Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00899/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00899-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Tracy Ann McNally, )

)

 Petitioner, )

) 

v. ) CV 06-899 PHX EHC (VAM)

)

State of Arizona, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 )

 Respondent. )

TO THE HONORABLE EARL H. CARROLL, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Tracy Ann McNally ("petitioner") filed a pro se Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner presents two grounds for relief in the amended

petition. (Doc. 7 at p. 5). Respondents filed an answer

opposing the granting of habeas relief. (Doc. 8).

I.BACKGROUND

On November 21, 2001, a state trial court accepted

petitioner's guilty plea to manslaughter and aggravated assault. 

(Doc. 8 at Exhibits D and E). On January 17, 2002, petitioner

was sentenced to 15 years in prison on the manslaughter

conviction and 5 years probation for the aggravated assault

conviction. (Id. at Exhibit F). 

On April 5, 2002, petitioner filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief Pursuant to Rule 32.1 in the trial court. 

(Doc. 8 at Exhibit G). Petitioner followed up by filing a

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petition raising the following grounds:

1. Petitioner was denied effective assistance of

counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution.

... [counsel had] minimal contacts with Petitioner, ...

failed to affirmatively explore avenues of defense in

Petitioner's case ....

... [counsel] advised Petitioner to plead guilty

without having received or reviewed Petitioner's blood

test results. This ... evidence, ... contained

information that had [counsel] been provided ...

sooner, she would not have advised Petitioner to plead

guilty .... the blood test results were of such a

critical nature, and had, up to this point, not been

provided to defense counsel ....

... [counsel] did not give Petitioner ample opportunity

to review the plea agreement, nor reflect on the

repercussions to follow ....

2. Based on the misleading information provided

Petitioner by [counsel], Petitioner did not knowingly,

intelligently and voluntarily plead guilty.

(Doc. 8 at Exhibit B).

The trial court denied the petition in a minute entry filed

on November 6, 2002. (Doc. 8 at Exhibit H). Petitioner sought

review, but the Arizona Court of Appeals denied the petition for

review without comment on February 17, 2004. (Id. at Exhibit I).

On October 25, 2004, petitioner initiated a second Rule 32

in the trial court. In the accompanying petition, petitioner

raised the following claims:

I. [Petitioner] Was Not Competent At The Time She

Entered Her Plea Agreement And Is Thus Entitled To

Withdraw From The Plea.

II. [Petitioner] Did Not Receive Effective Assistance

Of Counsel At All Stages Of The Proceedings.

... failing to prepare for sentencing adequately. 

Counsel called no witnesses at sentencing - either

regarding [petitioner's] mental health problems or

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regarding the actual mechanics of the accident or even

family members or friends to speak on her behalf;

counsel failed to argue a probation tail as a

mitigating factor; counsel failed to review the

available medical records and police reports ....

III. The Trial Court Imposed An Aggravated Sentence In

Violation Of The Arizona And United States

Constitution.

(Doc. 8, Exhibit J, Attachment 1 at pp. 1-3). 

The trial court denied the petition, concluding it was

untimely. However, the court noted that her sentencing claim,

predicated on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), was

couched as a change in the law and addressed this claim on the

merits (denying relief). (Doc. 8 at Exhibit K). Other claims

were denied on the basis of preclusion. (See id. at Exhibit K). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review without comment on

September 21, 2005. (Id. at Exhibit L).

On March 28, 2006, petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus

petition. (Doc. 1). On July 10, 2006, petitioner filed an

amended petition. Petitioner raised the following grounds:

Ground one:

Misleading information from my counsel

concerning sentencing

The first visit with my counsel lasted approximatrly

[sic] ten minutes, where I was informed that my counsel

was waiting for the results of my blood test. I didn't

receive another visit until one month later on November

19, 2001 when counsel presented me with a plea

agreement that was to expire on November 21, 2001. At

this visit my counsel advised me that I would get the

mitigated sentence of seven years. Stating that she

was sure that I would get a seven year sentence, this

was following conversation that counsel had with the

prosecutor. Following the advise of my counsel for a

seven year sentence. I signed the plea agreement on

November 19, 2001.

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Ground two:

I was incompetent at the time of my plea and

sentencing

I had court ordered medical testing on February 20,

2002, that showed I was incompetent at the time of my

plea and sentencing. I was on five different

medications ordered by the court on August 7, 2001 put

me at a fifth grade level in math and a fourth grade

level in language skills. After discontinuing at least

three of the medication[s] I was retested on July 26,

2002 I obtained the highest score in math and language

skills. This information was not disclosed to me until

after the dismissal of my Post-conviction relief. My

plea signing was entered in on November 21st, 2001. My

sentencing was on January 17, 2002. My first postconviction relief was on April 5, 2002, second postconviction relief prepared by my attorney on June 24,

2002.

(Doc. 7 at p. 5).

II.DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

As part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-year statute of

limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and

sentences rendered by state courts. This provision, codified at

28 U.S.C. § 2244, states, in pertinent part:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time

for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action;

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1

 The Ninth Circuit has held that, pursuant to the counting

provisions outlined in Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, the one-year limitations

period for all habeas petitioner's challenging convictions or

sentences finalized prior to the April 24, 1996 effective date of

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the

right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.

In Calderon v. United States District Court for the Northern

District of California ("Beeler")(en banc), 128 F.3d 1283 (9th

Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit addressed the new limitations

period contained at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The Court noted that

prior to § 2244(d)’s enactment "state prisoners had almost

unfettered discretion in deciding when to file a federal habeas

petition" and that "delays of more than a decade did not

necessarily bar a prisoner from seeking relief." Beeler, 128

F.3d at 1286.

The Court noted, however, that the provisions of § 2244(d)

"dramatically changed this landscape" and a petitioner was now

"required to file his habeas petition within one year of the date

his process of direct review came to an end." Id. The Court,

following other circuits, also held that the period of

limitations "did not begin to run against any state prisoner

prior to the statute’s date of enactment" of April 24, 1996. 

Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1287. Thus, all federal habeas corpus claims

concerning state court judgments finalized prior to April 24,

1996, had to be filed by April 23, 1997,1 or they were barred by

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the AEDPA is April 24, 1997. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

6

the statute of limitations absent a showing the circumstances

surrounding the filing of the petition fell into one of the

categories listed in § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).

The Beeler Court also held § 2244(d) established a customary

statute of limitations period "subject to equitable tolling." 

Id. at 1288-89. The statute itself provided for tolling the

limitations period when a "properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

However, the Court cautioned that equitable tolling of the

limitations period "will not be available in most cases but will

only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on

time." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-89 (citing Alvarez-Machain v.

United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (3rd Cir. 1997)).

B. Application to the Facts of the Case

The record shows that petitioner's direct proceedings

concluded on January 17, 2002, when she was sentenced (petitioner

pleaded guilty). (Doc. 8 at Exhibit F). Petitioner was informed

of her rights of review and received written notice. (Id. at p.

5). Under Arizona law, because petitioner was convicted and

sentenced pursuant to a plea of guilty, petitioner had no direct

review rights but could only challenge the validity of the

conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1. See A.R.S. § 13-4033(B).

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Between January 17, 2002, when petitioner was adjudged

guilty and sentenced, and March 28, 2006, when she filed her

original federal habeas petition, (see Doc. 1), more than four

years elapsed. Unless petitioner can establish grounds for

tolling more than 3 years of this time, her claims are barred. 

The record shows petitioner's first Rule 32 proceeding was

pending in state court between April 5, 2002, and February 17,

2004 (when the Arizona Court of Appeals denied review). Nothing

indicates petitioner filed for review in the Arizona Supreme

Court. (See Doc. 8 at Exhibits G and I). Petitioner had nothing

further pending in state court until she initiated a second Rule

32 in the trial court on October 25, 2004. (Doc. 8 at Exhibit

J). This second Rule 32 was pending until September 21, 2005,

when the Arizona Court of Appeals again denied review. (See id.

at Exhibit L). Nothing in the record indicates petitioner sought

review in the Arizona Supreme Court. As a result, petitioner had

nothing pending in state court after September 21, 2005. She

filed her federal petition on March 28, 2006. (Doc. 1).

Although the time petitioner had Rule 32 proceedings pending

in state court tolled the limitations period, see 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2), petitioner had nothing pending in state court between

January 17, 2002 and April 5, 2002 (more than 2 and 1/2 months),

February 17, 2004, and October 25, 2004 (more than 8 months), and

September 21, 2005, and March 28, 2006 (more than 6 months). 

Together this adds up to more than 16 months of untolled time. 

See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003).

("[petitioner] ... kicked off a new round of collateral review. 

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He was no longer pursuing his application for habeas relief up

the state court system. Because ... his first round of

collateral review was complete when the Court's ruling became

final, he is not entitled to tolling of the ... period before he

began a second round of [state] petitions ...") (emphasis added);

see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1999)

(time between conclusion of direct appeal proceedings and

initiation of state collateral review proceedings does not toll

the statute of limitations because petitioner does not have any

state proceedings "pending" during this interval). 

Finally, despite being given the opportunity to respond to

respondents assertion that her claims are time-barred, (see Doc.

9), petitioner has failed to file a response and, thus, has

presented no basis for tolling the limitations period during the

months she had nothing pending in state court. As a result, her

habeas claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

C. Procedural Default

Because the Magistrate Judge believes petitioner's claims

are barred by the statute of limitations, it is not necessary to

address respondents' contention that at least one of petitioner's

claims is procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 8 at pp. 6-9).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied as untimely. 

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

Any notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of

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the district court’s order and judgment. The parties shall have

ten (10) days from the date of service of this Report and

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections

with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to

timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right

to de novo consideration of the factual issues and will

constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.

DATED this 13th day of September, 2006.

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