Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01771/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01771-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AARON MCCOY,

 Plaintiff,

v.

M. TANN, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case No. 1:11-cv-1771-LJO-MJS (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

TO:

(1) GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN 

PART DEFENDANT JAMES, JONES, 

AND PAZ’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT (ECF No. 57); AND

(2) GRANT DEFENDANT JIMENEZ’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

(ECF No. 60)

FOURTEEN (14) DAY OBJECTION 

DEADLINE

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1 & 6.) This matter 

proceeds against Defendants James, Jones, Paz, and Jimenez on Plaintiff‟s Eighth 

Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment. (ECF No. 20.) 

On January 10, 2014, Defendants James, Jones, and Paz filed a motion for 

summary judgment. (ECF No. 57.) On January 23, 2014, Defendant Jimenez filed a 

separate motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 60.) Plaintiff was granted leave to 

conduct additional discovery and an extension of time to file his opposition. (ECF No. 

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78.) Plaintiff filed his opposition on October 17, 2014 (ECF No. 79), and Defendants

filed replies (ECF Nos. 80, 81). These matters are deemed submitted pursuant to Local 

Rule 230(l).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall grant summary 

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Wash. 

Mut. Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each party‟s position, 

whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by (1) citing to 

particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, 

documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not 

establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party 

cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial, and to prevail on summary judgment, 

he must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than 

for him. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Defendants do not bear the burden of proof at trial and, in moving for summary 

judgment, they need only prove an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff‟s case. In re 

Oracle Corp. Secs. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010).

In judging the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court may not make 

credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984, 

and it must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,

Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 942 

(9th Cir. 2011).

III. FACTUAL SUMMARY

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff is incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison, but complains of acts that 

occurred in the Administrative Segregation Unit (“Ad-Seg”) at California Substance 

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Abuse Treatment Facility (“CSATF”) in Corcoran, California. His allegations may be 

summarized in relevant part as follows:

On June 9, 2010, Plaintiff was one of several inmates in Ad-Seg who covered up 

his cell windows to protest the treatment of inmates in his housing facility and to attract 

the Warden‟s attention to the inmates‟ grievances. Plaintiff spoke with the Warden and 

with Defendant James, and agreed to leave his cell provided he was restrained with 

waist chains and not handcuffed behind his back due to a medical condition. 

Several hours later, Defendants James, Jones, Paz, and Jimenez arrived to carry 

out the cell extraction. Plaintiff was ordered to strip and to cuff up. Plaintiff again advised 

Defendants he needed waist chains to comply. Defendant Jones then used a 

particularly strong form of pepper spray against Plaintiff. Plaintiff experienced burning 

pain. He was required to go through a strip search and was not permitted to put on 

boxer shorts after the search. Plaintiff was handcuffed behind his back despite his 

medical condition and was removed naked from his cell.

Defendant Paz took Plaintiff to the shower and allowed Plaintiff to shower for four 

seconds. Plaintiff was taken to an outside cage where he remained naked and 

handcuffed behind his back for several hours. Defendant Jones saw Plaintiff outside.

Plaintiff complained to him of pain, but Jones refused to remove Plaintiff‟s handcuffs. 

Plaintiff eventually was uncuffed, given boxer shorts, and returned to administrative 

segregation.

Plaintiff‟s claims for cruel and unusual punishment are based on the allegation 

that Defendants failed to adequately decontaminate him following the application of 

pepper spray. 

B. Undisputed Facts

The Court finds, based on the submissions of the parties, that the following 

relevant facts are undisputed.

On June 9, 2010, Plaintiff was one of several inmates in Ad-Seg who covered up 

cell windows. The Associate Warden instructed Defendant James to initiate tactical cell 

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extraction of the inmates. Defendants James, Jones, Paz, and Jimenez participated in 

the cell extraction.

Defendant James approached Plaintiff‟s cell and gave him a cell extraction

admonishment. Plaintiff refused to comply.1 Defendant James then instructed 

Defendant Jones to administer a single burst of pepper spray into Plaintiff‟s cell through 

the food port. There is a dispute as to whether Plaintiff attempted to comply following 

the first burst of pepper spray. Regardless, Defendant James instructed Defendant 

Jones to administer a second burst of pepper spray. This burst hit Plaintiff in the groin.

Following the second burst of pepper spray, Plaintiff uncovered his windows, was 

searched and handcuffed, and was removed naked from his cell. Plaintiff was taken by 

an escort team, including Defendant Paz, to a shower. Plaintiff was placed under the 

shower for approximately four seconds. He then was taken to an outdoor management 

cell. While in the outdoor management cell, he complained to medical staff of burning 

pain in his groin.

Defendant James did not see or communicate with Plaintiff after he was removed 

to the outdoor cell. Defendant Paz escorted Plaintiff to the outdoor cell. Defendant 

Jones spoke with Plaintiff while he was in the outdoor cell, but the substance of those 

conversations is disputed. 

Defendant Jimenez served as a shield officer for the extractions, and his 

responsibilities included entering an inmate‟s cell first to pin down a resisting inmate. He 

did not decontaminate inmates or escort inmates outside. Because Plaintiff submitted to 

restraints after being exposed to pepper spray, Defendant Jimenez‟s duties as a shield 

officer were not required, and he only stood on standby in the event he was needed.2

 

1 Plaintiff states that he refused to comply because he required waist chains rather than handcuffs. 

However, for purposes of this motion, the Court finds the reasons for Plaintiff‟s non-compliance to be 

immaterial.

2 Plaintiff disputes facts set out in Defendant Jimenez‟s declaration on the basis that Plaintiff has no 

knowledge of these facts. However, his contention that a fact is disputed must be supported by particular 

material in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). There is no such support here. Accordingly, the Court concludes these facts are not in 

dispute.

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IV. Discussion

A. Legal Standard – Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The Eighth Amendment‟s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 

protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and inhumane conditions of 

confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations 

omitted). “[A] prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying 

humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk 

of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate 

it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).

A conditions of confinement claim has both an objective and a subjective 

component. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “First, the deprivation alleged must be . . . 

sufficiently serious,” and must “result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of 

life‟s necessities.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) “[E]xtreme 

deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).

Second, the prison official must have acted with “deliberate indifference” to 

inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “Mere negligence is not sufficient to 

establish liability.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). Rather, a 

plaintiff must show that a defendant knew of, but disregarded, an excessive risk to 

inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. That is, “the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.

Delays in providing showers and medical attention for inmates suffering from 

harmful effects of pepper spray may violate the Eighth Amendment. Clement v. Gomez, 

298 F.3d 898, 905-06 (9th Cir. 2002).

B. Parties’ Arguments

Defendants James, Jones, and Paz argue that they were not deliberately 

indifferent to a risk of harm to Plaintiff because Plaintiff was, in fact, decontaminated 

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with running water and fresh air. (ECF No. 57 at 6.) Moreover, Defendant James did not 

see Plaintiff once Plaintiff was outside, nor did Plaintiff ask Defendant James for further 

decontamination. Thus, Defendant James was not aware of a risk of harm to Plaintiff. 

(Id. at 11.) Nor can Defendant James be held liable based on his supervision of the cell 

extraction. (Id.) Similarly, Plaintiff did not ask Defendants Jones and Paz for further 

decontamination and, in any event, Plaintiff was decontaminated with running water and 

fresh air. (Id. at 12.) Finally, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified 

immunity because they did not violate Plaintiff‟s constitutional rights, and Plaintiff was 

decontaminated consistent with Defendants‟ annual use-of-force training. (Id. at 13-14.)

Defendant Jimenez argues that his participation in the cell extraction was 

minimal and, as such, he was not responsible for decontaminating Plaintiff nor aware of 

any deficiencies in Plaintiff‟s decontamination. (ECF No. 60 at 11.) For the same 

reasons, Defendant Jimenez argues he is entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 15.)

Much of Plaintiff‟s opposition is directed toward the reasons Plaintiff covered his 

windows, the need for the use of pepper spray, Defendants‟ comportment during the 

cell extraction, Defendants‟ decision to handcuff Plaintiff behind his back, and 

Defendants‟ refusal to allow Plaintiff to put on boxer shorts following the cell extraction. 

(ECF No. 79.) However, the instant action is limited to Plaintiff‟s Eight Amendment claim 

based on inadequate decontamination from pepper spray. (ECF No. 20.) Accordingly, 

these other contentions will not be addressed.

In relevant part, Plaintiff argues that asking Defendant James for further 

decontamination would have been futile. (ECF No. 79 at 12-13). In any event, 

Defendant James deliberately “made himself scarce” and therefore Plaintiff could not 

ask him for further decontamination. Plaintiff asserts that he asked Defendant Jones to 

uncuff him so that he could properly decontaminate, but that Defendant Jones refused. 

(Id. at 5.) He also asserts that he attempted to stay in the shower longer, but was 

prevented from doing so by Defendant Paz. He argues that Defendant Jimenez was 

with the “rest of the „mob‟” and has a history of misconduct, thus creating a possibility 

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that he too was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff‟s need for further decontamination. 

(ECF No. 79 at 15.)

The parties‟ arguments with respect to each Defendant are discussed in greater 

detail below.

C. Analysis

1. Decontamination

Defendants James, Jones, and Paz argue that Plaintiff was decontaminated from 

pepper spray through exposure to fresh air and water, and thus Defendants could not 

have been deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff‟s safety. (ECF No. 57 at 10.) In support, 

Defendants provide the following statement in the declaration of Defendant Jones:

Pursuant to my annual use of force training, there are two 

ways to decontaminate from the effects of exposure to 

pepper spray. One way is to wash the exposed area with 

cool water. The other method is to expose the area to fresh 

air. Pepper spray residue evaporates with time, and water 

and/or air helps accelerate this process. 

(ECF No. 57-3 at 4.)

Defendants provide no other evidence to support their claim that Plaintiff was 

effectively decontaminated.3

Several factors lead the Court to conclude that there is a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether Plaintiff was, in fact, effectively decontaminated. The most 

significant factor is Plaintiff‟s statements to the contrary. In his declaration, in medical 

records following the incident, and in the video of the cell extraction submitted by 

Defendants, Plaintiff can be heard to complain of continued burning pain in his groin 

following his alleged decontamination. His continued pain may be construed as an 

indication that the decontamination was ineffective.

Additionally, a reasonable juror viewing the video of the cell extraction could 

conclude that Plaintiff‟s exposure to running water was insufficient to effectively 

 

3 Defendant James’ declaration also states that exposure to fresh air and water are methods for decontaminating from 

pepper spray, but he does not state the basis for his knowledge.

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decontaminate him. The video shows (and Plaintiff confirms) that Plaintiff was placed in 

a cell block shower, with water running over his head, for approximately four seconds. 

Defendant Jones states that one way to decontaminate from pepper spray is to “wash 

the exposed area with water.” A reasonable juror may well conclude that running water

over Plaintiff‟s head for four seconds would be ineffective in decontaminating his groin. 

Notably, the video also shows that other prisoners involved in the cell extraction were 

escorted to an outside decontamination area and exposed to copious amounts of 

running water for a markedly longer period of time than Plaintiff.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff was provided effective decontamination 

because there was a sink in the outdoor cell that Plaintiff could have used to 

decontaminate himself. Indeed, the video evidence shows Plaintiff attempting to do 

precisely that. Specifically, Plaintiff attempted to decontaminate by: 1) pressing a button 

on the side of the sink to start the flow of running water, 2) climbing on top of the sink 

while handcuffed behind his back, and 3) attempting to straddle the faucet so the flow of 

water would reach his groin. Plaintiff states, and Defendants do not dispute, that the 

sink had a timer and did not provide a continuous flow of water. Thus, continuing the 

flow of water would have required Plaintiff to straddle the faucet and lean over at more 

than a ninety degree angle to enable his cuffed hands to reach the button. Although 

Plaintiff conceded in his deposition that such acrobatics may be technically possible, a

reasonable juror could conclude that requiring such actions does not amount to 

providing effective decontamination.

Finally, the Court must address Defendants‟ contention that Plaintiff was 

effectively decontaminated because he was exposed to fresh air. Plaintiff‟s opposition 

includes as an exhibit a page from a January 2006 Division of Correctional Health Care 

Services manual stating that “[d]econtamination includes removal of all contaminated 

clothing and showering in cold/cool water or thorough rinsing with cold/cool water to 

remove all traces of [Oleoresin Capsicum} from the skin and hair.” (ECF No. 79 and 49.) 

The manual does not mention decontamination with air. Further, the Ninth Circuit has 

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held that delays in providing showers to inmates suffering from the harmful effects of 

pepper spray may violate the Eighth Amendment. Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 

905-06 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, there is some dispute as to whether decontamination with 

air is sufficient.

However, even accepting that Defendants were trained that decontamination with 

fresh air is an appropriate option, Defendants provide insufficient detail regarding the

appropriate use of air. Presumably, inmates are exposed to air at all times (although the 

freshness of that air may be a matter of some debate). Nevertheless, despite this ready 

access to air, the Ninth Circuit has held that delays in providing showers may constitute 

deliberate indifference. Id. Based on this conflict, a reasonable juror may conclude that 

merely placing a naked inmate outdoors is not an appropriate means of 

decontamination in all circumstances, particularly where pepper spray is applied directly 

to the skin, as opposed to merely being present in the air. Without additional detail 

regarding when and how air may be used to decontaminate, Plaintiffs are not entitled to 

summary judgment on this basis.

Defendants Jones, James, and Paz also argue that they are entitled to qualified 

immunity on the basis of their training that fresh air and water are the two methods of 

decontaminating from pepper spray. However, this argument fails due to the conflicts in 

the evidence discussed herein.

2. Defendant James

Defendant James states that he did not see or communicate with Plaintiff after he 

was placed in an outdoor cell, Plaintiff did not request further decontamination from 

Defendant James, and Defendant James was not informed by other staff that Plaintiff 

requested further decontamination. Accordingly, James argues, he was not put on 

notice of a risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff may 

attempt to argue that James should be held liable in his supervisory capacity, James 

argues that that the plan for cell extractions included decontaminating inmates with cool 

water and then placing them in an outdoor cell. Defendant James was not made aware 

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of Plaintiff‟s claim that his decontamination was ineffective.

Plaintiff concedes that he did not request further decontamination from 

Defendant James. He argues that doing so would have been futile because Defendant 

James preplanned the events and would not have deviated from his course of conduct. 

He also contends that Defendant James “deliberately made himself scarce”, and 

therefore further decontamination could not be requested of him.

Plaintiff has provided no evidence that Defendant James was aware of Plaintiff‟s

need for further decontamination. His speculation that Defendant James must have 

known is insufficient to demonstrate that he actually knew. McSherry v. City of Long 

Beach, 584 F.3d 1129, 1138 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Summary judgment requires facts, not 

simply unsupported denials or rank speculation.”). Similarly, the implication that 

Defendant James would have denied further decontamination had Plaintiff asked is too 

speculative to create a dispute of fact. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue 

as to whether Defendant James knew of, but disregarded, a serious risk of harm to 

Plaintiff. 

Defendants‟ motion for summary judgment with respect to Defendant James 

should be granted.

3. Defendant Jones 

Defendant Jones states that he spoke with Plaintiff while Plaintiff was held in the

outside cell. Defendant Jones does not recall the substance of the conversations, but 

denies Plaintiff asked for additional decontamination. 

Plaintiff contends that he did, in fact, ask Defendant Jones to uncuff him so he 

could decontaminate. (ECF No. 79 at 81; see also ECF No. 19 at 17.) He also 

complained to Defendant Jones of pain.

Based on the representations of the parties, there is a dispute of fact as to 

whether Defendant Jones knew of, but disregarded a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff 

due to inadequate decontamination. Summary judgment with respect to Defendant 

Jones should be denied.

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4. Defendant Paz

Defendant Paz states that Plaintiff did not ask for additional decontamination. 

Plaintiff states that he attempted to stay in the shower for as long as possible, but 

Defendant Paz stated, “That‟s enough,” and took Plaintiff away.

The Court finds there is a dispute as to whether Defendant Paz knew that 

Plaintiff required further decontamination. First, as stated above, a reasonable juror 

could find that the shower provided to Plaintiff by Defendant Paz was insufficient to 

decontaminate Plaintiff‟s groin. This is supported by Plaintiff‟s statement that he 

attempted to stay in the shower longer but was prevented from doing so. Additionally, in 

his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he asked Defendant Paz to uncuff him so he could 

decontaminate. This contention is supported by video evidence in which Plaintiff asks 

Defendant Paz to uncuff him, and can be heard complaining of burning pain in his groin 

as Defendant Paz walks away.

Accordingly, there is a dispute of fact as to whether Defendant Paz knew of, but 

disregarded a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff due to inadequate decontamination. 

Summary judgment with respect to Defendant Paz should be denied.

5. Defendant Jimenez

Defendant Jimenez states that he was not responsible for decontaminating 

Plaintiff or any other inmate and did not escort Plaintiff outside. Defendant Jimenez was 

not aware of the length of time Plaintiff was permitted to decontaminate, whether 

Plaintiff was able to decontaminate thoroughly, or whether Plaintiff complained of 

inadequate decontamination after he was escorted outside. Once Plaintiff was escorted 

outside, Defendant Jimenez did not see him again that day. 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Jimenez should be held liable because he was 

one of the “mob.” (ECF No. 79 at 14.) He also contends that Jimenez was part of a “pregame” plan to handcuff Plaintiff for a prolonged period of time, thereby preventing 

decontamination. He asserts that Jimenez has engaged in “rogue” behavior with other 

inmates. Finally, Plaintiff disputes Jimenez‟s contention that he did not see Plaintiff once 

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Plaintiff was outside. Plaintiff states that Defendant Jimenez likely came outside at 

various points, and would have been in plain view of Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff does 

not dispute that he did not speak with Jimenez once he was taken outside.

Defendant Jimenez replies that Plaintiff presents no evidence that Jimenez 

pepper sprayed him, decontaminated him, failed or refused to allow Plaintiff‟s 

decontamination, or otherwise caused him harm.

Plaintiff has submitted no evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude 

that Defendant Jimenez knew of, but disregarded Plaintiff‟s allegedly inadequate 

decontamination. Instead Plaintiff relies upon an inference of deliberate indifference 

arising out of Defendant Jimenez‟s mere participation in the cell extraction. This is 

insufficient to meet Plaintiff‟s burden on a motion for summary judgment. See E.E.O.C., 

v. Boeing Co., 577 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2009) (inferences arising from direct 

evidence may constitute proof for purposes of summary judgment provided they are 

“specific and substantial”, not merely speculative).

Defendant Jimenez‟s motion for summary judgment therefore should be 

granted.4

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden of putting forth sufficient 

evidence to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the liability of Defendants James and

Jimenez. However, Plaintiff has raised a triable issue regarding the liability of 

Defendants Jones and Paz. 

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Defendants James, Jones, 

and Paz‟s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 57) be GRANTED IN PART AND 

DENIED IN PART. The Court further recommends that Defendant Jimenez‟s motion for 

summary judgment (ECF No. 60) be granted.

 

4 Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that Defendant Jimenez’s conduct was 

unconstitutional, the Court does not address Defendant Jimenez’s qualified immunity argument.

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These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States 

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and 

Recommendations, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a 

copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 

Judge‟s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served 

and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of 

rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter 

v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 19, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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