Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08040/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08040-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Donna Rae Lankford, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 10-8040-PHX-JWS (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN W. SEDWICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Pending before the court is a pro se Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Petitioner Donna Rae Lankford. Doc. 4. Following

a jury trial in Coconino County Superior Court in Flagstaff, Arizona in 2003, Petitioner was

convicted of first degree felony murder, kidnaping, first degree burglary and armed robbery.

Doc. 10, Exh. A at 6; Doc. 4 at 1-2. On November 25, 2003, Petitioner was sentenced to

natural life in prison for the murder conviction and concurrent terms of 21 years each for the

other three convictions. Id.

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a timely direct appeal and submitted an opening brief

on May 28, 2004. Doc. 10, Exh. A at 6, Exh. B. After briefing was completed, the Arizona

Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision on January 13, 2005, in which it affirmed

the four convictions and the sentence for the murder conviction. Doc. 10, Exh. A at 2. The

Case 3:10-cv-08040-JWS Document 21 Filed 11/14/11 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Court of Appeals vacated Petitioner’s sentences for the other three convictions and remanded

to the trial court for re-sentencing on those offenses. Id. Petitioner filed a Petition for

Review to the Arizona Supreme Court on February 24, 2005. Doc. 10, Exh. C. On October

25, 2005, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Doc. 10, Exh. D. The Court, however,

granted a cross-petition for review filed by the State of Arizona and ordered the matter

remanded to the Arizona Court of Appeals in light of two Arizona Supreme Court decisions

issued around that time. Id. On remand, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a new

Memorandum Decision on January 26, 2006, in which it vacated the portion of its prior

decision that vacated three of the four sentences imposed. Doc. 10, Exh. E at 3. The Court

of Appeals then affirmed the three sentences as originally imposed by the trial court. Id. 

On January 23, 2006, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction relief under Rule

32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Doc. 10, Exh. F. Through counsel,

Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on October 4, 2006. Doc. 10, Exh. G.

After briefing was completed, the trial court issued an order on March 7, 2007, in which

some of Petitioner’s claims were dismissed and an evidentiary hearing was set on the

remaining claims. Doc. 10, Exh. H. After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued a

second order in which it denied the claims presented at the evidentiary hearing and denied

the overall petition for post-conviction relief. Doc. 10, Exh. I. Petitioner filed a Petition for

Review in the Arizona Court of Appeals on June 22, 2007. Doc. 10, Exh. J. The Court of

Appeals denied review on March 27, 2008. Doc. 10, Exh. K. A subsequent Petition for

Review in the Arizona Supreme Court was denied on July 18, 2008. Doc. 10, Exh. L, M. 

Petitioner filed her Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this court on March 8, 2010.

Doc. 1. After the District Court Judge dismissed the original petition with leave to amend,

Petitioner filed an Amended Petition on May 11, 2010. Doc. 4. Petitioner raises four

grounds for relief in the petition, though her second ground for relief includes several claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel. In ground one, Petitioner alleges that the trial court

violated the Fourteenth Amendment by abusing its discretion in imposing multiple

aggravated sentences despite the presence of numerous mitigating factors. In ground two,

Case 3:10-cv-08040-JWS Document 21 Filed 11/14/11 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Petitioner alleges that her attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial

phase and on direct appeal in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Specifically, Petitioner alleges that her lawyer failed to challenge the voluntariness of her

statements to police, in that counsel failed to file a pretrial motion regarding voluntariness

and failed to cross-examine the police detective regarding the conditions under which she

was questioned. Petitioner further alleges that her lawyer failed to ensure that her interview

with a defense expert was privileged. She also contends that counsel refused to allow her to

testify at trial. Petitioner’s final ineffective assistance claim alleges that her lawyer failed to

properly exhaust her appellate remedies regarding Blakely violations. In ground three,

Petitioner alleges that the police detectives who questioned her violated her Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by taking advantage of the circumstances

and coercing her into making statements. In ground four, Petitioner alleges that the trial

court denied her request to introduce statements by her co-defendant regarding his history

of violence and threats of harm while they were on the run. The trial court further prevented

testimony on these issues by a defense expert as evidence of Petitioner’s state of mind.

Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s actions violated her Sixth Amendment right to confront

witnesses against her and the right to compel the appearance of witnesses in her favor. 

The District Court Judge screened the amended petition on July 9, 2010, and ordered

Respondents to file an answer. Doc. 5. Respondents filed an initial Answer to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus on August 23, 2010. Doc. 10. Petitioner then filed a Reply on

September 16, 2010. Doc. 11. After reviewing Respondents’ initial answer, which was

limited to affirmative defenses, this court ordered Respondents to file a supplement

addressing the merits of Petitioner’s claims. Doc. 12. On April 8, 2011, Respondents filed

a Supplemental Answer to Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus along with

supporting attachments. Doc. 13-19. Petitioner then filed a Reply to Supplemental Answer

on April 27, 2011. Doc. 20.

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:

Case 3:10-cv-08040-JWS Document 21 Filed 11/14/11 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Lankford gave several versions of the shooting prior to trial. Initially, she told police

that she handed the gun to Odom, who actually shot the victim. When the prosecutor

interviewed Lankford’s expert witness, Dr. Kathleen Ferraro, Ferraro stated that Lankford

told her that Lankford had been handing the weapon to Odom when it went off. At trial,

Lankford’s position was that the weapon accidentally fired when she moved the bolt.

- 4 -

The State initially charged Lankford and her husband, co-defendant

Jimmy Lynn Odom, with the premeditated murder and felony murder of Duard

Stanphill, and with the underlying felonies of kidnapping, burglary in the first

degree, armed robbery, and theft. The charges arose from an incident that

occurred after Stanphill befriended Lankford and Odom in the Canyon Club

Bar in Williams, Arizona, on September 11, 2001. The couple, arriving from

California, had a malfunctioning car and no money.

Upon leaving the bar, Lankford and Odom accompanied Stanphill to his

campsite in the Kaibab National Forest where they continued to drink and

socialize. At some point in the evening, Stanphill went into his camper and

undressed to his underwear. Lankford left Odom by the campfire and went

inside the camper to get another drink.

As she and Stanphill talked in the camper, Odom burst in and hit

Stanphill in the head with a hammer, breaking the head off the hammer. As

Stanphill “hollered, ‘Jimmy, why,’” Odom told Lankford to “get me something

to tie him up with.” Lankford then handed Odom a “clock cord,” but when

that “didn’t work,” Odom began tying Stanphill’s left wrist with the electrical

cord from a fan.

Odom then told Lankford to “get a gun,” and she walked into the

bedroom area of the camper and retrieved a Savage .22-250 Model 110 boltaction rifle. As Odom stood over Stanphill tying his hands, Lankford

discharged the weapon, taking off “half of the top of [Stanphill’s] head.”1

Odom was situated so near the victim at the time that debris from the shot’s

impact hit Odom in the forehead, causing him to bleed.

Immediately following the shooting, Odom told Lankford “to grab

everything,” and she and Odom gathered items from the victim’s camper.

They took several weapons, including the Savage Model 110, whiskey,

cigarettes and “two plastic buckets full of change.” Lankford was “grabbing

stuff” and handing it to Odom, who was putting it in their car. She “grabbed”

some of the weapons and also “the change, and . . . two bottles of whiskey -

two or three,” and then they left in their car.

Thereafter, the couple drove towards Texas, stealing a min-van in New

Mexico after their vehicle broke down and transferring the guns and other

stolen items to the van. They abandoned the van after it ran out of gas in West

Texas near Pecos. Several of the stolen weapons were in the van when police

located it on September 16, including the Savage Model 110. Some truckers

picked up Odom and Lankford, and they ended up near Houston.

Lankford and Odom eventually headed into the “Big Thicket” area of

East Texas, a region of “extremely dense forest, marshes, sloughs, extremely

thick vegetation . . . [with] deer camps and deer stands.” After a “manhunt”

of several days involving several law enforcement agencies, Lankford and

Odom were apprehended on September 24 in a camper where they were

staying.

Case 3:10-cv-08040-JWS Document 21 Filed 11/14/11 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

DISCUSSION

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s claims in grounds one, three and four are

procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to properly raise them in the state court.

Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claims in ground two, Respondents concede

that Petitioner properly exhausted her state court remedies but argue that Petitioner has failed

to satisfy the standards for habeas relief. 

A. Procedural Default

1. Legal Standards

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state's highest court

in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). A

petitioner "must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues

by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." Id. at

845. In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals

by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate

post-conviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen

v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of

Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v.

Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895,

898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). "Our rule is that a state prisoner has not 'fairly presented' (and thus

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that

those claims were based on federal law." Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir.

2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). "If a petitioner fails to alert

the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is

Case 3:10-cv-08040-JWS Document 21 Filed 11/14/11 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court." Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). “Moreover, general appeals to broad constitutional

principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient

to establish exhaustion.” Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gray

v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996)).

If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are still available in state court, the federal court may

dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); see also Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002) (a

defendant's claim is procedurally defaulted when it is clear that the state court would hold

the claim procedurally barred). The federal court will not consider these claims unless the

petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for

his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Dretke v. Haley, 124 S.Ct. 1847, 1851-52

(2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).

A procedural default may also occur when a petitioner raises a federal claim in state

court but the state court declines to address the claim because the petitioner failed to meet

a state procedural requirement. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. In such cases, federal habeas

review is precluded if the state court opinion contains a plain statement clearly relying on a

state procedural bar that presents an independent and adequate basis for the court's decision.

See Harris, 489 U.S. at 263. A state procedural default ruling is "independent" unless

resolution of the issue depends on a federal constitutional ruling. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.

68, 75 (1985); Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002). A state's application of the bar

is "adequate" if it is "'strictly or regularly followed.'" Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578,

Case 3:10-cv-08040-JWS Document 21 Filed 11/14/11 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1982)). Moreover, even if

after rejecting a federal claim on procedural grounds, the state court goes on to discuss the

merits, the procedural bar is not eliminated. See Harris at 264 n.10; Poland v. Stewart, 169

F.3d 573, 578 n.8 (9th Cir. 1998). As with defaulted claims that were not fairly presented,

a federal court may still review the merits of a defaulted claim based on a state procedural

bar if the petitioner can establish cause and prejudice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51.

2. Ground One

Petitioner’s claim in ground one alleges that the trial court’s imposition of aggravated

sentences violated the Fourteenth Amendment, though she fails to identify what section or

clause has been violated. Petitioner argues that the trial court found five mitigating factors

and only one aggravating factor but failed to engage in a balancing of the factors. She claims

the court wrongfully imposed aggravated sentences for the three predicate offenses of

kidnaping, burglary and armed robbery.

In her direct appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner raised a claim that the

trial court abused its discretion in imposing an aggravated sentence of natural life in prison.

Doc. 10, Exh. B at 47-50. That claim, however, did not allege a violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment or any other federal constitutional provision. Id. Likewise, the petition for

review to the Arizona Supreme Court failed to allege that the trial court’s imposition of an

aggravated sentence violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Doc. 10, Exh. C at 10-11. Further,

none of Petitioner’s post-conviction relief filings raised a Fourteenth Amendment claim

based on the imposition of aggravated sentences. Doc. 10, Exh. G, J, L.

Petitioner addresses the exhaustion issue in her reply and contends that this claim “has

consistently been presented as a constitutional violation throughout her appeal process.”

Doc. 20 at 2. Plaintiff fails to identify, however, anywhere in her direct appeal or postconviction relief filings that she has raised this aggravated sentence claim as a violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment. The court’s review of her state court filings demonstrates that

a Fourteenth Amendment claim was never raised. By failing to present the claim in the state

court, Petitioner has failed to exhaust her state court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would

Case 3:10-cv-08040-JWS Document 21 Filed 11/14/11 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The time has passed to seek post-conviction relief in state court under Rule 32.4(a)

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Petitioner has not shown that any of the

exceptions to the time limits under Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h) apply to him.

- 8 -

no longer have a remedy if she returned to the state court.2

 As a result, the claim is

procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has presented nothing in her reply to establish cause for

the default, nor has she shown a miscarriage of justice to overcome the procedural default.

Doc. 20. The court will therefore recommend that the claim in ground one be denied.

3. Ground Three

 Petitioner alleges in ground three that the Phoenix police detectives who questioned

her after she was arrested, coerced statements from her by taking advantage of her vulnerable

condition. She alleges that their actions violated the Fifth Amendment. Petitioner did not

raise this claim in her direct appeal. Doc. 10, Exh. B. She raised no claim challenging the

statements she made to the police detectives. Id. Likewise, in her petition for review to the

Arizona Supreme Court on direct review, Petitioner raised no challenge to the statements she

provided to police. Doc. 10, Exh. C.

In her state petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner did raise a claim that her postarrest statements to police were coerced in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Doc. 10, Exh.

G at 5. The trial court, however, found the claim to be precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3) of

the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that a defendant is precluded from

relief on any ground that was waived at trial or on appeal. The trial court ruled that because

Petitioner did not challenge at trial or on direct appeal the voluntariness of her statements to

police, the claim was precluded on post-conviction review. Doc. 10, Exh. H at 4.

The trial court relied on a state procedural bar that presents an independent and

adequate basis for the court's decision. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (state

court’s determination under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) was independent of federal law);

Martinez Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1996) (Arizona’s rule of preclusion

is regularly and consistently followed). The claim is therefore procedurally defaulted based

on Petitioner’s failure to satisfy a state procedural requirement.

Case 3:10-cv-08040-JWS Document 21 Filed 11/14/11 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

In her reply, Petitioner addresses the voluntariness of her post-arrest statements but

she fails to refute Respondents’ procedural default argument. She does not argue cause and

prejudice or a miscarriage of justice. The court will therefore recommend that the claim in

ground three be denied.

4. Ground Four 

Petitioner alleges in ground four that the trial court violated her Sixth Amendment

right to confront the witnesses against her and the right to compulsory process for obtaining

witnesses in her favor. She claims these rights were violated when the court precluded her

from introducing statements by her co-defendant regarding his history of violence and threats

of harm while they were on the run and when the court prevented testimony on these issues

by a defense expert as evidence of Petitioner’s state of mind. 

In the section of her direct appeal brief in which she addressed the trial court’s alleged

error in precluding threatening statements by the co-defendant, Petitioner did not allege a

Sixth Amendment or federal constitutional violation. Doc. 10, Exh. B at 29-31. Petitioner

simply argued that the trial court abused its discretion and that it should have admitted the

statements under the state rules of evidence. Because it was not raised as a federal

constitutional claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals analyzed the issue as a state law

evidentiary and harmless error question. Doc. 10, Exh. A at 19-21.

By failing to raise the trial court’s preclusion of the co-defendant’s statements

regarding violence and threats as a Sixth Amendment claim, Petitioner has failed to exhaust

her state court remedies. Moreover, as with ground one, Petitioner would no longer have a

remedy if she returned to the state court. As a result, the claim is procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner fails to address this issue in her reply and thus has presented nothing to establish

cause for the default, nor has she shown a miscarriage of justice to overcome the procedural

default. Doc. 20. The court will therefore recommend that the claim in ground four be

denied. 

Case 3:10-cv-08040-JWS Document 21 Filed 11/14/11 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

- 10 -

B. Merits Analysis of Ground Two Claims

1. AEDPA Standard of Review

Under the AEDPA3

, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the state court

decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard of review).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent if (1) "the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or (2)

"if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision

of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent."

Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "A state court's decision can involve an 'unreasonable

application' of Federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then

applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) extends or fails

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively

unreasonable." Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, the

“unreasonable application” clause requires the state court’s application of Supreme Court law

to be more than incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). "When applying these standards, the federal court should

review the 'last reasoned decision' by a state court ...." Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044,

1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

2. Legal Standard for Ineffective Assistance Claims

The two-prong test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel was established

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an

Case 3:10-cv-08040-JWS Document 21 Filed 11/14/11 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show: (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. There is a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. Regarding prejudice, counsel’s errors must be “so

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is unreliable.” Id. at

687. It is not enough to merely show “that the errors had some conceivable effect on the

outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693.

In the context of a habeas petition, a petitioner must do more than demonstrate to the

federal court that the state court applied Strickland incorrectly. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685,

698-99 (2002). Rather, a petitioner must demonstrate that the state court “applied Strickland

to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Id. “The question is whether

there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.”

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011).

a. Failure to Challenge the Voluntariness of Statements

Among her four allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in ground two,

Petitioner first contends that her trial counsel failed to challenge the voluntariness of her

statements to police by failing to file any pretrial motions on the issue and failing to crossexamine the police detective regarding the circumstances under which she was questioned.

Petitioner fails to argue that there was a reasonable probability that the result would have

been different if counsel had challenged the voluntariness of her statements. She merely

provides a blanket assertion that all four alleged errors by counsel “prejudiced the entire

judicial process.” Doc. 4 at 7.

Case 3:10-cv-08040-JWS Document 21 Filed 11/14/11 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

The state trial court considered this claim on post-conviction relief. The trial court

initially found that these allegations raised a colorable claim for relief. Doc. 10, Exh. H at

5. The court, therefore, held an evidentiary hearing at which Petitioner and her trial counsel

testified. Doc. 10, Exh. I at 1-5. In a written decision following the evidentiary hearing, the

trial court ruled as follows:

In this case, trial counsel considered whether to request a voluntariness

hearing at length. She investigated petitioner’s claims that her statement was

not voluntary. She reviewed the documents in the case and interviewed the

appropriate witnesses. She weighed the benefits of getting evidence favorable

to the defense in, without having petitioner testify, thereby holding open the

option for a later determination. The court finds that this was a reasonable

strategy, and that trial counsel’s decision was well within the standards of

professional competence.

Even if the Court were to assume that trial counsel’s representation fell

below the minimum standard of professional competence, petitioner has not

shown prejudice. The evidence does not show that petitioner’s confession was

involuntary or that its introduction so upset the adversarial balance between

the defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict

rendered suspect.

Doc. 10, Exh. I at 3-4. The trial court went on to find that the conditions under which she

was questioned by police did not support a finding that her statements were coerced or

involuntary. Doc. 10, Exh. I at 4. Finally, the trial court found that there was substantial

evidence against her separate from her statements to police. Id. The court determined,

therefore, that Petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice. Id. at 5.

Petitioner’s conclusory claim on this issue in her habeas petition, in addition to the

brief discussion in her reply, fail to demonstrate that the state court’s decision denying this

claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland, or that the decision was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy

the standard for habeas relief on this claim, the court will recommend that it be denied.

b. Waiver of Privilege as to Defense Expert

Petitioner next contends that her lawyer failed to ensure that an interview between

Petitioner and a defense expert was privileged. Petitioner says nothing more about this claim

in her petition and she addressed it only briefly in her reply. She claims in her reply that her

Case 3:10-cv-08040-JWS Document 21 Filed 11/14/11 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

counsel failed to object during the prosecutor’s pre-trial interview of the defense expert, thus

waiving any privilege. Doc. 20 at 5.

The state trial court considered this claim on post-conviction relief. The trial court

determined that counsel’s performance was not deficient on this issue. Doc. 10, Exh. H at

6. The court found that defense counsel convinced the court to preclude admission of the

prosecutor’s interview with the expert for all but impeachment or rebuttal purposes. Id.

Additionally, the court explained, the interview was never used against Petitioner. Id.

Petitioner fails to address these findings by the state court and thus fails to show that

the decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland, or that the

decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Petitioner has, therefore,

failed to satisfy the standard for habeas relief on this claim. Consequently, the court will

recommend that the claim be denied. 

c. Refusal to Allow Defendant to Testify

Petitioner next alleges that her lawyer did not allow her to testify at her own trial.

Petitioner contends that she was unaware that she had the right to testify. In her reply,

Petitioner states that her lawyer failed to inform her of the absolute right to testify. Doc. 20

at 6. She argues that because she had an absolute right to testify, her lawyer provided

ineffective assistance by neglecting to so inform her.

The state trial court considered this claim on post-conviction relief. The court

distinguished in a footnote Petitioner’s claim that counsel refused to allow her to testify from

her similar claim that counsel was ineffective for advising her not to testify. Doc. 10, Exh.

H at 6. The court set an evidentiary on the question of whether counsel refused to let her

testify and decided without a hearing that counsel was not ineffective for advising her not to

testify. Id. Between Petitioner’s habeas petition and her reply, she does not clearly indicate

whether she is claiming counsel refused to allow her to testify or was ineffective when

advising her not to testify.

Regarding the claim that counsel was ineffective for advising Petitioner not to testify,

the trial court pointed out several different ways the State could have impeached her

Case 3:10-cv-08040-JWS Document 21 Filed 11/14/11 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

testimony. Doc. 10, Exh. H at 6. The court further explained how counsel found other ways

to present evidence “sufficient to competently argue her defense while protecting her client

from impeachment.” Id. The court therefore found that in light of all the circumstances,

counsel’s advice not to testify was reasonable given the facts known to her at the time. Id.

As a result, the court found no deficient performance. Id. The court went on to explain that

Petitioner had not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings

would have been different. Id.

Petitioner’s conclusory assertion in her petition and limited discussion in her reply fail

to demonstrate that the decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

Strickland, or that the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Petitioner having failed to satisfy the standard for habeas relief on this claim, the court will

recommend that it be denied.

Regarding the claim that counsel refused to allow Petitioner to testify, the trial court

held an evidentiary hearing at which Petitioner and trial counsel testified. Doc. 10, Exh. I

at 5-6. The court found, based on the evidence and credibility of the witnesses, “that trial

counsel told petitioner she had an absolute right to testify.” Id. at 5. The court found there

was conflicting evidence on the issue, but there was no evidence that trial counsel advised

Petitioner she could not testify. Id. Accordingly, the trial court found that trial counsel’s

actions were within the standards of professional competence, and that even if there was

deficient performance, Petitioner failed to show prejudice because most of what she would

have testified to was submitted to the jury through other witnesses. Id.

Petitioner’s habeas petition and her reply fail to present any meaningful challenge to

the trial court’s findings after the evidentiary hearing. This court finds that Petitioner has

failed to demonstrate that the state trial court’s decision denying this claim was contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, Strickland, or that the decision was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy the standard

for habeas relief, the court will recommend that this claim be denied. 

Case 3:10-cv-08040-JWS Document 21 Filed 11/14/11 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

d. Failure to Exhaust Appellate Remedies

Lastly, Petitioner alleges that her lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel

on appeal by failing to exhaust her appellate remedies with respect to Blakely issues that

affected her sentences. Petitioner fails to explain in her petition to what specific “Blakely

issues” she is referring. Likewise, her reply fails to provide any discussion of this issue other

than one case citation regarding the importance of preserving issues for future federal review.

The trial court addressed this issue on state post-conviction review. The court

explained that appellate counsel raised and argued a Blakely issue before the Arizona Court

of Appeals. Doc. 10, Exh. H at 7. The Court of Appeals reviewed the claim and held that

Petitioner’s sentence did not violate Blakely. Id. Thus, the trial court concluded that

Petitioner failed to demonstrate any prejudice and it summarily dismissed this claim. Id.

Petitioner’s habeas petition and her reply present virtually nothing to challenge the

trial court’s ruling on this issue. The one paragraph argument in Petitioner’s reply fails to

address the specific issue on which she seeks relief. Doc. 20 at 8. This court finds that

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state trial court’s decision denying this claim was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland, or that the decision was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts. Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy the

standard for habeas relief, the court will recommend that this claim be denied.

C. Conclusion

Having determined that the claims in grounds one, three and four are procedurally

defaulted, and that Petitioner has failed to satisfy the standard for habeas relief on the

ineffective assistance of counsel claims in ground two, the court will recommend that the

petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(Doc. 4) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

Case 3:10-cv-08040-JWS Document 21 Filed 11/14/11 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED: 

That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal

be DENIED because the dismissal of the Amended Petition is justified by a plain procedural

bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable and because

Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 14th day of November, 2011.

Case 3:10-cv-08040-JWS Document 21 Filed 11/14/11 Page 16 of 16