Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01655/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01655-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NASSER AZIMI,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ARLENE ACKERMAN and SAN

FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

Defendants /

No. C-05-1655 MMC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS;

VACATING HEARING

(Docket No. 6)

Before the Court is the motion filed April 27, 2005 by defendants Arlene Ackerman

(“Ackerman”) and San Francisco Unified School District (“District”) to dismiss plaintiff

Nasser Azimi’s (“Azimi”) complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Having read and considered the papers in support of and in opposition to the

motion, the Court deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument, see

Civil L.R. 7-1(b), VACATES the June 3, 2005 hearing on the matter, and rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

Azimi alleges he was employed by the District “to manage a project regarding

software systems and implementation contracts” for the District’s human resources and

accounting divisions. (See Defendants’ Notice of Removal Ex. 12 (First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”)) ¶¶ 2, 4.) According to Azimi, he discovered in the course of his work

that Ackerman, the District’s superintendent, was pursuing a “no public bid sole source

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contract” from PeopleSoft. (See id. ¶ 4.) Azimi believed Ackerman’s actions were in

violation of California law “regarding public bids on government contracts” and reported the

alleged violation to various city agencies, including the San Francisco City Attorney. (See

id. ¶ 7.) Azimi alleges that Ackerman thereafter retaliated against him by spreading false

rumors about his professional accomplishments, forging his signature on documents, and

terminating his employment. (See id. ¶¶ 10-12.)

Azimi asserts two causes of action against defendants. First, Azimi alleges

defendants violated California Labor Code § 1102.5 by retaliating against him for reporting

a violation of law to a government agency. (See FAC ¶ 1.) Second, Azimi asserts a

federal claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on defendants’ alleged deprivation of

Azimi’s liberty and property interests in his employment under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, and defendants’ alleged violation of Azimi’s

First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances. (See id. ¶¶ 21,

25.) Azimi seeks an award of damages in excess of $400,000 for defendants’ alleged

violation of § 1102.5. (See id. ¶ 18.) With respect to his § 1983 claim, Azimi seeks an

award of damages in excess of $400,000, plus punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and

injunctive relief, including reinstatement. (See id. ¶¶ 32-35.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) cannot be granted unless “it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would

entitle him to relief.” See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Dismissal can be

based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged

under a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699

(9th Cir. 1990).

Generally, a district court, in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, may not consider any

material beyond the pleadings. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner And Co.,

Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1990). Material that is properly submitted as part

of the complaint, however, may be considered. See id. Documents whose contents are

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alleged in the complaint, and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not

physically attached to the pleading, also may be considered. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14

F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994). In addition, the Court may consider any document “the

authenticity of which is not contested, and upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily

relies,” regardless of whether the document is referred to in the complaint. See Parrino v.

FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998). Finally, the Court may consider matters that

are subject to judicial notice. See Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d 1279,

1282 (9th Cir. 1986).

In analyzing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, and construe them in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. See NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). The

Court may disregard factual allegations if such allegations are contradicted by the facts

established by reference to exhibits attached to the complaint. See Durning v. First Boston

Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). Conclusory allegations, unsupported by the

facts alleged, need not be accepted as true. See Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121

(9th Cir. 1992).

DISCUSSION

1. Labor Code § 1102.5 Claim Against the District and Ackerman

Defendants move to dismiss Azimi’s cause of action for violation of Labor Code

§ 1102.5 against Ackerman and the District on the ground that Azimi failed to file an

administrative claim in compliance with the California Government Tort Claims Act

(“CTCA”).

Subject to certain exceptions, a plaintiff asserting a state law claim for damages

against a local public entity or its current or former employees must first present a timely

claim pursuant to the CTCA. See Cal. Gov. Code §§ 905, 911.2, 945.4, 950.2, 950.4. The

claim must include, among other things, a general description of the injury, and the names

of the public employees causing the injury. See Cal. Gov. Code § 910. “[I]t is not

necessary to file a [separate] claim against an employee as long as a claim is filed with the

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employing entity, identifying the employee and the basis for respondeat superior liability.” 

See Massa v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 43 Cal. App. 4th 1217, 1222-23 (1996). 

“Compliance with the claims statutes is mandatory . . . and failure to file a claim is fatal to

the cause of action.” City of San Jose v. Superior Court (Lands Unlimited), 12 Cal. 3d 447,

454 (1974). Failure “to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim

presentation requirements” subjects a claim against a public entity or employee to

dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. See State v. Superior Court (Bodde), 32

Cal. 4th 1234, 1239 (2004); see also Massa, 43 Cal. App. 4th at 1222.

In the instant case, Azimi’s cause of action for violation of California Labor Code

§ 1102.5 is asserted against a local public entity, the District, and one of its employees,

Ackerman, and seeks only money damages. (See FAC ¶ 18.) Thus, in the absence of any

applicable exception to the general rule, Azimi was required to present a claim pursuant to

the CTCA prior to filing suit in this Court. See Cal. Gov. Code §§ 905, 911.2, 945.4, 950.2.

Azimi, in his complaint, alleges two separate reasons as justification for his failure to

file an administrative claim. (See FAC ¶¶ 16-17.) First, Azimi alleges that “[n]o claim

pursuant to Gov. Code Section 910 is required for this whistleblower claim against a public

employee such as Ackerman, pursuant to Gov. Code Section 950.” (See FAC ¶ 16.) The

California Supreme Court, however, recently has held that exhaustion of administrative

remedies is required before a plaintiff may file a “whistleblower” suit under § 1102.5. See

Campbell v. Regents of the University of California, 35 Cal. 4th 311, 329-33 (2005). 

Second, Azimi alleges:

Plaintiff was an exempt employee, and was thereby unable to pursue any

administrative remedies with the Civil Service Commission or other

administrative bodies. Plaintiff confirmed this lack of administrative remedies

with discussions with the Human Resources director for the Unified School

District, who advised plaintiff that he was exempt.

(See FAC ¶ 17.) The parties do not address this allegation in their memoranda. To the

extent Azimi alleges he was an “exempt” employee, i.e., salaried and therefore exempt

from the overtime wage laws, see e.g., Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.

4th 319, 324 (2004), and, as a consequence thereof, was not required to exhaust any

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administrative remedies prior to filing suit, the Court has found no law permitting exempt

employees to sidestep the requirements of the CTCA. 

If, however, Azimi is alleging that a representative of the District told Azimi he was

exempt from the requirements of the CTCA and did not need to file an administrative claim

before filing suit, principles of estoppel may be applicable. California courts have held that

“[a] public entity may be estopped from asserting noncompliance with the claims statutes

where its agents or employees have deterred the filing of a timely claim by some

‘affirmative act.’” See Christopher P. v. Mojave Unified School District, 19 Cal. App. 4th

165, 170 (1993). Such estoppel arises “when the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance

of the evidence: (1) the public entity was apprised of the facts, (2) it intended its conduct to

be acted upon, (3) plaintiff was ignorant of the true state of facts, and (4) relied upon the

conduct to his detriment.” See id. 

As Azimi has not clearly alleged the reason for his failure to file an administrative

claim, the Court will GRANT defendants’ motion to dismiss Azimi’s § 1102.5 claim, and

afford Azimi an opportunity to amend the complaint to allege, if possible, an estoppel

defense to the claims presentation requirement of the CTCA.

2. Section 1983 Claim Against the District

The District moves to dismiss the § 1983 claim asserted against it, on two separate

grounds: (1) that it is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the United

States Constitution, and (2) that it is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

a. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

A defendant’s removal of an action to federal court constitutes a waiver of Eleventh

Amendment immunity as to the entire case, including both state and federal claims that are

added after the case is removed. See Embury v. King, 361 F.3d 562, 565-66 (9th Cir.

2004) (discussing Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 545 U.S. 613 (2002).)

Accordingly, when the District removed the instant action from state court to federal

court, it waived any Eleventh Amendment immunity to which it otherwise would have been

entitled.

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b. “Persons” Under § 1983

The Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their

official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Likewise, state “entities that are considered ‘arms of the state’ for

Eleventh Amendment purposes” also are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. See

id. at 70. The Ninth Circuit has held that school districts in California are considered to be

state agencies for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Belanger v. Madera Unified

School District, 963 F.3d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1992). Consequently, the District is not a

“person” subject to suit under § 1983, and the Court will GRANT the District’s motion to

dismiss the § 1983 claim, with prejudice.

3. Section 1983 Claim Against Ackerman

Defendants have withdrawn their motion to dismiss Azimi’s § 1983 claim against

Ackerman, which is asserted against her solely in her personal and individual capacity. 

(See Defendants’ Reply at 2 n. 1.)

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Azimi’s claim for violation of California Labor Code

§ 1102.5 is hereby GRANTED, and said claim is hereby DISMISSED, with leave to amend

the complaint to allege, if possible, an estoppel defense to the claims presentation

requirement of the CTCA.

2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Azimi’s claim against the District for violation of

42 U.S.C. § 1983 is hereby GRANTED, and said claim, as asserted against the District, is

DISMISSED with prejudice.

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Azimi’s § 1983 claim, as asserted against

Ackerman, has been voluntarily withdrawn.

4. Azimi may file an amended complaint within twenty days of the date of this order,

and may amend the complaint only to assert an estoppel defense to the claims

presentation requirement of the CTCA. If Azimi wishes to amend the complaint in other

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respects, he must first file a motion for leave to amend or a stipulation signed by all parties. 

If Azimi fails to file a timely amended complaint, his § 1102.5 claim will be dismissed with

prejudice.

This order terminates Docket No. 6.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 1, 2005 /s/ Maxine M. Chesney 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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