Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05574/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05574-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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United 

States District 

Court 

For the Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANTONIO P. SANCHEZ, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

 

BANK OF AMERICA F/K/A COUNTRYWIDE 

HOME LOANS; NATIONS FIRST LENDING, 

INC.; ALCA CORPORATION D/B/A HOME 

FUNDERS FINANCIAL; ROMEO FELISCO 

ALVIDERA; GI HUANG LI; and DOES 1-

20 inclusive, 

 

 Defendants. 

 

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Case No. 09-5574 SC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT 

ALCA CORPORATION'S 

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

I. INTRODUCTION

 Now before the Court is a Motion for Attorney's Fees filed by 

Defendants Alca Corporation DBA Home Funders Financial and Romeo 

Felisco Alivedera (collectively, "Defendants") against Plaintiff 

Antonio Sanchez ("Plaintiff"). Docket No. 42 ("Motion"). 

Plaintiff filed an untimely Opposition; Defendants filed a Reply. 

Docket Nos. 46, 44.1

 Based on the papers submitted by the parties, 

and for the reasons described below, the Court hereby GRANTS IN 

PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees.2

 

1

 No other Defendant participated in this Motion. 

2

 Because the Court has already issued an order in this case 

granting attorney's fees to a Defendant, See Sanchez v. Bank of 

America, No. 09-5574, 2010 WL 2382347 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2010), 

much of this Order mirrors the text of that earlier order. 

Case 3:09-cv-05574-SC Document 50 Filed 07/22/10 Page 1 of 11
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II. BACKGROUND

 In his initial Complaint, filed November 24, 2009, Plaintiff 

challenged alleged misconduct that took place during the 

origination of a housing loan. See Docket No. 1 ("Compl."). Among 

the eleven causes of action named in the Complaint were two federal 

causes of action: violation of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1601 ("TILA"), and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 

U.S.C. § 2605 ("RESPA"). See id.

 Various Defendants filed motions to dismiss or otherwise 

responded to the Complaint. Docket Nos. 16, 20, 22-24. In 

response, Plaintiff filed an untimely Statement of Non-Opposition, 

Docket No. 30 ("SNO"), stating that he did not oppose dismissal of 

the two federal causes of action. Plaintiff argued that because 

"Plaintiff's federal claims against all the defendants are now 

dismissed," the Complaint failed "to state a basis for the Court's 

jurisdiction and this Court should dismiss the complaint without 

prejudice." SNO at 2 n. 1. On the following day, February 26, 

2010, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, Docket No. 31 ("Am. 

Compl."), in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

15(a)(1)(B), which requires amended pleadings to be filed within 

twenty-one days of service of a Rule 12(b) motion. Plaintiff's 

Amended Complaint included seven state law causes of action and no 

federal causes of action. See Am. Compl. 

 The Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the case should 

not be dismissed. Docket No. 36 ("OSC"). In Plaintiff's Response, 

Plaintiff's counsel, Sharon Lapin ("Lapin"), admitted that the 

Statement of Non-Opposition and Amended Complaint were untimely 

filed, provided no reasons why the filings were late or incomplete, 

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and requested that any sanctions be imposed on Lapin herself and 

not on Plaintiff. Docket No. 37 ("OSC Response") at 1-2. At the 

show cause hearing on April 9, 2010, the Court dismissed the action 

against all Defendants with prejudice and permitted Defendants to 

file motions for attorney's fees. Docket No. 39. 

 In the declaration attached to Defendant's Motion, Defendants 

claim $17,221 in attorney's fees and $216 in costs. Roth Decl. ¶ 

4.3

 However, the billing records attached as an exhibit to the 

declaration document $8,947.50 in attorney's fees and $96.15 in 

costs. Roth Decl. Ex. A ("Initial Billing Statement"). In an 

exhibit attached to a supplemental declaration filed with their 

Reply, Defendants provide billing records documenting $17,724.50 in 

fees and $216.14 in costs. Roth Supp. Decl. Ex. A ("Supp. Billing 

Statement"). Defendants have not explained this discrepancy. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Sanctions

 In the present action, there are three relevant legal bases on 

which the Court can rely in awarding attorney's fees as a sanction. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, "[a]ny attorney . . . who so multiplies the 

proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be 

required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, 

expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such 

conduct." Second, under Civil Local Rule 11-6, the court may 

impose "appropriate sanctions" if the court "has cause to believe 

 

3

 Elizabeth Roth ("Roth"), counsel for Defendants, filed a 

Declaration in support of Defendants' Motion, Docket No. 40, and a 

Supplemental Declaration in support of Defendants' Reply, Docket 

No. 42. 

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an attorney has engaged in unprofessional conduct." Civ. L.R. 11-

6(a)(2)-(3). Third, courts have inherent power to issue sanctions 

as necessary to "manage their own affairs so as to achieve the 

orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Chambers v. NASCO, 

Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1992) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). The court may impose sanctions sua sponte under this 

authority. Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980). 

B. Calculation of Attorney Fees

 "The determination of attorney fees is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court." Zuniga v. United Can Co., 812 F.2d 

443, 454 (9th Cir. 1987). To determine a reasonable fee, the court 

should first "calculate the 'lodestar figure' by taking the number 

of hours reasonably expended on the litigation and multiplying it 

by a reasonable hourly rate." Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 

1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 

424, 433 (1983)). "Second, the court must decide whether to 

enhance or reduce the lodestar figure based on an evaluation of the 

Kerr factors that are not already subsumed in the initial lodestar 

calculation." Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119 (citing Kerr v. Screen 

Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975). The Kerr

factors are include the time and labor required, the novelty and 

difficulty of the questions involved, the skill requisite to 

perform the legal service properly, and awards in similar cases. 

Quesada v. Thomason, 850 F.2d 537, 539 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. Sanctions

 A specific finding of subjective bad faith by a counsel before 

the court will support a sanction of attorney's fees under 28 

U.S.C. § 1927. Salstrom v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 74 F.3d 

183, 184-85 (9th Cir. 1996). The same finding supports sanctions 

under the court's local rules, Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 

1473, 1482 (9th Cir. 1989), and under the court's inherent power, 

Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648-49 

(9th Cir. 1997). 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the court may find bad faith "when an 

attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument or 

argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an 

opponent," Estate of Blas ex rel. Chargualaf v. Winkler, 792 F.2d 

858, 860 (9th Cir. 1986), or when litigation conduct is "undertaken 

to increase expenses or delay," New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 

869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 1989). Under Civil Local Rule 11-6, 

in addition to a finding of bad faith or abusive litigation, the 

sanction should be "relatively mild" and (1) consistent with higher 

authority, (2) necessary for the conduct of the court's business, 

(3) consistent with "principles of right and justice," and (4) 

"proportionate to the offense and commensurate with principles of 

restraint and dignity in judicial power." Zambrano, 885 F.2d at 

1479-80. Monetary sanctions imposed under the court's inherent 

power are appropriate if the court makes an explicit finding that 

the underlying conduct constitutes bad faith, Primus, 115 F.3d at 

648-49, or if bad faith is patent from the record, Optyl Eyewear 

Fashion Intern. v. Style Co., 760 F.2d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 1985). 

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 The Court finds Lapin acted in bad faith in the present 

action. Lapin filed a baseless Complaint for an improper purpose 

against Defendants, she failed to comply with court rules, and she 

unreasonably and vexatatiously multiplied proceedings in the 

present action by filing an untimely Statement of Non-Opposition 

and an Amended Complaint. Over the last year, Lapin has filed more 

than thirty nearly identical actions in the Northern District of 

California on behalf of mortgage holders against their brokers and 

others in the mortgage business.4 Each of these actions has been 

dismissed. The majority of them follow the exact pattern found in 

the present case -- Lapin files a complaint with federal and state 

causes of action, defendant files a motion to dismiss the federal 

causes of action, Lapin files a statement of non-opposition, and 

the court grants defendant's motion to dismiss.5 Those that do not 

 

4

 E.g., Gonzalez v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, No. 09-4571; Hall v. PLM 

Lender Servs., No. 09-4760; Acevedo v. JP Morgan Chase, No. 09-

4765; Garlick v. Am. Home Mortgage Serv. Inc., No. 09-5015; Pasco 

v. Chase Home Finance, No. 09-5017; Johansen v. First Franklin Loan 

Servs., No. 09-5018; Turchie v. EMC Mortgage Corp., No. 09-5019; 

Leiva v. PennyMac Loan Servs., LLC, No. 09-5566; Morales v. Bank of 

America, No. 09-5566; Becerra v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, No. 09-5568; 

Almaraz v. JP Morgan Chase, No. 09-5569; Leiva v. Citi Mortgage, 

Inc., No. 09-5571; Soto v. Indymac Mortgage Servs., No. 09-5572; 

Saucedo v. First Franklin Loan Servs., No. 09-5573; Jimenez v. Bank 

of America, No. 09-5575; Leiva v. Bank of America, No. 09-5576; 

Martinez v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, No. 09-05577; Ramos v. Aurora Loan 

Servs., No. 09-5579; Kaleb v. Bank of America Home Loans, No. 09-

5958; Wright v. Saxon Mortgage Servs., No. 09-5960; Mendez v. EMC 

Mortgage Corp., No. 09-5961; Sanchez v. Citi Mortgage, No. 10-0006; 

Robinson v. Bank of America, No. 10-0050; Lobato v. Citibank NA, No. 10-0106; Aragon v. Bank of America, No. 09-5016; Ulloa v. 

Wachovia Mortgage, No. 09-5570; Ramirez v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 09-0578; Chuakay v. IndyMac Mortgage Servicing, No. 10-0051; Vo 

v. Downey Savings and Loan Assoc., No. 09-3985; O'Hearn v. Wells 

Fargo Bank NA, No. 09-4762. 

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 E.g., Gonzalez v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, No. 09-4571; Garlick v. Am. 

Home Mortgage Serv. Inc., No. 09-5015; Johansen v. First Franklin 

Loan Servs., No. 09-5018; Turchie v. EMC Mortgage Corp., No. 09-

5019; Morales v. Bank of America, No. 09-5566; Becerra v. Ocwen 

Loan Servicing, No. 09-5568; Almaraz v. JP Morgan Chase, No. 09-

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follow this precise pattern have been dismissed after Lapin failed 

to appear for a show cause hearing, e.g., Argon v. Bank of America, 

No. 09-5016, or upon Lapin's stipulation to dismissal at a motion 

hearing, e.g., O'Hearn v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 09-04762. Motions 

for sanctions have been filed in several actions. E.g., Jimenez, 

No. 09-5575, Lobato, No. 10-0106. Sanctions have been imposed in 

at least one action. Swanson v. EMC Mortgage Corp., No. 09-1507, 

2010 WL 1173089 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2010). 

 Furthermore, the facts show that Lapin knew at the time she 

filed Plaintiff's Complaint that this behavior was improper. On 

October 29, 2009, Judge O'Neill in the Eastern District of 

California dismissed with prejudice an action brought by Lapin on 

behalf of another plaintiff. Swanson, No. 09-1507, 2009 WL 

3627925, *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009). The order stated, "this 

Court is concerned that Ms. Swanson has brought this action in 

absence of good faith and that Ms. Swanson exploits the court 

system solely for delay or to vex." Id. at *13. The court held 

that "attempt to vex or delay provides further grounds to dismiss 

this action." Id. Both this dismissal with prejudice and a 

related order to show cause predate Lapin's November 29, 2009 

filing of the Complaint in the present action. While Lapin claims 

that her "significant and regrettable" errors "fall far short of 

 

5569; Leiva v. Citi Mortgage, Inc., No. 09-5571; Saucedo v. First 

Franklin Loan Servs., No. 09-5573; Leiva v. Bank of America, No. 

09-5576; Martinez v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, No. 09-5577; Kaleb v. Bank 

of America Home Loans, No. 09-5958; Wright v. Saxon Mortgage 

Servs., No. 09-5960; Mendez v. EMC Mortgage Corp., No. 09-5961; 

Sanchez v. Citi Mortgage, No. 10-0006; Robinson v. Bank of America, No. 10-0050; Ulloa v. Wachovia Mortgage, No. 09-5570; Ramirez v. 

Countrywide Home Loans, No. 09-5578; Chuakay v. IndyMac Mortgage 

Servicing, No. 10-0051; Vo v. Downey Savings and Loan Assoc., No. 

09-3985. 

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the subjective intentional bad faith and willful vexation and 

harassment," Opp'n at 5, this timing suggests otherwise. 

 The Court identifies with particularity Lapin's bad-faith 

conduct in this action. Lapin brought an action in federal court 

and failed to make a timely response to Defendants' motions to 

dismiss. She filed an untimely Statement of Non-Opposition in 

which she did not oppose dismissal of the federal causes of action 

-- the only basis for the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. 

Then she filed an untimely Amended Complaint with no federal causes 

of action and no other basis for subject matter jurisdiction. She 

has employed similar tactics in dozens of other actions filed 

throughout California. The only reasonable explanation is that 

Lapin is seeking to prolong lawsuits that appear to have no merit. 

At the show cause hearing and in her Opposition to this Motion, 

Lapin did not provide an alternative explanation for her conduct. 

 The Court finds an award of attorney's fees is both necessary 

for the conduct of the Court's business and proportionate to the 

offense. As requested, the Court will sanction Lapin, rather than 

her client. An award of attorney's fees will serve to deter Lapin 

and others from filing actions that they have no intent of 

litigating. An award of fees to Defendants is the appropriate and 

proportionate sanction, as it will compensate Defendants for the 

costs incurred due to Lapin's abusive conduct. In sanctioning 

Lapin, the Court relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1927, Civil Local Rule 11-6, 

and the Court's inherent power.6

 

6

 In their Motion, Defendants advance additional novel theories 

supporting their Motion, including malicious prosecution under 

Andrus v. Estrada, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1030, 1041 (1995). The Court 

declines Defendants' invitation to extend Andrus, instead relying 

on the above sources of authority. 

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 B. Calculation of Attorney Fees

"The party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence 

supporting the hours worked and rates claimed," and if the evidence 

is lacking, "the district court may reduce the award accordingly." 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. In their Motion and accompanying 

declaration, Defendants claim $17,221 in attorney's fees and 

$216.14 in costs. See Roth Decl. ¶ 4. As evidence offered in 

support, Defendants attach four pages of billing records evincing 

$8,947 in attorney's fees and $96.15 in costs. See Initial Billing 

Records. In their Reply, Defendants claim an additional $503.50 in 

fees "incurred since the filing of this Motion" and $795 in fees in 

filing their reply. Reply at 2. Defendants attach to their Reply 

six pages of billing records totaling $17,724.50. See Supp. 

Billing Records. 

The Court will not consider costs alleged for the first time 

in Defendants' reply; nor will it consider the Supplemental Billing 

Records attached to Defendants' Reply. Defendants had the 

opportunity to document their billing on this matter in support of 

their Motion, and they did so. They now claim a greater amount of 

damages, without explaining the difference between their original 

documentation and the later documentation. Nor did they seek leave 

from the Court to file supplemental materials, as required by Civil 

Local Rule 7-3(d). Furthermore, because Defendants provide no 

evidentiary support for the $17,221 claimed in their Motion, the 

Court will use the $8,947.50 figure Defendants support with their 

Initial Billing Records as a starting point in determining the 

appropriate sanction. 

With respect to Defendants' Initial Billing Records, the Court 

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finds them to be detailed, and helpful in determining both the 

reasonable number of hours worked and the reasonable rate. 

Defendants claim 31.5 hours of attorney time was spent on this 

matter. Initial Billing Records at 3. Defendants identify each 

discrete action taken, the amount of time dedicated to that action, 

and the billing rate for the person who performed that action. 

E.g., id. at 2 (identifying actions such as "Draft Motion for More 

Definite Statement" and "Draft Proposed Orders"). The rate for 

each attorney varies from $265 per hour to $325 per hour. Id.

The Court finds the hourly rates provided by Defendants to be 

reasonable. Other courts have found similar rates for attorneys 

practicing in San Francisco to be reasonable. E.g., Asis Internet 

Servs. v. Optin Global, Inc., No. 05-05124, 2010 WL 2035327, *6 

(N.D. Cal. May 19, 2010) (finding hourly rates of $180-$220 for 

junior attorneys, $240-$280 for temporary attorneys, and $350-$425 

for senior attorneys to be reasonable based on the court's 

"familiarity with the prevailing rates in this district"); Meyer v. 

ARS Nat. Servs., Inc., No. 07-6422, 2008 WL 3979466, *2 (N.D. Cal. 

Aug. 26, 2008) (finding $300 to be a reasonable hourly rate for 

attorneys practicing in the San Francisco Bay Area). 

The Court also finds the number of hours claimed to be 

reasonable. The 31.5 hours documented by Defendants is comparable 

to the number sought by movants in similar cases. In Swanson, the 

defendant claimed 28.75 hours of services rendered in responding to 

a similar action filed by Lapin. 2010 WL 1173089 at *8. 

 The Court also finds the $96.15 in costs detailed in the 

Initial Billing Records to be reasonable and appropriately 

documented. In light of these considerations, the Court finds 

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$8,947 to be a reasonable calculation of attorney's fees, and a 

"relatively mild" sanction in light of Lapin's bad-faith 

misconduct. Because the Court considered a number of the Kerr

factors in determining the reasonable hourly rate and reasonable 

number of hours worked, the Court opts against enhancing or 

reducing this amount based on a consideration of the other factors. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Motion for Attorney's Fees 

brought by Defendants Alca Corporation DBA Home Funders Financial 

and Romeo Felisco Alivedera is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 

Plaintiff Antonio P. Sanchez's counsel, Sharon Lapin, is hereby 

ordered to pay Defendants Alca Corporation DBA Home Funders 

Financial and Romeo Felisco Alivedera Eight Thousand Nine Hundred 

Forty-Seven Dollars and Fifty Cents ($8,947.50) in attorney's 

fees, and Ninety-Six Dollars and Fifteen Cents ($96.15) in costs, 

as a sanction for her misconduct in this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 22, 2010 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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