Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-00327/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-00327-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH JEROME PACKNETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. WINGO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 09-cv-00327-YGR (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; AND ADDRESSING 

OTHER PENDING MOTIONS

This is a reopened pro se civil rights action filed by Plaintiff Kenneth Jerome Packnett, a 

state prisoner, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations and state law claims

relating to his incoming legal mail and stemming from his incarceration at San Quentin State 

Prison (“SQSP”) in 2007 and 2008.

1

 Plaintiff seeks monetary and punitive damages. He 

originally named the following SQSP prison officials: M. Cramer, R. Wingo, R. L. Ayers, T. 

Amrhein-Conama, D. Sung, S. Gonzales, and N. Grannis.

The following summary of the allegations in the original complaint is taken from the 

Court’s September 29, 2010 Order:

According to the complaint, Plaintiff was involved in several 

lawsuits when he came into the custody of SQSP in March 2006. 

(Compl. 7.) Plaintiff’s allegations with respect to SQSP officials’

wrongful handling of his legal mail are as follows: (1) In January 

2007, two pieces of incoming mail, one from the law offices of 

Bailey, Perrin, & Bailey, and one from the Watts Law Firm, were 

inappropriately opened and delayed during January 2007, (id. at 9-

10); (2) in February 2007, two pieces of legal mail were opened 

outside of his presence, (id. at 11); (3) in March 2007, another piece 

of mail from Bailey, Perrin, & Bailey was opened outside of his 

presence and delayed twenty days, (id. at 14); (4) in July 2007, mail 

from Bailey, Perrin, & Bailey was delayed for over a month and 

opened outside of his presence, (id. at 16); (5) in October 2007, mail 

from Bailey, Perrin, & Bailey was opened and delayed, (id. at 18); 

and (6) in January 2008, mail from the Watts Law Firm was opened 

and a settlement check was removed, (id. at 20). Plaintiff alleges 

that the responses [to] the grievances he filed in connection with 

 

1 On March 6, 2012, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded 

certain claims after reviewing this Court’s September 29, 2010 Order granting Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss. Dkt. 65. The Ninth Circuit issued its mandate on March 29, 2012. Dkt. 67. This 

matter was reopened and then reassigned to the undersigned judge. Dkt. 66.

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these legal mail incidences had inadequate documentation as to the 

reasons why his mail was opened and who opened the 

correspondence in error. (Id. at 26, 28, 29, & 31-32.) 

Plaintiff claims that his First Amendment rights were 

violated when Defendants wrongfully opened and delayed his legal 

mail, and that their actions did not advance any legitimate state 

interest and created a “chilling effect” on his First Amendment 

rights. (Compl. at 28.) 

Dkt. 55 at 2.

After this case was reopened, Plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint and

submitted a proposed amended complaint. Dkt. 72. Plaintiff’s amended complaint named three

additional Defendants—V. Dasalla, Mederious and Bluitt (“SQSP mailroom staff Defendants”)—

and reasserted the First Amendment delay-of-mail and retaliation claims that he asserted against 

the original seven served Defendants. Dkt. 80. Similar to his claims against the original 

Defendants, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Dasalla, Mederious and Bluitt inappropriately 

handled his legal mail. Id. at 31, 36-38. The original Defendants filed a non-opposition to 

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Dkt. 73. Thereafter, the Court granted 

Plaintiff leave to file the amended complaint, and the original Defendants waived their right to 

reply to the amended complaint. Dkts. 79, 81.

On March 12, 2014, the Court screened Plaintiff’s amended complaint (the operative 

complaint in this action) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and allowed it to proceed on claims of First 

Amendment delay-of-mail and retaliation, as well as several state law claims against the named 

Defendants, including the three new Defendants. Dkt. 82. The Court found that Plaintiff’s 

allegations that Defendants opened his confidential legal mail outside of his presence and without 

his permission and that they did so with retaliation motives on several occasions in 2007 and 2008 

stated cognizable First Amendment delay-of-mail and retaliation claims. Id. at 3-5. The Court 

also found cognizable First Amendment claims based on Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants

Sung and Amrhein-Conama retaliated against him for filing grievances by searching his cell in 

January 2008 and confiscating his television. Id. at 4. The Court also exercised supplemental 

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. Id. at 5. The Court issued a briefing schedule for

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Defendants to file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion.

2

Pursuant to that briefing schedule, and after being granted extensions of time to do so, 

Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 108. At the time the motion was

filed, Defendants Bluitt and Mederious had not yet been served. Since then, both have been 

served. Defendants Bluitt and Mederious have each filed a Notice of Joinder, which will be 

construed as a motion to join the other Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Dkts. 138, 

140. Defendants Bluitt and Mederious’s motions are GRANTED, and the joinders are accepted. 

Id. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is based on the following grounds: (1) that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 

(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), as to his claim that Defendants Sung and Amrhein-Conama 

retaliated against him by searching his cell and confiscating his television; and (2) there are no 

genuine issues of material fact in dispute because the indisputable evidence shows: (a) Plaintiff’s 

rights under the First Amendment were not violated by the mishandling of his legal mail, (b) 

Defendants did not retaliate against him, and (c) Plaintiff fails to raise a material issue of facts as 

to his supervisorial liability claim and claim relating to the grievance process. Dkt. 128 at 1. In 

addition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to comply with the California Tort Claims Act for 

any state law claims, and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

Also before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery (dkt. 125-3) and his 

motion for sanctions (dkts. 125-4; 134). 

Having read and considered the papers submitted herewith, the Court GRANTS 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and addresses the pending motions below.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

Before addressing the merits of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court first 

 

2

In an Order dated May 30, 2014, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a 

supplemental complaint because the supplemental complaint was ill-timed, widened the scope of 

the amended complaint, did not satisfy the relation back requirement under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 15(c), and was broader than the original and amended complaints (raising postcomplaint allegations). Dkt. 93 at 2-4.

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resolves two pending motions filed by Plaintiff. 

A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel

Plaintiff filed a motion to compel Defendants to produce to the Court for in camera review 

the Daily Funds Received Form for January 2008 as well as the Central Control logbook for 

January 2008 (with legible signatures). Dkt. 125-3 at 11-12. Defendants counter that these 

motions are improper because Plaintiff failed to first meet and confer, in violation of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court’s Local Rules. Dkt. 128 at 10. Defendants’ contention is 

well taken. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(A) (providing that a motion to compel must include 

certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with non-disclosing 

party in an effort to secure disclosure without court action); Civ. L.R. 37-1 (same). Because

Plaintiff has not complied with these rules, his motion is subject to denial. Tri-Valley CARES v. 

U.S. Dept. of Energy, 671 F.3d 1113, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Denial of a motion as the result of a 

failure to comply with local rules is well within a district court’s discretion.”). Therefore, 

Plaintiff’s motion to compel is DENIED. Dkt. 125-3.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions

Plaintiff moves for sanctions against Defendants Sung and Amrhein-Conama and against

declarants Briggs, Baenziger, Burgess, and Duncan (Defendants’ attorney) for fraudulent 

misconduct, misleading the Court, and submitting altered and/or falsified documents. Dkt. 125-4 

at 1-2, Dkt. 134 at 1-2. Plaintiff claims that they are liable for fraudulently removing a

handwritten note at the top of the second level decision for appeal log no. SQ-08-00631 before

submitting it in support of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 125-4 at 6:11-15.

Defendants argue that there is no reason that the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR’s”) copy of 602 appeal log no. SQ-08-00631 would include a

handwritten note that Plaintiff claims to have written on his copy of the appeal after receiving it. 

See Duncan Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. M at 3. They further argue the CDCR keeps in the ordinary course of 

business the complete file as part of its records, any interlineation added to the document after it is 

in the possession of an inmate is something CDCR would not be aware of. Dkt. 128 at 11. 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants also removed a copy of Defendant Sung’s January 24, 2008 cell 

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search receipt from 602 appeal log no. SQ-08-00631. Dkt. 125-4 at 6:19-21. However, there is no 

evidence that the cell search receipt was ever attached to, or a part of, that appeal. The record 

shows that the cell search receipt was not part of the complete appeal file. See Duncan Decl. ¶ 14, 

Ex. M. As discussed in the analysis below, Plaintiff only mentioned in his appeal the cell search 

and confiscation of the television; therefore, the appeal responses did not address this issue. See 

id. Because there is no evidence that the Defendants, declarants, and Defendants’ counsel made 

misrepresentations to this Court, Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is DENIED. Dkts. 125-4, 134.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a party may move for summary judgment 

on some or all of the claims or defenses presented in an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)(1). “The 

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; see Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of 

establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 323 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (requiring citation to “particular parts of materials in 

the record”). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). 

The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be raised 

in a motion for summary judgment. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en 

banc). The defendants have the initial burden to prove “that there was an available administrative 

remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Id. at 1172. If the 

defendants carry that burden, “the burden shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence 

showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally 

available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. The ultimate burden of 

proof remains with defendants, however. Id. “If material facts are disputed, summary judgment 

should be denied, and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts.” Id. at 1166. 

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A district court may only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary 

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). 

In support of the motion for summary judgment, Defendants have presented declarations from the 

following: Defendants Amrhein-Conama, Sung, Wingo, Dasalla and Gonzales; Acting Chief of 

the Office of Appeals R. Briggs; SQSP Senior Accounting Officer/Supervisor N. Burgess; SQSP 

Appeals Coordinator M. Davis; and Attorney Duncan (Defendants’ attorney). Dkts. 110-118.

Plaintiff has filed: his verified amended complaint (Dkt. 80); his verified opposition to 

Defendants’ motion (Dkts. 125-1-125-3); his verified declarations in response to Defendant

Sung’s declaration (Dkt. 125-1 at 47-53; Dkt. 125-3 at 15-19), in response to Defendant AmrheinConama’s declaration (Dkt. 125-1 at 61-64), and relating to the “vindictive cell search” (Dkt. 125-

3 at 20-24); and a declaration by inmate K. Roland. The Court will construe these filings as 

affidavits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, insofar as they are based on personal 

knowledge and set forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 

F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995). 

DISCUSSION

I. FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS – DELAY-OF-MAIL

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants opened legal mail outside of his presence, in violation of 

his First Amendment rights. Dkt. 80 at 30-42. Defendants argue that: (1) the undisputed facts 

show that Plaintiff’s incoming mail was not labeled appropriately as legal mail; and (2) there is no 

evidence that either (a) Defendant Sung or (b) Defendant Gonzales opened or delayed Plaintiff’s 

legal mail in violation of his First Amendment rights. Dkt. 108 at 9-12.

A. Claim Against SQSP Mailroom Staff

1. Legal Framework

The issue of whether a prison official can open legal materials outside of an inmate’s 

presence is appropriately considered under the First Amendment. Prisoners enjoy a First 

Amendment right to send and receive mail. See Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 

1995) (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)). A prison, however, may adopt 

regulations or practices which impinge on a prisoner’s First Amendment rights as long as the 

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regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” See Turner v. Safley, 482 

U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Prison officials may institute procedures for inspecting “legal mail,” e.g., mail 

sent between attorneys and prisoners. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974) 

(incoming mail from attorneys). But the opening and inspecting of “legal mail” outside the 

presence of the prisoner may have an impermissible “chilling” effect on the constitutional right to 

petition the government. See O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 

Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972)). 

2. Analysis

Here, the parties dispute whether the opened mail was considered “legal mail.” In order to 

be classified as “confidential mail” or “legal mail,” the California Code of Regulations provides:

Incoming letters must show the name, title, return address and the 

office of persons listed in Section 3141 on the outside of the 

envelope to be processed as confidential correspondence. An 

attorney’s return address must match the address listed with the 

State Bar. A notice or request for confidentiality is not required on 

the envelope. Correspondence that is appropriately addressed with a 

return address that indicates it may be confidential shall be 

processed and treated as confidential correspondence whether or not 

it is stamped as such.

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3143. Similarly, Defendants have outlined the procedure of sorting mail

at SQSP during the relevant time frame to be as follows:

In 2007 and 2008, the process of sorting inmate legal mail from 

regular mail was a multi-step process that started with a Material 

and Stores Supervisor (“MSSI”) outside of the prison and ended 

with San Quentin mailroom staff double-checking the work of the 

MSSI and feeding the presumably non-confidential mail into an 

automatic letter opener. (See Decl. Wingo Supp. Summ. J. (Decl. 

Wingo) ¶¶ 3-5; Decl. Amrhein-Conama Supp. Summ. J. (Decl. 

Amrhein-Conama) ¶¶ 3-5.) Defendant Dasalla served as the MSSI 

at San Quentin. (Decl. Dasalla Supp. Summ. J. (Decl. Dasalla) ¶ 1.) 

Dasalla’s responsibilities included sorting and separating incoming 

mail with the assistance of the postmaster at the post office outside 

of San Quentin. (Id. ¶ 2.) It was Dasalla’s custom and practice to 

sort incoming mail into several categories including: express mail, 

staff mail, certified mail, non-confidential inmate mail, confidentiallegal mail, publications, newspapers, and packages. (Id.) After 

Dasalla and the postmaster sorted the incoming mail at the post 

office, Dasalla delivered the mail to the San Quentin mailroom. 

(Id.)

San Quentin mailroom staff would then process incoming 

mail by confirming that the mail was properly addressed to the 

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inmate’s cell. (Decl. Wingo ¶ 5; Decl. Amrhein-Conama ¶ 5.) If the 

envelope was not marked with the inmate’s cell number, the 

mailroom staff would look-up and write the inmate’s cell number on 

the envelope. (Id.) It was also customary practice for the mailroom 

staff to stamp the envelopes with a mark identifying them as the 

processor of the mail. (Id.) Mailroom staff were trained to continue 

to look for confidential-legal mail during the envelope cell marking 

process. (Id.) After the envelopes were cell marked, confidentiallegal mail was set aside for delivery by the housing staff and trays of 

non-confidential mail were opened by an automatic letter opener. 

(Id.)

The San Quentin mailroom processed a large volume of mail 

each day and occasionally mailroom staff would inadvertently place 

confidential mail into the automatic letter opener. (Decl. Wingo ¶ 7; 

Decl. Amrhein-Conama ¶ 7.) If confidential inmate mail was 

unintentionally opened, it was mailroom policy to complete a 

memorandum documenting the unintentional opening, attach it to 

the confidential mail, and to forward the mail to the inmate. (Id.) 

Occasionally a memorandum was not prepared when confidential 

mail was opened because the mailroom staff never identified that the 

mail was confidential legal mail after opening it. (Decl. Wingo ¶ 8; 

Decl. Amrhein-Conama ¶ 8.) In 2007 and 2008, the mailroom 

supervisors, Defendants Wingo and Amrhein-Conama, made every 

effort to identify and retrain any mailroom staff who failed to 

properly identify mail as confidential and prepare a memorandum 

documenting their inadvertent opening of the mail.

Dkt. 108 at 8-9. 

Here, Plaintiff argues that his First Amendment rights were violated because his legal mail 

was opened outside of his presence, processed as regular mail, and the inadvertent opening of his 

legal mail was never documented on a memorandum as required by mailroom policy. Dkt. 125-1 

at 15, ¶ 21. Plaintiff also complains that the mailroom policy of stamping opened mail with a

mark identifying the person who opened the legal mail was not followed. Id. at 17, 18, 19, 21, 

¶¶ 23, 26, 27, 33.

Meanwhile, Defendants acknowledge that on eight occasions SQSP mailroom staff 

unintentionally opened Plaintiff’s confidential legal mail by placing it into the automatic letter 

opener in mailroom. Wingo Decl. ¶ 7; Amrhein-Conama Decl. ¶ 7. Defendants also concede that 

in Plaintiff’s case, a memorandum was not prepared after they opened his alleged confidential 

mail. However, Defendants argue that a memorandum was not prepared because the mailroom 

staff never identified Plaintiff’s mail as confidential legal mail. Wingo Decl. ¶ 8; AmrheinConama Decl. ¶ 8. Defendants further allege that SQSP mailroom staff and the U.S. Post Office 

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outside of SQSP worked together to ensure that inmate confidential legal mail were separated 

from regular inmate mail. Wingo Decl. ¶¶ 3-6; Amrhein-Conama Decl. ¶¶ 3-6. Defendants 

acknowledge that, occasionally, mistakes were made and the mailroom staff opened confidential

legal mail in the mailroom instead of in the presence of the inmate/addressee. Wingo Decl. ¶¶ 7-8; 

Amrhein-Conama Decl. ¶¶ 3-6. However, Defendants argue that SQSP’s mailroom procedure was 

directly related to the legitimate penological interest in processing a large volume of inmate mail 

in an efficient manner. Dkt. 128 at 4 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). Defendants argue that the 

procedural mistakes and mail delays of the type Plaintiff has described do not rise to the level of 

First Amendment violations. Id. Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s incoming mail

envelopes were insufficiently labeled as confidential mail. Id. Defendants argue as follow:

The undisputed facts show Packnett’s incoming mail was not 

labeled appropriately as confidential mail. In each instance Packnett 

details in his amended complaint, the envelopes containing the 

allegedly confidential mail did not bear the “name [or] title” of an 

attorney. Packnett’s incoming mail was labeled as follows:

1. An envelope received on January 3, 2007 identified 

the sender as: bpb, Bailey Perrin Bailey, A Registered 

Limited Liability Partnership, 440 Louisiana Suite 

2100, Pharmaceutical Litigation Department, 

Houston, Texas 77002. (Decl. Duncan ¶ 3, Ex. B);

2. An envelope received on January 22, 2007 

identified the sender as: Watts Law Firm. (Id. ¶ 4, 

Ex. C);

3. An envelope received on February 9, 2007 

identified the sender as: State Bar of Texas, P.O. Box 

12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487. (Id. ¶ 7, Ex. F);

4. An envelope received on February 15, 2007 

identified the sender as: bpb, Bailey Perrin Bailey, A 

Registered Limited Liability Partnership, Seroquel 

Litigation Department, 440 Louisiana Suite 2100, 

Houston, Texas 77002. (Id. ¶ 7, Ex. F);

5. An envelope received on March 20, 2007 identified 

the sender as: bpb, Bailey Perrin Bailey, A Registered 

Limited Liability Partnership, Seroquel Litigation 

Department, The Lyric Center, 440 Louisiana Suite 

2100, Houston, Texas 77002. (Id. ¶ 8, Ex. G);

6. An envelope received on June 14, 2007 identified 

the sender as: bpb, Bailey Perrin Bailey, A Registered 

Limited Liability Partnership, Seroquel Litigation 

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Department, 440 Louisiana Suite 2100, Houston, 

Texas 77002. (Id. ¶ 10, Ex. I);

7. An envelope received on October 5, 2007 

identified the sender as: bpb, Bailey Perrin Bailey, A 

Registered Limited Liability Partnership, Seroquel 

Litigation Department, 440 Louisiana Suite 2100, 

Houston, Texas 77002. (Id. ¶ 12, Ex. K); and

8. An envelope received on January 18, 2008 

identified the sender as: Watts Law Firm. (Id. ¶ 14, 

Ex. M).

While the items of mail at issue bore return addresses indicating 

they may have been from law offices or attorneys, the phrases 

“Bailey Perrin Bailey, A Registered Limited Liability Partnership,” 

“State Bar of Texas,” and “Watts Law Firm” are not sufficient to 

create the designation of confidential, legal mail. Cal. Code Regs. 

tit. 15[,] § 3143 (2006, 2007). The undisputed material facts show 

that none of the items of mail described in Packnett’s amended 

complaint meet the criteria for confidential mail.

Dkt. 108 at 10-11.

In his opposition, Plaintiff counters Defendants’ argument, and claims that the documents 

contained in the envelopes at issue were on “law firm letterhead” and indicated that the 

correspondence was from an attorney, “K. Camp Bailey.” Dkt. 125-1 at 15:22-26, ¶ 21. Plaintiff 

thus seems to concede that the envelope did not contain the name and address of the attorney, but 

instead seems to be arguing that the documents inside contained such information, or, that the

“name” of the law firm (as opposed to the attorney) on the envelope should be sufficient. Id.

However, “[t]he Supreme Court ha[s] held that . . . prison officials [can] require both that 

the letters be specially marked with the name and address of the attorney and that the attorney 

communicate first with prison officials.” Sherman v. MacDougall, 656 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 

1981) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 575-77) (emphasis added). 

In Wolff, the Supreme Court was presented with the narrow issue of “whether letters 

determined or found to be from attorneys may be opened by prison authorities in the presence of 

the inmate or whether such mail must be delivered unopened if normal detection techniques fail to 

indicate contraband.” 418 U.S. at 575. Without specifying which constitutional rights might be 

violated when prison officials open mail from an inmate’s attorney in the inmate’s presence, the 

Court set forth several constitutionally appropriate prison procedures. Id. at 576. Most relevantly, 

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the Court stated that it would be an appropriate procedure to require confidential legal 

communication to be “specially marked as originating from an attorney, with his name and 

address being given.” Id. Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit has left open whether legal mail must be 

opened and read in the prisoner’s presence and whether a prison official’s failure to do so 

constitutes a violation of the First Amendment. Sherman, 656 F.2d at 528. And, as explained 

above, a prison may adopt regulations or practices which impinge on a prisoner’s First 

Amendment rights as long as the regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological 

interests.” See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. 

Here, because Wolff explicitly approves of the requirement in the California Code of 

Regulations, title 15, section 3143 that mail must be specially marked with an attorney’s name 

and title in order to be considered confidential/legal mail, 418 U.S. at 575-77, and because no 

such markings were on the envelopes of the mail that was opened, Plaintiff has failed to carry his 

burden of raising a genuine issue of fact to support his claim that Defendants’ actions rose to the 

level of a First Amendment violation. Further, in accordance with Turner, SQSP’s mailroom 

procedure was reasonably related to the prison’s legitimate penological interest in processing a 

large volume of inmate mail in an efficient manner. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim stemming from his allegation that his legal mail was opened 

outside of his presence.

B. Claim Against Defendant Sung 

Plaintiff claims that in January 2008, Defendant Song violated his First Amendment rights 

when he kept in his possession “mishandle[ed]” “confidential attorney-client correspondence from 

Watts Law Firm” addressed to Plaintiff, specifically, a settlement check. Dkt. 80 at 39-40.

1. Factual Background

On January 18, 2008, incoming mail addressed to Plaintiff from “Watts Law Firm” was 

opened by mailroom staff and sent to Defendant Sung, a security squad officer with the 

Investigative Services Unit (“ISU”), for investigation. Amrhein-Conama Decl. ¶ 11; Duncan 

Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. M.

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In 2008, Defendant Sung’s responsibilities as a security squad officer with the ISU 

included investigating checks and cash that were mailed into the prison for inmates. Any check 

made out to inmates in large amounts were forwarded to the ISU for investigation. As part of the 

ISU investigation, the bank and drawer of the check were contacted in an effort to identify any 

irregularities or issues with the check. If the check was found to be valid, the check was 

forwarded to the trust department for deposit into the inmate’s trust account. Sung Decl. ¶ 2.

During January 2008, Defendant Sung investigated a large check that was made payable to 

Plaintiff in the amount of $75,600. Upon Defendant Sung’s review of the check and the 

accompanying envelope, he noticed that the express mailing label included with the check was 

faded and illegible and did not include a “confidential” stamp and/or “legal” stamp. Sung Decl. 

¶ 3; Duncan Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. M.

During Defendant Sung’s investigation of Plaintiff’s check, he contacted the bank and the 

drawer of the check and determined that the check was valid. Defendant Sung also learned that 

the check was issued by a law firm. Defendant Sung then met with Plaintiff in the ISU office to 

notify him that a mailroom employee had “inadvertently” opened the confidential legal mail 

outside of his presence and that the employee would be re-trained. Sung Decl. ¶ 4.

After Defendant Sung completed his investigation of the check and met with Plaintiff, he 

forwarded the check to the trust department for deposit into Plaintiff’s trust account. Id. ¶ 5.

2. Analysis

The record shows that in 2008, Defendant Sung’s responsibilities as a security squad 

officer with the ISU included investigating checks and cash that were mailed into the prison for 

inmates. Sung Decl. ¶ 2. The undisputed evidence shows that Defendant Sung investigated a 

$75,600 check for Plaintiff, found it to be valid, and forwarded the check to the trust department 

for deposit into Plaintiff’s trust account. Id. ¶¶ 2-5; Duncan Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. M. 

Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of raising a genuine issue of fact to support his claim

the Defendant Sung’s aforementioned actions violated his First Amendment rights. Therefore, 

Defendant Sung is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s delayed mail claim against him 

relating to the alleged mishandling of legal mail, i.e., a settlement check.

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C. Claim Against Defendant Gonzales

Similarly, Plaintiff claims that in January 2008, Defendant Gonzales violated his First 

Amendment rights when she received from Defendant Sung the “mishandle[ed]” “confidential 

attorney-client correspondence from Watts Law Firm” addressed to Plaintiff, specifically, a 

settlement check. Dkt. 80 at 39-40.

1. Factual Background

In January 2008, Defendant Gonzales was an Accounting Technician at SQSP’s 

accounting office, and she was responsible for reviewing incoming checks and cash that were 

received by the accounting department. Defendant Gonzales was also responsible for conducting 

the initial processing of incoming checks for inmates, but she was not responsible for depositing 

the funds into the inmate’s trust accounts. Gonzales Decl. ¶¶ 1-3.

In January 2008, if a check came into the accounting department for an amount larger than 

$500, unless Defendant Gonzales was instructed otherwise by her supervisor, she was required to 

forward a copy of the check to the ISU for investigation of potential criminal activity. After 

investigating the check, an ISU officer would either approve or reject the check for processing into 

the inmate’s trust account. Gonzales Decl. ¶ 3. Defendant Gonzales would then prepare a deposit 

receipt and record the information regarding the check in her computer. Defendant Gonzales 

would then forward the check and deposit receipt to the accounting department cashier for deposit 

into the bank. Thereafter, the cashier would forward the paperwork to a member of the trust 

accounting staff for input into the inmate’s trust account. The entire process from receiving the 

check in the accounting department, ISU investigating it, depositing it, and posting to the inmate’s 

trust account could take anywhere from several days to more than a week. Gonzales Decl. ¶ 4.

Defendant Gonzales does not specifically recall processing Plaintiff’s $75,600 check in 

January 2008. Defendant Gonzales does not recall what if any envelope or accompanying 

documents were included with the check. She reviewed a photocopy of the $75,600 check from 

Matthew L. Garretson, TTEE to Kenneth Packnett dated January 15, 2008, a deposit receipt that 

she prepared for the check on January 24, 2008, and a printout from the Inmate Trust Accounting 

System Trust Account Display indicating that a $75,600 check was posted to Plaintiff’s trust 

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account on February 4, 2008. Based on Defendant Gonzales’s review of the documents, she 

determined that her supervisor, Tomeika Mitchell, approved the check for processing into 

Plaintiff’s trust account. Gonzales Decl. ¶¶ 5-6; Burgess Decl. ¶¶ 4-6, Exs. A-C.

2. Analysis

The record shows that in January 2008, Defendant Gonzales’s responsibilities as an 

accounting technician in the SQSP accounting office included reviewing incoming checks and 

cash that were received by the accounting department. Gonzales Decl. ¶¶ 1-3. The undisputed 

evidence shows that Defendant Gonzales documented the receipt of Plaintiff’s $75,600 check and 

forwarded to the trust department for deposit into Plaintiff’s trust account. Id. ¶¶ 2-5; Burgess 

¶¶ 4-6, Exs. A-C. Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of raising a genuine issue of fact to 

support his claim that Defendant Gonzales’s actions rose to the level of a violation of his First 

Amendment rights. Therefore, Defendant Gonzales is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

delayed mail claim relating to the alleged mishandling of legal mail, i.e., a settlement check.

II. FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM – RETALIATION BY CELL SEARCH 

Plaintiff claims that the Defendants Amrhein-Conama and Sung acted in retaliation by 

searching his cell in early 2008 and confiscating his property, including a television. Dkt. 80 at 

23-25, 40-41. 

Defendants argue that the prison has no record of his aforementioned retaliation claim

having been exhausted at the final level of review. Dkt. 108 at 6-8. 

A. Legal Framework

The PLRA requires a prisoner to exhaust “available administrative remedies” before 

bringing an action with respect to prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of all 

“available” remedies is mandatory; those remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must they 

be “plain, speedy, and effective.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-40 (2001). The PLRA 

requires proper exhaustion of administrative remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83 (2006). 

“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural 

rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly 

structure on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 90-91. Thus, compliance with prison grievance 

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procedures is required by the PLRA to properly exhaust. Id. The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement 

cannot be satisfied “by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative 

grievance or appeal.” Id. at 84. 

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) provides its 

inmates and parolees the right to appeal administratively “any departmental decision, action, 

condition, or policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). It also provides its inmates the right to file administrative 

appeals alleging misconduct by correctional officers. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(e). In 

order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must submit his 

complaint on CDCR Form 602 and proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal level 

grievance filed directly with any correctional staff member, (2) first formal level appeal filed with 

one of the institution’s appeal coordinators, (3) second formal level appeal filed with the 

institution head or designee, and (4) third formal level appeal filed with the CDCR director or 

designee (i.e., “Director’s level”). Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5; Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 

1262, 1264-65 (9th Cir. 2009). This satisfies the administrative remedies exhaustion requirement 

under Section 1997e(a).

Failure to exhaust is “an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.” Jones 

v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204, 216 (2007). A defendant may raise a failure to exhaust defense 

through a motion for summary judgment. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en 

banc). Under Albino, “a defendant must first prove that there was an available administrative 

remedy and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Williams v. Paramo, 775 

F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). The burden then shifts to the plaintiff, “who must show that 

there is something particular in his case that made the existing and generally available 

administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him by ‘showing that the local remedies were 

ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.’” Id. The ultimate 

burden of proof, however, remains with the defendants, and the evidence must be viewed in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. 

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B. Analysis

Defendants allege as follows:

The Office of Appeals of the CDCR, receives and maintains 

all inmate administrative appeals accepted for the third and final 

level of review with the exception of inmate health care appeals. 

(Decl. Briggs Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (Decl. Briggs) ¶ 2.) Upon 

review of its database, the Office of Appeals shows that Packnett 

exhausted eight non-healthcare-related administrative grievances at 

the third level of review between January 4, 2007 and December 31, 

2009. (Id. ¶ 6, Ex. A.) But none of the appeals that Packnett 

exhausted at the final level of review concerned allegations that 

Packnett’s cell was inappropriately searched and his television was 

confiscated in early 2008. (Decl. Briggs ¶ 6; Decl. Duncan Supp. 

Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (Decl. Duncan) ¶¶ 3-15, Exs. B-N.)

Dkt. 108 at 7.

Meanwhile, Plaintiff contends that he raised this retaliation claim in 602 appeal log no. 

SQ-08-00631. Dkt. 125-1 ¶ 15.

In their reply, Defendants argue that 602 appeal log no. SQ-08-00631 only describes 

“Unauthorized Opening, Obstructing the Delivery Of, and Seizure of Appellant’s Confidential 

Legal Mail.” Dkt. 128 at 2. Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff mentions the cell search and 

the confiscation of his television in an attachment to the grievance, but they argue that his 

concerns in the appeal were only relating to interference of his legal mail, as follows:

The actions requested in appeal number SQ-08-00631 were: 

(1) return of the legal documents, seized on January 18, 2008, 

(2) written notification why documents were seized, (3) receipt for 

check, identification of individual who forwarded documents to 

Investigative Services Unit, identification of the mailroom 

supervisor who the documents were returned to, and 

(4) identification of the employee who illegally opened legal mail 

and why the mailroom sergeant did not issue a chrono. ([Duncan 

Decl., Ex. M at 7.]) Packnett did not request that his television be 

returned or argue that his television was inappropriately confiscated. 

(Id.)

On a supplemental page attached to appeal number SQ-08-

00631, Packnett briefly mentioned that “Officer Sung conducted a 

clothed body search of appellant and his cell.[”] (Id., Ex. M at 9.) 

And Packnett stated “[a]t the conclusion of the cell search of 

appellant’s cell, it is noted that Officer Sung removed appellant’s 

new television from his cell.” (Id.) But Packnett did not argue that 

the removal of his television by Officer Sung was a problem or 

inappropriate. Because Packnett’s appeal described a problem with 

the alleged interference of his legal mail, the appeal was processed 

and responded to as a grievance regarding legal mail.

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Dkt. 128 at 2.

The Court has reviewed 602 appeal log no. SQ-08-00631, and agrees with Defendants’

assessment that Plaintiff merely mentions the alleged retaliatory 2008 cell search and confiscation 

of the television in this grievance. See Duncan Decl., Ex. M. There is also no evidence showing 

that Plaintiff raised it as an actual issue on this grievance. Id. According to the Director’s level 

response, Plaintiff’s position was that prison officials “inappropriately opened his Legal Mail, this 

obstructing delivery of his mail and committing seizure of his Confidential Mail.” Id. The entire 

response deals with the legal mail issue, and nowhere does the Director’s level reviewer handle 

any retaliation claim dealing with the 2008 cell search and confiscation of the television. Id.

The Court further notes that even if Plaintiff had raised his retaliation as an additional issue 

in 602 appeal log no. SQ-08-00631, it would have been likely screened out as a separate issue 

from the other issue relating to his legal mail. According to state regulations, each inmate appeal 

is limited to one issue or related set of issues. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(1). “The 

inmate . . . shall not combine unrelated issues on a single appeal form for the purpose of 

circumventing appeal filing requirements. Filings of appeals combining unrelated issues shall be 

rejected and returned to the appellant by the appeals coordinator with an explanation that the 

issues are deemed unrelated and may only be submitted separately.” Id. Nevertheless, it seems 

that the prison did not even acknowledge that a second retaliation issue was brought up in 602 

appeal log no. SQ-08-00631; therefore, there was no issue to screen out.

In sum, Defendants met their initial burden as the moving party by setting forth evidence 

to demonstrate Plaintiff’s non-exhaustion, specifically by conducting a search of the CDCR’s 

records and finding no grievances submitted to the Director’s level by Plaintiff concerning the 

aforementioned retaliation claim. See Paramo, 775 F.3d at 1191. Defendants cite the declaration 

of Acting Chief Briggs of the Office of Appeals, who clearly states: “None of the appeals

exhausted at the final level of review concerned allegations that [Plaintiff’s] cell as inappropriately 

searched and that his television was confiscated in early 2008.” Briggs Decl. ¶ 6. Under Albino, 

Defendants have therefore proven that there was an available administrative remedy and that 

Plaintiff did not exhaust that available remedy. See Paramo, 775 F.3d at 1191. Upon the burden 

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shifting to Plaintiff, he has failed to show that “there is something particular in his case that made 

the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him by 

‘showing that the local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or 

obviously futile.’” Id. Instead, as mentioned above, Plaintiff relies on 602 appeal log no. SQ-08-

00631 as proof of exhaustion, but his reliance is unwarranted because the retaliation issue was not 

presented in that grievance. Thus, the aforementioned evidence presented by Plaintiff is 

insufficient to defeat Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Meanwhile, the evidence 

produced by the Defendants is sufficient to carry their ultimate burden of proof in light of 

Plaintiff’s verified factual allegations. 

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on the failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies, and their motion is GRANTED as to the claim that Defendants AmrheinConama and Sung acted in retaliation during the 2008 cell search and confiscation of Plaintiff’s 

television.

III. FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS - RETALIATION RELATING TO MAIL DELAY

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants also retaliated against him in the following ways for 

exercising his First Amendment rights: (1) that Defendant Wingo’s “threat” (in his informal 

response to Plaintiff’s grievance) to “not to hold any legal mail” was retaliatory and “made against 

Plaintiff for exercising in his right to engage in confidential attorney-client correspondence” (dkt. 

80 at 30); (2) that Defendant Amrhein-Conama’s act of ignoring prison procedure and “voiding 

the use of any employee stamp, open-in-error stamp, or written stamp regarding how and why 

legal mail is opened” was an “act[ ] of reprisal for engaging in protected activity, i.e., 

communicating with retain attorneys in confidence” (id. at 34-35); and (3) that the SQSP 

mailroom staff Defendants’ acts of “opening, reading and copying” Plaintiff’s legal mail outside 

of his presence . . . created a ‘chilling’ effect on Plaintiff fundamental Freedom of Speech rights 

(id. at 42).” The Court will address each incident in turn below.

A. Legal Framework

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate 

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(2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 

The prisoner must show that the type of activity he was engaged in was constitutionally 

protected, that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the alleged 

retaliatory action, and that the retaliatory action advanced no legitimate penological interest. 

Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997) (inferring retaliatory motive from 

circumstantial evidence). Retaliatory motive may be shown by the timing of the allegedlyretaliatory act and other circumstantial evidence, as well as direct evidence. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 

F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 2003). However, mere speculation that defendants acted out of 

retaliation is not sufficient. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing cases) 

(affirming grant of summary judgment where there was no evidence that defendants knew about 

plaintiff’s prior lawsuit, or that defendants’ disparaging remarks were made in reference to prior 

lawsuit). 

To raise a triable issue as to motive, a plaintiff must offer evidence that the defendants 

knew about the protected speech. Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 568 (9th Cir. 2009). In 

addition, a plaintiff must show “either direct evidence of retaliatory motive or at least one of three 

general types of circumstantial evidence [of that motive].” McCollum v. California Dept. of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation, 647 F.3d 870, 882 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Allen v. Iranon, 283 

F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002)). To survive summary judgment without direct evidence, 

therefore, a plaintiff must “present circumstantial evidence of motive, which usually includes: 

(1) proximity in time between protected speech and the alleged retaliation; (2) [that] the 

[defendant] expressed opposition to the speech; [or] (3) other evidence that the reasons proffered 

by the [defendant] for the adverse . . . action were false and pretextual.” McCollum, 647 F.3d at 

882 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Analysis

1. Claim Against Defendant Wingo

Defendants argue that to the extent that Plaintiff is claiming that Defendant Wingo, the 

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SQSP mailroom supervisor from June 6, 2005 to July 2, 2007 retaliated against him, they disagree 

and contend that the evidence is insufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact. Dkt. 128 at 6-7.

The record shows that after Plaintiff discovered his legal mail was opened on January 3, 

2007, he filed 602 appeal log no. SQ-07-00455, requesting the identity of the staff member who 

opened his legal mail and replacement of a missing prepaid envelope. Duncan Decl., Ex. B. 

Among other relief requested, Plaintiff asked for “no retaliation by withholding future mail.” Id. 

Defendant Wingo reviewed this appeal at the informal level, and stated: “You will not be 

reimbursed for prepaid envelope that was not destroyed by mailroom staff. Your mail may have 

been opened in error by staff, legal mail (incoming) is logged by Housing Unit Staff. No mail 

will be held for your appeal.” Id. (emphasis added).

In his opposition, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Wingo’s response “created a factual 

inference that the prepaid envelope was destroyed with the possibility of incoming legal mail 

irregularity in the future.” Dkt. 125-1 at 16:1-23, ¶ 22. It seems that Plaintiff interpreted

Defendant Wingo’s statement as a threat of future retaliation and concludes that mailroom staff 

destroyed his prepaid postage envelope. However, in her declaration, Defendant Wingo clarifies 

that her intent in stating “No mail will be held for your appeal” was to assure Plaintiff that no 

retaliatory withholding of his mail would occur in the future. Wingo Decl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff’s appeal 

had, in fact, requested assurances that no retaliatory withholding of his mail would occur as a 

result of the appeal. Duncan Decl., Ex. B at 1. Contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendant 

Wingo was simply responding to Plaintiff’s request and there is no plausible reason to conclude 

that Defendant Wingo’s statement “No mail will be held for your appeal” was a threat.

Plaintiff also contends that Defendant Wingo’s role as the SQSP mailroom supervisor in 

February 2007 when mailroom staff inadvertently opened two pieces of his legal mail, 

“constituted profound and extreme acts of purposeful retaliation against Plaintiff.” Dkt. 125-1 at 

17:23-27, ¶ 25. In addition, Plaintiff makes the unsupported allegation that Defendant Wingo 

“encouraged [an] atmosphere of disregard for proper mail handling procedure.” Id. 18:20-21, 

¶ 26. But, once again, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendant Wingo are without support and 

merely speculative. See Wood, 753 F.3d at 904-05 (speculation on defendant’s motive is 

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insufficient to defeat summary judgment). The record shows that, as a mailroom sergeant, 

Defendant Wingo’s responsibilities were limited to accounting for the mailroom staff, delegating 

and revising work assignments, resolving problems, and addressing grievances or appeals arising 

from mailroom operations. Wingo Decl. ¶ 2. Defendant Wingo’s direct responsibilities did not 

include opening, inspecting, reading, or retaining the contents of inmate mail. Id. As previously 

discussed, because the SQSP mailroom processed a large volume of mail each day, mailroom staff 

would occasionally make mistakes and process legal mail as regular mail. Id. ¶ 7. In the six 

instances where Plaintiff’s legal mail was opened during Defendant Wingo’s tenure as mailroom 

supervisor, the mail was inadvertently opened in the mailroom because the sender failed to 

appropriately mark the mail in a way that SQSP would recognize it as legal mail. Defendant 

Wingo was not directly responsible for the inadvertent opening of Plaintiff’s legal mail, see id.

¶ 13, and mere speculation she retaliated against Plaintiff is not enough to defeat summary 

judgment. See Wood, 753 F.3d at 904 (“mere speculation that defendants acted out of retaliation 

is not sufficient”). 

Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of raising a genuine issue of fact to support his claim

that Defendant Wingo’s aforementioned actions violated his First Amendment rights. Therefore, 

Defendant Wingo is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against her.

2. Claim Against Defendant Amrhein-Conama

Defendants argue that to the extent that Plaintiff is claiming Defendant Amrhein-Conama, 

the SQSP mailroom supervisor from August 6, 2007 to January 13, 2008 and January 29, 2008 to 

February 23, 2009, retaliated against him, Defendants disagree and contend that the evidence is 

insufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact. Dkt. 128 at 7-8.

Plaintiff argues that prison officials continued to retaliate against him on October 5, 2007 

when he received a seventh item of legal mail that was opened outside of presence with no 

explanation for why the legal mail was processed as regular mail. Dkt. 125-1 at 24:5-12, ¶ 40. 

Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Amrhein-Conama was unable “to account or control her 

employees or obey the law.” Id. 24:13-15, ¶ 41. Plaintiff specifically claims that “[b]ecause 

Defendant Amrhein-Conama stopped using employee identification stamps on [Plaintiff’s] legal 

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mail, the pattern and practice of opening and reading [his] legal mail continued unabated.” Id.

24:23-26, ¶ 42.

The evidence, however, indicates that Defendant Amrhein-Conama did not personally sort 

legal mail from regular mail during her tenure as the SQSP mailroom sergeant. Amrhein-Conama 

Decl. ¶ 10. Occasionally, Defendant Amrhein-Conama double-checked the mail trays to ensure 

that confidential legal mail was sorted out from the regular mail. Id. However, Defendant 

Amrhein-Conama claims she never, opened, inspected, read, retained, or delayed the processing of 

Plaintiff’s mail. Id. ¶ 15. Furthermore, although the customary practice was for the mailroom 

staff to stamp the envelopes identifying the processor of the mail, id. 3:1-2, ¶ 5, it is possible that 

SQSP mailroom staff did not always follow this practice. Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant 

Amrhein-Conama “stopped” such a practice is mere speculation of an act of retaliation against 

Plaintiff; therefore it is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Wood, 753 F.3d at 904. 

Lastly, the record shows that Defendant Amrhein-Conama was not directly responsible for the 

inadvertent opening of Plaintiff’s legal mail, see dkt. 125-1 ¶ 15, and Plaintiff’s allegation that she 

did so in retaliation is mere speculation. Id. To the extent Plaintiff wishes to hold Defendant 

Amrhein-Conama liable for the acts of her subordinates, as further explained below, there is no 

respondeat superior liability under section 1983 solely because a defendant is responsible for the 

actions or omissions of another. See Milton v. Nelson, 527 F.2d 1158, 1159 (9th Cir. 1976); see 

also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of raising a genuine issue of fact to support his 

retaliation claim against Defendant Amrhein-Conama. Therefore, Defendant Amrhein-Conama is 

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against her.

3. Claim Against SQSP Mailroom Staff Defendants

Plaintiff claims that his First Amendment rights were violated when the SQSP mailroom 

staff Defendants wrongfully opened and delayed his legal mail, and that they did so with 

retaliation motives. 

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation because 

there is an absence of evidence as to a retaliatory motive and whether the alleged mishandling of 

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Plaintiff’s mail chilled his First Amendment rights.

In determining whether a retaliatory motive exists, a relevant factor includes whether the 

defendant was aware of the prisoner’s protected conduct. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th 

Cir. 1995). Here, Plaintiff does not proffer facts to show that Defendants knew about his protected 

conduct or that the protected conduct motivated Defendants to retaliate. The record shows that the 

SQSP mailroom staff did not consider Plaintiff’s mail “legal” when they opened it, thus indicating

a lack of retaliatory motive. Even assuming that Defendants knew about Plaintiff’s protected 

activities, although retaliatory motive may be shown by the timing of the allegedly retaliatory act 

and inconsistency with previous actions, as well as direct evidence, Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 

1288-89 (9th Cir. 2003), it is not established simply by showing adverse activity by the defendant 

after protected speech; rather, the plaintiff must show a nexus between the two, Huskey v. City of 

San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (retaliation claim cannot rest on the logical fallacy of 

post hoc, ergo propter hoc, i.e., “after this, therefore because of this”). Here, Plaintiff has not met 

his burden of showing that retaliation was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind 

Defendants’ actions of opening his legal mail. Plaintiff’s bare factual assertions that the 

mishandling of his mail was motivated by such reason is no more than post hoc, ergo propter hoc. 

In other words, Plaintiff seems to assert that because he had been handling several lawsuits, the 

mishandling of his mail (including any settlement checks) must have been retaliatory based upon 

suspect timing. Yet, Plaintiff has put forth no non-speculative evidence showing a triable issue of 

fact of a causal nexus. For example, he offers no evidence of having personal knowledge, as 

opposed to offering speculation, of such a motive. Further, there is no evidence that any of these 

Defendants expressed opposition to Plaintiff’s First Amendment activities. Nor is there evidence 

tending to show that Defendants’ reasons for opening his legal mail were false or pretextual, i.e., 

as mentioned above, Defendants claim they were unaware that the mail they opened outside his 

presence should have been considered “legal mail.”

In addition, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants’ acts of mishandling his legal mail had 

the impermissible chilling effect on his constitutional right to petition the government. A prisoner 

must at least allege that he suffered harm, since harm that is more than minimal will almost always 

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have a chilling effect. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68 n.11; see Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 

(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a retaliation claim is not actionable unless there is an allegation of 

harm). The prisoner need not demonstrate a total chilling of his First Amendment rights in order 

to establish a retaliation claim. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568-69 (destruction of inmate’s property 

and assaults on the inmate enough to chill inmate’s First Amendment rights and state retaliation 

claim, even if inmate filed grievances and a lawsuit). “[T]he proper First Amendment inquiry asks 

whether an official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First 

Amendment activities.” Id. at 568. Here, although a court must accept as true all factual 

allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Outside of reciting the element that Defendants 

“chilled” his First Amendment rights, Plaintiff does not otherwise support this element with any 

facts. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Id. Even so, an allegation of harm, rather than a “chilling effect,” 

may be a sufficient basis for a claim of retaliation. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 569-70. However, in the 

challenged instances of mishandled legal mail, there is an absence of evidence that Plaintiff was 

harmed. In each instance, Plaintiff promptly contested the opening of his legal mail outside his 

presence, and on appeal, it was determined that Plaintiff’s mail had been opened inadvertently. 

Thereafter, Plaintiff’s mail was eventually delivered to him, including any settlement checks. In a 

constitutional tort, as in any other, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s actions caused him 

some injury. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977). 

Here, while the evidence shows that his legal mail was in fact opened inadvertently, Plaintiff has 

not provided sufficient evidence showing that the opening of his mail outside of his presence had 

the impermissible chilling effect on his constitutional right to petition the government, or that he

was otherwise harmed. See O’Keefe, 82 F.3d at 325.

Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of raising a genuine issue of fact to support his claim 

that the SQSP mailroom staff Defendants’ actions of opening his legal mail violated his First 

Amendment rights. Therefore, these Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

retaliation claim against them.

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IV. REMAINING CLAIMS

A. Supervisory Liability Claims

Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when the SQSP mailroom staff

Defendants intentionally opened, read, copied, and delayed his attorney-client communication. 

However, he cannot link certain Defendants to the opening or delay of delivery of his legal mail. 

For example, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants Ayers, Cramer, Grannis, Wingo, and 

Amrhein-Conama reviewed and denied his grievances, that Defendant Ayers supervised the 

prison, and that Defendants Wingo and Amrhein-Conama supervised the SQSP mailroom do not 

establish the requisite level of personal involvement. Defendants cannot be found liable under the 

theories of vicarious liability or respondeat superior for civil rights violations under the Civil 

Rights Act.

Defendants whose personal involvement is not alleged cannot be held liable for the acts of 

their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. See Milton, 527 

F.2d at 1159. Vicarious liability on the part of a supervisory official is not recognized as a basis 

for liability under the Civil Rights Act. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993). 

A supervisor is liable only when he or she has directly participated in or proximately caused the 

alleged deprivation. Id. at 1437-38; see also Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th 

Cir. 1981); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). The law is clear that liability of 

supervisory personnel must be based on more than merely the right to control others. Monell v. 

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978).

Here, Plaintiff has not made a causal link between Defendants Ayers, Cramer, Grannis, 

Wingo, and Amrhein-Conama and a violation of his constitutional rights. To the extent these 

Defendants are sued in their capacity as supervisory officials under the theory of respondeat 

superior, Plaintiff fails to raise a material issue of fact against them. Accordingly, Defendants’

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims.

B. Claims Relating to Grievance Process

Plaintiff fails to raise a material issue of fact against Defendants Ayers, Cramer, Grannis, 

Wingo, or Amrhein-Conama for their denials of his 602 appeals because there is no constitutional 

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right to a prison administrative appeal or grievance system. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 

(9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Flick v. Alba, 932 

F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1991) (“prisoner’s right to petition the government for redress . . . is not 

compromised by the prison’s refusal to entertain his grievance.”).

Under the California Code of Regulations, title 15, prisoners have a purely procedural right 

to prison appeals that cannot form the basis of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest and 

therefore is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Smith v. Nonan, 992 F.2d 987, 989 (9th 

Cir. 1993); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Ramirez, 334 F.3d 

at 860. To the extent that these Defendants are sued in their capacity as administrative appeal 

reviewers, Plaintiff fails to raise a material issue of fact against them. Accordingly, Defendants’

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants 

relating to the grievance process.

C. State Law Claims

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims for failure to comply with the 

California Tort Claims Act and file a claim with the California Victim’s Compensation 

Government Claim Board (“VCGCB”). Under California law, the filing of a tort claim in the time 

and manner prescribed by state law is a prerequisite to the filing of a lawsuit against any state 

employee or entity. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 905.2, 911.2, 945.4, 950.2; Munoz v. California, 33 Cal. 

App. 4th 1767, 1776 (1995). The California Tort Claims Act provides the requisites for the filing 

of a tort claim against state employees and entities. Under the Tort Claims Act, a tort claim 

against a state employee or entity must be presented to the VCGCB within six months of the 

accrual of the cause of action. See Cal. Gov. Code § 911.2. Timely claim presentation is not 

merely a procedural requirement but “a condition precedent to plaintiff’s maintaining an action 

against [a state employee or entity] defendant.” California v. Super. Ct. (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 

1234, 1240 (2004). Failure to file a timely claim with the VCGCB is fatal to a cause of action for 

negligence or other state tort. See Hacienda La Puente Unified Sch. Dist. of Los Angeles v. Honig, 

976 F.2d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing City of San Jose v. Super. Ct. (Lands Unlimited), 12 Cal. 

3d 447, 454 (1974)). 

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The Court takes judicial notice that an authorized custodian of records for the VCGCB 

conducted a search of the VCGCB’s records from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2008, 

Duncan Decl., Ex, O, and found that Plaintiff never filed a claim related to his instant causes of 

action against Defendants. See Marsh v. San Diego County, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1043-44 (S.D. 

Cal. 2006) (courts may take judicial notice of records and reports of administrative bodies, 

including the VCGCB). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law claims are therefore DISMISSED. See 

United States v. California, 655 F.2d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 1980) (state tort claim not presented in 

accordance with California Tort Claims Act barred from consideration in federal action).

D. Punitive Damages Claims

Finally, dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages is in order as punitive 

damages may be awarded in a section 1983 suit only “when defendant’s conduct is shown to be 

motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the 

federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). There is no 

indication whatsoever that any of Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing rose to this requisite high level 

of culpability. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages are DISMISSED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to compel is DENIED. Dkt. 125-3.

2. Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is DENIED. Dkts. 125-4, 134.

3. Defendant Bluitt and Mederious’s motions to join the other Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment are GRANTED, and the joinders are accepted. Dkts. 138; 140.

4. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to all claims against 

all Defendants (including claims for punitive damages).

3

 Dkt. 108. 

5. All claims under California law are DISMISSED.

6. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment, terminate all pending motions, and 

 

3

The Court’s finding that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law 

on Plaintiff’s claims obviates the need to address these Defendants’ alternative argument regarding 

an entitlement to qualified immunity.

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close the file.

7. This Order terminates Docket Nos. 108, 125-3, 125-4, and 134.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: ______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

March 31, 2015

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