Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-05038/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-05038-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:145 Patent Infringement

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Case No. 13-cv-05038 NC

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ENPLAS DISPLAY DEVICE 

CORPORATION, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SEOUL SEMICONDUCTOR 

COMPANY, LTD.,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-05038 NC 

ORDER DENYING SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT ON INEQUITABLE 

CONDUCT DEFENSE

Re: Dkt. No. 161

In this patent infringement suit, plaintiff Enplas argues that the ’209 patent is 

unenforceable because its inventor, Dr. Pelka, engaged in inequitable conduct. Enplas 

argues that Dr. Pelka supervised Dr. Gleckman, inventor of the ’354 patent, so Dr. Pelka 

was aware of the ’354 patent and its materiality to his own ’209 patent. As a result, Dr. 

Pelka should have disclosed the ’354 patent to the PTO, but did not. 

Defendant SSC moves for summary judgment, arguing that Enplas cannot meet the 

clear and convincing threshold to demonstrate inequitable conduct. The Court finds that, 

drawing all inferences in favor of Enplas, Enplas has presented enough evidence that the 

Court could reasonably conclude that Dr. Pelka engaged in inequitable conduct. Thus, 

SSC’s motion is DENIED.

//

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I. BACKGROUND

In 1992, Dr. Pelka co-founded TIR Technologies, Inc. (“TIR”). Pelka Decl. ¶ 9.1 

TIR was a research company that developed technology for LED lighting systems and 

LCD backlights. Id. At TIR, Dr. Pelka had administrative responsibilities including 

making decisions about whether to file patent applications. Id. at ¶ 11.

Dr. Gleckman worked at TIR Technologies, and submitted two relevant patents to 

the PTO: the ’354 patent and the ’197 patent. In 1994, Dr. Pelka approved Dr. Gleckman’s

filing a patent application that claimed priority to the application for the ’197 patent. Pelka 

Decl. ¶¶ 20-21. In October 1994, Gleckman filed the patent application, which would 

become the ’354 patent. Pelka Decl. ¶ 20-21. Gleckman left TIR shortly after. Id. ¶ 31. 

Dr. Pelka filed the application for the ’209 patent on March 19, 1997. In May 1997, 

the patent attorneys submitted the ’197 patent, which had issued in 1995, for consideration 

by the PTO as a prior art reference to the ’209 patent. In April 1997, Teledyne, Inc. 

acquired TIR, including all of TIR’s pending patent applications. Pelka Decl. ¶ 29. Dr. 

Pelka became an employee of Teledyne. Id. ¶ 30. In November 1997, Gleckman’s 

application issued as the ’354 patent, a continuation-in-part of the ’197 patent. The parties 

dispute whether Dr. Pelka had administrative responsibilities in Teledyne between April 

and November 1997. On December 28, 1999, the ’209 patent issued.

A. The Gleckman ’354 Patent

The Gleckman patent (No. 5,684,354) is a continuation-in-part of the ’197 patent 

entitled, “Backlighting Apparatus For Uniformly Illuminating A Display Panel.” The 

invention relates to a “backlighting apparatus for displays, particularly for small-area 

liquid-crystal displays (LCDs), such as utilized in virtual reality headsets.” The figures in 

the Gleckman patent show a light source mounted on the side walls of the cavity, generally 

outside the “viewing aperture portion” (the portion of the cavity that lies directly beneath 

 

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The Court considers Dr. Pelka’s declaration solely for the background information 

provided. The Court does not rely on Dr. Pelka’s declaration in evaluating the facts that 

Enplas intends to present on its substantive claim.

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the aperture). 

B. The Pelka ’209 Patent

Dr. Pelka’s patent (No. 6,007,209) is entitled a “Light Source for Backlighting.” 

The invention relates to “a light source for a display panel of the type used in notebook 

computers.” Figures 3 and 4 of the ’209 patent are substantially similar to figures 12 and 

13 of the Gleckman patent, but the ’209 patent has light sources on the bottom of the 

cavity in addition to the side walls. The ’209 patent discloses the Gleckman ’197 patent.

C. Procedural History

Enplas brings this declaratory judgment action, alleging non-infringement of the 

’209, invalidity of the patent as anticipated, and a defense of inequitable conduct, among 

others. SSC alleges that Enplas’ LCD screens infringe the ’209 patent. 

Shortly after the close of discovery, Enplas moved to add inequitable conduct as a 

defense to the ’209 patent. The Court granted the motion. Dkt. No. 119. SSC now moves 

for summary judgment, arguing that Enplas cannot meet its burden to demonstrate 

inequitable conduct by clear and convincing evidence.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment may be granted only when, drawing all inferences and 

resolving all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014); 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under 

governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 

Bald assertions that genuine issues of material fact exist are insufficient. Galen v. Cnty. of 

L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007).

The moving party bears the burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, 

discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving 

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party must go beyond the pleadings, and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth 

specific facts showing that a genuine issue of fact exists for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 

Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Steckl v. 

Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983)). All justifiable inferences, however, 

must be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 

1863 (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255). 

III. DISCUSSION

Inequitable conduct is an equitable defense to patent infringement. Therasense, Inc. 

v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “To prove 

inequitable conduct, the challenger must show by clear and convincing evidence that the 

patent applicant (1) misrepresented or omitted information material to patentability, and 

(2) did so with specific intent to mislead or deceive the PTO.” In re Rosuvastatin Calcium 

Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511, 519 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC, 

735 F.3d 1333, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Because inequitable conduct is an equitable 

remedy, there is no right to a jury, and the Court will be the fact finder. Duro-Last, Inc. v. 

Custom Seal, Inc., 321 F.3d 1098, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Thus, the Court considers 

Enplas’ evidence as to (1) materiality; and (2) Dr. Pelka’s intent.

A. Materiality

Information is material if “the PTO would not have allowed the claim had it been 

aware of the undisclosed prior art.” Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291. “This means that to 

assess materiality, the court must look to the standard used by the PTO to allow claims 

during examination.” Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 768 F.3d 1185, 1189 

(Fed. Cir. 2014). Thus, the Court applies the preponderance of the evidence standard used 

by the PTO. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291-92. “[E]ven if a district court does not 

invalidate a claim based on a deliberately withheld reference, the reference may be 

material if it would have blocked patent issuance under the PTO’s different evidentiary 

standards.” Id.

Here, the Court dismissed Enplas’ invalidity defense as to the ’209 patent because 

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the Court concluded that Enplas’ evidence did not meet the clear and convincing threshold 

for invalidity. Dkt. No. 321. However, that ruling does not automatically lead to the 

conclusion that the Gleckman patent is immaterial. Instead, the Court reviews the 

evidence now to determine if it meets the preponderance of the evidence threshold used by 

the PTO.

The Court finds persuasive that Dr. Pelka disclosed the Gleckman ’197 patent in his 

patent application, presumably because he believed it to be material. In his deposition, Dr. 

Pelka admitted that he made a decision that the ’197 patent was sufficiently relevant that it 

should be brought to the examiner’s attention. Pelka Dep. at 34. The ’354 Gleckman 

patent was a continuation-in-part of the ’197 patent. Taken in the light most favorable to 

Enplas, the Court finds this alone sufficient to establish that there is a dispute of material 

fact, and that the Court could conclude that the ’354 patent is material. 

B. Intent

Inequitable conduct requires that the patentee acted with specific intent to deceive 

the PTO. “In a case involving nondisclosure of information, clear and convincing 

evidence must show that the applicant made a deliberate decision to withhold a known 

material reference.” Id. “[T]o meet the clear and convincing evidence standard, the 

specific intent to deceive must be ‘the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn 

from the evidence.’” Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290. “We recognize instead that because 

direct evidence of deceptive intent is rare, a district court may infer intent from indirect 

and circumstantial evidence, provided that such intent is the single reasonable inference.” 

Am. Calcar, 768 F.3d at 1190-91. 

Here, Dr. Pelka appears to have been aware of the ’354 patent. Pelka Decl. at 32. 

The Court acknowledges that many of the figures and claims from the ’209 and ’354 

patent are substantially similar, as the Court analyzed in its invalidity order. Dkt. No. 321. 

SSC relies on Dr. Pelka’s testimony that he discovered the similarity between the two 

patents recently, when he reviewed his 40 or so issued patents. Pelka Decl. at 12. 

However, the ’354 patent was not one of Dr. Pelka’s patent, so this statement suggests that 

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perhaps Dr. Pelka knew of the similarity between the patents at the time that he filed the 

’209 patent. Dr. Pelka also testified that the figures were copied from the ’354 patent 

because the attorneys were being cost effective. Pelka Decl. at 26.

SSC also relies on the fact that Dr. Pelka gave up administrative duties in the 

company once TIR was bought by Teledyne to demonstrate that Dr. Pelka would not have 

known of the issuance of the ’354 patent. At the motion hearing, the parties debated over 

whether Dr. Pelka remained in a position to know of and be aware of the issuance of the 

’354 patent from April to November 1997. This is a question of material fact that the 

Court could resolve at a full evidentiary hearing. 

The Court finds that, drawing all inferences in favor of Enplas, the Court could 

reasonably conclude that Dr. Pelka knew of the ’354 patent, copied from the ’354 patent, 

and intentionally withheld its disclosure for fear that the ’209 patent would not be granted. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that there is a dispute of material fact. Additionally, drawing 

all inferences in the light most favorable to Enplas, the Court finds that Enplas could 

demonstrate that ’354 patent is material, that Dr. Pelka knew of the ’354 patent and its 

materiality, and that he intentionally did not disclose the ’354 patent to the PTO. 

Thus, the Court DENIES SSC’s motion for summary judgment on inequitable 

conduct.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 8, 2016 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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