Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02024/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02024-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAFAEL FLORES,

Petitioner,

v.

SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

BRADLEY, Police; SULLIVAN, Police; 

STANLEY, Police; JONES, Police,

Respondents.

Case No.: 15-CV-2024-AJB-RBB

ORDER: 

(1) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION, (Doc. No. 29); 

AND 

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND FOR MORE 

DEFINITE STATEMENT, (Doc. No. 

16)

Petitioner Rafael Flores (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1.) 

Plaintiff filed his complaint on September 10, 2015, in which he asserts a claim for

excessive use of force against the San Diego Police Department (“SDPD”) and Police 

Officers Bradley, Sullivan, Stanley, and Jones (collectively, “Defendants”).1 Pending 

before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim 

 

1 Petitioner sues the officers in their individual capacities. (Doc. No. 1.)

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and for a more definite statement. (Doc. No. 16.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), 

United States Magistrate Judge Brooks submitted a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) 

to this Court, recommending Defendants’ motion be granted in part and denied in part. 

(Doc. No. 29.) Judge Brooks required the parties to file objections by August 1, 2016. No 

objections were filed. Having considered the parties’ submissions and the applicable law, 

and finding the R&R to be well reasoned, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and GRANTS in 

part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND

This dispute arises from an altercation that took place between Petitioner and 

Defendants on March 19, 2014.2 Petitioner asserts he was fleeing from police officers out 

of fright. While he was on a fence approximately ten to thirteen feet aboveground, Officer 

Bradley tased him, causing him to fall and land on his head. Officer Sullivan then 

proceeded to choke Petitioner in a carotid chokehold and “hammer fist” him on the back 

of his head. Officer Stanley pushed Petitioner at some point after he had been tased, and 

Officer Jones handcuffed him.

Following this incident, Petitioner was transported to the intensive care unit at the 

University of California, San Diego for treatment. Petitioner asserts his head was “cracked 

open” and his ribs were broken as a result of this altercation. Petitioner further asserts that, 

to this day, he suffers from nerve pain and numbness in his limbs, as well as blackouts that 

last for minutes at a time.

In response to this incident, Petitioner instituted this action by filing the operative 

complaint on September 10, 2015, asserting one claim for excessive use of force. (Doc. 

No. 1.) On November 25, 2015, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss and for a 

more definite statement. (Doc. No. 16.) Petitioner filed an opposition, (Doc. No. 20), and 

Defendants filed a reply, (Doc. No. 23). On July 7, 2016, Magistrate Judge Brooks issued 

an R&R, recommending that the Court grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motion. 

 

2 All facts contained in this section are taken from the complaint. (Doc. No. 1.)

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(Doc. No. 29.) Magistrate Judge Brooks permitted the parties until August 1, 2016, to file 

objections to the R&R. (Id. at 12.) To date, no objections have been filed.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district 

judge’s duties in connection with a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The 

district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to 

which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the 

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); 

see United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617–18 (9th Cir. 1989). However, in the 

absence of timely objections, the Court “need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error 

on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)

advisory committee’s note (1983); see also United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The statute makes it clear that the district judge must review the 

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not 

otherwise.”).

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Defendants seek dismissal of the cause of action as alleged against the individual 

officers for failure to provide sufficient facts to withstand Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny.3(Doc. 

No. 16-1 at 11–23.) They further seek dismissal of the complaint as alleged against the 

SDPD because it is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983. (Id. at 23–24.) 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure4 

 

3 Defendants seek dismissal of what they construe as two separate claims. (Doc. No. 16-1 

at 11–23.) While the Court agrees it could be clearer that Petitioner asserts only a single

claim, the “second” claim appears to be nothing more than further details of the injuries 

Petitioner sustained as a result of the officers’ actions as outlined in the “first” claim. 

Accordingly, the Court construes Petitioner’s complaint as alleging only a single cause of 

action. The Court notes Magistrate Judge Brooks treated the complaint in a similar fashion.

4 All references to “Rule” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 

(9th Cir. 2001). “The court may dismiss a complaint as a matter of law for (1) lack of 

cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim.” SmileCare 

Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan, 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). However, a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it 

contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In making this determination, a court reviews the 

contents of the complaint, accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l 

League of Postmasters, 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007).

Notwithstanding this deference, the reviewing court need not accept legal 

conclusions as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). It is also improper for a 

court to assume “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged[.]” 

Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 

(1983). However, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume 

their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 

relief.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679.

Neither party timely filed objections. Having reviewed the R&R, the Court finds 

Magistrate Judge Brooks’s R&R is thorough, well-reasoned, and contains no clear error. 

Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety. The Court thus GRANTS in 

part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Specifically, the motion is 

DENIED to the extent Defendants argue the complaint fails to state a claim as to Officers 

Bradley, Sullivan, and Stanley, but is GRANTED as to Officer Jones and the SDPD. The 

complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Officer Jones. The complaint 

is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to the SDPD. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1130–31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (explaining leave to amend should be granted unless 

amendment would be futile); Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. 

Cal. 1996) (dismissing § 1983 claim with prejudice as alleged against the Santa Clara 

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Department of Corrections because it “is an agency of the County of Santa Clara,” and 

while “[t]he County is a proper defendant in a § 1983 claim, an agency of the County is 

not”).

II. Motion for More Definite Statement Under Rule 12(e)

Defendants alternatively ask the Court to order Petitioner to file a more definite 

statement. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 24–28.) Specifically, they ask that Petitioner clarify whether 

he is asserting his claims under either the Fourth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, or 

both. (Id. at 24–27.) They also ask that Petitioner clarify whether he is asserting two 

separate causes of action. (Id. at 27–28.) The R&R does not address this argument.

Rule 12(e) permits a party to “move for a more definite statement of a pleading to 

which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party 

cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). “[T]he proper test in 

evaluating a motion under Rule 12(e) is whether the complaint provides the defendant with 

a sufficient basis to frame his responsive pleadings.” Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. 

Musacchio, 695 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 1988). However, Rule 12(e) motions are 

disfavored and rarely granted absent “the complaint [being] so indefinite that the defendant 

cannot ascertain the nature of the claim being asserted.” Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 

874 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (C.D. Cal. 1994). Accordingly, “[s]uch a motion is likely to be 

denied where the substance of the claim has been alleged, even though some of the details 

are omitted.” Id.

The Court finds granting Defendants’ motion is not necessary at this time. As 

explained supra, the Court finds the complaint is appropriately interpreted as alleging a 

single cause of action against Defendants. See supra note 3. Furthermore, whether 

Petitioner’s claim is brought to vindicate his Fourth Amendment rights versus his Eighth 

Amendment rights is a question the answer to which “is obtainable through the discovery 

process.” Medrano v. Kern Cnty. Sheriff’s Officer, 921 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1013 (E.D. Cal. 

2013). The Court does note that Magistrate Judge Brooks construed Petitioner’s claim as 

asserting a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. (Doc. No. 29 at 5.) The Court agrees 

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that this is an appropriate construction given Petitioner’s allegations that he was fleeing the 

officers out of fright. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) The Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion 

for a more definite statement. To the extent Petitioner intended to also assert a claim for 

violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, he may clarify so in an amended complaint. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Brooks’s R&R, 

(Doc. No. 39), and ORDERS as follows: Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state 

a claim is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Doc. No. 16.) The complaint is 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Officer Jones and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE as to the San Diego Police Department. Petitioner may file an amended 

complaint curing the deficiencies noted herein within sixty days of this order’s issuance. 

Failure to do so will result in dismissal of Officer Jones and any Eighth Amendment claims 

Petitioner intended to assert with prejudice. Defendants’ motion for a more definite 

statement is DENIED. (Doc. No. 16.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 22, 2016

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