Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02687/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02687-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

F I L b D u~itc;d s~~ft.'S (.l:)l:·,{ ~f l\ppeals 

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M.l\R 2 9 1990 

UNITED STATES couRT oF APPEALsROBERT L. HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

JERRY WAYNE SMITH, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. } No. 88-2687 

) 

HERB MASCHNER, DIRECTOR, DALE BOHANNON, ) 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, RANDALL BUFORD, ) 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, KENNY LYNCH, MAJOR ) 

OF SECURITY, LIEUTENANT DAN PETTIS, ) 

SERGEANT DOUGLAS SOPER, SERGEANT MIKE ) 

RALLS, SR., VICTOR GILL, CO. II, ) 

DANIEL YOUNG, SERGEANT PAT BRADLEY, ) 

JEAN MOWRY, MAILROOM SUPERVISOR, and ) 

SERGEANT WILLIAMSON, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

SERGEANT WILLIAM RICE and MARILYN ) 

BELSHE, HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATOR, ) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

{D.C. No. 84-C-3283) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Jerry Wayne Smith, pro se. 

Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General, Carol R. Bonebrake, Assistant 

Attorney General, State of Kansas, Topeka, Kansas, for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 88-2687 Document: 01019748468 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 1 
Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judge~. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff Jerry Wayne Smitn filed suit alleging defendants 

violated numerous of his constitutional rights, including 

deprivation of his property without due process of law, 

interference with his mail, denial of procedural due process 

during the course of his disciplinary hearings, and conspiring to 

deny him access to the courts. As part of the conspiracy claim, 

Smith alleged defendants placed him in disciplinary segregation in 

retaliation for his ongoing litigation against prison officials 

and his "jailhouse lawyering." Smith's amended complaint raised 

these allegations pursuant to 42 u.s.c. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 

{1982). The district court entered summary judgment against Smith 

on these claims, and denied his motion for partial summary 

judgment. Smith appeals from both these judgments. We affirm in 

part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.l 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2687 Document: 01019748468 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 2 
I. 

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary 

judgment: 

"In reviewing a summary judgment order, the 

appellate court applies the same standard employed by 

the trial court under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. When a motion for summary judgment is 

granted, it is the appellate court's duty to examine the 

record to determine if any genuine issue of material 

fact was in dispute; if not, the court must decide if 

the substan~ive law was correctly applied." 

Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (lOth 

Cir. 1988) (citation omitted}. Viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the party opposing the motion, we must determine 

"'whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to· a verdict.'" Smith 

Machinery Co. v. Hesston Corp., 878 F.2d 1290, 1294 (lOth Cir. 

1988) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby! Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 

(1986). Accord Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. 1 862 

F.2d 796, 798 (lOth Cir. 1988}. If so, summary judgment in favor 

of the defendant is unwarranted. Bearing in mind this standard of 

review, we address plaintiff's claims seriatim. 

A. Deprivation of Property Without Due Process 

Smith complains that on occasion several defendants deprived 

him of his property without due process of law. He alleges that 

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Appellate Case: 88-2687 Document: 01019748468 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 3 
prison officials (1) donated several of his Christmas presents to 

charity withou t his permission; (2) lost or destroyed law books , 

jewelry, ·federal transcripts, and .lega l files and briefs belonging 

to him; (3) deducted money from his prison trust account for 

postage to pay for returning to sender materials that the prison 

had authorized him to receive; (4) returned several items to 

sender without prior notice to him, including a "battery-operated 

religious pen," and denied his request to receive similar items 

while incarcerated; {5) failed to attach extra postage to his 

lett ~rs to his fiancee,. even though Smith had paid for extra 

postage, forcing his fiancee to pay postage due; and (6) 

confiscated from his mail his son's birth certificate, insurance 

papers, and an identification card, as well as financial 

information and vendor order forms. 

The district court held that Smith had an adequate state 

post-deprivation remedy for the loss of this property, and 

therefore had not stated a claim for the denial of his Fourteenth 

Amendmen t right to due process. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 u.s. 

517, 533 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 u.s. 527, 543-44 (1981). 

We agree. 

Smith had sought and recovered damages in a prior state court 

action on claims that prison officials depr i ved him of jewelry, 

twenty-six law books, one Christmas present, his federal 

transcripts, and several legal files and briefs. The availability 

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Appellate Case: 88-2687 Document: 01019748468 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 4 
of such a state post-deprivation remedy undercuts Smith's argument 

that defendants deprived him of this property without due process. 

See id. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting 

summary judgment on these claims. 

An adequate state remedy is also available for the other 

property deprivations Smith alleges. Smith argues on appeal that 

defendants should not be permitted to claim that he has an 

adequa~e post-deprivation remedy under state law.because he filed 

suit in state court and opposed defendants' petition for removal 

to federal court. Smith did not seek a remedy under state law in 

his state court action, however. Rather, he sought a remedy for 

alleged federal constitutional violations under 42 u.s.c. §§ 1983, 

1985, and 1986. We are not persuaded by Smith's argument that the 

district court erred in di~ecting.him-to state court given.that he 

chose not to seek a state law remedy in his prior action in state 

court. 

B. Interference With Prisoner Mail 

Smith contended below that defendants interfered with his 

mail by inspecting his correspondence and by returning it to the 

sender without his permission. Specifically, Smith alleged that 

prison officials (1) returned to sender letters mailed or 

forwarded to him by friends, including several chain letters; {2} 

opened and inspected legal mail, contrary to the prison's own 

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Appellate Case: 88-2687 Document: 01019748468 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 5 
regulations, including mail from the post office and the Internal 

Revenue Service; (3) returned catalogues mailed to plaintiff; (4) 

failed to return to him receipts for certified mail; and (5) had 

an ongoing policy of placing items di'scovered in a prisoner's mail 

in his inmate file for use by the parole board. 

The Supreme Court considered the issue of prisoner mail in 

Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989}, a case involving 

prisoners' challenge to Federal Bureau of Prisons regulations 

authorizing the censorship of incoming magazines. The Court 

acknowledged that prison officials were better equipped than the 

judiciary to deal with the security implications of interactions 

between prisoners and the outside world, and emphasized that broad 

deference should be accorded their efforts. Id. at 1878. Noting 

tha~ security concerns about incoming·material are of greater 

magnitude, id. at 1881, the Court held that 11 regulations affecting 

the sending of a 'publication' ••• are 'valid if [they are] 

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.'" Id. 

(quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 u.s. 78, 89 (1987)). Under this 

standard, the Court concluded that the regulations in Thornburgh 

permitting censorship of the content of incoming magazines were 

valid. Id. at 1882-84. 

The prison officials' actions here infringed on Smith's 

interest in receiving materials from the outside world to a much 

lesser degree than those permissible under the regulations in 

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Appellate Case: 88-2687 Document: 01019748468 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 6 
Thornburgh. Smith submitted exhibits to the district court 

showing that defendants returned to sender incoming mail 

consisting of chain mail or correspondence containing labels or 

stickers. Defendants contended, without serious dispute by Smith, 

that receipt of chain mail or labels and stickers by prisoners 

violates content-neutral prison regulations. Smith provided no 

grounds for believing these regulations are anything other than a 

valid response to legitimate security concerns. Significantly, he 

pointed to nothing in the record.suggesting that personal 

correspondence sent without the offending stickers or labels was 

not forwarded to him. We conclude Smith failed to demonstrate 

that the prison's regulation of his incoming personal 

correspondence violated any protected right. The district court 

did not err in granting summary judgment on this claim. 

As for Smith's claim concerning his rnaj1 from the post office 

and the IRS, he alleged only that prison officials opened and 

inspected it. Smith does not assert that inspection interfered 

with his commumunication with counsel or the courts. See LeVier 

v. woodson, 443 F.2d 360, 361 (lOth Cir. 1971) (regulation of 

prison mail flow generally better left to prison officials' 

discretion, with exception of correspondence to appropriate 

persons about prison conditions and legality of conviction); cf. 

Evans v. Moseley, 455 F.2d 1084, 1087 (lOth Cir.) (prisoner's 

right to correspond with attorney does not extend to to 

correspondence "on any subject,u but only to issues implicating 

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access to courts}, cert. denied, 409 u.s. 889 (1972). Defendants 

admitted to opening one piece of Smith's constitutionally 

protected legal mail by accident. ·s~h an isolated incident, 

without any evidence of improper motive or resulting interference 

with Smith's right to counsel or to access to the courts, does not 

give rise to a constitutional violation. 

Similarly, Smith's complaint about undelivered catalogues 

fails to raise an issue of constitutional magnitude. Cf. Mower v. 

Swyhart, 545 F.2d 103, 104 (lOth Cir. 1976) (maximum security 

prison may require prior authorization for prisoners to receive 

college catalogues). His complaint concerning unreturned 

certified mail receipts is also without merit. Plaintiff admitted 

that the addressees did receive their mail. His complaint is 

solely that h~ did n6t receive receipts for the mail. 

Finally, Smith failed to provide evidence of any prison 

policy of confiscating materials from the mail for punitive 

purposes, other than his unsworn statement. He offered no details 

concerning what material was confiscated, or the circumstances in 

which the prison had interfered with mail in this manner. Rather, 

he produced a letter indicating the prison had once confiscated 

unspecified mail in another inmate's case, and had forwarded the 

material to the parole board. He did not produce sufficient 

evidence on his allegation of a prison policy to withstand 

defendants• motion for summary judgment. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2687 Document: 01019748468 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 8 
C. Disciplinary Proceedings And Access To The Courts 

Smith's claims that prison officials denied him procedural 

due process in disciplinary proceedings and denied him his right 

of access to the courts are lntertwined. He asserted that he did 

not receive a fair disciplinary hearing on any of the charges 

against him, and that disciplinary proceedings were initiated 

against him in retaliation for his prior lawsuits against prison 

officials. He also complained of other instances of prison 

officials harassing him in retaliation for his litigation against 

the prison. 

The record before the district court reflects the following 

undisputed facts for purposes of the parties' cross motions for 

summary judgment. Officials searched Smith's briefcase before he 

left his cell for a trip to state court for a hearing. Smith then 

walked in shackles to the bus taking him to court, at which point 

officials ordered him to submit to another search of his 

briefcase. According to Smith, he had never before been required 

to submit to a second search under these circumstances. Smith 

disobeyed two orders to open his briefcase, and officers then told 

him he would have to leave his briefcase at the prison if he did 

not submit to the search. Once in court, Smith informed the judge 

that he could not proceed without the papers in his briefcase. 

The judge ordered prison officials to retrieve the case from the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2687 Document: 01019748468 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 9 
prison. When the briefcase arrived, it was opened in court and 

the hearing proceeded. 

Officials placed Smith in "segregation" immediately upon his 

arrival back at the prison. That same day, they informed him of 

the disciplinary charges against him, including two charges of 

disobeying an order, one charge of disrespect, and one charge of 

possession of unregistered personal property. 2 He was also 

charged later with violating prison mail regulations and with 

misuse of state property. 

I n addition to an initia l hearing the day following his 

segregation , plaintiff received a separat e hearing later on each 

charge before a disciplinary board consisting of three prison 

offi~ials . The board found him guilty on all charges, arid 

sentenced him to seven months in segregation and the loss of from 

eleven months and fifteen days to thirteen months of institution 

good time credits. 3 A portion of his segregation sentence was 

2 In a prior state court action, Smith apparently succeeded on 

a claim that the disciplinary proceeding in which he was found 

gui l ty of possession of unregistered personal property was 

unconstitutional. The district court below nevertheless reviewed 

the fairness of all of the proceedings. The current status of 

this charge is not clear from the record on appeal, but the 

fairness of the disciplinary proceeding remains relevant to this 

case insofar as Smith has relied on this event to substantiate his 

claim that prison officials acted in retaliation rather than in 

pursuit of any legitimate penologica l purpose . 

3 Smith alleged in his amended compl aint, filed April 19, 1985, 

that he lost thirteen months of institution good time credits. 

(continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 88-2687 Document: 01019748468 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 10 
later suspended . 

Smith challenged the fairness of the procedure at the 

disciplinar y hearings, contending that prison officials gave him 

notice of the charges only after he was placed in segregation; 

f ailed to make findings of fact supporting each guilty verdict; 

and denied his requests to call certain witnesses, be represented 

by a fellow inmate, and confront his accusers. In add ition, Smith 

alleged that witnesses lied at the hearings, and that the 

disciplinary proceeding£ constituted retaliation against him for 

successfully suing prison official s, both on his own behalf a nd on 

behalf of other inmates. Finally, although Smith questioned the 

neutrality of some of the hearing officers at the time of his 

disciplinary hearings, board chairman Major Ken neth Lynch refused 

to recuse himself. Smith · contended in district court that Maj or 

Lynch's refusa l t o step down denied him his right to an impartial 

fa ctfinder. 

The district court held that Smith 's hearings compl ied with 

the due process requ irements for prison disciplinary hearings in 

Wolff v . McDonnel l , 418 u.s. 539 ( 1974) . Under these standards, a 

prisoner punished by loss of good time credits must receive (1) 

"written notice of the charges" against him at least twenty-four 

(continued from previous page) 

The records from t he disciplinary proceedings indicate that 

plaintiff was sentenced to a loss of eleven months and fift ee n 

days . We need not resolve this possibl e discrepancy on appeal . 

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Appellate Case: 88-2687 Document: 01019748468 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 11 
hours before the hearing; (2) the opportunity "to call witnesses 

and present documentary evidence in his defense, when permitting 

him t~ do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety 

or correctional goals"; and {3) a "'written statement of the 

factfinders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons' for the 

disciplinary action" taken. Id. at 563-66 (citations omitted). 

The district court concluded that because Smith had received a 

procedurally fair disciplinary hearing on each charge, it could 

not look behind the evidence and substitute its judgment for that 

of prison officials. After reviewing the record, the court found 

no evidence that defendants conspired to retaliate against Smith 

by disciplining him, and therefore granted summary judgment on 

this claim. 

We agree with the district court th~t Smith received 

constitutionally adequate notice of the charges, as he was told of 

them within hours of being placed in segregation and the day 

before the first hearing. See id. at 564. Defendants also gave 

Smith a reasonable opportunity to respond to the charges against 

him at the hearings. Smith was not constitutionally entitled to 

counsel, and certainly not to counsel of his choice, at his 

disciplinary hearing. Id. at 570. Finally, although the board 

did not provide a written statement of the evidence supporting the 

disciplinary action, Smith received a written transcript 

containing the required information. Providing a written 

transcript more than suffices to insure adequate review of the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2687 Document: 01019748468 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 12 
proceedings, to protect the inmate against collateral 

consequences, and to guarantee that officials, faced with outside i 

scrutiny, will act fairly. See id. at 565; cf. Ruiz v. Estelle, 

679 F.2d 1115, 1155 (5th Cir. 1982} {suggesting that tape 

recording disciplinary hearing exceeds Wolff•s requirement of 

written findings), modified in part and vacated in part on other 

grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 u.s. 1042 

(1983). A transcript of the disciplinary proceedings was 

therefore an adequate substitute for written findings. 

Smith's argument that the disciplinary board did not permit 

him to call witnesses in-his defense raises more serious concerns. 

Smith submitted evidence that the hearing chairman, Major Lynch, 

denied his requests to call two witnesses. Smith made the 

requests at the hearing on the disrespect charge. At that 

hearing, Mr. Pettis accused Smith of showing disrespect towards 

Mr. Bohannon and, in defense, Smith sought to call Mr. Bohannon, 

the deputy director of the prison, and Mr. Lynch, the director of 

security. Mr. Bohannon had a time conflict and Mr. Lynch declined 

to testify because he was chairman of the disciplinary board. Mr. 

Lynch denied any knowledge of events. 

Under Wolff, prisoners are entitled to marshal their defenses 

by calling witnesses. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. The scope of this 

right, however, is limited by the special requirements of the 

prison setting. »prison officials must have the necessary 

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Appellate Case: 88-2687 Document: 01019748468 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 13 
discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable l i mits and to 

refuse to call witnesses that may create a risk o f reprisal or 

undermine authority, as well as to limit access to other inmates 

to collect statements or to compile other documentary evidence." 

Id. at 566. The scope of a priso ner's right to confront a nd 

cross-examine witnesses is similarl y committed to the sound 

discretion of prison officials. Id . at 569. 

Clearly, Smith was not entitled to call every ava ilable 

witness in his defense . There i s some indication in the 

d i sciplinary hearing record that Mr. Lyn ch may have had some 

knowledge of the events in question, but we conclude that the 

chairrnan•s refusal to take the stand himself was a proper exercise 

of his discre tion. The decision to deny Smithis request to 

question Mr. Bohannon; hOwever, is another -matter. Smith all eged 

at t h e hearing that Mr. Pettis was not giving an accurate account 

of events. Mr. Bohannon apparently was the only other participant 

in this situation besides Smith and Mr. Pettis. By denying Smith 

the opportuni ty to call Mr. Bohan non , therefore, defendants 

effectively denied him any defense other than his own testimony 

about the event s. Looking at t his evidence in the light most 

favorable to Smith, we conclude that Smith produced sufficient 

evidence to withstand defendants ' motion for summa ry j udgment on 

his claim that the denial of his request to call Mr . Bohannon 

deprived him of procedural due process at the disciplinary 

hearing. 

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Finally, Smith's presentation of evidence that defendants' 

motive in disciplining him was retaliation for prior lawsuits, and 

that the factfinders at his hearing had a hidden motive in finding 

him guilty, if believed, call into doubt whether Smith was given a 

meaningful opportunity to be heard. "The fundamental requirement 

of due process is 'the opportunity to be heard.' It is an 

opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 u.s. 545, 552 (1965} 

{citation omitted). When a prisoner asserts a valid challenge to 

the factfinders' neutrality, therefore, judicial review of 

disciplinary decisions must include an inquiry into whether 

discipline was imposed for an improper purpose. See Wolff, 418 

U.S. at 571 (existence of "a hazard of arbitrary decision making" 

may violate due process); see also Marchesani v. Mctune,. 531 F.2d 

459, 462 {lOth Cir.) (clear showing of abusive or capricious 

action in classifying prtsoner as a "special offender" may violate 

due process), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976); Graham v. 

Willingham, 384 F.2d 367, 368 (lOth Cir. 1967) (prison discipline 

or segregation imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner may 

support civil rights violation). 

The existence of an improper motive for disciplining a 

prisoner which results in interference with a constitutional right 

also may give rise to a second and separate cause of action under 

section 1983. Here, Smith alleged that defendants conspired to 

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deprive him and did deprive him of his right of access to the 

courts. "The right of access to the courts is basic to our system 

of government, and it is well established today that it is one of 

the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution." Nordgren 

v. Milliken, 762 F.2d 851, 853 (lOth Cir.) (quoting Ryland v. 

Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971 (5th Cir. 1983)), cert . denied, 474 

u.s. 1032 (1985). This right is one of the privileges and 

immunities accorded citizens under article 4 of the Constitution 

and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. It is also one aspect of the 

First Amendment r i ght to petition the government for redress of 

grievances. Id. Finally, the right of access is founded on the 

due process clause and guarantees the right to. present to a court 

of law allegations concerning the violation of constitutional 

rights. Id. 

Prison offici als may not retaliate against or harass an 

inmate because of the inmate's exercise of his right of access to 

the courts. "It is well establi shed that prison officials may not 

unreasonably hamper inmates in gaining access to the courts ... 

Evans, 455 F.2d at 1087; see, ~· Wildberger v. Bracknell, 869 

F.2d 1467, 1468 (11th Cir. 1989) (retaliation for fi l ing lawsuit s 

and administrative grievances "violates both the inmate's right of 

access to the courts and the inmate's First Amendment rights"} 

{citation omitted)}; Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 

1138 (9th Cir. 1 989) (allegation that prison offici als conspired 

to l abel prisoner a "snitch" in re t aliation for pet i tioning prison 

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Appellate Case: 88-2687 Document: 01019748468 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 16 
and government for redress of grievances stated cognizable claim 

for violation of right of access to the courts); Harris v. 

Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1236-38 (7th Cir. 1988) (allegations of 

retaliation, combined with evidence of termination from prison 

employment and cell transfers following successful lawsuits, held 

sufficient to create jury question in section 1983 action); Gibbs 

v. King, 779 F.2d 1040, 1046 (5th Cir.) ("The law is well 

established that prison officials may not retaliate against or 

harass an inmate because of the inmate's exercise of his right of 

access to the courts." (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 476 u.s. 

1117 (1986); Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373-74 (3d Cir. 

1981) (allegations viewed as a whole supported conspiracy to 

discipline prisoner for initiating civil rights suit against 

officials, contrary to First Amendment right of access to court); 

McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 18 (ist Cir. 1979)· {a.llegations 

supporting existence of circumstantial evidence of retaliation for 

court action sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss section 

1983 action); see also Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043 (8th 

Cir. 1989); Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1248-49 (5th Cir. 

1989); Cale v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 943, 950-51 (6th Cir. 1988). 

This principle applies even where the action taken in 

retaliation would be otherwise permissible. "[I]t is well 

established that an act in retaliation for the exercise of a 

constitutionally protected right is actionable under [42 U.S.C.] 

Section 1983 even. if the act, when taken for a different reason, 

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Appellate Case: 88-2687 Document: 01019748468 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 17 
would have been proper." Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223, 229 (7th 

Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979}; see,~~ Franco 

v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 590 (2d Cir. 1988}; Howland v. Kilquist, 

833 F.2d 639, 644 {7th Cir. 1987): Adams v. James, 784 P.2d 1077, 

1080 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. 

of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977} (even though 

government employee "could have been discharged for no reason 

whatever," allegation that decision not to rehire was in retaliation for protected speech stated constitutional claim); Owens v. 

Rush, 654 F.2d 1370, 1379 (lOth Cir. 1981) (retaliation against 

husband for helping wife in Title VII case unconstitutional, 

regardless of whether husband had independently protected liberty 

interest). 

Smith's appearance in· court, a protected activity, and the 

prison's disciplinary action, taken immediately upon his return 

from court, were indisputably in close temporal proximity. Smith 

presented evidence 4 that prison officials had never before 

questioned him about his briefcase, the primary subject of his 

disciplinary proceedings. 5 In spite of his prior good record, 

4 The Court in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

256-57 (1986), held that a plaintiff must produce evidence of 

improper motive, rather than relying upon allegations, to defeat a 

summary judgment motion. 

5 Significantly, one guard in his written report on Smith's 

possession of unregistered personal property stated that "on the 

way back [from court] we unfortunately were forced to put him 

[plaintiff] in the A & T Unit because of his way of acting down 

(continued on next page) 

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Smith was punished with a sizeable loss of good time credits. In 

addition, Smith presented an affidavit by fellow inmate T~omas 

Chappell that asserted officials intentionally segregated and then 

transferred Chappell to prevent his being a witness in a pending 

lawsuit by Smith. Smith alleged this type of interference 

occurred on other occasions as well, and that officials denied him 

his law files, papers, and books while he himself was in 

segreg~ion. Smith submitted an affidavit by Craig Bryant, a 

prison law clerk, that prison officials removed Mr. Bryant from 

library employment in retaliaton for assisting Smith while he was 

in segregation. 

Defendants denied that any disciplinary actions were taken in 

retaliation for Smith's successful litigation, or to deter future 

lawsuits. They similarly denied hindering Smith's access to the 

courts by any other means. Although defendants did not dispute 

transferring the prisoners named by Smith, they denied any 

improper motive. Defendants responded that if they deprived Smith 

of legal files or materials while he was in or out of segregation, 

their actions were unknowing and unintentiona1. 6 Defendants 

(continued from previous page} 

there at court." See Transcript of Disciplinary Hearing in Case 

No. 1872. According to the charges themselves, however, the 

incidents occurred before Smith left for court and upon his 

return. 

6 The state court determined that several law books and files 

had been destroyed by defendants, apparently during the time that 

Smith was in segregation. Whether these materials are the same as 

(continued on next page} 

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contended that they took no action with the intent of denying 

Smith access to the courts. 

The circumstantial evidence in this case leads us to conclude 

that a jury could reasonably find that defendants retaliated 

against Smith for the exercise of his right of access to the 

courts. When a defendant moves for summary judgment, "the judge 

must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably 

favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could 

return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." 

Anderson, 477 u.s. at 252. Where defendants' motives are 

seriously at issue, trial by affidavit is particularly 

inappropriate. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the 

evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts 

are. jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he ·is ruling on 

a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. The 

evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable 

inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255 (citing 

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)}. 

We think Smith's evidence is sufficient to support an 

inference by a fair-minded jury that defendants took disciplinary 

{continued from previous page} 

those referred to here is not clear from the record on appeal. In 

any event, the state court proceedings apparently addressed only 

the destruction of legal materials as a deprivation of property, 

not as evidence of retaliation. 

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action against him based at least in part on improper motives. 

Smith has supported his allegations of retaliation by the only 

means available to him -- circumstantial evidence of the 

suspicious timing of his discipline, coincidental transfers of his 

witnesses and assistants, and an alleged pattern by defendants of 

blocking his access to legal materials and assistance. 

Precisely because the ultimate fact of retaliation turns on 

defendants' state of mind, it is particularly difficult to 

establish by direct evidence. For example, in McDonald, 610 F.2d 

at 18, the plaintiff alleged only that his prison transfer had 

chronologically followed his court action. The First Circuit 

considered this fact, if proven, to be some circumstantial 

evidence of retaliation. 

I d. 

"While it may be possible in some cases to support such 

an ultimate fact with clear evidence which can be 

averred in the complaint, see Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 

223 (7th Cir. 1978) (direct written evidence of intent), 

we cannot presume this will often be the case, see 

Garland v. Polley, 594 F.2d 1220 {8th Cir. 1979-)-.-

Moreover [plaintiff) in his complaint did aver a 

chronology of events which may be read as providing some 

support for an inference of retaliation." 

Similarly, in Harris, 839 F.2d at 1236-1238, the plaintiff 

produced only circumstantial evidence of retaliation. The 

plaintiff brought a section 1983 action, submitting evidence that 

prison officials had fired him .from two prison jobs after his 

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partial success in a p~ior lawsuit against the assistant warden, 

and that·he was fired from a third job and transferred to a new 

cell after he declined to settle the same lawsuit. The district 

court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh 

Circuit reversed, explaining that the pattern and timing of 

firings and cell transfers were sufficient to make the existence 

of a retaliatory motive a jury question. Id. at 1237-38; see also 

Milhouse, 652 F.2d at 374 (prisoner's allegations should be viewed 

as a unit, rather than as isolated incidents; so viewed, they 

indicate a series of actions designed to punish prisoner for 

seeking access to the courts). 

In holding that a reasonable jury could find that Smith has 

supported his allegations of retaliation, we are not suggesting 

that a reasonable jury should .find for him. Rather, we conclude 

only that on the evidence before us, summary judgment was improper 

on Smith's retaliation claim. On remand, Smith must still prove 

that the actual motivating factor behind defendants' actions was 

retaliation for his prior or current litigation. McDonald, 610 

F.2d at 18. He must prove that "but for" the retaliatory motive, 

the incidents to which he refers, including the disciplinary 

action, would not have taken place. Id. {citing Mt. Healthy City 

School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 

In addition to complaining that prison officials retaliated 

against him for his own successful lawsuits, Smith alleged that 

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defendants retaliated in response to his "jailhouse lawyering" on 

behalf of other inmates. Smith does not have a protected interest 

in providing legal representation to other inmates . See Ervin v. 

Ciccone, 557 F.2d 1260, 1262 (8th Cir. 1977). Whether he may 

assert his fellow inmates' right of access to the courts is a 

separate issue, and there is some controversy in the circuits on 

whether a prisoner has standing to assert such claims. Compare 

McDonald, 610 F.2d at 19, and Buise, 584 F.2d at 227 and Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 612 F.2d 766, 769 (3d Cir. 1979) (prison writ writers 

have standing to assert other prisoners' right of access to the 

courts, citing Avery, 393 u.s. 483 (1969)) with Adams, 784 F.2d at 

1080-81 (prison writ writer has standing to assert other 

prisoners' right of access to the courts in a class action, but. 

has no standing in individual cases even. if prison officials fail 

t ·o s.how other pr i soners have access without writ wr~ter's 

assistance) and Gometz v. Henman, 807 F.2d 113 , 115 (7th Cir. 

1986) (reaching the merits, but with "some unease" about the 

plaintiff's standing to assert the claim on behalf of another 

prisoner). 

Smith, however, has not claimed that other inmates were 

deprived of access to the courts, or unduly hindered in the 

pursuit of their own legal remedies. Rather, Smith argues only 

that his fellow inmates were deprived of his assistance . Prison 

inmat es do not possess the right to a particular prisoner's help 

in preparing their legal materials, so long as prison. officials 

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make other assistance available. See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 

583 (lOth Cir. 1980) (inmates have no right to particular type of 

legal assistance), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); cf. Johnson 

v. Avery, 393 U.S. at 490 (prison may prohibit inmates from giving 

legal assistance if reasonable alternative available). Thus, even 

assuming Smith would have standing to assert his fellow prisoners' 

constitutional claims, there are no claims to assert . 

Our conclusion that Smith cannot assert the " right" of other 

inmates to his legal representation does not mean that his 

allegation of defendants' retal iation against him for prevailing 

in a class action to change the prisoners' conditions of 

confinement fails to state a constitutional claim. Such 

litigation is distinguishable from legal action pursued solely for 

the benefit of a singl e inmate. 

"Litigation undertaken in good faith by a pri soner 

motivated to bring about social change and protect 

constitutional rights in the prison is a 'form of 

political expression' and 'political association' much 

as the Supreme Court has held l itigation to be for 

certain organizations outside the prison setting. A 

properly stated first amendment claim by an inmat e does 

not fail simply because the a l legedly protected 

activities were conducted on behalf of others. The 

right of free expression is cherished for its force as 

an agent of social change and not only as a · right of 

self-interested individuals." 

Adams, 784 F.2d at 1081 (citations omitted). Smith's assertion 

tha t defendants denied him his right to use litigat ion to effect 

change in the prison by reta liating against him thus states a 

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Appellate Case: 88-2687 Document: 01019748468 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 24 
cla i m under section 1983 simi lar to his clai m that defendants 

retaliated against him for pursuing his own personal l i tigation. 

Finally , Smith alleged t hat defendants Ma schne r, Bohannon, 

Bufo r d , a nd Lynch encou rag ed the all e ge d r e taliatory inc i d e nts by 

faili ng t o t r ain prison e mployees properl y o r by failing t o 

i ntervene. We agree with the d i strict court t hat in t hese claims , 

Smith has alleged liability solely under a theory of respondeat 

s uperior, whi c h wil l not support section 1983 liability . See 

Ka i ser v . Lief, 874 F .2d 732 , 736 ( l Oth Ci r . 1989 ) . Defe nda nts 

may sti ll be l iable fo r t he ir personal participation , if a ny , in 

these incidents. 

II. 

We c oncl ude that Smith produced suffici e nt evidence on his 

retaliation claims a nd on h is procedu ral due p rocess claim 

r elating to the disciplinary hearing to withstand defendants' 

mo tion for s ummary judgment. However , he faces other o bstacles i n 

purs u i ng a federal remedy. 

Insofa r as Smith seeks restoration of his good time credits, 

h is complaint r uns afoul of the Supreme Court's hold i ng in Preiser 

v . Rodriguez, 41 1 U.S. 475 (197 3 ). The Court in Pre i s er construed 

state prisoneis' cha llenges to the disa llowance of good time 

cr edits as a c hallenge to the duration o f the ir imprisonme n t, and 

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Appellate Case: 88-2687 Document: 01019748468 Date Filed: 03/29/1990 Page: 25 
held that the wri t of habeas corpus was the appropria te remedy f or 

such claims. Id. at 487 -90. Smith also seeks the -restoration of 

good time credits. - His remedy, like the remedy of the plaintiffs 

in Preiser, is a writ of habeas corpus unde r 28 U.S. C. § 2254(d) 

rath~ r t han a complaint under sections 1983 , 1985, and 1986. 

The district court could liberally construe Smi th 's compla int 

as a section 2254 pe tition, cf. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S . 519, 

520-21 (1972) (pro se complai nts held to less stringent 

standards), but secti o n 2254 requires plaintiff to exhaust his 

state remedies prior to seeking habeas r elief in federal court. 

Because the record does not make clear whether Smith has 

adequa tely pursued the remedy of new disc iplinary hearings o r 

resto r ation of his good time credits in state court, we leave to 

the district court on remand to determine whether .Smith may. 

immed iately pursue relief under section 2254. 

Of course, t o the extent Smith seeks money damages as well as 

restoration of good time credi ts , his ac tion is gove rned by 

section 1983. As the Supreme Court noted in Wolff, 418 U.S. a t 

554, "Preiser expressly contemplated that claims properly brought 

under § 1983 could go forward while actual restoration of 

good-t i me credits is sought in state proceedings." 

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The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part, and 

the cause is REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with 

this opinion. The mandate shall issue forthwith . 

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