Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-05452/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-05452-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCO GARAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO.,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-05452-PJH 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION TO REMAND

Re: Dkt. No. 13

Before the court is plaintiff Marco Garay’s (“plaintiff”) motion to remand. Dkt.13. 

The matter is fully briefed and suitable for decision without oral argument. Having read 

the parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal 

authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for the 

following reasons.

BACKGROUND

On October 25, 2018, plaintiff filed his complaint alleging a putative employmentrelated class action against defendant Southwest Airlines Co. (“defendant”) in Alameda 

county. Dkt. 1, Ex. A (Compl.). Based on that complaint, defendant removed plaintiff’s 

action to this court on December 14, 2018, thereby giving rise to the related case Garay 

v. Southwest Airlines Co., 18-cv-07538-PJH (“Southwest I”). On February 28, 2019, this 

court granted plaintiff’s first motion to remand. Southwest I, Dkt. 17.

Defendant filed its second notice of removal of plaintiff’s action to this court on 

August 29, 2019. Dkt. 1. Defendant bases its subsequent removal on the same 

complaint and expressly acknowledges that “no further process, pleadings, or orders 

related to this case have been filed in the Superior Court action or served by any party.” 

Case 4:19-cv-05452-PJH Document 22 Filed 12/20/19 Page 1 of 14
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Id. ¶ 9. On September 28, 2019, plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand challenging 

defendant’s subsequent notice of removal. Dkt. 13. 

A. The Complaint

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges six claims on behalf of all persons employed by 

defendant in California four years prior to plaintiff’s action. Compl. ¶ 11. Such claims 

include the following:

1. Failure to provide meal periods, Compl. ¶¶ 37-52;

2. Failure to provide rest periods, id. ¶¶ 53-63;

3. Failure to pay hourly and overtime wages, id. ¶¶ 64-92;

4. Failure to provide accurate written wage statements, id. ¶¶ 93-99;

5. Failure to timely pay all final wages (“waiting time penalties”), id. ¶¶ 100-

110; and

6. Unfair competition (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200), id. ¶¶ 111-127.

In his complaint, plaintiff does not specify the amount in damages sought. 

B. Procedural Posture

1. Southwest I

In support of its first removal, defendant asserted federal jurisdiction under CAFA, 

as well as Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1441(a) and 1446. Southwest I, Dkt. 1. Plaintiff 

subsequently moved to remand the action to Alameda County Superior Court. The 

parties disputed only whether defendant satisfied its burden of showing CAFA’s $5 million 

amount in controversy requirement had been met. Southwest I, Dkt. 17 (February 28, 

2019 Order Remanding Action) at 2. To do so, defendant relied only on plaintiff’s second 

through fifth claims. Id. Defendant ultimately contended that, based on those four claims 

(plus attorneys’ fees), the amount in controversy totaled $134 million. Id.

As evidentiary support for that contention, defendant offered only the declaration 

of Senior Manager of Engagement and Administration Michelle Inlow (“Inlow”). 

Southwest I, Dkt. 1-2. As further shown below, a description of this declaration is 

significant. In her declaration, Inlow provided only the following concerning the amount in 

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controversy:

• Defendant employed approximately 2,475 individuals as hourly, nonexempt 

employees in California at any given time in 2014. Such employees had an 

average hourly rate of $22.12. Dkt. 1-2 ¶ 4;

• Defendant employed approximately 2,704 hourly, nonexempt employees in 

California at any given time in 2015. Such employees had an average hourly rate 

of $21.45. Id.;

• Defendant employed approximately 3,003 hourly, nonexempt employees in 

California at any given time in 2016. Such employees had an average hourly rate 

of $22.55. Id.;

• Defendant employed approximately 3,254 hourly, nonexempt employees in 

California at any given time in 2017. Such employees had an average hourly rate 

of $22.29. Id.;

• Defendant employed approximately 3,667 hourly, nonexempt employees in 

California at any given time in 2018. Such employees had an average hourly rate 

of $22.11. Id.;

• Full-time, hourly nonexempt employees are generally scheduled to work five eighthour shifts per week. Id. ¶ 5;

Inlow further testified that “[i]n general, [defendant’s] hourly, nonexempt 

employees work at least some overtime. Nonexempt, hourly employees in California 

worked, on average about 3.7 hours of overtime per workweek in 2015, 3.0 hours of 

overtime per workweek in 2016, 3.4 hours of overtime per workweek in 2017, and 2.7 

hours of overtime per workweek in 2018.” Southwest I, Dkt. 1-2 ¶ 6. Inlow further 

provided that defendant pays its nonexempt, hourly employees in California “twice per 

month, resulting in 24 wage statements per year.” Id. ¶ 7.

Lastly, Inlow testified that “[a]pproximately 907 nonexempt, hourly employees in 

California separated employment from [defendant] between October 25, 2015 and 

December 31, 2016 [sic], 233 employees in 2016, 284 in 2017, and 348 between January 

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1, 2018 and November 12, 2018.” Southwest I, Dkt. 1-2 ¶ 8. Defendant did not offer any 

additional evidence concerning such facts.

In its February 28, 2019 remand order, the court found that defendant failed to 

satisfy its burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in 

controversy for the claims alleged in the complaint exceeded $5 million. Southwest I, 

Dkt. 17. The court critiqued defendant’s amount in controversy conclusion on the ground 

that it unreasonably assumed a 100 percent violation rate and failed to provide any 

evidence in support of such assumed rate. Id. at 2. Significantly, the court characterized 

Inlow’s declaration as “do[ing] nothing to show how frequently the alleged violations 

occurred,” and providing that, for example, the fact “that putative class members may 

have been eligible to receive rest periods does not provide any evidence about whether 

or how often the defendant failed to provide rest periods.” Id. at 3. The court noted that 

the fact that class members received 24 wage statements per year says “nothing” about 

“how often” those statements were inaccurate, id., and pointed out that “evidence about 

the average number of overtime hours worked by putative class members does not show 

how often, if at all, [defendant] failed to pay overtime wages due,” id. at 3-4.

2. Southwest II

In support of its second removal, defendant again asserted federal jurisdiction 

under CAFA, as well as Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1441(a), and 1446. Dkt. 1. 

Defendant claims that it discovered that this action is removable “based on its own 

investigation.” Id. ¶ 11.

To show satisfaction of the $5 million amount in controversy requirement, 

defendant relies on the complaint’s third claim (failure to pay hourly and overtime wages), 

fourth claim (failure to provide accurate wage statements), and fifth claim (waiting time 

penalties). Defendant ultimately contends that the amount in controversy totals $26 

million (including attorneys’ fees) for this claim alone. Id. ¶ 38. In support of such 

contention, defendant again relies upon two declarations provided by Inlow—Dkt. 2 

(Inlow Declaration In Support of Second Notice of Removal (“Inlow Second Declaration”) 

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and Dkt. 15-2 (Inlow Supplemental Declaration In Opposition to Motion to Remand 

(“Inlow Third Declaration”)). Aside from Inlow’s declarations, defendant offers no further 

evidence in support of its amount in controversy contention. As summarized by claim 

below, both of Inlow’s latter two declarations offer more detail and specification on the 

employment related information at issue than that provided in her first declaration.

With respect to the third claim, defendant relies upon two apparent theories 

advanced in the complaint: (1) plaintiff’s purported “double-shift” theory, whereby 

defendant failed to pay an overtime premium (i.e., amount in addition to straight hourly 

pay), Compl. ¶¶ 27-29; and (2) plaintiff’s purported “shift differential” theory, whereby 

defendant failed to factor in certain “shift differential” or “non-discretionary” bonuses to 

members’ regular rate of pay when calculating overtime wages, id. ¶¶ 30-31.

With respect to the double-shift theory, Inlow testifies that “when [defendant’s] 

non-exempt, hourly employees in California voluntarily traded shifts with other employees 

pursuant to applicable policies, it did not pay overtime premium for those hours worked in 

the traded shift, even if such hours resulted in the employee working more than 8 hours 

in a day.” Dkt. 2 ¶ 2. With respect to the shift-differential theory, defendant “admits” that it 

paid putative class members “shift premiums” if they were required to work shifts outside 

their regular schedule, and that it did not factor such premiums in the regular rate of pay 

for overtime purposes. Dkt. 1 ¶ 23 citing Dkt. 2 ¶ 3. 

Based on her personal knowledge, Dkt. 2 ¶ 1, and role as manager responsible for 

commissioning defendant’s Technology Department to conduct a deeper investigation, 

Dkt. 15-2 ¶¶ 1, 6, Inlow further testifies to the following overtime compensation related 

statistics:

• Between October 25, 2014 and December 31, 2014, putative class members 

worked 46,491.7 hours beyond eight hours in a day for which they were paid at 

their regular rate of pay without an overtime premium, Dkt. 2 ¶ 4 (emphasis 

added);

• In 2015, putative class members worked 256,735.8 of such hours, id. ¶ 5;

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• In 2016, putative class members worked 285,902.7 of such hours, id. ¶ 6;

• In 2017, putative class members worked 311,038.2 of such hours, id. ¶ 7;

• In 2018, putative class members worked 370,502.9 of such hours, id. ¶ 8; and 

• Between January 1, 2019 and March 31, 2019, putative class members worked 

101,408.2 of such hours, id. ¶ 9.

Using the above information, defendant concluded that the amount in controversy 

from plaintiff’s third claim (under the double-shift theory) amounted to $14 million. 

Defendants failed to draw any conclusion about the amount in controversy under 

plaintiff’s purported “shift differential” theory.

With respect to the fourth claim, Inlow testifies that “between October 25, 2017 

and March 31, 2019, 5,670 putative class members worked a combined 43,290 pay 

periods during which they either worked more than 8 hours in a day for which they were 

paid straight time and no overtime premium and/or they were paid a shift premium and 

worked at least some overtime during the pay period during which the shift period was 

earned.” Dkt. 2 ¶ 10. On the basis of this statement, defendant contends that the fourth 

claim puts an additional $4 million in controversy.

With respect to the fifth claim, Inlow testifies that “[t]here are 617 putative class 

members who have separated their employment from [defendant] and either worked 

more than 8 hours in one day since October 25, 2017 [sic] for which they were paid 

straight time and no overtime premium and/or were paid a shift premium and worked 

some overtime for the period during which the shift premium was earned in a pay period 

since October 25, 2015.” Dkt. 2 ¶ 11. On the basis of this statement, defendant 

contends that the fifth claim puts an additional $3.1 million in controversy.

Plaintiff does not contest defendant’s evidentiary showing concerning the 

satisfaction of the $5 million amount in controversy requirement. Instead, as discussed 

below, the core of the parties’ dispute is whether the facts testified to by Inlow in her latter 

two declarations qualify as newly discovered evidence justifying a successive removal.

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DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

“A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal.” MooreThomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). A federal court 

properly remands an action to state court when it either lacks subject matter jurisdiction 

over such action or there is a defect in removal procedure. Allen v. UtiliQuest, LLC, 2014 

WL 94337, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2014) (“A remand may be ordered either for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction or for any defect in the removal procedure.”). 

As a general matter, a defendant may remove a civil action if a federal district 

court would have original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Title 28 

U.S.C. § 1453 (the Class Actions Fairness Act (“CAFA”)) vests district courts with 

jurisdiction over a civil class action if the following conditions are satisfied:

1. The matter in controversy exceeds $5 million;

2. The proposed class consists of more than 100 members; and

3. Any member of the proposed class is a citizen of a state different from any 

defendant.

Reyes v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 781 F.3d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 2015) citing 28 

U.S.C. §1332(d).

The Supreme Court has clarified that, despite the possible existence of a general 

presumption against federal jurisdiction “in run-of-the-mill diversity cases, no antiremoval 

presumption attends cases invoking CAFA.” Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 

920, 922 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).

As a procedural matter, a defendant initiates the removal process by filing a notice 

of removal in the appropriate district court, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), and giving notice to the 

adverse parties and the state court, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). The filing of a copy of the notice 

in state court “effect[s] the removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless 

and until the case is remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). 

Generally, a defendant must remove a case within 30 days of receiving the 

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complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). However, if the complaint itself does not provide a 

basis for removal, a defendant may file a notice of removal “within 30 days after receipt 

by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, 

motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one 

which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). For purpose of Title 28 

U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), “other paper” includes “information relating to the amount in 

controversy in the record of the State proceeding or in responses to discovery.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1446(c)(3)(a). 

Such notice need include only a plausible allegation that “the amount in 

controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold and need not contain evidentiary 

submissions.” Fritsch v. Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 788 (9th 

Cir. 2018). Unless clear from the face of the complaint, “the defendant seeking removal 

bears the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the aggregate amount 

in controversy exceeds $5 million when federal jurisdiction is challenged.” Ibarra v. 

Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015). “The amount in controversy is 

simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute, not a prospective assessment of 

defendant’s liability . . . In that sense, the amount in controversy reflects the maximum

recovery the plaintiff could reasonably recover.” Arias, 936 F.3d at 927 (emphasis in the 

original). Subsequently, “if the district court decides that a removed case does not satisfy 

the requirements for removal, the court must remand the action to state court.” Fritsch,

899 F.3d at 789.

B. Defendant’s Subsequent Removal Is Improper

As a general matter, a defendant may not subsequently remove an action to 

federal court. Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 789 (“After a remand, the defendant may generally not 

remove the case a second time.”). Still, a defendant may file a second removal petition 

when subsequent pleadings or events reveal a new and different ground for removal. 

Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 789; Reyes, 781 F.3d at 1188 (“A successive removal petition is 

permitted only upon a ‘relevant change of circumstances’—that is, ‘when subsequent 

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pleadings or events reveal a new and different ground for removal.’”) (emphasis in the 

original); Kirkbride v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 933 F.2d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Moreover . . . a 

relevant change of circumstances will justify reconsideration of a successive, good faith 

petition for removal. . . . [A] defendant who fails in an attempt to remove on the initial 

pleadings can file a removal petition when subsequent pleadings or events reveal 

a new and different ground for removal.”) (emphasis in the original). 

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that such “new and different” grounds for 

removal include the following circumstances: (1) a “change in law” giving rise to a basis 

for subject matter jurisdiction, Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 789 (“An intervening change in the law 

that gives rise to a new basis for subject-matter jurisdiction” qualifies as a subsequent 

event that justifies a successive removal petition.”); and (2) a subsequent order by a state 

court certifying a class broader than that apparently disclaimed by a named plaintiff to the 

federal court prior to removal, Reyes, 781 F.3d at 1189 (“Of course, defendants are not 

entitled to more than one bite at the apple, but the superior court's certification order 

substituted a new apple. . . . When the superior court later certified a broader class, it 

increased the amount in controversy, effectively amending the complaint.”). Significantly, 

the Ninth Circuit has not addressed whether the sort of basis proffered by defendant in 

support of its second removal here—that defendant’s Technology Department “created 

multiple programs” to determine the labor-related statistics based upon information 

presumably readily available to defendant at the time of its first removal, Dkt. 15-2 ¶ 4—

qualifies as a “new and different” ground for removal justifying a subsequent removal. 

The closest Ninth Circuit authority identified by either party is dictum from an unpublished 

decision in Garibay v. Archstone Communities LLC, 539 Fed. App'x 763 (9th Cir. 2013).

In Garibay, the Ninth Circuit recognized that “if [a defendant] later discovers 

evidence that the jurisdictional bar is met, it may once again attempt to remove this case 

to federal court.” 539 Fed. App'x at 765. In support of that recognition, the panel in 

Garibay cited Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., 720 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2013), which

held that “a defendant who has not lost the right to remove because of a failure to timely 

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file a notice of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) or (b)(3) may remove to federal 

court when it discovers, based on its own investigation, that a case is removable,” id. at 

1123, and then acknowledged that the defendant in Garibay lacked the benefit of such 

decision. Garibay, 539 Fed. App’x at 765. These recognitions are in-line with the Ninth 

Circuit’s still earlier recognition in Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co. 443 F.3d 676 

(9th Cir. 2006) that “later-discovered facts may prompt a second attempt at removal.” Id.

at 691. 

All of the above authorities consider situations where a defendant discovers new 

information. None address the scenario where a subsequent removal is premised upon 

information available to, but uncited by, a defendant at the time of its prior removal. 

Despite the absence of any Ninth Circuit authority on this point, at least three California 

district courts have considered the propriety of a subsequent removal premised upon 

such previously available information. All have held such removal improper.

Perhaps the most often cited is Allen v. UtiliQuest, LLC, 2014 WL 94337 (N.D. Cal. 

Jan. 9, 2014). In that case, Judge Armstrong considered whether a human resources 

manager’s declaration premised upon information readily available to defendant at the 

time of its first removal qualified as a new and different ground for defendant’s 

subsequent removal. Id. at *3 (“[T]he ‘new’ factual information cited by Defendant was 

readily available when it filed its opposition to Plaintiff's original motion to remand. In 

particular, Defendant relies on the declaration of its Senior Human Resources Manager, 

Neil Vocke, who reviewed the company's internal time records and payroll information 

pertaining to Plaintiff and employees working in his position, and estimated the amount of 

time and wages they may be owed for time spent commuting. . . . Based on the figures 

provided by Mr. Vocke, defense counsel, in turn, calculated the alleged amount in 

controversy.”). The court in Allen observed that, “in providing these estimates, Defendant 

simply relied on information already in its possession, as opposed to new information 

obtained from Plaintiff to establish that, in fact, the requisite amount was in controversy to 

support jurisdiction under CAFA.” Id. The court found that “[t]he information now 

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proffered by Defendant could—and indeed, should—have been presented to the Court in 

opposing Plaintiff's first motion to remand” and then held that the defendant’s “belated[] 

attempt[] to do so now does not render its factual showing ‘new and different’” for 

purposes of allowing a successive removal petition.” Id. (emphasis added).

Judge Bernal dealt with similar circumstances in Andersen v. Schwan Food Co., 

2014 WL 1266785 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014). In Andersen, the court considered a 

second removal that relied upon “declarations of Defendants' human resources 

personnel and on Defendants' calculations of the amounts owed to the putative class.” Id.

at *5. The court noted that “[l]ike the defendant in Allen, Defendants here simply rely on 

information already in their possession. The Initial Removal calculated the amount in 

controversy by extrapolating information provided in the Complaint . . . while the Second 

Removal bases its calculations on Defendants' payroll records.” Id. The court further 

pointed out that defendants “have not shown that the payroll records were unavailable to 

them when they initially sought removal, and the facts suggest the opposite.” Id. Then, 

citing Allen for the proposition that “the information now proffered by Defendant could—

and indeed, should—have been presented to the Court in opposing Plaintiff's first motion 

to remand,” the court in Andersen found that defendants’ “successive removal is 

improper.” Id. at *6.1

Again, in Gyorke-Takatri v. Nestle USA, Inc., 2016 WL 5514756 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 

30, 2016), Judge Orrick considered a similar situation. In that case, the court considered 

whether plaintiff’s post-remand acknowledgement that it would seek an alternative 

measure of damages (disgorgement as opposed to restitution) qualified as a new ground 

for removal. Id. at *3 (“Gerber asserts that, in their motion for class certification, plaintiffs 

 

1 The court in Andersen also addressed the Roth and Garibay cases that defendant relies 

upon. It noted that neither involved a successive removal and that “the final sentence in 

Garibay merely permits a second attempt at removal; it does not guarantee the propriety 

of such a removal.” Id. at *3. The court further identified that, “despite Roth and Garibay, 

“defendants seeking successive removal are still subject to the general rule that where a 

court has previously remanded a removed action . . . successive removals are allowed 

only where the second notice of removal is based on newly discovered fact not available 

at the time of the first removal.” Id. The court agrees.

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‘revealed for the first time that they do not seek restitution of the retail price they paid for 

Puffs, but rather seek disgorgement of Gerber's wholesale price’ and that this change 

constitutes a new ground for removal.”). The court concluded it did not. Id. It reasoned 

that such measure does not qualify as new evidence, in part, because “[plaintiffs] have 

only proposed a specific method of calculating damages based on the same allegations 

and facts included in their original complaint” and defendant “could have proposed this 

same method for calculating damages in its first removal based on the same facts 

alleged in the complaint.” Id. Like the court in Allen and Andersen, the court in GyorkeTakatri reiterated that despite “that it did not occur to [defendant] to offer this evidence 

during its first removal does not permit it to attempt a second removal now,” and 

concluded that defendant’s “second removal attempt is improper.” Id.

Here, defendant fails to provide any proof that the information supporting the 

labor-related statistics ultimately testified to by Inlow in her declarations in support of 

defendant’s subsequent removal was not available to defendant at the time of its initial 

December 14, 2018 removal in Southwest I. While “the complexities of using various 

systems to derive the data and the need to conduct quality control audits to ensure the 

data represented that which was intended” may have taken defendant’s Technology 

Department “four months” to complete a system that would allow Inlow to testify to the 

ultimate labor-related statistics provided in support of the subsequent removal, Dkt. 15-2 

¶ 5, defendant failed to testify to anything that prevented it from pursuing that course of 

investigation prior to its first removal. 

Moreover, any purported “complexities of using various systems to derive the 

data” aside, defendants fail to explain how the underlying information used to “derive” 

such “data” was itself unavailable to defendant at the time of its first removal. Despite 

Inlow’s conclusory statements that defendant “does not maintain data showing how often 

its employees voluntarily traded shifts or when they were only paid straight time when 

they worked a double shift as the result of a shift swap . . . [or] data showing how often 

putative class members worked at least some overtime during the same period for which 

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any different premiums are earned and paid,” all reasonable inferences support the 

opposite conclusion. Significantly, the complaint alleges claims premised upon conduct 

that largely occurred four years prior to the action’s October 24, 2018 filing. Compl. ¶ 11 

(“The relevant time period is defined as the time period beginning four years prior to the 

filing of this action until judgment is entered.”). Presumably, any raw employment-related 

information among defendant’s “various business records” (Dkt. 15-2 ¶ 3) used to support 

Inlow’s conclusions for this removal—including those used to “cause an investigation” 

into the recently testified to information, Dkt. 15-2 ¶ 2—had, for the past four years, 

already been in defendant’s possession. Defendant fails to provide any testimony to the 

contrary. In short, the information now proffered by defendant “could—and indeed, 

should—have been presented” in opposing plaintiff's first motion to remand in Southwest 

I, and that defendant “is belatedly attempting to do so now does not render its factual 

showing ‘new and different’ for purposes of allowing a successive removal petition.” 

Allen, 2014 WL 94337, at *3. 

In line with Allen, Andersen, and Gyorke-Takatri, the court holds that defendant 

may not subsequently remove this action based upon information that was in its 

possession at the time of its previous removal but uncited by it in support of that removal. 

In addition to the reasons identified by the above courts in support of their holding the 

same, the court points out the significant prudential implication of holding otherwise—

namely, a defendant could file multiple successive removals premised upon only 

incrementally different information (for myriad strategic reasons) without limit. Because 

defendant has failed to identify a “relevant change of circumstances” or “new and 

different” grounds for removal distinct from those relied upon or otherwise available to it 

in Southwest I, defendant’s subsequent removal was improper.

One final point related to the instant motion. In its opposition, defendant cites the 

court’s recognition at the February 2019 hearing on plaintiff’s first motion to remand that it 

could not “imagine that there is less than $5 million in controversy in a case such as this.” 

Dkt. 15 at 3, 8. Defendant fails to note, however, that the court made that recognition in 

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the following context:

“But the thing that I’ve seen occur on more than one occasion 

is that even if I remand, the defendant is able to remove again 

once a paper is produced establishing the amount in 

controversy, and I would anticipate that given that this is 

Southwest Airlines, that the amount in controversy is more than 

$5 million. . . . And so I would anticipate that this case could 

potentially be back here again after a discovery response is 

received that establishes that amounts . . .” Dkt. 15-1 Ex. F 

(emphasis added). 

When put in context, then, the court’s anticipation of a subsequent removal 

depended upon the identification of new information in the course of discovery—not 

defendant’s more laborious internal investigation post-remand. Consistent with that 

recognition, the court notes that a litigant, including defendant here, may still seek a 

successive removal on the basis of newly discovered information produced by plaintiff in 

discovery.

CONCLUSION

The court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to remand and REMANDS this action to the 

Alameda County Superior Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 20, 2019

/s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:19-cv-05452-PJH Document 22 Filed 12/20/19 Page 14 of 14