Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-13-02103/USCOURTS-ca3-13-02103-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 13-2103

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WILLIAM CONOVER,

Appellant

v.

DR. MERIL MAIN, Superintendent; 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-11-cv-06324)

District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan

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Argued October 21, 2014

Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 25, 2015)

Bruce P. Merenstein, Esquire (Argued)

Christian D. Sheehan, Esquire

Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis

1600 Market Street, Suite 3600

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Appellant

John J. Hoffman

 Acting Attorney General of New Jersey

Melissa H. Raksa

 Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel

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David L. DaCosta

 Deputy Attorney General, on the Briefs

Lisa A. Puglisi, Esquire (Argued)

Office of Attorney General of New Jersey

P.O. Box 112

25 Market Street

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex

Trenton, NJ 08625

Counsel for Appellees

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OPINION* 

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AMBRO, Circuit Judge

William X. Conover is a civilly committed detainee at the Special Treatment Unit 

at Avenel, New Jersey, under New Jersey’s Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). He 

appeals the District Court’s order denying habeas relief. For the following reasons, we 

affirm. 

I.

In 1993, Conover pled guilty to first-degree aggravated sexual assault, seconddegree attempted aggravated assault, first-degree kidnapping, first-degree armed robbery, 

and second-degree burglary. At the time of sentencing, Conover argued he qualified 

under New Jersey’s Sex Offender Act to serve his sentence at the Adult Diagnostic 

Treatment Center (ADTC) at Avenel, where he would receive “a program of specialized 

treatment for his mental condition.” N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(a) (1979). Based on a court-

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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ordered psychological evaluation, however, the trial judge determined Conover failed to 

meet the statutory criteria for incarceration at the ADTC and instead sentenced him to a 

24-year prison term, during which he neither requested nor received sex-offender 

treatment.

While Conover was still incarcerated, the New Jersey Legislature passed the 

SVPA, allowing it to identify and commit for treatment “a[ny] person who has been 

convicted . . . for commission of a sexually violent offense, . . . and suffers from a mental 

abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of 

sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and treatment.” N.J. 

Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27.26 (1998). After reviewing Conover’s case toward the end of his 

prison term to determine his eligibility under the SVPA, the State filed a petition for civil 

commitment in April 2007. Conover “immediately challenged the State’s petition, 

arguing that because he had not been provided with sex offender treatment while he was 

incarcerated, civil commitment would violate the ex post facto clauses of the federal and 

state constitutions.” In re Civil Commitment of W.X.C., 8 A.3d 174 (N.J. 2010). 

The SVPA trial judge rejected Conover’s facial and as-applied challenges to the 

SVPA, concluding that the statute was civil (rather than punitive) in nature and therefore 

did not subject him to ex post facto punishment. Further, the judge found that the State 

had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Conover was a sexually violent 

predator who qualified for civil commitment. He appealed, and both the New Jersey 

Superior Court Appellate Division and New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. The U.S. 

Supreme Court denied Conover’s petition for a writ of certiorari. 

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In October 2011, Conover filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 

U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging that his state-court 

commitment order imposes punishment in violation of the U.S. Constitution. The 

District Court dismissed Conover’s petition in full, which it construed as raising Eighth 

Amendment, ex post facto, and double-jeopardy claims, and this appeal followed. We 

granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on the three claims identified by the 

District Court and appointed pro bono counsel.1

II.

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

constrains our power to disturb a state-court’s order of civil commitment. We will 

reverse a state court’s determination of a claim on the merits only if it “resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As the District Court denied Conover’s petition 

without conducting an evidentiary hearing, our review of its decision is plenary. See 

Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 2008).

III.

Conover first challenges the state courts’ denial of his ex post facto and doublejeopardy claims as contrary to clearly established federal law. In rejecting Conover’s 

 

1 We acknowledge the highly professional pro bono representation of Conover by Bruce 

P. Merenstein and Christian D. Sheehan of Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, and 

thank them for their able representation.

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claims, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court reasonably relied on Kansas v. 

Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), rejecting similar challenges to the constitutionality of 

Kansas’s analogous civil-commitment statute. While Conover argues that his position is 

supported by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Hendricks, we agree with the New Jersey 

Supreme Court that Conover’s reasoning much more closely tracks that of the Hendricks 

dissent. Id. at 373 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (viewing the statute’s failure to “provide 

Hendricks . . . with treatment until after his release date from prison” as evidence of the 

Kansas legislature’s punitive intent). In any event, only the Hendricks majority opinion 

is clearly established federal law.2 

To the extent Conover disavows that his constitutional challenges to the SVPA are 

facial in nature, the District Court correctly held that the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001), bars him from arguing that the statute is 

unconstitutionally punitive “as applied” to him. 

IV.

Conover next challenges the District Court’s conclusion that his Eighth 

Amendment claim is not recognized under § 2254. In reaching this conclusion, the 

District Court relied on our decision in Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 2002). 

There we held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was the more appropriate vehicle for a prisoner to 

challenge the denial of sex-offense treatment required for his parole eligibility. We agree 

 

2 Conover posits that Justice Kennedy’s opinion is controlling, but in doing so he 

mischaracterizes Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court as a plurality opinion. Justice 

Kennedy wrote separately only to “add . . . additional comments” and “join[ed] the 

opinion of the Court in full.” 521 U.S. at 371 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 

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with Conover that Leamer is distinguishable. While he (like the Leamer plaintiff) bases 

his claim on the allegedly wrongful denial of sex-offender treatment in prison, he (unlike 

the Leamer plaintiff) challenges the effect of that denial on a subsequent order of 

confinement. Because “granting [Conover’s] petition would ‘necessarily imply’ a change 

to the fact . . . of [his civil commitment],” he may proceed under § 2254. McGee v. 

Martinez, 627 F.3d 933, 936 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Leamer, 288 F.3d at 543). 

Our conclusion that the District Court incorrectly concluded it was without 

jurisdiction to hear this claim, however, does Conover little good. Because the SVPA is 

not “punitive” in nature, “the law is not a ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ in violation of 

the Eighth Amendment.” Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 723 n.6 (8th Cir. 2005). 

Likewise, a “‘punitive as applied’ argument is foreclosed by Seling.” Hydrick v. Hunter, 

500 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds by 129 S. Ct. 2431 (2009). 

Conover’s Eighth Amendment claim therefore fails on the merits.3 

V.

Finally, Conover argues that the District Court erred in not granting him leave to 

amend his habeas petition to include a due-process claim. However, we did not include 

this issue in our COA, and because Conover “failed . . . to raise the due process issue in 

either state court or in the district court,” it “has been procedurally defaulted [and] 

waived.” Griggs v. Maryland, 263 F.3d 355, 359 (4th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we 

 

3 Accordingly, we need not reach the State’s argument that Conover procedurally 

defaulted this claim by failing to raise it before the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, 

notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts 

of the State.”). 

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decline Conover’s invitation to expand the scope of our COA to include this issue. 

* * * * *

We thus affirm the District Court’s order denying Conover’s petition for habeas 

corpus. 

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