Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01938/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01938-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT MARK BROWN, II, Civil

No. 12-CV-1938-GPC (BGS)

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF U.S.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: (1)

GRANTING MOTIONS TO

DISMISS OF DEFENDANT

CAWAGAS AND DEFENDANT

SERRA; AND (2) DENYING

MOTIONS TO STRIKE OF

DEFENDANT CAWAGAS AND

DEFENDANT SERRA 

[ECF Nos. 143, 144 and 146.]

v.

DEPUTY #1, Deputy Sheriff; et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Currently before the Court are Defendants Cawagas and Serra’s Motions to Strike

and Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(f). (ECF Nos. 143, 144 and 146.) 

After considering the briefing and for the reasons stated below, IT IS

RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss of Defendant Cawagas and the motion to

dismiss of Defendant Serra be GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that

the motion to strike of Defendant Cawagas and the motion to strike of Defendant Serra be

DENIED.

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II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. section 1983

alleging that Defendants Erick Villarreal and Jason Weber violated his civil rights for,

among other things, using excessive force resulting in severe injuries. (ECF. No. 1.) At

the time Plaintiff filed the complaint, he did not know the identities of all of the guards

who allegedly violated his rights. (Id.) After the parties engaged in discovery, Plaintiff

identified the guards referenced in the complaint and discovered the names of additional

defendants that allegedly violated his civil rights. (ECF. Nos. 53, 59, 64, 69.) Plaintiff

filed various motions requesting leave to add new defendants. (Id.) The motions did not

seek leave to add a new claim for deliberate indifference to the complaint, nor did they

seek permission to add prison medical staff as new defendants to the complaint. 

On June 24, 2013, Magistrate Judge Bernard G. Skomal issued a Report &

Recommendation to the District Judge to grant Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint

to add Deputies Garcia, Henton, Pierson, Lawson and Whittaker. (ECF No. 82 at 8:11-

12.) On October 4, 2014, the District Court adopted Judge Skomal’s Report &

Recommendation in its entirety and granted Plaintiff leave to add Deputies Garcia,

Henton, Pierson, Lawson and Whittaker to the complaint. (ECF No. 113 at 2:13-21.) 

Neither the Report & Recommendation, nor the Order Adopting the Report &

Recommendation approved the addition of a new claim or the addition of non-deputy

defendants to the complaint. 

On October 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint which named the

additional deputy defendants identified in connection with his use of excessive force

claim, but also added a new cause of action for deliberate indifference to medical needs

against two new defendants, Clarissa Cawagas, R.N. and John Serra, M.D. (ECF

No.117.)

III. PLAINTIFF’S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges on May 2, 2012, he was placed

in a choke hold and kicked in the head, chest and neck by prison guards after refusing to

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“strip out” in the hallway outside the gate of 3 house at the George Bailey Detention

facility. (ECF No. 117 at 9-10.) Plaintiff alleges the beating”fractured my ribs, made

black spots in my vision, incessant ringing in my ear, lumps behind and above my left

ear, from blunt force trauma (kicking), swollen throat from strangulation, my neck is

sprained, migraine headachs [sic], popping in left jaw when opening and closing my

mouth.” Plaintiff also claims “[t]he excessive force has so traumatized me that I have

night terrors and night mares, the psyc [sic] doctor told me that I suffer from PTSD.” (Id.

at 10-11.)

The First Amended Complaint alleges that after the altercation with prison guards,

Plaintiff was taken to the prison’s medical center. Plaintiff alleges “RN Cawagas # 6557

just looked at me and went with what the Deputies told her to write on her report. I tried

to explain what hurt, how bad it was but she didn’t care, she said ‘You’ll see a doctor

sometime.’ It took 7 days to get into a doctor so a lot of the swelling went down, etc.” 

(Id. at 11.)

Plaintiff also alleges in the First Amended Complaint that Dr. Serra examined him

on May 9, 2012. Plaintiff claims when he asked for “an xray of [his] rib and head areas,”

Dr. Serra refused and told Plaintiff, “If you’ve had a broken bone/rib before then you

know what it feels like and there’s nothing [Dr. Serra] can do.” (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff

claims “[t]here was a court order requesting an x-ray for rib pain it was entered into my

medical chart on May 12, 2012 at 20:53 and still nothing was done.” Plaintiff also

alleges “Dr. Serra did nothing for my vision, my neck, throat, or the tinnitis [sic] my

blood pressure was 141/96 a sign of pain and still nothing.” (Id. at 13.) 

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Defendants Cawagas and Serra’s Motions to Dismiss pursuant to 

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)

Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference

against them pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) on the ground that Plaintiff fails to state

facts demonstrating Nurse Cawagas or Dr. Serra knew of and disregarded a substantial

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risk of serious harm or medical need. 

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal

theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” 

Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). In other

words, the plaintiff’s complaint must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Id. (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2)). “Specific facts

are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant[s] fair notice of what ... the

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.

Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A motion to dismiss should be granted if plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

In addition, factual allegations asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully

pleaded,” are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-20 (1972). Because “Iqbal incorporated the Twombly

pleading standard and Twombly did not alter courts’ treatment of pro se filings, [courts]

continue to construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating them under Iqbal.” Hebbe v.

Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026,

1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985).

1. Clarissa Cawagas, R.N.

Defendant Cawagas argues Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for deliberate

indifference because he alleges no facts showing he suffered harm as a result of

Cawagas’ level of care. Defendant notes Plaintiff alleges in the First Amended

Complaint that after seeing Nurse Cawagas, but before seeing Dr. Serra, “a lot of

swelling went down”; Defendant argues Plaintiff’s allegation is a tacit admission that

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Plaintiff was not harmed by Nurse Cawagas’ treatment, or lack thereof. (ECF No. 4 at 1-

4.) 

In his opposition, Plaintiff argues Nurse Cawagas “would not treat [him] even

though [he] explained to her about [his] rib, jaw, vision, throat, etc.” and this evinces her

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (ECF No. 148 at 1.) 

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment,

prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes

v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care

does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official

deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2)

“the prison official ‘acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung,

391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). Before it can be said that a prisoner’s civil rights have

been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere

‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of

action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)). “[A] complaint that a physician has been

negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of

medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not

become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429

U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).

Specifically, a prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner

unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may be

manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical

treatment,” or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.”

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds,

WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

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After examination of the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, the

Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim ///

against Nurse Cawagas. All of Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Nurse Cawagas are as

follows: 

“RN Cawagas # 6557 just looked at me and went with what the Deputies told her 

to write on her report. I tried to explain what hurt, how bad it was but she didn’t

care, she said ‘You’ll see a doctor sometime.’ It took 7 days to get into a doctor so

a lot of the swelling went down, etc.” 

(ECF No. 117 at 12.)

These allegations fail to state facts sufficient to support a cause of action for

deliberate indifference. To the extent Plaintiff disagrees with Nurse Cawagas’

assessment of the severity of his condition, a prisoner’s disagreement with diagnosis or

treatment does not establish deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242

(9th Cir. 1989). The fact that Plaintiff had to wait seven days before seeing a doctor after

Nurse Cawagas dismissively stated: “You’ll see a doctor sometime,” also fails to support

an Eighth Amendment violation. It is established that “[m]ere delay alone in medical

treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference.” See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. Of

State Prison Com’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff must allege facts

showing the seven-day delay between seeing Nurse Cawagas and seeing Dr. Serra caused

him serious harm, however, he has alleged no facts to demonstrate that further injury

flowed from the delay. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838-842 (1970)

(explaining a prison official acts with deliberate indifference if he knowingly fails to

respond to a serious medical need, thereby inflicting harm on the plaintiff); see also

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir.1990) (finding a delay in medical

treatment may amount to deliberate indifference only if the delay was harmful). 

Plaintiff’s deficiency is especially clear in light of Plaintiff’s allegation that “a lot of the

swelling went down, etc.” by the time he was examined by Dr. Serra. See Estelle, 429

U.S. at 106 (requiring the indifference to medical need must be so substantial that

malpractice and negligence do not meet the threshold). IT IS THEREFORE

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RECOMMENDED that Defendant Cawagas’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim for deliberate indifference be GRANTED. 

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his complaint unless it is absolutely

clear the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Dep’t of

Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, “[u]nder Ninth Circuit case law,

district courts are only required to grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be

saved. Courts are not required to grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit

entirely.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.2000). Because Plaintiff has not

previously had the opportunity to amend his claim for deliberate indifference, and it is

not absolutely clear that Plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies in his complaint, IT IS

FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff be given leave to amend.

2. John Serra, M.D.

Similarly, Defendant Serra argues Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for deliberate

indifference against him because Plaintiff states no facts demonstrating Dr. Serra’s

treatment or failure to treat caused Plaintiff harm. (ECF No. 146 at 8:2-7.)

In his opposition, Plaintiff argues Dr. Serra’s deliberate indifference is

demonstrated by the fact that “[i]t was so obvious that the criminal judge that sentenced

Plaintiff made an order in court for SDCJ to take x-ray’s of Plaintiff’s rib area to which

no x-ray was taken.” (ECF No. 151 at 2:16-20.) 

As explained above in the Court’s analysis of the Eighth Amendment claim against

Nurse Cawagas, a prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of

an Eighth Amendment violation unless “the indifference to [Plaintiff’s] medical needs

[are] substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not

support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th

Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)). 

After examination of the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, the

Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim

against Dr. Serra. All of Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Dr. Serra are as follows: 

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“On 5-9-12, Doctor John Serra saw me at 11:09 a.m., I ask[ed] for an xray of my

rib and head areas he wouldn’t do it he said ‘if you’ve had a broken bone/rib

before then you know what it feels like and there’s nothing he can do.’ There was

a court order requesting an x-ray for rib pain it was entered into my medical chart

on 5-12-12 @ 20:53 and still nothing was done. Dr. Serra did nothing for my

vision, my neck, throat, or the tinnitis my blood pressure was 141/96 a sign of pain

and still nothing.” 

(ECF No. 117 at 12-13.)

These allegations fail to state facts sufficient to support a cause of action for

deliberate indifference against Dr. Serra. At most, the allegations demonstrate Plaintiff’s

disagreement with Dr. Serra’s diagnosis or treatment. However, a difference of opinion

between Plaintiff and his doctor does not establish deliberate indifference. Toguchi v.

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057-58 242 (9th Cir. 2004)(explaining a difference of medical

opinion is insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate deliberate indifference.) 

Moreover, as for Plaintiff’s allegation that his condition was so severe that a court order

was issued requiring Plaintiff to undergo an x-ray, Plaintiff has failed to allege Dr. Serra

was aware of this order. Plaintiff alleges he saw Dr. Serra on May, 9, 2012; however, he

also alleges the court order requiring an x-ray was not entered into Plaintiff’s medical

chart until May 12, 2012. Plaintiff makes no further allegations that he was seen by Dr.

Serra after May 12, 2012. See Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th

Cir. 2002)(“In order to know of the risk, it is not enough that the person merely ‘be aware

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, []

he must also draw that inference.’” Finally, Plaintiff does not allege harm resulted from

Dr. Serra’s decision not to x-ray. See McGuckin v. Snith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir.

1991), overruled on other grounds by WMC Texas., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.

1997 (en banc) (explaining that in order to show defendant’s response to the need was

deliberately indifferent, plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a purposeful act or failure to

respond, and (2) harm caused by the indifference.) There are no further allegations in

Plaintiff’s complaint to show the injury to his vision, neck, throat, or ears was aggravated

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by Dr. Serra’s decision not to order an x-ray. To the contrary, Plaintiff’s allegation that

“a lot of the swelling went down” before he was able to see a doctor suggests Plaintiff’s

injuries began to heal over time. See e.g. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 107-108, (1976) (“[a]

medical decision not to order [a form of treatment] ... does not represent cruel and

unusual punishment.”) IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Defendant

Serra’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate

indifference be GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff be

given leave to amend his deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Serra.

B. Defendants Cawagas and Serra’s Motions to Strike pursuant to 

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(f)

Defendants Cawagas and Serra also seek to strike the deliberate indifference to

medical needs claim which Plaintiff added to his First Amended Complaint, but was not

brought in his original Complaint. Defendants argue the Court’s previous Order

Adopting Report & Recommendation Regarding Plaintiff’s Various Motions to Amend

Complaint did not permit Plaintiff leave to add an additional claim and add defendants

other than the later-identified deputies alleged to have used excessive force. (ECF

No.113.) 

Under Rule 12(f), a party may move to strike “from a pleading an insufficient

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” FED.R.CIV.P.

12(f). Rule 12(f) motions are generally disfavored, and the remedy of striking a pleading

is used to discourage parties from raising allegations completely unrelated to the relevant

claims and when the interests of justice so require. See Augustus v. Bd. of Pub.

Instruction, 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir.1962); see also Allen v. County of Monterey, 2007

WL 1771521, *9 (N.D.Cal.2007) (“Rule 12(f) motions to strike are generally not granted

unless it is clear that the matter sought to be stricken could have no possible bearing on

the subject matter of the litigation. Any doubt concerning the import of the allegations to

be stricken weighs in favor of denying the motion to strike.”).

Moreover, “[e]xceeding the scope of a court's leave to amend is not necessarily

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sufficient grounds for striking a pleading or portions thereof.” See, e.g., Sapiro v.

Encompass Ins., 221 F.R.D. 513, 518 (N.D.Cal. 2004) (declining to strike complaint that

had been amended without leave from the court); U.S. v. $159.880.00 in U.S. Currency,

More or Less, 387 F.Supp.2d 1000, 1009 (S.D.Iowa 2005) (declining to strike amended

answer that differed substantially from a proposed amended answer because defendants

were not prejudiced). However, claims in an amended complaint may be stricken if they

are “wholly specious” or cause prejudice to the defendants. Sapiro, 221 F.R.D. at 518;

$159.880.00 in U.S. Currency, 387 F.Supp.2d at 1009. 

Here, while Plaintiff’s claims against Nurse Cawagas and Dr. Serra exceed the

scope of the Court’s leave to amend, Defendants do not articulate any prejudice that

would result from the addition of these claims. In addition, the allegations added by

Plaintiff are not irrelevant or immaterial because they stem from the beating Plaintiff

contends he suffered at the hands of prison guards on May 2, 2012. Accordingly, the

Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ motions to strike the deliberate indifference to

medical needs claims be DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted

to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28

U.S.C. section 636(b)(1). Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant Cawagas’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED [ECF No. 144];

2. Defendant Serra’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED [ECF No. 146];

3. Defendant Cawagas’ Motion to Strike be DENIED [ECF No. 143];

4. Defendant Serra’s Motion to Strike be DENIED [ECF No. 146]; and

5. Plaintiff be given leave to amend his medical indifference claims against

Defendants Cawagas and Serra.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 18, 2014 any party to this action may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than May 2, 2014. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 27, 2014

Hon. Bernard G. Skomal

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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