Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01102/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01102-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

NICHI AKI SENJURO, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appoaln Tenth Circuit 

AUG 2 8 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

vs. ) No. 91-1102 

DR. 

) 

MURRAY, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 90-C-1951) 

Nichi Aki Senjuro, pro se. 

Bonnie J. McLaren, Miles & Epstein, Denver, Colorado for 

Defendant-Appellee, Carolyn Murray, M.D. 

Before LOGAN, MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.* 

PER CURIAM. 

Nichi Aki Senjuro, a prisoner at the El Paso County, Colorado 

Detention Center, appeals from the district court's order 

dismissing his civil rights complaint. Mr. Senjuro sent a letter 

to the district court indicating his desire to appeal. We treat 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 91-1102 Document: 01019762425 Date Filed: 08/30/1991 Page: 1 
the letter as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal. 

See United States v. Leonard, No. 88-1671, slip op. at 2 (10th 

Cir. June 17, 1991) [1991 WL 102073]. However, the letter was 

sent outside the maximum thirty-day period from the entry of the 

order (constituting the judgment) on the court docket. See Fed. 

R. App. P. 4(a)(l); Herrera v. First N. Sav. & Loan Assn, 805 F.2d 

896, 899 (10th Cir. 1986). Therefore, Mr. Senjuro's letter noting 

his appeal was untimely. 1 See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 

(1988). In addition, Mr. Senjuro did not move for an extension of 

the time to appeal within the thirty-day grace period established 

by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). 2 See Romero v. Peterson, 930 F.2d 

1502, 1505 (10th Cir. 1991) (discussing excusable neglect 

standard); Oda v. Transcon Lines Corp., 650 F.2d 231, 232 (10th 

Cir. 1981) (discussing mechanics of Rule 4(a)(5)). Given these 

facts, we lack jurisidiction to consider his appeal because the 

1 The order from which Mr. Senjuro seeks to appeal was entered 

on January 31, 1991. The docket sheet indicates that the order 

was mailed to all counsel and the order contains a certificate of 

mailing to Mr. Senjuro. On March 8, 1991, the district court 

docketed a letter from Mr. Senjuro inquiring about the status of 

his case. On March 15, 1991, Mr. Senjuro's letter constituting 

his notice of appeal was filed, some forty-three days after the 

entry of judgment. 

2 Mr. Senjuro's letter merely indicates his desire to appeal 

and may not be deemed a motion for an extension of time under Fed. 

R. App. P. 4(a)(5). Neither a bare notice of appeal nor its 

functional equivalent "'should be construed as a motion for 

extension of time, where no request for additional time is 

manifest.'" Wilder v. Chairman of the Central Classification Bd., 

926 F.2d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting Shah v. Hutto, 722 F.2d 

1167, 1168-69 (4th Cir. 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 

975 (1984)). Nor may the filing of Mr. Senjuro's letter noting 

his appeal be viewed "as tantamount to the granting of the 

requisite extension." Mayfield v. United States Parole Comm'n, 

647 F.2d 1053, 1055 (10th Cir. 1981). 

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Appellate Case: 91-1102 Document: 01019762425 Date Filed: 08/30/1991 Page: 2 
time periods established by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) are "'mandatory 

and jurisdictional.'" See Browder v. Department of Corrections, 

434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 

U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). 

Mr. Senjuro argues that he did not receive timely notice of 

the entry of judgment in this case, but this does not obviate the 

need for a timely notice of appeal or a timely request for an 

extension. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d) ("Lack of notice of the 

entry by the clerk does not affect the time to appeal or relieve 

or authorize the court to relieve a party for failure to appeal 

within the time allowed, except as permitted in Rule 4(a) of the 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure."). See also Silvia v. 

Laurie, 594 F.2d 892, 893 (1st Cir. 1979) (while failure to 

receive notice may constitute excusable neglect allowing the 

district court to extend the time for appeal, a request for 

extension of time prior to the end of the thirty-day grace period 

is a prerequisite to relief); Mayfield v. United States Parole 

Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1053, 1055 (10th Cir. 1981) (request for 

extension of time to file notice of appeal must be made prior to 

the end of the thirty-day grace period). 

In carefully limited circumstances, relief from an untimely 

notice of appeal may be available. If the district court induced 

detrimental reliance by an appellant resulting in the filing of an 

untimely notice of appeal, we may allow the appeal in the "best 

interests of justice" given such unique circumstances. See 

Stauber v. Kieser, 810 F.2d 1, 1-2 (10th Cir. 1982). See also 

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Appellate Case: 91-1102 Document: 01019762425 Date Filed: 08/30/1991 Page: 3 
Pinion v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 928 F.2d 1522, 1526-35 (1991) 

(discussing "unique circumstances" doctrine). Here, we have no 

indication that any statements or actions of the district court 

resulted in detrimental reliance by Mr. Senjuro. We have also 

recognized that relief may be available via Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 

Wallace v. McManus, 776 F.2d 915, 916-17 (10th Cir. 1985). A 

party may seek to set aside the original judgment when notice of 

its entry was received outside the time in which to file a motion 

for extension of time under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). Id. at 917. 

In this case, however, Mr. Senjuro received notice of entry of 

judgment prior to the expiration of the thirty-day grace period in 

which to file for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. 

Thus, we must conclude that Mr. Senjuro's failure to note a timely 

appeal or to obtain an extension deprives this court of 

jurisdiction to consider his appeal. Accordingly, we GRANT 

appellee's motion to dismiss, and deny all other pending motions. 

APPEAL DISMISSED. 

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Appellate Case: 91-1102 Document: 01019762425 Date Filed: 08/30/1991 Page: 4