Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00807/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00807-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRYL G. MINNER,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07-CV-0807 W (NLS)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION 

 v.

MIKE E. POULOS, Warden,

Respondent.

On May 3, 2007, Petitioner Darryl G. Minner, a California inmate proceeding pro

se, filed this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On

August 2, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Petition. 

Plaintiff failed to file an opposition to Respondent’s motion. Accordingly, on

September 27, 2007, the Honorable Nita L. Stormes, United States Magistrate Judge, issued

an Order To Show Cause Why Motion to Dismiss Should Not Be Granted (“OSC”). The

OSC essentially provided Petitioner with additional time to oppose the motion. Petitioner

failed to respond to the OSC. 

On December 27, 2007, Judge Stormes issued a Report and Recommendation

(“Report”). The Report recommends that the Court find this case presents a “mixed

petition,” and allow Petitioner an opportunity to notify the Court about how he intends

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to proceed. The Report ordered that any objection was to be filed by January 8, 2008, and

any reply filed by January 22, 2008. To date, no objection has been filed, nor has there

been a request for additional time in which to file an objection. 

I. DISCUSSION

A district court’s duties concerning a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation

and a respondent’s objections thereto are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When no objections are filed, the district court

is not required to review the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. See United

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(holding that 28 U.S.C.

636(b)(1)(c) “makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s

findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise”)(emphasis in

original); Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D. Arizona 2003) (concluding

that where no objections were filed, the District Court had no obligation to review the

magistrate judge’s Report). This rule of law is well established within the Ninth Circuit and

this district. See Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2005)(“Of course,

de novo review of a R & R is only required when an objection is made to the R &

R.”)(emphasis added)(citing Renya-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1121); Nelson v. Giurbino, 395 F.

Supp. 2d 946, 949 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (Lorenz, J.) (adopted Report without review because

neither party filed objections to the Report despite the opportunity to do so, “accordingly,

the Court will adopt the Report and Recommendation in its entirety.”); see also Nichols

v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1157 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (Benitez, J.).

The Court therefore accepts Judge Stormes’ recommendation, and ADOPTS the

Report in its entirety. For the reasons stated in the Report, which is incorporated herein

by reference, the Court FINDS that this case involves a “mixed petition” because the

Petition has exhausted and unexhausted claims. The unexhausted claims are as follows:

• Petitioner’s Claim One - that the trial court violated his due process rights by

failing to admit the videotape of his pre-arrest interview with police.

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• Petitioner’s Claim Three - that the trial court violated his fifth, sixth and

fourteenth amendment rights to due process and a jury trial by instructing the

jury on the statutory presumption of “willful or wanton disregard” in Vehicle

Code § 2800.2.

With respect to these unexhausted claims, Petitioner must exhaust the state judicial

remedies through either a direct appeal or collateral appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b),(c).

Otherwise, the Court will dismiss the Petition.

In order to avoid the Court dismissing the Petition on its own accord, Petitioner

may choose one of the following options.

A. First Option: Demonstrate Exhaustion

Petitioner may file further papers with this Court to demonstrate that he has in fact

exhausted the claims identified above, that the Court has determined are likely

unexhausted. If Petitioner chooses this option, his papers are due no later than March 3,

2008. Respondent may file a reply by April 15, 2008.

B. Second Option: Voluntarily Dismiss the Petition

Petitioner may move to voluntarily dismiss his entire federal petition and return to

state court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. Petitioner may then file a new federal

petition containing only exhausted claims. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510, 520-21

(1982) (stating that a petitioner who files a mixed petition may dismiss his petition to

“return[] to state court to exhaust his claims”). If Petitioner chooses this second option,

he must file a pleading with this Court no later than March 3, 2008. Respondent may file

a reply by April 15, 2008. 

Petitioner is cautioned that any new federal petition must be filed before expiration

of the one-year statute of limitations. Ordinarily, a petitioner has one year from when his

conviction became final to file his federal petition, unless he can show that statutory or

equitable “tolling” applies. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001); 28 U.S.C. §

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1

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period

shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgement or claim is pending shall not be

counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

2

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) provides that a claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus

application under § 2254 shall be dismissed unless: 

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made

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2244(d).1 Filing a petition in federal court does not stop the statute of limitations from

running. Id. at 181-82; Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2001); 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d).

C. Third Option: Formally Abandon Unexhausted Claims

Petitioner may formally abandon his unexhausted claims and proceed with his

exhausted ones. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 520-21 (stating that a petitioner who files a

mixed petition may “resubmit[] the habeas petition to present only exhausted claims”). If

Petitioner chooses this third option, he must file a pleading with this Court no later than

March 3, 2008. Respondent may file a reply by April 15, 2008. 

Petitioner is cautioned that once he abandons his unexhausted claims, he may lose

the ability to ever raise them in federal court. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 488

(2000) (stating that a court’s ruling on the merits of claims presented in a first § 2254

petition renders any later petition successive); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (a)-(b).2

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retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or 

(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously

through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole,

would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the

underlying offense. 

3

Although the dismissal would be “without prejudice,” Petitioner is again cautioned that any later

federal petition may be barred by the statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)-(2); see also

footnote two of this Order.

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D. Fourth Option: File a Motion to Stay the Federal Proceedings

Petitioner may file a motion to stay this federal proceeding while he returns to state

court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S. 113 (2005); Jackson

v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2005). If Petitioner chooses this fourth option, he must file

a pleading with this Court no later than March 3, 2008. Respondent may file a reply by

April 15, 2008. 

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 6] is

DENIED to the extent it seeks dismissal of the Petition at this time. However, the Court

NOTIFIES PETITIONER THAT HE HAS FILED A PETITION THAT

CONTAINS BOTH EXHAUSTED AND UNEXHAUSTED CLAIMS AND IT

IS THEREFORE SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL. If Petitioner fails to respond to this

Order by the deadlines set forth above, the Court will dismiss the Petition without

prejudice.3

 See Rose, 455 U.S. at 522.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 30, 2008

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

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