Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01035/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01035-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 

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 Local Rule 72-302(c)(10) refers to the magistrate judges petitions to quash

administrative summonses filed pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2). Although plaintiff claims

that his challenge to these tax summonses in not pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2), as shown

below, his remedy -- if any -- arises under that provision. Additionally, this matter is properly

before this court pursuant to Local Rule 72-302(c)(21), as plaintiff is proceeding pro se.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMUEL D. BATES,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-1035 WBS EFB PS

vs.

DAVID OSBORN and INTERNAL

REVENUE SERVICE,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

This action involves a petition to quash tax summonses. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se,

and the matter was referred to the magistrate judge under Local Rule 72-302(c)(10) and (c)(21),1

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Presently before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s “petition to quash summons, petition for writ of mandamus, demand for a bill of

particulars and claim for personal damages.” That motion was taken under submission without

oral argument on September 18, 2006. Accordingly, the court issues the following findings and

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2

 These findings and recommendations also address plaintiff’s motion for default

judgment, filed on July 5, 2005. 

3

 The court refers to petitioner as “plaintiff” because his petition includes, among other

things, a purported claim for damages.

4

 David Osborn is a pseudonym registered with the IRS, per IRS internal procedures, and

is used for security and safety reasons. See Osborn Decl., at ¶ 2. 

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recommendations.2 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed on May 11, 2006, a document entitled “petition to quash summons, petition

for writ of mandamus, demand for a bill of particulars and claim for personal damages”

(hereinafter the “petition”).3

 The petition names as defendants Revenue Agent David Osborn

(and coworkers) and the Internal Revenue Service. The petition and its attachments contain

lengthy and incoherent allegations concerning, among other things, the purported inapplicability

of the tax code to plaintiff. Although the petition and its various attachments are vague and

ambiguous, it appears that the petition’s primary goal is to obtain an order quashing eight

administrative summonses issued by the IRS to various third parties concerning plaintiff and his

wife.

The IRS is conducting an examination of the income tax liabilities of plaintiff and his

wife, Joyce M. Bates, for the years 2003 and 2004. See Declaration of David Osborn (“Osborn

Decl.”), at ¶ 4. Defendant David Osborn,4 the IRS employee conducting that examination,

issued subpoenas to the following third parties on April 13, 2006: (1) Medical Savings Insurance

Company, Indianapolis, Indiana; (2) Mid-Ohio Securities Corporation, Elyria Ohio; (3) Safe

America Federal Credit Union, Hayward California; (4) Stockmans Bank, Elk Grove, California;

(5) Farmers and Merchants Bank of Central California, Lodi, California; (6) James Jordan, Jr.,

dba Colorado Bankers Services, Phoenix, Arizona; (7) Amerus Life Insurance Company, Des

Moines, Iowa; and (8) Executive Marketing Holding Corporation, Lakewood Colorado. Osborn

Decl., at ¶¶ 5-6. 

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These administrative summonses request financial records relating to the plaintiff and his

wife, and were issued for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of the plaintiff’s joint

federal income tax returns for the years 2003 and 2004. Osborn Decl., at ¶¶ 7, 15. 

Plaintiff asserts that his petition to quash is “undertaken under the Constitution and the

rules of equity, and not under law or the Internal Revenue Code, and is undertaken personally

and individually against the Defendant, David Osborn, and anyone else he may be working with

to illegally enforce the internal revenue laws of the federal United States.” See Petition, at 7:35-

37 (emphasis in original). 

The United States moves the court to dismiss the entire petition on various grounds. The

United States urges that it – not the named defendants – is the only proper defendant in an action

to quash a tax summons and the plaintiff has not satisfied the prerequisites to suit against the

United States. Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of sovereign immunity. In addition to lack of

jurisdiction, defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for damages pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Finally, defendant moves to dismiss the claims plaintiff

labels as requests for a bill of particulars and a writ of mandamus.

Plaintiff filed an untimely “reply to defendant’s motion to dismiss,” which this court

construes as an opposition. In his opposition, plaintiff requests default judgment against

defendant and again asserts that the IRS is without authority to issue the summons at issue in this

case. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Proper Party Defendant

Plaintiff names as defendants the Internal Revenue Service and Internal Revenue Agent

David Osborn (and coworkers). Neither are proper parties. The Internal Revenue Service is a

federal agency of the United States Government and as such may not be sued except to the extent

that Congress has specifically allowed. Devries v. IRS, 359 F. Supp. 2d 988, 992 (E.D. Cal.

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5

 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.

388 (1971). 

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2005) (citing Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 514 (1952)). Congress has made no provisions

allowing for suits against the IRS and it is not a suable entity. Devries, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 991-

92 (dismissing Treasury Department and IRS and substituting the United States as a defendant).

Similarly, a claim challenging the tax summonses may not be brought against the

individual IRS Agent, David Osborn. Rather, the action arises, if at all, solely against the United

States. “When an action is one against named individual defendants, but the acts complained of

consist of actions taken by defendants in their official capacity as agents of the United States, the

action is in fact one against the United States.” English v. Krubsack, 371 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1200

(E.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting Atkinson v. O’Neill, 867 F.2d 589, 590 (10th Cir. 1989)). “[A] suit

against IRS employees in their official capacity is essentially a suit against the United States.”

Gilbert v. Da Grossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Here, plaintiff specifically alleges that the present action is “undertaken personally and

individually against the defendant David Osborn.” Petition at 7:35-37. Yet, it is clear that the

only actions complained of are the issuance of the eight administrative summonses. The acts

complained of were taken by Osborn in his official capacity as an IRS agent while investigating

plaintiff’s tax liabilities. Thus, the action challenging those acts may only be brought against the

United States. 

Accordingly, because neither David Osborn nor the IRS are proper defendants they must

be dismissed from this action. 

B. Claim for Damages

To the extent the petition can be construed as a Bivens5 claim for damages against David

Osborn individually, plaintiff is barred from such relief. As a general matter, Bivens relief is

unavailable for alleged constitutional violations by IRS officials. Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d

1179, 1886 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Because the Internal Revenue Code gives taxpayers meaningful

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protections against government transgressions in tax assessment and collection, we hold that

Bivens relief is unavailable for plaintiffs’ suit against IRS auditors and officials.”). Moreover,

the complaint consists of frivolous and prolix tax protestor arguments about why the tax laws

should not be applied to plaintiff. He also alleges “harassment, intimidation, violation of due

process (Fifth Amendment), extortion under the color of law (18 U.S.C. § 872) and abuse of

legal process (18 U.S.C. § 1589(3))” by defendant David Osborn and his coworkers “as

individuals.” Plaintiff seeks “restitution” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1593 for defendant’s alleged

“illegal activities” in “mis-enforc[ing] the internal revenue laws of the federal United States.” 

See Petition at 9:9-15.

Plaintiff’s reliance on Title 18 of the United States Code to assert a claim for damages is

misplaced. “Civil causes of action . . . do not generally lie under the criminal statutes contained

in Title 18 of the United States Code.” Del Elmer v. Metzger, 967 F. Supp. 398, 403 (S.D. Cal.

1997). Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for damages by reference to the Fifth Amendment. Id.

at 404 (citing Supreme Court’s rejection of due process challenge to tax levies in Fuentes v.

Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-92 (1972) and Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595-97 (1931)). 

However inartfully plead, plaintiff’s claim for damages are premised on the alleged illegality of

the Internal Revenue Code’s enforcement. As such, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which

relief may be granted. Moreover, allowing plaintiff to amend his petition to state a claim for

damages would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal of a

pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper where amendment would be futile).

For these reasons plaintiff’s claims for damages are wholly without merit and must be

dismissed.

C. Dismissal of Petition to Quash Summonses

 The United States moves to dismiss the petition pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) on

the basis of the sovereign immunity. “It is well settled that the United States is a sovereign, and,

as such, is immune from suit unless it has expressly waived such immunity and consented to be

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 Plaintiff’s challenge to the summonses is little more than a rambling and meritless

attack on the legitimacy of the Internal Revenue Code. Plaintiff challenges the summonses as

“illegal,” Petition at 8:4, and on that basis asserts that the IRS has no authority over plaintiff’s

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sued.” Gilbert v. Da Grossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985). Absent its consent to suit, an

action against the United States must be dismissed. Elias v. Connett, 908 F.3d 521, 527 (9th Cir.

1990). 

“When an IRS summons is issued to a third party recordkeeper as defined in §

7609(a)(3), the taxpayer, as a person ‘entitled to notice of a summons’ under § 7609(a), has

twenty days from the date of notice to bring a proceeding to quash the summons.” Ponsford v.

United States, 771 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b) (2) (A)). “The

twenty-day filing requirement of § 7609(b)(2)(A) is jurisdictional . . . because it is a condition

precedent to the waiver of sovereign immunity.” Id. at 1309. Some decisions have questioned

whether Ponsford’s conclusion that § 7609(a) is jurisdictional remains controlling in light of the

Supreme Court’s decision in Irwin v. Dept. of Veteran’s Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990). See

Mackenzie v. United States, 1999 WL 1001598 (E.D. Cal., Oct. 4, 1999) (§ 7609(a) not

jurisdiction but a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling); Mack v. IRS, 1995 WL

556628 (E.D. Cal., July 18, 1995) (same). However, under either analysis, plaintiff’s challenge

here is time-barred.

The twenty day period begins to run on the date that notice of the summons is mailed to

the taxpayer. Hill v. Mosby, 896 F. Supp. 1004, 1005 (D. Idaho 1995) (citing Stringer v. United

States, 776 F.2d 274, 275-76 (11th Cir. 1985)). Here, the notices of summonses were provided

by certified mail to plaintiff on April 13, 2006, and April 18, 2006. Osborn Decl. at ¶¶ 5, 6, 11. 

Plaintiff did not file the petition until May 11, 2006 – more than twenty days after the IRS

provided notice. Plaintiff fails to deny or explain the untimeliness of his petition in any of the

documents he has filed with the court, either in the affidavit attached to his petition or in his

“reply to defendant’s motion to dismiss” and the attachments thereto.6

 He fails to present any

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“entire estate.” Petition at 9:12-14. 

7

 Defendant also moves for dismissal due to plaintiff’s failure to comply with other

requirements set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 7609. Each are well taken. Plaintiff failed to send by

registered or certified mail copies of the petition to the summoned financial institutions or the

IRS within 20 days of receiving notice of the summons, as required by § 7609(b)(2)(B). He

failed to file the petition in the districts where six of the eight summoned parties are located, as

required by § 7609(h). Furthermore, he failed to properly serve the United States pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(I) (the petition was not sent by registered or certified mail; did not include a

summons; and, U.S. Attorney General’s Office has no record of receiving a copy of it). 

However, because the court has determined that dismissal of the petition is required on the

grounds discussed above, the court need not reach these alternate grounds. 

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basis for tolling the applicable time limitation.

Whether compliance with the twenty-day period is a jurisdictional “condition precedent

to the waiver of sovereign immunity,” Ponsford, 771 F.2d at 1309, or a statute of limitations

under Irwin, indisputably plaintiff failed to meet it. Moreover, he presents no good cause for

doing so and this fact alone requires dismissal.7

D. Writ of Mandamus

Plaintiff’s petition also includes a “petition for a writ of mandamus” to compel the IRS to

cease its investigation of his tax liabilities and to answer various questions and allegations

contained in the petition. “Mandamus writs, as extraordinary remedies, are appropriate only

when a federal officer, employee, or agency owes a nondiscretionary duty to a plaintiff that is so

plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt.” Stang v. IRS, 788 F.2d 564, 565 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Plaintiff has not identified any nondiscretionary duty owed to him by the IRS. Further, the

actions plaintiff seeks to compel are not duties owed by the IRS. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim

for mandamus must be dismissed.

E. Bill of Particulars

Plaintiff also demands that the IRS be required to produce a “bill of particulars

documenting probable cause.” No showing of probable cause is required merely for an

investigation concerning tax liabilities. United States v. Theep, 502 F.2d 797, 798 (9th Cir.

1974). Furthermore, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure no longer contemplate a motion for a

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bill of particulars. CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 290 F.2d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 1961). Thus, to the extent

plaintiff’s incoherent request can be construed as such a motion, the court recommends it be

denied and the claim dismissed. 

F. Motion for Default Judgment

Plaintiff’s “petition for entry of default judgment,” filed on July 5, 2006, is frivolous. He

urges entry of default judgment based on defendant’s failure to file an answer rather than the

instant motion to dismiss. Rule 12(b) plainly provides that a motion to dismiss made thereunder

“shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). No

answer is required until the district court disposes of a motion to dismiss made pursuant to that

rule. Terry v. IRS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17025, at *6-7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 1997). Defendant

filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b), and the motion has not yet been disposed of;

accordingly, defendant is not yet required to file an answer. Furthermore, pursuant to Rule 55(a)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff must apply for entry of default before default

judgment can be entered. Id. He has not done so, and any such request would be equally

frivolous. The defendant is not in default. Plaintiff’s “petition for entry of default judgment”

must be denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the “petition to quash summons, petition for writ of

mandamus, demand for a bill of particulars and claim for personal damages” be granted without

leave to amend; 

2. Plaintiff’s “motion for default judgment” be denied; and, 

3. The Clerk be directed to close this case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten (10)

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 26, 2007.

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