Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02482/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02482-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Javier Torres, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v.

Terry Goddard, Attorney General of

Arizona, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 06-2482-PHX-SMM

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses (Dkt. 54).

Having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court issues this Order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed a four-count Complaint on October 18, 2006 (Dkt. 1), and a First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on June 4, 2007 (Dkt. 47). Plaintiffs’ FAC pleads four causes

of action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging defendants’ violations of plaintiffs’ rights under

the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause and Foreign

Commerce Clause. According to the FAC, Defendants have seized and converted funds

belonging to Plaintiffs, pursuant to broad blanket seizure warrants unsupported by any

individualized or particularized suspicion of wrongdoing. Defendants seized the funds after

Plaintiffs placed them into the stream of interstate or foreign commerce, attempting to send

them via wire using money transfer services offered by Western Union. The First Amended

Case 2:06-cv-02482-SMM Document 71 Filed 12/03/07 Page 1 of 8
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Complaint pleads these claims on behalf both of plaintiffs, individually, and others similarly

situated.

Defendants answered the FAC on June 21, 2007 (Dkt. 51). Defendants contend that

the seizure warrants in question were lawful in all respects, and supported by probable cause.

Defendants raise seventeen affirmative defenses in their Answer. Plaintiffs filed a Motion

to Strike certain of those affirmative defenses (Dkt. 54), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(f). That motion is fully briefed and ready for determination. The Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). Venue in this district is proper per 28

U.S.C. § 1391(b).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court “may order stricken from any pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Motions to strike are generally

regarded with disfavor, but are proper when a defense is insufficient as a matter of law.

Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1057

(5th Cir. 1982). “The key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense

is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense.” Wyshak v. City Nat. Bank, 607 F.2d

824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs seek to strike affirmative defenses (f) through (q), or twelve of Defendants’

seventeen total affirmative defenses. Plaintiffs allege several deficiencies in those twelve

affirmative defenses, the most common of which is failure to provide adequate notice of the

factual and legal bases for the defense. Defendants respond that providing the affirmative

defenses in a list format provides fair notice, given that Plaintiffs are aware of the lawsuit’s

factual and legal context.

The Court’s central task in deciding this motion is thus to determine whether the

affirmative defenses as stated provide sufficient notice of their bases. Certain matters must

be pled with particularity, including lack of capacity to sue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(a). The

sufficiency of pleading other affirmative defenses depends on the nature of the affirmative

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defense. Merely naming the defense may be sufficient for some defenses, whereas others

may require a brief explanation of why the defense might apply. See, e.g., Qarbon.com Inc

v. eHelp Corp., 315 F.Supp.2d 1046, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (listing defenses of waiver,

estoppel, and unclean hands failed to provide fair notice). With these general principles in

mind, the Court will address each of the defenses individually.

A. Affirmative Defense (g): Res judicata, and/or claim preclusion, and/or issue

preclusion

Plaintiffs believe this defense is insufficient because it fails to identify the prior

proceeding that could carry a preclusive effect. Defendants respond that the defense is based

on the in rem forfeiture proceedings mentioned in the Complaint, and therefore Plaintiffs

“have notice of the legal proceedings which provide the basis for these affirmative defenses.”

(Defs.’ Resp. at 3.) The statement of the affirmative defense must itself provide fair notice

to the opposing party; it is not enough that elsewhere the pleadings indicate the basis for the

affirmative defense, or that the opposing party might accurately assume that basis. See

Wyshak, 607 F.2d at 827. The defenses of issue and claim preclusion are not limited to

proceedings mentioned in the pleadings. See Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l

Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) (claim preclusion); Diruzza v. County

of Tehama, 323 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (issue preclusion). Even if Plaintiffs would

correctly assume the prior proceedings to which Defendants allude, that still would not

discharge Defendants’ obligation to provide fair notice of the basis for their affirmative

defenses. 

As pleaded, affirmative defense (g) does not provide fair notice. Plaintiffs’ motion

will therefore be granted as to this defense.

B. Affirmative Defense (h): Statute of Limitations

Plaintiffs challenge the statute of limitations defense on the basis that Defendants fail

to allege why Plaintiffs’ claims are untimely. (Pls.’ Mot. to Strike at 3.) Defendants respond

that the time limit for filing a claim in the forfeiture proceedings amounts to a “statute of

limitations” which could bar a person’s claims in the present action. (Defs.’ Resp. at 3.) The

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Court finds that merely listing the statute of limitations is sufficient to provide fair notice of

the basis for the defense, i.e., that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred.. 

Plaintiffs also challenge the legal sufficiency of the statute of limitations defense,

asserting that the limitations period for this action is two years. (Pls.’ Mot. to Strike at 3,

citing A.R.S. § 12-542 and TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999).)

Plaintiffs further assert that their claims only pertain to funds seized within two years prior

to the filing of this action, and therefore the statute of limitations defense fails as a matter of

law. (Pls.’ Resp. at 3.) Plaintiffs cite FAC ¶ 20 as supporting their position that their claims

are limited to funds seized within two years of filing this action. However, that paragraph

merely states “[i]n the two years preceding the filing of this Complaint, defendant have (sic)

seized over $12 million in funds from thousands of transactions attempted by plaintiffs

and members of the proposed plaintiff class.” (FAC ¶ 20.) Elsewhere Plaintiffs aver that

seizures began “in at least 2004.” (FAC ¶ 10.) Given this discrepancy, the fact that this is

a purported class action, and that affirmative defense (h) provides fair notice, Plaintiffs’

motion will be denied as to this defense.

C. Affirmative Defense (i): Assumption of Risk

Plaintiffs challenge the assumption of risk affirmative defense as insufficiently

pleaded, and as inapplicable to a § 1983 claim. Defendants respond that the “evidence in this

case will show that [Plaintiffs] knew that their electronic funds transfer [would facilitate]

some kind of illegal activity,” and that assumption of risk is a valid defense under certain

factual circumstances. (Defs.’ Resp. at 4.) Unfortunately, Defendants failed to include that

brief explanation in their Answer. The Court finds that a reference to this doctrine, without

any legal or factual basis for the affirmative defense, does not provide fair notice of the

defense. See Qarbon.com Inc. v. eHelp Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1049-50 (N.D. Cal.

2004). Defendants’ post hoc explanations do not compensate for the deficient initial

pleading. Therefore the defense will be stricken.

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D. Affirmative Defense (j): Estoppel

Plaintiffs argue that the simple assertion of estoppel, “with numerous possible

applications requires additional specificity to satisfy the notice pleading standard.” (Pls.’

Mot. to Strike at 4, quoting Ganley v. County of San Mateo, 2007 WL 902551, *2 (N.D. Cal.

March 22, 2007).) Defendants respond that Plaintiffs’ claim of ownership in the funds seized

is “inconsistent with their original purpose to give the money away.” (Defs.’ Resp. at 4.)

Defendants miss the thrust of Plaintiffs’ motion: that merely listing estoppel as an affirmative

defense fails to provide fair notice of its basis, particularly given the numerous types of

estoppel. See Black’s Law Dictionary 589-91 (8th ed. 2004). Therefore the defense will be

stricken.

E. Affirmative Defense (k): Illegality

Plaintiffs claim that the Answer fails to provide fair notice of the nature of the

illegality defense. (Pls.’ Mot. to Strike at 4.) Defendants respond that, as with the

assumption of risk defense, Plaintiffs knew or should have known that the transferred funds

were to be used for illegal activities. (Defs.’ Resp. at 5.) As with the assumption of risk

defense, the Court finds that merely listing a doctrine does not provide fair notice of the

nature and basis for the defense. See Qarbon.com Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1049-50.

Therefore the defense will be stricken.

F. Affirmative Defense (l): Waiver

Defendants assert that “[t]he same factual circumstances which support the defense

of estoppel in this case also support the defense of waiver.” (Defs.’ Resp. at 5.) Be that as

it may, those same factual circumstances are not stated in the defense itself, even if they are

alleged elsewhere in the Answer. Defendants also assert that the Plaintiffs’ knowledge of

the factual background of the case, combined with allegations scattered throughout the

Answer, provide notice of the basis for waiver. (Defs.’ Resp. at 5-6.) Assuming that

Plaintiffs could cobble together the basis in this manner, that ability would not relieve

Defendants of their duty to provide fair notice. Therefore the defense will be stricken.

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G. Affirmative Defense (m): Release

Relying on the same arguments set forth with regard to estoppel and waiver,

Defendants assert that merely listing “release” as an affirmative defense provides fair notice.

For the same reasons set forth above, these arguments are unavailing.

H. Affirmative Defense (n): Unclean Hands

Defendants rely on the same arguments as set forth regarding assumption of risk and

illegality—that Plaintiffs knew or should have known of the illegal purpose for the

transferred funds—as the basis for an unclean hands defense. (Defs.’ Resp. at 6.)

Defendants further assert that “Defendants’ position as to the nature and purpose of the

money transfers in question is well known to the Plaintiffs,” and thus the listing of “unclean

hands” provided fair notice. (Id.) The Court again finds these arguments insufficient, and

the defense will be stricken.

I. Affirmative Defense (o): Persons and/or entities who are not presently parties

to this action were wholly or partially at fault in causing the injuries or damages

complained of by Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs argue that this is not a proper defense under Rule 8(c), that Defendants fail

to identify the person or entity that may be liable, and that the difference between this

defense and affirmative defense (p) is not clear. (Pls.’ Mot. at 6.) Defendants respond that

affirmative defenses are not limited to those listed in Rule 8(c), and that defense (o) as

pleaded provides fair notice. (Defs.’ Resp. at 7.) The Court agrees that affirmative defense

(o) provides fair notice, and that the defenses listed in Rule 8(c) are not exhaustive. Plaintiffs

provide no support for their contention that Defendants must identify the persons or entities.

Additionally, confusion as to the difference between this defense and affirmative defense (p)

militates against striking this defense at the pleading stage. See S.E.C. v. Sands, 902 F.

Supp. 1149, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (requiring that questions of law be clear and not in

dispute in order for to strike an affirmative defense). Therefore the motion will be denied

as to affirmative defense (o).

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J. Affirmative Defense (p): Failure to join a party or parties under Rule 19.

Plaintiffs set for the same arguments to this defense as they do to affirmative defense

(o). Defendants again assert that they are not required to name particular parties, and the

Court agrees. Plaintiffs’ reply addresses the merits of the need to join government agencies

and Western Union. (Pls.’ Reply at 6.) Plaintiffs do not “convince the Court . . . that under

no set of circumstances could the defense succeed.” Sands, 902 F. Supp. at 1165 (citations

omitted). Therefore the motion will be denied as to affirmative defense (p).

K. Affirmative Defense (f): Lack of capacity and/or standing

Affirmative defense (f) asserts “[l]ack of capacity and/or standing of the named

Plaintiffs to assert claims on behalf of unnamed parties, including members of the proposed

plaintiff class, for the reason that the Plaintiffs cannot meet the requirements of Rule 23(a),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Answer at 9.) Plaintiffs contend that this is not an

affirmative defense, but a response to the yet-to-be-filed motion for class certification. (Pls.’

Mot. at 6.) Defendants respond that while this does not “formally qualify” as an affirmative

defense, other provisions in the Rules indicate it is proper to affirmatively assert these

defenses in a responsive pleading. (Defs.’ Resp. at 8.) Defendants provide Rule 9(a) as an

example. 

Granting Defendants’ premise, this still does not save affirmative defense (f) because

Defendants do not comply with Rule 9. A party raising the issue of capacity or authority to

sue “must state any supporting facts that are peculiarly within the party’s knowledge,” which

Defendants have not done. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(a). Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs must

show that they would be prejudiced if the challenged material remained is not supported by

any authority from within the Ninth Circuit for this contention. Therefore the defense will

be stricken.

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L. Affirmative Defense (q): Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

Plaintiffs contend that failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is not

an affirmative defense. (Pls.’ Mot. at 7.) Defendants again concede that this does not

“formally qualify” as an affirmative defense, but argue that Rule 12(b) supports the propriety

of affirmatively asserting the defense in a responsive pleading. (Defs.’ Resp. at 8.) Rule

12(b) requires that every defense shall be asserted in the responsive pleading. Failure to state

a claim may be raised at various stages of the litigation, including “in any pleading permitted

or ordered under Rule 7(a).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2). Whether or not failure to state a claim

formally qualifies as an affirmative defense, it is a defense properly raised in the Answer and

provides fair notice of its basis.

CONCLUSION

As Benjamin Franklin observed, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”

In this case, a sentence or two in the Answer is worth a paragraph or two in response to the

Motion to Strike. For the reasons given above, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike is granted in part

and denied in part. The Court grants Defendants twenty days in which to amend their

Answer to the FAC. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike affirmative

defenses (f), (g), (i), (j), (k) (l), (m), and (n). (Dkt. 54.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike affirmative

defenses (h), (o), (p), and (q). (Dkt. 54.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall have until December 21, 2007

to file an amended Answer to the First Amended Complaint.

DATED this 3rd day of December, 2007.

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