Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-03021/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-03021-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD J. MOTTA,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFREY BEARD,

Respondent.

Case No.: 3:14-cv-03021-BEN-KSC

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION;

(2) DENYING PETITION; and

(3) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner Edward Motta, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition 

for Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254. (Docket No. 1.) The Magistrate Judge 

issued a thorough and thoughtful Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending 

habeas relief be denied. (Docket No. 25.) Petitioner filed Objections to the Report. 

(Docket No. 28.) For the reasons stated below, the Report and Recommendation is 

ADOPTED, and the Petition is DENIED.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of attempted murder, assault, making a criminal threat, 

false imprisonment, resisting an officer, burglary, and battery based on three incidents 

between Petitioner and his then-girlfriend. He was sentenced to 75 years-to-life plus 20 

years in state prison. 

Petitioner appealed his conviction. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. He 

then filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court of California. That petition was 

denied. 

The R&R recommends that Petitioner’s claims be denied. Petitioner makes four

objections to the R&R. First, he objects to the finding that he received constitutionally 

effective representation. Second, he objects to the Report’s finding that an evidentiary 

hearing was not necessary. Third, Petitioner argues that the Magistrate Judge failed to 

“independently review the record pursuant to Federal Habeas Corpus Rule 11.” Fourth, 

he contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying his mid-trial request for self-representation.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Report and Recommendation 

Where a timely objection to a report and recommendation has been filed, the 

district court reviews de novo those portions of the report or specific proposed findings or 

recommendations to which the petitioner objected. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

II. Petition for Habeas Corpus

A Petition for Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”); see Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 337 (1997). AEDPA states that a habeas petition will not be 

granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings 

unless that adjudication either: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

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unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state 

court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A federal court engages in extraordinarily 

deferential review of the state court’s determination, and only looks to see whether the 

state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarbrough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 

1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). When there is no 

reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the court “looks through” to the 

underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991).

The Supreme Court has stated that a federal habeas court “may issue the writ under 

the ‘contrary to’ clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law 

set forth in our cases, or if it decided a case differently than we have done on a set of 

materially indistinguishable facts.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). Relief under 

the “unreasonable application” prong is only granted where the governing law was 

correctly identified, but was applied to the facts in an “objectively unreasonable manner.” 

Id. As to § 2254(d)(2), “factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct

absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary . . . , and a decision adjudicated on 

the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overruled on 

factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the 

state-court proceeding.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

DISCUSSION

I. De Novo Review of the Petition 

The Court has reviewed the record in this case, and addresses Petitioner’s 

objections in turn.

A. Effective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner objects that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to fully 

investigate whether the victim’s hyoid bone, a bone in the neck, was fractured. He 

contends that a full investigation would have uncovered medical experts who could have 

refuted the testimony of Dr. James Schwendig, the trauma surgeon who treated the victim 

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and testified that her hyoid bone was fractured. He also contends that a more thorough 

investigation would have led to a more effective cross-examination of Dr. Schwendig.

The Court of Appeal found that Petitioner received constitutionally effective 

representation. The Report and Recommendation found that the Court of Appeal’s 

decision, the last reasoned decision, was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Having 

conducted a de novo review, this Court agrees.

Under Strickland v. Washington, a petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) defense 

counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) this deficient performance was prejudicial. 

466 U.S. 668, 690-92 (1984). Because of the difficulties inherent in evaluating the 

performance of counsel after the fact, a court must indulge a strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 

689. On federal habeas review, this Court must take “a ‘highly deferential’ look at 

counsel’s performance through the ‘deferential lens of § 2254(d).’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 

563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011). “The question ‘is not whether a federal court believes the state 

court’s determination’ under the Strickland standard ‘was incorrect, but whether that 

determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.” Knowles v. 

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). “Put differently, [the court] ask[s] not ‘whether 

counsel’s actions were reasonable’ but whether there is any reasonable argument that 

counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 

1150 (9th Cir. 2012). Petitioner “must show that the [state court] applied Strickland to 

the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Bell, 535 U.S. at 699.

As explained in more detail in the R&R, in evaluating Petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, the Court of Appeal determined that Petitioner’s trial counsel 

did not conduct an inadequate investigation of the hyoid bone issue. Trial counsel spoke 

to two medical professionals to investigate the hyoid bone injuries and may have spoken 

to Dr. Schwendig. Trial counsel also effectively cross-examined Dr. Schwendig, causing 

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him to admit he was unable to determine how the victim’s hyoid bone was fractured, to 

agree the fracture could have been caused by a fall, to admit he could not determine when 

the bone had been broken, and to state that the swelling in the victim’s neck was the 

potentially life-threatening aspect of her injuries, not the broken hyoid bone. 

The Court of Appeal also went on to explain that, even assuming arguendo that 

trial counsel’s actions fell below prevailing professional norms because she did not 

present expert medical evidence to counter Dr. Schwendig’s testimony, Petitioner could 

not show he was prejudiced by that failure in light of the overwhelming evidence against 

Petitioner. The prosecution presented eyewitness testimony, testimony from the victim, 

evidence regarding the extent of the victim’s injuries from the responding paramedic and 

treating physician, and physical evidence from the crime scenes to support the 

convictions. Moreover, Petitioner’s own psychiatric expert admitted that Petitioner’s 

version of one of the incidents was “nonsensical.” Thus, considering the sum of 

evidence, there is no reasonable probability that had trial counsel investigated further and 

put on medical experts at trial to rebut Dr. Schwendig, the jury would not have returned 

guilty verdicts. 

Based on this record, the Court of Appeals decision was not objectively 

unreasonable. The court correctly rejected Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Accordingly, Petitioner’s objection is OVERRULED.

B. Evidentiary Hearing 

Petitioner objects to the R&R’s determination that an evidentiary hearing is neither 

necessary nor warranted. Petitioner requested an evidentiary hearing on all four of his 

claims, but his Objection appears to be directed to the denial of an evidentiary hearing 

regarding his trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate the hyoid bone fracture fully.

An evidentiary hearing is not necessary where the federal claim can be denied on 

the basis of the state court record. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 1994). 

And where a petitioner has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court 

proceedings, he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless he shows that (1) the claim 

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relies on (i) a new rule of constitutional law or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have

been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence, and (2) he establishes

by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error no reasonable jury 

would have found him guilty. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

The Court agrees that no evidentiary hearing is necessary in this case. As 

discussed above, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the 

hyoid bone issue can be rejected based on the state court record. Furthermore, Petitioner 

has not come forward with a new rule of constitutional law or newly discovered evidence 

and established by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would 

have found him guilty. In light of the sum of evidence discussed above and in the R&R, 

medical testimony that the victim’s hyoid bone was not fractured would not have raised a 

reasonable doubt sufficient to undermine Petitioner’s convictions. Accordingly, 

Petitioner’s objection is OVERRULED.

C. Error by Magistrate Judge Crawford

Petitioner’s third objection is not entirely clear. Although his objection is titled as 

an objection “to the Magistrate’s failure to independently review the record pursuant to 

Federal Habeas Corpus Rule 11,” his argument addresses issues of harmless error and 

refers to his Petition, in which he argues that the failure to have a jury determine whether 

his prior convictions were strikes under California law was not harmless error. To the 

extent Petitioner argues that Magistrate Judge Crawford did not review the record of the 

state court proceedings, this Court disagrees. The R&R provides a thorough and detailed 

analysis of the underlying proceedings. To the extent Petitioner argues that Magistrate 

Judge Crawford failed to determine whether any error under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 

U.S. 466 (2000), was harmless, he misreads the R&R. The R&R clearly states that “even 

if there is Apprendi error here, federal habeas relief is not available because any error is 

clearly harmless.” (R&R at 42.) The R&R then supplies detailed reasoning for this 

conclusion. Therefore, Petitioner’s objection is OVERRULED.

/ / /

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D. Self-Representation 

Petitioner objects to the trial court’s denial of his mid-trial request to represent 

himself. He contends that there was no finding that the Government would be prejudiced 

by the timing of his request and, without such a finding, the other reasons provided in 

denying the request were without merit and insufficient.

The Court of Appeal held that Petitioner’s motion was untimely and concluded that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. The Court of Appeal 

found that granting Petitioner’s motion would cause disruption and delay the case.

The R&R concluded that the Court of Appeal’s conclusion was objectively 

reasonable. Clearly established federal law provides that a criminal defendant has a 

constitutional right to self-representation, and a State violates that right when it forces 

him to accept a state-appointed attorney after he knowingly and intelligently waives his 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel and clearly and unequivocally declares a desire to 

represent himself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-36 (1975). A Faretta request 

must be knowing and intelligent, unequivocal, timely, and not for purposes of delay. See 

id. at 835; Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 882 (9th Cir. 2007).

The Court agrees that the state court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s request was 

untimely and was meant for the purpose of delay was an objectively reasonable 

application of clearly established law. Petitioner’s request came in the middle of trial 

near the close of the prosecution’s case and one and one-half years after arraignment. See 

Stenson, 504 F.3d at 879, 884-885 (affirming denial of Faretta request made near the end 

of jury selection as untimely). Furthermore, as explained more fully in the R&R, 

Petitioner’s request was equivocal because it was predicated on the trial court’s refusals

of his multiple requests to replace retained counsel. See id. at 883 (“A clear preference 

for receiving new counsel over representing oneself . . . may . . . be an indication that the 

request, in light of the record as a whole, is equivocal.”). Petitioner had never before 

requested to represent himself, and his Faretta request was made only after the repeated 

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denials of his requests for new counsel. These considerations weigh against finding 

Petitioner’s request to be unequivocal. See id. at 882.

Therefore, this Court finds that the Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s 

claim is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the state court record. Accordingly, Motta’s objection is OVERRULED.

II. Certificate of Appealability 

The Court DENIES a certificate of appealability because the issues are not 

debatable among jurists of reason and there are no questions adequate to deserve 

encouragement. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327.

III. Conclusion

The R&R is ADOPTED over Petitioner’s Objections. The Petition is DENIED. 

A Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. The Clerk shall close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 26, 2016

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