Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01337/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01337-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHANG HEUM LEE, individually CASE NO. CV-F-07-1337 LJO SMS

and as the Successor in Interest to the

Estate of SIGMUN LEE (deceased), ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, 

vs.

COUNTY OF KERN, et al,

Defendants.

 /

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants County of Kern, Sheriff Donny Youngblood (“Sheriff Youngblood”), Deputy Sean

Pratt, and Deputy Jason Nelson (collectively “Defendants”) move to dismiss this 42 U.S.C. §1983

(“Section 1983") and wrongful death action on the basis that: (1) the first amended complaint (“FAC”)

does not comply with this Court’s November 8, 2007 order; (2) Plaintiff Chang Heum Lee (“Mr. Lee”)

lacks standing; (3) Mr. Lee failed to join indispensable parties; and (4) a public entity cannot be held

liable for common law negligence. Further, Defendants seek a more definite statement, pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(e), to set forth “specific, nonconclusory factual allegations” identifying the basis for

qualified immunity. Rather than oppose the motion, Mr. Lee filed a second amended complaint

(“SAC”). For the reasons set forth below, this Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss, denies

Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) motion, and allows Mr. Lee to proceed on his SAC. 

II. BACKGROUND

On December 24, 2006, Deputy Pratt and Deputy Nelson used deadly force while attempting to

subdue and arrest Mr. Lee’s son, Sigmun Lee (“decedent”). A complaint was filed on September 13,

2007, which named decedent and Mr. Lee as plaintiffs. This Court granted Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the complaint on November 8, 2007 amd granted Mr. Lee leave to amend. The Court directed

Case 1:07-cv-01337-LJO -DLB Document 19 Filed 12/12/07 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Mr. Lee not to include the decedent as a plaintiff and to allege proper standing. 

Mr. Lee filed his FAC on November 6, 2007, two days prior to this Court’s order. Mr. Lee refiled the FAC on November 9, 2007. On November 19, 2007, Defendants moved to dismiss the FAC

on the ground that, inter alia, the FAC failed to comply with this Court’s November 8, 2007 order. 

Mr. Lee did not oppose Defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC. Rather, on December 5, 2007,

Mr. Lee filed an “Amended Document,” which is the SAC. On December 7, 2007, Defendants filed a

response, requesting this Court to grant their unopposed motion.

In the FAC, Mr. Lee asserts the following causes of action:

1. A violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to Section 1983, against

Deputy Pratt, Deputy Nelson, and the County;

2. A violation of “constitutional rights,” pursuant to Section 1983, against the Sheriff and

the County;

3. Wrongful death(negligence); and 

4. Wrongful death (intentional).

Because Mr. Lee did not oppose the motion, he is not entitled to be heard at oral argument

pursuant to this Court’s Local Rule 78-230( c). Accordingly, this Court vacates the December 20, 2007.

Having read and reviewed Defendants’ motion and reply, and Mr. Lee’s FAC and SAC, this Court issues

the following order.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a courtmay dismiss a complaint “for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the

court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, construe the pleading in the light

most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's favor. Jenkins

v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of

Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). In civil rights cases, the Court applies the basic "notice

pleading" standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence

and Coordination Unit, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1162 (1993) (prohibiting district court from applying heightened

pleading standard in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under § 1983). 

Case 1:07-cv-01337-LJO -DLB Document 19 Filed 12/12/07 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

B. Mr. Lee’s Standing

In its November 8, 2007 order, this Court found that Mr. Lee lacked standing to assert a survivor

claim pursuant Section 1983 and failed to file an affidavit, as required by Cal. Civ. P. Code § 377.32.

(November 8, 2007 Order, pp, 2-4) The Court granted leave to amend the complaint and directed Mr.

Lee to allege standing properly and to include an affidavit as required by California law and a statement

identifying any pretermitted heirs. (Id., p.5) 

Mr. Lee failed to comply with this Court’s November 8, 2007 order. The FAC does not contain

 the Court-directed affidavit or statement, nor does Mr. Lee allege properly that he has standing to pursue

a Section 1983 claim as a survivor. Mr. Lee has not alleged that he is a successor-in-interest and has

failed to acknowledge whether there are indispensable parties to this action. Accordingly, Defendants’

motion to dismiss is granted for failure to comply with this Court’s order, failure to assert standing

properly and failure to address whether there are indispensable parties not yet joined. 

C. Sheriff’s Individual Capacity

Mr. Lee does not clarify whether Sheriff Youngblood is sued in his individual or official

capacity, or both. Defendants contend that to the extent Mr. Lee seeks to hold Sheriff Youngblood

individually liable for the shooting death of decedent, Mr. Lee must allege that Sheriff Youngblood

personally committed a constitutional violation. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

While Sheriff Youngblood may be sued in his official capacity through a Monell claim,

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985), Mr. Lee would, indeed, need to allege that Sheriff

Youngblood personally committed a constitutional violation to pursue an action against him in his

individual capacity. The FAC contains no allegations of any personal involvement by Sheriff

Youngblood. Accordingly, Mr. Lee may only pursue a claim against Sheriff Youngblood in his official

capacity. Any allegations against Sheriff Youngblood in his individual capacity are dismissed.

D. Common Law Negligence Cause of Action

Defendants argue that the negligent wrongful death cause of action should be dismissed because:

(1) the complaint exceeds the allegations of the Government Tort Claim originally filed and (2) Mr. Lee

cannot pursue common law negligence against a public entity. As discussed more fully below, Mr. Lee

did not oppose this motion and withdrew this cause of action in the SAC. Accordingly, Defendants’

Case 1:07-cv-01337-LJO -DLB Document 19 Filed 12/12/07 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court notes that Mr. Lee is establishing a pattern of non-compliance with both the Federal Rules and this 1

Court’s Local Rules. The original complaint was non-compliant, as discussed in this Court’s previous order, and the SAC

was filed without this Court’s leave. Additionally, Mr. Lee ignored this Court’s November 8, 2007 order. Any further

violation of the Federal or Local Rules, or violation of this Court’s order, WILL result in an Order to Show Cause why this

case should not be dismissed and/or why sanctions should not be imposed.

4

motion to dismiss the negligent wrongful death cause of action with prejudice is granted. 

E. More Definite Statement 

Defendants move for a more definite statement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Defendants

request that this Court require Mr. Lee “to provide a more definite statement which includes ‘specific,

nonconclusory’ factual allegations that will allow the Court to determine the issue of County

Defendants’ qualified immunity.” Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e), “A party may move for a more

definite statement of a pleading...which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably

prepare a response. The motion...must point out the defects complained of and the details desired.” 

In this motion, Defendants do not point out the defects of the complaint, nor the specific details

desired. Although they present law on qualified immunity, Defendants do not direct this Court to

allegations of the complaint they allege to be “so vague or ambiguous” that they “cannot reasonably

prepare a response.” Instead, Defendants make a vague request for allegations “that will allow the Court

to determine the issue.” Mr. Lee alleges several Constitutional violations by Defendants in two causes

of action, which are consistent with the “notice” requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Because Defendants

fail to identify which defects, if any, exist in the FAC, this Court denies the motion for more definite

statement. 

F. Leave to Amend

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1), Mr. Lee may amend his pleading once “as a matter of

course.” Mr. Lee amended his complaint and filed his FAC twice. Mr. Lee’s attempt to file the SAC,

however, violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) which holds, “a party may amend its pleading only with the

opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” No signed consent from the opposing party was

submitted and Mr. Lee did not seek leave of this Court to file the SAC. Therefore, the SAC is not in

compliance with the Federal Rules. The Court may strike the SAC and dismiss this action for lack of

standing and failure to comply with this Court’s order.1

Case 1:07-cv-01337-LJO -DLB Document 19 Filed 12/12/07 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

For the sake of judicial economy, however, this Court will not strike the SAC. Although Mr. Lee

did not request leave to amend the FAC, his amended document addresses Defendants’ arguments

contained in the instant motion. For example, the SAC: (1) contains an affidavit in compliance with this

Court’s November 8, 2007 order, thereby curing the standing defect; (2) names Sheriff Youngblood in

his official capacity only; and (3) does not include a negligent wrongful death action. In its previous

order, this Court granted Mr. Lee leave to amend and considers that had Mr. Lee requested it, “the court

should freely give leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Additionally, although Defendants were notified of

the SAC, they did not address Mr. Lee’s attempt to cure the defects, did not raise the non-compliance

issue, and did not request that this Court strike the SAC. Therefore, this Court grants Mr. Lee leave to

amend the FAC, grants Mr. Lee leave to file the SAC, and orders the SAC shall be deemed filed as of

the date of this order. 

 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court orders:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint is GRANTED;

2. Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement is DENIED;

3. The Second Amended Complaint(Doc. 17)shall be considered filed as ofthe date of this

order;

4. Defendants shall respond to the SAC in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P.12(a);

5. The December 20, 2007 hearing is VACATED; and

6. The clerk is DIRECTED to terminate Sigmun Lee (Deceased) as a plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 11, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-01337-LJO -DLB Document 19 Filed 12/12/07 Page 5 of 5