Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-02437/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-02437-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KRL, a California General

Partnership, ROLAND WOMACK, et

al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RUSSELL MOORE, et al.,

Defendants. 

 CIV-S-99-2437 DFL DAD

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND

ORDER

Plaintiffs are KRL, a California general partnership, and

members of the Womack family. Their principal claim is that

defendants Russell Moore, David J. Irey, Todd D. Riebe, and Ron

Hall violated the Fourth Amendment during a criminal

investigation into the removal and alleged concealment of an

underground gasoline storage tank (“UST”). Plaintiffs and

defendants now move for reconsideration of the portions of the

court’s March 3, 2006 order relating to the warrants issued and

executed in 1999 on plaintiffs’ Ridge Road property. For the

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 The Ninth Circuit opinion states, “The warrant authorized 1

the seizure of a broad range of documents created since

January 1, 1995, and was executed by Moore, Hall, and others

beginning on January 11, 1999. KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105,

1109 (9th Cir. 2004).

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reasons stated below, the court DENIES both parties’ motions. 

I.

The facts relevant to the 1999 Ridge Road searches are as

follows. In June 1998, defendant Ron Hall (“Hall”), an

investigator with the District Attorney’s Office, began the DA’s

investigation into Robert Womack’s alleged concealment of the

UST. (Pls.’ Additional Facts (“PAF”) ¶ 13.) Shortly afterwards,

David Irey (“Irey”), a San Joaquin County deputy DA, began to

assist with the investigation. (Id. ¶ 15.) Defendant

California Highway Patrol Officer Russell Moore (“Moore”) joined

the investigation team in October 1998. (Id. ¶ 30.) 

On January 11, 1999, Moore submitted an affidavit to obtain

a search warrant for Ridge Road. (Moore Statement of Undisputed

Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 40.) Before Moore submitted the affidavit, Irey

reviewed it, as did defendant Todd Riebe (“Riebe”), who had been

sworn in that very day as the new Amador County District

Attorney. (PAF ¶ 57.)

The warrant authorized seizure of numerous documents dated

from January 1, 1995 to the present. (Moore Mot. Ex. 22.) The

court’s March 3, 2006 order reiterates the facts set forth in the

Ninth Circuit order and states that Moore and Irey executed the

warrant on January 11, 1999. (3/3/2006 Order at 4.) However, 1

defendants now point out that the warrant issued on January 11

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was actually executed on the morning of January 13, 1999. 

(Defs.’ Mot. at 3.) During that search, Moore and Irey

discovered additional items that exceeded the scope of the

warrant. (Riebe & Hall (“R&H”) SUF ¶ 41.) Therefore, they

interrupted the search and obtained a broader warrant allowing

them to seize documents dating back to 1990. (Moore MSJ Ex. 22.) 

In the original complaint, plaintiffs allege that the 1999

Ridge Road warrants were facially invalid and executed beyond

their scope. In 2002, the court denied summary judgment as to

Riebe, Hall, and Irey on the facial invalidity claim. (1/17/2002

Order at 10.) On the overbroad execution claim, the court denied

summary judgment as to Hall, but granted summary judgment as to

Irey and Riebe. (Id. at 8.) 

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Riebe, Hall, and Irey

were protected by absolute immunity for the 1999 Ridge Road

searches to the extent the search sought evidence to support the

prosecution of the pending indictment against Womack. KRL, 384

F.3d at 1112-13. However, Riebe, Hall, and Irey were not

protected by absolute immunity to the extent the searches sought

evidence of new crimes. Id. at 1114. 

The Ninth Circuit also held that Riebe was protected by

qualified immunity for his role in approving the warrant issued

on January 11. Id. at 1116-17. However, the court found that

Hall did not have qualified immunity because: (1) in the court’s

understanding, Hall was the lead investigator; and (2) Hall

unreasonably sought to broaden the warrant’s scope back to 1990

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in the January 13 afternoon search. Id. at 1117. 

Thus, remaining before the court on remand were the Fourth

Amendment claims against Hall, Irey, and Moore for the 1999 Ridge

Road searches to the extent that the searches sought evidence of

new offenses. More specifically, the facial invalidity claim

remained as to Hall, Irey, and Moore, and the overbroad execution

claim remained as to Hall and Moore. The court’s March 3, 2006

order denied summary judgment as to Hall, Irey, and Moore on the

facial invalidity claim and granted summary judgment as to Hall

and Moore on the overbroad execution claim. (3/3/2006 Order at

36.) 

II.

A. Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration

Reconsideration is appropriate if the court: “(1) is

presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear

error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if

there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School Dist.

No. 13, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th

Cir. 1993). “Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and are

not the place for parties to make new arguments not raised in

their original briefs or to ask the Court to simply rethink what

it has already thought.” United States v. Bond, No. CR 03-0974-

PHX-GDC, 2006 WL 544524 at *3 (D.Ariz. March 6, 2006) (citing

N.W. Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918,

925-26 (9th Cir. 1988)).

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Defendants ask the court to reconsider and clarify its March

3 ruling because the warrant issued on January 11, 1999 was

executed on January 13, rather than January 11 as stated in the

order. They claim that, in light of this factual

misunderstanding, all three moving defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity for the narrower warrant issued on January 11. 

To hold otherwise would allegedly “impose a higher standard of

responsibility on Moore, Irey, and Hall than the Ninth Circuit

has imposed on Riebe for performing exactly the same function

with respect to [the] same search.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 5.) 

However, defendants are merely taking advantage of a minor and

irrelevant factual misunderstanding to reiterate an identical

argument that the court already rejected on summary judgment. 

The language in the March 3, 2006 order makes clear that

when the court discusses the “January 11 warrant,” it is

referring to the narrower of the two 1999 Ridge Road warrants

that allowed for seizure of documents dating back to 1995. (See

3/3/2006 Order at 4.) When the court discusses the “January 13

warrant,” it clearly intends to refer to the broader warrant that

allowed for seizure of documents dating back to 1990. (See id.

at 4-5.) To the extent that the March 3, 2006 order mislabeled

the warrants, this order shall serve as a correction. 

With regard to the narrower Ridge Road warrant, the court

found that Hall, Irey, and Moore were not entitled to qualified

immunity because a reasonable jury could infer that they were

lead investigators for that search. (Id. at 19.) Defendants

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 Defendants argue in their reply brief that, even if 2

defendants were lead investigators, they still were entitled to

qualified immunity for the warrant issued on January 11 if they

only took items within the scope of the warrant. (Defs.’ Reply

at 3.) They support this argument by asserting that “the Ninth

Circuit held that an official who reviewed the warrant, which

would include any lead investigating officer, could have

reasonably believed that it showed probable cause to justify

seizure of KRL documents back to 1995.” (Id.) However,

defendants misread the Ninth Circuit decision. The Ninth Circuit

recognized that the warrant issued on January 11 still lacked

probable cause. KRL, 384 F.3d at 1116. It only held that Riebe

was entitled to qualified immunity because the warrant was not

“so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official

belief in its existence unreasonable.” Id. However, the court

specifically distinguished Hall from Riebe on the ground that

lead investigators have a greater responsibility to ensure that a

warrant is not defective. Id. at 1117. While a reviewing

official could reasonably believe probable cause existed, an

official who was also a lead investigator could not.

Defendants’ argument could be relevant to the overbroad

execution claim. If defendants only seized documents dating back

to 1995 when executing the warrant issued on January 11, they

would not be liable for overbroad execution. However, the court

has already granted summary judgment in favor of defendants Irey,

Hall and Moore on that claim. 

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have presented no new facts to justify reconsideration of this

finding. Accordingly, the court denies defendants’ motion for 2

reconsideration. 

B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration

Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the section of the March

3, 2006 order granting summary judgment to Moore and Hall on the

overbroad execution claim for the 1999 Ridge Road searches. 

(Pls.’ Mot. at 4.) Regarding Hall, the order states that

“plaintiffs fail[ed] to cite any evidence that Hall actually

seized documents predating 1990. At best, the evidence cited by

plaintiffs demonstrates that defendants removed a tax return from

1989. However, that return was dated April 15, 1990, making its

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seizure valid under the terms of the warrant.” (3/3/2006 Order

at 22-23.) Because plaintiffs cited the same evidence for Moore

as they did for Hall, the court also granted Moore’s motion for

summary judgment on the overbroad execution claim. (Id. at 23.) 

Plaintiffs now assert that “the [c]ourt did not consider

material facts and evidence that [p]laintiffs presented to the

[c]ourt in their [o]pposition papers to Moore and Hall’s summary

judgment motions on this issue.” (Pls.’ Mot. at 4.) 

Specifically, they cite to Robert Womack’s declaration and the

Return to Search Warrant that lists the items seized during the

search. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiffs also claim that the court

ignored the fact that their overbroad execution claim is based

upon Moore and Hall’s illegal seizure of the Womack’s firearms

and mail. (Id. at 7-8.) As discussed below, plaintiffs

assertions are without merit. 

1. Womack’s Declaration and the Return to Search Warrant

Robert Womack’s declaration stated that “KRL Partnership

financial and tax records were maintained at KRL’s office at

Ridge Road. Those records covered the time period from

approximately 1989 to October 1998, for all of the financial

transactions, income and expenses of the KRL Partnership.” 

(Womack Decl. ¶ 4.) Womack also stated that “[d]uring the

searches conducted by [d]efendants of the Ridge Road property . .

. [d]efendants removed . . . almost all of the originals of the

KRL Partnership’s financial and tax records in plaintiffs’

possession.” (Id. ¶ 5.) 

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In addition, plaintiffs point out that the Return to Search

Warrant listing the items seized from Ridge Road, cites “Tax

Returns for ‘1989’ – Extensions dated 4-15-90.” (Moyer Decl. Ex.

2.) It also itemizes other seized documents, such as

miscellaneous papers and bills, but does not note the date of

those documents. (Id.)

This evidence does not create a disputed issue of material

fact. Womack’s statement that documents from “approximately

1989” were seized apparently refers to the 1989 tax return. 

However, a tax return for the calendar year 1989 could not have

been dated prior to 1990. Even if, for some reason, the tax

return was completed and filed prematurely, the officers would be

entitled to qualified immunity on this particular issue because a

reasonable officer could have concluded that a tax return for one

calendar year is actually prepared and filed by April 15 of the

following year. 

Womack’s additional statement that undated documents were

seized also does not present a factual dispute. The mere fact

that the documents were undated does not demonstrate that the

documents predated 1990. Plaintiffs argue for the first time in

their reply brief that defendants had a duty to identify the

dates in the Return to Search Warrant. (Pls.’ Reply at 3; see

also Pls.’ Corrected Opp’n to Moore’s MSJ at 25-26; Pls.’

Corrected Opp’n to R&H’s MSJ at 24-27.) Plaintiffs assert that a

jury could reasonably infer that defendants failed to list the

dates deliberately because the documents exceeded the scope of

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that arguments cannot be raised for the first time on a motion

for reconsideration. (See Pls.’ Reply at 4.)

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the warrant. (Pls.’ Reply at 3.) Because plaintiffs allegedly

engaged in wrongdoing, plaintiffs cite inapplicable California

law to assert that the burden of proof then shifted to defendants

to prove the documents did not predate 1990. (Id. (citing

Galanek v. Wismar, 68 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1426 (1999))) 

Leaving aside the weaknesses in plaintiffs’ reasoning,

plaintiffs’ argument fails because it was not raised in their

original briefs. N.W. Acceptance Corp., 841 F.2d at 925-26.3

Accordingly, the court denies plaintiffs’ motion for

reconsideration to the extent they rely on this new argument. 

2. Seizure of Firearms and Mail

Plaintiffs also claim that the court ignored the fact that

their overbroad execution claim is also based upon Moore and

Hall’s alleged illegal seizure of the Womack’s firearms and mail. 

(Pls.’ Mot. at 7-8.) There are several reasons why this argument

fails. 

First, plaintiffs did not properly raise these issues when

opposing defendants’ summary judgment motions. Plaintiffs

alleged in the fact section of their oppositions that “the

executing officers also knowingly seized other property that was

outside the scope of the warrant such as numerous hunting rifles

and the Womacks’ mail including correspondence from the Womacks’

attorney which was never returned.” (Opp’n to R&H MSJ at 11,

Opp’n to Moore MSJ at 11.) However, plaintiffs failed to address

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these allegations in their legal analysis. Plaintiffs only

addressed Hall and Moore’s alleged seizure of documents predating

1990 and claimed that there was evidence to prove that defendants

seized pre-1990 documents, thus justifying the overbroad

execution claim. (Opp’n to R&H Mot. at 24-27; Opp’n to Moore MSJ

at 25-26.) Plaintiffs did not argue that defendants were also

liable for overbroad execution because they seized weapons and

correspondence. It is not the court’s job to create legal

arguments for the plaintiffs based on facts raised only in

plaintiffs’ statement of facts. 

Second, the court already disposed of the firearms issue as

to Hall, Riebe, and Irey in its January 15, 2002 order. The

order stated, “Hall, Riebe, and Irey are all entitled to summary

judgment on plaintiffs’ fourth amendment claim based on the

illegal seizure of firearms at Ridge Road. Plaintiffs have not

demonstrated that Riebe and Irey participated in the firearms’

seizure and failed to respond to Hall’s argument that the seizure

was authorized by Cal. Penal Code § 12021.” (1/15/2002 Order at

17.) Plaintiffs still have not addressed the authority of

section 12021, and they have presented no reason why the court

should reconsider its prior ruling. 

For these reasons, the court denies plaintiffs’ motion for

reconsideration on this issue. 

///

///

///

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III.

For the reasons stated above, the court DENIES both

defendants’ and plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 6/26/2006

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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