Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02465/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02465-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Yolanda M. Romero, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant.

No. CV-14-02465-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Claimant Yolanda Romero’s appeal, which challenges 

the Social Security Administration’s decision to deny benefits. (Doc. 19.) Defendant 

concedes that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed to support with substantial 

evidence his decision to deny the Claimant benefits. (Doc. 24 at 2.) Accordingly, the 

Court vacates the ALJ’s decision and remands for further proceedings. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Standard of Review 

 Here, the Defendant concedes that the ALJ erred by “failing . . . to provid[e] 

[legally] sufficient rationale for rejecting the opinions of [treating] Drs. Posner, Burgher, 

Battersby, and [consulting psychologist] Dr. Piatka, [and for] finding the claimant less 

than credible.” (Doc. 24 at 2.) In such a case, the Act “makes clear that courts are 

empowered to . . . modify[] or reverse a decision by the Commissioner ‘with or without 

remanding the case for a rehearing.’” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting § 405(g)). “While [courts] generally remand to the [ALJ] for ‘additional 

investigation or explanation,’” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 

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1100 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted), the Ninth Circuit, like every other circuit, 

recognizes that “in appropriate circumstances courts are free to reverse and remand a 

determination by the Commissioner with instructions to calculate and award benefits.” 

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1019 (citing cases from every circuit). Accordingly, the only 

dispute arising between the parties is whether the Court should remand for further 

proceedings or for an award of benefits. 

II. Remedy 

 The Ninth Circuit applies the “three-part credit-as-true standard, each part of 

which must be satisfied in order for a court to remand to an ALJ with instructions to 

calculate and award benefits[.]” Id. at 1020. The Claimant must establish: first, that the 

ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether medical 

opinion or claimant testimony; second, that the record has been fully developed and 

further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; and third, whether if 

the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to 

find the claimant disabled on remand. See Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1100–01 (citing 

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020). If all three conditions are met, the reviewing court may 

remand for an award of benefits. Id. at 1101. Nonetheless, the reviewing court retains 

flexibility in determining the appropriate remedy if the record as a whole still creates 

“serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled[.]” Id. at 1107 (citing 

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021.) 

 It is uncontested that the first condition of the credit-as-true standard is met: the 

ALJ erred by failing to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the testimony of 

three of Claimant’s treating physicians, one consulting psychologist, and for finding the 

Claimant less than credible. (Doc. 24 at 2.) 

 The next step is to determine whether further administrative proceedings would be 

useful. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103. To make that determination, the Court must “review 

the record as a whole and determine whether it is fully developed, is free from conflicts 

and ambiguities, and ‘all essential factual issues have been resolved.’” Dominguez v. 

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Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1101). 

Importantly, “assess[ing] whether there are outstanding issues requiring resolution [must 

be done] before considering whether to hold that the claimant’s testimony is credible as a 

matter of law.” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1105 (citation omitted). The same order of 

operations also applies when dealing with improperly rejected medical opinion evidence. 

See Dominguez, 808 F.3d at 409. As a result, any conflict between salient evidence on 

the record and evidence improperly rejected by the ALJ, or any need for further 

development of the record, prohibits the reviewing court from reaching the credit-as-true 

step, since “[i]f such outstanding issues do exist, the district court cannot deem the 

erroneously disregarded testimony to be true; rather, the court must remand for further 

proceedings.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 495 

(9th Cir. 2015) (“The touchstone for an award of benefits is the existence of a disability, 

not the agency's legal error.”). 

 Here, as the Defendant points out, the improperly rejected opinions of Drs. Posner, 

Burgher, and Battersby as well as Claimant’s own testimony conflict with the opinions of 

other consulting physicians on the record. (Doc. 24 at 4.) For example, Dr. Posner 

opined Claimant could only sit, stand, or walk for less than 1-hour per 8-hour workday. 

(R. at 1018–23.) Likewise, Dr. Battersby found that Claimant could walk for no more 

than 2 hours, stand for no more than 3 hours, and sit for no more than 4 hours per 8-hour 

workday. (R. at 770.) And Dr. Burgher concluded that Claimant could not work nor 

“perform daily activities” at all. (R. at 808.) Furthermore, the Claimant testified at an 

August 10, 2010 hearing before the ALJ, and likewise at a later December 6, 2012 

hearing,1

 that she can only walk for “[p]robably about 15 minutes, 20 minutes,” and can 

“sit . . . , but it’ll be about 15 minutes before I have to stand up for a bit.” (R. at 70–71.) 

However, to the contrary, consulting physician Dr. Radkowsky examined Claimant’s 

medical records and determined that Claimant could sit, stand, and/or walk for 6- to 8-

 

1

 Claimant provided almost identical testimony during the December 2012 hearing, stating that she can stand “[f]or, like 20 minutes, 30,” and can “sit . . . for about 

20 minutes . . . 30 minutes and that’s pretty much it.” (R. at 41.) 

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hours per 8-hour workday. (R. at 543.) Other consulting physicians like Dr. Bargan (R. 

at 139–55), Dr. Ostrowski (R. at 119–33), and Dr. Chaffee (R. at 538–41) came to similar 

conclusions. 

 The examples above illustrate clear conflicts between the testimonies and opinions 

in the record that raise legitimate questions regarding the extent of Claimant’s 

impairments. The inconsistencies also prove that further administrative proceedings 

would serve a useful purpose. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1105. Accordingly, the matter must 

be remanded for further proceedings before the ALJ. See, e.g., Dominguez, 808 F.3d at 

409; Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1105; Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining credibility, and 

resolving ambiguities). 

 The ALJ also improperly rejected the opinion of consulting psychologist Dr. 

Piatka; nonetheless, the opinion is not yet resolved such that the Court may credit her 

opinion as true. While Dr. Piatka listed limitations related to understanding and memory, 

sustained concentration and persistence, social interaction, and adapting to change, Dr. 

Piatka also noted that a further medical review of Claimant’s medications was necessary 

to “rule out concentration or cognitive abnormalities secondary to medication effects and 

to determine to what extent some symptoms may reflect medication effects . . . .” (R. at 

956.) The inconsistencies between Dr. Paitka’s opined limitations and Dr. Paitka’s 

acknowledgment that those limitations may not in fact stem from any psychological 

dysfunction in Claimant but rather may be the effects of her medications again supports 

the Court remanding this matter for further development before the ALJ. See Treichler, 

775 F.3d at 1101. 

 Claimant argues that her more recent pain and symptom testimony (post-2010) not 

only supports a finding of disability but is uncontested by medical evidence on the 

record. (Doc. 25 at 4–5.) The Defendant concedes that the ALJ failed to properly reject 

Claimant’s testimony as not credible. Nevertheless, whether crediting Claimant’s more 

contemporary testimony as true may qualify her for disability during that time is 

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inapposite to the current calculation. First, the Claimant must be found disabled 

beginning on her March 6, 2008 onset date; therefore, Claimant’s post-2010 condition 

cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. (R. at 1098.) Second, the existing record conflicts 

nonetheless and requires remand for reconsideration. See Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1105. 

Moreover, the impact and relevance of Claimant’s pain and symptom testimony, preand/or post-2010, on the formulation of Claimant’s residual functional capacity is a 

determination left “up to the ALJ [to make], not the court . . . .” Dominguez, 808 F.3d at 

409; see also Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (The Court 

“may not substitute [its own] judgment for that of the ALJ.”). 

CONCLUSION

 The record before this Court is not “free from conflicts” nor the need to further 

develop the record. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1107. “In light of the inconsistencies, 

conflicts, and gaps in the record that require further administrative proceedings,” the 

Court cannot proceed to the final step in the credit-as-true analysis, “whether the ALJ 

would be required to find [Claimant] disabled” if Drs. Posner, Burgher, Battersby, and 

Piatka’s opinions were credited as true and the Court held Claimant’s testimony to be 

fully credible. See Dominguez, 808 F.3d at 409; Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1105. 

Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that this matter is remanded back to the ALJ for a third 

opportunity to decide the issue. The Clerk of the Court shall remand and enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 Dated this 29th day of February, 2016. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge

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