Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00741/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00741-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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JWB

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Salam S. Alkhafaji, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

County of Maricopa, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 11-0741-PHX-DGC-MEA

ORDER

Plaintiff Salam S. Alkhafaji brought this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against the following Maricopa County employees: Correctional Officers G. Bush

and Rain; Sergeant Roger; and doctors P. Drapeau and Humis (Doc. 19 at 2-2A). Defendants

move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims as time-barred and for failure to state a claim (Doc. 30).

The motion is fully briefed (Docs. 32, 34). The Court will grant Defendants’ motion and

dismiss this action.

I. Background

Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on April 14, 2011 (Doc. 1). After several

attempts, Plaintiff filed a complete In Forma Pauperis application on July 22, 2011 (Doc. 12).

The Court granted the application and proceeded to screen the original Complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The pleading was dismissed for failure to state a claim and, after

Plaintiff failed to timely file an amended pleading, this action was dismissed on

September 27, 2011. Plaintiff successfully moved to reconsider the Court’s decision and

Plaintiff was permitted to file a First Amended Complaint, which he did on March 8, 2012

Case 2:11-cv-00741-DGC Document 36 Filed 10/29/12 Page 1 of 6
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28 1 Upon screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), Count II and Defendants Arpaio,

Chris, Oddly, Straight, and Spiritu were dismissed (Doc. 20 at 8). 

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(Doc. 19). In his amended pleading, Plaintiff presented two claims for relief stemming from

his incarceration as a pretrial detainee in Maricopa County’s Lower Buckeye Jail. In Count

One, Plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to excessive force on December 30, 2008, while

he was suffering an incapacitating asthma attack (id. at 3B-C). Plaintiff alleged that Drapeau

came to Plaintiff’s cell to evaluate him, believed Plaintiff was malingering, and directed

Bush, Rain, Roger, and Humis to place Plaintiff in hand and leg restraints (id.). Then, when

Plaintiff did not stand up, Drapeau directed Bush Rain, Roger, and Humis to force Plaintiff

to comply, which included grabbing Plaintiff by the ears and beating and kicking Plaintiff

for several minutes (id.). After the incident, Bush and Roger took Plaintiff to a disciplinary

isolation cell, where he was stripped and shackled to a four-point restraint bed for more than

forty-eight hours, forcing Plaintiff to urinate and defecate on himself (id.). 

In Count Three, Plaintiff claimed that from October 2006 until August 20, 2009, he

was kept in complete isolation under the direct supervision of Drapeau (id. at 5). As a result,

Plaintiff asserts that he was subjected to psychological, physical, and verbal abuse, including

being housed in an empty cell without clothing or bedding for months, placed in a four-point

restraint for extended periods, verbally abused, denied basic necessities and health services,

and assaulted (id.). 

The Court screened the First Amended Complaint and directed Bush, Rain, Roger,

Drapeau, and Humis to respond to Counts One and Three (Doc. 20 at 8).1

 Defendants

Drapeau and Rain have been served (Docs. 26, 28) and they move to dismiss (Doc. 30).

Bush, Roger, and Humis have not been served (Docs. 23, 24, 29). 

II. Statute of Limitations Analysis

A. Governing Standard

When the statute of limitations forms the basis of a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, the motion can only be granted “if the assertions of the complaint, read with

the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.”

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Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980); see also TwoRivers v.

Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). The complaint cannot be dismissed unless “it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the

timeliness of the claim.” Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th

Cir. 1995).

Section 1983 does not include its own statute of limitations. TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at

991. Therefore, federal courts apply the statute of limitations governing personal injury

claims in the forum state. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985); TwoRivers, 174 F.3d

at 991. In Arizona, the limitations period for personal injury claims is two years. Id.; see

also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (providing that actions for personal injury must be commenced

within two years after the cause of action accrues). 

Although the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims is borrowed from state

law, federal law continues to govern when a § 1983 claim accrues. Wallace v. Kato, 549

U.S. 384, 388 (2007); TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991. Under federal law, a claim accrues

“when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the

action.” Id.; Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996).

The Court must also apply any state rule for tolling to actions brought under § 1983.

Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 544 (1989); Johnson v. State of California, 207 F.3d 650,

653 (9th Cir. 2000); TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 992. Under Arizona law, the limitation period

is tolled during mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Brown v. Valoff, 422

F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005); Arizona Dep’t of Revenue v. Dougherty, 29 P.3d 862 (Ariz.

2001); Third & Catalina Assoc. v. City of Phoenix, 895 P.2d 115, 119 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994);

see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821.01(c) (cause of action required by law or contract to be

submitted to administrative review process does not accrue until process exhausted)).

Finally, the Court “may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record’ without converting

a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250

F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504

(9th Cir. 1986)).

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2 Even if the Court were to engage in a relation back analysis, the First Amended

Complaint would not relate back because the excessive force claim alleged in Count One was

not presented in the original Complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).

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B. Count One

According to Plaintiff, the claim presented in Count One of the First Amended

Complaint occurred on December 30, 2008 (Doc. 19 at 3C). Because of the nature of the

claim, Plaintiff was aware of his injuries at the time of the alleged excessive force, or no

more than forty-eight hours after he was transferred to the isolation cell. Plaintiff was,

therefore, required to file this action within two years, or no later than January 1, 2011. See

TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991. But Plaintiff filed his original Complaint—which did not

include this claim—in April 2011 and filed his First Amended Complaint including this

claim in March 2012. Consequently, it is not necessary for the Court to determine whether

Count One of the First Amended Complaint relates back to the original because neither

pleading was filed within the statute of limitations.2

 Nor is there time to toll for the

exhaustion of administrative remedies because Plaintiff states in his First Amended

Complaint that he was not able to exhaust the jail’s grievance process (Doc. 19 at 3, 5).

Brown, 422 F.3d at 943. For these reasons, Count One is time-barred and must be dismissed.

C. Count Three

The allegations in Count Three, in contrast, are a continuing series of events that

occurred between October 2006 and August 20, 2009 (Doc. 19 at 5). Consequently, at the

latest, Plaintiff was aware of his claim by August 20, 2009, thereby requiring that his claim

be filed no later than August 20, 2011. The question becomes, therefore, whether this

claim—presented in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint filed on March 8, 2012—relates

back to the filing of Plaintiff’s original Complaint on April 14, 2011, which would render it

timely filed. See Advisory Committee Notes on 1966 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15

(“[r]elation back is intimately connected with the policy of the statute of limitations”). 

The decision of whether an amended complaint relates back is committed to the

Court’s discretion. Louisiana-Pac. Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 5 F.3d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1993);

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Kilkenny v. Arco Marine, Inc., 800 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1986). Under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15(c)(1), an amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading

when: 

(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation

back;

(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,

transactions, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original

pleading; or

(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom

a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period

provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be

brought in by amendment:

(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be

prejudiced in defending on the merits; and

(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been

brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper

party’s identity.

No law other than Rule 15 provides for relation back of Plaintiff’s claims as required

by Rule 15(c)(1)(A), and the requirement of Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is dispositive because it applies

to both subparagraphs (B) and (C). Plaintiff complained in the original complaint about an

alleged incident of excessive force that occurred on August 2, 2009, the denial of medical

treatment stemming from that incident, and general allegations about being threatened with

abuse when attempting to submit administrative remedies (Doc. 1 at 3-5). The claims in the

original Complaint bear no relation to the allegations in Count Three of his First Amended

Complaint, where Plaintiff avers that Drapeau kept him in isolation for nearly three years,

denied him clothing, bedding, basic necessities and medical care, kept him in four-point

restraints for extended periods, and verbally and physically abused him. Because Count

Three does not arise out of the conduct, transactions, or occurrence at issue in the original

complaint, the Court finds that Count Three does not relate back to the original complaint

under Rule 15(c)(1)(B) or (C). Because both Count One and Count Three are time-barred,

the Court need not consider Defendants’ additional argument that Count Three fails to state

a claim. 

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IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss (Doc. 30).

(2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 30) is granted. 

(3) This action is dismissed and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment

accordingly. 

(4) For the reasons set forth herein, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), an 

appeal from the judgment in this action would not be taken in good faith.

DATED this 26th day of October, 2012.

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