Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00121/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00121-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 29:1801 Farmworker Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE A. LOPEZ, JUAN CARLOS CASE NO. CV-F-08-121 LJO GSA

APOLINAR, JUAN JOSE ESTRADA

SOTA, JUN JOSE CERVANTES, 

ISMAEL CUEVAS, REYNAR 

MENDOZA, AND JESUS RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiffs, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY

ADJUDICATION MOTION (Doc. 42)

vs.

LASSEN DAIRY, INC., d/b/a MERITAGE 

DAIRY, TULE RIVER FARMS INC, TULE

RIVER RANCH, INC, BONANZA FARMS,

and WILLIAM VANDER POEL, SR.,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Jose A. Lopez, Juan Carlos Apolinar, Juan Jose Estrada Sota, Juan Jose Cervantes,

Ismael Cuevas, Reynar Mendoza, and Jesus Rodriguez (“plaintiffs”) assert eleven unfair wage and labor

claims against defendants Lassen Dairy, Inc., d.b.a. Meritage Dairy, Tule River Farms, Inc., Tule River

Ranch, Inc., Bonanza Farms, and William Vander Poel, Sr. (collectively “defendants”). Defendants

move for summary adjudication of plaintiffs’ first cause of action, which alleges violations of the

Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq. (“AWPA”). 

Because the undisputed facts establish that plaintiffs’ employment at Meritage Dairy was neither

“seasonal” nor “temporary in nature,” this Court GRANTS defendants’ summary adjudication motion

as to plaintiffs’ AWPA cause of action.

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BACKGROUND

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Plaintiffs’ Claims

Plaintiffs were employed by Meritage Dairy at various times between 2005 and 2007. 

Proceeding on the second amended complaint, plaintiffs seek recovery for wages and compensation

under federal and California law based on allegations that defendants maintained and enforced against

its non-exempt employees unlawful labor practices and policies. Among other things, plaintiffs allege

that defendants violated AWPA by: (1) failing to pay minimum wages; (2) failing to provide plaintiffs

rest periods; (3) requiring plaintiffs to work at least five hours without a meal period; (4) failing to

provide split-shift pay to plaintiffs; (5) failing to pay plaintiffs premium overtime wages; (6) failing to

pay plaintiffs all wages due upon voluntary or involuntary termination; (7) failing to maintain and

provide to plaintiffs accurate itemized wage statements; (8) failing to pay plaintiffs statutory penalties;

(9) forcing plaintiffs to purchase, use, and/or maintain tools and equipment (including gloves, scissors,

and automobiles), but failing to reimburse them for these expenses at their fair rental value; (10)

violating the terms of the “working arrangement”; and (11) failing to pay wages when due.

Defendants’ Undisputed Facts

Defendants rely on the following facts to support their position that plaintiffs lack standing to 2

assert AWPA claims:

Meritage Dairy has a year-round dairy operation that operates continuously to produce milk. 

Meritage Dairy has no slack season for milking cows. Milk production remains relatively constant

through the year.

Plaintiffs were hired to perform work activities related to caring for and milking cows at

Meritage Dairy. Plaintiffs’ employment positions were permanent and continuous, not limited to a

discrete time period. Meritage Dairy did not employ plaintiffs for seasonal or temporary agricultural

work. Plaintiffs’ positions were at will, and not dependent on the duration of a job task. 

The Court relies on the evidence presented by the parties in the record and cites to the most relevant for purposes

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of deciding this motion.

Defendants facts are established by the declaration of Richard Oppedyk, who is an owner and Chief Financial

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Officer of Lassen Dairy, Inc., doing business as Meritage Dairy. Upon plaintiffs’ request, Mr. Oppedyk provided discovery

and submitted evidence to support his declaration.

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None of the plaintiffs’ positions with Meritage Dairy required them to be absent overnight from

their permanent residence. Meritage Dairy is located in Kern County, California. Plaintiffs all provided

permanent addresses located in Kern County. Defendants did not provide or arrange temporary housing

for plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs’ Undisputed Facts

Plaintiffs were employed by defendants to work at their dairy facilities caring for and milking

cows. Defendants’ dairy classifies employees in the following job categories: Milker, Cow Pusher, Cow

Feeder, Calf Feeder, Maternity Barn Employee, Outside Help, and Relief Help. According to the job

descriptions:

Because [defendants] want to provide as much continued employment as possible for

everyone working with [defendants’] company, employees may be required to do any

number of jobs other that [sic] what is described in their basic qualification.

Cows are kept in outdoor pens and “pushed” to dairy barns by Cow Pushers to be milked.

Pushers and relief helpers provide milking help in the barn when needed. Employees in various

classifications performed work such as “blading hay and/or feed” (cow feeders, maternity barn

employees, outside help, relief help), and chopping weeds, scrapping corrals, preparing alfalfa for feed

and maintaining dairy grounds (outside and relief help). At all relevant times, plaintiffs were employed

in “agricultural work.”

Procedural History

Plaintiffs initiated this action on January 24, 2008, on behalf of themselves and others similarly

situated. Plaintiffs are proceeding on their second amended complaint, filed on October 24, 2008. The

Court has not considered the class certification question. 

Defendants moved for summary adjudication on November 25, 2009. Plaintiffs moved to

continue the summary adjudication motion to allow time for completion of discovery related to the

issues raised in defendants’ motion. This Court granted plaintiffs’ motion, and set a further scheduling

conference. A second scheduling order set a briefing schedule for this motion.

Plaintiffs opposed the pending motion on July 12, 2010. Defendants replied on August 6, 2010. 

This Court found this motion suitable for decision without a hearing, vacates the August 12, 2010

hearing pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), and issues the following order.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

On summary judgment, a court must decide whether there is a “genuine issue as to any material

fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also, Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). A party

seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party may satisfy

this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing of sufficient

evidence to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, and on which the non-moving

party bears the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. “The judgment sought should be rendered if the

pleadings, the discoveryand disclosure materials on file, and anyaffidavits show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). “If the partymoving for summary judgment meets its initial burden of identifying for the court

those portions of the material on file that it believes demonstrates the absence of any genuine issues of

material fact,” the burden of production shifts and the nonmoving party must set forth “specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n,

809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material

issue of fact conclusively in its favor, but “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of

the truth at trial.” First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968); T.W.

Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. The nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by depositions, answer to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) requires

a party opposing summary judgment to "set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial." "In the absence of specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing the existence of a genuine

issue for trial, a properly supported summary judgment motion will be granted." Nilsson, Robbins, et

al. v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1545 (9th Cir. 1988).

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With these standards in mind, the Court turns to defendants’ arguments.

DISCUSSION

AWPA's purpose is to "assure necessary protections for migrant and seasonal agricultural

workers[.]" 29 U.S.C.A. § 1801. Consistent with this purpose, the provisions of the Act provide

protections for either "migrant agricultural workers" or "seasonal agricultural workers." Thus, to assert

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an AWPA claim, plaintiffs must qualify as either “migrant agricultural workers,” as defined by 29

U.S.C. §1802(8)(A), or “seasonal agricultural workers,” as defined by 29 U.S.C. §1802(10)(A). 

Defendants argue that plaintiffs cannot establish that they meet either of those classifications. Because

plaintiffs fail to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether they are “migrant agricultural workers” or

“seasonal agricultural workers,” this Court finds that plaintiffs lack standing to assert an AWPA claim.

Migrant Agricultural Worker

The AWPA defines “migrant agricultural worker” as “an individual who is employed in

agricultural employment of a seasonal or other temporary nature, and who is required to be absent

overnight from his permanent place of residence.” 29 U.S.C. §1802(8)(A). Based on this statute, three

elements must be satisfied to establish that an individual is a migrant agricultural worker: (1) the

employment must be agricultural in nature; (2) the employment must be of a seasonal or temporary

nature; and (3) the employment required overnight absence from the worker's permanent place of

residence.

Defendants contend that plaintiffs are not migrant agricultural workers, as defined by AWPA,

because their employment with Meritage Dairy did not require overnight absence from their permanent

place of residence. Plaintiffs do not dispute the factual basis for defendants’ argument, nor the legal

conclusion. Because defendants established that plaintiffs’ employment did not require overnight

absence from their permanent place of resident, this Court finds that plaintiffs do not qualify as migrant

agricultural workers, as defined by AWPA, as a matter of law.

Seasonal Agricultural Worker

 A “seasonal agricultural worker” is:

AWPA’s provisions address other classes of individuals that are not implicated in this action.

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an individual who is employed in agricultural employment of a seasonal or other

temporary nature and is not required to be absent overnight from his permanent place of

residence–

(i) when employed on a farm or ranch performing field work related to planting,

cultivating, or harvesting operations; or

(ii) when employed in canning, packing, ginning, seed conditioning or related

research, or processing operations, and transported, or caused to be transported, to or

from the place of employment by means of a day-haul operation.

28 U.S.C. §1802(10)(A). The residential requirement of the seasonal agricultural worker definition is

inapplicable under the facts of this action. Thus, to be “seasonal agricultural workers,” plaintiffs: (1)

must be employed in agricultural employment; and (2) the employment must be seasonal or temporary

in nature.

Agricultural Employment

“Agricultural employment” is defined as “employment in any service or activity included within

the provisions of section 2(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1983 (29 U.S.C. §203(f)), or section

3121(g) of Title 26 and the handling, planting, drying, packing, packaging, processing, freezing, or

grading prior to deliveryfor storage of anyagricultural or horticultural commodityin its unmanufactured

state.” 29 U.S.C. §1802(3). “Dairying” is included in the definition of “agricultural employment.” 29

U.S.C. §203(f). Defendants concede, for purposes of this motion, that plaintiffs were engaged in

“agricultural employment.” Accordingly, plaintiffs satisfy the first element of the seasonal agricultural

worker definition.

Seasonal or Other Temporary Employment

Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ employment was neither seasonal nor temporary in nature. 

For their argument, defendants rely on the definitions of “seasonal” and “temporary” labor provided in

the Department of Labor regulations applicable to AWPA. According to the regulations, labor is

“seasonal” where “the employment pertains to or is of the kind exclusively performed at certain seasons

or periods of the year and which, from its nature, may not be continuous or carried on throughout the

year.” 29 C.F.R. §500.20(s)(1). A “worker who moves from one seasonal activity to another, while

employed in agriculture or performing agricultural labor, is employed on a seasonal basis even though

he may continue to be employed during a major portion of the year.” Id. AWPA defines labor as “other

temporary nature” where a worker “is employed for a limited time only or his performance is

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contemplated for a particular piece of work, usually of short duration. Generally, employment, which

is contemplated to continue indefinitely, is not temporary.” 29 C.F.R. §500.20(s)(2). “On a seasonal or

temporary basis does not include the employment of any worker who is living at his permanent place

of residence, when that worker is employed by a specific agricultural employer or agricultural

association on essentially a year round basis to perform a variety of tasks for his employer and is not

primarily employed to do field work.” 29 C.F.R. §500.20(s)(4).

According to the Oppedyk declaration, Meritage Dairy has a year-round dairy operation that

operates continuously to raise cattle and to produce milk from year to year. Meritage Dairy has no slack

season for milking cows, and milk production remains relatively constant throughout the year. All

named plaintiffs were hired at will for an indefinite period of time. Any turnover in employees at

Meritage Dairy is independent of the duration of a job task. Based on these facts, defendants carried

their initial burden to establish that plaintiffs’ work at Meritage Dairy was not “seasonal” as defined by

the regulations.

Similarly, defendants establish that plaintiffs’ employment was not temporary in nature. 

Plaintiffs were employed at various times at Meritage Dairy, and for various lengths of time:

 

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The applicable regulation defines “temporary work” as follows:

A worker is employed on other temporary basis where he is employed for a limited time

only or his performance is contemplated for a particular piece of work, usually of short

duration. Generally, employment, which is contemplated to continue indefinitely, is not

temporary.

29 C.F.R. §500.20(s)(2). Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether the type of work is temporary in nature,

or whether the type of work is ongoing. Although some plaintiffs worked at Meritage Dairy for a short

period of time, the length of employment does not necessitate a finding that the employment was

temporary in nature. Moreover, plaintiffs’ subjective intent as to the nature or duration of the work is

irrelevant:

Many of the workers, however, consider themselves temporary workers because

they frequently left DeCoster to perform other temporary agricultural work and then

returned to DeCoster. But that circumstance was not due to the nature of the work.

Instead, the work was available on a permanent basis and was not for a particular task

that would be of short duration. The workers' subjective intent and the decisions they

make as to how long they will stay employed cannot be the rule of decision for coverage

of “temporary” work under the Act. Not only can no employer ever be confident of its

employees'intentions as to permanent employment, but more importantly, the statute and

the regulations direct our attention to the nature of the work, not the employee's

intentions (“agricultural employment of a seasonal or other temporary nature”).

Ramirez v. DeCoster, 194 F.R.D. 348, 356-57 (Dist. Me. 2000). Defendants submit evidence to

establish that plaintiffs were employed for an indefinite period of time and for positions that were of an

unlimited duration. Plaintiffs submit no evidence to dispute this evidence. Accordingly, this Court finds

an absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiffs were employed on a temporary

basis.

In opposition, plaintiffs argue that theyqualifyfor AWPA protection because:(1) AWPA affords

protections to all “migrant workers” within the meaning of the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act

(“FLCRA”); (2) the dairy industry is seasonal as a matter of law; (3) the dairy industry is seasonal under

the analysis of Caro-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson, 993 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1993); and (4) questions

of law exist as to the seasonality of the dairy industry. The Court considers each argument below.

“Migrant workers” under FLRCA

Plaintiffs argue that they qualify for AWPA protection because AWPA covers all “migrant

workers” within the meaning of the FLCRA. Under the FLCRA, an individual was a “migrant worker”

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if his or her primary employment was agricultural within the meaning of FLSA, or he or she engaged

in agricultural worker on a seasonal or other temporary basis. 7 U.S.C. §2042(g) (repealed 1983). 

Plaintiffs argue that this Court should interpret the AWPA broadlyto encompass all agricultural workers

who were protected under FLCRA. Because plaintiffs were employed primarily within agriculture, and

qualify as a “migrant worker” under FLCRA, plaintiffs conclude that they qualify for AWPA protection.

Congress enacted the FLCRA in 1963, and substantially amended it in 1974. FLCRA

Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-518. In 1984, Congress repealed the FLCRA and replaced it with

AWPA. Because the FLCRA has been repealed, this Court will not enforce its defunct provisions.

In addition, this Court is restricted by the plain language of the AWPA, which limits its

protections to agricultural employeeswhose work is temporaryor seasonal. Unlike the FLCRA “migrant

worker” provision, the AWPA does not include language to allow protections for those who are

employed primarily in agricultural work. As set forth above, a person must be employed in agricultural

work that is seasonal or temporary to qualify for AWPA protection. 29 U.S.C. §1802(8)(A); 29 U.S.C.

§1802(10)(A). This Court cannot ignore, as plaintiffs suggest, the plain language of the AWPA which

limits its protections to those who engage in agricultural work that is seasonal or temporary:

[I]t is up to Congress to determine what categories of workers deserve protection. Here,

Congress has used plain language that simplywill not encompass these workers, because

their work is neither seasonal nor temporary. Congress could have left those limiting

criteria out of the Act and extended its protection to any employee who engaged in

agricultural-related labor and who left his home to be so engaged, but Congress chose

not to. The statutory language is clear and must control.

Ramirez, 194 F.R.D. at 357. “AWPA allows seasonal and migrant agricultural employees to bring suit

in federal court if employers fail to pay them wages owed or violate a working arrangement.” Valenzuela

v. Giumarra Vineyards Corp., 614 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1091 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, this Court rejects plaintiffs argument,which improperlyattempts to broaden the protections

of AWPA beyond the plain language of the statute.

Seasonal as a Matter of Law

Plaintiffs argue that the dairy industry is seasonal as a matter of law. To support their position,

plaintiffs cite inapplicable and inapposite case law and legislative histories. See, e.g., Brannan v. Stark,

342 U.S. 451, 460 (1952) (discussing in dicta that demand for milk is greater during the winter months

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in the Boston area); Defiance Milk Products Co. v. Lying, 857 F.2d 1065, 1066 (6th Cir. 1988)

(discussing federal regulation of marketing of milk in Ohio Valley area based on temporary glut of milk

in that market); Lames Dairy Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Ag., 379 F.3d 466, 469 (7th Cir. 2004) (milk

handler’s challenge to the milk marketing order); United States v. Dairy Farmers Coop. Assoc., 611 F.2d

488, 490 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that a milk handler must exhaust administrative remedies before

challenging the milk marketing order); Synser v. Block, 760 F.2d 514, 521 (3d Cir. 1985) (appellant

challenged emergency amendments to regional marketing order designed to insure that milk producers

shared in the added transportation costs associated with a market glut). None of the cited cases or

legislative histories relate to AWPA. In addition, although these cases discuss the supply and demand

of milk, and milk marketing orders, none of the plaintiffs’ cited legal authorities establishes that

plaintiffs’ employment–caring for and milking cows at the Meritage Dairy in California from 2005

through 2007–was seasonal as a matter of law. 

Caro-Galvan vs. Ramirez

The parties rely on separate cases to support their positions regarding whether plaintiffs’

employment was seasonal within the meaning of AWPA. In their moving and reply papers, defendants

rely on Ramirez, 194 F.R.D. 348, to support their position that plaintiffs’ employment was not seasonal. 

In opposition, plaintiffs rely on Caro-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson, 993 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1993) to

argue that plaintiffs employment was seasonal. Having considered the parties’ arguments and the cases,

this Court finds Caro-Galvan distinguishable for the following reasons, and adopts the reasoning and

conclusion of Ramirez, 194 F.R. D. 348, discussed infra.

First, the facts of Caro-Galvan are distinguishable from the instant case. In Caro-Galvan, the

Eleventh Circuit found that agricultural workers were engaged in seasonal work under the following

facts: “From January through May, [plaintiffs] harvested ferns. During the rest of the year–the distinct

‘slack season’ during which fern harvesting was so slow appellants could not even earn minimum wage

doing it and thus were free to work elsewhere–they weeded, cleaned, did some harvesting, and worked

other miscellaneous jobs.” Id. at 1508. The parties did not dispute that the agricultural work related to

the fern industry was seasonal. There was a distinct slack season in which the employees were free to

work elsewhere, and could not earn even minimum wage working in the fern industry, because there was

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little or no fern harvesting to be done during June through December. Here, there is no evidence to

support an inference that there was a limited number of months, or a season, for the care and milking

of cows. There is no evidence to suggest a “distinct slack season” that was so slow that plaintiffs could

not earn minimum wage by milking, pushing, or feeding cows, or that the employees were free to work

elsewhere because of the lack of work during the slack period of the year. Rather, the evidence

presented establishesthat Meritage Dairyoperated year-round and continuouslyto producemilk and care

for cows. 

Second, the Caro-Galvan court ruled that the AWPA protects all “migrant workers” as defined

under the FLCRA, 993 F.2d at 1507, a proposition this Court rejected above. The court considered the

legislative history of the FLCRA and AWPA, and concluded that AWPA covers employees who

engaged primarilyin agricultural work as well as migrant and seasonal agricultural employees as defined

by AWPA. The court noted that the plain language of the AWPA is narrower, but chose to give the

statute a broader application: 

Admittedly, in defining "migrant worker" in FLCRA, Congress distinguished an

individual for whom agriculture was "primary employment" from one who worked in

agriculture "on a seasonal or other temporary basis," covering them both. 7 U.S.C. §

2042 (g) (repealed 1983). By contrast, AWPA covers only employment of a seasonal or

other temporary nature. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1802(8)(A), 1802(10)(A). Hence, it is arguable that

AWPA's scope is narrower than its predecessor's. We believe, however, that the

legislative history clearly evinces Congress' intent not to narrow the class of protected

workers, notwithstanding the somewhat different language of the two acts. Because farm

laborers are poor, politically weak, and excluded from the overtime and collective

bargaining rights afforded other types of workers, they always are vulnerable to

exploitation, not just when they migrate from job to job. Construing AWPA broadly to

effect its humanitarian purpose, we find that, like "migrant worker" under FLCRA,

Congress intended "employment of a seasonal or other temporary nature" to be a term

of art not limited to short-term or itinerant workers.

Id. at 1507. Unlike the Caro-Galvan court, this Court declines to interpret the statute beyond its plain

language. Indeed, this Court cannot rely on legislative history to extend a statutory provision beyond

its plain language. As this Court explained above, it is for Congress, not this Court, to decide the extent

of a statute. Moreover, this Court questions the court’s premise that the legislative history conclusively

suggests that the AWPA provision is meant to have a broad interpretation. As the Ramirez court points

out:

there is some legislative history that suggests that some members of Congress thought

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that previous legislation had been interpreted too broadly in its coverage. AWPA's

predecessor, the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, defined a migrant worker as

"an individual whose primary employment is in agriculture, as defined in section 203(f)

of title 29, or who performs agricultural labor, as defined in section 3121(g) of title 26,

on a seasonal or other temporary basis." 7 U.S.C. § 2042(g) (repealed 1983). Rep.

Panetta, one of the sponsors of AWPA, co-sponsored a bill to limit the definition of

"migrant worker." Citing his "shock" that "'migrant worker' no longer means migrant

worker[; it] is now interpreted by the Labor Department to mean any employee who is

performing agricultural work," Rep. Panetta proposed a limiting definition to "migrant

worker" substantially similar to that found in AWPA. 127 CONG. REC. H10353, 10354

- 55 (daily ed. May 20, 1981) (statement of Rep. Panetta); H.R. 3636, 97th Cong. § 8

(1981) ("The term 'migrant worker' means an individual who is engaged in agricultural

employment on a seasonal or other temporary basis and who cannot regularly return to

his or her domicile each day after working hours").

194 F.R.D. at 357 n. 10. Thus, the legislative history is conflicting. This Court need not attempt to

resolve the conflict, however, because the statutory language is clear and controlling.

Third, the distinguishable facts led the Caro-Galvan court to interpret a part of the regulations

that are inapplicable to this action. In Caro-Galvan, the parties did not dispute that the fern industrywas

seasonal. The question presented was whether the employees worked on a seasonal or temporary basis

because they performed other miscellaneous jobs for their employer during the slack season. In

considering the applicable AWPA regulation, the Caro-Galvan court noted:

[L]abor is performed on a seasonal basis where, ordinarily, the employment pertains to

or is of the kind exclusively performed at certain seasons or periods of the year and

which, from its nature, may not be continuous or carried on throughout the year. A

worker who moves from one seasonal activity to another, while employed in agriculture

or performing agricultural labor, is employed on a seasonal basis even though he may

continue to be employed during a major portion of the year.

29 C.F.R. § 500.20(s)(1) (quoted in Caro-Galvan, 993 F.2d at 1507) (emphasis in Caro-Galvan). The 

court further considered 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(s)(4), which provides:

Seasonal or temporary work does not include the employment of any worker who is

living at his permanent place of residence, when that worker is employed by a specific

agricultural employer or agricultural association on essentially a year round basis to

perform a variety of tasks for his employer and is not primarily employed to do field

work.

Id. at 1507-08 (emphasis added). The Court interpreted these regulations to conclude that if “the worker

performs ‘field work,’ he or she is employed on a seasonal temporary basis,” even if it is “year-round

employment.” Id. at 1508. This Court need not apply these legal extrapolations to the facts of this case,

because the question presented to this Court relates to the first sentence of 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(s)(1);

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namely, whether the employment was performed at certain seasons of the year, or whether it may be

continuous or carried out throughout the year. The Caro-Galvan court did not consider or interpret this

provision.

By contrast, this Court finds the case relied upon by defendants, Ramirez, 194 F.R.D. 348, to

be instructive. In Ramirez, the court ruled that employment in an egg production business is not

seasonal, as it “operates year-round, has no slack season, and is continuous.” Id. at 357. In so ruling,

Ramirez relied on 29 C.F.R. §200.50(s)(1), the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of the meaning of

seasonal labor as applied to AWPA. This Court gives deference to the United States Secretaryof Labor's

interpretation of AWPA, as the Department of Labor is charged to enforce the statute. See Chevron,

U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984). Pursuant to the applicable

regulation, as set forth above, “laboris performed on a seasonal basis where, ordinarily, the employment

pertains to or is of the kind exclusively performed at certain seasons or periods of the year and which,

from its nature, may not be continuous or carried on throughout the year.” 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(s)(1). 

Accordingly, this Court considers whether plaintiffs raise a triable issue of fact under this definition.

No Disputed Material Facts

In their motion, defendants argued that plaintiffs’ work was not seasonal because Meritage Dairy

operates year-round, has no slack season, and their employees’ labor is continuous. Defendants offered

admissible evidence to support this position. In addition to the declarations, defendants submitted

monthly milk production and feeding data for the October 2005-November 2009 time period. The

records demonstrate that cows produced milk each month throughout the year, without a noticeable

variation related to a season, and at a relatively constant rate. Cows gave birth each month of the year,

without a noticeable variation related to a season. Cows were milked at Meritage Dairy every day of the

year. Thus, no “distinct slack season” in milk production is apparent from defendants’ milk production

records. In addition, defendants’ evidence establishes that daily animal husbandry was required

regardless of whether cows were milking or giving birth. Cows were fed daily, including those cows

who were not producing milk.

Defendants further submit evidence that they turned these records over to plaintiffs, despite

plaintiffs’ contrary assertions. Indeed, this Court stayed this motion, filed in November 2009, to allow

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plaintiffs to conduct discovery on this issue. Although plaintiffs were in possession of defendants’

records, plaintiffs do not argue that the Meritage Dairy milk production and feeding records give rise

to an inference that the employment was seasonal. Instead, Plaintiffs ignore this evidence entirely in

their opposition, and produce no admissible evidence to dispute defendants’ evidence.

In an attempt to dispute defendants’ facts, plaintiffs argue that the term “seasonal” is ambiguous. 

Defendants point out in their reply, however, that “seasonal” labor is defined by the regulation, as set

forth above. In their opposition, plaintiffs ignore the AWPA regulations that define “seasonal” labor. 

Because the Court defers to the administration’s interpretation of the statute, this Court finds that

“seasonal” labor is not ambiguous, as it is defined in the regulations. Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to raise

a disputed material fact by challenging the meaning of the term seasonal.

Plaintiffs also rely on scholarly articles in an attempt to establish that dairy cows undergo

seasonality. Defendants object to the admission of these articles as an improper attempt to introduce

expert testimony, without having provided the required disclosures in discovery, and inadmissible

hearsay. This Court agrees with defendants, and will not rely on plaintiffs’ proffered articles.

Ultimately, plaintiffs’ declarations fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

plaintiffs’ employment was “seasonal” as defined by AWPA. The nonmoving party must "go beyond

the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by depositions, answer to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. In

their declarations, plaintiffs do not dispute that employment at Meritage Dairy related to the caring for

and milking of cows “operates year-round, has no slack season, and is continuous.” Rather, according

to the declarations, plaintiffs worked 10 or more hours every day, six days a week, throughout their

employment. Although plaintiffs contend that there was more work in some months than other months,

plaintiffs’ statements do not give rise to an interference that there was a prolonged time period in which

there was no work for their position, or that there was a specific time period during the year that the

position was necessary or unnecessary. Indeed, plaintiffs’ declarations do not give rise to a specific

seasonality, as some plaintiffs claimed that there were more births in summer months, while others

declare that there were more births in winter months. Plaintiffs’ declarations do not address defendants’

evidence that establishes that there is a consistent, year-round demand for employment at Meritage Dairy

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related to animal husbandry, milking and birthing, and other tasks related to the caring for and milking

of cows.

Plaintiffs declarations relate to their labor and wage violation claims, but do not raise issues of

whether employment at Meritage dairy “is of the kind exclusively performed at certain seasons or

periods of the year and which, from its nature, may not be continuous or carried on throughout the year.”

29 C.F.R. § 500.20(s)(1). Plaintiffs’ declarations provide no evidence that gives rise to an inference that

there was a slack season for a Milker, Cow Pusher, Cow Feeder, Calf Feeder, MaternityBarn Employee,

Outside Help, and Relief Help at Meritage Dairy, in which an employee could not earn a living during

certain months of the year and was free to leave that employment during the slack season. The evidence

demonstrates that there was consistent work throughout the year for each of those positions,

notwithstanding some fluctuation in birthing and milking rates. Because plaintiffs fail to raise a genuine

issue of disputed fact as to whether plaintiffs were engaged in agricultural employment that was

“seasonal,” this Court finds that plaintiffs lack standing to raise an AWPA claim.

Leave to Amend

In their opposition, plaintiffs argue that, in the event this Court grants summary adjudication on

plaintiffs’ AWPA claim, this Court should grant plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to substitute

two plaintiffs and to assert a Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) claim. Defendants oppose plaintiffs’

request, arguing that plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint improperly without following standard

motion practice. Defendants argue that this Court should deny plaintiffs request, as the improper notice

left defendants with only seven days to address not only the substantive and relevant issues in the

opposition to defendants summaryadjudication motion, but also the complex issues of whether plaintiffs

have grounds to pursue a CAFA claim. This Court agrees. Plaintiffs must notice and move for leave

to file a third amended complaint in accordance with this Court’s local rules. Accordingly, this Court

denies without prejudice plaintiffs’ leave to amend request. It is not lost on the Court that a good deal

of money is being wasted at the pleading stage due to a lack of diligence by the Plaintiffs. This should

not be, and will not be in any way rewarded.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court:

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1. GRANTS defendants’ summary adjudication motion as to plaintiffs’ AWPA cause of

action;

2. DENIES plaintiffs’ request for leave to file a third amended complaint; and

3. VACATES the August 12, 2010 hearing on this motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 10, 2010 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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