Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00308/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00308-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN O’QUINN,

No. 2:02-CV-00308-MCE-KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RALEY’S AND BEL AIR, a

California Corporation; JOYCE

RALEY TEEL, an individual;

MICHAEL J. TEEL, an

individual,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

The above matter came before the Court upon Defendant

Raley’s Motion to Vacate Second (Punitive Damages) Phase of

Trial, filed on September 12, 2007. Following its review of the

papers submitted, the Court conducted a hearing on September 21,

2007 at 9:00 a.m. Larry Baumbach appeared on behalf of

Plaintiff; Mark Van Brussel appeared on behalf of Defendants.

///

///

///

Case 2:02-cv-00308-MCE -KJM Document 104 Filed 09/25/07 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Plaintiff sued Defendants claiming disparate treatment

employment discrimination under both Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., and the

California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t

Code § 12940, et seq. This case was tried by a jury on the issue

of liability from August 27 to August 29, 2007. On August 31,

2007, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff in the

amount of $455,500. The Court then ordered the jury and the

parties to return on September 28, 2007 for the second phase of

trial, the punitive damages phase.

Raley’s now moves to vacate the punitive damage phase of the

trial. Raley’s argues that, although Plaintiff brought suit

under both federal and state claims, that Plaintiff abandoned his

state law claim when he failed to request California Approved

Civil Jury Instructions (“CACI”) on that claim. Accordingly,

Raley’s argues that Plaintiff proceeded only on his federal claim

and that 42 U.S.C. § 1981a caps his damages at $300,000.00.

Plaintiff’s FEHA claim has not been disposed of by way of a

motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. Raley’s

cites no case law to support its argument that Plaintiff

abandoned his state law claim by failing to request a CACI

instruction on that claim. This Court has found no legal

authority that supports that proposition. 

At oral argument, counsel for Raley’s was unable to provide

the Court with any other basis to support its claim that

Plaintiff abandoned his FEHA claim. 

///

///

Case 2:02-cv-00308-MCE -KJM Document 104 Filed 09/25/07 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

The Final Pretrial Order directed the parties to submit Ninth

Circuit Model Jury Instructions and to only use alternate

instructions if a Ninth Circuit Model Instruction was

unavailable. Plaintiff had one claim for employment

discrimination under both Title VII and FEHA. By Raley’s own

admission, “the analysis of such claims under each statute is

virtually identical.” Def.’s Trial Br. 3:4. Accordingly, this

Court finds that Plaintiff did not abandon his FEHA claim.

Further, according to the Ninth Circuit precedent cited by

the parties, the Court has broad discretion to allocate the

damages award and has a general obligation to uphold lawful jury

awards wherever possible. Pavon v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 192

F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 1999); Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson

Consumer Products Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 509-510 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Raley’s concedes this Court has discretion to allocate the

damages awarded by the jury. However, Raley’s attempts to

distinguish Passantino the basis that in that case the jury form

indicated that the jury found for the plaintiff on both state and

federal claims. Although the jury verdict form in this case,

which Raley’s submitted jointly with Plaintiff, does not

distinguish between federal and state claims, it does not

necessarily follow that the jury found for Plaintiff only on his

federal claim. The verdict form in the instant case asks only

two questions. First, whether Plaintiff had proved that his race

as the sole reason Defendants decided not to promote Plaintiff,

and second, whether Plaintiff suffered injury, damage, loss or

harm as a result. 

///

Case 2:02-cv-00308-MCE -KJM Document 104 Filed 09/25/07 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Although it is not clear that the jury found for Plaintiff under

both Title VII and FEHA, there is also no evidence upon which to

base a finding that the jury specifically found for Plaintiff on

his federal claim and specifically denied his state claim.

Finally, Raley’s argues that California law requires

instructions on the heightened standards for awarding punitive

damages under FEHA and that California law requires these

instructions be given in the first phase of trial. Without

addressing the merits of this argument, the Court finds that even

if this were the case, at most failing to give the instruction

would only bar recovery of punitive damages as to Plaintiff’s

FEHA claim. Should the jury award punitive damages in the second

phase of trial, this Court could exercise its discretion to

allocate the compensatory damages to the FEHA claim, then

allocate the punitive damages, if any, to the Title VII claim and

apply the damages cap under section 1981a. As such, the

appropriate result is not to vacate the punitive damages phase,

but rather to allow the jury to deliberate on the issue of

punitive damages, and then to allocate the award as appropriate

and in a manner which adheres to this Court’s obligation to

uphold lawful jury awards wherever possible.

Additionally, the Court notes that Raley’s points to both

the jury instructions and the jury verdict form in support of its

argument. While these documents could certainly be clearer,

pursuant to the Final Pretrial Order, both parties were

responsible for the preparation of these documents and the

parties settled the jury instructions with the Court before they

were given to the jury. 

Case 2:02-cv-00308-MCE -KJM Document 104 Filed 09/25/07 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Raley’s had ample opportunity to clarify these issues prior to

trial and chose not to do so.

Because there are no grounds upon which to deny Plaintiff

from proceeding with the second phase of trial, Raley’s Motion to

Vacate the Second (Punitive Damages) Phase of Trial is hereby

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 25, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:02-cv-00308-MCE -KJM Document 104 Filed 09/25/07 Page 5 of 5