Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01292/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01292-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUSTAVO RAMIREZ,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10cv1292-WQH (MDD)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION THAT

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT BE 

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED

IN PART. 

[ECF No. 20]

vs.

GEORGE GIURBINO; LARRY SMALLS;

E. SILVA; M. TAMAYO; E. DUARTE;

JOHN ZINNA; JAMES MORENO,

Defendants.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge William Q.

Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil Local Rule 72.3 of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 14, 2010, Gustavo Ramirez (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against George

Giurbino, et al (“Defendants”), for violating his civil rights under 42 U.S.C § 1983. (Doc. No. 1). 

On July 19, 2010, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 4). On November 8,

2010, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. (Doc No. 15). 

On November 19, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend his First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 16)

which was granted on December, 16, 2010. (Doc. No. 18). Also on December 16, 2010, Plaintiff

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filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (Doc. No. 19). As a result, Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss was terminated and Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint (Doc. No 20). Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (“Opposition”) on January 13,

2011. (Doc. No. 21). On January 21, 2011, Defendants filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Response

(“Reply”). (Doc. No. 22). 

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts are taken from the parties’ pleadings and are not to be construed as findings of

fact by the court. 

Plaintiff’s SAC alleges that his civil rights were violated during his incarceration at

Calipatria State Prison. SAC at 1. He claims that the Defendants improperly classified him as a

gang member, which resulted in his placement in a Security Housing Unit (“SHU”) and a loss of

privileges. Id. Plaintiff contends that the process by which he was determined to be a gang

member is flawed, and that, in any event, Defendants failed to comply with their own processes by

relying on improper information. Id. at 3. First, Plaintiff asserts Defendants failed to follow the

“single source” rule which, as discussed below, he does not define. Id. at 3. Second, Plaintiff

asserts Defendants improperly relied on confidential information, and then failed to adequately

corroborate that information. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants improperly

elicited information by using Mayan cultural symbols during its gang validation process. Id. 

The validation process resulted in Plaintiff being classified as a gang member. Plaintiff

contends that this process was not properly supervised, and that no investigation was made into the

veracity of the outcome. Id. at 5. Plaintiff asserts that he was then placed in an SHU, where he

was not allowed to participate in training or educational activities, not allowed contact visits, and

denied phone access. Id. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the

complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief. Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of

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what the ...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127

(2007) (internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the

grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-

56 (2007). Thus, while specific detail is not required, every complaint must, at a minimum, plead

“enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 547; Weber v. Dep’t of

Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008). 

The court must assume the truth of the facts which are presented and construe all

inferences from them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Thompson v. Davis,

295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). A pro se party’s pleadings should be construed liberally. Id. 

However, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level

on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Bell, 127 550 U.S. at 555. 

Thus, the court is not required to “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory,

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,

266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted). Furthermore, the court may not

“supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the

University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Count One: First Amendment Claims Against Defendants Silva, Duarte,

Mitamayo, Zinna, and Moreno

Count One of Plaintiff’s SAC asserts that Defendants E. Silva, E. Duarte, M. Tamayo, J.

Zinna, and J. Moreno, personnel involved in Plaintiff’s gang validation process, violated his Due

Process and First Amendment rights by classifying him erroneously as a gang member and placing

him in SHU. SAC at 1-5. First, Plaintiff claims that the manner in which information was

collected for his evaluation as a gang member was improper. SAC at 1. Specifically, Plaintiff

asserts that these Defendants relied on an informant who was not reliable, used symbols that

carried religious significance to Plaintiff in order to elicit information, contacted third parties

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without Plaintiff’s knowledge, used outdated information, and failed to follow the “single source

rule.” Id. at 1-3. Second, Plaintiff asserts that these Defendants used an improper standard in

determining that he was a gang member. Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the terms of his

confinement in SHU were improper. Id. Plaintiff does not specify which of these actions he

believes violate his First Amendment rights and which violate his Due Process rights.

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants do not contest the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Due

Process claims. (Doc. No. 20). Defendants do challenge, however, the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s

First Amendment claims. Id. Defendants argue that even if Plaintiff adequately specified

regulations or procedures relating to his classification as a gang member that he believed violated

the First Amendment, such regulations or procedures would be constitutional as they are

reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Id. In his Opposition to the Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff counters that even if the prison regulations are reasonably related to a

legitimate penological interest, they are invalid because they lack a clear standard by which they

can be applied. (Doc. No. 21). In their Reply, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s Opposition

misinterprets the standard for a First Amendment violation. Id. 

1. First Amendment Claims

In his SAC, Plaintiff does not specify how the gang validation process violates his First

Amendment rights. Although stating his intention to bring a First Amendment claim, Plaintiff

only describes his Due Process claims. SAC at 3-5. Plaintiff does not allege any specific facts

that would, if proved, constitute a First Amendment violation nor describe how each Defendant

personally participated in a First Amendment violation. Although the Court must accept the facts

alleged in the complaint as true, wholly vague and conclusory allegations are not sufficient to

withstand a motion to dismiss. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. Furthermore, though the Court must

construe a pro se plaintiff’s filings liberally, the Court cannot supply missing facts or essential

elements of a claim. Id. 

Accepting the allegations in Plaintiff’s SAC as true, as this Court must do, Plaintiff has

merely described the prison’s process for classifying a prisoner as a gang member without stating

with any specificity which regulations or practices constitute a First Amendment violation. SAC

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at 1. Even construed liberally, these conclusory statements are insufficient to survive a motion to

dismiss. Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988. Thus, Plaintiffs First Amendment claims against the

Defendants listed in Count One of his SAC fail. 

Even if Plaintiff had described how the prison regulations and procedures implicated the

First Amendment, his First Amendment claims would not necessarily survive. When a prison

regulation impinges on an inmate’s constitutional rights, such regulation is valid so long as it is

reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 88 (1987). 

This is a low level of justification which “is necessary if prison administrators..., and not the courts

[are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.” Id. (quoting Jones v.

North Carolina Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977)). Defendants, in their Motion to

Dismiss, argue that the regulations referenced by Plaintiff are related to the prison’s interest in

managing the danger of prison gang activity. (Doc. No. 20-1 at 2). Identifying prison gang

members in order to advance prison and prisoner safety has been clearly established as not only a

legitimate penalogical interest, but a compelling one. Warsoldier v. Woodfood, 418 F.3d 989, 997

(9th Cir. 2005). The measures described by Plaintiff in his complaint are information gathering

measures intended to identify gang members. As such, they are reasonably related to the state’s

compelling interest in prison safety and pass constitutional muster. Id.

In his Opposition, Plaintiff argues that the First Amendment mandates that “there must be a

clear line or standard applied” to the gang validation process, and that no such standard is present

here. (Doc. No. 21 at 2). Plaintiff cites Rios v. Lane, 812 F.3d 1032, 1038 (11th Cir. 1987) in

support of this proposition. In Rios, a prisoner challenged disciplinary sanctions brought against

him after he passed a note card containing a list of Spanish radio stations around the prison. 812

F.2d at 1034. While the court in Rios found that a higher constitutional standard applied to direct

prohibitions on political speech, the court still found that no First Amendment violation had

occurred, as the regulation bore a sufficient relationship to the compelling interest of managing

prison gang activity. Id. at 1036. Furthermore, the court distinguished between the actual

censorship of speech imposed on the plaintiff as a result of the prison regulation, and the question

of whether the regulation itself was unconstitutionally vague. Id. The court identified the latter as

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a Due Process complaint, and not a First Amendment one. Id. Thus, Rios does not rescue

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims. 

Plaintiff alleges also that the Defendants violated the “single source” rule. Plaintiff does

not provide any basis to determine what the “single source” rule is, from where it derives and how,

if it exists and applies in this case, it was violated by these Defendants. To the extent that Plaintiff

is asserting a First Amendment violation regarding the “single source” rule, it is denied. 

Plaintiff’s complaint does not adequately ascribe any violation of his First Amendment

rights. Rather, Plaintiff’s challenges to his placement in SHU as a result of his validation as a

gang member are more appropriately analyzed as part of Plaintiff’s Due Process claims. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion be GRANTED as to

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims against the Defendants listed in Count One of Plaintiff’s SAC. 

Plaintiff should be given leave to amend those claims. 

B. Count Two: Claims Against Larry Smalls and George Giurbino

In Count Two of his SAC, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Larry Smalls, the warden at

Calipatria State Prison, and George Giurbino, the prison supervisor, violated his First Amendment

rights, his Eighth Amendment rights, and his Due Process rights. SAC at 5. Defendants move to

dismiss all causes of action against both Defendants named in Count Two of Plaintiff’s SAC. 

(Doc No. 31-1). 

1. First Amendment Claims

As in Count One of Plaintiff’s SAC, Count Two fails to allege facts that would give rise to

a First Amendment claim. While Plaintiff asserts in his Reply that the prison regulations regarding

validation of gang members violates the First Amendment, this mere conclusory statement is

insufficient to survive Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988. Accordingly,

the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s

First Amendment claims against the Defendants’ listed in Count Two of his SAC. Plaintiff should

have leave to amend those claims. 

/ / /

/ / /

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2. Eighth Amendment Claims

In addition to the First Amendment claims discussed above, Plaintiff also alleges that

Smalls and Giurbino violated his Eighth Amendment rights by placing him in SHU for an

indeterminate time. SAC at 5. Plaintiff describes SHU as a “prison within a prison” where he is

extremely isolated and deprived of most of his privileges. Id. Defendants contend that the

conditions of the SHU have been previously upheld as constitutional, and thus Plaintiff’s claims

should be dismissed as a matter of law. (Doc. No. 20-1 at 6). 

The Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment ensures that

prisoners are kept in conditions compatible with “civilized standards, humanity and decency.” 

Estelle v Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners

are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. See

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In order to state a claim under the Eighth

Amendment, an inmate must first show that he suffered a deprivation or injury that was

“objectively, sufficiently serious[.]” Id. at 834 (internal citations omitted). Second, the plaintiff

must show that the prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” in that they acted

with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate.” Id. 

First, Plaintiff has not stated an objectively serious deprivation. There is nothing per

se improper about segregating inmates, even for indeterminate terms. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.

678, 685-87 (1978); Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1494 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1984). Rather,

prison officials have broad discretion to determine the specific conditions of segregation. Farmer,

511 U.S. at 833. They may impose conditions that are “‘restrictive and even harsh’” Id. (quoting

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). While some courts have found that the terms of a

SHU can violate the Eighth Amendment when applied to certain mentally ill inmates, Plaintiff has

not alleged such a condition. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1995). While

Plaintiff asserts that he experienced an “atypical” hardship, he has not alleged sufficient facts to

support his claim. His conclusory statement is insufficient to survive Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Thus, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

Complaint fails the “objectively serious” requirement of an Eighth Amendment violation. 

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Second, even if Plaintiff had satisfied the objective requirement, his claim would still fail. 

In order to satisfy the second prong of his Eighth Amendment Claim, Plaintiff must show that each

Defendant was “deliberately indifferent” to a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff. Farmer, 511

U.S. at 825. Deliberate indifference requires that an official knows of and disregards an excessive

risk to inmate health or safety. Id. at 837. The official must both be aware of facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and must also draw the

inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “A plaintiff may make the factual showing that a prison

official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk in the usual ways, including inference

from circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 842 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, “[t]urning a

blind eye to the relevant surrounding facts will not shield a prison official from liability.” Swan v.

United States of America, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1182 (N.D. Cal 2001). “‘If the evidence shows

that a [prison official] merely refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected to exist

[...], liability may be imposed.” Id. at 1182 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843, n. 8). 

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that either Smalls or Giurbino were aware of a specific risk

to Plaintiff as a result of Plaintiff’s placement in SHU. As discussed above, Plaintiff has not even

described a particular risk of harm associated with his placement in SHU. Rather, Plaintiff merely

details the conditions of confinement in SHU which, while unpleasant, are not unconstitutional. 

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim also fails the subjective element of an Eighth

Amendment claim. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

be GRANTED with regard to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Smalls and Giurbino

in Court Two of his SAC . Plaintiff should be given leave to amend these claims. 

3. Due Process Claims

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action

for deprivation of due process rights, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty

interest for which the protection is sought. Id. 

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s claims in Count Two of his SAC are primarily directed at

Defendants in their supervisory capacity. In the SAC, Plaintiff asserts that Smalls “is responsible

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for the SHU imposed on Plaintiff[.]” SAC at 5. Plaintiff alleges that Smalls failed to make an

independent investigation into the validation process, and that he failed to “properly ensure his

staff followed Due Process guidelines and properly train his staff.” SAC at 6. Plaintiff also

asserts that Giurbino was “responsible” for his placement in SHU. Id. Plaintiff states that

Giurbino failed to properly train his staff, resulting in improper application of prison policy. Id.

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants assert that these claims are improper as they are based on

theories of vicarious liability not available to a plaintiff’s in a § 1983 action. (Doc. No. 21-1). In

his Opposition, Plaintiff clarifies that Smalls “signed off on the SHU” and did not “ensure Due

Process.” Opp. at 3. Plaintiff also reasserts that Giurbino “must ensure Due Process.” Id.

Defendants are correct that an action under § 1983 cannot proceed on a theory of

respondeat superior because vicarious liability is inapplicable. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,

1948 (2009), __ U.S. __. Rather, a Plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead that each defendant,

through his own actions, subjected him to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights. Id. “A person

‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, when

he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act

which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Thus, Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions that

Smalls “is responsible for the SHU” and “failed to ensure his staff followed Due Process

guidelines” are inadequate under Iqbal. 129 S.Ct. at 1948. Similarly, Plaintiff’s assertion that

Giurbino was “responsible” for his placement in SHU does not allege specific facts of Giurbino’s

personal involvement, and is likewise deficient under Iqbal. Id. 

As for Plaintiff’s contention, that Smalls and Giubino failed to train their staff, although a

cognizable theory of § 1983 liability, it still fails in this case. A supervisor may be liable, as an

individual, if his failure to train subordinates amounts to deliberate indifference. Canell v.

Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388

(1989)). A plaintiff must show that the failure to train resulted from the defendant’s “deliberate”

or “conscious” act, and that there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s

conduct and the constitutional violation. Canell, 143 F.3d at 1213; Redman v. County of San

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Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Here, Plaintiff has not pled any facts that explain how Smalls failed to train his

subordinates, or how this failure led to unconstitutional activity. Additionally, regarding Giurbino,

he merely states that Giubino did not teach his staff what “artwork or symbols” are permitted in

the validation process. SAC at 6. He does not show any casual connection between Defendants’

failures to train and unconstitutional conduct. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts

showing that the failures to train were deliberate acts. Even affording Plaintiff’s complaint a

liberal reading, as this Court is required to do, Plaintiff’s mere conclusory contention regarding

Defendants’ failures to train cannot survive Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Canell, 143 F.3d at

1213; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

As to Giurbino, Plaintiff has not identified any specific act that resulted in the alleged

Constitutional violations. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss be GRANTED as to all claims against Giurbino. Plaintiff should be given leave to

amend his claims. 

As to Warden Smalls, Plaintiff alleges that Smalls himself imposed the SHU, and that

Smalls accepted the validation at “face value” without performing an independent investigation. 

SAC at 5. In their Motion, Defendants contend that Smalls did not participate in the validation

because the actual decision is made by the Institutional Classification Committee (“ICC”), and that

while Smalls’ is a member of the ICC, his role is merely supervisory. Reply at 3. Furthermore,

Defendants assert that even if Warden Smalls had a duty to perform an independent investigation

into the accuracy of Plaintiff’s validation as a gang member, he would be entitled to qualified

immunity on that issue. (Doc. No. 20-1). 

Defendants detail the prison procedures regarding a prisoner’s validation as a gang member

and placement in SHU, and contend that Warden Small’s role in this process is minor and

“administrative.” Reply at 3. However, in a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the facts as

presented in the complaint as true (See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)) and factual challenges to the

complaint have no bearing on the legal sufficiency of the action. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250

F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). As the facts are presented in the SAC, Plaintiff has stated a

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plausible claim that Warden Smalls was personally involved in the decision to validate Plaintiff as

a gang member and place him in SHU.1

 Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that Warden Smalls did so

despite ample evidence that the validation was conducted improperly and based on false or

unreliable information. SAC at 5. Thus, Plaintiff has provided “enough facts to state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 547; Weber, 521 F.3d at 1066. Because Plaintiff has

described Warden Smalls’ personal participation in the events at issue, the Court proceeds to

analyze the substance of his claim. 

In their Motion, Defendants do not discuss the substance of Plaintiff’s Due Process claim

against Warden Smalls, but rather contend that even if Smalls did not perform an independent

investigation into the validation process, he is entitled to qualified immunity on that issue. (Doc.

No. 20-1). In his Opposition, Plaintiff counters that qualified immunity is not properly determined

in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Opp. at 3. In their Reply, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s argument is

based on old law, and that immunity should be determined at the earliest possible stage. Reply at

3. 

Qualified immunity protects “government officials... from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

Qualified immunity does not protect a defendant when: (1) the defendant’s action violated a

federal constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct at

issue. LSO, Lt. V. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2000). A qualified immunity defense is

generally not amenable to a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) because facts necessary to establish an

affirmative defense generally must be shown by matters outside the complaint. See Morley v.

Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that, in light of court’s duty to accept

allegations in the complaint as true, a finding of qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss is

1

Defendant has also provided the Court with the relevant prison regulations detailing what role

Warden Smalls plays in the gang validation process. Reply at 3. Defendants ask the Court to take

judicial notice of these regulations and contend that they show that Smalls had no role in the

imposition of the SHU. Id. While the Court can take judicial notice of these regulations, doing so

does not refute Plaintiff’s claim. Factual challenges to the complaint have no bearing on the legal

sufficiency of the action. Lee, 250 F.3d at 688. 

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inappropriate). While a ruling on immunity “should be made early in the proceedings so that the

costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive[,]” (Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 199 (2001)), the court is usually “not equipped at this stage to determine whether

qualified immunity will ultimately protect [the defendant]. Those issues must be resolved at

summary judgment or at trial.” Id.; see also Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir.

2001). 

Defendants are correct that, in some cases, qualified immunity can be determined in a

motion under Rule 12(b)(6). In Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth

Circuit emphasized that qualified immunity is “a right not merely to avoid standing trial, but also

to avoid the burdens of such pretrial matters as discovery.” (internal citations omitted). Therefore,

when the record is clear that the official had a reasonable belief that his conduct was lawful, a

court may properly dismiss a claim on the basis of qualified immunity. See Act Up!/Portland v.

Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Smalls deliberately placed him in SHU, even though Smalls

should have known that the validation of Plaintiff as a gang member was improperly conducted

and based on false and/or unreliable information. SAC at 5. This deliberate action would violate

the second prong on the qualified immunity analysis, as no official could believe such conduct to

be reasonable or lawful. See LSO, Lt., 205 F.3d at 1157. As stated above, while Defendants

provide a detailed assessment of Smalls’ role in the validation process and argue that he did not

commit an intentional act, this Court cannot consider those facts in a motion to dismiss. Lee, 250

F.3d at 688. Rather, the Court must accept all allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint as true. Id.

Based on those allegations, it is not clear that Smalls held a reasonable belief that his actions were

lawful or reasonable. Thus, the Court cannot, at this time, find that qualified immunity applies.

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be

DENIED as to Plaintiff’s Due Process claim against Smalls listed in Count Two of his SAC. 

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED:

1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claims against the

Defendants listed in Count One of his Second Amended Complaint be GRANTED, and Plaintiff

given leave to amend those claims. 

2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Due Process Claims against the Defendants

listed in Count One of his Second Amended Complaint be DENIED.

3) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claims against the

Defendants listed in Count Two of his Second Amended Complaint be GRANTED, and Plaintiff

given leave to amend those claims. 

4) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claims against the

Defendants listed in Count Two of his Second Amended Complaint be GRANTED, and Plaintiff

given leave to amend those claims. 

5) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Due Process Claims against the Defendants

listed in Count Two of his Second Amended Complaint be GRANTED as to Defendant Giurbino

and DENIED as to Defendant Smalls. Plaintiff should be given leave to amend his claim against

Giurbino. 

This report and recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1988). Any party may

filed written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties by June 15, 2011. The

document shall be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed by June 24, 2011.

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to raise those objectins on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 24, 2011

 

 Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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