Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01845/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01845-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRADFORD O. BRYANT, 

Petitioner,

 vs.

BEN CURRY, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 07-1845 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner, a prisoner of the State of California, has filed a habeas corpus petition

challenging a parole denial. This Court ordered Respondent to show cause why a writ

should not issue. After Respondent had answered and Petitioner had filed a traverse, the

United States District Court for the Ninth Circuit decided Hayward v. Marshall, 603

F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), in which a number of important issues involving

parole habeas cases had been raised. In consequence, the Court ordered the parities to

provide supplemental briefs addressing the impact of Hayward on this case, which they

have done. For the reasons stated below, the petition is denied on the merits.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner pleaded guilty in San Diego County Superior Court to second degree

murder. On April 24, 1980, he was sentenced to a prison term of fifteen years to life. 

This petition is directed to a denial of parole on January 25, 2005. He exhausted these

claims by presenting them to the highest state court available, the California Supreme

Court, in a state habeas petition.

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DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), codified

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state

prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the Petitioner is not

challenging his underlying state court conviction.” White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002,

1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, this Court may entertain a petition for habeas

relief on behalf of a California state inmate “only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a).

The writ may not be granted unless the state court’s adjudication of any claim on

the merits: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” Id. at § 2254(d). Under this deferential standard, federal habeas relief will

not be granted “simply because [this] court concludes in its independent judgment that

the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000).

While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in determining whether the

state court made an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, the only

definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

II. Respondent’s Claims

In order to preserve the issues for appeal, Respondent argues that California

prisoners have no liberty interest in parole, and that if they do, the only due process

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28 1 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 

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protections available are a right to be heard and a right to be informed of the basis for the

denial – that is, respondent contends there is no due process right to have the result

supported by sufficient evidence. Because these contentions are contrary to Ninth

Circuit law, they are without merit. See Pirtle v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 2010

WL 2732888 at * 4 (9th Cir. July 12, 2010); Cooke v. Solis, 606 F.3d 1206, 1213-14 (9th

Cir. 2010) (citing Hayward, 603 F.3d at 555, 561-64); Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606,

610-11 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Hayward, 603 F.3d at 561-64). 

III. Petitioner’s Claims

As grounds for federal habeas relief, Petitioner asserts that: (1) the Board of

Prison Terms’ denial of parole was a violation of his plea agreement; (2) the Board’s

decision was not supported by some evidence; (3) the Board violated his due process

rights by denying parole eleven times based on the circumstances of his offense; (4) the

regulations governing parole are unconstitutionally vague; (5) his rights under Apprendi1

and progeny were violated; (6) the Board’s consideration of letters opposing parole

violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause; (7) The Board’s consideration of

opposition to parole by the prosecutor’s office violated the plea agreement; (8) the Board

did not provide a written decision sufficient to allow review, a violation of due process;

(9) the Board’s denial of parole was breach of the implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing contained in the plea agreement; and (10) he has a federal liberty interest in

parole.

A. Breach of Plea Agreement

Petitioner contends that by denying him parole the Board has breached his plea

bargain. In a document filed with the superior court headed “Change of Plea (Guilty),”

Petitioner stated that he understood the maximum possible punishment to be “15 years to

life (parole after 10 years with credit under law for time served in the County Jail since

his arrest.” (Pet., Ex. A.) At the time of the 2005 parole hearing at issue here, Petitioner

had served twenty-five years. 

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1. Procedural Grounds

Respondent asserts not only that the claim lacks merit, but that it is procedurally

defaulted, successive, and untimely.

a. Procedural Default

Petitioner raised this claim in state habeas petitions directed to the denial of parole

at issue here. The superior court denied the claim because it had been rejected

previously. (Ex. 8 at 9-10.) The California Court of Appeal denied it on the same

grounds, saying “[t]his argument was raised and rejected in the prior petition and will not

be readdressed.” (Ex. 10 at 1.) The California Supreme Court denied the habeas petition

without comment or citation of authority. (Ex. 12.) Respondent contends that the claim

is procedurally defaulted. 

A federal court will not review questions of federal law decided by a state court if

the decision also rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question

and adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30

(1991). In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court

pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of

the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to

consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. at 750. When

the highest state court available has denied the state habeas petition without comment, as

here, the federal court considering a procedural default claim must “look through” that

decision to the last reasoned decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06

(1991). 

Respondent contends that the state courts’ rejection of this claim as duplicative is

a procedural bar to pursuing it here, citing In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410 (1972), and In re

Miller, 17 Cal. 2d 734 (1941). In Lynch, the court said: “petitioner contends his prior

conviction of indecent exposure in 1958 was invalid because he was assertedly denied

various constitutional rights at that proceeding. This contention, however, has been

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raised in several prior applications for habeas corpus by petitioner, each of which we

have denied. Accordingly, it does not require our reconsideration. ( In re Miller (1941)

17 Cal.2d 734, 735 [112 P.2d 10].).” Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d at 439 n.26. In Miller, the court

said: “[a] prior petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in this court by this

petitioner on May 22, 1936, and was based on the same grounds set forth in the present

petition. The prior petition was denied on May 25, 1936, and since that time no change

in the facts or the law substantially affecting the rights of the petitioner has been

disclosed.” Miller, 17 Cal. 2d at 735. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that Miller means only that the claim is being denied

in the second petition on the same grounds as it was denied on in the first one – which is

not the same thing as invoking a procedural bar. See Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317,

1319 n.1 (1986). Instead, the court must “look through” the ruling based on Miller and

treat it as being based on the same rationale as the prior ruling. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at at

804 n.3 (state court decision “based on ineligibility for further state review” has no effect

on availability of federal habeas; court should look through the later decision to the last

reasoned state court opinion); Karis v. Vasquez, 828 F.Supp. 1449, 1457 (C.D. Cal.

1993) (applying Ylst to a state decision that cited Miller). 

Respondent has failed to provide the earlier state decisions rejecting this claim. 

The Court thus cannot determine whether a procedural bar was invoked. Because the

burden of showing procedural default is on the Respondent, this failure of proof requires

rejection of his contention that the plea bargain claim is barred by procedural default. 

See Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-86 (9th Cir. 2003) (burden on state). 

b. Statute of Limitations

Respondent contends that this claim is untimely because it was not filed within

one year of the date when Petitioner should have been paroled under his interpretation of

the plea agreement. 

The statute of limitations provides: 

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

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2 In Burns the court characterized the limitations period as starting “on the date

the inmate claims the state breached the plea agreement.” 2009 WL 2381423 at *3. 

The court cited Murphy v. Espinoza, 401 F.Supp.2d 1048, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2005), in

support of that proposition, describing Murphy’s holding as “(statute of limitations

begins to run on date petitioner claimed State breached plea agreement).” Burns, 2009 WL 2381423 at *3. In fact, however, Murphy treated the limitations period as

starting when the petitioner knew, or should have known, there had been a breach, and

did not say that it started on the date of breach. Murphy, 401 F.Supp.2d at 1052. Furthermore, even in Burns itself the court applied the “knew or should have known”

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habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable

to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Time during which a properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review is pending is excluded from the one-year time

limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2). 

The limitations period of Section 2244(d) applies to “all habeas petitions filed by

persons in ‘custody, pursuant to the judgment of a State court,’ . . . even if the petition

challenges a pertinent administrative decision rather than a state court judgment.” 

Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). Because Petitioner is in custody

as a result of a state court judgment, the statute of limitations as provided in Section

2244(d) therefore is applicable to him. For claims that the state breached a plea

agreement such as Petitioner raises here, the limitations period begins running on the

date the petitioner learned of the breach. See Burns v. California, 2009 WL 2381423 at

*3 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (limitations period began running on the date of the breach)2

;

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standard, despite having recited the “date of breach” standard earlier in the ruling. 

Burns, 2009 WL 2381423 at *3. This court therefore concludes that Murphy and

Burns are in fact authority for the proposition that the correct trigger date is when the

petitioner knew or should have known of the breach. 

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Crenshaw v. Tilton, 2008 WL 878887 at *6 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (limitations period begins

running on date prisoner knew or should have known there had been a breach); Singleton

v. Curry, 2007 WL 1068227 at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (limitations period for breach of plea

bargain claim is determined under section 2244(d)(1)(D)); Daniels v. Kane, 2006 WL

1305209, *1 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (statute of limitations begins to run on “the date a

petitioner knew or should have known that a breach occurred”); Murphy v. Espinoza,

401 F.Supp.2d 1048, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (statute of limitations begins to run on date

petitioner became aware, or should have become aware, that the plea agreement had

been breached).

Petitioner contends that his plea agreement provided that he would be paroled

after ten years, with a credit of 162 days for time served prior to the plea. (Pet.,

attachment at 8; Ex. A at (unnumbered) 1 (Change of Plea form); Ex. C at 8 (transcript

of sentencing).) He was sentenced on April 24, 1980. (Ex. 1 (abstract of judgment) at

1.) Thus, under his interpretation of the agreement, he should have been paroled no later

than November 13, 1989 (ten years less 162 days), or if not then, at least when the next

parole hearing was held after he had served ten years, which appears to have been the

hearing on February 21, 1990. (Pet., Ex. L (decision effective April 2, 1990).) In short,

no later than February 21, 1990, Petitioner knew or should have known that the

purported plea agreement that he would be paroled after ten years had been breached. 

The one-year limitations period thus ran out no later than February 21, 1991. See

Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (adopting “anniversary

method” for calculating § 2254 limitations period; absent tolling, expiration date of

limitation period expires on same date as triggering event but in following year). This

claim was not filed until April 3, 2007, so it is barred by the statute of limitations. 

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c. Successive

Respondent also contends that this claim is successive, and so must be dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (“A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus

application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be

dismissed.”). Petitioner raised the same claim in an earlier federal habeas petition in this

Court, Bryant v. Kane, No. C 05-0723 JSW (PR). That petition was denied in an order

entered on December 13, 2007. That case is presently pending on appeal.

The earlier petition, C 05-0723 JSW (PR), was directed to Governor Gray Davis’

February 21, 2003, reversal of a the parole board’s grant of parole. The present petition

is directed to a Board of Prison Terms’ denial of parole on January 25, 2005. Petitioner

contends that because this petition is directed to a different decision, it involves a

different breach of the plea agreement, and the claim is not successive. The claims,

however, are the same legally in both cases. That is, both depend on the rule that due

process requires that a state perform the terms of a plea agreement, see Buckley v.

Terhune, 441 F.3d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), and that the terms of the

agreement are construed according to state contract law, see Ricketts v. Adamson, 483

U.S. 1, 6 n.3 (1987). And because the same plea agreement is involved in both claims,

of course the applicable state contract law is the same. The only difference between the

claims, in fact, is that the denial here was by the Board and in 2005 rather than by the

governor and in 2003. This is a minor factual difference, and so is not sufficient to

distinguish the two claims. See Babbitt v. Woodford, 177 F.3d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1999)

(claims are “successive” if “‘the basis thrust or gravamen of the legal claim is the

same;’” new factual allegations that do not change gravamen of legal claim do not

prevent claim from being successive) (quoting United States v. Allen, 157 F.3d 661, 664

(9th Cir. 1998)). The claim must be dismissed as successive. 

2. Merits

Petitioner points to the “Change of Plea” document filed in the criminal case as

evidence that the plea agreement called for him to be paroled after ten years. That

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3 The underlining in the quotation indicates typed insertions; the remainder is

form language. 

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document is a declaration by Petitioner filed in the criminal case to support his motion to

change his plea to guilty. (Pet., Ex. A.) It contains a series of declarations

acknowledging, for instance, that he understands the nature of the charges against him

and that his attorney has explained his rights. He has initialed each statement. 

Paragraph 10 reads: “[Petitioner] . . . does declare: . . . 10. That his attorney has

explained the possible sentence and understands the maximum possible punishment to

be: 15 years to life (parole after 10 years with credit under law for time served in the

County Jail since his arrest)[] and further that in the event he is sentenced to State Prison,

he will be placed on parole for a period of up to 7 yrs.”3

 (Id.) 

Paragraph 12 of the same document reads: “12. That he has not been induced to

plead guilty by any promise or representation of a lesser sentence, probation, reward,

immunity, or anything else. If defendant’s plea of guilty is the result of discussions with

the District Attorney (e.g., that the District Attorney has agreed to move to dismiss a

count if defendant pleads guilty to another count), explain briefly such promise or plea

bargaining, in the following space: Defendant to be charged with no other offense

arising out of this case.” (Id.) 

The document is signed by Petitioner. It carries the signatures of defense counsel

and the prosecutor, and at the end, an order signed by the court granting the motion to

withdraw the not guilty plea. (Id.) 

The key part of the document is, of course, paragraph ten, with its reference to

“15 years to life (parole after 10 years . . . .)” Petitioner treats this as a promise that he

will be paroled after ten years, but strictly speaking, it is only a statement by Petitioner

of what he understands in deciding to change his plea – that the maximum sentence

would be fifteen years to life with parole “after” ten years. 

There are two related points to be made here. One is that “after” is not the same

thing as “will be paroled when he has served ten years,” in that “after” includes all time

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4 This is confirmed by paragraph twelve, in which he says that the only promise

that has been made to him is that he will not be charged with any other crimes “arising

out of this case.” 

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subsequent. That is, the purpose of the parenthetical phrase might have been to ensure

that Petitioner knew he would have to serve at least ten years. That other point is that

paragraph ten is a description of what Petitioner understands the maximum punishment

to be; it describes his understanding, not the promise by the prosecutor.4

 Admittedly, if

it were interpreted to mean that Petitioner’s understanding of the maximum included

guaranteed parole in ten years, rather than that he would have to serve at least ten years,

his understanding of the maximum possible punishment would have been wrong, and

Petitioner might have been able to use that as a basis for claiming that the plea itself was

not voluntary and intelligent. But that is not what is at issue here; the only relevant point

here, where the claim is breach of a plea agreement, is whether the paragraph constitutes

a promise that Petitioner would be paroled in ten years. 

For the reasons discussed above, it is would be perfectly reasonable to interpret

paragraph ten as something other than a promise, so it was not unreasonable for the state

courts to reject this claim. This claim is not only procedurally barred, but because the

state courts’ decisions were reasonable, habeas relief cannot be granted on the merits. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (federal habeas relief can be granted only if state court

decisions were contrary to, or unreasonable applications of, clearly established United

States Supreme Court authority). 

B. “Some Evidence” Claim

Petitioner contends that denial of parole was not supported by “some evidence”

and thus violated his due process rights.

1. Impact of Hayward

In his supplemental brief, Respondent contends that Hayward “dramatically

changes a federal court’s review of a state court decision upholding the denial of parole

to a California inmate.” (Resp. Supp. Br. at 2.) Subsequent to the filing of the brief,

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however, this was proved wrong. 

Hayward did hold that there is no constitutional right to “release on parole, or to

release in the absence of some evidence of future dangerousness,” arising directly from

the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution; instead, any such right “has to arise

from substantive state law creating a right to release.” Hayward, 603 F.3d at 555. The

court overruled Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003); Sass v. California Bd. of

Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2006); and Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846 (9th Cir.

2007), “to the extent they might be read to imply that there is a federal constitutional

right regardless of whether state law entitles the prisoner to release . . . .” Hayward, 603

F.3d at 556. All three of those cases had discussed the “some evidence” requirement, but

in all three it was clear that the requirement stemmed from a liberty interest created by

state law; that portion of the cases, therefore, was not overruled by Hayward. See Biggs,

334 F.3d at 914-15; Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127-19; Irons, 505 F.3d at 850-51; see also

Cooke v. Solis, 606 F.3d 1206, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 2010) (post-Hayward case; noting that

California law gives rise to a liberty interest in parole). However, all three also

contained references in dictum to the possibility that “[a] continued reliance in the future

on an unchanging factor, the circumstances of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment, [would] run[] contrary to the rehabilitation goals espoused by the prison

system and could result in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17; see also

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129; Irons, 505 F.3d at 853-54. It appears that this possibility –

referred to below as a Biggs claim – is the only thing that was “overruled” by Hayward. 

Aside from making clear that there could be no “Biggs claim” arising directly

from the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, it appears that Hayward has had no

significant impact on federal habeas review of California parole decisions. The Ninth

Circuit still recognizes that California law gives rise to a liberty interest in parole. Pirtle,

2010 WL 2732888 at * 4; Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1213-14; Pearson, 606 F.3d at 610-11. 

Under California law, “some evidence” of current dangerousness is required in order to

deny parole. Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562 (citing In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1205-

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06 (2008), and In re Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th 1241 (2008)). “California’s ‘some evidence’

requirement is a component of the liberty interest created by the parole system of that

state.” Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1213. A federal court considering a “some evidence” claim

directed to a parole denial thus must determine whether there was “some evidence” of

current dangerousness to support the parole board’s decision; if not, the prisoner’s due

process rights were violated. This was also true prior to Hayward, although now the

rationale is that the Court is applying California’s “some evidence” rule as a component

of the required federal due process. 

In short, Ninth Circuit decisions after Hayward have essentially returned things to

the way they were before Hayward. See Pirtle, 2010 WL 2732888 at *4; Cooke, 606

F.3d at 1213-14; Pearson, 606 F.3d at 610-11. Respondent’s arguments that Hayward

has transformed the legal landscape are rejected. 

2. Analysis

A federal district court reviewing a California parole decision“must determine

‘whether the California judicial decision approving the governor's [or the Board's]

decision rejecting parole was an ‘unreasonable application’ of the California ‘some

evidence’ requirement, or was ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence.’” Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562-63 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1)-(2)). That requirement was summarized in Hayward as follows:

[a]s a matter of California law, ‘the paramount consideration for both the

Board and the Governor under the governing statutes is whether the inmate

currently poses a threat to public safety.’ There must be ‘some evidence’

of such a threat, and an aggravated offense ‘does not, in every case,

provide evidence that the inmate is a current threat to public safety.’ The

prisoner’s aggravated offense does not establish current dangerousness

‘unless the record also establishes that something in the prisoner’s pre- or

post- incarceration history, or his or her current demeanor and mental state’

supports the inference of dangerousness. Thus, in California, the offense

of conviction may be considered, but the consideration must address the

determining factor, ‘a current threat to public safety.’

Id. at 562 (quoting Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th. at 1191, 1209-15); see also Cooke, 606 F.3d at

1214 (describing California’s “some evidence” requirement). 

When a federal court considers a habeas case directed to a parole decision, the 

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“necessary subsidiary findings” and the “ultimate ‘some evidence’ findings” by the state

courts are factual findings – and thus are reviewed by the federal court under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2) for whether the decision was “based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence.” Id. (citing Hayward, 603 F.3d at 563). 

The nature of the offense was one basis for the Board’s conclusion that Petitioner

would be a danger to society if paroled. The Board set out the facts of the offense,

which Petitioner did not dispute:

On 11-13 of 1979 at approximately six a.m. Daryl Kohlstaddt, . . . left

his home in Spring Valley California on his way to work at the 32nd Naval

Station. His wife, Beverly Kohlstaddt, heard a commotion outside and within

a few minutes the doorbell rang and her ex-husband, Bradford Bryant, was

standing at the door. He stated that he had been in an accident and asked to

use her bathroom. She heard him washing up and then he left. 

A neighbor living directly across the street had observed a fistfight in

front of the Kohlstaddt home and called the sheriff’s office. Deputies arrived

and spoke with Ms. Kohlstaddt regarding the fight and then left. later, Ms.

Kohlstaddt noticed that her husband’s car was still parked in front of the

house. She called his place of employment and learned that he had not

reported to work. At about 12 noon she discovered her husband’s body

alongside the house. Cause of death was determined to be cerebral

lacerations and hemorrhages, left hemothorax due to skull fractures, multiple

stab wounds through the chest and back.

(Ex. 2 at 20-21.)

At the time of the hearing in 2005 Petitioner was approximately fifty-five years

old and had served a bit more than twenty-five years on his sentence of fifteen years to

life. This significant passage of time certainly reduces the evidentiary value of the

offense itself, but the Court concludes that the circumstances of the offense still are

entitled to some weight; whether they would be enough in themselves to constitute

“some evidence” need not be resolved, because the denial also is supported by other

evidence. There was evidence before the Board that Petitioner had failed to participate

in sufficient self-help programs, in particular those helping prisoners deal with anger

issues (id. at 44-48, 75-78); did not have parole plans in California, where he would have

to be released initially (id. at 56-63); and had not completed vocational programs (id. at

42). Importantly, the Board found that Petitioner’s demeanor at the hearing was “very

angry,” which combined with his lack of anger management programming and the outCase 3:07-cv-01845-JSW Document 16 Filed 08/10/10 Page 13 of 24
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of-control violence of his crime, in itself is “some evidence” that he would be a danger to

society if released. (76, 79-81.) 

In light of this evidence, the state courts’ applications of the California “some

evidence” requirement, and those courts’ consequent rejections of the claim, were not

“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.” See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). This claim therefore cannot be the basis for federal habeas relief. 

See Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1214 (federal habeas court considering California parole “some

evidence” claim must apply § 2254(d)(2)); Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562-63 (requiring

application of California’s “some evidence” standard). 

C. Biggs Claim

Petitioner contends that the Board violated his due process rights by denying

parole eleven times based on the circumstances of his offense. 

In Biggs, the court said, in dictum, that “[a] continued reliance in the future on an

unchanging factor, the circumstances of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment,

runs contrary to the rehabilitation goals espoused by the prison system and could result

in a due process violation.” 334 F.3d at 917. As discussed above, the court in Hayward

overruled any implication that such a claim might be viable. Hayward, 603 F.3d at 556. 

This claim therefore is without merit. 

D. Vague Regulation

The main ground upon which the Board based its conclusion that Petitioner would

be a danger to society if released was that: 

[t]he offense was carried out in an extremely cruel and extremely

callous manner. The victim was abused, defiled, and mutilated during the

offense by being staffed multiple times in a very violent manner and then

having a 40-pound rock thrown on his face smashing it flat. The motive for

the crime was extremely trivial in relation to the offense and that the ;prisoner

went to his ex-wife’s home to confront her husband and as the victim came

outside there was a struggle between the prisoner and the victim and the

victim was stabbed multiple times and then his skull was crushed with a rock.

In fact with the multiple stabbing there was such force that the knife was

broken off in the victim.

(Ex. 2 at 73-74.) 

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 The entire regulation reads:

§ 2402. Determination of Suitability.

(a) General. The panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is

suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a

life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the

judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society if released from prison.

(b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable information available

to the panel shall be considered in determining suitability for parole.

Such information shall include the circumstances of the prisoner's social

history; past and present mental state; past criminal history, including

involvement in other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented;

the base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before,

during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime;

any conditions of treatment or control, including the use of special

conditions under which the prisoner may safely be released to the

community; and any other information which bears on the prisoner's

suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly

establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which

results in a finding of unsuitability.

(c) Circumstances Tending to Show Unsuitability. The following

circumstances each tend to indicate unsuitability for release. These

circumstances are set forth as general guidelines; the importance

attached to any circumstance or combination of circumstances in a

particular case is left to the judgment of the panel. Circumstances

tending to indicate unsuitability include:

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in

an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to

be considered include: 

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the

same or separate incidents. 

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate

and calculated manner, such as an execution-style

murder. 

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated

during or after the offense. 

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which

15

Petitioner contends that in so holding the Board was applying Section 2402(c)(1)

of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations, which provides that a circumstance

tending to show unsuitability for parole is that the crime was committed in “an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.” 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1).5

 He argues that 

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demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering. 

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial

in relation to the offense. 

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous

occasions inflicted or attempted to inflict serious injury on

a victim, particularly if the prisoner demonstrated serious

assaultive behavior at an early age. 

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of

unstable or tumultuous relationships with others. 

(4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has previously

sexually assaulted another in a manner calculated to inflict

unusual pain or fear upon the victim. 

(5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a lengthy history of

severe mental problems related to the offense. 

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious

misconduct in prison or jail. 

(d) Circumstances Tending to Show Suitability. The following

circumstances each tend to show that the prisoner is suitable for release.

The circumstances are set forth as general guidelines; the importance

attached to any circumstance or combination of circumstances in a

particular case is left to the judgment of the panel. Circumstances

tending to indicate suitability include:

(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record of

assaulting others as a juvenile or committing crimes with a

potential of personal harm to victims. 

(2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has experienced

reasonably stable relationships with others. 

(3) Signs of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend to

indicate the presence of remorse, such as attempting to repair the

damage, seeking help for or relieving suffering of the victim, or

indicating that he understands the nature and magnitude of the

offense. 

(4) Motivation for Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as

the result of significant stress in his life, especially if the stress

has built over a long period of time. 

(5) Battered Woman Syndrome. At the time of the commission of

the crime, the prisoner suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome,

as defined in section 2000(b), and it appears the criminal

behavior was the result of that victimization. 

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(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any significant

history of violent crime. 

(7) Age. The prisoner's present age reduces the probability of

recidivism. 

(8) Understanding and Plans for Future. The prisoner has

made realistic plans for release or has developed

marketable skills that can be put to use upon release. 

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities indicate

an enhanced ability to function within the law upon

release. 

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1).

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this phrase is unconstitutionally vague. 

The United States Supreme Court has not provided any guidance as to how a

vagueness challenge to a parole regulation should be analyzed, but as the Ninth Circuit

noted in Hess v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, which did involve such a

challenge, the Supreme Court has held that a basic principle of due process is that a state

law must establish adequate guidelines to govern the exercise of discretion by state

officials, such that the law neither “authorizes [n]or even encourages arbitrary and

discriminatory enforcement.” Hess, 514 F.3d at 913 (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.

703, 732 (2000)). In deciding how that rather general proposition should be applied to

parole regulations, the Hess court noted that “[t]he Due Process Clause does not require

the same precision in the drafting of parole release statutes as is required in the drafting

of penal laws,” and concluded that in the absence of Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit

cases involving vagueness challenges to parole regulations, the Court’s “jurisprudence

concerning vagueness challenges to sentencing statutes is informative . . . .” Id. The

court held:

Like parole release statutes, sentencing statutes guide decisions about how

to impose punishments; they do not themselves define and penalize crimes. 

When faced with vagueness challenges to statutes that govern the

imposition of the death penalty, the Supreme Court has upheld the statutes

so long as they permitted a ‘principled distinction between those who

deserve the death penalty and those who do not,’ and directed the exercise

of discretion in such a way as to ‘minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and

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capricious action.’ Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774-76 (1990) (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

Hess, 514 F.3d at 914. 

This Court cannot grant habeas relief on a legal question unless the state courts’

rulings were contrary to, or an unreasonable applications of, “clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1). Hess makes clear that the only such clearly established law applicable to

parole regulations is the general proposition that state laws must contain “adequate

guidelines to govern the exercise of discretion by state officials, such that the law neither

“authorizes [n]or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Hess, 514

F.3d at 913 (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)). The standard Hess

adopted for parole regulations – that the regulations must provide a “‘principled

distinction between those who deserve [parole] and those who do not’” and direct the

exercise of discretion in such a way as to “‘minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and

capricious action’” – is not a holding of the Supreme Court, and thus cannot be directly

applied here, but it is persuasive authority on the question whether a particular state court

holding is an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent or in assessing

what law is "clearly established." Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (9th Cir.

2003). 

In Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993), the Supreme Court considered an Idaho

death penalty statute that included as an aggravating factor that the crime was carried out

with an “utter disregard for human life.” Id. at 470-78. It held that the phrase was not

impermissibly vague because a limiting construction had been adopted which defined the

factor as meaning those crimes demonstrating “the utmost disregard for human life, i.e.,

the cold-blooded pitiless slayer.” Hess makes clear that Arave is useful authority,

despite its being a sentencing case, in considering whether the state court decisions here

were unreasonable.

Here, the phrase to which Petitioner objects is followed in the regulation by a list

of five factors for the Board to consider when determining whether a crime is especially

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“heinous, atrocious or cruel,” including the presence of multiple victims, the abuse or

mutilation of the victim and a trivial motive for the crime. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2402(c)(1)(A)-(E). The five factors serve to limit the more general “heinous, atrocious

or cruel” phrase sufficiently to prevent it from being unconstitutionally vague, just as did

the judicial construction in Arave. Those factors provide the sort of guidelines to prevent

arbitrary enforcement that the court in Hess recognized are required by Supreme Court

authority to avoid a due process problem. It thus was not unreasonable for the state

courts to reject this claim. 

E. Apprendi Claim

Petitioner claims that the Board’s action violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466 (2000), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and Cunningham v.

California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007). 

The rule from Apprendi and its progeny is that, "under the Sixth Amendment, any

fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence [than the statutory

maximum] must be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable

doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the evidence." Cunningham v. California, 127

S. Ct. 856, 863-64 (2007). The relevant statutory maximum "'is not the maximum

sentence a judge may impose after finding additional fact, but the maximum he may

impose without any additional findings.’" Id. at 860 (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542

U.S. 296 303-04 (2004)).

The Blakely court explained that the Apprendi rationale does not apply to

indeterminate sentencing within the permitted sentence range. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at

309 (“Of course indeterminate schemes involve judicial factfinding, in that a judge (like

a parole board) may implicitly rule on those facts he deems important to the exercise of

his sentencing discretion. But the facts do not pertain to whether the defendant has a

legal right to a lesser sentence – and that makes all the difference insofar as judicial

impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is concerned.”). That is, the heart of

the analysis is whether the statutory scheme requires that a certain sentence be imposed

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upon the finding of certain facts. 

In California, for persons sentenced to a term of years to life, as petitioner was,

the sentence is a life sentence until he or she is found suitable for parole. See

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1083-84 ("an inmate whose offense was so serious as to

warrant, at the outset, a maximum term of life in prison, may be denied parole during

whatever time the Board deems required for ‘this individual' by ‘consideration of the

public safety.'" (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b) (emphasis in original)). And

although there are regulations applicable to the parole board’s decision whether to find

an inmate suitable for parole, those regulations "are set forth as general guidelines; the

importance attached to any circumstance or combination of circumstances in a particular

case is left to the judgment of the panel." Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402 (c), (d)). That

is, the regulations do not require a particular outcome when a particular fact or facts are

found, which is the required predicate for application of the Apprendi/Blakely rule. 

Because Petitioner does not have a legal right to a lesser sentence when particular facts

are found, see Blakely, 542 U.S. at 309, the Apprendi/Blakely rule is inapplicable and

this claim is without merit.

F. Remaining Claims: Letters Opposing Parole, Prosecutor’s Opposition, Written Decision, and Liberty Interest

The issues the Court has labeled issues six through ten in the list on page three,

above, do not require extended discussion. These are Petitioner’s claims that the

Board’s consideration of letters opposing parole violated his rights under the Ex Post

Facto Clause; the Board’s consideration of opposition to parole by the prosecutor’s

office violated the plea agreement; the Board did not provide a written decision

sufficient to allow review, a violation of due process; the Board’s denial of parole was

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in the plea

agreement; and that he has a federal liberty interest in parole.

///

1. Claim Six

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In the heading for his “some evidence” issue, which is claim five in the petition,

Petitioner asserts, in addition to the “some evidence” claim discussed above, that the

Board’s consideration of letters from the victim’s family and from the district attorney

violated his ex post facto rights. Because this issue is unrelated to the main “some

evidence” issue, the Court has treated it as a separate issue and labeled it issue six. 

Petitioner does not refer to the ex post facto claim in his discussion of his claim five, but

for no obvious reason there is some discussion of it in the argument in support of a later

claim. 

From Petitioner’s brief discussion it appears that the ex post facto claim is based

on his belief that the right of the public and the prosecutor to participate in the hearing

was provided by statute in 1984, after he had committed the crime. Even if this were

true, it would not be a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See California Dep't of

Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995) (new state law that simply alters "'the

method to be followed' in fixing parole release date under identical substantive

standards" not Ex Post Facto violation); Johnson v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 964, 967 (9th Cir.

1996) (retroactive application of law that transfers final decision on parole from Board of

Prison Terms to governor does not violate Ex Post Facto Clause). The same would be

true of any letter of opposition from the prosecutor. 

2. Claim Seven

 In the heading for his claim five Petitioner also asserts that the Board’s

consideration of the prosecutor’s opposition to parole violated his plea agreement, a

claim the Court has labeled claim seven. Petitioner does not point to any provision in the

plea agreement that the prosecutor would not oppose parole, and the record does not

contain any such provision. This claim is without merit.

3. Claim Eight

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor’s opposition to parole was a breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that California law implies in every

contract. In the absence of any agreement in the plea bargain that Petitioner would be

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paroled after ten years, as discussed above, there is nothing of bad faith or unfairness

about the prosecution’s opposition to parole. 

4. Claim Nine

Petitioner also contends that the Board failed “to provide a written record that can

be reviewed by the court in a meaningful way as provided by due process.” (Pet. 35.) 

There was a written decision, so it appears that Petitioner’s real complaint is that it was

pro forma and thus not sufficient to allow meaningful review. 

There is a federal requirement that the Board provide an explanation of the

reasons for denial, but no federal requirement that it be written or that it be sufficient to

allow effective review; the purpose of the requirement that reasons be given is so the

inmate will know in what ways he falls short, not to facilitate review. See Greenholtz v.

Nebraska, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979). In any case, the record is more than sufficient to allow

meaningful review. This claim is without merit.

5. Claim Ten

Finally, Petitioner contends that he has a liberty interest in parole. This is true,

see Pirtle, 2010 WL 2732888 at * 4, but it is not in itself a ground for relief.

IV. Appealability

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently

been amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a

certificate of appealability in the ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases,

28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). 

A petitioner may not appeal a final order in a federal habeas corpus proceeding

without first obtaining a certificate of appealability (formerly known as a certificate of

probable cause to appeal). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A judge

shall grant a certificate of appealability "only if the applicant has made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The certificate

must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. See id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy

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§ 2253(c) is straightforward: the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists

would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or

wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000). 

For the reasons set out above, jurists of reason would not find the result debatable

or wrong. A certificate of appealability will be denied. Petitioner is advised that he may

not appeal the denial of a COA, but he may ask the court of appeals to issue a COA

under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a), Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases. 

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The Clerk shall close the

file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 10, 2010 JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

G:\PRO-SE\JSW\HC.07\Bryant1845.RUL.wpd

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRADFORD O. BRYANT,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BEN CURRY et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV07-01845 JSW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S.

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on August 10, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter

listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an

inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Bradford O. Bryant

CTF

P.O. Box 689

C-16113

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

Dated: August 10, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Jennifer Ottolini, Deputy Clerk

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