Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00881/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00881-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANJAY BAKSHI,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BAYER HEALTHCARE, LLC,

Defendant. /

No. C07-00881 CW

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS

FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

COMPLAINT AND TO

REMAND

Plaintiff Sanjay Bakshi moves pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15(a) for leave to amend his complaint to add an

additional Defendant, and to remand the case. Adding the

additional Defendant would defeat diversity jurisdiction and this

case would have to be remanded for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Defendant Bayer Healthcare, LLC, opposes the

motions. Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties,

the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motions for leave to amend the

complaint and to remand.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are alleged in Plaintiff's complaint. 

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant. On June 6, 2005, Plaintiff

injured his back while working at home. A few weeks later,

Plaintiff returned to his job. However, due to the severity of his

back injury, Plaintiff returned to work with physical work

restrictions from his doctor. Plaintiff's immediate supervisor,

James Glover, ignored Plaintiff's requests for limited job duties

Case 4:07-cv-00881-CW Document 23 Filed 04/26/07 Page 1 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

and told him to get the job done regardless of his physical

limitations. Glover retaliated against Plaintiff by increasing the

physical demands on Plaintiff. 

In early September, 2005, Plaintiff received a letter from the

administrator of Defendant's disability program stating that

Defendant would honor Plaintiff's work restrictions. However, due

to the physical demands imposed on Plaintiff by Glover and

Defendant's failure to accommodate his disability, Plaintiff never

fully recovered from his injury. In mid-September, 2005,

Plaintiff's physician instructed him not to return to work until he

had fully recovered to avoid further aggravation of his injury.

Defendant authorized disability leave for Plaintiff through

December 26, 2005. On or about December 21, 2005, Plaintiff's

doctors cleared him to return to work with restrictions. Plaintiff

notified Defendant via facsimile that he was cleared to return to

work, but Defendant never responded. On January 30, 2006,

Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant notifying him that his

employment was terminated because of his current medical

restrictions. 

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant on January 23,

2007, in the Superior Court of California, Alameda County. 

Defendant removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(b) on grounds of diversity jurisdiction on February 12,

2007. Plaintiff does not dispute that removal was proper. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave of

the court allowing a party to amend its pleading "shall be freely

Case 4:07-cv-00881-CW Document 23 Filed 04/26/07 Page 2 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

given when justice so requires." Leave to amend lies within the

sound discretion of the trial court, which "must be guided by the

underlying purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate decision on the merits,

rather than on the pleadings or technicalities." United States v.

Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted). Thus,

Rule 15's policy of favoring amendments to pleadings should be

applied with "extreme liberality." Id.; DCD Program, Ltd. v.

Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) provides that, if "after removal the

plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would

destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or

permit joinder and remand the action to the State court." 

Permitting joinder of non-diverse defendants in a removed action

divests a district court of jurisdiction if diversity is the sole

basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Morris v. Princess Cruises,

Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Desert Empire

Bank v. Insurance Co. of North America, 623 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th

Cir. 1980)). 

Once a case has been removed, a diversity-destroying amendment

could be motivated by the plaintiff's desire to gain procedural

advantage by returning to state court. Clinco v. Roberts, 41 F.

Supp. 2d 1080, 1086-87 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Therefore, a district

court must scrutinize a proposed diversity-destroying amendment to

ensure that it is proper; in other words, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e)

applies and the logic and policy of Rule 15(a) do not apply. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit has urged trial courts to "look with

particular care at such motive in removal cases, when the presence

Case 4:07-cv-00881-CW Document 23 Filed 04/26/07 Page 3 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

of a new defendant will defeat the court's diversity jurisdiction

and will require a remand to the state court." Desert Empire, 623

F.2d at 1376. When a party seeks to join diversity-destroying

defendants, courts generally look at six factors. Palestini v.

Gen. Dynamics Corp., 193 F.R.D. 654, 658 (C.D. Cal. 2000); IBC

Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, et. al.,

125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Bonner v. Fuji Photo

Film, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1119-20 (N.D. Cal. 2006). The six

factors are 

(1) whether the new defendants should be joined under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a) as 'needed for just adjudication';

(2) whether the statute of limitations would preclude an

original action against the new defendants in state

court; (3) whether there has been unexplained delay in

requesting joinder; (4) whether joinder is intended

solely to defeat federal jurisdiction; (5) whether the

claims against the new defendant appear valid; and

(6) whether denial of joinder will prejudice the

plaintiff. 

Palestini, 193 F.R.D. at 658. 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to name Glover as a

defendant. Plaintiff acknowledges that adding Glover will destroy

diversity and will require the Court to remand the action to state

court. 

Defendant argues that leave to amend should be denied because

Plaintiff's primary motive in seeking to amend his complaint is to

destroy diversity. 

I. Palestini Factors

When a party seeks to join diversity-destroying defendants,

the Court addresses the six factors set forth in Palestini, 193

Case 4:07-cv-00881-CW Document 23 Filed 04/26/07 Page 4 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

F.R.D. at 658. 

A. Compulsory Joinder

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 provides that joinder is

required of persons whose absence would preclude the grant of

complete relief, or whose absence would impede their ability to

protect their interests. IBC Aviation, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1011

(citing Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 19). Such a 

necessary party is one "having an interest in the

controversy, and who ought to be made [a] party, in order

that the court may act on that rule which requires it to

decide and finally determine the entire controversy, and

do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved

in it." This standard is met when failure to join will

lead to separate and redundant actions.

Id. (citing CP Nat’l Corp. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 928 F.2d

905, 910, 912 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

Whether a party is necessary under Rule 19 is a factor to be

considered, but the standard for joinder under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e)

is less restrictive than the standard for joinder under Rule 19. 

Id. (citing Trotman v. United Parcel Serv., 1996 WL 428333, *1

(N.D. Cal. 1996). Courts do not allow joinder of non-diverse

defendants where those defendants are only tangentially related to

the cause of action or would not prevent complete relief. Id.

California Government Code section 12940(h) provides that it

is an unlawful employment practice for "any employer, labor

organization, employment agency, or person to discharge, expel, or

otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has

opposed any practices forbidden under [the California Fair

Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)] or because the person has filed

a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under [the

Case 4:07-cv-00881-CW Document 23 Filed 04/26/07 Page 5 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

FEHA]." This statute has been interpreted to provide that an

individual supervisor can be held liable for retaliation under the

FEHA, separate and distinct from the liability incurred by an

employer. Page v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1206, 1211-12

(1995).

Plaintiff alleges that Glover's instructions to Plaintiff were

the main cause of Plaintiff's further injuries. Erlich Dec., Ex. A

¶ 29. Plaintiff additionally alleges that Glover's instructions

were in retaliation for Plaintiff's request for accommodation and

need for medical leave. Id. 

Defendant argues that Glover is not a necessary party under

Rule 19(a). Defendant argues that Plaintiff can obtain complete

relief without joinder of Glover because, under the principle of

respondeat superior, liability for Glover's actions is imputed to

Defendant. Under California Government Code section 12926(d), an

employer is defined to include "any person acting as an agent of an

employer, directly or indirectly." However, in addition to

Defendant's potential liability, Glover could be personally liable

for retaliation. 

Defendant cites Bonner, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1120, for the

proposition that Plaintiff may obtain complete relief from

Defendant. However, the defendants that Bonner sought to add to

her complaint were already parties to the litigation because the

named defendant had filed a third-party complaint against them. 

Id. at 1114-15. In the present case, Glover is not a named party. 

Furthermore, Glover is not tangentially related to the cause

of action; he is directly related to the cause of action.

Case 4:07-cv-00881-CW Document 23 Filed 04/26/07 Page 6 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

Denying Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend would hinder

Plaintiff in asserting his rights against Glover, who was allegedly

directly involved in the retaliatory conduct.

B. Statute of Limitations

Plaintiff does not argue that a separate action in state court

against Glover would be time-barred. However, requiring Plaintiff

to litigate the same issues in state and federal court would waste

judicial resources. It would also risk inconsistent results

because Defendant is under an obligation to indemnify Glover under

California Labor Code section 2802 for all necessary expenditures

or losses incurred by him in direct consequence of the discharge of

his duties, or of his obedience to the directions of the employer.

C. Unexplained Delay

Plaintiff filed his complaint in state court on January 23,

2007. Defendant removed the case to this Court on February 12,

2007. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint and remand on March

19, 2007.

Plaintiff argues that the motion to amend the complaint was

timely because it was made within thirty-five days of the notice of

removal. 

Citing Bonner, Defendant argues that courts also consider

whether there is an explanation for the passage of time. Bonner,

461 F. Supp. 2d at 1120 (Bonner failed to explain why she waited

until after removal to add diversity-destroying defendants). 

Plaintiff did mention Glover in the original complaint. Notice of

Removal, Ex. A, ¶¶ 30-31, Docket No. 1. Plaintiff explains that he

did not include Glover in the original complaint because California

Case 4:07-cv-00881-CW Document 23 Filed 04/26/07 Page 7 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

law was not clear as to whether an individual supervisor could be

held liable for retaliation under the FEHA. Plaintiff cites three

cases that allegedly clarified this point of California law: 

Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power, 144 Cal. App.

4th 1216, 1237 (2006); Ross v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit

Dist., 146 Cal. App. 4th 1507, 1517 (2007); and Jones v. Lodge at

Torrey Pines Partnership, 147 Cal. App. 4th 475, 500-504 (2007).

However, prior to time of the filing of the present complaint,

California Court of Appeal cases held that an individual supervisor

can be held liable for retaliation under the FEHA. Page, 31 Cal.

App. 4th at 1211-12; Matthews v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. App. 4th

598, 603 (1995); Walrath v. Sprinkel, 99 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 1241-

42 (2002) (both California courts and federal courts have held the

FEHA "to allow individual liability for retaliatory acts by

supervisors"); Taylor, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 1237. Taylor was

decided on November 20, 2006, over two months before this case was

filed in state court on January 23, 2007.

Plaintiff's delay in seeking to add Glover is unexcused. 

D. Motive

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's motive for seeking joinder

is to destroy diversity. 

"The legislative history to § 1447(e) . . . suggests that it

was intended to undermine the doctrine employed by some courts that

amendments which destroyed diversity were to be viewed with

suspicion." IBC Aviation 125 F. Supp. at 1012 (citing Trotman,

1996 WL 428333, at *1); see also Righetti v. Shell Oil Co., 711 F.

Supp. 531, 535 (N.D. Cal. 1989) ("Nor does the court find that

Case 4:07-cv-00881-CW Document 23 Filed 04/26/07 Page 8 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

section 1447(e) requires an inquiry into the plaintiffs' motive for

adding a non-diverse defendant."); but see Clinco v. Roberts, 41 F.

Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (plaintiff’s suspected motive

to join defendant to defeat diversity did not support granting

joinder); Buttons v. NBC, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (C.D. Cal.

1994) (plaintiff’s primary motive to join defendants was to destroy

diversity; this and other factors favored denial of plaintiff's

motion).

Because Plaintiff has no valid reason for failing to include

Glover in his original complaint, the Court finds that the primary

reason for seeking to add him now is to destroy the Court's

diversity jurisdiction.

E. Validity of Claims

Defendant argues that the claims against Glover have no merit

because liability for Glover's actions is imputed to it under the

principle of respondeat superior and it can satisfy any judgment to

which Plaintiff may be entitled under his claim of retaliation.

As noted above, an individual supervisor can be held

personally liable for retaliation under the FEHA. Thus, the claims

against Glover are not invalid.

F. Prejudice

Citing Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th

Cir. 1987), Defendant argues that Plaintiff would suffer no

prejudice because he seeks only monetary damages. Defendant argues

that Glover is currently employed by Defendant and does not need to

be subpoenaed to give testimony at deposition or trial in this

action, and that nothing prevents Plaintiff from proceeding

Case 4:07-cv-00881-CW Document 23 Filed 04/26/07 Page 9 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

separately against Glover in state court. 

However, denying Plaintiff's Motion to Amend would be

prejudicial to Plaintiff. It would require him to either abandon

the potential claims against Glover or to commence litigation in

state court against Glover. Furthermore, allowing Plaintiff to

amend would not prejudice Defendant, except in the choice of forum,

because the present case is in its early stages.

II. Weighing Factors

Several factors weigh in favor of granting Plaintiff's motion

for leave to amend the complaint. However, Plaintiff did not

explain the delay in attempting to add Glover as a defendant and

his primary motive appears to be to destroy diversity jurisdiction. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the

complaint and motion to remand are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 4/26/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:07-cv-00881-CW Document 23 Filed 04/26/07 Page 10 of 10