Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00244/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00244-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHELLE L. JOE,

Plaintiff,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-CV-00244-OWW-LJO-P

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO EITHER

FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY

COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED

ONLY ON CLAIMS FOUND TO BE

COGNIZABLE 

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Michelle L. Joe (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on February 22, 2005.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this

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standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg.

Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395

U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

A. Summary of Plaintiff’s Allegations

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at the Central California Women’s

Facility in Chowchilla, where plaintiff is presently incarcerated. Plaintiff names Governor Arnold

Schwarzenegger, California Department of Corrections Director Jeanne S. Woodford, Health Care

Division Director Renee Kanan, Dr. Augustine C. Mekkam, Dr. Sampeth Suryadevara, Dr. Lorraine

Goodwin, Dr. Shelley Kruse, and Does 1-20 as defendants. Plaintiff is seeking money damages and

equitable relief. Plaintiff alleges that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to her serious

medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that in 1997, she began experiencing lower back pain

associated with leg pain, swelling, and, on occasion, sciatic nerve pain on the right side. Plaintiff

alleges that pursuant defendants Mekkam and Suryadevara’s orders, Ultram, a non-narcotic pain

medication which had been prescribed to plaintiff for four months and which was the only effective

medication that had been given to plaintiff, was discontinued. 

Plaintiff alleges that in April of 2002, plaintiff developed on-going stomach pain. Non-party

Dr. Reynolds determined that further testing was warranted, ordered an MRI, x-rays, and lab work,

and referred plaintiff to an orthopedic surgeon and a neurologist on the basis that plaintiff might have

neuropathy. Following Dr. Reynolds’ transfer to another institution, defendant Mekkam cancelled

the referral to the specialists. 

On or around June of 2002, plaintiff developed severe stomach pain accompanied by diarrhea

and vomiting. Plaintiff was seen by non-party Dr. Berry, who determined that plaintiff may have

neuropathy, prescribed medication, ordered lab work, and referred plaintiff to specialists, including

a neurologist. On or around August of 2002, plaintiff was seen by defendant Mekkam regarding her

test results, which revealed that plaintiff suffered from a Helicobacter pylori, or H. pylori, infection.

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Plaintiff alleges that H. pylori is a bacteria that affects the lining of the stomach and if left untreated,

can lead to more serious gastrointestinal problems such as ulcers and stomach cancer. Plaintiff

alleges that defendant Mekkam told her the MRI results were normal, but she observed that the

report found degenerative disk disease. Plaintiff alleges that the condition had progressed since

previous x-rays were taken. Plaintiff alleges that she was placed on anti-biotics and informed by

defendant Mekkam that pain medication was the only treatment for her back pain, but that he would

not prescribe any medication. Plaintiff alleges she was provided with no relief and that when she

asked about being seen by a neurologist, defendant Mekkam said she was not ever going to be seen

by a neurologist and that her problems were all in her head. Defendant then referred plaintiff to a

prison psychiatrist.

On or around August of 2002, plaintiff again began experiencing severe stomach and

abdominal pain, diarrhea, vomiting, and anorexia, and increased lower back and leg pain. Plaintiff

was seen by non-party Dr. Pillar, who denied any follow-up testing for the H. pylori bacteria and

informed her that he was unable to prescribe any pain medication other than Tylenol per defendant

Mekkam’s orders.

Plaintiff alleges that she continued to suffer from intermittent numbness in her hands and

legs, increased pain in her lower back and legs, and H. pylori bacterial infection symptoms. 

Plaintiff alleges that on or around October 25, 2002, she was seen by defendant Goodwin,

who ordered a blood test to determine if plaintiff was suffering from a recurrence of the H. pylori

bacteria. Plaintiff alleges that the test revealed a high level of the bacteria, but defendant refused to

treat plaintiff with the recommended antibiotics. On or around November of 2002, plaintiff was

again notified by defendant Goodwin of the presence of a high level of the bacteria, but provided

with no treatment. Plaintiff alleges that in December of 2002, her severe stomach problems persisted

and she was unable to ingest food without experiencing severe pain, nausea, and diarrhea. Plaintiff

alleges that she was again seen by defendant Goodwin, who refused to treat plaintiff or provide any

relief. 

Plaintiff alleges that on or around January 20, 2003, she began vomiting and having bloody

diarrhea. Plaintiff took a stool sample to defendant Doe 1, a medical technical assistant, but she was

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refused treatment. Plaintiff alleges that she presented a request for treatment on January 21, 2003,

due to increased pain, vomiting and diarrhea. Plaintiff was seen by defendant Doe 2, a registered

nurse, at the yard clinic, who told her it was highly unlikely she had a recurrence of H. pylori

bacteria, denied her treatment, and referred her to defendant Goodwin. Defendant Goodwin

subsequently refused to see plaintiff but ordered a blood test. Plaintiff alleges that on or around

January 29, 2003, she experienced severe stomach pain and bloody diarrhea for more than eight

hours. Plaintiff was seen by defendant Doe 3, the registered nurse on duty at the yard clinic.

Defendant Doe 3 refused to see her, but told her to fill out a co-pay form and she would be placed

on the nurse’s list. Defendant Doe 3 also refused to give plaintiff a medical excuse from her job

assignment.

On or around February 5, 2003, housing staff contacted defendant Doe 2 and requested that

plaintiff be seen. Defendant Doe 2 refused to see plaintiff and told her to fill out a co-pay form to

be scheduled for an appointment.

On or around February 2003, defendant Goodwin ordered a blood sugar level to rule out

diabetes as a cause of plaintiff’s neuropathy. Defendant Goodwin performed a finger prick test and

determined that plaintiff did not have diabetes, but no actual blood sugar testing was performed.

On or around September of 2004, defendant Kruse ordered a cervical x-ray and informed

plaintiff that the result revealed a crushed disk in her neck. Plaintiff alleges that defendant refused

to prescribe any pain relievers despite plaintiff’s legitimate medical condition and informed plaintiff

that she was precluded from prescribing the medication that had been effective in the past pursuant

to the orders of defendants Mekkam and Suryadevara. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant refused

to refer her to a neurologist because there was no longer one on staff and refused to order a complete

blood sugar test, telling plaintiff she no longer had neuropathy.

Plaintiff alleges that her physical pain has increased over time to intolerable levels and has

been left untreated by defendants despite their knowledge that her medical conditions warrant

treatment and further evaluation. 

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2. Legal Standard for Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claims

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference” standard involves

an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms,

“sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501

U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than conduct undertaken for the very

purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official does not act in a

deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Id. 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner’s

civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere

‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.”

Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at

105-06. “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.

Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a

prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310,

1316 (9th Cir. 1995); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Even gross

negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood

v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). A prisoner’s mere disagreement with

diagnosis or treatment does not support a claim of deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d

240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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3. Claims Against Defendants Mekkam, Suryadevara, Goodwin, Kruse,

and Does 1-3

The court finds that plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to claims for relief under

section 1983 against defendants Mekkam, Suryadevara, Goodwin, and Kruse. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

Although “[a] difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities

regarding treatment does not give rise to a s 1983 claim,” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344

(9thCir. 1981) (internal citation omitted), the court cannot find, at this early stage in the proceedings,

that plaintiff’s claims are based on nothing more than her disagreement with the treatment provided.

The needless suffering of pain may be sufficient to demonstrate further harm for the purposes of an

Eighth Amendment claim. Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). Therefore, the

refusal to provide plaintiff with effective pain medication may amount to deliberate indifference.

Further, if plaintiff’s medical condition warranted further treatment and evaluation and defendants

knew this but failed to provide further care, defendants may have acted with deliberate indifference.

However, the court finds that plaintiff’s allegations fall short of stating a claim under section

1983 against defendants Does 1-3. Plaintiff’s allegations establish that Does 1-3 were on duty at the

facility yard clinic. The Doe defendants’ alleged refusal to provide treatment when she contacted

them at the yard clinic is insufficient, without more, to support the claim that in turning her away,

defendants “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health or safety.” Farmer,

511 U.S. at 837 (emphasis added). 

 4. Claims Against Defendants Schwarzenegger, Woodford, and Kanan

The Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against state officials in their official

capacity. See Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997); Eaglesmith

v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1996); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992).

However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages against state officials in their

personal capacity. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991); Ashker v. California Dep’t of

Corrections, 112 F.3d 392, 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 168 (1997); Pena v. Gardner, 976

F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992). “Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a

government official for actions [the official] takes under color of state law. See Kentucky v.

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Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1988). Where plaintiff is seeking damages against a state official, such

as in the instant action, this “necessarily implies” a personal-capacity suit because an officialcapacity suit would be barred. SeeCerrato v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 26 F.3d 968,

973 n.16 (9th Cir. 1994); Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284

(9th Cir. 1994); Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991). 

With respect to personal capacity suits against individuals such as the Governor, the Director

of CDC, and the Director of Health Care Services, liability for the actions of subordinate employees

may not be premised on a theory of respondeat superior. When a named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld,

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To support a claim for

supervisory liability under section 1983, plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that supervisory

defendants either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew

of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so

deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of

the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)(internal citations

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards

are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under Section 1983. See Leatherman v.

Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any factsdemonstrating that defendants Schwarzenegger, Woodford,

or Kanan personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the

violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient

that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black at 646. For this reason, plaintiff fails to state a claim for

relief against these defendants under section 1983 for violating her rights under the Eighth

Amendment.

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C. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint contains cognizable claims for relief under section

1983 against defendants Mekkam, Suryadevara, Goodwin, and Kruse for violation of the Eighth

Amendment. However, the court finds that plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any cognizable

claims for relief under section 1983 against defendants Does 1-3, Schwarzenegger, Woodford, and

Kanan. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint, if

plaintiff wishes to do so.

If plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and wishes to proceed against

defendants Mekkam, Suryadevara, Goodwin, and Kruse only, plaintiff may so notify the court in

writing. The court will then issue Findings and Recommendations recommending thatthe remaining

claims and defendants be dismissed from this action, and will instruct plaintiff on initiating service

of process.

In the event that plaintiff does wish to amend her complaint, plaintiff is advised Local Rule

15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976);May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980);Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must either:

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a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in

this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that she does not wish to file an amended

complaint and wishes to proceed only against defendants Mekkam,

Suryadevara, Goodwin, and Kruse; and

3. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 2, 2005 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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