Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01324/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01324-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 08CV1324 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTER BURNETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. DUGAN, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________

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Civil No. 08-CV-1324-L(WVG)

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL

COMPLAINT

[DOC. NO. 89]

 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

file a supplemental complaint. (Doc. No. 89.) Plaintiff seeks to

join fourteen new defendants for alleged Eighth Amendment violations

that transpired after filing of the original Complaint but before

filing of the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). The undersigned

recommends that Plaintiff’s motion be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Brief Factual Background

Plaintiff has lumbar disk disease that ultimately required

surgery. His back problems include mobility impairment to his lower

extremities. Plaintiff’s proposed complaint alleges that the

putative defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical

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needs because they did not provide him a single-bed cell while he

recovered from back surgery.

Dr. Calvin was an outside consultant who was not employed by

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(“CDCR”). (Doc. No. 89-3 at 10 (claim appeals letter to Plaintiff).) Dr. Calvin’s role was to recommend a course of treatment,

which was reviewed by CDCR doctors, who then ordered the proper

course of treatment. (Id.) All but two of Plaintiff’s proposed new

claims stem from Dr. Calvin’s recommendation that Plaintiff be

permanently assigned to a cell with a single bed and without any

overhead obstructions, such as a bunk bed. Plaintiff challenges the

CDCR doctors’ decision to order a different course of treatment than

Dr. Calvin recommended and consistently characterizes Dr. Calvin’s

recommendations as “orders” or “prescriptions.”

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on July 22, 2008.

(Doc. No. 1.) Shortly thereafter, the Court screened the Complaint

and sua sponte dismissed it with leave to amend. (Doc. No. 3.)

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on November 24, 2008.

(Doc. No. 11.) On October 5, 2009, however, the Court granted in

part Defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC and granted Plaintiff

leave to amend. (Doc. No. 68.) Plaintiff then filed his Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on November 10, 2009. (Doc. No. 83.)

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the SAC for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies and a second motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. Nos. 87,

88.) Rather than respond to Defendants’ motions to dismiss,

Plaintiff filed a motion to file a supplemental complaint. (Doc.

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No. 89.) Defendants opposed plaintiff’s motion, and Plaintiff has

replied. (Doc. Nos. 94, 95.)

On July 23, 2010, the undersigned issued a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) that recommended, inter alia, that Plaintiff’s motion to file his supplemental complaint be denied. (Doc.

No. 102.) Senior District Judge Lorenz adopted the R&R as it

related to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, dismissed the SAC, and

referred Plaintiff’s motion to file a supplemental complaint back to

the undersigned to be considered in light of an intervening change

in the law. The undersigned now considers Plaintiff’s motion anew

in light of Defendants’ original opposition and Rhodes v. Robinson,

621 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2010).

II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A. Supplementation of a Pleading

Because Plaintiff’s motion seeks to supplement a pleading, it

necessarily invokes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), which

provides that a party may “serve a supplemental pleading setting

forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened

since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(d). “Rule 15(d) provides a mechanism for parties to file

additional causes of action based on facts that didn’t exist when

the original complaint was filed.” Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.,

621 F.3d 858, 874 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).

B. The Eighth Amendment

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin v.

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

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grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.

1997) (en banc). A determination of “deliberate indifference”

involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the

prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response

to that need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059.

A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or

the “wanton infliction of unnecessary pain.” Id. Examples of

serious medical needs include “the existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the

existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Id. at 1059-60.

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows

that a prisoner faces a “substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate

it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). For example,

deliberate indifference may include a prison doctor’s inadequate

response to a prisoner’s medical needs, “prison guards intentionally

denying or delaying access to medical care, or intentionally

interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S.

at 104-105.

“The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent

in cases involving a prisoner’s medical need than in other cases

involving harm to incarcerated individuals because ‘[t]he State’s

responsibility to provide inmates with medical care ordinarily does

not conflict with competing administrative concerns.’” McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1060. Nonetheless, the indifference to medical needs

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must be substantial; inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or

even negligence, does not amount to a constitutional violation.

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th

Cir. 2004). Disagreements over “matters for medical judgment,” such

as whether additional tests or treatment are required, are insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at

107.

C. The Eighth Amendment and Supervisory Liability

In this case, Plaintiff seeks to hold some Defendants liable

on a theory of supervisory liability. “Supervisors can be held

liable for: 1) their own culpable action or inaction in the

training, supervision, or control of subordinates; 2) their

acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation of which a complaint

is made; or 3) for conduct that showed a reckless or callous

indifference to the rights of others.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229

F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000). For liability to exist, the

supervisor must have been “personally involved in the constitutional

deprivation or a sufficient causal connection must exist between the

supervisor’s unlawful conduct and the constitutional violation.”

Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 2001).

There is no “vicarious liability” under Section 1983. See Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff Exhausted His Administrative Remedies

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s proposed supplemental

complaint is barred because he failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies before he first filed suit in July 2008. The undersigned

concludes that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies.

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The Prison Litigation Reform Act amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under section 1983 . . . by a prisoner confined in any

jail, prison or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a). Courts have construed this requirement strictly to

“afford[] . . . corrections officials time and opportunity to

address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a

federal case.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525-26 (2002).

In the original R&R, the undersigned concluded that Plaintiff

was required to administratively exhaust his proposed new claims

before he originally filed suit in 2008. Thus, because all of the

claims and allegations against the fourteen new defendants arose

after Plaintiff first filed suit, he could not possibly have

exhausted his claims before 2008, and he was barred from bringing

those claims in this suit. However, on September 8, 2010, the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Rhodes v. Robinson,

621 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2010).

Rhodes decided the issue whether an inmate must administratively exhaust new claims before he first files suit or whether

those new claims are barred from joinder because they arose after

the filing of the original complaint. Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

Rhodes specifically addressed the situation where “a prisoner is

filing an amended complaint based on new conduct” that arose after

the original complaint. Id. Reasoning that “when a plaintiff files

an amended complaint, ‘[t]he amended complaint supercedes the

original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent,’” id.

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28 1/ Rather, Defendants argue that the October 2009 exhaustion was

immaterial because it did not occur before the filing of the

original complaint.

7 08CV1324 

at 1005 (citation omitted), the Court held that new claims that

arise after the filing of the original complaint can be brought by

amended complaint so long as the new claims were exhausted before

filing of the amended complaint, id. at 1007.

Here, Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies in

October 13, 2009, one month before filing the SAC. (Doc. No. 89-10

at 2-6 (October 13, 2009, letter denying appeals).) Defendants’

opposition does not dispute that the claims in the proposed

complaint were exhausted in October 2009.1/ Following Rhodes, the

undersigned concludes that Plaintiff exhausted the new claims in his

proposed complaint before he sought leave to file it. Having

determined that Plaintiff’s claims were properly exhausted, the

Court turns to whether he should be allowed to file the supplemental

complaint.

B. Rule 15(d) Does Not Apply; Plaintiff’s Motion Should Instead

Be Construed as a Motion To Amend Under Rule 15(a)

As Rhodes teaches, because “when a plaintiff files an amended

complaint, ‘[t]he amended complaint supercedes the original, the

latter being treated thereafter as non-existent,’” Rhodes 621 F.3d

at 1005 (citation omitted), the operative complaint that Plaintiff’s

motion necessarily seeks to supplement is his Second Amended

Complaint--not either of the two preceding complaints. The Second

Amended Complaint became the sole operative complaint in this case

when it was filed because the first two complaints ceased to exist.

The undersigned therefore turns to whether Plaintiff may supplement

the Second Amended Complaint.

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2/ Regardless of how the motion is styled, the standard which governs

amendments to pleadings under Rule 15(a) is the same as governs

supplemental pleadings. See Glatt v. Chicago Park Dist., 87 F.3d

190, 194 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.). Thus, even if Plaintiff’s

motion is not construed as a motion to amend, the Rule 15(a)

analysis below nonetheless applies if the motion is considered as a

motion to supplement pleadings. The outcome would be the same.

8 08CV1324 

Because the facts and parties Plaintiff seeks to supplement

are all related to events that transpired before Plaintiff filed his

Second Amended Complaint, he cannot supplement the SAC. Eid v.

Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858, 874 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Plaintiffs, however, seek to add defamation claims arising from conduct

which happened nearly a year before they filed their first complaint. These claims could not, therefore, be brought as supplemental pleadings under Rule 15(d).”) (emphasis in original). Rule

15(d) does not apply.

However, although Plaintiff’s motion is styled as a motion

for leave to file a supplemental complaint, the undersigned

recommends that the motion be construed as a motion for leave to

file an amended complaint under Rule 15(a).2/ See Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to be

liberally construed’ . . . .”) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)) (internal citations omitted);

Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Pro se habeas

petitioners may not be held to the same technical standards as

litigants represented by counsel.”); Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952,

957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (explaining that courts “tolerate

informalities from civil pro se litigants.”).

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C. Rule 15(a) Is Unavailing Because Plaintiff’s Proposed

Amendments Are Futile

Construing Plaintiff’s motion as a motion to amend, the

undersigned nonetheless recommends denying it based on the futility

of the amendments sought.

Rule 15(a) allows a Plaintiff to amend his complaint once as

a matter of course and then only after leave of court or the

opposing party’s consent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)-(2). “The court

should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. § 15(a)(2).

“The power to grant leave to amend, however, is entrusted to the

discretion of the district court, which ‘determines the propriety of

a motion to amend by ascertaining the presence of any of four

factors: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party,

and/or futility.’” Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir.

2010) (citations omitted). “[I]n the normal course district courts

should freely grant leave to amend when a viable case may be

presented.” Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1039 (9th

Cir. 2002).

However, “[f]utility alone can justify the denial of a motion

to amend.” Id.; see also Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath Med.

Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (futile amendments

should not be permitted). “‘[A] proposed amendment is futile only

if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the

pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or

defense.’” Sweaney v. Ada County, 119 F.3d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir.

1997) (quoting Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th

Cir. 1988).) “When a proposed amendment would be futile, there is

no need to prolong the litigation by permitting further amendment.”

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28 3/ Unless otherwise noted, the undersigned’s reference to “claim” or

“count” is to a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim based on alleged

violations of the Eighth Amendment.

10 08CV1324 

Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir.

2002).

1. Count 1 Against Dr. Davenport and Dr. Levin

Plaintiff alleges a new claim3/ against Dr. Davenport and Dr.

Levin for an alleged conspiracy to cause him pain and suffering by

“intentionally” denying him treatments recommended by another

doctor, Dr. Calvin. (Doc. No. 89-3 at 6.) Specifically, Plaintiff

alleges that Dr. Davenport and Dr. Levin knew that Dr. Calvin

recommended, based on his “professional judgment,” that Plaintiff

should receive a single-bed cell. (Id. at 7.) Dr. Davenport and

Dr. Levin allegedly went against Dr. Calvin’s professional judgment

and ordered Plaintiff placed in a cell that contained a bunk bed.

On March 17, 2009, Dr. Davenport opined that Plaintiff had “no

mobility impairment” and ordered “no housing restriction.” (Doc.

No. 89-8 (Part 5) at 1-2 (doctor’s order).)

Plaintiff’s allegations are at their core a general challenge

to differing medical opinions. Plaintiff does not allege that a

non-medical prison official, such as a correctional officer,

disregarded a doctor’s order. Rather, he alleges that two doctors’

(Davenport and Levin) medical judgments differed from another

doctor’s (Calvin) judgment.

The most significant flaw with Plaintiff’s allegations is his

treatment of Dr. Calvin’s medical opinion as the absolute last word

on the subject, cast in stone, and unable to be ever be changed by

anyone in the future. If any other doctors disagreed with Dr.

Calvin’s recommendation, he reasons, those doctors must be falsifyCase 3:08-cv-01324-L-WVG Document 123 Filed 02/23/11 Page 10 of 19
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ing reports and maliciously conspiring against him to cause him pain

and suffering based on some inexplicable motive. However, Dr.

Calvin’s opinion is just one of the two competing medical opinions

in this case. The other doctors Plaintiff seeks to sue opine that

Plaintiff did not need the special accommodations. Just because the

latter doctors’ opinions differ from Dr. Calvin’s does not mean

there was a conspiracy or constitutional violation. Dr. Calvin’s

differing medical opinion is just that and nothing more.

Because challenges to differing medical opinions cannot be

the basis for an Eighth Amendment violation, Plaintiff’s proposed

first claim fails, and Plaintiff’s proposed amendment is futile as

a result.

2. Count 2 Against Dr. Levin

Plaintiff again alleges that Dr. Levin disregarded the

medical opinion that Plaintiff should be permanently housed in a

single-cell bed when Dr. Levin approved Dr. Davenport’s recommendation that Plaintiff not be housed in a single-bed cell. (Id. at 10;

see also Doc. No. 89-8 (Part 5) at 1-2 (removal order).) He also

alleges that Dr. Levin initiated an “adverse transfer” to Calipatria

prison with the intent to transfer him back to Centinela and have

him housed in general population. (Doc. No. 89-3 at 11.) As with

Count 1, Count 2 is another challenge to differing medical opinions

between doctors, not a lay person’s failure to follow a doctor’s

order. Count 2 fails for the same reason Count 1 fails.

Count 2 also includes a passing allegation against Dr. Ball,

Calipatria Prison’s Chief Medical Officer, who allegedly conspired

with Dr. Levin to deprive Plaintiff a single-bed cell. (Id. at 10.)

Because Dr. Ball’s actions were based on Dr. Levin’s differing

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medical judgment, and because Dr. Levin’s judgment cannot be the

basis for an Eighth Amendment violation, it follows a fortiori that

Dr. Ball could not have conspired with Dr. Levin to violate

Plaintiff’s rights.

Plaintiff also mentions that Dr. Levin’s actions were in

violation of Judge Lorenz’s Order that granted Plaintiff’s request

for a preliminary injunction and ordered that he be housed in a

single-bed cell. However, because Dr. Levin’s alleged actions

occurred on and before March 17, 2009, he could not possibly have

been in violation of Judge Lorenz’s subsequent May 6, 2009, Order.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s proposed amendments are futile.

3. Count 3 Against Dr. Shiller

Plaintiff alleges that on March 18, 2009, Dr. Shiller, a

Primary Care Physician at Centinela, denied him a single-bed cell

despite knowing that Dr. Calvin recommended a single-bed cell.

(Doc. No. 89-3 at 15.) Plaintiff’s proposed amendment to add Count

3 is futile for the same reasons as Counts 1 and 2. Further, Dr.

Shiller’s April 15, 2009, alleged violation of Judge Lorenz’s Order

is illogical since the Order did not issue until May 6, 2009. (See

Doc. No. 36 (Order granting request for preliminary injunction).)

4. Count 4 Against Dr. Hjerper et al.

Plaintiff’s proposed fourth claim alleges that Dr. Hjerper

conspired with six other doctors, a prison grievance appeals

coordinator, an un-named nurse, and two prison wardens to devise a

devious, far-reaching “ruse or trick or stratagem to deceive

Plaintiff into believing that Dr. Calvin had changed his orders and

recommendations to say Plaintiff did not require single bed no

overhead housing.” (Doc. No. 89-3 at 20.)

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Count 4 fails to the extent it challenges differing medical

opinions. The allegations against the two named wardens fail

because they are supervisors and their personal involvement is not

alleged. The allegations against Nurse Jane Doe fail because she

acted in reliance on the doctors’ medical opinions. Finally, the

allegation that the above proposed defendants violated Judge

Lorenz’s May 6, 2009, Order is illogical because the dates Plaintiff

cites in Count 4 all predate the Order.

As with Counts 1 through 3, Count 4 fails to state a claim

against any of the named putative defendants. As a result,

Plaintiff’s proposed amendment is futile.

5. Count 5 Against Dr. Ball

The allegations against Dr. Ball in Count 5 are based on the

same differing medical opinions described above. As a result, Count

also 5 fails, and Plaintiff’s proposed amendment is futile.

6. Count 6 Against Nurse Jane Doe

Plaintiff alleges that Nurse Jane Doe lied to him when she

stated that Dr. Calvin had changed his “orders,” that Plaintiff be

housed in a single-bed cell, and conspired with the previously-named

doctors and wardens into tricking him into believing Dr. Calvin had

done so. (Id. at 27.) Again, no matter how much Plaintiff

disagrees with the medical opinion that he should not be housed in

a single-bed cell, Nurse Doe relied on that medical opinion. Even

assuming she lied about Dr. Calvin’s changed opinion, which was

simply a recommendation and not an order, the fact remains that the

orders of Dr. Davenport and Dr. Levin both support Nurse Doe’s

alleged assertion. As a result, Count 6 fails, and Plaintiff’s

proposed amendment is futile.

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7. Count 7 Against Dr. Vo

Count 7 repeats the same allegations above against Dr. Vo.

For the same reasons as above, Count 7 fails, and Plaintiff’s

proposed amendment is futile.

8. Counts 8 and 9 Against Wardens Uribe Jr. and Smalls

Plaintiff alleges that Warden Uribe Jr. transferred Plaintiff

to Calipatria State Prison because Centinela did not have the

facilities to accommodate his medical needs. (Id. at 34.) When

Plaintiff was transferred back to Centinela, he was placed in

general population. (Id.) He further broadly claims that Warden

Smalls generally participated in the alleged conspiracy against him.

(Id. at 39.)

Plaintiff’s claims against the wardens fail because he does

not allege that either warden personally ordered that he be

transferred between the prisons or placed in general population upon

his return to Centinela. Not only are Plaintiff’s broad assertions

unsupported by factual allegations, the exhibits to his proposed

complaint contradict his broad, general assertion that the wardens

transferred him in violation of his rights. These exhibits

demonstrate that the decision to transfer him to Calipatria was

based on the medical opinions of the two prisons’ chief medical

officers, Dr. Levin and Dr. Ball, not the prisons’ wardens. The

doctors’ transfer agreement was memorialized by Dr. Levin:

The above named patient/inmate will be transferred to

Calipatria State Prison Out-Patient Housing Unit on

02/20/09. He has been accepted by Dr. Ball, CMO (A) at

Calipatria State Prison. This agreement was made between

Dr. Levin, CMO (A) Centinela State Prison and Dr. Ball, CMO

(A) Calipatria State Prison. He is accepted as a medical

and return under the CMO-to-CMO agreement.

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(Doc. No. 89-7 at 702.) Moreover, the exhibits contradict Plaintiff’s general assertion that Warden Uribe placed him in general

population upon his return to Centinela. Warden Uribe responded to

Plaintiff’s letter after he complained about his placement in

general population:

A. Pope, Correctional Counselor II from Facility C was

contacted and she informed me you were seen in Unit Classification Committee (U.C.C.) for Out to Medical and Return on

March 13, 2009, and cleared for double celling. She also

informed me there was documentation provided from Calipatria

State Prison via the Assistant Classification and Parole

Representative from Centinela State Prison, which cleared

you medically for double cell housing by Dr. Calvin. In

addition, your Central File (C-File) was reviewed and you

did not meet single cell housing criteria per classification

policy. She claims to have informed you if you were not

satisfied with [the] Committee’s action you had the right to

appeal the action via the CDC 602 appeal system.

(Doc. No. 89-9 at 26.) Contradicting Plaintiff’s general assertion

that Warden Uribe placed him in Centinela’s general population, this

letter shows that a classification committee was responsible for

Plaintiff’s housing decisions, not the warden. In light of

Plaintiff’s bare assertions, and Plaintiff’s own contradictory

exhibits, Counts 8 and 9 fail, and Plaintiff’s proposed amendments

are futile.

9. Count 10 and 11 Against Dr. Fraze and Dr. John Doe

Counts 10 and 11 against Dr. Fraze and Dr. John Doe are based

on the same general facts explained above. For the same reasons as

above, Counts 10 and 11 fail, and Plaintiff’s proposed amendments

are futile.

10. Counts 12 and 13 Against Correctional Counselors Keys

and Pope

Counts 12 and 13 allege that Correctional Counselors Keys and

Pope stated that Plaintiff no longer needed a single-bed cell and

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incorrectly classified him during a classification hearing. (Id. at

52-53.) These claims fail because Keys and Pope were lay persons

who relied on the doctors’ medical opinions. Plaintiff’s proposed

amendments are futile.

11. Counts 14 and 15 Against Nurse Gerardo and Nurse

Gonzalez

Counts 14 and 15 allege that Nurses Gerardo and Gonzalez

consistently failed to timely deliver Plaintiff’s medication to him.

(Id. at 60.) Specifically, Dr. Davenport had ordered that Plaintiff

was to take his medication with his meals, but the nurses consistently gave him his medication after he had already eaten. He also

alleges he was given the incorrect medication, which further delayed

his taking the medication. As a result, he suffered a “severe upset

stomach.” (Id.) The nurses allegedly delayed his medication

dispensation on three occasions: December 8, 2008; December 10,

2008; and December 11, 2008. (Id.) Finally, the nurses allegedly

intentionally delivered Plaintiff’s medication late because they

knew doing so would cause him pain. (Id.)

During the complaint appeal process, Plaintiff was told that

the medication was dispensed in compliance with regulations, which

required dispensation within one hour of the prescribed time. (Doc.

No. 89-10 at 17.) Further, Plaintiff was advised that his request

for disciplinary action against the involved nurses was “beyond the

scope of the appeals process.” (Id.)

a. The Requirement of a Serious Medical Need

As briefly mentioned above, for an Eighth Amendment violation

to lie, the named nurses must disregard a serious medical need, such

as “the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects

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an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and

substantial pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th

Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 n.3

(9th Cir. 1994) (“In examining medical conditions separate from the

‘routine discomfort’ of incarceration, indicia of a ‘serious’

medical need include . . . the existence of chronic or substantial

pain”).

Because the medical need must be serious, a temporary,

insubstantial discomfort does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See

Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1372 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining

that not “every ache and pain or medically recognized condition

involving some discomfort can support an Eighth Amendment claim.”).

If the medical need involves “minor maladies or non-obvious

complaints of a serious need for medical care,” Blackmore v.

Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004), the inmate must

“place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the

detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment.” Napier v.

Madison County, Ky., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001).

b. Plaintiff Has Not Sufficiently Alleged a Serious

Medical Need

Plaintiff’s allegations are limited to just three specific

days, and there is no indication of either the severity or duration

of the “severe upset stomach” he suffered. Without more, Plaintiff

has not alleged he suffered more than a fleeting, insubstantial

pain. See Lusero v. Rowland, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15492, *3 (9th

Cir. June 26, 1992) (“Finally, the interruption in Lusero’s

medication due to a shortage of antibiotics in the pharmacy, or

Lusero’s upset stomachs as a result of taking the antibiotics, do

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not rise to a level of deliberate indifference.”); Bledsaw v.

Simpson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9398 (8th Cir. May 3, 1994) (concluding that an inmate’s pain was a “brief, minor discomfort” and not

significant enough to trigger an Eighth Amendment violation where

the inmate “had stomach cramps and could not eat anything for two or

three days.”); Benthall v. McKay, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115782, *5-6

(E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2008) (concluding that inmate’s suffering “upset

stomach and some nausea” was not a serious injury and was insufficient to make out an Eighth Amendment violation).

The proposed complaint simply lacks sufficient allegations

that Plaintiff’s medical need was serious. Counts 14 and 15, as

they currently stand, fail to state a viable Section 1983 claim. As

a result, Plaintiff’s proposed amendments are currently futile

because they will necessarily fail at a future motion to dismiss.

Further, Counts 14 and 15 should be dismissed because they

did not arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of

transactions or occurrences.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A). All

of the alleged acts or omissions in Counts 14 and 15 occurred well

after this lawsuit was originally filed, and none are related to the

differing medical opinions regarding the single-bed cell. Counts 14

and 15 arose from events separate and distinct from any other event

or series of events alleged in this case. As a result, Plaintiff

cannot now attempt to join Nurses Gerardo and Gonzalez in this

action.

III. CONCLUSION

Because Counts 1 through 13 rely on predicate facts that

cannot be the basis for violation of the Eighth Amendment, those

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claims irreparably fail to state a cause of action against the

proposed Defendants. Plaintiff’s proposed amendments of Counts 1 

through 13 are futile as a result. The undersigned therefore

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s request to file a supplemental complaint

be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE as to Counts 1 through 13. The undersigned

further RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE

as to Counts 14 and 15.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 9, 2011, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

March 16, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 23, 2011

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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