Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00506/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00506-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

---

1

3:17-cv-00506-GPC-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CREE, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

TARR, INC.; IRON ADS, LLC; 

NATHAN MARTINEZ; DOES 1-10, 

inclusive;

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-00506-GPC-NLS

ORDER DENYING AS MOOT 

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 

CLARIFICATION

[ECF No. 28]

Before the Court is Defendants’ “motion for clarification.” (ECF No. 28.) For the 

reasons explained below, the motion is DENIED as moot.

Plaintiff Cree, Inc. (“Cree”) filed this action on March 14, 2017, asserting claims 

relating to trademark infringement against Defendants Tarr, Inc.; Iron Ads, LLC; Nathan 

Martinez; and ten unnamed individuals. (ECF No. 1.) On May 10, 2017, Defendants 

filed a motion to dismiss Cree’s complaint in its entirety. (ECF No. 16.) In the same 

filing, Defendants alternatively sought a more definite statement under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(e). (See ECF No. 16-1 at 12–13.) 

On July 28, 2017, this Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part 

the motion to dismiss, and denying the motion for a more definite statement. (ECF No. 

Case 3:17-cv-00506-GPC-NLS Document 30 Filed 10/10/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 3
2

3:17-cv-00506-GPC-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24 (the “July 28 Order”).) The Court explained that Cree had alleged sufficient facts to 

state plausible claims for relief and to adequately apprise Defendants of how they have 

allegedly infringed Cree’s trademark. (Id. at 6–13.) The Court found, however, that 

Plaintiff’s alter ego allegations were insufficient to state a plausible claim “that 

[Defendants] Tarr and Iron Ads are the alter egos of Defendant Martinez.” (Id. at 14.) 

The Court explained that the allegations failed to establish (1) a unity of interest between 

Defendant Martinez and Tarr and Iron Ads, or (2) that adherence “to the fiction of the 

separate existence of the corporation . . . would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.” 

(Id. at 15–16.) Finally, the Court explained that a more definite statement was not 

required from Plaintiff because the complaint is “sufficiently detailed to apprise 

Defendants of the misconduct alleged and the claims against them.” (Id. at 17.) The 

Court therefore granted Defendants’ motion only as to Cree’s alter ego allegations. The 

Court gave Cree thirty days from the date of its order “to amend its complaint to cure the 

deficiencies as identified by this order.” (Id. at 18.)

On September 1, 2017, Cree filed a notice stating that it “does not intend to file an 

amended complaint in an effort to cure the deficiencies of the later ego allegations, as 

identified by the Court’s July 28, 2017 Order, and intends to move forward on its existing 

Complaint under the effects of [the] Court’s July 28, 2017 Order.” (ECF No. 25.) 

On September 17, 2017, Defendants filed the pending “request for clarification.” 

(ECF No. 28.) In their request, Defendants state that they “need to know which 

allegations are withdrawn and which allegations remain,” and that they “would prefer 

that Cree file an amended complaint that affirmatively withdraws Cree’s alter-ego 

allegations and those allegations that rest on Cree’s alter-ego theory of liability.” (ECF 

No. 28.)

The Court disagrees with Defendants’ assertion that the complaint, as it stands, is 

confusing as to which allegations are still operative after the July 28 Order. In fact, the 

Court stated as much in its ruling when addressing Defendants’ challenge to Cree’s alter 

ego allegations:

Case 3:17-cv-00506-GPC-NLS Document 30 Filed 10/10/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 3
3

3:17-cv-00506-GPC-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court observes that its conclusion that Plaintiff has failed to plead an 

alter ego relationship between Martinez and Tarr, along with Martinez and 

Iron Ads, has a minimal effect on the pleadings. This is so because the 

complaint has alleged that each of the Defendants are primarily liable for all 

causes of action, and therefore none of Plaintiff’s causes of action rely on 

the alter ego relationship to establish liability. See Compl. ¶ 11 (Defendants 

are “jointly, severally and concurrently liable and responsible with one 

another upon the causes of action hereinafter set forth.”).

(ECF No. 24 at 14 n.7 (emphasis added).) Because (1) only a few of the allegations in 

the complaint refer to any aspect of alter ego liability (see ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 5–9), (2) the 

causes of action asserted in the complaint do not rely on an alter ego relationship, and (3) 

the Court has already determined that the complaint’s allegations are sufficiently clear to 

apprise Defendants of the misconduct alleged and the claims against them, it is 

unnecessary for Cree to file an amended complaint. The Court accepts Cree’s declination 

to file an amended complaint in response to the July 28 Order. Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Cree’s claims of alter ego liability between Tarr, Inc., and Nathan Martinez, and 

Iron Ads, LLC, and Nathan Martinez is GRANTED with prejudice. 

Defendants’ motion to clarify (ECF No. 28) is DENIED as moot. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 10, 2017

Case 3:17-cv-00506-GPC-NLS Document 30 Filed 10/10/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 3