Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02207/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02207-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Arthur Larry Lucero, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-2207 PHX EHC (VAM)

)

Warden Meg Savage, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Respondents. )

TO THE HONORABLE EARL H. CARROLL, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Arthur Larry Lucero ("petitioner") filed a pro se Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner raises two grounds for relief in the petition. (Doc. 1

at pp. 5-6). Respondents filed an answer opposing the granting of

habeas relief. (Doc. 4).

BACKGROUND

On February 11, 2002, petitioner waived his right to a jury

and was convicted in Maricopa County Superior Court of the first

degree murder of Chandler Police Officer James Snedigar. (Doc. 4,

Exhibit D at pp. 1-2). Petitioner's conviction was based on both

felony murder and premeditated murder. (Doc. 4, Exhibit M). 

Petitioner was also convicted of the first degree murder (felony

murder) of Sergio Hernandez Martinez, armed robbery and first

degree burglary. (Doc. 4, Exhibit D at pp. 1-2). The court

sentenced petitioner to 5 years in prison for the burglary

conviction and 15 years in prison for the armed robbery

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conviction, to be served consecutively to the 5-year sentence for

burglary. Petitioner was also sentenced to life in prison (with

no possibility of parole until 25 calendar years have been

completed) for the two first degree murder convictions, to be

served consecutive to the sentences for the burglary and armed

robbery convictions. (Id. at Exhibit E).

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. Petitioner raised one claim, to wit: the trial court

erred in denying his Rule 20 motions for judgments of acquittal on

the murder charges. (Doc. 4, Exhibit F at pp. 8-11). 

On February 11, 2003, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a

decision reversing petitioner's conviction based on "premeditated

murder" concerning victim James Snedigar but affirming the murder

convictions on a felony murder theory. (Doc. 4, Exhibit G at pp.

1, 5-12). On May 30, 2003, the Arizona Supreme Court issued an

order denying review without comment. (Id. at Exhibit I).

On June 25, 2003, petitioner filed a NOTICE OF POSTCONVICTION RELIEF pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1. (Doc. 4 at

Exhibit J). Eventually, petitioner filed a pro se petition for

post-conviction relief raising a single claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel based on his trial attorney's advice "TO

WAIVE MY RIGHTS TO A JURY TRIAL AND HAVE A BENCH TRIAL TO AVOID

THE DEATH PENALTY FROM CHARGES OF FELONY MURDER." (Doc. 4,

Exhibit L at p. 3 (Attachment)). In support, petitioner stated:

I WAS NOT AWARE AT THE TIME THAT UNDER THE FELONY MURDER

ACCOMPLICE LAW, A DEFENDANT CANNOT BE GIVEN THE DEATH

PENALTY. IM SURE YOUR HONOR IS AWARE THERE IS CASE LAW

TO SUPPORT THIS FACT. THEREFORE MY ATTORNEY ALEX

GONZALEZ MISREPRESENTED THE FACTS AND MISLEAD ME INTO

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WAIVING MY RIGHTS TO A JURY TRIAL TO AVOID THE DEATH

PENALTY THAT I WAS NEVER REALLY IN ANY THREAT OF. 

COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN FULLY AWARE THAT I WAS NOT

UNDER THREAT OF THE DEATH PENALTY, AND IF HE WAS AWARE

THEN HE CLEARLY "LIED." EITHER WAY HE WAS INEFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE. I TRULY BELIEVE COUNSELS REASON FOR ADVISING

ME TO WAIVE MY RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL WAS TO MAKE HIS JOB

EASIER IN AVOIDING A TRIAL BY JURY, SO HE MISLED ME AND

MISREPRESENTED HIS DEFENDANT ... I AM ASKING THE COURT

TO DISMISS DEFENDANTS WAIVER TO A JURY TRIAL AND ALLOW

DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL AND PROPER COUNSEL.

(Id.). On August 19, 2004, the trial court issued a minute entry

denying the Rule 32 petition. (Doc. 4 at Exhibit M). Petitioner

did not seek appellate review. (Doc. 1 at pp. 3, 6).

On July 26, 2005, petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus

petition raising the following grounds:

GROUND I: Amendment IV

ME (LUCERO) AND MY CO-DEFENDANTS WERE CONVICTED OF (1)

FELONY MURDER FIRST DEGREE MURDER OF OFFICER JAMES

SNEDIGAR (2) FELONY FIRST DEGREE MURDER OF SERGIO

MARTINEZ (3) ARMED ROBBERY AND (4) FIRST DEGREE

BURGLARY. ON APRIL 16th 1999 AT APPROXIMATELY A QUARTER

TO NOON, CRESCENT JEWELERS IN TEMPE, AZ. WAS ROBBED. I

(LUCERO) WAS LATER IDENTIFIED AS ONE OF THE ROBBERS. 

THE POLICE CHASED A BLACK MUSTANG BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN

INVOLVED UNTIL IT TURNED OFF INTO AN APARTMENT COMPLEX

IN CHANDLER, AZ. THE PURSUING OFFICER "LOST SIGHT" OF

THE SUSPECT VEHICLE AND SHORTLY AFTER FOUND THE MUSTANG

ABANDONED IN THE PARKING LOT, AT APPROXIMATELY 11:57 AM

ON THAT DATE, JEWELRY FROM THE ROBBERY WAS FOUND IN THE

VEHICLE, S.W.A.T. TEAMS FROM TEMPE AND CHANDLER THEN

CONVERGED ON THE COMPLEX LOOKING FOR SUSPECTS AND

"SEVERAL HOURS" PASSED DURING WHICH THEY CONDUCTED A

DOOR TO DOOR SEARCH. OFFICERS FOUND A BROKEN WINDOW AT

APARTMENT 1055 AT 2:45 PM. AT 3:00 PM THEY ENTERED AND A

GUN BATTLE TOOK PLACE WHERE OFFICER JAMES SNEDIGAR WAS

KILLED AND SERGIO MARTINEZ "NO ONE" ELSE WAS IN THE

APARTMENT. APPROXIMATELY AN HOUR AFTER THE SHOOTING,

OFFICERS ARRESTED ME AND CO-DEFENDANT STANDING OUTSIDE

OF APT. 1086 IN THE SAME COMPLEX, 528 FEET FROM

APARTMENT 1055 WHERE THE SHOOTINGS OCCURED [sic]. 

MYSELF AND CO-DEFENDANT WERE ARRESTED AND CONVICTED OF 2

COUNTS OF FELONY MURDER OF OFFICER JAMES SNEDIGAR AND

SERGIO MARTINEZ. I FEEL I NEVER SHOULD HAVE BEEN

CHARGED WITH EITHER COUNTS OF FELONY MURDER. IN THIS

INSTANCE THE ROBBER AND HIGH SPEED CHASE WERE COMPLETED

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AT 11:57 AM WHEN THE OFFICER FOUND THE ABANDONED MUSTANG

IN THE PARKING LOT OF THE COMPLEX. AT THAT POINT, THEY

HAD NO IDEA WHERE THE SUSPECTS WERE. THE OFFICERS

PURSUIT HAD TURNED INTO A "SEARCH." THREE HOURS AFTER

THE SEARCH BEGAN SNEDIGAR AND MARTINEZ WERE KILLED. MY

SELF AND CO-DEFENDANT WERE NEVER NOWHERE NEAR THE DEATH

SCENE. ACCORDINGLY, AT THE TIME OF THE DEATH OF THE TWO

INDIVIDUALS I WAS NOT ACTING IN COURSE AND FURTHERANCE

OF THE COMPLETED ROBBERY, NOR WAS I IN IMMEDIATE FLIGHT

FROM IT. THEREFORE I SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH

EITHER COUNT OF MURDER.

GROUND II: Amendment VI

ON THIS ISSUE I AM CLAIMING THT MY LAWYER MISLED ME INTO

WAIVING MY RIGHTS TO A JURY TRIAL IN THIS CAPITAL

PUNISHMENT CASE. MY LAWYER ADVISED ME THAT IT WOULD BE

BEST IF I WAIVE MY RIGHTS TO A JURY TRIAL AND HAVE A

BENCH TRIAL. IN EXCHANGE, THE STATE WOULD DROP ITS

INTENT TO SEEK THE DEATH PENALTY, AND ONLY IF I'M FOUND

GUILTY OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER OF OFFICER SNEDIGAR, THE

STATE WAS WILLING TO DROP OTHER CHARGES I HAD PENDING. 

NOW IN HINDSIGHT, I FEEL IT WAS A BAD DECISION TO LISTEN

TO MY LAWYERS ADVICE BEING THAT MY CHANCES WITH A "JURY"

WOULD HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE. MY KNOWLEDGE TO THE LAW

IS VERY LIMITED AND I CANNOT AFFORD A LAWYER. SO PLEASE

EXCUSE ANY ERRORS I MAY HAVE MADE THROUGHOUT THIS HABEUS

[sic] CORPUS.

(Doc. 1 at pp. 5-6).

DISCUSSION

A. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the following standard for

granting a federal habeas petition originating from a state court

conviction applies:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim

that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

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unreasonable interpretation of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

The Act also codifies a presumption of correctness of state

court findings of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) states that "a

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof

to rebut the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." As

discussed more fully below, these provisions of the Act set the

standard for the Court’s evaluation of the merits.

The Act limits the district court’s discretion to hold

evidentiary hearings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) states:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis

of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall

not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the

applicant shows that--

(A) the claim relies on--

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court that

was previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due

diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient

to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but

for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would

have found the applicant guilty of the underlying

offense.

A petition may be denied on the merits even though it

contains unexhausted claims, and the state does not waive

exhaustion except by an express waiver on the record. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(2) and (3).

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B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

1. Law Generally

A federal court has authority to review a federal

constitutional claim presented by a state prisoner if available

state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454

U.S. 1, 3 (1981)(per curiam); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829,

833 (9th Cir. 1991). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in

case law and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254, now states:

(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears

that--

 (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available

in the courts of the State; or

 (B)(i) there is an absence of available state

corrective process; or

 (ii) circumstances exist that render such process

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

.......

(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted

the remedies available in the courts of the State,

within the meaning of this section, if he has the right

under the law of the State to raise, by any available

procedure, the question presented.

The exhaustion requirement can be satisfied in one of two

ways. First, a petitioner can fairly present his or her claims to

the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through

either the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate

post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). Only one of these avenues of relief must be

exhausted before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. 

This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

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constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown

v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy,

827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059

(1989).

Claims presented in habeas petitions are considered exhausted

if they have been ruled upon by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

However, if the sentence received is life imprisonment, the claims

must be presented to the Arizona Supreme Court. Swoopes, 196 F.3d

at 1010. Although a federal habeas petitioner may reformulate

somewhat the claims made in state court, Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796

F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d in part on other grounds by

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 1995), the substance of the federal

claim must have been "fairly presented" in state court. Anderson

v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam); Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971). While the petitioner need not recite

"book and verse on the federal constitution," Picard, 404 U.S. at

277-78 (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir.

1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support

the federal claim were before the state courts or that a "somewhat

similar state law claim was made." Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6.

As an alternative to presenting his claims to the highest

state court, a petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement

by demonstrating that no state remedies remained available at the

time the federal habeas petition was filed. Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 125 (n. 28)(1982); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602

(9th Cir. 1989). However, this path is fraught with danger:

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If state remedies are not available because the

petitioner failed to comply with state procedures and

thereby prevented the highest state court from reaching

the merits of his claim, then a federal court may refuse

to reach the merits of that claim as a matter of comity.

Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988); see also

Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010 (determining that the exhaustion

requirement is satisfied if a petitioner presented a claim to the

Arizona Court of Appeals either on direct review or via a petition

for post-conviction relief). This failure to comply with

reasonable state procedures is usually characterized as

"procedural default," "procedural bar," or a "waiver." As

discussed, exhausting state remedies by means of a procedural

default is risky. The burden is on the petitioner to show that he

or she has properly exhausted each claim. Dismissal of the

petition is proper when the record does not show that the

exhaustion requirement is met. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103,

1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023

(1982). If the unavailability of state remedies is in no way the

fault of the petitioner or his or her counsel, the exhaustion

requirement will likely be satisfied and a federal court may reach

the merits of the petitioner’s habeas claims.

In many cases, however, the lack of available state remedies

is a direct result of the petitioner’s failure to avail himself of

the state remedies in a timely or procedurally correct manner. In

such instances, the petitioner has procedurally defaulted, and may

not obtain federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of

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1

Appellate defaults are examined under the same standards that

apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim during trial.

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986).

9

"cause and prejudice" sufficient to excuse the default.1

 Reed v.

Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-

91 (1977); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298 (1989);

Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). "Cause"

is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). "Prejudice" is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Id.

"Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a

procedural default can occur, the Supreme Court ‘has not given the

term "cause" precise content.’" Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268,

1274 (11th Cir.)(quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that

cause should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to

petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a

claim was not reasonably available to counsel, (citation

omitted), or that "some interference by officials,"

(citation omitted), made compliance impracticable, would

constitute cause under this standard.

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); see also Harmon, 894

F.2d at 1275; Allen v. Risley, 817 F.2d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1987).

The standard is one of discretion intended to be flexible and

yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State

Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). The

"cause and prejudice" standard is equally applicable to pro se

litigants, Harmon, 894 F.2d at 1274; Hughes, 800 F.2d at 908,

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whether literate and assisted by "jailhouse lawyers," Tacho, 862

F.2d at 1381; illiterate and unaided, Hughes, 800 F.2d at 909, or

non-English speaking. Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d 1056, 1058

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100 (1989).

Finally, if a claim has been found to be procedurally

defaulted, the failure to establish cause for the default may be

excused under exceptional circumstances. For instance:

... in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ even in the absence of showing cause for

the procedural default.

Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,

327 (1995)(to meet the Murray standard, "the petitioner must show

that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would

have convicted him in the light of the new evidence").

2. Application of Law to Facts of the Case

Respondents first assert that the claim presented in Ground I

is procedurally defaulted because plaintiff never raised it on

direct appeal. Review of plaintiff's brief to the Arizona Court

of Appeals on direct appeal, shows that although plaintiff raised

a similar claim in state court he did not raise it as a violation

of his federal constitutional rights, rather, plaintiff raised

this claim solely as a violation of state law. (See Doc. 4,

Exhibit F at pp. 9-11). Similarly, on appeal to the Arizona

Supreme Court, petitioner likewise confined his arguments on this

issue to violations of state law. (See id., Exhibit H at pp. 3-

6). As a result, the federal nature of the claim presented in

Ground I of the habeas petition was never exhausted in state

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court. Because the time to present this claim in state court has

long passed, petitioner is without further state remedies with

respect to this issue and Ground I is technically exhausted. 

Technical exhaustion is not proper exhaustion, unless petitioner

can present cause and prejudice for failing to exhaust his federal

claim in state court, the claim is procedurally barred from

federal habeas review. See Reed, 468 U.S. at 11. Petitioner has

made no such showing and Ground I is procedurally defaulted.

The Court may ignore the procedural default and consider the

substance of this claim if petitioner can demonstrate exceptional

circumstances that will result in his conviction, though innocent,

if his claim is not considered. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 496,

Schlup 513 U.S. at 327. Upon review of the record, the Magistrate

Judge concludes petitioner has made no such showing. 

Similarly, even assuming the substance of Ground II was

properly presented in petitioner's Rule 32 petition to the trial

court, (see Doc. 4 at Exhibit L), this claim is also procedurally

defaulted. By petitioner's own acknowledgment, he never presented

this claim to the state appellate courts after the trial court

denied relief. (Doc. 1 at p. 6). As a result, this claim was not

properly exhausted in state court. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S.

27, 29 (2004) (holding that to properly exhaust a federal habeas

claim in state court, the petitioner "must 'fairly present' his

claim in each appropriate state court, thereby alerting that court

to the federal nature of the claim."). Because the opportunity to

present this claim to an appellate court has long passed,

petitioner has no further opportunity to exhaust this claim in

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state court and the claim is also technically exhausted. 

Petitioner has presented no cause for failing to properly exhaust

this claim in state court. He simply acknowledges he did not do

so but offers no explanation. (Doc. 1 at p. 6). As a result,

this claim is likewise procedurally defaulted. 

As noted with respect to Ground I, petitioner has presented

no evidence of extraordinary circumstances justifying the Court to

disregard the procedural default and consider the substance of the

issue raised in Ground II.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be denied. 

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any

notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the

district court’s order and judgment. The parties shall have ten

(10) days from the date of service of this Report and

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections

with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge

will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver

of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in

an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

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Report and Recommendation.

DATED this 7th day of December, 2005.

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