Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01967/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01967-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOVELL BULLOCK,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-09-1967 MCE GGH P

vs.

LORRAINE KENTER, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s amended complaint filed November 23,

2009. For the following reasons, the amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.

As in the original complaint, plaintiff alleges that an “R” suffix was improperly

imposed on his classification status. Plaintiff alleges that defendants have refused to remove the

“R” suffix despite his requests.

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without

due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1974). In order to

state a cause of action for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish

the existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise

from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68,

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103 S.Ct. 864 (1983).

The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in a

particular classification status. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88, n. 9, 97 S.Ct. 274 (1976).

The existence of a liberty interest created by state law is determined by focusing on the nature of

the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995). Liberty interests

created by state law are generally limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin,

515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293.

Under certain circumstances, labeling a prisoner with a particular classification

may implicate a liberty interest subject to the protections of due process. Neal v. Shimoda, 131

F.3d 818, 827 (9th Cir.1997) (“[T]he stigmatizing consequences of the attachment of the ‘sex

offender’ label coupled with the subjection of the targeted inmate to a mandatory treatment

program whose successful completion is a precondition for parole eligibility create the kind of

deprivations of liberty that require procedural protections.”). 

In the August 18, 2009, order dismissing the original complaint with leave to

amend, the undersigned found that plaintiff had not alleged any facts establishing the existence of

a liberty interest with respect to the assignment of the “R” suffix designation. Plaintiff did not

describe any injury he suffered as a result of the “R” suffix designation. Because plaintiff did not

allege that he suffered an “atypical and significant hardship” as a result of the R suffix, the

undersigned found that he had failed to state a colorable claim for relief. Accordingly, the 

complaint was dismissed with leave to amend. 

In the amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that as a result of the “R” suffix

designation, he has been subjected to “injuries, defamation, shunning, slander, libel, stigmatizing,

embarrassment and dissocialization.” Amended Complaint, p. 4. However, plaintiff does not

describe these alleged injuries in any detail. Plaintiff does not describe how he has been shunned

or stigmatized. These allegations of injury are so vague and conclusory that the court cannot

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determine whether plaintiff has suffered an “atypical and significant” hardship as a result of the

“R” suffix designation. Accordingly, plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed with leave to

file a second amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore,

vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an

amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v.

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently

alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s

amended complaint is dismissed with twenty-eight days to file a second amended complaint;

failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation of dismissal of this action.

DATED: January 7, 2010 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

bul1967.ame

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