Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01169/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01169-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HUGO LUA,

CDCR #P-48040,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DAVID CLAYTON, Medical Doctor,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-01169-GPC-LL

ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

[ECF No. 2]

AND

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING 

FEE REQUIRED BY 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

Plaintiff Hugo Lau, a prisoner currently incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison

(“SVSP”) in Soledad, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 20, 2019. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.)

Plaintiff claims Defendant David Clayton, a medical doctor at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, denied him adequate medical care 

in violation of the Eighth Amendment while he was incarcerated at RJD in August and 

September 2018. (Id. at 2, 3.) 

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Plaintiff did not pay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time 

he filed his Complaint; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2).

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

A. Standard of Review

“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, “face

an additional hurdle.” Id.

In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a filing fee,” in “monthly 

installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)(b), the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to 

proceed IFP in cases where the prisoner:

. . . has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any 

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was 

dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent 

danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). “Pursuant to 

§ 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews 

v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “Cervantes”) (under the 

PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred 

from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The objective of the PLRA is to further 

“the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney 

v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 

were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court 

styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 

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prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 

When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 

dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 

the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” ElShaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 

F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). “When ... presented with multiple claims within a single 

action,” however, courts may “assess a PLRA strike only when the case as a whole is 

dismissed for a qualifying reason under the Act.” Hoffman v. Pulido, __ F.3d. __, No. 18-

15661, 2019 WL 2910812, at *5, (9th Cir. July 8, 2019) (citing Washington v. L.A. Cnty. 

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016)).

Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g) prohibits his pursuit 

of any subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he faces “imminent 

danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-

52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a plausible allegation 

that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.”).

B. Discussion

Plaintiff, who suffers from chronic lower back, nerve pain, and bowel and bladder 

disfunction, claims Dr. Clayton acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs in 

August and September 2018, by improperly discontinuing a previously prescribed course 

of morphine and failing to renew his prescription for gabapentin after a drug screen 

indicated no presence of morphine in Plaintiff’s urine. (See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1, 3, 12-

14.) Plaintiff claims Clayton falsely accused him of diverting the medication, and falsified 

his medical records in order to retaliate against him for filing an administrative grievance 

and a complaint against him with the California Medical Board. (Id. at 4-5, 16-18.)

However, Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at HDSP, no longer a patient of Dr. 

Clayton’s, and does not plausibly suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical 

injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)); 

see also Stewart v. Lystad, No. 2:16-CV-01439-BHS-JRC, 2016 WL 6816278, at *3 (W.D. 

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Wash. Oct. 14, 2016) (finding prisoner’s claims of “intractable” foot pain, and an alleged 

inability to “work out, fall asleep, work, stand for long periods or walk long distances” 

insufficient to satisfy § 1915(g)’s exception based on “imminent danger”), report and 

recommendation adopted, No. C16-1439 BHS, 2016 WL 6805339 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 17, 

2016); Balzarini v. Lewis, No:13cv820-LJO-BAM(PC), 2015 WL 2345464, at *8 (E.D. 

Cal. May 14, 2015) (finding plaintiff’s disagreement with prison medical personnel about 

the course or adequacy of treatment he was receiving did not establish imminent danger); 

Thomas v. Ellis, Case No. 12cv5563-W(PR), 2015 WL 859071, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 

2015) (finding allegations showing prisoner was receiving medical treatment for his 

chronic pain, but that he disagreed with the type of medication the medical staff was 

prescribing for him was insufficient to show an imminent danger of serious physical 

injury); Stephens v. Castro, No. 04cv6717 AWISMSP, 2006 WL 1530265, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 

May 31, 2006) (disagreement with prison personnel about course of treatment does not 

establish an imminent danger of serious physical injury under Section 1915(g)); Gonzales 

v. Castro, No. 1:09-cv-1545-AWI-MJS-PC, 2010 WL 2471030 at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 

2010) (finding prisoner’s allegations of retaliation insufficient to “constitute a real danger 

... or even an ongoing threat” of “serious physical injury” under § 1915(g)).

And while Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 

demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in 

some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 

satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 

1120. That is the case here.

A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case 

No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing 

United States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. 

Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 

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1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th 

Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, 

Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992).

Based on a review of its own dockets and other court proceedings available on 

PACER, the Court finds that Plaintiff Hugo Lua, identified as CDCR Inmate #P-48040, 

while incarcerated, has had three prior civil actions dismissed on the grounds that they were 

frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

They are: 

1) Lua v. Cal. Inst. for Men at Chico, Civil Case No. 2:00-cv-06616-DOCCW (C.D. Cal., West. Div., Jan. 7, 2002) (Mem. & Order dismissing 

complaint sua sponte for failing to state a cognizable § 1983 claim pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(a) & 1915A) (ECF No. 9); (C.D. Cal., West. Div., 

Jan. 31, 2002) (Report & Recommendation [“R&R”] to dismiss civil action

for failure to comply with court order to amend and/or prosecute) (ECF No. 

10); (C.D. Cal., West. Div., March 13, 2002) (Order accepting R&R) (ECF

No. 12) (strike one);1

2) Lua v. Finander, et al., Civil Case No. 2:10-cv-03548-DOC-JCG (C.D. 

Cal., West. Div., March 23, 2011) (R&R to sua sponte dismiss Second 

Amended Complaint with prejudice for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(a) & 1915A) (ECF No. 17); (C.D. Cal., West. Div., May

6, 2011) (Order adopting R&R) (ECF No. 18) (strike two); and

3) Lua v. Smith, et al., Civil Case No. 1:14-cv-00019-LJO-MJS (E.D. Cal. 

April 8, 2015) (Findings & Recommendations [“F&Rs”] to Dismiss Action 

with prejudice for Failure to State a Claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(a) 

& 1915A) (ECF No. 18); (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2015) (Order Adopting F&Rs) 

(ECF No. 22); (E.D. Cal. April 1, 2016) (Order denying Motion for 

Reconsideration) (ECF No. 30) (strike three).

 

1 See Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen (1) a district court 

dismisses a complaint on the ground that it fails to state a claim, and (2) the court grants 

leave to amend, and (3) the plaintiff then fails to file an amended complaint, the dismissal 

counts as a strike under § 1915(g).”).

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Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated more than three 

“strikes” pursuant to § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he faced 

imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is not 

entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; 

Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all 

prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing 

the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin 

v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is 

itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).

II. Conclusion and Order

 For the reasons explained, the Court: 

(1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) as barred by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g);

(2) DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte and without prejudice based on 

Plaintiff’s failure to prepay the $400 civil and administrative filing fees required by 28 

U.S.C. § 1914(a);

(3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and

(4) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter a judgment of dismissal and to close 

the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2019

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