Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00441/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00441-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Guadalupe Gonzales, Jr.,1

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV12-0441-TUC-DCB (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 

 Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) 

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Guadalupe Gonzales, Jr. In accordance with 

the Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona 

and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report 

 

1

 In the captions of the state court filings and the Reply filed in this action (Doc. 11), 

Petitioner’s last name is spelled “Gonzalez.” However, in the caption of the Petition 

(Doc. 1), his name is spelled “Gonzales.” 

Case 4:12-cv-00441-DCB Document 12 Filed 07/09/13 Page 1 of 10
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

and recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that 

the District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition 

with prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Following a jury trial, Gonzales was convicted of two counts of second degree 

murder, four counts of endangerment, and four counts related to driving under the 

influence. Answer, Ex. A, p. 1; Ex. I, p. 1. The trial court sentenced Gonzales to 

consecutive mitigated 10-year sentences on the murder convictions, and concurrent 

sentences ranging from six months to one-year in prison on the remaining counts. 

Id., Ex. A., p. 3. 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the factual background as follows: 

Around midnight on April 15 or 16, 2008, Gonzalez was in Pima 

County traveling southbound on Kino Parkway at approximately 

seventy miles per hour (mph) when he drove through a red light at 

22nd Street, colliding with an eastbound Thunderbird and killing its 

driver, L., and her passenger, A. At the moment of impact, Gonzalez 

was traveling approximately fifty-nine mph, nineteen mph over Kino 

Parkway's posted speed limit of forty mph. L. was traveling 

approximately forty-eight mph, eighteen mph over 22nd Street's thirtymph speed limit. Before coming to rest, Gonzalez's truck also struck a 

minivan traveling behind the Thunderbird and a northbound taxicab 

stopped at the red light on Kino Parkway. Laboratory analysis showed 

Gonzalez had ingested cocaine before driving and his alcohol 

concentration one hour after the collision was .201. Laboratory analysis 

from L.'s autopsy showed therapeutic levels of the prescription 

painkiller oxycodone in her bloodstream. 

Answer, Ex. A, p. 2. 

 Gonzales appealed his conviction, claiming that the trial court erred by 

precluding evidence of oxycodone in the victim’s blood and by failing to instruct the 

Case 4:12-cv-00441-DCB Document 12 Filed 07/09/13 Page 2 of 10
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

jury on “superseding cause,” and regarding consideration of the decedent’s conduct 

in defining and determining recklessness. Id., Ex. I. On March 19, 2010, the Court 

of Appeals affirmed Gonzales’s conviction in an unpublished memorandum decision. 

Id., Ex. A. Gonzales then petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for review and the 

petition was denied on September 8, 2010. Id., Ex. B. 

 On October 7, 2010, Gonzales filed a timely notice for post-conviction relief 

(“PCR”). Id., Ex. C. However, in a ruling dated June 3, 2011, the trial noted that 

Gonzales had failed to file a memorandum in support of his PCR petition and, after 

having granted several previous motions to extend, refused to grant an additional 

extension and dismissed the petition. Id., Ex. D. Gonzales appealed the dismissal. 

Id., Ex. E. On July 18, 2011, the Court of Appeals issued an order finding that 

Gonzales’ petition for review was not in compliance with Rule 32.9, Ariz.R.Crim.P. , 

and ordered Gonzales to file a petition conforming to the rule by August 17, 2011. 

Id., Ex. F. On December 2, 2011, Gonzales filed a petition claiming that the 

dismissal of his petition was reversible error and that his trial counsel had been 

ineffective by failing to present expert testimony that the oxycodone in the victimdriver’s bloodstream affected her driving ability. Id., Ex. G. On December 16, 2011, 

the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because there had been “no compliance 

with this Court’s order dated July 18, 2011.” Id., Ex. J. Gonzales claims he appealed 

the dismissal to the Arizona Supreme Court. Petition, p. 5. 

 In the petition now before the Court, which was filed on June 8, 2012, 

Gonzales alleges that the trial court erred by precluding evidence of oxycodone in the 

Case 4:12-cv-00441-DCB Document 12 Filed 07/09/13 Page 3 of 10
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

decedent driver’s blood and by failing to instruct the jury on the defense theory of the 

case. Petition, pp. 6-7. 

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 A. The Petition is untimely. 

 1. Gonzales did not satisfy the AEDPA statute of limitations.

 The Respondents contend that Gonzales’s petition is untimely. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) provides for a one 

year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations period must be dismissed. 

Id. 

 The one-year statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitions generally begins 

to run on “the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). In Arizona, the opportunity for direct review includes postconviction relief proceedings filed under Rule 32, Ariz.R.Crim.P. “Arizona’s Rule 

32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct review within 

the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 717 

(9th Cir. 2007). The limitations period is tolled during the pendency of a properly 

filed state post-conviction proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 

544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005). 

 In this case, the one-year limitations period began to run on June 3, 2011, 

when the trial court dismissed the PCR notice due to Gonzales failure to timely file a 

Case 4:12-cv-00441-DCB Document 12 Filed 07/09/13 Page 4 of 10
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

supporting memorandum. Answer, p. 3. As of that date, there was no properly filed 

post-conviction proceeding pending. Pace, 544 U.S. at 410, 417 (holding that 

untimely state post-conviction petition is not “properly filed” within the meaning of § 

2244(d)(2)). Thus, the one-year limitations period began to run on June 3, 2011, and 

expired before the petition was filed in the instant matter on June 8, 2012. 

 2. Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

 The United States Supreme Court has determined that “§ 2244(d) is subject to 

equitable tolling in appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 

(2010). However, it is available only when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a 

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time” and “the 

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness.” Laws v. Lamarque, 

351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger 

equitable tolling is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. 

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 

F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)). 

 In his Reply, Gonzales admits that his petition was mailed three days late, but 

claims that this was due to limited access and time to complete legal research. Reply, 

p. 10-11. However, even if these circumstances can be characterized as 

“extraordinary,” equitable tolling is not warranted when the circumstances are 

encountered early on in the limitations period, see Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 

(9th Cir. 2001), or where the circumstances are not shown to have caused the 

untimely filing of the habeas petition, Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

Case 4:12-cv-00441-DCB Document 12 Filed 07/09/13 Page 5 of 10
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2009). Here, Gonzales merely lists several situations encountered in prison that could 

delay access to the library, but has not described the time periods. It is unlikely that 

these events were constant and that Gonzales was entirely precluded from using the 

library. In any case, Gonzales has not satisfied the “heavy burden” he is required to 

meet to establish a basis for equitable tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Because he is 

not entitled to equitable tolling, his federal habeas petition was untimely. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1). 

B. Gonzales’ claims are not cognizable.

 Even if the petition was found to be timely filed, Gonzales’ claims do not 

merit relief. Gonzales’ claims are that the trial court improperly excluded evidence 

of oxycodone in the decedent driver’s blood and failed to give jury instructions that 

were directed at placing fault on the decedent driver based on the oxycodone use and 

speed at the time of the wreck. Respondents contend that these claims fail to raise 

cognizable federal habeas claims. The Court agrees. 

 Habeas relief is available only where a prisoner is in custody “in violation of 

the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). Subsection (a) of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 states 

that habeas relief is appropriate where the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Further, 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(1) and (2) require that a petitioner demonstrate that the state courts’ 

adjudication of his claims resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an 

Case 4:12-cv-00441-DCB Document 12 Filed 07/09/13 Page 6 of 10
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding. 

 Gonzales’ first claim attacks the trial court’s evidentiary decision to disallow 

evidence of the presence of therapeutic levels of oxycodone in decedent-driver’s 

blood. In support of this claim, Gonzales cites only Arizona cases. In addressing this 

claim, the Court of Appeals logically based the vast majority of its decision on 

Arizona cases and Rule 403, Ariz.R.Evid. In its only mention of federal authority in 

relation to this claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the 

trial court’s ruling precluding the oxycodone evidence violated Gonzales’ 

constitutional right to present a defense, finding that: 

 “well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude 

evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors 

such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead 

the jury.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326, 126 S.Ct. 

1727, 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006). Because the court properly excluded the 

evidence under Rule 403, we find no violation of Gonzalez's 

constitutional rights. 

Answer, Ex. A, pp. 10-11. 

 To be cognizable here, Gonzales must establish that the trial court’s admission 

of evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally 

unfair. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 70 (1991); Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 

1357 (9th Cir. 1995). The category of evidentiary infractions that violate fundamental 

fairness is a very narrow one. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 73. As such, few evidentiary 

errors implicate fundamental fairness. Id. at 70. Moreover, the Due Process Clause 

does not guarantee the right to introduce all evidence, even if it is relevant. Montana 

Case 4:12-cv-00441-DCB Document 12 Filed 07/09/13 Page 7 of 10
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996). Even if evidence is relevant, a state laws 

justification for its exclusion does not violate a defendant’s right to present a defense 

unless the decision is “arbitrary or disproportionate” and “infringe[s] upon a weighty 

interest of the accused.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) 

(citations omitted). 

 In Gonzales’ case, the state court found that the decedent’s oxycodone use 

was irrelevant to a charge of second degree murder because “the jury here could not 

reasonably conclude Gonzalez had been permitted to proceed legally through the 

intersection or that [the decedent driver’s] negligence had caused the collision.” 

Answer, Ex. A, pp. 7-8. Additionally, the state court concluded that the evidence, if 

admitted, would result in confusion because it would have spawned “a multiplicity of 

minor issues,” and would have been a waste of time. Answer, Ex. A, p.10. These 

reasons are far from arbitrary or disproportionate and cannot be said to have resulted 

in the violation of Gonzales’ due process rights. 

 Turning to Gonzales’ next claim, like evidentiary error, a state court’s 

instructional error “does not alone raise a ground cognizable in a federal habeas 

corpus proceeding.” Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988); see 

also Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72 (“[T]he fact that the instruction was allegedly 

incorrect under state law is not a basis for habeas relief. Federal habeas courts 

therefore do not grant relief, as might a state appellate court, simply because the 

instruction may have been deficient in comparison to the [model instruction.]”). 

Rather, to be cognizable on habeas review, a state court’s instructional error must 

Case 4:12-cv-00441-DCB Document 12 Filed 07/09/13 Page 8 of 10
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

have “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” 

Id. To prevail on such a claim, a petitioner must show that the defective instruction, 

“considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the entire trial record,” 

show “a reasonable likelihood” that the jury instructions operated to relieve the State 

of its burden of proof. Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 191 (2009); Estelle, 

502 U.S. at 72 (citations omitted). Additionally, a successful petitioner must show 

that the error was not harmless and had a “substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 

(1993); Pulido v. Chrones, 629 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 Here, Gonzales asserts that instructions that the decedent driver’s oxycodone 

use, lack of seatbelt use, and speed at the time she was killed were intervening and 

superseding causes for the wreck and her injuries. In rejecting this claim, the Court 

of Appeals recited some of the overwhelming evidence that Gonzales did not have 

the right of way and concluded that no reasonable jury could have found that he had 

entered the intersection legally. Answer, Ex. A, p. 13. This determination was 

entirely reasonable. The evidence showed that the decedent had the right of way and 

that Gonzales killed her by running a red light. He was not entitled to the requested 

instructions under state law or under federal constitutional principles. As such, this 

claim is not cognizable and must be dismissed. 

Case 4:12-cv-00441-DCB Document 12 Filed 07/09/13 Page 9 of 10
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

III. RECOMMENDATION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court, after its independent review, dismiss with prejudice Petitioner’s Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and 

file written objections within 14 days of being served with a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

The parties are advised that any objections filed are to be identified with the 

following case number: 12-CV-00441-TUC-DCB. 

 Dated this 9th day of July, 2013. 

 

 

Case 4:12-cv-00441-DCB Document 12 Filed 07/09/13 Page 10 of 10