Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02522/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02522-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHUKWUMA E. AZUBUKO,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11 CV 2522 MMA (BLM)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

[Doc. No. 8]

vs.

ROBERT F. CHAPSKI; CYNTHIA M.

GARRATY,

Defendants.

Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s

November 16, 2011 Order denying his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismissing his

complaint with prejudice [Doc. No. 3]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.

BACKGROUND

On October 28, 2011, Plaintiff Chukwuma E. Azubuko, proceeding pro se, initiated this

action by filing a complaint against Defendants Robert F. Chapski and Cynthia M. Garraty. [Doc.

No. 1.] Plaintiff contemporaneously filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 

[Doc. No. 2.] On November 16, 2011, the Court issued an order denying Plaintiff’s motion to

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proceed IFP, dismissing the complaint as frivolous, and finding that the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims and venue is improper in the Southern District of California. 

[Doc. No. 3.] On January 4, 2012, Plaintiff filed the pending motion for reconsideration under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for reconsideration where one

or more of the following is shown: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2)

newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered before the

court’s decision; (3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) voiding of the judgment; (5) satisfaction of the

judgment; (6) any other reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); School Dist. 1J v. A Cand S

Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff moves for reconsideration under “Rule

60(b)(4)(6).” [Doc. No. 8, p.4.]

With respect to subparagraph (4), “[t]he Ninth Circuit has consistently held that a final

judgment is void for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) only if the court that considered it lacked

jurisdiction, either as to the subject matter of the dispute or over the parties to be bound, or acted

in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” Jimena v. UBS AG Bank, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 68560 *24 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2011) (citing In re Sasson, 424 F.3d 864, 876 (9th Cir.

2005) (quoting United States v. Berke, 170 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1999)). “A judgment is not

void within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(4) merely because it is erroneous.” Id. (citing In re Sasson,

424 F.3d at 875). Under subparagraph (6), Plaintiff must show that there are extraordinary

grounds justifying relief; mere dissatisfaction with the court’s order or belief that the court is

wrong in its decision are not adequate grounds for relief. Twentieth Century -- Fox Film Corp. v.

Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981).

DISCUSSION

I. RECONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF’S IFP STATUS IS NOT WARRANTED

Plaintiff first urges the Court to reconsider its denial of his motion to proceed IFP on the

ground that individuals should not be denied access to the Courts solely because they are unable to

pay the filing fee. [Doc. No. 8, p.4.] Contrary to Plaintiff’s suggestion, he was not denied access

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to the Court because he is unable to pay. Rather, the Court carefully considered Plaintiff’s motion

to proceed IFP and determined it was incomplete, and that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate he lacked

the financial resources to pay the filing fee. [Doc. No. 3, p.2.] 

As stated in the Court’s challenged order, a party need not be completely destitute to

proceed in forma pauperis. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40

(1948). However, proceeding IFP is a privilege, not a right. Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116

(9th Cir. 1965). “[T]he same even-handed care must be employed to assure that federal funds are

not squandered to underwrite, at public expense, either frivolous claims or the remonstrances of a

suitor who is financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull his own oar.” Temple v.

Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration does not

challenge the Court’s analysis of his financial resources, nor provide any additional information

that might warrant a different result. Accordingly, reconsideration of the Court’s order denying

Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP is not appropriate under Rule 60(b)(4) or (b)(6). 

However, even if the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP, the action still could

not proceed for at least three reasons, each of which the Court identified in its November 16 Order. 

First, Plaintiff’s complaint is frivolous, as it is entirely incomprehensible and does not state any

claim upon which relief can be granted. Second, the complaint does not provide any legally

cognizable ground for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Third, even if

federal jurisdiction existed, venue is not proper in the Southern District of California. The Court,

again, addresses each of these deficiencies below. 

II. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE

Plaintiff appears to dispute the Court’s conclusion that his complaint does not satisfy

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), requiring a short and plain statement demonstrating he is

entitled to relief. [Doc. No. 8, p.2.] Plaintiff also asserts he should have been given leave to

amend. [Id.] The Court disagrees. Although the Court must construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings

broadly, dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate where “it is absolutely clear that the

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Franklin v. Murphy, 245 F.2d

1221, 1228 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984). Just like his complaint, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is

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almost entirely incomprehensible. For example, Plaintiff states: “The Court’s take vis-a-vis the

sub-head was untrue! Should the Plaintiff shave his teeth for compliance?” [Id.] The Court is

simply unable to decipher what type of relief Plaintiff seeks, or any facts evidencing that leave to

amend would not be futile. 

 In addition, the Court’s prior Order identified several pleading deficiencies beyond its 

Rule 8 concerns. [See Doc. No. 3, p.2-4.] The Court declines to reiterate that discussion here, as

Plaintiff’s pending motion still fails to identify any facts or coherent theories of liability. It

remains entirely unclear what kind of action Plaintiff desires to bring. Moreover, Plaintiff does

not explain why reconsideration is appropriate, nor does he even attempt to identify facts that he

could allege to cure the noted deficiencies in his complaint. Accordingly, the Court concludes it

correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice and without leave to amend.

Even if the Court could be persuaded that Plaintiff might be able to state a claim if granted

leave to amend, Plaintiff’s claims cannot proceed in this Court because it lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over this action. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)

(“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare

the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing

the fact and dismissing the cause.”) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514

(1868)). 

III. THE COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Plaintiff asserts the Court should reconsider its conclusion that subject matter jurisdiction

is lacking, and identifies several cases that purportedly demonstrate this Court can exercise

jurisdiction over his claims. [Doc. No. 8, p.5-7.] Plaintiff’s references are entirely unhelpful, as

they do not bear on the facts of this case. “Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,

possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute. We presume that a cause lies

outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party

asserting jurisdiction.” K2 Am. Corp. v. Roland Oil & Gas, LLC, 653 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir.

2011) (citations and internal marks omitted). Neither Plaintiff’s complaint nor his motion for

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reconsideration state a legally cognizable ground for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s unintelligible allegations. Accordingly, reconsideration is not warranted.

IV. VENUE IS NOT PROPER IN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Lastly, even assuming federal jurisdiction existed, Plaintiff’s action still cannot proceed in

this district. Neither Plaintiff’s complaint nor his motion for reconsideration identifies a single

fact that suggests Plaintiff’s grievances have any connection to the Southern District of California. 

See generally, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. As stated previously, Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions that venue

exists carry no weight. A careful review of the record reveals no discernable link to California, let

alone the Southern District. [See Doc. No. 3, p.4 (“Defendants reside in Tennessee and

Connecticut, and Plaintiff resides in Massachusetts . . . none of the parties reside in California, nor

does it appear any discernable conduct occurred in this district”).] The Court therefore declines to

reconsider its ruling that venue is improper.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. 

[Doc. No. 8.] The case shall remain closed; no further filings will be accepted.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: February 2, 2012

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

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