Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00430/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00430-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VIRIGL GRAVES, VIRGIL GRAVES,

SR., BEVERLY WARD, and COREY

GRAVES,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF STOCKTON, STOCKTON

POLICE DEPARTMENT, CHIEF MARK

W. HERDER, OFFICER JENNEIAHN

(#1471), OFFICER FRY (#1480),

OFFICER JOHNSON (#4k49),

OFFICER GRAVIETTE, SENIOR CADET

WONG, SGT. MURRELL, SGT.

RESTUCIA, OFFICER RIDENOUR

(#1433), DETECTIVE C.

VILLANUEVA (#1120), DETECTIVE

T. KAMIGAKI (#4188), OFFICER

THRUSH (#1114), and DOES 4 to

20,

Defendants.

CIV-S-04-0430 DFL KJM 

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Virgil Graves, Jr. (“Graves”), Virgil Graves, Sr.

(“Graves, Sr.”), and Corey Graves (“Corey”) bring this excessive

force action against the City of Stockton (“City”), the Stockton

Police Department (“SPD”), and twelve individual officers under

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42 U.S.C. § 1983 and several state statutes. Defendants move for

summary judgment on all of plaintiffs’ claims. For the reasons

stated below, the motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. 

I.

This case turns on whether the defendant officers used

excessive force on two different occasions. The parties agree

that a police dog bit Graves on the two occasions. However, the

parties present conflicting accounts of the facts and

circumstances surrounding the incidents. Because defendants

filed this motion for summary judgment, the court views the facts

and circumstances surrounding each incident in the light most

favorable to plaintiffs. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986).

A. March 22, 2002

The first incident occurred on March 22, 2002. The court

accepts the following facts as true for purposes of this motion. 

Officers Jenneiahn and Fry responded to a disturbance involving

Graves and another man. (Pls.’ Resp. to SUF ¶ 2.) When the

officers arrived on the scene, Graves and the other man were

yelling at each other. (Id. ¶ 4.) The officers separated the

two men. (Id.) Jenneiahn walked with Graves towards a police

car. (Graves Dep. 37:4, Oct. 25, 2005; Jenneiahn Dep. 20:11, May

18, 2005.) Jenneiahn informed Graves numerous times that he was

not under arrest. (Pls.’ Resp. to SUF ¶ 7.) Graves voluntarily

submitted to a pat-down by Jenneiahn. (Id. ¶ 8.) The pat-down

did not uncover a weapon. (Id.) Officer Jenneiahn instructed

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Graves to get into the police car. (Id. ¶ 9.) Graves complied

with Jenneiahn’s request and sat in the backseat of the police

car. (Graves Dep. 38:20-39:2.) Johnson arrived on the scene

with a police dog. (Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ SUF ¶ 11.) While

Graves was seated in the car, Johnson’s police dog attacked him

without warning. (Graves Dep. 40:15-16; 42:1-12.) Moments

later, Jenneiahn began striking Graves with a baton and taunting

him. (Id. 40:17-19; 42:24-43:3.) Graves remained in the vehicle

for approximately one minute before an officer pulled him out of

the car by his hair. (Id. 41:9-13.) Using its teeth, the dog

held Graves’ arm throughout the entire incident, and did not

release its grip until after the police had Graves in handcuffs. 

(Id. 40:21-41:6.) Graves’ bite wounds were treated at the County

Hospital. (Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ SUF ¶ 31.)

B. April 10, 2002

The second incident occurred on April 10, 2002. The court

accepts the following facts as true for purposes of this motion.

Graves escaped from police custody on April 7, 2002. (Pls.’

Resp. to Defs.’ SUF ¶ 35.) On April 10, 2002, the police staked

out Graves’ apartment because he was wanted for robbery and

escape. (Id. ¶ 36, 38.) At some point, Graves got into a car

with his mother, Corey, and Graves, Sr. and drove away from the

apartment building. (Id. ¶¶ 40-41.) Graves and his family

pulled into a gas station and Graves exited the vehicle. (Id. ¶

42-43.) Two plainclothes police officers arrived at the gas

station in an unmarked car, got out of the car, drew their

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weapons, and ordered Graves to “freeze.” (Graves Dep. 59:6-15.) 

Several other officers arrived on the scene and also drew their

weapons. (Id. 59:15-18.) The officers instructed Graves to get

on the ground. (Id. 59:18-19.) Graves raised his hands in the

air and lowered himself to his knees. (Id. 61:13-15.) An

officer approached Graves and kneed him. (Id. 61:16-18.) Graves

grabbed a nearby steel pole that was concreted into the ground. 

(Id. 62:1-2.) After five other officers approached Graves and

began striking him, Graves let go of the pole. (Id. 62:10-14,

63:22-24.) The officers took control of Graves’ arms, began

choking him, and sprayed mace on his face. (Id. 63:25-64:10.) 

The officers handcuffed Graves, put leg restraints on him, and

connected the leg restraints to the handcuffs in a “hogtie”. 

(Id. 65:7-17.) At that point, while he was hogtied and on the

ground, the police dog attacked Graves without warning. (Id.

65:7-9; 65:15-18; 64:24-65:3.) The dog bit him several times on

the shoulder and ripped off a chunk of his left ear. (Id.) The

officers then threw Graves into the back of a police car and took

him to jail. (Id. 65:4-6.) After photographing him at the jail,

the police took Graves to the County Hospital for treatment. 

(Id.) Graves, Sr. and Corey witnessed the events at the gas

station. 

II.

Plaintiffs originally asserted a host of claims against

fourteen defendants. After defendants moved for summary

judgment, the parties stipulated to dismiss all claims except the

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following: (1) Graves’ § 1983 claim for excessive force in

violation of the Fourth Amendment against the City, Jenneiahn,

Johnson, Villanueva, Kamigaki, and Thrush; (2) Graves’ claims for

battery and negligence against the City, Jenneiahn, Johnson,

Villanueva, Kamigaki, and Thrush; and (3) Graves, Sr. and Corey’s

intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence

claims against the City, Villanueva, Kamigaki, and Thrush. 

Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims.

A. Excessive Force

The officers argue that they are entitled to qualified

immunity from Graves’ excessive force claim under § 1983. 

Qualified immunity protects “government officials performing

discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727

(1982). Courts follow a two-step test when determining whether

an official is entitled to qualified immunity. First, the court

must determine whether “[t]aken in the light most favorable to

the party asserting the injury . . . the facts alleged show

[that] the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001). 

Second, the law must clearly establish “that the officer’s

conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the case.” Id. at

207. According to plaintiff Graves’ version of the facts, on

both occasions the defendant officers used a dog to bite Graves

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 Plaintiffs also submit a declaration from an expert 1

witness who states that the SPD’s lack of a canine policy caused

Graves’ injuries. (Bogardus Decl. ¶ 19.) He also asserts that

the Department had a policy permitting excessive force because it

failed to criticize either dog handler for his conduct. 

However, at the hearing plaintiffs conceded that the SPD had a

canine use policy when the incidents occurred. Therefore, this

argument fails. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the

Department ratified the conduct of the dog handlers having found

the facts to be as plaintiffs assert. 

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when there was no reason to use any additional force. If these

are the facts, then the officers used excessive force and cannot

claim that there was any uncertainty as to their right to use the

force employed. 

B. Liability of the City under § 1983

Plaintiff Graves also sues the City under § 1983. “[A]

municipality cannot be held liable under 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). Thus, the City is not liable

under § 1983 for the negligence of its employees. See Thompson

v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Instead, plaintiff Graves must show that a City policy, practice,

or custom caused the violation of his rights. Monell, 436 at

690; see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct.

3099 (1985) (finding that a city is liable if it is the “moving

force” behind a civil rights violation). 

Plaintiff Graves asserts two bases for holding the City

liable: (1) “the officers used force in accordance with and

pursuant to department policy”; and (2) the City failed “to train

or supervise” the officers. However, plaintiff Graves fails to 1

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provide sufficient evidence to support either basis for municipal

liability.

1. Use of Force in Accordance With Policy

Defendants have the burden of showing that plaintiff Graves

has failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury could

find that a City policy, custom, or practice caused the violation

of his rights. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct.

2548 (1986). To satisfy this burden, defendants provide the SPD

canine use policy and the SPD use of force policy. 

The SPD canine use policy is five pages long and sets forth

guidelines for the “[u]se of police canines.” (Green Decl. Ex.

11.) The policy states: “Canine use should be tempered with an

awareness of the public’s sensitivity and occasional outright

fear of dogs.” (Id.) According to the policy, there are six

intended uses of SPD canines: (1) “Officer personal safety”; (2)

“Apprehension of fleeing suspects”; (3) “Search”; (4) “Approved

crowd control”; (5) “Mutual aid requests”; and (6) “Demonstration

requests.” (Id.) The policy provides that a police dog can be

used to assist an officer who is being assaulted; however, a dog

should only be used “when it appears obvious other less

aggressive measures of defense would not be effective, (i.e.

negotiation, physical restraint).” (Id.) 

The SPD use of force policy is eleven pages long. It

states: “Department members may use reasonable force to effect an

arrest, prevent an escape, or overcome resistance. The type and

degree of force used will be reasonable, based upon the facts of

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the situation. Only that force necessary and reasonable for the

crime involved will be used.” (Id.) The use of a police dog is

considered force under the policy and is prohibited “against noncombative persons” except to conduct a search. (Id.)

In response, the only evidence plaintiff Graves provides to

support his claim is the deposition testimony of Johnson and

Thrush, the dog handlers involved in the two incidents. (Opp’n

at 23-26.) At his deposition, Johnson stated that he believed

“department rules” permitted him to release a dog on a man who

was striking another officer in the chest in an effort to escape. 

(Johnson Dep. 46:8-25.) Officer Thrush stated that “our canine

sergeant” declared that the April 10, 2002 bite was “in policy”

because Graves was wanted for felony robbery, he was actively

resisting arrest, and was assaulting police officers. (Thrush

Dep. 72:7-11.) 

There are a number of problems with plaintiff Graves’

submission. First, these barebones comments do not establish

what department policy was at the time of the incidents. Johnson

merely states that he thinks he acted in conformity with policy. 

There is no showing on what he based his opinion. Thrush’s

testimony is equally unhelpful. He gives a second hand version

of what another officer concluded based on circumstances that are

not specified in any detail. Plaintiff Graves apparently failed

to depose those persons in the department who are responsible for

formulation of the department’s policies on the use of force. 

On the basis of this scanty proof no reasonable juror could

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conclude that the department had a policy that was different than

its announced written policy. Second, it is not at all clear

from these brief comments that the policy as described would

permit an unreasonable use of force. In both depositions the

officers describe situations in which an officer is under direct

assault. Finally, there is no evidence of recurring instances of

excessive force by dog handlers such that a jury could conclude

that the department had a policy or custom other than that

expressed in its written policy. See Meehan v. County of Los

Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that evidence

of illegal conduct during two police raids was not enough to show

a practice or custom); Nadell v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t,

268 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2000)(holding that proof of single

incident of unconstitutional activity does not show a custom or

practice).

In sum, on the evidence provided, plaintiff Graves fails to

show that the defendants were acting in accordance with an

unconstitutional policy. 

2. Inadequate Training

To succeed on a § 1983 claim against the City under a theory

of inadequate training, plaintiff Graves must show that: (1) the

City failed to provide adequate training; (2) the City exhibited

deliberate indifference to adequately training the officers; and

(3) the inadequate training caused the deprivation of Graves’

rights. However, plaintiff Graves has provided no evidence to

show that the City failed to provide adequate training or that

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the City was deliberately indifferent to the training of its

officers. In fact, after naming this theory as one of two bases

for City liability, plaintiff Graves fails to discuss it at all,

perhaps conceding the point. Without introducing evidence of the

training programs offered by the City or the training that the

individual defendants received, plaintiff Graves cannot succeed

at trial on the claim that he was injured because the City failed

to adequately train its officers.

Because plaintiff Graves have failed to produce evidence to

allow a reasonable jury to find the City liable for his injuries,

defendants’ motion is GRANTED on the § 1983 claim against the

City. 

C. Liability Under the California Tort Claims Act

Plaintiffs assert state law claims for negligence,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and battery against

all defendants. Defendants argue that they are immune from these

claims under Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 820.2, 820.4, and 821.6. 

However, “California denies immunity to police officers who use

excessive force in arresting a suspect.” Robinson v. Solano

County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Scruggs v.

Haynes, 252 Cal.App.2d 256, 264 (1967) (“The California cases

have consistently held that a peace officer making an arrest is

liable to the person arrested for using unreasonable force.”). 

Therefore, none of the immunities claimed by the individual

defendants applies here. The individual defendants’ motions for

summary judgment based on statutory immunities are DENIED.

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The California Tort Claims Act provides that public entities

in California are liable for injuries caused by their employees

if: (1) the employees were acting within the scope of their

employment; and (2) the employee could be held personally liable

for the action. Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(a). From the facts as

presented by Graves, a jury could conclude that the officers

caused his injuries during the course of their employment. As

discussed above, those individual defendants are not immune from

suit if the force used against Graves was unreasonable. 

Therefore, the City, as employer of the individual defendants,

can be held liable for plaintiffs’ damages under § 815.2(a). The

City’s motion for summary judgment based on statutory immunity is

DENIED.

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Graves, Sr. and Corey assert claims for intentional

infliction of emotional distress. The relevant facts for these

claims, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, 

are as follows. Graves, Sr. and Corey watched a dog attack

Graves, their son and brother, respectively, at the direction of

a police officer, while Graves was lying on the ground in a

hogtie, and while they were detained in separate police cars,

unable to assist him.

The elements of an intentional infliction of emotional

distress (“IIED”) claim in California are: (1) “[e]xtreme and

outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of

causing, or reckless disregard of the potential for causing,

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emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or

extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate

causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous

conduct.” KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 31 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1028

(1995). Defendants argue that plaintiffs cannot prove the first

two of these elements.

1. Extreme and Outrageous Conduct

 “Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed

all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” 

Id. (citation omitted). “Generally, conduct will be found to be

actionable where the recitation of the facts to an average member

of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor,

and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!'” Id. (citation and

internal quotation omitted). The court finds that, when viewing

the facts in the light most favorable to Graves, a jury could

find that the police engaged in outrageous behavior when they

directed a police dog to bite a hogtied man so viciously that

part of his ear was ripped off. 

In addition, the court finds that a reasonable jury could

conclude that the officers exercised reckless disregard towards

Graves, Sr. and Corey when they ordered the dog to attack Graves

while he was hogtied and in their plain view. Because plaintiffs

need not prove that defendants intended to injure Graves, Sr. and

Corey, just that they “devoted little or no thought to [the]

probable consequences of [their] conduct,” the court finds that

defendants engaged in the requisite conduct to support an IIED

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claim. Id. 

2. Emotional Distress

Emotional distress for which a plaintiff can recover

“includes fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry,

mortification, shock, humiliation and indignity, in addition to

physical pain.” Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal.3d 644, 648-49 (1989). 

It may include “all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as

fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger,

chagrin, disappointment, worry and nausea.” Young v. Bank of

America, 141 Cal.App.3d 108, 114 (1983). “Severe emotional

distress means . . . emotional distress of such substantial

quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in a

civilized society should be expected to endure it.” Girard v.

Ball, 125 Cal.App.3d 772, 787-88 (1981) (internal citation

omitted). “It is for the court to determine whether on the

evidence severe emotional distress can be found; it is for the

jury to determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact

existed.” Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.App.3d 376,

397 (1970). 

Graves, Sr. avers that he gets visions of his son’s mauling

whenever he returns to the gas station, and that he has woken up

at night “frightened and frustrated by being handcuffed in the

police car and forced to watch the cops mutilate my boy with a

dog and not being able to do anything about it.” (Graves, Sr.

Dep. ¶ 6.) Corey avers that she could not sleep for “quite a

while, thinking about how the cops treated my brother. In fact,

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I cried about it for several days.” (Corey Dep. at 2.) 

The California case law reveals that a reasonable jury could

conclude that these facts constitute severe emotional distress. 

In Young, a woman sued Bank of America for IIED because the bank

instituted a collection action against her for unpaid credit

charges even though she had informed the bank that her credit

card had been stolen. 141 Cal.App.3d at 115. She claimed that

her negative credit rating and the rejection of a credit card

application caused her embarrassment, shame, and feelings of

helplessness and frustration. Id. “She complained of severe

stress, nervousness, headaches, and insomnia.” Id. The

appellate court upheld the trial court’s finding that the

plaintiff had alleged facts from which a reasonable jury could

conclude that she had suffered severe emotional distress. Id.

Similarly, in Golden v. Dungan, 20 Cal.App.3d 295, 311

(1971), the plaintiff made an IIED claim against a process server

who knocked on his door at 11:00 in the evening. The plaintiff

alleged that as a result of this disruption to his sleep and

ensuing interaction, the “plaintiff became frightened, upset,

nervous and humiliated, and suffered extreme and severe mental

suffering and duress.” 20 Cal.App.3d at 311. The court found

that this was enough for the claim to survive summary judgment. 

Id. 

Graves, Sr. alleges that he experienced fright, grief,

shame, and disappointment as a result of witnessing the attack on

his son. Corey alleges that she suffered grief and insomnia

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caused by witnessing the incident. Although neither plaintiff

alleges that these emotions were particularly “enduring,” a

reasonable jury could conclude that they were “substantial.” As

a result, the court finds that plaintiffs have alleged enough

facts to meet their summary judgment burden on this issue.

Therefore, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to

the plaintiffs, the court holds that plaintiffs’ IIED claim does

not fail as a matter of law. Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on the IIED claim is DENIED. 

E. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

A claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress

(“NIED”) requires plaintiffs to prove that they: (1) are closely

related to the victim; (2) were present at the scene of the

injury-producing event at the time it occurred and knew that the

victim was being injured; and (3) suffered emotional distress

beyond what a disinterested witness would likely suffer. Thing,

48 Cal.3d at 647. 

As Graves’ father and sister, Graves Sr. and Corey are

closely related to Graves. Id. at 668 n.10. Furthermore, it is

undisputed that they witnessed Graves’ injuries firsthand. 

Therefore, the only issue regarding their ability to recover on

their NIED claim is whether they suffered more emotional distress

than a disinterested witness would likely have suffered. 

The California Supreme Court has characterized such distress

as “serious mental distress.” Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27

Cal.3d 916, 927-28 (1980). “Serious mental distress may be found

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where a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to

adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the

circumstances of the case.” Id. at 929-30. “Severe mental

distress” appears to be a more exacting standard than “serious

mental distress.” See Cal. Jury Instructions - Civil §§ 12.73,

12.80, 12.83 (2005). Therefore, for the reasons stated above,

the court holds that a reasonable jury could find that plaintiffs

suffered serious mental distress. Defendants’ summary judgment

motion is DENIED on the NIED claim.

F. Plaintiffs’ Request for Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment. 

However, in their opposition, plaintiffs request that the court

find that defendants’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment as a

matter of law. (Opp’n at 27 (citing Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett,

685 F.2d 309, 311 (9th Cir. 1982).) A court can grant summary

judgment to the non-moving party if it finds that there is no

genuine dispute of material fact and that an issue can be

resolved as a matter of law. Cool Fuel, 685 F.2d at 311. The

court declines to grant summary judgment to plaintiffs sua sponte

given that the facts are in such dispute.

III.

The Ninth Circuit has admonished district courts to grant

summary judgment for defendants in police misconduct cases

“sparingly.” Santos, 287 F.3d at 853. “This is because police

misconduct cases almost always turn on a jury’s credibility

determinations.” Id. This case appears to be a typical police

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misconduct case, with each party presenting very different

versions of the facts. In light of this warning and based on the

above analysis, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on Graves’ § 1983 claim against defendant the City;

DENIES defendants’ summary judgment motion on all other claims;

and DENIES plaintiffs’ request to find a constitutional violation

as a matter of law. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/24/2006

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

Case 2:04-cv-00430-DFL -KJM Document 51 Filed 03/27/06 Page 17 of 17