Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00630/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00630-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WARNER BROS. RECORDS INC., a )

Delaware corporation, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

v. )

)

VANESSA MALACARA, )

)

Defendant. )

)

 )

1:06-cv-00630-OWW-SMS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT

JUDGMENT (DOCS. 17, 23)

Plaintiffs are proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302(c)(19) and 72-303.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for a default

judgment against Defendant Vanessa Malacara, filed on November

20, 2006, and re-noticed as an amended motion on December 7,

2006, including a notice of motion and motion, a declaration of

Thomas Kerr with attachments, and a proposed order. By separate

order the Court has vacated the hearing on the motion and has

deemed the matter submitted to the Court for decision.

I. Legal Standards on a Motion for Default Judgment

A court has the discretion to enter a default judgment

against one who is not an infant, incompetent, or member of the

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armed services where the claim is for an amount that is not

certain on the face of the claim and where 1) the defendant has

been served with the claim; 2) the defendant’s default has been

entered for failure to appear; 3) if the defendant has appeared

in the action, the defendant has been served with written notice

of the application for judgment at least three days before the

hearing on the application; and 4) the court has undertaken any

necessary and proper investigation or hearing in order to enter

judgment or carry it into effect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); Alan

Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th

Cir. 1988). Factors that may be considered by courts in

exercising discretion as to the entry of a default judgment

include the nature and extent of the delay, Draper v. Coombs, 792

F.2d 915, 924-925 (9 Cir. 1986); the possibility of prejudice to th

the plaintiff, Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th

Cir.1986); the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, id.; the

sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint to support

judgment, Alan Neuman Productions, Inc., 862 F.2d at 1392; the

amount in controversy, Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d at 1471-1472;

the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts, id.;

whether the default was due to excusable neglect, id.; and the

strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

that favors decisions on the merits, id.

 A default judgment generally bars the defaulting party from

disputing the facts alleged in the complaint, but the defaulting

party may argue that the facts as alleged do not state a claim.

Alan Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392.

Thus, well pleaded factual allegations, except as to damages, are

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taken as true; however, necessary facts not contained in the

pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not

established by default. Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of North America,

980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9 Cir. 1992); TeleVideo Systems, Inc. av. th

Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9 Cir. 1987). th

II. Service, Entry of Default, Notice, and Status of

 Defendant

The declaration of Thomas Kerr establishes that after

Defendant was identified, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent Defendant a

letter advising her that copyright infringement had been detected

and providing contact information for her to use to communicate

with Plaintiffs’ representatives to resolve the matter without

litigation; Plaintiffs’ settlement representatives were unable to

resolve the matter. (Decl. ¶ 8-9.) The sworn proof of service

filed on June 20, 2006, reflects that on June 9, 2006, the

summons and complaint were served on Defendant Vanessa Malacara

by a registered process server’s leaving the summons, complaint,

and related documents with an adult member of the household at

the dwelling house or usual place of abode of Plaintiff. (Doc.

9.) This service is sufficient under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2).

After Plaintiff failed to respond to the complaint, Plaintiffs

sent a letter to Defendant informing her that she was in default

and that if she failed to answer, a judgment for damages and an

injunction would be entered. Defendant did not respond to the

letter. (Decl. of Kerr, Ex. 3, ¶ 12.) 

Defendant failed to respond to the complaint, and pursuant

to Plaintiffs’ request, the Clerk entered default as to Defendant

on September 5, 2006 (Doc. 13.) Plaintiffs served the clerk’s

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certificate of default on Defendant by mail on the same date.

(Doc. 14.) Plaintiffs also filed proof of having served Defendant

by mail with the notice and motion for default judgment on

November 20, 2006, and with the amended notice of hearing and

motion on December 7, 2006. (Docs. 21, 23.)

Further, the notice was adequate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

55(d) and 54(c), which require that a judgment by default shall

not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for

in the demand for judgment. Plaintiff expressly sought in the

complaint the types of relief sought by the instant application

for default judgment, including injunctive relief, actual or

statutory damages at the election of Plaintiff, and costs.

(Compl. at pp. 4-5.) The failure to allege a specific sum in the

complaint does not prevent entry of a default judgment for a

certain sum or a sum that can be made certain where appropriate

notice has otherwise been given. See Appleton Elec. Co. v. Graves

Truck Line, 635 F.2d 603, 611 (7 Cir. 1980). th

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff gave adequate notice of

the nature and amount of its claim.

Finally, in the declaration, Kerr states that he is informed

and believes that Defendant is neither a minor nor an incompetent

person; further, a search for Defendant’s name conducted in the

United States Military Locator database of LexisNexis revealed no

evidence that Defendant is in the military service. (Decl. ¶ 15.)

Thus, it appears that with respect to notice and status, a

default judgment would be appropriate with respect to Defendant

Vanessa Malacara.

///

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III. Legal Sufficiency of the Complaint

An infringer of copyright is liable for actual damages and

any additional profits of the infringer attributable to the

infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a). An infringer is anyone who

violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as

provided by sections 106 through 118. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).

Copyright protection subsists in original works of authorship,

including pictorial and graphic works and sound recordings. 17

U.S.C. § 102. The owner of a copyright has the exclusive rights

to perform or authorize the reproduction of the copyrighted work

in copies, prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted

work, distribute copies to the public by sale or other transfer

of ownership, and display the copyrighted work publicly. 17

U.S.C. § 106.

Thus, to prevail on a claim for infringement of copyright

under 17 U.S.C. § 501, Plaintiffs must establish that Defendant

violated an exclusive right of the copyright owner as provided in

17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501(a). Elektra Entertainment Group Inc. v.

Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 392-93 (C.D.Cal. 2005). This means that 

to establish a prima facie case of direct infringement,

Plaintiffs must show 1) ownership of the allegedly infringed

material, and 2) the infringer’s violation of at least one

exclusive right granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. §

106. Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 453 (9 Cir. 2006). th

Here, Plaintiffs alleged that Plaintiffs owned the

copyrights or were the licensees of exclusive rights under the

United States copyright law with respect to various sound

recordings, including but not limited to seven specific sound

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recordings, entitled Taking You Home, Forever Your Girl, Blowing

Kisses in the Wind, Santeria, Breakdown, I Have Nothing, and

Nobody Else; each sound recording was the subject of a valid

certificate of copyright registration issued by the Register of

Copyrights; Plaintiffs owned the exclusive rights under copyright

law in the United States to reproduce and distribute the

copyrighted recordings. (Cmplt. pp. 2-3, Exs. A, B.) Plaintiffs

also alleged that each of the specific copyrighted sound

recordings in question contained a copyright notice on the album

cover; published copies advised the viewer that it was protected

by copyright laws. (Cmplt. p. 3.) Plaintiffs then alleged that

without Plaintiffs’ permission or consent, Defendant used and

continues to use an online media distribution system to download

the recordings, distribute them to the public, and make them

available for distribution to others in violation of Plaintiffs’

exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution; Defendant

thereby infringed Plaintiffs’ exclusive rights. (Cmplt. p. 3.)

Plaintiff further alleges expressly that the acts of infringement

were willful, intentional, and with disregard and indifference

for Plaintiffs’ rights. (Id.)

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have adequately stated claims for

copyright infringement.

IV. Discretionary Considerations

Here, it does not appear that there is any risk of mistake

or excusable neglect on the part of anyone with a potential

interest in the subject matter of the instant action. Further,

there is no apparent likelihood of a dispute as to a material

fact essential to the Plaintiffs’ case. No just cause for delay

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appears. It is apparent from the declaration submitted to the

Court that Defendant is not an infant, incompetent, or member of

the armed services. There does not appear to be any reason why

the general policy in favor of a decision on the merits would

warrant refusing to enter the requested default judgment. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown

their entitlement to a default judgment.

V. Damages

Plaintiffs request statutory damages in the amount of

$5,250.00, consisting of the minimum statutory amount of $750.00

for each of the seven specific sound recordings infringed.

Title 17 U.S.C. § 504 provides in pertinent part:

(a) In General. Except as otherwise provided by

this title, an infringer of copyright is liable 

for either--

(1) the copyright owner’s actual damages

and any additional profits of the infringer,

as provided by subsection (b); or

(2) statutory damages, as provided by

subsection (c).

....

(c) Statutory Damages.--

(1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this

subsection, the copyright owner may elect, at

any time before final judgment is rendered,

to recover, instead of actual damages and

profits, an award of statutory damages for

all infringements involved in the action,

with respect to any one work, for which any

one infringer is liable individually, or for

which any two or more infringers are liable

jointly and severally, in a sum of not less

than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court

considers just. For the purposes of this

subsection, all the parts of a compilation or

derivative work constitute one work.

(2) In a case where the copyright owner

sustains the burden of proving, and the court

finds, that infringement was committed

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willfully, the court in its discretion may

increase the award of statutory damages to a

sum of not more than $150,000. In a case

where the infringer sustains the burden of

proving, and the court finds, that such

infringer was not aware and had no reason to

believe that his or her acts constituted an

infringement of copyright, the court in its

discretion may reduce the award of statutory

damages to a sum of not less than $200. The

court shall remit statutory damages in any

case where an infringer believed and had

reasonable grounds for believing that his or

her use of the copyrighted work was a fair

use under section 107, if the infringer was:

(i) an employee or agent of a nonprofit

educational institution, library, or archives

acting within the scope of his or her

employment who, or such institution, library,

or archives itself, which infringed by

reproducing the work in copies or

phonorecords; or (ii) a public broadcasting

 entity which or a person who, as a regular

 part of the nonprofit activities of a public 

 broadcasting entity (as defined in subsection (g)

 of section 118) infringed by performing a published 

 nondramatic literary work or by reproducing a 

 transmission program embodying a performance of

 such a work. (Emphasis added.)

A district court has wide discretion in determining the amount of

statutory damages to be awarded and should consider what is just

in the particular case in light of the nature of the copyright,

the circumstances of the infringement, and so forth. Los Angeles

News Service v. Reuters Television International, Ltd., 149 F.3d

987, 996 (9 Cir. 1998). The statutory damages serve both th

compensatory and punitive purposes, so in order to effectuate the

statutory policy of discouraging infringement, recovery of

statutory damages is permitted even absent evidence of the actual

damages suffered by a plaintiff or of the profits reaped by a

defendant. Id. 

Here, Plaintiffs have established that seven different sound

recordings were infringed; on May 25, 2005, Plaintiffs’

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investigators discovered that Defendant was using an online media

distribution system over a peer-to-peer file-sharing network, had

752 music files on the computer, and was offering them to people;

and MediaSentry downloaded a number of the works and verified

that they were, indeed, Plaintiffs’ copyrighted recordings. (Kerr

Decl. pp. 1-2.) Hundreds more sound recordings were in the

“share” folder. (Cmplt. p. 2, Ex. B.) Combined with the copyright

notices included in each of the albums, this establishes the

wilfulness of the violations.

The Court further considers the fact that the copyright

relates to a sound recording and that Plaintiff failed to respond

to the complaint or otherwise participate in discovery and

thereby prevented discovery of the full extent of injury to

Plaintiffs. 

Considering all of the pertinent circumstances as

demonstrated by the declaration and attachments submitted by

Plaintiffs, and in order to effectuate the purposes of the

statute, the Court concludes that the minimum amount of 

$5,250.00 in damages for the multiple infringements is just and

reasonable. 

VI. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs pray for injunctive relief enjoining Defendant 

from directly or indirectly infringing Plaintiffs’ rights under

federal or state law in the copyrighted recordings and any sound

recording, whether now in existence or later created, that is

owned or controlled by Plaintiffs (or any parent, subsidiary, or

affiliate record label of Plaintiffs) (“Plaintiffs’ Recordings”),

including without limitation by using the Internet or any online

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media distribution system to reproduce (i.e., download) any of

Plaintiff’s Recordings, to distribute (i.e., upload) any of

Plaintiffs’ Recordings, or to make any of Plaintiff’s Recordings

available for distribution to the public, except pursuant to a

lawful license or with the express authority of Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs also seek to require Defendant to destroy all copies

of Plaintiffs’ Recordings that Defendant has downloaded onto any

computer hard drive or server without Plaintiffs’ authorization

and shall destroy all copies of those downloaded recording

transferred onto any physical medium or device in Defendant’s

possession, custody, or control. (Cmplt. p. 4.)

Title 17 U.S.C. § 502 states:

(a) Any court having jurisdiction of a civil

action arising under this title may, subject to the

provisions of section 1498 of title 28, grant temporary

and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem

reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a

copyright.

(b) Any such injunction may be served anywhere in

the United States on the person enjoined; it shall be

operative throughout the United States and shall be

enforceable, by proceedings in contempt or otherwise,

by any United States court having jurisdiction of that

person. The clerk of the court granting the injunction

shall, when requested by any other court in which

enforcement of the injunction is sought, transmit

promptly to the other court a certified copy of all the

papers in the case on file in such clerk's office

(emphasis added).

As a general rule, absent a great public injury, a permanent

injunction will be granted when liability has been established

and there is a threat of a continuing violations. Cadence Design

Systems, Inc. v. Avant! Corp., 125 F.3d 824, 829 (9 Cir. 1997); th

MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 520 (9th

Cir. 1993) (issuing an injunction against further infringement of

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protected software rights where the plaintiff demonstrated that

the defendant had computers in its loaner inventory with the

protected software on it). Generally a party seeking a

preliminary injunction must show either a likelihood of success

on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that

serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance

of hardships tips sharply in its favor; however, because in a

copyright infringement claim a showing of a reasonable likelihood

of success on the merits raises a presumption of irreparable

harm, a plaintiff need only show a likelihood of success on the

merits to obtain a preliminary injunction. Micro Star v. Formgen,

Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9 Cir. 1998). Here, Plaintiffs seek a th

permanent injunction. They have already shown actual success on

the merits because their complaint states a claim for

infringement, and Defendant has defaulted; further, Plaintiffs

have alleged that unless restrained, Defendant will continue to

cause irreparable injury for which there is no full monetary

compensation. (Cmplt. pp. 4-5.) This is sufficient for a

permanent injunction. Sony Music Entertaniment, Inc. v. Global

Arts Productions, 45 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1347 (S.D.Fla. 1999). An

injunction against further infringement and even infringement of

future works is permitted, and it is appropriate to grant an

injunction on an application for default judgment. Princeton

University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d

1381, 1392-93 (6 Cir. 1996) (noting that an injunction of works th

copyrighted in the future is supported by the weight of

authority); Elektra Entertainment Group Inc. v. Crawford, 226

F.RD. 388, 393-94 (C.D.Cal. 2005) (granting a final injunction on

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default judgment to enjoin defendant from directly or indirectly

infringing plaintiffs' rights under federal or state law in

copyrighted recordings, whether then in existence or later

created, where requested terms of injunction were the same as

those prayed for in complaint, proposed injunctive relief was

appropriate, the plaintiffs sent two letters to defendant before

plaintiffs sought entry of default which warned of default

judgment, defendant failed to respond to serious claims brought

against him despite receiving adequate notice, and failure to

grant injunction would have resulted in plaintiffs' continued

exposure to harm with no method of recourse). If infringement is

established, then it is appropriate as part of a final judgment

to order the destruction or other reasonable disposition of all

copies or phonorecords found to have been made or used in

violation of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights and of all

other articles by means of which such copies might be reproduced.

17 U.S.C. § 503(b). 

Here, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant infringed and

wilfully continues to use the on-line distribution system to

distribute to the public the obviously copyrighted sound

recordings and thereby is causing irreparable injury that cannot

be measured or compensated in money. Further, it is alleged that

Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law. (Cmplt. ¶¶ 14, 18.)

The requested terms of the injunction are the same as those

prayed for in the complaint. Defendant’s lack of intent to comply

with the copyright restrictions is demonstrated by the

Defendant’s failure to reply to the letter that Plaintiffs sent

to the Defendant which warned of enforcement of a default

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judgment, and by Defendant’s further failure to respond to

serious claims brought against her despite receiving adequate

notice. It appears that the failure to grant the requested

injunction would result in Plaintiffs' continued exposure to harm

with no method of recourse. There does not appear to be any

public injury that would result from issuance of the injunction.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that injunctive relief is

appropriate.

However, the injunctive relief sought is too broad.

Generally an injunction must be narrowly tailored to remedy only

the specific harms shown by the plaintiffs rather than to enjoin

all possible breaches of the law; injunctive relief concerning a

copyright will be limited to works that infringe on the

Plaintiffs’ copyright. Iconix, Inc. v. Tokuda, 457 F.Supp.2d 969,

998-1002 (N.D.Cal.2006) (preliminary injunction in copyright

case). Further, it is established that every order granting an

injunction shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be

specific in its terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and

not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or

acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the

parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants,

employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active

concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of

the order by personal service or otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P.

65(d). Even without objections by a party, a court has an

independent duty to assure that an injunction is specific in its

terms and describes in reasonable detail the acts sought to be

restrained. See, EFS Marketing, Inc. v Russ Berrie & Co., 76 F.3d

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487, 493-94 (2 Cir. 1996); 4 Nimmer on Copyright, § 14.06(C) nd

(2006).

Here, the injunction purports to forbid infringing

Plaintiffs’ rights under “federal or state law” in the

copyrighted recordings. However, the sole subject of the

complaint and this action is infringement of rights created by

the Copyright Act, not any other federal or state law.

Further, the injunction sought would enjoin infringement not

only of copyrighted sound recordings, but also of any sound

recording owned or controlled by Plaintiffs; thus, it would

include recordings that are not copyrighted. This exceeds the

scope of the infringement, which was limited to copyrighted

works.

Likewise, the proposed injunction would cover infringement

not only of recordings copyrighted by Plaintiffs, but also those

owned or controlled by any parent, subsidiary, or affiliate

record label of Plaintiffs. Such a provision does not give

reasonable notice of what conduct would be included within the

scope of the injunction because a reasonable person would not

know what entities or operations constitute parents,

subsidiaries, or affiliate record labels of Plaintiffs. This

aspect of the injunction would be unclear and also would exceed

the scope of the infringement.

Accordingly, these aspects should be eliminated from the

injunctive relief sought. 

VII. Costs 

Plaintiffs seek $420.00 in costs.

Title 17 U.S.C. § 505 states:

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In any civil action under this title, the court

in its discretion may allow the recovery of full

costs by or against any party other than the

United States or an officer thereof. Except as

otherwise provided by this title, the court may

also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the

prevailing party as part of the costs.

The costs sought here consist of $350.00 for the filing fee, and

$70.00 for service of process. (Decl. of Kerr ¶ 16.)

Plaintiffs are entitled to costs of $420.00.

VII. Recommendation

Accordingly, it IS RECOMMENDED that

1) Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment against Defendant

Vanessa Malacara BE GRANTED; and

2) The Clerk BE DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of

Plaintiffs and against Defendant Vanessa Malacara in the amount

of $5,250.00 of statutory damages, and $420.00 in costs; and 

3) The Clerk BE DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of

Plaintiffs and against Defendant Vanessa Malacara enjoining

Defendant from directly or indirectly infringing Plaintiffs’

rights in the copyrighted sound recordings and any copyrighted

sound recording, whether now in existence or later created, which

is owned or controlled by Plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs’ recordings”),

including without limitation by using the Internet or any online

media distribution system to reproduce (i.e., download) any of

Plaintiffs’ recordings, to distribute (i.e., upload) any of

Plaintiffs’ recordings, or to make any of Plaintiff’s recordings

available for distribution to the public, except pursuant to a

lawful license or with the express authority of Plaintiffs;

Defendant also shall destroy all copies of Plaintiffs’ recordings

that Defendant has downloaded onto any computer hard drive or

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server without Plaintiffs’ authorization and shall destroy all

copies of those downloaded recordings transferred onto any

physical medium or device in Defendant’s possession, custody, or

control.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served

by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 26, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00630-OWW -SMS Document 25 Filed 02/27/07 Page 16 of 16