Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01801/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01801-44/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GEORGE N. ALLEN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

AUDREY KING and JACK 

CARTER, 

Defendants.

Case No. 1:06-cv-01801-BLW-LMB 

(lead case) 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

ORDER

WAYNE P. DEBERRY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

AUDREY KING and DAVID 

LANDRUM, 

Defendants. 

Case No. 1:07-cv-00850-BLW 

(consolidated case)

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2 

JACKIE ROBINSON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

STEPHEN MAYBERG, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 1:08-cv-01339-BLW-LMB 

(consolidated case)

DARRYELL FRAZIER, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

STEPHEN MAYBERG and PAM 

AHLIN, 

Defendants.

Case No. 1:09-cv-02153-BLW 

(consolidated case)

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3 

INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiffs, who are statutorily designated sexually violent predators (“SVPs”) are 

proceeding pro se in this action. Multiple motions are pending before the Court (Dkts. 

217, 226–229, 232, 243), but primarily at issue here is whether Defendants’ restriction of 

Plaintiffs’ electronic devices constitutes an unconstitutional condition of confinement. 

Pursuant to Local Rule 230(l), all motions shall be submitted on the record without oral 

argument. 

BACKGROUND 

Beginning in 2006, several SVPs at the Department of State Hospitals-Coalinga 

(“DSH-C”), including Plaintiffs Allen, DeBerry, Frazier, and Robinson, filed complaints 

in federal court alleging various conditions of confinement claims. Related cases were 

consolidated and the parties participated in a triage conference as to some of Plaintiffs’ 

claims, including the claims at issue here. Those claims came to be known as Plaintiffs’ 

“computer claims.” Generally, Plaintiffs allege that the confiscation and restriction of 

possession of their electronic devices violates their constitutional rights. With regard to 

the computer claims, the relevant facts are not materially in dispute. 

 Plaintiffs Allen, Frazier, DeBerry, and Robinson are patients at DSH-C and are 

confined there pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”). Def.’s Reply to 

Pl.s’ Resp. to Def.’s Undisputed Material Facts (hereinafter “UMF”); ¶ 4, Dkt. 240. In 

late July of 2006, DSH-C patients were—for the first time—allowed to own and possess 

their own laptop computers through a test program provided by Administrative Directive 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4 

(“AD”) 654. UMF, ¶ 5. AD 654 also prohibited devices or equipment that enabled private 

communications with others; as well as games, movies, or electronic images that depicted 

overt sexual acts or violence with adults and children. Id., ¶ 6. Finally, AD 654 also 

expressly reserved the administration’s right to prohibit items deemed to be a safety or 

security threat. Id., ¶ 7. 

 Following the implementation of this test program, numerous safety and security 

violations were discovered, including: patients’ widespread distribution of pornographic 

material, including child pornography; audio recordings of staff and patient conversations 

within the hospital; widespread distribution and sharing of data encryption software; 

widespread distribution and sharing of data concealing software; and computerized street 

map and atlas software. Id., ¶ 8. According to the Plaintiffs, it was hospital staff that sold 

the illicit devices to patients at a premium. Id. Eventually, a risk assessment was 

conducted at DSH-C. The results indicated that patients’ continued use of their existing 

wireless-capable devises put the facility at risk of patients gaining internet access, and 

gaining home and business network access. Id., ¶ 9. 

 Only seven months after AD 654 was implemented, on February 28, 2007, a highrate of security risks and incidents forced a moratorium on the patient-owned computer 

policy. Id., ¶ 10. Over two years later, on October 26, 2009, Regulation 4350—a 

statewide emergency regulation—was issued. Id., ¶ 11. See Cal. Code of Reg., Title 9, § 

4350. Codified in the California Code of Regulations, Regulation 4350 prohibits patients 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5 

at all of DSH’s facilities from possessing devices with wired or wireless internet 

connectivity capabilities. Id. It reads in relevant part: 

Contraband Electronic Devices with Communication and Internet 

Capabilities. 

Electronic devices with the capability to connect to a wired (for example, 

Ethernet, Plain Old Telephone Servce (POTS), Fiber Optic) and/or a 

wireless (for example, Bluetooth, Cellular, Wi-Fi [], WiMAX) 

communications network to send and/or receive information are prohibited, 

including devices without native capabilities that can be modified for 

network communication. . . . Some examples of prohibited devices include 

desktop computers, laptop computers, cellular phones, electronic gaming 

devices, personal digital assistant (PDA), graphing calculators, and radios 

(satellite, shortwave, CB and GPS). 

9 CCR § 4350. 

 In February of 2010, DSH patients were notified of the anticipated implementation 

of Regulation 4350 and were asked to store, mail, or dispose of any prohibited items in 

order to become compliant. Id., ¶ 12. Some DSH-C patients who owned laptops prior to 

the moratorium were allowed to continue to use their devices, pending the outcome of 

this litigation. Id., ¶ 14. Of the approximately 920 patients at DSH-C committed under 

the SVPA, there are approximately 60–70 patient-owned computers at DSH-C. Id., ¶ 15. 

However, as will be discussed more below, DSH-C provides hospital-owned computers 

and word processing equipment for patient use for legal work, treatment, and other needs. 

Id., ¶ 19. 

 Even with the current moratorium on devices, at least 200 individuals at DSH-C 

have been involved with the possession or transmission of child pornography. Id., ¶ 22. 

And even with the present ban, and with the hospital IT department’s preventative 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6 

measures to restrict internet access on patient-owned devices, there are nonetheless still 

typically 2–3 new child pornography cases reported each month involving Coalinga 

patients and which require investigation. Id., ¶ 24. Sergeant Jerry DuVall is currently the 

only qualified examiner on staff in the DSH-C Department of Police Services who has 

the training and qualifications to conduct computer-crime investigations. Id., ¶ 21. His 

investigations are necessarily time-intensive, as he must conduct forensic examinations of 

cell phones, memory cards, hard drives, and laptops. Id., ¶ 27. In examinations with 

multiple devices, Sgt. DuVall’s investigation may take months. Id., ¶ 32. In addition to 

investigations involving child pornography, Sgt. DuVall also has investigations 

involving: aerial photographs of DSH-C; local maps; partially created identifications 

cards; photographs and videos of staff and other patients; recordings of conversations 

with staff and patients; access to websites where child profiles are sought; searches for 

staff information on social media sites; use of phone call anonymizers to block caller ID; 

emails and texts to arrange narcotics trafficking; coordination of other contraband into the 

hospital; and prohibited contact with children via video chat, voice chat, or phone calls. 

Id., ¶ 33. 

 Plaintiffs have alleged that Regulation 4350 is unconstitutionally punitive in 

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court originally dismissed Plaintiffs’ 

computer claims for failure to state a claim, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that 

Plaintiffs “stated a plausible condition of confinement claim” but noted that “[i]t may 

well be that the defendants can provide reasonable justifications for Section 4350’s ban 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7 

on the relevant devices.” Dkt. 228, p. 40. Primarily before the Court is Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs DeBerry, Frazier, and Robinson, and their 

motion for partial summary judgment as to Allen. In addition, the Court will resolve the 

other pending motions, as discussed below. 

ANALYSIS 

1. Jackie Robinson’s Motion to File an Amended Complaint (Dkt. 243) 

 Robinson has previously amended his complaint three times. See Dkts. 1, 6, 10, 

and 35 in Case No. 1:08-cv-1339. His operative complaint is at Docket 35, titled Third 

Amended Complaint in his now-closed member case (Case No. 1:08-cv-1339). 

Defendants answered Robinson’s Third Amended Complaint on September 12, 2014, at 

docket number 196 in the lead case. Robinson now seeks to file a Fourth Amended 

Complaint. His proposed Fourth Amended Complaint primarily expands on his existing 

condition of confinement claim that DSH-C’s computer policies are excessively 

restrictive. But he also seeks to propound a new claim not currently before the Court: that 

DSH-C has violated his First Amendment Rights “to communicate with others, to create 

information and speech, [and] to receive [and] send information.” Dkt. 244, p. 7. For the 

reasons discussed below, the Court will deny Robinson’s motion. 

“The district court is given broad discretion in supervising the pretrial phase of 

litigation, and its decisions regarding the preclusive effect of a pretrial order . . . will not 

be disturbed unless they evidence a clear abuse of discretion.” Johnson v. Mammoth 

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir.1992) (citation and internal quotation marks 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8 

omitted). “Courts are free to grant a party leave to amend whenever ‘justice so requires,’ 

. . . and requests for leave are generally granted with ‘extreme liberality.’” Moss v. United 

States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Owens v. Kaiser 

Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir.2001)).1

 However, liberality in 

granting a plaintiff leave to amend “is subject to the qualification that the amendment not 

cause undue prejudice to the defendant, is not sought in bad faith, and is not futile.” 

Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789, 799 (9th Cir.2001) (citation 

omitted). 

Here, the Court finds that Robinson’s proposed amended complaint would cause 

undue prejudice to the Defendants and would be futile. With regard to his First 

Amendment claim, the Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court’s dismissal of that claim and 

remanded only the substantive due process claim. Dkt. 188. As Defendants note, 

 

1

 Conversely, when a motion to amend is filed after the deadline to amend in a court’s scheduling 

order, the standard is different. In general, the pretrial scheduling order can only be modified “upon a 

showing of good cause.” Id. at 608 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)). The pretrial schedule may be modified 

“if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Id. at 609. If the 

party seeking the modification “was not diligent, the inquiry should end” and the motion to modify should 

not be granted. Id. On December 15, 2014, the Court entered a Scheduling Order governing the computer 

claims of Plaintiffs Allen, DeBerry, Robinson, and Frazier. See Dkt. 201. While that Scheduling Order 

did not provide a deadline to amend complaints, it did provide deadlines for the remainder of this 

litigation. Because the Scheduling Order could have been more specific, the Court will apply the more 

liberal amendment standard under Rule 15(a) versus the “good cause” standard under Rule 16(b). But 

regardless, Robinson has not met either standard. 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9 

Robinson may not now try to revive an already-dismissed claim by seeking to amend his 

complaint yet again. 

With regard to the clarifications Robinson wishes to make to his existing condition 

of confinement claim, the Court finds that allowing this amendment would significantly 

prejudice the Defendants and would delay the resolution of this lawsuit. Defendants 

answered Robinson’s Third Amended Complaint on September 12, 2014, at docket 196 

in the lead case. Prior to that, Robinson had ample time to amend his complaint and did 

so successfully three times. Robinson has not pointed to any newly discovered 

information that would compel the Court to allow this amendment. Accordingly, the 

Court will deny Robinson’s Motion to Amend (Dkt. 243). 

2. Allen and DeBerry’s Motion to Compel (Dkt. 217)

In their Motion to Compel, Plaintiffs Allen and DeBerry ask this Court to order 

Defendants to supply responses to their interrogatories and requests for production. Dkt. 

217. Defendants served their answers to interrogatories and a response to the request for 

production of documents on or about the April 13, 2015 deadline. Defendants intended to 

supplement their responses, but before they did so, Plaintiffs filed the Motion to Compel 

on May 14, 2015. Dkt. 217. On May 27, 2015, Defendants served their supplemental 

response. Dkt. 220, p. 3. Within their supplemental response, Defendants produced 

documents responsive to 12 of the 25 requests, provided substantive answers to 18 of the 

25 interrogatories, and also noted when there were no responsive documents in existence. 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10 

As Defendants explained in their response brief, Plaintiffs took issue only with the 

Defendants original responses, not their supplemental response and document production. 

Plaintiffs did not file a reply brief and therefore do not apparently object to Defendants’ 

supplemental responses and document production. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ Motion to 

Compel (Dkt. 17) will be denied as moot. 

3. Robinson’s Motion for Extension of Time and Request for Counsel (Dkt. 232) 

Three days after the response deadline following Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment had passed, Robinson untimely filed a motion for extension of time 

and request for counsel. Robinson requests counsel based on the complexity of this 

lawsuit and argues that without counsel, he will be unable to articulate his arguments. 

Various plaintiffs involved in this litigation have requested counsel in the past. 

Most recently, the Court denied Plaintiff Vasquez’s request for “amicus curiae or class 

counsel.” Dkt. 170. Within that order, the Court noted that it “has made it clear in past 

orders that, even though Court staff are attempting to find new pro bono counsel for 

Plaintiffs, that may not be possible, and all pro se parties must continue representation of 

themselves pro se during the pendency of this case.” Dkt. 170, p. 19. To the extent 

Robinson’s current motion can be construed as a motion for reconsideration of the 

Court’s previous orders regarding appointment of counsel, it must be denied. 

Reconsideration of a court’s prior ruling under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

59(e) is appropriate “if (1) the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, 

(2) the district court committed clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 11 

unjust, or (3) there is an intervening change in controlling law.” S.E.C. v. Platforms 

Wireless Int'l Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1100 (9th Cir.2010) (citation omitted). If the motion 

to reconsider does not fall within one of these three categories, it must be denied. 

Robinson has not met this standard. He has not pointed to any new factual 

information or any intervening change in the controlling law. Nor is the Court persuaded 

that it committed any error in denying requests for counsel earlier in this case. 

While Robinson does not indicate that he is indigent, he should nonetheless be 

aware that the federal courts have no authority to require attorneys to represent indigent 

litigants in civil cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the 

Southern Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 396, 298 (1989). Rather, when a court “appoints” an 

attorney, it can only do so if the attorney voluntarily accepts the assignment. Id. The 

Court has no funds to pay for attorney fees in civil matters, such as this one. 

Unlike criminal defendants, prisoners and indigents in civil actions have no 

constitutional right to counsel unless their physical liberty is at stake. Lassiter v. Dept. of 

Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). In civil cases, 

counsel should be appointed only in “extraordinary cases.” Id. at 1330. To determine 

whether extraordinary circumstances exist, the court should evaluate two factors: (1) the 

likelihood of success on the merits of the case, and (2) the ability of the plaintiff to 

articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of legal issues involved. Agyeman v. 

Corrections Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12 

Neither factor is dispositive, and both must be evaluated together. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 

F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir.1990). 

Here, as will be discussed below, the likelihood of success on the merits of 

Robinson’s computer claim is nonexistent. Moreover, Robinson has repeatedly 

demonstrated that he is more than capable of articulating his position. His lawsuit has 

been pending for eight years; at this point, Robinson has more experience in federal court 

than many attorneys. While this case presents something of a procedural quagmire, the 

complexity of Robinson’s remaining claim is not particularly high. As such, the Court 

will deny Robinson’s motion (Dkt. 232). 

4. Allen’s Motion to Strike (Dkt. 229)

Allen moves to strike the filing submitted by Defendants on July 10, 2015 at 

Docket No. 226. Dkt. 229. This filing was a request from defense counsel Jesse Rivera to 

file an over-length brief. Allen submits that Mr. Rivera has “never submitted any 

[c]orrespondence, pleadings and filings in regards to [his] claims” and that he has 

“always dealt with the California State Attorney General Office.” In response, 

Defendants point out that Mr. Rivera has “been engaged as an active litigator for the 

defense in this consolidated matter since 2010, including appearing at the triage 

conference in this Court, and in the 9th Circuit arguments.” Dkt. 231, p. 4. The Court will 

deny Allen’s motion to strike (Dkt. 229) as it appears that there is no basis in fact or in 

law to hold otherwise. The Court will also grant Defendants’ motion to file an overlength brief (Dkt. 226). 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13 

5. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (DeBerry, Frazier, Robinson 

Cases) and Partial Summary Judgment (Allen Case) (Dkt. 227, 228)2

In 2012, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ computer claims, finding that Plaintiffs 

had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Dkt. 102, p. 23. Plaintiffs 

appealed and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Plaintiffs “alleged sufficient facts to 

plausibly claim that Section 4350 is punitive.” Allen v. Mayberg, 577 F. App'x 728, 732 

(9th Cir.2014). The Ninth Circuit noted, however, that “[i]t may well be that the 

defendants can provide reasonable justification for Section 4350’s ban on relevant 

devices.” Id. 

A. Legal Standards

(1) Summary Judgment 

Summary judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to any claim or 

defense, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). One of the principal purposes of the 

summary judgment “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims . . . .” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). It is “not a disfavored procedural 

shortcut,” but is instead the “principal tool[ ] by which factually insufficient claims or 

defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant 

 

2

 Defendants originally filed their motion for summary judgment at Docket No. 227, with an 

accompanying memorandum (Dkt. 227-1), statement of facts (Dkt. 227-2), and various declarations and 

attachments (Dkt. 227-3–227-9). Thereafter, they filed an amended memorandum in support of their 

motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 228). This was filed as an amended motion but in reality is simply an 

amended memorandum. Accordingly, the Court will consider Docket Nos. 227 and 228 together. 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 14 

unwarranted consumption of public and private resources.” Id. at 327. “[T]he mere 

existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise 

properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). There must be a genuine dispute as to any material fact—a fact 

“that may affect the outcome of the case.” Id. at 248. 

 The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 

and the Court must not make credibility findings. Id. at 255. Direct testimony of the 

non-movant must be believed, however implausible. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 

1152, 1159 (9th Cir.1999). On the other hand, the Court is not required to adopt 

unreasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence. McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 

1205, 1208 (9th Cir.1988). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a 

genuine dispute as to material fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th 

Cir.2001)(en banc). To carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce any 

affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or deposition excerpts) but may simply point out 

the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Fairbank v. Wunderman 

Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir.2000). 

This shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce evidence sufficient to 

support a jury verdict in her favor. Deveraux, 263 F.3d at 1076. The non-moving party 

must go beyond the pleadings and show “by her [ ] affidavits, or by the depositions, 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15 

answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file” that a genuine dispute of material fact 

exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 

 However, the Court is “not required to comb through the record to find some 

reason to deny a motion for summary judgment.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. 

Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir.2001) (quotation omitted). Instead, the “party 

opposing summary judgment must direct [the Court’s] attention to specific triable facts.” 

Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.2003). 

(2) Conditions of Detention 

To determine whether conditions of confinement of civilly committed individuals 

violate the constitution, courts look to the substantive due process clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982); Jones v. 

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931–32 (9th Cir.2004). Civilly committed persons have a 

substantive due process right to be free from restrictions that amount to punishment. 

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746–47 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 

535 (1979). “There is no constitutional infringement, however, if restrictions are but an 

incident of some other legitimate government purpose.” Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 

1039, 1045 (9th Cir.2002) (internal citations omitted). 

In order to be permissible, restrictions must (1) have a legitimate, non-punitive 

purpose and (2) not appear excessive in relation to that purpose. Bell, 441 U.S. at 538–39. 

Due process requires that civil detainees’ conditions of confinement bear some 

reasonable relationship to the purpose for which they are committed. Seling v. Young, 531 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 16 

U.S. 250, 265 (2001). Examples of legitimate, non-punitive government interests include 

ensuring a detainee’s presence at trial, maintaining jail security, and effective 

management of a detention facility. Jones, 393 F.3d at 932. 

Finally, although civilly detained persons must be afforded more considerate 

treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement 

are designed to punish, courts may rely on decisions defining the constitutional rights of 

prisoners, as they establish a floor for constitutional rights of persons detained under a 

civil commitment scheme. Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 759 (9th Cir.2012) (citations 

omitted). 

B. There is no Constitutionally protected right to possess and use personal 

laptops and electronic devices 

 A Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) is statutorily defined as an individual with “a 

diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of 

others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” 

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1). SVPs are not prisoners, but the SVPA is 

designed to protect society from—and provide treatment for—SVPs who would endanger 

others upon release. “The law generally requires a careful balancing of the rights of 

individuals who are detained for treatment, not punishment, against the state’s interests in 

institutional security and the safety of those housed at the facility.” Hydrick v. Hunter, 

500 F.3d 978, 990 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds by Hunter v. Hydrick, 556 

U.S. 1256 (2009) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319–322 (1982)). It is 

important to keep in mind that “SVPs have been civilly committed subsequent to criminal 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 17 

convictions and have been adjudged to pose a danger to the health and safety of others. 

Therefore, the rights of SVPs may not necessarily be coextensive with those of other 

civilly detained persons.” Id. 

 To this Court’s knowledge, no court has ever held that a civil detainee such as an 

SVP has a constitutionally protected right to possess and use personal laptops and other 

similar electronic devices. See Telucci v. Withrow, 2016 WL 2930629 at *5 (E.D. Cal 

May 19, 2016 (unpub.) (listing the following cases for the same proposition: see Endsley 

v. Luna, 2008 WL 3890382 at *3 (C.D.Cal. May 23, 2008) (unpub.) (citing Sands v. 

Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir.1989)) (prisoners do not have a constitutional right 

to have memory typewriters in cells), overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 

U.S. 343, 350-55 (1996); Taylor v. Coughlin, 29 F.3d 39, 40 (2nd Cir.1994) (“If prison 

inmates do not enjoy a constitutional right to typewriters as implements of access to the 

courts, it would be illogical for us to rule that there is a constitutional right to typewriters 

of a specific memory capacity.”); State ex rel. Anstey v. Davis, 203 W.Va. 538, 545, 509 

S.E.2d 579 (1998) (“We are persuaded by the uniformity of opinion on this issue and 

therefore hold that prison inmates have no constitutional right to possess personal 

computers in their cells.”); Endsley v. Luna, 2009 WL 3806266 (C.D.Cal. Nov.12, 2009) 

(unpub.) at *16 (citing Fogle v. Blake, 227 Fed. Appx. 542, 542 (8th Cir.2007)) (finding 

civil committee failed to state a constitutional claim regarding denial of a computer or 

typewriter); Spicer v. Richards, 2008 WL 3540182 at *7 (W.D.Wash. Aug.11, 2008) 

(unpub.) (finding no authority to show that SVP had a 14th Amendment right to possess a 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 18 

“cell phone, pager, computer, [or] color ink cartridge printer.”); Carmony v. County of 

Sacramento, 2008 WL 435343 at *18 (E.D.Cal. Feb.14, 2008) (finding civil detainee had 

no “free-standing First Amendment right to access computers and/or the internet.”); 

White v. Monahan, 2009 WL 499121 at *2 (C.D. Ill. Feb 24, 2009) (acknowledging that 

while civil detainees enjoy more liberties than convicted prisoners, “[t]he inability to 

possess a computer does not implicate a property interest that might be protected by 

procedural due process protections or an interest that might be classified as a substantive 

due process interest.”)). 

 Because Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that they have a constitutionally protected 

property interest in owning their own electronic devices, any claim that Defendants 

violated their procedural due process rights must fail as a matter of law. See Valdez v. 

Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir.2002) (“Valdez did not have a state-created 

liberty interest in using a telephone during his pretrial confinement. Accordingly, his 

procedural due process claims fail.”) Without addressing whether Plaintiffs have a 

constitutional right to possess laptops and other related electronic devices, the Ninth 

Circuit found that Plaintiffs stated “a plausible condition of confinement claim . . . that 

Section 4350 is punitive.” Accordingly, the Court will next analyze whether Regulation 

4350 amounts to a denial of substantive due process because it constitutes punishment. 

The Court concludes that it does not. 

C. Regulation 4350 does not violate the 14th Amendment. 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 19 

Again, Regulation 4350 prohibits patients from possessing any electronic devices 

with wireless capabilities, as well as electronics with audio or video recording 

capabilities. Within their various complaints, Plaintiffs have alleged generally that 

Regulation 4350 is excessively punitive in light of the Defendants’ non-punitive purpose 

in enacting it, and that the same non-punitive purpose could be accomplished via less 

restrictive alternatives.3

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “punitive conditions may be shown (1) where 

the challenged restrictions are expressly intended to punish, or (2) where the challenged 

restrictions serve an alternative, non-punitive purpose but are nonetheless excessive in 

relation to the alternative purpose, or are employed to achieve objectives that could be 

accomplished in so many alternative and less harsh methods.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 

918, 932 (9th Cir.2004) (citations omitted). “Legitimate, non-punitive government 

 

3 Plaintiffs Allen and DeBerry request this Court take judicial notice of eleven separate 

documents that they have submitted in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 

237). They have not cited any authority for this request, and the Defendants have not opposed it. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 authorizes a court to take judicial notice of “adjudicative facts,” but 

not entire documents. Plaintiffs have alleged that these eleven documents are “true copies of the original 

copies” and therefore may be asking the Court to find that these documents are “self-authenticating” 

under Federal Rule of Evidence 901. What is clear to the Court is that Plaintiffs wish for these documents 

to be considered as part of their response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. As Defendants 

have not opposed Plaintiffs’ request, the Court will construe the same liberally and will grant Plaintiffs’ 

motion for judicial notice insofar as the Court will consider the eleven documents as part of Plaintiffs’ 

opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

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interests include ensuring a detainee’s presence at trial, maintaining jail security, and 

effective management of a detention facility.” Id.

(1) There is no evidence that Regulation 4350 was expressly 

intended to punish patients at DSH-C. 

Defendants have submitted uncontroverted evidence that Regulation 4350 was 

adopted for legitimate, non-punitive purposes. The reasonable justifications for 

Regulation 4350’s ban on electronic devices are many, but DSH-C’s primary interest in 

implementing the ban is to ensure the safety and security of staff and patients. 

Prior to the promulgation of Regulation 4350, patients were permitted to own and 

possess their own laptop computers through a test program provided by AD 654. AD 654 

allowed patients to own their own computers, but prohibited devices or equipment that 

allowed patients to have private communications with others, and also prohibited 

electronic images that depicted overt sexual acts or violence with adults and children. 

UMF, ¶ 6. However, during this time that AD 654 was in place, numerous safety and 

security violations were found at DSH-C including: (1) patients’ widespread distribution 

of pornographic material, including child pornography; (2) audio recordings of staff and 

patient conversations within the hospital; (3) widespread distribution and sharing of data 

encryption and concealing software; and (4) computerized street map and atlas software. 

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UMF, ¶ 8.4 Eventually, DSH-C conducted a risk assessment analysis and concluded that 

patients’ use of their existing personal devices under AD 654 put the facility at risk of 

patients gaining internet access. Id., ¶ 9. It was no surprise, then, when DSH-C issued a 

moratorium on personal devices only seven months after AD 654 was implemented. Id., ¶ 

10. 

On October 26, 2009, two years and eight months after the moratorium was 

implemented, Regulation 4350 was issued statewide. Id., ¶ 11. In February of 2010, DSH 

patients were notified of the procedures that Regulation 4350 would require and were 

asked to store, mail, or dispose of the now-illicit devices in order to become compliant. 

Id., ¶ 12. 

Despite the moratorium on patient-owned devices, safety and security problems 

still repeatedly arise. Id., ¶ 16. In fact, Sgt. DuVall’s declaration indicates that even with 

the current moratorium on patient-owned devices, “at least 200 individuals at DSH-C 

have been involved with the possession or transmission of child pornography.” DuVall 

Decl., ¶ 5. Plaintiffs do not dispute that some patients have been found possessing 

thousands of images and videos of child pornography, with children as young as infants 

depicted. Id. And, even with the present ban in place and despite DSH-C’s preventative 

 

4

 Allen and DeBerry do not dispute this fact but they do allege that the ability to engage in these 

prohibited activities was facilitated by DSH-C staff who introduced illegal devices to the patient 

population. UMF, ¶ 8. Assuming this is true, it does not change the Court’s analysis, or have any bearing 

on the ultimate issue: whether Regulation 4350 is punitive. 

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measures, “there are typically 2–3 new child pornography cases reported each month . . . 

at Coalinga[,] which require investigation.” Id., ¶ 10. Indeed, Sgt. DuVall has 

investigated cases where patients have solicited child pornography via text messages, 

internet searches, and downloads from torrent sites or peer to peer file sharing. Id., ¶ 6. 

The financial costs associated with investigating child pornography cases are 

substantial. These investigations require “labor-intensive forensic examinations of cell 

phones, memory cards, hard drives or laptops to detect child pornography.” DuVall Decl.,

¶ 7. DSH-C Police Services use semi-automated software to aid in their searches, but the 

content must still be reviewed by an examiner because the software cannot detect 

document files or links, web history, or text-based documents. Id. Plaintiffs do not 

dispute that examining devices such as memory cards, hard drives, and cell phones 

requires specialized—and costly—equipment. Id. It is also undisputed that police 

examinations in instances “where multiple devices are involved can take months to 

complete, further taxing already overburdened resources.” Id., ¶ 8. 

Crucially, even when DSH-C staff takes preventative measures to remove the 

WiFi cards and plug the Ethernet ports on patients’ laptops, those precautions are easily 

defeated when a contraband cell phone is used to tether internet connection to a laptop or 

other device. UMF, ¶ 35. According to Sgt. DuVall, at least 100 cell phones have been 

confiscated at Coalinga. Id., ¶ 36. Cell phones are also used to coordinate the introduction 

of contraband from outside sources. Id., ¶. DSH-C patients are permitted to move freely 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 23 

about the facility and socialize with one another, which makes it easier to conceal and 

share memory cards and contraband images. Id., ¶¶ 39–40. 

In addition to child pornography violations, the unauthorized use of patient-owned 

devices has resulted in a wide array of threats to security of staff. Even with the present 

ban, Sgt. DuVall has investigations involving the following: (1) aerial photographs of 

DSH-C; (2) local maps; (3) partially created identification cards; (4) photographs and 

videos of staff and other patients from inside the hospital; (5) secret recordings of 

conversations between staff and patients; (6) social websites where child profiles have 

been sought out; (7) Facebook searchers of staff; (8) use of cell phone anonymizers to 

block caller ID; (9) emails and texts to outside persons to arrange narcotics and other 

contraband deliver; (10) harassing phone calls to members of the public; and (11) 

prohibited contact with children via video chat, voice chat, or phone calls. Id., ¶ 11. 

In addition, DSH-C is currently installing a new wireless security system in its 

facilities, known as the Personal Duress Alarm (PDA) system. UMF, ¶ 84. This system is 

being installed in response to staff security threats, and will allow the facility to 

individually track staff locations. Id., ¶ 87. But the installation of the PDA also opens 

DSH-C up to the potential for a different type of security breach. Id., ¶ 90. Installation of 

the PDA necessitates thousands of wireless access points in the facility. Id., ¶ 86. The 

Deputy Director of Information Technology for DSH, Jamie Mangrum, indicates in his 

declaration that “[a] very real and serious danger to staff could occur if an unauthorized 

person, such as an SVP patient, used a device to breach and gain access to the PDA.” 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 24 

Mangrum Decl., ¶ 5. DSH-C is also planning to install a wireless prescription ordering 

and dispensing system to modernize the current methods used by staff. Id., ¶ 7. But 

because it is a wireless system, it is vulnerable to a security breach. Id. If unauthorized 

access is gained to the planned prescription system, drugs or dosages may be 

manipulated, which could be life-threatening to patients. Id. 

In sum, there is no evidence in the record that the adoption of Regulation 4350 

was expressly intended to punish DSH-C patients. Rather, the reasons for implementing 

the ban are numerous and well-founded. To allow patients to possess their own electronic 

devices would necessarily increase the already alarming number of violations that occur 

at DSH-C. Even with the ban in place, the child pornography violations are pervasive and 

well-documented; even Plaintiffs admit there is a “porn epidemic” at DSH-C. Dkt. 233, 

p. 11. Moreover, the cost to DSH-C in terms of hiring technology staff and conducting 

investigations would be prohibitive. The logistics and expense involved in taking 

preventative measures with over 1100 patients who may have multiple devices, 

monitoring those devices to ensure that wireless capabilities have not been reactivated, 

and conducting time-intensive investigations when violations do occur is simply not 

feasible given the hospital’s already overburdened staff and budget. In short, to lift the 

ban on devices would jeopardize the safety of patients and staff, lead to the revictimization of child pornography victims, and halt the progress of patients’ treatment. 

(2) Regulation 4350 is not excessive in relation to its nonpunitive purposes; nor could those same non-punitive 

purposes be accomplished with less harsh methods.

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 25 

In next addressing whether punitive intent can be inferred from the nature of the 

restriction, courts ask whether the restriction is reasonably related to a legitimate 

governmental objective. If it is, then the restriction does not amount to punishment. 

Valdez, 302 F.3d 1039, 1045–46. 

Looking first to the governmental interests in restricting patients’ ownership and 

possession of electronic devices, the Court concludes that DSH-C has a legitimate 

interest in ensuring the safety of its staff, other patients, and the public. Bell, 441 U.S. at 

566 (“maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are 

essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional 

rights of [. . .] pretrial detainees.”). Additionally, there is a legitimate governmental 

interest in the government’s efficient allocation of resources and staff. See Beard v. 

Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529 (2006); Lewis v. Phillips, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42586, at *16 

(C.D. Ill., Mar. 28, 2014) (unpublished). The record in this case makes clear that 

Regulation 4350 was imposed to further these interests for all the reasons already 

discussed above. 

Turning next to consider whether Regulation 4350 is reasonably related to these 

legitimate interests, the Court must conclude that there has been no “exaggerated 

response” here. A reasonable relationship between the governmental interest and the 

challenged restriction does not require an “exact fit,” [] nor does it require showing a 

“least restrictive alternative.” Valdez, 302 F.3d at 1046 (citations omitted). Defendants 

explain that Regulation 4350 is designed not only to restrict potential internet access, but 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 26 

also to combat the patients’ ability to discretely store and share inappropriate material 

and to record staff and patient conversations. UMF, ¶¶ 8–10, 13, 16, 23–26, 31, 34–35. 

While cell phones and laptops are the most obvious electronic threats, other devices have 

varying abilities to connect to the internet. And with ever-advancing technological 

developments, it is not feasible for Defendants to list every internet-capable device by 

name. Id., ¶¶ 97–101. 

It is important to note that while restricting patient-owned devices, DSH-C 

provides safer, comparable substitutes for its patients through hospital-owed devices. 

DSH-C provides computers and word processing equipment for patients to do legal 

research, legal work, and to work on treatment-related assignments. UMF, ¶ 19.5

 Allen 

admits that legal research can be done on the hospital-provided computers in the library. 

UMF, ¶ 44. On certain nights, the hospital has game nights where patients can play bingo 

and card games, but not electronic games. Id., ¶ 48. That DSH-C provides comparable, 

safer alternatives to patients further underscores that Regulation 4350 is not punitive and 

that there has been no exaggerated response to DSH-C’s legitimate concerns. 

Finally, the same non-punitive purposes of safety and security could not be 

accomplished with less harsh methods. Indeed, DSH-C has tried to use less restrictive 

 

5 As to this statement of fact and several others, Allen and DeBerry dispute this by saying “[n]o, 

[s]ee Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ MSJ.” This response does not create a genuine issue of 

material fact, as Plaintiffs have not supported their blanket denials with any admissible evidence. 

Statements in a brief are not evidence and cannot be used to create an issue of fact. Barnes v. Independent 

Auto Dealers, 64 F.3d 1389, 1396 n. 3 (9th Cir.1995).

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 27 

means and the results were (1) a strain on limited resources; (2) an increase in patient 

policy violations; and (3) a decrease in overall hospital security. While AD 654 was in 

effect, DSH-C staff attempted to monitor approved devices owned by hundreds of 

patients, but privileges were abused and policy violations were made. If Regulation 4350 

is lifted, additional financial hospital resources and staff will be needed to acquire and 

maintain software capable of effectively searching electronic devices and files for indicia 

of unlawful activity such as child pornography. UMF, ¶ 17. Additionally, DSH-C would 

need to hire additional specially trained IT staff and law enforcement to conduct 

electronics searches and criminal investigations, which would in turn divert from alreadylimited mental health resources. Id., ¶ 18. 

Plaintiffs have not put forth any evidence that Regulation 4350 is excessive in 

relation to its legitimate, non-punitive government purposes of maintaining staff and 

patient safety, as well as effectively managing the hospital and its limited resources. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to DeBerry, Frazier, and Robinson is 

granted, as is Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as against Allen. 

ORDER 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Robinson’s Motion for Request for Leave to File First Amended Complaint 

(Dkt. 243) is DENIED. 

2. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel (Dkt. 217) is DENIED AS MOOT. 

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 28 

 3. Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Over-Length Brief (Dkt. 226) is 

GRANTED. 

4. Robinson’s Motion for Extension and Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. 232) 

is DENIED. 

5. Allen’s Motion to Strike Attorney Filing (Dkt. 229) is DENIED. 

6. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 227, 228) is 

GRANTED. 

7. Separate judgments shall issue in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54. 

DATED: August 16, 2016 

_________________________ 

B. Lynn Winmill 

Chief Judge 

United States District Court 

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