Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01022/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01022-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Insurance Contract

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- 1 - 06CV1022 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.,

Plaintiff,

CIV. NO. 06-CV-1022-B (BLM)

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ CROSS

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[Docket Nos. 26 & 44]

vs.

ILDEFONSO MORALES, ALICIA A.

RUIZ DE MORALES, and JUAN

JAVIER LOPEZ,

Defendants.

After Plaintiff New York Life Insurance Co. was discharged from this interpleader

action, the remaining Defendants filed cross motions for summary judgment to determine

who is entitled to the benefits of a life insurance policy. The Court convened several

hearings and allowed the parties to file supplemental briefs. The Court incorporates its

remarks from the November 20, 2007 hearing into this written Order and denies both

motions. The parties were instructed to consult with Magistrate Judge Major regarding any

discovery matters. Thereafter, the case shall be set for a Pretrial Conference and a Bench

Trial.

Background

The insured Maria F. Lopez purchased a $100,000 life insurance policy from Plaintiff

New York Life and named her husband, Defendant Juan Javier Lopez, as the beneficiary. 

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There is an exception if comparable constitutional protections such as the right to

(continued...)

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She died on February 19, 1998 in Tijuana, Mexico. Her parents, Defendants Ildefonso and

Alicia Ruiz Morales, contend that Juan Lopez is not entitled to benefit from the insurance

policy because he killed her. They rely on California’s “Slayer Statute.” Juan Lopez was

tried and convicted in a Mexican court for homicide in 2003; however, he contends that he is

innocent.

Discussion

A. California’s “Slayer Statute”

Since 1905, California Probate Code’s “Slayer Statute” has barred a killer from

collecting money from his victim’s estate. The current version of the statute provides that

“[a] named beneficiary of a . . . life insurance policy . . . who feloniously and intentionally

kills the . . . person upon whose life the policy is issued is not entitled to any benefit under

the . . . policy . . . , and it becomes payable as though the killer had predeceased the

decedent.” Cal. Prob. Code § 252. 

1. Subsection (a): When the Final Judgment is “Conclusive” Evidence

The first subsection of California’s “Slayer Statute” states that “[a] final judgment of

conviction of felonious and intentional killing is conclusive for purposes of this part.” Cal.

Prob. Code 254(a). If there is a final criminal conviction, the killer is not entitled to present

any evidence in the probate proceedings to dispute the finding of intentional homicide. 

Wilson v. Wilson, 78 Cal.App.3d 226 (1978) (interpreting former § 258); McGowan v.

Herman, 35 Cal.App.3d 611 (1973) (under former § 258: “It is reasonable to assume that

the Legislature meant to avoid a redetermination in civil proceedings of issues that had been

fully litigated in prior criminal proceedings.”). 

Although the parents submitted evidence of the husband’s final conviction, those

criminal proceedings occurred in Mexico. In 1978, the Ninth Circuit held that § 254(a) did

not apply to a foreign conviction so as to render it “conclusive” evidence. Haung Tang v.

Aetna Life Ins. Co., 523 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1975).1

 

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(...continued)

counsel and jury were provided. Haung Tang, 523 F.2d at 813 & nn.1-3. The parents

provided a declaration of an American lawyer who has handled extradition matters and states

that he is “generally familiar” with Mexican criminal law. Decl. Morrison ¶ 3. He states that

Mexico uses an “equivalent” standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. The parents have

not provided sufficient information about the Mexican criminal procedure; thus, under

Huang Tom, § 254(a) does not apply to render the Mexican judgment “conclusive” evidence

but is only part of the evidence that may be considered.

2

Initially a California court had held that the Probate Court must use the beyond a

reasonable doubt standard, but the legislature expressly changed that standard to

preponderance of the evidence. McGowan’s Estate, 35 Cal.App.3d 611. 

- 3 - 06CV1022 

2. Subsection (b): Preponderance of Evidence Standard

Because subsection (a) does not apply to Mexican judgment of conviction in this case,

the Court turns to subsection (b). In 1984, some years after the Huang Tang decision, and in

accordance with the Uniform Probate Code, California added a new subsection to the “Slayer

Statute” that allows courts to determine whether the applicant is barred from inheriting a

victim’s insurance proceeds in circumstances when the final judgment of conviction cannot

be treated as conclusive evidence. Section 254(b) states: 

(b) In the absence of a final judgment of conviction of felonious and

intentional killing, the court may determine by a preponderance of evidence

whether the killing was felonious and intentional for purposes of this part. The

burden of proof is on the party seeking to establish that the killing was

felonious and intentional for purposes of this part.

Cal. Prob. Code § 254(b) (emphasis added).2

 The Court will apply this subsection to the

competing claims for the life insurance proceeds of Maria Lopez. 

Under this section, the court independently determines if the killing was felonious and

intentional. Unif. Prob. Code § 2-803(g) (1993 Comment) (Probate Court is proper forum to

decide if killing was “felonious and intentional” to bar inheritance); McGowan, 35

Cal.App.3d at 618-19 (under former § 258 and citing Unif. Prob. Code, in absence of final

conviction “the court in any subsequent civil proceeding must independently examine the

facts in order to determine whether the defendant actually committed the offense”) (footnote

omitted); Kramme v. Kramme, 20 Cal.3d 567, 571-72 (1978) (under former § 258, Probate

Court had authority to decide “independently” whether killing was intentional to forfeit

inheritance within plain meaning of statute); e.g., Davis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 279 F.2d 304

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(9th Cir. 1960) (under former § 258, court could use a properly supported summary judgment

to determine if conviction satisfied slayer statute); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 106 F.

Supp. 419 (C.D. Cal. 1952) (district court independently examined evidence to determine

that killing was not intentional). Pursuant to this subsection, the parties have submitted

portions of the trial transcript and various declarations to support their summary judgment

motions.

B. Summary Judgment Standard

Because the parents are not named as beneficiaries in the policy, they bear the burden

of proving that the husband is not qualified to inherit the proceeds. Cal. Prob. Code § 252(b). 

At the September 10, 2007 hearing, the Court instructed the parents to submit the translated

portions of the Mexican record that supported their position that the husband intentionally

killed their daughter; and indicated that the husband could submit any additional portions that

supported his view of the evidence. The husband has asked the Court to reconsider this

ruling so as to place the burden of proof solely on the parents. The Court’s ruling, however,

has been confirmed by a recent California case in a similar fact pattern. Principal Life Ins.

Co. v. Peterson, 156 Cal. App. 4th 676 (2007). There, the husband had been convicted of

killing his wife, but his conviction was not final due to a pending appeal and could not be

given conclusive effect for purposes of § 252(a). The victim’s parent invoked subsection (b)

of the “Slayer Statute” and filed a motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal held

that when the moving party has carried its “burden of production, he causes a shift, and the

opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie

showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact” – that is, that the husband “did

not feloniously and intentionally kill” his wife. Id. at 687; accord State Farm Ins. Co. v.

Smith, 29 Ill.App.3d 942 , aff’d in part, 66 Ill.Dec. 838 (1975).

Summary judgment is appropriate when the "pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A

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- 5 - 06CV1022 

fact is "material" when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of

the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a

material fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party." Id. 

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can

satisfy this burden either by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the

non-moving party's case or by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a

showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23.

Once the moving party meets this initial burden, however, an adverse party must “go

beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by ‘the depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 

When making this determination, all inferences drawn from the underlying facts must

be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). "Credibility determinations, the

weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury

functions, not those of a judge, [when] he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment." 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

C. Analysis

The parents submitted portions of the Mexican Judge’s decision, in which he

discusses the evidence showing that Juan Lopez intentionally killed his wife. However, Juan

Lopez submitted a sworn declaration in which he states: “I did not kill my wife Maria F.

Lopez and I am totally innocent regarding her homicide on February 19, 1998.” Ex. 2, ¶ 1 to

Def.’s Notice of Lodgment (Decl. of Juan Lopez). Lopez claims he “found my wife covered

with blood” when he returned home for lunch and he immediately called the paramedics. Id.

¶ 4. Lopez reports that the trial judge in Mexico disregarded DNA evidence that did not

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- 6 - 06CV1022 

match him. Id. ¶ 5. Lopez further notes that the Mexican court did not have any direct

evidence linking him to the murder, for example, Lopez alleges that one of the weapons was

from outside the household. Id. ¶ 6. 

The nonmoving party can defeat a summary judgment with his own affidavit when it

states facts within his personal knowledge. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; United States v.

Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 1999) (a party’s declaration can often be selfserving, but “properly so, because otherwise there would be no point in his submitting it”). 

The Court cannot, in the context of a summary judgment motion, disregard Lopez’s sworn

affidavit that he did not kill his wife because the Court cannot make a credibility

determination. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 225 (“The evidence of the non-movant is to believed,

and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”); Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 769

(9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the disputed facts must be resolved in trial. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 225 (citing Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, 257 (1948) (good judicial

administration may require a case to be resolved on a thorough and solid findings)).

Conclusion

Upon due consideration of the memoranda and exhibits, the arguments of counsel, and

for the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motions for summary

judgment [# 26 & 44]. The parties shall discuss any outstanding discovery issues with the

Magistrate Judge, and an amended Scheduling Order will follow. Because the parties waived

their rights to demand a jury, the case will be set for a bench trial. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 10, 2007

Hon. Rudi M. Brewster

United States Senior District Judge

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