Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02147/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02147-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN JOSEPH FIELD, Civil No. 11-cv-2147 WQH (BGS)

Petitioner, REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary, et al.,

Respondents.

On September 15, 2011, Petitioner John Joseph Field (“Field”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

challenging a parole denial by the California Board of Hearings (“Board”). (Doc. No. 1.) 

Respondent filed an Answer on January 12, 2012. (Doc. No. 4.) On March 12, 2012, Field

filed a Traverse. (Doc. No. 8.)

BACKGROUND

Field challenges the Board’s denial of his parole. (Doc. No. 1.) In 1992, he was

convicted of first degree murder with use of a firearm. Field was sentenced to 27 years to life

in prison, with the possibility of parole. On November 20, 2009, Field had a parole hearing

before the Board. After reviewing his criminal and social history, conduct in prison, plans if

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paroled, and psychological evaluation, the Board found Field unsuitable for parole. The Board

denied Field parole for five years. 

On June 10, 2010, Field filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego County

Superior Court challenging the Board’s parole denial. He also asserted that his multiple year

denial pursuant to Marsy’s Law is an unconstitutional imposition of an Ex Post Facto sentence

enhancement. The court found the Board’s decision to be supported by the record and that the

Board had sufficient reason to believe Field remained dangerous to the public (citing In re

Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181 (2008)). (Lodgment No. 2.) Field then filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal. Likewise, the court found that the Board’s

decision was supported by evidence in the record and denied the petition on November 17, 2010. 

(Lodgment No. 6.) Finally, the California Supreme Court denied Field’s petition. (Lodgment

No. 8.)

Field’s present petition for writ of habeas corpus claims that: (1) the Board’s denial of his

parole is without merit because it is not supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) the Board’s

application of Marsy’s Law violated ex post facto principles. With respect to Field’s first claim,

he contends that the Board’s finding that he poses an unreasonable risk of danger if released is

without merit because the Board failed to articulate a nexus between the dangerous finding and

the risk he currently poses. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) Further, Field argues that the Board’s adverse

credibility determination with respect to his explanations about prison incidents and claim of

remorse is without merit. (Doc. No. 1 at 7, 9.) Field also contends that the Board deliberated

under a misinterpretation about his prior criminal history and that the misinterpretation

prejudiced his parole hearing. (Doc. No. 1 at 11.) Additionally, Field argues that there is “no

evidence to support the Board’s finding” that he committed the underlying crime “in an

especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel manner.” (Doc. No. 1 at 12.) Finally, Field contends

that his due process rights were violated because the Board allowed the San Diego District

Attorney’s opposition to parole to serve as its basis for denying him parole. (Doc. No. 1 at 14.)

Respondent argues that Field’s claims do not merit relief because his challenges to the

evidentiary sufficiency of the Board’s decision are foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s opinion

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in Swarthout v. Cooke, —U.S.—, 131 S.Ct. 859 (Jan. 24, 2011). (Doc. No. 4.) Respondent

further argues that Field’s challenge to Marsy’s Law is precluded by a pending class action, as

well as that the amendment to the California Penal Code does not alter the criteria for

determining parole suitability and that the statute provides the Board with flexibility in

determining how long the denial should be, thus, it is not a violation of ex post facto sentencing

principles. (Id.) 

DISCUSSION

1. Scope of Review and Applicable Legal Standard

Federal courts may review petitions for writ of habeas corpus by persons in custody

pursuant to a state court judgment “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375 n. 7 (2000). As Petitioner filed this petition after April 24, 1996, it is

governed by the Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Section

2254(d) of the AEDPA provides the following standard of review:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). According to Williams, federal courts may grant habeas relief under the

“contrary to” clause of section 2254(d)(1) if the state court either (1) “applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Court’s] cases” or (2) “confronts a set of facts that

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are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result

different from [the Court’s] precedent.” 529 U.S. at 405–06. Relief is also available under

section 2254(d)(2) if the factual findings used by the state court were objectively unreasonable.

Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).1

When prisoners challenge a parole denial on due process grounds, federal courts must

determine whether the prisoner received procedural due process. In Swarthout, the Supreme

Court held that due process claims require a two-step inquiry. 131 S.Ct. at 861. Courts must first

determine whether the person has been deprived of a valid liberty or property interest. Id. at

861–62 (holding that California law creates a liberty interest in parole but that there “is no right

under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid

sentence.”). Once the court finds a protected liberty interest, it must determine whether the state

followed constitutionally sufficient procedures. Id. at 863. 

Whether California’s parole procedures were constitutionally sufficient depends not on

whether they reasonably applied the “some evidence” standard according to California law, but

whether the prisoner received adequate procedural due process. Id. at 816, 862. A prisoner

receives procedural due process when he or she has an opportunity to be heard and has received

a statement explaining the Board’s parole denial. Id. at 862. Accordingly, federal habeas review

of a parole denial is limited to determining whether certain procedural safeguards as set forth in

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), were satisfied. Id.

at 861–63.

2. The Parole Hearing Procedures Did Not Violate Due Process

Field’s claims are not cognizable. To the extent Field claims that the decision to deny

parole was not based on “some evidence” or otherwise failed to satisfy substantive due process,

the claim is foreclosed as a matter of law because there is no clearly established federal

constitutional substantive due process right in parole. Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at 862. When a 

petitioner is provided the requisite procedural protections, the federal court may neither inquire

1

 State court factual findings are presumed to be correct and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting these findings

by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Summer v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545–47 (1981).

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into the evidence supporting the parole denial nor determine “whether the constitutionally

requisite procedures provided by [the state] produced the result that the evidence required.”

Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at 862 (“No [Supreme Court] opinion . . . supports converting California’s

‘some evidence’ rule into a substantive federal requirement.”). Thus, to the extent Field

challenges the evidence supporting the parole denial, or the Board’s decision-making process,

his claims are not cognizable in this habeas proceeding because they involve the application or

interpretation of state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at 863 (“it is no

federal concern . . . whether California’s ‘some evidence’ rule of judicial review (a procedure

beyond what the Constitution demands) was correctly applied”); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 68 (1991) (“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a

conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).

 And to the extent Field claims that he was not provided the proper procedural

protections, a review of the record shows that his rights under Greenholtz were satisfied. Field

was allowed to speak at his parole hearing, was represented by counsel, and was given the

opportunity to contest the evidence against him. He was also notified of the reasons why parole

was denied. (See Lodgment No. 7, Ex. 4.) To the extent Field contends that he was not afforded

these protections, his contentions are refuted by the record and lack merit. Moreover, to the

extent Field asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because the Board relied on improper

evidence, his claims do not warrant habeas relief. Swarthout was “unequivocal in holding that

if an inmate seeking parole [received the safeguards under Greenholtz], that should be the

beginning and the end of the inquiry into whether the inmate received due process.” Pearson

v. Muntz, 639 F.3d 1185, 1191 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at 862) (internal

quotations, alterations, and ellipsis omitted). Thus, the only right at issue in the parole context

is procedural, and the only proper inquiry is whether the inmate received process in accordance

with Greenholtz. 

Accordingly, because Field has not demonstrated—and the record does not show—that

his rights under Greenholtz were denied, Field’s parole claims are not cognizable in this habeas

proceeding. See Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2011) (Due Process Clause

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satisfied because the petitioner was permitted to speak on his own behalf and contest the

evidence against him, and was provided an explanation of the Board’s parole denial; the state’s

possible misapplication of its own parole laws provides no basis for federal habeas relief).

2. Field Does Not State an Ex Post Facto Claim

Field also claims that application of “Marsy’s Law,” which was passed after he was

sentenced and changed the law governing the deferral period between parole hearings by

increasing the deferral period, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Ninth Circuit recently

addressed the issue in Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, 638 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2011), and concluded

that “Marsy’s Law” is not a prohibited ex post facto law. The court reasoned that, because the

new law provides a mechanism for inmates to request an advance hearing, there was no

significant risk that inmate’s incarceration would be prolonged. 

The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Gilman comports with preexisting United States Supreme

Court precedent upholding similar laws decreasing the frequency of parole eligibility where, as

here, the laws afforded the parole board discretion to advance scheduled parole hearing dates.

See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 247 (2000) (upholding change in frequency of parole

hearings from every three years to up to every eight years for inmates serving life sentences);

Cal. Dept. of Corrs. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 501–02, 507 (1995) (holding that decrease in

frequency of parole hearings for inmates convicted of murder from every year to up to every

three years did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause).

In short, no authority supports Field’s assertion that “Marsy’s Law” violates the Ex Post

Facto Clause. Accordingly, the state courts’s rejection of his ex post facto challenge was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by

the Supreme Court. Habeas relief, therefore, is not warranted. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the above stated reasons, the undersigned recommends that the assigned district

judge: (1) approve and adopt this Report and Recommendation and (2) direct that judgment be

entered DENYING Field’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

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This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to

the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than seventeen days after receiving a copy this Report &

Recommendation, any party to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties within 10 days of being served with the objections.

DATED: March 20, 2012

Hon. Bernard G. Skomal

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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