Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_98-cv-00951/USCOURTS-cand-4_98-cv-00951-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON SPIELER, by his guardian ad

litem, ALISON J. SPIELER,

Plaintiff,

v.

MT. DIABLO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 98-0951 CW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION

TO ALTER OR AMEND

OR, ALTERNATIVELY,

FOR RELIEF FROM THE

COURT'S MAY 1, 2007

ORDER

Defendant Mt. Diablo Unified School District moves pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52(b), 59(e) and 60(b) for

amendment of the Court’s findings and May 1, 2007 order;

alternatively, it moves, under Local Civil Rule 7-11, for amendment

of the Court’s order. Plaintiff Jason Spieler opposes the motion. 

The matter is scheduled to be heard on June 21, 2007. Having

considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court denies

Defendant’s motion: Defendant is not entitled, under any of these

Rules, to the relief it seeks. 

Case 4:98-cv-00951-CW Document 140 Filed 06/20/07 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1According to Defendant the playboxes which do not contain a

rubberized surface are filled with two brands of EWF: Fibar and

Sierra Organics, both of which are certified as complaint with the

American Society for Testing and Material (ASTM) standards for

accessability of playbox surfacing. In Plaintiff's April 6, 2007

letter, however, his counsel alleged that they have good faith

reason to believe that the district uses a mix of wood chip

products from varying manufacturers, not including Fibar.

2

BACKGROUND

In 2000, the parties entered into a consent decree that

resolved a class action, alleging a denial of Plaintiff's and other

class members' right to full and equal access to Defendant's

facilities and programs. As part of the consent decree, Defendant

fixed its playboxes to make them minimally accessible to mobilitydisabled children. Defendant replaced the surface of some

playboxes with a rubberized surface; it purportedly replaced the

surface of other playgrounds with engineered wood fiber (EWF).1

In 2005, the parties disputed whether the district had

satisfied its obligation under the consent decree concerning the

playboxes. After meeting with a magistrate judge, the parties

entered into a settlement agreement to “resolve whether the use of

EWF satisfies the requirements of the Consent Decree.” This

agreement required Defendant to pay a neutral observer to obverse

the condition of the EWF in its playboxes during the 2005-2006

school year. Although the observer was to make her observations

taking into consideration the Americans with Disabilities Act and

ASTM standards, the observer did not determine whether there were

violations of the ADA, ASTM or the consent decree; she merely

provided her observations to the parties. If the parties were

unable to resolve their disagreements after meeting and conferring,

Case 4:98-cv-00951-CW Document 140 Filed 06/20/07 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

they would bring their dispute to the Court. 

On March 2, 2007, pursuant to the settlement agreement, the

parties filed letters with the Court concerning whether Defendant

had satisfied its obligations with regard to the maintenance of the

EWF and/or woodchips in the playboxes. Plaintiff argued that

Defendant did not and moved for enforcement of the consent decree. 

Defendant argued that it had satisfied its obligations and that its

maintenance of the EWF was satisfactory and sufficient. The

observations showed steady improvement by Defendant, but there were

still instances at the end of the school year where the surfacing

in the playboxes exceeded the recommended slope. 

On May 1, 2007, the Court signed Plaintiff's proposed order

granting his motion for enforcement of the consent decree. The

order stated that “with respect to the use of wood chip surfacing

of the playboxes and as maintained by defendants, defendants have

violated the terms of the Consent Decree.” The parties were

ordered to meet and confer to attempt to agree upon a remedy. If

the parties could not agree, they were ordered to submit proposed

remedial orders and, if necessary, the Court would schedule a

hearing on the matter.

On May 16, 2007, Defendant filed a motion for amendment of the

Court’s findings and judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 52(b), 59(e) and 60(b); alternatively, it moved for

amendment of the Court’s May 1, order under Local Civil Rule 7-11. 

On June 6, 2007, Plaintiff filed his proposed remedial order

and a supporting brief. Five days later, Defendant filed a letter 

Case 4:98-cv-00951-CW Document 140 Filed 06/20/07 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

brief in support of its proposed remedial order and in opposition

to Plaintiff's proposed remedial order.

DISCUSSION

Defendant states that the basis of its motion is that (1) the

term “wood chip surfacing” in the May 1, 2007 order is ambiguous;

(2) the Court did not make any specific findings as to how

Defendant failed to comply with the requirements of the consent

decree; (3) it cannot meaningfully meet and confer with Plaintiff

pursuant to the order without clarification; and (4) the Court did

not rule on Defendant's objections. Plaintiff argues that

Defendant's motion is untimely and does not meet any of the

requirements for relief under the Federal or Local Rules.

I. Rule 52(b)

 Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides,

“Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of

judgment the court may amend its finding or make additional

findings and may amend the judgment accordingly.”

Defendant's motion to alter or amend the Court’s order is not

properly brought under this Rule. The Court's May 1, 2007 order is

not an "entry of judgment." Defendant objects to the Court's

failure to make specific findings of fact. Rule 52(a) provides

that findings of fact are unnecessary on decisions on motions under

Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in subdivision

(c) of this Rule, which concerns judgment on partial findings. The

Court’s order was not akin to an evidentiary trial or hearing, as

Defendant contends. Specific findings were not necessary in the

Court's May 1, 2007 order. 

Case 4:98-cv-00951-CW Document 140 Filed 06/20/07 Page 4 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

II. Rule 59(e)

 Rule 59(e) provides that "any motion to alter or amend a

judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of

judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Again, the Court's May 1, 2007

was not a judgment; thus, Defendant's motion to alter or amend the

Court’s order is also not properly brought under this Rule. 

Further, Rule 59(e) motions are interpreted as motions for

reconsideration and are appropriate if the district court "(1) is

presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error

or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is

an intervening change in controlling law." School Dist. No. 1J,

Multnomah County, Oregon v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th

Cir. 1993). Rule 59(e) does not allow parties to revisit

previously traveled legal terrain. Demasse v. ITT Corp., 915 F.

Supp. 1040, 1048 (D. Ariz. 1995) (noting a motion seeking

reconsideration under Rule 59(e) "may not be used to relitigate old

matters or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have

been raised prior to entry of judgment"). 

Defendant contends that the Court made a factual error by

referring to “wood chip surfacing,” not EWF. Whether the

playboxes' surfacing consisted of EWF, wood chips or a combination

of both is disputed. Nonetheless, the Court's reference to the

material in the playboxes as "wood chip surfacing" is not “clear

error.” Nor did the Court commit clear error by not ruling on

Defendant's objections. The Court did not consider any improper or

inadmissible evidence. The Court's order was not manifestly

unjust.

Case 4:98-cv-00951-CW Document 140 Filed 06/20/07 Page 5 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

III. Rule 60 

 Where the Court's ruling has resulted in a final judgment or

order, a motion for reconsideration may be filed under Rule 60(b)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b) provides for

reconsideration where one or more of the following is shown: 

"(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have

been discovered before the court's decision; (3) fraud by the

adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been

satisfied; (6) any other reason justifying relief." Fed. R. Civ.

P. 60(b).

The Court’s May 1, 2007 order was not a “final order" and,

therefore, relief under this section is also not available. Even

if it was a final order, no circumstances exist here warranting

relief. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, "mere disagreement

with the Court's interpretation of the evidence and its opinions"

does not warrant reconsideration under Rule 60(b). United States

v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 473 F.3d 915, 958 (9th Cir.

2006).

IV. Local Civil Rule 7-11(a)

Defendant contends that, if the Court finds that Rules 52, 59

and 60 are not applicable here, the Court should clarify its order

and findings pursuant to Local Rule 7-11(a). But, as Plaintiff

notes, Defendant's motion does not comply with Rule 7-11(a)’s

requirement that motions brought pursuant to Rule 7-11(a) be

accompanied by either a stipulation or declaration that explains

why a stipulation could not be obtained. Further, motions to

Case 4:98-cv-00951-CW Document 140 Filed 06/20/07 Page 6 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

exceed otherwise applicable page limitations or motions to file

documents under seal, for example, are brought under Rule 7-11, not

motions seeking amendment or clarification 

Defendant should have brought its motion pursuant to Rule 7-9,

which sets out the appropriate standard applied to motions for

reconsideration of the Court’s order. Even if Defendant had

brought a motion under Rule 7-9, however, such motion would be

denied as Defendant failed to seek leave and failed to show:

(1) “a material difference in fact or law exists from that

which was presented to the Court before entry of the

interlocutory order for which reconsideration is sought”; or

(2) an “emergence of new material facts or change of law

occurring after the time of such order”; or (3) a “manifest

failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive

legal arguments which were presented to the Court before such

interlocutory order.” 

Civil L.R. 7-9(b). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion

(Docket No. 128). The Court, however, does not vacate the hearing

date. The parties are to appear as scheduled on June 21, 2007. 

Pursuant to the Court's May 1, 2007 order, an appropriate remedy

will be discussed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

6/20/07

Dated: ________________________ 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:98-cv-00951-CW Document 140 Filed 06/20/07 Page 7 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SPIELER, ET AL,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MT. DIABLO UNIFIED, ET AL et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV98-00951 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on June 20, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies)

in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in

the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's

office.

Gregory Alan Wedner

Gregory J. Rolen

Lozano Smith

2000 Crown Canyon Place

Suite 200

San Ramon, CA 94583-1344

Lisa Margaret Burger

Disabilty Rights Advocates

2001 Center St, 3rd Floor

Berkeley, CA 94704-1204

Mark Andrew Chavez

Maxwell Singer Peltz M

Chavez & Gertler LLP

42 Miller Ave.

Mill Valley, CA 94941

Dated: June 20, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:98-cv-00951-CW Document 140 Filed 06/20/07 Page 8 of 8