Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00707/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00707-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Fair Labor Standards

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-1- 07CV0707 BEN (CAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

D’ARRIGO BROS. CO. OF

CALIFORNIA, a California

corporation,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

AGRICULTURAL LABOR

RELATIONS BOARD, a State

Administrative Agency, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CASE NO. 07-CV-0707 BEN (CAB)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

[D.E. 4, 5, 11]

Plaintiff D’Arrigo Bros. Co. of California (“Plaintiff”) seeks to enjoin Defendant

State of California Agricultural Labor Relations Board (“ALRB” or “Defendant”) from

ordering Plaintiff to participate in compulsory interest arbitration. Plaintiff premises this

present action on the possibility that the final decision resulting from this administrative

process could potentially raise issues implicating the preemptive effect of the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). See 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. The

administrative procedure that Plaintiff seeks to enjoin commenced on May 10, 2007, and

continues to this date. Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 

(Doc. No. 4.) For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

Case 3:07-cv-00707-BEN-CAB Document 14 Filed 06/07/07 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-2- 07CV0707 BEN (CAB)

I. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s entire suit under Rule 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “Whether a claim is ripe for

adjudication goes to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction under the case or controversy

clause of article III of the federal Constitution.” William St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880

F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). “Like other challenges to a court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, motions raising the ripeness issue are treated as brought under Rule 12(b)(1)

even if improperly identified by the moving party as brought under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the jurisdiction of the court

over the subject matter of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Federal courts are

courts of limited jurisdiction and possess ‘only that power authorized by Constitution and

statute.’” Sandpiper Village Condominium Ass’n., Inc. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 428

F.3d 831, 841 (9th Cir. 2005). Limits upon federal jurisdiction must not be disregarded or

evaded. See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). “A

federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary

affirmatively appears.” A-Z Intern. v. Phillips, 323 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003)

(internal quotation and citation omitted). It is the burden of plaintiffs to persuade the

Court that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Hexom v. Oregon Dept. of Transp., 177

F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 1999). 

B. Analysis

Congress enacted ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., as a comprehensive legislative

scheme “to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit

plans.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983). By enacting such a broad

scheme, Congress also sought to protect employers by “eliminating the threat of

conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.” Id. at 99.

To further this goal of nationwide consistency, Congress included a preemption clause, 

Case 3:07-cv-00707-BEN-CAB Document 14 Filed 06/07/07 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Section 514(a) provides that ERISA “supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may now

or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)

(defining employee benefit plans).

-3- 07CV0707 BEN (CAB)

section 514(a)1 that is “conspicuous for its breadth. It establishes as an area of exclusive

federal concern the subject of every state law that ‘relate[s] to’ an employee benefit plan

governed by ERISA.” FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990). However,

ERISA’s preemption provision is not without limits. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.

Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985) (noting the presumption that Congress did not

intend to preempt areas of traditional state regulation). 

A state law relates to an ERISA employee benefit plan “if it has a connection with

or reference to such a plan.” Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97; New York State Conference of Blue

Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645, 646 (1995). 

However, “[s]ome state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote,

or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law ‘relates to’ the plan.” Shaw, 463

U.S. at 100 n. 21; Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Ahue, 12 F.3d 1498, 1504 (9th Cir. 1993). Given

that the analysis is factually driven, it is not presently apparent whether the current ALRB

administrative matters will or will not produce a final order that is subject to ERISA

preemption. For this reason, Plaintiff seeks relief based on a patently unripe claim. 

The purpose of the ripeness doctrine is to avoid premature judicial review of

administrative action. “Judicial intervention in uncompleted administrative proceedings,

absent a statutory mandate is strongly disfavored.” Bakersfield City School District v.

Boyer, 610 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir.1979). Given that the pending ALRB administrative

proceedings and/or related agency action have not yet ripened into an actual case or

controversy, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 

Case 3:07-cv-00707-BEN-CAB Document 14 Filed 06/07/07 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-4- 07CV0707 BEN (CAB)

II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc.

No 4). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

The Motion to Intervene by the United Farm Workers of America (Doc. No. 5) and

Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 11) are therefore denied as moot. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 7, 2007

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-00707-BEN-CAB Document 14 Filed 06/07/07 Page 4 of 4