Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02271/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02271-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 368
Nature of Suit: Asbestos Personal Injury - Prod.liab.
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARA J. BALLENGER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

AGCO CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 06-2271 CW

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION

TO REMAND CASE AND

FOR PAYMENT OF FEES

AND COSTS

Plaintiffs Mara J. Ballenger, individually and on behalf of

the Estate of John M. Ballenger, James M. Ballenger and Charles J.

Ballenger move to remand this action to state court. Defendant

Todd Shipyards Corporation opposes this motion and requests that,

if the Court is inclined to grant Plaintiffs' motion, the Court

certify its order for interlocutory appeal. The motion was heard

on June 21, 2007. Having considered all of the papers filed by the 

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United States District Court

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Although the complaint does not identify any particular

vessel on which Mr. Ballenger worked, Plaintiffs state that, during

a major overhaul at Todd Shipyards in San Pedro, California, Mr.

Ballenger was exposed to asbestos while serving as a Naval officer

on the USS Tappahannock.

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parties and oral argument, the Court denies Plaintiffs' motion to

remand.

BACKGROUND

John M. Ballenger died of mesothelioma in 2005. Before his

death, he and his wife filed suit for asbestos personal injury and

loss of consortium in San Francisco County Superior Court. Todd

Shipyards was named as a defendant in that action. After it

threatened to remove the action, however, Mr. and Mrs. Ballenger

dismissed without prejudice the claims against Todd Shipyards. 

Plaintiffs explain that Mr. Ballenger's health was rapidly

declining and they could not risk the delay that would have been

caused by removal; Mr. Ballenger died shortly thereafter. 

After his death, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint,

seeking damages for asbestos-caused wrongful death and loss of

consortium and reviving the claims against Defendant Todd

Shipyards. Plaintiffs bring negligence and strict liability causes

of action against "Asbestos Defendants," which includes Defendant

Todd Shipyards. The complaint alleges that Mr. Ballenger's

terminal mesothelioma stemmed, in part, from his occupational

exposure to asbestos-containing products while working on premises

owned or operated by Defendant Todd Shipyards.1 

According to the complaint, Defendant Todd Shipyards'

employees and contractors negligently exposed Mr. Ballenger to

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In Westbrook, the court remanded an action that was

improperly removed to federal court under the federal officer

removal statute and awarded the plaintiffs the amount they incurred

in attorneys' fees bringing the motion to remand. There, unlike

here, the plaintiffs disclaimed, in writing, any claims arising out

of work done on U.S. Navy vessels.

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airborne asbestos fibers by working with asbestos-containing

materials in his presence and then failed to warn him of the

hazardous condition. The complaint states that Defendant Todd

Shipyards' duty to warn Mr. Ballenger was independent of any

potential role the U.S. Navy might have played in specifying the

use of asbestos-containing materials on Navy ships and cites

Westbrook v. Asbestos Defendants, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11575 (N.D.

Cal.).2

The complaint further states:

The Federal Courts lack jurisdiction over this action and

removal is therefore improper. There is incomplete diversity

of citizenship due to the presence of a California ASBESTOS

DEFENDANT. Every claim arising under the Constitution,

treaties, or laws of the United States is expressly

disclaimed. This includes any claim arising from an act on a

Federal Enclave as defined by Article I, section 8, clause 17

of the United States Constitution. This also includes any

claim arising from any act or omission of the United States,

any agency thereof, any officer of the United States, or a

claim against any other person or entity that is based on an

act that was performed under specific direction of the United

States, any agency thereof or any Officer of the United

States. No claim of admiralty or maritime law is raised. 

Plaintiffs sue no foreign state or agency.

First Amended Complaint, ¶ 8. 

On March 30, 2006, Defendant Todd Shipyard filed its notice of

removal, contending that removal is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

section 1442(a)(1). Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand. Before

the Court ruled on Plaintiffs' motion, the Judicial Panel on

Multidistrict Litigation (MDL Panel) ordered this case transferred

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Specifically, § 1442(a)(1) provides:

A civil or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court

against any of the following persons may be removed by them to

the district court of the United States for the district and

division embracing the place wherein it is pending:

(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or

person acting under him, for any act under color of such

office or on account of any right, title or authority claimed

under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment

of criminals or the collection of the revenue.

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to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for coordinated or

consolidated pretrial proceedings. The Eastern District of

Pennsylvania court severed all claims for punitive damages and

advised the MDL Panel that coordinated or consolidated pretrial

proceedings with respect to the remaining claims had been

completed. After the MDL panel conditionally remanded all claims

in this case, except for the severed punitive damages claims, to

this Court, Plaintiffs re-noticed their motion to remand.

DISCUSSION

I. Remand

Defendant Todd Shipyards argues that it properly removed this

action under the federal officer removal statute, which provides

that an action may be removed by “any officer of the United States

or any agency thereof, or person acting under him, for any act

under color of such office.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).3 

Generally, removal statutes are to be strictly construed; any

doubt as to the right to remove should resolved in favor of

remanding to state court. See, e.g., Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d

564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). But that is not the case concerning the

federal officer removal statute. See Durham v. Lockheed Martin

Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that, because it

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is important to the federal government to protect federal officers,

removal rights under section 1442 are much broader than those under

section 1441). The Ninth Circuit instructs that there is a “clear

command from both Congress and the Supreme Court that when federal

officers and their agents are seeking a federal forum, we are to

interpret section 1442 broadly in favor of removal.” Id. (noting

that the Supreme Court has "insisted that the policy favoring

removal 'should not be frustrated by a narrow, grudging

interpretation of § 1442(a)(1)'" (quoting Arizona v. Manypenny, 451

U.S. 232, 242 (1981))).

As the Supreme Court explained in Jefferson County v. Acker,

527 U.S. 423 (1999),

It is the general rule that an action may be removed from

state court to federal court only if a federal district court

would have original jurisdiction over the claim in suit. To

remove a case as one falling within federal-question

jurisdiction, the federal question ordinarily must appear on

the face of a properly pleaded complaint; an anticipated or

actual federal defense generally does not qualify a case for

removal. Suits against federal officers are exceptional in

this regard. Under the federal officer removal statute, suits

against federal officers may be removed despite the nonfederal

cast of the complaint.

527 U.S. at 430-31 (citations omitted). 

Thus, the fact that Plaintiffs' complaint expressly disavows

any federal claims is not determinative. Rather, removal is proper

under the federal officer removal statute if the moving party:

(1) demonstrates that it acted under the direction of a federal

officer; (2) raises a colorable federal defense to the plaintiff's

claims; and (3) demonstrates a causal nexus between the plaintiff's

claims and the defendant's acts performed under color of federal 

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4In addition, the removing party must qualify as a "person"

for purposes of 28 U.S.C. section 1441(a). As a corporation,

Defendant Todd Shipyards meets this preliminary requirement. See

Fung, 816 F. Supp. at 572.

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office. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 124-25, 134-35 (1989);

Fung v. Abex Corp., 816 F. Supp. 569, 571-72 (N.D. Cal. 1992).4

A. Acts under the direction of a federal officer

To show that it was acting under the direction of a federal

officer, Defendant Todd Shipyards must show that a federal officer

had "direct and detailed control" over it. Fung, 816 F. Supp. at

572. If it "establishes 'only that the relevant acts occurred

under the general auspices of a federal officer,' such as being a

participant in a regulated industry," it is not entitled to remove

under section 1442(a)(1). Id. (quoting Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co.,

781 F. Supp. 934, 947 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)).

Defendant Todd Shipyards contends that it acted under the

direction of U.S. Navy officers and provides declarations

supporting this contention. According to a retired U.S. Navy

Admiral, at the time that Mr. Ballenger was on the USS

Tappahannock, all private contractors, such as Defendant Todd

Shipyards, performed their work pursuant to precise requirements

imposed by the Navy and under the Navy's detailed supervision; "the

Navy dictated every aspect of the design, manufacture,

installation, overhaul, written documentation and warnings

associated with its ships, including the USS Tappahannock" and did

not permit deviations from its contractors. Horne Dec., ¶ 15. 

Among the requirements the Navy imposed on private contractors was

that they use asbestos-containing materials in the maintenance and

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repair of Naval vessels. Admiral Roger B. Horne states that, in

his opinion, "no private contractor could have affixed a written

warning anywhere aboard an active duty Naval warship, advising the 

risk of asbestos exposure, following the completion of Navymandated repairs, except by permission of the United States Navy." 

Id. 

Defendant Todd Shipyards notes that its acts here are similar

to the defendant's acts in Fung. There, the court concluded that

the "acting under" requirement was satisfied where the defendant

established that the U.S. Navy monitored its "performance at all

times and required the defendant to construct and repair the

vessels in accordance with applicable and approved specifications

incorporated in the contracts. In addition, all contract supplies

were subject to inspection, test, and approval by the government." 

Fung, 816 F. Supp. at 572-73. 

Plaintiffs argue that, because Defendant Todd Shipyards has

not produced any actual contractual documentation of the work it

allegedly performed on behalf of U.S. Navy officers, it has not

shown that it acted under the direction of federal officers. This

argument is not persuasive. Defendant Todd Shipyards is not

required to produce contracts from decades past in order to

demonstrate that it worked under the direction of federal officers;

to require such documentation would frustrate the purpose of

section 1442(a)(1). See Durham, 445 F.3d at 1252. Admiral Horne's

declaration suffices. 

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Plaintiffs further argue that, even accepting Admiral Horne's

declaration as true, his declaration only proves that the

government required Defendant Todd Shipyards to use asbestos

products, not that Defendant Todd Shipyards was under the direct 

control of the Navy with respect to failure to warn and negligent 

use of asbestos. Plaintiffs, however, concede that Admiral Horne

concluded that the Navy directed every aspect of installation and

warnings associated with its ships. They contend that neither

Admiral Horne's declaration, nor any other declaration Defendant

Todd Shipyards submitted, establishes that the Navy directed the

exact manner in which Defendant Todd Shipyards' workers and its

subcontractors performed their work with asbestos products, nor

that the government affirmatively prohibited contractors, including

Defendant Todd Shipyards, from providing warning. This contention

is not persuasive. Just as Defendant Todd Shipyards is not

required to produce contracts from decades past, it is not required

to produce such detailed declarations concerning whether the Navy

directed the exact manner of installation and affirmatively

prohibited any kind of warning in order to demonstrate that it

worked under the direction of federal officers; such requirement

would frustrate the purpose of section 1442(a)(1). See Durham, 445

F.3d at 1252. Horne's declaration is sufficient to establish that

a federal officer had "direct and detailed control" over Defendant

Todd Shipyards.

B. Colorable Federal Defense

To meet the second prong of the Mesa test, Defendant Todd

Shipyards must show that it has a colorable federal defense; it

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need not prove that its defense will be meritorious. Mesa, 489

U.S. at 128; Fung, 816 F. Supp. at 573. As the Supreme Court

explained in Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969), "The

officer need not win his case before he can have it removed."

Under Boyle v. United Technologies, Corp., 487 U.S. 500

(1988), liability for design defects in military equipments cannot

be imposed on contracts, "pursuant to state law, when (1) the

United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the

equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier

warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the

equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United

States.” 487 U.S. at 512. In their motion, Plaintiffs argue that

Defendant Todd Shipyards fails to produce any evidence necessary to

show that it is entitled to the government contractor defense. In

their reply, however, Plaintiffs do not argue that Defendant Todd

Shipyards does not have a colorable government contractor defense;

rather, they argue that the Court need not address this issue

because Defendant Todd Shipyards fails to satisfy the first and

third prongs of the Mesa test. The Court, however, finds that

Defendant Todd Shipyards satisfies the first prong, as discussed

above, and the third prong, as discussed below. Further, the Court

finds that Defendant Todd Shipyards has a colorable federal

defense. 

C. Causal Nexus

The final prong requires that a defendant demonstrate a causal

nexus between the claims against it and the acts it performed under 

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color of federal office. See Overly v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 1996

WL 532150, *4 (N.D. Cal.) (noting that the final requirement under

the Mesa test is that there be a causal connection "between the

rules imposed by the United States on the defendant contractor by

the federal government and the liability asserted by plaintiff"). 

Defendant Todd Shipyards argues that this prong is satisfied

because, as discussed above, it has produced evidence attesting to

the regulations imposed by the U.S. Navy on the repair of its

vessels, including the USS Tappahannock. These regulations

required that Defendant Todd Shipyards use asbestos products. The

Navy directed, inspected and supervised work on its vessels to

ensure that contractors, such as Defendant Todd Shipyards, adhered

to its requirements. 

Plaintiff responds that there is no causal nexus, arguing that

Defendant Todd Shipyards only establishes that federal officers

directed it to use asbestos and that its claims are not limited to

mere use of asbestos: the same argument the Court rejected above.

The Court finds that Defendant Todd Shipyards also satisfies the

causal nexus requirement.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' motion

to remand this case and their request for attorneys' fees and costs

incurred in bringing their motion to remand. Removal was proper

under the federal officer removal statute. Defendant Todd 

Shipyards' request to certify this motion for interlocutory appeal 

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Both parties submitted objections to other parties' evidence. 

To the extent that the Court relied upon evidence to which there is

an objection, the parties' objections are overruled. To the extent

that the Court did not rely on such evidence, the parties'

objections are overruled as moot. The Court has not relied on any

inadmissible evidence in deciding this motion. 

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is denied as moot.5

IT IS SO ORDERED.

6/22/07

Dated: ________________________ 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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