Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-03227/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-03227-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GEORGE M. PASION, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

JOHN A. HAVILAND, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:10-cv-3227 TLN AC P 

ORDER AND FINDINGS & 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff is a former state prisoner proceeding through counsel with a civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the court are defendant Cappel’s motion for 

summary judgment (ECF No. 83) and the parties’ stipulated request for a case management 

conference (ECF No. 107). 

I. Procedural History 

On July 13, 2011, the previously assigned magistrate judge screened the second amended 

complaint and dismissed all claims except for a retaliation claim against defendant Cappel. ECF 

No. 15 at 7. After the close of discovery, defendant Cappel moved for summary judgment on the 

merits (ECF No. 36) and the motion was granted (ECF No. 50). Plaintiff proceeded to appeal. 

ECF No. 52. 

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that in light of Cappel’s failure to provide any facts 

that supported his non-retaliatory explanations for plaintiff’s placement in administrative 

Case 2:10-cv-03227-TLN-AC Document 109 Filed 01/07/16 Page 1 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

segregation, a reasonable jury could find that the reasons given were pretextual. ECF No. 56 at 2-

3. The Ninth Circuit also found that there was an issue of fact as to whether Cappel was 

threatening plaintiff when he asked plaintiff if he was going to withdraw his grievance. Id. at 3-4. 

On these facts, the court determined that plaintiff had provided facts from which a reasonable jury 

could find that Cappel had placed plaintiff in administrative segregation in retaliation for filing a 

staff complaint. Id. at 4. The Ninth Circuit declined to address Cappel’s argument that he is 

entitled to qualified immunity and remanded the issue so that the district court could consider it in 

the first instance. Id. The court also found that the screening of the second amended complaint 

had improperly dismissed plaintiff’s retaliation claim against defendant McGuire. Id. at 5. 

On remand, defendant Cappel was given an opportunity to file a motion for summary 

judgment on qualified immunity and plaintiff was given an opportunity to amend the complaint as 

to the claims against defendant McGuire only. ECF No. 76. Plaintiff filed a third amended 

complaint (ECF No. 81) and defendant Cappel filed a motion for summary judgment which has 

been fully briefed (ECF No. 83). Defendant McGuire has answered the complaint (ECF No. 103) 

and the parties have submitted a stipulated request for a status/scheduling conference (ECF No. 

107). 

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 

Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by another inmate and that when officers responded 

to the assault, they used pepper spray on plaintiff as well as his assailant. ECF No. 81 at 3-4,1

 ¶¶ 

13-14. Plaintiff was then denied an opportunity to decontaminate until approximately forty-five 

minutes later. Id. at 4, ¶ 16. Five months later, plaintiff suffered from swelling in his face and 

irritation on his face and arms which ultimately led to him to be hospitalized for seven days. Id. 

at 4-5, ¶¶ 17-20. Plaintiff filed a grievance alleging staff misconduct against the officers that 

pepper sprayed him. Id. at 5, ¶ 21. 

//// 

 

1

 All page numbers refer to the numbers electronically stamped on the documents by the court 

upon filing. 

Case 2:10-cv-03227-TLN-AC Document 109 Filed 01/07/16 Page 2 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

On February 13, 2009, defendant McGuire interviewed plaintiff about his appeal of his 

grievance and after the interview McGuire placed plaintiff in administrative segregation. Id., ¶¶ 

22-23. The report submitted by McGuire stated that plaintiff was “placed in Administrative 

Segregation for the accusation of staff misconduct.” Id., ¶ 23. Plaintiff alleges that defendant 

McGuire placed him in administrative segregation in retaliation for filing a grievance against the 

officers that pepper sprayed him. Id. at 6, 8, ¶¶ 24, 33. 

Plaintiff was subsequently interviewed by defendant Cappel to determine whether he was 

a threat to the safety of others while an investigation of his allegations was being conducted. Id. 

at 6-7, ¶ 27. Cappel had the authority to release plaintiff back into the general population. Id. 

Plaintiff claims that during the interview, Cappel asked him to withdraw his complaint and 

ordered plaintiff retained in administrative segregation when he would not. Id. At the hearing to 

determine whether plaintiff should be released into the general population, Cappel recommended 

not releasing plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Cappel’s actions were in retaliation for refusing 

to withdraw the grievance against the officers that pepper sprayed him. Id. at 7-8, ¶¶ 28, 33. 

III. Motion for Summary Judgment 

A. Legal Standards for Summary Judgment 

 Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). 

 Under summary judgment practice, “[t]he moving party initially bears the burden of 

proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 

376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving 

party may accomplish this by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including 

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations 

(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admission, interrogatory answers, or 

other materials” or by showing that such materials “do not establish the absence or presence of a 

genuine dispute, or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the 

fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, 

Case 2:10-cv-03227-TLN-AC Document 109 Filed 01/07/16 Page 3 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving 

party’s case.” Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, “after adequate time for 

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” 

Id. at 323. Summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court 

demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment . . . is satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). In attempting to establish the 

existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials 

of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or 

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c)(1); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in 

contention is material, i.e., a fact “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 

law,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific 

Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., 

“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” 

Anderson, 447 U.S. at 248. 

 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “‘the claimed 

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the 

truth at trial.’” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630 (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 

391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings 

and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita, 475 

U.S. at 587 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Case 2:10-cv-03227-TLN-AC Document 109 Filed 01/07/16 Page 4 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

 “In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact, [the 

court] draw[s] all inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party.” Walls 

v. Central Contra Costa Transit Auth., 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). It is 

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be 

drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to 

demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations 

omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank, 391 

U.S. at 289). 

B. Qualified Immunity Standard 

Government officials are immune from civil damages “unless their conduct violates 

‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known.’” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In analyzing a qualified immunity defense, the court must consider the 

following: (1) whether the alleged facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 

demonstrate that defendant’s conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right; and (2) whether 

the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the incident. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 

194, 201 (2001) overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (overruling 

Saucier’s requirement that the two prongs be decided sequentially). These questions may be 

addressed in the order most appropriate to “the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” 

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Thus, if a court decides that plaintiff’s allegations do not support a 

statutory or constitutional violation, “there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning 

qualified immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. On the other hand, if a court determines that the 

right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct, the 

court need not determine whether plaintiff’s allegations support a statutory or constitutional 

violation. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 242. 

//// 

Case 2:10-cv-03227-TLN-AC Document 109 Filed 01/07/16 Page 5 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

 C. Arguments of the Parties 

 Both parties rely on the evidence and statements of facts that they submitted during 

briefing of the original motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 36). ECF No. 83 at 7; ECF No. 

101 at 12:7-14. 

1. Defendant Cappel 

 Defendant Cappel argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because it was not 

clearly established that keeping an inmate in administrative segregation pursuant to 15 C.C.R. § 

3335 violated that inmate’s constitutional rights. ECF No. 83 at 9-11. He further argues that 

allegations of improper motive have no impact on a qualified immunity defense, and that other 

courts have granted qualified immunity to prison officials acting under § 3335. Id. at 10-13. 

 2. Plaintiff 

 Plaintiff argues that the law regarding retaliation was clearly established, and that 

evidence of improper motive is relevant to a qualified immunity defense when intent is an 

essential element of the cause of action. ECF No. 87 at 10-15. 

 D. Discussion 

 1. Violation of a Constitutional Right 

The Ninth Circuit has already held that, taken in in the light most favorable to plaintiff, 

the allegations in the complaint demonstrate that defendant Cappel kept plaintiff in administrative 

segregation in retaliation for plaintiff filing a grievance, which violates plaintiff’s rights under the 

First Amendment. ECF No. 56. This prong of the qualified immunity analysis is therefore 

resolved in plaintiff’s favor. 

 2. Clearly Established Right 

Defendant argues that the question with respect to whether plaintiff had a clearly 

established right is as follows: “[I]n 2009, would a reasonable prison official in Captain Cappel’s 

position have known that his actions in retaining Pasion in administrative segregation under a 

mandatory state regulation violated Pasion’s federal rights?” ECF No. 83 at 10. As plaintiff 

points out, that it is the wrong question. ECF No. 87 at 12. The proper question is whether it was 

clearly established in 2009 that correctional officers could not retain an inmate in administrative 

Case 2:10-cv-03227-TLN-AC Document 109 Filed 01/07/16 Page 6 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

segregation in retaliation for filing a grievance.2 The answer to that question is yes. 

“[T]he prohibition against retaliatory punishment is ‘clearly established law’ in the Ninth 

Circuit, for qualified immunity purposes.” Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (citing Schroeder 

v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995) (at the time of defendants’ conduct, “the law 

clearly established that defendants cannot transfer a prisoner from one correctional institution to 

another in order to punish the prisoner for exercising his First Amendment right to pursue civil 

rights litigation in the courts” (citation omitted))). Prior to the events at issue in this case, a 

number of Ninth Circuit cases had found a variety of actions by corrections officers, including 

placing an inmate in administrative segregation, could violate the First Amendment if they were 

taken in retaliation for filing a grievance. Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(placement in administrative segregation in retaliation for filing grievances); Rhodes v. Robinson, 

408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2004) (arbitrary confiscation and destruction of property, initiation of 

a prison transfer, and assault in retaliation for filing grievances); Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 

1288-89 (9th Cir. 2003) (validation as a gang member in retaliation for filing grievances); Hines 

v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997) (issuance of false rules violation and subsequent 

finding of guilt in retaliation for filing grievances); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 

1138 (9th Cir. 1989) (inmate labeled as a snitch in retaliation for filing grievances). 

Defendant’s formulation of the “clearly established right” issue is also misleading because 

it implies that 15 C.C.R. § 3335 mandated retaining plaintiff in administrative segregation during 

an investigation into a staff complaint, and deprived defendant of all discretion regarding 

segregation. However, defendant states that his responsibility was “to review administrative 

segregation placements, and determine whether the inmate should be released or retained pending 

review by the Institutional Classification Committee.” ECF No. 83 at 7. This statement 

indicates, and plaintiff argues (ECF No. 87 at 12-13; ECF No. 101 at 10:14-21), that the decision 

 

2

 Defendant’s argument that the question of “whether retaliatory punishment was prohibited” 

poses too broad a question (ECF No. 88 at 2-3) is meritless. While that question would 

potentially be too general to conduct an effective qualified immunity analysis, the more focused 

question presented here is not. 

Case 2:10-cv-03227-TLN-AC Document 109 Filed 01/07/16 Page 7 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

to retain plaintiff in administrative segregation was not mandatory simply because there was an 

ongoing investigation. A review of the relevant portion of the regulation shows that § 3335 

mandates retention in administrative segregation only when certain criteria are met: 

When an inmate’s presence in an institution’s general inmate 

population presents an immediate threat to the safety of the 

inmate or others, endangers institution security or jeopardizes 

the integrity of an investigation of an alleged serious 

misconduct or criminal activity, the inmate shall be immediately 

removed from general population and be placed in administrative 

segregation. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3335(a) (2008) (emphasis added). Based on the plain language of the 

statute, the mere fact of an investigation would not be sufficient to warrant placement in 

administrative segregation. Rather, segregation was required only if plaintiff’s placement in the 

general population posed a threat to institutional safety or security or jeopardized the integrity of 

the investigation. 

According to Cappel, he retained plaintiff in administrative segregation “to protect the 

safety and security of PASION, the involved staff members and the institution” and “to protect 

the inmate from exposure to the employee against whom he made the allegations, to help 

eliminate witness tampering, to help control with whom the inmate has contact during the 

investigation, including the employee against whom he made the allegations, and to help create a 

clean record of the investigation and hold everyone involved accountable.” ECF No. 83-1 at 16, 

¶ 7. If these concerns did in fact motivate Cappel, he would be entitled to judgment in his favor. 

Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84, 287 (1977) (retaliation 

is actionable even if the act, taken for a different reason, would have been proper, but defendant 

may prevail if he shows he would have reached the same decision absent the protected conduct). 

It is indisputable that “[m]aintaining the integrity of an investigation into serious 

institutional misconduct is a legitimate penological interest.” Bryant v. Cortez, 536 F. Supp. 2d 

1160, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2008); see also Draper v. Harris, 245 F. App’x 699, 701 (9th Cir. 2007). 

However, the Ninth Circuit explicitly found in this case that there were no facts on the record to 

support the contentions that (1) plaintiff posed a threat to the safety and security of the institution, 

Case 2:10-cv-03227-TLN-AC Document 109 Filed 01/07/16 Page 8 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9

staff, or other inmates or (2) that plaintiff’s return to the general population would jeopardize the 

integrity of the investigation. ECF No. 56 at 2-3. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found a triable 

issue of fact as to whether plaintiff’s retention in administrative segregation advanced a legitimate 

penological goal. Id. On remand, defendant has offered no additional facts into the record that 

would support the justifications put forth for plaintiff’s retention in administrative segregation. In 

light of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, and absent any additional evidence to support the stated 

reasons for retaining plaintiff in administrative segregation, this court cannot conclude that the 

undisputed facts establish that § 3335 mandated plaintiff’s retention in administrative segregation, 

rendering irrelevant any retaliatory motive Cappel may have also harbored. 

In support of his argument that the law was not clearly established, defendant also cites to 

two district court cases for the proposition that “courts have determined that [§ 3335] is 

mandatory.” ECF No. 88 at 3 (citing Morris v. Hickison, No. 06-cv-2936-LKK, 2010 WL 

3034194, at *15, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77152, at *42-43 (E.D. Cal. July 30, 2010); Anderson v. 

Deleon, No. C 12-6055 SI (pr), 2014 WL 3595020, at *9, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98920, at *30 

(N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014). Neither of the cases cited by defendant involved a disputed issue of 

fact as to whether the reasons given for the plaintiffs’ placement in administrative segregation 

was pretextual. Accordingly, the undersigned does not find them persuasive. 

 3. Motive is Relevant to the Qualified Immunity Analysis 

Defendant argues that whether he had an improper motive in retaining plaintiff in 

administrative segregation is immaterial to a qualified immunity analysis. ECF No. 83 at 10-11. 

He relies on Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998), and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982), for this proposition, arguing that they state that “subjective intent” and 

“bare allegations of malice” do not impact qualified immunity. ECF No. 83 at 11. However, as 

plaintiff correctly points out, defendant has misapprehended the law. ECF No. 87 at 14-15. 

“Although a defendant’s subjective intent is usually not relevant to the qualified immunity 

defense, his mental state is relevant when, as here, it is an element of the alleged constitutional 

violation.” Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original) 

(analyzing Eighth Amendment claims) (citing Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 911). 

Case 2:10-cv-03227-TLN-AC Document 109 Filed 01/07/16 Page 9 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10

As explained in Crawford-El, Harlow reformulated the standard for qualified immunity. 

Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 586-94. Prior to Harlow, “the mere allegation of intent to cause any 

‘other injury,’ not just a deprivation of constitutional rights, would have permitted an open-ended 

inquiry into subjective motivation.” Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 592 (citing Wood v. Strickland, 

420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). The Crawford-El court explained that “[w]hen intent is an element of 

a constitutional violation, however, the primary focus is not on any possible animus directed at 

the plaintiff; rather, it is more specific, such as an intent . . . to deter public comment on a specific 

issue of public importance.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Using facts from the case, the 

Crawford-El court gave the following example of the distinction between the “subjective intent” 

and “bare allegations of malice” that are irrelevant to a qualified immunity analysis and the 

retaliatory intent that is a necessary component of a First Amendment claim: “[P]roof that 

respondent diverted the plaintiff’s boxes because she hated him would not necessarily 

demonstrate that she was responding to his public comments about prison conditions, although 

under Wood such evidence might have rebutted the qualified immunity defense.” Id. Contrary to 

defendant’s assertion, Harlow and Crawford-El do not stand for the proposition that all subjective 

intent is irrelevant. They establish that evidence of a defendant’s general hatred of a plaintiff is 

not relevant to a qualified immunity defense, but specific intent that constitutes an element of a 

constitutional violation is relevant. Retaliatory intent is precisely such an element. 

 E. Conclusion 

 As set forth above, defendant Cappel cannot establish that he is entitled to qualified 

immunity under either prong of the test and his motion for summary judgment should therefore be 

denied. 

IV. Request for Status/Scheduling Conference 

 The parties’ stipulated request for a status conference will be granted in part. The court 

will set a status conference. However, due to the pending recommendation that defendant 

Cappel’s motion for summary judgment be denied and to facilitate judicial economy, the status 

conference will not be set until the district judge rules on the findings and recommendations. 

//// 

Case 2:10-cv-03227-TLN-AC Document 109 Filed 01/07/16 Page 10 of 11
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

11

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

The parties’ stipulated request for a status conference (ECF No. 107) is granted in part. 

The court will schedule a status conference upon resolution of the pending findings and 

recommendations on defendant Cappel’s motion for summary judgment. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that defendant Cappel’s motion for summary 

judgment (ECF No. 83) be denied. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: January 6, 2016 

Case 2:10-cv-03227-TLN-AC Document 109 Filed 01/07/16 Page 11 of 11