Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00061/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00061-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LARRY CALDWELL,

NO. CIV. S-05-0061 FCD JFM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSEVILLE JOINT UNION HIGH

SCHOOL DISTRICT; JAMES JOINER

and R. JAN PINNEY, in their

official capacities as members

of the Board of Education;

TONY MONETTI in his official

capacity as Assistant

Superintendent for Curriculum

and Instruction, DONALD

GENASCI in his official

capacity Deputy Superintendent

for Personnel and Chief

Compliance Officer; RONALD

SEVERSON in his official

capacity Principal of Granite

Bay High School; and Does 1

through 10.

Defendants.

_________________________/

----oo0oo----

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders the matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230 (h). 

2 The factual background of this case is taken from

plaintiff’s complaint.

2

This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion to

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),

12(b)(6), 8(a), and 10(a). For the reasons set forth below,1

defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

BACKGROUND2

From June 3, 2003 through June 1, 2004, Larry Caldwell

(“plaintiff”) sought to introduce new material into the science

program in defendant Roseville Joint Union High School District

(“District”). (Pl.s’ Third Am. Compl. (“TAC”), filed July 29,

2005, ¶ 14). Teachers from the district teach Darwin’s theory of

evolution in biology classes. (Id.) Plaintiff sought to have the

District adopt his Quality Science Education Policy (“QSEP”),

which presents some of the scientific weaknesses of evolution

along with the scientific strengths. (Id.) In seeking to

persuade public officials of the district to adopt the QSEP,

plaintiff engaged in three distinct public processes. (Id. ¶

16). Specifically, plaintiff sought 1) to list the QSEP as an

agenda item on school board meetings, 2) to participate on the

curriculum instruction team, and 3) to participate in the

district’s “instructional materials challenge” procedure. (Id.

¶¶ 6, 10, 12). Plaintiff alleges the following in support of his

claims. 

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3

A. School Board Meetings

Plaintiff sought to place items on the school board agenda

and have the board vote on his QSEP policy. (See id. ¶¶ 6-10). 

The School Board regularly holds meetings open to the public. 

(Id. ¶ 17). Plaintiff requested that the QSEP be placed on the

agenda of a regular school board meeting for public debate and

potential adoption. (Id.) The school board listed the topic of

“supplemental materials” instead. (Id. ¶ 18). Plaintiff

questioned R. Jan Pinney (“Pinney”), a member of the Board of

Trustees, about the omission of the QSEP from the board’s agenda. 

(Id.) Pinney told plaintiff that the omission was intentional

and instructed plaintiff that he would need to obtain approval

from each high school council before he would be permitted to

place the QSEP on the school board’s agenda. (Id.)

Despite Pinney’s instruction, plaintiff proceeded to seek

adoption of his QSEP proposal through the school board, but the

school board refused to list the QSEP on the board’s agenda. 

(Id. ¶ 27). In total, the board denied plaintiff’s request to

place the QSEP on the meeting agenda on 12 occasions. (Id.) 

On April 19, 2004, plaintiff threatened legal action if the

district continued to refuse to place the QSEP on the board’s

agenda. (Id. ¶ 24). In response, Superintendent Tony Monetti

(“Monetti”) agreed to place the QSEP on the board’s agenda on May

4, 2004 (Id. ¶¶ 24-25). The board entertained discussion from

the public regarding the QSEP and was prepared to vote on its

adoption. (Id. ¶ 25). According to plaintiff, Monetti then

“asserted a bogus procedural objection” that prevented the board

from voting to adopt the QSEP. (Id.) Plaintiff requested to

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discuss the QSEP again at a later meeting. The board denied his

request. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ refusal to

place the QSEP on the board agenda and the deprivation of a board

vote was motivated by an intent to discriminate against Caldwell

and other citizens on the basis of their viewpoint and/or their

religious beliefs and affiliations. (Id. ¶ 28). 

B. Curriculum Instruction Team

Plaintiff also sought to express his views by participating

in the Curriculum Instruction Team (“CIT”) of his daughter’s high

school, Granite Bay High School (“GBHS”). (Id. ¶ 29). The CIT

is a parent advisory council with the purpose of informing and

involving parents in the development of programs at GBHS. (Id. ¶

33). A newsletter addressed to parents of students of GBHS

invited participation and presented a potential topic: “How is

evolution taught in our school? . . . If you have questions like

these about curriculum and instruction issues at GBHS, the

Curriculum and Instruction team is the place for you.” (Id.)

Plaintiff viewed the CIT as a potential avenue to address

his ideas about the QSEP and asked the school principal, Ronald

Severson (“Severson”) whether it would be a proper forum. (Id. ¶

34). Severson responded that he would prefer to meet and discuss

these issues with plaintiff individually rather than at the CIT

meeting. He also informed plaintiff that he did not support the

QSEP. (Id.)

The agenda for the CIT meeting on December 3, 2003, included

a topic regarding updating the science curriculum and referred to

the QSEP. (Id. ¶ 35). Plaintiff and others supporting

plaintiff’s views attended the CIT meeting, but Severson told

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them that they would not be permitted to discuss the QSEP. 

Severson removed the item from the agenda. (Id.) Plaintiff was

not allowed to discuss the QSEP at any later CIT meetings that

year. (Id.) Plaintiff believes that defendants’ refusal to

permit him to discuss the QSEP at CIT meetings was motivated by

hostility toward plaintiff’s actual and perceived religious

beliefs. (Id. ¶ 36).

C. Instructional Materials Challenge

Additionally, plaintiff sought to challenge the use of the

Holt Biology Textbook in the district. (Id. ¶ 38). The district

has an “instructional materials challenge” procedure for parents

and others to object to the use of a particular textbook. (Id.) 

The challenge provides four levels of review: individual teachers

(Level One), school principals (Level Two), Assistant

Superintendent of Curriculum Instruction (Level Three), and

Superintendent (Level Four). (Id.) 

In September 2003, plaintiff challenged the Holt Biology

Textbook on the grounds that its coverage of evolution was not

“accurate, objective, and current” as required by the California

Education Code. (Id. ¶ 39). Plaintiff’s proposed solution was

to supplement the current text with the QSEP materials. (Id.) 

Because all teachers in the district used the textbook, the

District and plaintiff agreed that the Level One challenge could

be satisfied through a consolidated challenge as opposed to

meeting each teacher individually. (Id.) Plaintiff also

believed that this meeting would satisfy the second level of

review. (Id.) Most of the district’s science teachers attended

the meeting, and plaintiff believes that principals and

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administrators were also in attendance. (Id.) On December 15,

2003, nineteen science teachers rejected plaintiff’s challenge. 

(Id.) Plaintiff is unclear whether he was accorded a level two

review and alleges that he was not afforded a level three or

level four review. (Id. ¶¶ 43-45). Plaintiff believes that the

district’s failure to comply with its own instructional materials

challenge was based on both “religious animus” and viewpoint

discrimination. (Id. ¶ 46). 

D. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed administrative complaints to the district on

behalf of himself and others. (Id. ¶ 47). Genasci had the legal

authority to respond to plaintiff’s allegations and denied each

of the administrative complaints. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he

has exhausted his administrative remedies. (Id. ¶ 51).

Plaintiff filed this action in federal court on January 11,

2005. He amended the complaint once as of right on January 18,

2005. He then sought leave to amend to file a second amended

complaint (“SAC”). The court granted plaintiff leave and the SAC

was filed on March 10, 2005. Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss the SAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for

failure to state a short plain statement of relief as required

under Rule 8(a). On June 30, 2005, the court issued an order

dismissing the SAC under Rule 8(a) and directing plaintiff to

file an amended complaint within thirty days. The court vacated

defendants’ motion to dismiss as moot. On July 29, 2005,

plaintiff filed the third amended complaint (“TAC”). 

Plaintiff’s TAC alleges the following claims: 1) violation

of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 2) violations of state

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constitutional laws; and 3) waste of tax dollars under California

Code of Civil Procedure section 526(a). Plaintiff seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief, nominal damages, and

attorney’s fees and costs. (Pl’s. Prayers for Relief ¶¶ 1-24). 

STANDARD

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party may by motion raise the defense

that the court lacks “jurisdiction over the subject matter” of a

claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). It is well established that

the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court

bears the burden of establishing the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d

1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). The Eleventh Amendment limits the

subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Seminole

Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53-54 (1996). 

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

may attack the allegations of jurisdiction contained in the

complaint as insufficient on their face to demonstrate the

existence of jurisdiction (“facial attack”). Thornhill

Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733

(9th Cir. 1979). If the motion constitutes a facial attack, the

court must consider the factual allegations of the complaint to

be true. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir.

1981).

B. Motion to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

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every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th

Cir. 1986).

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that plaintiff

“can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants

have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” 

Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. Calif. State

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover, the

court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the

form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v.

Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

C. Rule 8(a)

Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading provide "a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The pleading must give the

defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

47 (1957). “[D]ismissal for a violation under Rule 8(a)(2) is

usually confined to instances in which the complaint is ‘so

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verbose, confused or redundant that its true substance, if any, 

is well disguised.’” Gillibeau, 417 F.2d at 431 (citing Corcoran

v. Yorty, 347 F.2d 222, 223 (9th Cir. 1965)).

D. Rule 10(a)

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide, “[i]n the

complaint, the title of the action shall include the names of all

the parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). “The rule serves to

apprise the parties of their opponents, and it protects the

public’s legitimate interest in knowing all the facts and events

surrounding court proceedings.” Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158,

160 (D. Cal. 1981). If a party is unknown at the time a

complaint is filed, federal courts typically will allow the use

of a fictitious name in the caption so long as it appears that

the plaintiff will be able to obtain the true name through the

discovery process. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642

(9th Cir. 1980).

ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction and Justiciability

1. Justiciability

Defendants raise a number of arguments relating to the

court’s jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims, including issues

relating to standing, the political question doctrine, and

mootness. These arguments are off-point because they address

claims not before the court. 

Defendants repeatedly argue that plaintiff’s “real complaint

is that the District did not adopt his QSEP.” (Defs.’ Reply,

filed Sept. 16, 2005, at 5). This so-called “real complaint” was

never filed by plaintiff. On defendants’ motion to dismiss, the

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court may only address plaintiff’s claims, not defendants’

claims. Here, plaintiff claims that: (1) defendants are denying

him the opportunity to speak at various types of school district

meetings, thus violating his rights guaranteed by the First and

Fourteenth Amendments; (2) plaintiff was treated differently and

unfairly because of his religious beliefs in violation of the

Free Speech Clause, his right to petition the government, the

Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and his rights

to procedural due process; and (3) his constitutional rights will

continue to be violated by defendants based upon their past

pattern and practice. Plaintiff’s TAC does not seek an order by

this court requiring the adoption of the QSEP in the school

curriculum. Defendants’ various and extended arguments

addressing this non-existent allegation are not germane to

defendants’ motion and will not be considered by the court.

In addition, defendants argue the merits of plaintiff’s

claims, which seek relief for the above alleged violations of his

Constitutional rights. On a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, the

court may only examine the allegations of the complaint. The

court may not look at the merits of plaintiff’s claims or

defendants’ factual defenses. This does not mean that defendants

may not ultimately prevail on a motion for summary judgment. It

means that, as a result of defendants’ motion to dismiss, the

court can only consider the allegations on the face of the

complaint, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Therefore, the court will not 

address those arguments of defendants more properly made on a

motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56. 

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3 Plaintiff designated that the individual defendants

were being sued “in their official capacities” in the TAC. 

Plaintiff failed to request and receive leave to amend the SAC to

properly change the caption. As such, the changes must be

stricken. Nevertheless, in assessing the TAC, the court will

consider this amendment as a demonstration of plaintiff’s

intention to sue the individual defendants only in their official

capacities. 

11

2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiff’s TAC alleges claims against the District and

against all individual defendants in their official capacities.3

Defendants argue that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity, and therefore, this court does not have

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims.

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims against the

District should be dismissed because the Eleventh Amendment bars

a federal court from hearing claims by a citizen against

dependant instrumentalities of the state. Cerrato v. San

Francisco Comm. College Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The Ninth Circuit has established that California school

districts are state agencies. See Belanger v. Madera Unified

School District, 963 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that

a school district was a state agency for purposes of the Eleventh

Amendment because a judgment against the school district would be

satisfied out of state funds and because the district performed

central government functions). Under the Eleventh Amendment,

agencies of the state are immune from private damage actions or

suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court. Mitchell

v. Los Angeles Comm. College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir.

1988) (citing Pennhurst State Sch & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.

89, 100 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment proscribes suit against state

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agencies “regardless of the nature of the relief sought”). Thus,

because the District is a state agency, it possesses Eleventh

Amendment immunity from plaintiff’s claims for damages and for

injunctive relief. Id. Defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s claims against the District are GRANTED.

Defendants also argue that the individual defendants are

entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Generally, a

claim asserted against an officer of the state, acting in his/her

official capacity is, as a matter of law, asserted against the

State of California itself, Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72

(1985), and therefore is generally barred on Eleventh Amendment

immunity grounds. See Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1026

(9th Cir. 1999) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars actions for damages

against state officials who are sued in their official capacities

in federal court.”) (citations omitted). However, “[i]t is well

established that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a federal

court from granting prospective injunctive relief against an

officer of the state who acts outside the bounds of his

authority.” Cerrato, 26 F.3d at 973; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.

123. To the extent that plaintiff seeks declaratory and

injunctive relief under federal law against the individual

defendants, defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

This exception to the general rule granting immunity does

not apply when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has

violated a state law. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105-06 (“[I]t is

difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty

than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to

conform their conduct to state law.”). “Ex parte Young allows

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prospective relief against state officers only to vindicate

rights under federal law.” Spoklie v. Montana, 411 F.3d 1051,

1059 (9th Cir. 2005). To the extent that plaintiff’s TAC alleges

violations of state law by the individual defendants in their

official capacity, defendants’ motion is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff’s TAC alleges violations of federal and state

constitutional law as well as a state taxpayer claim for

wasted/illegally expended municipal funds. Plaintiff seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief, nominal damages, and

attorney’s fees and costs. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, one who

prevails in a § 1983 action is entitled to recover attorney’s

fees as costs, not as damages. See Williams v. Vidmar, 367 F.

Supp. 2d 1265, 1277 (N.D. Cal. 2005). Thus, plaintiff’s only

claims for monetary damages are in the form of his request for

nominal damages in the amount of $100. Because a suit for

damages against a state official is barred by the Eleventh

Amendment, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for

nominal damages is GRANTED.

3. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants argue that this case should be dismissed because

plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

“[E]xhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be

required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to §

1983.” Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982)

(superceded on other grounds); See also Porter v. Nussle, 534

U.S. 516, 523 (2002)(superceded on other grounds). Accordingly,

defendants’ motion is DENIED.

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B. Immunity

1. Federal Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that plaintiffs complaint should be

dismissed because they are entitled to federal qualified immunity

under § 1983. “Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to

damage liability; it does not bar actions for declaratory or

injunctive relief.” Amer. Fire, Theft, & Collision Managers,

Inc. v. Gillespie, 932 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations

omitted). Plaintiff brings this suit for declaratory and

injunctive relief, nominal damages, and for attorneys’ fees and

costs. Therefore, to the extent that plaintiffs assert claims

for equitable relief, defendants are not protected by federal

qualified immunity. See Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169 (9th

Cir. 1984) (“[I]mmunity from injunctive relief is generally

without foundation. . . . The availability of such injunctive

relief is necessary to permit the vindication of important

federal rights.”). Defendants’ motion to dismiss based upon

federal qualified immunity is DENIED.

2. State Law Immunity

Defendants argue that they are immune based upon state law

absolute or discretionary immunity. State statutory immunity

provisions do not apply to federal civil rights actions. 

Guillory v. Orange County, 731 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984). 

The Ninth Circuit explained, “To construe a federal statute to

allow a state immunity defense ‘to have controlling effect would

transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise,’ which the

supremacy clause does not allow.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Therefore, state law immunity provisions will not guard

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4 Because plaintiff’s state law claims against the

individual defendants are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, this

court does not address defendants’ arguments regarding the

applicability of state law discretionary or absolute immunity to

plaintiff’s state law claims. 

15

defendants from plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for relief and

defendants’ motion to dismiss based upon state law immunity is

DENIED.4

C. Plaintiff’s Alleged Failure to State a § 1983 Claim

Turning to the sufficiency of plaintiff’s § 1983

allegations, defendants contend that plaintiff fails to state

sufficient allegations. To state a claim under § 1983,

plaintiffs must plead that (1) defendants acted under color of

law, and (2) defendants deprived plaintiff of rights secured by

the Constitution or federal statutes. Gibson v. U.S., 781 F.2d

1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). 

1. Plaintiff’s Free Speech Rights

Plaintiff alleges that his First Amendment rights were

violated because defendants refused to place his QSEP on the

agenda. (TAC ¶¶ 17-28). Defendants argue and plaintiff admits

that he was able to place the QSEP on the agenda and discuss it

at a school board meeting. (Id. ¶ 25). However, plaintiff

alleges that he was unable to place the QSEP on the agenda for

twelve meetings during the 2003-2004 school year because

defendants intended to discriminate against him based on his

religious beliefs and affiliations. (Id. ¶ 28). Plaintiff also

alleges that, based upon defendants’ past conduct, he is likely 

to be denied his rights to place the QSEP on the meeting agenda

in the future. (Id.)

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Because this case concerns the government’s ability to limit

private expression in a public context, it is governed by the

public forum doctrine. Levanthal v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist.,

973 F. Supp. 951, 956 (S.D. Cal. 1997). The Supreme Court has

identified thee distinct types of fora: (1) traditional public

fora, “places which by long tradition or by government fiat have

been devoted to assembly and debate;” (2) limited public fora,

places generally open to the public for expressive activity,

“even if [the government] was not required to create the forum in

the first place;” and (3) nonpublic fora, “public property which

is not by tradition or designation a forum for public

communication.” Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’

Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). Under this doctrine, the

state’s ability to regulate speech depends on the nature of the

forum. See id. 

The State of California has designated certain public

property for use as public fora. Under the Brown Act and the

California Education Code, the California Legislature has

designated school board meetings as limited public fora, i.e.

fora open to the public in general, but limited to comments

related to the school board’s subject matter. Cal. Gov. Code §

54954.3 (West 2005); Cal. Educ. Code § 35145.5 (West 2005); see

Leventhal, 973 F. Supp at 957; Baca v. Moreno Valley Unified Sch.

Dist., 936 F. Supp. 719, 729 (C.D. Cal. 1996). The government

may impose content neutral regulations on speech in limited

public fora if they are reasonable time, place, or manner

restrictions. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. The government may 

/////

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5 To the extent that defendants argue that there is a

sufficient justification for restricting plaintiff’s speech, they

may later assert such a compelling government interest. However,

the assertion or sufficiency of such a government interest cannot

be evaluated at this stage of the litigation. 

17

only impose content based prohibition is they are “narrowly drawn

to effectuate a compelling state interest.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that on numerous occasions he was

restricted from placing the QSEP on the agenda and presenting the

QSEP at open school board meetings because of his viewpoint. 

“The public’s right to speak at open school board meetings

includes the right to place school matters on the agenda of those

meetings.” Leventhal, 973 F. Supp. at 962 n. 7 (citing Cal.

Educ. Code § 35145.5). Because plaintiff has alleged that

defendants have restricted his speech in a limited public forum

on the basis of it content, plaintiff has sufficiently pled a

claim for violation of his First Amendment Right to free speech.5 

Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

2. Plaintiff’s Petition Rights

Plaintiff alleges that defendants deprived him of his

constitutional rights to petition and instruct the government. 

The First Amendment protects citizens’ rights to petition the

government for redress of grievances. See Smith v. Arkansas

State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 464 (1979);

Evers v. County of Custer, 745 F.2d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 1984). 

“[T]he right to petition extends to all departments of the

government, including the executive department, the legislature,

agencies, and the courts.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1232 

/////

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(9th Cir. 2000). However, this right to petition is not

absolute.

[The] right to petition government afforded by the

First Amendment does not include the absolute right to

speak in person to officials. Where written

communications are considered by government officials,

denial of a hearing does not infringe upon the right to

petition. The right to petition government does not

create in the government a corresponding duty to act. 

Prestopnik v. Whelan, 253 F. Supp. 2d 369, 375 (N.D.N.Y. 2003)

(no violation where a teacher’s attorney was given the

opportunity to submit her complaint in writing); see WalkerSerrano v. Leonard, 168 F. Supp. 2d 332, 347 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (no

violation where plaintiff elementary school student was not

allowed to pass petitions to students but was afforded other

avenues).

Plaintiff alleges that defendants infringed upon his First

Amendment right to petition in denying him the opportunity to

place items on the school board agenda for discussion. The right

to petition does not require that plaintiff be given an

opportunity to speak publicly about his petition nor that the

government act upon his petition. See Prestopnik v. Whelan, 253

F. Supp. 2d at 374; Walker-Serrano, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 347. 

Plaintiff sent numerous letters to the board regarding the QSEP. 

(Id. ¶¶ 17, 19, 22, 24, 28). Defendants responded to these

letters. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 20, 23, 25). Moreover, on May 4, 2004,

plaintiff had the opportunity to publicly debate the QSEP. (Id.

¶ 25.) While plaintiff alleges that the Board did not vote on

the adoption of the QSEP, that inaction does not violate

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. “[T]he First Amendment does 

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not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to

listen, [or] to respond.” Smith, 441 U.S. at 465. 

Plaintiff alleges that he made written requests and

complaints to defendants, that he discussed the situation in

person with individual defendants, and that he publicly presented

the QSEP at a board meeting. The facts alleged by plaintiff

demonstrate that there were opportunities to petition the

government, albeit not in the forum that plaintiff desired. 

Therefore, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for a

violation of his right to petition at defendant’s school board

meetings. 

Plaintiff further claims that his right to petition was

violated when he was not permitted to discuss the QSEP at CIT

meetings. (TAC ¶ 29.) Specifically, Severson told plaintiff and

others that they would not be permitted to discuss the QSEP at a

CIT meeting. (Id. ¶ 36.) However, Severson offered to meet with

plaintiff personally to discuss the QSEP. (Id. ¶ 34.) Because

plaintiff alleges facts that demonstrate that he was given an

avenue to petition the government, his constitutional right was

not violated. See Walker-Serrano, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 347.

Under Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir.

1995), in dismissing for failure to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6) “a district court should grant leave to amend even if no

request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that

the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of

other facts.” Since the court has found that plaintiff’s own

allegations demonstrate that he was given avenues to petition the

government, he could only cure this pleading by denying his own

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6 Plaintiff brings a claim for relief under § 1983 for

violations of his rights under the Establishment and Free

Exercise clauses of the First Amendment. It is unclear from the

face of the complaint whether plaintiff intended to bring claims

under both of these clauses separately. Moreover, in his

opposition papers, plaintiff incorporates his argument relating

to the Establishment Clause in his argument relating to the Free

Exercise Clause and alleges the same violations as under his

Establishment Clause claim. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that

defendants do not allow Christian citizens to participate in

public debates and public policy-making to the same extent as

non-Christians. Because this court cannot discern how these

violations prevent plaintiff from exercising his religion, the

court will address these violations under only the Establishment

Clause. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (finding no

Free Exercise violation where the disputed legislation did not

criminalize the holding of any religious belief or opinion, did

not force anyone to embrace any religious belief, or say or

believe anything in conflict with his religious tenets); see also

Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 383-86 (1974).

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allegations. Thus, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED without leave

to amend. 

3. Plaintiff’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clause

Rights6

Plaintiff asserts that defendants’ restriction of his

participation in meetings, failure to give full review of his

QSEP, and failure to remedy violations of his constitutional

rights violate the Establishment Clause of the United States

Constitution. The Establishment Clause provides: “Congress shall

make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” 

U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 1. The prohibition of the

Establishment Clause applies to state governments through the

Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,

8 (1947). According to the Supreme Court,

the Establishment Clause [has come] to mean

that government may not promote or affiliate

itself with any religious doctrine or

organization, may not discriminate among

persons on the basis of their religious

beliefs and practices, may not delegate a

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7 See Brown v. Woodland Jt. Unif. Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373,

1378 (9th Cir. 1994); Kreisner v. San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 780

(9th Cir. 1993).

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governmental power to a religious

institution, and may not involve itself too

deeply in such an institution’s affairs.

County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590-91 (1989)

(footnotes omitted), quoted in Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94

F.3d 1223, 1231 (9th Cir. 1996). 

As decreed by the Supreme Court, and followed in the Ninth

Circuit,7 claims brought under the Establishment Clause are

analyzed under the three-part “Lemon Test.” See Lemon v.

Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Under the Lemon analysis, a

statute or practice which touches upon religion must (1) have a

secular purpose; (2) must neither advance nor inhibit religion in

its principal or primary effect; and (3) must not foster an

excessive entanglement with religion. County of Allegheny, 492

U.S. at 592; see Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.

Defendants’ argument under the establishment clause fails to

address any of plaintiff’s allegations in his claim for relief. 

Instead, defendants assert, generally, that they had discretion

to reject plaintiff’s QSEP and maintain the current science

curriculum. Plaintiff does not claim that defendants did not

have such discretion. Rather, plaintiff alleges that defendants

violated his First Amendment constitutional rights by exhibiting

hostility towards him and his beliefs. (TAC ¶¶ 16, 28, 36-37,

43-47). Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ actions were 

motivated by “religious animus” and constituted government

disapproval of Christian religious beliefs. (Id.) 

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“In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask

whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove

of religion.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985). In

this case, the answer to this inquiry is dispositive and the

court need not address the second and third elements of the Lemon

test. See id.; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)

(O’Connor, concurring) (“The purpose prong of the Lemon test

requires that a government activity have a secular purpose.”). 

Plaintiff has alleged that defendants inter alia restricted his

participation at meetings, did not accord his QSEP appropriate

review, and refused to remedy the denial of his constitutional

rights based on their “religious animus.” (TAC ¶¶ 16, 28, 36-37,

43-47). On a motion to dismiss, the court may only evaluate the

allegations on the face of the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc.

12(b). Reading the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom,

plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the primary purpose of

the defendant’s actions was to disapprove of plaintiff’s actual

or perceived religious beliefs. Defendants’ alleged actions do

not pass the secular purpose test. Thus, plaintiff has

sufficiently pled a violation of his First Amendment rights under

the Establishment Clause. Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

4. Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Rights

Plaintiff alleges a claim for relief against defendants

under § 1983 for violations of the Equal Protection Clause. (Id.

¶ 71). Defendants allege that plaintiff has failed to properly

allege any “suspect classifications” necessary for stating a

claim for violation of his equal protection rights.

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The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

provides that no State shall “deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.

Amdt. 14, § 1. This is “essentially a direction that all persons

similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v.

Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). “The guarantee of

equal protection is not a source of substantive rights or

liberties, but rather a right to be free from discrimination in

statutory classifications and other governmental activity.” 

Williams, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 1270 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448

U.S. 297, 322 (1980)). “[D]iscrimination cannot exist in a

vacuum; it can only be found in the unequal treatment of people

in similar circumstances.” Id. (quoting Attorney General v.

Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Under

the liberal notice-pleading standard, plaintiff need only allege

a broadly identified class of similarly situated persons for an

equal protections claim. See Williams, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 1271

(finding a broadly identified class was sufficient to put

defendants on notice where plaintiff sufficiently alleged that he

was treated differently from other teachers because he is an

“avowed Christian”). 

Again, the court must accept as true all factual allegations

made by plaintiff on a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff states that

he is a Christian, whom defendants pejoratively refer to as a

“right-wing evangelical Christian fundamentalist.” (TAC ¶ 16). 

He alleges that defendants have restricted him and members of the

public from exercising their rights under the First and

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Fourteenth Amendment because of “an intent to discriminate

against Caldwell and other citizens on the basis of their

viewpoint and/or their religious beliefs and affiliations.” (Id.

¶¶ 16, 28, 37). Plaintiff further alleges that “defendants are

hostile to Caldwell’s actual and perceived religious beliefs and

affiliations and . . . have been motivated and continue to be

motivated by such antireligious hostility in depriving Caldwell

of constitutional rights.” (Id. ¶ 28). Plaintiff claims that

the defendants’ “pattern and practice” violate the Equal

Protection Clause.

Plaintiff has alleged that he is treated differently from

other members of the community based upon his actual or perceived

religious beliefs. In the context of the complaint, plaintiff’s

allegations identify the class of similarly situated persons as

those parents and members of the community who participate in

school board meetings, the curriculum instruction team, and

challenges to the instructional materials. Under the liberal

notice-pleading standard, these allegations are sufficient. See

Williams, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 1271. Defendants’ motion is DENIED. 

 5. Plaintiff’s Procedural Due Process Rights

Plaintiff further alleges that defendants have subjected him

to a deprivation of his rights to procedural due process under

the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that

defendants, “motivated by their false presumptions about his

perceived religious and political viewpoints,” engaged in a

“pattern and practice of preventing plaintiff from exercising his

constitutional rights. (TAC ¶ 16). Plaintiff argues that

defendants acted upon an unwritten, unconstitutionally vague

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policy in deciding what matters would be placed on the meeting

agendas. (See id. ¶ 49). 

To allege a procedural due process claim on the basis of a

vague regulation, a plaintiff must first allege a deprivation of

a constitutionally protected interest, and second, allege that

the deprivation was achieved by means of a constitutionally vague

policy or procedure. Zinerman v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125

(1990); Williams, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 1274. As demonstrated

above, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged deprivations of his

First Amendment rights in his complaint. Plaintiff alleges that

all of the adverse conduct by defendants was performed pursuant

to “established policies, practices, or customs.” (TAC ¶ 49). 

Again, under a liberal notice-pleading standard, plaintiff’s

allegations are sufficient because they apprise defendants of the

basis for the claims asserted against them. Taking plaintiff’s

allegations as true and deriving all reasonable inferences

therefrom, plaintiff has alleged that the deprivation of his

constitutional rights were achieved by unwritten policies and

practices that are unconstitutionally vague on their face or as

applied to plaintiff. Defendants motion is DENIED.

D. Procedural Defects

Defendants allege procedural defects with plaintiff’s TAC

under Rule 8(a). Rule 8(a) requires the complaint to provide "a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief." Plaintiff has amended his complaint to

sufficiently allege his claims for relief as well as the factual

basis for those claims. Therefore, the TAC meets the

requirements of Rule 8(a). Defendant’s motion is thus DENIED.

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Defendants also allege that plaintiff’s TAC violates Rule

10(a). Defendants point to plaintiff’s addition of the 10 “Doe

defendants” as well as the addition of the “official capacity”

designation following the names of the individual defendants. 

Plaintiff did not previously seek leave to amend his complaint to

add the new defendants or the new designation. Because plaintiff

was not granted leave to amend, the 10 Doe defendants as well as

the “official capacity” designations of the individual defendants

are STRICKEN. 

E. Leave to Amend

Pursuant to Rule 15(a), “leave [to amend] is to be freely

given when justice so requires.” “[L]eave to amend should be

granted unless amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing

party, is sought in bad faith, is futile, or creates undue

delay.” Martinez v. Newport Beach, 125 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir.

1997). Though the court has stricken plaintiff’s additions to

the caption because plaintiff failed to properly seek leave to

amend, plaintiff’s TAC does allege claims against the 10 Doe

defendants as well as the individual defendants “in their

official capacity.” Therefore, plaintiff is granted leave to

amend the third amended complaint for the limited purpose of

amending the caption to include the 10 Doe defendants and the

“official capacity” designation following the names of the

individual defendants. 

F. Request for Sanctions, Attorneys’ Fees, and Costs

Defendants request sanctions, attorneys’ fees, and costs,

alleging that the TAC is “totally without merit, frivolous, and

in violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Def.’s

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Mot. at 47). To the contrary, plaintiff’s TAC has alleged 

colorable claims under § 1983. Therefore, defendants’ request is

DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims against

Roseville Joint Union High School District is GRANTED with

prejudice because such claims are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s state law

claims against all individual defendants is GRANTED with

prejudice because such claims are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment.

3. Defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for

nominal damages is GRANTED with prejudice because such claims are

barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

4. Defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 claims

is:

a. DENIED with respect to plaintiff’s First Amendment

free speech claims;

b. DENIED with respect to plaintiff’s Free Exercise

and Establishment Clause claims;

c. DENIED with respect to plaintiff’s Equal

Protection Clause claims;

d. DENIED with respect to plaintiff’s procedural due

process claims;

e. GRANTED with prejudice with respect to plaintiff’s

First Amendment right to petition claims.

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5. Defendant’s request for sanctions, attorneys’ fees, and

costs is DENIED. 

Plaintiff is granted twenty (20) days from the date of this

order to file a fourth amended complaint in accordance with this

order. Pursuant to this order, plaintiff’s fourth amended

complaint may only reflect changes to the caption of the

complaint to include the 10 Doe defendants and the “official

capacity” designation following the names of the individual

defendants. Defendants are granted thirty (30) days from the

date of service of plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint to file a

response thereto.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 25, 2005

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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