Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00745/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00745-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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09cv745

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HARVEY EUGENE LARSON,

Petitioner,

v.

CARRASCO, Warden, et al.

Respondents.

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Civil No. 09cv745-L(PCL)

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART THE

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION AND

REMANDING IN PART THE

MATTER TO THE MAGISTRATE

JUDGE FOR FURTHER REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Harvey Eugene Larson, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The case was

referred to United States Magistrate Judge Peter C. Lewis for a report and recommendation

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B) and Civil Local Rule 72.3. Petitioner subsequently

twice amended the petition. His operative petition is the Second Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Petition”). Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Petition as time-barred

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner opposed the motion. The Magistrate Judge issued a

Report and Recommendation recommending the Petition be dismissed. Pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) Petitioner filed objections to the Report and Recommendation, to

which Respondent did not respond. For the reasons which follow, the Report and

Recommendation is ADOPTED IN PART. The matter is REMANDED to the Magistrate

Judge for a further report and recommendation on the issues listed below.

Case 3:09-cv-00745-L-PCL Document 36 Filed 08/23/10 Page 1 of 6
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1 The Report and Recommendation references only the filing of the Second

Amended Habeas Corpus Petition on August 26, 2009. (R&R at 3.) Should the filing date

become important for purposes of the statute of limitations, it appears that the filing of the initial

petition would be relevant.

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In reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court “shall

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,”

and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made

by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to

the magistrate judge with instructions.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

The Report and Recommendation found that the Petition was time-barred and

recommended dismissal. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) “sets a one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition seeking

relief from a state court judgment.” Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009); see

also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Generally, the statute runs from “the date on which the judgment

became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The judgment in Petitioner’s case became final on July 30,

2002 and, in the absence of tolling, the statute of limitations expired on July 30, 2003. (See

Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) at 4.) The original petition in federal court was filed in

March 2009.1

Once the statute of limitations begins to run, statutory and equitable tolling may suspend

it for specific periods of time. A petitioner may be entitled to statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. 

Section 2244(d)(2), which provides in pertinent part, 

The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

The Magistrate Judge applied statutory tolling and found that at least two time periods

adding up to approximately four years, from July 30, 2002 to November 23, 2003 and August

13, 2004 to May 29, 2007, when statutory tolling did not apply. (R&R at 4-7.) Accordingly,

statutory tolling did not make Petitioner’s filing timely. The Magistrate Judge found that

equitable tolling did not apply because Petitioner did not set forth any facts in support of his

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claim. (Id. at 7.) Last, the Magistrate Judge declined to analyze Petitioner’s argument that his

Petition may be granted review under the “actual innocence” gateway because Petitioner did not

adequately articulate his argument. (Id. n.6.) 

Petitioner argues that his filing in California Court of Appeal on May 14, 2003 should

have triggered statutory tolling because it was properly filed and not untimely. He attempted to

file a habeas petition on May 14, 2003, but it was rejected by the clerk because it consisted of a

letter and exhibits only. (See Letter from Deputy Clerk of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate

District, dated May 14, 2003.) The clerk returned Petitioner’s exhibits together with a form

Petitioner should use to file a habeas petition. (Id.) 

A habeas petition is considered “properly filed” for purposes of statutory filing “when its

delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings. 

These usually prescribe, for example, the form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery,

the court and office in which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee.” Artuz v. Bennett,

531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (internal quotation marks, citations and footnote omitted.) 

Petitioner argues that the petition was properly filed. He relies on authorities addressing

the proper form of a writ of habeas corpus issued by the court. (See Objections at 4.) However,

those authorities are irrelevant to the proper form of a habeas corpus petition. Petitioner also

points to California Rules of Court 4.551 and 8.380, which allow the state court, for good cause,

to accept for filing a habeas petition which is not presented on the Judicial Council form, if it

contains the information which is called for by the form and California Penal Code Section

1474. Because Petitioner’s letter to the court did not include this information, it was not filed. 

Petitioner’s argument that his May 14, 2003 state court filing was a “properly filed” habeas

petition is therefore rejected. 

Petitioner’s argument that his state habeas petition filed on November 23, 2003 was

timely filed under California law and was therefore “properly filed” for purposes of statutory

tolling is unavailing. By the time Petitioner filed his state habeas petition on November 23,

2003, the AEDPA statute of limitations had expired. (See R&R at 5.) A timely and otherwise

properly filed state habeas petition, which is filed after the expiration of the AEDPA statute of

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limitations, does not provide a basis for statutory tolling of the federal petition under the

AEDPA. Ferguson v. Palamteer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

Petitioner also argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because of an intervening

change in the law. Based on Townsend v. Knowles, 562 F.3d 1200, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2009), he

argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because the Ninth Circuit law regarding statutory

tolling changed on April 27, 2005, when the United Supreme Court decided Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005). Although Petitioner is correct that equitable tolling may be

based on an intervening change in the law, it is appropriate only “in the rare case where a

petitioner relies on [a] legally erroneous [Ninth Circuit] holding in determining when to file a

federal habeas petition.” Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008); see also

Townsend, 562 F.3d at 1205-06. This in not the case here, because the statute of limitations

expired on July 30, 2003 – before the Supreme Court decided Pace. 

In his objections Petitioner provided an affidavit with voluminous exhibits in support of

his claim that the statute of limitation should be equitably tolled because his legal work was

confiscated and sometimes destroyed, and because of lack of access to the law library. Although

ordinary prison limitations on access to the law library without more do not warrant equitable

tolling, lack of access to Petitioner’s legal work may warrant it. See Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 998. 

Furthermore, in support of his opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Petitioner filed

exhibits documenting his problems with prison mail, access to the law library and to his legal

work (see docket no. 21 at 19-65); however, this evidence is not addressed in the Report and

Recommendation. With his objections Petitioner provided additional evidence regarding these

issues. 

Because the Magistrate Judge did not have an opportunity to consider this new evidence,

and to provide him an opportunity to consider the previously filed exhibits, the issue of equitable

tolling is remanded for a Report and Recommendation in light of Petitioner’s evidence. The

Report and Recommendation shall include consideration of the issue whether the limitations on

Petitioner’s access to the law library were ordinary limitations inherent in prison life, or

amounted to an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to justify equitable tolling. The Report

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and Recommendation shall also include consideration of the issues whether Petitioner’s

difficulties with prison legal mail and/or access to his legal materials warrant equitable tolling.

Petitioner also argues that his Petition is timely because of a State-created impediment to

filing under 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d)(1)(B). This issue was raised in Petitioner’s opposition to

Defendant’s motion to dismiss (see docket no. 21 at 6-14), but is not addressed in the Report and

Recommendation. (See R&R at 7.) Accordingly, this issue is remanded for a Report and

Recommendation regarding tolling under 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d)(1)(B) in light of

Petitioner’s evidence filed with his opposition and in support of his objections.

Furthermore, in his opposition Petitioner argued that the statute of limitations should be

tolled because he was not able to discover the factual predicate of his claims before November

23, 2003. (Docket no. 21 at 6.) This issue is not addressed in the Report and Recommendation

and is therefore also remanded for consideration.

Last, Petitioner raised “actual innocence gateway” as a ground to circumvent the statute

of limitations. This argument is unavailing because “there is no ‘actual innocence’ exception to

the one-year statute of limitation for filing of an original petition for habeas corpus relief.” See

Lee v. Lampert, __ F.3d __, 2010 WL 2652505 (9th Cir. Jul. 6, 2010).

Based on the foregoing, the Report and Recommendation ADOPTED IN PART AND

REMANDED IN PART to the Magistrate Judge as provided herein. Although Petitioner has a

right to object to the report and recommendation issued after remand, see Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b)(2), in the absence of Petitioner’s showing of good cause, the Court is not inclined to

consider evidence or argument which was not already provided with Petitioner’s opposition to

Respondent’s motion to dismiss or in support of his objections to the Report and

Recommendation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 23, 2010

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

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COPY TO: 

HON. PETER C. LEWIS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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