Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02329/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02329-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

Unital Stat. Court of A~ 

Tenth eireuit 

(PUBLISH) AUG 0 6 1990 

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

JEFF McHARGUE and JULIA 

McHARGUE, 

Plaintiffs/Appellants 

v. 

STOKES DIVISION OF PENNWALT 

CORP. I 

Defendant/Appellee 

* 

CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY 

Cross Claimant/Appellant 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

No. 88-2329 

88-2409 

) 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Colorado 

D.C. No. 86-A-1301 

Blaine A. Rutenbeck, Denver, Colorado, and J. Conard Metcalf of 

Williams, Trine, Greenstein & Griffith, Boulder, Colorado, for 

Plaintiff/Appellants. 

James A. Clark, Bruce D. Pringle and Darwin Poyfair of Baker & 

Hostetler, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant/Appellee. 

Wendelyn K. Walberg, ·Kurt E. Walberg of Walberg Law Offices, Denver, 

Colorado, for Cross-Claimant/Appellant. 

Appellate Case: 88-2329 Document: 01019371205 Date Filed: 08/06/1990 Page: 1 
Before BALDOCK and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and SAM, District Judge.* 

SAM, District Judge. 

This is a products liability case in which plaintiffs Jeff and 

Julia McHargue and cross-claimant Continental Insurance Company 

(Continental) 1 appeal from the trial court's denial of the McHargues' motion for a new trial after the jury returned a no cause of 

action verdict for defendant-appellant Stokes Division of Pennwalt 

Corporation (Stokes). The McHargues assert the trial court abused 

its discretion by (1) allowing Stokes to cross-examine the 

McHargues' expert witness on whether the Occupational Health and 

Safety Act (OSHA) recognizes American National Standards Institute 

(ANSI) standards, (2) allowing Stokes' expert to testify regarding 

the probability the subject accident would occur, and (3) instructing the jury that misuse was a complete defense to the products 

liability claim. Stokes asserts the trial court erred by denying 

Stokes' motion for summary judgment or motion for directed verdict. 

Our jurisdiction over this diversity case arises under 28 

u.s.c. § 1291. We hold there was no abuse of discretion below 

because (1) Stokes did not cross-examine regarding OSHA for any 

*Honorable David Sam, United States District Judge for the 

District of Utah. 

1

Continental JOlns on the McHargues' briefs because it seeks 

to recover workers' compensation payments from Stokes. The 

appellants will be jointly denominated "the McHargues." 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-2329 Document: 01019371205 Date Filed: 08/06/1990 Page: 2 
reason related to liability, but rather, to counter the McHargues' 

expert's attack on the credibility of ANSI standards; and (2) where 

strict liability was the only issue submitted, the jury's finding 

the product was not defective obviated deliberation of the parties' 

comparative fault. 2 Stokes' assertion concerning denial of its 

dispositive motions is therefore moot. Accordingly, we affirm. 

I. Facts 

These facts are relevant to the one issue remaining: the 

propriety of allowing Stokes to use OSHA standards in crossexamination of the McHargues' expert. Jeff McHargue was employed 

as a first shift supervisor at Denver Plastics, where he had a duty 

to turn on the injection molding machines and ensure they were 

running safely. Stokes manufactured and sold to Denver Plastics a 

300-ton horizontal plastic injection molding machine (horizontal 

machine) called "Blue 300." The machine operates by forcing heated 

plastic into a mold composed of two platens, one that is stationary 

and one that moves horizontally to open and close the mold. 

Hydraulic pressure causes the movable platen to be brought up 

against the stationary platen, forming a completed mold into which 

the heated plastic is pumped. After the plastic product is formed, 

?Finding no reversible error at trial, we need not reach 

issues related to the comparative fault of either party. Consequently, we will not discuss the probability issue because it 

relates solely to Stokes' fault, or the misuse issue because it 

relates solely to Jeff McHargue's fault. 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-2329 Document: 01019371205 Date Filed: 08/06/1990 Page: 3 
the movable platen returns to its original position and the product 

is either manually removed or automatically ejected from the mold. 

The year before Stokes sold Blue 300 to Denver Plastics, ANSI 

promulgated standards for safety devices that should be found on 

horizontal machines. ANSI standard B151.1-1976 (B151.1) requires 

a front safety gate (equipped with a hydraulic, an electric and a 

mechanical safety interlock) and a rear safety guard (equipped with 

an electric interlock) . It is undisputed that Blue 300 met ANSI 

standards, and the question whether it was appropriate to introduce 

those standards is not on appeal. 3 

Jeff was injured when the platens slammed on his hand as he 

used his fingers to remove a plastic part stuck in the machinery. 

The platens shut when another employee inadvertently closed the 

front gate while Jeff was at the rear trying, without first turning 

off the machine, to dislodge the plastic part. The safety devices 

failed to function as a result of an improperly wired timer (which 

Stokes did not manufacture or sell as part of Blue 300). 

The jury returned a verdict for Stokes on the strict 

liability claim by finding Blue 300 was not defective. This appeal 

3Although "the issue of manufacturer compliance with industry 

standards is generally considered . irrelevant in a strict 

liability case," Rexrode v. American Laundry Press Co., 674 F.2d 

826, 831 (lOth Cir. 1982), the McHargues did not object below to 

the relevance of B151.1. 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-2329 Document: 01019371205 Date Filed: 08/06/1990 Page: 4 
is taken from the trial court's denial of the McHargues' motion for 

a new trial. 

II. Discussion 

In ruling on a motion for a new trial, the trial judge has 

broad discretion. Scholz Homes Inc. v. Wallace, 590 F.2d 860, 864 

(lOth Cir. 1979). He has the obligation or duty to ensure that 

justice is done, and, when justice so 

authority to set aside the jury's verdict. 

requires, he has the 

Seven Provinces Ins. 

Co. Ltd. v. Commerce & Industry Ins. Co., 65 F.R.D. 674, 688 

(W.D.Mo. 1975). He may do so when he believes the verdict to be 

against the weight of the evidence or when prejudicial error has 

entered the record. Holmes v. Wack, 464 F.2d 86, 88 (lOth Cir. 

1972) . 

As an affirmative defense, Stokes asserted the safety devices 

on Blue 300 met Bl51.1. The McHargues' expert attempted to 

diminish the credibility of Bl51.1 by characterizing it as nothing 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-2329 Document: 01019371205 Date Filed: 08/06/1990 Page: 5 
more than a minimum consensus standard. 4 Stokes sought to bolster 

the credibility of ANSI standards in general by asking the 

McHargues' expert whether OSHA recognized any national consensus 

standards other than ANSI standards. The expert replied that, as 

far as he knew, B151.1 was the only nationally recognized consensus 

standard for a horizontal machine. 

The McHargues contend that the cross-examination improperly 

affected their common law rights in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 

653 (b) ( 4) , 5 because "it is error to admit evidence to the effect 

that a product does not violate OSHA standards." The only 

supporting authority they cite, Minichello v. United States 

Industries, 756 F.2d 26, 29 (6th Cir. 1985), holds that although 

OSHA regulations might be relevant in a products liability case, 

4The Mchargues also argue that Stokes' reference to OSHA was 

improper because OSHA creates safety standards for employers only 

and Stokes was not Jeff's employer. While that argument might be 

persuasive had Stokes introduced a specific OSHA regulation as a 

standard, cf. Bailey v. V & 0 Press Co., Inc., 770 F.2d 601, 607-08 

(1985) (error not to give limiting instruction regarding OSHA 

regulation when action was not against employer), it is unpersuasive where Stokes merely made a general reference to OSHA in an 

attempt to enhance the credibility of the ANSI standard, see, e.g., 

Fabian v. E. W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257, 1261 (lOth Cir. 1978) 

(strict liability claim) ("The proper rule is that industry 

standards are not conclusive as to ordinary care in design, but 

rather are admissible evidence"). 

5section 653(b) (4) reads: 

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to 

supersede or in any manner diminish or affect in any 

other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, 

or liabilities of employers and employees under any law 

with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees 

arising out of, or in the course of employment. 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-2329 Document: 01019371205 Date Filed: 08/06/1990 Page: 6 
they can "never provide a basis for liability." The Minichello 

defendant referred to a specific OSHA regulation as proof that 

absence of a certain handrail did not make the product unreasonably 

dangerous. The Sixth Circuit held that such use of an OSHA 

regulation impermissibly affects the standard of civil liability, 

because knowledge of a specific OSHA regulation could lead the 

trier of fact to base its finding regarding product defect on 

whether the product complies with the regulation. In National 

Marine Service, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Co., the court held that OSHA 

regulations may not be used to create civil liability; however, 

they may be referred to as guidelines for determining standards of 

care. 433 F. Supp. 913, 919-20 (E.D. La. 1977) (citing Buhler v. 

Mariott Hotels, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 999, 1000 (D.C. La. 1974)). 

Both Minichello and National Marine are inapposite to this 

case because Stokes did not introduce the OSHA standards for any 

reason related to liability; that is, neither to prove Blue 300 met 

OSHA regulation nor to set out standards of care. Stokes never 

referred to a specific OSHA regulation; it cross-examined merely to 

show that OSHA recognized the ANSI standards generally and that no 

other standards existed for horizontal machines, 6 and then only 

after the McHargues put the credibility of ANSI standards in issue. 

stokes' cross-examination was necessary and proper to counter the 

6

The McHargues cite no authority and we are aware of none to 

support their contention that the standard for civil liability on 

a strict liability claim would be affected by evidence that OSHA 

recognizes ANSI standards. 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-2329 Document: 01019371205 Date Filed: 08/06/1990 Page: 7 
McHargues' attack on the credibility of the ANSI standards. 

Moreover, in our view, any error resulting from the cross-examination was harmless. 7 Therefore the trial court did not abuse its 

broad discretion by allowing Stokes' cross-examination regarding 

OSHA. 

AFFIRMED. 

7The Fifth Circuit reasoned (on facts more prejudicial to the 

plaintiff than these) that "(a]ssuming the OSHA standards were 

erroneously admitted, the error was harmless because the OSHA 

standards were merely cumulative to the almost identical and 

properly admitted ANSI standards." Dixon v. International 

Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 582 (5th Cir. 1985) (specific OSHA 

standards admitted in strict liability case). 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-2329 Document: 01019371205 Date Filed: 08/06/1990 Page: 8