Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05964/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05964-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH FAULKNER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

COUNTY OF KERN, et al, )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

1:04-cv-05964-OWW-TAG

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

(Doc. 37)

Background

On October 3, 2005, Plaintiff noticed the depositions of three witnesses, two of whom

currently are parties and one of whom is not. Those noticed were (1) Deputy Attorney General

R. Todd Marshall (a defendant), (2) Deputy District Attorney John Brownlee (also a defendant), and

(3) Patricia Poeschel (formerly a defendant, but not at the time of the deposition notice). (Doc. 29,

Doc. 37 at Ellison Decl. at ¶ 2.) The deposition was noticed to occur at the offices of Plaintiff’s

counsel in Los Angeles. (Doc. 29.)

Upon receipt of the deposition notice, Deputy Attorney General Gary Binkerd sent a letter to

Plaintiff’s counsel on October 11, 2005, requesting alternative dates and a more convenient locale

(Bakersfield). (Doc. 29 and Binkerd Decl. at ¶ 4.) Thereafter, on October 13, 2005, in what has

been characterized as “an attempt to informally meet and confer,” Deputy County Counsel Andrew

Thompson had a telephonic conversation with Plaintiff’s counsel to inquire about changing the dates

and the location of the depositions to Bakersfield. (Doc. 29 and Thompson Decl. At ¶¶ 7-8.) The

discussions were unsuccessful. (Doc. 29.) Thereafter, a motion for protective order and ex parte

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 The Attorney General’s motion was subsequently joined in by counsel for proposed deponent Deputy District

Attorney John Brownlee and for non-party Patricia Poeschel. (Doc. 30.)

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request for an order shortening time for a hearing on the same was filed by Deputy Attorney General

Binkerd. (Doc. 29.)1

Upon hearing the matter by telephone on October 26, 2005, this Court denied Defendant

Marshall’s request for an order shortening time, whereupon Defendant Brownlee withdrew his

request for an order shortening time and counsel stipulated to allow the Court to immediately decide

the underlying motion for a protective order regarding the depositions of Defendant Brownlee and

non-party Poeschel. The Court denied the motion for a protective order as to Defendant Brownlee

and granted the motion as to non-party Poeschel. (Docs. 31, 33). The Court granted a protective

order as to non-party Poeschel because Plaintiff noticed her deposition to occur at a location more

than 100 miles from her residence, as prohibited by Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(2). (Doc. 33.) 

Motion for Sanctions 

Plaintiff now seeks sanctions against Defendants for having filed a motion for a protective

order that (1) was not preceded by the required “meet and confer,” and (2) was, in part, denied.

On November 28, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Sanctions seeking “monetary sanctions to

recover expenses incurred defending defendants’ Ex-Parte Application to shorten time for hearing on

a Motion filed by defendants requesting a protective order and for sanctions.” (Doc. 36, 2:2-4). On

November 28, 2005, Plaintiff also filed an amended “Motion for Order Awarding Monetary

sanctions against Gary Binkard” seeking “monetary sanctions to recover expenses incurred opposing

Deputy Attorney General Binkard’s Ex-Parte Application to shorten time for hearing on a Motion

filed by him, on behalf of his client, requesting a protective order and for sanctions.” (Doc 37, 2:2-

06). The Court construes Court document number 37 to be an amended motion for sanctions filed by

Plaintiff, and thus to supercede the motion for sanctions identified as Court document number 36.

Although the motion itself (Doc. 37) seeks sanctions related only to the Defendant’s ex parte request

for an order shortening time, its accompanying memorandum of points and authorities seeks

sanctions based on both the request for an order shortening time and the underlying motion for a

protective order. 

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a. Ex parte request for order shortening time.

Defendant Marshall’s ex parte request sought an order shortening time for a hearing on a

motion for a protective order regarding the depositions of Defendants Marshall and Brownlee and

non-party Poeschel. The request for an order shortening time as to Defendant Marshall (represented

by Deputy Attorney General Binkerd) was denied at the October 26, 2005 telephonic hearing on the

ex parte request, when the Court found that the Defendant Marshall failed to show good cause for an

order shortening time. (Doc. 31). However, at the same hearing, counsel stipulated to allow the

Court to hear and decide the underlying motion for a protective order as to Defendant Brownlee and

non-party Poeschel. Thus, although the request for an order shortening time was denied as to

Defendant Marshall, inasmuch as Defendant Brownlee and non-party Poeschel were included in the

joint request for an order shortening time, and the underlying motion for a protective order as to their

depositions was decided immediately on the merits at the same hearing, two of the three deponents

benefitted as though the request for an order shortening time as to them had been granted, i.e., the

Court made an expedited ruling on the merits on the underlying motion for a protective order. 

b. Meet and confer.

The meet and confer requirements are set forth in Rule 37-251 of the Eastern District of

California and in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Rule 37-251 states that “Counsel for all interested parties

shall confer in advance of the filing of the motion [for a protective order] in a good faith effort to

resolve the differences that are the subject of the motion. Counsel for the moving party . . . shall be

responsible for arranging the conference, which shall be held at a time and place and in a manner

mutually convenient to counsel.” E.D. Cal. R. 37-251(b). Similarly, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) requires

certification that the party moving for a protective order has “in good faith conferred or attempted to

confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 26(c). 

Plaintiff contends that the meet and confer requirements were not satisfied. (Doc. 37 at pp.

5-6.) The Court disagrees. In light of the distance between counsel in this case - Plaintiff’s counsel

is in Los Angeles and Defendants’ counsel are in Sacramento and Bakersfield - as well as the late

stage of these proceedings, the Court finds that the written and oral communications between counsel

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 Plaintiff’s citation to a different subdivision of Rule 37, which pertains to discovery motions granted in their

entirety, is not on point. (See Doc. 37 at p. 5)(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(A)).

 Plaintiff also asserts violation of the notice requirement set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(“A party, upon reasonable

notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling disclosure or discovery”). (Doc.

29 at p. 5.) However, Defendants had filed a motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c) to preclude the taking of

depositions. They had not moved, under Rule 37, to compel discovery. As to protective order motions that are denied

(whether in whole or in part), Rule 26(c) does not incorporate Rule 37(a), with its notice requirement, but only Rule

37(a)(4)(C) vis-a-vis sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ.26(c)(“The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses

incurred in relation to the motion”). This makes sense since the two Rules have different preliminary requirements: Rule

26(c) has a meet and confer requirement, while Rule 37 has a notice obligation.

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on October 11 and 13, 2005, were sufficient attempts to satisfy their meet and confer obligations. 

See In re ATM Fee, _ F.R.D. _ , 2005 WL 3299763 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2005)(exchange of e-mails

and letters satisfied the requirements of Civil Local Rule 37 to meet and confer); Lahrichi v. Lumera

Corp., Slip Copy, 2005 WL 2898145 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2005)(letters, phone calls and e-mails

satisfied meet and confer requirement).

c. Degree of success.

Fed. R. Civ. P.26(c) states that Rule 37(a)(4) applies to the award of expenses incurred in

relation to a motion for protective order that is denied in whole or in part. Rule 37(a)(4), in turn, is

divided into three parts. Part A pertains to discovery motions that were granted, Part B pertains to

discovery motions that were denied, and Part C pertains to discovery motions that were granted in

part and denied in part. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).

Here, since Defendant’s motion for a protective order was granted in part as to the deposition

of Patricia Poeschel, yet denied in part as to the depositions of Deputy District Attorney John

Brownlee and Deputy Attorney General R. Todd Marshall, the applicable subdivision is Fed. R. Civ.

P. 37(a)(4)(C). Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 635, 639 (D. Kan. 2005)(“Rule

37(a)(4)(c) governs the award of expenses when the motion [for protective order] is granted in part

and denied in part”).2 An award of sanctions under Rule 37(a)(4)(C) is not mandated but, rather,

discretionary. As the section states:

“If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may enter any protective

order authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, after affording an opportunity to be

heard, apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among

the parties and persons in a just manner.”

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(C)(emphasis added). See Cardenas, 230 F.R.D. at 639 (declining to

award sanctions under Rule 37(a)(4)(C) as neither appropriate nor just in the case at hand).

Here, all counsel erred in some measure, and refused to acknowledge or correct their errors

without judicial intervention. Neither Plaintiff’s counsel nor Defendant Marshall’s counsel fully

complied with the applicable rules, and neither Plaintiff’s counsel nor Defendants’ counsel fully

prevailed in their requests for relief from the Court. Plaintiff’s counsel improperly noticed the place

for a non-party deposition, and Defendants’ counsel sought an unwarranted order shortening time as

to at least one party, and a protective order to preclude a properly noticed deposition of another party. 

The Court did not rule on the motion for a protective order as to Defendant Marshall - the Court

simply denied his ex parte request for a protective order - and it appears that no noticed motion

seeking a protective order as to his deposition was subsequently filed. The level of communication

and willingness to conciliate between all counsel was far from exemplary up to October 26, 2005; 

however, at the hearing on the instant motion for sanctions counsel reported that they were ultimately

able to work out the details of Defendant Marshall’s deposition. After giving due consideration to

the totality of the circumstances regarding the subject discovery dispute, the Court finds that an

award of sanctions is neither appropriate nor just. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 37) is hereby DENIED. Each party

shall bear their own attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in connection with the underlying request

for an order shortening time and accompanying motion for a protective order (Doc. 29) and the 

motion for sanctions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2006 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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