Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08060/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08060-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

HUGH B. JOHNSON, Jr., as Personal 

Representative of the Estate of Ben 

Johnson, Deceased, for and on behalf 

of Hugh B. Johnson, Jr. and Laura C. 

Johnson, beneficiaries, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEPARTMENT 

OF INTERIOR, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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FILED 1s 

U 'ted States Coμrtqf Appea. n1 Tenth Circuit 

NOV 13 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-8060 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. NO. C89-220-J) 

Stanley P. DeGory of Benya and Douglass, Indiana, Pennsylvania, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Carol A. Statkus (Richard A. Stacy, United States Attorney, with 

her on the brief), Assistant United States Attorney, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before MCKAY, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-8060 Document: 010110096931 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff, Hugh B. Johnson, Jr., on behalf of Hugh B. 

Johnson, Jr. and Laura 

court's final order 

C. Johnson, appeals from 

granting summary judgment 

the district 

in favor of 

Defendant, the United States of America. Plaintiff brought this 

action against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort 

Claims Act, 28 u.s.c. §§ 1346(b) and 2671-80, for the wrongful 

death of decedent, Ben Johnson. Plaintiff sought to recover 

damages from the United States alleging the National Park Service 

was negligent in undertaking the rescue of decedent. 

The district court concluded Plaintiff's claim could not 

stand because he failed to establish a legal duty imposed upon the 

National Park Service. In 

Plaintiff failed to present 

addition, 

evidence of 

the district court found 

a breach of duty or 

proximate cause sufficient to put those elements of negligence at 

issue. 

We affirm the summary judgment in favor of the United States 

on different grounds from those of the district court. Reviewing 

the record de novo, we conclude the discretionary function 

exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 u.s.c. 

§ 2680(a), applies to the undisputed facts of this case. 

Plaintiff's complaint must therefore be dismissed for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. See Zumwalt v. United States, 928 

F.2d 951, 952 (10th Cir. 1991). 

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Appellate Case: 90-8060 Document: 010110096931 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 2 
I. 

The material facts of this case are undisputed. On June 28, 

1987, decedent, Ben Johnson, and three companions, Robin Macal, 

Daniel Feikin and David Wechner, hiked to the summit of Buck 

Mountain in Grand Teton National Park. 1 Macal and Wechner had 

acquired the necessary climbing permit from the Jenny Lake Ranger 

Station the previous afternoon. The four climbers had varying 

degrees of experience. Wechner was the designated leader of the 

party. Johnson was the least experienced, with no technical 

climbing experience whatsoever. Johnson and his companions began 

their ascent at approximately 8:00 a.m. via Buck Mountain's east 

ridge, a nontechnical route. The four climbers reached the summit 

at different times between 9:00 and 10:30 a.m. 

After gathering at the summit, the group descended in pairs, 

at different times, via the east· face, a nontechnical route 

regarded as relatively easy. The two most experienced climbers, 

Macal and Wechner, descended first. They reached Timberline Lake 

at approximately 12:00 noon, the entire descent taking 

approximately fifteen minutes. Although Johnson and Feikin began 

their descent along the east face shortly thereafter, they soon 

strayed south, entering more difficult and technical terrain. 

Unable to find their way back to the easier route, Johnson and 

Feikin attempted to descend the southern route. At some point, 

however, Feikin resolved he could go no further and remained on a 

1 Buck Mountain is the seventh highest peak in the Teton Range, 

rising to an elevation of 11,938 feet above sea level and 5,729 

feet (approximately one mile) above the valley floor. 

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Appellate Case: 90-8060 Document: 010110096931 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 3 
ledge where he was in visual contact with Macal and Wechner 

waiting at Timberline Lake. Johnson, on the other hand, decided 

to continue his descent. After leaving the summit, Johnson was in 

occasional voice contact, but never in visual contact with Macal 

and Wechner. 

At approximately 2:30 p.m. Macal and Wechner decided to 

summon help from the Park Rangers. Macal ran from Timberline Lake 

to the trailhead where he retrieved his vehicle and drove to the 

Moose Visitor's Center. Arriving at the visitor's center at 

approximately 4:30 p.m., he approached Ranger James Springer and 

informed him that Johnson and Feikin were off course and stuck, 

but that he believed there was a ranger in the area. At this 

point Macal was unaware, and therefore unable to report, that at 

approximately 3:15 p.m. Johnson had fallen on a hard snowslope, 

crashed into rocks and sustained a serious head injury and 

lacerations. Upon receiving Macal's information, Springer made 

radio contact with Ranger Randy Harrington, who had been in the 

vicinity of Buck Mountain, to determine whether he knew of any 

climbers in distress. Ranger Harrington reported that he had 

encountered four climbers descending Buck Mountain and that they 

were walking through Death Canyon. 

Ranger Springer told Macal he 

After talking with Harrington, 

should return to Whitegrass 

Trailhead to wait for his companions. 

Macal returned to the trailhead and remained in the area 

until approximately 8:45 p.m. when Wechner arrived from Timberline 

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Appellate Case: 90-8060 Document: 010110096931 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 4 
Lake. After Wechner reported he had not seen Johnson and that 

Feikin was still stranded on the ledge, Macal realized the 

communication between Rangers Springer and Harrington had been 

erroneous.

2 Wechner and Macal then drove to the Moose Visitor's 

Center where they told Ranger Northrup about the previous 

miscommunication. They informed him Feikin had been on the same 

ledge for over four hours and Johnson had not been seen since 

earlier in the day. Both Wechner and Macal were still unaware 

that Johnson was injured. Northrup contacted Ranger Peter 

Armington, the Jenny Lake District search and rescue (SAR) 

coordinator. 

Ranger Armington consulted with his SAR team3 concerning a 

possible rescue effort. At approximately 9:30 p.m., Armington 

decided to send climbing rangers Harrington and Larsen to Buck 

Mountain to retrieve Feikin from· the ledge and to look for 

Johnson. The rangers reached Feikin in the early morning hours, 

but were unable to locate Johnson. A helicopter search was 

initiated at first light, 6:15 a.m. Johnson's body was located 

approximately twenty minutes later in a melt pool near Timberline 

Lake. Johnson had died from hypothermia at approximately 10:30 

p.m. the previous night. 

2 The four climbers Ranger Harrington reported seeing were Jeff 

McMullen, Anne Petroni, Macal and Wechner. Ranger Harrington 

mistakenly assumed that McMullen and Petroni were part of the 

Wechner group. 

3 The SAR team is a group of experienced climbing rangers, 

which to the extent practicable patrols the rugged backcountry 

climbing terrain. In June 1987 there were eighteen search and 

rescue rangers in the Jenny Lake Subdistrict. 

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Appellate Case: 90-8060 Document: 010110096931 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 5 
Plaintiff alleges that Ben Johnson would not have died but 

for the Park Service's negligent failure to: (1) adequately 

regulate recreational climbing activity in Grand Teton National 

Park; (2) initiate a rescue effort after Macal's initial report; 

and (3) conduct a reasonable rescue effort after Macal's second 

report. In response to these allegations, Defendant filed a 

motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, 

asserting as a matter of law: (1) Plaintiff's action is 

jurisdictionally barred by the discretionary function exception to 

the FTCA, 28 u.s.c. 2680(a); and (2) the United States had no 

legal duty to rescue Ben Johnson. We review these issues de novo. 

Oberndorf v. City and County of Denver, 900 F.2d 1434, 1437 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 129 (1990). Because we conclude 

the discretionary function exception deprived the district court 

of jurisdiction, we do not address ·the propriety of the district 

court's summary judgment rulings regarding legal duty, breach of 

duty or proximate cause. 

II. 

The FTCA authorizes civil suits against the United States 

for money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or 

personal injury ... caused by the negligent or wrongful 

act or omission of any employee of the Government while 

acting within the scope of his office or employment, 

under circumstances where the United States, if a 

private person, would be liable to the claimant in 

accordance with the law of the place where the act or 

omission occurred. 

28 u.s.c. § 1346(b). This broad waiver of sovereign immunity is 

limited, however, by the discretionary function exception, which 

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prohibits any claim against the United States "based upon the 

exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 

discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or 

an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion 

involved be abused." Id. § 2680(a) (emphasis added). The 

discretionary function exception "marks the boundary between 

Congress' willingness to impose tort liability upon the United 

States and its desire to protect certain governmental activities 

from exposure to suit by private individuals." United States v. 

S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 

U.S. 797, 808 (1984). Application of this exception is therefore 

a threshold issue -- a jurisdictional issue which precedes any 

negligence analysis. See Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 

662 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983). 

This circuit applies the principles set forth in Berkovitz v. 

United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988), to guide its application of 

the discretionary function exception. Zumwalt, 928 F.2d at 953; 

Boyd v. United States ex rel. U.S. Army, Corps of Eng'rs, 881 F.2d 

895, 897 (10th Cir. 1989). We first consider whether the 

challenged action "is a matter of choice for the acting employee." 

Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. If a statute, regulation, or policy 

prescribes a specific course of conduct, then an employee must 

"adhere to the directive" and no discretion is involved. Id. If, 

however, the challenged action is discretionary, we must then 

determine whether it is of the kind Congress intended to shield 

through the exception. Id. The Court concluded that Congress 

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Appellate Case: 90-8060 Document: 010110096931 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 7 
intended to shield only those "governmental ... decisions based on 

considerations of public policy" 

social, economic and political policy.'" 

decisions "'grounded in 

Id. at 537 (quoting 

Varig, 467 U.S. at 814). Accordingly, the discretionary function 

exception will not bar a negligence claim if the government's 

"policy leaves no room for an official to exercise policy judgment 

in performing a given act, or if the act simply does not involve 

the exercise of such judgment." Id. at 546-47. 

Interestingly, no federal court has been asked to apply the 

discretionary function exception to circumstances similar to those 

presented here. Therefore, the issue of whether the National Park 

Service's climbing regulation and rescue decisions in Grand Teton 

National Park are shielded from 

impression. 4 We do not approach 

liability is 

this issue 

one of first 

lightly5 

"[e]xceptions to the FTCA are to be narrowly construed." Miller, 

710 F.2d at 662. For that reason, we must carefully apply the 

Berkovitz analysis6 to the unique facts of this case, examining 

4 A review of case law addressing the scope of the 

discretionary function exception reveals that the cases typically 

fall into one of two broad categories: alleged negligence in 

program design/construction (technical decisions requiring 

economic, social, or political judgments such that the exception 

is applicable) or alleged negligence in failure to warn of a 

hazardous condition (safety considerations under an established 

policy such that the exception is not applicable). Compare Weiss 

v. United States, 787 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1986), and Miller, with 

Boyd. This case does not fall squarely within either category. 

5 See Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1424-25 (10th Cir. 

1987) (McKay, J., concurring) (concern that the discretionary 

function exception has been interpreted to apply "in all but the 

most trivial of matters"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). 

6 While characterized as the Berkovitz analysis, the contours 

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Appellate Case: 90-8060 Document: 010110096931 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 8 
separately Plaintiff's claims regarding (1) regulating climbing 

activity, and (2) initiating and conducting rescue efforts. We 

examine the regulation claim first. 

A. 

Plaintiff challenges, inter alia, Park Service decisions not 

to require additional warnings regarding the potential danger of 

mountain climbing, not to require safety equipment use, not to 

test the competency of each mountain climber, and not to "clear" 

the mountains of all climbers before dark. They assert that these 

decisions regarding the nature and extent of mountain climbing 

regulations in Grand Teton National Park do not invoke the 

discretionary function exception in light of this court's decision 

in Boyd. We disagree. 

By statute, the Park Service is directed to 

promote and regulate the use of ..• national parks 

by such means and measures as conform to the fundamental 

purpose of the said parks which purpose is to 

conserve the scenery and the natural and historic 

objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the 

enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means 

as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of 

future generations. 

16 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (emphasis added). Grand Teton National Park 

is to be administered in accordance with this general mandate. 

of the discretionary function exception evolved from three 

important United States Supreme Court decisions: Dalehite v. 

United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); United States v. S.A. Empresa 

de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 

(1984); and Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988). See 

Kennewick Irr. Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1022-25 (9th 

Cir. 1989) for an excellent overview of this evolution. 

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Appellate Case: 90-8060 Document: 010110096931 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 9 
Id. § 406d-1. According to the affidavit of Jack Stark, 

Superintendent, Grand Teton National Park, no federal statutes or 

regulations apply to the National Park Service or to Grand Teton 

National Park which specify how mountain climbing should be 

regulated. The Park Service has never promulgated a formal 

mountain climbing policy or climbing regulations. The Park does, 

however, require climbers to obtain a permit before departing on a 

climb. The purpose of the permit system is to educate climbers 

via face-to-face ranger contact. When a permit is requested, 

rangers attempt to evaluate the climbers' capabilities, and 

suggest alternative climbs if appropriate. Rangers have no 

authority, however, to prohibit climbers from taking a particular 

route. 

Within this broad statutory/regulatory framework, we first 

examine Plaintiff's assertion that Park Service decisions 

regarding climbing regulation are not insulated from liability. 

Plaintiff concedes these decisions involve an exercise of judgment 

or choice, and thereby satisfy the first Berkovitz prong. No 

statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of 

action for the National Park Service to follow. Decisions as to 

the extent or nature of mountain climbing regulation are truly the 

product of the Park Service's independent judgment -- they are 

discretionary. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. 

Plaintiff argues, however, that these regulatory decisions 

fail the second prong of Berkovitz they do not implicate 

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social, economic, or political policy considerations. To the 

contrary, Superintendent Stark asserts that each of Plaintiff's 

contentions have been considered, but were rejected for the 

following social and economic policy reasons: (1) the inherent 

dangers of mountain climbing are patently obvious; (2) both 

manpower and economic resources should be conserved to preserve 

availability during emergency situations; (3) it would be 

impractical if not impossible to test competency, monitor 

equipment use, or "clear" the mountain given the limited available 

manpower and economic resources; and (4) many Park visitors value 

backcountry climbing as one of the few experiences free from 

government regulation or interference. Plaintiff has presented no 

evidence to dispute Superintendent Stark's assertions. We 

conclude that decisions if, when and how to regulate mountain 

climbing in Grand Teton National Park go to the essence of the 

Park Service's judgment in maintaining the Park according to the 

broad statutory directive. By their very nature, these decisions 

involve balancing competing policy considerations pertaining to 

visitor safety, resource availability, and the appropriate degree 

of governmental interference in recreational activity. The Park 

Service's actions, insofar as they relate to the regulation of 

mountain climbing in Grand Teton National Park, are therefore 

shielded from judicial review by the discretionary function 

exception. 

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Plaintiff's failure to warn claim7 should be analyzed 

separately from the alleged failure to adequately regulate 

mountain climbing. Zumwalt, 928 F.2d at 955. However, as in 

Zumwalt, Plaintiff mistakenly contends that Boyd places any 

failure to warn outside the scope of the discretionary function 

exception. To the contrary, a decision not to warn "still may be 

a policy decision or part of a policy decision protected by the 

discretionary function exception." Id. (emphasis added). 

In Boyd, the alleged failure of the Army Corps of Engineers 

to warn swimmers of potential dangers was not shown to be part of 

the Corps' zoning decision to dedicate part of a lake to 

unrestricted use. In other words, "the government's failure to 

warn was not connected to the policy decision which created the 

hazard." Zumwalt, 928 F.2d at 955. Unlike the decision not to 

warn in Boyd, the record here indicates the Park Service's 

decision not to place additional warnings in the Teton Range, 

whether explicit or implicit, was part of the overall policy 

decision to limit governmental regulation of climbing, educate 

climbers via the permit system, and preserve the Park in 

accordance with the statutory directive. This decision cannot be 

divorced from the overall policy not to engage in strict 

regulation of climbing activity in the Park. "A decision that is 

7 Try as he might, Plaintiff cannot legitimately characterize 

this case as a Boyd-type "failure to warn" case. The record makes 

it abundantly clear that the basis of Plaintiff's suit is the 

alleged negligent failure to rescue. In fact, the record 

indicates that a warning was posted at the Buck Mountain trailhead 

informing climbers of the dangers of snowslopes -- the specific 

danger encountered by Ben Johnson. 

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Appellate Case: 90-8060 Document: 010110096931 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 12 
a component of an overall policy decision protected by the 

discretionary function exception also is protected by this 

exception." Zumwalt, 928 F.2d at 955; ~ also Weiss, and Miller. 

In the absence of facts indicating the failure to post additional 

warnings was a distinct, nonpolicy decision, we conclude that 

Plaintiff's failure to warn claim is barred by the discretionary 

function exception. 

B. 

We now turn to the issue of whether Park Service decisions 

if, when and how to conduct rescue operations are shielded by the 

discretionary function exception. Fundamentally, Plaintiff 

alleges that the National Park Service was negligent in its 

response to Ben Johnson's plight. However, the dispositive 

threshold issue is not whether the Park Service was negligent, but 

rather what was the nature of the Park Service's decisions. In 

response to this issue, Plaintiff baldly asserts that "[t]he 

rangers [sic] negligent actions in responding to Macal and Wechner 

'simply did not involve the exercise of [social, economic and 

political] judgment,'" and, therefore, do not invoke the 

discretionary function exception. A closer analysis is in order. 

Again, we must first determine whether the challenged action 

"is a matter of choice for the acting employee." Berkovitz, 486 

U.S. at 536. In addition to the general statutory directive 

quoted above, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized, not 

mandated, to assist National Park visitors in emergencies. 16 

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u.s.c. § 12 (1988). No statute imposes a duty to rescue, nor are 

there regulations or formal Park Service policies which prescribe 

a specific course of conduct for search or rescue efforts. 

Instead, the decision if, when or how to initiate a search or 

rescue is left to the discretion of the SAR team. Therefore, the 

rangers must act without reliance upon fixed or readily 

ascertainable standards when making a search or rescue decision in 

the field. Plaintiff wisely concedes that these decisions are 

discretionary and therefore satisfy the first prong of Berkovitz. 

Plaintiff contends, however, that Park Service rescue 

responses do not involve the kind of discretionary judgment 

protected by the discretionary function exception. We therefore 

focus our attention on the second prong of the Berkovitz analysis 

-- whether the decision if, when or how to initiate a search or 

rescue is the kind of decision the discretionary function 

exception was designed to shield. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. 

Congress intended that this exception protect from judicial 

second-guessing only those governmental actions and decisions 

based on public policy considerations. Id. at 536-37. The key to 

a proper construction of the discretionary function exception thus 

lies in the determination of whether a governmental decision is 

"grounded in social, economic, and political policy." Varig, 467 

U.S. at 814 (emphasis added). 

Governmental actions outside the regulatory context may be 

protected by the discretionary function exception. Allen, 816 

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F.2d at 1422 (citing Varig, 467 U.S. at 810-14, and Dalehite, 346 

U.S. at 31). Furthermore, "the nature of the conduct, rather than 

the status of the actor ..• governs whether the discretionary 

function exception applies in a given case." Varig, 467 U.S. at 

813. The fact that the rangers, as employees, make nonregulatory 

search and rescue decisions is therefore inconsequential to our 

determination of whether those decisions are policy judgments. 

The nature of the rescue decision process is the critical inquiry: 

Do Park Service search and rescue decisions simply involve 

weighing safety considerations under an established program or do 

they involve the balancing of competing policy considerations? 

Park Service search and rescue decisions are not guided by 

formal standards. Yet, these decisions are not arbitrary. The 

record demonstrates that Park rangers make individual search and 

rescue decisions based on the following considerations: 

(1) Safety -- It is a primary objective of the Park Service 

to protect the safety of both the visitors and the rangers. For 

this reason the rangers consider a variety of factors, including 

but not limited to, the nature of the situation reported (e.g., 

lost, overdue, off route, injured), 8 the weather, the nature and 

difficulty of the terrain, the number of climbers, and the 

presence or absence of a leader at the scene. 

8 Because it is not uncommon for climbers to be overdue, 

unaccounted for, or off route, it is not Park policy to initiate a 

search or rescue effort based on a report that a climber is 

overdue, unaccounted for, or off route, or simply because another 

climber demands one. 

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(2) Human resources -- The Park Service has limited manpower 

resources which it must allocate and deploy carefully. In June 

1987, Grand Teton National Park had 17,197 visitors per day. 

Hikers and climbers accounted for 1,009 of these daily visitors. 

During this same period, forty seasonal and twelve permanent 

rangers (including the eighteen search and rescue rangers in the 

Jenny Lake Subdistrict) patrolled 332,331 acres -- over 519 square 

miles of extremely rugged terrain. 

(3) Economic resources The Park Service has limited 

economic resources which it must use wisely. Search and rescue 

efforts are expensive. For example, a helicopter search costs 

$750 per hour. 

(4) Governmental interference· The climbing community 

appreciates the inherent danger of the sport and is perceived to 

value the individual freedom of a backcountry experience. 

We need not find evidence in the record that the rangers in 

this instance considered each of the identified policy factors. 

The discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a 

conscious decision, so long as the Park Service's search and 

rescue program allowed room for the rangers to make independent 

policy judgments. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 546; Richardson v. 

United States, 943 F.2d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1991); Sea-Land 

Serv., Inc. v. United States, 919 F.2d 888, 892 (3d. Cir. 1990), 

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cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 2235 (1991). The record before us 

adequately supports our conclusion that the rangers' decision if, 

when or how to rescue inherently involves the balancing of safety 

b . t' 9 o Jee .1.ves against such practical considerations as staffing, 

funding and minimizing government intrusion. As such, these 

decisions are grounded in social and economic policy, and thus are 

shielded from liability under the FTCA discretionary function 

exception. 

Finally, Plaintiff seems to argue that even if the exception 

protects the decision if, when or how to rescue, the initial 

interview/communication stage is not protected. To attempt to 

separate the rangers' information gathering activity from the 

ultimate rescue decision is, however, to elevate form over 

substance. The gathering of information from an individual 

reporting a potential problem and· the communication between 

rangers is inextricably tied to the rescue decision. The ultimate 

decision is necessarily based upon this information. With regard 

to each reported incident, Park rangers are in the unique position 

to assess the quantity and quality of information offered. No 

meaningful way exists for this court to consider the nature of 

these acts apart from the total rescue decision. 10 

9 Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, the fact that visitor 

safety is a primary Park Service objective does not make search 

and rescue decisions any less discretionary, or remove them from 

the discretionary function exception. 

10 While a "lost person questionnaire" form was mentioned by 

some of the rangers in their deposition testimony, nothing in the 

record indicates that this form was adopted by the Park Service 

for use by all rangers during the interview stage of a search and 

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( 

We reiterate, "[a] decision that is a component of an overall 

policy decision protected by the discretionary function exception 

also is protected by this exception." Zumwalt, 928 F.2d at 955; 

see also Weiss, and Miller. The rangers' initial investigatory 

conduct is a component of the overall policy decision; as such, it 

cannot by itself support Plaintiff's suit under the FTCA. See 

generally Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 515-16 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 

(allegations of improper pre indictment investigation are 

insufficiently separable from discretionary decision whether to 

prosecute), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Payton v. United 

States, 679 F.2d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 1982) (the manner and degree 

of consideration with which the Parole Board examines a prisoner's 

records is inextricably tied to its ultimate discretionary 

decision whether to grant parole). 

III. 

After careful examination of the record, we find nothing to 

contradict the government's evidence that Park Service search and 

rescue decisions are discretionary decisions requiring rangers to 

balance competing policy considerations. 11 In opposing the 

government's summary judgment motion, Plaintiff had the burden of 

rescue decision. Consequently, this form fails to constitute a 

sufficient fixed or readily ascertainable standard by which this 

court could evaluate the rangers' investigatory conduct apart from 

the ultimate rescue decision. 

11 The record in this case may have been more helpful to the 

court had both counsel devoted more time and effort developing the 

facts and less time and effort squabbling with each other. 

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presenting evidence that would put in issue the discretionary 

nature of these decisions. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 324 (1986). Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden. 

We recognize that in Plaintiff's view this is a harsh end. 

However, Plaintiff's entire case rests on the assertion that Park 

Service personnel could have communicated more accurately and 

responded more quickly. While this assertion may be true (i.e., 

the rangers' interview and response may have deviated from 

standards against which liability is measured where liability is 

available) it is not sufficient to establish FTCA liability. 

Allen, 816 F.2d at 1424. Factual issues concerning negligence are 

irrelevant to the threshold issue whether the officials' actions 

are shielded from liability by the discretionary function 

exception. Id. at 1421. The Park Service's conduct involved the 

permissible exercise of policy judgment, therefore governmental 

immunity is preserved under 28 u.s.c. § 2680(a) "whether or not 

the discretion involved be abused." 

In summary, we conclude the district court properly granted 

summary judgment. The record reveals no disputed material facts 

as to the discretionary nature of the Park Service's actions. 

Plaintiff has confused negligence with immunity -- to adopt the 

argument would be to jeopardize the Park rangers' autonomy to make 

difficult, individualized search and rescue decisions in the 

field. We seriously doubt Congress intended to expose these 

decisions to the second guessing of courts far removed from the 

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exigencies of the moment. Plaintiff's negligence claims are 

therefore barred by the discretionary function exception to the 

FTCA. The district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 

the United States is AFFIRMED. 

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