Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00624/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00624-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Fran S. Cunningham, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 09-624-TUC-HCE

ORDER

Plaintiff has filed the instant action seeking review of the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Magistrate Judge has

jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the parties’ consent. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (Doc. 20) (hereinafter

“Plaintiff’s Brief”) and Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (Doc. 25)

(hereinafter “Defendant’s Brief”). For the following reasons, the Court remands this matter

for further proceedings.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 23, 2006, Plaintiff protectively filed with the Social Security

Administration (hereinafter "SSA") an application for disability insurance benefits under

Title XVI of the Social Security Act alleging an onset date of disability from August 1, 2004

due to depression, panic attacks and back problems. (TR. 114-121, 139-140). Plaintiff's

application was denied initially and on reconsideration. (TR. 62-65, 70-73). 

Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. (TR. 74). The

matter proceeded to hearing on April 8, 2009 before Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter

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“ALJ”) Larry E. Johnson. (TR. 19-41). At the April 8, 2009 hearing, Plaintiff, represented

by counsel, testified before the ALJ. (TR.22-32). Other witnesses at the April 8, 2009

hearing included medical expert Vincent Rousseau, M.D. (TR. 32-38), and vocational expert

(hereinafter “VE”) George Bluth (TR. 38-41). On May 19, 2009, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s

claim. (TR. 52-61). 

Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council. (TR. 13-16). On November 3,

2009, the Appeals Council granted Plaintiff’s request for review and ruled, in part, in

Plaintiff’s favor to the extent that the Appeals Council determined that “[f]or the period

beginning on March 11, 2009, the date the claimant attained age 55, Medical-Vocational

Rule 202.04 directs a finding of disabled.” (TR. 6). The Appeals Council adopted that part

of the ALJ’s decision that pertained to the period up to March 11, 2009. (Id.). The November

3, 2009 decision of the Appeals Council represents the Commissioner’s final decision.

Plaintiff initiated the instant action to challenge the decision that she is not disabled

for the period from February 23, 2006 up to March 11, 2009. (Plaintiff’s Brief, p.4).

Plaintiff does not dispute the determination that she is disabled after March 11, 2009. (Id.).

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s decision on a very narrow issue: that Plaintiff’s functional

limitations as found by the ALJ preclude the performance of the alternative work identified

by the VE and relied upon by the ALJ in rendering his decision.

II. PERTINENT PORTION OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL

A. The Vocational Expert’s Testimony

At the hearing, the ALJ posed the following hypothetical question to VE Bluth:

Let’s assume a residual functional capacity for light [sic] with unlimited

sitting; standing/walking one hour at a time, looks like a four-hour total; with

a limit of five to 20 pounds lifting as noted by the doctor; with no excessive

neck or overhead activity; and with limited bending, no crawling or climbing.

Would there be jobs in the light category for that degree of limitation?

(TR. 38). The VE responded that there are “jobs that would offer a sit/stand option that

might, that would fit into that category,” and he cited the following jobs: cashier, assembly

worker, quality control inspector. (Id.). The VE further testified that these jobs would be

available even if: the employee’s attention and concentration were limited to a moderate

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degree; and “more frequent than one hour at a time change of position is required....” (TR.

39). The VE also testified that there are: 4,000 cashier jobs available in Arizona and 800,000

nationally; 4,000 assembly worker jobs available in Arizona and 800,000 nationally; and

2,000 quality control jobs available in Arizona and 300,000 nationally. (Id.).

Plaintiff’s counsel based her question to the VE on the same hypothetical posed by

the ALJ but added: assume the individual has moderate limitations in performing work

within a schedule, making simple work-related decisions, completing a normal workday or

week, and responding appropriately to changes in a work setting. (TR. 40). The VE testified

that such an individual would not be able to perform any of the jobs he identified. (Id.). 

B. The ALJ’s Findings

1. Claim Evaluation

SSA regulations require the ALJ to evaluate disability claims pursuant to a five-step

sequential process. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520, 416.920; Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1395

(9th Cir. 1991). The first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is engaged

in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If so, then the

claimant is not disabled under the Act and benefits are denied. Id. If the claimant is not

engaged in substantial gainful activity, the ALJ then proceeds to step two which requires a

determination of whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of

impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). In making a determination at step two,

the ALJ uses medical evidence to consider whether the claimant’s impairment more than

minimally limited or restricted his or her physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities. Id. If the ALJ concludes that the impairment is not severe, the claim is denied.

Id. If the ALJ makes a finding of severity, the ALJ proceeds to step three which requires a

determination of whether the impairment meets or equals one of several listed impairments

that the Commissioner acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1. If the claimant’s

impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, then the claimant is presumed to

be disabled and no further inquiry is necessary. If a decision cannot be made based on the

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1

RFC is defined as that which an individual can still do despite his or her limitations.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.

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claimant’s then current work activity or on medical facts alone because the claimant’s

impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, then evaluation proceeds to the fourth

step. The fourth step requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant has sufficient

residual functional capacity (hereinafter “RFC”)1

 to perform past work. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the ALJ concludes that the claimant has RFC to perform past

work, then the claim is denied. Id. However, if the claimant cannot perform any past work

due to a severe impairment, then the ALJ must move to the fifth step, which requires

consideration of the claimant’s RFC to perform other substantial gainful work in the national

economy in view of claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(f). 416.920(f). At step five, in determining whether the claimant retained the

ability to perform other work, the ALJ may refer to Medical Vocational Guidelines

(hereinafter “grids”) promulgated by the SSA. Desrosiers v. Secretary, 846 F.2d 573, 576-

577 (9th Cir. 1988). The grids are a valid basis for denying claims where they accurately

describe the claimant’s abilities and limitations. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 462,

n.5 (1983). However, because the grids are based on exertional or strength factors, the grids

do not apply where the claimant has significant nonexertional limitations. Penny v. Sullivan,

2 F.3d 953, 958-959 (9th Cir. 1993); Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 729 (9th Cir. 1998).

When the grids do not apply, the ALJ must use a vocational expert in making a

determination at step five. Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 580.

2. The ALJ's Decision 

In his May 19, 2009 decision, the ALJ made the following findings:

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since February 23, 2006, the application date (20 CFR 416.971

et seq.). 

2. The claimant has the following severe impairments:

degenerative disc disease, lumbar (mild) and cervical

degenerative disc disease (moderate) (20 CFR 416.920(c)). 

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3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed

impairments 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR

416.925 and 416.926).

4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b), with the

ability to stand and walk 1 hour at a time, for a total of 4 hours,

lift 20 pounds occasionally and 5 pounds frequently; no excess

neck movement or overhead activities and limited bending.

***

5. The claimant did not have any past relevant work (20 CFR

416.965).

***

6. The claimant was born on March 12, 1954 and was 51 years old,

which is defined as an individual closely approaching advanced

age, on the date the application was filed. (20 CFR Part 404,

416.963).

7. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to

communicate in English (20 CFR 416.964).

8. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination

of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a

framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,”

whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR

82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).

9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and

residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant

can perform (20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969a).

In determining whether a substantial adjustment to other work

can be made, the undersigned must consider the claimant’s

residual functional capacity, age, education, and work

experience in conjunction with the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines, 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2. If the

claimant can perform all or substantially all of the exertional

demands at a given level of exertion, the medical-vocational

rules direct a conclusion of either “disabled” or “not disabled”

depending upon the claimant’s specific vocational profile (SSR

83-11). When the claimant cannot perform substantially all of

the exertional demands of work at a given level of exertion

and/or has nonexertional limitations, the [M]edical-[V]ocational

[R]ules are used as a framework for decisionmaking unless there

is a rule that directs a conclusion of “disabled” without

considering the additional exertional and/or nonexertional

limitations (SSRs 83-12 and 83-14). If the claimant has solely

nonexertional limitations, section 204.00 in the MedicalCase 4:09-cv-00624-HCE Document 26 Filed 03/28/11 Page 5 of 16
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Vocational Guidelines provides a framework for

decisionmaking (SSR 85-15).

If the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform

the full range of light work, a finding of “not disabled” would be

directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 204.14. However, the

claimant’s ability to perform all or substantially all of the

requirements of this level of work has been impeded by

additional limitations. To determine the extent to which these

limitations erode the unskilled light occupational base, the

Administrative Law Judge asked the vocational expert whether

jobs exist in the national economy for an individual with the

claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity. The vocational expert testified that given

all of these factors the individual would be able to perform the

requirements of representative light occupations, with a sit/stand

option, such as cashier, with 4000 positions in Arizona and

800,000 nationally; assembly work, with the same numbers;

there was always a quality control inspector, with 2000 in

Arizona and 300,000 nationally. The vocational expert also

testified that moderate mental limitations in attention,

concentration, or pace would not prevent the person from

performing the same positions in the same numbers.

Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, the vocational expert’s testimony is

consistent with the information contained in the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles.

Based on the testimony of the vocational expert, the undersigned

concludes that, considering the claimant’s age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity, the claimant is

capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that

exists in significant numbers in the national economy. A finding

of “not disabled” is therefore appropriate under the framework

of the above-cited rule.

10. The claimant has not been under a disability as defined in the

Social Security Act since February 23, 2006, the date the

application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)).

DECISION

Based on the application for supplemental security income filed on February

23, 2006, the claimant is not disabled under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the

Social Security Act.

(TR. 54-61).

3. The Appeals Council’s Decision

On November 3, 2009, the Appeals Council adopted in part and rejected in part the

ALJ’s decision. Specifically, the Appeals Council:

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1. ...adopt[ed] all of the findings and conclusions of the Administrative

Law Judge for the period beginning of [sic] February 23, 2006, the date

of the SSI application up to March 11, 2009.

2. For the period beginning on March 11, 2009, the date the claimant

attained age 55, Medical-Vocational Rule 202.04 directs a finding of

disabled.

(TR. 6). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Argument

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ is required to inquire of the VE on the record as to

whether the VE’s testimony is consistent with the occupational information supplied by the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles (hereinafter “DOT”). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed

to make such an inquiry on the instant record. Further, according to Plaintiff, the ALJ’s

determination of Plaintiff’s RFC is inconsistent with the jobs of cashier, assembly worker,

and quality control inspector as described in the DOT. Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ

erred when he failed to solicit a sufficient explanation from the VE regarding conflicts

between the VE’s testimony and the DOT listings. Plaintiff requests remand for benefits or,

alternatively, remand for further proceedings. 

Defendant concedes that the ALJ erred in failing to ask the VE about any possible

conflict between the VE’s testimony and information provided in the DOT. (Defendant’s

Brief, p. 4). However, Defendant asserts that the error was harmless. 

 B. Standard of Review

An individual is entitled to disability insurance benefits if he or she meets certain

eligibility requirements and demonstrates the inability to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423, 1382. “‘A claimant will be found

disabled only if the impairment is so severe that, considering age, education, and work

experience, that person cannot engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which

exists in the national economy.’” Penny, 2 F.3d at 956 (quoting Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d

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172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990)).

To establish a prima facie case of disability, the claimant must demonstrate an

inability to perform his or her former work. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir.

1984). Once the claimant meets that burden, the Commissioner must come forward with

substantial evidence establishing that the claimant is not disabled. Fife v. Heckler, 767 F.2d

1427, 1429 (9th Cir. 1985).

The findings of the Commissioner are conclusive and courts may overturn the

decision to deny benefits “only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or it is based on

legal error.” Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992)(citations omitted).

Therefore, the Commissioner's determination that a claimant is not disabled must be upheld

if the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards and if the record as a whole contains

substantial evidence to support the decision. Clem v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir.

1990) (citing Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 575-76; Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th

Cir. 1983)). Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence which a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064,

1067-68 (9th Cir. 1997); Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 644 (9th Cir. 1988). However,

substantial evidence is less than a preponderance. Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019. 

The Commissioner, not the court, is charged with the duty to weigh the evidence,

resolve material conflicts in the evidence and determine the case accordingly. Id. However,

when applying the substantial evidence standard, the court should not mechanically accept

the Commissioner's findings but should review the record critically and thoroughly. Day v.

Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1975). Reviewing courts must consider the evidence

that supports as well as detracts from the examiner's conclusion. Id. at 1156.

C. Analysis

“The Social Security Administration has taken administrative notice of the Dictionary

of Occupational Titles, which is published by the Department of Labor and gives detailed

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2

“The DOT is ‘the [Commissioner’s] primary source of reliable job

information.’...One purpose of the DOT is to classify identified job titles by their exertional

and skill requirements.” Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1990)).

3

The ALJ acknowledged that testimony from the VE was necessary because “the

claimant’s ability to perform all or substantially all of the requirements of...” the full range

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physical requirements for a variety of jobs.”2 Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1153 n.8

(9th Cir. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. §416.966(d)(1); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 735

(7th Cir. 2006)). “In making disability determinations, the Social Security Administration

relies primarily on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles for ‘information about the

requirements of work in the national economy.’” Id. 486 F.3d at 1153 (quoting SSR 00-4p

at *2). The ALJ may also use testimony form a vocational expert to obtain occupational

evidence. Id. The Ninth Circuit has held that:

Although evidence provided by a vocational expert “generally should be

consistent” with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, “[n]either the

[Dictionary of Occupational Titles] nor the [vocational expert]...evidence

automatically ‘trumps’ when there is a conflict.” Thus, the ALJ must first

determine whether a conflict exists. If it does, the ALJ must then determine

whether the vocational expert’s explanation for the conflict is reasonable and

whether a basis exists for relying on the expert rather than the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles.

Id. (quoting SSR 004-p at *2) (bracketed text in original); see also Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435

(“We make explicit here that an ALJ may rely on expert testimony which contradicts the

DOT, but only insofar as the record contains persuasive evidence to support the deviation.”).

In the instant case, it was “incumbent on the [Commissioner] at a minimum to come

forward with specific findings showing that the claimant has the physical and mental capacity

to perform specified jobs, taking into consideration the requirements of the job as well as the

claimant’s age, education, and background.” Hall v. Secretary of Health, Education and

Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1377(9th Cir. 1979) “Without other reliable evidence of a claimant’s

ability to perform specific jobs, the [Commissioner] must use a vocational expert to meet that

burden.” Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988). Consistent with Embrey, the

ALJ herein called upon a VE.3

 When an ALJ uses a VE, the “[h]ypothetical questions posed

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of light work “has been impeded by additional limitations. To determine the extent to which

these limitations erode the unskilled light occupational base, the [ALJ] asked the vocational

expert whether jobs exist in the national economy for an individual with the claimant’s age,

education, work experience, and residual functional capacity.” (TR. 61).

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to the vocational expert must set out all the limitations and restrictions of the particular

claimant, including, for example, pain and an inability to lift certain weights.” Embrey, 849

F.2d at 422 (emphasis in original).

1. Lifting Limitations

The ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform less than the full range of light work. (See

TR. 61) (“the claimant’s ability to perform all or substantially all of the requirements of this

level of work [i.e., light] has been impeded by additional limitations.”); see also (TR. 54)

(setting out Plaintiff’s RFC)). The Commissioner defines “light work” as the ability to lift

“no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up

to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. §416.967(b). See also SSR 83-10. However, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff could lift 20 pounds occasionally and “5 pounds frequently....” (TR. 54). The

ALJ’s hypothetical question posed to the VE included assuming “a residual functional

capacity for light [work]...with a limit of five to 20 pounds lifting....” (TR. 38). Although

the VE identified three occupations that Plaintiff could perform, he did not cite specific DOT

listings for these occupations. In adopting the VE’s opinion, the ALJ did not cite specific

DOT listings.

Plaintiff argues that her inability to lift no more than 5 pounds frequently precludes

the performance of the alternative work identified by the ALJ. Plaintiff does not cite to

specific DOT listings, however, Plaintiff asserts that “the three identified occupations of

cashier, quality control inspector, and assembly worker are performed at the light level of

exertion.” (Plaintiff’s Brief, at p. 11). 

Defendant has not disputed that the occupations identified by the VE and, in turn,

relied upon by the ALJ fall within the category of light work. Moreover, the ALJ indicated

that the VE testified that a claimant with Plaintiff’s RFC “would be able to perform the

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4

Social Security Rulings “reflect the interpretation of the [Social Security

Administration] and are entitled to ‘some deference’ as long as they are consistent with the

Social Security Act and regulations.” Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1152 n.6 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted); see also Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, n.1 (9th Cir.

2001) (“SSRs do not have the force of law. However, because they represent the

Commissioner’s interpretation of the agency’s regulations, we give them some deference.”).

Additionally, once an SSR is published, it is “binding precedent upon ALJs.” Gatliff v.

Commissioner of Social Security, 172 F.3d 690, 692 n.2 (9th Cir. 1999).

5

“SSR 00-4p gives examples of several reasonable explanations for deviating from the

Dictionary. Among them are that the Dictionary does not provide information about all

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requirements of representative light work occupations....” (TR. 61) (emphasis added).

Therefore, the record supports the conclusion that the occupations identified by the VE and

adopted by the ALJ fall within the category of light work. It follows, then, that a person

performing those occupations would need the RFC to frequently lift or carry “objects

weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b). Because Plaintiff is limited to carrying

up to 5 pounds frequently, there is a conflict between the DOT listing for light work and

Plaintiff’s actual RFC. See SSR 96-8p (The RFC “is not the least an individual can do

despite his or her limitations or restrictions, but the most.”) (emphasis in original). The Ninth

Circuit has made clear that if a conflict exists between the VE’s testimony and the DOT, “the

ALJ must...determine whether a basis exists for relying on the expert rather than the [DOT].”

Massachi, 486 F.3d. at 1153.

Moreover, SSR 00-4p4

 is clear that when a VE provides evidence about the

requirements of a job or occupation, the ALJ “has an affirmative responsibility to ask about

any possible conflict between...” the VE’s evidence and the information provided in the

DOT. SSR 00-4p at *4 (emphasis added). Specifically, the ALJ shall “[a]sk the VE...if the

evidence he or she has provided conflicts with information provided in the DOT.” Id. If the

evidence appears to conflict with the DOT, “the ALJ must then determine whether the

vocational expert’s explanation for the conflict is reasonable and whether a basis exists for

relying on the expert rather than the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.” Massachi, 486 F.3d

at 1153 (citing SSR 00-4p at *2).5

 Further, 

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occupations, information about a particular job not listed in the Dictionary may be available

elsewhere and the general descriptions in the Dictionary may not apply to specific

situations.” Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1153 n.17 (citing SSR 00-4p at *2-*3). 

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[w]hen vocational evidence provided by a VE...is not consistent with

information in the DOT, the adjudicator must resolve this conflict before

relying on the VE...evidence to support a determination or decision that the

individual is or is not disabled. The adjudicator will explain in the

determination or decision how he or she resolved the conflict. The adjudicator

must explain the resolution of the conflict irrespective of how the conflict was

identified.

SSR 00-4p at *4.

The record is clear that at the hearing, the ALJ did not inquire of the VE as to whether

there was “any possible conflict between the VE...evidence and information provided in the

DOT.” SSR 00-4p at *4. (See TR. 38-40). There was no specific mention of the DOT

during the VE’s testimony. (See TR. 38-40). Although the ALJ stated in his decision that the

VE’s “testimony is consistent with the information contained in the [DOT],” (TR. 61), there

is no basis in the record, including the ALJ’s decision, as to how the ALJ arrived at this

determination. The basis for the ALJ’s conclusion is especially necessary in light of the

conflict identified by Plaintiff. See Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1153-54. Consequently, as

Defendant has conceded, the ALJ erred.

As in Massachi, the procedural error in the instant case “could have been harmless,

were there no conflict, or if the vocational expert had provided sufficient support for [his]

conclusion so as to justify any potential conflicts...Instead, we have an apparent conflict with

no basis for the vocational expert’s deviation.” Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1154 n. 19. Moreover,

to the extent Defendant argues that the ALJ’s conceded error is harmless because Plaintiff’s

counsel did not raise the issue during the hearing, Defendant has not provided authority for

the proposition that the failure of a claimant’s counsel to raise the issue during the hearing

renders such error harmless where an apparent conflict between the DOT and the VE’s

testimony exists that was not addressed by the ALJ in compliance with SSR 00-4p. (See

Defendant’s Brief, pp. 5-6 (citing Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 146-47 (5th Cir. 2000)

(noting that “claimants should not be permitted to scan the record for implied or unexplained

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conflicts...when the conflict was not deemed sufficient to merit adversarial development in

the administrative hearing” and also finding that there was no conflict); Pires v. Astrue, 553

F.Supp.2d 15, 25 (D.Mass. 2008) (noting that the plaintiff’s counsel did not object to the

VE’s testimony and finding, inter alia, that plaintiff raised only the possibility of a conflict

but did not “describe any clear dichotomy between the DOT and the [VE’s] testimony....”)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). SSR 00-4p states that the ALJ has “an

affirmative responsibility to ask about any possible conflict between the VE...evidence and

information provided in the DOT.” SSR 00-4p at *4. This requirement is consistent with

the Supreme Court’s observation that “Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial rather

than adversarial. It is the ALJ’s duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both

for and against granting benefits....” Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 111 (2000) (citation

omitted). Even the Carey decision cited by Defendant noted that: “a vocational expert's

erroneous characterization of the exertional level or skills required to perform a particular

job calls into question both the probative value and reliability of the expert's testimony.

Likewise, an explained [sic] discrepancy between the ALJ's determination of the claimant's

residual functional capacity and the vocational expert's testimony that the claimant can

perform certain identified jobs with inconsistent skill requirements may require remand for

further exploration.” Carey, 230 F.3d at 147. On the instant record, where there is an

apparent conflict with no basis for the VE’s deviation from the DOT or for the ALJ’s

decision to adopt the VE’s testimony, the Court declines to find harmless the ALJ’s conceded

error on the basis that Plaintiff’s counsel failed to raise the issue at the hearing.

Given that Plaintiff has identified an actual conflict between the DOT and the VE’s

testimony and given that there is no explanation in the record to resolve the conflict in favor

of the VE’s position, this Court “cannot determine whether the ALJ properly relied on [the

VE’s]...testimony.” Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1154. As a result, this Court “cannot determine

whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s...” finding that Plaintiff was not disabled

under the Act for the relevant time period. Id. (remanding for further proceedings).

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2. Other Limitations

Plaintiff points to other inconsistencies between the VE’s testimony and the DOT

which Plaintiff argues were not sufficiently resolved in the ALJ’s decision adopting the VE’s

testimony. For example, Plaintiff asserts that the DOT contains only 11 listings for quality

control inspector at the light level of exertion. (Plaintiff’s Brief, p. 10 n. 5). However, all

11 “of the occupations require a specific vocational preparation beyond that of unskilled

work and consistent with skilled or semi-skilled work...In finding Ms. Cunningham disabled

pursuant to grid rule § 202.04, the Social Security Administration has determined that Ms.

Cunningham’s work background is unskilled and therefore she cannot perform those

occupations.” Id. (See also TR. 61 (ALJ indicated that he called the VE “[t]o determine the

extent to which [Plaintiff’s]...limitations erode the unskilled light occupational base.

(emphasis added)). Defendant has not disputed Plaintiff’s assertion on this issue. On this

record Plaintiff has identified a conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT. Because

this conflict was not explored by the ALJ, the Court “cannot determine whether the ALJ

properly relied on [the VE’s]...testimony” and “whether substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s...” decision. Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1154. 

Plaintiff also points out that the ALJ found that Plaintiff could stand and walk 1 hour

at a time, for a total of 4 hours. (TR. 54). The full range of light level work requires the

ability to stand or walk “off and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour

workday.” SSR 83-10 at *6. See also 20 C.F.R. 404.916.967(b). “The demand for ‘a good

deal of walking or standing’ is ‘the primary difference between sedentary and most light

jobs.’” Willrodt v. Astrue, 2010 WL 2850785, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting SSR 83-10 at *5)

(emphasis in original). Yet, “not all jobs that are classified as ‘light work’ require standing

or walking for six hours in an eight-hour day.” Id. (emphasis in original). SSR 83-10 notes

that a job is in the light-work “category when it involves sitting most of the time but with

some pushing and pulling of arm-hand or leg-foot controls, which requires greater exertion

than in sedentary work; e.g., mattress sewing machine operator, motor-grader operator, and

road-roller operator (skilled and semiskilled jobs in these particular instances). Relatively

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Plaintiff has pointed out that she falls within the category of unskilled light work.

(Plaintiff’s Brief, p. 10, n.5; see also TR. 60-61).

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few unskilled jobs are performed in a seated position.”6 SSR 83-10 at *5 (emphasis added).

Defendant points out that the VE accounted for Plaintiff’s limitations on standing and

walking by testifying that the identified occupations “‘offer a sit/stand option’....”

(Defendant’s Brief, p. 6 (quoting TR. 38)). Defendant asserts that “[b]ecause the DOT does

not address sit/stand options, it is reasonable to infer that the [VE’s] testimony was based on

his experience, a proper basis for deviating from the DOT.” (Id. at p. 6) (footnote omitted).

SSR 00-4p notes that “[i]nformation about a particular job’s requirements or about

occupations not listed in the DOT may be available...from a VE’s...experience in job

placement or career counseling. SSR 00-4p at *2. It may well be that the ALJ considered

the availability of a sit/stand option as identified by the VE as evidence within the VE’s

experience that is consistent the DOT. Given the lack of clarification at the hearing and lack

of explanation in the decision, the record is not entirely clear on this issue.

3. Remand

Plaintiff requests that the Court either reverse the Commissioner’s decision and grant

benefits or, alternatively, remand for further proceedings. (Plaintiff’s Brief, p.1). 

"'[T]he decision whether to remand the case for additional evidence or simply to

award benefits is within the discretion of the court.'" Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 763

(9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Stone v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1985)). "Remand for

further administrative proceedings is appropriate if enhancement of the record would be

useful." Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593, (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Harman v. Apfel,

211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000)). Conversely, remand for an award of benefits is

appropriate where:

(1) the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the

evidence; (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a

determination of disability can be made; and (3) it is clear from the record that

the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence

credited.

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Benecke, 379 F.3d at 593(citations omitted). Where the test is met, "we will not remand

solely to allow the ALJ to make specific findings....Rather, we take the relevant testimony

to be established as true and remand for an award of benefits." Id. (citations omitted). 

As set forth supra, at III.C.1., the record presents a conflict between the DOT and the

VE’s testimony with regard to Plaintiff’s lifting limitation set out in the ALJ’s RFC finding.

The ALJ did not comply with SSR 00-4p in addressing and resolving this conflict. As a

result, this Court is unable to determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled under the Social Security Act for the relevant period.

In such a situation, the Ninth Circuit has directed the district court to remand the matter “so

that the ALJ can perform the appropriate inquiries under SSR 00-4p.” Massachi, 486 F.3d

at 1154. There is nothing in the instant record to support deviation from the Massachi

Court’s decision that remand for further proceedings is appropriate for such error.

Accordingly, the Court will remand the matter “so that the ALJ can perform the appropriate

inquiries under SSR 00-4p.” Id. On remand, the ALJ should also perform the appropriate

inquiries under SSR 00-4p with regard to the other apparent inconsistencies relating to the

occupation of quality control inspector and to Plaintiff’s stand/walk limitations as discussed

supra, at III.C.2.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, remand for further proceedings is necessary so that the ALJ

can perform the appropriate inquiries under SSR 00-4p as discussed within the body of this

Order.

IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner’s final decision in this matter is

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Order. The Clerk of Court is

instructed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.

DATED this 25th day of March, 2011.

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