Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04964/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04964-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Federal Defendants include the Treasury Department, Small Business Administration, Veterans Administration,

Homeland Security, Glenda - Supervisor TOCS, Barbara Zepeda, Tanya N. Garfield, and Inspector Lott.

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Plaintiff recently filed four documents entitled “motions” but without notice of a hearing date. The Court denies

as moot Plaintiff’s “Motion Opposing Extension of Time for Conference Meeting” and “Motion & Order to Add Defendants”

given that Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss disposes of the case. The Court denies Plaintiff’s “Motion & Order in

Opposition to Dismissal and “Negligence for a Default Judgment Against United States”and “2nd Motion & Order for a

Default Judgment Against United States” because Plaintiff fails to state grounds sufficient for a default judgment. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT CURTIS,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

 TREASURY DEPARTMENT ET AL,

Defendant. /

No. C05-04964 MJJ

ORDER GRANTING FEDERAL

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Federal Defendants’1 Motion to Dismiss and Alternatively Motion for a

More Definite Statement. (Docket No. 75.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the

Motion to Dismiss without leave to amend. Furthermore, the Court DENIES as moot Federal

Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite Statement and VACATES the October 2, 2007 hearing in

this matter.2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 1, 2005, pro se Plaintiff Robert Curtis (“Plaintiff”) filed his original

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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On April 23, 2007, this Court granted Defendant Visa U.S.A.’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

for failure to state a claim and for insufficient process and service, and again gave Plaintiff leave to file an amended claim

against Visa U.S.A. (Docket No. 59.).

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Plaintiff’s SAC also names Bank of America and Visa Card as Defendants. The Motion before this Court only

concerns Federal Defendants. 

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges new facts that seem to raise claims against new individuals and entities such as such

as Bureau of Land Management, Judge Owen G. Panner, William Elliot, Frank Noonan, Steve Shapiro, G. Joan Betts, and

President George W. Bush. (See SAC at 1-10.). The Court need not address these arguments because these individuals are

not parties to the action and the current Motion is brought by the Federal Defendants. 

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Complaint. On February 6, 2007, this Court granted the Federal Defendants’ first motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim. Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiff had

failed to (1) affirmatively allege that he filed an administrative claim; and (2) identify the United

States as the sole party Defendant. The Court granted Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his

Complaint.

Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint on March 2, 2007.3

 On May 31, 2007, the Court

granted Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: (1) failure to properly

amend by continuing to name individual agencies as Defendants, rather than the United States; and

(2) failure to allege timely presentation of a written claim to the administrative agency. The Court

granted Plaintiff another opportunity to amend. On June 29, 2007, Plaintiff filed the Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”), which is the operative complaint before this Court. 

Plaintiff’s SAC is entitled “2nd Amended Complaint for Federal Fraud Against Robert

Curtis.” In the SAC, Plaintiff complains of “fraud” and “Lost [sic] of Construction Income,” “Lost

[sic] of Bonding [sic],” “Lost [sic] of Credit,” “Lost [sic] of SBA Job 2005-2006,” “Lost [sic] of

Income,” “Lost [sic] of $730.23,” “Lost [sic] of $500,000.00,” “Lost [sic] of $1.3 Billion,” “Lost

[sic] of the Curtis diamonds,” “Lost [sic] of a Certain Life Style,” and “Lost [sic] of Life, Liberty

and the pursuit of Happiness.” (SAC at 20.) Plaintiff names the United States, United States

Treasury Department, the Small Business Administration (“SBA”), the United States Veterans

Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, and four Federal employees as Federal

Defendants.4

 As best as this Court can discern, Plaintiff’s SAC arises from the alleged procedures

used to satisfy a debt allegedly owed by the Plaintiff to the Portland Veterans Hospital.

Plaintiff’s SAC makes the following relevant allegations against the agency Federal

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Defendants. Plaintiff was employed by the SBA as a Loss Verifier from September 15, 2004 to

December 15, 2004. (SAC ¶ 46.) During this time, the SBA issued Plaintiff travel vouchers that

were deposited to a government-issued Bank of America MasterCard account in Plaintiff’s name. 

(Id. ¶ ¶ 50, 55.) On November 22, 2004, Plaintiff received notice from the Treasury Department that

he owed a debt to the Portland Veterans Hospital for pharmacy charges following his quadruple

bypass surgery in August 2003. (Id. ¶ ¶ 40, 47.) Plaintiff believes he should have been exempt from

these charges because his income was below the $10,929.00 threshold level. (Id. ¶ ¶ 42-43.) The

Treasury Department collected the debt owed by Plaintiff by intercepting the travel vouchers that

were deposited into this account. (Id. ¶ ¶ 47-48, 55.) The interception allegedly occurred as two

debit adjustments in the amounts of $600.44 and $129.79 for a total amount of $730.23. (Id. ¶ ¶ 46-

47.) As a result of the collection, Plaintiff’s account had a negative balance and he was held

responsible for the charges owed. (Id. ¶ 53.) The Treasury Department also intercepted his 2003

Tax Returns in the amount of $81.00. (Id.¶ 81.) Plaintiff sent copies of his first Complaint to the

SBA, Veterans Administration, and Treasury Department via Certified Mail. (Id. ¶ 75.)

Plaintiff makes the following relevant allegations against individual Federal Defendants. On

April 8, 2005, he contacted individual Defendant Barbara Zepeda, of the SBA in Sacramento, via

telephone regarding the offset deduction from his Travel Card Account. (SAC ¶ ¶ 56-57.) In

response, Zepeda stated: “I cannot help!” “It is your Problem!” “I cannot deal with this!” “You

made an Error!” “Not my problem!” “Contact Bank of America!” “Go to Hell!” (Id. ¶ 57.) He also

spoke to individual Defendant Glenda of the Treasury Department. (Id. ¶ 67.) Glenda similarly told

him, “Go to Hell!” He faxed a copy of his initial complaint to Zepeda and Glenda. (Id. ¶ ¶ 72-73.) 

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Rule 12(b)(1) authorizes a party to move to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; thus, the Court presumes lack of

jurisdiction, and the party seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that

subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994). A party challenging the court’s jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may do so by raising either

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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a facial attack or a factual attack. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). 

A facial attack is one where “the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a

complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v.

Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In evaluating a facial attack to jurisdiction, the Court

must accept the factual allegations in plaintiff’s complaint as true. See Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d

1156, 1157 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2001). For a factual attack, in contrast, the Court may consider extrinsic

evidence. See Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir.1987). Further, the court does

not have to assume the truthfulness of the allegations, and may resolve any factual disputes. See

White, 227 F.3d at 1242. Thus, “[o]nce the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a

factual motion by presenting affidavits or evidence properly before the court, the party opposing the

motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing

subject matter jurisdiction.” Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir.

2003). 

 In the Ninth Circuit, “[j]urisdictional dismissals in cases premised on federal-question

jurisdiction are exceptional, and must satisfy the requirements specific in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678

[] (1946).” Sun Valley Gas., Inc. v. Ernst Enters., 711 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir. 1983); see Safe Air for

Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. The Bell standard provides that jurisdictional dismissals are warranted

“where the alleged claim under the [C]onstitution or federal statute clearly appears to be immaterial

and made solely for the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly

insubstantial and frivolous.” 327 U.S. at 682-83. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has admonished

that a “[j]urisdictional finding of genuinely disputed facts is inappropriate when ‘the jurisdictional

issue and substantive issues are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is dependent on the

resolution of factual issues going to the merits’ of an action.” Sun Valley, 711 F.2d at 139. The

jurisdictional issue and the substantive issues are intertwined where “a statute provides the basis for

both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the plaintiff’s substantive claim for

relief.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (quoting Sun Valley, 711 F.2d at 139). 

II. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

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sufficiency of a claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the focus of a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion is on the legal sufficiency, rather than the substantive merits of a claim, the

Court ordinarily limits its review to the face of the complaint. See Van Buskirk v. Cable News

Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court

accepts the plaintiff’s material allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Generally, dismissal is proper only when the plaintiff has failed to assert a cognizable legal theory or

failed to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See SmileCare Dental Group v.

Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1996); Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th

Cir. 1984). In pleading sufficient facts, however, a plaintiff must suggest his or her right to relief is

more than merely conceivable, but plausible on its face. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127

S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). Allegations drafted by pro se plaintiffs, however, are held to a "less

stringent standard" than those prepared by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). 

ANALYSIS

I. The Court Dismisses the Agency Defendants Because the United States is the Only

Proper Party Under the FTCA.

Plaintiff frames the SAC as a tort action against the Treasury Department, the SBA, Veterans

Administration, the Department of Homeland Security and four individuals. The Federal Tort

Claims Act (FTCA) provides that the United States is the sole party which may be sued for personal

injuries arising out of the negligence of its employees. Allen v. Veteran’s Administration, 749 F.2d

1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint on the

ground that the United States, not Veterans Administration was the proper defendant). Individual

agencies of the United states, such as the Treasury Department, may not be sued. Despite being

given two chances to properly allege his complaint against the correct parties, Plaintiff has failed to

do so. In fact, the Court warned that the case would be dismissed without prejudice if the Plaintiff

did not comply in the prior Order Granting Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on May 31,

2007.

As such, the Court GRANTS Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Treasury

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Department, Small Business Administration, Veterans Administration, and Homeland Security for

failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court does not

grant Plaintiff leave to amend.

II. The Court Does Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction Because Plaintiff Failed to

Affirmatively Allege Compliance with the FTCA.

Federal Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to assert this Court’s jurisdiction, contrary

to this Court’s orders on February 6 and May 31, 2007. Before an individual can file an FTCA

action against the United States in district court, he must seek an administrative resolution of the

claim. Section 2675(a) of the FTCA provides, in relevant part:

An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money

damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death . . . unless the

claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and

his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by

certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a

claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time

thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section. 

28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). “The timely filing of an administrative claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to

the bringing of suit under the FTCA [] and as such should be affirmatively alleged in the complaint.” 

Gillespie v. Civileti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1980).

According to Federal Defendants, Plaintiff has never filed an administrative tort claim. 

Plaintiff alleges that he faxed “a Copy of the future Complaint 05-4964-MJJ - Federal Fraud Against

Robert Curtis” to individual Defendants Glenda of the Treasury Department and Barbara Zepeda of

the SBA, the SBA, Veterans Administration and Treasury Department. (SAC ¶ ¶ 72, 73, 75.) 

Federal Defendants argue that a faxed complaint does not constitute a proper Administrative Tort

Claim. Though they do not cite to case law to indicate what constitutes a proper administrative tort

claim, we agree with their conclusion. “[T]he major reason for the administrative claim requirement

is to facilitate settlement of cases.” Caidin v. United States, 564 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1977). A

faxed complaint to employees such as Zepeda and Glenda does not sufficiently work towards this

purpose because they are not in the business of settling tort cases. Plaintiff’s faxed complaint would

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Federal Defendants argue that even if a faxed complaint constitutes a proper administrative tort claim, it would still

be insufficient because the FTCA requires that plaintiffs file their tort claims before issuing their complaints under 25 U.S.C.

§ 2675. It is unclear exactly when Plaintiff allegedly faxed the complaints but the Court does not need to reach this argument

because faxing a complaint to government employees does not constitute a sufficient administrative tort claim.

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As best as this Court can discern, Plaintiff’s allegations against individual Glenda arose from a phone conversation

on October 10, 2005. (SAC ¶ ¶ 67-68.) Plaintiff alleges that upon calling the Treasury Department, he reached Glenda, who

he believes holds a supervisor position at the Treasury Department. (Id. ¶ 67.) He demanded the return of $730.23 and faxed

her his credit card statement and “Treasury offset notices.” (Id.) He alleges that he called her back a few days later and was

told “Go to Hell!” (Id. ¶ 68.)

His allegations against individual Defendant Barbara Zepeda are similar. After he received the second delinquency

notice from the SBA, he called Barbara Zepeda “requesting Assistance to [sic] resolved [sic] the $730.23 Illegal Offset

deduction on [ ] Plaintiff’s Travel MASTERCARD.” (SAC ¶ 56.) Barbara Zepeda allegedly replied “I can not help!” “It

is your Problem!” “I cannot deal with this?!” “You made an Error!” “Not my problem!” “Contact Bank of America!” - “Go

to Hell!” (Id. ¶ 57.)

Notably, Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support his FTCA claims against individual Defendants Tanya Garfield

and Inspector Lott.

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not trigger an administrative process and cannot constitute a proper administrative tort claim.5 As

such, the Court GRANTS Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the remaining Federal Defendants

under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). 

III. The Court Need Not Reach Federal Defendants’ Final Arguments. 

Federal Defendants also assert that the individual Defendants (Glenda, Supervisor TOCS;

Barbara Zepeda; Tanya N. Garfield; Deputy Area Director; and Inspector Lott) should be dismissed

because Plaintiff fails to allege that these individuals were acting outside the course and scope of

their employment.6 A plaintiff may bring FTCA claims against individuals as long as those

individuals were not acting within the course and scope of their employment. See 28 U.S.C. §

2679(d)(1); Billings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 1995). It is unclear from the facts

alleged here whether individual Defendants were acting within their scope of employment. 

However, the Court does not need to reach this issue because Plaintiff has not exhausted his

administrative remedies. 

Finally, the Court need not address Federal Defendants’ additional arguments as to the

insufficiencies of Plaintiff’s complaint because Plaintiff has failed to seek administrative resolution

of the claim and as a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction. 

//

//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

Having dismissed Plaintiff’s case against the Federal Defendants bringing this motion, the Court

DENIES as moot the Federal Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite Statement. Plaintiff has had

two chances to properly allege his claims against Federal Defendants but has failed to do so. As

such, this Court does not grant him leave to amend. This Court VACATES the October 2, 2007

hearing in this matter. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the file. 

Dated: September 26, 2007 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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