Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01876/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01876-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:504 Copyright Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Alexander Wild, doing business as Alex Wild Photography, asserts he took a photo of 

an ant that he registered with the United States Copyright Office. Plaintiff contends Defendant 

Benchmark Pest Control used the photo on its website, without permission from Plaintiff, and is liable 

for Copyright Infringement. (Doc. 1) 

Defendant responded to the allegations by filing an Answer, and identified eleven affirmative 

defenses. (Doc. 8) Plaintiff now seeks to strike each of the affirmative defenses.1 (Doc. 11) For the 

following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART.

I. Pleading Standards for Affirmative Defenses

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a party responding to a pleading to identify its 

 

1 Notably, however, Plaintiffs offers no argument as to the fifth affirmative defense. Thus, the Court declines to address 

this defense. Nevertheless, the Court invites Defendant’s attention to the discussion below related to the Eight Affirmative 

Defense which, it would seem, addresses the deficiencies of the Fifth Affirmative Defense as well.

ALEXANDER L. WILD, doing business as 

ALEX WILD PHOTOGRAPHY, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

BENCHMARK PEST CONTROL, INC.,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:15-cv-01876- JLT

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT’S 

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Case 1:15-cv-01876-JLT Document 21 Filed 03/16/16 Page 1 of 10
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defenses to each claim asserted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1). Further, responding parties are instructed to 

“state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including: accord and satisfaction; assumption of risk; 

contributory negligence; duress; estoppel; failure of consideration; fraud; illegality; injury by fellow 

servant; laches; license; payment; release; res judicata; statute of frauds; statute of limitations; and 

waiver.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). 

Notably, “courts are in disagreement” as to whether an affirmative defense is required to only 

give fair notice, or should satisfy the heightened “plausibility” standards articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). See Dodson v. Strategic 

Rests. Acquisition Co. II, LLC, 289 F.R.D. 595, 599, 603 (E.D. Cal. 2013). This Court determined that 

“affirmative defenses are subject to the heightened pleading standards announced in Twombly and 

Iqbal.” Dodson, 289 F.R.D. at 603; see also J & J Sports Prods. v. Franco, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

25642 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2011) (adopting the heightened pleading standard for affirmative defenses). 

Under the heightened pleading standard, “in order to adequately ‘state . . . its defenses to each 

claim asserted against it’ under Rule 8(b)(1), a party must allege ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true,’... to demonstrate that plaintiff lacks a right of recovery.” Dodson, 289 F.R.D. at 601 (quoting 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This Court has explained, “To hold otherwise would permit defendants to 

merely plead ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of’ an affirmative 

defense... and in so doing, undermine the rationale of Twombly and Iqbal.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555; see also Kohler v. Staples, 291 F.R.D. 464, 469 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (an affirmative defense 

“must at least give notice of the grounds upon which it rests”).

III. Motion to Strike

The Court may strike “an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 

scandalous matter” from a pleading, either on the Court’s own motion or by motion of a party. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(f). A defense may be “insufficient” as a matter of pleading or as a matter of law. See 

Security People, Inc. v. Classic Woodworking, LLC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44641, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 4, 2005) (citing Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979); Kaiser Aluminum 

& Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1057 (5th Cir. 1982)). A defense is 

insufficiently pleaded if it fails to give “fair notice” of the defense, while it is insufficient as a matter of 

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law when there are no questions of fact or law, and the defense would not succeed under any 

circumstances. Wyshak, 607 F.2d at 827; SEC v. Sands, 902 F. Supp. 1149, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1995) 

(citations omitted). Further, a defense may be stricken as immaterial if it “has no essential or important 

relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 

1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994); see also 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

The purpose of a motion to strike under Rule 12(f) “is to avoid the expenditure of time and 

money that must arise from litigating spurious issues.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 

880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). However, motions to strike affirmative defenses “are disfavored and 

infrequently granted.” (Neveau v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2005). The 

Court “must view the pleading under attack in the light more favorable to the pleader.” Garcia ex rel. 

Marin v. Clovis Unified School Dist., 2009 WL 2982900, at *23 (E.D. Cal. Sept.14, 2009) (internal 

citation omitted). Even if a court strikes an affirmative defense, leave to amend should be freely given 

where the opposing party will not be prejudiced given the policy favoring resolution of cases “on the 

proofs rather than the pleadings.” Rennie & Laughlin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208, 213 (9th

Cir. 1957); Wyshak, 607 F.2d at 827.

Here, Plaintiff seeks to strike each of the affirmative defenses asserted by Defendant. (Doc. 11) 

According to Plaintiff, all of the affirmative defenses are “legally insufficient” because they lack factual 

support and “are bare statements reciting mere legal conclusions.” (Doc. 11 at 3, 4) In addition, 

Plaintiff contends the First, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Affirmative Defenses are not proper 

affirmative defenses, but are rather “negative defenses.” (Id. at 5-7) Finally, Plaintiff contends several 

defenses identified are redundant or immaterial to the claims presented. (Id. at 7-9) Defendant agrees 

the First and Second Affirmative Defenses are not proper and should be stricken without leave to 

amend. (Doc. 16 at 2) Furthermore, Defendant concedes it did not adequately allege factual support 

for the Third and Fourth Affirmative Defenses. Id.

Accordingly, the Court addresses only the disputed affirmative defenses.

IV. Discussion and Analysis

A. Third Affirmative Defense (Superseding Intervening Acts of Other 

Individuals/Entities): “[T]his answering Defendant is informed and believes and 

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based thereon alleges that the damages described in each and every cause of action 

alleged against this answering Defendant in Plaintiff’s Complaint were proximately 

caused or contributed to by the conduct of persons or entities other than this answering 

Defendant, including but not limited to the Plaintiff, as well as Plaintiff’s agents, 

servants, customers, licensed users, and employees, which conduct constitutes one or 

more intervening or superseding causes of damages as alleged in the Complaint, and as 

such Plaintiff is barred from any and all recovery under those causes of action alleged 

in his Complaint against this answering Defendant. (Doc. 8 at 2-3)

Plaintiff contends this affirmative defense should be stricken because it lacks factual support. 

(Doc. 11 at 4) In addition, Plaintiff asserts the defense “should be stricken because superseding and 

intervening causes are not applicable or related to copyright infringement claims.” (Id. at 8) According 

to Plaintiff, “[s]uperceding and intervening causes are neither justification nor defense to unauthorized 

use of copyrighted work.” (Id.)

Defendant concedes that the Third Affirmative Defense has “not adequately alleged sufficient 

supporting facts.” (Doc. 16 at 2) However, Defendant argues the defense, which is based upon a theory 

of contributory negligence, “is neither Immaterial nor Redundant to the issues in this case.” (Id. at 6) 

Accordingly, Defendant asserts leave to amend the defense should be granted by the Court. (Id. at 4)

Significantly, as Plaintiff asserts, there is not a negligence claim presented in this action. Since 

“it is clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the 

litigation,” the defense is immaterial Plaintiff’s claims. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Gidha, 2012 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20427, 2012 WL 537494, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2012). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

motion to strike the Third Affirmative Defense is GRANTED without leave to amend.

B. Fourth Affirmative Defense (Waiver): “[T]his answering Defendant are informed 

and believe and based thereon allege that Plaintiff, through his own acts and/or

failures to act, engaged in conduct whereby he effectively waived any and all rights to 

assert any and all claims and/or causes of action against this answering Defendant; as 

such, Plaintiff is barred from any and all recovery under those causes of action alleged 

in his Complaint against this answering Defendant.” (Doc 8 at 3)

Plaintiff asserts this affirmative defense fails because it lacks factual support and is immaterial 

to his claims. (Doc. 11 at 4, 8) In general, waiver is an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment 

of a known right.” United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1997). Notably, the Ninth 

Circuit has determined that in a copyright infringement action, “waiver or abandonment of copyright,” 

which “occurs only if there is an intent by the copyright proprietor to surrender rights in his work.” 

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See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, there is no 

indication in Defendant’s answer that Plaintiff engaged in activity that constitutes a waiver or 

abandonment of his copyright. Without supporting factual allegations, the assertion that the doctrine 

of waiver is applicable is insufficient. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Nguyen, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

51641, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2012) (finding an affirmative defense insufficient where the 

defendant “does not provide any supporting facts, making it impossible for Plaintiff to ascertain the 

basis for the affirmative defense[]”). Because, as Defendant concedes, the Fourth Affirmative Defense 

lacks factual support, the defense is STRICKEN with leave to amend. 

C. Sixth Affirmative Defense (Fair Use): “[T]his answering Defendant is informed and 

believes and based thereon alleges that any such purported use of the alleged protected 

“Image” as claimed by Plaintiff in his Complaint was an exempted use as provided by 

17 U.S.C. section 107; as such, there has been no violation or infringement by this 

Defendant as claimed by Plaintiff, as well as no damages resulting there from, and 

Plaintiff is barred from any and all recovery under those causes of action alleged in his 

Complaint against this answering Defendant.” (Doc. 8 at 4)

Fair use is an affirmative defense that “presumes that unauthorized copying has occurred, and 

is instead aimed at whether the defendant's use was fair.” Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 

1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012). The doctrine is codified at in the Copyright Act, which provides:

[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 

phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as 

criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom 

use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether 

the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered 

shall include—

(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 

commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;

(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 

work as a whole; and

(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 

work.

The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding 

is made upon consideration of all the above factors.

17 U.S.C. § 107. 

Significantly, defendants asserting a fair use of a copyrighted work must allege some facts to 

give a plaintiff notice of how the defense is applicable in the action. Amini Innovation Corp. v. 

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McFerran Home Furnishings, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13342 at *10-11 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014). 

Though Defendant states it believes Plaintiff’s actions cause the material to fall within the fair use 

exception, Defendant fails to explain why it thinks so. Indeed, the defense fails allege any facts 

addressing the factors set forth above, demonstrating the use was fair. Merely citing to the statute is 

insufficient. Because Defendant fails to allege facts regarding how the doctrine of fair use applies here, 

the defense is insufficiently pleaded. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to strike the Sixth Affirmative 

Defense is GRANTED, and the defense is stricken with leave to amend.

D. Seventh Affirmative Defense (Protected Use): “[T]his answering Defendant is 

informed and believes and based thereon alleges that any such purported use of the 

alleged protected “Image” as claimed by Plaintiff in his Complaint was an exempted 

use as provided by 17 U.S.C. section 113(c); as such, there has been no violation or 

infringement by this Defendant as claimed by Plaintiff, as well as no damages resulting 

there from, and Plaintiff is barred from any and all recovery under those causes of 

action alleged in his Complaint against this answering Defendant.” (Doc. 8 at 4)

Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 113(c), with works “lawfully produced in useful articles that have been 

offered for sale or other distribution to the public, copyright does not include any right to prevent the 

making, distribution, or display of pictures or photographs of such articles in connection with 

advertisements or commentaries related to the distribution or display of such articles, or in connection 

with news reports.” 

Plaintiff argues this affirmative defense is immaterial “because 17 U.S.C. § 113(c) is 

applicable where the use is lawful.” (Doc. 11 at 8) Plaintiff contends, “Defendant’s use is not lawful 

because Defendant has not obtained Plaintiff’s permission to use the image.” (Id. at 8-9) Contrary to 

Plaintiff’s argument, pursuant to the terms of Section 113(c), permission is not required for the use of 

an image. Nevertheless, Defendant has not pleaded facts to support the assertion that the use was 

exempted pursuant to Section 113(c), such as whether the image was produced in a news report or an 

article available to the public, and whether Defendant’s use was made in connection with any article or 

news report. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to strike the Seventh Affirmative Defense is GRANTED 

and the defense is stricken with leave to amend.

E. Eighth Affirmative Defense (Good Faith): “[T]his answering Defendant is informed 

and believes and based thereon alleges that Plaintiff is barred from any and all 

recovery, including any and all statutory damages, attorney’s fees and/or costs under 

those causes of action of his Complaint against this answering Defendant, since said 

Defendant, at all times relevant hereto, acted in good faith and did not willfully 

infringe on any previously unknown and now claimed copyright interests of Plaintiff.” 

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(Doc. 8 at 4)

Plaintiff contends this defense should be stricken because it is not an affirmative defense but, 

instead, merely negates an element of Plaintiff’s case. (Doc. 11 at 6) The Court agrees that whether an 

act is willful is an element of Plaintiff’s claim of infringement. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. 

Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2011) (to receive heightened statutory damages for 

an infringement, the plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant was actually aware of infringing 

activity, or (2) that defendant’s actions were the result of “reckless disregard” for, or “willful blindness” 

to, the copyright holder’s rights). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to strike the Eighth Affirmative 

Defense is GRANTED without leave to amend.

F. Ninth Affirmative Defense (Invited Public Use): “[T]his answering Defendant is 

informed and believes and based thereon alleges that any such purported use of the 

alleged protected “Image” as claimed by Plaintiff in his Complaint was the result of the 

Plaintiff’s actions “inviting” such use by failing to include or provide any watermark or 

copyright protection on the alleged “Image”, which would have provided notice to this 

answering Defendant and/or his website designer that the “Image” was a copyrightprotected photo; as such, there has been no violation or infringement by this Defendant 

as claimed by Plaintiff, as well as no damages resulting there from, and Plaintiff is 

barred from any and all recovery under those causes of action alleged in his Complaint 

against this answering Defendant.” (Doc. 8 at 5)

Plaintiff asserts this defense is insufficient as a matter of pleading and lacks factual support. 

(Doc. 11 at 3-4) In addition, Plaintiff contends this “defense is ‘redundant’ and ‘immaterial’ because 

the defense of ‘Invited Public Use’ alleged by Defendant, is not relevant to a copyright infringement 

claim.” (Id. at 9) Plaintiff argues, “Notice, watermark, or any other signs on an image are not 

necessary to obtain Copyright protection.” (Id.)

As an initial matter, Defendant alleges there was no watermark or copyright indication on the 

image, which was sufficient to give Plaintiff fair notice of the facts supporting the affirmative defense. 

Further, to the extent Plaintiff contends this is not a proper defense because a copyright notice is not 

required to obtain protection, the Court agrees. However, to the extent the defense addresses 

Defendant’s intent for the purpose of seeking a reduction in damages (17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2), the Court 

disagrees that Defendant’s intent is immaterial. See Erickson Prods. v. Kast, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

56711 at*14-15 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2014) (where the defendant argued “there was no way for him to 

know that using the photos violated anyone's copyright because they did not bear copyright notices,” 

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the court declined to strike the affirmative defense because the defendant’s “mental state bears on the 

issue of remedies) (citing Shropshire, 809 F. Supp.2d at 1147 n.2; 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)). 

Nevertheless, while Defendant has alleged facts to demonstrate it did not know the material was 

copyrighted, there are no facts to support that he had no reason not to know the material was 

copyrighted. (17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) [“In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and 

the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts 

constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory 

damages to a sum of not less than $200.”] Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to strike the Ninth Affirmative 

Defense is GRANTED and the defense is STRICKEN with leave to amend.

G. Tenth Affirmative Defense (Lack of Intent): “[T]his answering Defendant alleges 

that at no time on, before, or after February 17, 2015 and before or on April 17, 2015, 

did this answering Defendant have any of the following:

a) The intent to knowingly or willfully utilize any copyright-protected material, 

including the subject “Image” allegedly owned by the Plaintiff;

b) The intent to deprive Plaintiff of his customary fee for the use of his alleged 

copyright-protected “Image”, which is believed to be from $95.00 to $375.00; and

c) The intent to willfully damage Plaintiff by any act or omission.”

Plaintiff argues this defense is insufficient. (Doc. 11 at 4, 9) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that 

the defense “should be stricken because it is ‘redundant’ and ‘immaterial.’” (Id.) Furthermore, 

Plaintiff asserts the lack of intent “is not a defense to copyright infringement. (Id.)

Plaintiff does not explain why he believes the defense is “redundant,” and the Court will not 

speculate as to the reasoning. As Plaintiff asserts, the Ninth Circuit has determined that “the innocent 

intent of the defendant constitutes no defense to liability” for copyright infringement. Monge v. Maya 

Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David 

Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 1308[B][1] (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2011)). While true, 

“Defendant’s mental state . . . is relevant to the issues of remedies,” because damages may be reduced 

where the infringer was not aware of a copyright and had not reason to believe the material was 

protected. Shropshire v. Canning, 809 F.Supp.2d 1139, 1147 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Under the 

Copyright Act:

In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that the 

infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an 

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infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory 

damages to a sum of not less than $200.

17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). Consequently, the lack of intent serves as an affirmative defense to the amount 

of statutory damages available. 

On the other hand, Defendant fails to allege any facts supporting this affirmative defense. In 

the opposition to the motion, Defendant argues this defense was intended to describe “the fact that all 

times relevant thereto, Defendant had no knowledge of the claimed copyright alleged by Plaintiff.” 

(Doc. 16 at 3, 5) However, this fact is not alleged in support of this defense—although it is suggested 

in support of the Ninth Affirmative Defense. (See Doc. 8 at 5) In any event, without factual 

allegations to support Defendant also had no reason to know the material was protected, the mere fact 

Defendant did not know of the copyright—due to the lack of watermark—is insufficient still. Because 

Defendant fails to plead the facts supporting this defense in its Answer, the motion to strike the Tenth 

Affirmative Defense is GRANTED with leave to amend.

H. Eleventh Affirmative Defense (Injunctive Relief): “[T]his answering Defendant 

alleges that the Plaintiff’s Complaint, even if assumed to be true and correct in its 

entirety, which is disputed by this answering Defendant, asserts that any such claimed 

unauthorized use of the alleged “Image” was limited to the period between February 

17, 2015 and April 17, 2015; as such, there is no need for any injunctive relief in this 

instance, nor is there any irreparable damage being caused to Plaintiff since he charges 

a flat fee for the commercial use of his copyright-protected photos. (Doc. 8 at 5-6)

Notably, copyright law authorizes injunctive relief for copyright infringement. Elektra Ent. 

Group, Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005). A temporary or permanent injunction 

may be ordered “to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502. In general, “a 

permanent injunction will be granted when liability has been established and there is a threat of 

continuing violations.” MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 520 (9th Cir. 1993); 

Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923, 940 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“a showing of copyright 

infringement liability and the threat of future violations is sufficient to warrant a permanent 

injunction”).

Here, Defendant asserts injunctive relief is not appropriate because the image was removed 

from its website. Accordingly, Defendant purports to identify a defect in Plaintiff’s request for an 

injunction against “further infringement of all copyrighted works of the Plaintiff” (Doc. 1 at 6). 

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However, an allegation “that plaintiff has not met its burden of proof as to an element plaintiff is 

required to prove is not an affirmative defense.” Zivkovic v. S. California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 

1088 (9th Cir. 2002). Rather, such a defense is merely rebuttal against the allegations presented by the 

plaintiff. Accordingly, the Eleventh Affirmative Defense is not a proper affirmative defense, and 

Plaintiff’s motion to strike the defense is GRANTED without leave to amend.

V. Conclusion

Many of the affirmative defenses are improper affirmative defenses and insufficient as a matter 

of law. In addition, many of the defenses fail to provide sufficient factual support to give Plaintiff with 

fair notice, and are inadequate as a matter of pleading. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion to strike the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Affirmative 

Defenses is GRANTED and they are STRICKEN with leave to amend;

3. The First, Second, Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Affirmative Defenses are STRICKEN 

without leave to amend; and

4. Any amended answer SHALL be filed within 21 days of the date of service of this 

order. Failure to amend will result in the matter proceeding without the affirmative 

defenses stricken here.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 16, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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