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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-10661

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-24918-JEM

DIANA BERBER, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

WELLS FARGO, NA, 

MARSHA PAINTER, 

 Defendants - Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(January 8, 2020)

Before WILSON, WILLIAM PRYOR, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Diana Berber appeals from the district court’s orders granting summary 

judgment on one count, granting a motion to dismiss on another, and striking a claim 

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for punitive damages from her complaint, in a lawsuit she filed involving allegedly 

fraudulent consumer practices by her former employer, Wells Fargo, NA. On 

appeal, Berber argues that the district court erred in: (1) granting summary judgment 

on her state law retaliation claim, which she brought under the Florida 

Whistleblower Act (“FWA”), Fla. Stat. §§ 448.101-105; and (2) dismissing her 

claim under the “Florida RICO” statute, Fla. Stat. § 772.103, for failure to state a 

claim. Berber also requests that this Court certify a question of statutory 

interpretation to the Florida Supreme Court, relating to the availability of punitive 

damages under the FWA. After thorough review, we affirm the district court’s 

rulings, and reject as moot the certification request.

I.

We review a district court’s decision granting summary judgment de novo. 

Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000). We construe 

all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. If, 

after we do so, no genuine dispute of material fact remains, summary judgment is 

proper. Id.

We also review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Boyd 

v. Warden, Holman Correctional Facility, 856 F.3d 853, 863–64 (11th Cir. 2017). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. 

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007)). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. While we do accept 

plausible allegations as true, we need not do the same for mere legal conclusions; a 

complaint “must include enough facts to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if 

doubtful in fact).” Boyd, 856 F.3d at 864 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

II.

The relevant facts, which are either undisputed or resolved in favor of Berber, 

who is the non-moving party, are these. Diana Berber was hired by Wells Fargo as 

a Personal Banker in Fort Lauderdale, Florida in July 2013. Her employment 

continued until her termination on March 18, 2014. In her termination letter, Wells 

Fargo explained that Berber had not met performance expectations for her position, 

and had not performed what were termed “daily activities to attain sales goals.” 

Two years after her termination, Berber filed this lawsuit in Florida state court 

alleging a violation of the FWA and the Florida RICO statute. Wells Fargo removed 

to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under diversity 

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In between Berber’s termination and initial 

complaint, the federal government’s Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

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(“CFPB”) investigated Wells Fargo for fraudulent sales practices, and Wells Fargo

ultimately reached a settlement with the CFPB. Berber generally claims she was 

fired for refusing to participate in these sales practices, which allegedly included

opening accounts and applying for credit cards on behalf of consumers without their 

action or consent. The district court dismissed Berber’s Florida RICO allegation for 

failure to state a claim, and later granted summary judgment on her FWA retaliation 

claim. This timely appeal follows. 

III.

First, we are unpersuaded by Berber’s argument that the district court erred in 

granting summary judgment on her FWA claim. The FWA provides, in relevant 

part, that “[a]n employer may not take any retaliatory personnel action against an 

employee because the employee has . . . (3) [o]bjected to, or refused to participate 

in, any activity, policy, or practice of the employer which is in violation of a law, 

rule, or regulation.” Fla. Stat. § 448.102. A retaliation claim under the FWA is 

guided by the same analysis as a Title VII federal claim. See, e.g., Sierminski, 216 

F.3d at 950. Accordingly, a plaintiff claiming retaliation under the FWA must

establish a prima facie case by demonstrating: (1) she engaged in a statutorily 

protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action;1 and (3) the two 

are causally related. See Olmsted v. Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457, 1460 (11th Cir. 

1 The adverse employment action prong is not at issue in this case.

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1998). The burden then switches to the defendant to offer a legitimate reason for the 

adverse action; if the defendant can do so, the plaintiff then must prove that the 

proffered reason is “mere pretext” for prohibited, retaliatory conduct. Id.; see also

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).

In the operative complaint, which has been amended four times, Berber claims

she was terminated in violation of the FWA in retaliation for refusing to increase her 

sales figures through the fraudulent opening of accounts for consumers, based on the 

allegations Wells Fargo settled after her termination. However, Berber admits she 

never was personally asked to engage in any fraudulent sales practices or directly 

encouraged to do so; she was not even aware any fraud was taking place at the time. 

She says she was inappropriately judged on her lower sales record against coworkers 

with high sales, whom she “suspected” of engaging in fraud, but offers no support 

for her suspicion that her coworkers in fact engaged in fraudulent practices. 

Berber seems to be arguing that she was indirectly pressured to engage in 

fraud, because the sales goals were so high as to be otherwise unattainable. But she 

admits she was unaware that the sales conduct was potentially illegal, and that she 

never reported any activity to management or outside of the company. Berber also 

admits she never refused a request to engage in fraud. Berber says she “refused to 

participate” in opening accounts for individuals who may not have needed them, but 

admits there was “never an instance” where she was asked to engage in any type of 

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fraudulent activity. Instead, she felt vaguely “pressured to generate sales.” The 

district court granted summary judgment on Berber’s FWA claim, holding that 

Berber failed to demonstrate that she “objected or refused to participate” in any 

illegal activity. We agree. 

A key element for any retaliation claim is to identify precisely the protected 

activity that is being retaliated against. Berber’s claim fails here because there is 

nothing in the record that creates a genuine issue of material fact that Berber ever 

“refused” to do anything. She was never asked to commit fraud, never spoke out 

against any alleged fraud being committed at the company, and, at the time, never 

even knew the practices in question might be illegal. She also did not know fraud 

was being committed by her coworkers, but “suspected” it was. At most, Berber has 

alleged she felt “pressured” to increase her sales goals, but importantly, this pressure 

was never characterized as pressure to commit fraud. It is a momentous leap to claim 

that a failure to respond to general pressure to increase sales somehow transforms 

into an active refusal to commit fraud under the FWA. 

As for Berber’s suggestion that passive inaction is sufficient to qualify as a 

“refusal” or objection under the FWA (or Title VII), we are unpersuaded. Berber 

focuses on the phrase “refused to participate,” claiming she refused to engage in 

fraud to increase sales. However, the word “refuse” (when, as here, it’s used with 

an infinitive, like “to participate”) is defined as: “to show or express a positive 

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unwillingness to do or comply with.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

1910 (2002). Under no interpretation of the facts did Berber express any “positive 

unwillingness” to participate in the alleged fraud. At most, she felt vaguely 

“pressured” to increase her sales, and she did not engage in illegal acts to alleviate 

this pressure. This can hardly be characterized as a “positive unwillingness” to 

engage in fraud, when she did not claim she was being specifically pressured to 

commit fraud in the first place. 

The flaw in Berber’s interpretation is also revealed by the purpose of the 

FWA. The Florida Supreme Court has ruled that the FWA aims to achieve the same 

goal as a similar Florida law regarding public employees: “to encourage the 

elimination of public corruption by protecting public employees who ‘blow the 

whistle.’” Arrow Air v. Walsh, 645 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1994) (quotations 

omitted).

2

 That is, the FWA is aimed at encouraging employees to speak out and 

act when they witness illegality. Standing by and taking no action does not increase

illegal activity, but it also clearly does not “eliminate” it. 

Under both the plain meaning of the word “refuse,” as well as the FWA’s goal 

to encourage the active elimination of illegality, Berber’s argument about passive 

2 Like the private employee provision at issue here, the public employee counterpart tracks the 

language in the FWA as well, protecting employees who “refuse to participate” in activity 

prohibited by the law. Fla Stat. § 112.3187(7). 

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inaction falls flat.

3

 Thus, because Berber has not identified any protected activity 

she took to “object or refuse to participate [in]” against illegal activity, she has failed 

to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FWA. 

But even if Berber had established a prima facie case of retaliation, she has 

failed to rebut Wells Fargo’s proffered legitimate reasons for her termination as 

pretext. Berber appears to argue that because she was unable to meet the sales goals, 

it was impossible to meet the goals without engaging in fraud. However, many other 

legitimate explanations exist: higher effort by her coworkers, more time invested, 

pre-existing relationships with potential customers, or simply an aptitude for sales.

Berber has offered nothing to support the idea that the sales goals were only 

attainable through fraudulent means. Without offering more specificity, Berber has 

not rebutted the proffered reason for her termination: she failed to meet her sales 

goals. 

3 Berber’s cited authority is unpersuasive. In Kearns v. Farmer Acquisition Co., a car salesman 

was terminated after complaining to management that the dealership was not inspecting its cars 

before sale, among other questionable practices. 157 So. 3d 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).

However, we can easily identify the objection the plaintiff took: he repeatedly and explicitly made 

complaints about the illegality of the actions. Id. at 461–62. Thus, that case does not help Berber’s 

argument. Her second citation, Aery v. Wallace Lincoln-Mercury, LLC, is unpersuasive for the 

same reason: the plaintiff there had a sit-down meeting with management to discuss an illicit partswitching scheme. 118 So. 3d 904, 907–08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). Lastly, Berber’s citation 

to United States v. Stein fares no better; Stein stands for the proposition that an affidavit need not 

be disregarded merely because it is self-serving, but rather the self-serving element should be 

weighed alongside the rest of the affidavit by the finder of fact. 881 F.3d 853, 858 (11th Cir. 

2018). Here, we are not weighing evidence at all: even after taking any genuine factual dispute in 

Berber’s favor, she still has not alleged any active refusal or action taken in opposition to illegality.

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Indeed, if anything, the record reveals additional legitimate justifications for 

her firing. For example, Berber was cited for arriving to work late, failing to arrange 

appointments with potential customers, and failing to organize out-of-office events 

to generate sales. When we consider these reasons as a whole (all of which relate to 

sales, the stated reason for her termination), Berber has not shown a genuine dispute 

of material fact indicating that her failure to meet sales goals was a pretext for her 

termination. Because Berber has no proof that fraud was required to meet the bank’s 

demands, and because ample evidence supports a legitimate reason for her 

termination, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim.

We are also unconvinced by Berber’s argument that the district court erred in 

dismissing her claim under Florida’s RICO statute, which alleged that an enterprise 

of Wells Fargo, its parent company, and Berber’s supervisor committed fraud on 

customers, resulting in Berber’s injury through her termination. Florida’s RICO 

statute is largely modeled after the federal version and requires similar elements: (1) 

conduct of (2) an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of criminal activity. Fla. Stat. 

§ 772.103; see also, e.g., Gross v. State, 765 So. 2d 39, 42 (Fla. 2000) (“Given the 

similarity of the state and federal statutes, Florida courts have looked to the federal 

courts for guidance in construing RICO provisions.”); Bortell v. White Mts. Ins. 

Grp., Ltd, 2 So. 3d 1041, 1047 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Like the federal version, 

Florida courts have required a showing of proximate cause between the claimed 

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injury and the predicate criminal act. See Bortell, 2 So. 3d at 1047; see also Holmes 

v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).

Here, the district court dismissed Berber’s argument for failure to state a claim 

-- that is, the failure to plausibly allege proximate cause between her injury 

(termination) and the predicate criminal act (committing fraud on customers). 

While the sometimes-nebulous proximate cause analysis has frustrated courts for 

generations, the facts as pled are beyond any reasonable definition of proximate 

cause.

In Wells Fargo, we explained that for a statutory claim arising under the Fair 

Housing Act, foreseeability of injury alone is not sufficient to satisfy proximate 

cause. Instead, we must also identify “some direct relation between the injury 

asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 

923 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 

137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017)). That is, “while foreseeability ensures ‘cause,’ ‘some 

direct relation’ ensures that the cause is sufficiently ‘proximate.’” Wells Fargo, 923 

F.3d at 1272. We ask if there is “a direct, logical, and identifiable connection 

between the injury sustained and its alleged cause. If there is no discontinuity to call 

into question whether the alleged misconduct led to the injury, proximate cause will 

have been adequately pled.” Id. at 1264. Further, the analysis will “depend[] in 

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part on the ‘nature of the statutory cause of action.’” Id. at 1272 (citing Bank of 

Am., 137 S. Ct. at 1306). 

Specific to RICO, the Supreme Court has long required that there be “some 

direct relation” between the claimed violation and resulting injury. Holmes, 503

U.S. at 268. In Holmes, the Supreme Court explained that “[a]llowing suits by those 

injured only indirectly would open the door to massive and complex damages 

litigation,” so “RICO’s remedial purposes would more probably be hobbled than 

helped” by a relaxed proximate cause standard. Id. at 274. The Supreme Court 

reiterated thisstandard of causation in Anza, a RICO case where the plaintiff claimed 

injury resulting from a competitor failing to charge sales tax. Anza v. Ideal Steel 

Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 453–55 (2006). In Anza, again, the Supreme Court 

concluded that proximate cause was lacking, because the “direct victim” of the 

RICO violation was the state tax collector, not the plaintiff. Id. at 458. The Court 

explained that the cause of the alleged harm (losing business due to a competitor’s 

lower prices) was “entirely distinct from the alleged RICO violation (defrauding the 

State),” and that any connection between the two was “attenuated.” Id. at 458–59. 

Accordingly, our case law is clear: for a RICO claim, the plaintiff must identify 

“some direct relation” between the injury and alleged RICO violation.

Viewing Berber’s allegation in the most generous light possible, she fails to 

state a claim for relief. Berber argues the following chain under Florida RICO: The 

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predicate conduct was that Wells Fargo allegedly committed fraud on its customers 

by opening unrequested accounts in their name. The “enterprise” was between 

Wells Fargo, its parent company, and Berber’s supervisor.4

 The “pattern” was 

ongoing fraud against customers. The “injury” was Berber’s termination and its 

corresponding consequences. 

Even under a generous construction of proximate cause, Berber’s injury was 

disconnected from the alleged conduct against Wells Fargo customers. At best, 

Berber’s termination was an unrelated consequence many steps down the causal 

chain. Compare her claim to the facts in Wells Fargo. There, the casual chain was 

easy to identify: Redlining leads to higher foreclosures. Higher foreclosures lead to 

less tax revenue. Or, compare to Anza: A company fails to pay enough taxes, letting 

them sell their own products for less, leading to a competitor’s loss of revenue. 547 

U.S. at 453–55. That causal chain was far simpler than Berber’s, and even there the 

Supreme Court found it insufficient. Here, Berber says that as a side effect of the 

fraud on customers, she was fired for not similarly committing fraud. This is, at 

best, a tenuous causal chain, and her own actions relating to coming into work late 

4 The district court noted that an “enterprise” likely does not exist between Berber’s supervisor, 

Wells Fargo N.A. (subsidiary), and Wells Fargo & Company (parent). The definition of 

“enterprise” under both federal and Florida RICO is a hotly disputed area of law among the federal 

circuits. Since Berber’s claim fails on other grounds, we need not address this issue. See United 

States v. Goldin Indus., 219 F.3d 1271, 1276 n.7 (11th Cir. 2000) (declining to rule on whether a 

parent/subsidiary relationship qualifies as an enterprise).

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and failing to conduct sales events likely sever whatever thin connection might have 

existed.

Berber argues that Wells Fargo somehow lowers the bar to find proximate 

cause. We are unpersuaded: the Supreme Court required us to increase our scrutiny 

of proximate cause by analyzing not only foreseeability, but also whether there was 

“some direct relation.” See Wells Fargo, 923 F.3d at 1264 (“The [Supreme] Court 

held that the standard that this panel had applied -- foreseeability -- was not enough 

on its own to demonstrate proximate cause.”). Further, RICO claims have long 

required “some direct relation” between the injury and alleged RICO violation. See 

Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268. Berber’s claim fails because allegedly defrauding banking 

customers neither foreseeably leads to firing an employee, nor does it have any direct 

relation. Despite its ever-expanding scope, RICO was never intended to allow for 

sprawling civil causes of action. The Supreme Court in Anza expressly said there 

was “no need to broaden the universe of actionable harms to permit RICO suits by 

parties who have been injured only indirectly.” 547 U.S. at 460. Creative utilization 

of RICO notwithstanding, under no interpretation could we envision the intent of the 

law to allow for liability under Berber’s remote casual chain.5

 Accordingly, even 

5 Berber’s other authority is also unhelpful. In Burgese v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, 

Inc., a district court case in the Third Circuit, hotel staff had been involved in a prostitution scheme, 

and the plaintiff brought a RICO claim after being assaulted by prostitutes in the hotel lobby. 101 

F. Supp. 3d 414, 418 (D.N.J. 2015). Regardless of the accuracy of the proximate cause analysis 

in that case, Berber’s causal chain is far less direct than the resulting injury there. Id. at 426. 

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under a generous pleading standard, Berber has failed to plead a plausible claim 

under RICO. We again must affirm.

Last, Berber asks us to certify a question about the availability of punitive 

damages under the FWA to the Florida Supreme Court. Since we’ve rejected 

Berber’s FWA retaliation claim, we deny this request as moot. But even if we had 

ruled otherwise, we would still deny the request. Certification to a state supreme 

court is warranted when “substantial doubt exists about the answer to a material state 

law question.” Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 746 F.3d 1008, 1039

(11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). As the district court explained, the answer here 

is clear: The FWA explicitly outlines the types of relief available, and punitive 

damages did not make the list. See, e.g., Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 314 F. 

Supp. 2d 1194, 1197 (M.D. Fla. 2004); Hanna v. WCI Cmtys., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 

1332, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2004).

6

Berber also offers K.T. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 931 F.3d 1041 (11th Cir. 2019). But 

K.T. was not a RICO case, and the Court found proximate cause when a cruise ship breached its 

duty to guard an underage, intoxicated passenger from going to a cabin with a group of men. 

Again, the causal chain there (overserving and failing to protect an underage passenger) was at 

least somewhat related to the resulting injury (sexual assault). Those facts are distinct from 

Berber’s. 

6 Berber cannot claim that punitive damages were intended to be included as a residual catchall, 

because the statute already contains one, allowing “[a]ny other compensatory damages allowable 

at law.” Fla. Stat. § 448.103 (emphasis added). 

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AFFIRMED.

7

7 In addition, we DENY Berber’s motion to take judicial notice of the Wells Fargo settlement as 

irrelevant, because even if we assume Wells Fargo settled claims of fraud, our evaluation of 

Berber’s claims does not change.

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