Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02643/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02643-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERT E. LEVY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COUNTY OF ALPINE, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-02643-KJM-CKD 

ORDER 

Alpine County is home to about 1,100 people, fewer than any other county in 

California. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dep’t of Commerce, 2010 Census.1 Markleeville, the 

County Seat, is home to about 200. Id. 

Robert Levy, former Undersheriff of Alpine County, brings this case against 

Alpine County and two of its officers. He charges them with violations of his civil rights, age 

discrimination, retaliation, and defamation. The defendants move for summary judgment. The 

court held a hearing on January 29, 2016. Douglas Watts appeared for Levy, and Gayle Tonon 

appeared for the defendants. For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part. 

 1

 The court takes judicial notice of these dicta. See, e.g., United States v. Esquivel, 

88 F.3d 722, 727 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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I. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

The court first briefly addresses the defendants’ evidentiary objections. See Resp. 

& Objections Stmt. Disputed Facts, ECF No. 35-1; Resp. & Objections to Stmt. Undisputed 

Facts, ECF No. 35-2; Objections to Declarations, ECF No. 35-3; Notice of Objections, ECF 

No. 36. 

In recent years, many judges in this district, including the undersigned, have 

cautioned litigants against advancing numerous, terse and reflexive objections at summary 

judgment, especially when the objector is the moving party. See, e.g., Lindell v. Synthes USA, 

___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2016 WL 70305, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2016); U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Placer 

ARC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1052–53 (E.D. Cal. 2015); Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics, Inc. v. 

Capstone Orthopedic, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1126 n.1 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Burch v. Regents of 

Univ. of Cal., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006). Defendants are directed to these 

orders, for future reference. 

Standards of admissibility at trial and summary judgment are governed by 

different rules and different motivations. Whereas the full panoply of the Federal Rules governs 

evidence presented to a jury at trial, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a party may 

raise objections if “the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form 

that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). As this language suggests, at 

summary judgment the evidence’s propriety depends not on its form, but on its content. Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Block v. City of L.A., 253 F.3d 410, 418–19 (9th Cir. 

2001). Thus, for example, on review of summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit has considered the 

hearsay contents of a diary whose substance would have been admissible in some other form at 

trial. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003). Similarly, if evidence lacks 

full-fledged authenticity or foundation at summary judgment, it may yet warrant consideration if 

“substantive evidence could be made use of at trial.” Portnoy v. City of Davis, 663 F. Supp. 2d 

949, 953 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Fraser, 342 F.3d at 1036) (quotation marks omitted). 

Relevance, vagueness, speculation, and similar objections are particularly ill-fitted 

for summary judgment because the court may simply disregard irrelevant or indecipherable 

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evidence. See, e.g., Burch, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1119. Likewise, an objection that a statement is 

argumentative or mischaracterizes the record either requests a credibility determination unsuited 

for summary judgment or would better be directed at the underlying evidence itself. See, e.g., 

Stonefire Grill, Inc. v. FGF Brands, Inc., 987 F.Supp.2d 1023, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 

The court overrules each of the defendants’ objections. First, the hearsay 

objections attack evidence that is likely admissible in some other form at trial. In addition, much 

of the supposed hearsay is not hearsay at all, but the statements of a party opponent or statements 

cited for some purpose other than establishing their truth.2 See, e.g., Responses & Objections nos. 

4, 9, ECF No. 35-1; cf. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Second, the court disregards irrelevant evidence 

and counsel’s raw assertions unsupported by evidence, and therefore overrules objections based 

on relevance, misstatement of the record, improper argument, and overrules objections that a 

witnesses’ statement is unsupported in turn by citations to other evidence. Finally, the court 

overrules objections based on assertions of immunity. The motion papers, not separate statements 

of fact, are the correct means of arguing affirmative defenses. 

II. UNDISPUTED FACTS 

Levy was born in 1964. Pl.’s Response Undisputed Material Facts (UMF), ECF 

No. 32. He was hired as a Deputy Sheriff in Alpine County in April 1995 and promoted to 

Undersheriff in 2000. UMF nos. 4, 5. In general, as Undersheriff, Levy “ran the operations” in 

the Sheriff’s Office. Crawford Dep. 19. Specifically, he supervised officers and patrol, ensured 

investigations were completed, and he briefed the Sheriff daily, among other duties. Id. at 19–20. 

For most of Levy’s employment, John Crawford was Sheriff. See generally Crawford Decl., ECF 

No. 34. 

At about the same time Levy began working as Undersheriff, the County and the 

State of California began discussions on a joint project to develop and update the 

telecommunications infrastructure on a mountaintop within the County (the Hawkins Peak 

 2

 Hearsay is a particularly strange objection in a case of alleged defamation such as this 

one, where a plaintiff presumably intends to prove a defamatory statement is false, not true. See

Cal. Civ. Code §§ 44–46. 

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project). See Levy Dep. 31; Knorr Decl. Ex. F, at 1, ECF No. 026-4. Discussions about a similar 

project on another peak began in 2008 (the Leviathan Peak project). See UMF no. 6; Levy Dep. 

30–31. As Undersheriff, Levy took on several duties related to the telecommunications projects, 

although these duties were not strictly within his job description, and he received no separate 

compensation for this work. See Levy Dep. 155–56; id. Ex. H; Nunes Dep. 28, 50. Among other 

things, Levy made reports on the projects to the County Board of Supervisors. See generally

Knorr Decl. Ex. F; Veatch Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 34. Tom Sweeney, a former college professor, and 

Henry “Skip” Veatch, former Alpine County Sheriff, were both on the Board of Supervisors 

during the relevant period. See Sweeney Dep. 10–12; Veatch Decl. ¶ 4. 

Pamela Knorr began working as the County’s administrative officer in 2008. 

Knorr Decl. 1. During this time she was also the County’s personnel director, Knorr Dep. 40, and 

at some point she further assumed the responsibilities of social services director, Veatch Dep. 66. 

Knorr reported to and worked closely with the Board of Supervisors. Knorr Decl. 2. Knorr also 

began working with the Sheriff’s Department on the telecommunications projects. See Crawford 

Dep. 88. In about January 2011, she asked to take over control of the Leviathan Peak project, and 

the Sheriff’s Department assumed an advisory role. Id. 

Knorr and Levy did not get along. They butted heads over Knorr’s requests for 

access to information that Levy believed she had no right to receive; he often denied her requests. 

See Levy Dep. 242–47. Levy recounts that while he was on vacation in 2010, Knorr told the 

Sheriff a “radon problem” required some of Levy’s staff to relocate to another office about five 

miles away. Levy Dep. 183–84. When Levy returned from vacation, he found his staff had 

moved, and he was eventually forced to relocate his own office and join his staff. Id. at 184. 

Levy believes Knorr invented the “radon problem” because she was mad at him. See id. at 

183-85. 

Levy also complained to the Sheriff and to Veatch about what he believed was 

Knorr’s unlawful discrimination against “older management workers.” Levy Dep. 164–65. Levy 

supports his opposition with testimony from the County’s former Human Relations (HR) 

Specialist, Beth Nunes, who believed Knorr engaged in a “nefarious” campaign to shed 

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employees Knorr believed were too old, paid too much, or otherwise undesirable. Nunes Decl. 

¶ 5, ECF No. 34. Nunes recalls Knorr saying one particular staff member had to go, even if it 

meant Knorr had to “make her sit there and count paper clips all day.” Nunes Dep. 115–16. 

Another witness remembers Knorr relating her goal in a Board of Supervisors meeting: “creating 

a younger, cheaper workforce.” Hartnett Dep. 38–39. 

For her part, Knorr said she believed Levy had purposefully withheld information 

about the costs of the Leviathan Peak project. Nunes Dep. 10, 39–41, 61. 

Levy also had a rocky relationship with Sweeney, with whom he had 

disagreements about the funding and installation of infrastructure for the County’s emergency 

services, paramedics, and fire protection before he was promoted to Undersheriff. Levy 

Dep. 255–57. 

In mid-2012, the County Board of Supervisors received a report from the Sierra 

West Group, a construction consulting company, on the expected costs of the Leviathan Peak 

project. See Knorr Decl. Ex. F, at 9; Levy Decl. Ex. A, at 2–6. Some evidence suggests the 

report was presented in April 2012, see Knorr Decl. Ex. F, at 9, whereas other evidence suggests 

the report was not completed before July 2012, see Levy Decl. Ex. A, at 2, but the discrepancy is 

not material to this order. In August 2012, on her own initiative, Knorr performed a “financial 

analysis” to compare various cost estimates for the Leviathan Peak project, including the Sierra 

West estimates, and she submitted her findings to the Board of Supervisors. See Knorr Decl. 2 & 

Ex. B. She described her findings as “beyond disturbing” and expressed concerns that the County 

was at risk of incurring additional, unexpected multi-million-dollar liabilities. Id. Ex. B, at 1. 

She recommended the Board engage a “neutral party” to investigate. Id. 

The Board authorized Knorr to retain a third party investigator. See id. at 2–3 & 

Ex. C. A San Francisco law firm, Liebert Cassidy Whitmore (LCW), was retained. Id. at 3. 

After conducting interviews and reviewing public records, LCW pronounced that no County 

official had violated the law or engaged in any self-dealing. Id. Ex. F, at 1. But on the other 

hand, LCW found “the Board of Supervisors was not provided complete and factual information 

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necessary to make the budgetary decision to undertake the multi-million dollar Leviathan Peak 

project.” Id. Ex. F, at 1. Among other recommendations, LCW wrote, 

Staff should not be permitted to negotiate contracts without the 

guidance of County Counsel, particularly contracts with significant 

legal implications. In this case, it appears that County Counsel was 

not consulted until the Undersheriff had negotiated the lease 

agreement with an attorney from the state. This resulted in a onesided contract with onerous provisions for the County. County 

Counsel, who has knowledge and experience regarding public 

works contracts, can negotiate a fair contract that minimizes the risk 

of costly claims and litigation. 

Id. at 10–11. The LCW report was presented at the Tuesday, November 20, 2012 Board of 

Supervisors meeting. See Knorr Decl. 3 & Exs. D, E. 

Levy and Veatch disagree with LCW that the Board received less than “complete 

and factual information.” See Levy Dep. at 117; Veatch Decl. ¶ 11. They believe Knorr intended 

the investigation as retaliation against Levy for his reports of Knorr’s perceived misdeeds. See

Levy Decl. ¶¶ 5–6; Veatch Decl. ¶ 10. Levy, Veatch, and Crawford also believe the report was a 

backdoor personnel investigation in violation of the California Peace Officers Bill of Rights. See

Levy Decl. ¶ 6; Veatch Decl. ¶ 10; Crawford Decl. ¶ 7. Levy alleges Knorr and Sweeney used 

the report to wound his personal and professional reputation; he points to evidence that on Friday, 

November 16, 2012, a few days before the LCW report was presented to the Board of 

Supervisors, it was released by email and distributed among the County’s residents. See Levy 

Dep. 171–72; Levy Decl. ¶ 5; id. Ex. B (email chain from Teola Tremayne, Nancy Thornburg, 

and Tom Sweeney urging recipients to read the report and attend the Board of Supervisors 

Meeting on November 20, 2012). 

In addition to the LCW report, Levy cites the following disparaging statements: 

 During a break in a Board of Supervisors meeting, Sweeney said loudly to 

Crawford, “I don’t trust you guys.” Levy Dep. 110. About ten people were 

present. Id.

 Knorr and Sweeney told Nunes Levy had “purposefully withheld key project cost 

estimates in regard to the communications projects.” Nunes Dep. 61. 

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 During a coffee break, Sweeney told Nunes that Levy was dishonest, id. at 53, and 

told her and others that Levy “frustrates me,” “I don’t think he’s telling the whole 

truth,” and “I think he knows how much it’s going to cost, and he just drags this 

out,” id. at 58–59. 

 According to an article published February 19, 2011, in a “monthly meeting,” 

“Supervisor Tom Sweeney . . . answer[ed] questions and inform[ed] the public 

about the issues before the Board of Supervisors.” Sweeney Dep. & Ex. D. 

According to the article, Sweeney described the Hawkins Peak project as “an 

amorphous, mysterious project.” Sweeney Dep. at 85 & Ex. D. 

 At lunch one day, Knorr told Crawford she thought Levy may be guilty of a crime. 

Crawford Dep. 59–60. 

After the LCW report was released, the Sheriff felt compelled to relieve Levy of 

his responsibilities related to the telecommunications projects. Crawford Decl. ¶ 10. Crawford 

believed Knorr and Sweeney “wanted Levy terminated at any cost.” Id. During this time, Levy 

experienced health problems, including stress, weight gain, plantar fasciitis, back pain, headaches, 

irritability, nightmares, insomnia, chronic fatigue, and colorectal problems. Levy Dep. 237–38. 

These concerns did not prevent him from doing his job, but they made his work more difficult. 

Id. at 238–39. Levy declined to run for Sheriff in 2013 because he believed he was unelectable in 

the wake of the LCW report. Levy Dep. 132. Veatch agrees Levy had no chance to be elected at 

that point, Veatch Decl. ¶ 11, and Crawford estimates “the report and its public unveiling created 

such controversy around Undersheriff Levy that his ability to seek the office of the Sheriff went 

from reasonably possible to no possibility at all.” Crawford Decl. ¶ 9. 

Knorr’s employment ended in August 2013, Knorr Decl. at 1, and Sweeney’s term 

as Supervisor concluded in January 2013, Sweeney Dep. 12. At the County’s “specific request,” 

Crawford then restored Levy to some but not all of his former responsibilities with respect to the 

telecommunications projects. Crawford Decl. ¶ 10. 

Levy filed a complaint in this court on December 20, 2013. ECF No. 1. As the 

parties stipulated, several claims and defendants were dismissed voluntarily. See Minute Orders, 

ECF Nos. 8, 24. Six claims remain: (1) First Amendment retaliation and Equal Protection claims 

against the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) conspiracy to violate Levy’s civil rights under 

42 U.S.C. § 1985 against the County, Knorr, and Sweeney; (3) age discrimination against the 

County under California Government Code section 12940(a); (4) unlawful retaliation against the 

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County under Government Code section 12940(h); (5) failure to prevent retaliation against the 

County under Government Code section 12940(k); and (6) defamation under California Civil 

Code sections 44–46. 

Levy retired in mid-2015, during the pendency of this case, at the top of his pay 

grade, and he characterizes his retirement as “premature.”3 See UMF no. 28; Levy Dep. 155–58, 

192; Levy Decl. ¶ 2. He never received a poor evaluation. UMF no. 29. 

The defendants moved for summary judgment on October 26, 2015. Mot., ECF 

No. 26; Mem. P. & A., ECF No. 26-2. Levy opposed the motion, ECF No. 31, and the 

defendants replied. ECF No. 35. The defendants also submitted a supplemental reply, at the 

court’s invitation, to address matters Levy’s counsel raised at hearing. ECF No. 38. 

III. LEVY’S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING AND EX PARTE APPLICATION 

Following hearing, Levy filed an ex parte application for permission to file a 

supplemental declaration in support of his opposition brief. ECF No. 39. The Local Rules of this 

district require that oppositions to any noticed motion must be filed and served no less than 

fourteen days before the hearing. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(c). This court’s standing order also 

provides that “[n]o supplemental brief shall be filed without prior leave of court.” Standing 

Order 3, ECF No. 4-1. 

While Levy seeks the court’s leave to supplement his prior filings, he has not 

provided an explanation for his delay. The hearing had in fact already been continued to allow 

Levy’s counsel to obtain additional information. See ECF No. 29; see also, e.g., Mission Power 

Eng’g Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 883 F. Supp. 488, 492 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (ex parte applications are 

ordinarily denied unless “the moving party is without fault in creating the crisis that requires ex 

parte relief” or “the crisis occurred as a result of excusable neglect”). The ex parte application is 

denied, and Levy’s supplemental reply is stricken. 

 3

 Given his retirement date (“mid-2015”) and birth date (September 9, 1964), Levy was 

fifty or fifty-one years old at retirement. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to his 

case, the court assumes for purposes of this motion that his retirement was in advance of his 

required law-enforcement retirement date. 

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IV. LEGAL STANDARD 

A court must grant a motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A motion for summary judgment calls for a “threshold inquiry” into 

whether a trial is necessary at all, that is, whether “any genuine factual issues . . . properly can be 

resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either 

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The court does not weigh 

evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses; rather, it determines which facts the parties do not 

dispute, then draws all inferences and views all evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. See id. at 255; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 

574, 587–88 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to 

find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 

(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the 

basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 

(1986). If the party opposing summary judgment bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving 

party need only illustrate the “absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” In re 

Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). The burden then shifts to the 

nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate specific facts showing that there is 

a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quotation marks omitted). The non-moving 

party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material 

facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of 

the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

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V. DISCUSSION 

A. First Amendment Retaliation and Equal Protection 

Levy asserts this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against only the County. 

Municipal bodies are subject to liability under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of 

N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 & n.54 (1978). The “touchstone” of such a claim is the plaintiff’s 

allegation that the defendant’s official policy is responsible for his injury. Id. at 690–91. 

“Policy” can be a vexing word, blending into the terms “custom” and “usage,” which are 

expressly used in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (imposing liability on every “person” who 

deprives another of federally protected rights “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 

custom, or usage”). The word “policy” does mean a singular decision “officially adopted and 

promulgated” by a local government’s officers, Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, “the acts of its 

policymaking officials,” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). In other words, 

“municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers” when their 

“acts or edicts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 

U.S. 469, 480 (1986) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Thus “a local government may be held 

liable under § 1983 when the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official 

with final policy-making authority” in the relevant sphere. Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 

591 F.3d 1232, 1249 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Levy alleges County officials unconstitutionally retaliated against him. 

Compl. ¶ 38. The County correctly notes the absence of any evidence of a written policy or 

longstanding custom or practice of retaliation, or a pattern of similar violations. But Levy has 

presented evidence that could lead a reasonable trier of fact to believe (1) the County’s 

administrative officer, acting within her policy-making responsibility, instituted an investigation 

of the telecommunications projects in an effort to discredit Levy and terminate his employment 

and (2) the Board of Supervisors approved the investigation. In the context of the small size of 

Alpine County and its government, Levy has in this way set up a triable case against the County. 

It may well be that Levy proves neither of his constitutional claims, but because the County’s 

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motion advances no other argument than the absence of a policy, the court does not reach any 

further question on this claim. 

B. Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 

“Section 1985(3) provides no substantive rights itself; it merely provides a remedy 

for violation of the rights it designates.” Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 

366, 372 (1979). It is not to be construed as a “general federal tort law.” Gerritsen v. de la 

Madrid Hurtado, 819 F.2d 1511, 1518–19 (9th Cir. 1987). A claim under § 1985(3) has four 

elements: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any 

person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and 

immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of this conspiracy; (4) whereby a person 

is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the 

United States.” Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United 

Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828–29 (1983)). 

Section 1985(3) protects the right to be free from racial discrimination, Life Ins. 

Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 1979), but “courts have struggled to 

determine whether and when § 1985(3) applies in contexts not involving race, and have produced 

opinions that are all over the map,” Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536 (collecting authority). In this circuit, 

§ 1985(3) extends beyond race discrimination “only when the class in question can show that 

there has been a governmental determination that its members ‘require and warrant special federal 

assistance in protecting their civil rights.’” Id. (quoting Schultz v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718 

(9th Cir. 1985)). 

Levy argues the defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his age when 

they made decisions related to his employment as Undersheriff. See also Compl. ¶ 44; Opp’n at 

10–11. But for some time now, federal courts, including this court, have held that age 

discrimination employment claims may not be channeled through § 1985(3). See, e.g., Webb v. 

Cty. of El Dorado, No. 15-1189, 2015 WL 9480956, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2015); Steshenko v. 

Gayrard, 70 F. Supp. 3d 979, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Hetzler v. Gianunzio, No. 96-3710, 1997 WL 

33805, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 1997); Golden v. Shapell Indus., Inc., No. 80-510, 1980 WL 213, 

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at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 1980); see also United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 998 (9th 

Cir. 2008), aff’d, 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (age is not a suspect classification). 

Summary judgment is granted as to this claim. 

C. FEHA Age Discrimination 

The FEHA prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of age. See Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 12940(a). More specifically, an employer may not take an “adverse action toward 

an employee ‘because of’ his or her membership in a protected classification.” McCaskey v. 

California State Auto. Ass’n, 189 Cal. App. 4th 947, 979 (2010). “For purposes of an age 

discrimination claim, the protected class is persons over 40 years of age.” Id. at 978 (citing Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 12926(b)). A claim for violation of section 12940(a) is a “disparate treatment” 

claim. Id. 

“California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the 

United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination, including age discrimination, 

based on a theory of disparate treatment.” Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 354 (2000) 

(citing, inter alia, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). First, the plaintiff 

must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. “Generally, the plaintiff must provide 

evidence that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he 

sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse 

employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some 

other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” Id. at 355. If the employee meets this 

burden, the employer is presumed to have discriminated unlawfully. See id.

Levy has not established a prima facie case of age discrimination because he has 

presented no evidence he suffered an adverse employment action. The term “adverse 

employment action” is not defined in the FEHA. Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 

1028, 1049 (2005). In the absence of a statutory definition, the California Supreme Court has 

held that “the proper standard for defining an adverse employment action is the ‘materiality’ test, 

a standard that requires an employer’s adverse action to materially affect the terms and conditions 

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of employment.” Id. at 1036. The court must, however, take the totality of the circumstances 

into account, including the context of the plaintiff’s workplace. Id. at 1052. 

Under this standard, an “offensive utterance or even a pattern of social slights” do 

not suffice to meet the materiality test. Id. at 1054. Likewise “trivial adverse actions” that are 

reasonably likely to “do no more than anger or upset an employee” fall outside the bounds of 

section 12940(a). Id. at 1054–55. And changes that are “merely contrary to the employee’s 

interests or not to the employee’s liking” do not alone support a claim. McRae v. Dep’t of Corr. 

& Rehab., 142 Cal. App. 4th 377, 386 (2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Rather, the 

employer’s actions must have a “detrimental and substantial effect on the plaintiff’s 

employment.” Id.

It is undisputed Levy maintained his position and received no negative 

performance evaluation. He suffered no pay cut and retired at the top of his pay grade. Although 

he calls his retirement “premature,” Levy has presented no evidence showing he was 

constructively discharged. Cf. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 1238, 1246 (1994) (“In 

order to establish a constructive discharge, an employee must plead and prove . . . that the 

employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted working conditions that were so 

intolerable or aggravated at the time of the employee’s resignation that a reasonable employer 

would realize that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would be compelled to 

resign.”). Moreover, it is undisputed he retired only after Knorr and Sweeney left the County 

government. 

The most significant event in the course of Levy’s employment was the County’s 

decision to commission and release the LCW report. But Levy has presented no evidence the 

terms or conditions of his employment changed during the report’s preparation, and upon its 

release, the only change he experienced was temporary relief from duties related to the 

telecommunications projects. Moreover, Levy testified in deposition that the County had 

discriminated against him by imposing these additional duties on him without additional pay. 

Levy Dep. 155–56. In addition, although Levy and Veatch believe the LCW report inaccurately 

recounts Levy’s role in the projects, he has produced no evidence to show the County, rather than 

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LCW, was responsible for the report’s contents. Neither has Levy presented evidence showing 

the report altered the terms or conditions of his employment as Undersheriff. Moving his office 

five miles down the road to Turtle Rock may have been inconvenient and contrary to his interests, 

but he has not shown the move had a “detrimental and substantial effect” on his ability to do his 

job. McRae, 142 Cal. App. 4th at 386. 

Because Levy has not established a prima facie case of discrimination, summary 

judgment is granted on this claim. 

D. Retaliation 

An employer may not discharge or “otherwise discriminate” against its employees 

for reporting unlawful employment discrimination. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(h). “[T]he term 

‘otherwise discriminate’ in section 12940(h) should be interpreted to refer to and encompass the 

same forms of adverse employment activity that [are] actionable under section 12940(a).” 

Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at 1050–51. The same burden-shifting scheme also applies to claims under 

both subdivisions 12940(a) and (h). Id. at 1042. Because Levy has not met the County’s motion 

with evidence showing he suffered an adverse employment action, summary judgment is also 

granted on this claim. 

E. Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation 

Levy’s claims of the County’s failure to prevent discrimination are founded on the 

same allegations and evidence as his claims for discrimination and retaliation. See Compl. 

¶¶ 62-66; Opp’n at 11–12. No claim for failure to prevent discrimination or retaliation can 

continue where no discrimination or retaliation are shown to have occurred. See, e.g., Dickson v. 

Burke Williams, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 4th 1307, 1318 (2015). Summary judgment is therefore also 

granted on this claim. 

F. Defamation 

Defamation is libel or slander. See Cal. Civ. Code § 44. Libel is a false, 

unprivileged, memorialized publication that exposes a person to “hatred, contempt, ridicule, or 

obloquy,” that causes the person “to be shunned or avoided,” or that “has a tendency to injure him 

in his occupation.” Id. § 45. Slander is a false, unprivileged, oral publication that, among other 

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things, charges a person with a crime, injures him in his “office, profession, trade or business,” or 

“by natural consequence causes actual damage.” Id. § 46. A “privileged publication” is one 

made in the “proper discharge of an official duty” or in a “(1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial 

proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or 

course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant [California Civil Code 

sections 1084 et seq.].” Cal. Civ. Code § 47(a). 

If the plaintiff in a defamation case is a public figure, as a matter of federal 

constitutional law, he must show each defamatory statement was made “with knowledge that it 

was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan

376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); Ampex Corp. v. Cargle, 128 Cal. App. 4th 1569, 1577 (2005). The 

plaintiff bears the burden to make this showing by clear and convincing evidence. Bose Corp. v. 

Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510 n.30 (1984). Nothing suggests these rules 

apply differently in a small town. See, e.g., Shafer v. Lamar Pub. Co., 621 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. Ct. 

App. 1981) (small-town police officer was a public figure). 

Levy does not dispute he is a public figure, and courts have concluded law 

enforcement officers are public figures for purposes of their defamation claims. See, e.g., Rattray 

v. City of Nat’l City, 51 F.3d 793, 800 (9th Cir. 1994); McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d 835, 

841 & n.3 (1986); see also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (“[T]he ‘public official’ 

designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who 

have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of 

governmental affairs.”). The court agrees Levy is a public figure for purposes of his defamation 

claim. 

Levy has not met his burden on this claim in response to the defendants’ motion. 

First, Levy has presented no evidence to show that Sweeney’s statements about the “amorphous” 

and “mysterious” nature of the Hawkins Peak project were false. The same is true of Sweeney’s 

statement of his own distrust. Second, in response to the defendants’ argument that each 

allegedly defamatory statement is privileged under Civil Code section 47, Levy points to only two 

statements he claims were unprivileged: those of Knorr and Sweeney when they told Nunes that 

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Levy had lied to the Board of Supervisors. See Opp’n at 13–14. But Levy has presented no 

evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, showing Knorr and Sweeney knew he had told 

the truth or showing they recklessly disregarded the falsity of their words. “Actual malice 

consistently has been deemed subjective in nature, provable only by evidence that the defendant 

‘realized that his statement was false or that he subjectively entertained serious doubt as to the 

truth of his statement.’” Newton v. Nat’l Broadcasting Co., 930 F.2d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 510 n.30). Although the record may imply Knorr and Sweeney 

disliked or even hated Levy, evidence of “spite, hostility, or deliberate intention to harm” is not a 

substitute for a showing of “actual malice” as defined by the Supreme Court. Shoen v. Shoen, 

48 F.3d 412, 417 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10–

11 (1970)). 

Summary judgment is granted on this claim. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

Summary judgment is GRANTED on all claims but the first, brought under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The supplemental declaration at ECF No. 39 is STRICKEN. This order 

resolves ECF No. 26. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 10, 2016. 

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