defendant Amico that an IR could only be suspended if the subject was being 

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investigated in a criminal prosecution. (Id.) Plaintiff asked Amico to dismiss the 

disciplinary charge, but Amico declined to do so and said that the “procedural issue [was] 

inconsequential.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, under 28 CFR § 541.8(a), the disciplinary 

hearing officer must decide whether Plaintiff committed the charged acts, Plaintiff 

committed similar acts as those charged in the IR, or Plaintiff did not commit the charged 

acts or refer the IR back for further investigation. (Id.) However, Amico found Plaintiff 

guilty of acts that were not charged in the IR and that were not similar to the acts charged 

in the IR. (Id.) On March 8, 2012, Plaintiff received the disciplinary hearing report. 

(Id.) Plaintiff claims that Amico falsified the disciplinary hearing report, stating that 

Plaintiff did not raise any procedural issues, and Amico failed to document that the IR 

had been suspended, and that Plaintiff had objected to being found guilty of an act neither 

charged nor similar to a charged act. (Id.) 

 On March 23, 2012, Plaintiff filed a BP-10, appealing Defendant Amico’s guilty 

finding, which allowed five days for the BP-10 to arrive to the Regional Office in 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (Id.) On April 24, 2012, Plaintiff received a response to the 

BP-10, stating that “[i]t was rejected” because it was untimely and did not have the 

disciplinary hearing report attached to it. (Id.) “Region” stating that Plaintiff’s BP-10 

arrived one day past the 20-day deadline. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that the five days he 

accorded for mailing the BP-10 was “ample” and that he did attach a copy of the 

disciplinary hearing report to the BP-10. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant Jane/John 

Doe 53 failed to “receive, log-in, and process” his BP-10 in a timely manner and 

erroneously rejected the appeal. (Id. at 27.) 

 On April 25, 2012, Plaintiff submitted a BP-11, appealing the “Region’s” denial of 

his BP-10. Plaintiff did not receive an acknowledgement of receipt or a response to his 

BP-11, in violation of 28 CFR § 541.18. (Id. at 26.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant 

Jane/John Doe 54 failed to “receive, log-in, process, and respond to” his BP-11. (Id. at 

27.) 

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 As his injury, Plaintiff alleges that the guilty finding at the disciplinary hearing 

was used to expel Plaintiff from a BOP rehabilitative program and the Parole 

Commission used the dismissed charge and expulsion when it rescinded Plaintiff’s parole 

date. (Id. at 26.) Plaintiff states that he is “applying for declaratory relief.” (Id. at 27.) 

 In Count Six, Plaintiff asserts a due process claim concerning disciplinary 

proceedings. (Id. at 28.) Plaintiff alleges that on December 16, 2012, he received an IR 

for a “Code 201.” (Id.) On January 25, 2013, Defendant Schnieder held a disciplinary 

hearing and found Plaintiff guilty of the Code 201. (Id.) On February 4, 2013, Plaintiff 

filed a BP-10, appealing the guilty finding. (Id.) Defendant Norwood responded to the 

BP-10 and “remanded the case for further review and rehearing, if necessary.” (Id.) On 

March 13, 2013, Norwood wrote a memorandum to Defendant Meeks stating that the IR 

needs to be rewritten to “giv[e] the Inmate notice of the allegations against him.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims rewriting an IR is not authorized by regulation and that the original IR 

described the incident and provided him with notice of the allegations. (Id.) On March 

20, 2013, the IR was “rewritten and altered by Def[endant] Murphy.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

claims that Murphy’s rewrite was “factually incorrect,” “unnecessary,” “and in violation 

of the Code of Federal Regulations and BOP regulations.” (Id. at 28-29.) 

 On May 2, 2013, the second disciplinary hearing was held, and Plaintiff told 

Defendant Schnieder that 28 CFR § 541.1 did not allow for rewriting or altering an IR. 

(Id. at 29.) Plaintiff asked that the charges be dismissed and the IR expunged. (Id.) 

Schnieder denied Plaintiff’s request and found Plaintiff guilty despite testimony from the 

witnessing officer that the officer had not witnessed the alleged altercation or Plaintiff 

acting aggressive or offensive. (Id.) 

 On June 3, 2013, Plaintiff submitted a BP-10, appealing the guilty finding. (Id.) 

On July 10, 2013, Defendant Norwood responded and stated that nothing prohibits staff 

from rewriting IRs, but he failed to cite any authority that explicitly authorizes rewriting 

IRs. (Id.) On August 1, 2013, Plaintiff submitted a BP-11 regarding the rewritten IR. 

(Id.) Defendant Rodgers responded and “did nothing more than regurgitate” a portion of 

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Plaintiff’s appeal and failed to cite any authority that authorizes rewriting or altering IRs. 

(Id.) 

 As his injury, Plaintiff alleges that the conviction from the disciplinary hearing 

elevated his custody status and the Parole Commission used the finding when it rescinded 

Plaintiff’s parole date. (Id. at 28.) 

 Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id. at 30.) 

III. Failure to State a Claim

A. Defendant Dosanj 

Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a 

violation of the Eighth Amendment. To state a Bivens medical claim, a plaintiff must 

show (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, 

and (2) the defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must 

both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

837 (1994). Deliberate indifference in the medical context may be shown by a 

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and 

harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may 

also be shown when a prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with 

medical treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976); Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

 Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor 

gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of 

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Corr., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 

622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or 

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion 

does not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” 

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, 

without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate 

indifference. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 

(9th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of 

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dosanj’s response regarding when the request for 

a consult was submitted was contradictory to Defendant Tracy’s response and that “staff 

stated anything in an attempt to cover their tracks . . . .” This allegation is not sufficient 

to show that Dosanj acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical need. 

Plaintiff does not allege that Dosanj intentionally lied and interfered with the consultation 

request. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Defendant Dosanj without prejudice. 

 B. Count Three – Violation of 10 U.S.C. § 812 

Plaintiff asserts a violation of his due process rights and 10 U.S.C. § 812, Article 

12, which prohibits confinement with enemy prisoners. Specifically, Article 12 states 

that “[n]o members of the armed forces may be placed in confinement in immediate 

association with enemy prisoners or other foreign nationals not members of the armed 

forces.” Article 12 “applies to members of the armed forces when placed in confinement 

in a state or federal facility within the continental United States due to an adjudged courtmartial sentence.” United States v. Wilson, 73 M.J. 529, 531 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.), aff’d

73 M.J. 404 (C.A.A.F. 2014). “The heart of this prohibition lies in the words ‘in 

immediate association’ and is not necessarily violated by the general confinement of the 

designated classes of prisoners within the same institution.” Kuykendall v. Taylor, 285 

F.2d 480, 481 (10th Cir. 1960). Military courts have defined “immediate association” as 

“being confined in a manner so that [military personnel] would be directly connected or 

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combined with captured foreign personnel.” United States v. Wise, 64 M.J. 468, 474 

(C.A.A.F. 2007) (emphasis added). The Wise court concluded that a member of the 

armed forces was not in “immediate association” with a foreign national for purposes of 

§ 812 when a “single strand of concertina wire” separated the member and Iraqi 

prisoners. Id. 

 Plaintiff’s allegations in Count Three are too vague and conclusory to state a 

claim. Plaintiff names numerous Defendants from several different federal prisons and 

states that since January 2006 he has been housed with foreign nationals. But Plaintiff 

fails to provide any facts to support that he was ever placed in “immediate association” 

with foreign nationals. Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support that he was ever confined 

in the same cell as a foreign national or that he was ever forced to come into direct 

contact with a foreign national. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count Three. 

C. Count Four – Due Process and BOP Policy Violations 

In Count Four, Plaintiff alleges that his requests to be transferred to a low security 

facility were denied and claims that he is not subject to PS 5100.08, which provides that 

an inmate who escaped from a secured facility, or an open institution with the threat of 

violence, be housed in at least a medium security facility. Plaintiff claims that he did not 

escape from a security facility because he escaped from a hospital. 

 Plaintiff contends that the Court has jurisdiction to hear the allegations contained 

in Count Four pursuant to the APA. The APA instructs that a person that is detrimentally 

affected by an agency decision is entitled to judicial review of that decision unless the 

statute precludes review or the action complained of has been committed to agency 

discretion. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702. “Judicial review of agency actions made pursuant 

to 18 U.S.C. § 3621, including actions made under P.S. 5100.08, is foreclosed under 18 

U.S.C. § 3625.” Aldaco v. Holder, No. 10-590(JRT/LIB), 2011 WL 825624, at *11 (D. 

Minn. Jan. 7, 2011.) Under § 3621, “[t]he Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of 

the prisoner’s imprisonment.” Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants acted in 

violation of PS 5100.08 or § 3621 fails for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

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D. Counts Five and Six-Disciplinary Challenges

In Counts Five and Six, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied due process in 

connection with disciplinary proceedings. In Count Five, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

Amico found him guilty of acts that were not charged in the Code 203 IR or acts similar 

to those charged in the Code 203, which violates 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(a). Plaintiff further 

contends that Defendants Jane/John Doe 53 and 54 failed to timely process and/or 

respond to his appeals. In Count Six, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Murphy 2 rewrote 

and/or altered an IR and that the rewritten IR was “factually incorrect,” “unnecessary,” 

“and in violation of the Code of Federal Regulations and BOP regulations.” Plaintiff also 

alleges that Defendant Schnieder found him guilty of the charge despite testimony from 

the witnessing officer that did not support the guilty finding. Lastly, Plaintiff asserts that 

in Defendants Norwood and Rodgers’ responses to his appeals, they failed to cite any 

authority that explicitly authorized rewriting an IR. 

 a. APA Claims 

In Counts Five and Six, Plaintiff asserts that he is bringing his claims pursuant to 

the APA and asserts that “[t]he agency action is reviewable as a final agency action for 

which there is no other adequate remedy.” The APA, however, “is not applicable to 

federal prison disciplinary proceedings.” Clardy v. Levi, 545 F. 2d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 

1976). The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s APA claims. 

 b. Bivens Claims 

In a Bivens action, the applicable statute of limitations is the forum state’s statute 

of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266, 274-76 

(1985); Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1991). The Arizona statute of 

limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1); 

Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa County, 943 P.2d 822, 824 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Vaughan, 

927 F.2d at 478. “[A] claim generally accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to 

know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 

159 F.3d 374, 379 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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 Plaintiff states his injuries occurred in 2012 and 2013. Plaintiff clearly had 

contemporaneous knowledge of the claimed violations, and did not commence this action 

until significantly more than two years after they accrued. Accordingly, these Bivens 

claims are time-barred and will be dismissed. 

IV. Claims for Which an Answer Will Be Required

 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has sufficiently asserted an Eighth Amendment 

medical care claim against Defendants Ricotta, Asberry, Smith 1, Briggs, Ackley, Tracy, 

Mitchell, and Connors in Count One, and the Court will require these Defendants to 

answer Count One. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (recognizing a Bivens

remedy for a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 

punishment by a prisoner who claimed federal prison officials had failed to treat his 

asthma). 

 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has sufficiently asserted an Eighth Amendment 

medical care claim against Defendants Ricotta, Asberry, Tracy, Mitchell, and Connors in 

Count Two, and the Court will require these Defendants to answer Count Two. 

V. Warnings

A. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

B. Copies

 Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 

copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, 

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 

5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

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C. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Counts Three, Four, Five, and Six are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (2) Defendants John/Jane Doe 1-54, Giordani, Childress, Williamson, 

Norwood, Hutton, Grondolsky, Smith 2, Wilson, Meeks, Jones, Batts, Zuniga, Powell, 

Jefferson, Dosanj, Wastell, Jones, Dooley, Clark, Basler, Murphy 1, Byrum, Daun, 

Powers, True, Revell, the United States of America, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 

Amico, Schnieder, Norwood, Murphy 2, and Rodgers are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (3) Defendants Ricotta, Asberry, Smith 1, Briggs, Ackley, Tracy, Mitchell, and 

Connors must answer Count One, and Defendants Ricotta, Asberry, Tracy, Mitchell, and 

Connors must answer Count Two. 

 (4) Plaintiff’s Motion for Service ((Doc. 3) is denied as moot. 

(5) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the 

Complaint (Doc. 1), this Order, and summons forms for Defendants Ricotta, Asberry, 

Smith 1, Briggs, Ackley, Tracy, Mitchell, and Connors. 

 (6) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 

 (7) If Plaintiff does not complete service of the Summons and Complaint on a 

Defendant within 90 days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of 

this Order, whichever is later, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not 

served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(ii). 

 (8) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the 

Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 

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 (9) The United States Marshal must for the individual Defendants Ricotta, 

Asberry, Smith 1, Briggs, Ackley, Tracy, Mitchell, and Connors, personally serve a copy 

of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order at Government expense, pursuant to Rule 

4(e)(2) and (i)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 (10) The Clerk of Court must send by certified mail a copy of the Summons for 

each individual Defendant, the Complaint, and this Order to (1) the civil process clerk at 

the office of the United States Attorney for the District of Arizona and (2) the Attorney 

General of the United States, pursuant to Rule 4(i)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

 (11) Defendants must answer the Complaint or otherwise respond by 

appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 (12) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on 

whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or 

paper that does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. 

 (13) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Bridget S. Bade pursuant to 

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 Dated this 12th day of October, 2018. 

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