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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 21, 1997 Decided December 19, 1997 

No. 96-5297

SCOTT J. RAFFERTY,

APPELLANT

v.

JUDICIAL COUNCIL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

No. 95cv01499

Scott J. Rafferty, pro se, argued the cause and filed the 

briefs.

Daniel Van Horn, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee with whom Eric H. Holder, U.S. Attorney 

at the time the briefs were filed and R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, were on the briefs.

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Before: NEWMAN, MAYER, and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges.*

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge NEWMAN.

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge: Scott J. Rafferty, Esq., brought 

suit in the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia, requesting the declaration that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 372(c)(14), the confidentiality provision of the Judicial 

Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 

1980, 28 U.S.C. § 372, is unconstitutional. The district court 

dismissed the suit for lack of case or controversy.1 The 

dismissal is affirmed, on the following premises.

OPINION

Mr. Rafferty filed a complaint of judicial misconduct with 

the Judicial Council for the District of Columbia Circuit. 

Although such complaints are governed by certain confidentiality requirements, 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(14),2

information 

__________

* Judges Newman and Mayer of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judge Niemeyer of the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 291(a).

1 Rafferty v. Judicial Council for the District of Columbia 

Circuit, No. 95-CV-1499 (EGS), 1996 WL 451052 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 

1996).

2

§ 372(c)(14). Except as provided in paragraph (8), all papers, documents, and records of proceedings related to investigations conducted under this subsection shall be confidential and shall 

not be disclosed by any person in any proceeding except to the 

extent that

(A) the judicial council of the circuit in its discretion releases a 

copy of a report of a special investigative committee under paragraph (5) to the complainant whose complaint initiated the investigation by that special committee and to the judge or magistrate 

whose conduct is the subject of the complaint;

(B) the judicial council of the circuit, the Judicial Conference of 

the United States, or the Senate or the House of Representatives 

by resolution, releases any such material which is believed necesUSCA Case #96-5297 Document #317266 Filed: 12/19/1997 Page 2 of 5
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about this complaint became public through no fault of Mr. 

Rafferty. He states that because of this confidentiality provision he has been and continues to be restricted from responding to inaccurate and prejudicial disclosures and actions in 

this and other forums, and from otherwise defending his 

interests and those of his clients. He states that he has been 

prejudiced to the extent of violation of First Amendment and 

Fifth Amendment rights, and on these grounds he challenges 

the constitutionality of the statute.

Mr. Rafferty states that even though the complaint of 

judicial misconduct and a substantial amount of related information have been disclosed by others, he has been advised 

that the statute requires absolute forbearance and silence on 

his part. He cites an advisory letter from the Assistant 

General Counsel of the Administrative Office of the United 

States Courts, advice from and actions of the Clerk of this 

court, and statements of congressional staff. He states that 

§ 372(c)(14), on its face and as thus interpreted, denies him 

the right to defend himself and his professional reputation, 

the right to disclose information to potential attorneys and to 

the public, and the right to disclose information to Congress 

or its committees in petition for redress of grievances. He 

cites investigations by Bar Counsel of the District of Columbia on whether he filed a "meritless judicial complaint," to 

which he is unable to respond. He states that he has 

experienced loss of clientele, whom he identifies, and loss of 

professional regard.

Thus Mr. Rafferty argues that this is a case of actual 

controversy, see Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and that he 

has standing to seek relief and a declaration of unconstitutionality by virtue of the actual prejudice and injury he has 

experienced and continues to experience. He argues that he 

is not required to place himself in a position of possible 

__________

sary to an impeachment investigation or trial of a judge under 

article I of the Constitution; or

(C) such disclosure is authorized in writing by the judge or 

magistrate who is the subject of the complaint and by the chief 

judge of the circuit, the Chief Justice, or the chairman of the 

standing committee established under section 331 of this title.

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contemptthe remedy for infraction of § 372(c)(14)in order 

to challenge the constraint that this statute has imposed and 

continues to impose on him.

The Judicial Council for the District of Columbia Circuit, 

the body responsible for administering the Act in this circuit, 

states that there is no controversy between it and Mr. 

Rafferty because the Judicial Council will not act against Mr. 

Rafferty. In its brief on this appeal the Judicial Council 

states that it interprets § 372(c)(14) as applying only to 

judicial officers and staff such as courtroom deputies and 

reporters, and not to the complainant. The Judicial Council 

states that it "is not seeking to prevent disclosures of the sort 

contemplated by Mr. Rafferty's complaint and has no intent 

either to impose any sanction on Mr. Rafferty for making 

such disclosures or to assert any privilege with respect to that 

information." Brief at 6-7. The Judicial Council states that 

it "has construed the statute to provide the maximum protection for complainants rather than to restrict their activities. 

In short, there is simply no basis for Mr. Rafferty to fear that 

the Judicial Council will penalize him for disclosing truthful 

information concerning judicial complaints to his prospective 

attorneys, to Congress, or to the public at large." Brief at 7. 

The Council states that "as far as the Judicial Council is 

concerned, Mr. Rafferty is free to use whatever information 

about judicial complaints he desires, in whatever manner he 

desires, to advance or protect his interest in any and every 

way." Brief at 11.

Mr. Rafferty, stressing the contrary views of the Administrative Office and the Clerk of this court, suggests that these 

representations of the Judicial Council are artfully worded, 

that they are contained in documents filed under seal, and in 

all events that they do not protect his use of the information 

in other forums. The Judicial Council, recognizing that there 

may have been uncertainty in the past, states that, "If 

confusion or uncertainty ever existed about the Judicial Council's interpretation of the statutory confidentiality requirement, the Judicial Council's representations in this case have 

conclusively put any doubts about that subject to rest." Brief 

at 12. At oral argument, in response to a question from the 

bench, the Judicial Council stated that it sees no risk of 

enforcement of the statute outside of action by the Judicial 

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Council, for example by contempt proceedings or criminal 

action.

The clearly stated, unconditional, and broad assurances 

now provided to Mr. Rafferty by the Judicial Council resolve 

the issue, for the Council has committed itself, insofar as Mr. 

Rafferty is concerned, and may not thereafter assume a 

contrary position to his prejudice. See Davis v. Wakelee, 156 

U.S. 680, 689 (1895) ("[W]here a party assumes a certain 

position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining 

that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his 

interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially 

if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the 

position formerly taken by him.") Cf. Chance v. Board of 

Examiners, 561 F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977) (parties who 

make an agreement with the court are bound by their representations). Any residual harm in this or other possible 

forums is speculative, and thus insufficient to support standing. See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 

298 (1979) ("[P]ersons having no fears of state prosecution 

except those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be 

accepted as appropriate plaintiffs.")

Since the commitments made by the Judicial Council resolve the concerns raised by Mr. Rafferty, we need not and 

do not review the Council's interpretation of the statute, or 

advise on the merits of Mr. Rafferty's constitutional challenge. See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 

89 (1947) ("[T]he federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions."); 

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 

270, 273 (1941) ("[T]he question in each case is whether the 

facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is 

a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse 

legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant 

the issuance of a declaratory judgment.")

Upon the Judicial Council's commitment that Mr. Rafferty 

is free to make the disclosures he wishes to make, there 

remains no case or controversy in terms of Article III, and no 

basis for a declaratory judgment action, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 

The judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

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