Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00019/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00019-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Richard and Maria Shupe, 

 Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

Bank of America, National Association, 

 Defendant. 

CV 13-019-TUC-JGZ (JR) 

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

 

 Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by 

Defendant Bank of America, National Association (“BANA”) (Doc. 129). Plaintiffs 

Richard and Maria Shupe (“Plaintiffs” when referred to collectively) filed a 

Response (Doc. 162), and BANA has replied (Doc. 171). For the reasons explained 

below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after conducting an 

independent review of the record, grant the motion. 

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I. Procedural Background 

The Court’s jurisdiction over this action arises from the Telephone Consumer 

Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227. See Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, 

LLC, -- U.S. --, 132 S.Ct. 740 (2012). In the original complaint, in addition to claims 

made under the TCPA, the Plaintiffs alleged claims for invasion of privacy, 

harassment, intentional infliction of emotional and physical distress, and claimed that 

the Defendant violated A.R.S. § 44-1282, which prohibits certain intrastate 

telemarketing solicitations (Doc. 1). The complaint alleged that the Defendant 

ignored the Plaintiffs’ notices not to call their residential telephone number by using 

predictive dialing systems to call them on more than 50 occasions. On March 4, 

2013, the Plaintiffs withdrew their claims for harassment and intentional infliction of 

emotional and physical distress (Doc. 19). 

On April 9, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Leave to File an Amended 

Complaint to add a negligence claim (Doc. 80). The Magistrate Judge recommended 

that the motion be denied (Doc. 105). The recommendation was adopted by the 

District Court (Doc. 119). 

II. Factual Background

 It is undisputed that between August 1 and November 25, 2011, BANA made 

between 48 and 56 calls to 520-xxx-6400 (“the 6400 number”), which was then the 

Plaintiffs’ residential telephone number. Defendant’s Statement of Facts (“DSOF”), 

¶¶ 8-9; Plaintiffs’ Opposition Statement of Facts (“POSF”), ¶¶ 3-4. Plaintiffs have 

both a mortgage and credit card with BANA. DSOF ¶¶ 3-4; POSF, ¶¶ 3-4. 

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However, BANA contends that the calls in question were not associated with the 

Plaintiffs’ accounts, but were intended for a third party, Jose Ascension Sontoyo, 

who had a mortgage provided by BANA. DSOF, ¶ 5. BANA alleges that the calls 

were made to the 6400 number because Mr. Sontoyo had provided that number as his 

work telephone number on his 2006 mortgage application. DSOF, ¶ 5. When his 

mortgage went into default, BANA attempted to contact him at the 6400. However, 

sometime in 2010, the Plaintiffs acquired the 6400 number. DSOF, ¶ 7; POSF, ¶ 7. 

BANA admits that most of the calls were made using auto-dialing technology, but 

that the calls did not employ an “artificial or prerecorded voice.” DSOF, ¶ 12. 

III. Motion for Summary Judgment 

 BANA moves summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ claims for (1) violation of 

the TCPA; (2) violation of A.R.S. § 44-1282; and (3) invasion of privacy. BANA 

argues that (1) the calls it made to the Plaintiffs did not violate the TCPA because 

they were not telemarketing calls and were not made using an “artificial or 

prerecorded voice; (2) because the calls did not violate the TCPA, they are not 

unlawful under A.R.S. § 44-1282; and (3) the Plaintiffs have failed to produce 

evidence supporting their invasion of privacy claim. 

 A. Summary Judgment Standard

 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 

to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment is not 

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proper if material factual issues exist for trial. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 318, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); 

Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995). In evaluating a motion 

for summary judgment, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party, and may neither make credibility determinations nor perform any 

weighing of the evidence. See, e.g., Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 

554–55 (1990); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 

(2000). “An issue is ‘genuine’ only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which 

a reasonable fact finder could find for the nonmoving party, and a dispute is 

‘material’ only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” In 

re Barboza, 545 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). A 

party cannot defeat summary judgment by producing a “mere scintilla of evidence to 

support its case.” City of Vernon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1369 

(9th Cir. 1992).

 B. TCPA Claim 

 The TCPA is intended to ban specific categories of telephone calls that 

Congress has found to be intrusive and invasive of privacy. Mims v. Arrow 

Financial Services, LLC, 132 S.Ct. 740, 743 (2012). One category of calls that is 

prohibited by the Act is the use of artificial or prerecorded voice messages to call 

residential telephone lines without prior express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B). 

BANA contends that the Plaintiffs have never alleged that the calls employed an 

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artificial or prerecorded voice and, therefore, they cannot state a claim under the 

TCPA. 

 In their response, the Plaintiffs contend that BANA called them “using a 

Predictive/ATDS dialing system; in some instances using a prerecorded voice.” Doc. 

162, p. 23. In support of their contention that BANA used a prerecorded voice, the 

Plaintiffs submit a joint affidavit stating that “BANA called our home using ATDS of 

which some calls included a prerecorded message.” Affidavits of Richard and Maria 

Shupe, Doc. 162, p. 55, ¶ a. BANA argues that the Plaintiffs’ affidavit substantially 

supplements their deposition testimony and should be disregarded. As BANA 

contends, a party cannot substitute an affidavit offering helpful facts that are 

contradicted or omitted from earlier deposition testimony in order to avoid summary 

judgment. Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 

1264 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Foster v. Arcata Assocs., Inc., 772 F.2d 1453, 1462 (9th

Cir. 1985) and Radobenko v. Automated Equipment Corp., 520 F.2d 540, 544 (9th

Cir. 1975).) However, such an affidavit can be rejected as a “sham” only after the 

Court makes a finding of fact that it was generated solely for the purpose of creating 

an issue of material fact in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. 

 Upon comparing Richard Shupe’s deposition and affidavit testimony, the 

Court finds that the affidavit was manufactured by Mr. Shupe in an effort to 

supplement his previous testimony and avoid summary judgment. Kennedy v. Allied 

Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 267 (9th Cir. 1991). The newly-drafted affidavit is 

devoid of any specific information such as dates of the alleged prerecorded calls or a 

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description of their content. And more important, as BANA notes, the Plaintiffs’ 

contention that any of the calls made by BANA were prerecorded appears for the first 

time in their response to BANA’s motion for summary judgment. This recent 

allegation contradicts Mr. Shupe’s deposition testimony where he said that he spoke 

with someone from BANA when they first called and that in “each subsequent call 

thereafter, as soon as they started their marketing, we hung up.” DSOF, Ex. A, p. 

37:19-25. Mr. Shupe further explained that the “conversations were never extensive. 

As soon as she started marketing to me, I told her not to call.” Id., p. 38:4-8. He 

claims that the BANA callers made “[s]mall talk” and never gave him their name or 

department. Id., p. 38:19-25. After providing this description of BANA’s calls, Mr. 

Shupe was asked if any of the calls differed from his description and responded, “I 

don’t recall. Irrelevant. To the best of my knowledge, they were all pretty much the 

same.” Id., p. 39:9-12. He later agreed with the statement that for each call he 

terminated, there was some small talk before he hung up the telephone. Id., p. 40:13-

15. This deposition testimony forecloses any argument by the Plaintiffs that their 

failure to earlier allege that any of the calls was prerecorded was an honest mistake. 

 In fact, from the inception of this case, the Plaintiffs have taken issue not with 

the fact that BANA had employed prerecorded messaging, but with the fact that the 

calls were made using an autodialing system. This was fully illustrated in their 

motion seeking a declaration from the Court that the use of autodialing equipment 

violated the TCPA (Doc. 139). In the order denying such a declaration, the Court 

expressly noted that BANA alleged, and the Plaintiffs did not dispute, that “the calls 

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at issue in this case were not made using an artificial or prerecorded voice.” (Doc. 

155, p. 2). The foregoing clearly establishes that the Plaintiffs’ allegation that BANA 

used any artificial or prerecorded voice is an eleventh hour contrivance designed to 

avoid summary judgment on their TCPA claim. As such, the allegation is not 

appropriate for consideration in evaluating the pending motion. 

 In addition to the foregoing argument, the Plaintiffs assert once again that the 

TCPA not only prohibits calls to residential lines using artificial or prerecorded voice 

messages, but also calls made using an automatic telephone dialing system 

(“ATDS”). Response, p. 10. The support for this argument, Plaintiffs contend, is 

found in Satterfield v. Simon and Schuster, 569 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2009). In that 

decision, the Ninth Circuit did indeed note that the Federal Communications 

Commission had stated “that under the TCPA, it is unlawful to make any call using 

an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded message to any 

wireless telephone number.” Id. at 953. It is apparent, however, that the court, by 

referencing wireless telephones, was not discussing section 227(b)(1)(B) of the 

TCPA, but section 227(b)(1)(A). Under the latter section, a cause of action exists 

where (1) the defendant called a cellular telephone number; (2) using an automatic 

telephone dialing system; (3)without the recipient’s prior written consent.” Meyer v. 

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012). In this 

case, it is undisputed that BANA called the Plaintiffs’ residential line and not a 

cellular phone. That fact undermines the Plaintiffs’ contention that BANA’s use of 

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an ATDS violated the TCPA. The use of such equipment is not prohibited when 

calls are made to residential lines. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B). 

 Finally, the Plaintiffs contend BANA is subject to liability because “it’s the 

causing of a phone to ring that violates the TCPA.” Response, p. 10. The Plaintiffs 

do not identify any statutory support for their argument, but contend that Accounting 

Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless Personal Communications supports their 

assertion. The Plaintiffs did not provide a citation for the Accounting Outsourcing 

case, but a Westlaw search of all federal cases for a case by that name returns five 

documents from a group of consolidated cases originating in the Middle District of 

Louisiana. In those cases, the plaintiffs sought damages under the TCPA and 

Louisiana law after they had received unsolicited facsimile advertisements. 

Accounting Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless Personal Communications, 329 

F.Supp.2d 789, 793 (M.D.La. 2004). However, at least insofar as the Court can 

discern, none of the five orders available online support the notion that a TCPA 

plaintiff need only establish that his phone rang in order to impose liability. See id.; 

2007WL7087615 (M.D. La. August 2, 2007); 2006WL2669063 (M.D.La. August 3, 

2006); 2006WL2669066 (M.D.La. March 6, 2006); 294 F.Supp.2d 834 (M.D.La. 

2003). 

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 C. State Law Claims 

 1. Jurisdiction

 The remaining two causes of action of the assert violations of Arizona state 

laws. The Plaintiffs do not allege that this Court has diversity jurisdiction over this 

action. Plaintiffs allege that this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state 

law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and 1441(c). The federal supplemental 

jurisdiction statute provides: 

[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original 

jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over 

all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such 

original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy 

under Article III of the United States Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law 

claim if: 

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over 

which the district court has original jurisdiction 

(3). the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction, or 

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for 

declining jurisdiction. 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Having recommended dismissal of the federal TCPA claim, it 

is within the Court’s discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

the state law claims against the moving Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 

See San Pedro Hotel Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 478 (9th 

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Cir.1998). However, as discussed below, the Court recommends that the District 

Court grant summary judgment on the Arizona claims, and recommends that judicial 

economy would be best served if the District Court retains jurisdiction.

 2. A.R.S. § 44-1282 

BANA argues summary judgment should be granted because the calls made 

by BANA are permitted under A.R.S. § 42–1282 and, additionally, the Arizona law 

applies only to intrastate calls, and there is no evidence that BANA made any 

intrastate calls. Section 42-1282 prohibits solicitors from initiating telephone calls to 

numbers entered in the national do-not-call registry, but expressly allows calls “that 

would be permitted by federal law or regulation relating to interstate telephone 

solicitation.” A.R.S. § 44–1282(A) & (B). As BANA correctly asserts, since the 

calls in question are not proscribed by the TCPA, they are not unlawful under the 

Arizona statute. Because the calls are not unlawful, there is no need to determine if a 

factual dispute exists as to the origin of the calls. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge 

recommends that the District Court grant BANA’s motion for summary judgment on 

the Plaintiffs' claim under A.R.S. § 44–1282. 

 3. Invasion of Privacy 

 BANA contends that the calls in question were not “highly offensive to the 

ordinary man” and thus cannot serve to impose liability for the tort of invasion of 

privacy. The Arizona Supreme Court has recognized the invasion of privacy torts 

laid out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § § 652A et seq., which include the tort 

of intrusion upon seclusion, see Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 162 Ariz. 

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335, 338 (1989), and at least one Arizona Court of Appeals decision has applied the 

tort of intrusion upon seclusion. See Hart v. Seven Resorts Inc., 190 Ariz. 272, 279 

(Ct.App.1997). The Arizona courts generally follow the Restatement in the absence 

of Arizona authority on an issue. Reed v. Real Detective Publ'g. Co., 63 Ariz. 294 

(1945); Campbell v. Westdahl, 148 Ariz. 432 (Ct.App.1985). Consequently, we look 

to the Restatement for guidance regarding how the Arizona Supreme Court would 

resolve the Plaintiffs’ claim. 

 The Restatement describes the tort of intrusion upon seclusion as follows: 

“One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or 

seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the 

other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a 

reasonable person.” Hart, 190 Ariz. at 279 (citing Rest.(2d) Torts § 652B (1977)). 

The comments to the Restatement further define the contours of the tort; there is no 

liability unless the interference with a plaintiff's seclusion is “a substantial one, of a 

kind that would be highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man.” Rest. (2d) 

Torts § 652B (1977), cmt d. Relevant here is the Restatement’s comment that “when 

. . . telephone calls are repeated with such persistence and frequency as to amount to 

a course of hounding the plaintiff, that becomes a substantial burden to his existence” 

and a plaintiff’s privacy may be invaded. Id. 

 In support of their contention that BANA is not entitled to summary judgment 

on their invasion of privacy claim, the Plaintiffs cite two federal cases originating out 

of California. In the first, the District Court for the Southern District of California 

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applied the standard enunciated in the Restatement (2d), and found the plaintiffs’ 

allegation that defendant had contacted them, in an attempt to collect a debt, 380 

times over a seven month period, at a rate of five to ten times per day, despite 

notifications that Plaintiffs were represented by counsel, adequately stated a claim for 

intrusion upon seclusion. Chaconas v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 713 F.Supp.2d 1180 

(S.D. Cal. 2010). In another, the same district court denied a defendant’s motion to 

dismiss an invasion of privacy claim based on the plaintiff’s allegations that the 

defendant made continuous and numerous phone calls to collect a debt through an 

automated dialing system even after the defendant was made aware that the plaintiff 

was represented by counsel. See also Hurrey–Mayer v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 

Inc., 2009 WL 3647632, at *2–3, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103039, at *6–7 (S.D. Cal. 

Nov. 4, 2009). 

 Here, the Plaintiffs have not presented evidence that would save their claim 

for invasion of privacy. First, they allege that they only once informed the callers 

from BANA that the calls were unwelcome. The Court notes that even that claim is 

suspicious. BANA has produced unrebutted evidence that the first call to the 

Plaintiffs, like most of the others, lasted one second. DSOF, ¶ 12. However, giving 

Plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt, even assuming they spoke to a BANA 

representative during that first call and informed them that the calls were unwelcome, 

the Plaintiffs admit that they hung up on BANA during each of the ensuing calls. 

Thus, even under the Plaintiffs’ version of events, this case is quite unlike the cases 

cited by the Plaintiffs. BANA was told once to stop calling and was never told that 

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the Plaintiffs were represented by counsel or were not the intended recipients of the 

calls. Moreover, BANA’s call log reflects that it made 48 calls over a four month 

period. Even if the number is 56 as the Plaintiffs contend, that amounts to an average 

of approximately one phone call every other day. DSOF, § 12. That number is far 

short of the 380 calls made in Chaconas and the “continuous” and “numerous” calls 

made in Hurrey–Mayer. Thus, on the record before the Court, the evidence 

establishes that around 50 calls were made over a four month period and most of 

them went unanswered. The Plaintiffs have cited no common law authority that 

would support a finding that the calls were made with such persistence and frequency 

as to amount to a course of hounding the Plaintiffs such that they would be 

considered highly offensive to a reasonable person. Accordingly, the Court 

recommends that the District Court grant BANA’s motion for summary judgment on 

the Plaintiffs’ claim for invasion of privacy.

IV. Recommendation

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court, after its independent review, grant Defendant Bank of America, National 

Association’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 129). 

 The parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District 

Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a 

response to the objections. Replies shall not be filed without first obtaining leave to 

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do so from the District Court. If any objections are filed, this action should be 

designated case number: CV 13-019-TUC-JGZ. Failure to timely file objections to 

any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

 Dated this 21st day of January, 2015. 

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