Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01610/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01610-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Medical Malpractice

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEANNE THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

FAMILY HEALTHCARE NETWORK, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:23-cv-01610-KES-SAB

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT 

MATTER JURISDICTION; DISMISSING 

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF 

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

ORDER VACATING MAY 8, 2024 

HEARING

(ECF Nos. 1, 16, 19, 20)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN

DAYS

I.

INTRODUCTION

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff Deanne Thomas’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for default 

judgment against Defendants Family Healthcare Network and Narwhals Mating, M.D. (ECF No. 

16.) The Court finds this matter suitable for decision without oral argument and vacates the 

hearing scheduled for May 8, 2024. See L.R. 230(g). For the reasons set forth herein, the Court 

recommends that Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment be denied, and the complaint be 

dismissed sua sponte with leave to amend to establish subject matter jurisdiction. 

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II.

BACKGROUND

On November 15, 2023, Plaintiff, a California resident, filed this negligence action 

against Defendant Family Healthcare Network, a California corporation with its principal place 

of business in California, and Narwhals Mating, M.D., a California resident. (ECF No. 1.) 

Plaintiff alleges the Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Id.)

Both Defendants failed to respond to the complaint. On March 12, 2024, Plaintiff 

requested entry of default against both Defendants (ECF No. 12), which the Clerk entered on 

March 13, 2024 (ECF No. 13). 

On April 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for default judgment against both 

Defendants. (ECF No. 16.) Upon review of Plaintiff’s motion, the Court had concerns whether 

diversity jurisdiction existed and, on April 23, 2024, ordered that Plaintiff show cause why the 

Court should not recommend that the case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

(ECF No. 19.) On April 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a response to the Court’s order to show cause 

confirming diversity jurisdiction does not exist. (ECF No. 20 at 2.) Plaintiff requests leave to 

amend to correct the statement of subject matter jurisdiction and to add the United States as 

either a Doe Defendant or as a named Defendant. (Id. at 2-3.)

II.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENTS

“Our starting point is the general rule that default judgments are ordinarily disfavored,” 

as “[c]ases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” NewGen, LLC 

v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 

1472 (9th Cir. 1986)). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55, obtaining a 

default judgment is a two-step process. Entry of default is appropriate as to any party against 

whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought that has failed to plead or otherwise defend as 

provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and where that fact is made to appear by 

affidavit or otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). After entry of default, a plaintiff can seek entry of 

default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). 

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The decision to grant a motion for entry of default judgment is within the discretion of 

the court. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The 

Ninth Circuit has set forth the following seven factors (the “Eitel factors”) that the Court may 

consider in exercising its discretion: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits 

of the plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at 

stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the 

default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. 

Generally, once default has been entered, “the factual allegations of the complaint, except 

those relating to damages, will be taken as true.” Garamendi v. Henin, 683 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (quoting Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). 

Accordingly, the amount of damages must be proven at an evidentiary hearing or through other 

means. Microsoft Corp. v. Nop, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1236 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Additionally, 

“necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not 

established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(internal citation omitted). The relief sought must not be different in kind or exceed the amount 

that is demanded in the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).

IV.

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment

Before evaluating the Eitel factors to determine whether default judgment should be 

entered, “a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject 

matter and the parties.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Valdez v. Allstate 

Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting federal courts are “obligated to consider 

sua sponte whether [they] have subject matter jurisdiction”). “To avoid entering a default 

judgment that can later be successfully attacked as void, a court should determine whether it has 

the power, i.e., the jurisdiction, to enter the judgment in the first place.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d at

712.

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Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and their power to adjudicate is limited to 

that granted by Congress. U.S. v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2000). Pursuant to 28 

U.S. C. § 1332, federal courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions between citizens of 

different States in which “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, 

exclusive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). This requires complete diversity of 

citizenship and the presence “of a single plaintiff from the same State as a single defendant 

deprives the district court of original diversity jurisdiction over the entire action.” Abrego 

Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). A 

corporation is deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the 

State where it has its principal place of business. Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 94 

(2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)).

In support of her allegation that this Court possesses diversity jurisdiction over this action

under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, Plaintiff argues in her motion for default judgment that “Defendants are 

citizens of California....Thus, the parties are diverse.” (ECF No. 16 at 5.) Plaintiff, however, 

fails to account for her own California citizenship. Plaintiff, Defendant Family Healthcare 

Network, and Defendant Narwhals Mating, M.D. are citizens of California. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) 

Plaintiff’s motion therefore fails to establish the parties are completely diverse or that this Court 

otherwise has federal subject matter jurisdiction. In response to the Court’s order to show cause

regarding subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff concedes the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction in 

this action. (ECF No. 20 at 2.)1 

Without subject matter jurisdiction, any default judgment entered by the Court would be 

1 Diversity jurisdiction is a basic federal court practice. Counsel for Plaintiff filed a form complaint that is intended 

to walk pro se litigants through filing negligence actions specifically under diversity of citizenship. The form 

complaint includes explanations of the basic requirements of diversity jurisdiction to unrepresented individuals with 

no legal background or experience. Aside from the issue that counsel for Plaintiff is expected to know the 

fundamental concept of diversity jurisdiction, counsel for Plaintiff failed to follow the instructions contained within 

the template pro se complaint. More concerning, however, is that counsel for Plaintiff knew both Defendants and 

Plaintiff shared the same state of citizenship when the complaint was filed in November 2023, yet filed a motion for 

default judgment re-asserting the parties were completely diverse. It is not well-taken that counsel for Plaintiff 

provided no explanation for this clearly incorrect statement of fact and law in his response to the Court’s order to 

show cause. When practicing in this Court, in fact any court of law for that matter, all counsel are expected to know 

the law and not be educated by the Court on basic legal concepts. Future conduct may be subject to sanctions as the

Court may take such actions by counsel as willful conduct.

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void. See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d at 712. Accordingly, the Court recommends denying Plaintiff’s 

motion for default judgment against Defendant Family Healthcare Network, and Narwhals 

Mating, M.D. for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 

B. Sua Sponte Dismissal and Request for Leave to Amend 

Given Plaintiff’s complaint alleges subject matter jurisdiction under diversity jurisdiction, 

the Court also recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint sua sponte for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. However, “a district court may, and should, grant leave to amend when it appears 

that subject matter jurisdiction may exist—even though the [complaint] inadequately alleges 

jurisdiction.” Seymour v. The Mut. of New York Life Ins. Co., No. CV 20-7578 PA (JEMX), 

2021 WL 4497502, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021); see also Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 

893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon 

de novo review, that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment”).

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff, who is represented in this action, filed a “Pro Se 5” form 

complaint for civil cases alleging negligence under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (ECF No. 1.) The form 

complaint utilized by Plaintiff is templated specifically for actions arising under diversity of 

citizenship. If Plaintiff chooses to amend her complaint, she must do so without using the same 

form complaint for negligence actions arising under diversity jurisdiction. 

The Court also briefly addresses the additional jurisdictional requirements of alleging a 

claim under the FTCA. In response to the Court’s order to show cause regarding subject matter 

jurisdiction, Plaintiff states that after further investigation, she has discovered that “Defendant 

Family Healthcare Network is a Federally Qualified Health Center, a Health Center Program 

grantee under 42 U.S.C. 254b, and a deemed Public Health Service employee under 42 U.S.C. 

233(g)-(n)” and that “Defendant Family Healthcare Network receives Health and Human 

Services funding and has Federal Public Health Service deemed status with respect to certain 

health or health related claims, including medical malpractice claims, for itself and its covered 

individuals (which includes Defendant Narwhals Mating, M.D.).” (ECF No. 20 at 2.) Plaintiff 

2 Because the Court finds it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this action as currently pleaded, the Court 

does not evaluate the merits of Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment.

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contends she has “initiated the process for this claim through the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 

USC § 1346(b)) and it is Plaintiff’s understanding that such actions must be brought in federal 

courts.” (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that “Defendants Narwhals Mating, M.D. and Family 

Healthcare Network are the proper actors at issue in this case,” but that it also “appears that the 

Federal Tort Claim Act (28 USC § 1346(b)) requires that the United States also be named as a 

party.” (Id.) Plaintiff therefore requests leave to add the United States as a Defendant in this 

action. (Id. at 2-3.)

The Court notes that amending the complaint to add the United States as a Defendant,

without more, would not cure the jurisdictional deficiencies. The FTCA limits federal court 

jurisdiction to hear actions for damages against the United States. Warren v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Interior, 724 F.2d 776, 777-78 (9th Cir. 1984). Before a plaintiff can file an FTCA action in 

federal court, she must exhaust the administrative remedies for her claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2675(a) (“An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money

damages ... unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal 

agency[.]”). “An administrative claim is deemed exhausted once the relevant agency finally 

denies it in writing, or if the agency fails to make a final disposition of the claim within six 

months of the claim's filing.” D.L. by & through Junio v. Vassilev, 858 F.3d 1242, 1244 (9th 

Cir. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)); Warren, 724 F.2d at 778 (“The plaintiff is permitted to 

sue the United States only after the claim is denied or six months have elapsed without final 

disposition by the agency”) (emphasis added). “Exhaustion of the claim procedures established 

under the [FTCA] is a prerequisite to district court jurisdiction.” Johnson v. United States, 704 

F.2d 1431, 1442 (9th Cir. 1983). “Because the requirement [to file an administrative claim] is 

jurisdictional, ‘it must be strictly adhered to. This is particularly so since the FTCA waives 

sovereign immunity.’ ” Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 

Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1992)); McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 

106, 113 (1993) (“The FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have 

exhausted their administrative remedies.”).

While Plaintiff generally states she “initiated the process for this claim through the 

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Federal Tort Claims Act,” she fails to proffer any information as to whether she exhausted her 

administrative remedies by filing an administrative tort claim with the appropriate federal agency

under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The Court is therefore unaware whether Plaintiff can cure the 

jurisdictional defect. However, if she can do so, amendment would not be futile. Accordingly, 

the Court recommends that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend to establish subject matter 

jurisdiction and demonstrate that her claim arises under the FTCA, if she believes she can do so 

in good faith. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 

IV.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against Defendants Family Healthcare 

Network and Narwhals Mating, M.D. be DENIED for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction; and

2. Plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED with leave to amend to establish subject 

matter jurisdiction. 

/ / /

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this 

action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 304. Within fourteen

(14) days of service of these recommendations, the parties may file written objections to the 

findings and recommendations with the Court. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The District Judge will 

review the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 6, 2024 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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