Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01284/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01284-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 JAMISI JERMAINE CALLOWAY,

Plaintiff, No. 1:05-CV-01284 ALA P

vs.

WARDEN, CSP CORCORAN, et at.,

Defendants. ORDER

____________________________/

Plaintiff Jamisi Jermaine Calloway is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Mr. Calloway

filed a complaint on October 11, 2005, seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

On November 16, 2005, Mr. Calloway filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). On March 3, 2007, findings and recommendations were

entered recommending that Mr. Calloway’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis be denied. On

July 17, 2006, Mr. Calloway paid the filing fee in full. 

I

Pending before this Court is Mr. Calloway’s motion to exclude his amended complaint. 

On March 13, 2006, Mr. Calloway filed a first amended complaint. On July, 18, 2006, the Court

granted, nunc pro tunc, Mr. Calloway’s motion to amend his complaint. On December 12, 2006,

Mr. Calloway filed a motion to exclude the first amended complaint and to serve the defendants

named in the original complaint. In his motion to exclude, Mr. Calloway explained: “I made a

formal request to amend complaint which was a[n] error on my behalf. Instead of joining my

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issues at C.M.F. California Medical Facility with the issues at Corcoran I & II Prisons, I would

just be filing my C.M.F. issues on another 1983 civil complaint form and dealing with both cases

separately.” An amended or supplemental complaint generally supersedes the original

complaint. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967); see also E.D. Local Rule 15-220. 

However, Mr. Calloway’s motion to exclude his first amended complaint is granted. The first

amended complaint is therefore stricken. See Docket No. 13. The original complaint filed on

October 11, 2005, is reinstated. See Docket No. 1.

II

Mr. Calloway alleges in his complaint that his Constitutional rights were violated by

officials of Corcoran State Prison. Mr. Calloway brings four claims, each of which concerns

separate incidents, against twenty-six defendants.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), when the litigant is a prisoner, this Court must screen

complaints brought against a governmental entity, or officer or employee of a governmental

entity. The Court must dismiss the complaint if the claims contained in it, even when read

broadly, are legally frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

or seek money damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(A)(b). A claim “is frivolous [if] it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “At this stage of the litigation, [this Court] must accept

[plaintiff’s] allegations as true.” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). “A court

may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts

that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Id.

“To sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that the conduct

complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the

conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” Hydrick v. Hunter,

466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cr. 2006). This Court will examine each of Mr. Calloway’s claims in his

complaint to determine if they are sufficient under § 1915A.

A

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Mr. Calloway’s first claim is that prison officials wrongly accused him of possessing

drugs and forced him to undergo a medical procedure involving an enema without his consent in

violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Compl., claim 1. Mr. Calloway also alleges that

Lieutenant Kennedy and Sergeant Phillips retaliated against him for reporting the incident. 

Specifically, Mr. Calloway alleges: “. . . Sergeant Phillips gave no reasons for my removal

[from my cell] and why I was being placed in the hole for my safety concerns in which I had no

safety concerns until [after the enema incident].” Compl., claim 1 at 4. 

The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments “‘draw[s] its

meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’

and so admits of few absolute limitations.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (holding

that the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual

punishment even though the prisoner does not suffer serious injury) (citations omitted). “What

is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Id. “[D]eliberate indifference to medical needs amounts

to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs are ‘serious.’” Id. at 9 (citation omitted). 

With respect to excessive force claims, however, when “prison officials maliciously and

sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated,”

regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Id.; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d

623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment excessive force standard

examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis injuries). 

In the instant case, Mr. Calloway alleges that Sergeant Montgomery ordered an enema

procedure after an x-ray showed that Mr. Calloway’s abdomen appeared “normal” and that he

was not in possession of drugs. Compl., claim 1 at 3. Mr. Calloway has set forth allegations that

Sergeant Montgomery used excessive force by maliciously ordering an unnecessary procedure,

and, therefore, has established an Eighth Amendment claim. See, e.g, Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5-6

(explaining that the question of whether prison security measure to a particular incident inflicted

cruel and unusual punishment depends on “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to

maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing

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harm”) (citations omitted). Mr. Calloway’s allegations that Correctional Officers B. Babb and

R. Spears restrained him over a mop bucket while the procedure was being publically performed

are also sufficient to state a claim. Mr. Calloway has set forth allegations that Correctional

Officers B. Babb and R. Spears were maliciously motivated to perform the procedure publically

instead of privately. See id. However, Mr. Calloway did not set forth any allegations that

Doctor Bhatt or L. Kappe acted maliciously or sadistically; thus, Mr. Calloway has failed to state

a cognizable claim against them.

Although Mr. Calloway fails to specify which Constitutional rights were violated when

he was allegedly retaliated against, the most likely basis is the First Amendment. Allegations of

retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment rights to speech may support a § 1983 claim. 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005). “Within the prison context, a viable

claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state

actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected

conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and

(5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Id. at 567-68; see also

Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that a

plaintiff must plead facts which suggest “that the protected conduct was a ‘substantial’ or

‘motivating’ factor in the defendant's decision”) (citation omitted). 

Mr. Calloway fails to state a claim for retaliation. He has not provided any allegations

that would demonstrate that retaliation, rather than a concern for his safety, was Sergeant

Phillips’s substantial or motivating factor for moving him to the “hole.” Moreover, these

allegations are inconsistent with allegations Mr. Calloway makes later in his complaint that he

refused to be placed back in his original cell “because [he] was place[d] in the hole for safety

concerns.” Compl., claim 3 at 1. Mr. Calloway also has failed to allege any personal

involvement by Lieutenant Kennedy, and, thus, has failed to state a claim against him as well.

See, e.g., Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Liability under [§] 1983 arises

only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.”). 

B

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In the second claim, Mr. Calloway alleges that District Attorney Ronald L. Calhoun

brought charges against him for drug possession in retaliation for reporting the enema incident. 

Compl., claim 2 at 1. This claim fails. District attorneys are entitled to absolute immunity from

civil suits for damages. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976) (holding that state

prosecuting attorney is entitled to prosecutorial immunity for civil liability in performing

functions intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process).

Mr. Calloway also alleges in his second claim that when he was transported to a hearing

for the drug possession charges he had an altercation with Correctional Officers P. Tome and A.

Pyle where they assaulted Mr. Calloway by hitting his head on the floor while he was

handcuffed. Compl., claim 2 at 3. Mr. Calloway claims that Sergeant Rangel then pepper

sprayed him. Compl., claim 2 at 4. Mr. Calloway further alleges that nurse R. Tyner,

Correctional Officers R. Mobert, Scott, Mendoza, and Zavala interacted with him after the

alleged attack, but “deliberately” failed to provide him medical treatment until later that day. 

Compl., claim 2 at 4-6. Although Mr. Calloway does not specify what Constitutional rights were

violated, the most likely basis is excessive force and inadequate medical care in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. 

Mr. Calloway has stated a claim of excessive force against Correctional Officers P. Tome

and A. Pyle and Sergeant Rangel. See, e.g, Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5 (explaining that the question

of whether prison security measure to a particular incident inflicted cruel and unusual

punishment depends on “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore

discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm”) (citations

omitted). 

Mr. Calloway, however, has failed to state a cognizable claim against the other

defendants for inadequate medical care. A prisoner's claim of inadequate medical care does not

constitute cruel and unusual punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). “[T]he

deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994) (citations omitted). A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent

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manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” 

Id. at 837. Mr. Calloway has not set forth specific facts regarding whether his injuries were

sufficiently serious to require more prompt medical treatment than he had received or how nurse

R. Tyner, or Correctional Officers R. Mobert, Scott, Mendoza, and Zavala deliberately denied

him medical care. 

Although the complaint is unclear, it appears that in the second claim Mr. Calloway

makes two additional claims. First, he alleges that his hearing concerning the alleged assault

was “held until over 60 days [which violated his] constitutional rights[,] 5th and 14th

Amendment due process.” Compl., claim 2 at 7. To the extent this is a claim, it fails because he

has not alleged any personal involvement by any named defendant. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045

(“Liability under [§] 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the

defendant.”). 

Second, Mr. Calloway claims that he reported the alleged assault to Warden A.K.

Scribner, who “did nothing.” Compl, claim 3 at 7. This allegation fails to state a claim. The

Ninth Circuit has “found supervisorial liability under § 1983 where the supervisor was

personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection exists

between the supervisor's unlawful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Edgerly v. City &

County of San Francisco, 495 F.3d 645, 660 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Thus, supervisors ‘can be held liable for: 1) their own culpable action or inaction in the

training, supervision, or control of subordinates; 2) their acquiescence in the constitutional

deprivation of which a complaint is made; or 3) for conduct that showed a reckless or callous

indifference to the rights of others.’” Id. (citations omitted). Mr. Calloway has failed to allege

specific facts that demonstrate Warden Scribner personally participated in the alleged

constitutional violations or caused the alleged constitutional violations through his individual

actions. Mr. Calloway’s allegations are conclusory and, thus, he fails to state a cognizable claim

against Warden Scribner.

C

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Mr. Calloway makes numerous allegations in his third claim. First, Mr. Calloway alleges

that Warden Scribner and Assistant Warden Stockton denied his request to transfer prisons. 

Compl., claim 3 at 1, 4. Second, Mr. Calloway alleges that Warden Scribner, Doctor M.

Talisman, and Psychiatrist A. Syedud violated his due process rights when they moved him to

administrative segregation on a “suicide watch for 90 days” without a hearing. Compl., claim 3

at 2. Third, Mr. Calloway alleges that Correctional Officer Leos knowingly placed him with a

dangerous cellmate who attacked him. Compl., claim 3 at 4-5. Each of these allegations will be

addressed below. 

First, Mr. Calloway fails to state a cognizable claim against Warden Scribner and

Assistant Warden Stockton that his constitutional rights were violated when his request to

transfer was denied. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983) (explaining that

prisoners have no constitutional right to incarceration in a particular institution). 

With respect to his due process claim, Mr. Calloway has also failed to state a cognizable

claim against Warden Scribner, Doctor M. Talisman, and Psychiatrist A. Syedud. A prisoner

possesses a liberty interest under the due process clause when a change occurs in confinement

that imposes an “‘atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Mr.

Calloway has not alleged any facts about the conditions in administrative segregation, and, thus,

has failed to allege that his placement there subjected him to “atypical and significant hardship.” 

See also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a due process claim

failed because a prisoner had no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within

sentence imposed and administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily

contemplated by a sentence).

Mr. Calloway has failed to specify which Constitutional rights he alleges were violated

when Correctional Officer Leos allegedly placed him with a dangerous cellmate. He has, thus,

failed to state a cognizable claim against him. 

D

In the fourth claim, Mr. Calloway, who asserts that he needs dialysis care, alleges that

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Doctor Chan failed “to give follow-up physicals on a monthly basis.” Compl., claim 4 at 1. Mr.

Calloway also alleges that during one of his dialysis treatments he had an altercation with nurse

Erica Casanova. Because of the alleged altercation, Mr. Calloway claims: “Her [Ms.

Casanova’s] actions caused me to be removed off the dialysis without a doctor order and . . . I

was sent back to the prison without treatment . . . Do [sic] to the miss treatment [sic] and

deliberate indifference to my serious medical needs I had to be rushed by ambulance to the

outside hospital because I had a mild stroke and life threaten[ing] high potassium and my blood

pressure was so low that they couldn’t get a reading in which [they had to] hospitalize me.” 

Compl., claim 4 at 3. Mr. Calloway further alleges that Warden Scribner was “deliberately

indifferent [to his] serious medical needs by denying him monthly check ups by a kidney

specialist doctor and undermining [his] medication.” Compl., claim 4 at 5. 

To establish a claim that inadequate medical care constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment, the mistreatment must rise to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. The prison official must act with a “sufficiently

culpable state of mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than conduct

undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official

does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id.

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a

prisoner's civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be

substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle,

429 U.S. at 105-06.) “While poor medical treatment will at a certain point rise to the level of a

constitutional violation, mere malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not suffice.” Wood v.

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding no constitutional violation where a

medical pin in a prisoner’s shoulder broke and there were days of delay in treating the injury) .

Here, Mr. Calloway has failed to state a claim against Ms. Casanova because he has

failed to allege whether she is a prison official. See, e.g., Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (explaining

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there could be an Eighth Amendment claim “ whether the indifference [to serious medical needs]

is manifested by prison doctors . . . or by prison guards”). If Mr. Calloway chooses to amend

this claim, he is ordered to cite authority for the proposition that a claim for deliberate

indifference to medical treatment can be brought against a nurse.

Mr. Calloway has also failed to state a cognizable claim against Doctor Chan and Warden

Scribner. Mr. Calloway must allege, with at least some degree of particularity, specific overt

acts which Doctor Chan and Warden Scribner engaged in that support his claims. The

allegations must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.’” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (citations

omitted); see also Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977) (explaining that

conclusory allegations and citation to constitutional amendments are insufficient to state

cognizable claims for relief). The only allegations pertaining to these defendants are so vague

and conclusory as not to provide fair notice of the basis of Mr. Calloway’s claims against them. 

E

In the caption, Mr. Calloway lists Gambro President Richard Turner, Gambro Health

Care Salma Clinic, and “Corcoran State Prison #1 & #2 S.A.T.F.” as defendants. However, Mr.

Calloway does not link these named defendants with any alleged act or omission. There can be

no liability under § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a

defendant’s actions and the claimed constitutional deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.

Moreover, Mr. Calloway should note that prisons, as state agencies, are entitled to

Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. See id. (concluding that Nevada Department of

Prisons was a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). 

///

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s claims against Doctor Bhatt, L. Kappe, Lieutenant Kennedy,

Sergeant Phillips, Assistant Warden Stockton, Warden A.K. Scribner, Ronald L. Calhoun, R.

Tyner, Correctional Officer R. Mobert, Correctional Officer Scott, Correctional Officer

Mendoza, Correctional Officer Zavala, Doctor M. Talisman, Psychiatrist A. Syedud,

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Correctional Officer Leos, Doctor Chan, Erica Casanova, Gambro President Richard Turner,

Gambro Health Care Salma Clinic, and Corcoran State Prison #1 & #2 S.A.T.F. are dismissed

for the reasons discussed above, with leave to file an amended complaint within thirty-five (35)

days from the date of service of this Order. Failure to file an amended complaint will result in

these defendants being dismissed from this action.

2. Upon filing an amended complaint or expiration of the time allowed therefor,

the court will make further orders for service of process upon some or all of the defendants.

/////

DATED: November 26, 2007

/s/ Arthur L. Alarcón 

 UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

Sitting by Designation

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