Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02034/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02034-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROWDERICK P. WHITEHEAD, JR.,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10cv2034-WQH-JMA

ORDER

vs.

SELENE RMOF REO ACQUISITION II,

LLC,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

(“Motion to Proceed IFP”). (ECF No. 2).

BACKGROUND

On September 29, 2010, Plaintiff Rowderick P. Whitehead, Jr., a nonprisoner

proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a Complaint and the Motion to Proceed IFP.

(ECF No. 1, 2).

ANALYSIS

Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999).

Case 3:10-cv-02034-WQH-JMA Document 3 Filed 11/16/10 Page 1 of 3
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In an affidavit accompanying the Motion to Proceed IFP, Plaintiff states that he has not

been employed since 2008, he has no bank accounts, and he owns no assets of value, such as

real estate or a vehicle. Plaintiff states that his sole source of income is “gift from family $600

per month.” (ECF No. 2 at 2). The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s affidavit and finds it is

sufficient to show that Plaintiff is unable to pay the fees required to maintain this action. The

Court grants the Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Initial Screening

After granting IFP status, the Court must dismiss the case sua sponte if the case “fails

to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun

v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001).

The standard used to evaluate whether a complaint should be dismissed is a liberal one,

particularly when the action has been filed pro se. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97

(1976). However, even a “liberal interpretation ... may not supply elements of the claim that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982); see also Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[P]ro se litigants are

bound by the rules of procedure.”). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides that “[a]

pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation

to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions,

and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation omitted).

The Complaint alleges that this action “involves real property located at ... 40008

Montage Lane, Murrieta, CA....” (ECF No. 1 at 1). The Complaint alleges that “[t]he Lenders

dishonored/failed to give full disclosure pursuant to Regulation Z of the Truth-in-Lending

Act,” in the course of a loan transaction. Id. at 3. Plaintiff seeks rescission and damages.

The allegations of the Complaint are insufficient to put Defendant on notice of the

claims against it, as required by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The

Complaint does not identify the date of the loan transaction, the parties to the transaction, or

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how the “Lenders” failed to comply with the Truth in Lending Act. The Complaint repeatedly

references “rescission” and Yamamoto v. Bank of New York, 329 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2003).

(ECF No. 1 at 4, 10, 12). As discussed in Yamamoto, in order to prevail on a rescission claim

pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act, a borrower is obligated to tender the property the

borrower received from the creditor under the loan. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); 12 C.F.R.

§226.23(d); see also Yamamoto, 329 F.3d at 1171 (courts have the discretion to condition

rescission upon the satisfaction of the tender requirement). Plaintiff stated in his affidavit

submitted in support of the Motion for IFP that Plaintiff has no assets, savings, or income

beyond a monthly gift of $600. The Complaint contains no allegations related to the tender

requirement.

The Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted

and must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Leave to Proceed in Formal Pauperis

is GRANTED. (ECF No. 2). The Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice and the Clerk

of the Court shall close this case. No later than THIRTY (30) DAYS from the date of this

Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint, which shall be entitled, “First Amended

Complaint,” and which shall cure the deficiencies addressed in this Order. If Plaintiff does not

file an amended complaint within thirty days, this case shall remain closed without further

order of the Court.

DATED: November 16, 2010

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

Case 3:10-cv-02034-WQH-JMA Document 3 Filed 11/16/10 Page 3 of 3