Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01957/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01957-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE, a nonprofit organization, 

Plaintiff,

NO. CIV. S-08-1957 FCD/EFB

v.

ALICE B. CARLTON, in her

official capacity as Forest

Supervisor for Plumas National

Forest, RANDY MOORE, in his

official capacity as Regional

Forester for Region 5 of the

United States Forest Service,

and the UNITED STATES FOREST

SERVICE, 

Defendants,

and

SIERRA ACCESS COALITION, a

California non-profit

corporation, THERESA WINNINGHAM,

W.M. BEATY & ASSOCIATES, INC., a

California corporation, PLUMAS

UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, and PEW

FOREST PRODUCTS, a California

corporation,

Proposed Defendant

Intervenors.

_______________________________/

----oo0oo----

Case 2:08-cv-01957-FCD-EFB Document 52 Filed 09/11/08 Page 1 of 8
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1 Defendants have not filed a response to applicants’

motion to intervene.

2 Because oral argument will not be of material 

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

See E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

3 The facts provided are for considered only for the

purposes of applicant’s motion to intervene.

2

This matter is before the court on a motion to intervene

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) filed by

applicants Sierra Access Coalition, Theresa Winningham, W.M.

Beaty & Associates, Inc., Plumas Unified School District, and Pew

Forest Products (collectively, “applicants”). Plaintiff Earth

Island Institute (“Earth Island”) opposes applicants’

intervention in the litigation, and in the alternative, opposes

applicants’ intervention specifically in the merits

determination.1 For the reason’s set forth below,2 applicants’

motion to intervene as defendants is GRANTED in part and DENIED

in part. 

BACKGROUND3

On August 20, 2008, plaintiff filed a complaint in this

court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based upon

alleged violations of the National Environmental Policy Act

(“NEPA”) and the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”) by

defendants Alice B. Carlton, Randy Moore, and the United State

Forest Service’s (collectively “federal defendants”) arising out

of their decision to authorize a large commercial logging project

in the Plumas National Forest, known as the “Moonlight Roadside

Safety and Hazard Tree Removal Project” (the “Moonlight

Project”). (Compl., filed Aug. 20, 2008, ¶¶ 1-2.) The parties

stipulated to an expedited briefing schedule, and on September 2,

Case 2:08-cv-01957-FCD-EFB Document 52 Filed 09/11/08 Page 2 of 8
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2008, plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to be

heard on September 19, 2008. (Stipulation and Order, filed Aug.

29, 2008; Mot. for Prelim. Inj., filed Sept. 2, 2008.) On

September 9, 2008, applicants filed a motion to intervene as

defendants in the action and an application for an order

shortening time to hear the motion in light of the shortened

schedule for plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. 

(Mot. to Intervene, filed Sept. 9, 2008; Mot. to Shorten Time,

filed Sept. 9, 2008.)

All applicants have an interest relating to the safe access

and use of the forest roads. (Mot. to Intervene at 10.) Sierra

Access Coalition (“SAC”) is a non-profit California corporation

that advocates for non-motorized and motorized access for members

that recreate on the Plumas and Lassen National Forests. (Decl.

of Steven Dupont, filed Sept. 9, 2008, ¶ 1.) SAC contends that

it is vital to the safety of its members that the Forest Service

remove dead and dying trees that can rot and fall on roads. (Id.

¶ 2.) Theresa Winningham resides on Diamond Mountain Road next

to the Moonlight Project. (Decl. of Theresa Winningham, filed

Sept. 9, 2008, ¶ 3.) She contends that the dead trees are not

visually attractive and is concerned that unremoved dead trees

may increase the chance of uncontrollable wild fires. (Id. ¶¶ 3,

5.) W.M. Beaty & Associates, Inc. (“Beaty”) is a private

corporation responsible for the management of private, family

owned timberlands, approximately 125,000 acres of which are

located within the boundaries of the Plumas and Lassen National

Forests. (Decl. of Bonald J. Beaty, filed Sept. 9, 2008, ¶ 1.) 

Beaty asserts that the Forest Service needs to remove dead and

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dying roadside hazard trees in order to prevent unnecessary risk

to its workers and to allow access to areas that need planting. 

(Id. ¶ 7.) Plumas Unified School District contends that the

Moonlight Project must go forward because the resultant timber

sales will provide revenue from the school’ share of 25% of

Forest Service receipts. (Decl. of Glenn Harris, filed Sept. 9,

2008, ¶ 4.) Pew Forest Service is a family owned logging company

and the apparent high bidder on the Wildcat and Eagle Roadside

Hazard timber sales. (Decl. of Randy A. Pew, filed Sept. 9,

2008, ¶¶ 1, 5.) 

STANDARD

Rule 24 provides two grounds for intervention in federal

court: intervention as of right and permissive intervention. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (West 2006). Applicants may seek permissive

intervention under Rule 24(b), which provides in relevant part:

On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to

intervene who . . . has a claim or defense that shares

with the main action a common question of law or fact. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). A court may grant permissive intervention

where the applicant demonstrates (1) independent grounds for

jurisdiction; (2) the motion is timely; and (3) the applicant’s

claim or defense, and the main action, have a common question of

law or fact. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131

F.3d 1297, 1308 (9th Cir. 1997) (quotations and citation

omitted); see Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094,

1108 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that Rule 24(b) “plainly dispenses

with any requirement that the intervenor shall have a direct

personal or pecuniary interest in the subject of the litigation”

and that all that is necessary for permissive intervention is a

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4 The court notes that case law in the Ninth Circuit

lacks a certain degree of clarity with respect to the independent

jurisdiction requirement in cases addressing permissive

intervention in NEPA and NFMA cases. However, the court need not

fill this apparent void in its adjudication of the current motion

because, as set forth infra, while it allows applicants to

intervene in the remedial portion of the litigation, it does not

exercise its discretion to allow applicants to intervene with

respect to the liability. See, e.g., Center for Food Safety v.

Connor, No. C 08-0484, 2008 WL 3842889, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15,

2008) (allowing permissive intervention only in the remedies

phase of a NEPA action); W. Watersheds Projects v. United States

Forest Serv., No. C 08-1460, 2008 WL 2952837, at *6 (N.D. Cal.

July 30, 2008) (same); Olympic Forest Coalition v. United States

Forest Serv., No. C07-5344, 2007 WL 3374996, at *2 (W.D. Wash

Nov. 9, 2007) (same); Ctr. for Tribal Water Advocacy v.

Gutierrez, No. 06-CV-708, 2007 WL 527932 (D. Or. Feb. 12, 2007)

(same). 

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common question of law or fact with the main action). Even if

the applicant satisfies these requirements, the court has broad

discretion to deny intervention based upon other considerations

relevant to the individual circumstances of the case before it. 

See Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir. 1998);

Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover,

“[i]n exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether

the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication

of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). 

In reviewing a motion to intervene, the court generally

should accept as true the allegations and evidence submitted by

the applicant. Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg,

268 F.3d 810, 819-20 (9th Cir. 2001). 

ANALYSIS

Applicants have satisfied the threshold requirements for

permissive intervention.4 Plaintiff filed its complaint on

August 20, 2008, and applicants filed their motion to intervene

on September 9, 2008, prior to the filing of any response by the

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named defendants and prior to the issuance of a pretrial

scheduling order. See Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A., 995 F.2d 1478,

1481 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding trial court’s finding that

application was timely where filed before defendant had filed its

answer). Further, applicants seek to intervene based upon their

contention that the Moonlight Project must proceed in order to

ensure the safe access and use of the forest roads, common facts

relevant to plaintiff’s main claim against federal defendants. 

However, the court does not exercise its discretion to allow

applicants to intervene with respect to the merits of plaintiff’s

NEPA and NFMA claims. The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a]s a

general rule, ‘the federal government is the only proper

defendant in an action to compel compliance with NEPA.’” Kootenai

Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps of

Eng’rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000)). The rationale

behind this rule is that “because NEPA requires action only by

the government, only the government can be liable under NEPA. 

Because a private party can not violate NEPA, it can not be a

defendant in a NEPA compliance action.” Id. (quotations and

citations omitted). Like NEPA, NFMA requires only action by the

government. Kootenai, 313 F.3d at 1108. As such, under the

Ninth Circuit’s rationale, only the government can be a defendant

in a NFMA compliance action. See Olympic Forest Coalition v.

United States Forest Serv., No. C07-5344, 2007 WL 3374996, at *2

(W.D. Wash Nov. 9, 2007). Federal defendants must make the final

decision as to whether to defend their own conduct with respect

to statutory obligations, and if so, how that defense will be

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5 The court does not find compelling applicants’ argument

that the balancing nature of the court’s analysis for preliminary

injunctive relief requires applicants’ participation in the

liability portion of the litigation. As set forth above, it is

the government’s conduct that is at issue in the merits inquiry. 

The court is capable of conducting its own balancing of the

merits of the litigation, as argued by plaintiff and federal

defendants, and the hardships and interests involved, as argued

by all parties, including defendant intervenors. 

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made. See Western Watersheds Project v. United States Forest

Serv., No. 05-0189, 2005 WL 3244253, *1 (D. Idaho, Nov. 4, 2005). 

Applicants’ participation in the liability portion of the

litigation (1) would not add any further clarity or insight into

the liability portion of the plaintiff’s suit because federal

defendants are solely responsible for statutory compliance; (2)

could upset federal defendants’ proper role in this case if

applicants disagree with the proffered defense of their conduct;

and (3) could create undue delay in the litigation. As such,

applicants’ motion to permissively intervene in the liability

portion of the litigation is DENIED.5

The court will allow applicants to intervene in the remedial

aspects of the litigation. Applicants all contend that they have

an interest in the execution of the Moonlight Project as

currently scheduled. The named defendants in this action are

government entities and officials. These defendants do not have

the same types of interests in the litigation as applicants. As

such, if plaintiff prevails on its burden with respect to

liability, it is likely that federal defendants will not advance

the same arguments as applicants in regards to potential

remedies. See Berg, 268 F.3d at 824 (addressing adequacy of

representation in a motion to intervene as of right). Moreover,

because of their varied interests, applicants’ participation in

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the action may add further clarity or insight into the court’s

determination of appropriate equitable relief. Therefore,

applicants’ motion to permissively intervene in the remedial

portion of the litigation is GRANTED. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, applicants’ motion for

permissive intervention is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

Applicants’ motion is GRANTED to the extent it seeks intervention

limited solely to the issues of remedy, and not for purposes of

liability. It is DENIED in all other respects. As such, in

considering plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, the

court will consider only those sections of applicants’ proposed

opposition that address the nature of the relief sought (the

balance of harms).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 11, 2008

____________________________

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:08-cv-01957-FCD-EFB Document 52 Filed 09/11/08 Page 8 of 8