Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00523/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00523-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KAREL SPIKES,

Plaintiff,

v.

KUM CHA SHOCKLEY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-CV-523 DMS (JLB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against 

Defendant Kum Cha Shockley. The motion is unopposed. Upon consideration of the 

pleadings, the motion, and Defendant’s lack of appearance in this case or opposition to the 

motion, the Court grants the motion. The Clerk of Court shall enter the judgment in favor 

of Plaintiff in the amount of $9,046.35.

I.

BACKGROUND

On March 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint on behalf of himself as a person with 

a disability to enforce the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et 

seq., and California Civil Code § 52 (the “Unruh Act”). Plaintiff is an amputee who uses 

a wheelchair for mobility. (P’s Mot. For Def. Judg. At 2). Although Plaintiff included 

additional claims in his original complaint, he is seeking default judgment based only on 

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the ADA and Unruh Act claims. (See P’s Mot. For Def. Judg. At 2). Plaintiff’s claims 

arise from his alleged attempt to patronize the marijuana dispensary and retail store, “The 

Dank House,” (d.b.a. Green Dreams, LLC.), on February 4, 2019. There, Plaintiff alleges 

he encountered difficulties because the facility lacked designated accessible parking spaces 

and the wheelchair access ramp was steep and in need of repair. (Compl. at ¶¶ 13—16). 

Plaintiff alleges this establishment is located on property owned by Defendant Shockley. 

(Id. at ¶ 6). Defendant was served on April 30, 2019. (Dkt. No. 3). Defendant did not 

respond to Plaintiff’s complaint. On June 7, 2019, Plaintiff requested the Clerk’s entry of 

default of Defendant. (Req. for Entr. Of Def. at ¶ 6). The Clerk entered default on June 

10, 2019, and on June 27, 2019, Plaintiff filed the present motion for default judgment. 

(P’s Mot. For Def. Judg. at 1). 

II.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff requests entry of default judgment against Defendant, seeking injunctive 

relief under the ADA, actual damages of $4,000, statutory treble damages of $12,000, and 

attorney’s fees and costs. (P’s Mot. For Def. Judg. at 1). In the alternative, Plaintiff 

contends he is entitled to “no less than the statutory minimum amount of $4,000 in 

damages” under the Unruh Act. (Id. at 9.)

A. Default Judgment

The Clerk of the Court is required to enter default “when a party against whom a 

judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that 

failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 55(b)(2) allows for entry of default judgment by the court. However, “[a]

plaintiff does not receive default judgment as a matter of right; rather, a court has discretion 

as to whether it should be granted.” United States v. Boyce, 148 F. Supp. 2d. 1069, 1093 

(S.D. Cal. 2001) (citations omitted). 

In exercising that discretion, courts consider the following factors:

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“(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s 

substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake 

in the action[,] (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts[,] (6) whether 

the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.” 

Id. (quoting Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471—72 (9th Cir. 1986)). Consistent with 

the last factor of the strong public policy in favor of decisions on the merits, “any doubts 

as to the propriety of a default are usually resolved against the party seeking a default 

judgment.” VonGrabe v. Spring PCS, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1318 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (citing 

Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 220 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1985)). In general, 

however, “upon default[,] the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to 

the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” TeleVideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 

F.2d 915, 917—18 (9th Cir. 1987).

1. Possibility of Prejudice to the Plaintiff 

The first Eitel factor considers the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff if a default 

judgment is not entered. See 782 F.2d at 1471—72. Plaintiff contends that the architectural 

barriers located on Defendant’s property do not comply with the ADA and Unruh Act, and

thus constitute discrimination and denial of equal access. Here, Defendant has failed to 

appear and has not remedied these barriers to access. If a default judgment is not entered, 

Plaintiff will likely have no recourse against Defendant. Plaintiff has therefore made a 

sufficient showing to meet this factor.

2. Merits of Plaintiff’s Substantive Claims and Sufficiency of the Complaint 

The second and third Eitel factors are the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim and 

the sufficiency of the complaint. See id. These factors “require that a plaintiff state a claim 

on which it may recover.” Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 

2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff seeks relief under the 

ADA and the Unruh Act, each of which is addressed in turn. 

/ / /

/ / /

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a. Discrimination under Title III of the ADA 

Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public accommodations. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12182(a). To state a claim under the ADA, Plaintiff’s complaint must first demonstrate 

that he has Article III standing to bring an ADA claim. Further, Plaintiff must show (1) he 

is disabled under the ADA; (2) “The Dank House” contains architectural barriers 

prohibited by the ADA; and (3) “that the removal of those barriers is readily achievable.” 

Hubbard v. Rite Aid Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1158 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12182(a)). 

i. Standing to Bring a Claim Under the ADA 

As with all actions, Plaintiff must have Article III standing to bring a claim under 

the ADA. To establish Article III standing under the ADA, Plaintiff “must demonstrate 

that [he has] suffered an injury in fact, that the injury is traceable to the challenged action 

of the Defendant and that the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision.” Hubbard, 

433 F. Supp. 2d at 1162 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992)). 

Since Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief, this analysis considers the threat of future harm, 

defined by the likelihood that Plaintiff will return to “The Dank House.” See Vogel, 992 

F. Supp. 2d at 1008 (citing San Diego Cty. Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1126 

(9th Cir. 1996)). In the context of the ADA, when “determining the likelihood that a 

plaintiff will return to defendant’s facility, courts have examined such factors as (1) the 

proximity of the place of public accommodation to plaintiff’s residence, (2) plaintiff’s past 

patronage of defendant’s business, (3) the definitiveness of plaintiff’s plans to return, and 

(4) the plaintiff’s frequency of travel near defendant.” Hubbard, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1162. 

(citing Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Further, a disabled individual “suffers a cognizable injury if he is deterred from visiting a 

noncompliant public accommodation because he has encountered barriers related to his 

disability there.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2011).

Here, Plaintiff alleges he faced difficulties when he attempted to patronize 

Defendant’s store. He alleges he could not find any designated accessible parking on site. 

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(Compl. at ¶ 14). Plaintiff also alleges the ramp to the dispensary entrance “was too steep 

and in need of repair.” (Id.) While Plaintiff was “able to enter the place of public 

accommodation with some difficulty,” he alleges he “suffered legally cognizable injury 

including, but not limited to, difficulty, discomfort or embarrassment in accessing 

Defendants’ place of public accommodation.” (Id. at 14—16, 18). Taking these 

allegations as true, Plaintiff’s complaint states an adequate claim for an injury based on his 

past visit to Defendant’s store. See TeleVideo Systems, Inc., 826 F.2d at 917-18. 

In terms of the likelihood of Plaintiff returning to Defendant’s property, Plaintiff

alleges he resides near the property. (Compl. at ¶ 14). Plaintiff also notes he attempted to 

patronize the business on February 4, 2019, as discussed. (Compl. at ¶ 12). Finally, 

Plaintiff notes he “will continue in the future to visit this place of public accommodation 

for the purposes of shopping and/or otherwise using and enjoying the facility’s 

accommodations, and to evaluate the facility’s accessibility to individuals with disabilities 

or to determine if other forms of discrimination exist.” (Compl. at ¶ 11). Taking these

allegations as true, Plaintiff has alleged a sufficient claim for threat of future injury based 

on the likelihood he will return to Defendant’s property. See TeleVideo Systems, Inc., 826 

F.2d at 917-18. In sum, Plaintiff has standing to bring this ADA claim. 

ii. Discrimination under the ADA 

To prevail on a claim for discrimination under Title III of the ADA, the Plaintiff 

must show (1) he is disabled under the definitions provided by the ADA, (2) the Defendant 

is “a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation,” and 

(3) the Plaintiff “was denied public accommodations . . . because of [his] disability.” 

Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). Further, in the context of 

discrimination based on architectural barriers, Plaintiff must show (1) “The Dank House” 

contains architectural barriers prohibited by the ADA; and (2) “that the removal of those 

barriers is readily achievable.” Hubbard, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1158 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 

12182(a)). 

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Here, Plaintiff established he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA as an 

amputee who uses a wheelchair for mobility.1

 (P’s Mot. For Def. Judg. At 2). Plaintiff 

also alleges “Defendant operates the marijuana dispensary on this property,” and

Defendant has not contested this assertion. (Id.) Finally, “The Dank House” is a public 

accommodation because it is a sales establishment that is open to the public. See Vogel, 

992 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); § 12181(7)(E)) (“A sales 

establishment is a place of public accommodation.”). Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated 

a claim for a violation of the ADA, if he suffered discrimination on Defendant’s property 

due to his disability. 

Discrimination “on the basis of disability includes a failure to remove architectural 

barriers where such removal is readily achievable.” Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F. 3d 

1034, 1043 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182). Under the ADA, the term “readily 

achievable” is defined as “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much 

difficulty or expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9)(A)—(D). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges the architectural barriers at Defendant’s establishment include 

the lack of accessible parking and the steep ADA ramp. However, Plaintiff only requests 

the Court issue an injunction requiring Defendant to designate an accessible parking spot 

and path to the store entrance. Although determining what is “readily achievable” requires 

analyzing context-specific facts such as the nature and cost of the repair and the overall 

financial resources of the facilities and covered entity, Plaintiff did not have the opportunity 

to acquire this information from Defendant because Defendant failed to appear. See id. in 

addition, some courts have found “the creation of a handicap accessible parking space is 

per se readily achievable.” See, e.g., Johnson v. San, No. 2:15-CV-162-JAM-EFB, 2015 

WL 7188245, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2015), report and recommendation adopted No. 2:15-CV-

 

1 Under the ADA, the term “disability” includes “a physical or mental impairment that 

substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 

12102(1)(A). 

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162-JAM-EFB, 2016 WL 659791 (E.D. Cal. 2016). The creation of designated accessible 

parking spaces is also listed as an example of a readily achievable step in ADA guidelines. 

See 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b). This makes good sense. Further, Plaintiff’s allegation that 

removal of such barriers is readily achievable “is sufficient to satisfy his burden of 

production” because his allegations are taken as true upon default. See Vogel, 992 F. Supp.

2d at 1011 (citing Johnson v. Beahm, 2011 WL 5508893 *3 (E.D. Cal. 2011)). Therefore, 

the second and third Eitel factors weigh in favor of Plaintiff’s ADA claim. 

b. Unruh Act Claim

Plaintiff’s second claim for relief is based on a violation of the Unruh Act. (P’s Mot. 

For Def. Judg. At 7). The Unruh Act provides for “full and equal accommodations, 

advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments” for “all persons 

. . . no matter what their . . . disability.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). Unlike the ADA, the 

Unruh Act provides for monetary damages, including actual damages, treble damages, or 

independent statutory damages of $4,000. Molski, 491 F.3d at 731. The Unruh Act also 

provides for attorney’s fees and costs. Id.; Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). 

“[A] violation of the ADA is, per se, a violation of the Unruh Act.” See Lentini v. 

Cal. Ctr. For the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2004); Cal. Civ. Code § 

51(f). Moreover, “no showing of intentional discrimination is required when the Unruh 

Act violation is premised on an ADA violation.” Id. Because Plaintiff’s claim for relief 

under the ADA meets the second and third Eitel factors, these factors are also met with 

respect to his Unruh Act claim.

3. Sum of Money at Stake in the Action

The fourth factor to be considered is the sum of money at stake in relation to the 

seriousness of the defendant’s conduct. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. Courts disfavor 

default judgment when “the sum of money at stake is too large or unreasonable in relation 

to the defendant’s conduct.” Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.

Here, Plaintiff is requesting a total of $21,406.35—consisting of $4,000 in actual 

damages, $12,000 in treble damages, and $5,406.35 in attorney’s fees and costs. In the 

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alternative, Plaintiff requests $9,406.35: $4,000 in statutory minimum damages and 

$5,406.35 in attorney’s fees and costs. Plaintiff also seeks an injunction ordering 

Defendant to provide and designate accessible parking and a path to the store entrance in 

compliance with ADA guidelines. Though the scope of injunctive relief will add to 

Defendant’s financial burden, the ADA “limits this liability to removal of barriers that is 

readily achievable, and in this way caps a defendant’s liability.” See Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 

2d at 1012. 

As discussed below, this Court will decline to award treble damages to Plaintiff. 

Thus, the sum of money at stake in the action here is $9,406.53, in addition to the cost 

associated with injunctive relief. This amount is within the range of acceptable sums of 

money other courts within this Circuit have awarded in similar actions. See, e.g., id. at 

1012 (granting a judgment of $13,739.20, including statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, and 

costs); Moore v. Cisneros, No. 1:12—cv—00188 LJO SKO, 2012 WL 6523017, at *4 

(E.D. Cal. 2012) (granting an award of $10,119.70 on default judgment and noting the 

amount “was not a particularly large sum of money”); Johnson v. Huynh, No. Civ S—08—

1189 JAM DAD, 2009 WL 2777021, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (holding $12,000 was “a 

relatively small award of damages” in a default judgment). Therefore, the fourth Eitel 

factor weighs in favor of entry of default judgment against Defendant here. 

4. The Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts

The fifth factor asks whether there is a possibility of a dispute over material facts. 

Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. When a court clerk enters default, “all allegations in a wellpleaded complaint are taken as true,” and there is “no likelihood that any genuine issue of 

material fact exists.” Elektra Ent. Grp. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 

So it is here. Defendant failed to respond, and default was entered Thus, the fifth factor 

weighs in favor of Plaintiff. 

/ / /

/ / /

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5. Excusable Neglect

The sixth Eitel factor is excusable neglect. See 782 F.2d at 1472. The question of 

what conduct “constitutes excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) and similar rules is at 

bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the 

party’s omission.” Brandt v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, 653 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Svcs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 395 

(1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure governs grounds for relief from a final judgment, Rule 55(b) constitutes 

a similar rule because it governs the grounds for entering a default judgment. 

There is “little possibility of excusable neglect and default judgment is favored when 

defendants fail to respond after being properly served.” See Constr. Laborers Trust Funds 

for S. California Admin. Co. v. Anzalone Masonry, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1201-02 

(C.D. Cal. 2018). Here, Defendant received notice of the complaint and did not respond. 

Though Plaintiff did not provide evidence of serving Defendant with the instant motion, 

such service is not required by Rule 55(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Thus, this factor 

weighs in favor of entry of default judgment.

6. Strong Policy Underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Favoring 

Decisions on the Merits 

The final factor requires the Court to consider the strong policy favoring decisions 

on the merits. See 782 F.2d at 1472. Although resolving disputes on the merits is the 

preferred approach, that is not possible where, as here, a defendant fails to respond. 

Nonetheless, this factor does not weigh in favor of Plaintiff. 

7. Conclusion Regarding the Eitel Factors 

Here, all factors, aside from the seventh factor favoring decisions on the merits, weigh 

in favor of Plaintiff. 

B. The Character and Amount of Plaintiff’s Recovery 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), a default judgment “must not differ in 

kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” The demand for 

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relief must be specific. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3). When deciding whether to grant a 

default judgment, “the general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the 

complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” Geddes 

v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted). When 

“determining damages, a court may rely on declarations submitted by the plaintiff in lieu 

of a full evidentiary hearing.” Ewing v. Senior Life Planning, LLC., 19-CV-1005-BASLL, 2019 WL 4573703 at *1 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Phillip Morris USA v. Castworld 

Prods. Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P 55(b)(2)). Further, 

“[s]tatutory damages are appropriate in default judgment cases because the ability to 

determine a plaintiff’s actual damages is limited when a defendant fails to mount a defense 

or participate in discovery.” G&G Closed Circuit Events, LLC v. Sanchez, 18-CV-382-

WQH-KSC, 18 WL 5311792 at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2018). 

1. Statutory Damages

As noted, Plaintiff is seeking $4,000 in actual damages and an additional $12,000 in 

treble damages for discrimination under the Unruh Act. In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks 

the statutory minimum damages of $4,000. While the statutory damages provided by the 

Unruh Act are reasonable, the trebling of those damages is not. Under California Civil 

Code § 52 (the “Unruh Act”),

“whoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or distinction 

contrary to Section 51, 51.5, or 51.6, is liable for each and every offense for the 

actual damages, and any amount that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting 

without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in 

no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000), and any attorney’s fees that may be 

determined by the court in addition thereto.” Cal. Civ. Code §52(a) (West). 

Here, Plaintiff seeks damages based on emotional distress, but fails to set out the 

basis for those damages, let alone the need to treble them. (P’s Mot. For Def. Judg. at 8). 

In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks the $4,000 statutory minimum damages. (Id.) To recover 

statutory damages, the Plaintiff “need not prove she suffered actual damages.” Molski, 481 

F.3d at 731. Plaintiff “need only show that he was denied full and equal access, not that 

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he was wholly excluded from enjoying defendant’s services.” See Vogel, 992 F.Supp.2d 

at 1014. 

Because Defendant did not respond, the record is undeveloped as to Plaintiff’s claim 

for actual and treble damages. And while Defendant bears the burden of this default 

judgment due to his failure to respond, there is no indication Plaintiff’s injury would not 

be adequately redressed with statutory minimum damages, attorney’s fees, and injunctive 

relief. Therefore, the Court declines to award treble damages for Plaintiff and finds the 

award of statutory damages is sufficient. 

2. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief under the ADA to compel Defendant to “install 

a van accessible parking space and access aisle and an accessible path of travel from the 

parking and public sidewalk to and through the entrance to the facility in full compliance 

with . . . the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”).” (P’s 

Mot. For Def. Judg. at 9). Under the ADA, “injunctive relief is proper when architectural 

barriers at defendant’s establishment violate the ADA and the removal of the barriers is 

readily achievable.” Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1015. Further, the plaintiff is “not required 

to satisfy the other prerequisites generally needed for injunctive relief.” Id. (citing Moeller 

v. Taco Bell, 816 F. Supp. 2d 831, 859 (N.D. Cal. 2011)). As discussed, Plaintiff’s request 

for injunctive relief is readily achievable. Defendant, in his capacity as property owner, 

can “make the physical changes necessary to remove the specific barriers,” either as the 

operator of the establishment or in his capacity as landlord. See id. Defendant shall 

therefore install a van accessible parking space and create an accessible path of travel from 

the parking and sidewalk to the entrance of “The Dank House” in compliance with the 

ADAAG. 

3. Attorney’s Fees and Costs 

Plaintiff further requests attorney’s fees and costs in the sum of $4,446.00 and

$600.35, respectively, both of which are permitted under the ADA and the Unruh Act. See 

42 U.S.C. § 12205; Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). Plaintiff provided declarations in support of 

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his request for fees and costs. The requested attorney’s fees and costs are reasonable. 

Therefore, the Court will award fees and costs totaling $5,046.35. 

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for default 

judgment for $4,000 in statutory damages and $5,046.35 in attorney’s fees and costs. The 

Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for treble damages. The Court ORDERS Defendant to 

provide and designate accessible parking and a path to the store entrance at 956 Broadway, 

Chula Vista, CA 91910, in compliance with the American with Disabilities Act 

Accessibility Guidelines. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment 

against Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 28, 2019

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