Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01457/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01457-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAURICE HUNT,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. MATEVOUSIAN et al.,

Defendants.

No. 1:15-cv-01457-DAD-SAB

ORDER ADDRESSING OBJECTIONS TO 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(Doc. No. 19)

Plaintiff is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with this civil action 

brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1961). On December 

31, 2015, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. (Doc. No. 13.) On January 27, 2016, the 

assigned magistrate judge screened plaintiff’s first amended complaint and dismissed it for failure 

to state a cognizable claim with leave granted to file a second amended complaint within thirty 

days. (Doc. No. 14.) On February 23, 2016, plaintiff filed objections to the order dismissing his 

first amended complaint. (Doc. No. 16.) Those objections were overruled by the magistrate 

judge. (Doc. No. 17.) On March 4, 2016, plaintiff again filed objections to the magistrate judge’s 

order dismissing his first amended complaint with leave to amend, this time directed to the 

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undersigned. (Doc. No. 19.)1 Because plaintiff’s objections ask this court to review the 

magistrate judge’s prior ruling, the court construes plaintiff’s request as a motion for 

reconsideration.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to reconsider a magistrate judge’s ruling is reviewed under the “clearly 

erroneous or contrary to law” standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Rule 72(a) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Local Rule 303(f). As such, the court may only set aside a 

magistrate judge’s order if that order is either clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Id.; Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 72(a); Grimes v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Pursuant to the Local Rules of this court, a party seeking reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s 

ruling shall file a request for reconsideration specifically designating the ruling, or part thereof,

objected to and the basis for that objection. Local Rule 303(c).2

A magistrate judge’s factual findings are “clearly erroneous” only when the district judge 

is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Security Farms v. 

Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 124 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 1997); Green v. Baca, 219 F.R.D. 485, 489 

(C.D. Cal. 2003). This standard is “significantly deferential.” Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., 

Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993).

The “contrary to law” standard allows for independent review of purely legal 

determinations by the magistrate judge. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3rd 

Cir.1992); Green, 219 F.R.D. at 489. “An order is contrary to law when it fails to apply or 

misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” Knutson v. Blue Cross & Blue 

Shield of Minn., 254 F.R.D. 553, 556 (D. Minn. 2008); Rathgaber v. Town of Oyster Bay, 492 F.

 

1 Although titling his filing as “Objections to Magistrate Recommendations and Findings,” 

plaintiff’s filing appears to concern only the magistrate judge’s screening order, dated January 26, 

2016 (Doc. No. 14). 

2 At the outset, the court notes that the Local Rule provide that a ruling by the magistrate judge 

becomes final if no reconsideration of the order is sought within fourteen days of service of the 

order. Local Rule 303(b). Here, twenty-seven days passed before plaintiff filed his objection to 

the magistrate judge’s order. While, plaintiff’s request for reconsideration therefore appears to be 

untimely, the undersigned will nonetheless consider it. 

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Supp.2d 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Surles v. Air France, 210 F. Supp.2d 501, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 

2001); see also Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace, 570 F. Supp. 202, 205 (N.D. Cal. 1983).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s findings (1) that the allegations in plaintiff’s first 

amended complaint show at most negligence rather than deliberate indifference, and (2) that the 

denial of his assistive devices was temporary. (Doc. No. 19.) Here, the court cannot conclude 

that the magistrate judge’s findings in regards to plaintiff’s first amended complaint were clearly 

erroneous. 

A. Deliberate Indifference

In the Ninth Circuit, a deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment has two 

components:

First, the plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by 

demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could 

result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.’” Second, the plaintiff must show the 

defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent. This 

second prong—defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent—is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure 

to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) 

harm caused by the indifference. Indifference “may appear when 

prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical 

treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison 

physicians provide medical care.”

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).

As the magistrate judge found, plaintiff’s alleges that after having his assistive devices 

confiscated, he was later provided with devices, but that the response by prison officials was 

inadequate. (Doc. No. 14 at 4.) As pled, and as the magistrate judge found, these allegations do 

not satisfy the deliberate indifference standard. (See id. at 4–5.) In objecting to the magistrate 

judge’s order, plaintiff also “wishes to present” new evidence that may relate to the prison 

officials’ awareness of his medical condition. (Doc. No. 19 at 3.) These facts, however, were not 

pled in plaintiff’s first amended complaint and therefore cannot be considered in determining 

whether that pleading sufficiently stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, the 

magistrate judge’s findings were also not made in clear error. 

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B. Temporary Denial of Assistive Devices

The magistrate judge also concluded that plaintiff alleged, at most, that he was 

temporarily deprived of his assistive devices when he first arrived at USP Atwater. (Doc. No. 14 

at 4.) In his objections, plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge erred in that prison officials 

continue to deprive him of his assistive devices. Looking to the first amended complaint, plaintiff 

alleges that On July 31, 2015, prison officials brought plaintiff some assistive devices, but not 

others due to prison policies. (See Doc. No. 13 at 9.) Additionally, plaintiff alleges that on 

August 4, 2015, he was moved to handicap-accessible cell, but that the cell was not properly 

functioning. (See id. at 10.) These facts alleged are unclear at best as to the duration of plaintiff’s 

claimed deprivations. To the extent plaintiff now argues that he is experiencing an ongoing 

failure to address his serious medical needs on the part of prison officials, the magistrate judge’s 

prior conclusion that plaintiff’s deprivation was temporary was not made in error. The court 

advises plaintiff to allege such additional facts in any second amended complaint he elects to file 

in order to support such a claim.

Separately, the court notes that the magistrate judge also found that the first amended 

complaint fails to clearly describe whether plaintiff fully exhausted all his administrative 

grievances prior to filing the suit. (Doc. No. 14 at 5–6.)3 Based on his findings, the magistrate 

judge ordered that the first amended complaint be dismissed but that plaintiff be granted leave to 

file an amended complaint addressing these concerns. (Id. at 7.) Because this court finds that the 

magistrate judge committed no clear error, plaintiff’s objections, construed as a motion for 

reconsideration, will be denied.

Accordingly,

1. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. No. 19) is denied;

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

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But see Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Failure to exhaust under the 

PLRA is ‘an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.’”) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 

549 U.S. 199, 204, 216 (2007)).

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3. Within thirty (30) days of the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file a second 

amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal, in accordance with the 

magistrate judge’s order (Doc. No. 14); and 

4. Any failure on the part of plaintiff to file a second amended complaint within the time 

provided may result in the dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 2, 2016 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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