Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02440/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02440-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

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1

The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Western District of Arkansas.

 United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2440

___________

Fern K. Richmond, * 

 * 

 Appellant, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western 

* District of Arkansas. 

Continental Casualty Company; *

Continental Assurance Company; * [UNPUBLISHED]

CNA Group Life Assurance *

Company, also known as Hartford *

Life Group Insurance Company; *

Baxter Healthcare Corporation, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: June 11, 2007

Filed: June 20, 2007

___________

Before BYE, RILEY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Fern Richmond appeals the district court's1

 dismissal of her Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) lawsuit, in which she challenged

the decision of CNA Group Life Assurance Company (CNA) to discontinue her longAppellate Case: 06-2440 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/20/2007 Entry ID: 3321021
2

Baxter Healthcare Corporation (Baxter) was Richmond's employer and the

employer-sponsor of CNA's plan. Because CNA was the sole administrator of the

plan at all relevant times, and Baxter had no role in the discontinuation decision,

Baxter was never a proper defendant. See Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246, 1249

(8th Cir. 1998) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of employer in ERISA

action where CNA was sole administrator of the LTD plan at all relevant times). The

remainder of the named defendants had nothing to do with the discontinuation of

Richmond's benefits. Thus, we affirm the dismissal of the claims against all of the

named defendants except CNA without further comment.

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term disability benefits (LTD) provided under an employer-sponsored benefit plan.2

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

Richmond argues the district court erred in applying the deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard of review, a question we review de novo. See Farley v. Ark. Blue

Cross & Blue Shield, 147 F.3d 774, 776 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating standard of review).

Abuse-of-discretion review is appropriate where "the benefit plan gives the

administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits

or to construe the terms of the plan." Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489

U.S. 101, 115 (1989). Richmond concedes the benefit plan at issue gives CNA such

discretion but argues less deference is due because CNA both funded the insurance

benefit and administered the claim, creating a financial conflict of interest. 

We have applied a less deferential standard of review where an ERISA plaintiff

"presents probative evidence demonstrating that (1) a palpable conflict of interest or

a serious procedural irregularity existed, which (2) caused a serious breach of the plan

administrator's fiduciary duty to her." Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1160-61

(8th Cir. 1998). While CNA's dual role may be "palpable evidence of a conflict of

interest," Torres v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 405 F.3d 670, 678 (8th Cir. 2005),

Richmond fails to point to any evidence CNA's conflict caused a serious breach of its

Appellate Case: 06-2440 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/20/2007 Entry ID: 3321021
3

Richmond contends she was at a disadvantage in proving CNA's dual role

caused a serious breach of its fiduciary duty to her because "there were pending

discovery requests that were not allowed by" the district court. Appellant's Br. 42.

As Richmond's notice of appeal does not reference the order in which the district court

denied her motion to compel responses to those "pending" discovery requests, we are

without jurisdiction to review her contention. See Berdella v. Delo, 972 F.2d 204, 208

(8th Cir. 1992) (holding jurisdiction lacking where appellant failed to reference

challenged order in his notice of appeal in violation of Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)). Even if

we were to construe the dismissal order Richmond appealed as a reaffirmation of the

denial of her motion to compel, Richmond has failed to make the requisite showing

for reversal. Toghiyany v. AmeriGas Propane, Inc., 309 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir.

2002) (stating standard of review is gross abuse of discretion).

4

Under the benefit plan at issue, once the LTD benefit has been payable for

twelve months, further payments require a disability which prevents the claimant from

engaging in any occupation for which she is qualified.

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fiduciary duty to her. Thus, the district court correctly applied the abuse-of-discretion

standard of review.3

Richmond argues she is entitled to benefits even under the abuse-of-discretion

standard of review. Under this standard, we must affirm if a reasonable person could

have reached a similar decision, given the evidence before him. See Wise v. Kind &

Knox Gelatin, Inc., 429 F.3d 1188, 1190 (8th Cir. 2005). CNA found Richmond's

ankle and back injuries were not so severe as to prohibit gainful employment.4

 While

the record shows the physician who treated Richmond's back injury indicated she

could not do her old job, Richmond stopped seeing the back specialist and reported

taking no medication for back pain. No physician indicated her back injury precluded

sedentary work. The physician who treated Richmond's ankle cleared her for seated

work and deferred any assessment of her back to other physicians. Thus, we conclude

CNA's discontinuation decision was supported by substantial evidence.

Accordingly, we affirm.

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