Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02491/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02491-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD STANLEY MILLS,

CDCR #C-30008,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WARDEN, Calipatria State Prison, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-2491-GPC-PCL

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

[ECF No. 3] 

AND

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

EDWARD STANLEY MILLS (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Calipatria 

State Prison (“CAL”) and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). 

Plaintiff did not pay the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time he 

filed his Complaint; he has, however, since filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 3).

/ / /

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I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance 

in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no 

assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody 

of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding 

month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those 

payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 

136 S. Ct. at 629.

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In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

Dec. 1, 2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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In support of his IFP motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate 

Statement Report from CAL pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. 

See ECF No. 2 at 3-8; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This statement shows that Plaintiff had 

no monthly deposits, carried no balance in his trust account during the 6-month period 

preceding the filing of this action, and had an available balance of zero at the time of filing. 

Therefore, the Court assesses no initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)

because it appears Plaintiff is unable to pay any initial fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) 

(providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or 

appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets 

and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; 

Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” 

preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to 

the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 3), 

declines to “exact” any initial filing fee because his prison certificate shows he “has no 

means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Secretary of the CDCR, or his 

designee, to collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 

and to forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment 

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

II. Initial Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

A. Standard of Review

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status or the payment of any filing fees, the PLRA 

also requires the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by 

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, 

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or 

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as 

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any complaint, or any portion of a complaint, 

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which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who 

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 

(9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”).

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply 

essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the 

University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

/ / /

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B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff contends CAL’s Warden, the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), and CAL Correctional Officer D. Bell violated his due process 

rights. Specifically, Plaintiff claims Officer Bell “lied” in a CDC 115 Rules Violation 

Report (“RVR”), dated January 7, 2015, which charged him with the use of a controlled 

substance in violation of CAL.CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3016(a), by claiming Plaintiff’s random 

urine sample was collected in the “D-Medical” unit, instead of in the D-yard gym. See ECF 

No. 1 at 2-4, 10, 22-23. Plaintiff claims Bell “admitted” this during his January 19, 2015 

RVR hearing, id. at 3, but he was nevertheless “found guilty” and “given the maximum 

punishment” in violation of “due process.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief restoring 

his contact visits and removing him from mandatory drug testing, as well as $55,000 in 

general and punitive damages. Id. at 6.

1. CDCR

First, the Court notes that Plaintiff includes the CDCR as a Defendant in the caption 

of his Complaint (ECF No. 1 at 1), but nowhere in the body of his pleading does he include 

any factual allegations which might plausibly show how or why the CDCR could be held 

liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Jones v. Community 

Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even pro 

se plaintiff must “allege with at least me degree of particularity overt acts which defendants 

engaged in” in order to state a claim).

Section 1983 “creates a cause of action against a person who, acting under color of 

state law, deprives another of rights guaranteed under the Constitution.” Jones v. Williams,

297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). The CDCR is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. 

See Hale v. State of Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a state 

department of corrections is an arm of the state, and thus, not a “person” within the meaning 

of § 1983). And if by including the CDCR in the caption, Plaintiff instead intends to sue 

California itself, his claims would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. 

Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (“There can be no doubt . . . that [a] suit 

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against the State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, unless 

[the State] has consented to the filing of such a suit.”). “This jurisdictional bar applies 

regardless of the nature of the relief sought.” Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100

(1984) (citations omitted). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff names the CDCR as a 

Defendant, his claims must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

2. Unnamed Warden of CAL

Second, Plaintiff also includes an unidentified Warden at CAL as a Defendant (ECF 

No. 1 at 1, 2), but his Complaint includes no “factual content” describing the Warden’s 

role in either his drug testing or the RVR hearing held afterward, which would “allow[] the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the [Warden] is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

“All § 1983 claims must be premised on a constitutional violation.” Nurre v. 

Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009). To state a claim, Plaintiff must 

demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his 

constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 673; Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1070 

(9th Cir. 2014). Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the acts or 

omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

672-673; Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Instead, supervisors may be held liable only if they 

“participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to 

prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 

625 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011).

Because Plaintiff fails to allege any “factual matter” to suggest how or to what extent 

CAL’s Warden personally participated in either his drug testing or the RVR proceedings 

which form the basis of his alleged due process claim, his Complaint “fails to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045, and

his claims against the unnamed Warden must also be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). 

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3. Correctional Officer Bell

Plaintiff’s allegations as to Correctional Officer Bell are more specific. He alleges 

Bell violated his right to due process of law when he “lied about where [his] urine sample 

was taken.” See ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff contends that the RVR Bell issued on January 7, 

2015, which charged him with use of a controlled substance after a toxicology report 

concluded his urine tested positive for methamphetamine, was “falsified” insofar as Bell 

reported the urine was collected in the restroom of the “D” Medical Clinic, and not in the 

D-yard gym. Id. at 3-4, 10, 22.

Insofar as Plaintiff challenges the issuance of his RVR on grounds that it included

false information as to the location of his drug testing, he cannot state a claim. See e.g., 

Dawson v. Beard, 2016 WL 1137029 at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (“The issuance of a false 

RVR, alone, does not state a claim under section 1983.”); Ellis v. Foulk, 2014 WL 4676530, 

at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (noting that claims of arbitrary action by prison officials are 

grounded in “‘the procedural due process requirements as set forth in Wolff v. 

McDonnell.’”) (quoting Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140 (7th Cir. 1984)); Solomon 

v. Meyer, 2014 WL 294576, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“[T]here is no constitutionally 

protected right to be free from false disciplinary charges.”) (citing Chavira v. Rankin, 2012 

WL 5914913, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“The Constitution demands due process, not errorfree decision-making.”)); Johnson v. Felker, 2013 WL 6243280, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2013) 

(“Prisoners have no constitutionally guaranteed right to be free from false accusations of 

misconduct, so the mere falsification of a [rules violation] report does not give rise to a 

claim under section 1983.”) (citing Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) 

and Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951-53 (2d. Cir. 1986)).

Insofar as Plaintiff challenges the validity of the disciplinary proceedings which 

resulted from the January 7, 2015 RVR issued by Correctional Officer Bell on grounds that 

they violated his right to procedural due process, he also fails to state a claim upon which 

§ 1983 relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b).

/ / /

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The Due Process Clause protects prisoners against deprivation or restraint of “a 

protected liberty interest” and “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation 

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 

2003) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Although the level of the hardship must be determined in a case-by-case 

determination, courts look to:

1) whether the challenged condition ‘mirrored those conditions imposed upon 

inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody,’ and thus 

comported with the prison’s discretionary authority; 2) the duration of the 

condition, and the degree of restraint imposed; and 3) whether the state’s 

action will invariably affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence.

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 861 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87). Only if an inmate has 

alleged facts sufficient to show a protected liberty interest does the court next consider 

“whether the procedures used to deprive that liberty satisfied Due Process.” Ramirez, 334 

F.3d at 860.

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege facts which show that any

disciplinary punishment he faced as a result of his positive drug test subjected him to any 

“atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id.; 

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 584. Plaintiff does not compare the conditions of his confinement 

before or after his disciplinary conviction. Nor does he allege the duration of his term of 

discipline, or the degree of restraint it imposed. Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 861 (quoting Sandin, 

515 U.S. at 486-87).

And while the exhibits attached to his Complaint indicate Plaintiff did suffer the loss 

of yard, phone, work, and visitation privileges (ECF No. 1 at 27), his pleading contains no 

“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678, that Correctional Officer Bell’s actions “presented a dramatic departure from the basic 

conditions of [Plaintiff’s] indeterminate sentence,” or caused him to suffer an “atypical” or 

“significant hardship.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 584-85. Indeed, the loss of privileges like yard 

time, phone access, or visitation are “within the range of confinement to be normally 

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expected for one serving [the underlying sentence]”). Id. at 487; see also Davis v. Small, 

595 F. App’x 689, 691-92 (9th Cir. 2014); Higdon v. Ryan, No. CV 13-0475-PHX-DGC, 

2014 WL 1827156, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2014) (noting that the “loss of contact visitation 

cannot form the basis for an independent due process violation,” and dismissing claims that 

the denial of contact visitation was a “significant and atypical hardship” under Sandin).

In addition, even if Plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to invoke a protected liberty 

interest under Sandin, he still fails to plead factual content to show he was denied the 

procedural protections the Due Process Clause requires. See Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860 (“If 

the hardship is sufficiently significant, then the court must determine whether the 

procedures used to deprive that liberty satisfied Due Process.”). Those procedures include: 

(1) written notice of the charges at least 24 hours before the disciplinary hearing; (2) a 

written statement by the fact-finder of the evidence relied on and reasons for the 

disciplinary action; (3) the right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence if 

doing so will not jeopardize institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) the right to appear 

before an impartial body; and (5) assistance from fellow inmates or prison staff in complex 

cases. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72 (1974).

Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied any of the procedural safeguards required 

by Wolff. Indeed, Plaintiff’s own exhibits show he was provided notice prior to his RVR 

hearing, given a written statement of the charges, presented with both the physical and 

documentary evidence supporting the charge of violating CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 

§ 3016(a) (use of a controlled substance), and provided an opportunity to defend. In fact, 

Plaintiff specifically “raised the issue of the collection area” during his January 19, 2015 

RVR hearing, as well as in his administrative appeal challenging Bell’s actions. See ECF 

No. 1 at 8-9, 11, 26-28. 

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff appears to challenge either the reliability or sufficiency 

of the evidence used to support the disciplinary conviction itself, he also fails to state a 

claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Plaintiff alleges Correctional Officer 

Bell “lied” in his initial RVR by claiming his urine sample was taken in the D Medical 

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Clinic, when it was instead collected in the D-yard gym. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3.) Plaintiff argues 

this was not merely a “typo” as Bell explained when challenged during the disciplinary 

hearing that followed, and that it instead constituted “misinformation” in violation “D.O.M. 

section 52010.17” and “the D.O.M. section 52010.18” which require drug testing be 

conducted “in a secure or clean area.” (ECF No. 1 at 3, 4.)2

Plaintiff’s exhibits show, however, that the Senior Hearing Officer (“SHO”) 

considered Plaintiff’s objections as to the location of his drug testing during his January 

19, 2015 disciplinary hearing, and “based upon testimony of Correctional Officer Bell” 

nevertheless “determined that the issue would have no bearing on the results” because “all 

protocols were followed by . . . Bell in the collection of the sample for testing.” (Id. at 26.) 

Therefore, the SHO concluded, based on “a preponderance of evidence,” which included 

Bell’s RVR, his testimony as to protocol, and the toxicology results procured from the 

National Toxicology Laboratory, that Plaintiff was guilty for violating CAL. CODE REGS., 

tit. 15 § 3016 (use of a controlled substance). Id.

Wolff does not require either judicial review or a “specified quantum of evidence” 

to support the fact finder’s decision. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst. v. Hill, 472 

U.S. 445, 454 (1985). Rather, a prison disciplinary board’s findings are upheld where they 

“are supported by some evidence in the record.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454-55. The “some 

evidence” standard is “minimally stringent,” and a decision must be upheld if there is any 

reliable evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the fact finder. 

Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56). 

 

2 These sections of the CDCR’s Operations Manual, which govern urine sample collection procedures, 

provide that “[o]nly staff properly trained and certified in the collection and processing of urinalysis 

samples shall be involved with the urine testing process,” CAL. DEPT.CORR. OP. MAN., § 52010.17 (2016), 

and that “[t]he securing of a urine sample from an inmate for the purpose of testing for the presence of 

controlled substances or for the use of alcohol shall be conducted in accordance with CCR 3290(c). When 

collecting the urine sample, staff shall ensure that reasonable security is maintained, consideration is given 

to the privacy of the inmate, and the test is conducted in a sanitary manner. All urine collection shall be 

conducted in an area designated by the Institution Head.” Id. § 52010.18.

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Here, the exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint are sufficient to show his 

disciplinary conviction was supported by “some evidence.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454-55. At 

bottom, Plaintiff asks this Court to disbelieve Correctional Officer Bell’s testimony, but 

the “some evidence” standard “does not require examination of the entire record, 

independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.” Hill, 

472 U.S. at 455. The Constitution does not even “require evidence that logically precludes 

any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 457. Even where the 

evidence “might be characterized as meager,” if “the record is not so devoid of evidence 

that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary,” 

those findings must be upheld. Id; see also Martinez v. Busby, No. EDCV 11-604 VAP 

FFM, 2013 WL 1818268, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2013) (report and recommendation to 

dismiss prisoner’s due process / sufficiency of the evidence challenge to prison disciplinary 

conviction for use of a controlled substance in violation of CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, 

§ 3016(a)), adopted, No. EDCV 11-604 VAP FFM, 2013 WL 1800439 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 

2013).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a due process 

claim as to any Defendant, and that therefore, it is subject to sua sponte dismissal in its 

entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d 

at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, however, and 

the Court has now provided him with “notice of the deficiencies in his complaint,” it will 

also grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 3).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by 

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garnishing monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty 

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forwarding those 

payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account 

exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL 

BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED 

TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-

0001.

4. DISMISSES this civil action for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 

relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

1915A(b)(1).

5. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in 

which to re-open his case by filing an Amended Complaint which cures all 

the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. If Plaintiff elects to file 

an Amended Complaint, it must be complete by itself without reference to his 

original pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. 

Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n 

amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 

F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to 

amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered 

waived if not repled.”).

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If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, this civil 

action will remain dismissed without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

1915A(b)(1). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 28, 2016

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