Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01600/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01600-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY BONDS, et al., )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

NICOLETTI OIL INC., et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-07-1600 OWW/DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING 

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO REMAND

(Doc. 18) AND DENYING IN

PART AND GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND TO STRIKE (Docs.

11 & 14) 

Before the court are Plaintiffs’ motion to remand this

action to the Merced County Superior Court and Defendants’ motion

to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim 

and to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

A. BACKGROUND.

On October 2, 2007, Plaintiffs Larry Bonds, Gayle Bonds,

Jesus Aguilar, Joe Anderson, Rose Anderson, Jim Ballanger, Jeanie

Ballanger, Charles Bates, Loretta Bates, Pedro Bermudez,

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Hortencia Bermudez, Linda Butler, Gloria Cardenas, Thomas M.

Climer, David Darnell, Felix Esquivel, Delia Esquivel, Pablo

Martinez, Ezequivel Ortega, Joe Ortega, Hope Ortega, Bobby

Parson, and Jeff Sullivan filed an Amended Complaint for Damages,

Declaratory Relief, and Equitable Indemnity (Amended Complaint)

in the Merced County Superior Court. Defendants are Nicoletti

Oil Inc. and Does 1-100. 

The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs are residents

or landowners in the City of Dos Palos whose homes are located on

the north side of Blossom Street and north of Defendant’s bulk

fuel storage and fueling facility. In the section of the Amended

Complaint captioned “Common Facts”, it is alleged:

22. Plaintiffs’ properties and the ‘storage

facility’ of ‘Defendants’, and each of them,

are separated on the South by Blossom Street. 

A small road bisects the neighborhood East to

west [sic]. ‘Defendants’ underground and

aboveground storage tanks and supply lines

contain gasoline and other petroleum

hydrocarbons. Said fuel contains benzene,

toluene, methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE)

and other substances known in the state of

California to cause cancer and birth defects. 

The ‘storage facility’ is between 50 and 175

feet from Plaintiffs’ yards and homes. The

ground water in the area is very shallow

running between 2.5 and 7 feet below the

ground. The groundwater is observed to move

North and Northwest, approximating the flow

of the San Joaquin River. 

23. At all times mentioned in this

complaint, ‘Defendants’, and each of them

have occupied, used, and maintained their

premises in a manner such that gasoline,

diesel fuel, aviation fuel, other petroleum

hydrocarbons, and/or benzene leaked from

underground and aboveground storage tanks and

supply lines. Leaks from the storage tanks

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on defendants’ property have migrated into

and contaminated the soil and groundwater on

plaintiffs’ property.

24. Through its own testing, ‘Defendants’

knew by at least 1988 of the presence of

petroleum hydrocarbons in subsurface soil and

groundwater. The ‘storage facility’ suffered

leaks that started to migrate into the

surrounding soil and groundwater. 

‘Defendants’ conducted tests on their own

premises in 1988 and again in 1993. The

series of tests showed high levels of

petroleum hydrocarbons containing benzene,

xylenes, toluene, tetryl ethyl lead and other

harmful and carcinogenic compounds. In 1994

‘Defendants’ installed monitoring wells off

their property on Blossom Street, North of

the facility. In 1995, petroleum hydrocarbon

concentrations were seen to increase. Later,

‘floating product’ was observed in the wells

North of the ‘Defendants’ property. 

‘Defendants’ made no effort to determine the

extent of the spill despite continued high

readings of their own monitoring tests. In

2002, ‘Defendants’ tests showed the presence

of MTBE at levels of 1,200 micrograms per

liter in the soil bore tests and monitoring

well samples. ‘Defendants’ results showed

the presence of benzene at 25,000 micrograms

per liter of water, and ethyl benzene at

7,4000 micrograms per liter of water. Both

compounds are toxic and are listed as

carcinogens in the State of California. 

‘Defendants’ did not notify the surrounding

residences and businesses of the presence of

high levels of petroleum hydrocarbons in

areas outside of the ‘Defendants’ properties. 

Neither did ‘Defendants’ attempt to test any

area beyond those monitoring wells installed

in 1993 despite having knowledge of the

presence of high levels of petroleum

hydrocarbons in the monitoring wells

installed North of ‘Defendants’ property and

near ‘Plaintiffs’ (and each of them)

property.

25. On April 8, 2004, the California

Regional Water Quality Control Board issued a

letter (attached hereto as Exhibit A)

notifying the owners of the properties North

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of ‘Defendants’ facility that contamination

‘may have migrated beneath plaintiffs’

properties.’

26. In November of 2004, ‘Defendants’ began

to install the first nested wells on all of

the herein named plaintiffs’ properties, and

monitoring of these wells began on December

22, 2004. Plaintiffs therefore had no notice

that petroleum hydrocarbons existed on and

under their property until December 22, 2004.

27. ‘Defendants’ completed construction of a

remediation system under order from the

California Regional Quality Control Board

[sic] and began operation of said system on

or about December 22, 2005. This method was

/is the least aggressive remediation solution

from which ‘Defendants’ could choose.

28. ‘Defendants’, and each of them, in

conjunction with previous ‘storage facility’

owner Exxon/Mobil Corporation, began

operation of a Groundwater Pump & Treat

(GWP&T) system, as well as a Soil Vapor

Extraction (SVE) method. This method of

removal will take more than a decade to

remove the contaminants, if it is successful.

29. The plaintiffs and each of them have

sought to resolve this matter informally and

the parties executed a statute tolling

agreements [sic] effective April 8, 2005 and

running through April 8, 2007 (See tolling

agreement attached as Exhibit B). The

parties agreed to extend that statute tolling

agreement until October 8, 2007 (See extended

tolling agreement attached as Exhibit C). 

The agreement required that if any party was

to opt out of the tolling agreement, that

party was to give 60 days notice, said notice

to be mailed certified, return receipt

requested.

30. Following the failure of the parties to

reach a resolution, plaintiffs sent proper

notice of their intent to terminate the

statute tolling agreement. (attached [sic]

hereto as Exhibit D).

31. The parties executed a one week

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extension of the tolling agreement on August

30, 2007 in an effort to reach a settlement

agreement before the final expiration of the

agreement (See letter attached as Exhibit E). 

Said settlement agreement attempt failed. 

The tolling agreement therefore tolled the

running of any statutes from April 8, 2005

until September 12, 2007.

32. As a result of the ‘Defendants’ acts

and/or omissions, plaintiffs and each of them

have suffered damages including, but not

limited to, an interference with the use of

their residential property, a diminution in

the property’s value, and other substantial

costs and expenses. Plaintiffs and each of

them are informed and believe and based

thereon allege that they and each of them

individually, have suffered damages in excess

of $25,000 in diminution of their property

value as a result of the presence of the

contaminants of benzene, ethyl benzene,

toluene, tetryl ethyl lead and MTBE on their

property.

33. As a result of the defendants’ acts or

omissions, plaintiffs, and each of them, have

suffered physical damage to their respective

property as a result of contamination from

the petroleum hydrocarbons, including

contamination from toluene, benzene, tetryl

ethyl lead and ethyl benzene. Such

contamination is harmful to the surface,

subsurface, groundwater and structures on the

lots, in that the presence of such

contaminants makes the property less suitable

for habitation, because of the build up of

dangerous pollutants in the soil, air and

water, and the build up of potentially

explosive gases in the confined spaces of the

structures on the property.

34. Since plaintiffs and each of them

purchased their respective properties, the

values of surrounding properties in the area

have increased. Were it not for the presence

of contaminants, plaintiffs’ properties would

have increased in fair market value. 

Plaintiffs and each of them have incurred or

will incur other expenses in an amount to be

determined in addition to those alleged

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above, including, without limitation, closing

costs, title insurance, casualty and

liability insurance, principal and interest

on obligations outstanding, taxes, fees for

engineers and consultants and moving

expenses. Plaintiffs and each of them

continue to incur expenses in an amount

unknown to said plaintiffs at this time. 

Plaintiffs and each of them will pray leave

to court to amend this complaint to insert

the full amount of these expenses when they

are ascertained. All of these expenses were

necessary, and all were made in good faith

reliance that the property was free from

contamination.

35. As a further legal cause of the

‘Defendants’ acts and/or omissions,

plaintiffs and each of them have incurred

great mental and nervous suffering and pain

due to nervousness, fright, worry and anxiety

about the certain potential health and

financial damages caused by ‘Defendants’ acts

and omissions. As a result of such injuries,

plaintiffs have suffered general damages in

an amount to be proven, but not less than

$25,000 each.

36. In engaging in the acts set forth above,

‘Defendants’, and each of them, were guilty

of malice, fraud, and oppression as defined

in California Civil Code Section 3294. 

Plaintiffs and each of them should recover in

addition to actual damages, damages to make

an example of and punish defendants, in an

amount to be determined.

The Amended Complaint alleges nine causes of action:

1. First Cause of Action for negligence;

2. Second Cause of Action for damages for

private nuisance;

3. Third Cause of Action for damage for

trespass;

4. Fourth Cause of Action for damage for

fraud-concealment;

5. Fifth Cause of Action for intentional

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infliction of emotional distress;

6. Sixth Cause of Action for negligent

infliction of emotional distress; fear of

cancer;

7. Seventh Cause of Action for unlawful

business practice in violation of California

Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq.;

8. Eighth Cause of Action for unlawful

business practice in violation of California

Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq.,

based on California Health & Safety Code §§

25249.6 et seq.;

9. Ninth Cause of Action for declaratory

relief and equitable indemnity.

Defendants removed the action to this Court. The Notice of

Removal states as grounds:

7. Congress has the power to control the

jurisdiction of the lower federal courts,

whether by expansion or contraction. 

McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596, 598-

99 (1895).

8. Section 1503 of the Energy Policy Act of

2005 provides:

Claims and legal actions filed

after the date of enactment of this

Act related to allegations

involving actual or threatened

contamination of methyl tertiary

butyl ether (MTBE) may be removed

to the appropriate United States

District Court. See 119 Stat. 594,

1076 (2005)(reprinted in 42 U.S.C.

§ 7545, 2005 Amendments, ‘Claims

Filed After Enactment’).

9. The Energy Policy Act was signed into law

by the President on August 8, 2005, its

effective date, and the instant action was

filed after that date. See Energy Policy Act

of 2005, 119 Stat. 594, 1076 (2005)(reprinted

in 42 U.S.C. § 7545, 2005 Amendments, ‘Claims

Filed After Enactment’).

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10. This action is ‘related to allegations

involving actual or threatened contamination’

by MTBE.

11. Section 1503 of the Energy Policy Act of

2005 provides a basis for removal of this

action that is independent of any federal

question and/or the general removal statute,

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

12. This case is removable because the

Complaint [sic] is ‘related to allegations

involving actual or threatened contamination

of’ MTBE. Plaintiffs’ Complaint [sic]

alleges that Defendant is liable to the

Plaintiffs based upon Defendant’s alleged

contamination of soil and groundwater with

MTBE, and that Defendant used MTBE as a

petroleum fuel constituent. 

13. For example, Plaintiffs allege that

‘Defendants’ underground and aboveground

storage tanks and supply lines contain

gasoline and other petroleum hydrocarbons. 

Said fuel contains benzene, toluene, methyl

tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE) and other

substances known in the state of California

to cause cancer and birth defects.’ See

Complaint [sic] at 6:20-22, ¶ 22. Plaintiffs

also claim that ‘In 2002, “Defendants’ [sic]

tests showed the presence of MTBE at levels

of 1,200 micrograms per liter in the soil

bore tests and monitoring well samples.’ See

Complaint [sic] at 7:13-14, ¶ 24. The

Complaint further alleges that Plaintiffs

have each ‘suffered damages in excess of

$25,000 in diminution of their property

values as a result of the presence of the

contaminants of benzene, ethyl benzene,

toluene, tetryl ethyl lead and MTBE on their

property.’ See Complaint [sic] at 9:1-3, ¶

32. Plaintiffs’ Complaint [sic] also alleges

that Defendant’s ‘conduct includes releasing

into the environment harmful substances in

the form of petroleum hydrocarbons containing

Proposition 65 listed chemicals, including

benzene, tetryl ethyl lead (TEL), methyl

tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE), toluene, and

ethyl benzene without a clear and reasonable

warning or notice to persons potentially or

actually affected ...’ See Complaint [sic] at

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18:25 to 19:2, ¶ 89.

14. Plaintiffs’ Complaint [sic] contains

multiple other allegations of

‘contamination,’ contaminants,’ ‘groundwater’

contamination and/or ‘soil’ contamination

caused by ‘gasoline’ or ‘fuel’ or other

‘petroleum’ releases or leaks. See generally

Complaint [sic] at ¶¶ 33, 34, 39-40, 43-44,

49-50, 54-55, 58, 60-62, 71, and 98-100. 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that such

products contain MTBE. See Complaint [sic]

at 6:20-22, ¶ 22. This action is, therefore,

‘related to allegations involving actual or

threatened contamination’ by MTBE. 

B. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND.

Plaintiffs move to remand this action to the Merced County

Superior Court. The primary basis for the motion to remand is

Plaintiffs’ contention that they do not depend on any claim of

MTBE contamination to maintain any of their causes of action. 

Plaintiffs assert that the Amended Complaint does not allege that

Plaintiffs have suffered harm, actual or threatened, from MTBE

because Plaintiffs have not asserted a claim for contaminated

drinking water. Plaintiffs assert that “MTBE is only harmful, if

at all, when present in drinking water supplies.” Plaintiffs

refer to the April 8, 2004 letter from Warren W. Gross,

Engineering Geologist, California Regional Water Quality Control

Board, Central Valley Region, attached to the Amended Complaint

as Exhibit A and to Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice as

Exhibit 1, which letter states in pertinent part:

We have identified you as the owner and/or

resident of property to the north of the bulk

petroleum facility at 2801 Blossom St. ...

The release of gasoline and diesel fuel from

the Property in past years has impacted

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groundwater which now may have migrated

beneath your property. That groundwater may

contain dissolved constituents of gasoline

and diesel fuel and a layer of

gasoline/diesel fuel may be floating on top

of the groundwater. Gasoline vapors and

gasoline and diesel fuel contamination may

also be present in soil above the

groundwater. These conditions have been

observed in the vicinity of your property but

their full extent has not yet been

determined.

As you are supplied with city water, the

primary potential health hazard (if any) is

the possibility of gasoline vapors in indoor

air and direct contact with hydrocarbons in

deep excavations on your property.

Plaintiffs also refer to “cleanup and abatement order No. R5-200-

0057 issued by California Regional Quality Control Board, Central

Valley Region, Page 3.” Plaintiffs assert that a copy of this

order is attached as Exhibit 2. No such exhibit is attached. 

Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice is a copy of

“Achieving Clean Air and Clean Water: The Report of the Blue

Ribbon Panel on Oxygenates in Gasoline” dated September 15, 1999. 

In any event, Plaintiffs contend:

During indoor testing by both California

E.P.A. and (CRWQCB) [sic] in 2005 on samples

that were collected, focused on levels of

vaporized Benzene and Tetryl Ethyl Lead (TEL)

... No testing was performed to determine if

MTBE was present in air samples. Based on

their earlier assurances to residents,

CRWQCB’s only concern regarding the

residents’ health was, in fact, airborne

pollutants in enclosed spaces, i.e., their

homes. 

The existence of MTBE in the ground water

around and under plaintiffs’ residences does

not create an independent cause of action. 

Plaintiffs mention MTBE primarily as a ‘time

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marker’ only to help a trier of fact

establish when the leak may have begun, and

how long it continued. Contrary to

defendants’ inference, plaintiffs’ complaint

does not rely upon the existence of MTBE in

their soil or groundwater. In fact, it is

very clear from the complaint that

plaintiffs’ chief concerns were the presence

of toluene, benzene, tetryl ethyl lead and

ethyl benzene, as it relates to their

physical health.

Plaintiffs are making no claim that their

drinking water was affected, and because

plaintiffs have no health concerns about

MTBE, they did not bring an action based on

contaminated drinking water. There is no

federal claim. Plaintiffs are willing to

amend their complaint to eliminate any

reference to MTBE from the complaint, and

will stipulate that MTBE does not pose a

threat as a contaminant in, around or under

plaintiffs’ property, as it has not affected

the drinking water in the area. 

Plaintiffs contend that they brought this action:

[B]ecause their properties had been damaged

by petroleum hydrocarbons. Specifically, the

plaintiffs [sic] concerns were contamination

of their residences by the spread of the

petroleum hydrocarbons through the surface

groundwater and onto their land. There has

never been a concern that drinking water

supplies would be affected by defendants

[sic] facility leaking MTBE, and thus

plaintiffs made no such claim.

Plaintiffs assert that “the entire basis of [their] claims has

been one based on the harm, and potential harm, caused by

airborne volatile organic compounds as a result of defendants

[sic] ... acts”. 

As Defendant notes, Pub. L. 109-58, Title XV, § 1503

provides:

Claims and legal actions filed after the date

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of enactment of this Act [August 8, 2005]

related to allegations involving the actual

or threatened contamination of methyl

tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) may be removed to

the appropriate United States district court.

Although Plaintiffs attempt to downplay the allegations in the

Amended Complaint of actual or threatened contamination of the

properties by MTBE, among other contaminants, Paragraph 32 of the

Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs have suffered

“diminution of their property value as a result of the presence

of the contaminants of benzene, ethyl benzene, toluene, tetryl

ethyl lead and MTBE on their property.” [Emphasis added]. 

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s construction of Section

1503 is overbroad:

Plaintiffs would not actually have had to

mention MTBE in the complaint at all. 

Defendant interprets ‘actual or threatened

contamination’ to mean that plaintiff does

not have to bring an action for ‘actual or

threatened contamination,’ only that MTBE be

present. Such a literal and simplistic

interpretation could allow Defendant to

remove any case whether the ‘threat of

contamination’ exists without regard to the

relevance of MTBE in the case. The Congress

did not create a new body of law to regulate

all fuel leaks where MTBE is present. 

Defendant wants the independent grant of

jurisdiction without any other basis, and

without regard to whether plaintiffs’

substantive complaint relies on, or asks for

relief as result of, MTBE contamination.

Plaintiffs’ argument is unpersuasive given the allegations

of the Amended Complaint. The Court need not address or resolve

Plaintiffs’ contention because, clearly, this is not a situation

where removal is attempted based solely on the defense position

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that MTBE must be present in the contaminated area. 

Plaintiffs’ assertion that remand will be proper once they

delete all references to MTBE from the Amended Complaint to

defeat federal jurisdiction is unsupported by citation of

authority. As Defendant notes, Ninth Circuit law is to the

contrary. See Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National Ass’n of

Securities Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9 Cir.1998): th

Finally, Sparta directs our attention to an

amended complaint it filed after removal in

which most references to exchange rule

violations were deleted. This is of no

moment to us, however, for jurisdiction must

be analyzed on the basis of the pleadings

filed at the time of removal without

reference to subsequent amendments ...

Because of this rule, a plaintiff may not

compel remand by amending a complaint to

eliminate the federal question upon which

removal was based.

Plaintiff further argues that removal is not required

because of the word “may” in Section 1503. This argument is of

no moment because Defendant, who has the legal right to remove an

action in which federal jurisdiction exists, elected to do so.

While Plaintiffs may be correct that their primary concern

is with contaminants other that MTBE, there is no question that

Paragraph 32 alleges that Plaintiffs have been damaged because of

the presence of MTBE. In addition, there are, as Defendant

points out in the Notice of Removal, numerous references to

contamination by MTBE in the Amended Complaint. While the burden

of establishing federal jurisdiction falls on the party invoking

removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, Harris v. Provident Life and Acc.

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Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 930, 932 (9 Cir.1994), Defendant has th

sustained this burden simply by referring to the allegations of

the Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs’ protestations that they did

not mean it are simply not persuasive in light of the

allegations. 

The motion to remand is DENIED. 

C. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS.

1. GOVERNING STANDARDS.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Novarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9 Cir.2001). Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is th

appropriate only where “it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-

46 (1957). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) where the

complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or where the complaint

presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential

facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9 Cir.1984). In reviewing a motion to th

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of

all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from

them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9 Cir.2002). However, th

legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they

are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock,

Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9 Cir.2003). Immunities and other th

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affirmative defenses may be upheld on a motion to dismiss only

when they are established on the face of the complaint. See

Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9 Cir.1999); Jablon v. th

Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9 Cir. 1980) When ruling th

on a motion to dismiss, the court may consider the facts alleged

in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents

relied upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity

is not contested, and matters of which the court takes judicial

notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-706 (9th

Cir.1988).

2. STATUTES OF LIMITATION.

Defendant argues that the Amended Complaint is barred by the

applicable statutes of limitation. 

The statute of limitations for tort causes of action arising

from injury to real property is three years. California Code of

Civil Procedure § 338(b). The statute of limitations for

violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et

seq. is four years. California Business & Professions Code §

17208. The statute of limitations for infliction of emotional

distress is two years. California Code of Civil Procedure §

335.1.

Defendant refers to the allegations at Paragraphs 24 and 43

of the Amended Complaint:

24. Through its own testing, ‘Defendants’

knew by at least 1988 of the presence of

petroleum hydrocarbons in subsurface soil and

groundwater. The ‘storage facility’ suffered

leaks that started to migrate into the

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surrounding soil and groundwater. 

‘Defendants’ conducted tests on their own

premises in 1988 and again in 1993. The

series of tests showed high levels of

petroleum hydrocarbons containing benzene,

xylenes, toluene, tetryl ethyl lead and other

harmful and carcinogenic compounds. In 1994

‘Defendants’ installed monitoring wells off

their property on Blossom Street, North of

the facility. In 1995, petroleum hydrocarbon

concentrations were seen to increase. Later,

‘floating product’ was observed in the wells

North of the ‘Defendants’ property. 

‘Defendants’ made no effort to determine the

extent of the spill despite continued high

readings of their own monitoring tests. In

2002, ‘Defendants’ tests showed the presence

of MTBE at levels of 1,200 micrograms per

liter in the soil bore tests and monitoring

well samples. ‘Defendants’ results showed

the presence of benzene at 25,000 micrograms

per liter of water, and ethyl benzene at

7,4000 micrograms per liter of water. Both

compounds are toxic and are listed as

carcinogens in the State of California. 

‘Defendants’ did not notify the surrounding

residences and businesses of the presence of

high levels of petroleum hydrocarbons in

areas outside of the ‘Defendants’ properties. 

Neither did ‘Defendants’ attempt to test any

area beyond those monitoring wells installed

in 1993 despite having knowledge of the

presence of high levels of petroleum

hydrocarbons in the monitoring wells

installed North of ‘Defendants’ property and

near ‘Plaintiffs’ (and each of them)

property.

...

43. At various times beginning in at least

1988 and continuing through the present date,

‘Defendants’ caused and/or permitted the

release of contaminants and failed to clean

up the contamination, or otherwise remedy the

situation so that the contaminants migrated

under properties owned by plaintiffs and into

subadjacent groundwater, and in such a manner

as to be injurious to plaintiffs’ health and

property, to obstruct plaintiffs’ and each of

their free use of their properties, yards,

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homes and outbuildings, to obstruct

plaintiffs’ and each of their quiet enjoyment

of life and property, thereby constituting a

nuisance under California Code of Civil

Procedure Sections 3479-3503.

Relying on these allegations, Defendant argues that the Amended

Complaint facially establishes that the statutes of limitations

on the various causes of action ran prior to the earliest

effective date, April 8, 2005, that Plaintiffs allege for the

tolling agreements between the parties.

Plaintiffs respond that the First Cause of Action for

negligence, the Second Cause of Action for damages for private

nuisance and the Third Cause of Action for trespass are not timebarred under the “continuing wrong” theory.

Defendant argues that the “continuing wrong” theory does not

apply to the tort of negligence. Defendant cites West Coast Home

Builders, Inc. v. Aventis Cropscience USA Inc., 2006 WL 1867717

(N.D.Cal.2006):

The Court concludes that plaintiff’s claims

for negligence, negligence per se,

ultrahazardous activity, and state law

declaratory relief are barred by the statute

of limitations. CAMSI IV v. Hunter

Technology Corporation, 230 Cal.App.3d 1525

(1991), is instructive. In CAMSI IV, a

plaintiff landowner sued a company that had

previously owned the land, alleging that the

former property owner had discharged volatile

organic chemicals onto the property. The

plaintiff alleged claims for negligence,

negligence per se, and strict

liability/ultrahazardous activity. Id. at

1532. The Court of Appeal held these claims

were time-barred because the complaint

alleged that the former property owner,

Hunter, had manufactured circuit boards on

the property until 1983, and thus ‘[u]nder

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the orthodox rule, the three-year limitation

period would have commenced no later than

1983 and expired in 1986,’ two years before

the plaintiff filed suit. Id. at 1534. The

court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that

its claims did not accrue until a regional

water quality control board issued an order

in 1986 requiring cleanup of the property:

[F]rom the face of the second

amended complaint, it is apparent

that any harm the alleged

tortfeasor, Hunter, had done to the

property had been completed by no

later than 1983, and that so far as

the complaint reflects the physical

aspects of that harm were not

progressive: The contamination of

the soil and groundwater, once and

to the extent caused by Hunter,

apparently remained constant.

Id. at 1535. 

Defendant also cites Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 230

Cal.App.3d 1125 (1991). In Mangini, the Court allowed the

plaintiff to amend to allege a continuing nuisance and a

continuing trespass but ruled that the causes of action for

negligence, negligence per se, and strict liability were timebarred.

Defendant’s authority that there cannot be continuing

negligence is not persuasive. Mangini does not discuss or hold

that such a theory is not possible. The facts of the Central

District case and the California decision cited by it are

different from those alleged in the Amended Complaint. From the

allegations of the Amended Complaint, the contamination of

plaintiffs’ properties is continuing to this day.

Defendant concedes in its reply brief that nuisance and

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trespass claims can invoke a continuing statute of limitations if

appropriate allegations are made. Defendant argues, however,

that the Amended Complaint does not contain the required

allegations. Defendant cites Beck Development Co. v. Southern

Pacific Transportation Company, 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1217 (1996),

as holding that ‘[a] plaintiff cannot simply allege that a

nuisance is continuing to avoid the bar of the statute of

limitations ...” and notes that Paragraph 43 of the Amended

Complaint alleges that Defendant’s conduct is “[c]ontinuing to

the present date.” 

At issue in Beck Development Co. was the election to treat a

nuisance as permanent or continuing. The Court of Appeal stated:

A plaintiff cannot simply allege that a

nuisance is continuing in order to avoid the

bar of the statute of limitations, but must

present evidence that under the circumstances

the nuisance may properly be considered

continuing rather than permanent ... It is

only where the evidence would reasonably

support either classification that the

plaintiff may choose which course to pursue.

Defendant also cites Mangini, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at 1146:

“Plaintiff’s proposed pleading therefore meets the crucial test

of a continuing nuisance: that the offensive condition is

abatable.”

Defendant raised these contentions for the first time in the

reply brief. Because Defendant moved to dismiss all causes of

action on the bar of the statute of limitations, it is improper

for Defendant to raise an alternative ground for dismissal of the

nuisance and trespass claims in the reply brief. See Northwest

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Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 923 (9th

Cir.1981); United States v. Boyce, 148 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1085

(S.D.Cal.2001).

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the negligence, nuisance and

trespass causes of action for failure to sufficiently allege the

continuing nature of the harm is DENIED. 

Defendant contends that all causes of action other than

nuisance and trespass are time-barred as established from the

face of the Amended Complaint. Defendant asserts that each

Plaintiff is required to allege specific facts that delay the

accrual of these time-barred causes of action. Defendant places

primary reliance on McKelvey v. Boeing North America, 74

Cal.App.4th 151 (1999).

In McKelvey, the plaintiffs argued that the allegations of

their complaints were sufficient to invoke the delayed discovery

rule to overcome the bar of the statute of limitations. The

Court of Appeals disagreed:

The common law rule - that an action for

personal injury or property damages accrues

on the date of injury - applies only as

modified by the ‘discovery rule,’ which

provides that the accrual date of a cause of

action is delayed until the plaintiff is

aware of his injury and its negligent cause. 

The plaintiff is charged with this awareness

as of the date he suspects or should suspect

that his injury was caused by wrongdoing,

that someone has done something wrong to him. 

Accordingly, the period of limitations will

begin to run without regard to whether the

plaintiff is aware of the specific facts

necessary to establish his claim, provided

that he has a ‘suspicion of wrongdoing,’

which he is charged with once he has ‘notice

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or information of circumstances to put a

reasonable person on inquiry.’ ... A

plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face

that his claim would be barred without the

benefit of the discovery rule must

specifically plead facts to show (1) the time

and manner of discovery and (2) the inability

to have made earlier discovery despite

reasonable diligence. The burden is on the

plaintiff to show diligence, and conclusory

allegations will not withstand demurrer ....

74 Cal.App.4th at 160. The Court of Appeals further noted:

There is absolutely no authority for

plaintiffs’ fanciful contention that they had

no duty of inquiry because they were not

purchasers or tenants of property owned or

managed by Boeing and thus were not in

‘privity’ with Boeing. When it is apparent

from the face of the complaint that, but for

the delayed discovery rule, the action would

be time barred, it is the plaintiff’s burden

to show diligence. For this reason, the

plaintiff must plead (and later prove) ‘the

facts showing: (a) lack of knowledge; (b)

lack of means of obtaining knowledge (in the

exercise of reasonable diligence the facts

could not have been discovered at an earlier

date); (c) how and when he did actually

discover the fraud or mistake. Under this

rule, constructive and presumed knowledge are

equivalent to knowledge. So, when the

plaintiff has notice of information or

circumstances to put a reasonable person on

inquiry, or has the opportunity to obtain

knowledge from sources open to his

investigation (such as public records or

corporation books), the statute commences to

run.’ (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th

ed.1996) Actions, § 602, p.773, italics

added.

74 Cal.App.4th 160 n.11.

In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-514

(2002), the Supreme Court rejected application of a heightened

pleading standard in employment discrimination cases because such

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a standard conflicts with Rule 8(a)(2), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, that a complaint must include only ‘a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” The Supreme Court held:

Such a statement must simply ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s

claim is and the grounds upon which it is

rests.’ ... This simplified notice pleading

standard relies on liberal discovery rules

and summary judgment motions to define

disputed facts and issues and to dispose of

unmeritorious claims. ... ‘The provisions for

discovery are so flexible and the provisions

for pretrial procedure and summary judgment

so effective, that attempted surprise in

federal practice is aborted very easily,

synthetic issues detected, and the gravamen

of the dispute brought frankly into the open

for the inspection of the court.’ ....

Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard

applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions. Rule 9(b), for example, provides

for greater particularity in all averments of

fraud or mistake. This Court, however, has

declined to extend such exceptions to other

contexts. In Leatherman we stated: ‘[T]he

Federal Rules do address in Rule 9(b) the

question of the need for greater

particularity in pleading certain actions,

but do not include among the enumerated

actions any reference to complaints alleging

municipal liability under § 1983. Expressio

unius est exclusio alterius.’ ... Just as

Rule 9(b) makes no mention of municipal

liability under ... § 1983 ..., neither does

it refer to employment discrimination. Thus,

complaints in these cases, as in most others,

must satisfy only the simple requirements of

Rule 8(a).

Other provisions of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure are inextricably linked to

Rule 8(a)’s simplified notice pleading

standard. Rule 8(e)(1) states that ‘[n]o

technical forms of pleading or motions are

required,’ and Rule 8(f) provides that ‘[a]ll

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pleadings shall be so construed as to do

substantial justice.’ Given the Federal

Rules’ simplified standard for pleading, ‘[a]

court may dismiss a complaint only if it is

clear that no relief could be granted under

any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations.’ ... If a

pleading fails to specify the allegations in

a manner that provides sufficient notice, a

defendant can move for a more definite

statement under Rule 12(e) before responding. 

Moreover, claims lacking merit may be dealt

with through summary judgment under Rule 56. 

The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is

the starting point of a simplified pleading

system, which was adopted to focus litigation

on the merits of the claim ....

In California Sansome Co. v. U.S. Gypsum, 55 F.3d 1402, 1407

(9 Cir.1995), the Ninth Circuit, when discussing California’s th

discovery rule, stated: “All parties agree that the burden is on

Sansome to plead and prove the facts necessary to toll the

limitations period once it is established that it would have

otherwise commenced.” In Adobe Lumber, Inc. v. Hellman, 415

F.Supp.2d 1070, 1081 (E.D.Cal.2006), Judge Shubb ruled in

pertinent part:

Plaintiff correctly points out that the

heightened pleading standard of the discovery

rule seems to conflict with the liberal

notice pleading standard in Federal rule of

Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). However, the Ninth

Circuit has unequivocally held that in order

to rely on a defense to a statute of

limitations challenge provided by state law,

plaintiff must meet the pleading requirements

of state law. Cal. Sansome Co. v. U.S.

Gypsum, 55 F.3d 1402, 1407 (9 Cir. th

1995)(recognizing that ‘plaintiff must allege

specific facts establishing the applicability

of the discovery-rule exception’ but need not

‘specifically allege when the cause of action

accrued’); Gallardo v. DiCarlo, 203 F.Supp.2d

1160, 1169 n.[1]3 (C.D.Cal.2002)(refusing to

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apply the discovery rule because plaintiff

failed to plead specific facts addressing the

time and manner of discovery and plaintiff’s

diligence).

It is unclear to what extent California Sansome Co. remains good

law - it was decided years before Swierkiewicz. The district

court opinions applying California Sansome do not mention

Swierkiewicz. Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1270

n.3 (9 Cir.2006), notes: th

Pleading requirements differ between federal

law and California law. California law

requires that a complaint contain ‘a

statement of the facts constituting the cause

of action, in ordinary and concise language.’ 

Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 425.10(a)(1) ... On the

other hand, ‘[t]he Federal Rules do not use

the term “cause of action,” and their

emphasis is on the factual rather than the

“legal right” aspects of the cause of

action.’ 4 B.E. Witkin, California Procedure

§ 25 (4 ed.2006). The Federal Rules do not th

require that the complaint state all of the

facts constituting a cause of action:

Conspicuously absent from Federal

Rule 8(a)(2) is the requirement

found in the codes that the pleader

set forth the ‘facts’ constituting

a ‘cause of action.’ The

substitution of ‘claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief’

for the code formulation of the

‘facts’ constituting a ‘cause of

action’ was intended to avoid the

distinctions drawn under the codes

... and eliminate the unfortunate

rigidity and confusion surrounding

the words ‘cause of action.’

5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3rd

ed.2006). Under federal law, the primary aim

of the pleading requirements is to give fair

notice to the other party. Unlike California

law, ‘[a] reading of Garcia, Conley, and

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Swierkiewicz, and a host of other cases ...

suggests that the complaint, and other

relief-claiming pleadings need not state with

precision all of the elements that are

necessary to give rise to a legal basis for

recovery as long as fair notice of the nature

of the action is provided to the opposing

party.’ Id. (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema

N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 ... (2002); Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 ... (1957); Garcia

v. Hilton Hotels Int’l, 97 F.Supp. 5, 8

(D.P.R.1951).

Despite this tension between notice pleading under Rule 8

and code pleading under California law, the applicable law places

the burden on Plaintiffs to plead facts to justify delayed

discovery. Defendant argues that the Amended Complaint does not

do this. Defendant refers to documents attached to its Request

for Judicial Notice which are documents generated by the local

Regional Water Quality Control Board and other governmental

entities dating back to the late 1980s and continuing every year

to the present. Defendant asserts:

The Regional Water Quality Control Board’s

files were and are available to the public

under California’s version of the Freedom of

Information Act, known as the California

Public Records Act. Thus, Plaintiffs had the

means of obtaining the knowledge that the

events triggering the running of the statute

of limitations period had occurred.

Defendant further argues that the Amended Complaint fails with

regard to each Plaintiff to allege facts showing that the

exercise of reasonable diligence would not have discovered the

operative facts at an earlier date:

[T]hey have fatally pled allegations showing

that they were on notice of Defendants’

investigation of environmental conditions in

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the street in front of - and less than 175

feet from - their residences. Specifically,

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant ‘installed

monitoring wells ... on Blossom Street, North

of the facility’ (Complaint at 24, p.7:10-

11), that these monitoring wells were

installed ‘near Plaintiffs (and each of them)

property” (Id. at 24, p.7:21-22), that

‘Plaintiffs’ homes are located on the north

side of Blossom Street’ (Id. at 1, p.2:3) and

that Defendant’s property ‘is between 50 and

175 feet from [P]laintiffs’ yards and homes

(Id. at 22, p.6:23). The Complaint thus

establishes that the investigation of the

alleged contamination was occurring less than

175 feet, and in some cases less than 50

feet, from each and every one of the

Plaintiffs’ properties.

Defendant also refers to public agency records submitted with the

Request for Judicial Notice that in June 1993, Defendant was

drilling investigatory wells in Blossom Street near Plaintiffs’

homes, blocking traffic lanes in the process. Defendant argues

that, coupled with the other information alleged, “it stretches

the limits of credulity for Plaintiffs to assert they were not

obligated to exercise reasonable diligence to investigate

further.” 

Plaintiffs respond by noting that in McKelvey, the

complaints at issue alleged that “‘public notices and newspaper

articles were published about [Boeing’s] intentional, reckless

and/or negligent conduct.’” The Court of Appeals held:

In the face of that admission, plaintiffs’

conclusory assertion that they ‘were and are

not [sic] aware of the actual and potential

harm caused by [Boeing’s] conduct’ is

patently inadequate. Without resort to the

matters submitted to the court for judicial

notice, the bottom line is that plaintiffs’

amended (and proposed amended) complaints

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acknowledge the publicity surrounding

Boeing’s operation of the Rocketdyne

facilities, yet nevertheless fail to explain

how they managed to ignore those ‘newspaper

articles.’ Other than a general reference to

an entire year and an ambiguous reference to

an undated report (‘the final report of the

University of California at Los Angeles’

Rocketdyne Worker Health Study’), they have

not alleged facts about the time or manner of

discovery; discovery despite reasonable

diligence ... They do not allege that they

did not read, hear or see the articles and

broadcasts they admit were published.

McKelvey, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at 161. 

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant does not assert widespread

publicity about its acts of contamination and contend that

“[m]assive publicity ... is much different that the mere

existence of documents at a Regional Water Quality Control

Office.” Plaintiffs contend that they “have not expressly or

impliedly alleged that they were on notice of Defendant’s

wrongful conduct before April 8, 2004, when the California

Regional Water Quality Control Board issued a letter ...

notifying the owners of the properties North of Defendant’s

facility that contamination ‘may have migrated beneath

Plaintiffs’ properties.” 

With regard to Defendant’s installation of monitoring wells

near Plaintiffs’ properties, Plaintiffs refer to the allegation

at Paragraph 24 of the Amended Complaint that “‘Defendants’ did

not notify the surrounding residences and businesses of the

presence of high levels of petroleum hydrocarbons in areas

outside of the ‘Defendants’ properties” and did not “attempt to

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test any area beyond those monitoring wells installed in 1993

despite having knowledge of the presence of high levels of

petroleum hydrocarbons in the monitoring wells installed North of

‘Defendants’ property and near ‘Plaintiffs’ (and each of them)

property.” Plaintiffs also refer to the allegation at Paragraph

26:

In November of 2004, ‘Defendants’ began to

install the first nested wells on all of the

herein named plaintiffs’ properties, and

monitoring of these wells began on December

22, 2004. Plaintiffs therefore had no notice

that petroleum hydrocarbons existed on and

under their property until December 22, 2004. 

Plaintiffs argue that the April 8, 2004 letter from the CWQCB

that “[t]he release of gasoline and diesel fuel from the property

in past years has impacted the ground water which now may have

migrated beneath your property ...” was the first notice that

Plaintiffs could reasonably have understood that there could be

damage to their properties. Plaintiffs contend:

When one factors in the Tolling Agreement,

each cause of action that Plaintiffs have

asserted has been filed well within the

applicable statute of limitations. The

letter from the California Regional Water

Quality Control Board was sent on April 8,

2004. The Statute of Limitations was tolled

by agreement of the parties from April 8,

2005 to September 12, 2007. The Plaintiffs’

Complaint was filed September 14, 2007;

therefore, none of Plaintiffs’ causes of

action are barred by the Statute of

Limitations.

Defendant responds by noting that constructive notice

constitutes notice: “Plaintiffs concede, in addition to the

environmental investigation and remediation work that occurred

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literally in front of their front doors, there were public

records available from which Plaintiffs could have known about

the alleged contamination as early as the late 1980s/early

1990s.”

There are numerous factual issues involved in this aspect of

the motion to dismiss. For example, the testing and drilling on

Defendant’s facility and the work done on Blossom Street - were

these actions publicized as an environmental investigation/clean

up? When did it become known to Defendant or the Water Board

that the contaminated ground had possibly migrated under

Plaintiffs’ properties? Defendant’s property could have been

contaminated years before Plaintiffs’ properties. A review of

the documents submitted with Defendant’s Request for Judicial

Notice indicates that, other than the April 8, 2004 letter

previously quoted, all of the documents pertain to contamination

at the site, i.e., Defendant’s facility. Therefore, when each

Plaintiff discovered their respective injury raises questions of

fact. Plaintiffs allege they did not know the purpose of the

monitoring wells; what test results were achieved; or that they

had any duty to inquire about the wells unless and until

Defendant publically disclosed the purpose of the wells and

testing results.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the bar of the

statute of limitations and the failure to plead the discovery

rule as required by California law is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

3. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD-CONCEALMENT.

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The Fourth Cause of Action incorporates all preceding

allegations and further alleges:

54. At various times beginning in at least

1988 and continuing through April 8, 2004,

Defendants and each of them knew of the

presence of contaminants on said defendants’

property and on property north of their

‘storage facility.’ [sic] Defendants ...

through their own monitoring discovered

dangerous levels of hydrocarbons in the soil

and subadjacent ground water in wells dug on

Blossom Street and other areas surrounding

said defendants’ ‘storage facility.’

55. Despite high readings for benzene,

toluene, xylenes and other carcinogenic

substances, ‘Defendants’ ... performed no new

tests and made no effort to clean up the

contamination said defendants had discovered. 

Defendants ... further ... made no efforts to

contact any homeowners or persons living near

the ‘storage facility’ regarding their

findings, until required to do so by the

California Regional Water Quality Control

Board in April 2004.

56. Defendants ... by their actions,

knowingly and/or intentionally failed to

disclose said important fact, that was known

only to said defendants, and said fact was

one that the plaintiffs ... could not have

reasonably discovered.

57. Plaintiffs and each of them had no

reason to suspect that a petroleum

hydrocarbon plume existed under or near their

respective properties until April 14, 2004 at

the earliest when the first plaintiff

received notice from the Regional Quality

Control Board [sic] of the potential for

existence of petroleum hydrocarbons under

plaintiffs’ and each of their properties. 

Plaintiffs and each of them did not know of

the actual existence of dangerous

hydrocarbons in their soil and in the

subadjacent groundwater until monitoring

wells were installed in November and December

of 2004 on plaintiffs’ respective properties. 

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58. Defendants ... intended to deceive

plaintiffs and each of them by concealing the

fact that said defendants knew of the

existence of petroleum hydrocarbons located

off the ‘storage facility,’ that the

petroleum hydrocarbon plume migrated from

said defendants ‘storage facility,’ that the

said product had migrated north from the

‘storage facility’ on a path which a

reasonable person would believe would migrate

onto plaintiff’s and each of their property,

that said defendants had discovered large

amounts of petroleum in the wells dug north

of the ‘storage facility,’ which would lead a

reasonable person to believe that said

contaminants had migrated onto, into and/or

under said plaintiffs’ properties.

59. Plaintiffs ... reasonably relied on the

belief that Defendants ... were operating

their plant and/or ‘storage facility’ in a

safe and reasonable fashion, and that no

danger existed to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs

also relied on the belief that said

defendants would notify said plaintiffs if

said defendants believed that petroleum

hydrocarbons had leaked and migrated onto the

said plaintiffs’ properties. Plaintiffs and

each of them were harmed as alleged ....

Defendant moves to dismiss the Fourth Cause of Action on the

ground that Plaintiffs have not alleged any fiduciary

relationship or transaction between Defendant and Plaintiffs that

would give rise to a duty to disclose. 

Plaintiffs concede that, ordinarily, a failure to disclose

material facts is not actionable fraud unless there is some

fiduciary relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose. 

However, Plaintiffs contend “‘[t]he duty to disclose may arise

without any confidential relationship where the defendant alone

has knowledge of material facts which are not accessible to the

plaintiff.’” Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc., 48 Cal.App.4th 471,

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482 (1996). In addition, Plaintiffs contend, “[e]ven if a

fiduciary relationship is not involved, a nondisclosure claim

arises when the defendant makes representations but fails to

disclose additional facts which materially qualify the facts

disclosed, or which render the disclosure likely to mislead.” 

Roddenberry v. Roddenberry, 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 666 (1996).

Relying on these principles, Plaintiffs assert that they have

alleged that Defendant possessed knowledge about its wrongful

acts of contamination, affecting nearby landowners and that

Plaintiffs did not possess such knowledge. Plaintiffs further

assert that they have alleged they reasonably relief upon their

belief that Defendant was operating the storage facility in a

safe manner and that no danger existed to Plaintiffs or their

properties.

The Fourth Cause of Action does not state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Plaintiffs have not and cannot allege

that Defendant alone has knowledge of material facts which were 

not accessible to the Plaintiffs. From the documents submitted

with Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice, both the Merced

County Department of Public Health and the Regional Water Quality

Control Board were aware of the information that petroleum

hydrocarbons were leaking at the storage facility and ultimately

were aware that they may have migrated under Plaintiffs’

properties. Plaintiffs have not alleged any affirmative 

misrepresentation by Defendant; they only allege their belief

that Defendant “would” operate the storage facility in a safe

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manner. This does not implicate a duty to disclose. No claim

for concealment or fraud has been stated. The motion to dismiss

the Fourth Cause of Action is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

4. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.

The Fifth Cause of Action for intentional infliction of

emotional distress, after incorporating all prior allegations

alleges in pertinent part:

64. Defendants, and each of them,

intentionally caused said plaintiffs severe

and continuing emotional distress. 

Defendants and each of their conduct was

extreme and outrageous and displayed a

reckless disregard of the probability of

causing emotional distress. Defendants and

each of them, learned that petroleum

hydrocarbons had leaked into the soil in and

around said defendants’ storage facility. 

Said defendants learned by at least 1993 that

petroleum hydrocarbons had migrated through

the soil and groundwater and off of their

storage facility, but failed to inform

plaintiffs or any of them of said findings.

65. In April of 2004, Defendants notified

said plaintiffs of the potential of the

existence of petroleum hydrocarbons near said

plaintiffs’ properties. Testing confirmed

the presence of petroleum hydrocarbons in the

soil on and/or under said plaintiffs’

respective properties and subadjacent

groundwater in December of 2004, over 10

years after defendants learned of the

potential migration of hydrocarbons onto said

plaintiffs’ properties.

66. Plaintiffs and each of them, upon

learning of the presence of petroleum

hydrocarbons first near, and later on, their

properties, suffered severe emotional

distress both because of damage to their

properties as well as potential health risks

to themselves and their families.

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67. Defendants and each of their conduct by

first causing the leak of petroleum

hydrocarbons into the soil and groundwater

and then knowingly and/or intentionally

concealing the existence of petroleum

hydrocarbons near said plaintiffs’ homes

caused said plaintiffs, upon learning of the

presence of petroleum hydrocarbons on, and

under, their soil and subadjacent ground

water, severe emotional distress.

68. As a result of exposure to petroleum

hydrocarbons and its constituent product,

benzene, toluene, xylenes, MTBE, tetryl ethyl

lead (TEL) and other known carcinogens and

harmful compounds contained in petroleum

hydrocarbons, the need for future medical

monitoring is reasonably certain, and given

the long exposure plaintiffs and each of them

have suffered and the highly toxic nature of

the substances, the need for future medical

monitoring is reasonable.

69. As a result of living over the toxic

plume for over two years and possibly much

longer, plaintiffs and each of them have

suffered and will continue to suffer,

significant and extended exposure to known

carcinogens contained in petroleum

hydrocarbons, which have migrated under their

respective properties.

70. California Proposition 65 lists benzene,

ethyl benzene and toluene as known

carcinogens and/or chemicals known to cause

reproductive toxicity. Defendants own

testing shows high concentrations of those

chemical compounds in the soil and

subadjacent ground water on and under

plaintiffs property.

71. Plaintiffs and each of them suffer risk

of cancer, specifically leukemia, which is

raised significantly by exposure to benzene

in the air, ground and water. Plaintiffs ...

can be significantly helped by early and

ongoing detection of benzene exposure and the

presence of it in their respective

environment or in or on their respective

person. Medical detection is necessary as is

medical monitoring until a reasonable amount

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of time has passed after all contaminants

have been completely removed from the herein

described soil. It is reasonable given said

plaintiffs’ past and ongoing exposure, and

said defendants’ failure to take steps to

remedy said plaintiffs’ exposure.

Defendants move to dismiss this cause of action, relying on

Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965 (1993).

In Potter, residents living near a landfill, at which the

dumping of toxic substances was prohibited, brought an action

against Firestone for dumping toxic waste materials at the site,

alleging that their water supply was thereby contaminated. The

trial court entered judgment for plaintiffs, finding that

Firestone was negligent, that negligent and intentional

infliction of emotional distress was established, and that

Firestone’s conduct was ultrahazardous activity that would

subject Firestone to strict liability. Plaintiffs were awarded

damages for their fear of cancer and resultant emotional

distress, punitive damages, and damages for future medical

monitoring. 

The Court of Appeal reversed the awards for medical

monitoring costs, as well as a postjudgment order directing

Firestone to pay costs and interest, but otherwise affirmed the

judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court

of Appeal that had affirmed the award of punitive damages and the

fear of cancer damages. It also overturned the reversal of the

award for future medical monitoring. As to the award of damages

for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Supreme

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Court ruled:

‘The elements of the tort of intentional

infliction of emotional distress are: “‘(1)

extreme and outrageous conduct by the

defendant with the intention of causing, or

reckless disregard of the probability of

causing, emotional distress; (2) the

plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme

emotional distress; and (3) actual and

proximate causation of the emotional distress

by the defendant’s outrageous conduct ....’ 

Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme

as to exceed all bounds of that usually

tolerated in a civilized community.” ... The

defendant must have engaged in “conduct

intended to inflict injury or engaged in with

the realization that injury will result.”

....’ (Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at

p.903.)

In Christensen, supra, we held that ‘”[t]he

law limits claims of intentional infliction

of emotional distress to egregious conduct

toward plaintiff proximately caused by

defendant.” ... The only exception to this

rule is that recognized when the defendant is

aware, but acts with reckless disregard, of

the plaintiff and the probability that his or

her conduct will cause severe emotional

distress to that plaintiff ... Where reckless

disregard of the plaintiff’s interests is the

theory of recovery, the presence of the

plaintiff at the time the outrageous conduct

occurs is recognized as the element

establishing a higher degree of culpability

which, in turn, justifies recovery of greater

damages by a broader group of plaintiffs than

allowed on a negligent infliction of

emotional distress theory ....’ 

(Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 905-906

....)

Thus, ‘[i]t is not enough that the conduct be

intentional and outrageous. It must be

conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur

in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the

defendant is aware.’ (Christensen, supra, 54

Cal.3d at p. 903 ....) ‘The requirement that

the defendant’s conduct be directed primarily

at the plaintiff is a factor which

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distinguishes intentional infliction of

emotional distress from the negligent

infliction of such injury.’ ....

In this case, it is ambiguous whether the

lower courts determined that Firestone’s

conduct was directed at these particular

plaintiffs in the sense intended by

Christensen ... Although the Court of Appeal

correctly rejected Firestone’s contention

that Firestone was not liable because it did

not know the particular names of any

individual whose groundwater was contaminated

by the hazardous waste, it is unclear whether

it believed that Firestone was actually aware

of the presence of these particular

plaintiffs and their consumption and use of

the water.

Furthermore, it is questionable whether the

trial court made a finding that Firestone

possessed the requisite knowledge, and if so,

whether such a finding would be supported by

substantial evidence. Although the trial

court concluded that Firestone ‘had to

realize’ that the eventual discovery of the

toxic contamination ‘by those drinking the

contaminated water would almost certainly

result in their suffering severe emotional

distress,’ this may be interpreted in one of

two ways. First, this may have been a

finding that Firestone actually knew of these

particular plaintiffs and their consumption

of the water, and nevertheless sent

prohibited wastes to Crazy Horse despite a

realization that plaintiffs would almost

certainly suffer severe emotional distress

upon their discovery of the facts. 

Alternatively, this may have been a finding

that Firestone had to have realized that its

misconduct was almost certain to cause severe

emotional distress to any person who might

foreseeably consume the water and

subsequently discover the facts. Although

the knowledge requirement is met under the

first interpretation of the court’s ruling,

it is not satisfied under the second because

knowledge of these particular plaintiffs is

lacking.

This conclusion is consistent with the result

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reached in Christensen ... There we held

that, even though it was alleged that

defendants’ conduct in mishandling the

remains of deceased persons was intentional

and outrageous and was substantially certain

to cause extreme emotional distress to

relatives and close friends of the deceased,

the plaintiffs’ cause of action for

intentional infliction of emotional distress

was not sufficiently supported where there

was no allegation that the defendants’

misconduct was directed primarily at

plaintiffs, or that it was calculated to

cause them severe emotional distress, or that

it was done with knowledge of their presence

and with a substantial certainty that they

would suffer severe emotional injury. 

(Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 903,

906.)

...

For guidance of the lower courts should the

Court of Appeal determine that a retrial on

this claim is appropriate, we hold that

recovery of fear of cancer damages in actions

for intentional infliction of emotional

distress should not depend on a showing of a

medically corroborated belief that it is more

likely than not that the plaintiff will

develop the feared cancer as a result of the

toxic exposure.

The reasons for not applying the more likely

than not threshold are obvious. First, the

intentional infliction cause of action

requires a showing of ‘extreme and outrageous

conduct’ which is directed at the plaintiff

... Thus, a high degree of culpability is

required which justifies recovery of greater

damages by a broader group of plaintiffs than

allowed in an ordinary negligence action ...

Moreover, where a defendant undertakes

extreme and outrageous conduct toward the

plaintiff, the concern that liability will be

imposed out of proportion to fault is not

present. Finally, the requirement of extreme

and outrageous conduct directed at the

plaintiff places adequate limitations on the

class of potential plaintiffs who might sue

for fear of cancer under this theory. 

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Therefore, the public policy concerns

supporting application of the heightened

threshold (see pt. II.A.2.c., ante) are not

implicated.

Of course, even though the heightened

threshold is not applicable to intentional

infliction actions, it must nevertheless be

established that the plaintiff’s fear of

cancer is reasonable, that is, that the fear

is based upon medically or scientifically

corroborated knowledge that the defendant’s

conduct has significantly increased the

plaintiff’s risk of cancer and that the

plaintiff’s actual risk of the threatened

cancer is significant. Reasonableness of the

fear is required because in intentional

infliction actions, recovery is allowed only

for ‘severe or extreme emotional distress.’

... Severe emotional distress means

‘”emotional distress of such substantial

quality or enduring quality that no

reasonable [person] in civilized society

should be expected to endure it.”’ ....

6 Cal.4th at 1001-1004.

At the hearing, Defendant argued that the Fifth Cause of

Action fails to allege that Defendant’s conduct was outrageous or

that the conduct was directed to these particular plaintiffs. 

Defendant further argued that each plaintiff must specifically

allege a significant risk of cancer on an individual basis. 

Although the Fifth Cause of Action does not allege that

Defendant’s conduct was directed toward the named plaintiffs as

required by Potter and Christensen, Potter makes clear that the

heightened pleading required under California pleading laws to

state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, see

infra, has no application to a claim for intentional infliction

of emotional distress based on a fear of cancer. This claim is

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best addressed by dispositive motion. The motion to dismiss is

DENIED. 

5. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS; FEAR OF CANCER.

The Sixth Cause of Action for negligent infliction of

emotional distress based on a fear of cancer alleges that each

plaintiff was exposed to toxic and carcinogenic substances as a

result of Defendant’s negligent conduct; and further alleges:

75. Defendants ... acted with malice,

oppression and/or fraudulent intent because

said defendants’ conduct was despicable and

was carried out with wilful and/or conscious

disregard of said plaintiffs’ rights and/or

safety and that said defendants knew of

petroleum hydrocarbons, knew that the

petroleum hydrocarbons had migrated off of

their property, and that the petroleum

hydrocarbons had migrated near said

plaintiffs’ properties. Despite this fact,

said defendants failed to alert or notify any

of the said plaintiffs that the potential

existed for petroleum hydrocarbons to be in

and/or under said plaintiffs’ soil, despite

the fact that said defendants ... knew of the

existence of these hydrocarbons for over 10

years prior to disclosure.

76. Defendants ... knowingly and/or

intentionally concealed the said material

facts known to said defendants, with a

willful and knowing disregard of the safety

of others and of said plaintiffs and that

said concealment would expose said plaintiffs

and each of them to significant harm.

77. Plaintiffs, and each of them, have

suffered serious emotional distress from

fears that they will develop cancer and/or

long term health effects as a result of said

exposure. Reliable medical or scientific

opinion confirms that plaintiffs’ risks of

developing cancer and/or long term health

effects will significantly increase by the

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exposure and an actual risk that is

significant. 

In Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., supra, 6 Cal.4th

965, the Supreme Court addressed a similar claim of negligent

infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court held that

the Court of Appeal erred in concluding the reasonableness of

plaintiffs’ fear of cancer claims was established by the mere

fact of exposure to toxins or a significant increase in the risk

of cancer. Absent a present physical injury or illness, fear of

cancer damages are recoverable only if the fear stems from

knowing it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will

discover cancer due to the exposure. The Supreme Court held that

these plaintiffs were excepted from having to prove it was

probable that cancer would develop, since Firestone’s conduct

brought the case within the “oppression, fraud or malice”

exception for recovery for fear of cancer damages. The

California Supreme Court held:

[W]ith respect to negligent infliction of

emotional distress claims arising out of

exposure to carcinogens and/or other toxic

substances: Unless an express exception to

this general rule is recognized, in the

absence of a present physical injury or

illness, damages for fear of cancer may be

recovered only if the plaintiff pleads and

proves that (1) as a result of the

defendant’s negligent breach of a duty owed

to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is exposed to

a toxic substance which threatens cancer; and

(2) the plaintiff’s fear stems from a

knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical

or scientific opinion, that it is more likely

than not that the plaintiff will develop the

cancer in the future due to the toxic

exposure. Under this rule, a plaintiff must

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do more than simply establish knowledge of a

toxic ingestion or exposure and a significant

increased risk of cancer. The plaintiff must

further show that based upon reliable medical

or scientific opinion, the plaintiff harbors

a serious fear that the toxic ingestion or

exposure was of such magnitude and proportion

as to likely result in the feared cancer.

6 Cal.4th at 997. There is an exception to this general rule,

where the plaintiff pleads and proves that the defendant’s

conduct in causing the exposure amounts to “oppression, fraud, or

malice” as defined in Civil Code § 3294:

[I]n the absence of a physical injury or

illness, a plaintiff may recover damages for

negligently inflicted emotional distress

engendered by a fear of cancer without

meeting the more likely than not threshold if

the plaintiff pleads and proves that: (1) as

a result of the defendant’s negligent breach

of a duty owed to the plaintiff, he or she is

exposed to a toxic substance which threatens

cancer; (2) the defendant, in breaching its

duty to the plaintiff; acted with oppression,

fraud or malice as defined in Civil Code

section 3294; and (3) the plaintiff’s fear of

cancer stems from a knowledge, corroborated

by reliable medical or scientific opinion,

that the toxic exposure caused by the

defendant’s breach of duty has significantly

increased the plaintiff’s risk of cancer and 

has resulted in an actual risk of cancer that

is significant.

Id. at 999-1000. The Supreme Court’s holding “is equally

relevant to emotional distress engendered by fear that other

types of serious physical illness or injury may result from toxic

exposure.” Id. at 980 n.5.

Defendant invokes Potter to argue the allegations of the

Amended Complaint do not satisfy the Potter requirements for the

recovery of fear of cancer damages arising from negligent

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infliction of emotional distress, because each individually named 

plaintiff has not made the required allegations. Defendant

asserts that “risk is an individual issue, not group”, which

depends on various factors such as age, lifestyle, etc.

Defendant’s motion is without merit. The Amended

Complaint’s allegations meet the Potter requirements, especially

in light of federal notice pleading requirements. Whether or not

Plaintiffs can prove their respective entitlement to such

recovery is a matter for the trier of fact.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Sixth Cause of Action is

DENIED.

6. SEVENTH AND EIGHTH CAUSES OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION

CALIFORNIA BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE §§ 17200 et seq.

The Seventh Cause of Action incorporates all preceding

allegations and alleges that California Business & Professions

Code §§ 17200 provides that “unfair competition shall mean and

include any unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practice”;

and goes on further to allege:

81. Defendants, and each of them, did engage

in and continue to engage in the practice of

intentionally, willfully and wantonly

operating their bulk fuel storage facility

despite knowing as early as 1988 or before

that there was ongoing leakage at said

facility and that said leak was substantial

enough to cause large amounts of highly toxic

chemicals to leak into the soil and

subadjacent groundwater. Defendants and each

of them persisted and continue to persist in

this practice to the present time.

82. Defendants and each of them concealed

the fact that petroleum hydrocarbons had

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[begun] to leak into the soil and groundwater

around the ‘storage facilities’ in the 1970's

and 1980's. After said defendants started

[performing] tests and maintaining records in

approximately 1988, said defendants knew or

should have known, that based on the sheer

amount of petroleum hydrocarbons in the soil

and groundwater most certainly had migrated

off of the ‘storage facilities.’ By the time

the said defendants started conducting tests

off of the ‘storage facilities’ site in 1993,

defendants and each of them knew of the large

amounts of petroleum hydrocarbons present in

the adjacent soil, yet failed to notify

surrounding residents of the danger.

...

84. An action for injunctive relief and

restitution under the Unfair Competition Act

is specifically authorized by Business &

[Professions] Code § 17203.

The Eighth Cause of Action incorporates all preceding allegations

and alleges:

88. Proposition 65 requires clear and

reasonable warnings be given by persons who,

in the course of doing business, knowingly

and intentionally expose any individual to a

chemical known to the State of California to

cause cancer or reproductive harm.

89. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and

thereon allege, that Defendants, and each of

them, have engaged in conduct which violates

Health & Safety Code § 25249.6 et seq. This

conduct includes releasing into the

environment harmful substances in the form of

petroleum hydrocarbons containing Proposition

65 listed chemicals ... without a clear and

reasonable warning or notice to persons

potentially or actually affected, within the

meaning of Health & Safety Code §§ 25249.6

and 25249.11.

90. In addition, said defendants have

engaged in unfair competition in violation of

Business & [Professions] Code § 17200 by

operating their facility in violation of

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State and Federal environmental laws, and by

allowing the ongoing release of chemicals

known to cause cancer and birth defects while

said defendants competitors in the industry

were expected to operate in a safe, ethical

and fair manner.

...

94. By committing the acts alleged above,

said defendants and each of them, have

violated and continue to violate Proposition

65, and thereby have engaged in an unlawful

business practice constituting unfair

competition in violation of California

Business & Professions Code § 17203.

California Health & Safety Code § 25249.6 provides:

No person in the course of doing business

shall knowingly and intentionally expose any

individual to a chemical known to the state

to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity

without first giving clear and reasonable

warning to such individual, except as

provided in Section 25249.10.

Defendant moves to dismiss the Seventh Cause of Action

because the Amended Complaint does not allege that Defendant “is

in violation of any permit requirement governing its operations,

that Defendant is in violation of any Regional Water Quality

Control Board order, or that Defendant is in violation of any law

whatsoever.” Defendants assert that, because Plaintiffs cannot

plead a material violation of law, they premise the Seventh Cause

of Action on a failure to warn theory, and:

This assertion is rather amazing because

Plaintiffs cannot deny that they were

apprised of, and warned about, site

conditions by the Regional Water Quality

Control Board and the Defendant. Considering

that the Regional Water Quality Control Board

and the Merced County Department of Public

Health were aware of the existence of the

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contamination from the inception of its

discovery in 1988, of all of the material

conditions plead in the Complaint, and of the

current status of Defendant’s operations, the

Complaint’s silence speaks volumes.

Plaintiffs respond that Defendant’s contention that no

violations of law are alleged is belied by the allegations in the

Amended Complaint. 

The only laws alleged to have been violated by Defendants

are Proposition 65 and Business & Professions Code § 17200. At

the hearing, Plaintiffs conceded that they cannot bring a private

right of action for violation of Proposition 65 because they have

not complied with the requirements in California Health & Safety

Code § 25249.7(d)(1). 

This concession precludes Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Unfair

Competition Law to state a claim against Defendants under either

the Seventh or the Eighth Causes of Action. See In re Vaccine

Cases, 134 Cal.App.4th 438, 457-459 (2005)(“Proposition 65

conditioned a private right of action for violation of the [Safe

Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, Health & Safety

Code §§ 25249.5 et seq.] on compliance with these substantive

provisions. To allow plaintiffs to bring a UCL action against

... defendants without complying with section 25249.7,

subdivision (d)(1), would frustrate the purpose of this

requirement and would nullify its enactment.”) 

Defendants further move to dismiss the Seventh Cause of

Action to the extent that the Seventh Cause of Action seeks

restitution as a remedy. Defendant cites State v. Altus Finance,

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S.A., 36 Cal.4th 1284, 1304 (2005): “A UCL claim for restitution

seeks to compel ‘defendant[s] to return money obtained through an

unfair business practice to those persons in interest from whom

the property was taken, that is, to persons who had an ownership

interest in the property or those claiming through that person.’

....” Defendants note that Plaintiffs have not alleged that

Defendant ever obtained Plaintiffs’ money or that Plaintiffs ever

had an ownership interest in any of the defendants’ profits.

At the hearing, Plaintiffs explained that their theory

underlying the Seventh Cause of Action is that Defendant operated

at a competitive advantage over other oil companies, which

resulted in a greater profit to Defendant. Defendant complained

that Plaintiffs cite no case to support their theory. 

In Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc., 23 Cal.4th

116, 127 (2000), the California Supreme Court commented:

An order that an defendant disgorge money

obtained through an unfair business practice

may include a restitutionary element, but is

not so limited ... [S]uch orders may compel a

defendant to surrender all money obtained

through an unfair business practice even

though not all is to be restored to the

persons from whom it was obtained or those

claiming under those persons. It has also

been used to refer to surrender of all

profits earned as a result of an unfair

business practice regardless of whether those

profits represent money taken directly from

persons who were victims of the unfair

practice.

Kraus provides arguable authority supporting Plaintiff’s theory

of restitution. Because the Seventh Cause of Action does not

allege facts that state a Section 17200 claim, dismissal of the

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Seventh Cause of Action is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

As to the Eighth Cause of Action, Defendant, assuming that

the warning required by Health & Safety Code § 25249.6 applies,

argues “that the impossibility of alleging a lack of warning is

apparent on the face of the Complaint” because of the allegations

that the Regional Water Quality Control Board issued the April 8,

2004 letter warning Plaintiffs that the contamination may have

migrated beneath Plaintiffs’ properties and that Defendants

warned Plaintiffs in April 2004. Defendant argues:

Plaintiffs’ Complaint thus plainly

demonstrates that Plaintiffs have known for

over three and a half years, and were warned

by Defendant over three and a half years ago,

of the very same purported risk of chemical

exposure Plaintiffs now seek to make the

subject of a judicial injunction. The waste

of judicial resources, not to mention the

absurdity, inherent if Plaintiffs’ cause of

action is transparent. Proposition 65 is a

warning statute, not a prohibition on the

release of chemicals ... Plaintiffs allege

that they received that warning years ago.

At the hearing, Plaintiffs contended that the Eighth Cause

of Action relates to the time period prior to the 2004 warnings. 

However, as discussed above, Plaintiffs cannot rely on a

violation of Section 25249.6 to state a claim based on an unfair

business practice. 

The motion to dismiss the Seventh and Eighth Causes of

Action is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

6. NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND

EQUITABLE INDEMNITY.

Defendant moves to dismiss this cause of action on the

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Because leave to amend is granted, Defendant’s motion to 1

dismiss the prayer for punitive damages is not addressed.

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ground the Amended Complaint fails to allege any facts from which

it may be inferred that a “controversy has arisen and now

exists.” Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have not and cannot

allege that Defendant has ever asserted that Plaintiffs are

responsible for any contamination of their properties or that any

agency or other entity has made such an assertion or requested

any action by Plaintiffs. 

At the hearing, Plaintiffs asserted that some of them are

landlords and that the Ninth Cause of Action seeks to protect

those Plaintiffs from liability by tenants for harm caused to

those tenants by Defendants’ alleged acts and omissions. 

The motion to dismiss the Ninth Cause of Action is DENIED.1

D. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE.

Defendant motion to strike the allegation in the Amended

Complaint at Paragraphs 19-21 pertaining to CERCLA § 309

preemption and the CERCLA statute of limitations is GRANTED. 

CERCLA is inapplicable to releases of petroleum under CERCLA’s

“petroleum exclusion.” The entire section of the Amended

Complaint captioned “Statutory Background and Definitions” is

stricken; these allegations have no place under Rule 8(a)(2) and

are immaterial. To this extent, the motion to strike is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion to remand is DENIED;

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2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED IN PART AND

GRANTED IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND:

a. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth

Causes of Action are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND as barred by the statute of limitations

and failure to plead the discovery rule;

b. The Fourth Cause of Action is DISMISSED

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND;

c. The motion to dismiss the Fifth and Sixth

Causes of Action is DENIED;

d. The Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action

are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; 

e. The motion to dismiss the Ninth Cause of

Action is DENIED. 

3. Defendants’ motion to strike is GRANTED to the extent

set forth in this Memorandum Decision.

4. Counsel for Defendant shall prepare and lodge a form of

order setting forth the rulings in this Memorandum Decision

within five (5) court days following the date of service of this

decision;

5. Plaintiff shall file a Second Amended Complaint within 20

days after the filing of the Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 28, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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