Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02683/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02683-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1333in Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WINNIE DIGGS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHIEF NEIL GALLUCCI, Carlsbad 

Police Department,

Defendant.

Case No.: 18-CV-2683 JLS (KSC)

ORDER (1) GRANTING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, 

AND (2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE

(ECF No. 2)

On November 28, 2018, Plaintiff Winnie Diggs, proceeding pro se, filed a 

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Southern District of California alleging 

violation of several of her constitutional rights by the Chief Neil Gallucci of the Carlsbad 

Police Department. See generally ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).

I. IN FORMA PAUPERIS MOTION

Presently before the Court is Ms. Diggs’ Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

(“IFP”) (“Mot.,” ECF No. 2). All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in 

a district court of the United States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must 

/ / /

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pay a filing fee of $350.1 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may still proceed without the 

prepayment of fees if a party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). A federal court 

may authorize the commencement of an action if the party submits an affidavit, including 

a statement of assets, showing that she is unable to pay the required filing fee. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a).

Here, Ms. Diggs indicates that she receives $787 per month in disability, Mot. at 2, 

and owns a 1982 Volvo. Id. at 3. Ms. Diggs estimates that her monthly obligations total 

approximately $705, see id. at 4–5, only $82 per month less than her monthly income. On

this record, the Court concludes that Ms. Diggs has sufficiently established that she is 

unable to pay the required filing fee. As such, she meets the requirements to proceed IFP 

and the Court therefore GRANTS Ms. Diggs’ Motion.

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

The Court must screen every civil action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

and dismiss any case it finds “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief 

may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Coleman v. Tollefson, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 

1763 (2015) (“[T]he court shall dismiss the case [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)] at 

any time if the court determines that—(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the 

action or appeal—(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief 

may be granted; [or] seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.”); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

 

1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after May 1, 2013, must pay an 

additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, 

District Court Misc. Fee Schedule) (eff. Sept. 1, 2018). The additional $50 administrative fee, however, 

is waived if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but 

requires a district court to dismiss an In Forma Pauperis complaint that fails to state a 

claim”).

All complaints must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). “[D]etermining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw 

on its experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663–64 (citing Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 556). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court 

must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see 

also Andrews v. King, 393 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005); Barren v. Harrington, 152 

F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the 

language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). 

“While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not.” Hoagland 

v. Astrue, No. 1:12-cv-00973-SMS, 2012 WL 2521753, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) 

(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Courts cannot accept legal conclusions set forth in a 

complaint if the plaintiff has not supported her contentions with facts. Id. (citing Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 679).

In addition, courts have a duty to construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally, see 

Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), a duty that is 

“particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th 

Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, a

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court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. 

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The district court 

should grant leave to amend if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the 

defect,” unless the court determines that “the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 

allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc) (citing Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995); Balistreri v. Pacifica 

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990)).

B. Factual Allegations

Ms. Diggs’ Complaint seeks to hold Chief Gallucci liable for several alleged 

violations of her constitutional rights. See Compl. at 4. Ms. Diggs seeks damages for 

“multiple counts of assault,” “treatment for current and future effects of these attacks on 

[her] body,” loss of “[s]everal great jobs opportunities . . . worth billions,” loss of two cars 

and five computers, “financial hardship,” and “pain and suffering.” Id. at 8 (emphasis 

omitted).

Ms. Diggs alleges police and “townspeople” began stalking her in September 2015. 

See id. at 7, 11. She claims that the police “fabricated” a false charge for driving under the 

influence and that “six warrants [were] erroneously placed in [her] courts’ files.” Id. at 22. 

Due to a misunderstanding, Ms. Diggs’ Hyundai was then “taken” by the Carlsbad police 

on June 14, 2017. Id. at 11. After being “[w]rongfully prosecuted,” she has been “extorted 

thousands in fines and fees.” Id. at 22. Ms. Diggs emailed Chief Gallucci on unspecified 

dates to “let[ him] know about the aggression displayed by police officers and others in the 

community.” Id. at 11. Ms. Diggs alleges that “[t]he police and communities’ actions are 

condone[d] by way of Chief G[allucc]i[’s] . . . silence.” Id. She believes she has been 

“targeted for writing to our government and local officials . . . because [she] cho[]se to 

bring these evil forces to the attention of the authority; unless of course they condone these 

activities with their silence.” Id. at 12. Ms. Diggs claims that, “[d]uring the holidays 2017, 

predators started using electronic technology weapons, physically attacking [her] 24/7.” 

Id. at 23.

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C. Analysis

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under 

color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey,

263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive 

rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a 

right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation 

was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 

698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). A person “acts under color of state law [for purposes 

of section 1983] only when exercising power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made 

possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” Polk 

Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317–18 (1981) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 

299, 326 (1941)).

Liberally construing Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts 

to allege conduct that deprived her of a right, privilege, or immunity protected by the 

Constitution. It appears that Ms. Diggs alleges that the Carlsbad Police created a false 

arrest report. See, e.g., Compl. At 5. It is unclear from Ms. Diggs’ Complaint, however, 

when the false report was made and what its contents were. 

Further, “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff 

must plead that each government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Jones v. Cmty.

Redev. Agency of City of L.A., 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even pro se plaintiffs 

must “allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged 

in” to state a claim). Ms. Diggs’ Complaint contains no specific factual allegations directly 

related to Chief Gallucci, much less any details as to what he did, or failed to do, to violate 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that Rule 8 “demands more 

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” and that “[t]o 

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survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555, 570). Although Ms. Diggs alleges that she sent emails to Chief Gallucci, see

Compl. at 11, the timing and contents of those communications is unclear. 

As currently pleaded, Ms. Diggs’ Complaint fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) because she has failed to allege any facts which “might 

plausibly suggest” that Chief Gallucci violated her constitutional rights. See Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for relief 

only against those who, through their personal involvement as evidenced by affirmative 

acts, participation in another’s affirmative acts, or failure to perform legally required duties, 

cause the deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights); see also, e.g., 

Malfitano v. Hewitt, No. 16-CV-05339-MEJ, 2016 WL 7230872, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 

2016) (“Without more clearly articulated statements about how each Defendant violated 

Plaintiff’s rights and when, the Court cannot at this point assess whether Plaintiff is capable 

of stating a claim upon which relief may be granted.”). The Court therefore finds that 

Ms. Diggs has failed to state a claim for relief, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and 

DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Ms. Diggs’ Complaint.

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Ms. Diggs’ Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2) is 

GRANTED;

2. Ms. Diggs’ Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1); and

3. Ms. Diggs is GRANTED forty-five (45) days from the date on which this 

Order is electronically docketed to submit a First Amended Complaint which cures all the 

deficiencies of pleading noted above. Ms. Diggs’ Amended Complaint must be complete 

in itself without reference to her original pleading. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1. Any 

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Defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Should 

Ms. Diggs fail to file an amended complaint within the time provided, the Court may 

enter a final order dismissing this action for failure to prosecute.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 7, 2019

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