Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01358/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01358-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dean M. MacKenzie,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro,

Defendant. 

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CV 06-01358-PHX-JWS (JCG)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Dean M. Mackenzie, presently incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison

Complex, Lewis/Barchey Unit, in Buckeye, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this

matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin for Report and Recommendation. Before the

Court are the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") (Doc. No. 1), Respondents'

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Answer") (Doc. No. 8), and Petitioner's

Traverse to Petition to Habeas Corpus ("Reply"). (Doc. No. 11.) The Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court, after its independent review, dismiss the petition on the

ground that it is time barred. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties are in agreement as to the relevant factual and procedural background.

(Reply at 2.) On December 5, 2001, Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Mohave County

Superior Court in the State of Arizona of theft, a class one misdemeanor, and theft of means

of transportation, a class three felony. (Answer, Ex. K.) The trial court sentenced Petitioner

to 158 days in prison for the misdemeanor, with credit for 158 days served. (Answer, Ex.

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L.) The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a term of 14 years imprisonment for the class three

felony. Id. 

Petitioner, represented by counsel, timely appealed his conviction on July 11, 2002.

(Answer, Ex. M.) On November 7, 2002, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a

memorandum decision indicating that it had reviewed the record for reversible error and

found none. (Answer, Ex. N.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the Arizona

Supreme Court. Thus, his direct appeal concluded on December 7, 2002. 

On January 6, 2003, Petitioner timely filed a pro se notice of post-conviction relief

and petition for post-conviction relief. (Answer, Ex. P.) In his petition, the Petitioner raised

only one issue: whether the jury's finding of "dangerousness" for the offense of theft of

means of transportation was supported by the evidence. Id. Petitioner requested counsel and

the trial court appointed Jill Evans to represent him. (Answer, Ex. Q.) On January 27, 2003,

the State filed a response to the petition for post-conviction relief. (Answer, Ex. R.) On

February 21, 2003, Petitioner filed a pro se reply to the State's response to his petition.

(Answer, Ex. S.) Because Petitioner was represented by counsel, the trial court declined to

consider his pro se reply. (Answer, Ex. T.)

On March 6, 2003, Petitioner's counsel, Jill Evans, moved to withdraw, indicating that

Petitioner intended to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Answer,

Ex. U.) The trial court granted the motion and appointed Eric Devany to represent Petitioner.

(Answer, Ex. V.) On June 27, 2003, Petitioner's counsel filed a notice of completion of postconviction review, stating that he was unable to find any viable claims to raise in postconviction relief proceedings. (Answer, Ex. X.) On August 28, 2003, the trial court denied

the petition. (Answer, Ex. Y.) Petitioner did not appeal this ruling to the Arizona Court of

Appeals or the Arizona Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. AA.)

Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief on November 12, 2004, citing

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000) and Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). (Answer, Ex. Z.) Petitioner argued that

Apprendi and Blakely required a jury to consider any aggravating factors at sentencing, and

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thus he was entitled to a jury finding and re-sentencing. Id. On December 9, 2004, the trial

court summarily dismissed Petitioner's second notice of post-conviction relief, after

concluding that Petitioner's conviction was final, and that Blakely did not apply retroactively.

(Answer, Ex. AA.)

On December 15, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for review of the trial court's

decision in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Answer, Ex. BB.) The Court of Appeals

summarily dismissed the petition on October 5, 2005. (Answer, Ex. CC.) On October 19,

2005, Petitioner mailed a "Motion for Reconsideration Plus Supplement for Review" to the

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Answer, Ex. DD.) The Arizona Court of Appeals refused to

accept Petitioner's motion based on Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.18, which

prohibits the filing of a motion for reconsideration of an order denying a petition for review.

(Answer, Ex. EE.)

On November 7, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme

Court. (Answer, Ex. FF.) In addition to arguing that Apprendi and Blakely required resentencing, Petitioner also raised the issue of whether the trial court erred in finding there

was sufficient evidence to offer to the jury as to the "dangerousness" of his offense. Id. The

Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Answer, Ex. GG.) 

On May 24, 2006, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

(Doc. No. 1.) On July 20, 2006, Respondent filed an Answer. (Doc. No. 8.) On September

6, 2006, Petitioner filed a Traverse to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereafter "Reply").

(Doc. No. 11.) 

DISCUSSION

In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner alleges four grounds for relief:

(1) his aggravated sentence for theft of means of transportation violated Apprendi and

Blakely; (2) trial counsel was ineffective during the sentencing phase of the proceedings; (3)

appellate counsel was ineffective; and (4) counsel who represented him during his first "of

right" post-conviction relief was ineffective. The State asserts: (1) the petition is untimely;

and (2) Petitioner failed properly to exhaust his state court remedies. Because this Court

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1

 Of these possible starting dates, only the first and third are relevant in this action.

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 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction on November 7, 2002.

(Answer, Ex. N.) Petitioner's direct appeal became final thirty days later on December 7, 2002,

because Petitioner failed to petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review.

 3 The one-year anniversary of this date, December 8, 2003, would have been the last day

for Petitioner to timely file a petition for writ of habeas corpus not accounting for time tolled. See

Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (calculating the one-year period using the

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concludes that the Petition is untimely, the Court will not address the state's second

argument. 

I. Timeliness Under AEDPA

Federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners are governed by a

one-year statute of limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute of limitations

begins to run from the latest of: (1) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2) the date

on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing such State action; (3) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on

which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).1

 The statute of limitations

is tolled during the time that a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). An application for post-conviction

relief is properly filed "when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the

applicable laws and rules governing filings." Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4. 8, 121 S.Ct. 361

(2000).

On December 7, 2002, Petitioner's direct appeal became final2

 and the one-year statute

of limitations began to run the next day, on December 8, 2002.3

 The statute of limitations

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"anniversary method" of Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)). 

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 Though Petitioner's initial notice of post conviction relief was timely filed thirty days

after the statute of limitations began to run on January 6, 2003, his second subsequent notices of

post-conviction relief were untimely. (Answer, Exs. Z, BB, FF, HH.) Because the notices were not

"properly filed," they cannot continue the statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,

408-09 (2005); Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000).

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 Equitable tolling may be available even after the statute of limitations period expired if

"extraordinary circumstances" beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a timely

petition. Alvarez-Machain v. U.S., 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 814, 118

S. Ct. 60, 139 L.Ed.2d 23 (1997). Equitable tolling is appropriate only if extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time, and is

unavailable in most cases. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d at 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Miles

v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) and Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288). Petitioner has not

argued that he was unable to timely file the pending petition due to extraordinary circumstances

beyond his control. In fact, a total of 548 days passed from the time the statute of limitations

commenced until Petitioner filed his federal petition for habeas corpus.

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ran for thirty days from December 8, 2002, to January 6, 2003, when Petitioner timely filed

his initial petition for post-conviction relief. (Answer, Ex. P.) The statute of limitations was

tolled until August 28, 2003, when the trial court denied the petition. (Answer, Ex. Y.) The

statute of limitations resumed on August 29, 2003, and continued for an additional 442 days,

until Petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief on November 12, 2004.

(Answer, Ex. Z.) When Petitioner filed his second petition for post-conviction relief, the

365-day limitations period had expired.4

 Petitioner did not file the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus until May 24, 2006. Therefore, the petition is time barred.5

 

II. Retroactivity of Blakely

Petitioner argues that the statute of limitations should begin to run on the date on

which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court in

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). If Blakely recognized a new constitutional right

and made that right retroactive to cases on collateral review, then, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1), the statute of limitations for Petitioner's claim would not have begun to run until

June 24, 2004 – the date of the Blakely decision. However, Blakely does not apply

retroactively on collateral review. See Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005).

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 Though Petitioner's initial notice of post-conviction relief was timely filed thirty days

after the statute of limitations began to run on January 6, 2003, his second subsequent notices of

post-conviction relief were untimely. (Answer, Exs. Z, BB, FF, HH.) Because the notices were not

"properly filed," they cannot continue the statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,

408-09 (2005); Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000).

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Therefore, the Blakely decision cannot be used to determine the date the limitations period

commenced.

III. Rule 9 Governing § 2254 Cases

In his Reply, Petitioner asserts that a petition for writ of habeas corpus is timely if

filed within five years. In support, Petitioner cites Rule 9 of the Rules Governing § 2254

cases. Petitioner further claims that "the petitioner is held to a standard of reasonable

diligence. Any inference or presumption arising by reason of the failure to attack collaterally

a sentence may be disregarded where there has been a change of law." (Reply, Doc. No. 11.)

Petitioner also asserts that Rule 9(a) is not a statute of limitations; he notes that the language

of that provision is permissive rather than mandatory and therefore the court has discretion

in determining whether to dismiss a petition for untimeliness. 

Rule 9, as currently written, does not contain a subsection (a), applies to successive

petitions for writs of habeas corpus and is therefore inapplicable here. The Rule provides

simply that: Before presenting a second or successive petition, the petitioner obtain an order

from the appropriate court of appeals authorizing the district court to consider the petition

as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) and (4). In other words, Rule 9 will not remedy

Petitioner's untimely filing or alter the conclusion that Petitioner's claim is time barred.6

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court,

after its independent review, enter an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties are advised that any objections

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filed are to be identified with the following case number: CV 06-1358-PHX-JWS.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents. 

DATED this 29th day of January, 2007.

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