Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_01-cv-00741/USCOURTS-casd-3_01-cv-00741-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 01cv0741

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALDO MEDRANO AYALA,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 01cv0741 BTM

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS GROUP FIVE

CLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART RESPONDENT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND GRANTING

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR AN

EVIDENTIARY HEARING

vs.

ROBERT L. AYERS, JR., Warden of

California State Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent.

Respondent has filed a motion for summary judgment on the Group Five Claims

(Claims 1-9, 12-16, and 69 of the Second Amended Petition). Respondent has also filed a

motion to dismiss Claims 1, 3-9, 12-16, and 69 on the basis of state procedural bars.

Petitioner has filed a motion seeking summary judgment, or, in the alternative, for evidentiary

hearings on each of his Group Five claims. Given the very extensive briefing and the nature

of the claims, the Court finds these motions fully suitable for decision on the papers without

oral argument. For the reasons discussed below, Respondent’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, Respondent’s motion to dismiss is

DENIED, Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED, and Petitioner’s motion for

an evidentiary hearing is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

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I. BACKGROUND 

On October 12, 1988, Petitioner was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder

in violation of California Penal Code (“CPC”) § 187, one count of attempted murder in

violation of CPC §§ 664 and 187, and one count of robbery and three counts of attempted

robbery in violation of CPC §§ 664 and 211--each count with findings that he used a firearm

in the commission of the crimes in violation of CPC § 12022.5. Petitioner was also found

guilty of the two special circumstance allegations, multiple murder under CPC § 190.2(a)(3)

and murder in the commission of a robbery under CPC § 190.2(a)(17)(1). On December 12,

1988, Petitioner was sentenced to death for each of the three murders. 

On April 17, 1997, Petitioner filed his automatic appeal with the California Supreme

Court, and filed a reply brief on April 27, 1998. On July 23, 1998, Petitioner filed a habeas

petition with the California Supreme Court. On June 8, 2000, the California Supreme Court

denied the appeal. See People v. Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th 225 (2000). On June 8, 2000, the

California Supreme Court also summarily denied the habeas petition without comment.

Subsequently, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the United States Supreme

Court, which was denied on March 5, 2001. 

On May 3, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. Shortly thereafter, the Court dismissed without prejudice

certain claims presented in the Petition in order to permit Petitioner to exhaust those claims

in state court. The Court stayed the federal proceedings pending the exhaustion of state

court remedies.

On September 23, 2002, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus in the California Supreme Court. On September 10, 2003, the California Supreme

Court denied the petition.

On November 14, 2003, Petitioner filed his First Amended Petition for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus in this case. He subsequently filed a Second Amended Petition for a Writ

of Habeas Corpus, the operative pleading in this action. 

///

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II. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondent moves to dismiss Claims 1, 3-9, 12-16, and 69 on the basis they are

procedurally defaulted. When a state court’s rejection of a federal claim is based on a

violation of a state procedural rule that is adequate to support the judgment and

independent of federal law, a habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claim. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). A state procedural rule is

adequate if it has been “firmly established and regularly followed” by the state court. 

Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991). The procedural rule is independent if it is not

“interwoven with the federal law.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). If a

state procedural ground is an adequate and independent ground for dismissal, a federal

court will not consider the merits of the claims unless a petitioner can show sufficient

cause for the default and resulting prejudice, or show that a failure to consider the claims

would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

In the instant case, Petitioner filed his automatic appeal on April 17, 1997, and

filed his first state habeas petition on July 23, 1998. Petitioner then raised the contested

claims in a second state (exhaustion) petition filed on September 23, 2002. The

September 10, 2003 California Supreme Court order denying the second state petition

concluded that Claims 1, 3-9, 12-16, and 69 are “procedurally barred, separately and

independently, as untimely. In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th at 780-781 (1998); In re Clark, 5

Cal. 4th 750, 763-799 (1993).” The court also found that Claims 1, 3-9, 12-16 and 69 are

“procedurally barred, separately and independently, as successive. In re Clark, 5 Cal.

4th at 767-768; In re Horowitz, 33 Cal. 2d 534, 546-547 (1949).” 

The California Supreme Court additionally found Claims 7 and 15 “procedurally

barred, separately and independently, as repetitive of a claim raised on appeal. In re

Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 824-849; In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218, 225 (1965).” The court

found Claims 1, 9 (“insofar as it asserts the prosecution violated the terms of a

stipulation”), and 69 “procedurally barred, separately and independently, as pretermitted

because they could have been, but were not, raised on appeal. In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th

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813, 824-829; In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal. 2d 756, 759.” Finally, the court found claim 6

(“insofar as it refers to the putative failure to disclose certain purportive information about

Rafael Mendoza Lopez”) to be procedurally barred because it was “raised and rejected in

petitioner’s first petition for writ of habeas corpus (In re Ronaldo Medrano Ayala on

Habeas Corpus (S072059, petn. den. June 8, 2000). (In re Miller (1941) 17 Cal. 2d 734,

735.)” The California Supreme Court alternately denied all of the claims raised in the

second exhaustion petition on the merits. 

A. Repetitive (In re Waltreus)

Waltreus provides that “in the absence of strong justification, any issue that was

actually raised and rejected on appeal cannot be renewed in a petition for habeas

corpus.” In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th at 829. In Waltreus, the California Supreme Court stated

“habeas corpus ordinarily cannot serve as a second appeal.” Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d at

225.

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that the rule announced in Waltreus “is not

sufficient to bar federal relief.” Calderon v. United States District Court (Bean), 96 F.3d

1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1996); Maxwell v. Sumner, 673 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 1982);

LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d, 702, 705 n.11 (9th Cir. 2001). In Forrest v. Vasquez, 75

F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit explained, “[A] Waltreus denial on state

habeas has no bearing on [a habeas petitioner’s] ability to raise a claim in federal court.” 

The Ninth Circuit reiterated this conclusion in Hill v. Roe, 321 F.3d 787, 798 (9th Cir.

2003), stating, “[t]he California Supreme Court’s reliance on In re Waltreus does not bar

federal review.” 

In accordance with Ninth Circuit precedent, the Court holds that the Waltreus rule

is not sufficient to bar federal review of Petitioner’s claims.

B. Untimely and Successive (In re Robbins and In re Clark)

In their briefing on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Group Three Claims based on

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28 Petitioner addresses procedural default in his Reply brief on the Group Five claims, 1

in which he largely reiterates the arguments previously raised in the Group Two pleadings.

5 01cv0741

procedural bars, the parties relied upon the motion papers previously submitted in

support of the Group Two claims. In the Court’s Order dated September 27, 2007, the

Court conducted an analysis of the California Supreme Court’s application of the

untimeliness and successiveness procedural bars (In re Clark and In re Robbins) and

found that California’s untimeliness and successiveness procedural bars were

inadequate to bar consideration of Petitioner’s Group Three claims on the merits. In the

Court’s Order dated April 16, 2008, the Court noted that the parties, in briefing the Group

Four claims, again relied upon the papers submitted in support of the Group Two claims. 

Therefore, the Court again concluded that the procedural bars imposed by the California

Supreme Court on the grounds of untimeliness and successiveness did not bar this Court

from considering the Group Four claims on the merits.

In the briefing filed in support of the motions on the Group Five claims, the parties

again rely primarily on the papers previously submitted in support of the Group Two

Motions. Therefore, in accordance with the Group Three and Group Four Orders, this 1

Court cannot conclude that the application of these procedural rules is sufficient to

prohibit the consideration of the Group Five claims on the merits. The procedural bars

imposed by the California Supreme Court in its September 10, 2003 order on the

grounds of untimeliness and successiveness will not bar this Court from considering

those claims on the merits for the reasons set forth in the Court’s September 27, 2007

Order. 

C. Pretermitted (In re Dixon)

As stated above, in their briefing on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Group Four

Claims based on procedural bars, the parties relied primarily upon the motion papers

previously submitted in support of the Group Two claims. In the Court’s Order dated April

16, 2008, the Court conducted an analysis of the California Supreme Court’s application

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of the pretermitted procedural bar (In re Dixon). The Court found that the Dixon bar was

independent of federal law, and found that Petitioner had met his interim burden under

Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2003), to challenge the adequacy of the

procedural bar by challenging the consistency of its application, but concluded that

Respondent had not met his ultimate burden under Bennett of proving the adequacy of

the procedural rule. The Court held that the Dixon bar was not sufficient to prohibit the

consideration of the Group Four claims on their merits. 

In the briefing filed in support of the motions on the Group Five claims, the parties

again rely primarily on the papers previously submitted in support of the Group Two

Motions. Therefore, this Court cannot conclude that the application of the Dixon

procedural rule is sufficient to prohibit the consideration of Claims 1, 9, and 69 on the

merits. For the reasons set forth in the Court’s April 16, 2008 Order, the Dixon

procedural bars imposed by the California Supreme Court in its September 10, 2003

order will not bar this Court from considering those claims on the merits.

D. In re Miller

In Miller, the California Supreme Court denied a habeas petition because a prior

petition filed in that court “was based on the same grounds set forth in the present

petition” and “no change in the facts or the law substantially affecting the rights of the

petitioner has been disclosed” in the interim. Id., 17 Cal. 2d at 735. In Kim v. Villalobos,

the Ninth Circuit stated that, by invoking Miller, the California Supreme Court was

effectively “denying the petition for the same reasons that it denied the previous one.” 

Id., 799 F.2d 1317, 1319 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986). Miller does not constitute a procedural bar

to federal review. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 n.3 (1991) (“Since a later

state decision based upon ineligibility for further state review neither rests upon

procedural default nor lifts a pre-existing procedural default, its effect on the availability of

federal habeas is nil.”)

Accordingly, the Court holds that a citation to In re Miller is not sufficient to bar

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federal review of Petitioner’s claims.

E. Conclusion

The Court finds that the Waltreus and Miller rules are not sufficient to bar federal

review of Claims 6, 7, and 15. The Court further finds that Respondent has failed to carry

his ultimate burden of demonstrating that the untimeliness, successiveness, and

pretermitted (Dixon) bars are consistently applied. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude

those procedural bars are sufficient to prohibit the consideration of Claims 1, 3-9, 12-16,

and 69 on the merits. Accordingly, Respondent’s motion to dismiss those claims on the

basis of procedural default is DENIED.

III. TEAGUE V. LANE

The United States Supreme Court, addressing perceived inconsistencies in its

prior retroactivity jurisprudence, held that “new” constitutional rules of criminal procedure

will not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review unless they fall within two

narrow exceptions. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). A new rule is one that “breaks

new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” or

one whose “result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time defendant’s

conviction became final.” Id. at 301. The two exceptions to the Teague rule are: (1)

rules placing certain kinds of private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal

law to prohibit, and (2) procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty without which

the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492

U.S. 302, 305 (1989), abrogated on other grounds, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304

(2002); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993). 

When the state properly argues that a “defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule

of constitutional law, the court must apply Teague v. Lane before considering the merits

of the claim.” Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994). Under Teague, habeas relief

is generally unavailable if it is based “on a rule announced after [a petitioner’s] conviction

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and sentence became final.” Id. The first step in a Teague analysis, therefore, is to

determine whether a petitioner is seeking the benefit of a constitutional rule announced

after his or her conviction became final. Id. at 389-90. 

In the Answer to the Second Amended Petition (“Answer”), Respondent asserts

the Teague bar for Claims 1-9, 12-16, and 69 - every claim in Group Five. Respondent’s

argument on those claims consists solely of the general contention that “Petitioner has

not shown that the claim does not rest upon a new rule barred under Teague v. Lane.” 

The Ninth Circuit recently expressed its view on the duties placed on the state to

properly raise and plead a claim made under Teague:

If a state seriously wishes to press Teague upon us, at a minimum Teague

should be identified as an issue (indeed the first issue) on appeal, the new rule

of constitutional law that falls within its proscription should be articulated, the

reasons why such a rule would not have been compelled by existing precedent

should be explained with particular reference to the appropriate universe of

precedent, and an argument should be made why the rule contended for is not

within one of Teague’s exceptions. 

Arredondo v. Ortiz, 365 F.3d 778, 781-782 (9th Cir. 2004).

Respondent merely references Teague in the Answer and fails to properly develop

his Teague argument with respect to any of the Group Five claims in the merits briefing. 

The Ninth Circuit places the burden on the state to articulate and present this argument,

and Respondent’s burden to raise and plead a Teague claim is not satisfied by little more

than a one-line citation to Teague. Therefore, the Court will not conduct an analysis on

whether Claims 1-9, 12-16, and 69 are barred under Teague v. Lane.

IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Standard of Merits Review under AEDPA

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for

federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court

shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added).

In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997), the United States Supreme Court

held that the new provisions of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) “generally apply only to cases filed after the Act became effective.” In capital

habeas actions, cases are typically commenced by the filing of requests for appointment

of counsel and stays of execution of the petitioners’ death sentences. Petitioner filed his

request for appointment of counsel and stay of execution on April 27, 2001 and filed his

petition with this Court on May 3, 2002. AEDPA became effective on April 24, 1996,

when the President signed it into law. See id. Accordingly, AEDPA applies to this case.

Relevant to this case are the changes AEDPA rendered to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),

which now reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). 

A decision is “contrary to” clearly established law if it fails to apply the correct

controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts

materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a

different result. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A decision involves

an “unreasonable application” of federal law if “the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner's case.” Id.; Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2004).

Even when the federal court undertakes an independent review of the record in

the absence of a reasoned state court decision, the federal court must “still defer to the

state court’s ultimate decision.” Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). If

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the state court decision does not furnish any analytical foundation, the review must focus

on Supreme Court cases to determine “whether the state court’s resolution of the case

constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.” Greene v.

Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal courts also look to Ninth Circuit

law for persuasive authority in applying Supreme Court law, and to determine whether a

particular state court decision is an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court

precedent. Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The Group Five Claims were each denied on the merits by the California Supreme

Court in the September 2003 Order which stated, “The petition for writ of habeas corpus

is denied. All claims are denied on the merits.” Therefore, the Court will conduct an

independent review of the record with respect to these claims. See Pirtle, 313 F.3d at

1167.

B. Standard for Evidentiary Hearing 

AEDPA also limited the circumstances under which district courts may grant an

evidentiary hearing. Section 2254(e)(2) provides:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in

State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing

unless the applicant shows that--

(A) the claim relies on--

(I) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to

cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence;

and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

Under AEDPA, when determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, the

district court must first ascertain whether the petitioner has failed to develop the factual

basis of a claim in state court. Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670 (9th Cir.

2005). As explained by the Supreme Court:

For state courts to have their rightful opportunity to adjudicate federal rights,

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the prisoner must be diligent in developing the record and presenting, if

possible, all claims of constitutional error. If the prisoner fails to do so, himself

or herself contributing to the absence of a full and fair adjudication in state

court, § 2254(e)(2) prohibits an evidentiary hearing to develop the relevant

claims in federal court, unless the statute’s other stringent requirements are

met.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000).

If the petitioner has not failed to develop the facts in state court, an evidentiary

hearing is required if: (1) the petitioner establishes a colorable claim for relief – i.e.,

petitioner alleges facts that, if proven, would entitle him to habeas relief; and (2) the

petitioner did not receive a full and fair opportunity to develop those facts. Earp v.

Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). The second requirement is met by a

showing that: 

(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2)

the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole;

(3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate

to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly

discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at

the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of

fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair hearing.

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963), overruled on other grounds by Keeney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992). 

V. DISCUSSION

The Group Five claims consist of allegations of prosecutorial misconduct at all

stages of Petitioner’s case - during pre-trial investigation and motions, the guilt and

penalty phases of trial, and in post-trial proceedings. The Group Five claims also consist

of allegations of Petitioner’s actual innocence of the crimes, a lack of fundamental

fairness in the trial proceedings, Brady violations, destruction of evidence, and threats

and intimidation of Petitioner and witnesses. The Court incorporates the Group Three

Order’s overview of the evidence presented during the guilt and penalty phases of trial.

(Doc. No. 236 at 15-28, 75-83.) 

Petitioner seeks summary judgment and/or an evidentiary hearing on each of the

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Group Five claims. Respondent seeks summary judgment on each of the Group Five

claims.

A. Claim 1 - Actual Innocence

Petitioner alleges that he was falsely and wrongly convicted of the 43rd Street

murders, and that he is actually innocent. Petitioner asserts that his conviction and

sentence therefore stand in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. 

In Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), the United States Supreme Court

assumed without deciding that “in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of

‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a defendant

unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to

pursue such a claim.” Id. at 417. In Herrera, the Supreme Court refrained from

announcing a standard for evaluating a freestanding innocence claim, but cautioned that

due to the anticipated frustration of the need for finality and burden on the court in the

case of a potential reversal and retrial, the threshold of such a claim would be

“extraordinarily high.” Id. at 418. The Ninth Circuit later held that “a habeas petitioner

asserting a freestanding innocence claim must go beyond demonstrating doubt about his

guilt, and must affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent.” Carriger v. Stewart, 132

F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997).

Petitioner asserts that his claim of innocence should be evaluated under the

standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). In

Schlup, the Supreme Court’s decision centered on a reviewing court’s ability to hear an

otherwise procedurally barred claim when the petitioner was able to demonstrate enough

evidence of innocence that there would be a “miscarriage of justice” if his constitutional

claims were not evaluated on the merits. Id. at 315. The Supreme Court explained that

the threshold showing to satisfy a “miscarriage of justice” exception is lower than the

“extraordinarily high” threshold necessary to assert a freestanding claim of actual

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 Petitioner also cites Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986), and Sawyer v. 2

Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) in support of his claim. However, the holdings of these cases,

like Schlup, address the circumstances under which a habeas court may consider an

otherwise procedurally barred claim, and do not apply to Petitioner’s freestanding claim of

actual innocence.

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innocence under Herrera. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315-16. The Court explained that the

Schlup “miscarriage of justice” exception applied only to the Court’s ability to consider his

procedurally barred claims, and was not an independent basis for habeas relief. Id. at

315. In contrast, a freestanding innocence claim is not based on any underlying

constitutional error and is thus subject to a higher level of scrutiny. Id. at 316; see also

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554 (2006) (“The sequence of the Court’s decisions in

Herrera and Schlup- first leaving unresolved the status of freestanding claims and then

establishing the gateway standard- implies at least that Herrera requires more convincing

proof of innocence than Schlup.”) Petitioner’s claim has nothing to do with the

consideration of a procedurally barred claim. Instead, Petitioner asserts that his actual

innocence is itself a basis for habeas relief. Therefore, the claim cannot be evaluated

under Schlup v. Delo. 

2

Petitioner asserts that the bulk of the case against him was comprised of the false

and concocted testimony of Pete Castillo, Juan Meza and Bobby Garcia, as well as the

coerced recantation of Rafael Mendoza Lopez, and emphasizes that there is no physical

evidence corroborating any of the witnesses’ testimony. Petitioner alleges that trial

counsel failed to present impeachment witnesses at trial, including Richard Savocchio,

Raul Garcia and Johnny Mendez, whose testimony would have exposed the testimony of

Meza, Mendoza Lopez and Castillo as false and a product of government intimidation. 

Petitioner argues that “[a]bsent the testimony of Juan Meza and Pedro Castillo there was

no evidence to support the conviction of Petitioner.” (Petitioner’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [“Petr.’s MSJ”] at 47.) 

The Ninth Circuit has held that post-conviction evidence whose sole function is to

“undercut the evidence presented at trial” is insufficient support for a freestanding claim

of actual innocence. Carriger, 132 F.3d at 477. The Court has considered each of

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Petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits, and has granted an evidentiary hearing on

several claims in his federal petition. Petitioner fails to offer any new evidence to

substantiate his claim of actual innocence, but merely reiterates the allegations made in

other claims in his federal petition, and fails to surmount the “extraordinarily high”

threshold contemplated by Herrera. 

Petitioner also points to witness Tracy Pittman, who provided the police with a

description of two men who went to the body shop just before the shootings, was shown

photos of Petitioner and his brother, and said that neither of the two men she saw were

either Ronaldo or Hector Ayala. However, this evidence is not newly discovered- Ms.

Pittman testified to these events at trial. The jury heard her testimony, and nevertheless

voted to convict Petitioner. The testimony of Ms. Pittman does not support a claim of

actual innocence.

Petitioner’s allegations of perjured testimony, trial counsel’s ineffective

performance, and the lack of physical evidence are addressed in other claims in the

instant petition, and serve at most only to undercut the evidence presented at trial, but do

not make a persuasive showing of actual innocence. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s actual innocence claim fails on the merits, and the state court’s

denial of this claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Petitioner fails to establish facts

that, if proven, would entitle him to habeas relief on this claim, and is therefore not

entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Earp, 431 F.3d at 1167. 

B. Claim 2 - Fundamental Fairness

Petitioner asserts that his trial was infected by the ineffective assistance of

appointed counsel, multiple errors by the trial court, the trial court’s failure to ensure due

process, and numerous acts of misconduct by the prosecution and the jury, and argues

that each of the errors “individually and cumulatively in whole and in part, caused

Petitioner prejudice.” (Second Am. Pet. ¶ 161.) Petitioner alleges that his right to

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fundamental fairness at trial, as guaranteed under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments, was violated as a result of these errors.

Respondent maintains the claim is conclusory, and asserts that to the extent

Petitioner seeks to assert cumulative error, “he fails to show that there were any errors to

cumulate.” (Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss [“Resp.’s MTD”] at 4.) Petitioner maintains

that “[e]ven if these errors do not individually rise to the level of prejudice necessary for

the granting of the writ, taken as a whole the pattern of error resulted in an unfair trial and

requires that a new trial be granted, or at a minimum, that Petitioner’s death sentence be

vacated.” (Petr.’s MSJ at 48.)

The Court has granted evidentiary hearings on several claims in this case, and the

resolution of those claims will impact the merits review of this claim. Therefore, the Court

will consider this claim after the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing. At this time, the

Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Respondent’s motion for summary judgment on

this claim, DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment

and DENIES Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing. Claim 2 shall be considered

on the merits after the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing.

C. Claim 3 - Biased and Improper Investigation of 43rd Street and Casas

Murders

In Claim 3, Petitioner alleges that his constitutional rights to due process and equal

protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a fair trial under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments, and to a fair and non-arbitrary penalty determination under the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, were violated because the investigations of the

43rd Street murders and Casas killing were not conducted in a fair and impartial manner. 

Petitioner claims that “the treatment of Petitioner as part of that investigation revealed the

bias against Petitioner with which the police and the prosecution pursued their official

duties.” (Second Am. Pet. ¶ 163.)

Generally, the decision whether or not to prosecute rests in the discretion of the

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Claim 3 also alleges bias in the investigation of the Casas murder. However, 3

Petitioner does not state any facts linking Chacon to the investigation of the Casas murder

or otherwise establishing bias in connection with the investigation of the Casas murder.

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prosecutor. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). However, selectivity in

the enforcement of laws is subject to constitutional constraints and may not be based

upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Id. 

There is a presumption that prosecutorial decisions do not violate equal protection. 

United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926). To overcome this

presumption, a criminal defendant must present “clear and convincing evidence to the

contrary.” Id. 

Petitioner has not presented any facts establishing that the prosecution was based

on an impermissible motive. In support of this claim, Petitioner relies on the same

evidence he submitted in support of Claim 24 of the Group Three Claims, namely

portions of the Hart Declaration and Supplemental Hart Declaration regarding Chacon’s

alleged bias against the Ayalas, Chacon’s immediate conclusion that the Ayalas had

committed the 43rd Street murders, and Chacon’s interjection of himself into the

investigation of the case, including contact with crucial witnesses. (Hart Decl. ¶¶ 8-17;

Supp. Hart Decl. ¶¶ 3-9.) Although this evidence may show bias in connection with the

police investigation into the 43rd Street murders, it does not support the conclusion that

the decision to prosecute was based on unjustified standards. 

As for bias in connection with the investigation of the murders, Petitioner does not

cite any authority for the proposition that the bias of an investigating officer, in and of

itself, rises to the level of a constitutional violation. Perhaps realizing the shortcomings 3

of this claim, in his Reply Brief Petitioner states that this claim actually concerns the use

of fraudulent evidence in connection with the improper investigation. (Petr.’s Reply at

37.) However, the claim as set forth in the Second Amended Petition is not couched as a

false evidence claim. Furthermore, Petitioner has asserted separate claims for

Prosecutorial Misconduct by Failure to Disclose Consideration Given to Prosecution

Witnesses and Failure to Correct False Testimony by Prosecution Witnesses (Claim 8),

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False Evidence (Claim 12), Concocting the Testimony of Mendoza Lopez and Meza

(Claim 15), and Failure to Disclose Material Exculpatory Evidence Regarding Detective

Carlos Chacon (Claim 5). Therefore, to the extent that Petitioner intends Claim 3 to

cover false evidence and Brady violations, it is duplicative. 

The state court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Petitioner is

not entitled to habeas relief or an evidentiary hearing on this claim. See Earp, 431 F.3d

at 1167. 

D. Claim 4- Wrongful Intimidation and Threats to Witnesses

In Claim 4, Petitioner alleges that his rights to due process, equal protection, a fair

trial, and an individualized penalty determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments were violated as a result of the state’s wrongful intimidation and

threatening of witnesses. 

Petitioner alleges that Detective Chacon “threatened, coerced and/or intimidated

potential and actual witnesses, including but not limited to Rafael Mendoza Lopez,

Joseph Moreno, Moreno’s daughter, Gina Moreno, Tracy Pitman [sic], Jennifer [sic]

Mendoza, Maria Soto, Sara Castro, Ochoa Hernandez, Richard Buchanan and Ishmael

Maldonado, as well as Petitioner himself, whom Detective Chacon threatened to kill.” 

(Second Am. Pet. ¶ 169.) Furthermore, Petitioner alleges that Chacon falsely told a

number of witnesses, including Tracy Pittman, that Petitioner was a member of the

Mexican Mafia and that the witnesses were at risk of murder and/or physical harm at the

hands of the Mexican Mafia. (Second Am. Pet. ¶ 170.)

“It is well established that substantial government interference with a defense

witness’s free and unhampered choice to testify amounts to a violation of due process.” 

United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Thus, coercive or threatening behavior toward a potential witness may justify

reversal of a defendant’s conviction. See Earp, 431 F.3d at 1170-71. 

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 Petitioner has presented evidence of threats against Pittman. According to Hart, 4

Pittman’s father told Hart that in 1985, San Diego Detectives told him that the Eme had a

contract out to kill his daughter. (Supp. Hart. Decl. ¶ 10.d.) Pittman herself recalled that on

one occasion an unidentified white male driving a black car pulled up next to her and told her

that she better not testify in the case, although there is no evidence that this man was

associated with the police or the prosecution. (Ex. F. to Belter Decl. dated 7/29/08.) Pittman

explained that she was scared for her life and went into hiding until she was convinced to

testify for the defense. (Id.) 

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Other than Hart’s statement that on information and belief, Chacon threatened

and/or intimidated Sara Castro and Ishmael Maldonado, Petitioner does not present any

evidence that these individuals were in fact threatened. As for the alleged threats against

Tracy Pittman and Javier Ochoa Hernandez, both of these witnesses testified for the 4

defense and Petitioner does not claim that their testimony would have been more

favorable absent the alleged threats. Thus, Petitioner’s claim fails as to these witnesses.

Petitioner’s claim that Chacon threatened him is addressed in Claim 14.

With respect to Richard Buchanan, in Hart’s original declaration, Hart stated on

information and belief that while Buchanan was at the county jail, Chacon attempted to

coerce Buchanan into falsely fingering Petitioner as the instigator of an attack Buchanan

had allegedly carried out against another inmate, Manuel Rebeles. (Hart Decl. ¶ 20.) In

support of his instant motion, Petitioner submitted a report of an interview of Buchanan

by investigator George Newman on April 7, 2006. (Ex. C to Belter Decl. dated 7/29/08.) 

During the interview, Buchanan claimed that Chacon and Deputy District Attorney Gloria

Michaels had put pressure on him to make up a story that he was an Eme hit man and

that Petitioner had ordered him to carry out a hit on Rebeles, a fellow inmate of

Buchanan’s who had been stabbed. Buchanan claimed that after he refused, Chacon

threatened to “bury” him. Buchanan also stated that Chacon attempted to put pressure

on him to testify against the Ayalas by convincing Rebeles to falsely identify Buchanan as

his attacker. According to Buchanan, Rebeles admitted on the stand that the police “fed”

him the story about Buchanan’s involvement. In addition, Buchanan claimed that

Rebeles was visited everyday by a man Buchanan is “pretty sure” was Chacon. Even if

Buchanan’s testimony is credited, Petitioner has not established that his due process

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rights were violated. Buchanan did not in fact testify against Petitioner. Conversely,

Petitioner does not claim that he was going to call Buchanan as a defense witness in the

murder trial but was prevented from doing so. Therefore, there was no government

interference with witness testimony.

As for Maria Soto, Petitioner relies on Hart’s Supplemental Declaration, which

states:

Maria Soto was an important witness (along with Ignacio Vehar and Ismael

Maldonado), and before I first interviewed her, Chacon had for months paid

her as a protected witness, which I learned by reviewing memos that reflected

payments by Chacon. Maria Soto was an important witness because she links

Tony Figueroa to the murders. Soto was told by Pete Castillo and Tony

Figueroa that a hit man by the name of Sosa was going to kill her if she

testified. Based on Chacon’s relationship with Sosa and his threats to other

witnesses, I took this threat to have eminated from him as well. I discussed

this issue with trial counsel and the tampering of witnesses, but I was

precluded from following up on it. 

(Hart Supp. Decl. ¶ 10.e.) As discussed in the Court’s Group Three Order, Hart’s

conclusion that the threats toward Soto emanated from Chacon is purely speculative and

does not warrant an evidentiary hearing.

The Supplemental Hart Declaration also includes information regarding threats

directed towards Joe Moreno:

b. As for Joe Moreno, when I first began working on the case, Moreno

was wanted but had not been apprehended. At some point, he was

apprehended and was later tried and exonerated in a subsequent trial. Before

he had been apprehended, I interviewed Joe Moreno’s daughter who told me

that she had been approached by Detective Chacon, and that Chacon told her

that Joe Moreno’s life was in danger, but that if Joe surrendered and admitted

he was involved in the killings then Chacon would make sure he would not be

assassinated in jail. Essentially, he tried to coerce her into obtaining a false

confession from her father with threats of fear and intimidation.

c. I also spoke many times with Joe Moreno’s wife, Gina Moreno, who

told me she had constantly been harassed by the police. She told me that at

one point, the police had raided Joe’s house and took items. Then, she said,

Detective Chacon subsequently came to her house, holding pants and

announced to her there’s Joe’s pants with blood on it, it’s been tested and it

was the blood of the victim. Gina was there with a family friend and they both

openly laughed at Chacon. The friend announced that the pants were his.

Detective Chacon retreated and there was never any reference again to the

pants. It was apparently a clumsy effort by Chacon to frame or coerce Joe

Moreno and, by extension, the Ayalas. I told trial counsel about my interview

with Gina Moreno and that Ms. Moreno said she would testify to it. Trial

counsel did not use that information.

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(Hart Supp. Decl. ¶ 10.) These facts fall short of establishing a violation of Petitioner’s

due process rights. Most significantly, Petitioner does not claim that he was going to call

Joe Moreno as a defense witness. It is unclear whether Moreno was even apprehended

by the time of Petitioner’s trial. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that the State

interfered with his right to call Moreno as a defense witness.

Petitioner has a stronger claim with respect to the alleged intimidation of Rafael

Mendoza Lopez. Petitioner has submitted a report by Paul Pickering of his interview with

Jenifer Mendoza, Mendoza Lopez’s wife, on November 17, 1988 and November 23,

1988. (Ex. K to Belter Decl. dated 7/22/05.) According to the report, Jenifer explained

that she had brought drugs to Mendoza Lopez while he was in prison so he could sell the

drugs. Jenifer claimed that Chacon called her when Mendoza Lopez refused to

cooperate with him and threatened to bust her for her criminal activity. Chacon allegedly

said that “maybe it was time to take Jenifer off the street.” Jenifer said that Chacon really

wanted to keep Petitioner in jail and told Jenifer that if she was taken off the streets,

something would have to be done with her kids. Jenifer also said that she thought

Mendoza Lopez was told that he was on a ‘hit list’ and that Chacon could protect him and

his family. 

Petitioner has submitted additional evidence regarding the intimidation of Rafael

Mendoza Lopez in connection with his instant motion. Salvador Colabella was

interviewed by investigator Newman on June 9, 2008. (Ex. G to Belter Decl. dated

7/29/08.) Colabella, who grew up knowing the Ayalas, Chacon, Meza, Mendoza Lopez,

and Castillo, claims that on one occasion, he encountered Mendoza Lopez in the old San

Diego County Central Jail. Mendoza Lopez told Colabella that he had cooperated with

the authorities regarding the Ayala matter because they had caught his wife smuggling

heroin into prison and were going to prosecute her and take away her children. Luis

Garcia, who was also interviewed by Newman, stated that he “he heard that they (police)

had told him they’d let her [Jenifer] go. She’d been busted for dealing (drugs), and they

traded her for his testimony.” (Ex. B to Belter Decl. dated 7/29/08.) This evidence is 

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consistent with Jenifer Mendoza’s claims. 

In addition, Petitioner has submitted an investigator report summarizing Newman’s

interview of Mario Marin. (Ex. A to Belter Decl. dated 7/29/08.) Marin claimed that he

initially was going to provide false testimony for the prosecution in Petitioner’s case

because the District Attorney was offering a lot of deals for testimony against the Ayalas. 

However, he decided that he would not lie in court. Marin also stated that he and

Mendoza Lopez were incarcerated together at the Central jail and later at the California

Institute for Men. During one encounter, Mendoza Lopez told Marin that he had lied in

his testimony for the prosecution because when the authorities were bringing him to

court, they told him that the Ayalas were going to have him killed. In addition, they were

offering him freedom. According to Marin, Mendoza Lopez also admitted to him that he

(Mendoza Lopez) was involved in killing Dominguez and that Mendoza Lopez and others

had brought some guys up from Mexico to steal drugs from Dominguez. Setting aside

the issue of whether Mendoza Lopez was involved in the murders, Marin’s statements

support Petitioner’s claim that Mendoza Lopez was intimidated into giving false

testimony. See Earp, 431 F.3d at 1170-71. 

Respondent points out that Petitioner did not present the evidence regarding the

threats/intimidation of Jenifer Mendoza and Rafael Mendoza Lopez to the state court. 

Respondent argues that Petitioner failed to develop the factual basis for his claim in state

court and that, therefore, AEDPA’s evidentiary hearing standard applies. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(2). The Court disagrees. Although the state petition did not provide the details

included in the evidence now before the Court, the state petition specifically asserted that

Chacon had threatened and/or intimidated Jenifer Mendoza and Rafael Mendoza Lopez. 

(First Am. State Pet. ¶ 170.) The state court had sufficient information before it to

determine whether to allow the case to move forward. 

The Court also rejects Respondent’s argument that Petitioner’s claim is

unexhausted in light of this new evidence. A claim remains exhausted provided any

newly presented evidence does not “fundamentally alter the legal claim already

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regarding the alleged threats may be admissible at the evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Fed.

R. Ev. 404(b).

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considered by the state court.” Vasquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S. 254, 257 (1986). This claim

is not fundamentally altered by the details Petitioner now provides.

Thus, Petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he has established a

colorable claim for relief. Earp, 431 F.3d at 1167. Although Petitioner does not present

direct evidence that Rafael Mendoza Lopez changed his testimony as a result of

threats/intimidation, Petitioner’s evidence tends to support his claim and raises serious

questions regarding whether there was substantial governmental interference with

Mendoza Lopez’s testimony. Given the importance of Mendoza Lopez’s testimony, if his

changed testimony was the result of threats and intimidation by Chacon, Chacon’s

misconduct, when viewed in conjunction with other alleged prosecutorial misconduct

identified in this order, arguably substantially affected the jury’s verdict. See Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Therefore, Petitioner has made out a colorable

claim for relief and is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this issue. See Earp, 431 F.3d

at 1167.5

E. Claim 5- Failure to Disclose Brady Evidence Regarding Detective Chacon

In Claim 5, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

amendment rights were violated by the prosecution’s failure to disclose material

exculpatory information to Petitioner’s trial counsel regarding Detective Chacon. 

Petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to disclose evidence of Chacon’s bias

against the Ayalas, and the way Chacon interjected himself into the case and intimidated

witnesses. (Hart Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 3-10.) The Court analyzed the specific evidence of

Chacon’s alleged bias and involvement in the case in connection with Claim 24

(Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - Impeachment of Chacon). (See Doc. No. 236 at 58-

64.) The specific evidence of intimidation of witnesses is set forth above in the Court’s

discussion of Claim 3 (Wrongful Intimidation and Threats of Witnesses). 

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Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963), the prosecution has a duty to

disclose any evidence that is material and favorable to the accused. A Brady violation is

material when “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to

the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). A reasonable probability of a different result exists

“when the government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome

of the trial.’” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-36 (1995) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at

667.)

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claim fails because Petitioner does not allege

that the defense was unaware of the facts in question. It is unclear exactly when Hart

learned of the various facts set forth in his declarations. However, certain facts clearly

were not known until after trial. Hart explains that he was retained by Petitioner’s counsel

from August 1985 until December 1986. (Hart Decl. ¶ 3.) After that time, Hart continued

to work on Petitioner’s case even though he was no longer retained by trial counsel. 

(Hart Decl. ¶ 5.) Hart continued to receive information from Petitioner’s new investigators

and, after the conviction, continued to interview additional witnesses and compile

information. (Id.) 

Significant information learned by Hart after the trial includes (1) Chacon’s

statement to Hart in 1990 that if the Ayalas ever got out of jail, Chacon would kill them

(Hart Supp. Decl. ¶ 3) and (2) Chacon’s alleged threats toward Jenifer Mendoza, Rafael

Mendoza Lopez’s wife (Hart Supp. Decl. ¶ 10.a). Additionally, it appears that Hart may

not have known the full extent of Chacon’s alleged connections with the Sosa family and

alleged bias against the Ayalas until after Petitioner was convicted. It is unclear when

Hart learned about the alleged intimidation/threats directed toward Joe Moreno, Tracy

Pittman, and Richard Buchanan. 

The combined evidence of Chacon’s bias against the Ayalas, attempts by Chacon

and the police to intimidate Rafael Mendoza Lopez, and attempts by Chacon and the

police to intimidate other witnesses such as Pittman, Moreno, and Buchanan, could have

been used to shed doubt on the testimony of Rafael Mendoza Lopez as well as the

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testimony of Meza, who admitted that he has known Chacon since he was young and

met with Chacon a number of times between the time of the murders and the time he

came forward with his version of events in 1987. Given the importance of Meza and

Mendoza Lopez’s testimony to the prosecution’s case, the suppression of the evidence

described above arguably might undermine confidence in the outcome of Petitioner’s

trial. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434-36.

Accordingly, Petitioner has established a colorable Brady claim with respect to

evidence of Chacon’s bias against the Ayalas, the attempted intimidation of Rafael

Mendoza Lopez, and the attempted intimidation of Moreno, Pittman, and/or Buchanan (to

the extent Hart did not know about this evidence until after trial). Therefore, the Court

grants in part Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing on this claim.

F. Claim 6 - Prosecutorial Misconduct- Brady evidence regarding Jailhouse

Informants

In Claim 6, Petitioner claims that his constitutional rights were violated by the

prosecution’s failure to disclose material evidence to the defense regarding the

prosecution’s use of jailhouse informants – namely, Juan Meza, Rafael Mendoza Lopez,

Glen Albrecht and Walter Lewis – with histories of misrepresentations and known gang

affiliations.

With respect to Meza, Petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to disclose

Meza’s long history as a prosecution informant and the fact that Meza previously denied

having any personal knowledge of the 43rd street murders. As discussed in the Court’s

Group Three Order (See Doc. No. 236 at 44), Meza’s history as an informant would not

necessarily have helped the defense case because the evidence could be interpreted as

establishing Meza’s reliability as an informant. As for Meza’s purported prior denial of

knowledge regarding the 43rd street murders, Petitioner relies on Meza’s statements to

Hart in 1986. (Hart. Supp Decl. ¶ 8.) However, as already discussed, whether or not

Meza knew that Hart was an investigator for the defense, Meza probably had good

reasons to be cautious about admitting knowledge of the murders and admitting that he

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was cooperating with the authorities. (Doc. No. 236 at 61.) Therefore, Meza’s denial of

knowledge to Hart is insignificant. Although Hart states on information and belief that

Chacon initially learned from Meza and/or others that Meza did not have personal

knowledge regarding the murders (Hart Decl. ¶ 15), Hart does not point to any facts

supporting his “information and belief.”

Petitioner claims that the prosecution represented that Rafael Mendoza Lopez had

“no gang affiliation” when, in actuality, he was affiliated with the Mexican Mafia. It is

actually unclear whether Mendoza Lopez was affiliated with the Mexican Mafia. 

According to his file, he once belonged to the “Logan Heights” street gang and had

knowledge regarding activities of the Southern Hispanic (SUR) gang. (Ex. I to Belter

Decl. dated 7/22/05.) At any rate, even if Mendoza Lopez was somehow affiliated with

the Mexican Mafia, Petitioner fails to establish how he was prejudiced by the

prosecution’s alleged failure to disclose this information. In his reply brief, Petitioner

argues that information regarding Mendoza Lopez’s affiliation with the Mexican Mafia

could have been used to impeach him and “demonstrate his motive for flipping.” (Petr.’s

Reply at 47.) The Court does not follow the logic of Petitioner’s argument. If anything,

Petitioner’s alleged affiliation with the Mexican Mafia would support his story that he

originally testified for the defense because he was afraid of being killed by members of

the “Southern group.” (RT 16355, 16381-82.) Petitioner fails to demonstrate that this

evidence was material to his case, and the claim fails on the merits. See Bagley, 473

U.S. at 682. 

It appears that Petitioner has abandoned this claim as it relates to Glen Albrecht

and Walter Lewis, as Petitioner’s briefs do not address this aspect of the claim.

Moreover, defense counsel cross-examined Albrecht about his history as a jailhouse

informant. (RT 17590-95.) Defense counsel also cross-examined Lewis about his

affiliation with the Aryan Brotherhood and the fact that he had begun informing on other

inmates in 1986. (RT 17668, 17686.) 

The state court’s denial of this claim was not contrary to, nor did it involve an

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unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Therefore, Petitioner is not

entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

G. Claim 7- Prosecutorial Misconduct- Injection of Allegations of Gang 

Affiliations at Trial and Vouching 

In Claim 7, Petitioner alleges that his constitutional rights were violated because

the prosecution improperly attempted to inject gang issues into the trial during both the

guilty and penalty phases of the trial. For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner is not

entitled to relief on this claim.

1. Guilt Phase

Petitioner argues that during closing argument, the prosecutor made numerous

references to witnesses’ fear of Petitioner and his “group,” thereby improperly invoking

racial prejudice and anti-gang bias. 

The California Supreme Court, on direct appeal, rejected Petitioner’s contention

that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct with respect to the closing argument:

Next, defendant contends that counsel were ineffective for failing to ask the

trial court to assign misconduct to references to his gang membership during

the prosecution's closing argument. Again, however, the record belies his

claim. The prosecutor, in attempting to bolster or weaken the credibility of

Juan Manuel Meza, Pedro Castillo, Eduardo Sanchez Galdan, and Rafael

Mendoza Lopez, argued that all were afraid of defendant and, to provide a

representative example of the prosecutor's wording, “those people who

associated with the defendant”-a fear that accounted for aspects of their

testimony. He carefully avoided referring to the Mexican Mafia or any other

gang by name. The argument was proper, and there was no basis on which

counsel should have asked the trial court for a ruling against it. (Moreover, in

the case of the prosecutor's reference to Sanchez, counsel did ask the court

to cure harm he felt arose from the prosecutor's impugning Sanchez's

credibility on the basis of his fear. There was no occasion at that point to

object to any reference to gangs, however, because there was none.)

The prosecutor, referring to certain witnesses, argued that “[t]hose people who

now are willing to come forward have done so, and they have taken a

substantial risk . . .” and acted “at great peril to themselves.” Defendant also

finds fault with this remark and claims ineffective assistance of counsel for

failing to request an assignment of misconduct. In our view, however, the

prosecutor was asking the jurors to take note of others' courage and not shirk

their own responsibility - in fact his following remarks so show. We discern no

deficient performance by counsel in failing to object to these remarks; they

were proper argument.

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Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 286-87.

In Claim 26 of the Second Amended Petitioner before this Court, Petitioner again

asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecution misconduct

during closing argument. In the Court’s Group Three Order, the Court held that Petitioner

was not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. In reaching this conclusion, the Court

analyzed the portions of the closing argument to which Petitioner objects and found that

there was no prosecutorial misconduct. (See Doc. No. 236 at 66-70.) Claim 7 fails for

the same reasons as enunciated in connection with Claim 26. 

To the extent Petitioner claims that the prosecution engaged in misconduct by

eliciting testimony touching upon witnesses’ fear of Petitioner and/or his affiliates, the

Court addressed this issue in connection with Claim 41 of the Group Four Claims. (See

Doc. No. 247 at 39-43). As explained by the Court in the Group Four Order, the

prosecution properly elicited this testimony to explain, among other things, (1) why

Castillo did not identify the Ayalas and Moreno immediately; (2) why Meza did not go

along with the Ayalas’ proposed plan and was receiving protection from the state; and (3)

why Rafael Mendoza Lopez initially lied on the stand. See also Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 277

(explaining that “[t]here was no error” in presenting sanitized evidence regarding

witnesses’ fear of Petitioner and his associates because such evidence “affected the

witnesses’ credibility.”) 

2. Penalty Phase

Petitioner claims that the prosecution made improper attempts to inject gang

issues into the trial by instructing Kenneth Blasingame to write the word “EME” to

designate where Petitioner went to stand after the assault on Richard Christiansen. 

Petitioner also points to the prosecution’s questioning of Alex Macugay and Richard

Christiansen regarding prison gang activity.

This claim fails because, as discussed in connection with Claim 41 of the Group

Four Claims, defense counsel announced the defense’s tactical decision to allow

references to gangs during the penalty phase of the trial. Defense counsel reasoned:

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I should make it clear, I think, as a matter of record, that as a tactical

decision I think the defense has decided to present evidence in this regard

because it is our position essentially that the – that the way in which the

climate of fear was created by the evidence presented at the guilt phase I

think is worse than simply fully presenting this issue to the jury and allowing

the jury to decide what it will with a full understanding of the circumstances

that existed in prison during the 70's and the early 1980's. 

(RT 17281.) 

Given defense counsel’s express choice to present evidence regarding gangs in

prison, it was not improper for the prosecution itself to bring up the issue of gangs. 

Because the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, relief is not warranted on this

claim. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

H. Claim 8- Prosecutorial Misconduct- Failure to Disclose Consideration Given

to Witnesses and to Correct False Testimony

In Claim 8, Petitioner alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by (1) the

prosecution’s failure to disclose material information to Petitioner’s trial counsel relating

to payments and inducements made to prosecution witnesses who testified against

Petitioner at the guilt and penalty phases of his trial, and (2) the prosecution’s failure to

correct the false testimony by prosecution witnesses Meza, Mendoza Lopez, Castillo,

Garcia, Albrecht, and Lewis and/or the false impression created by the testimony of some

of these witnesses concerning such payments and consideration.

1. Rafael Mendoza Lopez

With respect to Meza, Petitioner relies on the following evidence:

• CDC documents revealed that Mendoza Lopez was a jailhouse informant

who had previously testified against inmates in exchange for favors from

the state. (Hart Decl. ¶ 53.)

• In an effort to convince Mendoza Lopez to testify on behalf of the

prosecution, Mendoza Lopez’s wife had been threatened by Detective

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Chacon with imprisonment shortly after Mendoza Lopez testified favorably

to Petitioner. (Pickering Decl. ¶ 9; Belter Decl. dated 7/29/08, Exs A, B, G.)

• According to prison documents, Mendoza Lopez had strong ties to prison

gangs.

The Court has already determined that Petitioner has failed to establish that the

information regarding Mendoza Lopez’s informant history and his ties to prison gangs

would have helped the defense in any significant way. (See Doc. No. 236 at 55-56.) As

discussed in the Court’s Group Three Order, Petitioner’s assertion that Chacon

threatened to reveal Mendoza Lopez’s informant status if he failed to cooperate is based

on pure speculation; Petitioner has not presented any evidence establishing a nexus

between Mendoza Lopez’s informant history and his recantation. In the absence of

materiality, any failure by the prosecution to reveal information regarding Mendoza

Lopez’s informant history and/or ties to prison gangs does not constitute a Brady

violation. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. 

The evidence regarding Chacon’s threats toward Jenifer Mendoza is discussed

above in connection with Claim 4. The Court granted an evidentiary hearing on Claim 4

as it pertains to Jenifer Mendoza and Rafael Mendoza Lopez. This claim overlaps with

Claim 4 in that the evidentiary hearing may reveal that Rafael Mendoza Lopez gave false

testimony for the prosecution as a result of threats and/or intimidation of his wife and/or

himself. Because the alleged threats emanated from a police officer(s), it does not

matter that the prosecutors may not actually have known that the testimony was false.

See Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the

constitutional prohibition on the “knowing” use of perjured testimony applies when any of

the State’s representatives, including police, would know the testimony was false). 

Accordingly, the Court grants an evidentiary hearing on this claim as it relates to the

falsity of Rafael Mendoza Lopez’s testimony as a result of threats/intimidation.

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2. Pedro Castillo

Petitioner alleges that the prosecution knew of, but did not disclose,

inconsistencies between Castillo’s pretrial statements and his trial testimony, including

his purported fear of the Mexican Mafia. However, Petitioner does not support this

general allegation with specific evidence regarding what statements Castillo made and

how they were inconsistent with his trial testimony. The Court notes that trial counsel

impeached Petitioner with various inconsistencies between this trial testimony and prior

testimony at preliminary hearings as well as his statements to the police. Specifically,

trial counsel impeached Castillo with the fact that in 1985, Castillo answered “No” to the

question, “Any reason why you wouldn’t have told the people in the ambulance exactly

what happened.” (RT 12429-31.) Petitioner does not identify any other inconsistencies

that were not known to trial counsel, were known to but not disclosed by the prosecution,

and were material. 

Petitioner also alleges that the prosecution did not reveal that Castillo had

complained about not receiving adequate cash payments prior to trial and that, after said

complaints, increased and regular monthly payments commenced. However, Petitioner

does not present any evidence in support of this allegation. Moreover, it does not appear

that this information, if true, would have had any bearing on the trial. As pointed out by

Respondent, defense counsel chose not to cross-examine Castillo regarding his

payments because they did not want to raise the issue of Castillo’s participation in the

witness protection program. Thus, any evidence that Castillo wanted his payments

increased would not have made a difference in the defense case. 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim as it relates to Castillo.

3. Juan Meza

Petitioner alleges that the prosecution knew and did not disclose additional

information that: (a) Juan Meza had a long term friendship with Detective Chacon

because the two grew up together; (b) Detective Chacon had met Meza beginning in

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1985 regarding the alleged 43rd Street murders; (c) Meza and/or others had told

Detective Chacon at or about that time that Meza did not have any knowledge of the 43rd

Street murders, or of Petitioner’s involvement in those murders; (d) that Chacon and

Meza had made up the story about the Ayalas’ involvement in the murders; (e) that in the

years preceding the trial Meza had received favors and/or sweetheart deals for a number

of criminal offenses, and (f) that said consideration had been engineered by Detective

Chacon.

As discussed in connection with Claim 19, Meza admitted that he had known

Chacon since he was young and trusted him. (RT 14538.) Chacon apparently did talk to

Meza in 1985 about the killings. However, according to Chacon, Meza told Chacon that

he was aware of the killings and their reason because he had spoken to the Ayalas

before and after the murders and that he was to have provided the guns for the killings. 

(Ex. R to Belter Decl. dated 7/22/05.) Although Petitioner claims that Chacon knew that

Meza did not have knowledge of the 43rd Street murders or Petitioner’s involvement in

the murders, Petitioner has not presented any specific evidence supporting this claim. 

Furthermore, Petitioner has not presented any evidence of “sweetheart deals” or

favors engineered by Detective Chacon. Evidence was presented at trial regarding the

fact that Meza would be receiving protection for his family, use immunity, and, potentially,

early release from custody. (RT 14419-21; 14579-83.) Trial counsel proffered that in

1986, when Meza was arrested for simple possession, Chacon called the District

Attorney’s Office and asked that he be given a concurrent sentence because he had

been providing information. (RT 14540-61.) However, trial counsel obviously already

had this information.

As for Petitioner’s claim that Chacon and Meza made up the story about the

Ayalas’ involvement in the murders, as discussed below in connection with Claim 12,

Petitioner has not alleged facts establishing that Chacon and Meza concocted Meza’s

testimony or that the prosecution was otherwise aware that Meza’s testimony was false.

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim as it relates to Meza.

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4. Remaining Witnesses

Petitioner has not presented any evidence of suppressed information regarding

payments/consideration received by Roberto Garcia, Albrecht, or Lewis. Therefore,

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim as it relates to these individuals.

I. Claim 9- Prosecutorial Misconduct Regarding Petitioner’s Alleged

Participation in the Pantry Robbery

In Claim 9, Petitioner alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by the

prosecution’s misconduct in improperly and untruthfully misleading Petitioner into

stipulating to an unadjudicated robbery of a store called the Pantry. Petitioner has

declined to pursue this claim. (See Petr.’s MSJ at 85.) 

J. Claim 12- Introduction of False Evidence

In Claim 12, Petitioner alleges that his constitutional rights were violated because

the key testimony introduced against him in the guilt phase – i.e., the testimony of Pedro

Castillo, Roberto Garcia, Juan Meza and Rafael Mendoza Lopez – was false. Petitioner

also alleges that the testimony of Walter Lewis and Glen Albrecht introduced against him

in the penalty phase was false.

As explained by the Supreme Court:

[I]t is established that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence,

known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the

Fourteenth Amendment. The same result obtains when the State, although

not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.

Napue v. People of the State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (internal citations

omitted). Napue applies whenever the prosecution “knew or should have known that the

testimony was false” - thus, if the police are aware of evidence that a witness’s testimony

is false, the prosecution is deemed to have knowledge of the falsity of the testimony. 

Jackson, 514 F.3d at 1075 (quoting Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005)).

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Brady as well. Setting aside exhaustion and variance issues, the Brady claims would fail for

the same reasons as the Napue claims – insufficient evidence that the police or prosecution

knew of evidence indicating that the testimony at issue was false.

33 01cv0741

1. Pedro Castillo

In support of his claim that Castillo’s testimony was false, Petitioner relies on the

same evidence presented in support of Claim 20 (Failure to Adequately Investigate and

Impeach Pedro Castillo). In the Court’s Group Three Order, the Court analyzed the

evidence and found that, for the most part, the evidence was insufficient to establish that

Castillo could have been impeached in any significant way. (See Doc. No. 236 at 46-50.) 

However, the Court granted an evidentiary hearing on Claim 20 as it relates to evidence

that Castillo solicited Johnny Mendez to kill Zamora. 

Although the Court granted an evidentiary hearing in connection with Claim 20,

Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim. Petitioner presents no

facts establishing that the police or the prosecution knew or should have known about

Castillo’s purported attempt to hire Mendez to kill Zamora. Therefore, Petitioner has not

established a Napue violation as to Castillo and is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing or

habeas relief. 

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2. Roberto Garcia

In support of his claim that Roberto Garcia’s testimony was false, Petitioner relies

on the same evidence presented in support of Claim 21 (Failure to Adequately

Investigate and to Impeach Robert Garcia). The Court analyzed the evidence in the

Court’s Group Three Order (See Doc. No. 236 at 50-52), and found that it did not tend to

show that Garcia was lying or involved in the murders. Therefore, the Court denied

habeas relief on Claim 21. For the same reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner has

failed to demonstrate that there was a Napue violation as to Garcia. 

///

///

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3. Juan Meza

With respect to Juan Meza, Petitioner relies on the same evidence submitted in

support of Claim 19 (Failure to Adequately Investigate and to Impeach Juan Meza). The

Court analyzed the evidence in the Court’s Group Three Order. (See Doc. No. 236 at 43-

46.) For the reasons discussed in the Group Three Order, the evidence regarding

Meza’s history as a prosecution informant, his relationship with Detective Chacon, and

his encounters with Detective Chacon beginning in mid-1985, do not establish that

Meza’s testimony was concocted. Similarly, whether Meza was ever actually a member

of the Mexican Mafia does not have any bearing on the truthfulness of Meza’s testimony. 

The Court granted an evidentiary hearing on Claim 19 as to (1) evidence that

Meza admitted to Richard Savocchio that he was lying about the Ayalas’ involvement in

the murders, and (2) evidence that Petitioner approached Raul Garcia about fabricating a

story implicating Petitioner in the murders. However, Petitioner has not presented any

facts establishing that the police or prosecution knew or should have known about

Savocchio or Garcia. 

In his original declaration, Hart stated: 

Meza had confessed to numerous witnesses, including Richard Sovacchio

among many others – known to Petitioner’s counsel – that he had no idea

whether Petitioner had actually participated in the 43rd street murders and that

he had put together his story with Detective Chacon in order to arrange for an

early release from prison. 

(Hart Decl. ¶ 37.) However, the investigator’s report of the interview with Savocchio does

not make any mention of Chacon or police involvement with Meza’s alleged fabrication of

stories implicating the Ayalas. (Ex. O to Belter Decl. dated 7/22/05.)

Due to the lack of evidence establishing that Chacon and Meza worked together to

concoct a false story, Petitioner has not established that the prosecution knew or should

have known about Meza’s alleged false testimony. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to

an evidentiary hearing or habeas relief on this claim. 

///

///

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4. Rafael Mendoza Lopez

The Court has granted an evidentiary hearing on Claims 4 and 8 with respect to

Chacon’s alleged threats toward Jenifer Mendoza. As discussed above, Petitioner’s

claim that Mendoza Lopez’s testimony was false overlaps with Claim 4 in that the

evidentiary hearing may reveal evidence that Mendoza Lopez gave false testimony for

the prosecution as a result of threats and/or intimidation of his wife and/or himself. 

Because the purported threats came from a member(s) of the police department, the

prosecution would be deemed to have had knowledge that the testimony was false. See

Jackson, 513 F.3d at 1074-75. Accordingly, the Court grants an evidentiary hearing on

this claim as it relates to the falsity of Rafael Mendoza Lopez’s testimony as a result of

threats/intimidation. The other evidence upon which Petitioner relies to establish the

falsity of Mendoza Lopez’s testimony does not support Petitioner’s claim for the reasons

set forth in the Court’s discussion of Claim 22 (Impeachment of Rafael Mendoza Lopez).

(See Doc. No. 236 at 53-57.)

5. Walter Lewis & Glen Albrecht

It appears that Petitioner has abandoned the claim as it pertains to Lewis and

Albrecht. (Petitioner previously withdrew Claim 28 regarding trial counsel’s alleged failure

to investigate and present defenses to and/or evidence in mitigation of the unadjudicated

Casas murder charge). No facts have been presented establishing that their testimony

was false. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim as it relates to Lewis

and Albrecht. 

K. Claim 13- Destruction of Evidence

Petitioner alleges that the prosecution assisted in the destruction of a pair of pants

worn by Pedro Castillo on the night of the homicides, which could have been used in his

defense at trial. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution’s actions resulted in a violation of

his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

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Pedro Castillo was shot and stabbed on the night of the murders but survived, and

was a key prosecution witness. At trial, Pedro Castillo testified that he was shot when

attempting to escape, and that when running from the body shop he felt a sting on his

back about waist-level. (RT 12077). Petitioner alleges that Castillo was shot at close

range, not in an escape attempt, and asserts that an examination of Castillo’s pants by

ballistics and forensic experts could have demonstrated how far Castillo was from the

shooter, which may have supported a finding that Castillo’s testimony was false. (Petr.’s

Reply at 56.)

The Supreme Court has clearly stated that “unless a criminal defendant can show

bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not

constitute a denial of due process of law.” Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58

(1988). Clearly established law dictates that the duty to preserve evidence pertains only

to material evidence, which “must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent

before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be

unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” California

v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984). 

At the hospital, Castillo’s belongings were gathered and given to Detective Padillo,

who turned several items over to Detectives Carey and Avery, the evidence technicians.

(RT 13154-55; 13176-77.) Padillo did not examine the contents of the bag prior to

turning it over to the evidence techs. (Id.) However, Castillo’s pants were not among the

inventory items, and Petitioner asserts that the pants were turned over to Castillo’s wife

Maria at the hospital. Maria Castillo first stated that Detective Padillo gave her the

clothing, but later stated that a hospital nurse gave her the clothes, and Detective Padillo

turned over her husband’s wallet. 

Investigator Hart declares on information and belief that Detective Padillo gave the

pants to Maria Castillo, who he expected to destroy or “lose” the pants. (Supp. Hart Decl.

¶ 11.) Hart states that he interviewed Castillo’s wife around the time of the trial, who said

that Detective Padillo gave her the pants, and they were gone. (Id.) Hart claims that the

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evidence shows that Castillo could not have been shot in the way he claimed, stating: 

“I took some reports of the physical evidence- including Castillo’s medical

records- to a doctor- Dr. Mark Schechter- not a ballistics expert, but someone

whom I trusted with medical experience. I met with him in Del Mar to discuss

Pete Castillo’s contention about how he claimed to have been shot. After

reviewing the records, Dr. Schechter told me that, based on his review of the

records, Castillo couldn’t have been shot the way he said. He was shot in the

side and the bullet traveled diagonally and downward through his body.” 

(Id.)

The declaration is based on speculation and hearsay. The Court previously held

that “[t]he declaration does not reveal what information Dr. Schechter was given, what Dr.

Schechter’s qualifications were, or what Dr. Schechter’s exact findings were.” (Doc. No.

236 at 49.) Hart concedes that Dr. Schechter was not a ballistics expert. Petitioner

asserts that the pants were destroyed before they could have been tested to determine if

there was stippling or gunpowder, which would have gone against Castillo’s testimony

about how far away he was when shot. However, there is no reason to believe that the

pants were of any material evidentiary value to the defense. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at

489. Petitioner also fails to demonstrate that the police acted in bad faith by failing to

preserve the pants. Moreover, “[t]he mere failure to preserve evidence which could have

been subjected to tests which might have exonerated the defendant does not constitute a

due process violation.” United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1997)

(emphasis added). 

Petitioner also requests an evidentiary hearing on this claim, stating that a hearing

“would reveal whether the officers who gathered the disputed evidence and chose to

release it to Castillo’s wife considered the evidence relevant to the investigation, and

whether they even inquired of the police investigators and prosecutors whether they

should preserve the evidence.” (Petr.’s Reply at 56.) Petitioner fails to demonstrate a

colorable basis for his allegations of constitutional error, and Petitioner's speculation on

potential results of testing on Castillo's pants are not a sufficient basis for an evidentiary

hearing. Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Baja v.

Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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Additionally, Petitioner fails to establish the evidence was material to his case, or

that the police acted in bad faith in turning the pants over to Castillo’s wife, and therefore

cannot prevail on the merits. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489; see also Youngblood,

488 U.S. at 58. The state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at

412-13. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim 13.

L. Claim 14- Threats and Intimidation of Petitioner

Petitioner alleges that the prosecution, primarily Detective Carlos Chacon,

engaged in threats and intimidation of Petitioner and other witnesses, violating his rights

under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The allegations of threats

against other prospective or testifying defense witnesses (such as Richard Buchanan)

are addressed in Claim 4 of this Order. The merits discussion of this claim will address

allegations of threats against and the attempted intimidation of Petitioner.

Petitioner alleges that Detective Chacon and the prosecution engaged in a

campaign of intimidation and threats against him. In his declaration, Hart states that

Detective Chacon escorted Petitioner from Los Angeles, where he had been arrested, to

San Diego. (Supp. Hart Decl. ¶ 18.) Petitioner was handcuffed and placed in Detective

Chacon’s car, and during the trip Chacon placed his gun against Petitioner’s head and

threatened to kill him. (Id.) 

Hart also states that Petitioner was at one time placed, shackled and chained, with

Manuel Rebeles, who was not restrained. Hart states that Rebeles was an alleged

member of Nuestra Familia, an informant, and an associate of Chacon. Rebeles

attacked Petitioner, who defended himself. Petitioner appeared before the jury shortly

after this incident with scratches and bruises. While an incident between Richard

Buchanan and Rebeles is mentioned in the Hart declaration, there is no mention of any

altercation between Rebeles and Petitioner. The Court finds no reference to this incident

in any supporting exhibits or declarations.

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Petitioner also alleges that the prosecution tried to get him to be an informant in

exchange for a reduced sentence. Petitioner refused, and the state attempted to

intimidate him by informing his defense counsel that he was the target of a hit by the

Mexican Mafia. Petitioner also alleges that while he was in the San Diego jail, he was

placed in a cell alone with Julio Sosa, a member of the Nuestra Familia, a rival gang to

the Mexican Mafia, on two separate occasions. Petitioner was restrained with handcuffs

and shackles and Sosa was left unchained. The Hart declaration does mention that

Chacon had a close relationship with the Sosa family, and that Julio Sosa allegedly

became a police informant. (Supp. Hart Decl. ¶ 11.) However, Petitioner does not offer

any documentary support for these alleged incidents, the incidents are not mentioned in

the Hart declaration, and the Court finds no reference to them in any supporting exhibits

or witness declarations. 

Petitioner “concedes that support for this claim is currently thin insamuch as

Petitioner does not assert that the intimidation tactics of the prosecution is the sole

reason he did not testify in his own defense.” (Petr.’s Reply at 57.) Petitioner does not

allege that any of the incidents actually intimidated him. Petitioner does assert prejudice

from the altercation with Rebeles, as Petitioner appeared before the jury with scratches

and bruises, possibly “implying a predisposition for violence.” However, Petitioner does

not even offer his own declaration in support of any of these allegations, and there is no

documentary support for the Rebeles incident. The Hart declaration states that one

incident, Chacon’s threat of Petitioner, occurred “on information and belief,” but again

fails to allege any resulting prejudice. These largely unsupported and conclusory

allegations, and the thin assertion of potential prejudice, do not assert a colorable claim

for relief and are insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. See Earp, 431 F.3d at

1167.

Ultimately, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violations

arising from the threats and intimidation of Petitioner had a “substantial or injurious effect

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631

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n.7 (1993). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits. The state court’s denial of

this claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

M. Claim 15- Concocting Testimony of Meza and Mendoza Lopez

In Claim 15, Petitioner alleges that his constitutional rights were violated in that the

prosecution intentionally placed critical witnesses Mendoza Lopez and Meza together in

order to ensure that their stories were consistent, and misrepresented to the Court the

reasons for placing the men together.

The evidence in support of this claim was analyzed in connection with Claim 42. 

(See Doc. No. 247 at 51-53.) In Claim 42, Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in

denying Petitioner’s motions to reopen and for mistrial, which were based on the

defense’s discovery that prior to Mendoza Lopez’s rebuttal testimony, Mendoza Lopez

and Meza were both housed in the protective custody module of the South Bay facility of

the San Diego County Jail. The Court denied the claim and held that the California

Supreme Court was reasonable in concluding:

Defendant could produce no evidence that the prosecution enabled Mendoza

and Meza to confer and tailor their testimony, or that of Mendoza, or that

Mendoza's testimony was altered as a result of his lodging in the South Bay

jail. Nor was defendant denied any right to present a defense, or more

precisely, evidence relevant to the theory of his defense. Such a right does not

require “the court [to] allow an unlimited inquiry into collateral matters,” which

this surely was; rather, “the proffered evidence must have more than slight

relevanc[e].” (Ibid.) Finally, because informing defendant of the two men's

confinement arrangement would not have created a reasonable probability of

a different outcome, we discern no violation of the due process right to be

provided with favorable material evidence. Nor do we discern the denial of any

right to a reliable guilt and penalty determination.

Ayala, 23 Cal. 4th at 282.

As discussed in the Group Four Order, the prosecution had a valid explanation for

why Mendoza and Meza were housed together (because the downtown San Diego’s

protective custody facility was not secure enough and the El Cajon jail lacked protective

custody housing) and why permission was given for the men to interact (to apprise the

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deputies that the men did not pose a danger to each other). Most importantly, Mendoza

Lopez’s taped recantation took place before he was placed in protective custody. 

The facts alleged by Petitioner do not establish that there was prosecutorial

misconduct or collusion between Mendoza Lopez and Meza. Therefore, Petitioner is not

entitled to an evidentiary hearing or habeas relief on this claim. 

N. Claim 16- Improper Surveillance of Defense Team and Violation of the

Attorney-Client Privilege

Petitioner alleges that Detective Chacon improperly surveilled and obtained

information about his defense team and witnesses before and during the trial.

This claim is based largely on the statement of Investigator Eric Hart that he

believes Chacon improperly obtained information about the defense during the trial

proceedings. Petitioner also offers the report of an interview with Mario Marin, conducted

in June 2008 by Investigator George Newman at the Vista Jail. In the interview, Marin

stated that when members of the Ayala defense team came to the jail to talk to

witnesses, the prosecution would know it, and stated that he “and other cooperating

witnesses were heavily monitored and whenever anyone presumed to be associated with

the defense had contact with them, they were subsequently approached by prosecution

agents, who demanded to know what had been discussed, what the witnesses had told

them, etc.” (Ex. A to Belter Decl. dated 6/3/08.)

Petitioner concedes the evidence in support of this claim is thin, but maintains

that, “in light of Detective Chacon’s comments to Eric Hart, Mr. Hart believes that the

defense team may have been surveilled,” and Petitioner requests discovery on the claim. 

(Petr.’s Reply at 62.) The Court finds no reference to any comments by Carlos Chacon

on this subject in any of the supporting declarations or exhibits attached to the instant

petition or merits briefing. Hart’s allegations that the defense team or witnesses may

have been surveilled is made without any detailed allegations or supporting facts, only on

“information and belief.” (Hart Decl. ¶ 21.) Marin admits that he gave evidence on the

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Ayalas to the prosecution, and his statements demonstrate only that the prosecution may

have been monitoring the jail visitation logs of their cooperating witnesses. Marin’s

statements do nothing to substantiate Petitioner’s claims that the defense team or

defense witnesses were being monitored by Chacon or the prosecution. 

This claim lacks factual support, and Petitioner fails to assert that the alleged

surveillance was prejudicial to his case. The unsupported and conclusory allegations,

and the lack of any demonstration of prejudice, are insufficient to warrant an evidentiary

hearing or discovery on this claim. See Earp, 431 F.3d at 1167. 

Petitioner also fails to demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violations arising

from the threats and intimidation of Petitioner had a “substantial or injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631 n.7. Therefore, this

claim also fails on the merits. The state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary

to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Williams, 529

U.S. at 412-13. 

O. Claim 69- Petitioner’s Purported Waiver of his Rights Regarding the Pantry

Robbery was Obtained Unconstitutionally

In Claim 69, Petitioner alleges that his constitutional right to confront witnesses

against him was violated when he stipulated to participating in an unadjudicated robbery

based on false representations by the prosecution, and the wavier of his right to crossexamine witnesses was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Petitioner has declined to

pursue this claim. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Group Five

Claims on procedural bar grounds (In re Clark, In re Robbins, In re Waltreus, In re Dixon) 

is DENIED. Respondent’s motion for summary judgment [281] is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to Claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 15,

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16 and 69. Respondent’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Claims 2 and 5

and GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as to Claims 4, 8, and 12. Petitioner’s

motion for summary judgment [263] is DENIED. Petitioner’s motion for evidentiary

hearing is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court will hold an evidentiary

hearing in connection with Claims 4, 5, 8, and 12 on the issues identified in this Order.

The Court will, in the final judgment, GRANT a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”)

on Claims 1, 4, 6, 7 (as to guilt phase only), and 8, and DENY a Certificate of

Appealability on Claims 3, 7 (as to the penalty phase only), 9, 12 (as to the parts of the

Claim for which summary judgment was granted herein), 13, 14, 15, 16 and 69.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 9, 2009

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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