Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06028/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06028-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS A. HIGHTOWER,

Plaintiff,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:04-cv-06028-OWW-SMS PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DISMISS UNCOGNIZABLE CLAIMS AND

TO ALLOW SERVICE ON COGNIZABLE

CLAIMS (Doc. 31)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

I. Screening Order

Plaintiff Thomas A. Hightower (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. 

Plaintiff filed this action on July 29, 2004. On February 24, 2006, the court dismissed plaintiff’s

complaint, with leave to amend, for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). 

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on June 28, 2006. On March 8, 2007, the court dismissed

plaintiff’s first amended complaint, for failure to state cognizable claims, with leave to amend

one last time. On August 13, 2007, plaintiff filed his second amended complaint. 

A. Screening Requirement

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

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“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may

dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that

could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff

will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the

claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and

unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171

(9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . .

.’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal

pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin.,

122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Federal Claims

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is sixty-seven typewritten pages long and contains

a plethora of claims against numerous defendants. Instead of stating an overall summary of

plaintiff’s complaint, the court will address plaintiff’s allegations against each defendant by

topic. 

///

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1. Freedom of Religion

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall

make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .

.” U.S. Const., amend. I. Prisoners “retain protections afforded by the First Amendment,”

including the free exercise of religion. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107

S.Ct. 2400 (1987). However, “‘[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or

limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying

our penal system.’” Id. (quoting Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060

(1948)). “In order to establish a free exercise violation, [a prisoner] must show the defendants

burdened the practice of his religion, by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by

his faith, without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 

Freeman v. Arpaio,125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997). “In order to reach the level of a

constitutional violation, the interference with one’s practice of religion ‘must be more than an

inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that is

central to religious doctrine.’” Freeman, 125 F.3d at 737 (quoting Graham v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d

844, 851 (9th Cir. 1987)).

“To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials, . . . prison

regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a ‘reasonableness’ test less

restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional

rights.” O’Lone, 382 U.S. at 349. Under this standard, “when a prison regulation impinges on

inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987). First, “there

must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate government

interest put forward to justify it,” and “the governmental objective must itself be a legitimate and

neutral one.” Id. A second consideration is “whether there are alternative means of exercising

the right that remain open to prison inmates.” Id. at 90 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 

 A third consideration is “the impact accommodation of the asserted right will have on guards 

///

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and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.” Id. “Finally, the absence

of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation.” Id.

Plaintiff states that he is making a claim for violation of his right to freedom of religion. 

Doc. 31, pg. 9. However, he fails to state any facts to indicate that his practice of his religion

was burdened in any way other than relative to his inability to receive religious publications from

the publisher of his choice. See I.B.2. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim

for infringement on his right to freely exercise his religion against any defendant(s) named in this

action.

2. Religious Publications/Mailings

Central to his allegations regarding religion are plaintiff claims that his right to receive

religious publications has been violated. Plaintiff alleges that, in order for a prisoner to receive

publications via mail, the publishers must obtain pre-approval, and that he desires to receive

publications from publishers of religious materials (for Seventh Day Adventists “SDA”) that are

not on the pre-approved list. Plaintiff further alleges that the review board is seated with only

main line religious persons who have not approved publications from minority known religious

organizations. Plaintiff alleges that he was advised that he could receive publications via SDA

clergy, but that no clergy knowledgeable in SDA has been hired. Plaintiff acknowledges that

there are a few approved religious publishers, but alleges that this is an unacceptable vehicle for

him to obtain his desired publications as the approved religious publishers either do not handle

any minority religious materials, or are overpriced and do not offer any free or low cost materials. 

Thus, plaintiff alleges his constitutional rights have been violated as he is not allowed to receive

paid for, or even free mailings from certain publishers. 

A prisoner’s right to receive publications from outside the prison should be analyzed in

light of the Turner factors. See Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 901-02 (9 Cir. 2001). th

Prisoners have “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff, 52

F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison regulations relating to the regulation of incoming mail are

analyzed under the Turner reasonableness standard set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-

91 (1987). Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989). The regulation is valid if it is

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reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. In determining the

reasonableness of the regulation, court must consider the following factors: (1) whether there is a

“valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate government interest put

forward to justify it,” (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right,” (3) the

impact that the “accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other

inmates,” and (4) “the absence of ready alternatives.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.

Although the prisoner’s free exercise right is still subject to the legitimate penological

interests of the prison, an inmate who adheres to a minority religion must be given a “reasonable

opportunity of pursuing his [or her] faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners

who adhere to the conventional religious precepts.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per

curiam). “Reasonable opportunities,” however, are not the same as identical treatment. See

Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322 n.2. 

Plaintiff has not alleged that the restriction on his receiving religious

publications/mailings from the publisher of his choice is not reasonably related to any legitimate

penological interests. In fact, plaintiff admits that the defendants advised him that the

publications from the publisher of plaintiff’s choice were not allowed due to safety and security

concerns. Doc. 31, pg. 56. 

Further, plaintiff’s allegations acknowledge that there are approved publishers from

whom he might obtain materials, but that they are overpriced, or do not offer free or low cost

materials. Per his own allegations, there are reasonable opportunities available for plaintiff to

obtain SDA publications/mailings from pre-approved publishers. The fact that pre-approved

publishers do not offer publications that are “free or low cost” does not vitiate plaintiff’s

opportunity to pay for and receive their publications. Thus, plaintiff has failed to state a

cognizable claim for infringing on his right to receive religious publications/mailings. 

3. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act (“RLUIPA”)

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”) provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person residing in or confined to an institution. . . , even if the burden results from

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a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition

of the burden on that person–

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that defendants

substantially burdened the exercise of his religious beliefs. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d

989, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2005). If plaintiff meets his burden, defendants must demonstrate that “any

substantial burden of [plaintiff’s] exercise of his religious beliefs is both in furtherance of a

compelling governmental interest and the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

governmental interest.” Id. (emphasis in original). “RLUIPA is to be construed broadly in favor

of protecting an inmate’s right to exercise his religious beliefs.” Id. 

Plaintiff has not set forth any facts to show that the defendants substantially burdened the

exercise of his religious beliefs. Plaintiff’s claims regarding his inability to receive religious

publications from the publisher(s) of his choice do not show a substantial burden on the exercise

of his religious belief. Plaintiff also has not set forth sufficient facts linking actions or omissions

of named defendants to the alleged violation of his rights under RLUIPA. Thus, he has not stated

a claim for violation of RLUIPA. 

4. Freedom From Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to

petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v.

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some

adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that

such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did

not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-

68 (9th Cir. 2005). An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file

a prison grievance is sufficient to support a claim under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d

1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). Adverse action is action that “would chill a person of ordinary

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firmness” from engaging in that activity. Pinard v. Clatskanie School Dist., 467 F.3d 755, 770

(9th Cir. 2006); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Lewis v. Jacks, 486

F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2007); Bennett v.

Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2005); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George

Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 500 (4th Cir. 2005); Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 381 (2d Cir.

2004); Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). Both litigation in court and filing

inmate grievances are protected activities and it is impermissible for prison officials to retaliate

against inmates for engaging in these activities. However, not every allegedly adverse action will

be sufficient to support a claim under section 1983 for retaliation. In the prison context, cases in

this Circuit addressing First Amendment retaliation claims involve situations where the action

taken by the defendant was clearly adverse to the plaintiff. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 (arbitrary

confiscation and destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault in retaliation

for filing grievances); Austin, 367 F.3d at 1171 (retaliatory placement in administrative

segregation for filing grievances); Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288 (retaliatory validation as a gang

member for filing grievances); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267(9th Cir. 1997) (retaliatory

issuance of false rules violation and subsequent finding of guilt); Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806 (retaliatory

prison transfer and double-cell status); Valandingham, 866 F.2d at 1138 (inmate labeled a snitch

and approached by other inmates and threatened with harm as a result); Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 530-

32 (retaliatory reassignment out of vocational class and transfer to a different prison). 

Plaintiff alleges that (after he filed a notice of enemy concerns/staff misconduct against

Figueroa) Figueroa: (1) allowed inmate Morales to read plaintiff’s confidential legal papers

against Figueroa; (2) directed inmate Morales to make threats to plaintiff that inmate Morales

would make life hard on plaintiff’s family in Old Broderick (part of West Sacramento where

plaintiff and inmate Morales are from) unless plaintiff ceased pursuing legal action regarding the

conditions at the facility; and (3) caused verbal abuse and threats of violence against plaintiff

from other Hispanic inmates who sided with Figueroa based on ethnic origin. Plaintiff alleges

that he contacted “defendants” about these actions and they failed to act. Plaintiff further alleges

that this was over familiarity and retaliation by Figueroa and “the other named defendants.” Doc.

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31, pp. 32, 35-37. This is a cognizable retaliation claim against Figueroa. However, plaintiff

fails to link specific actions to the persons he addresses as “defendants” and “the other named

defendants” such that his retaliation claim against these amorphous groups of defendants based

on the facts discussed in this paragraph fail. 

Plaintiff has stated additional valid retaliation claims against a number of defendants in

this case. All of plaintiff’s retaliation claims were allegedly precipitated by his filing prisoner

grievances/appeals against prison staff. Thereafter, various defendants engaged in activities

attempting to chill plaintiff’s activity without advancing any legitimate penological goal(s). The

specific allegations as to each defendant’s retaliatory action(s) will be discussed herein below

under the applicable topic. 

 5. Safety/Failure to Protect

“Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical

abuse.” Hoptowit v. Ray 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9 Cir. 1982); see also Farmer v. Brennan

th

511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994).

To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison officials were

“deliberately indifferent” to serious threats to the inmate’s safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

To demonstrate that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to the

inmate’s safety, the prisoner must show that “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an

excessive risk to inmate ... safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [the official] must

also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310,

1313 (9 Cir. 1995). To prove knowledge of the risk, however, the prisoner may rely on th

circumstantial evidence; in fact, the very obviousness of the risk may be sufficient to establish

knowledge. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9 Cir. 1995). th

To grant injunctive relief concerning serious risks to the inmate’s safety, the court must

find that at the time the relief will be granted there is still a serious, present risk to the inmate and

that the prison officials are still acting with deliberate indifference to that risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. 

///

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at 845-47; see also Helling v. McKInney 509 U.S. 25, 35-36 (1993) (discussing injunctive relief

where there is a threat of harm to inmate’s health).

The Ninth Circuit has held that placing a pre-operative transsexual, who acts and dresses

effeminately, in the prison’s general population evidenced of deliberate indifference to an

inmate’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 848-49; cf. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2 1435,

1444-45 (9 Cir. 1991)(en banc)(concluding that placing a young pre-trial detainee in a cell with th

a known aggressive sexual offender was deliberate indifference to the detainee’s safety). 

Allegations that a defendant placed an “R-suffix” (indicating inmate is a sexual offender) in an

inmate’s file, knowing that the inmate would be stabbed if he was subsequently placed into the

general population are sufficient to show that the defendant had knowledge of a risk to plaintiff’s

safety. See Knight v. Runnels No. CIV S-07-0751-FCD-CMK-P (E.D. Cal. Filed Aug. 20,

2007). The Ninth Circuit has also held that allegations that prison officials called a prisoner a

“snitch” in the presence of other inmates were sufficient to state a claim of deliberate

indifference to an inmate’s safety. See Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1139 (9th

Cir. 1989). But see Morgan v. MacDonald 41 F.3d 1291, 1293-94 (9 Cir. 1994)(rejecting th

Eighth Amendment claim where prisoner who had been labeled a snitch had not been retaliated

against). 

Plaintiff, a disabled Level III sex offender inmate, alleges that Cobbs and Diaz retaliated

against him by keeping him at a Level IV facility, and placing him in a cell with an inmate who

was known to be very violent and had recently murdered another inmate. Thus, plaintiff’s

allegations are sufficient to state cognizable claims for deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s safety

against Cobbs and Diaz.

6. Conditions of Confinement

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh,

prison officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and

personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v.

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Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from

unsafe conditions of confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with

“deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124,

1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First,

the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second,

the prison official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . .

. .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth

Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a

substantial risk of harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. 

Id. at 837-45. “[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment]

conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citation

omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part of the penalty

that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations denying the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an

Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

Plaintiff’s allegation that defendant Santa Cruz refused to honor the medical order for incell food trays, and that he could pick up and carry his own tray from the dining hall (which

plaintiff was not able to do due to his cane, back brace, and difficulty walking) or starve, he did

not care, and that plaintiff did go without food, is sufficient to show that Santa Cruz was

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s need for food and to be fed in his cell due to his medical

conditions. Doc. 31, 18-19.

Plaintiff further states a valid claim for conditions of confinement and retaliation against

Santa Cruz for Santa Cruz ordering medical change to chrono from 6 months to 1 month in

retaliation for plaintiff’s filing a 602 administrative appeal against Santa Cruz for not receiving

his food trays in his cell as Klarich had ordered. Doc. 31, pg. 19. 

///

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Likewise, plaintiff states a valid conditions of confinement claim against Barnerio for

waiting 3 months before issuing (and then backdated) the chrono regarding Klarich’s medical

order for in-cell food trays. Doc. 31, pg. 39.

Further, plaintiff states a valid conditions of confinement claim against Santa Cruz and

Cobbs interception of Barnerio’s chrono regarding Klarich’s medical order for in-cell food trays

in willful interference and cancelling Klarich’s order. Doc. 31, pg. 39-40.

7. Medical Needs

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the

level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of

the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with

deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison

official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994). Deliberate indifference may be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or

intentionally interfere with medical treatment,” or in the manner “in which prison physicians

provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on

other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to

further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison

Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

As to Dr. Klarich, plaintiff alleges that he submitted to Dr. Klarich over a period of

almost two years, and that he presented with obvious indicators of end stage liver disease,

respiratory distress, COPD w/emphysema, seizure disorder, spinal disease, and GI disease. 

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Klarich: (1) knew of plaintiff’s high ammonia levels and mental

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confusion, yet intentionally disregarded the severity of plaintiff’s medical status (“obvious

destruction of brain and organ tissue”) and only prescribed medical cell feedings and over the

counter Ibuprofen, causing organ damage and brain cell death; (2) knew of plaintiff’s respiratory

distress symptoms of suffocation and black-outs, and yet failed to treat plaintiff or prescribe a

chest x-ray and breathing treatments; (3) knew of plaintiff’s degenerative spinal and facet

disease, arthritis, bone spurring and the fact that plaintiff was in obvious acute distress from pain,

yet only prescribed over the counter Ibuprofen for pain, knowing that this would leave plaintiff in

severe pain at all times. Doc. 31, pp. 15-18. These allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable

claim against Dr. Klarich for deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. 

Plaintiff alleges that he submitted to Dr. Nyguen for slightly over a year, and that he

presented with obvious indicators of end stage liver disease, and respiratory distress, COPD

w/emphysema, seizure disorder, spinal disease, and GI disease. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Nyguen:

(1) knew of plaintiff’s high ammonia levels and mental confusion, yet intentionally disregarded

the severity of plaintiff’s medical status (“mental confusion presentation [end stage liver failure

indicator]”) and only prescribed over the counter antacids and routine blood work for GI

conditions, causing organ damage and brain cell death; (2) knew of plaintiff’s respiratory distress

symptoms and yet failed to treat plaintiff, prescribe a chest x-ray or breathing treatments thus

causing oxygen deprivation and blackouts; (3) knew of plaintiff’s degenerative spinal and facet

disease, arthritis, bone spurring and the fact that plaintiff was in obvious acute distress from pain,

yet only prescribed over the counter Ibuprofen for pain, knowing that this would leave plaintiff in

severe pain at all times. Doc. 31, pp. 20-22. Plaintiff alleges that on July 18, 2003, he was seen

by Dr. Nyguen to review: the GI specialist’s report; revisit wheelchair use; pain management

plan; medically disabled status; pain management via extra mattress/pillow chrono; and

appointments with orthopedic physician, dietician, and pain management clinic. Plaintiff alleges

Dr. Nyguen refused to look at any specialist reports, said routine blood work was acceptable,

forced plaintiff to leave, verbally assaulted plaintiff, and told plaintiff to file a 602 inmate appeal

again. Dr. Nyguen also allowed plaintiff’s anti-seizure medications to expire and did not renew

them for weeks. Plaintiff further alleges that a month later, he presented to Dr. Nyguen for

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renewal of his medications, but that Dr. Nyguen refused to see plaintiff until September 15, 2003,

when he saw plaintiff for being bedridden due to excessive illnesses secondary to his prescription

of Rebetol. Dr. Nyguen verbally berated plaintiff, and sent him away without medical care

despite plaintiff’s blood toxicity being past maximum safe levels and showing extra high

ammonia levels that were destroying plaintiff’s mental functions and internal organs. Doc. 31,

pg. 45-46. Plaintiff also alleges that on October 17, 2003, Dr. Nyguen renewed some of his

medications (ignoring others), verbally berated plaintiff in retaliation for filing inmate appeals

against him, and refused to discuss any specialists reports or referrals. Doc. 31, pg. 48. These

allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable claim against Dr. Nyguen for deliberate

indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs and for retaliation for filing grievances in the

past. However, plaintiff’s claim that Dr. Nyguen verbally assaulted him is not sufficient to state

a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139

(9th Cir. 1987).

Plaintiff alleges that he submitted to Dr. Deering for slightly over a year, and that he

presented with obvious indicators of end stage liver disease, and respiratory distress, COPD

w/emphysema, seizure disorder, spinal disease, and GI disease. Plaintiff alleges that Dr.

Deering: (1) knew of plaintiff’s high ammonia levels and mental confusion, yet intentionally

disregarded the severity of plaintiff’s medical status (“mental confusion presentation [end stage

liver failure indicator]”) and only prescribed over the counter antacids; (2) knew of plaintiff’s

respiratory distress symptoms and yet failed to treat plaintiff, prescribe a chest x-ray or breathing

treatments thus causing oxygen deprivation, blackouts, organ damage and brain cell death; (3)

knew of plaintiff’s degenerative spinal and facet disease, arthritis, bone spurring and the fact that

plaintiff was in obvious acute distress from pain, yet only prescribed over the counter Ibuprofen

for pain, knowing that this would leave plaintiff in severe pain at all times. Doc. 31, pp. 22-24. 

These allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable claim against Dr. Deering for deliberate

indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. 

Plaintiff alleges that he submitted to Dr. Wu for slightly over a year, and that he presented

with obvious indicators of end stage liver disease, and respiratory distress, COPD w/emphysema,

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seizure disorder, spinal disease, and GI disease. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Wu: (1) knew of

plaintiff’s high ammonia levels and mental confusion, yet intentionally disregarded the severity

of plaintiff’s medical status (“mental confusion presentation [end stage liver failure indicator]”)

and only prescribed medical cell feedings and over the counter antacids; (2) knew of plaintiff’s

respiratory distress symptoms and yet failed to treat plaintiff, prescribe a chest x-ray or breathing

treatments thus causing oxygen deprivation, blackouts, organ damage, brain cell death, and 

distress for weeks similar to slow suffocation; (3) knew of plaintiff’s degenerative spinal and

facet disease, arthritis, bone spurring and the fact that plaintiff was in obvious acute distress from

pain, yet only prescribed over the counter Ibuprofen for pain, knowing that this would leave

plaintiff in severe pain at all times. Doc. 31, pp. 24-26. Further, plaintiff alleges that on April

23, 2003, Dr. Wu saw plaintiff: (1) knew that he was in severe pain, acknowledged that hard steel

bunks were aggravating his pain from bulging discs, spinal disease, and arthritis, yet denied

plaintiff an extra mattress and pillow for pain management; (2) confirmed carpal tunnel

syndrome and arthritis in both hands, but refused to issue wrist braces for pain, “nor medically

unassigned status;” and (3) when plaintiff requested Dr. Wu check on appointments with

specialists that were more than a year overdue, in retaliation, Dr. Wu pushed plaintiff out of his

office and told plaintiff to file a grievance on him, since plaintiff was so good at it. Doc. 31, pg.

42-43. These allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable claim against Dr. Wu for deliberate

indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs and for retaliation.

Plaintiff alleges that, on May 15, 2005, Dr. Peneda performed a cursory exam; called and

spoke with Bhatt, Nyguen, Wu, and Adams to ascertain what they wanted his report to say; and

thereafter issued a report stating no medical treatment was needed so that “other defendants”

could use his report to deny plaintiff referrals and pain management. Plaintiff alleges that Dr.

Peneda conspired with “CDCR Officials” (to rebut CDCR’s neurosurgeon’s report ordering

immediate use of a wheelchair, extra mattress and pillows for spinal disease, permanently

unassigned status, chronic pain management with Vicodin and epidural injections) in retaliation

against plaintiff for seeking redress and medical care. Doc. 31, pp. 43-44. These allegations do

not rise to the level of a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical

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needs as plaintiff failed to allege that Dr. Peneda knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Nor is this sufficient to

state a claim against Dr. Peneda for conspiracy. See I.B.11.a.&b.

Plaintiff alleges that Doe pharmacy staff knew the necessity and nature of medications the

doctors had prescribed for him (Tegratol & Neurontin for control of grand mal seizures;

Azmacort, Antrovent & Albuterol for emphysema, asthma, and bronchitis; and Reglan &

Prilosec for severe GI problems) but ignored the physician’s orders in deliberate indifference to

plaintiff’s serious medical needs. In this instance, plaintiff does not state how the pharmacy staff

“ignored” the doctors’ prescriptions – i.e. whether they refused to fill the scripts, or dispensed the

wrong medications or dosages, etc. Plaintiff also does not state what, if any, injuries he sustained

as a result of the Doe pharmacy staff ignoring the doctors’ prescriptions. Doc. 31, pg. 27. 

Plaintiff subsequently makes further allegations against Doe pharmacy staff for taking no action

to get plaintiff his anti-seizure medication and failed to timely schedule a follow-up as ordered by

Dr. White. However, plaintiff again fails to allege what, if any, injuries he sustained because of

this inaction by Doe pharmacy staff. Doc. 31, pp. 37-38. While plaintiff alleges a delay in

receiving medical treatment, he failed to allege that the delay led to further harm in order for the

prisoner to make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974

F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.

1985)). Thus, plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim against Doe pharmacy staff for

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

Plaintiff further alleges that he saw Overly who was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s

medical needs, and verbally harassed and chastised plaintiff for filing an inmate appeal on the

issue of not receiving the medications and timely follow-up as ordered by Dr. White. Doc. 31.,

38-39. While plaintiff alleges Overly caused a delay in receiving medical treatment, he failed to

allege that the delay led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada

Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). Further, plaintiff’s claims that

Overly harassed and chastised him is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42

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U.S.C. § 1983, Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987), and threats do not

rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). 

However, this is a cognizable claim for retaliation against Overly. 

Plaintiff’s allegation, at Doc. 31, 18-19, that Santa Cruz refused to honor Klarich’s

medical order for in-cell food trays is insufficient to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

violation for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Plaintiff has not alleged facts

supporting a claim that defendant Santa Cruz “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to

[plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. However, these allegations against Santa

Cruz do state a cognizable claim for the condition of his confinement. See I.B.6.

Plaintiff’s allegation, at Doc. 31, pg. 39, that Barnerio waited 3 months before issuing

(and then backdated) the chrono regarding Klarich’s medical order for in-cell food trays is

insufficient to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation for deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs. Plaintiff has not alleged facts supporting a claim that defendant

Barnerio “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837. Doc. 31, pg. 39. However, these allegations against Barnerio do state a cognizable

claim for the condition of his confinement. See I.B.6.

Plaintiff’s allegation, at Doc. 31, pg. 39-40, that Santa Cruz and Cobbs intercepted

Barnerio’s chrono regarding Klarich’s medical order for in-cell food trays in willful interference

and cancelling Klarich’s order is insufficient to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

violation for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Plaintiff has not alleged facts

supporting a claim that Santa Cruz and Cobbs “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to

[plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Doc. 31, pp. 39-40. However, these

allegations do state cognizable claims against Santa Cruz and Cobbs for the condition of his

confinement. See I.B.6.

Plaintiff alleges that McCant and Bhatt were deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs based on their refusing to correct the policy/egregious voids in the system as

illuminated by the handling of Klarich’s order for in cell feedings. Doc. 31, pg. 40. Plaintiff has

not alleged facts supporting a claim that McCant and/or Bhatt “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an

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excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. However, these allegations

do state a cognizable claim against McCant for failing to correct/recommend changes and against

Bhatt as the “chief policy maker” regarding the handling of medical orders by prison staff. See

I.B.16.

Plaintiff alleges that Schwarzenegger, Alemedia, Bhatt and Adams had “first hand

involvement” in the deliberate indifference as to his serious medical needs based on contacts they

received from The Prison Law Offices and Jeff Dicks Society. Doc. 31, pg. 41. Plaintiff has not

alleged facts supporting a claim that Schwarzenegger, Alemedia, Bhatt and Adams “[knew] of

and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Wessel was contacted by the Jeff Dicks Society on August 28,

2003 and that Wessel referred the issue back to Nyguen and Bhatt and thereafter took no action. 

Doc. 31, pg. 49. This is insufficient to show that Wessel “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an

excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Further, plaintiff’s allegations that Schwarzenegger is liable for underfunding prison

medical care likewise is not sufficient to show that Schwarzenegger “[knew] of and disregard[ed]

an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

8. Equal Protection

Plaintiff appears to allege that defendants’ denial of religious publications via mail

violates the Equal Protection Clause. “The Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction

that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living

Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). “‘To state a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to

discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.’” Lee v. City of

Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193,

1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted at least in part

because of a plaintiff’s protected status.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir.

2003) (quoting Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis in

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original). “Where the challenged governmental policy is ‘facially neural,’ proof of its

disproportionate impact on an identifiable group can satisfy the intent requirement only if it tends

to show that some invidious or discriminatory purpose underlies the policy.” Lee, 250 F.3d at

687 (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (264-66)

(1977) (internal citations omitted)). “The mere fact that [a] facially neutral polic[y] had a

foreseeable disproportionate impact on an identifiable group does not mean that [it] violated the

Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 687. 

Plaintiff’s equal protection claims appear to relate solely to his claim(s) regarding his

inability to receive religious publications from publishers of his choice which were previously

determined to be defective as discussed at I.B.2.b. herein above. Other than his claims regarding

receipt of religious publications, plaintiff has set forth no facts that support a claim that he was

intentionally discriminated against on the basis of being a Seventh Day Adventist. Thus, plaintiff

has failed to state a claim for violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause against

defendants Adams, Alemedia, Gomez, Grannis, and “Schwarzenegger, et al.” 

9. Due Process

a. Procedural

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to

state a cause of action for deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence

of a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. “States may under certain circumstances

create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state law are generally limited to freedom

from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 

“[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any

substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993)

(citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza,

334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no

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entitlement to a specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir.

2001) (existence of grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams,

855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). “Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest

requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Azeez v.

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). 

Actions in reviewing prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability under

a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

Plaintiff alleges that:

(1) Grannis denied his class action appeal based on lack of documentation (CDC 1819

Denied Publications form), yet ignored the basis of the appeal being denial of

publications “‘[w]ithout notice of due process protections.’” Doc. 31, pg. 60. 

(2) F.S. Cotes, D. Duvall, D. Adams, L.L. Rianda, and N. Grannis had duties to

respond to and investigate plaintiff’s appeals; knew he was in danger; and “chose

to ignore facts easily verified.” Doc. 31, pp. 12-13.

(3) Barbiro, Allison, McCant, Cotes, Appelbaum, Duvall, Arline, Aguillerra-Morreno,

and Overly failed to investigate why plaintiff was not getting his prescribed

medications when plaintiff contacted them. Doc. 13, pp. 27-28.

Denial and/or negative findings of plaintiff’s prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve

as the basis for liability under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. Thus, plaintiff has

failed to state cognizable claims against Grannis, Cotes, Duvall, Adams, Rianda, Barbiro, Allison,

McCant, Appelbaum, Arline, Aguillerra-Morreno, and Overly regarding their involvement in

reviewing his administrative appeals/grievances. 

b. Substantive

 “To establish a violation of substantive due process . . . , a plaintiff is ordinarily required

to prove that a challenged government action was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no

substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Where a particular

amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort

of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due

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process, must be the guide for analyzing a plaintiff’s claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874

(9th Cir. 1996) (citations, internal quotations, and brackets omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1845

(1997); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). Plaintiff has not alleged any

facts that would support a claim that his rights under the substantive component of the Due

Process Clause were violated.

10. Access to Court Claims

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right of access is merely the right to bring to court a grievance the

inmate wishes to present, and is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil

rights actions. Id. at 354. An inmate claiming interference with or denial of access to the courts

must show that he suffered an actual injury. Id. 

Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a

litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a

meritorious suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536

U.S. 403, 412-15, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2185-87 (2002). For backward-looking claims such as that at

issue here, plaintiff “must show: 1) the loss of a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; 2)

the official acts frustrating the litigation; and 3) a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but

that is not otherwise available in a future suit.” Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.

2007).

The first element requires that plaintiff show he suffered an “actual injury” by being shut

out of court. Harbury 536 U.S. at 415, 121 S.Ct. at 2187; Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351, 116 S.Ct. at

2180; Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1076. The second element requires that plaintiff show that each

involved defendant proximately caused the alleged violation of plaintiff’s rights, “[t]he touchstone

. . . [for which] is foreseeability.” Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1077. Finally, the third element requires

that plaintiff show he has no other remedy than the relief available via this suit for denial of access

to the courts. Id. at 1078-79.

A number of courts have declined to dismiss for failure to exhaust where prison officials

have rendered the process itself unavailable, either through the failure to respond in a timely

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manner or through the failure to respond at all. Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th

Cir. 2002) (the failure to respond to a grievance within the policy time limits renders remedy

unavailable); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002) (when prison officials fail

to respond, the remedy becomes unavailable, and exhaustion occurs); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d

687, 698 (8th Cir. 2001) (district court did not err when it declined to dismiss claim for failure to

exhaust where prison failed to respond to grievance); Powe v. Ennis, 177 F.3d 393, 394 (5th Cir.

1999) (when a valid grievance has been filed and the state’s time for responding has expired, the

remedies are deemed exhausted); Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 1998) (when

time limit for prison’s response has expired, the remedies are exhausted); see also Mitchell v.

Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003) (recognizing that a remedy prison officials prevent a

prisoner from utilizing is not an available remedy); Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir.

2002) (formal grievance procedure not available where prison officials told prisoner to wait for

termination of investigation before filing formal grievance and then never informed prisoner of

termination of investigation); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001) (a remedy prison

officials prevent a prisoner from utilizing is not an available remedy). In joining the Eighth and

Fifth Circuits with respect to this issue, the Seventh Circuit Court stated that it “refuse[d] to

interpret the PLRA ‘so narrowly as to . . . permit [prison officials] to exploit the exhaustion

requirement through indefinite delay in responding to the grievances.’” Lewis v. Washington, 300

F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Goodman v. Carter, No. 2000 C 948, 2001 WL 755137, at

*3 (N.D.Ill. July 2, 2001)). 

Plaintiff claims that: (1) Cotes, Duvall, Adams, Rianda, and Grannis have met and

designed a policy and procedure of “calculated loss, destruction, denial of plaintiff’s appeals” to

stifle his filing inmate appeals and to delay exhaustion of his administrative remedies; (2)

Barbiro, Allison, McCant, Cotes, Appelbaum, Duvall, Arline, Aguillerra-Morreno, and Overly set

up a policy of stalling, delaying, or totally losing inmate appeals regarding medications/medical

issues to prevent exhaustion of administrative remedies in retaliation against plaintiff to prevent

him from having access to the courts, and to inflict suffering and/or lingering death on plaintiff;

(3) that Cotes refused to log inmate appeals or grievances in retaliation for plaintiff’s petitioning

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the courts for redress and to prevent plaintiff from timely bringing constitutional claims before the

courts; and (4) that he is in a dependent fiduciary relationship with “defendants” and that a wrong

continues to occur based on “defendants” delay in processing and/or preparing findings regarding

his various prisoner grievances/appeals. Doc. 31, pp. 11-13, 28-29, 32-33, & 49-50. 

Per the cases sited in this section, it is not a foregone conclusion that plaintiff will

ultimately suffer dismissal because his appeals have been delayed or have otherwise gone

unanswered. Until plaintiff suffers some actual prejudice with respect to his suits and this

prejudice results from prison officials’ failure to respond to his appeals, plaintiff has not suffered

an actual injury. Plaintiff has failed to allege cognizable claims for interference with his access to

the courts claims stemming from the inadequacies of the inmate appeals process. 

a. Law Library

Woven into plaintiff’s claims based on denial of access to the courts are claims that the

proposal by Schwarzenegger and Alemedia to install one computer terminal with limited access

for every 500 inmates is inadequate. Doc. 31, pg. 31.

Inmates do not have the right to a law library or legal assistance. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. 

Law libraries and legal assistance programs are only the means of ensuring access to the courts. 

Id. Because inmates do not have “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal

assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury by establishing that his prison’s law

library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Id. Rather, an inmate

claiming interference with or denial of access to the courts must show that he suffered an actual

injury. Id. 

Plaintiff does not have the right to a law library or legal assistance. Therefore, his claims

against Schwarzenegger and Alemedia fail to state a cognizable claim. 

Further, plaintiff claims that, because of the inadequate law library available to him, he

was prevented from suing the Roman Catholic Church and/or Archbishop for being a victim of

childhood clergy sexual abuse in the open revival period provided for by California Code of Civil

Procedure § 340.1. Plaintiff further claims that, had he had access to “a constitutionally minimal

prison law library,” he would have received a settlement in the millions of dollars. Plaintiff

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claims that Figueroa, Zimmerman, Bollard, Ward, Duvall, Adams, Sanchez, Yates, Cobbs,

Dahlberg, Grannis, Alemedia, and Schwarzenegger are responsible for the inadequacy of the law

library so as to prevent him from having access to the courts. Doc. 31, pp. 29-31. However,

plaintiff’s claim for childhood clergy sexual abuse is not a direct criminal appeal, habeas petition,

or civil rights action. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996). Therefore, plaintiff’s claims as

to being denied access to the courts for regarding his claim for childhood clergy sexual abuse,

based on the inadequacy of the law library are not cognizable. 

11. Conspiracy

a. 42 U.S. C. § 1985(3)

“To state a cause of action under § 1985(3), a complaint must allege (1) a conspiracy, (2)

to deprive any person or a class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal

privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) an act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of

the conspiracy, and (4) a personal injury, property damage or a deprivation of any right or

privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Gillespie v. Civiletti 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9 Cir. 1980) th

(citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971); see also Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp.,

978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9 Cir. 1992). th

“The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection . . . means that there must be

some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory animus behind the

conspirators’ action.” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 (emphasis added); see also Sever, 978 F.2d at

1536. Animus toward union members does not meet the “otherwise class-based” factor of Griffin. 

See United Bhd. Of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 835 (1983). The Supreme

Court has declined to address whether gender is an “otherwise class-based” category under §

1985(3). See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993). 

The Ninth Circuit has extended § 1985(3) “beyond race ‘only when the class in question

can show that there has been a governmental determination that its members “require and warrant

special federal assistance in protecting their civil rights.”’” Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536. More

specifically, [the Ninth Circuit] require[s] ‘either that the courts have designated the class in

question a suspect or quasi-suspect classification requiring more exacting scrutiny or that

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Congress has indicated through legislation that the class required special protection.’” Id (quoting

Schultz v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718 (9 Cir. 1985) (per curiam)); see also Maynard v. City of th

San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9 Cir. 1994); McCalden v. California Library Ass’n, 955 F.2d th

1214, 1223 (9 Cir. 1990); Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff’s Posse Comitatus, 641 F.2d 711, 720 th

(9 Cir. 1981); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9 Cir. 1979). th th

Plaintiff claims that “all defendants” know that the ban on publications from certain

religious groups is unconstitutional and is used purposely to “incite, vex, oppress plaintiff’s class

to the point of unrest; with the sole purpose to gain greater overtime pay for periods of lock-down. 

Their personal gain, and recidivism [job security], to the detriment of plaintiff, his class, and

Society.” Doc. 31, pp. 56-57.

Plaintiff claims that Schwarzenegger, Alemedia, Adams, Grannis, and “Doe defendant

policy makers and supervisors” conspired “with their subordinates, to ignore the unconstitutional

denial of rights owed to plaintiff. Creating a void of totally unsupervised conditions at all prisons

under their policies and commands, statewide.” Doc. 31, pg. 60. 

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Peneda conspired with “CDCR Officials” (to rebut CDCR’s

neurosurgeon’s report ordering immediate use of a wheelchair, extra mattress and pillows for

spinal disease, permanently unassigned status, chronic pain management with Vicodin and

epidural injections) in retaliation against plaintiff for seeking redress and medical care. Doc. 31,

pp. 43-44. 

Plaintiff alleges that Bhatt, Cotes, and Allison conspired so as to cause plaintiff’s inmate

appeals against Nyguen to be routed back to Nyguen rather than being investigated and/or

otherwise addressed such that no other defendant would be informed of the state of medical care

or neglect at the facility to create “premeditated plausible denyability.” Doc. 31. pp. 47-48. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Wessel was contacted by the Jeff Dicks Society on August 28,

2003 and that Wessel referred the issue back to Nyguen and Bhatt and thereafter took no action. 

Doc. 31, pg. 49. 

Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim under § 1985(3) as he has failed to allege a

class-based discriminatory motive by any of the defendants he accuses of conspiring against him.

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b. 42 U.S. C. § 1986

“Section 1986 authorizes a remedy against state actors who have negligently failed to

prevent a conspiracy that would be actionable under § 1985.” Cerrato v. San Francisco Cmty.

Coll. Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 971, n.7 (9 Cir. 1994). “A claim can be stated under [§] 1986 only if th

the complaint contains a valid claim under [§] 1985.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t,

839 F.2d 621, 626 (9 Cir. 1988); see also McCalden v. California Library Ass’n 955 F.2d 1214, th

1223 (9 Cir. 1990); Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1040 (9 Cir. 1990). Since th th

plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim against the defendants under § 1985(3), his claims

under § 1986 fail as well. 

12. Property Possession Regulation – Rehabilitation Act & First Amendment

Claims

Plaintiff alleges that the regulation restricting inmates to six cubic feet of property in their

cell violates his rights under the Rehabilitation Act (RA) because it limits his access to learning

material that will allow him to grow and be productive in the world, and violates his rights under

the First Amendment because it infringes on his right to own rehabilitative material.

“[Section] 504 of the RA . . . prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of disability,” Lovell

v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002), and provides that “no otherwise qualified

individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or

activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ,” 29 U. S. C. § 794. “To establish a violation

of § 504 of the RA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is handicapped within the meaning of the

RA; (2) [he] is otherwise qualified for the benefit or services sought; (3) [he] was denied the

benefit or services solely by reason of [his] handicap; and (4) the program providing the benefit or

services receives federal financial assistance.” Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052. 

As stated in this Court’s prior screening order, plaintiff’s allegation that the regulation

permitting inmates only six cubic feet of property in their cells violates his rights under the RA is

patently frivolous. With respect to the First Amendment, plaintiff has supplied no basis for such a

claim. The fact that plaintiff is required to exercise discretion in choosing which property he

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keeps with him in his cell does not offend the Constitution. Thus, plaintiff’s claims against

defendants Adams, Grannis, Alemedia, Gomez and Schwarzenegger regarding the regulation

permitting inmates only six cubic feet of property in their cells fail.

13. Establishment Clause

In Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, at 15-16 (1947) the Supreme

Court stated: “The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this:

Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid

one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence

a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or

disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs

or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can

be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or

whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal

Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or

groups and vice versa.”

Plaintiff states that defendants Alemedia, Schwarzenegger, Orth, Holmes, Duvall CCII,

Adams, Grannis, Henry, Frost, Lee, Puguese, Gomez, Mendoza SATF/SP Mail Room, and

Aguilar have instituted mail room procedures and have acted in a manner so as to violate the

Establishment Clause by returning packages to the Light Bearers Ministry Prison Outreach stating

they were not an approved religious vender, “[a]s opposed to ‘all’ non-religious books may come

from ‘any’ book store or publisher.” Doc. 31, pp 51-52. It appears that plaintiff is trying to allege

that the defendants’ actions of denying him receipt of religious materials from the publisher(s) of

his choice show a preference to one religion over his Seventh Day Adventist religion. However,

by his own allegations, plaintiff acknowledges that there are approved publishers from whom he

might obtain materials, but finds them objectionable for being overpriced or not offering free or

low cost materials. Per his own allegations, there are reasonable opportunities available for

plaintiff to obtain SDA publications/mailings from pre-approved publishers. The fact that preCase 1:04-cv-06028-AWI-SMS Document 32 Filed 03/19/08 Page 26 of 32
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approved publishers do not offer publications that are “free or low cost” does not vitiate plaintiff’s

opportunity to pay for and receive their publications. Plaintiff’s claims for violation of the

Establishment Clause also fail as his claims are made against individual defendants – not the state

or federal government. 

14. Violation of the Plata and Armstrong Remedial Plans

Plaintiff may not pursue any claims in this action based on the alleged violation of the

Plata and Armstrong Remedial Plans. To the extent that plaintiff wishes to seek assistance that he

believes is due pursuant to either remedial plan, plaintiff “must pursue his request via the consent

decree or through class counsel.” Crayton v. Terhune, No. C 98-4386 CRB(PR), 2002 WL

31093590, *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2002). Plaintiff may not sue for damages in this action solely

on the basis that defendants allegedly violated the remedial plans. Plaintiff’s claims fail as a

matter of law. 

15. Supervisor Liability

Through out his complaint, plaintiff alleges that supervisors are involved and/or have

implemented policies allowing the actions which plaintiff complains of. 

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must

be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim

for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some

facts that would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the

alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation

of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v.

Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be

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alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit,

507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff fails to state cognizable claims against Alemedia and Schwarzenegger for the

“pervasive state of mind in all CDCR” in relation to the handling of Klarich’s order for in cell

feedings, as stated at Doc. 31., pg. 40, as plaintiff fails to show that either of these defendants

personally participated in; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or

promulgated or implemented a policy so deficient as to be the moving force behind the other

defendants’ actions of the mishandling of Klarich’s cell feeding order. 

Plaintiff’s claims against Bhatt for failing to see to plaintiff’s medical needs that were

being neglected by Nyguen are based on respondeat superior and thus fail. Doc. 31, pg. 49.

Plaintiff states cognizable claims against Adams, Rianda, Grannis, and Tilton for knowing

that Cobbs and Diaz had caused plaintiff to be in a dangerous circumstance (of being a disabled

convicted sex offender celled with a known violent and aggressive inmate who had just murdered

another inmate) and of plaintiff being retained in a Level IV facility when he should have been

placed in a Level III facility. Yet they failed to investigate, prevent or correct the situation in

disregard for the risk of serious injury to plaintiff. Doc. 31, pg. 15. 

Plaintiff states cognizable claims against Zimmerman, Bollard, Ward, Duvall, Cotes,

Adams, Sanchez, Yates, Cobbs, Dahlberg, and Grannis for knowing of and condoning the

retaliatory actions by Cotes & Figueroa as previously discussed in retaliation against plaintiff for

petitioning to the courts for redress. Doc. 31, pp. 32-33.

Plaintiff states cognizable claims against Adams, Rianda, and Grannis for creating

policies, protocols, and “local operating procedures (OP)” of ignoring all administrative appeals,

regardless of the danger a prisoner might be in. Doc. 31., pp. 14.

Plaintiff states cognizable claims against Cotes, Duvall, Adams, Rianda, and Grannis for

designing and implementing a policy and procedure of “calculated loss, destruction, denial of

plaintiff’s appeals” to stifle filing of inmate appeals and to delay exhaustion of administrative

remedies. Doc. 31, pp. 11-13.

///

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Plaintiff states cognizable claims against Grannis and Tilton for creating policies of

indifference and hands off approach that has allowed Santa Cruz’s actions (as discussed

hereinabove) to continue unabated and have created retaliatory deliberate indifference by custody

staff. Doc. 31, pg. 19.

Plaintiff states cognizable claims against Barbiro, Allison, McCant, Cotes, Appelbaum,

Duvall, Arline, Aguillerra-Morreno, and Overly for setting up a policy of stalling, delaying, or

totally losing inmate appeals regarding medications/medical issues to prevent exhaustion of

administrative remedies in retaliation against plaintiff to prevent him from having access to the

courts, and to inflict suffering and/or lingering death on plaintiff. Doc. 31, pp. 28-29. 

Plaintiff states cognizable claims against McCant and Bhatt for acknowledging, yet failing

to correct/intervene regarding the handling of medical orders (issuing medical chronos prescribed

but never issued/honored) by prison staff as discussed regarding the cell feeding order. Doc. 31,

pg. 40. 

Plaintiff states cognizable claims against Schwarzenegger, Alemedia, Bhatt and Adams for

instituting policies and underground regulation calculated to guarantee a delay and/or interference

with medical care for prisoners. Doc. 31, pg. 41

Plaintiff states cognizable claims against Bhatt, Adams, Alemedia and Schwarzenegger for

implementing a policy in CDCR that staff can do no wrong, therefore any medical care (or no

medical care, even deadly lack of care) is acceptable, and because of this policy, despite numerous

complaints, Nyguen has not been trained, counseled or removed. Doc. 31, pg. 47.

Plaintiff fails to state congizable claims against Adams, Schwarzenegger, Alemedia,

Grannis, Henry, Frost, Lee, Pubuese, Holmes, Gomez, “[a]ll defendant supervisory staff,” and

AW Doe for originating and instigating a policy of banning all letters, newsletters, books, tracts,

etc. from any unapproved religious organization. Doc. 31, pp. 53-55. As previously discussed,

this policy is not a violation of constitutional rights. 

17. Failure to Train/Supervise

In City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Supreme Court held that,

under certain circumstances, a municipality may be held liable based on the failure to train its

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employees. This court finds no authority for the extension of City of Canton and its progeny to a

state prison official being sued in his personal capacity. It appears to this court, following a

review of the relevant case law, that the cases involving failure to train are limited to suits against

city and county entities. This is not to say that a plaintiff cannot allege facts involving the failure

to train that are sufficient to state a claim under a theory of supervisory liability. For instance, it is

possible that the failure to train employees in a particular respect may amount to a policy or

practice of failing to provide employees with adequate training, and that the policy or practice of

failing to provide adequate training amounts to deliberate indifference.

Plaintiff alleges cognizable claims against Bhatt, Adams, Alemedia and Schwarzenegger

for implementing a policy in CDCR that no staff can do wrong, therefore any medical care, or no

medical care, even deadly lack of care, is acceptable, and because of this policy, despite numerous

complaints, Nyguen has not been trained, counseled or removed. Doc. 31, pg. 47. The alleged

originating and implementation of this policy was previously addressed. As to the allegation that

Bhatt, Adams, Alemedia and Schwarzenegger failed to train Nyguen, the court finds no authority

to suggest that prison officials are responsible for training physicians who care for inmates beyond

that which the physician should have received in obtaining his or her medical degree and

continuing education as required to maintain his or her license to practice medicine. Thus,

plaintiff fails to state cognizable claims against Bhatt, Adams, Alemedia and Schwarzenegger for

failing to train Nyguen.

II. Findings and Recommendation

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint states the following cognizable

claim(s) for relief against the following defendants: 

Defendant Cognizable Claim(s)

P. Figuero Retaliation

A.W. Cobbs Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Safety

Condition(s) of Confinement (re in cell feedings)

Retaliation 

Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

R.M. Diaz Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Safety

Retaliation 

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A. Santa Cruz Condition(s) of Confinement (re in cell feedings)

Retaliation 

T. Bareiro Condition(s) of Confinement (re in cell feedings)

Dr. Klarich Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Serious Medical Needs

Dr. Nyguen Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Serious Medical Needs

Retaliation

Dr. Deering Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Serious Medical Needs

Dr. Wu Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Serious Medical Needs

Retaliation

D. Overly Retaliation 

Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

E. McCant Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

Dr. Bhatt Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

D. Adams Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

L.L. Rianda Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

N. Grannis Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

J. Tilton Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

Zimmerman Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

J. Bollard Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

J. Ward Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

D. Duvall Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

F.S. Cotes Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

D.W. Sanchez Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

D.W. Yates Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

C. Dhalberg Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

Barbiro Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

K. Allison Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

Appelbaum Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

Arline Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

Alemedia Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

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Aguillera-Moreno Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

A. Schwarzenegger Failure to Act/Implementation of Policy

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint does not state any claims against any defendants

other than as identified herein. 

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. This action proceed on plaintiff’s second amended complaint filed on

August 13, 2007, against the defendants on the claims stated in the findings

herein above;

2. All of plaintiff’s claims against all any named defendant(s), other than as

stated in the findings herein above, be dismissed with prejudice for failure

to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, or 1986; and

3. Defendants M. Hodges-Wilkins, Rick Manuel, R. Hansen, H.Dunn, M.D.,

Does Health Care Manager, Doe R.N., M. Poshner, M.D., Mendoza

Mailroom, R. Frost, C. Haunai Henry, B. Gomez, J. Lopez, Does Internal

Affairs CDCR, B. Morales, CO Seinz, CO Silva, Ruff R.N., R. Wessel, CO

Orth, T. Holmes, R. Lee, and C. Puguese be dismissed based on plaintiff’s

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against them.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty

(30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v.Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 19, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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