Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02345/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02345-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

KENDELL HULL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-02345 PHX DGC (MEA)

)

ELIZABETH ERICKSON and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

On October 2, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254,

challenging his criminal conviction by an Arizona state court.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 10) on December 15, 2006.

Respondents argue the action for habeas relief was not timely

filed and, therefore, that the petition must be denied and

dismissed with prejudice. Additionally, Respondents assert the

Court should not consider the merits of Petitioner’s claims for

habeas relief because Petitioner procedurally defaulted his

federal habeas claims in the state courts and he has not shown

cause for, and prejudice arising from, his procedural default of

his claims. 

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1

 The indictment alleged Petitioner entered the residence of

his ex-wife’s parents, where she was then residing with their

children, shot his ex-wife’s father, resulting in his death, and shot

at his ex-wife’s brother as the brother fled the scene.

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I Procedural History

In 2003 a Maricopa County Grand Jury issued an

indictment charging Petitioner with first-degree murder, felony

burglary, and aggravated assault. Response, Exh. A.1 Petitioner

did not enter into a plea agreement regarding the charges stated

in the indictment, however, on June 15, 2004, Petitioner pled

guilty to each of the charges stated in the indictment. Id.,

Exh. G, Exh. H, Exh. I. 

Petitioner moved to withdraw his guilty pleas one month

later, on July 14, 2004. Id., Exh. I. Petitioner asserted

that, 

at the time he pleaded guilty he was not

aware that the sentence on the aggravated

assault would commence only after the

sentence on the murder charge was completed.

[Petitioner] contends that he believed that

the sentence on the aggravated assault would

begin at the time he had completed 25 years

on the murder charge and not later. 

[Petitioner] contends that he never would

have pleaded guilty had he known the

consecutive sentence on the aggravated

assault would/could commence later than after

he served 25 years in prison on the murder

charge.

Id., Exh. I. Petitioner ultimately withdrew the motion to

withdraw his guilty pleas. Id., Exh. L at 8, Exh. Q at 7.

Multiple sentencing memoranda and a presentence report

were filed. Id., Exhs. M-P. On September 27, 2004, a hearing

was conducted regarding the sentences to be imposed. Id., Exh.

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2

 Petitioner was born in 1965 and was approximately 39 years

of age at the time of his sentencing. Accordingly, Petitioner would

be approximately 71 years of age before he is eligible for release

from prison.

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R. 

Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated term of 7.5

years imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for aggravated

assault. Id., Exh. R. Petitioner was sentenced to life in

prison with the possibility of parole after he had served 25

years pursuant to his conviction on the charge of first-degree

murder; this sentence was ordered to be served after Petitioner

served his sentence for aggravated assault. Id., Exh. R.

Additionally, Petitioner was also sentenced to an aggravated

term of 10.5 years imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for

burglary, this sentence to be served consecutive to the term

imposed for aggravated assault and concurrent with the sentence

for murder. Id., Exh. R. Accordingly, Petitioner was sentenced

to a term of 7.5 years, followed by a term of 25 years to life,

with the possibility of release, i.e., Petitioner must serve

32.5 years imprisonment before he is entitled to consideration

of his release. Id., Exh. R at 2-4, Exh. V at 2-3.2

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of his

motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, which motion was denied on

October 15, 2004. Id., Exh. S & Exh. V. On November 16, 2004,

Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief. Id., Exh.

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3

 Pursuant to the “mailbox rule,” the Court considers the

relevant pleading “filed” on the date the pleading was signed by

Petitioner. See, e.g., Davis v. Woodford, 446 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir.

2006).

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Y.3 Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed a notice with the trial

court averring she could find no colorable issues to raise on

Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. Z. Petitioner filed a pro se

petition for post-conviction relief, asserting he had been

denied his right to a speedy trial, that his guilty pleas were

not knowing and voluntary, and that the trial court “changed its

mind” regarding the sentences imposed. Id., Exh. BB.

On October 5, 2005, the Arizona Superior Court denied

the petition for post-conviction relief, concluding each of the

claims stated by Petitioner were without merit. Id., Exh. EE.

Although Petitioner sought advice from the Arizona Superior

Court as to how he could appeal the decision denying relief,

Petitioner did not ever appeal the Superior Court’s decision

denying post-conviction relief to the Arizona Court of Appeals.

See id., Exh. HH.

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on

September 11, 2006. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to relief

because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of

counsel and because he was denied his right to a speedy trial.

II Analysis

A. Relevant statute of limitations

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations as found in the Antiterrorism

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4

 This conclusion has been regularly followed in section

2254 habeas cases arising in the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona. See, e.g., Moore v. Schriro, 2006 WL 2827131,

at *4; Smith v. Schriro, 2006 WL 2547294, at *2.

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and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

Because Petitioner pled guilty, pursuant to Arizona law

he had no right to a direct appeal and his convictions arguably

became “final” for the purpose of federal habeas relief on the

date judgment was entered and he was sentenced by the state

trial court, i.e., September 27, 2004. See Montgomery v.

Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258 (1995); Isley v. Arizona Dep’t of

Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). Cf.

Hernandez-Almanza v. United States Dep’t of Justice, INS, 547

F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding, for purposes of

immigration proceeding, that a criminal conviction was final

when the defendant entered a guilty plea and waived direct

appeal).4 Therefore, Petitioner’s convictions became final after

the 1996 effective date of the AEDPA and his habeas petition is

subject to its one-year statute of limitations.

The AEDPA requires state prisoners to file any petition

for federal habeas corpus relief within one year of the date

that their state court convictions become “final.” See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. 2006) (“A 1-year period of

limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court.”). The running of this one-year statute of

limitations is tolled during any period when “a properly filed

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5 The motion for reconsideration of the decision denying

Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was, arguably, not

a “properly filed action for state post-conviction relief,” and,

therefore, did not toll the statute of limitations. See Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 412-13, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1811-14 (2005);

Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 132 (2006). Compare Richardson v. Newland, 171 Fed. App.

156, 157 (9th Cir. 2006), and Douglas v. Horn, 359 F.3d 257, 262 (3d

Cir. 2004), with Draughon v. DeWitt, 65 Fed. App. 949, 951 (6th Cir.

2003).

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application for state post-conviction or other collateral review

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in

any state court. See id. § 2244(d)(2); see also Calderon v.

United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286-87 (9th

Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. Kelly, 163

F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Petitioner’s conviction became final, for purposes of

the AEDPA’s statute of limitations on September 27, 2004.

Therefore, Petitioner had until September 26, 2005, to file his

habeas petition, absent any statutory or equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. 

The one-year statute of limitations regarding

Petitioner’s federal habeas action ran against Petitioner for

approximately 49 days, from September 27, 2004, when his

conviction became final, until November 16, 2004, when he filed

his action for state post-conviction relief, which statutorily

tolled the statute of limitations.5 The statute of limitations

was tolled until October 5, 2005, when the Arizona Superior

Court denied Petitioner’s claims for relief and dismissed his

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Rule 32 petition. 

Petitioner had thirty days to seek review of this

decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, even though he did not

take such an appeal, and, therefore, the statute of limitations

on his federal habeas action was further statutorily tolled

until November 4, 2005. See Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799,

803-04 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Thus, we hold today that, regardless

of whether a petitioner actually appeals a denial of a

post-conviction application, the limitations period is tolled

during the period in which the petitioner could have sought an

appeal under state law.”); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417,

420-24 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that, because a judgment is not

final until the time for seeking review expires, the word

“pending” includes that time period, whether or not such review

is sought, and collecting cases so holding). See also

Lookingbill v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 266 (5th Cir. 2002)

(collecting cases so holding).

Petitioner filed his federal habeas action on September

11, 2006. Between November 5, 2005 and September 11, 2006, is

a time period of 309 days. Accordingly, Petitioner’s federal

habeas action was filed within the relevant 365-day statute of

limitations because only 358 days of untolled time (49 days

after his conviction became final and the statute of limitations

was tolled by the initiation of his Rule 32 action and 309 days

while his Rule 32 action was “pending”) passed between the date

his conviction became final and the date his federal habeas

action was filed.

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6 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2006). 

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B. Applicable law regarding exhaustion

A state prisoner must “exhaust” a claim in the state

courts before the District Court may grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of the claim. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 729-30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Castille v.

Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1989). To

properly exhaust a claim, the petitioner must afford the state

the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille, 489 U.S. at

351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2971 (2005).6

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court”

test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 348 (2005). 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

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7 Procedural default also occurs when a petitioner did

present a claim to the state courts, but the state courts did not

address the merits of the claim because the petitioner failed to

follow a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at

727-28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657,

665 (9th Cir. 2005); Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2002)

(“A state is entitled to treat as forfeited a proposition that was not

presented in the right court, in the right way, and at the right

time--as state rules define those courts, ways, and times. Failure

to comply with the state’s procedural rules furnishes an independent

and adequate state ground of decision that blocks federal collateral

review.”). 

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2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2006). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994

& Supp. 2006); Castille, 489 U.S. at 351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060.

If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally

barred pursuant to state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue

of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of the claim. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a claim in state court and is now barred from doing so

by the state’s procedural rules, including rules regarding

waiver and the preclusion of claims. See Castille, 489 U.S. at

351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376,

1378 (9th Cir. 1988).7 “If a prisoner has defaulted a state

claim by ‘violating a state procedural rule which would

constitute adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review

... he may not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a

showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v.

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8 Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is also appropriate if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of his claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage

of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393, 124 S. Ct. 1847,

1852 (2004). A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs only when

a constitutional violation results in the conviction of one who is

actually innocent of the crime of conviction. See ; Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986); Thomas

v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing of factual

innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice relief).

Petitioner does not assert he is actually innocent of the

charges against him. Petitioner asserts his sentence was invalid and

that his guilty plea should be vacated because of the trial court’s

“promise” with regard to imposing sentence, not because he did not

commit the crimes involved or because he was tried in a proceeding

involving constitutional error.

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Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v.

Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Petitioner did not properly exhaust his federal habeas

claims in the state courts by fairly presenting them to the

Arizona Court of Appeals in a direct appeal or in his action for

post-conviction relief. Because the Arizona rules of criminal

procedure regarding timeliness, waiver, and preclusion bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust his

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted his claims. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303

F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

C. Cause and prejudice

Federal habeas relief based on a procedurally defaulted

claim is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate a

miscarriage of justice, or cause and actual prejudice to excuse

his default of the claim. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51, 111

S. Ct. at 2555-56.8 

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“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s

procedural default and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from

the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis, 945

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To demonstrate cause, a

petitioner must show the existence of some external factor which

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules.

See Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir.

1996). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage, infecting his entire [criminal proceedings] with

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady,

456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982). See also

Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1998).

Establishing prejudice requires Petitioner to prove that, “but

for” the alleged constitutional violations, there is a

reasonable probability he would not have been convicted of the

same crime. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th

Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999).

Although both cause and prejudice must be shown to excuse a

procedural default, the Court need not examine the existence of

prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. See Engle

v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43

(1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

III Conclusion

Petitioner did file his federal habeas action within

the one-year period specified by the AEDPA. However, Petitioner

procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claims in the Arizona

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state courts. Because Petitioner does not argue cause for nor

prejudice arising from his procedural default of his federal

habeas claims, the Court may not grant relief based on the

merits of the claims.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Hull’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

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law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 24th day of January, 2007.

 

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