Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03491/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03491-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL GEARY WILSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Case No. 14-cv-03491-SI 

Docket Nos. 67, 90, 91

Currently before the Court are defendants’ motions to dismiss, Docket Nos. 67, 90, 91, 

which for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part. 

BACKGROUND

In his first amended pro se complaint, plaintiff alleges as follows. On February 2, 2014, at 

or about 6:10 a.m., plaintiff entered the lobby of the 24-hour Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Office 

(CCCSO). First Amended Complaint (FAC) ¶¶ 24, 27. Plaintiff picked up a white phone at a 

public service window and told the CCCSO employee who answered the phone that he needed to 

report some crimes and requested medical attention, asking her to call 911. Id. ¶ 27. The 

employee then contacted defendant Kelly Challand. Id. Challand summoned defendant deputy 

sheriff Chad MacDonald to confirm plaintiff’s identity. Id. ¶ 28. MacDonald offered to let 

plaintiff sit down in a nearby chair, which plaintiff refused. Id. ¶ 29. According to plaintiff, 

MacDonald did not offer him the medical attention he requested nor did he call 911. Id. Plaintiff 

handed MacDonald a report and request regarding alleged crimes committed by Anthony 

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Piscitelli.1 Id. Plaintiff alleges that Challand and MacDonald then physically blocked plaintiff 

from exiting the chair in which he was seated and Challand told plaintiff to leave or he would 

arrest him for trespassing. Id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff alleges that Challand refused to call 911 for him and 

ignored his statements that he was having trouble walking and standing. Id. 

At or about 6:26 a.m., Challand noticed that plaintiff had an audio recorder and was 

actively recording. Id. ¶35. Challand seized the recorder, arrested plaintiff, and MacDonald 

searched plaintiff’s person. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Challand, MacDonald, and three other Doe 

defendants used excessive force upon him, causing him pain, nerve damage, scars, and bruises. 

Id. ¶ 36. At or about 6:28 a.m. Challand stated to other CCCSO employees that plaintiff “is a nut 

job.” Id. ¶ 39. At or about 6:30 a.m., Challand told defendant Matthew Schuler that dispatch said 

plaintiff needed a mental health arrest. Id. ¶ 41. At or about 6:31 a.m. defendant Schuler said to 

everyone in the area, “Evidently, [Plaintiff is] crazy.” Id. ¶ 42. 

At or about 6:32 a.m., Challand and other defendants searched plaintiff’s property. Id. 

¶ 43. Plaintiff alleges that Schuler ordered a Doe defendant to run plaintiff’s name through 

ARIES, a database containing information about people with mental disorders. Id. ¶ 44. 

Defendant Jarred Pereira read part of plaintiff’s victim/witness report and discussed with others 

some of the alleged crimes perpetrated by Anthony Piscitelli. Id. During this period, defendants 

kept plaintiff in a glass-enclosed room; according to plaintiff, Pereira ignored plaintiff’s requests 

for immediate medical attention as well as his complaints that the handcuffs on his wrists were 

causing pain and numbness in his hands. Id. ¶ 55.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants put him in an overcrowded group cell for approximately 

24 hours, during which he complained about the conditions and begged repeatedly for water, but 

defendants did nothing to help him. Id. ¶ 63. At or about 3:15 p.m. defendant Michael Elder 

conducted a 5150 evaluation of plaintiff. Id. ¶ 68. Plaintiff alleges that Elder falsified medical 

records with false reference to a report from a lobby aid, and a fraudulent diagnosis of mental 

disorder. Id. Plaintiff further alleges Elder unlawfully searched his medical records and disclosed 

 

1

Plaintiff describes Piscitelli as a process server associated with Contra Costa County. FAC ¶ 23. 

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to other defendants the content of his interview with plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff was released at or 

about 5:45 a.m. on February 3, 2014. Id. ¶ 76. On February 5, 2014, plaintiff and his attorney met 

with defendant Ronald Hoekwater to file a confidential internal affairs complaint regarding the 

alleged wrongdoings of defendants. Id. ¶ 83. Plaintiff alleges that Hoekwater has not kept the 

complaint confidential and has published false accusations that plaintiff committed crimes related 

to recording conversations. Id. 

On August 1, 2014, plaintiff filed the initial complaint in this case. Docket No. 1. 

Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s initial complaint, which the Court did in part, with leave 

to amend. Docket Nos. 24, 27, 52. Plaintiff has added twenty-seven new claims in his first 

amended complaint, and defendants now move to dismiss the first amended complaint. 

 

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2) and a complaint that fails to do so is subject 

to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff 

must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires the plaintiff to 

allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a Defendant has acted unlawfully.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). While courts do not require “heightened fact 

pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, 555. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and 

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 

‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

557). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported 

by factual allegations.” Id. 

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must accept as true all facts alleged in 

the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 

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580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009). However, a district court is not required to accept as true 

“allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 

inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). If the Court 

dismisses a complaint, it must decide whether to grant leave to amend. The Ninth Circuit has 

“repeatedly held that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the 

pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 

allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted).

In the Ninth Circuit, courts “construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating them under 

Iqbal. While the standard is higher, our ‘obligation’ remains, ‘where the petition is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the 

benefit of any doubt.’” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bretz v. 

Kelman, 773, F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)). However, a court will not “supply 

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The district court must provide the pro se plaintiff 

notice of the deficiencies of his or her complaint prior to dismissal, but a pro se plaintiff must still 

allege facts sufficient to allow the reviewing court to conclude a claim has been stated. Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.3d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992); Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.3d 

266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982). 

DISCUSSION

I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff has alleged claims against all individual defendants under Section 1983 for violations 

of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.2 Defendants move to dismiss all of 

plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims.

 

2

In his initial complaint plaintiff alleged violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

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A. Fourth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges his Fourth Amendment rights were violated in three ways: (1) unlawful 

arrest and seizure; (2) excessive force; and (3) warrantless searches.3 Defendants contend that the 

allegations contained in plaintiff’s complaint show that there was probable cause to arrest and 

search him, and that the use of force was reasonable as a matter of law. Defendants further argue 

that even if there was no probable cause to arrest plaintiff, the defendants are entitled to qualified 

immunity as to any violations of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

1. Unlawful Arrest

“Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless arrest requires probable cause.” United 

States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007). There is probable cause when, “under the 

totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have 

concluded that there was a fair probability that [the defendant] had committed a crime.” Id. 

(quoting United States v. Smith, 790 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1986)). “[A] warrantless arrest 

satisfies the Constitution so long as the officer has ‘probable cause to believe that the suspect has 

committed or is committing an offense.’” Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 173 (2008) (quoting 

Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979)). 

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s allegations provide facts that would lead a reasonable 

officer to believe that plaintiff was trespassing on public property in violation of California Penal 

Code section 602.1(b). Under section 602.1(b), any person who intentionally interferes with any 

lawful business carried on by employees of a public agency open to the public by obstructing 

those attempting to carry on business and who refuses to leave the premises after being requested 

to leave by a supervisor of the public agency is guilty of a misdemeanor. Cal. Penal Code 

§ 602.1(b). 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that while interacting with defendants Challand and 

 

3

From plaintiff’s initial complaint, it was unclear whether his claims pertained to his arrest or the 

5150 evaluation. Plaintiff has clarified his position in this first amended complaint, specifying 

that his Fourth Amendment claims arise from his arrest.

 

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MacDonald in the public lobby of the CCCSO, MacDonald offered to let him sit down in a chair. 

FAC ¶ 29. The complaint states that Challand and MacDonald physically blocked plaintiff from 

exiting the chair. Id. ¶ 30. Challand said to plaintiff, “Now get outta here! I’m gonna arrest you 

for trespassing!” but Challand, MacDonald, and two or three defendant Does simultaneously 

surrounded plaintiff and physically blocked him from leaving his seat. Id. ¶¶ 30-31. Plaintiff 

further alleges that he repeatedly stated to defendants that he was having trouble standing and 

walking and so he remained seated and asked them for help. Id. According to plaintiff, he was 

arrested when Challand noticed his Olympus Recorder was actively recording. Id. ¶ 35. 

MacDonald then conducted a search of plaintiff’s person and a defendant Doe reached into an 

outside pocket of plaintiff’s bag. Id. In his complaint plaintiff alleges that Challand arrested him,

and clarifies that only Challand arrested him, not MacDonald or other defendants. Id. ¶¶ 35, 49, 

50. Thus, as to plaintiff’s claim for unlawful arrest, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state 

a claim against defendants MacDonald, Schuler, Pereira, McQuoid, Elder, or Hoekwater. 

On a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true. 

Additionally, in a pro se civil rights case, the Court must “construe the pleadings liberally” and 

“afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.’” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 

2010) (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773, F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)). Drawing all 

facts and reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently 

pled a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment against defendant Challand. The allegations

stated in plaintiff’s amended complaint make it plausible that Challand did not have probable 

cause to arrest plaintiff. Plaintiff has alleged that he was physically blocked by defendants from 

exiting his chair, was having trouble walking and standing, and therefore remained seated. FAC 

¶¶ 29-31. While evidence presented later in the litigation may demonstrate that plaintiff was 

intentionally interfering with lawful business and refused a supervisor’s requests to leave such that 

probable cause existed for Challand to arrest plaintiff, at the pleading stage plaintiff’s allegations 

are sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss.4 

 

4 Defendants also argue that the officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for recording their 

confidential communications without their consent in violation of California Penal Code section 

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Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s claims for 

unlawful arrest and excessive force. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government 

officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 

(1982)). Whether the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right is the 

threshold question in the qualified immunity analysis. See id., see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 

194, 201 (2001). If the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right, the Court must 

decide “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the defendant’s alleged 

misconduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. Here, plaintiff has alleged a violation of his Fourth 

Amendment rights for unlawful arrest and excessive force. 

As to defendants’ claim of qualified immunity for plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claim, the 

Court asks “whether a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest 

the plaintiff.” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 437 (9th Cir. 2002). California Penal Code section 

602.1(b) provides that any person who intentionally interferes with any lawful business carried on 

by employees of a public agency open to the public by obstructing those attempting to carry on 

business and who refuses to leave the premises after being requested to leave by a supervisor of 

the public agency is guilty of a misdemeanor. Cal. Penal Code § 602.1(b). Plaintiff has alleged 

that he was surrounded by defendants, physically blocked from leaving his seat, and unable to 

 

632. Section 632 “prohibits the electronic recording of any ‘confidential communication’ without 

the consent of all parties to the communication.” Medical Laboratory Management Consultants v. 

American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 816 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Shulman v. 

Group W. Productions, Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 234 (Cal. 1998)). Under Section 632, a “confidential 

communication” is confidential “if a party to that conversation has an objectively reasonable 

expectation that the conversation is not being overhead or recorded.” Flanagan v. Flanagan, 24 

Cal. 4th 766, 776-77 (2002); Cal. Penal Code § 652(c). Defendants assert that plaintiff has failed 

to allege that anyone else was present in the lobby such that the officers did not have a reasonable 

expectation as to a confidential conversation with plaintiff. Plaintiff has alleged in paragraph 37 

of the first amended complaint that “various members of the public” were in the area and therefore 

heard “any conversations that occurred there.” FAC ¶ 37. Accordingly, defendants’ argument 

fails. 

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stand and walk so he remained seated and asked defendants for help. FAC ¶¶ 30-31. The Court 

finds that based on the facts alleged, a reasonable officer would not have believed that plaintiff, 

who was physically blocked from leaving his seat and unable to walk or stand, was refusing to 

leave the premises. 

Defendant Challand, the only defendant as to whom plaintiff has stated a claim for 

unlawful arrest, is not entitled to a finding of qualified immunity at this pleading stage of the 

litigation. 

2. Warrantless Searches

Plaintiff alleges that defendants MacDonald, Challand, Schuler, Pereira, Elder, and 

McQuoid carried out unreasonable warrantless searches of his person, messenger bag, portfolio, 

confidential documents, confidential or privileged conversations with healthcare providers, 

Olympus recorder, medical records, background, and car. FAC ¶ 140. 

Plaintiff claims that MacDonald and Challand searched his person and his belongings, 

specifically his Olympus recorder, his portfolio, his confidential correspondence, and his 

messenger bag. Id. ¶¶ 58, 35, 40, 43. Defendants argue that the search was incident to plaintiff’s 

arrest and is therefore permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged 

that he was arrested without probable cause and the Court has found that the allegations in 

plaintiff’s amended complaint make it plausible that he was arrested unlawfully. Plaintiff has 

stated a claim under the Fourth Amendment for the search incident to his unlawful arrest. See 

United States v. Mota, 982 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he arrest must be both custodial 

and lawful to support a search incident to that arrest.”). The motion is DENIED as to defendants 

MacDonald and Challand on this claim. 

As to Schuler, plaintiff contends that he violated the Fourth Amendment by ordering a 

defendant Doe to search plaintiff’s name in the ARIES database and by eavesdropping on 

plaintiff’s conversation with a healthcare professional. FAC ¶¶ 44, 61. Similarly, plaintiff alleges 

Pereira eavesdropped on him during a medical examination. Id. ¶ 65. These alleged acts do not 

constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and plaintiff has not alleged that 

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Schuler or Pereira searched his person or possessions. Plaintiff has not remedied the defects of 

these claims in his amended complaint. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss 

plaintiff’s claims as to defendants Schuler and Pereira with prejudice. 

Plaintiff alleges McQuoid “snickered and otherwise indicated that Plaintiff’s car either 

already had been searched or was going to be searched” and that McQuoid and possibly others 

unlawfully searched his car during his imprisonment. FAC ¶¶ 73-74. But plaintiff’s amended 

complaint also states that McQuoid stated that he could not find plaintiff’s car in the adjacent 

parking lot. Id. ¶ 73. These claims were previously dismissed, with leave to amend, but plaintiff 

has not supplemented his statements with facts to support his claims. Thus, the Court must 

GRANT the motion to dismiss this claim as to McQuoid with prejudice. 

As to Elder, plaintiff alleges he conducted a Section 5150 evaluation of plaintiff and 

unlawfully searched plaintiff’s medical records. Id. ¶¶ 68-69. Accessing plaintiff’s medical 

records in conducting a medical evaluation is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment. In his amended complaint plaintiff has not remedied his Fourth Amendment claim 

against Elder, thus the motion to dismiss this claim is GRANTED as to defendant Elder with 

prejudice. 

3. Excessive Force 

The Court finds that plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for excessive force under the 

Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff has alleged that he remained seated because defendants physically 

blocked him from exiting his chair and upon his arrest defendants grabbed his arms extremely 

tightly while lifting him from a seated position and roughly carried him from the public lobby. 

FAC ¶ 36. Plaintiff alleges this excessive force by Challand, MacDonald and defendant Does 

caused him severe pain, nerve damage, scars, and deep bruises. Id. Plaintiff further alleges the 

defendants tightened the handcuffs they used so much that they cut deeply into the skin around his 

wrists and caused his hands to go completely numb and become discolored. Id. The Ninth Circuit 

has explained that it “is well-established that overly tight handcuffing can constitute excessive 

force.” Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Meredith v. 

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Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). Assuming the truth of plaintiff’s allegations, the 

Court finds plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for excessive force against defendants Challand 

and MacDonald.

Again, defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s 

excessive force claim. To determine whether the constitutional right was clearly established, “it is 

not enough that there is a generally established proposition that excessive use of force is 

unlawful.” Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 756 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 

2004). Rather, the “contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). Here, 

on the facts alleged, a reasonable officer would have understood that what he was doing violated 

plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff alleges that he told defendants that the handcuffs 

were causing pain and numbness in his hands, asked for medical attention, and that the handcuffs 

caused him severe pain, nerve damage, scars, and deep bruises. FAC ¶¶ 36, 55. Defendants are 

therefore not entitled to a finding of qualified immunity on plaintiff’s excessive force claim. The 

motion is DENIED as to defendants Challand and MacDonald. 

B. First Amendment

Plaintiff alleges a violation of his First Amendment rights against all individual defendants. 

FAC ¶ 126. To state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he 

was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, (2) the defendant’s actions would chill a 

person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity and (3) the 

protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s conduct.” Pinard v. 

Clatskanie School Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Skoog v. County of 

Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit has “recognized that a 

retaliatory police action such as an arrest or search and seizure would chill a person of ordinary 

firmness from engaging in future First Amendment activity.” Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 

1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2013). 

According to plaintiff, he engaged in conduct protected by the First Amendment, including 

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petitioning the government for redress of grievances, expressing his viewpoint, and gathering 

information about government activities by recording it. FAC ¶ 126. Plaintiff alleges defendants 

retaliated against him because he engaged in protected speech. Id. ¶ 128. Plaintiff does not 

specify the retaliatory action taken by defendants, but the Court presumes plaintiff complains of 

his arrest by defendant Challand. 

In his complaint plaintiff alleges that Challand arrested him, and later clarifies that only 

Challand arrested him, not MacDonald or other defendants. Id. ¶¶ 35, 49, 50. Accordingly, the 

Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation against 

defendant MacDonald, Schuler, Pereira, McQuoid, Elder, or Hoekwater.5 Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss is GRANTED as to these defendants. 

As to defendant Challand, the Court finds that plaintiff has not stated a claim for First 

Amendment retaliation related to petitioning the government for redress of grievances or 

expressing his viewpoint. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he was arrested at or about 6:26 a.m. 

Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff further alleges that at 6:32 a.m. defendant Pereira skimmed at least part of 

plaintiff’s report, which he states was the first time any defendant even skimmed the document. 

Id. ¶ 44. Thus, plaintiff has alleged that the supposed retaliatory action occurred prior to any of 

the defendants even skimming his report — the document which contained plaintiff’s request for 

redress of grievances and the expression of his viewpoint. Thus, plaintiff has failed to state a 

claim for First Amendment retaliation for expressing his viewpoint. 

Plaintiff appears to argue that he was engaged in protected speech when he recorded the 

conversations taking place in the CCCSO office lobby and he was arrested in retaliation for 

recording. In his amended complaint plaintiff alleges that Challand noticed plaintiff was actively 

recording on his Olympus recorder, so Challand seized and arrested plaintiff and his property. Id. 

 

5

In his amended complaint plaintiff alleges that Hoekwater did not keep confidential the 

complaint he made subsequent to his arrest. FAC ¶ 83. However, plaintiff has not alleged any 

adverse action taken by Hoekwater that would chill or silence a person or ordinary firmness from 

future First Amendment activities. Skoog v. County of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir. 

2006). His claim against Hoekwater therefore fails. 

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¶ 35.6 The Ninth Circuit has recognized a “First Amendment right to film matters of public 

interest.” Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995). Similarly, other circuits 

have held that the First Amendment protects an individual’s right to film police officers 

performing their duties in a public place. Gilk v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith 

v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, plaintiff has alleged that he was 

recording police officers engaged in their duties in the public lobby of the CCCSO. FAC ¶¶ 26; 

28-30; 35-36. Plaintiff has further alleged that Challand noticed he was recording “so he seized 

and arrested Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 36. Taking these facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as it 

must, the Court finds that at this point in the pleading stage, plaintiff has stated a claim against

defendant Challand for retaliation under the First Amendment. 

Defendants argue for qualified immunity, asserting that it was reasonable for the officers to 

believe they could arrest plaintiff and that the case law cited to the Court pertained to overt 

recording of police activities. As previously discussed, from the facts alleged, a reasonable officer 

would not have believed there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff under California Penal Code 

Section 632 as there were other persons present in the lobby, thus the officers could not have had 

an objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation was not being overhead or recorded. 

Additionally, plaintiff has alleged that the recording devices he used “were in plain view.” FAC 

¶¶ 26, 37. Thus, defendants’ suggestion that plaintiff was recording covertly fails. It is clearly 

established law that officers may be filmed while carrying out their official duties. See Fordyce, 

55 F.3d at 439; see also Adkins v. Limtiaco, 537 Fed. Appx. 721, 722 (9th Cir. 2013). Defendants 

have not met their burden to demonstrate defendant Challand is entitled to qualified immunity. 

The motion to dismiss this claim as to defendant Challand is DENIED. 

///

 

6 Defendants again cite California Penal Code § 632 to argue that plaintiff was not engaged in 

protected activity, because plaintiff was violating California law in recording confidential 

communications without their consent. As previously discussed, defendants’ assertion that 

plaintiff violated Section 632 fails. 

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C. Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff again alleges violations of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In his 

amended complaint, plaintiff specifies that his claims are based on: (1) lack of medical care; (2) 

the conditions of his confinement; and (3) denial of his equal protection rights due to his disability. 

FAC at 35-38. 

To succeed on a claim based on medical treatment, a plaintiff must show “deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). First, 

plaintiff must allege facts that “failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further 

significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” and that “defendant’s 

response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1086 (9th Cir. 

2006) (citations omitted). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 

391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference when he 

knows of and disregards “an excessive risk to inmate health; the official must both be aware of 

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he 

must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “Indifference may 

appear when prison official deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment.” Jett, 

439 F.3d at 1096 (citations omitted). 

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds that he has stated a 

claim for lack of medical care against defendant Pereira. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he 

made repeated pleas for medical attention, that he told Pereira that he “was having a medical 

emergency and that the handcuffs were causing pain on his wrists and numbness in his hands” but 

Pereira refused every request. FAC ¶ 55. Plaintiff alleges he was “shaking and crying from pain”

but all defendants refused his repeated requests to treat the wounds on his wrists caused by the 

handcuffs. Id. ¶ 59. Plaintiff further alleges that Pereira eavesdropped on a conversation in which 

healthcare professionals confirmed plaintiff needed immediate emergency medical attention but 

defendants prevented his transfer to a hospital for treatment. Id. ¶ 65. Contrary to defendants’ 

assertions, plaintiff has alleged that Pereira knew that plaintiff needed immediate medical attention

and disregarded this serious medical need. Accordingly, the Court cannot say that plaintiff has 

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failed to state a claim for lack of medical care as to defendant Pereira. 

Plaintiff next alleges the conditions of his confinement violated the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Id. ¶ 161. To state a claim a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement, 

plaintiff must allege that defendants deprived him of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s 

necessities” and that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to an excessive risk to his health 

or safety. Grenning v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hallett v. 

Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002)). Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in “a frigid, dirty, 

smelly, overcrowded group cell with bright lights, a blaring television, no potable water, no open 

seat and no place to sleep.” Id. ¶ 63. He claims that defendants knew the conditions created a 

substantial risk of serious harm to him and disregarded that risk; plaintiff specifies that he begged 

over and over for water, which he needed due to his serious medical needs, but no one did 

anything to help him. Id. ¶¶ 63, 163. As a result, plaintiff’s pain and health condition worsened as 

did his risk of serious harm. Id. Taking the facts alleged as true and drawing all reasonable 

inferences in plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim as to 

the conditions of his confinement ad to defendants Challand, MacDonald, Schuler, Pereira and 

McQuoid.

7

 

Plaintiff also alleges that defendants discriminated against him based upon his disability in 

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. ¶ 171. To state a claim under § 1983 for violation of 

the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiff must allege that the defendants 

acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional. Reese v. Jefferson 

School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, plaintiff states that defendants 

“acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against Plaintiff based upon his disability,” but he 

has not alleged facts to support the allegation that defendants acted in a discriminatory manner or 

that it these acts were intentional. Thus, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for violation of the 

Equal Protection clause. 

The Court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently alleged Fourteenth Amendment claims based 

 

7

Plaintiff asserts this claim against defendants generally, but defendants Elder and Hoekwater do 

not appear to have anything to do with this part of plaintiff's complaint.

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on lack of medical care against defendant Pereira; and claims based on the conditions of his 

confinement as to defendants Challand, MacDonald, Schuler, Pereira and McQuoid. Thus, the 

motion is DENIED as to these claims. The motion is GRANTED as to plaintiff’s Equal 

Protection/disability claim, with prejudice. 

II. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and § 1985(3)

Plaintiff has asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2) and (3) against all individual 

defendants. FAC ¶¶ 172; 179. In his complaint plaintiff cites to the second clause of 1985(2), 

which concerns access to state or territorial courts. FAC ¶ 174; Portman v. County of Santa 

Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 909 (9th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that defendants 

have obstructed justice in state court (or any court) and the Court cannot envision additional facts 

plaintiff could plausibly allege to successfully state a claim pursuant to section 1983(2). Thus, the 

Court must GRANT defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim under § 1985(2) with 

prejudice. 

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, “was enacted by the Reconstruction 

Congress to protect individuals — primarily blacks — from conspiracies to deprive them of their 

legally protected rights.” Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). To 

state a claim under § 1985(3) a plaintiff must allege: “the existence of a conspiracy to deprive the 

plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws; an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and a resulting 

injury.” Scott v. Ross, 140 F.3d 1275, 1284 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536)). The 

deprivation of plaintiff’s rights must be motivated by “some racial, or perhaps otherwise classbased, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Sever, 978 F.2d at 

1536 (citations omitted). In his Fourteenth Amendment claim, plaintiff alleges that defendants 

knew he was disabled, conspired together, and “acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate 

against Plaintiff based on his disability.” FAC ¶¶ 168-171. Defendants argue plaintiff’s 

allegations must fail because plaintiff has failed to allege any facts tying any adverse actions by 

defendants to plaintiff’s alleged disability. In his opposition, plaintiff directs the Court to 

paragraphs 32 and 33 of his amended complaint as statements of invidious discriminatory animus 

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and intent on the basis of plaintiff’s disability. Specifically, plaintiff cites a statement purportedly 

made by Challand: “I don’t care what you have! I’m not giving you your free Obamacare!” Id. 

¶ 33. Plaintiff has not alleged facts that support his allegation that defendants agreed to a 

conspiracy amongst themselves, nor has he alleged facts that the alleged conspiracy was the result 

of discriminatory animus. Plaintiff alleged claims of conspiracy is his initial complaint and has 

already been granted leave to amend his claims. Accordingly, the Court must GRANT 

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s 1985(3) claim with prejudice. 

III. 42 U.S.C. § 1986

Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 against some currently unidentified 

defendants who knew of wrongs conspired to be done in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. FAC 

¶¶ 187, 189. For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 fail, and thus his 

dependent claim under § 1986 must similarly fail. Defendant’s motion as to this claim is 

GRANTED with prejudice. 

IV. 18 U.S.C. § 1030

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Challand and some unidentified individual defendants have 

violated 18 U.S.C. § 1030. FAC ¶ 191. Specifically, plaintiff cites § 1030(4), which applies to 

anyone who “knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without 

authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended 

fraud and obtains anything of value . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(4). Plaintiff has not specified what act 

gives rise to this claim, the amended complaint contains no facts pertaining to computers, and 

plaintiff has not explained to the Court the grounds for his claim in his opposition. Plaintiff has 

failed to allege facts that any defendant accessed “a protected computer without authorization” and 

therefore has failed to state a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1030. The Court must therefore GRANT 

defendant’s motion to dismiss as to this claim with prejudice. 

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V. 42 U.S.C. § 12132

Plaintiff alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12132 against defendants Challand, MacDonald, 

Schuler, Pereira, Elder, McQuoid, and some Does. FAC ¶ 357. To state a claim under Title II of 

the Americans with Disabilities Act, a plaintiff must allege: 

(1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is otherwise 

qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, 

programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff was either excluded from participation in 

or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or 

was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, 

denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability.

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Weinreich v. L.A. County Metro. 

Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

With respect to the first element, the ADA definition of “disability” is: (A) a physical or 

mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such 

individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an 

impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Here, plaintiff alleges only that he is has a disability, that 

defendants excluded him from participation in and denied him the full and equal benefits of the 

services, programs, and activities of the Defendant Contract Costa, and discriminated against him 

because of his disabilities. FAC ¶ 360. Plaintiff specifically cites § 12102(2)(A), but he has not 

specified what “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 

activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Instead he states only that he is “disabled” and has 

“disabilities.” FAC ¶¶ 1, 32, 359. Plaintiff must allege facts to support his allegation that he has a 

disability that substantially limit one or more of his major life activities. Plaintiff alleged 

wrongdoing under § 12132 in his initial complaint and has not remedied the defects of his initial 

claim in this amended complaint. Therefore, the claim is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

VI. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Monell Liability

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s Monell claim against the County of Contra Costa. 

“Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments under § 1983 must prove that ‘action 

pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused their injury.” Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350,

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1359 (2011) (quoting Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). 

"Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its 

policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force 

of law." Id. The Ninth Circuit has explained that the pleading requirements for civil actions, 

including Monell claims, require that plaintiff’s allegations “may not simply recite the elements of 

a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and 

to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of 

Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff’s factual allegations “must plausibly suggest 

an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to 

the expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Here, plaintiff has alleged that the County of Contra Costa has policies and customs of 

indifference to misconduct by law enforcement employees by failing to properly investigate 

complaints of misconduct and failing to discipline employees. FAC ¶ 98. Plaintiff further alleges 

that the County of Contra Costa “maintains and supports policies and practices of extortion, 

harassment, intimidation, retaliation, excessive force, false arrests, defamation, delaying and/or 

denying medical attention and other wrongs that harm people it targets, including Plaintiff.” Id. 

¶ 101. Plaintiff then lists fifteen examples, including the deaths of specific persons while 

imprisoned by the County of Contra Costa and the “Dirty DUI” scandal that resulted in numerous 

false arrests. Id. These allegations are sufficiently specific to identify an alleged policy or custom

to provide fair notice to defendants. See Haines v. Brand, No. 11-cv-1335-EMC, 2011 WL 

6014459, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 2, 2011); see also Von Haar v. City of Mountain View, No. 10-cv02995-LHK, 2011 WL 782242, at *5 n.2 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 1, 2011). Plaintiff’s claims against the 

County of Contra Costa are not dismissed at this time, as it is plausible that plaintiff’s claims — if 

proven to be constitutional violations — were part of a practice or custom of the County. The 

motion to dismiss is DENIED as to this claim. 

VII. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

Plaintiff has asserted numerous state law tort claims against defendants. Defendants move 

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to dismiss these state law claims based on plaintiff’s failure to comply with the California 

Government Claims Act. Before filing suit on tort claims against certain state actors, a plaintiff 

must file a government claim pursuant to the California Government Claims Act. Cal. Gov. Code. 

§ 810 et seq. A plaintiff must present this claim “not later than six months after the accrual of the 

cause of action.” Cal. Gov. Code. § 911.2. 

Here, plaintiff presented his claim on August 5, 2014 — more than six months after the 

accrual of the cause of action. Docket No. 91-2, Ex. A. On August 7, 2014, plaintiff’s claim was 

returned to him because he failed to present the claim within the time allowed by law. Docket No. 

91-4, Ex. C. Plaintiff filed a petition with the Board of Supervisors of Contra Costa County for 

leave to present a late claim, but this was denied on September 16, 2014. Docket No. 91-5, Ex. 

D. Pursuant to California Government Code 946.6, plaintiff could have — within six months 

from the denial of his September 16, 2014 petition — filed a petition seeking relief from the 

claims presentation requirement. Cal. Gov. Code 946.6. Plaintiff has not provided the Court with 

evidence that he filed such a petition, nor has he presented any argument regarding his late filing. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s state law claims with prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above the Court hereby DENIES the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment/unlawful arrest claims against defendant Challand; and DENIES the motion to 

dismiss the Fourth Amendment/warrantless search and Fourth Amendment/excessive force claims 

against defendants MacDonald and Challand. The motion is GRANTED as to all other defendants 

and as to the remaining Fourth Amendment claims, with prejudice. 

The Court DENIES the motion to dismiss the First Amendment/retaliation claim against 

defendant Challand. The motion is GRANTED as to MacDonald, Schuler, Pereira, McQuoid, 

Elder, and Hoekwater with prejudice. 

The Court DENIES the motion to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment/medical care claims 

as to defendant Pereira and DENIES the motion to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment/conditions 

of confinement claims as to defendants Challand, MacDonald, Schuler, Pereira and McQuoid. As 

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to all other defendants, the motion is GRANTED with prejudice. The motion to dismiss the 

Fourteenth Amendment/equal protection claim is GRANTED as to all defendants with prejudice. 

The Court DENIES the motion as to plaintiff’s Monell liability claim. 

The motion is GRANTED with prejudice as to all defendants on plaintiff’s claims under 

42 U.S.C. §1985(2) and (3); 42 U.S.C. § 1986; and 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 

The motion is GRANTED with prejudice as to all defendants on plaintiff’s claims under

42 U.S.C. § 12132 and plaintiff’s state law claims. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 6, 2015

________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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