Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00059/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00059-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TORRY BUCHANAN,

Plaintiff, 

v.

RE. A. GARIKAPARTHI and DR. S. 

ROBERTS,

Defendant. 

Case No.: 15cv0059-BEN-MDD

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION ON 

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

[ECF No. 48]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

Districted Judge Roger T. Benitez pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local 

Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of California.

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Torry Buchanan (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis, with a civil complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

(ECF Nos. 1, 4). In his Complaint, Plaintiff sets forth two claims alleging 

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that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by Doctors Garikaparthi 

and Roberts, who were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical 

needs. (ECF No. 4 at 2-4). Both of Plaintiff’s claims are related to 

Defendants’ alleged failure to provide adequate medical treatment that led to 

the amputation of three of Plaintiff’s toes. (Id. at 3-4). 

On July 13, 2017, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, 

and served a Rand notice on Plaintiff. (ECF No. 48). Plaintiff was given

until September 19, 2017, to file his opposition, but as of the date of this 

Report and Recommendation, he has not done so.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendants have produced evidence of the following facts.1 In 2002, 

Plaintiff was shot, resulting in right foot drop, which made his foot 

susceptible to additional injury. (ECF No. 48-3 at ¶8). Plaintiff received 

accommodations for his foot from prison staff including orthosis, a cane, and 

special shoes. (Id.). Additionally, it was recommended that Plaintiff not have 

prolonged periods of either standing or sitting. (Id.).

In October, 2012, Plaintiff was first seen by Dr. Sedighi for treatment of 

a wound on his right foot’s big toe. (Id. at ¶9). According to medical records, 

Plaintiff indicated that he had had a blister for three weeks, but did not 

present for medical care until shortly before his scheduled appointment with 

Dr. Sedighi. (Id.) The wound appeared “superficial with no discharge,” but 

“out of an abundance of caution,” Plaintiff was given a round of oral 

antibiotics and instructed to have his dressings changed daily with topical 

antibiotics. (Id.) Plaintiff also had an x-ray taken which showed no 

 

1 These facts are undisputed because Plaintiff has not filed an opposition or put forth any 

evidence disputing them.

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underlying osteomyelitis or other bony abnormality. (Id.) Because Plaintiff’s 

foot drop was known, a podiatry referral was made, with the appointment 

focusing on new accommodations for Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶11). At this November 

9, 2012 appointment, Plaintiff refused wound care. (Id.).

On November 20, 2012, a prison officer placed a note in Plaintiff’s 

medical record. (Id. at ¶12). The note indicated that despite instructions to 

avoid prolonged sitting or standing and to use orthotics and a cane, Plaintiff 

was observed playing football for “approximately 45 minutes and was 

running, jumping, throwing, and catching.” (Id.).

Starting in early December, 2012, Plaintiff began reporting to the 

podiatrist for regular treatment of his wound including removing damaged 

tissue and applying Silvadene, a cream used to prevent and treat infection. 

(Id. at ¶13).

According to medical staff, as of April 12, 2013, Plaintiff had refused 

wound care twenty-one times. (Id. at ¶14). Plaintiff further refused to 

attend his scheduled podiatry appointment on May 3, 2014. (Id. at ¶15). 

Additionally, notes from a May 2013 appointment indicate that Plaintiff both 

refused crutches and had been removing the accommodation “designed to 

offload weight from his big toe in order to help his ulcer heal. The doctor 

noted ‘poor patient compliance.’” (Id. at 16).

On June 5, 2013, a nurse treating Plaintiff’s wound noticed 

serosanguinous drainage and consulted with Dr. Garikaparthi who requested 

a culture be sent to the lab for analysis. (Id. at 54). Plaintiff again refused 

crutches at this appointment. (Id.) A week later the lab results showed “the 

growth of Staph aureus and Pseudomonas. (Id. at ¶18). The following day 

Dr. Garikaparthi met with Plaintiff for the first time. The doctor noted 

Plaintiff’s “pertinent past history, addressed pain management, and started 

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Plaintiff on antibiotics....” (Id. at 55-59).

At Plaintiff’s second and last visit with Dr. Garikaparthi on October 10, 

2013, the doctor was concerned by the appearance of Plaintiff’s wound and 

sent plaintiff to the Triage and Treatment Area (“TTA”) for “an antibiotic 

injection for immediate onset, to have two oral antibiotics and Tylenol with 

Codeine for pain control initiated, and continued daily dressing changes.” 

(Id. at ¶19.) An x-ray was negative for osteomyelitis. As of the October 10 

appointment, Plaintiff had twenty-six documented refusals of wound care. 

(Id.)

Plaintiff was then sent to Alvarado Hospital for treatment, staying 

there from October 14 to October 23, 2013. (Id. at 68). Medical staff believed 

Plaintiff had chronic osteomyelitis and septic arthritis in his right big toe. 

(Id.). During his hospitalization, various medical professionals urged 

Plaintiff to consent to having his big toe amputated, which Plaintiff 

repeatedly refused. (Id. at ¶21). As such, a “less than optimal” treatment 

plan was devised, including intravenous antibiotics that would control but 

not resolve the infection. (Id.).

Dr. Sedighi documented Plaintiff’s refusals of and noncompliance with 

treatment through to October 24, 2013, noting that Plaintiff had been 

counseled against refusing treatment and the likelihood that without 

treatment he was increasing his risk of a “higher level” amputation, sepsis, or 

death. (Id. at ¶23). Dr. Sedighi indicated that Plaintiff “verbalized 

understanding but states that he does not want to have IV antibiotics.” (Id.). 

Further, Dr. Sedighi indicated he would be referring Plaintiff for a 

psychiatric evaluation to determine whether Plaintiff’s capacity to make 

medical decisions was impaired. (Id.). Two days later, a psychologist 

determined that Plaintiff did not seem to be having urgent mental health 

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problems. (Id. at ¶24).

On October 31, 2013, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Currier, who noted that 

Plaintiff checked himself out of the treatment center against medical advice. 

(Id. at ¶25). Dr. Currier explained to Plaintiff in great detail, including handdrawn diagrams, what was happening internally with Plaintiff’s toe, 

summarized the recommendations from all of the medical professionals who 

had opined on Plaintiff’s condition, and that the consensus was that 

amputation was necessary. (Id.). Further, Dr. Currier explained that as 

Plaintiff had refused amputation, the next best option was IV antibiotics, 

which Plaintiff also refused. Dr. Currier’s notes indicate that Plaintiff was 

only willing to take oral antibiotics and that medical staff did not agree with 

this plan. (Id.).

In notes from December 19, 2013, Dr. Kandkhorova stated that he told 

Plaintiff that his condition would not resolve with medication alone and that 

amputation was necessary, but that Plaintiff refused. (Id. at ¶26). Plaintiff 

was again taken to Alvarado hospital on January 8, 2014, after additional 

documented refusals of care, where records indicate that Plaintiff “...‘again 

refused amputation,’ but agreed to have ... removal of necrotic tissue and 

cultures. Eight weeks of IV antibiotics were recommended to Plaintiff, but he 

would only agree to undergo four weeks....” (Id. at ¶28). Following this 

appointment Plaintiff reported a brief period of relief, however, by April 2014, 

Plaintiff was again complaining of worsening pain in his toe. (Id.).

Following five additional refusals of care, Plaintiff saw Dr. Bates on 

May 5, 2014, who ordered immediate transport to Tri-City Medical Center. 

(Id. at ¶30). The first, second, and third toes on Plaintiff’s right foot were 

amputated for extensive osteomyelitis on May 7, 2014. (Id. at ¶31).

Plaintiff filed a number of 602-HC health care appeals with respect to 

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his right foot. (ECF No. 48-4 at ¶8). None of Plaintiff’s appeals mentioned 

Dr. Garikaparthi. (Id. at ¶9). Dr. Roberts was tasked with responding to 

three appeals, HC 14051270, HC 14051455, and HC 15053483), each of which 

were filed after Plaintiff’s toes had been amputated. (Id. at ¶10). The first of 

these, HC 14051270, was filed on June 2, 2014, and requested that Plaintiff 

be put back on medication that was supposedly discontinued without first 

seeing a doctor. (Id. at 9). Dr. Roberts indicated that interviewing and 

examining doctors noted Plaintiff’s surgery wounds were healing well, that 

Plaintiff’s treatment plan would change naturally without seeing a physician 

as he healed, and that physicians were reviewing his chart regularly to make 

any required adjustments. (Id. at ¶4).

The second appeal, HC 14051455, was filed on July 8, 2014 and

contained Plaintiff’s request for stronger medication. (Id. at 9-10). Plaintiff’s 

appeal was partially granted, however Plaintiff was given Tylenol and a right 

foot orthotic because narcotics were not generally given two months after 

surgery. (Id. at ¶5).

Dr. Roberts’ third and last involvement with Plaintiff’s appeals process 

was on June 17, 2015, when Plaintiff’s appeal, HC 15053483, requested 

shower shoes. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff’s request for footwear was denied “as not 

being medically indicated.” (Id. at ¶6). Dr. Roberts did not respond to any of 

Plaintiff’s other health care appeals. (Id. at ¶8).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Summary Judgment

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the 

granting of summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

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moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The standard for 

granting a motion for summary judgment is essentially the same as for the 

granting of a directed verdict. Judgment must be entered, “if, under the 

governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). “If reasonable 

minds could differ,” however, judgment should not be entered in favor of the 

moving party. Id. at 250-51.

The parties bear the same substantive burden of proof as would apply 

at a trial on the merits, including plaintiff’s burden to establish any element 

essential to his case. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252; Celotex v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). The 

moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the elements of the claim 

in the pleadings, or other evidence, which the moving party “believes 

demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 323; see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); 

Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). “A material 

issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a

trial to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth.” S.E.C. v. 

Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1982). More than a 

“metaphysical doubt” is required to establish a genuine issue of material fact. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 

(1986).

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to establish, 

beyond the pleadings, that there is no genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 324. To successfully rebut a properly supported motion for 

summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must point to some facts in the 

record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and, with all 

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reasonable inferences made in the plaintiff[’s] favor, could convince a 

reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff[].” Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 

14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 323; Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249).

While the district court is “not required to comb the record to find some 

reason to deny a motion for summary judgment,” Forsberg v. Pacific N.W. 

Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988), see also Nilsson v. 

Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1545 (9th Cir. 1988), the court may 

nevertheless exercise its discretion “in appropriate circumstances,” to 

consider materials in the record which are on file but not “specifically 

referred to.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 

1031 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the court need not “examine the entire file for 

evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence is not set 

forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could be 

conveniently found.” Id.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court need not accept 

legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” Western Mining 

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). “No valid interest is 

served by withholding summary judgment on a complaint that wraps 

nonactionable conduct in a jacket woven of legal conclusions and hyperbole.” 

Vigliotto v. Terry, 873 F.2d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 1989).

Moreover, “[a] conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed 

facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of 

material fact.” F.T.C. v. Publ’g Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 

(9th Cir. 1997). Nevertheless, “the district court may not disregard a piece of 

evidence at the summary stage solely based on its self-serving nature.” Nigro 

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 784 F.3d 495, 497-498 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding 

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plaintiff’s “uncorroborated and self-serving” declaration sufficient to establish 

a genuine issue of material fact because the “testimony was based on 

personal knowledge, legally relevant, and internally consistent.”). 

A district court may not grant a motion for summary judgment solely 

because the opposing party has failed to file an opposition. Cristobal v. 

Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488, 1494-95 & n. 4 (9th Cir. 1994). A court may, 

nonetheless, “grant an unopposed motion for summary judgment if the 

movant’s papers are themselves sufficient to support the motion and do not 

on their face reveal a genuine issue of material fact[.]” Williams v. Santa 

Cruz Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 234 F. App’x 522, 523 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Henry 

v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993)).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings two claims. (ECF No. 4). Claim 1 alleges that 

Defendant Dr. Garikaparthi violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to 

be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to provide Plaintiff 

with adequate medical treatment. (ECF No. 4 at 3). Claim 2 alleges that 

Defendant Dr. Roberts similarly violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right 

by not fulfilling his obligation in his supervisory capacity to ensure that 

Plaintiff’s medical needs were being adequately met. (Id. at 4).

1. 11th Amendment Immunity

Defendants argue that as they were sued in their official capacities 

only, they are not “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and as such are immune 

from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. (ECF No. 48-2 at 17). 

The Supreme Court has recognized that “a suit against a state official 

in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a 

suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against 

the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). 

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Absent a waiver by the state or a valid congressional override, the Eleventh 

Amendment offers state agencies immunity from private causes of action for 

damages brought in federal court. Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 

1025-26 (9th Cir. 1999). The State of California has not waived its immunity 

under the Eleventh Amendment for § 1983 claims. Id. In addition, the 

Supreme Court has held that Congress did not intend for § 1983 to abrogate a 

state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 

473 U.S. 159, 169 n.17 (1985)). 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that defendants Garikaparthi

and Roberts are entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's 

official capacity claims for damages. See also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 

(1991) (clarifying that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against 

state officials sued in their individual capacities, nor does it bar suits for 

prospective injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official 

capacities).

2. Deliberate Indifference

In the FAC, Plaintiff claims that between October 2012 and May 2015, 

he repeatedly complained about a painful infection in his big toe and that Dr. 

Garikaparthi “failed to take [his] condition seriously and prescribe [him] with 

the appropriate medical treatment.” (ECF No. 4 at 3). Plaintiff further 

alleges that Dr. Garikaparthi’s treatment only involved bandages and foot 

cream, which were “all superficial and did not affectively address the 

underlying problem of [his] infection. (Id.). Defendants argue in their motion 

that Dr. Garikaparthi was only involved in Plaintiff’s medical care in three 

specific instances and that the medical record lacks any support for the 

theory that Dr. Garikaparthi was deliberately indifferent. (ECF No. 48-2 at 

19-20.)

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To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim predicated on the denial of 

medical care, a plaintiff must establish that he had a serious medical need 

and that the defendant's response to that need was deliberately indifferent. 

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 

429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat 

the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may 

be shown by the denial, delay, or intentional interference with medical 

treatment, or by the way in which medical care is provided. Hutchinson v. 

United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988).

To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both be aware

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Thus, a defendant is liable if he knows 

that plaintiff faces “a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that 

risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. A 

physician need not fail to treat an inmate altogether in order to violate that 

inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 

1314 (9th Cir. 1989). Failure to competently treat a serious medical 

condition, even if some treatment is prescribed, may constitute deliberate 

indifference in a particular case. Id.

It is important to differentiate common law negligence claims of 

malpractice from claims predicated on violations of the 8th Amendment's 

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. In asserting the latter, “[m]ere 

'indifference,' 'negligence,' or 'medical malpractice' will not support this cause 

of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 

1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06); see also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

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1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff must show a deliberate disregard for a 

known medical need. The Ninth Circuit has made clear that a difference of 

medical opinion is, as a matter of law, insufficient to establish deliberate 

indifference. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058. “Rather, to prevail on a claim 

involving choices between alternative courses of treatment, a prisoner must 

show that the chosen course of treatment ‘was medically unacceptable under 

the circumstances,’ and was chosen ‘in conscious disregard of an excessive 

risk to [the prisoner's] health.’” Id. (quoting Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 

330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Deliberate indifference lies somewhere between negligence and 

“conduct engaged in for the very purposes of causing harm or with the 

knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836; see also Redman 

v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1440 (9th Cir. 1991). To succeed on a 

deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must also demonstrate that the 

prison official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

839-40. Thus, an official must: (1) be actually aware of facts from which an

interference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists; (2) 

actually draw that inference; but (3) nevertheless disregard the risk to the 

inmate’s health and wellbeing. Id. at 837-38.

Here, the signed declarations filed with defendants’ motion indicate 

that Plaintiff had two in-person interactions with Dr. Garikaparthi, each 

resulting in medical treatment increasing in intensity. Additionally, it was 

Dr. Garikaparthi who ordered lab tests of Plaintiff’s serosanguinous 

drainage, started Plaintiff on antibiotics, and referred Plaintiff to the TTA. 

Indeed, Dr. Garikaparthi’s involvement in Plaintiff’s treatment resulted in 

Plaintiff receiving medical treatment beyond bandages and cream. 

Under the circumstances of this case, it would be likely that a trier of 

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fact would determine that Plaintiff’s complaints amounted to a serious 

medical condition. However, there are no facts to support a finding of 

deliberate indifference. Plaintiff saw medical personnel frequently and was 

provided with substantial treatment for his complaints. At the same time,

Plaintiff repeatedly refused treatments and frequently refused to heed the 

recommendations of medical staff. 

Of importance is the fact that Dr. Garikaparthi did not work as a 

physician at RJD for the entirety of the time Plaintiff alleges the doctor 

ignored his requests for treatment. Plaintiff alleges that his complaints of 

pain span from October 2012, to May 2015. Dr. Garikaparthi only worked at 

RJD from May 2013 to November 2014. Dr. Garikaparthi provided a 

consultation to a nurse regarding Plaintiff’s toe ulcer on June 5, 2013, and 

then Dr. Garikaparthi met with Plaintiff on June 13, 2013 and October 10, 

2013. Plaintiff alleges that he repeatedly complained to Dr. Garikaparthi 

about his increasingly painful infection, but the medical record shows that 

Plaintiff only had the opportunity to complain twice. Further, both of those 

meetings resulted in increased and more advanced treatment. 

Plaintiff has not supported his contention that Dr. Garikaparthi’s 

indifference to Plaintiff allowed the infection to spread and ultimately led to 

the amputation. To the contrary, the medical record shows that the only 

indifference here was that of Plaintiff toward his own medical care. Plaintiff 

was repeatedly advised that failure to acquiesce to more advanced treatment 

or amputation of his big toe had the potential to lead to more serious medical 

issues up to and including death. Despite these warnings, Plaintiff 

attempted to substitute his own medical opinion, rejecting IV antibiotics for 

the less favored oral antibiotics, only willing to take four weeks’ worth of 

antibiotics instead of the recommended eight. The undisputed medical facts 

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show that it was only Plaintiff who disregarded the substantial risk of serious 

harm.

Although Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that Dr. Garikaparthi was 

deliberately indifferent in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights 

from October 2012 to May 2015, Plaintiff has presented no evidence of that or 

of any purposeful act or failure on the part of the doctor.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference 

claim.

3. No liability for involvement in the appeals process

Plaintiff argues that he sent Defendant Dr. Roberts several letters 

indicating he was not receiving adequate treatment on his toes and 

expressing concern that he would lose his foot. (ECF No. 4 at 4). Plaintiff

asserts that Dr. Roberts was aware of Plaintiff’s condition through 

institutional correspondence and that his failure to satisfy his supervisory 

responsibility to ensure Plaintiff was being adequately treated constituted 

deliberate indifference. (Id.). Defendants argue that Dr. Robert’s 

involvement was limited to responding to some of Plaintiff’s 602-HC appeals 

and that that limited involvement does not open up Dr. Roberts to liability. 

(ECF No. 48-2 at 25). Further, Defendants assert that there is no vicarious 

liability for civil rights violations. (Id. at 24).

“Prison officials are not required to process inmate appeals in a specific 

way or respond to them in a favorable manner.” De Bose v. Schmidt, No. 

2:15-cv-1076-EFB (TEMP) P, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75504, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 

June 9, 2016). “Inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a 

specific prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 

(9th Cir. 2003). A prisoner is entitled to the procedural right of a grievance 

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process, but this does not then bestow upon the prisoner any substantive 

right. Rios v. Paramo, No. 14cv1073-WQH (DHB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

117271, at *155 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2015). A prison official’s denial of an 

inmate’s grievance or appeal from a misconduct finding generally does not 

constitute significant participation in an alleged constitutional violation 

sufficient to give rise to personal liability. See Wilson v. Woodford, 2009 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 25749, 2009 WL 839921, *6 (E.D. Cal. 2009).

Here, Dr. Roberts’ role as an appeals officer does not contribute to a 

claim for an 8th Amendment violation. Additionally, Dr. Roberts did not 

serve as Dr. Garikaparthi’s supervisor and therefore could not be held labile 

for failure to properly supervise Dr. Garikaparthi. As established by the 

dates of the 602-HC appeals that Dr. Roberts addressed, his participation in 

Plaintiff’s case began after Plaintiff’s toes were amputated and months after 

the last contact between Plaintiff and Dr. Garikaparthi. (ECF No. 48-2 at 

22). Plaintiff alleges no facts that indicate Dr. Roberts personally treated 

Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s conclusory statements in the Complaint do not establish 

how Dr. Roberts’ involvement in reviewing three 602-HC appeals constitutes 

a significant involvement in an alleged Eighth Amendment violation 

sufficient to establish personal liability.

Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that summary judgment be 

GRANTED as to Dr. Roberts’ participation in the appeals process.

4. Qualified immunity

Defendants raise qualified immunity as an alternative basis for 

dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. Defendants contend that they are entitled to 

qualified immunity because there is no clearly established authority that 

would find their conduct unconstitutional. (ECF No. 48-2 at 30).

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing 

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discretionary functions from liability for civil damages unless their conduct 

violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 

640 (1987). “In determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified 

immunity, we consider (1) whether there has been a violation of a 

constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the 

time of the officer's alleged misconduct.” C.V. by & through Villegas v. City of 

Anaheim, 823 F.3d 1252, 1255 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lal v. California, 746 

F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Court may decide which of the two 

prongs to address first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Here, 

as discussed above, there is no constitutional violation. Accordingly, both 

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Based on the lack of any evidence of an Eighth Amendment violation

and Defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity on this claim, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that their motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, 

and that this action be DISMISSED.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the 

District Court issue an Order: (1) Approving and Adopting this Report and 

Recommendation; and (2) GRANTING Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report 

must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than October 

30, 2017. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objection shall be 

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than November 6, 

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2017. The parties are advised that the failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the 

Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 16, 2017

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