Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02657/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02657-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

VILLAGE OF LOS RANCHOS DE ALBUQUERQUE; and 

RIO GRANDE VALLEY PRESERVATION SOCIETY, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

and 

ELBERT KING; JOAN MCGINNIS; VELMA WHIPPLE; 

THOMAS MONTOYA; PRISCILLA MONTOYA; 

JOHN TROTTER ; KIT SARGENT, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

R.H. BARNHART, Administrator of the Federal ) 

Highway Administration; ELIZABETH DOLE, ) 

Secretary of the Department of Transport a t ion; ) 

PETER A. LOMBARD, Environmental Protection ) 

Specialist for the Federal Highway ) 

Administration; DANIEL DAKE, Director, Office ) 

of Planning and Programming Development of ) 

the Federal Highway Administration; DEWEY ) 

LONSBERRY, Federal Highway Division, ) 

Administrator, ) 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

THE CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE; and THE COUNTY 

OF BERNALILLO, 

Defendants-Intervenors-Appellees. 

} 

} 

} 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

f I 1 u ··~~. .( - 1./ 

Uniced Srit@~ t:mH'f (it Appewl5 

'f emh Circu: r 

ROBERT L HOECKER. 

Clerk · 

No . 87-2657 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. CV-84-1273-JB) 

Appellate Case: 87-2657 Document: 01019439225 Date Filed: 07/02/1990 Page: 1 
Alice G. Hector of Hector & Associates, P.A., Albuquerque, New 

Mexico for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Vicki L. Plaut {Roger J. Marzula, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, Herbert A. Becker, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, Robert L. Klarquist, Attorney, Department 

of Justice, Land and Natural Resources Division, and Jean G. 

Rogers, of Counsel, Federal Highway Administration, with her on 

the brief) for Defendants-Appellees. 

James H. Foley, City Attorney, and Edward R. Pearson, Assistant 

City Attorney, for City of Albuquerque, and Joe C. Diaz, County 

Attorney, and MaryAnn Lunderman, Deputy County Attorney, for 

County of Bernalillo, on the brief for Defendants-IntervenorsAppellees. 

Before LOGAN, MOORE and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2657 Document: 01019439225 Date Filed: 07/02/1990 Page: 2 
Plaintiffs (The Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque, the 

Rio Grande Valley Preservation Society, and certain named 

residents in Albuquerque 1 s North Valley} appeal from a decision of 

the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico 

granting summary judgment in favor of defendants (certain 

officials in the Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA"), the City 

of Albuquerque, and the County of Bernalillo). We affirm. 

FACTS 

The district court summarized the relevant facts as follows: 

The North Valley river crossings project is a 

proposal for construction of two bridges across the Rio 

Grande River, one at Paseo del Norte just south of an 

existing crossing at Corrales Road, and another further 

south at Montano Road. Construction on the Paseo del 

Norte has begun as of this writing, while the Montano 

Bridge is still in the planning stage. Both bridges 

involve substantial right-of-way acquisitions within the 

Village (of Los R~nchos de Albuquerque], a rural 

community northwest of Albuquerque. Further, the 

project involves widening of Village roads and addition 

of new roads to handle the increased bridge traffic, 

with resulting effects of increased noise, etc., on 

neighboring Village landowners. The bridge at Paseo del 

Norte will be a four-lane crossing with an option for 

later expansion to six lanes, while the Montano crossing 

is proposed to be two lanes. 

While few residential homeowners would react 

favorably to the prospect of having a major arterial 

traffic route built practically in their backyards, the 

citizens of the Village are particularly concerned about 

the impact of the new bridges on the rural quality of 

their neighborhood, various sites of historical interest 

in that area, and the effects of the project on the 

river bosque wetlands. The Village has thus brought 

suit under various federal environmental protection 

statutes, arguing that, in approving the bridge 

projects, the federal government is taking action which 

will adversely affect the environment, without adequate 

study and planning as required by law. 

The central issue in this motion [for summary 

judgment] is whether or not the federal government's 

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Appellate Case: 87-2657 Document: 01019439225 Date Filed: 07/02/1990 Page: 3 
involvement in the river crossings project is 

sufficiently major to trigger the applicable statutes. 

Therefore, the extent of that involvement must here be 

set forth in some detail. 

Federal involvement in the river crossings project 

was initiated by a January 1979 decision of the Urban 

Transportation Planning Policy Board ("UTPPB"} of the 

Middle Rio Grande Council of Governments to seek a 

location-environmental study of the project. This 

request was presented to the Federal Highway 

Administration ("FHWA"), where, on February 5, 1979, the 

Division office in Santa Fe, New Mexico, authorized 

preliminary engineering work in preparation of the 

environmental study for the river crossings project. 

The authorization form for the project, Defendants' 

Exhibit 8A, estimated the cost of the locationenvironmental study at $75,000.00, and authorized 

federal financial assistance for part of these costs, in 

the amount of $58,972.50. 

In addition to provision of funding, the federal 

government took an active role in the preparation of the 

EIS. Without going into exhaustive detail as the 

process is set forth in Defendants' Answers to 

Interrogatories, submitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, it 

is safe to say that the actual preparation of the EIS 

required fairly exhaustive federal assistance from 

approving agencies and individual FHWA personnel. The 

process is lengthy and, as the actual sufficiency of the 

EIS itself is not at this time before the Court, the 

Court will not here reiterate those procedures. A Final 

Environmental Impact Statement ("FEIS") for the river 

crossings project was approved by Peter Lombard, 

Director of the Office of Planning and Program 

Development in the Region 6 Office of the FHWA, on 

September 16, 1983. 

After approval of the FEIS, the City of Albuquerque 

programmed $4.2 million of 1983 general obligation bond 

money for the Montano crossing, and an additional $6.1 

million was appropriated for the project from the 1985 

bond election. 

According to the affidavit/testimony of Joseph 

Martin, Director of New Mexico Department of 

Transportation, Harry E. Kinney, former Mayor of 

Albuquerque, and Kenneth E. Bower, Jr., Director of 

Technical Support for the New Mexico State Highway 

Department, federal funding has not been and will not be 

requested for any part of the Montano or the Paseo del 

Norte river crossings. Thus, as of the date of FEIS 

approval by the FHWA, federal involvement in the river 

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crossing came to an end, as far as any financial 

assistance was concerned. 

{Memorandum Opinion and Order at 3-5, June 9, 1987) (footnote 

omitted}. 

Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the federal 

environmental laws were violated and an injunction against all 

further federal participation in the project. After considering 

the evidence submitted by both sides, the district court granted 

summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants on the ground 

that the FHWA's participation in the bridge projects was not 

sufficient to trigger the federal laws. The district court 

subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the local 

defendants "on the same grounds as stated by the Court for 

dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint against the Federal 

Defendants.~ (Order at 1, October 7, 1989.) Plaintiffs appeal. 

ISSUES 

Plaintiffs raise four issues on appeal: (1) whether 

construction of the Montano bridge is a "major federal action" 

subject to the requirements of the National Environmental Policy 

Act; {2) if construction of the bridge is not a major federal 

action, whether the bridge project was properly segmented from the 

federally funded I-25/Los Angeles project, which is a major 

federal action; (3) whether construction of the bridge requires 

compliance with section 106 of the National Historic Preservation 

Act; and (4) whether construction of the bridge requires 

compliance with section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation 

Act or Executive Order 11990. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2657 Document: 01019439225 Date Filed: 07/02/1990 Page: 5 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 

Plaintiffs argue that the federal defendants' improper 

approval of the EIS for the Montano bridge violated the National 

Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 u.s.c. § 4332 et seq. NEPA 

provides in pertinent part: 

The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the 

fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, 

and public laws of the United States shall be 

interpreted and administered in accordance with the 

policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies 

of the Federal Government shall --

{C) include in every recommendation or report on 

proposals for legislation and other major Federal 

actions significantly affecting the quality of the 

human environment, a detailed statement by the 

responsible official on --

(i) the environmental impact of the 

proposed action, 

(ii) any adverse environmental effects 

which cannot be avoided should the proposal be 

implemented, 

(iii) alternatives to the proposed 

action, 

(iv) the relationship between local 

short-term uses of man's environment and the 

maintenance and enhancement of long-term 

productivity, and 

{v) any irreversible and irretrievable 

commitments of resources which would be 

involved in the proposed action should it be 

implemented. 

Section 4332 (emphasis added). 

The requirements of NEPA apply only when the federal 

government's involvement in a project is sufficient to constitute 

"major federal action." Plaintiffs contend that the bridge 

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project is a major federal action because of (1) the local 

defendants' eligibility for federal funding or (2) the FHWA's 

participation in and approval of the EIS. We disagree. 

1 . Eligibil ity for Federal Funding 

Federal courts have not agreed on the amount of federal 

involvement necessary to trigger t he applicability of NEPA. In La 

Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971 ), cert. 

denied 409 u.s. 890 (1972) (prematurely filed), supplemented by 57 

F . R.D. 94 (attorney's fees), aff'd 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), 

cert . denied, 417 U. S. 964 (1974), the Federa l District Court for 

the Northern District of California addressed the issue of whether 

"the federal regulations and statutes apply to a highway project 

upon location approva l, construction approval, or some 

intermediate point when federal participation is assured[ .]" Id. 

at 226. The court analyzed the problem by dividing highways into 

three categories: (l) "highways for which federal funds have been 

approved or are immediately sought"; (2) "state highways 

constructed without federal funds, and for which federal 

participation has never been sought''; and (3) "those projects that 

may eventuall y receive federal funds." Id. at 226-27. The court 

said that there is no question that highways in the first category 

are major federal actions, and highways in the second category 

clearly are not; the troublesome category is the third . The court 

concluded that highways in the third category are major federal 

actions and require compliance with federal rules because "[a ]ny 

project that seeks even the possibl e protection and assistance of 

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Appellate Case: 87-2657 Document: 01019439225 Date Filed: 07/02/1990 Page: 7 
the federal gover nment must fall within the statutes and 

regulations." Id. at 227. 1 

The United States District Court for the District of 

Connecticut recognized the flaws in the approach taken in La Ra za , 

and, instead of requiri ng a ll highways in La Raza's third category 

(state highways that may eventually rece i ve federa l funds) to 

submit to federal requirements , rejected La Raza and held tha t no 

highways in that category should be subj ect to federal 

requir ements: 

Though recognizing the f o rce of the argument developed 

in La Raza Onida, this Court concludes that wh ile 

Congress no doubt has power to requ ire NEPA compliance 

in such circumstances, the existing legislation s imply 

does not do so . 

The contentions in [La Raza] are all sound, but 

with deference I do not understand how they esta b l ish 

that such an option [to apply for federa l funding] on 

the part of a state consti tutes the highway a " Federa l 

action" within the mean ing of NEPA. So licitude for the 

environment cannot su bstitut e for legislation. Congress 

has not applied NEPA to a l l highways that the states are 

eligible to fund with federal dollars. 

The State's option to use fede ral dollars , though 

open vi r tually until the concrete i s poured , is 

1 In the case b e fore us, the district court disting uished La 

Raza by noting that in La Raza the local government· s till had~he 

option to receive feder al funds, whereas here , the district cou rt 

concluded that the local defendants have for eclosed that 

possibility and thus fall into La Raza's second category. We 

agree with the district cou r t that an official foreclosure of all 

possibility of federal assistance will undoubtedly wo rk to exempt 

a federal agency fr om NEPA requirements. However, her e we find no 

concrete evidence that the local government was ever officially · 

precluded from seeking feder al assistance even though it expressed 

its intention not to seek federal funds. Thus, we ana l yze this 

case on the premise that the local government still had the 

possi bility of receiving federal funds. 

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nonetheless an option, and the State ' s choice should not 

be restricted simply because one alternative of the 

option (using state dollars) might result in less 

adequate assessment of environmental considerations. If 

the highway is not a federal action, t hen a state's 

decision to avoid federal involvement cannot have the 

paradoxical effect of establishing federal involvement. 

Citi zens for Balanced Environ . & Transp. , Inc . v. VolEe, 376 F. 

Supp. 806 , 812-13 (D. Conn.}, aff'd , 503 F.2d 601 ( 1 974}, cert. 

denied, 423 u.s. 870 (1975) (emphasis in original). 

We are persuaded by the analysis of Citizens and adopt its 

conclusions. Therefore, because the State of New Mexico, the Ci ty 

of Albuquerque, and the County of Bernalill ohere (hereinafter 

collectively referred to as " the state") are only eligible for 

fede ral assistance, that eligibility in itself is not sufficient 

to establish a ma j or federal action requiring the FHWA to comply 

with the r equi rements of NEPA. 

2. Approval of the EIS 

Plaintiffs also argue that FHWA's assistance in and approval 

of the EIS is sufficient to make the bridge project a major 

federal action. 2 The district court rejected this argument on the 

following grounds: 

Clearly , the state in the instant case did not initially 

2 In their reply brief, plaintiffs state that "an EIS itself is 

not a 'major fede ral action,''' and that they "are not making such 

an absurd claim." See Appellant 's Reply Brief at 2. Rat her, 

plaintiffs arg ue thar-"it is the funding and preparation 

a ssistance by the FHWA of the location s t udy that preceded the EI S 

that triggers NEPA." Id. However, at oral argument plaintiffs 

argued that the location study is a component of the EI S. We 

cannot accept plaintiffs' implicit argument that the lesser (the 

location study) can impose higher standa rds (such as compliance 

with NEPA) than the greater (preparation of the EIS) . Therefore, 

we construe plaintiffs' argument as stating that the EIS , which 1n 

this case includes the locati on study, is the major federal 

action. 

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need any type of federa l a pproval, assuming tha t they 

chose not to seek fede ral money, in order to proceed 

with the river crossi ngs project. The fact that the 

state d id voluntarily request a federa l EIS , though they 

were not legally bound to do so, should not , without 

more, constrain the state to make the entire project 

federa l. Unless the state is actually receiving or is 

planning to receive federal funding for a project, mere 

prepa ration and approval of an EIS is not 11maj or federal 

action .u 

(Memorandum Opinion and Order at 9, June 9 , 1987.) We agree wi t h 

the district court and would only add that an EIS is what is 

requ ired once a project is deemed to be a major federal action. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) . It would be anomalous indeed to say 

that in a case such as this, where there is no showing that the 

local defendants were involved i n a sham transaction to evade 

fede ral environmental requirements, that the preparation and 

approval of an EIS is a major federa l action for which an EIS must 

be prepared and approved. 

Plaintiffs also point to the fact that the federal government 

contributed nearly $59,000 of the $75,000 cost of the location 

study . Although $59 , 000 is indeed a large portion of that cost, 

it was incurred in connection with the preparation of the EIS and 

it is minuscule in compar ison with the cost of the total bridge 

project. 3 Cf. Citizens for Balanced Environ . & Transp., Inc. v. 

Volpe, 376 F. Supp. 80 6, 810 (D . Conn.) ("The only other federal 

fund ing indicated is a sum less than $50,000 of federal highway 

planning and research funds tha t were used in connection with the 

planning of the proposed road. The size of this expenditure and 

the t otally prelimina ry purposes of the funds are too 

3 The City of Albuquerque floated $10.3 mi l lion in bonds in 1983 

and 1984 to finance the bridge project . 

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Appellate Case: 87-2657 Document: 01019439225 Date Filed: 07/02/1990 Page: 10 
insignificant to render the proposed multi-million dollar highway 

a federal action."} (footnote omitted), aff'd, 503 F.2d 301 

(1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 870 (1975). 

For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the district court 

"that federal involvement with the bridge project[] was minimal, 

and, as a matter of law, did not rise to the level of 'major 

federal action' so as to bring the project within the purview of 

federal environmental laws." Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2, 

(June 9, 1987). 

We draw guidance from Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F .2d 1068 

(lOth Cir. 1988), as to the meaning of the phrase "major federal 

action.'' In that case we analyzed whether and to what extent the 

Bureau of Land Management (the ''BLM") could exercise control over 

a county's major road improvement project, and then we addressed 

whether such input or control by the BLM consti t uted ''major 

federal action." First, we observed that the Council on 

Environmental Quality's regulations have defined major federal 

action to encompass not only ac tions by the federal government but 

also nonfederal actions n•with effects that may be major and which 

are potentia lly subject to Federal control and responsibility. 40 

C.P.R.§ 1508. 18 ."' Id. at 1089. However, we went on to state 

that: 

"[T]he distinguishing feature of 'federal' involvement 

is the ability to influence or control the outcome in 

material respects. The EIS process is supposed to 

inform the decision-maker. This presupposes he has 

judgment to exercise." 

The touchstone of major federal action, in the 

context of the case before us, is an agency's authority 

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to influence .significant nonfederal act ivity. This 

influence must be more than the power to give nonbinding 

advice to the nonfederal actor . Rather, the 

federal agency must posses actual power to control the 

nonfederal activity. 

Id. at 1089 (quoting W. Rodgers, Environmental Law 763 (1977} 

(cita tion omitted). 

Given the decision of the state to proceed with the bridge 

project without federal assistance beyond the initial location 

study and EIS preparation, we conclude tha t there is no evidence 

that the federal governme nt had the actual power to control this 

project. At most , it gave advice as to the location of the 

bcidge . Thus, we do not here have any "major feder a l action." 

SEGMENTATION 

Plaintiffs argue that even if the participation in , and 

approval of, the EIS alone is not enough t o make the project 

federal , the bridge project was improperly "segmented" from the I25/Los Angeles Interchange p ro ject, which is a major fede ral 

project subject to the r equirements of NEPA. The district court 

rejected that argument, holdi ng that "the ev idence is undisputed 

that the projects are , at best , only peripherally related, and 

have not been improperly segmen ted from one another. " (Memorandum 

Opinion and Order at 10 , June 9, 1987 . ) We agree. 

"As a gene ral rule under NEPA, segmen tation of highway 

projects is improper for pu rposes of preparing e nvironmental 

impact statemen ts. " Piedmont Heights Civic Club , I nc . , v . 

Moreland, 637 F.2d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 1981 ). However, a local 

proj ect closely related physically to a fede ral proj ect may be 

deemed independent for NEPA p urposes aft er consideration of 

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whether .the proposed segment: 

(l) has logical termini, (2) has substantial independent 

utility, ( 3 ) does not foreclose the opportuni ty to 

consider alternatives, and {4) does not irretrievably 

commit federal funds for closely related projects. 

Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the district court erred in 

determining that they had failed to present any issues of material 

fact. 5 Spec ifically, they argue that an affid~v it submitted by 

one of their transpo rtation consultants demonstr ates that the 

eastern terminus of the bridge project, Edith Avenue, is not 

logical: 

8. The •.. Wilson & Company [traffic] report 

addresses a Montano Corridor with termini at Coors Road 

and Edith Boulevard. Figure 2 in that repor t indicates 

that 30% of the estimated year 2005 bridge traffic (or 

5,070 vehicles per day) will use the section of Montano 

between Edith Boulevard and I -25. 

9. Since nearly a third of all bridge traffic will use 

Montano Bridge east of Edith Boulevard , this strongly 

4 The district court considered only the first three factors 

enumerated in Piedmont Heights. (Memorandum Opinion and Order at 

10-11, June 9, 1987 , citing 23 C.F.R. § 77l.lll(f}; Daly v. Volpe, 

514 F.2d 1106 {9th Cir. 1975)). The appellants, however, do not 

argue that the district court failed to consider all relevant 

factors. Instead, they argue the district court erroneously found 

no issue of material fact with regards to the factors it did 

consider. 

5 The district court's findings are as follow: 

The Court finds that there is no material issue of fact 

as to whether such segmenta tion was proper, as 

[plaintiffs have] presented no evidence to the Court 

that the [I-25] project is in any way related to the 

Montano bridge crossing, other than the inevitable 

relationship caused by the fact that some of the new 

frontage road traffic will undoubtedly use that route as 

a means of access to Montano Road, and hence to the new 

bridge crossing. 

Memorandum Opinion and Order at 11, (June 9, 1987). 

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suggests t hat the logical eastern terminus for 

considerati on of bridge traffic impacts and related 

improvements would be I-25, which is the nex t major 

intersecting , regional route east of Edith Bouleva rd. 

10. An I-25 terminus for Montano Corridor improvemen ts 

also has basis according to the Environmental Assessmen t 

(EA) for t he I-25 Frontage Road i mprovements. Section 

" 0" of the EA notes tha t among the assumpt i ons beh ind 

t h e traffic forecasts used in the I-25 Frontage Road 

analysis was the following: 

... a new Montano corridor bridge and roadway (twolane limited access faci lit y) from Coors Road to 

Interstate 25 via Montano Road/Montgomery Boulevard. 

Affidavit of Harvey R. Joyner, Doc . 111 at ~ 8-10} (emphasis 

added) . 

We do not r ead that evidence to say that Edi t h Boulevard is 

not a logical t e r minus. Rather, the affidavit, at most , merely 

asserts that the I-25 terminus would be more logical. That a 

termi nus is the most logical is not mandated by the segmen tation 

analysis that analysis requires only that a terminus be 

"logical." Because plaintiffs point us to no ev i d e nce in the 

record indicating the Edith Boulevard is not a logical terminus, 

we agree with the district court that there is no question of 

material fact on that issue. 

Even if a local project terminates at a point of juncture 

with a federall y funded project, that would not preclude 

segmentation. "Congress has not purported to apply NEPA 

requirements to [e]ve ry highway that connects with a federallyfunded highway, and the fact that the connection he r e involves a 

three-mile overlap mak es no difference ." Citizens for Balanced 

Environ . & Transp., Inc. v . Volpe , 376 F. Supp. 806, 810 (D. 

Conn.), aff'd, 503 F .2d 301 (1974), cert . denied, 423 U.S. 870 

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(1975). Because all local projects must start and end somewhere, 

under plaintiffs' theory the entire highway network across the 

country could be considered one project. Such an implication is 

obviously inde fensi ble. 

Because the criteria advanced in Piedmont Heights are 

satisfied here, and beca use plaintiffs have not demonstrated a ny 

issues of material fact or raised any other arguments that would 

demonstrate that the district court erroneously granted summary 

judgment in favor of defendants, we affirm the district court's 

holding that defendants did not improperly segment the bridge 

project from the I -25 project. 

NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT 

Plaintiffs argue that the construction of t he bridge requir es 

compli ance with section 106 of the National Historic Preservation 

Act ("NHPA"), 16 u.s.c § 470 et ~ The NHPA p r ovides in 

pertinent part: 

The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect 

jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or fede ral ly 

assisted undertaking in any State ••. shall, prior to 

the approva l of expendi ture of any Federal funds on the 

undertaking or prior to the issuance of any license, as 

the case may be , take into account the effect of the 

undertaking on any d istrict, site, bui lding , structure 

or object that is included i n the National Registe r. 

16 u.s.c. § 470 f (emphasis added) . 

As we held above, the parti cipation in and appr oval of the 

EIS in this case did not render the bridge project federal in 

natur e. Moreover , the bridge project is not under the "dir ec t or 

indirect jurisdiction" of the FHWA . Therefore, we cannot say that 

it is ''a proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking" 

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requiring the FHWA 's compliance with the requirements of the 

NHPA. 6 See Lee v. Thornburgh, 877 F.2d 1053, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 

1989). 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ACT 

and EXECUTIVE ORDER 11990 

Plaintiffs argue that the construction of the bridge requires 

compliance with section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation 

Act ( "DTA"), 49 u.s.c. App. § 303 and 23 u.s.c. § 138 , and 

Executive Order 11990. We disagree. 

1. Section 4(f) 

Section 4(f) provides that it is the national policy "that 

special effort should be made to preserve the natural beauty of 

the countryside and public park and recreation lands , wildlife and 

6 Plaintiffs refer to the 1986 version of the regulation 

promulgated to implement the NHPA, which defines "undertaking" as 

any Federal, federally assisted or federall y licensed 

action, activity, or program or the approval , sanction, 

assistance, or support of any non-Federal action, 

activity or program. Undertakings include new and 

continuing projects and program activities .•. that 

are 

(3) carried out pursuant to a Federal lease, permit , 

license, certificate , approval, or other form of 

entitlement or permission. 

36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c) (1986) (emphasis added in Appellants' Brief). 

Assuming, without deciding, that this quoted version of the 

regulation is the relevant and appropriate version controlling the 

present dispute, it cannot broaden the reach of the statute . 

Because the project is neither "federally assisted" nor under the 

"direct or indirect jurisdiction" of ,any "head of any Federal 

Agency," we need not address the definition of "undertaking 11 in 

this regulation. 

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waterfowl refuges, and historic s ites." To that end, Section 4(f) 

permits the Secretary of Transportation to approve a 

transportation project only if 

(1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative to 

using that land; and (2) the program or pro ject includes 

all possible planning to min i mize harm to the park, 

recreat ion area, wildlife or waterfowl refuge, or 

histori c site resulting from such use. 

49 u.s.c. App. § 303: see 23 u.s.c. § 138. Plaintiffs argue that 

the Secretary 's actions in this case constituted "approval .. of the 

project such that compliance with Section 4(f) ' s requirements is 

necessary . 

We hold that, like the NEPA and the NHPA, Section 4(f) is 

only applicable to federal projects. See Historic P r eservation 

Guild of Bay Vi ew v. Burnley, 896 F.2d 985, 988 (6th Cir. 1989) 

(Section 4{f) is appli cable only to federal projects, and not 

state projec ts) ;~ also Quince Orchard Valley Ci tiz ens Ass'n v. 

Hodel , 8 7 2 F .2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1 989) ( assuming, bu t not 

deciding, tha t Section 4(f) does not apply to a project that has 

received only f e deral planning funds); cf., Citizens to Preserve 

Overton Park v . Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411 (1971) (The language of 

Section 4(f) " is a plain and explicit bar to the use of federal 

funds f or constructio n of highways through parks--only the most 

unusual situations are exempted."). Here, the district court 

properly explained that section 4(f) does not apply because it 

"bars the use of fede ral funds to finance construction of highways 

through parks, without all possibl e planning to minimize harm to 

the park." Memorandum Opini o n and Order at 13 , June 9, 1987 

(emphasis in origina~) . 

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2. Executive Order 11990 

Plaintiffs also argue that defendants have fai led to comply 

with the requirements of Executive Order 11990. Specifically, 

appellants mainta i n that the defendants' action fall within the 

coverage of Section l(a){3) of Executive Order 11990. That 

section provides as follows: 

(a) Each agency shall provide leadership and s hall take 

action to minimize the destruc tion, loss or degradation 

of wetlands, and to preserve and enhance the natural and 

beneficial values of wetlands in carrying out the 

agency 's responsibilities for ... (3) conduct ing 

Federal activities and programs affecting land use, 

includi ng but not limited to water and related land 

resource planning, regula ting , and licensing activities. 

Executive Order 11990, 42 Fed. Reg . 26961 (May 24, 1977 ) (emphasis 

added). The district court held t hat the order was inapplicable 

to the chal lenged a ctions because there had not been ''any 

s ign ificant federal participation in the river crossings project." 

Memorandum Opinion and Order at 12, (June 9, 1987 ). 

We agree with the district court that Section l(a)(3) of 

Executive Order 11990 does not apply in this case. Plaintiffs 

argue that the preparation of the EIS constituted " land resource 

planning." While that may be true , Executive Order 11990 only 

imposes obligations upon an executive agency in carr ying out i ts 

responsibilities for land use planning . Giving that term its 

normal usage, 7 the federal defendan ts were not " responsible" for 

the land use planning here at issue because they did not have any 

7 A "responsibility" is defined as "the state or fact of being 

••• answer able or accountable, as for something within one's 

power or control . " Random House College Dictionary, 1125 (1980). 

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ability to exercise control· over the project unless the state 

elected to seek federal funding for the project. Because the 

state declined to seek such funding, it was free to reject 

whatever federal location advice was offered in c o nnection with 

the preparation of the EIS. Thus , the district court correctly 

concluded that the defendants' limited involvement in this project 

is insufficient federal action to trigger the requirements of 

Executive Order 11990. 

CONCLUSIONS 

For the foregoing reasons , we AFFIRM the decision of the 

district court in all respects. 

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