Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03158/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03158-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 

C-404 United States Courthouse 

1929 Stout Street 

Denver Colorado 80294 

February 21, 1992 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 90-3158, Best v. State Farm Mutual 

Filed November 25, 1991 by Judge Ebel 

Please be advised of the following correction to the 

captioned opinion: 

Page 2, second paragraph, the name of the immediate 

supervisor has been deleted. 

Attachment 

A corrected page 2 is attached. 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

By~~ 

Barbara Schermerhorn 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 90-3158 Document: 010110096992 Date Filed: 11/25/1991 Page: 1 
( 

We are presented with two issues on this appeal: (1) whether 

a plaintiff is entitled to recover pain, suffering, and 

humiliation damages in excess of $2,000 and punitive damages under 

the Kansas Acts Against Discrimination; and (2) whether a 

plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial in federal court when her 

claim is based upon the Kansas Acts Against Discrimination. The 

district court resolved both issues against the plaintiff, and we 

affirm. 

FACTS 

Plaintiff-appellant Mary Best was employed by State Farm 

Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ( 11State Farm11 ) in Topeka, 

Kansas. Best claims that her immediate supervisor made several 

direct sexual advances toward her between June 1979 and January 

1981. In January 1981, this immediate supervisor was promoted and 

transferred out of Topeka and was replaced by William Burton. 

Best asserts that between January 1981 and September 1983, Burton 

and three other male co-workers 11made comments regarding her 

figure and/or personal life which she found offensive. 11 Brief of 

Appellant at 4. Best also contends that she was discriminated 

against in the training she received as well as in the workload 

assigned to her. In response to what she perceived as sexual 

discrimination, Best met with the divisional manager, James 

Wilkerson, to air her grievances. 

According to Best, Richard Scott, a divisional superintendent 

in charge of the Topeka office, later chastised her for meeting 

with Wilkerson. Best asserts that Scott told her 11 that he had 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MARY J. BEST, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED 

United States Coprt (?f Appeals Tenth C1rcu1t 

NOV 25 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 90-3158 

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 

INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 86-4344-S) 

Alan V. Johnson of Sloan, Listrom, Eisenbarth, Sloan & Glassman, 

Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintif f-Appell·ant. 

Dale L. Beckerman and Mimi E. Doherty of Deacy & Deacy, Kansas 

City, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before EBEL and HcWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and ALLEY, District 

Judge.* 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Wayne E. Alley, District Judge for the United 

States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, 

sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-3158 Document: 010110096992 Date Filed: 11/25/1991 Page: 3 
We are presented with two issues on this appeal: (1) whether 

a plaintiff is entitled to recover pain, suffering, and 

humiliation damages in excess of $2,000 and punitive damages under 

the Kansas Acts Against Discrimination; and (2) whether a 

plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial in federal court when her 

claim is based upon the Kansas Acts Against Discrimination. The 

district court resolved both issues against the plaintiff, and we 

affirm. 

FACTS 

Plaintiff-appellant Mary Best was employed by State Farm 

Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") in Topeka, 

Kansas. Best claims that her immediate supervisor, William Roe, 

made several direct sexual advances toward her between June 1979 

and January 1981. In January 1981, Roe was promoted and 

transferred out of Topeka and was replaced by William Burton. 

Best asserts that between January 1981 and September 1983, Burton 

and three other male co-workers "made comments regarding her 

figure and/or personal life which she found offensive." Brief of 

Appellant at 4. Best also contends that she was discriminated 

against in the training she received as well as in the workload 

assigned to her. In response to what she perceived as sexual 

discrimination, Best met with the divisional manager, James 

Wilkerson, to air her grievances. 

According to Best, Richard Scott, a divisional superintendent 

in charge of the Topeka office, later chastised her for meeting 

with Wilkerson. Best asserts that Scott told her "that he had 

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Appellate Case: 90-3158 Document: 010110096992 Date Filed: 11/25/1991 Page: 4 
never liked her and she didn't belong with State Farm; that she 

had an attitude problem; and that she should find work elsewhere. 

He also told her that she would receive no more salary increases; 

that she would not be eligible for any promotions; that she would 

receive no further training; and that he was going to review her 

files on a daily basis." Brief of Appellant at 5. In November 

1984, Best's employment was terminated. 

On January 29, 1985, Best filed a sex discrimination 

complaint with the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights ("KCCR"), 

alleging that she was sexually harassed and that she was 

terminated in retaliation for her complaints to Wilkerson. In 

response, State Farm claimed that she was fired for poor job 

performance. The KCCR issued a finding of no probable cause and 

dismissed her complaint. 

On October 31, 1986, Best filed suit in the United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, contending that State 

Farm's actions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

42 U.S.C. 2000(e) et seq., and the Kansas Acts Against 

Discrimination ("KAAD"), Kan. Stat. Ann.§§ 44-1001 et seq. In 

addition, Best argued that State Farm's conduct constituted 

"fraud, misrepresentation, retaliatory discharge, and breach of 

contract." First Amended Complaint, Record, Vol. 1, Doc. 13, at 

5. She sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, 

reinstatement, back pay, and actual and punitive damages. The 

district court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment on 

all claims except for Best's Title VII and KAAD retaliatory 

discharge claims. 

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Prior to the trial, the district court ruled that the KAAD 

does not provide for punitive damages and that under the KAAD, a 

recovery for pain, suffering, and humiliation cannot exceed 

$2,000. In addition, the court refused Best's request that the 

case be tried before a jury. A bench trial took place in April 

1990. The district court then ruled against Best on her remaining 

claims of retaliatory discharge. Best now appeals. 

DISCUSSION 

Best raises only two issues on appeal: (1) she argues that 

the district court erred in refusing her request for a jury trial; 

and (2) she argues that the district court erred in holding that 

she was not entitled to recover either pain, suffering, and 

humiliation damages in excess of $2,000 or punitive damages. Best 

acknowledges that if we rule against her on the jury trial claim, 

her damages claim is moot. 

The two issues are interrelated. In order to determine 

whether a statutory action should be considered one at law or at 

equity, the court "must examine both the nature of the action and 

of the remedy sought." Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 

(1987). The Kansas Supreme Court has analogized an action under 

the KAAD to an action under Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights 

Act, which is undeniably equitable in nature. Furthermore, the 

language of the Kansas Supreme Court and the logic of the KAAD 

suggest that any monetary award of damages is limited and only 

incidental to the equitable relief provided under that act. Thus, 

we conclude that Best was not entitled to a jury on her claims. 

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Under the KAAD, an employer cannot "discharge, expel or 

otherwise discriminate against any person because he has opposed 

any practices or acts forbidden under this act or because he has 

filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under 

this act." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1009(a)(4). An aggrieved 

employee must first lodge a complaint with the KCCR. Id. 

§ 44-l00S(a). If the hearing commission finds in favor of the 

employee, the commission is empowered to do the following: 

[T]he presiding officer shall render an order requiring 

such [employer] to cease and desist from such unlawful 

employment practice or such unlawful discriminatory 

practice and to take such affirmative action, including 

but not limited to the hiring, reinstatement, or 

upgrading of employees, with or without back pay, and 

the admission or restoration to membership in any 

respondent labor organizations •..• Such order may 

also include an award of damages for pain, suffering and 

humiliation which are incidental to the act of 

discrimination, except that an award for such pain, 

suffering and humiliation shall in no event exceed the 

sum of $2,000. 

Id. § 44-1005(k). 

Once a plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies 

under the KAAD, she is entitled to appeal to the district court. 

Van Scoyk v. St. Mary's Assumption Parochial Sch., 580 P.2d 1315, 

1317 (Kan. 1978). If the KCCR dismisses an employee's claim 

because it finds that "no probable cause" exists, the employee is 

entitled to bring an independent tort action in the state district 

court. Id. at 1318. However, because even an independent tort 

action would be premised upon the KAAD, one would presume that all 

of the substantive provisions of the KAAD would apply, and nothing 

in Van Scoyk suggests to the contrary. 

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The key case in our analysis is Woods v. Midwest Conveyor 

Co., 648 P.2d 234 (Kan. 1982). There, the Kansas Supreme Court 

reversed a state district court that had awarded an employee 

$23,700.90 for back wages and $12,000 for pain, suffering, and 

humiliation under the KAAD, The KCCR had originally issued these 

awards, and on de novo review on appeal, the district court 

adopted the KCCR's judgment as its own. 

The court first began by noting that the statute contained no 

language providing for such an award. 1 In addition, the court 

relied upon federal court cases construing Title VII: 

[Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1005(k) is] almost identical to a 

parallel provision of Title VII of the Federal Civil 

Rights Act, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(g) .••. 

The federal courts uniformly hold that an award of 

either punitive or compensatory damages, except for back 

pay or front pay, cannot be recovered. 

As previously stated, the federal court decisions 

concerning Title VII are not controlling but they are 

persuasive when one considers the comparability of the 

provisions of the two statutes. 

Woods, 648 P.2d at 240-41. The court then noted that Title VII 

provides only for equitable relief, not legal relief. Id. at 241. 

Analogizing to Title VII, it held that an employee was not 

entitled to recover mental suffering damages under the KAAD 

1 Following Woods, the Kansas legislature added a provision 

limiting any mental suffering award to $2,000. See Kan. Stat. 

Ann. § 44-1005(k). 

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because such relief is equitable in nature. 2 Woods, 648 P.2d at 

244-45. 

Best argues that the woods opinion dealt only with the KCCR's 

administrative authority to award the employee $12,000 for pain 

and suffering and that it did not address the court's authority to 

award damages at law in the event the claimant brought an 

independent tort claim under the KAAD in the courts. We think 

this reading is too narrow. The case actually came to the Supreme 

Court after a de novo trial in the district court: 

The hearing examiner found in favor of [the employee] 

and ordered [the employer] to pay him back wages in the 

amount of $23,700.90 and damages for pain, suffering, 

and humiliation in the amount of $12,000.00. On appeal 

the district court tried the case de nova from the 

transcript of the hearing before the Commission and 

affirmed, adopting the Commission's findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. [The employer] appeals. We reverse 

and remand with directions. 

Woods, 648 P.2d at 236 (emphasis added). Although Best correctly 

asserts that the Kansas Supreme Court·determined that the KCCR had 

exceeded its legislative mandate as an administrative agency, the 

court nonetheless held that "[t]he jurisdiction and authority of 

the district court on review can be no greater than the authority 

of the KCCR even if the matter is heard on appeal in the nature of 

2 Best argues that because Title VII was enacted after the KAAD, 

Title VII is of little value in interpreting the K.AAD. We 

disagree. Regardless of which statutory scheme was enacted first, 

the Kansas Supreme Court is entitled to refer to Title VII when it 

interprets the KAAD, and we then are obliged to follow that 

interpretative tool as adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court. See 

Carreno v. IBEW Local No. 226, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 81, 

82 n.1 (D.C. Kan. 1990) (district court applied Title VII 

standards to KAAD claim because Kansas courts have done so). 

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a trial de novo." 3 Id. at 243. 

Although the Woods opinion is not free from ambiguities, it 

constitutes the best authority available to us that (1) the Kansas 

Supreme Court would analogize the KAAD to Title VII and would hold 

that a claim under the KAAD, wherever it may be asserted, is 

essentially equitable in nature, thus not providing a right to 

trial by jury; and that (2) it would hold that section 44-1005(k) 

limits any award for pain, suffering, and humiliation to a maximum 

of $2,000, whether issued by the KCCR or by a court. 

Best claims that several cases support her position, 

including Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685 (Kan. 1988), and Parker v. 

Kansas Neurological Institute, 778 P.2d 390 (Kan. App.), review 

denied, 245 Kan. 785 (1989). In Palmer the Kansas Supreme Court 

held that the discharge of a whistle-blower who reported a 

Medicaid fraud stated a cause of action in tort. Palmer, 752 P.2d 

at 689-90. That case is not relevant to the case before us, 

however, because it did not involve discrimination and was not 

constrained by the Kansas discrimination statute in fashioning 

relief. 

3 At oral argument, Best argued that the procedural posture of her 

case (a trial before a state court following a finding of no 

probable cause by the KCCR) distinguishes her case from Woods. 

She asserted that a claim for retaliatory discharge can be raised 

in three ways: (1) by bringing the claim before the KCCR; (2) by 

appealing a KCCR decision to a court of law in the nature of a 

trial de novo, where the KCCR found probable cause but one of the 

parties was dissatisfied with the KCCR's resolution of the dispute 

(Woods); and (3) by bringing a claim in a court of law following a 

KCCR finding of no probable cause (the instant case). At least 

for purposes of determining whether the limitations of§ 44-

1005(k) are applicable, we reject this trichotomy and instead view 

the second and third procedural postures as identical. 

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We find Best's assertion that Parker supports her position to 

be her strongest argument. In Parker, the Kansas Court of Appeals 

held that a ruling by the Kansas Civil Service Board does not have 

a res judicata effect on a subsequent independent tort action 

brought in the state courts under the KAAD. Parker, 778 P.2d at 

393. In support of its holding, the Kansas Court of Appeals 

stated: 

[The plaintiff-employee] could have raised the 

issue of racial discrimination in her hearing before the 

[Kansas Civil Service] Board determining the 

reasonableness of her discharge but, as she had the 

right to do, elected to submit this issue to the KCCR. 

[The plaintiff-employee] could not, however, assert the 

claims for actual damages (including pain, suffering and 

humiliation) in excess of $2,000 and punitive damages, 

nor could she have received de novo review of the action 

in district court with or without a jury .••• The 

Board thus lacked the authority to consider certain 

aspects of [plaintiff-employee's] claim and she should 

not be precluded from pursuing an action pursuant to 

K.S.A. 44-1001.4 

Id. at 392. Although admittedly this language suggests that an 

employee may recover punitive damages as well as pain and 

suffering damages in excess of $2,000 in a claim for 

discrimination brought in a court of law, this was not the 

4 Kan. Stat. Ann.§ 44-1001 contains the declaration of the policy 

behind the KAAD. 

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ultimate issue before the court. 5 We find the Kansas Supreme 

Court's analysis in Woods, 648 P.2d at 234, to be more indicative 

of how it would decide this issue. If a federal court is 

convinced by persuasive indications that the highest court of the 

state would decide otherwise, the federal court is not bound by a 

ruling of a state intermediate court. Commissioner v. Estate of 

Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967). Because we are so convinced, we 

choose to follow the Kansas Supreme Court's pronouncement in 

Woods, rather than the intermediate court's statements in Parker. 

The policy underlying the KAAD further supports our position. 

Although the administrative remedy is not exclusive, it must be 

exhausted before a state action can be brought. Van Scoyk, 580 

P.2d at 1317. Under Best's interpretation, an employee would have 

very little incentive to pursue a discrimination claim 

aggressively before the KCCR if, upon rejection, the employee 

5 In Parker, the employee alleged that she had been 

discriminatorily discharged from her position at a state hospital. 

She brought an action before the Kansas Civil Service Board 

("Board"), which reviews grievances by employees of state 

institutions. The Board ruled against her and she appealed to the 

state district court ("first district court"). In the first 

district court proceeding, however, she abandoned her 

discrimination claim. Instead, she brought a separate 

discrimination action before the KCCR. After the KCCR made a no 

probable cause finding, she filed another petition in the state 

district court ("second district court"). The second district 

court, applying the doctrine of claim preclusion, held that she 

was barred from raising the discrimination claim under Kan. Stat. 

Ann.§§ 44-1001 et seq because she had abandoned that claim in the 

first district court proceeding. The court of appeals reversed, 

finding the doctrine of claim preclusion inapplicable. The 

appellate court distinguished the two proceedings by noting that 

Parker's claim before the Civil Service Board could not provide 

her a remedy for pain, suffering, and humiliation damages in 

excess of $2,000 and punitive damages. The clear implication of 

this distinction was that such remedies were available in a KAAD 

claim. We note, however, that the court of appeals cited no 

authority for this proposition. 

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could pursue more favorable remedies in state or federal courts. 

Unless compelled to do so by clear authority, we are reluctant to 

adopt a reading of the Kansas statute that would lead to the 

illogical result that, when the KCCR finds a claimant's 

allegations to be without probable cause, that claimant has 

broader remedies in a subsequent civil suit than the claimant 

whose allegations were found by the KCCR to have probable cause. 

Both parties agree that whether a party is entitled to a jury 

is a question of federal law. See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 

222 (1963) (per curiam). However, in order to determine whether 

Best was entitled to a jury, we must construe the relief afforded 

under the KAAD according to state law. In Woods, the court 

analyzed the KAAD by analogizing to Title VII. See Woods, 648 

P.2d at 239, 240-41, 243-44. There is no constitutional 

entitlement to a jury under Title VII. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 

453 U.S. 156, 164 (1981); Trotter v. Todd, 719 F.2d 346, 348 (10th 

Cir. 1983). Indeed, in Woods, the court determined that the 

statutory similarity that convinced it to overrule the district 

court's decision to gran~ pain, suffering, and humiliation damages 

was partly evidenced by the fact that there was no absolute right 

to a jury under either statutory scheme. Id. at 243-44. 

The only difference between the KAAD and Title VII is that 

under the KAAD, an employee can recover pain, suffering, and 

humiliation damages so long as they do not exceed $2,000. 

Admittedly, this type of relief is legal as opposed to equitable. 

However, we must decide whether Best's cause of action as a whole 

is equitable or legal. Because we view Kan. Stat. Ann.§ 4-1009 

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as providing primarily equitable relief, the fact that it may have 

a "legal characteristic" to the extent that it allows up to $2,000 

for pain, suffering, and humiliation does not render the cause of 

action legal. See Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 

1975); Koerner v. Custom Components, Inc., 603 P.2d 628, 637-38 

(Kan. 1979); Karnes Enterprises, Inc. v. Quan, 561 P.2d 825, 830-

31 (Kan. 1977). 

Because the Kansas Supreme Court has held that the KAAD is to 

a large extent analogous to Title VII, and because it is 

well-settled law that an employee is not entitled to a jury trial 

under Title VII, we affirm the district court's conclusion that 

Best was not entitled to have a jury consider her retaliation 

claims under the KAAD. Accord Douglass v. Blue Cross & Blue 

Shield of Kansas, No. 88-2257-S, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13089, at 

*11 (D. Kan. Oct. 23, 1989) (no right to a jury trial under the 

KAAD because the KAAD is analogous to· Title VII and a KAAD cause 

of action is essentially equitable in nature). 

Therefore, in all respects, the memorandum opinion of the 

district court is AFFIRMED. 

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