Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02620/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02620-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Order of Service

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARMAND A. JACKSON,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

OFFICER LEDWITH, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. C 05-2620 JF (PR)

ORDER OF SERVICE

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. 

The Court initially dismissed the complaint with leave to amend because the complaint failed to

allege sufficient facts to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed an amended

complaint. Thereafter, on January 29, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a second

amended complaint and a second amended complaint. The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for

leave to file a second amended complaint. The Court now reviews the second amended

complaint and orders service of the second amended complaint on the named Defendants. 

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**Original filed 5/18/07**

Case 5:05-cv-02620-JF Document 29 Filed 05/18/07 Page 1 of 7
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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on January 21, 2005, he was subjected to excessive force by San

Mateo Police Officer Mark Myer and Belmont Police Officer Ledwith during his detention and

arrest. Plaintiff contends that the officers’ excessive force was in retaliation for Plaintiff’s

eluding the police after he fled his vehicle. Plaintiff claims that the use of force employed by a

taser gun subjected him to vomiting blood for three weeks and he could not hold down food for

two weeks. Plaintiff maintains that Officer Myers pointed a gun with the direct intent to use

force causing irreparable harm. Plaintiff names the following Defendants: Officer Ledwith,

Belmont Police Department and Officer Myers, San Mateo Police Department. Plaintiff seeks

declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive monetary damages. See Second Amended

Complaint at 1-6. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro

se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699

(9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under

the color of state law committed a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

1. Excessive Force

The use of excessive force by a law enforcement officer in effectuating an arrest states a

valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). 

Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is reasonable requires a careful

Case 5:05-cv-02620-JF Document 29 Filed 05/18/07 Page 2 of 7
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balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment

interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Id. at 396. Because the

reasonableness test is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application, its proper

application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case,

including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the

safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight. Id. These factors are not exclusive, however, and the totality of the particular

circumstances of each case must be considered. See Fikes v. Cleghorn, 47 F.3d 1011, 1014 (9th

Cir. 1995). This analysis also applies where there has not been a formal arrest, but there has

been a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, i.e., the suspect reasonably

believes he is not free to leave. Robinson v. Solano, 278 F.3d 1007, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2002) (en

banc). Police officers may also be held liable if they have an opportunity to intercede when their

fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a plaintiff but fail to do so. See Cunningham v.

Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 2000). 

An officer’s show of force is subject to Fourth Amendment reasonable requirements even

where no actual force is applied. Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Pointing a gun at a suspect, even without harming him, can amount to excessive force and

violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Robinson v. Solano, 278 F.3d 1007, 1013-14 (9th Cir.

2002) (en banc) (finding excessive force for police to point gun from a distance of three to six

feet at the head of suspected misdemeanant who was outnumbered by police, was approaching

them peacefully, and no longer carried shotgun as previously reported). Keeping a gun pointed

at an infant is objectively unreasonable and will subject the officer to Fourth Amendment

liability. Motley, 432 F.3d at 1089.

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has alleged a cognizable excessive force claim against the

named Defendants. The Court will order service of this claim. 

2. State Law Claims 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ conduct violated various provisions of the California

Constitution. The federal supplemental jurisdiction statute provides that “‘district courts shall

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have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action

within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under

Article III of the United States Constitution.’” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Liberally construed,

plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the statutory requirement. Accordingly, the Court will exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state constitutional claims. 

CONCLUSION

1. The Clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, 

without prepayment of fees, copies of the second amended complaint in this matter, received on

January 29, 2007, all attachments thereto, and copies of this order on the following Defendants: 

Belmont Police Officer Ledwith, and San Mateo Police Officer Mark Myers. The Clerk shall

also serve a copy of this order on Plaintiff. 

In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff states that Officer Myers is no longer

employed by the San Mateo Police Department. Plaintiff shall file additional contact

information for Defendant Myers as soon as possible. 

2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date of this order, Defendants shall

file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion, or shall notify the Court that

Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by such a motion. The motion

shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

Defendants are advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor qualified

immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If Defendants are of the opinion that this

case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they shall so inform the Court prior to the

date the summary judgment motion is due. 

All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the

Court and served on Defendants no later than thirty (30) days from the date Defendants’ motion

is filed. Ninth Circuit authority holds that the following notice should be given to plaintiffs:

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The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment by

which they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary

judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if

granted, end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a

motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment

must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact--

that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect

the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your

case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary

judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other

sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint

says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated

documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts

shown in the defendant’s declarations and documents and show

that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not

submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if

appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is

granted in favor of defendants, your case will be dismissed and

there will be no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986) (holding party opposing

summary judgment must come forward with evidence showing triable issues of material fact on

every essential element of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file an opposition to

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment may be deemed to be a consent by Plaintiff to the

granting of the motion, and granting of judgment against plaintiff without a trial. See Ghazali v.

Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 653 (9th

Cir. 1994). 

Plaintiff is also advised that a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) will, if granted, end his case, albeit without prejudice. 

Plaintiff must “develop a record” and present it in his opposition in order to dispute any “factual

record” presented by the defendants in their motion to dismiss. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d

1108, 1120 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003).

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days after

Plaintiff’s opposition is filed. 

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d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

3. All communications by the Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendant,

or Defendants’ counsel, by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendants or Defendants’

counsel.

4. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court

and the parties informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a

timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

5. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

No further Court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16-1 is

required before the parties may conduct discovery.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: JEREMY FOGEL 

United States District Judge

5/18/07

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A copy of this ruling was mailed to the following:

Armand A. Jackson

T-64343

CTF - North 

P.O. Box 705

Soledad, CA 93960-0705

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