Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01425/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01425-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTOINE BOYD, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S- 05-1425 DFL GGH P

vs.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, et al., 

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6) filed July 7, 2006, on grounds that this action is barred by the statute of

limitations. After carefully considering the record, the court recommends that defendants’

motion be granted.

Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.

Ct. 1848, 1850 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421,

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89 S. Ct. 1843, 1849, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). The court will “‘presume that general

allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’” NOW, 510

U.S. at 256; 114 S. Ct. at 803, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.555, 561, 112 S.

Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992). Moreover, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972). 

The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may disregard

allegations in the complaint if they are contradicted by facts established by exhibits attached to

the complaint. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Furthermore, the court is not required to accept as true allegations that contradict facts which

may be judicially noticed. Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir.

1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040 (1988). The court need not accept as true conclusory

allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981). The court

need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” Western Mining

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981). 

A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an

opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F. 2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, the court may grant dismissal on 

grounds that the action is barred by the statute of limitations “pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the

plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir.

1999), citing Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir.1991) (quoting Jablon v. Dean

Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir.1980)).

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Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff originally filed this action in the United States District Court for the

Northern District of California on June 6, 2005. On July 15, 2005, the Northern District

transferred the case to this court.

This action is proceeding on the amended complaint filed December 1, 2005, as to

defendants Quezada and Dunn. Plaintiff alleges that on April 3, 1998, he and inmate Allen were

involved in an altercation. After this incident, plaintiff and Allen were listed as enemies in their

prison file, meaning that they should not be housed together. 

On April 21, 1998, inmate Allen was moved to administrative segregation unit D6. On May 1, 1998, plaintiff was moved to the same housing unit. On May 2, 1998, defendant

Quezada released plaintiff to the exercise yard with inmate Allen. Inmate Allen immediately

attacked plaintiff by hitting him in the face and upper body area with his fist. One minute after

the attack started, defendant Dunn told everyone on the exercise yard to get down. Plaintiff tried

to get down but inmate Allen kept up the attack. Inmate Allen kicked plaintiff in the side,

causing him unbearable pain. Plaintiff heard a loud sound, and realized that defendant Dunn had

shot him in the face with a wooden block gun.

After the incident, plaintiff was examined by the medical staff who found the

following injuries: a one inch abrasion on plaintiff’s cheek, a one quarter inch cut below the

abrasion, a slight edema to plaintiff’s finger, a superficial abrasion on plaintiff’s right thigh and a

superficial scratch on plaintiff’s right cheek. 

Discussion

Federal courts apply the personal injury statute of limitations of the forum state to

section 1983 claims, and in California, prior to January 2003, the applicable statute of limitations

was one year, as codified in Cal.Code Civ.Proc. § 340(3). Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th

Cir. 1999), citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985); Elliott v. City of

Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9 Cir. 1994). th

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However, as of January 1, 2003, California amended the statute of limitations for

a personal injury action setting forth that a personal injury action must be filed within two years,

not one year, of the accrual of the cause of action. Cal.Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1. It is not

retroactive, except for victims of the September 11, 2001 terrorist actions. Maldonado v. Harris,

370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004); Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 4th 301, 303, 133

Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 296, n. 2 (2003) (citing Stats. 2002, ch. 448, § 1.).

Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 352,1 provides that a prisoner serving a term of less than

life is entitled to a two-year tolling provision before the commencement of the statute of

limitations for bringing a civil rights action. There are no tolling provisions for prisoners serving

a life sentence. Therefore, at most plaintiff is entitled to a two year tolling period.

Because plaintiff’s claim accrued prior to January 2003, plaintiff is entitled to a

one year statute of limitations and two years of tolling. Therefore, plaintiff had three years from

the May 2, 1998, incident to bring a timely federal action. The instant action, filed June 6, 2005,

is not timely. 

In his opposition, plaintiff suggests that his claim did not accrue until he

discovered the true extent of the injuries, both mental and physical, caused by the May 2, 1998,

incident. Plaintiff does not explain when he discovered these additional injuries. 

Federal law governs when a cause of action accrues and the statutory period

begins to run. Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153-1154 (9th Cir. 2000);

Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir.1991). “A federal claim accrues

when the plaintiff ‘knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.’”

Morales, supra, at 1154 (quoting TwoRivers c. Lewis, supra, 174 F.3d at 991); Bagley, supra, at

760 (quoting Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986), in

turn quoting Trotter v. International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 704 F.2d 1141,

1143 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

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That plaintiff later discovered that he suffered additional injuries as a result of the

May 2, 1998, incident does not alter the date his claims accrued. It is clear from the allegations

in the amended complaint that on May 2, 1998, plaintiff was aware of injuries caused by

defendants’ alleged conduct, i.e. the abrasions to his face and thigh, the scratch to his cheek and

the edema to his finger. That plaintiff later discovered additional injuries does not change the

date on which his claims accrued. 

For the reasons discussed above, the court finds that this action is barred by the

statute of limitations. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ July 7, 2006,

motion to dismiss be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 9/7/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

 GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:kj

boy1425.mtd

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