Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05126/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05126-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 15, 2009 Decided May 7, 2010 

No. 09-5126 

MICHAEL ARTHUR NEWDOW, ET AL., 

APPELLANTS

v. 

JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE U.S. SUPREME 

COURT, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:08-cv-02248-RBW) 

Michael Newdow argued the cause for appellants. 

With him on the briefs was Robert V. Ritter. 

Lowell V. Sturgill Jr., Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellees John G. Roberts, Jr., et 

al. With him on the brief was Mark B. Stern, Attorney. Brad 

P. Rosenberg, Attorney, entered an appearance. 

Dominic F. Perella argued the cause for appellees 

Presidential Inaugural Committee and Emmett Beliveau. 

With him on the brief were Craig A. Hoover, Catherine E. 

USCA Case #09-5126 Document #1243573 Filed: 05/07/2010 Page 1 of 36
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Stetson, E. Desmond Hogan, Robert Bauer, and Andrew 

Werbrock. Marc Elias entered an appearance. 

H. Robert Showers and Kevin T. Snider were on the 

brief for appellees Joseph Lowery and Richard Warren. 

James Matthew Henderson, Sr. was on the brief for 

amicus curiae American Center for Law & Justice in support 

of appellees. 

Greg Abbott, Attorney General, James C. Ho, Solicitor 

General, C. Andrew Weber, First Assistant Attorney General, 

Adam W. Aston, Assistant Solicitor General, David S. Morales, 

Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation, Candice N. 

Hance, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General=s Office 

of the State of Texas, Troy King, Attorney General, Attorney 

General=s Office of the State of Alabama, Daniel S. Sullivan, 

Attorney General, Attorney General=s Office of the State of 

Alaska, Terry Goddard, Attorney General, Attorney General=s 

Office of the State of Arizona, Dustin McDaniel, Attorney 

General, Attorney General=s Office of the State of Arkansas, 

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Attorney General=s 

Office of the State of California, John W. Suthers, Attorney 

General, Attorney General=s Office of the State of Colorado, 

Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, Attorney General’s 

Office of the State of Connecticut, Joseph R. Biden, III, 

Attorney General, Attorney General=s Office of the State of 

Delaware, Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Attorney 

General=s Office of the State of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker, 

Attorney General, Attorney General=s Office of the State of 

Georgia, Mark J. Bennett, Attorney General, Attorney 

General’s Office of the State of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden, 

Attorney General, Attorney General=s Office of the State of 

Idaho, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Attorney General=s 

Office of the State of Illinois, Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney 

General, Attorney General=s Office of the State of Indiana, 

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Tom Miller, Attorney General, Attorney General=s Office of 

the State of Iowa, Steve Six, Attorney General, Attorney 

General=s Office of the State of Kansas, Jack Conway, 

Attorney General, Attorney General=s Office of the 

Commonwealth of Kentucky, James D. ABuddy@ Caldwell, 

Attorney General, Attorney General=s Office of the State of 

Louisiana, Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, Attorney 

General=s Office of the State of Maine, Douglas F. Gansler, 

Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office of the State of 

Maryland, Martha Coakley, Attorney General, Attorney 

General’s Office of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office 

of the State of Michigan, Lori Swanson, Attorney General, 

Attorney General’s Office of the State of Minnesota, Jim 

Hood, Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office of the 

State of Mississippi, Chris Koster, Attorney General, Attorney 

General’s Office of the State of Missouri, Steve Bullock, 

Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office of the State of 

Montana, Jon C. Bruning, Attorney General, Attorney 

General’s Office of the State of Nebraska, Catherine Cortez 

Masto, Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office of the 

State of Nevada, Michael A. Delaney, Attorney General, 

Attorney General’s Office of the State of New Hampshire, 

Anne Milgram, Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office 

of the State of New Jersey, Gary K. King, Attorney General, 

Attorney General’s Office of the State of New Mexico, 

Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, Attorney General’s 

Office of the State of New York, Roy Cooper, Attorney 

General, Attorney General’s Office of the State of North 

Carolina, Wayne Stenehjem, Attorney General, Attorney 

General’s Office of the State of North Dakota, Richard 

Cordray, Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office of the 

State of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General, 

Attorney General’s Office of the State of Oklahoma, John R. 

Kroger, Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office of the 

State of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., Attorney General, 

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Attorney General’s Office of the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania, Patrick C. Lynch, Attorney General, Attorney 

General’s Office of the State of Rhode Island, Henry D. 

McMaster, Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office of the 

State of South Carolina, Marty J. Jackley, Attorney General, 

Attorney General’s Office of the State of South Dakota, Robert 

E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office of 

the State of Tennessee, Mark Shurtleff, Attorney General, 

Attorney General’s Office of the State of Utah, William H. 

Sorrell, Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office of the 

State of Vermont, Bill Mims, Attorney General, Attorney 

General’s Office of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Robert M. 

McKenna, Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office of the 

State of Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney 

General, Attorney General’s Office of the State of West 

Virginia, J. B. Van Hollen, Attorney General, Attorney 

General’s Office of the State of Wisconsin, Bruce Salzburg, 

Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office of the State of 

Wyoming, and Vincent F. Frazer, Attorney General, Attorney 

General’s Office of the U.S. Virgin Islands, were on the brief 

of amici curiae States of Texas, et al. in support of appellees. 

Before: GINSBURG, BROWN, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

Opinion concurring in the judgment filed by Circuit 

Judge KAVANAUGH. 

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal 

of their constitutional challenge to religious elements of the 

presidential inaugural ceremony. We affirm the dismissal 

because plaintiffs’ claims regarding the 2009 inaugural 

ceremony are moot and plaintiffs lack standing to challenge 

the 2013 and 2017 inaugurations. 

USCA Case #09-5126 Document #1243573 Filed: 05/07/2010 Page 4 of 36
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I 

Barack Obama was elected President of the United 

States on November 4, 2008. Prior to and following his 

election, organizations were formed to assist preparations for 

the January 20, 2009 ceremony that would mark his 

inauguration. The then President-elect created a private 

coordinating group, the Presidential Inaugural Committee 

(“PIC”), recognized by statute as “the committee appointed by 

the President-elect to be in charge of the Presidential inaugural 

ceremony and functions and activities connected with the 

ceremony.” 36 U.S.C. § 501(1). By concurrent resolution, 

Congress established the Joint Congressional Committee on 

Inaugural Ceremonies (“JCCIC”) and authorized it to “utilize 

appropriate equipment and the services of appropriate 

personnel of departments and agencies of the Federal 

Government” to “make the necessary arrangements for the 

inauguration of the President-elect.” S. Con. Res. 67, 110th 

Cong. (2008). The U.S. military services, pursuant to 10 

U.S.C. § 2553, jointly formed the Armed Forces Inaugural 

Committee (“AFIC”) to assist the JCCIC and the PIC in 

“[p]lanning and carrying out” security and safety measures, 

ceremonial duties, and other appropriate activities for the 

inauguration. Id. § 2553(b). 

Through the PIC, President Obama invited two private 

ministers—Revs. Rick Warren and Joseph Lowery—to lead 

invocation and benediction prayers, respectively, at the 

inaugural ceremony. President Obama also communicated 

his wish to John Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the United 

States,1

 that the Chief Justice administer the presidential oath 

of office at the ceremony and append the phrase “So help me 

God” to conclude the oath. See Declaration of Jeffrey P. 

 

1

 Both parties and the case heading refer to Chief Justice Roberts as “the 

Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.” If one is to be 

completely exact, however, the official title is simply “Chief Justice of the 

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1. 

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Minear, Counselor to the Chief Justice, Newdow v. Roberts,

Civil Action No. 08-2248 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2009), App. for 

Appellants at 42. 

While these preparations were ongoing, plaintiffs were 

also preparing themselves to attend or view President Obama’s 

inauguration. Plaintiffs—who individually describe 

themselves as atheist, see, e.g., App. for Appellants at 125, 

nonreligious and nontheistic, see, e.g., id. at 126, Secularist, 

see, e.g., id. at 128, or humanist, see, e.g., id. at 136—were 

hoping President Obama would eschew the prayers and the 

“So help me God” phrase that have become traditional 

elements of the inaugural ceremony. However, upon learning 

these elements were scheduled to be part of the ceremony, 

plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the district 

court that would bar those elements for the 2009 as well as for 

future inaugurations as violations of the First and Fifth 

Amendments, and in particular the Establishment Clause of the 

First Amendment. See Complaint at 1, Newdow, Civil Action 

No. 08-02248 (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 2008). The complaint 

represented the third Establishment Clause lawsuit the lead 

plaintiff, Michael Newdow, has brought before federal courts 

against religious elements of presidential inaugural 

ceremonies. 2 Plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary 

injunction six days after filing their initial complaint. 

The district court, after a hearing, denied plaintiffs’ 

preliminary injunction motion and ordered them to show cause 

 

2

 Newdow’s first suit challenged President George W. Bush’s sanctioning 

of a Christian prayer as part of the 2001 inaugural ceremony. The Ninth 

Circuit ultimately dismissed that suit for lack of standing “because 

[Newdow] d[id] not allege a sufficiently concrete and specific injury.” 

Newdow v. Bush, 89 F. App. 624, 625 (9th Cir. 2004). Newdow’s second 

suit, challenging President Bush’s second inaugural ceremony, was also 

dismissed for lack of standing, because the doctrine of issue preclusion 

prevented Newdow from relitigating the Ninth Circuit’s decision that he 

lacked standing, and because the issue was moot. See Newdow v. Bush, 

391 F. Supp. 2d 95, 99–101 (D.D.C. 2005). Newdow did not appeal that 

decision. Br. for Appellants at 52. 

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as to why their complaint should not be dismissed for lack of 

standing and on grounds of issue preclusion related to 

Newdow’s prior challenges, which had been dismissed on 

standing grounds. See Order, Newdow, Civil Action No. 

08-02248 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2009). Plaintiffs did not appeal the 

denial and the inaugural ceremony took place as planned. See 

Reply Br. for Appellants at 8. The district court then issued a 

second show cause order directing plaintiffs to explain why 

their complaint should not be dismissed as moot. See Show 

Cause Order, Newdow, Civil Action No. 08-02248 (D.D.C. 

Feb. 10, 2009). Plaintiffs responded to those orders and also 

moved to amend their complaint to add more plaintiffs as well 

as unnamed defendants and allegations concerning the 2013 

and 2017 inaugural ceremonies. 

Upon consideration of all parties’ responses to the 

show cause orders, the district court dismissed the complaint. 

It found plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the 2009 

inaugural ceremony and that Newdow was precluded from 

challenging the inaugural prayers. See Order at 3, Newdow, 

Civil Action No. 08-02248 (Mar. 12, 2009). While the district 

court did not consider plaintiffs’ amended complaint, it noted 

that the same standing issues afflicting the original complaint 

and the original plaintiffs would also afflict the new complaint 

and the new plaintiffs. See id. at 2 n.1. 

Plaintiffs appealed to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 

1291, and request that we reverse the district court’s rulings on 

issue preclusion and standing and remand for a proceeding on 

the merits. We review the district court’s dismissal of 

plaintiffs’ suit de novo. See Young Am.’s Found. v. Gates, 

573 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

II 

The parties present three issues on appeal. The first is 

whether the lead plaintiff, Newdow, is precluded by the 

findings of prior cases from challenging inaugural prayers. 

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The second is whether plaintiffs’ challenge to the 2009 

inaugural ceremony is moot. The third is whether plaintiffs 

have standing to bring their claims concerning the 2013 and 

2017 inaugurations. We consider each issue in turn. 

A 

Plaintiffs argue that despite prior cases in which 

Newdow was found to have lacked standing to challenge 

inaugural prayers, he is not precluded from challenging those 

prayers now because changes in circumstances and in the 

relevant law have cured or made obsolete the standing issues 

on which those prior challenges failed. Plaintiffs further 

argue that issue preclusion need not be considered because 

Newdow is not the only plaintiff in this case and if any of the 

other plaintiffs has standing, then the status of Newdow’s 

standing is irrelevant. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 

431 U.S. 678, 682 (1977) (explaining that once one plaintiff 

has standing, there is “no occasion to decide the standing of the 

other [plaintiffs]”). 

We agree with plaintiffs’ second argument, and 

therefore do not address the first. The question of preclusion 

with regard to Newdow is superfluous amidst other plaintiffs 

in the case whose standing has not been passed upon in prior 

cases. We put aside the issue of preclusion and move to the 

more relevant questions of mootness and standing. 

B 

The federal defendants and the PIC argue that 

plaintiffs’ challenge to the religious elements of the 2009 

inaugural ceremony is moot. The brief for the federal 

defendants—joined in full by the PIC in its brief, see Br. for the 

PIC at 14—reasons that with the 2009 inauguration having 

already occurred and the prayers and the oath already spoken, 

the court is not in the practical or constitutional position to 

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grant the declaratory and injunctive relief requested by 

plaintiffs. Br. for Fed. Defs. at 14–15. 

This argument rings true. It is a basic constitutional 

requirement that a dispute before a federal court be “an actual 

controversy . . . extant at all stages of review, [and] not merely 

at the time the complaint is filed.” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 

U.S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974). This rule assures that “federal 

courts are presented with disputes they are capable of 

resolving,” U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 

397 (1980), and not mere opportunities to engage in spirited 

sophistry. Whether the 2009 ceremony’s incorporation of the 

religious oath and prayers was constitutional may be an 

important question to plaintiffs, but it is not a live controversy 

that can avail itself of the judicial powers of the federal courts. 

It is therefore moot. 

At oral argument, plaintiffs conceded their claims 

regarding the 2009 inauguration would be moot under basic 

mootness doctrine. See Tr. of Oral Argument at 6, 27, 52. 

However, they contend their challenge is saved by an 

exception to mootness for cases that are capable of repetition 

but evade review. Reply Br. for Appellants at 3–9. The first 

prong of that exception requires that resolution of an otherwise 

moot case must have “a reasonable chance of affecting the 

parties’ future relations.” Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 

699, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The second prong requires that 

“the challenged action [be] in its duration too short to be fully 

litigated prior to its cessation or expiration.” Weinstein v. 

Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975). 

Plaintiffs cannot lay claim to this exception. Even if 

we assume plaintiffs’ challenge is capable of repetition, they 

are barred from asserting it evaded review because plaintiffs 

failed to appeal the district court’s denial of their preliminary 

injunction motion. Had plaintiffs pursued an appeal of that 

denial and had the preliminary injunction been granted, their 

case would not have become moot. This circuit—along with 

every other circuit to have considered the issue—has held that 

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“a litigant who could have but did not file for a stay to prevent 

a counter-party from taking any action that would moot his 

case may not, barring exceptional circumstances, later claim 

his case evaded review.” Armstrong v. FAA, 515 F.3d 1294, 

1297 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing consistent cases from other 

circuits). 

We note that Armstrong’s language applies its rule to 

stays and does not specifically discuss preliminary injunctions 

or appeals from denials of preliminary injunctions. Plaintiffs 

seize on Armstrong’s silence regarding appeals from denials 

and suggest it means they fall under the exception. Reply Br. 

for Appellants at 8–9. That suggestion is incorrect. It is 

clear the principle of Armstrong requires a plaintiff to make a 

full attempt to prevent his case from becoming moot, an 

obligation that includes filing for preliminary injunctions and 

appealing denials of preliminary injunctions. See Minn. 

Humane Soc’y v. Clark, 184 F.3d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1999) 

(applying the rule to numerous avenues of preliminary relief, 

including appeals). First, the difference between stays and 

injunctions is of no moment. “Both can have the practical 

effect of preventing some action before the legality of that 

action has been conclusively determined,” with the difference 

being that a stay “operates upon [a] judicial proceeding itself” 

while an injunction acts upon a “party’s conduct.” Nken v. 

Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1757–58 (2009). We see no reason 

why this distinction is relevant to the reasoning of Armstrong. 

Second, it is not logical to construe Armstrong’s principle as 

stopping short of requiring plaintiffs to pursue appeals of 

denials of injunctive relief. “[T]he capable-of-repetition 

doctrine applies only in exceptional situations,” City of Los 

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983), and the Armstrong 

rule ensures only situations that truly evade review in an 

exceptional way fall under the doctrine’s umbrella. The 

capable-of-repetition doctrine is not meant to save mooted 

cases that may have remained live but for the neglect of the 

plaintiff. We therefore find the exception inapplicable in this 

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case. 

C 

 We turn to the question of plaintiffs’ standing to 

challenge the 2013 and 2017 inaugurations. 3 Standing is 

determined under the familiar test established in Lujan v. 

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), which states a 

plaintiff must: 1) have suffered an injury in fact; 2) that is fairly 

traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and 3) that 

will likely be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 

560–61. The absence of any one of these three elements 

defeats standing. Id. at 561. 

Plaintiffs do not claim President Obama’s recitation of 

“So help me God” at the conclusion of his oath injured them. 

See Br. for Appellants at 38. The President cannot be denied 

 

3 Plaintiffs’ did not make claims regarding future inaugural ceremonies in 

their original complaint but did so in a proposed amended complaint. The 

district court, however, dismissed plaintiffs’ case without granting or 

denying their motion for leave to amend. See Order at 3, Newdow, Civil 

Action No. 08-02248 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2009). It would therefore appear 

the issue of plaintiffs’ standing to challenge future inaugurations is not 

before this court, since the complaint was not formally amended. That 

places plaintiffs in the peculiar position of requesting that this court 

“recognize” their proposed amended complaint, Br. for Appellants at 7, 

since they are not in the position to appeal the district court’s non-action of 

refusing to rule on their motion for leave to amend. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 

(granting courts of appeals jurisdiction only over appeals from “final 

decisions of the district courts”). We observe that the district court 

considered in its order—but did not decide—whether the amended 

complaint exhibited standing to challenge future inaugurations, see Order at 

2 n.1, Newdow, Civil Action No. 08-02248 (Mar. 12, 2009), that both 

parties have fully briefed the standing issue, and that the motion for leave to 

amend should have been granted as of right under the version of the federal 

rules in effect at the time of plaintiffs’ motion, see FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1) 

(2009) (superseded Dec. 1, 2009). In light of these observations and in the 

interests of judicial economy, we shall consider the standing issue. It 

would serve no purpose beyond mere slavish adherence to form to do 

otherwise. 

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the prerogative of making such a religious reference, they 

concede, because doing so would abrogate his First 

Amendment rights. See Tr. of Oral Argument at 10–11. 

For sure, if it were otherwise, George Washington could not 

have begun the tradition by appending “So help me God” to his 

own oath; Lincoln could not have offered a war-weary nation 

“malice toward none” and “charity for all [] with firmness in 

the right as God gives us to see the right”; Kennedy could not 

have told us “that here on earth God’s work” must be our own; 

nor could President Reagan have evoked “the shining city . . . 

built on rocks stronger than oceans, windswept, God-blessed, 

and teeming with people of all kinds living in harmony and 

peace” in his farewell address. Instead, plaintiffs claim they 

are injured because “God” was referenced by the Chief Justice 

and the prayer leaders in the course of the 2009 ceremony. 

These references, they argue, might have misled the 

uninformed to think the imprimatur of the state had been 

placed on the invocation of the Almighty and contributed to a 

social stigma against them as atheists. See Tr. of Oral 

Argument at 8–9. We will assume, without holding, that 

plaintiffs’ claimed injury is an injury in fact and that it can be 

fairly traced to the conduct of the defendants. It is in the third 

element, redressability, where we find two problems with 

plaintiffs’ case for standing. 

First, plaintiffs request relief with regard to unnamed 

defendants over whom this court has no jurisdiction. 

Plaintiffs’ amended complaint targets “Other Unknown Oath 

Administrators,” “Other PIC Defendants,” and “Other 

Unnamed Clergy” whom the President or President-elect4

 may 

ask in the future to conduct and facilitate religious oaths and 

prayers at the 2013 and 2017 inaugurations. First Amended 

Complaint at 21–22, 24, Newdow, Civil Action No. 08-02248 

 

4

 This section references both the President and President-elect because the 

2013 and 2017 inaugurations may involve either sitting Presidents 

beginning a second term or a newly elected person who will not yet be 

President until after the inaugural ceremony. 

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(D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2009). It asks that we enjoin these 

defendants from taking part in those elements of the ceremony 

and to declare their possible actions in support of such 

religious elements unconstitutional. See id. at 55. It is 

impossible for this court to grant such relief. As a general 

matter, a court will not entertain a suit unless the defendant has 

been made a party by service of process. See FED. R. CIV. P.

4(m); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 

100, 110 (1969). Courts do grant an exception to this rule for 

“John Doe” defendants, but only in situations where the 

otherwise unavailable identity of the defendant will eventually 

be made known through discovery. 5 See Gillespie v. 

Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). This case is not 

such a situation. No amount of discovery will uncover the 

identities of the unnamed defendants. Therefore, by naming 

as defendants all persons the future President could possibly 

invite to administer an oath, lead a prayer, or help in the 

planning of these events, plaintiffs are essentially seeking a 

declaration of their rights accompanied by an injunction 

against the world. There is another name for that type of 

generally applicable relief: legislation. And that’s not within 

the power of the courts. See Chase Nat’l Bank v. City of 

Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 436–37 (1934) (holding that general 

injunctions “violate[] established principles of equity 

jurisdiction and procedure”). 

The second redressability problem is that declaratory 

and injunctive relief against the defendants actually named 

would not prevent the claimed injury. Plaintiffs have sued the 

 

5

 It is under this exception that plaintiffs might have been able to pursue 

“Other Governmental ‘Roe’ Defendants” who “along with or in addition to 

the other Defendants . . . control access to the inaugural platform and to 

[broadcast] audio-visual systems,” had their complaint otherwise met 

standing requirements. First Amended Complaint at 23, Newdow, Civil 

Action No. 08-02248 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2009). It is conceivable discovery 

would have revealed other governmental actors that were made responsible 

for the security and logistical arrangements of the ceremony. 

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Chief Justice for the injury inflicted by the utterance of the 

phrase “So help me God,” and they have sued the JCCIC, the 

PIC, AFIC, and the named clergymen for the injury inflicted 

by inaugural prayers. But while these defendants have had 

some role in facilitating the injury in the past and may again in 

the future, they possess no authority—statutory or 

otherwise—to actually decide whether future inaugural 

ceremonies will contain the offending religious elements. 

The defendants make clear (and plaintiffs do not contest) that 

the Chief Justice has no legal authority or duty to decide what 

may be added to the presidential oath. See Declaration of 

Jeffrey P. Minear, Counselor to the Chief Justice, Civil Action 

No. 08-2248 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2009), App. for Appellants at 42. 

It is also clear that the resolution and statute authorizing the 

JCCIC and the AFIC, respectively, do not confer on those 

entities the authority or duty to sponsor or determine the 

contents of the inaugural ceremony. The committees are only 

authorized—not obligated—to assist or make arrangements for 

a ceremony should one take place. See S. Con. Res. 67, 110th 

Cong. (2008); 10 U.S.C. § 2553. The PIC also has no 

authority or duty to sponsor or determine the contents of the 

inaugural ceremony. It is merely recognized by statute as a 

coordinating committee should a future President designate 

such a group. And, almost needless to say, the named 

clergymen do not have any authority or duty to institute 

inaugural prayers or lead them. Indeed, no law obligates the 

President or President-elect to utilize the services of the Chief 

Justice, the JCCIC, the AFIC, the PIC, or certain clergymen. 

To make the point clearer, there is no law mandating that the 

President or the President-elect even carry out an inaugural 

ceremony. The inaugural ceremony is a peculiar institution, 

the whole of which is subject to the President’s or 

President-elect’s discretion (as plaintiffs concede, see Tr. of 

Oral Argument at 53 (“[U]ltimately it’s the President who 

makes all the decisions.”)). The named defendants are 

powerless to direct, say no to, or otherwise stop the future 

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President if he wishes to have his ceremony contain the 

offending elements. 

Therefore, issuing an injunction to prevent them from 

implementing the future President’s inaugural plan would be 

folly, akin to enjoining a sound technician from turning the 

Chief Justice’s microphone on when administering the oath. 

The defendants, like the sound technician, are not responsible 

for the offending conduct and the future President could 

simply find other willing assistants not subject to the 

injunction to carry out his wishes. In other words, he could 

find someone else to turn the microphone on. The future 

President is therefore a “third party not before the court” whose 

“independent action” results in the alleged injury, Lujan, 504 

U.S. at 560, and courts cannot “redress injury . . . that results 

from [such] independent action,” Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare 

Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976).6

 

Declaratory relief against the named defendants will 

also not provide redress since a declaration with regard to 

defendants’ conduct will have no controlling force on the 

President or President-elect. Plaintiffs dispute this, arguing 

that the possibility the future President will choose to abide by 

a declaratory judgment establishes the appropriate level of 

redressability to confer standing. For this proposition, they 

cite two cases, both of which are inapplicable to this case. 

First, plaintiffs cite language in Clinton v. City of New 

York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), stating that “traceability and 

redressability are easily satisfied [when] injury is traceable to 

the President’s [actions] and would be redressed by a 

declaratory judgment that the [actions] are invalid.” Id. at 433 

n.22. We put aside the fact that plaintiffs in that case (unlike 

 

6

 The Lujan Court discussed “independent action” by a “third party” in 

reference to the causation prong of standing doctrine rather than 

redressability. However, the Supreme Court acknowledged in subsequent 

cases, such as Simon, that causation and redressability are closely related, 

and can be viewed as “two facets” of a single requirement, Allen v. 

Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984). 

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16 

plaintiffs in this case) actually named the President in their 

suit. Instead, we highlight that Clinton was a challenge to the 

constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act, and the declaratory 

judgment in that case struck down that statute and nullified the 

statutory power of the President to wield a line item veto pen. 

See id. at 448–49. It was, in other words, a basic case of 

judicial review of legislation. This case, however, challenges 

no statutory power, but rather a decision committed to the 

executive discretion of the President or the personal discretion 

of the President-elect. A court—whether via injunctive or 

declaratory relief—does not sit in judgment of a President’s 

executive decisions. See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 

Wall.) 475, 499 (1867) (“An attempt on the part of the judicial 

department . . . to enforce the performance of [executive and 

political] duties by the President [is] ‘an absurd and excessive 

extravagance.’”) (quoting Chief Justice John Marshall); Swan 

v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 976 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (identifying 

separation of powers issues raised by requests for declaratory 

relief against the President). And plaintiffs fail to cite any 

authority allowing this court to declare unlawful the personal 

religious expression of a private citizen like the 

President-elect. 

The second case plaintiffs cite is Franklin v. 

Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992), which contains language 

endorsing the idea that declaratory relief against an officer 

subordinate to the President—in that case, the Secretary of 

Commerce—made it “substantially likely that the President . . . 

would abide by an authoritative interpretation” of the relevant 

law “even though [he] would not be directly bound by such a 

determination.” Id. at 803. This citation is unpersuasive. 

First, that portion of the opinion did not garner the support of a 

majority of the Supreme Court and is therefore not controlling 

on this court. See id. at 789–90 (listing only three Justices 

joining Part III of Justice O’Connor’s opinion containing its 

standing discussion); see also id. at 825 (Scalia, J., concurring 

in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Redressability 

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17 

requires that the court be able to afford relief through the 

exercise of its power, not through the persuasive or even 

awe-inspiring effect of the opinion explaining the exercise of 

its power.”). Second, it is distinguishable. In that case, the 

Commerce Secretary was obligated by statute to provide the 

President with a report of the nation’s total population, see id. 

at 799 (citing 13 U.S.C. § 141(a)), which the President consults 

before sending his own statutorily required report to Congress 

showing the population of each state for purposes of 

apportioning the number of representatives in the House of 

Representatives, see id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 2(a)). In other 

words, the Commerce Secretary was legally responsible for 

providing the President with advice and information on which 

he would base his final decision. Therefore, a plurality of the 

Supreme Court thought declaratory relief applicable to the 

Secretary’s legal duty would make it “likely” the President 

would take the action desired by the plaintiffs, even if he was 

not obligated to do so. See id. at 803. There is no 

corresponding advisory relationship between the named 

defendants and the President or President-elect in this case. 

The future President is free to use any decisionmaking process 

he desires when designing and staging an inaugural ceremony 

and is not obligated to consult anybody or take any cognizance 

of the opinions issuing from this court. 

The only apparent avenue of redress for plaintiffs’ 

claimed injuries would be injunctive or declaratory relief 

against all possible President-elects and the President himself. 

But such relief is unavailable. Beyond the fact that plaintiffs 

fail to name future President-elects or the President in their 

suit, plaintiffs cannot sue all possible President-elects for the 

same reason they cannot sue all possible inaugural 

participants; as discussed, general injunctions are outside the 

judicial power. With regard to the President, courts do not 

have jurisdiction to enjoin him, see Mississippi, 71 U.S. (4 

Wall.) at 501, and have never submitted the President to 

declaratory relief, see Franklin, 505 U.S. at 827–28 (Scalia, J., 

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18 

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 

III 

 

 Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the 2009 inaugural 

ceremony are moot and plaintiffs do not have standing to bring 

their claims pertaining to the 2013 and 2017 ceremonies 

because their injury is not redressable by this court. The 

district court’s dismissal of their case is therefore 

Affirmed. 

 

 

USCA Case #09-5126 Document #1243573 Filed: 05/07/2010 Page 18 of 36
 KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: 

 Under the Supreme Court’s precedents, plaintiffs have 

standing to raise an Establishment Clause challenge to the 

Inaugural prayers and to the inclusion of the words “so help 

me God” in the official Presidential oath administered at the 

public Inauguration ceremonies. I would reject plaintiffs’ 

claims on the merits because those longstanding practices do 

not violate the Establishment Clause as it has been interpreted 

by the Supreme Court. 

 

I 

 The Government initially argues that plaintiffs lack 

standing to challenge the Presidential oath and Inaugural 

prayers. I disagree. Under the relevant Supreme Court 

precedents, plaintiffs have demonstrated injury-in-fact, 

causation, and redressability, the three components of 

standing. 

A 

 To show injury-in-fact, plaintiffs must allege an injury 

that is concrete and particularized. Plaintiffs are atheists. 

They claim that they will attend the next Presidential 

Inauguration and witness the Presidential oath and Inaugural 

prayers – government-sponsored religious expression to 

which they object. Those allegations suffice under the 

Supreme Court’s precedents to demonstrate plaintiffs’ 

concrete and particularized injury. 

 An alleged Establishment Clause injury is sufficiently 

concrete and particularized when the plaintiff sees or hears a 

government-sponsored religious display or speech that 

offends his or her beliefs. See In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 

F.3d 756, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court has 

consistently decided Establishment Clause cases involving 

USCA Case #09-5126 Document #1243573 Filed: 05/07/2010 Page 19 of 36
2 

objections to government-sponsored religious displays or 

speech in public settings. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 

677, 682, 691 (2005) (plurality opinion) (plaintiff 

“encountered” Ten Commandments monument during visits 

to state capitol in which he “walked by the monument”); 

McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 852 (2005) (county 

citizens saw Ten Commandments display that was “readily 

visible” to them when they used courthouse to conduct civic 

business); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 587-

88 (1989) (local residents saw crèche in county courthouse 

and menorah on town property); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 

668, 671 (1984) (local residents saw crèche on town 

property); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784-86 (1983) 

(member of legislature heard prayer at opening of each 

legislative session); cf. Salazar v. Buono, No. 08-472, slip op. 

at 3 (U.S. Apr. 28, 2010) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) 

(recognizing that plaintiff’s standing to challenge public 

display of a cross was accepted in prior lower-court 

decision).1

 Moreover, the fact that a large number of people 

might see or hear the religious display or speech does not 

negate a plaintiff’s standing. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 

24 (1998). 

 It is true that the Court did not pause to expressly address 

standing in those religious display and speech decisions. And 

“cases in which jurisdiction is assumed sub silentio are not 

binding authority for the proposition that jurisdiction exists.” 

In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d at 764 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). But the Supreme Court’s consistent 

adjudication of religious display and speech cases over a span 

 1

 The display and speech cases are distinct from those in which 

a person simply becomes aware of government conduct to which 

the plaintiff objects. See Valley Forge Christian College v. 

Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 

U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982); In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d at 764. 

USCA Case #09-5126 Document #1243573 Filed: 05/07/2010 Page 20 of 36
3 

of decades suggests that the Court has thought it obvious that 

the plaintiffs in those matters had standing. Indeed, none of 

the dissenters in those cases ever contended that the plaintiffs 

lacked standing. To ignore the import of those cases for the 

standing analysis, one would have to believe the Supreme 

Court repeatedly overlooked a major standing problem and 

decided a plethora of highly controversial and divisive 

Establishment Clause cases unnecessarily and inappropriately. 

I find that prospect extremely unlikely. In light of the 

Supreme Court’s precedents, plaintiffs here have alleged a 

sufficiently concrete and particularized injury. 

 To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement when 

challenging a future event, plaintiffs also must show that the 

alleged injury is “imminent.” That inquiry mirrors the test for 

constitutional ripeness. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union 

v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427-28 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 

see, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 

128 & n.8 (2007). To demonstrate imminence, plaintiffs must 

allege an injury that is “substantially probable.” Stilwell v. 

Office of Thrift Supervision, 569 F.3d 514, 518 (D.C. Cir. 

2009). In this case, it is substantially probable that the 

Presidential oath at the next Inauguration will include “so 

help me God” and that there will be prayers during the 

Inaugural ceremony. History, tradition, and common sense 

tell us as much. As explained more fully below, both “so help 

me God” and Inaugural prayers have long been staples of 

Inaugural ceremonies, and there is no reason to think those 

practices will cease soon. 

 Imminence is not defeated by the fact that the next 

Inauguration remains a few years away. In Lee v. Weisman, 

the Supreme Court decided a challenge to prayer at a high 

school graduation that loomed in the distant future. 505 U.S. 

577, 584 (1992). As that case exemplifies, imminence 

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4 

“requires only that the anticipated injury occur with[in] some 

fixed period of time in the future, not that it happen in the 

colloquial sense of soon or precisely within a certain number 

of days, weeks, or months.” Fla. State Conference of the 

NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1161 (11th Cir. 2008); 

see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 

(1992). 

B 

 As to the causation and redressability elements of 

standing, plaintiffs’ alleged injury is fairly traceable to the 

defendants here – namely, the officer who recites the official 

Presidential oath (the Chief Justice) and the entity that runs 

the events and organizes the speakers (the Presidential 

Inaugural Committee). See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 586 

(permitting Establishment Clause suit against officials who 

“direct the performance of a formal religious exercise”). An 

injunction against the named defendants is therefore also 

likely to redress plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. See Dynalantic 

Corp. v. Dep’t of Defense, 115 F.3d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 

1997) (“Typically, redressability and traceability overlap as 

two sides of a causation coin.”).2

 2

 Plaintiffs acknowledge that a President on his or her own 

might still say “so help me God” even if those words are not part of 

the official oath recited by the Chief Justice. See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 

10-11; Plaintiffs’ Br. at 37-38. In this suit, plaintiffs do not seek to 

constrain a President’s choice of what he or she says at the 

Inaugural ceremonies, whether during the oath or the Inaugural 

Address. Nor do plaintiffs argue that a private ceremony that 

included “so help me God” or prayer would be impermissible. 

Rather, plaintiffs challenge the inclusion of “so help me God” in the 

official Presidential oath articulated by the Chief Justice in a public 

ceremony, as well as the Inaugural prayers delivered by the selected 

clergy during that public ceremony. 

USCA Case #09-5126 Document #1243573 Filed: 05/07/2010 Page 22 of 36
5 

 To be sure, it is possible that the Presidential Inaugural 

Committee’s responsibilities might be transferred to a 

successor entity before the next Inauguration, akin to the way 

the named defendant changes when there is turnover in a 

government office. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d). But 

redressability is still satisfied because “a declaration of the 

[plaintiffs’] legal right . . . could form the basis of an 

injunction” against the entity to which the committee’s 

responsibilities are transferred. Center for Arms Control & 

Non-Proliferation v. Pray, 531 F.3d 836, 839 n.* (D.C. Cir. 

2008). In addition, as in any challenge to future government 

action, it is theoretically possible that Congress or the 

President could completely change the nature of the Inaugural 

ceremonies before the next Inauguration. But the question is 

one of “likelihood.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 

523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. The next 

Inaugural ceremony likely will resemble past Inaugurals, just 

as the Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman concluded that the 

high school’s next graduation prayer likely would resemble 

past graduation prayers. 

 Because plaintiffs have standing, I turn to the merits of 

plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claims. 

II 

 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 

thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has 

interpreted that elusive text on many occasions. The question 

here is whether the Presidential oath and Inaugural prayers 

contravene the relevant Supreme Court precedents. 

USCA Case #09-5126 Document #1243573 Filed: 05/07/2010 Page 23 of 36
6 

A 

 In analyzing the Establishment Clause issues in this case, 

I begin with several background principles. 

 First is an obvious point, but one worth emphasizing. In 

our constitutional tradition, all citizens are equally American, 

no matter what God they worship or if they worship no god at 

all. Plaintiffs are atheists. As atheists, they have no lesser 

rights or status as Americans or under the United States 

Constitution than Protestants, Jews, Mormons, Muslims, 

Hindus, Buddhists, Catholics, or members of any religious 

group. 

 Second, in deciding this case, we cannot gloss over or 

wish away the religious significance of the challenged 

Inaugural prayers. The fact that religious words are common 

to many faiths – or are used repeatedly – does not diminish 

their religious meaning. Neither the numbing effect of 

repetition nor the brevity of a prayer extinguishes the 

religious nature of words such as “help me God.” 

 Third, and relatedly, we cannot resolve this case by 

discounting the sense of anguish and outrage plaintiffs and 

some other Americans feel at listening to a governmentsponsored religious prayer. Any effort to tell plaintiffs that 

“it’s not a big deal” or “it’s de minimis” would be entirely out 

of bounds, in my judgment. Plaintiffs’ beliefs and sincere 

objections warrant our respect. 

 Fourth, at the same time, we likewise cannot dismiss the 

desire of others in America to publicly ask for God’s blessing 

on certain government activities and to publicly seek God’s 

guidance for certain government officials. Plaintiffs suggest 

that no one should be upset if government ceremonies were 

USCA Case #09-5126 Document #1243573 Filed: 05/07/2010 Page 24 of 36
7 

entirely cleansed of religious expression; they argue that such 

a regime would reflect true government “neutrality” toward 

religion. Others respond, however, that stripping government 

ceremonies of any references to God or religious expression 

would reflect unwarranted hostility to religion and would, in 

effect, “establish” atheism. Cf. Salazar v. Buono, No. 08-472, 

slip op. at 14-15 (U.S. Apr. 28, 2010) (opinion of Kennedy, 

J.) (“The goal of avoiding governmental endorsement does 

not require eradication of all religious symbols in the public 

realm. . . . The Constitution does not oblige government to 

avoid any public acknowledgment of religion’s role in 

society.”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992) (“A 

relentless and all-pervasive attempt to exclude religion from 

every aspect of public life could itself become inconsistent 

with the Constitution.”).

B 

 With that background in mind, I turn to the Establishment 

Clause analysis of the Presidential oath and Inaugural prayers. 

To begin, the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 

jurisprudence does not set forth a one-size-fits-all test. See 

Salazar, No. 08-472, slip op. at 18 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); 

Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality 

opinion); Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 

718 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring 

in judgment). Rather, the Court ordinarily analyzes cases 

under various issue-specific rules and standards it has 

devised. 

 This case concerns government-sponsored religious 

speech at public events outside of the public school setting. 

The Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Marsh v. Chambers, 

463 U.S. 783 (1983), sets forth the Court’s approach to that 

issue. In Marsh, the Court upheld a state legislature’s practice 

USCA Case #09-5126 Document #1243573 Filed: 05/07/2010 Page 25 of 36
8 

of beginning each session with prayer by a state-paid 

chaplain. The Court reasoned that the practice of opening 

legislative sessions with prayer was “deeply embedded in the 

history and tradition of this country.” Id. at 786. Since the 

Founding, the “practice of legislative prayer has coexisted 

with the principles of disestablishment and religious 

freedom.” Id. The practice is “part of the fabric of our 

society” such that the invocation of God was “not, in these 

circumstances, an ‘establishment’ of religion . . . [but] simply 

a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the 

people of this country.” Id. at 792.3

 3 Marsh is consistent with the Supreme Court’s broader 

approval, albeit sometimes in dicta, of a variety of governmental 

references to God and prayers in the public square – sometimes 

known by the umbrella term “ceremonial deism.” See Elk Grove 

Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37 (2003) (O’Connor, J., 

concurring in judgment); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 

573, 603 (1989); id. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 

concurring in judgment); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 

(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). These include: Congress’s 

selection of “In God we trust” as the National Motto, 36 U.S.C. § 

302, the inclusion of “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, 4 

U.S.C. § 4, and the President’s Thanksgiving Day Proclamations. 

See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (binding opinion of Breyer, J.) 

(motto and Thanksgiving Proclamation); County of Allegheny, 492 

U.S. at 602-03 (motto and Pledge); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676 (motto, 

Pledge, and Thanksgiving Proclamation); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 

U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952) (Thanksgiving Proclamation); Steven B. 

Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 

COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2094-96 (1996). Under the Court’s 

precedents, these “ceremonial deism” principles do not always 

translate to the public school setting where young students face 

inherent coercion. See Lee, 505 U.S. 577; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 

421 (1962). 

The Court’s religious display cases have followed an approach 

similar to the speech cases. See Salazar, No. 08-472; Van Orden, 

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9 

 As to the permissible content of the legislative prayers, 

the Marsh Court articulated a somewhat ambiguous standard: 

“The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, 

as here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has 

been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to 

disparage any other, faith or belief. That being so, it is not for 

us to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to parse the content 

of a particular prayer.” Id. at 794-95. 

 The Supreme Court’s holding in Marsh – allowing 

government-sponsored religious speech or prayer at a public 

event where prayers have traditionally occurred, at least so 

long as the prayers are not proselytizing (seeking to convert) 

or otherwise exploitative – does not satisfy all Americans. No 

holding on this issue would in our pluralistic society. But the 

precedent has endured, and as a lower court we must follow 

and apply it in this case. 

 

545 U.S. 677; McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); 

County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573; Lynch, 465 U.S. 668. But 

because of their fixed quality, displays have caused somewhat more 

concern than spoken words, which by their nature are fleeting. Cf.

Salazar, No. 08-472, slip op. at 11-12 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); 

Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701 (binding opinion of Breyer, J.); id. at 

722-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting); McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 

868-69, 877 n.24; County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, 

J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“I doubt 

not, for example, that the Clause forbids a city to permit the 

permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall. 

This is not because government speech about religion is per se 

suspect, as the majority would have it, but because such an 

obtrusive year-round religious display would place the 

government’s weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on 

behalf of a particular religion.”). 

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10 

C 

 Like the legislative prayer in Marsh, the words “so help 

me God” in the Presidential oath are not proselytizing or 

otherwise exploitative. Moreover, like the practice of 

legislative prayer, use of “so help me God” in oaths for 

government officials is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history 

and tradition. By many accounts, George Washington said 

“so help me God” when he took the first Presidential oath in 

New York on April 30, 1789. The First Congress – the same 

Congress that drafted and approved the First Amendment – 

mandated “so help me God” in the oaths of office for federal 

judges. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 928-29 (Sept. 17, 1789) 

(Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (final congressional approval of 

statute requiring oath for judges); id. at 948 (Sept. 24, 1789) 

(final congressional approval of First Amendment); see also

Judiciary Act of 1789, § 8, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (1789) (signed into 

law on Sept. 24, 1789). State constitutions in effect at the 

ratification of the First Amendment similarly included “so 

help me God” in state officials’ oaths of office. See, e.g.,

MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. VI, art. I (1780); N.H. CONST. pt. 2 

(1784); VT. CONST. ch. II, § XII (1786). 

 The words “so help me God” remain to this day a part of 

oaths prescribed by law at the federal and state levels. See, 

e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (federal civil service and military 

officers); 28 U.S.C. § 453 (federal justices and judges); id. § 

951 (federal court clerks and deputies); ALA. CONST. art. XVI, 

§ 279; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 38-231(E); CONN. CONST. art. 11, § 

1; DEL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. II, § 5(b); KAN 

STAT. ANN. § 54-106; KY. CONST. § 228; LA. CONST. art. X, § 

30; ME. CONST. art. IX, § 1; MASS. CONST. amend. art. VI; 

MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 268; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 3; NEV.

CONST. art. XV, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 84; N.J. STAT.

ANN. § 52:15-2; N.M. STAT. § 14-13-1; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 

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11 

11-11; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 4; R.I. CONST. art. III, § 3; S.C.

CONST. art. VI, § 5; TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; VT. CONST. 

ch. II, § 56; VA. CONST. art. II, § 7; WIS. STAT. § 19.01; WYO.

STAT. ANN. § 1-2-103.4 

 In light of that extensive historical record and the nonproselytizing, non-exploitative nature of the oath, it comes as 

no surprise that the Supreme Court several times has 

suggested, at least in dicta, that the Constitution permits “so 

help me God” in officially prescribed oaths of office. See 

Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 

212-13 (1963) (that “religion has been closely identified with 

our history and government . . . . is evidenced today in our 

public life through the continuance in our oaths of office from 

the Presidency to the Alderman of the final supplication, ‘So 

help me God’”); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 

(1952) (it is “common sense” that the First Amendment “does 

not say that in every and all respects there shall be a 

separation of Church and State” as evidenced by the inclusion 

of “‘so help me God’ in our courtroom oaths”). Many 

Justices have reiterated the point in separate opinions over the 

years. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 886 

(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 

Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 26 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring 

 4

 An officer or employee of course may decline to say “so help 

me God” on free exercise, anti-coercion grounds. See Torcaso v. 

Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 

So too, no one in the audience at a public ceremony may be 

compelled to utter religious words. See West Virginia State Bd. of 

Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Those bedrock rights are 

analytically quite different, however, from a third-party observer’s 

asserted anti-establishment right to prevent inclusion of “so help me 

God” in an official oath taken by someone else or to halt a prayer 

said by someone else. 

USCA Case #09-5126 Document #1243573 Filed: 05/07/2010 Page 29 of 36
12 

in judgment); id. at 36 n.* (O’Connor, J., concurring in 

judgment). 

 Under Marsh and other Supreme Court precedents, the 

Establishment Clause permits “so help me God” in the official 

Presidential oath. 

D 

 Plaintiffs’ challenge to the traditional Inaugural prayers 

(usually consisting of an invocation and benediction) also 

fails. Those prayers closely resemble the legislative prayers 

upheld by the Supreme Court in Marsh. 

 Like legislative prayers, prayers at Presidential Inaugural 

ceremonies are deeply rooted in American history and 

tradition. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 

671-72 n.9 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in 

part and dissenting in part) (“our Presidential inaugurations 

have traditionally opened with a request for divine blessing”). 

Indeed, formal prayers “have been associated with 

presidential inaugurations since the inauguration of George 

Washington.” Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the 

Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV.

2083, 2106 (1996). During the first Inauguration, the new 

President, Vice President, and Members of Congress – in 

accordance with a resolution passed by the First Congress – 

“proceeded to St. Paul’s Chapel, where divine service was 

performed” by the Senate chaplain. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 

(Joseph Gales ed., 1789); see also Epstein, Ceremonial 

Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. at 2106-07. “It is to be noted that 

this was not a service provided by an Episcopal church to 

which senators and representatives were invited, but an 

official service carefully arranged for by both houses of 

Congress and conducted by their duly elected chaplain.” 1 

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13 

ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED 

STATES 485 (1950). Inaugural prayers were conducted by the 

Senate chaplain in the Senate chambers until 1937; since then, 

the prayers typically have taken place on the Inaugural 

platform at the Capitol grounds. See App. at 20-23; Epstein, 

Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. at 2107 & n.137. 

 To be sure, unlike Marsh, this case involves the 

Executive, not the Legislature. But there is no persuasive 

reason why opening every “executive session” with prayer 

would raise more of an Establishment Clause problem than 

opening every “legislative session” with prayer. 

 Having established that Inaugural prayers are permissible 

in concept, we confront a distinct and delicate question 

regarding the precise content of the prayers. Recall that 

Marsh stated that “[t]he content of the prayer is not of 

concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication that 

the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or 

advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief. 

That being so, it is not for us to embark on a sensitive 

evaluation or to parse the content of a particular prayer.” 

Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95. 

 Under Marsh, we know that proselytizing prayers – that 

is, those that seek to convert – are problematic. Inaugural 

prayers traditionally have not crossed that boundary. 

 But what about sectarian references – that is, prayers 

associated only with particular faiths, or references to deities, 

persons, precepts, or words associated only with particular 

faiths? (References such as God and Lord are generally 

considered non-sectarian for these purposes.) Does a 

sectarian reference mean for purposes of Marsh that the 

“prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or 

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advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief”? 

If so, the Presidential Inaugural prayers might pose a problem 

because they have included sectarian references. For 

example, the prayers at the 2009 Inauguration contained a 

reference to Jesus, a recitation of a Protestant version of the 

“Our Father,” and a quotation from the Shema, an important 

prayer in Judaism. See 155 CONG. REC. S667 (daily ed. Jan. 

20, 2009). 

 Marsh indicates, however, that the Establishment Clause 

does not ban any and all sectarian references in prayers at 

public ceremonies. Some of the prayers at issue in Marsh 

itself were Christian, and others were in the Judeo-Christian 

tradition. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 688 n.8 (plurality 

opinion) (noting that “prayers [in Marsh] were often explicitly 

Christian”). 

 In the wake of Marsh, moreover, our en banc Court 

upheld the practice of Congressional prayers, which then (as 

now) sometimes included sectarian references. See Murray v. 

Buchanan, 720 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc) (per 

curiam). The Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have 

similarly concluded that Marsh does not prohibit any and all 

sectarian references. See Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 

1263, 1271-72 (11th Cir. 2008); Simpson v. Chesterfield 

County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 281-82 n.3 (4th Cir. 

2005); Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1234 

(10th Cir. 1998) (en banc); see also Doe v. Tangipahoa 

Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188, 211 (5th Cir. 2006) (opinion of 

Clement, J.). But see Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 

292, 298-99 (4th Cir. 2004).5

 

 5

 As several courts have concluded, the Supreme Court’s postMarsh decision in County of Allegheny does not mandate that a 

prayer be entirely non-sectarian. See Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1271-

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15 

 The more nuanced issue, therefore, is how courts should 

distinguish permissible sectarian references from 

impermissible sectarian references in determining under 

Marsh whether a “prayer opportunity has been exploited to 

proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, 

faith or belief.” As Judge Pryor explained in his thoughtful 

opinion for the Eleventh Circuit, courts must approach that 

difficult task with sensitivity lest they become “ecclesiastical 

arbiter[s].” Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1274. In that regard, the en 

banc Tenth Circuit’s formulation is instructive: “the kind of [] 

prayer that will run afoul of the Constitution is one that 

proselytizes a particular religious tenet or belief, or that 

aggressively advocates a specific religious creed, or that 

derogates another religious faith or doctrine.” Snyder, 159 

F.3d at 1234 (emphasis added); see also Doe, 473 F.3d at 

213-14 (opinion of Clement, J.) (expressing approval of the 

Tenth Circuit test). Under Marsh, therefore, sectarian 

references alone typically do not render a prayer 

impermissible. But at some point sectarian references can 

become so overwhelming and one-sided that the prayer 

opportunity can be said to have been “exploited” to “advance 

any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.” That is 

particularly true when other factors suggest exploitation of the 

prayer opportunity. See Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1277. 

 

72 (plaintiffs “argue that Allegheny requires us to read Marsh 

narrowly to permit only nonsectarian prayer, but they are wrong”); 

Simpson, 404 F.3d at 281-82 n.3 (“Nothing in Allegheny suggests 

that it supplants Marsh in the area of legislative prayer.”); see also 

Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 356 (4th 

Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, J., sitting by designation) (“We need not 

decide whether the Establishment Clause compelled the Council to 

adopt their [non-sectarian] legislative prayer policy, because the 

Establishment Clause does not absolutely dictate the form of 

legislative prayer.”). 

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 Review of the modern Inaugural prayers yields no 

indication that this admittedly imprecise Marsh principle is 

being breached. Inaugural prayers are traditionally inclusive 

and largely non-sectarian. They typically include many 

references to God, Lord, and the like, which are considered 

non-sectarian for these purposes. The sectarian references in 

Inaugural prayers tend to be limited in number, as was the 

case at the 2009 Inauguration for example. In short, it cannot 

be said for purposes of Marsh that the Presidential 

Inauguration is being “exploited to proselytize or advance any 

one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”6

 

III 

 In an emergency motion filed before the oral argument in 

this case, plaintiffs moved that we dispense with the Court’s 

invocation, “God save the United States and this honorable 

Court.” According to plaintiffs, that traditional invocation is 

unconstitutional. We denied the motion, and I take this 

opportunity to explain my vote. 

 The traditional prayer before this Court’s sessions (and 

before the Supreme Court’s sessions) is analogous to “so help 

me God” in the Presidential oath and to the legislative prayers 

upheld in Marsh. As with the legislative prayers in Marsh, 

the use of “God save the United States and this honorable 

Court” before court sessions does not proselytize or otherwise 

exploit the prayer opportunity so as to advance any one, or to 

disparage any other, faith or belief. And this prayer is deeply 

 6

 The constitutional question whether some sectarian 

references in Inaugural prayers are permissible under Marsh is of 

course separate from the policy question whether such references 

should be included. 

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rooted in American history and tradition. See McCreary 

County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 886 (2005) (Scalia, J., 

dissenting) (prayer used under John Marshall); Elk Grove 

Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 29 (2003) 

(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment) (prayer used in 

Supreme Court at least since 1827). Therefore, under the 

Marsh test, the prayer “God save the United States and this 

honorable Court” before court sessions is constitutionally 

permissible. Indeed, Marsh itself specifically referenced 

“God save the United States and this honorable Court” as a 

quintessential example of a permissible religious reference. 

See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983); see also 

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). Many Justices 

in individual opinions have indicated their agreement with 

that conclusion. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 716 

(2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); McCreary County, 545 U.S. 

at 886 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 29 

(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment); id. at 37 

(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); County of Allegheny 

v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 672 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring 

in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Wallace v. Jaffree, 

472 U.S. 38, 84 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Lynch v. 

Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 

concurring); id. at 714 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 

 In light of the relevant Supreme Court precedents, 

plaintiffs’ challenge to “God save the United States and this 

honorable Court” is unavailing. 

* * * 

 Applying Marsh and the other relevant Supreme Court 

precedents, I would hold that both “so help me God” in the 

Presidential oath and the prayers at the Presidential 

Inauguration do not violate the Establishment Clause. I also 

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agree with our Court’s decision to deny plaintiffs’ challenge 

to the invocation “God save the United States and this 

honorable Court.” 

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