Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-07067/USCOURTS-ca10-90-07067-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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r 

FI LED 

United Scates Courr of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TP{'!tb Grruit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

THOMAS HOWARD GILBREATH, ) 

) 

Petitioner - Appellant, ) 

) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

) 

JAMES L. SAFFLE, Warden; ATTORNEY ) 

GENERAL OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ) 

) 

Respondents - Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

MAR 6 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-7067 

(D.C. No. 89-499-C) 

( E • D. Okla. ) 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

The parties have agreed that this case may be submitted for 

decision on the briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 

34.1.2. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral 

argument. 

The petitioner, Thomas Howard Gilbreath, was convicted of 

robbery with a dangerous weapon after former conviction of a 

felony. Mr. Gilbreath appeals the district court's denial of his 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-7067 Document: 010110031071 Date Filed: 03/06/1991 Page: 1 
I 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

The petitioner argues that the Oklahoma trial court erred by 

sentencing him under a section of the Oklahoma habitual offender 

statute that was declared unconstitutional in Thigpen v State, 571 

P.2d 467 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977). In Thigpen the court found that 

Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, S 51(B) (Supp. 1977), which required two 

previous felony convictions to enhance a sentence, was unconstitutionally vague because the statutory scheme permitted a jury to 

impose greater sentences on defendants with only one prior conviction than those for defendants with two or more prior convictions. 

Id. at 471. However, due to a severability clause in the statute, 

the validity of section 51 (A), which required only one prior conviction, was not affected by section 5l(B). Id. 

In the sentencing stage of Mr. Gilbreath's trial, the prosecution listed two prior convictions in the information. The 

jury, however, was instructed to calculate the sentence pursuant 

to section 51(A). The petitioner argues that his due process 

rights were violated because section 51(A) requires that the prosecution present only one prior conviction. 

The precedent petitioner cites, Porter v. State, 674 P.2d 558 

(Okla. Crim. App. 1984), does not support his argument. In Porter 

the defendant asserted that two of his former convictions were 

improperly admitted into evidence for sentencing purposes. The 

court rejected this argument and concluded that the sentence was 

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properly computed because only one conviction was needed to support the sentence imposed. Id. at 560. Contrary to the petitioner's reading of the case, Porter does not state that the listing of two prior convictions triggers the application of the section Sl(B). Nor does it state that the prosecution can list only 

one prior conviction if the jury is to be instructed under section 

Sl(A). We find that the petitioner's argument is without merit. 

Similarly, the petitioner's reliance on the Supreme Court's 

decision in Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 342 (1980), is misplaced. 

In that case the petitioner was sentenced pursuant to section 

Sl(B) which was subsequently declared unconstitutional in Thigpen. 

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, however, affirmed the conviction, concluding that the petitioner was not prejudiced because 

the sentence was within the range of punishment that could have 

been imposed under section Sl(A). The court vacated the conviction. It held that the "frail conjecture that a jury might have 

imposed a sentence equally as harsh as that mandated by the 

invalid habitual offender provision" was an "arbitrary disregard 

of the petitioner's right to liberty" and denied him due process 

of law. Id. at 346. 

Significantly, the Court in Hicks observed that the jury had 

not been properly instructed under the constitutionally valid section of the habitual offender statute. Id. If the jury had been 

properly instructed, there was a substantial possibility that the 

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jury would have returned a lesser sentence. Id. 

By contrast, the jury in Mr. Gilbreath's trial was properly 

instructed under section 5l(A). In addition, the fact that the 

information listed two prior convictions does not render the sentence invalid. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of 

Mr. Gilbreath's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

This matter is also before the court on the petitioner's 

motion for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs 

or fees and application for a certificate of probable cause. 

The petitioner can make no rational argument on the law or 

facts in support of the issues raised on appeal. See 28 u.s.c. 

S 1915(a); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); Ragan 

v. Cox, 305 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1962). 

We have reviewed the files and records and conclude that Mr. 

Gilbreath has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial 

of a federal right necessary for the issuance of a certificate of 

probable cause under 28 u.s.c. S 2253. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 

463 U.S. 880 (1983). 

It is ordered as follows: 

1. The filing fee is waived; 

2. Appellant's motion for leave to proceed on appeal without 

prepayment of costs or fees is denied; 

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3. Appellant's application for a certificate of probable 

cause is denied; 

4. The district court's denial of Mr. Gilbreath's petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed; and 

5. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

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