Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_04-cv-01061/USCOURTS-almd-3_04-cv-01061-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

Because summary judgment is clearly warranted on the federal claims alleged, these state 1

torts included as pendent claims need not be considered: assault and battery (¶¶ 24-26); negligent

(continued...)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

CLEMENTINE CLARK, on )

behalf of minor child QP, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 3:04-CV-01061-WKW

) [WO]

RUSSELL COUNTY BOARD )

OF EDUCATION, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 18) is due to be granted pursuant to

the findings and conclusions discussed in this Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Represented by counsel, on November 2, 2004, Clementine Clark (“Clark”) on behalf

of QP, a minor child initiated this action against the Russell County Board of Education

(“RCBOE”); Dr. Phillip Elder, in his individual and official capacity as Superintendent of the

RCBOE (“Supt. Elder”); and Larry Screws, in his individual and official capacity as former

Principal of Mt. Olive Elementary School (“Principal Screws”). Docketed as a civil rights

action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the complaint asserted an additional assortment of federal

jurisdictional grounds and state tort claims arising from Principal Screws’ alleged assault on

1

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(...continued) 1

training and supervision (¶¶ 27-29); negligence and gross negligence (¶¶ 30-32); wantonness (¶¶ 33-

36); and intentional infliction of emotional distress (¶¶ 36-39). It bears noting, however, that each

of these claims is insufficiently plead and unsupported by the same undisputed facts which dictate

summary judgment on the federal claims. Moreover, the RCBOE properly claims sovereign

immunity, and its Superintendent and Principal would similarly enjoy immunity as state agents

performing discretionary functions. See Def.’s Br. at 20-43. 

The Motion by Attorneys Zachary T Collins and Juraldine Battle-Hodge cited “an 2

irreconcilable breakdown of the attorney-client relationship.” (Doc. 14)

Plaintiff’s handwritten, non-captioned pleading requested “mycase to be set aside for a later 3

date all because at this present time I do not have a attorney” and appeared to state her intent to

maintain this lawsuit against only defendant Larry Screws. Defendants’ Objection (Doc. 23, Dec.

28, 2005) argued that “plaintiff has had adequate time to retain an attorney.” 

2

the minor plaintiff – by “throwing [him] down and choking him” at the school on September

9, 2003. On May 10, 2005, the court granted the motion of plaintiffs’ counsel to withdraw

(Doc. 15), and Plaintiff has failed to secure other representation.

2

A scheduling order filed June 1, 2005, reset the requested jury trial for the April 10,

2006 term, with a dispositive motion deadline of December 10, 2005, and a discovery

deadline of February 17, 2006. Defendants timely filed their dispositive motion along with

a Narrative Summary of Undisputed Facts and a supporting brief. (Docs. 18 and 19, Dec. 9,

2005). Upon referral of the case, including the dispositive motion, for pretrial action and

recommendations (Doc. 20, Dec. 13, 2005), the Magistrate Judge set a January 9, 2006, showcause deadline for the pro se plaintiff’s response. After Defendants objected to Plaintiff’s

Motion for Extension of Time (Docs. 22 and 23) , the court set the Motion for hearing on

3

January 13, 2006, advising, in relevant part:

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Plaintiff filed this pending motion to secure a lawyer more than seven months after

the withdrawal of previous counsel, and her motion provides no basis for evaluating

any good-faith efforts undertaken to secure counsel. Solely in deference to the

plaintiff’s pro se status, it is 

ORDERED that this Motion is set for hearing at 10:00 a.m. on Friday,

January 13, 2006 in Courtroom 4A. Plaintiff MUST APPEAR with or without

an attorney, and she is HEREBY WARNED that the court may consider her

failure to attend as abandonment of this lawsuit and shall proceed to consider the

pending summary judgment motion. Plaintiff shall be prepared to show any good

cause for granting her any additional time to secure a lawyer, and she shall be

prepared to document each effort undertaken to hire new counsel since the May 9,

2005 filing of her previous lawyers’ motion to withdraw. 

(Doc. 24, Jan. 3, 2006).

Clark appeared at the scheduled hearing as did Defendants’ counsel, Phillip Franklin

Hutcheson, and Defendant Screws. Clark orally moved to dismiss the RCBOE and Supt.

Elder from the case, explaining that she did not have specific complaints against them, that

post-incident communications with them had satisfied her preliminary concerns, and that

her lawyers decided to designate them as defendants. After duly considering the plaintiff’s

sworn testimony, the court entered the following findings:

1. Notwithstanding notice as early as April 25, 2005 (following the taking of her

deposition) that her counsel of record would not continue his legal representation,

the Plaintiff failed to undertake any good-faith effort to secure substitute counsel

until December 2005, when she telephoned one Montgomery-based lawyers and

January 2006, when she reported unsuccessful phone solicitations to two lawyers

based in Phoenix City and a third with offices in Columbus, Georgia. The court finds

unreasonable Plaintiff’s explanation that the delay reflected her confusion regarding

the status of her case after withdrawal by her lawyer. In the interim of at least seven

months after the court’s order permitting withdrawal of counsel, Plaintiff had a

reasonable opportunity to exercise greater diligence in seeking substitute counsel.

Though Plaintiff is a fifth-grade dropout who earned a G.E.D. in 1983, she is

employed, communicates sufficiently for basic comprehension, acknowledged her

access to friends for lawyer referrals, and offers no compelling excuse for her

dilatoriness.

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2. The likelihood that additional time will increase Plaintiff’s prospects in securing

counsel is slim. Any competent lawyer experienced in federal civil rights practice will

readily discern from the complaint and summary judgment motion the patently

insurmountable obstacles to any recovery by Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s own testimony

reflects her misgivings about finding counsel in that she requested that she be

permitted, at minimum, to represent herself with an extension of time to respond to

the pending motion.

3. Upon Plaintiff’s request that she be permitted to dismiss two of the three

designated defendants – the Russell County Board of Education and Dr. Phillip Elder

– the court examined and counseled further sufficiently to find that her request is

voluntary, knowing, and based on her acknowledgment that her asserted claims were

grounded on her negative emotions which ameliorated somewhat following

communications with these defendants. As indicated during this proceeding, the

court will not premise dismissal of these defendants solely on Plaintiffs’ oral request

but will instead inform any recommendation for dismissal on the merits of these

Defendants’ claimed entitlement to summary judgment.

(Doc. 26, Jan. 13, 2006).

Pursuant to these findings the court denied Clark’s Motion to the extent of her request

for a stay of proceedings in order to allow additional time for her to secure counsel; but

granted the Motion only to the extent of her orally amended request for an extension of time

to file pro se a response in opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion, extending

the deadline to January 27, 2006. 

Clark has filed no response at all to the summary judgment motion.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ. P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment always bears the

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initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, identifying

those portions of the pleadings and evidentiary record which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986);

see also Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11 Cir. 1993) (discussing burdenth

shifting under Rule 56). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing

there is no genuine issue of material fact, or by showing the non-moving party has failed to

present sufficient evidence to establish an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim.

Celotex at 331. As the Supreme Court instructed in Celotex, 477 U. S. at 323, “the plain

language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . . against a party who

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

In response to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the “adverse party

may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the

adverse party’s response, by affidavits, or as otherwise provided .... must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The court’s role is

neither to weigh the evidence nor to find the facts; instead, it is “the threshold inquiry of

determining whether there is the need for a trial – whether, in other words, there are any

genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

250 (1986). Substantive law will identify those facts which are material on motions for

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Assuming Plaintiffs’ intention to state a claim sounding in malpractice by the RCBOE and 4

Supt. Elder, Defendantsshow the lack ofjudicial precedent for any such claim. See Defs.’ Br. at 7-10.

6

summary judgment. Id. at 258. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants “RCBOE” and Supt. Elder

Notwithstanding its finding that Clark’s oral motion to end her lawsuit against the

RCBOE and Supt. Elder is “ voluntary, knowing, and . . . acknowledg[es] that . . . asserted

claims were grounded on her negative emotions which ameliorated somewhat following

communications with these defendants”, the court has proceeded to examine the summary

judgment submissions to ascertain their merit as to these defendants.

Defendants properly cite the absence of any evidentiary foundation for the Title VII claim

against the RCBOE, described in Count 1 as “deprivation of civil rights.” Claiming “emotional

distress and mental anguish” by her son, Clark ground the claim solely on his removal from school

on December 11, 2002:

During the time period following, until the end of the 2002-2003 school term,

Plaintiff QP did not receive sufficient public school instruction and/or assistance from

the defendant Board. During the same period, Defendant Board failed to sufficiently

provide the necessary teachers, books, and other material to ensure that Plaintiff QP

was not deprived of his civil rights to obtain an adequate public education.

This allegation states no claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e and none otherwise cognizable

in this court.4

 Neither Count 1 nor the captioned Count 2 action – “42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Individual

Defendants” – directs any allegations against the defendant Superintendent but instead only

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Claims asserted against Defendants Elder and Screws in their official capacity are due to be 5

dismissed – to the extent they state claims – as impermissible actions against the state. See Busby v.

City of Orlando, 931 F. 2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (“In contrast to individual capacity suits, when

an ... [employee] ... is sued in his or her official capacity, the suit is simply another way of pleading

an action against an entity of which an ... [employee] .. Is an agent.”

Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Complaint aver: 6

Defendant Board was deliberately indifferent to the abuse when it failed to

take appropriate action when it placed Plaintiff QP in an inadequate

homebound program, and failed to properly protect Plaintiff QP from and as

a result of the assault and battery. (¶ 21). By failing to properly supervise and

train or to provide an adequate alternative for Plaintiff QP, Defendant Board

with deliberate indifference, malice and bad-faith caused Plaintiff QP to

undergo further abuses. (¶ 22) 

See GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367-68 (11 Cir. 7 th

1998)(“We stress at this point, . . . that the heightened pleading requirement is the law of this circuit.

. . . Although the Supreme Court has held that courts may not impose a heightened pleading

requirement in § 1983 cases involving municipalities, see Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics

Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167-68, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1162, 122 L.Ed.2d 517

(1993), the Court specifically declined to extend its holding to cases involving individual government

officials, see id. at 167, 113 S.Ct. at 1162, and we likewise decline to do so here.”); See Wash v.

Bauer, No. 05-10531, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19395, at *5 (11 Cir. Sept. 2, 2005)(“[T]here is a th

heightened pleading requirement when a plaintiff brings a §1983 complaint against officials acting in

their individual capacities.”)

7

generally and insufficiently alludes to “unconstitutional policies and customs practiced by

Defendants” , and imputes to the defendant Board knowledge of unconstitutional deprivations. 5 6

When a governmental officer sued individually under Section 1983 asserts qualified immunity, as is

the case here, controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent imposes a “heightened pleading” standard for

the complaint instead of Rule 8's minimal notice pleading. Accordingly, like Principal Screws, Supt. 7

Elder would be entitled to claim qualified immunity, but the complaint presents no

particularized conduct, much less any violation of a clearly established constitutional or

statutory right, for any analysis. Moreover, it appears that respondeat superior is the intended

Case 3:04-cv-01061-WKW-DRB Document 28 Filed 02/14/06 Page 7 of 13
Plaintiffs do not allege the Board’s or the Superintendent’s supervisory liability because either 8

directly participated in the alleged assault underlying the complaint or either acted to cause directly

the assault. See Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11 Cir. 1990)]; see also Cottone v. Jenne,

th

326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11 Cir. 2003) (describing the “extremelyrigorous” standard for the referenced th

supervisory liability). 

In Trustees of Central Pension Fund v. Wolf Crane Service, Inc., 374 F. 3d 1035, 1039(11 9 th

Cir. 2004), the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that “summary judgment cannot be granted as a sanction

for merely failing to file a response to a motion for summary judgment”, and thus reaffirmed its

instruction to trial courts, in United States v. One Piece of Property, 5800 S.W. 4 Ave., Miami, th

(continued...)

8

though impermissible basis for Section 1983 liability against the RCBOE and Supt. Elder.

See Hardin v. Hayes, 957 F.2d 845, 849 (11 Cir.1992). h 8t

Because the undisputed submissions clearly show the lack of any disputed material

issue of fact, as it relates to putative liability, and otherwise demonstrates these defendants’

entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the court recommends entry of the requested

summary judgment. 

B. Defendant Principal Screws

Pressed during oral arguments to explain the basis of her action against Principal

Screws, Clark simply repeated her apparently sincere belief that the Principal wrongly

assaulted her child though she acknowledged the absence of any serious or permanent

injuries. She offered neither factual nor legal support for her opinion. While no written

submissions controvert the requested summary judgment, the court duly examines the merit

of the motion. Defendants’ submissions clearly demonstrate the absence of any genuine

9

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(...continued) 9

Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004), not to “ base the entry of summary judgment on the th

mere fact that the motion was unopposed but, rather,[to] consider the merits of the motion.” (citing

Fed.R.Civ.P.56(e)).

9

issue of disputed material fact and Principal Screws’ entitlement to judgment as a matter of

law.

1. Undisputed Material Facts

Undisputed altogether is the defendant Principal’s account of the material facts which

provide the analytical context for Clark’s liability claims:

8. On December 10, 2002, Q.P., a third-grade student Mt. Olive Elementary

School informed his teacher, Mrs Prosser, after she threatened to send him to

the office, that he was not afraid of Mr. Screws and that e would “bring a

fucking knife to school and kill him.” I was familiar with Q.P., as he had been

in trouble on several prior occasions, including one time where he wrote a note

that he hated his mother and was going to kill her.

9. I suspended Q.P. pending Class III (Major Offense) disciplinary hearing before a

Hearing Tribunal as set outin the Russell County Schools Handbook and the policies

of the Russell County Board of Education. According to the Russell County Schools

Handbook and the policies of the Russell County Board of Education, the

normal punishment for a Class III offense is removal from school for the

remainder of the school year. The Class III hearing was held on December 16,

2002. Following the Class III hearing, Q.P. was not allowed to return to Mt.

Olive Elementary School for the remainder of the school year. To my

knowledge, Q.P. did not appeal this decision to the Superintendent as allowed

by the Russell County Schools Handbook and the policies of the Russell

County Board of Education. 

10. On September 9, 2003, Q.P., who was back in school at this time, was

brought to the office by Assistant Principal Curtis Jernigan for talking back to

his teacher, calling her “stupid,” and basically disrupting her class. Mr.

Jernigan asked the school secretary, Ms. Hood, to call Q.P.’s mother, but when

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Ms. Hood could not reach her, Q.P. was asked to sit in a chair outside my

office.

11. I began to talk to Mr. Jernigan in my office while Q.P. was outside my

office. At that point, Q.P. stood up and began making disruptive noise. I

could hear him mutter,“stupid,” under his breath. I asked him to sit down and

be quiet numerous times, but he continued to stand and make disruptive noise.

I finally walked out of my office, and based on my education, training and

background, made the decision to put both hands on Q.P.’s shoulders, and

push him down in his seat. At that point, Q.P. wadded up a paper he had in

his hand and hit me in the chest with it. I then restrained Q.P. by placing my

left hand on his shoulder, and I asked Mr. Jernigan to come get Q.P. I had no

intent to cause any harm to Q.P. but merely to maintain discipline and prevent

further disruption in the office. I used the reasonable and appropriate physical

force upon Q.P. that I believed was necessary and appropriate to maintain

discipline.

12. As Mr. Jernigan took Q.P. out of the office down the hall, Q.P. ran out

the front door. I saw him out the window of my office with a stick in his hand

waving it threateningly at me. As Mr. Jernigan and I started to the outside of

the building, we noticed Q.P. coming in the front of the building. He had a

brick in his hand and was making threats as he approached me. Mr. Jernigan

jumped between me and Q.P. and wrestled the brick away from him.

13. I requested another Class III hearing for Q.P. By this time, Q.P. had been

determined to be in need of special education services. Under the provisions of the

Russell County Schools Handbook and the policies of the Russell County Board of

Education, his case was turned over to special education and his IEP

(individualized education plan) team for placement.

14. I have never spoken to the plaintiff or his next of friends regarding the

allegations made in this lawsuit.

15. I know the student plaintiff, and I have no ill-will towards him. I have

never acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or with any intent

to cause him damage or injury.

16. At all times pertinent herein, I exercised my best judgment, professional

training and experience in the discharge of my duties as Principal of Mt. Olive

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Affidavit of Larry Screws (“Screws Aff.”) at 3-5, Ex. 1, Mot. (Doc. 18). 10

Qualified immunity offers “complete protection for government officials sued in their 11

individual capacities if ‘their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346

(11 Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

th

An officer asserting qualified immunity “must first prove that ‘he was acting within the 12

scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.’” Courson v.

McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11 Cir. 1991) (quoting Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1563 (11 th th

Cir. 1998)). Assuming the officer’s requisite showing for his discretionary authority, the burden shifts

to the Section 1983 plaintiff to demonstrate the impropriety of qualified immunity. 

11

Elementary School in dealing with the plaintiff, Q.P.10

 

2. Summary Judgment Analysis

Because Defendant Screws asserts qualified immunity, the court must decide initially 11

if his actions in controversy occurred within the scope of his discretionary authority. His

unchallenged affidavit leaves no doubt that they did. The complaint attributes to Principal 12

Screws individual liability for an alleged assault against the minor school student. In order

to defeat the claim of qualified immunity, Clark must establish first that Principal Screws

violated her minor’s clearly established right. The court’s evaluation must be guided by the

two-pronged test required by the Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001):

A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider,

then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a

constitutional right?...[I]f a violation could be made out on a favorable view of

the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right

was clearly established. This inquiry...must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.

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Concerning the predicate inquiry, the only evidence submitted on this summary

judgment motion disputes the assault described in the complaint – “throwing ...Q.P. down

and choking him” – denies any willful or malicious intent by the Principal to harm the minor

student, and provides relevant context which demonstrates affirmatively both the defendant

principal’s authorization for the disciplinary action taken against the minor and the

reasonableness of that action. The facts simply do not approach even the borders of a

constitutional violation, and no controlling judicial precedent suggests otherwise. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on these findings and conclusions, it is the RECOMMENDATION OF THE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 18) be

GRANTED, and, accordingly, that JUDGMENT be entered against the Plaintiff,

“Clementine Clark, on behalf of Minor Child, QP”, and in favor of all Defendants – Russell

County Board of Education, Phillip Elder, Superintendent, and Larry Screws, Principal – with

this action being dismissed with prejudice.

It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this not later

than February 28, 2006. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

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Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright,

677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir.

1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting

as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the

close of business on September 30, 1981

Done this 14 day of February, 2006 th

/s/ Delores R. Boyd

DELORES R. BOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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