Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02541/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02541-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID AUSTIN,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-2541 GEB PAN P

vs.

ANTHONY J. MALFI, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has moved to dismiss on the grounds

that this action is barred by the statute of limitations.

On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

was enacted. The AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) so that it now provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

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the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(2) provides that “the time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

For purposes of the statute of limitations analysis, the relevant chronology of this

case is as follows:

1. On April 18, 2001, petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of second degree

robbery in violation of California Penal Code § 211, with an arming enhancement; one count of

possession of cocaine in violation of California Health and Safety Code § 11350, subdivision (a),

and one count of petty theft in violation of California Penal Code § 666. Petitioner was

sentenced to 13 years in state prison. 

2. Petitioner did not appeal his conviction.

3. On December 29, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the Sacramento County Superior Court, case number 03F11292. (February 17, 2006 Lodged

Document (hereafter “Lodged Document”) No. 2.) This petition was denied as untimely on

January 23, 2004, citing In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 774-75 (1993). (Lodged Document No. 3.)

4. On March 17, 2004, petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus

in the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, case number C046369. (Lodged

Document No. 4.) That petition was denied on April 1, 2004, without comment. (Lodged

Document No. 5.) 

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 In his opposition, petitioner disputes this recitation of his collateral challenges in state 1

court, alleging that his petitions were all one continued collateral challenge to the three cases for

which he was convicted (00F07697, 00F09377, 00F08895). Petitioner characterizes this

recitation as “respondent’s attempt to illustrate this progression as piecemeal through the state

courts.” (Opp’n at 3.) However, petitioner is mistaken. Petitioner appropriately filed his

petitions in each state court and the recitation of his filings accurately reflects petitioner’s efforts

to exhaust his state court remedies as to petitioner’s underlying conviction. There is no

differentiation noted as to the three cases consolidated for trial below.

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5. Petitioner filed a third petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California

Supreme Court on October 6, 2004, case number S128273. (Lodged Document No. 6.) That

petition was denied on August 17, 2005, without comment. (Lodged Document No. 7.)1

6. On November 15, 2005, petitioner filed the instant action. 

For most state prisoners, the one-year period of limitation begins to run when the

prisoner's judgment of conviction becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). In this case,

petitioner has not asserted and it does not appear that any other provision of § 2244(d)(1) is

applicable. Judgment was entered in petitioner's case on April 18, 2001, and became final sixty

days later, on June 18, 2001, upon expiration of the time for filing an appeal. See Cal. Rules of

Ct. 31 (prior to amends. effective Jan. 1, 2004). Accordingly, the AEDPA statute of limitations

began to run for petitioner on June 18, 2001.

The statute of limitations expired one year later, on June 17, 2002, unless

petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the tolling provisions. "The time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted" toward the AEDPA statute of limitations. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The statute of limitations is not tolled, however, during the interval

between the date on which a judgment becomes final and the date on which the petitioner files

his first state collateral challenge. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.1999).

In this case, petitioner's first state habeas petition was mailed to the Sacramento

County Superior Court on December 19, 2003, more than one year and seven months after the

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statute of limitations expired on June 17, 2002. State habeas petitions filed after the one-year

statute of limitations has expired do not revive the statute of limitations and have no tolling

effect. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.2003); Jimenez v. Rice, 276 F.3d

478, 482 (9th Cir.2001). The state habeas petitions filed by petitioner in 2003, long after the

statute of limitations had already expired, do not entitle petitioner to statutory tolling of the

one-year period of limitation.

Petitioner's federal habeas petition, dated and served on November 3, 2005, was

filed in federal court on November 15, 2005, over three years after the statute of limitations

expired on June 17, 2002. This action is therefore barred by the statute of limitations.

III. Equitable Tolling

The doctrine of equitable tolling has been applied in cases where a party was

prevented from asserting a claim by wrongful conduct on the part of the opposing party or where

extraordinary circumstances beyond the party's control made it impossible for him to file a claim

on time. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir.1996).

The AEDPA statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling, but "only when

'extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on

time' and 'the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness." ' Laws v.

Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th

Cir.2003)). "[A] litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements:

(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way." Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 1814 & 1815, n.8

(2005). Equitable tolling will be unavailable in most cases. See Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d

874, 877 (9th Cir.2002); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999).

The petitioner in the present case alleges that he did not appeal his conviction

because he had asked his trial counsel to file the appeal and petitioner reasonably relied on his

trial counsel to file a notice of appeal. (Opp’n at 5.) Petitioner states that it took him many,

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 The Spitsyn court was presented with the following facts: Though he was hired nearly

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a full year in advance of the AEDPA deadline, counsel completely failed to prepare and file a

petition. Spitsyn and his mother contacted counsel numerous times, by telephone and in writing,

seeking action, but these efforts proved fruitless. Furthermore, despite a request that he return

Spitsyn's file, counsel retained it for the duration of the limitations period and more than two

months beyond. That conduct was so deficient as to distinguish it from the merely negligent

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many months to realize and actually know his trial counsel failed to file a notice of appeal. (Id.) 

Petitioner contends he attempted numerous times to obtain critical documents from his trial

counsel to no avail. Petitioner maintains he did not become aware his trial counsel failed to file

an appeal until his wife contacted the California Appellate Project during the month of July,

2002, when petitioner was first transferred out of a reception center to a mainline institution

where he had access to a law library. 

From July, 2002 to December 29, 2003, petitioner alleges he only had about 11

months to prepare his pro se habeas petition due to prison lockdowns. (Opp’n at 8-9.) Petitioner

argues he exercised due diligence from the time he first filed his state habeas petition on

December 29, 2003 through the various levels of state court review. (Opp’n at 3.) 

However, petitioner's conclusory allegations do not demonstrate or even suggest

that extraordinary circumstances existed continuously during the time that elapsed between June

18, 2001, when petitioner's statute of limitations period began to run, and July of 2002, when

plaintiff states he first became aware his trial counsel failed to file an appeal. Nor has petitioner

made any showing that he pursued his rights diligently during that time. Indeed, it appears

petitioner did not seek his transcripts from the state court until June of 2003 (Opp’n, Ex. C), long

after the statute of limitations had already run. Petitioner states he was diligent “subsequent to

his initial discovery of the substantive violations made by his trial counsel.” (Opp’n at 10.) 

Unfortunately, that diligence was too late.

The Ninth Circuit has held that equitable tolling may be warranted where an

attorney retained to file a habeas petition effectively abandons his client and fails to file the

habeas petition within the required period. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir.2003).2

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performance of counsel in Frye and Miranda. Spitsyn, supra.

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In that case, Spitsyn had retained counsel specifically to pursue habeas relief. Here, petitioner

had allegedly asked trial counsel to file an appeal, and petitioner argues that “a reasonable and

competent attorney would have known to pursue an appeal from the conviction and sentence.” 

(Opp’n at 3.) However, petitioner does not state that trial counsel agreed to file an appeal or that

petitioner retained trial counsel to file an appeal on petitioner’s behalf. Moreover, even if trial

counsel had agreed to file an appeal and failed to do so, such failure would only be viewed as

negligence, not as an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. 

Incompetence and "negligence in general do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient

to warrant equitable tolling." Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.2001); but see

United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.2004) (leaving open the question of whether an

attorney's refusal to provide a habeas client with important parts of his legal file may rise to the

level of "extraordinary circumstances"). Although petitioner claims he made several attempts to

get his file from trial counsel without success, petitioner did not attempt to obtain court

transcripts from state court until June of 2003. Because trial counsel was not retained to pursue a

collateral challenge on petitioner’s behalf, those transcripts would not have been located in trial

counsel’s files. Thus, petitioner’s delay in seeking said transcripts demonstrates petitioner was

not diligent in pursuing those records once his conviction became final on June 18, 2001 through

the running of the statute of limitations on June 17, 2002.

Moreover, an attorney's negligence in failing to advise his client of AEDPA's

limitation period also does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to invoke

equitable tolling. Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.2001); see also Miranda v.

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 (9th Cir.2002) (counsel's prejudicial miscalculation of deadline

did not constitute an extraordinary circumstance). 

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For all of the foregoing reasons, respondents’ motion to dismiss should be

granted.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondents’ February 17, 2006 motion to dismiss be granted; and 

2. This action be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 20, 2006.

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aust2541.mtd

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