Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00320/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00320-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 EDWARD JESUS ELIAS, Case No.: 16cv0320-AJB (KSC)

12 Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE DENIAL OF PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

13 v.

14 SCOTT KERNAN, Secretary,

15 Respondent.

16

Petitioner Edward Jesus Elias is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis with a First Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 4.) He challenges his San Diego Superior Court convictions for

two counts offirst degree murder with special circumstances, for which he was sentenced

to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, later

reduced to two consecutive terms of25 years-to-life plus one year because he was 17 years

old at the time of the crimes. (First Amended Petition [“FAP”] at 1-2.) He claims his

federal constitutional rights were violated because insufficient evidence supports the guilty

verdicts and the special circumstance findings (Claims 1-2), by prosecutorial misconduct

(Claim 3), and instructional error (Claim 4). (Id. at 6-9, 15-30.)

Respondent has filed an Answer and lodged portions ofthe state court record. (ECF

Nos. 12-13.) Respondent argues habeas relief is unavailable because the state court

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1 adjudication of Petitioner’s claims is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),

and because any errors with respect to Claims 3 and 4 are harmless. (Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support ofAnswer [“Ans. Mem.”] at 9-28.)

After the Answer was filed, Petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the First

Amended Petition for the stated purpose ofresponding to the argument in the Answer that

he had not satisfied the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). (ECF No. 16.) The Court

construed that filing as a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the First

Amended Petition. (ECF No. 17.) Petitioner has also filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 25.)

For the following reasons, the Court finds that federal habeas relief is unavailable

because Petitioner has not satisfied the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as he has failed

to show that the state court adjudication of any claim is contrary to, or involves an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or that it is based on an

unreasonable determination ofthe facts. In addition, even ifPetitioner could satisfy those

standards with respect to Claims 3 and 4, it is clear that any errors as to those claims are

harmless. The Court therefore recommends the Petition be denied.

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17 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

18 A two-count Second Amended Information filed in the San Diego County Superior

Court on March 8, 2012, charged Petitioner and his codefendant Leopoldo Chavez with

two counts of first degree murder in violation of Penal Code section 187(a), and alleged

they were armed with a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022(a)(1).

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. [“CT”] at 16-19.) Two special circumstance allegations

charged that the murders were committed during the commission of a robbery within the

meaning ofPenal Code section 190.2(a)(17), and that the defendants committed more than

one murder within the meaning ofPenal Code section 190.2(a)(3). (Id.)

On March 26,2012, following ajoint trial, ajury found Petitioner and Chavez guilty

on both counts, and returned true findings on the firearm use and special circumstance

allegations. (CT 420-24, 474-78.) On June 21, 2012, both defendants were sentenced to

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1 two consecutive terms oflife without the possibility ofparole plus one year. (CT 431,485;

2 RT 915-17.)

Petitioner and his codefendant filed a consolidated appeal, raising, inter alia, the

claims raised here. (Lodgment Nos. 3-4.) The appellate court affirmed the convictions but

remanded for resentencing on the basis that both defendants were 17 years old at the time

of their offenses and intervening law had modified the factors to be considered before

sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Chavez,

et al.. No. D061946 (Cal.Sup.Ct. July 22, 2014).) Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for

review in the California Supreme Court presenting the claims raised here. (Lodgment No.

6.) On October 29,2014, the petition for review was summarily denied without a statement

ofreasoning or citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 7.) Petitioner was later resentenced

to two consecutive terms of 25 years-to-life plus one year. (FAP at 1.)

II. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

Because Petitioner is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court will

review the trial testimony in detail. First, it is useful to set forth a brief summary ofthe

evidence as provided by the state appellate court:

[T]he 20- and 23-year-old victims were sailors enlisted in the United States

Navy, one of whom was driving a brand new Toyota pickup truck. The

victims were murdered at a location where young adults, including other Navy

personnel and their friends, frequently gathered to drink, listen to music and

socialize around a number of bonfires. Multiple witnesses recalled that

Chavez, who was 17 at the time ofthe killings, was at the scene ofthe bonfires

shortly before the murders took place. The witnesses also uniformly recalled

that Chavez was in the company of at least one other teenager or young adult

and that Chavez and his companion were acting in a very aggressive and

threatening manner toward other Navy personnel and their friends present at

the bonfires. Four days after the murders, Chavez was stopped in Tijuana,

Mexico while driving the 20-year-old victim’s new Toyota pickup truck.

Importantly, some years after the murders, investigators were able to match

DNA retrieved from the pants pocket ofthe 20-year-old victim with Chavez’s

DNA.

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The witnesses’ identification ofChavez as being present at the bonfires

shortly before the murders, his possession ofthe truck following the murders, 28

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1 and his DNA in the pants pocket of one ofthe victims, make a strong case

Chavez participated in the truck robbery and the killings. 2

3 With respect to Elias, who was also 17 at the time ofthe murders, the

record is sufficient to sustain his conviction and the special circumstances

findings. Within just a few hours after the killings, investigators found a

cigarette butt at the scene ofthe murders among items that had been taken out

of the Toyota truck. Later, investigators were able to match DNA on the

cigarette butt with Elias’s DNA. Elias’s DNA was also found on a cup

recovered from inside the victim’s truck when it was stopped in Tijuana after

the murders. In addition to the DNA on the cup, Elias’s fingerprints were

found both inside and outside ofthe truck.

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The cigarette butt Elias left at the scene ofthe murders, with ash still

attached, very near items discarded from the truck and recovered very shortly

after the murders, places Elias at that location at or near the time of the

murders. Elias’s DNA, found in the cup retrieved from the truck, and his

fingerprints, found both inside and outside ofthe truck, place Elias in the truck

with Chavez shortly after the time it was stolen and near the time of the

killings. These circumstances support the conclusion Elias was Chavez’s

companion at the bonfires and an active participant in the robbery and killings.

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People v. Chavez. 228 Cal.App.4th 18, 21, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 334, 336 (2014).

Rita Ellis testified that her son CliffEllis enlisted in the Navy and was stationed in

San Diego in the summer of 1993. (Lodgment No. 2, Reporter’s Tr. [“RT”] at 89-90.) She

said Cliff always dressed nicely, including tucking in his shirt with a nice belt, and always

carried a wallet, but his wallet, military identification card and the telephone calling card

he used on a regular basis to call home were missing from his personal effects when they

were returned to her after he was murdered. (RT 91 -93.) CliffEllis’ father Charles testified

that he co-signed a loan for Cliffto buy a new, white 1993 Toyota pickup truck when Cliff

was stationed in San Diego. (RT 94-95.) Cliffwas murdered less than two months later,

and when the pickup truck was recovered in Tijuana and returned to Charles, it had less

than one thousand miles on the odometer. (RT 95-96.)

Willis Pope testified that he grew up in Mississippi with his friend Cliff Ellis. (RT

104-05.) They both joined the Navy and were stationed in San Diego in 1993, where they

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hung out together nearly every day. (RT 105-06.) Pope said Ellis was very proud ofthe

new pickup truck he had purchased about two months before he was murdered, and that he

kept it immaculately clean both inside and out. (RT 107-08.) Ellis always dressed well

and had a laid-back, non-aggressive personality. (RT 108.)

Pope testified that on September 24,1993, Ellis came to Pope’s barracks about 5:00

p.m., accompanied by Ellis’s friend Keith Combs, and they were joined by Pope’s friend

Sean Milligan. (RT 108-09.) After dinner Ellis drove the four ofthem in his truck to an

area in Imperial Beach near Palm Avenue and the 805 freeway. (RT 110.) Although that

area was developed at the time oftrial in 2012, Pope testified that in 1993 it was a rugged,

undeveloped area used by off-road vehicles. (RT 110-11.) They hung out drinking around

a bonfire, a typical activity for them growing up in Mississippi, and one of them had a

camera and took pictures. (RT 111-14.) The four of them returned to the base about

midnight, requiring them to show their military identification to get on base, and went to

the barracks. (RT 115-16.) Pope left to make a 30 minute phone call home, and when he

returned Ellis and Combs were gone and he never saw either of them again. (RT 118.)

Pope testified that he had assumed they went back to their ship because he thought Combs

had duty in the morning, but acknowledged that he had told an investigator in 1993 that

Ellis wanted to go back to the bonfire area and keep partying and Pope declined because

he had duty the next morning. (RT 118, 127.)

Sean Milligan testified that he was friends with Pope when they were both in the

Navy and stationed in San Diego in 1993, and that he met Cliff Ellis through Pope. (RT

130.) Milligan and Pope frequented a country and western bar on the 32nd Street Navy

base called Anchors and Spurs, and Ellis accompanied them there once or twice. (RT 131.)

On September 24,1993, Milligan went to Pope’s barracks and met Ellis and Combs there.

(RT 132.) After the four ofthem ate pizza in the barracks, they grabbed some beer and

Ellis drove them in his new pickup truck to an off-road area where they started a bonfire

and hung out. (RT 133-34.) They all returned to the base together, which required showing

their military identification, and he never saw Ellis or Combs again. (RT 137-38.)

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Stephen Forde testified that he was in the Navy in 1993, that he hung out at the

Anchors and Spurs bar, and on three occasions had attended bonfires near Palm Avenue

after the bar closed. (RT 160.) He attended a bonfire on September 24, 1993, arriving

between midnight and 1:00 a.m., with a number of other young military people. (RT 160-

64.) Forde said he parked his truck next to Cliff Ellis’ truck, that there were twenty or

more people around their bonfire, and that there were two or three other bonfires nearby.

(RT 165-67.) Forde saw two young men in the area who concerned him because he thought

were “kind ofsmart asses.” (RT 171-73,176.) Although he did not remember at trial, he

told an investigator in 1993 that those men were Mexican, and that theirmannerisms caused

him to move away from them to the other side ofthe bonfire. (RT 174.) Less than an hour

after that incident, between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m., before sunrise, Forde left the area while

Ellis’ truck was still there. (RT 174-75, 189.) On February 9, 1994, Forde picked out a

photograph of codefendant Chavez from a photographic lineup as resembling one ofthe

two young Mexican men he saw that night. (RT 177-80, 399.)

Justin Duvall testified that he was in the Navy in 1993, was stationed in San Diego,

and went to the Anchors and Spurs bar nearly every weekend. (RT 194-95.) He had often

heard of people going to the Palm Avenue area after the bar closed to hang out and drink

beer around bonfires, and went for the first time during the early morning hours of

September 25, 1993. (RT 195-96.) He had not been drinking at all that night, parked his

car at the end ofPalm Avenue about 3:00 a.m., and walked to a bonfire. (RT 196-97, 200-

01.) There were about fifty people around the bonfire, made up mostly ofthe Anchors and

Spurs crowd, that is, short haired, clean-cut young Navy people dressed in an off-duty,

country and western style. (RT 199.)

Duvall testified that about 5:00 a.m., just as the sun was coming up and most ofthe

people were leaving, three Hispanic males, about 17 or 18 years old, wearing baggy

clothes, approached the group, and two ofthem asked for beer. (RT 201-02.) Duvall’s

group was playing country and western music, and the two young males said: “Fuck you,

White cowboy,” and: “You fucking cowboys, we don’t like your music.” (RT 202, 212.)

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1 Duvall testified they looked like gang members, and that one had his right hand behind his

back “like he had a gun,” although the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard those

remarks.1 (RT 202-03.) Duvall said that when his group did not give them beer they went

to another bonfire, but he felt uncomfortable and decided to leave. (Id.) He told an

investigator in December 1993 that those three young males had arrived in a light blue Ford

Courier with a camper shell. (RT 204-05.) The investigator showed Duvall a photographic

lineup, from which he identified codefendant Chavez as one ofthe three young Hispanic

males who had approached him in an aggressive manner. (RT 209-10, 399.)

Kristeen Kowalow testified thatshe and herroommate Pam Rios were at the Anchors

and Spurs bar on the evening of September 24, 1993, and went to a bonfire near the 805

freeway and Palm Avenue after closing, as she had several times before. (RT 243-45.)

She parked her car at the end of Palm Avenue and rode in with someone driving a truck.

(RT 245.) There were about fifty people and ten vehicles around their fire, including a

newer white pickup truck. (RT 245-48.) When interviewed by an investigator a couple of

months later, she identified CliffEllis and his white pickup truck as being there that night,

and said that Ellis’ pickup truck was still there after most people left. (RT 249.)

Kowalow said that at one point a small pickup truck with a camper shell and three

19 or 20-year old Hispanic men drove up, parked near the fire, and two ofthem sat on the

back of their truck. (RT 250-51.) Kowalow spoke to them briefly but immediately felt

uncomfortable and decided to leave because the two men did not fit in with the rest ofthe

people around the fire. (RT 251-52.) She said that although the Anchors and Spurs group

contained White, Black and Hispanic individuals, they were all short-haired, clean shaven

military people in their twenties, whereas the two Hispanic males were teenagers dressed

in baggy clothes with a “different demeanor.” (RT 254-56.) She had previously described

them as “gang bangers,” but the trial judge ruled that description inadmissible. (RT 253.)

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,27 i The trialjudge also excluded proffered prosecution evidence that four young Hispanic males with gang

monikers Bandit, Lazy, Weasel and Shady hung out together, and that Petitioner was known as Lazy and

Chavez was known as Weasel. (RT 456-62.)

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1 When she and her friends left around 5:00 a.m., the only people around the fire were two

white male sailors and the two young Hispanic males, and the only vehicles were the pickup

truck similar to Cliff Ellis’ and the Hispanic males’ pickup truck with the camper shell.

(RT 255-56, 266.) Kowalow could not say for sure ifEllis was there that night, but she

later picked codefendant Chavez from a photographic lineup, although she said she was

not sure where she recognized him from. (RT 256, 266, 399.)

Mary Macy testified that she and her friend Susan Stuhr were regulars at the Anchors

and Spurs bar in 1993, and were part of a group of people from the bar who often went to

bonfires in the area ofthe 805 freeway and Palm Avenue after closing, including September

25, 1993. (RT 285-86.) On that occasion she drove her Chevy Blazer there with Stuhr and

two Navy men, and backed her vehicle up to the bonfire. (RT 286.) Just as they arrived a

brand new pickup truck parked next to her with two Navy men who she thought were from

Anchors and Spurs. (RT 289.) She remembered the truck because it was the type she

wanted to buy, and identified it from a photograph as Cliff Ellis’ truck. (RT 289, 298.)

The truck later moved about thirty yards away, but was still by the bonfire. (RT 291.)

At some point Macy noticed that the music had stopped and most of the other

vehicles had left, which gave her a bad feeling. (RT 292-93.) Just before 5:00 a.m., while

it was still dark, as she was getting into her truck to leave, a small pickup truck with a

camper shell pulled up alongside her, and two young Hispanic males spoke to her, but she

ignored them and waived them off because she did not want to speak to them. (RT 293-

97,306.) The only other vehicle there was Ellis’ truck, and she decided to drive by it before

leaving to make sure the men were not passed out or asleep inside, but nobody was inside

the truck or around it, so she left. (RT 298.)

Barbara Behmke testified that in 1993 she was a regular member of the group of

people who attended bonfires near Palm Avenue after the Anchors and Spurs bar closed.

(RT 312.) She went to the bar on the evening ofSeptember 24,1993, and drove her Chevy

Blazer to the bonfire afterwards with her roommate and two friends. (RT 313-15.) She

knew Cliff Ellis and Keith Combs from the Anchors and Spurs bar, and saw them out at

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1 the bonfire that night in Ellis’ white pickup truck. (RT 316.) About 4:00 a.m., her friend

Sean was injured in a fight and she drove him to a hospital. (RT 317-19.) Behmke returned

to the bonfire to pick up her friend and her jacket, arriving about 4:30 or 4:45 a.m. (RT

321-22.) There were still several vehicles and people at the bonfire, and she noticed four

young Hispanic males who had not been there when she left. (RT 323-24.) Two ofthose

men approached her vehicle and made her feel uncomfortable by making sexual gestures

and saying things of a sexual nature, so she left after about five minutes. (RT 325-26.)

Behmke said Ellis’ pickup truck was still there, but she did not see Ellis or Combs. (RT

325.) In December 1993, she identified codefendant Chavez from a photographic lineup

as one ofthe young Hispanic males. (RT 327-28, 399.)

Scott Hultquist testified that in 1993 he regularly rode his dirt bike in the area around

Palm Avenue and the 805 freeway, when it was undeveloped open space. (RT 340.) He

arrived at the area around 6:00 a.m. on September 25, 1993, sat drinking coffee at the end

ofPalm Avenue waiting forthe fog to lift, and did not hear any gunshots or see any vehicles

leave the area. (RT 341-45.) Juanita Johnson testified that she and her daughter found two

bodies in that area about 7:00 a.m. on September 25, 1993, and that it was very foggy at

the time. (RT 140-45.)

David Swiskowski, a retired San Diego Police Sergeant, testified that in 1993 he was

assigned to the homicide team which investigated this case. (RT 349-51.) On September

25, 1993, he arrived at a dirt area near the 805 freeway and Palm Avenue and supervised

the preservation and collection of evidence. (RT 351-65.) There were no wallets or

identification found on the two victims, who were lying parallel to each other on their backs

about sixteen feet apart, although two ball caps were lying by their bodies with their names

written inside. (RT 368-69, 375.) Keith Combs had a gunshot wound in his back with

powder marks and stippling which indicated it was fired from close range, about three or

four inches away. (RT 369-71.) Combs also had two gunshot wounds to his head, one

behind his ear and one on the top of his head, and a camera lying at his feet. (RT 371.)

CliffEllis was shot once in the chest and twice in the head, had his shirt untucked and his

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belt buckle undone with dirt and vegetation stuck to his face and body, and looked as if

someone had stepped on his body. (RT 372-74.)

Six .22 caliber shell casings were recovered at the scene, one from underneath

Combs’ body, which in Swiskowski’s opinion suggested he fell on the casing after he was

shot. (RT 375-82.) The parties stipulated that all six .22 caliber shell casings were fired

from the same gun. (RT 427.) A white box recovered near Ellis’ body appeared to have

come from his truck, and contained car wax, a scrub brush, a college pamphlet, a map, and

a can ofArmor-All cleaner. (RT 383-84.) A cigarette butt with the ash still attached was

collected from between the two bodies. (RT 384-88.) Another cigarette butt with an ash

attached was collected from closer to Ellis’ body. (RT 388-90.) The fact that ash was still

attached to the cigarette butts and they were lying in an area with many footprints and tire

tracks indicated in Swiskowski’s opinion they had been dropped recently. (RT 390-91.)

On September 29, 1993, Swiskowski was notified that Ellis’ pickup truck was in

custody in Tijuana, along with Chavez who was stopped while driving it, and he went there

with an evidence technician where they fingerprinted and collected evidence from the

vehicle. (RT 395-97.) The keys were with the truck, and neither the ignition nor the door

locks had been tampered with. (RT 419.)

Dr. Leena Jariwala testified that she was a deputy medical examiner for the County

of San Diego in 1993. (RT 495.) She examined the bodies ofCliffEllis and Keith Combs

where they were found, and opined they had been killed between 1:30 a.m. and 5:20 a.m.

(RT 504-06.) Dr. Jariwala later performed autopsies on the bodies. (RT 509.) The two

bullet wounds in Combs’ head were from a gun fired a few feet away, whereas the bullet

wound to his back was from a gun fired very near the body; any ofthe three wounds could

have been fatal, and blood in Combs’ lungs indicated that he took at least a few breaths

after all three shots and might have lived for a few minutes. (RT 509-24.) Combs had a

blood alcohol level of 0.03 percent and no defensive wounds. (RT 525.) There were two

bullet wounds to Ellis’ head, one of which was caused with the gun almost touching the

skin, and one to his chest with an exit wound in his back; all three wounds could have been

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1 fatal and any ofthem would have caused him to fall to the ground; Dr. Jariwala was unable

to say in what order the wounds to either victim occurred, although Ellis was alive when

he was shot in the head. (RT 526-40.) Ellis had a blood alcohol content of 0.03 percent,

and abrasions and bruises on his face and leg, a scratch below his eye and around his neck,

and an abrasion on the back ofhis head. (RT 540.)

Dr. Glenn Wagner, the ChiefMedical Examiner for San Diego County, testified that

based on the trajectory ofthe bullets in Keith Combs’ body, either the shooter, the weapon

or Combs was moving at the time the shots were fired, and it did not appear that Combs

was wearing his hat when he was shot in the head. (RT 551, 553.) He said Cliff Ellis

would have been capable of movement after being shot in the chest and temple, but not

after being shot in the back ofthe head. (RT 555.)

Robert Michael Callison testified that he worked as an evidence technician for the

San Diego Police Department homicide squad in 1993, collected the items of evidence

identified by Swiskowski, and said the brand ofthe cigarette butts collected at the scene

was Marlboro. (RT 421-34.) Lisa Combs testified that her husband Keith Combs smoked

Marlboro cigarettes. (RT 100.) Gary Dorsett testified that he was employed as an evidence

technician with the San Diego Police Department in 1993, and that he collected forty-six

latent fingerprints from Ellis’ truck, and five fingerprints from items in the truck, including

a red cup and a plastic bottle. (RT 472-80.) There were stains on the floorboard of the

truck and a clutter oftrash inside, which included an ace bandage. (RT 478-81.)

Gloria Pasqual, a latent fingerprint examiner with the San Diego Police Department,

testified that she found CliffEllis’ fingerprints on the college pamphlet recovered from the

white box which came from Ellis’ truck. (RT 564.) Pasqual found Petitioner’s fingerprints

on the rear view mirror, interior rear sliding window, interior passenger side window, front

hood, and exterior passenger door ofEllis’ truck, as well as on the plastic bottle found in

the truck. (RT 565-72.) She found Chavez’ fingerprints on the front passenger fender,

interior rear sliding window, exterior driver’s side door wing window, driver’s door mirror,

exterior driver’s door handle, front hood, and driver’s side doorjamb, (hi)

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Shawn Montpetit, a DNA technical manager with the forensic biology unit of the

San Diego Police Department crime lab, testified that Combs and codefendant Chavez were

major contributors to DNA found on the inside of the pockets of the pants Combs was

wearing when his body was found. (RT 585-93.) Petitioner’s DNA was found on the

cigarette butt recovered between the two bodies near the white box, and Combs’ DNA was

found on the cigarette butt found closer to his body. (RT 389,594-95,602.) Chavez’ DNA

was found on the bandage found in Ellis’ pickup truck, and DNA from Petitioner and

Chavez were found on the red cup recovered from the truck. (RT 603-04.) Montpetit said

that because the evidence sat at room temperature at police headquarters for fifteen to

sixteen years, the DNA may have degraded and decreased the chances of more useful

results. (RT 586-87.) The People rested. (RT611.)

The defense moved for a directed verdict, arguing that because the jury was to be

instructed that ifthere are two equally reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence,

one of innocence and one of guilt, they must draw the inference of innocence, the only

possible verdict would be not guilty because the circumstantial evidence in the case could

lead only to an inference of innocence. (RT 668.) The trial judge denied the motion on

the basis that the evidence provided a very powerful inference that Petitioner and Chavez

had killed and robbed the victims, and a weak inference that they just happened to be in

the area around the time someone else committed the crimes. (RT 669-70.)

Lisa Dimeo, a forensic specialist, testified for the defense that she had examined the

autopsy reports and photographs ofthe crime scene. (RT 677.) She opined that because

the pool of Ellis’ blood was not next to his head and there was debris on his clothing, he

fell forward and laid on his stomach for minutes or hours before being rolled onto his back.

(RT 679-83.) The defenses rested and there was no rebuttal evidence. (RT 711-12.)

The jury was instructed. (RT 719-48.) Petitioner contends in Claim 4 here that the

burden of proof was diluted by the instruction, which the People admitted on appeal was

error under state law to give: “If you conclude that the defendant knew he possessed

property and you conclude that the property had in fact been recently stolen, you may not

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1 convict the defendant ofmurder based on those facts alone. However, ifyou also find that

supporting evidence tends to prove his guilt, then you may conclude that the evidence is

sufficient to prove he committed murder. The supporting evidence need only be slight and

need not be enough by itselfto prove guilt.” (RT 731.)

Petitioner’s defense counsel argued to the jury in closing that the circumstantial

evidence compelled an inference which points to innocence because there was no gunshot

residue found in the truck or in Combs’ pants pockets where Chavez’ DNA was found,

which would have been expected ifeither ofthe defendants had shot the victims and stolen

the truck, and that the evidence merely showed, at most, that Petitioner was at the scene

near the time of the murders and had been in the Ellis’ truck within four days of the

murders. (RT 803-13.) Defense counsel also argued that the opinion ofthe defense expert

that Ellis’ body had been rolled over minutes or hours after he died allowed for an inference

that Chavez came along after the murders, rolled Ellis over, took his keys and stole his

truck, which, as with the evidence that Petitioner was merely at the scene at some point,

was insufficient to support the murder charges. (RT 814-21.)

The prosecutor argued in closing that Petitioner and Chavez were guilty of aiding

and abetting premeditated murder, or aiding and abetting a robbery, that resulted in the

death ofthe victims, because they waited until Ellis and Combs were the only ones left at

the bonfire, going so far as to scare their friends off, including making unwanted sexual

overturesto Mary Macy to chase her away when she returned after everyone else was gone,

and because it must have taken at least two teenagers working together to kill two young

strong sailors in a manner necessitating a struggle which left the usually well-dressed Ellis

disheveled and covered in dirt and vegetation. (RT 753-81.) The prosecutor argued that

the defendants eventually shot the victims execution-style, took the their wallets and Ellis’

keys, left their DNA at the scene, and then stole the truck and were in continuous possession

ofit for several days as shown by their DNA and fingerprints in the truck and leaving the

always immaculate truck filthy. (Id.) As relevant to Claim 3 here, the prosecutor argued

that: (1) the victims were serving their country (RT 752, 756), which Petitioner argues was

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an appeal to the sympathy ofthe jury; (2) that: “The witnesses are dead. But just as my

heart is beating in my chest, those two men stopped the heartbeats ofKeith and Cliff’ (RT

767), which Petitioner contends was an expression of a personal opinion of guilt; and (3)

said: “And I have to comment on the [defense] expert. How can I not? You can hire

somebody and have them come in here and say anything” (RT 831), which Petitioner

argues improperly disparaged the defense expert. Petitioner also claims the prosecutor

argued facts not in evidence when she urged the jurors to speculate that the defendants had

a preconceived “plan” to rob the victims because they arrived at the scene “with a loaded

gun,” that four young Hispanic males “surrounded” the victims, that Combs was shot first

and Ellis then tried to escape, that Ellis “fought for his life,” and that the crimes required

multiple perpetrators. (RT 757-78, 827, 830.)

After deliberating about two days, during which the testimony of Mary Macy and

Barbara Behmkhe were read back, the jury found Petitioner and Chavez guilty of two

counts of first degree murder, and found they were armed with a firearm during the

commission ofthe murders. (CT 413-24,474-78.) The jury also found true the two special

circumstance allegations that the murders were committed during the commission or

attempted commission of robbery, and that both defendants had been convicted of more

than one count of first degree murder. (Id.) The defendants were each sentenced to two

consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole plus one year, later reduced to

two consecutive terms of 25 years-to-life plus one year. (CT 427, 485.)

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims his federal constitutional rights were violated because the evidence

is insufficient to prove he was guilty of murder (Claim 1) and insufficient to support the

special circumstance findings (Claim 2), because the prosecutor committed misconduct in

closing argument by appealing to the sympathy ofthe jury, expressing a personal beliefin

guilt, arguing facts not in evidence, and denigrating the defense expert (Claim 3), and

because the court erred in instructing the jury that Petitioner could be found guilty of

murder based on his possession ofstolen property plus other slight evidence ofguilt (Claim

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1 4). (FAPat6-9,15-30.) Respondent answers that habeas reliefis unavailable because the

adjudication of the claims by the state court is neither contrary to, nor involves an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and any errors with respect to

Claim 3 and 4 are harmless. (Ans. Mem. at 16-35.)

Petitioner replies that because the evidence presented at his trial does not establish

the elements ofmurder, aiding and abetting murder, or the special circumstances, the state

court adjudication ofClaims 1 and 2, on the basis that sufficient evidence supports the jury

verdicts, is contrary to, or involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law which requires that every element of a criminal offense, as those elements are

defined under state law, must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. (Memorandum

of Points and Authorities in Support of First Amended Petition [“FAP Mem.”] at 26-39;

Traverse at 6-12.) He also argues that the determination by the state court that there was

no prosecutorial misconduct and that the instructional error was harmless, is unreasonable,

and that those errors are not harmless. (FAP Mem. at 39-43; Traverse at 12-17.)

Standard of Review

In order to obtain federal habeas reliefwith respect to claims which were adjudicated

on their merits in state court, a federal habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the state

court adjudication ofthe claims: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination ofthe facts in light ofthe evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006). Even if § 2254(d) is satisfied, or does

not apply, a petitioner must still show a federal constitutional violation occurred in order

to obtain relief. Fryv, Pliler. 551 U.S. 112,119-22 (2007); Frantz v. Hazev. 533 F.3d 724,

735-36 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Furthermore, a petitioner must also show that any

constitutional error is not harmless, unless it is ofthe type included on the Supreme Court’s

“short, purposely limited roster ofstructural errors.” Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993, 1015

(9th Cir. 2007), citing Arizona v. Fulminante. 499 U.S. 279,306 (1991) (recognizing “most

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constitutional errors can be harmless”) Insufficiency ofthe evidence claims are notsubject

to harmless error review. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (requiring habeas

reliefto be granted if“all rational fact finders would have to conclude that the evidence of

guilt fails to establish every element ofthe crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”)

A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court

precedent (1) “ifthe state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth

in [the Court’s] cases” or (2) “ifthe state court confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of[the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different

from [the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor. 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state

court decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal

law, “ifthe state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases

but unreasonably applies it to the facts ofthe particular state prisoner’s case.” hi at 407.

Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is available “if, and only

if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there

could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” White v. Woodali 572 U.S.,

134 S.Ct. 1697, 1706-07 (2014), quoting Harrington v. Richter. 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. . . . Rather, that application must be

objectively unreasonable.” Lockver v. Andrade. 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). In order to satisfy § 2254(d)(2), the petitioner must

show that the factual findings upon which the state court’s adjudication of his claims rest

are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

B. Claim 1

Petitioner alleges in Claim 1 that there is no evidence in the record ofhis conduct at

any time relevant to the killings, no eyewitness testimony, no identification of him, no

evidence connecting him to the only weapon used, no evidence he had a relationship with

Chavez, and no evidence ofconsciousness ofguilt. (FAP at 6,15-22.) Rather, the evidence

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against him is a cigarette butt with his DNA found at the scene, which is a party area

frequented by large groups ofyoung people, and his fingerprints and DNA found in and on

the stolen truck. (Id) He claimsthat his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments was violated because the evidence is insufficient to satisfy the elements, as

defined by California law, of murder, robbery, or aiding and abetting murder or robbery,

but merely establishes he was at some unknown time in the stolen truck and at some

unknown time at the crime scene. (Id.)

Petitioner presented this claim, as a federal constitutional claim, to the state supreme

court in his petition for review. (Lodgment No. 6 at 10-16.) That petition was summarily

denied without citation of authority or a statement ofreasoning. (Lodgment No. 7.) The

same claim was also presented to the state appellate court on direct appeal as a federal

constitutional claim. (Lodgment No. 3 at 11-21.) The claim was denied on the merits in a

written opinion affirming the convictions. (Lodgment No. 5.)

There is a presumption that “[w]here there has been one reasoned state judgment

rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding thatjudgment or rejecting the

same claim rest upon the same ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker. 501 U.S. 797,803-06 (1991);

see also Barker v. Fleming. 423 F.3d 1085,1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Before we can apply

[the] standards [of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)], we must identify the state court decision that is

appropriate for our review. When more than one state court has adjudicated a claim, we

analyze the last reasoned decision.”) The state appellate court first identified the applicable

legal standards under state law regarding sufficiency ofthe evidence claims. (Lodgment

No. 5, People v. Chavez, et al.. No. D061946, slip op. at 12-13.) As discussed below, they

are identical to the controlling federal legal standards, which, as Petitioner correctly

observes, require the existence ofsufficient evidence to prove every element of a criminal

offense beyond a reasonable doubt, as those elements are defined by state law. The state

appellate court then identified the elements of first degree murder under the two theories

argued by the prosecution: aiding and abetting the deliberate, premeditated murder ofthe

victims, and aiding and abetting a robbery that resulted in the death ofthe victims. (Id. at

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1 13-15, citing People v. Prettvman. 14 Cal.4th 248, 259 (1996) (holding that under

California law a person who aids and abets a crime is a principal in the crime, sharing the

same guilt as the perpetrator, and that “[a]n aider and abettor is a person who, acting with

(1) knowledge ofthe unlawful purpose ofthe perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of

committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission ofthe offense, (3) by act or advice

aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission ofthe crime.”) (internal quotation

marks omitted).)

After concluding there was sufficient evidence to convict Chavez and denying his

insufficiency ofthe evidence claim, the state appellate court stated:

Elias likewise contends there is insufficient evidence to support his

conviction. Elias argues that the cigarette butt found at the scene and the

forensic evidence recovered from Ellis’s truck do not lead to the reasonable

inference that Elias aided and abetted the robbery. Elias’s argument relies, in

large part, on a misstatement of the applicable standard of review. Elias

argues that his convictions cannot stand ifthe evidence is as consistent with

guilt as with another rational conclusion that pointsto innocence. (See People

v. Flores (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 764, 769 (“it is elementary law that

circumstances relied upon to establish the guilt of one accused of crime must

be consistent with that hypothesis and inconsistent with any other rational

conclusion”).) However, this principle is not a correct statement oflaw to be

applied on appeal. ‘“Although it is the duty ofthe jury to acquit a defendant

if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations,

one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence (citations), it is the jury,

not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. “‘Ifthe circumstances reasonably justify the trier

of fact’s findings, the opinion ofthe reviewing court that the circumstances

might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant

a reversal ofthe judgment.

“Nor may a conviction be set aside because evidence is susceptible of two

reasonable inferences, one looking to guilt and another to innocence.”

{People v. Lewis, supra, 222 Cal.App.2d at p. 149.)

Viewing the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

and drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence in support of the

conviction, as we must, we conclude the substantial evidence supports Elias’s

convictions. Our Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Bean (1988) 46

Cal.3d 919 {Bean) is instructive. In that case, the defendant challenged the

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sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for two discrete

murders. The evidence tying the defendant to one ofthe murders bears some

similarity to the evidence here: “A pair of sunglasses bearing what the

People’s experts identified as defendant’s fingerprints were found next to the

body of Eileen Fox, and the defendant admitted owning a pair of similar

sunglasses. In addition there was evidence that defendant had been seen,

possibly observing the house, in the past; that he was living nearby with his

sister; and that he was familiar with the shortcut from the location at which

the automobile, purse, and wallet were discarded to the Florin Meadows

apartments.” (Id. at pp. 933-934, fns. omitted.)

With other evidence ofthe victim’s condition, the Supreme Court found

sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s first degree murder conviction

and “the jury’s conclusion that the murder was committed in the perpetration

of a burglary and a robbery.” (Bean, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 934.)

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The evidentiary similarity between Bean and the instant case supports

the conclusion Elias participated in the killings and robbery. Flere, just as in

Bean, forensic evidence on a small, portable object places Elias at the scene

of the crime. (See Bean, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 933.) While Elias was not

specifically identified by any witness as one of Chavez’s companions that

night, it is reasonable to infer that he was there based on the cigarette butt and

the forensic evidence recovered from Ellis’s truck. Elias’s fingerprints were

recovered from multiple interior and exterior surfaces on the truck, as were

Chavez’s, and DNA from both Chavez and Elias was recovered from the same

cup inside the truck. Elias claims that no evidence ofthe relationship between

Chavez and Elias was introduced, but the forensic evidence recovered from

the truck demonstrates that they were known to each other. Moreover, the

evidence tying Elias to the fruits ofthe robbery is arguably stronger than the

evidence considered sufficient in Bean. Elias’s fingerprints and DNA were

recovered from Ellis’s truck, whereas the evidence in Bean showed only that

the defendant was familiar with a route near where certain stolen goods were

discarded. (See Id. at p. 934.) Elias’s attempt to distinguish Bean on the facts

is unpersuasive, as the evidence here is in fact more incriminating than the

evidence considered by the Supreme Court in Bean.

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murder as the perpetrator ofthe robbery and murder, the reasonable inferences

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1 theory of liability pursued by the prosecution here. Indeed, the purpose of

aiding and abetting liability is to “obviate() the necessity to decide who was

the aider and abettor and who the direct perpetrator or to what extent each

played which role.” {People v. McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1120; see

People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 433 (“the doctrine . .. ‘“snares all

who intentionally contribute to the accomplishment of a crime in the net of

criminal liability defined by the crime, even though the actor does not

personally engage in all ofthe elements ofthe crime’””).)

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“Factors relevant to a determination ofwhether defendant was guilty of

aiding and abetting include: presence at the scene of the crime,

companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.” {People v.

Singleton (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 488, 492.) Considering these factors, and

viewed as a whole, the evidence points to Elias’s complicity and supports his

conviction. Although Elias contends there is “no evidence” of his actions or

intent that night, it is reasonable to infer that Elias was present with Chavez at

the Anchors and Spurs bonfires prior to the robbery and murders, that he

waited with Chavez until Combs and Ellis were alone, that he assisted Chavez

and potentially others in robbing and murdering Combs and Ellis (or was the

perpetrator himself), and that he then left the scene with Chavez in Ellis’s

stolen truck. These inferences arise out of the consistent testimony of

witnesses that Chavez was present at the bonfires with one or more

companions, separate DNA recovered at the crime scene which showed that

Chavez and Elias had been present, and the DNA and fingerprints found in

Ellis’s truck, which showed that both defendants were occupants ofthe truck.

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shows that at least two perpetrators were needed to accomplish the robbery

and double murder. Witnesses testified that Ellis parked his truck with its rear

facing the bonfire, where his body and Combs’s body were later found.

Although the bodies of Ellis and Combs were 16 feet apart, their location,

their parallel positioning and the location ofthe items removed from the truck

and dumped on the ground support the conclusion that Ellis and Combs were

killed on either side ofthe truck. Combs’s body was found on what would

have been the passenger side of Ellis’s new truck; Ellis’s body, parallel to

Combs’s body, was found on what would have been the driver’s side of the

truck, the same side where the accessory items from the truck and the brochure

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1 were found after being removed from the truck and dropped on the ground.

The condition of Ellis’s body supports an inference he had been in a fight

before he was killed. His face and neck area had contusions. His leg had been

injured. His clothing was uncharacteristically disheveled, and there was plant

debris on his face. Given the distance between the bodies, the likelihood the

truck was between them and the fact one ofthe victims engaged in a physical

fight before being killed, it is difficult to conclude that only one person was

able to subdue, fight and kill both victims.

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Although a mere spectator may not be liable for aiding and abetting,

and mere knowledge of a perpetrator’s unlawful purpose is insufficient, in

light of all the circumstantial evidence in the record, Elias’s contention that

his role might have been so limited is speculation. (See People v. Nguyen,

supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at pp. 529-530.) As the court in People v. Allen (1985)

165 Cal.App.3d 616 stated on an analogous record: “Under these

circumstances, it is immaterial that the evidence was silent as to which

defendant actually shot (the victim); it is virtually inconceivable that the one

who did not shoot him did not aid and abet the shooting.” (Id. at p. 626.)

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Cal.3d 667, in which the Supreme Court concluded the evidence was

insufficient to support a defendant’s conviction of first degree murder. We

disagree. In that case, an eyewitness offered potentially exculpatory

testimony tending to show that the defendant was not one of the individuals

she had seen at the scene of the crime. (Id. at p. 696.) Although the

defendant’s fingerprint was found in the house where the robbery and murder

occurred, the defendant had been a guest there in the past. (Id. at p. 697.) The

Supreme Court explained, “The highly speculative and equivocal

identification testimony and the solitary fingerprint ofsome unknown vintage

do not constitute evidence which is ‘reasonable, credible and ofsolid value -

such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.’ (Citation.)” (Ibid.) Here, the evidence tying Elias to the

crime is more robust, including, in particular, the recently smoked

Marlborough [sic] cigarette butt found between the victim’s bodies very

shortly after they were killed and powerful evidence ofElias’s presence with

Chavez in Ellis’s stolen truck. Importantly, unlike the record in People v.

Trevino, here there is no arguably exculpatory evidence in the record.

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1 We likewise conclude that the evidence in the record here is more

compelling than the evidence found insufficient in the various authorities

cited by Elias in his briefing. (See People v. Flores, supra, 58 Cal.App.2d at

pp. 766-768 (evidence consisted of defendant’s fingerprints on rearview

mirror of stolen car); Birt v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 934, 938

(evidence consisted ofdefendant’s fingerprint on cigarette lighter in rental van

used in robbery).) Substantial evidence supports Elias’s convictions.

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(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Chavez, et al.. No. D061946, slip op. at 16-22.)

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon

proofbeyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which

he is charged.” In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Fourteenth Amendment’s

Due Process Clause is violated, and an applicant is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief,

“if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact

could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson. 443 U.S. at 324.

Federal habeas courts must analyze Jackson claims “with explicit reference to the

substantive elements ofthe criminal offense as defined by state law.” Id at 324 n.16.

Although the state appellate court did not specifically cite to Jackson or any other

federal law, the state law cases cited by and relied on by the appellate court acknowledge

and adopt the Jackson standard. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Chavez, et al.. No. D061946,

slip op. at 12-13.) Thus, although the appellate court here did not cite to Jackson, “such a

citation is not required ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court

decision contradicts’ Supreme Court precedent.” Juan H. v. Allen. 408 F.3d 1262, 1274

n.12 (9th Cir. 2005), quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3,8 (2002). Accordingly, this Court

will look through the silent denial by the state supreme court and apply the provisions of

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to the appellate court opinion. Ylst. 501 U.S. at 803-06. The Court

must “apply the standards ofJackson with an additional layer of deference,” and can only

grant habeas reliefifthe state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. Juan EL, 408

F.3d at 1274-75 (holding that habeas relief is only available if the state court decision

reflects “an unreasonable application ofJackson and Winship to the facts ofthis case.”)

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Petitioner argues that he can overcome these levels and layers of deference because

the state appellate court clearly erred in finding that the evidence at trial established the

elements ofthe offenses under California law. (FAP Mem. at 28-33.) In particular, he

contends there was no evidence he knew that Chavez or anyone else planned to commit

murder or robbery, and no evidence that he affirmatively aided, encouraged or facilitated

murder or robbery. (Id.) He contends the evidence merely established he was in the stolen

truck within four days ofthe murders and at the crime scene at some point. (Id.)

The state court correctly found that the jury could have drawn a reasonable inference

from the evidence that at least two people were required to kill and rob the two victims.

That finding is supported by evidence that the usually well-dressed Ellis was found with

his shirt untucked and his belt undone, with dirt and vegetation stuck to his face and body,

and appearing as if someone has stepped on him, from which the jury could draw a

reasonable inference that he put up a fight. Evidence showed that Ellis was shot in the

chest and found lying on the ground by the driver’s side of where his truck was last seen,

and that Combs was shot in the back from close range and a shell casing was found under

his body near where the passenger side ofthe truck would have been, which supported an

inference that Combs was shot in the back as he was standing near the passenger door with

a gun at his back. The jury could have drawn a reasonable inference that Combs was shot

just before or while someone else struggled with Ellis near the driver’s door (perhaps

Chavez since a bandage with his DNA was found in Ellis’ truck and he was found driving

the truck), and that the person who shot Combs in the back nearthe passenger side (perhaps

Petitioner because his fingerprints were found on the passenger side of the truck), then

came around to the driver’s side in order to assist the person struggling with Ellis and shot

Ellis. The testimony ofthe medical expert that the two bullet wounds in Combs’ head were

fired from a few feet away, whereas the bullet wound to his back was fired very near his

body, that he was not wearing his hat when he was shot in the head, and lived a short time

after being shot, coupled with evidence that he was lying on a shell casing, allowed a

reasonable inference to be drawn that Combs was shot while someone was holding a gun

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at his back, he fell down, which caused his hat to fall off, landed on top ofthe shell casing,

and while lying on the ground was shot twice in the head execution-style to ensure he was

dead. The evidence that Ellis could have lived for a short time after the shots to his chest

and temple, and did live for a short time after being shot, but would have died instantly

from the shot to the back of his head, and had been rolled over, supports an inference that

he was shot in the chest, fell down, shot in the head execution-style to ensure he was dead,

and was then rolled over and had his keys taken. Thus, it was objectively reasonable for

the state appellate court to find that the evidence supported an inference that at least two

people were involved in the crimes.

The appellate court also reasonably found that evidence was presented from which

the jury could reasonably infer that Chavez and Petitioner were those two people. That

evidence consisted ofthe numerous eyewitness identifications ofChavez as one of a group

ofseveral young Hispanic males who were acting in an aggressive manner threatening or

chasing away any remaining Anchors and Spurs people from the area around 5:00 a.m., a

time when only Ellis and Combs remained from the Anchors and Spurs crowd, and the

most likely time of death. Additional evidence supporting Chavez’ participation was his

DNA in Combs’ pocket, from which it is reasonable to presume Chavez took Combs’

wallet, as well as Chavez’ DNA and fingerprints found inside and outside the truck,

primarily in and around the driver’s side, from which it is reasonable to presume he drove

offin Ellis’ truck contemporaneously with the murders, particularly since he was stopped

while driving the truck a few days later in possession ofthe truck’s keys, and the truck’s

ignition and locks had not been tampered with. Evidence that Petitioner was Chavez’

companion includes the eyewitness testimony that Chavez was with several other teenage

Hispanic males, (Petitioner was at the time ofthe crimes a teenaged Hispanic male), along

with Petitioner’s DNA found on a recently discarded cigarette butt collected from between

the two bodies, near where items taken from a white box from inside the truck were

scattered on the ground, as well as his DNA and fingerprints which were found in and

around Ellis’ truck.

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Petitioner contends his DNA on the recently smoked cigarette butt, even assuming

it places him at the scene around the time of death, or his DNA and fingerprints in the

stolen truck, does not permit a reasonable inference that he acted with Chavez during the

murders, or that he shared Chavez’ intent to kill or rob the victims. However, once a state

court fact finder has found a defendant guilty, federal habeas courts must consider the

evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Jackson. 443 U.S. at 319. It was

reasonable and rational for the jury to draw an inference that the victims were murdered

during the course of a robbery. That inference was supported by the evidence that the

victims’ wallets were missing, that Ellis had been rolled over after he was shot, and his

truck was driven away with its keys rather than having its locks and ignition tampered with.

The jury was able to draw a rational inference that Chavez participated in the robbery and

murders, as several eyewitnesses testified that they saw Chavez at the scene around the

time of the murders chasing potential witnesses away, and his DNA was found in one

victim’s pocket and his DNA and fingerprints found in the other victim’s truck. The jury

could draw a reasonable inference that someone acted with the teenaged Chavez because

the evidence showed that the victims were two young sailors, one of whom was likely

standing with a gun to his back when shot next to the passenger door ofthe truck, while

the other, the owner ofthe truck, engaged in a stmggle near the driver’s side ofthe truck.

Finally, the jury could draw a reasonable inference that Petitioner was the person who

assisted Chavez from Petitioner’s DNA found on a cigarette butt recently discarded

between the two dead bodies, near where Ellis’ truck was last seen parked, and evidence

that his and Chavez’ DNA and fingerprints were found in Ellis’ truck when it was being

driven by Chavez several days after it had been stolen during the murders.

In addition to thatstrong circumstantial evidence that Petitioner was one ofthe group

of young Hispanic males at the scene around the time of the murders, evidence that the

keys were with the truck when Chavez was stopped, and that the locks and ignition were

undamaged, supports a reasonable inference that the truck was stolen contemporaneously

with the murder ofits owner. Evidence that numerous fingerprints ofChavez were found

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in and around the driver’s side ofthe truck, and numerous fingerprints of Petitioner were

found in and around the passenger side ofthe truck, as well as their DNA inside the truck,

supports a reasonable inference that they jointly took the truck at the time ofthe murders

and shared it for four days, which supports an inference they jointly shared the spoils of

the robbery, and thusjointly participated in the murders and robbery.

Accordingly, sufficient evidence was presented from which a reasonable jury could

infer that Petitioner had knowledge ofthe unlawful purpose ofthe person who robbed and

murdered the victims, or was that person, that he had or shared the intent or purpose of

committing, encouraging, or facilitating those crimes, or that he advised, promoted,

encouraged or instigated the commission ofthe crimes. Thus, the finding by the jury that

the elements ofthe crimes, as defined by state law, had been proven beyond a reasonable

doubt, does not “fall below the threshold of bare rationality.” Coleman v. Johnson, 566

U.S. 650,, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2065 (2012) (per curiam) (“The jury in this case was

convinced, and the only question under Jackson is whether that finding was so

insupportable as to fall below the threshold ofbare rationality.”); see also Richter. 562 U.S.

at 103 (holding that federal habeas relief functions as a “guard against extreme

malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,” and not simply as a means of error

correction), quoting Jackson. 443 U.S. at 332 n.5. It is also clear that Petitioner has failed

to show that the factual findings upon which the state court’s adjudication of his claims

rest are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El. 537 U.S. at 340. The Court finds that federal

habeas reliefis not available as to Claim 1 because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that

the state court adjudication of the claim is contrary to, or involves an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, or is based on an unreasonable determination

ofthe facts, and the Court recommends denying habeas relief as to Claim 1.

C. Claim 2

Petitioner alleges in Claim 2 that there is insufficient evidence to support the special

circumstance allegation findings for “similar reasons” presented in support of Claim 1.

(FAP at 7, 22-23.) He contends there is insufficient evidence that: (1) he was a major

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1 participant in the robbery, orthat he acted with intentto kill or reckless disregard for human

life, as required for the first special circumstance ofmurder during the course ofrobbery;

and (2) there was insufficient evidence that he acted with the intent to kill as required for

the second special circumstance ofmultiple murder. (Id.)

Respondent answers that Petitioner has not shown that the denial ofthis claim by the

state court, on the basis that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding

of intent to kill, is contrary to, or involves an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. (Ans. Mem. at 14-24.) Petitioner replies that there is no evidence

he knew any member ofhis group was armed, no evidence he killed the victims to prevent

them from identifying him as the state appellate court found, and no evidence he was the

shooter or shared the shooter’s intent. (Pet. Mem. at 34-35.)

Petitioner presented this claim as a federal claim to the state courts in the same

manner as Claim 1. (Lodgment No. 3-7.) Forthe same reasons set forth above with respect

to Claim 1, the court will look through the silent denial ofthe claim by the state supreme

court and apply the provisions of28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to the appellate court opinion. Ylst,

501 U.S. at 803-06. The appellate court stated:

Here, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Chavez and

Elias intended to kill Combs and Ellis. Chavez and Elias went to an isolated

location, either armed themselves or with armed accomplices, and waited for

Combs and Ellis to be left alone as the Anchors and Spurs party wound down.

Combs and Ellis were young Navy men who were capable ofresisting robbery

by a group ofteenagers. It is reasonable to infer that Chavez and Elias knew

that their group was armed and that they intended to use deadly force against

Combs and Ellis in order to rob them. Once Chavez and Elias confronted

Combs and Ellis, it is likely that Chavez and Elias were concerned that Combs

and Ellis would identify them and either killed the victims themselves or

intended for their accomplices to do so. “In light ofthis evidence, a rational

jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt defendants(s) intended to kill

the victims in order to prevent them from identifying (them).” (See Cain,

supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 40.)

Moreover, the location and condition ofthe bodies, including the fresh

abrasion found on Ellis, provide a reasonable basis to infer that Chavez, Elias,

and their accomplices collectively restrained and subdued Combs and Ellis in

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1 orderto kill them. When a witnessreturned to the bonfire to retrieve herjacket

and interrupted them, either shortly before or after they killed Combs and

Ellis, Chavez made sexual remarks to the witness to scare her off. After the

killings, Chavez went through Combs’s pockets for valuables, someone

turned Ellis’s body over, and Chavez (likely with Elias) drove away in Ellis’s

truck. Viewing the record as a whole, we conclude that substantial evidence

supports the jury’s finding that Chavez and Elias intended to kill Combs and

Ellis.

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Elias argues that “(t)here was no evidence ofplanning, no evidence that

the participants knew the shooter was armed, and no evidence of what

occurred during the shooting or what Elias did during the shooting.”

However, “‘(c)ircumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a

defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’

(Citation.)” {Bean, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 933.) On appeal, we “presume() in

support ofthe judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonable

deduce from the evidence.” {Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) We do not

examine the record for direct evidence on specific issues. Rather, we consider

whether the evidence as a whole would be sufficient for a reasonable jury to

find intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt. “Even ifwe might have made

contrary factual findings or drawn different inferences, we are not permitted

to reverse the judgment ifthe circumstances reasonablyjustify those found by

the jury. It is the jury, not the appellate court, that must be convinced beyond

a reasonable doubt. Our task and responsibility is to determine whether that

finding is supported by substantial evidence.” {Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p.

1126.) Here, as we have discussed, we conclude that the jury’s finding is

supported by substantial evidence.

Chavez’s argument relies on extensive quotations from the

prosecution’s closing argument. Chavez contendsthat the prosecutor’s theory

of intent was speculative and unsupported. “It is elementary, however, that

the prosecutor’s argument is not evidence and the theories suggested are not

the exclusive theories that may be considered by the jury.” {Perez, supra, 2

Cal.4th at p. 1126.) Regardless ofthe prosecution’s stated theory ofintent in

closing arguments, we conclude that the evidence supports the jury’s finding

ofintent to kill here.

The jury’s inference that Chavez and Elias intended to kill Combs and

Ellis, where the evidence shows that Chavez and Elias waited for Combs and

Ellis to be alone, confronted them in an armed group in the early morning

hours at an isolated location, and overpowered them in circumstances showing

that multiple individuals were involved, resulting in their violent and brutal

deaths, is based on neither speculation nor guess work. It is the rational

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product of reason applied to the direct forensic and eyewitness evidence

admitted by the trial court. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s multiple

murder finding.

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(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Chavez, et aL No. D061946, slip op. at 23-25.)

Sufficient evidence was produced at trial to support a reasonable inference that

Petitioner acted with intent to kill. As set forth above in Claim 1, reasonable inferences

could be drawn that both victims were shot in the head after they had been shot in the back

and chest respectively and were lying on the ground. That circumstance shows an obvious

intent to kill, and it is not objectively unreasonable for the appellate court to also find that

evidence consistent with an intent to ensure the witnesses could not identify the

perpetrators.

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Additional evidence supports the finding that Petitioner had the intent to kill or

shared Chavez’ intent to kill. A reasonable inference could be drawn that at least two

teenagers needed to help each other to overcome the two young, fit victims. In addition,

they died on opposite sides ofthe truck, also indicating more than one perpetrator. The

jury could reasonably find that the killers came from a group of several young Hispanic

teenagers who were seen chasing witnesses away from the scene around the most likely

time of death, one of whom was identified by several witnesses as Chavez, indicating

planning and cooperation. Thus, the evidence supported a reasonable inference that by

shooting the victims in the chest and back, and then twice each in the head after they had

been subdued, whoever killed or helped kill the victims acted with an intent to kill, that

one ofthose persons was Chavez, and that someone helped Chavez.

There is sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to draw a reasonable inference

that Petitioner was the person who killed the victims or assisted Chavez in killing them.

That evidence consisted of Petitioner’s DNA at the scene on a cigarette butt recently

discarded between the two bodies near where items from inside the truck were scattered,

from which the jury could draw a reasonable inference that Petitioner was a member ofthe

group of young Hispanic males seen in the area, and was present during the robbery and

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murders. Evidence that Petitioner’s fingerprints and DNA were found in and on the truck,

mostly in and around the passenger side, when it was stopped four days later with Chavez

driving, which, along with evidence that the truck was stolen contemporaneously with the

murders and driven away by Chavez, allowed the jury to draw a reasonable inference that

Petitioner and Chavez were the people who stole the truck after murdering the victims

execution style, and shared the spoils ofthe robbery. The finding by the jury that the intent

to kill elements of the two special circumstance allegations had been proven beyond a

reasonable doubt does not “fall below the threshold ofbare rationality.” Johnson. 132 S.Ct.

at 2065 (“The jury in this case was convinced, and the only question under Jackson is

whether that finding was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare

rationality.”); see also Richter. 562 U.S. at 103 (holding that federal habeas relieffunctions

as a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,” and not

simply as a means of error correction.), quoting Jackson. 443 U.S. at 332 n.5.

The state court adjudication of Claim 2, on the basis that sufficient evidence

supported the two special circumstance allegations, is neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Andrade. 538 U.S. at 75-76;

Williams. 529 U.S. at 405-07; see also Richter. 562 U.S. at 103 (“As a condition for

obtaining habeas relieffrom a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s

ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking injustification that there

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.”) The Court also finds that the state court adjudication was not

based on an unreasonable determination ofthe facts. Miller-El. 537 U.S. at 340. The Court

therefore recommends habeas reliefbe denied as to Claim 2.

D. Claim 3

Petitioner alleges in his third claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct in

closing argument by appealing to the sympathy ofthe jury, expressing a personal beliefin

guilt, arguing facts not in evidence, and denigrating the defense expert. (FAP at 8.)

Respondent answers that the adjudication ofthis claim by the state court, on the basis that

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the prosecutor’s comments were not improper, is neither contrary to, nor involves an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Ans. Mem. at 18-23.)

Respondent also argues that any error is harmless because the prosecutor’s remarks were

insignificant in light ofthe evidence ofPetitioner’s guilt. (Id. at 23-24.)

Petitioner presented this claim to the state supreme court in support of his federal

due process violation. (Lodgment No. 6 at 18-21, citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo. 416

U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (holding that misconduct by a prosecutor in a state criminal trial

violates the right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment only where the

remark “by itselfso infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a

denial of due process.”) and Darden v. Wainwright 477 U.S. 168, 182-83 (1986) (holding

that a federal constitutional error does not arise unless the prosecutor’s argument rendered

the trial fundamentally unfair).) The state supreme court summarily denied the claim

without citation of authority or a statement ofreasoning. (Lodgment No. 7.)

The claim was also presented to the state appellate court on direct appeal.

(Lodgment No. 3 at 24-31.) However, Petitioner did not claim a violation of federal due

process in the state appellate court, but provided citations to state cases only, although he

did argue that ifthe claim was precluded by a failure to object at trial such preclusion was

due to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 32-33.) The claim was

denied on the merits in a written opinion affirming the convictions, without reference to

federal constitutional due process, and with an aside that because there was no misconduct

there was no need to determine whether any failure to object constituted constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Lodgment No. 5.)

The last decision with respect to Petitioner’s federal due process claim is the silent

denial by the state supreme court. This Court must presume it was an adjudication on the

merits ofthe federal constitutional claims presented. See Richter. 562 U.S. at 99 (“When

a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it

may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of

any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.”) This Court “must

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determine what arguments or theories ... could have supported the state court’s decision;

and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those

arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of’ the Supreme

Court. Id. at 102. However, the reasoning set forth by the state appellate court, if it is

relevant to the constitutional issue, must be part of a federal habeas court’s consideration.

Frantz. 533 F.3d at 734-38; Barker. 423 F.3d at 1093.

Petitioner first claims the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence when she urged

the jurors to speculate that the defendants had a preconceived “plan” to rob the victims

because they arrived at the scene “with a loaded gun,” that four Hispanics “surrounded”

the victims, that Combs was shot first and Ellis then tried to escape, that Ellis “fought for

his life,” that the crimes required multiple perpetrators, and that no one tried to prevent the

shooting. (FAP at 8,25-26.) The appellate court stated:

“(S)tatements of facts not in evidence by the prosecuting attorney in

his argument to the jury constitutes misconduct.” {People v. Kirkes (1952) 39

Cal.2d 719, 724.) “Although prosecutors have wide latitude to draw

inferences from the evidence presented at trial, mischaracterizing the evidence

is misconduct.” {People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823.)

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prosecutor’s argument that Ellis was shot after Combs, that Ellis tried to

escape, and that Ellis fought with multiple perpetrators and was restrained.

Elias points out correctly that there was no direct evidence or expert testimony

regarding the sequence ofshots or signs ofstruggle. The scope ofpermissible

argument, however, is broader. “It is settled that a prosecutor is given wide

latitude during argument. The argument may be vigorous as long as it

amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can include reasonable

inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom. (Citations.)” {People v.

Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 567.) The prosecutor’s comments in this

instance were reasonable inferences from the evidence admitted. Ellis had

several abrasions on his neck and leg, one ofwhich was fresh. His belt was

undone, and his clothes were uncharacteristically disheveled. From these

facts, the prosecutor could reasonable infer that Ellis had been involved in a

struggle, tried to flee, and was restrained. Finally, eyewitnesses testified that

up to four people were with Chavez that night, so it is reasonable to infer that

they were also involved in the robbery and murder. Though Elias argues that

other inferences are also possible, the prosecution may argue its own

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1 interpretation of the evidence so long as it is reasonable. {People v.

Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1026.) 2

3 The second series of alleged misstatements identified by Elias reflect

the prosecutor’s argument that Elias planned the robbery and that Elias was

armed. Again, we find no misconduct. The evidence showed that Chavez and

his group were at the Palms for some time prior to the robbery. While there

was no direct evidence of a plan, the presence ofChavez and his group at the

bonfires prior to the robbery, the fact that their group was armed, and the

robbery itself give rise to the reasonable inference that the robbery was

planned rather than occurring spontaneously. While Elias contends that the

prosecution claimed he was personally armed, the prosecutor’s argument was

that “they took a loaded gun with them” to the Palms area. She did not

specifically identify Elias. Since Combs and Ellis were shot, and all

reasonable inferences point to a group consisting of at least Chavez and Elias

as the shooter or shooters, the prosecutor’s statement was a proper comment

on the record. {People v. Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 567.)

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13 We can discern no misconduct in the alleged misstatements identified

by Elias. In light of our conclusion, we need not consider whether Elias

forfeited his claims of error on appeal by failing to object or whether Elias’s

counsel was ineffective by failing to make such objection.

(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Chavez, et al.. No. D061946, slip op. at 33-35.)

Clearly established federal law provides that prosecutorial misconduct, in order to

constitute a federal due process violation, must be “‘ofsufficient significance to result in

the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.’” Greer v. Miller. 483 U.S. 756, 765

(1987), quoting United States v. Bagiev. 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). The misconduct must

be reviewed in the context of the entire trial. DeChristoforo. 416 U.S. at 643; see also

Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Improper argument does not, per

se, violate a defendant’s constitutional rights.”); Williams v. Borg. 139 F.3d 737, 744 (9th

Cir. 1998) (“The relevant question is whether the prosecutor’s comments so infected the

trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.”)

The record supports the finding by the state appellate court that the prosecutor did

not ask the jury to draw unreasonable inferences from facts not in evidence when she

argued the crimes were planned, that the defendants arrived with a loaded gun, that the

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1 victims were surrounded, that Combs was shot first and Ellis then tried to escape, that Ellis

fought for his life, and that the crimes required multiple perpetrators. As discussed in

Claim 1, a reasonable inference ofplanning could be drawn from the evidence that a group

ofteenage Hispanic males, like Petitioner, and which included Chavez, were either waiting

for the victims’ friends to leave the area or chasing them away around the time of the

crimes, and that the crimes occurred after everyone except the victims and the young

Hispanic males left the area. A reasonable inference could be drawn that more than one

teenager was required to rob and kill two young men who were capable of putting up a

fight, and that one perpetrator shot Combs in the back on the passenger side ofthe truck

while Ellis put up a struggle with another perpetrator on the driver’s side. That evidence,

coupled with the fact that the victims were shot in an isolated area, supports the inference

argued by the prosecutor that the defendants brought a loaded gun to the area, planned the

crime, and more than one defendant participated. With respect to Petitioner’s challenge to

the prosecutor’s statement that “no one tried to prevent the shootings” (FAP at 8), Petitioner

has never provided a record citation for that statement, either here (id.), or in the state

supreme (Lodgment No. 6 at 18-20) or appellate (Lodgment No. 3 at 24-28) courts, and it

does not appear in the record.

The state supreme court’s silent denial, as informed by the appellate court’s findings

and reasoning, ofthe aspect ofClaim 3 alleging that the prosecutor committed misconduct

when she argued facts not in evidence, is not based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts, and is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law which provides that the alleged misconduct must be “‘ofsufficient significance

to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.’” Greer, 483 U.S. at 765,

quoting Bagiev. 473 U.S. at 676; Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340.

With respect to Petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct by

appealing to the sympathy ofthe jury, the appellate court stated:

In her closing argument, the prosecutor described Combs and Ellis and

“young men who had come to San Diego to serve their country.” She also

referred to Ellis’s college pamphlet, arguing that “that’s the kind of guy he

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1 (was), trying to better himself, serve his country -(][)... (f) - go to college.”

The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection to the latter comment.

No objection was made to the former. Elias contends on appeal that the

prosecutor’s statement that Ellis and Combs “serve(d) their country” when

they were killed was an improper appeal to the jury’s sympathy. (See People

v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 1100, 1130.) In Kipp, the prosecutor argued to the

jury, during the guilt phase of a capital trial, that the jury should ‘“think for a

moment about what (murder) means. A living, breathing human being had all

ofthat taken away.’” {Id. at p. 1129.) The court held that “(t)he prosecutor’s

argument, inviting the jury to reflect on all that the victim had lost through her

death, was an appeal for sympathy for the victim, and therefore it was

improper ....” (Id. atp. 1130.)

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Here, the prosecutor’s statement that Combs and Ellis “serve(d) their

country” does not invite such an emotional response from the jury. A

prosecutor is not “required to discuss his view of the case in clinical or

detached detail.” {People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 463.) Such a mild

comment on the victims’ military service, which was relevant to a number of

issues in the case, does not improperly appeal to the jury’s sympathy and was

not misconduct.

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15 (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Chavez, et al.. No. D061946, slip op. at 35-36.)

The state court correctly observed that the fact that the victims were serving in the

military was relevant to the issue ofrobbery, as several witnesses testified that the victims

used their military identification cards to get on base earlier that evening, were always

required to show them to get on base, and were therefore in possession ofthem that night,

but they were not found on their bodies. The fact that they were in the military was also

relevant to the prosecution theory that it would have taken more than one teenager to rob

and kill two young Navy men. Although the prosecutor’s comment about the victims

serving their country when they were killed seems to have strayed somewhat from a

relevant comment on those issues, it was objectively reasonable for the state appellate court

to find that such a mild comment regarding relevant evidence did not improperly appeal to

the sympathy ofthe jury. There is, therefore, no basis to find that the comment “so infected

the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.”

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 643: see also Smith v. Phillips. 455 U.S. 209,219 (1982) (“The

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touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the

fairness ofthe trial, notthe culpability ofthe prosecutor.”) Even ifthe prosecutor’s remarks

could be read to seek the sympathy ofthe jury for the victims on the basis that they were

serving their country when they were murdered, in light ofthe mildness ofthe comment

and the relevance ofthe evidence, the comment did not infect the trial with unfairness. See

Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 n.12 (prosecutor’s argument did not deprive petitioner of a fair

trial where it “did not manipulate or misstate the evidence, nor did it implicate other

specific rights ofthe accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain silent.”)

The state court adjudication ofthis aspect of Claim 3 is objectively reasonable within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

With respect to Petitioner’s claim the prosecutor committed misconduct by

expressing an improper personal beliefin the defendants’ guilt, the appellate court stated:

The prosecutor also argued, in closing, that “(n)obody was there to

witness it. The witnesses are dead. But just as my heart is beating in my

chest, those two men stopped the heartbeats of Keith and Cliff.” Defense

counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s statement. Elias argues on appeal

that the prosecutor expressed an improper personal belief in Chavez’s and

Elias’s guilt.

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“A prosecutor may not express a personal opinion or beliefin the guilt

ofthe accused when there is a substantial danger that the jury will view the

comments as based on information other than evidence adduced at trial.”

{People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 447.) “The general rule is that

improper vouching for the strength of the prosecution’s case “‘involves an

attempt to bolster a witness by reference to facts outside the record.’”

(Citation.) Thus, it is misconduct for prosecutors to vouch for the strength of

their cases by invoking their personal prestige, reputation, or depth of

experience, or the prestige or reputation of their office, in support of it.

(Citations.) Specifically, a prosecutor’s reference to his or her own

experience, comparing a defendant’s case negatively to others the prosecutor

knows about or has tried, is improper. (Citation.) Nor may prosecutors offer

their personal opinions when they are based solely on their experience or on

other facts outside the record. (Citations.)” {People v. Huggins (2006) 38

Cal.4th 175, 206-07.)

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1 Elias argues that the context ofthe prosecutor’s statement, made after

the prosecutor presented her theory of how the crime occurred, created a

substantial risk that the jury interpreted the statement as being based on facts

outside the record. We disagree. While the prosecutor did vouch for her case,

neither the content nor the context ofthe prosecutor’s statement indicated to

the jury that her belief in Chavez’s and Elias’s guilt was based on anything

other than the facts admitted in evidence. The prosecutor repeatedly

referenced the facts and evidence in the record during her closing argument

and argued the prosecution’s view ofthe reasonable inferences to be drawn

therefrom. We discern no error or misconduct under these circumstances.

Again, in light of our conclusion. We need not address issues offorfeiture or

ineffective assistance of counsel.

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10 (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Chavez, et al.. No. D061946, slip op. at 36-37.)

In order to show that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for the strength of her

case, Petitioner must show the prosecutor placed “the prestige ofthe government” behind

her statement by personally assuring the strength of the prosecution’s case or suggesting

that she was in possession of additional information not presented at trial which supported

the government’s case. United States v. Ruiz. 710 F.3d 1077,1085 (9th Cir. 2013); United

States v. McChristian. 47 F.3d 1499, 1506 (9th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.

McKoy, 771 F.2d 1207, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The rule that a prosecutor may not

express his personal opinion ofthe defendant’s guilt or his belief in the credibility of a

witness is firmly established.”) Although the prosecutor vouched for the strength of her

case by presenting her personal opinion ofguilt, there is no indication in the record that the

jury may have believed she was knew of evidence that had not been presented at trial, as

opposed to arguing reasonable inferences from the evidence. See United States v.

Younger. 398 F.3d 1179,1190 (9th Cir. 2005) (“It is not misconduct for the prosecutor to

argue reasonable inferences based on the record.”), quoting United States v. Cabrera. 201

F.3d 1243, 1250 (9th Cir. 2000).

In addition, instructing the jury that the statements of counsel are not evidence can

“neutralize” any affect vouching may have. United States v. Potter. 616 F.2d 384,392 (9th

Cir. 1979). The jury here was instructed that: “Nothing the attorneys say is evidence. In

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1 their opening statements and closing arguments, the attorneys will discuss the case, but

their remarks are not evidence.” (RT 723.) In fact, the prosecutor began her opening

statement by saying:

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4 Now the court has instructed you what I say is not evidence. Opening

statement wasn’t evidence. This isn’t evidence, so ifI stand up her and I spin

some tale for you, you’re not to consider or speculate as to whether or not that

tale is true, because that’s not the facts for you to consider. [|] The only thing

for you to consider is anything that came out ofthe mouth of witnesses after

they took an oath to tell the truth. That’s it. You considerthe facts. You have

the physical evidence thatwas admitted. That’s it. So what I say doesn’t count.

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9 (RT 752.)

10 Clearly established federal law provides for a presumption that jurors follow their

instructions. See Francis v. Franklin. 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985) (“The Court presumes

that jurors, conscious ofthe gravity oftheir task, attend closely the particular language of

the trial court’s instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, makes sense of,

and follow the instructions given them.”) That presumption may be overcome only where

there is “a strong likelihood that the effect of the [error] would be devastating to the

defendant.” Greer. 483 U.S. at 766 n.8.

There is no indication here that the jury believed the prosecutor had placed the

prestige of the government behind her statement that she believed in her heart that the

defendants were guilty, or that her statement was based on evidence which was not

admitted at trial. She in fact informed the jury at the beginning of his closing argument

that she had no intention of doing so, and that if it appeared as if she had they were to

ignore her. In addition, the jury was instructed that anything the prosecutor said was not

evidence but merely a comment on the evidence. Petitioner has not overcome the

presumption that the jury followed that instruction because he has not shown there is “a

strong likelihood that the effect of the [prosecutor’s statement] would be devastating” to

his case should the jury have ignored their instructions. Greer. 483 U.S. at 766 n.8. The

Court finds that the state court adjudication of this aspect of Claim 3 is objectively

reasonable within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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1 In Petitioner’s final allegation ofprosecutorial misconduct he alleges the prosecutor

disparaged the defense expert witness. The appellate court stated:

The prosecutor addressed the defense expert witness, Lisa Dimeo, in

closing argument as follows: “And I have to comment on the expert. How

can I not?” You can hire somebody and have them come in here and say

anything.” Defense counsel objected but was overruled. Elias contends that

the prosecutor’s comments improperly implied that defense counsel or the

expert improperly fabricated evidence.

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“(C)ounsel is free to remind the jurors that a paid witness may

accordingly be biased and is also allowed to argue, from the evidence, that a

witnesses’ testimony is unbelievable, unsound, or even a patent Tie.’

(Citations.)” {People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 162.) However, “(i)t is

generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel offabricating

a defense (citations), or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury

(citation). Such attacks on counsel’s credibility risk focusing the jury’s

attention on irrelevant matters and diverting the prosecution from its proper

role of commenting on the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences

therefore. (Citations.)” {People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846.)

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15 Although we are reluctant to definitively declare error, given the mild

and fleeting nature ofthe prosecutor’s remark, it is possible that a juror could

reasonably interpret the statement “(y)ou can hire somebody and have them

come in here and say anything” as an implicit attack on the credibility of

counsel, who hired the expert, rather than a critique based on the evidence. If

it was error, however, it was harmless given the nature of the remark, the

context in the prosecution’s closing statement, the relative unimportance of

the defense expert’s testimony (see fn. 3, ante), and the substantial evidence

ofChavez and Elias’s guilt introduced at trial. It is not “reasonably probable

that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached

in the absence ofthe error.” (See Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)

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(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Chavez, et al.. No. D061946, slip op. at 37-38.)

Reviewing the alleged misconduct in the context ofthe entire trial as the Court must,

DeChristoforo. 416 U.S. at 643, the prosecutor’s argument was a proper observation that

the defense expert was a paid witness. See United States v. Tucker. 641 F.3d 1110, 1120-

21 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A prosecutor may express doubt about the veracity of a witness’s

testimony (and) may even go so far as to label... testimony a fabrication.”) In any case,

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1 the expert’s testimony that the body appeared to have been rolled over a few minutes to a

few hours afterthe victim had been shot in the head because the pool ofblood on the ground

was not next to his body, was based on her review ofthe photographs taken at the scene

(RT 373, 677-79), which were admitted into evidence (RT 661-62), and was therefore

something the jury could have observed for themselves. Also, the defense expert admitted

on cross-examination that she could not tell how long the body had lied on the ground

before it was rolled over. (RT 683.)

The record supports the state appellate court’s observation that the prosecutor’s

attack on the credibility ofthe defense expert was very modest. The alleged misconduct is

not ‘“ofsufficient significance to result in the denial ofthe defendant’s right to a fairtrial.’”

Greer, 483 U.S. at 765 (1987), quoting Bagiev, 473 U.S. at 676; see also Thompson, 74

F.3d at 1576 (“Improper argument does not, per se, violate a defendant’s constitutional

rights.”); Williams. 139 F.3d at 744 (“The relevant question is whether the prosecutor’s

comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial

of due process.”) The Court finds that the state court adjudication ofthis aspect ofClaim

3 is objectively reasonable within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

In sum, each ofthe prosecutor’s challenged statements, when reviewed in the context

of the entire trial, which includes a presumption the jury followed their instruction that

nothing the attorneys say is evidence, was not ‘“ofsufficient significance to result in the

denial ofthe defendant’s right to a fair trial.’” Greer, 483 U.S. at 765, quoting Bagiev. 473

U.S. at 676; DeChristoforo. 416 U.S. at 643. The Court finds that the silent denial ofthis

claim by the state supreme court, as informed by the appellate court’s reasoning and

findings, did not involve an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law providing for a presumption that jurors follow their instructions and that

prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of a federal due process violation only where it

denies a defendant the right to a fair trial. Andrade. 538 U.S. at 75-76; Williams. 529 U.S.

at 405-07; see also Richter, 562 U.S. at 103 (“As a condition for obtaining habeas relief

from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim

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1 being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement.”) The Court also finds that the state court adjudication of Claim 3 is not

based on an unreasonable determination ofthe facts in light ofthe evidence presented in

the state court proceedings. Miller-El. 537 U.S. at 340.

In addition, assuming Petitioner could demonstrate a federal due process violation

arising from any ofthe prosecutor’s statements, the Court finds any error to be harmless.

Fields v. Woodford. 309 F.3d 1095, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002) (“If prosecutorial misconduct is

established, and it was constitutional error, we then apply the Brecht harmless error test.”),

citing Brecht v. Abrahamson. 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993) (holding that federal habeas relief

is available for an alleged constitutional error only if“in light ofthe record as a whole” the

error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury verdict.”)

The Court must determine whether it is “in grave doubt about the likely effect of’ any error

arising from the prosecutor’s statements before the Brecht standard is satisfied. Padilla v.

Terhune. 309 F.3d 614, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S.

432, 435 (1995); see also Kotteakos v. United States. 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) (“[I]f one

cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the

erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the

error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected.”)

Assuming the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for the strength ofher

case, appealing to the sympathy of the jury, expressing her personal opinion of guilt, or

denigrating the defense expert, those errors are harmless. The prosecutor herself extolled

the jury “not to consider or speculate as to whether or not [any tale I spin] is true,” that

“what I say doesn’t count,” and to consider only the testimony and physical evidence

admitted at trial. (RT 752.) The trial judge instructed the jury that “[njothing that the

attorneys say is evidence,” and “[i]n their opening statements and closing arguments, the

attorneys will discuss the case, but their remarks are not evidence.” (RT 723.) For those

reasons, and because as set forth above the statements were by their nature very mild, it

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1 appears unlikely the jury was influenced by the prosecutor’s remarks. “[I]n light of the

record as a whole” it does not appear the alleged errors had a “substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury verdict.” Brecht. 507 U.S. at 638. The Court is

not “in grave doubt about the likely effect of’ any error arising from the prosecutor’s

statements. O’Neal. 513 U.S. at 435. The Court therefore recommends habeas relief be

denied as to Claim 3.

D. Claim 4

Petitioner alleges in his final claim that his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights were violated because the trial court erred in instructing the jury that evidence ofhis

possession ofstolen property by itselfis not sufficient to convict him ofmurder, but such

evidence when coupled by “slight” supporting evidence could support a murder conviction.

(FAP at 9,29-30.) He argues the jurors likely convicted him under this instruction because

there was only slight evidence ofhis guilt, consisting ofhis DNA on a cigarette butt found

at the scene, and his DNA and fingerprints in the stolen truck. (Id.)

Respondent answers that although it was error under state law to give the instruction,

which is a modified version of CALCRIM No. 376, the state court adjudication of the

claim, on the basis that any error is harmless, is neither contrary to, nor involves an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Ans. Mem. at 25-28.)

Respondent also argues that any error is harmless because the instruction did not have a

substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. (Id.)

Petitioner presented this claim to the state appellate and supreme courts on direct

appeal as a federal constitutional claim. (Lodgment No. 6 at 22-23; Lodgment No. 3 at 34-

39.) The state supreme court summarily denied the claim without citation of authority or

a statement of reasoning. (Lodgment No. 7.) The claim was denied on the merits in a

written opinion by the state appellate court. (Lodgment No. 5.) For the same reasons set

forth above with respect to Claim 1, the court will look through the silent denial ofthis

claim by the state supreme court and apply the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to the

appellate court opinion. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-06.

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The appellate court stated:

Chavez and Elias argue that it was error for the court to refer to

“murder” in this instruction because the legal principle embodied by

CALCRIM No. 376 applies only to theft-based offenses such as robbery,

burglary, or receiving stolen property. (See People v. McFarland (1962) 58

Cal.2d 748, 755.) In People v. Barker (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1166, this court

held that it was error to include the crime ofmurder in the prior pattern jury

instruction based on this principle (CALJIC No. 2.15) because the same

natural and logical inferences that link the possession ofstolen property with

theft-based offenses do not apply in the same way to the crime of murder.

(Barker, at pp. 1175-1176; see People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 248,

249 (“We find Barker persuasive and hold that the trial court’s application of

CALJIC No. 2.15 to nontheft offenses like rape or murder as improper.”).)

The Attorney General concedes that the trial court here erred.

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11 The issue presented is thus whether the trial court’s error was

prejudicial. An instructional error is prejudicial if, “‘after an examination of

the entire cause, including the evidence,’ (the reviewing court) is of the

‘opinion’ that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the

appealing party would have been reached in the absence ofthe error.” (People

v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,836 (Watson); see People v. Gamache (2010)

48 Cal.4th 347, 376 (holding that Watson applies to analogous instructional

error).) “The Watson standard provides that an error is harmless unless the

appellant shows it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the

appellant would have been reached had the error not occurred.” (People v.

Harden (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 848, 859.)

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19 Here, Chavez and Elias argue that instructing the jury with the modified

version ofCALCRIM No. 376 lowered the prosecution’s burden ofproof and

provided an improper evidentiary pinpoint instruction that was prejudicial

given the evidence presented at trial. Elias further argues that this instruction

was prejudicial because his possession of stolen property was allegedly

unclear.

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In view of the totality of the instructions provided, we disagree with

Chavez and Elias’s contention that the instruction’s reference to “slight

corroborating evidence” lowered the prosecution’s burden ofproof. As given,

the instruction itself contained the following admonition directly after it

reference to “slight corroboration evidence”: “Remember that you may not

convict the defendant of any crime unless you are convinced that each fact

essential to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty ofthat crime has been

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1 proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Any confusion the jury may have had

was resolved promptly by that clear and express statement ofthe prosecution’s

burden in the instruction itself. Moreover, the court fully and correctly

instructed the jury regarding the elements of the charged offenses and the

prosecution’s burden ofproofin other instructions. Even without the express

admonition at the close ofCALCRIM No. 376, those instructions alone were

sufficient to ensure that the jury would not misapply the burden of proof in

this case. {People v. Barker, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1177 (“we can find

no possibility such instruction (i.e., CALJIC No. 2.15) suggested that the jury

need not find all the statutory elements ofmurder had been proven beyond a

reasonable doubt”); People v. Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 376.)

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9 The instruction’s specific reference to possession of stolen property,

and the inferences that “may” be drawn therefrom, also was not prejudicial

error. Additional instructions provided the jury with the appropriate weight

to be placed on circumstantial evidence, the scope and effect of permissible

inferences from the evidence, and the responsibility ofthe jury to weigh the

evidence independently. We find it unlikely that the jury ignored these

additional instructions in favor ofthe modified version ofCALCRIM No. 376

given here. [Footnote omitted] CALCRIM No. 376 instructs the jury that

they “may” find certain evidence sufficient to find a defendant guilty. It does

not contradict the additional instructions that place bounds on the jury’s

consideration of evidence. Chavez’s reliance on authority where a court gave

expressly inconsistent or erroneously mandatory instructions is therefore

unpersuasive. (See LeMons v. Regents ofUniversity ofCalifornia (1978) 21

Cal.3d 869, 878; Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S. 307, 322.)

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19 We likewise find unpersuasive Elias’s argument that the court’s use of

CALCRIM No. 376 was prejudicial because the evidence ofhis “possession”

ofthe truck was uncertain. In People v. Rubio (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 757, the

court held that when a defendant’s possession ofstolen property was “an open

question,” CALJIC No. 2.15 should not be used because it “assumed that the

evidence established, without dispute, defendant’s possession of stolen

property.” {Rubio, at p. 768.) At the time, however, CALJIC No. 2.15 was

materially different than the instruction given here. CALJIC No. 2.15 stated:

“‘The mere fact that a person was in conscious possession ofrecently stolen

property is not enough to justify his conviction ofthe crime charged . . . .’”

{Rubio, at p. 767.) By contrast, CALCRIM No. 376 phrases the predicate

findings conditionally and emphasizes the jury’s responsibility for any such

findings: “Ifyou conclude that he defendant knew (he) possessed property and

you conclude that the property had in fact been recently (stolen)....” (Italics

added.) The concerns expressed in Rubio and, later, in People v. Morris

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1 (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1,40-41, thus have no application to the instruction at issue

here. 2

3 In light of the substantial circumstantial evidence admitted at trial

tending to prove Chavez and Elias’s guilt, the forensic evidence tying Chavez

and Elias to the crime scene and the victims, and the foregoing discussion of

the potential effects ofthe trial court’s erroneous use ofCALCRIM No. 376

here, we conclude it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to

Chavez and Elias would have been reached in the absence ofthis instruction

error. (See Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) Although the court’s

application of CALCRIM No. 376 to the crime of murder was error, as the

Attorney General concedes, the error was harmless in this case.

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(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Chavez, et al.. No. D061946, slip op. at 30-33.)

Clearly established federal law provides that a defective reasonable doubt instruction

“vitiates all the jury’s findings” and is structural error, not amenable to harmless error

analysis. Sullivan v. Louisiana. 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993); Byrd v. Lewis. 566 F.3d 855,

862 (9th Cir. 2009). Instructional errors which do not categorically negate all the jury’s

findings are reviewed for harmless error. Hedgpeth v. Pulido. 555 U.S. 57, 61 (2008);

Neder v. United States. 527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999).

Here, the jury was given a proper reasonable doubt instruction. (RT 722.) The trial

judge repeatedly instructed the jury that the prosecution bore the burden ofproofbeyond a

reasonable doubt. (RT 722, 729, 730, 732, 736, 742, 743, 744, 745, 748, 751.) The

prosecutor and defense counsel repeatedly reminded the jury during closing argument that

the prosecution had the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (RT 767, 787, 794,

795, 801, 804, 805, 806, 812, 813, 820, 821, 822, 823, 826.) In fact, the challenged

instruction was immediately followed by: “Remember that you may not convict the

defendant of any crime unless you are convinced that each fact essential to the conclusion

that the defendant is guilty ofthat crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (RT

732.) Thus, to the extent the challenged instruction, which the parties admit was error

under state law, rises to the level of a federal constitutional violation, it is subject to

harmless error analysis. Pulido, 555 U.S. at 61.

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In order for the challenged jury instruction to rise to the level of a federal

constitutional violation, Petitioner must demonstrate that the instruction “so infected the

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle v. McGuire. 502 U.S.

62, 72 (1991), quoting Cupp v. Naughten. 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). In addition, “[i]t is

well established that the instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must be

considered in the context ofthe instructions as a whole and the trial record.” McGuire, 502

U.S. at 72, quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147.

The state court correctly observed thatthe jury was properly instructed on reasonable

doubt, and that even if the challenged instruction had the potential for confusion, that

potential went unrealized because the instruction was immediately followed by the

admonition: “Remember that you may not convict the defendant of any crime unless you

are convinced that each fact essential to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty ofthat

crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (RT 732.) In light of those

instructions, and the fact that the jury was repeatedly reminded ofthe beyond a reasonable

doubt requirement, there is no basis to find that challenged instruction “so infected the

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” McGuire. 502 U.S. at 72,

quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147: see also Franklin. 471 U.S. at 324 n.9 (“The Court presumes

that jurors, conscious ofthe gravity oftheir task, attend closely the particular language of

the trial court’s instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, makes sense of,

and follow the instructions given them.”) In orderto overcome that presumption, Petitioner

must show “a strong likelihood that the effect ofthe [error] would be devastating to the

defendant.” Greer, 483 U.S. at 766 n.8. Petitioner has not made such a showing with

respect to the challenged instruction because the jury was repeatedly reminded of the

reasonable doubt instructions by the trial judge and the attorneys, including immediately

following the instruction. Accordingly, the Court findsthat the state-law instructional error

did not rise to the level of a federal constitutional error.

However, clearly established federal law provides that when a state court finds a

federal constitutional violation, the state court is required to determine whether the error is

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harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)

(holding “that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the [state] court

must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”)

Deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply where the state court uses a wrong

legal standard. Wade v. Terhune. 202 F.3d 1190,1195 (9th Cir. 2000).

As quoted above, the state court found that giving the challenged instruction was

error under state law, and went on to find the error harmless because “it is not reasonably

probable that a result more favorable to Chavez and Elias would have been reached in the

absence ofthis instruction error.” (LodgmentNo. 5, People v. Chavez, et al.. No. D061946,

slip op. at 33.) To the extent the challenged instruction resulted in a federal constitutional

error, the application by the state court of a harmless error test different than the Chapman

standard would preclude this Court from applying the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Wade, 202 F.3d at 1195. However, as discussed above, the instruction did not amount to

federal constitutional error. Accordingly, the Court finds that the state court adjudication

of this claim is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law which providesthat a federal due process violation only arises when

the challenged instruction “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates

due process.” McGuire. 502 U.S. at 72, quoting Cupp. 414 U.S. at 147. The Court also

finds that the state court adjudication of this claim does not involve an unreasonable

determination ofthe facts in light ofthe evidence presented in the state court proceedings.

Miller-El. 537 U.S. at 340.

Finally, even were the courtto find the instructional error rose to the level ofa federal

constitutional violation and therefore the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) do not apply,

or Petitioner could otherwise satisfy those provisions, habeas relief is still unavailable if

the error is harmless. Pulido, 555 U.S. at 61; Neder. 527 U.S. at 12. The instruction did

not directly address the burden ofproof, which the jury was repeatedly instructed upon by

the judge and reminded of by the attorneys. In fact, it instructed the jury that they could

not convict the defendants of murder based solely on their possession ofrecently stolen

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property, and told them that ifthey found the defendants possessed recently stolen property

they were required to consider “how, where, and when the defendant possessed the

property, along with any other relevant circumstancestending to prove his guilt ofmurder.”

(RT 731-32.) And the instruction was immediately followed by: “Remember that you may

not convict the defendant of any crime unless you are convinced that each fact essential to

the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of that crime has been proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.” (RT 732.)

Because the instruction did not mislead the jury regarding the burden of proof, and

“in light of the record as a whole” which includes substantial evidence supporting the

convictions, the Court finds that the challenged jury instruction did not have a “substantial

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury verdict.” Brecht. 507 U.S. at 638.

The Court is not “in grave doubt about the likely effect of’ any error arising from the

challenged instruction. O’Neal. 513 U.S. at 435.

The Court finds that the state court adjudication ofClaim 4 is objectively reasonable

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and that even if Petitioner could satisfy that

standard, any error is harmless. The Court therefore recommends denying habeas relief

with respect to Claim 4.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all ofthe foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2)

directing that Judgment be entered denying the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than 30 days from the issuance ofthis Order, any

party to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all

parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than ten days after being served with the

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections with the specified time

may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal ofthe Court’s order. See Turner v.

Inez v. Ylst 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th

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Duncan. 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998};

Cir. 1991).

DATED: 3fa// 7

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8 KAREN S. CRAWFORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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