Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00548/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00548-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

FREDDIE GUNN, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civil Action No.: 2:16cv548-WKW-WC 

 ) 

ELMORE COUNTY BOARD OF ) 

EDUCATION, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 Before the court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 

6), Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 13) and Amended Complaint (Doc. 12), and Defendant’s 

Reply (Doc. 15). On August 17, 2016, the United States District Judge referred the abovestyled matter to the undersigned for “consideration and disposition or recommendation on 

all pretrial matters as may be appropriate.” Doc. 11. For the reasons that follow, the 

undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) be DENIED. 

 Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on July 6, 2016, alleges violations of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., as amended. Doc. 1. In that complaint, Plaintiff 

states that he received a right-to-sue notice from the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”) on April 6, 2016. Id. at 2, ¶ 10. On August 8, 2016, Defendant 

filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) on the basis of untimeliness. Doc. 6 at 1. In that motion, Defendant argues that 

Plaintiff’s complaint is untimely because a plaintiff must file suit within ninety days of 

Case 2:16-cv-00548-WKW-WC Document 17 Filed 10/04/16 Page 1 of 4
2 

receiving a right-to-sue notice, and Plaintiff’s complaint was filed ninety-one days after 

April 6, 2016, the date Plaintiff alleges he received his notice. Id. at 2. On August 29, 

2016, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant’s motion stating that the date listed as 

Plaintiff’s receipt date in the original complaint was incorrect, and that the amended 

complaint reflects the correct date on which Plaintiff received his right-to-sue notice. Doc. 

13 at 1, ¶ 2. Plaintiff’s amended complaint states that Plaintiff received the right-to-sue 

notice “on or about April 7, 2016.” Doc. 12 at 2, ¶ 10. 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) governs amendments to pleadings. That rule 

states: 

(a) Amendments Before Trial. 

(1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading once 

as a matter of course within: 

A. 21 days after serving it, or 

B. If the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 

21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after 

service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is 

earlier. 

(2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading 

only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The 

court should freely give leave when justice so requires. . . . 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Accordingly, a plaintiff has the right to amend a complaint once as 

a matter of course within twenty-one days of a responsive pleading or motion to dismiss, 

whichever is earlier. Id. at 15(a)(1)(B). 

 Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on August 29, 2016, which is twenty-one days 

after Defendant filed its motion to dismiss. Thus, Plaintiff has filed a timely amended 

complaint as a matter of course. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). Within that complaint, 

Plaintiff has alleged that he received his right-to-sue notice on or about April 7, 2016. 

Case 2:16-cv-00548-WKW-WC Document 17 Filed 10/04/16 Page 2 of 4
3 

Assuming the veracity of Plaintiff’s allegation in the amended complaint, as the court must 

do for a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff has satisfied the conditions precedent for filing a Title 

VII action. See Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159–60 (11th Cir. 2003) (On a motion to 

dismiss, the court should accept the non-conclusory allegations in the complaint as true 

and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the plaintiff.); see 

also Williams v. Bd. or Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1292 n.6 (11th Cir. 

2007) (“When the plaintiff has the right to file an amended complaint as a matter of course,

however, the plain language of Rule 15(a) shows that the court lacks the discretion to reject 

the amended complaint based on its alleged futility.”) (emphasis in original). If Defendant 

doubts the veracity of Plaintiff’s allegations in the amended complaint, in whole or in part, 

then Defendant may deny “specifically and with particularity”—in a timely motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint—that the preconditions of Plaintiff’s suit have not 

been fulfilled. See Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1010 (11th Cir. 

1982). Plaintiff would then bear the burden of providing that the conditions precedent, 

which Defendant has specifically joined in issue, have been satisfied. Id. 

 Because Plaintiff has filed a timely amended complaint under Rule 15(a)(1)(B) that 

alleges a date which satisfies the preconditions for filing suit under Title VII, the 

undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s current motion to dismiss (Doc. 6) be 

DENIED. It is further 

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before October 18, 2016. Any objections filed must specifically 

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is 

Case 2:16-cv-00548-WKW-WC Document 17 Filed 10/04/16 Page 3 of 4
4 

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the 

District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the 

court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

 Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the 

District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on 

appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon 

grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5thCir. 

1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. 

City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11thCir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent 

all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business 

on September 30, 1981). 

Done this 4th day of October, 2016. 

 Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 2:16-cv-00548-WKW-WC Document 17 Filed 10/04/16 Page 4 of 4