Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01532/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01532-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 The Court notes Plaintiff previously litigated a case

against Defendant Pinkstaff and Defendant Stapler regarding these

Defendants’ alleged failure to provide proper medical treatment to

Plaintiff, which was resolved by means of summary judgment in favor

of Defendant Stapler and the dismissal of the claims against Defendant

Pinkstaff. See Spencer v. Pinkstaff, 124 Fed. App. 518, 519 (9th Cir.

2005), from an appeal of the decision entered in Spencer v. Pinkstaff, 02 CV 0540 PHX SMM, Docket No. 60 (entered March 16, 2004).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CLINTON LEE SPENCER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIV 04-1532 PHX SMM (VAM)

)

PATRICIA STAPLER, CONRAD LUNA, ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GARY PINKSTAFF, )

)

 Defendants. )

_________________________________)

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (Doc. 53), and Defendants’ motion to strike

Plaintiff’s statement of facts (Doc. 62).

Background

Plaintiff, a prisoner confined by the Arizona

Department of Corrections, filed a pro se civil rights complaint

(Doc. 1) on July 26, 2004, seeking compensatory damages.1 On

September 28, 2004, the Court ordered Defendants, sued in their

individual and official capacities, to answer two counts of the

complaint. Doc. 5. The Court ordered Defendants to answer

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Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs in violation of

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, i.e., that Defendants

denied him warmer clothing and a warmer cell, and that

Defendants failed to provide proper medical treatment for

Plaintiff’s Type II diabetes. Id.

 On September 18, 2005, the Court denied Plaintiff’s

motion for injunctive relief with regard to the treatment

provided by the Arizona Department of Corrections for

Plaintiff’s diabetes. See Doc. 51. On October 31, 2005,

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and a separate

statement of facts in support of their motion for summary

judgment. Doc. 53 & Doc. 54. Defendants filed extensive

exhibits to their motion for summary judgment. See Doc. 56 &

Doc. 57. Plaintiff filed a response to the motion for summary

judgment and a separate statement of facts on December 1, 2005.

Doc. 59 & Doc. 60. Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff’s

response to their motion for summary judgment (Doc. 63), and a

motion (Doc. 62) to strike Plaintiff’s statement of facts on

December 23, 2005.

Defendants assert that they are entitled to judgment as

a matter of law because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the

applicable statute of limitations and because the undisputed

material facts establish Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Defendants maintain Plaintiff presents

no evidence that they knowingly disregarded a serious medical

need, and also argue Plaintiff has not shown any physical damage

attributable to Defendants’ acts. Defendants assert Plaintiff

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offers only his unsupported conclusions that a different course

of treatment for his diabetes would have minimized or prevented

further physical problems.

Additionally, Defendants assert they are entitled to

qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s claims against them in their

official capacities. Defendants also argue that, because

Plaintiff does not allege any physical injury with regard to his

claim against Defendant Luna, his claim for monetary relief

against Defendant Luna is barred by 42 U.S.C. 1997e(e). 

Discussion

A. Standard for granting a motion to strike statement

of facts in opposition to motion for summary judgment

Defendants assert Plaintiff’s statement of facts in its

entirety and the supporting exhibits at Docket No. 60 should be

stricken because the alleged facts are not admissible as

evidence, lack foundation, or are objectionable because they are

“irrelevant, inaccurate, misleading, and otherwise improper.”

Doc. 62.

Granting or denying a motion to strike a statement of

facts or affidavit, or portions thereof, offered in support of

or opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a matter that

is within the Court’s discretion. See Ackley v. Western

Conference of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir. 1992);

O’Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 987-88 (7th

Cir. 2001); Lennon v. Rubin, 166 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1999).

Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be

made on personal knowledge, shall set forth

such facts as would be admissible in

evidence, and shall show affirmatively that

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the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein. Sworn or certified

copies of all papers or parts thereof

referred to in an affidavit shall be attached

thereto or served therewith. The court may

permit affidavits to be supplemented or

opposed by depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or further affidavits. ...

If Plaintiff’s affidavit does not conform to the

requirements of Rule 56(e), the Court may decline to consider

the facts asserted in the affidavit in determining whether

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or the

Court may strike the affidavit in its entirety. See Evans v.

Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962 (4th

Cir. 1996). The Court need not consider statements in an

affidavit made by a plaintiff which are not based on the

plaintiff’s personal knowledge, or which are only conclusory

statements, when determining if the plaintiff has produced

enough evidence to support his claims. See Union Ins. Soc’y of

Canton, Ltd. v. William Gluckin & Co., 353 F.2d 946, 952-53 (2d

Cir. 1965). Additionally, “statements that are impermissible

hearsay ... or self-serving are generally precluded.” Judicial

Watch, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 224 F.R.D. 261,

264 (D.D.C. 2004).

Clearly, portions of Plaintiff’s affidavit are

conclusory allegations not supported by Plaintiff’s personal

knowledge. However, rather than striking the entire statement

of facts, the Court will exercise its discretion to exclude only

those statements which are not based on Plaintiff’s personal

knowledge. See Chambless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension

Plan, 571 F. Supp. 1430, 1459 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The Court will

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ignore or refrain from using those parts of any affidavit which

are defective in determining whether Plaintiff has produced

sufficient evidence to survive Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment.

B. Standard for granting summary judgment

The Court must grant a motion for summary judgment if

the pleadings and supporting documents, viewed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23

(1986). Substantive law determines which facts are material.

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of

summary judgment.” Id. The dispute must also be genuine; the

evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 

A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate

and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323-24. Summary judgment is appropriate against a party

who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 322; see also Citadel Holding Corp. v.

Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994). The nonmoving party

need not “produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at

trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at

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324. However, “Rule 56(e) ... requires the nonmoving party to

go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the

‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.’” Id.

The Court must consider a party’s motion for summary

judgment construing the alleged facts with all reasonable

inferences favoring the nonmoving party. See Baldwin v. Trailer

Inns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001). Although a pro

se litigant’s pleadings are to be liberally construed, pro se

litigants are held to the same evidentiary legal standard in

determining whether to grant a motion for summary judgment. See

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 529 (1972).

C. Factual background

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the Arizona

Department of Corrections (“ADOC”). Plaintiff has been in ADOC

custody since 1991, and he has been housed at the Special

Management Unit II (“SMU II”), Arizona State Prison ComplexEyman (“ASPC-Eyman”) since 1998. In 1991 Plaintiff was

diagnosed with “Type II” diabetes. In is undisputed that

Plaintiff has numerous secondary health problems resulting from

his diabetes, including eye, nerve, and kidney disease. 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges Defendants’ failure to

properly treat his diabetes caused the effects of his diabetes,

i.e., his eye, nerve, and kidney disease. Plaintiff contends

Defendants continually failed to provide him with the necessary

medications, examinations, education, and therapy to prevent his

secondary health problems. See Doc. 59. 

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Plaintiff contends Defendant Stapler delayed treatment

for his diabetic neuropathy, alleging this resulted in

“substantial harm.” Doc. 60 at 4. Plaintiff further contends

he is denied a diet which accommodates his diabetes. Id. at 5.

Plaintiff alleges his “poor circulation likely resulted from

blood vessel disease caused by uncontrolled diabetes.” Id. at

6. Plaintiff alleges facts regarding the treatment of his

diabetes by Defendant Stapler, which he argues were inadequate

or improper. Plaintiff contends, inter alia, that Defendant

Stapler denied him the medication Glyburide (an oral diabetes

medication) and that Defendant discontinued his medications on

October 31, 2001, “to harm [Plaintiff’s] health.” Id., Attach.

at 4. Plaintiff avers various ADOC inmates are prepared to

testify that Defendant Stapler failed to provide those inmates

with proper medical care, i.e., they will testify as to

Defendant Stapler’s “neglect.” Id., Attach. at 16.

 Additionally, Plaintiff alleges “Defendants Stapler,

Luna, and Pinkstaff denied a basic human need for warmer

clothing and a warmer cell causing Plaintiff to suffer from

numerous medical problems... ” Doc. 59 at 2. Plaintiff

contends his diabetic condition made warmer clothing and a

warmer cell a medical necessity and, therefore, that Defendants

failure to provide him with these conditions constituted

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. 

 Defendants contend Plaintiff refused proper treatment

for his diabetes, including insulin, and that Plaintiff refused

to adjust his diet to accommodate his diabetes. Doc. 54 at

para. 42 & para. 43. Plaintiff contends he has “not refused

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insulin in the past and that he would not refuse insulin at any

time.” Doc. 60 at para. 2. 

Plaintiff received oral medication for his diabetes,

including Glyburide and Metformin (an oral medication which

lowers blood sugar), from at least July of 2002 through August

of 2003. Doc. 54 at 2 & para. 40; Doc. 59 at 7. From November

of 2000 through July of 2003, Plaintiff’s blood sugar was tested

on nine occasions. Doc. 54 at para. 41. Defendant Stapler

submitted at least five requests for outside consultations for

Plaintiff’s diabetic retinopathy after July 25, 2002. Id. at

para. 36. Defendant Stapler conferred with Plaintiff about his

diet and the effects of his diet on his diabetes on November 20,

2002, November 22, 2002, June 14, 2003, and July 17, 2003. Id.

at para. 42. Defendant Stapler avers Plaintiff refused insulin

injections to control his diabetes between October of 2000 and

July of 2003. Id. at para. 43 & Exh. 5. Defendant Stapler did

not prescribe Glucovance (a combination of Glyburide and

Metformin) for Plaintiff’s diabetes as he requested because “he

had already failed on the medications that are equivalent to

Glucovance.” Id. at para. 44.

Throughout the period 1999 through early 2002,

Plaintiff submitted ten inmate grievances regarding his medical

care to ADOC officials. See Doc. 54 at para. 15. Defendant

Pinkstaff was the ADOC Facilities Health Administrator at ASPCEyman, where Plaintiff is now incarcerated in SMU II, from

August 25, 1997, through July 5, 2002. Plaintiff contends

Defendant Pinkstaff was the Facilities Health Administrator

“until now 2005...” Doc. 59 at 4. Defendant Pinkstaff’s duties

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included evaluating the health care and treatment delivery

systems for inmates consistent with their treatment by primary

health care providers. His duties included reviewing inmate

grievances and requests for medical services. Defendant

Pinkstaff is not a trained medical provider and has never

provided medical care to Plaintiff.

Defendant Stapler has been a physician at the ASPCEyman facility since 1984. She is a family practitioner and has

been treating Plaintiff since October 2000. 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges he was denied warmer

clothing and a warmer cell, resulting in “nerve damage to

[Plaintiff’s] feet, a persistent cough, headaches, frequent

infections, vision problems, neuropathy and flu-like symptoms.”

Doc. 5 at 1-2. Plaintiff’s affidavit attached to his statement

of facts alleges he has presented evidence showing that

Defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk to

Plaintiff’s health by denying him extra blankets. Doc. 60,

Attach. at 10. 

Defendant Luna was the Deputy Warden at the ASPC-Eyman

facility, including SMU II, from October 30, 2002, through June

18, 2004. Doc. 54 at para. 20. Defendant Luna responded to two

inmate grievances submitted by Plaintiff in December 2003 and

February 2004 regarding warmer clothing and the temperature of

his cell. Id. at para. 29. Defendant Luna informed Plaintiff

in response to his grievances that SMU II thermostats are set to

maintain a temperature of 70 degrees and that the thermostats

are checked each morning. Id. at para. 26. In response to a

grievance appeal filed by Plaintiff, ADOC Director Schriro

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2

 Plaintiff filed his previous complaint against Defendant

Pinkstaff and Defendant Stapler on October 22, 2002, and Plaintiff

sought injunctive relief in that matter, in the form of specific

treatment for his diabetes, on March 10, 2003. Any claims, therefore,

which allege deliberate indifference on the part of Defendant Stapler

regarding her alleged improper treatment for his diabetes and

deliberate indifference on the part of Defendant Pinkstaff for not

“ordering” Defendant Stapler to provide different treatment in

response to Plaintiff’s grievances, which arise prior to March 10,

2003, are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges“medical staff at SMU-II [have]

failed and refused to properly treat Plaintiff’s Type 2 diabetes from

October 2000 to 2003.... ”, and that medical care was “intentionally

not provided on ... January 28, 2003.” Doc. 1 at Attach. These dates

are within the relevant statute of limitations; however, these

specific claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

Compare Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404,

406 (9th Cir. 1985).

 

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stated: “Our health professionals tell us that temperature

variations such as cold do not result in nerve damage to

extremities in diabetics; nerve damage is the result of the

disease itself.” Id. at para. 28.

Plaintiff stated at his deposition that the only

Defendant who had ignored his requests for warmer clothing and

a warmer cell was Defendant Luna. Doc. 54, Exh. 2. Plaintiff

does not allege any other wrong-doing by Defendant Luna. Id.,

Exh. 2. Plaintiff stated in his deposition that he did not

suffer any physical harm as a result of the denial of warmer

clothing. Id. at para. 8.

D. Analysis

1. Statute of limitations

Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary

judgment regarding all claims arising from events occurring

prior to two years before Plaintiff filed his section 1983

complaint. Doc. 53 at 3.2 A two-year statute of limitations

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applies to section 1983 suits filed by prisoners in the custody

of the Arizona Department of Corrections. See, e.g., De Luna v.

Farris, 841 F.2d 312, 313 (9th Cir. 1988); Marks v. Parra, 785

F.2d 1419, 1420 (9th Cir. 1986). However, the statute of

limitations may be tolled during the time that a prisoner is

exhausting his administrative remedies prior to filing a section

1983 suit. Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d 595, 596 (6th Cir. 1999);

Wisenbaker v. Farwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1165 (D. Nev.

2004); Third & Catalina Assoc. v. City of Phoenix, 182 Ariz.

203, 207, 895 P.2d 115, 119 (Ct. App. 1994). See also Cooper v.

Nielson, 194 F.3d 1316 (Table), 1999 WL 719514, at *1 (9th

Cir.).

Plaintiff filed his complaint on July 26, 2004.

Therefore, absent any tolling of the relevant statute of

limitations while Plaintiff exhausted his administrative

remedies, claims in the complaint arising from events occurring

prior to July 26, 2002, are presumptively barred by the two-year

statute of limitations applicable to prisoner civil rights

complaints filed in the District of Arizona. Defendant

Pinkstaff was the Facilities Health Administrator at ASPC-Eyman

from August 25, 1997 through July 5, 2002. Defendant asserts

that the statute of limitations, therefore, bars all claims

against Defendant Pinkstaff. 

The specific allegations in the complaint against

Defendant Stapler discuss incidents occurring on January 9,

1999, September 13, 2001, April 19, 2002, July 4, 2002.

Defendant Stapler contends that, because all of these dates are

more than two years before Plaintiff filed his complaint, the

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claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Because Plaintiff’s claims may be denied on the merits,

the Court concludes it is not necessary to undertake an analysis

of which claims may be barred by the statute of limitations or

the extent to which Plaintiff is entitled to tolling of the

statute of limitations during administrative exhaustion of his

claims.

2. Relevant section 1983 law

A defendant is not liable to a plaintiff for violation

of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights unless the defendant

was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.

See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976); Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff must also

establish that a defendant’s conduct, allegedly violating the

plaintiff’s rights, was within their discretion and authority to

control. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; Williams v. Bennett, 689

F.2d 1370, 1388 (11th Cir. 1982); Pinto v. Nettleship, 737 F.2d

130, 133 (1st Cir. 1984). Section 1983 liability cannot be

predicated on the theory of respondeat superior. See, e.g.,

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

3. Legal standard for an Eighth Amendment claim

To prevail in a section 1983 medical treatment claim a

plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted with

“deliberate indifference to his serious medical need.” Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A serious medical need

exists only if the defendant’s failure to treat the plaintiff’s

condition could result in further significant injury or the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain on the plaintiff.

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Id., 429 U.S. at 104. “A defendant must purposefully ignore or

fail to respond to a [plaintiff’s] pain, medical need or

condition acting with knowledge or reckless disregard resulting

in significant harm” to violate the plaintiff’s Eight Amendment

rights. Farmer v. Brenna, 511 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1994). 

“[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind

more blame worthy than negligence,” but “is satisfied by

something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of

causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id,, 511

U.S. at 835. Deliberate indifference is demonstrated where

prison officials deny, delay, or interfere with medical

treatment, if the indifference is substantial and the conduct

rises to the level of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06; Hutchinson v. United States, 838

F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). A delay in medical care that

does not result in “substantial harm” is insufficient, as a

matter of law, to prevail on a section 1983 claim. See Wood v.

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990). Additionally,

state prison officials have “wide discretion regarding the

nature and extent of medical treatment.” Jones v. Johnson, 781

F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986). “A difference of opinion between

a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding

treatment does not give rise to a section 1983 claim.” Franklin

v. State of Or. Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir.

1981). 

4. Defendant Luna

The Court ordered Defendant Luna to answer Plaintiff’s

allegation that Defendant Luna was seriously indifferent to his

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serious medical needs. During his deposition, Plaintiff

testified that his claim against Defendant Luna was predicated

on this Defendant’s refusal to provide Plaintiff with warm

clothing, which resulted in harm to Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff has failed to establish a legitimate dispute

about a material fact, i.e., whether any denial of warmer

clothing and a warmer cell resulted in harm to Plaintiff.

Additionally, Plaintiff presents no evidence that Defendant Luna

acted with the requisite state of mind. Plaintiff presents no

evidence Defendant knew that Plaintiff’s desire for a warmer

cell and warmer clothing was premised on a “serious medical

need.” Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to establish a disputed

issue of material fact with regard to Defendant Luna’s alleged

indifference and with regard to the existence of a serious

medical need.

Plaintiff has failed to provide any admissible evidence

that Defendant Luna acted with deliberate indifference to a

known serious medical need and, therefore, Defendant Luna is

entitled to summary judgment on this claim. See McGuckin v.

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that “[a]

defendant must purposefully ignore or fail to respond to a

prisoner’s pain or possible medical need in order for deliberate

indifference to be established.”), overruled on other grounds,

WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997).

Taking the facts in the light most beneficial to Plaintiff,

Defendant Luna was, at worst, negligent in not inquiring further

as to the necessity of providing warmer clothing to Plaintiff as

an alleged necessary treatment for his diabetes. However, as a

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matter of law, any such negligence did not constitute deliberate

indifference and, therefore, Defendant Luna is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1334-35 (9th Cir. 1990).

5. Defendant Stapler

The Court ordered Defendant Stapler to answer the

allegation that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights pursuant to the Eighth Amendment by denying him proper

treatment for his diabetes.

The evidence provided by Defendants indicates Defendant

Stapler was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious

medical needs. Defendant Stapler treated Plaintiff’s diabetes,

counseling him regarding his diet and medication regiments.

Additionally, Plaintiff presents no admissible evidence that any

alternative treatment requested by Plaintiff would have resulted

in a better outcome regarding Plaintiff’s secondary physical

ailments. Plaintiff has not provided evidence to establish a

legitimate dispute that he received improper care for diabetes;

at best, Plaintiff asserts a difference of opinion between

himself and his medical care providers regarding the course of

treatment prescribed for his diabetes. 

 Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence that

Defendant Stapler purposefully ignored or failed to respond to

Plaintiff’s pain or serious medical needs and, therefore,

Plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights by Defendant Stapler. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d

at 1060 (concluding that “[a] defendant must purposefully ignore

or fail to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need

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in order for deliberate indifference to be established.”); Wood,

900 F.2d at 1334-35; Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1344. 

6. Defendant Pinkstaff

The Court ordered Defendant Pinkstaff to answer

Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Pinkstaff was deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs because

Defendant Pinkstaff failed to ensure Plaintiff’s diabetes was

adequately treated. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges only

that Defendant Pinkstaff failed to order or direct Defendant

Stapler to give Plaintiff insulin or to monitor his blood sugar

more frequently. 

The evidence presented in this matter indicates

Plaintiff’s diabetes was adequately treated. Additionally,

Defendant Pinkstaff is not a physician and did not direct the

medical treatment for Plaintiff’s diabetes. Liability pursuant

to section 1983 attaches only if the plaintiff establishes that

the named defendant personally participated in the deprivation

of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Taylor, 880 F.2d

at 1045. A supervisor is only liable for his subordinates’

violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights if the supervisor

participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the

violations and failed to act to prevent them. Id. Plaintiff

presents no evidence that he was deprived of a constitutional

right, or that Defendant Pinkstaff failed to prevent any

violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Conclusion

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law

with regard to Plaintiff’s claims because Plaintiff has not

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produced sufficient evidence that Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs in violation of

his Eighth Amendment rights. 

Miscellaneous Motions

A. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff recently sought appointment of counsel (Doc.

65). There is no constitutional right to appointment of counsel

in a civil case. See Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1982). The appointment of

counsel in a civil rights case is required only when exceptional

circumstances are present. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089,

1093 (9th Cir. 1980); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328 (9th

Cir. 1986). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an

evaluation of both ‘the likelihood of success on the merits

[and] the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro

se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’”

Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331 (quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d

952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)). Plaintiff is an articulate and

competent litigator, and his issues are not unusually complex

medical claims. Also, his claims are not sufficient to

withstand summary judgment. The Court will deny his request for

counsel. 

B. Motion for Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff filed a “Demand Court Ordered Retaliation

Claim” (Doc. 67) based on an incident on May 12, 2006, when, to

retaliate against him for filing this lawsuit, an unidentified

nurse allegedly switched his syringe, and Drs. Sharp and McRill

supposedly failed to intervene. None of the allegations

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involved the conduct of the current Defendants. 

Defendants responded with a motion to strike,

contending that Plaintiff’s motion was based on an alleged

retaliation claim involving matters unrelated to the Complaint.

(Doc. 68 at 2.) The contention is well-taken. An injunction is

appropriate to grant intermediate relief of the same character

as which may be granted finally. DeBeers Consol. Mines v. U.S.,

325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945). When the requested relief deals with

a matter lying wholly outside the issues in suit, relief is not

proper. Id.; accord Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fl., 122 F.3d 41, 43

(11th Cir.) (per curiam), amended, 131 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 1997)

(per curiam). Plaintiff’s motion concerns events that are

unrelated to the subject of his complaint and that concerns

conduct of persons other than the Defendants. Plaintiff’s

request will therefore be denied. Defendants’ motion to strike,

and Plaintiff’s responsive motion to quash will be denied as

moot. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (Doc. 53) is GRANTED. Judgment in favor of

these Defendants and against Plaintiff shall be entered with

regard to all counts of the complaint stated against each

Defendant and these Defendants are hereby dismissed from this

matter.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to strike

Plaintiff’s statement of facts is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN

PART, as specified in this Order. (Doc. 62.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED withdrawing the reference to the

Magistrate Judge as to Plaintiff’s motion to quash Defendants’

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motion to strike and Defendants’ motion to strike (Doc. 68, 69).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to quash

Defendants’ motion to strike and Defendants’ motion to strike

are DENIED as moot. (Doc. 68, 69).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for

appointment of counsel is denied. (Doc. 65)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED withdrawing the reference to the

Magistrate Judge as to Plaintiff’s “Demand Court-Ordered

Retaliation Claim” (Doc. 67)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Demand CourtOrdered Retaliation Claim” (Doc. 67) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as a result of summary

judgment having been granted, the Clerk of the Court shall enter

judgment accordingly.

DATED this 21st day of July, 2006.

 

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