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Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 30, 2001 Decided December 28, 2001

No. 00-5281

James A. Willis, a/k/a Jimmy Willis,

Appellant

v.

Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(96cv01455)

James H. Lesar argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Meredith Manning, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant

U.S. Attorney.

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Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, Randolph and Tatel,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: This case presents an issue of

first impression for this circuit: what criteria should guide

district courts in deciding motions for the appointment of

counsel in cases brought under the Freedom of Information

Act, 5 U.S.C. s 552 ("FOIA")?

James A. Willis is serving time for drug offenses. He filed

a FOIA action in 1996 seeking the release of numerous

documents. The documents, he claims, will exonerate him.

After bringing suit, Willis filed two motions for the appointment of counsel. FOIA does not contain a provision authorizing the appointment of counsel. Willis therefore invoked the

general civil statute: "The court may request an attorney to

represent any person unable to afford counsel." 28 U.S.C.

s 1915(e)(1). The district court denied both motions and then

granted summary judgment against Willis.

On Willis's appeal, we held that the failure of the magistrate judge, who was managing the case pursuant to 28

U.S.C. s 636, to provide any reasons for refusing to appoint

counsel for Willis necessitated a remand. Willis v. FBI, No.

98-5071, 1999 WL 236891 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 19, 1999). We stated

that the district court or the magistrate judge will need to

determine whether the criteria set forth in Poindexter v. FBI,

737 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1984), a Title VII case, should be

adopted for FOIA cases.

On remand, the magistrate judge issued a report explaining

why he had denied Willis's motions for counsel. See Report

and Recommendation of March 6, 2000. Willis had shown

that he was capable of representing himself, his FOIA action

did not involve complex legal or factual issues, the case would

not require discovery, and the interests of justice would not

be served by appointing counsel. See id. at 5-8.

The district court adopted the report. The court concluded

that Local Civil Rule 83.11(a)(4)(B)--rather than Poindexter--provides the relevant factors for deciding motions for the

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appointment of counsel in FOIA cases. The local rule provides: "If the judge assigned the case determines, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. s 1915(e), that the case should not be dismissed,

the judge may then determine whether to appoint an attorney

to represent such party. Such a determination should be

made as soon as practicable after the action is assigned,

taking into account: (i) the nature and complexity of the

action; (ii) the potential merit of the claims as set forth in the

pleading; (iii) the inability of the pro se party to retain

counsel by other means; (iv) the degree to which the interests of justice will be served by appointment of counsel,

including the benefit the court may derive from the assistance

of the appointed counsel; and (v) any other factors deemed

appropriate by the judge to serve the interests of justice."

D.D.C. Civ. R. 83.11(a)(4)(B).

Neither Willis nor any other indigent civil litigant is guaranteed counsel. The discretionary decisions of district courts

whether to appoint counsel under 28 U.S.C. s 1915(e)(1) will

be set aside only for abuse. See Cookish v. Cunningham, 787

F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1986); Luttrell v. Nickel, 129 F.3d 933, 936

(7th Cir. 1997). Here the magistrate judge, whose report and

recommendation the court adopted, followed the criteria in

Local Civil Rule 83.11(a)(4)(B). The magistrate determined

that counsel need not be appointed because Willis had shown

through numerous coherent filings that he was capable of

representing himself and making logical presentations to the

court. The magistrate also based his denial on his determination that Willis's FOIA case did not involve complex legal or

factual issues and, like many FOIA cases, would not require

any discovery. Willis points out that an analysis of the merits

of his case was absent from the magistrate's report, and he

argues that the magistrate's explanation for denying counsel

was therefore insufficient. We disagree. Given the magistrate's conclusion that Willis was capable of handling his

relatively straightforward FOIA case unaided, the magistrate

did not need to go any further.

In addition, we reject Willis's contention that the court

erred in selecting Local Civil Rule 83.11 as the appropriate

standard rather than Poindexter's multi-factor test. The

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Poindexter criteria are the plaintiff's ability to afford an

attorney; the merits of the plaintiff's case; plaintiff's efforts

to secure counsel; and the capacity of the plaintiff to present

the case adequately without the aid of counsel. 737 F.2d at

1185. Poindexter interpreted Title VII's appointment provision, 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5(f)(1), a provision "generally viewed

as imposing a lesser burden on plaintiffs seeking appointment

of counsel, both because of the specificity of Congress' action

... and because this provision does not require that the

plaintiff be a pauper." Poindexter, 737 F.2d at 1182 n.18.

That provision obviously does not apply to FOIA cases, nor

do the reasons behind it. Local Civil Rule 83.11, which

implements 28 U.S.C. s 1915(e)(1), thus controls. The local

rule differs only slightly from the Poindexter factors and, to

the extent there are differences, it embraces many of the

considerations adopted in other circuits for applying 28

U.S.C. s 1915(e)(1). See, e.g., Long v. Shillinger, 927 F.2d

525, 527 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that courts should consider

the merits of the litigant's claims, the nature of the factual

issues, the litigant's ability to present his claims, and the

complexity of the legal issues); Cookish, 787 F.2d at 3

(holding that factors to be considered include the indigent's

ability to conduct whatever factual investigation is necessary,

the complexity of the factual and legal issues, and the capability of the indigent litigant to present the case); Ulmer v.

Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that

courts should consider a number of factors including the type

and complexity of the case and whether the indigent is

capable of adequately presenting the case).

Because the district court acted within its discretion in

deciding that Willis did not qualify for counsel under the local

rule, its judgment denying his motions is

Affirmed.

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