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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Grcuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

ELVIRA CALLINS, as Personal ) 

Representative of the Survivors ) 

of JOHN D. CALLINS, and the Estate ) 

of JOHN D. CALLINS, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ) 

THE COUNTY OF GREER, OKLAHOMA; ) 

CITY OF MANGUM, OKLAHOMA; ALFRED ) 

ROGERS; JIMMY E. LIPTON, and ) 

persons unknown, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

AP 8 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-6190 

(D.C. No. CIV-89-724-A) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. p . 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

* 

The case is therefore ordered 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6190 Document: 010110031882 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff Elvira Callins brought this action under 42 u.s.c. 

§ 1983 and 42 u.s.c. § 1985(3) to redress the death of her husband 

John D. Callins (decedent), who died while incarcerated in the 

city-county jail in Mangum, Oklahoma. Plaintiff named as 

defendants Greer County, Oklahoma, the City of Mangum, the sheriff 

of Greer County, and the Mangum chief of police. The district 

court granted summary judgment in defendants' favor, and this 

appeal followed. 

This court reviews the grant of summary judgment under the 

same standard applied by the trial court. Osgood v. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). "Summary 

judgment shall be rendered forthwith if ... there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact and .. the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). The evidence in the record must be viewed in the light 

most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Lucas v. 

Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 909 F.2d 419, 420 (10th Cir. 1990). 

The facts pertinent to this appeal are undisputed. Decedent 

was arrested on June 3, 1987, for driving under the influence of 

alcohol and driving while his license was suspended. He was 

incarcerated in the city-county jail located in Mangum. 

Initially, decedent was housed on the first floor of the jail. 

However, on June 12, 1987, he was moved to the second floor of the 

jail in a three cell block with a common area open to all the 

cells. Housed with decedent were two other prisoners--one 

awaiting trial on rape and murder charges and another awaiting 

trial for arson. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6190 Document: 010110031882 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 2 
During the early morning hours of June 16, 1987, a loud 

banging sound was heard coming from the second floor cells. A 

Mangum police officer on duty was summoned to return to the jail 

and investigate the noise. When the officer arrived, he went 

upstairs and found the decedent lying semiconscious in the common 

area of the cell block with a bleeding head injury. How the 

injury was inflicted upon decedent is unknown. See Rec. Vol. I, 

doc. 61 at 2 n.1 (discussing the conflicting evidence regarding 

whether the injury was self-inflicted or caused by the actions of 

others). Decedent was transferred to the Mangum Hospital. As a 

result of his injury, decedent was rendered a paraplegic. 

Decedent was intermittently hospitalized until his death on 

March 26, 1989. 

I. Liability of Greer County and City of Mangum under Section 

1983 

It is well established that a county or municipality may be 

held liable under section 1983 only when the constitutional 

deprivation at issue was undertaken pursuant to a "custom" or 

"policy" of a county or municipality and not simply on the basis 

of respondeat superior. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 

U.S. 112, 125 n.2 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 

469, 478-80 (1986). In this case, the district court, in granting 

summary judgment in favor of Greer County and the City of Mangum 

on plaintiff's section 1983 claim, held that plaintiff failed to 

prove that any act or omission with respect to decedent was caused 

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Appellate Case: 90-6190 Document: 010110031882 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 3 
by the execution of some "policy" or "custom" of Greer County or 

the City of Mangum. 

On appeal, plaintiff has failed to even demonstrate some 

recognition of any theory of county or municipal liability under 

section 1983 let alone articulate some arguable basis for undoing 

the district court's determination. Specifically, plaintiff has 

not identified any actions by lawmakers for Greer County or the 

City of Mangum which sanctioned or authorized the manner in which 

decedent was incarcerated in the city-county jail. Pembaur, 475 

U.S. at 480 ("recovery from a municipality is limited to acts that 

are, properly speaking, acts 'of the municipality'--that is, acts 

which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered."). 

Furthermore, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the injuries to 

decedent were the result of some pervasive county or city custom. 

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (to prove section 1983 liability based 

on custom, plaintiff must establish a widespread practice that, 

"although not authorized by written law or express municipal 

policy, it is so permanent and well settled as to constitute 

custom or usage with the force of law."). 

In her appellate brief, plaintiff describes the sheriff and 

the chief of police as "policymakers." See Brief of Appellant, 

pp. 5-6. By characterizing the sheriff and the chief of police in 

such a manner, plaintiff has inadvertently raised the individual 

policymaker route to municipal liability which has been the 

subject of the two recent Supreme Court decisions. Praprotnik, 

485 U.S. at 123; Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-84. In these cases, the 

Court concluded that municipal liability may be imposed for a 

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Appellate Case: 90-6190 Document: 010110031882 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 4 
decision or action of a municipal policymaker, where that 

decisionmaker possesses "final authority" to establish municipal 

policy with respect to the action ordered. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 

at 127; Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-84. In this case, however, even 

assuming that the sheriff and the chief of police had final 

policymaking authority concerning the manner in which people were 

confined at the city-county jail, plaintiff has failed to identify 

an existing policy, proclamation, or edict attributable to the 

sheriff or chief of police, the implementation of which resulted 

in decedent's injuries. The absence of such a link between 

decedent's injuries and any acts or decisions of the sheriff or 

the chief of police precludes the imposition of municipal 

liability based on final policymaking authority. Cf. City of 

Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985)(there must be an 

"affirmative link" between the policy and a particular 

constitutional violation alleged). 

II. Liability of Sheriff and Chief of Police under Section 1983 

Plaintiff did not make any allegation or present any evidence 

indicating that the sheriff or the chief of police were directly 

involved in injuring decedent. Rather, plaintiff's position is 

that these defendants are liable as supervisors because they 

acquiesced in actions that resulted in decedent's injury. The 

district court, in granting summary judgment in favor of the 

sheriff and the chief of police, concluded that plaintiff failed 

to establish any basis for supervisory liability. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6190 Document: 010110031882 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 5 
This court has addressed the limits of supervisory liability 

under section 1983 on a number of occasions. Under the law of 

this circuit, "[a] supervisor is not liable under section 1983 

unless an 'affirmative link' exists between the (constitutional] 

deprivation and either the supervisor's 'personal participation, 

his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to 

supervise.'" Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1527 (10th Cir. 

1988)(quoting Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516, 1524 (10th Cir. 

1987), reh'g en bane granted on other grounds, and judgment, but 

not opinion, vacated, 837 F.2d 940 (1988)); see also Snell v. 

Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir. 1990); D.T. by M.T. v. 

Independent School Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176, 1187 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 213 (1990). To be liable, a supervisor 

must have "participated or acquiesced in the constitutional 

deprivations of which the complaint is made." Kite v. Kelley, 546 

F.2d 334, 337 (10th Cir. 1976). Thus, this court has held that a 

sheriff responsible under state law for the proper management of 

the jail in his county "is accountable in a§ 1983 action whenever 

. [he] knew or should have known of the misconduct, and yet 

failed to prevent future harm." Anthony v. Baker, 767 F.2d 657, 

666 (10th Cir. 1985). 

In this case, plaintiff argues that the sheriff and the chief 

of police each had responsibility for the administration of the 

city-county jail and each had knowledge of and acquiesced in the 

moving of decedent to the second floor cell block. It is 

significant that plaintiff's claim against the sheriff and the 

chief of police is being assessed in the context of a summary 

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Appellate Case: 90-6190 Document: 010110031882 Date Filed: 04/08/1991 Page: 6 
judgment. Under these circumstances, the question is not whether 

the plaintiff will ultimately prevail on her claim. Rather, the 

inquiry is whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence which, 

if believed, could support an inference that the sheriff or the 

chief of police knew of and acquiesced in the manner in which 

decedent was incarcerated in the city-county jail. See Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)("Rule 56(c) mandates 

the entry of summary judgment . against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party's case . . . . . II ) Plaintiff's evidence 

must have been such that a reasonable jury could have returned a 

verdict for her. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

252 (1986). 

Plaintiff, however, as the district court held, merely makes 

the conclusory allegation that the sheriff and the chief of police 

were aware of the manner in which decedent was incarcerated. 

Plaintiff has not pointed to any specific evidence that indicates 

that the sheriff and the chief of police acquiesced in or knew of 

or should have known of the conditions under which decedent was 

held in the city-county jail. In the absence of such evidence, 

plaintiff's claim against the sheriff and the chief of police as 

supervisors can only be characterized as rooted in speculation. 

This is insufficient for plaintiff to overcome summary judgment in 

favor of the sheriff and the chief of police. Conaway v. Smith, 

853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1988)(to defeat summary judgment, "a 

party cannot rest on ... speculation, or on suspicion"). 

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III. Section 1985(3) claim 

An essential element of a claim under section 1985(3) is 

proof of a "conspiracy." Plaintiff must show a meeting of the 

minds among various defendants to violate his constitutional 

rights. 

(1970). 

See Adickes v. s. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 

Here, plaintiff, as the district court held, completely fails 

to support her section 1985(3) allegations with any colorable 

evidence of a "conspiracy." Nowhere in her appellate brief does 

plaintiff point to any evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, 

which could convince a jury that there was any agreement among the 

various defendants. Therefore, summary judgment against plaintiff 

under section 1985(3) was appropriate. See, e.g., Jaxon v. Circle 

K Corp., 773 F.2d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 1985)(summary judgment 

proper where record contains no support in any form for section 

1985 conspiracy claim); see also Caldeira v. County of Kauai, 866 

F.2d 1175, 1181 (9th Cir.)(summary judgment in favor of defendant 

affirmed because plaintiff's "conspiracy allegations were 

unsupported by any evidence that would convince a 

'fair-minded jury' to find in his favor."), cert. denied, 110 

S . Ct . 6 9 ( 19 8 9 ) . 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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