Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_00-cv-03706/USCOURTS-cand-3_00-cv-03706-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Petitioner was separately convicted and sentenced to death for, among other things,

murdering two people and attempting to murder a third in Santa Cruz County between March and

May 1981. The Santa Cruz County charges, also due to pre-trial publicity, were tried in Los

Angeles County. Petitioner’s conviction and death sentence based on that case is the subject of a

separate federal habeas petition pending before this Court. See Carpenter v. Woodford, C 98-2444

MMC, (“Carpenter I”).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID J. CARPENTER,

Petitioner,

v.

KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden of

California State Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent.

NO. C 00-3706 MMC 

 ORDER DENYING GROUP III

 CLAIMS 4, 15C, 16, 18, 19, 20, 

 21, 26 and 27 

DEATH PENALTY CASE

Introduction

The instant case arises from petitioner’s conviction and death sentence for murdering five

people in Marin County and raping or attempting to rape three of them. His crimes occurred

between October 11, 1980, and November 28, 1980. Due to pre-trial publicity, the case was tried in

San Diego County. On November 29, 1999, the California Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s

conviction and death sentence. See People v. Carpenter, 21 Cal. 4th 1016 (1999).1

 On October 2,

2000, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari. See Carpenter v. California,

531 U.S. 838 (2000). Prior to affirmance of his conviction and sentence on direct review, petitioner

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 1 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Petitioner appealed certain of the Court’s orders regarding the competency determination;

on July 31, 2009, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed and denied the appeal in an

unpublished memorandum. See Carpenter v. Ayers, Nos. 08-99019 & 08-99020, 2009 WL

2387288. (9th Cir. 2009). 

2

filed two separate state habeas petitions. The first was filed in the trial court on September 28, 1988,

and was based on allegations of juror misconduct. The trial court granted the petition and ordered a

new trial, but the California Supreme Court subsequently reversed the new trial order and denied the

petition. See In re Carpenter, 9 Cal.4th 634 (1995). The second was filed in the California Supreme

Court on November 1, 1999, and was denied on January 13, 2000. See In re Carpenter, No.

S083246.

On November 4, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district

court. On November 26, 2002, this Court granted petitioner’s motion to hold the proceedings in

abeyance while he filed a second state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. On

December 18, 2002, the California Supreme Court denied the second state petition, and on

December 27, 2002, petitioner filed his First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“First

Amended Petition”) in federal district court. 

Respondent subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended Petition, in which

respondent primarily asserted various procedural grounds that, respondent argued, required

dismissal of at least certain portions of the First Amended Petition. Thereafter, in a series of orders,

this Court addressed all of those procedural issues. 

In 2008, based on allegations in the First Amended Petition and the applicable law, the Court

issued an order for a timely determination of petitioner’s competency, pursuant to Rohan ex, rel.

Gates v. Woodford, 334 F. 3d 803 (9th Cir. 2003). See id. at 817 (holding petitioners have “statutory

right to competence in [their] habeas proceedings”). Based on the case record and the examination

report of stipulated expert Dr. Robert Roesch, this Court found petitioner competent to pursue his

habeas claims.2

The parties thereafter met and conferred, and agreed to a briefing schedule, subsequently

amended by this Court, by which the remainder of petitioner’s claims were to be addressed. The

schedule also separated the claims into nine separate groups. This Order addresses Claims 4, 15C,

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 2 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

 The parties agree that AEDPA applies to this matter. 

3

16, 18 19, 20, 21, 26 and 27 in Group III. For the following reasons, all of said claims will be

denied.

 Legal Standard

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), this Court

may not grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in

state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(d).3

 A federal court must presume the correctness of the state court’s

factual findings, and the presumption of correctness may only be rebutted by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of section 2254(d) have separate

and distinct meanings. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). A state court’s decision is

“contrary to” clearly established United States Supreme Court law if it fails to apply the correct

controlling authority or if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts materially

indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Id. at

413-414. A decision is an “unreasonable application” of United States Supreme Court law if “the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 414. A federal court must bear in mind, however, that “‘an

unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” 

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410) (emphasis in

original). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so

long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Id. at

786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 653, 664 (2004)).

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 3 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

In that regard, “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly[;] [r]ather, that application must be objectively

unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). “While the ‘objectively

unreasonable’ standard is not self-explanatory, at a minimum it denotes a greater degree of

deference to the state courts” than previously had been accorded them. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The holdings of the Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision are the only

definitive source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 

While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court

decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, only the Supreme Court’s holdings

are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be reasonably applied. See Clark, 331

F.3d at 1070. A state court’s decision need not cite to and a state court need not be aware of federal

law to pass muster under AEDPA; rather, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts [federal law],” the decision may be upheld. Early v. Packer, 537

U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

When a federal court is presented with a state court decision that is unaccompanied by a

rationale for its conclusions, the court has no basis other than the record “for knowing whether the

state court correctly identified the governing legal principle or was extending the principle into a

new context.” Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). In such situations, federal courts

must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court decision is

objectively unreasonable. Id. Specifically, “where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an

explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable

basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 

Moreover, even if a petitioner meets the requirements of section 2254(d), habeas relief is

warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). Under this

standard, petitioners “may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 4 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual

prejudice.’” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 439 (1986)). 

Analysis

I. Claim 4: Multiple Prosecutions

In Claim 4, petitioner contends the state’s decision to prosecute him in two cases, brought in

two different counties and using evidence from each such case in the other, violated his right to due

process. On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court denied this claim in a reasoned opinion, as

follows: 

1. Alleged Impermissible Multiple Prosecutions

In Carpenter II, defendant argued that the two Santa Cruz murders should

have been tried separately (Carpenter II, supra, 15 Cal. 4th at ¶. 361-362.) Now he

argues that all of the Marin County and Santa Cruz County crimes should have been

tried together. He claims that trying him separately for the crimes committed in each

county violated Penal Code section 654 and “his rights to due process, and to a

reliable penalty determination.” Just as we disagreed that the Santa Cruz County

crimes had to be tried piecemeal, so, too, do we disagree that the all the crimes in

both counties had to be tried together. 

As pertinent, Penal Code section 654 provides that when an “act or omission .

. . is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law,” an “acquittal or

conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same act or

omission under any other.” [Footnote omitted]. Defendant argues that this provision

bars prosecution of the Marin County crimes after he was convicted of the Santa Cruz

County crimes. He relies principally on Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal. 2d

822 [parallel citation omitted]. In Kellett, the defendant was standing on a public

sidewalk with a pistol in his hand. He was charged with and pleaded guilty to a

misdemeanor charge of exhibiting a firearm in a threatening manner. We held that

this conviction prohibited a later prosecution for the felony of possessing a

concealable weapon by a felon arising out of the same facts. Kellett bears no

similarity to this case. Whatever the scope of that decision, the murder or separate

victims on separate days in separate counties is not a single act or even a “course of

conduct” (id. at p. 827) requiring a single prosecution. . . . 

Penal Code section 790 generally places venue for a murder charge in the

county (1) where the fatal injury was inflicted, (2) where the victim died, or (3) where

the body was found. Santa Cruz was the site for all three of the murders charged in

that county, Marin County the site for all three of the murders charged in that county. 

Defendant waived his right to be tried in those counties when he successfully moved

to change venue. But no authority permitted, and none compels, murders committed

in different counties to be tried together. . . . 

Because evidence of some of the crimes of the other county was presented in

each trial, defendant contends the successive prosecution violated due process. It did

not. (Ciucci v. Illinois (1958) 356 U.S. 571 [parallel citations omitted].) . . . We also

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 5 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Defendant does not specifically argue the separate prosecutions violated the prohibition

against double jeopardy. That argument would also lack merit. “‘[T]he murder of two persons,

even by the same act, constitutes two offenses, for each of which a separate prosecution will lie, and

. . , a conviction or acquittal in one case does not bar a prosecution in the other.’” (People v. McLain, supra, 46 Cal. 3d at pp.120-121, quoting People v. Majors (1884) 65 Cal. 138, 146-147.) 

6

disagree that trying both sets of crimes separately resulted in an unreliable penalty

determination.4

Carpenter, 21 Cal. 4th at 1038-1039. 

Petitioner has not cited to any clearly established federal law demonstrating the state court’s

denial of this claim was objectively unreasonable, nor has he shown such denial relied on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Significantly, petitioner can point to no clearly established

federal law holding, or even suggesting, that multiple prosecutions for multiple murders violates due

process. 

As the California Supreme Court correctly stated, controlling Supreme Court authority

regarding this issue is Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958). Defendant Ciucci killed his wife and

three children and left them in a burning building; he was subsequently prosecuted for the deaths of

his wife and two of the children in three separate trials. In each trial, the prosecution introduced

evidence from all four of the deaths. Each trial resulted in a different sentence: 20 years in prison,

45 years in prison, and death. Ciucci argued on appeal that the multiple trials violated his due

process rights. Ciucci, 356 U.S. at 572. 

The Supreme Court rejected Ciucci’s argument, holding “[t]he State was constitutionally

entitled to prosecute these individual offenses singly at separate trials, and to utilize therein all

relevant evidence.” Id. at 573. The same is true here, and petitioner has not shown such prosecution

in two trials for multiple crimes was, in any manner, fundamentally unfair. Id.

Petitioner argues the Supreme Court, by a footnote in United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116,

125 n.9 (1996), limited Ciucci to its facts. Petitioner is incorrect. In Ewell, the Court rejected a

claim of double jeopardy, and in so doing noted that the issue therein was to be distinguished from

that in Ciucci, which “involved only the question whether the Fourteenth Amendment prevents a

state from bringing successive prosecutions against a defendant where each prosecution alleges the

same statutory offense and the same general transaction but names different victims.” Id. at 125 n.9.

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 6 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

The Ewell Court did not otherwise mention nor rely on Ciucci, and there is nothing in the footnote

limiting Ciucci to its particular facts or suggesting that it is not to be used as precedent. Indeed, as

respondent correctly points out, Ciucci did not even address double jeopardy, which was at issue in

Ewell. Accordingly, petitioner’s reliance on Ewell is misplaced.

In sum, as petitioner can cite to no federal precedent compelling the result he seeks, he

cannot demonstrate the state court’s decision denying his claim was unreasonable, and,

consequently, his claim will be denied. 

II. Claim 15C: Cross-Examination of Tina Vance

In Claim 15C, petitioner asserts it was constitutional error for the trial court to limit his

cross-examination of Tina Vance. This claim was denied by the California Supreme Court in a

reasoned opinion on direct appeal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), the factual findings made by the

California Supreme Court, set forth below, are presumptively correct. 

1. Evidentiary Rulings as to One Witness 

A witness [Tina Vance] testified on direct examination that one weekend in

September or October 1980, when she was 14 years old, she went to Mollie Purnell’s

home in Modesto with her boyfriend. Defendant showed her and the boyfriend a “big

handgun” and talked about “burglaries and thieving and things like that.” She

understood defendant “to be a professional thief, that’s what he said, and a burglar

and things like that.” The next day she went with defendant to San Francisco. On the

way, they stopped at a park. Defendant showed her what he called his “thief kit,” a

suitcase containing another gun, woven wire like the kind used to hang pictures, and

strips of nylon or cloth. Referring to the nylon or cloth, defendant said, “This is what

I use to gag people with.” Referring to the wire, he said, “This is what I use to tie

them up with.” The witness testified that the gun she saw at the park was smaller

than the one she saw earlier that weekend. The second gun looked like the gun used

in the killings. The first time she told anyone about seeing two different guns was

two days before her testimony at this 1988 trial. 

. . . . 

[D]efendant argues the court improperly limited his cross-examination of the

witness in two respects. First, defendant sought to cross-examine her about her

probationary status in a juvenile matter at the time she first spoke with law

enforcement about the case. The court ruled that defense counsel could not ask her

whether she was on probation but could ask her whether she had a juvenile case, and

could “develop with her whether she thought in any aspect of that juvenile case she

was going to get any benefit in this case or anybody made any promise to her about

the facts underlying her juvenile adjudication, in which she allegedly used a gun. The

court ruled that the defense could ask the witness about her familiarity with guns, but

it did not allow the defense to go into the details of the juvenile case. On crossexamination, the witness denied knowing much about guns. The defense again

sought to go into the details of the facts underlying the juvenile matter. The court

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 7 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

ruled her testimony did not “open up the door.” It found the underlying facts were not

“probative with respect to . . . what has been offered by the prosecution,” and that “it

just would be cumulative and totally a waste of time for [the defense] to probe into

. . . the underlying circumstances of her juvenile case.” We find no error.

“[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by

showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate crossexamination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness,

and thereby, to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately

draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” (Delaware v. Van Arsdall

(1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680 [parallel citations, internal quotation, and citation omitted]. 

However, not every restriction on a defendant’s desired method of cross-examination

is a constitutional violation. Within the confines of the confrontation clause, the trial

court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-examination that is repetitive,

prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of marginal relevance. (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at ¶. 678-679 . . . .) California law is in accord. (See People v. Belmontes

(1988) 45 Cal. 3d 744, 780 [parallel citations omitted].) Thus, unless a defendant can

show that the prohibited cross-examination would have produced ‘a significantly

different impression of [the witnesses’] credibility’ (Van Arsdall, supra 475 U.S. at p.

680), the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in this regard does not violate the Sixth

Amendment.” (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal. 4th 894, 946 [parallel citations

omitted].)

As he did at trial, defendant relies heavily on Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S.

308 [parallel citations omitted]. In Davis, a “crucial witness for the prosecution” was

on juvenile probation both at the time of the events about which he testified and at

trial. (Id. at 310-311.) Because of state rules requiring confidentiality of juvenile

adjudications, the trial court refused to allow any cross-examination about the

witness’s juvenile history. The court found the blanket prohibition violated the

defendant’s right to confront witnesses. However, that decision does not require

courts to permit any cross-examination the defense may wish regarding juvenile

proceedings. (See Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678-679 [parallel

citations omitted].) Here, the trial court considered the state of the evidence and Davis

v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. 308. It permitted the defense to inquire into whether the

witness had a juvenile case and whether she received any promises or expected any

benefits regarding that matter. It did not preclude the defense from presenting

evidence she did receive any promises or benefits; the defense did not claim it had any

such evidence. Moreover, the defense did not claim, and the record does not indicate,

that the witness was on probation when she testified several years later. The record

does not establish the prohibited cross-examination would have produced “a

significantly different impression of [the witness’s] credibility . . . .” (Delaware v. Van

Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680 [parallel citation omitted].) Accordingly, we find no

abuse of discretion. 

We also find the court did not abuse its discretion in not permitting the defense

to probe into the facts underlying the juvenile adjudication. Defendant argues that

because the facts allegedly involved the witness’s use of a gun, the evidence showed

she was familiar with guns, contrary to her trial testimony. Her familiarity with guns

was of marginal relevance. Defendant argues this familiarity shows she could have

fabricated her testimony about seeing the two guns. Her testimony, however, was not

particularly technical; she would not have needed great knowledge about guns to

invent it. Courts may “prevent criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars

of attrition over collateral credibility issues.” (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal. 4th

284, 296.) . . . 

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 8 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Moreover, rather than being “crucial” (Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at p.

310), this witness was minor in the context of the entire case. Even assuming the court

permitted the prosecution to elicit too much information, and the defense too little, we

would find the error harmless under any standard.

Carpenter, 21 Cal. 4th at 1046-1052. 

Petitioner contends his rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated by the trial court’s

limitations on his cross-examination of Tina Vance. The Confrontation Clause provides that, in

criminal cases, the accused has the right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S.

Const. Amend. VI. This right includes the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Davis v. Alaska,

415 U.S. 308, 315-316 (1974) (noting “a primary interest” secured by Confrontation Clause is right

of cross-examination) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

Limits on cross-examination, however, are permitted. The Confrontation Clause guarantees

an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever

way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)

(per curiam). Accordingly, "trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is

concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examinations based on concerns about, among

other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is

repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). A

limitation on cross-examination does not violate the Confrontation Clause unless it limits relevant

testimony, prejudices the defendant, and denies the jury sufficient information to appraise the biases

and motivations of the witnesses. United States v. Urena, 659 F. 3d 903, 907-908 (9th Cir. 2011);

Fenenbock v. Director of Corrections, 692 F.3d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding trial court violates

Confrontation Clause only when it prevents defendant from examining “a particular and relevant

topic”). 

Petitioner has not cited to any clearly established federal law demonstrating the state court’s

denial of this claim was objectively unreasonable, nor has he shown the state court’s denial of the

claim relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The state court’s reasoned opinion

demonstrates, and this Court’s review of the record confirms, that the trial court’s limitation on crossexamination of Vance was reasonable. In contrast to the situation in Davis, where the trial

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 9 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

court issued a blanket prohibition against any cross-examination regarding the witness’ juvenile

record, the trial court in petitioner’s case did allow petitioner’s attorney to inquire into whether the

witness had a juvenile case and whether she received any promises or expected any benefits

regarding that matter. Further, the trial court did not preclude the defense from presenting evidence

that Vance did receive promises or benefits. See Carpenter, 21 Cal. 4th at 1051. Additionally, the

witness in Davis was a key witness, see 415 U.S. at 310, while Vance was a “minor [witness] in the

context of the entire case,” Carpenter, 21 Cal. 4th at 1051. As the California Supreme Court

reasonably found, additional cross-examination would not have produced “‘a significantly different

impression of [the witness’s] credibility. . . .,’” Carpenter, 21 Cal. 4th at 1051 (citing Van Arsdall,

475 U.S. at 680), and petitioner thus cannot demonstrate the trial court’s decision to limit crossexamination constituted error. 

Morever, Confrontation Clause claims are subject to harmless error analysis. United States v.

Nielsen, 371 F.3d 574, 581 (9th Cir. 2004). For purposes of federal habeas corpus review, the

standard applicable to violations of the Confrontation Clause is whether the inadmissible evidence

had an actual and prejudicial effect upon the jury. See Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). Here, even if petitioner had

shown that the trial court’s rulings were in error, he has not demonstrated he suffered any prejudice. 

Petitioner was allowed to impeach Vance, whose testimony was not crucial, let alone dispositive;

multiple additional witnesses connected petitioner to the murder weapon and identified him as the

shooter. 

Accordingly, this claim will be denied. 

III. Claim 16: Admission of Certain Statements by Petitioner

In Claim 16, petitioner contends the trial court admitted several items of allegedly irrelevant

and prejudicial evidence, and thereby violated his due process rights. The California Supreme Court

denied this claim in a reasoned opinion on direct appeal, as follows: 

2. Other Evidentiary Rulings

Defendant contends the court made several other erroneous evidentiary rulings. 

One witness testified that in February 1981, defendant said he carried a gun in his van. 

The witness never saw the gun. Another witness testified that in February

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 10 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

or March 1981, defendant showed her a gun that “looks like” the murder weapon. The

court ruled both items of evidence admissible over objection. We find no error. 

Although the witnesses did not establish the gun necessarily was the murder weapon,

it might have been. Unlike People v. Riser, supra, 47 Cal. 2d at page 577, this

evidence did not merely show that defendant was a person who possesses guns, but

showed he possessed a gun that might have been the murder weapon after the first and

before the last of the killings. The evidence was thus relevant and admissible as

circumstantial evidence that he committed the charged offenses. (People v. Neely,

supra 6 Cal. 4th at p. 896.) 

Another witness testified over objection that around late April or early May

1981, defendant told her “there is really nothing like the power of a gun to achieve the

ends you want”; “it was really the ultimate challenge to get away with murder”; and

rape “is really an ultimate achievement, to do something like that.” The court

excluded any statements about “robberies.” Defendant contends the evidence was

inadmissible character evidence under Evidence Code section 1101 and should have

been excluded as unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352. The Attorney

General argues, first, that the claims are not cognizable on appeal because defendant

failed to object on these grounds at trial. We disagree. Although he did not

specifically cite Evidence Code section 1101 in objecting to these statements (he did

in making similar objections to other items of evidence), he did object on the ground

that the statements merely showed he was a “criminal” and a “bad person.” Under the

circumstances, the specific nature of the objection was sufficiently clear to preserve

the issue. 

The contention, however, lacks merit. Evidence that defendant talked about

using guns and committing murder and rape soon after the rapes and murders in this

case, all involving the use of a gun, was circumstantial evidence that he committed the

charged crimes. Unlike People v. Guerrero, supra, 16 Cal. 3d 719, which defendant

cites, where the prosecution presented evidence the defendant committed an

uncharged crime, the prosecution here did not suggest these statements showed

defendant committed crimes other than those of this case; rather, these statements

were admitted to show he committed these crimes. Defendant argues the statements

were merely “part of a philosophical discussion about crime.” If so, they were of little

relevance. But, from the evidence as a whole, the jury could reasonably find they

were a very general relevance to the charged crimes, which made them relevant to

whether he committed them. 

Defendant also contends the record fails to show the court considered the

prejudicial effect of the evidence. However, a court need not expressly state for the

record it engages in a weighing process every time it makes a ruling. (People v.

Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal. 4th 83, 135 [parallel citations omitted].) The record as a

whole shows the court was well aware of, and consistently performed, its duty under

Evidence Code section 352 to balance the probative value of evidence against any

prejudicial effect. 

A defense witness testified on direct examination that he was defendant’s

employer at a trade school in Hayward. They “became friends.” The witness also

operated another business called “Moon Tide” at the same location. He testified that

time sheets indicated defendant was at work until 2:15 p.m. the day another defense

witness said she saw a man who might have been the gunman near the scene of the

Hansen/Haertle shooting. On cross-examination, the witness said defendant was also

involved in the Moon Tide business. Over objection, the witness testified defendant

invested about $2000 into the business. The prosecution was allowed to introduce into

evidence a letter dated November 16, 1980, that defendant wrote to the witness

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 11 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

demanding repayment of this money by November 30, 1980. The letter threatened

after that date to “turn[] on the vigorish clock,” i.e., to charge the amount of interest

“used in the loan sharking business,” which would make the witness owe about

$10,000 by December 1. The amount owed would “increase rapidly” after that. The

letter said, “either pay me now or pay me a lot more later,” and concluded, “Your old

pal, now your ex-old pal.” 

Defendant contends the letter was irrelevant and inadmissible “character”

evidence. The court admitted the letter as relevant to the witness’s “credibility with

respect to bias and prejudice” and also relevant in light of defense cross-examination

of Millie Purnell. Previously, the defense had elicited from Purnell that defendant told

her he wanted the gun to “move money” for the “Mafia.” We see no error in light of

the defense evidence. As the court found, evidence that the witness and defendant

were not merely friends and employer-employee was relevant to the witness’s

credibility and to the reliability of the employment records used to establish the partial

alibi. “Evidence showing a witness’s bias or prejudice or which goes to his

credibility, veracity or motive may be elicited during cross-examination.” (People v.

Howard (1988) 44 Cal. 3d 375, 428 [parallel citations omitted].) Moreover, the

evidence was relevant to corroborate the testimony the defense elicited from Purnell in

an apparent attempt to discredit her testimony. Defendant argues the letter should

have been excluded as too prejudicial. We disagree. The letter was relatively

innocuous. As the court noted, the reference to the “loan sharking business” was not

much different from the “Mafia” reference the defense itself elicited from Purnell. 

The court acted within its discretion in admitting the letter. 

Carpenter, 21 Cal. 4th at 1052-1054. 

Petitioner has not cited to any clearly established federal law demonstrating the state court’s

denial of this claim was objectively unreasonable, nor has he shown the state court’s denial of the

claim relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts. A petitioner’s burden in demonstrating a

due process violation based on a trial court’s evidentiary decisions is substantial. Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991); Boyde v. Brown, 404 F. 3d 1159, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005). The admission of

evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless a specific constitutional guarantee is violated

or the error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed 

by due process. See Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999); Colley v. Sumner, 784

F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir.). The Supreme Court “has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of

irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant

issuance of the writ.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding trial

court’s admission of irrelevant pornographic materials was “fundamentally unfair” under Ninth

Circuit precedent but not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law under section 2254(d)). The due process inquiry in federal habeas review is whether the

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 12 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

admission of evidence was so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Walters v.

Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Colley, 784 F.2d at 990. Only if there are no permissible

inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process. See

Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991). 

In petitioner’s case, as the state court reasonably found, there were permissible inferences the

jury could have drawn from the testimony at issue. See Jammal, 926 F. 2d at 920. It would have

been permissible for the jury to infer that the statements about guns, murder and rapes were a

“general reference to the charged crimes, which made them relevant to whether [petitioner]

committed them.” Carpenter, 21 Cal. 4th at 1053. The letter was admitted as relevant to witness

credibility, and as to the reliability of evidence elicited by petitioner’s counsel. Id. To the extent

petitioner contends the state evidentiary rules at issue in his trial give rise to a protected liberty

interest under Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980), his argument also fails. To begin with, the

Supreme Court has confirmed that not every state-law error rises to the level of a federal due process

violation. Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 159 (2009). Moreover, as the California Supreme Court

held in its reasoned opinion, there was no state-law error in the admission of the evidence at issue. 

Carpenter, 21 Cal. 4th at 1052-1054. A state court’s interpretation of state law, including one

announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas

corpus. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988). 

Furthermore, petitioner has not shown any of the above-referenced alleged errors were

prejudicial. Even if a petitioner meets the requirements of section 2254(d), habeas relief is warranted

only if the constitutional error at issue had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). Under this

standard, as noted, petitioners “may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are

not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual

prejudice.’” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 439 (1986). Here,

petitioner maintains that the testimony at issue was irrelevant and prejudicial character evidence that

could have made the jury more likely to conclude he committed the charged crimes. As the state

court reasonably found and as the record confirms, however, there was substantial other evidence

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 13 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

introduced against petitioner to show he committed the charged offenses, see Carpenter, 21 Cal. 4th at

1029-1032, and, given the strength of the evidence against him, there is no reasonable likelihood that

without the challenged evidence, petitioner would have been acquitted. Petitioner thus cannot

establish he suffered any prejudice, and, consequently, his claim fails for that reason as well. See

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

Accordingly, this claim will be denied. 

IV. Claim 18: Admission of Autopsy Photos

In Claim 18, petitioner contends admission of autopsy photos deprived him of his rights to

due process and a fundamentally fair trial. The California Supreme Court denied this claim in a

reasoned opinion on direct appeal, as follows:

3. Photographs

The prosecution sought to admit a number of photographs of the murder

victims. The court excluded some as unduly prejudicial but admitted others over

defense objection, including three of victims O’Connell and May. The court admitted

one to show the mark on O’Connell’s neck, which was relevant to whether the wire

one witness said defendant showed her could have inflicted it. The court admitted two

to support the pathologist’s testimony regarding the manner of death and sequence of

shots. Defendant contends the court erred in admitting the photographs and violated

his federal constitutional rights. “Because defendant objects only on statutory

grounds, the constitutional arguments are not cognizable on appeal.” Carpenter II, supra, 15 Cal. 4th at p. 385.) Moreover, “The court did not abuse its broad discretion

in admitting the photographs.” (Ibid.) They were relevant for the purposes identified. 

The court carefully exercised its discretion in excluding photographs it found unduly

gruesome and admitting others it found less gruesome.

Carpenter, 21 Cal.4th at 1054. 

Petitioner cannot demonstrate he is entitled to relief on this claim. As this Court has already

noted, petitioner bears a substantial burden in demonstrating a due process violation based on the 

trial court’s evidentiary rulings. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68. The admission of evidence is not 

subject to federal habeas review unless a specific constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is 

of such magnitude that the result is a denial of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process,

see Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031, and, as noted, the Supreme Court “has not yet made a clear ruling that

admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient 

to warrant issuance of the writ,” Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. The due process inquiry on federal habeas

review is whether the admission of evidence was so prejudicial that it rendered the trial

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 14 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

fundamentally unfair. Walters, 45 F.3d at 1357; Colley, 784 F.2d at 990. Only if there are no

permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due

process. See Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. 

In order to show a violation of due process based on photographic evidence, petitioner “must

demonstrate that the erroneous admission of the photographs rendered his trial fundamentally

unfair.” Villafuerte v. Steward, 111 F. 3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding photographs of blood at

crime scene and of bindings used on murder victim relevant evidence to show defendant knowingly

restrained victim with intent to kill or injure her, and, as such, did not deprive defendant of fair trial);

see also Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F. 2d 1463, 1465-1466 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding 45-minute

video of murder victim’s autopsy was relevant to show cause of death and did not render defendant’s

trial fundamentally unfair).

Here, as the state court found and as the court’s review of the record confirms, the

photographs in question were relevant to show how the victims were killed, and thus to connect the

murder weapon to petitioner, and they also corroborated the testimony of pathologist Dr. Ervin

Jindrich on a significant issue. Consequently, there were permissible inferences the jurors could

draw from the photographs, and petitioner thus cannot demonstrate their introduction in evidence

rendered his trial unfair. See Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. This claim will be denied. 

V. Claim 19: Fourth Amendment Claim

In Claim 19, petitioner argues that evidence obtained through wrongful searches and seizures

was improperly used against him at his trial. This claim was rejected by the California Supreme

Court in a reasoned decision on direct appeal, as follows:

3. Search and Seizure Issues

At trial, defendant moved to suppress various items of evidence. He contends

the court erred in denying the motion. As a threshold matter, the Attorney General

argues that because defendant made a similar motion to suppress evidence in the first

prosecution (see Carpenter II, supra, 15 Cal. 4th at ¶. 362-366), he is collaterally

estopped from relitigating the searches’ legality. [citations omitted]. The Attorney

General makes a similar argument as to other issues that are common to both

prosecutions. We need not decide whether and to what extent collateral estoppel

applies here, because none of the contentions have merit. . . . 

As in the earlier appeal, defendant challenges a search warrant for the search

of his home, person, and cars. He makes one argument not made in the first appeal.

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 15 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

He argues that the warrant was overbroad because it did not “particularly describ[e]

the . . . things to be seized.” (Cal. Const.’ art. I, § 13.) He does not clearly specify

what evidence admitted at trial was seized under a provision that he claims was

overbroad, but he appears to challenge the admission of maps and “Sierra Club

materials . . . including books, hiking schedules, and maps of Mt. Tamalpais.” The

warrant authorized the seizure of “National or State Park material brochures, maps,

receipts, or literature; and road maps.” The authorization was appropriate. The

police had probable cause to believe defendant was a serial killer of victims along

isolated hiking trails. Under the circumstances, the range of potential relevant

evidence was quite broad. “[I]n a complex case resting upon the piecing together of

many bits of evidence the warrant properly may be more generalized than would be

the case in a more simplified case resting upon more direct evidence.” (People v.

Bradford (1997) 15 Cal. 4th 1229, 1291 [parallel citations, additional internal

quotation, and citation omitted].) Items showing familiarity with the crime scenes

were clearly relevant to connect defendant to these crimes. 

The remaining portions of the warrant that defendant challenges as overbroad

also seem reasonably directed to the seizure of relevant evidence. But we need not

decide the question definitively. Defendant has not identified any item seized under

any of these provisions which was admitted at trial. Accordingly, even if we assume

some provision of the warrant was overbroad, defendant has not shown that any

evidence should have been suppressed. (People v. Camarella (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 592,

607, fn. 7 [parallel citations omitted].) 

Defendant also argues the affidavits supporting the warrant contained material

misstatements and omitted material facts, and the search of his home exceeded the

warrant’s scope. On the latter point, defendant challenges only one item of evidence

actually admitted at trial, a pair of athletic shoes. Our discussion rejecting similar

arguments in Carpenter II, supra, 15 Cal. 4th at pages 362-364, also applies to these

contentions. 

Defendant challenges the seizure and subsequent search of his Chevrolet

station wagon. We rejected most of the arguments in Carpenter II, supra, 15 Cal. 4th

at pages 364-365. Defendant makes new arguments that some of the information

supporting probable cause was stale, and that the affidavits supporting the warrant

omitted more material information than he argued before. Having considered the new

arguments, we continue to find there was probable cause to search the vehicle and

that the supporting affidavits were not substantially misleading. Defendant also

challenges the seizure of the bullet from the car. We previously rejected a similar

argument. (Carpenter II, supra, 15 Cal. 4th at p. 365.) To the extent defendant’s

current contention differs from his previous one, we find nothing warranting a

different outcome. 

Finally, defendant argues the police unlawfully obtained his federal prison

and parole records. His federal probation officer allowed the police to review the

records when they were investigating these crimes. Later the police obtained copies

of some of the records from federal authorities. Defendant argues these events

violated the federal Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts. (5 U.S.C. §§ 552,

552a.) Assuming that the acts cover these records (see United States v. Miller (10th

Cir. 1981) 643 F. 2d 713, 715), the Privacy Act allows disclosure “for a routine use . .

.” (5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).) The probation officer testified that he provided the

information to the police under agency rules stating that approved routine uses

include “‘providing assistance to federal, state, local or foreign enforcement officers

investigating a violation of law.’” Defendant does not challenge the accuracy of this

testimony. “Consequently, no violation of the Privacy Act occurred.” (United States

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 16 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

v. Miller, supra, 643 F. 2d at p. 715 [additional citations omitted]. Because defendant

has shown no violation of the acts, we need not decide whether a violation would

require the suppression of evidence.

Carpenter, 21 Cal.4th at 1043-1044. 

Petitioner cannot prevail on this claim. To begin with, as petitioner does and must

acknowledge, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82, 494 (1976), bars federal habeas review of

Fourth Amendment claims unless the state did not provide an opportunity for full and fair litigation

of those claims. Even if the state courts' determination of the Fourth Amendment issues is improper,

it will not be remedied in federal habeas corpus actions so long as the petitioner was provided a full

and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. See Locks v. Sumner, 703 F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1983). 

All Stone v. Powell requires is the initial opportunity for a fair hearing. Such an opportunity for a

fair hearing forecloses, upon habeas review, this Court's inquiry into the trial court's subsequent

course of action, including whether or not the trial court made any express findings of fact. See

Caldwell v. Cupp, 781 F.2d 714, 715 (9th Cir. 1986). The existence of a state procedure allowing an

opportunity for full and fair litigation of Fourth Amendment claims, rather than a defendant's actual

use of those procedures, bars federal habeas consideration of those claims. See Gordon v. Duran,

895 F.2d 610, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding whether or not defendant litigated Fourth Amendment

claim in state court is irrelevant if he had opportunity to do so under California law). California

state procedure provides an opportunity for full and fair litigation of any Fourth Amendment claim. 

See Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 979

(1991) (discussing factors relevant to opportunity for full and fair litigation of claim). 

Petitioner suggests the bar set forth in Stone should not apply in capital habeas cases and that

AEDPA calls such bar into question. Petitioner, however, cites to no clearly established federal law

that in any way limits Stone to non-capital and/or pre-AEDPA cases. Indeed, as respondent

correctly points out, case authority is to the contrary. (See Respondent’s Brief at 39-40 and cases

cited therein.) Further, even if Stone did not preclude this Court from examining the merits of his

claim, petitioner would not be entitled to relief. The state court’s reasoned opinion was not

objectively unreasonable under any clearly established federal law, nor was it based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts.

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 17 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 Eyeglasses were relevant to the investigation because victim Haertle described the glasses

worn by his assailant, and the police were aware that petitioner wore glasses. 37 RT 2212-2219. In

addition, prescription eyeglasses were found at the scene of another murder that was believed to

share a similar modus operandi with the Marin County murders. 37 RT 2295-2298. 

18

Accordingly, this claim will be denied. 

VI. Claim 20: Admission of Evidence Allegedly Obtained in Violation of Miranda

In Claim 20, petitioner asserts the state courts unreasonably relied on the inevitable

discovery doctrine to admit evidence obtained as an alleged result of a violation of petitioner’s

Miranda rights. The California Supreme Court denied this claim in a reasoned opinion on direct

appeal, as follows: 

3. Evidence Allegedly Obtained in Violation of Defendant’s Miranda

Rights

Defendant moved to suppress evidence he claimed was obtained in violation

of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [parallel citations

omitted]. On May 13, 1981, defendant’s parents told the police that Dr. Stamper was

the family optometrist. Sergeant Brook went to the doctor’s office the same day and

was told that defendant’s mother was a patient but not defendant. Sergeant Brook

testified at the suppression hearing that he was dissatisfied with the information he

had received from the office and had decided to return to investigate further. He

questioned defendant after his arrest on May 15, 1981, and asked further questions

after defendant invoked his right to counsel. Defendant told him that he had ordered

some glasses from Dr. Stamper. The next day, another officer went to the doctor’s

office and interviewed various employees, including Jacqueline Purcell.[5] 

The prosecution did not present evidence of defendant’s statement, but Purcell

testified at the guilt phase that on May 2, 1981, defendant came to the doctor’s office

to have his glasses repaired and to order a new pair of glasses with the model name

“Hillside.” She sometimes saw him wearing a baseball cap. The court refused to

suppress the evidence, finding that the police inevitably would have discovered

Purcell as a potential witness. In a detailed oral ruling, the court specifically

“accept[ed] and credit[ed]” Sergeant Brook’s testimony. It found that Sergeant

Brook was still very interested in Dr. Stamper’s office, and had he “not received the

direct information from [defendant] on May 15th, that he . . . or some other

investigator would have gone back to Dr. Stamper’s office. . . .” In addition to

Sergeant Brook’s testimony, the court noted the sheer size and scope of the

investigation into the serial killer case in determining that the police would inevitably

have discovered Purcell’s information. 

The parties agree that Sergeant Brook obtained defendant’s statement in

violation of the Miranda rules. Accordingly, the statement itself was inadmissible; it

was not admitted. Defendant argues that the court also had to suppress Purcell’s

testimony as the fruit of the poisonous tree. (See generally Wong Sun v. United

States (1963) 371 U.S. 471 [parallel citations omitted]). The Attorney General

responds that the fruit of the poisonous tree does not apply to a noncoerced statement

taken in violation of the Miranda rules. . . . We need not resolve the question because

we uphold the trial court’s application of the inevitable discovery rule. 

Evidence need not be suppressed if the prosecution can establish by a

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 18 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

preponderance of the evidence that the information would inevitably have been

discovered by lawful means. (Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431 [parallel and

additional citations omitted]. As this is essentially a question of fact, we must uphold

the trial court’s determination if supported by substantial evidence. (See People v.

Boyer, supra, 48 Cal. 3d at p. 263 . . .) Deferential review is particularly necessary

when, as here, the factual determination depends in part on judging a witness’s

credibility. Here, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding. Sergeant Brook,

whose testimony the court specifically credited, testified he had intended to return to

the office to investigate further. Urging his own view of the evidence, defendant

argues the police might not have discovered the information absent the Miranda

violation, but we have no basis on which to overturn the court’s determination. 

Defendant also argues that the inevitable discovery rule should not apply

because of the “flagrancy” of the unlawful conduct. We implicitly disagreed in

People v. Boyer, supra, 48 Cal. 3d at pages 277-279. Although Sergeant Brook

clearly violated the prophylactic Miranda rules, the record does not suggest that

defendant’s statement was coerced or otherwise involuntary. In those circumstances,

federal law (and California law today) allows even the statement itself to be used for

impeachment. . . . When, as here, the evidence would have been discovered lawfully

even absent the Miranda violation, “the deterrence rational [of the exclusionary rule]

has so little basis that the evidence should be received. Anything less would reject

logic, experience, and common sense.” Nix v. Williams, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 444

[parallel citation omitted].

Moreover, any error would have been harmless, whether measured by the

reasonable doubt standard applicable to federal constitutional error (Chapman v.

California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [parallel citations omitted]) or the reasonable

probability standard applicable to errors of state law. (People v. Watson (1956) 46

Cal. 2d 818, 836-837 [parallel citation omitted]). The issue of guilt was not even

remotely close. The trial court correctly described the evidence of defendant’s guilt

as “overwhelming.” (Carpenter I, supra, 9 Cal. 4th at p. 645.) The evidence of

identity was so strong that defendant did not contest it at the first trial. Defendant’s

friend, Mollie Purnell, purchased the gun used to commit all the crimes. Purnell and

other witnesses connected him to that weapon. It is unreasonable to suppose that

Purnell, Shane Williams, who told the police where to find the murder weapon, and

Karen Williams, Shane’s wife and partner in crime, all chose to commit perjury to

help convict an innocent person of capital crimes. In addition, “[r]egarding the

Hansen/Haertle crimes, there were multiple eyewitness identifications, evidence

regarding the distinct jacket both the gunman and the defendant wore, shoeprint

evidence, and evidence that defendant owned a car similar to the gunman’s.” 

Carpenter II, supra, 15 Cal. 4th at p. 362.). 

At the second trial, defendant did attempt to establish a doubt as to his identity

as the gunman but did little to diminish the force of the prosecution evidence. 

Defendant presented virtually no alibi evidence other than his own testimony. An

employer testified that he was at work with her until as late as 5:30 to 6:00 p.m. the

day Alderson was killed. Even if one believes the witness could remember that

particular day with such precision, the testimony proved little. The victim was seen

alive around 5:30 p.m. that day, and her body was not discovered until two days later. 

Defendant presented documentary evidence that he claimed supported his testimony

regarding some of his activities the day Moreland and Stowers were killed, but even

crediting those documents, they did not prevent him from being the killer on that

date. Moreover, an expert testified that someone intentionally altered the date on two

of the documents.

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 19 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

Defendant also presented the testimony of some witnesses who saw a person

who might have been the gunman but presumably was not defendant. The evidence

may have shown a few false leads, or that some witnesses noticed the gunman’s

jacket but did not particularly note his face at a time when there was no reason to. It

did little else. Moreover, two of these witnesses testified that defendant did look like

the person they saw. Defendant presented evidence showing that a particular shoe

similar (not identical) to one he purchased could not have made the gunman’s

footprints, but other evidence established that the shoes he purchased could have

made the footprints; they were of the same size and pattern. 

Defendant testified, denying the crimes and describing in great detail his

activities during the relevant times, but his testimony was far from convincing. He

admitted wearing the distinctive jacket and purchasing the shoes similar in size and

pattern to those of the gunman. He also admitted knowing Purnell and others who

connected him to the murder weapon. Testifying after he reviewed telephone

records, he admitted he had numerous telephone conversations with Purnell during

the relevant times, including four the day before she purchased the eventual murder

weapon, one the day after she purchased it, and others around the time she received it. 

He denied that these conversations related to her purchasing the gun for him and

claimed that she was lying. He also denied his other acquaintances’ testimony that

connected him to the murder weapon. He admitted owning a red Fiat like the

gunman’s, which he said he purchased on March 25, 1981. He also admitted that

when he talked to the police a few days before his arrest, in response to their

questions about his vehicles, he told them about one of his cars but not the Fiat. He

claimed he understood the police to be interested only in the cars to which he had

access on May 2, 1981, and he did not have access to the Fiat on that date because it

was “in the shop.” Defendant testified he was at work all day the day Alderson was

killed. On direct examination, he referred to some records that he said showed he had

typed a response to a certain business letter from Hong Kong that day. On crossexamination, the prosecution confronted him with his employer’s records showing

that the letter from Hong Kong was itself dated the day Alderson was killed. 

Defendant then acknowledged that he could not have written the response when he

said he did.

In light of the trial as a whole, Purcell’s testimony was insignificant. Any

error in allowing her to testify was harmless. 

Carpenter, 21 Cal.4th at 1039-1042. 

Petitioner has not pointed to any clearly established federal law demonstrating the state

court’s denial of this claim was objectively unreasonable, nor has he shown the state court’s denial

of the claim relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts. It is undisputed that petitioner’s

statement regarding Dr. Stamper was made after petitioner had invoked his right to counsel and thus

was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and that, consequently,

petitioner’s statement was not admitted at trial. Although petitioner argues that the evidence

obtained as a result of his statement ought to have been suppressed under the “fruit of the poisonous

tree” doctrine, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the “fruit of the poisonous tree”

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 20 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

doctrine does not operate in the Miranda context in the same way that it does in the Fourth

Amendment context. In the former, as the Supreme Court has held, “the exclusionary rule

articulated in cases such as Wong Sun does not apply.” See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630,

636 (2004) (plurality opinion) (finding physical fruits of voluntary statements taken in violation of

Miranda not excludable).

Here, petitioner has never contended his statement regarding Dr. Stamper was involuntary,

and there is no evidence in the record that he was in any manner subjected to coercion. Indeed, the

trial court hearing regarding this issue confirmed there was no coercion, and that petitioner himself

stated he was “treated fairly” by the interrogating officer. 38 RT 2361-2362. See Colorado v.

Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (holding confession is involuntary under Fourteenth

Amendment only if product of “coercive police activity”); see also Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d

1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Moreover, as the state court reasonably found, see Carpenter, 21 Cal.4th at 1040-1041, the

discovery of Dr. Stamper’s office, as well as the eventual testimony of his employee Purcell, was

inevitable. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1983) (holding evidence obtained as result of

illegal conduct by police admissible where such evidence would have been discovered even absent

illegal conduct). Finally, petitioner has not shown that any alleged evidentiary errors were

prejudicial to him. Even if a petitioner meets the requirements of section 2254(d), habeas relief is

warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht , 507 U.S. at 638. As the state court reasonably found and

as the record confirms, there was a considerable amount of other evidence introduced against

petitioner to demonstrate he committed the crimes, Carpenter, 21 Cal. 4th at 1041-1042, and there is

no reasonable likelihood that without Purcell’s testimony, petitioner would have been acquitted. 

Given the strength of the evidence against him, petitioner cannot establish that any alleged

evidentiary error was prejudicial to him. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

Accordingly, this claim will be denied. 

VII. Claim 21: Admission of Eyewitness Identification Evidence Obtained Via Lineup

In Claim 21, petitioner contends identification evidence used against him was obtained by an

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 21 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

unfair lineup in violation of his rights to counsel and due process. The California Supreme Court

denied this claim in a reasoned opinion on direct appeal, as follows: 

4. Denial of Motion to Suppress Identification Evidence

After defendant’s arrest, several witnesses viewed him in a six-man physical

lineup. Defendant contends the lineup was impermissibly suggestive. We rejected a

similar argument regarding the same lineup in Carpenter II, supra, 15 Cal. 4th at

pages 366-368. As we held in that case, nothing in the lineup caused defendant to

“‘stand out’ from the others in a way that would suggest the witness should select

him.” (Id. at p. 367.) “[A]s a whole, the lineup was not unduly suggestive.’” (Ibid.) 

Although two defense attorneys attended the lineup, defendant also contends

his right to their assistance was violated because they were not allowed to be present

at interviews with the witnesses just before and after the lineup. He relies solely on

People v. Williams (1971) 3 Cal. 3d 853 [parallel citations omitted]. In Williams, defense counsel was present for the lineup, but after viewing it, the witness “was

taken outside the viewing room for the purpose of making his identification. 

Appellant’s attorney asked permission to accompany [the witness] and listen to any

identification made by him” but was not permitted to do so. (Id. at p. 855.) Under

these facts, we found a violation of the defendant’s rights to an attorney. Defendant

argues a similar violation occurred in this case. We rejected a similar argument in

Carpenter II, supra, 15 Cal. 4th at pages 368-369, and distinguished Williams partly

on the basis that here the actual identifications occurred in the presence of defense

counsel. Defendant now makes new factual arguments that two of the witnesses, one

who identified him at the lineup and one who selected someone else, made the actual

identifications in defense counsel’s absence. 

In response, the Attorney General argues first that, because the lineup was

held before formal judicial proceedings had begun, defendant was not entitled to

counsel at all. (Kirby v. Illinois (1972) 406 U.S. 682 [parallel citations omitted];

United States v. Gouveia (1984) 467 U.S. 180, 187-188 [parallel citations omitted].) 

He notes that the holding of People v. Bustamente (1981) 30 Cal. 3d 88 [parallel

citations omitted], which established a contrary rule under state law, applied

prospectively only (id. at p. 102), and that the lineup of this case occurred months

before that decision. It appears that at the time of the lineup, formal charges had been

filed for the Santa Cruz County crimes but not the crimes charged in this case. We

need not decide whether defendant’s right to counsel applied only to the Santa Cruz

County crimes because there was no violation of the right as to any of the crimes. 

The evidence was conflicting whether the two witnesses made their

identifications during the lineup or afterwards. The witnesses themselves testified

they received and marked identification cards after the lineup. However, the detective

who escorted the witnesses individually to and from the lineup testified that the

witnesses who identified defendant did so in the lineup room. The victim, Haertle,

testified he marked his identification form in the lineup room, suggesting that the

detective’s pattern was to have the witnesses fill out the card in the lineup room. The

trial court could reasonably have credited the detective’s testimony, concluding that

the two witnesses, who testified long after the lineup, merely forgot they had received

the lineup card during the lineup. The court did not expressly resolve this factual

question, but “[a]n order is presumed correct; all intendments are indulged in to

support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively

shown.” (Corenevsky v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal. 3d 307, 321 [parallel citations

omitted].) We must “view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 22 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

ruling and defer to its findings of historical fact, whether express or implied, if they

are supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal. App. 4th

917, 922 [parallel citations omitted].) Because substantial evidence supports an

implied finding that the witnesses made their identifications in the lineup room,

defendant has not demonstrated error. 

Moreover, we see no basis to exclude any evidence even if either or both of

the two witnesses had actually marked the lineup card in counsel’s absence. The

Williams court expressly limited its holding to its facts and “expressed[ed] no opinion

on any case which may arise in a different factual setting.” (People v. Williams, supra, 3 Cal. 3d at p. 857.) In this case, the interviews were tape-recorded, which

“minimized the concerns that led to the adoption of the Williams rule.” (Carpenter II,

supra, 15 Cal. 4th at p. 369). Unlike Williams, counsel here could listen to the

recording of the interview, and thus be “fully apprised” of what occurred. (People v.

Williams, supra 3 Cal. 3d at p. 856.) Williams was narrowly decided. As Justice

Mosk’s strong dissent, joined by two others, noted, defense counsel must not be

allowed to interfere with a police investigation. (Id. at p. 860). 

Carpenter, 21 Cal.4th at 1045-1046. 

Petitioner has not cited to any clearly established federal law demonstrating the state court’s

denial of this claim was objectively unreasonable, nor has he shown the state court’s denial of the

claim relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Petitioner first argues the identifications

were made under unduly suggestive circumstances. As the state court reasonably found, however,

and as the record confirms, the identification process was not unduly suggestive. See id. at 1045

(incorporating detailed findings made in Carpenter II, 15 Cal.4th at 366-68, as to participants in

lineup). The cases relied upon by petitioner concern the admissibility of identification evidence

once it has already been determined that the procedures were unduly suggestive. See, e.g., Manson

v. Brathwaite, 422 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). Here, by contrast,

petitioner can point to no evidence demonstrating the state court decision holding the identification

process was not unduly suggestive was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Consequently, to the extent petitioner’s claim is based on an assertedly

suggestive lineup, the claim fails.

Secondly, petitioner argues that, although defense counsel for the Santa Cruz County charges

was present, no attorney had been appointed for the Marin County homicides and he thus was

improperly denied the assistance of counsel as to the Marin County charges. At the time of the

lineup, however, petitioner had not been charged with any crimes in Marin County. As petitioner

acknowledges in his brief, controlling United States Supreme Court authority confirms there is no

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 23 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

right to counsel at pre-indictment lineups, as the right to counsel does not attach until adversary

judicial proceedings have been initiated against a defendant. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,

688-691 (1972). Consequently, to the extent petitioner’s claim is based on an asserted denial of

counsel, the claim likewise is unavailing. 

Accordingly, this claim will be denied.

VIII. Claim 26: Jury Instructions Regarding Theories of First Degree Murder

In Claim 26, petitioner argues the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that, if it

unanimously agreed petitioner was guilty of first-degree murder, it did not have to unanimously

agree on the underlying theory of murder. According to petitioner, such instruction violated his

rights under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The California Supreme Court rejected

this claim in a reasoned opinion on direct appeal, as follows:

As to the murders of Alderson, O’Connell, and May, the court instructed the

jury on felony murder as a theory of first degree murder. It also instructed that if the

jury unanimously agreed defendant was guilty of first degree murder, it was not

required to agree on a theory. Defendant argues the instruction was erroneous. We

have repeatedly rejected the argument. (Carpenter II, supra, 15 Cal. 4th at ¶. 394-

395, and cases cited.) Any error was also harmless. As to the murders of Moreland

and Stowers, the court instructed only on premeditation as a theory of first degree

murder. The jury convicted defendant of the first degree murder of those victims,

thus finding premeditation. It is hard to imagine how the jury could find defendant

premeditated those killings and not the others. Moreover, as to the other three

victims, the jury also found defendant guilty of rape or attempted rape and found true

the rape-murder special circumstance. The jury thus unanimously agreed with a firstdegree felony-murder theory. (Carpenter II, supra, 15 Cal. 4th at p. 395.)

Carpenter, 21 Cal. 4th at 1058. 

Petitioner cannot point to any clearly established federal law demonstrating the state court’s

denial of this claim was objectively unreasonable, nor has he shown the state court’s denial of the

claim relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Indeed, petitioner concedes that his

ability to prevail on this claim is foreclosed by Sullivan v. Borg, 1 F. 3d 926, 927-929 (9th Cir.

1993). In Sullivan, the Ninth Circuit found no due process violation where an instruction permitted

jurors to convict on a first degree murder charge without requiring unanimity with respect to a

finding of felony murder or premeditation and deliberation, because California permissibly

characterized first-degree murder as “‘a single crime as to which a verdict need not be limited to any

one statutory alternative.’” See id. (quoting Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 630-631 (1991)).

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 24 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

Accordingly, this claim will be denied.

IX. Claim 27: Jury Instructions Regarding Circumstantial Evidence

In Claim 27, petitioner contends various guilt phase instructions regarding circumstantial

evidence unconstitutionally reduced the prosecution’s burden of proof. According to petitioner,

such instructions violated his rights to due process and to a reliable guilt phase verdict. In particular,

petitioner challenges the use of the words “appear” and “duty” in CALJIC No. 2.01, which, in part,

states: “If . . . one interpretation of such [circumstantial] evidence appears to you to be reasonable

and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to accept the reasonable

interpretation and to reject the unreasonable.” See CALJIC No. 2.01. He also challenges similar

language that appears in CALJIC Nos. 2.02 (circumstantial evidence of specific intent), 8.83

(circumstantial evidence of special circumstances), and 8.83.1 (circumstantial evidence of mental

state for special circumstances), all of which were given at the guilt phase. On habeas review, the

California Supreme Court, in a summary opinion, denied the claim, both on procedural grounds and

on the merits. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the

crime with which he or she is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). This constitutional

principle prohibits the state from using evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect

of relieving the state of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential

element of a crime. See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 400-03 (1991); Carella v. California, 491 U.S.

263, 265-66 (1989); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.

510, 520-24 (1979). So long as the trial court instructs the jury on the necessity that defendant's

guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require that any particular form

of words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof. Victor v. Nebraska, 511

U.S. 1, 6 (1994). Rather, taken as a whole, the instructions must correctly convey the concept of

reasonable doubt to the jury. See id. (citing Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954)). 

The proper inquiry is "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the

instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard." Id. at 6.

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 25 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 The language of said instructions as given at petitioner’s trial and at the time of the trials

under consideration in the above-referenced cases is in all material respects the same.

26

Petitioner is unable to demonstrate that the state court’s decision is objectively unreasonable. 

See Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982. Petitioner does not argue that the instructions given at his trial

regarding reasonable doubt were inadequate, nor has he shown that the challenged instructions in

any manner compelled the jurors to disregard the reasonable doubt standard. Petitioner has cited to

no case that calls into question the constitutionality of the cited jury instructions, which permissibly

instruct the jurors to accept reasonable interpretations of the evidence. Indeed, the California

Supreme Court has consistently held CALJIC No. 2.01 and the above-challenged related instructions

do not reduce the state’s burden of proof, see, e.g., People v. Brasure, 42 Cal. 4th 1037, 1058

(2008); People v. Snow, 30 Cal. 4th 43, 95 n.18 (2003); and while neither the United States Supreme

Court nor the Ninth Circuit appear to have squarely addressed CALJIC No. 2.01 or the related

instructions, at least one district court has held CALJIC No. 2.01 does not reduce the state’s burden

of proof and is not in violation of clearly established federal law, see Lara v. Allison, 2011 WL

835594, *13-14 (C.D. Cal. 2011).6

 

As those cases make clear, petitioner takes the challenged language out of context. In both 

CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 8.83 themselves, the jury was first expressly instructed that every fact

necessary to prove an element of the offense or special circumstance must be proved beyond a

reasonable doubt. Further, those instructions, as well as CALJIC Nos. 2.02 and 8.83.1, expressly

admonished the jury that if two reasonable inferences could be drawn from the circumstantial

evidence, it was the jury’s duty to reject the inference pointing to the defendant’s guilt or special

circumstance. 

Accordingly, as there is no “reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to

allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard,” see Victor, 511 U.S. at 6,

this claim will be denied. 

//

//

//

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 26 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Claims 4, 15C, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26 and 27 in petitioner’s First

Amended Petition are hereby DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 26, 2013

 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:00-cv-03706-MMC Document 162 Filed 08/26/13 Page 27 of 27