Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03723/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03723-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLARK WALKER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, et al.

Defendants.

NO. C03-3723 TEH 

 NO. C05-2800 TEH

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART THE

PARTIES MOTIONS IN LIMINE

After carefully considering the parties’ written arguments and finding oral argument

to be unnecessary except as set out in the Court’s Order on Defendants’ Motions in Limine

concerning the Consent Decree, the Court hereby rules on the parties’ remaining motions in

limine as follows:

PLAINTIFF’s MOTIONS

Plaintiff’s Motion To Exclude Opinions of Defense Expert Ron Gesner

Defendants plan to introduce opinion testimony by Ron Gesner– the Battalion Chief

to whom Plaintiff transferred command at the Kirker Pass Road fire. Defendants designated

Chief Gesner as a potential expert witness in order to introduce two opinions: 1) that at the

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 Although Plaintiff’s motion is to exclude all “opinion testimony” by Gesner,

Plaintiff has not offered specific argument relating to Gesner’s ability to testify about

whether the fire was active or the incident was escalating. Moreover, Gesner’s is based in

his first hand knowledge of the fire and application of his 25 years’ experience in the fire

service. Accordingly, that testimony will be permitted.

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time he took incident command, “the fire was ‘active’ in the area of the rollover accident, and

the incident was not ‘de-escalating;’” and, 2) that “a face to face transfer of command is

standard, preferable, and more effective than other methods.” Defendants argue Gesner’s

opinions are relevant for their substance and because Chief Grace relied on Gesner’s

opinions during his investigation of the incident and subsequent discipline of Plaintiff.

Plaintiff moves to exclude Gesner’s opinion testimony that face-to-face transfer is

“standard, preferable, and more effective” than other methods of transfer on the ground that

it does not meet the standards for expert testimony set out in Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert

v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590-91 (1993), and other applicable

law.1 Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

A witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education, can offer an opinion based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge

if it will assist the trier of fact. Fed. R. Evid. 702. To be admissible, expert testimony must

be both relevant and reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589

(1993); Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). The trial court has a “special

obligation” to determine the relevance and reliability of an expert’s testimony “to ensure

accurate and unbiased decision-making by the trier of fact.” Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ.,

Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The proponent has the

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burden of establishing that pertinent admissibility requirements are met and that the opinions

offered are reliable. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 172 (1987); In re Paoli R.R.

Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994)(proponent must establish reliability). 

Defendants argue that Chief Gesner’s “extensive and direct experience with incident

command as exercised in the Fire District,” and his partial reliance upon FPD documentation

concerning the transfer of incident command, provides a sufficient basis for his opinion that

face to face transfers are “standard, preferable, and more effective than other methods.” 

Where a witness relies solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain 1)

“why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion;” 2) “how the experience leads to

the conclusion reached;” and 3) “how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.” Adv.

Comm. Notes to 2000 Amendments to Fed. R. Evid. 702. Chief Gesner’s opinion that a

face-to-face transfer of command is “preferable, and more effective than other methods,” is

sufficiently based on his experience of transferring incident command, which he has done,

either as a battalion chief or as a captain, over 100 times. Although Plaintiff discounts

Gesner’s experience gained while he was a captain, Plaintiff has offered no reason to believe

considerations involving the continuity of incident command and the efficacy of face-to-face

transfers would differ depending on the rank of the individual transferring command. 

Moreover, Gesner explicitly explained how his experience led him to conclude that

face-to-face transfers were superior to other methods (that the person in command of an

incident has “the most amount of data,” that “[i]t takes excellent communication skills” to

transfer that information in a “concise, thorough manner,” and that even in a face-to-face

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transfer, some information is always lost). Finally, Gesner appears to have reliably applied

his experience to the facts of the present case; he concluded a face to face transfer would

have been preferable because the Captain who did the transfer was unable to answer

particular questions that Chief Gesner believes Plaintiff would have been better able to

answer. Gesner’s specialized testimony that face-to-face command transfer is preferable is

relevant, reliable, and will be admitted. 

Gesner’s opinion that face-to-face transfer is “standard,” however, is not sufficiently

reliable to be admitted under Rule 702. Gesner’s deposition makes it clear that he was not

relying on any specific Fire Protection District (“FPD”) policies, procedures, or rules to

inform his opinion that face-to-face transfer was “standard.” Gesner Depo. at 19, 20, 33, 34. 

He did no investigation within the FPD on transfer of incident command practices, id. at 39,

nor did he investigate what the practices of other incident commanders have been. Id. at 40. 

There is no evidence to suggest Gesner conducted any research or has any knowledge of

what practices are “standard” outside his own fire protection district.

To be able to render an expert opinion about what is “standard” practice, the Court

would expect Gesner to, at a minimum, review relevant policy and practice guidelines and

documentation, and likely investigate the practices of other fire professionals in that same

department or locality. Gesner has failed to show that his opinion about the “standard”

practice is reliable, and may not present opinion testimony on that topic.

Nonetheless, employees generally operate with an understanding of what the standard

practices and policies are in a place of employment. Here, Gesner’s own understanding of

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the “standard” practice informed his report to Defendant Grace. Gesner may, therefore,

testify to his own understanding, as an employee, of what the standard transfer of incident

command practice was at the relevant time. He may not testify to any post-hoc research he

may have done to determine what standard practice is, either in Contra Costa or elsewhere. 

He may not testify to bases for his opinion beyond those he listed at his deposition.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Opinions of Defense Expert Gerald Udinsky

Defendants plan to offer Dr. Gerald Udinsky’s expert opinion testimony that

“[P]laintiff received substantially more compensation as a Battalion Chief in the period 2003

to 2005 than he would have had he been promoted to Assistant Chief in 2003.” Dr.

Udinsky testified that “he did not calculate the economic value of [Plaintiff’s] pension

benefits.” Accordingly, Plaintiff moves to exclude any opinions by Dr. Udinsky on the

economic value of Plaintiff’s retirement benefits. Defendants do not oppose the motion, but

contend they should be entitled to introduce Dr. Udinsky’s pension calculations “in pure

rebuttal only” if some witness for the Plaintiff calculates the economic value of the benefits.

Any testimony offered by Dr. Udinsky on pension benefits would not be rebuttal

evidence. The parties have long known that Plaintiff’s retirement benefits might be at issue,

and that Plaintiff would likely introduce evidence about his pension benefits. If Defendants

wanted Dr. Udinsky to offer expert opinions about Plaintiff’s pension benefits, then he was

required to include his opinion in his expert report pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(a)(2)(B),

or, to rebut opinion testimony offered by Plaintiff’s expert, in a report pursuant to Fed R.

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Civ. Pro. 26(a)(2)(C). Plaitniff’s motion is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Improper Character Evidence

Plaintiff moves to exclude evidence of an anonymous complaint about him to the

County Board of Supervisors. Defendants do not oppose the motion. The motion is

GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Allegations re: Falsification of Education Records

Plaintiff moves to exclude evidence of any allegations that he falsified his educational

records from Laney College. Defendants do not oppose the motion. The motion is

GRANTED.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS

Defendants’ Motions to Exclude Evidence re: Alcohol Use and Evidence re: Witness

John Ross

Defendants seek to exclude any evidence of abuse of alcohol by Defendant Richter or

other District managers. They also seek to exclude any evidence relating to Assistant Fire

Chief John Ross’s accident in a district vehicle, his DUI conviction after that accident, and

subsequent discipline imposed on him, on the ground that such evidence would be irrelevant,

prejudicial, and invades Chief Ross’s personal privacy interests.

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2

 Plaintiff opposed this motion late. The parties stipulated, and this Court

ordered, that the opposition would be due seven calendar days after the motion was filed. 

Stipulation and Order, Docket No. 197, filed November 2, 2006. The Motion was filed on

November 2. Docket No. 198. The opposition was filed on November 13. Docket No. 208.

By Order dated November 8, 2006, the Court cautioned the parties that any further

late filings would be sanctioned. Docket No. 202. Although the Court will consider

Plaintiff’s opposition to this motion, they Court will sanctions Plaintiff to an amount of

monetary sanctions to be determined before the close of the trial.

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 Although such evidence could also show Richter’s favoritism toward Ross and his

“preselection” for the position, “preselection,” without more, does not prove discriminatory

animus. As Judge Patel observed in Tunnel v. Powell, 219 F.Supp.2d 230, 240-41 (N.D.Cal.

2002), preselection puts all other candidates – regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender – at an

equal disadvantage. 

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Plaintiff opposes these motions only as to evidence relating to Chief Ross.2 Plaintiff

argues that Richter’s allegedly lenient discipline of Ross’s serious misconduct, when

compared to his allegedly harsh discipline of Plaintiff in 2004, is evidence of Richter’s

favoritism toward Ross, his intent to discriminate against Plaintiff, and that the discipline

imposed on Plaintiff was pretextual. 

Evidence of Richter’s discipline of Ross is relevant. Disparate discipline of AfricanAmerican firefighters can be probative evidence of his discriminatory motive and of pretext. 

See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2002)(disparate discipline

can be evidence of discriminatory motive); Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1479-81 (9th Cir.

1995)(evidence of other acts can show discriminatory animus and pretext). Evidence that

Richter transferred Ross to a position of more supervisory responsibility while Ross was on

disciplinary probation for the DUI undercuts Richter’s position that Plaintiff was disciplined

in 2003 for his “poor judgment” rather than for some unlawful reason.3 The Court finds that

the probative value of this evidence outweighs any prejudice to the Defendants. Moreover,

evidence that Ross was convicted of D.U.I will not unduly invade his privacy interests given

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 This ruling is not a ruling as to the admissibility of the letter imposing discipline on

John Ross.

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that the conviction is public record and, as Plaintiff represents, has been reported in the local

newspaper.

Defendants’ motion to exclude evidence of alcohol use with respect to individual

defendants or other District managers is GRANTED, except as to evidence of John Ross’s

DUI accident and conviction. The motion to exclude evidence relating to John Ross’s DUI

accident, conviction, and subsequent discipline is DENIED.4 

Defendants’ Motion to Preclude Testimony by Plaintiff’s Expert Witness Kay Kirkland

Plaintiff plans to offer opinion testimony by Kay Kirkland, an attorney who served as

an investigator and supervisor for the California Department of Fair Employment and

Housing (“DFEH”) from 1972 to 1994. Kirkland will opine that Defendants’ 2003 Assistant

Fire Chief selection process was “tainted” – in other words, “motivated by race.” Defendants

move to exclude Kirkland’s testimony on the ground that her opinions are irrelevant and

unreliable. The motion is GRANTED.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that expert testimony is admissible if

“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand

the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed.R.Evid. 702. To be admissible, expert

testimony must be both relevant and reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S.

579, 589 (1993); Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Encompassed in the

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1

 Plaintiff did not offer Ms. Kirkland’s report under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(a)(2)(B) in

opposition to the motion, or genuinely dispute the Defendants’ description of Kirkland’s

experience, analysis, or opinions. Accordingly, the Court must base its ruling on the

deposition excerpts offered by the Defendants.

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 Kirkland herself has not authored articles or books, nor has she done any teaching in

the field. She has no experience specific to fire departments, and did no research on

fire department organization, operation, or hiring.

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determination of whether expert testimony is relevant is whether it will be helpful to the jury,

and whether it “address[es] an issue beyond the common knowledge of the average layman.”

Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1063 n. 7, 1066 n.9 (9th Cir.

2002), amended by 319 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of showing that Kirkland’s opinion testimony is

admissible under this standard.1 While there is no absolute bar on expert testimony

concerning the ultimate issue in a case, see Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1066, n.10, Plaintiff has not

shown that Kirkland’s opinion on the ultimate issue is based on anything more than ordinary

logic and evaluation of circumstantial evidence. 

Kirkland is not offered as an expert in statistics, good human resources practices, civil

service personnel practices, or hiring policies, procedures, or requirements in fire

departments. She is, apparently, offered as an expert in discerning discriminatory intent. 

Her specialized knowledge is based on her own experience as an investigator at the DFEH

(“experience in 14,000 cases” that “I either investigated myself or was accountable for as an

administrator”).2 She applied no particular analytical methodology and consulted no outside

sources or research to reach her conclusions. 

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In fact, Plaintiff offers only one concrete example of how Kirkland’s “specialized

knowledge” would assist the jury: it would help them analyze whether “the structure of the

interview ranking system and the interview questions themselves were biased.” But Plaintiff

fails to explain why or how. The evidence before the court suggests that Kirkland’s

testimony on this topic is not particularly helpful: she drew her conclusions about the

ranking system because the three-grade rating system used -- HQ, Q, and NQ -- “leads to all

kinds of subjective selection from one rater to another, particularly a question on

interpersonal relationships,” and because the rating form had “the two [candidates Richter

wanted] in the top three, and Walker at the bottom” instead of being in alphabetical order. 

Kirkland Depo. at 31, 33. 

There is no showing that such opinions flow from specialized expertise beyond the

ken of the average juror – such as the expert’s experience with drug dealers’ slang and code

words that passed muster in United States v. Decoud, 456 F.3d 996, 1013-1014 (9th Cir.

2006). Experience is not always tantamount to expertise. Kirkland may have evaluated

hundreds of discrimination claims, but she appears to have based her opinion that the

selection process was “motivated by race” on the same kinds of evidence and critical

thinking that the jury will use to decide the same question. For precisely these reasons,

numerous courts have held that expert testimony on motive in discrimination cases is

inappropriate. See Kotla v. Regents of the University of California, 115 Cal.App.4th 283,

292-294 (2003)(collecting cases). In addition, because Kirkland’s opinion would add little or

nothing of probative value, her opinion on a central issue in the case could unduly prejudice

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 Kirkland was not referring to the Consent Decree when she made this statement. 

See Kirkland Depo. at 34-36.

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the defendants because it would come “cloaked in authority” and imbued with an “aura of

expertise.” Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1067.

Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown that Kirkland’s testimony is sufficiently reliable. 

Plaintiff argues that the Daubert factors for determining whether expert testimony is

sufficiently reliable – testing, error rate, peer review, publication, general acceptance in the

community (see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94) – are inapplicable to testimony which rests on

the knowledge and experience of the expert, rather than on the scientific or technical theory

behind the expert’s opinion. See Hangarter v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d

998, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004). But any claim to reliability here is undermined by Kirkland’s

misunderstanding of applicable discrimination law. Kirkland testified that she believed

“affirmative action” required the Defendants to give Walker a “plus” because of his race, and

to hire him for the Assistant Chief position, because there were no African Americans at the

Assistant Chief level. Kirkland Depo. at 34-38, 100-105.3 She was wrong: at that time,

giving Plaintiff preferential treatment on the basis of his race would have violated the

California constitution. See Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 24 Cal.4th

537, 559-560 (2000). Because Kirkland’s opinion revolves in large part around whether

Richter’s decision was motivated by race, this error infects Kirkland’s entire testimony. 

The Court agrees with the Defendant that “if Kirkland testifies to the opinions she

expressed at her depositions, and bases them on the evidence she referred to during that

deposition to support them, she will be doing little more than delivering plaintiff’s closing

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argument from the witness box.” Plaintiff has done nothing to dispel this impression. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

Defendants’ Motion to Preclude Evidence of Unrelated Prior Acts Occurring Before

May 1998 

Defendants move to exclude evidence of allegedly discriminatory acts, statements,

and events that occurred prior to May, 1998. Specifically, they seek to exclude evidence

concerning : (1) racial harassment of another African-American firefighter in 1979; (2) a

1979 incident in which Plaintiff claims he was prevented from applying for a Battalion Chief

position; (3) Plaintiff's application for a Battalion Chief position in 1985; (4) Plaintiff's

application for Assistant Fire Chief in 1984; (5) Plaintiff's application for Assistant Fire

Chief in 1991; (6) Plaintiff's application for Fire Chief in 1997, and (7) evidence of Mike

George's involvement in legal actions taken by Plaintiff against Defendant County in 1985

and subsequent statements made about Plaintiff's job performance. Defendants argue that

evidence of these prior acts are not relevant to prove either Defendant Richter or Defendant

Grace's state of mind regarding the 2003 and 2005 employment decisions that are at issue in

this case. 

Most of the evidence is not relevant. Plaintiffs argue in general terms that evidence of

prior allegedly discriminatory acts is relevant background evidence, and relevant to prove the

Defendants’ discriminatory animus or their “knowledge, motive and intent” under Fed. R.

Evid. 404(b). As the Ninth Circuit recently noted in Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1110

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 Nor is the County’s notice of alleged prior discrimination relevant, as there is no

surviving § 1983 claim against the County under Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of

New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978).

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(9th Cir. 2002), evidence of the employer's discriminatory acts outside the limitations period

“may constitute relevant background evidence” which, in the context of a racial disparate

treatment claim, means evidence relevant to the defendant’s intent. 

However, the evidence in categories 1-6 above is not relevant to Richter or Grace’s

intent to discriminate or retaliate against Plaintiff in 2003 or 2005. Richter was appointed

Fire Chief in 1998. Grace was hired in 2003. It is undisputed that both worked outside

California before joining the County fire protection district. Neither was even employed by

the Defendant County at the time these earlier incidents took place, and neither played any

role in these incidents. Accordingly, the incidents are in no way relevant to their state of

mind during 2003 or 2005.4 

Statements and acts by Mr. George may, however, be relevant to the Defendants’

discriminatory intent. Plaintiff argues that George is biased against him: he was involved in

the events which led to Plaintiff’s filing a discrimination case in 1985, and he has “admitted

on more than one occasion that he was predisposed against Plaintiff based upon his prior

involvement in defending the County from Plaintiff's discrimination claims.” Plaintiff claims

Defendant Richter nonetheless selected George to sit on the internal interview panel for the

Assistant Fire Chief positions in 2003. Assuming Plaintiff can show that Richter was aware

of George’s bias, then the evidence at issue goes to Richter’s intent, and may suggest that

Richter “stacked the deck” against the Plaintiff during the 2003 selection process. Such

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evidence is more probative than prejudicial and will be admitted.

Plaintiff also argues that evidence relating to his attempts to promote in 1984, 1991,

and 1997 are essential to put his emotional distress damages in context, and that he should be

permitted to testify to the “cumulative effect of the discrimination on his emotional psyche.” 

This argument certainly has intuitive appeal; a person who feels he is being denied

promotion for discriminatory reasons for the third or fourth time may well experience the

loss more keenly, and suffer more emotional distress, than a first-time victim of

discrimination. 

Generic rules relating to damages also suggest that a plaintiff should be permitted to

present evidence that he was particularly vulnerable to damage. As the First Circuit

explained in Doty v. Sewall, 908 F.2d 1053, 1059 (1st Cir. 1990)

In personal injury law, it is well settled that in an action for damages, the tortfeasor

“takes his victim as he finds him.” United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 685 (1975)...

Stoleson v. United States, 708 F.2d 1217, 1221 (7th Cir.1983) (explaining eggshell

skull rule); Pierce v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 823 F.2d 1366, 1372 n. 2 (9th

Cir.1987) (“[w]hen an emotional injury causes physical manifestations of distress we

can see no principled reason why the eggshell plaintiff rule should not apply”).

See also Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 (1986)(where

a plaintiff seeks damages under § 1983, “the level of damages is ordinarily determined

according to principles derived from the common law of torts”).

This Court has found at least one case in which a plaintiff was permitted to testify, in

a discrimination suit, that earlier instances of discrimination made his emotional distress

more intense. In Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973), the plaintiff

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testified that 

in the past on a number of occasions “in college towns across the country” he and his

family had been denied housing facilities. It is understandable that he “was very tired

of it” and “upset” over such treatment and was determined to do something about it. 

Id. at 384. The court proceeded to uphold the compensatory damage award. Id.; see also

Doty v. Sewall, supra (finding no abuse of discretion where district court admitted evidence

of plaintiff’s experiences in Vietnam, where plaintiff argued Vietnam experiences made him

particularly emotionally vulnerable to defendant Union’s acts, which triggered his post

traumatic stress disorder). 

In this case, however, allowing Plaintiff to testify to the details of each incident, his

belief that he had suffered discrimination, and the reasons for his belief, would be unfairly

prejudicial to the Defendants. Here, each prior incident relates to alleged discrimination by

the same employer; even with a limiting instruction, such evidence would unfairly prejudice

and inflame the jury against the defendants. 

Moreover, under governing limitations law, Defendants are on trial only for events

occurring since 2002 – specifically, the 2003 Assistant Fire Chief selection and the

investigation and letter of reprimand relating to the Kirker Pass Road fire. The trial is not,

as Plaintiff claims, about “cumulative discrimination.” Allowing Plaintiff to collect damages

for his “cumulative” emotional distress would run the risk of having the jury award damages

for harm incurred in allegedly discriminatory incidents which are outside the limitations

period and which have not been proven. Allowing Plaintiff to prove the discriminatory

nature of each incident would both consume undue time and eviscerate the statute of

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limitation.

The risk of unfair prejudice, confusion, and of waste of time is too high. Plaintiff has

offered no authority that would permit him to present evidence of prior alleged

discrimination that is not relevant to intent, solely on the ground that it is relevant to the

Plaintiff’s emotional distress. 

Plaintiff will be permitted to give a brief history of his attempts to promote within the

Department. However, he will not be permitted to delve into what he believes are the

reasons for the County’s failure to select him. He will be permitted to offer evidence relating

to Mr. George’s bias against him, provided he can lay a foundation that defendant Richter

knew of his bias. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

 

Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Lay Opinion to the Causes of or Fact of

Plaintiff’s Heart Disease.

Plaintiff has suffered from serious heart disease since at least 1995. Plaintiff plans to

testify about his experience of his own health over time, and “the exacerbation of his

physical health conditions and the psychological stress stemming from Defendants’

discriminatory actions against him,” apparently as to allegedly discriminatory actions both

before and during the limitations period. He plans to call his treating physician to testify as

an expert witness on causation. 

Defendants move to exclude any evidence by Plaintiff as to the causes of his heart

disease, on the ground that Plaintiff is not qualified under Fed. R. Evid. 702 to testify to the

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 If Dr. Woodworth was in fact timely disclosed as an expert witness, Plaintiff may

seek reconsideration of this ruling upon a showing that he was so disclosed, or some other

showing that admission of expert testimony would be appropriate. 

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medical cause of his heart disease. Defendant also argues that unless Plaintiff can offer

competent evidence (e.g., expert testimony) that links his heart disease to the Defendants’

acts, he should be precluded from offering any testimony about his heart disease at all.

The first question raised by the motion is whether Plaintiff’s treating physician can

offer expert testimony as to the causes of Plaintiff’s heart disease. Defendants argue that

“plaintiff has not disclosed any expert competent on the issue” of causation; Plaintiff asserts

in opposition only that he “intends to call” his treating cardiologist, Dr. Woodworth, “to

testify as an expert witness.” The Court interprets this opposition to mean that Dr.

Woodworth was not disclosed as an expert witness pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

26(a)(2)(A).5 

Witnesses planning to offer opinions based on “scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge” must be disclosed as expert witnesses pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

26(a)(2)(A), regardless of whether those opinions were formed during interaction with a

party prior to the litigation. See Fed. R. Evid. 701, Advisory Committee Notes to 2000

Amendments (“any part of a witness’ testimony that is based upon scientific, technical, or

other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702 is governed by the standards of

Rule 702 and the corresponding disclosure requirements of the Civil and Criminal Rules”); 

Kirkham v. Societe Air France, 236 F.R.D. 9 (D.D.C. 2006)(expert testimony on causation

by treating physician is subject to disclosure requirements of Fed.R.Civ. Pro. 26(a)(2)(A).) 

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Assuming Dr. Woodworth was disclosed only as a fact witness, he will not be 

permitted to offer expert testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702. He may testify regarding what

he actually observed and what treatment he provided. A treating physician's testimony

regarding observations and treatment “are not matters outside the ken of the average juror, so

Rule 702 and the disclosure obligations of Rule 26(a)(2)(A) are not triggered.” Brandon v.

Village of Maywood, 179 F.Supp.2d 847, 859 (N.D.Ill. 2001). 

Whether specific testimony from Plaintiff's treating physician falls within the scope of

Fed.R.Evid. 702 may be addressed through appropriate objections when the testimony is

presented to the Court.

The second question is what testimony Plaintiff should be permitted to offer about his

heart disease. Plaintiff concedes that he does not “possess specialized knowledge regarding

cardiac pathology,” but argues he should be permitted to give lay testimony about “the

effects of Defendants’ adverse actions on his health.” 

Federal Rule of Evidence 701 provides that a witness may give lay testimony in the

form of an opinion if it is “rationally based on the perception of the witness,” “helpful to a

clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue,” and

“not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule

702.” Further, “generally plaintiff must prove causation by expert medical testimony except

where there is an obvious causal relationship—one where injuries are immediate and direct.” 

In re Baycol Products Litigation, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1125 (D. Minn. 2004) (citation

omitted) (internal quotation omitted). 

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Plaintiff can certainly testify about his own experience of his health, his stress level,

and his symptoms of heart disease, and when they occurred. However, Plaintiff’s lay opinion

testimony that he experienced an “exacerbation of his physical health conditions and . . .

psychological stress” as a result of Defendants’ actions, i.e., Defendants’ alleged

discrimination of, and retaliation against him, is not testimony about an “obvious causal

relationship.” The provenance of heart disease and its symptoms is the subject of

specialized medical knowledge; it is not like testimony about what caused a simple physical

injury like a broken leg. The cause of Plaintiff’s illness is the province of an expert. 

Moreover, Plaintiff will not be permitted to testify to otherwise excludable prior acts under

the guise of explaining the source of his heart problem. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

Motion to Exclude Evidence re: 1998 Captain’s Promotional Examination

Defendants move to exclude any evidence relating to Defendant Richter’s decisions to

investigate accusations of cheating by African-American candidates in a 1998 Captain’s

promotional exam, and Richter’s refusal to make the results of that investigation public. 

Plaintiff represents that he does not plan to offer any evidence relating to the dispute between

the Black Firefighter’s Association and Richter regarding the examination or the

displacement of the African-American who placed first on the list to a lower place on the list. 

He asserts that the only evidence he plans to offer is that his relationship with Richter soured

when he “criticized Richter privately for initiating an investigation of the 1998 Captain’s

examination simply because three of the five top candidates were African-Americans.” He

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argues that this information is necessary to put his relationship with Richter “in context.”

The implicit allegation that Richter chose to investigate reports of cheating “simply

because three of the five top candidates were African-Americans” is highly inflammatory. 

Absent any foundation for this allegation (which Plaintiff has not offered), it is far more

prejudicial than probative. Plaintiff will be permitted to testify only that he criticized

Richter’s decision to initiate an investigation into alleged cheating on the examination by

African-American firefighters, and to the changes in their relationship that he believes

flowed from that criticism. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

Counsel shall advise each witness, before that witness testifies, of the limitations

imposed on these rulings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2006 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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