Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-03942/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-03942-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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Case No.: 5:13-cv-03942-EJD

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO MODIFY SCHEDULING ORDER

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

NICHOLAS SMITH, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NORTHROP GRUMMAN,

Defendant.

Case No. 5:13-cv-03942-EJD 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO MODIFY SCHEDULING 

ORDER

Re: Dkt. No. 46

Plaintiff Nicholas Smith (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action against Defendant Northrop 

Grumman Corporation (“Northrop”), alleging various state-law claims under California’s Fair 

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). Presently before the court is Defendant’s Motion to 

Modify Scheduling Order. See Mot., Dkt. No. 46. Plaintiff opposes the motion. See Opp’n, Dkt. 

No. 47. 

Federal jurisdiction arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. Having carefully 

considered the pleadings, the court finds, concludes, and orders as follows: 

1. By way of background, Northrop contends that on August 20, 2015, Plaintiff 

served a supplemental disclosure statement to identify Wendy Landreville, M.D., as a witness he 

intended to call in support of his claims. Mot. at 1. On September 2, 2015, Northrop served a 

subpoena on Dr. Landreville to take her deposition, and they agreed to take the deposition on 

September 17, 2015. Id. Northrop contends that a scheduling conflict arose, thus on September 

15, 2015, Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to stipulate to an extension of the discovery cut-off date to 

accommodate the deposition. Id. To avoid modifying the scheduling order, Northrop offered to 

accept a brief declaration in lieu of the deposition appearance. Id. Dr. Landreville agreed, and the 

Case 5:13-cv-03942-EJD Document 59 Filed 12/15/15 Page 1 of 3
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Case No.: 5:13-cv-03942-EJD

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO MODIFY SCHEDULING ORDER

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United States District Court

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deposition was cancelled. Id. Northrop further contends that thereafter, Plaintiff’s counsel wrote 

to Dr. Landreville that the discovery cutoff had expired and urged her not to sign the declaration, 

and refused to stipulate to a modification of the discovery cutoff. Id. It appears that Northrop’s 

intent with Dr. Landreville was to inquire about the two letters she wrote for Plaintiff stating that 

he could not serve on jury duty due to his disability. Id. According to this court’s scheduling 

order, the fact discovery cut-off date was September 18, 2015. See Dkt. No. 41. 

2. As such, through the instant motion, Northrop moves to extend the discovery cutoff date in order to depose Dr. Landreville. Id. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the information 

Northrop seeks from Dr. Landreville is irrelevant because Plaintiff’s ability, or inability, to serve 

on a jury bears no relevance to his FEHA claims. Opp’n at 1. 

3. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, a party must initially demonstrate 

sufficient “good cause” to modify the scheduling order so as to allow an extension for the 

discovery cut-off date. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good 

cause and with the judge’s consent.”). If, and only if, the requisite good cause is shown, the court 

then turns to an examination of the relevant factors under Rule 15. Hood v. Hartford Life & 

Accident Ins. Co., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1224 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Johnson v. Mammoth 

Recreations Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (1992) (“If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should 

end.”). 

4. In examining this matter, the Court must be mindful of what can constitute “good 

cause” under Rule 16. “Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy which focuses on the bad 

faith of the party seeking to interpose an amendment and the prejudice to the opposing party, Rule 

16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the 

amendment.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. “The district court may modify the pretrial schedule if it 

cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Id. (internal 

quotations omitted). “[N]ot only must parties participate from the outset in creating a workable 

Rule 16 scheduling order but they must also diligently attempt to adhere to that schedule 

throughout the subsequent course of the litigation.” Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 

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Case No.: 5:13-cv-03942-EJD

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO MODIFY SCHEDULING ORDER

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607 (E.D. Cal. 1999). 

5. Here, Northrop argues that good cause exists because it acted promptly and 

diligently in serving Dr. Landreville the subpoena to appear for deposition prior to the discovery 

cutoff. Mot. at 5. It argues that the need to extend the discovery arose at Dr. Landreville’s request 

due to her scheduling; it was not due to Northrop. Id. 

6. While the court understands Northrop’s position, it fails to see how Dr. 

Landreville’s testimony regarding the letters she wrote to excuse Plaintiff from jury duty is 

relevant to Plaintiff’s FEHA claims. See Mot. at 3 (“Northrop proposed to Dr. Landreville that 

she simply sign a declaration in lieu of appearing for deposition. She was asked to address two 

letters in her medical file advising that Smith’s condition was so incapacitating that he could not 

serve on jury duty.”). The letters themselves were part of the record that Northrop offered for its 

Motion for Summary Judgment. See Def.’s Ex. 25, Dkt. No. 48-8. In ruling on the motion, the 

court determined that the issue of Plaintiff’s ability or inability to serve on jury duty was irrelevant 

to Plaintiff’s FEHA claims. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment. To the extent Northrop’s intent in seeking to depose Dr. Landreville is 

solely to inquire about her letters pertaining to jury duty, there is an insufficient showing of good 

cause to modify the scheduling order. 

Accordingly, Northrop’s Motion to Modify Scheduling Order is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 15, 2015 

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

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