Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00348/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00348-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Constitutionality of State Statute(s)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL L. POTTS, D.D.S., and

THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF IMPLANT

DENTISTRY, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

KATHLEEN HAMILTON, in her

Official Capacity as Director,

California Department of

Consumer Affairs; CYNTHIA

GATLIN, Executive Officer,

California Dental Board; and

ALAN H. KAYE, D.D.S.,

President; Public Member; LA

DONNA DRURY-KLEIN, R.D.A.,

Secretary; DAVID I. BARON,

Public Member; NEWTON GORDON,

D.D.S., Member; LAWRENCE

HYNDLEY, D.D.S., Member;

PATRICIA OSUNA, R.D.H., Member;

GEORGE SOOHOO, D.D.S., Member;

ARIANE TERLET, D.D.S., Member;

and CHESTER YOKOHAMA, D.D.S.,

Member, in their Official

Capacities with the California

Dental Board, 

Defendants. 

CIV-S-03-0348 DFL-DAD

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Michael Potts, D.D.S. and the American Academy of

Implant Dentistry (“AAID”) filed this § 1983 challenge to the

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constitutionality of a California statute restricting the

advertisement of dental speciality credentials. The court

granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on September 8,

2004. The court also granted plaintiffs’ request for declaratory

and injunctive relief on February 7, 2005, enjoining defendants

from enforcing the statute against plaintiffs and similarly

situated AAID members. Final judgment was entered in favor of

plaintiffs on February 16, 2005. 

Plaintiffs now move for attorneys’ fees and litigation

expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as the prevailing party in their

lawsuit, requesting $337,667 in attorneys’ fees and $58,121.85 in

litigation expenses. (Mot. at 8.) Additionally, plaintiffs have

separately filed a bill of costs for $19,617.42. Defendants

concede that plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees and

certain litigation expenses, but challenge the amounts requested. 

Defendants also challenge some of the listed items on the bill of

costs.

I. 

A. Attorneys’ Fees

The court uses the “lodestar” method for determining the

appropriate attorneys’ fee award. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d

1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992). Under this approach, the court

multiplies a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours

reasonably expended in the litigation. Id. There is a strong

presumption that the lodestar amount is reasonable. Harris v.

Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 18 (9th Cir. 1994).

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 There does not appear to be any difference between the 1

historic and current rates for the paralegals and other

attorneys, as plaintiffs have only requested the current rates

for Schwing’s and Recker’s time. 

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1. Reasonable Rate

Plaintiffs seek an award of $337,667 in attorneys’ fees for

the 1,321.33 hours their legal team spent on the case. (Mot. at

2, 8.) Plaintiffs had two principal attorneys: Frank Recker, an

attorney at Frank Recker and Associates Co., L.P.A. in Florida,

and Ann Taylor Schwing, local counsel at McDonough Holland &

Allen. (Id. at 3.) In addition, several associates and

paralegals assisted on the case. Plaintiffs’ documentation

reveals that plaintiffs incurred $73,142 in attorneys’ fees from

Schwing’s firm, and $225,676.25 in fees from Recker’s firm, for a

total of $298,818.25 in attorneys’ fees. (Reply at 9.) These

fees were calculated using Schwing’s and Recker’s historic

billing rates, which were $250, $275, and $300 for Schwing and

$275 and $325 for Recker. (Schwing Decl. at 3; Recker Decl. at

5.) AAID paid these fees as they were billed. (Recker Decl. at

5.) However, plaintiffs request compensation for their

attorneys’ fees at Recker’s and Schwing’s current rates - - $325

for Recker and $300 for Schwing – rather than their historic

rates, resulting in the current request for $337,667 in

attorneys’ fees. (Schwing Decl. at 9.)

Defendants do not challenge the requested rates for any of

the associates or paralegals who assisted on the case. However, 1

they dispute the rates requested by Schwing and Recker on several

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grounds. First, they argue that Schwing’s and Recker’s rates

should be based upon their historic rates, rather than their

current rates. (Opp’n at 4-5.) The court agrees. 

The Supreme Court has held that courts have discretion to

compensate prevailing parties for the length of time the

successful party’s attorney has had to wait to receive fees

(i.e., for the lost use of the funds and the effects of

inflation) by awarding fees at the attorney’s current, rather

than historic, rates. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284,

109 S.Ct. 2463 (1989); Gates, 987 F.2d at 1406-07. Here,

plaintiffs’ attorneys did not experience a long delay in

receiving their funds; rather, AAID paid the legal bills as they

became due. (Recker Decl. at 5.) Nonetheless, plaintiffs ask

the court to apply current rates in this case because AAID was

denied the use of the funds for the intervening years or months. 

(Mot. at 5.) 

However, the cases in which courts have applied the

attorneys’ current rates are significantly distinguishable from

the present case, in that they all involve complex civil rights

litigations where plaintiffs’ attorneys received compensation

several years after their services were rendered. See Jenkins,

491 U.S. at 284 n.6 (major school desegregation case where

attorneys had to wait over three years before receiving

compensation); Gates, 987 F.2d at 1407 (complex civil rights

litigation where attorneys waited more than three years to be

compensated). Plaintiffs have not cited, nor could the court

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find, a case where a court has applied the current attorneys’

rate in a situation similar to this - - to compensate a client

for having paid his attorneys’ fees as billed. Accordingly, the

court finds that Schwing and Recker should be compensated at

their historic rates, not at their current rates.

Second, defendants argue that Schwing’s historic rates are

higher than the prevailing Sacramento rate for similar work by

attorneys of like skill. (Opp’n at 3-4.) The court disagrees. 

In light of her years of experience, standing in the legal

community, credentials, and skill, the requested rates are

reasonable for the Sacramento community. The case cited by

defendants, Peters v. Winco Foods, Inc., 320 F.Supp.2d 1035,

1042-43 (E.D.Cal. 2004), does not suggest otherwise. In Peters,

the court awarded rates of $240 for work performed in 2003 and

$260 for work performed in 2004. Id. However, unlike Schwing,

the attorney in Peters was a recent law school graduate with

limited experience. (Reply at 3-4.) In light of Schwing’s

experience and credentials, the court finds her historic rates

reasonable. 

Finally, defendants assert that Recker’s requested rates

also exceed the prevailing Sacramento rate for an attorney of his

skill level, arguing that Recker should be paid at the same rate

as Schwing. (Opp’n at 4.) However, Recker brought special

expertise to this litigation by virtue of his extensive

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26 Recker has a Doctorate in Dentistry, in addition to his 2

law degree, and has been a practicing dentist in three different

states. (Reply at 4.)

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background in dentistry. (Reply at 4.) In light of his 2

credentials and special expertise, the court finds Recker’s

requested historic rates to be reasonable for the Sacramento

community. 

2. Reasonable Hours Expended

Defendants also raise challenges to several of plaintiffs’

documented time entries, none of which is persuasive. (Opp’n at

5-6.) First, defendants argue that certain secretarial services

performed by associate attorneys should not be compensated

because they are overhead expenses. (Id. at 6.) However, these

tasks amount to at most a few hours out of the more than 1,300

hours spent on this case. (Reply at 6.) Moreover, several of

the time entries defendants identify consist primarily of nonsecretarial tasks. (Id.) In light of the reasonableness of the

overall hours expended on this case, the court declines to reduce

the fee award for these minimal, administrative tasks. 

Second, defendants complain about forty billed hours for

which Recker used an associate to summarize depositions, as

opposed to a paralegal. (Opp’n at 6.) Courts have compensated

attorneys for reviewing and summarizing depositions where the

time spent is reasonable. See Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber

Co., 163 F.R.D. 308, 323-24 (N.D.Cal. 1995) (finding it

reasonable for senior level attorney to review and summarize

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depositions and awarding fees for such entries where attorney had

small staff); Corder v. Gates, 688 F.Supp. 1418, 1422 (C.D.Cal.

1988)(awarding fees for time lead counsel spent reviewing and

summarizing depositions where overall hours billed were

reasonable), rev’d on other grounds, 947 F.2d 374 (9th Cir.

1991). Here, Recker’s use of an associate to review the

depositions was reasonable, given that he did not have a

paralegal on staff at that time. (Reply at 7.) Moreover, the

forty hours spent reviewing the depositions was not excessive. 

Accordingly, the court finds these time entries are compensable. 

 Third, defendants assert it was unreasonable for Recker to

bill at his full rate for travel time. (Opp’n at 6.) However,

several cases have held that reasonable travel time by the

attorney during the course of the litigation may be compensable

at full market rates. See U.S. v. City & County of San

Francisco, 748 F.Supp. 1416, 1422 (N.D.Cal. 1990), aff’d in

relevant part Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d

1536, 1543 (9th Cir. 1992). Defendants do not contend that the

travel was unrelated to the litigation; accordingly, it is

appropriate to compensate Recker for his travel time at the

requested full rate. 

Finally, defendants complain that some of the time entries

were too vague to determine whether the time was reasonably

expended. (Opp’n at 6.) Specifically, defendants complain about

several entries labeled “review emails.” (Id.) The amount of

time billed for these entries is minimal, with each entry

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covering a maximum of 30 minutes. The court finds the

descriptions provided for these entries are sufficiently

specific. 

Accordingly, the court finds the documented hours for

plaintiffs’ attorneys are reasonable. 

3. Conclusion 

The court awards plaintiffs attorneys’ fees in the amount of

$298,818.25. As described above, this award compensates

plaintiffs for the 1,321.33 documented hours plaintiffs’ legal

team spent on the case at their attorneys’ historic rates. 

B. Litigation Expenses

Plaintiffs request $58,121.85 in litigation expenses,

consisting primarily of expenses for legal research, travel, and

expert witness fees. Defendants do not challenge the legal

research and travel expenses. However, they argue that

plaintiffs are not entitled to the $50,675 requested for expert

witness fees because 42 U.S.C. § 1988 does not provide for the

award of such fees in excess of the limits imposed by 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1821 and 1920. (Id.)

 Expert witness fees are recoverable as part of an attorneys’

fee award only if they are authorized by explicit statutory

authority. W.Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 87,

111 S.Ct. 1138 (1991). Following Casey, Congress expressly made

expert witness fees recoverable as part of attorneys’ fees in an

action brought to enforce a provision of §§ 1981 and 1981(a). 42

U.S.C. § 1988(c). Here, plaintiffs brought their suit under §

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 Plaintiffs argue that, despite the statutory language and 3

the applicable case law, the court still has discretion to award

expert witness fees. (Reply at 8.) However, this argument is

foreclosed by Casey and Padro. 

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1983, not § 1981. Accordingly, plaintiffs are limited to

recovering only those expert witness fees allowed by 28 U.S.C. §§

1821 and 1920. See Padro v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 100 3

F.Supp.2d 99, 109 (D.P.R. 2000) (citing cases). 

Section 1920(6) provides for the compensation of

court-appointed experts. Because plaintiffs’ experts were not

court appointed, they can only receive basic witness fees under

28 U.S.C. § 1821. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(3). Section 1821(b)

limits witness fees to “an attendance fee of $40 per day” at a

deposition or a trial, plus other travel expenses where

applicable. Here, plaintiffs have not indicated that their

experts appeared at either a deposition or a trial. Accordingly,

plaintiffs are not entitled to any of their requested expert

witness fees. The court awards plaintiffs their remaining,

requested litigation expenses, totaling $7,446.85. 

C. Bill of Costs

Defendants object to several of the costs plaintiffs include

within their bill of costs. First, they challenge the inclusion

of a $1,400 charge for payments to defendants’ two expert

witnesses for the taking of their depositions. (Bill of Cost

Objections at 2.) For the reasons described above, defendants

are correct, and plaintiffs are limited by §§ 1821 and 1920 to

$80 for the two days of deposition testimony by these witnesses. 

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 Plaintiffs originally requested $9,204.52 under this 4

category of “other costs.” However, plaintiffs withdrew their

request for two of the specific charges listed - - (1) a charge

for on-command movie fees ($38.97), and (2) an unexplained

business center cost of $ 190.64 - - after defendants objected to

them. (Reply to Objections to Bill of Costs at 2-3; Reply to

Attorneys Fee Opp’n at 8.). Accordingly, they reduced their

requested travel expenses costs to $8,974.91. (Reply to Attorney

Fees Opp’n at 8.) 

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See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437,

445, 107 S.Ct. 2494 (1987).

Second, defendants object to the $8,974.91 listed under the

category of “other costs,” representing the travel and related

expenses for plaintiffs’ attorneys to attend depositions in this

case. (Bill of Cost Objections at 2.) While conceding that 4

these expenses are compensable, defendants contend that they

should have been requested as part of plaintiffs’ motion for

attorneys’ fees, rather than in plaintiffs’ bill of costs. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs do not challenge defendants’ argument, but ask that,

if the court finds these expenses not recoverable as costs, they

be allowed to seek recovery of them as part of their attorneys’

fees motion. (Reply to Bill of Costs Objections at 2; Reply to

Attorney Fees Opp’n at 8.) 

The court agrees with defendants that these costs are more

properly recovered as part of an attorneys’ fees motion; section

1920 does not specifically provide for travel expenses and courts

have accordingly found them not compensable as part of a bill of

costs. See Yasui v. Maui Elec. Co., Ltd., 78 F.Supp.2d 1124,

1130 (D.Haw. 1999). Accordingly, the court awards these costs to

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plaintiffs as part of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees motion,

bringing plaintiffs’ “litigation expenses” award to $16,421.76. 

Defendants do not object to the remainder of plaintiffs’

bill of costs, and the court finds these costs appropriate. The

court, therefore, awards plaintiffs $9,012.90 for their bill of

costs. 

D. Conclusion

Based on the above discussion, the court awards plaintiffs

$298,818.25 in attorneys’ fees and $16,421.76 in litigation

expenses. The court also awards plaintiffs $9,012.90 in costs. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 6/17/2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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