Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02471/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02471-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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1 Actually Eagle is moving to strike four affidavits and a purported

declaration, but for the sake of brevity, the court will collectively refer to

these submissions as “affidavits.”

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Harris Technical Sales, Inc.,

an Arizona corporation, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Eagle Test Systems, Inc., a

Delaware corporation, 

Defendant. 

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No. 06-02471-PHX-RCB

 O R D E R

Currently pending before the court is a motion for “partial

summary judgment” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 by defendant,

Eagle Test Systems, Inc. (“Eagle”) (doc. 44). Also pending are

five motions by Eagle to strike portions of the opposing

affidavits1 filed by plaintiff, Harris Technical Sales, Inc.

(“Harris”) (docs. 98, 99, 100, 101 and 102). After carefully

Case 2:06-cv-02471-RCB Document 158 Filed 02/06/08 Page 1 of 40
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2 Finding oral argument unnecessary, the court denies Eagle’s request

in this regard. See Mot. (doc. 44) at 1. 

3 Hereinafter this document will be referred to as the “termination

letter.”

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considering these motions, plaintiff’s response to Eagle’s 

motion for “partial summary judgment” (docs. 76 and 77), Eagle’s

reply (doc. 96) and its “objections to plaintiff[’s] . . .

statement of facts [“PSOF”] (doc. 97), the court rules as

follows.2

I. Evidentiary Objections

The court will first address Eagle’s motions to strike and

its objections to PSOF. After clarifying the state of the record

vis-a-vis these evidentiary rulings, the court will then be in a

position to address Eagle’s Rule 56 motion.

Complying with LRCiv 56.1(a), Eagle filed a succinct

statement of facts (“DSOF”), identifying the following 

“undisputed material facts” which form the basis for its Rule 56

motion:

1. Plaintiff . . . and Defendant . . . entered 

into a contract entitled ‘Manufacturers 

Representative Agreement’ on or about November 12, 

1998 [(hereinafter “the Agreement”)]. . . .

2. Mike Harris, president of [plaintiff] Harris 

. . . , sent a letter to Len Foxman of Eagle . . . 

dated November 29, 2000, which stated in part 

‘you have given me no choice but to terminate the 

contract effective immediately’ and ‘please 

use this letter as your formal notification 

[plaintiff] Harris . . . , no longer represents

[Eagle]. . . .3

3. Eagle . . . paid [plaintiff] Harris . . . , 

a total of $152,538.34 in commissions for sales 

that were closed prior to March 1, 2001, which 

was 90 days after [plaintiff] Harris terminated 

the Agreement on November 29, 2000. . . . 

Case 2:06-cv-02471-RCB Document 158 Filed 02/06/08 Page 2 of 40
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4 That Rule reads in its entirety as follows:

 Each numbered paragraph of the statement 

 of facts set forth in the moving party’s 

separate statement of facts shall, unless 

otherwise ordered, be deemed admitted for 

purposes of the motion for summary judgment

if not specifically controverted by a 

correspondingly numbered paragraph in the 

opposing party’s separate statement of facts.

LRCiv 56.1(b) (emphasis added). 

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DSOF (doc. 45) at 1, ¶¶ 1-3 (citations omitted). 

As Eagle is quick to point out, plaintiff Harris did not, as

LRCiv 56.1(b) mandates, “specifically controvert[] by a

correspondingly numbered paragraph[]” any of the “facts” in

DSOF.4 Thus, in accordance with that Rule, the court “deem[s]

admitted for purposes of th[is] motion” the three uncontroverted

facts set forth in the DSOF. See LRCiv 56.1(b). 

A. PSOF

In striking contrast to plaintiff, Eagle filed detailed

objections to PSOF. Of the 27 paragraphs in PSOF, there are only

two which Eagle does not dispute. Eagle agrees that it entered

into the November 12, 1998, Agreement with plaintiff and that

“Illinois has enacted a Sales Representative Act[.]” Def. Obj.

(doc. 97) at 2,¶ 2; and at 12, ¶ 27. 

Eagle “objects” to 12 of the paragraphs in PSOF because

plaintiff did “not cite to any, let alone a specific portion of,

evidence” to support these purported “facts.” See, e.g., id. at

2, ¶¶ 1, 3 and 4 (emphasis in original). This objection is well

taken.

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As the non-moving party, plaintiff Harris “must come forward

with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586-87 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

In this regard, “[p]arties must designate specific facts and

provide the court with their location in the record.” Esteem v.

City of Pasadena, 2007 WL 4270360, at *3 (C.D.Cal. 2007) (citing

Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 765 (9th Cir. 2002))

(emphasis added). LRCiv 56.1(b) echoes this requirement

specifically mandating that an opposing factual statement “refer

to a specific admissible portion of the record where the fact”

supposedly creating a genuine issue for trial “finds support.” 

The Ninth Circuit strictly adheres to this specificity

requirement, having repeatedly held that “[g]eneral references

without page or line numbers are not sufficiently specific.” See

Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885,

889 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing cases). 

In the present case, as to 12 of the purported “facts” set

forth in PSOF, conspicuously absent are any cites to the record, 

much less a simple failure to provide a page or line number. 

What is more, to the extent that evidence might exist somewhere

in the record to support these 12 claimed “facts” by plaintiff,

the court is not “required to comb the record” to find it. See

Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029

(9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Accordingly, the court will disregard paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 6, 14-

20, and 26 of PSOF. See Esteem v. City of Pasadena, 2007 WL

4270360, at *3 (C.D.Cal. 2007) (citing, inter alia, Orr, 285 F.3d

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at 775 (“It is within our discretion to refuse to consider to

evidence that the offering party fails to cite with sufficient

specificity.”). Likewise, the court also is disregarding the

references to the deposition of Eagle’s CEO in paragraphs 23, 24

and 25 for failure to provide page or line numbers. 

Because Eagle’s objections to the remaining 13 “facts” in

PSOF are inextricably intertwined with its motions to strike, the

court will address the latter first. In the context of its

rulings on those motions to strike, the court will then return to

Eagle’s detailed objections to the remaining “facts” enumerated

in PSOF. 

B. Motions to Strike

In opposing Eagle’s Rule 56 motion, plaintiff is relying

upon affidavits from Messrs. Domke (PSOF (doc. 77), exh. C

thereto) and Barcey (PSOF (doc. 77), exh. D thereto), and a

“Verified Statement” from William Wu (PSOF (doc. 77), exh. B

thereto). Additionally, plaintiff is relying upon the affidavits

of its president, K. Michael Harris (doc. 48 at 3-4), and Valerie

Mack (doc. 48 at 5-6), previously filed in support of its motion

for a continuance. See Resp. (doc. 76) and 6 and 8. Eagle is

seeking to strike a significant portion of these opposing

affidavits. The court will address these motions to strike in

the order in which they were filed, but before doing so, it has a

few observations. 

First, the court is keenly aware that it “may only consider

admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” 

Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 745 (9th Cir. 2006)

(citation omitted). The court is equally cognizant of the fact

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that the Ninth Circuit has long recognized that “[d]efects in

evidence submitted in opposition to a motion for . . . summary

judgment are waived ‘absent a motion to strike or other

objection.’” FDIC v. N.H. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 478, 484 (9th Cir.

1991) (quoting Scharf v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 597 F.2d 1240, 1243

(9th Cir. 1979)). By the same token, however, this case is

representative of a growing trend where “attorneys . . . raise 

every objection imaginable without regard to whether the

objections are necessary, or even useful, given the nature of

summary judgment motions in general, and the facts of their cases

in particular.” See Burch v. Regents of the University of

California, 433 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1120 (E.D. Cal. 2006). Eagle’s

objections to PSOF, as well as its motions to strike, are replete

with unnecessary or improper objections. If the court were to

consider each and every one of Eagle’s countless objections, not

only would it be futile in many instances, but also it would be

“counter-productive[]” because this exercise would “begin[] to

defeat the objectives of . . . summary judgment practice –

namely, promoting judicial efficiency and voiding costly

litigation.” See id. at 1122 (citation omitted). Indeed,

largely because of the manner in which plaintiff offered its

opposing evidence and the manner in which Eagle objected to it,

rather than promoting judicial efficiency, these motions had the

opposite effect.

To illustrate, Eagle is seeking to strike virtually every

averment in the five opposing affidavits. A careful review of 

plaintiff’s opposing submissions reveals, though, that it is

relying only upon a few specific averments in those affidavits

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(nine, to be exact). Plainly then Eagle’s detailed objections to

all 32 averments serve no legitimate purpose. 

Many of Eagle’s objections also are substantively

unnecessary. Eagle is moving to strike nearly every averment in

each of the five opposing affidavits because they are irrelevant. 

As the court in Burch astutely observed, however, “objections to

evidence . . . [as] irrelevant, speculative, and/or

argumentative, or that it constitutes an improper legal

conclusion are all duplicative of the summary judgment standard

itself.” Id. “A court can award summary judgment only when

there is no genuine dispute of material fact. It cannot rely on

irrelevant facts, and thus relevance objections are redundant.” 

Id. Similarly, Eagle’s objections that certain averments are

speculative or constitute improper legal conclusions, are

“superfluous in this context[]” because such averments “are not

facts and likewise will not be considered on a motion for summary

judgment.” Id. (citation omitted). As the court accurately

observed in Burch, “[i]nstead of objecting[,] parties should

simply argue that the facts are not material.” Id.

1. Governing Legal Standards

“[T]o survive summary judgment, a party does not necessarily

have to produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at

trial, as long as the party satisfies the requirements of Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure 56.” Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032,

1036-37 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Subsection (e) of

that Rule “requires that affidavits submitted in support of a

motion for summary judgment must: (1) be made on the personal

knowledge of an affiant who is competent to testify to the matter

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stated therein, (2) must state facts that would be admissible in

evidence, and (3) if the affidavit refers to any document or

item, a sworn or certified copy of that document or item must be

attached to the affidavit.” Boyd v. City of Oakland, 458

F.Supp.2d 1015, 1023 (N.D.Cal. 2006) (citing, inter alia, Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e); and Orr, 285 F.3d at 774 n.9). “This rule applies

to declarations as well as affidavits.” Id. (citations omitted).

Additionally, “[a] declarant must show personal knowledge

and competency to testify [as to] the facts stated.” Id. (citing

Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

In other words, “[t]he matters must be known to the declarant

personally, as distinguished from matters of opinion or hearsay.”

Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, “[a] declarant’s mere

assertions that he or she possesses personal knowledge and

competency to testify are not sufficient.” Id. (citing

Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999 (9th Cir.

1990)). Rather, in accordance with Rule 56(e), a declarant must

show personal knowledge and competency “‘affirmatively,’ . . . ,

for example, by the nature of the declarant’s position and nature

of participation in [the] matter.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). 

 With these principles in mind, the court will consider

Eagle’s motion to strike plaintiff’s five opposing affidavits.

a. Harris Affidavit

Eagle is moving to strike eight of twelve averments from the

affidavit of plaintiff’s president, K. Michael Harris. Eagle

offers a litany of reasons as to why the court should strike each

of those averments: (1) lack of foundation; (2) improper opinion;

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(3) failure to “set forth specific facts showing . . . genuine

issues for trial[;]” (4) lack of relevancy; and (5) the averments

are “vague, ambiguous and misleading[.]” See, e.g., Def. Obj. to

Harris Aff. (doc. 98) at 1, ¶ 4. As to paragraph nine,

pertaining to the termination letter, Eagle also challenges this

averment on the basis that the letter itself is the “best

evidence of its contents[.]” Def. Obj. to Harris Aff. (doc. 98)

at 3, ¶ 9. 

Given the court’s resolution of certain issues, it is not

necessary to individually rule on each of the seven objections

which Eagle separately makes to eight of Harris’ averments. 

Suffice it to say for now that in accordance with established

Ninth Circuit precedent, the court will not consider those

aspects of the Harris affidavit which it deems to be “conclusory,

self-serving, [and] lacking [in] detailed facts and . . .

supporting evidence[.]” See Nilsson v. City of Mesa, 503 F.3d

947, 952 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Publ’g

Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997), as

amended (citations omitted)). Nor will the court consider

statements in Mr. Harris’ affidavit which are not based upon

personal knowledge and to which he is not competent to testify. 

Finally, although the court will consider the termination letter

referenced in paragraph nine of the Harris affidavit, it will not

consider the remainder of that averment. The court declines to

consider most of that averment because nowhere in its response

did plaintiff cite to any specific language therein supporting

its theory of commissions in perpetuity. 

b. Mack Affidavit

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Eagle is seeking to strike nearly the entire affidavit of

Valerie Mack, “an executive assistant for [plaintiff] . . .

[f]rom 1995 to 2002[,] . . . was responsible for internal

management of [plaintiff’s] contracts.” See Affidavit of Valerie

Mack (May 27, 2007) (doc. 48) at 1, ¶ 1. Interestingly,

plaintiff does not rely upon Ms. Mack’s affidavit to support any

of the “facts” in its SOF. Instead, the only reference to the

Mack affidavit is in plaintiff’s response memorandum. In

particular, plaintiff states that Ms. Mack’s affidavit, among

others, “attest[s] to the repeated unsuccessful efforts made by

Plaintiff to obtain an accounting and overdue commission payments

from Defendant.” Resp. (doc. 76) at 6-7. Close examination of

the Mack affidavit reveals that there is only one reference

arguably pertaining to those efforts – paragraph 6. That

paragraph states: “Throughout 1999, 2000 and 2001, I made

numerous requests of Eagle’s employee Miriam Becerra, who I

understood was the sister of Eagle’s CEO Leonard Foxman, for

sales activity reports and payment of sales commissions due to

[plaintiff], which were never provided.” Mack Aff. (doc. 48) at

6, ¶ 6. 

The court agrees with Eagle that that paragraph is

“[i]rrelevant” to the narrow issue before the court on this

motion, i.e. whether plaintiff “is entitled to commissions in

perpetuity pursuant to [the] Agreement[.]” See Def. Obj. to Mack

Aff. (doc. 99) at 2, ¶ 6. Moreover, even if paragraph 6 could

somehow be deemed relevant, given the manner in which it was

presented to the court, i.e. through counsel’s characterization

in a legal memoranda, it is insufficient to defeat Eagle’s Rule

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5 Paragraph one, quoted above, simply explains Mack’s position with

plaintiff, while paragraph seven explains that her “primary contact for

communication with Eagle was . . . Miriam Becerra and” that she “also

communicated directly with Eagle’s CEO Leonard Foxman.” Mack Aff. (doc. 48) at

6, ¶ 7. Neither of these averments advance plaintiff’s opposition argument

though, as will become evident. 

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56 motion. See Sudbeck v. Sunstone Hotel Properties, Inc., 2006

WL 2728624, at *6 (D.Ariz. 2006) (citing Smith v. Mack Trucks,

505 F.2d 1248, 1249 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam)) (“Statements of

counsel, whether in legal memoranda or elsewhere, are not

evidence and may not be relied on to either support or defeat a

motion for summary judgment.”) Thus the court will not consider

paragraph 6 of the Mack affidavit in ruling on Eagle’s Rule 56

motion.

What is more, because plaintiff is not relying upon any

other part of Ms. Mack’s affidavit in opposing this motion, there

is no need to address the fairly detailed objections which Eagle

interposes to the remainder of her affidavit. Accordingly, the

court grants Eagle’s motion to strike the Mack affidavit (doc.

99), with the exception of paragraphs 1 and 7.5 

c. Wu “Verified Statement”

Generally, Eagle objects to the “Verified Statement of

William Wu” (doc. 77 at 9) because it does not indicate the place

of execution. Nor did Mr. Wu certify that he executed that

statement “under penalty of perjury or under the laws of the

United States.” See Def. Obj. to Wu Statement (doc. 100) at 1. 

Eagle also objects in a number of ways “to the specific language”

of Mr. Wu’s statement. Id. As will be seen, this “Statement”

was not properly executed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746. 

The court therefore grants Eagle’s motion to strike Mr. Wu’s

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statement, thus rendering moot Eagle’s objections to the contents

thereof. 

Relying upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1746,

Eagle contends that the court cannot consider Mr. Wu’s statement

because it “does not constitute evidence” under either of those

provisions. See id. Eagle’s reliance upon Rule 43(c),

pertaining to the “Record of Excluded Evidence,” is puzzling to

say the least in that that Rule has been abrogated. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 43(c). 

On the other hand, Eagle is correct that Mr. Wu’s statement

does not comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, and hence it is

inadmissible. Declarations made in accordance with that statute 

satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) and thus may be

offered in support of or opposition to a summary judgment. See

Knight v. United States, 845 F.Supp. 1372, 1375 (D.Ariz. 1993),

aff’d without pub’d opinion, 77 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Essentially, section 1746 provides that any matter that “is

required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or

proved” may be done so by an unsworn declaration in writing of

the person making the same “which is subscribed by him, as true

under penalty of perjury, and dated[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1746. 

Evidently Mr. Wu’s statement was made outside the United

States as he indicates that his office is in Singapore. See Doc.

77 at 9, ¶ 4. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746(a), an unsworn

declaration “executed without the United States[]” should be in

“substantially the following form[,]” indicating that it was made

“under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States[,]”

and that it is “true and correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1746(1). 

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Although Mr. Wu’s statement recites that it “is true and

correct[,]” doc. 77 at 9, nowhere therein does Mr. Wu indicate

that he is making that statement “under penalty of perjury under

the laws of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1746(1). 

The Ninth Circuit has yet to address the issue, but at a

minimum “substantial compliance” with section 1746 seems to

require at least “[a]cceptance of the penalties of perjury[,]” if

not “both an acceptance of the penalties of perjury and a

statement that the declaration is ‘true.’” See Silva v. Chertoff,

2007 WL 1795786, at *2 and n. 4 (D.Ariz. 2007) (and cases cited

therein). Because Mr. Wu did not accept the penalties of perjury

in his statement, the court strikes that statement and will not

consider this inadmissible evidence in opposition to Eagle’s Rule

56 motion. See id. at *2 (declining to “accept” a document which

did not substantially comply with section 1746 in opposition to a

summary judgment motion).

d. Domke Affidavit

Careful review of plaintiff’s opposition shows that it is

relying upon the affidavit of Douglas C. Domke, a former ON

Semiconductor employee, to establish three relatively narrow

“facts.” First, through this affidavit plaintiff is trying to

show that “[a]ll ON Semiconductor facilities worldwide receive

their instructions from ON Semiconductor’s headquarters in

Phoenix, Arizona for the installation of test systems that were

sold by Eagle.” PSOF (doc. 77) at 2, ¶ 9 (citing Domke Aff.) 

Second, plaintiff is trying to establish that “[t]he selection

of test equipment was an ON Semiconductor corporate decision and

only ON Semiconductor’s headquarters in Phoenix, Arizona had the

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6 In contravention of LRCIv 56.1(b), plaintiff did not refer to any

specific part of Mr. Domke’s affidavit to support the statements in its SOF. The

court will overlook this omission, however, because it is easy to discern the

paragraphs upon which plaintiff intended to rely. In the future, however, the

court will not be so lenient in that “[t]he efficient management of judicial

business mandates that parties submit evidence responsibly.” See Orr, 285 F.3d

at 775. 

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authority to make purchasing decisions for its test systems

installed anywhere in the world.” Id. Third, again relying upon

an unspecified part of the Domke affidavit, plaintiff states that

“Domke, . . . , attended multiple meetings with both Eagle’s

President, . . . , and Harris’ President, . . ., for the purpose

of being briefed on the capabilities of Eagle’s products and

services.” Id. at 2-3, ¶ 11 (citation omitted).

Given this limited scope of plaintiff’s reliance upon the

Domke affidavit, Eagle’s objections to any other averments

therein are superfluous. Thus, the court will confine its

analysis of this motion to strike the Domke affidavit to the

“facts” just enumerated. When it does that the court is

compelled to strike paragraphs four, six, and seven6 for failure

to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In its present form, Mr.

Domke’s affidavit does not “affirmatively” show that he has

“personal knowledge” and “is competent to testify to the matters

stated” in those paragraphs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

Therefore, the court grants Eagle’s motion to strike those three

paragraphs. Necessarily then, the court also sustains Eagle’s

objections to paragraphs nine, ten and eleven of PSOF because

they are based exclusively upon the Domke affidavit, which the

court has struck in pertinent part.

. . .

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 e. Barcey Affidavit

Plaintiff also is attempting to rely upon the affidavit of

Russell E. Barcey, an approximately 30 year employee of Texas

Instruments, formerly Burr-Brown, who allegedly began “working

with” plaintiff “in 1983.” See Affidavit of Russell E. Barcey

(Nov. 7, 2007) (doc. 77) at 13, ¶¶ 1 and 3. Eagle is moving to

strike this entire affidavit, once again broadly asserting lack

of foundation, lack of relevancy, and “improper opinion.” See

Def. Obj. to Barcey Aff. (doc. 102) at 1, ¶ 1; and 1-2 at ¶¶ 4

and 5. 

This particular motion to strike need not detain the court

for long. Technically this motion is redundant, as previously

explained, to the extent it is premised on lack of relevancy. 

Nonetheless, even assuming the contents were otherwise

admissible, because the court agrees that the Barcey affidavit is

not relevant to the narrow issue of plaintiff’s entitlement under

the Agreement to commissions in perpetuity, the court grants this

motion to strike. 

The irrelevancy of the Barcey affidavit becomes even more

apparent taking into account the limited basis for which

plaintiff is offering it. Plaintiff mentions the Barcey

affidavit in only two paragraphs of its SOF, and nowhere in its

response. Without citing to any particular specific part of that

affidavit, in its SOF plaintiff declares that “[b]efore [it]

became the sales representative for Eagle to Burr-Brown/Texas

Instruments [(“T.I.”)], . . . . . . , [T.I.] had serious problems

with Eagle’s services and support.” PSOF (doc. 77) at 3, ¶ 12

(citation omitted). Plaintiff further declares that “[p]rior to

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[it] coming to [T.I.] as the sales representative for Eagle,

Eagle had not sold test equipment to [T.I.] in Arizona for at

least ten years.” Id. at 3, ¶ 13 (citation omitted). It is

patently obvious that neither of these declarations, assuming

they are otherwise properly supported by the Barcey affidavit,

are in any way relevant to the issue of supposedly perpetual

commissions under the Agreement. Thus, the court grants Eagle’s

motion to strike the Barcey affidavit in its entirety (doc. 102).

2. Authentication

In light of the foregoing rulings, seven “facts” in PSOF

remain for the court’s consideration. To support six of those

seven “facts,” plaintiff is relying upon various documents, all

of which Eagle is objecting to based upon lack of proper

authentication. Eagle reasons that those documents cannot

support PSOF; and thus, in turn, plaintiff has not created a

genuine issue of material fact sufficient to withstand Eagle’s

Rule 56 motion.

a. Governing Legal Standards

“Authentication is a ‘condition precedent to admissibility,

and this condition is satisfied by ‘evidence sufficient to

support a finding that the matter in question is what its

proponent claims.’” Orr, 285 F.3d at 773 (quoting Fed. R. Evid.

901(a) (footnotes omitted). “[D]ocuments authenticated through

personal knowledge must be attached to an affidavit that meets

the requirements of [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 56(e) and the affiant must

be a person through whom the exhibits could be admitted into

evidence.” Id. at 773-74 (internal quotation marks, citations

and footnote omitted). The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held

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that ‘documents which have not had a proper foundation laid to

authenticate them cannot support [or defend] against a motion for

summary judgment.’” Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d

1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Canada v. Blain’s

Helicopters, Inc., 831 F.2d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

“Consequently, objections predicated upon Federal Rule of

Evidence 901 [“Requirement of Authentication or Identification”]

are appropriate in the context of a motion for summary judgment.” 

Burch, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1120.

By the same token, however, the court agrees with the

observation in Burch that it is “questionable” whether, as here,

“the authentication requirement should be applied to bar evidence

when its authenticity is not actually disputed[.]” See id. This

proposition is “questionable” because: “[T]he Ninth Circuit has

held that a district court’s consideration of unauthenticated

evidence in conjunction with a motion for summary judgment is

harmless error when a competent witness with personal knowledge

could have authenticated the document.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Further, as the Burch court stressed, “Rule 56(e) requires only

that evidence would be admissible, not that it presently be

admissible.” Id. This harmless error “exception to the

authentication requirement is particularly warranted in cases

such as this where the objecting party does not contest the

authenticity of the evidence submitted but nevertheless makes an

evidentiary objection based on purely procedural grounds.” Id.

(citing Fenje v. Feld, 301 F.Supp.2d 781, 789 (N.D.Ill. 2003)

(“Even if a party fails to authenticate a document properly or to

lay a proper foundation, the opposing party is not acting in good

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faith in raising such an objection if the party nevertheless

knows that the document is authentic.”)). Id. (footnote

omitted). That is because “[i]n such a situation, it would

appear equally probable that the documents are what they purport

to be as it is that they are not.” Mason v. Sandham, 2007 WL

2531524, at *3 (E.D.Cal.) (citation omitted), adopted by, 2007 WL

3342196 (E.D.Cal. 2007). 

Moreover, “the court cannot ignore the fact that a nonmovant

in a summary judgment setting is not attempting to prove its

case, but instead seeks only to demonstrate that a question of

fact remains for trial.” Burch, 433 F.Supp. at 1121. Thus, in

accordance with the “general principle . . . long ago adopted by

the Ninth Circuit, whereby it treat[s] the opposing party’s

papers more indulgently than the moving party’s papers[,]” the

court declines to bar the challenged evidence for lack of

authentication. See id. (internal quotation marks, footnote and

citations omitted). 

Nonetheless, insofar as Eagle is raising other valid

objections to the remaining purported “facts,” which are

discussed below, plaintiff cannot withstand summary judgment on

the basis of these “facts.”

i. Facsimile Cover Sheet

Plaintiff is relying upon a “facsimile cover sheet” dated

January 15, 1999, to support its assertion that “In January 1999,

Eagle’s President, . . . , sent [plaintiff’s] President, . . . to

Singapore to meet with Eagle’s Managing Director for Asia[.]” See

PSOF (doc. 77) at 2, ¶ 5 (citing exh. A thereto). Even if

properly authenticated, this claimed fact has no bearing on the

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7 That Rule states in pertinent part: “To prove the content of a

writing, . . . , the original writing, . . . is required, except as otherwise

provided in these rules or by Act of Congress.” Fed. R. Evid. 1002.

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issue of whether plaintiff is entitled to commissions in

perpetuity. Hence, the court will disregard paragraph 5 of PSOF.

ii. Deposition Testimony

In its PSOF plaintiff recites that Eagle’s CEO “testified in

his deposition . . . , that ‘85 percent of our product goes to

Asia.’” PSOF (doc. 77) at 2, ¶ 8 (citing “At page 30, lines 21-

21"). Again, ignoring the lack of foundation, the court will

disregard this “fact” because it has no bearing on the commission

issue which is the subject of this motion. Furthermore, because

plaintiff did not provide excerpts, much less authenticated

excerpts, the court also is disregarding all references in

plaintiff’s response to deposition testimony. See Orr, 285 F.3d

at 774-75. 

iii. Plaintiff’s Correspondence

Additionally, to support certain “facts” plaintiff relies

upon four different letters from its president, Mr. Harris, to

Eagle, including the termination letter. As to each of these

letters, the court agrees with Eagle that pursuant to Fed. R.

Evid. 1002,7 the letters themselves are the “best evidence” of

their contents. Therefore, the court will ignore the

“generalizations by plaintiffs’ counsel” in PSOF “as to the

contents” of those letters. See Mann v. GTCR Golder Rauner,

L.L.C., 483 F.Supp.2d 884, 905 (D.Ariz. 2007) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). In any event, a careful reading of

those letters shows that they are demands for commissions already

due, and do not mention commissions in perpetuity, which is the

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focus of this motion. See PSOF (doc. 77), exhs. E, F, G and H

thereto. 

As a result of these rulings on Eagle’s motions to strike

and its objections to PSOF, as will soon become evident,

plaintiff is left with very little in the way of opposing facts. 

II. Eagle’s Rule 56 Motion

Having addressed Eagle’s numerous evidentiary objections, as

well as its motions to strike, at last the court can proceed to 

Eagle’s Rule 56 motion. 

A. Propriety of “Partial Summary Judgment”?

Relying solely upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), Eagle contends

that it is entitled to “partial summary judgment on the

determinative issue of whether the Agreement allows Harris to

passively collect commissions for sales after it terminated the

Agreement in 2000 until Eagle ceases doing business.” Mot. (doc.

44) at 1. Before addressing the merits, there are several

procedural issues which the court must address. 

The first is that Eagle is improperly relying upon

subsection (a) of Rule 56. That subsection pertains, inter alia,

to “[a] party seeking to recover upon a claim,” whereas

subsection (b) pertains to “[a] party against whom a claim . . .

is asserted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) and 56(b)(emphasis added). 

As the defendant moving with respect to one of plaintiff’s

claims, clearly Eagle should be relying upon subsection (b)

rather than upon subsection (a). The court can easily overlook

this error because there was no prejudice to plaintiff; nor did

plaintiff raise this issue.

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The court must also briefly consider the limited scope of

Eagle’s motion. “Rule 56(d) provides that if a judgment ‘is not

rendered upon the whole case . . . the court at the hearing of

the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it

and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what

material facts exist without substantial controversy. . . It

shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear

without substantial controversy . . . and directing such further

proceedings in the action as are just.’” Lies v. Farrell Lines,

Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(d)) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, on its face

Rule 56(d) “allows a court to salvage some of the effort involved

in ruling on a failed motion for summary judgment by resolving

issues of law and fact for which a trial would not be necessary.” 

In re Hat, 2007 WL 2580688, at *8 (Bankr. E.D.Cal. Sept. 4,

2007). It is less clear though whether a court “may make a

determination under [that] Rule . . . only after having been

presented with a motion for full summary judgment, having

considered it, and having determined that it cannot be

granted[,]” or whether relief may be granted under that Rule

where, as here, a party has “fil[ed] an independent motion

seeking adjudication of a particular issue, rather than filing a

motion for full summary judgment[.]” See id. Indeed, “[t]here is

a . . . split of authority as to whether a party can

independently move under Rule 56(d) for partial summary judgment

on parts of claims.” Advanced Semiconductor Materials America,

Inc. v. Applied Materials, Inc., 1995 WL 419747, at *2 (N.D.Cal.

July 10, 1995) (citations omitted). However, “Ninth Circuit

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district courts have found independent requests for partial

summary adjudication to be appropriate where the fact or issue to

be adjudicated is potentially case dispositive.” Hat, 2007 WL

2580688, at *9 (citing cases). 

Here, the issue of whether plaintiff Harris can collect

sales commissions after termination of the Agreement is not

potentially case dispositive. Nonetheless, “significant time

needed for trial would be saved[]” by early resolution of this

issue. See id. The relief which Eagle is requesting herein

“goes much further than seeking the resolution of a merely

evidentiary matter en route to summary judgment[.]” See id.

Likewise, this relief “goes much further than seeking . . . an

adjudication of an issue of fact which would not be dispositive

of an issue or even part of an issue.” Id. Thus, despite the

fact that Eagle is not moving for full summary judgment, the

court will allow this independent motion seeking resolution of

the commission issue identified above. See Watson Laboratories,

Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 178 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1122-1123

(C.D.Cal. 2001) (allowing “partial summary judgment” motion by

supplier of hypertension drug which sought to bar plaintiff from

recovering lost profit damages on sales occurring after

supplier’s obligation had expired); The Los Angeles County

Employees Retirement Association v. Towers, Perrin, Forster &

Crosby, 2002 WL 32919576, at *2 (C.D.Cal. June 20, 2002) (finding

motion for “summary adjudication . . . proper” where defendants

sought “ruling on a single element of an affirmative defense,

which . . . ha[d] the effect of narrowing the issues on

[plaintiff’s] damages claim[]”). A ruling favorable to Eagle

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would shorten any potential trial as there would no need to

litigate the issue of sales commissions allegedly due in

“perpetua[ty][.]” See Co. (doc. 1) at 3, ¶ 10. 

What is more problematic though is the fact that Eagle is

expressly moving for partial summary judgment as opposed to

partial summary adjudication. Quoting Professor Moore with

approval, the Ninth Circuit in Lies astutely observed that

although “‘[i]t is clear that Rule 56 authorizes a summary

adjudication that will often fall short of a final determination,

even of a single claim[,] . . . the term ‘partial summary

judgment’ as applied to an interlocutory summary adjudication is

often a misnomer.’” Lies, 641 F.2d at 769 n.3 (quoting 6 Moore’s

Federal Practice (hereinafter Moore’s) ¶ 56.20(3.-2) (2d ed.

1976)). That term is a misnomer because although “[s]ome courts

have concluded that Rule 56 . . . permits judgment on a portion

of a single claim[,]” Americans Disabled for Accessible Public

Transportation (ADAPT), Salt Lake Chapter v. Skywest Airlines,

Inc., 762 F.Supp. 320, 323 (D. Utah 1991) (emphasis added), those

courts have not taken into account the important distinction

between summary judgment and partial summary adjudication. As

explained by Professor Moore, “partial summary judgment is merely

a determination before the trial that certain issues shall be

deemed established in advance of the trial.” Lies, 641 F.2d at

769 n. 3 (quoting 6 Moore’s ¶ 56.20(3.-2)). 

“Partial summary judgments ‘are by their terms

interlocutory[,]’” however. Camellia Park Homeowners Ass’n v.

Greenbriar Homes Co., 882 F.Supp. 150, 151 (N.D.Cal. 1995)

(quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744

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(1976)). In fact, “‘[s]ubdivision (d) of Rule 56 indicates

clearly . . . that a partial summary ‘judgment’ is not a final

judgment[.]’” Id. (quoting Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules,

1946 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)). Thus, “‘[b]y its

terms, Rule 56(d) involves an adjudication of less than the

entire action, and consequently does not purport to authorize a

final and appealable judgment.’” ADAPT, 762 F.Supp. at 324

(quoting 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and

Procedure; Civil 2d § 2737 (citations omitted)). Accordingly, a

“partial summary judgment” does “not terminate the action as to

any of the claims or parties and the order or other form of

decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of

judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and

liabilities of all the parties.” Camellia Park, 882 F.Supp. at

151 (quoting, inter alia, Wetzel, 424 U.S. at 742-44 & n.2); see

also ADAPT, 762 F.Supp. at 324 n.2 (“A partial summary

adjudication is not final, nor does it have any res judicata

effect.”) 

In light of the foregoing, if Eagle ultimately prevails on

this Rule 56 motion, in the court’s view the more soundly

reasoned approach is to grant partial summary adjudication, not

partial summary judgment. Proceeding in this way is consistent

with the purpose of Rule 56(d) which is to “help[] to focus the

issues to be litigated, thus conserving judicial resources.” See

Advanced Semiconductor Materials America, 1995 WL 419747, at *4

(citation omitted); see also Camellia Park, 882 F.Supp. at 151

(quoting Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1946 Amendment to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)) (Pretrial adjudication under Rule 56(d)

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“‘is more nearly akin to the preliminary order under Rule 16, and

likewise serves the purpose of speeding up litigation by

eliminating before trials matters where there is no genuine issue

of fact.’”) 

B. Governing Legal Standards

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), a party is entitled to

summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” It is beyond dispute that “[t]he moving

party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of any

genuine issue of material fact.” Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia,

475 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). “The

criteria of ‘genuineness' and materiality’ are distinct

requirements.” Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912,

916 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “The requirement that an issue be ‘genuine

relates to the quantum of evidence the plaintiff must produce to

defeat the defendant's motion for summary judgment.” Id. “There

must be sufficient evidence ‘that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Id. (quoting Anderson,477

U.S. at 248). “As to materiality, the substantive law will

identify which facts are material.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

Here, as will be seen, the law of Illinois is the substantive

law. 

“Once the moving party meets its initial burden, . . . , the

burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth, by affidavit

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or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). This “[e]vidence must be

concrete and cannot rely on ‘mere speculation, conjecture, or

fantasy.’” Bates v. Clark County, 2006 WL 3308214, at * 2

(D.Nev. Nov. 13, 2006) (quoting O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer,

Inc., 792 F.2d 1464, 1467 (9th Cir. 1986)). Similarly, “a mere

‘scintilla’ of evidence” is not sufficient “to defeat a properly

supported motion for summary judgment; instead, the nonmoving

party must introduce some significant probative evidence tending

to support the complaint.” Fazio v. City & County of San

Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Anderson,

477 U.S. at 249, 252). Thus, in opposing a summary judgment

motion it is not enough to “simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 586 (citations omitted).

By the same token though, when assessing the record to

determine whether there is a “genuine issue for trial,” the court

must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor.”

Horphag, 475 F.3d at 1035 (citation omitted). “Nevertheless,

inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn.” Yang v. Peoples Benefit Ins. Co., 2007

WL 1555749, at *7 (E.D.Cal. 2007) (citations omitted).

On a summary judgment motion, the court may not make

credibility determinations; nor may it weigh conflicting

evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Thus, as framed by the

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8 Although the Agreement expressly defines “geographic area,” it does

not define “region.” Nor does the Agreement define “territory,” another word

arguably synonymous with “geographic area” and “region,” and also used in the

Agreement.

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Supreme Court, the ultimate question on a summary judgment motion

is whether the evidence “presents a sufficient disagreement to

require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that

one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52.

C. “Perpetual” Commissions

On November 12, 1998, plaintiff Harris and defendant Eagle

entered into the Agreement which is the subject of this

litigation. See Declaration of Loretta Aidikonis (May 1, 2007)

(doc. 46), exh. A thereto; see also DSOF (doc. 45) at 1, ¶ 1; and

PSOF (doc. 77) at 1, ¶ 2. Under the terms of the Agreement,

plaintiff was “appoint[ed]” to be Eagle’s “Exclusive

representative in the geographic area described as Arizona and

New Mexico[.]” Id., exh. A thereto at 5. The compensation

structure under that Agreement was dependent upon several

factors, such as where the “order[] [was] placed” and the nature

of the items ordered. Id., exh. A thereto at 7, ¶ 4(a). “For

orders placed . . . directly . . . from [plaintiff’s] region,8”

plaintiff was to receive a commission of “10% of the net system

base price as ordered.” Id. (footnote added). If a “system” was

“purchased from [Eagle] by [a] customer in another region and

directly shipped to the [plaintiff’s] region,” plaintiff would

“receive compensation of 3%[] of the net order to [Eagle] (less

other commissions paid or discounts given).” Id. (emphasis in

original). Likewise, for “system[]s . . . purchased from the

region and shipped to another region, the [plaintiff] w[as] [to]

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receive compensation of 3% of the net order to [Eagle] (less

other commissions paid or discounts given).” Id. Finally, Eagle

was to “provide commission[s] to [plaintiff] within 30 Days of

receipt of final payment by [Eagle].” Id., exh. A thereto at 7,

¶ 4(e). 

“[E]ither party” could terminate the Agreement “on ninety

(90) days written notice” without cause. Id., exh. A thereto at

8, ¶ 7(a). Continuing, the Agreement further states: “In the

event of a breach of any material provision of this agreement it

may be terminated upon written notice by either party. The

notice must specify the breach upon which termination is based.” 

Id., exh. A thereto at 8, ¶ 7(b). “Upon termination[,]” although

plaintiff “no longer ha[d] the right to act as” Eagle’s

representative, it could “continue selling any items in inventory

at the time of termination[.]” Id. at 8, ¶ 7(c). The primary

focus of this motion is the following provision:

Neither [Eagle] nor [plaintiff] shall by 

reason of the termination, be liable to 

the other for compensation, reimbursement 

or damages on account of the loss of prospective 

profits or anticipated sales, or on account 

of expenditures, investments, leases or commitments 

made in connection with this agreement. Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing contained 

in this paragraph shall be deemed to limit or 

otherwise restrict either parties [sic] right to 

recover damages for the other parties [sic] breach 

of any provision of this agreement.

Id. at 9, ¶ 7(f) (emphasis added). 

The Agreement concluded with an integration clause

prohibiting oral modification. Instead, the Agreement expressly

required that “[a]ny amendment [thereto] must be authorized in

writing by qualified officers of both parties.” Id. at 10, ¶ 13.

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By letter dated November 29, 2000, plaintiff’s president,

Mike Harris, advised Len Foxman, Eagle’s CEO, that he was

“terminat[ing] the [Agreement][.]” Id., exh. B thereto at 13. 

Mr. Harris explained: “I have not received a commission check

from [Eagle] since April 2000, and have yet to receive any

commissions from bookings in the year 2000. In addition, I

believe there are other commissions outstanding from 1999.” Id.

Harris added that he “fe[lt]” that he was “entitled to at least

3% of all business generated by [his] efforts at ON Semiconductor

. . . , and per the contract.” Id. 

In that letter, Mr. Harris specifically “demand[ed] a full

accounting of the commissions due and for [Eagle] to issue a

commission check immediately.” Id. Mr. Harris also indicated

that he was “aware” of “exist[ing] purchase orders which [Eagle]

ha[d] yet to deliver against and” that he “expect[ed] those

moneys to be paid out in accordance to the terms in the

contract.” Id. In light of the foregoing, Mr. Harris

emphatically stated, that “[b]y failing to pay [plaintiff] for

the past 9 months, you have given me no choice but to terminate

the contract effective immediately.” Id. Mr. Harris explicitly

informed Eagle that plaintiff was “no longer represent[ing]

[it].” Id.

As noted earlier, plaintiff does not controvert the fact

that “Eagle paid [it] a total of $152,538.34 in commissions for

sales that were ordered prior to March 1, 2001, which was 90 days

after [plaintiff] terminated the Agreement on November 29, 2000.” 

DSOF (doc. 45) at 1, ¶ 3 (citations omitted). In other words,

plaintiff has been “paid additional commissions for sales that

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9 Therefore, to the extent the parties are relying upon law from other

jurisdictions -- Eagle upon Ohio law as interpreted in Gadsby v. Norwalk

Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324 (7th Cir. 1995) and plaintiff upon Indiana law as

interpreted in Harold Wright Co., Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 49 F.3d

308 (7th Cir. 1995) – the court concludes that they are not binding. 

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[it] had closed, but for which” it “had not yet been paid when it

sent the above quoted letter. See Mot. (doc. 44) at 1. Despite

those payments, based upon its theory that pursuant to the

Agreement commissions “are exclusive, perpetual and proprietary

and [that] the Agreement does not provide for [their]. . .

cessation, release or waiver . . . for any reason[,]” plaintiff

is claiming that it is entitled to additional unspecified “sales

commissions due and unpaid[.]” Co. (doc. 1) at 3, ¶ 10 (emphasis

added); and at 6, ¶ I. Given Eagle’s alleged “fail[ure] and

refus[al] to pay sales commissions[,]” plaintiff is alleging

breach of contract, unjust enrichment and demanding an

accounting. Id. at 5, ¶¶ 22 and 24. 

Plaintiff believes that Eagle is “mov[ing] for summary

judgment on [its] breach of contract claim.” Resp. (doc. 76) at

5. Plaintiff misconstrues the scope of this motion. As noted at

the outset, Eagle’s motion is narrowly circumscribed. It is

seeking partial summary adjudication on the “issue of whether the

Agreement allows [plaintiff] to passively collect commissions for

sales after it terminated the Agreement in 2000 until Eagle

ceases doing business.” Mot. (doc. 44) at 1. The court will

confine its analysis to this discrete issue. 

The parties agree that in accordance with the express terms

of the contract, Illinois law governs this dispute.9

 See

Aidikonis Decl’n (doc. 46), exh. A thereto at 10, ¶ 11 (“Should

any conflicts arise concerning this agreement . . . , action may

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be brought to resolve the conflict according to the laws of the

State of Illinois[.]”) “Under Illinois law, the Court must

interpret the language of the contact in accordance with its

plain meaning and must construe the contract as a whole.” 

Continental Casualty Co. v. LaSalle RE Ltd., 511 F.Supp.2d 943,

947 (N.D.Ill. 2007) (citations omitted). “The Court also must

ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties.” 

Continental Casualty, 511 F.Supp.2d at 947 (citation omitted). 

There is a presumption under Illinois law that “[a] written

contract . . . speak[s] the intention of the parties who signed

it, and their intentions must be determined from the language

used.” Id. (citation omitted). In this regard, “[u]nless a

contract clearly specifies its own meanings, a court must

interpret the words of the contract with their common and

generally accepted meanings.” William Blair & Co., LLC v. FI

Liquidation Corp., 358 Ill.App.3d 324, 335 (2005) (citation

omitted). Stated somewhat differently, “[w]here a court can

have reasonable confidence that it knows what the contract means,

it can . . . decide the issue at hand on the basis of the

contractual language alone.” In re Ocwen, 2005 WL 1027118, at *4

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such is the

case here. 

Illinois law further “presume[s] that all [contract]

provisions were inserted for a purpose, and conflicting

provisions will be reconciled if possible so as to give effect to

all of the contract’s provisions.” SMS Demag Aktiengesellschaft

v. Material Sciences Corp., 2007 WL 4191937, at *17 (C.D.Ill.

2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Thus, a

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contract must be construed such that none of its terms are

regarded as mere surplusage.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). 

“Additionally, a court cannot alter, change or modify the

existing terms of a contract or add new terms or conditions to

which the parties do not appear to have assented, write into the

contract something which the parties have omitted or take away

something which the parties have included.” Continental

Casualty, 511 F.Supp.2d at 947 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Further, where, as here, “a contract purports

on its face to be a complete expression of the parties’ entire

agreement, courts will not add another term about which the

agreement is silent.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, “[t]he

Court’s analysis begins with the language of the contract itself,

and ‘[i]f the language itself unambiguously answers the question

at issue, the inquiry is over.’” Id. (quoting Emergency Med.

Care, Inc. v. Marion Mem. Hosp., 94 F.3d 1059, 1060-61 (7th Cir.

1996) (interpreting Illinois law)). 

 “Construing the language employed in a contract is a matter

of law appropriate for summary judgment . . . , unless the

contract is ambiguous. Paul B. Episcope, Ltd. v. Law Offices of

Campbell and Di Vincenzo, 373 Ill.App.3d 384, 389 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted), appeal denied, 225 Ill.2d

639 (2007). “Whether an ambiguity exists in a document is a

question of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Plainly, then, “[t]he initial inquiry for th[is]

district court is . . . whether the [Agreement] is ambiguous.” 

See In re Ocwen Federal Bank FSB Mortgage Servicing Litigation,

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10 To support its position, Eagle relies heavily upon Gadsby v. Norwalk

Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324 (7th Cir. 1995). Although Eagle explicitly states

that the Gadsby Court was interpreting Illinois law, Mot. (Doc. 44) at 6; and

Reply (doc. 96) at 7, it was not. The Gadsby court was interpreting Ohio law.

See id. at 1327. Therefore, Gadsby does not apply here. 

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2005 WL 1027118, at *4 (N.D.Ill. 2005)(citation omitted). “A

contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to more

than one meaning[.]” Paul B. Episcope, 373 Ill.App.3d at 389

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also

Clarendon American Insurance Co. v. Aargus Security Systems,

Inc., 374 Ill.App.3d 591, 595 (2007) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted) (“A contract term is ambiguous if it can

reasonably be interpreted in more than one way due to the

indefiniteness of the language or due to it having a double or

multiple meaning.”) However, “[a]ny ambiguity claimed has to be

asserted reasonably and plausibly.” Id. “The interpretation of

the party contending for ambiguity needs to be equally plausible

to the construction of the party arguing the contract is

unambiguous.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Here, Eagle contends that the Agreement is unambiguous: 

plaintiff is not entitled to commissions in perpetuity. In

making this argument, Eagle stresses that section 7(f) of the

Agreement clearly states, in part, that “[n]either” party “by

reason of termination” shall “be liable to the other . . . on

account of the loss of prospective profits or anticipated

sales[.]” Aidikonis Decl’n (doc. 46), exh. A thereto at 9, 

¶ 7(f). Not only that, as Eagle is quick to point out, the

Agreement does not contain any “express . . . provision for the

payment of commissions ad infinitum.” Mot. (doc. 44) at 6

(internal quotation marks omitted).10 Rather, plaintiff’s

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entitlement to commissions was tied directly to its status as

Eagle’s manufacturer’s representative, for which plaintiff had

certain enumerated “responsibilities.” See Aidikonis Decl’n

(doc. 46), exh. A thereto at 6, §(b). Thus, when plaintiff

“formal[ly] notifi[ed]” Eagle that it was “no longer

represent[ing]” Eagle and that plaintiff was “terminat[ing] the

[Agreement] effective immediately[,]” id., exh. B thereto at 13,

Eagle took the position (which it adheres to on this motion) that

plaintiff’s “contractual right to receive commissions” ended. 

See Mot. (doc. 44) at 7. 

Plaintiff retorts that sections four (“Compensation and

Payment Terms”) and seven (“Termination”) of the 

Agreement “are ambiguous and open to multiple interpretations[,]”

thus precluding partial summary adjudication. See Resp. (Doc.

76) at 3. Yet, plaintiff does not elaborate upon this argument

at all. See id. This omission is significant. Just as “an

ambiguity is not created merely because the parties disagree[,]”

Paul B. Episcope, 373 Ill.App.3d at 389 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted), it is not enough to merely state that a

contract term is ambiguous. To the contrary, “[a] party

asserting that a contract is ambiguous has the burden of

‘convinc[ing] a judge that this is the case.’” In re Ocwen, 2005

WL 1027118, at *4 (quoting Murphy v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co.,

61 F.3d 560, 565 (7th Cir. 1995)). This is done by “produc[ing]

objective facts, not subjective and self-serving testimony, to

show that a contract which looks clear on its face is actually

ambiguous.” Murphy, 61 F.3d at 565 (citations omitted). 

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Plaintiff has not met this burden of production. Nor has

plaintiff, as it must, come forward with a reasonable and

plausible interpretation of the Agreement which would support its

view that it is entitled to commissions thereunder in perpetuity. 

Indeed, plaintiff does not advance any alternative

interpretations of the Agreement, much less a reasonable and

plausible one. 

Focusing upon the language of the Agreement, plaintiff

impliedly asserts that the following language creates an

ambiguity:

Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing contained 

in this paragraph shall be deemed to limit or 

otherwise restrict either parties [sic] right to 

recover damages for the other parties [sic] breach 

of any provision of this agreement.

See Aidikonis Decl’n (doc. 46), exh. A thereto at 9, § 7(f). The

fundamental weakness with this position is that, again, plaintiff

does not explain how this supposed ambiguity arises.

Moreover, the just quoted provision is not susceptible of

more than one reasonable interpretation, either when read in

isolation or in the broader context of section seven (f) as a

whole. Plaintiff’s November 29, 2000, letter to Eagle

unequivocally states that it is “terminat[ing] the contract

effective immediately[.]” Id., exh. B thereto at 13. Once it did

that, under the plain terms of the Agreement, Eagle is not

“liable to [plaintiff] for compensation, . . . on account of the

loss of prospective profits on anticipated sales[.]” Id., exh. A

thereto at 9, § 7(f). This language is unequivocal; it does not

have double or multiple meanings. Plaintiff’s suggestion to the

contrary is not persuasive.

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11 “A deposition or an extract therefrom is authenticated in a motion

for summary judgment when it identifies the names of the deponent and the action

and includes the reporter’s certification that the deposition is a true record

of the testimony of the deponent.” Orr, 285 F.3d at 774 (citations and footnote

omitted). “Ordinarily, this wculd have to be accomplished by attaching the cover

page of the deposition and the reporter’s certification to every deposition

extract submitted.” Id. Plaintiff did not do that here. In fact, plaintiff did

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Not only that, requiring payment of commissions in

perpetuity, as plaintiff urges, would render meaningless the

first sentence of section 7(f) prohibiting recovery for “the loss

of prospective profits or anticipated sales” if the Agreement is

terminated. See Aidikonis Decl’n (doc. 46), exh. A thereto at 9,

¶ 7(f). Such a reading is contrary to the settled Illinois

contract principles outlined herein. Likewise, “interpreting the

Agreement as requiring perpetual commissions would deprive the

termination provisions of any practical effect and render them

meaningless.” Mot. (doc. 44) at 8. Finally interpreting the

Agreement as plaintiff urges, to allow for commissions in

perpetuity, would violate the “well settled” principle that

“‘courts are not in the business of rewriting contracts to

appease a disgruntled party unhappy with the bargain it

struck.’” See SMS Demag, 2007 WL 4191937, at *10 (quoting Davis

v. G.N. Mortgage Corp., 396 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2005)

(applying Illinois law)) (other citation omitted). 

Plaintiff attempts to create an ambiguity where none exists

by resorting to extrinsic evidence in several forms. For

example, supposedly plaintiff’s president testified that the

November 29, 2000 letter was “a demand for payment of commissions

due[,]” whereas supposedly Eagle’s CEO construed that letter as a 

voluntary termination of the Agreement. Resp. (doc. 76) at 5. 

Overlooking the lack of proper authentication,11 still, it would

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not even include any deposition extracts; it simply cites to them. 

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be improper for the court to consider this deposition testimony. 

That is so because plaintiff is putting the proverbial cart

before the horse. Use of extrinsic evidence is permissible to

resolve an ambiguity. See Cambridge Engineering, Inc. v. Mercury

Partners 90, 2007 WL 4302511, at *9 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2007). 

However, “when the language of a contract is unambiguous,” as it

is here, there is no need to “resort[] to extrinsic evidence.” 

Id. (citations omitted). 

Along those same lines, plaintiff cannot defeat Eagle’s

motion on the basis of paragraph 22 of PSOF. In that paragraph,

plaintiff claims that after receiving the November 29, 2000

letter, Eagle called, “requesting that [plaintiff] continue sales

efforts on behalf of Eagle and . . . promis[ing] that . . .

commission payments . . . would be brought current and continue.” 

PSOF (doc. 77) at 22 (citation omitted). “In reliance” on that

“promise to promptly pay sales commissions . . . for past and

future sales activity,” plaintiff claims that it “agreed to

continue its sale s efforts on behalf of Eagle.” Id. (citation

omitted). The court is excluding this evidence, however, because

although plaintiff is relying upon the Harris affidavit to

support this statement, but it did not cite to any particular

paragraphs in that affidavit. See Orr, 285 F.3d at 775 n. 14 (on

a summary judgment motion, “when a party relies on . . . an

affidavit without citing to paragraph numbers[,] . . . the trial

court may in its discretion exclude the evidence[]”). And, once

again, extrinsic evidence is not relevant when a contract is

unambiguous, as is the Agreement at issue herein.

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Similarly there is no need, as plaintiff urges, to resort to

the assistance of an independent industry expert to inform the

trier of fact . . . of industry practices[.]” Resp. (doc. 76) at

3. Indeed, Illinois courts have consistently held “that in the

absence of ambiguity[,] contract interpretation is a question of

law for which expert testimony would not be appropriate.” 

William Blair, 358 Ill.App.3d at 338-39 (citing cases). 

To avoid the obvious, plaintiff raises the specter that this

Agreement was orally modified to expand its “sales region . . .

to include Asia.” See Resp. (doc. 76) at 7. This argument, as

with much of plaintiff’s opposition, is not responsive to the

narrow issue before the court on this motion, i.e. plaintiff’s

claimed entitlement to commissions in perpetuity under the

Agreement. As the court has just found, plaintiff is not

entitled to commissions in perpetuity; that is so regardless of

how “sales region” is defined.

As another means of avoiding the plain language of the

Agreement, plaintiff invokes the procuring cause doctrine. Under

that doctrine, “a party ‘may be entitled to commission on sales

made after termination of a contract if that party procured the

sales through its activities prior to termination.’” Hammond

Group, Ltd. v. Spalding & Evenflo Companies, Inc., 69 F.3d 845,

850 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing, inter alia, Scheduling Corp. Of

America v. Massello (Massello II), 151 Ill.App.3d 565 (1987)). 

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12 This assumption is highly doubtful, especially at this point where

plaintiff has not “offer[ed] any evidence tying specific invoices to efforts”

made by it. See Hammond, 69 F.3d at 850. Here, all that plaintiff has done is

to baldly refer to accounts listed by name only it its complaint, without

reference to time frame or region. This is an insufficient basis upon which to

allow recovery under the procuring cause doctrine. See id. (under Illinois law,

procuring cause doctrine did not entitle a manufacturer’s representative to

recover commissions which arose after contract termination where the

representative “did not offer any evidence tying specific invoices to [its]

efforts”). 

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Assuming arguendo that this doctrine otherwise applies,12 it,

too, is non-responsive to the issue of perpetual commissions. 

Lastly, plaintiff contends that regardless of the plain

language of the Agreement under the Illinois Sales Representative

Act, 820 ILSC § 120/0.01 et seq. and its Arizona counterpart, ARS

§ 44-1798 et seq., it is entitled to commissions in perpetuity. 

The fundamental flaw with this argument is that plaintiff’s

complaint does not mention either of these Acts; and a

“[p]laintiff, . . . , cannot raise a new theory of liability in

opposition to summary judgment.” Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc.

v. Fortis Ins. Co., Inc., 520 F.Supp.2d 1184, 1193 n. 9 (C.D.Cal.

2007) (citing Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1292

(9th Cir. 2000)). Consequently, plaintiff’s reliance upon these

Acts to defeat this motion for partial summary adjudication is

unavailing. 

In short, for all of these reasons, the court grants

defendant’s motion for partial summary adjudication finding that

plaintiff is not “allow[ed] . . . to passively collect

commissions for sales after it terminated the Agreement in 2000

until [defendant] ceases doing business.” See Mot. (doc. 44) at

1.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the court hereby 

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(1) GRANTS defendant’s motion to strike the affidavit of K.

Michael Harris (doc. 98) to the extent set forth herein;

(2) GRANTS defendant’s motion to strike the affidavit of

Valerie Mack (doc. 99), with the exception of paragraphs one and

seven;

(3) GRANTS defendant’s motion to strike the “Verified

Statement of William Wu (doc. 100);

(4) GRANTS defendant’s motion to strike paragraphs four, six

and seven of the affidavit of Douglas C. Domke (doc. 101);

(5) GRANTS defendant’s motion to strike the affidavit of

Russell E. Barcey (doc. 102); and

(6) GRANTS defendant’s motion for partial summary

adjudication finding that plaintiff is not “allow[ed] . . . to

passively collect commissions for sales after it terminated the

Agreement[.]” See Mot. (doc. 44) at 1.

DATED this 5th day of February, 2008.

Copies to all counsel of record

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