Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_02-cv-00629/USCOURTS-alsd-1_02-cv-00629-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

MELVIN DAVIS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-0629-CB-M

COCA-COLA BOTTLING CO.

CONSOLIDATED, 

Defendant.

ORDER

Following the granting of summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims except those of certain of

plaintiffs’ claims, the court ordered the parties to rebrief the summary judgment arguments on plaintiff’s

hostile work environment claims. The parties had previously briefed the defendant’s summary judgment

motion as to plaintiffs’ hostile work environment claims. In addition, defendant seeks reconsideration of

the denial of its motion to dismiss certain of plaintiffs’ §1981 promotion claims on the basis of the statute

of limitations. Upon consideration, the court grants reconsideration and dismisses plaintiffs’ promotion

claims as untimely. The court also grants summary judgment in favor of the defendant on plaintiffs’

remaining claims.

Reconsideration of Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs do not contest defendant’s assertion that all of the promotion claims raised by plaintiffs

involve a promotion froma unionpositionunder a collective bargaining agreement to a managerial position

which was not subject to collective bargaining. As noted by defendants, such a promotion would, of

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 To the extent plaintiffs seek to include additional promotion decisions not identified in the

complaint, those additional claims are not properly brought in this action. See Coon v. Georgia

Pacific Corp., 829 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1987).

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necessity, involve a different contract and create a separate contractual relationship between the parties.

Such promotions were actionable under §1981 prior to its amendment in 1991. See e.g. Patterson v.

McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 185 (1989). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims arising from such

promotions pursuant to §1981 are subject to the borrowed state-law statute of limitations. See Jones v.

R.R.Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) (four-year federal limitations statute applies to claims

under §1981 which could not have been brought prior to its amendment). In Alabama, the applicable

period istwo years. As all of the challenged promotions1took place more thantwo years priorto the filing

of this action, all of those claims are due to be dismissed.

Summary Judgment Standard

“[T]he purpose of Rule 56 is to enable a party who believes there is no genuine dispute as to a

specific essential fact to demand at least one sworn averment of that fact before the lengthy process of

litigation continues.” Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990). The court’s

analysis ends “where there is no genuine issue of material fact and where the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt Miller, 957

F.2d 1575, 1578 (11thCir.1992). Summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmovant “fails to make

a showing sufficient to establishthe existence of anelement essentialto that party's case, and onwhichthat

party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

A dispute of material fact “is ‘genuine’... ifthe evidence issuchthat a reasonable jurycould return

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a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Factual

disputesthat are irrelevant or unnecessarywill not be counted.” United States v. Gilbert, 920 F.2d 878,

883 (11th Cir.1991) (citation omitted). The nonmovant “must present affirmative evidence in order to

defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 257. Mere

conclusory statements or reliance on the pleadings are insufficient. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

Inassessing whetherthe movant is entitled to summaryjudgment initsfavor, the Court mustreview

the evidence and allreasonable factualinferencesarisingfromit inthe light mostfavorable to the nonmoving

party. Welch v. Celotex Corp., 951 F.2d 1235, 1237 (11thCir.1992). The Court must avoid weighing

conflicting evidence or making credibility determinations, Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255.

 [A]lthough the courtshould review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence

favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. That is, the court

should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that “evidence

supporting the moving partythat is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent

that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.” 

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000) (citations omitted).

Hostile Work Environment

The court previously granted summary judgment on all claims except those for hostile work

environment. Doc. 95. Thereafter, the court reconsidered its dismissal of plaintiffs’ §1981 claims on the

basis of the borrowed two-year statute of limitations, but has again dismissed those claims hereinabove.

The court had rejected plaintiff’s attempt to lump all of the harassing conduct together rather than

addressing specific events in relation to each plaintiff’s individual claims. The court ordered plaintiffs to

supplement their submissions to correct that problem. 

Specifically, the courtstated “[p]laintiffs failto addresstheirindividualclaims ofharassment, instead

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 Among the harassing events cited by plaintiffs is the fact that, in his deposition, another

employee, Kane, admitted to using the term ‘nigger.’

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 Plaintiffs assert in their response that the comments were made over the space of twenty-six

years.

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relying on a general list of events and apparently arguing [erroneously] that all of those events support the

claims of allplaintiffs equally.” The order allowed plaintiffs an opportunity to correct that problem. Rather

thanoffer evidence astothe conduct whichaffected eachplaintiff, their supplementalresponse again simply

lists all of the racial slurs of which any plaintiff was aware or which were identified in discovery.2 They

failed to comply with the court’s order, and failed to bear their burden in responding to a motion for

summaryjudgment, instead resubmitting anundifferentiatedlaundrylistofracialslursthatallegedly occurred

at the defendant’s plant. There does not appear to be much, if any, difference between the supplement and

the original response. The information provided does not identifywhenthe comments were made,3 which

ofthe plaintiffs knew ofwhichcomments and how they learned of them, or how theywere affected. Such

information is necessary to establish that the harassment was sufficiently severe to alter the terms and

conditions of eachplaintiff’sjob. See Edwards v. Wallace Comm. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995).

The court will not comb the voluminous record in this case to do the job of plaintiffs’ counsel,

collecting and organizing the necessary information from the record presented, particularly after giving

plaintiffs an additional opportunity for that verypurpose. “The trial court no longer has the duty to search

the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.” Matsushita Electronic

Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); see 11 Moore’s Federal Practice,

§56.13[4] (“The party opposing summary judgment has an affirmative dutyto direct the court’s attention

to those specific portions ofthe record onwhich the party relies to crete a genuine issue ofmaterialfact.”).

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Fromthe minimal information provided concerning the discrete racial slurs, it does not appear that any of

the plaintiffs has offered evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the terms and conditions of his or her job

was affected by those harassing actions. 

Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to their

claims to have suffered a racially hostile work environment. The court need not address the

appropriateness of entry of summary judgment as a sanction for failure to comply with the court’s order

of supplementation. The court will grant summary judgment on those claims brought under Title VII and

§1981.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED 

1) that defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED;

2) that the court RECONSIDERS its prior order vacating the dismissal of plaintiffs’ §1981 claims; and

3) that allremaining claims brought by plaintiffs are DISMISSED with prejudice. Aseparate judgment

shall issue.

DONE this the 26th day of April, 2005.

s/Charles R. Butler, Jr. 

Senior United States District Judge

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