Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01575/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01575-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:2241fd Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

---

- 1 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUCIANO MORALES,

Plaintiff,

vs.

KEVIN MCALEENAN, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 19cv1575-LAB (AHG)

ORDER DENYING TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER [Dkt. 2]

Petitioner Luciano Morales has filed a last-minute request for a temporary

restraining order (“TRO”) enjoining the government from executing a removal scheduled

to take place today, August 21, 2019, at 4:00 p.m. For the reasons below, that request

is DENIED.

Background

Morales, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States unlawfully in 2009. 

Following his arrest, the United States instituted removal proceedings against him on

February 11, 2015. For the last four years, he has sought to forestall or overturn his

removal by arguing, among other things, that his 2015 arrest violated the Fourth

Amendment and that evidence related to the arrest should be suppressed. The

immigration judge rejected the suppression argument, admitted the evidence, and

sustained the government’s allegations. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals

Case 3:19-cv-01575-LAB-AHG Document 4 Filed 08/21/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 5
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(“BIA”) concluded that Morales had waived his ability to challenge the immigration judge’s

suppression finding because Petitioner’s then-counsel did not address the issue in his

appeal. The BIA denied Morales’ appeal on July 2, 2018. Arguing that his counsel’s

inadvertent waiver constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, Morales filed a Motion to

Reopen with the BIA on August 6, 2019. Before that motion could be heard, however,

the government informed counsel that it planned to deport Morales on August 21, 2019

at 4:00 p.m. He now seeks to enjoin that deportation until the BIA can hear his Motion to

Reopen.

Analysis

Although the Court has only limited jurisdiction over deportation-related matters, it

does have jurisdiction over habeas petitions—like this one—that are derivative of the

underlying deportation order. See Sied v. Nielsen, 2018 WL 1142202, at *12 (N.D. Cal.

2018) (“In sum, if a habeas petition is not a direct challenge to an order of removal, nothing

in Section 1252(a)(5) or (b)(9) prevents a district court from exercising jurisdiction to hear

the petition.).

But despite having jurisdiction, the Court cannot grant the extraordinary relief

Morales seeks here. To grant an ex parte TRO, Petitioner must establish “that he is likely

to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in

the public interest.” Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). The scant

information provided by Morales does not establish that he is likely to succeed on the

merits of his underlying claim. In particular, other than his bare allegation that the stop

that resulted in his arrest was an “egregious violation of his 5th Amendment rights,”

Morales offers no information about the circumstances surrounding the stop nor about

any subsequent ICE investigation into its legality. The Court simply can’t deduce from

these unadorned allegations that Morales has any likelihood of successfully challenging

his removal on a motion to reopen. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)

Case 3:19-cv-01575-LAB-AHG Document 4 Filed 08/21/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 5
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Preliminary injunctive relief “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not

be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”).

Aside from the lack of factual substance, there is a substantial likelihood that

Morales’s Motion to Reopen will be denied as untimely. A party seeking to reopen an

immigration appeal must generally file that motion “no later than 90 days after the date

on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The

BIA issued its final administrative decision on April 10, 2019 when it denied Morales’s

motion for reconsideration. This means any motion to reopen was due on or about July

9, 2019. But Morales didn’t file his motion until August 9, 2019 – a month after the

statutory deadline and well outside the 90-day window. Morales’s petition doesn’t reveal

when his present counsel first learned of the illegal stop allegation, so the Court has no

basis for concluding that he might qualify for equitable tolling that would extend this

window. Instead, as it stands, it appears substantially likely that any Motion to Reopen

will be denied as untimely. This further undercuts Morales’s argument that he is likely to

succeed on the merits of his underlying claim. 

Morales also alleges that his prior counsel was ineffective, but this is largely a red

herring. Though Morales’s former counsel has filed a declaration conceding that her

handling of Morales’s BIA appeal was ineffective, she does not say it was

unconstitutionally defective – only that that it was “below (sic) standard performance of

[her] own typical work.” Dkt. 3 Ex. B. More importantly, ineffective assistance of counsel

is material only if it affects the ultimate outcome of the case, see Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (“An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does

not warrant setting aside the [underlying] judgment . . . if the error had no effect on the

judgment.”). And, as the Court has already pointed out, it cannot be said on this limited

record that Morales was likely to succeed on the merits of his suppression argument,

even with effective counsel. Whether he may have received ineffective assistance of

counsel at an earlier stage of these proceedings is thus immaterial here. 

Case 3:19-cv-01575-LAB-AHG Document 4 Filed 08/21/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 5
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In short, the Court does not find that Morales has shown he is likely to succeed on

the merits of his underlying claim. In light of this finding, the Court isn’t required to and

does not address the remaining factors Morales must show to justify issuance of an

injunction. See Glob. Horizons, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 510 F.3d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir.

2007) (Although the injunction factors may be considered on a sliding scale, “[t]o reach

this sliding scale analysis . . . a moving party must, at an irreducible minimum,

demonstrate some chance of success on the merits.”). While the Court denies the

injunction, it’s worth noting that Morales can continue to litigate his Motion to Reopen from

Mexico. The availability of this avenue of relief also cuts against a finding of irreparable

harm. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009) (“It is accordingly plain that the

burden of removal alone cannot constitute the requisite irreparable injury. Aliens who are

removed may continue to pursue their petitions for review, and those who prevail can be

afforded effective relief by facilitation of their return, along with restoration of the

immigration status they had upon removal.”).

One last observation: Although the above analysis is sufficient to warrant denying

the TRO, the timing of this motion also militates against granting relief. Morales filed his

motion approximately 4:00 p.m. on August 21, 2019 – exactly the time that he was

scheduled to be removed. Conspicuously absent from Morales’s briefing is any reference

to when he first learned of the scheduled deportation date and time. Assuming he knew

the schedule sometime before today—which seems likely given the extensive briefing his

counsel has prepared—there was no reason to prejudice Respondents by waiting until

the time of the scheduled deportation to seek the extraordinary remedy of a TRO. This

District’s local rules require that any party seeking ex parte relief submit a declaration

demonstrating that (1) the party informed the opposing party when and where the motion

would be made, (2) that the party tried but was unable to inform the opposing party of the

motion, or (3) that the party should not be required to inform the opposing party. See Civ.

L.R. 83.3(g); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 65(b). Morales hasn’t even tried to make this required

showing. Although the burden on the Court is not a significant factor in denying the relief

Case 3:19-cv-01575-LAB-AHG Document 4 Filed 08/21/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 5
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

sought here, it’s also worth pointing out that Morales may have already been deported,

which means the Court runs the very real risk of issuing an advisory opinion on a moot

issue. 

Morales’ request for a temporary restraining order is DENIED. Dkt. 2. Petitioner’s

counsel is ORDERED to immediately notify the Court if Petitioner is removed. This Order

does not prejudice Petitioner’s right to seek a stay of removal from BIA, DHS, or any other

appropriate immigration authority. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 21, 2019

Honorable Larry Alan Burns

Chief United States District Judge

Case 3:19-cv-01575-LAB-AHG Document 4 Filed 08/21/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 5