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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L E D 

United Stat.es Court of Appeals 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Tenth circuit 

SEP O 7 1990 

GEORGE WRIGHT SMITH, Jr. ) 

) 

) 

) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v . ) 

) 

No. 90-6114 

JACK COWLEY; ATTORNEY 

State of Oklahoma, 

GENERAL,) 

) 

(D . C. No. CIV-89-2157-W 

(W . D. Okla.) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges . 

After examining the briefs and appellate. record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal . See Fed. R. App . P . 

34(1); 10th Cir. R. 34 . 1 . 9 . 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

This is a prose appeal by a state prisoner who asserts the 

denial of his petition for habeas corpus was erroneous. 

* be 

for 

res 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6114 Document: 010110041934 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 1 
Mr. Smith raises six issues, which he states as follows: 

1. Whether the district court decided the habeas 

petition in a way that was arbitrary to the issue of 

self representation. 

2. Whether the fact finding procedure employer [sic] 

by the district court was adequate to afford a full and 

fair hearing on issue whether prosecution suppressed 

exculpatory evidence. 

3. The trial court committed error when it over-ruled 

the petitioner's objections and motion for mistrial when 

the prosecutor commented on the petitioner's failure to 

testify. 

4. Petitioner was denied due process when the demeanor 

and conduct of the prosecutor was highly prejudicial to 

the petitioner which denied petitioner due process and a 

fair and impartial trial. 

5. Motion to request for petitioner to act as his own 

co-counsel. 

6. Motion to require plaintiff's witness to submit to 

defendant's pre-trial investigation. 

Mr. Smith is challenging his conviction of first degree rape 

in the state court of Oklahoma for which he received a sentence of 

fifty years imprisonment. Mr. Smith was convicted based upon the 

testimony of his victim as well as other persons who were at the 

scene of the crime. The district court reviewed the transcript of 

the state court trial and set forth the facts in his thorough 

memorandum opinion of March 7, 1990. 

The district court determined that no evidentiary hearing was 

necessary as the issues raised could be resolved on the basis of 

the state court record. The district court reviewed the state 

court record and set forth the facts in meticulous detail. Mr. 

Smith in his brief to this court does not quarrel with the facts 

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Appellate Case: 90-6114 Document: 010110041934 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 2 
as set forth by the district court; rather, he quarrels with the 

application of the law to the facts. 

We first note that Mr . Smith has exhausted his state 

remedies. His conviction was appealed to the Court of Criminal 

Appeals for the State of Oklahoma (No. F-73-347), which affirmed 

the conviction. Mr. Smith then sought post-conviction relief 

through the state court system and relief was denied. (No. PC-74-

330, Order of the Court of Criminal Appeals dated June 3, 1974). 

In order for relief to be granted under habeas corpus, there 

must be a finding that the state court ' s rulings " ' render[ed] the 

trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal 

constitutional rights. '" Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 

1197 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F . 2d 839, 850 

(10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S . 1047 (1980) . We review 

whether the district court gave proper weight to the state court's 

findings. Graham v. Wilson, 828 F . 2d 656, 658 (10th Cir. 1987), 

cert. denied, 484 U. S. 1069 (1988) . 

We have reviewed the record on appeal and are satisfied that 

Mr. Smith's contentions which he now raises are without merit. 

The district court performed a thorough, well-reasoned and correct 

analysis of the facts and the law. As this case involves no 

unique law or application of the law to the facts, this court 

adopts the reasoning and analysis of the district court. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6114 Document: 010110041934 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 3 
We therefore grant Mr. Smith a certificate of probable cause 

to appeal. We AFFIRM the decision of the district court for 

substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court in 

its memorandum opinion entered March 7, 1990, a copy of which is 

attached to this order and judgment. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 90-6114 Document: 010110041934 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 4 
. .. 

GEORGE 

vs. 

• 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ~E, LED 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA r 

MAR 7 1990 

WRIGHT SMITH, JR., ) 

) 

Petitioner ) 

) 

) CIV-89-2157-W 

) 

JACK COWLEY, Warden, ET AL., ) 

) 

Respondents ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Petitioner, a state prisoner, appearing prose and in forma 

pauperis, brings this action for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant 

to 28 u.s.c. §2254. The Respondents have filed their Rule 5 

response and the Petitioner has replied thereto. Thus, the matter 

is at issue. The Court determines that an evidentiary hearing is 

not necessary, as the issues can be resolved on the basis of th.e 

record. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 ( 1963) ; Cartwright v. 

Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203, 1216 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 486 U.S. 356 

(1988). 

In this proceeding, the Petitioner challenges his conviction 

of first degree rape in the District Court of Oklahoma County on 

April 11, 1973, Case No. CRF-72-1945, for which he received a 

sentence of fifty years imprisonment. The Petitioner has not yet 

begun serving the sentence under attack in this proceeding, as he 

is currently serving a sentence of seventy-five years for armed 

robbery. However, since the conviction under attack involves a 

consecutive sentence to be served in the future, the Court finds 

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Appellate Case: 90-6114 Document: 010110041934 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 5 
• 

that the Petitioner is "in custody" for purposes of review under 

§2254. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1968). 

The relevant facts are that L.K.H. testified that on August 

9, 1972, she, her sister and brother were visiting an elderly 

couple, the Whitneys, at their rural home in Oklahoma City when 

four black men forced their way into the home. L.K.H. testified 

that the Petitioner took her, her sister and brother upstairs where 

he tied her and her brother to chairs. He then took L.K.H. 's 

sister and went downstairs. Later, the Petitioner returned to the 

upstairs room, gagged L.K.H., and took her downstairs to a small 

room known as the "saddle room." When the Petitioner removed the 

gag, L.K.H. screamed and begged for release, but the Petitioner 

put a gun to her head, threatened her and then proceeded to rape 

her. L.K.H. testified that the Petitioner made penetration but 

did not ejaculate, because his friends came into the room and said 

they had to leave. L.K.H. identified the Petitioner in court. She 

further testified that after being freed, she discovered that her 

car, a 1970 orange-colored Maverick, was gone, and that her 

drivers' license was in the car. She did not see her drivers' 

license until a policeman later brought it to her. 

The state then called V.L.H., L.K.H.'s sister, who identified 

the Petitioner as the person who forced her, her sister and her 

brother to the attic, and had bound her brother and sister. V. L. H. 

further stated that the Petitioner took her downstairs and told her 

to remove her clothes. V.L.H. screamed, struggled and managed to 

break free from the Petitioner after which she ran into the living 

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. : 

room. One of the other men who was with the Petitioner, asked 

V. L. H. how old she was. She replied that she was thirteen, 

although .she was actually fifteen years old. The man then stated 

that she was "too young," so they tied her up in the living room. 

She then observed the Petitioner bring her sister downstairs and 

enter the saddle room, where she heard her sister screaming for 

help. A third eyewitness, Mrs. Whitney, testified that the 

Petitioner was one of the four men who forcibly entered her home 

and she identified the Petitioner as having a gun. 

Oklahoma City Police Detective Don Acox testified that he 

recovered L.K.H.'s drivers' license during a search of a residence 

where the Petitioner and four other men lived, pursuant to a search 

warrant. Eddie Eugene Ellis then testified that he shared the 

residence with the Petitioner and three others, and that on the 

date in question, the Petitioner and the other three persons 

arrived in an orange-colored Maverick, a car which he had not seen 

before. Ellis testified that he observed those four individuals 

unloading things from the car and taking them into the house. 

Ellis further testified that the Petitioner stated that he had 

raped a white girl at the Whitney farm, and that he was leaving 

town because "it was getting too hot." Ellis conceded that he was 

presently in jail for concealing stolen property, a shotgun, that 

had been taken from the Whitney farm, and which he claims he took 

from the orange Maverick. Ellis also admitted to a prior felony 

conviction. After the prosecution rested, the Petitioner called 

only one witness, an identification officer for the Oklahoma County 

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- • 

Sheriff's Office. This witness identified photographs of the 

Petitioner and of Ellis, and the photographs were admitted into 

evidence. Thereafter the Petitioner rested. 

The Petitioner's first claim for relief is that the prosecutor 

improperly commented on the Petitioner's failure to testify. The 

record reflects that the prosecutor stated during closing argument: 

Now, this evidence is that this is the man that raped her 

and it is confirmed by three people and I submit to you 

a very important factor - if I don't make one other 

point, I would like to emphasize this, the fact he is the 

one that raped her. It is unrefuted, uncontradicted 

except for the remarks of Mr. Atkinson (Petitioner's 

trial counsel), and the Court has told you what he says 

or attempts to testify to is not law and it is not 

evidence in this case. 

(TR-220) 

The Petitioner states that "to comment directly or indirectly 

upon the Petitioner's failure to testify is reversible error, 

denying Petitioner his const~tutional right to remain silent and 

due process of law." The Respondents claim that the prosecutor's 

remark only attempted to differentiate between sworn testimony of 

witnesses and statements made by defense counsel. 

When a defendant chooses not to testify, the Fifth Amendment 

prohibits any direct adverse comment during the trial about the 

defendant's failure to take the stand. Griffin v. California, 380 

U. S. 609, 614, (1965). Indirect comment on a defendant's silence, 

however, does not violate the Fifth Amendment unless "manifestly 

intended" or of such character that the jury would "naturally or 

necessarily view the remark as a comment on a defendant's refusal 

to testify." United States .v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382, 1402 (10th 

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Appellate Case: 90-6114 Document: 010110041934 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 8 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1023 (1985), citing United 

States v. Bennett 542 F.2d 63, 64 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 

429 U.S. 1048 (1977). The Court finds that the comments of the 

prosecutor would not have been naturally taken by the jury as 

comments on the Petitioner's failure to testify. See, e.g., United 

States v. Nabors, 762 F.2d 642, 649-650 (8th Cir. 1985) 

(prosecutor's comment during rebuttal to closing argument that 

"these lawyers still haven't explained to you how the boots that 

made the print right outside the getaway car, fresh print, ended 

up underneath the house" held not comment on defendant's failure 

to testify). Furthermore, Petitioner's trial counsel had already 

commented on the decision he made to not allow the Petitioner to 

testify when he stated: "Now, Mr. Grove (the prosecutor) has the 

privilege of speaking to you last and he has a skillful tongue and 

skillful brain, and that is why I do not put my client on to expose 

him " (TR-211). 

In any event, the Supreme Court has held that harmless error 

analysis is applicable to determine whether a prosecutor's 

reference to a defendant's failure to testify requires reversal. 

United States v. Hasting. 461 U.S. 499, 510-512 (1983) 

(prosecutor's comment on silence harmless beyond reasonable doubt 

because jury would have returned guilty verdict absent such 

allusion) • In view of the overwhelming evidence against the 

Petitioner at trial, including three eyewitnesses, the victim's 

drivers' license found at the Petitioner's residence, and the 

victim I s poignant declaration of identification ( "I would never 

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Appellate Case: 90-6114 Document: 010110041934 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 9 
- forget his face"), the Court finds that the Petitioner's 

constitutional right to a fair trial was not violated under 

harmless error analysis, even assuming the prosecutor's comment was 

\ 

erroneous. 

The Petitioner next contends that he was denied a fair trial 

because of prosecutorial misconduct. The Petitioner contends that 

statements made by the prosecutor in his closing argument were 

outside the record and were intended to inflame the passion of the 

jury. The first remark complained of was when the prosecutor 

referred to the Petitioner as " ••• this pistol packing defendant." 

The trial testimony of both V.L.H. and L.K.H. revealed that the 

Petitioner had put a gun to their heads, and thus this statement 

was a fair comment on the evidence. The Petitioner further objects 

to another statement made by the prosecutor in his closing argument 

that the Petitioner "skipped out of town two days after this crime 

occurred." Again, trial testimony of Eddie Ellis indicated that 

the Petitioner left the state two days after the crime, and thus 

this statement is also supported by the record, and was a fair 

comment on the evidence. Finally, the Petitioner complains that 

the prosecutor aroused the passion and prejudice of the jury by 

stating: 

Little [L.K.H.] wasn't able to be brave but you can be 

brave for her when you assess the punishment in this 

case. There is a wide range of punishment beginning with 

the term of five years and going up to whatever you want 

to give him. A million years or whatever. I ask you to 

keep in mind these children, the fear in their hearts of 

looking around the corner wondering when he is going to 

be on the streets again. 

(TR-233). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6114 Document: 010110041934 Date Filed: 09/07/1990 Page: 10 
Habeas corpus relief is available for prosecutorial misconduct 

only when the prosecution's conduct is so egregious in the context 

of the entire trial that it renders the trial fundamentallyu~fair. 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637, 642-648 (1974). Improper 

remarks by a prosecutor must therefore prejudicially affect 

defendant's due process rights such as to deprive a defendant of 

a fair trial. Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1987) 

(no "reasonable probability" that outcome of trial would have been 

different, but for improper conduct of prosecutor) . The primary 

concern is whether the Petitioner has been deprived of a fair 

trial. United States v. Washita Construction co. , 789 F.2d 809 , 

822 (10th Cir. 1986). 

Improper prosecutorial argument will only warrant federal 

habeas relief if it renders a petitioner's trial or sentencing 

"fundamentally unfair." Drake v. Kemp. 762 F. 2d 1449, 1458 (11th 

Cir. 1985), ~- denied, 478 U. S. 1020 (1986); citing Brooks v. 

Kemp. 762 F.2d 1383, 1397 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated on other 

grounds, 478 U. S. 1016 (1986); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 

at 642: see also, Byrne v. Butler, 845 F.2d 501, 507 (5th Cir. 

1988), cert. denied, 108 s.ct. 2918 (1988) . To establish that a 

prosecutor's remarks were so inflammatory that they prejudiced the 

substantial rights of the petitioner, a petitioner must demonstrate 

either persistent and pronounced misconduct, or that the evidence 

was so insubstantial that absent the remarks, a conviction probably 

would not have occurred. Byrne v. Butler, 845 F.2d at 508, citing 

Bridge v. Lynaugh, 838 F. 2d 770, 774 (5th Cir. 1988); Felde v. 

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•.• 

- • 

Blackburn, 795 F.2d 400, 403 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 

U.S. 873 (1987). 

Upon the Court's review of the evidence, in the context of the 

trial as a whole, it cannot be said that the Petitioner was denied 

a fair trial by the prosecutor's comments. There was neither 

persistent and pronounced misconduct nor was the evidence so 

insubstantial that absent the remarks, a conviction probably would 

not have occurred. The prosecutor recommended a 3 3 o o year 

sentence, and the jury assessed punishment at 50 years 

imprisonment. Given the violent circumstances of this crime and 

the overwhelming evidence supporting guilt, it cannot be said that 

the actions of the prosecutor denied the Petitioner fundamental 

fairness so as to warrant federal habeas relief. 

The Petitioner's final ground for habeas relief contends that 

the state court denied Petitioner due process by overruling three 

motions at trial. Two of these motions challenged general trial 

procedures. 

plaintiff's 

The Petitioner suggests that a motion to require "a 

witness to submit to defendant's pretrial 

investigation," and a motion for the Petitioner to act as his own 

co-counsel were improperly denied. 

The threshold question for federal review of a state 

prisoner's habeas corpus petition is whether an error is 

demonstrated to be of constitutional magnitude. In Pulley v. 

Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984), the Supreme Court reiterated that 

unless a constitutional violation occurs at trial, the claim is 

governed by state law and is not cognizable in federal habeas 

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• 

proceedings . .I.g. at 41. See also, Bond v. State of Oklahoma, 546 

F.2d 1369, 1377 (10th Cir. 1976); Brinlee v. Crisp. 608 F.2d 839, 

\ 843 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980) (state 

court errors must deprive petitioner of "fundamental rights" under 

the Constitution). Although the Court must liberally construe the 

Petitioner's factual allegations, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520 (1972), "[the court] will not supply additional facts," nor 

will the court "construct a legal theory for the petitioner that 

assumes facts that have not been pleaded." Dunn v. White, 880 F. 2d 

1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989), ~- denied, 110 s.ct. 871 (1990). 

As the Respondents note, with respect to the motion to require 

a "pretrial investigation," the Petitioner provides no facts in 

support of this allegation. Therefore, this claim is frivolous. 

With regard to the motion for the Petitioner to act as his own cocounsel, the Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional 

right to such "hybrid" representation. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 

U.S. 168, 183 (1984). Further, the trial court specifically gave 

the Petitioner the option of representing himself or of being 

represented by his attorney, and the Petitioner wisely chose the 

latter option. (TR-9-10). Therefore, this claim is without merit. 

Finally, the Petitioner attempts to suggest that the 

prosecution suppressed evidence, presumably in violation of Brady 

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 · (1963). But again, Petitioner has 

failed to provide the Court with facts to support this allegation. 

In the reply to the Rule 5 response, the Petitioner states that he 

was seeking the medical report from the prosecutrix's doctor, who 

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- examined her after the alleged rape occurred. The record indicates 

that the state endorsed the examining physician as a state witness, 

but did not issue a subpoena for him to testify at trial. The 

Petitioner states that he was prejudiced "when the state knew that 

it would not use Dr. Wagner, because Petitioner believes that it 

would have shown that no penetration had ever been [achieved]." 

As noted earlier, the record indicates that the victim ,, 

testified that the Petitioner did not ejaculate, although he 

penetrated her. Her testimony was corroborated by V.L.H. 's 

description of the attack, and by Eddie Ellis' testimony regarding 

Petitioner's statements. Under Oklahoma law, the state does not 

need to establish by medical testimony evidence of sperm or other 

medical evidence, but merely the fact of penetration. Simms v. 

State, 735 P.2d 344, 347 {Okla. Crim. 1987); Vaughn v. State, 697 

P.2d 963 {Okla. Crim. 1985). Moreover, a conviction may be 

sustained upon even the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecuting 

witness, unless the testimony is so incredible and unsubstantial 

as to make it unworthy of belief. Ray v. State, 762 P.2d 274 

(Okla. Crim. 1988). Moreover, the records indicate that the trial 

court instructed the jury on the elements of attempted rape as a 

lesser included offense. Therefore, it is apparent that the 

prosecutrix•s testimony was credible to the extent the jury chose 

not to convict the Petitioner of attempted rape, an offense 

identical to first degree rape except for the element of 

penetration. 

Since the examining physician's name was endorsed on the 

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• 

information, the Petitioner was free to subpoena the doctor as his 

witness, and indeed the trial court granted the Petitioner a oneday continuance, when the Petitioner's counsel stated that he had 

relied upon the endorsement for the state to produce the doctor for 

cross-examination. Since the Petitioner was unable to subpoena the 

doctor during the continuance, the Petitioner thus appears to argue 

that the failure of the state to produce the doctor at the trial 

was a Brady violation. 

However, under Brady. there must be (1) a specific request for 

(2) evidence material to guilt or punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 

87 . The Petitioner has shown neither. Since there was no 

testimony that would indicate that semen samples might have been 

available, or that the medical report was otherwise beneficial to 

the Petitioner, the Petitioner has not demonstrated that the state 

possessed exculpatory evidence. Under Brady. moreover, the state 

is not required to disclose neutral or inculpatory evidence, United 

States v. Comosona, 848 F. 2d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir. 1988), or 

evidence available to the defense, United States v. Wolf, 839 F. 2d 

1387, 1391-1392 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 s.ct. 304 

(1988). As noted, the state was not required under Oklahoma law 

to put forth medical testimony to prove the fact of penetration. 

Finally, as the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals noted, "the 

defendant on final argument was free to argue that the failure of 

the state to call the doctor inferred that any examination showed 

no evidence of sperm or trauma," which Petitioner's counsel did in 

fact argue. In any event, Petitioner's allegations do not amount 

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. ,. • 

to a Brady violation, and thus he is not entitled to relief. 

Based upon the foregoing, the petition for habeas corpus must 

be denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this ___ day of March 1990 . 

/_- a ;tta?-:l--------- LEE R. WEST 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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