Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02638/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02638-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331bv Fed. Question: Bivens-Prisoner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH A. PRADO,

Booking #16113441,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WILLIAM GALLO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-02638-BAS-BLM

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2]; AND

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION AS 

FRIVOLOUS AND FOR SEEKING 

MONETARY RELIEF AGAINST 

IMMUNE DEFENDANTS 

Plaintiff Joseph A. Prado, currently incarcerated at the San Diego Central Jail 

(“SDCJ”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Proceed In 

Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.)

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

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$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016), and regardless of whether his action is 

ultimately dismissed. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1), (b)(2); see also Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 

F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial 

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, 

or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is 

greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1), (b)(4). The 

institution having custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); see 

also Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a prison certificate authorized 

by a SDCJ detentions captain attesting to his trust account activity (ECF No. 2 at 4). See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2);CivLR 3.2(b). These statements show Plaintiff has had no monthly 

deposits to his account, has carried no balance over the six month period preceding the 

filing of his Complaint, and that his current available balance is zero. Therefore, the Court 

GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2), declines to require any initial 

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

Dec. 1, 2014)). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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filing fee, see Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Watch Commander at SDCJ to 

collect and forward to the Clerk of Court the entire $350 balance of the required fees

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from 

bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that 

the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee”); see

also Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve”

preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to 

the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered”).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a pre-answer 

screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the 

Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is 

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the 

targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A prisoner need not plead detailed factual allegations, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of 

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

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suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim 

for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 

2009).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings his Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming as Defendants 

United States Magistrate Judges William Gallo and Karen Crawford, San Diego Superior 

Court Judges Mike Groch and Ann Espana,

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and United States District Judge Cathy 

Bencivengo. (ECF No. 1. at 1–2.) The Complaint contains no coherent factual allegations. 

Plaintiff seeks $700,000 in general and $700,000 in punitive damages. (Id. at 7.) After 

conducting the required screening, the Court finds dismissal of the Complaint appropriate

for two reasons.

First, it is well-established that “[j]udges and those performing judge-like functions 

are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official 

capacities.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 

Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against Magistrate Judges Gallo and Crawford, 

Superior Court Judges Groch and Espana, and District Judge Bencivengo, for either 

proceeding over his criminal proceedings or denying him relief in his federal civil actions, 

his claims are legally frivolous.

Second, Plaintiff’s Complaint is duplicative of another civil action he previously 

litigated in the Southern District of California. See Prado v. Dumanis, et al., S.D. Cal. 

 

2 Plaintiff’s Complaint incorrectly refers to Superior Court Judge Groch as “Giroch” and Superior Court 

Judge Espana as “Esponza.”

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Civil Case No. 3:16cv2309-BEN-KSC (ECF No. 1, filed September 7, 2016).3 A 

prisoner’s complaint is considered frivolous if it “merely repeats pending or previously 

litigated claims.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing 

former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Therefore, 

because Plaintiff has previously litigated what appear to be identical claims presented in 

the instant action against many of the same Defendants in Prado v. Dumanis, et al., the 

Court must dismiss the instant action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b).

See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105 n.2; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446 n.1.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous and seeks 

monetary damages against immune defendants. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the 

Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d

1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27.

Finally, while the Court would typically grant Plaintiff leave to amend in light of 

his pro se status, the frivolous nature of the Complaint would make any amendment futile.

See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 

F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing “[f]utility of amendment” as a proper basis for 

dismissal without leave to amend). Accordingly, the Court’s dismissal is without leave to 

amend.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

(ECF No. 2);

2. DIRECTS the Watch Commander of SDCJ, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

 

3 A court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial 

system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 

1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)).

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payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income, and to forward those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS 

SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO 

THIS ACTION;

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on the Watch 

Commander, San Diego Central Jail, 1173 Front Street, San Diego, California 92101;

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for seeking monetary damages against 

immune defendants and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). 

This dismissal is without leave to amend;

5. CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and 

therefore, would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See 

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 

550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal 

would not be frivolous); and

6. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 16, 2017

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