Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00362/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00362-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 120
Nature of Suit: Marine Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 46:741 Shipping

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LT. RICHARD T. GENGLER and LT.

DANIEL S. McSEVENEY,

Plaintiffs/Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THROUGH

ITS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND

NAVY; AND SECRETARY DONALD C.

WINTER,

Defendants/Respondents.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

1:06-cv-0362 OWW LJO

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT

AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE:

MOTION REQUESTING ORDER

THAT GENGLER REMAIN IN

CHICAGO UNTIL DECEMBER 8,

2006 OR PENDING DECISION ON

THE MERITS (DOC. 81)

AND

ORDER RE: BAIL ON HABEAS

CORPUS PETITION

Before this Court for decision is Petitioner Richard T.

Gengler’s motion requesting an order for admission to release

from Defendants’ custody to permit Gengler to remain in Chicago

until December 8, 2006, or pending a decision on the merits of

his amended habeas corpus petition. (Doc. 81, filed Oct. 13,

2006). Although there are two Petitioners in this habeas corpus

case, Lt. Cmdr. Gengler and Lt. Cmdr. Daniel S. McSeveney, the

present motion relates solely to Lt. Cmdr. Gengler. Much of the

background and early procedural history of this case is set forth

in detail in this Court’s Memorandum Decision and Order Re:

Defendants’ [First] Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 49, filed Aug. 24,

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 107 Filed 11/03/06 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Gengler’s Service agreement is identical in content to 1

that of Petitioner McSeveney. Exhibit A, Declaration of Lt.

Daniel S. McSeveney in Support of Motion for Order for Entry of

Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re

Preliminary Injunction, dated April 18, 1996. (Doc. 5).

2

2006) at 1-9.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioner Gengler is a Naval Officer and Aviator who

is stationed with the Operational Test Evaluation Squadron Nine

(VX-9) in China Lake, California. He entered the Navy Reserve on

April 12, 1996, upon signing an “Aviation Officer Candidate

Program Service Agreement” (hereinafter “the Service Agreement”). 

Exhibit A, Declaration of Lt. Richard T. Gengler in Support of

Motion for Order for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order and

Order to Show Cause Re Preliminary Injunction, dated March 29,

2006 (hereinafter “Gengler Decl.”) (Doc. 4). The Service

Agreement is a contract of adhesion drafted by the Navy and

signed by its representative, Lt. Scott A. Potas. 

1

2. The Service Agreement provides that Gengler will accept

a commission as a Reserve Officer in the Navy. (Service

Agreement, Doc. 4, Ex. A, at ¶ 1d). The Agreement also states:

“a commission as an (sic) Reserve Officer is held at the pleasure

of the President.” (Doc. 4, Ex. A, at ¶1e(1)).

3. The Service Agreement further provides that “upon

acceptance of a commission, [Gengler] will be required to serve

at least eight years as a Reserve Officer in the United States

Navy from the date of appointment to commissioned grade” (Doc. 4,

Ex. A, at ¶1e(2)), “any portion of this eight-year period not

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 107 Filed 11/03/06 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 During oral argument on this motion, Petitioner’s counsel 2

represented to the Court that Gengler’s designation as a Naval

Aviator occurred on April 2, 1999. The government did not

dispute this and admits in its Declaration of Lieutenant

Commander Jeremy W. Gunther, USN dated July 27, 2006, submitted

in opposition to Petitioners’ ex parte motion for order for entry

of temporary restraining order and order to show cause re entry

of preliminary injunction, that Gengler was “winged” in April

1999.

3

served on active duty will be served on inactive duty.” (Doc. 4,

Ex. A, at ¶1e(3)). On October 11, 1996, Gengler was appointed as

commissioned officer in the Navy Reserve. (Gengler Decl. at ¶

4). Accordingly, his eight-year minimum period of service as a

commissioned Reserve Officer was completed in October 2004.

4. The Service Agreement further states that “a

resignation of [Gengler’s] commission as a Reserve Officer

submitted prior to the completion of this eight-year term will

normally be rejected and, after this period, may be accepted or

rejected by the President, as the needs of the service may then

require.” (Doc. 4, Ex. A, at ¶ 1e(4)).

5. Separate from the provisions related to service as a

Reserve Officer, the Service Agreement contains specific

provisions relating to an agreed-upon period of service on active

duty. Paragraph 2 of the Agreement states, “I consent to serve

on active duty as a commissioned officer for a period of seven

years from date of designation as a Naval Aviator (unless sooner

released to inactive duty or discharged by the Chief of Naval

Personnel.(]) Doc. 4, Ex. A, at ¶ 2). Petitioner Gengler was

designated as a Naval Aviator on April 2, 1999 and therefore his

seven-year period of active duty was completed on April 2, 2006.2

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 107 Filed 11/03/06 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The Service Agreement quotes 10 U.S.C. sections 671a and 3

671b, which allow for limited extensions of active duty service

in wartime. (Doc. 4, Ex. A, at ¶ f). The Navy has not invoked

those statutes in this case.

4

At present he remains in an active duty status.

6. Another paragraph in the Service Agreement sets forth

the procedure by which Gengler may effect his release from active

duty: “I must notify the Chief of Naval Personnel . . . of this

desire at least nine months prior to the end of my obligated

service . . . failure to so notify the Chief of Naval Personnel .

. . constitutes a desire on my part to be extended on active duty

for an indefinite period of time.” (Doc. 4, Ex. A, at ¶ 2).3

8. The following statute was enacted by Congress in 1989,

some seven years before the Navy presented Gengler with his

Service Agreement:

§ 653. Minimum Service Requirement for Certain flight

Crew Positions.

(a) Pilots.-–The minimum service obligation of any

member who successfully completes training in the armed

forces as a pilot shall be 8 years, if the member is

trained to fly fixed-wing jet aircraft, or 6 years, if

the member is trained to fly any other type of

aircraft.

...

(c) Definition. In this section, the term “service

obligation” means the period of active duty or, in the

case of a member of a reserve component who completed

flight training in an active duty for training status

as a member of a reserve component, the period of

service in an active status in the Selected Reserve

required to be served after - 

(1) completion of undergraduate pilot training in the

case of training, as a pilot; 

9. The eight-year statutory service term of § 653 sets out

a minimum active duty service obligation but does not state that

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 107 Filed 11/03/06 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Gengler alleges that the Service Agreement with the seven- 4

year term was routinely used by the Navy from at least 1990

through 1996. (Verified Third Amended Petition, Doc. 77, filed

October 12, 2006, at ¶ 14).

5

any contract made in violation of the term is unenforceable.4

10. Gengler’s eight-year period of active duty after

successful completion of training as a pilot, terminates on April

2, 2007.

11. Lt. Cmdr. Gengler has served with distinction during

his ten years in the Navy. He has made two full deployments as a

strike fighter pilot on the aircraft carrier, USS CONSTELLATION. 

He has flown numerous combat missions and logged combat time in

Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, Southern Watch, and

others. Petitioner Gengler has received two Air Medals (with

Combat Distinguishing Device), the Navy and Marine Corps

Commendation Medal (with Combat Distinguishing Device), the Navy

and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, among others. Two of his

awards, an Air Medal and the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation

Medal, were given to him for individual acts of bravery as a

strike fighter pilot during Operation Iraqi Freedom. (Doc. 77,

at ¶¶ 3-6).

12. Gengler complied with his obligation to timely notify

the Chief of Naval Personnel of his request for Release from

Active Duty (“RAD”) by submission of a series RAD requests dated

January 21, 2004, February 9, 2005, March 8, 2006 and July 21,

2006. (Doc. 77, at ¶¶ 97-98). The Navy denied all of the

requests and Gengler filed the appropriate administrative appeals

all of which were denied citing a variety of reasons, but all

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 107 Filed 11/03/06 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

essentially based on the position that he should serve eight

years of active duty following flight training instead of seven.

(Doc. 77, ¶¶ 99, 109-110). On February 13, 2006, the Navy

informed Lt. Cmdr. Gengler that he had exhausted his

administrative remedies. (Doc. 4, Ex. E; Doc. 77, at ¶ 101). 

This case was filed March 31, 2006.

13. Petitioner Gengler has also alleged that between 2002

and 2004, the Navy has discharged at least eight Naval Aviators

upon completion of their contractual seven-year term of active

duty. (Doc. 77, at ¶¶ 48-56). He also asserts in his Petition

and other documents, that the Navy has a surplus of Naval

Aviators and has implemented various voluntary and involuntary

separation Programs to discharge several hundred officers

including approximately 300 pilots in September 2006. (Doc. 77,

at ¶¶ 37-47; Mem. Dec. Doc. 49, at 6-7).

14. The March 31, 2006 Complaint alleges five causes of

action, including one habeas corpus claim. (Doc. 1). Petitioner

also sought a temporary restraining order to prevent the

Respondents from changing his status to deployable or sending him

outside the Continental United States. (Mem. Dec., Doc. 49, at

8).

15. The parties reached an agreement as to non-deployment.

There was a period of internal discussion by the Navy regarding

the discharge request. At some point prior to July 25, 2006, the

Navy notified Petitioner’s counsel that Gengler would not be

discharged.

16. The parties then litigated the motion for a temporary

restraining order, which was denied on August 10, 2006, except

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 107 Filed 11/03/06 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

that the Navy would be required to provide at least 20 days’

notice of any intent to change Petitioner Gengler’s current nondeployment status so he could make application for appropriate

relief to the Court should that occur. (Order Re: Plaintiff’s Ex

Parte Motion for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order and Order

to Show Cause Re Entry of Preliminary Injunction; and Order Re

Petition for Habeas Corpus (Doc. 37); (Mem. Dec., Doc. 49, at 8-

9).

17. On August 3, 2006, in lieu of Answer, the government

filed its first motion to dismiss. (Doc. 31). Following

briefing, that motion was decided on August 24, 2006. The motion

to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was granted in

part and denied in part, finding that the only valid basis for

jurisdiction is habeas corpus. (Mem. Dec., Doc. 49, at 43-44). 

The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6), was granted in part and denied in

part. The motion to dismiss was denied without prejudice,

subject to repleading, on a contract-based habeas corpus claim. 

The court identified a list of factors to assist it in

determining whether the seven-year active duty provision in the

Service Agreement would be enforced, or whether the statutory

eight-year term must be given effect. The motion to dismiss was

granted with leave to amend on the equitable estoppel claim;

requiring re-pleading with greater specificity. (Mem. Dec., Doc.

49, at 36-39, 44).

18. Following this ruling, Petitioner Gengler filed several

subsequent Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus. The present

petition (Doc. 77) was ordered filed at a hearing on October 23,

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 107 Filed 11/03/06 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

2006.

19. While the case was pending, Lt. Cmdr. Gengler’s

circumstances changed. He was admitted to the Graduate School of

Business at the University of Chicago. (Doc. 77, at ¶ 122). The

term was scheduled to begin in September 2006. In summer 2006,

Petitioner Gengler trained his replacement at his squadron. 

(Doc. 77, at ¶ 130). He asked his Commanding Officer, Captain

Fecht, for 60 days of leave to attend school. The request was

granted on August 16, 2006. (Doc. 77, at ¶¶ 131-134). 

Petitioner Gengler was also told approximately a week later that

he would no longer fly for the Navy. (Doc. 81, at 1). Gengler

paid $17,000 in tuition and fees and enrolled in school. (Doc.

77, at ¶ 141). The first quarter at business school is the most

critical. If Petitioner Gengler is required to leave before it

is completed, he will be forced to drop out or fail school and

lose his tuition. (Doc. 81, Gengler Decl. at ¶¶ 14-16).

20. The Respondents filed a second motion, to dismiss the

habeas corpus petitions, on October 12, 2006. (Doc. 78). The

government argues that there is no subject matter jurisdiction

and that the equitable estoppel claim fails to state a cause of

action. According to the government, an officer’s commission is

indefinite in term, and an officer serves at the pleasure of the

President and can only resign a commission effective upon

acceptance, which means, a court may not order that the

resignation be accepted and the officer discharged. (Doc. 78, at

7-17). The government cites SECNAV Instruction 1920.6C and

MILPERSMAN 1920-130, 1920-200 for these propositions. (Doc. 78,

at 14-15). Under this position, the length of time of active

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 107 Filed 11/03/06 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

duty service is limited by neither the Service Agreement nor by

§ 653.

21. The government further argues the court has no

authority to determine the legality of the contract in dispute,

the Navy’s actions, and cannot meddle in the Navy’s conduct of

its business.

22. Petitioner Gengler counters that the government

conflates two separate concepts: service as a commissioned

Reserve Officer and service on active duty. A Reserve Officer

may serve either on active or inactive duty status. The Service

Agreement provides for service on active duty for seven years

following successful completion of flight training, and this is

fully consistent with the requirement that service as a

commissioned officer, who is a fixed wing jet pilot, must be for

at least eight years and a commission is held at the pleasure of

the President. The Navy’s Personnel Manual, MILPERSMAN 1001-090

(¶2), provides that a required time on active duty may be

established by a service agreement. Here, that time is seven

years. 

23. MILPERSMAN 1331-010 (¶ 4) specifies that if an officer

timely declares an intent to resign from active duty, he or she

may not receive orders obligating the officer for service beyond

this minimum required time. (Doc. 85, at 6-11).

24. As the motion to dismiss was briefed, Petitioner

Gengler filed the present motion to allow him to remain in

Chicago and complete his first quarter at the University of

Chicago. (Doc. 81, filed October 13, 2006). At the suggestion

of government counsel, he had sought additional leave from his

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 107 Filed 11/03/06 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Commanding Officer. (Doc. 81, Gengler Decl. at ¶ 17). That

request was denied on October 10, 2006. (Doc. 81, Gengler Decl.

at ¶ 19).

25. The Court heard extended argument on both motions on

October 23, 2006. The motion to dismiss was submitted, and is

decided by separate decision. With respect to Gengler’s leave,

the Respondents submitted a declaration from the Commanding

Officer stating that additional leave was not consistent with

Navy policy, and that petitioner Gengler had enrolled in school

taking the risk that this case might not be decided by the time

his leave was over in November. (Doc. 89, at ¶¶ 3-6).

26. Petitioner Gengler proposed a solution - that he could

return to duty for two short periods and obtain leave that would

allow him to complete the quarter in school and comply with Navy

policy. (Doc. 90, at 4). The Court suggested that Lt. Cmdr.

Gengler’s Commanding Officer be asked to consider the proposal. 

On October 27, 2006, Respondents informed Petitioner’s counsel

that it would not grant additional leave. (Doc. 92, at 2).

27. Captain Fecht submitted a supplemental declaration,

stating this his squadron, VX-9, is experiencing a manning

shortage in aircrew billets. Petitioner Gengler is needed at the

command to perform duties as Squadron Duty Officer, managing the

daily flight schedule, and assisting with other administrative

matters. He would not fly aircraft, but would backfill for other

officers. (Doc. 94, Fecht Decl. at ¶¶ 4-6).

28. The Court heard extended argument on the present motion

on November 1, 2006. At argument, Petitioner’s counsel also

stated (and government counsel agreed) that on October 23, 2006,

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 107 Filed 11/03/06 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Petitioner Gengler had received orders for his separation from

the Navy in April 2007. This results in service on active duty

for an eight-year term.

29. Through counsel, Gengler asked that the Court enlarge

him on bond under the inherent power of a habeas corpus court to

and including December 8, 2006, or until this case is decided on

the merits. Counsel agreed and it was ordered that for the

period Gengler was enlarged on bond, the time on bond would not

be credited towards Gengler’s required period of service on

active duty. 

30. In view of the irreconcilable inconsistency of

Gengler’s service agreement and 10 U.S.C. § 653(a)’s minimum

active duty service requirement and substantial presently

unresolvable factual and legal issues, it was decided that absent 

permission for release from custody, the relief Petitioner seeks

will be rendered unobtainable. 

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. This case is a petition for writ of habeas corpus

brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). Section 2241(c)(1) provides

jurisdiction to test the legality of a person’s confinement if he

is “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United

States.” Section 2241(c)(3) provides jurisdiction to determine

whether a person is “in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States.” Petitioner Gengler

alleges that he is under the custody and control of the United

States Navy, which exists under “the authority of the United

States.” (Doc. 77, at ¶¶ 1-3). The Petitioner alleges, inter

alia, that he is held in custody of the Navy in violation of the

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 107 Filed 11/03/06 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

Constitution and laws of the United States because he is required

to serve on active duty beyond the period set forth in his

Service Agreement with the Navy. (Doc. 77, at ¶¶ 19, 69, 70,

166).

2. A district court has the inherent power to enlarge a

petitioner on bond pending hearing and decision on his petition

for writ of habeas corpus. The authority “derives from the power

to issue the writ itself.” Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 507

(9th Cir. 1987). In Scaggs v. Larsen, 396 U.S. 1206 (1969), Mr.

Justice Douglas, sitting as circuit justice, released an enlisted

reservist from Army custody pending a decision on the merits of

his habeas corpus petition. The petitioner alleged that he was

required to serve beyond his enlisted contract. Mr. Justice

Douglas held that “[a]t the least the issue is substantial and

should be resolved.” Id. at 1209.

3. In Land v. Deeds, 878 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1989), the

court of appeals stated that “[b]ail pending a decision in a

habeas case is reserved for extraordinary cases involving special

circumstances or a high probability of success.” Id. at 318-19

(citing Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5 (1964)); see also United

States v. Mett, 41 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 1994) (following

Land). The Court in Aronson, cited in Land, set out the

following in assessing whether bail should be granted on a habeas

corpus petition related to a criminal conviction: “[I]t is

therefore necessary to inquire whether, in addition to there

being substantial questions presented by the appeal, there is

some circumstance making this application exceptional and

deserving of special treatment in the interests of justice.” 

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 107 Filed 11/03/06 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

Id. at 5. The Aronson Court suggested that a greater showing

must be made by a petitioner seeking bail in a criminal

conviction habeas “than would be required in a case where

applicant had sought to attack by writ of habeas corpus an

incarceration not resulting from a judicial determination of

guilt.” Id. These cases establish that enlargement on bail may

be granted to a habeas corpus petitioner where there are

exceptional circumstances and, at a minimum, substantial

questions as to the merits. Aronson suggests that the test may

be relaxed where, as here, the custody is not related to a

criminal conviction.

4. Based on these facts, the Court finds that there are

exceptional circumstances present in this case that favor

enlargement on bail:

a. The Service Agreement was drafted by the Navy, not

Petitioner Gengler.

b. The Navy, not Petitioner Gengler, knew or should

have known of the existence of § 653 and of any conflict between

their Service Agreement and the provisions of § 653 and the

minimum term of active duty.

c. The unusual and exceptional circumstances present

here were created by the Navy through its error in drafting the

Service Agreement.

d. A reasonable interpretation of the express

language of Petitioner’s Service Agreement as a whole is that

while the obligation to serve as a commissioned Reserve Officer

is for a minimum of eight years, and there is no unilateral right

to resign a commission, the obligation to serve the active duty

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 107 Filed 11/03/06 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

component of that commission and service is only for seven years.

e. The Service Agreement created Petitioner Gengler’s

reasonable and justifiable expectation that he would only be

required to serve on active duty for seven years after his

designation as a Naval Aviator. 

f. That expectation was reinforced by language in his

Service Agreement providing for a limited ability to extend a

period of active duty, as well as by procedures within the Navy

to implement a right to release from active duty after service of

the minimum required period set forth in a Service Agreement.

g. The Navy did not explain or take any action to

resolve the conflict between the active duty term of the service

agreement and § 653. 

5. Neither Petitioner Gengler nor the Respondents have

improperly delayed the litigation of the present case. 

Respondents’ motions to dismiss, which it had a right to file,

have delayed discovery and the scheduling of the case for trial. 

Questions of disputed fact and law prevent the case being decided

as a matter of law. 

6. The Petition is not before the Court for a ruling on

the merits and a decision on the merits cannot be rendered by

November 4, 2006.

7. Petitioner Gengler will unduly suffer if he is required

to withdraw from the University of Chicago Graduate School of

Business prior to the completion of his first quarter of studies. 

8. Although the court recognizes that Petitioner Gengler’s

Commanding Officer granted petitioner’s initial leave at

Gengler’s request and the squadron is not fully manned, there are

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 107 Filed 11/03/06 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

nevertheless exceptional circumstances that favor enlargement on

bail.

9. The Court also finds that there are, at a minimum,

substantial questions going to the merits of the petition. It is

established that the terms of service contracts of enlisted

personnel are governed by contract law standards and are

enforceable. See, e.g., Santiago v. Rumsfeld, 425 F.3d 549, 554

(9th Cir. 2005). Though there is no case directly on point, at

least one district court has held that an officer’s agreement to

serve additional time as a result of educational programs is also

contractual in nature, even though an officer is a Presidential

appointee. See Wallace v. Brown, 1979 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10156,

*20 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

10. The court is troubled by the lack of disclosure, in a

contract drafted by the Navy, which results in a mistake from

which the Navy seeks to benefit, by considering the express term

relating to time of service on active duty to be invalid and

unenforceable. 

11. This practice creates the risk that every officer

candidate, who signs an erroneous agreement without disclosure by

the Navy, relating to such a material term, may enter into a

service obligation mistakenly, without being fully informed.

12. The exceptional circumstances of this petition to

resolve Petitioner’s right to be released from active duty

include that further delay renders nugatory his good faith

expectations and belief as to release from active duty on which

he relied to his detriment and will obviate any relief in this

case.

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 107 Filed 11/03/06 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

13. For the reasons set forth above and at the hearing in

open court, Petitioner’s motion requesting order that Gengler

remain in Chicago until December 8, 2006, is hereby GRANTED. 

Petitioner Gengler is enlarged on bail, and is released from

custody of the Respondents beginning on November 4, 2006, and

continuing to and including December 8, 2006, after which he will

immediately return to the custody of Respondents.

14. To maintain the status quo, the period of time during

which Petitioner is enlarged on bail will not be credited towards

his requirement of active duty service.

15. The oral motion of the government for a stay made at

the end of the hearing, was GRANTED in open court and the

execution of this order is STAYED until November 3, 2006, at

12:00 noon. 

16. This order in no way discharges Petitioner Gengler from

his appointment as a commissioned officer in the United States

military.

TO THE EXTENT ANY FINDING OF FACT CAN BE INTERPRETED AS A

CONCLUSION OF LAW OR A CONCLUSION OF LAW CAN BE INTERPRETED AS A

FINDING OF FACT, IT SHALL BE SO INTERPRETED.

THIS ORDER SUPERCEDES THE PRIOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ISSUED NOVEMBER 2, 2006 (Doc. 100).

SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 3, 2006.

 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

 OLIVER W. WANGER

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 107 Filed 11/03/06 Page 16 of 16