Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00148/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00148-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELVIN JONES, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL A. TOZZI et al., 

Defendants.

________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

1:05-CV-0148 OWW DLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS,

DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE,

DENYING MOTION FOR MORE

DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND

DENYING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS. 

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court for decision are two motions filed by

Defendant John Hollenback: (1) a motion to dismiss the second

amended complaint for failure to state a claim and (2) a motion

for sanctions, which alleges that Plaintiff is fabricating

evidence. This case, the fourth filed in this court by Plaintiff

Melvin Jones concerning a family law dispute previously heard in

state court, was transferred to the undersigned judge on March

16, 2005, as a related case. See Doc. 15, filed March 21, 2005. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of a child custody dispute between

Plaintiff and Kea Chhay, the mother of Plaintiff’s minor child. 

The case was first filed in Santa Clara Superior Court, but was

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 103 Filed 10/21/05 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 See Jones v. California, 1:04-CV-065676; Jones v.

Strangio, 1:04-CV-06567; and Jones v. Strangio, 1:05-CV-00410. 

2 On April 20, 2005, Defendants Jensen and Hollenback

filed a motion to join the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants

Tozzi and Sovey-Silveria. Docs. 25, 26 & 27. Their motion was

not set for hearing, however, because it was improperly noticed. 

See Doc. 30, filed April 20, 2005.

2

later transferred to Stanislaus County. Additional background

concerning the state proceedings is set forth in various

memorandum opinions in this case and related cases.1

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on February 3, 2005. 

Doc. 1. Then, prior to the filing of any responsive pleading by

Defendant, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on March 3,

2005. Doc. 7. The first amended complaint named as defendants: 

Michael A. Tozzi, the Executive Officer of Stanislaus County

Superior Court; Superior Court Judge Marie Sovey-Silveria; and

attorneys Leslie Jensen and John Holenback. 

Defendants Tozzi and Silveria moved to dismiss this

complaint on March 9, 2005.2 Doc. 8. Plaintiff opposed this

motion, Doc. 13, filed Mar. 14, 2005, and moved for default

judgment against defendants Jensen and Hollenback. Doc. 14,

filed Mar. 14, 2005. Plaintiff then (improperly) filed an

additional “counter motion” in opposition to Defendants Tozzi and

Silveria’s motion to dismiss, along with a motion to amend the

complaint a second time. Doc. 16, filed Mar. 24, 2005. This

motion to amend is still pending. Four days later, on March 28,

2005, Plaintiff lodged yet another “second amended complaint” to

“supercede” the second amended complaint that was attached to his

motion for leave to amend. Doc. 19, filed Mar. 28, 2005. 

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 103 Filed 10/21/05 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

On March 18, 2005, the district court issued an order

dismissing Plaintiffs related case, Jones v. Strangio. See Doc.

72, 1:04-cv-06567. In light of that dismissal, the district

court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be

dismissed as well. Doc. 18, filed Mar. 29, 2005. Plaintiff

responded to the order to show cause on April 20, 2005. Doc. 29. 

At the same time, Plaintiff filed yet another proposed amended

complaint intended to supercede the complaint lodged on March 24,

2005. See Proposed Second Amended Complaint lodged Apr. 20,

2005. This complaint contained numerous new allegations that

Defendants made racially derogatory remarks to plaintiff as part

of a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights in

contravention of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986. 

A memorandum opinion and order dated May 11, 2005 dismissed

Defendants Tozzi and Silveria, denied Plaintiff’s motion for

default judgment against Defendants Jensen and Hollenback, and

denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint a

second time. Doc. 47. 

On June 22, 2005, the district court granted Defendants

Jensen and Hollenback’s motion to dismiss, but afforded Plaintiff

one final opportunity to amend the complaint. Doc. 61. A

separate memorandum opinion, dated June 29, 2005, denied

Plaintiffs’ April 9, 2005 motion for sanctions. Doc. 65.

On July 6, 2005, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Defendant

Jensen from the case. Doc. 66. Plaintiff then filed a second

amended complaint alleging that Defendant Hollenback directed

racially derogatory remarks at Plaintiff with the goal of

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 103 Filed 10/21/05 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

deterring Plaintiff’s participation in proceedings related to

Plaintiff’s family law case. See Doc. 67, filed July 6, 2005.

Defendant Hollenback now moves to dismiss the second amended

complaint on a variety of grounds. Doc. 78, filed Sept. 8, 2005.

Defendant Hollenback also moves for sanctions, alleging that

Plaintiff made false statements in his amended complaint. Doc.

91, filed Sept. 27, 2005.

III. SUMMARY OF THE COMPLAINT

The second amended complaint alleges that Defendant

Hollenback became involved with Plaintiff’s family law dispute in

December 2003 as counsel for Ms. Chhay. Doc. 67 at ¶44. 

Plaintiff filed contempt charges against Ms. Chhay in early 2004. 

Id. at ¶ 45. Plaintiff alleges that on April 22, 2004, Defendant

Hollenback told Plaintiff that he “called the Stanislaus County

Housing Authority and told them what a lazy low-life black piece

of shit you are... you get nigger justice.” Id. at ¶ 47.

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Hollenback stated that “he

would knock the teeth out of his black greasy face...and rattle

them out of his jive-monkey ass if he showed up for the contempt

hearings.” Id. at ¶48. Plaintiff asserts that “as a direct and

proximate cause of the defendant’s threats, [he] withdrew [the]

contempt charges....” Id. at ¶ 51. The complaint further

alleges that the statute of limitations on the contempt charges

expired in July 2004. Id. at ¶ 54. As a result, “Mr. Jones’

access to the judicial system was deprived.” 

The complaint alleges that Defendants alleged conduct

deprived Plaintiff of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C.

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 103 Filed 10/21/05 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

§ 1981 in seven different ways. Specifically, the complaint

alleges that Defendant:

(1) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to sue on

account of his race and ethnicity”;

(2) deprived Plaintiff of his federal right to enforce

contracts on account of his race and ethnicity”;

(3) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to be a

party to proceedings on account of his race and

ethnicity”;

(4) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to give

evidence at proceedings on account of his race and

ethnicity”;

(5) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to full

benefit of proceedings on account of his race and

ethnicity”;

(6) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to equal

benefit of all proceedings on account of his race

and ethnicity”; and 

(7) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to equal

benefit of all laws on account of his race and

ethnicity.”

Id. at ¶64-77. 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a court

must “take all of the allegations of material fact stated in the

complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 103 Filed 10/21/05 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Defendant requests that the court take judicial notice

of this document. It is appropriate for the district court to

take judicial notice of this pleading filed in state court, for

its existence, but not for the truth of its contents, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 201.

Despite repeatedly referencing this document and making it

the subject of a request for judicial notice, however, Defendant

has failed to attach a copy of the Notice to any court filing in

this case. Mr. Jones appears to have attached a copy of the

Notice to his Opposition, however. Doc. 87, Attachment E.

6

to the nonmoving party.” Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979,

983 (9th Cir. 2002). In general, “a pro se complaint will be

liberally construed and will be dismissed only if it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Pena v.

Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). However, “a liberal

interpretation of a [pro se] complaint may not supply essential

elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Id. 

V. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Defendants arguments concerning the Plaintiff’s “Notice

of Withdrawal [of] Contempt Without Prejudice.” 

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff should be estopped

from alleging that he withdrew the contempt charges because of

Hollenback’s threats. In support of this argument, Defendant

points to a document filed by Mr. Jones in his family law case

entitled “Notice of Withdrawal of Contempt Hearing Without

Prejudice.”3 The Notice states:

I Melvin Jones hereby declare that I am the Plaintiff

and moving party and Kea Chhay is the Defendant. I

hereby request that the amended contempt charges #23-25

be withdrawn without prejudice for the following

reasons:

1.) Due to the matter(s) set-forth in my letter to the

Honorable Judge Wray Ladine dated 4-23-04, sent

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 103 Filed 10/21/05 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

regular mail on 4-23-04 and sent via Express mail

#ER 899883487 US. 

2.) To allow appropriate time for formal investigation

by the Commission on Judicial Performance

regarding matters set forth in said letter and my

detailed formal complaint. 

3.) My overwhelming concern for the safety of myself,

and my perspective witness’ [sic] appearing on my

behalf.

4.) Due to my concern that further violation(s) of my

Civil and Constitutional Rights will occur. 

I declare under the penalty of perjury and under the

Laws of the State of California that the foregoing is

true and correct. 

Dated this 7th Day of May, 2004

/s/ Melvin Jones 

Melvin Jones, Jr. 

Plaintiff

Defendants argue that this Notice “fatally contradicts”

Plaintiff’s assertion that he withdrew his contempt claim because

of the Mr. Hollenback’s alleged derogatory statements. But

Defendants misunderstand the nature of a motion to dismiss. At

this stage, the district court must accept the allegations of the

complaint as true. Unless converted into a summary judgment

motion, after notice, the court does not weigh or determine

credibility of evidence. Accepted as true, the Notice is not

inconsistent with the allegation in the second amended complaint

that Plaintiff withdrew the contempt charges because of

Hollenback’s threats. Specifically, the Notice acknowledges that

among the reasons for Plaintiff’s withdrawal of the contempt

claims are his “overwhelming concern for the safety of [himself],

and [his] perspective witness...” and his “concern that further

violation(s) of [his] Civil and Constitutional Rights will

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 103 Filed 10/21/05 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 This conclusion is not an endorsement of the veracity

or plausibility of Plaintiff’s claims. As the district court has

stated in the past, this Plaintiff has exhibited a tendency to

change or supplement his factual submissions over time with

previously unasserted matters in an apparent effort to evade

dismissal.

8

occur.” This general statement of reasons is arguably a

reference to the alleged comments/threats made by Mr. Hollenback. 

Although the Notice presented by Defendants is relevant to the

weight a finder of fact might afforded Plaintiff’s allegations,

it does not on its own require dismissal.4

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1981

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint relies exclusively upon

42 U.S.C. § 1981 to establish subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1981 provides: 

(a) Statement of equal rights. 

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United

States shall have the same right in every State and

Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be

parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal

benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of

persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,

and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,

penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every

kind, and to no other.

(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined

For purposes of this section, the term "make and

enforce contracts" includes the making, performance,

modification, and termination of contracts, and the

enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and

conditions of the contractual relationship.

(c) Protection against impairment

The rights protected by this section are protected

against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination

and impairment under color of State law.

42 U.S.C. § 1981. This provision prohibits private individuals

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 103 Filed 10/21/05 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

as well as state actors from discriminating against an individual

on the basis of his or her race with respect to that individual’s

right “to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and

equal benefit of all laws...” See General Bldg. Contractors

Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982). 

“Section 1981 cannot be construed as a general proscription

of racial discrimination... for it expressly prohibits

discrimination only in the making and enforcement of contracts.” 

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176

(1989)(emphasis added); see also Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780,

791 (1966) ("The legislative history of the 1866 Act clearly

indicates that Congress intended to protect a limited category of

rights"):

In this respect, [Section 1981] prohibits

discrimination that infects the legal process in ways

that prevent one from enforcing contract rights, by

reason of his or her race, and this is so whether this

discrimination is attributed to a statute or simply to

existing practices. It also covers wholly private

efforts to impede access to the courts or obstruct

nonjudicial methods of adjudicating disputes about the

force of binding obligations, as well as discrimination

by private entities, such as labor unions, in enforcing

the terms of a contract.

Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177 (1989). 

Here, Plaintiff suggests that bringing a contempt proceeding

in state court against Ms. Chhey was an effort to enforce the

family law visitation agreement he and Ms. Chhey signed. Neither

party offers legal authority supporting or refuting the

proposition that such a contract is covered by section 1981. 

Legal authority applicable to this issue suggests that a wide

range of contracts are covered by the provision. See Runyon v.

McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (section 1981 reached discrimination

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 103 Filed 10/21/05 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

in private education where private schools denied admission to

minority children thereby interfering with parents’ right to

contract for educational services). 

In order to establish a claim under § 1981, it must be shown

that “(1) the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) an

intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and

(3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities

enumerated in the statute (i.e., the right to make and enforce

contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence, etc.).” Mian v.

Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d

Cir. 1993); see Green v. State Bar of Tex., 27 F.3d 1083, 1086

(5th Cir. 1994). 

Proof of these elements of a prima facie case of

discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is not required

at the pleading stage. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506,

510-511 (2002)(there is no general requirement that the plaintiff

plead facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination). 

Nevertheless, the complaint does set forth factual allegations

which address each of the prima facie elements. It is not

disputed that Plaintiff is African American, satisfying the first

element. Plaintiff alleges that on April 22, 2004, Defendant

Hollenback told Plaintiff that he “called the Stanislaus County

Housing Authority and told them what a lazy low-life black piece

of shit you are... you get nigger justice.” Id. at ¶47. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Hollenback stated that “he

would knock the teeth out of his black greasy face...and rattle

them out of his jive-monkey ass if he showed up for the contempt

hearings.” Id. at ¶48. Plaintiff asserts that “as a direct and

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 103 Filed 10/21/05 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 Specifically, Defendant argues that slander is not a

constitutional tort which would normally form the basis for a

civil rights violation. However, the complaint alleges more than

slander. Plaintiff suggests that Defendant threatened him, using

language suggesting a race-based motive behind those threats, in

a manner that interfered with Plaintiff’s access to the judicial

system. 

11

proximate cause of the defendant’s threats, [he] withdrew [the]

contempt charges....” Id. at ¶ 51. These alleged facts, which

the court must assume to be true for the purposes of this motion,

suggest that Defendant intended to interfere with Plaintiff’s

access to the court system to give evidence and the racially

derogatory nature of the remarks are evidence of discriminatory

intent. 

Rather than addressing the allegations in the complaint

head-on, Defendant “categorically denies” making any such

statements to Plaintiff, but appears to admit that he called

Plaintiff a low life. Doc. 78 at 7. Defendant then proceeds to

frame his entire legal argument5 around his own version of the

statement, rather than the statement as alleged in the complaint. 

This is not helpful. On a motion to dismiss, a district court is

not at liberty to disregard the allegations in the complaint on

the basis of conflicting evidence -- no matter how credible the

conflicting evidence may be. Such disputes are more

appropriately resolved on summary judgment or at trial. 

Defendant also argues that the complaint does not allege

“discrimination” as that term is commonly defined, citing various

cases concerned with disparate treatment. Id. at 9. Defendant

exhibits an almost total misunderstanding of federal civil rights

law. It is well established law that explicit racial slurs

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 103 Filed 10/21/05 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

directly connected with an allegedly discriminatory act are

evidence of discrimination. E.E.O.C. v. Pape Lift, Inc., 115

F.3d 676, 679, 684 (9th Cir. 1997)(evidence of age discrimination

existed where employer “just kept saying, 'I don't think Bill

fits the mold of the young, aggressive manager.'”). Plaintiff’s

complaint is sufficient to state a claim under section 1981.

C. Motion to Strike Certain Paragraphs from the Complaint

as Surplussage.

Defendants move to strike the following paragraphs from

Plaintiff’s amended complaint as being irrelevant and unrelated

to any substantive claims : ¶¶ 4, 8-10, 12-22, 23, 27-43, 47, 49,

52. Many of these paragraphs contain somewhat relevant

background information, while others allege facts that are

clearly relevant to the claims alleged in the complaint. For

example, paragraph 47 contains the allegation that “On 4/22/2004

defendant Hollenback made statements to Mr. Jones that, “he

called the Stanislaus County housing Authority and told them what

a lazy low-life black piece of shit you are... you get nigger

justice.” It is not clear whether the Defendant’s paragraph

references may refer to a different version of the complaint, or

whether there is some other explanation for Defendant’s request

that the court strike substantive allegations from the complaint. 

Absent such clarification, the motion to strike must be DENIED.

//

//

//

//

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 103 Filed 10/21/05 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

D. Motion for Sanctions

Defendant moves for sanctions on the ground that Plaintiff

has made false statements in his complaint. Along with the

motion for sanctions, Defendant presents his own affidavit

stating that he “did not make either of the statements claimed by

Mr. Jones.” Doc. 91, Decl. of John H. Hollenback. Defendant

also asserts that he “does not use in his private or public

speech any language that is in any manner derogatory toward

African Americans or members of any other minority ethnic group

[with the] possible exception [of his] tendency to speak

disparagingly of ‘rich white folk’ and their various foibles.” 

Id. 

There is, clearly, a factual dispute between the parties as

to what, if any, comments were exchanged between them. This is

not a matter to be resolved in a motion for sanctions. The

motion for sanctions is DENIED. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above Defendant Hollenback’s:

(1) Motion to dismiss is DENIED;

(2) Motion to strike is DENIED; and 

(3) Request for sanction is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 20, 2005 /s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

_____________________________ 

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 103 Filed 10/21/05 Page 13 of 13