Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05533/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05533-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLARK FRATUS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-05533-MEJ 

ORDER RE: MOTION TO ALTER 

JUDGMENT AND/OR RELIEF FROM 

FINAL JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 102

INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiffs Clark Fratus and Karla Fratus (“Plaintiffs”) move to alter or amend the 

judgment entered on September 30, 2016 and/or for relief from said judgment pursuant to Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”) 59(e) and 60(b). Mot., Dkt. No. 102. Defendants1filed an 

Opposition (Dkt. No. 104), and Plaintiffs filed a Reply (Dkt. No. 105). The Court has carefully 

reviewed Plaintiffs‟ Motion, as it did their Opposition and supporting evidence at summary 

judgment. In doing so, the Court has frankly often struggled to understand Plaintiffs‟ writing and 

arguments, and thus, in the interests of justice, has spent a significant amount of time and 

resources pouring over the record. But at this point, the Court ultimately finds no grounds to grant 

the relief they seek. As such, the Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral 

argument and VACATES the December 8, 2016 hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7-

1(b). Having considered the parties‟ positions, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, 

 

1

“Defendants” are the County of Contra Costa (“County”), Catherine Kutsuris (former Director of 

the County‟s Department of Conservation and Development (“DCD”)), Jason Crapo (Deputy 

Director for the Building Inspection Division of DCD), Michael Angelo Silva (former Chief of the 

Property Conservation section of the Building Inspection Department), Gano Thomas (former 

Principal Building Inspector and Office Coordinator for East County Satellite Office), Robert 

Erickson (County building inspector), Aruna Bhat (Deputy Director of Community Development 

Division in DCD), and Keith Denison (DCD‟s Application and Permit Center Manager).

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the Court DENIES Plaintiffs‟ Motion as set forth below.

BACKGROUND

This action arose out of a code enforcement action initiated originally in 2007 on 

Plaintiffs‟ properties at 2284 and 2300 Dutch Slough Road in the Oakley area of unincorporated 

Contra Costa County (the “Properties”). The County‟s Department of Conservation and 

Development (“DCD”) issued code enforcement violations and imposed fines on Plaintiffs‟ 

Properties. Plaintiffs appealed the notices of fines, and in late 2009, Defendants Jason Crapo, a 

Building Official, and Robert Drake, the Deputy Zoning Administrator, heard the appeal. Less 

than a month later, Crapo and Drake issued a final administrative order upholding the fines.

Following the decision, Plaintiffs filed a writ of mandamus in Contra Costa County 

Superior Court. In June 2011, the state court granted Plaintiffs‟ motion for administrative 

mandate, finding the DCD‟s findings were not supported by the evidence, which rather reflected 

that both Properties had been permitted during the 1960s for two stories of living space. 

Although Plaintiffs chose not to act on the state court‟s mandate, on July 26, 2011, 

Plaintiffs filed their first federal action concerning the code enforcement case, naming the same 

defendants they name in this case (except for Defendant Denison, who was named for the first 

time in this case) and asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their procedural 

and substantive due process rights. That case is Clark Fratus, et al., v. Contra Costa Board of 

Supervisors, et al., Case No. 11-cv-3659-JSC (N.D. Cal.) (“Fratus I”).

In the interim period, a number of actions were taken. On February 2, 2012, DCD

rescinded the fines, and on June 26, 2012, recorded a release of the Assessment Liens on the 

Properties. Then on November 27, 2012, DCD recorded Notices of Pending Nuisance Abatement 

on both properties, closing the code enforcement actions on the Properties. On December 18, 

2012, Plaintiffs went to the County‟s Application and Permits Center and filled out a “Planning 

Information Request” form. According to Plaintiffs, Defendant Denison told them he would not 

allow them to submit an application because second units are not permitted in the F-1 zoning, and 

Plaintiffs “left the office unable to even file an application.” See K. Fratus Suppl. Decl. ¶ 7, Dkt. 

No. 85 (“Keith Denison told me that he would not allow me to submit an application because 

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second units are not permitted in the F-1 zoning. . . . Mr. Denison would not accept the form[.]”). 

On December 21, 2012, Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley granted the defendants‟

motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in their favor. Fratus I Order re: Mot. for 

Summ. J., Dkt. No. 119; Fratus I Judgment, Dkt. No. 120. Judge Corley concluded Plaintiffs‟

procedural due process claim—which alleged defendant Crapo was biased in favor of DCD—

failed as a matter of law because there was no genuine dispute that DCD revenues from fines for 

the applicable time periods were de minimis. Judge Corley also granted summary judgment to the 

defendants on Plaintiffs‟ substantive due process claim because Plaintiffs had failed to raise an 

issue of fact as to whether Defendants‟ conduct in enforcing the applicable land use and building 

codes was arbitrary or egregious. Fratus I Order re: Mot. for Summ. J. at 11-12. 

Plaintiffs moved for relief from Judge Corley‟s summary judgment order, which she 

subsequently denied. Fratus I Order Denying Relief from Final Judgment, Dkt. No. 144. In doing 

so, Judge Corley recognized that “Defendants . . . rescinded the fines and released the Assessment 

Liens for Plaintiffs‟ failure to pay their fines, as well as the Notice of Pending Nuisance 

Abatement.” Id. at 2; Fratus v. Contra Costa Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 2013 WL 5645195, at *1 

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2013). Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed. The Ninth 

Circuit found, among other things, that “[t]he County‟s conclusion that a 1951 county ordinance 

prohibited attached second living units in Plaintiffs‟ homes was not „egregious.‟” Fratus v. 

Contra Costa Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 599 F. App‟x 707, 708-09 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Brittain 

v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 996 (9th Cir. 2006)). It agreed “DCD employees did not act in ways that

„shock[] the conscience‟ and they did not „intend[] to injure in some way unjustifiable by any 

government interest.‟” Id. (quoting Brittain, 451 F.3d at 991) (edits in original). 

Plaintiffs filed the above-captioned case in state court on February 14, 2014, and 

Defendants removed the action to this Court on December 18, 2014. Notice of Rem., Dkt. No. 1. 

Plaintiffs filed three state law claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as a claim for

inverse condemnation. See First Am. Compl. (“Compl.”), Causes of Action 1-3 (“state law 

claims”), Dkt. No. 1-2. They also filed three federal claims for denial of equal protection, First 

Amendment retaliation, and denial of substantive due process. See id., Causes of Action 4-6 

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(“federal claims”). 

On September 30, 2016, this Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants‟ Motion 

for Summary Judgment. Summ. J. Order, Dkt. No. 97. After holding a hearing in this matter and 

allowing Plaintiffs a further opportunity to file supplemental briefing and evidence to support their 

claims (Minute Entry re: Hrg., Dkt. No. 82; Suppl. Br. Order, Dkt. No. 83), the Court determined 

Plaintiffs‟ federal claims did not withstand summary judgment and declined to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims. Summ. J. Order at 21; Judgment, 

Dkt. No. 98. Specifically, the Court found: (1) “Plaintiffs‟ substantive due process and equal 

protection claims are barred based on res judicata as they were resolved or could have been 

resolved in Fratus I” and “[t]he same is true for Plaintiffs‟ state law claims to the extent they could 

have been brought and adjudicated in Fratus I”; and (2) their First Amendment retaliation claim

failed because they “identified no evidence that any of Defendants‟ allegedly unlawful acts were 

taken because Plaintiffs engaged in protected speech[.]” Summ. J. Order at 19-20. 

Plaintiffs now move to alter or amend the judgment. On the same day they filed this 

Motion, Plaintiffs also appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Notice of Appeal, Dkt. No. 

103. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), “[r]econsideration is appropriate if the 

district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the 

initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” 

Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc. (Multnomah Cty.), 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th 

Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). “[A] Rule 59(e) motion is an „extraordinary remedy, to be used 

sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.‟” Wood v. Ryan, 759 

F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014) (quoting Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate 

of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides for reconsideration of a judgment where 

one or more of the following is shown: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; 

(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered before the 

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court‟s decision; (3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has 

been satisfied; or (6) any other reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Relief under Rule 

60(b)(6)—“any other reason justifying relief”—requires a party to “show „extraordinary 

circumstances,‟” such as circumstances showing “the party is faultless in the delay.” Pioneer Inv. 

Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993) (citations omitted). Such relief 

“normally will not be granted unless the moving party is able to show both injury and that 

circumstances beyond its control prevented timely action to protect its interests.” United States v. 

Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F. 2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993).

“Rule 59(e) permits a court to alter or amend judgment, but it „may not be used to relitigate 

old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry 

of judgment.‟” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (quotation omitted). 

A party seeking reconsideration under either Rule 59 and Rule 60 must do more than rehash 

arguments or raise contentions that could have been considered prior to the challenged judgment.

See Young v. Peery, 163 F. Supp. 3d 751, 753 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2015); United States v. 

Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1130-31 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2001).

DISCUSSION

A. Bases for Plaintiffs’ Motion

Plaintiffs do not contend they discovered new evidence since the Court rendered the 

judgment in this matter; rather, their arguments suggest they challenge whether (1) the Court 

committed clear error or (2) the Summary Judgment Order was manifestly unjust, and thus 

justifies relief from the corresponding judgment. They also indicate there may have been an 

intervening change in controlling law. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs raise the following arguments in support of their Motion: (1) they 

contend the Notices of Final Disposition and Release “affirmatively stated the Fratus properties 

were not in violation” making the “state of knowledge of the county officials [] different in 

December 2012” and “[a]ny inference that the County was acting in good faith but mistaken belief 

about the law was no longer available to them in 2012” (see Mot. at 1-2); (2) “[i]n 2013 plaintiffs . 

. . discovered the zoning history” including an ordinance from 1947 which “[e]videnced . . . 

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duplexes . . . etc. have always been permitted in the plaintiffs zoning district” and “[t[he county 

has acted in bad faith and intentionally misrepresented the fact that „DUPLEXES‟ contrary to what 

Aruna Bhat‟s Declaration Document 36 Filed 02/11/16 misrepresents to this court and 

misrepresented to Judge Corley‟s Court” (id. at 3); (3) “the county‟s position on zoning and the 

misinterpretation conflicts with the mandatory state laws in which the county has adopted 

specifically in their county ordinances which contain the mandatory language „shall‟ and 

Government Code § 65852.2 and the position taken by Defendants Aruna Bhat and Keith 

Deninson are contrary to the law” and “county defendants have never had the legal authority to 

deny the second units” (id.); (4) “[t]he Corley court failed to consider the 2011 Brady Order” (id.); 

(5) “[i]n August and September of 2016 Governor Jerry Brown signed four new bills which 

support the laws and the contentions the county defendants have ministerial and mandatory duties 

to approve the second units prospectively” (id. at 4); (6) a “much more plausible inference” about 

why Denison “refused to even consider an application to legalize those units . . . . is that the 

County was retaliating against the Fratus‟ for their lawsuit, particularly since County had already 

acknowledged the fundamental premise that the second units were not in violation, and this was 

also established by the State Court” (id.); and (7) “[i]f the majority of units in the area have second 

units and the County has acknowledged there was no violation at the Fratus‟ property, there is 

clearly a triable issue of fact with respect to their motive, whether retaliatory or in violation of 

equal protection” (id. at 5) (errors in original). 

B. Analysis

Amending judgment is an “extraordinary remedy,” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 

1101, 1113 (9th Cir. 2011), and Rule 59(e) “may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise 

arguments or present evidence that could have been made prior to the entry of judgment,” Exxon 

Shipping, 554 U.S. at 485 n.5. Nor is re-litigation of argument appropriate for a Rule 60 motion.

See Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.

As an initial matter, the Court finds that all of Plaintiffs‟ arguments either were or could 

have been presented in Plaintiffs‟ Opposition to Defendants‟ Motion for Summary Judgment and 

supplemental briefing. Plaintiffs‟ dissatisfaction with the Court‟s ruling on arguments the parties 

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already presented is not a valid basis for a motion under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). This alone is a 

sufficient reason to deny the present Motion. Nor is the fact that Plaintiffs timely filed their 

Motion a reason to grant it, as they appear to suggest. See Reply at 8-9 (“Plaintiffs have timely 

filed their motion in satisfaction of Rule 59(e). Defendants continued arguments are without 

substance or merit as it applies to Rule 59(e).”). 

Nonetheless, the Court discusses Plaintiffs‟ specific arguments below. 

1. Evidence & Arguments Available to Plaintiffs in Fratus I

Plaintiffs raise a number of arguments and evidence that they raised or could have raised in 

Fratus I. First, Plaintiffs point to a 1947 zoning history, which includes Ordinance 382. They 

contend this Ordinance shows duplexes have been permitted in the area of Plaintiffs‟ Properties, 

and based on this evidence Defendants “misrepresented” the zoning laws to Judge Corley. Mot. at 

3. While Plaintiffs may have only found this evidence in 2013, they have not shown it was 

somehow not procurable until then. Plaintiffs had the duty to put forward their best arguments in 

Fratus I, and to the extent they contend Defendants had a duty to present this evidence in Fratus I, 

they have not demonstrated this to be the case. They have not shown how the 1947 zoning 

ordinance related to duplexes supports the legality of their specific Properties, nor have they 

explained that Defendants knew or should have known about that Ordinance, that it was still 

effective, or that it justifies a finding that Defendants‟ actions were irrational or arbitrary. See also 

Opp‟n at 5 n.2 (indicating a difference between duplexes and second units—the latter of which are 

at issue here).

Second, Plaintiffs contend the position taken by Defendants is “contrary to the law” and

“county defendants have never had the legal authority to deny the second units[.]” Mot. at 3. 

Third, and relatedly, they contend “[t]he Corley court failed to consider the 2011 Brady Order” 

because County counsel “misle[d]” Judge Corley. Id. As a preliminary matter, the Court lacks 

jurisdiction to review the Fratus I judgment. In any event, Plaintiffs raised and could have raised

the same arguments about Defendants‟ legal authority to deny the second units as well as Judge 

Brady‟s Order in Fratus I. Judge Corley considered the County‟s basis for its decisions, 

(including the same basis used by Defendants Bhat and Denison, which Plaintiffs challenged again 

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in this action) and found Plaintiffs had not shown Defendants‟ decision was arbitrary or irrational. 

Plaintiffs had the opportunity to explain Judge Brady‟s order before Judge Corley rendered her 

summary judgment order, and furthermore, it is clear Judge Corley considered Judge Brady‟s 

order at the time of her decision. See Fratus I Order re: Mot. for Summ. J. at 4 (discussing 2011 

State Court Order); Fratus I Order Denying Relief from Final Judgment at 2 (same). In sum, none 

of these arguments or the evidence justifies overturning the judgment.

2. Denison‟s December 2012 Decision on Plaintiffs‟ Planning Information Request

Plaintiffs essentially argue the Court should infer that in December 2012 Denison knew of 

the November 27, 2012 Notices of Final Disposition and Release of Notice of Pending Nuisance 

Abatement Proceeding for the Properties, the State Court‟s Order, and that other units “in the 

area” had “second units.” See Mot. at 3, 5. They then argue Denison‟s decision on their Planning 

Information Request was intentional, irrational, and/or arbitrary in finding second units are not 

permitted on Plaintiffs‟ Properties; instead, they posit that Denison‟s decision is a result of the 

County retaliating against Plaintiffs for their lawsuit. Id. at 4.

The Court considered the two November 27, 2012 Notices of Final Disposition and 

Release of Notice of Pending Nuisance Abatement Proceeding for the Properties, and the same 

arguments Plaintiff reassert here: i.e., that the Notices “constitute an admission by the County that 

there was never a problem with their existing second unit use of those properties” because “[t]he 

Notices were issued without the Fratus‟ having made any renovations, modifications or 

improvements of any kind to their Dutch Slough Road properties[.]” Summ. J. Mot. at 9 (quoting 

Pls.‟ Suppl. Br. at 2, Dkt. No. 84; and considering Suppl. K. Fratus Decl., Exs. A-B at 12

(Notices), Dkt. Nos. 85-(1-2) & id., Ex. 3 (copy of part of envelope allegedly containing notices)). 

The Court ultimately found the Notices and the delay in sending them immaterial to any dispute in 

the action, noting “these Notices show termination of the code enforcement actions to Plaintiffs‟ 

 

2

The second pages of these exhibits contain pictures and Plaintiffs‟ commentary and arguments 

about their Properties and this case. See Civ. L.R. 7-5 (declarations “must avoid conclusions and 

argument” or “may be stricken in whole or in part”).

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benefit—not a deprivation of rights.” Id. at 9 (citing Brittain, 451 F.3d at 991 (“Substantive due 

process protects individuals from arbitrary deprivation of their liberty by government.” (emphasis 

added))). It also found no basis for Plaintiffs‟ argument that the Notices constitute an admission 

that “there was never a problem” with their Properties. Id. As previously explained, objectively, 

the Notices do not say there was never a problem with the Properties. See Notices (stating the 

“nuisance abatement proceeding[s]” have “been completed” and the “propert[ies] [are] no longer

in violation” (emphasis added)). And even if Plaintiffs did not make changes to their Properties, 

they provided the Court with “no objective evidence to support their interpretation of the Notices 

or to dispute Defendants‟ evidence” that DCD had issued the notices to help resolve Fratus I. See 

Crapo Decl. ¶¶ 16-17, Dkt. No. 38. As there was “no other evidence to support Plaintiffs‟ 

interpretation of the Notices,” the Court found “they cannot use these Notices to establish a 

genuine dispute of fact that Defendants‟ prior actions related to Plaintiffs‟ Properties were 

unreasonable or arbitrary.” Summ. J. Order at 10. As indicated, the Court thus considered the 

Plaintiffs‟ arguments and ultimately found Plaintiffs had failed to support their position. 

Consequently, as to Plaintiffs‟ argument that these Notices changed Denison‟s “state of 

knowledge” (Mot. at 2), Plaintiffs provided no support that Denison knew about these Notices; 

that he should have known about the Notices; or that if he did know about the Notices they would 

have or should have altered his actions when he considered Plaintiffs‟ Planning Information 

Request. The same is true for the State Court‟s Order and the information about the second units: 

Plaintiffs provided no support that Denison knew about them; should have known about them; or 

that this information should have altered his actions. See Summ. J. Order at 16 n. 11 (noting state

court did not “finally determine the legality” of the Properties, but found “based on the 

administrative record before it, DCD‟s findings were not supported by the evidence.”). To the 

extent Plaintiffs contend the evidence about other properties in the area having second units 

demonstrates Defendants‟ actions at to them was irrational or arbitrary, Plaintiffs had the 

opportunity to raise this evidence in Fratus I to challenge the rational basis for Defendants‟ 

decisions. See id. at 17 n.12 (discussing same). There is no evidence Denison was acting 

arbitrarily or irrationally at the time made his decision on the Planning Information Request.

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On the contrary, the only evidence in the record about Denison‟s decision is that he based 

his conclusion on the same reasoning that Judge Corley found “not wholly unreasonable” and “at 

least „fairly debatable‟” (Fratus I Order re: Mot. for Summ. J. at 12), a decision the Ninth Circuit 

affirmed. See Summ. J. Order at 15 (discussing same). This finding means Plaintiffs‟ substantive 

due process and equal protection claims are barred as they both apply the same rational-basis 

review. Id. at 16-17; see Brittain, 451 F.3d at 991; N. Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 

478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008) (“plaintiff must establish that the City intentionally, and without rational 

basis, treated the plaintiff differently from others similarly situated” (citations omitted)); see also

Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he rational relation test will not 

sustain conduct by state officials that is malicious, irrational or plainly arbitrary.” (citation 

omitted)).

Finally, as to Plaintiffs‟ argument that Denison was retaliating against Plaintiffs for 

exercising their First Amendment rights, as the Court previously found, there is no evidence in the 

record to support this claim, as an “inference” or otherwise. See Summ. J. Order at 20. Again, 

“Plaintiffs have identified no evidence that any of Defendants‟ allegedly unlawful acts were taken 

because Plaintiffs engaged in protected speech, such as by showing that Denison even knew about 

the lawsuit in Fratus I.” Id. Even if Denison knew about the other lawsuit at the time of his 

decision, there is no evidence he used that a basis for his decision on Plaintiffs‟ Planning 

Information Request. Finally, as the Court also noted, there is no “evidence that any of 

Defendants‟ acts would chill a person of ordinary firmness from speaking out. Plaintiffs have 

presented no evidence on which a jury could find in their favor on this claim.” Id.; see Blair v. 

Bethel Sch. Dist., 608 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 2010) (to prove a First Amendment retaliation claim, 

“a plaintiff must prove: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) as a result, he was 

subjected to adverse action by the defendant that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from 

continuing to engage in the protected activity; and (3) there was a substantial causal relationship 

between the constitutionally protected activity and the adverse action.” (quoting Pinard v. 

Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006))). 

In sum, none of the foregoing arguments and evidence warrant altering the judgment.

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3. New Laws Signed in August and September 2016

The last argument Plaintiffs provide in support of their Motion is that:

In August and September of 2016 Governor Jerry Brown signed 

four new bills which support the laws and the contentions the county 

defendants have ministerial and mandatory duties to approve the 

second units prospectively. The current laws in place are defined by 

AB 1866 (Wright) amended the law in 2003 in three ways: 

• On and after July 1, 2003, an application received pursuant to a 

local ordinance adopted pursuant to Government Code § 65852.2(a) 

must be considered ministerially without discretionary review or 

hearing.[] The section in the law that allowed a city to require a 

conditional use permit was deleted. 

• Effective January 1, 2003, an application received by a city that 

has not adopted its own ordinance, must be approved or 

disapproved ministerially without discretionary review.

Mot. at 4 (footnote omitted, errors and emphasis in original). 

Plaintiffs do not explain how the foregoing supports any of the claims raised in this case. 

Even if as of “August and September of 2016” Defendants now have a duty to “approve the 

second units prospectively” this does not show that Defendants violated Plaintiffs‟ rights in the 

past. DCD closed the code enforcement action on Plaintiffs‟ Properties in November 2012, and 

Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that Defendants currently violate the code section Plaintiffs 

identify above. 

CONCLUSION

In sum, based on the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to alter or amend its Judgment 

and accordingly DENIES Plaintiffs‟ Motions brought pursuant to Rules 59(e) and 60(b)(1).3 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

//

//

 

3

Plaintiffs raise a number of new arguments in their Reply not addressed in their Motion. See

Reply at 8 (asserting County Defendants made false statements); id. at 11 (“Upon Fratus‟ hiring a 

supervising attorney, this court erred in dismissing the hearing and the opportunity for Counsel to 

make oral argument on Plaintiffs behalf and striking supporting Declarations.” (errors in original); 

id. at 11-12 (arguing the Court improperly struck Plaintiffs‟ four expert witness reports). As any 

new arguments Plaintiffs make on Reply are waived, see Bazuaye v. I.N.S., 79 F.3d 118, 120 (9th 

Cir. 1996), the Court declines to consider them. 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Dated: November 28, 2016

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:14-cv-05533-MEJ Document 107 Filed 11/28/16 Page 12 of 12