Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04624/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04624-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 1

Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, DENYING

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND TERMINATING REMAINING MOTIONS AS MOOT

(JFLC1)

**E-Filed 3 /25/2007**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

WADE ROBERTSON,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

SHIRAZ QADRI, AVENIR RESTAURANT

GROUP, INC. and GREG ST. CLAIRE,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 06-04624 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 1

DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECTMATTER JURISDICTION, DENYING

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND,

AND TERMINATING REMAINING

MOTIONS AS MOOT

[re: docket nos. 105, 110, 123, 136,

152]

Defendants move to dismiss the instant action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff moves: (1) for leave to file a fourth amended complaint; (2) for sanctions; and (3) to stay

the action, or, in the alternative, for a protective order. Each motion is opposed. The Court heard

oral argument on the motions on July 20, 2007 and September 14, 2007. For the reasons set

forth below Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction will be granted,

and Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend and motion for sanctions will be denied. The

remaining motions will be terminated as moot.

Case 5:06-cv-04624-JF Document 308 Filed 03/25/08 Page 1 of 10
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Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, DENYING

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND TERMINATING REMAINING MOTIONS AS MOOT

(JFLC1)

I. BACKGROUND

On July 20, 2007, the Court heard oral argument on Defendant’s motion to dismiss for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a fourth amended

complaint, motion for sanctions, and motion to stay the action, or, in the alternative, for a

protective order. At the time of that hearing, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend did not

include proposed amended complaint. Accordingly, the Court deferred consideration of the

motion to dismiss and the motion to amend pending Plaintiff’s submission of a proposed

pleading.

Plaintiff’s motion to stay was granted in part and denied in part without prejudice. The

Court stayed discovery that would implicate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights in the underlying

state criminal action but otherwise permitted discovery to proceed. On September 14, 2007, the

Court requested supplemental briefing with respect to the issue of Plaintiff’s domicile. On

October 2, 2007, the Court heard oral argument on the motion for sanctions.

II. DISCUSSION

1. Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint

 Plaintiff moves for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. The request for leave to

amend is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), which provides that “leave shall be

freely given when justice so requires.” In deciding whether to grant leave to amend, the Court

will consider several factors, including: (1) undue delay by the party seeking the amendment; (2)

prejudice to the opposing party; (3) bad faith; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) whether the

party previously has amended its pleadings. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir.

1995). “However, each is not given equal weight. Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify

the denial of a motion for leave to amend.” Id.; see also Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. City of Mesa,

997 F.2d 604, 614 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s proffered

amendment fails to stat a cognizable federal claim and thus would be futile. In light of the many

opportunities Plaintiff has had to amend his complaint, the motion will be denied.

“[W]here [a] proposed amendment is insufficient in law and would thus be a useless act,

Case 5:06-cv-04624-JF Document 308 Filed 03/25/08 Page 2 of 10
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 Additionally, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 Plaintiff seeks attorneys fees in connection 2

with this claim.

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Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, DENYING

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND TERMINATING REMAINING MOTIONS AS MOOT

(JFLC1)

it is proper . . . to deny leave to amend.” Baker v. Pac. Far E. Lines, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 84, 89

(N.D. Cal. 1978). A proposed amendment is insufficient or “futile” if “there is no set of facts

which could be proved under the amendment to the pleadings which would constitute a valid and

sufficient claim or defense . . . .” Id.; see also Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214

(9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff’s proposed Fourth Amended Complaint seeks to add one new claim for

relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Qadri and St. Claire. In support of this claim, 2

Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant Qadri willingly acted in conspiracy, or agreement, or concerted

action with Officer Dan Ryan of the Palo Alto Police Department (State of California), towards a

common goal to falsely arrest and/or falsely imprison Plaintiff under California state law.” 

Fourth Amended Complaint at ¶ 44. 

A plaintiff seeking to hold private individuals liable under § 1983 must allege a

conspiracy with some party acting under the color of state law. Todd v. City of Natchitoches, 238

F. Supp.2d 793, 803(W.D. La. 2002). Conclusory allegations of conspiracy do not satisfy this

requirement and are insufficient to survive a challenge at the pleading stage. Rivoli v. Gannett

Co., 327 F. Supp. 2d 233, 239 (W.D.N.Y. 2004). Rather, “the facts that are pleaded must

provide a basis for a reasonable inference of state action, for the Court is not obliged to draw

unreasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor or to accept plaintiff’s conclusions of law.” Id. 

The investigating and reporting of a suspected criminal activity by various people

does not amount to a conspiracy; the court looks for a genuine actual issue of

concerted activity toward an unlawful objective. Diffuse and expansive

allegations are insufficient, and complaints containing only conclusory, vague or

general allegations of a conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights will

generally be dismissed

. . . A claim that private individuals conspired with government officials under

color of state law must be supported by specific factual allegations in the

complaint. Bald and conclusory allegations that private parties acted in concert

with state officials to deprive the plaintiffs of constitutional rights will not defeat a

motion to dismiss; some factual basis supporting the existence of a conspiracy

must be pleaded. In the absence of a sufficiently pleaded conspiracy claim or a

genuine factual issue of conspiracy between private parties and state actors, the

private individuals are not acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983

Case 5:06-cv-04624-JF Document 308 Filed 03/25/08 Page 3 of 10
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Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, DENYING

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND TERMINATING REMAINING MOTIONS AS MOOT

(JFLC1)

by virtue of the conspiracy claim.

 Moore, Fed. Proc., Civil Rights § 11:329 (footnotes omitted). “[T]o establish a conspiracy

under Section 1983, the plaintiff must show that defendants had a unity of purpose, common

design, and understanding, or meeting of the minds in an unlawful arrangement to violate the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Rivoli, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 239 (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff ‘s Fourth Amended Complaint does not contain the allegations required to make

a valid and sufficient claim against a private individual under §1983. Plaintiff claims

conclusively that “Defendant Qadri, individually and in concert with Officer Dan Ryan, acted

maliciously, wantonly, unlawfully, willfully, knowingly and with the specific intent to deprive

Plaintiff of his rights of freedom from illegal searches and seizure . . .” Fourth Amended

Complaint at ¶ 46. However, “it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that the [private and

state] defendants merely acted in concert or with a common goal. There must be allegations that

the defendants had directed themselves towards an unconstitutional action by virtue of a mutual

understanding.” Todd, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 802 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see

also Carey v. Cont’l Airlines, 823 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding that a citizen’s arrest

followed by police arrest did not constitute conspiracy); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437 (Minn.

1987) (rejecting “unsupported allegations of malice” as insufficient to establish conspiracy). 

Plaintiff also alleges that “[e]mployer Defendant, or St. Claire, or both, acquiesence [sic] to or

ratified the wrongful conduct of Defendant Qadri against Plaintiff after the events described

herein occurred.” Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint at ¶

51. This allegation undermines the argument that there was a meeting of the minds between

Qadri and state actors prior to Plaintiff’s arrest. 

“A district court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to amend where the

movant presents no new facts but only new theories and provides no satisfactory explanation for

his failure to fully develop his contentions originally.” Bonin, 59 F.3d at 845 (citing Allen v. City

of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 376, 374 (9th Cir. 1990)). “At some point, a party may not respond to

an adverse ruling by claiming that another theory not previously advanced provides a possible

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 Defendants bring their motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) because they already have 3

answered the Complaint. The parties agree that the standard under Rule 12(h)(3) is the same as

under Rule 12(b)(1).

5

Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, DENYING

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND TERMINATING REMAINING MOTIONS AS MOOT

(JFLC1)

grounds for relief and should be considered.” Mir v. Fosburg, 646 F.2d 342, 347 (9th Cir. 1980).

2. Jurisdiction

a. Diversity Jurisdiction

Plaintiff asserts that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction not only under § 1983 but

also on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Having reviewed the parties’ supplemental briefs the

Court concludes that citizenship is not diverse.

Federal district courts are vested with original jurisdiction over civil actions where

the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of [$75,000], exclusive of

interest and costs, and is between “citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. §

1332(a)(1). To demonstrate citizenship for diversity purposes a party must (a) be a

citizen of the United States, and (b) be domiciled in a state of the United States.

See, e.g., Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir.1983);

Hill v. Rolleri, 615 F.2d 886, 889 (9th Cir.1980). Our cases have established

several principles to guide this inquiry. First, the party asserting diversity

jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. Resnik v. La Paz Guest Ranch, 289 F.2d

814, 819 (9th Cir.1961). Second, a person is “domiciled” in a location where he or

she has established a “fixed habitation or abode in a particular place, and [intends]

to remain there permanently or indefinitely.” Owens v. Huntling, 115 F.2d 160,

162 (9th Cir.1940) (quoting Pickering v. Winch, 48 Or. 500, 87 P. 763, 765

(1906)); 1 J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.74(3.-3), at 707.58-60 (1985) . .

. . Third, the existence of domicile for purposes of diversity is determined as of

the time the lawsuit is filed. Hill, 615 F.2d at 889.

Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1986). 

A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual. White v. Lee, 227 3

F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). In a facial attack, the challenger

asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face

to invoke federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger

disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke

federal jurisdiction. . . .

In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the district court may review evidence

beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for

summary judgment. Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.

2 (9th Cir.2003) (citing White, 227 F.3d at 1242). The court need not presume the

truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations. White, 227 F.3d at 1242. “Once the

moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a factual motion by

presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party

opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy

its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Savage, 343 F.3d at 1039 n. 

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 Plaintiff suggests that the Court must hold an evidentiary hearing if it wishes to 4

consider a factual attack. Plaintiff bases this suggestion on a citation to McLachlan v. Bell, 261

F.3d 908, 909 (9th Cir. 2001), in which the Ninth Circuit indicated that “[b]ecause no evidentiary

hearing was held, [it] accept[ed] as true the factual allegations in the complaint.” However, the

Ninth Circuit also stated in the same case that it “review[s] the decision whether to conduct an

evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion.” Id. at 910. This language indicates that the district

court has discretion whether to hold an evidentiary hearing and that the holding in McLachlan

doe not affect the scope of the district court’s review of a factual challenge to diversity

jurisdiction. See Rosales v. United States, 824 F.2d 799, 802-03 (9th Cir. 1987) (“A district

court may hear evidence and make findings of fact necessary to rule on the subject matter

jurisdiction question prior to trial, if the jurisdictional facts are not intertwined with the merits.”).

 Jon Robertson also asserts that “Wade Robertson has repeatedly, expressly stated to me 5

that he maintains his permanent domicile in the city of Memphis, in the state of Tennessee and he

as made these express statements prior to July 28, 2006 and he has made them again (repeatedly)

since that time and to the present date.” Jon Robertson Decl. ¶ 4. To the extent that this

statement is introduced to prove the location of Plaintiff’s domicile, it is inadmissible hearsay. 

Similar statements in the other supporting declarations likewise are inadmissible hearsay.

6

Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, DENYING

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND TERMINATING REMAINING MOTIONS AS MOOT

(JFLC1)

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).4

To invoke this Court’s diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff must establish that he is domiciled

in a state other than California. Plaintiff contends that he is a citizen of and domiciled in the

state of Tennessee. He alleges that on the date of filing of this action, he “had and maintained

residences in four states – New York, the District of Columbia, Tennessee, and California,” was

registered to vote in Tennessee and had a Tennessee driver’s license, registered his only

automobile in Tennessee, had bank accounts only in New York and the District of Columbia, and

is single, self-employed, and has no ownership interest in real property. Wade Robertson Decl.

¶¶ 4-10. Plaintiff also asserts that at the time he filed this action, he was licensed to practice law

in California and the District of Columbia, and that while he was present in California, he 

intended to return to Tennessee. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.

Plaintiff also provides a series of supporting declarations. Plaintiff’s father, who lives in

Tennessee, asserts that he is a co-owner of the automobile registered in Plaintiff’s name in

Tennessee. Jon Robertson Decl. ¶ 5. Won-Gil Choe, the founder of Plaintiff’s client the 5

Stanford Venture Group, asserts that the organization is at the proposal stage only, that Plaintiff

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 Plaintiff objects to the Court’s consideration of these exhibits and to a large portion of 6

the Kerwin declaration. 

7

Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, DENYING

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND TERMINATING REMAINING MOTIONS AS MOOT

(JFLC1)

never has been an employee of the Stanford Venture Group, that Plaintiff had no contact with the

Stanford Venture Group prior to the filing of this action and that Plaintiff currently is an outside

counsel, not the general counsel, of the Stanford Venture Group. Choe Decl. ¶¶ 4-10. Vladamir

Kholunov asserts that he rents limited residential and small home-office space in the District of

Columbia to Plaintiff and that he has retrieved mail for Plaintiff delivered to that address. 

Kholunov Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, 7. Ray Connolly asserts that he has rented limited residential and small

home-office space in New York to Plaintiff, and that he has retrieved mail for Plaintiff delivered

to that address. Connolly Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, 7. Finally, Plaintiff himself declares that he voted via

absentee ballot in Tennessee in 2000, 2004 and 2006.

In response to Plaintiff’s evidence, Defendants submit the declaration of their attorney,

Patrick Kerwin, with accompanying exhibits. These exhibits include a tax record for the

Tennessee property belonging to Plaintiff’s parents, Plaintiff’s California Bar information,

information from the Stanford Venture Group website, and a record of Plaintiff’s prior addresses

from the Westlaw “People Finder” service. Most significantly, the “People Finder” document 6

suggests that since September 2001, Plaintiff’s address of record with at least one credit reporting

agency was in Palo Alto, California. Also of note, the California Bar record shows that Plaintiff

was admitted to practice in California in 2001; Plaintiff does not assert that he is licensed to

practice law in Tennessee. Notwithstanding the evidentiary objections asserted in his papers,

Plaintiff conceded at oral argument that the information contained in Exhibit B (Plaintiff’s Bar

record) and Exhibit D (Plaintiff’s address) to the Kerwin declaration are correct. In light of these

admissions, Plaintiff’s lack of a Tennessee law license that would allow him to return and

practice there, and Plaintiff’s overall failure to provide any detailed information about how and

where he spends the majority of his time, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to carry his

burden of establishing diversity of citizenship. 

In the exercise of its discretion, the Court declines to hold an evidentiary hearing. 

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Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, DENYING

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND TERMINATING REMAINING MOTIONS AS MOOT

(JFLC1)

Plaintiff offers no explanation as to what information he would elicit at an evidentiary hearing

that he could not have provided to the Court in his declaration. The Court also will deny

Plaintiff’s request for additional discovery. Discovery is necessary in connection with a factual

attack on subject matter jurisdiction “only if it is possible that the plaintiff can demonstrate the

requisite jurisdictional facts if afforded that opportunity.” St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d

199, 202 (9th Cir. 1989). Discovery is not required if a plaintiff can provide no explanation why

he did not undertake such discovery previously. Id. Here, Plaintiff seeks discovery into voter

registration records, bank records, and additional third-party testimony. Plaintiff has access to or

otherwise can testify to the contents of his voter registration and bank records. Plaintiff fails to

identify the third-parties whose testimony he would introduce, and he does not explain why he

could not have secured their testimony previously or what additional information this would

produce. Because Plaintiff has had an adequate opportunity “to develop and argue the facts in a

manner that is adequate in the context of the disputed issues and evidence,” id., additional

discovery is not required. 

b. Federal Question Jurisdiction

 Plaintiff has asserted two federal claims in this action. One, a claim for declaratory

judgment, was dismissed by the Court on October 26, 2006. The other the claim for relief under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserted in Plaintiff’s proposed Fourth Amended Complaint, is disposed of by

this order. Accordingly, no federal claims remain before the Court. Because neither diversity

nor federal question jurisdiction is present, dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is

appropriate.

3. Motion for Sanctions

Plaintiff moves for sanctions of default judgment and for attorney discipline against

Defendants’ counsel. Plaintiff seeks these sanctions in connection with dispute concerning the

correction of deposition testimony in a deposition that has yet to be completed and an apparent

interaction with the assistant district attorney responsible for prosecuting Plaintiff in state court. 

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s submission carefully and perceives no evidence of

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 Plaintiff also moves for sanctions based on Defendants’ argument distinguishing a case 7

cited in Plaintiff’s moving papers, Hambleton Bros. Limber Co. v. Balkin Enters., Inc., 397 F.3d

1217 (9th Cir. 2005). Defendants argued that Hambleton was distinguishable because in that

case the party seeking to make changes to deposition testimony did so after the deposition had

actually been completed and only after the opposing party had filed a motion for summary

judgment and also because the deponent failed to provide an explanation for the changes as

requried under Rule 30(e). These are legally permissible arguments, and the Court will not

sanction Defendants for having raised them.

9

Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, DENYING

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND TERMINATING REMAINING MOTIONS AS MOOT

(JFLC1)

sanctionable conduct, let alone conduct meriting terminating sanctions. Similarly, it will not

discipline counsel for Defendants. 

7

4. Motion to Stay Action or, in the Alternative, for Protective Order

In light of the foregoing Plaintiff’s remaining motions will be terminated as moot.

III. ORDER

Good cause therefor appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is DENIED.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction is GRANTED.

3. Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is DENIED.

4. Plaintiff’s motion for a stay, or in the alternative, for a protective

order is TERMINATED as moot.

DATED: March 25, 2006

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 06-04624 JF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, DENYING

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND TERMINATING REMAINING MOTIONS AS MOOT

(JFLC1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Patrick Cannon Kerwin pkerwin@msn.com, jmbattorney@yahoo.com 

Notice will be delivered by other means to:

Wade Robertson

Post Office Box 20185

Stanford, CA 94309

Case 5:06-cv-04624-JF Document 308 Filed 03/25/08 Page 10 of 10