Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06338/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06338-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 “Lodged Doc.” refers to the documents lodged by Respondent with his response.

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN H. CORNEALUS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

ROBERT A. HOREL, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:04-CV-06338 GSA HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO ENTER JUDGMENT

ORDER DECLINING ISSUANCE OF

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The parties having voluntarily consented to exercise of Magistrate

Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), by order dated March 3, 2005, this case was

assigned to the Magistrate Judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, following his conviction by jury

trial on May 25, 2000, of four counts of residential robbery in violation of California Penal Code

§ 211, and one count of first degree burglary in violation of California Penal Code § 459. See

Lodged Doc. No. 13. In addition, Petitioner was found guilty of the enhancement charged for 1

personally using a firearm during commission of the offenses in violation of California Penal Code

Case 1:04-cv-06338-GSA Document 28 Filed 10/26/07 Page 1 of 13
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28 The facts are derived from the factual summary of the case as set forth by the 5 DCA in its opinion of October

2 th

18, 2002.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

§§ 12022.5(a)(1), 12022.53(b). Id. Petitioner admitted allegations that he had previously suffered a

prior serious felony conviction and served a prior prison term within the meaning of California Penal

Code §§ 667(a)(1), 667(b)-(i). Id. On August 22, 2000, Petitioner was sentenced to serve a total

determinate term of twenty-eight years in state prison. Id. 

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District

(hereinafter “Fifth DCA”). On October 18, 2002, the Fifth DCA affirmed the judgment. See Lodged

Doc. No. 3. Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, and the

petition was summarily denied on January 15, 2003. See Lodged Doc. No. 5.

Petitioner next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fresno County Superior Court,

which was denied on May 29, 2003. See Lodged Docs. Nos. 6, 7. He then filed a habeas petition in

the Fifth DCA, and that petition was denied on October 30, 2003. See Lodged Docs. Nos. 8, 9. He

then filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on August 11, 2004.

See Lodged Docs. Nos. 10, 11.

On September 30, 2004, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition in this Court. The petition

presents the following six (6) grounds for relief: (1) Petitioner alleges he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel for defense counsel’s insistence that Petitioner enter into a plea bargain; (2)

Petitioner contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to

investigate or call a witness to testify; (3) Petitioner alleges he was denied his right to substitute

counsel; (4) Petitioner claims he was denied his right to confront a witness; (5) Petitioner alleges he

was denied his right to introduce expert witness testimony; (6) Petitioner contends the trial court

committed reversible error in instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.71.5. 

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on March 3, 2005. Respondent concedes the

petition is exhausted. On April 11, 2005, Petitioner filed a traverse.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

On the evening of June 3, 1999, Roosevelt Maldonado (“Maldonado”), Jamie Barracio

(“Barracio”), Manuel Almanzar (“Almanzar”), Connie Garza (“Garza”), and three-year-old Andrew

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 3

were in Maldonado’s Fresno apartment when a man waving a gun walked in, picked up Andrew, told

everyone to get on the ground, and demanded money. Garza grabbed Andrew from the man and the

group fell to the floor as another man entered the room and joined in the robbery. Almanzar and

Garza heard one intruder call the other “June.” One of the men also ordered the other to shoot if

anyone moved. The two men left the apartment within five minutes, taking cash, a shirt, three

telephones, a pager, and a rifle.

Garza positively identified Petitioner in a photo line-up, a live line-up, at the preliminary

hearing, and at trial as the man with the gun referred to by the other as “June.” She specifically

remembered he came to the apartment the day before the robbery looking for marijuana. A neighbor

also identified Petitioner running from the apartment complex with a rifle after the robbery. 

State Officer Ronald Hill visited Petitioner before trial and saw him respond to the name

“June.” District Attorney Investigator Greg Noll interviewed an individual in custody who also

referred to Petitioner as “June.”

See Lodged Doc. No. 3.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Fresno County Superior Court,

which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly,

the Court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. th th

denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 4

(holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was

filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70

(2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court

must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time

of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other words, 'clearly

established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by

the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. 

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 5

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states,

Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court

decision is objectively unreasonable. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th

Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537

U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003). 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ground One

In his first ground for relief, Petitioner claims he was denied the effective assistance of

counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment when defense counsel urged Petitioner to accept a

negotiated plea. Petitioner claims counsel felt sorry for the victim in this case and therefore urged

him not to subject the victim to a trial.

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for the

purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v. Roe, 151

F.3d 1226, 1229 (9 Cir. 1998.) In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance

th

of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9 Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner must

th

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 6

show that counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel made errors so

serious that he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that were

not the result of reasonable professional judgment considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United

States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9 Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's th

performance is highly deferential. A court indulges a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9 Cir.1994). th

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ... would have been different," 466 U.S., at 694. Petitioner

must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, one whose

result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court must evaluate whether the entire trial was

fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78

F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1356, 1461 (9 Cir. 1994). th

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining

the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S.

668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2074 (1984). Since the defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice, any

deficiency that does not result in prejudice must necessarily fail. However, there are certain instances

which are legally presumed to result in prejudice, e.g., where there has been an actual or constructive

denial of the assistance of counsel or where the State has interfered with counsel’s assistance. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S., at 659, and n. 25, 104 S.Ct., at

2046-2047, and n. 25 (1984). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the

“unreasonable application” prong of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Weighall v. Middle,

215 F.3d 1058, 1062 (2000). 

In this case, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from counsel’s

actions. Petitioner did not accept the negotiated plea; rather, he pleaded not guilty and proceeded to

trial. Because he cannot establish any prejudice, the claim must be denied.

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“RT” refers to the Reporter’s Transcript lodged with the Court. 3

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 7

B. Ground Two

Officer Ronald Hill testified he had heard Petitioner answer to his sister when she called him

by the nickname “June” on previous occasions. (RT 1156.) Defense counsel objected on hearsay 3

grounds and moved to strike, and the trial court initially sustained the objection. (RT 1156-1157.)

When the prosecutor commented on the objection, the trial court reserved its ruling based in part on

the fact that the sister’s statement was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Petitioner

contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel for defense counsel’s failure to investigate

and call the sister, “Schnell Tenison,” as a witness to rebut the testimony of Officer Hill. 

As set forth above, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must

show that counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel made errors so

serious that he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that

where not the result of reasonable professional judgment considering the circumstances. Id. at 688.

In addition, Petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result ... would have been different," 466 U.S., at 694. 

This claim was first presented in a habeas petition to the Fresno County Superior Court. On

May 29, 2003, the superior court denied the claim in a reasoned opinion. See Lodged Doc. No. 7. 

Petitioner then presented the claim in petitions to the Fifth DCA and California Supreme Court were

it was summarily denied without comment. The California Supreme Court, by its “silent order”

denying review of the decision, is presumed to have denied the claims presented for the same reasons

stated in the opinion of the superior court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). 

In this case, Petitioner has failed to show counsel erred. First as Respondent points out,

counsel did investigate Schynell Tenison as she had been subpoenaed by the defense as a possible

witness. (RT 209-210.) Second, counsel did not err in failing to call her as a defense witness. Officer

Hill’s statement was not offered to show Petitioner’s name was in fact “June.” The statement was

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“CT” refers to the Clerk’s Transcript lodged with the Court. 4

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 8

offered to show that Petitioner had responded to the nickname in the past. 

Furthermore, Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice resulting from counsel’s alleged error.

Even if counsel had called Tenison to the stand ostensibly to testify that she did not call Petitioner by

the name “June,” there was substantial evidence admitted otherwise which showed Petitioner did go

by the nickname “June.” Petitioner’s accomplice, Derrell Jones, admitted to Investigator Greg Noll

that Petitioner went by the nickname “June.” (RT 1203.) The victim Garza positively identified

Petitioner as the man referred to as “June” during the robbery. (RT 342.) In addition as noted by

Respondent, on several occasions prior to and during trial Garza positively identified Petitioner as

the man called “June” who committed the robbery: 1) She identified Petitioner at trial as the man

who picked up her son and committed the robbery (RT 335); 2) She recognized him from the day

before the robbery when Petitioner approached her house, contacted her, and asked her for marijuana

(RT 336); 3) She testified that she heard Petitioner’s accomplice call Petitioner by the name “June”

during the robbery (RT 342); 4) She identified Petitioner several times in a book of approximately

2,500 mug shots (RT 349-351, 1127); 5) She identified Petitioner at a live line-up (RT 349-351); and

6) She identified Petitioner from a photo line-up within 10 to 15 seconds of viewing it (RT 1123-

1124). 

In light of the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s identity as the man called “June” who

committed the robbery, there is no probability that, but for counsel's alleged error, the result would

have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Therefore, it cannot be said that the state court

rejection of this claim was unreasonable. The claim must be rejected.

C. Ground Three

Petitioner next alleges he was denied effective assistance of counsel when the trial court

improperly ruled on Petitioner’s motion for substitution of counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden, 2

Cal.3d 118 (1970.) 

On March 2, 2000, a trial readiness conference was held before Honorable W. Kent Levis,

and all parties appeared. (CT 101.) The minute order and transcript of the proceedings show a 4

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“ART” refers to the Augmented Reporter’s Transcript lodged with the Court. 5

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 9

Marsden motion was reserved for trial at Petitioner’s request, and trial was scheduled to begin on

March 6, 2000. (CT 101; ART 5.) Thereafter, the trial date was repeatedly continued until trial 5

commenced on May 12, 2000, before Honorable Jane York. (RT 205.) From the time Petitioner

requested his motion be reserved until trial actually commenced, Petitioner did not file a written

Marsden motion. From the first day of trial, Petitioner never alerted the court that he was dissatisfied

with defense counsel and desired new counsel. Therefore, Petitioner cannot now complain the trial

court improperly ruled on his motion for substitution of counsel when the issue was never presented

to the trial court. The claim is without any factual foundation and must be rejected.

D. Ground Four

In his next claim, Petitioner argues the trial court acted to prevent him from presenting the

criminal history of witness Derrell Jones to the jury. He claims he should have been allowed to

present evidence that Jones was a gang member who had possibly been involved in numerous “take

over” robberies. He argues the trial court denied his right to confront Jones and attack his credibility

on cross-examination. He further contends the evidence would have shown Jones was more likely

the perpetrator of the crimes. Petitioner also argues he was denied exculpatory evidence of Jones’

criminal history by the prosecution in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

 The evidence referred to by Petitioner comes from an investigative report prepared by

Investigator Noll. Prior to Jones’ testimony, the parties discussed his conviction with the trial court.

As noted by Respondent, defense counsel never objected to a general reference to Jones having

sustained a prior felony conviction. (RT 1151-1154, 1188-1189, 1190-1191, 1195-1196.) Therefore,

Petitioner’s claim that the trial court acted to prevent him from presenting Jones’ criminal history is

completely without foundation.

Petitioner’s Brady claim is also factually unsupported. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87

(1963), the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an

accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to

punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." See also Strickler v.

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CALJIC No. 2.71.5 as given to the jury provides:

6

If you should find from the evidence that there was an occasion when the defendant, one, under conditions which

reasonably afforded him an opportunity to reply or failed to make a denial in the face of an accusatory statement

expressed directly to him or in his presence tending to connect him with the commission of a crime, and, three - -

excuse me, and three, that he heard the accusatory statement and understood its nature, then the circumstance of his

silence and conduct on that occasion may be considered against him as indicating an admission that the statement

thus made was true.

Evidence of an accusatory statement is not received for the purpose of proving its truth but only as it supplies

meaning to the silence and conduct of the defendant in the - - excuse me. But only as it supplies meaning to the

silence and conduct of the accused in the case of it. Unless you find that the defendant’s silence and conduct at the

time indicated an admission that the accusatory statement was true, you must entirely disregard the statement.

(RT 1501-1502.)

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 10

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-281 (1999). It is clear from the record that the prosecutor advised defense

counsel prior to the Jones’ testimony of the prior felony conviction.

For the above reasons, Petitioner’s claim is completely meritless and must be rejected.

E. Ground Five

Petitioner next argues the trial court precluded Petitioner from presenting the expert

testimony of psychologist Matthew J. Sharp regarding eyewitness identification. Petitioner’s claim is

belied by the record. Dr. Sharp did in fact testify as a defense witness and specifically addressed the

subject matter of eyewitness identification. (RT 1270 et seq.) The claim is patently without merit.

F. Ground Six

In his final claim for relief, Petitioner argues the trial court erred in instructing the jury with

CALJIC No. 2.71.5 with respect to adoptive admissions. 6

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that the

ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). Additionally, the instruction may not be judged

in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the

trial record. Id. The court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the

jury as a component of the entire trial process. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982),

citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). Furthermore, even if it is determined that the

instruction violated the petitioner’s right to due process, a petitioner can only obtain relief if the

unconstitutional instruction had a substantial influence on the conviction and thereby resulted in

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actual prejudice under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (whether the error had a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.); see also Hanna v.

Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9 Cir. 1996). A jury instruction is constitutionally sound if it creates th

a permissive inference that allows, but does not require, the jury to infer an essential fact from proof

of another fact so long as “the inferred fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on

which it is made to depend.” Schwendeman v. Wallenstein, 971 F.2d 313, 316 (9th Cir.1992)

(citations and internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 975 (1993).

This claim was first presented and denied on direct appeal to the Fifth DCA. In rejecting this

claim, the appellate court stated:

[Petitioner] argues his failure to deny his nickname is “June” when Officer Hill 

visited was not a failure “to make a denial in the face of an accusatory statement” permitting

an adoptive admission under CALJIC No. 2.71.4. [Petitioner] notes that being called “June”

is neither an accusation nor a crime.

“‘When a person makes a statement in the presence of a party to an action under

circumstances that would normally call for a response if the statement were untrue, the

statement is admissible for the limited purpose of showing the party’s reaction to it.

[Citations.] His silence, evasion, or equivocation may be considered as a tacit admission of

the statements made in his presence.’” (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1189.) “‘To

warrant admissibility, it is sufficient that the evidence supports a reasonable inference that an

accusatory statement was made under the circumstances affording a fair opportunity to deny

the accusation; whether the defendant’s conduct actually constituted an adoptive admission

becomes a question for the jury to decide.’” (Id. at pp. 1189-1190.) “‘For the adoptive

admission exception to apply, . . . a direct accusation in so many words is not essential.’” (Id.

at p. 1189.) 

Sufficient foundation existed for the trial court to permit the jury to consider, as an

adoptive admission, testimony that [Petitioner] responded to the name “June.” While calling

[Petitioner] “June” was not a direct accusation of criminal activity, his response permitted the

jury to infer that [Petitioner] and the perpetrator of the crimes shared the same name and were

possibly the same individual. Contrary to [Petitioner’s] belief, the jury was not told to view

[Petitioner’s] response to the name “June” as an admission of guilt. The instruction did not

refer to any particular evidence or cause the jury to infer [Petitioner] committed the crimes

simply because he responded to the name. Instead, the trial court defined adoptive admissions

generally and instructed the jurors to disregard any untrue accusatory statement. (See People

v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 891.)

Even assuming arguendo that [Petitioner’s] response to the name “June” did not fall

within the adoptive admission exception to the hearsay rule, the trial court’s instruction to the

jury with CALJIC No. 2.71.5 was harmless. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386, 18, 24.)

Overwhelming evidence pointed to [Petitioner] as the perpetrator of the crimes; Garza

positively identified [Petitioner] as one of the intruders, and a neighbor saw [Petitioner]

fleeing the apartment complex with a rifle. Moreover, the adoptive admission instruction

provided: “Unless you find that the defendant’s silence and conduct at the time indicated an

admission that the accusatory statement was true, you must entirely disregard the statement.”

Therefore, the jury would have discounted [Petitioner’s] response to the name “June” if it

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were not an accusatory statement. To the extent there was an insufficient evidentiary basis for

instructing with CALJIC No. 2.71.5, its substantive provisions had not effect.

See Lodged Doc. No. 3.

The court concluded the instruction was a correct statement of law and properly applied in

this case. Federal courts are bound by state court rulings on questions of state law. Oxborrow v.

Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 942 (1989). Even assuming the

instruction was given in error, Petitioner cannot demonstrate any prejudice resulting therefrom. As

discussed in Ground Two, supra, there was overwhelming evidence that Petitioner went by the

nickname “June” and in fact committed the robbery, apart from Officer Hill’s testimony. As

Petitioner has failed to show the instructions had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, the

state court rejection of this claim was not unreasonable and the claim must be denied.

In sum, the rejections of Petitioner’s several claims by the state courts were neither contrary

to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, nor an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The petition

must be denied.

IV. Certificate of Appealability

A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a

district court’s denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue

a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

 (a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a 

district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court

of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

 (b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the 

validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial 

a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the 

validity of such person’s detention pending removal proceedings.

 (c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an 

appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from–

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State 

court; or

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 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which 

specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

If a court denies a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability

“if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or

that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further.” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at 1034; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). While the

petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate “something more than

the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . part.” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at

1040.

In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s

determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or

deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court hereby DECLINES to issue a

certificate of appealability.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE;

2) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent; and 

3) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 25, 2007 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

60kij8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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