Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00473/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00473-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICKY GRAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

B. COGDELL, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-0473 KJN P

ORDER

On March 12, 2014, this court identified plaintiff as a “three strikes litigant,” under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g), which precludes plaintiff from proceeding in forma pauperis in an action unless 

he demonstrates that he was “under imminent danger of serious physical injury” when he filed the 

complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 

2007). Plaintiff did not contend that he met this exception, but instead paid the full filing fee on 

April 11, 2014. Thereafter, plaintiff filed two copies of his First Amended Complaint (FAC).1 

(ECF Nos. 8, 9.) References herein are to the FAC filed April 11, 2014. (ECF No. 8.)

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1

 Plaintiff’s second-filed FAC appears to be identical to his first-filed FAC. The second FAC is 

prefaced by a letter in which plaintiff expresses his concerns that the first FAC may have been 

incomplete, which does not appear to be the case. (See ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff’s motion for an 

extension of time to pay the filing fee and file his complaint (ECF No. 7), will be denied as moot.

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I. Screening of FAC

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In 

reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the 

complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), 

construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the 

plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). The court must dismiss a 

complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or 

malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is frivolous when based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual 

contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); see also

Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). A complaint fails to state a claim 

when it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in that would entitle him to 

relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 

45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 

1981). 

The court finds the FAC difficult to construe, as it does not conform to an acceptable 

format, and the legal claims are interwoven with the factual allegations. The FAC commences 

with 19 “grounds for relief,” is then signed by plaintiff, and thereafter concludes with 90 

“statement[s] of claims,” which include 20 “counts;” the FAC names 25 defendants. The FAC

challenges plaintiff’s validation as a gang member, as allegedly based on unreliable and 

fabricated evidence. The FAC also alleges that plaintiff was denied access to the courts by 

defendants’ allegedly intentional obstruction of plaintiff’s efforts to exhaust his administrative 

remedies, particularly with respect to his gang validation. The FAC asserts that defendants’ 

alleged misconduct was motivated by retaliation against plaintiff for attempting to expose 

defendants’ allegedly corrupt practices, apparently pursuant to the administrative exhaustion 

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process. Plaintiff asserts legal claims premised on the First Amendment (alleged retaliation,

2

by 

falsely validating plaintiff, and preventing his exhaustion of the administrative appeals process; 

alleged denial of access to the courts;3and alleged confiscation and banning of reading material4);

 

2

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five 

basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (fn. and citations 

omitted). At the pleading stage, the “chilling” requirement is met if the “official’s acts would 

chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.’” Id. at 

568, quoting Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th 

Cir. 1999). However, direct and tangible harm will support a First Amendment retaliation claim 

even without demonstration of a chilling effect on the further exercise of a prisoner’s First 

Amendment rights. Rhodes, at 568 n.11. “[A] plaintiff who fails to allege a chilling effect may 

still state a claim if he alleges he suffered some other harm” as a retaliatory adverse action. 

Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009), citing Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 n11. 

The plaintiff need not prove that the alleged retaliatory action, in itself, violated a 

constitutional right. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (1995) (to prevail on a retaliation claim, 

plaintiff need not “establish an independent constitutional interest” was violated); see also Hines 

v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 268 (9th Cir.1997) (upholding jury determination of retaliation based on 

filing of a false rules violation report); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (transfer of prisoner 

to a different prison constituted adverse action for purposes of retaliation claim). Rather, the 

interest asserted in a retaliation claim is the right to be free of conditions that would not have been 

imposed but for the alleged retaliatory motive. However, not every allegedly adverse action will 

support a retaliation claim. See, e.g., Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 

2000) (retaliation claim cannot rest on “the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, literally, 

‘after this, therefore because of this’”) (citation omitted).

3

“[P]risoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 

817, 821 (1977); see also Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1990). This right “requires 

prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by 

providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the 

law.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. In order to state a denial of access claim under the First 

Amendment, a prisoner must show that he suffered an “actual injury” as a result of the 

defendants’ actions by explaining how the challenged official acts or omissions hindered 

plaintiff’s efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-55 

(1996). Actual injury may be shown if the alleged shortcomings “hindered his efforts to pursue a 

legal claim,” such as having his complaint dismissed for “for failure to satisfy some technical 

requirement” or if he “suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the 

courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was unable even to file a 

complaint.” Id. at 351. 

4

“[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status 

as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. 

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Eighth Amendment (alleged cruel and unusual punishment5resulting from plaintiff’s allegedly 

unsupported gang validation, viz., indefinite SHU assignment, effective LWOP, diminished 

ability to obtain a parole date, resulting mental and emotional distress, and physical 

deterioration); and Fourteenth Amendment (alleged denial of due process6in gang validation; and 

alleged denial of equal protection,

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including alleged reliance on the gang validation process as a 

pretext to confiscate reading material from African American prisoners/plaintiff.)

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Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (factors to be 

considered in evaluating the constitutionality of prison regulations). 

5

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” The 

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited 

by the United States Constitution. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Neither accident 

nor negligence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, as “[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not 

inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and 

Unusual Punishments Clause.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. What is needed to show unnecessary 

and wanton infliction of pain “varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional 

violation.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). To 

prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim the plaintiff must show that objectively he suffered a 

“sufficiently serious” deprivation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Wilson v. 

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991). The plaintiff must also show that subjectively each 

defendant had a culpable state of mind in allowing or causing the plaintiff’s deprivation to occur. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

6

To state a claim for the deprivation of procedural due process, plaintiff must allege that an 

identified state actor denied him of a specific liberty interest. Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 

483-84 (1995). A prisoner whose liberty interest is threatened is entitled to advance written 

notice of the charges, a hearing, written findings and reasons for the disciplinary action taken and, 

when it presents no security risk, permit the prisoner to call witnesses and present evidence in his 

defense. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-566 (1974).

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Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are 

treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. San Antonio 

School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Prisoners are protected from invidious 

discrimination based on race. Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at 556. Racial segregation is 

unconstitutional within prisons save for the necessities of prison security and discipline. Cruz v. 

Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam). In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation 

of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that 

defendants acted with intentional discrimination against plaintiff, or against a class of inmates 

which included plaintiff, and that such conduct did not relate to a legitimate penological purpose. 

See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that equal protection 

claims may be brought by a “class of one”).

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5

The court has been required to cull these apparent claims. The FAC lacks coherence, 

particularly in failing to separate factual allegations from legal claims, and specifying the alleged 

constitutional violation(s) of each defendant. The FAC reads as a disfavored “shotgun” pleading. 

See, e.g., Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1129 (11th Cir. 2001) (“a shotgun complaint leads to a 

shotgun answer” and “disjointed pleadings make it difficult, if not impossible, to set the 

boundaries for discovery”); Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trustees of Centr. Florida Comm. Coll., 77 

F.3d 364, 366-7 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[e]xperience teaches that, unless cases are pled clearly and 

precisely, issues are not joined, discovery is not controlled, the trial court’s docket becomes 

unmanageable, the litigants suffer, and society loses confidence in the court's ability to administer 

justice”); Smith v. Rainey, 2010 WL 4118096, 16 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (“[w]hatever the merits of the 

underlying claim(s), [p]laintiff[] risk[s] having them overshadowed by the manner in which these 

claims are alleged”).

The court finds the allegations in plaintiff’s FAC to be vague and conclusory. The FAC

does not contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the 

Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and state the 

elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 

(9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with some degree of particularity the specific overt acts 

which each defendant allegedly engaged in that support plaintiff’s respective legal claims. Id. 

For these reasons, plaintiff’s FAC will be dismissed, with leave to file a Second Amended 

Complaint (SAC) that meets the requirements set forth herein. Plaintiff need not file an SAC; 

however, if he does, he must clearly allege how the conditions about which he complains resulted 

in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode, supra, 423 U.S. at 371. The 

complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant allegedly violated plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights. Id. There can be no liability under Section 1983 unless there is some 

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivations. Id.; 

May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are 

not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

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Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without 

reference to any prior pleading. The SAC will supersede the FAC. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Therefore, in the SAC, each claim and the involvement of each defendant 

must be sufficiently alleged.

Plaintiff may, however, request that the exhibits attached to his FAC (see ECF No. 8 at 

19-63) be attached to his SAC. 

The court has set forth, in the footnotes of this order, elements of several legal claims that 

plaintiff attempts to assert, which should guide plaintiff in articulating his claims in a SAC.

II. Request for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff requests the appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff states that he is 

indigent; that he has tried unsuccessfully to obtain representation on his own (plaintiff provides 

copies of several letters from various attorneys and law firms so indicating); that he lacks legal 

knowledge and experience; that he is housed in solitary confinement with limited access to the 

prison law library; that he is hearing impaired, ADA designated, and “mentally ill on 

psychotropic medication” (id. at 6; see also id. at 57 (March 2013 Consent Form indicating that 

plaintiff was then taking 60 mg. Prozac per day)). Plaintiff also asserts that his “case and 

situation [are] unique, being Plaintiff is the first prisoner in the history of California prisons to 

actually obtain his confidential prison file which clearly supports his claims against defendants. . . 

.” (Id. at 5.) (Indeed, plaintiff has submitted copies of several apparently official documents 

referencing this apparent breach of confidentiality.) Plaintiff asserts that this case is meritorious 

and complex; that an attorney is required to handle the confidential documents; that considerable 

discovery will be required, including obtaining the identity of, and interviewing, confidential 

witnesses; that expert testimony will be required; and that each of these matters is better pursued 

by appointed counsel.

District courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in section 

1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In exceptional 

circumstances, the court may request an attorney to voluntarily to represent such a plaintiff. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. 

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Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). When determining whether “exceptional 

circumstances” exist, the court must consider plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits as 

well as the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the 

legal issues involved. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). The burden of 

demonstrating exceptional circumstances is on the plaintiff. Id. Circumstances common to most 

prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not establish 

exceptional circumstances that warrant a request for voluntary assistance of counsel. 

The court finds plaintiff’s request for appointment premature, in light of the requirement 

that plaintiff file a further amended complaint to demonstrate that he has potentially cognizable 

legal claims. Moreover, most of plaintiff’s arguments in support of appointing counsel are 

common to most prisoners, and therefore do not support such appointment. While plaintiff’s 

apparent possession of confidential information relied upon to validate him as a gang member is 

unique, it does not automatically transform this into a meritorious case or require the appointment 

of counsel.

Having considered the factors under Palmer, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to 

meet his burden of demonstrating exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of 

counsel at this time.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to pay the filing fee and file his complaint 

(ECF No. 7), is denied as moot.

2. Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 6), is denied without prejudice.

3. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (ECF Nos. 8, 9) is dismissed. 

4. The Clerk of Court is directed to send plaintiff a “Prisoner Civil Rights Packet,” for 

guidance in the preparation of his Second Amended Complaint.

5. Within thirty days after service of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached 

Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

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a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

b. An original and one copy of the Second Amended Complaint.

6. Plaintiff’s SAC must be so labeled, bear the docket number assigned to this case, and 

comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 

the Local Rules of Practice. 

7. Failure to file a Second Amended Complaint in accordance with this order may result 

in the dismissal of this action.

Dated: June 6, 2014

/gray0473.14.AC.kjn

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICKY GRAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

B. COGDELL, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-0473 KJN P

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court’s order 

filed______________.

_____________ Second Amended Complaint

_____________ Plaintiff requests that the exhibits attached to his 

First Amended Complaint (see ECF No. 8 at 19-63), 

be attached to his Second Amended Complaint.

____________________________________ ____________________________________

Date Plaintiff

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