Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00089/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00089-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Although it appears to be a motion to add a claim to the Petition, the Motion is

inexplicably captioned "Rule 47 Motions and Supporting Affidavits."

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kris Kers Dimitrov, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 07-0089-PHX-JWS (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, Kris Kers Dimitrov, who is presently confined in the Echo Unit of the

Arizona State Prison Complex in Tucson, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this

matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin for Report and Recommendation. Before the

Court are the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. No. 1), a supplement to

the Petition (Doc. No. 3), Respondents’ Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Answer”) (Doc. No. 13), and Petitioner's Reply (Doc. No. 16). In addition, Petitioner filed

a motion to add a new claim1

 to his Petition (Doc. No. 15); Respondents filed an opposition

to that motion (Doc. No. 17) and Petitioner replied. (Doc. No. 18.) The Magistrate Judge

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recommends that the District Court deny the Petition and deny Petitioner's motion to add a

new claim.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 21, 2000, the Maricopa County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner on one count

of aggravated assault and one count of endangerment. (Answer, Ex. A.) The State alleged

that Petitioner had committed the offenses while on probation for two prior felony

convictions. (Answer, Exs. B & C.) On March 21, 2001, Petitioner was convicted on both

counts. (Answer, Ex. G.) The trial court sentenced Petitioner to the presumptive terms of

imprisonment for each of the two crimes: 10.5 years for the aggravated assault conviction,

and 2.25 years for the endangerment conviction, with both sentences to run concurrently.

(Answer, Ex. K.) In addition, the trial court revoked Petitioner's probation on the prior

felonies and sentenced him to an additional 2-year term, to run consecutively to the prison

terms in the current case. (Answer, Ex. K.) 

On July 19, 2001, Petitioner appealed his conviction, raising one issue: whether he

was denied a fair trial when, during closing argument, the prosecutor impermissibly

commented on Petitioner's failure to testify. (Answer, Ex. N.) The Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed Petitioner's conviction on December 24, 2001. (Answer, Ex. O.) Petitioner filed

a petition for review by the Arizona Supreme Court; the Arizona Supreme Court summarily

denied review on July 16, 2002. (Answer, Ex. R; Petition, Ex. B.) 

On June 25, 2002, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief. (Answer, Ex. S.)

After his court-appointed counsel filed a notice of completion stating that he was unable to

raise any viable issues on Petitioner's behalf, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. ("First Rule 32 Petition"), raising

seven claims for relief: (1) Petitioner's appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise

meritorious issues on appeal, (2) Petitioner was denied his constitutional right to a 12-person

jury, (3) Petitioner's constitutional right to due process and a fair trial was violated when the

court improperly permitted the jury to convict him on two offenses in a single count, (4)

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Petitioner's right to due process and a fair trial was violated when a non-qualified juror was

permitted to deliberate the verdicts, (5) Petitioner was improperly sentenced pursuant to

A.R.S. § 13-604.02, (6) the trial court's sentencing minute entry incorrectly stated that

Petitioner violated A.R.S. § 13-604.01, (7) Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective because

he: (a) failed to inform Petitioner of his constitutional right to a 12-person jury, (b) failed to

object to Petitioner being tried by an 8-person jury, (c) failed to object to the improper jury

instruction that permitted Petitioner to be convicted on two offenses in a single count, (d)

failed to object to a non-qualified juror deliberating the verdict, (e) failed to object to the

court sentencing Petitioner pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604.02, and (f) failed to object to the

error in the trial court's sentencing minute entry. (Answer, Ex. W.) On July 14, 2003, the

trial court corrected the clerical error in its sentencing minute entry but otherwise dismissed

Petitioner's Rule 32 petition. (Answer, Ex. AA.)

On August 19, 2003, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for review by the Arizona Court

of Appeals, in which he presented three claims: (1) Petitioner was denied his constitutional

right to a 12-person jury, (2) Petitioner's constitutional right to due process and a fair trial

was violated when the court improperly permitted the jury to convict him on two offenses

in a single count, and (3) Petitioner's trial and appellate counsel were ineffective because they

failed to request a 12-person jury, and failed to object to the improper jury instruction that

permitted Petitioner to be convicted on two offenses in a single count. The Arizona Court

of Appeals summarily denied review on August 4, 2004. (Answer, Ex. FF.) Petitioner

petitioned for review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Answer, Ex. GG); the Supreme Court

denied review on February 14, 2005. (Petition, Ex. F.) 

On October 18, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for special action in the Arizona Court

of Appeals, in which he raised one claim: the trial court abused its discretion when the jury

was improperly instructed on the charge of aggravated assault. (Answer, Ex. HH.)

On February 16, 2005, Petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief

pursuant to Rule 32 ("Second Rule 32 Petition"). (Answer, Ex. II.) In his Second Rule 32

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Petition, Petitioner presented two claims: (1) Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to request a jury instruction that aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is a

specific-intent crime, and (2) Petitioner's appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise

this issue on direct review. (Answer, Ex. II.) The trial court dismissed the Second Rule 32

Petition pursuant to Rule 32.2(a), because Petitioner had raised claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel in his First Rule 32 Petition. (Answer, Ex. JJ.) The Arizona Court of

Appeals summarily denied review on January 6, 2006. (Answer, Ex. KK; Petition, Ex. H.)

On January 10, 2007, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in federal

court. In his Petition, Petitioner presents three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel:

Ground 1: Trial counsel failed to request a specific jury instruction on the aggravated

assault charge;

Ground 2: Petitioner was represented by one attorney during arraignment and a

different attorney during trial and sentencing; and 

Ground 3: Trial counsel did not file an appeal on Petitioner's behalf; instead the

appeal was filed by a different defense attorney. (Doc. No. 1.)

Also on January 10, 2007, Petitioner filed a pleading that was captioned "Motion to

Stay," but that the Court subsequently recognized as a supplement to the Petition. (Doc. Nos.

3 & 12.) The supplement presents eight additional claims:

Ground 4: Petitioner's blood was drawn for DUI testing without his consent in

violation of his due process rights;

Ground 5: Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of

Petitioner's blood alcohol level into evidence;

Ground 6: Petitioner's due process rights were violated when the jury was not

instructed to consider the effects of "intoxification”;

Ground 7: Petitioner's Miranda rights were violated;

Ground 8: The jury selection took only 85 minutes, which violated Petitioner's due

process rights;

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Ground 9: Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial

after one juror commented that Petitioner "should have just signed his f-ing plea”;

Ground 10: The court illegally coerced a juror into serving in violation of Petitioner's

due process rights; and 

Ground 11: Petitioner's rights under the Speedy Trial Act were violated. 

On May 8, 2007, Petitioner filed a motion to add one additional claim to his federal

petition: 

Ground 12: Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial

counsel failed to obtain the grand jury transcripts to review for violation of Petitioner's rights.

DISCUSSION

 The Magistrate recommends that the Petition be denied because Petitioner has failed

to exhaust his state court remedies with respect to all 12 claims presented.

A. Legal Standard

Ordinarily, before a federal court will consider the merits of a habeas petition, the

petitioner must exhaust the remedies available to him in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(1)(A); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). First enunciated in Ex parte

Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), the exhaustion requirement is designed "not to create a

procedural hurdle on the path to federal habeas court, but to channel claims into an

appropriate forum, where meritorious claims may be vindicated and unfounded litigation

obviated before resort to federal court." Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).

The requirement is grounded in principles of comity, and reflects a desire to protect state

courts' role in the enforcement of federal law. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989)

(citation omitted). The requirement is also based on a pragmatic consideration that fully

exhausted claims will usually be accompanied by a complete factual record once they reach

federal court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982). 

A petitioner must exhaust his claims by fairly presenting them in state court, either

through a direct appeal or collateral proceedings, before a federal court will consider the

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merits of habeas corpus claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 519. A

petitioner must have also presented his claim in a procedural context in which its merits will

be considered. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. A habeas petitioner's claims may be precluded

from federal review on exhaustion grounds in either of two ways. First, a claim may be

procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in state court but found by that

court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

729-30 (1991). Second, the claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if the

petitioner failed to present the claim in a necessary state court and "the court to which the

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred." Id. at 735 n.1. If a petitioner

has procedurally defaulted a claim in state court, a federal court will not review the claim

unless the petitioner shows "cause and prejudice" for the failure to present the constitutional

issue to the state court, or makes a colorable showing of actual innocence. See Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 337 (1992); Murray

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986).

B. Ground 1

Petitioner presented Ground 1 in his Second Rule 32 Petition and in his petition for

review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. The trial court declined to address the claim,

however, because, pursuant to Rule 32.2(a), Petitioner could have raised those claims in his

First Rule 32 Petition. (Answer, Ex. JJ.) Thus, Ground 1 was not exhausted because Petition

did not present it in a procedural context in which its merits could be considered. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. 

C. Grounds 2-11

Petitioner did not present Grounds 2-11 in state court, and he cannot raise them for

the first time in federal court. Petitioner is now precluded by Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 from obtaining relief on Grounds 2 -11 in state court absent

an applicable exception, which Petitioner does not assert. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b);

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32.1(d)-(h). Thus, Grounds 2-11 are technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted, absent

a showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501

U.S. at 749-50 (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted); Thomas v. Goldsmith,

979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992). “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the default, and

“prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Magby v.

Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir.1984). Petitioner has not presented any arguments

in his Petition, reply or supplement which constitute a showing of cause and prejudice or a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Petitioner argues in his Reply that he was unable to

exhaust his state court remedies because his prison law library is inadequate and prisoners

are granted only limited time in the law library. Petitioner’s pleadings, however, reflect

adequate access to and use of legal materials. See Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th

Cir. 1991). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Grounds 1-11.

C. Ground 12

Respondents argue that Ground 12 was not timely. The Court need not consider this

argument, however, because even if it were timely filed, Ground 12 was not properly

exhausted. Petitioner did not present Ground 12 in state court, and cannot raise it for the first

time in federal court. Petitioner is now precluded by Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 from obtaining relief on Ground 12 in state court absent an applicable

exception. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). Of these exceptions, the only one

which arguably applies is 32.1(e)'s exception for newly discovered material facts. See Ortiz

v. Stewart, 149 F.3d at 923, 931 (1998) (stating that it is the role of the district court to

determine if a petitioner presently has a remedy available in state court). Petitioner contends

that he could not have raised Ground 12 earlier because he did not discover it until he

reviewed the State's response to his federal Petition, which states "the Maricopa County

Grand Jury indicted Petitioner on the following two counts . . . ." According to Petitioner,

it was only after reading that sentence that he began to wonder what happened at the grand

jury proceedings. (Doc. No. 18.) A sudden realization by Petitioner that he might have a

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claim related to his grand jury proceedings is not, however, as the "discovery of new

evidence" contemplated by Rule 32.1(e). Moreover, Petitioner has failed to articulate any

error committed during grand jury proceedings that, had it been noted by his trial counsel,

would have entitled him to relief. Thus, Petitioner fails to satisfy Rule 32.1(e)'s requirement

that the newly discovered evidence "probably would have changed the verdict or sentence."

 Accordingly, Ground 12 is technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted, absent

a showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501

U.S. at 749-50 (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted); Thomas, 979 F.2d at

749. Petitioner has not presented any arguments in his Petition, reply or supplement which

constitute a showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground 12.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1) and DENYING

Petitioner's Motion to add a new claim. (Doc. No. 15.)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the parties should use

the following case number: CV 07-0089-PHX-JWS.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 29th day of June, 2007.

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