Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05331/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05331-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

F. ANTHONY EDWARDS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

and DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive,

Defendant. /

No. C 06-05331 WHA

ORDER GRANTING MOTION 

TO DISMISS PETITION TO

QUASH, GRANTING MOTION

TO ENFORCE SUMMONS, AND

VACATING HEARING 

On October 25, 2006, defendant IRS filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff F. Anthony

Edwards’ petition to quash summons, and a motion to enforce summons. The summons was

served on Edwards on July 27, 2006. Edwards’ petition to quash was originally filed in state

court and was timely removed to this Court. Because the IRS’ process in serving the summons

was proper and Edwards failed to sustain his claim of attorney-client privilege, this order

GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss the petition to quash and GRANTS defendant’s motion

to enforce summons. 

STATEMENT

The IRS is currently conducting an investigation into plaintiff Edwards’ federal income

tax liability for the years 2000 and 2001 (Gustafson Decl. ¶ 2). A summons was issued to West

America Bank on July 26, 2006, to produce the books, papers, and other data described in the

summons (Gustafson Decl. ¶ 3). Notice of the summons was mailed to Edwards and West

Case 3:06-cv-05331-WHA Document 10 Filed 12/04/06 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 America Bank was served with an attested copy of the summons (Gustafson Decl. ¶¶ 4–5). Per

Edwards’ instructions, West America Bank did not produce the requested books, papers, and

records by the date set for compliance, August 25, 2006 (Gustafson Decl. ¶ 6). 

Edwards filed a petition to quash the summons in California Superior Court on August

24, 2006. Edwards argued that the summons was unlawful because compliance would require

turning over information related to his Client Trust Account. Turning over such information

would violate attorney-client privilege. The petition was removed to this Court on August 30,

2006. The IRS later filed this motion to dismiss Edwards’ petition to quash the summons and

motion to enforce the summons. 

ANALYSIS

The IRS urges that its motion to dismiss and motion to enforce should be granted

because the issuance of the summons was proper. They further argue that Edwards’ motion to

quash was not timely filed, and that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to Edwards’

petition. The IRS also argues that plaintiff has improperly named the IRS and Does 1–50 and

defendants in this action. 

1. THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUMMONS WAS PROPER.

Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7601 and 7602, the IRS has the authority to issue summonses to

(1) ascertain the correctness of any return, (2) make a return where none has been made, (3)

determine the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax, or (4) inquire into any offense

connection with the administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws. To obtain

enforcement of a summons, the IRS must establish good faith requirements. United States v.

Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964). Powell requires the IRS to show (1) that the investigation

will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose; (2) that the inquiry will be relevant to that

purpose; (3) that the information sought is not already in the Commissioner’s possession; and

(4) that administrative steps required by the code have been followed. The burden under the

good faith requirements is met by a declaration from the investigation agent. Lidas v. United

States, 238 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Here, the IRS offers the declaration of revenue agent Sarah Gustafson to fulfill the

Powell requirements. She states that she is conducting an investigation to determine Edwards’

tax liability for the years 2000 and 2001. The information the summons seeks, Edwards’

account data from West America Bank, will be relevant to the investigation. Gustafson further

states that the IRS does not already have the information sought by the summons in its

possession. Finally, the necessary administrative procedures require that the IRS send Edwards

the summons through the mail, which the IRS did on July 27, 2006. Thus, the IRS has fulfilled

the good faith requirements under Powell to have proper authority to issue the summons. 

2. EDWARDS’ MOTION TO QUASH WAS NOT TIMELY FILED.

The IRS next argues that Edwards’ motion to quash the summons was not timely filed. 

Edwards does not dispute this argument. Under 26 U.S.C. 7609(b)(2)(A), a person identified in

a summons has 20 days from the date the notice of summons is mailed to begin proceedings for

a motion to quash. The date of receipt of the summons is irrelevant. The 20-day limit is

jurisdictional, and if the motion to quash is not timely filed, the district court will have no

jurisdiction over it. Ponsford v. United States, 771 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1985). 

The notice of summons was mailed to Edwards on July 27, 2006. He filed his petition

to quash the summons in Superior Court on August 24, 2006, eight days after the 20-day period

had tolled. Because petitioner failed to file his petition to quash during the statutory period,

defendant’s motion to dismiss should be dismissed.

3. APPLICATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE.

In his motion to quash, Edwards asserts that attorney-client privilege applies to the

information sought by the summons because it involves his law practice bank records. The

elements of the attorney-client privilege are:

(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser

in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made

in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)

from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) unless the protection be

waived. 

In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1977). To claim attorney-client privilege, “a party

claiming the privilege must identify specific communications and the grounds supporting the

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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privilege as to each piece of evidence over which the privilege is asserted.” United States v.

Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 1000 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Here, Edwards effectively claims that all the information sought by the government is

protected by attorney-client privilege. He has not asserted that any of the information contained

in the accounts was given to him in confidence by a client. He has not identified any specific

communications to which the privilege applies. In short, he has presented no evidence

supporting his assertion of privilege. Accordingly, Edwards has failed to assert attorney client

privilege and must comply with the summons. 

In his petition to quash summons and his briefs in the instant action, Edwards cites a

number of decisions. None helps plaintiff. First, Tedder and Associates v. United States, 77

F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1996), holds that the attorney-client privilege applies to clients’

names, where such names have not been disclosed to third parties, and not to the entirety of

records. Similarly, in United States v. Blackman,72 F.3d 1418, 1424 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.

denied, 475 U.S. 1119 (1986), the Court held that the attorney-client privilege does not protect

fee arrangements with clients, unless those clients are under investigation. Edwards has made

no such assertion with respect to any of the information. United States v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504,

509–510 (9th Cir. 1997), applies the privilege to advice the attorney has given to the client. 

Edwards fails to show how his clients’ bank records constitute advice. Finally, Edwards cites

Geilim v. Superior Court, 235 Cal. Rptr. 602, 606 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1991), which deals with

court review of sealed documents in camera. None of Edwards’ cited authorities supports his

overbroad, non-specific claim of attorney-client privilege. 

4. PROPER PARTY DEFENDANTS.

Defendant finally argues that Edwards has incorrectly named the IRS and Does 1–5 as

defendants, and that the proper defendant should be the United States. Though most actions to

quash IRS subpoenas or summonses name the United States as defendant, the Ninth Circuit has

not squarely addressed this question. Because defendants’ action to dismiss the petition to

quash succeeds on the merits, this question is not addressed here. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant IRS’s motion to dismiss the petition to quash the

summons and motion to enforce the summons are GRANTED. Plaintiff shall be ordered to

comply with the summons. Finding no further argument to be necessary, the hearing in this

matter is hereby VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 4, 2006 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:06-cv-05331-WHA Document 10 Filed 12/04/06 Page 5 of 5