Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02233/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02233-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SALVADOR A. RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner, No. C 04-2233

v. ORDER STAYING CASE;

ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSURE

DERRAL ADAMS, Warden,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

On June 7, 2004, petitioner Salvador Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) filed a petition for writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. His subsequent November 24, 2004

amended petition contained three claims for relief. However, there is currently only one

claim pending because the court dismissed one claim as non-cognizable, and Rodriguez

elected not to proceed on another unexhausted claim. In the sole surviving claim,

Rodriguez contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial

counsel’s failure “to investigate into matters pertaining to [his] trial.” 

On March 1, 2007, this court appointed counsel for Rodriguez based on the

weakness of his presentation in his petition and traverse, his lack of knowledge of the law

and his difficulty handling legal matters, and letters the court received from a former

investigator, William Walter Foskett, suggesting that an evidentiary hearing might be

appropriate in the case. On March 14, 2007, current counsel, Linda Fullerton, was

appointed. 

At the time counsel was appointed on March 14, 2007, the petition was already fully

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The author of the MPA is unclear to the court. It appears to have been prepared by

an attorney in spite of the fact that Rodriguez filed the state court petition pro se.

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Rodriguez also filed habeas petitions with the state trial court and state court of appeal,

alleging the same ineffective assistance of counsel claim, prior to filing his petition before the

California Supreme Court. The trial court denied his claim in a minute order without any

reasoned explanation, and the California Court of Appeal similarly issued a postcard denial.

See Exh. 5, Respondent’s November 8, 2007 Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, there are no

written, reasoned decisions from any of the state courts on Rodriguez’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claim.

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briefed. Subsequently, on April 26, 2007, because the court determined that the pro se

briefing on the only issue was inadequate, this court afforded Fullerton, on Rodriguez’s

behalf, the opportunity to file a supplemental traverse and also to request an evidentiary

hearing. Rodriguez filed his supplemental traverse and request for evidentiary hearing on

September 17, 2007.

On November 8, 2007, respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioner’s claim, as

articulated in the supplemental traverse, as unexhausted and untimely. He also filed an

opposition to Rodriguez’s request for an evidentiary hearing. Rodriguez filed an opposition

to the motion to dismiss on January 14, 2008, and the state filed a reply on January 29,

2008.

A. Exhaustion

In his form pro se state habeas petition before the California Supreme Court,

Rodriguez alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, and attached a memorandum of points

and authorities (“MPA”) and several exhibits in support of his claim.1

 In the MPA,

Rodriguez contended that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely subpoena an

important defense witness, Roy Ramsey, and in failing to seek admission of Ramsey’s

preliminary hearing testimony at trial. MPA at 16. The state supreme court issued a

postcard denial of Rodriguez’s claim.2 R.T. Exh. 11.

In his supplemental traverse filed by appointed counsel on September 26, 2007,

Rodriguez asserts that his counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to present witnesses that

were located and interviewed by a defense investigator (Foskett) prior to trial that would

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have supported his position that the homicide was justified, including Roy Ramsey, Elaine

Caufield, and Dennis Lyons; and (2) failing to locate and investigate additional witnesses

that were available and who would have testified that Rodriguez’s role in the homicide was

justified, including Kenneth Jackson and Vonree Alberty. Rodriguez argues that these

witnesses would have substantiated the defense’s position that the homicide victim’s

friends were committing a robbery or robberies at the time the victim was shot. 

Accordingly, Rodriguez further contends that these additional witnesses would have

supported his position at trial that the homicide was justified in that he acted reasonably in

the defense of another, or alternatively, that such evidence would have supported

conviction of a lesser included offense, voluntary manslaughter, by suggesting to the jury

that Rodriguez acted honestly but unreasonably in the defense of another or in the heat of

passion.

In support, Rodriguez attached six exhibits to his supplemental traverse that are not

a part of this court’s record, nor were they a part of the record before the California

Supreme Court. Those exhibits include: (1) a September 9, 2007 declaration from Scott

Whitney; (2) a September 10, 2007 declaration from Vonree Alberty; (3) a September 16,

2007 declaration from Kenneth Jackson; (4) a May 3, 1999 interview report for Dennis

Lyons; (5) a September 16, 2007 declaration from Foskett; and (6) a May 7, 1999 interview

report for Elaine Caufield (who is now apparently deceased).

In response, respondent moves to dismiss Rodriguez’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, as articulated in his supplemental traverse, as unexhausted. He contends

that even though petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was phrased generally

in his federal habeas petition, that before the California Supreme Court, Rodriguez

asserted a claim only with respect to witness Roy Ramsey. Respondent thus argues that

Rodriguez’s enlargement of the claim in his supplemental traverse, combined with the

additional evidence attached to Rodriguez’s supplemental traverse, renders the claim

unexhausted because it was never presented to the state court. Rodriguez counters that

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he merely supplemented the ineffective assistance of counsel claim presented before the

state court, and that the inclusion of the supplemental evidence and arguments does not

alter the substance of the claim so as to render it unexhausted.

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are first required to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting

the highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and

every claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981);

McNeeley v. Arave, 842 F.2d 230, 231 (9th Cir. 1988). To exhaust the factual basis for the

claim, the specific factual basis must be presented to the highest state court. Kelly v.

Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1067-69 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v.

Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding unexhausted ineffective assistance of

counsel and prosecutorial misconduct claims where specific instances of ineffectiveness

and misconduct asserted in federal petition were neither in the California Supreme Court

petition nor discussed by the court of appeal); cf. Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th

Cir. 2008) (finding that petitioner provided sufficient facts to exhaust claim concerning

disciplinary proceeding where he explicitly stated that he was denied his due process rights

under Wolff v. McDonnell, cited to a case, a statute and a regulation, and noted that he was

charged with battery on a non-inmate.). A claim has not been fairly presented if facts

alleged in federal court fundamentally alter the nature of the claim that was presented to

the state’s highest court. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). Where a federal

habeas petitioner presents newly discovered evidence or evidence not before the state

courts that would place the case in a significantly different and stronger evidentiary posture

than when the state court considered it, the state must be given the opportunity to consider

the evidence. Aiken v. Spalding, 841 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1988).

The new evidence and arguments presented by Rodriguez in his supplemental

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traverse, although related to his claim before the state court, indeed place that claim in a

significantly stronger evidentiary posture. Only two witnesses testified at trial in support of

Rodriguez’s position that the victim was shot in the defense of others who were being

robbed by the victim and the victim’s friends at the time of the shooting - Rodriguez and

Thurston Breshell. Four of the supplemental exhibits - the declarations and interview

memoranda from Alberty, Jackson, Caufield, and Lyons - corroborate Rodriguez’s and

Breshell’s testimony and provide additional details regarding the scene of the crime,

including the alleged robberies, Rodriguez’s conduct, and the conduct of the numerous

other witnesses present that day. These exhibits also corroborate the preliminary hearing

testimony of Roy Ramsey, whose failure to testify at trial provided the underlying factual

basis for Rodriguez’s state court ineffective assistance of counsel claim. For example, the

Alberty and Jackson declarations provide further detail regarding the victim’s and the

victims’ friends’ role at the scene, the robberies allegedly perpetrated on Rodriguez’s

friends by the victims’ friends, and also suggest that the victim and/or his friends may have

possessed a firearm. Additionally, the supplemental Whitney and Foskett declarations

strengthen Rodriguez’s argument that his trial counsel’s performance with respect to the

preliminary investigation was deficient in so far as they demonstrate the ease with which

Alberty and Jackson, previously not interviewed, were located and interviewed in

conjunction with these federal habeas proceedings.

B. Stay and Abeyance

Having found that the new evidence and arguments render petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim unexhausted, the court must now consider the appropriate

relief. In his opposition to the state’s motion to dismiss, Rodriguez requests that, if the

court concludes that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based on witnesses other

than Ramsey, is unexhausted, that this court stay the instant proceedings so that

Rodriguez may return to state court to exhaust the claim. See Oppos. at 4-5. Respondent

did not respond this request in his reply brief.

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1. Timeliness/Relation-Back

District courts have the authority to stay mixed petitions to allow for exhaustion of

the unexhausted claim in state court. See Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S. 269, 274-75 (2005). 

However, it would be futile to grant a stay to allow Rodriguez to exhaust the unexhausted

claim if he would be unable to amend his petition upon returning to federal court after

exhaustion because the newly-exhausted claim would be untimely. See Mayle v. Felix, 545

U.S. 644, 662 (2005). 

Here, there can be no dispute that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations has

expired on Rodriguez’s unexhausted claim. The California Supreme Court denied

Rodriguez’s habeas petition on February 4, 2004. Thus, the statute of limitations began

running on March 5, 2004, thirty days after the California Supreme Court’s denial of the

final habeas petition was filed, and would have expired on March 4, 2005, because there is

no statutory tolling during the period when a federal habeas petition is pending. See

Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2001); Allen v. Lewis, 295 F.3d 1046, 1046 (9th

Cir. 2002).

However, amendments to claims, made after the AEDPA statute of limitations

expires, including following exhaustion, may relate back to the date of the original pleading

if the original and amended pleadings “arise from the same core facts as the timely filed

claims.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 657, 662 (2005) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2)). 

Unlike the exhaustion analysis above, in which the court compared Rodriguez’s claim, as

stated in his supplemental traverse, with that asserted in his state court habeas petition, the

court now compares Rodriguez’s supplemental traverse claim with that asserted in his

amended federal habeas petition.

In conducting this comparison, it is noteworthy that the claim alleged in Rodriguez’s

amended federal habeas petition is similar, but not identical to that contained in his state

habeas petition. In his November 24, 2004 federal habeas petition, Rodriguez stated that

his counsel was ineffective in failing “to investigate into matters pertaining to [his] trial.” In

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support, Rodriguez attached numerous exhibits to his petition, and unlike his state habeas

petition, which referred the state court to Rodriguez’s MPA, Rodriguez specifically refers

the court to “Exhibit J” as providing factual support for his federal claim. Exhibit J is a

February 6, 2002 letter from investigator Foskett to Rodriguez’s counsel on his state court

direct appeal, which was not attached to his habeas petition before the California Supreme

Court. See R.T. Exh. 10. In his letter, Foskett, a former investigator for the Alameda

County Public Defender’s Office, and the investigator assigned to Rodriguez’s case, details

his interactions with Rodriguez’s trial counsel, and the investigative efforts that were

undertaken in the case. Specifically, he references the investigation, or lack thereof,

undertaken with respect to witnesses Roy Ramsey, Elaine Caufield, Dennis Lyons, and

Thurston Breshell. Foskett also opines that “as an expert in police investigations. . . . this is

one of the worst homicide investigations ever completed by police and DA inspectors.” 

Foskett further suggests that trial counsel’s performance was indeed ineffective, and offers

several examples in support.

The court concludes that Rodriguez has satisfied the requirements of Mayle, and

that the claim contained in his pro se amended federal petition and the claims detailed in

his supplemental traverse are indeed “tied to a common core of operative facts.” Id. The

ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleged in Rodriguez’s amended petition is framed

broadly enough that it could encompass counsel’s failures and omissions with respect to all

witnesses - not just Roy Ramsey. Additionally, as noted, the supporting evidence cited by

Rodriguez in his amended petition references witnesses in addition to Ramsey. Moreover,

the claims articulated in Rodriguez’s traverse are both tied to the same “common core of

operative facts” – counsel’s failure to present evidence in support of Rodriguez’s defense

that the shooting occurred in the defense of others. 

For these reasons, a stay would not be futile because following exhaustion of the

currently unexhausted claim, as stated in Rodriguez’s supplemental traverse, the thenexhausted claim would relate back to the timely-filed claim stated in Rodriguez’s November

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24, 2004 amended habeas petition.

2. Considerations under Rhines v. Webber

Having determined that once exhausted, the unexhausted claim will relate back to

the timely amended petition in this case, the court is nevertheless required to consider

additional factors in assessing whether a stay is appropriate under the circumstances of

this case. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 274-75. In Rhines, the Supreme Court held that a stay

may only be granted upon a showing of: (1) good cause for petitioner’s failure to exhaust

the issues before filing the federal petition; (2) that the issues which the petitioner proposes

to exhaust are “potentially meritorious;” and (3) that the petitioner did not engage in

“intentionally dilatory tactics.” Id. at 277.

With respect to good cause, Rodriguez filed both his state and federal habeas

petitions without the assistance of counsel, and was unaware of the nature and/or

substance of additional witness statements until his current habeas counsel conducted the

recent investigation. Additionally, the court finds the unexhausted ineffective assistance of

counsel claim “potentially meritorious,” and further finds no evidence that Rodriguez has

engaged in any dilatory tactics. Rodriguez filed the instant federal habeas case on June 7,

2004, within three months of the state supreme court’s denial of his state habeas petition.

Accordingly, the stay will be granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the state’s motion to dismiss Rodriguez’s habeas petition

is DENIED, Rodriguez’s request for a stay is GRANTED, and the case is hereby STAYED

to allow petitioner to present his unexhausted claim in state court. If petitioner is not

granted relief in state court, he may return to this court and ask that the stay be lifted. The

stay is subject to the following condition: Petitioner must notify this court within thirty

days after the state courts have completed their review of his claims or after they

have refused review of his claims. 

If this condition of the stay is not satisfied, this court may vacate the stay and act on

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this petition. See Rhines, 125 S. Ct. at 1535 (district court must effectuate timeliness

concerns of AEDPA by placing “reasonable limits on a petitioner’s trip to state court and

back”). 

Rodriguez’s motion for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE,

and may be renewed, if necessary, upon returning to this court. 

The clerk shall administratively close this case. The closure has no legal effect; it is

purely a statistical matter. The case will be reopened, the stay vacated, and an order to

show cause issued upon notification by petitioner in accordance with the conditions set

forth above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 4, 2008

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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