Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02067/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02067-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRAVIS D. REAY,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-2067 GEB DAD P

vs.

A. K. SCRIBNER, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction

entered against him on October 14, 1998 in the Sacramento County Superior Court on a charge

of first degree murder. He seeks relief on the grounds that: (1) the trial court violated his right to

due process by denying his motion to sever his trial from that of co-defendant Nettie Reay; (2)

his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to request a limiting instruction

regarding evidence of Battered Woman’s Syndrome; (3) his right to a fair trial was violated by

improper cross-examination conducted by trial counsel for co-defendant Nettie Reay; (4) his

right to a fair trial was violated by juror misconduct, the inadequacy of the trial court’s voir dire

and the refusal of the trial court to dismiss a juror; (5) his right to due process was violated by

jury instruction error; (6) his right to a fair trial was violated because of the jury’s exposure to

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 The following summary is drawn from the August 21, 2003 opinion by the California 1

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 1-10, filed in this

court on March 25, 2005, as respondent’s Lodged Document 10.

 All further section references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 2

2

evidence of his prior acts of domestic violence against Nettie Reay; (7) his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance when he failed to object to the admission of evidence of Battered Woman’s

Syndrome; (8) his right to a fair trial was violated by the cumulative effect of the errors described

in claims (1) through (7); (9) the prosecutor committed misconduct during his closing argument;

(10) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to object to the prosecutorial

misconduct in closing argument; (11) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because of

his failure to call petitioner’s sister as a witness to testify in support of petitioner’s alibi defense;

(12) newly discovered evidence demonstrates that he is factually innocent; and (13) the

California Court of Appeal improperly denied his motion for state habeas counsel. Upon careful

consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that

petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

We revisit in part the appeals of defendants Travis Reay and Nettie

Reay (Travis and Nettie or collectively defendants) on remand

from the California Supreme Court.

In a prior unpublished decision, we reversed the judgment against

Nettie because the trial court refused to give an instruction on

duress for lack of evidence to support the defense, and affirmed as

modified the judgment against Travis. The People petitioned the

Supreme Court for review of this issue, which was granted. A

separate petition by Travis was denied.

The Supreme Court has directed us to “vacate [our] decision and to

reconsider the cause in light of People v. Anderson (2002) 28

Cal.4th 767" (hereafter Anderson), which held inter alia that duress

is not a defense to the crime of murder under Penal Code section

26.2

Having done so, we determine that Anderson is retroactive. 

Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of conviction as to

Nettie except to modify her restitution fine. We shall also affirm

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the judgment of conviction of Travis with a modification as to

restitution.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On Monday, August 16, 1993, at 1 p.m., law enforcement officers

found Angel Dixon, dead, in a field near the Sacramento Airport. 

She had been stabbed more than 50 times, five of the wounds

caused her death, one to the neck and two to each lung. It was

determined that she had probably died more than a day earlier; she

might have been killed as early as on the previous Sunday morning.

About three and one-half years later, the Sheriff’s Department

received a telephone call from a person who asserted the

defendants were responsible for the killing. On October 16, 1996,

deputy sheriffs interviewed Nettie. She implicated Scott DeGraff. 

She and DeGraff, who was granted use immunity for his testimony,

testified at trial.

DeGraff testified to the following account of the killing. He was

visiting Travis’s house; Nettie was also there. Angel Dixon

arrived. As DeGraff came back from the bathroom she left. Travis

told DeGraff to follow her and tell her that “they were only

kidding” and to ask her to return. He did so. When she returned

with DeGraff, one of the defendants locked the door.

The defendants, yelling, confronted Dixon about “itching her arm”

(apparently an idiom for using drugs) in the presence of Travis’s

nephew. Dixon attempted to leave. Nettie struck Dixon, causing

her to fall to the floor and then hit her in the nose. Travis left the

room, returned with handcuffs, and, with Nettie’s assistance,

cuffed Dixon’s hands behind her back. On cross-examination

DeGraff conceded that his account in a statement to the police that

Nettie continued to hit Dixon for a few minutes was more accurate. 

He said he thought Dixon’s nose was broken and that she bled

profusely.

Travis asserted he was afraid that Dixon would retaliate against his

family or his dog through Dixon’s association with a motorcycle

gang. He informed DeGraff that he needed to leave the area to

avert retaliation. The defendants took Dixon to DeGraff’s car and,

following directions from Travis, DeGraff drove to the place where

Dixon’s body was found.

The defendants took Dixon out of the car. Nettie struck Dixon

several times. In direct examination, DeGraff said the defendants,

holding Dixon’s arms, pulled her along into the field to an area of

bushes. On cross-examination, impeached with a statement to

police officers, DeGraff said Travis pulled Dixon into the field. 

On re-direct examination DeGraff went back to his account of

Nettie also pulling Dixon. DeGraff stayed by the car. Travis threw

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Dixon to the ground and got on top of her. DeGraff saw him

making striking motions with an object as Nettie held Dixon down.

Eventually, the defendants returned to the car. DeGraff saw

movement in the brush where Dixon was. Dixon got up and ran

toward the car. Nettie said: “I don’t think she’s dead.” Dixon,

bloodied, reached the car and beseeched DeGraff to help her. He

pushed her away, saying he did not “want anything to do with it.” 

On direct examination DeGraff testified that the defendants

grabbed Dixon and dragged her back further into the bushes. On

cross-examination DeGraff said he looked away. On redirect

examination he agreed with his statement to the police that on the

second occasion, Nettie pushed Dixon to the ground.

On direct examination DeGraff testified that at some point during

the first or second assault in the bushes Travis asked Nettie to help

because his knife was stuck. Nettie kneeled or stepped on Dixon’s

back and Travis pulled the knife out. On cross-examination

DeGraff testified that he did not see Nettie stand on Dixon, that he

saw Travis put his foot on Dixon’s back during the second assault

in the bushes, and that after he returned to the car Travis said the

knife had gotten stuck in Dixon.

Eventually the defendants returned to DeGraff’s car and he drove

to a liquor store in their neighborhood. Travis said he had to get

rid of the knife and he put it in a garbage can. DeGraff then drove

them to the house of a relative of Nettie. They went into the house

for a short time, then they went to a smaller detached residence in

the backyard. Nettie told DeGraff where a hose was located and he

washed the blood off of the car. DeGraff then left with his car and

did not see either defendant for a couple of months.

On cross-examination DeGraff testified that after the killing they

had first gone to the house of Travis Reay’s mother. DeGraff said

that Travis’s mother had acted hysterical and Travis had struck her. 

After they arrived at the second house, Nettie was upset and asking

Travis, “why did you do it?” He was angered and struck her in the

nose and in the stomach, causing her to drop to her knees, gasping.

Nettie testified at trial. Her account of the killing differs from that

of DeGraff as to some details. She assaulted Dixon at Travis’s

house because he told her to “whip her ass.” She went to

DeGraff’s car because she was told to do so. When they arrived at

the field Travis removed the handcuffs from Dixon and told her

she had 10 seconds to run. Dixon ran off and Travis ran after her. 

Dixon went down out in the field and Travis was on top of her,

hitting her. After about five minutes he told Nettie to come to him. 

She went and saw Dixon lying “full of blood.” Travis had two

knives. He handed one to her and told her to “stick” Dixon. She

did so three or four times, once in the stomach, the others in the

legs. She did not think Dixon was alive.

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When she walked back to the car Dixon got up and started to run. 

Travis ran after Dixon and stabbed her again. She did not

“remember” Dixon coming to the car as Degraff had testified. 

When Travis came back to the car he said the knife was stuck and

he could not get it out.

The first place they went after the killing was to Nettie’s mother’s

house. They washed the car off and then walked to her cousin’s

house. She gave the handcuffs to her cousin to dispose of, but

Travis asked what she was doing and she took them back. They

walked to a donut shop to meet Travis’s mother. In the parking lot

Nettie became emotional and Travis struck her. They went to his

house and she went straight to the bedroom.

Nettie Reay also testified on direct examination that the reason she

beat Dixon and later stabbed her was because she was afraid of

disobeying Travis’s directions. She believed that if she did not

beat Dixon she would be beaten and that if she did not stab Dixon

she also would be laying in that field. She testified that her father

abused her mother. She testified that since about 13 she had

cohabited with a man who beat her regularly and severely until the

relationship ended in October 1992. She met Travis in January

1993 and commenced a relationship with him. He soon began to

slap her and push her around and one one occasion before the

killing beat her severely. He hit her two, three, sometimes four

times a month. (Seven or eight months after killing Dixon they

married.) He beat her up in front of his mother, who attended the

trial.

On cross-examination Nettie was impeached with statements that

she had given law enforcement officers. She denied she told them

she had chased Dixon after the first stabbing episode and stabbed

her again. She conceded the officers asked if she had been forced

to participate and she did not indicate she had been. She conceded

she had beaten Dixon in part because she was angry about her drug

use in the presence of Travis’s nephew. She admitted saying she

wanted to accompany Travis to make sure he did not engage in

sexual conduct with Dixon. If he had tried that she would have

told him no. She conceded she told the detectives she did not

know why she stabbed Dixon and that she agreed with their

statement: “You just did it because you wanted to be part of the

group[.]”

Charlotte Scharp, DeGraff’s fiancé, testified that in the spring of

1993, after she had stopped dating Travis, he invited her to his

house. When she arrived he handcuffed her hands behind her back

and Travis and another man abused her, squirting water on her,

pushing her from one to the other, and smacking and kicking her.

Linda Arnell, Nettie’s mother, testified she was awakened in the

middle of the night in August 1993 by her daughter, who told her

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she needed to park DeGraff’s car in her garage because it had

blood on it or in it. Nettie said DeGraff and Travis were with her. 

Arnell denied the request but said she could use the hose to wash

the car off.

Connie Teeters, Nettie’s cousin, testified that in mid-August 1993,

when she was 14 years old and living near Arnell’s house, Nettie

made a noise at her window one night between midnight and 3 a.m. 

Teeters went to the window and saw Travis and Nettie, alone. 

Nettie said: “we just killed somebody.” She handed Teeters a pair

of handcuffs and said to hide them or throw them away. Teeters

threw them in her trash can. At this point Travis said: “What are

you doing?” Nettie told Teeters to return the handcuffs. She did

so.

Connie Teeters’s mother, Nettie’s aunt, Doris Teeters, testified that

the day before the discovery of Dixon’s body was announced on

the evening news, her niece told her of the killing. Her account of

the conversation is consistent with the broad outline of Nettie’s

trial testimony. Doris Teeters said that Nettie asked her if Connie

Teeters talked to her about seeing her the night before.

Nettie adduced the opinion testimony of two expert witnesses

concerning the battered women’s syndrome. Dr. Linda Barnard, a

licensed marriage and family child counselor, opined that Nettie

suffered from this syndrome at the time of the Dixon killing. A

woman in this condition believes there is no escape and copes by

choosing submissive behaviors. Symptoms include depression,

flashbacks, startled response, and hypervigilance. Nettie

demonstrated these typical symptoms. 

She testified that Nettie does not cope with domestic violence well,

“she just goes downhill pretty quickly into depression and into

compliance.” She is prone to enter a disassociative state, in which

the psyche protects itself from trauma by emotional numbness:

“she finally just sort of gave up and just didn’t feel.”

Dr. Barnard testified that Nettie only told her of two specific

instances of battery by Travis before the killing, one in February

and one in March 1993. However, as a rule she does not ask about

every instance of battery when doing an interview.

Dr. Phyllis Kaufman, a licensed clinical psychologist and social

worker, opined that Nettie suffers from post-traumatic stress

disorder, consistent with the battered women’s syndrome, as a

result of witnessing domestic violence as a child and being battered

from age 13 on. Emotional stress impairs her judgment and an

excess of stress causes a disassociative state in which she is not

able to make effective judgments and she becomes impulsive and

confused. When she cannot cope with stress she suffers loss of

cognitive control: “Loss of intellectual ability to understand what

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she is doing, that ability to look at one’s self and be in control of

one’s behavior. She loses that. She does not know what she is

doing. She becomes a robot and takes orders from others.”

Travis did not testify, nor did he call his mother as a witness. He

called Stephanie Schaefer, who testified that she was at his house

from 6 or 7 p.m. on the night of August 15, 1993. Schaefer said

that Nettie was there when she arrived but left an hour later. 

Schaefer spent the night, sleeping on the living room sofa, and

Travis did not leave his house that night. Schaefer’s account of the

evening of August 15, 1993, was corroborated by testimony of

David Coe, who also said he spent that night in the living room.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas

corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377

(1972). 

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). Section 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a

federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief

is available under section 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003);

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). When it is clear that a state court has not

reached the merits of a petitioner’s claim, or has denied the claim on procedural grounds, the

AEDPA’s deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim

de novo. Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Motion for Severance (Claim I)

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his right to due process when it

denied his motion to sever his trial from that of his co-defendant Nettie Reay. Petitioner explains

his claim in this regard as follows:

At the commencement of trial, petitioner’s counsel moved to sever

petitioner’s trial from that of codefendant Nettie Reay. Counsel

argued that petitioner and Nettie would present totally antagonistic

defenses at trial because it was anticipated that Nettie would assert

a defense based upon domestic violence and Battered Woman’s

Syndrome and provide evidence that she assisted in killing April

Dixon only because she feared that petitioner would kill Nettie if

she refused. Petitioner, on the other hand, would present a defense

of alibi, and assert that he was not present on the scene and did not

participate in the homicide. The trial court denied this motion.

The court erred in refusing to sever petitioner’s trial from that of

Nettie Reay because the defenses of petitioner and Nettie were

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completely antagonistic. Petitioner’s defense was that of alibi. His

primary witnesses Stephanie Schaefer and David Coe testified that

they were with petitioner at his home at the time Dixon was killed;

they further testified that Nettie at some point left by herself

disgruntled and possibly intoxicated. On the other hand, Nettie’s

defense was that she was a victim of repeated domestic violence

carried out by petitioner and her prior boyfriend and that she

participated in killing Dixon because petitioner ordered her to do

so and implicitly threatened serious bodily injury if she did not

obey. Extensive evidence put on by Nettie through her own

testimony and her expert witnesses described petitioner as having

subjected Nettie to severe physical and psychological abuse which

included frequent beatings and repeated threats to take Nettie’s

daughter Karen away from her. All of this evidence that petitioner

repeatedly assaulted and battered Nettie was completely irrelevant

to the question of whether petitioner was guilty of murdering

Dixon and such evidence would not have been admitted at

petitioner’s trial if he had been tried alone.

The prejudice flowing from wrongful denial of severance was

compounded by the court’s additional error in failing to provide

adequate limiting instructions precluding the jury from using the

domestic violence evidence introduced by Nettie as evidence that

petitioner was guilty of assaulting and killing Dixon.

(Second Amended Petition (hereinafter Pet.) at 3-4.)

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s arguments in this regard,

reasoning as follows:

Travis claims that, regardless of error in denying the motion for

severance, the gross unfairness arose because Nettie adduced

evidence of his acts of domestic violence in support of her claim

she lacked the requisite mental states for conviction. We disagree.

The evidence of uncharged misconduct is not “particularly

disgusting” (citation omitted), in comparison with the crime

charged against the defendants and it is essentially dependent upon

Nettie’s testimony. Travis’s defense was she is a lying, vengeful

former spouse who made up the story about him to injure him and

to cover her own guilt. She admitted beating up the victim, and her

self serving testimony of abuse by Travis (among others) did not

independently and differentially tend to besmirch him.

The case against Travis was strong. DeGraff and his codefendant

agreed on most of the events and on Travis’s central role. Their

account was corroborated by Nettie’s relatives. The only defense

offered was alibi. However, even if the testimony of the alibi

witnesses was accepted, it was immaterial unless the killing took

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place the night before the discovery of Dixon’s body. But Doris

Teeters testified she was told of the killing the day before the body

was found. As related, Travis did not call his mother as a witness

to deny the testimony that he struck her on the night of the killing.

After a review of the entire record, we are unable to say that Travis

was probably convicted because of an illicit inference of propensity

to do evil derived from the evidence of uncharged misconduct.

Accordingly, the contention of error in the nature of a denial of a

fair trial has no merit.

(Opinion at 33-34.)

A court may grant habeas relief based on a state court's decision to deny a motion

for severance only if the joint trial was so prejudicial that it denied a petitioner his right to a fair

trial. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538-39 (1993) (court must decide if "there is a

serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or

prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence"); United States v.

Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1986) ("misjoinder would rise to the level of a constitutional

violation only if it results in prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right

to a fair trial”); Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1503 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); see also

Comer v. Schiro, 480 F.3d 960, 985 (9th Cir.) (in the context of the joinder of counts at trial,

habeas relief will not be granted unless the joinder actually rendered petitioner’s state trial

fundamentally unfair and therefore violative of due process), cert. denied, ___U.S.___, 127 S. Ct.

2455 (2007). Petitioner bears the burden of proving that the denial of severance rendered his trial

fundamentally unfair, Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370 (9th Cir. 1997), and must establish

that prejudice arising from the failure to grant a severance was so "clear, manifest, and undue"

that he was denied a fair trial. Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999)

(quoting United States v. Throckmorton, 87 F.3d 1069, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

On habeas review, federal courts neither depend on the state law governing

severance, Grisby, 130 F.3d at 370 (citing Hollins v. Dep't of Corrections, State of Iowa, 969

F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1992)), nor consider procedural rights to a severance afforded

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to criminal defendants in the federal criminal justice system. Id. Rather, the relevant question is

whether the state proceedings satisfied due process. Id.; see also Cooper v. McGrath, 314 

F. Supp. 2d 967, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

This court concludes that the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for

severance did not render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. First, the court notes that

“mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538. In light of

the overwhelming evidence of petitioner’s guilt, the admission of evidence that petitioner

routinely beat Nettie, while potentially harmful to petitioner, did not rise to the level of a due

process violation. The evidence regarding Battered Woman’s Syndrome and domestic violence

was admitted only to support Nettie’s defense. This evidence was tangential to the issue of

whether petitioner murdered Dixon. In other words, evidence that petitioner had battered Nettie

would not necessarily lead a jury to conclude that petitioner had murdered Dixon. Under these

circumstances, Nettie’s testimony regarding Battered Woman’s Syndrome would not have

prevented the jury from making a reliable judgment about whether petitioner was guilty of

Dixon’s murder. See United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 770-71 (9th Cir. 1995)

(upholding trial court's denial of defendant's motion for severance from co-defendants, even

though evidence was introduced at trial involving three homicides and marijuana enterprise with

which defendant was not involved); United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1201-02 (9th Cir.

1980) (upholding denial of severance, even though evidence relating to co-defendant's

connection to organized crime and participation in murder was admitted). 

The jurors at petitioner’s trial were instructed that: (1) the evidence of Battered

Woman’s Syndrome could only be considered for the purpose of determining whether Nettie had

the requisite mental state to commit murder and whether she was a credible witness; (2) they

were to consider each defendant separately in deciding whether either defendant was guilty or not

guilty; and (3) each defendant was entitled to an individual determination of whether he/she was

a member of a conspiracy to murder Dixon. (Resp’ts’ Lodged Document 15 (hereinafter CT) at

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 Finally, Nettie Reay’s testimony regarding petitioner’s involvement in the murder could 3

have been admitted against petitioner in a separate trial. See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540 (“A

defendant normally would not be entitled to exclude the testimony of a former codefendant if the

district court did sever their trials, and we see no reason why relevant and competent testimony

would be prejudicial merely because the witness is also a codefendant”). 

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421, 445, 463.) These instructions were sufficient to cure any possibility of prejudice arising

from the trial court’s decision not to grant petitioner’s motion for a separate trial. See Zafiro, 506

U.S. at 541 (finding similar jury instructions sufficient to cure any prejudice arising from joint

trial of defendants with antagonistic defenses); United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1108 (9th

Cir. 1998).3

The decision of the state courts that petitioner’s right to due process was not

violated by the denial of his motion to sever is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

the federal due process principles set forth above. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief

on his claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendant.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner raises several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After

setting forth the applicable legal principles, the court will evaluate two of these claims below.

1. Legal Standards

 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88. After a

petitioner identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of

reasonable professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally

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competent assistance. Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Second, a

petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981

(9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged

deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim “[t]here is a strong

presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the ‘wide range of professional assistance.’”

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There

is in addition a strong presumption that counsel “exercised acceptable professional judgment in

all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

2. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Request a Limiting Instruction Regarding

Evidence of Battered Woman’s Syndrome (Claim II)

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he

failed to request a limiting instruction regarding the Battered Woman’s Syndrome and domestic

violence evidence introduced at the joint trial. Petitioner describes this claim as follows:

In moving for severance, petitioner’s trial counsel had argued, inter

alia, that absent severance, petitioner’s jury would be exposed to

evidence, presented by Nettie’s counsel, regarding petitioner

engaging in acts of domestic violence. Given this awareness on

defense counsel’s part and the fact that his severance motion was

denied, it was accordingly incumbent upon counsel to request that

appropriate limiting instructions to be given to the jury. Such

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instructions patterned after CALJIC No. 2.07 (evidence limited to

one defendant only) and/or CALJIC No. 2.50 (consideration of

other-crime evidence), would have told the jurors that they could

not consider Nettie’s evidence of domestic violence as evidence

against petitioner (CALJIC No. 2.07) or that they could not, under

any circumstances, consider the domestic violence evidence for

purposes of “prov[ing] that defendant is a person of bad character

or that he has a disposition to commit crimes” (CALJIC No. 2.50).

(Pet. at 4.)

The California Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, reasoning as follows:

Nor is ineffective assistance of counsel demonstrated by the failure

to request a limiting instruction. The jury was directed by the

instructions given to consider the evidence, if believed, for

purposes of determining Nettie’s mental state and credibility. 

Travis’s counsel reasonably could have decided as a tactical matter

that this was sufficient and that drawing further attention to the

evidence would be counter productive. 

(Opinion at 34-35.)

The decision by the state appellate court rejecting petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland and should

not be set aside. Petitioner has failed to establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

error in failing to request additional limiting instructions, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. In this regard, petitioner’s jury was given a limiting instruction explaining how to

evaluate the evidence of domestic violence. That instruction was sufficient for the reasons stated

by the state appellate court. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

3. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Object to the Admission of Evidence of Battered

Woman’s Syndrome (Claim VII) 

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to

“move that the domestic violence and Battered Women’s Syndrome Evidence . . . should have

been excluded from petitioner’s trial as irrelevant and highly prejudicial.” (Pet. at 13.) Petitioner

argues that in 1998, when his trial took place, the question of whether evidence of duress could

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serve as a defense to a charge of murder had not been resolved by the state courts. (Id.) 

Accordingly,

Defense counsel had an obligation to raise such an objection for

purposes of maximizing his client’s chances for acquittal, as well

as to preserve this objection for subsequent review if the domestic

violence evidence was admitted and petitioner was convicted. 

Furthermore, there could be no satisfactory tactical reason for

defense counsel’s failure to move to exclude the domestic violence

evidence. As indicated by his severance motion, defense counsel

was well aware of the great potential prejudice which could flow

from the jury’s being permitted to consider, in a wholesale and

unlimited manner, evidence of petitioner’s engaging in repeated

and severe acts of domestic violence and the danger that the jury

would conclude, based upon this evidence, that petitioner was a

bad person with a predisposition towards crime and violence. 

Accordingly, given that defense counsel’s severance motion was

denied, it should have been incumbent upon counsel to move to

exclude Nettie’s evidence of domestic violence and Battered

Woman’s Syndrome.

(Id. at 13-14.)

In People v. Anderson, 28 Cal. 4th 767 (2002), which was decided after the

California Court of Appeal issued its first decision in this case, the California Supreme Court

held that duress is not an affirmative defense to the crime of murder. Id. at 780. The court

recognized, however, that the circumstances of duress are relevant to a determination of

premeditation, deliberation and implied malice. Id. at 780-84. In its opinion after remand from

the California Supreme Court, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence of

Battered Woman’s Syndrome introduced at trial by his co-defendant was not unduly prejudicial

to petitioner and, in any event, was relevant to “establish Nettie’s defense that she was a battered

woman who feared Travis and that she acted out of fear rather than malice.” (Opinion at 36.) 

The state appellate court concluded that “because the evidence of BWS was properly admitted,

defendant’s alternative contention that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the

evidence is likewise rejected.” (Id.)

Petitioner’s jury was instructed to use evidence of Battered Woman’s Syndrome

only for the purpose of determining Nettie Reay’s mental state or to evaluate her credibility. (CT

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at 421.) The jury was not instructed that duress was a possible defense to murder. Under these

circumstances, it was not necessary for petitioner’s counsel to object to the evidence of Battered

Woman’s Syndrome on the grounds that it was irrelevant to the murder charge. In addition, for

the reasons expressed below in connection with this court’s analysis of petitioner’s claim

regarding the introduction of evidence of domestic violence (Claim VI), admission of such

evidence did not render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, the failure of

petitioner’s trial counsel to object to the admission of this evidence on due process grounds did

not constitute ineffective assistance. See Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1239 n.8 (9th Cir.

2000) (an attorney's failure to make a meritless objection or motion does not constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel). See also Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996)

("the failure to take a futile action can never be deficient performance"). 

For the foregoing reasons, the conclusion of the state appellate court that

petitioner’s trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to object to the admission

of evidence of Battered Woman’s Syndrome offered by petitioner’s co-defendant is not contrary

to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief

on this claim.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Co-Defendant Nettie Reay (Claim III)

Petitioner claims his right to a fair trial was violated by improper crossexamination of witness Charlotte Scharp conducted by counsel for co-defendant Nettie Reay. 

The California Court of Appeal fairly described the background to this claim as follows:

Nettie’s counsel, at the conclusion of the questioning of Scharp,

asked if Travis engaged in any other incident of assault on her after

the incident in which she was handcuffed. She answered that he

ran her off the road in a driving incident. The trial court

immediately called a bench conference and upon going back on the

record directed the jury to disregard all testimony concerning the

purported incident. 

(Opinion at 36-37.)

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Petitioner argues that Nettie Reay’s trial counsel committed error in eliciting this

testimony from Scharp and that the error violated his right to a fair trial. He argues,

This illicit evidence which codefendant’s counsel smuggled before

the jury was highly prejudicial. Although petitioner’s jury was

exposed to evidence of petitioner’s past violent behavior by way of

beating Nettie Reay and a physical altercation with Charlotte

Scharp, the automobile incident involving Scharp was the only

evidence the jury heard that petitioner had engaged in a potentially

deadly attack on someone (other than the present homicide victim

April Dixon). Therefore, this illicit evidence was highly

prejudicial in the context of petitioner’s being tried for a murder.

(Pet. at 6.) 

On appeal, the prosecution conceded that Nettie Reay’s trial counsel erred in

eliciting the above-described testimony at petitioner’s trial. (Opinion at 36.) The California

Court of Appeal concluded, however, that the error was not prejudicial. The appellate court

explained its reasoning as follows:

This is not the kind of exceptional case where this miscue is

reasonably likely to have tipped the balance. If the jury found the

earlier portion of Scharp’s testimony believable, they already

would have accepted the fact that Travis possessed handcuffs and

used them to restrain a woman while he engaged in an unprovoked

assault in concert with another man. It is unlikely the brief

reference to an additional nondescript assault, related by DeGraff’s

fiancé, would alter the balance significantly in favor of her

credibility or that it would tip the balance in the case at large. We

conclude there was no prejudicial error.

(Opinion at 37.)

The decision of the California Court of Appeal that the error made by Nettie

Reay’s trial counsel did not render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair is not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law and should not be set aside. For the reasons described by

the state appellate court, Scharp’s very brief reference to an incident that was far less prejudicial

than her testimony regarding the attack upon her by petitioner and his friend could not have had a

substantial impact on the verdict in this case. Further, any possible prejudice would have been

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alleviated, if not eliminated, by the trial judge’s admonition to the jury to disregard Scharp’s

testimony about the road incident. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

D. Juror Misconduct (Claim IV)

Petitioner claims that his right to a fair trial was violated by juror misconduct, the

inadequacy of the trial court’s voir dire, and the refusal of the trial court to dismiss a juror who

had been the victim of domestic violence in her childhood. Petitioner explains his claim in this

regard as follows:

Petitioner did not receive a fair jury trial because: 1) in the course

of voir dire Juror Number Two committed misconduct by failing to

reveal her experiences with domestic violence, which was an issue

in this case; 2) the trial court’s voir dire questions were not

sufficiently probing so as to reveal the biases of potential jurors;

and 3) the trial court improperly refused defense counsel’s request

to dismiss Juror Number Two when her personal traumatic

childhood experiences caused her to be emotionally affected during

jury deliberations.

(Pet. at 6-7.)

The California Court of Appeal fairly explained the background to petitioner’s

claims of juror misconduct as follows:

During jury deliberations, the foreperson sent a note to the court

asserting that some jurors were concerned about the impartiality of

one of the jurors. The court and counsel questioned the foreperson

who gave the following account. Juror Two appeared withdrawn. 

When asked about it she complained that another juror had been

disrespectful of her opinions and then she became very emotional. 

She said when she was a child her father beat up and battered the

mother and the children and that she had had therapy as an adult to

deal with the problem. Ten of the jurors felt she could be impartial

but two did not think so.

After conferring with counsel about proposing questions, the court

questioned Juror Two, who gave the following account. She and

her brothers and sisters had been disciplined violently when she

was a child. She had received counseling, however, not as a

specific result of this. She did cry during deliberations, however,

she had not refused to participate in deliberations. She had not

brought her childhood experiences up during voir dire, because she

had interpreted the questions as calling for a response only if the

venire member felt that she could not be impartial. She continued

to believe that she could be impartial.

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Travis argues that Juror Two committed misconduct in failing to

bring up her childhood experiences with violent discipline after

another member of the venire was excused after she told the court

she did not think she could be impartial because she had a friend

who was battered and who killed her husband. He argues she also

committed misconduct in not volunteering the information in

response to questions on the jury questionnaire, as follows. Asked

if she could be impartial, knowing what she did of the case, she

answered yes. Asked if there was anything she would like to bring

to the court’s attention that might affect her ability to be impartial,

she answered no. Asked if she had been a witness to a crime, she

answered no.

(Opinion at 38-39.)

Petitioner also notes in support of his claim of juror misconduct that, at the

beginning of jury voir dire, the trial court advised the potential jurors that a defense of “Battered

Woman’s Syndrome” might be raised and that, if it was, the jurors would receive an instruction

to the effect that any evidence relating to that defense could only be considered for the purpose of

determining whether or not Nettie Reay formed the mental state necessary for murder or whether

Nettie Reay was a credible witness. (Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 389-90.) The trial

judge asked the jurors whether they could carefully and fairly consider such an instruction and

whether, in light of these statements, any juror felt they could not serve on the case or had a

“change of heart.” (Id. at 393.) Juror No. Two did not respond in any way to these remarks by

the trial judge. Petitioner argues that Juror No. Two should have revealed her childhood

experiences at that time. Petitioner also argues that, to the extent Juror No. Two did not

understand she should reveal on voir dire her past history with domestic violence, the trial court’s

questions to the potential jurors were not sufficiently specific to apprise her of her duty in this

regard. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s argument on this issue,

reasoning as follows: 

Misrepresentation by a juror in response to voir dire is misconduct. 

(citation omitted.) Travis submits the aforementioned answers and

omissions can only be perceived as untruthful, hence

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 On remand from the California Supreme Court, the California Court of Appeal 4

concluded that it was not required to revisit its opinion with respect to this claim in light of the

decision in United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2000). (Opinion at 41-42.) As

the discussion which follows reveals, this court has taken the Gonzalez holding into

consideration in issuing these findings and recommendations.

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misrepresentations. However, all but one of the matters on which

he relies are questions calling for opinions of the venire member

concerning her own impartiality. At this remove, we cannot say

that Juror Two was answering falsely when she opined she could

be impartial. The remaining question called for her to assess

whether she had been a witness to a crime. A venire member

might well fail to connect this characterization with violent

childhood discipline, e.g., corporal punishment, or truthfully assess

such discipline as not criminal, depending upon the severity, dates

of occurrence, or place of occurrence. 

On this record, the conclusion that Juror Two was untruthful is not

compelling, the trial court could reasonably conclude there was no

misconduct. (citations omitted.) For the same reason, the trial

court did not err in denying the motion to remove Juror Two.

For his claim the court was obliged to conduct a more extensive or

focused voir dire to require the disclosure of Juror Two’s

childhood experience, the defendant relies on People v. Chapman

(1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 136, discussing the “new system of courtconducted voir dire . . . .” (Id. at p. 141.) In that case the court

refused to voir dire on a salient point, thereby prejudicially

constricting the voir dire. Chapman is simply inapposite where the

parties are permitted to ask their own questions and there is no

showing that an area of inquiry was restricted. In these

circumstances, we discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in

asking the venire whether particular matters would present them a

difficulty in being impartial, rather than eliciting all facts

concerning their background that might afford an inference of a

potential problem concerning impartiality.

The contention of error in the nature of juror misconduct has no

merit.

(Opinion at 39-40.)4

The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial “guarantees to the criminally accused a

fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).

See also Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85 (1988); Green v. White, 232 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir.

2000). Due process requires that the defendant be tried by “a jury capable and willing to decide

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the case solely on the evidence before it.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). See also

United States v. Plache, 913 F.2d 1375, 1377-78 (9th Cir. 1990). Jurors are objectionable if they

have formed such deep and strong impressions that they will not listen to testimony with an open

mind. Irvin, 816 U.S. at 722 n.3. A defendant is denied the right to an impartial jury if even one

juror is biased or prejudiced. Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc);

United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, “[t]he presence of a biased

juror cannot be harmless; the error requires a new trial without a showing of actual prejudice.”

Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1111 (quoting Dyer, 151 F.3d at 973 n.2).

Courts have analyzed juror bias under two theories, actual bias and implied (or

presumed) bias, either of which may support a challenge of a prospective juror for cause. Fields

v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 766 (9th Cir. 2007). Actual bias is “‘bias in fact’ – the existence of a

state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality.” 

Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1112 (quoting United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997)). A

trial judge’s conclusion, after a hearing, that a juror does or does not harbor “actual bias” is a

finding of fact to which the presumption of correctness applies. Dyer, 151 F.3d at 973. This is

because such a decision “depends heavily on the trial court’s superior ability to appraise witness

credibility and demeanor.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 99-100 (1995). See also

Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985) ( “[T]he question whether a venireman is biased

has traditionally been determined through voir dire culminating in a finding by the trial judge

concerning the venireman’s state of mind. . . . such a finding is based upon determinations of

demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.”). 

“Although actual bias is the more common grounds for excusing jurors for cause, 

‘[i]n extraordinary cases, courts may presume bias based upon the circumstances.’” Gonzalez,

214 F.3d at 1112 (quoting Dyer, 151 F.3d at 981). See also McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.

v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556-57 (1984) (Blackmun, Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., concurring)

(accepting that “in exceptional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred”);

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id at 558 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ, concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that “[t]he bias of a

prospective juror may be actual or implied; that is, it may be bias in fact or bias conclusively

presumed as [a] matter of law”) (alterations in original) (quotations omitted); Smith v. Phillips,

455 U.S. 209, 221-24 (1982) (O’Connor, J, concurring) (“there are some extreme circumstances

that would justify a finding of implied bias”); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 11 (1933). 

Thus, the Ninth Circuit has, in several cases, presumed bias from “the ‘potential for substantial

emotional involvement, adversely affecting impartiality,’ inherent in certain relationships.” 

Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68,

71 (9th Cir. 1977)). See also Green, 232 F.3d at 676; Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1112-14; Dyer, 151

F.3d at 981-82; Eubanks, 591 F.2d at 517. 

The distinction between actual and implied bias has been explained as follows:

Unlike the inquiry for actual bias, in which we examine the juror’s

answers on voir dire for evidence that she was in fact partial, the

issue for implied bias is whether an average person in the position

of the juror in controversy would be prejudiced. Accordingly, we

have held that prejudice is to be presumed where the relationship

between the prospective juror and some aspect of the litigation is

such that it is highly unlikely that the average person could remain

impartial in his deliberations under the circumstances.

Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1112 (citations and internal quotes omitted). Accordingly, implied bias

may be found despite a juror’s denial of any partiality. Torres, 128 F.3d at 45 (“And in

determining whether a prospective juror is impliedly biased, ‘his statements upon voir dire [about

his ability to be impartial] are totally irrelevant.’”); Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978, 987 (10th

Cir. 1996); United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1229 n.8 (5th Cir. 1976) (The concept of

implied or presumed bias arises from “situations in which the circumstances point so sharply to

bias in a particular juror that even his own denials must be discounted.”). Implied bias is bias

conclusively presumed as a matter of law. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936); 

United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 171 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Torres, 128 F.3d at 45). On

collateral review, a petitioner alleging juror misconduct must show that the alleged error " 'had

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substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' " Jeffries v.

Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637

(1993)).

In McDonough, a juror failed to inform the trial court, after a question on voir dire

seeking to elicit information about previous injuries to members of the juror's immediate family

that resulted in disability or prolonged pain, that his son had sustained such an injury. 464 U.S.

at 550. The juror explained that he did not believe his son’s injury (a broken leg) was relevant to

the trial court’s inquiry because it did not result in disability or prolonged pain. Id. at 552 n.3. In

declining to order a new trial on the basis of juror bias, the United States Supreme Court

explained:

To invalidate the result of a three-week trial because of a juror's

mistaken, though honest response to a question, is to insist on

something closer to perfection than our judicial system can be

expected to give. A trial represents an important investment of

private and social resources, and it ill serves the important end of

finality to wipe the slate clean simply to recreate the peremptory

challenge process because counsel lacked an item of information

which objectively he should have obtained from a juror on voir

dire examination.

Id. at 555. The Supreme Court held in that case that “to obtain a new trial in such a situation, a

party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir

dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a

challenge for cause.” Id. at 556. 

In Fields, a juror in a rape trial disclosed on voir dire that his wife had been

assaulted and beaten, but failed to specify that she had also been raped. When questioned after

the verdict at an evidentiary hearing before the federal district court about this voir dire answer,

the juror explained that when he volunteered that his wife had been assaulted and beaten, he

expected for people in the courtroom to understand that she had been sexually abused. Fields,

503 F.3d at 765. The juror testified that, if asked, he would have said that he could be fair and

impartial. Id. He explained that he told the truth when he stated he would base his decision

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petitioner’s claim of juror bias is contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 

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strictly on the evidence presented, and stated that he did his best to be a fair juror. Id. The

district court found that the juror was not dishonest during voir dire, that he was not actually

biased, and that application of the implied bias doctrine in the absence of juror dishonesty would

be a new rule barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Fields, 503 F.3d at 763. The

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, concluding, first, that the juror did not respond

dishonestly on voir dire and did not intend to mislead the trial court when he used the word

“assault” instead of “rape” and “kidnap” to describe what had happened to his wife. Id. at 767. 

To the extent the juror may have been mistaken in assuming that the words he used would make

it apparent that his wife had also been raped, the Ninth Circuit concluded that this was “an honest

mistake for a layperson to make.” Id. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that there was no

evidence the juror harbored “actual bias” and that the facts indicated the juror had remained

impartial, notwithstanding what had happened to his wife. Id. at 767-68. 

Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that the juror in question did not harbor implied

bias. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court has never held that a juror was

impliedly biased in the absence of juror dishonesty. Id. at 771. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has

recognized that “it is an unresolved question whether dishonesty is a necessary predicate to a

finding of juror bias.” Id. The court in Fields also noted that the similarity of experiences 5

between the juror and the defendant was due to the juror’s wife's experience, not his own. The

court stated, “[a]lthough we have recognized that bias may be implied where close relatives of a

juror “have been personally involved in a situation involving a similar fact pattern . . . we have

never done so when the juror was honest on voir dire.” Id. at 773. The Ninth Circuit concluded:

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Given [the juror’s] honest response on voir dire that revealed a

potentially disqualifying relationship, but not an extreme or

extraordinary one, and the results of the evidentiary hearing which

disclosed no actual bias, we see no basis for inferring bias now as a

matter of law.

Id. at 775.

This court is not compelled to reject the conclusion of the California Court of

Appeal that Juror No. Two did not respond dishonestly on voir dire or intend to mislead the trial

court when she stated that she had not been a witness to a crime, that she had nothing to bring to

the court’s attention regarding her ability to be impartial, and that she believed she could be

impartial. As noted by the state appellate court, the latter two questions seek a statement of

opinion, not fact. Further, Juror No. Two repeated during the interview with the trial judge that

she honestly thought she could be impartial, notwithstanding the events of her childhood. Juror

No. Two’s belief that her childhood experiences did not involve a crime was, as in Fields, an

honest mistake for a layperson to make. This is also true of her statement that she believed she

need not bring up her past experiences unless they would tend to make her impartial. See

McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555 (observing that “jurors are not necessarily experts in English

usage” and “may be uncertain as to the meaning of terms which are relatively easily understood

by lawyers and judges”); Dennis v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 511, 521 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that

juror's misunderstanding of a legal term did not connote dishonesty); Dyer, 151 F.3d at 973

(observing that it follows from the holding in McDonough that “an honest yet mistaken answer to

a voir dire question rarely amounts to a constitutional violation; even an intentionally dishonest

answer is not fatal, so long as the falsehood does not bespeak a lack of impartiality”). Further, as

stated by the Ninth Circuit in Fields, “[t]o the extent that events or information bearing on [the

juror’s] honesty in voir dire or impartiality as a juror came after he was empaneled, the

evidentiary hearing held by the district court afforded Fields an opportunity to show that [the

juror] was not a fair and impartial juror.” Fields, 503 F.3d at 773. The same is true here. The

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interview conducted by the trial court of Juror No. Two demonstrated that this juror did not

harbor bias against petitioner because of her childhood experiences. 

In the absence of juror dishonesty, this court cannot conclude that petitioner has

demonstrated actual or implied bias. Even if juror No. Two’s failure to disclose her childhood

experiences with domestic violence constituted dishonesty on voir dire, there is no actual

evidence in this case of juror bias, either actual or implied. There is no evidence that the

presence of Juror No. Two on petitioner’s jury prejudiced petitioner to the extent that he did not

receive a fair trial. Accordingly, petitioner’s claims regarding juror bias should be denied.

E. Jury Instruction Error (Claim V)

Petitioner claims that several jury instructions given at his trial reduced the

prosecutor’s burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in violation of his

constitutional rights. (Pet. at 10.) 

The state court record reflects that immediately prior to Charlotte Scharp’s

testimony that petitioner assaulted her after placing her in handcuffs in the spring of 1993, the

trial court instructed petitioner’s jury with CALJIC Nos. 2.50, 2.50.1 and 2.50.2, as follows:

Ladies and gentlemen, you’re going to hear evidence as I

understand it of Mr. Travis Reay’s use of handcuffs on this witness

and the allegation that some physical assault was committed upon

this witness after she had been handcuffed as I understand it.

And that – in that regard, I am going to give you a limiting

instruction in terms of how you may consider this evidence. This

instruction will be in your packet of instructions at the conclusion

of this trial, and it would be as follows:

Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the

defendant, Travis Reay, committed an act similar to those

constituting a crime other than that for which he is on trial. This

evidence, if believed, may not be considered by you to prove that

defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition

to commit crimes. It may be considered by you only for the limited

purpose of determining if it tends to show a characteristic method,

plan, or scheme in the commission of an act similar to the method

plan or scheme used in the commission of the offense in this case,

which would further tend to show the existence of the intent, which

is a necessary element of the crime charged and that defendant

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Reay possessed the means that might have been useful or necessary

for the commission of the crime charged.

For the limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence,

you may weigh it in the same manner as you do all other evidence

in this case. You’re not permitted to consider this evidence for any

other purpose.

Within the meaning of the preceding instruction, the prosecution

has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence

that defendant, Travis Reay, committed an act similar to those

constituting a crime other than that for which he is on trial. You

must not consider this evidence for any purpose unless you find by

preponderance of the evidence that defendant Travis Reay

committed an act similar to those constituting a crime.

Preponderance of the evidence means evidence that has more

convincing force than that opposed to it. If the evidence is so

evenly balanced that you are unable to find that the evidence on

either side of an issue preponderates, your finding on that issue

must be against the party who had the burden of proving it. You

should consider all of the evidence bearing upon every issue

regardless of who witnessed it.

(RT at 613-14.) These instructions were repeated later in the trial. (Id. at 1406.) 

Petitioner objects to the foregoing jury instructions, arguing as follows:

The problem with the above-quoted instructions is that they

permitted the jury to establish two critical facts based upon proof

of less than beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) that petitioner was in

possession of handcuffs similar to those which Nettie Reay and

Scott DeGraff testified as having been used on Dixon just prior to

her being killed, and 2) that petitioner was “guilty” of having

assaulted Charlotte Scharp in the spring of 1993 while employing

such handcuffs. The jury was, in turn, permitted to use these two

critical facts, established by the lesser preponderance-of-theevidence standard, to resolve the determinative issue in this case:

whether Nettie Reay and Scott DeGraff were telling the truth when

they described petitioner first handcuffing and then stabbing April

Dixon. This being the case, it it logically impossible to escape the

conclusion that the jury was permitted to resolve the issue of

petitioner’s guilt regarding the murder of April Dixon upon proof

of less than beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Pet. at 11-12.) (emphasis in original.)

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s argument in this regard,

reasoning as follows:

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. . . the defendant’s argument is unpersuasive because the

reasonable doubt standard only pertains to facts that are essential to

conviction. (citations omitted.)

Inference chains cascade and cumulate. One need not be certain of

all of a number of circumstances individually and yet be certain of

a proposition that the aggregate tends to support.

Belief in Scharp’s testimony is not critical to the guilty verdict. A

juror could believe her testimony and nonetheless harbor a

reasonable doubt that defendant Travis Reay was guilty of

murdering Dixon. Accordingly, the instruction that evidence of the

uncharged misconduct should not be considered unless proven by a

preponderance of the evidence did not implicate the requirement of

proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Opinion at 43.) 

A challenge to jury instructions generally does not state a federal constitutional

claim. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 119 (1982)); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). In order to

warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction cannot be merely “undesirable,

erroneous, or even universally condemned, but must violate some due process right guaranteed

by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting

Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973) (internal quotations omitted)). Petitioner must

demonstrate the instruction “‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process.’” Id. (quoting Darnell v. Swinney, 823 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

The state appellate court concluded that the testimony of Charlotte Scharp did not

concern facts that were essential to petitioner’s conviction, and therefore did not implicate the

prosecutor’s burden to prove petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This conclusion is not

an unreasonable determination of the facts of this case, nor is it contrary to or an unreasonable

application of federal law. Further, contrary to petitioner’s argument, the challenged jury

instructions did not tell the jurors that his conviction could be based on proof by a preponderance

of evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, petitioner’s jurors were

specifically informed that each element of the charged offenses must be proven beyond a

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reasonable doubt and that only the prior acts could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 

(RT at 1407, 1412, 1421.) Cf. Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812, 821-825 (9th Cir. 2004) (trial

court's use of the 1996 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01, together with CALJIC No. 2.50.1

violated defendant’s right to due process by allowing the jury to find that the defendant had

committed uncharged offenses by a preponderance of the evidence and then to infer that he had

committed the charged acts also by a preponderance of the evidence). As set forth above,

petitioner’s jurors were specifically informed that the prior crimes evidence could not be

considered to prove that petitioner had a disposition to commit crimes, but only to show a

characteristic method, plan or scheme. See Burleson v. Kernan, No. C 05-1263 SI (pr), 2007 WL

3478432 at *23 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2007) (denying similar jury instruction challenge on

collateral review because the jury instructions given, if carefully followed, would not permit

petitioner’s conviction based on anything less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Gonsalves

v. Carey, Civ. S-03-1091 MCE EFB P, 2007 WL 172326 at *14 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2007); Cf.

Gibson, 387 F.3d at 817 (jury was specifically informed that if they found the defendant

committed a prior offense they were allowed to also infer that he had a disposition to commit the

same or similar offenses, including the offense of which he was accused). 

After a review of the jury instructions as a whole, this court concludes that the

state court’s decision that the challenged instructions did not violate petitioner’s right to a fair

trial is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Accordingly, petitioner is

not entitled to relief on this claim.

 F. Evidence of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence (Claim VI)

Petitioner claims that his right to a fair trial was violated because of the jury’s

exposure to evidence of his prior acts of domestic violence described above. Petitioner argues

that although this evidence was introduced by co-defendant Nettie Reay, in support of her 

defense to the murder charge, the evidence was irrelevant for that purpose. Petitioner explains,

“in essence, petitioner Travis Reay did not receive a fair trial because extensive, highly

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 The United States Supreme Court “has never expressly held that it violates due process 6

to admit other crimes evidence for the purpose of showing conduct in conformity therewith, or

that it violates due process to admit other crimes evidence for other purposes without an

instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the evidence to such purposes.” Garceau v.

Woodford, 275 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003). In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly left open this question. 

See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 75 n.5 (“Because we need not reach the issue, we express no

opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of

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prejudicial evidence of his past acts of domestic violence against Nettie was admitted at trial

notwithstanding that, in actuality, this evidence possessed no legitimate relevancy, per the

California Supreme Court’s holding in Anderson that duress is no defense to murder.” (Pet. at

13.)

The question whether evidence of prior uncharged acts was properly admitted

under California law is not cognizable in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67. The only question before this court is whether the trial court

committed an error that rendered petitioner’s trial so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it

violated federal due process. Id. See also Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir.

1991) (“the issue for us, always, is whether the state proceedings satisfied due process; the

presence or absence of a state law violation is largely beside the point”). A writ of habeas corpus

will be granted for an erroneous admission of evidence “only where the ‘testimony is almost

entirely unreliable and ... the factfinder and the adversary system will not be competent to

uncover, recognize, and take due account of its shortcomings.’" Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F. 3d

939, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983)). Evidence

violates due process only if “there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the

evidence.” Jammal, 926 F. 2d at 920. Even then, evidence must "be of such quality as

necessarily prevents a fair trial." Id. (quoting Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463 (9th

Cir. 1986)). 

Petitioner’s trial was not rendered fundamentally unfair because of the admission

of evidence of his acts of domestic violence against Nettie Reay. As noted by the state appellate 6

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‘prior crimes’ evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime”). Accordingly, on this

basis alone, it would be difficult to conclude that the state courts’ decision with respect to this

claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.

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court, the incidents of domestic violence were decidedly less inflammatory than the

circumstances of the charged crimes. In addition, evidence of domestic violence was relevant to

the case against Nettie Reay to show her state of mind. These are rational inferences the jury

could draw from the challenged evidence that are not constitutionally impermissible. 

Moreover, any claimed error in admitting this testimony did not have “a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at

637. See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 793-96 (2001). As described above, the evidence

against petitioner was overwhelming, consisting of direct evidence from two eyewitnesses and

circumstantial evidence from several other witnesses. Further, any threat of improper prejudice

flowing from the testimony was mitigated by the trial court’s instruction directing the jury to

consider the uncharged acts testimony only as it was relevant to show the existence of Nettie

Reay’s intent and/or whether she was a credible witness. The jury is presumed to have followed

this instruction. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 196-97 (1997); United States v. Reed,

147 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987)

(referring to "the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions"). 

For all of these reasons, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

G. Cumulative Error (Claim VIII)

Petitioner claims that his right to a fair trial was violated by the cumulative effect

of the errors described in the claims addressed above.

The United States Supreme Court has clearly established that the combined effect

of multiple trial errors may give rise to a due process violation if it renders a trial fundamentally

unfair, even where each error considered individually would not require reversal. Parle v.

Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643

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(1974) and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 290 (1973)). “The fundamental question in

determining whether the combined effect of trial errors violated a defendant's due process rights

is whether the errors rendered the criminal defense ‘far less persuasive,’ Chambers, 410 U.S. at

294, and thereby had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence’ on the jury's verdict.” Parle,

505 F. 3d at 927 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). In determining whether the combined effect

of multiple errors constituted a due process violation, “the overall strength of the prosecution's

case must be considered because ‘a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is

more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.’” Parle,

505 F. 3d at 928 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696). 

This court has addressed each of petitioner’s claims alleged to have caused

prejudicial cumulative error and has concluded that no error of constitutional magnitude

occurred. The court also concludes that the alleged errors, even when considered together, did

not render petitioner’s defense “far less persuasive,” nor did they have a “substantial and

injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.” This is particularly true here, where the

evidence against petitioner was strong. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his

claim of cumulative error.

H. Prosecutorial Misconduct (Claim IX)

1. Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner claims the prosecutor committed misconduct during his closing

argument when he criticized the testimony of petitioner’s alibi witness Stephanie Schaefer. (Pet.

at 14.) Specifically, petitioner objects to the following portion of the prosecutor’s argument to

the jury:

In this case Ms. Schaefer has Travis’s child. So right there you

have got to think there is a relationship there. She told you on the

stand she still loves him. She said she wants him back. She said

she would do anything within reason to get him back. She has

visited over fifty times in the jail. So right there when she testifies

you have got to keep that in account when you consider what she is

saying and whether or not she is actually believable.

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Now, keeping that in mind that Travis is the father of her child, she

loves him, she has visited him fifty times, ask yourself when I read

you these transcript quotes that this actually makes sense.

The question: Did he tell you he was going to turn himself in,

Travis?

She goes: Yes, he did.

Question: At that time did you contact law enforcement to give a

statement?

Answer: I never contacted law enforcement, no.

Question: When is the first time you were contacted by defense

attorneys in this case?

Answer: I talked to his attorney for the first time last week, made

my statement for the first time.

Right there you should say that is a complete joke. How can

someone be the mother of a child, love this person, you are with

him when he says he is going to turn himself in, you are aware he

is going to be turning himself in for murder, the logical question

would be when did this murder happen.

Certainly the logical inference is that Travis knows when it

happened because he is charged with a crime that says on or about

the 16th of August of 1993. He tells her all this, and what does she

do? Does she go down to law enforcement with him and give a 

statement? No. Doesn’t that right there cause you to think she is

full of it, I don’t want to believe anything she says?

(RT at 1272-73.)

Petitioner also objects to the following portion of the prosecutor’s closing

argument, delivered after the above-described remarks:

So then he comes to Stephanie Schaefer and says well, let’s stick

with her, and under cross-examination on her, to come up a goose

egg, I don’t think so. All you have to do is ask her why didn’t you

go to the police when you are with him the day he turns himself in? 

And she gives a lame response about I’m not sure what I was

supposed to do, I thought I would wait until I was contacted. 

That’s bull, I’m going to let him sit in jail for two years and I will

wait for my starring moment and come into court and look like a 

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 In In re Hillery the state appellate court held that absent a showing of an extraordinary 7

circumstance warranting action by the court of appeal in the first instance, post-conviction claims

should be presented to the superior court before they are presented to the court of appeal. 202

Cal. App. 2d at 294. 

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fool on the stand when I talk about how I was with him and have

no explanations for any of it.

(Id. at 1387-88.)

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor knew his argument in this regard was false. 

In this regard, petitioner argues,

In fact, the prosecutor’s implication was false and the prosecutor

knew it to be false: Schaefer had been in contact with defense

counsel’s investigator and had informed him of her potential alibi

testimony from the time of petitioner’s arrest. Moreover, the

district attorney’s office had subpoenaed Schaefer to testify as a

prosecution witness at the time of petitioner’s preliminary hearing

in April 1997, although she was not actually called to the witness

stand at that time. The prosecutor’s misleading argument thus

unfairly undermined petitioner’s alibi defense in the eyes of the

jury.

(Pet. at 15.)

2. Standard of Review

On July 31, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal, raising the following claims: (1) the prosecutor committed

misconduct in closing argument; (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he

failed to object to the prosecutor’s improper argument; (3) his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance when he failed to call petitioner’s sister and one “Kimberly Taylor” as defense

witnesses; and (4) newly discovered evidence indicated he was factually innocent of the murder. 

(Resp’ts’ Lodged Document 12 (Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, California Supreme Court,

S120319), Attach., page 2.) This petition was denied with a citation to In re Hillery, 202 Cal.

App. 2d 293 (1962). (Id.) 7

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On March 13, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

California Superior Court, in which he raised the same four claims. (Id.) The Superior Court

denied petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct on the grounds that the claim should have

been raised on appeal, denied petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on the

merits, and made no mention of petitioner’s claim of newly discovered evidence of actual

innocence. (Pet’r’s Lodged Document 12, Ex. G.) On November 20, 2001, petitioner filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, in which he raised these same

claims. (Resp’ts’ Lodged Document 6.) That petition was summarily denied. (Id.) It appears

from the foregoing that no state court has issued a decision on the merits of petitioner’s claim of

prosecutorial misconduct. Accordingly, this court will analyze that claim de novo. Nulph, 333

F.3d at 1056.

3. Legal Standards

A defendant's due process rights are violated when a prosecutor's misconduct

renders a trial fundamentally unfair. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). 

However, such misconduct does not, per se, violate a petitioner's constitutional rights. Jeffries, 5

F.3d at 1191 (citing Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 and Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1457

(9th Cir. 1987)). Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed "'on the merits, examining the

entire proceedings to determine whether the prosecutor's [actions] so infected the trial with

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’" Johnson v. Sublett, 63

F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). See also Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765

(1987); Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643; Turner v Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 868 (9th Cir. 2002). Relief

on such claims is limited to cases in which the petitioner can establish that prosecutorial

misconduct resulted in actual prejudice. Johnson, 63 F.3d at 930 (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at

637-38); see also Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-83; Turner, 281 F.3d at 868. Put another way,

prosecutorial misconduct violates due process when it has a substantial and injurious effect or

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influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th

Cir. 1996). 

In considering claims of prosecutorial misconduct involving allegations of

improper argument the court is to examine the likely effect of the statements in the context in

which they were made and determine whether the comments so infected the trial with unfairness

as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Turner, 281 F.3d at 868; Sandoval v.

Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 778 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643; Darden, 477

U.S. at 181-83. Thus, in order to determine whether a prosecutor engaged in misconduct during

closing argument, it is necessary to examine the entire proceedings to place the challenged

remarks in context. See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33 (1988) (“[P]rosecutorial

comment must be examined in context. . . .”); Greer, 483 U.S. at 765-66; Williams v. Borg, 139

F.3d 737, 745 (9th Cir. 1998). In fashioning closing arguments, prosecutors are allowed

“reasonably wide latitude,” United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666, 671-72 (9th Cir. 1984), and

are free to argue “reasonable inferences from the evidence.” United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d

1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1989). See also Ducket v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 742 (9th Cir. 1995). 

“[Prosecutors] may strike ‘hard blows,’ based upon the testimony and its inferences, although

they may not, of course, employ argument which could be fairly characterized as foul or unfair.”

United States v. Gorostiza, 468 F.2d 915, 916 (9th Cir. 1972). 

4. Background

As noted by respondents, petitioner contended at trial that the murder occurred

late Sunday, August 15 or early Monday August 16, 1993. The prosecution argued that the

murder occurred late Saturday, August 14 or early Sunday, August 15. (Answer at 32.) 

Stephanie Schaefer provided an alibi for the period late Sunday, August 15 through the morning

of August 17, 1993. (RT at 1136, 1138-39, 1144, 1151.) Petitioner did not offer an alibi for the

period of time from late Saturday, August 14 to early Sunday, August 15. 

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26 Petitioner’s trial commenced on August 3, 1998 and Schaefer testified on August 27, 8

1998. 

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During the prosecution’s cross-examination of Ms. Schaefer, plaintiff’s alibi

witness, the following exchange occurred:

Q. (by the prosecutor): Did you talk to [petitioner] prior to him

going into custody?

A. (by Stephanie Schaefer): I had seen him the day he turned

himself in.

Q. Did he tell you he was going to turn himself in?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. At that time did you contact law enforcement and give a

statement?

A. I never contacted law enforcement, no.

Q. When is the first time that you were contacted by defense

attorneys in this case?

A. I talked to his attorney for the first time last week, made my

statement for the first time.

Q. When did you first get contacted by defense attorneys?

A. I’m not quite sure.

(RT at 1140.) Upon further questioning, Schaefer estimated that she was first contacted by

defense attorneys “in the springtime,” and maybe “as late as June.” (Id.) Schaefer explained 8

that her first contact with the defense was when an investigator called her and asked Schaefer

whether she had anything to “share” with the defense. (Id. at 1141.) She responded that she

would rather talk to petitioner’s attorney directly. (Id. at 1142.) The next day, the investigator

drove Schaefer to meet with petitioner’s trial counsel. (Id.) 

Later in her testimony, Schaefer stated she didn’t think about contacting law

enforcement at the time petitioner turned himself in. (Id. at 1152.) She stated she asked

petitioner’s mother whether she should make a statement and she “was told that I would be

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contacted when they need me.” (Id.) Schaefer further explained she didn’t think she was

“supposed to” call the Sheriff’s Department, but was “supposed to wait until his attorney

contacted me.” (Id.) In his claim before this court, petitioner argues that the prosecutor, in his

closing remarks, falsely stated that Schaefer didn’t come forward with her alibi until just before

trial, when in fact the prosecutor knew that Schaefer had been willing to inform the appropriate

authorities of petitioner’s whereabouts at the time in question much earlier.

5. Analysis

This court concludes that the prosecutor’s challenged remarks did not unfairly

characterize Schaefer’s testimony or convey a knowingly false impression to the jury. The

prosecutor was trying to make the point that Schaefer’s alibi testimony was suspect because she

had failed to report it until she was contacted by petitioner’s attorney shortly before the trial. 

This was a fair argument based on Schaefer’s trial testimony. Contrary to petitioner’s claim,

Schaefer did not testify that she told the defense investigator about petitioner’s alibi at the time of

his arrest. On the contrary, she testified that she was not contacted by the investigator until

shortly before the trial. Further, petitioner’s contention that the prosecution subpoenaed Schaefer

as a witness at the preliminary hearing, even if true, is not dispositive of this claim. There is no

indication from the record as to why the prosecutor might have subpoenaed Schaefer at that time,

and this court will not speculate on a reason. Viewing the prosecutor’s closing argument in its

entirety, this court concludes the challenged comments were a reasonable inference from the

testimony given by Schaefer at petitioner’s trial. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief

on this claim. 

I. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner has raised several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in

addition to those discussed above. The court will evaluate these claims below.

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26 Petitioner’s trial commenced on August 3, 1998. (RT at 1.) 9

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1. Counsel’s Failure to Object to the Prosecutor’s Misconduct in Closing

Argument (Claim X)

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because of

his failure to object to the above-described comments during the prosecutor’s closing argument

and his failure to “take steps to ensure that the jury learned that defense witness Stephanie

Schaefer first told a defense investigator of her potential alibi testimony shortly following

petitioner’s arrest.” (Pet. at 15.) Petitioner also argues, “to the extent that trial counsel’s delay or

inaccuracies in revealing Schaefer’s known status as a defense alibi witness may have

contributed to the prosecutor’s feeling justified in making the closing argument set forth [in the

claim above], defense counsel was likewise ineffective in engaging in such conduct.” (Id.) 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice with respect to this claim. As

described above, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by virtue of his comments on the

alibi testimony of Stephanie Schaefer. There is, of course, no obligation to raise meritless

arguments on a client’s behalf. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 (requiring a showing of

deficient performance as well as prejudice). Accordingly, petitioner’s trial counsel did not render

ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecutor’s argument. 

Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel was deficient in

failing to present evidence that Schaefer told a defense investigator about petitioner’s alibi

shortly after he was arrested. First, there is no evidence that Schaefer made such a statement to

anyone at or around the time of petitioner’s arrest. Rather, as noted above, Schaefer testified at

trial that she was first contacted by defense attorneys through an investigator perhaps as late as

June of 1998 and met with counsel the following day where she made her statement in support 9

of petitioner’s alibi for the first time. (RT at 1140-42.) Even if Schaefer had been willing to

testify that she told a defense investigator about petitioner’s alibi shortly after his arrest, defense

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counsel could have reasonably decided as a tactical matter not to challenge the credibility of his

alibi witness by contradicting her previous trial testimony. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687)

(counsel’s tactical decisions are “virtually unchallengeable”). Accordingly, petitioner is not

entitled to relief on this claim.

2. Counsel’s Failure to Call Petitioner’s Sister to the Witness Stand to Testify in

Support of His Alibi Defense (Claim XI) 

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance “in

unreasonably electing not to call petitioner’s sister, Melinda McCullar, to the witness stand” in

support of petitioner’s alibi defense. (Pet. at 15.) Petitioner states that he asked his counsel to

call Ms. McCullar but that he failed to do so. Petitioner notes that the prosecutor argued to the

jury that if the account of petitioner’s alibi witness was truthful, his sister would have been called

to the stand to support it. (Id. at 16; see RT at 1388.) Petitioner also informs the court of the

following:

When state appellate counsel contacted [trial counsel] concerning

this matter, [trial counsel] explained that he had interviewed Ms.

McCullar, but decided that she would not make a good defense

witness because she was not articulate and possessed only

borderline intelligence. Appellate counsel then spoke to Ms.

McCullar by telephone and strongly disagreed with [trial

counsel’s] representation . Ms. McCullar was articulate and she

stated that she had been ready, willing and able to testify in support

of petitioner’s alibi defense. 

(Pet. at 16.) 

It appears that petitioner’s trial counsel knew petitioner’s sister was willing to

testify in support of petitioner’s alibi defense. He chose, however, not to call her as a witness

because he believed she would not have been a credible or helpful witness for the defense. This

tactical decision may not form the basis of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See

Bergmann v. McCaughtry, 65 F.3d 1372, 1380 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[a]s a matter of trial strategy,

counsel could well decide not to call family members as witnesses because family members can

be easily impeached for bias"). 

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Even assuming arguendo that trial counsel’s failure to call petitioner’s sister as a

witness to support petitioner’s alibi defense fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,

petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice stemming therefrom. As noted above, the

prosecutor argued that the murder took place at a time for which petitioner had no alibi. If the

jury believed the prosecutor’s theory as to the date and time of the murder, an alibi for a different

date would not have had a significant impact on the verdict. Further, the jury was informed by

both Stephanie Schaefer and David Coe that petitioner was in their presence from August 15

through August 17. The absence of cumulative evidence on this point from petitioner’s sister

would not have resulted in a different outcome at trial. 

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the California Superior Court rejecting

petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of Strickland. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

J. Newly Discovered Evidence

Petitioner raises two claims of “newly discovered evidence” of factual innocence.

As described above in connection with petitioner’s claim IX, it appears that no state court has

issued a decision on the merits of these claims. Accordingly, the court will review them de novo. 

Nulph, 333 F.3d at 1056.

1. Potential Testimony of Angela Wolfe (Claim XII)

Petitioner claims that “newly discovered evidence” demonstrates his “factual

innocence” of the murder. (Pet. at 16.) Petitioner explains as follows:

Angela Wolfe was another woman housed in the North Sacramento

jail at the same time as codefendant Nettie Reay. A member of

petitioner’s family informed state appellate counsel that a named

friend of hers discussed this case with Wolfe. Wolfe said that

Nettie Reay had told her that she would lie to implicate petitioner

in the Dixon murder. Accordingly, Wolfe’s potential testimony

represents newly discovered evidence, providing grounds for

habeas corpus relief.

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(Id. at 16-17.) Petitioner states that he was prevented from presenting this claim “more fully” in

state court because the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court denied his

motions for habeas counsel and for funds to investigate his claims of actual innocence. (Id. at

17.)

In Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), a capital case, a majority of the

Supreme Court assumed without deciding that the execution of an innocent person would violate

the Constitution. A different majority of the Supreme Court explicitly so held. Compare 506

U.S. at 417 with 506 U.S. at 419 and 430-37. See also House v. Bell, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct.

2064, 2084 (2006) (declining to resolve whether federal courts may entertain claims of actual

innocence but concluding that the petitioner’s showing of innocence in that case fell short of the

threshold suggested by the Court in Herrera); Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir.

2000); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Although the Supreme

Court did not specify the standard applicable to this type of “innocence” claim, it noted that the

threshold would be "extraordinarily high" and that the showing would have to be "truly

persuasive." Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417. See also Carriger, 132 F.3d at 476. The Ninth Circuit has

determined that in order to be entitled to relief on such a claim a petitioner must affirmatively

prove that he is probably innocent. Jackson, 211 F.3d at 1165; Carriger, 132 F.3d at 476-77. 

A habeas petitioner’s claim of actual innocence must be supported “with new

reliable evidence – whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness

accounts, or critical physical evidence – that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513

U.S. 298, 324 (1995). To prevail, a petitioner making an actual innocence claim “must show

that, in light of all the evidence, including evidence not introduced at trial, ‘it is more likely than

not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 

Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 776 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). See also

Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 672-73 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (concluding that

petitioner’s claim of actual innocence seeking to discredit a prosecution’s witness, rather than

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affirmatively presenting new exculpatory evidence, does not fundamentally call into question the

reliability of petitioner’s conviction); Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002)

(concluding that new evidence that raised questions about the victim’s motive to lie but which

did not provide direct evidence regarding the commission of the crime, did not present a

colorable claim of actual innocence).

Even assuming arguendo that a claim of actual innocence is cognizable in this

non-capital case, petitioner has failed to make the required showing. Petitioner’s unsupported

statement that an unnamed family friend had a conversation with an inmate in the North

Sacramento jail who spoke to Nettie Reay is not “reliable” evidence, nor does it demonstrate that

petitioner is probably innocent of the murder for which he was convicted. Petitioner’s argument

that he was improperly prevented from presenting this claim more fully in his state habeas

petition is unavailing. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to collateral

proceedings in state court. Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Clearly, there

is no constitutional right to counsel on habeas.”). For these reasons, petitioner is not entitled to

relief on this claim.

2. Potential Testimony of Kimberly Taylor (Claim XIV)

Petitioner explains his second claim of “newly discovered evidence” of actual

innocence as follows:

Kimberly Taylor was a woman who shared a jail cell with

petitioner’s codefendant, Nettie Reay. Prior to trial, Ms. Taylor

contacted defense counsel Corbin and indicated that she had

information which might he helpful to petitioner. This consisted of

jail cell conversations between Nettie Reay and Taylor to the effect

that Nettie Reay intended to falsely implicate petitioner in the

murder of April Dixon. Defense counsel Corbin had an

investigator contact Taylor, but at that point she refused to be

interviewed. Mr. Corbin then subpoenaed Taylor to testify at trial. 

When she came to court, she likewise refused to be interviewed by

Mr. Corbin. Therefore, Mr. Corbin did not call her to the witness

stand. Petitioner believes that, given the elapse of time, it is

reasonably probable that if an investigator now personally

contacted Taylor that she might now be willing to testify in

accordance with her initial contact with Mr. Corbin. Taylor’s

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potential testimony to the effect that Nettie Reay told Taylor that

she would lie to implicate petitioner in the Dixon murder would

constitute new evidence providing grounds for habeas corpus

relief.

(Pet. at 18.) 

Petitioner has also failed to make the required showing to prevail on this claim of

actual innocence. Petitioner’s unsupported speculation that Kimberly Taylor would change her

mind and now be willing to testify about statements allegedly made to her by Nettie Reay does

not constitute reliable evidence demonstrating that petitioner is actually innocent of Angel

Dixon’s murder. The court also notes that, even if Kimberly Taylor testified in accordance with

petitioner’s expectations, a rational juror could have found petitioner guilty of murder. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

K. Improper Ruling by the California Court of Appeal (Claim XIII)

Petitioner claims that his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the

laws was violated when the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District denied 

motions filed by petitioner’s appellate attorney to expand his appointment for purposes of filing a

state habeas corpus petition and to provide funds for a habeas investigation. Petitioner contends

that these motions would have been granted if his appeal had been pending before the First,

Second, or Sixth Appellate Districts. In support of this claim, petitioner has filed the declaration

of his appellate counsel, which was attached to petitioner’s application for a petition for writ of

habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. (Pet., Ex. C.) In the declaration, appellate

counsel states that, based on his experience, he believes that “it is almost certain that if Mr.

Reay’s appeal had been pending in the First, Second or Sixth Appellate Districts [he] would have

been permitted to spend at least $750 investigating Mr. Reay’s potential habeas claims and that

[he] would have been reasonably compensated for [his] time and expenses in preparing a habeas

corpus petition on [petitioner’s] behalf under the policies of those appellate districts.” (Id.) 

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Petitioner cites the decisions in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) and Myers v.

Ylst, 897 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1990) in support of this claim in this regard. These cases are not on

point. In Myers, the petitioner provided evidence that the state court afforded one person the

retroactive benefit of a ruling on the right to an impartial jury while denying it to the petitioner on

identical facts. Myers, 897 F.2d at 423. Petitioner has provided no such evidence. In Bush v.

Gore, the United States Supreme Court held that held that the Equal Protection Clause required

uniform and specific standards for vote counting. 531 U.S. 105-06. The Supreme Court

expressly limited its analysis to the unique circumstances relating to the 2000 presidential

election process in Florida and the various recount procedures developed to address those

circumstances. 531 U.S. at 109 ("Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for

the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities"). 

The holding in Bush v. Gore does not apply to the circumstances presented here. See Coleman v.

Quarterman, 456 F.3d 537, 542-43 (5th Cir. 2006) (concluding that “Bush v. Gore’s utter lack of

implication in the criminal procedure context” is beyond debate), cert. denied, ___U.S.___, 127

S. Ct. 2030 (2007);

No constitutional provision or federal law entitles petitioner to state collateral

review. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987). Therefore, unless state collateral

review violates some independent constitutional right, errors cannot form the basis for federal

habeas corpus relief. See Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir. 2004) (errors in a state

post-conviction review proceeding are not addressable through federal habeas corpus), cert.

denied, 543 U.S. 1071 (2005); Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (same, joining

four other circuits). There is no evidence of an independent constitutional violation here. 

Petitioner’s claim that his motions for the appointment of habeas counsel and funds for an

investigation would have been granted by other state appellate courts, and his appellate counsel’s

opinion to the same effect, are based on pure speculation. Further, petitioner has failed to

demonstrate, or even to allege, that the Third District Court of Appeal’s decision not to expand

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the appointment of his appellate counsel was based on race, religion, or any other arbitrary

classification. The fact that different districts of the California Court of Appeal may apply

different standards in practice for the appointment of counsel in collateral proceedings does not

constitute an equal protection violation where there is no evidence that the standards are applied

in a discriminatory fashion. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (“the conscious

exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation”).

For these reasons, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

 CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 16, 2008.

DAD:8

reay2067.hc

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