Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00490/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00490-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD HAMILTON, BOBBY JONES, DAMON

BARRON SMITH, and ALJARICE SANDERS,

on behalf of themselves and others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SIGNATURE FLIGHT SUPPORT

CORPORATION, a Delaware

corporation, BBA AVIATION SHARED

SERVICES, INC., a Florida

corporation, BBA GROUP US HOLDINGS,

INC., a Massachusetts corporation,

BBA GROUP PLC, a United Kingdom

corporation, STEVE TRUE, NORMAN

RAMIREZ, DENNIS SMITH, LYNN SHAW,

HAY SINGH, MARCARIO LIPORADA, and

DOES 1-100,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-490 CW

ORDER GRANTING

IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO

DISMISS AND

DENYING

DEFENDANTS'

MOTIONS TO SEVER

AND FOR A MORE

DEFINITE

STATEMENT 

Defendants Signature Flight Support Corporation

(Signature), BBA Aviation Shared Services, Inc. (BBA), Steve

True, Dennis Smith, Lynn Shaw and Jay Singh (collectively,

Defendants) move to dismiss certain of the causes of action

against them for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Defendants also move

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 to sever the case

into four separate actions and for a more definite statement

pursuant to Rule 12(e). 

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Plaintiffs Donald Hamilton, Bobby Jones, Damon Barron Smith

and Aljarice Sanders do not oppose dismissal of their claims

against Defendants Shaw and Singh, and have since voluntarily

dismissed the claims against those Defendants. Plaintiffs also

do not oppose dismissal of their claims for wrongful

termination, disability discrimination and age discrimination

against individual Defendants True and Smith. Accordingly, the

Court grants Defendants' motion with respect to Defendants Shaw

and Singh, and grants Defendants' motion to dismiss the wrongful

termination and age discrimination claims against Messrs. True

and Smith and the disability discrimination claim against Mr.

True. Since the hearing on this motion, Plaintiffs have filed a

First Amended Complaint (FAC) that brings the claims for

wrongful termination, disability discrimination and age

discrimination against the corporate Defendants only. 

Otherwise, Plaintiffs oppose Defendants' motions, including the

remaining portions of the motion to dismiss, the motion to sever

and the motion for a more definite statement. 

The matter was heard on May 27, 2005. Having considered

all of the papers filed by the parties and oral argument on the

motion, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss the Title

VII claim for sex discrimination against Defendant True, but

denies the remaining portions of Defendants' motion to dismiss,

denies the motion to sever and denies the motion for a more

definite statement.

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs in this employment discrimination action are all

current or former employees at the San Francisco offices of

Signature, a Delaware corporation that provides flight support

services to private planes and executive jets. Plaintiffs are

all African-Americans. Plaintiffs all bring claims of racial

discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and

California's Fair Housing and Employment Act (FEHA), creation of

a hostile work environment in violation of § 1981 and FEHA,

intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of

contract/failure to investigate. In addition, Ms. Sanders

brings claims for discrimination based on sex; Mr. Hamilton, Mr.

Jones and Ms. Sanders bring claims of retaliation and wrongful

termination; Mr. Hamilton brings a FEHA claim for perceiveddisability discrimination; and Mr. Jones brings claims for age

discrimination, assault and battery and tortious interference

with contract. Plaintiffs' claims for racial discrimination,

sex discrimination and retaliation are brought on behalf of

others similarly situated. In a related case, the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has brought employment

discrimination claims against Signature on behalf of Mr.

Hamilton. 

Defendant BBA, a Florida corporation, is the parent

corporation of Signature. Mr. True is the General Manager for

Signature's San Francisco fixed base operations (FBO). Mr.

Smith is based in Florida and is Signature's national VicePresident of Human Resources. 

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1The facts in this section are all drawn from Plaintiffs'

complaint and are assumed to be true for the purposes of the

motion to dismiss. 

4

Plaintiffs allege generally that Signature has engaged in a

pattern or practice of discrimination against African-Americans,

including failing to hire them; demoting and firing them on

pretextual bases; applying more burdensome obligations on them;

paying them less and denying them overtime pay and benefits; and

refusing to promote them. They further allege that both San

Francisco and national management personnel are aware of the

discrimination, but fail and refuse to investigate, and

retaliate against employees who complain of discrimination. In

addition, Plaintiffs allege that Signature encourages a hostile

work environment based on race and sex, in which AfricanAmericans, but not others, are subject to verbal abuse, and

women, especially African-American women, are subjected to

persistent lewd and inappropriate behavior. 

The experiences of the named Plaintiffs are diverse, but

each alleges that he or she was treated differently than nonAfrican-Americans, and all allege specific incidents suggesting

that their treatment was motivated by racial discrimination.1

Mr. Hamilton was hired in 1996 and promoted to a supervisory

position on a probationary basis in 2003. At that time,

however, Mr. True warned that Mr. Hamilton had "two things

against you, you are Black and you have a stammering problem." 

Mr. True and others allegedly prevented Mr. Hamilton from

accomplishing his supervisory duties, e.g. by refusing to

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enforce his disciplinary recommendations and denying him an

email address and keys. Mr. Hamilton was subsequently demoted

for alleged violations that were common practice at Signature. 

Mr. Hamilton filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC,

resulting in increased harassment and threats of termination. 

However, a day after Signature learned that the EEOC intended to

file suit on Mr. Hamilton's behalf, Mr. Hamilton was instead

promoted. 

Mr. Jones was hired as a customer service representative

(CSR) in 1999, and was denied opportunities for promotions,

which were given to less qualified non-African-Americans. Mr.

Jones also was paid less than non-African-American trainees, and

was denied opportunities to work overtime on the grounds that he

was "too old." After arriving from Signature's national

headquarters to investigate Mr. Jones' internal complaints of

racial discrimination, Mr. Smith made a comment about a

(fictional) African-American entrepreneur, Otis Spunkmeyer, and

rebuffed Mr. Jones' attempt to learn the results of the

investigation. Mr. Jones was dismissed after an assault on him

by a man, Doe 1, who identified himself as a "good friend" of

Mr. True. 

Ms. Sanders was hired as a CSR in 2002 and fired in 2004,

two weeks after filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. 

According to the complaint, the reasons for firing her were

pretextual. Ms. Sanders was subjected to numerous incidents of

harassment, including inter alia lewd and disparaging remarks

about women, the word "bitches" written across her box of latex

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gloves, and defacement of her posted announcement regarding

Black History Month. Signature did not respond to her

complaints about these incidents. 

Mr. Barron-Smith was hired in 1999 and continues to work at

Signature. However, he was repeatedly discouraged from applying

for promotions despite positive performance reviews. His beaded

hairstyle was criticized, he was denied opportunities to work

overtime, he was required to wear a hat and he was denied

additional paternity leave. Non-African-Americans were not

subjected to these rules or denied overtime and extended leave. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim will be

denied unless it is “clear that no relief could be granted under

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the

allegations.” Falkowski v. Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1132

(9th Cir. 2002), citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.

506 (2002). A complaint must contain a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “Each averment of a pleading

shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of

pleading or motions are required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). These

rules “do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts

upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules

require is ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will

give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds on which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

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41, 47 (1957).

When granting a motion to dismiss, a court is generally

required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request

to amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be

futile. Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv.

Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining

whether amendment would be futile, a court examines whether the

complaint could be amended to cure the defect requiring

dismissal “without contradicting any of the allegations of [the]

original complaint.” Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d

291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). Leave to amend should be liberally

granted, but an amended complaint cannot allege facts

inconsistent with the challenged pleading. Id. at 296-97. 

II. Misjoinder and Severance

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) "permits the joinder

of plaintiffs in one action if: (1) the plaintiffs assert any

right to relief arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,

or series of transactions or occurrences; and (2) there are

common questions of law or fact." Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d

1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson v. Montgomery Ward &

Co., Inc., 852 F.2d 1008, 1011 (7th Cir. 1988)). 

"Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an

action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. However, if the Rule 20(a) test

for permissive joinder is not satisfied, "a court, in its

discretion, may sever the misjoined parties, so long as no

substantial right will be prejudiced by the severance." 

Coughlin at 1350 (citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21

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(parties "may be dropped or added by order of the court on

motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the

action and on such terms as are just")). If a court does so, it

can generally dismiss all but the first named plaintiff without

prejudice to the filing of new, separate lawsuits by the dropped

plaintiffs. Id. (citing Aaberg v. ACandS, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 498,

501 (D. Md. 1994)).

III. More Definite Statement

"[T]he proper test in evaluating a motion under Rule 12(e)

is whether the complaint provides the defendant with a

sufficient basis to frame his responsive pleadings." Federal

Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Musacchio, 695 F. Supp. 1053, 1060

(N.D. Cal. 1988) (citing Famolare Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores,

Inc., 525 F. Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981)). 

"Motions for a more definite statement are viewed with

disfavor and are rarely granted because of the minimal pleading

requirements of the Federal Rules." Sagan v. Apple Computer,

Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (1994). "Rule 12(e) is designed

to correct only unintelligibility in a pleading not merely a

claimed lack of detail." FRA S. p. A. v. Surg-O-Flex of

America, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 421, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The

proper tool for eliciting additional detail is discovery, not a

Rule 12(e) motion. Musacchio, 695 F. Supp at 1060 (citing

Kuenzell v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 96, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1957)).

A Rule 12(e) motion may be granted, however, "where the

complaint is so general that ambiguity arises in determining the

nature of the claim or the parties against whom it is being

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made." Sagan, 874 F. Supp. at 1077. In particular, the

plaintiff may be required to specify which defendants are

intended by a general reference to "defendants" in order "to

allow the defendant to plead intelligently." Van Dyke Ford,

Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 277, 284 (E.D. Wis. 1975). 

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss

A. Twelfth Claim for Breach of Contract/Failure to

Investigate

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' twelfth claim for

"breach of contract/failure to investigate" on the grounds that

the duty to investigate, remedy and prevent discrimination and

harassment in the workplace is mandated by statute, and

Plaintiffs cannot establish a breach of contract claim based

upon the same duty. See Louisville Title Ins. Co. v. Surety

Title, Guar. Co., 60 Cal. App. 3d 781, 791 (1976) (noting

"uniform rule of law that a consideration for an agreement is

not adequate when it is a mere promise to perform that which the

promisor is already legally bound to do" (quoting General Motors

Accept. Corp. v. Brown, 2 Cal. App. 2d 646, 650 (1934)). 

Defendants and Plaintiffs agree, however, that the claim of

failure to investigate does not form the basis for an

independent statutory cause of action. See, e.g., Swenson v.

Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1198 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Title

VII liability cannot be premised on inadequacies in

investigation where employer takes prompt steps to stop

harassment). Instead, Plaintiffs base their claim on alleged

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violations of Signature's Employee Information Guide, which,

according to Plaintiffs, encourages employees to come forward

with discrimination and harassment complaints and "contains

express promises regarding the manner in which those complaints

would be resolved." Complaint ¶ 121. Plaintiffs contend that

the Guide represents an implied contract, the breach of which

has resulted in "loss of income, loss of advancement and

promotion, loss of career opportunity and loss of intangible job

benefits." Id. ¶ 123. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' contract cause of action

is superfluous because the harms identified by Plaintiffs are

indistinguishable from the harms caused by the underlying

alleged harassment and discrimination. While the harms

identified by Plaintiffs, e.g. loss of advancement, do indeed

overlap with other claims, Defendants have not shown that no

relief for breach of contract could be granted under any set of

facts consistent with the allegations. Nor have Defendants

cited any authority to the effect that a contract cause of

action should be dismissed if it may be superfluous to the

recovery available in tort. Cf. Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 24

Cal. 4th 317, 352-353 (2000) (holding more narrowly that

plaintiff cannot bring a claim for breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing if such a claim merely

realleges breach of an implied covenant-in-fact). Therefore,

the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs'

twelfth claim. 

B. Claims Against Defendant BBA

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Defendants move to dismiss all claims against Defendant BBA

on the grounds that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts

sufficient to show that BBA, as a parent corporation, could be

found liable for the acts of Signature, its subsidiary. 

In order to hold BBA liable for the conduct of Signature,

Plaintiffs must establish the existence of a relationship under

the "integrated enterprise" test or another theory of jointcorporate liability. See, e.g., Laird v. Capital Cities/ABC,

Inc., 68 Cal. App. 4th 727, 737 (1998) (setting forth factors

for "integrated enterprise" test). In the complaint, Plaintiffs

allege that BBA is the parent company and, generally, that 

each of the Defendants was and is the agent, employee and

servant of each other Defendant and committed the

occurrences, acts and omissions complained of herein while

acting within the scope of such agency, employment and

servitude. Each Defendant is responsible for the

occurrences, acts and omissions of each other Defendant

complained herein.

Complaint ¶ 20. Plaintiffs argue that the basis for BBA's

liability is clear from these allegations, and that dismissal on

this issue without allowing Plaintiffs opportunity for discovery

would be premature. Defendants object that the complaint

contains no specific allegations indicating that BBA and

Signature are an integrated enterprise, and that Plaintiffs have

failed to explain what facts they hope to obtain from discovery

in order to fill the necessary gaps. 

Defendants' argument fails to address the standard

governing motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs

could prove, consistent with the allegations in the complaint,

that BBA and Signature are integrated enterprises. In fact, the

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cases Defendants rely upon involve decisions on summary

judgment, not motions to dismiss. Laird at 732; Cellini v.

Harcourt Brace & Co., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1035 (S.D. Cal.

1999). Therefore, the Court denies Defendants' motion to

dismiss the claims against BBA. 

C. Hostile Environment Claims Against Defendants True

and Smith

Defendants move to dismiss the claims that Mr. True and Mr.

Smith created a hostile work environment on the grounds that

these Defendants' alleged contacts with Plaintiffs are

insufficient to give rise to personal liability. Specifically,

Defendants argue that the complaint attributes only isolated

comments to Mr. True, and that there are not and could not be

any specific allegations against Mr. Smith, who worked in

Florida. 

The complaint's only specific allegation of harassment or

abuse by Mr. True himself is his remark to Mr. Hamilton, newly

promoted to a probationary period as supervisor, that Mr.

Hamilton had "two things against you, you are Black and you have

a stammering problem." Complaint ¶ 37. The complaint also

alleges that Mr. Smith, while in the presence of Mr. Jones for

the purpose of investigating his complaint of racial harassment,

"expressed disappointment to TRUE that the keynote speaker was

Otis Spunkmeyer, an African American entrepreneur." Id. ¶ 47. 

The complaint's more general allegations suggest that Signature

condoned and encouraged a severe and pervasive racially hostile

work environment, in which African-American employees were

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subject to verbal abuse and racially hostile actions of

supervisory and non-supervisory employees were encouraged. 

 In order to state a hostile environment claim, a plaintiff

must allege that his or her employer failed to remedy or prevent

a hostile work environment that the employer either knew, or

reasonably should have known, existed. Fuller v. City of

Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995); Steiner v. Showboat

Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1462-63 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.

denied, 115 S. Ct. 733 (1995); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,

881 (9th Cir. 1991). Supervisors with the authority to hire and

fire or control the environment may also be held personally

liable under FEHA for a hostile environment if they committed

the harassing acts themselves, or were aware of the harassment

and assisted or encouraged the harasser. Matthews v. Superior

Court, 34 Cal. App. 4th 598, 604-605 (1995). 

Plaintiffs have sufficiently plead that Mr. True himself

either created or encouraged the creation of a hostile or

abusive working environment. With respect to Mr. Smith,

Plaintiffs have plead sufficient facts to state a claim that he

was aware of and assisted or encouraged harassment. To the

extent that Defendants argue that the allegations in Plaintiffs'

complaint, if true, are in themselves insufficient to establish

liability against Mr. True and Mr. Smith, Defendants

misinterpret the standard used to evaluate a motion to dismiss. 

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss the

hostile work environment claims against Mr. True and Mr. Smith. 

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

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Against Defendant Smith

Defendants move to dismiss the intentional infliction of

emotional distress (IIED) claim against Defendant Smith, on the

grounds that Plaintiffs have alleged no "extreme and outrageous

conduct" attributable to him. 

Plaintiffs argue that, because they have set forth

sufficient allegations to allow Mr. Smith to be found liable for

harassment, they have also sufficiently stated an IIED claim. 

Plaintiffs point to cases in which courts have found that

harassment constitutes the necessary extreme and outrageous

conduct. For instance, in Accardi v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.

App. 4th 341, 352 (1993), disapproved on other grounds by

Richard v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 798 (2001), the Court of

Appeal found that a claim for IIED rested on the same basis as a

claim for sex discrimination. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have alleged only a

"simple pleading of personnel management activity" that is

"insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress, even if improper motivation is alleged." 

Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics, 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 80 (1996). 

However, the more general allegations in the complaint regarding

Mr. Smith's actions exceed mere management activity. While the

specific facts alleged, if true, may not in themselves be

sufficient to establish an IIED claim, Plaintiffs have stated a

claim based on Mr. Smith's alleged participation in

discrimination and encouragement of a hostile work environment. 

Therefore, the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss the

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IIED claims against Mr. Smith. 

E. Racial Discrimination and Retaliation Claims

Against Defendant Smith

Defendants move to dismiss the claims of racial

discrimination and retaliation against Mr. Smith on the grounds

that Plaintiffs have not alleged that he took adverse employment

action against them. 

Both sides agree that an adverse employment action is a

required element of these claims. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Breen, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Akers v. County of San Diego,

95 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1453 (2002). Although Defendants concede

that each Plaintiff has alleged that he or she was subjected to

an adverse employment action, Defendants argue that the only

specific allegation against Mr. Smith is that his investigation

into Mr. Jones' discrimination complaints was inadequate, and

that the other allegations of adverse employment actions

involved Mr. True. However, Plaintiffs did allege generally

that Signature management at the "national level" was aware of

instances of discrimination and retaliation against them, and

that each Defendant was responsible for the acts and omissions

of the others. Complaint ¶¶ 28, 20. A conclusion that Mr.

Smith, as Signature's Vice-President for Human Resources, was

aware of and condoned the human resources decisions made by the

San Francisco FBO would be consistent with the allegations in

the complaint. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' motion

to dismiss the claims of racial discrimination and retaliation

against Mr. Smith. 

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F. Sex Discrimination Claim Against Defendant True

Defendants move to dismiss the sex discrimination claim

against Mr. True on the grounds that, as a matter of law, Title

VII and FEHA exclude individuals from liability for sex

discrimination. Plaintiffs concede that individuals may not

be held liable for discrete acts of sex discrimination. In the

FAC, Plaintiff Sanders brings her claim for sex discrimination

against the corporate Defendants only. Therefore, this portion

of Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted. 

II. Motion to Sever

Defendants move to sever the claims of each of the four

named Plaintiffs from the others on the grounds that Plaintiffs

are misjoined because each allegedly suffered very different

employment actions and the complaint raises no common questions

of law or fact. Plaintiffs contend that their claims are

properly joined because they raise the common question of fact

as to whether they were subjected to a systemic "pattern or

practice" of discrimination against African-Americans and

whether these practices resulted in a hostile work environment. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' experiences are too

widely divergent to represent a "pattern or practice" of race

discrimination. However, each Plaintiff identifies instances in

which he or she was allegedly treated worse than non-AfricanAmericans, and each alleges specific negative remarks or

incidents relating to race. In fact, Mr. True allegedly told

Mr. Hamilton that being African-American was a factor working

"against" him in his job. Clearly, whether Defendants' acts

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were the result of a pattern or practice of discrimination is a

common question of fact relevant to all Plaintiffs. As a

result, Plaintiffs' claims are properly joined. Fed. R. Civ. P.

20(a). The fact that some of the named Plaintiffs bring

additional claims based on their individual experiences does not

alter this fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). 

For these reasons, Defendants' motion to sever is denied. 

III. Motion for a More Definite Statement

Defendants move for a more definite statement with respect

to named Plaintiffs' claims on behalf of those similarly

situated. Specifically, Defendants ask the Court to order

Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to demonstrate that they

will be able to meet the class action requirements of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 23 for each claim. 

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants misinterpret the

pleading requirements of Rule 12(e), and that, in any event,

Plaintiffs do not yet know details about the size and definition

of a potential class because that information is within

Defendants' control. Under notice pleading standards,

Plaintiffs are not required to allege the necessary facts to

support every element of each claim, and Defendants have cited

no authority showing that potential class action complaints

should be held to a higher standard. The court in Harris v.

Palm Spring Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909, 913 (9th Cir.

1964), in reversing a district court's dismissal of a class

action, noted, "At most, failure to comply with Rule 23 would

render the complaints subject to dismissal without prejudice in

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so far as they sought relief on behalf of the class." Harris

does not suggest that a determination as to dismissal must be

made prior to Rule 23 certification. Moreover, unlike this

case, Harris did not depend upon information within the control

of defendants. Pioche Mines Consol., Inc., v. Dolman, 333 F.2d

257, 264-265 (9th Cir. 1964) similarly did not state a

requirement that Rule 23 elements be established at the pleading

stage. 

The only other cited case that is controlling authority,

Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 432 (9th Cir.

1969), faulted plaintiffs not only for alleging conclusory class

claims but also for failing to seek a class certification order

at an "early practicable time" as required by Rule 23(c). Here,

Plaintiffs have explained that they intend to delay moving for

class certification until after they have had the opportunity

for additional discovery. Defendants have not identified any

prejudice or any problem that cannot be addressed at the later

class certification stage. Therefore, the Court denies

Defendants' motion for a more definite statement. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and

denies in part Defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket No. 13) as

follows: all claims against Defendants Shaw and Singh are

dismissed without prejudice; Plaintiffs' claims for wrongful

termination, disability discrimination and age discrimination

against individual Defendants True and Smith are dismissed with

prejudice; and Plaintiffs' sex discrimination claim against

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Defendant True is dismissed with prejudice; otherwise,

Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied. The FAC already filed

by Plaintiffs comports with this order.

The Court denies Defendants' motion to sever (Docket No.

10) and motion for a more definite statement (Docket No. 15). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 6/21/05 /s/ CLAUDIA WILKEN 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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