Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01034/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01034-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 23:1441 Contract Real Estate

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 LTA Defendants’ request for oral argument is denied because the issues have been fully

briefed and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b);

Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Suenos, LLC, an Illinois limited liability

company, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Diane Goldman, a New Jersey

individual, et al.,

Defendants.

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No. CV10-1034 PHX DGC

ORDER

Defendant Diane Goldman moves to dismiss the case against her on the ground that

the contract between her and Plaintiff provides for mediation and arbitration. Doc. 36.

Plaintiff Suenos, LLC asserts that it has opted out of arbitration, and, in the alternative,

requests the case against Goldman be stayed pending mediation. Doc. 42. Defendant did not

file a reply. Plaintiff and Defendant subsequently stipulated to a settlement conference as

a mediation (Doc. 44) and the Court granted the motion (Doc. 47). Consequently, Defendant

Goldman’s motion to dismiss will be denied as moot.

Defendants Gail Dacey and Lawyers Title of Arizona, Inc. (collectively “LTA

Defendants”) move to dismiss the claims against them under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state

a claim. Doc. 37. The motion has been fully briefed.1

 Docs. 37, 43, 53. LTA Defendants

Case 2:10-cv-01034-TL Document 65 Filed 12/30/10 Page 1 of 3
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argue that the terms of the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant Goldman – more

specifically the “absolute discretion,” indemnity, and “hold harmless” clauses – exempt them

from the liability asserted in Plaintiff’s claims. Doc. 37 at 1-2, 3:1-11. Moreover,

Defendants argue that because the terms are unambiguous, they should be decided as a matter

of law. Id. at 3; Doc. 53 at 2-3. Plaintiff responds that the contract also required the LTA

Defendants to release earnest money according to the contract’s terms, not arbitrarily, and

that Defendants’ failure to do so is the basis for the claims at issue. Doc. 43 at 7-8; Doc. 1

at 11-17.

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the

factual allegations “‘are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.’” Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation

omitted). The terms of a contract should generally be interpreted in concert with each other,

with the presumption being against surplusage. E.g., Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 854 P.2d 1134, 1144 n.9 (1993) (noting that “a contract should be interpreted, if at all

possible, in a way that does not render parts of it superfluous”). Plaintiff’s complaint alleges,

in an exhibit, that the contract contains the following provision: “In the event of a dispute

between Buyer and Seller regarding any Earnest Money deposited with Escrow Company,

Buyer and Seller authorize Escrow Company to release Earnest Money pursuant to the terms

and conditions of this Contract in its sole and absolute discretion.” Doc. 1-4 at 3. Assuming

as true the allegation that these were the terms of the contract, the escrow company had

discretion to release the earnest money as long as the contract terms provided for such release

in the circumstances of the case.

LTA Defendants assert that a release was proper under the factual circumstances of

this case: Defendant Goldman (the buyer) tendered a notice of cancellation by the extended

inspection-period deadline. Doc. 37 at 4. Plaintiff responds, however, that the inspection

period was extended only for the limited purpose of ascertaining property tax information,

that the notice was delivered later than the general-inspection period deadline, and that

cancellation of the contract was not permitted for the reason stated in the notice. Doc. 43 at

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7-8; Doc. 1 at 11-13. Moreover, Plaintiff also asserts that the LTA Defendants had actual

notice of these facts when they released the funds. Doc. 43 at 5; Doc. 1 at 11. The factual

dispute between the parties precludes dismissal of the claims against LTA Defendants as a

matter of law at this stage of the litigation. The Court will deny the motion to dismiss.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant Goldman’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 36) is denied as moot.

2. LTA Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 37) is denied.

DATED this 29th day of December, 2010.

Case 2:10-cv-01034-TL Document 65 Filed 12/30/10 Page 3 of 3