Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00457/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00457-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

The case caption has been changed to reflect the holdings in **

this Order and the Court’s September 29, 2006 Order.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT E. HUNTER, D.V.M.; HOWARD ) 2:06-cv-00457-GEB-EFB

ELEY, )

 ) ORDER*

Plaintiffs, ) 

)

v. ) 

)

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; LOU BLANAS, )

in his individual capacity; and )

SHERIFF JOHN MCGINNIS in his )

official capacity, )

)

Defendants. )

**

)

On June 13, 2008, Defendants County of Sacramento, Sheriff

John McGinnis in his official capacity and Lou Blanas (“Blanas”) in

his individual capacity (collectively “Defendants”) filed a motion for

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28 The official capacity suit is not separately discussed since 1

the claims are duplicate of the claims against the County. 

2

summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ third and fourth claims in

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. Defendants also seek dismissal 1

of all class action allegations, Doe Defendants (claim one) and

Defendant William Kevin Sowles (claim two). Plaintiffs Robert Hunter

(“Hunter”) and Howard Eley (“Eley”) oppose the summary adjudication

motion, but have not opposed the dismissal motions. (Opp’n at 1:23-

26.) 

The Order Setting Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Conference

filed March 6, 2008, required Plaintiffs to justify keeping

allegations against Doe Defendants in the action and warned that

failure to provide justification could result in the Doe Defendants

being dismissed; since said justification has not been provided, and

the discovery and law and motion deadlines have past, the Doe

Defendants are dismissed. 

Further, the Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order filed

November 17, 2006, provided Plaintiffs notice under Rule 4(m) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that if Defendant William Kevin

Sowles was not served with the Second Amended Complaint on or before

December 20, 2006, he would be dismissed from this action for failure

to serve process within Rule 4(m)’s 120-day service period unless

Plaintiffs filed on December 21, 2006 either a proof of service or an

explanation of good cause why Sowles should not be dismissed. To

date, Plaintiffs have not filed anything required by the Order and

there is no indication whatsoever that Sowles has been served or will

be served; therefore, Sowles is dismissed from this action. 

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28 The background facts are stated in the light most favorable to 2

Plaintiffs under the summary judgment standard. 

3

In addition, since Plaintiffs failed to file a motion to

certify a class action as prescribed in the Status (Pretrial

Scheduling) Order filed November 17, 2006, Plaintiffs’ class action

claims are dismissed.

BACKGROUND2

Hunter was arrested for driving under the influence on

September 17, 2005. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 9.) While at the Sacramento

County Main Jail detox holding center, Hunter saw the toilet he

desired to use was clogged and overflowing; therefore, he signaled to

sheriff deputies to inform them of the toilet’s condition and to

request access to another toilet. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) Several unknown

deputies responded by throwing him on the floor and applying force

that resulted in a fractured elbow, stretched tendons, and nerve

damage. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 28.) In addition, Hunter feared his safety would

be threatened if he asked to use a telephone. (Hunter Decl. ¶ 32.) 

Eley was incarcerated in the Main Jail on or about March 21,

2004, where Eley and then-deputy sheriff Sowles had a verbal

disagreement, following which Sowles shoved, slapped and then chocked

Eley without provocation. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 48.) 

Plaintiffs allege in their third claim that the excessive

force to which they were subjected, in violation of their rights under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, was ratified in an unwritten policy allowed to exist

by the County of Sacramento and former County of Sacramento Sheriff

Lou Blanas, and that this policy has resulted in other detainees being

subjected to excessive force in the County’s Main Jail, and led to

Hunter and Eley’s injuries. (Compl. ¶¶ 63, 99, 100, 122, 126.) 

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4

Plaintiffs allege in their fourth claim that their liberty

interests, and the liberty interests of other inmates, were violated

when the County of Sacramento and former Sheriff Lou Blanas ratified a

policy preventing them from making phone calls. (Id. at ¶¶ 148, 155,

158, 164.)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW

When considering a summary judgment motion, the facts are

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and

reasonable inferences are drawn in the non-movant’s favor. Devereaux

v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1086 (9th Cir. 2001). 

ANALYSIS

I. Third Claim

A. Against the County of Sacramento

The County argues it is entitled to summary judgment because

it “has established specific [constitutional] policies [and training]

regarding both the general treatment of persons incarcerated and,

specifically, with respect to the use of force.” (Mot. at 6:24-7:3

(citing Main Jail Operations Orders 1/30 and 3/11).) Plaintiffs argue 

this evidence is not relevant, contending that the policies have not

been shown to have been in effect at the time of Plaintiffs’

incarceration. However, the County provides the declaration of Dawn

Douglas in which she declares that the policies were in effect in 2004

and 2005. (Supp. Douglas Decl. ¶ 3.) In addition, the County

presents evidence the policies were in effect before 2004 since the

policies attached to the Douglas declaration contain notations that

they were revised in 1998 and 2002. (Douglas Decl. Exs. A, B, C.) 

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ objection is overruled. Defendants have shown

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that the County’s formal written policies prohibit the use of

excessive force. 

Plaintiffs counter with the declarations of Hunter, Eley,

Austin Chase (“Chase”) and their expert Lieutenant Timothy Twomey

(retired) (“Twomey”), arguing these declarations show, notwithstanding

the County’s written policies and training, that the County had an

unwritten policy at the County Main Jail which allowed the use of

excessive force. (Opp’n at 2:5-15.) 

Municipal entities are subject to [42 U.S.C. §

1983] liability where “action pursuant to official

municipal policy of some nature cause[s] a

constitutional tort.” A direct causal link

between departmental policy or custom and the

alleged deprivation is therefore required. 

Plaintiff may establish municipal liability by

proving that the violation was committed pursuant

to a formal departmental policy or a “longstanding

practice or custom which constitutes the standard

operating procedure of the local governmental

entity.” 

Afshar v. City of Sacramento, 2006 WL 768823, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Mar.

27, 2006) (as amended) (quoting first Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 385 (1989)) (quoting second Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491

U.S. 701 (1989)). A policy “may be inferred from widespread practices

or ‘evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the

errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded[.]’” 

Nadell v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 268 F.3d 924, (9th Cir. 2001)

(reversed on other grounds) (quoting Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d

1342, 1349 (9th Cir. 1992)). For instance, in Henry v. County of

Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 518-519 (9th Cir. 1997) as amended, 137 F.3d

1372 (9th Cir. 1998), a triable issue was found to exist since 

evidence was “presented that the county acted in accordance with an

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established policy or deliberate indifference to violation of rights

by stripping and detaining in rubber rooms persons stopped for minor,

non-jailable traffic offenses who refuse to sign a notice to appear,

or demand to be taken before a magistrate.” Henry concerned evidence

of incidents over a seven-year period, beginning in 1985 when Henry

received the same alleged treatment he allegedly received in 1993 at

issue in the lawsuit, and also two other detainees who received the

same treatment subsequent to Henry’s alleged experience in 1993. The

Ninth Circuit found that the County was put on clear notice that

constitutional violations had occurred but failed to reprimand the

officers involved.

Plaintiffs’ expert witness Twomey is a former County of

Sacramento Sheriff’s Department Lieutenant and is proffered as an

expert on law enforcement management procedures, investigations, and

use of force. (Twomey Decl. ¶¶ 4, 63, 88.) Twomey opines that “there

were approximately 40 to 50 major incidents of some type of excessive

force at the Main Jail between 2000 and September 17, 2005, the date

Plaintiff Hunter was injured in Detox[; Towmey explains] ‘Major’

incident means some form of taking down an inmate or detainee . . .” 

(Id. ¶¶ 562, 572, 567.) Twomey further opines “there exists at the

main jail an informal policy condoning the use of excessive force on

jail inmates.” (Id. ¶ 585.) 

The County objects to Twomey’s opinion regarding an

“informal policy” arguing it is conclusory and lacks factual basis. 

The burden of showing the lack of foundation for Twomey’s opinions

rests squarely on the shoulders of the County. Under the summary

judgment standard, the portions of Twomey’s declaration discussed

below have not been shown to lack sufficient foundation. Twomey

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opines there were several instances of excessive force which the

county condoned. He discusses seven “similar” cases of excessive

force over the last five years, some of which he opines were either

approved of, not investigated, or went unpunished by the County

Sheriff’s Department; and instances of excessive force witnessed by 

declarants Hunter, Eley and Chase. (See e.g. Twomey Decl. ¶¶ 100,

152, 477, 562, 567, 569.) 

Twomey’s opines that Hunter, Eley and Chase describe 

“identical incidents, independent of the other, with common facts on

the use of take downs [of detainees].” (Id. ¶ 134.) Twomey declares

all these incidents involved “throwing a man to the floor, twisting

both arms behind the back while pulling upward with the legs bent back

and/or held in place while the person is on their stomach. Then, what

follows, deputies commence to punch and/or kick a person who is

already immobilized with an unauthorized control hold.” (Id.) Twomey

discusses Hunter’s declaration where Hunter declares: “[d]uring my

stay, no less than 8 different officers used a method of force which

consisted of twisting a detainee’s arms behind their back, and

simultaneously applying pressure to both by twisting and lifting the

arms. . . .” (Hunter Decl. ¶ 20.) 

Twomey also discusses Eley’s declaration in which Eley

declares from roughly June 18, 2003 to March 15, 2008, he witnessed

fifteen to twenty take-downs on inmates. (Eley Decl. ¶ 9, 11.) Eley

further declared “[t]he most common theme to take-down an inmate by

deputies was for them to just throw the inmate to the hard floor face

first, and several deputies would twist both arms of the inmate behind

the back while holding the legs. Always, the inmate taken down would

scream with obvious pain, and the deputies would not stop. In fact,

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the more the inmate struggled to stop the pain, the more the deputies

would twist both arms.” (Id. ¶ 10.) 

Twomey also discusses the declaration of Chase, who declared

during the twenty days he was at the Main Jail in September of 2005 he

witnessed four or five “identical events” “whereby the detainees were

thrown down hard on the floor while both arms are pulled up behind

their back . . . .” (Chase Decl. ¶¶ 23, 31.) 

Twomey declared that the statements of Hunter, Eley and

Chase “are corroborated by actual videos” produced in the following

matters involving excessive force against arrestees: Jafar Afshar,

Michael Hay and Mihaita Constantin. (Twomey Decl. ¶ 152.) Twomey

avers the Hay incident occurred in 2000,the Afshar and Constantin

incidents in 2003, the Eley incident occurred in 2004, and Chase and

Hunter in 2005. (Id. ¶ 569.) 

Twomey explains he provided expert witness testimony in the 

excessive force case involving arrestee Afshar. (Id. ¶ 2.) Twomey

reviewed a video taken of the incident in the booking area of the Main

Jail. (Id. Ex. W.) Twomey opines that at no time did Afshar pose a

threat; however, Deputy Brett Spaid grabbed Afshar from behind, threw

him backward onto the floor causing him to smash his head on the floor

and then spun him onto his stomach where Spaid and another deputy both

applied the felony handcuffing (double wrist locks). (Id. ¶¶ 207-10,

239, 226.) Twomey opined that the take-down and the double wrist lock

were both unnecessary and unwarranted and amounted to excessive force. 

(Id. ¶¶ 239, 240, 247.) 

Spaid testified that the take-down was in complete

compliance with departmental use of force polices. (Id. ¶ 377.) 

Twomey further declared a high-ranking sheriff deputy official

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reviewed the tape during a deposition in the Afshar case and said he

could not determined whether excessive force had been used and did not

question the control technique. (Id. ¶¶ 160, 378.) After the

incident, Afshar filed a citizen/IA complaint that he had been beaten

in the Main Jail. (Id. ¶¶ 139, 474.) According to Twomey, Department

policies require an Internal Affairs (“IA”) case number and

investigator be assigned after any complaint but that neither was

done. (Id. ¶¶ 379, 380, 388.) Twomey declared that a manager would

usually review the PF10 incident report and the video; Twomey opined

what he reviewed showed that an IA investigation was warranted. (Id.

¶ 237.) After reviewing the video, a Sheriff’s Department official

deposed in the Afshar case admitted an IA case should have been opened

and investigated but was not. (Id. ¶ 378.) Twomey further declared

he saw Blanas reviewing the Afshar video on television and not taking

any action but saying that it was not suppose to happen. (Id. ¶ 474.)

 Twomey reviewed the discovery responses and video in the

excessive force case involving Constantin. (Id. ¶ 100, Ex. T.) 

Constantin was booked for driving under the influence. (Id. ¶ 119.) 

Twomey declares the video shows Deputy Mason grabbing Constantin for

an unknown reason and then throwing him to the ground, after which 

four other deputies “join the fray,” during which the felony wrist

lock technique was applied. (Id. ¶¶ 391, 392, 402.) Consequently,

Constantin suffered a fractured nose and hand. (Id. ¶ 119.)

Twomey declared in his experience, there is no doubt that

the matter should have been investigated as Constantin was diagnosed

in the emergency room with a broken hand and nose and not a single

officer was injured; yet no IA investigation resulted. (Id. ¶¶ 105,

137, 406.)

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Twomey also reviewed the case file and video in the

excessive force case involving Hay. (Id. ¶ 100, Ex. X.) Hay was

booked for public intoxication and suffered a broken arm. (Id. ¶

119.) Hay filed a citizen complaint in January of 2001 and a civil

action in April 2001. (Id. ¶ 128.) In January of 2002 the case

settled. (Id.) Twomey declared that after the case settled, the

deputies involved were punished, but not for the use of excessive

force and no retraining on use of force was ordered. (Id. ¶¶ 128,

130, Ex. 4.) Twomey declared the IA file was signed by upper level

management, even though the video obviously shows excessive force and

negates any alleged justification for the use of force. (Id. ¶ 130,

186.) The Commander of the Main Jail admitted to viewing the video

and concluded the use of force on Hay was appropriate. (Id. ¶ 146.) 

Twomey further declared there were other clues of excessive

force in the Hay file ignored by those who signed off on it, which

suggests the chain of command ignored hints of use force. (Id. ¶ 192-

93, 427, 457.) One officer, Ramos, who was involved in the incident

testified during the IA interview that he hears a popping sound 60%-

70% of the time he applies the felony wrist lock, although Twomey says

this means he is applying the technique incorrectly. (Id. ¶¶ 147-8.) 

Captain Kelly’s report informed Ramos that the popping sound should

not be heard but again, no discipline or retraining was ordered. (Id.

¶¶ 149-50.) 

Twomey further declared that in the Hay video a nurse can be

heard warning Hay “they like to hurt people around here” as Hay argued

he did nothing wrong. (Id. ¶ 191.) Shortly thereafter in the video,

a deputy can be seen making a “shadow boxing” gesture as Hay has his

back turned, suggesting to Twomey that he meant that Hay was about to

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be subject to force. (Id. ¶¶ 192-3.) Twomey declared that despite

this video evidence, the administrative summary makes no reference to

these aspects of the video, did not interview the nurse or the deputy

making the hand motions. 

Twomey infers a policy of excessive force existed in part

from his opinion that the Sheriff’s Department does not investigate

all claims of abuse that are brought to the attention of management. 

(Id. ¶ 567.) 

Plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether there was a “widespread” policy or

custom of excessive force at the Main Jail in the form of using

unauthorized control holds in situations where force was not

justified, and as to whether such a policy was “longstanding,” and as

to whether Sheriff Department officials were aware of past incidents

of this type of excessive force but did not reprimand or retrain the

deputies involved. Therefore, the County’s motion for summary

adjudication of Plaintiffs’ third claim is denied. 

B. Against Blanas in His Individual Capacity

Blanas argues he is entitled to summary judgment because

“Plaintiffs have no evidence and do not even allege that he personally

participated in violating their constitutional rights . . . .” (Mot.

at 9-12.) Plaintiffs counter that the declaration of Twomey

demonstrates that “Blanas is liable in his individual capacity for his

‘action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his

subordinates’ and because he ‘condoned, ratified and encouraged’ the

unconstitutional actions of his subordinates.” (Opp’n at 3:5-8, 4:3-8

(citing Clay v. Conlee, 815 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1987)) (quoting

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Larez v. City of L.A., 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991).) Blanas 

rejoins

there is no evidence that Blanas . . . approved or

ratified use of force against either Hunter or

Eley, but in fact, the Deputy involved in the

incident with Eley was terminated as a result of

the incident. . . . Additionally, plaintiffs’

expert Twomey asserts that while defendant Blanas

was Sheriff, Internal Affairs investigations were

typically reviewed by a Deputy Chief as opposed to

the Sheriff. 

(Reply at 2:4-8 (citing Dull Decl.; Towmey Decl. ¶¶ 408-412, 417-

420).)

Blanas is exposed to liability “in his individual capacity

if he set[] in motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refused

to terminate a series of acts by others, which he kn[e]w or reasonably

should [have] know[n], would cause others to inflict the

constitutional injury.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Under

this standard, Blanas is exposed to liability in his personal capacity

for his “‘own culpable action or inaction in the training,

supervision, or control of his subordinates,’ for his ‘acquisce[nce]

in the constitutional deprivations of which [the] complaint is made,’

or for conduct that showed a ‘reckless or callous indifference to the

rights of others.’” Larez, 946 F.2d at 646 (quoting first Clay, 815

F.2d at 1170) (quoting second Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1528

(10th Cir. 1988)) (quoting third Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151,

1163 (1st Cir. 1989)). 

When an official’s personal liability is premised

upon failure to remedy known constitutional

violations or failure to adequately supervise or

train subordinates, the plaintiff must shown that:

1. The official received “notice of a pattern of

unconstitutional acts” committed by subordinates;

2. The official “demonstrated deliberate

indifference [to] or tacit authorization of the

offensive acts”; 3. The official failed to take

sufficient “remedial” action; and 4. The

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official’s failure proximately caused injury to

plaintiff.

Doe “A” v. Special Sch. Dist., 682 F. Supp. 451, 453 (E.D. Mo. 1988)

(citing Wilson v. City of N. Little Rock, 801 F.2d 316, 322 (8th Cir.

1986) and Clay, 815 F.2d at 1170).

Twomey opines that Blanas ratified a policy of tolerating

excessive force. Twomey declared that “the Chief Deputy is typically

the ultimate decision making authority in determining whether use of

force is appropriate when discipline is NOT recommended — it stops

with him, and thus ratified by the Sheriff.” (Twomey Decl. ¶ 408.) 

However, this opinion is wholly conclusory and lacks any statement of

factual basis (as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e))

for how the Sheriff ratified a use of force determination that he did

not review. Twomey further declared “[T]he Captains, and primarily

the Chief Deputies make policy regarding the minimum threshold on the

use of force, not the Sheriff, and that the Sheriff simply turns a

blind eye to the decisions and policies implemented by his subordinate

staff; hence ratifying their decisions.” (Id. ¶ 409.) However, this

statement is insufficient to establish ratification by Blanas as

Twomey gives no indication that Blanas knew or reasonably should have

known that the policies set by the Chief Deputies were

unconstitutional.

Elsewhere in his declaration, Twomey opines that Blanas was

put on notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts because the Hay

Afshar and Constantin videos, which Twomey opines clearly show

excessive force, became public. Twomey declared

when the videos of the [Michael] Hay, [Jafar]

Afshar and [Mihaita] Constantin beatings surfaced,

Defendant Blanas . . . has then Undersheriff

McGinnis appear on KCRA Channel 3, downplaying

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excessive force at the Jail in 2005. . . . I

worked for an Undersheriff in past

administrations, and there is no way Undersheriff

McGinnis would make the appearance he did on TV

and Radio without the express approval of the

Sheriff. And if the Sheriff were to claim that he

did not view the video tapes of Hay and Constantin

(he admitted to viewing the Afshar video on TV,

first broadcast on the Hispanic Channel) he would

either by lying or purposely refusing to view the

videos to insulate himself from liability though

he has the express duty to know if his deputies

are involved in excessive force when the issue

becomes public. 

(Id. ¶¶ 106-08.) (See also id. ¶ 474 (“Sheriff Blanas was seen by me

on Television reviewing the Afshar video, and not taking any action. 

All he said was that was not suppose to happen.”), ¶ 490 (“[B]ecause

of extensive press coverage, Defendant Blanas cannot claim he did not

know.”). However, these statements do not establish that Blanas

should have credited these allegations of excessive force or should

have independently viewed the videos to make a determination of

whether excessive force was involved since Twomey admits that Blanas

delegated that authority to the Chief Deputies. Twomey declared that

Blanas only viewed one of the videos, and one instance of excessive

force does not make a “pattern.” 

Accordingly, insufficient evidence exists for a jury to

reasonably find that Blanas knowingly refused to terminate a series of

acts by others, which he knew or reasonably should have known, would

cause others to inflict the constitutional injuries alleged by

Plaintiffs. Therefore, Blanas’s motion for summary adjudication of

Plaintiffs’ third claim against him in his individual capacity is

granted. 

///

///

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Defendants further argue that Eley “was not an arrestee, but 3

incarcerated as an inmate to the time of the incident. . . . Thus, the

requirements of telephone access do not apply.” (Mot. at 8:6-8.)

However, Eley’s declaration concerns events that occurred “at the time

[he] was booked into the main jail . . . .” (Eley Decl. ¶ 3.)

Plaintiffs contends this evidence is irrelevant because the 4

policies had not been shown to be in effect at the time of Plaintiffs’

detentions. However, sufficient evidence establishes that they were in

effect in 2004 and 2005. (Supp. Douglas Decl. ¶ 3.) Accordingly,

Plaintiffs’ objection is overruled.

Eley also declared “[s]ome of the other inmates I have talked 5

to also told me that they were not allowed to make any phone calls until

(continued...)

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II. Fourth Claim

Defendants seek summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ fourth

claim arguing that “Main Jail Operations Order 4/250, covering access

to telephones by arrestees, requires . . . at least three phone calls

be allowed.” (Mot. at 8:4-6.) Plaintiffs argue that the 3 4

declarations of Twomey, Hunter, and Eley “create[] a triable issue of

fact on this issue as well, under both Monell and Defendant Blanas’

individual liability. It is very clear that there was no policy in

effect allowing arrestees to three phone calls.” (Opp’n at 4:16-21.) 

Defendants rejoin:

Contrary to the declaration of Twomey, the

declarations of Hunter and Chase do not refer to

lack of telephone access. The only reference to

such an incident is in the Eley declaration[,] a

single incident for which municipal liability

cannot attach. [And] there is no evidence that

[Blanas] personally participated in or approved

restricting telephone access.

(Reply at 3:23-4:3.)

Eley declares “At the time I was booked into the main jail,

I was not given access to a telephone for approximately 20 hours. The

phones that were available did not work.” (Eley Decl. ¶ 3.) Hunter 5

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almost a day later after they were booked.” (Eley Decl. ¶ 4.)

Defendants’ objection to this statement as hearsay is sustained.

(Objection to Eley Decl. ¶ 1.)

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declared that while he was at the Main Jail, he “feared for [his] life

and safety if [he] were to ask to use a phone or obtain medical

treatment.” (Hunter Decl. ¶ 32.) Twomey declared “[a]ll the

individuals noted in the videos were NEVER given access to a phone. 

From all the evidence I reviewed, I have not reviewed a single

statement or reviewed a single video that arrestees are provided

access to a working telephone while going through booking as required

by law.” (Twomey Decl. ¶¶ 559-60.) 

Twomey reviewed the videos of four individuals, Eley would

be one more denial, and even assuming Hunter’s fear to ask for a phone

violated his rights, these six instances over eight years, without

more, are insufficient to establish a widespread policy of denying

arrestees access to phone. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for

summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ fourth claim against the County of

Sacramento; County of Sacramento, Sheriff’s Department and Sheriff

McGinnis in his official capacity is granted. Further, Plaintiffs

present no evidence that Blanas knew or should have known of a policy

to deny arrestees access to a telephone and thus summary adjudication

of Plaintiffs’ fourth claim against Blanas is granted in Blanas’s

favor. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, all class action allegations, Doe

Defendants and thus claim one, and Defendant William Kevin Sowles and

thus claim two are dismissed. The motion for summary adjudication of

Plaintiffs’ third claim against the County of Sacramento and Sheriff

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John McGinnis in his official capacity is denied. Summary

adjudication of Plaintiffs’ third claim is granted on behalf of

Blanas, and Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of 

Plaintiffs’ fourth claim is granted. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 5, 2008

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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