Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-07009/USCOURTS-caDC-02-07009-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 7, 2003 Decided March 28, 2003

No. 02-7009

CURTIS E. CRAWFORD,

APPELLANT

v.

PATRICIA A. JACKSON,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv01272)

Nicholas G. Terris, appointed by the court, argued the

cause as amicus curiae on behalf of appellant. With him on

the briefs were Glenn R. Reichardt and Stephen W. Grafman.

Curtis E. Crawford filed pro se briefs.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Mary L. Wilson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued

the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Charles L.

Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Edward E.

Schwab, Assistant Corporation Counsel. John R. Fisher,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: EDWARDS, HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Curtis E. Crawford appeals the

denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging

the revocation of his parole. We hold, in light of the United

States’ waiver of any objection to lack of personal jurisdiction,

that the court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. We

further hold, in light of the strong indicia of reliability of the

police investigative report, that the D.C. Parole Board’s reliance on hearsay evidence did not violate Crawford’s due

process rights. The police investigative report was detailed,

Crawford’s admissions corroborated portions of the report,

and the report was internally corroborative of the complainant’s claim that Crawford had assaulted her. In the absence

of contrary evidence, which Crawford had an opportunity to

present, and Crawford’s far-fetched and incomplete explanation of how the complainant suffered her injuries, the report

provided sufficiently reliable evidence of Crawford’s culpability for aggravated assault, and thus of his violation of parole.

Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

Since being convicted by a jury of second degree murder in

1972, Crawford has violated parole on numerous occasions.

As relevant here, Crawford was paroled on November 14,

1996, and arrested on February 4, 1999, by the Metropolitan

Police Department for aggravated assault in October 1998.

At a parole revocation hearing in July 1999, the Board

considered as grounds for revocation the aggravated assault

charge as well as Crawford’s use of marijuana and cocaine.

The Report of July 7, 1999, on the revocation hearing

focuses primarily on the October 1998 assault. After sumUSCA Case #02-7009 Document #740790 Filed: 03/28/2003 Page 2 of 15
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marizing the Arrest Prosecution Report of the Metropolitan

Police Department (‘‘police investigative report’’), the Hearing

Report states that Crawford ‘‘adamantly denies his involvement’’ in the aggravated assault, claiming that the complainant instead had a disagreement with a third person inside of

the house, had left the premises, and then fallen while

attempting to climb a fence and injured herself. The Report

noted that Crawford had not been indicted for aggravated

assault although he was scheduled to return to court for a

felony conference. However, as the Report further noted,

Crawford did not deny his drug use on two different occasions

while on parole. The Report also recounted that Crawford

had violated parole ‘‘at least four (4) times,’’ continued to get

arrested and to use drugs, had a history of serious assaultive

behavior and illegal drug use, and had been diagnosed in 1987

as having a severe antisocial personality. Nonetheless, Crawford’s probation officer recommended that his parole be reinstated. The Hearing Official disagreed, recommending to the

Board that it revoke Crawford’s parole and reconsider Crawford for parole by May 11, 2000. The Board concurred in the

Hearing Official’s recommendation and, based on the aggravated assault and two drug-use violations of the conditions of

his parole, revoked Crawford’s parole on July 21, 1999.

Crawford filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in May

1999 challenging his detention pending a parole revocation

hearing; after the July revocation, he amended his petition to

challenge the revocation. Following denial of the petition,

Crawford appealed, contending that his due process rights

were violated at the revocation hearing because, among other

claims, the Board (1) did not allow him to cross-examine the

author of the police investigative report; (2) denied him the

opportunity to call witnesses; and (3) relied solely on the

police investigative report containing hearsay to revoke his

parole. The court summarily affirmed denial of the writ

except with respect to Crawford’s challenge to the Board’s

reliance on the police report. Crawford v. Jackson, No. 02–

7009 (Order of April 10, 2002).

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II.

The threshold question of our jurisdiction has been resolved by the United States’ waiver of any objection to lack of

personal jurisdiction. See Chapman–Bey v. Thornburgh, 864

F.2d 804, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1988). When Crawford originally

filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he was confined

as a D.C. prisoner at the District of Columbia’s Correctional

Complex in Lorton, Virginia, where his custodian was Warden

Patricia Jackson. At that point there is no question that the

court had jurisdiction to consider the petition. As the court

stated in Blair–Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1039 (quotation

omitted), reh’g granted in part on other grounds, 159 F.3d

591 (D.C. Cir. 1998), ‘‘the appropriate defendant in a habeas

action is the custodian of the prisoner,’’ which would have

been the warden of Lorton, over whom we have jurisdiction,

id. at 1043; McCall v. Swain, 510 F.2d 167, 177 (D.C. Cir.

1975).

Pursuant to section 11201(b) of the National Capital Revitalization and Self–Government Improvement Act of 1997

(‘‘1997 Revitalization Act’’), Pub. L. 105–33, 111 Stat. 251, 734,

however, Crawford was subsequently removed in June 2000

from the Lorton Correctional Complex, and was eventually

transferred to the Federal Correctional Institution at Petersburg, Virginia. Section 11201(b) required the District of Columbia to close its Correctional Complex in Lorton, Virginia

by December 31, 2001, and directed that ‘‘the felony population sentenced pursuant to the District of Columbia Code

residing at the Lorton Correctional Complex shall be transferred to a penal or correctional facility operated or contracted for by the Bureau of Prisons.’’ Crawford’s transfer thus

raised the question whether the court lacks jurisdiction to

consider his petition.

Although the transfer of a prisoner from one correctional

facility to another would not ordinarily deprive the court of

jurisdiction over the habeas petition, see Blair–Bey, 151 F.3d

at 1039 n.1, the transfer here was not simply a transfer

between correctional facilities, but also a transfer of responsibility for the imprisonment of D.C. felons from the District of

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Columbia to the United States, such that the District of

Columbia asserted that it is ‘‘now powerless to comply with

any court order that [Crawford] should be released TTT or

have a new parole revocation hearing.’’ Appellee’s Br. at 5.

Given both the fact that Crawford is currently housed in the

federal Petersburg correctional facility in Virginia and the

questions surrounding the continued applicability of this circuit’s precedent to the transfer of such a D.C. prisoner, the

court ordered the United States to enter a limited appearance

to advise the court whether it may substitute the United

States as appellee in this case. Crawford v. Jackson, No. 02–

7009 (Order of February 7, 2003). In light of a pending

appeal involving D.C. prisoners transferred pursuant to the

1997 Revitalization Act, the court granted leave to file an

amicus curiae response to the Public Defender Service for the

District of Columbia. Id. (Order of March 12, 2003).

The court need not now address the complex issues that

may arise regarding the effect of the 1997 Revitalization Act

on this circuit’s preexisting habeas corpus precedent. See,

e.g., Blair–Bey, 151 F.3d at 1039 n.1; Chatman–Bey, 864 F.2d

at 806 n.1; Fed. R. App. P. 23(a). The United States has

entered an appearance and advised that it is waiving any

objection to lack of personal jurisdiction in this case, and that

the court ‘‘may substitute the Warden at FCI Petersburg,

Stephen M. Dewalt, as the custodian of appellant/petitioner

Curtis E. Crawford.’’ Entry of Appearance and Response to

Court Order of February 19, 2003, at 1. The United States

also adopted, except as to an argument regarding Federal

Rule of Appellate Procedure 23, the brief filed by the District

of Columbia pursuant to D.C. Code § 24–132(h)(1)(c). While

Crawford claims, in addressing the Response of the United

States, that he is being unlawfully held because his transfer

violated Rule 23, to the extent that Crawford claims that he

therefore should be released from confinement, he never

made such a claim in his opening brief although he had raised

the claim in the district court. Because the jurisdictional

question has been resolved by the United States’ waiver and

Crawford has not preserved any other Rule 23 claim, the

court need not address whether, as the United States mainUSCA Case #02-7009 Document #740790 Filed: 03/28/2003 Page 5 of 15
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tains in its February 13, 2003 Response, Rule 23 is inapplicable to a transfer under the 1997 Revitalization Act. See

Benkelman Tel. Co. v. FCC, 220 F.3d 601, 607 n.10 (D.C. Cir.

2000)

Accordingly, we substitute Stephen M. Dewalt as the respondent, and in view of the United States’ waiver of objection to lack of personal jurisdiction, we hold that the court has

jurisdiction to address the merits of Crawford’s appeal.

III.

The essence of Crawford’s remaining challenge to the D.C.

Parole Board’s revocation of his parole is that the Board

impermissibly relied solely on an uncorroborated police investigative report containing hearsay evidence. He contends

that under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in

Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), revocation requires

more than a finding of probable cause and must be based on

verified facts. For this question of law, our review is de novo.

See Maddox v. Elzie, 238 F.3d 437, 446 (D.C. Cir), cert.

denied, 534 US 836 (2001).

A.

As a preliminary matter, we reject the government’s position, relying on Duckett v. Quick, 282 F.3d 844 (D.C. Cir.)

cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 247 (2002), that Crawford waived his

right to challenge the Board’s reliance on a single piece of

hearsay evidence.

Prior to the hearing, Crawford received written notice of

the procedural rights that he would receive at the revocation

hearing. Crawford indicated, by checking appropriate boxes

on the Notice Form, that he wished to present witnesses and

requested that ‘‘persons be present at the hearing who have

given information against me on which the Board may rely to

revoke my parole.’’ Another form, titled ‘‘Opening Statement

at Revocation Hearing Without Attorney’’ and dated July 7,

1999, indicates that Crawford did not have ‘‘any adverse

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witnesses whose presence you requested’’ and that Crawford

was ‘‘ready to go forward with the hearing.’’

Because Crawford indicated prior to the revocation hearing

that he wished to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the

Opening Statement form that the government maintains

shows waiver was never signed by Crawford and only reflects

a notation, presumably by the Board official who presided at

the hearing, that Crawford did not wish to call additional

adverse witnesses, the government’s waiver theory fails. The

Opening Statement also shows that Crawford had unspecified

procedural matters that he wished to raise before the revocation hearing began, procedural matters that could have included an objection to exclusive reliance on hearsay evidence

with regard to the aggravated assault charge. Further, while

the government states that Crawford orally waived continuance of the revocation hearing so that he could call additional

witnesses, that is a different issue from whether there was

constitutionally sufficient evidence to revoke parole where the

Board relied solely on the police report as evidence of Crawford’s culpability in the aggravated assault. Therefore, unlike

Duckett, where the defendant ‘‘was represented by counsel at

the revocation hearing,’’ 282 F.3d at 848, we hold that Crawford, a pro se petitioner, provided sufficient indication that he

had concerns with the Board’s reliance on the hearsay evidence. We turn to the merits of Crawford’s challenge.

B.

Crawford raises no objection to the admissibility of the

police investigative report, and the court has held that the

Board’s regulations do not limit the information that it may

consider. Maddox, 238 F.3d at 444, citing D.C. Mun. Regs.

tit. 28 §§ 219.1–219.12 (1987). Rather, Crawford challenges

the Board’s exclusive reliance on the police investigative

report to find a violation of the conditions of parole inasmuch

as it is unsworn, prepared months after relevant events, and

apparently consisted not of the author’s personal observations

or conversations with the complainant but instead was a

summary of an affidavit prepared by another police officer

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who responded to the scene. Further, Crawford notes the

general unreliability of police reports in light of the adversarial relationship between the arresting officer and the arrestee.

Crawford also points out that the report writer concluded

only that there was probable cause to believe Crawford had

committed the assault, and not that a preponderance of the

evidence supported the accusation, as he asserts was required

by the Board’s regulations. As further indication of the

Board’s error in relying on the police investigative report,

Crawford points out that in December 1999 the aggravated

assault charge was dismissed for failure to prosecute and in

June 2001 the D.C. Superior Court granted his motion pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 118 to seal and expunge

his arrest record for that charge.

Reliance on hearsay in parole revocation proceedings is not

per se impermissible, Morrisey, 408 U.S. at 489; cf. Gagnon

v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.5 (1973), as this court has

acknowledged, Maddox, 238 F.3d at 443. But just as clearly

the reliability of hearsay evidence can vary greatly. As the

Seventh Circuit has observed, the use of ‘‘unsubstantiated or

unreliable hearsay TTT would certainly eviscerate the safeguards guaranteed TTT by Morrisey and Gagnon.’’ Egerstaffer v. Israel, 726 F.2d 1231, 1235 (7th Cir. 1984). Similarly, in

the context of reviewing a U.S. Parole Commission decision

for abuse of discretion, the Fourth Circuit stated in Marshall

v. Garrison, 659 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1981), that ‘‘[s]hort of

some relevant, reasonably reliable evidence of the commission

of another crime, the district court may not permit the Parole

Commission to deny or postpone the granting of parole on the

basis of a prisoner’s commission of other crimes.’’ Id. at 446.

Courts are properly more concerned with whether the

evidence considered as a whole, including the hearsay evidence, was both sufficient in quantity and reliability to ensure

fundamental due process rights. For example, in Taylor v.

U.S. Parole Commission, 734 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), the

Sixth Circuit eschewed any concern about the admissibility or

consideration of the hearsay per se in reviewing a Parole

Commission decision for abuse of discretion. Id. at 1155.

Rather, the court’s concern arose from ‘‘the paucity of reliable

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evidence of [the parolee’s] criminal conduct’’ when based

solely on a probation officer’s summary of an arrest report.

Id. at 1155–56. Such a finding ‘‘is but a step away from a

finding of criminal conduct based solely upon evidence of a

parolee’s arrest with no account of the underlying circumstances.’’ Id. at 1156. The court expressed no opinion,

however, on whether the Commission could properly have

made a finding of new criminal conduct based solely on a copy

of the actual investigative report. Id. at 1156 n.3. Again, in

another abuse of discretion case, United States v. Stephenson,

928 F.2d 728 (6th Cir. 1991), the Sixth Circuit concluded that

the paucity of reliable evidence was too great where the only

reliable evidence of the assault was ‘‘the meager testimony of

the probation officer and [the parolee’s] admission that

‘[t]here was some pushing in there.’ ’’ Id. at 732. No evidence by any witness established the extremely offensive or

provocative conduct required to show a violation of state law.

Id. at 732–33. In more extreme circumstances, the Second

Circuit held in Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1972),

that due process was violated when parole was revoked on the

basis of a parole violation report that relied on statements by

several confidential informants. Id. at 1244. The infirmity in

the hearing and determination arose from the fact that the

Board resolved a credibility issue solely on the basis of the

report without itself taking statements from the informants.

Id. Hence, the court stated, ‘‘the board had no way of

knowing how reliable the informants were and had no real

basis on which to resolve the credibility issue against the

parolee and conclude that he did in fact violate [a] condition

TTT of his parole.’’ Id. The extreme nature of the circumstances was revealed by the Board’s refusal to provide the

defendant with a copy of the report or with the substance of

the informants’ statements or their identity. Id.

This court has not addressed whether it is appropriate for a

parole authority to rely exclusively on a police investigative

report in revoking parole. However, in evaluating whether

there is sufficient evidence to support a parole revocation, the

court has examined whether the decision was ‘‘either totally

lacking in evidentiary support or [was] so irrational as to be

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fundamentally unfair.’’ Duckett, 282 F.3d at 847. That standard matches well with the focus by other circuits on the

quantity and reliability of hearsay evidence in similar cases,

and appears, therefore, to be the appropriate one to apply in

the instant case. Thus, in the context of hearsay evidence,

we follow other circuits that have examined the reliability of

the particular hearsay evidence, condemning reliance on it

when the court reaches a negative evaluation. Compare

United States v. Comito, 177 F.3d 1166, 1171, 1173 (9th Cir.

1999) with United States v. Kindred, 918 F.2d 485, 487 (5th

Cir. 1990). This approach raises a red flag for parole authorities to ensure, before relying on hearsay, that there are

sufficient indicia of reliability under the circumstances at

hand to protect the prisoner’s due process rights.

With respect to the use of police reports as hearsay evidence in parole revocation hearings, other circuits have expressed the readily apparent concerns regarding the dangers

of relying on uncorroborated police reports. In United States

v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1986), the Eighth Circuit noted

the relative unreliability of police reports as compared to

laboratory reports of drug tests, and that the ‘‘relationship

between police officers and those whom they arrest is much

more personal and adversarial in nature than that between

chemists and those whose urine they test.’’ Id. at 643–44. In

the court’s view, ‘‘Congress exhibited similar doubts about the

reliability of such reports when it specifically excluded them

from the public records exception to the hearsay rule in

criminal cases.’’ Id. at 644. In Farrish v. Mississippi State

Parole Board, 836 F.2d 969, 978 (5th Cir. 1988), the Fifth

Circuit viewed hearsay testimony most damaging when presented through police officers, stating that ‘‘[t]he use of TTT

unreliable hearsay undermines the accuracy of the factfinding process’’ where the crucial testimony was provided by

a police officer’s recounting of ‘‘self-serving’’ statements by an

informant. In addition, police statements are less reliable to

the extent that they are unsworn, Comito, 177 F.3d at 1172

n.9, or contain multiple layers of hearsay, see Bell, 785 F.2d at

644.

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We join the other circuits in expressing concern about the

reliance in parole revocation hearings on hearsay in police

reports, particularly as many revocation hearings likely will

involve pro se prisoners with limited resources to obtain

independent witnesses. To this extent, given judicial concern

in light of the protections guaranteed by Morrisey, a parole

authority takes a certain risk that its decision to revoke

parole will not be judicially sustained where it relies solely on

hearsay contained in a police investigative report as the basis

for its decision. As the circuits’ expressions of concern

suggest, that risk is measurably lessened only in circumstances that demonstrate the strong reliability of the hearsay

evidence.

Crawford’s case presents the issue not decided by the Sixth

Circuit in Taylor. The D.C. Parole Board relied on a police

investigative report charging Crawford with aggravated assault. The report was prepared as the basis for an affidavit

for an arrest warrant. As such it was quite detailed. The

police investigative report recounted that while celebrating

Crawford’s birthday the complainant sustained a laceration to

the top of her head and on her lip, and that the complainant’s

face was swollen on the right side, and her left rib and back

were bruised. According to the complainant, Crawford had

been drinking and had slammed her against the living room

wall several times. The responding police officer stated that

he observed ‘‘deep indentations in the wall that [were] consistent with [Crawford] slamming the complainant’s head

against the wall in the living room several times. The

indentations were also bloody.’’ The writer of the report

sought an arrest warrant for Crawford for ‘‘intentionally,

knowingly, viciously beat[ing] the complainant to a point of

unconsciousness,’’ stating that ‘‘[t]he attack was unprovoked

by the complainant.’’

The hearsay relied on by the D.C. Parole Board in revoking

Crawford’s parole is significantly different from that condemned in the parole revocation cases that we have discussed.

First, the report is a police investigative report, and not

merely a probation officer’s summary of a police report. As

such, the report is quite detailed, an indicia of reliability.

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See, e.g., United States v. Chin, 224 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir.

2000); Bell, 785 F.2d at 644 (8th); Egerstaffer, 726 F.2d at

1235 (7th). It provides a fairly full account of the circumstances surrounding the aggravated assault. Missing only is

Crawford’s version of events.

Second, Crawford’s admissions at the revocation hearing

corroborate portions of the report recounting an altercation

and its underlying circumstances. Key facts are undisputed:

Crawford was celebrating his birthday, he had been drinking,

and he had vomited inside the house; thereafter, the complainant was injured. According to the complainant, Crawford had beaten her up. Thus, much of what the police

report states with regard to what the complainant said is

conceded as accurate by Crawford, who challenges only the

complainant’s credibility in accusing him as her attacker.

Third, the report contains internal corroboration of the

complainant’s version of events. The responding officer stated that he saw the bloody indented walls inside the house.

This observation undercuts Crawford’s claim that the complainant was injured when she fell while climbing a fence

outside of the house. Crawford never disputed the condition

of the living room walls or explained their bloody appearance.

The report itself thus provided the Board with a basis for

evaluating and crediting the complainant’s credibility. Indeed, the far-fetched explanation offered by Crawford to

explain the complainant’s injuries and his failure to explain

the condition of the living room wall provided reasonable

cause for the Board to doubt his denial of culpability.

Fourth, Crawford had an opportunity at the revocation

hearing to present evidence contesting the hearsay police

report but did not. Unlike the parolee in Birzon who was

unaware of the contents of a report based on information

provided by anonymous informants, Crawford was not denied

access to the police investigative report and knew the identity

of the complainant as well as the identity of a third person

who was present at the premises at the pertinent time. Yet,

despite the obvious incentive to present supporting evidence,

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he did not call any witness or present evidence other than his

own testimony to support his version of events.

Fifth, neither the claimed double or triple hearsay in the

police investigative report nor its writer’s legal conclusion

diminish the reliability of the report. It is unclear whether

the writer of the report was the responding police officer,

referring to himself as the affiant. But assuming he was not,

the writer is reporting what the responding officer saw.

Crawford’s admissions were corroborative of much of the

report and he presented no evidence other than his own

testimony to show that he was not the complainant’s attacker,

much less that there were no bloody indentations on the

living room wall or that there was another explanation for the

condition of the walls. Thus, the usual suspicion of second/third-hand hearsay is considerably lessened. The fact

that the writer of the report reached the legal conclusion that

there was probable cause to believe Crawford was guilty of

aggravated assault is irrelevant; the Board could read the

report in light of Crawford’s denial and explanation of the

complainant’s injuries and conclude that there was a preponderance of evidence of his culpability.

Under the circumstances, given the indicia of reliability of

the police investigative report, the Board’s reliance on the

hearsay evidence did not render its revocation decision so

lacking in support that it was fundamentally unfair. In a

different context, this court has cautioned the government

against relying on hearsay at sentencing where the defendant

‘‘vigorously dispute[s]’’ allegations supported by hearsay evidence. United States v. Lemon, 723 F.2d 922, 934 & n.35

(D.C. Cir. 1983). Here the report provided the Board with a

basis on which to credit the complainant, Crawford had an

opportunity to present evidence, and the Board could reasonably reject Crawford’s denial of culpability based on its

assessment of his testimony. Cf. United States v. Yunis, 859

F.2d 953, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Moreover, as the court has

already concluded, Crawford failed to show any prejudice

from his inability to cross-examine the police officer who

wrote the report or to call the complainant at the revocation

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hearing. Crawford v. Jackson, No. 02–7009 (Order of April

10, 2002).

Contrary to Crawford’s position, the expungement of the

record of his arrest for aggravated assault by the Superior

Court of the District of Columbia, two years after the Board

revoked his parole, does not undermine the reliability of the

police investigative report. Cf. Teachey v. Carver, 736 A.2d

998, 1007 (D.C. 1999). The expunging court made no findings

of fact based on clear and convincing evidence as required by

Superior Court Criminal Rule 118(e), see Dist. of Columbia v.

Davis, 811 A.2d 800, 802 (D.C. 2002), and in reaching its

conclusion summarily stated that it relied on Crawford’s

motion and the government’s lack of opposition. United

States v. Crawford, Criminal No. F–796–99 (D.C. Sup. Ct.

Aug. 21, 2002). Under District of Columbia law, the movant

is not entitled to relief under Rule 118 based on the default of

the government unless the petitioner has made a prima facie

showing that he was entitled to relief, see Davis, 811 A.2d at

804, and the D.C. Superior Court never made such a finding,

U.S. v. Crawford, Criminal No. F–796–99. Although appellate courts will presume that trial courts applied the correct

law, the expunging court never made any findings of the

‘‘factual circumstances of the challenged arrest and any postarrest occurrences that it deems relevant,’’ as required by

Rule 118(f)(2)(c). Even to establish that the expungement

collaterally estops the government from continuing to enforce

the Board’s revocation of Crawford’s parole, Crawford has

‘‘the burden of showing that any issue in the present litigation

as to which he seeks preclusion is identical to the one that

was decided’’ earlier. Hogue v. Hopper, 728 A.2d 611, 615

(D.C. 1999). Absent findings by the expunging court, the

basis of the expungement is unclear and Crawford therefore

cannot show that the expunging court credited his version of

events. Id.

Finally, while Crawford maintains that the Board’s decision

to revoke parole is not necessarily supported solely by what

he characterizes as his two non-criminal drug violations of the

conditions of his parole, violations that he views as ‘‘little

more than an afterthought,’’ Crawford’s admission of his

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illegal drug use on two occasions while on parole does lend

further support for the Board’s decision. His parole officer

advised the Board that the two tests of Crawford’s urine

indicated the presence of unlawful drugs. Crawford does not

contest that his drug use violated conditions of his parole.

However, because we hold that the Board permissibly relied

on the police investigative report, there is no occasion to

address whether the Board’s reliance would have been harmless in view of the drug violations. Compare Egerstaffer, 726

F.2d at 1237–38, with United States v. Zentgraf, 20 F.3d 906,

910 (8th Cir. 1994); Nixon v. Quick, 781 A.2d 754, 763–64

(D.C. 2001).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court

denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

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