Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01712/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01712-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

OMAR HERNANDEZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

) CIV 07-01712 PHX DGC (MEA)

v. )

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DORA B. SCHRIRO, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

On August 30, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 9) on October 29, 2007.

Respondents argue the action for habeas relief was not timely

filed and, therefore, that the petition must be denied and

dismissed with prejudice. Petitioner filed a response to the

answer to his habeas petition on November 28, 2007. See Docket

No. 10.

I Procedural History

On April 9, 2003, after a two-day trial, a jury found

Petitioner guilty of armed robbery and also found the crime was

a dangerous offense. Answer, Exh. A. On May 16, 2003,

Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated term of eleven and

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1

 In his federal habeas petition Petitioner states he is

serving a 240 month sentence imposed by a Nevada state court on June

27, 2002.

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one-half years imprisonment pursuant to this conviction, to be

served consecutively to a sentence he was then serving in the

state of Nevada. Id., Exh. B.1 

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his conviction and

sentence for armed robbery. Petitioner’s appointed appellate

counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, averring

that he could find no legitimate claim to raise on Petitioner’s

behalf and noting Petitioner wished to raise the issue that his

sentence was too harsh. Id., Exh. C. In a decision issued

February 26, 2004, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. Id., Exh. D. Petitioner

did not seek review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme

Court.

Petitioner filed a timely notice of post-conviction

relief in the Maricopa County Superior Court. Id., Exh. E.

Petitioner’s appointed post-conviction counsel filed notice he

could find no good-faith claim to raise on Petitioner’s behalf.

Id., Exh. E. In a decision issued October 5, 2004, the Arizona

Superior Court allowed Petitioner 45 days to file a pro se

petition for post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. E. After

Petitioner failed to file a pro se petition for post-conviction

relief, but instead filed another notice of post-conviction

relief, the Arizona trial court dismissed the first Rule 32

action in a decision filed January 3, 2005. Id., Exh. F. 

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Petitioner filed a second action for post-conviction

relief on February 9, 2005, asserting his inability to

understand English kept him from presenting his claims in his

first action for post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. H.

Petitioner filed a third action for post-conviction relief on

July 6, 2005, again asserting his language abilities as cause

for his failure to previously raise his claims, and a fourth

petition on December 29, 2006, and a fifth action for state

post-conviction relief on February 20, 2007. Id., Exhs. G-J.

In his fourth action for post-conviction relief Petitioner

asserted he was entitled to a new trial because he did not have

an interpreter at his trial. Id., Exh. I. In denying relief,

the Arizona court noted Petitioner did have an interpreter at

his trial. Id., Exh. I. See also id., Exh. A. All of these

actions for state post-conviction relief were dismissed as not

timely filed and because Petitioner had stated no exception to

the timeliness rule. See id., Exhs. G-J. 

In his fifth action for post-conviction relief,

Petitioner asserted he was entitled to relief because there was

insufficient evidence to support his conviction and because the

trial court erroneously admitted evidence. Id., Exh. J.

Petitioner also asserted a finding of criminal liability based

on his accomplice status was unconstitutional. Id., Exh. J.

The Arizona Superior Court found these claims were precluded by

Petitioner’s failure to raise the claims in his direct appeal.

Id., Exh. J. Petitioner also raised a Blakely claim, which the

trial court noted was not applicable to Petitioner’s case, which

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became final prior to the date Blakely was issued by the Supreme

Court. Id., Exh. J.

On August 30, 2007, Petitioner filed his petition for

federal habeas corpus relief. Petitioner asserts he is entitled

to federal habeas relief because “[t]he introduction at trial of

an identification obtained in violation of [his] constitutional

rights...” Petitioner at 6. Petitioner also alleges he was

denied his right to the effective assistance of trial and postconviction counsel. Id. at 7. Additionally, Petitioner alleges

he is entitled to habeas relief because the prosecution failed

to provide the defense with exculpatory evidence. Id. at 8.

Petitioner further maintains the prosecution proffered perjured

testimony at his trial. Id. at 9. Petitioner asserts he did

not exhaust any of these claims in the state courts because he

is not learned in the law and because he does not write or speak

English. Id. 

II Analysis

The petition is barred by the statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on prisoners

seeking federal habeas relief from their state convictions. See

Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002). The statute

of limitations begins to run on the date on which the

petitioner’s conviction becomes “final,” or on “the date on

which the impediment to filing an application created by State

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action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by

such State action.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(B) (1994 &

Supp. 2007). See also Lott, 304 F.3d at 920. The AEDPA

provides that a petitioner is entitled to tolling of the statute

of limitations during the pendency of a “properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2)(1994 & Supp. 2007); Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8,

121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000).

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence in his direct appeal in a decision

issued February 26, 2004. Petitioner did not seek review of

this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court or the United States

Supreme Court. Accordingly, the AEDPA statute of limitations

began to run on or about March 25, 2004, when Petitioner’s

opportunity to petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review had

expired. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. 2007)

(stating that a judgment becomes final either at the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a)(stating that a defendant has

thirty days after the filing of a decision to file a petition

for review by the Arizona Supreme Court). See also Roy v.

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub

nom., Belleque v. Kephart, 127 S. Ct. 1880 (2007); Rasberry v.

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006); Foreman v. Dretke,

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2

 Because Petitioner could not seek certiorari without first

presenting his direct appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court,

Petitioner’s conviction was “final” without allowing for the time

period during which he could otherwise have sought certiorari. See

Foreman v. Dretke, 383 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 2004); Eisermann v.

Penarosa, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1273 n. 5 (D. Haw. 1999). With regard

to this conclusion, the undersigned is persuaded by the reasoning of

an unpublished opinion issued by the United States District Court for

the District of Arizona:

[C]ertiorari review with the U.S. Supreme Court

may only be sought following a decision or denial

of discretionary review by the state court of

last resort, i.e. the Arizona Supreme Court. [ ]

Accordingly, the time for seeking a writ of

certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court cannot be

considered in determining when Petitioner's

judgment became final when review by the state

court of last resort was not sought....

Gutierrez v. McDaniel, 2006 WL 3449098, at *4.

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383 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 2004).2 Petitioner had one year from

that date, i.e., until March 25, 2005, to seek federal habeas

relief, absent any statutory tolling of the statute of

limitations pursuant to a pending state action for postconviction relief. See, e.g., Brambles v. Duncan, 412 F.3d

1066, 1069 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 485 (2005). 

It is unclear when Petitioner filed his first notice of

post-conviction relief, but it was pending at least by October

of 2004. Accordingly, allowing Petitioner the broadest possible

latitude in calculating the running of the statute of

limitations, the Court will conclude that Petitioner’s first

action for post-conviction relief was pending when the statute

of limitations began to run. Pursuant to this assumption, the

statute of limitations was tolled at least until January 3,

2005, when the Arizona Superior Court dismissed Petitioner’s

first Rule 32 action. Petitioner had thirty days to seek review

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of this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, even though he

did not seek review, and, therefore, the statute of limitations

on his federal habeas action was further statutorily tolled

until February 3, 2005. See Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799,

803-04 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Thus, we hold today that, regardless

of whether a petitioner actually appeals a denial of a

post-conviction application, the limitations period is tolled

during the period in which the petitioner could have sought an

appeal under state law.”); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417,

420-24 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that, because a judgment is not

final until the time for seeking review expires, the word

“pending” includes that time period, whether or not such review

is sought, and collecting cases so holding).

The one-year statute of limitations then ran from

February 4, 2005, and expired on February 4, 2006, and

Petitioner’s federal habeas action, filed August 30, 2007, more

than six months after the statute of limitations expired, was

not timely filed.

Although Petitioner filed second, third, fourth, and

fifth actions for post-conviction relief in the Arizona state

courts, these actions were not timely filed and, accordingly,

they did not toll the applicable statute of limitations. See

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413-14, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1815

(2005) (holding a state petition that is not filed within the

state’s required time limit is not “properly filed” and,

therefore, that the petitioner is not entitled to statutory

tolling). Additionally, any action for post-conviction relief

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3 This holding does not affect a petitioner’s ability to

raise claims involving a change in the law made retroactive to cases

on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or claims

involving newly-discovered evidence of innocence. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(2) (2004 & Supp. 2007). Absent those circumstances, which are

not present here, the strict application of the jurisdictional

deadline is appropriate in a collateral proceeding and is now

established Supreme Court precedent. See Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at

2365–66.

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filed after February 4, 2006, could not and did not restart the

already-expired statute of limitations for filing Petitioner’s

federal habeas action. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820,

823 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333

(11th Cir. 2001); Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th

Cir. 2000). See also Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th

Cir. 2001) (holding that, where the petitioner filed his state

post-conviction relief proceeding “after the AEDPA statute of

limitations ended ... [t]hat delay resulted in an absolute time

bar to refiling...”).

The Supreme Court recently concluded section 2254

petitioners are not entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s

statute of limitations because this does not comport with the

plain meaning of the statute. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct.

2360, 2365 (2007) (holding that “time limits enacted by

Congress” are “jurisdictional” and rejecting the argument that

the federal courts could craft an “equitable” exception to the

jurisdictional requirement).3 But see Lawrence v. Florida, 127

S. Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007) (assuming, without deciding, that

section 2244(d) provides for equitable tolling). Bowles was

decided four months after Lawrence and is more directly on point

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and, accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Bowles controls

the issue of whether a section 2254 is entitled to equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations stated in the AEDPA.

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

barred by the statute of limitations applicable to it pursuant

to the AEDPA. Petitioner is not, pursuant to a recent Supreme

Court holding, entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Hernandez’

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

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328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 18th day of December, 2007.

 

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