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Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit ____________ 

No. 23-50662 

____________ 

U.S. Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee of the 

Tiki Series IV Trust, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Jerry K. Walden, Jr., also known as Jerry K. Walden; 

Tamatha Walden, 

Defendants—Appellants. 

______________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas 

USDC No. 1:21-CV-1188 

______________________________ 

Before Clement, Graves, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.

James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge: 

An entity that owns and holds a loan agreement, including its note and 

the beneficiary interest in the security instrument, sought to foreclose on a 

property after borrowers failed to make required payments on the note; this 

court entered a judgment for non-judicial foreclosure. Below, the district 

court denied the borrowers’ motion for extension of time, adopted the 

magistrate judge’s report recommending that summary judgment be entered 

against the borrowers, entered a declaratory judgment, and denied the 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

December 20, 2024 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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No. 23-50662 

2 

borrowers’ motion for an altered judgment, which was stylized as a motion 

for a new trial. The borrowers challenged the district court’s orders, alleging 

abuse of discretion and plain error. We conclude that the district court did 

not abuse its discretion but did err in finding that the entity did not manifest 

an unequivocal intent to abandon acceleration. Thus, we AFFIRM in part, 

REVERSE in part, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

BACKGROUND 

On June 15, 2004, Jerry and Tamatha Walden received real property 

located at 1017 Burleson Street, San Marcos, Texas (the Property) via a 

Warranty Deed with a Vendor’s Lien.1

 Years later, in 2008, the Waldens 

executed a $316,800 Texas Home Equity Note with a 5.5% annual interest 

rate payable to Nationstar Mortgage LLC. This Note included a 

corresponding Texas Home Equity Security Instrument2

 that granted 

Nationstar, the named beneficiary, a security interest in the Property. 

Together, the Note and the Security Instrument made up the Loan 

Agreement. 

The Loan Agreement provided that (1) the Waldens were required to 

pay the Note’s principal and interest when due; and (2) that if they failed to 

do so, or they failed to comply with any of the covenants and conditions of 

the Security Instrument, the lender could enforce the Security Instrument by 

selling the Property according to the law and with the provisions set out in 

the Loan Agreement.

_____________________ 

1

 This document was recorded in the Official Public Records of Hays County, 

Texas on June 16, 2004, as Document No. 04017063. 

2

 This document was recorded in the Official Public Records of Hays County, 

Texas on April 18, 2008, as Document No. 2008-80010245. 

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No. 23-50662 

3 

In 2008, Nationstar assigned the Loan Agreement to the Federal 

National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). Fannie Mae then assigned the 

Loan Agreement to MTGLQ Investors, L.P. and recorded the transfer on 

May 18, 2017. After the Waldens failed to pay the amount they owed on the 

Loan Agreement, MTGLQ served a Notice of Acceleration on January 30, 

2018. 

Then, in 2019, MTGLQ filed suit. In 2020, the district court entered 

its final judgment and an order authorizing the non-judicial foreclosure of the 

Property. The Waldens appealed the district court’s judgment, which this 

court affirmed. MTGLQ Invs., L.P. v. Walden, 853 F. App’x 957 (5th Cir. 

2021) (per curiam), opinion withdrawn and superseded on denial of reh’g, No. 

20-50944, 2021 WL 4888870 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 2021) (per curiam). 

While the appeal was pending, MTGLQ assigned the Loan 

Agreement to U.S. Bank.3

 U.S. Bank presently owns and holds the Loan 

Agreement, including the Note and its beneficiary interest in the Security 

Instrument. 

On August 13, 2021—after this court affirmed the ruling of the district 

court—U.S. Bank and SN Servicing, its loan servicer, sent a notice of default 

to the Waldens. The notice of default stated that the Waldens could cure the 

default by paying $346,060.32—less than the full accelerated amount due 

under the Loan Agreement. Despite receiving the notice of default, the 

Waldens still did not pay on the Note. 

This court issued a substitute opinion on October 19, 2021. MTGLQ 

Invs., L.P. v. Walden, No. 20-50944, 2021 WL 4888870 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 

2021) (per curiam) (affirming summary judgment, denying rehearing, and 

_____________________ 

3

 The Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded on May 4, 2021, in the Official 

Public Records of Hays County, Texas as Document No. 21030450. 

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4 

denying motion to vacate and dismiss as moot). U.S. Bank then sent the 

Waldens another notice in November 2021 indicating that the Property 

would be sold at a foreclosure sale on January 4, 2022. 

U.S. Bank filed this suit on December 31, 2021, arguing that it had a 

right to foreclose pursuant to the final judgment the district court issued and 

this court affirmed. U.S. Bank filed a motion for summary judgment. On May 

17, 2023, a United States Magistrate Judge issued a report and 

recommendation recommending that the district court grant U.S. Bank’s 

motion for summary judgment. The report and recommendation allowed the 

parties to file written objections within fourteen days. 

On May 31, 2023, the Waldens filed an unopposed motion to extend 

time to file objections. The district court granted the motion and extended 

the deadline to June 9, 2023. The day of the deadline, the Waldens filed a 

second motion to extend time to file objections that was the same in form and 

substance as the first. 

On June 12, 2023, the Waldens filed a corrected motion, 

acknowledging their error in submitting an identical motion and requesting 

to extend the deadline again, until June 16, 2023. The district court mooted 

the June 9th motion and denied the corrected motion. 

On June 23, 2023, the Waldens filed a motion for leave with their 

objections attached. On June 28, 2023, the district court found that there was 

no good cause to grant the Waldens leave to file their objections, adopted the 

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, and entered a judgment for 

non-judicial foreclosure. 

On July 26, 2023, the Waldens filed a motion for new trial, which the 

district court denied on August 10, 2023. This appeal followed. 

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5 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We “review a district court’s grant or denial of an extension of time 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) for an abuse of discretion.” L.A. 

Pub. Ins. Adjusters, Inc. v. Nelson, 17 F.4th 521, 524 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing 

Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 793 (5th Cir. 1990)); Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 6(b). The same is true of a district court’s denial of motions for a new trial. 

Fornesa v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co., 897 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing 

United States v. Sertich, 879 F.3d 558, 562 (5th Cir. 2018)). 

“When a party who is warned of the requirement to file timely 

objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation fails to file any 

such objections, and the magistrate judge’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions are accepted by the district court, our review is for plain error.” 

Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Servs., L.L.C., 875 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 

2017). “When, however, the district court undertakes an independent review 

of the record, our review is de novo, despite any lack of objection.” Id. (citing 

Guillory v. PPG Indus., Inc., 434 F.3d 303, 308 (5th Cir. 2005)). 

DISCUSSION 

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Waldens’ motion 

to extend time to file objections to the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation.

The trial court’s denial of the Waldens’ motion to extend time to file 

objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation was not an 

abuse of discretion. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, a party has 14 

days to file objections to the proposed findings and recommendations of the 

magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The Waldens did not file their 

objections in 14 days. Instead, they filed a motion for an extension. 

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District courts have broad discretion in managing their dockets and 

deadlines. See Versai Mgmt. Corp. v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., 597 F.3d 729, 741 

(5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Before the original deadline expires, a court may

extend time for a party to act if there is good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P.

6(b)(1)(A). Using its discretion, the district court extended the Waldens’ 

deadline to file their objections until June 9, 2023. However, the Waldens did 

not meet that deadline. 

Instead, on June 9th, the Waldens requested a second extension with 

a motion that was similar in form and substance to their first extension 

request. This extension request violated Western District of Texas Local 

Rule CV-7(g) because the Waldens failed to confer with opposing counsel, 

despite sufficient time before filing to do so. W.D. TEX. CIV. R. 7(g). 

Acknowledging their substantive and procedural error, the Waldens 

filed a corrected motion on June 12, 2023, three days after the deadline for 

the extension. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6, the court may for 

good cause extend the time after it has expired “if the party failed to act 

because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). 

In assessing whether a party failed to act because of excusable neglect, 

a district court weighs the following factors: “the danger of prejudice to the 

[opposing party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial 

proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the 

reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good 

faith.” United States v. Clark, 51 F.3d 42, 44 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Pioneer 

Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). 

Employing these factors, the district court denied the request, noting 

that “when [it] alerted counsel to the error [in filing the same motion], 

counsel replied that the motion contained the correct dates, rather than first 

checking to determine whether a mistake had been made.” The court also 

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considered that the Waldens did not conference with U.S. Bank prior to the 

motion being filed on June 9th, so U.S. Bank did not have sufficient time to 

note opposition. Taken together, the district court concluded the Waldens 

did not show good cause and denied their motion. 

Given the imprudent reason for the delay, which was clearly in the 

Waldens’ control, this denial was well within the district court’s discretion 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B). Therefore, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion. 

II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Waldens’ motion for 

leave to file objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. 

The Waldens filed the motion for leave to file objections, like the 

second motion to extend time, without conference with U.S. Bank in 

violation of Western District of Texas Local Rule CV-7(g). The district court 

denied the motion because it did not find good cause. 

The Waldens argue that the denial was based on an error—the 

incorrect date on the motion. They reason that this error established good 

cause to grant their motion for leave. But the Waldens are mistaken. 

Because the Waldens raised this issue after the final judgment, we 

analyze the denial of the motion for leave under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b). A district court does not abuse its discretion by denying a 

Rule 60(b) motion when “the proffered justification for relief” is the mistake 

or carelessness of the party’s own counsel. Lozano v. Donna Indep. Sch. Dist., 

648 F. App’x 412, 413 n.2 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. 

Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 356–57 (5th Cir. 1993)). The Waldens, by admission, 

acknowledged that the motion was incorrect because of their mistake. Thus, 

the district court’s denial was not an abuse of discretion. 

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III. Upon de novo review, we conclude that U.S. Bank owned the loan and had 

standing, but it abandoned acceleration on the loan via a notice that 

unequivocally manifested its intent to abandon.

In its order denying the motion for the new trial, the trial court noted 

that the Waldens’ objections were not timely filed. This means it could have 

performed plain error review. Alexander, 875 F.3d at 248. Instead, the district 

court acknowledged that “even considering their objections along with 

Plaintiff’s response, under a de novo standard, the [district court] agrees” 

with the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. 

As the district court indicated it undertook an “independent review 

of the record, our review is de novo,” id., and we “apply the same standard 

applicable to the district court.” Carnegie Techs., L.L.C. v. Triller, Inc., 39 

F.4th 288, 293 (5th Cir. 2022). 

“A ‘court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A 

movant is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law [when] the nonmoving 

party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] 

case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof.” Id. (alterations in 

original) (quoting Terral River Serv., Inc. v. SFC Marine Inc., 20 F.4th 1015, 

1018 (5th Cir. 2021)). 

A. The ownership of the loan/standing 

The Waldens argue that U.S. Bank does not have standing to foreclose 

on the loan because MTGLQ improperly assigned the loan to U.S. Bank. 

According to the Waldens, Fannie Mae did not have authority to transfer the 

Loan Agreement to MTGLQ because the Federal Housing Finance Agency 

(FHFA) was Fannie Mae’s receiver. Therefore, the argument goes, 

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MTGLQ did not transfer any interest in the Loan Agreement to U.S. Bank 

because it never had an interest to transfer. 

The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 4501 

et seq., “created the [FHFA], ‘an independent agency’ tasked with regulating 

[Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] and, if necessary, stepping in as their 

conservator or receiver.” Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2021) 

(citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 4511, 4617). As conservator or receiver of Fannie Mae, 

the FHFA may “transfer or sell any asset or liability of the regulated entity 

in default, and may do so without any approval, assignment, or consent with 

respect to such transfer or sale.” 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(G). The role of the 

FHFA, as conservator, is to oversee Fannie Mae, not to control daily 

operations. See Collins, 594 U.S. at 229–30. Fannie Mae, then, continues to 

operate as a business corporation, including the ability to transfer assets, 

although the FHFA retains ultimate authority. See Conservatorship, FHFA, 

https://www.fhfa.gov/conservatorship (last visited December 18, 2024)); 12 

U.S.C. § 1719(a)(2). 

Thus, when Fannie Mae assigned the Loan Agreement to MTGLQ, 

it was well within its statutory authority to do so, and it properly transferred 

the interest. Likewise, MTGLQ properly transferred the interest in the Loan 

Agreement to U.S. Bank, making U.S. Bank the owner and holder of the loan. 

The Waldens also argue that U.S. Bank did not suffer a concrete 

injury. This is incorrect. Because U.S. Bank owns and holds the loan that the 

Waldens defaulted on, it has suffered a concrete injury in the form of financial 

loss. See Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 748 (5th Cir. 2015) (“It is well 

established that a financial loss generally constitutes an injury.”). Further, 

U.S. Bank’s concrete injury is traceable to the Waldens’ nonpayment and is 

redressable through foreclosure. Therefore, U.S. Bank has standing. See 

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (“To establish 

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Article III standing, an injury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or 

imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a 

favorable ruling.’” (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 

139, 149 (2010))). 

The Waldens also argue that U.S. Bank’s request for a declaratory 

judgment is not a sufficient injury-in-fact to confer standing because it asks 

this court to issue an advisory opinion. 

The Waldens are correct that a court “cannot render an advisory 

opinion on hypothetical or abstract facts.” Hodgson v. H. Morgan Daniel 

Seafoods, Inc., 433 F.2d 918, 920 (5th Cir. 1970). But declaratory judgments 

are not advisory opinions based on hypothetical or abstract facts. Instead, 

declaratory judgments permit courts to “declare the rights and other legal 

relations of any interested party” where an “actual controversy” exists. 28 

U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added). 

U.S. Bank requests a declaratory judgment that the August 13, 2021 

notice it sent to the Waldens did not affect the final judgment in the first suit. 

The Waldens disagree that is the case. As these parties have opposing 

interests that affect their respective rights and obligations, an actual 

controversy exists. This controversy requires judicial resolution to determine 

if U.S. Bank can foreclose on the Property, making the dispute ripe. Thus, 

U.S. Bank is not requesting an advisory opinion. 

Taken together, we conclude that U.S. Bank owns the loan and had 

standing. 

B. The status of acceleration of the loan 

The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, which was 

adopted by the district court after de novo review, determined that U.S. Bank 

did not abandon acceleration of the loan. The Waldens, however, argue that 

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the August 13, 2021 notice was an “unequivocal express notice of 

abandonment of any prior acceleration.” U.S. Bank contends, and the district 

court agreed, that the notice was inadvertently sent and that the notice, by 

itself, did not manifest an unequivocal intent to abandon acceleration as U.S. 

Bank later sent the Waldens another notice of foreclosure sale on November 

22, 2021. However, binding precedent forecloses that conclusion. 

“The acceleration of a note can be abandoned ‘by agreement or other 

action of the parties.’” Boren v. U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 807 F.3d 99, 104 (5th 

Cir. 2015) (quoting Khan v. GBAK Props., Inc., 371 S.W.3d 347, 353 (Tex. 

App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.)). “Texas courts have framed the 

issue of abandonment of acceleration by reference to traditional principles of 

waiver.” Id. at 105. Under Texas law, “[t]he elements of waiver include 

(1) an existing right, benefit, or advantage held by a party; (2) the party’s 

actual knowledge of its existence; and (3) the party’s actual intent to 

relinquish the right, or intentional conduct inconsistent with the right.” 

Thompson v. Bank of America Nat’l Ass’n, 783 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 2015) 

(quoting Ulico Cas. Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex. 

2008)). “The central element is intent, which must be unequivocally 

manifested.” Id.

In Boren, this court held that a “notice unequivocally manifested an 

intent to abandon” acceleration when it “informed [the party] that the total 

amount necessary to bring their loan current was the amount due under the 

original terms of the Note and that the bank would accelerate the maturity 

date of the loan if the [party] failed to pay [the amount].” 807 F.3d at 106 

(emphasis added). 

With this in mind, we look at U.S. Bank’s notice to the Waldens, 

which stated: 

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To the extent you have received demand letters with intent to 

accelerate the obligations under the above subject Note and any 

notice of acceleration of said Note prior to the date of this 

demand letter, be advised that any such demands or notices 

of acceleration have been withdrawn, cancelled, and 

abandoned. 

(emphasis omitted in part). This notice expressly withdraws, cancels, and 

abandons any demands or notices of acceleration, and provides the Waldens 

with the “opportunity to avoid foreclosure.”4 Boren, 807 F.3d at 106. 

Boren is unequivocally clear that a written notice constitutes intent to 

abandon acceleration under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code 

§ 16.038.5 Id.; accord Jatera Corp. v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 917 F.3d 831, 835 

_____________________ 

4

 What’s more, the opportunity to avoid foreclosure for the Waldens is less 

stringent than of the mortgagees in Boren as it is not premised on the condition that the 

Waldens pay the full amount. 

5

 U.S. Bank cites Lyons v. Select Portfolio Servicing Inc., 748 F. App’x 610 (5th Cir. 

2019) (per curiam) for the proposition that a post-acceleration statement that identifies the 

arrearage the borrower can pay to avoid foreclosure will not abandon acceleration if the 

lender persists in its efforts to foreclose. But Lyons is inapposite because it is 

distinguishable. As Lyons makes clear, the key difference between cases like Lyons and cases 

like Boren is that in Boren “a mortgagee accelerated a loan under the terms of the note and 

deed of trust but later ‘manifested an intent to abandon [the] previous acceleration.’” 

Lyons, 748 F. App’x at 611 (alteration in original) (quoting Boren, 807 F.3d at 106). In Lyons,

“the Bank never wavered from accelerating the loan.” Id. Unlike the mortgagee in Lyons

and like the mortgagee in Boren, U.S. Bank did not merely send a “monthly mortgage 

statement and reinstatement notice [that] referenced different amounts from the original 

loan amount.” Id. at 611–12. Instead, it sent a document with clear language demonstrating 

abandonment, i.e., “any such demands or notices of acceleration have been withdrawn, 

cancelled, and abandoned . . . .” 

 Insofar as the Boren and Lyons holdings present any tension in the case law, “we 

are bound by this Circuit’s rule of orderliness. Under our rule of orderliness, one panel of 

our court may not overturn another panel’s decision, absent an intervening change in the 

law, such as by a statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court, or our en 

banc court.” Mercado v. Lynch, 823 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). “Under our 

rule of orderliness, the earlier published decisions control over the later unpublished ones.” 

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(5th Cir. 2019); Martin v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 814 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 

2016); cf. Sexton v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 731 F. App’x 302, 308 (5th 

Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“Our court has consistently held a lender 

demonstrates abandonment where the lender, after accelerating a debt, sent 

subsequent notices of default seeking only the amount overdue and warning 

borrowers that, in the event of failure to cure, the debt would be 

accelerated.”). 

Because the district court’s grant of summary judgment is contrary to 

controlling circuit precedent, we REVERSE the district court’s order 

granting summary judgment, VACATE the judgment it entered, and 

REMAND the matter to the district court for further proceedings 

consistent with Boren. 

C. The lender’s ability to rescind/abandon acceleration

 The Waldens argue that U.S. Bank is permitted to abandon 

acceleration despite this court’s judgment in the first suit because it was a 

“foreclosure pursuant to the security instrument—i.e., power of sale,” 

making it a non-judicial foreclosure. This court’s judgment in the first suit, 

argue the Waldens, was based upon the state of acceleration but the 

acceleration was subsequently rescinded. The Waldens contend that when 

acceleration is abandoned, the lender must seek a new order authorizing 

exercise of power of sale or judicial foreclosure. U.S. Bank argues, in the 

alternative, that even if the prior acceleration was abandoned, summary 

judgment in its favor must be affirmed because it conclusively established 

that it is entitled to a second order authorizing foreclosure. On remand, we 

direct the district court to address these arguments. 

_____________________ 

Poole v. City of Shreveport, 13 F.4th 420, 426 (5th Cir. 2021). Thus, even if Lyons and Boren 

are in conflict—and the court is not convinced they are—Boren controls. 

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*** 

 We AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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