Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01593/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01593-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEROME BLANE SEPHERS, 

Plaintiff,

v.

ERIC DIAS # 13890;

RICHARD WHEATON # 142941,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-1593 SI (pr)

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT 

INTRODUCTION

This case is now before the court for consideration of defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted and judgment will be

entered in defendants’ favor.

BACKGROUND

This action concerns the amount of force used when defendants arrested Jerome Blane

Sephers. The following facts are undisputed except as otherwise noted.

 On March 14, 2005, Eric Dias and Richard Wheaton were police officers in the Menlo

Park police department. Jerome Blane Sephers lived in Menlo Park in a room he rented from

Doris Backey. 

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At about 12:30 a.m. on March 14, 2005, the homeowner’s son, Reginald Backey, made

a 9-1-1 call to police and reported that Sephers had challenged him to a fight. Backey told police

he wanted Sephers out of the home and that Sephers had been drinking. Officer Wheaton and

other officers responded to the call and asked Sephers to leave for the night. The officers

discovered that Sephers had a suspended driver's license and advised him not to drive his vehicle

that was parked in the driveway. Sephers agreed to leave for the night and surrendered the keys

to his vehicle. While responding to the call, officer Wheaton also learned that Sephers was a

registered sex offender (having been convicted of rape by force).

Within an hour, at about 1:30 a.m., Reginald Backey again called 9-1-1 and reported that

Sephers was back at the home and causing a disturbance. Officer Dias was the first officer to

respond to this second call. Officer Dias saw Sephers walking on the street and went to

investigate the situation, pulling his car up near Sephers as Sephers was finishing a cell phone

conversation. Sephers initially told officer Dias that he did not want any problems and wanted

his car keys. Sephers then became agitated and put his right hand in his waistband area, which

officer Dias thought might mean he had a weapon. Officer Dias told Sephers to remove his hand

from his waistband, but Sephers refused. Instead, Sephers made a move toward officer Dias.

Officer Dias unholstered his weapon and ordered Sephers to put his hands in the air. Sephers

refused to comply and abruptly ran away. Officer Dias ordered him to stop, but Sephers refused.

Officer Dias put out a radio call for emergency officer assistance and chased after Sephers.

Sephers discarded a tissue with crack cocaine in it as he ran from officer Dias.

Sephers eventually ran into a dead-end corner of a churchyard. He turned around and

started coming back toward officer Dias while screaming and yelling, becoming increasingly

agitated. He puffed out his chest and raised his hands as if to start a fist fight. Officer Dias

ordered Sephers to get on the ground, but Sephers refused and instead advanced toward officer

Dias, who then pulled out his baton for defense. 

Meanwhile, officer Wheaton arrived in response to the officer assistance call. Officer

Wheaton came into the churchyard and saw that Sephers was advancing toward officer Dias in

what appeared to be a threatening and dangerous manner. Officer Wheaton ran up to Sephers

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from behind and tackled him. Once Sephers was on the ground, the officers handcuffed him.

At the time he saw Sephers confronting officer Dias, officer Wheaton was already familiar with

Sephers from the first 9-1-1 call. 

The parties disagree as to exactly happened starting at the point where Sephers was

tackled. Sephers stated in his verified complaint that Wheaton “stumped” him with his boots

several times when he tackled Sephers. Sephers also stated that Wheaton twisted and turned his

arms “as hard as he could” when subduing him, and that both officers dragged him for an

unspecified distance. Complaint, p. 3. Both officers stated that they used the least amount of

force necessary to get Sephers’ hands controlled and into handcuffs after he was tackled and

both deny they stomped on or dragged Sephers by his arms. Both officers thought there was a

real risk of danger to them from Sephers when they subdued him. 

Sephers claims that he is pain from the injuries he suffered during the arrest. He

submitted medical records showing that he had pain and problems with his right shoulder in the

months following the incident. His medical records also show that when he was evaluated on

the day of his arrest, the nurse evaluating him wrote that Sephers told her that he had left

shoulder problems and was already taking Vicodin and Motrin. See Flegel Decl., Exh. C. 

VENUE AND JURISDICTION

Venue is proper in the Northern District of California because the events or omissions

giving rise to the claims occurred in San Mateo County, which is located within the Northern

District. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 1391(b). This court has federal question jurisdiction over this

action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that

there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and [that] the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A court will grant summary judgment

“against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

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essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . .

since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23

(1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law, and

a dispute about such a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). 

Generally, as is the situation with defendants' challenge to the Fourth Amendment claim,

the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record which

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden then shifts to the

nonmoving party to "go beyond the pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or by the 'depositions,

answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted).

Where, as is the situation with defendants' qualified immunity defense, the moving party

bears the burden of proof at trial, he must come forward with evidence which would entitle him

to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. See Houghton v. Smith, 965

F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). He must establish the absence of a genuine issue of fact on

each issue material to his affirmative defense. Id. at 1537; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. When the defendant-movant has come forward with this evidence, the

burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine

issue of fact on the defense.

A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it

is based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See

Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating plaintiff's

verified complaint as opposing affidavit where, even though verification not in conformity with

28 U.S.C. § 1746, plaintiff stated under penalty of perjury that contents were true and correct,

and allegations were not based purely on his belief but on his personal knowledge). Sephers'

verified complaint is considered in opposition to the motion for summary judgment even though

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he did not file a declaration with his opposition brief. 

The court's function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W.

Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and inferences to be drawn

from the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 631.

DISCUSSION

A. Excessive Force Claim

A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force in the course of an arrest or

other seizure is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. See Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). "Determining whether the force used to effect a

particular seizure is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of

'"the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests"' against

the countervailing governmental interests at stake." Id. at 396 (citations omitted). Because the

reasonableness standard is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application, "its

proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular

case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat

to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to

evade arrest by flight." Id. The reasonableness inquiry in excessive force cases is an objective

one, the question being whether the officer's actions are objectively reasonable in light of the

facts and circumstances confronting him, without regard to his underlying intent or motivation

and without the "20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. at 396-97. "Gratuitous and completely

unnecessary acts of violence by the police during a seizure violate the Fourth Amendment." 

Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2001) (physical and verbal sexual harassment

of an arrestee violates the Fourth Amendment); Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir.

1994) ("no particularized case law is necessary for a deputy to know that excessive force has

been used when a deputy sics a canine on a handcuffed arrestee who has fully surrendered and

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is completely under control").

The force used here was not unreasonable as a matter of law. Although the severity of

the crime that officer Dias was responding to was not great (i.e., the 9-1-1 call was that Sephers

was causing a disturbance at the Backey home), it was the second call of the night about Sephers

causing a problem at the home and the circumstances worsened once officer Dias arrived and

attempted to deal with Sephers. Just as a routine traffic stop can escalate into a much more

dangerous situation, so too can a call about a late night disturbance at a residence. Before any

force was used on Sephers, more serious circumstances developed. The undisputed facts are that

Sephers failed to comply with officer Dias’ commands to remove his hand from his waistband

area when he was first encountered, Sephers ran away from officer Dias, Sephers refused

commands to stop running and to get on the ground, Sephers did not put his hands in the air once

he reached the dead-end, and Sephers advanced toward officer Dias in a physically threatening

manner. The undisputed facts also are that the officers perceived Sephers to pose an immediate

danger to them. Their perceptions were not at all unreasonable, as they were dealing with

someone who had fled, had refused repeated police commands, made movements that suggested

he had a weapon and moved toward officer Dias in a way that suggested he was about to attack

officer Dias. Additionally, at least officer Wheaton knew Sephers had a criminal history, knew

that Sephers had been drinking alcohol earlier on the night of the incident, and knew that

Sephers had failed to abide the directions an hour earlier to leave the home for the evening after

the first visit by the police. The need to use force to effect the seizure of the apparently

dangerous Sephers was a reasonable one. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Sephers as the non-moving party, the

amount of force used cannot be said to have been excessive under the circumstances, even if

Sephers was kicked during the tackling and his arms twisted forcefully as he was handcuffed.

Sephers suggests that he was tackled too aggressively, but the evidence does not support a

reasonable inference that the force used on him was excessive. He may have been blind-sided

by officer Wheaton’s tackle, but at the time Sephers posed a threat to officer Dias. Officer

Wheaton had no duty to inform Sephers of the impending tackle. Sephers also has not raised

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a triable issue of fact that the force used by the officers was any more than that needed to get a

resisting arrestee into handcuffs. Cf. Johnson v. Woodard, 340 F.3d 787, 792-93 (9th Cir. 2003)

(deputy’s pulling and twisting of armed bank robbery suspect to extract him from the back seat

of his car and take him into custody following a high-speed car chase and crash was objectively

reasonable as a matter of law); Saman v. Robbins, 173 F.3d 1150, 1155-57 (9th Cir. 1999)

(officer's split-second judgment to administer a single kick to subdue plaintiff in tense, uncertain

and dangerous situation in which one officer had already been shot was objectively reasonable

as a matter of law); Mendoza, 27 F.3d at 1362-63 (use of a police dog resulting in several bites

to secure robbery suspect who was believed to be armed was objectively reasonable under the

circumstances). Sephers’ contention that he was dragged by his arms does not raise a triable

issue that the force was excessive, as he does not state the distance he was dragged so that it

cannot be inferred that it was anything more than being lifted up by handcuffed arms to be taken

to the police car. The police are not required to use the least intrusive degree of force possible;

they are required only to act within a reasonable range of conduct. No reasonable jury could

find that their conduct was not within that reasonable range under the circumstances. 

Sephers’ medical documents do not show any evidence of him being stomped or dragged

– he had only a shoulder injury and only to one of his shoulders. The fact that Sephers suffered

a shoulder injury does not mean that either defendant acted improperly, as the tackling event was

a reasonable use of force under the circumstances, as was the force used to get him into

handcuffs once he was on the ground. 

Sephers would parse the arrest into little pieces and examine the need for one kick or

another yank of an arm, as if there was time for leisurely reflection between each physical act

of force as the police subdued him that night. Such an approach would be inconsistent with the

Supreme Court's direction that the force must be analyzed making "allowance for the fact that

police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments--in circumstances that are tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving--about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular

situation." Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. 

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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Sephers, no reasonable jury could

find that defendants applied an excessive amount of force during his arrest. Sephers failed to

establish a triable issue of fact as to whether he was subjected to excessive force by defendants,

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Fourth Amendment claim.

B. Qualified Immunity Defense

The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials . . . from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of qualified immunity "'provides ample protection to all but

the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,

495 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

In the recent case of Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court set forth

a particular sequence of questions to be considered in determining whether qualified immunity

exists. The court must consider this threshold question: "Taken in the light most favorable to

the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a

constitutional right?" Id. at 201. If no constitutional right was violated if the facts were as

alleged, the inquiry ends and defendants prevail. See id. If, however, "a violation could be

made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask

whether the right was clearly established. . . . 'The contours of the right must be sufficiently

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'" Id.

at 201-02 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

The first step under Saucier is to determine whether a constitutional violation was

established. No constitutional violation was established on the record. Because no

constitutional right was violated on the facts taken in the light most favorable to Sephers, the

inquiry ends and defendants prevail. See Johnson, 340 F.3d at 791-94. Defendants are entitled

to judgment as a matter of law on their qualified immunity defense.

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CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. (Docket # 13, # 14.)

Judgment will be entered in defendants' favor and against plaintiff. The clerk will close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February_5, 2007 _____________________

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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