Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-03348/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-03348-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

E. J. MCELROY,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY ADAM,

Defendant.

Case No. 17-cv-03348-YGR (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO REVOKE PLAINTIFF’S IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS; GRANTING 

MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE; 

AND TERMINATING ALL REMAINING 

PENDING MOTIONS 

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a state prisoner and frequent litigant in federal court who is currently incarcerated 

at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJDCF”), filed the instant pro se civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials at two different institutions: Pelican 

Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) and the California Health Care Facility (“CHCF”). Magistrate Judge 

Donna M. Ryu granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).

Thereafter, the action was reassigned to the undersigned judge, who dismissed all claims relating 

to his incarceration at CHCF without prejudice to him refiling them in a new civil rights action in 

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, dismissed as moot his claims 

for injunctive relief, served the claim of deliberate indifference in the complaint on Defendant, and 

dismissed all remaining claims.

The parties are presently before the Court on Defendant’s motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP 

status, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and to dismiss the action without prejudice. Dkt. 43. 

Defendant has also filed a Request for Judicial Notice. Dkt. 43-1. Plaintiff has filed an 

opposition, and Defendant has filed a reply. Dkts. 46, 47, 50. For the reasons stated below, the 

court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status and to dismiss the action, 

GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice, and terminates all remaining pending motions.

II. BACKGROUND

On June 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed his complaint, alleging constitutional violations occurring 

at PBSP and CHCF, where he previously was incarcerated. Plaintiff sought monetary damages 

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and injunctive relief. 

As mentioned above, on August 23, 2017, Magistrate Judge Ryu granted Plaintiff’s motion 

for leave to proceed IFP. Dkt. 9. Thereafter, this matter was reassigned to the undersigned judge, 

who issued an Order of Partial Dismissal and Service. Dkts. 14, 15. The following background is 

taken from the Court’s Order of Partial Dismissal and Service, which states as follows:

It seems that Plaintiff claims that he was not provided with adequate 

medical and dental care at PBSP, stating as follows:

Prior to [PBSP] adverse transfer (July 2016) 

claimant was given a bonafide initial medical plan 

that discovered several or several more painful 

injuries and symptoms that tie in to injuries that were 

being disregarded at PBSP. . . .

Being adversely transfer[ed] to [PBSP] a 

second time didn’t make any symptoms better nor 

manageable and did cause several allergen outbreaks 

from what the Plaintiff did have allergic reaction in 

general . . . being more specific Plaintiff instantly 

“suffered gum/tooth pain,” inability to chew, “loud 

funk,” “ab[sc]ess ,” “cavity” “infection,” tongue 

inflammation, blisters, bleeding “pustules” and 

“painful swelling” on gums and tongue, “abdominal 

pain,” nausea, trouble swallowing, “flaring” and 

“burning” etc. etc. 

. . . [T]he PBSP Defendants allowed the same 

issues to rebuild as God-awful as the[y] were . . . 

claimant re-complained ever since, claimant wrote 

“Employee Misconduct Complaint” directly to the 

Chief Medical Officers at PBSP and CHCF and 1824 

Special Accommodation request forms at least twice 

also.

Dkt. 1 at 6.1 Plaintiff has linked his claim to Defendants Adam and 

“PBSP Doe . . . D.D.S.,” and the Court notes that Plaintiff refers to 

these Defendants in one portion of the complaint as follows:

Not only has claimant made out several 

grievances, he also has usually made it plain and 

simple of his needs with 7362 request for medical 

services at [PBSP] and at CHCF prisons to medical 

nurses, Assistants Adam [from PBSP] and Youssef 

[from CHCF] or B Yard CHCF Medical Doctor (to 

no avail) to get before a bonafide dental specialist . . .

at PBSP between September [2015] and January 

 

1 Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management 

filing system and not those assigned by the parties

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2016 and since July 18-22, 2016 Plaintiff has had no 

real medical awareness, alerts, nor proper treatment . 

. . (discriminatively) despite a bonafide medical 

facility that the state department recognizes . . . has 

made initial medical recommendations and 

prescriptions that specifically prevent defect . . . .

The Medical (“Olsen”) Record has since 

been withheld from claimant/proprietor of timeliness 

. . . those PBSP Defendants DDS and Does and 

Dental Assistant Phang [from CHCF] have 

recklessly been indifferent every time Plaintiff 

brought his dental injury to their attention. . . .

Id. at 8. These allegations above, liberally construed, state a claim of 

deliberate indifference against Defendants Adam and “PBSP Doe . . . 

D.D.S.” 

Dkt. 15 at 4 (footnote and brackets added). In its screening order, the Court noted that Plaintiff’s 

complaint arose from his treatment while incarcerated PBSP and CHCF, but that Plaintiff had 

been transferred to RJDCF (located in San Diego County). Upon its initial review of the 

complaint, the Court dismissed as moot Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief based on his 

confinement at PSBP because Plaintiff was no longer incarcerated at PBSP. The Court found that 

Plaintiff stated a cognizable claim of deliberate indifference against Defendant Adam and “PBSP 

Doe . . . D.D.S.” Plaintiff was given leave to identify the Doe Defendant, but to date he has not 

done so. The Court had warned Plaintiff that the failure to do so would result in the dismissal of 

Defendant “PBSP Doe . . . D.D.S.” without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a new action against him or 

her.2 The Court also dismissed any claims against the Defendant groups of PBSP “Medical Dept. 

Does and Dental Dept. CDCR Agenc[ies] contracted to provide individual[ized] effective health 

care” and “7-10 Does” who are PBSP “Medical Record Analysts” (as opposed to individually 

named PBSP employees). Finally, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims 

against Defendant Kernan, PBSP “Chief Medical Officer Doe,” and PBSP “Medical Supervisor.” 

As mentioned above, Defendant has filed a motion requesting for the Court to revoke 

Plaintiff’s IFP status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and to dismiss the instant action. Plaintiff has 

filed an opposition, and Defendant has filed a reply. Dkts. 46, 47, 50. 

 

2 Because Plaintiff has not identified Defendant “PBSP Doe . . . D.D.S.”, the Court 

DISMISSES all claims against this Doe Defendant without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a new 

action against him or her.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) was enacted, and became effective,

on April 26, 1996. It provides that a prisoner may not bring a civil action IFP under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915 “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any 

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Section 1915(g) requires that this Court consider prisoner actions dismissed before, as well as 

after, the statute’s 1996 enactment. Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1997).

Section 1915(g) is commonly referred to as the “three strikes rule.” The three strikes rule 

“requires so-called ‘frequent filer’ prisoners to prepay the entire filing fee before federal courts 

may consider their civil actions and appeals.” Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125, 1127 (10th Cir. 

2001).

For purposes of a dismissal that may be counted under section 1915(g), the phrase “fails to 

state a claim on which relief may be granted” parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) and carries the same interpretation, the word “frivolous” refers to a case that is 

“of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact,” and the word “malicious” refers to 

a case “filed with the ‘intention or desire to harm another.’” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (“Andrews I”). Only cases within one of these three 

categories can be counted as strikes for section 1915(g) purposes. See id. Dismissal of an action 

under section 1915(g) should only occur when, “after careful evaluation of the order dismissing an 

[earlier] action, and other relevant information, the district court determines that the action was 

dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim.” Id. 

Andrews I requires that the prisoner be given notice of the potential applicability of 

section 1915(g), by either the district court or the defendants, but also requires the prisoner to bear 

the ultimate burden of persuasion that section 1915(g) does not bar pauper status for him. Id. A 

defendant seeking to challenge a prisoner’s IFP status has the burden of producing evidence that 

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allows the district court to conclude that the prisoner plaintiff has suffered at least three prior 

dismissals that count as strikes under section 1915(g). Id. at 1120. Once the defendants have met 

this initial burden, the burden shifts to the prisoner to show why a prior dismissal should not count 

as a strike, or why he is entitled to the imminent danger of serious physical injury exception. Id.

A dismissal under section 1915(g) means that a prisoner cannot proceed with his action as 

a pauper under section 1915(g), but he still may pursue his claims if he pays the full filing fee at 

the outset of the action. See Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming 

district court’s denial of IFP status and dismissing complaint without prejudice under section 

1915(g)).

B. Plaintiff’s Prior “Strikes”

At the time Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed IFP, Magistrate Judge Ryu and the 

undersigned judge was unaware of the basis of the dismissals of his cases in other districts, i.e., the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. However, Defendant points out 

that a review of the dismissal orders in Plaintiff’s prior prisoner actions reveals that he has had 

multiple cases dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous or failed to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted. This Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the 

court documents provided in support of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff is 

barred from proceeding IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).3 Dkt. 43-1. Defendant argues that the 

following dismissals may be counted as dismissals for purposes of section 1915(g): (1) McElroy v. 

Gebmeddin, et al., No. 1:08-cv-0124-LJO-GSA PC (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2008) (dismissing 

complaint for failure to state a claim) (Req. Judicial Not., Ex. B); (2) McElroy v. Schultz, et al., 

No. 1:08-cv-00179-OWW-MJS PC (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2010) (adopting report and 

recommendation dismissing amended complaint for failure to state a claim) (Req. Judicial Not., 

Ex. C); (3) McElroy v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:08-cv-00733-HWG (E.D. Cal. June 3, 2009) 

 

3 The district court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and 

without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” 

Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted) (granting request to take judicial notice in section 1983 action of five prior cases in which 

plaintiff was pro se litigant, to counter her argument that she deserved special treatment because of 

her pro se status).

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(dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim upon plaintiff’s failure to file a timely amended 

complaint to cure deficiencies) (Req. Judicial Not., Ex. D); (4) McElroy v. Institutional Head 

Ground, et al., No. 1:13-cv-00483-MJS (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2013) (dismissing amended complaint 

for failure to state a claim) (Req. Judicial Not., Ex. E); (5) McElroy v. CDC, Case No. 2:15-cv02271 KJM-EFB (E.D. Cal. June 21, 2017) (adopting report and recommendation dismissing 

complaint without prejudice) (Req. Judicial Not., Ex. F).

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Although Defendant has listed multiple dismissals, only three prior dismissals need qualify 

under section 1915(g). This Court must review at least three dismissals to determine whether they 

qualify as strikes under section 1915(g). See Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1121. Plaintiff’s dismissals 

in Case Nos. 1:08-cv-0124-LJO-GSA PC, 1:08-cv-00179-OWW-MJS PC, 2:08-cv-00733-HWG, 

1:13-cv-00483-MJS, and 2:15-cv-02271 KJM-EFB, which were all entered before the instant 

action was brought by Plaintiff on June 9, 2017, may be counted as dismissals for purposes of 

section 1915(g). As further explained below, these dismissals all qualify as “strikes” under 

section 1915(g). See id.

1. Case No. 1:08-cv-0124-LJO-GSA PC – First Strike

In McElroy v. Gebmeddin, et al., No. 1:08-cv-0124-LJO-GSA PC, Plaintiff consented to 

magistrate judge jurisdiction. Req. Judicial Not., Ex. B. The magistrate judge of the Eastern 

District screened Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and, on November 4, 2008, 

issued Findings and Recommendations, in which the magistrate judge recommended that this 

action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. On 

 

4 Defendant has also listed another case, McElroy v. Turner, et al., No. 2:12-cv-01182-

CMK-P (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2012), as one of Plaintiff’s previously filed actions in the Eastern 

District. Req. Judicial Not., Ex. A. However, Defendant does not argue that this action involves a 

dismissal that may be counted as one of the dismissals for purposes of section 1915(g). See id. 

Instead, Defendant has indicated that the Eastern District denied Plaintiff’s application for leave to 

proceed IFP because he had three or more prior “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and issued an 

Order to Show Cause as to why this action should not be dismissed without prejudice to refiling 

upon pre-payment of the filing fees. Dkt. 43 at 3 (citing Req. Judicial Not., Ex. A.) Defendant 

further points out that the action was dismissed because Plaintiff did not respond to the Court’s 

Order to Show Cause. See id. In addition, Defendant has provided the Court with orders showing 

that Plaintiff’s IFP status has previously been revoked in two actions in this District in 2016: Case 

Nos. C 15-01599-EJD (PR) and C 15-0042-EJD (PR). See Req. Judicial Not., Exs. G, H.

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December 11, 2008, the district judge of the Eastern District issued an Order adopting in full the

November 4, 2008 Findings and Recommendations issued by the magistrate judge. Id. A search 

of the Court’s Public Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) system indicates that the 

judgment was entered on December 11, 2008. Plaintiff fails to provide persuasive evidence that 

rebuts the showing by Defendant that failure to state a claim is a qualifying reason for a strike 

under section 1915(g). Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant has met the burden of 

establishing that Case No. 1:08-cv-00124-LJO-GSA PC was dismissed for a qualifying reason 

under section 1915(g), and therefore counts as a strike. See Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120. 

2. Case No. 1:08-cv-00179-OWW-MJS PC – Second Strike

In McElroy v. Schultz, et al., No. 1:08-cv-00179-OWW-MJS PC, Plaintiff consented to 

magistrate judge jurisdiction. Req. Judicial Not., Ex. C. The magistrate judge of the Eastern 

District screened Plaintiff’s first amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and, on February 

25, 2010, issued an order dismissing the first amended complaint with leave to file a second 

amended complaint correcting certain deficiencies. Id. Plaintiff did not file a second amended 

complaint. Id. Thus, on March 31, 2010, the magistrate judge issued Findings and 

Recommendations, in which the magistrate judge recommended that the action be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. On April 30, 2010, the district judge 

of the Eastern District issued an Order adopting in full the Findings and Recommendations issued 

by the magistrate judge on March 31, 2010. Id. Judgment was entered on April 30, 2010. Id.

Plaintiff fails to provide persuasive evidence that rebuts the showing by Defendant that failure to 

state a claim is a qualifying reason for a strike under section 1915(g). Therefore, the Court finds 

that Defendant has met the burden of establishing that Case No. 1:08-cv-00179-OWW-MJS PC 

was dismissed for a qualifying reason under section 1915(g), and therefore counts as a strike. See 

Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120. 

3. Case No. 2:08-cv-00733-HWG – Third Strike

In McElroy v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:08-cv-00733-HWG, the visiting district judge of 

the Eastern District screened and dismissed the complaint on April 16, 2009 with leave to amend 

to cure certain deficiencies no later than May 18, 2009. Req. Judicial Not., Ex. D. Plaintiff failed 

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to file an amended complaint by the deadline, and the visiting district judge dismissed the action 

for failure to state a claim on June 3, 2009. Id. Judgment was entered on June 3, 2009. Id. As 

mentioned, Defendant asserts that failure to state a claim is a qualifying reason for a strike under 

section 1915(g). Again, Plaintiff did not challenge this assertion. Therefore, Defendant has met 

the burden of establishing that Case No. 2:08-cv-00733-HWG was dismissed for a qualifying 

reason under section 1915(g), and therefore counts as a strike. See Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120. 

4. Case No. 1:13-cv-00483-MJS – Fourth Strike

In McElroy v. Institutional Head Ground, et al., No. 1:13-cv-00483-MJS (E.D. Cal. Nov. 

1, 2013, Plaintiff consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Req. Judicial Not., Ex. E. The 

magistrate judge of the Eastern District screened and dismissed the first amended complaint for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on November 1, 2013. Id. Judgment was 

entered on November 1, 2013. Id. Again, Plaintiff did not challenge Defendant’s assertion that 

failure to state a claim is a qualifying reason for a strike under section 1915(g). Therefore, 

Defendant has met the burden of establishing that Case No. 1:13-cv-00483-MJS was dismissed for 

a qualifying reason under section 1915(g), and therefore counts as a strike. See Andrews I, 398 

F.3d at 1120. 

5. Case No. 2:15-cv-02271 KJM-EFB – Fifth Strike

In McElroy v. CDC, Case No. 2:15-cv-02271 KJM-EFB, Plaintiff consented to magistrate 

judge jurisdiction. Req. Judicial Not., Ex. F. The magistrate judge of the Eastern District 

screened Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and, on February 6, 2017, issued an order 

dismissing the complaint with leave to file an amended complaint correcting certain deficiencies

because the complaint failed to state a claim for relief. Id. Even after being granted an extension 

of time to do so, Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint. Id. Thus, on April 3, 2017, the 

magistrate judge issued Findings and Recommendations, in which the magistrate recommended 

that this action be dismissed for failure to prosecute without prejudice for failure to file an 

amended complaint. Id. On June 21, 2017, the district judge of the Eastern District issued an 

Order adopting in full the Findings and Recommendations issued by the magistrate judge on April 

3, 2017. Id. A search of the Court’s PACER system shows that the judgment was entered on June 

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21, 2017. A dismissal for failure to prosecute an action constitutes a strike when it is based upon 

the plaintiff’s failure to file an amended complaint after the original complaint is dismissed for 

failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Peralta v. Martel, 2010 WL 2629060, *5 (E.D. Cal. 2010) 

(dismissal for failure to prosecute without prejudice for failure to file an amended complaint 

constituted a “strike” under section 1915(g) where it was “clear from the district court’s reasoning 

that failure to state a claim was a fully sufficient condition for dismissing” the complaint). 

Plaintiff fails to provide persuasive evidence that rebuts the showing by Defendant that failure to 

state a claim is a qualifying reason for a strike under section 1915(g). Therefore, the Court finds 

that Defendant has met the burden of establishing that Case No. 2:15-cv-02271 KJM-EFB was 

dismissed for a qualifying reason under section 1915(g), and therefore counts as a strike. See 

Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120. 

In sum, Plaintiff’s five aforementioned dismissals constitute “strikes” under section 

1915(g). Thus, Plaintiff’s IFP status must be revoked unless he can show that he is entitled to the 

imminent danger of serious physical injury exception under section 1915(g).

C. Imminent Danger Exception

A plaintiff barred from bringing an action IFP because he has three strikes may still 

proceed without prepaying court fees if he can show he is “under imminent danger of serious 

physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The availability of the exception turns on the “conditions a 

prisoner faced at the time the complaint was filed, not at some earlier or later time.” Andrews v. 

Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Andrews II”). As this is merely a “threshold 

procedural” question, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that district courts should not conduct an 

overly detailed inquiry into whether a particular danger is serious enough under the serious 

physical injury prong. Id. at 1055. Rather, “the exception applies if the complaint makes a 

plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time 

of filing.” Id. In order to satisfy the imminence prong, the prisoner must allege that the danger is 

ongoing. See id. at 1056-57 (prisoner who alleges that prison officials continue with practice that 

has injured him satisfies ongoing danger standard and meets imminence prong of three-strike 

exception).

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A district court should liberally construe the allegations in a complaint filed by a pro se

prisoner facing a section 1915(g) bar. See McAlphin v. Toney, 281 F.3d 709, 710-11 (8th Cir. 

2002) (liberally construing allegations in complaint for initial determination of whether prisoner is 

under imminent danger of serious physical injury). It is sufficient if any part of the complaint 

plausibly alleges that the prisoner is in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time of 

filing. Andrews II, 493 F.3d at 1053. 

Here, Plaintiff makes no plausible allegation that he faced an imminent danger of serious 

physical injury at the time he filed his complaint. First, the Court notes that Plaintiff was no 

longer housed at PBSP on May 31, 2017, the date he signed his complaint. See Dkt. 1 at 1. 

Instead, he indicated that he had then been transferred to CHCF. Id. As noted earlier, the Court 

found that Plaintiff stated one claim for relief under section 1983: a claim for deliberate 

indifference in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights against Defendant. Dkt. 15 at 3-4. Even 

when liberally construed, it cannot be said that Defendant’s alleged deliberate indifference to 

Plaintiff’s dental needs, including chronic oral/dental problems such as cavities and inflammation 

of the gums and tongue, while housed at PBSP placed Plaintiff under imminent danger of serious 

physical injury at the time of filing. See Dkt. 1. The incidents involving Defendant alleged in 

Plaintiff’s complaint took place when he was incarcerated at PBSP from around September 2015-

January 2016 and in July 2016, and thus any alleged constitutional violations by Defendant ended 

before the filing of this lawsuit in June of 2017. See id. at 4-10. Moreover, again, Plaintiff had 

already been transferred to CHCF when he filed the complaint, which is a different institution 

from PBSP—where the alleged incidents of constitutional violations occurred and where 

Defendant is employed. Id. at 1. Thus, Plaintiff has not shown that he is entitled to the imminent 

danger exception under section 1915(g) to avoid dismissal without prejudice. 

Plaintiff’s IFP status is therefore revoked. See Banos v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 885 (5th 

Cir. 1998) (revoking IFP status on appeal on three strikes grounds); Patton v. Jefferson Corr. Ctr., 

136 F.3d 458, 461, 465 (5th Cir. 1998) (district court correctly revoked IFP upon discovering on 

remand that plaintiff had five prior strikes). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion 

to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status, and to dismiss the action without prejudice. Dkt. 43.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Court rules as follows:

1. This Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the court

documents provided in support of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff is barred 

from proceeding IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Dkt. 43-1.

2. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and to dismiss the action without prejudice. Dkt. 43. Leave to proceed 

IFP is REVOKED, and the portion of Magistrate Judge Ryu’s August 23, 2017 Order granting 

Plaintiff IFP status (dkt. 9) is VACATED. 

3. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff’s filing a motion to reopen

no later than twenty-eight (28) days from the date of this Order accompanied by the full filing fee 

of $350.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). If Plaintiff fails to file a motion to reopen and pay the 

full filing fee within the twenty-eight-day time frame, then he may pursue his claims by filing 

a new civil rights case in which he pays the full filing fee.

4. The Court notes that the parties have filed many other pending motions, which

should now be terminated. Defendant points out and the Court agrees that some of Plaintiff’s 

motions should be terminated as redundant and unnecessary, including: (1) his recent request for a 

preliminary injunction and a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) (dkt. 56) because it seeks

relief that the Court has already denied in its Order Denying Plaintiff’s Second Request for 

Preliminary Injunction and TRO (see dkt. 55); and (2) his most recent request for appointment of 

counsel (dkt. 57) as it is duplicative of his previous similar requests, which have all been denied 

(see dkts. 9, 26, 49). All remaining pending motions (dkts. 48, 53, 58, 59, 60, 63, 64) are 

terminated as moot. If this action is reopened, the parties may re-file these pending motions. 

5. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all pending motions and close the case.

6. This Order terminates Docket Nos. 43, 48, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 63, and 64.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: ______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

July 1, 2019

Case 4:17-cv-03348-YGR Document 65 Filed 07/01/19 Page 11 of 11