Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00573/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00573-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LEROY WILLIS II, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

JEFFREY BEARD, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-0573 AC 

ORDER 

Plaintiff, a state prisoner housed in Los Angeles County and proceeding pro se, seeks 

relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned. 

ECF No. 13. By order filed on April 14, 2014, plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed with leave to 

amend within twenty-eight days. ECF No. 14. Plaintiff timely filed an amended complaint. ECF 

No. 17. 

Screening Requirement 

 As plaintiff has been previously informed, the court is required to screen complaints 

brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion 

thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

Case 2:14-cv-00573-AC Document 19 Filed 10/08/14 Page 1 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 

 A complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “The pleading 

must contain something more. . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] 

a legally cognizable right of action.” Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and 

Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-35 (3d ed. 2004). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 

 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations 

of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 

(1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in 

the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421(1969). 

Plaintiff’s Allegations 

 Plaintiff names a single defendant in his amended complaint, Correctional Sergeant 

Spencer of the California Medical Facility-Vacaville (CMF). Plaintiff accuses defendant Spencer 

of having “assaulted [him] with malice,” of having been deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s right 

to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by acting “under color [sic] with malice” and of 

having deliberately “caused” plaintiff “mental anguish” by having “assaulted [plaintiff’s brain 

body [sic] by locking him up for no reason in inhumane ad seg for 12 months.” Plaintiff also 

Case 2:14-cv-00573-AC Document 19 Filed 10/08/14 Page 2 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

claims that defendant Spencer “typed up lies” and “fabricated [a] story” which led to his 

administrative segregation (“ad seg”) placement. Amended Complaint, ECF No. 17, at 1-2. 

 Plaintiff goes on to allege that he was “tortured” by being “forced to live in ad seg” as the 

result of defendant Spencer’s deliberate indifference. Plaintiff refers to having suffered mental 

anguish which caused “head trauma” and a “constant headache,” because Sgt. Spence fabricated a 

story that plaintiff’s handwriting matched that found on notes in the mail threatening a Dr. Soares 

(not a party). Plaintiff asserts that defendant Spencer is not a licensed handwriting expert. 

Plaintiff claims he was denied the right to call a handwriting expert at his hearing, citing Wolff v. 

McDonell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Plaintiff claims he should have been released from ad seg 

on December 25, 2012 but was kept there until September 17, 2013. Plaintiff also claims that the 

ICC (institutional classification committee) at CMF (no member of which had been identified as a 

defendant) kept him in isolation for twelve months. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff seeks money damages 

and asks that the defendant be enjoined from harming him for filing this complaint. Id. At 7. 

No Injunctive Relief Available 

 Plaintiff, who complains of an incident at CMF-Vacaville, is currently housed in 

California State Prison-Lancaster. When an inmate seeks injunctive or declaratory relief 

concerning the prison where he is incarcerated, his claims for such relief become moot when he is 

no longer subjected to those conditions. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975); 

Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, any claim for injunctive 

relief against the CMF defendant has been rendered moot. 

No Colorable Claim Regarding Allegedly False Report 

 Plaintiff’s allegation that a false report was submitted against him does not implicate any 

protected liberty interest. “The Due Process Clause itself does not contain any language that 

grants a broad right to be free from false accusations, but guarantees certain procedural 

protections to defend against false accusations.” Shallowhorn v. Gonzalez, 1:11-CV-00305-GBC 

PC, 2012 WL 1551342 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2012) aff’d, 514 F. App’x 660 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 

Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2nd Cir.1986); see also, Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 

1137, 1140 41 (7th Cir.1984) (allegation that prison guard planted false evidence in retaliation for 

Case 2:14-cv-00573-AC Document 19 Filed 10/08/14 Page 3 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

prisoner's failure to pay extortion demand fails to state section 1983 claim so long as procedural 

due process was provided). Notwithstanding, “prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a 

criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not 

apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 556. 

A prisoner charged with a disciplinary violation is, at most, entitled to certain due process 

protections which include 24-hour advance written notice of the charges, the right “to call 

witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not 

be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals,” and a written statement of the 

findings. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-566. Plaintiff makes no representation that he was denied any 

of these procedural protections, except to state that he was denied a witness in the form of a 

handwriting expert. Plaintiff’s exhibits make it clear that he protested the finding of guilt at a 

prison disciplinary hearing. See, e.g., ECF No. 17 at 8. Due process did not require that plaintiff 

be provided an independent handwriting expert at his disciplinary hearing. His right to 

procedural due process was satisfied by the disciplinary hearing, assuming he was afforded the 

opportunity to challenge defendant Spencer’s rules violation report, and by his appeal from the 

administrative decision. The first amended complaint will be dismissed but plaintiff will be 

granted leave to amend. 

Ad Seg Placement 

Due Process 

 Plaintiff’s ad seg placement, which allegedly occurred as the result of a false disciplinary 

report and was thereafter improperly extended, does not of itself implicate due process. 

“Placement in administrative segregation, in and of itself, does not implicate a protected liberty 

interest.” Keel v. Dovey, 459 F. Supp. 2d 946, 953 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (citing, e.g., Sandin v. 

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995)). State regulations give rise to a liberty interest protected by 

the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution only if those regulations pertain to “freedom 

from restraint” that “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. at 484. 

Following Wolff, we recognize that States may under certain 

Case 2:14-cv-00573-AC Document 19 Filed 10/08/14 Page 4 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the 

Due Process Clause. See also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 

369[] (1987). But these interests will be generally limited to 

freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in 

such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due 

Process Clause of its own force, see, e.g., Vitek [v. Jones], 445 

U.S., [480] at 493 [1980] (transfer to mental hospital), and 

Washington [v. Harper], 494 U.S., [210] at 221-222[1990] 

(involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs), nonetheless 

imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation 

to the ordinary incidents of prison life. 

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. 

Eighth Amendment 

 The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment of those criminally 

convicted. U.S. Const, Amendment VIII. To demonstrate that defendant Spencer violated his 

Eighth Amendment rights, plaintiff must first “make an ‘objective’ showing that the deprivation 

was ‘sufficiently serious' to form the basis for an Eighth Amendment violation. Second, the 

plaintiff must make a ‘subjective’ showing that the prison official acted ‘with a sufficiently 

culpable state of mind.’” Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting Wilson v. 

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). “‘Because routine discomfort is part of the penalty that 

criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations denying the 

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an 

Eighth Amendment violation.’” Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 623 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (omitting internal quotations and citations)). Plaintiff 

has alleged that defendant Spencer fabricated a false report against him that led to his ad seg 

placement, but plaintiff has not alleged any deprivation that is sufficiently serious to rise to the 

level of an Eighth Amendment violation. The first amended complaint will be dismissed but 

plaintiff will be granted one further opportunity to amend. 

Application of Heck

Plaintiff was previously informed that he is foreclosed by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 

477 (1994), from seeking money damages for harm caused him by an allegedly unconstitutional 

disciplinary hearing or conviction absent showing that the finding of guilt has been invalidated. 

In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 

Case 2:14-cv-00573-AC Document 19 Filed 10/08/14 Page 5 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would 

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. If it would, the complaint must be 

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been 

invalidated. Id. at 487. In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641(1997), the Supreme Court held that 

Heck applies to challenges to prison disciplinary hearings when the nature of the challenge to the 

procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment. 

However, if plaintiff was not assessed a loss of time credits at the disciplinary hearing and 

is simply challenging his ad seg placement rather than seeking a restoration of time credits, he 

could not proceed to challenge the guilty finding by way of a habeas petition.1

 Heck is not 

applicable in this context. 

[N]othing in Preiser, Heck, or Edwards holds that prisoners 

challenging the conditions of their confinement are automatically 

barred from bringing suit under § 1983 without first obtaining a 

writ of habeas corpus. Rather, the applicability of the favorable 

termination rule turns solely on whether a successful § 1983 action 

would necessarily render invalid a conviction, sentence, or 

administrative sanction that affected the length of the prisoner’s 

confinement.

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added); id. at 858 (holding “that 

the favorable termination rule does not apply to § 1983 suits challenging a disciplinary hearing or 

administrative sanction that does not affect the overall length of the prisoner’s confinement.”). 

Plaintiff includes as an exhibit to his complaint a September 20, 2013 memorandum from 

CMF Acting Warden Duffy. ECF No. 17 at 12. In the memo, Warden Duffy references 

plaintiff’s August 21, 2013 ICC hearing to address the CSR’s unspecified concerns related to 

plaintiff’s ad seg housing and (then pending) transfer from CMF. Id. The warden states that the 

CSR had reviewed the recommendation of the ICC on August 21, 2013 and had “noted the 

classification errors referenced in the July 31, 2013 ICC action were corrected.. . .” and that 

plaintiff had been endorsed for transfer to CSP-Lac on September 3, 2013 and was transferred on 

September 19, 2013. This documentation does not demonstrate that the guilty finding at the 

 

1

 “[T]he heart of habeas corpus” is a challenge to “the fact or duration of [a prisoner’s] physical 

confinement itself . . . .” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498 (1973). 

Case 2:14-cv-00573-AC Document 19 Filed 10/08/14 Page 6 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

prison disciplinary hearing at issue had ever been invalidated. However, if plaintiff was not 

assessed a loss of good time credits and seeks no such restoration here, Heck does not bar 

plaintiff’s action in this court. 

Amendment 

 If plaintiff chooses to amend the amended complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the 

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the second amended complaint must allege 

in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions 

and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, 

vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not 

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

 In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original or previously amended complaint. 

See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a second amended 

complaint, the original or earlier amended pleading no longer serves any function in the case. 

Therefore, in a second amended complaint, as in a prior version of the complaint, each claim and 

the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the first amended 

complaint is dismissed for the reasons discussed above, with leave to file a second amended 

complaint within twenty-eight days from the date of service of this order. Failure to file a second 

amended complaint will result in dismissal of this action. 

DATED: October 7, 2014 

Case 2:14-cv-00573-AC Document 19 Filed 10/08/14 Page 7 of 7