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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 18, 1996 Decided November 5, 1996

No. 95-7254

ELEANOR T. JOHNSON, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 86cv03110)

-

CERTIFICATION OF QUESTION OF LAW

by the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Bruce P. Heppen argued the cause for appellant, with whom Robert L. Polk, Robert J. Kniaz and

Frederic H. Schuster were on the briefs.

David T. Smorodin argued the cause and filed the brief for appellees.

Before: WALD, WILLIAMS and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: On October 18, 1996 we heard oral argument in the case of

Eleanor T. Johnson et al. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, No. 95-7254. A

question of District of Columbia law will be determinative of the pending appeal. There is no

controlling precedent to be found in the decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. We

therefore certify the following question of law to the District ofColumbia Court of Appeals pursuant

to D.C. Code § 11-723:

Under District of Columbia law, and upon the facts described below, may a plaintiff

who has voluntarily assumed an unreasonable risk of incurring a particular injury

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recover from a defendant who failed to take the last clear chance to prevent that

injury?

This question arose in a wrongful death action against the Washington Metropolitan Area

Transit Authority that was originally filed in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. For a

brief discussion of the procedural history of this case, see Johnson v. WMATA, 867 F. Supp. 1103,

1104-06 (D.D.C. 1994). The WMATA removed the action to the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia. Finnegan's Wake would be more easily summarized than the ensuing

procedural history of this case. For the published record of these proceedings, see Johnson v.

WMATA, 883 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990), on remand, 764 F.

Supp. 1586 (D.D.C. 1991), 773 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1991), 790 F. Supp. 1174 (D.D.C. 1991), 867

F. Supp. 1103 (D.D.C. 1994), and 901 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995).

The few relevant facts are as follows. On March 20, 1986 Devora Johnson jumped from the

subway station platforminto the path of an oncoming WMATA train. The parties do not contest that

Ms. Johnson jumped of her own volition and with the intention of committing suicide. See 883 F.2d

at 127; see also 901 F. Supp. at 2-3 (discussing legalsignificance of fact that Ms. Johnson intended

to commit suicide); Memorandum and Order, Civil Action No. 86-3110-LFO (D.D.C. February 3,

1993) ("This case involvesthe death of Devora Johnson, who committed suicide by jumping onto the

defendant's subway track").

At the end of the second trial of this cause, the presiding judge concluded that the WMATA

could be found liable under the doctrine of last clear chance even though Ms. Johnson had assumed

the risk of dying as she did. The court therefore instructed the jury first to determine whether the

WMATA in fact had the last clear chance to save Ms. Johnson. At trial, the parties had agreed that

a reasonably prudent train operator would have been able to react to the danger and to apply the

emergency brakes no more than one second after Ms.Johnson leapt onto the tracks, bringing the train

safely to a standstill in ten seconds. The jury found that Ms. Johnson jumped when the train was still

more than ten seconds away and, therefore, that the WMATA had the last clear chance to save Ms.

Johnson by stopping the train.

Because Ms. Johnson was a trespasser upon the tracks, the WMATA could be found liable,

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even under the doctrine of last clear chance, only if the train operator had been willful or wanton in

failing to take action to prevent the accident. See Holland v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 431 A.2d 597,

599 (D.C. 1981) (en banc) (trespasser may recover only for "intentional, wanton or willful injury or

maintenance of a hidden engine of destruction"), quoted in Johnson, 883 F.2d at 130. Therefore, the

jury was asked second to determine whether the train operator had been willful, wanton, or reckless

in failing to take the last clear chance he had to avoid injuring Ms. Johnson. The jury concluded that

the train operator did act willfully or wantonlywhen he operated histrain, presumably because of the

evidence showing that he had tested positive for cocaine and marijuana shortly after the accident.

The jury held the WMATA liable under both the Wrongful Death and the SurvivalActs. The

WMATA then filed the present appeal, arguing that the plaintiffs are barred from recovering under

the doctrine of last clear chance because Ms. Johnson had assumed the risk of death on the tracks.

We understand that under the law of the District of Columbia a plaintiff who has been

contributorily negligent may recover nonetheless under the last clear chance doctrine. See Robinson

v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 1255, 1258 (D.C. 1990), quoted in Belton v. WMATA, 20 F.3d

1197, 1199-1200 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In order to recover under the last clear chance doctrine, the

negligent plaintiff must show:

(1) that the plaintiff was in a position of danger caused by the negligence of both

plaintiff and defendant; (2) that the plaintiff was oblivious to the danger, or unable

to extricate herself from the position of danger; (3) that the defendant was aware, or

by the exercise of reasonable care should have been aware, of the plaintiff's danger

and of her oblivion to it or her inability to extricate herself from it; and (4) that the

defendant, with means available to him, could have avoided injuring the plaintiff after

becoming aware of the danger and the plaintiff's inability to extricate herself from it,

but failed to do so.

District of Columbia v. Huysman, 650 A.2d 1323, 1326 (D.C. 1994), quoting Felton v. Wagner, 512

A.2d 291, 295 (D.C. 1986).

The District ofColumbia Court of Appeals has not, however,spoken to the question whether

a plaintiff who voluntarily assumed an unreasonable risk of incurring a particular injury may recover

froma defendant who failed to take the last clear chance to avoid inflicting that injury. We are unable

to determine how the Court of Appeals would resolve this question. On the one hand, the Court of

Appeals has held that a plaintiff who voluntarily exposes herself to an unreasonable risk of injury is

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considered not to have "assumed the risk" but to have been contributorily negligent. See, for

example, Scoggins v. Jude, 419 A.2d 999, 1004 (D.C. 1980) ("we ... limit the assumption of risk

discussion to reasonable voluntary risk taking, and consider all unreasonable risk taking under the

heading of contributory negligence"); Janifer v. Jandebeur, 551 A.2d 1351, 1352 (D.C. 1989)

("Where a plaintiff has [voluntarily exposed himself to an unreasonable risk], the concept of

"assumption of risk' overlaps with contributory negligence and amounts to the same defense"). This

suggests that a court in the District of Columbia would hold that Ms. Johnson was contributorily

negligent when she jumped in front of the oncoming train, with the consequence that the plaintiffs

would be able to recover under the last clear chance doctrine.

On the other hand, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held that a plaintiff's

assumption of a risk acts as a bar to her recovery because "the plaintiff is regarded as having

consciously relieved the defendant of any duty which he otherwise owed the plaintiff. Being under

no duty, the defendant may not be charged with negligence." See Sinai v. Polinger, 498 A.2d 520,

524 (D.C. 1985); accord Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts, § 503 ("A plaintiff whose

conduct is in reckless disregard of his own safety is barred from recovery against a defendant whose

reckless disregard of the plaintiff's safety is a legal cause of the plaintiff's harm"). This suggests that

Ms. Johnson, by willfully leaping in front of the train, relieved the WMATA of its duty of care in

operation of the train with respect to her, in which event the plaintiffs would not be able to recover

under the last clear chance doctrine.

In addition we note that in order to recover under the last clear chance doctrine, a plaintiff

must prove that she "was oblivious to the danger, or unable to extricate herself from the position of

danger." Huysman, 650 A.2d at 1326. Thus the doctrine presupposes that the plaintiffs' decedent,

far from voluntarily accepting and welcoming the risk, would have chosen to take the steps needed

to avoid the risk had she been able to do so. The doctrine, by its terms, therefore seems inapplicable

to a plaintiff who has voluntarily assumed the risk of incurring, or asseems more accurate in this case

actively invited, the particular injury that occurred.

Finally, the policy in the law favoring the preservation of human life may not be furthered by

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permitting the estate of a suicide to recover under the doctrine of last clear chance. Allowing an

individual to recover for injuries she has actively invited would provide an incentivein the form of

expected compensation for her heirsif not for herselffor a suicidal or a financially desperate person

to act upon her self-destructive impulses. In contrast, the defendant with the last clear chance of

avoiding the injury has the proper incentive to try to prevent the injury regardless whether the

individual in peril was negligent, reckless, or willful because the defendant will not ordinarily know

ex ante how the person came to be in a perilous situation.

These are strong argumentsfor denying recovery. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the District

of Columbia Court of Appeals has equated the voluntary assumption of an unreasonable risk with

contributory negligence at least in some circumstances. The Court of Appeals has not, however,

indicated whetherthe plaintiff's voluntaryassumption of an unreasonable risk acts as a bar to recovery

under the last clear chance doctrine. For that reason, we are impelled to certify the question to the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Appended to this certification are the briefs and portions of the trial court record provided

by the parties to this appeal. In addition, we shall provide the Court of Appeals with any other

portion of the trial court record that the Court of Appeals would like to have in order to answer the

certified question.

So ordered.

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