Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_02-cv-00513/USCOURTS-casd-3_02-cv-00513-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BORDER POWER PLANT WORKING

GROUP,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 02CV513 IEG (POR)

Order (1) Denying Plaintiff’s Motion

for Summary Judgment, (2) Granting

Federal Defendants’ Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment, (3) Granting

Defendant-Intervenor Termoelectrica

U.S.’s Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment, (4) Granting DefendantIntervenor Baja California Power’s

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,

(5) Granting in Part, Denying in Part

All Defendants’ Motions To Strike the

First Declaration of William E.

Powers, (6) Granting in Part, Denying

in Part Plaintiff’s Motion To Strike the

Declaration of Octavio M.C. Simoes,

(7) Granting in Part, Denying in Part

All Defendants’ Motions To Strike the

Second Declaration of William E.

Powers, (8) Denying DefendantIntervenor Termoelectrica U.S.’s

Motion To Voir Dire William E.

Powers, and (9) Denying as Moot All

Defendants’ Motions To Strike the

Declaration of Theodore D. Schade

[Doc. Nos. 225, 233, 238, 243, 247,

249, 253, 254, 255, 258]

vs.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; SAMUEL

W. BODMAN, in his official capacity;

KEVIN KOLEVAR, in his official capacity;

BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT;

REBECCA W. WATSON, in her official

capacity,

Defendants,

 vs.

TERMOELECTRICA U.S., LLC; BAJA

CALIFORNIA POWER, INC.,

 Defendant-Intervenors.

Case 3:02-cv-00513-IEG-POR Document 282 Filed 11/30/06 Page 1 of 40
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1

 The Administrative Record (“record”) is a compilation of documents relied upon by the

agencies in making their challenged decisions and sets forth the material facts in this case. On January

20, 2006, the federal defendants lodged the record as five CD-ROMs. The first four CD-ROMs

contained the materials generated during the preparation of the environmental impact statement

(“EIS”) and the records of decisions (“RODs”) challenged in the present litigation. The final CDROM contained the record materials that plaintiff challenged in the prior litigation. 

2

 The Court cites to the Record by referring to the DOE or Bureau of Land Management

(“BLM”) document number and the page number of the Adobe portable document format (PDF) file.

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Presently before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the Border

Power Plant Working Group (“plaintiff”); Department of Energy, Bureau of Land Management,

and agency officials (“federal defendants”); defendant-intervenor Termoelectrica U.S., LLC (“TUS”); and defendant-intervenor Baja California Power, Inc. (“Baja”). Also presently before the

Court are the following evidentiary motions: defendants’ motions to strike the first and second

declarations of William E. Powers, and the declaration of Theodore D. Schade; T-US’s motion to

voir dire William E. Powers; and plaintiff’s motion to strike the declaration of Octavio M.C.

Simoes. 

BACKGROUND1

I. Factual and Procedural History of the Prior Litigation

The Department of Energy (“DOE”) is responsible for issuing Presidential permits for the

construction, operation, maintenance, and connection of electric transmission facilities at the

United States international border. [D-1076, at 2; D-1077, at 2.2

] On February 27, 2001, Baja

applied to DOE for a Presidential permit to construct a 230-kV transmission line extending from

San Diego Gas & Electric Company’s Imperial Valley Substation to the U.S.-Mexico border. [D1077, at 2.] There, the line would connect with transmission facilities in Mexico and extend to the

La Rosita Power Complex in Mexicali. [Id.] 

On March 7, 2001, Sempra Energy Resources (“SER”) applied to DOE for a Presidential

permit to construct a 230-kV transmission line that would run parallel to the Baja line. [D-1076, at

2.] At the border, the line would connect with transmission facilities in Mexico and extend to the

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3

 Both proposed transmission lines would cross federal lands managed by BLM, a subdivision

of the Department of the Interior. [D-1076, at 2 n.1.] Therefore, Baja and Sempra each applied to

BLM for a right-of-way across the federal lands. Although the Presidential Permits were issued by

DOE and the rights-of-way by BLM, both agencies relied upon the same environmental analysis

documents. Additionally, for this litigation, the parties focused their briefing almost entirely on the

DOE’s issuance of the Presidential permits. [But see Pl. Reply, at 37 & n.26.] For convenience, the

Court will follow suit and refer primarily to the DOE permits, although the Court’s analysis applies

to both agencies’ decisions. 

4

 Pursuant to a reorganization of Sempra Energy, the corporate parent of both SER and T-US,

ownership, operation, and maintenance of the SER transmission line passed to T-US. [Doc. No. 39,

at 3.] 

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Termoelectrica de Mexicali power plant.3 The primary purpose of both transmission lines is the

importation of power into the United States. [DOE-101, at 13.] 

Because of the similarity in the proposals, DOE decided to consider both transmission lines

in a single environmental document. [D-1077, at 3.] DOE and BLM (collectively, “agencies”)

concluded that an environmental assessment (“EA”) was the appropriate level of review under the

National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). [Id.] On December 1, 2001, the agencies

completed the EA, and, based on that document, made a finding of no significant impact

(“FONSI”). [DOE-101, DOE-103.] DOE issued the permits on December 5, 2001. [DOE-104,

DOE-105.] SER and Baja then began constructing the transmission lines, which commenced

operation to export electricity from Mexico in July 2003. [Final Environmental Impact Statement

(“FEIS”), Vol. 1, at 1-1.] 

On March 19, 2002, plaintiff filed its complaint against DOE, BLM, and agency officials

challenging the EA and FONSI. [Doc. No. 1, at 2.] Plaintiff alleged causes of action under NEPA

for DOE’s failure to prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) or to analyze reasonable

alternatives. [Id., at 16-19.] The Court granted SER’s and Baja’s motions to intervene with

respect to the remedy phase. [Doc. Nos. 18, 32.] On January 30, 2003, the Court ordered the

substitution of T-US for SER.4

 [Doc. No. 42.] 

On May 2, 2003, applying the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review under the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), this Court partially granted

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to the EA and FONSI’s inadequate analysis on the

issues of the potential for controversy, water impacts, impacts of ammonia and carbon dioxide,

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reasonable alternatives, and cumulative impacts. [Doc. No. 91, at 40.] After denying plaintiff’s

motion for injunctive relief [Doc. No. 124], the Court remanded to the agencies for preparation of

appropriate NEPA documents on July 9, 2003. [Doc. No. 162, at 34.] The Court prohibited the

agencies from considering on remand the completion of the transmission lines’ construction, their

interim operation, or the Court’s analysis of the environmental impacts. [Id.] 

II. Factual and Procedural History of the Present Litigation

On October 24, 2003, DOE issued a Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS. [D-0059, at 1.] 

Pursuant to the Court’s remand Order, the agencies “conduct[ed] their NEPA review from a fresh

slate, i.e., as if the transmission lines did not exist.” [Id., at 8.] On May 11, 2004, DOE published

notice in the Federal Register that the Draft EIS was available. [D-0702.] DOE originally

provided a forty-five day period to comment on the Draft EIS, and extended the comment period

by one month at plaintiff’s request. [D-0717, at 1.] 

On December 10, 2004, the agencies issued the FEIS and filed it with the Environmental

Protection Agency. [Fed. Defs. Memo. ISO Motion, at 3; D-1069, at 1.] The FEIS contained a

separate volume of comments received during the review period–including the transcripts of two

public hearings–along with DOE’s responses to those comments. [See FEIS Vol. 2.] On April 18,

2005, DOE issued new permits to Baja and T-US. [D-1076; D-1077.] 

On April 25, 2005, DOE published the ROD in the Federal Register. [D-1085.] The ROD

explained what alternatives DOE had considered: (1) no action; (2) granting one or both permits

with corresponding right(s)-of-way, based on the current design of the Mexicali power plants

(“proposed action”); (3) granting one or both permits with corresponding right(s)-of-way, with

more stringent emissions controls and alternative cooling technologies installed at the Mexicali

power plants; and (4) granting one or both permits with corresponding right(s)-of-way, with offsite mitigation measures implemented to minimize domestic environmental impacts. [Id., at 3.] 

On May 27, 2005, the federal defendants notified the Court that the agencies had completed the

FEIS and issued new RODs. [Doc. No. 179.] 

On August 18, 2005, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the Court ordered the filing of

plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“FAC”). [Doc. No. 181, at 4.] The FAC alleges six (6) causes

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 Despite the voluntary dismissal, plaintiff’s reply argues for NEPA violations predicated on

the agencies’ failure to consider cumulative impacts. [See Pl. Reply ISO Motion, at, e.g., 27-28.] 

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of action: one under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), four under NEPA, and one under the APA.

The first cause of action alleges that, based on data in the FEIS, the total number of direct

and indirect emissions of pollutants in Imperial County caused by DOE’s permitting actions

exceeds regulatory thresholds. Therefore, plaintiff alleges the federal defendants violated the

CAA by failing to conduct a conformity determination to ensure that the permits conform to

California’s state implementation plan for Imperial County. 

In its opening brief, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its second cause of action under NEPA

for failure to evaluate cumulative impacts adequately.5 [Pl. Memo. ISO Motion, at 34 n.23.] 

The third cause of action alleges a NEPA violation for failure to evaluate alternatives

adequately. Plaintiff specifically alleges DOE failed to evaluate adequately certain alternative

technologies, such as wet-dry cooling, that would minimize adverse environmental impacts and

still satisfy the purpose and need for the project. Although DOE included a section on alternative

technologies in the FEIS, the analysis was so “skewed” by inaccurate information that the

alternatives were “never fairly presented to the public or the decisionmakers.” [FAC ¶ 42.] Also,

when preparing the FEIS, DOE assumed the power plants were already built and operating. 

Plaintiff alleges this assumption violated the Court-ordered prohibition against the federal

defendants’ consideration of the interim operation of the transmission lines or the completion of

construction. [Id. ¶ 41 (quoting Doc. No. 162, at 33).] 

The fourth cause of action alleges a violation of NEPA regulations for failure to ensure the

scientific accuracy of relied-upon information. Specifically, in recommending against retrofitting

the Mexicali power plants with wet-dry cooling technology, DOE failed to rely on high-quality

data or accurate information about the appropriate design and cost of a wet-dry cooling system. 

DOE further failed to rely on accurate information in its analysis of the environmental impacts of a

wet-dry cooling system, including the potential water savings and corresponding reductions in

plant efficiency. 

The fifth cause of action alleges a NEPA violation for inadequate analysis of mitigation

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measures. While the ROD states the proposed action would be implemented without any

mitigation, plaintiff alleges the ROD’s explanation of the decision not to mitigate is legally

insufficient. 

The sixth cause of action alleges an APA violation for the defendants’ “arbitrary and

capricious” agency action. Plaintiff specifically alleges defendants’ underlying violations of CAA

and NEPA are unlawful agency actions that the APA requires a reviewing court to set aside.

As remedies, plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment that (1) the permits were issued in

violation of the CAA, (2) the FEIS and ROD did not comply with NEPA, and (3) defendants

violated the APA. Plaintiff also petitions the Court to (1) set aside the permits, (2) enjoin

operation of the transmission lines, or, (3) in the alternative, require mitigation measures to offset

air and water quality impacts–all pending completion of a CAA-compliant conformity

determination and a NEPA-compliant EIS and ROD. 

On October 12, 2005, the Court granted T-US’ and Baja’s motions to intervene in all

phases of the case. [Doc. No. 194.] 

On October 18, 2005, the federal defendants answered the FAC. [Doc. No. 195.] On

November 1, 2005, T-US and Baja each answered the FAC. [Doc. Nos. 197-98.] 

On February 8, 2006, the Court denied defendant-intervenors’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

first cause of action. [Doc. No. 214.] The Court found defendant-intervenors did not “cite[] any

persuasive authority categorically exempting the emissions from the Mexican power plants from

analysis under the conformity provisions of the CAA because they occur outside Imperial

County.” [Id., at 6-7.] In the absence of said authority, the Court then construed the definition of

“indirect emissions” to include the emissions from the Mexican power plants. [Id. at 10-16.] 

On March 29, 2006, the Court denied plaintiff’s motion to bar all defendants from further

litigation on summary judgment of issues resolved in the Order denying the motion to dismiss. 

[Doc. No. 224.] The Court found the “law of the case” doctrine inapplicable because its findings

on the motion to dismiss were “not the type of concrete determinations that would ordinarily bar

further litigation of such issues[.]” [Id., at 5.] 

The Court adopted a briefing schedule for summary judgment motions on February 24,

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6

 While complying with the summary judgment briefing schedule, the parties also filed motions

to strike certain of the declarations accompanying the motion papers. A concise list of those motions

appears in the caption and first paragraph of this Order. 

At oral argument, the Court granted the following motions: plaintiff’s motion to withdraw its

motion to file surreply [Doc. Nos. 268-69], plaintiff’s motion for leave to file documents referred to

in the declaration of Theodore D. Schade [Doc. No. 269], plaintiff’s motion for leave to file

documents referred to in the second declaration of William E. Powers [Doc. No. 275], federal

defendants’ motion to file motion for summary judgment nunc pro tunc [Doc. No. 270], and T-US’s

motion for joinder in federal defendants’ motion to strike the first and second declarations of William

E. Powers [Doc. No. 256.] 

The Court now grants Baja’s motion to join the motions to strike filed by the federal

defendants and T-US. [Doc. No. 258.] 

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2006. [Doc. No. 218.] On April 14, 2006, plaintiff filed its motion for summary judgment,

accompanied by the declarations of William E. Powers and William R. Stockwell. [Doc. Nos.

225, 227-28.] On June 15, 2006, T-US filed its cross-motion for summary judgment, along with

the declarations of Octavio M.C. Simoes and Alberto Abreu. [Doc. Nos. 233, 236-37.] That same

day, Baja also filed its own cross-motion for summary judgment, accompanied by the declaration

of Perry H. Fontana. [Doc. Nos. 239-40.] Finally, federal defendants filed their cross-motion for

summary judgment nunc pro tunc to the same date. [Doc. No. 243.]

On August 15, 2006, plaintiff filed its reply in opposition, accompanied by the declaration

of Theodore D. Schade and the second declaration of William E. Powers. [Doc Nos. 244-46.] On

September 15, 2006, T-US and Baja separately filed their replies. [Doc. No. 259 (Baja); Doc. No.

261 (T-US).] On September 18, 2006, federal defendants filed their reply. [Doc. No. 257.] 

On October 6, 2006, the Court held oral argument on the motions for summary judgment

and the motions to strike,6

 and took these motions under submission. 

MOTIONS TO STRIKE

Before the Court addresses the parties’ legal claims, it must determine what evidence

beyond the record is admissible in deciding those claims. Therefore, the Court begins by

addressing the parties’ motions to strike. 

I. Expert Testimony of William E. Powers

William E. Powers is a professional mechanical engineer and the chairperson of plaintiff’s

organization. [First Powers Decla. ¶ 1.] In its motion to strike both Powers declarations, T-US

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7

 To support its argument about Powers’s experience, T-US submits Powers’s resume and

correspondence with Octavio Simoes. All materials date back to the 1990s, when Powers tried to

solicit work from Simoes on an emissions permitting project. 

8

 The same level of discretion extends to the manner in which the district court determines the

reliability of the expert’s testimony. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152. Applying this discretion, the Court

is satisfied that Powers meets the requirements of an expert, based on the statements in his declaration

and the arguments in the briefs on this issue. The Court denies T-US’s request to voir dire Powers.

9

 When commenting on the draft EIS, Simoes, in fact, relied on data provided by Wyndrum.

[Simoes Decla. ¶ 19.] 

10 In fact, after the oral argument, T-US filed an ex parte application asking the Court to take

judicial notice of an administrative law decision in which the ALJ rejected Powers’s ultimate

conclusions. [Doc. No. 279.] The Court takes judicial notice as to Powers’s participation in the

decision and the fact of the ALJ’s decision. However, the ALJ’s decision is not helpful to the

resolution of this question beyond the fact that the ALJ recognized Powers as an expert. [Doc. No.

279, Exhibit 1, at 31.] Furthermore, in the process of filing this ex parte application, T-US brought

the Court’s attention to yet another administrative law case in which the ALJ is actually considering

the cooling system proposed by Powers. [See id., at 2 n.2; Doc. No. 280, at 3 n.2.] 

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argues that Powers is not an expert. T-US explains that Powers does not have a graduate degree in

engineering and has experience only in the emissions testing aspects of power plant operations, but

not cooling technologies.7

 T-US further alleges that Powers’s conclusions are inaccurate because

Powers never visited the actual power plants to which the transmission lines are connected. 

Where “specialized knowledge will assist” the Court in understanding evidence, a qualified

expert witness may offer opinion testimony, “if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or

data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has

applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. The

district court enjoys great discretion in determining whether the expert’s testimony is reliable.8

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). Applying that discretion to this case,

the Court finds Powers is qualified to testify as an expert. Powers co-authored a presentation on

dry-cooling systems at an EPA symposium with Ralph Wyndrum.9

 [Second Powers Decla. ¶ 1 &

n.1.] He has made presentations on cooling technologies at conferences sponsored by the

California Energy Commission. [Id.; see Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-

94 (stating that peer review and “submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community” are

“pertinent consideration[s]” in determining the validity of an expert’s opinion).] He has served as

an expert witness on power plant cooling in administrative law cases.10 Taken together, Powers’s

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11 The Court recognizes it has the discretion to exclude the expert’s testimony where “there

is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Gen. Elec. Co. v.

Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). However, given the highly technical subjects of Powers’s testimony

and the value of any scientific perspective that can shed light on these subjects, the Court is unable

to conclude Mr. Powers is not an expert merely because of his conclusions. 

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experience satisfies the Court that he meets the qualifications of an expert. T-US’s remaining

objections are focused on Powers’s conclusions, and this Court cannot consider the expert’s

conclusions in the threshold determination of reliability.11 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (“The

focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they

generate.”).

II. Extra-Record Evidence

A. Legal Standard

In reviewing a claim under the APA, “the focal point for judicial review should be the

administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing

court.” Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743 (1985) (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411

U.S. 138, 142 (1973)). A court may not consider evidence outside the record to determine whether

the agency made the correct decision. Asarco, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 616 F.2d 1153,

1160 (9th Cir. 1980); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Fed. Highway Admin., 290 F. Supp. 2d

1175, 1200-01 (S.D. Cal. 2003). However, the district court may go beyond the record when such

evidence helps to explain the agency’s action. Animal Def. Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432,

1436 (9th Cir. 1988), amended by 867 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1989). Specifically, extra-record

evidence is admissible if any of these “narrow exceptions” applies: “(1) if admission is necessary

to determine whether the agency has considered all relevant factors and has explained its decision,

(2) if the agency has relied on documents not in the record, (3) when supplementing the record is

necessary to explain technical terms or complex subject matter, or (4) when plaintiffs make a

showing of agency bad faith.” Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 460 F.3d

1125, 1145 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir.

2005)) (other internal quotations omitted). The first and third exceptions are potentially applicable

to these facts.

//

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 B. First Declaration of William E. Powers

Plaintiff acknowledges the frequency of Powers’s participation during the comment period,

identifying at least six documents Powers submitted for the record. [Pl. Opp. to Fed. Defs. Motion

To Strike First Powers Decla., at 7-8.] Furthermore, plaintiff repeatedly argues that the

information in the First Powers Declaration was contained in the record. [Id., at 1, 7-8.] A court

may strike extra-record evidence consisting of information that “already exists in the record” or

“[is] extracted from the record.” Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d

1443, 1451 (9th Cir. 1996). The federal defendants argue the First Powers Declaration falls into a

Catch-22: either the contents of the declaration are already in the record, or they provide “new,

belated criticism” of the agencies’ substantive conclusions, and are inadmissible in either case. 

[Fed. Defs. Reply ISO Motion To Strike First Powers Decla., at 6-7.] 

However, under the federal defendants’ argument, any challenge to an agency’s decisionmaking process could be construed as an impermissible challenge to its substantive conclusions. 

Such a construction would leave no room for the established exception allowing courts to consider

extra-record evidence where necessary to determine if the agency has considered all relevant

factors and explained its decision. The Ninth Circuit recently invoked this exception when it

admitted a declaration discussing measurement errors in an FEIS’s analysis of tree mortality rates. 

Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2006). The declaration

established the FEIS was “misleading” because the FEIS did not accurately report the findings of

the studies it purportedly relied upon. Id. at 1166-67; cf. Hodel, 840 F.2d at 1437 (where

information appears in the administrative record, evidence would still be admissible unless

explicitly discussed in the EIS); Friends of the Payette v. Horseshoe Bend Hydroelectric Co., 988

F.2d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 1993) (extra-record evidence admissible “[w]hen a failure to explain action

frustrates judicial review”). 

Because of the similar allegations in this case, the Court finds it appropriate to admit

portions of the First Powers declaration. For example, the declaration discusses potentially

relevant factors–including the existence of power plants of similar sizes in similar climates with

dry-cooling systems–that the agency allegedly failed to consider. The declaration also discusses

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problems in the agency’s reasoning–including purportedly incorrect assumptions about the design

of the dry-cooling system the power plants could feasibly accommodate–that could potentially call

into doubt whether the agency adequately explained its decision. 

Furthermore, the subject matter of this case is highly complex and technical. The NEPA

causes of action center largely on the engineering design of the cooling system at the power plants. 

When the federal defendants argue that “the vast majority of the Powers Declaration” improperly

goes to Powers’s substantive disagreement with the FEIS, they impliedly concede that some

portion of the First Powers Declaration would help the Court understand the technical issues in

this case. In the first declaration, Powers explains the operation of various types of power plants

and their water demands. 

Nonetheless, certain paragraphs of the First Powers Declaration clearly do not fall within

any of the established exceptions to the rule against extra-record evidence. Therefore, the Court

strikes these paragraphs of the First Powers Declaration for the reasons stated:

Paragraph 12 states that T-US’s corporate parent, Sempra Energy, asked its cooling vendor

to submit a proposed wet-dry cooling system to DOE based on unrealistic assumptions. 

Criticizing the quality of data submitted by another commenter is not a proper reason to admit

extra-record evidence.

Paragraph 14 describes the agreement of the parties on the unit cost of a dry cooling

system. Plaintiff does not allege that the agencies failed to consider this factor, nor is this a highly

technical computation. For similar reasons, the Court strikes paragraph 15, which discusses the

potential costs to ratepayers of a wet-dry cooling system, and paragraph 18, which discusses the

parties’ agreement on the cost of a new surface condenser.

Paragraph 22 improperly objects to DOE’s decision on the merits. It does not object to

DOE’s decision-making process; any comments directed to the process are duplicative of

comments in other paragraphs the Court finds admissible. 

Paragraphs 24-27 discuss the feasibility of conducting a CAA conformity determination. 

Whether the agencies must conduct a conformity determination is a question of law not

implicating complex or technical facts. Because the CAA conformity determination is legally

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12 The concept of the Simoes Declaration as a “post hoc rationalization” is initially dubious

because T-US is the party submitting the declaration. If the agencies were trying to prop up the

FEIS’s analysis with the Simoes Declaration, one would have expected the federal defendants to

submit the declaration, or, at least, file a brief in opposition to plaintiff’s motion to strike the

declaration. 

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separate from the NEPA analysis, the evidentiary exception for the agency’s consideration of

relevant factors and explanation of its decision does not apply. 

C. Declaration of Octavio M.C. Simoes

Octavio M.C. Simoes is a registered professional engineer and the Vice President of Asset

Management for Sempra Generation. [Simoes Decla. ¶¶ 2, 4.] He oversaw development and

construction of the Mexicali power plant to which the T-US transmission line connects. [Id. ¶ 4.] 

T-US submitted Simoes’ declaration because, “[t]o the extent the Court considers the Powers’

declaration, it should likewise consider the Simoes Declaration.” [T-US Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. &

Memo. ISO Cross-Mot., at 4 n.4.] 

Plaintiff moves to strike the Simoes Declaration because it purportedly amounts to an

“impermissible post hoc rationalization of an agency decision, made in response to litigation.” See

Kunaknana v. Clark, 742 F.2d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that such rationalizations are

generally inadmissible, and, even when admissible, must not articulate a new rationalization). 

Plaintiff views the Simoes declaration as a backdoor attempt to patch up gaps in the FEIS’s

reasoning exposed by this litigation and the First Powers Declaration. 

The Court finds, instead, that portions of the Simoes Declaration fall within the wellestablished exception allowing supplementation of the record “to permit explanation or

clarification of technical terms or subject matter involved in the agency action under review.”12

Pub. Power Council v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1982). Among the documents

available to the Court, the Simoes Declaration provides the clearest explanation of such technical

terms as “duct firing,” “efficiency penalty,” and “parallel cooling system.” 

What plaintiff characterizes as “post hoc rationalization” is, in most cases, a response to the

information introduced in the First Powers Declaration. The Simoes Declaration explains, for

example, that the Sempra Generation plant is actually distinguishable from the purportedly similar

power plants discussed in the First Powers Declaration. In other words, whereas the First Powers

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13 Again, T-US offers the Simoes Declaration only to the extent the Court considers the First

Powers Declaration. The Court is not considering the paragraphs of the First Powers Declaration cited

in the last sentence of Simoes Declaration ¶ 8. 

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Declaration suggested that other power plants are “relevant factors” the agencies should have

considered, the Simoes Declaration establishes that those plants are irrelevant to the agencies’

decision regarding the Sempra Generation plant because the Sempra Generation plant is different. 

See Earth Island Institute, 442 F.3d at 1163-64 (where Ninth Circuit allowed plaintiff to introduce

an extra-record declaration to show that agency did not consider all relevant factors, agency was

allowed to introduce responsive declaration in rebuttal). And, the difference between power plants

is itself the kind of complex subject matter for which courts consider supplemental evidence. 

 Nonetheless, certain paragraphs of the Simoes Declaration clearly do not fall within any of

the established exceptions to the rule against extra-record evidence. Therefore, the Court strikes

these paragraphs of the Simoes Declaration for the reasons stated:

Paragraph 7 is irrelevant. It attacks Mr. Powers’s credentials and praises the high quality

of analysis in a document Simoes submitted for the record.

Paragraph 8, in its last sentence, cites paragraphs of the First Powers Declaration that the

Court has already stricken.13

Paragraph 17 does not address the agency’s failure to consider relevant factors, nor does it

explain technical subject matter. It merely elaborates on documents submitted for the record.

Paragraphs 21-23 merely summarize a document Simoes submitted for the record. [See D809, Exhibit B.] The Court may not rely on extra-record evidence when it can review the very

same evidence submitted for the record.

D. Second Declaration of William E. Powers

With its reply, plaintiff submits the Second Powers Declaration. Plaintiff argues for the

admission of this declaration under the same exceptions as before: determining whether the agency

considered all relevant factors, explaining the agency’s decision, and understanding technical

subject matter. Defendants argue that the Second Powers Declaration does not actually fall within

the recognized exceptions and is cumulative of other comments that Powers submitted–both for

the record and in his first declaration.

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Although the Court applies the same law as it did with the First Powers Declaration, the

Court views the Second Powers Declaration more skeptically. The Ninth Circuit has

acknowledged the risk district courts face if they admit too much testimony under the exception

for technical subject matter: eventually, the technical testimony will cease explaining the subject

matter and start reaching impermissibly to the merits of the agency’s decision. Asarco, 616 F.2d at

1160-61. In Asarco, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion because “the

scientific inquiry undertaken at trial necessarily led the district court to substitute its judgment for

that of the agency.” Id. at 1161. 

Applied to these facts, the Court perceives the Second Powers Declaration to spend less

time drawing the Court’s attention to potentially relevant factors not considered by the FEIS or

explaining technical subject matter. Instead, the Second Powers Declaration spends more time

opposing the Simoes Declaration, interpreting Powers’s own submissions to the record, and

redirecting the Court’s attention to the First Powers Declaration. Plaintiff’s NEPA causes of

action are directed against the FEIS, not the Simoes Declaration. Furthermore, the Court need not

admit Powers’s comments on his submissions for the record or his own first declaration; the Court

can read those documents for itself. Therefore, the Court strikes the following paragraphs of the

Second Powers Declaration for the reasons stated:

Paragraphs 2-4 reiterate and summarize comments Powers submitted for the record. 

Paragraph 5 repeatedly cites the Simoes Declaration and the First Powers Declaration, but

makes no reference to the FEIS.

Paragraphs 6-8 do not identify relevant considerations the agency failed to consider or

explain technical subject matter. Instead, they attempt to cast doubt on the arithmetic in Simoes’s

submission for the record and speculate about his calculations.

Paragraphs 9-10, though briefly alluding to the FEIS, are devoted to disputing the

conclusions of the Simoes Declaration. 

All sentences of paragraph 12 that cite to the Simoes Declaration or First Powers

Declaration are irrelevant to the adequacy of the FEIS.

Paragraph 13 exclusively criticizes the Simoes Declaration.

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Paragraph 16 discusses the CAA conformity determination. Whether the agencies must

conduct a conformity determination is a question of law not implicating complex or technical

facts. Because the CAA conformity determination is legally separate from the NEPA analysis, the

evidentiary exception for the agency’s consideration of relevant factors and explanation of its

decision does not apply. 

E. Declaration of Theodore D. Schade

Theodore D. Schade is a professional engineer and an air pollution control officer with the

Great Basin Air Pollution Control District. [Schade Decla. ¶ 1.] Plaintiff submits the Schade

Declaration in support of its CAA claim. The gravamen of the Schade Declaration is that the FEIS

improperly computed the emissions of a particular pollutant that would result from wind erosion at

the Salton Sea if the power plants continue to operate. [Id. ¶ 9.]

All defendants’ motions to strike the Schade Declaration are denied as moot. In deciding

the CAA claim, the Court relies on statutes, regulations, and portions of the FEIS not implicated

by the Schade Declaration. Because the Court need not consider the Schade Declaration in its

disposition of the CAA claim, it will not consider whether the Schade Declaration falls within one

of the established exceptions for admitting extra-record evidence. 

LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. Legal Standard

“Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and discovery, read in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Armstrong

v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 139 F.3d 1277, 1278 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting 20th Century Ins. Co. v.

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 965 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” when “the evidence presented is such that

a jury applying [the appropriate] evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff

or the defendant.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Neither NEPA nor the CAA independently provides for judicial review. Sierra Club v.

U.S. Envt’l Prot. Agency, 346 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2003) (CAA); Hells Canyon Alliance v.

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U.S. Forest Serv., 227 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000) (NEPA). Instead, a court reviews agency

action under the provisions of the APA. Id. The APA requires a reviewing court to “hold

unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]” 5 U.S.C. §

706(2)(A). Under this “highly deferential” standard of review, “the court ‘must consider whether

the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a

clear error of judgment.’” Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 1986)

(quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)). The court

must not find the agency action to be arbitrary or capricious “unless there is no rational basis for

the action.” Id.

When reviewing final agency action, “resolution of th[e] matter does not require fact

finding on behalf of this court. Rather, the court’s review is limited to the administrative

record[.]” Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994). In

the absence of fact finding, summary judgment is an “appropriate” vehicle for disposing of the

legal issues. Id.

CAA CLAIM

I. Legal Standard

A. Conformity Determinations

The CAA directs that EPA “shall by regulation promulgate . . . proposed national 

. . . ambient air quality standards [NAAQS].” 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1)(B); cf. 42 U.S.C. §

7409(a)(2) (similar). Pursuant to their primary responsibility for maintaining air quality, states

must submit a state implementation plan (SIP) “which will specify the manner in which [NAAQS]

will be achieved and maintained . . . in such state.” Id. § 7407(a); cf. § 7410(a)(1) (SIP must

“provide[] for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement” of each NAAQS). Once a state

submits a list of its areas in nonattainment, EPA then promulgates the official designation of the

area as “nonattainment” for one or more particular pollutants. Id. § 7407(d)(1)(B). 

EPA has designated Imperial County as a severe nonattainment area for particulate matter

under ten microns in diameter (“PM10 emissions”). EPA has further designated Imperial County

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14 For PM10 emissions, the total of direct and indirect emissions caused by the federal action

must not exceed 70 tons per year (tpy). 40 C.F.R. § 51.853(b)(1). For NOX and VOC emissions, the

limit is 100 tpy. Id. § 51.853(b).

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as a nonattainment area for ozone. Because ozone is not produced directly, EPA focuses on

emissions of its precursors: nitrogen oxides (“NOX emissions”) and volatile organic compounds

(“VOC emissions”). 41 C.F.R. § 51.852. 

The CAA further mandates, “No department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal

Government shall . . . license or permit . . . any activity which does not conform to an

implementation plan.” 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(1). The CAA instructs EPA to “promulgate . . .

criteria and procedures for determining conformity[.]” Id. § 7506(c)(4)(A). Therefore, EPA has

promulgated a regulation stating, “For Federal actions . . . a conformity determination is required

for each criteria pollutant or precursor where the total of direct and indirect emissions of the

criteria pollutant or precursor in a nonattainment . . . area caused by a Federal action would equal

or exceed” the stated emission rates.14 40 C.F.R. § 51.853(b). The conformity determination must

rely “on the most recent estimates of emissions.” 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(1). EPA requires “the latest

and most accurate emission estimation techniques available . . . (2) such as actual stack test data

from stationary sources which are part of the conformity analysis.” 40 C.F.R. § 51.859(b)(2). 

EPA has defined indirect emissions as: 

those emissions of a criteria pollutant or its precursors that:

(1) Are caused by the Federal action, but may occur later in time and/or may be

farther removed in distance from the action itself but are still reasonably

foreseeable; and

(2) The Federal agency can practicably control and will maintain control over due

to a continuing program responsibility of the Federal agency.

Id. § 51.852. Emissions are “caused by” a federal action when they “would not otherwise occur in

the absence of the Federal action.” Id. An agency has “continuing program responsibility” for

emissions when they

are specifically caused by an agency carrying out its authorities, and [not] emissions

that occur due to subsequent activities, unless such activities are required by the

Federal agency. Where an agency, in performing its normal program

responsibilities, takes actions itself or imposes conditions that result in air pollutant

emissions by a non-Federal entity taking subsequent actions, such emissions are

covered by the meaning of a continuing program responsibility.

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15 The memorandum explains that the ambiguity of the old question 20 reflected EPA’s

uncertainty whether the statute required conformity determinations within attainment areas. The 1995

statutory amendments clarified that conformity was not required within attainment areas, thus enabling

EPA to issue a document that more clearly stated when conformity was required. 

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Id.

The issue is whether the federal defendants must conduct a conformity determination for

the permitting of the two power plants in this case.

B. EPA Guidance Document

After EPA promulgated the general conformity rules, it published a question-and-answers

document to “deal[] with questions frequently asked of EPA regarding conformity.” Office of Air

Quality Planning and Standards, General Conformity Guidance: Questions and Answers (1994),

http://www.epa.gov/air/genconform/documents/gcgqa_940713.pdf, at ii. The guidance document

“represents EPA’s interpretation of the general conformity rule.” Id.

When this Court issued its Order on defendant-intervenors’ motion to dismiss, question 20

of the guidance document contained the following language:

20. Does the rule apply to activity that occurs in attainment areas that could impact

nonattainment areas?

A: If an activity in an attainment area causes indirect emission increases within a

nonattainment area, they may have to be analyzed. The current nonattainment rule

does not indicate how this situation should be dealt with. Until EPA issues

guidance on this, or addresses this instance in an attainment area rule on

conformity, Federal agencies should make their own decisions as to how the rule

applies to attainment areas with respect to this scenario.

Id. at 10. Quoting the first sentence of the answer to this question 20, the Court found that the

“Guidance Document does not give clear guidance as to whether emissions occurring outside the

United States need to be included in a conformity analysis.” [Doc. No. 214, at 8.] 

On June 5, 2006, EPA revised its guidance document. William T. Hartnett, Memorandum,

Revision to General Conformity Applicability Questions and Answers, http://www.epa.gov/air/

genconform/documents/Jun06/Revision_to_General%20_Conformity_Applicability_Q&As.pdf, at

1. The memorandum acknowledged CAA amendments, enacted in 1995 after the issuance of the

guidance document, which required conformity only in nonattainment and maintenance areas.15 In

response to the statutory amendments, EPA revised question 20 to read as follows:

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20(a). Does the rule apply to a Federal activity that occurs outside a nonattainment

or maintenance area but may impact nonattainment areas through transport of direct

or indirect emissions?

A: No. Consistent with the statutory [amendments] as enacted in 1995, general

conformity applies only to federal actions undertaken in a nonattainment or

maintenance area. Further, federal agencies are not required to undertake a general

conformity analysis for a federal action which is undertaken in an attainment or

unclassified area and which may cause emissions, whether direct or indirect, in an

attainment or unclassified area which may be transported into a nonattainment or

maintenance area.

20(b). Does the rule apply to a Federal action that occurs inside a nonattainment or

maintenance area and has direct or indirect emissions both in and outside

nonattainment areas?

A: In this case, only the emissions originating within the boundaries of the

nonattainment or maintenance area where the action is taking place need to be

analyzed under the general conformity requirements. In other words, emissions

originating outside the nonattainment or maintenance area do not need to be

considered in the applicability analysis or conformity analysis, consistent with

EPA’s interpretation of [the 1995 statutory amendments].

Id. at 2 (emphasis added).

II. Analysis

A. Number of Federal Action(s)

A threshold question under the CAA claim is whether the Court should treat each permit as

a separate federal action, or consider both permits together as a single federal action. Plaintiff

asserts that DOE has treated the permitting of the transmission lines as a single action with two

components (i.e., two permits). Plaintiff points to the preparation of a single EA and EIS, the

issuance of a single ROD, and instances within those documents (including the definition of the

proposed action and analysis of environmental impacts) where the agencies treated the issuance of

two permits as one action. 

NEPA regulations promulgated by the Council of Environmental Quality urge agencies to

analyze separate federal actions in the same EIS where appropriate: if “[s]imilar actions . . .

provide a basis for evaluating their environmental consequences together, such as common timing

or geography[,]” then the agency “may wish to analyze these actions in the same impact

statement.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(3). Applying this standard, the permits in this case are

particularly appropriate for evaluation in the same EIS because the corporate parents of T-US and

Baja applied for the permits within about a month of one another, and the transmission lines run

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parallel over the same federal lands. The agencies properly followed the recommendations of the

CEQ regulations. 

Furthermore, although the FEIS does occasionally treat the permits jointly, the relevant

documents makes clear that two different federal actions are at issue. The ROD clearly states,

“[d]ue to the similarities of these proposals, DOE and BLM decided to cooperate on the

environmental review and to consider both proposals in a single environmental document.” [D1085, at 2.] The FEIS described the proposed action as “grant[ing] one or both permits and

corresponding [rights-of-way].” [FEIS, Vol. 1, at S-17.] In considering the emissions of criteria

air pollutants from the power plants–a dispositive issue in the plaintiff’s CAA conformity

claim–the FEIS separates the T-US plant from the Baja plant when reporting the results. [FEIS,

Vol. 1, at 4-43.] These examples, along with similar references throughout the FEIS, convince the

Court that the agencies avoided de facto conflation of the two permits into a single federal action.

Finally, treating the permits as separate federal actions is consistent with this Court’s

findings in the first round of summary judgment motions. There, the Court treated the permits

separately to determine the environmental impacts of each power plant. [Doc. 91, at 17.] 

Merely because each permit is a separate federal action, the Court is able to grant summary

judgment to Baja. Emissions data provided by plaintiff in its reply brief show that, if the Baja

power plant is treated separately from the T-US facility, its total emissions do not exceed

conformity determination thresholds. [Pl. Reply ISO Motion, at 22.] 

B. Applicability of Guidance Document

Where agencies provide guidelines or comments regarding the implementation of their own

regulations, that guidance receives “controlling weight” unless it (1) violates the Constitution, (2)

impermissibly construes the governing statute, or (3) “is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the

regulation.” Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (internal quotations omitted); see

League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181,

1183 (9th Cir. 2002) (same). By contrast, where an agency interprets the statute in a context other

than formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, the agency’s interpretation is

“‘entitled to respect’ . . . but only to the extent that th[e] interpretation[] ha[s] the ‘power to

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16 The CAA itself provides remarkably little detail on conformity. The statute prohibits

nonconformity with a state implementation plan and defines conformity. 42 U.S.C. § 7605(c)(1). As

amended in 1995, the statute limits when the agency must conduct a conformity determination. Id.

§ 7506(c)(5). The statute then leaves to EPA the responsibility to figure out “criteria and procedures

for determining conformity[.]” Id. § 7506(c)(4)(A). Determining what emissions will count in a

conformity determination clearly falls within the “criteria and procedures” that EPA promulgates

through regulations. Therefore, when considered from another angle, EPA’s guidance document still

interprets the regulations. 

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persuade[.]’” Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift

& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) (internal citations omitted); see Vigil v. Leavitt, 381 F.3d 826,

835 (9th Cir. 2004) (same, in the context of EPA’s publication in the Federal Register of

preliminary views on certain CAA provisions). 

Applied to these facts, the Court finds that the guidance document interprets the

regulations, rather than the statute. The language of the guidance document itself strongly

supports this finding, for the introduction to the document states that it “represents EPA’s

interpretation of the general conformity rule.” General Conformity Guidance, at 2. Although both

the memorandum introducing the June 2006 revision and the revised question 20 itself reference

the 1995 statutory amendments, those references do not transform the guidance document into an

interpretation of the statute. Instead, those references are merely intended to confirm that EPA’s

interpretation of its regulations is consistent with the CAA. The fact that an agency takes pains to

interpret its regulations consistently with the statute does not mean the agency is interpreting the

statute.16

The revised guidance document permissibly construes the governing statute–indeed, EPA

revised the guidance document to interpret its regulations consistently with statutory amendments. 

The broad language of the amendments states that the CAA’s conformity provisions “shall apply

only with respect to– (A) a nonattainment area.” 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(5)(A). This language can be

interpreted not just to require a conformity determination only in nonattainment areas, but also to

limit the conformity determination itself to emissions taking place within the nonattainment area. 

Although plaintiff argues that the statute’s joint definition of “emission limitation” and “emission

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17 “The terms ‘emission limitation’ and ‘emission standard’ mean a requirement established

by the State or the Administrator which limits the quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions of air

pollutants on a continuous basis, including any requirement relating to the operation or maintenance

of a source to assure continuous emission reduction, and any design, equipment, work practice or

operational standard promulgated under this chapter[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(k). 

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standard”17 does not necessarily exclude emissions from outside the nonattainment area, the

definition, at most, creates ambiguity on the question of what emissions an agency must take into

account in a conformity determination. Because of the statutory ambiguity, and because of EPA’s

statutory mandate to promulgate regulations concerning the “criteria and procedures” for

conformity determinations, 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(4)(A), the guidance document permissibly

construes the CAA.

The agency’s interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the text of the

regulations merely because the definition of indirect emissions includes emissions “farther

removed in distance from the action itself.” 40 C.F.R. § 51.852. Limiting the conformity

determination to emissions within the nonattainment area does not render this definition

superfluous. The language leaves open the possibility of emissions reasonably foreseeable from

the federal action that occur elsewhere within the nonattainment area. Indirect emissions can be

“removed in distance” from a federal action while still taking place within a nonattainment area. 

This possibility is sufficient to make the guidance document’s interpretation “not plainly erroneous

or inconsistent” with the regulations themselves. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 45.

Even if the guidance document interpreted the statute, the Court would find it persuasive in

this particular context of emissions from power plants in Mexico crossing the international border

into Imperial County. As counsel for the federal defendants explained at oral argument, the power

plants “[a]re being regulated by a different governmental agency, in this sense a different country,

that has primary responsibility for the emissions of those power plants.” [Transcript of Motions

Hearing (“Trans.”), at 40:18-21.] When the Mexican government, and not DOE, issued permits

for the power plants in Mexicali, the foreign government, “as the United States government does

for facilities in the United States, [made] a bunch of trade-offs into . . . the level it wants to impose

for environmental protections vs. the need for its economy and generating electricity and jobs[.]” 

[Id., at 39:16-20.] Elsewhere, the CAA defers to foreign governments’ trade-offs on air quality:

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18 The federal defendants offered these and other arguments to support the proposition that

emissions from the Mexicali power plants are excluded from conformity analysis because the DOE

permits are “[a]ctions that implement a foreign affairs function of the United States.” 40 C.F.R. §

93.153(c)(2)(xviii). For legal authority, federal defendants cite to an Executive Order, a State

Department statement published in the Federal Register, and a 30-year-old Second Circuit opinion.

[Fed. Defs. Memo. ISO Motion, at 13.] 

In granting summary judgment to the defendants, the Court does not find that DOE’s permits

fall within EPA’s exemption for a “foreign affairs function.” Defendants simply do not have enough

legal authority to sustain that position. Furthermore, the Court’s finding would run directly contrary

to the position of the Department of Energy, which maintained, in a 2003 memorandum, that

conformity analysis applied to the construction of power transmission lines across the international

border. Office of Environmental Policy and Guidance, Compliance with the General Conformity

Regulations (2003), http://www.eh.doe.gov/oepa/guidance/caa/conformbrf.pdf, at 5. 

(Of course, DOE’s position also runs contrary to the position taken by EPA’s revised guidance

document, which the Court adopts here. However, the guidance document–revised earlier this

year–has been around a much shorter time than the foreign affairs exemption, which has existed in

EPA’s regulations for over a decade. Before the guidance document was revised, EPA had directed

agencies to interpret the conformity statute to “make their own decisions” on the applicability of the

conformity rule. DOE obviously did not believe that transnational power lines were a foreign affairs

function.) 

In summary, the Court finds that the revised guidance document persuasively explains EPA’s

regulations (and the CAA). The Court does not find that the foreign affairs function applies to the

power plant emissions. 

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the EPA Administrator will approve a SIP if the state can show that the SIP “would be adequate to

attain and maintain the relevant [NAAQS] . . . , but for emissions emanating from outside of the

United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 7509a(a)(2). Therefore, the guidance document’s interpretation is

certainly persuasive in excluding emissions outside the country altogether, from sources that are

permitted and regulated by a foreign government.18

Therefore, on the basis of the revised guidance document, the Court finds that DOE did not

have to consider emissions from outside Imperial County in its conformity determination. 

Specifically, DOE did not have to consider emissions from the power plants in Mexicali. Without

considering emissions from the power plants, and by treating each permit as a separate federal

action, plaintiff cannot show that emissions exceed the conformity determination thresholds at the

T-US power plant. [See Pl. Reply ISO Motion, at 22; Trans., at 6:1-3.] Plaintiff’s CAA claim

fails as a matter of law.

NEPA CLAIMS

I. NEPA Generally

“NEPA does not guarantee substantive results.” Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. U.S.

Dep’t of Transp., 222 F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 2000). Instead, as a “procedural statute,” NEPA

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seeks “to ensure informed agency action.” Swanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th

Cir. 1996). The dual goals of NEPA analysis are to “foster[] informed decision-making and

informed public participation.” California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th Cir. 1982). The

statute “requires only that the agency take a ‘hard look’ at its decision, and not that environmental

concerns trump all others.” Swanson, 87 F.3d at 343. Where a plaintiff challenges a number of

specific points in an EIS, a court “need not ‘fly-speck’ the document and ‘hold it insufficient on

the basis of inconsequential, technical deficiencies,’ but will instead impose a ‘rule of reason[.]’” 

Id. (quoting Or. Envt’l Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 492 (9th Cir. 1987)). If the EIS

“contains a reasonably thorough discussion,” the court will approve the EIS even though it may

disagree with the agency’s conclusion. Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, 222 F.3d at 680

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

In situations “where there is conflicting evidence in the record, the [agency’s]

determination is due deference–especially in areas of agency expertise[.]” Id. at 682. When facing

conflicting expert opinions, “an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions on

its own qualified experts[.]” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 161 F.3d

569, 577 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted); see City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S.

Dep’t of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 1997) (NEPA does not require “unanimity of

opinion, expert or otherwise”). 

II. Failure To Adequately Evaluate Alternatives

A. Legal Standard

The EIS must “[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives[.]” 

40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a). “[T]he heart of the environmental impact statement . . . should present the

environmental impacts of the proposal and the alternatives in comparative form.” Id. § 1502.14. 

The goals of this presentation are “[1] sharply defining the issues and [2] providing a clear basis

for choice among options by the decisionmaker and the public.” Id.; cf. § 1502.1 (requiring that

the EIS inform policymakers and the public of “reasonable alternatives” that would benefit the

environment). This standard includes “[d]evot[ing] substantial treatment to each alternative

considered in detail” and briefly explaining the reason for eliminating any alternative from detailed

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study. Id. § 1502.14(a)-(b).

The agency must “[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable

alternatives.” Id. § 1502.14(a). The court determines the spectrum of reasonable alternatives

based on the agency’s statement of the purpose and need for the proposed action. Westlands

Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 866 (9th Cir. 2004). In this case, DOE’s

purpose and need were “to determine whether it is in the public interest to grant Presidential

permits . . . for the . . . transmission lines. . . . In determining whether a proposed action is in the

public interest, DOE considers the impact of the proposed action on the environment and on the

reliability of the U.S. electric power supply system.” [FEIS, Vol. 1, at S-10.]

An agency does not have to consider “every conceivable permutation” of a given

alternative for the EIS evaluation to be adequate. Westlands, 376 F.3d at 871. The failure to fully

analyze specific alternatives does not make the range of alternatives unreasonable, especially

where the agency conducts a “thorough public debate” by directly responding to comments

proposing the alternatives that are not fully analyzed. Id. at 870-72. 

B. Analysis

1. DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES

Each power plant currently relies on a “wet cooling system,” which uses exclusively water

to condense the steam generated by the operation of the turbines. An alternative method of

condensing steam is to blow air across it (i.e., a “dry cooling system”). [D-809, at 10.] In the

section on alternative technologies, the FEIS considered the possibility of retrofitting one or both

power plants with a “wet-dry cooling system” that would combine a wet cooling system with a dry

cooling system. [See FEIS, Vol. 1, at 2-37–2-40.] The discussion addressed the advantages of dry

cooling, including reductions in the amount of water used and waste generated. [Id., at 2-38.] It

also addressed the disadvantages of dry cooling, including a decrease in power plant efficiency. 

[Id.] The FEIS specifically considered a wet-dry cooling system that would rely exclusively on

dry cooling up to an ambient temperature of eighty to ninety degrees Fahrenheit; above that point,

the system would begin to use wet cooling. [Id. at 2-39.] Above ninety degrees, the plant would

use exclusively wet cooling. [Id.] The retrofit would cost about $75 million. [Id.]

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19 Plaintiff also claims that the FEIS should have considered the smaller-size system (in terms

of the number of cooling cells) that Powers submitted for the record. In his declaration, Simoes claims

the size of the dry-cooling design he submitted for the record is the same as Powers’s proposed design.

[Simoes Decla. ¶ 8.] The FEIS does not appear to state the exact size of the dry cooling system

considered in its section on alternative technologies.

20 Even though the FEIS does not cite Powers as the commenter in question, the FEIS is

unmistakably referring to Powers’s comments. 

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Plaintiff objects the FEIS did not consider a different design for the wet-dry cooling system

that would have saved more money and water.19 Specifically, plaintiff proposed a wet-dry cooling

system that would have cost $30 million. [D-0743, at 5.] Also, according to plaintiff’s proposed

design, the power plants would only use one hundred percent wet cooling “on peak temperature

days.” [Id. at 4.] By making use of dry cooling above ninety degrees, the power plants would be

able to save more water than if they stopped using dry cooling at ninety degrees. Since a wet-dry

cooling system is, according to plaintiff, “the only alternative that would reduce or eliminate

adverse impacts to water resources,” plaintiff argues the FEIS’s discussion of wet-dry cooling is

inadequate because it did not consider another proposed design that would have saved more

money and water. [Pl. Reply ISO Motion, at 37.] 

The Court finds dispositive the FEIS’s acknowledgment of Powers’s comments for the

record and direct response to those comments. Identifying wet-dry cooling as a “Key Issue,” the

FEIS specifically references one commenter’s “recommendation . . . that the EIS should analyze a

parallel wet-dry cooling technology that would run primarily in dry mode and only be

supplemented with wet cooling on the hottest days of the year, resulting in a 90% reduction in

water use by the plants.”20 [Vol. 2, at 3-5.] In this section, the FEIS goes on to say that the

agencies “consider[ed] these comments and the associated technical submittals.” [Id.] It then

announces DOE’s conclusion: “a parallel wet-dry system that operates primarily in dry mode with

only supplemental wet cooling would be an infeasible alternative.” [Id.] The FEIS then lists

reasons to support its conclusion: (1) the power plants have wastewater treatment plants

(“WTPs”), (2) the WTPs need a constant flow of water through their bioreactors, and (3) the

climate in Mexicali is hot. [Id.] Based on its reasoning, DOE concluded “the only reasonable

alternative” was the wet-dry cooling system design discussed in over four pages in the FEIS. [Id.;

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see Vol. 1, at 2-37–2-40.] 

Another section of the FEIS (seventeen pages in all) is devoted exclusively to responding

to Powers’s comments. [Id., Vol. 2, 4-59–4-76.] Within this section, the agencies “disagree with

the statement in [Powers’s] comment that a ‘highly effective parallel wet-dry cooling system,

designed to reduce water use more than 90% relative to the current wet-only design, could readily

be retrofitted to [the power plants].’” [Id., at 4-63.] The agencies concluded a 90% water

reduction “is not considered reasonable” in light of the need for a consistently high level of water

to sustain the bioreactors. [Id., at 4-63–4-64.] Instead, the agencies cite Simoes’s submissions for

the propositions that (1) the temperatures in Mexicali are too hot to support a system relying

primarily on dry cooling and (2) the retrofit would cost two-and-a-half times what Powers

estimated. [Id.] 

These facts reveal a battle of the experts. Both Powers and Simoes submitted documents

for the record. The FEIS makes clear that the agencies actually read both experts’ submissions and 

found Simoes’s submissions persuasive. The agencies found Powers’s submissions unreasonable,

and the FEIS explains why. Clear Ninth Circuit precedent, applied to these facts, says the agencies

have done their job. In a battle of the experts, “an agency must have discretion to rely on the

reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts[.]” Morongo, 161 F.3d at 577 (emphasis added). 

Whether this Court thinks Powers might be more persuasive is irrelevant. Nat’l Parks &

Conservation Ass’n, 222 F.3d at 680. Nor are agencies required to consider alternatives they deem

unreasonable or infeasible. Carmel-by-the-Sea, 123 F.3d at 1155. The agencies conducted a

“thorough public debate” on wet-dry cooling systems by considering Powers’s comments and

directly responding to them. Westlands, 376 F.3d at 870, 872. The agencies’ failure to fully

analyze Powers’s proposal does not render the EIS deficient. Id. at 871. 

In the FEIS’s discussion of wet-dry cooling, the agencies also fulfilled their obligations

under applicable regulations. In eliminating Powers’s proposal from detailed study, the agencies

had to “briefly discuss the reasons for [its] having been eliminated.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a)

(emphasis added). The FEIS provided this discussion. [Vol. 2, at 3-5; 4-63-64.] Furthermore, the

agencies “[r]igorously explore[d] and objectively evaluate[d]” an alternative wet-dry cooling

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system through an extensive discussion of the advantages, disadvantages, and logistics of

installing dry-cooling systems at the power plants. [40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a); FEIS, Vol. 1, at 2-

35–2-40.] Finally, the agencies “present[ed] the environmental impacts of . . . th[is] alternative[]

in comparative form” in a summary chart that considered twelve different environmental impacts. 

[FEIS, Vol. 1, at S-67–S-76.] 

2. ASSUMPTION OF POWER PLANTS IN OPERATION

In its July 9, 2003 Order remanding for preparation of NEPA documents, the Court ordered

the agencies not to “consider[] the interim operation of the transmission lines [or] the completion

of the construction[.]” [Doc. No. 162, at 33.] In the FEIS, the agencies explained their “belie[f]

that the court ruling to treat the transmission lines as having never been built does not extend to the

connected power plants.” [FEIS, Vol. 1, at S-2.] 

Plaintiff alleges the agencies interpreted this Court’s ruling incorrectly; plaintiff believes

the Court also instructed the agencies not to consider the construction of the underlying power

plants. Therefore, based on this incorrect interpretation, the agencies inflated the cost of installing

the wet-dry cooling system because a retrofit is more expensive than installing the system from

scratch. 

Even if the agencies’ interpretation of the Court’s ruling is correct, plaintiff argues the

agencies still violated the Court’s prohibition because the cost estimates take into account the lost

income from shutting down the power plants during the retrofit. The power plants lose income

during a retrofit because they cannot send electricity across the transmission lines authorized by

the DOE permits, and the agencies were prohibited from considering those transmission lines in

the FEIS.

The Court finds, first, that the agencies correctly interpreted the Court’s July 9, 2003

Order. The Court’s instruction to the agencies does not include the words “power plant” anywhere

in the sentence. The phrase “completion of the construction” appears immediately after “interim

operation of the transmission lines”. Therefore, “of the transmission lines” is implied after the

words “completion of the construction”. 

The Court finds, second, that the FEIS’s passing references to lost power sales in

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21 The relative unimportance of lost power sales in the overall cost estimate distinguishes these

facts from a case in which the Ninth Circuit found the evaluation of alternatives inadequate where the

agency relied on an inaccurate market projection in developing its range of alternatives. Natural Res.

Def. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 421 F.3d 797, 813-14 (9th Cir. 2005). In that case, a separate

federal statute required the Forest Service to consider the market demand for timber in developing its

resource plan for the Tongass National Forest. Id. at 801. The Forest Service had erroneously

doubled its market projection for timber because it had misinterpreted economic projections, and

acknowledged such an error throughout the litigation. Id. at 800 & n.2. Here, by contrast, the

consideration of lost power sales is, at best, a marginal consideration in the overall cost estimate for

retrofitting the plants. Even without considering lost sales, the retrofit could cost more than $75

million. [D-809, at 16.] The possibility of lost power sales had little or no effect on the range of

retrofit costs the agencies considered in analyzing the reasonability of alternative wet-dry cooling

system designs. 

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estimating the cost of the wet-dry cooling system retrofit did not violate the prohibition in this

Court’s July 9, 2003 Order. [See FEIS, Vol. 1, at 2-39 ($75 million “include[s] . . . the cost of lost

power sales during installation.”] As Baja’s counsel explained at oral argument, the power plant

managers invested so much in building the plants that, even if they could not transmit electricity to

the United States, the managers would look for other opportunities to transmit electricity. [Trans.,

at 90:4-14.] During portions of the retrofit, however, the power plants would be totally shut down,

and could not provide electricity anywhere. Therefore, because the agencies properly assumed the

completed construction of the power plants when drafting the FEIS, they could also consider the

power plants’ inability to sell power to any customer while shut down during the retrofit. 

Furthermore, although the FEIS includes the lost power sales in its $75 million estimate, it cites a

document in the record which supports the proposition that the retrofit would cost more than $75

million even without considering lost sales.21 [D-809, at 16.] The agencies did not violate this

Court’s order in their adequate analysis of the wet-dry cooling alternative. 

III. Failure To Ensure the Scientific Accuracy of Relied Upon Information

A. Legal Standard

To ensure scientific accuracy, an EIS “shall identify any methodologies used and shall

make explicit reference by footnote to the scientific and other sources relied upon for conclusions

in the statement.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24. The “high quality” information in the EIS must include

“[a]ccurate scientific analysis [and] expert agency comments.” Id. § 1500.1(b). However, NEPA

review “must concentrate on the issues that are truly significant to the action . . . , rather than

amassing needless detail.” Id. In the FEIS specifically, “[t]he agency shall discuss . . . any

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22 The efficiency penalty is the percentage reduction in plant efficiency due to the extra power

needed to run the dry-cooling system. The penalty increases as the outside temperatures get hotter.

In the layperson’s explanation provided by T-US at oral argument, “[W]ater cools better than air, and

particularly in Mexicali, where it’s hot, hot air just doesn’t cool as well as colder water.” [Trans., at

108:14-16.] 

23 The mere fact the Simoes document devotes some attention to a 144-cell design does not

transform the FEIS’s reliance on other parts of the Simoes document into a NEPA violation.

Plaintiff’s skepticism of the assumptions behind the 144-cell design cannot form the basis of a NEPA

violation when the Simoes document itself rejects that design. 

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responsible opposing view which was not adequately discussed in the draft statement and shall

indicate the agency’s response to the issues raised.” Id. § 1502.9(b). Good science is consistent

with “NEPA’s purpose of providing decision makers and the public with an accurate assessment of

the information relevant to evaluate” the proposed action. Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 F.3d at

812. 

Inaccurate economic information in an EIS gives rise to a NEPA violation if it “‘impair[s]

the agency’s consideration of the adverse environmental effects’” and “‘skew[s] the public’s

evaluation.’” Id. at 811 (quoting Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Glickman, 81 F.3d 437,

446 (4th Cir. 1996)). 

B. Analysis

Plaintiff begins with the argument that the FEIS used inconsistent assumptions to make

wet-dry cooling as unattractive as possible. The FEIS allegedly based its cost estimate on an

extremely large plant design. However, when analyzing the efficiency penalty,22 the FEIS

allegedly considered a different, much smaller plant design, on par with the size of the design

proposed by Powers. 

The Court finds that plaintiff’s argument is based on an incorrect reading of the relevant

comment in the record. Plaintiff asserts, “Simoes, on wh[om] DOE solely relied, assumed an

unprecedented high number of dry cooling cells as part of the retrofit.” [Pl.’s Memo. ISO Motion,

at 22-23.] Specifically, plaintiff asserts that DOE developed its $75 million “inflated cost estimate

based on a parallel wet-dry cooling system with 144 cells[.]” [Id. at 24.] In fact, the Simoes

document cited by the FEIS says no such thing. Instead, the document describes the 144-cell

system as “cost-prohibitive” and “not practical.”23 [D-809, at 4, 12.] The document then proceeds

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Plaintiff insists the FEIS does rely on the 144-cell design because the FEIS says seven acres

of land would be required to build the dry cooling system. Analyzing the FEIS more closely, it says

the cooling retrofit “would require an area as much as about 7 acres[.]” [Vol. 1, at 2-39 (emphasis

added).] This sentence does not commit the FEIS to analyzing a dry cooling system of a particular

size; it merely stands for the proposition that dry cooling systems are difficult to install because they

are large. 

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to consider the cost of a retrofit to the Mexicali plant by making comparisons to “Project Alpha,” a

wet-dry cooling system being installed at another Sempra plant in an arid climate. [Id. at 12, 16.] 

Project Alpha is a thirty-cell system, the same size as the system Powers proposed. [Simoes

Decla. ¶ 8.] Therefore, contrary to plaintiff’s allegations, the FEIS is not “entirely inconsistent” in

its estimates of costs and efficiency penalties. [See Pl.’s Memo. ISO Motion, at 24.] Both points

of analysis are based on a thirty-cell dry cooling system. 

Plaintiff also strenuously objects to the following passage in the FEIS: 

A potential wet-dry cooling system design would use dry cooling to handle the

entire cooling load up to an ambient temperature of 80 to 90/F (27 to 32/C). Wet

cooling would augment the dry system at temperatures above 80 to 90/F (27 to

32/C); 100% wet cooling could be used on days the temperature is above 90/F

(32/C) to ensure maximum power output from the plants (Powers 2004b). The

analysis of impacts to water resources assumes that dry cooling will be used at

temperatures up to 90/F (32/C).

[Vol. 1, at 2-39.] 

 Plaintiff objects, first of all, that the cited Powers document [D-0743] does not precisely

stand for the proposition the FEIS claims. While the Powers document does propose exclusively

dry cooling up to a temperature of eighty to ninety degrees, and while the document also says that

wet cooling augmentation would begin at these temperatures, a close reading reveals that Powers

did not propose exclusively wet cooling above ninety degrees. Instead, Powers stated, “100

percent wet cooling could be used on peak temperature days to ensure maximum power output

from the plants.” [Id., at 4-5.] Explained another way, the FEIS substituted the words “on days

the temperature is above 90/F (32/C)” where the Powers document said “on peak temperature

days.” By the phrase “peak temperature,” Powers meant some temperature hotter than ninety

degrees; elsewhere in the Powers document, a chart shows that dry cooling could accomplish at

least seventy-five percent of the cooling even when the outside temperature is as hot as one

hundred degrees. [D-0743, at 4, 27.] 

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24 This is to say that, on days when the maximum temperature is between eighty and ninety

degrees or even greater than ninety degrees, the temperature is still less than eighty degrees during

some hours of the day. 

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Part and parcel of plaintiff’s analysis is its criticism of the FEIS’s climate data. The FEIS

projects that exclusively dry cooling would be used thirty-seven percent of the time because the

high temperature is less than eighty degrees on thirty seven percent of the days in Imperial,

California. Plaintiff disputes this conclusion because exclusively dry cooling could be used on

portions of hotter days when the temperature was below eighty degrees.24 If the FEIS had relied

on hourly climate data, rather than the maximum daily high temperature, plaintiff alleges the

agencies would have found exclusively dry cooling could be used a larger percentage of the time. 

The gravamen of plaintiff’s criticisms is that greater reliance on dry cooling means greater

water savings. While the FEIS considers a parallel wet-dry cooling system that would bring about

a 56% reduction in water used by the power plants, plaintiff alleges that a 90% reduction could be

achieved if the FEIS (1) adopted all the specifications of the cooling system proposed in the

Powers document that the FEIS actually cites, and (2) used more precise climate data. [Pl.’s Reply

ISO Motion, at 31-33.] 

Plaintiff relies on three cases to support its argument about the inadequacy of the FEIS’s

scientific analysis. In Powell, the Forest Service violated NEPA by using a sedimentation model

that “was incomplete and ignored key variables.” 395 F.3d at 1031. Relying heavily on the

model, the agency did not disclose the model’s shortcomings until its decision was challenged on

administrative appeal. Id. at 1032. 

Applying Powell, the Ninth Circuit found the Forest Service’s soil quality analysis violated

NEPA where the agency had failed to observe soil conditions directly in the areas affected by

agency action. Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1068-71 (9th Cir. 2005). Although

the agency pointed to informal field reports in the record indicating direct soil observation, the

court refused to credit those reports because “there [was] no indication in the draft EIS or final EIS

that the [agency] actually consulted and relied upon any of the field reports it now cites when it

was making its selection[.]” Id. at 1071. The Ninth Circuit further refused to defer to the agency’s

expertise because one of the agency’s own experts criticized the agency’s analysis on the record. 

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Id. at 1069 n.13, 1070 & n.15. 

Another NEPA violation in Austin was the agency’s failure to address the scientific

uncertainty regarding the effects of thinning old-growth forest stands on species dependent on oldgrowth habitat. Id. at 1063. The EIS assumed without discussion that thinning the forests would

benefit the species and did not meaningfully address the uncertainty surrounding that assumption. 

Id. at 1065. The agency could have avoided a NEPA violation if it had explained why further

study on this issue was “‘not necessary or feasible.’” Id. (quoting Seattle Audobon Soc’y v. Espy,

998 F.2d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1993)).

The third NEPA violation in Austin was the agency’s reversal on whether eliminating

newly created post-fire habitat would adversely affect a woodpecker species dependent on that

habitat. Id. at 1067. Before a fire took place in a national forest, the agency concluded that

eliminating post-fire habitat could result in the federal listing of the woodpecker. Id. After the

fire, the agency then reversed course and concluded that eliminating the habitat would probably

not result in federal listing. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that the agency had not provided the

public with any underlying data, and refused to accept the agency’s unsupported conclusion. Id. at

1068.

In the third case cited by plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit found a NEPA violation for inaccurate

economic information that “inflated the economic benefits and discounted the environmental

impacts of the [p]lan.” Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 F.3d at 811. The agency misinterpreted a

study on market demand projection for timber and based its decision on an estimated demand

twice the size of the actual demand. Id. at 802. 

The Court finds these precedents distinguishable. The agencies in this case did not rely on

factually inaccurate information, nor did they reverse their position during the NEPA process.

Instead, the agencies selected one expert’s opinion (Simoes) over another expert (Powers). The

agencies’ reliance on the Simoes document is unmistakable, as the FEIS cites to it during the

discussion of why the agencies did not adopt Powers’s proposal. [FEIS, Vol. 2, at 4-63–4-64.] In

the guise of an allegation the FEIS used scientifically inaccurate information, plaintiff seeks to

relitigate in this Court the battle it lost within the NEPA review process. Plaintiff tries to

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convince the Court to doubt the reliability of the Simoes document, often by directing the Court’s

attention to the conflicting Powers documents the agencies have already rejected. 

To the extent NEPA obligated the agencies to answer Powers’s competing perspective, the

agencies fulfilled that obligation. See 40 C.F.R. 1502.9(b) (FEIS “shall discuss . . . any

responsible opposing view which was not adequately discussed in the draft statement and shall

indicate the agency’s response to the issues raised.”) As a specific example, plaintiff insists the

FEIS’s estimated efficiency penalty is too large, in light of the California Energy Commission’s

estimated penalty at a purportedly similar power plant. [Pl. Reply ISO Motion, at 28.] Powers

presented these objections to the agencies through his comments reprinted in the FEIS. [Vol. 2, at

4-61–4-62.] The agencies responded to Powers’s comments by adding a sentence to the FEIS

estimating a smaller efficiency penalty for the entire power plant. [See id., Vol. 1, at 2-38–2-39

(“For a typical combined-cycle power plant where the steam cycle accounts for about one-third of

the total capacity, overall plant efficiency would be reduced from between 3 to 5%.”).] In

reducing the estimated efficiency penalty, the agencies were not obligated to reduce by the full

magnitude suggested in plaintiff’s comment. The Simoes Declaration, citing accurately to the

record, establishes that the California Energy Commission analyzed a power plant with a much

smaller steam turbine than the one at issue here. [Simoes Decla. ¶ 13 (citing D-0469, at 5).] 

The Court finds the agencies’ NEPA analysis did not undermine informed decision-making

because the agencies determined that the environmental impacts of the proposed action fell within

acceptable limits. Focusing specifically on water impacts (the area which, in plaintiff’s view, most

clearly manifests the FEIS’s purported scientific inaccuracies), the agencies found the Salton Sea

would reach critical levels of salinity in about thirty-six years, even if the agencies took no action. 

[D-1085, at 4.] Because the agencies took the proposed action, the Salton Sea will reach this

critical level four days earlier. [Id.] With respect to the New River, the ROD recognized that the

proposed action would bring about the greatest increase in its salinity, and that a wet-dry cooling

system would have the least impact on its salinity. [Id.] In announcing the adoption of the

proposed action, the ROD explained that the salinity increase from any of the alternatives

considered would neither prevent the New River from meeting its water quality objective nor

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25 The Court makes its findings even without reaching the ROD’s analysis on the greater

environmental impact that wet-dry cooling would have on air quality. [D-1085, at 7.] 

26As for the other impacts on water resources mentioned in the FEIS (e.g., the impacts on

aquatic species and pilot wetlands), the agencies fulfilled their obligations merely by listing and

discussing those impacts. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350

(1989) (NEPA does not prevent agencies “from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental

costs.”) 

27 Plaintiff asserts that the FEIS opaquely withheld Powers’s proposal of a retrofit that would

cost $30 million: “the FEIS does not disclose or reconcile Mr. Powers’ expert written comments that

. . . a parallel wet-dry retrofit on the plants would cost approximately $30 million per plant[.]” [Pl.

Reply ISO Motion, at 29.] This assertion is wrong. In reprinting Powers’s unredacted comments for

the record, the FEIS includes Powers’s statement, “the total installed cost of a 30-cell ACC retrofit

would be considerably less than $30 million.” [FEIS, Vol. 1, at 4-62.] 

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exceed the salinity limits of its wetland plants. [Id.] 

Explained another way, the ROD said that wet-dry cooling technology has marginally

fewer environmental impacts on water resources25 than the proposed action. However, the

agencies did not rely merely on the “negligible” magnitude of the differences in those impacts

when they adopted the proposed action. [Id., at 7.] The ROD also relied on the fact that all

alternatives, including the proposed action, had “small impacts” on the environment, in an absolute

sense. [Id..] The gravamen of the ROD’s discussion of impacts on water resources is that the

environmental impacts of the proposed action are acceptable; therefore, the agencies elected not to

adopt alternatives with fewer environmental impacts. In light of this discussion, it would have

made no difference if the agencies had used different climate data to conclude that dry cooling

would be used more often. The potential extra water savings would not have affected the

agencies’ analysis because the agencies were satisfied with the water resource impacts of the

proposed alternative.26

Because of these small environmental impacts, the fact the retrofit might have cost $30

million rather than $75 million did not compromise the agencies’ consideration of the

environmental impacts.27 As plaintiff implicitly acknowledges, the DOE ROD rejected wet-dry

cooling without considering costs. [See Pl. Reply ISO Motion, at 37-38.] Although the BLM

ROD did mention a consideration of costs, the Court agrees with federal defendants’ interpretation

of the agencies’ decision: “any water savings at the power plants . . . clearly would not justify the

expense of retrofitting the power plants, even accepting [p]laintiff’s estimate of $30 million per

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28 This comprehensive discussion should not be found inadequate merely because, e.g., the

FEIS says the steam flow rate at T-US’s power plant is more than ten times greater than the rate at a

parallel-cooling plant in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, when the rate is only four to seven times greater. [See

Pl. Reply ISO Motion, at 35.] 

29 The Court agrees with federal defendants that “[t]he wet-dry cooling alternative [for which

the FEIS cites Powers] includes basic features suggested by [p]laintiff.” [Fed. Defs. Reply ISO

Motion, at 12.] The FEIS and Powers both agree that dry cooling would be used exclusively up to an

outside temperature of eighty to ninety degrees. They likewise agree that wet cooling would be used

exclusively on hotter days. They simply disagree about the definition of a hot day. 

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plant.” [Fed. Defs. Reply ISO Cross-Motion, at 14.] 

In addition to the allegations discussed here, plaintiff alleges a host of other scientific

inaccuracies in the FEIS, e.g., the frequency of “duct firing,” the time it would take to install the

wet-dry cooling system, and the steam flow rates at other power plants. The Court finds none of

these to be availing. In Swanson, the Ninth Circuit upheld a grant of summary judgment for the

agency where the plaintiff had challenged “the accuracy of specific points” in the record. 87 F.3d

at 344. The court did not analyze those specific points in detail because it refused to “fly-speck”

the EIS in light of its “comprehensive discussion” of the proposed actions and their environmental

impacts. Id. at 343-44. Applied to these facts, the Court finds it sufficient that the FEIS

comprehensively discussed the environmental impacts of various proposed alternatives, and

explained why it did not consider Powers’s proposal to be a reasonable alternative.28 Nor should

this comprehensive discussion be found inadequate merely because it cites Powers for a

proposition with which Powers and plaintiff disagree.29

The Court further finds the agencies’ NEPA analysis did not undermine informed public

participation. Any member of the public who read the FEIS learned of Powers’s proposal because

the entire proposal was printed verbatim in the FEIS. [See FEIS, Vol. 2, at 4-61–4-63.] The

public received further information about the agencies’ response to Powers’s proposal because that

response appeared directly after the verbatim printing of Powers’s comments. [Id., Vol. 2, at 4-

63–4-64.] More than four months transpired between the FEIS’s publication and the issuance of

the ROD in the Federal Register. [Compare D-1069 (FEIS available to public by December 10,

2004) with D-1085 (ROD issued on April 18, 2005).] During that time, interested

parties–including the Imperial County Air Pollution Control District, EPA, and the permit

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applicants, but not plaintiff–actually submitted comments on the FEIS for the record. [D-1073; D1073a; D-1074; D-1075.] 

IV. Inadequate Analysis of Mitigation Measures

A. Legal Standard

An agency’s ROD must “[s]tate whether all practicable means to avoid or minimize

environmental harm from the alternative selected have been adopted, and if not, why they were

not.” 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(c); see Ass’n of Pub. Agency Customers, Inc. v. Bonneville Power

Admin., 126 F.3d 1158, 1187 (9th Cir. 1997) (allowing the satisfaction of this requirement by

adequate analysis in the EIS). The agency must take a “hard look” at mitigation “in sufficient

detail to ensure that environmental consequences have been fairly evaluated.” Neighbors of

Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1380 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Robertson,

490 U.S. at 353). Merely listing mitigation measures is not enough. Id. Nor can the agency

typically get by with “broad generalizations and vague references to mitigation measures.” Id. at

1381; see Carmel-By-The-Sea, 123 F.3d at 1154 (noting that the absence of “a reasonably

thorough discussion of mitigation measures . . . would undermine the action-forcing goals of

[NEPA]”). However, the agency can “describe[] in general terms and rely on general processes,

not on specific substantive requirements,” especially when actual adverse effects are uncertain and

the EIS extensively analyzes the potential effects. Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236

F.3d 468, 477 (9th Cir. 2000).

In Cuddy Mountain, the Forest Service approved a timber sale that would increase

sedimentation in three creeks to the detriment of redband trout. 137 F.3d at 1380. The Ninth

Circuit held the discussion of mitigation measures inadequate under NEPA because the Forest

Service did not even consider mitigation measures for the particular creeks and instead expected

that undefined mitigation measures elsewhere in the forest might compensate for the harms to the

creeks. Id. The Ninth Circuit also faulted the agency for failing to estimate how effective the

mitigation measures would be if adopted, or to reasonably explain why mitigation would not be

possible. Id.

The procedural requirement to discuss mitigation measures, however, is distinct from “a

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substantive requirement that a complete mitigation plan be actually formulated and adopted[.]” 

Robertson, 490 U.S. at 352. In Robertson, the Supreme Court held that agencies have no

obligation to adopt mitigation measures. Id. at 353. 

B. Analysis

The DOE ROD identified the adoption of off-site mitigation measures, including road

paving, as the environmentally preferable alternative. [D-1085, at 6.] Despite that identification,

DOE did not select the mitigation measures alternative for the following reasons: 

Whether, and the extent to which, these measures can in fact be implemented,

however, can depend in part on factors outside the [permit] applicants’ control. 

Most of the mitigation measures would require some degree of approval and

cooperation from local and state agencies for their implementation. Also, existing

local agreements could diminish the positive effect of some of the measures.

[Id.] Plaintiff faults this ROD because it “does not state why each individual, practicable measure

to mitigate impacts of the selected alternative was not adopted.” [Pl. Memo. ISO Motion, at 32.] 

By confining its arguments to the ROD, plaintiff would seek to prevent the Court from

considering the simply exhaustive discussion of mitigation measures in the FEIS. See Bonneville

Power Admin., 126 F.3d at 1187 (sufficient analysis in EIS satisfied 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(c), which

facially requires discussion of mitigation in ROD). One reason for the long list of measures is that

DOE affirmatively contacted plaintiff to solicit its suggestions about off-site mitigation that DOE

could consider. [FEIS, Vol. 1, at 2-40, 4-62.] That discussion is particularly impressive with

respect to water resources, because the FEIS individually describes each of five measures, explains

arguments against its adoption, and, at the end, summarizes the entire slate of measures. [Id., Vol.

1, at 4-27–4-30.] 

As for road paving, the FEIS does explain why that alternative was not adopted. In the

short term, paving roads would have increased soil erosion and the deposit of sediments in nearby

water. [Id., Vol. 1, at 4-30.] Making remote areas easier to access “could result in adverse

impacts to current land use.” [Id., Vol. 1, at 4-86.] Before road paving could even begin, agencies

would have to conduct a burdensome review to determine the impact on protected species and

cultural resources. [Id., Vol. 1, at 4-73, 4-83.] In addition, road paving would cost $430,000 per

mile. [Id., Vol. 1, at 2-42.] 

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The agencies’ FEIS in this case avoided the pitfalls of the EIS in Neighbors of Cuddy

Mountain. There, the EIS did not consider mitigating measures for the creeks actually affected by

the agency’s action, did not estimate the effectiveness of mitigation measures if they were adopted,

and relied on “broad generalizations and vague references.” 137 F.3d at 1381. Such criticisms

ring hollow against this FEIS, which considers mitigation measures in twelve different areas of

environmental impacts, and then summarizes its findings in an easily comprehensible chart. 

[FEIS, Vol. 1, at 2-44–2-53.] 

By claiming that the agencies must provide an itemized explanation on mitigation

measures, plaintiff has overstated what the law requires. Here, the DOE ROD concluded the 

proposed action had “low potential environmental impacts[.]” [D-1085, at 7.] Where

environmental impacts are minimal or speculative, an EIS may “focus on broad mitigation

measures.” Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, 222 F.3d at 681. But, even if the plaintiff had

correctly stated the law, this FEIS satisfied such a high standard. When the FEIS discusses

mitigation measures so extensively, plaintiff cannot make out a NEPA violation by focusing

narrowly on the ROD.

CONCLUSION

Because each permit is a separate federal action, and because EPA’s interpretation of its

regulations does not require DOE to consider emissions from the Mexicali power plants in its

conformity analysis, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the first

cause of action. The Court GRANTS all defendants’ cross-motions on this cause of action.

Because the agencies rigorously explored and objectively evaluated all reasonable

alternatives and briefly discussed the reasons for not considering other alternatives, and because

the agencies properly interpreted this Court’s Order remanding for more NEPA review, the Court

DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the third cause of action. The Court

GRANTS all defendants’ cross-motions on this cause of action.

Because the agencies found minimal environmental impacts from the proposed action and

responded to Powers’s comments in the record, the NEPA analysis did not undermine informed

decision-making or informed public participation. Therefore, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s

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motion for summary judgment on the fourth cause of action. The Court GRANTS all defendants’

cross-motions on this cause of action.

Because the FEIS thoroughly discusses mitigation measures, including some proposed by

the plaintiff, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the fifth cause of

action. The Court GRANTS all defendants’ cross-motions on this cause of action.

Because of this Court’s finding that neither NEPA nor CAA were violated under the first

five causes of action, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the sixth

cause of action. The Court GRANTS all defendants’ cross-motions on this cause of action.

Some paragraphs of the First Powers Declaration, Simoes Declaration, and Second Powers

Declaration fall within the established exceptions for admitting extra-record evidence. Therefore,

the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART all defendants’ motions to strike the First

and Second Powers Declarations. The Court DENIES T-US’s motion to voir dire Powers. The

Court also GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART plaintiff’s motion to strike the Simoes

Declaration.

The Court DENIES AS MOOT all defendants’ motions to strike the Schade Declaration.

This Order hereby CONCLUDES the litigation in this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 30, 2006

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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