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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 5, 2001 Decided October 30, 2001

No. 00-5149

Allan E. Lucas, Jr., et al.,

Appellant

v.

United States Government, et al.,

Appellees

Consolidated with

No. 00-5191

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv02779)

Donna Beasley argued the cause for appellant. With her

on the brief was Karl W. Carter, Jr.

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Mary T. Connelly, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued

the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Robert

R. Rigsby, Corporation Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy

Corporation Counsel, Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney,

R. Craig Lawrence and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys. Alexander D. Shoaibi, Assistant U.S. Attorney,

entered an appearance.

Before: Randolph, Rogers and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: In this appeal, employees of the

District of Columbia Department of Corrections claim federal

competitive status for the purpose of retirement benefits and

"entitlement" to federal employment. They sued the District

of Columbia and the United States under 42 U.S.C. s 1983,

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the

United States Constitution, and District of Columbia law, to

enforce their claimed federal status in connection with the

closing of the Lorton Reformatory, and to compel the United

States and the District of Columbia to follow correct procedures for reductions-in-force ("RIFs"). In appealing, appellants contend that the district court erred in dismissing their

claim to federal employment status under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6), and in disposing of their other claims for failure to

exhaust, requiring them to pursue their remedies under

District of Columbia personnel procedures. We find no error,

and accordingly we affirm the dismissal of the complaint.1

By separate order we remand the order imposing monetary

__________

1 In light of appellants' constitutional claim, it appears that the

district court determined, in its discretion, to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over appellants' claims under District of Columbia law.

See 28 U.S.C. s 1367. Neither the United States nor the District of

Columbia challenge the district court's assertion of supplemental

jurisdiction. We note that the court has treated the Home Rule Act

as a hybrid statute, not solely applicable to the District of Columbia

inasmuch as it affects various federal employees and the structure

of some federal agencies. See Thomas v. Barry, 729 F.2d 1469,

1471 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 28 U.S.C. s 1366. We need not decide

whether this alternative jurisdictional ground applies.

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sanctions on plaintiffs' counsel for entry of a final judgment

and clarification, by name, of the counsel against whom the

sanctions are entered.

I.

The status of employees of the District of Columbia government has changed over the years as Congress has changed

the nature of the local government. Throughout at least a

part of its existence, the District government has had a

correctional facility, and at least prior to the establishment of

the Mayor-Commissioner form of government under Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967, see 32 F.R. 11669, 81 Stat. 948,

Sec. 301 (1967), some employees of the District government

were treated as federal officers for certain purposes. See,

e.g., Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487, 489-90 (1956), rev'd on other

grounds 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Zinkhan v. District of Columbia,

271 F. 542, 544-45 (D.C. Cir. 1921). Whatever their previous

status may have been, the question posed by appellant Corrections Department employees requires the court to address

their status upon enactment of the D.C. Self Government and

Governmental Reorganization Act of 1973 ("Home Rule Act"),

Pub. L. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (codified at D.C. Code ss 1-201,

et seq. (2001)). If appellants were District government employees at the time of enactment, then they are subject to the

provisions of the D.C. Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act,

D.C. Code s 1-602.01 (2001) ("Merit Act"), unless they can

point to authority preserving their claimed federal competitive status.

Prior to enactment of the Home Rule Act, Congress established a commission to study the District government. See

Act of Sept. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-405, 84 Stat. 845. The

Commission was referred to as both the "Little Hoover

Commission," because it was modeled on the congressional

commissions in the 1940s and 1950s that recommended improvements in the organization and management of the federal government, see Report of the Nelsen Commission, H.R.

Doc. No. 92-317, vol. II, at xv (1972), and the "Nelsen

Commission," after its chairman, the Honorable Ancher NelUSCA Case #00-5191 Document #635454 Filed: 10/30/2001 Page 3 of 10
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sen. As part of its Report to Congress in 1972, the Commission examined the multiple personnel systems for District

government employees and called for a comprehensive

District-government-wide merit personnel system "geared to

municipal needs." Report of the Nelsen Commission, H.R.

Doc. No. 92-317, vol. II, at 178 (1972). It recommended that

"[t]he District personnel system should be restructured along

the lines of municipal rather than Federal Systems...." Id.

vol. II, at 550; see also id. vol. II, at 177-78. The Commission included in its Report a draft personnel bill, which

proposed that "[e]mployees of the District who are serving

with Federal competitive status shall be granted permanent

status in the [new District-government-wide] Career Service...." Id. vol. III, at 275.

The following year Congress enacted the Home Rule Act.

See D.C. Code, History of the D.C. Code, vol. 1 (2001) at 173

(The D.C. Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act as enacted December 23, 1973). As relevant here,

s 422(3) of the Home Rule Act provided that the Mayor

would administer the personnel functions for District government departments and agencies, and that personnel legislation enacted by Congress applicable to District government

employees would continue in force only until the Council of

the District of Columbia enacted a District government merit

system. See D.C. Code s 1-204.22(3) (2001). On October 31,

1978, the D.C. Council adopted the D.C. Comprehensive

Merit Personnel Act, codified at D.C. Code ss 1-601, et seq.

(2001), ("Merit Act"), which became effective on March 3,

1979. See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Barry, 459 A.2d

1045, 1048-49 (D.C. 1983). Stating among its purposes the

desire to "[c]reate uniform systems for personnel administration among the executive departments and agencies reporting

directly to the Mayor," D.C. Code s 1-601.02(a)(2), the Merit

Act adopted the general approach recommended by the Nelsen Commission. See Nelsen Commission Report, vol. II, at

178, 553.

The Merit Act established a municipal personnel system

quite apart from that of the federal government, with Career,

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ing "a function of the District government." D.C. Code

ss 1-603.01(3), -603.01(7), -608.01, -609.01, -610.51. With

exceptions inapplicable here, see D.C. Code s 1-602.01(a),

persons employed by the District government would, as of

January 1, 1980, "automatically transfer into the appropriate

personnel system established [by the Merit Act]." Id. at

s 1-602.04(c). At that time, personnel procedures, including

a right to review by the D.C. Office of Employee Appeals,

would become available to District government employees.

See id. at s 1-606.01. In order to ensure continuity in

retirement benefits, the Merit Act provided that such employees first employed before October 1, 1987, would continue to

participate in the United States Civil Service Retirement

System, see id. at s 1-626.02; for employees hired on or after

that date, District retirement benefits would apply. See id. at

s 1-626.03.

This background is reflected in the court's decision in

Thomas v. Barry, 729 F.2d 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In that

case, the court held that former United States Department of

Labor employees whose functions were transferred to the

District government as part of the governmental reorganization in the Home Rule Act ceased to be federal employees

with attendant federal employee rights and benefits once the

Merit Act took effect. See id. at 1473. The employees, who

had been career employees in the federal competitive service,

and retained their federal civil service rights prior to enactment of the Merit Act, claimed that they were entitled to

receive the same pay increases as federal government employees. See id. at 1470-71. For their claim to continued

status as federal competitive service employees, they relied

on two provisions of the Home Rule Act: s 204(g), see D.C.

Code s 1-202.04, which provided that federal employees

transferred to the District government retained their competitive service rights, and s 713(d), see D.C. Code s 1-207.13,

which provided that such transfers would not deprive the

transferred employees of the civil service rights they held

prior to transfer. See Thomas, 729 F.2d at 1472. The court

rejected the notion that the absence in the Home Rule Act of

an express time limit on these civil service rights was to be

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read as a continuing grant of federal benefits. See id. at

1473. Rather, the court concluded that the legislative history

of the Home Rule Act made clear that the transferred

employees' federal civil service rights were "merely interim

rights" that ceased to apply to the transferred employees

upon enactment of the Merit Act. See id. To hold otherwise

would "frustrate[ ] the congressional purpose of creating a

single, autonomous personnel system." Id. at 1474. Because

appellants, who do not claim to have ever been employees of

the federal government, have a lesser claim to federal benefits, Thomas would appear to be dispositive of their claims to

federal status.

II.

Appellants seek to distinguish themselves from the employees in Thomas and other District government employees by

virtue of their claim that they perform federal duties (and

thereby retain their federal status) because some federal

prisoners are committed to District of Columbia prisons.

They point to case law and various provisions of the Home

Rule Act. Neither source of authority supports their claims,

however, and Thomas controls, thereby resolving appellants'

other contentions as well.

Appellants rely on Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487, where the

Superintendent of the D.C. Jail sought to appeal the issuance

of a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court held that

insofar as the Superintendent of the D.C. Jail was custodian

of a federal prisoner, he was an "officer or employee of the

United States" for purposes of meeting the requirement of 28

U.S.C. s 1252 that the United States be a party to an appeal

involving a decision that an Act of Congress was unconstitutional. See Reid, 351 U.S. at 489-90. Appellants also rely on

Zinkhan where this court held that the Superintendent of the

Washington Asylum and Jail could not be held liable for

damages for false imprisonment based on the acts of his

subordinates over whom he had no power of appointment or

discharge. See Zinkhan, 271 F. at 545. Both cases, however, concern pre-Home Rule Act District government employUSCA Case #00-5191 Document #635454 Filed: 10/30/2001 Page 6 of 10
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ees. Consequently, as Thomas makes clear, they provide no

support for appellants' claim to federal competitive status

after enactment of the Merit Act. See Thomas, 729 F.2d at

1473. The Merit Act identified the Department of Corrections as an agency under the direct administrative control of

the Mayor, see D.C. Code s 1-603.01(17)(E), and also identified employees of the Corrections Department as among

those employees who, if first hired after September 30, 1987,

would be covered by the District's retirement benefits. See

id. at ss 1-626.03, -626.04(2)(B). Appellants' attempt to

distinguish themselves from other District government employees thus fails to overcome both Congress' direction that

there be a comprehensive merit personnel system for District

government employees, see Thomas, 729 F.2d at 1473, and

the Merit Act's express provisions covering Corrections Department employees. The basis for their claim to continued

federal competitive status, namely, their detention of federal

prisoners, was rejected implicitly when Congress directed the

new District government to enact an autonomous merit personnel act, and explicitly in the Merit Act itself, which treated

them as District government employees.

Appellants' reliance on other provisions of the Home Rule

Act is no more availing. First, they contend that the Home

Rule Act provision barring the D.C. Council from amending

Title 24 of the D.C. Code for four years trumps applicability

of the Merit Act to Corrections Department employees. Section 602(a)(9) provided that the D.C. Council would have no

authority to

enact any act, resolution, or rule with respect to any

provision of Title 23 [of the District of Columbia code]

(relating to criminal procedure), or with respect to any

provision of any law codified in Title 22 or 24 (relating to

crimes and treatment of prisoners) ... during the twenty-four full calendar months immediately following the

day on which members of the Council first elected pursuant to this Act take office.

D.C. Code Ann. s 1-233(a)(9) (1999 Repl.). This section was

amended in 1976 to extend Congress' exclusive jurisdiction

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over the District's criminal laws from twenty-four to fortyeight months. See Pub. L. No. 94-402, 90 Stat. 1220, (1976)

(codified as amended at D.C. Code Ann. s 1-233(a)(9) (1999

Repl.)). Appellants point in particular to s 411, see D.C.

Code Ann. s 24-411 (1999 Repl.), which they describe in their

brief as providing that Corrections Department employees

are under the general direction of the Mayor-Commissioner,

an interim post during implementation of District "home

rule." But this gets them nowhere. At the time Congress

enacted the Home Rule Act, s 411 provided only that employees at Lorton, Occoquan and the D.C. Jail would be subject to

the supervision of the D.C. Corrections Department, with the

Superintendent to be appointed by the then MayorCommissioner. See D.C. Code Ann. s 24-411 (1999 Repl.).

In any event, the express language that Congress used to

describe the four-year bar was limited to criminal laws and

criminal procedure, and was designed to carry out Congress'

purposes to await the recommendations on the criminal code

from the D.C. Law Revision Commission. See McIntosh v.

Washington, 395 A.2d 744, 751 (D.C. 1978). Because Congress' purpose in retaining exclusive jurisdiction for four

years on amendments to provisions of Title 24 has nothing to

do with employee personnel rights or benefits, appellants

again fail to show that their personnel and retirement rights

are distinguishable from those of employees subject to the

Merit Act. Although the Merit Act included provisions for

separate personnel systems for some District employees, such

as judges and teachers, see D.C. Code s 1-602.01, no similar

exception was provided for Corrections Department employees.

Second, appellants' reliance on the provision of the Home

Rule Act that provides for work-sharing agreements with the

United States, see D.C. Code s 1-207.31 (2001), likewise

provides no support for their claim of continued federal

status. That provision neither states nor implies that District

government employees who provide services to the United

States government have federal personnel and retirement

rights. To do so would be contrary to Congress' intention to

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have an autonomous personnel system for District government employees. Cf. Thomas, 729 F.2d at 1474.

For similar reasons, appellants' reliance on federal regulations applying to federal government employees, see 5 C.F.R.

ss 210.102(b), 211.102(b) and (c), 315.401-402, is misplaced;

they are not employees of the federal government. Lucas'

claim that he receives retirement benefits from the U.S. Civil

Service retirement system as a result of his employment with

the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department from 1972-73 would

not make him any different from District employees who

were hired prior to 1987. See D.C. Code ss 1-204.22(3),

-626.02, -626.03; Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 459 A.2d at

1051. Nor can appellants find support for their claim in the

Merit Act itself, for the Corrections Department is not a

grant-in-aid program under D.C. Code s 1-632.07(d), but is

an agency of the District government funded by annual

appropriations by Congress. See D.C. Code ss 1-201.03,

-626.04(2)(B).

Having failed to show that either Congress or the Merit

Act intended to treat Corrections Department employees

differently from other District government employees, appellants' substantive claims based on their claimed federal competitive status fail for the reasons stated in Thomas. It

follows that their constitutional claim, based on an alleged

property right to federal competitive status, is meritless. See

Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972); Am.

Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 459 A.2d at 1049. Therefore,

because appellants cannot avoid exhaustion requirements by

raising garden-variety work-related grievances as statutory

and constitutional claims, see Barwood, Inc. v. District of

Columbia, 202 F.3d 290, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2000), they must

exhaust their administrative remedies under the Merit Act

before filing suit in court. See D.C. Code ss 1-606.03,

-624.04; Washington Teachers Union Local 6 v. Bd. of Educ.

of D.C., 109 F.3d 774, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Robinson v.

District of Columbia, 748 A.2d 409, 411 (D.C. 2000). Contrary to appellants' claim, exhaustion is not impossible. They

have established no right to federal employment status, and

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thus have no claim against the United States. Further,

District of Columbia regulations permit intervention by nonparties before the Office of Employee Appeals. See 6

D.C.M.R. s 614.1, 46 D.C. Reg. 9306-07 (1999). Appellants'

reliance on Anjuwan v. District of Columbia Dep't of Public

Works, 729 A.2d 883 (D.C. 1998), and Bridges v. Kelly, 84

F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 1996), is misplaced as neither case excuses

exhaustion here. Even if these claims were exhausted, however, it is unclear how there would be federal subject matter

jurisdiction. Finally, appellants' claim that their collective

bargaining agreement expired in 1997, before the RIFs occurred, was not raised in the district court and thus is not

properly before the court. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503

U.S. 519, 533-38 (1992); Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees v.

Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of

appellants' amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

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