Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00964/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00964-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIXIE HAISLIP,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,1 Commissioner 

of Social Security

Defendant.

1:12-cv-00964 GSA

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S 

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her applications for Disability 

Insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income payments pursuant to Titles II and XVI of 

the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which 

were submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable Gary S. Austin, United States 

 

1 Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013. Pursuant to Rule 

25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted for Michael J. Astrue as the 

defendant in this action.

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Magistrate Judge.2

PRIOR PROCEEDINGS3

In February 2009, Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income, alleging disability beginning December 20, 2008. AR 18, 164-

170. Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and on reconsideration; Plaintiff then requested a 

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). AR 12, 18, 85-94. ALJ Patricia Henry 

held a hearing and issued an order denying benefits on January 19, 2011, finding Plaintiff was not 

disabled. AR 18-29. The Appeals Council subsequently denied review, making it the final 

decision of the Commissioner for purposes of review. AR 1-4.

1. Hearing Testimony

ALJ Henry held a telephonic hearing on December 8, 2010, in Rock Springs, Wyoming.4

Plaintiff appeared and testified; she was assisted by attorney Manuel Serpa who was located in 

California. AR 37-81. Vocational Expert (“VE”) Christine Backert also testified. AR 65-81.

a. Plaintiff’s testimony

Ms. Haislip was 53 years old at the time of the hearing. AR 64. She completed high 

school but no college, has no children, and has never been married. She is currently living in her 

friend Cindy’s home. AR 38–40, 63. 

In the past, Ms. Haislip has worked as a restaurant cashier, a department-store sales clerk, 

a telephone operator, and a security guard. AR 215–18. Most recently, she worked as a cashier at 

the Arctic Circle restaurant, but Ms. Haislip was only able to work about two hours per day due to 

her problems with depression, remembering things, focusing on work tasks, getting along with 

other people, and becoming irritable and angry. AR 43–56. She was only able to remain 

 

2 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. (See Docs. 9 & 10.)

3 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page number.

4 After the completion of the hearing, Plaintiff subsequently moved to Maricopa, California so venue is proper in this

district.

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employed there because she knew the owners. AR 53-54. They restricted her to a few hours 

because she could not handle any more than that. AR 53–54. The position was stressful for her 

because she made numerous mistakes handling orders, was unable to focus on the task at hand,

and was frequently unable to remember customers’ orders long enough to repeat them to the 

cooks correctly. AR 53–54. Additionally, she did not get along with the managers or her 

coworkers because of her impulsive anger; she had problems “popping off” or yelling at the 

managers. AR 54–57.

Plaintiff has a long-standing problem with controlling her anger and becoming irritated at 

people, although it is not always triggered by specific stimuli: “Sometimes I just wake up that 

way . . . and then if the wrong person comes to me, then I’m really irritated or mad” AR 56. She 

“[tries] to stay alone” and does not socialize with many people besides her friend Cindy. AR 58, 

63. She describes Cindy as one of the few people who do not make her angry, adding that Cindy 

helps her organize her life, prepare meals, keep appointments, and remember where she leaves 

things. AR 58–59. However, she does not get along with Cindy’s grandson, who also lives in the 

house, and she has no other friends in Wyoming. AR 63. In the past, Plaintiff received treatment 

at Southwest Counseling Services where she received prescriptions that helped her mood, but she 

currently is not taking any medications because she does not have a doctor. AR 53, 62.

With regard to activities of daily living, Plaintiff is able to take care of her personal 

hygiene and helps with chores around the house. AR 47. During a typical day, she sleeps a lot

because she suffers from insomnia. AR 47-48. She sometimes gets on the computer to play

games and check e-mails, but she mostly just sleeps. AR 49. She used to go to church but she 

does not do that anymore. AR 50. 

///

///

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b. VE Christine Backert

VE Christine Backert also testified at the hearing. The ALJ asked the VE to assume a 

hypothetical person of the same age, education, and work experience as Plaintiff, who has no 

exertional limitations, but who is limited to occupations which require no prolonged reading for 

content and comprehension, no use of mathematical calculations such as a cashier or teller, and is 

limited to unskilled work. AR 66. The VE indicated that such an individual could work as a 

security guard, telephone operator, salvage clerk, cooker’s helper, industrial cleaner, and a day

worker.5 AR 66-67.

Next, the ALJ asked the VE to assume a hypothetical person of the same age, education, 

and work experience as Plaintiff, who has no exertional limitations, but who is limited to 

unskilled work and can only have occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and 

members of the general public. AR 71. The VE indicated that this person could work as an 

industrial cleaner, a day worker, a security guard, and a power screwdriver operator. AR 71.

The ALJ asked the VE to assume a third hypothetical person of the same age, education, 

and work experience as Plaintiff, who has no exertional limitations, but who can only have 

occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and members of the general public, and is 

limited to occupations that are not performed in a fast paced production or quota based 

environment.6 AR 71. The VE indicated that this person could work as a day worker, a 

 

5 After the first hypothetical, the ALJ posed a second hypothetical involving a person of the same age, education, and 

work experience as Plaintiff, who has no exertional limitations but who is limited to occupations which require no 

prolonged reading for content and comprehension, no use of mathematical calculations such as a cashier or teller, and 

who is limited to SVP 2 work. AR 67. However, Plaintiff’s attorney asked the ALJ a question after the second 

hypothetical was posed which resulted in an extensive dialogue. AR 67. When the ALJ repeated her hypothetical to 

the VE, she returned to the first hypothetical rather than to the second hypothetical posed. In response, the VE 

identified a cooker’s helper, an industrial cleaner, and a day worker which are jobs that meet the SVP 2 classification. 

AR 69-70. A “SVP” refers to the Specific Vocational Preparation needed to perform a job. The jobs listed above 

reflect the responses the VE gave in response to both hypotheticals.

6

Plaintiff’s attorney asked the ALJ to repeat the third hypothetical posed after the VE had listed the proposed jobs. 

AR 71-72, 73-74. The ALJ repeated the hypothetical but included a limitation for unskilled work that was not 

included in the initial hypothetical posed. AR 73. Therefore, the unskilled limitation is not included in the instant 

hypothetical listed because the VE did not consider the unskilled limitation when identifying the proposed jobs.

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surveillance system monitor, and a power screwdriver operator. AR 72.

In a fourth hypothetical posed by Plaintiff’s counsel, the VE was asked to assume whether 

a person of the same education, and work experience as Plaintiff, except that the individual fails 

to pay close attention to details, makes careless mistakes at work, often has difficulties sustaining 

attention to tasks, does not seem to listen to when spoken to directly, often does not follow 

through on instructions,7fails to finish duties in the workplace, often has difficulties organizing 

tasks and activities including losing things necessary for the task, and is often forgetful in daily 

activities. AR 74-75. The VE indicated that this person would not be able to work because the 

person would not be able to stay on task for ninety percent of the required time. AR 76.

Plaintiff’s counsel asked the VE whether a person with a marked limitation in the ability 

to respond appropriately to both co-workers and supervisors would preclude Plaintiff’s past work 

and all work generally.8 AR 77. The VE indicated that all work would be precluded. AR 77.

Finally, counsel asked the VE to consider a person of the same education and work 

experience as Plaintiff, with moderate limitations in the in the following areas : 1) the ability to 

maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; 2) the ability to sustain an ordinary 

routine without special supervision; 3) the ability to interact appropriately with the general public; 

4) the ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; 5) the 

ability to get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral 

extremes; 6) the ability to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting; 7) the ability to 

travel in unfamiliar places or use public transportation; and 8) the ability to set realistic goals or 

make plans independently of others.9 AR 79. The VE indicated that this person would be unable 

 

7

The transcript regarding the wording of this portion of the hypothetical is unclear, however, it appears that counsel 

was listing items found in Dr. Gibson’s report at Exhibit 3F at pg. 6 verbatim. Accordingly, the Court has inserted 

that language here. AR 74, 334.

8 During the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that his hypothetical was based on Dr. Anderson’s report. AR 77, 

336-343.

9 This hypothetical was based Dr. Fleming’s report. AR.78, 358 -383.

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to work at any job. AR 79.

2. Medical Record

The entire medical record was reviewed by the Court. AR 312- 394. The relevant medical 

records are discussed below as needed.

a. Treatment at Southwest Counseling Service

Plaintiff received counseling from Southwest Counseling Service from October 2008 until 

March 2010. AR 323, 327, 388. During the initial assessment in October 2008, she reported that 

she had been depressed “on and off” for most of her life. AR 323. Plaintiff told her counselor 

that she was taking Prozac, but it did not help her. AR 323. She complained of an inability to 

focus and remember information; poor sleep; and out-of-control appetite. AR 323. She showed a 

euthymic mood during the examination, made good eye contact, was cooperative, and displayed 

adequate concentration and no memory impairment. AR 325. She was preliminarily diagnosed 

with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) predominately inattentive type, and major 

depressive disorder (recurrent, moderate). AR 325. The counselor assigned Plaintiff a Global 

Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”)score of 65.

10 AR 325.

On November 5, 2008, Plaintiff was examined by psychiatrist James Robinett, M.D.

Plaintiff indicated that she was unable to retain information and struggled to perform simple tasks 

with supervision. AR 388. Dr. Robinett noted Plaintiff reported feeling depressed and appeared 

to have a significant problem with anxiety. AR 388. During the interview, Plaintiff had difficulty 

talking with him and Dr. Robinett opined Plaintiff was uncomfortable around people, especially 

those in positions of authority. AR 388. He also noted Plaintiff had difficulty thinking abstractly 

 

10 The Global Assessment of Functioning or “GAF” scale reflects a clinician’s assessment of the individual’s overall 

level of functioning. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 30 (4th 

ed. 2000) (“DSM IV”). A GAF between 61 and 70 indicates “[s]ome mild symptoms (e.g. depressed mood and mild 

insomnia) or some difficulty in social occupational, or school functioning (e.g., occasional truancy, or theft within the 

household), but generally functioning pretty well, has some meaningful relationships...” DSM-IV at 32.

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and that her memory appeared to be significantly limited which he thought was due more to her 

anxiety since she appeared to have a fully intact long-term memory. AR 389.

Plaintiff reported a past history of drug addiction including taking methamphetamine since 

the 1970’s until approximately six months prior to his appointment with her. AR 388. She 

reported she had taken Zoloft in the past, but that it was not helpful. AR 388. At the time of the 

appointment, she was taking Prozac which she indicated also did not help her. AR 388. Dr. 

Robinett discontinued the Pozac and began Strattera and Trazodone. AR 388. He diagnosed 

Plaintiff with generalized anxiety disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, and

methamphetamine/polysubstance addition. He also assigned Plaintiff a GAF score of 45.11 AR 

388.

In February 2009, Plaintiff saw Dr. Robinett again. Tr. 327. Plaintiff reported that she 

experienced some benefit from taking Geodon (a drug that was apparently prescribed to her since 

the last reported visit with Dr. Robinette). AR 327. Plaintiff reported that her medication had 

reduced her anger, impulsiveness, and mood changes, but she continued to be impatient and 

easily frustrated. AR 327. Dr. Robinette also observed that Plaintiff was impatient. AR 327. 

Plaintiff reported that the Trazodone appeared to be helping her insomnia, but it did not give her 

complete relief. AR 327. Dr. Robinette increased Plaintiff’s prescription for Geodon and 

continued Plaintiff’s prescription for Trazadone. AR 327.

On January 25, 2010, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Methner. She reported that she had gotten 

angry at two of her bosses at work in the past month and her hours were reduced because of her 

explosiveness. AR 392. Dr. Methner indicated that Plaintiff was quite anxious, rocked back and 

forth in her chair, had pressured speech, exhibited some paranoid thoughts, and had impaired 

 

11 A GAF of 41–50 indicates that the individual has “[s]erious symptoms ... OR any serious impairment in social, 

occupational, or school functioning ...” DSM-IV at 32.

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insight and judgment. AR 329. Although Plaintiff reported that she was taking her medications 

regularly, she indicated that her bosses have questioned that, so “she may be forgetting.” AR 

392. Dr. Methner diagnosed Plaintiff with intermittent explosive disorder, and affirmed the prior 

diagnoses of generalized anxiety disorder and ADHD. AR 392. He discontinued her prescription 

for Geodon due to side effects, and prescribed Depakote, Wellbutrin, Trazadone, and Concerta. 

AR 391.

Plaintiff saw Dr. Methner on March 11, 2010, and reported that she was going to be 

moving to California. AR 392. She reported her medications helped her be more socially 

appropriate and she was better at managing her impulsive anger. AR 390. During the 

appointment, she exhibited a flat affect, increased rocking behavior, and anxious mood. AR 392. 

Dr. Methner’s final diagnosis included generalized anxiety disorder, ADHD, intermittent 

explosive disorder, and depressive disorder (not otherwise specified). AR 390.

b. Dr. Gibson, PhD

On March 31, 2009, Dr. Mark Gibson, Ph.D., a consultative state agency psychologist,

completed a psychological assessment which included, inter alia, administering a Wechsler 

Memory Scale (“WMS-IV”). AR 329-335. Plaintiff told Dr. Gibson that she was irritable and 

that her mind wandered; that she could not pay attention; and that she had trouble working with 

the public. AR 329-335. Plaintiff was “quite irritable” during the examination, but became more 

pleasant as the examination went on and eventually gave good effort on testing. AR 331. She told 

Dr. Gibson that her concentration was poor, and that she was depressed . AR 331. 

Dr. Gibson noted that Plaintiff had an average memory, fair insight, fair to poor judgment, 

and low average intellectual functioning. AR 332. He found few memory problems, despite 

Plaintiff’s claim to have a poor memory. AR 333. He did note, however, that her visual working 

memory score placed her in the fourth percentile of same aged-peers which would cause her to 

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struggle when processing information quickly form her short-term memory storage. AR 333. 

Moreover, she would likely struggle with understanding instructions given a stressful 

circumstance such as a fast food setting. AR 333. 

Dr. Gibson diagnosed Plaintiff with ADHD, Major Depressive Disorder (recurrent, 

moderate), a relational problem (not otherwise specified), and assigned her a GAF score of 55.12

He based the ADHD diagnosis on the fact that Plaintiff demonstrated the following symptoms : 1) 

failing to pay close attention to details; 2) making careless mistakes at work; 3) often has 

difficulty sustaining attention in tasks; 4) often does not seem to listen when spoken to directly; 5) 

often does not follow through on instructions; 6) failing to finish duties in the workplace; 7) often 

has difficulty organizing tasks and activities; 8) often loses things necessary for tasks or activities;

and 9) is often forgetful in daily activities. He noted that Plaintiff’s depression and ADHD issues 

are troubling for her, but it is unclear if these disorders keep her from being able to work in any 

situation. AR 335. He also found that Plaintiff has struggled with dealing with others or 

handling changes in routine. He further noted that “it is hoped that [Plaintiff] will be able to find 

work in a job that allows her to work independently.” AR 335.

c. Dr. Brent Anderson

Dr. Brent Anderson, a state agency consultative examiner, conducted a psychological 

assessment on April 15, 2009. AR 336-343. Dr. Andersen noted that Plaintiff was nervous, 

defensive, and uncomfortable during the examination. AR 337. Plaintiff reported that her mood 

had improved with medication, and that she was less irritable. AR 337. She stated that she lost 

jobs because she could not get along with coworkers or customers. AR 338. Dr. Andersen noted 

 

12

 A GAF between 51 and 60 indicates”[m]oderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional 

panic attacks) or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with 

peers or co-workers.) DSM-IV at 32.

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that Plaintiff had mild to moderate emotional distress, and that Plaintiff believed herself to have 

poor concentration, memory, and judgment. AR 340. However, he did not see attention or 

concentration problems during the examination. AR 341. 

Dr. Andersen diagnosed Plaintiff with dysthymic disorder (early onset), anxiety disorder 

(not otherwise specified), “rule out attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,” and a history of 

polysubstance and alcohol dependence. AR 342. He assigned her a GAF score of 51, and noted 

that she lacked a social support system. AR. 343.

After performing the Wechsler Abbreviated Score for Intelligence and the Minnesota 

Multiphasic Personality Inventory (“MMPI”) he opined that Plaintiff had fairly good native 

intelligence in the low-average range that can be utilized if she is not under stress. AR 341. She 

was able to focus in a one-to-one testing format. AR 341. Dr. Anderson noted that it was unclear 

whether Plaintiff had ADD, however, he opined that her cognitive problems are likely 

compromised by psychosocial difficulties. AR 341.

Dr. Anderson noted that that results of the MMPI-2 depressive score were “highly 

elevated.” AR 342. Dr. Anderson commented that “[t]he depression or dysthymia and what 

appears to be prominent anxiety will have a significant impact on her ability to work.” AR 342. 

He also noted that “[i]t is not likely that her interpersonal deficiencies, shyness and avoidant 

features are going to go away anytime soon and she will work best in positions that do not require 

high levels of social facility.” AR 342.

d. Dr. Dean Schroeder

On April 16, 2009, Dr. Dean Schroeder, a state-agency non-examining psychologist

reviewed Plaintiff’s records. AR 344-357. Overall, he found that Plaintiff’s mental impairments 

caused mild limitations in activities of daily living; moderate difficulties in maintaining social 

functioning; and moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. AR 

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354. In particular, Dr. Schroeder noted that Plaintiff exhibited moderate limitations in several 

areas including : 1) the ability to understand and remember detailed instructions (AR 358); 2) the 

ability to carry out detailed instructions (AR 358); 3) the ability to maintain attention and 

concentration for long periods (AR 358); 4) the ability to interact appropriately with the public 

(AR 359); 5) the ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from 

supervisors (AR 359); 6) the ability to get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them 

or exhibiting behavioral extremes (AR 359); and 7) the ability to respond appropriately to 

changes in the work setting. AR 359. 

Dr. Schroeder ultimately opined that Plaintiff would be able to perform simple, routine 

work with limited social contact. However, he indicated she would struggle with understanding 

instructions in stressful circumstances. AR 361.

e. Dr. Grant Fleming

On July 19, 2009, Dr. Grant Fleming, a non-examining state agency psychologist 

reviewed Plaintiff’s records. AR 366-383. He diagnosed Plaintiff with attention deficit 

hyperactivity disorder – inattentive type, major depressive disorder/dysthymic disorder, anxiety 

disorder (not otherwise specified), and personality disorder. AR 366-373. He agreed with Dr. 

Schroeder’s assessment and found that Plaintiff’s mental impairments caused mild limitations in 

activities of daily living; moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning; and moderate 

difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. AR 376. He also identified the 

same moderate limitations reported by Dr. Schroeder, but also added Plaintiff was moderately 

impaired in the following areas including : 1) her ability to sustain ordinary routine without 

special supervision (AR 380); 2) the ability to travel in unfamiliar places or use public 

transportation (AR 381); 3) and the ability to set realistic goals or make plans independently of 

others (AR 381). 

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Based on this assessment Dr. Fleming concluded that Plaintiff is capable of performing 

simple, routine tasks in a non-pressured environment. He also opined that Plaintiff is able to 

adjust to situations and perform work requiring little or no judgment and that can be learned 

within thirty days. AR 382.

3. The Disability Determination Standard and Process

To qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act, Plaintiff must establish that she is 

unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less 

than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual shall be considered to have a 

disability only if:

his [or her] physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that 

he [or she] is not only unable to do his [or her] previous work, but cannot, 

considering his [or her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other 

kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless 

of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he [or she] lives, or 

whether a specific job vacancy exists for him [or her], or whether he [or she]

would be hired if he [or she] applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

To achieve uniformity in the decision-making process, the Commissioner has established 

a sequential five-step process for evaluating a claimant’s alleged disability. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)-(f). The ALJ proceeds step by step in order and stops upon reaching a dispositive 

finding that the claimant is disabled or not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ must 

consider objective medical evidence and opinion testimony. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927, 416.929. 

The ALJ is required to determine (1) whether a claimant engaged in substantial gainful 

activity during the period of alleged disability; (2) whether the claimant had medicallydeterminable “severe” impairments;13 (3) whether these impairments meet or are medically 

 

13 “Severe” simply means that the impairment significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic 

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equivalent to one of the listed impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) 

whether the claimant retained the RFC to perform her past relevant work;14 and (5) whether the 

claimant had the ability to perform other jobs existing in significant numbers at the regional and 

national level. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f).

4. Summary of the ALJ’s Findings and Decision

Using the Social Security Administration’s five-step sequential evaluation process, the 

ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not meet the disability standard. AR 14-21. More particularly, 

the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 20, 

2008. AR 20. Further, the ALJ identified major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder not 

otherwise specified, personality disorder, (rule out ADHD), polysubstance abuse and 

methamphetamine addiction as severe impairments. AR 20-21. The ALJ performed an analysis 

pursuant to paragraphs B and C of the listing impairments for mental disorders and determined 

that the severity of Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or exceed any of the listed impairments

under 12.04, 12.06, 12.08, and 12.09. AR 20-22. 

Based on a review of the entire record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the RFC to

perform a substantial range of work at all exertional levels, but limited Plaintiff to unskilled work,

which requires no prolonged reading for content and comprehension, and no use of mathematical 

calculations such as a cashier or teller work. The ALJ also limited Plaintiff to occasional 

interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public. AR 22. After considering all of 

the above, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a fast food worker 

and cashier II. AR 27. Additionally, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could work as an industrial 

 

work activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

14 Residual functional capacity captures what a claimant “can still do despite [his or her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545. “Between steps three and four of the five-step evaluation, the ALJ must proceed to an intermediate step in 

which the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity.” Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1151 n. 2 

(9th Cir. 2007).

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cleaner and a power screwdriver operator. AR 28. Therefore, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was 

not disabled under the Act.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine 

whether: (1) it is supported by substantial evidence; and (2) it applies the correct legal standards. 

See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 

1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). 

“Substantial evidence means more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). It is “relevant evidence which, 

considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Id. Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one 

of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff argues that: 1) the RFC and the hypotheticals posed to the VE lack a basis 

in the administrative record; and 2) the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination is not supported 

by substantial evidence.

DISCUSSION

1. The ALJ’s Formulation of the RFC and Hypotheticals were Not Proper

Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s RFC and the hypotheticals are not supported by substantial 

evidence in the record. In particular, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ credited several doctors’

opinions, yet she failed to incorporate all of the doctors’ limitations into the RFC or the 

hypotheticals. Additionally, the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff could perform her past relevant 

work as a fast food worker and a cashier II based on the ALJ’s own RFC, as well as the VE’s 

testimony. Finally, even assuming the RFC was correct, the hypotheticals posed to the VE were 

deficient because they did not incorporate the combined effects of the limitations identified by the 

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ALJ.

In reply, Defendant argues that the ALJ’s RFC properly incorporates all of the doctors’

opinions and is supported by substantial evidence. Defendant concedes that the ALJ erroneously 

concluded that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a fast food worker and a cashier 

at step four. However, the ALJ formulated hypotheticals that reflected all of Plaintiff’s 

limitations at step five. While the ALJ improperly concluded Plaintiff could work as a 

screwdriver operator, she properly concluded that Plaintiff was able to work as an industrial 

cleaner. The VE also testified that Plaintiff could work as a day worker which further supports 

the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff is not disabled. 

a. The ALJ’s Treatment of the Medical Record

When formulating the RFC, the ALJ noted the following:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform a substantial range of work at all extertional levels but with 

the following nonexertional limitations: the claimant is limited to 

unskilled work which requires no prolonged reading for content and 

comprehension, and no use of mathematical calculations such as a 

cashier or teller work; and is limited to occasional interactions with 

supervisors, coworkers, and the general public.

AR 22.

In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ credited the opinions of four doctors : Dr. Gibson, a 

consultative psychologist (AR 239-235); Dr. Anderson, a consultative psychologist (AR 336-

343); and Drs. Schroeder and Fleming (244-257; 366-383), who were both non-examining 

psychologists. AR 25-27. A review of the record reveals that although the ALJ did a thorough 

summary of the medical record, she did not address all of the limitations identified by each 

doctor. For example, the ALJ appears to incorporate Drs. Schroeder’s conclusion that Plaintiff 

would be able to perform simple, routine work with limited social contact into her RFC. AR 27, 

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361. However, Dr. Schroeder’s assessment also identified several other moderate limitations that 

the ALJ does not specifically address including Plaintiff’s inability to: 1) understand and 

remember detailed instructions; 2) carry out detailed instructions; 3) maintain attention and 

concentration for long periods; 4) interact appropriately with the public; 5) accept instructions and 

respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; 6) get along with coworkers or peers without 

distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; and 7) to respond appropriately to changes in 

the work setting. AR 358-359. Similarly, Dr. Fleming concluded that that Plaintiff is capable of 

performing simple, routine tasks in a non-pressured environment. AR 382. However, in addition 

to the moderate limitations identified by Dr. Schroeder, Dr. Fleming noted three other moderate 

limitations including Plaintiff’s inability to: 1) sustain an ordinary routine without special 

supervision; 2) travel in unfamiliar places or use public transportation; and 3) set realistic goals or 

make plans independently of others. AR 380, 381. Finally, Dr. Gibson noted that his ADHD 

diagnosis was based on the following symptoms exhibited by Plaintiff: 1) fails to give close

attention to details; 2) makes careless mistakes at work; 3) often has difficulty sustaining attention 

in tasks; 4) often does not seem to listen when spoken to directly; 5) often does not follow 

through on instructions; 6) fails to finish duties in the workplace; 7) often has difficulty 

organizing tasks and activities; 8) often loses things necessary for tasks or activities; and 9) is 

often forgetful in daily activities. AR 335.

Here, the ALJ's credits all of these opinions, but the RFC determination did not account 

for all of the limitations, nor did the ALJ address them in any way. Additionally, the Court notes 

that there are inconsistencies between the doctors’ diagnoses that the ALJ does not acknowledge. 

For example, all of the doctors found that Plaintiff has ADHD except for Dr. Anderson who notes 

he is not sure, and that ADHD needs to be ruled out. Since several of the above limitations relate 

to attention and concentration deficits, the extent to which the ALJ credits the doctors’ opinions 

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will likely effect the extent any identified limitations can be supported by substantial evidence.

A claimant's RFC is “the most [the claimant] can still do despite [his or her] limitations.” 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a); 20 C.F .R. § 416.945(1). The assessment of RFC must be “based on all 

the relevant evidence in [the claimant's] case record.” Id. Furthermore, if the RFC assessment 

conflicts with a medical source opinion, the ALJ must explain why the opinion was not adopted. 

SSR 96-8. Thus, if the ALJ does not find the limitations to be supported by substantial evidence, 

she must explain why. The ALJ failed to do so.

Moreover, Drs. Gibson and Anderson were examining physicians. An examining 

physician's uncontradicted opinion, like a treating physician's, may be rejected only for clear and 

convincing reasons. When an examining physician's opinion is controverted by another doctor's 

opinion, the examining physician's opinion may be rejected only for specific and legitimate 

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d at 830–31 (9th

Cir. 1995). Likewise, Drs. Schroeder and Fleming were nonexamining physicians. AR 356–61.) 

“[T]he findings of a nontreating, nonexamining physician can amount to substantial evidence, so 

long as other evidence in the record supports those findings.” Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 

(9th Cir.1996). Thus, to the extent the ALJ may have disagreed with certain aspects of any of the 

opinions, the ALJ was required, at a minimum, to offer specific and legitimate reasons supported 

by substantial evidence in the record for rejecting those opinions. The ALJ did not so in this case.

Defendant has cited to Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F. 3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2008) 

for the premise that the RFC represents what the claimant can do rather than focusing on a 

claimant’s limitations. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s RFC limiting Plaintiff to 

unskilled work and occasional interactions with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public is 

sufficient because Drs. Schroeder and Fleming ultimately concluded that Plaintiff would retain 

the capacity to perform simple work in a low-stress environment with only occasional interaction 

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with supervisors, coworkers, and the public, despite the other moderate limitations they 

identified. However, the ALJ did not indicate that this was part of her analysis, and this Court is 

not permitted to make ad hoc rationalizations for the ALJ.15 Barbato v. Comm’r, 923 F.Supp. 

1273, 1276, n. 2 (C.D.Cal. 1996); Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 634-35 (9th Cir. 1981). A 

reviewing court cannot affirm an ALJ’s decision denying benefits on a ground not invoked by the 

Commissioner. Stout v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Pinto v. Massanari, 

249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2001)). Additionally, there were several other limitations identified 

by these doctors that the ALJ’s RFC did not address such as Plaintiff’s: 1) inability to sustain an 

ordinary routine without special supervision; 2) the inability to travel in unfamiliar places or use 

public transportation; 3) and the inability to set realistic goals or make plans independently of 

others.

Finally, not only did the ALJ's RFC determination fail to include all of the limitations 

indicated by the opinions of all of the doctors, the ALJ also failed to include those limitations in 

the ALJ's hypothetical question posed to the VE. AR 66-74. "Hypothetical questions posed to 

the vocational expert must set out all the limitations and restrictions of the particular claimant . . 

." Lewis v. Apfel, 236 503, 517 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gamer v. Secretary of Health and Human 

Services, 815 F. 2d 1275, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1987); Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th 

Cir.1988). The testimony of a VE "is valuable only to the extent that it is supported by medical 

evidence." Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 644 (9th Cir. 1982). The VE's opinion about a 

claimant's residual functional capacity has no evidentiary value if the assumptions in the 

hypothetical are not supported by the record. Embrey, 849 F.2d at 422. Here, because the ALJ 

failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence and fully incorporate the limitations into the

 

15 The Court also notes that it appears that the ALJ may have only intended to give Dr. Gibson’s diagnosis of ADHD

less weight since at step two the ALJ stated, “Rule out ADHD,” which is more consistent with Dr. Anderson’s 

diagnosis. AR 20, 26-27, 334, 342. Again, since the ALJ did not articulate this reason as a basis for the opinion, the 

Court may not adopt this reasoning.

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hypothetical questions, the VE's testimony cannot constitute substantial evidence to support the 

ALJ's findings. 

Given the above, the case is remanded to allow the ALJ an opportunity to re-examine the 

record and evaluate the medical opinions so that any contradictory opinions may be resolved, and 

any limitations that are supported by substantial evidence can be identified. The ALJ shall 

incorporate any limitations that are supported by the substantial evidence into the RFC and 

hypotheticals posed to the VE. The ALJ is only required to present the VE with those limitations 

she finds to be credible and supported by the evidence. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165-

66 (9th Cir. 2001). However, any hypothetical presented must contain all of the limitations the 

ALJ identifies.16

Since this Court found error with the ALJ’s formulation of the RFC, it is not necessary to 

address Plaintiff’s other arguments related to step four and step five of the ALJ’s decision. 

Furthermore, because the Court remands this case for renewed consideration of the medical 

evidence, the Court dispenses with an exhaustive analysis of the ALJ's assessment of Plaintiff’s 

credibility. Consideration of Plaintiff’s credibility is inescapably linked to conclusions regarding 

the medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929. As such, the re-evaluation of the medical evidence 

may impact the ALJ's findings as to Plaintiff's credibility.

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16 At the hearing, the ALJ listed individual hypotheticals that included the limitations separately rather than listing all 

of the limitations combined in one hypothetical. AR 66-74.

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by 

substantial evidence. Therefore, the case is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the ALJ 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to 

enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff Dixie Haislip and against Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Commissioner of Social Security.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 30, 2013 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

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