Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00156/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00156-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ERIC DANIELS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-cv-156-CSC

) (WO)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

On May 6, 2011, Plaintiff Eric Daniels protectively filed a Title II application for a

period of disability and disability benefits and a Title XVI application for supplemental

security income, alleging he became disabled on March 1, 2011. (R. 19, 134-44, 169). The

applications were denied initially and on reconsideration (R. 71-84, 87-88). Daniels then

requested a hearing by an administrative law judge (ALJ). Following a hearing held on

January 16, 2013 (R. 45-70), ALJ Michael D. Anderson issued a decision denying the claim

on April 25, 2013. (R. 19-40). The Appeals Council denied Daniels’s subsequent request for

review (R. 1-6). The ALJ’s decision consequently became the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 1

131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the court for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§

Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 1

103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to Social

Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.

Case 2:14-cv-00156-CSC Document 15 Filed 05/05/15 Page 1 of 16
405 (g) and 1383(c)(3). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to entry

of final judgment by the United States Magistrate Judge. (Doc. 9; Doc. 10). Based on the

court’s review of the record in this case and the briefs of the parties, the court concludes that

the decision of the Commissioner should be affirmed.

 II. Standard of Review

Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) a person is entitled to disability benefits when the

person is unable to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result

in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of not less than 12 months[.]

To make this determination the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 2

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

(1) Is the claimant presently unemployed?

(2) Is the claimant’s impairment severe?

(3) Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1?

(4) Is the claimant unable to perform his or her former occupation?

(5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work within the economy?

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of “not

disabled.”

A “physical or mental impairment” is one resultingfromanatomical, physiological, or psychological 2

abnormalities which are demonstrable bymedically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.

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McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).3

The standard of review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court

must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence.

Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial

evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such relevant evidence

as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A reviewing court may not look only to those parts of

the record which supports the decision of the ALJ, but instead must view the record in its

entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ. 

Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings . . . No similar

presumption of validityattaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal conclusions,

including determination of the proper standards to be applied in evaluating

claims.

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

III. The Issues

A. Introduction. Daniels was born on April 16, 1960. (R. 48). He was fifty-three

years old on the date of the ALJ’s opinion in this case. (Doc. 40). Daniels has a high school

education. (R. 57-58). He served in the United States Army from 1978 to 1981. (R. 57-58,

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986) is a supplemental security income case (SSI). 3

The same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 525 n.3

(1990). Cases arising under Title II are appropriately cited as authority in Title XVI cases. See, e.g., Sullivan,

493 U.S. at 525 n.3; Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A).

3

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279). He was stationed in El Paso, Texas, as a supply specialist refueling fixed-wing aircraft;

he did not see combat while in the military. (R. 57-58, 279). His past employment history

includes work as a concrete and semi-truck driver, a cook, a welder, and a hotel clerk. (R.

68). Daniels alleges that he is disabled due to major depression and post-traumatic stress

disorder (“PTSD”). In addition, Daniels has a history of alcohol, cocaine, and cannabis

abuse and dependence. 

B. The Findings of the ALJ

The ALJ found that Daniels has the following severe impairments: Major Depression,

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and a history of Alcohol, Cocaine, and Cannabis abuse and

dependence. (R. 22). The ALJ concluded that these impairments, including the substance

abuse disorders, meet or medically equal the listings found in section 12.09 (substance

addiction disorders) and 12.04 (affective disorders) of 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix

1. (R. 22-23). The ALJ determined that, in the absence of substance abuse, Daniels’s

remaining limitations would be severe but would not meet or medically equal any of the

listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 23-24). Further, the ALJ

determined that, “[i]f the claimant stopped the substance use, and with medication

compliance and treatment, the claimant would have the residual functional capacity to

perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c),” with certain

limitations. (R. 25). The ALJ determined that, if he stopped substance use, Daniels would

not be able to perform his past relevant work (R. 38), but that he would be able to perform

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other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (R. 39). The ALJ

concluded that Daniels was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act

because his substance abuse disorder is a contributing factor material to the determination

of disability and he would not be disabled if he stopped the substance abuse.

C. Issues. 

Daniels presents the following issues for review:

1. Whether the ALJ committed reversible error by improperly rejecting the opinion of

Daniels’s treating psychiatrist; and

2. Whether the ALJ erred by ignoring portions of the opinion of a consulting physician.

(Doc. 12 pp. 5, 13).

IV. Discussion

A. Introduction

A disability claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating an inability to return

to his past work. Lucas v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 1567 (11 th Cir. 1990). In determining whether

the claimant has satisfied this burden, the Commissioner is guided by four factors: (1)

objective medical facts or clinical findings, (2) diagnoses of examining physicians, (3)

subjective evidence of pain and disability, e.g., the testimony of the claimant and his family

or friends, and (4) the claimant's age, education, and work history. Tieniber v. Heckler, 720

F.2d 1251 (11th Cir. 1983). The ALJ must conscientiously probe into, inquire of and explore

all relevant facts to elicit both favorable and unfavorable facts for review. Cowart v.

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Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735–36 (11th Cir. 1981). The ALJ must also state, with sufficient

specificity, the reasons for his decision referencing the plaintiff's impairments.

Any such decision by the Commissioner of Social Security which involves a

determination of disability and which is in whole or in part unfavorable to such

individual shall contain a statement of the case, in understandable language,

setting forth a discussion of the evidence, and stating the Commissioner’s

determination and the reason or reasons upon which it is based.

42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1).

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Decision to Reject the Treating

Psychologist’s Residual Functional Capacity Assessment

An individual is not considered “disabled” for purposes of social security disability

insurance or supplemental security income if alcoholism or drug addiction is “a contributing

factor material to the Commissioner’s determination that the individual is disabled.” 2

U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(J). Therefore, when the ALJ finds that a

claimant is disabled and there is medical evidence of drug addiction or alcoholism, the ALJ 

must determine whether the drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor material to

the determination of disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.935(a); 404.1535(a). The key factor in

determining whether alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the determination of a

disability (the “materiality determination”) is whether the claimant would still be found

disabled if he stopped using drugs or alcohol. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.935(b)(1); 404.1535(b)(1). 

The ALJ makes this determination by first evaluating which of the claimant’s physical and

mental limitations would remain if the claimant stopped using drugs or alcohol. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 416.935(b); 404.1535(b). The ALJ then must determine whether any or all of the

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remaining limitations would be disabling; if the remaining limitations are not disabling, then

the ALJ must find that the claimant’s drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor

material to the determination of disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.935(b); 404.1535(b). However,

if the ALJ determines that the remaining limitations would be disabling, the ALJ must

conclude that the claimant is “disabled independent of [his] ... alcoholism and ... [his] ...

alcoholism is not a contributing factor material to the determination of disability.” 20 C.F.R.

§§ 416.935(b); 404.1535(b).

As noted in the ALJ’s opinion, Daniels has an extensive history of treatment for

depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and substance abuse. In February 2012, during

a time when he had relapsed and was not compliant with his mental health treatment (R.

1039-40 1046, 1058), one of Daniels’s treating physicians, Dr. Margaret Bok, opined that he

was unable to work a full time job due to major depression, PTSD, and polysubstance abuse,

though he had been “sober since June” with “sobriety off and on.” (R. 888). On January 24,

2013, during another period when Daniels had relapsed and was not compliant with his

mental health treatment, Dr. Bok completed a mental residual functional capacityassessment

form in which she opined that, as a result of his “current psychiatric/psychological

impairment[s],” Daniels had marked limitations in the following functional abilities: ability

to relate to other people; ability to maintain concentration, pace and attention for extended

periods of at least 2 hours; ability to sustain a routine without special supervision; ability to

perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual;

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understand, carry out and remember instructions; respond appropriately to supervision;

respond appropriately to co-workers; respond to customary work pressures; respond

appropriately to changes in the work setting; use good judgment on the job; perform

complex, repetitive, or varied tasks, and behave in an emotionally stable manner. (R. 1024-

25). In support of her opinion, Dr. Bok cited Daniels’s history of quitting jobs or being fired

and noted that he “cannot cope with stress.” (R. 1025). She opined that drug and alcohol

abuse were material factors regarding Daniels’s mental condition, that Daniels had sustained

no permanent damage as a result of drug and alcohol abuse, and that, if drug and alcohol use

were to stop, there would be no change in Daniels’s functional limitations. (R. 1025).

In his opinion, the ALJ stated that he “agree[d] with Dr. Bok’s opinion that the

claimaint’s drug and alcohol use is a material factor regarding his mental condition. 

However [the ALJ did] not agree with her opinion that the claimant’s level of functioning

would not improve in the absence of substance abuse.” (R. 35). 

Daniels argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Bok’s opinion that the marked

limitations reflected in her residual functional capacity assessment would persist in the

absence ofsubstance abuse. Daniels contends that, because Dr. Bok is his treating physician,

her February 2012 opinion about his ability to work and her January 2013 opinion regarding

his residual functional capacity in the absence of substance abuse are entitled to great weight

unless good cause is shown to the contrary. It is true that the medical opinion of a treating

physician is entitled to substantial or controlling weight unless the ALJ articulates good cause

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for rejecting that opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2); Lewis v.

Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). However, a treating physician’s opinions

on legal issues that are reserved to the Commissioner are not considered medical opinions

and are not entitled to any special weight. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). Issues

reserved to the Commissioner include opinions that the claimant is “disabled” or “unable to

work” and opinions regarding the claimant’s residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1527(d), 416.927(d). Thus, Dr. Bok’s opinion regarding Daniels’s ability to work and

his residual functional capacity in the absence of substance abuse is not a “medical opinion”

and is not entitled to any special weight.4

Although the Commissioner is the final authorityfor determining a claimant’s residual

functional capacity and whether the claimant can work, the Commissioner is required to

consider “all ofthe medical findings and evidence that support a medical source’s statement”

that a claimant is unable to work, as well as all medical source opinions regarding the

claimant’s residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). The ALJ did

so in this case, as is reflected in the ALJ’s thorough discussion of the extensive evidence in

Despite making arguments to the contrary, Daniels himself appears to recognize this fact. See 4

Plaintiff’s brief, Doc. 12 p. 9: “The ALJ further erred by stating that ‘I agree with Dr. Bok’s opinion that the

claimant’s drug and alcohol use is a material factor regrading his mental condition. However, I do not agree

with her opinion that the claimant’s level of functioning would not improve in the absence of substance

abuse.’ (Tr. 34). . . . As an initial matter, the concept of materiality is defined by the Commissioner’s

regulations and Rulings and is a legal term of art (see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535, 416.935; SSR 13-2p). 

Although Dr. Bok is Mr. Daniels’ treating psychiatrist, she is not a legal expert and is not empowered to

make a conclusion regarding materiality. Indeed, the question whether DAA is ‘a material factor in regards

to the patient’s mental condition,’ as Dr. Bok stated (Tr. 1025), is not at all the same as the question posed

by the regulations, i.e. whether DAA is ‘a contributing factor material to the Commissioner's determination

that the individual is disabled.’ SSR 13-2p, 2013 WL 621536, *2. Thus, the ALJ’sreliance upon this portion

of Dr. Bok’s opinion is erroneous as a matter of law and should be rejected.”

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this case, including Dr. Bok’s opinions.

The ALJ noted that Dr. Bok’s February 2012 opinion that Daniels had permanent

conditions that prevented him from being able to work at full-time job was entitled to “little

weight regarding Daniels’s ability to work during periods of sobriety” because that opinion

was inconsistent with Dr. Bok’s own records, including the fact that Dr. Bok consistently

assigned Daniels a Global Assessment Score (GAF) of 55, which is reflective of moderate

symptoms and moderate functional limitations. (R. 34). The court notes that, in her February

2012 opinion, Dr. Bok specifically stated that one of the permanent medical conditions that

prevented Daniels from being able to work was “polysubstance abuse” “sober since June –

sobriety off and on.” (R. 888). Thus, Dr. Bok’s February 2012 opinion is not a statement

of Daniels’s ability to work in the absence of substance abuse, and there is no error in the

ALJ’s conclusion that the opinion was due “little weight regarding the claimant’s ability to

work during periods of sobriety.” (R. 34) (emphasis added). In fact, the ALJ’s opinion is in

complete agreement with Dr. Bok’s February 2012 opinion that Daniels is disabled when all

of his impairments, including substance abuse, are considered. (R. 22-24; R. 888). See 20

C.F.R. §§ 416.935(b)(1); 404.1535(b)(1) (providing that the key factor in determining

whether alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the determination of a disability is

whether the claimant would still be found disabled if he stopped using drugs or alcohol). 

The ALJ provided the following specific reason for rejecting Dr. Bok’s January 2013

opinion regarding Daniel’s residual functional capacity in the absence of substance abuse:

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On January 15, 2013, the day prior to the hearing, the claimant presented to Dr.

Bok and reported that he had had a relapse. (Exhibit 18F) The claimant

reported symptoms of depression and being overwhelmed with having to care

for his ill father. The claimant reported that he had been off medication for two

months. After the hearing, Dr. Bok prepared a Mental Residual Functional

CapacityAssessment and opined that the claimant was unable to work because

of marked functional limitations. (Exhibit 17F) Dr. Bok also opined that drug

and/or alcohol abuse is a material factor in regards to the claimant's mental

condition; and that if drug and/or alcohol abuse were to stop, there would not

be any change in the claimant's limitations. I agree with Dr. Bok’s opinion that

the claimant's drug and alcohol use is a material factor regarding his mental

condition. However, I do not agree with her opinion that the claimant's level

of functioning would not improve in the absence of substance abuse. The

record includes periods ofsobrietyin which the claimant’s level offunctioning

did improve with sobriety.

(R. 34-35).

As noted by the ALJ and confirmed by Dr. Bok’s treatment notes, the record does

contain evidence that Daniels’s level of functioning improved with sobriety. For example,

as noted by the ALJ (R. 28), on June 9, 2010, Daniels reported that he had been free of

alcohol and illicit drugs and that his depression medicine helped him with motivation. (R.

315). Although he had recently relapsed to substance abuse and quit his post-secondary

education program, on June 9, 2010 he was interested in obtaining a letter from his doctor

that would allow him to return to school. (R. 315, 317). The ALJ noted that mental health

treatment notes from August 2011 through February 2012, a period in which Daniels

maintained sobriety, indicated that Daniels experienced improvement in his condition. (R.

28, 34). In August 2011, Daniels moved in with his father, reported that he was doing well,

was keeping himself busy by cutting grass and doing yard work and other odd jobs, and

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planned to make money by cutting hair. (R. 814). Further, as the ALJ noted (R. 33-34, 37),

two consultative examinations were performed while Daniels had been sober for substantial

periods of time, and these examinations reflected much more moderate limitations than those

assigned by Dr. Bok, whose January 2013 residual functional capacity assessment was

completed during a period when Daniels had relapsed and was not compliant with his mental

health treatment. In fact, as the ALJ noted, prior to January 2013, Dr. Bok had last seen

Daniels in February 2012, and, in January 2013, Daniels had been drinking daily, used

marijuana and cocaine, and had not taken anymental health medications in over two months. 

(R. 1044, 1047, 1051, 1058-59). Notations in Dr. Bok’s own records consistently assigned

Daniels GAF scores of 55 during periods of sobriety, which were consistent with moderate

functional limitations and inconsistent with Dr. Bok’s residual functional capacity

assessment. 

The court has independently reviewed the record and finds that it contains substantial

support for the ALJ’s conclusions regarding Daniels’s residual functional capacity and

improved functioning in the absence of substance abuse. This record documents a recurrent

cycle in which Daniels’s functioning improves with mental health treatment compliance and

sobriety. However, when Daniels is noncompliant with his mental health treatment and 

relapses into substance abuse, he experiences increased symptoms of depression and PTSD, 

as well as significant impairment in functioning. This cycle is detailed in the margin.5

See. e.g., 555 (February 9, 2009: Daniels reports no current substance abuse, has untreated 5

depression, and seeks job placement assistance); 473, 536 (February 19, 2009: Daniels checks into in-house

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treatment for homelessness, depression, and substance abuse; “[H]e has been using alcohol, cocaine and

cannabis . . . and has also noted progressive worsening of his mood with comorbid anhedonia, low self

esteem, poor energy, decreased libido, and disrupted sleep for the past two months,” was “consumed with

drinking and drugs then losing motivation in activities”); 189, 320 (March 1, 2009: Daniels obtains a job as

a cook); 415 (April 2009: “Daniels seems genuinely interested in maintaining his sobriety and returning to

the productive work force. . . Daniels states that he has a good work ethic, but then loses this when alcohol

or drugs are involved.”); 361 (May 2009: after substance abuse and mental health treatment, diagnosis

included “major depressive disorder, recurrent, mild, in remission”); 332 (March 2010: Daniels reports using

cocaine); 189, 320 (April 2010: Daniels quit hisjob as a cook; he reportsthat he quit due to depression); 301-

02 (May 2010: Daniels reportsthat he hasin a state of relapse to alcohol and substance abuse and quit school

due to increased depression); 278-79, 320, 317, 320 (May 19, 2010: Daniels reports that he has relapsed to

drug and alcohol abuse, was not taking depression medication because he “does not like to take medication,”

has quit school and his job, and is depressed); 315 (June 9, 2010: Daniels reports that he has been free of

alcohol and illicit drugs, that medication has helped him, that he has “improved energy level and improved

concentration,” and that he would like to try to go back to school); 309, 312, 314 (June 10, 2010: Daniels

seeks vocational rehabilitation and “is motivated for employment and within compliance with his [mental

health] provider and treatment”); 300, 302 ( June 29, 2010: Daniels has begun taking depression medications

and reports that he is free of drug and alcohol use); 189, 816 (July 1, 2010: Daniels began working as a

commercial concrete truck driver); 351 (October 2010: Daniels relapsed and began drinking alcohol again

daily); 289-91, 816 (April 2011: Daniels reportsthat he stopped taking medication and stopped reporting for

mental health treatment after he got his job driving concrete trucks, he has been drinking alcohol, is

depressed again, and has lost his job as a concrete truck driver due to nonattendence); 282-83 (May 4, 2011:

Daniels signs up for in-house 90-day substance abuse program; he has been using alcohol, cocaine, and

marijuana, and living with his father); 777, 783-85, 787 (June 15, 2011: Daniels checks into in-house

substance abuse and mental health program; he reports consuming 3-4 beers everyday and using marijuana;

he is now homeless because his father asked him to leave his house due to his alcohol use and failure to

contribute financially; Daniels also reports that although he “knows his meds,” he has “never” taken

outpatient medication appropriately because he has difficulty believing that he should take it and drinks

alcohol to treat his depression); 215 (June 15, 2011: Daniels self-reportsto social security administration that

drinking and drug use affect his ability to do house work and his personal appearance, his ability to be

efficient and thorough, causes him to lack motivation and to not “care,” and causes him to isolate himself

and sink further into depression; he reports that when he drinks and uses drugs it is to treat his depression); 

605 (July 19, 2011, during mental health and substance abuse treatment: “At present he feels that he is

managing his depression effectively and is gaining physical benefits as well [by treating his depression with

exercise rather than medication]. Veteran reports that he has lost approximately 18 pounds since he began

his exercise program and he feels really good about himself.”); 592 (July 2011: Daniels reports that he has

been off drugs, following a better diet, and exercising daily and is feeling well); 811-12 (August 5, 2011:

Dr. Denise Perone, Psychiatrist, remarks on his discharge report: “At first, he was willing to try meds, then

when he started running on a regular basis, he felt better so felt he no longer needed the meds. After stopping

the meds he became more depressed, and just as he started making some progress, he decided to leave the

program. This was unfortunate, because this is a man who has many work skills, but since he has been out

of the service he has been unable to keep a job for more than 2 months because he gets very depressed &

quits - this pattern is reflected in his behavior now, in that he is just getting somewhere in his therapy & he

feels compelled to quit. Unfortunately, he did not have any of hisissues resolved when he decided it was time

to leave so that he will probably be back with us soon when the depression hits him hard again.”); 814

(August 8, 2011: Daniels reported that he was doing fine, things were going well, he was able to help around

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As the ALJ noted, following periods of relapse, Daniels has a history of homelessness and

emergency room treatment and treatment at in-house mental health and substance abuse

programs, but there is no evidence of episodes of decompensation, emergency room

treatment, or inpatient hospitalization for any mental health problem in the absence of

substance abuse. (R. 36). Further, as the ALJ noted, Daniels has been able to work during

periods when he was sober and compliant with his medications. (R. 36). In sum, this record

contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings regarding Daniels’s improved

residual functional capacity when he maintains sobriety and is compliant with his mental

health treatment. (R. 25, 36).

Accordingly, the ALJ applied the correct legal standard by independently assessing

Daniels’s ability to work and his residual functional capacity in the absence of substance

abuse. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.935; 416.927(d); 404.1535; 404.1527(d). Substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s conclusion regarding Daniels’s residualfunctional capacityin the absence

of substance abuse. Therefore, the court finds no error in the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Bok’s

opinions regarding Daniels’s ability to work and his residual functional capacity in the

absence of substance abuse.

the house and was keeping himself busy by cutting grass, doing yard work and odd jobs; he reported that he

planned to cut hair to earn money and to attend support groups to maintain his sobriety); 925-28 (December

7, 2011: after Daniels completed a 12 week depression support group in December 2011, and while on

medication, Daniels has a negative screening for alcohol abuse and a negative screen for depression; he

reports to Dr. Bok that his mood is better and he is functioning better than he was; Dr. Bok assigns a GAF

of 55); 1039-40 1046, 1058 (January 15, 2013: Dr. Bok notes that Daniels has applied for disability, relapsed

a couple of months ago and has been drinking and using cocaine and marijuana again, has not taken his

mental health medications for at least two months, and has not reported to Dr. Bok in close to one year).

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B. The ALJ Did Not Err By Failing to Adopt Dr. Estock’s Opinion Regarding

Daniels’s Residual Functional Capacity.

Dr. Daniel C. Clark, Ph.D., performed a consultative examination on September 19,

2011 (862-67). On September 10, 2012, at a time when Daniels reported that he had been

sober for one year, Dr. Clark performed another consultative examination and evaluation

(including administering the WAIS-IV IQ test) and completed a medical source statement

of mental ability to do work-related activities. The ALJ adopted Dr. Clark’s September 2012

assessment as the claimant’s mental residual functional capacity. (R. 34).

On September 30, 2011, and October 5, 2011, Dr. Robert Estock, M.D., completed

a mental residual functional capacity assessment and psychological review technique based

on the medical records available at that time, including Dr. Clark’s September 2011

consultative evaluation. (R. 868-884). Although the ALJ did not adopt Dr. Estock’s 2011

assessments, the ALJ noted that his “findings agree substantially with those of the State

Agency medical consultant [Dr. Estock] who also determined that the claimant was not

disabled in the absence of substance abuse.” (R. 37). 

Daniels argues that the ALJ erred as a matter of law by failing to specifically adopt

two limitations in Dr. Estock’s mental residual functional capacity assessment: a limitation

that Daniels “would be expected to miss 1-2 days of work per month due to symptoms of

depression,” and a limitation that Daniels “would work best with supportive

nonconfrontational supervision.” (R. 870). The ALJ did not adopt Dr. Estock’s residual

functional capacity assessment. The ALJ was not obligated to adopt or defer to Dr. Estock’s

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assessment because the residual functional capacity assessment is a legal determination that

is reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). As explained in

Part IV.B. of this memorandum opinion, the ALJ’s detailed opinion confirms that the ALJ

did independentlyconsider all the evidence and make a determination as to Daniels’s residual

functional capacity. Thus, the ALJ did not commit any legal error by not adopting the 6

findings in Dr. Estock’s mental residual functional capacity assessment.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons as stated, the court concludes that the decision of the Commissioner

should be affirmed. See Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551, 1551-52 (11th Cir. 1986)

(“Because the factual findings made by the [ALJ] . . . are supported by substantial evidence

in the record and because these findings do not entitle [the claimant] to disability benefits

under the appropriate legal standard, we affirm.”).

The Court will enter a separate final judgment. 

Done this 5 day of May, 2015. th

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The court notes that the ALJ's opinion does incorporate moderate limitations in his ability to interact 6

with others, including supervisors.

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