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Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 13, 2010 Decided December 28, 2010

No. 07-5352

KEITH MAYDAK, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:97-cv-02199)

Jaclyn L. DiLauro, Student Counsel, argued the cause as

appointed amicus curiae in support of appellants. On the briefs

were Steven H. Goldblatt, appointed by the court, Charlotte

Garden and Kate Bushman, Supervising Attorneys, and Ekanem

O. Akpakip, Jimmy T. Doan, and William J. Durkin, Student

Counsel.

Paul Lee, Keith Maydak, and Gregory A. Smith, pro se,

were on the briefs for appellants.

Alan Burch, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellees. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr.,

U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

USCA Case #07-5352 Document #1285040 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 1 of 30
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Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: This is the third time that

we have heard an appeal involving the parties in this case. This

litigation is now thirteen years old and, unsurprisingly, it

presents a weighty and complicated record. The case concerns

trust fund claims brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 31

U.S.C. § 1321, and Privacy Act claims arising under 5 U.S.C.

§ 552a(g)(1). The appellants, Keith Maydak, Paul Lee, and

Gregory A. Smith, were incarcerated in federal prison facilities

when this action was initiated in the District Court, but they are

no longer in federal custody. Their action was lodged against

the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and the United States

(collectively, “the Government”). 

Appellants’ complaint is aimed at the operation of inmate

photography programs at several BOP correctional facilities.

The photo programs allow inmates to have their pictures taken,

either by themselves or with visitors, at the cost of $1.00 per

photo. The cost of the program is covered by monies from the

Inmate Trust Fund, a trust administered by the United States

government that provides programs, goods, and services to

federal prison inmates nationwide. Until recently, several prison

facilities that participated in the program regularly obtained two

copies of each photograph, giving one print to the inmate while

retaining the duplicate print. These duplicates were reviewed by

BOP officials for various purposes, including detection of

inappropriate inmate gestures or relevance to internal

investigations of suspected gang activity. 

In 1997, upon learning that BOP officials were secretly

retaining duplicate prints, Lee, along with two of his fellow

inmates, Maydak and Ambrose Mitchell, the latter of whom was

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eventually replaced in this litigation by Smith, filed a complaint

in the District Court. They alleged, in relevant part, that (1)

BOP’s charges for and uses of the duplicate prints for securityrelated purposes violated the terms of the Trust; and (2) BOP’s

undisclosed retention of duplicate prints violated various

provisions of the Privacy Act. Throughout this litigation, the

Government has maintained that BOP’s retention of unsorted

duplicate photos did not create a “system of records” containing

information about the inmates that was then retrieved by

personal identifiers giving rise to Privacy Act protections.

5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(a)(5), 552a(e). The “system of records” issue

was remanded by this court for further consideration by the

District Court following appellants’ last appeal. Maydak v.

United States (“Maydak I”), 363 F.3d 512 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

Following proceedings on remand of the case, the District

Court granted summary judgments in favor of the Government.

Maydak v. United States, No. 1:97-cv-02199 (D.D.C. Mar. 30,

2006) (“Maydak II”), reprinted in App. to the Opening Br. of

Appointed Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Appellants (“App.”) 319-

31; Maydak v. United States, No. 1:97-cv-02199, 2007 WL

1018469 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2007) (“Maydak III”); Maydak v.

United States, No. 1:97-cv-02199, 2007 WL 2381388 (D.D.C.

Aug. 20, 2007) (“Maydak IV”). The District Court concluded

that BOP had satisfactorily reimbursed the Trust Fund for any

misappropriations. The trial court also rejected appellants’

request for nationwide discovery, holding that further discovery

was unnecessary. Maydak III, 2007 WL 1018469 at *1; Maydak

IV, 2007 WL 2381388 at *1. In addressing the Privacy Act

claims, the District Court held that prison officials’ searches

through boxes of unsorted photos in the hopes of recognizing an

inmate did not constitute a “system of records” within the

compass of the Act. Maydak II, slip op. at 4, App. 322. The

District Court additionally held that, even if the disputed photo

searches were covered by the Privacy Act, appellants’ claims

lacked merit because the appellants had proffered no evidence

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that would allow a reasonable juror to find that BOP acted

willfully or intentionally to violate their rights under the Act. Id.

at 6-8, App. 324-26. Appellants, with the able support of

appointed amicus curiae, the Georgetown University Law

Center Appellate Litigation Clinic, now seek reversal of the

District Court’s judgments.

We vacate the District Court’s judgment on the Trust Fund

claims. All three appellants have been released from

incarceration, so their claims are now moot. And it is clear that

appellants no longer have standing to challenge the management

of the Trust. 

We affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment

for the Government on the Privacy Act claims. Even assuming

that BOP’s review and retention of duplicate photos created a

“system of records” triggering Privacy Act protections, civil

remedies are only available if appellants can show “that the

agency acted in a manner which was intentional or willful.”

5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4). At summary judgment, the Government

presented affidavits declaring that BOP officials did not

intentionally or willfully commit Privacy Act violations and that

the duplicate photos were used solely in furtherance of

legitimate law enforcement interests. In response, appellants

proffered no evidence and thus failed to establish a genuine

issue for trial regarding the intent and willfulness of

Government officials. In these circumstances, the District Court

was obliged to grant summary judgment for the Government.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Inmate Trust Fund and the Inmate Photography

Program

Each BOP correctional institution maintains a Commissary,

which is charged with two purposes: (1) maintenance of

inmates’ monies through the Inmate Deposit Fund; and (2)

provision of merchandise and services that are not generally

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supplied by the institution. BOP Program Statement No.

4500.07 (Apr. 19, 2010) (“Program Statement 4500.07”)

¶ 2.1(a). Each Commissary maintains a store where inmates are

able to purchase items such as snack foods, personal hygiene

products, and postage stamps, with all sales proceeds being

deposited into the Inmate Trust Fund. The United States

Government serves as the trustee for the Trust Fund and,

pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1), is obliged to ensure that

“disburse[ments are made] in compliance with the terms of the

trust.” It is undisputed that “trust funds may [only] be used for

any purpose accruing to the benefit of the inmate body, as a

whole, such as amusements, education, library, or general

welfare work.” Maydak I, 363 F.3d at 521 (quoting Washington

v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1096 (6th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Program Statement 4500.07 ¶ 2.3(d).

“The inmates at federal correctional facilities throughout the

country are . . . the sole beneficiaries of the trust,” Washington,

35 F.3d at 1104, and as a result, “[s]ecurity-related items,” such

as radios, fences, or razor wire, are prohibited uses of Trust

Fund profits. Program Statement 4500.07 ¶ 2.3(d)(3). 

One of the services supported by the Trust Fund is the

inmate photo program, pursuant to which inmates are allowed

to have personal pictures taken, either alone or with visitors, at

the cost of $1.00 per photo voucher. Id. ¶ 5.4. Trust Fund

monies are used to cover all operational costs of the program,

including camera equipment, photo processing, and

photographer salaries. Id. Until recently, officials at many BOP

correctional facilities accepted duplicate prints from the photo

developers, sometimes in connection with a complimentary

promotion and sometimes for an additional nominal fee.

Maydak I, 363 F.3d at 522. The duplicate photo prints often

were reviewed by BOP officials, variously, to uncover visual

signs of gang-related activity, obscenity, or potential threats to

the institution’s safety or security. Id. at 514. Photos marked as

problematic were added to existing security files or scanned into

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electronic files. Unused photo duplicates were either given to

the inmates, immediately destroyed, or retained for a short

period of time and then discarded. Id.

On April 19, 2010, BOP updated its Trust Fund Manual to

officially forbid individual institutions from accepting duplicate

prints, even if provided for free. Compare BOP Program

Statement No. 4500.07 ¶ 5.4 (“Institutions shall not accept

double prints from the vendor.”) with BOP Program Statement

No. 4500.06 (Feb. 19, 2009) ¶ 5.4(b)(2) (“Duplicate prints may

be offered if there is no increase in cost.”), reprinted in

Addendum to Br. for Appellees. 

B. Litigation History

In 1997, appellant Paul Lee realized that several BOP

institutions were ordering double prints but only releasing a

single print to the inmate. See Maydak I, 363 F.3d at 514-15

(discussing much of the case’s factual history). Lee, along with

two of his fellow inmates – appellant Keith Maydak and

Ambrose Mitchell, the latter of whom was eventually replaced

in this litigation by appellant Gregory Smith – filed a complaint

in the District Court. Am. Compl., reprinted in App. 32-71.

The litigation has since focused on the photo retention and

review practices at seven different federal correctional

institutions (“FCI”) in which the appellants were held – namely,

McKean, Ray Brook, Beckley, Lewisburg, Oklahoma City,

Cumberland, and Allenwood. 

Appellants have alleged that BOP’s undisclosed review and

retention of the duplicate photos violated various provisions of

the Privacy Act – including, for example, the requirement that

information about a “system of records” must be disclosed to the

public through publication in the Federal Register, 5 U.S.C.

§ 552a(e)(4), and the requirement that agencies must “establish

rules of conduct for persons involved in the design,

development, operation, or maintenance of any system of

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records,” § 552a(e)(9). Appellants also alleged that BOP

improperly used duplicate photos for prison security purposes in

violation of the terms of the Trust Fund and sought

reimbursements to the Fund under 31 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) for

these improper uses. 

The District Court initially dismissed the complaint in its

entirety, finding the Trust Fund claims unfounded and the

photograph files exempt from the Privacy Act’s requirements

because of the statute’s exception for information that is

compiled for law enforcement purposes. Maydak v. United

States, No. 1:97-cv-02199, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1999)

(citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2)). On appeal, this court vacated the

dismissal of the Privacy Act and Trust Fund claims. Maydak v.

United States, No. 99-5187, 1999 WL 1006593, at *1 (D.C. Cir.

Oct. 27, 1999). We held that the law enforcement exception did

not apply unless BOP had previously promulgated a regulation

invoking the exemption. We also held that, even if a law

enforcement exemption was properly sought, public disclosure

in the Federal Register would still be required. Accordingly, the

case was remanded for the District Court to determine whether

the retained photographs constituted a “system of records” as

necessary to trigger the Privacy Act requirements and to inquire

further into the Trust Fund claims. Id. 

Following remand, the Government initiated summary

judgment proceedings. BOP officials acknowledged that

duplicate prints were retained and occasionally reviewed for

signs of gang-related activities, offensive gestures or conduct,

and investigative or informational purposes. Maydak v. United

States, No. 1:97-cv-02199, slip op. at 7 (D.D.C. May 4, 2001),

reprinted in App. 210. The Government maintained, however,

and the District Court agreed, that these practices did not

produce a “system of records” as defined by the Privacy Act,

because the photos were never organized by any personal

identifiers. Id. at 7-9, App. 210-12; Maydak v. United States,

USCA Case #07-5352 Document #1285040 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 7 of 30
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No. 1:97-cv-02199, slip op. at 1-2 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2002),

reprinted in App. 218-19. The Government also argued, and the

District Court again agreed, that 31 U.S.C. § 1321 violations

only occurred where Trust Fund monies were used to pay for

duplicates and that reimbursements were not necessary where

the duplicate prints were provided by the vendor for free. In

those institutions where BOP acknowledged misusing funds to

cover the additional cost of duplicate prints, the District Court

found reimbursements of those additional costs sufficient and

concluded that further nationwide discovery of additional

misappropriations was not warranted. Maydak v. United States,

No. 1:97-cv-02199, slip op. at 2-4 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2002), App.

219-21. The District Court thus granted the Government’s

summary judgment motion on all counts.

The appellants appealed, and this court again vacated the

judgment below. Maydak I, 363 F.3d at 512. In Maydak I, this

court suggested strongly that the BOP photo review and

retention practices might constitute a “system of records,”

although we ultimately remanded the issue for consideration by

the District Court in the first instance. The relevant portion of

Maydak I says:

[W]e believe that a genuine issue of material fact remains

as to whether BOP’s photo file in fact constitutes a system

of records. Recall that a system of records is “a group of

any records . . . from which information is retrieved by the

name of the individual or by some identifying number,

symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the

individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (emphasis added). The

term “record” includes “any item . . . about an individual

. . . that contains his name, or the identifying number,

symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the

individual, such as a finger or voice print or a photograph.”

Id. § 552a(a)(4) (emphasis added). Under the Act’s plain

language, then, a “system of records” may be a group of

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any records retrieved by an identifying particular such as a

photograph. In other words, the personal identifier may be

the photograph itself.

In asserting that the prisons at issue here maintained no

such system of records, BOP officials failed to appreciate

this point. They assumed that because the photographs

were organized neither by name nor individually assigned

number, they were not organized by personal identifier. For

instance, the McKean [Special Investigative Supervisor

(“SIS”)] declared that duplicate photos with “investigative

or informative value” were retained in investigation case

files and other duplicates were “stored in a box for

approximately six (6) months and then destroyed.” Roy

Decl. ¶ 9. Yet the SIS also claimed that “[n]one of the

photographs . . . reviewed by the SIS office . . . [were]

retrievable by an individual inmate as they [were] not filed

by any personal identifier.” Id. ¶ 10. As amicus quite

properly asks, “What purpose would it serve to keep

photographs that BOP investigators have purportedly

determined have some significant importance to the

security of the institution in a filing system from which they

could not be retrieved by individual?” Amicus Br. at 12

n.4. “Presumably,” amicus points out, “one of the primary

reasons for keeping such a system is to enable the SIS to

track and prevent unlawful activities by individuals whose

photographs provide valuable information to do that.” Id.

Nor is it clear from the record why McKean officials

retained for six months duplicate photographs having no

investigative value. Although practices vary by prison, the

Ray Brook declaration, which is very similar to the

McKean declaration, suggests one such purpose: “to

identify possible associates or accomplices of an inmate

suspected of, or charged with, committing prohibited acts

at FCI Ray Brook.” Cross Decl. ¶ 9. This indicates that the

duplicate photographs stored in a box were retrievable by

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personal identifier – the photograph itself – for how else

could SIS staff have identified a particular inmate’s

associates or accomplices if not by the photograph?

The government argues that even if the photographs

were retrievable by personal identifier, the photograph file

would not constitute a system of records if the photos were

not actually retrieved by personal identifier. The

government is correct. In Henke [v. United States

Department of Commerce, 83 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1996)],

we held that “retrieval capability is not sufficient to create

a system of records”; the agency must in practice retrieve

information by personal identifier. [Id.] at 1460-61.

Although incidental or ad hoc retrieval by personal

identifier does not convert a group of records into a system

of records, where an agency compiles information about

individuals for investigatory purposes, “Privacy Act

concerns are at their zenith, and if there is evidence of even

a few retrievals of information keyed to [personal

identifiers], it may well be the case that the agency is

maintaining a system of records.” Id. at 1461.

On the record before us, it seems clear that at least one

institution, Ray Brook, retrieved photographs by personal

identifier. With respect to the other institutions, because

the declarations rested on a flawed understanding of

personal identifier, they cannot support the grant of

summary judgment. We will thus remand for the district

court to determine whether the prisons’ compilation of

photos constitutes a system of records. In considering this

issue, the district court should take into account “the

entirety of the situation, including the agency’s function,

the purpose for which the information was gathered, and the

agency’s actual retrieval practices and policies.” Id.

Maydak I, 363 F.3d at 519-20 (ellipses and third, fourth, fifth,

and eighth brackets in original). 

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As for the Trust Fund claims, we concluded in Maydak I

that reimbursements should not be confined to those institutions

where duplicate prints required an additional fee; we also

rejected as speculative the District Court’s unverified

determination that other BOP institutions were not

misappropriating Trust Fund monies. Id. at 521-22.

On remand, the District Court again found that BOP’s

retention of duplicate photos within boxes or computer files did

not constitute a system of records. On this point, the District

Court declared: 

Searching through a box or collection of unidentified

photos with the hope of recognizing an inmate does not fit

the definition [of a system of records] because the photos

are not “retrieved” by any “assigned” personal identifier.

In the absence of “evidence of even a few retrievals of

information keyed to individuals” names [or some other

personal identifier], the Court finds no genuine issue of

material fact existing as to whether the duplicate photos

retrieved in the manner described above constitute a BOP

system of records.

Maydak II, slip op. at 4 (last alteration in original) (citation

omitted) (quoting Henke, 83 F.3d at 1461), App. 322. The

District Court noted, however, that even if a system of records

had been created, no damages would be due because “[n]o

reasonable juror could find that BOP acted willfully or

intentionally if it reasonably believed that it was not creating a

system of records triggering Privacy Act’s [sic] requirements.”

Id. at 7, App. 325. In other words, according to the District

Court, BOP officials could not have intentionally violated the

Privacy Act if they never believed that their actions rose to the

level of Privacy Act violations. In two subsequent decisions, the

District Court dismissed appellants’ Trust Fund claims. In doing

so, the trial court (1) rejected appellants’ request for nationwide

discovery of additional misappropriations as unnecessary due to

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“the independent nature of these programs, and the absence of

class action certification”; and (2) upheld BOP’s additional

reimbursements of “50 percent of the total cost of the original

photos” as sufficient to reimburse the Trust Fund and cure the

prior misdeeds of Government officials in their handling of

Trust Fund monies. Maydak III, 2007 WL 1018469, at *1;

Maydak IV, 2007 WL 2381388, at *1.

Before this court, appellants seek reversal of the District

Court’s grants of summary judgment to the Government on their

Trust Fund and Privacy Act claims, dismissal of their motion for

additional discovery, denial of their motion to supplement the

complaint, and denial of their motion to join the Trust Fund as

a party and to have a receiver and counsel appointed for the

Fund. Professor Steven H. Goldblatt and the Georgetown

University Law Center Appellate Litigation Clinic were

appointed by this court as amicus curiae to brief and argue the

case in support of appellants on appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo,

applying the same standard of review as that of the District

Court. Estate of Coll-Monge v. Inner Peace Movement, 524

F.3d 1341, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is

appropriate only where there is “no genuine issue as to any

material fact” and, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, “the moving party is entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law.” McCready v. Nicholson, 465

F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56©).

B. Trust Fund Claims

When this lawsuit was filed, appellants were able to pursue

their Trust Fund claims under 31 U.S.C. §1321 because they

were federal inmates and beneficiaries of the Trust Fund. At all

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times during the litigation before the District Court, at least one

of the named appellants remained in BOP custody. However, all

three appellants have since been released from incarceration.

Appellant Keith Maydak was released from BOP custody in

2005; appellant Gregory Smith was released in November 2009;

and appellant Paul Lee was released in April 2010. We must,

therefore, first address whether this court still retains jurisdiction

over the Trust Fund claims. 

The problem here is that appellants’ claims against the Trust

Fund were rendered moot once they left prison. Under trust law,

claims for redress of a prior breach of trust can only be pursued

by beneficiaries of the trust. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TRUSTS §§ 199-200 (1959). Since federal prison inmates are

the sole beneficiaries of the Trust Fund, a claim for

reimbursements to the Fund can only be pursued by a current

federal inmate. All three appellants have been released from

incarceration. As a result of their changed circumstances, their

Trust Fund claims are now moot. See Weinstein v. Bradford,

423 U.S. 147 (1975) (per curiam) (parole applicant’s challenge

to parole board procedures moot once he gained complete

release); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per

curiam) (law student’s challenge to school’s affirmative action

program moot due to his pending graduation); Flynt v.

Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam)

(publisher’s suit challenging ban of press coverage of invasion

of Grenada rendered moot when press ban was lifted two days

after complaint was filed). 

There is no exception to an application of the mootness

doctrine in this case, for the matter is not “capable of repetition,

yet evading review.” The Court’s decision in Bradford is

instructive. In that case, Bradford sued members of the North

Carolina Board of Parole, claiming that they were obligated to

accord him certain procedural rights in considering his

eligibility for parole. The district court refused to certify the

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case as a class action and dismissed the complaint. By the time

the case reached the Supreme Court, Bradford’s temporary

parole had ripened into a complete release from supervision.

The Court noted that, “[f]rom that date forward it [was] plain

that [Bradford had] no interest whatever in the procedures

followed by [the Board of Parole] in granting parole.” 423 U.S.

at 148. Bradford argued that his case should not be dismissed as

moot, because it fit within the “capable of repetition, yet evading

review” exception to mootness. The Court rejected this

argument, saying:

[I]n the absence of a class action, the “capable of repetition,

yet evading review” doctrine [is] limited to the situation

where two elements combine[]: (1) the challenged action

[is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its

cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable

expectation that the same complaining party [will] be

subjected to the same action again. The instant case, not a

class action, clearly does not satisfy the latter element.

While [the members of the Board of Parole] will continue

to administer the North Carolina parole system with respect

to those who at any given moment are subject to their

jurisdiction, there is no demonstrated probability that

[Bradford] will again be among that number.

Id. at 149.

The same principles apply here with respect to appellants’

Trust Fund claims. The live dispute between the appellants and

the Government ended when appellants were no longer in the

custody of BOP.

Appellants seek to avoid this result by suggesting that,

notwithstanding their release from prison, they continue to have

standing to pursue their Trust Fund claims. In advancing this

position, appellants rely primarily on the Court’s decision in

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Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services

(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 

In Friends of the Earth, the plaintiffs sued under the citizen

suit provisions of the Clean Water Act to enjoin the

defendant’s violation of the statute and to require the

defendant to pay a civil penalty to the government. The

district court determined that injunctive relief was

inappropriate, because the defendant’s violations of the

statute had ceased after litigation commenced. However,

the court assessed a civil penalty against the defendant to

forestall future violations. The court of appeals reversed

the imposition of the fine, holding that the case was moot

once the defendant fully complied with the terms of the

statute. It reasoned that all elements of Article III standing

must exist throughout litigation and that the only remedy

available after the defendant’s violations had ceased – civil

penalties payable to the government – did not redress any

injury to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed,

holding that “the Court of Appeals confused mootness with

standing.” Id. at 189.

. . . .

The Friends of the Earth opinion follows easily from

earlier decisions holding that if a plaintiff challenges both

a specific action and the policy that underlies that action,

the challenge to the policy is not necessarily mooted merely

because the challenge to the particular action is moot. For

example, in Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416

U.S. 115 (1974), employers sought declaratory and

injunctive relief to prevent New Jersey from granting state

welfare benefits to striking workers on the ground that the

state’s actions violated federal labor law. The Court held

that because the strike that prompted the suit ended before

the case was resolved, the employer’s request for an

injunction preventing payment of welfare benefits during

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the strike was moot. However, the Court also held that the

employer’s request for declaratory relief was not moot,

because the challenged governmental action had not ceased

and the employer’s relationship with the union would be

continually affected by the “fixed and definite” state policy

of giving welfare benefits to strikers. Id. at 122–24.

HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL

STANDARDS OF REVIEW–REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT

DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS 115-16 (2007).

Friends of the Earth and Super Tire plainly are inapposite

here. Even though the plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief in

Friends of the Earth and injunctive relief in Super Tire were

rendered moot during the course of litigation, the plaintiffs in

those cases continued to have sufficient interests and the

necessary standing going forward to pursue their claims for civil

penalties and declaratory relief, respectively. The appellants in

this case have no such continuing interests or standing. 

Two decisions issued by the Supreme Court are illustrative

in highlighting the problem that appellants face in this case. The

first is the Court’s recent decision in Summers v. Earth Island

Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009). In that case, the plaintiffs

were several environmental protection organizations. When the

lawsuit was filed in 2003, the plaintiffs challenged the United

States Forest Service’s failure to apply its usual

notice-and-comment procedures to the approval of the so-called

“Burnt Ridge Project.” The plaintiffs also challenged the

underlying federal Forest Service regulation exempting certain

federal land sales from the notice-and-comment requirement

generally applied to significant land management decisions.

After the District Court issued a preliminary injunction, the

parties settled their dispute over the Burnt Ridge Project. The

plaintiffs then sought to continue pursuit of their challenge to the

agency’s regulation. The Court held that the plaintiffs had no

standing to pursue this claim, because a party who sues to

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17

challenge a certain action but then settles the claim does not

“retain[] standing to challenge the basis for that action (here, the

regulation in the abstract), apart from any concrete application

that threatens imminent harm to his interests.” Id. at 1150. 

The second case worth noting is the Court’s decision in

DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam). In that

case, a prospective law student brought suit against the

University of Washington Law School, seeking an injunction

granting him admission and challenging the school’s affirmative

action policy that allegedly prevented his admission. The

district court granted the preliminary injunction and DeFunis

enrolled in law school. By the time the case reached the

Supreme Court, however, DeFunis had already entered his last

year of law school and was about to graduate. Id. at 315. The

Supreme Court found that his claim for injunctive relief had

been mooted by his impending graduation, and that, as a result,

he no longer had a personal interest sufficient to support

standing to challenge the underlying admissions policy. Id. at

319-20. 

When the complaint in the instant case was filed, the

appellants were federal prison inmates and, as such, had a clear

and concrete personal interest in the management of the Trust

Fund. Appellants’ claims alleged an actual injury – namely,

decreased inmate benefits due to the diminished resources of the

Trust Fund – that was caused by BOP’s improper use of Trust

Fund monies and that could be redressed by BOP’s

reimbursement of the misappropriated funds. Standing was

clear. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61

(1992) (explaining the essential requirements of injury,

causation, and redressability necessary to support Article III

standing). Following appellants’ release from BOP custody,

however, they were no longer beneficiaries of the Trust Fund

and, therefore, held no continuing personal interest in future

disbursements from the Fund. Their Trust Fund claims are thus

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moot, and they have no standing to pursue the matter further.

Summers and DeFunis are controlling.

During oral argument before this court, Amici maintained

that appellants retained standing based on some individual de

minimis claims for photo voucher reimbursements and

overpayments caused by BOP’s misuse of the Trust Fund

monies. These claims come too late and are thus forfeited.

Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Williams, 348 F.3d 1033, 1043

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (“The general presumption against deciding

claims not raised below is particularly strong where, as here, the

claim turns upon factual questions not yet passed upon by the

district court.”). Neither the appellants’ amended complaint nor

their motion to further amend their complaint raise these de

minimis claims, a fact Amici effectively conceded in its reply

brief to this court. See Reply Br. of Appointed Amicus Curiae

in Supp. of Appellants at 20 (urging remand “so that plaintiffs

can file an amended complaint seeking individual

reimbursement”). In fact, appellants only mentioned these de

minimis claims in the District Court in connection with “out-ofpocket expenses” for Privacy Act damages relief, not as grounds

for individual standing on Trust Fund claims. See Pls.’ Memo.

in Opp. to the Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 9, 15-16, reprinted in

App. 286, 292-93.

Since appellants no longer have standing to pursue their

Trust Fund claims, we need not address the questions of whether

the District Court abused its discretion in denying appellants’

request for nationwide discovery; motion for leave to file

supplemental pleadings identifying additional instances of Fund

misuse; and motion to join the Trust Fund as a plaintiff, appoint

a receiver for the Trust Fund, and appoint counsel for the Trust

Fund. 

* * * *

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Where, as here, a claim cannot be reviewed on appeal due

to mootness or a lack of standing, we typically vacate the

District Court’s judgment on the merits and remand with

instructions to dismiss. See, e.g., Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753,

767 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (vacating summary judgment where

appellant failed to show causation necessary for Article III

standing); Humane Soc’y of U.S. v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 95 (D.C.

Cir. 1995) (vacating and remanding with instructions to dismiss

the case for want of jurisdiction upon finding that appellants

lacked constitutional standing); Flynt, 762 F.2d at 135-36

(vacating judgment of trial court after case became moot). This

“clears the path for future relitigation of the issues . . . and

eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented through

happenstance.” Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C.

Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340

U.S. 36, 40 (1950) (vacating case that has become moot)).

C. Privacy Act Claims

1. Introduction: The Conjunction Between the

Requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) Relating to a

“System of Records” and the Statutory Elements of

“Intentional or Willful” and “Adverse Effects”

Under the Privacy Act, the Government may be liable for

civil damages if a federal agency “fails to comply with

any . . . provision of [the statute] . . . in such a way as to have an

adverse effect on an individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D).

Plaintiffs seeking relief must establish that (1) the agency

violated a provision of the Act, (2) the violation was “intentional

or willful,” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4), and (3) the violation had an

“adverse effect” on the plaintiff, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D). On

the record before us, the second statutory element – relating to

intent and willfulness – is dispositive of the appellants’ Privacy

Act claims.

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As noted above, the extensive statutory requirements of

section 552a(e) of the Act come into play only with respect to

information that is maintained in a “system of records.”

5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (“Each agency that maintains a system of

records shall . . . .”). A main point of dispute in this litigation

has been whether BOP’s photo review and retention practices

constituted a “system of records” such that the protections of

section 552a(e) applied. As defined by the statute, a system of

records is “a group of any records under the control of any

agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the

individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other

identifying particular assigned to the individual.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 552a(a)(5). A system of records exists only if the information

contained within the body of material is both “retrievable by

personal identifier” and “actually retrieved by personal

identifier.” Maydak I, 363 F.3d at 520 (emphasis in original);

see also Henke, 83 F.3d at 1460 (“[R]etrieval capability is not

sufficient to create a system of records.”). 

There is clear tension between this court’s decision in

Maydak I, see 363 F.3d at 519-20, and the District Court’s

decision in Maydak II, see slip op. at 4, App. 320-22, regarding

whether the BOP photo review and retention practices

constituted a “system of records.” Although we did not

definitively resolve the matter, this court was of the view that “a

‘system of records’ may be a group of any records retrieved by

an identifying particular such as a photograph. In other words,

the personal identifier may be the photograph itself.” Maydak

I, 363 F.3d at 519. The District Court had a different view,

concluding that “[s]earching through a box or collection of

unidentified photos with the hope of recognizing an inmate does

not fit the definition [of a system of records] because the photos

are not ‘retrieved’ by any ‘assigned’ personal identifier.”

Maydak II, see slip op. at 4, App. 322. 

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The Government apparently has changed its policies

regarding the review and retention of duplicate photos. See

BOP Program Statement No. 4500.07 ¶ 5.4 (“Institutions shall

not accept double prints from the vendor.”). And in this appeal,

the Government does not attempt to defend the District Court’s

judgment regarding the “system of records” issue. Rather, the

Government’s principal argument before this court is that

the District Court correctly held that Appellants failed to

present evidence that BOP acted “intentionally and

willfully” as required by the Privacy Act to sustain a claim

for damages, which is the only Privacy Act claim advanced

by Appellants. There is no evidence that “anyone” in the

shoes of the BOP officials would have found retention of

duplicate photos an “egregious” violation of the Privacy

Act, and BOP’s evidence falls squarely within this Court’s

consistent Privacy Act precedents finding insufficient

evidence of intent.

. . . .

If the agency was ultimately incorrect in its assessment that

its retention of the photos constituted a system of records,

that adds nothing to the intent analysis in this case because

the question has remained open through several rounds of

litigation, including a favorable decision by the District

Court. And it should go without serious dispute that the

final outcome of this issue should not control the intent

analysis.

If the Court agrees that Appellants failed to demonstrate a

triable issue of fact regarding intent, all of their Privacy Act

claims fail and it is unnecessary to address other issues

regarding the Privacy Act.

Br. for Appellees at 4, 17.

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Given the present posture of the case, we will simply

assume, without deciding, that BOP’s review and retention of the

duplicate photos constituted a “system of records” under the

Privacy Act. Our analysis will focus on whether Government

officials acted intentionally or willfully to violate appellants’

rights under the Act. For the reasons indicated below, we agree

with the Government that appellants failed to proffer evidence

sufficient to create a triable issue of fact regarding intent or

willfulness. Therefore, it is unnecessary for us to determine

whether the alleged statutory violations had an adverse effect on

appellants. It is also unnecessary for us to address the

Government’s argument that “[a]ppellants’ Privacy Act claims

fail for the independent reason that they made no showing of . . .

‘actual damages,’ as required by the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.

§ 552a(g)(4)(A) . . . and the Supreme Court’s decision in Doe v.

Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004).” Appellee’s Br. at 22.

2. The “Intentional or Willful” Issue

Section 552a(g)(4) of the Privacy Act provides:

(4) In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection

(g)(1)(C) or (D) of this section in which the court

determines that the agency acted in a manner which was

intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the

individual in an amount equal to the sum of – 

(A) actual damages sustained by the individual as a

result of the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a

person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of

$1,000; and

(B) the costs of the action together with reasonable

attorney fees as determined by the court.

Pursuant to this provision, it is clear that “[t]he [Privacy] Act

does not make the Government strictly liable for every

affirmative or negligent action that might be said technically to

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23

violate the Privacy Act’s provisions.” Albright v. United States,

732 F.2d 181, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Rather, under the case law

construing and applying section 552a(g)(4), we have held that a

violation of the statute “must be so patently egregious and

unlawful that anyone undertaking the conduct should have

known it unlawful.” Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d

1106, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Laningham v. U.S. Navy,

813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “Intentional or willful” means:

“somewhat greater than gross negligence, or, an act committed

without grounds for believing it to be lawful, or by flagrantly

disregarding others’ rights under the Act.” Waters v.

Thornburgh, 888 F.2d 870, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (emphasis

added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted),

abrogated on other grounds by Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614

(2004).

The decision in Albright is illustrative of the burden of proof

that claimants must meet in order to satisfy the “intentional or

willful” element of the Privacy Act. Albright involved a case in

which analysts at the Social Security Administration sought

redress under the Privacy Act on the grounds that agency

officials impermissibly videotaped an informational meeting

attended by analysts to discuss a management decision to

downgrade their civil service classification. The District Court

concluded that the agency’s action did not give rise to damages

under the Privacy Act because there was no evidence that agency

officials acted intentionally or willfully to violate appellants’

rights. Albright, 732 F.2d at 183. We affirmed. 

 In construing § 552a(g)(4), Albright held that:

The terms “intentional” and “willful” must be interpreted in

their context to determine their meaning. Under Section

552a(g)(1)(D) liability is predicated on an agency’s “failure

to comply” with the Privacy Act. Thus, the “intentional or

willful” action requirement of Section 552a(g)(4) refers only

USCA Case #07-5352 Document #1285040 Filed: 12/28/2010 Page 23 of 30
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to the intentional or willful failure of the agency to abide by

the Act, and not to all voluntary actions which might

otherwise inadvertently contravene one of the Act’s

strictures. Section 552a(g)(4) imposes liability only when

the agency acts in violation of the Act in a willful or

intentional manner, either by committing the act without

grounds for believing it to be lawful, or by flagrantly

disregarding others’ rights under the Act.

Id. at 189 (footnotes omitted). During proceedings before the

District Court in Albright, the agency presented unrefuted

evidence establishing that the idea of a videotape originated from

an employee who had to miss the meeting, that the principal

purpose of the tape was to enable the agency to provide a “full

record of the events of the meeting” to absent employees, and

that the agency had offered to destroy the videotape. Id. at 189-

90. The court found that, under the applicable legal standard,

this evidence demonstrated that the agency acted with a

legitimate and lawful purpose and not pursuant to a proscribed

intention of infringing upon the employees’ Privacy Act rights.

Id. at 185. The appellants in Albright offered no affirmative

evidence of their own, but merely “claim[ed] that [trial witness]

testimony could have established other motives for the

videotaping.” Id. at 190 (emphasis added). We concluded that

“speculation on appeal about the possible content

of . . . testimony cannot rectify the plaintiffs’ failure to meet their

burden of proof on this critical element of the case” and found

dismissal of the Privacy Act claims justified. Id. 

Unlike Albright, the proceedings before the District Court in

this case involved a summary judgment, not a trial. Nonetheless,

the controlling legal standards are the same. In order to survive

the Government’s motion for summary judgment on the

“intentional or willful” issue, the appellants were required to

proffer evidence that the Government’s actions were:

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25

• so patently egregious and unlawful that anyone

undertaking the conduct should have known it

unlawful, or

• somewhat greater than gross negligence, or

• committed without grounds for believing them to be

lawful, or 

• in flagrant disregard of others’ rights under the Act. 

Plaintiffs who oppose summary judgment on the intent issue

cannot prevail by merely presenting evidence that “the

government acted negligently, or that the government handled a

matter in a disjointed, or confused manner, or that the

government acted inadvertently to contravene the Act.” Waters,

888 F.2d at 875-76 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets

omitted). Appellants in this case did not come close to satisfying

these standards in their submissions to the District Court.

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In our view, the

plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary

judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential

to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the

burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be “no

genuine issue as to any material fact,” since a complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial. The moving party is “entitled to a judgment as

a matter of law” because the nonmoving party has failed to

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make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her

case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In this

case, the Government supported its motion for summary

judgment with affidavits explaining the motives and purposes of

the BOP officials who engaged in the disputed photo review and

retention practices. See, e.g., Williams Decl. ¶ 6, reprinted in

App. 360-61. We agree with the Government that the evidence

proffered on behalf of BOP demonstrated that the agency “had

both a legitimate purpose in retaining the photos and their

practice of retention was perfectly consistent with its stated

purpose.” Br. for Appellees at 12. We do not mean to say that

the photo review and retention practices were consistent with the

requirements of the Privacy Act, but we do find that the

Government’s evidence clearly supports its claim that the

practices were not impermissibly “intentional or willful.”

In response to the Government’s motion for summary

judgment, the appellants offered nothing of substance to counter

the Government’s evidence. Rather, appellants merely argued

that BOP officials must have known that they were violating the

Privacy Act because the controversial and long-running litigation

put them on clear notice of this issue, and wrongful intent could

be inferred from the agency’s continued retention of duplicate

photos. See Pls.’ Memo. in Opp. to the Defs.’ Mot. for Summ.

J. 11-15, reprinted in App. 288-92. This was far short of what is

required by Rule 56 to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

It is true that “summary judgment will not lie . . . if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). However, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla

of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252. In this case,

appellants simply did not produce what Rule 56 requires.

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In summary judgment proceedings, “[i]f the burden of

persuasion at trial would be on the non-moving party [here, the

appellants], the party moving for summary judgment may satisfy

Rule 56’s burden of production [by (1) submitting] affirmative

evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s claim [or (2)] demonstrat[ing] to the court that the

nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim.” Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The

Government satisfied both of these requirements. Rule 56

further requires that:

Once the moving party has attacked whatever record

evidence – if any – the nonmoving party purports to rely

upon, the burden of production shifts to the nonmoving

party, who must either (1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked

in the moving party’s papers, (2) produce additional

evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial

as provided in Rule 56(e), or (3) submit an affidavit

explaining why further discovery is necessary as provided

in Rule 56(f). 

Id. at 332-33 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Appellants satisfied

none of these requirements.

Appellants’ arguments that BOP officials must have known

that they were violating the Privacy Act, offered to suggest a

triable issue of fact on the intent issue, simply cannot carry the

day. First, it is uncontested that the photographs that were

reviewed and retained by BOP officials were used only for

legitimate law enforcement purposes, such as review for signs of

gang-related activity. Second, given the complex statutory

definition of a “system of records” and its focus on retrieval by

an individual’s name or “identifying number, symbol, or other

identifying particular,” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5), the retention of

unsorted duplicates in a box for a period of months for legitimate

law enforcement purposes is not “so patently egregious and

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unlawful that anyone undertaking the conduct should have

known it unlawful.” Sussman, 494 F.3d at 1122 (quoting

Laningham, 813 F.2d at 1242). Third, the Supreme Court has

recognized that, although prisoners are not without constitutional

rights, prison officials must have the ability to anticipate security

problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable

problems of prison administration. See Jones v. N. C. Prisoners’

Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977); see also Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490

U.S. 401 (1989) (regulations authorizing prison officials to

screen and reject objectionable publications addressed to

prisoners held to be facially valid); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78

(1987) (regulation of inmate-to-inmate correspondence held to

be reasonably related to legitimate security concerns of prison

officials). Because the “solutions to problems arising within

correctional institutions [are] never [] simple or easy,” N. C.

Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. at 137 (Burger, C.J., concurring), it

is not surprising that BOP officials assumed that reviewing and

retaining photographs served the interests of good prison

administration. In this light, the disputed practice does not

reveal an agency action committed “without grounds for

believing it to be lawful.” Albright, 732 F.2d at 189. Fourth,

there is no evidence that BOP used the duplicate photos outside

the prison setting, see Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789 (D.C.

Cir. 1987), or “flagrantly disregard[ed]” defendants’ rights in any

other way. Albright, 732 F.2d at 189. Finally, even after our

remand of the case in Maydak I, BOP officials were still never

placed on clear notice that their practices violated the Act.

Notwithstanding this court’s critical discussion of the review and

retention policies at FCI Ray Brook, we did not resolve this

issue; rather, we remanded the matter to the District Court “to

determine whether the prisons’ compilation of photos constitutes

a system of records.” Maydak I, 363 F.3d at 520. It is thus

unsurprising that certain BOP facilities continued following

established practices until the issue was definitively resolved. In

fact, after the remand in Maydak I, the District Court agreed with

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the Government’s position and held that “[s]earching through a

box or collection of unidentified photos with the hope of

recognizing an inmate does not fit the definition [of a system of

records] because the photos are not ‘retrieved’ by any ‘assigned’

personal identifier.” Maydak II, slip op. at 4, App. 322. This

gave further support to the Government that its practices were

not unlawful.

As our case law makes clear, the Privacy Act’s “intentional

or willful” element cannot be satisfied with mere speculation,

Albright, 732 F.2d at 190, which is all that appellants have

offered in this case. The record in this case is plainly

distinguishable from a case like Waters in which the court

reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the

Government. In Waters, the plaintiff sued his employer, the

Department of Justice (“DOJ”), to complain about a letter sent

by DOJ to the Pennsylvania Board of Bar Examiners seeking

confirmation that Waters had indeed sat for the bar exam. The

plaintiff argued that DOJ violated the Privacy Act by failing to

collect information “to the greatest extent practicable directly

from the subject individual.” 888 F.2d at 872 (quoting 5 U.S.C.

§ 552a(e)(2)). The District Court granted summary judgment to

DOJ, persuaded by the agency’s proffered evidence that its

decision to contact the Pennsylvania Board was based on

reasonable doubts as to Waters’ veracity. Id. We reversed and

remanded, finding that the derogatory tone and content of DOJ’s

letter and the Pennsylvania Board’s refusal to respond without a

written “demonstration of need for the information” raised a

genuine issue of material fact regarding the agency’s intent to act

in violation of the Act. Id. at 875-77. Unlike the plaintiff in

Waters, the appellants here failed to raise any triable issue of fact

on intent. 

At oral argument, Amici argued that even if appellants failed

to proffer evidence in support of their claims that BOP officials

acted “intentionally or willfully,” the case should be remanded

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30

because the District Court wrongly stayed discovery and thus

prevented appellants from having an opportunity to gather the

necessary evidence. This argument fails, for there is nothing in

the record – and appellants point us to nothing – to indicate that

appellants ever sought discovery on the question of whether BOP

officials acted “intentionally or willfully.” Even after the

remand in Maydak I, which placed appellants on direct notice

that intent would be a necessary element of their Privacy Act

claims and that summary judgment would be appropriate if the

Government were able to show that BOP did not act intentionally

or willfully in violation of the Act, no discovery requests were

directed at this question. See Maydak I, 363 F.3d at 521 (“[T]his

issue [of BOP’s intent] is a question of fact entirely undeveloped

in the record . . . [and] it provides no basis for summary

judgment at this time.” (emphasis added)). Instead, appellants’

post-Maydak I discovery requests focused solely on their Trust

Fund claims. See Pls.’ Mot. to Compel (Aug. 10, 2004)

(appending discovery requests); Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ Protective

Mot. for Enlargement of Time at 1 (Aug. 10, 2004) (“The Court

of Appeals specifically remanded the trust fund claims with

instructions to allow the plaintiffs discovery.”). The District

Court’s refusal to allow further discovery on the Trust Fund

issues cannot excuse appellants’ failure to propound any

discovery requests related to the Privacy Act’s intent question.

Therefore, appellants cannot now cite the lack of discovery as a

ground to set aside the summary judgement issued in favor of the

Government. We therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment to the Government on the “intentional or

willful” issue.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s

judgment except where we vacate and remand with instructions

to dismiss due to a lack of jurisdiction. 

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