Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00503/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00503-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLEN SIMONS,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. NGUYEN, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-cv-0503-LJO-DLB PC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

AND DIRECTING CLERK OF THE COURT

TO ENTER JUDGMENT

(Doc. 50)

I. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Glen Simons (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s amended

complaint against defendant Dr. Nguyen (“Defendant” or “Dr. Nguyen”) for acting with deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, in violation of theEighth Amendment. At the time

of the events at issue in this action, Plaintiff was a state prisoner in the custody of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), and was housed at Corcoran State Prison.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on April 23, 2007. Plaintiff filed an

opposition on May 15, 2007 and Defendant filed a reply on May 17, 2007. 

B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

Case 1:05-cv-00503-LJO -DLB Document 53 Filed 01/28/08 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”

Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436

(9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

Case 1:05-cv-00503-LJO -DLB Document 53 Filed 01/28/08 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Plaintiff neither filed his own separate statement of disputed facts nor admitted or denied the facts set forth 1

by Defendants as undisputed in compliance with Local Rule 56-260(b). Further, Plaintiff did not tender any

evidentiary objections in any other form. FDIC v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 478, 484 (9th Cir. 1992)

(evidentiary defects waived absent objection). Therefore, Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts is accepted

except where brought into dispute by Plaintiff’s complaint or his opposition. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923

(9th Cir. 2004) (verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit if it is based on pleader’s personal

knowledge of specific facts which are admissible in evidence). A verified opposition to a motion for summary

judgment may also be considered as an opposing affidavit for purposes of the summary judgment rule if it is based

on facts within the pleader’s personal knowledge. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1998). 

3

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the

pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the Court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c).

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the Court must be drawn in favor of the

opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

C. Undisputed Facts1

1. Background Facts

1. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was an inmate duly incarcerated within the California

Case 1:05-cv-00503-LJO -DLB Document 53 Filed 01/28/08 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”).

2. At all relevant times, Dr. Nguyen was a licensed medical doctor employed by the CDCR,

assigned to the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (CSATF”), in Corcoran,

California. In that capacity, his primary job duties included providing medical care and

treatment to inmates, including Plaintiff. 

3. On October 25, 2002, at approximately 7:55 p.m., Plaintiff complained to nursing staff of

severe pain on his right flank abdomen, spitting blood, and bleeding from his rectum.

Nursing staff contacted Dr. Nguyen while he was at the Correctional Treatment Center

(hereinafter “CTC”), and he gave nursing staff a verbal order to transfer plaintiff to the CTC

for further evaluation.

4. About ten minutes after Plaintiff arrived at the CTC, Dr. Nguyen performed a negative rectal

examination. He noted Plaintiff to be in great pain and moaning on the table and then

ordered normal saline and Demoral 30 mg intravenously, and 70 mg intramuscularly. RN

Anna M. Varela took Dr. Nguyen’s order. 

5. Dr. Nguyen did not fill a syringe with Demerol or any other medication nor did he hand a

syringe to a registered nurse.

6. After plaintiff was injected byRN Varela, he went into respiratory distress. Dr. Nguyen and

nursing staff performed resuscitation, that included: (1) intravenous Narcan, a Demerol

antidote, which reversed the respiratory depression and enabled plaintiff to breath

spontaneously and; (2) ventilation support and oxygen administration by non-rebreathing

mask. Though the intubation attempt was unsuccessful, Plaintiff received adequate

ventilation by the Ambu bag. The result of the resuscitation was that plaintiff was able to

breathe spontaneously with adequate oxygen saturation until the ambulance team arrived. 

7. Dr. Nguyen reviewed certified copies of Plaintiff’s medical records obtained through the

discovery process with proper notice given to plaintiff, for the time he provided medical

treatment to plaintiff at CSATF.

8. Dr. Nguyen contends he provided Plaintiff with all reasonable and necessary care for his

medical complaints. Dr. Nguyen contends that at no time did he refuse to provide care or

Case 1:05-cv-00503-LJO -DLB Document 53 Filed 01/28/08 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Plaintiff’s complaint and opposition are verified and shall be treated as affidavits for purposes of the 2

summary judgment rule where they are based on facts within Plaintiff’s personal knowledge of admissible evidence,

and not merely on Plaintiff’s belief. Lew v. Kona Hospital, 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985); Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e). 

5

treatment to Plaintiff. Dr. Nguyen contends he did not intentionally or deliberately delay

medical treatment to Plaintiff and that he was at all times, motivated by genuine concern for

Plaintiff’s health and well-being.

9. Dr. Nguyen contends that all medical treatment provided to plaintiff by him was within the

community standard of knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed and exercised by members

of his profession under similar circumstances.

10. Plaintiff’s initial complaint was filed on April 15, 2005 and his amended complaint was filed

on September 30, 2005.

11. Plaintiff’s claim was received by the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board

on October 21, 2004, nearly two (2) years after plaintiff’s cause of action accrued against Dr.

Nguyen. The Board rejected plaintiff’s claim.

D. Discussion2

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Nguyen was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs when he

provided medical care to him on October 25-26, 2002. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Nguyen ordered

Nurse Varela to administer Demerol and that he heard Plaintiff telling her that the dose was too

much but failed to question him about why he was concerned about an overdose. Plaintiff contends

Dr. Nguyen intentionally allowed the overdose and then failed to properly intubate him because he

thought plaintiff molested a young girl in the visiting room. 

Dr. Nguyen argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because he did not refuse to

provide medical treatment to Plaintiff and after examining plaintiff, he ordered the administration

of Demerol. U.F. 4. Dr. Nguyen points out that once plaintiff was in respiratory distress, he, along

with other medical staff, provided immediate medical care and Plaintiff was airlifted to the

University Medical Center in Fresno, California. U.F. 6. 

The Court finds that Defendant has met his initial burden of informing the Court of the basis

for his motion, and identifying those portions of the record which he believes demonstrate the

Case 1:05-cv-00503-LJO -DLB Document 53 Filed 01/28/08 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff to establish that

a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). As stated above, in attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, Plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but

is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

n.11; First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1973).

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in

a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 

Plaintiff’s opposition is essentially a reiteration of the allegations set forth in the complaint.

It appears Plaintiff has confused the showing he must make at this stage with the initial showing he

had to make to state a claim for relief. Although Plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to state a

claim for relief under federal notice pleading standards, at this stage in the litigation, Plaintiff must

come forth with evidence in support of his claims. Plaintiff has not done so.

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060

(9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person

‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada,

290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Case 1:05-cv-00503-LJO -DLB Document 53 Filed 01/28/08 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Plaintiff’s allegations that Dr. Nguyen “should have heard him” complain to Nurse Varela

that the dose was too high and that the dose was in fact to high are insufficient to defeat Defendant’s

motion. Plaintiff, as a lay witness, is not qualified to opine that the dose he was given was an

overdose. “A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities

regarding treatment does not give rise to a s 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344

(9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted). To prevail, Plaintiff “must show that the course of

treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . . and . . . that

they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.” Jackson v.

McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted). While it is undisputed that

plaintiff had an adverse reaction to the Demerol, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the dose Dr.

Nguyen ordered was “medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . .” and chosen “in

conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330,

332 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted). It is undisputed that Dr. Nguyen provided treatment

for plaintiff and the record is utterly devoid of any evidence that Dr. Nguyen “[knew] of and

disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claim against him.

E. Conclusion

Forthe foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden of setting forth

admissible evidence raising triable issues of material fact, and Defendant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law on the claim against him. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, filed April 23, 2007, is GRANTED,

concluding this action in its entirety; and

2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for Defendant and against Plaintiff.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned

to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty (20) days of this

Order, the parties may file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure

Case 1:05-cv-00503-LJO -DLB Document 53 Filed 01/28/08 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order.

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 25, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00503-LJO -DLB Document 53 Filed 01/28/08 Page 8 of 8