Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00847/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00847-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 28:1335 Interpleader Action

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Andrew Berrey, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Plaintiff Investment Funding, LLC, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-00847-PHX-BSB

ORDER 

Defendant Injury Assistance, LLC (Injury Assistance) has filed a Motion to 

Disgorge Michael Love’s Attorney Fees. (Doc. 79.) Michael Love (Love) is counsel for 

Plaintiff Andrew Berrey (Berrey), who opposes the motion. (Doc. 80.) For the reasons 

set forth below, the Court denies the motion. 

I. Background 

This is an interpleader action in which the parties assert conflicting claims to 

settlement proceeds that Berrey received in a personal injury action. (Doc. 15.) Berrey 

deposited the settlement proceeds into the Court’s registry on June 23, 2014. (Doc. 25.) 

On October 27, 2014, Berrey, Injury Assistance, and Defendants Plaintiff Investment 

Funding, LLC (PIF) and Scottsdale Healthcare Corp., filed a Joint Stipulation for Entry 

of Judgment asking the Court to enter partial judgment in favor of Berrey for payment of 

his attorneys’ charging lien for $11,549.98. (Doc. 62.) The Court granted the stipulated 

motion and ordered that $11,549.98 be disbursed from the interpleaded funds to Berrey’s 

attorneys, and judgment was entered for Berrey in this amount. (Docs. 63, 64.) 

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 Injury Assistance now asks the Court to order Berrey’s attorney, Love, to disgorge 

the attorney’s fees that the Court previously ordered disbursed based on the parties’ joint 

stipulation. (Doc. 79.) The motion seeks disgorgement based on broad theories, 

including Love’s alleged misconduct in obtaining the joint stipulation for disbursement of 

his attorney’s fees from the settlement funds “under false pretenses,” Love’s alleged 

conflict of interest in representing Berrey in this case and representing PIF in an unrelated 

case in state court, and Love’s alleged violation of fiduciary duties to Berrey and nonclients, including Injury Assistance. (Doc. 79; Doc 82.) 

 Berrey opposes the motion, which he characterizes as an improper attempt to bring 

a claim against Love, a non-party, and he argues that the Court should find that Injury 

Assistance is estopped from seeking to disgorge the attorney’s fees because it previously 

stipulated to the disbursement of these fees. (Doc. 80 at 4-5, 10.) Berrey also asserts he 

has properly safeguarded the settlement proceeds by depositing them in the Court’s 

registry, Injury Assistance has no interest in the funds disbursed for his attorney’s 

charging lien, his attorney, Love, does not have a fiduciary duty to Injury Assistance, and 

Injury Assistance cannot assert that Love has a conflict of interest because it is not his 

client. (Id. at 5-6, 9-10.) The Court first addresses Berrey’s arguments asserting estoppel 

and characterizing the motion, and then addresses Injury Assistance’s allegations that 

Love engaged in misconduct in obtaining the joint stipulation, that Love has a conflict of 

interest, and that he violated fiduciary duties. 

II. Estoppel and Characterization of Injury Assistance’s Motion 

 A. Judicial Estoppel Does Not Bar Injury Assistance’s Motion 

 Relying on state law, Berrey argues that Injury Assistance is judicially estopped 

from its requested relief because Injury Assistance stipulated to the disbursement of the 

fees that are now at issue in the motion to disgorge. (Doc. 80 at 10 (citing State v. 

Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 304 (Ariz. 1996).) However, “federal law governs the application 

of judicial estoppel in federal court.” Helfand v. Gerson, 105 F.3d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 

1997) (citation omitted). Judicial estoppel, or the doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent 

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positions, “precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and then 

seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position.” Id. (citations omitted.) 

“It is an equitable doctrine, intended to protect the integrity of the judicial process by 

preventing a litigant from ‘playing fast and loose with the courts.’” Id. (citations 

omitted). 

 Here, Injury Assistance has changed its position with respect to the stipulated fee 

disbursement, but it does not appear that Injury Assistance is seeking to gain an unfair 

advantage by taking inconsistent positions. Instead, as set forth below in Section III, 

Injury Assistance seeks to withdraw its assent to the joint stipulation because it asserts 

that it discovered misconduct by Love and was misled into entering the joint stipulation. 

(Doc. 82 at 2.) It would be inappropriate to use the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel 

to shield allegations of misconduct from review. Therefore, the Court declines to apply 

judicial estoppel and will review the motion on its merits.

 B. The Motion Does Not Assert a Claim Against Love 

 Berrey characterizes Injury Assistance’s motion as asserting an independent “tort 

[claim] in the nature of a breach of fiduciary duty” against Love, and contends that this 

Court lacks jurisdiction over Love because he is not a party to the underlying action and 

has not been served with process. (Doc. 80 at 5.) Accordingly, Berrey argues that the 

motion must be summarily denied. (Id.) The Court disagrees with Berrey’s 

characterization of the motion and does not construe the motion as asserting an 

independent claim against Love because the motion pertains directly to the Court’s 

October 27, 2014 Order and Judgment. (Doc. 79 at 3-4, ¶ 9; Doc. 63; Doc. 64.) 

C. The Motion Seeks Relief from an Order and Judgment under Rule 60 

 By seeking to disgorge Love’s attorney’s fees, the motion effectively requests that 

the Court vacate its October 27, 2014 Order granting the parties’ joint stipulation to 

disburse the attorney’s fees (Doc. 63), and grant relief from the Order and Judgment 

(Doc. 64) by directing Love to deposit the previously disbursed funds in the Court’s 

registry. Therefore, although the parties do not assert that Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of 

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Civil Procedure applies to Injury Assistance’s motion, the Court construes the motion as 

a Rule 60 motion for relief from a judgment or order. 

 Rule 60(b)(3) provides that “[o]n motion . . . the court may relieve a party or a 

party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 

reasons . . . fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or 

misconduct by an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). Because the motion alleges 

that Love committed various ethical violations and falsely induced the parties to enter the 

joint stipulation to disburse attorney’s fees, the Court assumes that Injury Assistance 

alleges “misconduct by an opposing party” pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3). 

 To prevail on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, the moving party must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the judgment was obtained through misconduct, and that the 

“conduct complained of prevented the losing party from fully and fairly presenting the 

defense.” De Saracho v. Custom Food Mach., Inc., 206 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2000). 

“Rule 60(b)(3) is aimed at judgments which were unfairly obtained, not those which are 

factually incorrect.” Id. Therefore, the Court will consider whether Injury Assistance has 

established by clear and convincing evidence that Berrey obtained the October 27, 2014 

Order and Judgment through misconduct. 

III. Alleged Misconduct to Obtain Judgment 

Injury Assistance asserts that Berrey, through Love, used false pretenses to obtain 

the October 27, 2014 Order and Judgment, and that Love violated various ethical 

obligations. For the reasons below, the Court rejects these assertions. 

 A. Love Did Not Use “False Pretenses” to Obtain the Joint Stipulation 

 Injury Assistance asserts that Love should be ordered to disgorge his attorney’s 

fees because Love did not disclose his representation of PIF in an unrelated state court 

case.

1

 (Doc. 82 at 2.) Injury Assistance argues that by not disclosing his representation 

of PIF, Love obtained the joint stipulation for the disbursement of attorney’s fees under 

 

1

 The Court takes judicial notice of Maricopa County Superior Court case number CV2014-011941, which was filed on September 16, 2014. 

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false pretenses. (Id.) As set forth below, that argument lacks merit because Injury 

Assistance had notice of Love’s representation of PIF in the unrelated state court case 

before entering the stipulation for the disbursement of funds and nothing in the record 

suggests that Love attempted to conceal his representation of PIF or mislead the parties in 

this case. 

 First, Injury Assistance is a party in the state court matter in which Love 

represents PIF. In both the state court case and here, Injury Assistance is represented by 

George Griffeth. (Doc. 72 at 39, Ex. 5.) Because Griffeth and Love are counsel of 

record in both the state court case and here, Injury Assistance had notice of Love’s dual 

representation prior to entering the joint stipulation in this case. 

 Second, the docket in both cases supports the conclusion that Injury Assistance 

had notice of Love’s representation of PIF. In the state court case, Love filed an answer 

on behalf of PIF on October 3, 2014, and Griffeth filed an answer on behalf of Injury 

Assistance on October 9, 2014. (Doc. 72 at 39, Ex. 5.) The parties filed the joint 

stipulation to disburse attorney’s fees a few weeks later, on October 27, 2014. (Doc. 62.) 

Thus, Injury Assistance had at least two weeks to object to Love’s dual representation 

before filing the joint stipulation, but failed to do so. (Doc. 72 at 39, Ex. 5.) 

 Third, other than Love’s representation of PIF in the unrelated state court case, 

Injury Assistance has not asserted any basis to find that Love misled the parties or 

induced them to enter in the joint stipulation to disburse attorneys’ fees under “false 

pretenses.” Because Love’s role in both cases was a matter of public record, and Injury 

Assistance was a party in both cases and had the same counsel in both cases, there is 

nothing in the record to support Injury Assistance’s claim that it was misled when it 

entered the joint stipulation in this case. 

Therefore, the Court finds that Injury Assistance has failed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the October 27, 2014 Order was obtained through false 

pretenses, or that Love’s conduct prevented Injury Assistance from fully and fairly 

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presenting its case. Accordingly, Love’s alleged failure to disclose his representation of 

PIF does not constitute misconduct for purposes of Rule 60(b)(3). 

 B. Love Did Not Violate His Ethical Obligations 

 Injury Assistance also makes a number of claims regarding Love’s representation 

of Berrey and the extension of fiduciary duties from Love “to [Injury Assistance] and all 

other claimants.” (Doc. 79 at 3-4.) First, Injury Assistance objects to Love’s 

representation of Berrey on conflict of interest grounds. (Id. at 3.) Second, Injury 

Assistance alleges that Love violated the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct by 

representing Berrey. (Id. at 3-4.) Third, Injury Assistance argues that Love violated his 

fiduciary duties to Injury Assistance and the other claimants in this matter. (Id.) As 

explained below, the Court rejects each of these arguments. 

 1. Injury Assistance Cannot Assert Love’s Conflict of Interest 

 Injury Assistance argues that Love’s representation of Berrey in this case creates a 

concurrent conflict of interest with Love’s representation of PIF in an unrelated case in 

state court. (Doc. 79 at 3-5.) In Arizona, only a lawyer’s client is entitled to object to a 

lawyer’s representation based on a conflict of interest. State v. Garaygordobil, 359 P.2d 

753, 755 (Ariz. 1961) (citation omitted) (“the only ones entitled to object to such 

representation on the ground of conflicting interests is one who holds the relation of 

client to an attorney who undertakes to represent conflicting interests”). Therefore, the 

threshold question before considering Injury Assistance’s assertion of a conflict is 

whether an attorney-client relationship exists between Love and Injury Assistance. 

 “An attorney-client relationship exists when a person has manifested to a lawyer 

his intent that the lawyer provide him with legal services and the lawyer has manifested 

consent to do so.” Simms v. Rayes, 316 P.3d 1235, 1238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). Nothing 

in the record shows that Injury Assistance manifested to Love its intent that Love provide 

legal services to it, or that Love manifested any intent to do so. Love’s only attorneyclient relationship in this case is with Berrey. Because Injury Assistance does not have 

an attorney-client relationship with Love, Injury Assistance cannot be prejudiced by 

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Love’s representation of Berrey. Garaygordobil, 359 P.2d at 755. Thus, Injury 

Assistance cannot assert a conflict of interest to object to Love’s representation of Berrey. 

Id.

 2. Love May Represent Berrey and PIF in Unrelated Cases 

 Assuming Injury Assistance could appropriately object to Love’s representation of 

Berrey based on a conflict of interest, its argument would still fail. As explained below, 

although Love’s dual representation of Berrey and PIF may create a concurrent conflict 

of interest, both affected clients waived that conflict. Accordingly, Love has not violated 

the applicable ethical rules by representing Berrey in this case. 

 The Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct (ethical rules), as set forth in Rule 42 

of the Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court, apply to attorneys practicing before this 

Court. See LRCiv 83.2(e); Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 936 F. 

Supp. 697, 700 (D. Ariz. 1996). Therefore, this Court applies the Arizona ethical rules 

when evaluating potential conflicts of interest. 

 The ethical rules prohibit a lawyer from undertaking a representation involving a 

concurrent conflict of interest. See ER 1.7(a). A concurrent conflict of interest exists if a 

lawyer’s representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client, or if there 

is a significant risk that the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, a 

third person, or the lawyer’s personal interest will materially limit the lawyer’s 

representation. (Id.) From the limited record, it appears that Love’s representation of 

Berrey presents a concurrent conflict of interest because Berrey is directly adverse to PIF 

in this case, and Love represents PIF in an unrelated state court case. See ER 1.7(a)(1). 

 Notwithstanding that apparent concurrent conflict of interest, the ethical rules 

permit a lawyer’s representation if “each affected client gives informed consent, 

confirmed in writing,” and all three elements of Rule 1.7(b) are satisfied. See ER 1.7(b). 

Therefore, Love may represent Berrey in this matter because both Berrey and PIF have 

waived the conflict of interest, and it appears that all three elements of ER 1.7(b) are 

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satisfied.2 The elements of ER 1.7(b) are that (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that he 

will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client, 

(2) the representation is not prohibited by law, and (3) the representation does not involve 

the assertion of a claim by one client against another client in the same case. See ER 

1.7(b)(1)-(3). 

 Here, Injury Assistance has not argued or established any basis for the Court to 

find that Love could not reasonably believe that he could provide competent and diligent 

representation to each of his affected clients. See ER 1.7(b)(1). Furthermore, Love’s 

representation of Berrey is not prohibited by law, and he does not represent Berrey and 

PIF in the same litigation. See ER 1.7(b)(2) − (3). Therefore, the Court concludes that 

Love’s representation of Berrey does not violate the ethical rules prohibiting concurrent 

conflicts of interest. 

 3. Love Did Not Violate Duties to Injury Assistance 

 Injury Assistance makes four assertions regarding the duties it believes that Love 

owes to Injury Assistance and other claimants in this matter. The Court rejects these 

assertions. First, Injury Assistance argues that “Love, in addition to the fiduciary duty 

toward Berrey, has a fiduciary duty to Injury Assistance and all other claimants in this 

matter.” (Doc. 79 at 3.) To support this argument, Injury Assistance cites ER 1.15(d), 

which provides that “[a] lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a 

lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own 

property.” ER 1.15(a). The comments to the rule note that a lawyer may have a duty to 

protect third party claims, “such as a client’s creditor who has a lien on funds recovered 

in a personal injury action.” Id. at cmt 4. 

 Here, Berrey, through Love, apparently recognized the duty to protect the interest 

of the various claimants to the settlement proceeds and deposited those proceeds in the 

Court’s registry. (Doc. 25.) The parties, however, filed a joint stipulation to disburse 

 

2

 Although Love has not submitted the written waivers by Berrey and PIF, the Court notes Love’s undisputed declaration that he obtained written consent from both 

affected clients prior to his representation of Berrey. (Doc 80 at 14.) 

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$11,549.98 from the deposited funds in payment of the attorneys’ charging lien. (Doc. 

62.) By entering the joint stipulation for the disbursement of Love’s attorney’s fees, 

Injury Assistance apparently recognized the priority of the attorneys’ charging lien over 

its claim. Other than its argument that Berrey falsely induced the parties to enter the joint 

stipulation to disburse attorneys’ fees, Injury Assistance does not make any argument to 

challenge the validity of the attorneys’ charging lien. Therefore, Injury Assistance has 

not established that it has any interest in the funds disbursed to Love pursuant to the 

Court’s October 27, 2014 Order or that Love violated any duty under ER 1.15(d) with 

respect to the disbursed attorney’s fees. The only funds in which Berrey, Injury 

Assistance, and the other parties may have an interest are the remaining settlement 

proceeds deposited in the Court’s registry. (Doc. 25.) Love did not violate any fiduciary 

duties with respect to these funds. 

 Second, Injury Assistance asserts that “[n]either [Injury Assistance], nor any other 

party to this action, need be Love’s client in order for a fiduciary duty, in their favor, to 

attach to Love’s actions.” (Doc. 79 at 3, ¶8.) In support of this proposition, Injury 

Assistance cites Fickett v. Superior Court, 558 P.2d 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). In 

Fickett, the court analyzed whether a guardian’s attorney owed a derivative duty to a 

ward. Id. at 990. The duty recognized in Fickett “stem[med] from the attorney’s 

undertaking to perform legal services for the client but reach[ing] out to protect the 

intended beneficiary” of the legal services. Id. at 990. 

 In contrast to the shared interests of the ward and guardian in Fickett, Injury 

Assistance’s interests are directly adverse to Berrey’s. Thus, Injury Assistance is not the 

intended beneficiary of Love’s services. See Lewis v. Swenson, 617 P.2d 69, 72 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 1980) (“[A]n adverse party is not an intended beneficiary of the adverse 

counsel’s client.”) (citation omitted); Wetherill v. Basham, 3 P.3d 1118, 1128 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 2000) (envisioning “no benefit and much potential mischief from imposing on 

attorneys a duty to exercise reasonable care to nonclient third parties whose interests are 

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directly adverse to those of the attorney’s client”). Therefore, Love does not owe a duty 

to Injury Assistance under an intended beneficiary theory. 

 Third, Injury Assistance argues that “[t]he potential for harm to all parties owed a 

duty by Love is sufficient justification for an order mandating that Love disgorge his 

entire fee in this matter because of his disloyalty and obvious breach of fiduciary duty.” 

(Doc. 79 at 3–4, ¶ 9.) To support this argument, Injury Assistance cites a Texas case, 

Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 237–38 (Tex. 1999). The Court, however, is not bound 

by authority from Texas, and Burrow does not stand for the proposition for which it is 

cited. Instead, Burrow holds that a lawyer who violates a duty to a client may be denied 

compensation without proof of damages by the client. Id. at 240. Because Injury 

Assistance is not Love’s client, and Love has not violated any fiduciary duties to Injury 

Assistance or any of the other parties, the Court finds that Burrow is inapplicable and 

rejects this argument. 

 Finally, Injury Assistance argues that “Love’s duties to all parties involved in this 

matter include, without limitation, avoiding conflicts of interest, safeguarding funds owed 

the client and/or third persons and a clear duty to honor the [sic] their interests.” 

(Doc. 79 at 4, ¶ 11.) Injury Assistance’s reliance on Ulico Cas. Co. v. Wilson, Elser, 

Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, 843 N.Y.S.2d 749 (2007), is misplaced. Ulico is a New 

York case that did not involve the duties owed to non-clients or adverse parties, but rather 

discussed the duties that exist between a lawyer and his current clients. Id. at 759. 

Again, because Berrey properly deposited the settlement funds in the Court’s registry, 

Love’s fees were disbursed by Court order based on the parties’ joint stipulation, Injury 

Assistance is not Love’s client, and Love did not violate any duties under ER 1.7 or ER 

1.15, the Court is not persuaded by this argument. 

 In sum, Love did not violate any duty to Injury Assistance under ER 1.15(d), or 

based on a theory that Injury Assistance is an intended beneficiary of Love’s professional 

services. In addition, Injury Assistance and Love do not have an attorney-client 

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relationship. Therefore, Injury Assistance cannot enforce against Love the various duties 

that an attorney would owe to a client. 

IV. Conclusion 

The Court construes Injury Assistance’s motion to disgorge attorney’s fees as a 

Rule 60 motion for relief from a judgment or order and finds that Berrey, through his 

attorney Love, did not engage in misconduct that warrants vacating the October 27, 2014 

Order. Therefore, the Court denies Injury Assistance’s motion. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Injury Assistance’s Motion to Disgorge Michael Love’s 

Attorney’s Fees, construed as a motion for relief from a judgment or order, (Doc. 79) is 

DENIED. 

Dated this 10th day of April, 2015. 

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