Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02726/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02726-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHILOH HEAVENLY QUINE,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFREY BEARD, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-02726-JST 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY

Re: ECF No. 150

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to stay the Court’s order granting enforcement of 

the settlement agreement. ECF No. 150. The Court will deny the motion.

I. INTRODUCTION

On March 1, 2017, Plaintiff Shiloh Quine moved to enforce the parties’ settlement 

agreement. ECF No. 98. On April 28, 2017, the Court granted the motion in part and denied it in 

part. ECF No. 116. The Court concluded, among other things, that “(1) the existing property 

policy must be revised to provide access to items that present safety and security concerns to 

transgender inmates in all 24 non-‘hub’ transgender institutions, although transgender inmates are 

housed in the 11 ‘hub’ institutions; (2) the existing property policy must be revised to include 

access to pajamas, nightgowns, rovers, scarves, bracelets, earrings, hair brushes, and hair clips; 

and (3) CDCR must provide compression tops and binders to inmates who cannot afford them, at 

state expense.” ECF No. 150 at 2 (citing April 28 Order). Defendants appealed the order, and 

Plaintiff cross-appealed. ECF Nos. 121, 123. On July 20, 2017, Defendants moved for a stay of 

the Court April 28 Order pending Ninth Circuit review. ECF No. 150.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court's “power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to 

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control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 

counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). A stay is 

“an exercise of judicial discretion, and the propriety of its issue is dependent upon the 

circumstances of the particular case.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009) (internal 

alterations, citations, and quotations omitted).

Courts consider four factors when analyzing a request to stay:

(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is 

likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be 

irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay 

will substantially injure the other parties interested in the 

proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.

Id. at 426 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Defendants argue they are likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal for two reasons. 

First, Defendants claim that the Ninth Circuit is likely to agree with them that the settlement 

agreement only gave Plaintiff the right to comment on CDCR’s revised property policy, not to 

challenge the exclusion of specific property items. ECF No. 150 at 4. Therefore, Defendants 

argue, this Court was wrong to even consider the specific property items Plaintiff’s raised in her 

motion to enforce, since Plaintiff indeed had the opportunity to comment on the property policy. 

Defendants especially take issue with this Court’s reliance in its April 28 Order on defense 

counsel’s representation to Judge Vadas that Plaintiff would be able to dispute the exclusion of 

specific property items. Id. at 5. But Defendant ignores that the Court gave two justifications for 

its decision to review the specific property item challenges: “Both due to defense counsel’s 

representation to Judge Vadas and the plain language of the Agreement, the Court will consider 

Plaintiff’s arguments related to specific property items.” ECF No. 116 at 7. Therefore, even if 

Defendants were to prevail on their extrinsic evidence argument, they have not demonstrated that 

they are likely to prevail on the merits.1 

 

1 Nor could Plaintiff, by virtue of signing the Settlement Agreement, have waived her right to 

challenge the exclusion of particular property items, ECF No. 150 at 6, if that right was a part of 

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Second, Defendants argue that a stay is warranted because the April 28 Order “raises 

serious legal questions of first impression in this circuit”: namely, whether the Turner v. Safley

“reasonable relation” test, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), applies to gender discrimination claims that 

implicate prison administration. ECF No. 150 at 5-6. As a general matter, it is correct that a stay 

may be appropriate to allow the Ninth Circuit to address a “genuine matter[] of first impression.” 

Morse v. Servicemaster Glob. Holdings, Inc., No. C 08-03894, 2013 WL 123610, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 

Jan. 8, 2013). Here, however, Defendants have not given the Court any basis to conclude that 

there is even a “minimal chance” that the Ninth Circuit will disagree with this Court’s application 

of intermediate scrutiny to Plaintiff’s claims. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-CV-03826-

EMC, 2015 WL 9303979, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015). In its April 28 Order, the Court cited 

more than one district court case that relied on the reasoning in Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 

499, 509 (2005), to reject the application of Turner to gender discrimination cases related to prison 

administration. ECF No. 116 at 8-9. Defendants cite no case in their motion that has come to the 

contrary conclusion.2 After the reply deadline, Defendants filed a statement of recent decision: 

Harrison v. Kernan, No. 16-cv-07103-NJV, ECF No. 48 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2017). ECF No. 155. 

While that court applied Turner to a gender discrimination claim, it did not engage with any of the 

post-Johnson cases this Court discussed in its April 28 Order and is therefore not persuasive. See

ECF No. 155-1 at 15-16. The Court disagrees that the standard of review question, though 

undecided by the Ninth Circuit, warrants a stay pending appeal.3

In sum, this factor weighs against a stay.

 

the very Settlement Agreement she signed.

2

 Defendants cite a number of cases on reply (all but one were issued before Johnson, and are 

therefore unpersuasive), but “[i]t is inappropriate to consider arguments raised for the first time in 

a reply brief.” Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. C & R Vanderham Dairy, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 

1089 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 

3

In any event, “if only this lesser showing [of a question of first impression] is made, 

[Defendants] must further demonstrate that the balance of the hardships absent a stay tips 

‘sharply’ in its favor.” O’Connor, 2015 WL 9303979, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015) (emphasis 

added). As discussed below, Defendants have failed to make that showing.

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B. Irreparable Injury

On irreparable injury, Defendants make two ultimately unpersuasive arguments. First, 

Defendant claims that it will suffer irreparable injury absent a stay because “inmates in male 

institutions will have access to property that compromises prison safety and security.” ECF No. 

150 at 6. But the Court already addressed these safety concerns in the April 28 Order and found 

them “unconvincing.” ECF No. 116 at 11.4 

Second, Defendants argue that disseminating the property items to non-hub institutions 

will cause irreparable harm because “it may discourage inmates from moving to a hub institution.” 

ECF No. 150 at 8 (emphasis added). Not only is this statement inconclusive, it is unsupported. 

See In re Excel Innovations, Inc., 502 F.3d 1086, 1098 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Speculative injury cannot 

be the basis for a finding of irreparable harm.”). Moreover, as Plaintiff points out, ECF No. 152 at 

14, CDCR chooses where inmates live, not the other way around. Relatedly, Defendants claim 

that it will be “operationally very difficult for CDCR to administer a system-wide property access 

policy.” ECF No. 150 at 8. But again, Defendants offer little support for that broad statement, 

and seem to contradict themselves by also arguing that the “transgender inmate population is very 

small.” Id. at 7. 

This factor weighs against a stay.

 

4

For example, Defendants recycle the argument that male inmates should not be given certain 

clothing items subject to dispute because they are more likely than female inmates to use those 

items to escape. ECF No. 150 at 7. The Court rejected this very argument in its April 28 Order:

CDCR’s draft policy allows transgender female inmates in male institutions to 

have sandals, t-shirts, and walking shoes, but not the other items listed above. 

CDCR says it cannot introduce the other clothing items into male institutions 

“because male inmates are more escape-prone than female inmates.” CDCR goes 

on to explain that these items “contain large amounts of cloth that is significantly 

different from the cloth used in prison-issued clothing, which can be altered by 

inmates to approximate the look of street clothing, thus aiding in escape 

attempts.” But as Plaintiff notes, inmates at male institutions can purchase a 

number of other “street clothing” items—athletic shorts, sweat pants, a poncho, 

etc.—that would seem to create the same risk, if not a greater one. 

ECF No. 116 at 10 (internal citations omitted). 

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C. Injury to Plaintiff

The third factor is potential injury to parties other than the one seeking the stay. Here, the 

only other party is Plaintiff. The Court agrees with Defendants that a stay would not cause 

Plaintiff substantial harm. Plaintiff is already housed in a female institution and “has access to 

property in the same manner as any other female inmate.” ECF No. 150 at 8. Therefore, the 

property disputes resolved by the April 28 Order will not affect her directly. Plaintiff does not 

address this argument in her opposition, except to say that the “minimization of Plaintiff’s harm 

fails to consider the harm caused to all the other inmates for whom the property policies must also 

be updated.” ECF No. 152 at 15. But the impact on the other inmates is a consideration for the 

fourth factor, not this one. More generally, Plaintiff does suffer harm if she is prevented from 

obtaining the benefit of the bargain she struck with CDCR.5 This factor weighs only slightly in 

 

5

The Court rejects Defendants’ standing argument (which it appears to abandon on reply). 

Plaintiff is a party to the settlement agreement. The enforcement of settlement agreements is 

“governed by [] established contract principle[s].” Hook v. State of Ariz., Dep’t of Corr., 972 F.2d 

1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992). Under basic principles of contract law, “a promisee may sue to 

enforce such a contract made for the benefit of a third party in equity under the principle that the 

promisor is under an equitable obligation to the promisee to perform.” 55 N.Y. Jur. 2d Equity 

§ 55; cf. Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 712, (2010) (holding that the plaintiff had standing to 

enforce a final judgment because, “[a] party that obtains a judgment in its favor acquires a 

‘judicially cognizable’ interest in ensuring compliance with that judgment”). 

Imagine, for example, that Barbara evicts Alice from an apartment building she owns. 

Alice sues Barbara, arguing that the eviction was based on race. The parties reach a settlement 

agreement where Barbara pays Alice $100 and also agrees to undergo training on racial bias in 

exchange for Alice dismissing the case. Alice has no plans to rent from Barbara again, meaning 

she cannot benefit from Alice’s training. But the training was important to Alice, and she would 

not have agreed to settle without that provision. Clearly, Alice can sue Barbara if she fails to do 

the training and hold up her end of the agreement. Likewise, here, Plaintiff can sue to enforce the 

agreement she made with Defendants, even if some parts of the agreement benefit other prisoners 

and not her. 

Adopting Defendants’ position would render void any provisions in settlement agreements 

that require some form of institutional reform or that do not directly benefit the plaintiff. Given 

the prevalence of these provisions in individual plaintiff cases, that cannot be so. See, e.g., 

Jessica K. v. Eureka City Sch. Dist., No. 13-cv-5854, ECF Nos. 79, 81 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2014) 

(approving settlement agreement in case brought by a group of individual students, which required 

the school district to “retain an outside consulting group and undertake a process to review school 

climate, policies and practices, and adopt programs and services to achieve the goals stated in the 

agreement,” ECF No. 79 ¶ 17); E.E.O.C. v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys. of Houston, Inc., No. 1:11-

CV-1658-LJO-BAM, 2014 WL 223536, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) (upholding language in 

consent decree that would “enjoin defendants from discriminating or retaliating against their 

employees in the future”); Jacobson v. Washington State Univ., No. CV-05-0092-FVS, 2007 WL 

26765, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2007) (describing settlement agreement in individual 

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favor of a stay.

D. Public Interest in a Stay

“The public interest inquiry primarily addresses impact on non-parties rather than parties.” 

Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 974 (9th Cir. 2002). “It embodies the 

Supreme Court’s direction that ‘in exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay 

particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of 

injunction.’” Bernhardt v. Los Angeles Cty., 931-32 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Weinberger v. 

Romero–Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). Here, other CDCR inmates stand to benefit from 

implementation of the Court’s order, particularly those inmates in male institutions or at non-hub 

institutions. Defendants respond that if they win on appeal, inmates will possess contraband that 

prison officials will have to confiscate. ECF No. 150 at 9. But that argument is premised on a 

victory before the Ninth Circuit, which this Court already found to be unlikely. Defendants also 

argue that if they are forced to promulgate new emergency or permanent rules to comply with the 

Court’s order, the existing policy (which does provide some access) may expire. Id. The Court 

finds this argument unconvincing. The April 28 Order was issued over three months before 

Defendants filed their stay motion. Had they complied with the Order immediately, the process of 

updating the property policy regulations would be well underway. 

CONCLUSION

All four factors weigh against a stay. Accordingly, the motion for a stay is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 12, 2017

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

 

discrimination case that required the defendant “to provide an additional 40 hours of training in 

law enforcement and diversity”); In re Marriage of Smith & Maescher, 21 Cal. App. 4th 100, 104 

(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (action seeking specific performance of a marital separation agreement in 

which the husband agreed to pay for his children’s undergraduate education).

Accordingly, Plaintiff has standing to seek its enforcement and, correspondingly, to argue 

against a stay of the Court’s April 28 Order. 

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