Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04684/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04684-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Vantage Mobility International, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Kersey Mobility, LLC, 

Defendant.

No. CV-19-04684-PHX-JJT

ORDER 

On June 11, 2020, following the District Judge’s referral (Doc. 156), the Court held 

a telephonic hearing concerning the parties’ discovery dispute. For the reasons explained 

herein, Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 159) will be granted. 

I. BACKGROUND

As recounted in the Court’s January 24, 2020 Order:

Plaintiff [Vantage Mobility International, LLC

(“VMI”)] is an Arizona company that produces and sells 

wheelchair-occupied, lowered-floor minivan conversions. 

Since 2011, Defendant [Kersey Mobility, LLC (“Kersey”)] has 

been an authorized dealer of VMI products in certain portions 

of the State of Washington. Kersey is made up of two 

members, Defendants Kersey Mobility Systems, Inc. and 

Jensen8, Inc. VMI alleges that Defendant Michael Kersey is 

the “sole governor” of Kersey Mobility Systems, Inc. and 

Defendant Michael Jensen is a “governor” of Jensen8. 

In 2017, VMI and Kersey entered into an Authorized 

Dealer Agreement for Kersey to sell VMI’s manual equipment 

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(Doc. 54-8, Auth. Dealer Agree.), and a Select Dealer 

Agreement for Kersey to sell VMI’s powered equipment (Doc. 

54-9, Select Dealer Agree.). Each Agreement includes separate 

Dealer Policies, and the Agreement and Policies together 

constitute “Dealer Relationship Documents (DRD).” A 

Territory and Location Policy attached to the Authorized 

Dealer Agreement provides that if Kersey wishes “to sell or 

cease operating one or more of [Kersey’s] locations at or from 

which any or all of [VMI’s] Products are sold,” VMI has a right 

of notice, first offer, and first refusal. (Doc. 54-8 at 7, Location 

Policy.)

In November 2018, VMI added an Assignment and 

Change of Control Policy to the DRD as “governed by either 

the Select Dealer Agreement or the Authorized Dealer 

Agreement.” (Doc. 54-10, Control Policy.) That Policy states 

that, without the prior written consent of VMI, Kersey may 

neither “assign any or all of its rights or delegate the 

performance of any or all of its duties and obligations” under 

the agreements with VMI nor transfer control of Kersey. The 

Policy purports to survive any termination of the associated 

Agreements. The parties dispute whether the Control Policy is 

enforceable against Kersey.

The Braun Corporation (“BraunAbility”) is an Indiana 

company that also produces and sells wheelchair-occupied, 

lowered-floor minivan conversions and thus is a competitor of 

VMI. VMI alleges that BraunAbility orchestrated the purchase 

of all of Kersey’s membership interests by one of 

BraunAbility’s subsidiaries, Defendant Arch Channel 

Investments LLC (“Arch”), in June 2019, and that VMI stands 

to lose market share in Washington to BraunAbility, since 

Kersey is now owned by one of BraunAbility’s subsidiaries. 

VMI claims that, by entering into the membership interest sale, 

Kersey breached its agreements with VMI (Count 1) and that 

Defendants’ conduct constituted tortious interference with 

contractual relations (Count 2), unfair competition under 

A.R.S. § 44-1402 (Count 3), civil conspiracy (Count 4), and 

consumer fraud under A.R.S. § 44- 1522 (Count 5). (Doc. 37, 

First Am. Compl. (“FAC”).)

(Doc. 103 at 2-3).

On August 14, 2019, Defendant BraunAbility filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 

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Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. 20). The Court concluded that it did not have personal 

jurisdiction over Defendant BraunAbility and dismissed all claims against Defendant 

BraunAbility. (Doc. 102). The Court also granted in part a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 48) 

filed by Defendant Kersey. The remaining claim is Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant 

Kersey “for breach of the Control Policy as it pertains to the Authorized Dealer 

Agreement.” (Doc. 103 at 16-17).

On May 15, 2020, the parties filed a Notice of Discovery Dispute (Doc. 153). The 

matter was referred to the undersigned for resolution. (Doc. 156). The Court set May 27, 

2020 as the deadline for filing any motion requesting relief and set a telephonic discovery 

dispute hearing for June 11, 2020. (Doc. 157). 

On May 27, 2020, Defendant filed the pending Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 

159). Defendant requests that the Court quash subpoenas served on the following six nonparties: (i) Michael Kersey, (ii) Angela Kersey, (iii) Kersey Mobility Systems, Inc., (iv) 

Michael Jensen, (v) Kelly Jensen, and (vi) Jensen8, Inc. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant has Standing to Challenge the Subpoenas

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 159) should be 

denied on the basis that Defendant lacks standing to challenge the subpoenas served on the 

non-parties. (Doc. 162 at 8-10).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, any party may serve a subpoena on a 

non-party commanding the production of designated documents for inspection. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). Rule 45(d)(3)(A) provides that

On timely motion, the court for the district court where 

compliance is required must quash or modify a subpoena that: 

(i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; (ii) requires a 

person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified 

in Rule 45(c); (iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other 

protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or (iv) 

subjects a person to undue burden.

Rule 45(d)(3)(B) further provides that “[t]o protect a person subject to or affected by a 

subpoena, the court for the district where compliance is required the court may, on 

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motion, quash or modify the subpoena if it requires: (i) disclosing a trade secret or other 

confidential research, development, or commercial information . . . .”

The Court finds that Defendant has standing to challenge the subpoenas at issue 

because of its interest in securing the confidentiality of its proprietary business information, 

as evidenced by the Court’s granting of the parties’ Joint Motion for Protective Order. 

(Docs. 136, 141). The Court finds that the documents requested in the subpoenas are likely 

to encompass information that would qualify as protected material under the parties’ 

Protective Order (Doc. 141). See Wahoo Intern., Inc. v. Phix Doctor, Inc., No. 13cv1395-

GPC (BLM), 2014 WL 3573400, at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 18, 2014) (finding defendant’s 

interests sufficiently jeopardized to afford standing to seek a protective order 

where subpoenas sought sensitive financial information regarding defendant’s sales, were 

served on defendant’s current distributors, and put a strain on defendant’s business 

relationship with its distributors).

To the extent that Defendant lacks standing with respect to some of its arguments 

in support of quashing the subpoenas, the Court considers the merits of the Motion for 

Protective Order pursuant to its inherent discretion to manage discovery and 

its authority to sua sponte issue a protective order under Rule 26(c). See Little v. City of 

Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The district court has wide discretion in 

controlling discovery.”); McCoy v. Southwest Airlines Co., Inc., 211 F.R.D. 381, 385 (C.D. 

Cal. 2002) (“[U]nder Rule 26(c), the Court may sua sponte grant a protective order for 

good cause shown.”); Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 

C01-1351 THE, 2007 WL 4276554, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2007) (“A protective order 

may include an order that discovery not be had.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

B. The Subpoenas Will Be Quashed

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides that a party may obtain discovery 

“regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and 

proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). In determining 

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proportionality, the Court “consider[s] the importance of the issues at stake in the action, 

the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’

resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden 

or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. “Information within 

this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id.

The 2000 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) replaced prior language defining relevant 

discovery as that relating to the “subject matter” of the litigation to the more restrictive 

“claim or defense” language. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) Advisory Committee’s Note (2000 

Amendment). “The rule change signals to the court that it has the authority to confine 

discovery to the claims and defenses asserted in the pleadings, and signals to the parties 

that they have no entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or defenses that are not 

already identified in the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) Advisory Committee’s Note 

(2000 Amendment) (emphasis added). “This limitation ensured that discovery would no 

longer be used to troll for new claims or causes of action, but that the requested discovery 

was relevant to the specific claims and defenses before the court.” Franklin v. United 

States, No. 12-1167 KBM/LFG, 2013 WL 11336864, at *2 (D.N.M. Aug. 28, 2013); see 

also Monte H. Greenawalt Revocable Trust v. Brown, No. 2:12–cv–01983 LRH–VCF, 

2013 WL 6844760, at *3 (D. Nev. Dec. 19, 2013) (“This prevents litigants from engaging 

in ‘fishing expeditions’ that may expose the defendant to claims not previously asserted in 

the plaintiff's complaint.”); Dymnioski v. Crown Equip. Corp., No. CIV. 11-3696, 2012 

WL 1986584, at *6 (D.N.J. June 4, 2012) (“Discovery . . . cannot serve as a fishing 

expedition through which plaintiff searches for evidence to support facts he 

has not yet pleaded.”).

At the hearing, Plaintiff reasserted the argument in its Response (Doc. 162 at 8) that 

“Defendant Kersey seeks to foreclose the very discovery the Court expressly permitted 

VMI to conduct.” In support of this position, Plaintiff cites the Court’s April 27, 2020 

Order that states: 

On April 23, 2020, the Court reversed its prior decision 

and allowed Plaintiff the opportunity to file a motion to amend 

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the FAC between now and August 1, 2020. In reversing itself, 

the Court was primarily driven by the fact that Plaintiff had not 

yet had an opportunity to conduct discovery before the Court 

foreclosed the chance to amend. 

(Doc. 135 at 2). The Court’s Order (Doc. 135) does not permit Plaintiff to conduct 

discovery that is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1). 

After reviewing the parties’ briefing and considering the arguments made at the 

hearing, the Court finds that much of the discovery Plaintiff seeks through the third-party 

subpoenas may be obtained from Defendant Kersey. “Courts are particularly reluctant to 

require a non-party to provide discovery that can be produced by a party.” Amini 

Innovation Corp. v. McFerran Home Furnishings, Inc., 300 F.R.D. 406, 410 (C.D. Cal. 

2014); see also Precourt v. Fairbank Reconstruction Corp., 280 F.R.D. 462, 467 (D.S.D. 

2011) (“If the party seeking information can easily obtain the same information without 

burdening the non-party, the court will quash the subpoena.”). 

Moreover, to reiterate, the Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims except for the 

claim against Defendant Kersey for “breach of the Control Policy as it pertains to the 

Authorized Dealer Agreement.” (Doc. 103 at 16). The Court concludes that the documents 

requested in the subpoenas at issue that may not be obtained by propounding discovery on 

Defendant Kersey are not proportional to the needs of the case. Plaintiff may not serve 

subpoenas on non-parties to search for evidence to support new causes of action.

1

 See 

Booker v. State of Arizona, No. 2:09-cv-00902-ROS (D. Ariz. July 9, 2010), ECF No. 44

(granting motion for protective order because discovery did not pertain to pled causes of 

1 Plaintiff states in its Response: 

The discovery disputes arise with Braun driving the 

protest in an effort to keep VMI from finding out the total scope 

of behavior among related entities and persons, all of whom 

were acting in concert to achieve the decimation of VMI in the 

Seattle market, while harming its business operations and 

opportunities in Arizona and elsewhere in the United States. 

For its part, VMI is confronted with a deadline to amend its 

case by August 1, 2020, and a desperate effort to discover how 

this illicit transaction came to pass.

(Doc. 162 at 3).

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action and explaining that if “Plaintiffs wish to obtain the discovery they have propounded, 

they must amend their complaint to plead additional theories”); Iacono v. Int’l Bus. 

Machines Corp., No. CV17-8083-FMO (PLA), 2018 WL 6112606, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 

17, 2018) (“[E]ven if the information sought is – at best –marginally relevant to plaintiff’s 

allegations (which the Court does not determine), the burden on defendant to search for the 

proverbial needle in the haystack is not proportional to the needs of this case.”). The 

Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 159) will be granted. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 159).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED quashing the subpoenas issued for Michael Jensen, 

Kelly Jensen, Jensen8, Inc., Michael Kersey, Angela Kersey, and Kersey Mobility 

Systems, Inc. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s Motion to File Under Seal (Doc. 

163). The Clerk of Court is directed to file under seal the lodged exhibits.

Dated this 11th day of June, 2020.

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge

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