Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00992/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00992-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CHRISTOPHER ALARCON, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

VITAL RECOVERY SERVICES, INC., et 

al., 

Defendants.

 CASE NO. 15cv992-LAB (KSC) 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

 

 A decade ago, Beneficial California loaned Christopher Alarcon about $14,000. He 

defaulted. Beneficial sued him in state court, but lost. Four years later, Alarcon received a 

letter from debt collector Vital Recovery Services explaining Galaxy Asset Purchasing 

owned Alarcon’s debt to Beneficial, which had ballooned to around $24,000. Alarcon 

responded by filing this suit against Vital and Galaxy for sending him the letter in violation 

of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and California’s analogous Rosenthal Act. The 

dispute here turns on one key issue: Did the judgment for Alarcon extinguish his debt? 

 But before the Court resolves that issue, it must first decide if Alarcon has plausibly 

alleged an injury-in-fact to support standing. The parties disagree about whether Alarcon 

only needs to allege a statutory violation, or if he also needs to allege actual injuries from 

the letter. Compare Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 1982) (“statutory 

damages are available without proof of actual damages”), with Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 

S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a 

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statutory violation”). But the Court need not decide how to apply Spokeo to a standing 

analysis under the FDCPA yet because Alarcon’s complaint doesn’t offer sufficient 

allegations for the Court to find even a statutory violation. Instead, his complaint boils down 

to two main facts: Beneficial lost in 2010 and Defendants sent him a Dunning Letter in 2014. 

That’s not enough information for the Court to find Alarcon met his burden to “clearly [ ] 

allege facts demonstrating” how the letter violated the five different FDCPA provisions he 

recites in his complaint. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. 

 The complaint is dismissed with leave to file an amended complaint by August 3, 

2018. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Defendants may file an updated motion to dismiss by August 

17, the opposition is due August 31, and the reply is due September 7. The Court will decide 

the motion on the papers. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 19, 2018 

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge 

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