Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00959/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00959-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES CATO,

Plaintiff,

v.

M. DARST, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2: 14-cv-0959 TLN KJN P

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 

the grounds that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. (ECF No. 24.)

On July 20, 2015, the undersigned vacated defendants’ summary judgment motion and 

ordered an evidentiary hearing. (ECF No. 41.) The undersigned conducted an evidentiary 

hearing on November 9, 2015. Accordingly, defendants’ summary judgment motion is reinstated. 

For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that defendants’ summary judgment 

motion be granted.

On February 1, 2016, the court received a letter from inmate Jesse Stephen King in 

support of plaintiff’s claims against defendants. (ECF No. 60.) On February 8, 2016, defendants 

filed a motion to strike this letter on grounds that it did not originate from plaintiff and there is no 

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indication that inmate King is authorized to file documents on behalf of plaintiff. (ECF No. 61.) 

Good cause appearing, defendants’ motion to strike is granted. 

Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the standard set forth in 

Federal Rule of Civil procedure 56 is met. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those 

portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting then-numbered Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 

“Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need 

only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Nursing 

Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.), 627 F.3d 376, 

387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory 

committee’s notes to 2010 amendments (recognizing that “a party who does not have the trial 

burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot 

produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact”). Indeed, summary judgment 

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. 

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case 

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. 

Consequently, if the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to 

the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to 

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establish the existence of such a factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the 

allegations or denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material in support of its contention that such a 

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party 

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome 

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 

(9th Cir. 1987), overruled in part on other grounds, Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 

1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 

amendments).

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be 

drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences 

are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual 

predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. 

Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to 

demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could 

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not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted).

By contemporaneous notice provided on June 10, 2014, (ECF No. 11), plaintiff was 

advised of the requirements for opposing a motion brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); 

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

Legal Standard re: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . , or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion 

requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general 

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other 

wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 

Proper exhaustion of available remedies is mandatory, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731,

741 (2001), and “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other 

critical procedural rules[.]” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). The Supreme Court has 

also cautioned against reading futility or other exceptions into the statutory exhaustion 

requirement. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6. Moreover, because proper exhaustion is necessary, 

a prisoner cannot satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement by filing an untimely or otherwise 

procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-93. 

“[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners ‘must complete the administrative 

review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,’ [] - rules that are defined not 

by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 

(2007) (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88). See also Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 1027 

(9th Cir. 2009) (“The California prison system’s requirements ‘define the boundaries of proper 

exhaustion.’”) (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 218). 

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In California, prisoners may appeal “any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission 

by the department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a material 

adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). 

On January 28, 2011, California prison regulations governing inmate grievances were revised. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7. Now inmates in California proceed through three levels of 

appeal to exhaust the appeal process: (1) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal 

form, (2) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (3) third level appeal to the 

Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7. Under specific circumstances, the first level review may be bypassed. Id. 

The third level of review constitutes the decision of the Secretary of the CDCR and exhausts a 

prisoner’s administrative remedies. See id. § 3084.7(d)(3). Since 2008, medical appeals have 

been processed at the third level by the Office of Third Level Appeals for the California 

Correctional Health Care Services. A California prisoner is required to submit an inmate appeal 

at the appropriate level and proceed to the highest level of review available to him. Butler v. 

Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005); Bennett v. King, 293 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 

2002). Since the 2011 revision, in submitting a grievance, an inmate is required to “list all staff 

members involved and shall describe their involvement in the issue.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 3084.2(3). Further, the inmate must “state all facts known and available to him/her regarding 

the issue being appealed at the time,” and he or she must “describe the specific issue under appeal 

and the relief requested.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.2(a)(4). An inmate now has thirty 

calendar days to submit his or her appeal from the occurrence of the event or decision being 

appealed, or “upon first having knowledge of the action or decision being appealed.” Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.8(b). 

Failure to exhaust is “an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.” Bock, 

549 U.S. at 204, 216. In Albino, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the underlying panel’s decision1

 

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 See Albino v. Baca, 697 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2012). The three judge panel noted that “[a] 

defendant’s burden of establishing an inmate’s failure to exhaust is very low.” Id. at 1031. 

Relevant evidence includes statutes, regulations, and other official directives that explain the 

scope of the administrative review process. Id. at 1032.

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“that the burdens outlined in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996), 

should provide the template for the burdens here.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 

2014) (en banc). A defendant need only show “that there was an available administrative remedy, 

and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. Once the 

defense meets its burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the administrative 

remedies were unavailable. See Albino, 697 F.3d at 1030-31. 

A prisoner may be excused from complying with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement if 

he establishes that the existing administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. See

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172-73. When an inmate’s administrative grievance is improperly rejected 

on procedural grounds, exhaustion may be excused as effectively unavailable. Sapp v. Kimbrell, 

623 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1224-26 (9th Cir. 

2010) (warden’s mistake rendered prisoner’s administrative remedies “effectively unavailable”); 

Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (exhaustion excused where futile); Brown 

v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 940 (9th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff not required to proceed to third level where 

appeal granted at second level and no further relief was available).

Where a prison system’s grievance procedures do not specify the requisite level of detail 

for inmate appeals, Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824, a grievance satisfies the administrative exhaustion 

requirement if it “alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.” Griffin 

v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009). “A grievance need not include legal terminology 

or legal theories unless they are in some way needed to provide notice of the harm being grieved. 

A grievance also need not contain every fact necessary to prove each element of an eventual legal 

claim. The primary purpose of a grievance is to alert the prison to a problem and facilitate its 

resolution, not to lay groundwork for litigation.” Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120.

If under the Rule 56 summary judgment standard, the court concludes that plaintiff has 

failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. 

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Albino, 

747 F.3d 1162. 

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Plaintiff’s Claims

This action is proceeding on the original complaint against defendants Darst and Romero. 

(ECF No. 1.) All relevant events occurred at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”). Plaintiff 

alleges that in March 2013, he was housed in administrative segregation (“ad seg”). (Id. at 3.) 

Plaintiff alleges that on March 6, 2013, defendant Darst threw a hot food tray at plaintiff, causing 

plaintiff to suffer pain. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that on March 7, 2013, defendant Romero threw a 

hot food tray at plaintiff, causing plaintiff to suffer pain. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that on 

March 8, 2013, plaintiff begged defendant Darst for food because plaintiff had not received an 

evening meal in two days. (Id.) Defendant Darst told plaintiff that he would let him eat if he 

cleaned up the food on his cell door. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s Evidence Regarding Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Attached to His 

Complaint and Opposition to Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion

Plaintiff alleges that prison officials failed to process his administrative grievances 

regarding the alleged assaults. The July 20, 2015 order directing that an evidentiary hearing be 

held described plaintiff’s evidence regarding administrative exhaustion as follows herein.

In his verified complaint, plaintiff alleges that in March 2013 he submitted an appeal 

regarding the alleged assaults to the HDSP appeals coordinator, via institutional mail. (ECF No. 

1 at 6, 10.) In his verified opposition to defendants’ summary judgment motion, plaintiff alleges

that after receiving no response to his first grievance, he wrote to HDSP officials. (ECF No. 27 at 

4, 10.) A copy of this one page, handwritten document, signed by plaintiff on March 27, 2013, is 

attached to plaintiff’s opposition. (Id. at 10.) This document is prepared on a sheet of paper, and 

not on a 602 administrative appeal complaint form. (Id.) This document, titled “staff complaint,” 

describes the alleged assaults and requests an investigation. (Id.) At the bottom of this document, 

plaintiff wrote, “I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and sent to the 

appeals coordinator office at High Desert State Prison for processing written on a CDCR 

602/CDCR602-A.” (Id.) 

In the verified opposition, plaintiff states that after receiving no response to his March 27, 

2013 staff complaint, he wrote a letter to the Director of Corrections. (Id. at 4.) A copy of this 

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letter, addressed to then California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) 

Director Kathleen Dickinson, is attached to the opposition. (Id. at 12.) In this letter, dated April 

14, 2013, plaintiff described the alleged assaults. (Id.) Plaintiff also wrote that “I have filed 

complaints (602) stipulating the facts herein but don’t know if my complaints even made it to the 

appeals coordinator office. An investigation is needed.” (Id.) According to defendants, this 

letter was forwarded to the HDSP Warden’s office and a use of force investigation was initiated 

in response to this letter. (ECF No. 24-14 at 6.) 

In his opposition, plaintiff alleges that after receiving no response from anyone for three 

months, on June 9, 2013 he submitted an Inmate Request for Interview form, i.e., CDCR 22 form. 

(ECF No. 27 at 4, 15.) A copy of this form is attached to plaintiff’s opposition. (Id. at 15.) In 

this form, plaintiff alleged that in March 2013, he submitted a staff complaint against defendants 

Darst and Romero. (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff claimed that he received no response to his staff 

complaint. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that if ad seg officers were throwing his 602s away, then he 

requested that the coordinator personally come and retrieve his complaint. (Id.)

On June 11, 2013 prison officials responded to plaintiff’s June 9, 2013 CDCR 22 Inmate 

Request for Interview form. (Id.) The response stated that headquarters received a letter from 

plaintiff alleging misconduct, and plaintiff was interviewed on April 27, 2013, apparently as part 

of the use of force investigation. (Id.) The response advised plaintiff to submit his staff 

complaint to the “IAD,” and that a CDCR 602 form was attached. (Id.)

The section of the CDCR 22 form contains a section where an inmate may request a 

“supervisor review” of the response to the initial request for an interview. The “Request for 

Supervisor Review” section of the CDCR 22 form attached to plaintiff’s opposition is filled in by 

plaintiff. (Id.) This section, containing plaintiff’s signature dated June 23, 2013, states that on 

June 16, 2013, plaintiff submitted another staff complaint per the June 11, 2013 instructions. (Id.) 

Plaintiff wrote that he had received no logging notice. (Id.) Plaintiff wrote that ad seg staff had 

again thrown his complaint away. (Id.) 

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July 20, 2015 Order

The July 20, 2015 order addressed the arguments raised in defendants’ summary judgment 

motion on which the undersigned found defendants were not entitled to summary judgment. 

This order also addressed why an evidentiary hearing was warranted. The relevant portions of the 

July 20, 2015 order are set forth herein. 

Analysis

The parties do not dispute that plaintiff did not pursue a grievance 

regarding the alleged assaults to the third level of review. Instead, 

defendants’ summary judgment motion addresses plaintiff’s claim 

that prison officials refused to process his grievances regarding the 

alleged assaults. Defendants dispute plaintiff’s claim that he filed 

grievances in March and June 2013. The undersigned addresses 

these arguments herein. 

Defendants argue that there is no record that plaintiff submitted a 

grievance in March 2013 regarding the alleged assaults. (See ECF 

No. 24-14 at 3-4.) For the following reasons, the undersigned finds 

that the issue of whether plaintiff submitted a grievance in March 

2013 is a materially disputed fact.

In his verified complaint and opposition, plaintiff alleges that he 

submitted a grievance regarding the alleged assaults in March 2013. 

Plaintiff alleges that when he did not receive a response to this 

grievance, he submitted the March 27, 2013 staff complaint. In his 

April 14, 2013 letter to CDCR, plaintiff states that he filed 

complaints regarding the assaults but received no response. This 

evidence is sufficient to create a dispute regarding whether plaintiff 

submitted the initial grievance in March 2013 or the March 27, 

2013 staff complaint. 

The undersigned observes that plaintiff does not identify the date he 

submitted the initial grievance in March 2013, nor has he submitted 

a copy of it. In addition, plaintiff’s March 27, 2013 staff complaint 

does not mention the previously submitted grievance. While these 

circumstances are not sufficient grounds to grant defendants’ 

summary judgment motion, plaintiff may be required to address 

these matters at an evidentiary hearing.

Defendants also argue that there is no record that plaintiff submitted 

a grievance to the HDSP appeals office after receiving the June 11, 

2013 response to his June 9, 2013 CDCR 22 form. (See id. at 7.) 

However, plaintiff wrote in his June 23, 2013 Request For Review 

By Supervisor form that he submitted the grievance on June 16, 

2013, and received no response. Plaintiff makes the same claim in 

his verified opposition. For these reasons, the undersigned finds 

that whether plaintiff submitted a grievance on June 16, 2013 is a 

materially disputed fact. 

Defendants next argue that plaintiff’s speculation that ad seg 

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officials threw away his appeals is refuted by plaintiff’s inmate 

appeal history. Defendants observe that while plaintiff was housed 

in Facility D ad seg from March 5, 2013, to January 15, 2014 (see

ECF No. 24-3 at 2), he submitted seven grievances. (See ECF No. 

24-14 at 3-4.) In addition, while in ad seg, plaintiff submitted four 

appeals that were screened out. (Id. at 5.) Defendants argue that 

this history demonstrates that plaintiff had the opportunity to file 

appeals while in ad seg. Defendants further argue that this history 

demonstrates that ad seg correctional officers were not interfering 

with plaintiff’s ability to file appeals. 

In Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2015), the plaintiff 

argued that prison officials refused to process her administrative 

grievances. The defendants argued that “remedies were available to 

[plaintiff] as evidenced by the multiple unrelated appeals that she 

was able to file successfully.” 775 F.3d at 1192. The Ninth Circuit 

rejected this argument:

This argument is a virtual non-sequitur because it does 

nothing to rebut Williams's evidence that administrative 

remedies were not available to her at the time she tried to 

file the relevant grievance and appeal in this case. Other 

circuits have similarly concluded that defendants may not 

simply rely on the existence of an administrative review 

process to overcome a prisoner’s showing that 

administrative remedies were not available to him. In 

Hemphill v. New York, for example, the Second Circuit 

held that merely showing that grievance mechanisms are in 

place does not end the inquiry into availability where the 

plaintiff claims that threats by prison officials made the 

remedy functionally unavailable to him. 380 F.3d 680, 687–

88 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 

268–69 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that records showing 53 

other inmates had filed grievances during the period in 

question did not demonstrate that administrative remedy 

was available to plaintiff). Moreover, permitting a defendant 

to show that remedies merely existed in a general sense 

where a plaintiff has specifically alleged that official action 

prevented her from filing a particular grievance would force 

a plaintiff to bear the burden of proof, a burden which the 

plaintiff does not bear. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172.

Id.

Based on the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning set forth above, the 

undersigned is not persuaded by defendants’ argument that 

plaintiff’s ability to pursue other unrelated grievances demonstrates 

that administrative remedies were available to him. 

Defendants next argue that even assuming plaintiff submitted an 

appeal on June 16, 2013, as alleged in the CDCR 22 form, such 

appeal would have been untimely. The alleged assaults occurred on 

March 6 and 7, 2013. Defendants argue that under CDCR 

regulations, plaintiff had thirty calendar days after the alleged 

incidents to file timely grievances. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 

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3084.6(c)(4). Defendants argue that the grievance filed by plaintiff 

on June 16, 2013, was filed more than thirty days after the alleged 

incidents. 

While the June 16, 2013 appeal may have been filed more than 

thirty days after the assaults, the regulations provided that plaintiff 

could explain why the appeal was untimely. See Cal. Code Regs. 

tit. 15, § 3084.6(c)(4). Prison officials’ failure to respond to 

plaintiff’s first grievance, allegedly submitted in March 2013, may 

have rendered the June 16, 2013 appeal timely. Moreover, the 

grievances allegedly filed in March 2013 would have been timely. 

For these reasons, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment 

on the grounds that plaintiff did not pursue timely administrative 

grievances. 

Defendants also observe that plaintiff waited until June 9, 2013, to 

file the CDCR 22 form complaining that prison officials failed to 

respond to the grievance he submitted in March. Defendants 

suggest that the length of time plaintiff waited to bring this matter 

to the attention of prison officials undermines his claim that he filed 

a grievance in March 2013. Prison officials have thirty working 

days from the date of receipt by the appeals coordinator to respond 

to a first level grievance. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 3084.8(c)(1). 

Plaintiff submitted the CDCR 22 form after he allegedly submitted 

the staff complaint on March 27, 2013, and the April 14, 2013 letter 

informing prison officials that he had not received responses to his 

grievances. Taking all of these circumstances into account, the 

undersigned cannot find that the length of time plaintiff waited to 

submit the CDCR 22 form was so great that it completely 

undermines plaintiff’s claim that he submitted a grievance in March 

2013.

Defendants also argue that following his transfer from HDSP to 

California State Prison-Corcoran in January 2013, plaintiff could 

have submitted a grievance regarding the alleged assault. 

Defendants argue that plaintiff still had administrative remedies 

available to him after his transfer to Corcoran. Defendants argue 

that even though the grievance would have been late, plaintiff could 

have explained why the appeal was late. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 

15 § 3084.6(c)(4). 

The undersigned is not persuaded by defendants’ argument that a 

prisoner is obligated to continue exhausting administrative remedies 

after prison officials allegedly thwart his attempts at administrative 

exhaustion. As discussed by the Central District of California, 

unavailable remedies can excuse exhaustion because:

The PLRA “does not require exhaustion when 

circumstances render administrative remedies ‘effectively 

unavailable.’” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 

2010). An administrative remedy becomes unavailable for 

purposes of exhaustion if prison officials do not respond to 

properly filed grievances or if they otherwise use 

affirmative misconduct to thwart an inmate’s attempts to 

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exhaust. See Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th 

Cir. 2010); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d at 943 n. 18 (9th Cir. 

2005).

Ekene v. Cash, 2013 WL 2468387, *4 (C.D.Cal.2013).

If HDSP prison officials destroyed plaintiff’s grievances, as 

plaintiff alleges, or otherwise thwarted his attempts to pursue these 

grievances, then he was not required to file additional grievances 

following his transfer to Corcoran. Defendants are not entitled to 

summary judgment on this ground because the facts surrounding 

plaintiff’s alleged attempt to exhaust administrative remedies are 

disputed. 

Defendants next argue that plaintiff’s claims that his appeals were 

thrown away is improbable given the process for collecting mail in 

ad seg. In support of this argument, defendants submitted the 

declaration of HDSP Correctional Sergeant Davis. (ECF No. 24-3.) 

Correctional Sergeant Davis has worked as a sergeant in the 

Facility D Ad Seg Unit of HDSP since May 2014. (Id. at 1.) 

Correctional Sergeant Davis describes the ad seg mail procedures:

4. Inmates housed in ASU [i.e., ad seg unit] are not 

restricted or limited from filing inmate appeals. Inmates in 

ASU submit inmate appeals via HDSP institutional mail. 

Mail is picked up every evening from Sunday through 

Thursday, during evening count. Evening count begins at 

2115 (9:15 p.m.) and ends at about 2130 (9:30 p.m.), and is 

performed by officers on third watch. Third watch ends at 

2200 (10:00 p.m.). First watch control booth officers 

generally arrive about 2150 (9:50 p.m.).

5. The evening count is performed by two officers. The 

count officers move down the tiers, proceeding from cell to 

cell and count the inmates. As they are moving from cell to 

cell counting the inmates, one officer takes mail from 

inmates. Generally, when collecting inmate mail, the 

officers do not stop at the cells, or open the cell door of the 

food port. Rather, inmates typically slide any mail to be 

collected out of the corner of the door of their cells for the 

count officers to collect. During count, an officer would not 

have to read, review, or even scan any inmate mail 

collected; if they did do this, they would not timely 

complete count. Once count is completed, the count officer 

who collected the mail immediately places the mail in a bag. 

That bag is then taken upstairs to the first watch control 

booth. The first watch control booth officer sorts the mail 

and searches it for contraband and illegal messaging. The 

control booth officer then separates and bundles the mail 

into two categories: institutional mail and outgoing mail. 

Inmate appeals (602) are considered institutional mail, and 

would be routed directly to the appeals coordinator’s office.

6. Since inmate appeal form 602s are distinct from other 

items of inmate mail, the officer sorting the mail would be 

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able to recognize that the form is a 602 simply from its 

appearance and the form number printed on it. It would be 

unnecessary for the officer to also read the content of the 

602 before sorting them into the institutional mail stack for 

the appeals coordinator’s office. Under CDCR regulations 

governing appeals, the appeals coordinator is responsible for 

reviewing and screening appeals.

7. Based on my experience working in the HDSP ASU, a 

standard program for the Facility D ASU would have been 

approximately 75-80 inmates in D-7 and about the same 

number in D-8 on any given day. In my experience, inmates 

in ASU file many inmate appeals and I have not personally 

gotten any complaints from inmates about lost 602 or 602s 

being “thrown away” by officers, nor have I ever heard of 

this happening. In addition, it would be a serious violation 

of policy and CDCR regulations for an officer to “throw 

away” an inmate’s 602 and the officer could be terminated 

for such action.

8. Plaintiff contends that he submitted an inmate appeal on 

June 16, 2013 and claims it was thrown away. June 16, 

2013 was a Sunday. Sunday mail pick-up in ASU is very 

heavy, due to the fact that mail is not picked up on Friday or 

Saturday. The high volume of mail on Sunday makes it 

even more unlikely that officers would have the time or 

opportunity to go through the mail, locate a specific 602, 

read it and then “throw it away” as alleged by plaintiff. 

(ECF No. 24-3 at 2-3.) 

Defendants’ argument that the procedures for picking up and 

processing ad seg grievances would not have allowed for ad seg 

prison officials to find and destroy plaintiff’s grievance is 

persuasive. However, the procedures described above would not 

have precluded prison officials from interfering with plaintiff’s 

grievances. Accordingly, defendants are not entitled to summary 

judgment on this ground at this time. 

Defendants next argue that further proof that ad seg officers did not 

interfere with plaintiff’s appeals is evident from the CDCR Form 

22. Defendants observe that this form, sent through institutional 

mail, did reach the appeals office. Plaintiff alleges that his staff 

complaint, also sent through institutional mail, did not reach the 

appeals office. Defendants argue that if ad seg officers were 

throwing away plaintiff’s appeals relating to defendants, it stands to 

reason that they would have also thrown away the CDCR Form 22, 

which also mentioned plaintiff’s claims against defendants. The 

undersigned also finds this argument to be persuasive. However, at 

this stage of the proceedings, the undersigned cannot reject 

plaintiff’s claim that prison officials destroyed his grievances

because his CDCR 22 Form reached the appeals office.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment 

because plaintiff’s claims alleging that prison officials destroyed his 

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grievances are too conclusory. Defendants cite Crayton v. 

Hedgpeth, 2011 WL 1988450 at *7 (E.D. Cal. 2011), in support of 

this argument. In the section of Crayton cited by defendants, the 

District Court found that plaintiff’s claims alleging that his 

grievances were lost, stolen and destroyed were “too vague to 

effectively rebut defendants’ claim that plaintiff failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies.” 2011 WL 1988450 at *7. The district 

court went on to state, 

Plaintiff has not provided the court with any evidence that 

suggest his administrative remedies for this claim was 

obstructed. The allegation that some grievances were lost or 

destroyed is not sufficient to support the inference that 

plaintiff's administrative remedies was wrongfully 

obstructed for all of his claims, particularly when there is 

ample evidence that many of plaintiff's grievances were 

recorded and responded to through the director's level of 

review (Todd Decl., Exh. A). Since April 2007, plaintiff has 

filed approximately eighty inmate appeals, a number of 

which he has successfully exhausted (ibid.). Plaintiff has 

also submitted hundreds of pages worth of exhibits to this 

court, including many copies of inmate appeals and 

complaints.

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he inquired about the 

status of the appeals, or attempted to re-file the appeals once 

he received notice that they were screened out. Plaintiff has 

provided no basis to conclude that he made a bona fide 

effort to obtain review of his grievances, and that such 

review was “effectively unavailable.” See Nunez v. Duncan, 

591 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2010). In the absence of 

evidence of improper behavior, this court does not credit 

plaintiff's conclusory allegation that defendants destroyed 

his inmate appeal regarding this claim. Cf. Taylor v. List, 

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding conclusory 

allegations that are unsupported by factual data cannot 

defeat a motion for summary judgment). Accordingly, the 

federal allegations raised in Claims 14 are DISMISSED.

Id. at 7-8.

The instant case is distinguishable from Crayton. First, in Williams 

v. Paramo, supra, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument relied on 

by the district court in Crayton that an inmate’s ability to 

administratively grieve unrelated claims undermines the inmate’s 

claim that he could not administratively exhaust the at-issue claim. 

Second, unlike the plaintiff in Crayton, plaintiff in the instant action 

inquired about the status of his appeals and sought to bring the 

assaults to the attention of prison officials when he submitted the 

March 27, 2013 staff complaint, the April 14, 2013 letter and the 

June 2013 CDCR 22 form. This record demonstrates that plaintiff 

has made more than a bare assertion that prison officials failed to 

process his grievances.

Whether plaintiff submitted grievances in March and June 2013, 

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and whether prison officials destroyed or otherwise thwarted 

plaintiff’s attempt to file these grievances, are disputed factual 

issues. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing to address these issues 

is appropriate. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 

2014) (court shall hold evidentiary hearing to decide disputed 

factual questions relevant to administrative exhaustion). 

(ECF No. 41 at 8-14.)

Evidentiary Hearing

As indicated above, the purpose of the evidentiary hearing was to address the issue of 

whether prison officials thwarted plaintiff’s ability to file administrative grievances regarding his 

claims against defendants. 

Prior to the evidentiary hearing, on October 27, 2015, the parties had a telephonic status 

conference before the undersigned. At this telephonic status conference, the parties agreed that 

plaintiff submitted his first March 2013 grievance on March 17, 2013. 

Thus, plaintiff is claiming that he submitted the following grievances/requests regarding 

the alleged assaults: 1) grievances submitted March 17, 2013 and June 16, 2013; 2) “staff 

complaint,” written on paper, submitted March 27, 2013; 3) April 14, 2013 letter addressed to 

CDCR Director Kathleen Dickinson; 4) June 9, 2013 CDCR 22 Inmate Request for Interview 

Form and June 23, 2013 request for a supervisor to review response to June 9, 2013 request. 

The undersigned herein summarizes the relevant evidence presented at the evidentiary 

hearing. The transcript from this hearing was filed on February 17, 2016. 

Defendants’ Witnesses

HDSP Sergeant Davis testified that on March 17, 2013, plaintiff was housed in Facility D, 

Building 8, which is in the administrative segregation (“ad seg”) unit of HDSP. (Reporter’s 

Transcript (“RT”) at 9.) Sergeant Davis testified regarding the procedures for inmates housed in 

ad seg to submit their inmate appeal 602 forms. Sergeant Davis testified that in the ad seg unit, 

602 grievances are collected nightly, with the mail, Sunday through Thursday by the floor 

officers. (Id. at 10.) The mail is generally collected on Third Watch at about 2115 hours, i.e., 

9:15 p.m., with the count. (Id.) Sergeant Davis testified that during the count, one floor officer 

will count the inmates while another floor officer moves ahead or behind of him collecting the 

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mail, i.e., two floor officers conduct the count/mail pick-up. (Id. at 11.) 

Inmates get their mail, including grievances, to the floor officers by sliding it through a 

space in the cell door near the top. (Id. at 11.) The mail hangs out and the floor officer will walk 

by and collect it. (Id.) After all of the mail is collected, the floor officer takes it to the staff office 

in the Ad Seg Unit (“ASU”) and places it in a large canvas bag. (Id.) The mail bag generally 

stays in the office for 20 to 25 minute minutes. (Id. at 15.) Then, the First Watch officer will take

the bag to the control booth. (Id.) The First Watch control booth officer then screens the mail. 

(Id. at 13.) 

Sergeant Davis testified that if an officer were to intentionally throw away or destroy mail, 

it would be terminable misconduct. (Id. at 13.) Sergeant Davis testified that while he worked as 

a sergeant in the HDSP ad seg unit, he did not have any reports or complaints of officers throwing 

away or mishandling inmate mail or 602s. (Id.) Sergeant Davis also testified that if an inmate 

believed that his mail was being mishandled, he could submit a CDCR form 22 regarding the 

alleged mishandling. (Id. at 14.) A CDCR form 22 requests an interview with prison staff 

regarding a problem. (See Defendants’ Exhibit B.) Sergeant Davis testified that while legal mail 

has to be signed for by the officer who collects the mail, 602s are not signed for. (RT at 16-17.) 

Lacy Lopez, the HDSP Appeals Coordinator, testified that the time limit for submitting 

inmate grievances is 30 calendar days from the event. (Id. at 23.) Ms. Lopez testified that 

normally, the appeals office would not accept anything other than a 602 form to begin the 

grievance process. (Id. at 21.) Ms. Lopez testified that plaintiff’s April 14, 2013 letter addressed 

to CDCR Director Kathleen Dickinson, would not be accepted as sufficient to exhaust 

administrative remedies. (Id. at 21-22.) 

Ms. Lopez testified that if an inmate sent a letter to the appeals office complaining about 

an improper use of force, her office would initiate a use of force investigation. (Id. at 22.) A use 

of force investigation would involve her office contacting the facility where the event occurred. 

(Id.) Next, the facility where the event occurred would conduct a videotaped interview and 

complete a CDCR 3014 form, which are reviewed by the sergeant and associate warden. (Id.)

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Ms. Lopez testified that a use of force investigation is separate from the 602 process. (Id.) 

If an inmate complained about an improper use of force in a 602, her office would send the 

complaint to the hiring authority to determine whether the complaint should be assigned for a 

staff complaint inquiry. (Id. at 23.) 

Ms. Lopez testified that HDSP records indicated that plaintiff had not filed any 602s 

regarding his administrative appeals not being processed or reviewed. (Id. at 45.) Ms. Lopez 

testified that if an inmate submitted an appeal he believed was not being responded to, he would 

be encouraged to submit a CDCR Form 22 to the appeals coordinator. (Id. at 43.) Ms. Lopez 

testified that her office has received CDCR Forms 22s from inmates “once or twice” complaining 

that their grievances were not being processed. (Id. at 44.) In response, someone from her office 

would go out and talk to the inmate or else give them another 602 to fill out. (Id.) Ms. Lopez 

said that her office would accept as timely the 602 from the inmate who had filed the CDCR 

Form 22 alleging that his prior 602 was not responded to, even if the later 602 was not filed 

within the time set forth by the regulations. (Id. at 45.) 

Ms. Lopez also testified that she had no knowledge of plaintiff’s April 14, 2013 letter 

addressed to Kathleen Dickinson. (Id. at 50.) This letter states, in part, that plaintiff filed 

grievances regarding his claims against defendants but he does not know if they made it to the 

appeals coordinator. (ECF No. 27 at 12.) Ms. Lopez testified that if she had received this letter, 

she would probably have brought plaintiff another 602, had him fill it out, then brought it back to 

process. (RT at 50.) She testified that a grievance filed by plaintiff raising his claims against 

defendants under these circumstances would probably have been treated as timely. (Id. at 51.) 

HDSP Appeals Analyst Bolls testified that she responded to the CDCR 22 form submitted 

by plaintiff on June 9, 2013. (Id. at 57.) She testified that that the form alleged assault and 

battery, so she pulled up “our IATS system” and saw that no appeal regarding these allegations 

had been received. (Id.) In response, she provided plaintiff with a blank 602. (Id. at 58.) A copy 

of this form submitted by plaintiff on June 9, 2013, and responded to be defendant Bolls on June 

11, 2013 was admitted into evidence as defendants’ exhibit B. As discussed above, the CDCR 

form 22 contains a section for inmates to request a review by a supervisor of the first response by 

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prison staff. (See Defendants’ Exhibit B.) Defendants’ Exhibit B contains no request by plaintiff 

for a supervisor to review the response by defendant Bolls. (Id.) In other words, this section is 

empty.

As discussed above, in support of his opposition, plaintiff submitted the CDCR 22 form 

containing defendant Bolls’ response. (ECF No. 27 at 15.) Unlike the form submitted by 

defendants, this form contains a request by plaintiff for a review by a supervisor, dated June 23, 

2013. (Id.) Ms. Bolls testified that prior to the evidentiary hearing, she searched her files for this 

CDCR form 22 with the section requesting a review by a supervisor completed. (RT at 59.) Ms. 

Bolls could not find this form. (Id.) Ms. Bolls testified that the absence of such a form in the 

prison records indicates that plaintiff did not submit a form containing a request for review by a 

supervisor. (Id.)

Defendants then called as witnesses the two floor officers working the Third Shift in the 

ad seg unit of Facility D8 on March 17, 2013, i.e., Sergeant Hastey and Officer Antram. As 

testified to by Sergeant Davis, these two floor officers conducted the count and collected the mail

on that date. 

Sergeant Hastey testified that on March 17, 2013, he worked as a floor officer in the ad 

seg unit of Facility D8 at HDSP on third watch. (Id. at 66-68.) As a floor officer, his duties 

included picking up the mail from inmates. (Id. at 66.) The inmates would stick the mail through 

a slot in their door. (Id.) Sergeant Hastey testified that he would put the mail in a mailbag as he 

collected it. (Id.) Sergeant Hastey had no recollection of the events of March 17, 2013. (Id. at 

67.) 

Sergeant Hastey testified that as a floor officer, his duties did not include sorting, 

screening or searching the mail. (Id. at 69.) Sergeant Hastey testified that he ordinarily did not 

have time to read or look at the mail that he picked up from inmates. (Id.) After the mail was 

collected and put in the mailbag, he would give it to the control booth officer. (Id.) Sergeant 

Hastey testified that when he worked in the HDSP ad seg unit as a floor officer, he did not 

interfere with any inmate 602s. (Id.) He testified that he did not throw away or destroy any 602s 

belonging to plaintiff. (Id. at 69-70.) He testified that if he had thrown away or destroyed an 

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inmate’s 602, he could have been disciplined or terminated. (Id. at 70.) 

Sergeant Hastey testified that because March 17, 2013 was a Sunday, there would have 

been a lot of mail being picked up. (Id. at 72-73.) He also testified that inmate 602s were 

somewhat noticeable, if they were not put in a separate envelope, because they were on a green 

form. (Id. at 73.) 

Correctional Officer Antram testified that he was the other floor officer on March 17, 

2013, in the ad seg unit of Facility D8 at HDSP. (Id. at 75.) Officer Antram testified that when 

he collected the mail, he picked it up and put it in the mailbag. (Id. at 77.) Officer Antram 

testified that when he picked up the inmate mail, he did not ever specifically look for inmate 

602s. (Id. at 77-78.) Officer Antram testified that it was the job of the First Watch Control Booth 

Officer to screen the mail. (Id. at 78.) Officer Antram testified that he had not ever interfered 

with or destroyed or otherwise thrown away any 602 forms. (Id.) Officer Antram testified that if 

he had engaged in this conduct, he would most likely be fired. (Id.) 

Officer Antram testified that he had probably worked with defendant Darst, sitting with 

counsel at the defense table during the evidentiary hearing, during his (Antram’s) 13 years of 

employment with CDCR. (Id. at 80.) He testified that he had most likely worked with defendant 

Darst in ad seg, but he could not remember. (Id. at 81.) Officer Antram also testified that he

could not recall plaintiff. (Id.) 

Officer Jones testified that on March 18, 2013, he worked as the Control Booth Officer on 

the First Watch in D8 at HDSP. (Id. at 83.) He testified that his duties included going through 

the mail bag to separate the different kinds of mail, including legal mail, 602s and requests for 

interviews. (Id. at 84.) Officer Jones would put the mail into separate piles. (Id.) Officer Jones 

would skim the letters to determine if they contained possible threats to the institution or 

referenced escapes or gang related stuff. (Id. at 84-85.) He testified that he did not review the 

602s “much,” because the inmates were not going to write about escapes, etc. in their grievances. 

(Id. at 85.) Officer Jones testified that he did not ever interfere with or throw away any inmate 

602s. (Id. at 86.) He also testified that he did not hear about First Watch Control Officers 

interfering with inmate grievances. (Id.) He also testified that no correctional officer had ever 

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asked him to throw out a 602. (Id.) Officer Jones testified that it was not his duty to review the 

602s to see if they complied with rules and regulations. (Id. at 87.) 

Officer Jones testified that he did not recall working with defendant Darst in the D unit at 

HDSP. (Id. at 88.) Officer Jones testified that defendant Darst did not look familiar to him. (Id.) 

Officer Jones testified that he could not recall there ever being a situation where he came 

in as the First Watch Control Booth Officer and found mail that had been misplaced by a previous 

shift or that should have gone out. (Id. at 90-91.) 

Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff testified that on March 17, 2013, he put his 602 containing his claims against 

defendants in an unsealed u-save-em envelope. (Id. at 96.) Plaintiff slid the envelope out of the 

slide of the door for mail pickup, and it was later picked up. (Id.) After receiving no reply to this 

grievance, he submitted another grievance on March 27, 2013. (Id. at 96-97.) Plaintiff received 

no response to this grievance. (Id. at 97.) On April 14, 2013, plaintiff wrote the letter to CDCR 

Director, Kathleen Dickinson. (Id.) On April 29, 2013, plaintiff was videotaped as part of the

use of force investigation, initiated as a result of his April 14, 2013 letter. (Id.) 

Plaintiff testified that on May 3, 2013, defendant Romero said to plaintiff, “I thought 

better of you.” (Id. at 98.) Defendant Romero then pointed to his shirt collar to show that he now 

had sergeant stripes. (Id.) He then said to plaintiff, “This is what they do to guys like me, they 

promote me.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff testified that on June 9, 2013, he submitted his CDCR 22 form stating that he had 

not received a response to his grievance against defendants. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that Ms. Bolls 

responded by giving him a 602 form, but no one came to see him. (Id. at 99.) Plaintiff testified 

that on June 16, 2013, he submitted another 602 via institutional mail. (Id.) After receiving no 

response to this grievance, on June 23, 2013, he testified that he submitted a request for a 

supervisor to review Ms. Boll’s response to his CDCR 22 form. (Id.) 

When asked why he waited until March 17, 2013, to submit his grievance regarding the 

alleged incidents involving defendants on March 6 and 7, 2013, plaintiff testified that he waited 

because he was trying to be sneaky. (Id. at 104.) Plaintiff testified that both defendants were 

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stationed “right there,” so he had to wait until he thought it was “safe enough for me to do so and 

there wouldn’t be any further retaliation...” (Id. at 105.) Plaintiff testified that he did not keep a 

copy of his March 17, 2013 grievance because he was afraid that if he asked for a copy of it to be 

made, the officer making the copy would tell defendants. (Id. at 106.) Plaintiff admitted that if 

he filed a staff complaint or a 602, the defendants would be made aware of it. (Id.) Plaintiff 

testified that by that time, the “higher ups” in the prison would know about his claims. (Id. at 

107.)

Plaintiff’s testified that he knew that he submitted his grievance on March 17, 2013 

because he kept a calendar, and that date had a circle around it and the notation “602.” (Id. at 

107) A copy of this calendar, which is for the year 2013, was admitted into evidence. As noted 

by the undersigned at the evidentiary hearing, the months of January and February contain no 

notations. Every day in March is circled, except for March 1-4. Every day in April is circled. 

May 1-9 are circled, with the notation “602” next to May 8. May10-17 contain “x’s” through 

them, and the remainder of the dates in May contain slashes through them, with May 22 also 

being circled. June 1-3 contain slashes, and June 5 is circled. The rest of June contains no 

notations, as do the rest of the months except for August 21, which is circled. 

Plaintiff testified that the circled dates had no significance. (RT at 108-09.) Plaintiff 

testified that on March 17, 2013 he wrote “602” next to that date, i.e., the same date he claims he 

submitted the grievance. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that the slashes and x’s also had no significance. 

(Id. at 110.) 

Plaintiff admitted that he filed other 602s while in ad seg regarding “disciplinary, living 

conditions, legal, canteen,” and these grievances got through. (Id. at 114.) Plaintiff speculated 

that these grievances were processed because they did not involve particular officers. (Id.) 

Plaintiff speculated that the reason prison officials had no record of his June 23, 2013 

Form 22 requesting a supervisor’s review is that it “never made it.” (Id. at 119.) Regarding the 

second 602 he allegedly submitted in June 2013, plaintiff speculated that it was never responded 

to because, “[i]n my mind, you know, I’m already dealing with the conspiracy.” (Id. at 120.) 

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Plaintiff admitted that his calendar contained no notation indicating that he submitted a 

602 in June 2013. (Id. at 121.) Plaintiff also admitted that he did not keep a copy of this 602. 

(Id. at 125.) 

Discussion

For the following reasons, the undersigned finds that the evidence and testimony 

presented by defendants met their burden of demonstrating that plaintiff failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies. Through his testimony and evidence, plaintiff did not meet his burden 

of demonstrating that administrative remedies were not available to him.

At the outset, based on Appeal Coordinator Lopez’s testimony, the undersigned finds that 

plaintiff’s March 27, 2013 “staff complaint” would not have exhausted administrative remedies 

because it was not prepared on a 602 form. This handwritten document was prepared on a sheet 

of paper. Also based on Appeal Coordinator Lopez’s testimony, the undersigned finds that 

plaintiff’s April 14, 2013 letter addressed to CDCR Director Kathleen Dickinson would not have 

exhausted administrative remedies as it was not prepared on a 602 form. While this letter caused 

a use of force investigation to be initiated, a use of force investigation does not satisfy the 

administrative exhaustion requirement of the PLRA. Panaro v. City of North Las Vegas, 432 

F.3d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 2005). 

For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned finds that plaintiff’s testimony that he 

mailed grievances on March 17, 2013, and June 16, 2013, is not credible.

At the evidentiary hearing, defendants presented credible evidence refuting plaintiff’s 

claim that he filed a grievance on March 17, 2013, regarding the alleged assaults. The three 

officers responsible for processing the mail on March 17, 2013, including inmate grievances, i.e., 

Officers Hastey, Officer Angram and Officer Jones, persuasively and credibly testified that they 

did not tamper with any grievance filed by plaintiff on that date. Defendants also presented 

evidence in support of their summary judgment demonstrating that prison officials have no record 

of any grievance filed by plaintiff regarding the alleged assaults. (See ECF No. 24-14 

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(declaration by HDSP Appeals Coordinator Clark). This evidence and testimony indicates that 

plaintiff did not file any grievance on March 17, 2013.

2

 

Plaintiff’s failure to present any documentary evidence of the March 17, 2013, and June 

16, 2013 grievances also undermines his claim that he filed a grievance on those dates. While 

plaintiff had copies of the March 27, 2013 staff complaint, the April 13, 2013 letter addressed to 

CDCR Director Kathleen Dickinson, and his June 2013 CDCR Form 22, he had no copies of 

either the March 17, 2013 or June 16, 2013 grievances. Under these circumstances, plaintiff’s 

failure to keep copies of these grievances undermines the credibility of his testimony that he 

actually submitted them to prison officials. The undersigned is not persuaded by plaintiff’s 

testimony that he did not ask for a copy to be made of the March 17, 2013 grievance because he 

was afraid the officer making the copy would tell defendants about the grievance.

The undersigned also finds that plaintiff’s calendar, admitted into evidence at the 

evidentiary hearing, is not credible evidence regarding his mailing of the grievances. This 

calendar contains the notation “602” next to March 17, 2013. However, this calendar contains no 

notations reflecting the filing of the June 16, 2013 grievance or any of the other documents 

plaintiff allegedly submitted to prison officials regarding the incident involving defendants, such 

as the March 27, 2013 staff complaint. These circumstances undermine the credibility of 

plaintiff’s claim that he recorded the mailing of the March 17, 2013 grievance on March 17, 2013. 

In addition, defendants submitted evidence in support of their summary judgment motion 

that plaintiff submitted seven grievances in 2013 that were accepted for review and nine 

grievances that were screened out, i.e., not accepted for review. (ECF No. 24-14 at 5-6.) 

Plaintiff’s 2013 calendar contains the notation “602” next to only two dates, i.e., March 17, 2013,

and May 8, 2013. Plaintiff’s failure to note on his calendar the other fourteen grievances he 

submitted in 2013 further undermines the credibility of his testimony that he mailed the March 

 

2

 The undersigned acknowledges that affirmative actions by prison officials that prevent 

exhaustion, “even if done innocently,” are grounds for excusing compliance with the exhaustion 

requirement. Albino v. Baca, 697 F.3d 1012, 1034 (9th Cir. 2010). In the instant case, the 

undersigned finds that there is no evidence that plaintiff filed a grievance on March 17, 2013. 

The undersigned does not find that plaintiff mailed the grievance on March 17, 2013, and it was 

not processed due to “innocent” mishandling. 

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17, 2013 grievance on March 17, 2013. Instead, the record suggests that plaintiff added the “602” 

notation to this date well after the March 17, 2013, perhaps in anticipation of the instant litigation.

As discussed in the July 20, 2015 order, plaintiff submitted documents referencing the 

March 17, 2013, and June 16, 2013 grievances he allegedly filed regarding the incident involving 

defendants, i.e., the March 27, 2013 staff complaint, the April 4, 2013 letter to Kathleen 

Dickinson and June 2013 CDCR 22 form. Considering these documents in the light of the entire 

record, including the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the undersigned finds that 

these documents are not persuasive evidence that plaintiff filed the grievances alleged.

Plaintiff’s staff complaint, filed March 27, 2013, contains the following statement at the 

bottom: “I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and sent to the 

Appeals Coordinator Office at High Desert State Prison for Processing Written on a CDCR 

602/CDCR 602 A.” (ECF No. 27 at 10.) Plaintiff claims that this statement is in reference to the 

grievance submitted on March 17, 2013. The undersigned finds that the interpretation of this 

statement by plaintiff is not supported by the record. Instead, the undersigned finds that although 

this statement references a 602, it is clearly intended as a proof of service of the March 27, 2013 

staff complaint on the Appeals Coordinator. This interpretation is supported by the fact that this 

document does not specifically mention the grievance allegedly filed by plaintiff ten days earlier 

on March 17, 2013. For these reasons, the undersigned finds that the March 27, 2013 staff 

complaint is not evidence that plaintiff filed a grievance on March 17, 2013. 

Plaintiff’s June 9, 2013 CDCR 22 form states that, “During the month of March 2013 I 

submitted a staff complaint on the assault and battery...” (ECF No. 27 at 15.) Plaintiff goes on 

to write, “If you haven’t received my complaint, then ad seg officers are throwing away my 

602s...” (Id.) It now appears that plaintiff’s June 9, 2013 CDCR 22 form refers to the staff 

complaint submitted by plaintiff on March 27, 2013, as the CDCR 22 form specifically references 

a “staff complaint.” Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the June 9, 2013 CDCR form is not 

evidence of plaintiff’s administrative grievance allegedly filed on March 17, 2013.

The April 14, 2013 letter to CDCR Director Kathleen Dickinson states, “I have filed 

complaints (602) stipulating to the facts herein but don’t know if my complaints even made it to 

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the appeals coordinator office. An investigation is needed.” (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff argues that this 

statement is meant to reference the grievance he filed on March 17, 2013. For the reasons 

discussed herein, the undersigned finds that this statement is neither sufficient nor credible 

evidence that plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the alleged assaults on March 17, 2013. 

The April 14, 2013 letter states that plaintiff filed “complaints (602)” regarding the 

alleged assaults but he had “no idea” whether these grievances made it to the Appeals 

Coordinator’s Office. However, this letter does not identify the dates plaintiff allegedly filed 

these grievances. In addition, if plaintiff filed a grievance on March 17, 2013, prison officials had 

thirty working days to respond to the grievance. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.8(c)(1). 

Thirty working days had not passed from March 17, 2013 when he submitted his April 14, 2013 

letter to Kathleen Dickinson. These circumstances suggest that the statement in the April 17, 

2013 letter that plaintiff does know whether his grievances made it to the Appeals Coordinators 

Office did not apply to any grievance filed by plaintiff on March 17, 2013.

Other than plaintiff’s testimony, the April 14, 2013 letter is the only possible reference in 

the record to the grievance plaintiff claims he filed on March 17, 2013. Because of the strong 

evidence presented by defendants indicating that plaintiff did not file a grievance on that date, and 

the lack of any other evidence submitted by plaintiff supporting his claim that he filed a grievance 

on that date, the undersigned finds that the April 14, 2013 letter is not sufficient to meet plaintiff’s 

burden of demonstrating that he filed a grievance on March 17, 2013. 

The record also suggests that plaintiff’s claim that he filed a grievance on June 16, 2013,

is not credible. The only evidence supporting this claim, other than plaintiff’s testimony, is his 

statement in the Request for Supervisor Review section of the CDCR Request for Interview form. 

However, as discussed above, the record suggests that plaintiff did not submit this request, as 

alleged and may have completed this section of the form in anticipation of the instant litigation. 

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that defendants have 

met their burden of demonstrating that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating that administrative remedies were not available 

to him, as he alleges. 

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ motion to strike (ECF No. 61) 

is granted; and

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ summary judgment motion (ECF 

No. 24) be granted. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: May 2, 2016

Cato959.evi

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