Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00772/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00772-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:0227 FCC-Unsolicited Telephone Sales

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CASE NO. 3:19-CV-00772-L-JLB 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RYAN LEUSCH, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 

Defendant. 

Case No. 3:19-CV-00772-L-JLB 

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO COMPEL 

ARBITRATION AND STAY 

THE ACTION [DOC. 14]; 

AND 

(2) DENYING AS MOOT 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION [DOC. 8] 

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Plaintiff Ryan Leusch (“Leusch”) brings an individual action against 

Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) for violations of the Telephone 

Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). Pending before the Court is Uber’s motion to 

compel arbitration and stay the action pending arbitration [doc. 14]. Leusch opposed 

the pending motion and Uber replied. Docs. 17, 18. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 

7.1.d.1, the Court decides this matter on the briefs as the issues were suitable for 

disposition without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

GRANTS Uber’s motion and STAYS this action. The Court also DENIES AS 

MOOT Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. 

I. Background

Uber offers transportation services through a smartphone application called the 

“Uber App.” Uber also provides meal delivery services through a different 

smartphone application called the “Uber Eats App.” Prior to receiving the calls at 

issue in this case, Leusch used the Uber App for transportation. Despite not using 

the Uber Eats App, Leusch was called numerous times with the following 

prerecorded message: 

“Hi. This call is from Uber Eats. Your restaurant is receiving an 

order request, but it hasn’t been accepted. The order can be accepted by 

clicking the blinking section on the ipad [sic]. If you are not ready to 

accept orders right now, please change the status from accepting orders 

to pause orders. For any issues, please contact our support team. Thank 

you.” 

See Doc. 8-3 at ¶¶ 4-6, 17. Leusch contacted Uber at least three times requesting that 

Uber stop the calls as Leusch (1) does not own or operate any restaurant and (2) has 

no interest in receiving the above notification. Uber responded that it would look 

into it, but the calls persisted. Leusch attempted to block the numbers from which 

the calls were coming, but Uber kept changing the numbers it used to place these 

calls. 

 On April 26, 2019, Leusch filed his Complaint alleging TCPA violations 

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against Uber. On May 16, 2019, Leusch filed a motion for a preliminary injunction 

because he was still receiving the above-mentioned calls from Uber after the lawsuit 

was filed. One June 7, 2019, Uber filed the instant motion in reliance on its “Terms 

and Conditions.” See Docs. 14, 14-2. 

II. Legal Standard 

It is undisputed that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs here. Under 

the FAA, a Court must consider two threshold questions to determine whether to 

compel arbitration: (1) is there a valid agreement to arbitrate? If so, (2) does the 

agreement cover the matter in dispute? Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, 

Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). “If the response is affirmative on both 

counts, then the [Federal Arbitration] Act requires the court to enforce the arbitration 

agreement in accordance with its terms.” Id. 

The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that the claims at 

issue are not suitable for arbitration. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. V. Randolph, 531 

U.S. 79, 91 (2000). An arbitration clause can be challenged on “generally applicable 

contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.” Rent-A-Center, West, 

Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The party attempting to compel arbitration must demonstrate “(1) the existence 

of a valid, written agreement to arbitrate; and, if it exists, (2) that the agreement to 

arbitrate encompasses the dispute at issue.” Ashbey v. Archstone Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 

785 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “However, these gateway 

issues can be expressly delegated to the arbitrator where ‘the parties clearly and 

unmistakably provide otherwise.’” Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 

649 (1986)); see Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 78 (“ ‘[Q]uestion[s] of arbitrability’ thus 

include questions regarding the existence of a legally binding and valid arbitration 

agreement[.]”). 

/ / / 

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III. Discussion 

The key issue presented by the parties concerns whether Leusch agreed to 

arbitrate the arbitrability of his claims under the Arbitration Agreement. Upon 

review of the Arbitration Agreement, the Court finds that this question has been 

delegated to the arbitrator through the following clauses: 

“By agreeing to the Terms, you agree that you are required to resolve any claim 

that you may have against Uber on an individual basis in arbitration, as set forth in 

this Arbitration Agreement.” Doc. 14-2 at 7, Arbitration Agreement. 

“The parties agree that the arbitrator (“Arbitrator”), and not any 

federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority 

to resolve any disputes relating to the interpretation, applicability, 

enforceability or formation of this Arbitration Agreement, including 

any claim that all or any part of this Arbitration Agreement is void or 

voidable. The Arbitrator shall also be responsible for determining 

all threshold arbitrability issues, including issues relating to whether 

the terms are unconscionable or illusory and any defense to arbitration, 

including waiver, delay, laches, or estoppel.” 

Doc. 14-2 at 7-8, Rules and Governing Law (emphasis added). 

 “A delegation clause is enforceable when it manifests a clear and unmistakable 

agreement to arbitrate arbitrability, and is not invalid as a matter of law.” McLellan 

v. Fitbit, Inc., 2017 WL 4551484, at *1 (N.D. Cal. October 11, 2017) (citing Brennan, 

796 F.3d at 1130). Here, the above contract language “delegating to the arbitrator[] 

the authority to determine the validity or application of any of the provisions of the 

arbitration clause[] constitutes an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning 

the arbitration agreement,” and such language “clearly and unmistakably indicates 

[the parties’] intent for the arbitrator[] to decide the threshold question of 

arbitrability.” Momot v. Mastro, 652 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rent-ACenter, 561 U.S. at 68) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Leusch fails to “contest 

the validity of the delegation provision in particular.” Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 74. 

Notably, Leusch does not mention the delegation clause in his opposition to the 

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motion to compel. See Doc. 17. Accordingly, the Court “must treat it as valid under 

§ 2 [of the FAA], and must enforce it under §§ 3 and 4, leaving the challenge to the 

validity of the Agreement as a whole for the arbitrator.” Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 

72. 

IV. Motion for Preliminary Injunction 

Motions for preliminary injunction are weighed against the following factors: 

(1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm in the 

absence of the injunction; (3) the balance between harm and injury on the interested 

parties if the injunction issues; and (4) the public interest. Lands Council v. Martin, 

479 F.3d 636, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). As a result of the Court’s grant 

of Uber’s motion to compel arbitration, Leusch’s motion for preliminary injunction 

is rendered moot. 

V. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Uber’s motion to compel 

arbitration [doc. 14] and STAYS this action. See 9 U.S.C. § 3. The Court also 

DENIES AS MOOT Leusch’s motion for preliminary injunction [doc.8]. The Clerk 

of Court is instructed to administratively close the case. The parties must notify the 

Court within seven (7) days of the conclusion of arbitration proceedings. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

Dated: October 29, 2019 

 Hon. M. James Lorenz 

United States District Judge 

 

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