Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02978/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02978-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARYL GRAY,

Booking #16113441,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ARMIN VIANZON, JR.; JOSE 

JIMENEZ; JUAN ANDRADE; 

CRYSTAL VENTURE; WILLIAM D. 

GORE; HELEN ROBBINS-MEYER; 

JESSICA PAUGH,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-2978-DMS-JMA

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 11]

2) DENYING MOTION FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

[ECF No. 15]

AND

3) DISMISSING CLAIMS FOR 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

Daryl Gray (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the San Diego Central Jail 

(“SDCJ”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights 

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for 

Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 15), a “Motion for Sanctions for Being Denied 

Access to Court” (ECF No. 6), a “Motion to Add Defendant(s) to Complaint” (ECF No. 

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10), a “Motion Requesting Leave to File Amended Complaint and Motion for Leave to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis” (ECF No. 17), as well as a Motion to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 11). 

In addition, before the Court could conduct the required sua sponte screening, 

Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) which is now the operative pleading. 

(ECF No. 13.)

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 

2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a prison certificate authorized 

by a SDCJ administrative sergeant attesting to his trust account activity. See ECF No. 17 

at 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This 

statement shows that Plaintiff’s current available balance is only $1.61. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a 

civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the 

prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) 

acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a 

“failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 11), 

declines to “exact” any initial filing fee because his trust account statement shows he “has 

no means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Watch Commander at SDCJ

to instead collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 

and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment 

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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II. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff seeks appointment of counsel to assist him in this matter. (ECF No. 15.) 

However, there is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dept. of 

Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). While under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district 

courts have some limited discretion to “request” that an attorney represent an indigent 

civil litigant, Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004), 

this discretion is rarely exercised and only under “exceptional circumstances.” Id.; see 

also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A finding of exceptional 

circumstances requires “an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the 

merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the 

complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103, quoting Wilborn 

v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Applying these factors to Plaintiff’s case, the Court DENIES his Motion to

Appoint Counsel because a liberal construction of his original pleadings shows he is 

capable of articulating the factual basis for his claims. All documents filed by pro se 

litigants are construed liberally, and “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, 

must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Moreover, FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) requires that 

“[p]leadings . . . be construed so as to do justice.” 

The pleadings filed by Plaintiff to date demonstrate that while Plaintiff may not be 

a trained in law, he is capable of legibly articulating the facts and circumstances relevant 

to his claims, which are typical, straightforward, and not legally “complex.” Agyeman,

390 F.3d at 1103. Therefore, neither the interests of justice nor any exceptional 

circumstances warrant the appointment of counsel in this case at this time. LaMere v. 

Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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III. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.

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B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

On October 28, 2016, Plaintiff claims that four San Diego County Sheriff Deputies 

“pulled up to me and my girlfriend” in their patrol cars, drew their weapons and ordered 

Plaintiff and his girlfriend to get down on the ground. (FAC at 3.) Plaintiff claims they 

complied but the Deputies “jumped on my back and neck” which caused Plaintiff to 

“pass out.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he “woke in the back seat of the police car in 

serious pain” but when he was taken to the County Jail he alleges that he was denied 

adequate medical care. (Id.) 

Approximately two weeks later, on November 17, 2016, Plaintiff had a preliminary 

hearing based on criminal charges brought by Deputy District Attorney Jessica Paugh. 

(See id. at 4.) Plaintiff claims he is being “maliciously prosecuted” by Defendant Paugh 

whom he claims is “racially motivated.” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants 

William Gore and Helen Robbins-Meyer are liable for “ethical misconduct” in their 

supervisory capacity. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff seeks 10.5 million in compensatory damages and 5.6 million in punitive 

damages, as well as injunctive relief. (Id. at 7.)

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

/ / /

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D. Criminal Proceedings – Law Enforcement Defendants

First, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against law enforcement officials and 

claims they falsely arrested and “maliciously prosecuted” him, he may not pursue those 

claims in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, without first showing those 

convictions have already been invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 

(1994).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held:

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions 

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence 

invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or 

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 

make such determination, or called into question by a federal 

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A 

claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or 

sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under 

§ 1983.

Id. at 486-87. 

“Suits challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within 

‘the heart of habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state 

prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but 

not to the fact or length of his custody.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 

2003), quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-99 (1973) (holding that a writ of 

habeas corpus is “explicitly and historically designed” to provide a state prisoner with the 

“exclusive” means to “attack the validity of his confinement” in federal court).

Because Plaintiff seeks damages based on an arrest and criminal charges he claims 

are “false,” his claims amount to an attack on the validity of his underlying criminal 

conviction, and may not proceed pursuant to § 1983, unless his conviction has already 

been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 855-56 (“Absent such a 

showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no

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cause of action under § 1983.’”), quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489. In other words, were 

Plaintiff to succeed in showing that Defendants conspired to wrongfully convict him, an 

award of damages would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his conviction and/or 

sentence. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; see also Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 701 (9th Cir. 

2006) (finding § 1983 action stemming from allegations of wrongful arrest, malicious 

prosecution, and a general conspiracy of “bad behavior” among officials in connection 

with the plaintiff’s arrest, prosecution, and incarceration were barred by Heck).

E. Judicial and Prosecutorial Immunity

Second, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against Deputy District Attorney 

Paugh for prosecuting Plaintiff on criminal charges, she is entitled to absolute 

prosecutorial immunity. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Where 

a prosecutor acts as an advocate ‘in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the state’s 

case,’ absolute immunity applies.” (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431

(1976)); see also Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 912 (9th Cir. 2012)

(“Prosecutors performing their official prosecutorial functions are entitled to absolute 

immunity against constitutional torts.”).

F. Causation

Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted because he 

sets forth no individualized allegations of wrongdoing by Sheriff Gore or Helen RobbinsMeyer, and instead seeks to hold them vicariously liable for the actions of individual 

deputies. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . 

§ 1983 suits,” Plaintiff “must plead that each Government-official defendant, though the 

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”) 

Plaintiff’s FAC contains no factual allegations describing what Defendant Sheriff 

Gore or Robbins-Meyer knew, did, or failed to do, with regard to Plaintiff’s needs. 

Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Causation is, of 

course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.”) “The inquiry into causation must be 

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant 

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whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. 

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988), citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 

(1976); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Thus, without some specific “factual content” that might allow the Court to “draw 

the reasonable inference” that Sheriff Gore or Robbins-Meyer may be held personally 

liable for any unconstitutional conduct directed at Plaintiff, the Court finds his FAC, as 

currently pleaded, contains allegations which Iqbal makes clear fail to “state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 568.

G. Excessive Force claims

As to the excessive for claims brought against Defendants Vianzon, Ventura and 

Andrade, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims sufficient to survive the “low threshold” for 

proceeding past the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 

1915A(b). See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. 

IV. Motion for Sanctions

Plaintiff also has filed a “Request for Sanctions” in which he claims that he is 

being “denied ‘access to court’ by County Sheriff Employees.” (ECF No. 6 at 1.) While 

it is not clear what relief Plaintiff is seeking, it appears that he claims he has had 

difficulty in obtaining his inmate trust account statement. (Id.) However, Plaintiff has 

now submitted his inmate trust account statement to the Court, see ECF No. 17 at 2, and 

thus, Plaintiff’s request is moot. 

V. Leave to Amend

Because the Court has determined that some of Plaintiff’s claims survive the sua 

sponte screening process, the Court will give Plaintiff the opportunity to either: (1) 

notify the Court of the intent to proceed with his excessive force claims against the 

named Defendants; or (2) file an amended pleading correcting all the deficiencies of 

pleading identified by the Court in this Order. Plaintiff must choose one of these options 

within forty-five (45) days from the date this Order is filed. If Plaintiff chooses to 

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proceed as to his excessive force claims only, the Court will issue an Order directing the 

U.S. Marshal to effect service of his FAC and dismiss the remaining claims and 

defendants.

VI. Conclusion and Order

For all the reasons explained the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 11).

2. DIRECTS the Watch Commander of GBDF, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on the Watch 

Commander, San Diego Central Jail, 1173 Front Street, San Diego, California, 92158.

4. DENIES Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 15.)

5. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions, Motion to Add Defendants, and 

Motion Requesting Leave to File Amended Complaint and Motion for Leave to Proceed 

IFP (ECF Nos. 6, 10, 17) as moot. 

5. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims against William Gore and Helen RobbinsMeyer for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b).

6. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims against Jessica Paugh for seeking monetary 

damages against an immune defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 

§1915A(b).

7. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in 

which to either: (1) Notify the Court of the intention to proceed with excessive force 

claims only; or (2) File an Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of 

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pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without 

reference to his original pleading. Defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in 

the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal 

Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey, 693 F.3d at 928 (noting that 

claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading 

may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

If Plaintiff fails to choose either option within the time provided, this civil action 

will remain dismissed without prejudice based on his failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

8. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a court approved form civil 

rights complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 1, 2017

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