Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-23-02728/USCOURTS-ca7-23-02728-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 376
Nature of Suit: other
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 23–2728 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel., 

JUDITH ROBINSON, 

Plaintiff, 

and

STATE OF INDIANA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

HEALTHNET INC., 

Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL OF: JUDITH ROBINSON

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:19-cv-4258-JRS-TAB — James R. Sweeney II, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MARCH 29, 2024 — DECIDED DECEMBER 26, 2024 

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, ST. EVE, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges. 

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2 No. 23-2728 

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. On its face, this is a qui tam action 

brought by Dr. Judith Robinson, the relator, on behalf of the 

United States and the State of Indiana, against HealthNet, a 

federally qualified health center in Indiana which provides, 

among other services, obstetric and gynecologic services to 

individuals at or below the federal poverty level. Because we 

find that the relator lacks standing to bring Count III of her 

amended complaint and the settlement between Indiana and 

HealthNet is fair, adequate, and reasonable, we affirm the 

holdings of the district court.

I.

HealthNet employed Dr. Robinson from 2005 until 2013. 

During her time at HealthNet, Dr. Robinson witnessed certain 

practices that caused her concern, including discrepancies between the way certain patient services were performed and 

how those services were billed and recorded. For example, 

Medicaid will only reimburse ultrasound readings if those 

readings are done during a face-to-face encounter between 

the doctor and the patient. In her wrap-around claims—called 

“wrap-around” due to the reimbursement calculation and 

structure for the underlying service—Dr. Robinson alleged 

that HealthNet doctors would review ultrasound photographs at the end of the day, rather than during a face-to-face 

encounter, but would bill Medicaid as though the doctor had 

read the ultrasound during a face-to-face encounter. As a result of her concerns, Dr. Robinson brought a qui tam suit,

United States & Indiana ex rel. Robinson v. Indiana University 

Health, Inc., et al., No. 1:13-cv-2009-TWP-MJD (S.D. Ind. 2013)

(“Robinson I”), on behalf of the United States and the State of 

Indiana alleging violations of the federal Anti-Kickback 

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No. 23-2728 3

Statute and False Claims Act and the Indiana False Claims 

and Whistleblower Protection Act.

When an individual brings a qui tam suit, he or she is 

termed the “relator.” The relator stands in the shoes of the 

government, and he or she prosecutes the action on the government’s behalf. The government is permitted to intervene 

in the action, but it is not required to do so, and the relator 

may continue the action even if the government does not intervene. However, if the government does intervene, it takes 

primary responsibility for prosecuting the action. If the action 

successfully results in a recovery for the government, the relator is entitled to a share of that recovery. The size of the 

share varies from suit to suit, and it depends on the specific 

characteristics of the action, including whether the government intervened.

In April 2017, Dr. Robinson reached a settlement with 

HealthNet in Robinson I. At the time of settlement, the value 

of the wrap-around claims could not be determined because 

Indiana had not completed its reconciliation process. As a result, the settlement agreement specifically excluded the wraparound claims and dismissed the remaining claims with prejudice. The wrap-around claims, by contrast, were dismissed 

without prejudice. The settlement awarded Dr. Robinson a relator’s share of 27.5% of the $18 million recovered by the 

United States and Indiana. 

By March 2018, the reconciliation process concluded, and 

the value of the wrap-around claims was determined to be 

$1,454,541.91. A dispute arose between Indiana and the 

United States about each entity’s liability for the relator’s 

share. The federal government reimburses states that participate in Medicaid for a portion of their Medicaid expenditures. 

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The reimbursement amount is based on the Federal Medical 

Assistance Percentage (“FMAP”), which is tied to each state’s 

per capita income. For the period of the wrap-around claims, 

Indiana’s FMAP was approximately 66%. Thus, in Indiana’s 

view, it only had liability to Dr. Robinson for a relator’s share 

based on 33% of the recovery because the federal government 

had reimbursement responsibility for 66% of the total recovery. In the United States’s view, Indiana had never submitted 

these wrap-around claims to it for reimbursement and, therefore, it had not suffered a loss. HealthNet, for its part, had refused to accept funds from Indiana for the wrap-around 

claims. 

In June 2019, Dr. Robinson moved to reopen Robinson I. In 

her motion, Dr. Robinson claimed that she reached an oral settlement agreement with HealthNet as to the wrap-around 

claims and, now that those claims could be valued, she 

wished to enforce the oral settlement agreement. Magistrate 

Judge Dinsmore, to whom the district court judge referred the 

motion to reopen, held a status conference and denied the motion to reopen in a minute entry. In that entry, Judge 

Dinsmore wrote that the court no longer had subject matter 

jurisdiction over the wrap-around claims because they had 

been dismissed, but that Dr. Robinson could file another suit 

for the purposes of resolving whether the United States or the 

State of Indiana should pay Dr. Robinson’s share. 

Instead of following Judge Dinsmore’s suggested course 

of action, Dr. Robinson then filed this suit, Robinson II, which 

was assigned to Judge Sweeney, against one defendant, 

HealthNet. In her complaint, Dr. Robinson realleged the substantive allegations related to the wrap-around claims from 

her complaint in Robinson I, as well as other claims that she 

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No. 23-2728 5

had also raised and settled in Robinson I. See e.g., R. 9 at 11 (alleging that HealthNet submitted claims for the administration 

of Depo-Provera birth control as a physician-patient encounter when, in reality, the Depo-Provera shot was administered 

by a nurse). Count I of Robinson II alleged violations of the 

federal False Claims Act and Count II alleged violations of the 

Indiana False Claims Act. Dr. Robinson also included Count 

III, which was new to the Robinson II complaint. Count III 

sought to enforce the alleged oral settlement agreement 

reached between Dr. Robinson and HealthNet and requested 

that the court “use its equitable powers” to enforce the alleged 

oral agreement. R. 9 at 18. Notably, Dr. Robinson does not allege that either the State of Indiana or the United States has 

failed to abide by the oral settlement agreement.

The United States declined to intervene in Robinson II, but 

Indiana exercised its right to intervene and made a series of 

motions that changed the scope of the litigation. Specifically, 

Indiana sought to dismiss all claims except for the wraparound claims as barred under res judicata. As to the wraparound claims, Indiana argued that both the federal and Indiana False Claims Act statutes have a six-year statute of limitations that is triggered when the violation occurs, and a second three-year statute of limitations that is triggered when the 

government learns of the false claim. R. 20 at 16–17. Dr. Robinson filed Robinson II on October 17, 2019; thus any violations 

that occurred before October 17, 2013 were barred unless the 

federal government and Indiana learned of the alleged violations within the three years prior to the filing of Robinson II. 

Id. However, Dr. Robinson filed Robinson I on October 29, 

2014, which alerted the government entities to the alleged violations. Id. Thus, any wrap-around claims that occurred before October 17, 2013 were time-barred. Id. Dr. Robinson did 

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6 No. 23-2728 

not oppose Indiana’s motion, and the district court dismissed 

all claims except for the wrap-around claims that allegedly 

arose between October 18, 2013 and February 28, 2015. R. 38. 

Indiana also argued that the court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over Count III of Dr. Robinson’s complaint both 

facially and factually. R. 43. The district court agreed with Indiana that, based on the evidence presented to it by the parties, Dr. Robinson lacked standing and, in turn, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction factually. R. 80. The district court declined to address Indiana’s facial challenge because its determination as to the factual challenge was “sufficient to decide 

[Indiana’s] motion.” Id. at 9. In explaining its holding, the district court started from the premise that a relator—like Dr. 

Robinson—does not suffer an injury in fact until “the qui tam 

action is completed and recovery is made.” Id. at 8–9. Then, 

the district court explained, Dr. Robinson would only have an 

injury in fact—a required element of standing—if a settlement 

agreement existed. See id. at 10. But Indiana proffered evidence that called Dr. Robinson’s standing into question. Id. at 

11–12. This evidence included the Robinson II complaint, 

which stated that all claims except the wrap-around claims 

were settled on May 4, 2017, the Robinson I settlement agreement, which contained an integration clause that claimed that 

the written settlement agreement (which specifically excluded the wrap-around claims and made no mention of an 

oral agreement) was the “complete agreement between the 

parties,” and the relator’s motion to reopen, which was filed 

three years after Robinson I was settled, and stated that the 

parties “were finally prepared to reach a settlement agreement” and made no mention of the alleged oral agreement. Id.

at 11–13 (emphasis added). This proffer, which removed the 

“presumption of correctness” that normally accords to a 

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No. 23-2728 7

complaint’s allegations, shifted the burden back to Dr. Robinson to prove the existence of an oral settlement agreement. Id.

at 12. In response, Dr. Robinson argued that Indiana’s evidence did not exclude the possibility that an oral agreement 

existed, and that Judge Dinsmore’s entry stating that the Robinson I court lacked jurisdiction over Dr. Robinson’s motion to 

reopen memorialized the agreement. Id. But this, the district 

court explained, did not constitute competent proof. Id. at 13. 

Indeed, the only affirmative proof that Dr. Robinson offered 

the district court, Judge Dinsmore’s entry, “in no way support[ed]” Dr. Robinson’s claim that an oral agreement existed. 

Id. As a result, the court dismissed Count III without prejudice, leaving only the wrap-around claims, alleged under federal and state law, pending. Id. at 15.1

Indiana also filed its own complaint in intervention, which 

further changed the scope of the litigation. R. 17. Dr. Robinson 

had filed her Robinson II complaint under the federal False 

Claims Act and the Indiana False Claims Act statute. R. 9. Indiana’s complaint-in-intervention realleged the Indiana False 

1 In the same order, the district court addressed HealthNet’s motion 

to dismiss Dr. Robinson’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. Dr. Robinson claims that the district court erred 

in its order by dismissing her Count III on the merits after the district court 

determined that it lacked jurisdiction. But careful reading of the order indicates that Count III was dismissed because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, the court wrote “HealthNet’s motion is denied as 

moot as to Count II and granted as to Count III of the Amended Complaint 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as address[ed] in granting Indiana's motion.” R. 80 at 18 (emphasis added). Dr. Robinson’s argument that the district court improperly dismissed Count III without leave to amend faces a 

similar obstacle. The district court’s order states, “Count III of the Relator’s 

Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.” Id. at 19.

Case: 23-2728 Document: 37 Filed: 12/26/2024 Pages: 18
8 No. 23-2728 

Claims Act claim, but also alleged a claim under the Indiana 

Medicaid False Claims Act. R. 17 at 25–28. Indiana’s complaint-in-intervention superseded Dr. Robinson’s allegations 

in Count II. R. 80. Following these changes, the remaining 

claims were the wrap-around claims from October 18, 2013 to 

February 28, 2015, as pled under the Federal False Claims Act, 

in Count I, and under the Indiana False Claims Act and the 

Indiana Medicaid False Claims Act, in Count II.

Indiana then moved to settle the remaining state-law 

claims with HealthNet, and Dr. Robinson dismissed Count I 

of her complaint, which left only the state wrap-around 

claims pending. The settlement valued these claims at 

$155,413.58. R. 97 at 2. It arrived at such a calculation by reducing the calculated value of the wrap-around claims 

($1,454,541.91) by the value of the claims dismissed as timebarred ($984,730.69). R. 84 at 10–11. The settlement agreement 

further reduced the value of the settlement by 66.92%, which 

represented the FMAP. Id.

Dr. Robinson opposed the settlement as unfair because it 

reduced her relator’s share. She argued that she had orally 

settled the claims between January 1, 2011 and February 28, 

2015 with HealthNet and, therefore, she was entitled to a relator’s share that reflected the value of all the wrap-around 

claims, including the claims dismissed as time-barred. She 

also argued that the value of the settlement should not be reduced by the federal share because Indiana had not submitted 

the wrap-around claims to the federal government for reimbursement and thus, in Dr. Robinson’s view, Indiana received 

the entire value of the settlement agreement.

The district court rejected Dr. Robinson’s arguments and 

found that the settlement was fair, adequate, and reasonable 

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No. 23-2728 9

under the unique circumstances of the action. R. 80 at 13. The 

district court explained that it was Dr. Robinson’s choice of 

actions—not the settlement—that reduced the relator’s share. 

Id. at 9–11. Specifically, Dr. Robinson failed to obtain a tolling 

agreement with HealthNet as to the wrap-around claims and, 

therefore, many of those claims were time-barred. Id. Furthermore, the district court judge found that the FMAP percentage should be applied, thus reducing the value to Indiana by 

approximately 66%. Id. at 11–13. 

On appeal, Dr. Robinson challenges the district court’s 

holdings that it lacked jurisdiction over Count III and that the 

settlement was fair, adequate, and reasonable. 

II.

We begin by considering Dr. Robinson’s standing and, in 

turn, our subject-matter jurisdiction over Count III. The Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to “cases” and 

“controversies,” U.S. Const. art. III § 2, cl. 1, and “standing is 

an essential ingredient of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Bazile 

v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 983 F.3d 274, 278 (7th Cir. 2020). 

As the party invoking the court’s jurisdiction, Dr. Robinson 

bears the burden of demonstrating that she has standing. 

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Silha v. ACT, 

Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015). To carry her burden, Dr. 

Robinson “must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is 

fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, 

and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). This injury “must actually exist.” Id. at 340. Until the underlying “litigation is complete[] and the relator prevails,” Dr. Robinson, 

as the relator, only has standing insofar as the government 

would have standing. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex 

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10 No. 23-2728 

rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772–74 (2000). In other words, it is 

the government’s injury that gives Dr. Robinson standing, not 

an injury to the relator herself. Id. at 774. 

Standing must exist throughout the litigation, and if 

standing is challenged by the court or a party, then the party 

invoking the court’s jurisdiction must present “competent 

proof” that standing exists. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance 

Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Apex Digit., Inc. v. Sears, 

Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443–45. (7th Cir. 2009). Standing 

may be challenged either facially or factually. A facial challenge to standing “argues that the plaintiff has not sufficiently 

‘alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction’” whereas a factual challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction “contends that 

‘there is in fact no subject matter jurisdiction,’ even if the 

pleadings are formally sufficient.” Silha, 807 F.3d at 173 (emphasis in original) (quoting Apex Digit., 572 F.3d at 443–44). 

Here, the district court found that Dr. Robinson factually 

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because, after Indiana proffered evidence that no oral settlement agreement existed, Dr. 

Robinson failed to present competent evidence that an oral 

settlement agreement existed between herself and HealthNet. 

Our review of the district court’s determination is de novo. Bazile, 983 F.3d at 278. 

We find that Dr. Robinson failed to establish standing, but 

for reasons slightly different from those articulated by the district court. Dr. Robinson insists that she brings Count III on 

behalf of the government, Robinson Br. at 17, but she fails to 

allege any injury related to the settlement agreement that the 

government has suffered at the hands of HealthNet. According to Dr. Robinson, the terms of the agreement were that 

HealthNet would not accept reimbursement for the allegedly 

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No. 23-2728 11

fraudulent claims and, in return, Dr. Robinson would dismiss 

the suit. R. 9 at 14, ¶ 38; Robinson Br. at 38–40. HealthNet

claims that it has not accepted any of the alleged overpayment, and Dr. Robinson does not dispute that representation. 

HealthNet Br. 11. Thus, accepting, arguendo, that an oral 

agreement did exist, Dr. Robinson has not articulated how 

HealthNet has breached that agreement or what injury the 

government has suffered. 

That is not to say that a relator is without recourse if he or 

she settles a qui tam suit only to have the government intervene and execute a less-favorable settlement with the purpose 

of reducing the relator’s share. Because the interests of the 

government and the relator diverge at settlement, such an allegation is concerning and worthy of close consideration by 

the court. See United States v. United States ex rel. Thornton, 207 

F.3d 769, 773 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that the interests of the 

government and relator “diverge when it comes time to pay 

the relator’s share”). But such an argument is better considered as a challenge to the fairness of the government’s settlement rather than an independent claim alleging breach of 

contract against the defendant particularly where, as here, the 

plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the defendant breached. Indeed, qui tam defendants, including HealthNet, do not unilaterally determine the relator’s share. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d); Ind. 

Code § 5-11-5.7-6(a)(4) (“After conducting a hearing at which 

the attorney general or the inspector general and the person 

who initially filed the complaint may be heard, the court shall 

determine the specific amount to be awarded under this section to the person who initially filed the complaint.”); Ind. 

Code § 5-11-5.5-6(a)(4) (same). And, as Dr. Robinson has 

claimed, it was the government entities that allegedly 

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promised Dr. Robinson a particular relator’s share, not 

HealthNet. R. 57 at 11 n. 7. 

Because Dr. Robinson has failed to allege any breach of the 

alleged oral settlement agreement by HealthNet, she lacks 

standing to bring Count III. We, therefore, affirm the district 

court’s dismissal of Count III for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. With our jurisdiction clarified, we turn to the fairness, 

adequacy, and reasonability of the Indiana and HealthNet’s 

settlement of Count II.

III. 

As we alluded to above, Dr. Robinson’s suit is more 

properly understood as a challenge to the fairness of the settlement agreement between HealthNet and Indiana. The government may settle a qui tam action over the objection of the 

relator if the court finds “after a hearing, that the proposed 

settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B); Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-

5(c) (same under the Indiana False Claims and Whistleblower 

Protection Act); Ind. Code § 5-11-5.7-5(c) (same under the Indiana Medicaid False Claims and Whistle Blower Protection 

Act). All parties cite United States v. Everglades Coll., Inc., 855 

F.3d 1279, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017), for the inquiry the court must 

make when reviewing a qui tam settlement. In that case, the 

Eleventh Circuit stated that 

[R]eview of proposed settlements must account for the 

reasonableness of the rationale offered by the government as well as the potentially prejudicial effect on the 

relator. Thus, we ask whether the government has advanced a reasonable basis for concluding the settlement is in the best interests of the United States, and 

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No. 23-2728 13

whether the settlement unfairly reduces the relator's 

potential qui tam recovery. 

Everglades Coll., 855 F.3d at 1289, abrogated on other grounds by 

United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 

419 (2023).2 

Of course, the district court reviews the settlement agreement first, and our review is of the district court’s decision. 

The district court’s decision is discretionary, and our review 

is for an abuse of that discretion. See United States ex rel Grear

v. Emergency Med. Assocs. of Ill., Inc., 436 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 

2006) (reviewing the award of costs in a qui tam suit for abuse 

of discretion), abrogated on other grounds by Canter v. AT&T 

Umbrella Benefit Plan No. 3, 33 F.4th 949 (7th Cir. 2022). Indeed, 

the statute directs that a district court must assure itself that 

the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, which mirrors the directive in Rule 23 to courts considering class action 

settlements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (instructing that the court 

must find “a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or 

compromise” that would bind class members “fair, reasonable, and adequate”). We review class action settlements for 

abuse of discretion and, even though differences exist 

2 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Everglades College considered the 

federal False Claims Act, but did not have reason to consider the Indiana 

False Claims and Whistleblower Protection Act or the Indiana Medicaid 

False Claims and Whistleblower Protection Act, the statutes under which 

the state wrap-around claims were alleged following Indiana’s complaint 

in intervention. R. 80. However, the relevant provisions in the Indiana 

statutes are materially indistinguishable from the federal statute, and we 

have no reason to believe—nor has any party argued—that the settlements 

of claims brought under the Indiana statutes should be reviewed differently from settlements achieved under the federal statute. See Ind. C.R. 

Comm'n v. Sutherland Lumber, 394 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).

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between qui tam suits and class actions, we see no reason to 

apply a different standard of appellate review to the approval 

of settlements of these suits, nor has any party advocated for 

a different standard. See e.g., In re Southwest Airlines Voucher 

Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 711 (7th Cir. 2015). 

In Dr. Robinson’s view, she orally settled all the wraparound claims at some point before she filed Robinson II and, 

therefore, the pending settlement agreement is unfair because 

it grants her a relator’s share based only on the wrap-around 

claims occurring between October 18, 2013 and February 28, 

2015, thus reducing her recovery. Dr. Robinson further argues 

that the settlement is unfair because the amount attributable 

to Indiana’s recovery is reduced by the amount Indiana could 

have recovered from the federal government, had Indiana reimbursed HealthNet’s claims. In Dr. Robinson’s view, Indiana has received the entire benefit of the claims because the 

United States—which now doubts the claims’ legitimacy—

will not reimburse Indiana for those claims should Indiana 

pay them to HealthNet. 

We begin by examining why the basis for the relator’s 

share resulting from Indiana and HealthNet’s settlement is 

smaller than the basis stemming from the alleged oral agreement. Of course, the basis for the relator’s share relies wholly 

on the amount recovered by the government entity as a result 

of the qui tam action. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d); Ind. Code 

§ 5-11-5.7-6; Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-6. Indeed, under each statute, the relator receives a percentage of the recovery obtained 

by the government. Id. 

In Robinson I, Dr. Robinson alleged that HealthNet submitted fraudulent wrap-around claims from January 1, 2011 until 

February 28, 2015. We now know the value of those claims to 

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No. 23-2728 15

be approximately $1.4 million. So, the maximum relator’s 

share was some percentage of $1.4 million. Dr. Robinson 

claims that she orally settled the wrap-around claims with 

HealthNet at some point before she filed Robinson II and that 

the oral settlement agreement guaranteed her a percentage of 

the $1.4 million. That, Dr. Robinson argues, is the end of the 

story.

But as the district court considered, and as we must too, 

that is only the end of the chapter, not the story. At the end of 

Robinson I, Dr. Robinson dismissed the wrap-around claims 

without prejudice. Even though Dr. Robinson was free to refile the wrap-around claims after the dismissal, Robinson I put 

the government on notice about the wrap-around claims and, 

thus, the statute of limitations continued to tick by. 31 U.S.C. 

§ 3731(b) (suit must be brought within “3 years after the date 

when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United 

States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances”); Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-9(b) (same under Indiana False 

Claims Act); Ind. Code § 5-11-5.7-9(b) (same under Indiana 

Medicaid False Claims Act); Beck v. Caterpillar Inc., 50 F.3d 405, 

407 (7th Cir. 1995) (the statute of limitations continues to run 

during the pendency of a timely filed case, and a voluntarily 

dismissed suit “is treated as if it had never been filed”). Notably, Indiana did not intervene in Robinson I, thus Dr. Robinson 

retained “primary responsibility for prosecuting the action.” 

See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c); Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-5(e) (under the Indiana False Claims Act, “[i]f the attorney general or the inspector general elects not to intervene in the action, the person 

who initially filed the complaint has the right to prosecute the 

action”); Ind. Code § 5-11-5.7-5(e) (same under Indiana Medicaid False Claims Act). 

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Between Robinson I and Robinson II, the parties sought to 

draft a written agreement settling the wrap-around claims. Indiana started from the proposition that the recovery was valued at $1.4 million and that the relator’s share would be a percentage of that amount. R. 62-3 at 32. But a dispute arose 

when the United States claimed that it suffered no loss (because Indiana had not submitted the wrap-around claims to 

it for reimbursement) and thus it would not pay any portion 

of the relator’s share. Id. Indiana, for its part, only believed 

that it was the ultimate beneficiary of 33% of the $1.4 million 

because, had Indiana paid HealthNet’s wrap-around claims, 

Indiana would have sought reimbursement from the federal 

government for approximately 66% of the $1.4 million. Thus, 

Indiana agreed to pay approximately 33% of the relator’s 

share. Id. The relator was unhappy with Indiana’s offer and 

wanted Indiana to pay the entire relator’s share. Id. at 49. Indiana refused and Robinson II ensued. 

By the time Dr. Robinson brought Robinson II, many of the 

wrap-around claims were untimely. When Indiana, which assumed primary responsibility for prosecuting Robinson II, 

moved to dismiss the untimely wrap-around claims as timebarred, Dr. Robinson did not object. The dismissal of the 

wrap-around claims dramatically reduced the amount of 

money that Indiana could recover from HealthNet through 

Robinson II and, in turn, the basis for the relator’s share. The 

dismissed claims are valued at $984,730.69, leaving the remaining claims valued at $155,413.58. Now, Indiana seeks to 

settle the remaining claims.

Considering this development of events, the district 

court’s conclusion that the settlement agreement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances” was not 

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No. 23-2728 17

an abuse of discretion. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B); Ind. Code 

§ 5-11-5.5-5(c); Ind. Code § 5-11-5.7-5(c). It was Dr. Robinson’s 

choice to dismiss the wrap-around claims while the reconciliation was ongoing and her failure to obtain a tolling agreement that limited the scope of cognizable claims, not the settlement agreement, or some unfairness perpetrated by Indiana or HealthNet. Indeed, Indiana did not intervene in Robinson I, so these choices rested with Dr. Robinson alone.

Dr. Robinson relies heavily on a Fifth Circuit case, United 

States v. United States ex rel. Thornton, 207 F.3d 769 (5th Cir. 

2000), for the proposition that the other, time-barred wraparound claims should be included in calculating the value of 

the settlement and, in turn, her relator’s share. But Thornton

itself instructs that “for the value of the released claims to be 

included, there must be an indication that they were released 

in return for the government’s release of the [False Claims Act] 

claims.” Thornton, 207 F.3d at 771 (emphasis added). Because 

relator’s inaction made the wrap-around claims non-cognizable, there are no claims for the government to release in exchange for the time-barred wrap-around claims. In this context, where actions by the relator, not the government, limited 

the scope of cognizable claims, and the government has offered reasonable and credible arguments in favor of the settlement, the government’s choice to limit the agreement to the 

claims pending before the district court is not inherently unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable. 

Dr. Robinson’s second argument is that Indiana’s recovery 

should not be reduced by the federal government’s percentage because the federal government never reimbursed Indiana for its portion of the wrap-around claims and, now that 

the claims are presumed to be fraudulent, Indiana cannot seek 

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18 No. 23-2728 

reimbursement. But as we indicated at oral argument, this 

stops the hypothetical math problem partway through its solution. If Dr. Robinson had not filed Robinson I, Indiana presumably would have reimbursed HealthNet for its wraparound claims and the federal government would have, in 

turn, reimbursed Indiana for approximately 66% of each 

claim. Compounding this issue, Dr. Robinson herself moved 

to dismiss the federal government’s claims. R. 86. She cannot 

now seek a relator’s share based on the claims that she dismissed, and the district court’s conclusion that the FMAP 

should be applied was not an abuse of its discretion. 

Aside from the arguments discussed above, Dr. Robinson 

does not challenge the district court’s reasoning that the settlement agreement was fair, adequate, and reasonable. Nor 

does she challenge the district court’s procedure or, aside 

from the arguments addressed above, the district court’s decision to award her a 20% relator’s share. Dr. Robinson received notice of Indiana and HealthNet’s motion to approve 

the settlement, and the district court followed its statutory obligation to provide Dr. Robinson an opportunity to be heard. 

R. 84 at 6–7. Because we find that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in rejecting Dr. Robinson’s challenges to 

the fairness of the settlement agreement, and because Dr. Robinson has provided no other argument against the district 

court’s analysis or claimed shortcomings in the district court’s 

procedure, we find the settlement agreement to be fair, adequate, and reasonable under the circumstances. 

IV. 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 

district court.

Case: 23-2728 Document: 37 Filed: 12/26/2024 Pages: 18